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\,l. XXXIV, No. 875
April 2, 1956
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 1957 MUTUAL SECURITY
PROGRAM
Message of President Eisenhotoer to the Congress ...... 54S
Statement by Under Secretary Hoover 550
A^REPORT ON ASIA • Address by Secretary Dulles .... 539
A CRUCIAL CONTEST WITH THE COMMUNIST
WORLD • by Deputy Under Secretary Murphy ...... 556
VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER COSTELLO OF
IRELAND • Statements and Addresses by the Prime
Minister 560
CLARIFICATION OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD NORTH
AFRICA • by Ambassador C. Douglas Dillon 553
For index see inside back cover
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MAY 9 - 1956
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VoL.XXXIV,No.875 • Publication 6313
April 2, 1956
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A Report on Asia
Address hy Secretary Dulles ^
I have just returned from a 19-day trip which
took me to 10 countries of Asia. It gave me the
chance to talk intimately with the leaders of each
of these 10 countries. That is a great aid to good
international relations. We can, of course, write
each other notes. But talking face to face is the
best way yet invented for enabling men to under-
stand each other.
I also took part in the annual meeting, held
this year at Tokyo, of the heads of our 14 United
States missions in the Far East area.^ I discussed
our policies with them and answered their ques-
tions and received their suggestions.
The particular reason why I took this trip at
this time was that the Council of the Southeast
Asia Treaty Organization — Seato, for short — was
meeting in Pakistan. That treaty, you may re-
call, was made at Manila in 1954 ^ to deter Com-
munist aggression which was then threatening
ominously in Southeast Asia. We have a Coun-
cil meeting each year, attended by the Foreign
Ministers of the eight member countries. Last
year our Ministerial Council met at Bangkok.^
This year we met in Pakistan.
We had a good meeting which further devel-
oped the organization and gave it increased stat-
ure. We feel confident that our combined
strength and vigilance will safeguard the treaty
area against open armed aggression. We also be-
'Made to the Nation over radio and television on
Mar. 23 (press release 159).
" For text of communique issued at close of Tokyo
meeting, see p. 543.
'For text of treaty, see Bui>u:tin of Sept. 20, 1954,
p. 893.
•/Bid., Mar. 7, 1955, p. 371.
lieve that this shield will make it more possible
for the member countries to develop, individually
and collectively, their economic and social
welfare.^
After 4 days in Pakistan, I went on to visit In-
dia, Ceylon, Indonesia, Thailand, Viet-Nam, the
Philippines, Formosa (Taiwan), Korea, and
Japan. These 10 countries I visited have a total
population of over 700 million people, or almost
one-third of the total population of the earth.
More than 600 million of these people were colonial
people until as recently as the close of World War
II. Now they are independent nations.
Several of them are only now completing their
new political institutions. For example, while we
were in Pakistan that country adopted its first
constitution. In Indonesia the first government
based on national elections was in process of for-
mation. On the day I left Viet-Nam, a popularly
elected Constituent Assembly was meeting to
frame a constitution.
This building and testing of new political proc-
esses is the outstanding and exciting characteris-
tic of the area I visited.
Another characteristic is the determination to
develop the economic potentials of the area. So
far, productivity is low. The average income
amounts to about $100 a year. The people expect
their new governments to improve their living
conditions.
There are some who doubt the determination
or ability of these free Asian nations to preserve
and develop their political independence and also
° For text of communique issued at Karachi, see ibxA.,
Mar. 19, 1956, p. 447. For the First Annual Report of the
Council Representatives, see ibi^.. Mar. 12, 1956, p. 403.
»ij>t\\ 2, 7956
539
to make that independence serve to improve social
and economic conditions. I do not share that
doubt. But I do come back with tlie strength-
ened conviction that the United States can help
the Asian countries to achieve both of these goals.
Also, I feel sure that it is in our own interest
to provide that help.
I should like to give you a country-by-country
report. But there is hardly time for that. So
I shall give some general conclusions.
Political Independence
Let me speak first of the jjroblem of political
independence in Asia. We need to be aware of
how proud the peoples of Asia are to be free of
foreign domination and how sensitive they are
to any hint of encroachments from without. Also,
let us remember that, while loe think first of the
danger that stems from international communism,
many of theyn think first of possible encroach-
ments from the West, for that is the rule they have
actually known at firsthand.
But I found that the leaders are quite aware
of the danger of penetration by international
communism and of the fact that Soviet and Chi-
nese Communist economic lures generally go with
a hook and line that leads to Moscow or Peiping.
Some take more eifective precautions than others
to avoid being caught. But none of the leaders
is blind to this danger.
They all desire help which will in fact preserve
their independence and develop their free insti-
tutions. But they want to be very sure that that
help does not subtract from their sovereignty or
retard their development by involving them in
controversies that do not directly concern them.
The United States is able sympathetically to
understand that attitude. We ourselves were
once a colony. Our struggle for independence
is the first chapter of histoi-y that is learned by
every American boy and girl. Also, in our early
days we too saw our first task as that of internal
development, and only changed conditions have
made it apparent that international security is
best assured by collective efforts.
That story of America is well known in Asia.
George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, and Abra-
ham Lincoln are honored names, and it is signifi-
cant that the President of Indonesia, in his open-
ing address to the Bandung conference, invoked
the memory of Paul Revere and the principles of
the American Revolution.
All of this creates a bond of sympathy and
helps to make possible a good understanding be-
tween us and them. Our historical experience is
an asset of priceless value in Asia.
Many of the countries of Asia feel that their
independence is better assured if they participate
with us in arrangements for mutual security.
Then we help them develop their national forces
and they share the deterrent of our mobile military
power. There are such arrangements — bilateral
or multilateral — with 7 of the 10 countries I
visited — Pakistan, Thailand, Viet-Nam, the Phil-
ippines, free China, Japan, and Korea. Three of
the countries I visited — India, Ceylon, and Indo-
nesia — have preferred not to join regional security
arrangements. That choice also we respect. The
United States does not seek ties of mutual defense
with any comitry whatsoever unless that country
believes that this application of the principle of
collective security will better assure its inde-
pendence.
Economic and Social Development
Let me turn now from the problem of political
indejjendence to the problem of economic and
social development. Here, too, the conduct and
example of the United States provide an inspira-
tion and a responsibility.
The United States has itself realized an eco-
nomic miracle. Our population of about 165 mil-
lion produces nearly half of all the goods that are
produced in the world.
When contrasted with our example, the produc-
tion of forced labor pales into relative insignifi-
cance.
There is, of course, no magic formula for repro-
ducing elsewhere economic productivity like ours.
It is not to be had merely for the wanting, or
merely by the installation of machines. It is a
product of widespread education, of an ingrained
spirit of enterprise, and of savings which provide
more efficient tools for labor.
I did not find that the Asian leaders expect that!
either they, or we, or all of us in combination will
be able to change their economies overnight. ButI
I did find in Asia a natural and powerful urge'
to get on a path which surely, even though slowly,
leads upward to better economic and social
conditions.
If we wish to see the free world preserved and
enlarged, we must help, or forces of despotism
will take control. The day is past when the
540
Department of State Bulletin
peoples of Asia will tolerate leadei'ship which
keeps them on a dead center economically and so-
cially, and when each generation merely ekes out
a bare subsistence, with a brief life expectancy,
and passes on to the next generation only the same
bleak prospect.
U.S. Mutual Security Programs
The United States has already come to see that
its own self-interest is served by helping others
improve their economic condition. Our Nation
provides this help in many ways, public and pri-
vate, throughout the free world. For 10 years
now we have had mutual security programs, and
for the last 3 years, following the completion of
the Marshall plan for Europe, much attention has
been given to Asia.
One component of our mutual security program
is technical assistance. It helps others to develop
new techniques. This is a good program manned
by loyal and competent persons. But it is a pro-
gram which could be enlarged and improved.
For example, I found a widespread desire in
Asia to learn the English language. This knowl-
edge is eagerly sought for as opening the door to
a valued literature in both cultural and technical
fields.
The Soviet Union has been specializing for many
years on training technicians. These technicians
are at the same time thoroughly indoctrinated in
communism so that they can serve also as political
|| agents. All of these teclmicians are at the com-
mand of the Soviet Government, which can direct
them to go wherever it wills. It is trying to in-
sinuate them into key posts in lands which they
hope to dominate.
In the case of the United States the Government
can appeal, but it cannot command. Also it can-
not match the financial rewards of private busi-
ness. The answer, it seems to me, must be found
in a greater recognition on the part of our people
of the inner or spiritual satisfactions to be gained
by public service and aiding in the cause of human
welfare.
■I In the past, missionaries, doctors, and educators
' in large numbers carried our faith and our knowl-
edge to other people under conditions involving
great hardship and sacrifice. There are many
Americans today who are doing that very thing.
tj In the 38 countries which I have visited since
becoming Secretary of State I have almost always
talked with gatherings of the Americans of our
Foreign Service and related services. I have often
found them serving under conditions of hardship.
But also I have found that they derive satis-
factions which are not readily to be found under
conditions of greater ease and material prosperity
at home.
It is my earnest hope that more of our young
men and women who are specially qualified to
help others to help themselves will engage in this
great adventure.
In addition to technical assistance we have eco-
nomic programs of other sorts. We have pro-
grams which help our allies to bear the cost of
their defense establishments, which vitally sup-
plement our own.
Then we have surplus commodity programs
which under proper conditions can do much good.
It is necessary to avoid unfair competition with
countries which historically depend upon the sales
abroad of their own agricultural surplus. But I
was impressed with the fact that, subject to this
qualification, our surpluses can do much to bring
a better life to Asian people. For example, we
have just concluded an agreement with Indonesia
for delivery of surplus commodities of a value of
some $95 million,'' and we are just beginning a
milk program for the children of Ceylon.
These programs involving military support,
technical assistance, and surplus commodities are
of great impoi'tance and contribute to preserving
and developing the Asian economies. But by
themselves they are not sufficient to enable the
free Asian countries to make their economies more
diversified or lessen their dependence on others for
manufactured goods. The present lack of diversi-
fication and industrialization is the weakness
which Asian leaders above all want to cure. That
aspect of the matter requires more emphasis.
Japan should be able to help in this respect as
one Asian nation, indeed the only Asian nation,
which has found the way to industrialization.
President Eisenliower has just sent to the Con-
gress his message on the mutual security program,
including economic assistance.' On the basis of
my trip I am more than ever convinced of the vital
importance of this program. It can be improved
in ways the President has suggested. There is
need for greater flexibility in the use of the funds
appropriated. In addition, the United States
'Ibid., Mar. 19, 1956, p. 469.
' See p. 545.
April 2, 1956
541
should be able to back long-range projects requir-
ing several years for completion. This will im-
portantly strengthen our program.
To meet defense costs and dietary needs is im-
portant. The one preserves independence; the
other preserves life. But also there is need for
more water, more fuel and electric power, more
development of mineral resources, and more in-
dustrial plants so that, hereafter, the people can,
by their own efforts, raise their own living
standards.
To share with others our own blessings accords
with the best and most deeply rooted of Ameri-
can traditions. George Washington, in his Fare-
well Address, said.
It will be worthy of a free, enlightened, and, at no dis-
tant period a great nation to give to mankind the mag-
nanimous and too novel example of a people always guided
by an exalted justice and benevolence. AVlio can doubt
that in the course of time and things the fruits of such a
plan would richly repay any temporary advantages which
might be lost by a steady adherence to it?
Our mutual security plan conforms to Wash-
ington's prescription. Even though, to use Wash-
ington's phrases, it loses us some temporary advan-
tages, the fruits of that plan will, in the course of
time, richly repay us. That plan provides the
margin of difference between a world environment
which is friendly and healthy and one which is
corroded by massive discontents dangerous both to
us and to the discontented.
Profound Desire for Peace
Throughout most of the countries I visited there
is a profound desire for peace. In the case of the
Republic of Korea and the Republic of China
the leaders and the people would be willing to
make almost any sacrifice to restore freedom to
their countries as a whole. However, even there
the will to sacrifice is tempered by knowledge
that modern war creates such widespread devas-
tation and so many evils that it provides no clear
solution to any problem.
Communist propaganda has sought diligently to
create the impression that the United States seeks
war and that its collective security arrangements
are aggressive in purpose. I had no opportunity
to judge the impact of that propaganda upon the
people generally. But so far as concerns the
leaders with whom I talked I found no evidence
whatsoever that they believe that the United
States wants war.
The spot in the Far East where, at the moment,
conflict most threatens is the Taiwan (Formosa)
area. I reported to our Asian friends how, at our
Geneva talks with the Chinese Communists, we
were patiently but persistently striving for a re-
ciprocal renunciation of force with particular re-
lation to this Taiwan area.
I found in India some fear lest our arms sup-
plied to Pakistan, which feels endangered from
the north, might be turned against India. I re-
ceived the most categorical and convincing as-
surances from the highest authorities of Pakistan
that they have no belligerent intentions whatso-
ever as against India. In India I publicly called
attention to the fact that the Southeast Asia se-
curity pact expressly prohibits any use of force
except in defense against aggression. Also the
agreements under which we are supplying arms
to Pakistan explicitly provide that these arms
shall not be used for any aggressive purpose. I
expressed my conviction that Pakistan would
scrujjulously observe these solemn engagements.
I found uniformly that the Asian leaders with
whom I talked desire the United States to be
strong and that that strength should continue to
be a sort of protective umbrella over other free
nations. That was the clearest single impression
that I received. Repeatedly I was asked whether
it was our purpose to maintain that protective
cover, affording new freedoms the opportunity to
sink deep their roots and grow strong. Each time
my reply was emphatically affirmative. And this
reply was received with profound satisfaction.
There is of course a great desire for disarma-
ment, particularly since it is felt that armament
limitation would release funds which, in part,
would inure to the benefit of the less economically
developed countries of the world. President
Eisenhower's letter to Chairman Bulganin of
March 1,* discussing disarmament, was made
public while I was on my trip. It gave much
satisfaction as evidence of our purpose to seek
limitation of armament which could be verified
and controlled. I found no one who wanted uni-
lateral disarmament by the United States or dis-
armament which might in fact turn out to be uni-
lateral because of evasions by others.
I believe that there is general realization of our
ardent dedication to peace as well as respect for
our determination to have the strength to insure
' riiid.. Mar. 26, 1956, p. 514.
542
Department of State Bulletin
tliat no one need feel that peace has to be bought
by surrendering freedom to despotism.
Asian Culture
There is throughout the Asian peoples a desire
for Western recognition of their dignity.
We need to remember that although we have
developed more rapidly than Asians in some di-
rections, notably in industrialization, they have
preceded us in finding many of the ways to make
life richer. Their culture and art long antedate
our own and in many respects have not yet been
equaled by our own. Their handicraft is out-
standing. They have an exceptional love and
appreciation of beauty. They possess in full
measure those human qualities which all admire —
devotion to family and to country, courage, and
willingness to sacrifice. They possess unusual
qualities of patience, reflection, and repose.
Therefore, let us not forget that, while we have
material and teclinical things to give, they also
have things to give. And if we are wise enough
to perceive and to take what Asia has to offer, the
balance struck between us will not be one-sided
by any true measure of values.
I come back from this trip encouraged. Of
course, Soviet and Chinese economic tactics are a
danger. Of even greater danger are their tactics
of stirring up hatred as between free nations. But
I feel that conditions which we wish for will pre-
vail in the area I visited, if only we play worthily
our part.
The Goal We Seek
"W^iat is it that we seek ? It is not conquest or
domination. If that were our goal, I would have
to conclude that it is doomed to failure. Our de-
sire is a world in which peoples who want political
independence shall possess it whenever they are
capable of sustaining it and discharging its re-
sponsibilities in accordance witli the accepted
standards of civilized nations. That condition
of independence is developing throughout non-
Communist Asia, and I believe that it will con-
tinue to develop as against assault from any quar-
ter.
But we also realize that political independence
is not enough. It is a means to certain ends. One
of these ends is the infusing of men with reason-
able hope that, if they strive, they can build a
better world for their childi'en and their chil-
dren's children. That reasonable hope we can
help to provide without any encroachment what-
soever on the political independence of others.
Under those conditions help will be welcome.
Under reverse conditions, it would, I am glad to
say, be rejected.
Also, there is need for a new attitude toward
the diversity that Asians provide. Differences of
race and of culture are not measures of superiority
or inferiority. Indeed, uniformity and conform-
ity are conditions to be abhorred. The great rich-
ness of our universe is due above all to its diversity.
We may take honorable pride in our own dis-
tinctive accomplishments. But we should equally
be aware that the accomplisliments of others are
a proper subject for their pride and our apprecia-
tion.
The future belongs to independence, not domi-
nation; to freedom, not servitude; to diversity,
not conformity. Acceptance of that fact will cre-
ate between the Asians and ourselves a solid basis
for fellowship. It will enable us, as mutual
friends and helpers, to pursue hopefully the des-
tiny that we share in common.
Chiefs of Mission in Far East
Meet at Tokyo
Following is the text of a communique issued at
Tokyo on March 21 after the final session of the
3-day conference of U.S. Chiefs of Mission in the
Far East}
United States Chiefs of Mission in the Far East
met under the chairmanship of Assistant Secre-
tary of State Walter S. Eobertson from March
19 to 21 in Tokyo. They reviewed the present
situation in Asia, the progress made over the past
year, and the prospects for the future. Secretary
Dulles presided over the first session, summarizing
developments in connection with his recent trip
through Asia.
The meeting revealed a general feeling of con-
fidence based on the political, social and economic
advances made during the past year in the free
countries of Asia, the growing strength and vigor
of collective security efforts against the still power-
ful threat of Communist aggression, and the de-
veloping sense of partnership in free Asia.
^ For an announcement of the meeting, see Bulletin
of Feb. 20, 1956, p. 278.
Apr// 2, 1956
543
Among the significant developments during the
past year in East Asia have been the series of free
elections and the increasing association and practi-
cal cooperation among free Asian nations.
The Chiefs of Missions expressed their confident
belief that the free Asian nations will continue to
consolidate their independence and make progress
in their national programs to their mutual advan-
tage and the greater security of the free world.
Philippines Chosen as'^Site
for Asian Nuclear Center
Press release 137 dated March 15
The United States Embassy at Manila an-
nounced on March 15 that Secretary Dulles has
informed President Magsaysay that the Republic
of the Philippines has been chosen as the site for
the new Asian Nuclear Center. This center was
proposed by the United States at the Colombo
Plan meeting held at Singapore last October.^
The United States is now preparing to move
rapidly with initial plans for the establishment
of this center as a means of putting atomic energy
to work for the economic and social progress of
Asia. This action will represent an important
step toward the further advancement of President
Eisenhower's atoms-for-peace program. -
1 Bulletin of Nov. 7, 1955, p. 747.
2 The International Cooperation Administration an-
nounced on Marcli 15 that the U.S. Government, with
financing provided from the President's Fund for Asian
Economic Development, is now arranging for the U.S.
Atomic Energy Commission's Brookhaven National Lab-
oratory to develop preliminary technical proposals as to
how the center can best serve the needs of the region
and as to what facilities would be required. The Brook-
haven Laboratory, an institution with unique competence
in the field of nuclear science, is a cooperative regional
center uniting the facilities of nine American universities.
In developing its proposals, the Brookhaven Laboratory
shortly will send survey teams of experts to consult with
scientists and government officials in Asia. The Brook-
haven group is expected to assemble in Washington within
the next month for a brief period of orientation. The
survey team will then proceed to Manila to inspect pos-
sible sites and facilities before visiting the various par-
ticipating countries to discuss with them their principal
fields of interest and plans for using the center. It is
expected that detailed plans for the center will be pre-
sented at the Colombo Plan meeting in Wellington, New
Zealand, next October.
Pan American Day and
Pan American Week, 1956
A PROCLAMATION^
Whereas the sixty-sixth anniversary of the founding
of the Pan American Union, nucleus of the inter-American
system of mutual co-operation and good will, now known
as the Organization of American States, will be observed
liy the twenty-one American Kepublics on Saturday, April
14, 1956; and
Whereas the observances commemorating this auspi-
cious event in the history of the Western Hemisphere
will be held throughout the week of April 8 to April 14,
1956; and
Whereas the American Republics stand together in fur-
thering the maintenance of peace and the defense of free-
dom through the Organization of American States, which
they have built together and together uphold ; and
Whereas the Government and the people of the United
States of America are steadfast in adhering to the friend-
ship uniting them with the other American Republics :
Now, therefore, I, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, Presi-
dent of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim
Saturday, April 14, 1956, as Pan American Day, and the
period from April 8 through April 14, 1956, as Pan Ameri-
can Week ; and I urge that the people of this Nation on
that day and throughout that week give expression to
their cordial good wiU toward the i)eoples of the other
American Republics and of their intention to maintain
the principles of freedom and equality fundamental to all.
I also invite the Governors of the States, Territories,
and possessions of the United States of America and the
Governor of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico to issue
similar proclamations ; and I call upon all our citizens and
all interested organizations to join in appropriate ob-
servance of Pan American Day and Pan American Week,
in testimony of the steadfast friendship which unites the
people of the United States with the people of the other
American Republics.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and
caused the Seal of the United States of America to be
afiixed.
Done at the City of Washington this fifteenth day of
March in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred
[SE^\L] and fifty-.six, and of the Independence of the
United States of America the one hundred and
eightieth.
By the President :
Herbert Hoover, Jr.
Acting Secretary of State
' No. 3126 ; 21 Fed. Reg. 1763.
544
Department of Stale Bulletin
Recommendations for 1957 Mutual Security Program
MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT TO THE CON-
GRESS 1
To the Congress of the United States:
For almost a decade the United States has
moved, year by year, with growing success, to
help fortify the economies and military strength
of nations of the free world. Over the years this
effort has changed in size and character in keep-
ing with changing world affairs. Today it re-
mains as indispensable to the security of every
American citizen and to the building of an endur-
ing peace as on the day it began 9 years ago.
Today this great Nation, at the peak of its peace-
time military and economic strength, must not
hesitate or retreat in this vital undertaking. Nor
can we subordinate this program to local concerns
or collateral issues, on the unsound premise that
steady progress through this jirogram for 9 years
makes it no longer necessary.
We cannot now falter in our quest for peace.
The need for a mutual security program is
urgent because there are still nations that are eager
to strive with us for peace and freedom but, with-
out our help, lack the means of doing so.
The need is urgent because there are still forces
hostile to freedom that compel the free world to
maintain adequate and coordinated military
power to deter aggi'ession.
The need is urgent because there are still peo-
ples who aspire to sustain their freedom but con-
front economic obstacles that are beyond their
capabilities of surmomiting alone.
These facts are as fundamental to our own se-
curity and well-being as the maintenance of our
own armed forces.
Our goal is clear — an enduring peace with jus-
' H. Doc. 358, 84th Cong., 2d sess., transmitted on Mar.
19. For the section on the mutual security program in
President Eisenhower's budget message for the fiscal year
1957, see Bui-letin of Jan. 30, 1956, p. 150.
tice. To achieve it will continue to require effort,
skill, patience, and sacrifice. Toward it we must
and will strive constantly by every means avail-
able to us.
We must continue to work with other countries
to insure that each free nation remains free, se-
cure from external aggression and subversion, and
able to develop a society marked by human wel-
fare, individual liberty, and a rising standard of
living. We must continue to maintain our eco-
nomic and military strength at home. We must
continue to stimulate expansion of trade and in-
vestment in the free world. We must continue
helping to build the productive capacities of free
nations through public loans and guarantees of
private investment. We must continue to provide
technical knowledge and essential materials to
speed the advance of other nations in peaceful uses
of the atom. We must continue our cultural and
educational exchanges to expand mutual knowl-
edge and understanding. We must continue and
intensify our information programs so that the
peoples of the world may know our peaceful
purposes and our love of human liberty. And
through our mutual security programs we must
continue helping to create in the free world condi-
tions in which freedom can survive and develop,
and free nations can maintain the defensive
strength necessary to deter aggression.
Peace with justice remains the sole objective of
our mutual security programs. We have no other
interest to advance. We have no desire or intent
to subjugate or subvert other peoples — no purpose
to change their chosen political, economic, or cul-
tural patterns — no wish to make any of them our
satellites. We seek only to further the cause of
freedom and independence and to develop the mil-
itary strength necessary to protect and defend
it, in the interest of peace.
To help a free country to maintain forces neces-
sary for the protection of its freedom and inde-
Apri; 2, 1956
545
pendence but beyond those which it can alone sup-
port may mean foregoing some domestic expendi-
ture. To help a less developed nation in its initial
steps toward an economy that can sustain freedom
and independence and provide opportunity for
higher living standards may mean postponement
of desirable projects here in this country. We
must continue willing to make these sacrifices, for
the benefits we gain in the interests of peace are
well worth the price. The mutual security pro-
gram is a demand of the highest priority upon
our resources.
Because our people and the peoples of other
nations in the free world have been willing to
make the necessary sacrifices, the past mutual se-
curity programs have achieved a real measure of
success. By combined effort the free world has
advanced toward stability and toward economic
strength. It has achieved the power and the will
to resist aggression. Collective security arrange-
ments have brought into existence free world de-
fense forces and facilities far greater than those
which we, by our unaided efforts, could have raised
and maintained from our own resources without a
crushing burden of taxation on our people. In
their economic aspects, our programs have made
significant advances toward the solution of many
problems of the free world. Without this assist-
ance many other nations, beyond doubt, if existing
at all, would exist today only in the grip of
chaos. Moreover, we ourselves are more secure,
more prosperous, better fitted to go forward in
the common enterprise of freedom than ever
before.
Significant testimony to the success of our mu-
tual security programs appears in the new turns
and developments of Soviet policy. Aggression
through force appears to have been put aside, at
least temporarily, and the Communists are now
making trade approaches to many nations of the
free world.
The Soviet maneuver, which is still developing,
includes offers of bilateral trade arrangements
which may involve provision of arms and capital
goods as well as technical assistance. Had we
any reason to believe that the Soviet leaders had
abandoned their sinister objectives, and now shared
our own high purpose of helping other nations
to develop freedom and independence, we would
welcome the new Soviet program, for it appears
to have aspects of normal trade expansion and
546
business competition. Its danger for us and for
other free nations, however, lies in the traditional
Soviet objectives and in the entanglements to
which acceptance of their offers may lead.
Even while we welcome respite from the Soviet
policy of threat and violence, we must take care-
ful stock of what still remains of it. The vast
Soviet military establishment has not been
scrapped. On the contrary, tlie Soviets and their
Communist allies are increasing the strength and
effectiveness of their armed forces and are pro-
viding them with equipment of the most modern
design. The threat implicit in this huge aggre-
gation of military power still casts an ominous
shadow over the world. There is nothing here
to warrant a slackening of our efforts to strengthen
the common defense of the free world.
In its new departures in foreign policy, we see*
that the Soviet Union continues in its familiarl
pattern of ceaseless probing for opportunities tol
exploit political and economic weaknesses. We
cannot view otherwise the arms traffic in areas
where tensions are high and the peace is in danger.
We cannot view otherwise the extension of credits
hand in hand with exploitation of ancient ani-
mosities and new hatreds in a world already over-
burdened with them.
We must therefore assume that Soviet ex-
pansionism has merely taken on a somewhat dif-
ferent guise and that its fundamental objective is
still to disrupt and in the end to dominate the free
nations. With Soviet leaders openly proclaiming
their world aim, it would be folly for us and our
friends to relax our collective efforts toward sta-
bility and security.
Needless to say, we do not intend to permit
specific Soviet moves to control our activities.
Our mutual security program, conceived in the
common interests of the free nations, must go
ahead affirmatively along tested lines to meet the
common need. "Wliere changes now give promise
of making the program more responsive to the
need and more effective, I am recommending
changes.
The authorizations and appropriations I an
recommending for fiscal year 1957 are designee
to carry forward the program toward the goal w<
seek.
I recommend that the Congress authorize ap
propriations of $4,672,475,000 in accordance witl
the scliedule attached. In a separate letter to thi
Department of State Bulletii
I
Speaker of tlie House of Representatives,^ I am
requesting the appropriation of $4,859,975,000 for
the same fiscal year to cover these recommended
authorizations together with authorizations
granted but not fully used in prior years. Certain
aspects of this program require special attention.
Continuity and Flexibility
We should be able to assure the nations of the
free world that we will continue to participate in
particular nonmilitary projects and enterprises
which will take a number of years to complete.
Such assurance from us will help these nations to
mobilize their own funds for projects which will
contribute to an important degree to their eco-
nomic strength, to enlist public and private loans
and investment, and to plan ahead intelligently.
It will be difficult for these nations to organize
such projects unless mutual security program sup-
port can be relied on for more than a single year.
I request authority of the Congress to make
commitments up to ten years in length to assist
less developed countries in long term projects im-
portant to their development. Funds to fulfill
such commitments would come from appropria-
tions for nonmilitary mutual security, and would
not exceed an aggregate of $100 million in any
year.
The mutual security program, in a world in
which events move with great rapidity, requires
that flexible authority exist for the use of funds
made available by the Congress. Section 401 of
the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended,
provides such flexibility with respect to the funds
appropriated, or transferred, for use pursuant to
that section. It provides a valuable means of
meeting numerous unforeseeable requirements for
assistance without the necessity for postponing or
reducing other urgently needed programs.
A year ago the Congress appropriated a special
Presidential fund of $100 million to be used under
section 401. For fiscal year 1957, I request the
authorization of an appropriation of a further
$100 million for this special fund. I also ask
that the authority of the President to transfer
other mutual security funds for use under the
provisions of section 401 be increased. With re-
spect to at least $100 million in this special fimd,
I urge that the maximum degree of flexibility be
authorized for its expenditure whenever the Presi-
jl ' H. Doc. 360, 84tli Cong., 2(1 sess.
dent determines that the use of sums in this man-
ner is important to the security of the United
States.
The Middle East and Africa are areas in which
it is especially important to build new strength
friendly to us. There is need for an adequate fund
M'hich can be used to assist in meeting special
economic problems that may arise in those regions.
The United States must be in a position to act
promptly to help the governments in this area in
their efforts to find solutions for economic and
social problems. I therefore recommend creation
of a special fund of $100 million to be available
for use in any part of the Middle East or Africa
for nonmilitaiy mutual security programs which
will advance the cause of free world security and
economic strength.
In 1955, the President's fund for Asian eco-
nomic development was established. The sum of
$100 million was then appropriated for it and
authorization was given for the appropriation of
a further $100 million. It is now desirable that
the whole of the funds authorized be made avail-
able, and I shall request the appropriation of the
remaining $100 million.
Advanced Weapons Systems
I recommend that about $530 million be made
available to enable the Department of Defense to
begin a progi'am of aiding our allies in developing
an even more effective defense based on an im-
proved and better coordinated early warning and
communications system and utilizing advanced
weapons systems, including missiles, now being
procured for our troops.
These advanced weapons, which are purely de-
fensive in character, pose no threat to any nation
which does not initiate aggression. They are de-
signed to give warning of, and repel, such aggres-
sion — and by their potential effectiveness to
deter it.
The sum of $195 million has been included ini-
tially for Nato countries in the fiscal year 1957
program. The eventual distribution of the bal-
ance of the advanced weapons included in the 1957
program will be made on the basis of later judg-
ment as to their most effective employment world-
wide.
Our defense methods cannot be static in view
of the constant growth of the military potential
of the Communists. We and our allies must keep
our defenses adequate to meet new methods of
April 2, J 956
547
attack. Because of the rapidity of scientific ad-
vances, it is likely that the content of this advanced
weapons program will be modified from time to
time.
Europe
The program for the Nato countries of Europe
(excluding Greece and Turkey) is primarily one
of military assistance. This includes the ad-
vanced weapons I have mentioned. Although our
allies have made great progress in building up
their defense forces, military grant assistance is
still necessary in most countries to assist them in
maintaining equipment and replacing materiel
lost by attrition. No economic assistance is pro-
posed for any European country in the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization. A small amount
of technical exchange assistance is proposed.
Continued economic support is required for
Berlin, and military and economic support for
Spain and Yugoslavia.
Middle East, Africa, and Asia
In Asia and the Middle East, serious risk of
aggression still exists. The program recommends
aggregate military assistance of approximately
$1,640 million for countries in these regions which
must maintain substantial forces in the field to
resist possible attacks. The military assistance
which we propose will support the objectives of
various mutual defense pacts, including Seato,
to which the United States is a party.
In these areas, the problems of building security
are economic as well as military. Many of the
nations in the area do not now have the resources
required for a minimum rate of economic growth.
They are striving to create the standards of living
under which their economies can develop. This
is a long-term process, in which their own efforts
will play the major part, but in which our help
can be crucial.
The program, accordingly, proposes economic
help to those of our allies whose own resources
cannot support their essential defense effort. This
help is designed, as in former years, in part to
assist projects of a nonmilitary character which
further defense activities, in part to help build
internal resources and economic stability, and in
part to contribute to the recipient's programs of
economic development.
Provision is also made for economic assistance
to nations in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia,
which receive no military assistance, where such
economic assistance will contribute to their eco-
nomic strength and thus to their ability to retain
their independence. This program is of the ut-
most importance to the security of the fi-ee world.
The program for fiscal year 1957 also provides
for continuing our teclinical cooperation and as-
sistance in less-developed countries.
Latin America
We propose to strengthen further the friendly
relationships which exist with our sister Republics
to the south. I recommend that we continue to
encourage by technical assistance the programs,
initiated by Latin American nations, to make
better use of their own resources. "We should also
continue our participation in the technical assist-
ance activities of the Organization of American
States.
In special circumstances, when loans from the
Export-Import Bank and the "World Bank are not
available to countries facing critical situations,
the mutual security program has assisted in meet-
ing temporary economic problems, as in the case
of two countries where it is proposed that such
assistance be continued in the next fiscal year.
Military assistance in Latin America should be
continued where needed in order to provide stand-
ardized equipment, maintenance of equipment al-
ready furnished, and training in the use of such
equipment.
United Nations and Other Special Programs
The United States should continue its support
of the United Nations Expanded Technical As-
sistance Program, the United Nations Childi'en's
Fund, and the United Nations Relief and AVorks
Agency, which provides relief and rehabilitation
of the Arab refugees from Palestine.
Provision is also made for continuing our sup-
port of the program of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees and the work of the
Intergovernmental Committee for European Mi-
gration. Authorizations for continuing our own
Government's program for care and resettlement
of escapees from communism, and our program
of paying the ocean freight costs of shipment both
of relief supplies donated to our voluntary relief
agencies and of surplus agricultural commodities,
are also reconunended.
548
Department of State Bulletin
Size of the Program
The request for military assistance authoriza-
tion in fiscal year 1957 is substantially larger than
the requests and appropriations for this purpose
for the past 2 years. The lower level of appro-
priations for fiscal years 1955 and 1956 will, by
the end of the current fiscal year, have brought
about reduction in unexpended balances over the
2-year period by approximately $2i/^ billion to $3
billion. Now, however, in order to maintain the
flow of military assistance in 1958 and 1959 an in-
crease in the appropriation for fiscal year 1957 is
required.
A substantial period of "lead" time is required
to translate appropriated funds into actual pay-
ment for, and deliveries of, nearly all items of
military equipment. This year, for the first time,
more than $500 million are included in the mili-
tary assistance program for advanced weapons.
These weapons, because of their complexity, have
even longer lead times.
On the economic side of the program, appro-
priations for the last 2 years have been approxi-
mately at the same rate as expenditures. The
amounts requested this year for economic assist-
ance are larger principally because of the new
fund proposed for the Middle East and Africa
and because of heavier emphasis on programs in
Asia.
Other Aspects of the Program
The mutual security program for fiscal year
1957 proposes continued procurement within the
United States of surplus agricultural commodities
for use abroad. In addition, large amounts of
such commodities are moving abroad under the
Agi'icultural Trade Development and Assistance
Act for the mutual benefit of this and other coun-
tries. This latter effort has been considered in
the development of the 1957 mutual security pro-
gram requirements, and every effort is being made
to coordinate the two programs.
In the request for appropriations to carry out
the fiscal year 1957 program, I am urging that
Congress permit greater flexibility in the obliga-
tion of appropriations, in order that there may
be more thorough planning of expenditures and
more time allowed for necessary negotiation of
contracts with suppliers and of arrangements with
other nations.
FY 1957 MUTUAL SECURITY PROGRAM
Authorization and Appropriation Request"
TiUe and Section
FY mr
Authorization
Request
FY 1957
Appropriation
Request
Title I— Mutual Defense Assistance:
Cfiapter 1 — Military Assistance
Sec. 103 (a) (3)— General Authorization .
Sec. 104— Infrastructure
$2. 925. 000. 000
''(75,000.000)
$2, 925. 000. 000
b 75. 000. 000
Total— Chapter 1
Chapter S — Defense Support
Sec. 131 (c):
(1) Europe
2, 925, 000, 000
78, 700. 000
170.000.000
882, 000, 000
"3,000,000,000
78. 700. 000
(2) Near East and Africa
(3) Asia
170. 000, 000
882, 000, 000
TOTAI^TITLE I
1, 130, 700, 000
4,055.700.000
1, 130, 700, 000
4,130,700,000
Title II— Development Aiaistanc€:
Sec. 201 (c)
(1) Near East and Africa
(2) Asia
63,000,000
80, 000. 000
27. 000, 000
63,000,000
SO. 000. 000
(3) Latin America
27. 000. 000
TOTAL— TITLE II
170, 000, 000
170. 000. 000
Title III— Technical Cooperation:
Sec. 304 (b)— General Authorization . .
Sec. 306— -Multilateral Technical Coop-
eration;
(a) United Nations Expanded Pro-
gram of Technical Assistance ....
(b) Organization of American States .
140,500,000
15,500.000
1, 500, 000
140, 500, 000
15,500,000
1, 500, 000
TOTAI^TITLE III
157, 500, 000
157, 500, 000
Title 1\— Other Programs:
Sec. 401 (b)— Special Presidential Fund .
Sec. 403 (b) — Special Assistance in Joint
$100, 000. 000
12, 200, 000
i (12,500,000)
2, 300, 000
7,000,000
10, 000, 000
» (45,300,000)
1,400,000
14, 000, 000
1,175,000
35,250,000
(100,000,000)
100, 000, 000
5,950,000
$100, 000, 000
12,200,000
12, 500, 000
2, 300. 000
7. 000 000
Sec. 405 — Migrants, Refugees and Es-
capees;
(a) Intergovernmental Committee for
European Migration
(c) United Nations Refugee Fund . .
Sec. 406(b)— Children's Welfare
Sec. 407 (b) — Palestine Refugees in the
Near East
10, 000, 000
• (45, 300, 000)
Sec. 408— North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
See. 409— Ocean Freight Charges;
(c) Volimtary Relief Shipments . . .
(d) Surplus Agricultural Commodities .
Sec. 410— Control Act Expenses
Sec. 411 (b)— Administrative and Other
Expenses (Other than Chapter 1 of
1, 400, 000
14,000,000
1, 175, 000
35. 250, 000
Sec. 418 (b)— President's Fund for Asian
Economic Development
Sec. 420— Special Authorization for the
Middle East and Africa
Sec. 10— Foreign Reactor Projects ....
100, 000, 000
100,000.000
5, 950, 000
TOTAL— TITLE IV
259, 276, 000
401,776,000
GRAND TOTAI^ALL TITLES. . . .
$4,672,475,000
$4,859,975,000
■ Title and section references are, with one exception, to the Mutual Se-
cm'ity Act of 1964 as it would be cumulatively amended by the proposed
Mutual Security Act of 1956. The exception is the section reference for
"Foreign Reactor Projects", which is to the proposed Mutual Security
Act of 1956.
!> 1957 authorization not being requested as Sec. 104 of the Mutual Secunty
Act of 1954 authorized the appropriation of $321 million in mstallments prior
to Jtme 30, 1958. In FY 1955 $100 million was appropriated. An additional
$122 million was appropriated in FY 1956 leavmg an imappropriated au-
thorization of $99 raiUion. The 1957 appropriation request will leave an
unappropriated authorization balance of $24 million.
o For FY 1967 Direct Forces Support has been consolidated with "Military
A ssis t niics ' '
<• Continuing authorization provided under Sec. 405 (a) of the Mutual
Security Act of 1954.
" Estimated unobligated balance of FY 1956 funds for which carry-over
authority is requested.
April 2, 7956
549
Conclusion
The mutual security program is vitally impor-
tant to our people. Its cost is not disproportionate
to our Nation's resources and to our national
income. That cost is a low price to pay for the
security and vastly greater chances for world
peace which the program provides.
The mutual security program is an indispen-
sable part of our national effort to meet affirma-
tively the challenge of all the forces which threaten
the independence of the free world and to over-
come the conditions which make peace insecure
and progress difficult.
dwight d. elsenhoweb
The White House,
March 19, 1956.
STATEMENT BY UNDER SECRETARY HOOVERS
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee,
I come before your Committee this morning in
support of the President's program for mutual
security. I do not intend to go into any great
detail. The Secretary of State, who is returning
to Washington tomorrow, plans to appear before
you shortly to report on the Seato meeting in
Karachi and his trip through 10 of the countries
in the Near and Far East. He will undoubtedly
touch upon the importance of this program in the
areas he has visited. Mr. Hollister, the Director
of IcA, who is with me this morning, will discuss
the details of the proposed program which is be-
fore your Committee. I do, however, wish to take
this opportunity to express my conviction that the
mutual security program is a fundamental and
essential aspect of the conduct of our foreign pol-
icy today.
Importance of the Mutual Security Program
Many of the members of this Committee have
recently visited the areas whose problems and
needs will be considered in connection with this
program, and I am sure that no one on the Com-
mittee is unaware of the tremendous importance
of the program. It is vital to the security of the
United States and of the whole of the free world.
We are looked upon for leadership in the free
world, and the consequences of what we do or fail
'Made before the House Committee on Foreign Af-
fairs on Mar. 20 (press release 150) .
550
to do with respect to the mutual security program
reach far beyond our own national frontiers.
The world today is one in which we and our
friends cannot relax our collective efforts for sta-
bility and security. There is no basis for any
hope that the long-range objectives of interna-
tional communism for world domination have been
abandoned. We must, therefore, place continued
reliance on the mutual security program and its
provisions for continued economic and military
assistance.
We seek, on the one hand, to make outright ag-
gression unprofitable, and thus unlikely. To this
end, we have supported mutual defense agree-
ments throughout the world and have supplied
arms, materiel, and training to assist in the de-
fense of friendly nations.
Without abandoning defensive efforts, we seek,
at the same time, to help the construction of
healthy economies and free institutions and thus
to promote stability and minimize the threat of
subversion.
The Soviet New Look
The Soviet Government continues to pursue its
overall aim of Communist domination. The Com-
mittee will recall that Mr. Khrushchev stated
frankly to the Supreme Soviet 2 months ago that
"we never renounced and we will never renounce
our ideas, our struggle for the victory of com-
munism." But we need to keep in mind in our
consideration of the program this year that the
emphasis on Soviet tactics has shifted from pri-
mary reliance on force to a campaign of political
and economic blandishment.
In this campaign the Soviet Union and its satel-
lites have expanded their trade relations with the
free world, they have offered their technical and
advisory services to the less industrialized coun-
tries, and they have provided long-term low-
interest loans for economic development. By
themselves these activities are more or less legiti-
mate, but they are being carried on in combination
with efforts to stir up local controversies and strife
and with pressures to disrupt and destroy the
security arrangements that have been constructed
in the free world. The immediate Soviet goal is
quite clearly one of isolating the countries of the
free world from the U.S. This much accom-
plished, the goal of outright conquest or subversion
would be greatly advanced. »
Department of State Bulletin
I
I
We must view the new Soviet campaign with
concern for it is aimed at the welfare and free-
dom of all the independent countries. We are
not presenting the mutual security program as an
answer to the Soviet activities, but we do need to
make our own program, which is of long standing,
as effective an instrument for aiding the cause of
independence and freedom as is possible.
Key New Provisions
Our own security depends upon the security of
the free world. This security, in turn, depends
directly upon the ability of the free nations to
maintain their independence and to strengthen
their free institutions. These continue to be our
aims. From the founding of our country we have
been deeply devoted to the cause of freedom. In
this new phase of our struggle to achieve an en-
vironment of freedom, when many nations of the
free world desperately need assistance in their
efforts to achieve security and healthy economic
development, it is vital that we have in the mutual
security program a larger measure of flexibility.
Changes occur in the world at a very rapid pace.
We cannot forecast them in advance, but it is
vital to our national security that we have the
ability to adapt the mutual security program to
reflect changes. That presents a major dilemma.
Because of the long lead time necessary to the
effective administration of this program, the pro-
posals we are making today for fiscal year '57
will not be implemented before early 1958. That
is a period of almost 2 years. It is obvious that,
to meet the conditions existing then, there be a
degi'ee of flexibility in the legislation now.
The President has accordingly requested a
greater flexibility in his authority to use funds
made available for this program by the Congress.
Some measure of flexibility is provided in the
present legislation. But we consider it of the ut-
most importance to the efficient and economic ac-
complisloment of our objectives that the President
be given even wider discretion for future years.
The President has also asked the Congress for
authority to make certain commitments of a
longer-term nature in assisting countries to carry
out a restricted number of important projects.
These commitments would be met from nonmili-
tary mutual security appropriations. We are not
asking for additional appropriations. It is con-
templated that this kind of assistance will be fur-
April 2, 1956
nished in special cases where the recipient country
cannot carry out a major project with its own re-
sources. I have in mind such projects as river
development, improvement of ports, highways,
railroads, or other means of communication, and
important large industrial projects. Works of
this kind generally require a number of years for
completion. Wliere we provide aid for these pur-
poses, it is essential that the recipient country be
given reasonable assurance that our aid may be
continued for the period of time necessary for
completion of the projects and so long as the pur-
poses of the free world are served thereby. Only
with assurances of this type of support will these
countries be able to develop additional financing
from other sources.
Rate of Expenditure
The purpose of the proposed program is to carry
on at approximately the same rate of expenditure
as last year and the year before. In view of the
increased threat of Communist economic pene-
tration in the free world, we cannot afford to re-
duce our efforts at this time.
The requested increase in appropriation from
$2.7 billion in fiscal year 1956 to $4.9 billion in
fiscal year 1957 does not imply a corresponding
increase in expenditures. The details of this situ-
ation will be brought out later in the hearings.
But I wish to make the basic facts clear at this
time.
The $4.9 billion figure is made up of two parts :
First is the defense-support and economic pro-
gram amounting to $1.9 billion. This compares
to a fiscal 1956 request of $1.8 billion and a final
appropriation of $1.7 billion. The second part is
the military and direct-forces support program
of $3 billion. This compares to a fiscal 1956 re-
quest of $1.7 billion, and a final appropriation of
$1 billion, which was less than half of the annual
rate of expenditure.
To recapitulate, the increased request this year
of $4.9 billion, as compared to the appropriation
last year of $2.7 billion, or a difference of $2.2
billion, is made up as follows :
(a) increase in defense support and economic
aid— $200 million ;
(b) increase in military and direct-forces sup-
port— $2.0 billion.
The increase of $200 million in defense support
551
and economic aid is requested to cover a prudent
and moderate increase in the program for the
Middle East, South and Southeast Asia, and the
Far East. This represents an increase of approxi-
mately 12 percent in the size of the program
for this year. One-half of this increase, or $100
million, is requested for use as a special fund in
the Middle East and Africa, with emphasis on the
Baghdad Pact countries, while the other half is
needed in Asia and the Far East.
The increase of $2 billion in military and direct-
forces support will bring to $3 billion the amount
requested for these purjjoses for fiscal year '57.
This sum is designed to provide for one extra
year's military expenditures at the average annual
rate at which tlie Department of Defense is now
expending funds for military assistance. In ad-
dition, there is requested authorization of $530
million for advanced weapons, for most of which
there have been no prior appropriations.
A detailed explanation of the various programs
will be given, of course, in the hearings that are to
follow. My purpose in presenting the basic figures
at this time is to place the major aspects of the
program in their proper perspective.
Again, I would like to reiterate that the purpose
of the proposed program is to maintain approxi-
mately the same rate of expenditure during fiscal
year 1957 as in the years 1955 and 1956. The fact
that increased authorizations are required in order
to maintain the same expenditures, particularly
in the military program, will be brought out later
by Mr. Gray and other witnesses from the Depart-
ment of Defense.
lem we face and the proposal of the executive
branch for the solution of that problem. It is
our earnest hope the Committee will approve this
program.
Visit of Deputy Prime Minister
of Rhodesia and Nyasaland
The Department of State amiounced on March
24 (press release 160) that Sir Roy Welensky,
Deputy Prime Minister of the Federation of Rho-
desia and Nyasaland, will visit "Washington March
25-30, mider the auspices of the International Ex-
change of Persons Program. Principal purpose
of the tour is to familiarize Sir Roy with the
United States and particularly with its transpor-
tation and manufacturing industries as well as to
afford him the opportunity to confer with U.S.
Government transportation, labor, and business
leaders.
Deputy Prime Minister Welensky arrived in
New York March 17 and has just completed visits
to Pittsburgh and Chicago. While in Washington
he will confer with officials of the Departments of
State, Commerce, and Labor, Members of Con-
gress, and labor and transportation officials. Fol-
lowing his stay here, the Deputy Prime Minister
will fly to California via Denver, Colo., and will
also visit the Grand Canyon, Texas, and the Ten-
nessee Valley. After another visit in New York,
from April 12-21, he will fly to Canada.
Conclusion
Mr. Hollister plans to discuss with you the de-
tailed legislative provisions which we are request-
ing for this 1957 program. Altogether we believe
that these appropriations, subject to the approval
of Congress, will :
(1) provide adequate means to continue to
strengthen our allies ;
(2) continue soundly and affirmatively our eco-
nomic i^rogram, which in itself is the best answer
to new Soviet activities;
(3) achieve a greater measure of flexibility so
urgently needed;
(4) supply a limited element of continuity in
our aid program.
I have presented in very brief outline the prob-
Congratuiatory Messages on Signing
of French-Tunisian Protocol
Message From U.S. Consul General to Bey of Tunis'
Press release 154 dated March 22
My Government wishes to convey to His High-
ness the Bey, to the members of the Tunisian
Government, and to the people of Tunisia its con-
gratulations on the signature of the Protocol of
Agreement of March 20 between the Governments
of Tunisia and France, and on the recognition of
Tunisian independence as embodied therein.
My Government desires to express its particular
' Delivered on Mar. 22 by Morris N. Hughes, Consul
General of the United States in Tunis, to Sidi Mohammed
Lamine Pasha, Bey of Tunis.
552
Department of State Bulletin if,j
admiration for the courage and realism of those
who once again have proven steadfast in adhering
to tlie principle of peaceful negotiation. In fol-
lowing the paths of friendship which have led to
the signature of this solemn act, the leaders of
Tunisia give proof to the world of their devotion
to the real welfare of the inhabitants of their
country.
° Delivered on Mar. 22 by the American Embassy at
Paris.
Message From U.S. Ambassador
to French Foreign Office '
Press release 155 dated March 22
My Government desires to pay new homage to
the realism and magnanimity of those who have
made i>ossible the Franco-Tunisian Protocol of
Agreement, signed on March 20, and to the role of
France, which has proven once again her dedica-
tion to the i^rogress of North Africa and to the
aspirations of its people.
Clarification of U.S. Policy Toward North Africa
iy C. Douglas Dillon
Ambassador to France ^
I am glad to have the opportunity to speak
to you today. Recently I have noticed in France
an increasing misimderstanding of United States
policy toward North Africa. Such misunder-
standing is a matter of serious concern to us all
and should not be allowed to continue. In an at-
tempt to clarify this situation I am going to de-
sci'ibe briefly the basic views of my Government
regarding the problems which France is facing in
that area.
I think you will all agree that there are today
a number of people in France who seem to feel
that the United States has not been adequately
supporting France in North Africa or, worse still,
that we have even contemplated the possibility
of replacing her in that area. Nothing could be
farther from the truth. Ever since I have been
here in Paris my Government has loyally sup-
ported the French Government in its search for
solutions to North African problems — solutions
that will make possible long-term, close coopera-
tion between France and the Moslem communi-
ties of Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria. The United
States has consistently supported France when
North African subjects have been discussed in
the United Nations. The most recent instance
I was our strong support last fall of the position
that Algeria is an internal French problem and
I therefore not appropriate for discussion by the
U. N.^ In addition, when last year the important
' Translation of address delivered in French before the
Diplomatic Press Association at Paris, France, on Mar. 20.
April 2, 7956
379843—56 3
question of helicopters was brought to our atten-
tion, we responded promptly and favorably to
the requests of the French Government. Never
once since I have been in Paris have I had a specific
complaint from any member of any French gov-
ernment or, for that matter, from any informed
Frenchman regarding any action taken by the
United States Government in North Africa.
I say "United States Government" advisedly,
because I do not mean to say that Frenchmen
have not occasionally siioken to me about the ac-
tions of a few private American citizens in the
North African area. But I have two observations
to make on this score: First, if one looks at the
overall picture, any actions taken by the few pri-
vate American citizens who have had anything
to do with North Africa are clearly of very minor
importance in the drama of the past few years;
second, and even more important, I am sure that
you will all agree with me that in free countries
such as France and the United States, where
there is no governmental control over the thoughts
and words of our citizens, it is most important
to distinguish clearly and sharply between the ac-
tion of the nation as such taken by its govern-
ment and the actions or words of private individ-
uals. There has been a tendency in France to
confuse the two when talking of American policy
in North Africa, and I ask you to help in guard-
ing against this error.
' Bm-LETIN of Oct. 3, 1955, p. 546.
553
Witli tliis background, how is it possible that
so much misunderstanding should have arisen?
Misunderstanding between peoples almost inevit-
ably means that there must be some fault on both
sides. I have looked hard at the American posi-
tion in this matter, and I think that I may have
found one of the causes. That is that, until now,
there have been very few public expressions of
United States policy in this area. On the one
hand we have felt that Algeria was primarily a
French afl'air and on the other that the relation-
ships between France and Morocco and Tunisia
were matters to be settled between the French
Government on the one hand and the Moroccan
and Tunisian Governments on the other. We
thought that public expression of our views would
be considered to be undue interference in other
people's aft'airs, and accordingly we have kept si-
lent. While we have repeatedly given assurance
in private to the French Government that we sup-
ported their etl'orts to reach liberal and mutually
acceptable solutions in the area, our policy of
avoiding public expression of our views may have
contributed to a misunderstanding of our position.
I hope today that I can do something to rectify
this situation. May I suggest, on the other hand,
that we Americans, when judged by the record of
our longtime friendship and cooperation as well
as our sacrifices on the fields of France during the
last two wars, may deserve a greater degree of con-
fidence than has been shown us by certain circles
of public opinion.
Tunisia and Morocco
Now let me elaborate a little on our policies.
First, let us look at Tunisia and Morocco. With
these two countries the French Government, ani-
mated by the liberal traditions for which France is
justly famous, has concluded agreements. In the
first agreement — that with Tunisia — a long step
was taken toward independence. There followed
the recerit agreement according full independence
to Morocco.' And we have just learned that new
negotiations perfecting the independence of
Tunisia have been successfully completed. These
agreements should usher in a new era of close in-
terdependence between those two countries and
France. They have been greeted with applause
and thanksgiving throughout the free world.
' Ibid., Mar. 19, 1956, p. 466.
What does this newly acquired status of inde-
pendence mean ? It simply means that henceforth
the relationships between France on the one hand
and Morocco and Tunisia on the other will be
freely negotiated as between sovereign equals. We
certainly hope that these new relationships will
not weaken but rather will strengthen the close
ties that have bound France and these two lands
together in a common destiny. I am certain that
the Tunisian and Moroccan people must realize
that they owe their remarkable economic and so-
cial development of recent years to French initia-
tive and to French investment.
My Government was particularly happy to
learn that the recent negotiations with Tunisia
and ^Morocco opened up the prospect of a con-
tinued close relationshijj between the Govern-
ments and people of France and these two coun-
tries. The United States wholeheartedly supports
such a relationship of freely negotiated interde-
pendence. We believe it is a necessity in the world
of today, when it has become difficult if not impos-
sible for any country to stand alone.
You have all heard that the people of the United
States are anticolonialist by tradition. That is
true, and we are proud of it. But what does this
mean? It means that we believe, as I am sure
the people and Government of France believe, that
the less-favored peoples of the world should be
brought forward as rapidly as possible to a state
of freedom in which they can freely and rationally
choose their own destiny. Such freedom of choice
can take many forms. It by no means requires a
rupture between the peoples that have newly ac-
quired their freedom and those that have led them
along the path to this freedom. May I point, for
example, to the decisions of the peoples of Paki-
stan, India, and Ceylon to stay on as members of
the British Commonwealth in their capacity as
sovereign nations? May I point to the free de-
cision of the people of Puerto Rico to maintain an
even closer relationship with the United States?
Therefore, it should come as no surprise when I
say that the United States hopes for and favors
the continuation of the closest possible interde-
pendence between France and ^Morocco and
Tunisia. May I also say, once and for all, and
with the greatest clarity and force, that the United
States has no desire to interfere in any way with
the close relationship between France and these
554
Deparimenf of State Bulletin
two countries — a relationship which we look upon
as one of the bulwarks of the free world.
Algeria
Now let me turn for a moment to Algeria. Here
the problem is quite different and the solution
must undoubtedly be different. The four depart-
ments of Algeria are French territory. There are
1,200,000 Frenchmen living in Algeria alongside
8,000,000 Moslems, and this coexistence in itself
poses a most complex and difficult problem.
Wliile my Government has been, and is, well
aware of this problem, it is fair to say that public
opinion in the United States has not been ade-
quately informed regarding the French commu-
nity in Algeria. The size of this community, the
extent of its participation in all phases of Algerian
life, and the length of its history in Algeria are
now becoming better known to the American
people, and with this knowledge is coming greater
understanding and sympathy for the problems you
face in Algeria. I can assure you that France
has our profound sympathy and support in its
attempt to work out a liberal solution to this diffi-
cult problem of coexistence.
The French contribution in North Africa, the
great advances in hygiene and public health, the
building of roads and hospitals, the multitude of
costly and ingenious programs that have made
barren areas fruitful — these are all elements of a
dramatic story that is not well enough known
abroad. The soaring population increases in
Algeria and throughout North Africa over the
past decades are in themselves testimony to these
achievements. France can and should be proud
of her efforts in North Africa. It would be help-
ful if she were to make a greater effort to spread
the knowledge of these good works throughout the
world.
Now, to return again to Algeria, there the
French Government has proposed a liberal pro-
gram, the basic element of which is a search for
new arrangements for the continued coexistence
of the French and Moslem communities — new ar-
rangements to be freely arrived at by discussion
between the chosen leaders of the Moslem com-
munity and the representatives of France and the
French community in Algeria. The French Gov-
ernment has solemnly promised free elections for
the purpose of choosing these leaders. Such elec-
tions are wholly consistent with the ideals of
liberty and justice which are held so dear by both
the French and American people. But we all
know that elections cannot take place while dis-
order reigns. Hence, we in the United States
fervently hope that peace and order will come soon
to the Algerian countryside so that progress can
be made toward the liberal solution sought by the
French Govennnent.
U.S. Support for France
My countrymen have always been shocked by
blind acts of terrorism, and those who take part
in such activity should not for a moment imagine
that they have the support of my Government or
of any segment of our public opinion. May I
repeat so that there can be no possible misunder-
standing: The United States stands solidly be-
hind France in her search for a liberal and equi-
table solution of the problems in Algeria.
We recognize that there have been external in-
fluences at work trj'ing to undermine the French
position throughout North Africa. I hope that
what I have just said will be of help in enabling
the people of France to differentiate sharply be-
tween her friends and her foes, between the friends
and allies who support her in her search for liberal
and fair solutions, and those who have sought to
destroy every possibility of a continuing relation-
ship between France and the Moslem communities
throughout North Africa.
Finally, I would like to ask your help in one
concrete matter, which I feel is in the best interests
of France as well as of my own country. It is
undeniable that the terrorists and those who seek
simply to drive France from North Africa are
encouraged by any indication that there may be
differences between France and her allies, in par-
ticular the United States, regarding North African
policy. There have been articles in the press
stressing that differences of opinion exist in this
matter between France and the United States.
Such articles can only serve to encourage the ene-
mies of France. I hope that after the explanation
which I have just given of United States policy in
North Africa you will feel able to join with me
in an effort to dissipate the misunderstandings of
the past and to let everyone realize that France,
in its search for liberal solutions that will insure
the continuance of its presence in North Africa,
has the wholehearted support of the United States
Government.
April 2, 1956
555
A Crucial Contest With the Communist World
I
hy Deputy Under Secretary Murphy '
The part George Washington University plays
in this community more than bears out the wisdom
of the first President of our country in sponsoring
the idea of a university located in the Capital of
the Nation. Of course, George Washington's wish
was not for a university devoted exclusively to the
training of civil servants, important as that is.
His desire also was for a university providing
"education in all branches of polite literature : in
arts and sciences. . . ."
The 14 colleges, schools, and divisions of the
University, including medicine, law, engineering,
education, j^harmacy, and government, as well as
the 4-year course in liberal arts, have fulfilled
his wisli more completely than he might have
dreamed. The graduates of these schools and dis-
ciplines, whether or not they go into the Govern-
ment, contribute richly to the life and wealth of
our area and Nation.
We sometimes fail to appreciate the contribu-
tion made by our system of higher education, not
only to the internal needs and culture of our
country but to our understanding of foreign af-
fairs. The strength of our society depends in
large part on the intelligence and training of our
people, on the mixing of technical and profes-
sional skills, and on the ability of all our people to
analyze and comprehend the economic, political,
and social forces at work in the world today.
We not only rely on technical training and on
scientific skills for the enrichment of our society.
The liberal arts, the inquiring mind, the well-
rounded individual are perhaps of more funda-
mental significance in our kind of country. The
'Address made before the George Washington Uni-
versity Alumni Luncheon at Washington, D. C, on Mar.
24 (press release 157 dated Mar. 2.S).
Founding Fathers who drew up the charter for
our Nation reflected in high degree this attitude
of inquiry, this wide variety of skills, intelligence,
and experience. Our higlier education today is de-
voted to the idea of the well-rounded man.
By comparison we note that the Soviet system
does not have this breadth of purpose. It is pro-
ducing technicians, engineers, and men of science
in growing, if not disturbing, abundance. The
broad intellectual needs of a developed and well-
balanced society are seemingly neglected and even
repressed in the Soviet Union. In this way it ac-
complishes the purpose of the state to progress
rapidly in technical and economic fields. This
onesidedness in Soviet education and training rep-
resents a certain danger to the free world. It re-
sults in almost complete acceptance of dogmas and
of opinions handed down from above usually with-
out question and without understanding.
Recent Communist Party Congress
We liave witnessed a further startling example
of this onesidedness at the recent 20th Congress of
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union at Mos-
cow. This relates to the Stalin story, about which
we are still lacking factual information. The
news of this apparent development has leaked to
the outside world in a peculiar fashion. We still
do not possess the text of the speech said to have
been made by Klirushchev at the Party Congress
meeting in February, but it is reported that Khru-
shchev delivered a lengthy denunciation of his
former master. As a result of tliat speech Joseph
Stalin apparently has now become an outcast, a
pariali, where but a very few short years ago he
was the demigod, the physical and spiritual ruler
of all the Russians. If reports are accurate, this
556
Department of State Bulletin |p^|
rewriting of history, which the 200 million people
of tlie Soviet Union may be reluctantly forced to
accept, is a spectacle we have seen before and one
that makes us cherish more dearly than ever our
system of free inquiry and broad education.
The 20th Congress of the Communist Party was
in many respects a valuable performance for us to
watch, even though we do not as yet know the en-
tire story or understand its implications. During
the 3 years and 4 months since the 19th Communist
Party Congress, many changes had occurred on
the Soviet scene. The most important, of course,
was the death of Stalin in 1953, ending a 29-year
rule and paving the way for a new phase in Soviet
history. In this same period collective leadership
in top party organs, or perhaps more accurately
collective dictatorship, a form of oligarchy, be-
came the guiding principle of the Government.
At the same time, Khrushchev succeeded in mov-
ing to the forefront of the ruling group.
The purge of Beria brought the police under
firiner party control. The armed forces received
a greater share of prestige and recognition. Agri-
culture remained a weak point and became the
target for sustained special attention. A new
stress on consumers' goods was short-lived as the
regime reaffirmed the priority of heavy industry.
The first Soviet thermonuclear test explosion,
the appearance of new long-range bombers and
supersonic fighters, the development of guided
missiles, the modernization and reequipment of
ground forces, the continued emphasis on new
naval construction — all testified to the further
increase of Soviet military power since 1952.
In foreign affairs, the Soviets moved toward
new international relationships which gave them
more flexibility, whether or not they reflected any
fundamental change in Communist strategy.
This new posture was most dramatically expressed
at the "summit" meeting last summer in Geneva.
.The Soviets sought to create an image of the
U.S.S.R. as a peace-loving power by a number of
diplomatic gestures and by offering to remove
a few barriers to communication with the non-
Communist world. The wars in Korea and Indo-
china were ended, an Austrian treaty was signed,
relations with West Germany were established.
The U.S.S.R. warmed up its approach to Yugo-
slavia and to a number of non-Communist coun-
tries stretching from the Arctic to the Indian
Ocean. They employed new means — arms, cred-
its, machines, and technicians — in a new political
April 2, 7956
379843 — 56 4
offensive against less-developed non-Communist
countries.
Against this background, more than 1,400 dele-
gates to the 20th Communist Party Congress, as
well as delegates from 55 foreign Communist
Parties, assembled in the Great Hall of the
Kremlin in February.
The highlight and main innovation of the 20th
Congi-ess was the first formal public criticism of
Stalin by his successors. In the nearly 3 years
since his death, Stalin's stature had been progres-
sively reduced by withholding adulation from
him and concentrating it on Lenin, but previous
to the Congress there had been no official public
criticism.
The criticism of Stalin centered on methods of
rule, but it also involved policy decisions. Caustic
references were made to one-man decision-making,
leader-worship, overcentralization, mistakes in
economic jjolicies, ossified conduct of foreign
relations, distortions of ideology, propaganda in
Soviet history, unhealthy developments in Soviet
law, and arbitrariness in law enforcement.
A second important result of the conference was
to put the official stamp of approval on the present
organization of rule as well as on recent poli-
cies. The emphasis on collectivity in leadership
plus the criticism of one-man rule may have been
designed to make it more difficult for any Soviet
leader to set himself apart from the other mem-
bers of the ruling clique. Nevertheless, it may be
significant that the new Central Committee ex-
panded the party presidium to include members
with ties to Khrushchev. In addition, it enlarged
the party secretariat, which is directed by Khrush-
chev, and tied that body and the presidium
even more closely together through overlapping
of membership.
"Peaceful Coexistence"
In the field of foreign affairs, the Soviet rulers
claimed success for their new policies and promised
that they would be pursued even more vigorously.
Their basic premise they defined as peaceful co-
existence as the only alternative to "the most de-
structive war in history."
Their apparent plan is to cultivate friendly re-
lations with most countries, including the major
"Western Powers, but not at the cost of conces-
sions. They apparently will make special efforts
in less-developed areas and among foreign socialist
groups.
557
Their immediate aim was made clear : to under-
mine Western defense efforts and further to ex-
tend Soviet influence. Their ultimate goal was
expressed by speaker after speaker with even
greater optimism than in the past: "The ideas of
communism will triumph without war."
The Soviet rulers gave a nimiber of reasons for
their confidence. They cited growing Soviet mili-
tary power as a deterrent to Western aggression.
They depicted increasing Soviet economic strength
as a symbol of the success of communism. They
lumped into a "zone of peace" the neutral coun-
tries, which together with the Sino-Soviet bloc
they consider as proof that a majority of mankind
is moving toward "peace"' and socialism.
The speeches at the Communist Congress
showed awareness of the contradiction between co-
existence and continuing Communist-capitalist
conflict. Unwilling to discard either, the Soviet
leaders sought to appear both respectable and revo-
lutionary by adjusting their ideological garb. The
doctrine of the inevitability of war was modified
to stress the preventability of war. The doctrine
of the necessity of the violent overthrow of capital-
ism was shaded to sanction a "nonviolent" par-
liamentary seizure of power. These adjustments
were intended to reassure non-Communists of the
seriousness of Soviet ideas on coexistence and to
make clear to Communists that coexistence means
neither relaxation nor reformism. Coexistence, it
was stressed, is a state-to-state concept, which in-
volves no reconciliation with "bourgeois" ideas.
Within the U.S.S.R. the priority of heavy in-
dustry and the maintenance of a high level of
armaments continue to demand sacrifices from the
pojjulation, since the threat of war is assumed still
to exist. Outside the U.S.S.R., the Soviet speakers
declared, Soviet efforts to improve relations with
foreign governments are not to be interpreted by
local Communists as undercutting their efforts to
come to power. A period of coexistence, they
maintain, will still provide chances for revolution.
As we see it, these were the highlights of the
Soviet Congress. These are the features which
the Communist leaders themselves thought most
significant about the Soviet Union. Now we
might try to look at the world scene more objec-
tively.
Several important elements in combination have
been instrumental in bringing about the changes
in Soviet policy and strategy dramatized by the
20th Communist Congress. The death of Stalin
opened the door for new leaders to try out new
ideas and to get out from under Stalin's dead
weight. Very real increases in Soviet industrial
capacity have given them both greater confidence
in their power of control and the ability to expand
their economic operations. The development and
testing of thermonuclear weapons in the hands of
both sides perhaps has persuaded some that the
prospect of another world war is more remote.
Finally — and this is most significant — we must
bear in mind that, if the Soviets have in fact
shifted to new methods and new points of attack,
it is because the strength and firmness of the free
nations frustrated their old methods of intimida-
tion and aggression.
Challenge in Western Europe
The primary aim of the Soviets from 1945 until
rather recently was to take over Western Europe
through dividing and weakening it by subversion
and threats. Europe is the site of the world's most
highly developed industrial plant outside the
United States. The combined industrial capacity
of Western Europe and the United States is
greater by a ratio of seven to two than the capacity
of the Communist empire. Control of Western
Europe, however, would give the Communists a
lead of five to four. In population, in geography,
in military power, and in political, economic, and
cultural leadership. Western Europe was and is
the most valuable prize in the world for the Com-
munist imperialists.
To meet their challenge, we and our allies in
Europe built our military capacity to a point
where it was sufficient to deter an attack. Our
foreign aid at first prevented economic collapse
and has now produced record prosperity. The
North Atlantic Treaty provided a warning system
against any Communist attempt to move against
the European nations one by one.
The joining of a rearmed and prosperous Ger-
many with a unified and strong Nato was the
signal that the 10-year Soviet effort to weaken,
divide, and conquer the richest prize in the world
had failed. The problem now is to retain that
unity and strength.
In addition to their efforts at conquest in Eu-
rope, the Communists also attempted, by violence,
threats, and subversion, to forward their aggres-
sive aims in the Far East.
In Korea 3 years ago the Communists were
made to understand that, if they failed to reach
558
Departmenf of State Bulletin
I
an agreement for an early cease-fire, they would
run the risk of retaliation massive enough to cost
them far more than war could gain. Today Korea
is at peace.
In the Formosa Strait a year ago, the Chinese
Communists were aggressively pressing tlieir
claims to the offshore islands of Quemoy and
Matsu and to Formosa. The President sought and
obtained from Congress the overwhelming assur-
ance that the might of this country would be used
if necessary to guard the peace. AVar has not
broken out in the Formosa Strait.
Appeal to Colonial Peoples
It is said that a good general forces his opponent
to meet him on ground that is favorable to him.
The Soviets are now appealing to colonial and
former colonial peoples who are searching for
economic strength and political prestige. As a
former colony which won its own freedom and
has helped other nations to achieve theirs, the
United States can make a strong case for our sys-
tem against the "new colonialism'" of the Com-
munist empire. We are challenged, in effect, to
live up to our own heritage. I believe we are
meeting that challenge.
The Soviets are now imitating our efforts to
help other countries build economic strength.
Our efforts in this field have enjoyed much suc-
cess during the past 10 years. There is no ground
upon which we are better equipped by experience
and productive capacity to place our efforts up
against theirs. Our 160 million people, working
in freedom, produce over three times as much as
do the 220 million of the Soviet Union, working
in servitude. Again we are meeting the challenge,
and I am confident we will succeed. It is an ex-
pensive and trying experience for our Nation be-
cause our competitors tactics involve deceptive
practices. The Stalinist open military aggression
is supplanted by political and economic subversion
cloaked in langiuige of peace and friendly cooper-
ation. We have known how to deal with military
aggression. We are even better equipped to deal
with the present form of competition.
We are on the high ground in this crucial con-
test with the Communist world. Our reserves —
military, economic, and political — are vast. Our
methods have been tested and proven through 10
years of post-war competition. As President
Eisenhower has said,
The sum of our International effort should he this : the
April 2, J 956
waging of peace, with as much resourcefulness, with as
great a sense of dedication and urgency as we have ever
mustered in defense of our country in time of war. In
this effort, our weapon is not force. Our weapons are
the principles and ideas embodied in our historic tradi-
tions, applied with the same vigor that in the past made
America a living promise of freedom for all mankind."
Those party bosses who oppose us, by contrast,
are on the low ground, on the quicksands and
broken terrain of Soviet colonialism in all its bru-
tality, bad faith, and oppi'ession. Neither mate-
rially nor morally can they match our potential.
We enjoy the support of our people in our efforts.
I should doubt that the Communist leadership is
entirely confident of support of the masses. We
do not intend that they shall outwit or outdistance
us in this crucial test.
We will hope and work for the day when conflict
of any kind may cease, when all may join in
peaceful efforts toward peaceful ends, when Rus-
sia itself will be governed by men who put the
welfare of the Russian people above world con-
quest. But as long as there is to be conflict, we
are on the high ground, and if we have faith in
ourselves and our system, if we are brave, re-
sourceful, and patient, we will win through. I
know that we here today, as graduates of a uni-
versity with a proud record in our Nation's
history, will play a vital part in this epic struggle.
Soviet Payment of Damages
for U.S. Navy Plane
Press release 148 dated March 19
The following is the text of a note delivered
hy the Soviet Embassy in Washington to the De-
partment of State on March 16, 1956, in reply
to the United States note of January 6, 1966^ re-
questing payment of damages for the destniction
of a United States Navy Neptune plane on June
32, 1955.
[Translation]
The Embassy of the U.S.S.R. presents its com-
pliments to the Department of State of the U.S.A.
and, referring to the State Department's note of
January 6 of this year, has the honor to state the
following.
The State Department's note asserts that the
'Bulletin of Jan. 16, 1956, p. 79.
' Bulletin of Jan. 16, 1956, p. 94.
559
American military aircraft of the "Neptune" type
referred to in the note did not violate the state
frontier of the U.S.S.R.
In this connection, the Embassy considers it
necessary to recall that on June 25, 1955, in the
statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of
the U.S.S.R., V. M. Molotov, to the Secretary of
State of the U.S.A., Mr. Dulles,= factual data were
communicated regarding the violation of the
U.S.S.R. state frontier by an American military
aircraft of the "Xeptune" type.
The present note reaffirms the above-mentioned
statement concerning the circumstances of the vio-
lation of the U.S.S.R. state frontier by an Ameri-
can military aircraft.
In accordance with the agreement which has
been reached and with the request contained in
the State Department's note of January 6 of this
year, there is enclosed a check in the amount of
$724,947.68 in reimbursement for 50 percent of
the total amount of the damages borne by the
American side.
Visit of Prime Minister Costeilo of Ireland
Following are texts of statements and addresses
made during the visit to Washington of John A.
Costeilo, Prime Minister of Ireland, from March
U to 17.
WELCOME AT NATIONAL AIRPORT
Press release 136 dated March 14
Statement by Vice President Nixon
Mr. Prime Minister, it is a very great privilege
and honor for me to welcome you to Washington,
D.C., and the United States on behalf of Presi-
dent Eisenhower and on behalf of all the Ameri-
can people.
It seems to me rather symbolic that you are ar-
riving in this season of the year, because, as you
will note, in just a few days you will find virtually
all Americans blossoming out in the green, and not
onlj- those of Irish persuasion and descent but
others who have great affection for those who are
Irish. Consequently, perhaps, it is not too inap-
propriate that you are arriving on a day on which
the rain is falling very heavily in Washington,
because that means that we will have rain today
and a very green and happy St. Patrick's Day on
Saturday of this week.
In any event, may I say that, as j-ou know, we
have many bonds of friendship between our two
countries and our peoples. Those of Irish de-
scent have contributed tremendously to the United
States in many fields and particularly, as you will
' Ihid., July 18, 1955, p. 100.
note in Washington, in the fields of statesmanship
and politics.
So welcome, and we trust that your visit, though
it is brief here, will be one of warmliearted friend-
ship every place you go.
Response by Prime Minister Costeilo
Mr. Vice President, when I was listening to your
very kind words of welcome, I felt that you should
have been in my position as having kissed the
Blarney stone. I aiJj^reciate the warmth of the
welcome that has been extended to me this morn-
ing and appreciate that that welcome is given
from the American people to the Irish nation and
the Irish people.
Of course, even the great American Nation
which has achieved so much can as j'et not control
the weather. We have a saying in Ireland, going
back for many centuries — I will give you the Eng-
lish and not the Irish expression — that St. Pati-ick
took the cold stone out of the water. The old
legend was that the water was heated by hot stones,
and of course they grew cold and the water grew
cold. But St. Patrick took it out and, accord-
ingly, after St. Patrick's Da}' the weather will
get fine.
I regret I can't promise you the weather will
get fine before St. Patrick's Day.
The reason that I have come here to the United
States once again, where I have so many friends
and where there are so many people friendly to
my country, is one not as coming to a foreign coun-
try but as coming to a country in which we have
560
Deparfmenf of State BuUetin
much in common and in which we are really part
of the American race. We always remember the
welcome that was given to our people in bad times,
and we hope that they gave, as your Vice President
has said, good and substantial and ample return
for the warmth and welcome and the shelter they
got here in bad times in building up this great
American Nation.
You have given me a welcome as representative
of the Irish Government and the Irish people.
On their behalf and as their representative, I
thank you for the warmth of your welcome and
bring you their affectionate greetings and the
warmest admiration for this great United States
of America.
ADDRESS BY THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE
SENATE, MARCH 15 >
I wish to express my appreciation of the honor
you have done me by inviting me to appear here
and address you today. Your invitation is but
another of the many friendly gestures which your
great country has extended to mine, gestures which
spring from, and go far to perpetuate, those close
and intimate ties which bind our countries. It is
my earnest desire — and my firm intention, insofar
as any effort of mine can bring it about — that my
short stay amongst you will help to nourish and
foster those ties, so that in the future, as in the
past, there may exist between our two countries
full community of sympathy and interest notwith-
standing the 3,000 miles of ocean that separate
but paradoxically unite us.
Tlie ties which unite our countries sjiring from
a common outlook and from common ideals, based
on a Christian, democratic, and free way of life.
This is not surprising, as Ireland's spiritual em-
pire, consisting of many millions of persons of
Irish birth or descent scattered in every corner
of the globe, is nowhere so powerful as in your
country. It is this sense of basic community of
the spirit between our two countries which serves
to keep alive today the older historical ties which
for centuries past have constituted a bond between
us.
In the United States of America, we see the
mightiest upholder of the traditional values of the
West. In the veins of this great people flows the
' Reprinted from Covg. Rec. of Mar. 15, p. 4307.
blood of many European races, and the Irish have
contributed a more than proportionate share. It
is not long, in historical time, since America was
created as a new Nation, "conceived in liberty,"
but even then predestined to greatness. In her
growth and in the achievements of her people, she
has, however, far outstripped the older nations
from which she drew her origins. She has become
a giant among the nations of the world, splendid
in her youth and majestic in her strength.
I bring to you the greetings of a very old na-
tion, though one not long emerged into the light
of freedom from centuries of darkness and near
despair. We are proud to claim our place as a
people who contributed not a little to the creation
and development of your great country, and we
gladly acknowledge that our contribution has
been abundantly repaid in the sympathy and sup-
port which we have always received from you in
time of need.
At a time when freedom seemed for us, at home,
a dissolving dream, Ireland's sons played a signifi-
cant part in the attainment of liberty in this land
of yours. It is, I think, pardonable for us to feel
some of the pride that gladdens a parent whose
son has grown to manhood in strength and fame
and good repute.
Ours is a small country, yours a mighty one.
But we have much in common. We, like you, have
a tradition of devotion to those principles of
freedom, Christian justice and humanity which
are facing, in the world of today, a challenge more
powerful and menacing than any that has opposed
them in the past. It can scarcely be doubted that
the almost miraculous development of your coun-
try is a manifestation of God's providence, which
never leaves His people without a defender strong
enough to meet the evil forces of the time. We
see in you a Nation, magnificent in its youthful
vigor, well fitted to bear the tremendous burden
which, in the course of history, has fallen upon
its shoulders. Yours is the power and yours,
therefore, the responsibility to insure that, in these
days of great danger, freedom "shall not perish
from the earth."
Ireland may claim to be qualified, better per-
haps than any other nation, to serve as a link
between the Old World and the New. She is
herself an ancient European nation, and her peo-
ple are steeped in the Christian traditions of
European culture. Once situated at the edge of
Apr/; 2, J 956
561
the known world, she now finds herself rather
at its center, between Europe and America. Such
influence as she possesses cannot, in view of her
size, be founded in material strength. Bather is
it a spiritual influence, which, though without the
support of big battalions, has an importance which
the Christian democracies of the world will not
ignore. How fortunate these democracies are
that in your great country they have found a happy
alliance of the big battalions with that same
spiritual strength.
Millions of our people have found here a sec-
ond home. In the recent as well as in the more
distant past, many of her sons have fought and
died for America. I want, however, to mention
an Irishman who, nominally, at least, fought
against your country. His name was Richard
Fitzpatrick.
I seek through you the permission of Congress
to present to the Library of Congress five un-
published letters which Fitzpatrick wrote to his
brother, the Second Earl of Upper Ossory, dur-
ing your War of Independence. These letters are
a small Irish contribution to the study of the
history of the United States, but they have a wider
significance, which is my excuse for bringing them
to your attention today.
The outbreak of the War of Independence
found Richard Fitzpatrick a captain in the
British Army. As an intimate friend of Charles
James Fox, the great Whig leader, his whole in-
clinations were against the attempt to subdue the
American people, but when ordered abroad to war
his sense of duty forbade him to resign his com-
mission.
His letters do not concern themselves much with
the incidents of the campaign. They are for the
most part a series of reflections on the merits, con-
duct, and probable issue of the war.
Fitzpatrick, as a member of Parliament, must
have many times listened to the rolling periods of
his fellow Irishman Edmund Burke, the greatest
mind of the age, and one of the greatest political
thinkers of all time. Burke had not yet declared
the age of chivalry to be gone, and it is not sur-
prising that a man of feeling and intelligence who
lived and moved in such an environment as did
Fitzpatrick should detest a situation which made
him the instrument of an ignoble cause, "a situ-
ation," says Fitzpatrick, "where I am obliged to
be constantly acting in direct opposition to all my
feelings, principles and opinions."
"I grow every day," he cries, "more and more
disgusted with the folly and iniquity of the cause
in which I am condemned to serve."
Xeither is it surprising that Fitzpatrick's ex-
perience of the American character and temper
should lead him to the conclusion that the war
could have only one outcome.
Shrewd though many of his judgments were,
they pale into insignificance beside a remark which
he made when Congi'ess struck a medal in com-
memoration of the Convention of Saratoga. On
that occasion, he said :
There is a greatness and a dignity in all the proceed-
ings of this people that makes us contemptible indeed. I
am well convinced they will be the lirst and greatest
people there ever was an example of in the history of
mankind.
I doubt if history holds a comparable instance
of such prescience. It was this near prophecy on
the part of a private and comparatively obscure
observer of the scene 180 years ago that first
prompted the trustees of the National Library
of Ireland and myself to feel that the proper cus-
todian of these historic manuscripts should not be
the National Library of Ireland, whence I am
their bearer, but the Library of Congress.
Gentlemen, today the world looks to you as
"the first and greatest people there ever was an
example of in the history of mankind." IMay your
actions always be worthy of the responsibility thus
thrust upon you, and may there always be a "great-
ness and dignity in your proceedings" that will
match those shown by your stouthearted fore-
fathers in their critical hour.
That is my wish for you in presenting you with
this gift from a small nation which is deeply in
your debt but, you will permit me to say, whose
sons and daughters have played their part in mak-
ing you what you are — the greatest Nation in the
world.
ADDRESS TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
MARCH 15 '
I am deeply honored by the invitation to address
your assembly. I am sensible that you are hon-
oring not me but the Irish Government and the
whole Irish peojile, whose spokesman I am today.
I bring a message of good will from a young
= nid., p. 4236.
562
Department of Sfofe Bulletin
republic, which is an old nation, to your young
Nation, the oldest republic on earth.
At the outset of my remarks, and before I ad-
dress you on the topics I wish to cover in my ad-
dress today, I seek your permission to present to
tlie Library of Congress five unpublished letters
which Richard Fitzpatrick wrote to his brother,
the Second Earl of Upper Ossory during your
War of Independence. These letters were pur-
chased by the trustees of our National Library of
Ireland and were lodged in the National Library.
The originals of these letters go back to 1777.
Eichard Fitzpatrick, who wrote those letters, the
originals of which are in this small case, was an
Irishman fighting with the British Army against
the army of the forthcoming United States of
America. He did not like this task, but as a soldier
he felt bound to obey the orders to fight in a cause
of which he did not approve. During the course
of his campaigning against the soldiers of the
American Republic, he wrote some letters to his
brother in which he expressed the opinion that the
British people were fighting a battle in which they
should not be engaged. He also indicated what
his view would be of the outcome of the struggle.
I ask you to permit me to present the originals
of these letters to the Library of Congress. They
are remarkable for the fact they are so old, still
more remarkable for the fact they are the candid
and self-critical expressions of a soldier who was
fighting against an army who were themselves
struggling for independence, but they are really
remarkable, outstandingly remarkable, for one
particular passage which I ask your permission to
read to you and which in itself furnishes me with
an excuse, if an excuse were needed, and certainly
with a justification, for asking that your Library
shall have custody of these historic documents
rather than our National Library of Ireland.
In one of his letters, giving expression to his
views after Congress had struck a medal in com-
memoration of the Convention of Saratoga, he
said:
There is a greatness and a dignity in all the proceedings
of this people that makes us contemptible indeed. I am
well convinced they will be the first and greatest people
there ever was an example of in the history of mankind.
I am presenting you with this small gift as the
representative of a small nation to this Nation
which has fulfilled the prophecy Fitzpatrick made
180 years ago.
I take leave to express the conviction that your
actions will always be worthy of the responsibility
which has been thrust upon you and that there
will always be in the proceedings of this great
Nation a "greatness and dignity in your proceed-
ings" that will continue to keep you "the first and
greatest people there ever was an example of in
the history of mankind."
Your countrymen are well aware that they
occupy a very special place in the hearts of all
Irishmen, a position due as much to Irish admira-
tion of the achievements and attainments of the
United States as to the many associations our two
countries have in common.
You have been the world's exemplar of liberty
and the course you have so brilliantly traveled
many in the rest of the world have been content
but to follow. Your magnificent political institu-
tions, the creation of your youthful genius, have
been the model not less for us in Dublin than for
the other centers of the civilized world. Yours
has been the idea of a fundamental document pro-
tecting, with a carefully balanced arrangement of
political power, the fundamental human rights.
^Vhat a noble conception of man has inspired your
Constitution, yet how well founded it is on the
earth. The idealism has not vanished like a dream
but has remained the angelic part of a truly human
institution.
For your Founding Fathers, to whose broodings
political philosophers of every age return for in-
spiration, were not merely tliinkers but men of
action, too: If theoretical, practical also. They
knew the nature of man, so wittily disclosed by
G. K. Chesterton, who said :
There is one little defect about man, the image of God,
the wonder of the world and the paragon of animals, he
is not to be trusted.
This fine distrust, a lawyer's shrewdness, is writ
large over your Constitution. The men wlio made
it built well on sound foundations : and what they
built has endured.
It has been said that growth is the only evi-
dence of life. What amazing, unexampled growth
has not your history shown. What abounding life
does not your country display. May your future
repeat the miracles of your past and well will
humanity be served. Your present hospitality
is but another happy instance of those many
friendly gestures toward Ireland which the United
States has made in the ptast. It is not very many
years ago since it was my pleasant duty to ex-
April 2, 1956
563
press our thanks for the generous help which we
received under Marshall aid. But the help which
America gave Ireland did not start with Marshall
aid. Long before Marshall aid was thought of,
American support sustained the Irish people.
Ages ago, long before America was discovered
by Europe, it was imagined by Irish seers as I-
Breasail — The Island of Great Desire — a fertile
land of alluring loveliness; in the terrible centu-
ries of Ireland's misfortune when "Hope had
grown gray hairs, Hope had mourning on," this
memory remained. Then out into the miraculous
sunsets of the west coast of Ireland went many an
Irish family to reach this Island of Great Desire,
and truly were they not mistaken in their jour-
neys, for abounding hospitality and consolation
in plenty awaited them and a fine future of noble
living. Ajid it is our boast that our emigrants
have contributed not insignificantly to the build-
ing up of America. We allow ourselves, therefore,
to feel that we, too, may to an extent share your
greatness.
All small nations owe a special debt of gratitude
to the United States for its strong and unceas-
ing efforts for world peace. Through your efforts
we have been spared the unlimited horrors of
modern war and have thereby been able to main-
tain unscathed our Christian, democratic, and
free way of life.
It has been your honor to have exercised the
greatest power on earth in accordance with the
high principles of justice. It has, indeed, been
well said that you ai'e apt for power. If you do
but maintain your power as the servant of your
rectitude, the world's future will be in good hands.
I pray that it may be so. You will not need en-
couragement from me to ignore the misunder-
standings and misrepresentations with which your
foreign policy has been met in certain lands, for
ingratitude is the first of the sins of man. But
I can assure you that the free critical intelligence
of my countrymen has not faulted your intention.
History has inextricably intertwined the for-
tunes of our two countries, and it is an easy task
to come on such a mission as mine. I have the
sense of having traveled far only to find myself
at home. It was the Irish statesman, Henry Grat-
tan, who said that the ocean unites, and in the
west of my country we say that the next parish
is America.
Time has not fulfilled nor realized the optimist's
dream. Its passage has not exclusively brought
564
improvement to the human situation. Indeed,
some of the developments we have witnessed have
confronted mankind with the ultimate decisions
about life. Nevertheless, it was your great Amer-
ican judge, Oliver Wendell Holmes, who said :
I think it not improbable tliat man, like the grub that
prepares a chamber for the winged thing It never has
seen but is to be — that man may have cosmic destinies
that he does not understand.
This has been the heart of the Christian message,
imparted to all of us, that man has such cosmic
destinies ; and it is good that the people of America
and of Ireland can share together the Christian
hope.
Atoms-for-Peace Agreement Signed
by Ireland and U.S.
On March 16 the Atomic Energy Commission
and the Department of State (press release 141)
announced that representatives of Ireland and
the United States had on that day signed a pro-
posed agreement for cooperation in research in the
peaceful uses of atomic energy.^ The agreement
was negotiated within the framework of Presi-
dent Eisenhower's atoms-for-peace program.
The agreement was signed for Ireland by Am-
bassador John J. Hearne. The Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for European Affairs, C. Burke
Elbrick, and I^wis Strauss, Chairman of the
Atomic Energy Commission, signed for the United
States.
Under the proposed agreement, the Government
of Ireland will receive information as to the de-
sign, construction, and operation of research re-
actors and their use as research, development, and
engineering tools. It is contemplated that pri-
vate American citizens and organizations would be
authorized to supply to the Irish Government, or
to authorized private persons under its jurisdic-
tion, appropriate equipment and services.
The proposed agreement further provides that
the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission will lease to
the Irish Government for use in research reactors
up to 6 kilograms (13.2 pounds) of contained
U-235 in uranium enriched up to a maximum of
20 percent U-235. Ireland assumes resix)nsil)ility
for using and safeguarding the fissionable mate- "
rial in accordance with the terms of the proposed
' For text of a similar agreement with Turkey, Ini-
tialed on May 3, 1955, see Bitlletin of July 11, 1955, p. 55. A
Deparlmenf of Sfafe BuUelin (Im
J
agreement. The agreement provides for the ex-
change of unclassified information in tlie research
reactor field, related health and safety problems,
and on the use of radioactive isotopes in physical
and biological research, medical therapy, agri-
culture, and industry.
Looking to the future, the agi'eement expresses
the hope and expectation of the parties that this
initial agreement for cooperation will lead to con-
sideration of further cooperation in the peaceful
uses of atomic energy.
This proposed cooperative agreement will en-
able the Irish to enliance their own country's train-
ing and experience in nuclear science and engi-
neering for the development of peaceful uses of
atomic energy, including civilian nuclear power
within the framework of the atoms-for-peace
program.
Under the provisions of the U.S. Atomic Energy
Act of 1954, certain procedural steps must be
taken by the executive and legislative branches of
the United States Government before the agree-
ment signed may enter into force.
Earthquake Disaster in Lebanon
Following are the texts of messages sent to
President Camille Chamoun of Lebanon iy Presi-
dent Eisenhower on March 19 ( White House press
release dated March 20) and hy Acting Secretary
Hoover on March 17 {press release llfi) .
Message From President Eisenhower
News of the tragic consequences of the earth-
quakes in Lebanon has been received with sorrow
and concern throughout the United States. On
behalf of the American people I send deepest sym-
pathy to Your Excellency and to all those who
are suffering in this disaster.
Message From Acting Secretary Hoover
The news of Lebanon's earthquake disaster has
been yidely reported in the U.S. On behalf of
this Government and the American people, I
hasten to send Your Excellency heartfelt condo-
lences on the loss of lives that has resulted and
deepest sympathy to the bereaved families and
others in distress, particularly in Chauf and the
villages of Mt. Lebanon and South Lebanon.
Prime Minister of India
To Visit United States
White House press release dated March 20
The Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal
Nehru, has accepted the President's invitation to
visit the United States. It has now been found
that a visit immediately following the conclusion
of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Confer-
ence in London would be mutually agreeable.
It is expected that Mr. Nehru will arrive in the
United States on July 6 or 7 and will depart on
July 10 or 11. The visit will be an informal one,
and discussions between the President and Prime
Minister Nehru will cover matters of mutual in-
terest between the two countries.
The President has offered to have the Presi-
dential plane bring the Prime Minister from Lon-
don and return him there upon completion of
his visit.
CongratuBatory Messages to Pakistan
on Republic Day
MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT EISENHOWER
White House press release dated March 22
The President sent the follotoing letter on March
21 to General IsJcander Mirsa, President of
Pakistan, on the occasion of the celebration of Re-
public Day, Pakistan's new national holiday,
March 23, 1966.
Dear Mr. President: On the occasion of
Pakistan's establishment as a Republic within the
Commonwealth, I send my greetings and best
wishes, as well as those of the j^eople of the United
States, to you and through you to the people of
Pakistan. The United States will be represented
at the attendant ceremonies by the United States
Ambassador to Pakistan [Horace A. Hildreth]
and by a Special Representative, the Honorable
Jefferson Caffery, one of our most distinguished
citizens.
The inauguration of Pakistan's constitution
represents an important milestone in Pakistan's
development as a modern, democratic state, re-
sponsive to the needs and aspirations of its people.
The long efforts of Pakistan's leaders in drafting a
April 2, 1956
565
constitution based on democratic principles have
culminated in well-deserved success. Because of
the close ties of friendship between our countries,
the people of the United States are particularly
happy to send expressions of good will on this
memorable day in Pakistan's history.
I am confident that under your inspiring leader-
ship Pakistan will continue to make progress in
advancing the welfare of its people.
May I exjjress my good wishes for success in
these worthy endeavors.
Sincerely,
DwiGHT D. Eisenhower
MESSAGES FROM SECRETARY DULLES
Press release 156 dated March 22
Secretary Dulles on March 21 addressed the fol-
lowing congratulatory messages to Prime Minister
Chaudhri Mohamad Ali and Foreign Minister
Hamidul Huq Ghoudhury of Pakistan.
Secretary Dulles to the Prime Minister
Dear Mr. Prime Minister : I want to extend to
you my warmest congratulations on the coming
into effect of Pakistan's constitution and the estab-
lishment of Pakistan as a Republic within the
Commonwealth. Despite formidable difficulties
Pakistan has established an impressive record of
achievement in many fields since its independence
but a few years ago. The adoption of a constitu-
tion represents another important stride in
Pakistan's advance. It is our belief that the estab-
lishment of a Republic in Pakistan marks the be-
ginning of a new era of progi-ess and growth for
your country.
I greatly enjoyed my recent visit to Pakistan on
the occasion of our successful Seato meeting. I
shall long cherish the kindness and hospitality ex-
tended to me by the people of Pakistan.
Sincerely yours,
John Foster Dulles
Secretary Dulles to the Foreign Minister
Dear Mr. Minister: On the occasion of
Pakistan's establislunent as a Republic within the
Commonwealth I offer my best wishes to you and
to the people of Pakistan. The adoption of a con-
stitution guaranteeing the preservation of funda-
mental human rights is evidence of your country's
deep attachment to democratic principles and is an
566
event of which all the people of Pakistan may be
truly proud.
The United States looks forward to a continua-
tion of the close cooperation wliich has charac-
terized our common exertions for safeguarding the
peace. Pakistan's contribution to the collective
defense efforts of the free woi-ld is a reassurance
to its friends and I am sure it is also a source of
pride to Pakistan's own leaders and people.
Sincerely yours,
John Foster Dulles
Note to Japanese Government
on Pacific Nuclear Tests
Press release 158 dated March 23
Following is the text of a note concerning th£
forthcoming nuclear tests in the Pacific which was
delivered iy the Department of State to the Em-
bassy of Japan on March 19.
The Acting Secretary of State presents his com-
pliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of
Japan and has the honor to refer to the note from
the Embassy of Japan dated January 25, 1956,^
requesting assurances of compensation in the event
of damage or economic loss arising from the forth-
coming nuclear tests in the Pacific, and the Em-
bassy's note dated February 14, 1956,' transmit-
ting the resolutions of the Japanese Diet urging
suspension of nuclear tests and expressing the
strong wish of the Government of Japan that
earnest consideration be given to the realization
of the desire of the people of Japan as expressed
in these resolutions.
The United States is second to none in its desire
for the safeguarded control and reduction of
armaments, including nuclear weapons. Presi-
dent Eisenhower has led the way toward world
cooperation to achieve this goal. In his address
to the United Nations General Assembly on De-
cember 8, 1953,^ he stated,
. . . the United States pledges before you — and therefore
before Ihe world — its determination to help solve the fear-
ful atomic dilemma — to devote its entire heart and mind
to find the way by which tie miraculous inventiveness of
man shall not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated
to his life.
At the Summit Conference in Geneva last sum-
' Not printed.
' Bulletin of Dee. 21, 1953, p. 847.
Department of State Bulletin
mer, President Eisenhower proposed an exchange
of bhieprints and a system of aerial inspection.^
Most recently, in his letter of March 1, 1956, to
Premier Bulganin of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Kepublics,^ the President stated that :
In my judgment, our efforts must be directed especially
to bringing under control tbe nuclear threat. As an im-
portant step for this purpose and assuming the satisfactory
operation of our air and ground inspection system, the
United States would be prepared to work out, with other
nations, suitable and safeguarded arrangements so that
future production of fissionable materials anywhere in
the world would no longer be used to increase the stock-
piles of explosive weapons. With this could be combined
my proposal of December 8, 1953, "to begin now and con-
tinue to make joint contributions" from existing stockpiles
of normal uranium and fissionable materials to an inter-
national atomic agency. These measures, if carried out
adequately, would reverse the present trend toward a
constant increase in nuclear weapons overhanging the
world. My ultimate hope is that all production of fission-
able materials anywhere in the world will be devoted ex-
clusively to peaceful purposes.
The United States recognizes and strongly sym-
pathizes with the humane motivations which in-
spired the resolutions of the Japanese Diet, but is
constrained to point out that the problem of sus-
pending nuclear weapons tests cannot be treated
separately from the establishment of a safe-
guarded and controlled disarmament program.
The United States Government is convinced
tliat the proposed nuclear tests are vital to its own
defense and the defense of the free world because
the possession and competence in the use of nuclear
weapons by leading nations of the free world are
the chief deterrent to aggression and to war. In-
ternational agreement to abandon tests without
effective safeguards against the clandestine de-
velopment of new weapons would involve a reli-
ance by the United States upon the good intentions
of certain nations not justified by the record of
their actions in the past.
The United States Government is convinced
that no world-wide health hazard exists from the
past or planned tests. In this connection the
United States proposed a resolution ' unanimously
adopted by the United Nations Tenth General
Assembly establishing a scientific committee on
radiation, of which Japan is a member, to facili-
='/6i(i., Aug. 1,1955, p. 173.
' lUd., Mar. 26, 1956, p. 514.
' For text, see ibid., Nov. 21, 1955, p. 855.
tate jDooling and distribution of all available scien-
tific data on the effects of radiation upon man and
his environment. During the forthcoming tests
the United States will make every effort to elimi-
nate any danger and to minimize any inconven-
ience to maritime commerce and fishing.
It cannot be regarded as established on the basis
of present information that substantial economic
losses will result from the establishment of the
danger area. Military exercises are a traditional
use of the high seas, and the Government of the
United States considers that inconvenience for
other traditional uses which may result therefrom
is not compensable as a matter of right.
In view of precautions which will attend the
tests and the widespread dissemination of infor-
mation with respect to maximum permissible
levels of radiation, the United States Government
anticipates no economic losses from radioactive
contamination of marine life.
The United States Government is prepared,
however, in the interest of the fullest understand-
ing and cooperation between the two countries :
1. To examine with the Japanese Government
the consequences for Japanese maritime activities
resulting from establishment of the danger area,
to which end consultations have already begun ;
2. To make its experts available for any further
consultations which the Japanese Government
may desire upon radiation standards and maxi-
mum permissible levels of radiation, and to con-
sider arrangements for maximum feasible ex-
change of information on the effects of radiation
on marine life ; and
3. If after the test series has ended, any evidence
is officially presented that substantial economic
losses for Japan or Japanese nationals have been
incurred as a result of establishment of the danger
area and the tests, to give fm-ther consideration to
the question of compensation in the light of any
such evidence.
In conclusion the Acting Secretary wishes to
give the assurance that the United States continues
only such tests as are essential to the strength of
the free world defense and security. It has sought
and will continue to seek with renewed efforts a
system for a safe-guarded and controlled disarm-
ament program which ultimately may lead to the
type of action envisaged by the resolutions of the
Japanese Diet.
April 2, J 956
567
Visa Applications Cut Off for Refugees
Indigenous to Far East
Press release 147 dated March 19
Because of the heavy oversubscription for the
3,000 visas allotted by the Kefugee Relief Act
to refugees who are indigenous to the Far East, the
Department of State announced on March 19 that
it will accept no new applications for such visas
after midnight March 26, 1956.
As of March 9, 1956, 1,863 of the 3,000 visas
had been issued and the number of applications on
hand greatly exceeds the number of visas remain-
ing to be issued.
In instructions to the consulates. Pierce J. Ge-
rety, Deputy Administrator of the act, empha-
sized that :
1. The cutoff would not apply to orphan appli-
cants residing in the Far East who are processed
under another section of the act.
2. The cutoff would not apply to nonindigenous
refugees residing in the Far East or to refugees of
Chinese ethnic origin who have passports en-
dorsed by the Chinese Government. These cases
are processed imder other sections of the Refugee
Relief Act.
3. Since assurances for refugees indigenous to
the Far East received after the cutoff' date will
not be processed under the Refugee Relief Act,
such assurances will be sent to the appropriate
consular authorities to permit the applicant to es-
tablish a priority registration date mider the nor-
mal annual quota of the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act.
Similar cutoffs have been announced by the De-
partment of State for Greece and Italy,^ where
sufficient cases are on hand to cover the 17,000
visas allocated to Greece and the 60,000 visas
allocated to Italy under the Refugee Relief Act.
As of March 9, 1956, the total worldwide issu-
ance of visas under the Refugee Relief Act was
89,742. Despite the assured success of the pro-
gram in Greece, Italy, and in the indigenous refu-
gee category in the Far East, sponsors continue
to be needed f oi' refugees in Germany, the Nether-
lands, and Austria, as well as for refugees in
Italy and Greece who have been processed but are
still lacking sponsors.
^ Bulletin of Dec. 5, 1955, p. 917, and Jan. 2, 1956, p. 16.
568
Eximbank Credit to Philippines
for Industrial Growth
A credit of $65 million for development of the
economy of the Republic of the Philippines was
announced on March 8 by Samuel C. Waugh,
president of the Export-Import Bank of Wash-
ington, at a joint press conference with Miguel
Cuaderno, governor of the Central Bank of the
Philippines.
The credit was authorized by the Board of Di-
rectors of the Export-Import Bank for the pur-
pose of contributing to the industrial growth and
financial progress of the Philippines through a
series of loans for expansion and diversification of
the economy of the Republic. The Board also ex-
pressed its particular pleasure, in view of the
close friendship which exists between the Philip-
pines and the United States, in being able to make
this financial assistance available as an expression
of confidence of the U.S. Government in the future
prospects of the Philippines.
The loans will be made to either public agencies
or private concerns and will provide for purchase
in the United States, for export, of machinery,
equipment, material, and services required for
various projects.
Fifty million dollars will be made available di-
rectly in favor of public and private entities to
assist them in financing large-scale projects that
may be apjiroved on a case-by-case basis by the
Eximbank.
Fifteen million dollars will relate primarily to
small private industrial-expansion projects and
will be made available either directly in favor of
the Central Bank of the Philippines or upon rec-
ommendation of the Central Bank and approval
of the Export-Import Bank, to the Rehabilitation
Finance Corporation, Philippine National Bank,
and commercial banks in the Philippines. These
credits are for the purpose of enabling the Central
Bank to assist Philippine enterprises in meeting
dollar requirements of appropriate transactions
and for the purpose of enabling the Central Bank
and public and private Philippine lending institu-
tions to assist Philippine enterprises in connection
with purchases in the United States.
The Export- Import Bank indicated it is pre-
pared to consider the following general types of
developments for financing under the credit
authorization :
Department of State Bulletin
1. Projects designed to reduce Philippine de-
pendence on imported raw materials and find out-
lets for its growing labor surplus ;
2. Development of timber and mineral resources
in order to reduce the country's dependence on a
few agricultural products as the chief source of
foreign exchange;
3. Expansion of basic service industries, such
as power and transportation, to service a gi'owing
economy; and
4. Reduction of future foreign-exchange re-
quirements through development of industries
consuming domestic materials or imported mate-
rials at an earlier processing stage.
Terms of the loans will vary, depending upon
the nature of each. Smaller loans, coming under
the $15 million aspect of the program, will run in
general for 5 years, while loans in the $50 million
part of the pi'ogram, for larger projects, will be
of longer duration. Interest rates also will vary
slightly, case by case.
Mr. Waugh advised Governor Cuaderno that,
in establishing the $65 million credit, it is the
Eximbank's hope that the Philippine Govern-
ment and private enterjDrises in the Philippines
will be able to make use of credit through specific
loans in the immediate future to the mutual ad-
vantage of both nations.
Under the administration of President Magsay-
say the Philippine Government has encouraged
an industrial development program which will
greatly strengthen the economic stability of the
Republic. Under this program the hydroelectric
potential of the Agno River in northern Luzon is
under development and the proposed Binga Dam
is now under consideration.
The new $65 million credit is in addition to $5
million Eximbank credit extended in 1954 to
lending institutions in the Philippines, upon rec-
ommendation of the Central Bank.
U.S. Proposal to Burma
To Exchange Technicians for Rice
The U.S. Government has proposed to the Gov-
ernment of the Union of Burma an agreement
under which the United States would exchange
the services of American technicians for about
10,000 tons of rice, the International Cooperation
April 2, 1956
Administration announced on March 12. The new
technicians-for-rice agreement proposed by the
United States would enable Burma to pay for the
services of needed technicians which, because of a
shortage of dollar resei'ves, it could not otherwise
obtain.
Upon conclusion of such an agreement, the
United States would immediately make $1 million
available to Burma to enable its Government to
hire U.S. technicians. Burma would then repay
the United States in local currency. It is antici-
pated that this local currency would then be used
to provide up to 10,000 tons of rice for shipment
to Pakistan to help avert a severe food shortage in
East Pakistan. The United States has already
agreed to provide about 165,000 tons of U.S. sur-
plus rice to Pakistan under titles I and II of Public
Law 480 to meet the food shortage.
Recently Burma concluded an agreement with
the United States under which it will buy about
$21 million worth of U.S. surplus cotton, dairy
products, tobacco, and fruit.' Payments for these
commodities, too, will be in Burmese currency.
This agreement, under title I of Public Law 480,
will permit Burma to increase consumer imports
without drawing on its limited dollar foreign-
exchange reserves.
There is no U.S. aid program in Burma at pres-
ent. From 1950 to 1953, however, about $19 mil-
lion was spent by the United States in technical
cooperation programs there. Since that time the
Burmese Goveriunent has continued to employ the
services of several groups of U.S. technicians orig-
inally sent to Burma through the U.S. technical
cooperation program.
Escape-Clause Relief on Acid-Grade
Fluorspar Held Unnecessary
White House press release d-ited March 20
White House Announcement
The President on March 20 announced that he
has acted on the United States Tariff Commis-
sion's report of its escape-clause investigation re-
lating to acid-grade fluorspar by accepting as the
findings of the Tariff Commission the findings of
the three Commissioners who concluded that the
' BtJLLETiN of Feb. 20, 1956, p. 308.
569
domestic industry is not present!}' experiencing
serious injury, that it is not faced with a threat of
serious injury, and that escape-clause relief is not
warranted. The other three Commissioners found
no present serious injury but did find a threat of
such injury and recommended that the 1951 con-
cession on acid-grade fluorspar, reducing the tariff
from $5.60 per long ton to $2.10 per long ton, be
withdrawn in full.
Under present law, in escape-clause cases where
the Tariff Commission is equally divided, the
President is authorized to accept the findings of
eitlier half of the Commission as the findings of
the Commission.
The President's decision was taken only after
he had consulted with interested departments and
agencies in the executive branch of the Govern-
ment.
This application for escape-clause relief is sepa-
rate and distinct from the domestic industry's ap-
plication under last year's so-called national
security amendment to the Trade Agreements
Extension Act of 1951. The latter application is
still pending before the Director of the Office of
Defense Mobilization.
The Tariff Commission's report was submitted
to the President on January 18, 1956.^
The text of the President's letters to the Chair-
men of the Senate Finance and the House Ways
and Means Committees [Senator Harry F. Byrd
and Representative Jere Cooper] is as follows:
Text of President's Letter to Chairmen of Congres-
sional Committees
Dear Mr. Chairman : The United States Tariff
Commission on January 18, 1956 submitted to me
a report of its escape clause investigation relating
to acid grade fluorspar. The Commission's inves-
tigation was made pursuant to Section 7 of the
Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, as
amended.
The members of the Commission are equally di-
vided on the question of whether relief is war-
ranted. Under present law, I am authorized to
consider the findings of either group of Commis-
sioners as the findings of the Commission.
The three Commissioners who concluded that
escape clause relief is warranted found no existing
serious injury to the domestic acid grade fluorspar
'Copies may be obtained from tbe U.S. Tariff Commis-
sion, Washington 25. D.C.
industry but did find a threat of such injury.
These three Commissioners recommend that the
tariff on imports of acid grade fluorspar, which
was reduced in 1951 from $5.60 per long ton to
$2.10 per long ton, be restored in full.
The other three Commissioners do not find that
the domestic industry is currently experi-
encing serious injury, nor do they find it threat-
ened with serious injury. They report that they
do not detect any strong probability that the con-
ditions of the industry in the immediate future
will be less favorable than at present. They con-
clude that no basis exists for granting escape
clause relief.
After full consultation with interested depart-
ments and agencies of the Executive Branch, I
have decided to accept, as the findings of the
Commission, the findings of the three Commis-
sioners who held no escape clause relief to be neces-
sary at this time.
This application for escape clause relief is sep-
arate and distinct from the domestic industry's
application under last year's so-called national se-
curity amendment to the Trade Agi'eements Ex-
tension Act of 1951. The latter application is
pending before the Director of the Office of De-
fense Mobilization.
Sincerely,
DwiGHT D. Eisenhower
Current Legislation on Foreign Policy:
84th Congress, 2d Session
Japanese-American Evacuation Claims Act. Report to
accompany H. R. 7763. H. Rept. 1809, February 23,
1956. 15 pp.
Situation in the Middle East. Hearing before the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations. February 24, 1956.
73 pp.
Further Amending Section 20 of the Trading with the
Enemy Act, Relating to Fees of Agents, Attorneys, and
Representatives. Report to accompany S. 1146. S.
Rept. 1603, ITebruary 27, 1956. 4 pp.
Cargo Preference and Its Relation to the Farm Surplus
Disposal Program. Report pursuant to section 136 of
the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Public Law
601, 79th Congress. H. Rept. 1818, February 27, 1956.
30 pp.
Reorganization of the Passport OflBce. Report of the
Senate Committee on Government Operations. S. Reptj
1604, March 1, 1956. 25 pp.
Reorganization of the Passport Office. Report to accom-
pany S. ,S;!40. S. Rept. 1605, March 1, 1956. 8 pp.
Exemption of Certain Foreign Travel from Tax on Trans-
portation of Persons. Report to accompany H. R. 5265.
S. Rept. 1607, March 1, 1956. 12 pp.
Amending the United States Information and Exchange
Act of 1948, as Amended. Report to accompany S. 2562.
S. Rept. 1608, March 1, 1956. 5 pp.
570
Deparfmenf of State Bulletin
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
Calendar of Meetings '
Adjourned During March 1956
U.N. Trusteeship Council: Standing Committee on Petitions . . . New York Jan. 3- Mar. 31*
ICAO Special North Atlantic Regional Air Navigation Meeting . . Paris Feb. 20-Mar. 3
U.N. Trusteeship Council: Standing Committee on Administrative New York Feb. 21-Mar. 31*
Unions.
Inter-American Travel Congresses: 2d Meeting of Permanent Exec- Lima Feb. 27- Mar. 3
utive Committee.
International Telecommunication Union: Meeting of Chairmen of Geneva Feb. 29-Mar. 8
Seven CCIT and CCIF Study Groups.
ITU International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR): Study New York Mar. 5-18
Group XI, Color Television Demonstrations.
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Human Rights: 12th Session . . . New York Mar. 5-29
SEATO Council Karachi Mar. 6-8
ILO Governing Body: 131st Session Geneva Mar. 6-10
U.N. ECAFE Subcommittee on Electric Power Bangalore Mar. 7-12
Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences: 1st Meeting of 'Turrialba (Costa Rica) . . . Mar. 8-10
Technical Advisory Council.
UNICEF Executive Board and Program Committee New York Mar. 12-23
WMO Regional Association VI (Europe) : 2d Session Dubrovnik (Yugoslavia) . . Mar. 12-24
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Status of Women: 10th Session . . Geneva Mar. 12-28
U.N. Scientific Committee on Effects of Atomic Radiation: 1st New York Mar. 14-24
Session.
Inter- American Specialized Conference on the Conservation of the Ciudad Trujillo (Dominican Mar. 15-28
Natural Resources of the Continental Shelf and Marine Waters. Republic).
U.N. ECE Coal Committee Geneva Mar. 21-22
U.N. ECAFE Railway Subcommittee: 4th Session New Delhi Mar. 25-31
Meeting of Canadian-Mexioan-United States Heads of Government White Sulphur Springs (W. Mar. 26-28
Va.).
U.N. ECE Timber Committee Geneva Mar. 26-28
I In Session as of Marcli 31, 1956
North Pacific Fur Seal Conference Washington Nov. 28-
International Fair for Peace and Progress Ciudad Trujillo (Dominican Dec. 20-
Republic) .
GATT Contracting Parties: 1956 Tariff Negotiations Geneva Jan. 18-
U.N. Trusteeship Council: 17th Session New York Feb. 7-
U.N. International Wheat Conference: 2d Session Geneva Feb. 20-
International Atomic Energy Agency: Working Level Meeting on Washington Feb. 27-
Draft Statute.
U.N. Disarmament Commission: Subcommittee of Five (recon- London Mar. 19-
vened).
8th International Congress of the Vineyard and Wines Santiago Mar. 21-
4th International Exhibition of Drawings and Engravings Lugano (Switzerland). . . . Mar. 29-
U.N. ECAFE: 4th Regional Conference of Statisticians Bangkok Mar. 29-
Scheduled April 1-June 30, 1956
ICAO: 3d Caribbean Regional Air Navigation Meeting Ciudad Trujillo (Dominican Apr. 3-
Republic).
' Prepared in the Ofl5ce of International Conferences, Mar. 23, 1956. Asterisks indicate tentative dates and places.
Following is a list of abbreviations: U.N., United Nations; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; CCIT,
International Telegraphic Consultative Committee (Comity consultatif international tdlegraphique) ; CCiF, International
Telephone Consultative Committee (Comity consultatif international t61(5phonique) ; ITU, International Telecommuni-
cation Union; CCIR, International Radio Consultative Committee (Comitc consultatif international des radiocommuni-
cations) ; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; SE.ATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization; ILO, International Labor
Organization; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; UNICEF, United Nations Children's Fund;
WIVIO, World Meteorological Organization, ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; GATT, General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; FAO, Food and Agri-
culture Organization; UPU, Universal Postal Union; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; SUNFED, Special
United Nations Fund for Economic Development; ECLA, Economic Commission for Latin America; UNREF, United
Nations Refugee Fund; WHO, World Health Organization; CIGRE, Conference Internationale des grands reseaux elec-
triques; PASO, Pan American Sanitary^Organization.
April 2, 1956 571
Calendar of Meetings — Continued
Scheduled April 1-June 30, 1956 — Continued
ITU International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR) : Study London Apr. 3-
Group XI, Color Television Demonstrations.
ILO Petroleum Committee: 5th Session (reconvened) Geneva Apr. 4—
U.N. Economic Commission for Europe: 11th Session Geneva Apr. 5-
International Exhibition on Instrumentation-Automation Oslo Apr. 9-
UNESCO Executive Board: 43d Session Madrid Apr. 9-
ITU International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR) : Study The Hague Apr. 10-
Group XI, Color Television Demonstrations.
6th Inter-American Travel Congress San Jos6 (Costa Rica) . . . Apr. 12-
FAO Committee on Commodity Problems: Working Party of Con- Rome Apr. 16-
sultative Subcommittee on Rice.
U.N. ECOSOC Statistical Commission: 9th Session New York Apr. 1&-
WMO Executive Committee: 8th Session Geneva Apr. 17-
U.N. Economic and Social Council: 21st Session New York Apr. 17-
ITU International Telegraphic Consultative Committee (CCIT) : London Apr. 17-
h'- Study Group IV, Phototelegraphy and Facsimile.
UNESCO Conference on Asian-U. S. Cultural Relations United States Apr. 19-
ITU Administrative Council: 11th Session Geneva Apr. 21-
9th International Film Festival Cannes Apr. 23-
South Pacific Conference: 3d Session Suva (Fiji) Apr. 23-
ITU International Telegraphic Consultative Committee: Study London Apr. 23-
Group V, Joint CCIT/CCIR Committee on Phototelegraphy.
U.N. International Law Commission: 8th Session Geneva Apr. 23-
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Narcotic Drugs: 11th Session . . . Geneva Apr. 23-
UNESCO Regional Conference on Free and Compulsory Education Lima Apr. 23-
iu Latin America.
Inter-American Port and Harbor Conference San Jos6 (Costa Rica) . . . Apr. 25-
WMO Eastern Caribbean Hurricane Committee: 4th Session . . . Ciudad Trujillo (Dominican Apr. 25-
Republic).
U. N. Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Terri- New York Apr. 27-
tories: 7th Session.
5th International Philatelic Exhibition New York Apr. 28-
ILO Coal Mines Committee: 6th Session Istanbul Apr. 30-
UPU Executive and Liaison Committee Bern Apr. 30-
International Sugar Council: 8th Session London April
2d International Congress of Tribunals of Accounts Brussels* May 1*-
Inter-American Cultural Council: 2d Meeting Lima May 3-
Inter- American Ministers of Education: 2d Meeting Lima May 3-
NATO: Ministerial Meeting of the Council Paris May 4-
South Pacific Commission: 15th Session Suva (Fiji) May 4-
UNESCO Intergovernmental Meeting on International Principles Palermo (Italy) May 4-
Governing Archeological Excavations.
U. N. ECOSOC Commission on International Commodity Trade: New York May 7-
3d Session.
U. N. Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of SUNFED: 1st New York May 7-
Meeting.
U. N. Trusteeship Council: Standing Committee on Petitions . . . New York May 7-
International Cotton Advisory Committee: 15th Plenary Meeting . Washington May 8-
9th World Health Assembly ." Geneva May 8-
UNESCO Regional Seminar on Curriculum for Latin America . . Lima May 9-
ILO Building, Civil Engineering, and Public Works Committee: 5th Geneva May 14-
Session.
U. N. ECE Housing Committee and Working Parties Geneva May 14-
U. N. ECLA Committee of the Wliole: 5th Meeting Santiago May 19-
Inter- American Technical Cacao Committee: 6th Meeting .... Salvador (Brazil) May 20*-
UNESCO Conference on Cultural Integration of Immigrants . . . Caracas May 20-
4th International Congress of Mediterranean Citrus Growers . . . Israel May 20-
U. N. International Sugar Conference New York May 21-
Caribbean Commission: 22d Meeting Cayenne (French Guiana) . May 21*-
U. N. ECAFE Working Party of Senior Geologists on the Prepara- Tokyo May 22-
tion of a Regional Geological Map for Asia and the Far East:
2d Meeting.
WMO Working Group on International Radiosonde Comparisons . Payerne (Switzerland) . . . May 23-
FAO Technical Advisory Committee on Desert Locust Control: 6th Rome May 23-
Session.
UNREF Standing Program Subcommittee: 3d Session Geneva May 23-
UNESCO Meeting of Experts on Radioisotopes Paris May 25-
WHO Executive Board: 18th Session Geneva May 28-
ILO Governing Bodv: 132d Session (and Committees) Geneva May 28-
UNREF Executive "Committee: 3d Session Geneva May 28-
34th Padua International Fair Padua (Italy) May 29-
16th International Conference on Large Electric High Tension Sys- Paris May 30-
tems (CIGRE).
572 Department of State Bulletin
Calendar of Meetings — Continued
Scheduled April 1-June 30, 1956 — Continued
U.N. ECAFE Subcommittee on Minerals Resources Development:
2d Session.
U.N. ECE Steel Committee
() Inter-American Commission of Women : 1 1th General Assembly . .
International Seed Testing Association: 11th Congress (Executive
Committee Meetings June 1 and 10).
U.N. Trusteeship Council: 18th Session
PASO Executive Committee: 28th Meeting
International Labor Conference (ILO) : 39th Session
International Commission for Criminal Police: 25th General Meet-
ing.
International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries:
Annual Meeting.
World Power Conference: 5th Plenary Session
FAO Committee on Commodity Problems: 27th Session . . .
ICAO Assembly: 10th Session
5th International Congress on Bridge and Structural Engineering
U.N. ECE Coal Trade Subcommittee
U.N. ECE Conference of European Statisticians
UNESCO Intergovernmental Copyright Committee
U.N. ECE Coal Classification Working Party
International Meeting of Tonnage Measurement Experts . . .
6th
Tokyo May 30-
(Undetermined) May
Ciudad Trujillo (Dominican June 1-
Repubhc).
Paris June 4—
New York June 4-
Washington June 5-
Geneva June 6-
Vienna June 7-
HaUfax June 11-
Vienna June 17-
Rome June 18-
Caracas- June 19-
Lisbon June 25-
Geneva June 25-
Geneva June 25-
Paris June 25-
Geneva .... June 26-
Copenhagen . June
Progress in the Territory
of French Togoland
Statement hy Benjamin Gerig ^
The most important single development in the
life of the Togolese people under French adminis-
tration is the imminent, fateful, and far-reaching
choice which they will soon make concerning their
political future.
We were aware, of course, that following upon
the events in the Gold Coast and British Togo
a similar development in French Togo would nec-
essarily take place. But mitil we heard the state-
ment of the distinguished representative of France
a few days ago we were still thinking in terms of
years rather than months.
Now, however, we are confronted with a situa-
tion which in the very near future will require
the Trusteeship Council and the General Assem-
bly to cooperate with the Administering Authority
in presenting to the people of French Togo the
freedom to choose their destiny.
We cannot but pause a moment to reflect what
all this means to the people of Togo, to the Ad-
ministering Authority, to the United Nations, and
to the world. Freedom to choose one's destiny is
" Made in the U.N. Trusteeship Council on Feb. 28 (U.S./
D.N. press release 2360). Mr. Gerig is Deputy U.S. Rep-
resentative on the Trusteeship Council.
a tremendous opportunity. It is an opportunity
which in the past has sometimes been too long
delayed, or perhaps denied altogether. Indeed,
there are vast multitudes of people today who still
hope to be able to make such a choice — and, I may
add, they are not all in Africa.
But to those who are given the opportunity it
is also a tremendous responsibility. For a deci-
sion of this kind once made cannot easily be un-
done, and, indeed, it has elements of finality which
will affect a people for all time to come. We feel,
therefore, that as far as the Trusteeship Council
is concerned in the matter we at least will want to
exercise our part with the greatest care, conscious
that we are dealing with destiny.
New Technique of International Cooperation
There will be many practical details to be
worked out as experience in the case of British
Togo has shown. We are imdoubtedly develop-
ing a new teclinique of international cooperation,
or, if you like, a kind of jurisprudence wliich, as
our experience accumulates, will enable us to
smooth the way for other people who, in their turn,
will emerge to take their places among the free
peoples of the world.
Mr. President, as we listened to the thoughtful
remarks of the two distinguished representatives
of France, we were impressed with the way in
Apr;; 2, J 956
573
which the Administering Authority is hiying the
gi'oundwork for the people of this territory. No
one knows, of course, what tlie people of French
Togo will choose as to their future: association
with France, with neighboring territories in
Africa, or with some other state. We ourselves
were not altogether clear as to what the status of
a trust territory is, or would be, with respect to
the French Union. We therefoi'e appreciated the
clear-cut answer of the distinguished representa-
tive of France to our question on this point when
he said that an act of association between trust
territories and the French Union would provide
for the right of withdrawal. Thus, one of the
choices which the Togolese people will have to
make will permit them to exercise a relationship
which is not only freely chosen but which will give
them the basic attribute of independence. Indeed,
Mr. President, my delegation considers that at
the moment freedom of choice is offered to a people
in a trust territory it is in fact as well as in theory
exercising for that moment an act of independence.
We know, of course, of a number of territories
whose people have considered that complete inde-
pendence is less desirable than some form of asso-
ciation with another state or group of states — an
association in which they may voluntarily transfer
certain powers to another state to be exercised on
their behalf. But whether this choice or any of
the five outlined by the distinguished representa-
tive of France is made, the occasion will be a
momentous one for the people of Togoland.
On the question of the time and method of
granting freedom of choice, my delegation has
only one comment. We consider that, when a
people has shown itself to have the capacity to de-
termine its future, the choice should be offered
even before such people have all the institutions
and attributes of a fully self-governing nation.
We believe that in most cases self-determination
should precede full self-government or independ-
ence and that self-government or independence,
or even the rejection of these goals, is a matter
which people should freely be given the oppor-
tunity to choose. Thus, we believe that the ex-
perience which the United Nations has already
gained in this matter tends to support the thesis
put forward so logically and forcefully by the
French delegation.
And now I wish to comment, but only briefly,
on several matters in the political, economic, social,
and educational field.
574
Political Reforms
The efforts of the Administering Authority to
introduce political reforms throughout the Terri-
tory of French Togoland during 1955 have been
noted by my delegation with approval, and we
would urge the progressive extension and expan-
sion of the powers of the Territorial Assembly,
as rapidly as possible, so that it may become a
truly effective legislative organ representing the
indigenous population. Likewise, we look for-
ward to an extension of the powers of the Govern-
ment Council — which is at present considered by
the Government of France as a forerunner of a
Cabinet — so that the Council may soon acquire the
status of an executive body responsible to the
Assembly.
It is urged, moreover, that continued efforts be
made to expand the powers of the District and
Municipal Councils and to make them more rep-
resentative of the indigenous inhabitants by the
application of universal suffrage in the very near
future.
Economic Development
As a supplement to the important developments
in the political field which have occurred during
the past year, the United States wishes to com-
mend the Administration generally on its con-
tinued efforts to improve the economy of the ter-
ritory. It is a well recognized fact that, without
economic progress, developments in the political,
social, and educational fields would have little
meaning since it is only with an adequate stand-
ard of living that the population will have the
desire or capacity to jirogress in other fields.
We were encouraged during the debate on eco-
nomic conditions to learn that recent discoveries
in the territory of deposits of phosphate, bauxite, I'
iron, and other minerals may be an important f
factor in the territory's more rapid economic ad- ['
vancement. We shall await with interest further
details of these developments as well as efforts of
the Administration to provide a port for the ter-
ritory. Recognition by the Administering Au-
thority that industries should be increased and ex-
panded has likewise been noted by my delegation
as an encouraging sign. In this connection, we
would suggest that attention be given in the near
future to the establishment of a meat industry
which would be of benefit to the inhabitants.
!
(1
1,
m
Kill
Further efforts worthy of mention and commenda- kjjjj
Department of State Bulletin ^i^
ol
tion are the introduction of more protein into the
indigenous diet by the development of a fish-farm-
ing industry, measures taken to increase the de-
velopment of crops, to protect plants, and to
improve generally the yield and methods of
cultivation.
Moreover, the increase of indigenous participa-
tion in the economic life of the territory through
small rural development schemes — including
works in the field of agriculture, irrigation, drain-
age, soil conservation, and markets — ^have been
noted with approval. We should like to suggest
that, in addition to the measures already taken
to improve the road network, attention should
be given by the Administering Authority particu-
larly to improving and developing secondary and
feeder roads which will be extremely important to
the overall progress and development of the
territory.
Lastly, my delegation would urge that the Ad-
ministration continue to give serious considera-
tion to the jjossibility of following up the Ten-
Year Plan, which will end in 1957, by another plan
on the same line so that there will be no stoppage
of progress in the field of economic development.
Health and Medical Services
Steps taken in the field of health and medical
services have been noted with approval by my
delegation — and especially the measures taken to
combat various diseases throughout the territory.
The adoption of a family allowance plan during
1955 pursuant to the labor code of 1952 — as an aid
in helping to reorganize the family structure and
to improve the status of women — is also considered
as a constructive measure. My delegation would
like to suggest in the field of social progress that
further attention be devoted by the Administering
Authority to the suggestion of the Visiting Mis-
sion to improve the conditions in the penal institu-
tions throughout the territory.
On the unduly protracted discussion as to what
! is meant by the term "elite," it is our opinion that
*"1 the differences of view which are expressed reflect
r I a difference in semantics rather than of substance.
w'^l French and English usages of the terra "elite"
iTitflare markedly different. But we believe that in
every society leaders in every walk of life will
lift emerge. And this leadership will become en-
»iibT 'trusted with the political, economic, and social
life of the people. It cannot be otherwise in
French Togoland.
risf
In conclusion, my delegation believes that the
rapid political progress now under way in the
territory reemphasizes the urgent need for better
facilities for higher education. We were pleased
to note that 69 scholarships for study in France
were awarded to pupils from secondary schools in
1954. In view of the territory's growing need
for qualified African personnel, however, we hope
that ways and means will be found to provide addi-
tional higher educational facilities for Togoland-
ers, both in France and in Africa.
On the whole, we consider, therefore, that the
outlook for the Territory of French Togoland is
one of hopeful progress in all major fields; and
while we realize that much remains to be done, we
consider that the Administering Authority merits
the sympathetic support and commendation of
the Trusteeship Council for the constructive guid-
ance which it is giving to the peoples of this
territory.
Attainment by Trust Territories
of Self- Government or Independence
Statements iy Benjamin Gerig ^
U.S. VIEWS ON COLONIALISM
U.S./U.N. press release 2361 dated February 29
The trend of the present-day aspects of colonial-
ism was clearly brought out at the Bandung
conference, to which the representatives of the
Soviet Union just referred. There it was pointed
out by a number of speakers, and rightly, that,
while colonialism was receding in other parts of
the world, a new and worse form of colonialistic
imperialism was developing in Eastern Europe
and elsewhere.
We agree with the Soviet representative that we
cannot overlook the problem of colonialism. As
to one type of colonialism, the Trusteeship
Council is doing constructive work — not always,
I am sorry to say, with the amount of disin-
terestedness which would be desirable. But on
the whole I believe our work has been effective.
Now as to the proposal of the Soviet delegate
on attainment of self-government, we adopted a
resolution at our previous session on this question,
the main paragraph of which instructs the Draft-
' Made in the U.N. Trusteeship Council on Feb. 29 and
Mar. 1.
llApri/ 2, 1956
575
ing Committee to prepare appropriate conclu-
sions and recommendations on this subject.^
Mr. President, the General Assembly in its later
resolution ^ requested the Council to insure that
the procedure devised by it should be fully com-
plied with and called on the Council to imple-
ment our own resolution. "We have certainly
begun to do that, but our new method has not yet
even had the time to prove itself in one session,
while the Soviet representative is now proposing
that it be set aside for something else.
The U.S. delegation thinks that the present
resolution now on the books should be given time
to work out, and we believe that the method pro-
posed will work effectively. Therefore, my dele-
gation proposes that the Council take note of the
General Assembly resolution.*
With respect to the reference which the Soviet
delegate made on the question of nuclear testing,
I don't know whether the Council considers that
that subject has any relevance to the item now
under discussion. We feel that there is no rela-
tion, but the Council may wish to decide on this
matter and we will have an opportunity to discuss
it at that time.
NUCLEAR TESTS IN TRUST TERRITORIES
U.S./U.N. press release 2363 dated March 1
Everyone, of course, understands the propa-
ganda motives which lie behind the proposal of
the Soviet representative regarding the holding
of nuclear tests in trust territories. "Wlien the
proposal was made yesterday, I said that we could
not see what relevance a proposal concerning nu-
clear testing could have with the item of attain-
ment of self-government or independence, which
was then under consideration. We believe his
proposal was, and still is, out of order. However,
we will waive this point, reserving our position on
'U.N. doc. T/Res/1254(xvi).
'U.N. doc. A/Res/946(x).
'A U.S.-sponsored resolution (T/L.6-10/Rev. 1) was
adopted by the Council on Mar. 16 by a vote of 10-2-2. It
takes note of General As.sembly resolution 04G(X), in-
structs the drafting committees on the annual reports of
Trust Territories to prepare "appropriate draft conclu-
sions and recommendations concerning the question of the
attainment by the Trust Territories of self-government or
independence," and reqiiests the Secretary-General to pre-
pare a separate section of the Council's report to the Gen-
eral Assembly "containing the information indicated in the
General Assembly resolutions referred to above, and the
conclusions and recommendations of the Council thereon."
576
the procedure, and we are fully prepared to deal
with the subject forthwith.
Let me state first of all that we of this Council
must continue to hope that those organs of the
United Nations which are working to bring about
an effective plan of armaments control will reach
a basis of agreement so that the testing of such
weapons now being carried on by the United King-
dom and the U.S.A., and which were conducted
within the last 4 months by the Soviet Union, will
become unnecessary.
Mr. President, let me repeat what everyone
knows, that in the absence of effective interna-
tional agreement, safeguarded by adequate inspec-
tion to limit or control armaments, preparations
must still be made to develop methods of defense
against nuclear attack, and for the maintenance
of international peace and security.
It is not my purpose — and we think the Trustee-
ship Council would in any case not be the place —
to debate tlie broad issues involved in the question
of nuclear tests as they are being carried on by
various countries. Otlier organs of the United
Nations are dealing with the disarmament prob-
lem, of which this question is a part, and the
United States will contribute everything within
its power in these bodies to achieve an effective
solution.
Indeed, since 1946, when the general question
first came before the United Nations, my Govern-
ment has urged the adoption of an effective and
dependably controlled program of disarmament.
The day tliis progi-am becomes a reality, nuclear
testing will become unnecessary.
Mr. President, certain aspects of this question
were before the Trusteeship Council in July 1954
in connection with nuclear testing at the Pacific
Proving Grounds. At that time this Council rec-
ommended that "if the Administering Authority
considers it necessary in the interests of world
peace and security to conduct further nuclear ex-
periments in the Territory, it take such precau- ,
tions as will ensure that no inhabitants of the ■
Territory are again endangered. . . ." ^
With respect to the forthcoming tests, my Gov-
ernment, in conformity with the resolution which
the United States unreservedly supported, will '
see to it that all feasible precautions are taken to
avoid endangering any inhabitants of the terri-
tory or any other peoples and will notify air and
K
F
' Bulletin of July 26, 1954, p. 139. j, ji
Department of State Bulhtlnmi
sea traffic of the details of the warning area well
in advance of the commencement of the operations.
For these reasons my delegation considers that
the proposal of the Soviet Union should be re-
jected. As far as the trust territory under U.S.
administration is concerned, the question is en-
tirely covered by the previous resolution to which
I have referred. My delegation will consequently
vote against the Soviet draft resolution.*
TREATY INFORMATION
Technology Agreement With Japan
Press release 153 dated Marcli 22
The Department of State announced on March
22 the signing of an agreement with Japan to
facilitate the exchange of patent rights and tech-
nical information for defense purposes. The
agreement was signed in Tokyo, March 22, 1956,
by Mamoru Shigemitsu, Jaipanese Minister of
Foreign Affairs, and by Jolin M. Allison, United
States Ambassador. It will enter into force upon
receipt by the United States of notification that
Japan has approved the agreement in accordance
with its legal procedures.
The agreement is expected to foster the ex-
change of technology for defense purposes be-
tween the two Governments and between the pri-
vate industries of the two countries. Thus it
should be of reciprocal benefit in pi'oviding for
national defense and in contributing to mutual
* defense.
' The agreement is the latest to be signed of a
'" series being negotiated with the Nato countries
f' and with Japan. Other agreements of this nature
have been signed with Italy,^ the United King-
* On Mar. 2 the Soviet representative withdrew his pro-
posal (U.N. doc. T/L. &i2 dated Feb. 29).
'Oct. 3, 19.j2; provisionally in force.
'Jan. 19, 19.53. For text see Treaties and Other Inter-
national Acts Series 2773.
'Bulletin of Nov. 8, 1954, p. 712.
'Ibid., July 11, 19.5.5, p. 84.
'Ibid., Jan. 16, 1956, p. 104.
dom,^ Belgium,^ Norway,* the Netherlands,*
Greece,* and the Federal Republic of Germany.^
These agreements recognize that privately
owned technology should, to the greatest extent
practicable, be exchanged through commercial
agreements between owners and users. They also
stipulate that rights of private owners of patents
and technical information should be fully recog-
nized and protected in accordance with laws ap-
plicable to such rights. Other provisions are in-
tended to assure fair treatment of private owners
when they deal directly with a foreign govern-
ment and also in cases in which private informa-
tion communicated through government channels
might be used or disclosed without authorization.
Tlie agreements also provide for the establishment
of arrangements by which owners of patentable
inventions placed under secrecy by one govern-
ment may obtain comparable protection in the
other country.
The agreements also provide that, as a general
rule, government-owned inventions shall be inter-
changed for defense purposes on a royalty-free
basis.
Each of the agreements provides for the es-
tablisliment of a Technical Property Committee to
be composed of a representative of each Govern-
ment. The Technical Property Committee is
charged with general responsibility for making
recommendations to the two Governments on any
matters relating to the agreement which are
brought before the committee by either Govern-
ment, either on its own behalf or on behalf of its
nationals. One of the specific functions of the
committee is to make recommendations to the Gov-
ernments, either in particular cases or in general,
concerning disparities in their laws affecting tlie
compensation of owners of patents and technical
information.
Policy guidance for the United States repre-
sentatives on the Technical Property Committees
is provided by the Interagency Teclmical Prop-
erty Committee for Defense, which is chaired by
the Department of Defense and includes repre-
sentatives of the Departments of State, Justice,
and Commerce, the International Cooperation Ad-
ministration, and the Government Patents Board.
This coimnittee is assisted by an industry advisory
gz'oup representing major sectors of American in-
dustry concerned with defense production.
^,^,Apn7 2, J 956
577
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
White Slave Traffic
Agreement for the repression of the trade in white women.
Signed at Paris May IS, 1904. Entered into force July
18,1905. 35 Stat. 1979.
Adherence deposited: Mexico, February 21, 1956.
BILATERAL
Bolivia
Agreement providing for an informational media guar-
anty program pursuant to section 1011 of the United
States Information and Educational Exchange Act of
1948, as amended (62 Stat. 6; 68 Stat. 862). Effected
by exchange of notes at La Paz February 27 and March
10, 1956. Entered into force March 10, 1956.
Germany
Arrangement concerning the exchange of information
relating to the illicit traffic in narcotics. Effected by
exchange of notes at Washington January 17 and
August 24, 1955, and March 7, 1956. Entered into
force March 7, 1956.
Iceland
Agreement relating to tlie addition of tuna to the types
of fish excepted from item 718 (b) of schedule II of the
trade agreement of August 27, 1943 (57 Stat. 1075).
Effected by exchange of notes at Reykjavik March 5
and 6, 1956. Enters into force April 14, 1956.
Ireland
Agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic
energy. Signed at Washington March 16, 1956. Enters
into force on the day on which each Government shall
receive from the other Government written notifica-
tion that it has complied with all statutory and con-
stitutional requirements.
Japan
Agreement to facilitate interchange of patent rights and
technical information for defense purposes. Signed at
Tokyo March 22, 1956. Enters into force upon receipt
by the United States of notification that Japan has
approved the agreement in accordance with its legal
procedures.
Pakistan
Agreement amending article II of the surplus agricultural
commodities agreement of January 18, 1955 (TIAS
3184). Signed at Karachi February 9 and 25, 1956.
Entered into force February 25, 1956.
Peru
Agreement extending for a period of 4 years from July 31,
1956, the naval mission agreement of July 31, 1940
(54 Stat. 2344), as extended. Effected by exchange of
notes at Washington January 27 and March 14, 1956.
Entered into force March 14, 1956.
PUBLICATIONS
Recent Releases
For sale hy the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Gov-
ernment Printing Office, Washinyton 25, D. C. Address
requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, ex-
cept in the cdse of free publications, which may he ob-
tained from the Department of State.
Mutual Defense Assistance, Disposition of Equipment
and Materiel. TIAS 3447. Pub. 6244. 3 pp. 5^.
Understanding between the United States and Iraq. Ex-
change of notes — Signed at Baghdad December 3, 1955.
Entered into force December 3, 1955.
Technical Cooperation, Program for Economic Develop-
ment in the Departments of Caldas, Cauca, and Valle del
Cauca. TIAS 3451. Pub. 6249. 10 pp. 10«(.
Agreement between the United States and Colombia. Eix-
change of notes — Signed at Bogota July 29 and November
15 and 28, 1955. Entered into force November 28, 1955.
Mexican Agricultural Workers. TIAS 3454. Pub. 6252.
5 pp. 50.
Agi-eement between the United States and Mexico, ex-
tending agreement of August 11, 1951, as amended and
extended. Exchange of notes — Dated at Mexico December
23, 1955. Entered into force December 23, 1955.
Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 3455. Pub.
6253. 2 pp. o(,K
Agreement between the United States and Spain, amend-
ing agreement of April 20, 1955 — Signed at Madrid Octo-
ber 20, 1055. Entered into force October 20, 1955.
Air Transport Services. TIAS 3456. Pub. 6254. 2 pp. 5^.
Agreement between the United States and Canada, amend-
ing schedule 2 of agreement of June 4, 1949. Exchange of
notes — Dated at Ottawa November 22 and December 20,
1955. Entered into force December 20, 1955
Technical Cooperation, Additional Assistance for Artibo-«|,,
nite Valley Project. TIAS 3457. Pub. 6255. 5 pp. 5^.K
Agreement between the United States and Haiti. Ex-f
change of notes — Signed at Washington December 27|
and 28, 1955. Entered into force December 28, 1955.
Defense, Use of Practice Bombing Range Near Cuxhaven
(Germany) by United States Air Force. TIAS 3458. Pub.J
6258. 4 pp. 5«;.
Agreement between the United States and the Federal'
Republic of Germany, supplementing agreement of August
6 and 28, 1954, as amended. Exchange of notes — Dated
at Bonn/Bad Godesberg and Bonn November 7, 14, anc
29, 1955. Entered into force November 29, 1955.
578
Department of State Bullelh
ki
April 2, 1956
Index
Vol. XXXIV, No. 875
Africa
Clarification of U.S. Policy Toward North Africa
(Dillon)
Visit of Deputy Prime Minister of Rhodesia and Nyasa-
land
Agricnltnre. U.S. Proposal to Burma To Exchange Tech-
nicians for Rice
American Republics. Pan American Day and Pan Ameri-
can Week, 1956 (text of proclamation)
Asia
Chiefs of Mission in Far East Meet at Tokyo
A Report on Asia (Dulles)
Visa Applications Cut Off for Refugees Indigenous to
Far East
Atomic Energy
Atoms-for-Peace Agreement Signed by Ireland and U. S. .
Ntite to Japanese Government on Pacific Nuclear Tests .
Philippines Chosen as Site for Asian Nuclear Center .
Burma. U.S. Proposal to Burma To Exchange Technicians
for Ilice
Claims and Property. Soviet Payment of Damages for
U.S. Navy Plane (text of Soviet note)
Congress, The
Current Legislation
Escape-Clause Relief on Acid-Grade Fluorspar Held Un-
necessary (Eisenhower)
Recommendations for 1957 Mutual Security Program
(Eisenhower, Hoover)
Economic Affairs
Escape-Clause Relief on Acid-Grade Fluorspar Held Un-
necessary (Eisenhower)
Eximbauk Credit to Philippines for Industrial Growth .
France
Clarification of U.S. Policy Toward North Africa
(Dillon)
Congratulatory Messages on Signing of French-Tunisian
Protocol (Hughes, Dillon)
Progress in the Territory of French Togoland (Gerig) .
India. Prime Minister of India To Visit United States .
International Organizations and Meetings. Calendar of
Meetings
ffreland
(Atoms-for-Peace Agreement Signed by Ireland and U.S. .
Visit of Prime Minister Costello of Ireland (Nixon,
Costello)
(Japan
Kote to Japanese Government on Pacific Nuclear Tests .
( technology Agreement With Japan
Lebanon. Earthquake Disaster in Lebanon (Eisenhower,
t Hoover)
ililitary Affairs. Soviet Payment of Damages for U.S.
Navy Plane (text of Soviet note)
Mataal Security
Recniunien(hitions for 1957
(Eisenhower, Hoover) .
.4 Keport on Asia (Dulles) .' .'
rechuology Agreement With Japan
Von-Self-Governing Territories
Attainment by Trust Territories of Self-GOTernment or
Independence (Gerig)
Progress in the Territory of French Togoland (Gerig) .
Pakistan. Congratulatory Messages to Pakistan on Re-
public Day (Eisenhower, Dulles)
Mutual Security Program
Philippines
Jsimbank Credit to Philippines for Industrial Growth .
:'ljilippines Chosen as Site for Asian Nuclear Center . .
'residential Documents
^Jiigratulatory Messages to Pakistan on Republic Day .
'earthquake Disaster in Lebanon
Escape-Clause Relief on Acid-Grade Fluorspar Held Un-
necessary
'an American Day and Pan American Week, 1956 ! '. '.
tecommendations for 1957 Mutual Security Program . .
'nblications. Recent Releases
553
552
569
544
543
539
568
564
566
544
569
559
570
569
545
569
568
553
552
573
565
571
564
560
566
577
565
559
545
539
577
575
573
565
568
544
565
565
569
544
545
578
Refngees and Displaced Persons. Visa Applications Cut Off
for Refugees Indigenous to Far East 568
Treaty Information
Atoms-for-Peace Agreement Signed by Ireland and U.S. . 564
Current Actions 578
Technology Agreement With Japan 577
Tunisia. Congratulatory Messages on Signing of French-
Tunisian Protocol (Hughes, Dillon) 552
United Nations
Attainment by Trust Territories of Self-Government or
Independence (Gerig) 575
Progress in the Territory of French Togoland (Gerig) . 573
U.S.S.R.
A Crucial Contest With the Communist World (Murphy) . 556
Soviet Payment of Damages for U.S. Navy Plane (text of
Soviet note) 559
Name Index
Costello, John A 560
Dillon, C. Douglas 553
Dulles, Secretary 539, 566
Eisenhower. President 544, 545, 565, 570
Gerig, Benjamin 573, 575
Hoover, Herbert. Jr 550,565
Hughes, Morris N 552
Murphy, Robert 556
Nehru, Jawaharlal 565
Nixon, Richard M 560
Welensky, Roy 552
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: March 19-25
Releases m.-jy be obtained from the News Division,
Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.
Press releases issued prior to March 19 which ap-
pear in thi.s issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 136 of
March 14, 137 of March 15, and 141 of March 16.
Subject
Conant : "Freedom and Slavery in a
Divided Germany."
Cutoff of visa applications in Far East.
Soviet payment in Neptune case.
Hoover message on Lebanon earth-
tjualie disaster.
Hoover testimony on mutual security
program.
Mills nominated Ambassador to Af-
ghanistan.
Assignments of economic officers in
Europe.
Technology agreement with Japan.
Message to Bey of Tunis.
Message to France on Tunisia.
Dulles messages on PalJistan Kepublic
Day.
Murphy : "A Crucial Contest With the
Communist World."
Note to Japan on Pacific nuclear tests.
Dulles : "A Report on Asia."
Visit of Deputy Premier of Federa-
tion of Rhodesia and Nyasaland
(rewrite).
* Not printed.
t Held for a later issue of the BtJLLEniN.
No.
Date
tl46
3/19
147
148
149
3/19
3/19
3/17
150
3/20
*151
3/20
*152
3/21
153
154
155
156
3/22
3/22
3/22
3/22
157
3/23
158
159
160
3/23
3/23
3/24
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Kingdom, and the United States cooperate to provide for their
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progress and social well-being of their peoples.
The Council Representatives, in this report, find that sub-
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This 27-page booklet is comprised of the first annual report
of the Seato Council Representatives, and the texts of the
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Vol. XXXIV, No. 876
April 9, 1956
FREEDOM AND:SLAVERY IN A DIVIDED GERMANY
• by Ambassador James B, Conant 583
TASKS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FOREIGN
SERVICE • Remarks by Secretary Dulles 588
EAST-WEST TRADE • Statement by Under Secretary
Hoover 619
AN OUTLINE OF THE MUTUAL SECURITY PRO-
GRAM FOR 1957 • Statement by John B. Hollister ... 605
THE DEVELOPMENT OF UNITED STATES POLICY
IN THE NEAR EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA
DURING 1955: PART III • Article by Harry N.
Howard 593
For index see inside back cover
;t:r)er
ntcrT^e.Tit of Documents
MAY 9 - 1956
,Jne z/^eha^yl^C'Tit ci^^ c/ta^e
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April 9, 1956
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Freedom and Slavery in a Divided Germany
hy James B. Gonant
Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany ^
When I last had the honor of being the Charter
Day speaker 16 years ago, I spoke as a college
president and I spoke about education. Having
deserted the ranks of university administrators 3
years ago, I now find myself speaking as the
United States Ambassador to the Federal Re-
public of Germany on the topic "Freedom and
Slavery in a Divided Germany."
If anybody had predicted in March 1940 that
I should once again be invited to be a Charter Day
speaker, I would have been highly flattered by the
suggestion. But if anyone had predicted that I
should be speaking as ambassador to a sovereign
German nation with which we were bound in a
military alliance, I would certainly have pro-
claimed the would-be prophet an utter idiot ! For
in 1940 Adolf Hitler's grip on Germany seemed
unshakable; he had already invaded Poland after
having overrun Austria and Czechoslovakia;
World War II was in its first stages. I was among
the many Americans who had long detested and
loathed everything that Hitler and his cohorts
stood for in Germany, and I was among those who
were fearful that Germany under his control
would soon conquer and enslave all Western
Europe. Therefore, in those days any suggestion
of my being an ambassador to Germany would
have seemed not only ridiculous but highly
repugnant.
Now, I must confess that my knowledge of
Germany in 1940 was incomplete. I did not
realize that there existed at that very moment a
not inconsiderable number of important Germans
who felt exactly as I did about Adolf Hitler, his
methods and his goals. But even if I had been
^Charter Day address made at the University of Cali-
fornia, Berkeley, CaUf., on Mar. 23 (press release 146
dated Mar. 19).
better informed about the internal situation in
Germany, I could not have foreseen that, within
two decades, from the ranks of the then dissenters
from national socialism would come the leaders
of a free Germany and that these leaders would
determine the mood of a large proportion of the
German people.
In 1940 few Americans had ever heard of one
Konrad Adenauer, who had bravely defied Adolf
Hitler shortly before the Nazis seized the govern-
ment and, as a consequence of his stand, had been
driven out of office as Mayor of Cologne. Today
everyone knows and honors the name of Chan-
cellor Adenauer; but I suggest that it is impor-
tant to remember that he, the present Chancellor
of the Federal Republic of Germany, as well as the
President of the Federal Republic of Germany,
Theodor Heuss, and not a few of the political lead-
ers in the separate states and in the Federal Re-
public, were during the entire Nazi period lit-
erally in danger of their lives. To me it is the first
prerequisite for understanding Germany today to
realize that these facts have had enormous influ-
ence on the history of that country since 1945.
The Spirit of Germany Today
The spirit of Germany today is the spirit of
a people who have repudiated the tyranny and
brutality of the period of the Nazi rule. Perhaps
some of my audience, still thinking in terms of
1945, may question this generalization. If so, I
suggest you have failed to understand how Hitler
and his followers completely discredited them-
selves by their actions during the last few years
of the total war.
The barbarous revenge which Hitler took after
the attempt to destroy him by a bomb on July 20,
1944, his senseless last-ditch resistance in Berlin
Apr]] 9, 1956
583
when the war was clearly lost, his repeated state-
ments that he would bring all Germany down in
ruins about him, his orders to flood the mines and
destroy the industry (orders which were never
carried out) , all of these things are well known in
Germany and have left their mark. So too have
the revelations of the horrors of the concentration
camps and the slaughter of the Jews. Therefore,
speaking as a reporter of the German scene, I
think it correct to state that the legend of Hitler
and the Nazis is completely dead. If there should
be another significant right radical movement in
Germany, such a movement, I feel sure, will not
employ the symbols of the Nazis or claim any con-
nection with their history, their slogans, or their
goals.
I have dipped back into the history of the ter-
rible years between 1933 and 1945 because I be-
lieve that in order to understand Germany today
one must first of all understand the mood in which
most articulate Germans regard their immediate
past. The second prerequisite for understanding
our new ally, the Federal Republic of Germany,
is to realize what has happened and is now hap-
pening in the Soviet Zone. In other words, one
must realize that, while some 50 million Germans
are enjoying freedom, another 17 million are suf-
fering under the slavery of an imposed conmiu-
nistic system. Not only does the Iron Curtain
run right through Germany, but the city of Ber-
lin itself is split between a free Berlin protected
by American, British, and French troops and an
Eastern Sector ruled as is the zone by a puppet
regime subservient to the Soviet masters.
Contrasting Political Systems
If one wants to study the contrast between a
free society and the modern form of tyranny which
finds its prototype in Soviet Russia, one cannot do
better than to examine Germany today. Indeed
if one wants to examine the situation in miniature,
the city of Berlin provides the best example, for
here the Iron Curtain is transparent ; one can see
for oneself in the Soviet Sector what communism
in action is really like. "Wliether one is interested
in political science, economics, education, or the
arts and letters, the contrast between the Soviet
Zone of Germany and the Soviet Sector of Berlin
on the one hand, and the Federal Republic of
Germany and free Berlin on the other, is the con-
trast of night and day.
584
Take, for example, the two political systems.
In the Federal Republic freely elected state legis-
lative assemblies and a freely elected national as-
sembly, the Bundestag, successfully govern a dem-
ocratic society; rival political parties wage elec-
tion campaigns much as they do here in the United
States. In the Soviet Zone the government is in
theory based on an elected assembly and, in addi-
tion to the Communist Party, in theoiy there are
parties with other labels. Actually all political
activity is but a puppet show with the controls
in Soviet hands; there is neither freedom of as-
sembly, of speech, nor of the press.
The regime in the Soviet Zone carries the name
"The German Democratic Republic," but what a
travesty of democracy is actually in operation is
evident from the election of a year ago. Like all
elections in Soviet Russia and the satellite states,
this election was a farce. A single ballot with a
single list of candidates was handed to each voter
as he entered the election booth ; he or she was ex-
pected to deposit it forthwith in a ballot box ; the
only opportunity the voter had for registering a
dissent was to go over to a special corner and ask
for a piece of paper and pencil to indicate dis-
approval of the list. It is hardly necessary to
point out that the officials in the booth were cer-
tain to report any voter who acted as if he were
living in a free land. Everyone in a police state
is under duress; it is not surprising that a vast
majority of the population of the Soviet Zone
went to the polls and cast the required ballot.
"Wliether, as reported, 99.9 percent of the voters
voted yes, no one can say, but, when one considers
the penalties of failure to toe the line, the figure
may be factually correct.
If there were free elections in the zone, there is
little doubt that the communistic regime would be
repudiated by an overwhelming vote. You will
recall that on June 17, 2 years ago, a spontaneous
uprising in East Berlin could only be put down
by the Soviets' bringing in troops and tanks. The
spirit of freedom which was symbolized by those
young men who threw stones at the Soviet tanks
still burns strongly, not only in East Berlin but
throughout the zone — of that fact there can be
no doubt.
Over the last 3 or 4 years more than a million
Germans have left the Soviet Zone — the refugees
still swarm through Berlin at the rate of nearly
a thousand a day. In an attempt to diminish this
flood the government of the so-called "German
Department of Sfafe Bulletin
Democratic Republic" recently condemned to
death two of its citizens because they were alleged
to have advised their compatriots to migrate to
the Federal Republic of Germany. This bar-
barous sentence was denounced by a unanimous
resolution of the Bundestag, the elected assembly
of the Federal Republic of Germany. As a con-
sequence of this protest and the incensed public
opinion in the free world, the sentences have been
commuted to life imprisonment, but they still re-
main an example of the ruthlessness and brutality
of a government of Soviet agents.
If time permitted, I would like to tell you of
the way the schools and the universities in the
Soviet Zone have been remodeled to fit the Com-
mmiist pattern, how all publications must con-
form to the official line, how the industries have
been nationalized and agriculture reshaped to
conform to Communist ideology. Nationaliza-
tion of industry, for example, has proceeded ahead
of plan, and 85 percent of industrial output now
comes from nationalized plants. In heavy indus-
try the percentage is even higher — 94 percent.
I only wish that those who in some free nations
appear still to harbor illusions about the nature
of communism would go to Berlin and visit there
for a few days and talk to the refugees who have
come from what the Communists declare to bo
a workers' paradise but M-hich, in fact, is a terror-
ized society of slaves.
Prosperity in Western Germany
In terms not only of freedom but also in terms
of material prosperity there is a striking contrast
between the Soviet Zone and the Federal Republic
of Germany. What private initiative can do
under a stable political system with a stable cur-
rency has been demonstrated once again by the
rebuilding of Western Germany. Recovery has
proceeded at a most astonishing pace. Today
there is little if any unemployment in Western
Germany, the factories are rmming full blast, the
export markets are expanding. Prosperity is to
be seen at every turn.
In the Soviet Zone, on the other hand, there
are recurrent crises and food shortages: Despite
the Five- Year-Plan promise to discontinue food
rationing by 1953, rationing of meat, fats, sugar,
milk, and potatoes continues, and shortages of
these and many other food items are chronic,
sometimes so severe that even the basic ration re-
quirements cannot be covered for certain prod-
ucts. This is partly due, of course, to the use of
Commimist methods in agriculture, whose failure
is reflected by the fact that crop yields in the zone
are an average of 20 percent lower per hectare
than in West Germany. Luxury goods are high
priced and scarce; automobiles, in comparison to
Western Germany, are rarely to be seen.
When one realizes that these contrasts are before
the eyes of the German voters, one is not surprised
that the Communist vote in West Berlin and in
the Federal Republic of Germany has been almost
negligible. The Soviet model of so-called "de-
mocracy" has no appeal to the Germans who can
freely express their view.
The Bundestag election of 1953 was higlily sig-
nificant in this regard. Neither the Communist
Party nor the right radical parties polled enough
votes to place a single member in the national
legislative assembly (the Bundestag). The elec-
tion in free Berlin of the State Assembly in De-
cember 1954 was equally decisive as showing a
repudiation of radicalism of the right and left.
There can be no doubt about the fact that a vast
majority of the citizens of Germany who are free
to vote have repeatedly demonstrated their com-
mitment to a political system based on the dignity
of the individual, private ownership of property,
and parliamentary democracy which insures free-
dom of speech, religion, and the press.
Many Americans who have reported on Ger-
many in the last few years have emphasized the re-
markable prosperity of the Federal Republic.
Indeed those who last saw the ruined German
cities in 1946 can hardly believe their eyes when
they revisit the same spots today. How was the
amazing recovery accomplished, many ask. The
answer is that several factors were involved. The
currency reform of 1948 — an act of the three
Western occupying powers — was the first essen-
tial ; closely related was the creation of a govern-
ment with a banking system that issued a stable
currency. Indeed, if anyone ever needed evidence
as to the importance of sound money, the recent
history of Germany provides the material. From
the close of the war until the summer of 1948 very
little progress was made in rebuilding the cities
and industrial plants, trade was largely on a barter
basis, the stores were almost empty. But as soon
as the new currency was introduced into the three
Western zones, conditions changed almost over-
night; people began to work, trade to function,
recovery began.
April 9, 1956
585
A year after the currency reform the first elec-
tions under a new constitution were held, and
shortly thereafter Adenauer was elected Chan-
cellor by the Bundestag. The economic policy of
his government — the policy of his Minister for
Economics, Professor Erhard — proved admirably
suited for the tasks which lay ahead. Private
initiative and competition were encouraged, so-
cialization of industry was rejected, tax laws were
passed which enabled industry to put back its
profits into plant reconstruction. And it has been
largely by plowing back profits that the industrial
recovery has taken place.
Of course, the impetus given by American aid
through the Marshall plan was of the greatest
importance, and that this is so is freely acknowl-
edged by Germans in all walks of life. All told,
the American taxpayer has contributed some $3.5
billion to the reconstruction of Germany. But I
might note that no new aid has been given for
the last 4 years except for the city of Berlin, whose
situation as an outpost of freedom presents us
with special problems.
To the factors I have mentioned should be
added three others in explaining German recov-
ery. First, the attitude of the labor leaders who
during the critical years refrained from pushing
demands for increased wages. Second, the esprit
de corps of the technical staff and working force
in many factories which enabled these plants to
start functioning again as soon as equipment could
be put in order and raw materials obtained.
Third, the well-known desire of the German people
to work hard and effectively once a sound basis
is at hand.
Political Developments
To describe the material reconstruction and eco-
nomic recovery of Western Germany without men-
tioning the political developments of the critical
years, 1946 to 1951, would be to present a dis-
torted picture. For unless there had been a rapid
and satisfactory building of representative gov-
eriunent, there would be no sovereign Germany
today. The process started in the Western zones
with the election of state legislative assemblies,
which elections gave an opportunity for rival po-
litical parties to present programs to the voters.
Early in 1948 the three Western occupying jiowers
authorized the governments of the separate states
(then 10 in number) to convene an assembly
charged with the task of drafting a constitution.
or Basic Law, for a federated republic. A year
later such a Basic Law was submitted to the sep-
arate stat«s and ratified bj' a majority of the as-
semblies. Then followed in the summer of 1949
a national election of representatives of the lower
house, the Bundestag, which in turn elected Kon-
rad Adenauer as Chancellor that fall. The Basic
Law provides for a national election every 4 years,
and the second election took place in WSo, return-
ing Chancellor Adenauer and his coalition govern-
ment to power with a large majority.
It would take too long to describe in detail the
federal structure of the German Government.
But there are one or two points of special interest.
The upper house, the Bundesrat, is composed of
delegates from the state governments, who vote
as the state governments direct, each state hav-
ing a certain number of votes allocated to it which
are always cast as a unit. But not all laws passed
by the lower house require the concurrence of the
upper house — only those which affect the individ-
ual states. A supreme court has the power of de-
claring unconstitutional laws which in the opinion
of the majority of the judges are contrary to the
provisions of the Basic Law. Thus, this federated
governmental structure is somewhat analogous to
our own.
At the same time, the Basic Laws provide for
a parliamentary government, not a government of
divided powei's as in the United States. But in
order to avoid that plague of rapidly changing
governments wliich has disturbed other European
countries, the Basic Law contains a unique pro-
vision. It is provided that a vote of no confidence
in the Chancellor can only be presented as part
of a motion which names his successor, and this
motion must be adopted by a majority of the
Bundestag by secret ballot. There is little doubt
that this provision gave stability to the first gov-
ernment of Chancellor Adenauer, which came into
power by only a one-vote margin.
The political history as well as the economic
history of the last 10 years in West Germany is
thus the story of the successful efforts of a free
people. But even more striking is the record of
the assimilation of more than 11 million expellees
and refugees. When the war ended, about 40 mil-
lion Germans were living within the area now
under the jurisdiction of the Federal Republic.
Into this portion of Germany came within a few
months nearly 8 million Germans from the East.
The job of finding living quarters and work for
586
Department of State Bulletin
this influx can be imagined. In addition, more
than 2 million Germans have fled from the Soviet
Zone, many literally in danger of their lives.
The danger that all these displaced families and
individuals would form an unassimilated and
hence dissatisfied fifth of the population was
great. If this occurred, a breeding ground for
radicalism of the right or left would clearly be
at hand. Recognizing what was involved, the
problem of the refugees was given high priority
by the Federal Government and the separate
states, each of which took its quota. Just as a
bit of "social engineering," if I may use the term,
the work of the officials involved in the gigantic
task of resettlement deserves the highest praise.
Today it is estimated that well over three-fourths
of the refugees are fairly well integrated into new
communities and have found suitable employment.
Our New Ally
Earlier in my remarks I spoke of the Federal
Republic of Germany as our new ally. I referred,
of course, to the fact that last May Germany be-
came sovereign and entered the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization. The process of building
up a German armed force as part of this organi-
zation is now under way. And I may remark in
passing that all the political parties are endeavor-
ing to see to it that this army will not be a "state
within a state." There is much concern with how
a free democratic nation can have a large armed
force which is both effective, completely loyal, and
under civilian control. If concern with a prob-
lem will produce the right solution, this difficult
question will be correctly answered by fi'ee Ger-
many today.
Though our formal partnership with Germany
as fellow members of Nato only began last May,
we have been in fact allied with the free Germans
in resisting Soviet aggression since the days of
the Berlin blockade in 1948 and 1949. The suc-
cess of the airlift and the brave stand of the in-
habitants of Berlin made possible a significant
victory for the free world. Furthermore, the
struggle transformed the relationship of the
American Armed Forces to the population. Le-
gally our status continued to be that of an occupy-
ing power. Actually, it was clear to all, we were
in Berlin as a defending power. A partnership
between Germans and Americans developed in
the beleaguered city, and after the blockade was
lifted the new relationship continued and grad-
ually spread to cities and towns in the American
Zone.
After the invasion of Korea more than one high
ranking official begged us to increase our military
strength in Germany. We did so early in 1951,
and this fact in itself was evidence that, while the
legal status remained unchanged, our soldiers
henceforth could only be regarded as defenders.
Discussion soon started as to how the Germans
themselves could participate in the defense of
Europe by once again organizing military forces.
In the meantime the formal relation remained un-
changed, but the spirit was altered ; the German
Government agreed to continue to pay what was
known as occupation costs but which were recog-
nized as in fact the Federal Republic's contribu-
tion to the defense of Europe.
I am told by those who were then in Europe
that the winter of 1950-51 was a period of great
fear. The possibility the Soviets might overrun
an almost defenseless Germany and France was
evident for all to see. Then came the strengthen-
ing of our forces, the appointment of General
Eisenhower as Commander in Chief of Nato;
anxiety gradually diminished. But it has taken
far longer than anyone then imagined to end for-
mally the occupation of the territory of the Fed-
eral Republic and provide a legal basis for a
German armed contribution.
At the moment it is only in the Soviet Zone that
any large number of Germans are in imiform and
carrying arms. The puppet government has
armed and trained some 100,000 of its youth. One
may well doubt whether these soldiers are either
honored or respected by the population. Yet be-
cause the power of the police state in the Soviet
Zone is backed by the presence of Russian troops,
tliere can be no question but that the regime has
physical domination of the unfortunate inhabi-
tants of the enslaved part of Germany.
The Future of Germany
"What of the future, you may ask. We are al-
lied to the free peoples of Germany today in de-
fense of Europe. The only government entitled
to speak for them, the freely elected Government
of the Federal Republic, is by its own declaration
a provisional government, for it has been elected
by only the inhabitants of what were once the
American, British, and French Zones. Wliile
praising its accomplishments and welcoming it as
April 9, 1956
587
a partner, we must at the same time hope for its
replacement by an all-German govermnent freely
elected by the inhabitants of the Soviet Zone as
well as by those of the Federal Republic. This
is the paradox of the present, a result of the tragic
split of Germany today.
As the Governments of the United States, Great
Britain, and France have repeatedly declared,
there can be no hope of lasting peace and security
in the world until German reunification is
achieved, until an all-German government is estab-
lished in Berlin. Wlien that day comes, the his-
tory of the Federal Eepublic will have been con-
cluded.
I have tried to tell you something of its present
achievements, material, political, and spiritual.
It has restored the German people to a position
of respect among free nations ; it is now our ally
in the gigantic struggle of our times; its prob-
lems are our problems. To cooperate effectively
the United States and the Federal Republic must
seek to understand each other.
Tasks and Responsibilities
of the Foreign Service
Remarks hy Secretary Dulles ^
I am happy by my presence here to testify to
the tremendous importance which I attach to the
Foreign Service of the United States and my grati-
fication that so many persons, some for the first
time and others in midcareer, are going out into
it with the special qualifications that you get
from tlie Institute.
As perhaps many of you know, my family has
been identified with the Foreign Service of the
United States for a long time, going back several
generations. But when I recall some of those
earlier days, I think how different the tasks and
responsibilities were then from what they are
today. They are just totally incomparable.
I have traveled about a good bit, as you may
have heard. I have been to a total, I believe, of
38 foreign countries, and in each of those coun-
tries I have made it a practice to ask the Am-
bassador to bring together the members of the
Foreign Service and of the related United States
' Made on Mar. 29 at graduation exercises for Foreign
Service officers graduating from the Foreign Service In-
stitute (press release 167).
services in that country. I have tried to take ad-
vantage of my presence to have a little talk with
them and to tell them what I think about the
Foreign Service and its responsibilities today.
To a greater extent than ever before in our
history, the fate of our own national future — and
I think one can fairly say of the future of most
of the free world — rests upon the group of people
who make up the Foreign Service of the United
States. In time of war that responsibility rests
upon the military services primarily. In time of
assured peace the task of the diplomat — of the
Foreign Service officer — may be an amiable one,
reflecting what it was in the earlier days to which
I referred. But in times like these the responsi-
bilities of representing the United States abroad
have become immense. There is today what is
called a "cold" war. There is a struggle going
on which is worldwide in scope. The danger con-
stantly exists that that struggle could break from
the so-called cold war into a hot war. We must
realize that in every post the loss of the so-called
cold war could have grave consequences not only
in that country but in adjoining countries.
As I was just saying to Secretary Henderson as
we were coming down here from my office — there
is no single post today that is not of great im-
portance. I think there are about 80. The num-
ber is increasing as new countries come into being.
We have a few new countries every year now. At
every one of these posts the problems are major
and important, and a loss there — a breakthrough
there — could have serious consequences, just as in
time of war a breakthrough by the enemy at any
point could have serious consequences all along
the line. So it is today.
Now, it used to be said that the practice of
diplomacy for the people in the field is not com-
plicated — that all they need to do is to deliver
notes and to receive notes. But nothing could be
further from the truth today. I believe that we
perhaps went through a period when that was the
case. But as things are now, on the basis of my
observation, the personal qualities of the members
of our Foreign Service are often the decisive ele-
ment. It is particularly important that they de-
velop the ability to make decisions, to report their
observations and opinions in an understandable
way, and to understand the point of view of their
own Government or that of the Government to
which they are accredited, as the case may be.
I find that on my trips abroad it is most helpful
588
Department of State Bulletin
to talk face to face with the Foreign Ministers of
other countries. After such talks I am able to
understand better their point of view and to ob-
tain a better understanding of the despatches and
cables that come to me. I can do that kind of
thing in a certain number of countries once in a
while. But the big task of helping me to such an
understanding, of assisting me in obtaining the
proper background, rests upon our Foreign Serv-
ice officers. They have the task not only of under-
standing and intei'preting accurately the point of
view of the country to which they are accredited
but equally the task of understanding the United
States point of view and transmitting that in an
acceptable way.
It is sometimes easy for a Foreign Service offi-
cer to get to feel that his job is to please the coun-
try to which he is accredited. It is of course his
job to keep on good relations with the peoples of
the country to which he is accredited. But he
must never forget that he is serving the United
States. And it is vital that he have the capacity to
understand United States foreign policy and to
realize that that foreign policy is, as far as we
can make it so, a coherent one. We don't make
our foreign policy just to please the people of
country "X," or country "Y," or country "Z." It
may please country "X" and it may not please
country "Y." "Well, that is tough on the Foreign
Service people that live in country "Y." But it is
a part of their job sometimes to face a tough
situation.
We receive reports — reports of the kind that
some of you people who are graduating here today
will be making from diil'erent posts. We put
those reports together with similar reports that
come in from other posts and use them in formu-
lating our policy. When our policy decision goes
out, it may not be the thing that you recommended.
You may feel disappointed about it. It may make
your job harder. But remember that the over-
all strategies and policies are made by giving con-
sideration to many factors. If something comes
to you that you don't like, it's because we in the
Department have received information from other
sources which has led us to believe that the policy
upon which we have decided is the best policy in
the interest of the United States. Your job is to
understand and make that policy understandable
to the leaders of the governments to which you are
accredited. That is a task which cannot be per-
formed merely by delivering written notes or by
receiving written notes. A personal element has
reappeared today in these relationships to a very
marked degree indeed.
An illustration of the importance of personal
relationships is the meeting which I attended the
last 2 or 3 days at AVhite Sulphur Springs, where
for the first time in history the President of the
United States has met with the Heads of Govern-
ment of the two countries to the north and south
of us. What was our purpose? It was not to
solve any problems. We had no concrete prob-
lems on our agenda. It was to create conditions
which would make problems which may arise more
solvable. You who are in foreign posts will find
that your task is not just to solve some concrete
problem, although there will be plenty of prob-
lems, but that you may also have the task of cre-
ating relationships, creating understanding, so
that when particular problems arise the atmos-
phere will be such as to make those problems more
solvable. This will be a tremendously exciting
job.
Those of you who are in the midcareer group
already know the fascination, the burdens, the
tasks, the responsibilities of the Service and are
better qualifying yourselves to solve them as you
go into senior positions. Some of you are just
completing your beginning course and will be as-
suming these tasks and responsibilities for the
first time.
I congratulate both gi'oups. I congratulate you
not only on what you have accomplished to date
but upon the future that lies ahead of you, the
future which will not always be easy.
In the talk I made last Friday night, after I
came back from Asia,^ I emphasized that we must
have more people who are willing to take on tasks
of this sort, recognizing that the sacrifices are con-
siderable, recognizing that they cannot be re-
warded in material things since they are not sell-
ing themselves in a market place to the highest
bidder. We must have more people who recog-
nize that it is the great American tradition to
carry the American message, the knowledge of
the American way of life and our ideals, to the
four corners of the globe. That is what our Na-
tion was founded for, really.
The opening paragraphs of The Federalist pa-
pers point out that it seems to be reserved for the
American people by their example to show the
other peoples of the world how a free form of so-
= Bttlletin of Apr. 2, 19.56, p. 539.
Apr// 9, 1956
589
ciety can be organized and that upon the success
or failure of our experiment will depend the wel-
fare of all humanity. That has been the concept
of our Nation since its earliest days. It is the
task of those of you who are graduating today
to carry out that great American tradition. In
this Institute you have been qualifying better to
perform this task. I am sure that in carrying it
out you will have satisfactions which can be
gained in no other way.
Canadian-IVlexicati-U.S. Meeting
at White Sulphur Springs
At the meeting of the Canadian-Mexican-United
States Heads of Government at Wliite Sulphur
Springs, W. Va., March 26 to 28, the three coun-
tries were represented by the following delega-
tions:
Canada
Louis S. St. Iiaurent, Prime Minister of Canada
Lester B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs
of Canada
Arnold D. P. Heeney, Ambassador of Canada to the
United States
John W. Holmes, Assistant Under Secretary of State for
External Affairs of Canada
Mexico
Adolfo Ruiz Cortines, President of the United Mexican
States
Luis Padilla Nervo, Minister of Foreign Relations of
Mexico
Manuel Tello, Ambassador of Mexico to the United States
United States
Dwight D. Elsenhower, President of the United States
John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State of the United
States
Livingston T. Merchant, Assistant Secretary of State
Henry F. Holland, Assistant Secretary of State
Francis White, Ambassador of the United States to
Mexico
R. Douglas Stuart, Ambassador of the United States to
Canada
U. S. Makes Final Payment
to U. N. Refugee Fund
D.S./D.N. press release 2377 dated March 27
Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., U.S. Eepresentative
to the United Nations, on March 27 transmitted
to the Secretary-General of the United Nations
a check for $261,000 representuig the final pay-
590
ment by the United States on its 1955 pledge to
the U.N. Refugee Fund. This brings to $1,006,000
this country's 1955 contribution to the program
which is designed to find permanent solutions to
the problem of the European refugees made home-
less by war and the political upheavals which fol-
lowed.
The U.S. pledge was for $1,200,000 for the cal-
endar year 1955, but this was made on the under-
standing that the U.S. contribution should not ex-
ceed one-third of all governmental contributions
to the fund.
The President has recently asked Congress for
an appropriation of $1,500,000 for the program
for 1956 on a similar basis and has also requested
that the unexpended balance for 1955 be carried
over for use in 1956. In addition, the President
has requested $800,000 for the first 6 months of
1957; if appropriated, these funds would facili-
tate advance planning for the program.
Atoms-for-Peace Agreement
With Thailand Signed
Folloioing are the texts of statements made at
Bangkok on March 13 hy Secretary Dulles and
Prince Wan Waithayakon, Foreign Minister of
Thailand, on the occasion of the signing of a Thair-
U.S. agreement on the civil uses of atomAc energy.
STATEMENT BY SECRETARY DULLES
Today, with the signing of this agreement on
the civil uses of atomic energy, Thailand and the
United States have forged yet another link in their
partnership for peace and human well-being. As
we all know, this partnership goes back over a
century. I am proud that American doctors, edu-
cators, and experts in many fields have worked
with Thai doctors, nurses, teachers, and tech-
nicians to put to use the scientific advances in
medicine and other fields. These Thai and
American pioneers built the Thai- American part-
nership on the solid foundations of mutual help
and mutual respect as they labored together. With
the inception of the Thai-U.S. economic coopera-
tion program, this Thai-American joint effort was
expanded and accelerated as new scientific dis-
coveries and new skills were brought to bear in
Thailand in the fields of agriculture, public health,
Department of State Bulletin
education, and transportation. Thai and Ameri-
can experts, working side by side, have evolved
improved breeds of rice, rid wide areas of malaria
and other diseases, expanded water supplies and
communications, and made higher education avail-
able to many. In turn, Thailand has shared its
skills in many of these fields with its neighbors
and fellow members of the United Nations while
in turn receiving aid in certain fields from inter-
national organizations as well as the United
States. We can look with deep satisfaction upon
our joint achievements while pushing forward
with the task of continuing to improve the con-
ditions under which men live.
Now science has put a wonderful new force
within our grasp — the untold energy of the atom.
The President of the United States, by his per-
sonal sponsorship of the atoms-for-peace pro-
gram, has shown the United States desire to share
this knowledge and help provide equipment to its
friends so that by pooling efforts the benefits of
atomic science may be sooner and more effectively
realized. To this end the United States has
worked earnestly with the other nations prin-
cipally involved toward the establisliment of an
international atomic energy agency. Represent-
atives both of Thailand and the United States
have attended and contributed to a very successful
international conference on peaceful uses of
atomic energy held under the auspices of the
United Nations in Geneva last summer. The
United States has concluded a series of bilateral
agreements with other nations of the free world
providing for cooperative efforts in this vast new
field. In signing this agreement here today,
Thailand joins in this program designed to ad-
vance the fi'ontiers of science for the benefit of
mankind. This program is imaginative, excit-
ing, and realistic. The agreement lays a basis
for further cooperation between Thailand and the
United States in this important field, including
the establishment of an experimental reactor in
Thailand. Radioisotopes to fight the ravages of
disease can thus be made available to Thai hos-
pitals and medical schools. A major source of
training in this important technology would thus
be set up in Thailand ; eight Thai scientists have
already gone to the United States for training in
the fundamentals of atomic science.
We must not expect atomic science to work any
sudden far-reaching miracles. We must carefully
build up common knowledge, work out common
problems, develop and share skills. Progress may
well be slow in the beginning as we explore the
complexities of atomic science. Here or any-
where it is a long path from the scientific labora-
tory to the engineering drawing board and to the
completion of any project in this field. Yet ex-
plorations in this field of atomic energy to date
give stirring indications of the potential benefits
to all men which we may some day realize. As
we strive forward, we must display those char-
acteristics of resourcefulness, devotion to duty, in-
dustry, and mutual assistance and cooperation
which characterized the work of those Thai and
Americans who pioneered in the fields of medicine
and applied sciences here in Thailand.
STATEMENT BY PRINCE WAN
It was indeed a great day in history, pregnant
with unlimited possibilities of benefit to mankind,
when President Eisenhower annoimced to the
world through the United Nations his atoms-for-
peace program. It stands as a landmark in his-
tory because it marks the determination of man
to harness this new potential source of energy for
peaceful uses. It opens up a wide vista of untold
benefits that will accrue to mankind. With the
lofty spirit that inspires the American people
your Government now offers to let the world share
in the knowledge and experience you have gained
in this new field of science.
In this spirit your Government has already
opened up your institutes to provide training for
scientists from other coimtries. As you men-
tioned, eight Thai scientists have already gone
to the United States for this purpose and more
will follow. An atomic research library is also
being made available free to Thailand. I under-
stand that the materials are already here and will
shortly be presented by your Ambassador to His
Majesty's Government.
And now comes this agreement for cooperation
between our two Governments in the establish-
ment of an experimental reactor in Thailand and
in making available to Thailand the requisite ma-
terials for experiments in research in the peace-
ful uses of nuclear energy to the end that diseases
may be fought and other uses in agriculture and
industry might follow later on.
We recognize that, in your offer to let the world
share in the program for peaceful uses of nuclear
April 9, 1956
591
energy, your Government is moved purely by the
noble desire to promote the happiness of mankind.
As you aptly put it, Mr. Secretary, the program
initiated by the agreement which we have just
signed is designed to advance the frontier of sci-
ence for tlie benefit of mankind. It is indeed
imaginative, exciting, realistic, and, I might add,
also extremely generous. We are deeply grateful
for this assistance and gladly accept it in the spirit
in which it is offered, for we know that no sinister
motive lies behind it. It is offered to us in the
same selfless spirit that moved American mission-
aries and other humanitarian workers, men and
women, to devote their untiring efforts, for well
over a century now, to help our people in the pro-
motion of their health and welfare.
Mr. Secretary, this agreement is yet another
testimony of the unshakable resolve of your Gov-
ernment to promote the progress of mankind so
that men can live in freedom and have the neces-
sary conditions to develop their freedom. It is
also another landmark in the history of Thai-
American relationships which have grown and are
growing ever closer and firmer every day. I am
indeed proud and highly honored to be able to
participate with you, Mr. Secretary of State, in
this historical event.
Sale of 129 Tons of Heavy Water
in Atoms-for-Peace Program
The Atomic Energy Commission on March 13
announced approval of the sale of 129 tons of
heavy water to six nations for assistance in their
peacetime applications of atomic energy. Six-
teen tons of the material have been shipped abroad.
The initial consignments of 11 tons to Great
Britain and 5 to France were manufactured at
the Commission's plant at Dana, Ind. Heavy
water also is produced at its facilities in South
Carolina. All sales are at the price of $28 per
pound announced August 8, 1955.
Included in the 129-ton total was an additional
11 tons for the Government of India. An original
order of 10 tons for India, announced February
12, 1955,^ was the first to be approved for this
special reactor material under the President's
atoms-for-peace program. The 21 tons will be
used by the Government of India in a research
reactor which the Government of Canada has an-
nounced it plans to give India under the Colombo
Plan.
The total amounts approved for sale are as
follows: United Kingdom, 50 tons; France, 30;
India, 21; Australia, 11; Italy, 10; and Switzer-
land, up to 7, with 2 tons to be delivered by Au-
gust 1957.
Britain will use the material in several of its
civilian research reactors. The Swiss order is to
go to Reactor, Ltd., the private group which car-
ries on nuclear research in Switzerland and op-
erates the pool-type research reactor purchased
from the United States at the close of the atoms-
for-peace confei-ence in Geneva last August.
Heavy water is used as a moderator in several
types of reactors to slow down the speed of neu-
trons emitted in the splitting of atoms of the
fissionable uranium-235.
Mr. Allyn To Be U.S. Rep resentative
to Eleventh Session of ECE ^
The Senate on March 28 confirmed Stanley C.
Allyn to be a representative of the United States
to the 11th session of the Economic Commission
for Europe.
' Bulletin of Mar. 7, 1955, p. 396.
592
Deparfmenf of State Bulletin]
The Development of United States Policy in the Near East,
South Asia, and Africa During 1955: Part III '
hy Harry N. Howard
MUTUAL SECURITY PROGRAMS AND U.S.
TECHNICAL AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
Broad Character of United States Programs
There was continued recognition, during the
course of 1955, of the positive necessity of techni-
cal and economic assistance, especially in such
underdeveloped areas as those of the Near East,
South Asia, and Africa. Although the Soviet
Government spoke much of technical and economic
assistance, particularly during 1955, it had not
participated in the United Nations Technical As-
sistance Program, hitherto condemned as a de-
sign for colonial exploitation, until 1953 and then
under restrictions and with a very small con-
tribution.- On the contrary, the United States
has long engaged, both directly and through the
United Nations, its specialized agencies, and re-
gional organizations, in constructive programs of
assistance. U.S. participation is based on the
realization that the maintenance of international
peace and security, the preservation of the politi-
cal independence and territorial integrity of states,
the promotion of political stability, and the
processes of orderly change are all interconnected.
The record of the United States in this field is an
impressive one. Between July 1, 194:5, and Sep-
tember 30, 1955, the total of United States grants
and credits to other nations reached $52,287,000,-
000, of whicli no less than $41,340,000,000 was in
net grants. Some $17,248,000,000 went for eco-
' For Part I of this article, dealing with political issues,
see BuLiETiN of Mar. 19, 1956, p. 452 ; for Part II, on prob-
lems of regional security, see i6i(J., Mar. 26, 1956, p. 510.
Mr. Howard is United Nations adviser for the Bureau of
Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs.
^'For a U.S. statement on Soviet participation, see
Bulletin of Mar. 5, 1956, p. 395.
Apr!/ 9, 1956
nomic and technical assistance, famine relief, and
other urgent relief. Of these amounts, grants
and credits in the Near East and Africa totaled
$4,466,000,000, the net grants reaching $3,934,000,-
000 and credits $532,000,000. In South Asia,
grants and credits totaled $548,000,000, with the
net grants standing at $280,000,000. A more de-
tailed picture of the situation in the Near East,
South Asia, and Africa as a whole may be seen
from the accompanying table.^
Summary of Net U.S. Orants and Credits
in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa (1945-1955) *
Greece
Turkey
Iran
Egypt
Israel
Jordan
Liberia
Unspecified (Near East and
Africa)
Afghanistan
India
Pakistan
Unspecified (South Asia) . . . .
Totals by Area
Near East and Africa . . . .
South Asia
Near East, South Asia and
Africa
Net Grants
Net Credits
$1,208,000,000
$81,100,000
226,000,000
94,000,000
147,000,000
54,000.000
26, COO. 000
4, 000, 000
233,000,000
137,000,000
25,000,000
6,000,000
19,000,000
189,000,000
-7,000,000
3,000,000
26,000,000
116,000,000
228, 000, 000
142,000,000
16,000,000
19,000,000
$1,967,000,000
$532,000,000
280,000,000
268, 000, 000
$2,247,000,000
$800, COO, 000
Net Total
$1,289,000,000
320,000,000
201,000,000
30,000,000
370. 000, 000
25,000,000
25, 000, 000
182, 000, 000
29,000,000
344, 000, 000
167,000,000
19,000,000
$2,499,000,000
648, 000, 000
$3, 047, 000, 000
" This article does not cover the contribution of the De-
partment of State International Educational Exchange
Service in this area. For a brief account of activities
under this program, see The International Exchange Pro-
gram, 15th Semiannual Report to Congress (Department
of State publication 6293, 1956).
* Department of Commerce, Foreign Grants and Credits
bij the United States Oovernment, September 1955 quar-
ter, tables 1 and 2. Net figures cited here differ from
certain of the individual country figures cited below be-
cause they are computed on another basis.
593
A potentially important phase of the broad U.S.
program was the initialing of a series of atoms-
for-peace agi'eements with Turkey (May 3), Ijcb-
anon (June 2), Israel (June 3), Pakistan (June
15), and Greece (June 22). Under these agree-
ments, the governments concerned were to receive
information concerning the design, construction,
and operation of research reactors and their use
as research, development, and engineering tools;
the United States Atomic Energy Commission
was to lease up to 6 kilograms (13.2 pounds) of
contained U-235 in uranimn enriched up to a max-
imum of 20 percent U-235. The agreements also
provided for exchange of unclassified informa-
tion in the research reactor field, and on the use
of radioactive isotopes in physical and biological
research, medical therapy, agriculture, and indus-
try. The agreements would enable the countries
involved to acquire valuable training and experi-
ence in nuclear science and engineering for the
development of peaceful uses of atomic energy,
including civilian nuclear power."
Assistance Programs During 1955
The programs of economic and technical as-
sistance during 1955 were within the broad frame-
work which had been elaborated over the years.
As President Eisenhower explained in his foreign
economic policy message to the Congress on Jan-
uary 10, the self-interest of the United States re-
quired "economic strength among our allies" and
"economic growth in underdeveloped areas" in
order to "lessen international instability growing
out of the vulnerability of such areas to Commu-
nist penetration and subversion." ^
President Eisenhower's theme was carried for-
ward in his recommendations for the 1956 mutual
security program, transmitted to the Congress on
April 20, in which there was considerable stress
on the problems of the Near East, South Asia,
and Africa.'' All told, the President recommended
that Congress approve funds totaling $3,530,000,-
000 for the mutual security program, of which
$712,500,000 was for economic programs, includ-
ing $172,000,000 for a continuation of technical
cooperation programs, $175,500,000 for special
programs, and $165,000,000 for development as-
sistance; $179,000,000 was to be allocated to the
Middle East. In all, about $812,500,000, or about
25 percent, was requested for nonmilitary pro-
grams. In a statement of May 5 before tlie Senate
Committee on Foreign Eelations, Secretary
Dulles declared :
International communism is pressing hard to extend its
influence in Asian countries which laeli the economic
strength to support an adequate defense establishment
and to provide the necessary foundation of political sta-
bility and steadily improving living standards.'
Mr. Dulles was convinced that a continuation of
this "investment of strength" under the mutual
security program could meet the Soviet challenge.
In the end, the Congress appropriated some
$2,700,000,000 for fiscal year 1956, including J
$1,700,000,000 for defense support, development '
assistance, technical assistance, and other pro-
grams. It may be observed that, of these funds,
some $113,700,000 was designed for defense sup-
port in the Near East and Africa, $73,000,000 was
to go for development assistance in that area, and
the general authorization for teclmical coopera-
tion amounted to $127,500,000. Other items of
interest were the appropriations of $14,500,000
for the U.N. Children's Fund (Unickf), some
$62,000,000 for the U.N. Relief and Works Agency
for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (Unrwa) ,
and $100,000,000 for the President's Fund for
Asian Economic Development. For all purposes
except direct military assistance, approximately
$317,000,000 was allocated to the Near East, South
Asia, and Africa during 1955.° ij
4
Assistance to Greece, Turltey, and Iran
Greece and Turkey had been the subject of spe-
cial American assistance, designed to strengthen
' For text of the agreement with Turkey, which entered
into force on June 10, see Bulletin of July 11, 1955, p. 55.
The agreement with Lebanon entered into force on July
18 ; that with Israel on July 12 ; Pakistan on Aug. 11 ; and
Greece on Aug. 4, 19.").').
' Bulletin of Jan. 24, 1955, p. 119.
' nid., May 2, 1955, p. 711.
• IMd., May 23, 1955, p. 855. See also the Secretary's
statement of May 25 before the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, ibid., June 6, 1955, p. 911, and that of
Harold E. Stassen before the House Committee on June
8, 1955, ibid., July 4, 1955, p. 29.
° For a summary of the uses to which mutual security
funds were put in individual countries during the first
half of 1955, see Report to Congress on the Mutual Secu-
rity Program for the Six Months Ended June 30, 1955,
H. Doc. 266, 84th Cong., 1st sess., p. 20 (Pakistan), p. 21
(India), p. 22 (Afghanistan and Nepal), p. 25 (Greece
and Turkey), p. 26 (Iran), p. 27 (Arab States and Israel),
and p. 32 (Africa).
594
Depattmeni of State Bulletin
their defensive positions and to preserve their po-
litical independence and territorial integrity. De-
spite serious difficulties between Greece and Tur-
key concerning Cyprus, Greek and Turkish armed
forces continued to constitute an essential ele-
ment in the Western defense system. Both were
members of Nato and the Balkan Alliance, and
Turkey was a signatory of the Baghdad Pact
(1955).
Among the noteworthy undertakings for
strengthening the Greek economy was an electric
power project, which provided Greece for the first
time with a unified electric power generating and
grid system, more than doubling the prewar out-
put.'" It was announced on June 24 that new aid
totaling $19,200,000, partly in the form of a loan,
had been made available to Greece to help meet
the economic pressures arising from earthquake
damage."
The United States also continued to assist Tur-
key during 1955. Under an agreement of Novem-
ber 1954, supplemented on April 28, 1955," $29
million worth of American surplus agricultural
products was to be shipped to Turkey, in view of
a crop failure and diminished foreign exchange,
the effects of which were felt during 1955. In
order not to jeopardize either Turkey's military
position or its achievements under the program
since 1950, the United States agreed in June to
increase the defense-support program in fiscal
1955 from $70 million to $100 million, the addi-
tional $30 million to assist Turkey during the
emergency period and to provide for imports of
raw materials, basic commodities, and spare parts
for its industrial establishment.
It was announced on January 17, 1956, that, at
the request of the United States and the Republic
of Turkey, Clarence B. Randall, the eminent in-
dustrialist and special consultant to President
Eisenhower on foreign economic policy, had
agreed to visit Turkey late in January to discuss
economic problems of interest to both countries.
It was expected that Mr. Randall's visit would
greatly contribute to the further development of
American-Turkish economic relations and to the
" Direct American participation in the project ended on
July 15, 1955. On June 10 Greece signed an agreement
with the United States for defense use of technology, de-
signed to foster the exchange of technology for defense
purposes { Bulletin of July 11, 1955, p. 84) .
" Bulletin of July 18, 1955, p. 100.
''Ibid., May 16, 1955, p. 814.
advancement of mutual understanding in this
realm.''
Although the oil settlement of October 1954 had
started the flow of substantial oil revenues to Iran
by 1955, financial assistance was still necessary to
meet urgent needs. The Foreign Operations Ad-
ministration (now the International Cooperation
Administration), for example, made a loan of
$32 million for defense purposes, government em-
ployee payrolls, and other expenses. There was
increasing evidence of the success of technical as-
sistance in Iran during 1955. A program for the
control of malaria had been launched 4 years
before by U.S. health technicians; by 1955, the
Iranians themselves were carrying on most of
the work. Similarly, U.S. technicians had taught
the tecliniques of livestock crossbreeding to Min-
istry of Agriculture employees, who in turn were
spreading the knowledge to rural areas. A
teacher-training program was now being carried
out by the Ministry of Education, involving some
12,000 teachers, or about 40 percent of the Iranian
teaching staff. There was also progress in the
field of public administration, and an Institute of
Administrative Affairs was opened at the Uni-
versity of Tehran in January 1955.'*
Assistance to the Middle East
The United States has also engaged in signifi-
cant development projects in the Middle East. In
the case of Egypt, which had initiated a compre-
hensive 10-year economic development program,
for example, the United States made available a
total of $40 million in development assistance dur-
ing fiscal year 1955, and, in addition, $2 million
was allocated for technical cooperation. The
American program stressed, among other things,
railway and highway improvement. A loan agree-
ment provided for repayment of $7 million of the
"/bid., Jan. 30, 1956, p. 171. Siuce the beginning of
1948 Turkey has received $463 million in economic as-
sistance from the United States for development assist-
ance related to the upkeep of its armed forces and for
technical assistance. During the same period, Turkey
has borrowed some $25 million from the Export-Import
Bank and about $63 million from the International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development, while short-term
government and commercial debts in Europe were esti-
mated at about $150 million.
" For text of a U.S.-Iranian agreement signed on Feb.
20, 1956, on surplus agricultural commodities, see Treaties
and Other International Acts Series 3506. On Feb. 26,
1956, the Export-Import Bank signed a $14 miUion credit
agreement with Iran for railroad improvement.
April 9, 1956
595
$40 million, and, as its share of the cost of the
projects, Egypt was to spend the equivalent of
$43 million from its resources.
In addition, the United States, together with
the United Kingdom and other countries, was
much interested in the project for the construction
of the High Aswan Dam on the Nile River, both
for hydroelectric and for irrigation purposes, the
total cost of which, over a 20-year period, was
estimated at some $1 billion. During a visit to the
United States by the Egyptian Minister of Fi-
nance, Abdel Moneim El Kaissouni, the problem
of the dam was discussed, and on December 17,
1955, it was announced that the United States and
the United Kingdom had assured the Egyptian
Government of their support of the project, "which
would be of inestimable importance in the devel-
opment of the Egyptian economy and in the im-
provement of the welfare of the Egyptian people."
The assistance was to take the form of gi-ants
toward defraying foreign exchange costs of the
initial stages of the construction, involving the
coffer dam, the foundations for the primary dam,
and auxiliary work. Assurance was also given,
subject to legislative authority, that the United
States and the United Kingdom were prepared
"to consider sympathetically in the light of then
existing circmnstances further support toward
financing the later stages to supplement World
Bank financing." "
The problem of assistance to Iraq differed from
that of aid to Egypt both because of the former's
signature of the Baghdad Pact and because of
its oil revenues of about $140 million a year. How-
ever, the United States has assisted in develop-
ing Iraqi military potential under the mutual
defense agreement of 1954.
The primary key to Iraqi development lies in
harnessing the waters of the Tigris-Euphrates
river system; construction is now under way on
a series of dams. Iraq initiated its second Five-
Year Plan on April 1, 1955, and the Iraqi De-
velopment Board proposed that the equivalent of
some $800 million be made available from petro-
leum to finance the program, much of the empha-
sis of which was on projects to raise living
standards. Under the technical cooperation
program in Iraq an agricultural college was estab-
lished at Abu Ghraib with the assistance of tech-
nicians from the University of Arizona, while the
Teclmical Institute at Baghdad was established
with similar assistance from the Bradley Institute
of Technology.
With its limited resources and the presence of
some 450,000 Arab refugees from Palestine, Jor-
dan continued to be confronted with serious eco-
nomic problems. During 1955 the United States
made $5 million available to the Jordanian de-
velopment program, $3.6 million of it in the form
of local currency purchased with pounds sterling
generated from the sale of American coal to the
United Kingdom. The assistance took the form
of road construction, afforestation, and water-
spreading activities ; some 50 miles of roads were
completed, about 5,000 acres of formerly unpro-
ductive land were brought under cultivation, and
many thousands of new trees were planted. Some
$2,200,000 was provided for technical cooperation,
with projects in agriculture, natural resources,
health, and education. Nineteen agricultural cen-
ters serving 300 villages are now in operation in
Jordan. Sound beginnings have been made in
education, and about 100 Jordanian trainees in the
field of education have been sent abroad.^^
During 1955, a large part of the program in
Lebanon was designed to assist in improving the
Lebanese road system, in view of its importance
to the country's economic development. An agree-
ment in June 1955 provided for $5,700,000 to help
finance construction of a modern highway from
Beirut to the Syrian border, connecting with the
road to Damascus, one of the important highways
in the Middle East. While the Lebanese Govern-
ment was to pay the major cost, $5 million of
American assistance was to be in the form of a
15-year loan at 3 percent, which the Lebanese Gov-
ernment has not yet taken up. The remaining
$700,000 was to be used to purchase American
i-oad-building equipment and to finance an engi-
neering survey by an American firm. Other forms
of assistance included provision of $1.4 million
for improved agricultural equipment, the estab-
lishment of 30 agricultural extension offices under
" Bulletin of Dec. 26, 1955, p. 1050. For the agricul-
tural commodities agreement with Egypt signed Dec. 14,
1955, see Treaties and Other International Acts Series
3439.
596
" On Oct. 30, 1955, the Jordanian Parliament approved
an agreement permitting Edwin W. Pauley, an Independ-
ent American petroleum producer, to explore Jordan for
oil. It provided for 50 percent sharing after payment of
exploration expenditures and for cancellation after 8
months If oil was not found ; all oil wells were to become
the exclusive property of Jordan after 55 years.
Department of State Bulletin
the guidance of American extension specialists,
the establishment of the Lebanon Industry Insti-
tute, and the setting up of the National Litani
Board for the development of the Litani Kiver.^'
The United States also continued to support the
program of assistance to Arab refugees under
Unrwa. Some 900,000 refugees were involved,
about 300,000 of whom were completely supported
by Unrwa in camps, while the rest received both
food rations and basic medical services, at an
average cost of $28 per annum.^* It is partly
in connection with the refugee problem that the
United States has sought to promote the develop-
ment of the Jordan River Valley, which would
permit the irrigation of some 225,000 acres of
land in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Israel and
make possible eventual settlement of some 200,000
refugees.
At the same time, the United States continued
its assistance to Israel, with special attention to
programs for orderly industrial development.
The program for 1955 centered on projects de-
signed to make maximum use of local raw ma-
terials, without neglecting agriculture." On
April 29 an agreement was signed with Israel
providing for the sale of $8.3 million worth of sur-
plus commodities, including 50,000 metric tons
of wheat and 40,000 metric tons of feed grains.
The Israeli pounds derived from the purchase of
these commodities were to be used for various
purposes, including American expenditures in Is-
rael; some were to be loaned for the purpose of
economic development in Israel.-"
Neither Yemen nor Saudi Arabia received eco-
nomic or technical assistance during 1955 from the
United States. By 1954, however, Saudi Arabia
was receiving royalties from the Arabian Ameri-
can Oil Company at the rate of about $260 million
annually. As President Eisenliower declared on
August 11, 1955, when receiving the credentials
of Saudi Arabian Ambassador Sheikh Abdullah
al-Khayall, "from the earliest years of our coun-
"It was announced on Mar. 2, 1956, that an Export-
Import Bank loan of $105,000 to Syria would assure the
beginning of a program to bring a dependable supply of
drinking water to various parts of Syria.
'' See also U.N. docs. A/2978 and Add. 1, A/2989, A/3057.
" Israel also receives large-scale assistance from unof-
ficial sources in the United States. During 1955, for ex-
ample, some $42,318,500 was subscribed in Israel bonds,
bringing the total sold since 1951 to $216,594,450.
"" BiXLETiN of May 16, 1955, p. 815.
April 9, 7956
380727—56 3
try, traders, doctors, and educators have gone [to
the Middle East] to contribute, through their
careers, to the growth and development of the
area." '^
On November 22, it was announced that Yemen
had granted a concession to the Yemen Develop-
ment Corporation, the first oil and mineral con-
cession in the history of the country. The 30-
year agreement provided for exclusive explora-
tion and development rights over 40,000 square
miles, or the northern two-thirds of the country,
with the exception of the narrow coastal strip
(Tihana). All net profits were to be divided
equally, but the agreement could be voided if com-
mercial quantities either of petroleum or minerals
were not found within 6 years.
Assistance in Africa
Among the projects of economic and technical
assistance in Africa, examples may be cited from
Liberia, Ethiopia, and Libya. Classes began in the
new Booker T. Washington Institute in Liberia
during August 1955. The project was launched
under a contract with Prairie View (Texas) Agri-
cultural and Mechanical College, wloich provided
assistance in improving teaching methods and
planning an educational curriculum. A project
for demonstrating the teclmiques of growing
swamp rice was completed in 1955, with the results
disseminated in many parts of Liberia tlii'ough an
agricultural extension system organized with
American assistance.
A joint Ethiopian-American educational com-
mission made a thorough examination of Etliio-
pian educational needs, through the technical as-
sistance program. The educational program in
agriculture and the mechanical arts was already
showing results in Ethiopia. The 3-year-old
Jimma Agricultural Secondary School and the
Handicraft School at Addis Ababa, were financed
entirely by the Ethiopian Government, except for
the cost of American technicians. In addition,
an apprentice trade school was established at Ad-
dis Ababa by technicians fi'om the Oklahoma Agri-
cultural and Mechanical College, as part of a
program for developing agricultural and mechan-
ical training. On October 3 the Export-Import
Bank announced that it would establish a $24 mil-
lion credit in Ethiopia's favor for the develop-
^ Department of State press release 486, Aug. 11, 1955
(not printed).
597
ment of commercial airfields and aviation facili-
ties throughout the country.^^
On presenting his credentials as Ambassador,
Sayyid Saddiq Muntasser, on May 6, 1955, noted
that the Libyan people had placed much trust in
the friendship of the United States and recalled
the role which the United States had played dur-
ing the consideration of the future of Libya in the
United Nations. Ambassador Muntasser also
noted that the decision to recognize the legitimate
right of self-determination had been made on
American soil. But independence had not solved
all problems, and Libya still counted on the as-
sistance of the United States to overcome some of
its difficulties to insure its complete independence
in all fields. President Eisenhower replied that
he was aware of the complex problems facing
Libya and indicated that the United States was
"deeply sympathetic" with the efforts which were
being made to raise Libyan standards of living.^^
The Libyan-American Reconstiniction Commis-
sion, with an American as executive director, was
established to help supervise American economic
assistance. Under a revised technical assistance
agreement, projects were being integrated within
Libyan government departments to pave the way
for Libya to assume greater responsibility for
project activities. Preventive and other public
health services were introduced by the Libyan-
American Joint Service in Public Health.
The International Cooperation Administration
announced on August 1 that it would ship 6,800
tons of surplus American wheat to Libya in an
emergency move to relieve distress occasioned by
a poor grain harvest, and on September 2 a further
agreement was signed covering an additional
grant of 6,000 tons and bringing to 45,000 tons the
total of wheat shipments authorized over a period
of some 20 months.''*
Assistance in South Asia
In South Asia, where the Soviet Union made
considerable propaganda with large offers of as-
sistance during the fall of 1955, the United States
had long been active under the United Nations
and its own bilateral programs.
Both military and economic assistance has been
rendered to Pakistan, which has taken a firm posi-
tion on the side of the free world, within the
framework both of the Southeast Asia Collective
Defense Treaty and the Baghdad Pact. In the 6
years ending on June 30, 1955, the United States
provided Pakistan with some $361,850,000 in eco-
nomic assistance. Because of its urgent need for
assistance, some $71.8 million — $20 million on a
loan basis — was provided during fiscal year 1955,
of which $40 million was for commodity imports.
The program also included $20 million for defense
support, $5.5 million for flood relief, $5.3 million
for technical assistance projects, and $1 million for
fi-eight costs in ocean transport of surplus agri-
cultural commodities.
The technical assistance program in Pakistan
during 1955 included projects directed toward im-
provement of transportation and industry.
Among other things, Pakistan International Air-
lines and Pan American World Airways signed
an agreement in May providing for American
technical assistance in expanding Pakistan's air
transportation system, and a group of American
technicians assisted in this work. American tech-
nicians also cooperated in agricultural produc-
tion, land reclamation, public health, vocational
education, and the community development pro-
gram. The United States assisted in designing a
multipurpose hydroelectric dam to be constructed
on the Karnafuli River in East Pakistan, electric
power from which will stimulate industrial devel-
opment and also contribute to flood control and
irrigation. In May the United States and Pald-
stan signed an agreement making possible guar-
anties for private investments in Pakistan, de-
signed to encourage private industry.^^
During the latter part of 1955, India was visited
by Premier Nikolai Bulganin and Party Secre-
tary Nikita Khrushchev and also received tanta-
lizing offers of Soviet economic and teclmical as-
" Bui-LETiN of Oct. 17, 1955, p. 617.
^Department of State press release 244, May 6, 1955
(not printed).
" Bulletin of Aug. 15, 1955, p. 26.3, and Sept. 12, 1955,
p. 427. For a U. S.-Libyan agreement on relief supplies
and equipment, see Treaties and Other International Acts
Series 3480.
=° Bulletin of Jan. 24, 1955, p. 157, and June 20, 1955,
p. 1018. Greece, Israel, and Turkey have signed similar
agreements with respect to the protection of private
investments.
For a U.S.-Pakistan agreement on mutual security
signed Jan. 11, 1955, see Treaties and Other International
Acts Series 3183 ; for an agreement on surplus agricul-
tural commodities signed Jan. 18, 1955, see TIAS 3184;
for a technical cooperation agreement signed Jan. 18,
1955, see TIAS 3185.
598
Department of State Bulletin
sistance.=^ The United States, for its part, had
long engaged in programs of economic and tech-
nical assistance in India. Indeed, since 1951, the
United States had provided India with gross as-
sistance totaling more than $500 million, divided
almost equally between grants and loans. In all
there were more than 50 joint projects, toward the
completion of which India was contributing about
$400 million. In addition, American foundations
and voluntary agencies have contributed some $48
million to various projects in India.
While the problems with regard to India were
complicated, results were already evident in a
number of fields, involving both agriculture and
industry. During fiscal year 1955, the United
States allocated $84.3 million to Indian projects,
of which $45 million was on a loan basis. Of
$69.1 million in development assistance funds
made available during 1955, $30 million was pro-
gramed for cotton and wheat purchases in the
United States ; the rupees acquired by the United
States from these purchases were part of the $45
million loan and were to be utilized for the de-
velopment of power, river valley projects, and
other joint projects.
Technical assistance projects continued to stress
conmiunity development and increased agricul-
tural production. Contracts were negotiated
with five American universities and colleges for
technical support to several Indian states and ag-
ricultural institutions. A village water supply
and sanitation system was inaugurated and at-
tention given to small irrigation projects, soil con-
servation, and farm management. The Univer-
sity of Tennessee was to assist Indian women's
colleges in home economics; the University of
Texas was to cooperate in the establishment of
teacher-training institutions in the field of sec-
ondary education.
There were also other forms of assistance. Up
to June 1955, for example, some $38,875,000 had
been earmarked for the purchase of railway roll-
ing stock and locomotives, and early in September
450 freight cars were received under the American
aid program. On October 4 the United States
and India announced an exchange of notes cover-
ing the extension of emergency assistance totaling
$4.7 million in the form of 10,000 tons of wheat
and 10,000 tons of rice from the stocks of the Com-
modity Credit Corporation to help relieve victims
of flood disaster in northeast India." On Janu-
ary 5, 1956, the fourth anniversary of the assist-
ance program in India, a new agreement was
signed, providing $10 million for importation of
100,000 tons of steel and 6,000 tons of DDT for
malaria control.-'
During the Bulganin-Khrushchev visit to Af-
ghanistan in December 1955, much was made of
the annomicement of a $100-million Soviet loan
to Afghanistan and of the reaffirmation of Afghan-
istan's "neutral" policy .^^ On the other hand, the
United States has endeavored over the years, al-
though on a relatively small scale, to assist Af-
ghanistan in a variety of ways. Through the
Export-Import Bank, loans totaling $39,500,000
were made for the multipurpose Helmand Valley
project for irrigation, flood control, and power
development. In addition, some $4 million had
been granted in the form of technical assistance.
During 1955 stress continued to be placed on
the Helmand River project, and a group of Amer-
ican experts assisted in such technical projects as
engineering, agriculture, health and sanitation,
community development, and public administra-
tion. Moreover, under contract with the Foreign
Operations Administration, Columbia University
Teachers College sent a group of four specialists
to Kabul to assist the Ministry of Education in
teacher training and general education. The Uni-
versity of Wyoming sent 23 specialists to assist in
technical education and agriculture ; helped in the
establisliment of the Afghanistan Institute of Ap-
plied Science, with two subsidiary schools, the
Afghan Institute of Technology and the Voca-
tional Agricultui-al School; and aided the Min-
istry of Agi-iculture in research and demonstra-
tion. The Near East Foundation, long experienced
in such matters, assisted in a project for commu-
nity development in Afghan villages.
Work in Nepal during 1955 looked primarily
^ India and the Soviet Union had signed a loan agree-
ment on Feb. 2, 1955, for the construction of a 1-miUion-
ton steel plant in central India at a cost of some $91 mil-
lion to be completed by 1960.
=' Bulletin of Oct. 17, 1955, p. 617.
''The steel import brought to 700,000 tons the total
which India had obtained from the United States. The
first 4 of 100 locomotives arrived at Bombay on Jan.
3, 1956; for an address by Ambassador John Sherman
Cooper on that occasion, see Bulletin of Feb. 6, 1956,
p. 205. For text of air transport agreement signed with
India on Feb. 3, see ibid., Feb. 13, 1956, p. 26-1.
™ Since 1954 the Soviet Union had loaned some $14
million to Afghanistan for road construction, storage
tanks, flour mills, etc.
April 9, 7956
599
toward reparation of flood devastation, and a
project for reclamation in the Rapti Valley, where
an area of some 130,000 acres was to be opened for
resettlement, was undertaken. The village im-
provement program involved six development
centers, which have trained more than 175 Nepa-
lese to demonstrate more effective use of insecti-
cides, fertilizers, and farm implements. Assistance
was also given in the field of public health. The
University of Oregon assisted in an educational
project, under wliich more than 100 villagers were
trained as teachers to work in schools throughout
Nepal. Since 1951 approximately $6 million in
Export-Import Bank
U.S. aid has gone to Nepal, including $1.5 million
in flood relief.
Export-Import Bank Loans
Even before the inauguration of the American
program for technical and economic assistance,
the Export-Import Bank of Washington had au-
thorized a number of loans in the Near East, South
Asia, and Africa for the economic development of
countries in that area. By July 1, 1955, these
loans were substantially as shown in the accompa-
nying table.
Loans, 1946-1955 3°
Country
Date
Authorized Credit
Purpose
Egypt
Fertilizer and Chemical Industries of
Egypt.
Egyptian Spinners (Barclays Bank
D. C. 0.).
United Spinning and Weaving Co., S. A. E.
7/16/47
5/6/55
6/13/55
$7, 250, 000
60, 000
25, 000
Construction of fertilizer plant
Textile equipment (Whitin Machine Works)
Textile equipment (Whitin Machine Works)
Total
$7, 335, 000
1/9/46
6/13/55
12/16/54
Greece
Kingdom of Greece
$25, 000, 000
300, 000
625, 000
U. S. products and services. Some $10,436,-
687.39 cancelled
Crawler tractors with angle-dozers and
Kingdom of Greece
Piraiki-Patraiki Industrie de Coton, S. A .
motor graders
Textile machinery
Total
$25, 925, 000
11/11/54
1/19/49
3/9/49
3/16/49
3/23/49
9/7/49
10/26/49
Iran
Government of Iran
$53, 000, 000
$70, 000, 000
9, 535, 243
25, 000, 000
5, 000, 000
5, 464, 757
20, 000, 000
Economic development
Agricultural production
Transportation. Some $544.52 cancelled
Housing materials
Israel
State of Israel
State of Israel
State of Israel
State of Israel
Telecommunications equipment. Some
State of Israel
$1,256.10 canceUed
Development of ports
State of Israel
Total
$135, 000, 000
1/3/46
7/20/50
Saudi Arabia
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
$25, 000, 000
15, 000, 000
Raw materials and equipment. Some
$15,000,000 cancelled
Public works and development projects.
Some $10,232,483.60 cancelled
Total
$40, 000, 000
10/13/48
1/26/46
3/16/49
5/25/49
Turkey
Sumer Bank (Republic of Turkey) . . .
Republic of Turkey
Etibank (Republic of Turkey)
Republic of Turkey
$417, 584. 33
431, 263. 64
104, 000
3, 750, 000
(International General Electric Co.)
State seaways and harbors
Ingersoll Rand Co.
State railways. Some $37,155.58 canceUed
'" Export-Import Bank of Washington, Twentieth Semiannual Report to Congress for the Period January-June 196B,
appendix C. Loans in Africa as a whole totaled $198,669,661.60 and in Asia $632,676,462.89.
600
Department of State Bulletin
Export-Import Bank Loans, 1945-1955 — Continued
Country
Turkey — Continued
Republic of Turkey
Republic of Turkey
Republic of Turkey
Etibank (Republic of Turkey)
Etibank (Republic of Turkey)
Republic of Turkey
Republic of Turkey
Cukurova Itholat ve Ithracat, T. A. O .
Total ,
Afghanistan
Royal Government of Afghanistan.
Royal Government of Afghanistan.
Total ....
Ethiopia
Ethiopian Empire.
Ethiopian Empire.
Total
Liberia
Republic of Liberia .
Republic of Liberia .
Republic of Liberia .
Total
Date
5/25/49
11/19/54
8/31/49
9/28/49
3/17/55
11/26/47
11/4/54
1/6/55
11/23/49
4/29/54
6/22/50
7/10/46
1/11/51
6/14/51
1/20/55
Authorized Credit
$4, 250, 000
500, 000
999, 524. 92
500, 000
78.5, 000
8, 000, 000
4, 235, 000
1, 020, 000
$24, 992, 372. 89
$21, 000, 000
18, 500, 000
$39, 500, 000
$1, 000, 000
2, 000, 000
$3, 000, 000
$5, 000, 000
1, 350, 000
15, 000, 000
$21, 350, 000
Purpose
State seaways and harbors
State seaways and harbors
U.S. rails and accessories
Earth-moving equipment
Materials, equipment and service for coal
washing plant (McNally Pittsburg Mfg.
Corp.)
Reconversion of vessels. Some $819.74
cancelled
Equipment, storage and handling of grain
(Colombian Steel Tank Co.)
Spare parts for tractors (Caterpillar Tractor
Co.). Some $1,020,000 cancelled
Construction of dam and canal
Heknand River Valley Development
Aircraft and spare parts. Some $27,731.82
cancelled
Communication equipment and industrial
machinery. Some $250,027.57 cancelled
Highway improvement and construction
Water supply and sewerage system
Highway construction projects
U.S. Support for U.N. Assistance Programs
The United States continued during 1955 to
contribute in major degree to United Nations pro-
grams of technical assistance, many of which were
concentrated in the Near East, South Asia, and
Africa.^^ It also maintained its contributions to
various United Nations agencies such as the Food
and Agriculture Organization (Fao), World
Health Organization (Who), United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organiza-
tion (Unesco), and Unicef which have given
basic assistance to underdeveloped areas in a wide
variety of ways.^^
The United States on December 5, 1955, com-
pleted the action required for membership in the
International Finance Corporation, established
^ See U.S. Participation in the U.N.: Report hy the Presi-
dent to the Congress for the Year 1954 (Department of
State publication 5769), pp. 235-39, for tables of contribu-
tions.
under Kesolution 823 (IX) of the General
Assembly .^^ This country, as in the past, made a
large contribution to the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, which assisted
" In general see U.N. docs. A/2943 : Report of the Eco-
nomic and Social Council covering the period from 7
August 1954 to 5 August 1955, passim; E/2740 (ST/BCA/
32) : Economic Developments in the Middle East, 1945-
1954, passim: ST/TAA/SER.C/21 : Fourth United
Nations Social Welfare Seminar for Aral States in the
Middle East (Baghdad, 6-21 March 1954) ; ST/TAA/K/
Israel/4: United Nations Technical Assistance Pro-
gramme, Revenue Administration and Policy in Israel
(Second Report) ; Seeds of Progress: Stories of Technical
Assistance (1955); E/ON.5/303/Eev. l/ST/SOA/26:
Social Progress Through Community Development
(1955).
^ BtriXETiN of Jan. 9, 1956, p. 54. The charter of the
International Finance Corporation requires a subscrip-
tion of $75,000,000 before the corporation can come into
being; by Jan. 10, 1956, $56,761,000 had been sub-
scribed. Egypt was the first Middle Eastern country to
complete action for membership (Dec. 16, 1955).
April 9, J 956
601
in a number of development programs in the Near
East, South Asia, and Africa. By June 30, 1955,
out of an authorized capital of $10,000,000,000,
some $9,028,000,000 had been subscribed." The
United States had subscribed $635,000,000, with
31,750 shares in the amount of $3,175,000,000. By
" Afghanistan and Israel became members of the IBRD
(luring 1955.
September 30, 1955, effective loans reached $1,837,-
262,49-1, of which $317,310,000, as illustrated in the
table below, were for development purposes in the
Near East, South Asia, and Africa. A develop-
ment survey was completed in Syria during 1955
and one was organized in Jordan.^^
"^ See also U.N. docs. A/2906 and A/3065 for material on
the proposed Special United Nations Fund for Economic
Development.
Loans of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1949-1955 '^
Country
Ceylon
India
India (Guarantor)
Indian Iron & Steel Company
Tata Hydro, Andhra and Tata Power
Companies
India (Guarantor)
Industrial Credit and Investment Corp.
of India
Iraq
Lebanon (Guarantor)
Litani River Authority
Pakistan (Guarantor)
Sui Gas Transmission Co
Karachi Electric Supply Corporation, Ltd .
Karnaphuli Paper Mills, Ltd
Trustees of the Port of Karachi
Turkey
First Tranche
Second Tranche
Turkey (Guarantor)
Industrial Development Bank of Turkey .
Industrial Development Bank of Turkey .
Ethiopia
Total
Date
7/9/54
8/18/49
9/29/49
4/18/50
1/23/53
12/18/52
11/19/54
3/14/55
6/15/50
8/25/55
6/2/54
6/20/55
8/4/55
8/4/55
7/7/50
7/7/,50
2/26/54
6/18/52
10/19/.50
9/10/53
9/13/50
9/13/50
2/19/51
Original
Amount
$19, 110,000
34, 000, 000
10, 000, 000
18, 500, 000
19, 500, 000
31, 500, 000
16, 200, 000
10, 000, 000
12, 800, 000
27, 000, 000
14, 000, 000
13, 800, 000
4, 200, 000
14, 800, 000
3, 900, 000
12, 500, 000
3, 800, 000
25, 200, 000
9, 000, 000
9, 000, 000
.5, 000, 000
2, 000, 000
1, 500, 000
$317, 310, 000
Purpose
Electrical power development
Railway rehabilitation. Some $1,200,000
cancelled or refunded
Agricultural development. Some $2,796,187
cancelled or refunded
Electric power development. Some $690,000
cancelled or refunded
Electric power development, fiood control and
irrigation. Some $9,000,000 cancelled or
refunded
Expansion of iron and steel production facili-
ties
Electric power development
Foreign exchange for development of private
industry
Construction of a flood control project. Some
$6, 506, 054 cancelled or refunded
Electric power development and irrigation
Construction of natural gas transmission line
Electric power development
Construction of paper and pulp mill
Port construction and development
Construction of grain storage facilities
Port construction and development
Port construction and development
Electric power development, irrigation and
flood control. Some $2,356,000 cancelled
or refunded
Foreign exchange for development of private
industry
Foreign exchange for development of private
industry
Highway rehabilitation
Foreign exchange for Development Bank
Rehabilitation and extension of telephone and
telegraph systems
^'International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Tenth Anmial Report 1954-1955, appendix F. See also
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development press release 427 (Nov. 3, 1955), Financial Statements for First
Quarter ending September 30, 1955. In addition to the above, the IBRD on Aug. 26, 1955, made a loan of $10 million for
electric power in Algeria and on Mar. 5, 1956, announced that it was sending a survey mission to the Trust Territory of
Somaliland.
602
Deporfmenf of Sfafe Bulletin
Reflections of United States Policy
That the United States continued to look upon
the problems of stability and security in the Near
East, South Asia, and Africa from a broadly
based point of view, and that it was prepared to
meet the new challenges which had arisen, was
indicated by a number of developments toward
the end of 1955 and the beginning of 1956. The
American attitude was reflected in the unanimous
view of the United States delegation to the Tenth
Session of the General Assembly of the United
Nations that economic and social questions were
"assuming increasing importance on the interna-
tional scene" and had moved to the forefront in
"the struggle between Communism and freedom,"
particularly since the Soviet Union was using
"economic and social collaboration as a means for
jumping military as well as political barriers," as
in India, Egypt, and Burma, for example. The
delegation believed that the United States should
counter the Soviet efforts, not by outbidding it
in sheer amounts of economic assistance but "by
making newly independent and newly articulate
peoples feel that they can best satisfy their wants
by becoming and remaining part of the community
of free nations." The delegation warned that the
United States was "in a contest in the field of
economic development of underdeveloped coun-
tries which is bitterly competitive" and that de-
feat in this contest "could be as disastrous as de-
feat in an armaments race." ^'
I President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles en-
' dorsed these views. Mr. Dulles had already de-
clared, on December 20, that the United States
sought no monopoly in the field of economic as-
sistance and welcomed "any grant of economic
aid" which invigorated less developed countries
and made them more independent, as had been the
aim of American policy since the Second World
War. Not one country had "lost any particle of
freedom or independence" as a result of American
assistance. Mr. Dulles hoped that Soviet assist-
ance was "not offered as a Trojan horse to pene-
trate, and then take over, independent countries" ;
he felt that the experienced statesmen of the areas
j concerned were well aware of the dangers.'*'
President Eisenhower sounded a similar note in
his state of the Union message on January 5, 1956,
declaring that the mutual security program must
be sustained and fortified and noting that "because
the conditions of poverty and unrest in less de-
veloped areas make their people a special target
of international communism, there is a need to
help them achieve the economic growth and sta-
bility necessary to preserve their independence
against Communist threats and enticements." ^
THE OUTLOOK IN UNITED STATES POLICY
Such were the major developments in United
States policy during 1955. As the year drew to
a close and another dawned, it was clear that the
problems were as manifold, complex, and per-
sistent as they had been in the past and that there
were no simple or easy solutions to any of them.
There was a recognition of the basic elements in
the situation in the discussions between Prime
Minister Eden and President Eisenhower, Jan-
uaiy 30 to February 1, 1956, in which the problems
of the Near East, South Asia, and Africa were
both broadly and specifically discussed.
It was agreed that every effort should be made
to reduce the sources of misunderstanding between
the Middle Eastern nations, whose peoples should
be helped to achieve "their legitimate aspira-
tions." Similarly, an Arab-Israel settlement was
considered urgent, but possible only if both sides
were "willing to reconcile the positions" liitherto
taken. The United States and the United King-
dom reiterated their willingness to contribute to a
settlement through financial assistance on the
Arab refugee problem and guaranties of "agreed
frontiers," reaffirmed the Tripartite Declaration
of May 25, 1950, and announced arrangements for
discussions, with French participation, as to "the
nature of the action" to be taken in the event of
violence. It was also clear that security in the
Middle East could not rest upon arms alone but
must be based on the establishment of good neigh-
borly relations. Soviet policy in arms supplies to
Middle Eastern countries was viewed as addmg to
^ BuiiETiN Of Jan. 23, 1956, p. 117.
™ For transcripts of the Secretary's news conferences
of Dec. 20, 1955, and Jan. 11, 1956, see ibid., Jan. 2, 1956,
p. S, and Jan. 23, 1956, p. 118. Mr. Dulles indicated that
mutual security requests for the next fiscal year would
total about $4,900,000,000, of which about $1,900,000,000
would be for the economic part of the program. See also
the transcript of the Secretary's press conference of Jan.
17, 1956, ibid., Jan. 30, 1956, p. 155.
'^ Hid., Jan. 16, 1956, p. 79. See also excerpts from the
President's budget message, ihid., Jan. 30, 1956, p. 147, and
his message transmitting the 1957 mutual security pro-
gram, ihid., Apr. 2, 1956, p. 545.
AprW 9, J 956
603
the tensions and increasing the risk of war — a
risk wliich the United States and the United
Kingdom desired to mitigate. In that interest
they fully supported the U.N. Truce Supervision
Organization and were ready favorably to con-
sider "recommendations for any necessary en-
largement . . . and improvement of its capabili-
ties." They were also agreed concerning the sig-
nificance of the Baghdad Pact, and the United
States indicated that it would "continue to give
solid support to the purposes ... of the Pact"
and that its observers would "play a constructive
part in the work of its committees." The belief
was expressed that difficulties in Arabia and the
region of the Persian Gulf could be solved
through "friendly discussions."
The Declaration of Washington, which ema-
nated from these discussions, reaffirmed the goal
of self-government and independence of "all coun-
tries whose people desire and are capable of sus-
taining an independent existence" and noted that,
in striking contrast to the Soviet record in Eastern
Europe and Central Asia, 600 million people "in
nearly a score of lands" had attained nationliood
since World War II with American and British
assistance and that many more millions were
"being helped surely and steadily toward self-
government." Since political independence alone
was insufficient, the need for technical and eco-
nomic assistance was recognized, and it was
stressed, again in contrast to Soviet aggrandize-
ment, that the United Kingdom and the United
States had "not sought nor desired extension of
either economic or political power." It was also
pointed out that Soviet aims had not changed, that
"militai-y and political force" had been used in the
past, and that now "economic inducements" had
been added to the "methods of penetration."
There were a warning lest underdeveloped nations
lose their independence through "threat, promise
or enticement" and a notice that some 50 nations
which cherished their freedom had "drawn to-
gether in voluntary associations for their collec-
tive security." *"
"For texts of communique and Declaration, see ihid.,
Feb. 13, 1956, p. 231.
The policy of the United States was reconfirmed
both generally and specifically on a number of oc-
casions in the period immediately following the
Anglo-American discussions, whether with regard
to North Africa, Middle East security and the
shipment of arms, South Asia, the Soviet chal-
lenge in the area, or the problems of economic
development. Secretary Dulles suggested to the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February
24, 1956, that Israel's security could be better as-
sured, in the long run, through measures — includ-
ing reliance on the United Nations — other than
the acquisition of additional arms in circum-
stances which might "exacerbate the situation."
He did not exclude the possibility, however, of
arms shipments, either to Israel or to the Arab
States, at a time when it would "preserve the
peace." "
President Eisenhower reiterated this position at
his news conferences on March 7 and 15, empha-
sizing that the United States was trying to avoid
the initiation of an arms race in the Middle East,
stressing the need for action under the United j
Nations and for the avoidance of incidents, and 1
noting continued adherence to the Tripartite Dec-
laration of May 1950. At the same time, the Pres-
ident indicated that the conflict between the Com-
munist and the free worlds was now undergoing a
"very great broadening" into the economic and
political fields, a very serious development which
demanded "flexibility" in the American foreign
assistance program.*^
"Ibid., Mar. 5, 1956, p. 368. See also the Secretary's
statements of Feb. 7, ibid., Feb. 20, 1956, p. 279, and of Feb.
28, ibid.. Mar. 12, 1956, p. 409. See also the correspond- ,
ence of Secretary Dulles with certain members of Con- |
gress, ibid., Feb. 20, 1956, p. 285. For the Department's
statement of Feb. 18, concerning the shipment of IS tanks
to Saudi Arabia under the Mutual Defense Assistance
Act of 1949 and the Mutual Security Act of 1954, see ibid.,
Feb. 27, 1956, p. 325.
" See also Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, "First
Annual Report of the Council Representatives, March
1956," ibid.. Mar. 12, 1956, p. 403, and the iinal communique
of the SEATO Council meeting at Karachi, Mar. 8, 1956,
ibid., Mar. 10, 1956, p. 447.
604
Deparfmenf of Sfafe Bulletin
An Outline of the Mutual Security Program for 1957
Statement iy John B. Hollister
Director, International Cooperation Administration ^
I am glad, Mr. Chairman, to have the oppor-
tunity to appear before you in support of the
President's request for authority for funds to
carry out the mutual security program in fiscal
year 1957. This request, as the President has in-
dicated in his message,^ is for the national defense
and for a program which is a vital part of the
foreign policy of the United States.
As you know, I became Director of the Inter-
national Cooperation Administration in June
1955. Full realization of the scope of the mutual
security program in all its aspects has come only
by 8 months' experience in day-to-day operations
and by visiting each of the principal regions in
wliich the program is carried out in cooperation
with our foreign allies and friends. I have held
regional meetings witli the chiefs of our missions
in Europe, the Near East and Africa, and in Latin
America. I have personally visited each Far
Eastern country in which we carry on a mission
and have seen some of the work being conducted
in representative nations in other parts of the
world. Altogether, I have visited personally 17
of the 50 countries where the Ica has missions.
These meetings and visits were essential to a
proper understanding of what this Govermnent
was trying to do in various parts of the world,
and it has given me a basis for appreciating the
many problems which confront us. I am glad
that a number of members of this committee, since
the Congress adjourned last summer and in prior
years, have been able to see some of the mutual
security programs in actual operation, for I am
sure that such firsthand observation is a great
help to understanding the need of the assistance
and the problems that beset us in furnishing it.
' Made before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs
on Mar. 20.
°BuixETiN of Apr. 2, 1956, p. 545.
The mutual security program is a large global
operation. No industrial company in the United
States spends anywhere near as much to deliver
as many varied items and services in as many dif-
ferent places abroad.
Administrative Setup
The program, as this committee well knows, is
both military and nonmilitary. In this program,
the Director of Ica performs two distinct roles.
One of these is as head of a semiautonomous oper-
ating agency within the State Department. This
agency is charged with the development and exe-
cution of most of the nonmilitary aspects of the
program. With respect to the nonmilitary phases
of the mutual security program, Ica administers
the operations through a planning and adminis-
trative staff in Washington and through several
thousand representatives in the field.
The other role of the Director is that of coordi-
nator of the whole program. This is not by virtue
of his position as head of Ica but by special dele-
gation of the Secretary of State. Under this
delegation it is the duty of the Director of Ica to
coordinate all elements of the mutual security
program. In all foreign policy matters, I take
guidance from the Secretary of State.
The Director in his coordinating activities must
see that the whole problem in each country is ex-
amined and is taken into account and that the
program in all of its aspects — policy, economic,
and military — is properly designed to accomplish
the objectives of the program. Accordingly, in
presenting our requests for funds for your con-
sideration, we will try to describe fully to you the
problems of each region and country as a whole, in
aU its aspects. We will plan to have here at all
times (1) a representative of the State Depart-
Aptil 9, 1956
605
ment for the region under discussion who can
answer your questions on foreign policy; (2) a
representative of the Department of Defense who
can inform you about the military situation and
program; and (3) a regional representative of
IcA to explain the economic and nonmilitary pro-
Program To Meet All Aspects of Problem
"We feel that the program should be viewed as
a whole, as a balanced effort to meet the Commu-
nist challenge for world domination which today
threatens the peace and security of the United
States and the rest of the free world. This chal-
lenge has existed since World War II and now
for nearly a decade has been the major problem
confronting the United States, to which many
other problems of our Government are related in
one way or another.
In meeting the Communist threat affirmatively,
we must recognize that the threat itself will con-
tinue to have many different aspects despite the
Soviet tactics of shifting from time to time the
emphasis from one form of offensive to another.
In the period 1947 to 1953 the Soviets aroused
well-founded fears of armed aggression through
all the free world. Today, although their pri-
mary effort appears to be economic, there is no
indication that the war preparations have ceased.
There can, therefore, be no relaxation in our own
military effort, nor in those of our allies, nor in
our support of those allies. At the same time we
must go forward with our own foreign economic
aid program, the success of which will be the
best answer to the new Soviet economic activities.
The total program (to be met out of new ap-
propriated funds) presented for fiscal year 1957
is $4.86 billion. Of this, $3 billion is for mili-
tary assistance. The balance of $1,860 million is
nonmilitary, although much of it directly supports
military effort.
I refer you to a chart which shows the approxi-
mate distribution of the fiscal year 1957 program
by function. The military assistance funds ($3
billion) will go for administration and expendi-
ture to the Department of Defense. The items for
defense support, development assistance, and tech-
nical cooperation will be allotted for administra-
tion and expenditure by the International Cooper-
ation Administration.
Military assistance now includes what was for-
merly called direct-forces support — that is, the
furnishing of consumable supplies, services, com-
modities, etc., to allies' military forces, as well as
the provision of equipment, weapons, and training.
Defense swpport is furnished to certain countries
eligible for military assistance. It is the name
which, as a result of previous congressional his-
tory, is applied to all forms of nonmilitary as-
sistance (except technical cooperation) in coun-
tries where there is a substantial military assist-
ance program. It includes aid for civilian-type
projects and activities which directly support the
military program of the country (for example,
highways, ports, communications) and also more
general assistance which makes it possible for a
country to maintain agreed force levels without
seriously adverse economic or political conse-
quences. At the same time, defense support is
designed to contribute to building up the recipient ,
country's internal strength, making possible prog-
ress toward improved living standards.
Development assistance is the term generally
used to define all forms of aid, except technical
cooperation, which are furnished in countries
where we have no substantial military aid pro-
gram. It is furnished to certain countries with
which we have no military agi'eements to promote
their economic development.
Technical cooperation consists of programs for
sharing technical knowledge and skills with less
developed countries. These programs are carried
on through direct arrangements between the
United States Government and individual gov-
ernments usually referred to as "host" govern-
ments, as well as through the United Nations and
through the Organization of American States.
Under the technical cooperation programs, tech-
nicians and experts are sent from the United States
to work overseas with host government officials
and to help host governments develop their own
teclmical resources for economic and social de-
velopment. Our teclmicians are supported, when
necessary, by supplies and equipment sent from the
United States for demonstration purposes. For-
eign nationals are also brought to the United
States (or other countries) for training or ad-
vanced study in technical specialties. This tech-
nical exchange program is operative equally in
countries which are eligible for military aid and
those which are not. Much of it is carried on
through contracts with American universities
606
Department of State Bulletin
MUTUAL S£CUfi/Ty PROGRAMS S/ FUNCmN
President's Contingency Fund
Asian Development Fund
Development
Assistance ""^Z $|62
6%
President's Contingency Fund
Middle East a Africo Fund'
Asion Development Fund $100
Development j^^-^*'-'*
Assistance Si/"^-i -, -
.1*
other
$2,703 MILLION
H.860 MILLION
Note: The figure of $4,860 million for the 1957 appropriation request excludes programs of $105 million to be
financed from reappropriations or funds remaining available in 1957.
under which technicians and specialists are sup-
plied. All of it is on a joint basis.
There are some further circumstances which
should be mentioned in this connection, as failure
to understand them may lead to confusion about
the total of the figures just mentioned. In addi-
tion to the new f mids requested for appropriation,
we expect to have on hand on June 30, 1956, an
unobligated balance of $45 million in the Pales-
tine Refugee Fund, which we ask be carried over.
We estimate that there will be an miobligated bal-
ance in the Asian fund of about $60 million,
wliich is available for 2 more years. We expect
that this smn will be programed and wholly ob-
ligated in fiscal year 1957.
The Military Program
For the description and details of the purely
military part of the program, you will hear from
representatives of the Department of Defense.
However, as coordinator of the mutual security
program, there are some aspects of that program
on which I wish to comment.
1. The military program has been developed
country by country, with careful consideration of
the entire situation in each region and comitry.
(a) In determining the military assistance to
be furnished to a country, we have tried to con-
sider all aspects of that country's status, including
the nature of the risks and dangers to the comitry
itself and the relationship of such risks and dan-
gers to the security position of the free world.
(b) We have considered what nonmilitary
projects are necessary to give direct support to
the military effort.
(c) We have considered the capacity of the
country to produce internally or to procure else-
where and pay for equipment which it needs.
(d) Equally, if a country cannot, without
either injury to its economy or outside aid, main-
tain agreed forces and adequate political stability
important to the security of the United States
and the free world, we must frame our nonmili-
tary programs in a way which helps to make
possible the maintenance of the desired defense
strength.
(e) We must give attention to the very prac-
tical consideration which exists in many coun-
Apn7 9, 1956
607
tries — 'Wliat is tlie maximum defense expenditure
which the country can make without endangering
the economic health and progress of the country?
In countries with low per capita incomes, this is
important because the peoples of the less devel-
oped countries have reasonable aspirations for
better conditions which should be satisfied as fully
as practicable if the countries are to remain stable
components of the free world.
(f) The military-assistance program in each
country, and action in carrying out the progi-ams
of prior years, must be related closely to the cur-
rent U.S. foreigii policy with reference to that
country and to developments in the general world
situation.
We have met with great cooperation from all
the agencies involved in trying to tie all aspects
of the program together.
2. The military program has a new aspect this
year — the commencement of a major effort to
equip the forces of our allies with very advanced
weapons. This will involve the provision of about
$530 million worth of advanced weapons for those
countries receiving military assistance who can
use them effectively in defense of the free world.
A portion of the funds for these advanced
weapons has already been earmarked for Nato
countries in the illustrative fiscal year 1957 pro-
gram. Tlie balance has not been distributed in
such specific fashion but will be allocated after
further study of their most useful and effective
employment.
While the problems of each country are differ-
ent, it is more convenient to discuss them in re-
gional categories, which is the historical method
of treatment.
Europe: NATO
Our earliest mutual security problems in the
period following World War II were encountered
in Europe. The Marshall plan, inaugurated in
1947, helped put Europe on the road to economic
recovery, and that recovery continues. At the
same time the military foi-ces of the Nato coun-
tries have been strengthened rapidly.
The aid request for Nato countries (excluding
Greece and Turkey) in fiscal year 1957 is almost
entirely military. For the second successive year
no defense support or related aid, vnth the excep-
tion of a small amount for technical exchange, is
being requested for any of these countries.
The need for military assistance is based pri-
marily on two main considerations.
The first consideration is strategic. The secu-
rity of Western Europe is vital to the security of
the United States. Western Europe is a first line
of our defense, and our divisions stationed there
are testimony to this fact. Western Europe has
the largest reserve of skilled manpower and, next
to the United States, the greatest industrial po-
tential in the world. It has a large pool of trained
forces under anns. Its air and naval bases are
vital to the defense of this country.
The second consideration is economic. Not-
withstanding Western Eui'ope's economic im-
provement, the heavy expense of creating and
maintaining an adequate defense in the area im-
poses a severe strain on the resources of many of
the Nato countries. The high cost of advanced
weapons, coupled with the annual recurring costs
of maintaining the defense establisliment already
built up, therefore, make the continuation of some
United States military assistance to them desira-
ble. Without this assistance, the effectiveness of
their forces would not be maintained. Equip- u
ment would deteriorate and fall into disrepair for
lack of spare parts, or become obsolescent.
In their own defense expenditures Nato coun-
tries have continued at a high level despite the
fact United States economic aid to these countries
has ceased.
The expenditures which the European countries
are now undertaking for their own defense are
very substantial indeed. The total outlay for
European defense establishments from 1949 to
1955 amounts to about $72 billion. Of this total,
about $10 billion is represented by United States
aid. In other words, the Nato countries are
footing the bill for about 85 percent of their
total defense expenditures. Moreover, since troop
pay in Europe is very much lower than in the
United States, the human and material resources
actually devoted to defense by the Europeans are
substantially larger than these figures would in-
dicate, by our yardstick. Likewise, the forces ac-
tually maintained through this expenditure are
significantly larger than those that we could main-
tain for the same expenditure.
In the coming fiscal year, of the military as-
sistance proposed for Western Europe, the greater
part will go to the Nato comitries. This will be
increased by the amount of any of the unallocated
reserve of advanced weapons which may be as-
608
Deparfment of State Bulletin
signed for use by Nato forces. In the light of all
the circumstances, including the advantage to the
free world of maintaining force strength and
quality of equipment, the help proposed to the
European nations in Nato is not disproportionate
to the benefit to us as a nation, nor does the
European effort as a whole represent less than a
reasonable share of the common defense effort.
Although no defense support or economic aid
as such is proposed for these countries in fiscal
year 1957, we are requesting $11/^ million for sup-
port of the European Productivity Agency, an
arm of the Oeec [Organization for European
Economic Cooperation]. Through this agency,
the Oeec countries are working together to adapt
and apply the best American and European tech-
nical experience to the development of more dy-
namic economies in Europe, thereby strengthen-
ing the economic base for Western defense.
West Berlin, Spain, Yugosiavia
The second group of European countries with
which we are concerned comprises West Berlin,
Spain, and Yugoslavia. All three of these lie,
politically and geographically speaking, on the
peri2Dhery of Western Europe. They are not
members of Nato and Oeec although Spain and
Yugoslavia are observers in the latter organiza-
tion. Spain and Yugoslavia have not benefited
as fully from the European recovery as the other
comitries, and their standards of living are appre-
ciably below those of other European areas. Yet
each of these coimtries is making a substantial
contribution to the military, political, or psycho-
logical defense of the West, and each is joined
with us in strong mutual security interest.
Spain is cooperating with us in the construction
of important air and naval bases ;
Yugoslavia, despite a common frontier with
four Iron Curtain countries, continues to set an
important example by guarding its independence
from Soviet domination, and is a member of the
Balkan Pact M'ith Greece and Turkey— both Nato
members, though generally considered "Near
East" countries;
West Berlin stands as an outpost of the free
world— a symbol of freedom far behind the Iron
Curtain.
These are the three special situations for which
defense support and related assistance is proposed.
Along with the $11/2 million for the European
Productivity Agency, the nonmilitary aid pro-
posed comes to $90 million. This is a slight re-
duction from funds available for similar pro-
grams for fiscal year 1956 and a reduction of more
than 50 percent from similar programs for fiscal
year 1955.
IVIiddie East, Africa, and Asia
Turning from Europe to the Middle East,
Africa, and Asia, the situation becomes much
more complex and much more varied. In these
areas we have a large nmnber of new nations, some
of them recently emerged from colonial status.
In most of these comatries the levels of living
standards, annual gross national product, indus-
trial capacity, and per capita income are low in
comparison to the more prosperous parts of the
free world.
Some of these nations, such as Korea, Laos,
Viet-Nam, Cambodia, and Taiwan, have recently
suffered from the effects of war or are faced by
large Communist forces at their borders, or both.
There is great need for many of them to main-
tain substantial defense forces. This poses an
economic problem of substantial proportions, for
the military expenditure in many cases is totally
beyond their resources. Nevertheless, they and
the free world need this military effort so that
they can remain free of external aggression and
can put down armed internal subversion.
Many of these allies of ours, and also other
nations of the free world not receiving military
assistance, are faced with internal economic prob-
lems which would confront them even if they
made no military effort. Their peoples, with un-
satisfactory living conditions, are aspiring to a
level above an austere subsistence standard. They
look to their leaders for a degree of economic prog-
ress which is beyond their powers to achieve mi-
assisted. We thus must face the problem of non-
military assistance of an economic character :
(a) To maintain the defense efforts of our less
prosperous allies at desired levels, and
(b) To assist some of our allies, and also vari-
ous less developed, uncommitted free nations, to
strike at those conditions of poverty, disease, and
low living standards which tend to create unrest
and instability and which, if not improved, can
lead to disorder or collapse which would threaten
world peace.
Our allies want to be strong. If they are to be
strong, we cannot see them bowed by an unbear-
able defense burden beyond their capacities and
Apri7 9, 1956
609
unable to meet the reasonable aspirations of their
peoples for progress.
In the case of uncommitted nations, we achieve
an important objective in the interests of the se-
curity of the United States and the free world if
we can succeed in helping them to make the prog-
ress which will keep alive their desire for inde-
pendence as responsible and developing members
of the free world. We have no desire to impose
our way of life upon them. Our sole purpose is
to help them to develop the internal economic con-
ditions in which free institutions can prosper.
We hope to keep them from throwing their weight
into the balance against the free world and on the
side of communism.
The problem has been greatly complicated by
the increased economic activities of the Soviet bloc
in relation to the free nations. Communist offers
of economic, military, and technical help have a
strong appeal for nations which need assistance
badly, and we, therefore, must expect many of
these offers, where they are sufficiently attractive,
to be accepted. Such acceptance involves dangers
as well as material benefits. It increases the op-
portunities for Communist penetration; it fre-
quently places the Soviet Union in a falsely favor-
able light; it may tie the recipient unduly to the
Communist bloc; it will be capitalized upon by
the Communists to proclaim their unselfish inter-
est in the economic welfare of others.
We must take this danger with the utmost of
seriousness. Some of the peoples throughout the
Middle East and Asia are all too likely to accept
the Communist propaganda line, which puts the
blame on free-world nations for the existence of
obstacles between present hard economic realities
and their own economic aspirations. For many
leaders in the region, the first direct contact with
the Soviet Government itself has been with the
new 1956 model of Soviet "traveling salesman"
diplomat who smilingly and seductively offers on
easy terms the capital and technical and military
help they desire. These Soviet offers have in-
cluded arms to Egypt, Afghanistan, and other
countries and machinery, food, industrial plants,
and technicians to many other countries around
the world. While we have no intention of com-
peting with the U.S.S.R., offer by offer — for to
TOTAL MUTUAL SBCUim MmRAM BY RE&ON
(MILITARY AND NON- MILITARY COMBINED)
FYI%7
FYI9X
Lotin America>
$77
(3%)
*2,943 MILLION
*4,965 MILLION
Note: The figure of $2,943 million for fiscal 1956 includes programs of $240 million financed from reappropriation
of funds. The figure of $4,965 for fiscal 1957 includes programs of $105 million to be financed from reappropriations
or funds remaining available in 1957.
610 l>epat\mQn\ of S/ofe Bulletin
do so would be to abandon independence and
judgment — ^yet we must take account of the new
approach which Soviet tyranny has adopted to
court the Moslem, Asiatic, and African worlds.
Our policy, I believe, should be to continue to
support projects and progi-ams which, in the light
of our best judgment and experience, contribute
to freedom and sound development in these areas.
We should not be stampeded into proposing proj-
ects beyond the capacity and energies of any
nation — for, unlike the Soviets, we care about their
future and will not deliberately entice a nation
into the quicksands of overexjjansion or inflation.
We must recognize that pressing human misery
has made many a nation nearsighted to the hu-
man tragedy of the concentration camps, slave
labor, and brutal rigidity that lies back of the
Soviet offers of arms and aid and Soviet methods
of obtaining industrial advances. We must imder-
stand that responsible leaders in the newly devel-
oping region, no matter how moderate or how pro-
free- world they may be themselves, must make sub-
stantial deliveries on programs of development in
order to continue as leaders in their nations. Our
program must recognize such circumstances. It
in fact does so by helping to provide the kind of
aid needed to carry forward sound development
programs at a rate and in a volume adapted to
the capacity of countries to maintain effectively,
and in terms of the economic and political circum-
stances that these countries, their peoples, and their
leaders face.
Before discussing the various countries of the
Middle East, Africa, and Asia in more detail, I
want to make two points which affect our programs
in these areas.
1. Great ■flexibility of action on the part of the
United States is needed to meet situations as they
arise.
These areas are in a volatile stage of develop-
ment and change. New problems are arising
daily, and old problems are constantly taking on
new aspects. We should be in a position to take
prompt action to deal with those situations where
assistance is wise, before others, hostile to free-
world objectives, exploit them dangerously.
2. Some of these problems are long-range. To
be most effective, we should be in a position to
make reasonable nonmilitary commitments ex-
tending beyond the span of a single fiscal year.
The President mentioned this problem in his mes-
sage, and I shall discuss it later.
MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA
I turn now to the situation in the Middle East
and Africa in greater detail. As examples of
some of our problems, let me mention a few in-
dividual situations.
Turkey's assumption of an extraordinarily
large military burden — she is presently contrib-
uting a substantial part of the ground forces of
Nato — merits our continued support. The com-
bination of the demands of the defense establish-
ment and the costs of accelerated development has
brought about serious economic strain. The Gov-
ernment of Turkey has recently announced a sta-
bilization program containing those elements of
economic reform which can contribute to financial
balance if properly carried out.
The oil of Iran is beginning to add substantially
to that coimtry's capital development, but in the
next year or so Iran will still need help in meeting
the heavy costs of government that are occasioned
by large military expenditures and the needs for
development.
We support the Egyptian Government's deter-
mination to build a better life for her people. To
bring fruition to their strivings for the common
decencies of life, Egyptians need aid to provide
long-range buildup of their resources, such as the
High Aswan Dam will accomplish. At the same
time, Egypt must satisfy immediate needs so that
there will be a "long-range" future with which
we can cooperate. Our relationship with this
great Moslem state depends on our understanding
of both future and present economic requirements
in connection with which Egypt needs external
help.
In the Arah States and in Israel, we hope that
our programs, which are designed to accelerate
desperately needed economic development and to
provide a partial answer to the pitiful plight of
the refugees from Israel, will also help in the solu-
tion of the bitter controversies that now plague
the whole Near East. We are prepared to sup-
port any programs or projects that hold real
promise of constructive progress on these prob-
lems, including broad support for regional proj-
ects that will harness the energy and equitably
distribute the waters of the Jordan River or facili-
tate tlie resettlement of refugees.
MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA FUND
Three factors in particular create a special need
for the capacity for flexible action on the economic
April 9, 7956
611
front in the Middle East and Africa. The first
is the increased Soviet activity in the area. The
second factor is a past pattern, which there is
every likelihood will continue to repeat itself in
the future, of frequent and sudden economic crises
in certain countries of the region. The third con-
sideration is the fact that many of the major
problems of the region with which our aid pro-
grams must deal are of a kind which concern two
or more countries. This means, when given the
sensitive political issues involved in the relation-
ships among some of these countries, that the exact
timing and character of the eventual solutions to
these problems cannot be accurately forecast, nor
the precise manner in which our aid can contrib-
ute.
We need to have available a fund which is not
programed in detail, far in advance and country
by country. This should be available during the
coming fiscal year for carrying out major country
and regional projects which seem of particular
importance in solving economic problems and in
maintaining peace and stability. Such a fund
would place the United States in a position to give
highly desirable economic assistance, without hav-
ing to divert funds earmarked for some other spe-
cific purpose. Such a fund would avoid the
necessity of transferring funds to high-priority
projects suddenly developing, at the expense of
soundly conceived country programs which have
been carefully presented for your approval as
illustrative programs.
The President suggests a fund of $100 million.
"We would expect to have it obligated in the course
of the coming fiscal year. Some of it would doubt-
less be applied in aid of projects which we are
already considering but which have not at the
moment developed to a point where we are able
to present them as part of our specific illustrative
programs. Some of the fund would doubtless be
applied to meet emergency situations.
SOUTH ASIA
In the light of PaJcistari's commitment to the
free world both in the Seato [Southeast Asia
Treaty Organization] and the Baghdad Pact, her
efforts to maintain adequate defenses and to build
economic strength deserve our strong support, for
Pakistan's strength and freedom are a center link
to a chain that guards free Asia.
Consistent with our policy of helping to
strengthen free nations which are striving to main-
tain their independence and which require help
in achieving a rate of economic growth adequate
for the minimum needs of their people, we plan
to assist India in carrying out its second 5-year
development program, which is to be initiated this
year. It is important for the United States to
give continued assistance as evidence of our in-
terest in and friendship for the Indian people, thus
helping a great nation, devoted to the principles
of freedom, to make the economic advances which
are essential to its welfare.
FAR EAST
The mutual security progi'am in the Far East
currently includes programs for Korea, Taiwan,
.Japan, the Philippines, Thailand, Viet-Nam,
Cambodia, Laos, and Indonesia. In general, the
reasons which I have already advanced for as-
sistance to the less developed countries of the
Middle East, Africa, and South Asia apply with
equal force to all our Far Eastern friends and
allies, except, in part, in the case of Japan, which
is the only highly industrialized country in the
Far East.
The major part of the total aid proposed for
the Far East would go to Korea, Taiwan, Viet- |
Nam, Cambodia, and Laos. Each of these coun-
tries is now maintaining large military forces
which it requires for its self-defense. These forces
are larger, in some cases many times larger, than
those which these comitries can raise and support
with their own resources alone. Over the past
several years we have helped them to develop and
maintain these forces through the provision of
all types of aid. As a result, the strength and
effectiveness of these forces has increased vei-y
greatly, but this strengtli and effectiveness cannot
be sustained without continuing aid of considera-
ble magnitude. Modern forces are far more ex-
pensive to maintain than primitive ones. More-
over, expanded forces require new facilities such
as airfields, naval bases, and barracks. These
countries, with their very limited resources, can-
not meet the high costs involved out of their own
revenues.
Some of these same nations, like Korea and
Viet-Nam, have also faced the problem of recov-
ering from the effects of war and of caring for
and absorbing a gi'eat influx of refugees. They
lack the foreign exchange to import consmner
goods, industrial raw materials, machinery and
612
Departmenf of S/ofe Bu//efin
spare parts which their j)resent economies need.
They also face the necessity of increasing their
own capacity for self-support and of making a
beginning at the long task of economic develop-
ment to raise living standards.
These countries will necessarily receive substan-
tial military assistance under the 1957 program.
The threat of further Communist aggression is not
by any means removed, and it is unfortunate that,
in countries with so much need for economic
progi-ess, it is necessary for the free world to spend
such large amounts for military pui'poses. In the
present state of the world this cannot be avoided.
The aid program for Korea continues to be the
largest single aid program currently being con-
ducted by the United States. This is true of both
its military and nonmilitary components. This
is partly because Korea has the largest single
army in the Far East and one which is well beyond
the capacity of Korea to support unaided. This
army is largely composed of battle-trained vet-
erans, and it has been created, and then main-
tained, at its present effective strength only by
huge volumes of continuing military aid and
defense support.
PRESIDENT'S FUND FOR ASIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
A year ago, the Congress authorized appropria-
tions of $200 million for Asian economic develop-
ment, but only $100 million was appropriated.
This year the President has requested appropria-
tion of the remaining $100 million. This commit-
tee is not called upon for any action now upon this
request since the appropriation has been author-
ized.
The Congress knew that planning the expendi-
ture of this money would take some time, and the
funds appropriated were therefore made available
I for a 3-year period.
I The first major expenditure from this fund will
probably be for a regional nuclear research and
training center to be located in the Philippines
for the benefit of Asians. This was announced
only last week.^ The Brookhaven National Lab-
oi'atory will start off a comprehensive survey of
this next month. Other projects under study in-
Ij volve communications, mineral-resources develop-
ment, production improvement, rail and water
transportation, and various regional teclinical
training centers.
'Ibid., p. 544.
April 9, 7956
Latin America
The fiscal year 1957 program recommends con-
tinuance of our technical cooperation programs in
Latin America. These are effective in assisting
the self-reliant governments and peoples of Latin
American countries in their own development ac-
tivities. These governments are striving to
achieve higher health, social, and economic stand-
ards, and the technical assistance we have been
able to furnish has been warmly received and gen-
erously acknowledged.
The programs are designed to assist the peoples
in each country to develop and utilize more effec-
tively their tremendous human and natural re-
sources. The progi-ams are cooperative in that
our representatives and those of the host govern-
ment work side by side and are supported by the
pooled contributions of both countries.
In a recent trip to several Latin American coun-
tries I gained the impression that the broad ob-
jectives of the mutual security program are being
achieved in generous measure. In each country,
whether it was in the palace or the foreign office
or in some jungle area of the interior, the answer
to the question "Wlao is carrying out this pro-
gram?" was invariably— "we"— "your people and
our people." This is the partnership spirit with
which our people are carrying out the progi-am,
and it is gratifying to me to find that it is shared
by those with whom we work. I think you can
feel assured that these technical assistance pro-
grams are a source of genuine good will between
the United States and Latin America.
Other Activities
We assist, as you know, various projects han-
dled through U.N. agencies. In dollar amount
our contributions to these agencies are included
in the fiscal year program for a total of $27,800,000.
Witnesses directly concerned with supervising
and operating these programs will testify about
them. They are in general comparable in size to
the programs of earlier years.
It has been the policy of the United States to
participate in these efforts of the United Nations
as well as those of other international organiza-
tions to deal with certain problems of economic
development and to meet the serious difficulties
of certain especially needy people whose problems
are best handled through multilateral action. We
propose support of (a) our own program for
613
fRBS Asm fMPORTANCE
WORLD MANPOWER
Free World = 1.8 Billion
Mft^JsWA
re wi/uui/i/y
Soviet Bloc = 0.9 Billion
■ 100 Million P*op1«
U.S. DEPENDENCE ON IMPORTS FROM ASIA
(Imports from Asio os Percent of Totol US. Imports in 1954)
Copro Tea Rubber Jute Manilo Spices ISn Mon- Tung-
Hemp gonese sten
DEFENSE EXPENDITURES
( As Percent of FY 1956 Budget )
58%
PRINCIPALIS. EXPORTS TO FREE ASIA
1954
971 ( $ Millions)
^^^ 259
Grains Textiles Chemicals
Mochinery Cotton
r^r r% (%"' r^° f^r-
Pwcont of Total U.S. Exports
escapees from communism, (b) the work of the
Intergovernmental Committee for European Mi-
gration (Icem), and (c) the program of paying
ocean freight costs on donated relief supplies.
These humanitarian programs are part of this
Government's general support of collective action
in the solution of important world social and
economic problems, some arising out of World
War II.
The Need of Flexibility
I have already referred to the need of flexibility
to deal with the problems which confront us.
This need will be apparent if I review for you
briefly our planning and program cycle.
Ordinarily we come before your committee in
the late spring. Incidentally, we are here before
you earlier this year than in any year since 1952.
Hearings before this committee, the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee, and the two Appropria-
tions Committees are thorough and comjilete, and
we develop for your benefit illustrative programs
which indicate the purpose for which we are ask-
ing very large sums of money.
Tliese illustrative programs, when they reach
you, have gone through a long process. Already
the country teams in the countries involved are
working on the early stages of the planning for
the fiscal year 1958. Much of the planning at
the country level for the 1957 fiscal year program
was done a year ago. These country programs,
both military and economic, then receive a very
thorougli screening in the field and in Washing-
ton. Priorities among the projects are then de-
termined. Those least useful and with least
promise are eliminated, and the program require-
ments are reconciled with fiscal needs. The Bu-
614
Department of Sfafe Bulletin
reau of the Budget thereafter participates in ex-
tended hearings on the programs as developed, and
they are again further refined. Thus, funds ac-
tually appropriated in the late spring or early
summer of 1956 for the fiscal year 1967 program
will be based on planning which started in the
spring of 1955.
Appropriation of funds does not end our plan-
ning process. The Congress frequently makes
changes in the program. This necessitates an
extended further program review to adjust the
illustrative programs to congressional action and
to changes in the general world or country situa-
tion. It takes time to make allocations of funds to
particular programs and situations. Usually we
do not get the funds in form to be used imtil No-
vember or December of the calendar year in which
the appropriations are made. After that, we
must begin the long process of negotiation, first
with other governments and later with contrac-
tors, designed to insure that we spend the money
you have granted to us with wisdom and frugality.
The negotiation camiot be started (particularly
with foreign governments) vmtil we know we have
money to spend. This is particularly true with
respect to country programs, including the sale
of agricultural commodities or the use of loans as
part of the program, for, in general, the agreement
with such a country is on a "package" basis. Both
for the Defense Department and for Ica, this puts
us on a very tight time schedule — and forces active
negotiation work by a busy staff just at the time
when it is preparing to present the program of
the next succeeding fiscal year to you.
This presentation is a very intricate task indeed.
The large presentation documents which come to
you each year do not write themselves. They in-
volve a vast amount of careful writing, checking
of figures, interdepartmental coordination and
clearances, and editing. The Defense and Ica
program and operating staffs have been working
steadily on the documents which you have before
you for over 2 months and at the same time have
been pressing to carry out the obligating of fiscal
year 1956 fmads. The same people must work
on both tasks, for they are the only people who
have the detailed knowledge to do this. The sit-
uation is particularly difficult because section 106
of the appropriation act provides that not more
than 20 percent of the funds made available xmder
the act may be obligated or reserved during the
last 2 months of the fiscal year.
I wish to make two principal points on the basis
of this description of the cycle.
First, a period of 1^^ years to 2 years thus
elapses between (a) initial planning and (b) obli-
gation of funds. This means a substantial time
lag between ascertainment of requirements and
obligation of fimds. New and substantial re-
quirements can develop rapidly in the interim.
We can meet these new requirements mider pres-
ent legislation in two ways.
1. We can transfer funds from other carefully
prepared programs. This is undesirable because
it means abandoiunent or postponement of care-
fully planned programs of assistance which are
badly needed.
2. We can use the $100-million President's con-
tingency fund under section 401. This is our most
valuable flexible asset in carrying out mutual se-
curity objectives, and we should save this for the
most serious emergencies and unprogramed calls
on our funds. The proposal of an additional
Middle East and Africa fund, which I have al-
ready mentioned, in essence would give us a fur-
ther available source of emergency funds for use
in this region. Although this fund would be ear-
marked for use in a particular area of the world,
it is a region in which unexpected need for funds
is especially likely to arise.
Second, the planning and program cycle which
I have described shows that the time available for
obligation of mutual security funds is very short
indeed, especially when 80 percent of them must,
under the provisions of the present appropriation
law, be obligated during the first 10 months of the
fiscal year. I believe the taxpayers would get
better value for their money and the conduct of the
mutual security program would be improved if the
Congress were to adopt the following recommen-
dations :
(a) Make military assistance funds available
on a "no year" basis as in the case of most other
military procurement funds expended by the De-
partment of Defense ;
(b) Provide that at least 25 percent of nonmili-
taiy Mutual Security Act funds shall remain
available until September 30 following the end of
the fiscal year (i. e. be 15-month funds).
I feel sure that the present provision limiting
obligations in May and June to 20 percent of ap-
propriations for the year exerts undue and un-
necessary pressures for early obligation of funds
which inevitably lead to hasty action. In essence.
Apr// 9, J 956
615
the present provision moves the pressure for last-
minute obli<^!ition of funds forward from June 30
to April 30, thus worsening the situation instead
of improving it. I hope that the appropriations
committees will see fit to relieve us of this require-
ment.
Further flexibility is needed in another wholly
dilferent direction. At the present time, the Presi-
dent is authorized to use under the provisions of
section 401 of the Mutual Security Act (Presi-
dent's Special Fund), without regard to the pro-
visions of the act itself or of any other statute for
which funds are appropriated under the act:
(a) $100 million specifically appropriated under
the act for fiscal yenv 1956 ; and
(b) $50 million of any other mutual security
funds appropriated for fiscal year 1956.
This provision has enabled us to move promptly
to carry out the purposes of the act in a luimber
of critical situations where these purposes could
not otherwise be accomplished within one or more
of the normal restrictions of the Mutual Security
Act and of certain other statutes.
We believe that the ability to act rapidly in an
imrestricted fashion will prove to be even more
necessary in the year which lies ahead. Accord-
ingly, the President has recommended the broad-
ening of the valuable authority provided by sec-
tion 401 in three respects.
First, he has requested that the amount which
is subject to the provisions of section 401 should
be increased from $150 million (composed of a
specific appropriation for fiscal year 1956 under
section 401 of $100 million and any other $50
million of fiscal year 1956 mutual security funds)
to $300 million (composed of a new specific ap-
propriation of $100 million for fiscal year 1957
under section 401 and any other $200 million of
fiscal j-ear 1957 mutual security funds). This
would mean that $300 million, or about 6 percent,
of the total mutual security funds requested for
fiscal year 1957 would be subject to the high de-
gree of flexibility now afforded by section 401.
Second, the President has requested that he be
given authority to use not in excess of $100 million
of the funds available under section 401 without
regard to the requirements of any act, if the Pres-
ident determines that such use would be important
to the security of the United States. This provi-
sion would be similar to the broad exemption al-
ready furnished by section 404 of the act with
respect to the funds provided under that section.
Third, he has requested that the amount of funds
which may be allocated under section 401 to any
one nation in any one fiscal year be increased from
$20 million to $40 million.
These three changes would be an important ad-
dition to the authority of the Department of De-
fense and of IcA to move rapidly and flexibly to
take necessary action in cases which may arise. i
Long-Term Commitments
The President has recommended that, for non-
military projects of significance or importance,
the President be authorized to make commitments
for not over 10 years. The funds to fulfill such
commitments would come from appropriations foi
nonmilitary purposes and would not exceed $100
million in any one year. I
The significant feature of the requested author- '
ity would be that the President would be able to
give to other nations assurance, backed by con-
gressional approval, that annually an agreed
United States contribution to the projects in ques-
tion will be made within and subject to the limits
of the funds made available annually. j
The Aswan Dam has frequently been cited as an I
example of the type of project in contemplation.
Although in the initial stages of this project use
of the requested new commitment authority may
not be involved, it does serve to illustrate the pos-
sible use of the requested authority.
This project is a large river development in-
volving many facets (irrigation, power, transpor-
tation, flood control, related agricultural enter-
prises, and service activities) all of which in the
aggregate constitute a long-range development
project, partly to be financed by the country to be
benefited and partlj^ by assistance progi'ams and
international loans. All these elements of such
an enterprise must be pulled together into a sound
arrangement for its financing. To obtain one part
of the financing there must be assurance of the
availability of the balance. The government of
the country concerned must know that the project
is financially feasible before it can safely go for-
ward or even plan on a firm basis.
Other types of projects for which such a power
would be useful involve harbor development, road
systems, inland waterways, power systems, com-
munications systems, industrial and educational
centers, with their respective related and subsidi-
ary schemes. If these are to be carried out over
a period of years, there is no need of actual ap-
616
Deparfmenf of State Bulletin
propriations until the year in which the funds are
actually to be obligated approaches. However, we
do request the authority, at an earlier date, to
make commitments not amomiting to binding con-
tract authoHty but backed by the assurance of the
Congress that these are undertakings for which
we expect later to make appropriations. This
authority may prove to be a very powerful and
useful mutual-security instrument in the difficult
years lying immediately ahead.
From personal experience in the House of Rep-
resentatives, I know and understand the congres-
sional reluctance to permit long-term arrange-
ments. The Congress likes to review proposed
appropriations on an annual basis and to check on
the expenditure of previously granted funds be-
fore granting new authority. This opportunity
to review will not be completely lost under the
proposal, for annual appropriations must be
made.
In the face of greatly increased Communist ac-
tivity in the economic field, those charged with
the execution of our mutual security programs are
going to need every reasonable tool to accomplish
their objectives. The Communist leaders can act
on dictatorial fiat without accountability to any-
one. They need not give thought to any wishes
of their own people or to their crying need for
consumer goods. We seek no sucli autocratic
power.
Agricultural Commodities
Under section 402 of the 1954 act, as amended,
$300 million is to be used in the current fiscal year
to finance the export and sale for foreign curren-
cies of surplus agricultural conunodities produced
in the United States. If we fail to arrange for
such exports in the full amount, to the extent of
our failure we cannot use our appropriations.
To that extent the mutual security program of the
United States and its allies is curtailed, and care-
fully planned projects must be scrapped or
postponed.
In fiscal year 1956 we hope to reach the $300-
million mark, but may fall short. Whatever fig-
ure we reach will be only after much effort and
PROGRAM BY REGION
($Millions)
MILITARY
Europe
$760
125%)
FY 1957 Program --$3,000 Million
NGN- MILITARY
Lotin America
ser
13%)
FY 1957 Program- -$1,965 Million
2,352
LATIN AMERICA
47
77
97
EUROPE
385
851
M
NEAR EAST 8 AFRICA
884
«»
40(
412
^105*^
296
NON-
REGIONAL
781
529
' ^
:i2l :
:J
'^5
r~i
-174
ZI6.
1955 1956 „ 1957 ,
(Pfoposea ProgrOffil
U S Fiscol reors
*$47.am;il!o(t of ih« ilOOmiUion Sp.ciol Preildar-tial Fund moudad
1955 1956" 1957
IPropoMd Program)
I profram ligurti.
April 9, 1956
617
in the face of many difficulties. In these situa-
tions, we must always try to avoid hurting nor-
mal export markets for United States agricultural
products or for the products of our allies and
friends. If we did cause such injury, we would
do damage to the very cause of free-world security
and stability we are trying to serve. This limits
our opportunities. The 50-50 shipping provision
also sometimes makes the problem difficult, par-
ticularly our efforts to work out triangular ar-
rangements. The shift of the mutual security
economic program toward less developed coun-
tries, which ai'e predominantly agricultural and
therefore need our surpluses less, also accentuates
the problem.
I therefore ask that the requirement of section
402 for the coming fiscal year be set at $250 mil-
lion. We shall do our utmost to carry out the
purposes of section 402, but we do not want to see
useful projects abandoned for lack of funds,
merely because under current world conditions we
find it impossible to reach some arbitrary goal.
Loans
In the administration of the mutual security
program it has been this Government's policy to
encourage the financing of nonmilitary projects
and activities by private investment or through
public lending institutions such as the Export-
Import Bank and the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development. This policy
has been considered and applied in formulating
the program for fiscal year 1957. Unfortunately,
loan financing of this character has not been avail-
able in adequate amoimts to meet the requirements
for capital even in many countries whose econ-
omies are sufficiently stable to indicate capacity
for repayment.
Under the mutual security program, we have
provided our assistance in the form of loans rather
than grants, so far as this was consistent with
the attainment of mutual security objectives. We
have tried to make sure that loans did not supplant
those which might be available from the public
lending institutions or replace potential private
capital investment, if that possibility exists. Con-
sequently, we have restricted the use of mutual
security loans to situations in which the transac-
tion would not take place at all unless on terms
substantially more liberal than those available
from the public lending institutions. The efforts
this year to increase the volume of loans actually
made under the mutual security program have
been disappointing. It has been foimd that the
attempted substitution of a loan for a grant is
frequently, either for political or economic rea-
sons, inconsistent with the attainment of mutual
security objectives, unless the terms of such loans
are so liberal as in effect to constitute partial
grants.
Unexpended Balances
At a later stage of these hearings, the appro-
priate accounting officers of the Defense Depart-
ment and of IcA will discuss in detail the status
of past appropriations and the unexpended bal-
ances of prior appropriations which we antici-
pate at the end of fiscal year 1956.
My present estimate, on the basis of information
furnished by the Department of Defense, is that i
the balance of unexpended military assistance ap-
propriations on June 30, 1956, will be about $4.8
billion. This balance will represent a decline in
the 2-year period since June 30, 1954, of about $2.9
billion. It will be equal to about 2 years of mili-
taiy assistance expenditures at the average rate
for the fiscal years 1955 and 1956.
On the nonmilitary side, on June 30, 1956, there
will probably be a slight decline in unexpended
balances from the levels prevailing at the end of
June 1955 and June 1954. This balance will be
equal to about 1 year's expenditure at the average
rate now prevailing.
The new military assistance authorization re-
quested is equal to about 1 year of expenditures
($2.4 billion) at the present rate plus the $530
million requested for advanced weapons of a type
for which, in general, no previous appropriations
have been made. The nonmilitary authorization
requested is equal to about 1 year of expenditures
at the current rate.
I'his, ladies and gentlemen, is a summary of my
vie\.rs on this vast program. The needs for sucl
a program were never greater. The usefulness of
it seems to me to be borne out by the news we
read in each day's newspapers. We shall try to
give you in the days to come a full picture of every
aspect of the program. We think that the facts
which you will hear in testimony and will find in
written form in the presentation books will be
more convincing than any expression of opinion
anj'one can give you.
<618
Department of State Bulletin
East-West Trade
Statement ty Under Secretary Hoover ^
You have asked me to appear today to give in-
formation on the matter of East-West trade.
At the outset there should be a clear understand-
ing of the type of East-West trade with which we
are here concerned. We do not refer to trade
between the United States and the Communist
bloc, for controls on our trade with the Commu-
nists are not in question. What we are dealing
with here is trade between our allies and the Com-
munist countries. The only effective way in
which we can control that trade is through the
power of persuasion.
We have offered to give your subcommittee —
and we repeat our offer — all necessary and appro-
priate information about such trade. The issue
between us seems to be that the subcommittee in-
sists that all of this information be given in pub-
lic session. We, on the contrary, feel that certain
portions should only be given to the Congress on
a classified basis. To make this information pub-
lic would violate our agreements with our allies
and would be prejudicial to our national security
interests.
In any consideration of our system of interna-
tional controls it is essential to remember that
these controls depend entirely upon a system of
volimtary cooperation among the free nations of
the West. Thus, the 1954 revision of the Interna-
tional Control List had to be negotiated and agree-
ment reached with all 14 of our allies.-
In those negotiations neither the United States
nor any of the other participants got everything
they wanted. The State Department, as well as
the other interested Departments, was not happy
' Alade on Mar. 26 before the Senate Permanent Sub-
committee on Investigations (press release 161).
^ For a Foreign Operations Administration announce-
ment on the 1954 revisions, see Bulletin of Sept. 13, 1954,
p. 372.
to see many items deleted from the control list.
By the same token, some of our allies were not
happy to see some items retained. We did suc-
ceed in retaining on the list highly strategic items
which could not be controlled successfully without
international agreement. We also succeeded in
achieving our other major objective, the setting
up of a more efl'ective enforcement system. With-
out agreement among all 15 nations it would not
have been possible to have any International Con-
trol List at all.
Thus all the responsible agencies are in full sup-
port of Governor Stassen's statement that the
1954 negotiations achieved a net security advan-
tage for the United States, under all the circum-
stances then prevailing, and that the results were
in the best interests of the United States.
Some criticism has been directed, during the
course of these hearings, at our allies for the posi-
tion taken by them with regard to East- West trade
controls. They, as well as we, were seeking to
achieve a balance between the beneficial effects of
peaceful trade and the dangers of unrestricted
trade in strategic items. Sometimes we dis-
agreed, as free nations often do, as to where to
strike that balance. Our negotiations in 1954
were on the whole a successful effort to resolve
this problem.
It has been suggested that we might have been
more successful if we had used more than the
power of persuasion. President Eisenhower an-
swered that contention on December 2, 1953,' as
follows :
The easiest thing to do with great power is to abuse
it, to use it to excess. This most powerful of the free
nations must not permit itself to grow weary of the
processes of negotiation and adjustment that are funda-
' lUd., Dec. 14, 1953, p. 811.
^l^rW 9, 1956
619
mental to freedom. If it should turn impatiently to co-
ercion of other free nations, our brand of coercion, so
far as our friends are concerned, would be a mark of the
imperialist rather than of the leader.
During the course of this investigation, com-
plaints have been made that the executive branch
has withheld information about the 1954 negotia-
tions which the Congress has a right to know. I
do not think the record will sustain that point.
On February 14 I appeared before your sub-
committee in executive session. I offered full co-
operation to the subcommittee and explained that
much of the information sought could only be
given in executive session in order to protect our
national security. The subcommittee did not re-
spond to that offer but instead proceeded with
open hearings.
Therefore, on February 20 a letter was sent to
the chairman on behalf of the Departments of
State, Defense, and Commerce and the Interna-
tional Cooperation Administration.* That letter
is in the record of these hearings. It pointed out
that most of the documents involved in these in-
ternational negotiations were classified and highly
sensitive and that they involved our relations with
other governments. It was further stated that
in many instances we had given a specific commit-
ment to keep the participation of a particular na-
tion in this program secret. The letter concluded
that, for these reasons, the International List could
not be made public but full information as to items
on the List could be offered to the subcommittee
in executive session and on a classified basis.
In a further effort to clarify our position a
letter was addressed to the chairman on INIarch
23,* pointing out that the information already of-
fered would give the subcommittee, on a classified
basis, every item on the International List. I
would like to enter that letter into the record at
this time. It stated we were ready to give the
subcommittee the List itself on a classified basis
and to discuss tlie 1954 revisions of that List with
the subcommittee in executive session.
Our request is not unusual. We are only ask-
ing to follow the same procedure followed by the
other committees of the Congress. In matters
involving foreign relations, officials from the re-
sponsible Departments meet in executive session
on frequent occasions with the appropriate con-
gressional committees to testify on classified niat-
' Not printed here.
620
ters that affect the national interest. That is all
that is being requested in this instance.
We believe that this position is essential if a
system of international trade controls is to be
maintained. That system rests on a voluntary
agreement among ourselves and 14 of our allies.
When the agreement was negotiated in 1954, it
was decided by the 15 negotiating countries that
the International List and the negotiations which
established it were to be classified. Some of our
allies would only consent to participate in the
negotiations on the basis of a specific commitment
to that effect. Pursuant to that agreement and
under security regulations issued by the Secre-
tary of State, the International List and the docu-
ments on which that List was based were classi-
fied.
I have personally examined the documents in-
volved, and it is my considered judgment that to
declassify the material would not only be a breach
of faith which would be prejudicial to our for-
eign relations but that it could seriously risk de-
stroying the entire agreement upon which our
system of controls now rests. Furthermore, it
would jeopardize our ability to conduct further
negotiations on this or any other subject in the
future. For these reasons the executive branch
must respectfully decline to declassify the Inter-
national List, it is, however, as stated previ-
ously, available to the subcommittee on a classified
basis.
In arriving at this conclusion a number of other
factors had to be considered. Our allies know
that tliey must trade if they are going to survive.
Many of them have had a substantial trade pat-
tern with countries now within the Communist
bloc, extending back over a period of a century
or more. They are under constant pressure from
their parliaments, trade unions, and industrial
interests to expand their trade. They regard
trade-control lists as an obstacle to such expansion.
That attitude is reflected in their negotiations
with us. We have done our best to resist those
pressures. Our task would be made far more
difficult if the International List were published
at this time.
Another factor has to do with Communist propa-
ganda. East-West trade controls are a major
target area today for Eed propaganda. The Com-
munists are seeking every opportunity to divide
the free nations on this issue. Were the Inter-
Department of Stale Bulletin
national List to be published, it would become a
target for attack by Communists and left-wing
groups within the participating countries. The
combination of parliamentary, trade union, and
business pressures, spurred on by subversive
groups directed by the Communists, could, in our
judgment, jeopardize the entire international sys-
tem of controls.
It has been claimed that the International List
is already public and known to the Soviets. What
is known to the Soviets is, of course, a matter of
speculation. No doubt they do have some infor-
mation as to items which are controlled. That
does not seem to be a valid reason why they should
be given all the information.
It has also been contended that the British
Board of Trade List is identical to the Interna-
tional List. That contention is not correct. The
items on the British list vary in significant details
from those on the International List. The Brit-
ish list does not include the surveillance list nor
the amounts of the quantitative control list. Na-
tional lists are published by a nvunber of other
countries — among them the Italians, the Cana-
dians, and ourselves. None of these lists are the
same, and none of them are the International List.
There is one other aspect of this problem that
should be mentioned. It is referred to in our
letter of March 23. The working papers of the
Joint Operating Committee are internal commu-
nications and working papers of an advisory na-
ture which are historically retained within the
executive branch. These files and working papers
we are not in a position to make available to the
subcommittee. The Secretary of Commerce is
prepared to discuss this aspect of the matter later
in the hearing.
We regret that the balance of the information
now being requested by your subcommittee can
only be furnished on a classified basis. To de-
classify it would jeopardize our foreign relations
and be prejudicial to the national interest. There
is no effort on our part to withhold from the Con-
gress any information which it should rightfully
have. Our only interest is to see to it that the in-
formation is made available in such a way as to
protect the best interests of the United States.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, may we repeat
that we desire to cooperate with your committee
to the fullest extent possible in your consideration
of this important subject.
TREATY INFORMATION
Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation
Treaty With Netherlands
Press release 164 dated March 27
A treaty of friendship, commerce, and naviga-
tion between the United States and the Kingdom
of the Netherlands was signed at The Hague on
March 27. The American Ambassador, H. Free-
man Matthews, signed on behalf of the United
States. The Netherlands signers were Dr. J. W.
Beyen, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Dr. J. M.
A. H. Luns, Minister Without Portfolio.
The new treaty affirms the friendly and coop-
erative spirit prevailing between the two coun-
tries and reflects the important business and com-
mercial interests which have developed in their
economic relations. The broad and liberal provi-
sions embodied in the treaty represent a set of
principles designed to promote the continued
growth of those relations along mutually bene-
ficial lines.
The new treaty contains 27 articles, together
with a protocol and exchange of notes, and covers
a wide range of subject matter. In brief, each
of the two countries :
(1) agrees to accord within its territories, to
citizens and corporations of the other, treatment
no less favorable than it accords to its own citi-
zens and corporations with respect to engaging in
commercial, industrial, and financial activities;
(2) formally endorses standards regarding the
protection of persons, their projierty and inter-
ests, that reflect the most enlightened legal and
constitutional principles ;
(3) recognizes the need for special attention to
stimulate the international movement of invest-
ment capital ; and
(4) reasserts its adherence to the principles of
nondiscriminatory treatment of trade and ship-
ping.
This treaty is the sixth of its type to have been
concluded between the United States and Euro-
pean countries since World War II. It represents
another step in a program pursued by this Gov-
April 9, 7956
621
ernment for the modernization of its commercial
treaty structure and the establislunent of legal
conditions favorable to foreign investment.
Similarly, tlie treaty is responsive to the im-
portant interest which the Netherlands has in in-
ternational commei'ce and investment, both as re-
ceiver and as supplier of goods and capital, and
reflects the policies which that country has de-
veloped to attract American capital. A large
number of American firms have established
branches or factories in the Netherlands in re-
cent years, and Netherlands firms likewise have
substantial and expanding investments in the
United States.
The treaty will be transmitted as soon as pos-
sible to the Senate for advice and consent to rati-
fication and, when the ratification processes of
both countries have been completed, will enter
into force one month after exchange of ratifi-
cations. Provision is made regarding the exten-
sion of the treaty to Surinam and the Netherlands
Antilles upon the election of those territories
communicated through the Netherlands Govern-
ment.
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Genocide
Convention on the prevention and punishment of the
crime of genocide. Done at Paris December 9, 1948.'
Accession deposited: Afghanistan, March 22, 1956.
Labor
Convention (No. SO) for the partial revision of the con-
ventions adopted by the General Conference of the In-
ternational Labor Organizaticm at its first 28 sessions.
Done at Montreal October 9, 1946. Entered into force
May 28, 1947 (TIAS 1810).
Ratification deposited: Bulgaria, November 7, 1955.
North Atlantic Treaty
Agreement between the parties to the North Atlantic
Treaty for cooperation regarding atomic information.
Signed at Paris June 22, 1955.
Notification of beinii bound hy terms of the agreement:
Turkey, March 29, 1956.
Entered into force: March 29, 1956.
Safety at Sea
Convention on safety of life at sea. Signed at London
June 10, 1948. Entered into force November 19, 1952.
TIAS 2495.
Acceptances deposited: Brazil, January 17, 1956; Vene-
zuela, February 8, 1956.
Regulations for preventing collisions at sea. Done at Lon-
don June 10, 1948. Entered into force January 1, 1954.
TIAS 2899.
Acceptance deposited: Uruguay, August 18, 1955.
Slave Trade
I'rotocol amending the slavery convention signed at
Geneva September 2.j, 1926 (46 Stat. 2183), and annex.
Done at New York December 7, 1953. Entered into
force for the United States March 7, 1956.
Proclaimed by the President: March 16, 1956.
Trade and Commerce
Fifth protocol of rectifications and modifications to the
texts of the schedules to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 3, 1955.
Will enter into force on the day it has been signed by
all the contracting parties to the general agreement.
Signatures: Haiti, Indonesia, Italy, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland,
United States of America,^ December 3, 1955 ; Union
of South Africa, December 5, 1955 ; Finland, January
4, 1956 ; Belgium, February 16, 1956.
BILATERAL
Italy
Agreement amending the surplus agricultural commodi-
ties agreement of May 23, 1955 (TIAS 3249) by provid-
ing that funds may also be used for the purchase of corn
and feed grains. Effected by exchange of notes at
Rome August 30 and September 2, 1955. Entered into
force September 2, 1955.
Netherlands V
Treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation, with
protocol and exchange of notes. Signed at The Hague
March 27, 1956. Enters into force one month after the
day of exchange of ratifications.
Philippines
Agreement providing for disposition of equipment and ma-
terial furnished by the United States under the mili-
tary assistance agreement of March 21, 1947 (TIAS
1662). Effected by exchange of notes at Manila July
27, 1953, and March 3, 1956. Entered into force March
3, 1956.
Spain
Agreement supplementing the surplus agricultural com-
modities agreement of March 5, 1956 (TIAS 3510) by
providing for the exchange and use of funds acquired
from the purchase of fertilizer by Spain from Austria.
Effected by exchange of notes at Madrid March 18
and 17, 1956. Entered into force March 17, 1956.
Agreement supplementing the surplus agricultural com-
modities agreement of March 5, 1956 (TIAS 3510) by
providing for the resale of wheat to Switzerland.
Signed at Madrid March 20, 1956. Entered into force .
March 20, 1956.
Thailand
Agreement for the sale and purchase of tin concentrates.
Signed at Bangkok March 12, 1956. Entered into force
March 12, 1956.
Agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic
energy. Signed at Bangkok March 13, 1956. Entered
into force March 13, 1956.
' Not in force for the United States.
' With a reservation.
622
Deparfment of State Bulletin
April 9, 1956 I n
Africa. The Development of United States Policy
in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa During
1955: Part III (Howard) 593
Asia. The Development of United States Policy
in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa During
1955: Part III (Howard) 593
Atomic Energy
Atoms-for-Peace Agreement With Thailand Signed
(Dulles, Waithayakon) 590
Sale of 129 Tons of Heavy Water in Atoms-for-
Peace Program 592
Canada. Canadlan-Mexican-U.S. Meeting at White
Sulphur Springs 590
Congress, The
East- West Trade (Hoover) 619
An Outline of the Mutual Security Program for
1957 (Hollister) 605
Economic Affairs
East-West Trade (Hoover) 619
Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Treaty With
Netherlands 621
Mr. Allyn To Be U.S. Representative to Eleventh
Session of ECE 592
Foreign Service. Tasks and Eesponsibilities of the
Foreign Service (Dulles) 588
Germany. Freedom and Slavery in a Divided Ger-
many (Conant) 583
International Organizations and Meetings
Canadian-Mexican-U.S. Meeting at White Sulphur
Springs 590
Mr. Allyn To Be U.S. Representative to Eleventh
Session of ECE 592
Mexico. Canadian-Mexican-U.S. Meeting at White
Sulphur Springs 590
Mutual Security
An Outline of the Mutual Security Program for 1957
(Hollister) 605
The Development of United States Policy in the
Near East, South Asia, and Africa During 1955 :
Part III (Howard) 593
Near East. The Development of United States
Policy in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa
During 1955: Part III (Howard) 593
d ex
Vol. XXXIV, No. 876
Netherlands. Friendship, Commerce, and Naviga-
tion Treaty With Netherlands 621
Refugees and Displaced Persons. U.S. Makes Final
Payment to U.N. Refugee Fund 590
Thailand. Atoms-for-Peace Agreement With
Thailand Signed (Dulles, Waithayakon) . . . 590
Treaty Information
Atoms-for-Peace Agreement With Thailand Signed
(Dulles, Waithayakon) 590
Current Treaty Actions 622
Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Treaty With
Netherlands 621
United Nations. U.S. Makes Final Payment to
U.N. Refugee Fund 590
Name Index
Allyn, Stanley C 592
Conant, James B 583
Dulles, Secretary 588,590
Hollister, John B 605
Hoover, Herbert, Jr 619
Howard, Harry N 593
Waithayakon, Prince Wan 591
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: March 26-April 1
Releases may be obtained from the News Division,
Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.
Press release issued prior to March 26 which ap-
pears in this issue of the Bulletin is No. 146 of
March 19.
No. Date Subject
161 3/26 Hoover: East- West trade.
*162 3/27 Educational exchange.
*163 3/27 Educational exchange.
164 3/27 Commercial treaty with Netherlands.
*165 3/29 Foreign Service training courses.
*166 3/29 Pinkerton nominated Ambassador to
the Sudan.
167 3/29 Dulles : remarks at FSO graduation.
* Not printed.
United States
Government Printing Office
DIVISION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS
Washington 25, D. C.
PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE TO AVOID
PAYMENT OF POSTAGE. 9300
(GPO)
OFFICIAL BUSINESS
A recent release in the popular Background series
Thailand
the
Department
of
State
Thailand is a predominantly agricultural country of small
rural communities and relatively few cities and large towns.
The agricultural economy is based almost entirely on small-
scale, peasant-type family operations, with a majority of the
farm operators holding title to their land.
Long known to the world as Siam, this southeastern country
of magnificent scenery, of great fertility, and of a 1 argely
homogeneous population has never been a colony, even though
in the past her neighbors on every side have fallen under
foreign rule.
Today, true to its historical tradition, Thailand is determined
to resist all Communist imperialist efforts to infiltrate and
subvert it, and to impose upon it the new colonialism of world
communism.
This 15-page illustrated pamphlet tells about the land, the
people, and the industries of this nation that is a little smaller
than Texas with a population of approximately 20 million, and
discusses briefly the role of Thailand in world affairs.
Copies of this publication may be purchased from the
Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing
Office, Washington 25, D. C.
Publication 6296
10 cents
Order Forr.i
To: Supt. of Do«"jii~;nls
Govt. I'lintJng Office
Washington 25, D.C. Please send me copies of Thailand.
Name:
EncloBed find; „ . , ,
Street Address:
% ,
(ettsh, check, or City, Zone, and State :
money order).
^
7 .>...'
'j/ie/ ^efia/i^Smmii/ ^£^ t/ta/te^
ol. XXXIV, No. 877
April 16, 1956
-Wi®'*'^ o«.
THE MESSAGE OF AMERICA • Remarks by President
Eisenhower 633
SIGNIFICANCE OF NEW SOVIET LINE CONCERN-
ING STALIN ERA • A^eios Conference Statement by-
Secretary Dulles 637
THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC
TREATY ORGANIZATION • by Deputy Under
Secretary Murphy 644
SECURITY COUNCIL AGREES UNANIMOUSLY ON
U.S. PROPOSAL TO SEND SECRETARY-GEN-
ERAL HAMMARSKJOLD TO MIDDLE EAST •
Statements by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., and Text
of Resolution 627
For index see inside back cover
Bnston Public Li'-vary
Cuperinte-Jflent of Documents
MAY 9 - 1956
bulletin
Vol. XXXIV.No. 877 • Publication 6317
AprU, 16, 1956
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing OtBce
Washington 25, D.C.
Price:
62 Issues, domestic $7.50, foreign $10.25
Single copy, 20 cents
The printing of this publication has been
approved by the Director of the Bureau of
the Budget (January 19, 1955).
Note: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and items contained herein miiy
be reprinted. Citation of the Department
or State Bulletin as the source will be
appreciated*
The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the
Public Services Division, provides the
public and interested agencies of
the Government with information on
developments in the field of foreign
relations and on the vcork of the
Department of State and the Foreign
Service. The BULLETIN includes se-
lected press releases on foreign policy,
issued by the White House and the
Department, and statements and ad-
dresses nuide by the President and by
the Secretary of State and other offi-
cers of the Department, as well as
special articles on various phases of
international affairs and the func-
tions of the Department. Informa-
tion is included concerning treaties
and international agreements to
which the United States is or may
become a party and treaties of gen-
eral international interest.
Publications of the Department,
United Nations documents, and legis-
lative material in the field of interna-
tional relations are listed currently.
Security Council Agrees Unanimously on U.S. Proposal To Send
Secretary-General Hammarskjold to Middle East
Following is the text of a letter of March 20
froTu Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., U.S.
Representative to the United Nations, to the Pres-
ident of the Security Council, Sir Pier son Dixon,
requesting a meeting of the Council to consider
the Palestine question, together with a series of
stateinents by Ajnbassador Lodge during the Se-
curity Council debate. On April 4 the Council
adopted unanimously a U.S. -sponsored resolution
on this agenda item {see box) .
LETTER TO PRESIDENT OF SECURITY COUNCIL
U.S./D.N. press release 2372 dated March 20
I have the honor on behalf of the Government
of the United States to request you to convene a
meeting of the Security Council as soon as possible
to consider the following agenda item :
The Palestine Question : Status of Compliance Given
to the General Armistice Agreements and the Resolutions
of the Security Council adopted During the Past Year.
The Government of the United States has be-
come increasingly concerned over recent develop-
ments in the Palestine area which may well endan-
ger the maintenance of international peace and
security. Information relating to the build-up of
armed forces on either side of the Armistice De-
marcation Lines leads the United States to believe
that the parties may not be fully complying with
the provisions of their Armistice Agreements
which stipulate limitations upon armed forces in
or near the Demilitarized Zones and the Demarca-
tion Lines.
The instances of firing across and otherwise
violating the Demarcation Lines are recurring at
a dangerous rate. Despite the earnest efforts of
the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Or-
ganization the parties have not agreed to proposals
which he has put forward to them on his own
initiative or as a result of the Security Council's
resolutions of 30 March 1955,^ 8 September 1955,"
and 19 January 1956.^ These three resolutions
had the unanimous support of the Security Coun-
cil and it should therefore be a matter of genuine
concern to each of its Members to ascertain the
extent of compliance being given to them. It is
a matter of deep concern to the Government of the
United States and it, therefore, requests urgent
and early action by the Security Council to con-
sider the situation now prevailing in the Palestine
area.
STATEMENT OF MARCH 26
U.S./U.N. press release 2376 dated March 26
The United Nations has been dealing with the
Palestine question almost continuously since April
2, 1947.
Since August 11, 1949, when the last of the armi-
stice agreements between Israel and the Arab
States had been signed and all had been approved,
the Security Council has met on the Palestine
question 90 different times. No other question has
so occupied the attention of the Council. No other
question has so persistently challenged United
Nations efforts.
Today, the 26th of March, 1956, 7 years since
the armistice agreements were signed, the Pales-
tine question is still unsolved. In fact, during
recent months the situation has deteriorated and
the world is alarmed at the prospects which it sees
in the Near East.
' Bulletin of Apr. 18, 1955, p. 662.
' Ibid., Sept. 19, 1955, p. 459.
' Ibid., Jan. 30, 1956, p. 183.
April 16, 1956
627
Resolution on Palestine Question '
Thv ticcurity Council.
Recalling its resolutions of 30 March 1955, 8 Sep-
tember 1955, and 19 January 1956,
RecaUinr/ that in each of these resolutions the
Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organiza-
tion and the parties to the General Armistice Agree-
ments concerned were requested by the Council to
undertake certain specific steps for the purpose of
ensuring that the tensions along the Armistice lines
should be reduced,
Noting with grave concern that despite the efforts
of the Chief of Staff the proposed steps have not
been carried out,
1. ConKiders that the situation now prevailing
lietween the parties concerning the enforcement of
the Armistice Agreements and the compliance given
to the above-mentioned resolutions of the Council
is such that its continuatice is likely to endanger
the maintenance of international peace and
security,
2. Requests the Secretary-General to undertake,
as a matter of urgent concern, a survey of the vari-
ous aspects of enforcement of and compliance with
the four General Armistice Agreements and the
Council's resolutions under reference;
.3. Requests the Secretary -General to arrange with
the parties for the adoption of any measures which
after discussion with the parties and with the Chief
of Staff he considers would reduce existing tensions
along the Armistice Demarcation Lines, includins
the following points :
(a) Withdrawal of their forces from the Armi-
stice Demarcation Lines ;
(b) Full freedom of movement for observers
along the Armistice Pemarcation Lines and in the
Demilitarized Zones and in the Defensive Areas;
(c) Establishment of local arrangements for the
prevention of incidents and the prompt detection of
any violations of the Armistice Agreements;
4. Calls upon the parties to the General Armistice
Agreements to co-operate with the Secretary-
(ieneral in the implementation of this resolution:
5. Requests the Secretary -General to report to
the Council in his discretion but not later than one
month from this date on the implementation given
to this resolution in order to assist the Council in
considering what further action may be required.
'U.N. doc. S/3,575: adopted unanimously by tlu
Security Council on Apr. 4.
This need not have been the case. In the
opinion of the United States progress had, until
recently, been made, and we thought that most of
the basic issues underlying tlie uneasy truce in
Piilestine were coming nearer to a solution.
United Nations efforts in the General Assembly,
628
in the United Nations Relief and Works Agency,
in the Security Council, and in the Truce Super-
vision Organization were producing hopeful signs
of progi-ess, and the trend was toward peace. That
trend, unfortunately, has recently been reversed.
It would be wrong to conclude tliat the United
Nations has failed in its responsibilities. War
has not come again to the Holy Land, and we trust
that it never will. The indispensable factor in
preventing hostilities thus far has been the United
Nations. The present alarming situation chal-
lenges this organization again to find new means
of arresting the present grave trend. This organ-
ization cannot fail to accept that challenge — which
has certainly never been more serious than it is at
this moment.
The Ignited States, having taken fully into ac-
count all of the circumstances of the present sit-
uation, is convinced that through this organiza-
tion the present tensions must be eliminated and
the prospect for peace restored. We have not
sought to come before the Council at this time
with any indictment or bill of particulars, or any
detailed assessment of the blames and shortcom-
ings of one or the other of the participants in or
outside of the area of conflict. We have felt in-
stead that the situation is much too serious for us
to lose any time in setting into motion the full
authority of the United Nations to deal with the
present ominous drift.
We propose, therefore, that the Council request
the Secretary-General to inidertake immediately
a personal investigation of ways and means of
settling the numerous problems which stand in
the way of peace.
In these circumstances it is clear that the United
Nations cannot be inactive or indifferent. The
United States believes that in the first instance
United Nations efforts should be concentrated on
full compliance with the armistice agreements by
Israel and the Arab States and on the carrying
out in detail of the Security Council's resolutions
of 30 March 195.5, 8 September 1955, and 19 Jan-
uary 195C. Each of these resolutions had the
unanimous support of the members of this Coun-
cil. They represent the combined judgment of the
members as to the essential steps to be taken to
reduce the tensions. There is no question in our
mind that, if these steps had been carried out,
we woidd not now have the serious situation which
confronts us. All the more reason, therefore, that
they should be curried out.
Department of State Bulletin
We therefore propose in the draft resohition
befoie the Council* that the Seci'etary-General
undertake as a matter of urgency discussions with
the parties and tlie Chief of Staff of the Ti-uce
Supervision Organization, General Burns, to find
ways and means to put these resolutions and the
proposals which they embody into immediate
effect.
We feel that tliese measures can and must be
given special consideration. The Chief of Staff'
has repeatedly emphasized the primary impor-
tance of several of these measures. We feel that
they deserve an honest chance. General Burns"
efforts must therefore have our continued and full
backing, and the proposal that we have placed be-
fore this Council would give him exactly that.
The draft resolution proposed by the United
States is not intended in any way to derogate
from the overall responsibility of the Security
Council in this question. We would expect the
Council to continue to follow with the greatest
concern the developments in the area and to hold
itself in readiness to deal at any time with any
problem which might arise.
We have therefore proposed in the draft reso-
lution that the Secretary-General should report
to the Security Council not later than one month
from the date of tlie adoption of the resolution,
at which time the Council would consider what
further steps might be necessary or desirable for
it to take.
Mr. President, the United States believes that
each member of the Council will i-ecognize the
need for the kind of action which we have pro-
posed. We trust that each member of the Coun-
cil and the parties will recognize the good faith
with wliich this proposal is brought forward and
will lend to the Secretary-General their full sup-
port. Clearly this is in the mutual interest of us
all. Anything less can only lead to our mutual
detriment.
STATEMENT OF MARCH 28
U.S./U.X. press release 2381 dated March 28
Let me first thank the representatives of Cuba,
of Belgium, and of Cliina for yielding to me for
these few moments so that I may make this state-
ment. I appreciate their courtesy.
Mr. President, when we adjourned on Monday,
* U.N. doc. S/3562 dated Mar. 21.
^ April 76, 7956
it was the Council's understanding that after
today's meeting we would meet again on Tuesday,
Ajjril 3. I trust that on April 3 we will come to
a vote after having heard further statements
by the members of the Council or such statements
as the j)arties care to make. That is my iinder-
standing of the sense of the meeting last Monday.
In view of certain remarks which have been
made to me since then, it may be helpful if I now
make a few words of explanation.
Frankly, the United States draft seemed to
us to be so simple and clear that there could be
no misunderstanding as to our intention. Indeed,
it has come as something of a surprise that anyone
could find in it any hidden meaning. That would
be a baseless suspicion indeed.
Our draft resolution speaks for itself. Its
meaning is right on the surface. The course which
we advocate is a normal procedure. It is what
we would expect to have done in our case if we
were in a similar situation. I do not believe I
can put it any more plainly than that.
Note also, please, gentlemen, that each member
of the Council has supported the resolutions on
which the United States draft is based. In other
words they have been unanimously endorsed.
That is a significant fact. And note also that the
j>arties to tlie Palestine question have themselves
in recent months expressed growing concern at
what they feared to be developments on the part
of the otlier side inimical to themselves.
Now, feeling as we did that this concern was
shared by all, we believed there would be — and
that there should be — prompt approval of our
initiative to bring about discussions between the
Secretary-General and the parties to find agreed
measures for reducing the tensions and carrying
out the armistice agreements.
Now, let me repeat, there are no hidden meanings
in this, and if you search from now vmtil dooms-
day with a magnifying glass the only purpose
you will find is to prevent war. That, after all —
I need hardly say it in this room — is the first
purpose of the United Nations.
As I said on Monday, we do not propose to
review the issues in the Palestine question, and we
do not feel that others would wish to do so in
view of the urgent need for action. This, too, is
reflected in the very limited nature of our text.
We wanted two things : to act promptly in the
face of a gravely worsening situation, and, in act-
629
ing promptly, to indicate, with the Security Coun-
cil's endorsement, certain steps which the
Secretary-General and the parties might take to
carry out the provisions of the armistice agree-
ments. These are not new purposes; the unani-
mous resolutions of the Security Council, to which
our draft resolution refers, likewise had as their
purpose the effective functioning of the armistice.
That is our sole purpose. Surely no one would
deny that, unless the armistice agreements can be
effectively carried out, a grave tlireat to the peace
may result.
We had hoped that at the end of today's meeting
the Security Council would have approved the
mission by the Secretary-General which we pro-
pose, and that he could pack his bags and leave
right away. But we did not wish to give gi'ound
for anyone to say that he had been rushed — even
though the proposal is so simple that the more
than 8 days which have elapsed since it was given
to the Council members and to the parties seems
more than enough.
Mr. President, we hope that the Security Coun-
cil will act speedily and that our resolution will
be approved by the Council and the parties. It
is in all truth a good-faith effort for peace.
FIRST STATEMENT OF APRIL 3
U.S./D.N. press release 2384 dated April 3
I am confident that there is no basic misunder-
standing, either by the parties to the armistice
agreement or by the members of the Security
Council, as to the intention of the United States
in bringing the pending draft resolution before
the Council.
But certain questions have been asked which I
am glad to answer and which may, I believe, be
summarized as follows:
a) Are the measures which the Secretary-
General might recommend for discussion with the
parties and the Chief of Staff to be within the
framework of the General Armistice Agreements ?
b) Is the proposal contained in paragraph 3 (a)
of the draft resolution to be considered applicable
in general, or where appropriate and in accordance
with local conditions?
c) Are the demilitarized zones and defensive
areas referred to in paragraph 3 (b) those zones
and areas as defined in the armistice agreements?
d) Do the various aspects of compliance with
the General Armistice Agreements which the
Secretary-General is requested to survey refer to
matters outside the General Armistice Agreements
or only to those matters with which the Truce
Supervision Organization is expected to deal?
e) Is it intended that the Secretary-General
should undertake to amend the armistice agree-
ments ?
f) Are the arrangements referred to in para-
graph 3 (c) arrangements in the nature of agree-
ments by the parties or in the nature of added
forces and machinery ?
g) Does the request to the Secretary-General to
report in his discretion refer to the timing or to tlie
nature of the report ?
These questions can first be answered by recall-
ing my original statement to the Council on Mon-
day, Marcli 26th. In describing the objectives of
the United States I stated that, in the present cir-
cumstances, it is clear that the United Nations
cannot be inactive or indifferent. I went on to
say, therefore, that "the United States believes
that in the first instance United Nations efforts
should be concentrated on full compliance with
the armistice agreements by Israel and the Arab
States and on the carrying out in detail of the
Security Council's resolutions of 30 March 1955,
8 September 1955, and 19 January 1956." I
pointed out, moreover, that "each of these resolu-
tions had the unanimous support of the members
of this Council. They represent the combined
judgment of the members as to the essential steps
to be taken to reduce the tensions." I said further
that "there is no question in our mind that, if these
steps had been carried out, we would not now have
the serious situation which confronts us. All the
more reason, therefore, that they should be car-
ried out." I said in this same connection that "we
therefore propose in the draft resolution before
the Council that the Secretary-General undertake
as a matter of urgency discussions with the parties
and the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision
Organization, General Burns, to find ways and
means to put these resolutions and the proposals
which they embody into immediate effect. We
feel that these measures can and must be given
special consideration."
These quotations from my statement introduc-
ing the draft resolution are the core of the United
States position, but, to make that position immis-
takably clear, I siJoke again at our last meeting
630
Deparfmenf of State Bulletin
to emphasize our concern and to place our pro-
posal in its proper perspective. Thus, at the meet-
ing of Wednesday, the 28th of March, I again
summarized our position as follows : "We wanted
two things: to act promptly in the face of a
gravely worsening situation, and, in acting
promptly, to indicate, with the Security Council's
endorsement, certain steps which the Secretary-
General and the parties might take to carry out
the provisions of the armistice agreements. These
are not new purposes; the unanimous resolutions
of the Security Council, to which our draft res-
olution refers, likewise had as their purpose the
effective functioning of the armistice. That is
our sole purpose. Surely no one would deny that,
unless the armistice agreements can be effectively
carried out, a grave threat to the peace may result."
I believe that it is fair to say that this ade-
quately summarizes the United States position.
In reviewing the questions which have been placed
before the Council by the parties, it seems to us
each of these questions is answered by the state-
ments I have referred to.
The representative of the United Kingdom put
the case even more simply when he said "first
things must come first." In speaking of those
matters which must receive immediate attention.
Sir Pierson Dixon went on to say that these were
problems in which "if one cannot move forward,
one finds one's self slipping back."
It has been this backward trend which the
United States wished to halt. We see no other
way of preventing such a backward trend at this
moment than by providing for strict compliance
with the armistice agreements between the parties
and the resolutions of the Security Council to
which I have referred.
Wliat we are dealing with now are the imme-
diate problems standing in the way of peace and
which concern the compliance of the parties with
the General Armistice Agreements and the carry-
ing out of measures which the Security Council
has already endorsed, in its recent resolutions, for
insuring compliance with those agreements.
I repeat that this is the immediate problem,
and this is the immediate purpose of the United
States initiative.
Now to be even more specific : the draft resolu-
tion envisages that the Secretary-General should
arrange, after discussion with the parties and the
Chief of Staff, for measures entirely within the
framework of the General Armistice Agreements
and the resolutions under reference.
Such measures would, of course, be applicable
where, by agreement between the Secretary-Gen-
eral and the parties, they consider conditions
warrant.
The references in the draft resolution to the
demilitarized zones and defensive areas are nat-
urally those defined in the armistice agreements.
The various aspects of compliance with the
armistice agreements which the Secretary-General
is requested to survey refer only to matters which
would come within the natural purview of the ar-
mistice machinery and the Truce Supervision
Organization.
The arrangements referred to in paragraph 3
(c) would, of course, be arrangements as agreed
between the parties and the Secretary-General.
It would not be a service to the Secretary-Gen-
eral or to the parties directly concerned to
enumerate further the problems or the measures
with which together they might wish to deal or
those with which he should not deal. We feel
that, with the clear understanding that the mission
of the Secretary-General is governed by the
Security Council's resolutions and the armistice
agreements, such a spelling out is not necessary nor
indeed desirable. The kind of undertaking which
we are asking the Secretary-General to undertake
becomes quite clear when seen in this context.
I hope that these explanations will be received
by the parties in the same spirit of cooperation
as they are given. It lies with the parties in the
end to determine the success or the failure of the
Secretary-General's mission. It will be for them
to determine in the final analysis the steps to be
taken.
The Secretary-General naturally cannot amend
or set aside the undertakings of the parties in the
General Armistice Agreements. As members of
the United Nations and as sovereign nations the
parties share with the members of the Security
Council the responsibility for determining what
can best be accomplished.
The Security Council is, of course, not relin-
quishing its primary responsibility for maintain-
ing international peace and security in adopting
the draft resolution proposed by the United States.
The resolution requests the Secretary-General to
report not later than one month from the date of
its adoption. He may report sooner if he considers
April 16, 1956
631
it desirable. This is wliat the phrase "in liis dis-
cretion'' refers to.
In tlie light of the Secretary-General's report
and of the situation then prevailing, the Council
would have to consider whether any further action
was required and what that action might be. The
"Cnited States would not presume to say what the
Council should do a month from now. "We can
and do hope that further action concerning com-
pliance witii the armistice agreements and the
carrying out of these resolutions will not be
necessary.
This attempts to lie a completely categorical and
responsive reply to the questions whicli have been
raised by representatives of the parties to the
armistice agreement.
SECOND STATEMENT OF APRIL 3
r.S./U.N. press release 2385 dated April 3
In accordance with the custom whereby the
sponsor of a proposition is expected to express
himself on amendments, and as a matter of fact
in response to at least one request which has been
made, I make this statement on the subject of the
amendments which have been introduced by the
representative of the Soviet Union.
The amendments to the draft resolution which
have been put forward by the Soviet Union are
not only in the opinion of the United States not
in any way necessary ; they also do not seem par-
ticularly desirable. Without making a detailed
analysis now, it is perhaps enough to say that
these amendments are not improvements. This
is, I think, an understatement.
Amendment No. 1 goes back into the past with-
out accomplishing anything constructive thereby.
Amendment No. 2 is fallacious because it is
clear that failure to comply with three unanimous
resolutions of the Security Council is in the words
of the resolution "likely" to endanger peace. Now
surely it is not exaggei'ated to say that noncom-
pliance with three unanimous resolutions is
"likely" to endanger peace. It seems none too
strong.
Amendment No. 3 seems to us to put the cart
before the horse. Obviously thei'e must be dis-
cussion before there is concordance. To say that
concordance must precede discussion seems to us
to be a non sequitur. Paragraph 3 as drafted
clearly means that agreement of the parties will
be necessary for the adoption of measures for re-
ducing tensions.
The words "in the defensive areas" as now in-
cluded in the draft resolution make quite clear
that the defensive areas are those areas provided
for in the armistice agreements. The Soviet rep-
resentative's amendment in this respect is unnec-
essary, I submit, and I understood the Soviet rep-
resentative to say he would not insist upon it.
The objectives of the pending jjioposal have,
I think, been made clear beyond any shadow of a
doubt. The draft resolution is addressed to a
clear and present danger. Our sole intent is to
dispatch the Secretary-General to the area so as
to reduce the growing tension. We believe that
the present text of the draft resolution is sufficient
in its present form, and, as everj' member here
knows, it was very carefully written.
We also believe that the governments in the
area are prepared to accept the resolution as it is,
and we think that the debate that has taken place
here today and in preceding days has made that
clear.
As the sponsor of the draft resolution, there-
fore, we believe it is desirable not to accept
amendments.^
FIRST STATEMENT OF APRIL 4
U.S. /U.N. press release 2386 dated April 4
There of course is nothing wrong with the
Government of the United States communicating
with 3 countries or 30 countries in an effort to
keep the peace — and I note that the Soviet repre-
sentative did not say there was anything wrong
with it. This proposal we have here today is not
a 3-nation proposition. We hope it will soon be-
come an 11-nation proiJosition.
Gentlemen, in view of the fact that yesterday I
gave my arguments against the Soviet amend-
ments, and in view of the fact that the objections
to these amendments have been very eloquently
explained by the representatives of Peru, the
I'nited Kingdom, France, and Australia. I will
not take any more time of the Council to argue
against them further.
I perhaps might say that the capitalizing of the
phrase "Defensive Areas" is not an amendment.
It is a typographical rectification. The position
"The amendments proposed by the U.S.S.R. (U.N. doc.
S/3r>74 dated Apr. 3) were rejected on Apr. 4.
632
Department of State Bulletin
of the United States is still in opposition to
amendments.
SECOND STATEMENT OF APRIL ^
U.S./U.N. press release 2386 dated April 4
Before we adjourn this meeting, perhaps the
members of the Security Council will forgive me
if I express my appreciation to the members and
to the representatives of the parties for the tone
which they have all observed here; for the high
level and the high plane on which this vitally im-
portant and delicate matter has been discussed.
To be President of this Security Council is one
of the great honors that can come to a man. but for
me, in this particular case, it is something more
than an honor." It has been a very precious ex-
perience indeed to have the cooperation of all of
the distinguished men who are seated around this
table. I shall always remember it and wish to
express my thanks to you for it.
Let me finally say to you, Mr. Secretary-Gen-
eral, and I feel sure I speak for everyone present
when I do so, that as you leave on this mission you
curry with you not only good wishes and our hopes,
but our heartfelt confidence and high regard and
great expectations for your success.
Visit of Spanish Minister
of Foreign Affairs
The Department of State announced on April
5 (press release 175) that Alberto Martin Artajo,
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain, and Seiiora
de Martin Artajo would be accompanied by the
following party chiring their visit to the United
States from April 9 to April 18:
Jose M. de Areilza, Count of Motrico, Ambassador of Spain
to the United States
Countess of Motrico
General Francisco Fernandez-Longoria Gonzales, Chief of
Staff, Spanish Air Force
Seiit)ra de Fernandez-Longoria
Juan de his Barcenas, Director General of Foreign Policy
Seiiora de las Barcenas
Juan .lose Rovira Sauchez-Herrero, Director General of
Economic Cooperation
Aurelio Valls, Press Section, Foreign Ministry
'Mr. Lodge became President of the Security Council
for the month of April.
Apr// ?6, 1956
Tiie Message of America
Remarks hy President Eisenhower'^
I think it was last year, gentlemen, when I met
with the Advertising Council,^ that I made the
request that the Council would try to do some-
thing about extending their good work to helping
the Government solve some of its problems in
the foreign field.
Xot only has the record of the past year shown
that they took me seriously, but I am particularly
delighted that this year they brought some of their
bosses along with them so that they can get edu-
cated also, because we are talking about one of
the most pressing problems with which the Gov-
ernment — indeed with which the whole Nation —
is confronted constantly. There is nothing that
takes place at home of any great importance —
if it is a difficult problem, at least — that is not
caused by or at least is colored by some foreign
consideration.
During this past year the Advertising Council
got together a team of experts and went over the
whole series of factors involved in these prob-
lems and came up with some very fine suggestions.
The one I want to mention particularly — a prod-
uct of their imagination — was the exhibit of
"People's Capitalism." I don't know how many
of you have seen it, but to me it is the kind of
message that America ought to be carrying abroad.
I would have liked to have seen some kind of ad-
jective put between "people's" and "capitalism" —
something of the order of — if not "democratic,"
something of the order of "competitive"' or some-
thing of that kind. But in any event, the exhibit
itself shows what the system of capitalism will
do for a people. AVhat it has done in this country
in a very, very short time, measured by historical
units, is a very telling thing.
I actually could hope that the truth that it ex-
emplifies and shows could be brought home to our
own people as well as to those abroad for whom it
was designed. Because I think too often we forget
some of the features of our own system that have
been so responsible for the place this Nation has
reached. So before I leave that part of what I
^Made before the 12th annual Washington Conference
of the Advertising Council on Apr. 3 (White House press
release).
■ BtiLLETiN of Apr. 11, 1955, p. 600.
633
L
wanted to say to you, my thanks to the agencies
for the time and talent they have contributed and
are continuing to contribute througli the media —
enlisting the space on radio and television — and
for the good work of all, particularly to the busi-
nessmen supporters of what the Council has been
doing, with the Goverimient as its principal
beneficiary.
Now, when we consider this system of which we
are so proud, we recognize that, like all things
human, it is neither perfect nor does it sustain it-
self forever without the people who are living in
it and are part of it doing something about it.
Internally and externally any form of government,
and particularly self-government, is always sub-
ject to some kind of attack, particularly successful
government that has brought material prosperity
in the measure which ours has. Internally we
watch that government, we watch it very carefully.
We watch particularly the Federal Government to
see that it doesn't transgress into fields from
which it should abstain, except only in those cases
where the changing miracle of industrial life
brings about problems that are not solvable by com-
munities, by private enterprise, or by individuals.
There we try to stick to the old Lincolnian dic-
tum that it is the fmiction of government to do
for people those things they could not do for
themselves and to stay out of things in places
where the people can do things for themselves.
We would hope, therefore, to have wisdom in
government to help distinguish this line beyond
which government should not go and yet be
courageous in doing those things that it should do.
Likewise, we should hope always for more wis-
dom in business leadership, not only in the busi-
ness man and in business management but in their
concert with labor, so that in the individual com-
pany or the corporation — particularly the influ-
ential ones — we do not make decisions that damage
us and the Idnd of system that we are trying to
run. That can easily be done within the corpora-
tion just as well as it can within the Congress or
within some regulatory commission.
Using Our Influence Abroad
Now, let us turn our eyes abroad. There is an
old story about the man in a town who owned the
factory on which the living of the community
depended. He built a great house on the hill, and
all the rest of the people lived in the plain below
in fairly meager circmnstances. The climax of
the story was, when things began to go bad, that
the man on top found that he was not safe except
onh' as the people below were contented and be-
lieved that they were advancing. When they be-
came depressed and lost their morale, and the
company began to fail, this man fell further than
the others because he had a greater distance to go.
Within a certain degree, that story has ap-
plicability in the world today. The United States
cannot live alone — a paragon of prosperity — with
all the rest of the world sinking lower and lower
in its standards of living.
There are many ways in which we can use our
influence to make certain that other peoples recog-
nize the virtues of a free, competitive capitalistic
system rather than take the shortcut — the spuri-
ous and false road that is offered them by the
communistic ideology.
You see, in many of these less developed areas
of the world, there is a very great ambition to in-
dustrialize themselves. Now the Communist
comes along and says : well, you see what we were
40 years ago? Look what communism has done
for us. And today we can bring to you this steel
mill or help you with this dam, or do this or that.
There is a very great appeal, because of the
very rapid transformation that on the surface, at
least, and under forms of dictatorship has been
accomplished in Russia. The man who is listen-
ing to the story doesn't understand that under-
neath this great facade of industrial organization
there is slavery, hmnan misery, rather than hu-
man happiness — no opportunity for a man to
realize his own spiritual, moral, physical, and
economic aspirations through his own efforts. He
obeys. He is regimented. But they don't say
that. As a matter of fact, it is not of importance
at the moment, because it is only in such a society
as ours, based upon the dignity of man, that the
importance of that kind of thing to humans is
recognized and catered to.
And so we must carry not only a material mes-
sage to the world of what the kind of enterprise
we have — the kind of system — can do for a people.
We must carry those moral values, spiritual values
of the worth of man — what he is entitled to as an
individual. We must say not merely what this
or that state would do if they would follow that
line, because I think it is not to be denied, if you j
would give the communistic system to any back-!
ward country, with a complete dictator who could!
direct everything without question, he could make,
634
Department of State Bulletin
on the short run, more rapid progi'ess than could
we by the cooperative method that is inherent in
democracy.
So I think that we must realize that, unless we
do these things in the world, someone else will do
them through false doctrines. And we finally will
reach more and more that place where we are iso-
lated from the rest of the world, with the whole
world in a position possibly of envy and then of
hatred, open antagonisms, that will reflect itself in
first, let us say, refusal to trade, then breaking off
relations, and finally and ultimately in a very, very
serious thing.
There is plenty of time for us to do it if we start
now and keep doing it. That is the reason that I
am so delighted that the Advertising Council has
directed itself in its efforts along this path.
Governmental officials are busy. They are con-
stantly putting out "fires." They are on the Hill
answering why they need this money or that
money, or sometimes why they don't need this or
that that someone is trying to give to them. This
is a new phenomenon, and ordinarily applies only
to election year.
The need in government is time to think, with the
ability of people to do it. Now by the selection of
these people of the Advertising Council they are
able to supplement the work of government and so
to assist it, to point out new, imaginative ways of
how the message of America can be carried.
Promoting Better Understanding
I assure you that that message must be carried,
not only in the ways I have indicated but it must
be expressed also in the readiness to help wherever
possible on good, sound business arrangements.
In other words, let us not forget for one instant
that, wlien we are putting $36 or $37 billion of
expenditures every year into arms and armaments,
those arms and armaments alone, remember, can
never take us forward — they will merely defend
what we have got.
But when you talk about something that pro-
motes a business arrangement — trade — when you
can talk about something that promotes a better
understanding between us and the people of the
iliddle East, or the people of Africa, or anybody
else, then you are talking about something con-
structive, something that yields results over the
years to come. It will not be merely something
essentially sterile and negative so far as our capac-
ity for raising human standards is concerned. We
will not be merely acting like a policeman to pro-
tect what we already have. Of course, protection
is necessary. It is just as necessary in this day and
time as it can possibly be. But let us not make the
ignorant, uninformed decision that only in arma-
ments are we going to find the solution of our
foreign problems.
And since we have been favored by the system
that our forefathers gave us, by the resources that
God gave us, by the good fortune we have of hav-
ing been born and raised here through the finest
educational and health systems in the world, and
so on, let us use our brains to make certain we sus-
tain our position by helping everybody else to
realize their own aspirations and legitimate am-
bitions. Not necessarily in the exact pattern of
this country — of course not. Nobody starts from
the same place, and no other nation would possibly
reach the same end.
But we can preach and show that we believe in
the dignity of man, in the independence of nations,
the right of people to determine for themselves
their own faith. We can help. Every dollar we
put into this kind of thing, if it is intelligently
spent, is to my mind, in the long rmi, worth any
five we put just in sheer defense because in the
long run it is a constructive thing. It is a de-
veloping thing, the kind of development America
has done at home and which we must help do
abroad.
So, all of these words, all of these thoughts, my
friends, give you the depth of my sincerity when
I say thank you for coming here, thank you for
helping. The people that talk to you today will
come not merely to give you a briefing of what
they are doing, but in doing so would hope that
from you they will get reactions — in other words,
what would you do ?
Government is nothing but individuals. Every
one of the individuals in government belongs to
you. He is your "boy" in some form or other.
You put him there directly or indirectly. So the
job is still that of the American people, and I
couldn't conceive of any job in this world being
in better hands than that of the American people.
Thank you very much.
April 16, 1956
635
1
Crusade for Freedom
White House press release dated March 27
The following letter from the President wa.f
handed by Mrs. Dwight D. Eifienhower to Wil-
liam A. Greene, President of the Crusade for
Freedom, in a ceremomj at the White House,
March 27, 1956.
Dear Mr. Greene : The captive European peo-
ples behind the Iron Curtain — Poles, Czechoslo-
vaks, Bulfjarians, Rumanians, Albanians, and
residents of the Baltic States — are constantly
bombarded by Communist propaganda designed
to break their will to resist and destroy their
liope for a better future.
In the continuing work of combating such prop-
aganda. Radio Free Europe, the radio arm of the
Crusade for Freedom, plays a major and effective
role. Day in and day out its broadcasts extend
the hand of friendship and hope to the people
behind the Curtain, assuring them that their
plight has not been forgotten by the free world
and fortifying their devotion to liberty.
To the National Committee for a Free Europe,
I extend congratulations on this and the other
valuable activities of the organization, with my
best wishes for success in enlisting, through the
Crusade for Freedom, the support of the Ameri-
can people. I am confident they will respond gen-
erously and thus forward this vital work for the
cause of freedom and peace.
Sincerely,
Dwight D. Eisenhoaver
Exchange of Messages Following
White Sulphur Springs Meeting
The White House on April 2 made pttblic the
following exchanges of messages, one between
President Eisenhotver and Louis -St. Laurent,
Prime Minister of Canada, and the other between
the President and Adolf o Ruiz Corf in es. President
of Mexico.
President Eisenhower to Prime Minister St. Laurent
March 31, 1956
Dear Mr. Prime Minister: Thank you for
your warm and thoughtful letter on our meeting
Avith the President of Mexico at Wliite Sulphur
Springs.
I liope you enjoyed the occasion as much as I
did, and I am confident that all three of us pi'ofited
from the friendly and informal talks tliat we had.
Tliese talks will surely bring even closer the inti-
mate relations between our three countries.
With warm regard.
Sincerely,
Dwight D. Eisenhower
The Right Honorable
LotTis St. Laurent
Pnme Minister of Canada
Ottawa
Prime Minister St, Laurent to President Eisenhower
Ottawa, March 28, 1956
Dear Mr. President: Immediately on my re-
turn I want you to know how much I enjoyed our
informal meeting and liow delighted I was to see
you looking so well and in such good spirits.
"We had a pleasant, smooth flight home and ar-
rived in Ottawa at 3 p. m.
Thank you for affording me the opportunity of
the talks with you and the President of Mexico
and may you continue to enjoy your present good
health.
With warm personal regards, I am.
Yours sincerely,
Louis St. Laurent
President Eisenhower to President Ruiz Cortines
April 2, 1956
His Excellency
Adolfo Ruiz Cortines
President of Mexico
I am deeply grateful for the kind message wliich
you so thoughtfully sent me on your return to
Mexico City from "\^liite Sulphur Springs. It was
a source of great satisfaction to me that you and
the Prime Minister of Canada found it possible to
join me in our recent informal meeting and that
you gave me the opportunity to renew our personal
friendship. I feel sure that such contact will
furtlier strengthen the friendh' ties wliich have so
long and happily been maintained through the
usual diplomatic interchange.
In extending my every wish for j'our continued
welJ-being, I renew to Your Excellency the assur-
ances of my personal consideration and highest
esteem.
Dwight D. Eisenih>wer
636
Department of State Bulletin
President Ruiz Cortines to President Eisenhower
Mexico City, March 29, 1956
His Excellency
DwiGHT D. Eisenhower
President of the United States of Ameiica
On returning to my country I have the honor to
convey to Your Excellency the expression of my
deep satisfaction at the friendly personal contacts
which upon your happy initiative we have just had
at White Sulphur Springs and which inaugurate
an era of personal relationship between the Ameri-
can Chiefs of State to the benefit of our countries.
I take particular pleasure also in expressing to you
my sincere gratitude for the innumerable manifes-
tations which I received of your very cordial hos-
pitality and your sincere and wholehearted friend-
ship. I beg Your Excellency to accept the
assurance of my cordial consideration and sincere
regards.
Adolfo Ruiz Cortines
President of the United Mexican States
Letters of Credence
Liberia
The newly appointed Ambassador of Liberia,
George Arthur Padmore, presented his credentials
to President Eisenhower on April 7. For the text
of the Ambassador's remarks and the text of the
President's reply, see Department of State press
release 181.
Delegation to Baghdad Pact
Council Meeting
Press release 180 dated April 6
The United States has demonstrated in many
ways its desire to cooperate in the achievement of
the objectives of the Baghdad Pact, which coincide
with our objectives in this area and elsewhere — of
peace, security, and welfare. "While the I'nited
States has not itself adhered to the pact, we have,
at the request of the members — Turkey, Iraq. Iran,
Pakistan, and the United Kingdom — maintained
continuing liaison witli the organization and have
had observers in attendance at its various meetings.
In line with this policy, the United States is
sending a delegation to the meeting of the Bagh-
dad Pact Council in Tehran from April 16 to 20.
The American delegation will be headed by Deputy
Under Secretary of State Loy W. Henderson.
Mr. Henderson will be accompanied to Tehran
by a special economic adviser and will be joined by
Selden Chapin, U.S. Ambassador to Iran, and by
Waldemar J. Gallman, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq,
togttlier with advisers drawn from the staffs of the
American Embassies in Tehran and Baghdad.
T)ie group of U.S. military observers at the
meeting will be headed by Adm. John H. Cassady,
Commander in Chief of the Eastern Atlantic and
Mediterranean Forces, who attended the last meet-
ing of the Council.^ He will be accompanied by
senior representatives of each of the military
services.
Significance of New Soviet Line
Concerning Stalin Era
Neivs Confererwe Statement hy Secretary Dulles
Press release 171 dated April 3
The official Soviet line, which seems to repudiate
the last two decades of Stalin's rule, is higUy
significant. It is too early to judge its full mean-
ing, but some important conclusions are now
possible.
The Soviet rulers must know that the brutal
and arbitrary rule of the Stalin era led to a gi"eat
yearning by the subject peoples for legality and
personal security, for tolerance of differences of
opinion, and for government genuinely dedicated
to the welfare of the governed.
Also the Soviet rulers must now see that their
foreign policies encounter effective resistance when
they are identified with the use of violence.
The essential question is this: Are the Soviet
rulers now attacking the basic causes of this
domestic discontent and foreign distrust, or is
their purpose merely to allay this discontent and
distrust by blaming them on the past? The
downgrading of Stalin does not of itself demon-
strate that the Soviet regime has basically changed
its domestic or foreign policies. The present
rulers have, to be sure, somewhat modified or
masked the harshness of their policies. But a dic-
tatorship is a dictatorship whether it be that of
' Bulletin of Jan. 2, 1956, p. 16.
AptW 16, 7956
637
one man or several. And the new Five- Year Plan
shows a continuing purpose to magnify the might
of the Soviet State at the expense of the well-
being of most of the people who are ruled.
In the field of foreign policy the Soviet rulers
have taken a few forward steps, notably the be-
lated liberation of Austria. But they continue
other predatory policies. They forcibly hold
East Germany detached from Germany as a whole.
The East European nations are still subjugated by
Soviet rule. They have not renounced their ef-
forts to subvert free governments. In Asia the
present Soviet rulers seek to stir up bitterness
and, in the Near East, increase the danger of hos-
tilities. In the Far East they are seeking to coerce
Japan to accept a peace treaty on Soviet terms.
These and other current actions fall far short of
the accepted code of international conduct.
Nevertheless, the fact that the Soviet rulers now
denounce much of the past gives cause for hope,
because it demonstrates that liberalizing influ-
ences from within and without can bring about
peaceful change. If the free world retains its
strength, its faith and unity, then subversion can-
not win where force and brutality failed. And
the yearnings of the subject peoples are not to
be satisfied merely by a rewriting of past history.
Thus we can hope for ultimate changes more
fundamental than any that have so far been re-
vealed. The United States, and indeed all the
free nations, will eagerly welcome the coming
of that day.
Visit of French Foreign Minister
News Conference Statement hy Secretary Duller
Press release 170 dated April 3
I am very pleased to announce that the French
Foreign Minister, Mr. Christian Pineau, has ac-
cepted an invitation to visit Washington. I have
had the possibility of such a visit in mind for some
time and first discussed it with Minister Pineau
when we met recently at Karachi. The dates for
the visit have now been set, and Minister Pineau
will be here from June 18 to June 20 inclusive.
We will have a further exchange of views on sub-
jects of mutual interest to our two countries. The
visit will also provide an occasion for high officials
of the United States Government to meet the
French Foreign Minister.
Transcript of Secretary Dulles'
News Conference
Press release 172 dated April 3
Secretary Dulles: I have two prepared state-
ments to make.^ . . . Now if you have any ques-
tions.
Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us whether there
has been any change in our policy on IsraeVs re-
quest for jet fighters and other armaments?
A. The policy in that respect remains substan-
tially as it was when I explained it to the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee about a month ago
[February 24].^
Q. Mr. Secretary, is the new version of the
Bricher amendment, which is known as the Dirh-
sen version, acceptable to the administration?
A. The President has not made, as far as I am
aware, any definite statement on that subject, and
imtil he does I would prefer not myself to speak of
it.
Q. Mr. Secretary, a story out of Tokyo yester-
day indicated that the Japanese Embassy here has
been directed to protest to the State Department
about the enactment of State laws which are ap-
parently designed to boycott Japanese goods.
Have you heard of this, first,- and, secondly, what
can you do about it?
A. Well, I am aware of the problem that you
refer to. We have not yet received any protest,
as far as I am aware, from the Japanese Govern-
ment. There is involved a question of trade trea-
ties, discrimination, and tliere is a possibility of
setting up forces here which could be very inimical
to the operation of our most-favored-nation policy
with respect to trade. But, as I say, until we re-
ceive the protest, until we have had a further
chance to study the matter in the light of our
treaty engagements and in the light of our policies,
I wouldn't want to say what our final conclusion
will be.
Q. Mr. Secretary, according to a UP report the
French Prime Minister, Guy Mollet, said yester-
day that the United States was taking the wrong
approach to German unification refusing to put
' These statements were also issued separately as press
releases 170 (see adjoining column) and 171 (seep. 637).
" Bulletin of Jlar. 5, 19.56, p. 368.
638
Deparimenf of State Bulletin
disarmament first. I was wondering whether you
have some comment on that.
A. Well, you know, I find as I go around the
world, and as I read the papei-s, that there is a good
deal of criticism in other countries, big countries,
little countries, of United States policy in various
of its phases, and I feel that the fact tliat those
criticisms are made, freely made, is one of the
greatest tributes to the United States that could
be made. Because all those countries know that
they can criticize the United States without any
fear of any reprisals or that we will change the
principles which actuate us. We are not trying
to run a popularity contest, and we don't give or
withhold assistance on the basis of whether people
say nice things about us or not. I think the finest
tribute that could be paid to a country as powerful
as the United States is that nobody fears to criti-
cize us.
Q. Mr. Secretary, could you return to the
Bricker amendment? I believe the President said
that he was not going to discuss it with us at the
press conference until he talked to you about it.
Has he talked to you, and have you taken a posi-
tion on it?
A. Well, he has talked to the Attorney Gen-
eral, but whether he has taken a final position
yet, I don't know.
Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us what is the
legislative status of the Bricker amendment?
Does the ad^ninistration have to decide very soon
its position on it?
A. I imderstand that the present version of the
Constitutional amendment has been reported out
of committee. I do not think that it is as yet on
the calendar, nor do I know what the action will
be about whether to put it on the calendar and, if
so, when. So that I will j ust say that as far as I
am now aware it is not on the calendar, and it is
not a matter of immediate urgency.
Q. Mr. Secretary, the freedom to criticize us
seems to have taken a tangible form in Icelamd.
Could you discuss the resolution of the Icelandic
Parliament in favor of moving American forces
out of Iceland?
A. Well, I think that the resolution reflects an
understandable desire on the part of the Members
of Parliament to reduce to a minimum the presence
April 16, 1956
of foreign troops there. Of course, the resolution
itself, as you know, has no operative effect inter-
nationally, and I do not anticipate that there will
be any decisive action now taken in that matter.
Certainly, there is no occasion for any for, I think,
a year and a half. But the problem of Iceland
has always been a difficult one because Iceland is
a quite small country. It has a population of, I
think, about 160,000, and in that small population
even a modest amount of forces from a foreign
land makes a considerable impact. If you were
to put it into relative terms, I would say that the
situation is as though there were 6,000,000 foreign,
non-English-speaking troops in the United States.
Well, as the years go by there would, naturally,
grow up a desire perhaps to reduce that, and a
desire to be sure that the Government did not con-
tinue it beyond the time that it was necessai-y.
There is, I think, a feeling in Iceland that perhaps
the recent Soviet moves make this less necessary.
Undoubtedly, that whole problem will be discussed
over the coming months. But I do not think that
it is reflective of anything other than a desire to
minimize the presence of foreign troops insofar
as it can safely be done. The question of how
safely it can be done is a matter which would
probably be discussed at some of our Nato
meetings.
Situation in Near East
Q. Mr. Secretary, would you discuss your views
on the present situation in the Middle East with
respect to the chances of avoiding a war?
A. It is, of course, basic to United States policy,
first, that war in that area should be avoided, and,
secondly, that nothing should happen to subvert
the genuine independence of the countries of that
area. Peace and independence for that area are
two basic points of our policy.
I have the feeling that the resolution which is
up before the Security Council now, and which
was introduced by the United States, will con-
tribute appreciably to minimizing the risk of war
in the area.^
Wlien I spoke on this subject before the Senate
Foreign Kelations Committee at the time that I
have already alluded to, I emphasized my thought
that the United Nations had a very peculiar re-
sponsibility toward Israel and the maintenance of
' See p. 628.
639
4
peace, because the State of Israel liad to an extent
been sponsored by the United Nations and tlie
truce and armistice agreements had been spon-
sored bv the T^nited Xations. I felt, therefore,
that the United Nations should assume increasing
responsibility.
The resolution that we introduced, if it is
adopted, as I am hopeful it will be (perhaps today
or more likely tomorrow), will, I think, add ap-
preciably to the assurance of peace in that part of
the world, and to that extent it will mark, I think,
real progress.
Q. Mr. Secretary., the British Foreign Office has
criticized Premier Nasser of Egypt on the ground
that he has hecome rather anti-Western and has
particularly made difficulties for Britain and
France in the area. Are you aioare of any such
conduct on Nasser'' s part?
A. In so far as I have been aware of Nasser's
public and official statements, I would say that he
was actuated primarily by a desire to maintain the
genuine independence of the area — the same desire
that I expressed. Of course, it is never possible
to make final judgments merely on the basis of
what people say. But I am not disposed to feel
that there is any irrevocable decision on the part
of the Government of Egypt to repudiate its ties
with the West or to accept anything like vassalage
to the Soviet Union.
Q. May I ask one more question on this area:
There have been reports published within the last
day or so that the United States Govemm,ent is
considering separating from IsraeVs arms re-
quests certain requests for electronic equipment,
chiefly radar, and approving that on the ground
that it is purely defensive. Cam, you comment on
these reports?
A. No, I'm afraid not. If that analysis is under
way, it is at a level which hasn't yet come to my
attention.
Q. Mr. Secretai^, getting back to your previous
answer, does your answer msan that IsraeVs arms
requests have been turned down?
A. No.
Q. Does it inean they are still open?
A. I would have to ask you to let me stand pretty
much on the statement which I made before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee in public
640
hearing about a month ago. Jly difficulty, ladies
and gentlemen, is this : that whenever I speak on
that subject I find that every single word and
phrase that I use is compared very, very closely
with something I may have said a month ago, and
if I don't use precisely the same words then it is
inferred that we have changed our policy.
Now it is not possible for me — my memory isn't
good enough — to repeat exactly in verbatim terms
what I said a month ago. And if I try to repeat
it in approximately the same terms, that wouldn't
be good enough because the differences, however
slight, would be studied with a view to seeing if
they don't hide some change of policy.
Now, broadly speaking, our policy is as I ex-
pressed it at that time, and I think rather than at-
tempt to restate it in what might be slightly differ-
ent words from which inferences might unjustifi-
ably be drawn, I would just rather stand on that
previous statement.
Q. Mr. Secretary, would you care to tell us who
makes this interpretation?
A. I would say that those interpretations — I am
not criticizing them — those interpretations are
made by the interested parties who, quite properly,
are seeking to detect, if possible, any changes in our
policy.
Q. Mr. Secretary, would you please corrmient on
the exception that the Netherlands appears to have
taken to some of your statements in Djakarta?
A. "Well, I had a friendly talk, yesterday I think
it was, with the Dutch Ambassador here and, I
think, clarified the situation. I believe that the
position which I took at Djakarta was a position
whicli, by and large, is in the interest of the United
States and all of the free nations, and I hope that
there will be a better understanding of what I said
and did there.
Q. Mr. Secretary, would you comment specif -
cally on the Jungschlaeger* case, particularly the
charge that an American Embassy plane had been
used to fly atnmimitiori to the rebels?
A. It is not our practice to conament in general
upon cases that are pending before courts. There
are a great many of these cases all around the
' Leou Jungschlaeger, retired Dutch naval captain on
trial in Indonesia for alleged subversive activities against '
tlie Indonesian Government.
Deparfment of State Bulletin
f\
world, and, in the main, it is oui- policy to avoid
comment on cases either at home or abroad that
are pending before tlie courts. As far as the refer-
ence to the use of a United States plane is con-
cerned, I understand that has been publicly and
officially denied by the United States Embassy.
Q. Mr. Secretary, in your appearance hefore the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee [in executive
session on March £3] you spoke of the Japanese
talhing about the use of American foreign aid to
help them in their payments program both in the
United States and Asia. Has anything further
developed on that?
A. No. That theme has been reported by me
to our economic people here in the State Depart-
ment and to the Ica [International Cooperation
Administration], and they are studying it to see
■what they may conclude as to feasibility of a i^rac-
tical application of that general thesis that we
should seek to coordinate our economic aid with
such economic aid as may result from Japanese
reparation payments and the like.
Free-World Unity
Q. Mr. Secretary, in your prepared statement
you said something about if the free world main-
tains its unity in the face of the Soviet changes.
We talked a lot here about criticism from a variety
of nations. Do you have any apprehensions the
free world will maintain its unity in the face of
the Soviet change?
A. I am convinced that the free world will main-
tain its unity. Now unity is something which has
to be carefully differentiated from conformity.
That is the difference between our system and the
Soviet Communist system — at least, as it has been
expounded up to the present time. Whether they
will change that or not I don't know. But the old
Soviet Communist line has been that there had
to be complete conformity and that no differences
of opinion were tolerated. In a free society the
situation is the reverse of that. We tolerate and
welcome differences of opinion, and, indeed, if
there wei-e no differences of opinion in a free so-
ciety there would be something badly wrong with
it. Therefore, the unity and vigor of a free so-
cietj' is not to be judged by the absence of criticism
and comments; on the contrary, I think it is a
sign of vigor that these comments and criticisms
occur.
April 16, 7956
381545—56 3
Now, there is of course some danger always that
a change of tactics such as is now going on in the
Soviet Union, where — as I put it — it may be that
old policies are merely being masked, may tem-
porarily have a deceptive effect. But one of the
encouraging impressions that I gained from my
trip to Asia is that there is a very large measure
of alertness to the possibility of danger from new
Soviet tactics. Therefore, I returned from this
trip convinced that, at least in so far as that part
of the world was concerned, there is a very good
hope that the unity of the free nations will be pre-
served. Not, as I say, in the form of a conformity,
or domination, or some nations being satellites to
others — goodness knows we don't want any sat-
ellites. But the kind of unity which means that
they are free from Soviet Communist or Chinese
Communist domination and within that freedom
each lives its own independent life. I believe that
situation is going to prevail.
Q. Mr. Secretary, it has been reported that the
United States would not oppose other Western
countries selling ar'ms to Israel. Would you ex-
plain to us the difference — whether the arms come
from, the United States or other Western coun-
tries?
A. The United States is following its policy in
relation to that area for reasons that seem to us
to be most conducive to our particular ability to
exert influence for the peace and independence
of the area of which I spoke. But the same con-
siderations which apply to the United States do
not necessarily apply to other countries, and there
is certainly no desire on the part of the United
States to dictate to other countries what their
policy should be.
Policy on Use of Troops
Q. Mr. Secretary, on that same subject how do
you interpret the May 25, 1950, declaration in so
far as it may involve the u^se of our own troops to
put down any acts of aggression in that part of
the world? Are you free, for example, without
congressional sanction?
A. Whether we are free or not is a Constitu-
tional question. It is very strongly the disposi-
tion of President Eisenhower, as I think you all
know, to resolve any of those doubts in favor of
going to Congress, assmning that Congress is in
session and can be expected to act promptly, or
641
could be called into session promptly. I would
think that, in the absence of an emergency of such
a character, congressional consultation and action
would be impractical and the President would
not be disposed to act without such consultation
and concurrence by the Congress.
Q. Mr. Secretary, didn't the 1950 declaration
commit Britain, France, and the United States to
follow a common folicy?
A. It laid down certain principles which each
accepted as a broad guide to its policies. Those
principles were, however, so general in their terms
that it is not easy to apply them to particulars,
and of course the situation has changed since that
time in view of the fact that the Soviet Union is
now a large purveyor of arms in that area.
Q. Would the considtations yoti were talking
about he of the kind that took place before the
Korean War or at the time the Korean War oc-
curred tvith congressional leaders, or are you
syeahing of some other kind of consultations with
Congress?
A. Well, I thought I coupled two words — I
thought I said consultation and approval, al-
though possibly if Congress was not in session and
an emergency arose then there might be consulta-
tions alone. But I would think, in the light of
what the President has said in the past, that he
would not normally expect to use the armed forces
of the United States in the area where there has
been no congressional approval given either
through a resolution or through a treaty.
Q. Mr. Secretary, does this Goveminent believe
that the shipinent of some small anns to Israel by
other countries would contribute to the stability
of the area?
A. It might do so. That is a difficult question
to answer in the abstract, but certainly the United
States has no view to the contrary which would
lead it to interpose any objections.
"Problems of Leninism"
Q. Mr. Secretary, it has been indicated to its in
the past you regarded Stalin''s Problems of Lenin-
ism as one of tfie basic texts in Soviet policy. I
uionder if recent events would lead you to subscribe
to that in the light of recent events.
A. I still have it on my desk both here and at
my house because, in so far as I am aware, the
Soviets, while they have attempted to disavow
much of Stalin's program and many of his acts,
have not themselves come up with any substitute.
There is this to be observed — that the portion of
Stalin's rule which is apparently being most vig-
orously disavowed is, roughly speaking, the last
20 years. The Problems of Leninism, runs up-
as I recall — to 1939, and most of the book embraces
statements, speeches, etc., made by Stalin prior to
1937. It may be, therefore, that the greater part
of that book will be preserved. Certainly, I don't
think one is justified in assuming that it all will
go, particularly as the book purports in large part
to be a statement of Lenin's doctrine.
Lenin wrote so voluminously that one can
delve into his books and arrive at almost any con-
clusion you wish by picking and choosing. Stalin
picked and chose, but much of the book is a quota-
tion from or an elucidation of Lenin's writings.
Therefore, I think it is not possible yet to conclude
that that volume, or the gi-eat«r part of it, may
not be preserved as a working model for the Com-
munists.
Q. Mr. Secretary, has this Government ever
been able to get hold of the text or a summary of
the secret Khrushchev speech or any party instruc-
tions on which you perhaps based your original
statements?
A. We have not as yet been able to get a full
text or written excerpts from it. We do think we
have, through indirection, a pretty good idea as
to what was said there. But obviously it is in-
complete because it was a very long speech and
the recollections which we are able to draw upon
are secondhand and somewhat fragmentary.
Q. Mr. Secretary, about Premier Nasser^s state-
ment, how' do you regard Premier Nasser^s state-
ment in the Neio York Times that he still was
iceighing the Soviet offer to build the Aswan dam;
secondly, are you aware of a change in heart in
Egypt in making a prompt start on the dam?
A. In so far as I am aware, there is no program
for making a prompt start, and, indeed, some of
the preconditions to a start are still under dis-
cussion.
Q. Mr. Seoretaiy, in reply to an earlier ques-
tion you said that you thought the President u^ould
leant congressional approval by either a resolution
or a treaty in order to u.se forces in some foreign
area —
642
Department of State Bulletin
A. In the absence of an emergency in which
the national interest was involved, and there
wasn't time to get congressional action.
Q. I loauld like to ash a question. Do you have
any flan or does the President have a plan to ash
Congress for such a resolution applying to the
Middle East or, alternatively, do you kntnc of any
emergency lohich might require action in the ab-
sence of congressional approval?
A. I will answer those questions in reverse order
because it is easier. The first is that we do not
know of any such emergency, and since we do not
know of it we do not have any present plans to seek
congressional action.
Q. Mr. Secretary, earlier yoti said, I believe, in
answer to a question that IsraeVs request for arms
has not been twmed down. Has the United States
decided to meet this request on the part of Israel?
A. No, it has not made an affirmative decision.
Q. Mr. Secretary, on the basis of \chat you said
regarding Stalinh loritings on Problems of Lenin-
ism, are you implying there is primarily a change
of methodology in the Soviet administration and,
if so, could not a change of methodology, loillitigly
or unimllingly, lead to a change of substance in
their policies?
A. Yes, I believe so, and that is the basis for the
hope which I expressed in the next-to-last sentence
of the statement which I read to you.
U.S. Policy Toward Indonesia
Q. Mr. Secretary, with respect to the fnction be-
tween the Netherlands and the United States,
could you ansiver these tioo questiom: A Christian
Science Monitor editorial recently suggested that
the United States should be careful not to take over
economic responsibilities in Indonesia where the
Netherlands is forced to leave off, and the second
question is this: There is a growing sentiment in
the Netherlands that the neutrality of the United
States regarding Netherlands New Guinea is about
to be over. Could you comment on that one?
A. Well, as far as economic assistance is con-
cerned, the United States has no desire or intention
of taking over the Dutch industrial position in
Indonesia, if that is the subject of your question.
Indonesia was a colony, and there was a very large
amount of Netherlands capital which was in there.
There is no desire or purpose on the part of the
United States, governmentally or through en-
couraging private business, to take over that dom-
inant economic position which the Dutch enjoyed.
We are giving a certain amount of economic
assistance to Indonesia. Just before I was there we
signed a Public Law 480 arrangement witli Indo-
nesia which involved approximately $95 million
worth of agricultural surplus goods.'^ So we are
sympathetic to assisting Indonesia wliere it desires
such assistance. But certainly we do not expect
to take over the Dutch commercial position in
Indonesia.
I think there were two parts of that question. I
have forgotten what the second part was.
Q. It concerned Netherlands New Guinea. So
far the United States delegation to the United
Nations, at least in recent years, has taken a posi-
tion of absolute neutrality. Some fears are being
expressed that is no longer the case.
A. We expect to continue to take a position of
neutrality because that is our general policy with
relation to these highly controversial matters
which involve countries both of whom are friends
and where we ourselves are not directly involved.
Q. Mr. Secretary, what does the administration
expect Congress loill do on long-range foreign aid
programs? Are you doing anything about it —
trying to sell the idea?
A. Yes, I am doing a good deal publicly and
privately. You will find I made two public
speeches of a nationwide character, within the last
6 weeks I think, which dealt with that subject."
I emphasized it in my appearances before the For-
eign Afl'airs and Foreign Eelations Committees
after I returned, and I have talked privately to a
number of Senators and Congressmen about it.
My belief is that there will be congressional action
in tliis respect which will enable us to go forward
on long-range projects with confidence.
' Bulletin of Mar. 19, 1956, p. 469.
" nid.. Mar. 5, 1956, p. 363, and Apr. 2, 1956, p. 539.
Apr;/ 16, 7956
643
The Foundations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
hy Deputy Under Secretary Mwrphy ^
This coming Wednesday it will be exactly 7
years since that April 4, 1949, when the repre-
sentatives of 12 nations gathered in Washington
to sign the North Atlantic Treaty. It is fitting
that we pause on this occasion to see what prog-
ress we have made and to look forward to some
of the problems facing the Atlantic community.
It is particularly fitting that this symposium
be held here in Norfolk. Your city is one of the
first to which our ancestors came from across the
Atlantic 300 years ago. Today Norfolk may be
described as one of the capitals of the Atlantic
community, since one of Nato's two major in-
tegrated command systems is located here. The
other is the Nato headquarters in Paris. Just
2 weeks ago I had a chance to talk over the sit-
uation in Europe with General [Alfred M.]
Gruenther, the Supreme Commander for Europe
stationed in Paris, and I look forward today to
renewing my long acquaintance with Admiral
[Jerauld] Wright, the distinguished Supreme
Allied Commander in the Atlantic.
We in Washington feel special gratitude to the
College of William and Mary and to the Norfolk
Chamber of Commerce for your sponsorship of
these meetings — the one last August and the one
beginning today — on the organization and pur-
poses of Nato. Through this kind of discussion
and study we will all better understand one of our
country's most important activities in the inter-
national field. By your example you can help
other Americans appreciate the significance of our
Atlantic alliance.
' Address made at a symposium on NATO sponsored by
the College of William and Mary and the Norfolk Cham-
ber of Commerce at Norfolk, Va., on Apr. 2 (press release
168).
This symposimn is an important step in that
direction, and I am honored that you asked me
to introduce your valuable discussions. Bather
than dwell on the general outline of Nato's or-
ganization and development, with which we are
fairly well acquainted, we might talk about some
of the principles and concepts which lie behind
the North Atlantic Treaty and some of the reasons
why Nato has become a vital force in world
affairs.
It is important that we keep in mind these
fundamental facts about our Atlantic alliance.
We will then be better able to meet some of the
questions we have been hearing recently about
Nato. And it is worth remembering that much
of the talk about Nato comes from greater public
interest and a wider knowledge about our security
problems. This is all to the good and in our
national interest.
All of us are familiar with some of the doubts
and questions raised during the last few months.
Some people complain that the United States is
devoting a great deal of money and manpower to
protecting Europe and is not getting enough in
return. Others argue that Nato — and in fact the
whole concept of collective security — -is being
rendered obsolete by the development of the hy-
drogen bomb and other weapons of massive de-
struction. Still others suggest that the recent
shift in Soviet tactics has greatly lessened the
danger of war and therefore reduced the need for
programs and relationships which have developed
through Nato.
In my opinion, all these doubts and questions
have their roots in misconceptions about the prem-
ises of the Atlantic alliance and about the true
character of the international situation now con-
I
644
Department of Slate Bulletin
fronting this country. The best way to clear up
these misconceptions is to take a good look at
Nato's background — to review some of the basic
considerations which led to its formation and
which make it so valuable today.
Nato has not arisen fi-om a single foundation but
rather from several firm-bedded foundations.
The main building blocks of Nato ai'e three : the
awareness of a common heritage, the presence of
a common danger, and a common determination to
resist it. These three elements have blended to
provide a solid basis for the most extensive and
most powerful association of free peoples that
history has ever known.
A Common Heritage
It is difficult to overestimate the importance of
what we might call the "human" foundations of
Nato. By this, I refer to the multiplicity of spirit-
ual, cultural, and personal ties that link the North
Atlantic peoples. "We should always remember
that Nato did not create the Atlantic community.
Rather, it was the fact that a community already
existed which made Nato possible. The common
heritage underlying Nato began nearly 500 years
ago with the voyages of discovery and explora-
tion, and the passing centuries have steadily
tightened the attachment of North America to
Europe. Let me give you a few examples.
According to the 19.50 census, there were more
than 33 million people living in the United States
who either were bom abroad or had parents born
abroad. Of this number, nearly half came from
the 14 other Nato countries. Of the remainder of
our population, an even larger percentage can
trace their ancesti-y back to one of the Nato
nations.
"We Americans have developed over the years a
political and constitutional structure that is
peculiarly our own. But its basic principles, in-
cluding rejjresentative government, restraints on
governmental authority, and guaranties of human
and pro]ierty rights, had European origins. Most
of our European allies, despite varying political
structures, still govern themselves under these
basic principles. In simple terms, we and our al-
lies share a devotion to the concepts of human
freedom and political liberty. These concepts are
what set the free nations apart in the world today.
A look at the content of our educational pro-
grams shows even more concretely our common
8 April ?6, 7
956
heritage with "Western and Southern Europe.
Here at "William and Mary, the second oldest uni-
versity in the country and one of our best, we find
as in other American universities numerous studies
in literature, science, art, and the social sciences.
If we forget for a moment the portion of this ac-
cumulated knowledge that has been produced by
the minds and hands of our own countrymen, we
will quickly recognize that the greatest part of the
remainder has come from the Nato countries of
Europe. Our whole culture is an Atlantic culture.
It would be possible to offer many additional
examples, but those I have given are sufficient to
illustrate my thesis that the Atlantic community
was a living reality long before the relationship
was formalized by intergovernmental organiza-
tions. Perhaps the most vivid demonstration of
this community relationship was provided by our
experience in the First and Second "World "Wars.
In both instances the American people, after try-
ing to avoid involvement in military hostilities,
discovered painfully that the fate of Europe was
indissolubly linked with our own. The bonds of
blood, friendship, and tradition are not easily
broken.
A Common Danger
In the period after 1945, another crisis arose.
This danger threatened every one of the Atlantic
nations. The Nazi dream of world empire was
shattered, but in the process a large part of the
Eurasian land mass fell into the hands of the ruth-
less Communist dictatorship. "Within a matter of
months. Western hopes that the Soviet Union
would restore freedom to the areas occupied by
its armies and would cooperate in the establishing
of a lasting peace were dashed.
Not only did the Soviet rulers make clear their
determination to hold fast to their conquests and
to exploit the newly acquired resources and peo-
ples for the aggrandizement of Soviet j^ower, but
they made equally clear their intention to continue
the expansion of Communist power into other
areas. INIoreover, it was evident that the Com-
munist bloc possessed powerful capabilities for
carrying out these intentions. The external pres-
sures of Soviet imperialism were reinforced by the
internal pressures exerted by pro-Communist ele-
ments within free societies. Guns were supple-
mented by propaganda. The specter of political
chaos was magnified by the risk of economic col-
645
lapse. Communism attacked on all fronts at the
same time. Its purpose was to destroy every
vestige of resistance to a Communist-dominated
-world. The situation in 1948 and 1949 was des-
perate.
Something had to be done.
A Common Response
The common civilization of tlie Atlantic com-
munity was challenged by a common danger, and
this inspired a common response. The Atlantic
nations cooperated in various ways to meet the
danger. Tlu-ough the Marshall plan and the Or-
ganization for European Economic Cooperation,
they labored to restore Western Europe's economic
health and thereby lay a basis for political sta-
bility. Through the Brussels Treaty, five Euro-
pean nations began the construction of a common
defense system. But it was painfully evident
that even the utmost toil and sacrifice on the part
of the Brussels Treaty powers would not be ade-
quate to produce defenses capable of holding the
Soviet colossus in check. Just as North American
support had proved necessary to European eco-
nomic recovery, so did North American participa-
tion prove essential to an effective defense
arrangement. The North Atlantic Treaty was the
result.
The North Atlantic Treaty was negotiated by
the United States and the 11 other original sig-
natories : Great Britain, Canada, France, Belgium,
the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Iceland, Norway,
Denmark, Portugal, and Italy. Since that time
Greece, Turkey, and most recently the Federal
Republic of Germany have acceded to the treaty,
making a total of 15 members. The main deter-
rent to aggression, completely apart from the
military strength which was later assembled, lay
in the unity of purpose which the treaty demon-
strated. Secretary Dulles, then a member of the
United States delegation to the United Nations,
clearly set forth tliis view wlien, during the hear-
ings on the ratification of the treaty, he said:
The treaty takes away from an aggressor one choice
that he used to have: the choice of making war on the
parties singly, one by one. If he chooses to fight one
party to this pact, he must fight them all, and all at the
same time.
The Principle of Collective Security
It is clear that the common danger confronting
the Atlantic nations provided the immediate
stimulus for Nato. But the existence of a com-
646
mon danger is only a part of the story. Even
more important is tlie fact that the Atlantic pow-
ers, in combination, possess a capacity for re-
sponding to this danger far greater tlian any one
of them possesses alone. Of all the tangible and
intangible elements that have joined together to
produce Nato, the most significant is the simple
fact that "Western Europe and Northern America
need each other — that an amalgamation of their
human and material resources is vital to the safety
and well-being of both.
Since the end of World War II, there has been
little question in the minds of most Europeans
about the need for American cooperation and sup-
port. Most of them have found it painfully ob-
vious that collective security is the only real se-
curity available. But among Americans the need
for Europe's cooperation and support is sometimes
less clearly understood. Old-style isolationism
has virtually died out in America, but there are
still a number of our people who are inclined to
doubt that we get much out of collective security
arrangements and who suspect that the United
States protects and assists others while receiving
little or nothing in return. This is a fallacy and
probably engenders more mistaken thinking about
foreign policy tlian any other single misconcep-
tion. I think it would be useful, therefore, to
examine the strategic value of the combination of
Nato resources primarily from the standpoint of
America's own national self-interests.
Stripped to its essence, the justification for Nato
is a simple exercise in elementary arithmetic.
North America and free Europe combined now
produce about 70 percent of the world's manu-
factured goods, while the entire Soviet bloc, in-
cluding China, produces only about 20 percent.
On the other hand, Soviet control of the territory
and resources of Western Europe would give the
Soviet bloc 50 percent of the total world's indus-
trial production, as against North America's 40
percent. The Atlantic nations, so long as they
are joined together, are in a position to maintain
decisive industrial superiority over the Soviet bloc
for an indefinite period of years. Soviet domina-
tion of Western Europe would rapidly shift the
industrial balance to the Communist side.
One of our great deficiencies in the global strug-
gle witli communism is manpower. The popula-
tion of the Communist bloc outnumbers the Ameri-
can population by a margin of 5 to 1. But with
free Europe and North America joined together,
Department of State Bulletin
I
this margin is reduced to approximately 2 to 1.
The extent to which the manpower of our
Eurijpean allies suj^plements the manpower of the
United States is vividly illustrated by the armed
forces of the two areas. The United States has
about 3 million men under ai-ms. Our Nato allies
are now adding another 3i/^ million to the total
military manpower available for free-world de-
fense. We do not know exactly how many men
the Communist countries have under arms, but a
fair estimate would be about IO14 million.
Our European allies also contribute substantial
sea and air strength, as well as naval and air bases,
to the common defense. There are now more than
150 Nato air bases in the European area. These
bases are indispensable for defense and retaliation
against aggression. We should note that our Nato
allies have not only contributed the land for these
bases but have paid most of the cost of their
construction.
Not the least of free Europe's potential contribu-
tions to the strength and well-being of the Atlantic
community is Europe's scientific and technological
capacity. It is worth recalling the nationalities
of the scientists who contributed to the original
development of the atomic bomb. The list reads
almost like a Nato rollcall ; for example, Fermi of
Italy, Bohr of Denmark, Cockcroft of England.
Finally, I think it is time to lay at rest the myth
that the cost of the Nato program rests primarily
upon the shoulders of the American taxpayer. It
is true that our defense expenditures are much
greater than those of other countries, but it is also
true that our national income is nearly three times
as great as that of all the other Nato nations com-
bined. Americans know that the United States
has made very large contributions to the equipment
and training of the military forces of our European
allies. But relatively few Americans realize that
these allies are now spending $6 from their own
budget to match every dollar's worth of U.S. assis-
tance they receive from us. All told, they are con-
tributing about $12 billion a year to the common
defense program. And $12 billion "ain't hay,"
even in this age of astronomical budgets. It is a
very substantial contribution to the common
defense.
These are some of the facts which explain the
origin of the North Atlantic Treaty and why it
is important to us. And just as significant as the
I series of commitments which the member nations
have given to assist one another in the event of
aggression is the wide range of collective activity
in which they are already engaged. Wliile most
of this activity is directed toward the maintenance
and improvement of military defense, there have
been significant advances toward closer political
and cultural cooperation as well.
Nato, with its 15 members, is a cornerstone of
our foreign policy, linking the power of North
America with that of Western and Southern
Europe. We have other important alliances.
In this hemisphere we have the Organization of
American States, the oldest regional system in
the world, and the Rio Pact, which bind us to-
gether with 20 Latin American Republics for
cooperation and joint defense. In Asia we are
members of Seato, still a new organization, which
is steadily gathering strength. We have impor-
tant bilateral pacts with the Republic of China,
Korea, the Philippines, Japan, and Spain, and
we have a trilateral security treaty with Australia
and New Zealand. The U.S. today is fortified
by security arrangements with more than 40
countries. Although we are not members of the
Baghdad Pact, wliich is the very newest defense
organization, including Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Pakis-
tan, and the United Kingdom, we have a deep
interest in its success. The United States has
entered into these defense alliances to meet the
danger we and our friends face in many parts of
the world. Our ability to meet this danger is
much more powerful than it was even a few years
ago. But the danger has not significantly
abated.
Shift in Soviet Tactics
This is true even though during the last year
we have witnessed what appears to be a rather
striking shift in Soviet tactics. Wliile the Com-
munist leaders have always employed a variety
of techniques to pursue their objective of world
domination, up until recently they had relied
largely on the use or threatened use of military
force. As a result of the increasing unity and
strength of free nations, there are indications that
they have now reached a better appreciation of the
suicidal risks of warfare and are beginning to
place much more emphasis on the use of political,
economic, and psychological teclmiques in the
unending Communist struggle against the free
world.
\ April 16, 7956
647
There is a lot we still do not know about what
is iroin<r on in the Soviet Union. "We do not know
whether they are changing their policies. In cer-
tain vital areas like the unification of Germany,
they appear to have made no change. On the
other hand, they appear to be trying to change
their approach and diplomatic methods, particu-
larly as they deal with Soutli Asia and the Near
East. They seem to be stepping \ip their over-
tures toward Western Europe. Toward Japan,
however, they are still using the heavy hand and
their old technique of diplomatic coercion. They
have not in the slightest relaxed their control over
the satellite nations.
The Stalin story is currently the most spectacu-
lar example of the Soviet enigma. We know that
Stalin's disciples and collaborators are now
blackening his name. Prarda, on Mai'ch the 28th,
told the world that Stalin lacked personal mod-
esty, that he did not cut short the glorifications and
praises addressed to him, and that all this violated
the principles of Marx and Lenin, who, according
to Pravda, taught that the ])eople must have the
right to elect their responsible leaders.
There are a lot of good reasons why the present
Soviet rulers would want to push Stalin off his
pedestal. They may well have found it necessary
to revitalize the political and economic machinery
of the Soviet Union, and by attacking Stalin
they may hope to shock the Communist Party and
the people of the Soviet Union into an awareness
that a new response is expected, that the people
on down the line in the Soviet hierarchy must
take on greater initiative and responsibility.
They probably want to stimulate the productive
and creative abilities of Soviet engineers, scien-
tists, and artists, who were never sure that Stalin
might not change the line and put them out of
business. And we cannot forget that the men in
Moscow probably feared the wrath of Stalin,
knowing what they Imew about the purges and the
secret police. They may also feel this new line
will be appealing to non-Communists and espe-
cially to socialists abroad, and that it will get them
out from under the domineering rigidities of
Stalin's foreign policy.
Time will tell us more about the "cult of the
individual"' and about the adjustments going on
in Russia.
It would be foolhardy, however, to assume that
the Communists have changed their objective. We
have almost no evidence that the basic totalitarian
features of the Soviet state have changed in any
way. Nevertheless, we can hope that they have
decided to reduce their emphasis on militai-y
strength and threat of force as major instruments
of policy. Such a shift would be an advantageous
development from the standpoint of the United
States and other free nations. The objective of
U.S. policy is to achieve in peace the blessings of
liberty, and thus any genuine indication that the
danger of armed Communist aggression has di-
minished would be welcome. We have no reason
to doubt the fundamental capacity of free societies
to compete with communism by peaceful means.
At the same time, there are two things we should
keep firmly in mind when we try to figure out
where we stand today.
Communist Capability for Aggression
First, we should remember that the Communist
bloc still retains a tremendous capaiility for mili-
tary aggression. It has a substantial superiority
in military manpower. It is rapidly developing
more modern weapons and a modem technology,
including an ominous atomic potential. The
Communists possess the capacity to engage in new
military adventures at any time, either on a gen-
eral or local scale. As long as this capacity exists,
it is obvious that the United States and other free
nations must be watchful of their freedom and
safety.
Second, even if the Communists remain cautious
about military adventures, we cannot afford to dis-
count the enormous stakes involved in the bitter
political and economic contest which they are de-
termined to continue waging against the free
world. In terms of the ultimate fate of free civili-
zation, this new strategy is no less dangerous than
the old. In some ways, it is even more difficult to
combat, because it is more subtle, more complex,
and geared to a longer time period. We should
not make the fatal mistake of assuming that a
seeming Communist de-emphasis of military
methods of conquest will allow us to take a holiday
from the struggle for freedom. On the contrary,
this struggle may become more intense and will
certainly tax our imagination, energy, and patience
to the utmost. Our ability to achieve success in
this struggle, like our ability to maintain an ade-
quate defense posture, will depend in large measure
upon our cooperation with other free nations.
The principle of collective security is as valid to-
648
Department of State Bulletin
day in the political field as it ever was in the mili-
tary field.
I think it is clear that the Xato countries have no
reason to de-emphasize their defense programs.
Actually, these very progrrams have been a princi-
pal factor in bringing about the recent shift in
Soviet tactics. Our current situation reminds me
of a story I once heard about a highway that went
through a mountain village. There was a very
high cliff at a sharp turn in the highway, and quite
a number of travelers failed to make it. There
was considerable agitation for a project to build a
fence at this point, and this was eventually done.
After several years had gone by, however, a
traveler happened to be passing through the vil-
lage and noticed that the fence had been removed.
He stopped to ask one of the natives about it and
received a very simple explanation. "We kept the
fence there for about .3 years," the old fellow said,
"but nobody fell off the cliff any more, so we took
it down."
Maintaining Our Guard
I feel sure that both the United States and its
allies recognize that this is no time to take down
our fences. We must maintain our guard as long
as a threat exists. Even though we hope that the
Soviet rulers have come to recognize the horrors of
modern warfare, we have no guaranty that they
will indefinitely desist from military adventures,
especially if they are tempted by military weak-
nesses in neighboring nations.
As I said in the beginning of this discussion, this
examination of N.\to"s background will help us to
give positive answers to any of the doubts or ques-
tions raised about the Nato relationship. Nato
remains vital to the interests of Americans and
Europeans alike. The onrush of modern tech-
nology has not lessened the need for collective
strength and collective effort. The new wind
blowing from Moscow remains chilly. We must
always be prepared for stormy weather.
To those who express concern about the oc-
casional differences of opinion among our Xato
allies, I would like to say this. I have never
known even a closely knit family that did not
have an occasional quarrel. There will be dis-
agreement among individuals and nations as long
as independent thinking survives, and independ-
ence of thought is one of the things we Americans
and our allies are most determined to preserve.
It is true, of course, that frictions and disagree-
ments could weaken the effectiveness of an alli-
ance. We must do everything we can to minimize
and resolve differences of this kind, but we must
never exaggerate their importance. Even the
most important differences among the Atlantic
nations cannot begin to match the significance of
our common interest in peace and survival.
I do not propose at this time to speculate about
the direction which N.\to may take in future years.
You here today, with your interest and expert
knowledge about Nato, are well qualified to do
this. I will confine myself, in conclusion, to ex-
pressing my deep conviction that the Atlantic
relationshii^, whatever the fluctuations of circum-
stance, will endure and grow. Nato's founda-
tions are solid, and its accomplishments are sub-
stantial. I know that you here in Norfolk will
continue your efforts to help it grow even stronger.
NATO Fellowship Awarded
to American Woman
The Department of State announced on April i
(press release 173) that M. ilargaret Ball, pro-
fessor of political science, Wellesley College,
AVellesley, Mass., is the U.S. winner of one of
the 11 Nato research fellowships offered by the
North Atlantic Council. Simultaneous announce-
ment of the award was made at Nato headquar-
ters in Paris.
The Nato Fellowship and Scholarship Program
was announced last July in implementation of
article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which pro-
vides for cooperation in nonmilitary fields. It
is designed to promote the study of historical,
political, constitutional, legal, social, cultural,
linguistic, economic, and strategic problems which
will reveal the common heritage and historical ex-
perience of the Atlantic covuitries, as well as the
jD resent needs and future develoj^ment of the North
Atlantic area considered as a community. Can-
didates for these first awards to be made under
the program were selected by a committee under
the chairmanship of Ambassador L. D. Wilgress,
Canadian Permanent Representative to Nato, who
is also chairman of the Nato Committee on In-
formation and Cultural Relations. Other mem-
bers of the committee were James B. Conant, U.S.
Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany
and formerly president of Har\ard University;
Robert Marjolin, professor at Nancj- University
and formerly Secretary-General of the Organiza-
April 16, 7956
649
tion for European Economic Cooperation ; Alberto
Tarchiani, formerly Italian Ambassador to the
United States; and II. U. "Willink, master of
Magdalene College, Cambridge, and formerly
vice-chancellor of Cambridge University. The
Conference Board of Associated Research Coun-
cils assisted the Department in recommending a
panel of American candidates to be considered by
the selection committee.
Miss Ball's research will be on the general sub-
ject of Nato and the Western European union
movement. She expects to leave this coming
autumn to spend the 4-month period of the fellow-
ship in London, Paris, Bomi, and other European
capitals.
U.S., Netherlands Begin Negotiation
of Air Transport Agreement
Press release 176 dated April 5
The Governments of the Kingdom of the
Netherlands and the United States began nego-
tiation of an air transport agreement in Wash-
ington on April 5.
The chairman of the delegation of the Kingdom
of the Netherlands is Dr. J. J. Spanjaard, Di-
rector of the Netherlands Department of Civil
Aviation. The delegation also includes repre-
sentatives of the Governments of Surinam and
of the Netherlands Antilles. The opening session
was also attended by the Netherlands Ambassador
to the United States, Dr. J. H. van Eoijen.
Chairman of the U.S. delegation is Thorsten
V. Kalijarvi, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for Economic Affairs. The vice chairman is Har-
mar Denny, member of the Civil Aeronautics
Board. The U.S. delegation is composed of of-
ficials from the Department of State and the Civil
Aeronautics Board.
There has never been a bilateral air transport
agreement between the United States and the
Netherlands. At present Royal Dutch Airlines
(Klm) operates from Amsterdam to New York
and from Curasao to Miami under permits granted
directly to the airline by the U.S. Government.
Similarly, Pan American Airways operates from
New York to Amsterdam and beyond to Frank-
fort, Germany, from New York to Surinam and
beyond, and from New York and Miami to Cu-
rasao and beyond under permits granted directly
to the airline by the Government of the Kingdom
of the Netherlands.
Transfer of Escapee Program
to Department of State
White House press release dated March 24
WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT
President Eisenliower on ]March 24 issued an
Executive order authorizing the Secretary of
State to carry out the functions pertaining to the
United States Escapee Progi-am through any offi-
cer or agency of the Department of State.^ It is I
contemplated that this program, which is pres-
ently being administered by the International Co-
operation Administration, will be transferred to
the Bui-eau of Security and Consular Affairs in J
the De^Jartment of State. The Escapee Program «
is designed to provide immediate assistance for
people fleeing from behind the Iron Curtain and
for their eventual reestablishment in Europe or
overseas. During its 4 years of operation the
program has assisted nearly 25,000 persons to
resettle in the free world.
The contemplated transfer will consolidate this
humanitarian program with the related refugee
functions already administered by the Bureau of
Security and Consular Affairs. The Deputy Ad-
ministrator of the Bureau, who is responsible for
the administration of the Refugee Relief Program,
will also direct the Escapee Program and repre-
sent the United States on the Intergoverimiental
Committee for European Migration.
Within the International Cooperation Admin-
istration the Office of the Deputy Director for
Refugees, Migration, and Voluntary Assistance
has been abolished. Those functions in this field
which remain the responsibility of the Director of
the International Cooperation Administration
have been transferred to the Office of the Deputy
Director for Technical Services. These functions
are concerned with registration of and relation-
ships with U.S. voluntai-y agencies which partici-
pate in international relief and rehabilitation proj-
' For an article on the Escapee Program by Mrs. Dorothy
D. Houghton, see Btjlletin of Mar. 14, 1955, p. 415.
650
Deparfmenf of State Bulletin
ects, and with staff support for the Advisory Com-
mittee on Voluntary Foreign Aid.
This change was recommended by a joint State-
IcA task force studying organizational relation-
sliips concerning these activities. The proposed
transfer has the approval of the Secretary of State
and the full concurrence of John B. Hollister,
Director of the Intex-national Cooperation Admin-
istration.
EXECUTIVE ORDER 10663 '
Administration of the Escapee Pbogbam
By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Mutual
Security Act of 1954 (68 Stat. 832), as amended, includ-
ing particularly sections 521 and 525 thereof, it is ordered
as follows :
Sec. 1. Section 1&4 of Executive Order No. 10610
of May 9, 1955 (20 F. R. 3181),° is hereby amended by
adding at the end thereof a new subsection (c) reading as
follows :
"(c) The Secretary of State may carry out the func-
tions now financed pursuant to section 405 (d) of the
Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, through any
officer or agency of the Department of State."
Sec. 2. There is hereby terminated the duty of the
Director of the International Cooperation Administration
(under section 103 (c) of Executive Order No. 10575 of
November 6, 1954 (19 F. E. 7251),* as affected by Execu-
tive Order No. 10610) to assist the Secretary of State
in formulating and presenting the policy of the United
States with respect to the assistance programs of the Inter-
governmental Committee for European Migration, the
United Nations Refugee Fund, and the United Nations
Children's Fund.
Sec. 3. The Secretary of State is hereby authorized
to transfer or assign to any agency or agencies of the
Department of State such offices, officers, and personnel,
and so much of the property and records, of the Inter-
national Cooperation Administration as he may deem
necessary for the administration by the said agency or
agencies of the functions referred to in section 104 (c)
of Executive Order No. 10610, as amended by this order.
Sec. 4. This order shall become effective on the first
day of the first month commencing after the date hereof.
/^ Cjls^ L'cZU Cj-iCj,^ A^Kj.^
The White House,
March 21,, 1956.
fl
'21 Fed. Reg. 1845.
' Bulletin of May 30, 1955, p. 889.
*Iiid., Dec. 13, 1954, p. 914.
Foreign Service Institute
Advisory Committee
Press release 177 dated April 6
The Department of State announced on April 6
the appointment of the following persons to serve
as members of an advisoi-y committee to the
Foreign Service Institute :
Mrs. Prances P. Bolton, U. S. House of Representatives
Ellsworth Bunker, President, The American National Red
Cross
Robert D. Calkins, President, The Brookings Institution,
Washington, B.C.
Robert Cutler, Director, Old Colony Trust, Boston, Mass.
Clyde K. Kluckhohn, Director, Laboratory of Social
Sciences, Harvard University
William L. Langer, Chairman, Committee on Regional
Studies, Harvard University
Charles E. Saltzman, Henry Sears & Company, New York,
N.Y.
Henry M. Wriston, Director, The American Assembly,
Columbia University
The Foreign Service Institute has statutory re-
sponsibility for training in the Department of
State. It is concerned with indoctrination and
training of newly commissioned Foreign Service
officers in the intricacies of a diplomatic and con-
sular career and also with the responsibility of pre-
parijig officers in mid-career for positions of
greater importance in the Service. Additionally,
the Institute provides training in many languages,
conducts courses in economics and administration,
and is responsible for university assignments in
pursuit of greater proficiency in such areas as po-
litical science, management, and economics. It also
furnishes to other officers and employees of the
Government such training in the field of foreign
relations as is needed.
I'he committee will meet periodically for the
purpose of advising the Director of the Institute
on all phases of training.
Negotiations Concerning Debts
of City of Berlin
Press release 169 dated April 3
Final arrangements have now been completed
to permit the opening of negotiations for the settle-
ment of the external debts owed by the City of
Berlin and by public utility enterprises owned or
controlled by Berlin.
April 16, 1956
651
These arrangements amplify the agi'eement re-
ferred to in the Department of State's press re-
lease 8 of January 5, 1956/ which lifted the
restrictions of article 5 (5) of the Agreement on
German External Debts of February 27, 1953,- on
the settlement of the Berlin external debts. The
arrangements were made in similar exchanges of
notes between the United States, British, and
French Embassies at Bonn and the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many. The text of the note sent by the United
States Embassy to the Foreign Ministry and an
unoiScial translation of the reply follow.
Note From U.S. Embassy at Bonn
No. ?,8G
The Embassy of the United States of America
presents its compliments to the Federal Ministry
for Foreign Affaii-s and has the honour to refer
to the Ministry's note number 507-519-746-
71284/55 of the 13th of August, 1955, and to the
Embassy's note number 94 of August 29, 1955 on
the subject of the settlement of the debts of the
City of Berlin and of the Berlin public utility
enterprises.
In the opinion of the United States Government,
the exchange of notes referred to constitutes the
agreement provided for in Article 5 (5) of the
Tendon Debt Agreement that negotiations on
the settlement of these debts are now considered to
be practicable. The Ministry has now raised in-
formally with the British, French and American
Embassies the question of the form of the negotia-
tions provided for in Article 5(5).
The United States Government considers that,
with the lifting of the exclusion provided in
Article 5 (5) , the terms of the London Debt Agi-ee-
ment and the appropriate annexes are applicable
to the settlement of the external debts of the City
of Berlin and of the Berlin public utility enter-
prises; and in particular, that the external bonded
debts of the City of Berlin fall under Annex I,
the bonded debts of the public utilities under
Annex II and the miscellaneous debts of the City
and of the public utilities, under Annex IV. It,
therefore, believes that no further intergovern-
mental conference is required, but that negotia-
tions may now be imdertaken between the debtors
and the creditor I'epresentatives.
' Bulletin of Jan. 16, 1956, p. 93.
' S. Exec. D, SSd Cong., 1st sess.
The question of the actual terms of settlement
of these debts will naturally be one of the principal
objects of the proposed negotiations. The United
States Government believes that the text of the
Agi'eement and the annexes provides ample flexi-
bility to take into account the special political
and economic position of Berlin.
If the Federal Government is in agreement
with the views presented above, it is suggested
that this note, the identical notes from the British
and French Embassies and the replies of the Fed-
eral Ministrj- for Foreign Affairs constitute an
interpretation of the London Debt Agreement, and
that certified copies of these notes be deposited
with the Government of the United Kingdom.
The Embassy of the United States of America
avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the
Federal ^Ministry for Foreign Affairs the assur-
ance of its highest consideration.
American Embassy, Bonn, Bud Godesherg, Feb-
ruary 29, 19-56.
Note Verbale From German Foreign Ministry
50T-519-T4G-5-5-7.3S35/56
The Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs has
the honor to acknowledge to the Embassy of the
United States of America the receipt of its Note
Verbale No. 386 of February 29, 1956 concerning
the debts of the City of Berlin and of the Berlin
jniblic utility enterprises and to reply as follows
with reference to the Note Verbale of the Federal
Ministry for Foreign Affairs of August 13, 1955 —
507-519-746-71284/55— and to the Note of the
Embassy of the United States of America of Au-
gust 29, 1955 — No. 94 — concerning the same sub-
ject :
In the opinion of the Government of the Federal
Republic of Germany the exchange of notes men-
tioned above constitutes the agreement provided
for in Article 5 (5) of the London Debt Agree-
ment that negotiations on the settlement of these
debts are now considered to be expedient. The
Embassy of the United States of America, the
Royal British Embassy and the French Embassy
have in tlie meantime informally discussed with
the Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs the ques-
tion of the form in which the negotiations pro-
vided for in Article 5 (5) are to take place.
The Government of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many considers that, after the lifting of the defer-
ment provided by Article 5 (5). the terms of the
London Debt Agreement and the appropriate an-
652
Deparfmenf of Sfofe Bo//ef/n
nexes are applicable to the settlement of the ex-
ternal debts of the City of Berlin and of the Berlin
public utility enterprises. It is, in particular, of
the opinion that the external bonded debts of the
City of Berlin are to be dealt with under Annex I,
the bonded debts of the public utilities under An-
nex II. and that the miscellaneous debts of the City
of Berlin and the Berlin public enterprises come
under Annex IV. It, therefoi-e, believes that no
further intergovernmental conference is required,
and that negotiations can now be opened between
the debtors and the ci'editor representatives.
The question of the actual terms of settlement of
these debts will naturallj- be one of the principal
subjects of the proposed negotiations. The Gov-
ernment of the Federal Eepublic of Germany be-
lieves that the text of the Agreement and its
annexes provides an ample margin to take into
account the special political and economic position
of Berlin.
The Government of the Federal Eepublic of
Germany is in agreement with the opinion of the
Government of the United States of America that
tlie three identical notes of the United States Em-
bassy, tlie Eo}-al British Embassy and the French
Embassy, dated February 29, 1956, and this Note
as well as the two identical notes to the Eoyal
British Embassy and the French Embassy con-
stitute an interpretation of the London Debt
Agreement, and that certified copies of these Notes
should be deposited with the Government of the
United Kingdom.
Tiie Federal Ministry for Foreign Afl'airs avails
itself of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy
of the United States of America the assurance of
its highest consideration.
Boxx, March 2, 1956
Question of Amending Proclamation
Limiting Dairy Imports
White House press release dated March 21
The President announced on March 21 that the
proclamation limiting imports of certain manu-
factured dairy products could not, on the basis of
the United States Tarifl' Commission's recent
limited investigation, be amended to include cer-
tain imports of cheeses not now considered subject
to the terms of the proclamation. The President
agreed with the majority of the Tariti' Commission
A.pn\ J 6, 1956
that the amendments requested by the Department
of Agriculture could be considered only after a
full-scale investigation under section 22 of the
Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended. The
Tariff Commission's investigation of last year was
made pursuant to subsection (d) of section 22,
which provides only for the modification of exist-
ing proclamations when "changed circumstances"'
so require.
Proclamation 3019, which was issued on June
8, 1053,^ established annual import quotas for cer-
tain manufactured dairy products, including
specified types of cheeses. Some imports of Ital-
ian-type cheeses, either because of the ingredients
they contain or because of the way in which they
are packaged, have not been regarded by the
Bureau of Customs as subject to Proclamation
3019. The Department of Agriculture has viewed
tliese cheeses as indistinguishable from those ad-
mittedly covered by the proclamation and has
sought to have such importations brought within
the purview of the proclamation. On April 7,
1955, the President, pursuant to a request from the
Department of Agriculture, directed the Tariff
Commission to make a supplemental investigation
pursuant to subsection (d) of section 22 to deter-
mine whether modification of Proclamation 3019
was warranted. -
The Tariff Commission reported its findings
and conclusions to the Pi'esident in July 1955.^
The majority and minority of the Commission
divided on a legal issue, namely, whether the re-
quested amendments to the proclamation to in-
clude cheeses not now considered under restriction
could be accomplished pursuant to subsection (cl)
of section 22, or whether such amendments should
be the subject of a new, full-scale investigation
under subsections (a) and (b) of section 22. The
President requested the advice of the Attorney
General on this question, and it was his opinion
that the requested amendments should not be made
on the basis of the limited investigation under sub-
section (d) . This was also the view of the major-
ity of the Tarifi' Commission. After reviewing
the case further, the President concurred with the
conclusion of the Tariff Commission majority.
1 Btjixetin of June 29, 1953, p. 919.
= Ibid., May 16, 19.55, p. 815.
^ Copies of the Tariff Commission's report may be olj-
tained from the U.S. Tariff Commission. Washington 25,
D.C.
653
l!
The advisability of requesting a new investiga-
tion under subsections (a) and (b) of section 22 is
currently under study in the Department of
Agriculture.
Increased Duty on Imports
of Canned Tuna in Brine
WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT
White House press release dated March 17
The President on March 16 issued a proclama-
tion providing that the duty on imports of tuna
canned in brine shall automatically increase from
121,^ percent to 25 percent ad valorem whenever
in any year such imports exceed 20 percent of
the previous year's U.S. pack of canned tuna of
all varieties.
The proclamation gives effect to an exchange of
notes with Iceland^ which withdraws tuna canned
in brine from the 1943 trade agreement with that
country and to an invocation of the right reserved
by the United States in the General Agreement
on Tariifs and Trade to increase the duty on tuna
canned in brine.
In any calendar year the increased duty would
apply only to those imports in excess of the stated
20 percent and only for the remainder of that year.
Imports in any year up to the 20 percent break-
point would be subject to the 121/4 percent ad
valorem rate. Because the President's proclama-
tion will become effective on April 14, 1956, it
provides that the increased rate of duty will apply
this year if and when imports of tuna canned in
brine after the April 14 date exceed 15 percent
of last year's domestic pack of canned tuna.
In the 1943 trade agreement with Iceland, the
United States reduced from 25 percent ad valorem
to 1214 percent ad valorem the duty on certain
miscellaneous canned fish, including such fish
canned in brine, dutiable under tariff paragraph
718 (b) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended.
This concession was intended primarily to cover
■certain speciality camied fish produced in Iceland.
When tuna canned in brine became an article of
international trade after the war, United States
imports of this product were classified as miscel-
^ Not printed.
«54
laneous canned fish under tariff paragraph 718 (b)
and subject to this reduced rate in the Icelandic
agreement. The withdrawal of this item from the
Icelandic agreement in no way affects the con-
cession granted on other fish specialties of primary
interest to Iceland.
In the 1955 trade agreement negotiations in-
volving Japan's accession to the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade, the United States
agreed not to increase the existing rate of 121^
percent ad valorem applying to imports of tuna
canned in brine, subject to the reservation of a
right to impose a higher rate of duty on imports
in any calendar year in excess of 20 percent of
the domestic pack of canned tuna during the pre-
ceding year. This reservation has now been in-
voked. Because annual imports of tuna canned
in brine are not at present amounting to 20 percent
of the domestic tuna pack, no immediate applica-
tion of the increased duty will follow upon the
President's action.
PROCLAMATION 3128 2
TERMINATING IN PART THE ICELANDIC TRADE
AGREEMENT PROCLAMATIONS AND SUPPLE-
MENTING PROCLAMATION NO. 3105 OP JULY 22,
19.55
1. Wherbias, under authority of section 350(a) of the
Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, the President on August
27, 1943, entered into a trade agreement with the Regent
of Iceland, including two schedules annexed thereto (5T
Stat. 107S), and by proclamation of September 30, 1943
(57 Stat. 1075), he proclaimed the said trade agreement,
which proclamation has been supplemented by proclama-
tion of October 22, 1943 (57 Stat. 1098) ;
2. Whereas item 718(b) of Schedule II of the said
trade agreement reads as follows :
United
States
Tariff Act
of 1930
paragraph
Description of Article
Rate of Duty
718 (b) Fish, prepared or preserved In any man-
ner, when packed In air-tight containers
weighing with their contents not more
than fifteen pounds each (except fish
packed in oil or In oil and other sub-
stances) :
Any of the foregoing (except herring, 12H% ad valorem |
smoked or kippered or In tomato
sauce, packed in immediate containers
weighing with their contents more
than one pound each, and except
salmon and anchovies)
' 21 Fed. Reg. 1793.
Department of State Bulletin ^
3. Whereas the Government of the United States and
the Government of Iceland by an exchange of notes dated
March 5 and 6, 1956, have agreed to the withdrawal,
effective April 14, 1956, of tuna from said item 718(b),
with the result that the said item shall thereafter read
as follows :
United
States
Tariff Act
of 1930
paragraph
Description of Article
Rate of Duty
718 (b) Fish, prepared or preserved in any man- 12H% ad valorem
ner, when packed In air-tight containers
weighing with their contents not more
than fifteen pounds each (except fish
packed in oU or in oil and other sub-
stances; except herring, smoked or kip-
pered or in tomato sauce, packed In im-
mediate containers weighing with their
contents more than one pound each;
and except salmon, anchovies, and tuna)
4. Whereas, under the authority of the said section
350(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, the President
on June 8, 1955, entered into a trade agreement providing
for the accession of Japan to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade," which trade agreement consists of
the Protocol of Terms of Accession of Japan to the Gen-
eral Agreement, including Schedule XX contained in An-
nex A thereto, and by Proclamation No. 3105 of July
22, 1955 (20 F. R. 5379),' he proclaimed the said trade
agreement, which proclamation was supplemented by a
notification of August 22, 1955 from the President to the
Secretary of the Treasury (20 F. R. 6211) ;'
5. Whereas item 718(b) in Part I of the said Schedule
XX reads as follows :
United
Tariff Act
of 1930
paragraph
Description of Article
Rate of Duty
718 (b) Fish, prepared or preserved in any man-
ner, when packed in ah-tlght containers
weighing with their contents not more
than 15 pounds each (except fish packed
in oil or in oil and other substances) :
Tuna 12H% ad val.
NOTE: The United States reserves
the right to increase the rate of duty
on fish of the foregoing description
which are entered In any calendar
year in excess of an aggregate quan-
tity equal to 20 per centum of the
United States pack of canned ttma
fish durmg the immediately pre-
ceding calendar year, as reported by
the United States Fish and Wildlife
Service.
6. Whereas on March 16, 1956 the Government of the
United States notified the Executive Secretary to the
CONTRACTING PARTIES to the General Agreement on
' BuLi-ETiN of June 27, 1955, p. 1053.
' Ibid., Aug. 8, 1955, p. 226.
" Ibid., Sept. 5, 1955, p. 397.
April 16, 1956
Tariffs and Trade that it invoked the reservation con-
tained in the note to the said item 718(b) set forth in the
fifth recital of this proclamation, effective April 14, 1956 ;
and
7. Whereas the first general note to the said Schedule
XX specified in the fourth recital of this proclamation
provides that the provisions of that schedule are subject
to the following general note to Schedule XX to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, of October 30,
1947 (61 Stat. (pt. 5) A1362) :
4. If any tariff quota provided for in this Schedule, other than
those provided for in items 771, becomes effective after the
beginning of a period specified as the quota year, the quantity
of the quota product entitled to enter under the quota during
the unexpired portion of the quota year shall be the annual
quota quantity less Me thereof for each full calendar month that
has expired in such period :
Now, therefore, I, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, Presi-
dent of the United of America, acting under and by virtue
of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the
statutes, including the said section 350 of the Tariff Act
of 1930, as amended, do proclaim as follows :
Part I
In accordance with the exchange of notes specified in
the third recital of this proclamation, I liereby terminate
in part the proclamations of September 30, 1943, and
October 22, 1943, referred to in the first recital of this proc-
lamation, insofar as such proclamations apply to tuna
provided for in the said item 718(b) set forth in the second
recital of this proclamation, such termination to be effec-
tive at the close of business on April 14, 1956, with the re-
sult that the rate of duty specified in the said item 718 (b)
BhaU thereafter apply only to the articles provided for in
the said item as set forth in the third recital of this
proclamation.
Part II
In accordance with the notification specified in the sixth
recital of this proclamation I hereby terminate in part,
effective at the close of business on April 14, 1956, the said
proclamation of July 22, 1955, and the said notification of
August 22, 1955, referred to in the fourth recital, insofar
as such proclamation and notification apply to tuna pro-
vided for in the said item 71S(b) set forth in the fifth
recital which are entered, or withdrawn from warehouse,
for consumption in the calendar year 1956 after April 14,
1956 in excess of an aggregate quantity equal to 15 per
centum of the United States pack of canned tuna during
the calendar year 1955, as reported by the United States
Fish and Wildlife Service, and in any calendar year after
1956 in excess of an aggregate quantity equal to 20 per
centum of the United States pack of canned tuna fish dur-
ing the immediately preceding calendar year, as so re-
ported, with the result that such tuna in excess of such 15
or 20 per centum of the United States pack shall be duti-
able at 25 per centum ad valorem, the full rate provided
for in paragraph 718(b) of the Tariff Act of 1930 (46 Stat,
(pt. 1) 633).
In witness whebeof, I have hereunto set my hand and
caused the Seal of the United States of America to he
affixed.
655
Do.NK at the City of Wasliiufrton this sixteenth day of
Mai-ch. ill tile year of our Lord nineteen hundred
[SEALj anil lifty-.six. and of the Independence of the
United States of Anicrira the one hundred and
eightieth.
By the President :
Herbert Hoover, Jr.
ActiiKj i<('cretiiry of State
U.S. Presents Atomic Energy Library
to the United Nations
STATEMENT BY HENRY CABOT LODGE, JR.
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE U.N.'
U.S./U.N. press release 2379 dated March 28
"Wlien speaking of atomic energy, we have be-
come accustomed to talking in terms of reactors
and megatons, kilograms of fissionable materials,
and millions of dollars for equipment and research.
Today we are talking only of books — but books
are the bedrock of scientific progress.
The library which the United States Govern-
ment has the honor of presenting to the United
Nations today contains 45 volumes of information
on basic research in atomic energy as well as many
thousands of articles and technical reports pub-
lislied in this country and abroad. There are also
many thousands of cards which index and de-
scribe all the nonclassified literature of the Atomic
Energy Commission. This library will be kept
up to date by the Atomic Energy Commission as
new material becomes available.
In a statement made on the floor of the General
Assembly on November 5, 1954,= I announced that
the United States was prepared to make available
to other countries the vast amount of documen-
tation on atomic energy that was already freely
published — totaling more than 200,000 pages of
information. I suggested that we would be able
to give 10 libraries containing these documents to
countries interested in using them.
' Made at U.N. Headquarters on Mar. 28 on the occasion
of the pte.sentation of an .\tomie Energy Lihrary to the
United Nations.
= Bi-LLETIN of Nov. 15, 19.^4, II. 742.
Since that time, not 10 but more than 40 coun-
tries have recpiested these libraries; 33 have al-
ready been presented, and the others are on their
way. Several more have been given to regional
and international organizations interested in
atomic energy development.
Our only request in return is that other co-
oj^erating nations send us their collections of of-
ficial nonseeret papers to be placed in appropriate
libraries in the United States.
The United States program of using the atom
for man's betterment rather than for his destruc-
tion has proceeded along two lines of action : mak-
ing facilities available and making information
available. As President Eisenhower has said, our
purpose is to spark the creative and inventive
skills, to put them to work for the betterment of
the conditions under which men must live. The
President has also stressed that this must be a
joint effort — "a continued partnership of the
world's best minds."
For these reasons, it is a pleasure for me today
to present to the United Nations Headquarters this
library, symbolized by this one volume, for the use
of the United Nations Secretariat and the dele-
gations of member countries. ■
DESCRIPTION OF LIBRARY
U.S./U.N. press release 2380 dated March 28
This is a technical library of nonclassified data
on nuclear energy and its applications. It is a
comprehensive collection containing the equiva-
lent of about 300 feet of library shelving and was
developed by the Technical Information Service
of the Atomic Energy Commission as one of the
several Commission projects supporting the Presi-
dent's atoms-for-peace program. In it is to be
found not only information unique to nuclear re-
actor technology and nuclear physics but also the
recorded impact of atomic energy in such fields
as chemistry, metallurgy, ceramics, electronics,
biology, medicine, and agriculture.
The library, which weighs approximately 1,000
pounds, consists of about 10,000 Atomic Energy
Commission research and development reports,
6,500 of which are on microcards; 34 bound vol-
umes of scientific and technical texts on nuclear
theory ; and 11 bound volumes of abstracts of some I
50,000 reports and articles published in this coun-
try and abroad. Also included are approximately
656
Department of State Bulletinl
55,000 index cards. The library will be kept cur-
rent and additional reports will be supplied as they
are issued.
The library is one of 44 that have been presented
or are in the process of being presented by the
United States under the atoms-for-peace program.
Previous recipients are:
Italy Netherlands The Council for Euro-
Spaiu New Zealand pean Nuclear Re-
Australia Portugal search (Switzerland)
Swedeu Peru Chile
Greece Soutli Africa Republic of China
Egypt Israel Dominican Republic
Burma Norway Haiti
Denmarli India Lebanon
Austria Argentina Pakistan
Philippines France Switzerland
Finland Japan Thailand
Turkey Brazil Uruguay
United Nations Library
(Geneva)
Other libraries are in transit to :
Ceylon
Guatemala
^'enezuela
Korea
Costa Rica
Iceland
Luxembourg
Iraq
U.S. Requests ECOSOC Study
of Economic Uses of Atom
lI.S./r.N. press release 2375 dated March 26
The United States on March 26 requested the
inclusion of a new item on the agenda of the 21st
Session of the Economic and Social Council re-
lating to "Studies on Atomic Energy as a Factor
in Economic Development."
Text of the note follows :
The Representative of the United States of America to
the United Nations presents hi.s compliments to the Sec-
retary General of the United Nations and has the honor
to propose, in accordance with Rule 13 of the Rules of
Procedure of the Economic and Social Council, inclusion
of the following topic as a sub-item to Item 5 (Economic
Development of Underdeveloped Countries) of the agenda
of the Twenty-first Session of the Council : Studies on
Atomic Encrgii as <i Factor in Economic Development.
The United States is proposing this item, as a matter
of urgency, with a view to having prepared for submission
to the Council at an early session an analysis and evalua-
tion of reports and materials available concerning the
possible uses of atomic energy for purposes of eco-
nomic development, particularly of the underdeveloix'd
countries.
The United States will in due course submit a draft
resolution on this matter for consideration of the Council.
Dr. John C. Baker, the United States Eepre-
5entative to the Economic and Social Council, ex-
plained the purpose of this proposal in the follow-
ing statement :
"A number of public, private, national, and
international agencies and organizations are inter-
ested in the applications of atomic energy to eco-
nomic development. It would be a help to realistic
economic planning by private and public bodies
if information on the economic aspects of this
new and cliallenging subject could be coordinated
and brought into one place.
"The United States believes that the Economic
and Social Council at this stage is the appropriate
organ for taking stock of the many reports and
studies which are being made on the potentialities
of atomic energy for economic development. The
United States Government, therefore, has re-
quested that the above item be placed on the pro-
visional agenda of the 21st Session of Ecosoc."
U.S. Delegations to
International Conferences
Inter-American Travel Congress
The Department of State announced on April
6 (press release 174) that the U.S. Government
will be represented at the Sixth Inter- American
Travel Congress, which will meet at San Jose,
Costa Eica, April 12-22, 1956, by a delegation
composed of the following representatives of U.S.
Government agencies and of private groups con-
cerned with travel matters :
Chairman
Henry H. Kelly, Special Assistant on International Travel,
Bureau of Foreign Commerce, Department of Com-
merce
Vice Chairman
Charles P. Nolan, OflScer in Charge, Transportation and
Communications, OflRce of Regional American Affairs,
Department of State
Members
Malcolm Hope, Chief, General Engineering Program, Divi-
sion of Sanitary Engineering Services, U.S. Public
Health Service
Godfrey Macdonald. Vice President, Grace Lines, Inc.,
for the American Merchant Marine Institute, Inc.^
New York, N.T.
William P. McGrath. Executive Vice President, American
Society of Travel Agents, New York, N.Y.
Parks B. Pedrick, Vice President. Mississippi Shipping
Co., for the American Merchant Marine Institute, Inc.,
New York, N.Y.
April ?6, 7956
657
Norman J. Pliilion, Colonial Airlines, for the Air Trans-
port Association of America, New York, N.X.
Russell E. Singer, Executive Vice President, American
Automobile Association, Washington, D.C.
Kuud Stowman, Special Consultant, Division of Sanitary
Engineering Services, Bureau of State Services, U.S.
Public Health Service
The Sixth Congress will consider reports of its
technical committees on (1) research and organi-
zation, (2) removal of travel barriers, (3) travel
plant (i. e. hotels), and (4) tourist-travel promo-
tion.
Current Treaty Actions
MULTILATERAL
Automotive Traffic
Convention concerning customs facilities for touring.
Done at New York .Tune 4, 1954.'
Ratification deposited: Austria, March 30, 1956.
Customs convention on temporary importation of private
road vehicles. Done at New York June 4, 1954.'
Ratification deposited: Austria, March 30, 1956.
Slave Trade
Protocol amending the slavery convention signed at
Geneva September 25, 1926 (46 Stat. 21S3), and annex.
Done at New York December 7, 1953. Entered into
force for the United States March 7, 1956.
Signature: Burma, March 14, 1956.
Telecommunications
International telecommunication convention. Signed at
Buenos Aires December 22, 1952. Entered into force
January 1, 1954. TIAS 3266.
Ratifications deposited: Byelorussian Soviet Socialist
Republic, February 21, 1956; Jordan, February 23,
1956.
Notification by Federal Republic of Germany of exten-
sion to: Land Berlin (efCective date to be the same
as that for the Federal Republic, i. e. July 26, 1955).
Trade and Commerce
Fourth protocol of rectifications and modifications to an-
nexes and texts of schedules to the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva, March 7, 1955.'
Siynature: Dominican Republic, March 6, 1956.
Protocol of organizational amendments to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva
March 10, 1955.'
Signature: Australia, March 2, 1956.
Protocol amending part I and articles XXIX and XXX of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at
Geneva March 10, 1955.'
Signature: Australia, March 2, 1956.
Protocol amending preamble and parts II and III of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at
Geneva March 10, 1955.'
Signature: Australia, March 2, 1956.
War Criminals
Penal administrative agreement. Concluded at Bonn and
deemed to have entered into force May 5, 1955.
Signatures: France, September 29, 1955; Federal Re-
public of Germany, November 1, 1955 ; United States,
December 20, 1955 ; United Kingdom, December 22,
1955.
BILATERAL
Austria
Agreement outlining the procedure for financing the de-
livery of nitrogenous fertilizer to Spain pursuant to the
agricultural commodities agreement of February 7, 1956
( TIAS .3505 ) . Effected by exchange of letters at Vienna
March 5 and 6, 1956. Entered into force March 6, 1956.
Finland
Agreement supplementing the surplus agricultural com-
modities agreement of May 6, 1955 (TIAS 3248) by pro-
viding for the purchase of additional commodities, and
exchange of notes. Signed at Helsinki March 26, 1956.
Entered into force March 26, 1956.
Agreement amending articles II and III of the surplus
agricultural commodities agreement of May 6, 1955
(TIAS 3248). Effected by exchange of notes at Hel-
sinki March 26, 1956. Entered into force March 26, 1956.
Netherlands
Agreement extending the agreement of April 11, 1947
(TIAS 1777) relating to American war graves in the
Netherlands. Effected by exchange of notes at The
Hague January 14 and August 29, 1955, and March 9,
1956. Enters into force on the date of receipt by the
United States of notification of constitutional approval
by the Netherlands.
Spain
Parcel iwst agreement. Signed at Madrid July 16 and at
Washington August 30, 1955. Ratified and approved by
the President September 23, 1955.
Entered into force: January 1, 1956 (the date "mutually
settled between the Adminisrations of the two coun-
tries").
THE DEPARTMENT
Resignations
On March 21 President Eisenhower accepted the resig-
nation of Christian A. Herter, Jr., as General Counsel of
the International Cooperation Administration. The ef-
fective date of the resignation was March 19. For the
texts of Mr. Herter's letter of resignation and the Presi-
dent's reply, see White House press release dated March 21.
FOREIGN SERVICE
' Not in force.
658
Confirmations
The Senate on March 28 confirmed Dempster Mcintosh
to be Ambassador to Venezuela.
The Senate on March 28 confirmed Sheldon T. MiUs to
be Ambassador to Afghanistan.
The Senate on March 28 confirmed Jefferson Patterson
to be Ambassador to Uruguay.
Depart/nenf of State Bulletin
April 16, 1956 Index
Afghanistsn. Mills confirmed as Ambassador .... 658
Agriculture. Question of Amending Proclamation Limit-
ing Dairy Imports 653
American Republics. Inter-American Travel Congress . 657
Atomic Energy
U..S. Presents Atomic Energ.v Library to United Nations
(Lodge) ■ 656
U..S. Requests ECOSOC Study o( Economic Uses of Atom . 657
CRiiadB. Bxchango of Messages Following White Sulphur
Springs Meeting (Eisenhower, St. Laurent, Ruiz Cor-
tintt.) 636
Economic Affairs
Increased Duty on Imports of Canned Tuna in Brine (text
of proclamation) 654
Inter-American Travel Congress 657
Negotiati'US Concerning Debts of City of Berlin . . . 651
U.S., Netherlands Begin Negotiation of Air Transport
Agreement 650
Educational Exchange. NATO Fellowship Awarded to
American Woman 649
Europe. Crusade for Freedom (Eisenhower) 636
Foreign Service
Confirmations (Mcintosh, Mills, Patterson) 658
Foreign Service Institute Advisory Committee .... 651
France. Visit of French Foreign Minister (Dulles) . . 638
Germany. Negotiations Concerning Debts of City of Ber-
lin 651
Iceland
Increased Duty on Imports of Canned Tuna in Brine (text
of proclamation) 654
Transcript uf Secretary Dulles' News Conference . . . 638
Indonesia. Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Confer-
ence 638
International Information
Crusade for Freedom (Eisenhower) 636
•The Message of America (Eisenhower) 633
International Organizations and Meetings
Delegation to Baghdad Pact Council Meeting .... 637
Inter-American Travel Congress 657
Japan. Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference . 638
Liberia. Letters of Credence (Padmore) 637
Mexico. Exchange of Messages Following White Sulphur
Springs Meeting (Eisenhower, St. Laurent, Ruiz Cor-
tines) 636
Near East
Delegation to Baghdad Pact Council Meeting .... 637
Security Council Agrees Unanimously on U.S. Proposal
To Send Secretary -General Hammarskjoid to Middle
East (Lodge, text of resolution) 627
Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference . . . 638
Netherlands
Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference . . . 638
U.S., Netherlands Begin Negotiation of Air Transport
Agreement 650
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
The Fnundation.s of the North Atlantic Treaty Organ-
ization (Murphy) 644
NATO Fellowship Awarded to American Woman . . . 649
Presidential Documents
Crusade for Freedom 636
Exchange of Messages Following White Sulphur Springs
Meeting 636
Increased Duty on Imports of Canned Tuna iii Brine '. '. 654
The Message of America 633
Transfer of Escapee Program to Department of State . . 651
Refugees and Displaced Persons. Transfer of Escapee Pro-
gram to Department of State (text of Executive order) . 650
Vol. XXXIV, No. 877
Spain. Visit of Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs . . 633
State, Department of
Resignation (Herter) 658
Transfer of Escapee Program to Department of State
(text of Executive order) 650
Treaty Information. Current Actions 658
U.S.S.R.
Significance of New Soviet Line Concerning Stalin Era
(Dulles) 637
Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference . . . 638
United Nations
Security Council Agrees Unanimously on U.S. Proposal
To Send Secretary-General Hammarskjoid to Middle
East (Lodge, text of rescihition ) 627
U.S. Presents Atomic Energy Library to the United
Nations (Lodge) 656
U.S. Requests ECOSOC Study of Economic Uses of Atom . 657
Uruguay. Patterson confirmed as Ambassador .... 658
Venezuela. Mcintosh confirmed as Ambassador .... 658
Name Index
Baker, John C 657
Ball, M. Margaret 649
Dulles, Secretary 637, 638
Eisenhower, President 633, 636, 651, 654
Henderson, Loy 637
Herter, Christian A., Jr 658
Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr 627, 656
Martin Artajo, Alberto 633
Mcintosh, Dempster 658
Mills, Sheldon T 658
Murphy, Robert 644
Padmore, George Arthur 637
Patterson, Jefferson 658
Ruiz Cortines, .\dolfo 637
St. Laurent, Louis 636
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: April 2-8
Releases
may be obtained from the News Division,
Departmeut of State, Washington 25, D.C. |
No.
Date
Subject
16S
4/2
Murphy : Nato symiMsium at Norfolk.
169
4/3
External debts of Berlin.
170
4/3
Dulles : visit of Foreign Minister Pineau.
171
4/3
Dulles : Soviet repudiation of Stalin.
172
V3
Dulles : news conference transcript.
173
4/4
American winner of Nato fellowship
(rewrite).
174
4/5
Delegation to Inter-American Travel
Congress (rewrite).
175
4/5
Visit of Spanisli Foreign Minister
(rewrite).
176
4/5
U.S.-Netherlands aviation talks.
177
4/6
Advisory Committee to Foreign Service
Institute.
tl78
4/6
Phleger : New York Bar Association.
*17!>
4/6
Japan credentials.
ISO
■V6
Delegation to Baghdad Pact Council
meeting.
INI
4/7
Liberia credentials (rewrite).
nted.
* Not pri
t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, t95E
{
United States
Government Printing Office
DIVISION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS
Washington 25, D. C.
PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE TO AVOID
PAYMENT OP POSTAOE. f30O
(GPOl
OFFICIAL BUSINESS
A recent release in the popular Background series
Thailand
the
Department
of
State
Thailand is a predominantly agricultural country of small
rural communities and relatively few cities and large towns.
The agricultural economy is based almost entirely on small-
scale, peasant-type family operations, with a majority of the
farm operators holding title to their land.
Long known to the world as Siam, this southeastern country
of magnificent scenery, of great fertility, and of a largely
homogeneous poj)ulation has never been a colony, even though
in the past her neighbors on every side have fallen under
foreign rule.
Today, true to its historical tradition, Thailand is determined
to resist all Communist imperialist efforts to infiltrate and
subvert it, and to impose upon it the new colonialism of world
communism.
This 15-page illustrated pamphlet tells about the land, the
people, and the industries of this nation that is a little smaller
than Texas with a population of approximately 20 million, and
discusses briefly the role of Thailand in world affairs.
Copies of this publication may be purchased from the
Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing
Office, Washington 25, D. C.
Publication 6296
10 cents
Order Form
To: Supt. of Documents
Govt. Printing Office
Washington 25, D.C.
Please send me copies of Thailand.
Enclosed And:
(eash, check, or
money order).
Name:
Street Address:
City, Zone, and State :
DEPOSITORY
^Ae/ ^eAcf/i^lme/yit/ m/ tnwte/
Vol. XXXIV, No. 878
AprU 23, 1956
FIFTY YEARS OF PROGRESS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW • by Herman Phleger, Legal Adviser 663
A REPORT ON GERMANY • by Ambassador James B.
Conant 669
THE MUTUAL SECURITY PROGRAM FOR EUROPE •
Statement by C. Burke Elbrick 674
THE INTER-AMERICAN PARTNERSHIP • by Milton S.
Eisenhower 682
For index see inside bach cover
Boston Public Library
SuperintcndoTit of Documents
MAY 2 2 1956
rjne z/^e/vci'yl^e'nt €£ C/tcil^e
■•tmO'
bulletin
Vol. XXXIV, No. 878 • Publication 6326
April 23, 1956
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington 25, D.C.
Price:
52 Issues, domestic $7.50, foreign $10.25
Single copy, 20 cents
The printing of this publication has been
approved by the Director of the Bureau of
the Budget (January 19, 1955).
Note: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and items contained herein may
be reprinted. Citation of the Department
OF State Bulletin as the source will be
appreciated.
The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the
Public Services Division, provides the
public and interested agencies of
the Government with information on
developments in the field of foreign
relations and on the work of the
Department of State and the Foreign
Service. The BULLETIN includes se-
lected press releases on foreign policy,
issued by the White House and the
Department, and statements and ad-
dresses made by the President and by
the Secretary of State and other offi-
cers of the Department, as well as
special articles on varioits phases of
internatioruil affairs and the func-
tions of the Department. Informa-
tion is included concerning treaties
and international agreements to
which the United States is or may
become a party and treaties of gen-
eral international interest.
Publications of the Department,
United Nations documents, and legis-
lative material in the field of inter-
national relations are listed currently.
Fifty Years of Progress in International Law
hy Herman Phleger
Legal Adviser ^
There is a special significance in this regional
meeting of the American Society of International
Law. It was in this city, and at the New York
Bar Association, that the Society was organized
on January 12, 1906.
This is therefore the 50th anniversary of the
founding of tlie Society.
Birthdays are not only times for celebration;
they are also times for appraisal.
In this case the appraisal might be of two kinds :
one as to how well the Society has achieved the
objectives of its founding; the other as to what
progress has been made in the field of interna-
tional law during the life of the Society.
I know we will all agree that the Society is to
be congratulated on its achievements during its
first 50 years. Having in mind the aphorism that
the first 50 years are the hardest, I know that
the Society can confidently look forward to an
ever-increasing contribution in its chosen fields.
Progress in International Law
What has been the progress of international law
during the past 50 years ? My comment must be
brief and general.
I recall some years ago hearing Sir Norman
Birkett observe that in an early edition of Anson
on Contracts the illustration given of contracts
Void because of impossibility of performance was
"as though one were to midertake to fly the
! Atlantic."
' Address made before the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York at a regional meeting celebrating the
50th anniversary of the American Society of International
j Law at New Toik, N.Y., on Apr. 9 ( press release 178
dated Apr. 6).
I have myself seen in a 1919 edition of Anson
the illustration given thus :
SupiMse the defendant had promised to pay 100 pounds,
but only on condition that X shall reach the moon. Here
the act to be performed by the defendant is quite possible,
but the act to be performed by X is not. Here no duty
or liability is created.
By the passage of a short span, of years the
impossible has become possible.
A promise to reach the moon replacing an un-
dertaking to fly the Atlantic, as; an example of
a promise impossible to perform, will no doubt
in turn give way to a new example.
This progression does not represent progress
in law but progress in science; Thoi legal prin-
ciple has remained the same. Only the appli-
cation of the principle has changed with the
changing times.
But there are legal pi-inciples which do change,
and the last 50 years have witnessed a funda-
mental change in one principle of international
law that affects us all.
Fifty years ago war was accepted as a legitimate
instrument of national policy. Learned writers
asserted its legality. Collective efforts were
largely devoted to ameliorating the harsh condi-
tions of war — agreeing on the rules of the game,
so to speak. The Hague Conventions and the later
Geneva Conventions regidating the treatment of
prisoners of war represented efforts to make war
endurable, since its abolition seemed impossible.
But two world wars and the harnessing of
nuclear energy have progressively convinced the
world of the necessity for providing an effective
means of preventing aggressive war. The at-
tempt to reach this objective has resulted in the
establishing of a new principle of international
Apn\ 23, 1956
663
law and the taking of steps to implement that
principle.
The new legal principle is that aggressive war
is illegal. The implementation has taken various
forms : (lie League of Nations, the United Nations,
and tribunals to apply and administer interna-
tional law, to name the more obvious.
Aggressive War Becomes Illegal
The experience of World War I resulted in the
League of Nations and its principle of collective
security with its objective "to promote interna-
tional cooperation and to achieve international
peace and security." It was intended to replace
the system of the balance of power by a system of
collective responsibility for the future peace.
In the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 the parties
condemned recourse to war and renounced it as an
instrument of national policy. They agreed not
to seek to settle conflicts by any but pacific means.
Sixty-five nations have ratified this treaty, and it
is in force today.
From the standpoint of international law this
treaty was a revolutionary development. At face
value it was the agreement of the world commu-
nity that aggressive war would be a breach of
solemn treaty obligations.
Yet 10 years later World War II was under way.
I cannot refrain from quoting the following
from Senator [George "Wliarton] Pepper's admir-
able autobiography. He wrote, speaking of the
spring of 1928 :
During our brief sojourn in Paris, tlie Kellogg-Briand
Pact was signed at the French Foreign Office in an atmos-
phere of optimism. Mrs. Pepper and I were guests at the
Embassy at a brilliant dinner given by Ambassador Her-
riek to Ambassador Kellogg. My incurable lack of faith
in international promises made me less enthusiastic than
the rest of the company. They felt, or pretended to feel,
that war had at last received its death warrant.
Then came the Second World War and — from
its ashes — the United Nations. By its charter its
members agree to settle their international dis-
putes by peaceful means and to refrain from the
threat or use of force against the territorial in-
tegrity or political independence of any state.
I think it can be fairly said that the charter
confirmed the fact that the principle accepted in
1900 that war was a legitimate instrument of na-
tional policy had been replaced by the principle
that aggressive war is illegal under international
law.
This was a fundamental change in international
law, and it has taken place during the 50-year
existence of this Society.
But those years have witnessed more than a
fundamental change in a principle of interna-
tional law. They have also witnessed persistent
attempts to provide the means of carrying that
principle into effect.
These attempts have taken, in general, two
forms. One, to provide a system of collective
security with sanctions against an aggressor. The A
other consisted of an attempt to provide a system i*
of international tribunals available for the ad-
judication and settlement of disputes between
states.
In addition international tribunals were estab-
lished for the trial of war criminals. I refer to
the Nuremberg tribunal established in 1945 by
the agreement of 23 nations and to the interna-
tional tribunal for the trial of Japanese war
criminals.
Modern developments in warfare and the atom
bomb have made clear how ineffective as a deter-
rent to war is the postwar pmiishment of individ-
uals. Indeed, if we were to have another world
war, there would be few left to act as judges,
even if there were enough vanquished still alive
to stand in the dock.
This emphasizes the necessity of settling differ-
ences peacefully when they arise, so they will not
develop into controversies which nations believe
can only be honorably settled by war, and the
necessity of having machinery to settle such
disputes.
Adjudication of International Disputes
But machinery is not enough, just as treaties
renouncing war were not enough. If we are to
settle international disputes by peaceful means,
we must not only have the machinery to settle
them, but states must use this machinery.
That there now exist fully adequate and avail-
able means for settlement of disputes by these
means is obvious.
For a half century we have had the Permanent
Court of Arbitration at The Hague.
The United Nations Charter, in chapter VI,
offers an array of remedies, through the Security
Council and the General Assembly, for states in-
volved in disputes or situations whose continuance
is likely to endanger international peace.
664
Department of State Bulletin
Commencing in 1921 with the Permanent Court
of International Justice, succeeded in 1945 by the
International Court of Justice, a court has been
available for the adjudication of disputes be-
tween states. Some 33 states, including the United
States, have now accepted the compulsory juris-
diction of that Court.
In addition, there has been available tradi-
tional ad hoc arbitration which has served so well
over the years to resolve disputes between nations.
Reluctance of States To Adjudicate Disputes
With this weaUh of machinery for the settle-
ment of international disputes, I would like to re-
port that their utilization is customary and a
matter of course. But the contrary appears to be
the case. There seems to be a natural reluctance
on the part of foreign offices to submit differences
to judicial examination and adjudication, or to
arbitration.
In 1937 John Bassett Moore wrote :
In spite of all suppositions and postprandial boasts
to the contrary, it is a fact that nations have not during
the past half century shown an increasing disposition to
submit to judicial determination disputes involving what
they conceive to be their important interests.
Today, almost 20 years later, the same observa-
tion could be made with equal truth. In the past
2 years the United States has filed four applica-
tions with the Recorder of the International Court
of Justice, one against Hungary,^ one against
Czechoslovakia,^ and two against Soviet Russia,*
arising out of the shooting down of planes. In
each instance the respondent government has re-
fused to submit to the jurisdiction of the Court.^
In another instance, where the United States
proposed resort to the Court, it was met with the
suggestion that friends should not litigate their
differences but should compose them. A sound
philosophy, but there has been no composition and
none seems likely.
I would suggest that if we wish to establish
the rule of law we mi;st not only have the law,
which we do have, but we must also establish the
habit and custom of being willing to be bound
by it according to the judgment of an independent
tribunal. What good does it do to say we agree
" Bulletin of Mar. 22, 1954, p. 449.
'lUi., Apr. IS, 19.55, p. 648.
V6t(f., Mar. 22, 1954, p. 449, and July 11, 1955, p. 65.
'/6!(?., July 26, 1954, p. 130, and Mar. 26, 1956, p. 513.
with the law and then refuse to submit our dif-
ferences to impartial adjudication of the facts
and the agreed law ?
Much has been done in this field, but much more
could be and must be done if the adjudication
of international disputes is to make a significant
contribution to our goal of international peace
and the rule of law.
U.S.-U.K. Record of Submissions
Our guest of this evening [Sir Lionel Fred-
erick Heald, M. P., former Attorney-General
of the United Kingdom] comes from a nation
that has a long and distinguished record of sub-
mission to arbitration and adjudication in the
international field.
The arbitration of the Alabama Claims in 1872
is a landmark in this field. It was followed by
the arbitration of the Venezuela dispute in 1904
and then by the North Atlantic Fisheries Arbitra-
tion in 1910.
The docket of the International Court of Jus-
tice records that the United Kingdom has been
a party to more proceedings there than any other
state. It has had 13 contentious cases before the
present Court and its predecessor. It has par-
ticipated in 12 of the advisory-opinion proceed-
ings before these two Courts. It has had 7 cases
before tribimals of the Permanent Court of
Arbitration.
I might at the same time note that the United
States has been a party to 6 contentious proceed-
ings before the present World Court, has par-
ticipated in all 10 of the advisory-opinion pro-
ceedings there, and has had 6 cases before tri-
bimals of the Permanent Court of Arbitration.
That the United States and the United King-
dom have been disposed to engage in a relatively
sizable volume of international litigation does
not mean that our two countries are contentious
by nature. It is simply indicative of a belief that
differences should be dealt with on their merits.
Wliere differences on legal questions have resisted
settlement by discussion, we have preferred to
have them decided by impartial arbiters.
This has not been the practice in the conduct
of foreign affairs by many governments. Un-
settled disputes have not been referred to an in-
ternational tribmial for decision and have been
allowed to trouble the relations of the parties for
an indefinite length of time. The rule of law
hpxW 23, ?956
665
will not be established so loiif^ as governments
insist on "waginif their law" through economic,
political, and other pressures, and are unwilling
to submit to impartial adjudication.
I believe it can be fairly said that relations be-
tween our country and the United Kingdom have
long been conducted on the basis of law and justice.
This happy tradition has certa,inly been favored
by the ties of history and language, by the heritage
of our legal system, and by a common disposition
to view situations on their merits and find prac-
tical solutions to difficulties. Our two countries
have been associated for common ends in war and
in peace. Today they are working together in
many arsas to preserve peace and advance the
realization of human values.
Problems of the Future
We cannot honestly be satisfied that the United
Nations system as it operates today creates a
■working regime of law throughout the world. But
the present organization of the international com-
munity must, of course, be appraised as a stage in
development and not as a final condition to be ac-
cepted or rejected.
Tlie problem of keeping international peace is
ciirrently being approached from the direction of
control over armaments and control over national
military cnpabilities in such a way that no nation
will feel it desirable to embark on aggressive
adventures.
The task of raising worldwide levels of eco-
nomic development and standards of living is be-
ing pursued today in various cooperative interna-
tional enterprises, soon to be increased by the addi-
tion of a ne-w one — the International Atomic
Energy Agency.
As we look ahead, the next 50 years promise no
diminution of difficult problems to cope witli.
Doubtless some that most concern us now will have
disappeared or receded in importance by the end of
another half century. New problems are likely to
come to the forefront. The achievements of
science and technology constantly demand a re-
doubling of effort in politics and law to avoid a
fatal lagging behind. There can already be dis-
cerned future problems in means of subsistence for
the earth's growing population and in the develop-
ment of exploration and travel beyond presently
known terrestrial limita
The world will have increasing need for wider
666
understanding of international relationships and
for intelligent designs to promote general well-
being. This Society and its coimterparts the
world over will not want for ample opportunities
of useful employment. ^
Conversations With Spanish Minister
of Foreign Affairs
Following are the texts of statements made at
Washington on the arrival of Alberto Martin
Artujo, the Spanish Minister of Foreign Afiairs,
on April 9 and of a communique issued on April
12 at the coneliision of his talks with Secretary
Dulles.
WELCOME AT NATIONAL AIRPORT
Press release 185 dated AprU 9
statement by Secretary Dulles
Mr. Minister, it is indeed a very great pleasure
to welcome you here with your wife and the
other members of your party. The last time that
I saw you was in Madrid about 6 months ago
[November 1, 1955], and I shall never forget the
great cordiality of the welcome which I received
there from the Head of your State, General
Franco, and from yourself and the other Ministers
and from the people of Madrid, who made known
their cordial reception of me.
I asked then that you should, if possible, come
to visit us, and I am delighted indeed that that
hope of mine has now come to pass. I think that
perhaps my visit to Madrid did a little something
to evidence the esteem in which the American
people hold the great nation of Spain. I believe
that your visit here, Mr. Minister, you, your wife
and daughter, and the other members of your
party, will enable us still further to build the type
of friendship and good relations wliich now exist
so happily between our two countries.
We welcome you here and we are glad you will
see something of our country. And we are con-
fident that out of this trip will come further good
will between us.
Response by Spanish Foreign Minister
The last time I was in America was when I was
a young man and I came to visit Wasliington and
Deparimenf of State Bulletin
New York with the International Congress of
Students.
Today I come to return the yisit to Madrid of
Secretary of State Dulles, who has proven how
much can be accomplished when diplomats sit
down face to face and talk plainly.
Friendship between the American and Spanish
peoples increases as personal knowledge increases,
and that is one of the reasons why I have come
to you.
I think this friendship between Spain and
America is important. As you know, we signed
agreements in the fall of 1953. I would like to
examine with members of your Govermnent their
application so far, and also to discuss various
aspects of world problems which affect our two
nations.
And now, to work!
TEXT OF JOINT COMMUNIQUE
Press release 193 dated April 12
During the official visit to Washington of Seiior
Don Alberto Martin Artajo, the Foreign Minister
of Spain, conversations were held between him and
the Secretary of State, Mr. John Foster Dulles,
and other officials of the United States Govern-
ment. These talks were on matters of specific
mutual interest to both countries as well as on
questions of general interest to their respective
foreign policies, including the situation in the
Near East.
The conversations, which were conducted in an
atmosphere of imderstanding and cordiality, have
rendered a valuable contribution to the strength-
ening of the ties of friendship and cooperation
that hapi^ily already exist between the two coun-
tries. Among other topics, the Foreign Minister
and the Secretary of State reviewed the results of
the mutual defense and economic aid agreements
signed between Spain and the United States on
September 26, 1953. They noted with satisfaction
the progress made in implementing these agree-
ments, which constitute a significant contribution
to western security. The Minister also reviewed
for the Secretary's information the recent negotia-
tions in Madrid between the Spanish Government
and that of the Sultan of Morocco. The Secre-
tary of State expressed his satisfaction with Span-
ish recognition of the unity and independence of
Morocco.
Spanish-Moroccan Declaration
Press release 186 dated April 10
Department Announcement
On April 7, 1956, the Foreign Minister of Spain
and the Prime Minister of Morocco signed a joint
declaration which recognized the independence
and unity of Morocco and defined the basis for
future relations between the two countries.
The U.S. Goverimient has instructed its repre-
sentatives in Spain and Morocco to express our
sincere congratulations for the success of the re-
cent negotiations and our hope for an era of
fruitful collaboration between the two nations.
Message to Acting Foreign Minister of Spain'
My Government desires to express its congratu-
lations to your Government on the occasion of the
signing April 7 of a joint declaration which recog-
nizes the independence and the unity of Morocco.
It is gratifying to pay tribute to the realism and
statesmanship which has made possible a new era
of collaboration between the two nations.
Message to Sultan of Morocco^
I have been instructed to convey to His Majesty
the Sultan, to the members of his Government
and to the Moroccan people my Government's
congratulations on the successful conclusion of
negotiations with the Spanish Government and to
express the hope for an era of fruitful collabo-
ration between the two nations.
Text of Declaration'
[Unofficial translation]
The Spanish Government and His Imperial Majesty
Mohammed V, Sultan of Morocco, in the desire of estab-
lishing an especially friendly relationship, on a basis of
reciprocity ; of strengthening their relations of secular
friendship and of consolidating peace in the area in
which their respective countries are located, have agreed
to make public the following declaration :
1. The Spanish Government and His Imperial Majesty
Mohammed V, Sultan of Morocco, considering that the
' Delivered by the American Charge d' Affaires at Madrid
on Apr. 10.
- Transmitted to His Cheriflan Majesty Mohammed V
on Apr. 10 in the name of the U.S. diplomatic agent in
Morocco.
° Signed at Madrid on Apr. 7 by Foreign Minister Alberto
Martin Artajo of Spain and Premier Embarek Bekkai of
Morocco.
Apr;; 23, 1956
667
regime established in Morocco in 1912 does not correspond
to present reality, declare that the agreement signed in
Madrid on November 27, 1912, cannot determine Hispano-
Moroccan relations in the future.
2. In consequence, the Spanish Government recognizes
the independence of Morocco, proclaimed by His Im-
perial Majesty Sultan Mohammed V, and its full sov-
ereignty, together with all the attributes of the same,
Including its own diplomatic service and army ; reiterates
its wish to respect the territorial unity of the Empire,
which is guaranteed by international treaties ; and under-
takes to take the necessary measures to effectuate it.
Moreover, the Spanish Government undertakes to lend
to His Imperial Majesty the Sultan the aid and assistance
which will be determined as necessary by common agree-
ment, especially with regard to foreign relations and to
defense.
3. The negotiations entered upon in Madrid between
the Spanish Government and His Imperial Majesty Mo-
hammed V have as their objective the conclusion of new
agreements between two sovereign and equal parties,
with the purposes of defining their free cooperation in
the field of their common interests. These agreements
will also guarantee, in keeping with the above-mentioned
particularly friendly spirit, the freedoms and rights of
the Spaniards residing in Morocco and of the Moroccans
residing in Spain, in the private, economic, cultural and
social domains, on a basis of reciprocity and of respect
for their respective sovereignties.
4. The Spanish Government and His Imperial Majesty
the Sultan agree that, until the above-mentioned agree-
ments come into effect, relations between Spain and
Morocco will be determined by the additional protocol to
the present declaration.
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL
1. The legislative power is exercised in sovereign man-
ner by His Majesty the Sultan. The representative of
Spain in Rabat will be advised of all proposed daliirs and
decrees which affect Spanish interests and may make
appropriate observations.
2. The powers exercised up to now by the Spanish
authorities in Morocco will be transferred to the Moroc-
can Government, in accordance with the modalities which
are fixed by common agreement. The prerogatives of
Spanish officials in Morocco will be preserved.
3. The Spanish Government will lend its assistance to
the Moroccan Government toward the organization of its
own army. The present status of the Spanish Army in
Morocco will be preserved during the period of transition.
4. The present status of the peseta will not be altered
until the conclusion of a new agreement on this matter.
5. As of the time of the present declaration, visas and
all administrative formalities required up to now for
the travel of persons from one zone to the other will
be eliminated.
6. The Spanish Government will continue to assume the
protection abroad of the interests of Moroccans native to
the zone formerly defined by the agreement of November
27, 1912, and residing abroad, until such time as the
Government of His Majesty the Sultan assimies this
responsibility.
U.S. Policy in Middle East
Statement hy Jatnes C. Hagerty
Press Secretary to the President
White House Office (Augusta, Ga.) press release dated April 9
Before leaving the White House, the President
met with the Secretary of State for a discussion of
repeated incidents of liostility in the Middle East.
The President and the Secretary of State regard
the situation with the utmost seriousness.
In their discussions concerning the area, they
are guided by fundamental principles of United
States foreign policy which are designed to pro-
mote and strengthen world peace. Therefore :
1. The United States will support in fullest
measure the mission of the Secretary-General of
the United Nations to the area pursuant to the
unanimous action of the Security Council,^ the
body on which all the members of the United Na-
tions liave conferred primary responsibility for
the maintenance of international peace and secur-
ity. The United States trusts that all United
Nations member countries, including particularly
the states directly involved, will similarly support
that mission of peace.
2. The United States, in accordance with its
responsibilities mider the charter of the United
Nations, will observe its commitments within con-
stitutional means to oppose any aggression in the
area.
3. Tlie United States is likewise determined to
support and assist any nation which might be sub-
jected to such aggression. The United States is
confident that other nations will act similarly in
the cause of peace.
NATO Atomic Information Agreement
Enters Into Force
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization an-
nounced at Paris on April 10 that the Nato Agree-
ment for Cooperation Regarding Atomic Inform-
ation went into force on March 29, 1956, with the
completion of notifications by all Nato govern-
ments that they were bound by the ternis of the
agreement. The agreement, signed at Paris on
June 22, 1955, by representatives of the Nato
nations, provides that the United States and other
Nato members may make various categories of
atomic information available to the organization.
' Bulletin of Apr. 16, 1956, p. 627.
668
Department of State Bulletin
A Report on Germany
hy James B. Conant
Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany ^
The title of my remarks is "A Eeport on Ger-
many." That may sound as if I proposed to de-
liver a lecture on the history of the nation to which
I am accredited as Ambassador of the United
States ; and since college presidents are not noted
for the brevity of their remarks you may conclude
you are in for at least an hour's session. But have
no fear. "Wliat I have to say can be said in less
than 30 minutes for I propose to consider primar-
ily the present situation and the problems which
we and the German people face together. To this
audience, so well informed on world affairs, it is
unnecessary to describe in detail the developments
of the last 10 years which have resulted in the Ger-
many of today.
I have said, the Germany of today. Yet it would
have been more accurate to say, the three Ger-
manys of today. For there is first of all the
Federal Republic of Germany, a sovereign nation
of 50 million, with which we are allied as members
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; the
territory of this Federal Republic comprises what
were once the American, British, and French zones
of occupation. The second part of Germany is
the part that lies to the east of the frontier wliich
separates the Soviet zone of occupation from the
Federal Republic of Germany. Within this area
lies the Soviet zone of occupation, a land whei'e
some 17 million Germans are ruled by the Com-
munist puppet regime set up by the Soviet au-
thorities ; this is the land of tyranny, whereas the
Federal Republic of Germany is the land of free-
dom. And then there is Berlin, that city with
which we Americans have had such close relations
smce the days of the blockade, a city which itself
^Address made before the Los Angeles World Affairs
Council on Mar. 28.
is divided between the three Western sectors — the
American, the British, and the French — still in
occupation status but nevertheless governed by a
freely elected German Government, and the East
sector controlled, like the zone, by the Russians
through their henchmen.
I could devote a very long speech indeed to the
history of the Federal Republic of Germany ; yet
this history is very short. The Federal Republic
itself is less than 7 years old ; its sovereignty dates
only from last May. The phenomenal industrial
recovery of this part of Germany is well known ;
so too is the remarkably rapid rebuilding of the
cities. Wliat is less well known, perhaps, are the
steps by which a stable representative system of
government has evolved. Separate states with
freely elected legislatures were created in the zones
of the three Western powers. Then in 1948 dele-
gates from the states met to draft a constitution,
or Basic Law, for the federal system. This Basic
Law, approved by the three Western occupying
powers, was then adopted by the state legislatures
in 1949. That sunmier the first national parlia-
ment, or Bundestag, was elected, which in turn
elected Konrad Adenauer as Chancellor. He was
reelected 4 years later by the second Bundestag,
which came into being following the second na-
tional election. The third national election, by the
way, will be held in the summer of 1957, and this
future event is already casting its shadow over
German politics. Parliamentary democracy in
the federal government and the states has provided
a stable political framework within which a free
competitive economy has flourished and the basic
rit'hts of citizens have been protected. Wliatever
may be the currents and crosscurrents of German
internal politics in the coming years, I have no
worry that the framework will be endangered.
Aoril 23, 1956
669
Last May, you will recall, the Federal Republic
of Germany, wlien it became a sovereign nation,
joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
In so doing it undertook the responsibility of shar-
ing with the other members, including the United
States, the burden of defending Europe. To ful-
fill this responsibility an armed force is in process
of formation. The process has been slower than
many imagined it would be 18 months ago when
the treaties were signed in Paris. But it is well to
remember that the Germans had to start the build-
ing of their armed forces completely anew. There
was no vestige of the old German Army, Navy, or
Air Force left after the surrender; furthennore,
for the first few postwar years few, if any, thought
of rearming Germany. Quite the contrary. In-
deed, the opposition party in the Bundestag (the
Social Democrats) questioned the legality of a
militai-y force even as part of a European army;
only in 1954 was the Basic Law amended so as to
clarify this point. (An amendment of the Basic
Law requires a two-thirds vote of the Bundestag
as well as the upper house, the Bundesrat, where
the states are represented.) "Within the past
month the Government and the opposition have
agreed on certain further amendments to the Basic
Law which will provide the legal basis for the Ger-
man armed forces and insure that the ultimate
control is in civilian hands. These amendments
have just been adopted. In this task of drafting
the necessary laws almost all political leaders
have had the same ideal in mind : They have
wanted to create a military establishment very dif-
ferent from those of the past ; they desire that the
new army, navy, and air force shall be firmly
under the control of a parliamentary government.
We, the United States and the Federal Republic,
are now partners on an equal basis ; we partake in
the defense of Europe and indeed the Atlantic
community. This means we share military and
economic problems; we must each do our part in
keeping the free world sturdy and healthy and
ever on the alert. This is no easy undertaking,
and differences of opinion among allies are pro-
verbial, but the Nato oi'ganization has already
proved its ability to reconcile conflicting views.
The same procedures can be used, if needed, to
make any adjustments required when a year from
now numbers of German youth begin to stand
side by side with American, British, French, and
other soldiers of the Atlantic community in the
defense of Europe. So I shall not report further
on our common problems as members of Nato
but rather direct your attention to our common
problems that exist because of the division of Ger-
many and the position of Berlin.
German Reunification
As President Eisenhower and Secretary of State
Dulles have said on more than one occasion, there
can be no hope for lasting peace and security in
Europe until a reunification of Germany is
acliieved. This same jioint of view has been re-
peatedly emphasized likewise by the heads of the
British and the French Governments. It is
hardly necessary to state that reunification is the
number-one goal of all the inhabitants of Ger-
many, whether they be in the Federal Republic
of German}' or in the Soviet Zone itself. To be
sure, in making this statement I must add that a
small percentage of the East Zone inhabitants who
are convinced Communists or who have thrown in
their lot irrevocably with the Soviet authorities
envisage a revmification of Germany in terms quite
different than do the vast majority of their coun-
trymen. These Soviet agents would like a re-
unified Germany which in fact would be another
Soviet satellite state.
To interpret properly the present attitude of
the Russians toward reunification, one must bear
in niind their policy of supporting the satellite
regime in the Soviet Zone. Their immediate goal
appears to be to force the recognition by the free
world, in law or in fact, of the legitimacy of their
so-called German Democratic Republic, which at
present has standing only among Russia's satellite
nations. The Communist regime, completely sub-
servient to the Soviets, claims to represent the in-
habitants. But, as everyone knows, the so-called
elections by which this government was put in
power were travesties of free elections. What the
unfortunate Germans who must suffer under the
tyranny of this communistic rule really think of
their German rulers was evidenced by the uprising
of .Time 17, 1953. This spontaneous protest, start-
ing in East Berlin, was ruthlessly put down by
Russian tanks and soldiei-s, but there is every
reason to believe that the spirit is by no means
dead. Wlien free elections are held in the Soviet
Zone, you may be certain that the Communist j
Party and its allies will receive not more than a
very small fraction of the votes. I say, when free
elections are held, for such free elections of an all-
Gernum government are the first necessary step to
670
Department of State Bulletin
reuHification. This is the firm position of the
three Western powers and the Federal Govern-
ment. But I shall return to this subject in a
moment. Let me ask you to direct your attention
to Berlin.
Ever since the blockade, the people of Berlin
and the people of the United States have been
partners in their resistance to Soviet aggression.
The successful breaking of the blockade was due
to the brave stand of the Berliners and the effec-
tiveness of the American Air Force aided by our
British and French allies. This was accom-
plished, you remember, in '48 and '49. The
Soviets then solemnly agreed that access to the
city should be unhampered, and for the last 7 years
traffic between free Germany and free Berlin by
means of rail, water, and road has been relatively
unhindered. But within the last year the Rus-
sians claim to have transferred to their puppet
regime, the so-called German Democratic Repub-
lic, all control and jurisdiction over traffic to Ber-
lin. This claim has been strongly rejected by our
Government, the British, and the French. We
have pointed out on more than one occasion that
the Soviet Government cannot in tliis fashion es-
cape responsibility for carrying out the solemn
undertakings which they themselves have entered
into. Therefore we shall continue to hold the
Soviets to their promise. We shall insist that
there be no hindrance to the flow of goods and
peo):)le from free Germany to Berlin.
Not only have the Soviets claimed they could
and would transfer to their German agents their
authority over the roads to Berlin, but they have
made a similar claim as to the Soviet sector of
Berlin itself. Here again their international ob-
ligations are quite clear : free circulation through-
out all the sectors of Berlin was a firm agreement
when Berlin was first occupied by the Four Pow-
ers. That the Soviets see to it that this continues
is a matter on which the three Western powers
insist.
Unique Position of Berlin
I am glad to report that, in spite of its strange
position, a unique position I might say, of being an
island of freedom in a sea of tyranny, free Ber-
lin — that is, West Berlin — has prospei-ed since the
days of the blockade. Thanks in no small measure
to American initiative and American aid, indus-
tries have ex|ianded, trade has increased, unem-
ployment has steadily diminished. The spirit of
the Berliners continues bold and confident.
Those who can freely express their opinion, the 2
million in West Berlin, are quick to demonstrate
tlieir realization of what Communist tyranny
really means. One has only to cross the sector
border into East Berlin to see communism at work,
and it is a most depressing and disquieting spec-
tacle, I can assure you. Indeed, I have often said
that Berlin was a city that should be visited by
any who had illusions about what communism is
in fact. A short visit to Berlin would demon-
strate to all but convinced members of the party
that the Soviet system is a system of brutal sup-
pression of freedom, a police state based on fear.
In Berlin one can z'eadily compare the eco-
nomic, political, and cultural aspeeis of the two
parts of the world whichi aa'© divided by the Iron
Curtain. In this city tlae curtaia is transparent.
And this is one of the reasons, why Berlin is so
important. Here at least, some oif the. unfortunate
Germans who live, under thei Communist dictator-
sliip can view an, example of the. world of freedcwa.
From here, uneensored news flow/S through the
American radio station RIA-S to the inhabitaojits
of the zone, naost of witom Cxon listen, in ^ite of
Soviet attempts at jamming. The Iron Curtain
between the zmis ajad the Federal Republic^ on
the other hand, is not transparent. Ttnere are only
four border crossing-points; everywhere else
armed guards, barbed wire, plowed' strips sepa-
rate the enslav«d Germans from their friends and
relatives in the West In some communities the
sealed border runs right thix)ugli a village. In
one spot I visited, a town lies in the zone and the
railroad station is in the Federal Republic aad
hence no longer of any use; foi- in order to go
from the town to the station one would have to
travel many miles to the one border crossing in
that area and then, if the necessary papers were
in order, one could cross and again travel back
along the border to the station.
Yet the Soviet Zone is far more accessible than
any other territory lying the other side of the Iron
Curtain. A great number of Germans travel back
and forth through the four crossing-points in or-
der to visit relatives and friends. And this traf-
fic is at present encouraged by the Soviets and
their agents since they are trying to win the re-
spect if not the affection of all Germans. They
are trying particularly to convince the working-
man that they are in the process of creating a
April 23, 1956
671
"workers' paradise" in their so-called Democratic
Republic. Last summer buses were sent through
one of the crossing-points to pick up children in
border towns who were invited for a 3-week va-
cation at no expense in this "workers' paradise."
And the camps where these youths were enter-
tained — propaganda centers in fact — I have heard
were extremely good. How lasting will be the ef-
fects of such exposure to Soviet Zone propaganda
is an open question.
Soviet'Formula for Reunification
Unless I am much mistaken, we are going to see
many such efforts; more propaganda will flow
from the East to the West. It will be claimed
that the German Democratic Republic provides
more opportunities for the worker and farmer,
more cultural developments, and, above all, is
working for peace and a unified Germany in con-
trast to the Government of the Federal Republic.
One of the slogans that is painted on the walls of
the official buildings of the Soviet sector of Berlin
demands that "Germans sit around one table."
This is the Soviets' formula for reunification ; they
demand that representatives of their puppet gov-
ernment meet with representatives of the Federal
Republic of Germany and work out a formula for
reunification. To anyone who knows the history
of what happened in Poland, Rumania, Czecho-
slovakia, and the other satellite countries it is
quite clear what the real aims of such a confer-
ence would be. Such a meeting of Russian agents
and free Germans could make no progress toward
reunification in freedom; it could only serve to
build up the prestige of the puppet government
and thus be one step toward a kind of reunifica-
tion that would be an extension of the Soviet sys-
tem of tyranny well into the heart of Western
Europe.
But the propaganda line embodied in the slogan
"Germans around one table" has certain disad-
vantages from the Soviet point of view and, conse-
quently, certain advantages for us in the free
world which we should endeavor to make appar-
ent. It means that the border crossing-points
where Germans from the West can visit their
relatives in the East and vice versa must be kept
open by the Soviets. This in turn means that what
goes on in the Soviet Zone of Germany is far more
exposed to the view of the entire world than what
goes on in such satellite countries as Poland or
Czechoslovakia. In other words the Iron Curtain
in Germany is at a few points somewhat porous.
This fact we must make tlie most of. It behooves
us to follow very carefuUy aU that transpires in
the Soviet Zone and to direct world opinion to the
shocking contrast between the Soviets' professed
intentions and their actual deeds. For when one
examines the true situation in the Soviet Zone, one
encomiters a record of brutal disregard of human
rights which must shock all except those who are
hardened by long years of exposure to Communist
discipline.
Let me give you one example : Nearly a thousand
Germans leave the Soviet Zone every day, mainly
through Berlin, prefen-ing to abandon all their
worldly goods than to suffer longer their loss of
liberty. This fact is in itself ample proof of the
real situation in this so-called democratic land.
Refugees are a double embarrassment to the Soviet
henchmen. They regret to see their labor force
diminished by the departure of able-bodied youth
and tliey realize the refugees are clear evidence of
the hate and mistrust with which the government
is regarded by the people. As a consequence meas-
ures are being taken to check the flow. Recently
two individuals were prosecuted for having al-
legedly advised some of their neighbors to migrate
to the Federal Republic of Germany. These un-
fortunates were found guilty by an authoritarian
court and condemned to death — condemned to die
for the supposed crime of asking a fellow German
to move from one city to another! The outcry
from West Germany and from the free world
seems to have shaken the authorities in East Berlin
a bit, for the sentences have now been commuted
to life. But even prison terms for such offenses, or
the fact that the alleged advice was regarded as an
offense, is hard to square with the slogan "Germans
around one table !"
Soviet Zone — the Achilles Heel
The Soviet Zone then is to my mind the Achilles
heel of the Soviet satellite system. We in the free
world should take advantage of this fact. We
should use every occasion to expose the fact that
the Russians are exploiting this portion of the
German population, and exploiting is the proper
word. The living standards are low ; the economy
is arranged for the benefit of the Soviet system
and not for the Germans who do the work; the
uranium mines are being depleted; the youth are
672
Department of State Bulletin
I
being forcibly recruited for an army which will
reinforce the other satellite contingents. Brutal
sentences are still meted out ; the tales of the refu-
gees are tales of a terrorized poiDulation. How
can this day-by-day behavior of the Soviets' agents
in East Germany be squared with the present
Soviet words about peace and friendly relations
with the West ? The simple answer is, it cannot.
And this fact to my mind should be continually
emphasized in every discussion of international
problems. The conscience of the free world must
be quickened to the injustice of a divided Ger-
many.
Let me conclude by turning your attention once
again to the city of Berlin. This city has stood
out boldly against Russian tlu'eats for 10 years
and more; today it is remarkably strong consid-
ering its past ordeals. But the future of Berlin is
as a capital city of a reimited Gei-many. For the
long run this is the only solution of the so-called
Berlin problem, for the Western powers will cer-
tainly never desert the Berliners as long as they
are in danger, which means as long as Germany is
divided. The free Berliners, the three Western
occupying powers, and the Federal Republic of
Germany work closely together to support Ber-
lin; we share the common task of preparing for
the day when the present capital of the Federal
Republic at Bonn will cease to exist and a new
freely elected all-German government will take
up its quarters in Berlin.
I have spoken of a new, freely elected, all-
German govermnent because the present Federal
Republic of Germany is, by its own declaration,
only a provisional, caretaker government. It is
the only government today which can speak for
all the German people, as it is the only freely
elected government. Nevertheless, its competence
is restricted by its own desires and in agreement
with the three Western powers. Because it has
not derived its mandate from the voters in the
Soviet Zone as well as from those in the three
former Western zones, it cannot speak for Ger-
many in a discussion of such matters as the final
boundaries of Germany and the terms of a peace
treaty. These are affairs which must be left to an
all-German government which can speak for all
the German people. Therefore, today in talking
about Germany we meet a paradoxical situation.
We welcome the opportunity of cooperating on a
most friendly basis with the German government
in Bonn, we look forward to its military contribu-
tion to the defense of the free world, but at the
same time we hope for its replacement by an all-
German government in Berlin.
We have a strong and reliable ally in the Ger-
man people — of that I have not the slightest doubt.
Those who can now speak for the free population
speak in terms of a close alliance witli the West.
I have no fear that if the free world remains
strong economically, politically, and militarily
there will be any reversal of this policy. The
peoples of the free European nations, of Great
Britain, and of the United States are now united.
In this unity there is strength. This strength
constitutes a bulwark against furtlier Soviet ag-
gression. In the not too distant future I believe
tliis strength, coupled with a continued exposure
of the true conditions in the Soviet Zone, must
bring about a reunification of Germany ; and with
that reunification will come hope for a more
peaceful world.
Current Legislation on Foreign Policy:
84th Congress, 2d Session
Technical Assistance Programs. Hearing before a sub-
committee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions. Part 2, January 23, 1956. 35 pp.
Operation and Administration of the Cargo Preference
Act. Hearings before the House Committee on Mer-
chant Marine and Fisheries on Public Law 664, 83d
Cong., 2d sess. January 31, February 1-16, 1956. 601
pp.
Operation of Article VII, NATO Status of Forces Treaty.
Hearing before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee
on Armed Services to review, for the period December
1, 1954, to November 30, 1955, the operation of article
VII of the agreement between the parties to the North
Atlantic Treaty regarding the status of their forces.
February 9, 1956. 47 pp.
International Cultural Exchange and Trade Fair Partici-
pation Act of 1956. Hearing before the Senate Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations on S. 3116 and S. 3172,
bills to provide for the promotion and strengthening
of international relations through cultural and athletic
exchanges and participation in international fairs and
festivals. February 21, 1956. 39 pp.
Regulation of Exports. Hearings before the House Com-
mittee on Banking and Currency on H. R. 9052. Febru-
arv 23, March 5 and 6, 1956. 182 pp.
Control and Reduction of Armaments. Hearing before
a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations pursuant to S. Res. 93, S4th Cong. Part 2,
Februarv 29, 1956. 33 pp.
Reorganization of the Passport Office. Report to ac-
company S. 3340. S. Rept. 1605, March 1, 1956. 8 pp.
Joint Economic Report. Report of the Joint Committee
on the Economic Report on the January 1956 Economic
Report of the President with supplemental and minority
views and the economic outlook for 1956 prepared by
the committee staff. S. Rept. 1606, March 1, 1956. 116
pp.
April 23, J 956
673
The Mutual Security Program for Europe
Statement by C, Burke Elhrick
Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs ^
4
I
Acting Secretary Hoover lias already discussed
with you the concepts underlying the mutual se-
curity progi'am as a whole.^ My purpose today
is to discuss in somewhat more detail the aspects
of the program that relate to the European area.
With relatively minor exceptions, the proposed
mutual security program in Europe is devoted
entirely to military defense. More specifically, it
is primarily designed to maintain and strengthen
the defensive power of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization. Apart from a minor technical ex-
change program, no economic aid, defense sup-
port, or other economic-type assistance is being
proposed for any of the Nato countries covered
by the European section of this legislation. Eco-
nomic-type assistance is requested only for two
non-NATO countries — Spain and Yugoslavia —
which face unusual economic difficulties in con-
nection with their defense efforts. A moderate
sum is also requested to meet special circumstances
connected with the maintenance of our vital po-
sition in West Berlin.
This program is being put forw-ard at a time
when the contest between the Communist bloc and
the free world has entered a new phase. Mr.
Hoover has already described the rather striking
shift in Soviet strategy and tactics, which seems to
involve a de-emphasis of military techniques of
aggression in favor of a stepped-up campaign to
spread Communist power and influence by non-
military means. This change in tactics will have
' Made before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs
on Mar. 27.
"For President Eisenliower's message to tlie Congress
on the mutual security program for 1957 and a statement
by Under Secretary Hoover, see Bulletin of Apr. 2, 1956,
p. 545. For a statement by John B. Hollister, see ibiA.,
Apr. 9, 1956, p. 605.
significant implications for our policies through-
out the world. Free nations will be required to
give greater attention to erecting and maintaining
adequate political, economic, and psychological
defenses against communism, and to preserving
the unity which the Soviet bloc is trying so hard
to shatter. A large part of the mutual security
program now proposed, as Mr. Hoover has pointed
out, is designed to assist friendly nations of Asia,
Africa, and South America in economic develop-
ment. At the same time, we should not make the
fatal error of assuming that we can now ignore the
military potentialities of the Soviet bloc. The
Soviet military threat is still with us and is likely
to remain with us for a long time.
If we are correct in the supposition that the
Soviet rulers have indeed become more reluctant
to assume the suicidal risks of modern warfare,
we have every reason to be pleased. American
interests will be served by doing whatever we can
to make sure that Soviet thinking continues along
these lines. Wliile we have no present grounds
for believing that basic Soviet objectives have
altered, nor for assiuning that the struggle to check
Communist political, economic, and psychological
])enetration is likely to be short or easy, I think
we all agree that this kind of struggle is infinitely
preferable to all-out military hostilities. Since
the change in Soviet tactics has largely been in-
duced by the growing strength and unity achieved
under our collective security policies, it is impera-
tive that these policies be continued without any
modification of purpose or relaxation of effort.
However charming may be the smiles that adorn
the faces of Soviet diplomats, however melodious
may be the siren songs of Communist propaganda,
and however temptuig may be the economic bait
674
Departmeni of State Bullelin
which they are holding out to some of the less
developed nations, we cannot i<inore the hard
fact that the Soviet Union and its satellites are
maintaining enormous military capabilities. They
have an overwhelming superioritj* in military man-
power, and they are making rapid strides in devel-
oping their potential for nuclear warfare. They
are also making other ominous technological ad-
vances. All told, they possess the capacity to
launch a dangerous military attack at any time,
either general or local. We have no assurance
whatever that they will indefinitely refrain from
military adventures, particularly if military weak-
nesses in neighboring nations should appear to
offer them attractive opportunities for cheap con-
quests. So long as the Soviet rulers retain and
increase their capacity for military aggression, we
cannot afford to base U.S. policies on their an-
nounced intentions. We camiot gamble our very
survival upon the mysterious mental processes of
the men in the Kremlin.
Every Member of the Congress is already fa-
miliar with tlie size and cost of the national defense
establishment which the U.S. is maintaining for
the purpose of deterring aggression. But we rec-
ognized long ago that the preservation of security
and peace is not a task for the United States alone.
It is neither possible nor desirable that the bur-
dens of free- world defense should be borne exclu-
sively by the American soldier and American
taxpayer. Therefore, it has been a major ob-
jective of our foreign policy to supplement and
reinforce American defensive power by securing
the cooperation of other free nations who share
our determination to preserve peace and freedom
and who are willmg and able to contribute to the
attainment of this objective. In brief, we have
recognized that the only real security available
to ourselves or to anyone else is collective security.
The free nations of Europe represent a most
important source of support. The peoples of
these nations are skilled in modern technology
and are capable of developing and using modern
weapons. They possess substantial industrial
and economic resources. Because of their geo-
graphic position they are in a position to provide
bases strategically situated for deterring or
countering a Soviet attack. Most important of
all, in my opinion, is the fact that these nations
share our belief in freedom, our cultural and moral
traditions, and our determination to make all
reasonable sacrifices to assure peace. We have
therefore joined together with 14 nations in a
connnon defense system, the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization. Through this alliance, we
are seeking to achieve an efficient combination and
utilization of our individual resources in a man-
ner that will increase the security of all.
Progress Under NATO
I have no hesitation in saying that Nato has
been a highly successful undertaking. Within a
relatively short period of time, the potential Euro-
pean contribution to international peace and se-
curity has been translated into actuality. We
liave faced many complex problems and difficul-
ties, of course, and have many problems still ahead
of us. When we look at the Nato program in the
perspective of the past 7 years, however, we can
see that remarkable progress has been made. This
progress is reflected not only in the number of
men under arms, the availability of weapons and
equipment, the establishment of bases, the im-
provement of organization, training, and deploy-
ment, and similar advances of a strictly military
nature, but also in the growth of general political
cohesion. It is also noteworthy that the Nato
defense buildup has been accomplished without
jiroducing an intolerable economic strain on any
of the member governments. In fact, it has been
accomplished during a period when the overall
European economic position has been steadily im-
proving.
On balance, 1955 has been a good year for Nato.
Despite political difficulties encountered by certain
governments and occasional disagreement among
members of the alliance, the basic military opera-
tions of Nato have moved forward smoothly.
These operations receive few headlines, since they
are rarely spectacular. Once the major political
and strategic decisions have been made, the day-
to-day job of building, maintaining, and improv-
ing Western defenses has tended to become more
routine and less exciting. But this job has lost
none of its importance, and it is being done.
Probably the most notable event of 1955 was the
final ratification of the Paris Agreement which
restored sovereignty to the German Federal Re-
public and brought this gi-eat nation into the
Nato family. The same agreements established
the Western European Union, closely linked to
Nato, to exercise special armament controls
among the seven member comitries. The signifi-
AptW 23, 1956
675
cance of this achievement goes beyond the addi-
tion to Nato of Germany's sizable military poten-
tial. Equally important was the fact that the
Pans Agreements afford a new foundation for
friendly and cooperative relations between France
and Germany, which should do a great deal to
consolidate the unity of the Atlantic community
as a whole. It is not a coincidence that the radical
transformation of Soviet tactics which paved the
way for the two Geneva conferences began con-
currently with the ratification of the Paris Agree-
ments, thus affording a striking demonstration of
the validity of our policies.
There have been other gratifying developments
in the European area during 1955, some of which
are only indirectly connected with the Nato pro-
gram but all of which are intimately related to
our overall policies of building strength and unity.
One of the most important was the signing of the
Austrian Treaty, after 8 years of wearisome ne-
gotiations with the Soviet Government. This
treaty not only restored Austrian independence
but had added significance as the first concrete in-
dication of a change in Soviet tactics. It marked
the first time since World War II that Soviet
troops have taken a backward step.
Special attention is also being given to the
political ties that bind the Atlantic allies. There
were five Nato ministerial meetings during 1955,
the largest nmnber ever held in any one year.
Three of these meetings were devoted primarily
to general political consultation — to a broad ex-
change of views on international problems and
individual attitudes toward these problems. I
believe the consultations held before the two
Geneva conferences, in particular, contributed
materially to the solidarity of the Western govern-
ments in dealing with the issues considered at
these conferences.
Soviet Efforts To Destroy Atlantic Alliance
It is no secret that the Soviet bloc is engaged in
a major effort to divide and destroy the Atlantic
alliance. The dissolution of Nato stands high on
the Communist list of objectives, as demonstrated
by their words and actions in nearly all recent
international negotiations, including the smnmit
conference. They are using every available means
to stir up old rivalries and to magnify and exploit
the minor differences that inevitably arise even
among the closest allies. They are also seeking to
delude members of the alliance into a relaxation of
their defense efforts, both military and nonmili-
tary, and to persuade them that neutrality offers
a cheaper and moi'e comfortable course than con-
tinued adherence to the Atlantic system.
It would be an excess of optimism to assume
that these Communist maneuvers have no prospect
of achieving results. There are differences among
allies. There are pressures in allied covnitries, as
in every democratic country, to relieve the tax-
payers of some of the burdens of defense. There
is a certain amount of neutralist sentiment in
Western Europe. To some extent, all these things
lend themselves to Communist exploitation. But
in terms of the policies and actions of allied gov-
ernments, it is noteworthy that the Soviet cam-
paign of division and enticement has not yet
produced any significant impact upon the solidar-
ity of the Atlantic alliance. Not only did the
three Western govermnents at Geneva maintain
unshakable harmony on fundamental issues, but
their general viewpoint was also supported by the
other Atlantic partners. Nor have the new Soviet
tactics yet caused any noticeable relaxation in al-
lied defense efforts. The combined defense ex-
penditures, for example, of the European Nato
countries are expected to remain at approximately
the same levels next year as this year.
European Integration
One very hopeful development in Europe is
the revival of the movement toward political and
economic integration among the European na-
tions themselves. The Congress is already fa-
miliar with the successful establishment of
supranational authority over the production and
marketing of coal and steel. The movement re-
ceived something of a setback when the plan for
a European Defense Community failed to receive
parliamentary approval, but is now showing new
signs of life. Several eminent European states-
men are currently working on proposals for a
multinational pooling of atomic power and also
for further steps toward a broad common market.
As you can understand, we are watching these
efforts with the greatest interest and sympathy.
There can be no doubt that the achievement of a
closely integrated European community would j
tend to consolidate and strengthen the Atlantic
alliance as a whole.
As Secretary Dulles has pointed out on more
than one occasion, the most significant thing about
676
Deparfmenf of Sfafe Bulletin
(he Atlantic alliance is not so much what has
happened as what has not happened. Before
Nato began, we were harassed by a long series of
crises in Europe, such as the Communist war in
Greece, the Berlin blockade, the Czechoslovak
coup, military threats against Norway and Tur-
key, and so forth. Since Nato came into being
there have been no military hostilities of any kind
in the European area and the Communists have
I not gained a single inch of additional territory.
I think this speaks for itself.
In reciting the progress made through Nato, it
is not my purpose to imply that all our difficulties
have suddenly vanished. We will continue to
face a great many problems. Nato is not the kind
of operation that we can ever expect to wrap up
and forget about. It requires constant attention
and constant ellort by all members of the alliance,
including ourselves.
Maintenance of Military Defenses
The mutual security program proposed for fiscal
year 1957 is directed toward two of Nato's most
pressing and most continuous problems — the
maintenance and the progressive modernization
of its military defenses. Even the best military
system cannot stand still. Weapons and equip-
ment wear out or become obsolete, and military
plans require constant revision. These problems
have always existed, but they have been greatly
magnified by the incredible sweep of modern
technology. "\^^iile our information about the
rate of Soviet scientific and technical advancement
is not as precise as we would like, we know enough
to be certain that the continued value of free- world
defense forces will depend largely upon our col-
lective ability to maintain up-to-date equipment
and facilities, to replace wornout or obsolete items,
and to keep pace with the furious advances of
science and technology.
Another current defense problem receiving
Nato attention, of course, is the buildup of Ger-
man military contingents. Since this buildup is
beginning from scratch, many different things
have to be done, ranging from the enactment of
basic legislation to the actual recruitment, organ-
ization, equipment, and training of military forces.
This process will necessarily be gradual, but steady
progress is being made. The mutual security pro-
gi'am recommended for fiscal year 1957 contains
no additional funds for the German buildup, since
AprW 23, 7956
382436 — 56 3
the currently planned U.S. contribution to this
program has already been obligated from previous
appropriations.
T'he military problems I have mentioned are
now receiving intensive attention by Nato military
planners. The Defense Ministers of all member
countries, including Secretary of Defense Wilson,
held a meeting in October to consider some of these
problems, and a subsequent meeting of senior mili-
tary authorities and the Nato commanders was
completed in Paris around March 1. The central
problem upon which both these meetings focused
is the adaptation of the Nato defense system to the
ever-changing requirements and techniques of
modern warfare. This problem is gravely com-
plicated by the limited financial resources avail-
able. While it is clear to all that this adaptation
is essentially evolutionary and that no sudden and
drastic displacement of either plans or machinery
is in prospect, it is necessary that the process move
forA\ard with minimum delay.
Most of the funds requested for Nato during
fiscal year 1957 fall under the heading of "main-
tenance." They will be used to service, repair, and
replace facilities and equipment already produced
and to provide training in the use of such equip-
ment and facilities. Some of the funds, in addi-
tion, are designed to make more modern weapons
and equipment available to our allies, with par-
ticular emphasis on the improvement of European
air defenses and early warning systems.
Modernization of Military Defenses
There are approximately $525 million in this
program set aside for advanced weapons, of which
$195 million have already been planned for allo-
cation to Europe. The value to the Europeans,
both in military and in psychological terms, of
acquiring guided missiles and more advanced types
of aircraft and electronic equipment cannot be
overestimated. Furthermore, it is to our own
benefit that we make these more modern weapons
available as a means of insuring that American
troops in Europe will have at their side well-
equipped forces equally able to mount an effective
defense.
There is no question but that the Europeans
have become increasingly concerned about the
rapid changes in the technology of modem warfare
and their limited ability to keep pace with the
newer developments. Apart from the British and,
677
to a lesser extent, the French, oiu' Em-opean allies
do not have the resources necessary to devote to
the large-scale research and development of new
weapons. Consequently, most European countries
are looking primarily to the United States to help
them keep pace with the growing capabilities of
the Soviet bloc forces. By sharing the newer
weapons as they are developed and produced, we
can make it possible for them to participate more
effectively in the defense of Western Europe and
thus to strengthen the deterrent power of the
alliance.
Officials of the Department of Defense will be
prepared to give you more detailed information
about the projected use of these funds and the
military purposes to be served. I will confine
myself to a few general observations. First, I
think it is obvious that the Nato alliance, one of
the mainstays of our security, can be preserved
over a long period of time only if our European
partners remain convinced that it offei's them
real protection and that their own contributions
to the common defense serve a useful purpose.
This conviction, in turn, will depend upon a rea-
sonable assurance that their defense efforts will
actually be meaningful within the context of mod-
ern instruments and techniques of warfare. Our
allies already know that there are certain key
items that they cannot produce for themselves and
cannot readily accumulate the dollars to buy.
Unless they are able to secure, maintain, and re-
place these things, they will feel that a large part
of what they are able to do for themselves would
be waste effort.
European Contribution to Mutual Security
I want to emphasize the fact that the things
our allies are doing for themselves add up to a
very substantial total. Two years ago Secretary
Dulles pointed out that our European allies were
spending for defense purposes the equivalent of
three dollars from their own budgets for every
dollar's worth of aid received from the United
States. A recent analysis by my staff indicates
that these countries are now spending the equiva-
lent of six dollars of their own money for each
dollar of U.S. aid received. Their total defense
expenditures last year came to more than $12 bil-
lion, which is an altogether creditable showing for
a group of nations whose combined gross national
incomes add up to less than one-half of the U.S.
national income. These expenditures, together
with the men they have placed under arms, the
outijut of their factories and laboratories, and the
bases they have provided, add substantially to the
security of the United States as well as the security
of Europe. It seems to me a matter of ordinary
common sense — a sound business proposition, if
you will — for the United States to continue pro-
viding certain weapons, equipment, and training
which will multiply the effectiveness of these
European efforts and produce more total defense
than would otherwise be available.
This is the fundamental justification for the
whole program. Without the program of the
character and magnitude being requested, some of
these countries would undoubtedly feel that they
just couldn't accomplish enough to make their
efforts and sacrifices worth while. Some would
lack many key items of equipment and would
face insuperable difficulties in trying to build
balanced forces capable of effective action under
modern conditions of warfare. The real defen-
sive power produced b}' their own commitments
of money and manpower would be greatly re-
duced and there would be almost irresistible
temptation to reduce these commitments. The
final result would be a drastic weakening of the
whole Atlantic system. In terms of the total
defensive power available to America and the free
world, we would clearly lose more than we would
save by not having this military assistance pro-
gram being requested.
Please understand that I am not making gloomy
predictions. On the contrary, I believe the general
outlook in Europe is fairly bright. I only want
to emphasize the fact that Nato represents a tre-
mendous asset for the security of the entire free
world, including our own country. We have al-
ready made a large investment in protecting and
increasing the value of this asset. The program
now being presented to you is designed to make
certain that neither the investment nor the asset
itself is lost.
Spain, Yugoslavia, Berlin
I mentioned earlier that a moderate portion of
the assistance proposed for the European area in
fiscal year 1967 is designed to provide economic-
type support to certain non-NAXo areas. The larg-
est amount is proposed for support of the Spanish
defense program. Spain's defense efforts are
678
Department of State Bulletin
L
closely related to the U.S.-Spanish agreements for
the construction and joint use of a series of im-
portant strategic air and naval bases. Therefore,
we have a considerable interest in the effective-
ness of these ellorts. We also recognize that
Spain, which did not participate in the Marshall
plan nor the early military defense assistance pro-
grams, faces unusual economic difficulties in carry-
ing out its defense plans.
A smaller amount is proposed to support Yugo-
slav defense efforts. While Yugoslavia is not al-
lied with the U.S., we have a definite interest in
Yugoslavia's ability to maintain the independent
position which it has achieved with great risk and
saci-ifice. Yugoslavia is the only country that has
successfully broken away from the Soviet camp.
The measure of this success is best illustrated by
the fervent campaign wliich the Soviet rulers are
now waging to entice Yugoslavia back into the
Soviet spider's web. But the Yugoslavs know
from experience what this means, and their na-
tion stands today as a vivid reminder to the satel-
lite areas that it is still possible for enslaved peoples
to regain national existence. Yugoslavia is al-
ready spending a larger percentage of its national
income for defense than any other country in free
Europe, and the moderate assistance contemplated
in this program is intended to help Yugoslavia
continue to maintain this defense program with-
out unbearable economic strain.
As in past years, we are also requesting special
economic assistance for programs in West Berlin.
The strategic and psychological importance of this
key Western outpost is well known, especially to
those Members of the Congress who have had an
opportunity to visit the area. West Berlin will
continue to face extraordinary economic difficul-
ties because of its geographic position, and we arc
determined to provide all necessary support to al-
leviate these difficulties and assure West Berlin's
survival.
In conclusion, I merely want to repeat my con-
viction that the P^uropean section of the proposed
mutual security program represents a good in-
vestment in our own national security. It has paid
off in the past and we ha.ve every reason to antici-
pate that it will pay handsome dividends in the
future.
Appointments to Advisory Group
on Refugee Relief Program
The Department of State announced on April
(press release 182) that George Meany, Presi-
dent of the Ajnerican Federation of Labor and
Congress of Industrial Organizations, and Joseph
Gimma, partner in the New York investment firm
of Hornblower & Weeks, had been appointed to
the Public Advisory Group of the Refugee Relief
Program.^ Mr. Meany will be the official repi-e-
sentative of the Afl-Cio; Mr. Gimma will serve
as a public member.
Other members of the group are :
Mssr. Edward E. Swanstrom, National Catholic Welfare
Confereute, Chairman of the Refugee Relief Program
Committee of the American Council of Voluntary Agen-
cies for Foreign Service
Roland Elliott, Director, Immigration Services, Church
World Service, First Vice Chairman of the Refugee
Relief Program Committee of the American Council of
Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service
Miss Cordelia Cox, Lutheran Refugee Service, Second
Vice Chairman of the Refugee Relief Program Commit-
tee of the American Council of Voluntary Agencies for
Foreign Service
.\rthur Greenleigh, Executive Director, United Hi as
Service, Inc.
Dr. William S. Bernard, Executive Director, American
Federation of International Institutes, Inc.
Dr. Jan Papanek, President of the American Fimd for
Czechoslovak Refugees, Inc.
Abram G. Becker, Executive Director, International Res-
cue Committee
Walter H. Bieringer, Canton, Mass., Vice President,
Plymouth Rubber Company, and Chairman of the Mas-
.saehusetts Governor's Committee for Refugees
Jlrs. Dorothy D. Houghton, Red Oak, Iowa, former Dep-
uty Director of the International Cooperation Admin-
istration
The Rev. Clyde N. Rogers, Columbus, Ohio, Ohio Council
of Churches, and Chairman of the Ohio Governor's Com-
mittee for the Refugee Program
Clark L. Brody, Lansing, Mich., Executive Vice President
of the Michigan Farm Bureau
' For background, see Bulletin of Aug. 29, IGS.^J, p. 36-3.
April 23, 1956
679
Hungary Accepts U.S. Offer
of Emergency Food Aid
Press release 101 dated April 12
Under the President's authorization, an oiler
of emergency food aid to victims in Hungai-y of
the effects of the recent European cold wave was
presented to the Hungarian Government on Feb-
ruary 23, 1956.^ The offer was not accepted at
that time. In view of the increasing severity of
flood conditions in that country and the conse-
quent widespread hardships, it was renewed on
March 23 by the American Minister to Hungary,
Christian M. Ravndal.
The Hungarian Governmeint informed Min-
ister Ravndal on March 27 of its acceptance of
the United States offer of food aid.
The U.S. Government is taking prompt steps,
with the cooperation of the League of Red Cross
Societies, to determine what existing need may
be met under the emergency food-aid offer and to
institute appropriate arrangements for carrying
out such aid as soon as possible.
In undertaking this program, the U.S. Govern-
ment is motivated by its friendly regard for the
Hungarian people and by the traditional desire of
the American jieople to alleviate suffering wher-
ever it may occur.
Triangular Sales of Farm Products
to Italy and Austria
The International Cooperation Administration
announced on March 31 that it has arranged two
'"triangular" transactions involving sales of U.S.
agricultural commodities to Italy and Austria.
The local currencies generated by the sale of the
agricultural commodities will finance the purchase
of goods in Italy and Austria needed by other
countries participating in the mutual security
program.
Under agreements signed recently with Italy
and Austria, each of the two nations will purchase
up to $5 million worth of agricultural commodi-
ties, paying for them in local currencies. The
lira and schilling proceeds of the sales will be de-
posited to the account of the U.S. Government.
IcA will make these funds available to countries
where the United States has defense or economic
' Bulletin of Mar. 5, 1956, p. 367.
680
assistance programs which require commodities
available in Italy and Austria. When purchases
of such goods in Italy and Austria are agreed
upon, they will be financed with the U.S.-owned
lira and schilling funds and the "triangular"
iiansaction will be completed.
Procurement authorizations for the agricultural
commodities to be sold to Italy and Austria will
be issued later by Ica.
The agreements with Italy and Austria were
made under section 402 of the ilutual Security
•Vet. This section requires that at least $300 mil-
lion of the funds authorized for the mutual se-
i-iirity program during the current fiscal year be
used to finance the sale of surplus U.S. agricul-
tural commodities for foreign currencies. The
local currency proceeds are to be used for mutual
security purjjoses.
To date this year, more than $200 million of
these commodities have been authorized by Ica
to more than a dozen countries.
U.S. Aid to Libya
Press release 184 dated April 9
In extended support of Libyan economic devel-
opment projects, to which it has been contributing
since 1954, the LT.S. Government will grant Libya
$5 million from this fiscal year's mutual security
funds. This is in addition to the $12 million in
aid which the United States has provided Libya
since 1954.
The United States has also informed Libya that
it will grant that country another 5,000 tons of
relief grain, bringing the total help of this nature
in fiscal year 1956 to 25,000 tons.
The Government of Libya has also been told
that in fiscal year 1957 the U.S. Government would
be prepared, subject to congressional authoriza-
tion, to provide an additional $7 million in eco-
nomic development assistance, relief wheat as
needed up to 25,000 tons, and the military equip-
ment for expansion of the Libyan Army by an
additional 1,000 men after a U.S. military survey
team has determined the requirements.
On being informed of the U.S. decision outlined
above, the Libyan Prime Minister stated publicly
on April 7 :
"While making with pleasure and satisfaction
this announcement of American aid, I feel it is
Department of State Bulletin
i
my duty to emphasize the spirit of understanding
shown by the American Government toward
Libya's needs and the sincere collaboration ex-
tended for meeting them.
"In the name of the Libyan Government and
people I extend my sincere thanks to the Govern-
ment of the United States of America with our
deep appreciation for their valued assistance
which will not fail to have far-reaching effects on
the i^rogress of our country and on raising the
standard of our people."
New ICA Loan to Turkey
A loan of $25 million to Turkey was announced
by the International Cooperation Administration
on April 8. This brings the total of U.S. aid to
Turkey during the 1956 fiscal year, including
iirants and a gift of emergency food supplies, to
$54,885,000. These funds are being used as
follows :
— $37.5 million, composed of the $25 million
loan and a grant of $12.5 million, to finance the
import of commodities such as alloys, chemicals,
pliarmaceuticals, and spare parts for industrial,
mining, agricultural, and highway equipment and
vehicles.
— $2 million in technical cooperation grants.
— $14 million worth of emergency food supplies
donated by tlie United States to stave off shortages
resulting from recent floods, an earthquake, and
a disastrous fire. The food includes 40,000 tons
of wheat and quantities of butter, cheese, pow-
dered milk, flour, and rice taken from U.S. agri-
cultural reserves.
— $1,385,000 as a grant to pay the costs of ocean
transportation for the emergency food shipments.
The agreement covering the loan was signed for
Turkey by Ambassador Haydar Gork. Signing
for the United States was Samuel C. Waugh, pres-
ident of the Export-Import Bank of Washington,
whicli administers Ica loans.
In announcing the $14 million gift of food sup-
plies on March 26, Ica said that, since January,
25,000 tons of Turkey's grain supply had been dis-
tributed free to disaster victims; an additional
free distribution was to be made during March
and April. The wheat included in the U.S. gift
would be used to replenish Turkish stocks from
which the free distribution was made.
The other gift foods from the United States —
3,600 tons of powdered milk, 2,615 tons of butter,
2,615 tons of cheese, 1,000 tons of flour, and 250
tons of rice — will be distributed fi-ee to needy per-
sons. The food is being supplied under title II
of the Agricultural Trade Development and As-
sistance Act (P. L. 480).
The new loan agreement brings total economic
aid to Turkey since the United States began pro-
viding such assistance in 1947 to more than one-
half billion dollars. The United States has been
helping Turkey in its efforts to improve the stand-
ard of living of its people and, at the same time,
to assume increasing responsibility for the support
of its defense efforts.
The greater part of U.S. aid to Turkey has been
directed toward such projects as development and
improvement of transportation, communications
and power facilities, mineral resources, and the
increase of industrial capacity. Aid also has been
given in various agricultural fields, including im-
provement of farm management.
In the field of technical cooperation, a recent
major project has been assistance in helping Tur-
key establish a new university at Erzurum in the
eastern part of the country. This project is being
carried out under contract with the University of
Nebraska. Emphasizing education in the agri-
cultural sciences, the new institution has been
named Ataturk University in honor of Turkey's
first president, Kemal Ataturk.
Vice President of Brazil
To Visit U.S.
The Department of State announced on April 13
(press release 196) that Vice President Joao Goul-
art of Brazil will visit the United States during
the period April 30-May 17, 1956. The invitation
was extended on behalf of the U.S. Government by
Vice President Nixon during Mr. Nixon's recent
trip to Brazil.
Mr. Goulart will be an official guest of the U.S.
Government in Washington during tlie period
April 30-May 3 and will stay at Blair House. He
then expects to make a private tour of several
major U.S. cities.
April 23, 7956
681
The I titer- American Partnership
by Milton S. Eisenhower '
Three years ago, in this beautiful House of the
Americas, President Eisenhower expi'essed his
profound personal dedication to doing all he could
to perfect the understanding and trust upon which
the American community of nations must rest.
He stated also his desire to visit the other
American Republics and know them better.
Since he could not himself make a prolonged tour,
he sent me as his personal representative to South
America. Soon afterward he asked Vice Presi-
dent Nixon to make a similar good-will visit to
Middle America.
I look upon my own tour of Latin America as
one of the most rewarding experiences of my life.
I had abundant opportunity to deepen my under-
standing of major problems in candid discussions
with leaders of government, labor, business, agi'i-
culture, and cultural institutions. I observed and
studied Latin America's remarkable achievements
and thus came to appreciate Latin America's de-
termination to be a mighty, progressive factor in
the defense of freedom and the extension of peace.
On the basis of a continental perspective de-
veloped on the trip I submitted, upon my return,
numerous recommendations for strengthening
hemispheric solidarity — recommendations which
met with approval and were incorporated into
United States policy .=
It is therefore with a renewal of the pride and
pleasure I felt during the period of intensive
work in 1953 tliat, again as the President's per-
sonal representative, I come here today to par-
ticipate in these Pan American Day ceremonies.
' Address made at the Pan American Union, Washing-
ton, D.C., on Pan American Day, Apr. 14 (OAS press
release). Mr. Eisenhower spoke as the personal repre-
sentative of the President.
= BULLETIN of Nov. 23, 19.53, p. 69.5.
682
It is especially gratifying to be with you wlien
the Council is lionoring a distinguished fellow
citizen who worked so diligently for hemispheric
cooperation, Cordell Hull. For him, continuous
cooperation among the Americas was a pilot proj-
ect for all nations. Speaking of the inter- Ameri-
can system on this day 13 years ago, in this same
House of the Americas, Secretary Hull declared
that "the practice of equity is not a design for a
liemisphere but is a rule for living in a free and
peaceful world." ^
Implicit in Mr. Hull's statement is a concept
tliat is fundamental to the foreign policy of the
United States as it applies to the other American
Republics. It is the conviction that mutually
helpful, friendly, and abiding relationships among
all the American peoples are of transcendent im-
portance and that these relationships do indeed
afford a working model for the rest of mankind.
Historical Nature of Inter-American Cooperation
It is not especially remarkable that one of our
Secretaries of State voiced this belief; but it is
significant that our Secretaries have been saying
it generation after generation. Whichever of our
political parties has been in power, whoever has
been the incumbent of the "Wliite House, whatever
has been the state of world affairs, we have ad-
hered firmly to the belief that on the hearth of the
American family of nations must burn a steadfast
flame to warm and illuminate mankind.
Our first Secretary of State, Thomas Jefferson,
said, "We have the same object, the success of
representative government. Nor are we acting
for ourselves alone, but for the whole human race."
' Ibid., Apr. 17, 1943, p. 322.
Department of State Bulletin
Secretary Elihu Root, at the Third Interna-
tional Conference of American States in 1906,
urged tlie American peoples to show the world
tiiat liberty is the twin sister of a just peace. "Let
us unite,'* he urged, "in creating . . . and making
effective an ail-American public opinion whose
power shall influence international wrong, [and]
bring us ever nearer to the perfection of ordered
liberty."
In 1925 Secretary Charles Evans Hughes em-
pliasized that hemispheric cooperation, while based
on mutual self-interest of the American Republics,
does not isolate our peoples from the rest of the
world. On the contrary, he said, our hemispheric
cooperation "in itself constitutes a most important
contribution to world peace.''
And only last year Secretary John Foster Dulles
expressed this truth in another way here at the
Pan American Union, saying: "This great inter-
American system, which was first a vision and a
dream and then an expression of faith, has become
in our time the most solid international organiza-
tion of free peoples on earth . . . beneficial to all
mankind." *
Abiding Family Relationship
Tliis persistent view of our Secretaries of
State — that the family relationship among the
American nations is of an abiding nature and is an
example for all mankind — has long been shared by
our Congress and our Chief Executives. Presi-
dents Thomas Jefferson, John Quincy Adams,
Abraham Lincobi, Herbert Hoover, Franklin D.
Roosevelt, Dwight D. Eisenhower — all have been
inspired by the power, the peaceful achievement,
and growing potential of the inter-American
frafernity of nations.
I have thought it worth while to emphasize the
historical nature of our friendship and coopera-
tion, for the overt propagandists and the covert
subversives of today contend that ours is an
ephemeral solidarity; that there does not really
exist a solid basis for continuing harmony; and
that our mask of pretension will one day be cast
aside to reveal the real creature, the hostile im-
perialist. Nearly everyone in the Americas recog-
nizes this kind of talk for what it is : a calculated,
malicious misrepresentation to serve the purposes
of a clever world conspiracy which holds our
deepest spiritual convictions in contempt and
* Ibid., May 2, 1955, p. 728.
Solidarity of tlie Western Hemisphere
Press release 195 dated April 13
President Eisenhower has is.sued a proclamation '
designating the period April 8-14 as Pan A-merican
Week, and Saturday, April 14, as Pan American Day.
In his proclamation, the President calls attention
to the fact that April 14 will mark the sixty-sixth
anniversary of the founding of the Pan American
Union, the forerunner of the great inter-American
system now known asi the Organization of American
States.
During the past year there have been many ex-
amples of the friendly cooperation and common
purpose which has been traditionally a hallmark of
United States relations with the countries of this
hemisphere. Several friendly visits were exchanged
by representatives of our respective governments.
A number of important new agreements were signed
looking to the development of peaceful iises of
atomic energy in the Western Hemisphere and
providing for mutual economic and technical
assistance.
The efficacy and great moral influence of the
peace machinery of the OAS were again demon-
strated when it was used successfully to bring
about a solution of a difficult situation which had
arisen between two of our neighbor governments.
Further progi-ess was made in the construction
of the Inter-American Highway in Central America,
which now is expected to be completed within 2
years.
The United States on its part was privileged to
lend assistance in connection with the floods which
struck in parts of Mexico and Honduras, and the
polio epidemic in Argentina. We ourselves received
aid from several of our neighbor republics when
floods and hurricanes hit our northeast coast in
the summer of 1955.
The solidarity of the sister republics of this
hemisphere is based on faith. First and foremost,
it is faith in the institutions all are pledged to
defend. Secondly, and equally, it is faith in one
another. It is in such spirit that the governments
and peoples of the 21 American Republics join
together to celebrate this Pan American Week.
' Bulletin of Apr. 2, 1956, p. .544.
which seeks, by coercion and subversion, to control
the destiny of mankind.
Our cooperation not only has a proud, long liis-
tory; it also possesses the assurance of a beneficial
future. For it is grounded firmly on mutuality in
our relations. As I stated in my report to my
brother and his associates in the Federal Govern-
ment, our solidarity is based, first upon a genuine
understanding of one another — an understanding
that permeates not only governments but also the
April 23, 7956
683
great masses of all our peoples. It is based, second,
upon the closely related requisites of mutual re-
spect and the sovereign equality of states. This is
especially important in relations between large and
small, powerful and weak nations, for nations, like
people, have dignity and pride; only if each re-
spects the rights, aspirations, cultures, sensibil-
ities, and equal legal rights of the others can there
be permanence in their friendship. Our coopera-
tion is based upon another fundamental : mutual
security. This is imperative in our threatened
world. Tliis concept, indeed, originated among
the American family of nations and was formal-
ized, as all know, in the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro
of 1947. And the other great requisite for our con-
tinuing cooperation is firm adlierence to common
goals — the goals of peace, liberty, independence,
rising levels of well-being, and the attainment of
spiritual values.
But while we may be satisfied that the elements
of our hemispheric unity are correct and firmly es-
tablished, we recognize that much remains to be
done, and no doubt always will remain to be done,
if our unity is to yield the constructive results we
all desire.
Fortunately, much has been accomplished in the
past several years to improve relationships; es-
pecially has a great deal been done to improve
mutual understanding and to strengthen economic
cooperation.
Heightened U.S. Interest
Never has interest in my country in all phases
of inter-American relations been so widespread
as it is now. This heightened interest was no
doubt caused to some extent by the anxiety our
people felt for a time at the Communist threat
that was so narrowly averted in one American
nation.
But it is due also, I am sure, to an increasing
awai'eness of our economic, political, military,
and cultural interdependence; to the widespread
publicity given to the inter-American conferences
at Caracas, Rio, and Ciudad Trujillo; to the swift
steps taken by the Organization of American
States to settle quickly three serious disputes
among member nations ; to a tremendous increase
in the exchange-of -persons programs, and to the
modest additional support of American schools in
Latin America ; to the most welcome visits to the
United States of the President of Uruguay, the
President of Guatemala, the President-elect of
Brazil, the President of Mexico, and the Prime
Minister of Canada; to the visits of our Vice
President to Middle America and Brazil ; and to
the visits of our Assistant Secretary of State to
every Republic of Latin America.
In addition to meetings at high official levels,
genuine mutual understanding is being continu-
ally enhanced by the exchange of literally thou-
sands of students, business and professional men
and women, and a rising tide of tourists.
The United States Information Agency has ex-
panded its programs of intellectual and cultural
cooperation in Latin America. More books than
ever before are being translated from Portuguese
and Spanish into English, and vice versa. Latin
American music has invaded the theaters, clubs,
and homes of my country as a welcome retaliation
for the infiltration of United States jive and rock-
and-roll into every nook and corner of the Latin
American Republics. And at tliis moment, exhib-
its of Argentinean, Chilean, Peruvian, Venezuelan,
and Caribbean arts are being shown in many
parts of the United States.
Most of all, however, mutual understanding is
being increased through the growing voliune of
material in the press and on the radio and tele-
vision; in every country of the American com-
munity our people are being exposed to informa-
tion and ideas about all the other countries of the
hemisphere.
Increased understanding and mutual respect,
valuable in themselves, have also effectively
strengthened economic cooperation — the real key
to better relations among our countries and
peoples.
Consistent Economic Programs
The most important recommendation I made in
my report to the President nearly 3 years ago was
that the United States adopt and adhere to trade
policies with Latin America which possess sta-
bility and a minimum of mechanisms permitting
the imposition of increased tariffs or quotas. I
emphasized that real cooperation in this hemi-
sphere can flow only from intelligent adlierence to
consistent economic programs, honorably and j
continuously observed.
I can proudly say today that both by congres-
sional enactments and by firm policies established
by the executive branch of the United States Gov-
684
Department of State Bulletin
ernment, gi-eater stability has been infused into our
trade, financial, and other economic relationships.
Assurance of access to the great market of the
United States, with a minimum of changes in the
j rules, is the most effective guaranty of economic
stability in Latin America. Similar assurance
tliat the other nations of this hemisphere can con-
tinue to buy much of our surplus production is an
essential of economic prosperity in the United
States.
In the last several years, too, the United States
Government has recognized that public and pri-
vate lending for sound development projects must
go forward on a substantial scale. Production and
productivity are increasing more rapidly in Latin
America than anywhere else in the world. This
advance creates an insatiable demand for capital.
We of the United States are placing greatest
reliance, as we should, upon a flow of private
capital for investment. That flow can be encour-
aged best by the Latin American nations them-
selves. Nonetheless, the United States has an-
nounced repeatedly in the last several years that
it favors public loans to finance those sound proj-
ects for which private financing is not available.
Indeed, we have assm-ed all nations of Latin
America that we will do everything we can to
satisfy all applications for sound economic-de-
velopment loans for which capital is not reason-
ably available either from private sources or from
the International Bank. Both the Export-Im-
port Bank and the International Banli, I am told,
; have ample funds to lend ; indeed, they are pre-
' pared to process applications greatly in excess of
those now on hand.
Since its creation in 1934, the Export-Import
Bank has authorized loans totaling more than
$2,500,000,000. Some 20 months ago the Bank
announced a new policy designed to expand its
activities in Latin America. In the next full
I year, loans to Latin America increased by more
than 500 percent to $284,000,000, or 58 percent of
the Bank's total loans. The Export-Import Bank
can be counted on to continue to make important
contributions to the economic development of this
I hemisphere.
Inter- American cooperation is developing pro-
grams of atomic energy for peaceful purposes —
' cooperation which may one day be recognized as
a significant turning point in history. For nu-
clear science may bring productive energy to
many nations wliich now suffer a serious deficiency
and which are constantly having difficulty with
foreign exchange because of the imperative need
to import oil, coal, and other fuels.
Truly impressive progress has been made on
the construction of the Inter- American Highway ;
through greatly increased appropriations the
United States is contributing a major share of the
cost of what may soon become the most traveled
artery of the Americas. Additional programs
of technical assistance have been worked out in
education, agriculture, public health, and related
fields.
Many of our countries, the United States among
them, have suffered in recent years from such
natural disasters as floods, hurricanes, and epi-
demics of disease; all countries, including the
United States, have received prompt and gener-
ous assistance from other American peoples.
This aid has been, indeed, a persuasive demonstra-
tion of the heart of America.
It is a long story, this story of inter- American
cooperation for better health, better education,
better living conditions; for peace, for freedom,
for order, and for independence.
It has been said, and justly said, that inter-
American neighborliness is not only the policy of
the American govermnents but also a state of
mind of all our peoples. I am sure this is so.
But while we have made traditional the practice
of proclaiming this fact anew every year on Pan
American Day, I believe all of us here would agree
that this attitude must in fact guide our actions
every day of every year.
Good Partners
So far as the United States is concerned, I
think I may confidently say that our state of mind
in this regard is better than ever before. The de-
velopment is sufficient that we have had to find
words to describe our thinking. We have gradu-
ally dropped the phrase "good neighbor'' and
have substituted, with sincerity, the phrase "good
partner."
This signifies much more than a difference of
words. It underscores a new approach to the
problems we share.
As neighbors, each American Eepublic tried in
the economic field to adopt policies and follow
courses which would not prejudice the interests
of the other members of the total community.
Each sought in good faith to respond construc-
April 23, J 956
685
tively to requests for cooperation and assistance
from othei-s. In the United States the good-
neijilibor policy gave a new and meaningful direc-
tion to our hemispheric programs and relations.
That policy has logically carried us to the re-
lationship that exists and must exist between us
today — a relationship which is so close that it can
no longer accurately be described as that of neigh-
bors. So interdependent are our destinies today
that each American Republic must recognize its
direct, continuing, and even selfish interest in the
solution of the critical problems of every other
member of the family. We must now be depend-
able, honorable partners in a great and lasting
enterprise — the peaceful independence, the pros-
perity, and the happiness of all our peoples —
peoples with great and marvelous cultural divers-
ity but with equally great and inescapable
interdependent goals.
In the spirit of partnership we have in recent
years made substantial progress toward better
understanding and mutual respect, and improved
political, military, and economic cooperation.
That must give us all deep satisfaction. As I said
in concluding my report on Latin America to
President Eisenhower :
"Working together, the nations of this Hem-
isphere can, if history should so decree, stand
firmly against any enemy in war, and prosper
mightily together in times of peace."
World Trade Week, 1956
A PROCLAMATION*
Whereas it is the continuing desire of the people of
the United States to strengthen our ties of friendship
with all nations of the free world and to foster under-
standing and cooperation among them ; and
Whehseas international trade, travel, and investment
make vital contributions to international stability and
the mutual development of resources, security, and cul-
ture ; and
Whereas the expansion of international social, cul-
tural, and business relationships promotes the imity and
solidarity of the nations of the free world ; and
Whereas the national interest requires that we join
with friendly nations in dealing with our trade problems
on a cooperative basis :
Now, THEREFORE, I, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, Pres-
ident of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim
the week lieginning May 20, 195f), as World Trade Week;
and I request the appropriate officials of the Federal Gov-
'No. 3130: 21 Fed. Reg. 19153.
ernment and of the several States, Territories, possessions,
and municipalities of the United States to cooperate in
the observance of that week.
I also urge business, labor, agricultural, educational,
and civic groujis, as well as people in the United States
generally, to observe World Trade Week with gatherings,
discussions, exhibits, ceremonies, and other appropriate
activities designed to promote continuing awareness of
the importance of world trade to our economy and our
relations with other nations.
In WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and
caused the Seal of the United States of America to be
aflBxed.
Done at the City of Washington this twenty-fourth
day of March in the year of our Lord nineteen
[seal] hundred and tifty-six, and of the Independence
of the United States of America the one hundred
and eightieth.
By the President :
John Foster Dotles
Secretary of State
Western Europe Cuts Curbs
on Dollar-Area imports
The International Cooperation Administration
armounced on March 28 that substantial progress
in relaxing restrictions on imports into AV^estem
Eui-ope from the dollar area had been reported
that day by the Organization for European Eco-
nomic Cooperation. As of January 1, 1956, some
54 percent of all private imports by the 17 Oeeo
member countries from the United States and
Canada, based on their dollar value, were free of
quantitative restrictions. Tliis compares with
only 11 percent free of such restrictions at the
beginning of 1953.
The progi-ess report brought an expression of
approval from John B. Hollister, Director of the
International Cooperation Administration, who
headed the U.S, delegation to the recent Oeec
Council meeting at Paris.
"This report," said Mr. Hollister, "constitutes
positive evidence that Western European coun-
tries are following through on their commitment
under the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, to remove restrictions on imports as their
external financial position improves. The United
States Government is pleased to note this progress
in AVestern Europe."
686
Department of State Bulletin
On tlie whole, the level of liberalization has been
hiflher for food and feedstuft's and for raw mate-
1, rial than for manufactured goods.
For the first 9 months of 1955, member coun-
tries' total imports from the United States and
Canada were 40 percent above those of the cor-
responding period in 1954, while their total im-
ports from all sources showed a 15 percent rise.
The increase in dollar imports contributed to
an enlargement of the trade deficit with the
United States and Canada, since member country
exports did not increase correspondingly. How-
ever, there was an overall increase in gold and
dollar holdings in 1955 by more than $800 million,
due primarily to American military expenditures.
With regard to so-called "invisible" transac-
tions, such as payments for sei-Ances and ware-
housing charged for goods in international trade,
returns on foreign investments, business travel,
etc., the report indicates that liberalization with
respect to the dollar area is more general and more
extensive than in the case of commodity trade.
The Oeec report is entitled Liheralization of
Europe's Dollar Trade. It is based on replies of
member countries to a questionnaire, on docu-
ments relating to commercial policies, and on dis-
cussions between government representatives from
the United States, Canada, and the Western Euro-
pean countries.
Oeec member countries are Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ire-
land, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Nor-
way, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and
the United Kingdom. Canada and the United
States are associate members.
Tariff Negotiations With Finland,
France, Dominican Republic
Press release 194 dated April 12
I The United States has concluded negotiations
with the Dominican Republic, Finland, and
France whereby these countries withdrew or modi-
fied under article XXVIII of the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade a number of tariff con-
cessions pi'eviously granted to the United States.
Although no changes in U.S. tariff rates were in-
volved, the negotiations permitted the United
States to obtain new concessions from the tln-ee
coimtries designed to offset the concessions with-
dra-.vn or modified and to maintain the previous
level of reciprocal concessions.
At specified but infrequent intervals and in ac-
cordance with established procedures, the contract-
ing parties of the general agi-eement are per-
mitted to withdraw or modify tariff concessions
previously granted. These concessions are either
reductions in tariff rates or agreements not to in-
crease these rates. In such cases, the contracting
party with whom the concession was originally
negotiated or any other contracting party having
a substantial trade interest in the concessionary
item has the right to negotiate for new concessions
with the objective of reestablishing the previous
level of concessions.
In such negotiations a variety of factors is con-
sidered in assessing the compensatory concessions
offered for those withdrawn or modified. The
trade value of the products affected is one item.
Another is the extent and severity of modifications
and withdrawals contrasted with the probable
trade-expansion potential of the compensatory
concessions which might be granted. The exis-
tence and operation of quantitative restrictions
maj' also be significant, as well as different
methods of valuing the same product, i. e., whether
as an import on the one hand or as an expoi-t on the
other. An examination of all pertinent factors is,
therefore, conducted before a new balance is struck
in order to assure that compensatory offei-s in
reality maintain the existing level of reciprocal
concessions.
United States participation in these negotiations
was guided by the recommendations of the Inter-
departmental Committee on Trade Agreements,
the group which advises the President on trade
agreement matters.
A summary of the principal changes involved
in the j^resent set of negotiations follows.^
Dominican Rep^iblic. The Dominican Repub-
lic modified three concessions made to the United
States relating to paints and varnishes. With
regard to varnishes, the modification consisted
wholly in revising the Dominican tariff classifi-
cation of this commodity, breaking up the pre-
vious "basket" item into a number of categories,
' For details, see Department of State publication 6324.
Results of similar negotiations with 16 other countries
will be found in Department of State publications 5881,
6001, 6201, and 6291.
April 23, 1956
687
without increasing the duty for any of tlie com-
ponent parts. The paint and pigment category
was similarly revised, but duties in this instance
were, in general, increased. Imports by the Do-
minican Eepublic from the United States for this
latter group of paints and pigments were $559,000
in 1954.
To compensate for these increases, the Domini-
can Eepublic reduced concession ai-y rates already
granted on six items and provided new concessions
on five items. Imports from the United States of
these 11 items by the Dominican Eepublic in 1954
amounted to $543,000, of which the most important
were cigarette tobacco and wheat semolina.
Finland. Finnish rates of duty on 17 items,
directly negotiated with the United States, were
increased and rebound at the higher rates. In
1954 Finland imported nearly $600,000 of all of
these items from the United States, the most im-
portant being certain varieties of fruit preserves
and preparations, compressors and air piunps, and
miscellaneous machinery and apparatus.
In return, Finland made concessions on 11 items.
In four instances duties were reduced and re-
bound; in seven, concessions on new items were
gr inted. Imports from the United States of these
11 items by Finland amounted to $819,000 in 1954.
Lubricating oils and tinned sheet iron and steel
comprised the principal part of this trade.
France. Of the 14 tariff concessions modified
by France, six were originally negotiated with the
United States. All of these modifications in-
creased French import duties. According to
French statistics for 1953, the latest data sup-
plied, imports of these items from the United
States amounted to $283,000, the preponderant
part being unsweetened fruit and vegetable juices.
United States trade data showed exports of
$238,000 for all 14 items to France in 1954.
As compensation, France reduced duties on four
items and bound rates on two others. French sta-
tistics indicated imports of these items from the
United States to be $1,791,000 in 1953, most of
them being fresh oranges. United States statistics
for 1954 listed exports of $4G6,000 for all of these
items, fresh oranges again ranking as the prin-
cipal item. As an additional concession, France
agreed not to seek compensation for the United
States withdrawal in August 1955 of its tariff con-
cession on bicycles.
Continuation of Rate of Duty
on Imports of Hatters' Fur
White House press release dated March 29
The President on ilarch 29 concurred with
the Tariff Commission's recent finding that no
formal investigation should be instituted at this
time to determine whether the tariff should be
reduced on imports of hatters' fur.' The Presi-
dent found, with the Tariff Commission, that
there is no sufficient reason at this time to reopen
the escape-clause action which resulted in an in-
crease of the duty on imports of hatters' fur.
The President's decision means that the increased
rate of duty established in 1952 as a result of
escape-clause action will continue to apply with-
out reduction or other modification.
The President's action was taken after the views
of all interested departments and agencies of the
executive branch had been received and studied.
The Tariff Commission's report was made pur-
suant to Executive Order 10401, which requires
periodic review of actions taken under the escape
clause. It was transmitted to the President on
February 6, 1956.
The tariff' on hatters' fur was reduced as the
result of trade agreement negotiations in 1935
and again in 1948. Effective February 9, 1952,
the tariff on imports of hatters' fur was increased
as the result of an escape-clause action to its pres-
ent rate of 471/20 per pound but not less than 15
jiercent nor more than 35 percent ad valorem.
The Tariff Commission's report constitutes its
third periodic review of the escape-clause action
taken on this product.
U.S. Delegations to
international Conferences
Inter-American Port and Harbor Conference
The Department of State annoimced on April
11 (press release 187) that the U.S. Government
will be represented at the Inter- American Port
and Harbor Conference, which will meet at San
Jose, Costa Eica, April 25-May 6, 1956, by a
' Copies of the Tariff Commission's report may be ob-
tained from the U.S. Tariff Commission, Washington 25,
B.C.
688
Deparfment of Sfafe Bulletin
delegation composed of the following representa-
tives of U.S. Government agencies and of private
groups concerned with port administration and
maritime transportation :
Chairman
Charles P. Nolan, Officer in Charge, Transportation and
Communications, OflBce of Regional American Af-
fairs, Department of State
Vice Chairman
Howard J. Marsden, Chief, Division of Port Develop-
ment, Maritime Administration, Department of
Commerce
Advisers
Benjamin P. Clark, Commander, TJSCG, Chief, Port Se-
curity Section, United States Coast Guard, Depart-
ment of the Treasury
J. Eugene Kennedy, Assistant Collector of Customs, Balti-
more, Md., Department of the Treasury
George J. Leovy, American Merchant Marine Institute,
New York, N.Y.
Robert E. Mayer, President, Pacific American Steamship
Association, San Francisco, Calif.
Matthew C. O'Hearn, American Merchant Marine Insti-
tute, Washington, D.C.
Jerrold P. Turner, President, American Association of
Port Authorities, Mobile, Ala.
The purpose of the meeting is to bring together
qualified technical experts of the American Ee-
publics to discuss matters relating to port admin-
istration, port practices and regulations, terminal
operation (including warehousing), cargo han-
dling, cargo loss prevention, port congestion, port
modernization, and free-trade zones.
Marshall Islanders' Petition
on Nuclear Tests in Pacific
STATEMENT BY BENJAMIN GERIG <
The United States delegation has just been in-
formed by the Department of State that a petition
concerning the forthcoming nuclear tests to be
held at the Pacific Proving Grounds was received
by the chairman of the Visiting Mission from the
Marshallese Congress Hold-Over Committee.
In accordance with rule 84, paragraphs 1 and 2,
the original was sent to the Secretary-General
'Made in the Trusteeship Council on Mar. 20 (U.S./
U.N. press release 2371). Mr. Gerig is Deputy U.S. Rep-
resentative in the Trusteeship Council.
and a copy to the United Nations Acting High
Commissioner of the Pacific Trust Territory. We
assume that the original has been or will shortly
be received by the Secretary-General and will be
made available to the Trusteeship Council.
The petitioners in effect reiterate their petition
of April 20, 1954,2 expressing the desire that the
nuclear tests should cease or that, if considered
necessary in the interest of world peace and se-
curity, should be conducted with all feasible pre-
caution. I may say parenthetically that all such
precautions are being taken.
Mr. President, we can all imderstand the feel-
ings of these people, and we share with them the
hope that a fully safeguarded disarmament pro-
gram, including an "open sky" agreement, will be
reached which will make such testing unneces-
sary. Although we have already discussed the
essentials of this problem and although the peti-
tion raises no new questions, the United States
delegation wishes to make clear that it is prepared
to have the Council discuss the petition at the
present session if it desires to do so.^
OBSERVATIONS OF THE U. S. GOVERNMENT AS
ADMINISTERING AUTHORITY «
Nothing would please the Administering Au-
thority more than to be able to comply with the
wishes of the Marshallese people that nuclear tests
be discontinued in their islands, but this is not yet
possible. The Marshallese people can, however,
be assured that the decision to hold further tests in
these islands was considered a matter of such grav-
ity that it was taken by President Eisenhower him-
self. Moreover, it was not taken until very care-
ful and comprehensive studies were made that
- BtTLLETiN of June 7, 1954, p. 887.
' On Mar. 29 the Council, by a vote of 9 to 4, approved
the proposal of its Standing Committee on Petitions
(U.N. doc. T/L. 649) that the Council draw to the peti-
tioners' attention the observations of the Administering
Authority ; reaffirm its resolution of 1954; and recommend
that all necessary measures should be taken "to guard
against any possible dangers," "to settle forthwith all
justified claims by the inhabitants of Bikini and Eniwetok
relating to their temporary displacement" in connection
with the earlier nuclear tests which were held in the
Pacific Proving Grounds in 1954, and "to compensate the
families which may have to be temporarily evacuated,
for any losses which may result from further nuclear
weapons tests."
' U.N. doc. T/OBS.10/5 dated Mar. 26.
April 23, 1956
689
convinced him tliiit there was at present no prac-
ticable alternative.
lender President Eisenhower's leadership, the
United States is earnestly seeking, along with
other Governments, a fully safeguarded disarma-
ment agreement whicii would make such tests un-
necessary. Until such an agreement has been
reached and as long as there is the threat of ag-
gression, elementary prudence requires the United
States to continue its tests. It is the conviction of
the United States that it has a responsibility not
only to its people but to all the peoples of the free
world to maintain at a maximum its capacity to
deter aggression and preserve peace. Thus it be-
lieves that, under present circumstances, further
tests are, in the words of the petitioners, "abso-
lutolv necessary for the eventual well being of all
the people of this world".
The question remains as to whether such tests
could not be conducted elsewhere than in the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands. An exhaustive
examination of alternative sites in the United
States and in other parts of the world was under-
taken. The conclusion reached was that there was
no other technically suitable site available to the
United States where such complete safeguards
agairist possible hazards could be taken.
Even after this conclusion was reached, there
was no decision to hold further tests in the islands
until a system of precautionary measures was
worked out that gave convincing assurance that no
human being, inhabitant of the Trust Territory
or otherwise would be in any way endangered by
the tests.
Thus the Administering Authority believes
that, although the United States Government is
regrettably unable to comply M'ith the first re-
quest of the petitioners, so far as is humanly pos-
sible the authorities are complying with the sec-
ond, namely that "all possible jsrecautionary
measures be taken before such weapons are ex-
ploded".
To begin with, a danger area has been estab-
lished. The boundaries of this area and the date
they become effective have been continually pub-
licized since 1 March by all available means, not
only in the Trust Territory but to all parts of the
world. Every effort has been made to see that
the people of the Trust Territory, as well as all
other people, are aware well in advance that it
will be dangerous to enter this area after 20 April.
Such warnings alone will not be relied on. Elabo-
rate sea and air patrols before each test wiU be
conducted to make sure that no vessel or aircraft
has strayed into the area.
The Administering Authority would like to re-
fer to the statement on 12 January 1956 of the
Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission to
the effect that
The forthcoming series of nuclear tests at the Eniwe-
tok Proving Grounds, as announced today by the Com-
mission and the Department of Defense, will involve
weapons generally smaller in yield than those tested
during the 1954 test series.
It is anticipated that the energy release of the largest
test will be substantially below that of the maximum
1954 test.
The timing of all test shots will be governed
by the judgement of weather experts assisted by
new devices and techniques. The precautions
that will be taken will ensure that '"fallout" will
occur only in the danger area, which does not in-
clude inhabited islands.
Among the steps that will be taken are the
following :
1. Improved techniques will provide for more
reliable weather predictions. The number of
weather stations in the Pacific will be increased,
aircraft will fly at high altitude to collect weather
data and new type weather balloons and rockets
will ascend to greater altitudes to gather weather
data. Recently developed computers have mech-
anized most of the computational problems of
predicting fallovf patterns, permitting forecasts
to be made much more rapidly than heretofore.
2. Following each detonation, aerial flights will
be initiated to accomplish a quick radiological
survey of the islands and surrounding seas.
3. There will be U.S. Air Weather Service and
U.S. Public Health Service personnel present on
sixteen islands for monitoring purposes. They
will be equipped with adequate radiological mon-
itoring devices and two-way radios. These islands
are as follows : Eongerik, Tarawa, Wotho, Utirik,
Majuro, Kusaie, Ujelang, Midway, Kwajalein, Iwo
Jima, Guam, Johnson, Truk, Wake, Ponape, and
Rongelap.
4. Radioactive clouds caused by the tests will
be tracked by airplanes to check on their course.
In paragraph 2 (a) of their petition the Mar-
shallese request that "all human beings and their
valuable possessions be transported to safe dis-
tances fii-st, before such explosions occur". It will
not be necessary to evacuate any of the Marshallese
690
Department of State Bulletin
people from their present homes prior to the tests.
It is fully expected that no evacuation will be
called for during or after the tests, but in con-
formity with pood planning complete plans have
been ])repared for emergency evacuation of the
inhabitants.
In paragraph 2 (b) the petitioners request that
"all the people living in this area be instructed in
safety measures", and in paragraph 2 (d) they
ask that "courses be taught to Marshallese Medical
Practitioners and Health-Aides which will be use-
ful in the detecting of and the circumventing of
preventable dangers". These requests are being
met in the following way : Scientific personnel who
are trained radiological monitors equipped with
radiation detection devices and two-way radios
and fully acquainted with the necessary safety
precautions will be stationed on the sixteen islands
mentioned above. Medical doctors will also be
in the area. Prior to and during the new series
of tests training will be given to Marshallese med-
ical practitioners and health aides in all neceasary
precautionary measures.
In paragraph 2 (c) the petitioners request that
"adequate funds be set aside to pay for the pos-
sessions of the people in case they will have to be
moved from their homes. This will include lands,
houses and whatever possessions they cannot take
witli them, so that the unsatisfactory arrange-
ments for the Bikinians and Enewetak people
shall not be i-epeated." It is not anticipated that
any of the inhabitants will have to be moved from
their homes; however, should this prove necessary
or should the inhabitants sutTer any other hard-
ship as a result of the tests, adequate funds as well
as other facilities will be available to make appro-
priate compensation.
The United States is pleased to note the peti-
tioners' opinion that the people of Rongelap, who
were evacuated from their homes after the last
tests, have been well cared for by the Administer-
ing Authority in their temporai-y location at Ejit.
The ITnited States Special Representative de-
scribed in some detail to the sixteenth session of the
Council ^ the measures being taken to care for the
displaced Rongelapese. He made clear that the
Administration is at the same time acutely aware
that these temporary arrangements do not provide
a normal existence for these people. He indicated
that it was the Administration's intention to re-
patriate them as soon as scientific surveys indicate
tliat there will be no danger to the inhabitants in
so doing. Several such surveys have been made,
one very recently, and it is now hoped that this
move can be made in the early autumn.
One of the most difficult questions referred to by
tlie petitioners is that of the land claims in the
Marshall Islands, including those of the people of
Bikini and Eniwetok. It is true that in the com-
plicated process of settling land claims in the
Territory greater progress has been made in other
districts than in the Marshall Islands District.
This situation results from greater availability of
land in these other areas than in the Marshalls.
Recently, however, agreement has been reached
within the United States Government on general
terms under which compensation in the Marshalls
and elsewhere will be possible. Administrative
arrangements are now being worked out pursuant
to this agreement in order to permit early satisfac-
tion of the claims. It should be recalled, however,
that both the Bikini and Eniwetok people have
been relocated on other land that has been deeded
to them and have been given considerable assist-
ance in their resettlement and readjustment.
The Administering Authority deeply appreci-
ates the friendly sentiments towards the United
States expressed by the petitioners, all of them
members of the Marshallese Congress. The Ad-
ministering Authority hopes that, despite the hard
decision tliat the United States Government has
felt obliged to make, the other measures described
will reassure them that the Administering Au-
thority is exercising its trust with the highest pos-
sible sense of responsibility, conditioned only by
its broader responsibility for world peace and
security.
PETITION FROM MARSHALLESE CONGRESS
HOLD-OVER COMMITTEE »
Letter From Sir John Macpherson ' to U.N. Secretary-
General
Majuro, 11 March 1956
In accordance with rule 84 paragraph 1 of the rules
of procedure of the Ti-usteeship Council, I have the
honour to transmit to you a communication dated 9
March 19.56 from the Marshallese Congress Hold-Over
Committee which was received by the Visiting Mission
to the Trust Territories in the Pacific.
' Bulletin of July 2.5, 1955, p. 153.
' U.N. doe. T/PET. 10/29 dated Mar. 20.
' Chairman of U.N. Visiting Mission.
April 23, 1956
691
1
A copy of this communication has been transmitted
to the Acting High Commissioner of the Trust Territory.
In transmitting the present communication to the Sec-
retary-General, the Mission wishes to record the circum-
stances in whicli it was received.
On 8 March 19.50, the Mission held a meeting at Majuro
with the members of the Marshallese Congress Hold-
Over Committee in the course of which a wide range of
matters came under discussion. The Committee stated
that the people of the Marshall Islands had been in-
formed officially that further nuclear tests would take
place in the near future in the Trust Territory. The
Committee wished to go on record before the Visiting
Mission that they reiterated the position they had taken
when they presented their petition in April 1954, namely :
(a) that nuclear explosion tests in the Marshalls be
discontinued; (b) that if these experiments were abso-
lutely necessary for the eventual well-being of all the
people of the world and could not take place elsewhere,
all measures enumerated in their petition (T/PET. 10/28)
should be taken.
On the following day the Mission held a private meet-
ing of its own to discuss several matters. During this
meeting, doubts were expressed as to whether it was the
intention of the Hold-Over Committee that their state-
ment should be brought to the attention of the Trusteeship
Council prior to the completion of the Visiting Mission's
report. In order to clarify the situation, the Mission
called in a representative of the Hold-Over Committee
who stated that the Committee wished to have its views
brought to the immediate attention of the Trusteeship
Council and was prepared to put them in writing. On 10
March the Mission received the present communication.
The Mission also desires to record that during a dis-
cussion with him, the Acting High Commissioner informed
the Mission that all possible precautions were being taken
to ensure the safety and the well-being of the people in
the vicinity of the test area.
It is requested that the present letter be transmitted
to the members of the Trusteeship Council at the same
time as the attached communication.
John Macpherson
Text of Petition
March 9th, 1956
To : The United Nations Visiting Mission
From : The Marshallese Congress Hold-Over Commit-
tee
Subject : Ee-iteration of the Marshallese people's petition
to the United Nations, dated April 20th, 1954,
regarding the explosion of lethal weapons
within our home islands.
In view of the official announcement to the Marshallese
people of the coming nuclear test in this area in the
not too distant future, we, the members of the Marshall-
ese Congress Hold-Over Committee and other interested
leaders of our people re-itei'ate our petition of April 20th,
1954, which dealt with the explosion of lethal weapons
within our home islands.
Our petition emphatically stated that :
1. All the experiments with lethal weapons within
this area be immediately ceased.
2. If the experiments with said weapons should be
judged absolutely necessary for the eventual well being of
all the people of this world and cannot be stopped or
changed to other areas due to the unavailability of other
locations, we then submit the following suggestions:
(a) All possible precautionary measures be taken be-
fore such weapons are exploded. All human beings and
their valuable possessions be transported to safe distancea
lirst, before such explosions occur.
(b) All the people living in this area be instructed in
safety measures. The people of Rongelab would have
avoided much danger if they had known not to drink
the waters on their home island after the radio-active
dusts had settled on them.
(c) Adequate funds be set aside to pay for the pos-
sessions of the people in case they will have to be moved
from their homes. This will include lands, houses and
whatever possessions they cannot take with them, so
that the unsatisfactory arrangements for the Bikinians
and Bnewetak people shall not be repeated.
(d) Courses be taught to Marshallese Medical Prac-
titioners and Health-Aides which will be useful in the
detecting of and the circumventing of preventable
dangers.
Our request Number 1 was not heeded, another test
will soon be made. Request Number 2, to some degree,
has been taken care of to the satisfaction of the Mar-
shallese people. The Rongelab people are well subsisted
and housed, and the medical care rendered them is ex-
cellent, yet, they are still on the small island of Ejit:
but together with the Administering Authority, the re-
sponsible Rongelab leaders, and other Marshallese realize
that long living in an abnormal existence is detrimental
to their society. They were told that they will soon be
going back to their home island, Rongelab, and with them,
the other Marshallese are looking forward to the fulfill-
ment of this promise.
Bikini and Enewetak, like all the other land claims
in the Marshall Islands, have not been compensated for,
or returned to the owners. We should like to repeat here
that, "Land means a great deal to the Marshallese. It
means more than just a place where you can plant your
food crops and build your houses ; or a place where you
can bury your dead. It is the very life of the people.
Take away their land and their spirits go also."
Therefore, we, the members of the Marshallese Con-
gress Hold-Over Committee, who are empowered by the
Marshallese Congress to act in its name when it is not
in session and which is in turn a group of members
representing all the municipalities in the Marshalls, due
to the undiminishing threat to our life, liberty, happiness
and po-ssession of land, do hereby submit this document
to the United Nations Visiting Mission with the request
that they send this on to the United Nations Trustee-
ship Council as soon as possible, which with its knowledge
of our great concern may then act on our urgent plea and
take all steps within its power to help remedy the situ-
ation.
In closing, we, the members of the Marshallese Con-
gress Hold-Over Committee want to make it very clear to
692
Department of State Bulletin
the United Nations Visiting Mission that this should not
be interpreted as a reflection of the Trust Territory
Government's deliberate ill-treatment of the Marshallese
people or be misconstrued as a repudiation of the United
States as our governing agency for the United Nations
under the trusteeship Agreement, for aside from repeat-
ing our plea to have the nuclear tests within our home
islands stopped as we are fearful of the danger these
lethal weapons can and have inflicted on people living in
the Marshalls, and the deep concern we have for the
number of people who have been dispossessed of land,
we have found the Administering Authority the most
aitreeable one we ever had.
Respectfully submitted,
1. Kabtja Kabua 7. Henet Samtjel
2. Atlan Anien (absent) 8. Jiblock
3. DwiGHT Heine 9. Aiseia David
4. Robert Reimers 10. Amata Kabua
."i. C. DoMiNicK 11. Lazarus Simon (absent)
6. Namu Ermis (absent) 12. Lajibiu (absent)
Current U.N. Documents:
A Selected Bibliography
Security Council
Letter Dated 21 January 1956 from the Minister of Ex-
ternal Affairs of the Sudan Addressed to the Secretary-
; General Concerning the Application of the Sudan for
Admission to Membership in the United Nations and
Declaration Accepting Obligations Under the Charter.
S/3543, January 30, 1954. 3 pp. mimeo.
Letter Dated 10 February 1956 from the Representative of
Saudi Arabia Addressed to the President of the Security
Council. S/354S, February 10, 1956. 2 pp. mimeo.
Letter Dated 6 March 1956 from the Representative of
Israel addressed to the President of the Security
Council. S/3554, March 7, 1956. 3 pp. mimeo.
General Assembly
Unref Executive Committee. Revised Plan of Opera-
tions (1956) (Submitted by the High Commissioner).
A/AC.79/21, November 28, 1955. 131 pp. mimeo.
Information From Non-Self-Governing Territories : Sum-
mary and Analysis of Information Transmitted under
Article 73e of the Charter. Report of the Secretary-
' General. Indian Ocean Territories. A/3107, December
22, 1955. 90 pp. mimeo.
Information From Xon-Self-Governing Territories : Sum-
mary and Analysis of Infonnation Transmitted Under
Article 73e of the Charter. Report of the Secretary-
General. Asian Territories [Brunei, Federation of
Malaya, Hong Kong, North Borneo, Sarawali, Singa-
pore.] A/3108, February 1.5, 1956. 138 pp. mimeo.
Information From Non-Self-Governing Territories : Sum-
mary and Analysis of Information Transmitted Under
Article 73e of the Charter. Report of the Secretary-
General. Central African Territories [Belgian Congo,
French Equatorial Africa, Northern Rhodesia, Nyasa-
land]. A/3109, January 16, 1956. 132 pp. mimeo.
Information From Non-Self-Governing Territories : Sum-
mary and Analysis of Information Transmitted Under
Article 73e of the Charter. Report of the Secretary-
General. East African Territories [British Somali-
land, French Somaliland, Kenya, Uganda, Zanzibar].
A/3110, February 1, 1956. 109 pp. mimeo.
Information From Non-Self-Governing Territories : Sum-
mary and Analysis of Information Transmitted Under
Article 73e of the Charter. Report of the Secretary-
General. West African Territories [French West
Africa, Gambia, Gold Coast, Nigeria, Sierra Leone].
A/3113, January 23, 1956. 149 pp. mimeo.
Information From Non-Self-Governing Territories : Sum-
mary and Analysis of Information Transmitted Under
Article 73e of the Charter. Report of the Secretary-
General. Other Territories [Aden, Cyprus, Falkland
Islands, Gibraltar, Saint Helena]. A/3114, February 8,
1956. 90 pp. mimeo.
Application of the Sudan For Admission to Membership in
the United Nations. Letters dated 21 and 12 January
1956 from the Minister of External Affairs of the Sudan
addressed to the Secretary-General. A/3117, January
31, 1956. 3 pp. mimeo.
Economic and Social Council
Rural Electrification. Propaganda (sales promotion)
methods at present applied in the various countries.
E/ECE/219, E/ECE/EP/177, November 1955. 48 pp.
mimeo.
Forced Labour. Report by the Secretary-General of the
United Nations and the Director-General of the Inter-
national Labour Office. E/2S15, December 15, 1955.
356 pp. mimeo.
Commission on the Status of Women. Information Con-
cerning the Status of Women in Trust Territories
(Report by the Secretary-General). E/CN.6/273, Jan-
uary 10, 1956. 20 pp. mimeo.
Commission on Narcotic Drugs. The Proposed Single
Convention on Narcotic Drugs (The International Drug
Convention). Views of Governments on (i) the pro-
cedure for amending the Single Convention, and (ii) the
question of reservations. E/CN.7/308, January 17,
1956. 20 pp. mimeo.
Commission on the Status of Women. Status of Women
in Family Law. Report of the Secretary-General based
on replies from Governments to Part HI of the Ques-
tionnaire on the Legal Status and Treatment of Women.
E/CN.6/185/Add. 15, January 19, 1956. 27 pp. mimeo.
Commission on the Status of Women. Technical As-
sistance : Summary of Selected Projects Affecting the
Status of Women and Selected List of Materials.
Memorandum by the Secretary-General. E/CN.6/274,
January 24, 1956. 63 pp. mimeo.
Commission on the Status of Women. Opportunities for
Women in Handicrafts and Cottage Industries. Prog-
ress Report prepared by the International Labour Of-
fice. E/CN.6/282, January 26, 1956. 11 pp. mimeo.
Report of the Eighth Session of the Sub-Commission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Mi-
norities to the Commission on Human Rights. New
York, 3 to 20 January 1956. E/CN.4/721, E/CN.4/
Sub.2/177, January 31, 1956. 71 pp. mimeo.
International Co-operation on Cartography. Report of
the Secretary-General. E/2823, February 2, 1956. 45
pp. mimeo.
Commission on the Status of Women. Opportunities for
Gii'ls in Vocational and Technical Education. Report
prepared jointly by the United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization and by the Inter-
national Labour Organisation. E/CN.6/280, February
2, 1956. 101 pp. mimeo.
Statistical Commission. General Conclusions Concern-
ing Statistical Aspects of International Definition and
Measurement of Levels of Living (Memorandum pre-
pared by the Secretary-General). E/CN.3/214, Febru-
ary 2, 1956. 19 pp. mimeo.
Statistical Commission. Observations Made by a Study
Group on Measurement of Levels of Health, in Con-
nexion with International Definition and Measurement
of Standards and Levels of Living (Summary account
prepared by the World Health Organization). B/CN.
3/213/Add. 4, February 7, 1956. 4 pp. mimeo.
April 23, 1956
693
Conimission on the Status of Women. Equal Remunera-
tion for Men and Women for Work of Equal Value.
Ueixirt piepaied by the International Labour Office.
E/CN.()/2S;j, February 9, l!J.j(J. 11 pp. mimeo.
Statistical Commission. Statistics of the Distribution of
Income (Memorandum prepared by the Secretary-
General). E/CN.3/208, Feliruary 10, 19.56. 50 pp.
mimeo.
Slavery. Draft Supplementar.v Convention on the Abo-
lition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and
Practices Similar to Slavery : Report of the Committee
Appointed by Resolution 564 (XIX). New York, 16
January to 6 February 1956. E/2S24, February 15,
1056. 76 pp. mimeo.
International Co-operation with respect to Water Re-
source Develojanent. Rejiort by the Secretary-General.
E/2827, February 23, 1056. 43 pp. mimeo.
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Colombia
Agreement providing for disposition of equipment and
materials furnished by the United States under the
military assistance agreement of April 17, 1952 (TIAS
240(;), and no longer required by Colombia. Effected
by exchange of notes at Bogotd February 22 and March
14, 1956. Entered into force March 14, 1956.
France
Agicemcnt relating to the grant of plots of land located -
in France for the creation of permanent military ceme-
teries or the construction of war memorials, with an-
nexes. Signed at Paris March 19, 1956. Entered into
force March 19, 1956.
Uruguay
General agreement for a program of technical coopera-
tion. Signed at Montevideo March 23, 1956. Will enter
into force on date Uruguay notifies the United States
of its ratification.
Viet-Nam
Agreement providing for direct forces support pursuant
to economic cooperation agreement of September 7,
1951 (TIAS 2346). Effected by exchange of notes at
Saigon February 21 and March 7, 1955. Entered into
force March 7, 1955.
Agreement relating to the disposition of equipment and
materials furnished by the United States found surplus
to the needs of the Vietnamese armed forces. Effected
by exchange of notes at Saigon March 1 and May 10,
19.'35. Entered into force Slay 10, 1955.
Bills of Lading
International convention for unification of certain rules
relating to bills of lading, and protocol of signature.
Done at Brussels August 25, 1924. Entered into force
June 2, 1931. 51 Stat. 2.33.
Accession deposited: Turkey, July 4, 1955.
Cultural Property
Convention for protection of cultural property in the
event of armed conflict, and regulations of execution.
Done at The Hague May 14, 19.54."
Ratifications deposited: San Marino, February 9, 1956;
Burma, February 10, 1956.
Protocol for the protection of cultural property in the
event of armed conflict. Done at The Hague May 14,
1954.'
Ratifications deposited: San Marino, February 9, 1956;
Burma, February 10, 1956.
Genocide
Convention on the prevention and punishment of the
crime of genocide. Done at Paris December 9, 1948.
Entered into force January 12, 1951.''
Ratification deposited: Burma, March 14, 1956.
BILATERAL
Chile
Agreement providing an interim arrangement for certain
tran.sactions pending the entry into force of the sur-
plus agricultural commodities agreement of March 13,
19.56. Effected by exchange of notes at Santiago March
20 and 26, 1956. Entered into force March 26, 1956.
China
Agreement regarding passport visas and visa fees. Ef-
fected by exchange of notes at Taipei December 20. 1955,
and February 20, 1956. Entered into force February
20, 1956.
694
THE FOREIGN SERVICE
First Career Ambassadors Sworn In
In simultaneous ceremonies at Washington, The Hague,
and Rio de Janeiro, the United States' first four Career
Ambassadors took the oath of oflice on April 9. They
are : James Clement Dunn, Ambassador to Brazil ; Loy
W. Henderson, Deputy Under Secretary for Adminis-
tration ; H. Freeman Matthews, Ambassador to the
Netherlands ; and Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Sec-
retary of State. All four are veteran career Foreign
Service officers. (For biographic details, see press re-
lense 1.S3 dated April 9.)
The class of career ambassador was created by Public
Law 250, 84th Congress. Under the terms of the law,
nominees for appointment to the class must have had at
least 15 years of Government service in a position of re-
sponsibility, including at least 3 years as a career min-
ister, and must have rendered exceptionally distinguished
service to the Government.
Confirmations
The Senate on April 12 confirmed Lowell C. Pinkerton
to be Ambassador to the Sudan.
' Not in force.
' Not in force for the United States.
Department of State Bulletin
April 23, 1956
Ind
e X
Vol. XXXIV, No. 878
American Republics
The Inter-American Partnership (Milton Eisenhower)^ . . 682
Inter-American Port and Harbor Conference 688
Solidarity of Westera Hemisphere 683
Atomic Enersry
Marshall Islanders' Petition on Nuclear Tests in Pacific
(Gerig, text of petition) 680
NATO Atomic Information Agreement Enters Into Force . 668
Austria. Triangular Sales of Farm Products to Italy and
Austria 680
Brazil. Vice President of Brazil To Visit U.S 681
Congress, The
Current Legislation 673
The Mutual Security Program for Europe (Elbrick) . . 674
Dominican Republic. Tariff Negotiations With Finland,
France, Dominican Republic 687
Economic Affairs
Continuation of Rate of Duty on Imports of Hatters' Fur . 688
Tariff Negotiations With Finland, France, Dominican
Republic 687
Triangular Sales of Farm Products to Italy and Austria . 680
World Trade Week (text of proclamation) 686
Western Europe Cuts Curbs on Dollar-Area Imports . . 686
Europe
The Mutual Security Program for Europe (Elbrick) . . 674
Western Europe Cuts Curbs on Dollar-Area Imports . . 686
Finland. Tariff Negotiations With Finland, France,
Dominicau Republic 687
Foreign Service
Confirmations (Pinkerton) 694
First Career Ambassadors Sworn In (594
France. Tariff Negotiations With Finland, France, Do-
minican Republic 687
Germany. A Report on Germany (Conant)i 669
Hungary. .Hungary Accepts U.S. Offer of Emergency Food
Aid 680
International Law. Fifty Years of Progress in Interna-
tional Law (Phleger) 663
International Organizations and Meetings. Inter-American
Port and Harbor Conference 688
Italy. Triangular Sales of Farm Products to Italy and
Austria 680
Libya. U.S. Aid to Libya 680
Morocco. Spanish-Moroccan Declaration (texts of mes-
sages, declaration, and protocol) 667
Mutual Security
The Mutual Security Program for Europe (Elbrick) . . 674
New ICA Loan to Turkey 681
U.S. Aid to Libya 680
Near East. U.S. Policy in Middle East (Hagerty) . . . 668
Non-Self-Governing Territories. Marshall Islanders' Peti-
tion on Nuclear Tests in Paciiie (Gerig, text of peti-
tion) 689
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
The Mutual Security Program for Europe (Elbrick) . . 674
NATO Atomic Information Agreement Enters Into Force . 668
Presidential Documents. World Trade Week 686
Refugees and Displaced Persons. Appointments to Advis-
Refugees and Displaced Persons. Appointments to Advi-
sory Group on liefugee Relief Program 679
Spain
Conversations With Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs
(Dulles. Martin Artajo, text of joint communique) . . 666
Spanish-Moroccan Declaration (texts of messages, declara-
tion, and protocol) 667
Sudan. Pinkerton confirmed as ambassador 694
Treaty Information
Current Actions 694
NATO Atomic Information Agreement Enters Into Force '. 668
Turkey. New ICA Loan to Turkey 681
United Nations
Current U.N. Documents 693
Marshall Islanders' Petition on Nuclear Tests in Pacific
(Gerig, text of petition) 689
U.S. Policy in Middle East (Hagerty) '. 668
Name Indew
Conant, James B 869
Dulles, Secretary \ \ 666
Dunn, James Clement ] 694
Eisenhower, Milton S [ 682
Eisenhower, President ' " ego
Elbrick. C. Burke [ 674
Gerig, Benjamin ' 689
Goulart, JoSo 681
Hagerty, James C ', 668
Henderson, Loy W 694
Macpherson, John ] 691
Martin Artajo. Alberto . 666
Matthews. H. Freeman 694
Murphy, Robert '. 694
Phleger, Herman 663
Pinkerton, Lowell C 694
Check List off Department off State
Press Releases: April 9-15
Releases may be obtained from the News Division,
Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.
Press release issued prior to April 9 which ap-
pears
in this issue of the Bulletin is No. 178 of
April 6.
No.
Date
Subject
182
4/9
Advisers on Refugee Relief Program.
183
4/9
Ceremonies for career ambassadors
(rewrite).
184
4/9
U.S. aid to Libya.
18.5
4/9
Welcome to Spanish Foreign Minister.
180
4/10
Spanish-Moroccan declaration.
187
4/11
Inter-American Port and Harbor Con-
ference (rewrite).
*188
4/11
Merchant nominated Ambassador to
Canada.
*189
4/12
Mills sworn in as Ambassador to
Afghanistan.
tl90
4/12
Foreign Relations volume.
191
4/12
U.S. food aid offer to Hungary.
tl92
4/12
Holland : "Ideological Aspects of the
Communist Prolilem."
in.-?
4/12
U.S.-Spanish communique.
194
4/12
Negotiations under GATT.
195
4/13
Pan American Day and Week.
190
V13
Visit of Brazilian Vice President.
*197
4/13
Holland : "The Soviet Policy of Peace-
ful Coexistence."
ted.
*Not prin
tHeld foi
a later issue of the BuLLE'nN.
the
Department
of
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OFFICIAL BUSINESS
Available in pamphlet form — two recent statements by Fran-
cis 0. Wilcox, Assistant Secretary for International Organiza-
tion Affairs.
The United Nations: Some New Perspectives After Ten Years
This address before the National Press Club, January 13,
1956, assesses the implications for U.S. foreign policy of recent
developments affecting the United Nations. Among its topics
are the impact of the Bandung conference and the Geneva
summit conference, the admission of new members to the
United Nations, peaceful uses of atomic energy, disarmament,
economic assistance to underdeveloped countries, and review
of the United Nations Charter.
Publication 6047
10 cents
The Soviet Challenge and the United Nations
This address was made before the Annual Convention of the
American Association of Junior Colleges at New York City,
March 9, 1956. It deals with the new look in Soviet tactics
which became manifest at the Geneva summit conference and
was shown in the rewriting of some of the Stalinist dogma by
the Soviet 20th Congress. The pamphlet discusses why Soviet
tactics have changed, what the challenge of the new Soviet
strategy means to the United Nations, and what colleges and
universities can do about it. It emphasizes that study of the
United Nations is of great importance in the teaching of inter-
national affairs, and examines facts and fallacies about the
United Nations.
Publication 6310 15 cents
Both of these pamphlets are available from the Superin-
tendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington
25, D.C.
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n The United Nations: Some New Perspectives After Ten Years
□ The Soviet Challenge and the United Nations
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1^
y/ie' ^e^iu^^f^fhnem^ /(w t/ta£e^
. XXXIV, No. 879
April 30, 1956
OUR QUEST FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM • Address
by President Eisenhower 699
DEVELOPING NATO IN PEACE • Address by Secretary
Dulles 706
THE SOVIET REAPPRAISAL OF STALIN • by Deputy
Under Secretary Murphy 719
OBJECTIVES [OF, THE MUTUAL SECURITY PRO-
GRAM IN ASIA • Statement by Assistant Secretary
Robertson . . . .f 723
UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY IN AFRICA • by
Assistant Secretary Allen 716
For index see inside back cover
Boston Public Library-
Superintendent of Docuraentt
MAY 2 2 1956
^ne z/^e/i€i'»i{^i€'nt c^ C/lctle
bulletin
Vol. XXXIV, No. 879 • Publication 6329
April 30, 1956
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington 25, D.C.
Price:
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Single copy, 20 cents
The printing of this publication has been
approved by the Director of the Bureau of
the Budget (January 19, 1955).
Note: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and Items contained herein may
be reprinted. Citation of the Department
or State Bdlletin as the source will be
appreciated.
The Department of State BULLETIN,
a tveekly publication issued by the
Public Services Division, provides the
public and interested agencies of
the Government with information on
developments in the field of foreign
relations and on the work of the
Department of Stute and the Foreign
Service. The BULLETIN includes se-
lected press releases on foreign policy,
issued by the White House and the
Department, and statements and ad-
dresses made by the President and by
the Secretary of State and other offi-
cers of the Department, as well as
special articles on various pluises of
international affairs and the func-
tions of the Department. Informa-
tion is included concerning treaties
and international agreements to
which the United States is or may
become a party and treaties of gen-
eral international interest.
Publications of the Department,
United Nations documents, and legis-
lative material in the field of interna-
tional relations are listed currently.
Our Quest for Peace and Freedom
Address hy President Eisenhower'
Three years ago, when I last talked to you,
stories from battlefields and fighting fronts
crowded the front pages of our press. Human
freedom was under direct assault in important
sectors by the disciples of communistic dictator-
ship. Violence and aggression were brutal daily
facts for millions of human beings. Fear of glo-
bal war, of a nuclear holocaust, darkened the fu-
ture. To many, the chance for a just and enduring
peace seemed hopeless.
Today, only 3 years later, we have reason for
cautious hope that a new, a fruitful, a peaceful
era for mankind can emerge from a haunted
decade. The world breathes a little more easily
today.
The prudent man will not delude himself that
his hope for peace guarantees the realization of
peace. Even with genuine good will, time and
effort will be needed to correct the injustices, to
cure the dangerous sores that plague the earth to-
day. And the future alone can show whether tlie
Communists really want to move toward a just
and stable peace.
Yet not for many years has there been such
promise that patient, imaginative, enterprising
effort could gradually be rewarded in steady de-
crease in the dread of war ; in an economic surge
that will raise the living standards of all the world ;
in growing confidence that liberty and justice
will one day overcome statism ; in the better under-
standing among all peoples that is the essential
prelude to true peace.
This week marks the anniversary of one of the
most important events in freedom's progress.
' Made before the American Society of Newspaper Edi-
tors and broadcast over radio and television at Wasbing-
ton, D. C, on Apr. 21 (White House press release).
One hundred eighty-one years ago on April 19th,
our forefathers started a revolution that still goes
on. The shots at Concord, as Emerson wrote,
were heard "round the world."
The echoes of Concord still stir men's minds.
The Bandung meeting, last year, of Asian and
African leaders bears witness to Emerson's vision.
There, almost two centuries after Concord, and
halfway round the earth. President Sukarno of
Indonesia opened the conference with an eloquent
tribute to Paul Revere and to the spirit of the
American Revolution.
Wliy do the musket shots of a few embattled
farmers at the Concord bridge still ring out in
far-off lands?
The reason is clear.
Concord was far more than a local uprising to
redress immediate grievances. The enduring
meaning of Concord lies in the ideas that inspired
the historic stand there. Concord is the symbol
of certain basic convictions about the relationship
of man to the state.
Those convictions were founded in a firm belief
in the spiritual worth of the individual. He must
be free to think, to speak, and to worship accord-
ing to his conscience. He must enjoy equality
before the law. He must have a fair chance to
develop and use his talents. The purpose of gov-
ernment is to serve its citizens in freedom.
Our forefathers did not claim to have discov-
ered novel principles. They looked on their find-
ings as universal values, the common property of
all mankind.
These deep convictions have always guided us
as a Nation. They have taken deep root else-
where in the Western World. In the 19th century
they inspired a great surge of freedom through-
Apti] 30, J 956
699
out Western Europe and in our own hemisphere.
These ideas of freedom are still the truly revo-
lutionary political principles abroad in the world.
They appeal to the timeless aspirations of man-
kind. In some regions they flourish ; in some they
are officially outlawed. But everywhere, to some
degree, they stir and inspire humanity.
The all'airs of men do not stand still. The ideas
of freedom will grow in vigor and influence — or
they will gradually wither and die. If the area
of freedom shrinks, the results for us will be tragic.
Only if freedom continues to flourish will man
realize the prosperity, the happiness, the enduring
peace he seeks.
Newly Independent Nations
The appeal of the ideas of freedom has been
shown dramatically during the past decade. In
that time, 18 nations, totaling some G50 million
people — a quarter of the human race — have gained
independence.
In manifold ways these nations differ widely
from each other and from us. They are the heirs
of many ancient cultures and national traditions.
All of the great religions of the world are found
among them. Their peoples speak in a hundred
tongues.
Yet they share in common with all free countries
the basic and universal values that inspired our
Nation's founders.
They believe deeply in the right of self-govern-
ment.
They believe deeply in the dignity of man.
They aspire to improve the welfare of the indi-
vidual, as a basic aim of organized society.
The new nations have many of the sensitivities
that marked our own early years as a free Nation.
They are proud of their independence and quick
to resent any slight to their sovereignty. Some
of them are concerned to avoid involvements with
other nations, as we were for many years.
Certainly we Americans should understand and
respect these points of view. "We must accept the
right of each nation to choose its own path to the
future.
All of these countries are faced with immense
obstacles and difficulties. Freedom and human
dignity must rest upon a satisfactory economic
base. Yet in many of these new nations, incomes
average less than $100 per year. Abject poverty
blinds men's eyes to the beauty of freedom's ideals.
Hopelessness makes men prey to any promise of a
better existence, even the most false and spurious.
Of ttimes the peoples of these countries expected
independence itself to produce rapid material
progress. Their political leaders are therefore
under heavy pressure to find shortcuts and quick
answers to the problems facing them.
Under these conditions, we cannot expect that
the vision of a free society will go unchallenged.
The Communists, aware of unsatisfied desires for
better conditions of life, falsely pretend they can
rapidly solve the problems of economic develop-
ment and industrialization. They hold up the
Soviet Union as a model and a guide. But the
Communists conceal the terrible human costs that
characterize their ruthless system of dictatorship
and forced labor.
"We have a vital interest in assuring that newly
independent nations preserve and consolidate the
free institutions of their choice.
The prospects for peace are brightest when
enlightened self-governing peoples control the
policy of nations. Peoples do not want war.
Eulers beyond the reach of popular control are
more likely to engage in reckless adventures and
to raise the grim threat of war. The spread of
freedom enhances the prospect for durable peace.
That prospect would be dimmed or destroyed
should freedom be forced into steady retreat.
Then the remaining free societies, our own among
them, would one day find themselves beleaguered
and imperiled. We would face once again the
dread prospect of paj'ing dearly in blood for our
own survival.
In every corner of the globe, it is far less costly
to sustain freedom than to recover it when lost.
Moreover, our own well-being is bound up in
the well-being of other free nations. We cannot
prosper in peace if we are isolated from the rest
of the world. If our economy is to continue to
flourish and grow, our Nation will need more
trade, not less. The steady growth of other na-
tions, especially the less developed coimtries, will
create new and growing demands for goods and
services. It will produce an environment which
will benefit both them and us.
Indeed, Atlanta, Pittsburgh, Seattle — every
American town and farm — has a stake in the suc-
cess or failure of these new nations — a stake al-
most impossible to exaggerate.
If these new nations are to achieve economic
progress with freedom, they will have to provide
700
Department of State Bulletin
I'nany of the necessary ingi-edients for themselves.
Only these peoples and their leaders can sup-
ply the initiative and determination essential for
success. And they must mobilize the larger part
of the resources they require.
But these nations are gravely lacking in trained
men for management, production, education, and
1 he professions. Their institutions for such train-
ing are limited. Hence they are handicapped in
trying to extend modern techniques to agriculture,
industry, and other fields.
They also face shortages of capital and foreign
excliange, even tliough they strain to mobilize
their own resources. Private foreign investment
should be utilized as much as feasible; but, for
many areas, it will clearly fall far short of the
requirements. Moreover, their tasli of improving
conditions of life is made the more diificult by
tlieir large and steadily increasing populations.
Inevitably tliese nations must look abroad for
assistance, as ours did for so many years. They
want lielp, first of all, in real and enduring friend-
ship. They want help in training skilled people
and in securing investment capital to supplement
their own resources. For such help they will
look to us as the most prosperous and advanced
economy of the world.
Foresight will compel an understanding re-
sponse from us. In our own enlightened interest
we can and must do much to help others in pur-
suit of their legitimate aspirations.
Further, we must recognize that economic and
technical assistance cannot be a transitory policy.
The problems of economic progi'ess are not to be
solved in a single spurt. Our efforts must be sus-
tained over a number of years.
To do tlie most good, some part of our material
help will have to be f urnislied on a long-term basis
which these nations can plan on. For some pur-
poses, commitments on a strictly annual basis are
not sufficient. It takes time to complete major
projects like hydroelectric and reclamation de-
velopments. If the new nations can plan on some
part of our help for several years, they will be
better able to mobilize resoui-ces of their own and
assistance from others.
Furtliermore, our assistance must be used
flexibly to fit needs and plans as they develop.
We must be ready to adapt our help promptly to
meet changing conditions.
The development program for mutual security
now before the Congress is based on these consid-
erations. It seeks from the Congress the addi-
tional authority tliat would add essential flexi-
bility and continuity to a part — a modest part —
of the program. The amounts requested are the
practicable minimum. In its entirety it is not,
I assure you, an excessive program. It is in our
national interest, in the fullest sense of that term.
"Collective" Dictatorship in U.S.S.R.
The ideas of freedom are at work, even where
they are officially rejected. As we know, Lenin
and his successors, true to Communist doctrine,
based the Soviet State on tlie denial of these ideas.
Yet the new Soviet rulers who took over 3 years
ago have had to reckon with the force of these
ideas, botli at home and abi-oad.
The situation the new regime inherited from the
dead Stalin apparently caused it to reappraise
many of his mistakes.
Having lived under his one-man rule, they have
espoused the concept of "collective" dictatorship.
But dictatorship it still remains. They have de-
nounced Stalin for some of the more flagrant ex-
cesses of his brutal rule. But the individual citi-
zen still lacks the most elementary safeguards of
a free society. The desire for a better life is still
being sacrificed to the insatiable demands of the
state.
In foreign affairs, the new regime has seemingly
moderated the policy of violence and hostility
which has caused the free nations to band together
to defend their independence and liberties. For
the present, at least, it relies more on political and
economic means to spread its influence abroad. In
the last year, it has embarked upon a campaign of
lending and trade agreements directed especially
toward the newly developing countries.
It is still too early to assess in any final way
whether the Soviet regime wishes to provide a
real basis for stable and enduring relations.
Despite tlie changes so far, much of Stalin's
foreign policy remains unchanged. The major in-
ternational issues which have troubled the post-
war world are still unsolved. More basic changes
in Soviet policy will have to take place before the
free nations can afford to relax their vigilance.
Guidelines for Future
At Concord, our forebears undertook the strug-
gle for freedom in this country. History has now
called us to special tasks for sustaining and ad-
vancing this great cause in the world.
April 30, 1956
701
As we take stock of our position and of the prob-
lems that lie ahead, we must chart our course by
three main guidelines:
First: We must inainta'm a collective shield
against aggression to allow the free peoples to
seek their valued goals in safety.
We can take some cautious comfort in the signs
that the Soviet rulers may have relegated military
aggression to the background and adopted less
violent methods to promote their aims. Neverthe-
less, Soviet military power continues to grow.
Their forces are being rapidly modernized and
equipped with nuclear weapons and long-range
delivery systems.
So long as freedom is threatened and armaments
are not controlled, it is essential for us to keep a
strong military establishment ourselves and
strengthen the bonds of collective security.
Without help from us, many of our allies could
not afford to equip and maintain the forces needed
for self-defense. Assistance to them is part of
our proper contribution to the systems of common
defense. If those systems did not exist, we would
have to bear much greater costs ourselves. Thus,
in aiding our allies the mutual security program
also advances our own security interests.
We hold our military strength only to guard
against aggression and to insure that the world
remains at peace. War in our time has become
an anachronism. Whatever the case in the past,
war in the future can serve no useful purpose. A
war which became general, as any limited action
might, could only result in the virtual destruction
of mankind.
Hence our search must be unceasing for a system
to regulate and reduce armaments under reliable
safeguards. So far, the Soviet Union has refused
to accept such safeguards. But even now we are
earnestly negotiating toward this end. The prob-
lems involved are difficult and complex. We can-
not afford to underestimate them. But we cannot
slacken our efforts to lift the burden of armaments
and to remove their threat.
If effective measures of disarmament could be
agi-eed upon, think how the world could be trans-
formed ! Atomic energy used for peace — not
war — could bring about the development of a new
industrial age. Far more human energy and out-
put could be devoted to reducing poverty and need.
To that end, as I said to you 3 years ago, we would
"join with all nations in devoting a substantial
percentage of the savings achieved by disarma-
ment to a fund for world aid and reconstruction."
Of even more importance, the pall of mutual
suspicions, fear, and hatred that covers the earth
would be swept away in favor of confidence,
prosperity, and human happiness.
Our second guideline: Within the free conu-
7nunity, ice ynust he a helpful and considerate
partner in creating conditions whei'c freedom will
flourish.
Beyond defense, the crucial task of the free
nations is to work together in constructive ways
to advance the welfare of their peoples. Arms
alone can give the world no permanent peace, no
confident security. Arms are solely for defense —
to protect from violent assault what we already
have. They are only a costly insurance. They
cannot add to human progress. Indeed, no matter
how massive, arms by themselves would not pre-
vent vital sections of the world from falling prey
to Communist blandishment or subversion.
If we are to preserve freedom here, it must like-
wise thrive in other important areas of the earth.
For the welfare of ourselves and others, we must,
therefore, help the rest of the free world achieve
its aspirations. For our mutual benefit, we must
join in building for greater future prosperity, for
more human liberty, and for lasting peace.
Within the Atlantic community, our aim must
be to strengtlien the close bonds which have stead-
ily developed since the war. On Monday next the
Secretary of State will speak on this topic.
In the less developed nations, the urgent need
is for economic and social progress for their peo-
ples. Tonight I have spoken particularly about
the newer nations of Asia and Africa which face
such urgent problems. Of equal importance is
continuing progress in other areas, especially by
our neighbors in Latin America, who are our fast
friends. These developing nations need the full
measure of our help in understanding and re-
sources.
The steady progress of the free world also de-
pends on the healthy flow of peaceful trade. Our
example will be of crucial importance in freeing
the channels of such trade from wasteful re-
straints. We can take an important step to that
end by joining the Organization for Trade Co-
operation. Our national interest will be served by
passage of the legislation for that purpose now
pending in the Congress.
702
Department of State Bulletin
Another important task is in helping to resolve
disputes between friends we value highly. Such
disputes impair the unity of the free nations and
impede their advance. In these situations, each
side would like the United States to back its point
of view without reservation. But for us to do so
could seldom contribute to the settling of the dis-
putes. It would only sharpen the bitter enmities
between the opposing sides and impair our value
in helping to reach a fair solution.
Our aim and effort must be to assist in temper-
ing the fears and antagonisms which lead to such
disputes.
My words apply with special force to the
troubled area of the Middle East. We will do all
in our power — through the United Nations when-
ever possible — to prevent resort to violence there.
We are determined to support and assist any na-
tion in that area which might be subjected to ag-
gression. We will strive untiringly to build the
foundations for stable peace in the whole region.
In these and many other constructive ways, our
Nation must help to build an environment con-
genial to freedom.
Our third guideline is this: We must seek, by
every peaceful means, to induce the Soviet bloc to
correct existing injustices and genuinely to pursue
peaceful purposes in its relations with other na-
tions.
I As I have said, many of the wrongs of Stalin
against other nations still prevail under his suc-
cessors. Despite the efforts of the West at Berlin
II and Geneva, Germany is still divided by the Soviet
' veto of free all-German elections. The satellite
nations of Eastern Europe are still ruled by Soviet
puppets. In Asia, Korea remains divided and
stable peace has not yet been achieved.
We must be tireless in our efforts to remedy these
injustices and to resolve the disputes that divide
the world. These knotty problems will yield to
patient and sincere effort. We stand ready to
explore all avenues for their just settlement. We
will not grow weary in our quest for peaceful
remedies for the enslavement or wrongful division
of once-free nations.
The interests and purposes of the United States
and of the free world do not conflict with the
legitimate interests of the Russian nation or the
aspirations of its people. A Soviet government
genuinely devoted to these purposes can have
friendly relations with the United States and the
free world for the asking. We will welcome that
day.
Need for Devoted Effort
We cannot doubt that the current of world his-
tory flows toward freedom. In the long run dic-
tatorship and despotism must give way. We can
take courage from that sure knowledge.
But as a wise American, Mr. Justice Holmes,
once said : "The inevitable comes to pass through
effort." We should take these words to heart
in our quest for peace and freedom. These great
aspirations of humanity will be brought about —
but only by devoted human effort.
Concord is a symbol of the faith, courage, and
sacrifice on which the victory of freedom depends.
We in our day must strive with the same dedica-
tion that brought the militiamen to the Concord
bridge. If we do so, freedom will surely prevail.
[After the President went off the air, he spoke to the
society as follows:]
To give you my feeling about what I would like
to say now, I will tell you a story of when I was a
young lieutenant in a regiment on the Mexican
border. There was not a great deal to do in those
days, and some people indulged in acquaintance-
ship with John Barleycorn more than they should.
One morning a couple of us young second lieu-
tenants were up as usual long before the captains
were, and we were standing by one captain's tent
as he got his feet out of the bunk. He was sitting
there on the edge of it with his head in his hands,
and he says r "I am nothing but a mountain goat.
All I do is jump from jag to jag."
Now any man who through 35 minutes or 30
minutes has been trying to hit the high spots of the
world today, and America's position in the inter-
national situation, certainly feels that he has been
jumping from jag to jag on the mountain tops.
So I wanted rather to come off" the summit of
those high spots and talk with you for just a few
minutes about some of the very great intricacies
in this problem that we call developing foreign
policies and in implementing them throughout the
world.
Now I think there is no use explaining the cold
war. We all have pretty clear ideas of what is
going on. But one thing that we do worry about
is : Who is wimiing and who is losing ?
Well, I don't think anybody knows, because
the situation differs in every single corner of the
April 30, 1956
703
globe. I have heard many people at home here
say tluit we are losing the cold war every day.
Others take exactly tlie opposite view, and these
more hopefid ones can point to some facts rather
than merely allegations about our prestige abroad,
or how many friends do we have, and that sort of
thing.
Change in Soviet Policy
For example, wlij- was there such a sudden
change in the Soviet policy ? They are out — their
basic aim is to conquer the world — through world
revolution if possible, but in any way. Their
doctrine — anyone that has read any of their books
knows that their doctrine is lies, deceit, subver-
sion, war if necessary, but in any way: conquer
the world. And that has not changed.
But they changed their policies very markedly.
They were depending on force and the threat of
force only. And suddenly they have gone into an
entirely different attitude. They are going into
the economic and political fields and are really
wearing smiles around the world instead of some
of the bitter faces to which we have become
accustomed.
Now any time a policy is winning and the people
are completely satisfied with it, you don't change.
If you change policies that markedly, you destroy
old idols, as they have been busy doing. You do
it only when you think a great change is neces-
sary. So I think we can take some comfort; at
least we can give careful consideration to the very
fact they had to change their policies.
And I think the whole free world is trying to
test and determine the sincerity of that plan, in
order that the free nations themselves, in pur-
suing their own policies, will make certain that
they are not surprised in any place.
But from the Communists — we look at some of
the advances we think they have made, but let
us remember : They did not conquer Korea, which
they announced they were going to do. They
were stopped finally in the northern part of Viet-
Nam, and Diem, the leader of the southern Viet-
Nam, the southern Vietnamese, is doing splendidly
and a much better figure in that field than anyone
even dared to hope.
The Iranian situation, which only a few short
years ago looked so desperate that each morning
we thought we would wake up and read in our
newspapers that Mossadegh had let them under
the Iron Curtain, has not become satisfactory,
but that crisis has passed and it is much better,
The difficulty in Egypt between our British
friends and our Egyptian friends over the big base
was finally settled.
The Trieste problem, which had plagued the
world for many years, if not an ideal solution,
has had a practical solution.
The first bridgehead that communism had suc-
ceeded, or practically succeeded, in establishing
in our hemisphere has been thrown out.
These are cold-war victories, because the pur-
poses of the Russians were defeated.
Now they have attempted to go into economic
fields, and here their unity of action, brought
about by the fact they are a single government,
is creating new problems. >
Free-World Economic Problems
A group of free nations can stay together fairly
easily when you have got a definite threat to their
very existence right in their faces. As long as the
Germans, for example, were powerful and aggres-
sive in Europe in the Second World War, there
was no great trouble in keeping the other nations
pretty well together in policy and in action. But
when those are lifted and j'ou go into the economic
field, each of us — each country — has its own eco-
nomic problems of itself; now it becomes very
difficult for a group of free nations through spon-
taneous cooperation to achieve a unity to oppose
the other man.
Let me take one example, just to show you how
these things work out. Let us take Japan. There
is no one in this room that needs a blueprint of
how important it is to us that Japan stay out-
side the Iron Curtain. A nation of 90 million
industrious and inventive people, tied in with
Communist China and with the Soviets, would
indeed pose a thi-eat to us that would be very grave
indeed.
Japan is 90 million people living on fewer arable
acres than there are in the State of California.
How are they going to live? Well, they have
got to trade. They have got to deal with other
people outside. We won't trade with them.
Every day — well, if not every day, every week —
there come to government, including to my desk,
pleas for greater protection against Japanese
goods.
Now this is not wholly one-sided, because some
704
Deparfment of Sfofe Bulletin
of our citizens have found out that last year — I
think my figures are correct — while we were buy-
ing 60 million dollars' worth of cotton textile
goods from Japan, they bought 120 million dol-
lars' worth of our cotton. So even that problem
is not clear in exactly what you should do.
But anyway, we won't trade with them, so they
can't make a living with us except on a minor scale.
Iiut we get tired, properly — we can't be trying to
sustain any other nation just with our money. So
A\ e don't just give them the millions by whicli they
(an go and buy all the things they need abroad.
But the next thing we come up against : We are
\ery certain in our own minds that some of these
nations — not all the United States people, but
some of them, are very loud in their denunciation
of any country that trades with tlie Communist
countries. So the Japanese can't trade with their
natural markets, with Manchuria and China. So
linally all of those southeastern markets, all the
S(nitlieastern Asian markets, have been largely
destroyed; they are so poor they can't support
Japan.
So what does Japan do ? Where are we chasing
lit'r? Chasing her to one place. She has to look
less and less to us and more to her mainland next
to her. She has to, now, begin to look rather long-
ingly unless something is done. Now that is the
kind of cross-purpose that comes up, and this goes
on around the world. Britain and France and
Germany, indeed every country with which we
deal has some problem different economically
from our own.
So we have a real job in trying to get agreed
policies among the free nations and then to imple-
ment them.
Need for Information
And I come, then, to the real purpose for ask-
ing you people to listen to me for a few minutes
more after my rather long, prepared address.
It is this : Our Nation is called to leadership —
and I am not going to argue the point, I know you
all understand — leadership in the world, to lead
it toward freedom, to keep expanding our areas of
freedom and not allow the Communist cloud to
engidf us little by little.
Now when a nation leads, it is not enough that
even an entire government, legislative and execu-
tive, should see this problem as one. That doesn't
make it a truly national policy in anything that is
April 30, 7956
as long-term, as vital, as is required in national
leadership of the whole world. Every citizen has
a job that he cannot delegate. He cannot delegate
it to the most powerful and the most influential
political leaders. He must take his part in getting
himself informed.
Wliat I want to say is this: There is nothing
more important in the world today than that
America — 167 million Americans — shall be in-
formed on the basic facts in this whole struggle.
We ought to get it as far away from dema-
goguery, from political partisanship, from every
extraneous influence that we possibly can. Just
get the naked truth to these peoxale with interpre-
tation through editorial pages, and so on, to let
them see the relation of one fact to another.
There are no easy panaceas. You can't say,
"We simply won't trade with the Communist na-
tions" — make that work for all of us. In fact,
to make such a statement is, to my mind, giving
up one of the great strengths for which the Yankee
has always been noted — he is a good trader.
In that kind of trade, who gets the best of it?
We should think of those things and not try to
pull out any slogan, any single idea, that will meet
this situation. All that is necessary is to get the
facts to the American people.
The other is to get, so far as we possibly
can, the facts of America's purposes — her inten-
tions, her disinterested motives, her lack of am-
bition for other territory and increased domina-
tion — to the world. We must get it out to the
world.
This is difficult because all over the world we
don't have you people. We don't have American
newspapers. Some of our wire services reach part
way, but very inadequately. The United States
Information Service is merely to help. It would
be far better did we not have to depend on it at
all. It should even itself depend on private media
wherever it can reach them in other countries.
This information should go out abroad, just as
at home, through the processes of a free people
so far as possible, and government should only
support that effort.
One more point, and I am finished.
The world changes, and in these days it changes
rapidly. A policy that was good 6 months ago is
not necessarily now of any validity. It is neces-
sary that we find better, more effective ways of
keeping ourselves in tune witli the world's needs
705
and helping to educate the world to know that it
itself — each nation — must do the major part of
the job. Any outsider can merely be helpful, can
give moral and some little physical support — ma-
terial support.
But the sums that we put out are a bagatelle
compared to what is needed and what these peo-
ple, most of them impoverished, must provide for
themselves if the whole free world is to advance.
Now there are different kinds of means, one of
which, I should think, would be getting together
and keeping a sort of rotating advisory body of
citizens, who are not burdened with the general
Developing NATO in Peace
and never-ending cares of office, to devote their
brains to the job in partnership with government.
We must constantly keep "up to snuff" because
if we don't we are bound to lose. We must be
ahead of the problem. We must see its major
parts. We must get its critical factors set up so
that we understand them thoroughly in simple
fashion, and then we must pursue a conunon course
vigorously, persistently, and with readiness to
make whatever sacrifies may be demanded.
And then, I say, we will be worthy of the
farmers of Concord.
Address hy Secretary Dulles ^
I feel honored to speak before this important
gathering of our free press. We share a great re-
sponsibility. I believe that the public should be as
fully informed as possible about what we are doing
m the State Department and what our foreign
policy is. Under our form of government the
effectiveness of our Nation's foreign policy de-
pends in large measure upon public understanding
and support. And our free society would indeed
be in trouble without the diligent reporting and
alert appraisal of world events that you make
possible.
We are at a point in time when important events
occurring in rapid succession change the scene in
Europe, in the Near East, in Asia, and in Eussia.
It seems that this second postwar decade upon
which we have entered will mark a new phase in
the struggle between the forces of despotism and
the forces of freedom.
The first postwar decade was marked by two
sharply contrasting trends. In those parts of
the world where the West had been politically
dominant, freedom flo\irished and independence
spread. Over 650 million people who were non-
self-governing in 1945 have now become 18 inde-
pendent and sovereign nations.
^ Made before the annual luncheon of the Associated
Press at New York, N. T., on April 23 (press release 210).
On the other hand, during that decade the
Soviet type of Communist despotism, which in
1945 ruled only 200 million people, aggressively
extended its rule to an additional 700 million peo-
ple belonging to what had been 13 independent
nations.
Inevitably these opposing trends to freedom
and to despotism led to a sharp cleavage of the
world. In response to the Soviet policies of vio-
lent expansion, the free nations drew close to-
gether. They submerged any differences of their
own in the face of the threat of open aggression
from without. Since they could not depend on
the United Nations Security Council, because of
Soviet veto power, they created their own collec-
tive security associations. Forty-five free-world
nations joined with others for collective defense^
These arrangements, backed by United States
mobile striking power, have constituted a great
deterrent to the open use of violence.
Also, the free peoples built moral bulwarks.
They unitedly condemned the violent and intol-
erant practices of Soviet communism and made
manifest their repugnance of Soviet despotism
and its tactics. They subjected the Soviet and
Chinese Communists to a kind of moral, social,
and — to some extent — economic ostracism.
By such measures the free world found the
706
Department of State Bulletin
ways to halt the Soviets in their hot pursuit of
the free nations one by one.
But the policies of the free world were never
designed to be purely defensive. Freedom is in-
lierently dynamic and expansive. We renounce
I ho use of force and violence to promote freedom.
Ihit we have sought in manifold other ways that
Ivussia should be governed in accordance with
civilized standards.
We reject the idea that we are dedicated to per-
petual hatred of Russia. What we hate is the
I'vil that Eussia's rulers do. The arbitrary
despotism of a police state, governmental intoler-
ance and enforced conformity, the enslavement of
people for the magnification of the state, the use
of violence and the threat of violence in inter-
national relations, the use of fraud and trickery
to corrupt and overthrow free governments — these
are the things which we abhor and against which
we stand. But United States foreign policy is
not merely negative. We seek, above all, to ad-
vance the inevitable day when the historic friend-
ship between the Russian and American peoples
can again be fully manifested. Therefore, we take
deep satisfaction from the fact that we can today
see within Russia some signs of light which could
mark the dawning of that new day.
Soviet "New Look"
The Soviet rulers who have replaced Stalin seem
to have concluded that the time had come to pre-
sent a "new look" at home and abroad.
In much of the world the Soviet rulers now
seek to present an aspect of conciliation. They
talk softly of "peacefrd coexistence" and often
gear their diplomatic activity to economic "aid" —
so-called — rather than to threats of violence.
Within the Soviet Union there is a change which
is even more significant because, while Soviet
foreign policy is readily reversible, it is not so easy
to erase the consequences of internal liberalization.
Stalin, the brutal demigod, has been dethroned.
"Collective leadership" now replaces one-man
despotism. Violence is no longer preached as the
only way. The sway of the secret police has, it
seems, been curtailed. There is greater tolerance
of independent thinking, and even the heresy of
"Titoism" has been made respectable. There is
an obvious effort to give individuals a sense of
greater freedom and security and to respect the
demands inherent in the higher and broader edu-
cation of many of the Russian people.
Vicious doctrinal works such as Stalin's Short
History of the Communist Party have been with-
drawn from circulation, and the fate of Stalin's
Problems of Leninism remains in doubt. Those
are the two works which for the last 20 years have
been the "bible" of Soviet and world communism.
Soviet doctrine and history are currently being
rewritten.
This must please at least the Russian school
children, for they are excused from taking ex-
aminations in history. No one yet knows the
"correct" answers.
Appraisal of Soviet Shift
It is important to appraise what these changes
mean and also what they do not mean.
They mean, I think, that unity and strength of
the free nations have shown the Soviet rulers the
futility of their policies of violence. Also they
must mean that forces for liberalization are at
work within the Soviet bloc and are powerful
enough to require some response, or at least the
appearance of response.
All of this is immensely important. It is more
than the free world dared hope for a few years
ago.
But satisfaction must be restrained.
True, Stalin has been demoted. But we do not
yet see, in the Soviet bloc, the reality of representa-
tive government or respect for the basic aspira-
tions of the peoples.
The Soviet rulers profess to have renounced
violence. But they press feverishly to develop
their military establishment, particularly nuclear
weapons and the means for their delivery.
The countries of Eastern Europe, including;
East Germany, are still under the iron heel of
Soviet force.
In Asia and the Near East the Soviet rulers have
become merchants of hatred and fomenters of
violence.
In relation to Japan, Soviet foreign policy is
still ugly in its asjDect.
In some places Soviet foreign policy is baited
with economic lures which may superficially seem
attractive. But close scrutiny shows that the bait
is attached to a hook and that the hook is attached
to a line and that the other end of the line is pur-
posefully held by Moscow.
And, if they have admitted some of the lies and
false testimony which marked political trials of
the Stalin era, they have failed to repudiate two
April 30, 7956
707
of the most outrageous lies ever perpetrated by
any government, and both perpetrated by Stalin —
the lie that South Korea was the aggressor in the
Korean War and the lie that the United Nations
forces in that war used germ warfare against the
Chinese Communists.
Khrushchev said last December, "We never re-
nounced and we will never renounce our ideas, our
struggle for the victory of communism."' So long
as that victory is the Soviet goal ; so long as it is
backed by a vast military establishment and the
underground apparatus of international com-
munism ; so long as these instruments are at the
absolute disposal of despots who repudiate moral
principles as restraint upon their conduct — so long
as this combination exists, it would be folly for
the free nations to consider that they can safely
lower their guai'd and fall apart.
I have often said in relation to the Soviet Com-
munist jDroblem that the moment of greatest
danger would be the moment when we relaxed.
Never was that statement more relevant than it is
today. If Ave treat the frospect of success as
being itself a complete success, that could turn
into an ultimate disaster.
The Task of the Free Nations
To say that is not to say that we should act as
though nothing had happened. We cannot and
would not set the clock back. There is no longer
the mood of fear that gripped the free world when
in quick succession there occurred the Communist
guerrilla war against Greece, the seizure of
Czechoslovakia, the blockade of Berlin, and the
armed attack upon the Republic of Korea. We
would not, if we could, smother the hope that a
benign transformation may have begim.
Our new task is to build more on hope and less
on fear. That is, of course, a more difficult task.
Fear makes easy the tasks of diplomats, for
then the fearful draw together and seek the pro-
tection of collective strength.
Soviet rulers and their agents, in their new
garb, have somewhat greater acceptability and
therefore more chance for mischief.
Allies no longer feel the same compulsion to
submerge differences as when they faced together
a clear and present danger.
Collective security arrangements, born prima-
rily out of fear of armed aggression, seem to some
less important now than 5 years ago.
Neutralism can now be plausibly portrayed as
a safe and even profitable course. (
Tender these conditions our tasks are harder — ^
so much so that some people deplore the recent
developments because they confuse what, until |
then, had been a rather simple scene.
That is not our view. Of course war, and dan-
ger of war, is a simplifier. When the issue is "who
dies and who lives?" all other issues seem unim-
portant. But we do not want simplicity at that
price. Nor do we intend to invoke needless fears
and a sense of emergency because that would make
our tasks more simple.
We cannot undo the changes that have come
ujion the world. And we do not want to reverse
what holds so much of promise, merely because
it also holds some risk of loss. Our task is not
to seek to reverse change but to build construc-
tively upon all the changes that hold a possibility
of good. In that way we may make our hopes
come true.
Because Soviet military capabilities remain so
vast and because their intentions are subject to
rapid change, we must maintain our vigilance and
our strength. But also we must increase the unity
and dynamism of the free world by greater em-
phasis on cooperation for something rather than
merely against something. Let us exalt freedom
by showing better what freedom can do.
President Eisenhower, speaking day before yes-
terday, outlined the task which lies before the free
nations of the world. He empliasized that task
as it relates to the newly independent and newly
develofDing nations of the world.
There is also need to maintain and develop
the strength and vitality of the older free-world
nations. Here, too, there is vast opportunity.
Our peoples have many common aspirations and
interests that go far beyond the instinct of self-
preservation and which we can more surely achieve
if we work together than if we work apart. We
can, in association, form major steppingstones
along the path to universal peace and justice and
human welfare.
We had all hoped that the United Nations would
establish order on a universal basis. It has in-
deed done much in this respect, and certainly
we should do nothing to detract from the United
Nations. It remains the cornerstone of United
States foreign policy.
But the United Nations was never expected to
be an exclusive means for developing world order.
708
Deparfment of State Bulletin
The charter itself looks to regional and collective
defense organizations to play a major role in tliis
great task.
Exploring the Possibilities of NATO
The Organization of American States illustrates
the possibilities of a regional organization. It
talves accoimt of external perils. But it concen-
trates primarily upon its own positive accomplish-
ments.
That Organization traces its origins back 66
years to when the Pan American Union was
founded. It is held together by considerations
which long preceded, and which will long succeed,
the fear of Soviet armed attack.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is an-
other organization which, in its own distinctive
way, contains the possibilities of great develop-
ment. It was, to be sure, conceived primarily as
a military alliance, and that aspect of the organi-
zation remains vitally important. But the Or-
ganization can and should be more.
The Canadian Government has notably espoused
this iDoint of view, and at last December's min-
isterial meeting of the Council both the French
and Italian delegations introduced resolutions
along this line. I expect that this matter will be
dealt with further at next week's ministerial meet-
ing to be held in Paris.
We basically have so much in common that we
should be able to do more in common.
All of our peoples embrace a religious faith
which makes atheistic materialism abhorrent to
them. "We have a common sense of moral values.
Our political institutions predominantly reflect
democratic conceptions which had their origin in
Greece and legal institutions which had their
origin in Rome.
Our economies are similar. We all believe in
and encourage the jJrivate ownership of property,
and there is a large and flourishing private trade
between our countries.
Our educational systems are much the same and
provide a broad basis for the free exchange of
views and the gaining of common understanding.
Not only do we have this firm and broad founda-
tion, but also we hold in common many guiding
principles of action which should enable us to
develop practically our fellowship.
We all believe that the days are past when any
part of the world, or any particular civilization,
should dominate others. Several of the members
of NATO are more than Atlantic countries. The
United Kingdom, for example, is a member of
the British Commonwealth. The United States
is a nation of the Americas and a Pacific nation.
We are today members not only of NATO but of
the Organization of American States, of the South-
east Asia Treaty Organization, and several other
collective defense treaties in the Pacific. We are
associated with the Baghdad Pact. All NATO
members would, I think, agree that NATO should
not attempt to represent the totality of their poli-
cies.
AVe all believe that no government has just pow-
ers except as it derives them from the consent of
the governed. At the same time we all recognize
that political independence is illusory unless those
who obtain it are able to sustain it and carry its
responsibilities. Also we reject the conception
which would prevent different races from freely
uniting in one political system. Under these con-
ditions we all strive to advance the historic evo-
lution of non-self-governing peoples to self-gov-
ernment or independence.
We believe that the spirit which in the last
decade has provided so many non-self-governing
peoples with political independence ought also to
operate peacefully to stimulate independence for
those subject to the ruthless colonialism of Soviet
Russia. Peace and welfare in Europe require
that East Germany should be allowed to unite in
freedom with the Federal Republic and that the
nations of Eastern Europe should once again be
independent.
We believe in the closer integration of some
Western European countries, such as is represented
by the Coal and Steel Community, by the Western
European Union created by the Brussels Treaty,
and by the prospective development of "Euratom,"
the means whereby the members of the Coal and
Steel Community would apply like community
principles to the development of atomic energy
for peaceful purposes. Such European integra-
tion, and the development of NATO, are comple-
mentary and not mutually exclusive processes.
The NATO members believe in the princiijle of
political consultation between allies and are in-
creasingly practicing it in the NATO Council.
Every NATO country, of course, has certain vital
national interests that may sometimes require in-
dependent judgment. Some of us have grave
worldwide responsibilities that cannot be effec-
tively discharged unless there is a capability of
April 30, 1956
709
prompt decision and corresponding action. Our
consultations must be designed to assure essential
harmony in our viewpoints on fundamentals. But
the processes of consultation should never enmesh
us in a procedural web so that we fall victim to
the ability of despotisms to act suddenly and with
all their might.
None of our governments is predatory. We
want military power to be used as a community
force to prevent aggression and not as a national
force for aggrandizement. Indeed, the amended
Brussels Treaty for Western European Union al-
ready sets an example in armament limitation that
we can ask the whole world to follow.
No NATO member, I suppose, wishes to drift
into some new and ill-defined relationship which
could be provocative of future misunderstandings.
But the unanimity of our thinking upon the great
basic issues makes it apparent that the time has
come to advance NATO from its initial phase into
the totality of its meaning.
statesmanship was to find ways whereby the West
can maintain its solidarity. Much — indeed, very
much — has been done. But more can still be done
to make sure that the good in Western civilization
is not again negated by differences.
The peoples who make up the Atlantic com--
munity ought, in increased unity, to I'esume their
greatness ; and true greatness is not to be measured
by ability to impose on others what they do not
want but by ability to find new ways whereby all
men can better realize their aspirations.
The North Atlantic Treaty already serves as
an indispensable and vital instrument of the
Atlantic community. But the time has, I believe,
come to consider whether its organization does
not need to be further developed if it is adequately
to serve the needs of this and coming generations.
If that be the common desire of the NATO mem-
ber nations, the United States will join eagerly in
exploring the possibilities which now beckon us
forward.
The Mission of the West
Western civilization has made an immense con-
tribution to the welfare of the whole world. It has
been a dynamic force which, like everything
human, has made its mistakes. But on the whole
it has reflected an enlightened view of the nature
of man and of his God-given right to enjoy life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Further-
more, the Western view of the nature of man has
made it inevitable that its influence should on the
whole be a liberalizing influence. Some nations
take pride in the size of their domain and the
number of people under their rule. But the West-
ern nations can feel that their greatest success was
to have brought to much of the world a knowledge,
a political freedom, and an economic opportunity
which it had never enjoyed before.
But the mission of the West is not completed.
More independence needs to be perfected. More
economic development needs to be planned and
supported throughout the world. More sense of
equality and human brotherhood needs to be de-
veloped. Also, the West needs to appreciate better
how rich are the gifts other civilizations have to
offer.
The historic weakness of the West has been its
disunity. Out of this disunity came wars which
have taken the lifeblood of its fuiest j-outh and
weakened its economies. A major task of postwar
710
Transcript of Secretary Dulles'
News Conference
Press release 198 dated April 17
Secretary Dulles: I have no statement of my
own to volunteer, so I am ready for questions.
Middle East
Q. Mr. Secretary, do you have any comment on
an announceinent from, the Soviet Foreign Office
that the Soviet Union is frepared to support
United Nations measures for peace in the Middle
East?
A. That was brought to my attention about 15
minutes ago, and I do not yet have the full text
of the Soviet statement, and we have learned in
these matters that it is important to read the fine
print. That I do not yet have. But I would say
this: The United States took the position some
time ago that this was properly a matter of con-
cern for the United Nations. I emphasized that
very strongly in my testimony before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee on February 24,^ and
since then the United States introduced the reso-
lution into the Security Council which was unani-
mously ado]3ted" and pursuant to which Secre-
' Bulletin of Mar. 5, 1956, p. 368.
"^ /6td., Apr. 16, 1956, p. 627.
i
{ieparXmenX of State Bulletin
f
tary-General Hammarskjold is now on his mission
in the Near East. Last week the President is-
sued liis statement from Augusta^ emphasizing
our full support of the United Nations and of the
Hammarskjold mission and calling upon all mem-
bers of the United Nations also to give that sup-
port. If it turns out that this Soviet statement
is responsive to the President's appeal and that
there is a genuine Soviet desire to support and
back up the United Nations in this matter, that
would, of course, be welcomed by the United States.
Q. Mr. Secretary, Jias there teen any diplomatic
effort on the part of this Government to contact
the Russians in the aftermath of the President's
statement to get their reactions to V.N. action?
A. There has been no specific diplomatic pro-
cedure of that kind. Of course, our Embassy at
Moscow was advised of the President's statement.
Q. It was not conveyed to Premier Bulganin in
any personal tnessage or anything like that?
A. No.
Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been jnuch specula-
tion in this connection with the so-called down-
grading of the Three-Power Declaration of 1960.
Will you tell us what the United States Govern-
ments position is on that declaration today?
A. Well, the position is the same, I think, as it
has always been. The declaration of 1950 itself
called for action — I think it said — consistently
with the obligations of the parties as members of
the United Nations, and called for action within
or without the United Nations. Now the United
Nations Charter itself provides that the Security
Council has "primary responsibility" for the main-
tenance of international peace and security. So
when the 1950 declaration said the action would
be taken "consistently with their obligations as
members of the United Nations," it made it quite
clear, I think, that we looked upon the U.N. Secu-
rity Council as the primary means of avoiding
hostilities and maintaining peace and security.
That is the interpretation the United States has
always put upon it and we believe that it is prefer-
able to act within the United Nations. That is, as
I say, the way which I think the declaration itself
indicates as the i^referable way to act. Now if
that shouldn't work, then we would have a new
'lUd., Apr. 23, 1956, p. 668.
situation. But, generally speaking, the action
which is now being taken through the United
Nations we regard as consistent with the 1950
declaration and not in derogation of that declara-
tion.
Q. Mr. Secretary, have the reports of Mr. Ham-
marshjoWs mission thus far indicated to you a
sense or indication of success in stopping the hos-
tilities so that it might he possible now to move
forward along the lines suggested in the Ru^ssian
statement toiuard the actual settlevfient of the
Palestine problem?
A. Well, I think it would be overoptimistic to
feel that the immediate troubles have been so fully
cleared away that we are yet at the point of deal-
ing with the problem broadly along the lines of,
for example, my August 2G speech.^ I think that
Mr. Hammarskjold feels that he has made good
progress, but he has by no means completed yet
the first phase of his activity, which is to establish
procedures and dispositions there which will ex-
clude the likelihood of future border incidents,
commando raids, and the like, which build up ten-
sion and ill will on both sides to a point where
long-range settlements are almost out of the im-
mediate question. Now the mandate from the
Security Council contemplated he should work
out such things as arriving at a greater freedom
of movement for the armistice observers there,
for perhaps a drawing apart of the forces along
the ai-mistice line so they would not be in direct
contact with each other. And while he has, I
think, made a good start, it would be premature
to say that that phase of his work has been com-
pleted or even that successful completion is defi-
nitely assured.
Q. Sir, when the time comes, if it does, when it
is possible to think in terms of permanent settle-
ment, is it our position that this is primarily a U.N.
responsibility or one between Israel and her
neighbors directly?
A. Well, obviously the problem is one in which
the parties at immediate interest are Israel and
the neighboring Arab States, and no one could or
should try to impose forcibly any solution upon
them. On the other hand, it is certainly a situa-
tion where the United Nations can play a con-
siderable role. There was established, you may
*nm., Sept. 5, 1955, p. 378.
kptW 30, 1956
711
remember, some years ago — I think it was in
1948 — a U.N. commission, which has been rather
inactive, which was composed of Turkey, France,
and the United States, to play a role in this con-
ciliation effort between the two sides.^ In the
speech of mine of August 2G which outlined a i^lan
which had been previously discussed with a num-
ber of other nations, we indicated there that there
would be an important role for the United Nations
to play. We spoke of a United Nations role, in
which the United States would participate, de-
signed to accomplish the dual purpose of helping
to solve the refugee problem and also to produce
more land whicli could be cultivated. Those are,
in a way, two sides of the same coin. That, we
thought, would be a United Nations operation
in the first instance, although it would require
financial support from member countries like the
United States. We also spoke of a guaranty of
the result and a situation in which we suggested
there would be a United Nations guaranty par-
ticipated in by member nations. So we have al-
ways assumed that, while the solution would, as
I say, in the first instance be a direct problem for
the parties, it might in fact not be possible for
them to arrive at a solution without assets from
outside — financial assets and assets in the form of
strong guaranties. Those would be necessary in-
gredients of any final settlement and they could
best be contributed by or through the United
Nations.
Communism in Latin America
Q. Mr. Secretary, hoo of the officials of the Gov-
ernment, Mr. Broionell and your own associate,
Mr. Holland, have discussed the Communist situa-
tion this week in speeches to the Inter- American
Bar Association. Does that mean that there is a
growing concern about communism. 171 that area,
and will you give us your views on the Communist
situation in Latin America?
A. I am not aware of any growing concern.
Indeed, my concern today is not nearly as great
as it was at a time when international communism
had virtually gotten control of Guatemala. The
Caracas Declaration of 195-4, which provided that,
if international communism got control of the
" For text of the General Assembly resolution establish-
ing the Conciliation Commission for Palestine, see ihid.,
Dec. 12, 1948, p. 726, and Dec. 20, 1948, p. 793.
political institutions of any American state, that
would be a threat to the peace and security of us
all, has created a political background against
which Communist activity has become less. Now
they realize that if they should succeed in any
one country all the rest of the countries would be
prepared to work against them. We saw the in-
fluence of that resolution shortly afterward in
what happened in Guatemala. I want to inject
here that, as perhaps you know, just a day or two
ago [April 5] the Government of the Argentine,
which had abstained on that resolution at Caracas,
declared its adhesion to that declaration, and that
is very warmly welcomed by the TTnited States.
Now that Caracas resolution provided, among
other things, for certain implementing machinery
in the way of exchange of information between
the countries about subversive activities and the
like. There has not been as effective a buildup
of that exchange mechanism as we would have
hoped, and we are trying constantly to keep that
antisubversive exchange of information growing.
It is not because we have any new fears of the
situation, but because, as I have said time and
again, the moment of greatest danger would be
the moment that we relaxed. We do not intend
to I'elax.
Japanese Textile Imports
Q. Mr. Secretary, Japan has expressed concern
at laws in two of our sovereign states which they
feel are aimed at Japanese textile imports, and
they feel that it is a violation of our treaty of
friendship, commerce, and navigation. Can you
say if the United States intends to reply shortly to
that a?id lohat our feeling is about it?
A. We are replying to the note.* We share
the concern that you refer to. It seems to us that
the action could be a very serious threat, not just
to Japanese trade but to our own foreign trade.
Our trade all over the world — and it is, as you
know, huge — is protected against discrimination
and boycott by these very same treaties. These
treaties are what enable our own business to oper-
ate with dependability throughout the whole
world. If there should be violations of those
treaties on om side, we would have to anticipate
that there would perhaps be reciprocal action on
other sides and that it would seriously imperil the
" For text of Japanese note and U.S. reply, see p. 728.
712
Deparfmenf of Sfate Bulletin
whole world structure of multilateral trade which
the United States has supported for quite a few
years now and upon which we believe a great deal
of the prosperity of the United States and the
growing strength of all the free world is based.
Therefore, we do look on the situation with very
great concern.
Q. Mr. Secretary, there Tms been a report of
Representative Celler which says the Egyptia/)is
are due to buy si,x submarines from the Soviet
bloc. Has any such report about submarines from
the Commamists reached the State DeparPment?
A. We have heard the same reports that prob-
ably have come to Representative Celler, but
whether, in fact, there is an arrangement for sub-
marines and whether it has been carried out we do
not know.
Q. Mr. Secretain/, have you given any indica-
tion of your views on the Israeli request for jet
planes made to Canada? Have the Canadians
been informed whether you loould appreciate their
filing that request?
A. The Canadians are aware of the fact that
there is no intention or desire of the United States
to try to establish a worldwide boycott of the
Government of Israel as far as arms are concerned.
Our own policy is based on certain considerations
which are, in some respects at least, distinctive to
ourselves and not necessarily a pattern which we
think all the world should follow, certainly not a
pattern which we are trying to impose upon other
countries of the world.
Q. Mr. Secretary, you just mentioned reference
to soTne machinery to implement the Caracas
Declaration. I wonder if you propose to use this
machinery to keep toatch on the recent Soviet trade
offers made to Latin Americans to see that they
are not axicompanied by political penetration.
A. We have to rely primarily upon the vigilance
of the countries concerned where the subject mat-
ter is one which is out in the open, as it is when
trade agreements are involved. The United
iJ States doesn't try to impose its views on others in
those respects. The type of machinery I referred
to is designed to counter underground activities
by international communism.
Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been some talk the
past several days of the United Nations Security
Council meeting in Geneva or Rome or some place
April 30, 1956
383217—56 3
in Europe to hear Mr. Hofnvmarskjold^s report on
his mission and take the next step. What is the
United States position on that?
A. The United States position on that is that it
is entirely a matter for the Secui'ity Council itself
to decide where it wants to meet. It can meet
other than in New York. It has met, as I recall,
both in London and Paris in the past, and, if it is
the desire of the members generally to meet some-
where else, the United States would not oppose
that.
Q. We donH take a strong position one way or
another?
A. No.
Cyprus
Q. Mr. Secretary, would you regard putting
Cyprus under NATO as a feasible temporary
arrangement?
A. No, I would doubt that would be feasible
because, you see, Nato is not, I might say, a cor-
porate entity. Nato is an organization where a
lot of sovereign states gather to discuss things but
it has no corporate existence, you might say. It
is like the United Nations. When the United Na-
tions exercises its trusteeship, it always does it
through some one or more countries. It picks one
of the member countries to exercise the trustee-
ship on its behalf because the United Nations does
not act of itself. It isn't a supergovernment which
has itself authority, with operating functions and
responsibilities. The same is true of Nato. There
is a group of what we call "permanent representa-
tives" that meet and exchange views. But that is
a group which can take no action except by unani-
mous consent of all the governments concerned.
And to put a situation like Cyprus under the ad-
ministration of a council of— what is it now — 15
nations acting through representatives who have
to discuss everything at great length, and cannot
agree on anything except after lengthy discussion,
is not an effective form of government.
Q. Has that been suggested to you?
A. I have heard of the idea, but it has not been
suggested as far as I am aware in any official
way by any government.
Q. Both you and the President have talked re-
cently of the necessity of gearing our sights for
longer-term foreign aid, but opposition on the
713
Hill seems to he more rather than less. What is
the administration doing at this point to jmsh the
program, of foreign aid? Or is it?
A. Yes, we are workiiifr actively on that mat-
ter. The presentations have begun before the For-
eign Affairs Committee and I discussed the sit-
uation with Chairman Richards of the committee
a few days ago. He felt the presentations had
been effective although of course he did not attempt
in any way to forecast the committee action. The
President may be discussing this problem in his
talk that he is making on Saturday although that
talk has not yet been linalized. But I know he
has had in mind at least referring to the subject
at that time.
Q. Mr. Secretary, do you think it will he pos-
sible to reach a solution of our prohlems in the
Middle East without the consultation and partici-
pation of the Soviet Union?
A. Well, to the extent we work this problem
out through the United Nations and the United
Nations Assembly, or Security Council — presum-
ably the United Nations Security Council — that
automatically does involve a certain participation
with the Soviet Union because the Soviet Union
is inescapably a member of both those bodies.
Q. The Sudanese have indicated they are ask-
ing the Russians for technical assistance. Do you
anticipate a widespread and successful Soviet drive
through the technical assistance program?
A. Well, I would expect there will be a Soviet
drive, but I have no reason to think it will be
successful. Recently the efforts which they made
in relation to Libya have received a setback, and
I think there is the same skepticism in most of
the African countries that there is in other coun-
tries of the "hookers" in Soviet technical assistance.
Q. Mr. Secretary, the Spanish Foreign Minister
said in New York yesterday that he thought the
United States would supply the Spanish Army
with the most modern weapons. Did he make such
a request while he was here?
A. Not to me. He did have talks, I believe, with
some of the defense people and Admiral Radford.
I don't know what he said there. -
Q. 'Would you comment on the visit this week
to London of Bulganin and Khrushchev, with par-
ticnlm" reference to talks on the kind of question
we have heen discussing here?
714
A. No, I think it would not be appropriate for
me to comment on that matter. '■
Q. Mr. Secretary, in the House Foreign Affairs
Committee hearing Chairman liichards presented
a somewhat new concept of handling foreign aid,
that is, that the United States follow somewhat in
the footsteps of the Soviet. For instance, the
Soviets come to Sudan or Libya — come to these
countries and say, "TFe will put up so much money
to build a dam^'' etc., and the United States says,
^"Go ahead and take that and then we will come
along and we will supply you with what the
Russians don't mahe up and when they let you
down,''"' etc. What is your thought on that? Mr.
Richards seriously presented that in a hearing now
going on.
A. Well, I am not familiar with that presenta-
tion of that point of view, and I would prefer not
to comment on it. I presume all these hearings
have been in executive session, haven't they?
Q. No, not all that I know of.
A. Was this presentation made at a public
hearing?
Q. No. Well, as you well knoio, Mr. Secretai^,
a lot of things that go on behind closed doors later
become public.
Germany
Q. Mr. Secretary, does this Government favor
the diplomatic talks on revmification that Germany
intends to begin soon with the Soviet Union
through its A7nbassador in Moscow?
A. I don't understand that there is any German
proposal to negotiate with the Soviet Union for
reunification. I understand that what Foreign
Minister von Brentano said was in answer to a
question as to whether they thought of inviting
Bulganin to come to Bonn to discuss reunification.
He said there was no necessity to invite him to
come now that they have diplomatic representa-
tion — they have embassies in both places. But, as
I read what he said, I did not interpret it as mean-
ing there was any present intention of carrying
on negotiations ; in fact, I think he expressly said
that any steps in that direction would only be
taken in agreement with the Western powers.
Q. Mr. Secretary, do you believe that the West-
em powers were wrong at the last Foreign Minis-
ters meeting to put German reninifwation ahead of
German secunty as you did? ■
Department of State Bulletin
A. No, I think we were right in doing that. Ex-
cuse me. I think perliaps I misinterpreted your
question, or did not answer it quite responsibly.
I thought you were referring to putting German
reunification ahead of disarmament.
Q. Yes. I incorrectly stated the question. That
is what I meant to say.
A. That is what I thought, and my answer goes
to what you meant to say.
Q. I didnH know you were a mind reader.
Q. Mr. Secretary, the Yugoslav Ambassador
said last week he thinks war loill he avoided in the
Middle East. Do you think that is an overopti-
mistic statement, or do you share that view?
A. I will certainly accept one-half of it, that
war can be avoided.
Q. You think it will he, and you have reason
for helieving sof
A. I certainly am not going to be said to feel
that I think there will be war in the Near East be-
cause I think that the chances are that there will
not be war. But I think it would be rash to say
now that there was no risk whatever of hostilities
in that area.
Q. Mr. Secretary, to go hack a minute to the
Soviet trade offers, it was said in Geneva last week
that they are considerahly more realistic now than
they have heen in the past. I wonder, if that is the
case, whether you think the same as you indi-
cated — that Soviet trade offers will continue, es-
pecially in Latin America?
A. I don't feel that I can make a very clear
answer to that question. All that I can say is that
we have been having occasional talks here with the
Ambassadors of the other 20 American Republics,
and we talk about these problems and there seems
to be a general consensus of thinking that there are
danger's in this situation and the need to approach
the problem in a very cautious way. But I
couldn't speak for all and each of these countries
as to what they will do.
Special Study of Foreign Aid
Q. Mr. Secretary, I understand that Chairman
George proposed over the weekend the creation
of some sort of special high-level group to study
foreign aid. Do you think this ivill he a good idea?
A. I think that the time has probably come
when it would be useful to have a comprehensive
study made of this whole problem, both from the
standpoint of our own machinery for conducting
the aid and the effectiveness of the present ma-
chinery, and also from the standpoint of the Soviet
activities and the extent to which those may be
relevant to our progi-am. There is the question,
for example, of whether more should be done in
terms of loans and less in terms of grants. There
is the question of whether or not more should be
given through international agencies like the
United Nations or whether they should be done
wholly on a bilateral basis or done through re-
gional organizations. There is a great mass of
serious problems of that sort which have been
growing up over the past few years. The adminis-
tration, I may say, is itself making plans to ex-
plore that problem and Senator George's think-
ing actually parallels thinking that has been going
on within the administration itself. I would think
that we would be receptive to working out some
program of that sort which would, I hope, com-
mand the confidence of the country and of the Con-
gress. The question of just how to set it up raises
questions but I do believe that the time is here
when a comprehensive examination of that pro-
gram is due.
Q. Would that he hy a commission outside the
adminis tra tion ?
A. I don't want to express myself at this time
as to the machinery which would be best adapted
because we have no clear conclusions within the
administrative or executive department on that
subject ourselves. And, whatever we did, we
would Mant to concert with the thinking of Con-
gress so, as I say, the result would carry a good
deal of confidence not only in the country as a
whole but in the Congress. So I don't want to
pronounce today on the machinery.
Q. When would it he held, Mr. Secretary?
A. I would think the studies ought to be, as
Senator George has I think indicated, carried on
between the present, or whenever the committee,
commission, or whatever it is, is set up, and next
January when the Congress would reconvene.
Q. Mr. Secretary, there have heen reports Paul
Hoffman came to you a few weeks ago and asked
you for your opinion about setting up a citizens''
April 30, 1956
715
council on foreign aid and you turned it down.
Is that correct?
A. It is true that Mr. Hoffman did come to me
and did talk about that subject but it has not been
turned down. That is one of the ideas that is in
tlie hopper and which we are thinking about in
line with what I described as the thinking of the
administration on this subject.
I
United States Foreign Policy in Africa
by George F. Allen
Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs
The problems confronting United States for-
eign policy in the vast continent of Africa are at
least as varied and manifold as the different stages
of evolution of the various countries making up
that continent. I would not presume to add to
the information about Africa which has been
proffered to you by the specialists in this field
during the past 48 hours. Instead, I believe the
most useful contribution I can offer to this sym-
posium is to attempt to place the policy problems
confronting the United States in Africa in per-
spective as we see them and then to analyze for
you briefly and in broad strokes the unique aspects
of the problems confronting us in Africa and the
basic principles from which we approach their
solution.
A responsible foreign policy toward Africa re-
quires of the United States a deep understanding
of the aspirations and problems of the individual
African countries both in their relationship with
the European powers and in their urge toward
self-determination so that we may lend our good
offices and assistance in promoting an orderly
progress toward independence and nationhood.
Africa'in World Perspective
In recent years the principle that the developed
countries have a moral obligation to aid the less
developed countries, such as those of Africa, has
become almost universally recognized, even taken
' Address made before the American Academy of Po-
litical and Social Science at Philadelpliia, Pa., on Apr. 21
(press release 206 dated Apr. 20).
for granted. There is a sound basis for the va-
lidity of this principle. In a world wherein all
countries and continents are becoming next-door
neighbors, glaring disparities in living standards
can produce tensions and animosities easily fanned
into conflict. In its postwar policies the United
States has been actively pursuing peace by trying
to mitigate such tensions. More recently even
the Soviet Union has begun belatedly to make ges-
tures of cooperation and assistance toward the
underdeveloped countries. While this constitutes
an important change in Soviet tactics, it remains
to be seen whether the change is consistent with
the basic Communist objective of world domi-
nation.
All this is highly pertinent to the consideration
of African problems. Besides the disturbing ele-
ment introduced in the Middle East by the Czech
arms deal with Egypt, the Soviets, either directly
or indirectly, have made overtures to Libya, Ethi-
opia, and Liberia ; and there is evidence of Com-
munist activity in areas as widely separated as
the Sudan and the Union of South Africa. We
would be betraying our position of leadership of
the free world if we assumed that these initiatives
are in the pursuit of normal, responsible foreign
relations. The old familiar pattern of exploiting
and championing local dissent and grievances to
create chaos and confusion is too fresh in our
minds.
The terms "imperialism" and "colonialism" can
be correctly used to describe a relationship, which
existed more in the past than at present, between
716
Department of State Bulletin
the metropolitan powers and their colonies, a rela-
tionship which most of the free- world powers have
J already rejected in principle.
Hardly a day passes that some further evidence
of the passing of colonialism does not appear in
the press. Morocco and Tunisia both obtained
their independence last month. A Moroccan Gov-
ernment is now operating in Eabat, and an all-
Tunisian Government in Tunis. This month
Tunisia held it« fii-st national elections. As for
Morocco, the United States has never ceased to
recognize the sovereignty of the Sultan and the
United States alone has always maintained a
diplomatic representative in Tangier.
Colonialism
The United States attitude toward colonialism
is known. In the light of our historical origins
and our traditions this attitude could hardly be
different. But the application of this principle
to present-day foreign-policy problems all over
the world requires patient understanding and a
high sense of responsibility regarding the ulti-
mate and basic security interests of the United
States. All of the so-called colonial powers repre-
sented on the continent of Africa are our friends
and allies in the worldwide contest between the
free and Communist worlds. Relationships estab-
lished by them with countries in Africa date from
an era when the concepts of international rela-
tions were diiferent. No one but a demagogue
would deny that basic advantages were brought
to the African territories by this process of open-
ing wider horizons and that, in fact, the impetus
toward modern nationhood grew out of these con-
tacts with Western civilization.
Furthermore, in the course of this relationship
between the metropolitan powers and the African
territories, there grew up interlocking economic
relations, the violent disruption of which would
seriously weaken our European allies. Similarly,
a sudden break of these lifelines would create con-
ditions of political and economic instability most
harmfvil to our African friends. It is more largely
a question of transforming this relationship into
a cooperative endeavor by which the newly emerg-
ing states in Africa achieve and maintain their
national self-respect and apply in their own way
the benefits of their national resources to improv-
ing the lot of their own people. A strong, free,
and friendly Africa is extremely important to
United States security. Our security interests and
our moral interests are both effectively served by
the same general line of action — we need friendly
and cooperative relations with Europe and Africa,
just as their own interests require the maintenance
of intimate ties with each other.
In Africa our allies are aware of the basic atti-
tude of the United States toward colonialism, but
they are equally aware of our intention to work
as friends of both sides toward an orderly solution
of these problems. Great Britain has publicly
announced its policy of helping the countries of
Africa toward independence, and its record in
Asia is an earnest of its sincerity. In line with
its policy as a responsible power, however, it does
not wish to create perhaps greater problems by
precipitate action which granting of immediate
independence might create. This is a time when
political vacuums are a great danger to world
peace.
In North Africa, France has recently recog-
nized the independence of Morocco and Tunisia '
and is engaged in trying to find a liberal solution
to the problem of Algeria. Spain has also recog-
nized the independence of its zone of Morocco,^
and that country has now the opportunity to be-
come unified. Both Spain and France are en-
gaged in working out arrangements by which the
mutual economic benefits derived from their past
association with Morocco can be continued in the
light of the new relationship. In other areas of
Africa, France is also looking toward creating
a new relationship with the groups which are
gradually developing a higher degree of political
consciousness. The Belgians have recently estab-
lished two universities in the Belgian Congo to
meet the educational needs of the Congolese.
Nationalism
The United States attitude toward nationalism
is not so easily definable. After World War II,
when the threat of international communism en-
dangered our security. United States opinion was
inclined toward promoting a greater faith in fed-
erations in Europe which cut across — and, we
hoped, would eventually obliterate — nationalistic
rivalries. But in other areas of the world we
recognized the strength of nationalism in resisting
= Bulletin of Mar. 19, 1956, p. 466, and Apr. 2, 1956,
p. 552.
' Ibid., Apr. 23, 1956, p. 667.
April 30, 1956
717
the threat of international communism. Com-
munism cynically exploits the passions of revolt
for the sole purpose of creating unrest, cliaos, and
revolution so that the small organized minority
may seize power and permanently bury the in-
stincts of healthy nationalism under the require-
ments of blind and absolute obedience to Moscow.
This issue assumes a special importance in Africa,
where the varying degrees of political experience,
tlie large amount of illiteracy, and the insecurity
of the individual in the process of exchanging his
old loyalties for new ones make the population
particularly vulnerable to exploitation of this is-
sue by unprincipled demagogues.
Again tlie principle of understanding and re-
sponsibility in the conduct of foreign relations
should guide us and other nations in relations with
the countries of Africa so that the elements of na-
tionalism which contribute toward genuine inde-
pendence and stability will be encouraged and
those which tend to be purely negative, anarchic,
and disruptive be curbed.
Racialism
In the light of experience which the United
States is undergoing domestically in developing
harmonious race relations, I think it behooves us
to approach the problem of race elsewhere in the
world in all humility. This aspect of relations
between people of different races living together
in multiracial states involves deep-seated emo-
tions and prejudices which can only be overcome
gradually. The principle for which the United
States stands and is known throughout the world
is perfectly clear: it is embodied in our Constitu-
tion and in our Bill of Eights. But it is equally
clear that the application of force and oppression
can only exacerbate the issue.
The vast continent of Africa illustrates this
problem in all its facets, from countries in which
the intermingling of races on an equal basis has
become an accepted and unquestioned fact to
countries in which an attempt is being made to
legislate segregation down to its last logical conse-
cjuence. The problem is infinitely complicated in
Africa by the presence of groups who wield politi-
cal and economic power but who are not other-
wise identified witli the country and people among
whom they live. This tends to confuse the issue
of racialism with questions of political, economic,
social, and cultural discrimination and makes the
approach to a solution of the problem more diffi-
cult by making it virtually impossible to isolate
the issue from all the other problems.
Again it behooves us not to become identified
with any of the conflicting factions but rather,
while preserving our adherence to our own basic
principle of racial equality, to attempt to exert a
moderating influence upon the extremists and to
oppose those who are exploiting these tensions for
ulterior purposes.
Challenge to U.S. Diplomacy
The continent of Africa presents a wide variety
of foreign polic}^ problems to the United States,
as varied as the number of countries and territories
it comprises and as complicated as the degree of
emergence toward independent statehood and the
complexity of relationships with the different
metropolitan powers with which the various states
are associated. Yet there is a unifying factor
in this diversity: the entire continent is under-
going simultaneously, even if in varying degrees,
a transformation along political, economic, socio-
logical, and racial lines. The substitution of new
ties for old tribal or family relationships in order
to assure security for the individual, the exchange
of old values for new ones in the attempt to ob-
tain social and economic status, the growing desire
for political self-expression, and the need for de-
veloping new approaches to produce stability in
multiracial groups devoted to common economic
and political goals — all these combine to create
a condition of ferment and potential progress
which is a real challenge to American diplomacy.
The United States, as a nation, has no selfish
interests in Africa except the preservation of our
own security, which we consider, in present world
circumstances, inextricably bound up with the kind
of future the African countries desire for them-
selves. We are dedicated to the preservation of
world peace, which we consider an indispensable
corollary to the kind of development Africa needs.
Because of our origins and traditions we are basi-
cally in sympathy with the desire for independ-
ence and nationhood of the emerging states, but
we are also friends and allies of the powers who
must help to shape this new status. This places
us in a position from which we hope and believe
our influence can be exerted to make the trans-
formation of Africa a process of orderly evolu-
tion and not one of violent revolution.
I
718
Department of State Bulletin
The Soviet Reappraisal of Stalin
by Deputy Under Secretary Murphy'^
Your society was founded in 1922, and at that
time I was a young officer in the Foreign Service
of the Department of State. During the years
which have elapsed, we have witnessed tremendous
improvements in the coverage and dissemination
of news. At my first post in Bern, Switzerland,
at the end of World War I, we had only sketchy
and infrequent reports on developments in Wash-
ington and elsewhere. The contrast between those
days and the present — with the almost instantane-
ous coverage that you give to world affairs today —
is enormous, as is its impact on the conduct of our
foreign affairs. Perhaps no other single item has
affected the techniques of diplomacy as has the
tempo and completeness of your activities in the
information field.
In our small way, we in the Department of State
are indebted to you for j'our valuable coverage of
international affairs. Our modern society would
be hard pressed to maintain its strength and its
freedom without the intelligent reporting and
keen appraisal of world events that you make
possible.
Perhaps the greatest difference between our
form of civilization and that of the Communist-
controlled powers is in our respective concepts
of the role and function of news media. To us full
information and freedom of expression are pri-
mary. Without them we would not have the in-
foi'med public oiDinion on which our society de-
pends. Communist countries hy their structure
are unable to have full and free information.
Their leaders cannot tolerate it. Their media of
expression are designed to present the views of the
ruling group. Only carefully selected items of
' Address made before the American Society of News-
paper Editors at Washington, D. C, on Apr. 19 (press
release 205).
news are disseminated, and the important items are
scrupulously edited either to generate public con-
fidence in the governing group or to inflame resent-
ment against enemies.of the state, real or imagi-
nary. The people of Russia and Communist-domi-
nated countries live in a world that closely re-
sembles the nightmare described by George Orwell
in 198^. What news they are allowed to read and
hear is presented to them to develop a state of
mind or point of view carefully chosen for them
in advance by the ruling group.
We have recently witnessed a rather ostentatious
reapjDraisal of Stalin, resulting in his denigration
and downgrading. In this performance we have
an exceptionally clear example of Soviet treatment
of the news and their concept of the role of the
news media in Communist society.
Rise and Fall of Stalin Cult
For 25 years all members of Communist-con-
trolled countries, whether within the Soviet Union
or without, had been increasingly conditioned to
the acceptance of Stalin as the all-wise and the
always-right. Any outward manifestation of less
than complete belief in Stalin's wisdom and coi*-
rectness led to mipleasantness. For 25 years
Communists at home and abroad were indoctri-
nated in this credo. Stalin's views of history and
science. Communist doctrine, the arts, and litera-
ture were the only views possible for Soviet or
Communist-controlled citizens to have or at least
to express. Cities and momitains, factories and
industrial plants, theaters, stadiums were named
in his honor. Art galleries, public buildings,
offices, and private homes were decorated with his
pictures and his statues. "V^Hiat was deemed good
in the Communist world was associated with
Stalin. And what was evil and what was daneer-
AprW 30, 7956
719
ll
ous was deviation, no matter how slight, from any
view on any subject that Stalin might have had
or was likely to have.
In the course of the 3 years since Stalin's death
the present Soviet oligarchy decided to "shrink"'
Stalin, to devalue him and to change the worship
of his name. The process of Stalin's devaluation
provides a spectacular example of the difference
in the ways in which our respective systems of
news dissemination function.
You are no doubt weary of references to the
February meeting in Moscow of the 20th Congress
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Be-
fore this meeting there had been hints and sug-
gestions that Stalin was no longer regarded by
the Politburo with the traditional worshipful
reverence. There were imiuendoes on occasion
that some parts of Stalin's foreign policy had been
less than perfect. But the symbol of Stalin, the
all-wise and the impeccable, had been treated
gingerly. On his birthday anniversary last De-
cember all of the important Soviet news media
referred to him as enjoying a secure and lasting
place in the trinity. His name was, as always,
coupled with those of Marx and Lenin. In Janu-
ary, at a series of lesser Party congresses, this
treatment of him continued.
Denunciation at Party Congress
Just as the 20th Congress of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union was to meet, there came
an indication that the dam was about to break.
The Congress opened with a minute of silent re-
membrance for three comrades who had died since
the 19th Congress. The three were Stalin, Gott-
wald, and Tokuda. The pairing of the great
Stalin with these lesser foreign figures was in
itself an insult. Then, during the Congress, his
name was mentioned less than a half dozen times
during the 11 days of speechmaking. In one
speech by Mikoyan, Stalin was mentioned only
once, though his policies were severely criticized.
Wlien the texts of the speeches made at the Con-
gress were published, it was obvious that he had
been under severe attack. But the detailed de-
nunciation of Stalin was saved for a climax speech
by Khrushchev at a closed session on the last day.
Seven weeks have elapsed since then, and the
Soviet press has not yet printed the Khrushchev
speech. Nor have they printed all the charges
made in the speeches, nor the widespread criticism
that has since been made of Stalin by satellite
leaders. Khrushchev's speech was made on Febru-
ary 25th and is said to have lasted for 21/2 hours.
You have seen public reports that the text runs to
60 pages. Yet up to now the people of the Soviet
Union have not been told of the speech or even of
the fact of its delivery. I am sure the Soviet
Ambassador will not mind if I say that I expressed
to him our interest in seeing the text.
Campaign of Defamation
As you luiow, Khrushchev's secret speech was
apparently the signal for a general campaign of
defamation of Stalin throughout the Communist
satellite comitries. In almost all these countries
there has been severe, definite, and personal criti-
cism of Stalin and his policies, yet it was not until
March 28 that Pravda denounced some of the
evils of the Stalin regime. "Wliile the satellite
countries have been allowed to be free in their
post-Congress criticism and while foreign cor-
respondents in Moscow have been allowed to re-
fer to the Khrushchev speech since March 17, the
Russian press has been under heavy wraps.
The manner in which the devaluation of Stalin
has been handled by the Soviet press is hard for
Americans to conceive. In our eyes this treat-
ment of news verges on the burlesque, yet we
know and understand that the leaders of the Soviet
Union do not embark on any such major change
in the accepted dogma of their system without the
most careful and calculated preparation. It is
usually done with all the abandon of a careful
chess player. The Soviet leaders had to make a
major and dangerous decision when they started
their process of devaluation. Apparently they are
willing to risk the consequences of a period of con-
fusion and doubt. Apparently they are confi-
dent that they will be able to use their news media
for persuasion and at the same time their various
means of coercion to keep their people in line mitil
a new mythology has been established. We even
have reports that examinations in Soviet history
are being suspended in Russian schools because
the teachers do not know what history is correct.
'Wliy are the Soviet leaders doing this? Does
it mean any real change in Soviet policy? The
answers to these questions gradually unfold. It
is onr opinion that this is a carefully planned op-
eration conducted largely for internal, domestic
reasons. Its impact abroad is incidental and may
even risk losses and Party discomfort. But the
\
720
Department of State Bulletin
I
major stakes in this instance are inside the Soviet
Union, where the dead weight of the Stalin ap-
paratus and heritage had to be lifted in order that
the Party program could breathe again and move
forward. The Soviet leadei-s are not easily em-
barrassed by criticisms or ridicule from abroad,
but they are relentlessly vigilant to protect their
primary source of power at home. The cult of
Stalin was corrupting that power. It had to be
destroyed. On the foreign front they move
blandly ahead, with successive maneuvers — a new
disarmament jDroposal, an announcement of the
dissolution of the Cominform which is really
a long overdue obituary, a dramatic plug for
credit in the Middle East, a Bulganin and
Khrushchev visit here and there. They are confi-
dent in the ability of the free world soon to forget
the purge of Stalin as the purge of the old
Bolshevists was forgotten. But the leadership
never forgets its source of power.
Perhaps you may recall a celebrated passage
from Sir Winston Churchill's speech at Massa-
chusetts Institute of Technology back in 1949,
at a time when tlie power of the Soviet threatened
the whole of Western Europe. Sir Winston,
speaking in parables, wanted to make the point
that unforeseen events mitigate the course of his-
tory, and he did it in tliis way :
Four or five hundred years ago Europe seemed about
to be conquered by the Mongols. Two great battles were
fought almost on the same day near Vienna and in Poland.
In both of these the chivalry and armed power of Europe
were completely shattered by the Asiatic hordes. It
seemed that nothing could avert the doom of the famous
continent from which modern civilization and culture
have spread throughout the world. But at the critical
moment the Great Khan died. The succession was vacant
and the Mongol armies and their leaders trooped back on
their ponies across the 7,000 miles which separated them
from their capital in order to choose a successor. They
never returned 'til now.
Now I would not imply from this that the in-
heritors of the power of Josef Stalin (he was
once described as Genghis Khan with a tele-
phone ! ) have fallen out to any crippling degree —
although the death of Beria and his friends and
the rehabilitation of many both living and dead
indicate deep subsurface disturbances. We can
be sharply aware of the fact that the Soviet Union
is in process of radical transition from one-man
rule to group dictatorship. This might be called
a process of institutionalizing a dictatorship.
This is perhaps the essence of the counterrevolu-
tion going on in Eussia today.
April 30, 1956
Eule by committee instead of by single dictator
inevitably has brought about a certain loosening
in the chain of command. The differing ways the
satellites have reacted to the anti-Stalin campaign
is just one case in point. Official rehabilitation
of Stalin victims — as in Hungary and Bulgaria —
is one end of the spectrmn. A tendency to blame
all past excesses on officials of the Beria stripe is
another. The dissolution of the Cominform, long
since a fact but only announced 2 days ago, is an
index of a trend.
In the Department of State we do not assume
that the Communists have changed their basic ob-
jectives. We have no evidence that they have.
We recall that Karl Marx, nearly 100 years ago,
aptly said that "the policy of Eussia is change-
less ... its methods, its tactics, its maneuvers
may change, but the polar star of its policy — world
domination — is a fixed star."
Nevertheless, the Soviet leaders today are re-
ducing their emphasis on military strength and
threat of force as major instruments of policy.
They are shifting and diversifying their methods.
Such a shift may be an advantageous development
from the standpoint of the United States and
other free nations.
Implications for U.S. Policy
A principal objective of United States foreign
policy is to prevent a devastating war. We would
welcome any genuine indication that the danger
of armed Communist aggression has diminished.
We have no reason to doubt the fundamental ca-
pacity of free societies to compete with communism
by peaceful means. At the same time, there are
two facts we should keep firmly in mind when we
try to figure out where we stand today.
First we should remember that the Communist
bloc retains a tremendous capability of military
aggression. It has a substantial superiority in
military manpower. It is rapidly developing
more modern weapons and a modern technology,
including, of course, an ominous atomic potential.
The Communists possess the capacity to engage in
new military ventures at any time, either on a
general or local scale. As long as this capacity
exists, it is obvious that neither the United States
nor other free nations can afford to risk their
freedom and safety on an optimistic reassessment
of Communist intentions.
Secondly, even if the Communists remain cau-
tious about military ventures, we camiot afford to
721
discount the vast stakes involved in the bitter
political and economic contests which they are
determined to wage against the free world. In
terms of the ultimate fate of free civilization,
this new strategy is no less dangerous than the old.
We assume it to be equally hostile but more decep-
tive to combat. It is more subtle, more complex,
and geared to a longer time period. We should
not make what could be the fatal mistake of assum-
ing that a Communist deemphasis on military
methods of conquest will allow us to take a holi-
day. On tlie contrary, the struggle to protect
our freedom may become moi'e intense and will
certainly tax our imagination, our resources, and
our patience. Our ability to achieve success, like
our ability to maintain an adequate defense pos-
ture, will depend in large measure upon our co-
operation with other free nations. The principle
of collective security is as valid today in the
political-economic field as it ever was in the mili-
tary field.
We are interested in what may have changed
within the Soviet Union. It is even more impor-
tant to remember what has not changed in tlie
Soviet Union.
First: The power for political decision is still
vested in a few men. The people of the U.S.S.R.
have no voice in political decisions.
Second: The U.S.S.R. is the most heavily armed
nation in the world, and it is continuing to develop
new weapons.
Third: The power structure of the U.S.S.R.
is bolstered by an ideology that is basically hostile
to any system it is unable to control.
It is still much too soon to make any final
appraisal of what tliis internal change means.
Stalin has been criticized for his domestic mis-
takes. He has been criticized for not preparing
the Soviet Union against attack from Germany.
His foreign policy, the injustices committed
abroad, have not been subject to the same wither-
ing reexamination. There has been no indication
that a free Germany will be allowed to unite.
There is little indication of a new attitude toward
Japan. There has been no indication that the
satellite countries will be free.
There is one development that clearly seems to
stem from the emerging Soviet system of insti-
tutionalizing, of group dictatorship. That is a
return to the processes of diplomacy.
You have perhaps seen the announcement just
made by Secretary-General Hammarskjold that
Egypt and Israel have agreed to an unconditional
cease-fire on their borders. This is indeed a wel-
come development. It reflects credit upon the i
parties immediately concerned, upon the efforts of H
Mr. Hammarskjold, and, if I may say so, on the
President and tlie Secretary of State, because the ■
United States wanted this dispute settled through |
the United Nations. In the course of this talk I
have not had the occasion to touch on the Middle
East, although I can assure you I am not unaware
of a certain focusing of interest there on your
part and by others. But I suggest that the
metliods by whicli the new economic-political con-
flict is being waged are increasingly through dip-
lomatic channels, and in the Middle East that is
especially true.
And because the prevention of war is the ulti-
mate goal of the diplomat, the lifelong purpose
to which his life is dedicated, perhaps we may hope
that this may be progress, even though very small
progress, toward the true peace for which you in
your important field and we in the State Depart-
ment all long and for which we all strive.
Israel and Egypt Agree
To Observe Armistice
Statement by Rem^j Cabot Lodge, Jr.
U.S. Representative to the United Nations
U.S. /U.N. press release 2390 dated April 19
The United States pointed out in the Security
Council on April 3^ that unless the armistice
agreements can be effectively carried out, a grave
threat to the peace may result.
It is heartening evidence of the good faith of the
parties that it has been possible for the Secretary-
General to annoimce that both Israel and Egypt
have notified the Chief of Staff of the U.N. Truce
Supervision Organization of orders issued in im-
plementation of assurances for the observation of
article 2 (2) of the Egyptian-Israeli Armistice
Agreement.
Tliis word of progress coming from the Secre-
tary-General is most welcome and sliows that he
is discharging well the mandate given him by the
Security Council on April 4.^
' Bulletin of Apr. 16, 1956, p. 630.
' Ibid., p. 628. t
722
Department of State Bulletin
Objectives of the Mutual Security Program in Asia
Statement hy Walter S. Robertson
Assistant Secretai-y for Far Eastern Affairs '
I appreciate the opportunity to appear in sup-
port of the Far East portion of the proposed
mutual security program for the fiscal year 1957.
In the area with which we are concerned today,
the United States is extending aid under the
mutual security program to nine countries — Ja-
pan, Korea, Taiwan, Philippines, Indonesia, Viet-
Nam, Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand. I should
like to make a general statement highlighting the
situation in the region and the political considera-
tions that make it so important for the United
States to continue these programs. After that,
the specific programs will be summarized for you
by Dr. Raymond Moyer, Ica [International Co-
operation Administration] Regional Director for
the Far East, and by Deputy Assistant Secretary
McGuire of the Department of Defense.
The area we are talking about — the free- world
Far East — is a region only in a geographical sense.
There are greater differences than similarities be-
tween the countries except that they, all but one,
share the common problem of being underde-
veloped by Western standards. In the area are
nearly 300 million people, most of whom are small
farmers with an average holding of about one to
two acres. The variation in population density is
dramatic, ranging from 16 per square mile in Laos
to 1,000 or more in some parts of Java and Japan.
Nobody really knows what the per capita income
is, but the best estimates we have run from about
$50 a year in the poorest country to $300 a year in
the richest country.
The area provides the free world with about 92
percent of its abaca, 88 percent of its natural
i
'Made before the Committee on Foreign Affairs of tlie
House of Representatives on Apr. 11.
April 30, 1956
rubber, 41 percent of its rice, 66 percent of its
copra, and 65 percent of its tin. There is still a
tremendous potential of available minerals — oil,
bauxite, iron ore, chromium, tin, manganese, sul-
fur, nickel, etc.
Politically the area is characterized by a very
strong spirit of nationalism and independence.
These nations are determined no longer to be re-
garded at home or abroad as second-class citizens.
To many of them the colonialism they have experi-
enced appears to be more of a menace than the
threat of communism.
The primary objective of our policy in the Far
East can be stated quite simply. It is to strengthen
the free world and to curb the power and prevent
the expansion of communism. The mutual se-
curity program is an increasingly essential factor
in the attainment of that objective.
The people of these comitries have aspirations
for a better life which they are determined to ful-
fill. This program, through technical and eco-
nomic-development assistance, is helping them to
achieve these objectives. The military assistance
part of the program is assisting them in maintain-
ing internal order and security and in creating a
first line of defense against aggression while they
build up in a nonmilitary sense internally. But
it is the success or failure of this mutual security
program, in giving these nations hope that they
will be more secure and better off tomorrow than
they are today, that will determine whether they
sulccumb to the blandishments of communism.
This hope, if it is to last, must be firmly grounded
in their own experience that progress is being
made ; that they are, in fact, better off today than
they were yesterday; and that, when tomorrow
becomes today, the same thing will be true.
723
As Secretary Dulles said upon his return from
his recent trip to the Far East : -
The (lay is past when the peoples of Asia will tolerate
leadcrshiit which keeps them on a dead center eco-
ncjiiiiciiUy and socially, and when each generation merely
ekes out a hare suljsistence, with a Ijrief life expectancy,
and passes on to the next generation only the same bleak
prospect.
As you know, I had the privilege of accompany-
ing Secretary Dulles on his recent trip. The
situation in this part of the world is still serious;
there are still many points of tension; but there
is general improvement in free-world competence
to deal with these tensions. Doubtless there will
be setbacks from time to time, but the general
course is one of progress.
The Asian leaders whom we saw uniformly de-
sired to preserve the independence of their coun-
tries. They too recognized that political inde-
pendence of itself is not enough. Eight out of
ten countries we visited were anti-Communist.
Those two which call themselves neutrals, how-
ever, were also appreciative of United States aid
and the help that United States policy affords
them in preserving their independence. Faith
and hope are the stuff of which free nations are
made. Our aid programs are assisting the govern-
ments of free Asian countries in making such faith
and hope possible.
For well over a year the forces of armed aggres-
sion in the area have been held in check. This fact,
and the radical change in Soviet tactics in recent
months, are, in my opinion, evidence of the effec-
tiveness of the courses of action we have been
following. Millions of free Asians have, in conse-
quence, enjoyed a measure of peace even though
living under the constant threat of a renewal of
armed aggression. That threat remains deadly
serious throughout the region as it did a year ago.
Let us look at it squarely.
Nature of Communist Threat
In Korea the Communists have not slackened
the buildup of their con^bat capability in the
north. Chinese Communist troops are still in oc-
cupation of North Korea. They have introduced,
in flagrant violation of the armistice agreement,
a modern jet air force and new types and larger
quantities of other equipment that greatly increase
their striking power. The experience with aggres-
' BuiiETiN of Apr. 2, 1956, p. 539.
sion in 1950, the enormous stake which the United
States and the United Nations have in a free and
independent Korea, and this threat posed by the
Communists to the north make it essential that
we maintain our guard in Korea. We cannot be
complacent in this situation.
Opposite Taiwan, the Chinese Communists are
building 10 airfields between Shanghai and Can-
ton to accommodate jet planes, multiplying their
gun positions, and constructing a military railroad
into the port of Amoy.
The Korean story is repeated in Viet-Nam,
where, in callous violation of the Geneva agree-
ment of 1954, the effective strength of the fighting
forces of the Viet Minh has approximately doubled
since the cease-fire and it is reported that artillery
firepower has been increased some sixfold.
Equipment and training are being furnished by
the Chinese Conmiunists.
In other parts of the region the Communist
tactics are more insidious, but the threat is none-
theless real and menacing.
In Japan, that industrial powerhouse which is
a prime Communist target, the Communist Party
is a legal entity with a following estimated at
close to 1 million. One of the few gestures in the
Far East toward the spirit of Geneva was made
by this organization when in July 1955 it re-
nounced past "errors" of violence and extremism.
This lipservice would have meant more if the
Party had not maintained an underground or-
ganization with a paramilitary arm which they
have used for purposes of espionage, sabotage,
and the instigation of mass violence.
In Laos, the Pathet Lao, flaunting the Geneva
agreement, continue to occupy the major parts of
two northern provinces. They send their agents
into other parts of the country to stir up trouble
and subvert the legitimate government.
In Thailand, the people recognize the potential
threat to them of continued occupation of these
Lao provinces and see beyond in adjacent Red
China the "Greater Thai State" created by the
Communists. There they see a former Thai
premier calling upon people of the Thai race
living in Thailand, Laos, and Burma to over-
throw their free government and substitute
communism.
In Singapore, Communist elements have made
disturbing advances particularly in the fields of
education and labor with their tactics of violence
and subversion. In the Federation of Malaya, the
724
Department of State Bulletin
British are still fighting their long war against
Communist guerrilla terrorism.
In Indonesia, a country which 8 years ago put
down forcefully an attempted Communist mili-
tary coup, the Communists have succeeded in
I'eestablishing themselves in the political sphere
and in the recent general elections polled 16 per-
cent of the vote and emerged as Indonesia's fourth
largest party. However, on the plus side, a new
non-Communist goveriunent coalition has been
formed which includes all major non-Communist
elements.
i In Burma, the Soviet bloc has moved swiftly
and adroitly to exploit the situation there. Faced
with a large, burdensome surphis of rice, Burma
has been forced to find markets in any quarter.
In consequence, Burma is one of the nentrals that
were singled out for special courtship by Bulganin
and Khrushchev with offers of technicians, equip-
ment for agricultural and industrial development,
schools, and cultural exchanges. During a recent
visit, Mikoyan initialed an agreement with Burma
by which the Soviets will supply capital and other
goods as well as "technical services" in exchange
for 400,000 tons of rice annually for 4 years.
Finally, throughout the area, internal pressures
in the form of subversion and economic and
psychological warfare are being brought to bear
in every country in the Far East.
Progress Made in Last Year
It is clear that there is much to be done. It is
also true that much has been done and that genuine
progress has been made in the last year.
A little less than a year ago, when the aid pro-
gram for fiscal year 1956 was presented before this
committee, you were informed of the tremendous
odds against which the newly independent Gov-
ernment of Viet-Nam was fighting. It was faced
with the military and subversion threat of the
Communists to the north of the I7th parallel ; it
was confronted with internal strife. There was
the ominous challenge to the government's control
posed by the armed, self-seeking, political-religious
sects ; there was the urgent necessity for resettling
hundreds of thousands of refugees who had fled
Communist domination following the military
partition. The problems were well-nigh over-
whelming. The program you approved at that
time has made possible our continued support of
this new republic in the economic and military
sphere. We can, I believe, take great satisfaction
in the remarkable improvement in the situation
which without our contribution, we believe, would
have been impossible.
We now find a firmly entrenched nationalist
government under the leatlership of President
Diem. This government has proved its capacity
not only to survive in the face of Communist sub-
versive efforts but to assume the responsibilities
of independence. The Diem government has
achieved a decisive victory in the recent elections
for the Assembly, which is now meeting to ratify a
constitution for free Viet-Nam.
Our own efforts in Viet-Nam are directed in the
first place toward helping to strengthen internal
security forces. These consist of a regular army
of about 150,000 men, a mobile civil guard of
about 45,000, and local defense units which are
being formed to give protection against sub-
version on the village level. We are providing
budgetary support and equipment for these forces
and have a mission assisting in the training of the
army. We are also helping to organize, train,
and equip the Vietnamese police forces. Some
600,000 refugees who fled to South Viet-Nam to
escape the Viet Minh are being resettled on pro-
ductive lands with the assistance of funds made
available by our aid program. In various ways
under "defense support" our program also pro-
vides assistance to the Vietnamese Government
designed to strengthen the economy and provide a
better future for the peoples in that area.
In Korea, we are demonstrating with other
nations of the United Nations that a free nation
can successfully be defended against Communist
acrorression and can be i-econstructed and built up
to defend itself. Our aid progi-am is the major
factor in the support of the Korean Army, which
is now the fourth largest in the world and the
largest among the free nations of Asia. That army
has obviously become an eft'ective deterrent against
further aggression by the Red Chinese and North
Korean armies entrenched beyond the 38th paral-
lel. Korea's 21 divisions, which we believe con-
tinue to be essential, are far beyond its ability to
support. Even without the burdens of this mili-
tary force, Korea would need outside economic
assistance for several years to come to complete
the rehabilitation of the country and develop the
economy so that it can ultimately become self-
supporting.
Taiwan continues to occupy a position of key
importance in the free world's island chain of
April 30, 1956
725
defense in the western Pacific. We continue to
regard its defense as essential to the non-Com-
munist countries of the Far East, as well as of
the United States itself. As the Communists con-
tinue to improve and expand their military estab-
lishment on the mainland, the defensive signifi-
cance of Taiwan assumes even greater importance
than heretofore.
The Government of the Republic of China pro-
vides a source of hope for the mainland Chinese
and an alternative focal point for their loyalty. It
also furnishes a political alternative to Commu-
nist influence for some 13 million overseas Chinese
residing in strategic parts of Southeast Asia. As
the Peiping regime intensifies its repression and
murder at home and subversive actions abroad,
the maintenance of a China that is free and inde-
pendent assumes an ever-increasing importance.
During the past j'ear good progress has been
made in strengthening the defensive capability of
the forces on Taiwan and in stabilizing the econ-
omy. Substantial assistance from the United
States continues to be necessary, however, since
the economic resources of Taiwan are still limited
in relation to the increasing population and the
large defense establishment.
Economic Value of Defense Support
At this point, let me interpolate a moment. It
should be clear to all of us that the term "defense
support" covers programs important to economic
development as well as to military objectives. A
highway, an airport, a harbor, a bridge, a factory
may in the first instance be vital for the military
purposes, but its construction in most instances also
contributes a much-needed economic item. Fur-
thermore, as in Taiwan, the necessity for capital
development to support military requirements
goes hand in hand with an important objective we
all have very much in mind — to reduce the burden
on the U.S. taxpayer. As the economy of a comi-
try strengthens, it is self-evident that it can do
more for itself and the need for grant aid corre-
sjjondingly declines.
Turning to Japan, while much remains to be
done, during the past 2 years Japan's self-defense
forces have grown in size and have obtained useful
training. The ground forces, numbering 150,000,
are regarded as adequate for the maintenance of
internal security but are not yet either quantita-
tively or qualitatively adequate for the defense of
Japan. The Japanese Government, strengthened
726
^
by the merger of the two conservative parties last
fall, has under study specific plans wMch would
improve the country's ability to defend itself un-
aided. These plans have not yet been approved.
The assistance for Japan contemplated under the
mutual security program will continue the help
given heretofore in the organization, training, and
equipping of Japan's self-defense forces. Japan's
economic recovery and its growing self-defense
capabilities have already made it an asset to the
free world. Further advance and development
should enable Japan to assume a greater share of
its own defense responsibilities and will permit
redeployment of certain American forces presently
stationed in Japan.
We regard the Philippine Eepublic as an in-
creasingly important partner in the collective de-
fense arrangements in the Pacific area. The inter-
nal threat of armed communism has been generally
overcome, thus making it possible for President
Magsaysay to proceed with his plans for the eco-
nomic development of his country. Through con-
tinued U.S. aid programs we are assisting Philip-
pine efforts to strengthen the main weaknessess of
the economy — the rate of industrial development
and backward rural conditions. We are also pro-
viding lielp to improve the defensive capabilities
of the armed forces.
Cambodia has made good progress in dealing
with elements inside the country which had been
a threat to internal stability. Our aid is assist-
ing Cambodia to strengthen its armed forces in
accordance with the expressed desire of the Cam-
bodians to defend the independence of their coim-
try and to build up an effective internal security
force to thwart subversion. Our program is
assisting in strengthening the civilian economy
by improving inland waterways, irrigation, and
land reclamation and constructing a highway from
the capital city to a port on the Cambodian
coast.
Eegionally in the Far East, the mutual security
program for fiscal year 1957 seeks to advance the
objectives of the network of mutual-defense
treaties that has been created in the Pacific area.
The program provides equipment, training, and
economic support essential for the military and
police forces, as well as aid for economic devel-
opment purposes. Our mutual-defense treaties
are designed to deter the aggressor and to give
greater assurance and confidence to the participat-
ing governments. Those arrangements are mak- I
Department of State Bulletin
ing a real contribution to the security of the area
and to the hopes and aspirations of Asian people
generally. This was deeply impressed on all of
us who accompanied Secretary Dulles to the
Karachi meeting of the Seato Council of Minis-
ters. After a most thorough review of the activ-
ities carried forwai-d during the first year under
Seato — a year devoted necessarily to preparatory
measures — it was apparent on all sides that a high
sense of optimism, based on solid achievements,
prevails among the treaty members.^
We can anticipate that during the months
ahead many of the free people of Asia, especially
those in the newly independent countries, will
receive a variety of enticements from the Soviets
masquerading as their bounteous benefactor. The
Soviets will hold themselves out as ready, willing,
and able to solve all their problems with the Soviet
brand of military, economic, and technical assist-
ance. We propose to meet this challenge by con-
tinuing our own constructive aid programs in the
Far East on the same sound principles that have
been the foundation for those programs in the
past. While not departing from the main course
we have charted, we will be better equipped to help
the free countries of Asia deal with this new Soviet
drive, as well as with other situations that may
well develop, if the requested authority for
increased flexibility can be written into the
legislation.
On the whole, I believe we can all derive genuine
satisfaction from the collective strength that the
free nations of Asia have been able, with our help,
to achieve. The job is by no means finished, how-
ever, nor have the threats to security lessened.
In our own interest, as well as theirs, we must
continue our help to them at a rate and in a manner
adequate to the needs of the developing situation.
U.S. Policy Toward Cambodia
Press release 204 dated April 19
Following is the text of a letter from Secretary
Dulles to Foreign Minister Nong Kimny of Gam/-
iodia delivered on April 19 at Phnom Penh iy
American Arribassador Robert McGlintock.
Deae Mr. Foreign Minister: I am disturbed
to learn that recent statements from various quar-
ters have given increasing publicity to allegations
' For text of the Council's first annual report, see ihid..
Mar. 12, 1956, p. 403.
that the United States has been attempting to
coerce Cambodia into the Seato alliance under the
penalty of withholding economic aid, and that
the United States has obliged the independent and
friendly nations of Viet-Nam and Thailand to
impose measures of economic warfare upon Cam-
bodia for the same alleged end.
I regret that these allegations have been made
since they are utterly false and could harm the
friendly relations existing between our two
countries.
The American Ambassador on April 2 officially
advised Their Majesties the King and Queen of
Cambodia that the United States at no time had
made any official public observation on Cambodian
foreign policy. United States policy in Cam-
bodia is based on a simple precept: That is, the
United States through its military and economic
aid programs seeks to assist the Cambodian Gov-
ernment in its endeavor to maintain the sovereign
independence of the Kingdom. This assistance is
extended only at the wish of the Royal Cambodian
Government, which officially requested military
aid on May 20, 1954 and military and economic aid
on September 1, 1954.
Although the United States believes that the
free nations can most effectively meet the threat
of Communist aggression through collective de-
fense, nevertheless United States policy recognizes
that certain countries, though determined to de-
fend themselves against aggression or subversion
of their independence, have preferred not to join
regional security arrangements. That choice we
respect. The United States does not seek ties
of mutual defense with any country unless that
country believes that this application of the prin-
ciple of collective security will better assure its
independence.
Eecognition of the position of these countries
in no way prevents the maintenance of close and
cordial relations with them. In giving economic
and military assistance to friendly countries to
improve their capacity to defend themselves
against aggression or subversion, the United States
is guided primarily by consideration of its own
national interests. It considers it to be in its
national interest to help in the economic and social
advancement of all free nations.
I trust that this letter will dispose of the false
allegations concerning our policy, which, I venture
to repeat, aims only at assisting free nations to
preserve their liberty and independence.
April 30, 1956
727
May I take this occasion to extend warm per-
sonal greetings and best wishes for success in the
new mission to which you have been called.^
State Legislation Regarding
Japanese Textiles
I'ress release 109 dated April 17
Following are the texts of a Japanese Embassy
note of April 4 concerning legislation in South
Carolina regarding Japanese textiles, and of the
Department of State's note of April 16 in reply.
Japanese Note
Tlie Ambassador of Japan presents his compli-
ments to the Honorable the Secretary of State and
has the honor to draw the attention of the latter to
tlie following facts.
The Senate and the House of Representatives
in the State of South Carolina passed a bill on
March 6, 1956 whicli requires all wholesale and
retail establishments in the State dealing in Jaj)-
anese textile goods, or garments made tlierefrom,
to display a sign "Japanese Textiles Sold Here".
The bill was approved by the Governor of the
State on March 8, 1956 and has since become effec-
tive. Furthermore, it is reported that the State
legislature by resolution has requested the other
southern and New England states, where the tex-
tile industry is prominent, to take similar steps.
The above-mentioned legislation discriminates
against the sale of Japanese textile goods in the
State of South Carolina. Such discrimination, in
the view of the Japanese Government, is in contra-
vention of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce
and Navigation between Japan and the United
States which provides, in Article 16, that products
of either party shall be accorded, within the terri-
tories of the other party, national treatment and
most-favored-nation treatment in all matters
affecting internal taxation, sale, distribution,
storage and use.
As the Secretary of State already knows, the
Government of Japan and the Japanese textile
industries concerned, in view of strong complaints
by the American cotton textile industries against
increased imports of Japanese products and moti-
vated by the sincere desire to settle the problem
' Mr. Nong Bamny became Foreign Minister in early
April.
amicably, voluntarily started to control the export
of cotton goods to the United States in January
1956.^ The voluntary initiation of this control
required great sacrifice on tlie Japanese side. It
resulted in the cancellation of a considerable num-
ber of outstanding contracts, which had been con-
cluded before the export quota was set, with the
consequent serious economic impact upon the tex- I
tile industries concerned, particularly the medium
and small enterprises. Yet these efforts have now
been met by the discrimination imposed in the
State of South Carolina. Furthermore, it is
feared that similar steps might be taken by other
states. The Government of Japan is deeply con-
cerned about the adverse effects such discrimina-
tory action might have upon the friendly relation-
ship between the two nations.
In view of the foregoing, the Ambassador,
under instructions from the Government of Japan,
has furtlier the honor to request the Government
of the United States urgently to take appropriate
measures to meet this regrettable situation and to
prevent similar situations from arising in other
states.
Embassy of Japan,
"Washington, April I^, 1956.
United States Note
The Secretary of State presents his compliments
to His Excellency the Ambassador of Japan and
has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of his
note of April 4, 1956, concerning legislation en-
acted by the State of South Carolina which re-
quires all wholesale and retail establishments in
that State dealing with Japanese textile goods or
garments made therefrom to display a sign "Jap-
anese Textiles Sold Here". The views of the Jap-
anese Government that this legislation discrim-
inates against the sale of Japanese textile goods in
South Carolina and that such discrimination is in
contravention of Article XVI of the Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between
the United States and Japan have received the
most careful consideration.
It is the policy of the United States Government
to effect the orderly elimination of unnecessary
^ For an exchange of correspondence between Secretary
Dulles and Senator Margaret Chase Smith on cotton
textile imports from Japan, see Bulletin of Dec. 26, 1955,
p. 1064.
728
Deparfmenf of State Bulletin
and artificial restraints on international trade.
The United States Government has made con-
tinued effoi'ts to brinp about a full acceptance of
Japan as a member of the world trading commu-
nity. The considerable degree of success that has
attended these eft'orts is a source of deep satisfac-
tion to this Government, which regards the
healthy and sound expansion of Japan's commerce
as beneficial to the economies not only of the
United States and Japan but of all the countries
of the free world. In addition, the United States
Government has contributed to a liigher level of
trade between the two countries, notably through
the negotiation of mutually advantageous tariff
reductions, the absence of quantitative i-estrictions
on imports and the conclusion of the Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation to which
the Ambassador's note refers. Tlie results of this
policy are reflected in the expansion of trade be-
tween the United States and Japan during recent
years.
The United States Government has noted the
action taken by the Government of Japan which
voluntarily imposed quotas on the export of cotton
goods to the United States starting from January
1956. It is aware that this vohmtary action in-
volved difficulties for an important segment of tlie
Japanese economy.
Because of its conviction that a higher level of
trade on a mutually beneficial basis between the
United States and Japan is advantageous not only
from an economic but also from a political aaid
security point of view, this Goveniment is opposed
to attempts to frustrate tliat development. With
respect to the South Carolina law referred to in
the Ambassador's note and the recently enacted
law in Alabama, the United States Government
must depend upon proceedings brought by inter-
ested parties in appropriate courts to uphold the
validity of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce
and Navigation. The fact that this is the regular
procedure under the constitutional system of the
United States for securing authoritative determi-
nations regarding the consistency of state laws
with treaties is always pointed out by the United
States representatives during the negotiation of
such treaties.
The Government of the United States shares the
concern of the Government of Japan about the ad-
verse effects which laws such as those now enacted
in South Carolina and Alabama might have upon
tlie friendly relations between the two nations.
Accordingly, the Secretary of State has the honor
to inform the Ambassador of Japan that he com-
municated with the Governor of Alabama con-
cerning the political, economic and legal problems
connected with such laws in order to make the
Governor aware of the adverse effects of the bill
while it was awaiting his signature. The Secre-
tary of State has the honor further to inform the
Ambassador of Japan that he is forwarding an
expression of concern to the Governor of South
Carolina together with a copy of this note and the
Ambassador's note referred to above.
The Department of State,
Washington, D. C, April 16, 1956.
Conclusion of 12-Nation Talks
on Atomic Energy Agency
FINAL COMMUNIQUE DATED APRIL 18
The twelve-nation Working Level Meeting to-
day unanimously adopted the text for a Statute
for the proposed International Atomic Energy
Agency which will be presented for consideration
at an International Conference to be convened in
September at U.N. Headquarters in New York.
While several delegations participating in this
meeting reserved their positions on certain details,
all delegations voted in favor of the Statute as a
whole.
The twelve-nation group is composed of the fol-
lowing countries: Australia, Belgium, Brazil,
Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Portugal,
Union of South Africa, Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, United Kingdom and United States. It
met for eighteen sessions from February 27 to
April IS, 1956 to consider a previous draft Statute
circulated on August 22, 1955 ^ in the light of
comments received from other countries during
discussions at the Tenth General Assembly of the
United Nations and subsequently.
This Working Level Meeting is the most recent
in a series of negotiations on an international
atomic energy agency which grew out of a pro-
posal made by President Eisenhower to the Gen-
eral Assembly of the United Nations on December
8, 1953.
' Bulletin of Oct. 24, 1955, p. 666.
AprW 30, 1956
729
Detailed arrangements for the September Con-
ference will be worked out at meetings of the
negotiating group at the adviser level.
Progress in the French Cameroons
Statement hy Benjwmin Gerig ^
The general impression gained by the United
States delegation after reviewing conditions in
the French Cameroons is that substantial prog-
ress has been made in the economic, social, and
educational fields. We are confident that within
the very near future the Administering Authority
will be able to raise the political status of the in-
habitants to the level existing in the economic,
social, and educational fields.
It is our feeling that the inhabitants of the ter-
ritory are capable and willing to accept new re-
sponsibilities in the political field. As a first step,
my delegation would like to urge that the Admin-
istering Authority take positive and energetic
steps to implement as soon as possible the con-
stitutional improvements elaborated in the bill on
constitutional reform drafted in 1953. We believe
that a reappraisal of this bill might be well war-
ranted to determine whether its various provi-
sions envisaged to reform the political situation
in the territory are, in view of the important de-
velopments of the past year, adequate to allow the
inliabitants to assume sufficient political responsi-
bility.
We hope, moreover, that the feeling of increased
antagonism and hostility between the north and
south which resulted from the May riots will soon
be eliminated as the result of continued efforts by
the Administering Authority to develop the terri-
tory in all fields, and particularly by increased
educational efforts of the inhabitants of all sec-
tions of the population. We realize that in this
"hinge of Africa," where many races and cultures
merge, there is likely to be some friction among
the different groups. However, we feel confident
that such a situation may be solved by the con-
tinued efforts of the Administering Authority to
foster a national consciousness.
In this connection, we should like to pay tribute
to the measures already suggested by the Admin-
'Made in the Trusteeship Council on Mar. 22 (U.S./
U.N. press rele.ise 2314). Mr. Gerig is Deputy U.S. Rep-
resentative in the Trusteeship Council.
730
istering Authority to remove the difl'erences be-
tween the two sections of the territory. In short,
these include a program to increase the contact
between all people of the territory and to raise the
standard of living and education of the people in
the north in order to diminish the misunderstand-
ings which have occurred toward those of the
south. We feel that these efforts, which are elab-
orated on page 41 of the Visiting Mission Report
(T/1231) , should be commended by the Council as
realistic efforts on the part of the Administering
Authority to assist the development of the terri-
tory toward self-government or independence.
The notable achievements of the Administering
Authority to develop and spread municipal and
local government institutions should also be com-
mended by this Council. In the field of local
government, while it has been noted that much
progress has occurred in the southern forest areas
and in the progressive Bamileke and Bamoun tri-
bal areas, my delegation feels that continued and
additional efforts of the Administering Author-
ity — despite initial opposition by the popula-
tion — are warranted in order to democratize the
local government institutions in the predomi-
nantly Moslem north.
We look forward with expectation to the insti-
tution of the single electoral college which the
representative of France informed us would be
effective in the very near future. We should also
like to associate ourselves with the expression of i
satisfaction voiced by the Visiting Mission at the f
steps taken to date by the Administering Author-
ity to broaden the base of the electorate in the
territory. We feel that the Council as a whole has
been pleased by the increase in the number of the
electors during the last 6 years from 50,000 to
750,000 and hope that the Council of the Republic
will soon take action on the draft law which would
give universal suffrage to the territory.
The United States delegation has taken note
with satisfaction that in almost every phase of its
economic life the Cameroons under French Admin-
istration is making solid advancement despite the
difficulties presented by the land and the climate.
From the new hydroelectric plant at Edea, which
we understand is the third largest in the French
Union, down to the small sawmills, progress is
evident everywhere in this agriculturally rich, yet
sparsely populated, territory.
We note especially the intensive measures being
Department of State Bulletin
taken by tlie Administration to acquaint the
African with modern metliods of cultivation,
marketing, and the maintenance of quality
through the "Societes Africaines de Prevoyance"
(Sap), the "Secteurs de Modernisation," and the
"Postes de Paysaimat." In this connection, we
noted the findings of the Visiting Mission that, in
the south, dependence of whole regions on such
single crops as coffee and cocoa was currently
causing widespread hardship due to the low world-
market prices for those commodities. To meet
this hardship, we believe that the Administering
Authority should consider the formation of
stabilization fimds and that further efforts should
be made to diversify the food crops.
^Yi^ realize the difficulties encomitered by the
administration in establishing an effective forest
conservation policy because of the noncooperation
of the population with respect to classification of
forests. We feel nonetheless that the Trusteeship
Council should once again draw the attention of
the inhabitants to the wisdom and necessity for
urgent action by the Administering Authority in
attempting to implement this policy of reforesta-
tion and classification of forests. It is our hope
that, as a result of a continued educational pro-
gram, the inhabitants will cease their resistance to
such a commendable program of activity.
Other noteworthy efforts undertaken by the
Administering Authority in the economic field and
worthy of commendation by the Council are its
efforts to increase the standard of living of the
population, the promotion of cotton and rice cul-
tivation, improvement of livestock and pasturage,
evidences of new progress in the promotion of
small industries, efforts to develop the cooperative
movement, agricultural experimentation, stock-
breeding, road and bridgebuilding, the introduc-
tion of fish farming, and improvements in com-
mimications. It is our hope that, as a result of the
operation of the new electrical plants, there will,
in the near f utui"e, be an increase in the establish-
ment of secondary industries throughout the
territory.
My delegation was pleased to learn of the de-
velopments in medicine and public health through-
out the Cameroons. The generous cooperation of
the Administering Authority in subsidizing hos-
pitals and dispensaries of the religious missions —
which has set a record rarely equaled in Africa —
should be commended. At the same time we are
concerned over the scarcity of medical supplies
in the hospitals and dispensaries in the territory.
Further developments in the social field of
which the Council should take note are the ad-
vances in the field of public and cooperative hous-
ing, attempts to hold down the cost of living, the
encouraging inroads being made against the
"bride price" practice, and the many new com-
munity centers for teaching domestic science. As
a requisite to complete abolishment of the "bride
price," we feel that continued education of girls
with this view in mind is necessary. We should
like to urge that the Administering Authority
continue its campaign to reduce alcoholism
throughout the south and that efforts be made to
improve sanitary conditions in the prisons. In
this connection also, we hope that increased at-
tention may be given to the necessity of bringing
offenders more quickly to trial.
Generally speaking, few African territories can
equal the record achieved by the French in the
Cameroons for the percentage of school-age chil-
dren actually enrolled in schools. The overall
average is an impressive 55 percent, a figure which
is, however, unevenly distributed geographically,
ranging from 86 percent in parts of the south to
6 percent in parts of the north. Yet it will be
noted that everywhere in the north where the
Mission visited it was met by demands for new
schools. This must be considered as a promising
omen, and we should like to support the sugges-
tion of the Visiting Mission that the Council
"commend the Administering Authority for its
successful educational campaigns in the north
and to urge it to continue to make every effort to
satisfy this keen desire for knowledge by appor-
tioning, in the future, more funds for schools and
teachers in the northern area and to apply regu-
lations regarding school-age as flexibly as pos-
sible."
Finally, we should like to express our apprecia-
tion for the successful efforts of the administra-
tion to adapt education to the local environment,
particularly with respect to curricula, textbooks,
and teaching methods, and to promote technical
training of the inhabitants. The notable increase
in schools and teachers throughout the territory
as well as a substantial increase in the number of
pupils enrolled in the schools, including girls, is
indeed an encouraging sign.
April 30, J 956
731
Ray T. Kickok Appointed Chairman
of U.S. Committee for U.N.
Press release 201 dated April IS
Secretary Dulles on April 18 announced the ap-
pointment of Ray T. Hickok of Rochester, N. Y.,
as 1956 chairman of the U.S. Committee for the
United Nations. Mr. Hickok is chairman of the
board of directors and president of the Hickok
Manufacturing Company.
Prior to this appointment, Mr. Plickok has
served for the past 2 years as a member of the
executive committee of the U.S. Committee for
the United Nations. He is a member of the fi-
nance committee of the Committee for Economic
Development and holds office in a number of busi-
ness and civic associations, including the Young
Presidents' Organization, of which he was founder
and first president.
In inviting Mr. Hickok to serve as chairman,
Secretary Dulles pointed out the importance of
the progi-am of the U.S. Committee for the United
Nations as evidence of our firm support of the
United Nations in the United States.
Mr. Hickok, in accepting the appointment, said
he did so because he is "deeply convinced that
the United Nations constitutes a major hope for
an orderly and peaceful world." He said : "Every
effort that can be made to increase public aware-
ness and education about the United Nations is
both worth while and necessary."
The U.S. Committee for the United Nations
was established in 1948 by the U.S. Government
in response to a U.N. General Assembly resolution
which called upon member nations to observe Oc-
tober 24 annually as United Nations Day. The
Committee is composed of more than 130 na-
tional organizations representing ci^-ic, business,
labor, agriculture, veterans, religion, education,
welfare, youth, women, and trade. Its primary
purpose is to promote and coordinate citizen pro-
grams across the Nation in obseiwance of United
Nations Day in an effort to increase public under-
standing and support of the United Nations.
The chairman of the Committee is appointed an-
nually by the Secretary of State. Mr. Hickok as
the ninth chairman succeeds James S. McDonnell,
Jr., president of the McDonnell Aircraft Cor-
poration of St. Louis, Mo. Chairmen in the
3 previous years were Morehead Patterson,
president, American Machine and Foundry Com-
pany; Thomas J. Watson, Jr., president, Inte*
national Business Machines Corporation; and
Frank L. Weil, Weil, Gotshal and Manges.
Senate Confirms Deputy Representative
?
in U.N. Security Council
The Senate on April 12 confirmed James W.
Barco to be a deputy representative of the United
States in the Security Council of the United
Nations.
U.S. Delegations to
International Conferences
South Pacific Conference
The Department of State announced on April
21 (press release 208) that the U.S. Government
will be represented at the third session of the'
South Pacific Conference, which will meet at Suva,
Fiji, April 23-May 4, 1956, by the following ob-
server delegation :
United States Cntnjnissioner
Knowles A. Ryerson, Dean of the College of Agriculture^
University of California, Berkeley, Calif.
Advisers
Edna H. Barr, Office of Dependent Area Affairs, Depart-
ment of State
Arthur S. Osborne, M. D., International Health Repre-
sentative, Division of International Health, Public
Health Service, Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare
The Conference, an auxiliary body to the South
Pacific Commission, meets every 3 years in one of
the territories of the area and is composed of dele-
gates, alternates, and advisers from the 19 depend-
ent territories. It was provided for in order to
associate with the work of the Commission repre-
sentatives of the local inhabitants and of official
and nonofficial institutions in the South Pacific
area. These representatives meet together to
consider their common problems of health, educa-
tion, and general economic and social welfare, and
to make recommendations for solving these prob-
lems on a regional basis. The commissioners and
advisers from the member governments attend as
observers for the purpose of advising the delegates
from their respective dependent territories.
Guam and American Samoa are the only U.S.
possessions that fall within the scope of the South
732
Deparfmenf of Sfale Bulletin
Pacific Commission. Tlie Trust Territory of the
Pacific Islands, under U.S. administration, also
lias been brought within the scope of the Com-
mission.
The first session of the South Pacific Conference
was held at Suva, Fiji, in 1950, and the second
session was held at Noumea, New Caledonia, April
15-27, 1953.
The substantive items of the agenda for the
third session provide for consideration of (1)
topics in the field of industrial and commercial
progress and develojDment, such as (a) progress
of indigenous industries, (b) j^roblems of modern-
izing and mechanizing industrial and commercial
enterprises, (c) processing of agricultural and
marine products; (2) farming systems, including
the place of livestock, in the South Pacific; (3)
cooperative societies and credit unions as a means
of promoting the welfare of the South Pacific
j^eople; (4) infant and maternal welfare, having
regard to social services, community organiza-
tions, and the improving of living conditions;
and (5) encouragement and retention, where use-
ful, of indigenous arts, customs, and culture.
At the close of the third session of the South
Pacific Conference, the commissioners and ad-
visers of the member governments of the South
Pacific Commission will meet to consider the rec-
ommendations made at the Conference.
Notification bp France of extension to: Overseas France,
from February 28, 1056.
Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consulta-
tive Organization. Signed at Geneva March 6, 1948.^
Acceptance withdraimi: Greece, March 26, 1956.
Trade and Commerce
Fifth protocol of rectifications and modifications to the
text.s of the schedules to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 3, 1955. '■
Signatures: Luxembourg, March 2, 1956; Sweden,
March 6, 1956; United Kingdom, March 8, 1956;
Austria, March 9, 1956.
BILATERAL
France
Agreement relating to the establishment and operation of
a rawinsonde observation station on the island of
Guadeloupe in the French West Indies. Effected by
exchange of notes at Paris March 23, 1956. Enters
into force on the date representatives of the Weather
Bureau and the Mi5t^orologie Nationale sign a memo-
randum of arrangement embodying the technical details.
Germany
Air transport agreement, and exchange of notes. Signed
at Washington July 7, 1955.
Entered into force: April 16, 1956 (date of receipt by
the United States of notification of approval by the
Federal Republic of Germany).
THE FOREIGN SERVICE
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Germany
Agreement on German external debts. Signed at London
Februarv 27, 1953. Entered into force September 16,
1953. TIAS 2792.
Ratification deposited: Yugoslavia, March 15, 1956.
Property
Convention for the protection of industrial property.
Signed at London June 2, 1934. Entered into force
August 1, 1938. 53 Stat. 1748.
Adherence effective: Monaco, April 29, 1956.
Shipping
International leadline convention. Signed at London
July 5, 1930. Entered into force January 1, 1933. 47
Stat. 2228.
Resignations
Homer Ferguson as Ambassador to the Republic of the
Philippines, effective April 8.
PUBLICATIONS
Foreign Relations Volume
Press release 190 dated April 12
The Department of State on April 21 released
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1938, Vol-
ume V, The Ainerican Ee publics. This is the final
volume of the Foreign Relations series of five vol-
umes for the year.
The first part of this volume consists of a gen-
eral section treating multilateral subjects. These
' Not in force.
April 30, 1956
733
n
include the Eighth International Conference of
American States at Lima, the Chaco dispute be-
tween Bolivia and Paraguay, conciliation of dif-
ferences between the Dominican Republic and
Haiti, a dispute between the United Kingdom and
Guatemala with respect to British Honduras, and
boundary disputes between Argentina and Chile,
Ecuador and Peru, and Honduras and Nicaragua.
The Conference of American States was notable
for the adoption of the Declaration of the Prin-
ciples of the Solidarity of America, generally
known as the Declaration of Lima.
The remainder of this volume deals with bi-
lateral relations of the United States with in-
dividual American Republics, the topics being
arranged under country headings. The subject
given most attention is that of trade agreements,
negotiations of that nature being recorded with 10
countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Do-
minican Republic, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Peru,
Uruguay, and Venezuela. Other topics treated
include military missions, protection of business
interests, exchange restrictions, debts, and claims.
Copies of volume V (v, 995 pp.) may be pur-
chased from the Superintendent of Documents,
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25,
D. C, for $4.25 each.
Recent Releases
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Gov-
ernment Printing Office, Washinpton 25, D. C. Address
requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, ex-
cept in the case of free publications, which may be ob-
tained from the Department of State.
Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 3459. Pub.
6259. 18 pp. 10c'.
Agreement between the United States and Argentina —
Signed at Buenos Aires December 21, 1955. Entered into
force December 21, 1955.
Atomic Energy, Cooperation for Civil Uses. TIAS 3461.
Pub. 6257. 6 pp. 5^.
Agreement between the United States and the Nether-
lands — Signed at Washington July 18, 1955. Entered
into force December 30, 1955.
Technical Cooperation, Program of Housing. TIAS 3462.
Put). 6264. 4 pp. 5^.
Agreement between the United States and Colombia, ex-
tending agreement of June 24 and 30, 1954. Exchange
of notes — Signed at Bogota December 1 and 21, 1955. En- i.
tered into force December 21, 1055 ; operative retroac- '
tively April 26, 1955.
Passport Visas. TIAS 3463. Pub. 6267. 4 pp. 5^. {
Agreement between the United States and Pakistan, re-
vising agreement of October 10 and 18, 1949, as revised.
Exchanges of notes — Dated at Karachi August 4, Octo- *
ber 20, November 25 and 29, 1955. Entered into force
December 1, 1955.
Atomic Energy, Cooperation for Civil Uses. TIAS 3465.
Pub. 6209. 26 pp. 15^.
Agreement between the United States and Japan — Signed
at AVashington November 14, 1955. Entered into force
December 27, 1955.
Mutual Defense Assistance, Return of Unusable Materiel.
TIAS 3467. Pub. 6276. 2 pp. 5«S.
Agreement between the United States and Norway. Ex-
change of notes — Dated at Oslo December 12 and 28, 1950.
Entered into force December 28, 1950.
Mutual Defense Assistance, Disposition of Surplus Equip-
ment and Material. TIAS 3468. Pub. 6277. 3 pp. 5^.
Agreement between the United States and Norway, sup-
plementing agreement of December 12 and 28, 1950. Ex-
change of notes — Dated at Oslo May 15 and June 26, 1953.
Entered into force June 26, 1953.
Atomic Energy, Cooperation for Civil Uses. TIAS 3476.*
6 pp. 5^.
Agreement between the United States and Uruguay —
Signed at Washington January 13, 1956. Entered into
force January 13, 1956.
Atomic Energy, Cooperation for Civil Uses. TIAS 3477.
Pub. None. 6 pp. 50.
Agreement between the United States and Sweden — ■
Signed at Washington January 18, 1956. Entered into
force January 18, 1956.
Financial Arrangements for Furnishing Certain Supplies
and Services to Naval Vessels. TIAS 3479. Pub. None.
8 pp. 100.
Agreement between the United States and Cuba — Signed
at Habana January 10, 1956. Date of entry into force:
April 9, 1956.
Relief Supplies and Equipment, Duty-Free Entry and
Exemption From Internal Taxation. TIAS 3480. Pub.
None. 5 pp. 5t}.
Agreement between the United States and Libya. Ex-
change of notes — Signed at Tripoli December 6 and 22,
1955. Entered into force December 22, 1955.
Atomic Energy, Cooperation for Civil Uses. TIAS 3483.
Pub. Ninie. 6 pp. 50
Agreement between the United States and Peru — Signed
at Washington January 25, 1956. Entered into force
January 25, 1956.
' Assignment of publication numbers to the TIAS series
pamphlets was discontinued with TIAS 3474.
734
Department of State Bulletin
April 30, 1956 Index
Africa
Progress in the French Cameroons (Gerig) . . . 730
United States Foreign Policy in Africa (Allen) . 71G
American Principles. Our Quest for Peace and
Freedom (Eisenhower) 699
American Republics
Foreign Relations Volume 733
Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference . 710
Asia
Objectives of the Mutual Security Program in Asia
(Robertson) "^23
South Pacific Conference 732
Atomic Energy. Conclusion of 12-Nation Talks on
Atomic Energy Agency (text of communique) . 729
Cambodia. U.S. Policy Toward Cambodia (DuUes) . 727
Cyprus. Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Con-
ference ''^10
Economic Affairs. State Legislation Regarding
Japanese Textiles (texts of notes) 728
Egypt. Israel and Egypt Agree To Observe Armis-
tice (Lodge) 722
Foreign Service. Resignations (Ferguson) . . . 733
France. Progress in the French Cameroons
(Gerig) 730
International Organizations and Meetings. South
Pacific Conference 732
Israel. Israel and Egypt Agree To Observe Armis-
tice (Lodge) 722
Japan
State Legislation Regarding Japanese Textiles
(texts of notes) 728
Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference . 710
Mutual Security
Developing NATO in Peace (Dulles) 706
Objectives of the Mutual Security Program in Asia
(Robertson) 723
Our Quest for Peace and Freedom (Eisenhower) . 699
Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference . 710
Near East. Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News
Conference 710
Non-Self-Governing Territories
Progress in the French Cameroons (Gerig) . . . 730
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Developing
NATO in Peace (Dulles) 706
Philippines. Resignation of Ambassador Fergu-
son 733
Presidential Documents. Our Quest for Peace and
Freedom 699
Publications
Foreign Relations Volume 733
Recent Releases 734
Treaty Information. Current Actions 733
U.S.S.R.
Developing NATO in Peace (Dulles) 706
Vol. XXXIV, No. 879
Our Quest for Peace and Freedom (Eisenhower) . 699
The Soviet Reappraisal of Stalin (Murphy) . . . 719
Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference . 710
United Nations
Conclusion of 12-Natiou Talks on Atomic Energy
Agency (text of communique) 729
Israel and Egypt Agree To Observe Armistice
(Lodge) 722
Progress in the French Cameroons (Gerig) . . 730
Ray T. Hickok Appointed Chairman of U.S. Com-
mittee for the U.N 732
Senate Confirms Deputy Representative in U.N.
Security Council 732
Name Index
Allen, George V 716
Barco, James W 732
Dulles, Secretary 706, 710, 727
Eisenhower, President 699
Ferguson, Homer 733
Gerig, Benjamin 730
Hickok, Ray T 732
Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr 722
Murphy, Robert 719
Robertson, Walter S 723
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: April 16-22
Releases may be obtained from the News Division,
Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.
Press release issued prior to April 16 which
appears in this issue of the Bulletin is No. 190 of
April 12.
Subject
Dulles : news conference transcript.
Notes on State legislation on Japanese
textiles.
Henderson, Seager : statements at
Baghdad Pact Council meeting.
Hickok appointed Chairman of U.S.
Committee for U.N.
Pinkerton sworn in as Ambassador to
Sudan.
Warren sworn in as Ambassador to
Turkey.
Dulles letter to Cambodian Foreign
Minister.
Slurphy : "The Soviet Reappraisal of
Stalin."
Allen : "U.S. Foreign Policy in Africa."
Delegation to UNESCO education con-
ference.
Delegation to South Pacific Conference.
Delegation to Inter-American Meeting
of Ministers of Education.
*Not printed.
fHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin.
No.
Date
198
199
4/17
4/17
1200
4/17
201
4/18
*202
4/19
*203
4/19
204
4/19
205
4/19
206
t207
4/20
4/21
208
t209
4/21
4/21
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Available in pamphlet form — two recent statements by Fran-
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The United Nations: Some New Perspectives After Ten Years
This address before the National Press Club, January 13,
1956, assesses the implications for U.S. foreign policy of recent
developments affecting the United Nations. Among its topics
are the impact of the Bandung conference and the Geneva
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United Nations, peaceful uses of atomic energy, disarmament,
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The Soviet Challenge and the United Nations
This address was made before the Annual Convention of the
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March 9, 1956. It deals with the new look in Soviet tactics
which became manifest at the Geneva summit conference and
was shown in the rewriting of some of the Stalinist dogma by
the Soviet 20th Congress. The pamphlet discusses why Soviet
tactics have changed, what the challenge of the new Soviet
strategy means to the United Nations, and what colleges and
universities can do about it. It emphasizes that study of the
United Nations is of great importance in the teaching of inter-
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United Nations.
Publication 6310 15 cents
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DEPOSITORY
^rie/ U)efi<M(i^e7it 4w CHaie/
Vol. XXXIV, No. 880
May 7, 1956
^BNX Oj»
THE INSTITUTIONALIZING OF PEACE • Address
by Secretary Dulles 739
THE PURGE OF STALINISM • by Allen W. Dulles . . 758
THE U.S. STAKE IN WORLD TRADE • by Secretary
of Commerce Sinclair Weeks 767
PROPOSED REVISION OF IMMIGRATION AND
NATIONALITY ACT • Statement by Secretary Dulles . 773
TEACHER DEVELOPMENT WORKSHOP AT THE
UNIVERSITY OF PUERTO RICO • Article by
Howard H. Russell 778
For index see inside back cover
Boston Public Li'orair
Superintendent of Documents
MAY 2 2 1956
■«»»«>'
bulletini
Vol. XXXIV, No. 880 • Publication 6331
May 7, 1956
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
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Note: Contents of thLs publication are not
copyrighted and items contained herein may
be reprinted. Citation of the Department
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appreciated.
The Department of State BULLETIN,
a tveekly publication issued by the
Public Services Division, provides the
public and interested agencies of
the Government with information on
developments in the field of foreign
relations and on the work of the
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Service. The BULLETIN includes se-
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issued by the White House and the
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eral interruitional interest.
Publications of the Department,
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national relations are listed currently.
The Institutionalizing of Peace
Address by Secretary Dulles '
I It is a conspicuous honor to address this 50th
annual meeting of the American Society of Inter-
national Law. The first meeting was addressed
by the then Secretary of State, Elihu Root, the
initial president of your society. Mr. Root pos-
sessed one of the finest legal minds this country or
any other country has ever kiiown, and he made
outstanding contributions to the development of
international law. Two of the original vice presi-
dents of the society were former Secretaries of
State — John W. Foster, my grandfather, and
Richard Olney. That tradition of close associa-
tion of the society with the Department of State
has been continuous. It is clue to that tradition
that I am today an honorai-y president of your
society and afforded the opportunity of speaking
on this important anniversary.
Befoi'e coming here, I reread Secretary Root's
address and I was struck by the way in which
history repeats itself. That address discussed au-
thoritatively the treatymaking power and con-
cretely the relation of that power to a State law
which seemed to violate our treaty of 1894 with
Japan. Today we are still discussing the treaty-
making power, and much the same issue that Mr.
Root discussed is raised by recent State laws which
seem to contravene our 1953 treaty with Japan.
Secretary Root concluded his address with a
powerful plea for a spirit of international friend-
ship and treaty observance without which, he said,
■'there can never be a world of peace."
I turn now to the broad problem of achieving
;he "world of peace" of which Secretary Root
jpoke. That problem today overshadows all other
I * Made before the 50th annual meeting of the American
['Society of International Law at Washington, D.C., on
ipr.
(press release 216).
May 7, 1956
problems, because the instruments of war have
become so powerful that their full use would de-
stroy vast segments of the human race.
It is particularly fitting that this problem should
be considered in this society of international
lawyers, because the problem will never be solved
without the help of those members of the legal
profession who are also students of international
affairs. Lawyers have always had a special apti-
tude in the formulation of political institutions;
and that is an art which is demanded at this
juncture in world affairs. Peace should not de-
pend upon the winds of emotion being friendly and
fair; or upon the deterrent of fear; or upon the
skills and improvisations of diplomacy. Now, as
never before, peace must be solid, and to be solid it
needs to be an institution.
Until recent years it has been war, not peace,
that has been an institution. It has been the
means whereby international change has been
effected. Not only has war been lawful, but the
concept of the "just war" has been deeply rooted
in our moral and political code.
By the latter part of the 19th century, states-
men began to take note of the heavy economic
burden of armament and of the increasing de-
struction that could be wrought by armament.
This led to the calling of the Hague Peace Con-
ferences of 1899 and 1907. These conferences did
not, however, attempt to abolish or replace the war
system. Rather they sought to assure that war
would continue to be a tolerable institution. It
was sought that war .should interfere as little as
possible with the lives and with the businesses of
civilians ; that private property should be immune
from seizure in time of war; that blockade should
be used only in exceptional circumstances; that
contraband be limited so that peaceful trade could
739
go on ; and to "prohibit the discharge of projectiles
and explosives from balloons."
Mr. Foster attended the second Hague Peace
Conference, and through him I became one of the
junior secretaries of the conference. I well re-
member those days, and particularly the debate
which took place between various of the delega-
tions as to whether or not humanizing war tended
to reduce resort to war. I recall that it was then
the German delegation that held the thesis which
reappears today — that peace is more apt to pre-
vail if war is terrible, because then all will avoid it.
You may recall that a third Hague conference
was planned for 1914. But World War I came
instead. At its close, an exhausted world sought
for the first time to institutionalize peace.
The League Effort
The League of Nations was designed to es-
tablish, at least in rudimentary form, those institu-
tional elements which enable mature democratic
societies to preserve order and observe justice.
In the national state, order is maintained and
violence is prevented primarily (1) by laws, writ-
ten or unwritten, which reflect the moral judgment
of the community subject thereto; (2) by political
machinery to change these laws from time to time
so that, as conditions change, laws will continue to
meet the test of justice and not perpetuate obsolete
concepts; (3) by an executive body to administer
law; (4) by courts which settle disputes of a jus-
ticiable character in accordance with law; (5)
by superior public force which deters violence by
its ability to apprehend and punish adequately any
who breach or defy the law; and (6) by a state of
public well-being sufficient so that the people heed
the dictates of reason and of prudence and are not
driven by a sense of desperation to follow ways of
violence.
The League of Nations had, in its Assembly, the
rough equivalent of a broadly based legislative
body, but requiring unanimity for most action.
That Assembly was authorized to advise a recon-
sideration of treaties which might become inap-
plicable and of international conditions whose
continuance might endanger the peace. The
Council and the Secretariat of the League I'epre-
sented a form of executive power. There was a
Permanent Court of International Justice to hear
and settle international disputes. A measure of
police power was to be found in the provisions for
740
sanctions to be applied in the case of illegal resort
to war. There was a call for "equitable treatment
for commerce."
The Pact of Paris
The United States, although it largely inspired
this effort to institutionalize peace, did not join
it. We initiated another project wliich super-
ficially seemed easier and simpler — that was to
abolish war. By the Pact of Paris of 1928 over
60 nations of the world, including all the great
powers, renounced war as an instrument of na-
tional policy and agreed to settle all disputes or
conflicts by pacific means.
This pact marks a milestone in history in that
for the first time war was made illegal. But also
that pact demonstrated the futility of attempting,
merely by the stroke of a pen, to abolish an insti-
tution as deeply rooted as the war system, when
no adequate compensating institutions were
brought into being to replace it.
In an effort to put "teeth" into the Pact of
Paris, Secretary Stimson in 1932 proposed the
doctrine of nonrecognition of "any situation,
treaty, or agreement which may be brouglit about
by means contrary to the covenants and obliga-
tions of the Pact of Paris of August 27, 1928."
But aggressors continued to find the fruits of
their aggression to be quite palatable, even though
others denied their right to such enjoyment.
Limitation of Armament
xVnother field of endeavor during the interwar
period was that of the limitation of armament.
It was argued that, since modern war cannot be
waged without armament, the likelihood of war
is reduced as armaments are reduced. Guided by
that simple proposition, the victors of World War
I sought first of all to disarm and keep disarmed
the defeated nations. At the same time they kept
up a search of ways and means to lessen arma-
ments for everyone. The League of Nations was
active in the field of disarmament, with the United
States participating in certain phases of its work.
In addition, there were efforts at naval disarma-
ment undertaken largely on the initiative of the
United States. There resulted a certain measure
of agreement among the leading naval powers on
limitations of specific categories of ships. But
the broader problems of disarmament proved baf-
fling:.
Department of State BuUetin Igy
The United Nations
All of these efforts became engulfed by World
War II. TVHien that war was nearing its end, 51
nations gathered at San Francisco in a new ef-
fort to institutionalize peace so as to "save suc-
ceeding generations from the scourge of war."
The pattern of this new etl'ort followed the pat-
tern of effort after the First World War. The
League of Nations was replaced by the United
Nations, and the covenant by the charter. There
is, as under the League, a Council and an Assem-
bly. The Permanent Court of International Jus-
tice is replaced by the International Court of
Justice. This time the renunciation of war, which
was found in the Pact of Paris but not in the
League Covenant, is in substance written into the
charter of the United Nations (article 2 (4)).
The quasi-legislative function, which was embod-
ied in the authority of the League's Assembly to
consider the revision of treaties and international
conditions, is replaced by articles 13 and 14 of the
charter which, among other things, call for "the
progressive development of international law and
its codification" and which authorize the General
Assembly to "recommend measures for the peace-
ful adjustment of any situation, regardless of ori-
gin, which it deems likely to impair the general
welfare or friendly relations among nations." The
charter makes limitation of armament a goal, as
did the Treaty of Versailles.
Of course, no constitution is self-executing.
The League provisions were inadequately imple-
mented. We may properly and usefully ask:
How well are the charter provisions being imple-
mented ?
The Development of International Law
First of all, there is the problem of law. The
charter itself establishes some basic international
law, notably by article 2, which deals with sov-
ereign equality, the settlement of international
I disputes by peaceful means, and the renunciation
lof the threat or use of force. Chapter XI, dealing
, with non-self-governing territories, also contains
I an important enimciation of legal principle.
Article 13, as we have noted, calls for "develop-
nient of international law and its codification."
Under this provision the General Assembly has
established the International Law Commission,
which has since 1949 met annually to carry out
this provision of the charter. Much useful work
May 7, 1956
has been accomplished by the Commission. But
progress in incorporating its proposals into the
body of international law has so far been minimal.
There is, as you well know, a considerable body
of so-called treaty law, represented by treaties
as between the nations. But not all treaties repre-
sent "law" in the sense we here use the term. Some
treaties are multilateral and prescribe agreed rules
of conduct in relation to such matters as the treat-
ment of aliens and international trade. Other
treaties, usually bilateral, represent merely bar-
gains and are not law in the sense of being a rule
of conduct formulated in response to a community
sentiment. They are somewhat the counterpart of
private contracts within a national society. There
has occurred a healthy growth in the multilateral,
lawmaking type of treaty.
There is also a body of world opinion which,
when it is crystallized and brought to bear on
particular situations, plays a role equivalent to
our "common law." There has been gratifying
progress in developing this kind of community
judgment, and the gatherings of the nations at the
General Assembly of the United Nations greatly
promote this result. There international conduct
is judged, sometimes formally but more often
informally; and even the most powerful nations
feel it expedient to be able to represent their con-
duct as conforming to this body of world opinion.
While there is good progress, it must be ad-
mitted that the total of international law still falls
far short of what is needed to institutionalize
peace.
Peaceful Change
Then there is the matter of peaceful means to
effect international change. We have referred to
article 14 of the charter, which authorizes the
General Assembly to recommend change. Of
course, power to recommend change is consider-
ably less than power to encu;t change. Neverthe-
less, the power to recommend, when exercised in a
responsible way by a great majority of the nations
of the world, is a considerable power, and many
Assembly recommendations have been transformed
into fact.
It must, however, be recognized that debates in
the General Assembly in relation to resolutions
calling for change tend to be emotional, and votes
are sometimes cast not on the basis of impartial
study and judgment of the facts but rather on the
basis of the political alinement of the members
741
and sometimes on tlie basis of what one might
refer to as international "logi-olling." Sometimes
Assembly debate is counterproductive and makes
change less likely because it arouses nationalistic
sentiments. Indeed, it sometimes seems that world
opinion is more powerful when it is sensed than
when the United Nations tries to formulate it in an
Assembly resolution.
There are vast potentialities in article 14, but
these potentialities are not yet sufficiently well
developed so that peaceful change is a well-ordered
function of the Assembly.
Change to and From Independence
World opinion bears particularly upon the con-
duct of those peoples who, in the words of our
Declaration of Independence, feel they owe "a de-
cent respect to tlie opinions of mankind." It is
largely through this force, which found expression
in chapter XI of the charter, that there has oc-
curred the greatest peaceful evolution that history
has ever known. During the 11 years since "World
"War II ended and the United Nations Charter
came into force, over 650 million people have
gained a new political independence, now repre-
sented by 18 newly sovereign nations. Other non-
self-governing peoples are at the threshold of in-
dependence.
It is highly encouraging that these vast changes
should have come about peacefully. It demon-
strates dramatically that a very large measure
of jieacef ul change is possible. But also we must
record the fact that these changes only took place
within the free nations and that elsewhere there
has been an obstinate resistance to the moral pres-
sure for change toward independence and self-
government.
There is not, in the world as a whole, any ade-
quate assurance of peaceful change.
Enforcement of Law and Order
Let us turn now to the problem of the adminis-
tration and enforcement of law. "We have in the
United Nations Security Council a body which,
by the charter, is given primary responsibility for
the maintenance of international peace and secu-
rity. The charter contemplates (article 43) that
the Security Council shall have at its disposal
armed forces necessary for maintaining peace.
Unfortunately, the charter scheme for a Secu-
rity Council action backed by an international
police force has, up to now, not been realized be-
cause of the so-called veto power. Thereby con-
fidence in the Security Council has been badly
shaken and its usefulness impaired.
In an effort to meet that situation the General
Assembly adopted in 1950 a resolution known as
"Uniting for Peace." It asked the members vol-
untarily to hold in readiness armed contingents
available for United Nations use in maintaining
international peace and security. Also the Assem-
bly set up a procedure for meeting on 24 hours'
notice in the event of a threat to the peace and a
paralysis of the Security Council through exercise
of the veto power.
This partially compensates for the undependa-
bility of the Security Council as a law enforce-
ment body. However, the General Assembly is
primarily a deliberative body and includes so
many members that it cannot serve effectively as
an executive or enforcement agency.
As further moves to reinforce the processes for
peace, 45 nations have joined in collective security
arrangements under article 51 of the charter,
which acknowledges the inherent right of col-
lective self-defense against armed attack. Most
of these collective security arrangements are
backed by the mobile striking power of the United
States. These arrangements go far to deny ag-
gressors the opportunity to follow the typical pat-
tern of aggression which consists of picking up
weaker nations one by one.
The Judicial Process
Let us turn now to the judicial process. Here
we find that, despite much lipservice to that
process, most nations prefer to seek the settlement
of their disputes by diplomatic means, or perhaps
they prefer to keep the disputes open for domestic
political reasons. In the 10 years since the new J
International Court of Justice has been in being,
there have been 21 contentious cases brought be-
fore the Court. There have been only 9 judg-
ments on the merits ; 2 cases are pending ; and the
remaining 10 have been disposed of without a de-
cision, principally because the respondent has de-
nied jurisdiction and refused to appear. During
the same period of time there have been 8 ad-
visory opinions delivered, and 2 requests for ad-
visory opinions are pending. This post-"World
"War II record, as far as contentious cases are
concerned, approximates the record of the Per-
742
Department of Sfofe Bulletin
manent Court of International Justice, which sat
for 23 years between the First and Second World
Wars and dealt with 22 cases on the merits. How-
ever, relatively more advisory opinions were ren-
dered by the Permanent Court.
It is significant that, with all the disputes which
exist in the world, there are only two contentious
cases now on the docket of the International Court
of Justice. It is demonstrated that nations are
reluctant to settle serious disputes on the basis of
rules of law.
Economic Weil-Being
There remains to consider the conditions of
human welfare.
On the whole there has been a vast improvement
in economic conditions throughout the world dur-
ing the first postwar decade. Much of this is due
to the fact that the economically mature states
have practiced an enlightened self-interest where-
by they have assisted others and have encouraged
multilateral trade on a most-favored-nation basis.
Thirty-five nations work through the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to promote world
trade on a multilateral basis. The United Na-
tions has economic commissions for Europe, Asia,
and South America.
On tlie other hand, it must be recognized that
all of this effort rests upon a fragile international
basis. It is open to the nations to escape from
their present tariffs and to create obstacles which
would seriously interfere with world trade and
gravely disrupt the economic life of many coun-
tries.
The danger of this is increased by the fact that
the domestic impact of imports is always plain
and identifiable and the role of such impoi'ts in
paying for exports is not so readily apparent.
World economy is in no sense organized to a
point where any one nation can feel that the wel-
fare of its people is free from grave hazard at
the will of other nations.
The Present Inadequacy
If one were to summarize the present state of
affairs, it could permissibly be concluded that con-
siderable progress, even unprecedented progress,
has been made in some of the essentials of an inter-
national order. There is more international law
than ever before. There are greater enforcement
possibilities than ever before, particularly in terms
of deterrence to open armed aggression. There
is more peaceful change than ever before.
But even if we recognize, as we gladly do, that
international society is moving in a sound direc-
tion, we must, I think, seriously ask ourselves
whether we have adequately learned, and are with
sufficient rapidity applying, the lessons of his-
tory. Humanity survived through World War II,
despite the failure after World War I. But we
cannot be sure that we shall be given a second re-
prieve. The new nature of warfare, as exem-
plified by the atomic bomb which burst upon a
stai-tled world just after the United Nations Char-
ter was signed, gave notice that there may not be
an amplitude of time with which to seek progress
by the timid route of pragmatic trial and error.
The Need for More International Law
The foregoing analysis suggests that there are
certain areas which particularly require develop-
ment at the present time.
One such area is the field of international law.
There needs to be a greater and more significant
body of such law. Popular attention tends to
focus upon the police functions of an interna-
tional order. These are more spectacular than
law itself. But law is absolutely essential to pre-
vent despotism. A policeman must know whom
he is to apprehend and why, and a citizen must
know when he can count upon the policeman
to protect him and when he must fear arrest.
Without law a policeman, whatever uniform he
wears, is a despot or a tool of despotism.
This necessity for law creates a perplexing prob-
lem because so much of the world is ruled by
those who do not believe in law in our sense of
the word. "Law," within the Communist bloc,
is considered the means whereby those in power
maintain their power and destroy their enemies.
Since communism is materialistic and atheistic,
its leaders cannot accept the view that law repre-
sents man's efforts to apply to human affairs prin-
ciples of justice which derive from a higher being.
For them there is no natural or moral law.
Neither can they understand the concept of rulers
being themselves subject to law since, by their
creed, the rulers are themselves the source of law.
Nevertheless, there is some glimmering of hope
in this respect. Eecent developments within the
Soviet Union indicate an effort to provide greater
personal security than existed when everyone was
lAay 7, 1956
743
subject to liquidation through the secret police at
the will of an enemy who possessed the greater
power. Vyshinsky's code of "trial by confession"
rather than by evidence is being repudiated. So,
despite the Communist doctrinal rejection of our
concept of law, there may be emerging a de facto
acceptance of law as a protection of the individual
against the capricious will of those in authority.
It is also a fact that on the international plane
the Soviet rulers, if only grudgingly and as a mat-
ter of expediency, take some account of the
opinions of mankind. And these, as we have ob-
served, can form a body of common or unwritten
international law.
Therefore, it is not hopele-ss to seek to develop a
greater body of law even on a universal basis.
In view, however, of the great difficulty of gain-
ing multilateral acceptance of formal codifications
of international law, we shall have to place much
reliance upon unwritten law. This, in turn, re-
quires constant education of public opinion, so
that it will reflect a sound judgment about inter-
national conduct. There needs also to be improve-
ment of the processes of the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly so that, when it acts in a quasi-
legislative or judicial capacity, it will comply with
such high standards as evoked the Anglo-Saxon
concept of the King's conscience which the Equity
Chancellor was to apply.
There can also be a useful development of law
among the free-world nations as a whole and
also among those groups of free nations as nat-
urally draw together. The Organization of
American States has already done much to develop
a body of American law and precedent which
helps to keep peace and order in the new world.
The Need for More Peaceful Change
When we consider the question of law, we must
always consider it jointly with the problem of
peaceful change. Law does not conduce to peace
if it merely perpetuates the status quo after that
status has ceased to serve the needs of a vital and
changing community. So far, force or the threat
of force has been by far the most effective means
of bringing about change. If force is to be eradi-
cated, adequate means for peaceful change must
exist. "^Vlaile, as we have seen, peaceful change has
already occurred to an unprecedented degi-ee in the
evolution of subject peoples to independence, there
still remains danger of war from efforts to perpet-
uate situations which by any standard of equity
ought to be changed.
This makes it of the utmost importance that
nations be responsive to informed world opinion
and that the "peaceful adjustment" article of the
United Nations Charter (article 14) should be put
to better use.
The Stabilization of International Trade
Another area which needs concentrated atten-
tion is the area of international trade. There is
often a lack of appreciation of the close relation-
ship which exists between international trade and
the problem of war or peace. That relationship
seems better understood by Soviet political stu-
dents. They consider that the vicissitudes of
trade under the capitalistic system are its greatest
weakness and provide them with their best chance
to overthrow that system.
The last important publication of Stalin be-
fore he died ^ argued that war between the Com-
munist world and the capitalistic world might not
be inevitable because the capitalistic world would
almost surely war within itself. This, Stalin con-
tended, would take place as a result of the quarrels
which would develop out of the need of the indus-
trial countries of the "West to find markets for
their goods, given the addition of Germany and
Japan as major industrial producers and the sub-
traction of the Soviet-Chinese Communist world
as free markets for the "West.
One of the most recent and authoritative Soviet
Communist publications is that brought out in
1954 under the title of Political Economy? It
deals thoroughly with the relationship of trade to
international relations and the issues of war and
peace.
"Wlien we think of the causes of the Second
"World War, we tend to identify them with the
personalities of Hitler and the Japanese war lords.
But we would do well to go behind them to the
economic condition that brought Hitler and the
Japanese war lords into power in the early 1930's.
Edmond "\^ermeil, an outstanding French student
of Germany, in his book, Germany's Three Reichs,
said that the economic crisis "suffices in itself to
"Economic Prohlems of Socialism in the V.S.S.R.
(Oct. 30, 1952).
' Textbook published by the Academy of Sciences,
U.S.S.R. (1954).
744
Department of State Bulletin
explain the final triumph of Hitlerism in 1930."
John ^Vlieeler-Bennett, outstanding British his-
torian, in his book, Munich — Prologue to Tragedy,
wrote, "The forces of nationalism . . . revived
■with renewed vigor under the influence of eco-
nomic disaster." And G. C. Allen of the Univer-
sity of London, writing in the book. The Industri-
alization of Japan, said, "The sufferings incidental
to the depression brought discredit on the [lib-
eral] government"; and Hugh Borton of Colum-
bia University in his book on Japan, speaking of
the Japanese Premier's efforts in 1931 to keep the
war lords under control, wrote, "Unfortunately for
him and for liberalism in Japan, he came to power
just when the world depression struck Japan. . . .
The cry of the militarists that Japan's economic
ills could be cured only by direct action in China
and by the exploitation of Manchuria fell on sym-
pathetic ears."
As we pointed out, economic conditions since
World War II have, on the whole, been sound
within the free world and there has been a definite
rising of standards of living. But there seems
as yet no adequate popular or even political
realization of how vital it is for peace that this
trend should continue.
Any serious interruption of international trade
could readily again bring reckless men to power
in hai'd-hit countries, demanding for their coun-
tries the resources and markets needed for eco-
nomic well-being. This could precipitate world
war III.
We have noted the need for peaceful change.
Of all forms of change, that of national boundaries
is the most difficult to effect peacefully. But the
need for change of boundaries becomes less if
boundaries are not barriers to the reasonable flow
of trade and movement of persons and ideas. The
more boundaries are barriers, the more need there
is to change them and the more difficult it is to
accomplish the peaceful change which is the only
alternative to violent change.
Armament as Community Power
I have left to the last the problem of armament.
This is in some ways the most important and in
many ways the most complex of the components
of institutionalized peace.
There exists today, primarily in the possession
of the Soviet Union and the United States, vast
power of atomic and thermonuclear weapons.
However, these two nations do not possess a mo-
nopoly. The United Kingdom also is developing
nuclear weapons. And as atomic energy becomes
used for peacetime purposes, others will have op-
portunity to get the weapons material which is a
byproduct of the production of nuclear power.
Nations are working today on several fronts in
an effort to bring nuclear power under interna-
tional control. There is the Disarmament Sub-
committee of the United Nations, now negotiating
at London, and the International Atomic Energy
Agency, in process of formation pursuant to Presi-
dent Eisenhower's atoms- for-peace proposal of
1953.
The task of controlling atomic power to exclude
the possibility of diversion to military use of the
byproduct material is, however, very difficult.
Science has yet to devise means to assure effective
supervision, control, and accounting for byprod-
uct fissionable material.
I do not intend to go into the highly compli-
cated problem of general limitation of armament,
a problem found insoluble after World War I.
Here, I think, we must rely, in part at least, upon
a lessening of political tensions and such recipro-
cal fear-dispelling knowledge as could result from
President Eisenhower's "open skies" plan. If it
be possible to create an atmosphere free of fear,
that will facilitate arms limitation because na-
tions will no longer feel it necessary or expedient
to spend vast sums upon their armament. Indeed,
under these conditions, it would be practically im-
possible to prevent substantial reductions of
armaments.
There is, however, one aspect of the matter which
I would touch upon tonight. That is the relation-
ship between the powerful new weapons and the
establishment of an effective international force
to deter and, if need be, punish violations of in-
ternational law.
How will it be possible to make commimity
power superior to that of the lawbreaker if in-
dividual nations possess atomic and nuclear weap-
ons and the means of their delivery ?
The answer, it seems, must be found in growing
recognition that destructive power such as that
now represented by atomic and nuclear weapons
is so great a power that it is clothed with a public
and community interest. Such power ought never
to be the tool of any single nation, to promote
its national objectives or to permit it to defy
community law and order. Unless that concept
May 7, 7956
745
is accepted, it is impossible for peace ever to be-
come a stable and dependable institution.
The United States has already made clear its
own purpose never to use the vast new power
which comes from new weapons and new means
of delivery except in the defense of principles
which the whole world accepts. These principles
are established by tlie charter of the United Na-
tions, which requires that "nations shall refrain
in their international relations from the threat or
use of force," and wliich also recognizes that na-
tions have an "inherent right of individual and
collective self-defense" as against armed attack.
It is generally accepted by the free-world
peoples that the United States means what it says
in these respects. They believe it not merely be-
cause we say it but because what we say conforms
to the traditions of our Nation and to the moral
principles which our people and their government
generally espouse.
The same cannot be said of the Soviet Union,
where power is despotic and exercised by those who
deny the existence of moral law or of principles
superior to the self-interest of the dictators.
Nevertheless, the time must come when the Soviet
rulers, if only as a matter of expediency and in
deference to what should be incessant demands
of world opinion, will be prepared to take steps
to assure that the new power of modern weapons
is in fact subjected to the will of the community.
It may seem that this prospect is remote. But
when we consider the many startling changes
which from time to time have occurred within the
Soviet Union, we need not regard this particular
prospect as wholly visionary.
In the meantime, and in order that we may set
an example which will be influential, the United
States itself, I suggest, should increasingly make
clear, by word and deed, through the United Na-
tions and through collective-defense associations
to which we belong, that it is our intent that this
new power be used only in defense of principles
to which the community of nations subscribes.
Paragraph 5 of the Vandenberg Resolution
(1948) called for progi'ess along two fronts,
"maximum efforts to obtain agreements to provide
the United Nations with armed forces" and also
"agreement . . . upon universal regulation and
reduction of armaments" of member nations.
Progress along these two lines, building com-
munity power and diminishing purely national
power, is necessary to the establishment of inter-
national law and order.
The Task Is Imperative
When we review the task of making peace a
stable institution through processes of law and
justice, and enforcement thereof, it is easy to be-
come discouraged. AVe must not, however, admit
of discouragement, because the task is much too
important. The fact that the task is difficult, and
that the road to the goal may be long, is a reason
not for delay or for despair but rather for greater
urgency and for greater effort.
There is much to be done and much that can
be promptly done. "\Miere universality may not
be practical, we can find in regional and collective-
defense associations an area where notable prog-
ress can be made. These associations can serve
as important steppingstones toward a universal
order. They can, as between their own members,
develop such principles of conduct as we have re-
ferred to, and they can make force into a sanction
for these principles, thus making it serve the com-
munity.
The essential thing is not that the ultimate goal
be immediately reached but that the peoples of
the world demonstrate the vision and the ca-
pacity to move steadily and hopefully toward that
goal. The spectacle of men working together in
fellowship on great tasks of creation is itself a
powerful influence for peace and order. Tliat ac-
tivity deters the unruly from seeking by violence
to interrupt a process which carries with it the
hopes of all mankind.
We need not assume that we are set to run a
hopeless race with time. We can gain time by
intermediate efforts such as I describe. Also,
what may seem to be far away today may be
reached much more quickly than we might sup-
pose. There has been a great evolution in thinking
in the last three decades. Already there is prog-
ress such as the world has never known before.
Also, never befoi-e was there such an awareness of
the need as now flows from a knowledge of the
nuclear menace. '\Aniereas, in the pa.st, it seemed
reckless to take chances for peace, today it is reck-
less not to do so. ;
We must assume, as our working hypothesis,
that what is necessary is possible. And we must
prove it so.
746
Department of Stale Bulletin
Transcript of Secretary Dulles'
News Conference
Press release 212 dated April 24
Q. Mr. Secretary, tliere has ieen a Jot of in-
terest and speculation on your remarks in New
York yesterday about expanding the operation or
p^irpose of NATO} This interest has ieen in-
creased iy the fact that in this conference several
weeks ago you talked rather negatively about what
can be done. Will you give us sovi-e of your fur-
ther ideas on this subject?
A. I do not feel that I can properly at this time
fill in very much what I said yesterday. Broadly
speaking, it is our view, and I think has been our
view, that an organization of this kind either
grows or tends to dry up. And we believe that the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization ought to be
in the class of organizations which grow ratlier
than those which dry up because they only were
designed to serve a limited purpose which may in
due course be fulfilled.
As I indicated yesterday, I believe that there is
a basis for continuing vitality in the Atlantic
community comparable to that which brought into
being the Pan American Union and the Organiza-
tion of American States, which have been in exist-
ence for over 66 years and which will go on, I
guess, for a great many more years.
Now, I do not think that there was an incon-
sistency in what I said yesterday with what I said
in my earlier press conference.^ I did say at that
earlier press conference that I felt that certain
types of activity in relation to economic trade as
between the members of Nato could perhaps be
better carried on through the Oeec [Organiza-
tion for European Economic Cooperation], which
includes in the main the members of Nato and
also one or two other countries who are not mem-
bers of Nato. But I did not intend in that par-
ticular remark, which I still stand by, to indicate
that there was no opportunity for the growth and
vitality of Nato.
Now, I don't want to discuss the details because
we are only one of 15 members of the North At-
lantic Treaty Organization. This matter will
undoubtedly be discussed rather actively next
• Bulletin of Apr. 30, 195C, p. 706.
' For transcript of Feb. 28 press conference, see ibid.,
Mar. 12, 1956, p. 409.
lAay 7, 1956
week in Paris, and I think that it is appropriate
that we should have an exchange of views around
the Council table with our partners and learn
more of their views before we attempt to refine
and define our own.
Q. Mr. Secretary, NATO is essentially operated
as a military organization. It woidd appear that
political and economic possibilities are the only
other two. Are you thiidcing more, broadly speak-
ing, in the economic or the political line in your
latest remarks'i
A. Well, I would say we are thinking on both.
Q. But you do feel that OEEC is the mare
proper way to handle economic matters?
A. Economic matters as within Europe. But
there are also economic problems which could con-
ceivably relate to activities between Nato coun-
tries, or some of them, and non-European coun-
tries.
Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us whether the
United States Government plans to take to the
next NATO meeting any specific plans or pro-
posals for expansion or development of NATO or
whether we are just going luith an open mind on
the matter?
A. Well, we will go with some thoughts to ex-
change, yes. I may say that the general concept of
my speech was discussed with the permanent rep-
resentatives at Paris, who make up the Nato
permanent Council there, about a week ago, before
I made my speech, because I wanted to be sure
there would be a general receptivity to that point
of view, and I found that there was.
Q. Mr. Secretary, are you thinking of the kind
of political development of the organization, for
example, that might make it possible, for instance,
to consider such problems aw Cyprus, and so on?
A. Well, now you're pimiing me down a little
bit more closely than I care for.
Q. Mr. Secretary, lohen you said economic ques-
tions and non-European countries, had you in
mind underdeveloped areas which might be as-
sisted by NATO or areas such as the Middle East
upon which NATO is dependent for its fuel?
A. I would think that both of those aspects of
the matter should be considered. Whether thei-e
is agreement to deal with them or not I wouldn't
747
know. But I think probably they should be dis-
cussed. It is certainly relevant, I would think,
to the Atlantic community, and to Nato that much
of its economy depends upon oil that comes from
the Middle East and if that was cut off you would
be cutting off an element upon which Nato is very
dependent as a military organization. That is one
aspect of the matter.
There are also possibilities of joint efforts which
might include all or some of the Nato countries
to assist in neighboring areas such as North Africa.
The French have made proposals along that line.
I don't want to imply that those proposals would
be acceptable, but I merely mention them as indi-
cating the possible range of thinking.
NATO and OAS
Q. Mr. Secretary, in general terms when you
point out OAS as an organization which NATO
may grow to he like, do you have in mind agen-
cies like the Inter-American Peace Commission,
which deals with regional disputes, and the Eco-
nomic and Social Council?
A. Well, again, I prefer not to go into that at
this time. I would say this : I do not suggest that
there should be any exact patterning of Nato to
correspond with the Organization of American
States. I was careful in my remarks yesterday
to say, after speaking of the Organization of Am-
erican States, that Nato or the Atlantic community
might grow in its own distinctive way. I used the
word "distinctive" for the very purpose of indi-
cating that it would not necessarily be exactly the
same pattern.
Q. Mr. Secretary, one of the characteristics of
the Organization of A7nerican States in this hem-
isphere has heen ivithin the limit of the area and
its universality. Do you anticipate any change in
the basic character of NATO which would make
it have appeal to all the non-Communist countries
in the European area? I mean such countries,
specifically, as Switzerland and Sweden.
A. Well, I do not contemplate the membership
of such countries in Nato because Nato is a de-
fensive military alliance. Its military activities
are major and for some time probably will be a
major phase of its activities, and in view of the
neutral status which those countries have elected
to take I could hardly expect that they would ac-
tually join Nato.
Q. How about Spain ? Do you envisage Spain
as being a partner?
A. Well, as far as the United States is con-
cerned, we would be verj' happy to see Spain
a member of Nato. And if the broadening of
Nato activities makes that easier, that would,
from our standpoint, be one of the good byprod-
ucts of it. But, of course, there is some difference
of opinion within Nato about Spain, and we are
not trying to press our views, or force our views,
upon other countries.
Q. Mr. Secretary, can you tell us why there is
a feeling among NATO countries today that there
is a danger of its drying up?
A. I don't think I said that they felt that there
was a danger of its drying up. What I said re-
ferred to a law of nature that it is inevitable that
things either grow or they do tend to dry up. And
an organization which is created to meet an emer-
gency or a special situation tends to diminish in
vigor as it is judged that the occasion for its com-
ing into being disappears.
Now, then, the question is, do we consider Nato
as an organization which was created and which
has its life only for the duration of the threat
that brought it into being ? If so, you do not look
ahead through long vistas of time. Or you con-
sider that Nato is an organization which reflects
the spirit of Western civilization, which has been
a great and vital factor in the world for a great
many years but the efficacy of which, as I pointed
out in my speech, has been greatly diminished by D
the disimity as between its members. A great '
task of postwar statesmanship is to heal the dis- j,
unities which in the past have so often been the!
cause of war. We have had wars which have come
out of the West almost every generation for a good ^Ilie
many years.
Now, a great deal has already been done to heal
that breach — through bringing the Federal Re-
public of Germany into Nato ; through the Brus-
sels Treaty, which now creates what is called
Western Euro^Dean Union. But if the divisions'
of Western Europe are healed by organizations <
wliich themselves are looked upon as emergency'!
and temporary organizations, then you have not'
got the element for a permanent healing of those [
divisions and the creation of unity. So I think it jj^
is important, from the standpoint of the long-i — .
range future of Europe and the avoidance of ' 'A
Mi
till
A.
748
Department of Slate Bulletin !%
what has in the past been a frequent cause of war,
that the things that tie together the countries of
Western Europe have the quality of permanency
and not be merely emergency ties.
Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been a good
■deal of criticism at home and abroad to the e-ffect
\that o^ir approach to world affairs has been over-
militarized. Could it be that your speech yester-
day indicates that you are at least explonng the
possibility of a different em^phasis without sacri-
f^ing the military — that you''re thinking of in-
creasing the accent on the economic and political
approach?
A. I think that that would be a fair interpre-
tation of what the President said on Saturday '
and what I said on Monday. In certain parts of
the world, at least, it seems that the Soviet activi-
ties are putting less emphasis upon violent means
and more emphasis upon other means. Perhaps
that appraisal needs a little adjustment, in the
light of Khrushchev's outburst in London yester-
day. But in the main there is an effort to elim-
inate from their doctrine, and perhajis to some
extent fiom their practice, the Stalin thesis that
only violence would serve. As I perhaps have
quoted or paraphrased here before, Stalin said
that anybody who believed that communism,
Soviet conmiunism, can achieve its goal without
resort to violence has either gone out of his mind
or else does not understand the basic funda-
mentals of Communist philosophy. Well, now
apparently they are trying to get away from that
point of view, both doctrinally and to some extent,
I believe, in practice. And it's necessary and ap-
propriate that we should, I think, adapt our tac-
tics to the changes in Soviet Communist tactics.
The Cold War
Q. Mr. Secretary., in that connection., it was the
consensus of a group of American newspaper
editors in Washington last week that the United
States is losing the cold war. On tlie same day,
the President expressed the opinion that exactly
the opposite was true. Can you spell out for v^
some of the toays in which we may be countering
the cold war?
A. Well, of course, when you approach the ques-
tion of whether we are winning or losing the cold
war, I suppose the first thing to determine is, what
do you mean by the "cold war"? As I tried to
point out yesterday, the cold war is not simply
a defensive operation. If by cold war you mean
merely to keep alive hatred of Kussia, or to keep
the Russians permanently ostracized and to deny
them any access to the free world, then I suppose
it could be judged that we are not winning the
cold war. But that is not my concept at all of
what the cold war is.
The cold war basically is an effort, first of all,
to do away with the great danger of hot war. I
notice that the same people who said we were
losing the cold war also agi-eed that there was
very much less danger of war than there has been
before. Well, if you call that losing, it's not my
definition of losing. And we also, of course, pri-
marily are looking to the day when Russia will be
something that we can be friends with and not
have to treat as enemies. And there has de-
veloped a beginning at least of a change within
the Soviet Union. The change that has happened
outside, which causes some to fear, is responsive
to what the world judges has happened inside.
It is widely judged, rightly or wrongly, but the
fact is it is widely judged by responsible people,
that the Soviet Union is not to be feared as much
now as it was before. And if, in fact, the Soviet
Union is not as much to be feared as it was, if it
has become more tolerant, if it has put aside the
use of violence, if it is beginning to move in a
liberal way within, then I would call that progress
toward victory in the cold war.
Q. Mr. Secretary, in your last press conference *
you pointed out that the fine print has to be read
on the Moscow statement on the Middle East. I
wonder if that reading of the fine print has been
completed and you can give us your assessment
of that statement.
A. Yes, I can say I have now read the fine print
and my impression is about the same as I ex-
pressed last week. It does seem to me that the
statement is responsive to President Eisenhower's
statement.^ Now, when I say responsive to, I
don't mean to say that it is in response to, which
is slightly different. I don't mean to say that the
Soviets made their statement because President
Eisenhower made his statement. But the Soviet
statement does, it seems to me, fit in with and
■ Ilid., Apr. 30, 1956, p. 699.
May 7, 7956
* Ihid., p. 710.
'Issued at Augusta, Ga., on Apr. 9; see ihid., Apr. 23,
p. 668.
749
in that sense is responsive to President Eisen-
hower's statement, which called upon all of the
member nations to support tlie Hammarskjold
mission and the efforts of the United Nations in
this respect. And I think to the extent that the
statement seems to commit the Soviet Union to
the support of the Hammarskjold mission and to
the handling of this matter in the United Nations,
and we can hope a handling which would exclude
its use of the veto power in the Security Council,
that is all in the right direction.
Relations With the Philippines
Q. Mr. Secretary, reports from the Philippines,
including an AP dispatch, tell of the dissatisfac-
tion with the prospective nominees for United
States Ambassador there. Other reports tell of
a rising anti-Ainerican sentim,ent. We are ac-
cused of treating the Philippines as an orphan.
The New York Times recently described the situa-
tion as "senmis, if not critical." The question is,
do we give weight to Philippine public sentiment
and its impact on friendly United States-Philip-
pine relations in our diplomatic and other deal-
ings with them?
A. We attach the greatest of importance to
good relations with the Philippines, and I be-
lieve that the relations at the present time are
basically good, although I am not unaware of
the fact that some are critical of the United States
because they do not feel that we are cutting the
Philippines in sufficiently upon our economic aid
program.
"Wlien I was in Manila on my last trip, a month
ago, I was quite aware of the criticism that was
made in that respect. There was a good deal of
attention paid to a chart which was drawn from a
United States newspaper which, for example,
showed a list of the countries that had received the
greatest aid from the United States. The chart
gave 10 countries, and the Philippines was last on
that list. That was interpreted in some quarters
as indicating that we were, as you put it, treating
it as an "orphan." Well, the chart did not mean
that. It picked the 10 countries that have gotten
the most aid and merely lumped together the
others, some 45, who had gotten less aid. The
whole purport of the chart was to show that the
Philippines was among the 10 who had gotten
the most aid out of the approximately 50 who had
750
been aided. And even there the chart was inaccu-
rate because it showed the total aid as approxi-
mately $1 billion, whereas the actual amount of
economic aid, including loans and U.S. expendi-
tures in the Philippines, is about $2.5 billion.
Also there is — very naturally, perhaps — mis-
understanding as to the nature of our aid. We
don't give foreign aid like a generous grandparent
to his grandchildren on Christmas Day, who
passes out checks to the favorite grandchildren
and gives the biggest check to the one that he loves
the most. This is a serious business — where we
are trying to build up defenses against the dangers
of Soviet communism. In Asia there is still a
very considerable military danger, and the trend
to renunciation of violence which I spoke of in
relation to the Soviet Union is not fully apparent
yet as far as Communist China is concerned. The
great bulk of our aid in that part of the world is
going to Korea, to Taiwan, and to Viet-Nam,
which are three danger points. There are there
actual wars suspended by armistices but not sus-
pended by formal peace, and there is actual shoot-
ing going on sporadically around Taiwan. When
we give help to those countries to hold back the
military threat of the Chinese Communists, we
are by that very fact helping the Philippines,
which itself is in an exposed position. If we didn't
help Korea. Taiwan, and Viet-Nam, as we are
doing, the Philippines would be very much worse
off. So that our program in those countries is
also in aid of the Philippines. These things are
not fully undei-stood. We are trying to make them
more clearly understood, because we greatly value
Philippine friendship.
I think you made some reference at the begin-
ning of your question to the acceptability of our
new Ambassador.
Q. Yes.
A. Well, I understand that the agrement on
him has been received.®
Q. Mr. Secretary, testimony before a congres-
sional: committee la.^t toeeh about the Soviet sailors
who have gone back to the Soviet Union indicated
that Mr. Sobolev and his associates of the Soviet
delegation in the United Nations may have in-
dulged in activities not necessarily consistent with
his position as a United Nations representative
'Albert F. Nufer was nominated to be Ambassador to
the Philippines on Apr. 25.
Deparfmenf of Sfa/e Bulletin
I
here. Does the State Department plam to protest
action in that respect?
A. "Well, that depends upon wliat the facts de-
velop to be. I understand that situation is being
examined by the Dejaartment of Justice and the
FBI. It falls within their jurisdiction, and I do
not yet have any report. Of course, if the re-
port justifies it, we would make protest. [See p.
765.]
Q. Mr. Secretai'y, have you made any investiga-
tion to 'find out why these five seamen went hack
to Russia?
A. Well, that investigation is what is going on.
But that investigation is conducted not by the
State Department but by the Department of Jus-
tice.
Q. Mr. Secretary, in regard to the changes in
Russia, is there any evidence of any hind that the
Russians are modifying their hold on the satel-
lites?
A. There is no evidence that they are voluntarily
modifying their hold. I would say that there is
a little evidence that their hold is getting some-
what weaker, not because they want it to be so
but because the changes that have occurred in the
Soviet policy have put a certain premium now
upon Titoism. And while we think always in
terms of tlie effect of Soviet policy in creating neu-
tralism in the free-world camp, the acceptance
now of Titoism in the Soviet camp has a certain
disturbing influence upon the Soviet hold over the
satellites who think that perhaps Tito is getting
the best of both worlds and that seems to be en-
tirely acceptable now to the Soviet Union ; there-
fore, why shouldn't they follow on that same path ?
So I do think that, while the Soviets have not
indicated any policy of relinquishing their hold,
their hold is becoming looser.
the most effective lines, and so forth. That state-
ment of the President was in pursuance of the
same thought. We are studying that whole ques-
tion rather intensely at the present time, and I
hope that within a few days we may be able to
come up with some concrete proposals in that
sense. We are, of course, in that respect, taking
account of the point of view which has been ex-
pressed in Congi-ess by Senator George in rela-
tion to the Foreign Relations Committee. We
know that, also. Congressman Richards and the
Foreign Afl'airs Committee are interested in that
problem.
•
Q. Will this hoard he confined strictly to foreign
aid, Mr. Secretary, or a hroader range?
A. Well, it is primarily conceived of in terms
of foreign aid. Did you mean to imply economic
aid as distinguished from military ?
Q. No. It seemed to me that the President was
suggesting a hoard which ivould consider a wider
range of foreign prohlems rather than —
A. No, I think he was only thinking of it in
terms of the foreign aid, and perhaps primarily
the economic aspect of it.
Q. Mr. Secretary, to go hack, if we may for a
second, to the Middle East, are ive or would we
attempt to discourage Israel from resuming dig-
ging in the so-called demilitarized zone on the
Jordan River project?
A. Well, the situation still is, I suppose, juridi-
cally the same as it was when that project was in-
terrupted about 3 years ago, at the behest of the
United Nations, of General Bennike, then the
Chairman of the Armistice Conamission, on the
ground that it was a violation of the armistice.
And I don't know of anything that has happened
to change that juridical position since then.
Proposed Advisory Board
Q. Mr. Secretary, President Eisenhower Satur-
<Iay night suggested some sort of rotating advis-
ory hoard for foreign policy. Have you given any
thought to a plan like that? Do you know what
he meant?
A. Yes, I think I know what he meant. I spoke
here last week of the fact that we recognized the
desirability of having a study made of the for-
eign aid and whether it is being conducted along
Policy Toward U.S.S.R.
Q. Mr. Secretary, in your discussion of the cold
war, you say you 7'eject — if I heard it correctly —
the idea of keeping alive the hatred of the Soviet
Union. The President has said, I helieve, that
the Russian hasic concept of world com/munism
has not changed despite these surface changes.
And you attach a numher of "ifs^^ to the possihility
of changes within the Soviet Union. What, sir,
should he the attitude of the average American
May 7, 1956
751
toward the Soviet Union in this context? What
do we do about exchange of students? The Uni-
versity of Chicago wanted to invite a Russian
student^ which was not permitted, according to the
story. Do we have, as yet, a new concept of the
American posture, so to speak, toward Russia?
A. We are adopting a somewhat more liberal
policy in that respect than was the case a year or
more ago. On the other hand, we do in the ap-
plication of our policy consider not merely the
question of whether or not a particular action
would be good or even tolerable, as between our
two countries, but we also take into account the
effect of our example upon other countries who
perhaps might not be able to have the same re-
lationship without their getting into difficulties.
The Soviets are very prone to turn to a smaller,
weaker country, and say, "Well, we had this kind
of relationship with the United States. Wliy
don't you do the same ? If the United States does
it, well, why not you ?" Now, it may very well be
that the Soviet Union has projects to ensnare that
smaller and weaker country which would be pro-
moted if that country had the same kind of re-
lationship which we could have with impunity.
Therefore, we take into account not merely the
question of whether or not what we do would be
tolerable as between our two countries, but what
use the Soviet Union can make of that example
when it tvirns to a third country and says, "Well,
now, the United States set the example; why
shouldn't you follow it?"
Q. Mr. Secretary, in London the other day Mr.
Khrushchev and Mr. Bulganin reportedly said that
that nnas the half-way stop on the way to America
and that they xoould like to come here after the
election. Has any thought been given to asking
them?
A. Well, I am not aware of any such thought
being given to their coming here, and possibly
after they have had this experience with the half-
way stop they might not want to go all the rest
of the way. (Laughter)
Q. Have loe given any thought to inviting Mr.
Zhukov here?
A. Not that I know of.
Q. Mr. Secretary, when do you plan to leave
for Paris?
A. On next Tuesday afternoon.
Communism and Nationalism
Q. Mr. Secretary, you referred to certain
changes in the Soviet Union as putting a premium
on Titoism. Could you specify for us which par-
ticular changes you have in mind?
A. Of course, the most important characteristic
of Titoism is the fact that it recognizes that com-
munism can be a national organization, not neces-
sarily an international organization. That was
the thesis which was held in Russia by Bukharin
and his associates, who were purged and executed
in the 1930"s because they took the view that you
could have communism within a country but did
not necessarily have to be a part of what is com-
monly called international communism.
The view then held by Stalin was that you could
not have communism just within one country but
that you had to have communism as a dynamic
movement which was trying to get control of all
countries. In that sense Stalin's communism was
incompatible with nationalism. Indeed, Stalin
himself said that Soviet communism is the most
international of all organizations because it tries
to break down all of the national boundaries. As
against tliis some people held the view that com-
munism could be a national phenomenon rather
than an international phenomenon. That was the
view that Tito held, and he broke with Stalin on
that issue because Moscow did not admit his right
to have a national communistic state which would
primarily be dedicated to the welfare of Yugo-
slavia.
If the Soviet Communists now say that it is all
right to have communism on a national basis, that
offers a great prospect to the Poles, the Czechs,
and so forth, who would much rather have their
own national brand of communism than be run
by Moscow.
Q. Mr. Secretary, Mr. Khrushchev seems to
have created some excitement in Britain yesterday
with a remark, about working on a guided missile
with an atomic or hydrogen warhead. Do you
have any comment on this remark of his?
A. Well, that is not primarily within my area.
I think it is no secret that they have been working
on tliis for some time. I just checked, for curios-
ity, this morning to see what the interpretation of
Mr. Khrushchev's remark was as being given out
by the Soviet press, because there was some ques-
tion as to just what he had said. And I just was
752
Department of State Bulletin
given, as I came down here, a note which says that
the Soviet radio reports it as follows : "I also think
that we are not behind in the development of
guided missiles," which is a slightly more moder-
ate statement than what was reported by some as
the version of what he said.
Q. Mr. Secretary., I believe Isaac Stem, a young
American violinist, is going to the Soviet Union
next Saturday for a I^-weeh tour. This is in re-
turn for some very successful Russian appearances
lie re. Do you think this favors the thawing of
relations, or does it create some erroneous impres-
sions here — the way you felt, I believe, about the
agricultural mission at one point?
A. No, I would think that the exchange of
genuine artists would probably be a good thing.
Of course, if the artists are spies in disguise, that's
another matter. But a genuine artist, I believe,
can go about the world, and it is good for every-
l)ody to have fine music made available.
Q. Thanh you, sir.
Second Meeting of Council
of Baglidad Pact Organization
Following are texts of statements m,ade by
United States observers during the second meeting
of the Baghdad Pact Cowncil at Tehran, April
10-20, together with the final communique issued
on April 20. ^
STATEMENT BY LOY W. HENDERSON ^
Press release 200 dated April 17
I take this occasion to express on behalf of the
delegation of the United States our deep apprecia-
tion of the courtesies and consideration which we
are receiving from our kind hosts, the Government
of Iran, and of the effective measures which have
been taken for the organization of this meeting.
I take pleasure in bringing to you today the
greetings of the President of the United States,
the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of De-
^ For text of the communique issued after the Council's
first meeting, see Bulletin of Jan. 2, 1956, p. 16.
^ Made before the Council on Apr. 16. Deputy Under
."Secretary Henderson headed the U.S. delegation to the
meeting.
lAa^ 7, J 956
384047—56 3
fense on this occasion of the second meeting of the
Council of the Baghdad Pact Organization.
It means much to me personally again to be in
the Middle East and to have the opportunity to
meet so many old friends and to make new friends
from countries whose friendship my own country
values so highly.
Our delegation considers it a privilege to be able
to sit with such a distinguished group of repre-
sentatives of friendly nations which, like the
United States, are so deeply interested in the main-
tenance of the peace and security of the Middle
East on a basis which would assure the preserva-
tion of the territorial integrity and the independ-
ence of the various nations of the area and would
ailord the peoples of the area maximum opportu-
nities for political, economic, and social develop-
ment.
Ambassadors Chapin and Gallman, Admiral
Cassady, Mr. Seager, and I, together with the
staffs which accompany us, are prepared to con-
tribute to your deliberations and to assist in the
work of your committees. We are anxious to do
here all that is possible and appropriate to i^ro-
mote the achievement of our common objective.
At a time when the peace of the world is threat-
ened in numerous areas by divisive conflicts, we
look with hope toward those groups of nations
which have banded together for their common
security and welfare. We desire to work with
such groups and so to strengthen them that they
will demonstrate to other nations in the area that
such cooperation is the true road to the achieve-
ment of national aspirations.
The American people are increasingly happy to
work with the nations grouped in the Baghdad
Pact in their cooperative efforts in the Middle
East. In planning for the bilateral programs of
economic and military assistance which we have
with each of the Pact nations, we are taking
strongly into account the courageous and un-
equivocal steps you have taken in forming this
association. We have come prepared to discuss
the supplementing of these bilateral programs
through a program of broader economic coopera-
tion coordinated through the Pact Organization.
We will be pleased to carry back with us to our
Government any suggestions which you may make
for closer cooperation in the many fields of com-
mon endeavor which the Pact has opened.
We are certain, however, that we express the
feelings of all who are here represented when we
753
say that it is our sincere desire to retain close,
friendly, and effective ties with other nations of
the area. We believe the Pact, based as it is on
friendship toward all and hostility toward none,
serves the interests of the area as a whole and
provides no reason for impairing the good re-
lations we all wish to maintain with your neigh-
bors. In our relations with the other nations we
shall continue to make clear our firm support for
the Pact and our belief that it represents an ef-
fective organization for area cooperation and
defense.
My colleagues and I look forward to a reward-
ing and stimulating conference with you during
this meetinc
STATEMENT BY CEDRIC SEAGER3
Press release 200 dated April 17
The United States is deeply interested in the
countries of the Baghdad Pact and their economic
and social advancement. The United States will
continue its assistance to these and other Middle
East countries to raise their standards of living
and safeguard their freedom and independence.
Significant steps are being taken by all the Pact
members to strengthen their internal economies.
The economic progress which is being made holds
encouraging promise for the future.
The United States believes that the work of the
Economic Committee of the Baghdad Pact is con-
tributing effectively toward the advancement of
development programs which will bring greater
prosperity and greater economic stability for all.
The United States has followed with gi-eat and
sympathetic interest the work of the Economic
Committee and its subcommittees. They have
assessed a broad range of subjects of common
interest on which cooperative action is desirable.
At its current session the Economic Committee
has given stimulus to the progress which is being
made in the economic development of the countries
of the Pact. The United States looks forward
with pleasure to a continuation of its cooperation
with the members of the Pact, and I feel assured
from this meeting that the Economic Committee
is determined to carry forward the task it has
' Made at the closing session of the Council's Economic
Committee on Apr. 11. Mr. Seager is Regional Director
for the Near East, South Asia, and Africa, International
Cooperation Administration.
undertaken. I congratulate the Economic Com-
mittee on its excellent work.
CLOSING STATEMENT BY MR. HENDERSON,
APRIL 20
On behalf of the United States observers I again
desire to express our appreciation to His Im-
perial Majesty, the Shahinshah, and his Govern-
ment for the warmth of their welcome, their hos-
pitality, and for the excellent facilities made avail-
able to us.
Prime Minister Ala has chaired our meetings
with the statesmansliip and ability for which he
has long been famous. We wish to congratulate
the Secretariat which, under the capable direction
of the Secretary-General, has done a superb job
in its reporting and in making the necessary ar-
rangements to permit the meetings to run
smoothly.
Our participation in this meeting has been stim-
ulating and inspiring. We have been deeply im-
pressed by the restraint, wisdom, and understand-
ing displayed by all of the delegations. We are
firmly convinced that any area which can pro-
duce the statesmanship which has been evidenced
at this meeting is certain to play a significant
and beneficial role in world affairs.
As we bid you adieu we have the warm feeling
which comes from being among friends. You
may be sure that we, the United States observers,
will faithfully convey to our Government the
views wliich have been expressed to us. We wish
all of you continued success in the implementing
of this Pact which means so much to the security
and welfare of the peoples of this area.
TEXT OF FINAL COMMUNIQUE
The Council of the Baghdad Pact held its second meet-
ing of Ministers in Tehran from 16th to 10th April, 1956,
under the Chairmanship of His Excellency Hussein Ala,
Prime Minister of Iran.
2. The meeting was attended by the Prime Ministers
and Foreign Ministers of Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and Tur-
key and by the Minister of Defence of the United King-
dom. The United States were represented by a dele-
gation of observers headed by the Hon. Loy Henderson,
Deputy Under Secretary of State.
3. The Council emphasised that their several Gov-
ernments adhered firmly to the principles that inspired
the United Nations Charter. The Baghdad Pact was
754
Department of Sfafe Bulletin
fully in conformity with those principles. Its object was
to assist in achieving the Charter's primary purpose of
maintaining international peace and security and pro-
moting human welfare. The Pact was wholly defensive
in character. While its members were determined to
defend themselves against aggression, they desired at the
same time to live in peace with all Governments and
all peoples.
4. The Council had before it the task of considering
the reports and recommendations of various committees
of the Baghdad Pact Organisation, and of reviewing the
international political situation especially from the point
of view of its repercussions on the Pact area.
5. In the light of their thorough review of the political
situation, the Council considered that although there was
a change of tactics, the basic objectives of international
communism remained unchanged. Its activities in the
area required that the free world continue to exercise
unceasing vigilance if its solidarity was to be maintained
and freedom and peace were to be preserved. There
could be no relaxation of measures designed to strengthen
the defensive capacity of this area. In the view of the
Council, the criticism and attacks from neutralist and
other sources directed against the Baghdad Pact and other
similar organisations created to provide for the legitimate
defence and peaceful development of their member na-
tions, spring largely from lack of knowledge and mis-
understanding of its true purposes. It is the hope of
the Council that as these purposes become better known,
these criticisms will give way to sympathetic and active
co-operation and that the Baghdad Pact will become, as
it is Intended to tele, a unifying factor among the peoples
in the region who wish to preserve a free and democratic
way of life. Meanwhile, these criticisms and attacks can
only help to keep the region divided and weak and mem-
ber countries decided to counter them actively and
resolutely.
6. Specific problems which were causing tension in this
area were also discussed thoroughly and frankly in a
spirit of mutual comprehension. In particular, the Coun-
cil emphasised the need for an early settlement of the
Palestine and Kashmir disputes.
7. In the midst of this troulJled political situation, it
was the Council's conviction that the Baghdad Pact offered
the best means of safeguarding the peace and stability
and of promoting the welfare and unity of the area, whilst
at the same time it effectively served the cause of world
peace. Urgent steps must, therefore, be taken to
strengthen this Pact. For this purpose, member coun-
tries in this area must be equipped with the means for
developing their military and economic strength and the
Pact must yield positive visible results. At the same
time, systematic elTorts should be made to create a better
vmderstanding of the Pact among the nations which are
opposing it.
8. The Council adopted the report of the Economic
Committee and the various resolutions submitted by it.
These provide for the establishment of a Centre for im-
parting training in the use of agricultural machinery
and in methods of soil and water conservation, for es-
tablishing joint training centres for anti-malaria opera-
tions and health education, for undertaking jointly by two
or more countries surveys in the field of locusts and pests,
for co-ordination of research in certain fields, and for
exchange of technical personnel and of information on
scientific and technical subjects. The Council agreed
that it was necessary to implement the resolutions with-
out delay, particularly those relating to projects which
are likely to yield early and visible results and to promote
the well being of the people in the Pact area. The Coun-
cil noted with satisfaction that the Atomic Energy Centre
was expected to open at Baghdad in January, 19.57.
9. The Council drew special attention to the importance
of joint projects of mutual interest to one or more mem-
ber countries. It was decided that a technical Committee
comprising members of each of the interested Govern-
ments should take place at Ankara to make a preliminary
study of the possibility of a joint development plan of
the water resources of the Tigi-is and Euphrates basin
and to make recommendations for the carrying out of any
further detailed studies which may be required. The
possibilities of development of mineral resources in the
eastern parts of Iran and the timber reserve in Caspian
provinces by the joint efforts of Iran and Pakistan were
noted. The Council also decided to set up a working
party to meet in June, 1956, at Tehran to consider the
means whereby regional projects of interest to two or
more members of the Pact could be studied and imple-
mented through economic and technical assistance. The
Council recognised the far reaching need for regional co-
operation and joint projects in the fields of industry and
communications.
10. The Council noted that the Economic Committee
would undertake a detailed study of the pattern of pro-
duction and trade between member countries with a view
to promoting trade within the Pact area. The Council
considered that notwithstanding the fact that the needs of
the member countries in the Pact area were at present
similar, there was .scope for expansion of trade in this
area in the immediate future. In this connection, Paki-
stan's recent offer to buy dates from Iraq was welcomed.
11. The Council recognised the importance of technical
assistance between member countries. The Council agreed
that the Secretariat shoidd co-ordinate this work on the
basis of the offers already received by the Economic
Committee. It noted that the United Kingdom and
Pakistan had offered technical assistance.
12. The Council welcomed the active participation of
the United States in the work of the Pact Organisation.
The Council considered that the active and continuing
support of the United States for the Pact and its objec-
tives was an essential factor in the strengthening and
development of the member countries and in the realisa-
tion of their peaceful aims. The United States reaffirmed
its solid support of the Pact and stated that it would
continue to lend support to the individual and collective
efforts of the Member nations to attain the political, de-
fensive, economic and social objectives of the Pact.
13. The United States, on the invitation of the Council,
became a full member of the Economic Committee and
the Counter Subversion Committee. The terms of refer-
ence of these two Committees provide for the extension
of membership to non-signatory governments at the dis-
cretion of the Council.
May 7, 1956
755
14. The United States delegate to the Economic Com-
mittee reaffirmed the intention of his country to continue
its bilateral technical and economic assistance to the
member nations, and indicated that the United States
would consider waj's of assisting joint projects under-
taken by members of the Kconomic Committee of the Pact.
15. The United States observer to the Military Com-
mittee offered to establish a Military Liaison group at the
permanent Headquarters of the Baghdad Pact, headed
by a Flag or General OflBcer. The Council welcomed and
accepted this proposal.
10. The United States observers expressed their Gov-
ernment's intention of continuing its military assistance
to the member countries.
17. The Council considered that there Is a threat of
subversion in this area and agreed that it can be met
most effectively by co-operation among members of the
Pact. To this end the Council decided to establish a
permanent organisation under the administrative control
of the Secretary General. The Council recognised that
while the threat of subversion could be countered with
measures designed to expose its real nature and give the
widest publicity to the aim and activities of the Pact,
the essence of combating subversion lay in the eradica-
tion of the conditions in which it thrives, namely, eco-
nomic under-developmeat and defensive weakness. Both
must be remedied as soon as possible.
18. In the light of the common determination that the
territorial integrity of the Member states of the Pact shall
be defended the Military Committee decided to expedite
all necessary further mea.sures for the defence of the
Baghdad Pact countries. The Council considered the re-
port of the Committee and noted that considerable progress
had already been achieved in the military sphere.
19. The Council decided that its next meeting at Minis-
terial level should be held at Karachi in the month of
January, 1957, and that in the meanwhile the Council
will continue to meet regularly at the Deputies' level.
Visit of Vice President of Brazil
The Department of State announced on April
26 (press release 220) that the members of the
party of Joao Goulart, Vice President of Brazil,
who will visit Washington from April 30 to May
3, will be as follows :
Joao Goulart, Vice President of the Republic of the United
States of Brazil ; Senhora Goulart
Joao Lima Teixeira, Senator from the State of Bahia
Fernando Ferrari, Federal Deputy from the State of Rio
Grande do Sul
Roberto Silveira, Lieutenant Governor of the State of Rio
de Janeiro
Geraldo Eulalio Nascimento e Silva, Foreign Service Offi-
cer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Eugenio Caillar, Executive Secretary to the Vice President
Yara Vargas Lopes, Secretary to Senhora Goulart
The party will leave Washington on May 3 for
756
a 2-week private tour which will include visits
to the King Ranch in Texas, Kansas City, Detroit,
and New York.
Change in NATO Command
Following are texts of statements and docu-
ments relating to the retirement of Gen. Alfred
M. Gruenther, Supreme Allied Commander,
Europe, and the appointment of Gen. Lauris
Norstad as his successor.
WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT OF APRIL 13
White House Office (Augusta, Ga.) press release
The White House today announced that the
President has witli deep regret accepted the re-
quest of General Alfred M. Gruenther for retire-
ment from the United States Army toward the
end of this year.
General Gruenther is at present serving as
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, under ap-
pointment by the North Atlantic Council. The
Council has acceded to the President's request
that General Gruenther be released from
this Nato Command upon retirement.
The "White House also announced that, in re-
sponse to a subsequent request by the North At-
lantic Council, the President has nominated and
the Council has approved the appointment of Gen-
eral Lauris Norstad, United States Air Force, as
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, in succes-
sion to General Gruenther. The appointment will
take effect at a date to be decided later.
In a letter to General Gruenther, the President
said, "The announcement of your decision to re-
quest relief as Supreme Allied Commander,
Europe, and to retire from active military service
will be received with great disappointment by our
European Allies and by the American people. All
appreciate the magnificent contribution you have
made toward the fulfillment of the objectives of
Nato and, I am certain, will wish to join with me
in congratulating you on your performance.
You have been intimately associated with Nato
since its inception. To your task as Supreme
Allied Commander, Europe, you brought a wealth
of military experience and a unique quality of
leadership which you have unselfishly and with
great distinction employed in improving the effec-
Department of State Bulletin
tiveness and solidarity of the forces under your
command."
In the letter nominating General Norstad, the
President said, "General Norstad is an officer of
outstanding ability. He has the special qualifica-
tion of long years of experience in Europe, cul-
minating in almost three years of devoted service
as Air Deputy to Saceub. The confidence placed
in him by the Member Nations has been amply
demonstrated. It is our common purpose to deter
and, if need be, defend against aggression so that
mankind maj^ live and prosper in freedom. I am
confident that under General Norstad's leadership
this high resolve will continue to be steadfastly
upheld."
ANNOUNCEMENT BY NORTH ATLANTIC COUN-
CIL, APRIL 13
1. The North Atlantic Council have been in-
formed of the contents of a communication from
the President of the United States of America to
the Secretary General and Vice-Chairman of the
Council, in which he asked that the member gov-
ernments should agree to the release at his own
request towards the end of this year of General
Alfred M. Gruenther from his assignment as
Supreme Allied Commander Europe in order to
permit his retirement from active duty.
2. The Council agreed with great regret to re-
lease General Gruenther from his assignment as
Supreme Allied Commander Europe. They rec-
ognised that General Gruenther had fully dis-
charged the trust reposed in him by the Council
when, in May 1953, they appointed him as Su-
preme Allied Commander Europe. They ex-
pressed to General Gruenther, in the name of the
governments represented on the Council, lasting
gratitude for the distinguished service rendered
by him.
3. The Council then unanimously decided to re-
quest the President of the United States of
America to nominate an officer of the US Armed
Forces for appointment by the Council as Su-
preme Allied Commander Europe to succeed Gen-
eral Gruenther. The request was immediately
transmitted to the President of the United States,
who informed the Council of his nomination of
General Lauris Norstad for consideration by the
Council as successor to General Gruenther.
4. The Council at a meeting this afternoon
unanimously adopted a resolution declaring that
they reposed the greatest faith in General Norstad
and appointed him Supreme Allied Commander
Europe, as successor to General Gruenther, with
the same powers and functions. The appointment
will become efl:'ective towards the end of this year.
Annex I. Letter Fkom the President of the United
States to Lord Ismat
10th April, 1956
Dear Lord Ismat,
I am addressing you as Vice-Chairman of the North
Atlantic Council with the request that appropriate action
be taken at an early date to secure the release toward the
end of this year of General Alfred M. Gruenther from
assignment as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. In
mailing this request through you to the Member Nations
who appointed him, I asli that they give favorable con-
sideration to his release.
Personal considerations have led General Gruenther
to request retirement from active duty in the Armed
Forces of the United States toward the end of this year.
I believe his distinguished career of dedicated national
and international service has earned for him the right to
have his request granted.
The steady growth of Communist armed strength, com-
pelling the NATO Nations to maintain their deterrent and
defensive strength, emphasizes the continued necessity
for outstanding leadership at SHAPE. The Council will
shortly proceed to appoint an able officer to the vacancy
created by General Gruenther's retirement. Surely the
Nation invited to nominate a successor will propose its
most eligible officer available.
Afforded the same high degree of trust and cooperation
that Nations have extended to General Gruenther, the
new SACEUR will, I am confident, be successful in
carrying out his vital responsibilities.
Sincerely,
Dwight D. Eisenhower
The Kight Honorable Lord Ismat, G.C.B., C.H., D.S.O.,
Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization,
Palais de Chaillot,
Paris.
Annex II. Counctl Resolution Accepting the Relief
OP General Alfred M. Gruenther and Requesting
Nomination of a US Officer To Be His Successor
The North Atlantic Council :
Having considered a communication by the President
of the United States to the Secretary General and Vice-
Chairman of the Council requesting him to initiate ap-
propriate action to secure the release of General Alfred M.
Gruenther from assignment as Supreme Allied Com-
mander Europe,
Agrees with great regret to the release towards the
end of this year of General Gruenther from as.signment
as Supreme Allied Commander Europe ;
Recognises that General Gruenther has fully discharged
the trust reposed in him by the North Atlantic Council
May 7, J 956
757
wlien in May li>ri3, the Council appointed liim Supreme
Allied Ck)minander Europe ;
Expressed to General Gruenther, in the name of the
Governments represented on the Council, lasting gratitude
for the distinguished service rendered by him ;
Unanimously requests the President of the United
States to nominate an officer of the Armed Forces of tlie
United States for appointment by the Council as Supreme
Allied Commander Burojie to succeed General Gruentlier,
at a date to be decided later.
Annex III. Letter From the President of the United
States to Lord Ismay
13th April, 1956
Dear Lord Ismat,
Pursuant to tlie request of the North Atlantic Council
that I nominate an otfieer of the Armed Forces of the
United States for appointment b.v the Council as Supreme
Allied Commander, Europe, to succeed General Alfred M.
Gruenther, I hereby nominate General Laurls Norstad.
General Norstad is an officer of outstanding ability.
He has the special qualification of long years of ex-
perience in Europe, culminating in almost three years of
devoted service as Air Deputy to SACEUR. The con-
fidence placed in him by the Member Nations has been
amply demonstrated.
It is our common purpose to deter and, if need be, de-
fend against aggression so that mankind may live and
prosper in freedom. I am confident tliat under General
Norstad's leadership this high resolve virill continue to
Ije steadfastly upheld.
Sincerely,
Dwight D. Eise.\hower
The Right Honorable Lord Ismat, G.C.B., C.H., D.S.O.,
Secretary Genrral of the
North Atliintic Trciity Orgaiiiziitioii.
The Purge of Stalinism
hy AlUn W. Dulles
Director of Central Intelligence ^
There is never a dull moment in my job as
Director of Central Intelligence. Events which
seem to defy analysis happen somewhere in the
world every day. Few trends seem to follow a
predictable course.
These last few weeks there have been develop-
ments in the Soviet Union which have puzzled all
the expex'ts who generally have ready answers —
sometimes more ready than accurate — to explain
Soviet conduct. Just at a time when some are say-
ing that everything is going wrong with foreign
policy in the free-world countries but that every-
thing in the Soviet Union is progressing according
to some gi"eat master design, the Soviet collective
leadership, as they call it, comes forward to beat
their collective breasts and indulge in the most
extreme self-criticism.
The men in the Kremlin now tell us that all
they said earlier about events in the U.S.S.R.
during the 20 years preceding Stalin's death is
quite wrong; that in fact this was an era of in-
' Address made before the Los Angeles World Affairs
Council on Apr. 13.
famy, crime, and shame. They admit that their
jiast adulation of Stalin was based on fear, not
on fact. The man they themselves used to call
the "glorious Stalin, genius of mankind" is now
being publicly accused of "grave errors" and pri-
vately described as a malicious monster.
The Soviet leaders do not very clearly explain
why the new collective leaders waited for 3 years
after Stalin's death to tell it to their people.
They do not make a very satisfactory showing as
to why they themselves sat acquiescent in the seats
of the mighty during all the period of Stalin's
dictatorship, exercising great powers as members
of his inner circle.
Possibly, as Khrushchev is reported to have ad-
mitted, the price of nonconformity was a bullet in
the head. This is a very human excuse but a poor
qualification for high office on the part of those
who now assert the rights and prerogatives of
leadership. In the free world, where we aspire to
build on the great traditions of the past, not to re-
pudiate them, we revere as our heroes and leaders
those wlio refused to conform, whatever the risks,
when the principles of liberty were at stake.
758
Department of State Bulletin
In the U.S.S.R., evidently, acquiescing in
crime as the price of simple survival under a
political tyrant is sanctioned as legitimate con-
duct. As they put it : "The point was not to save
one's own life ; the point was to save the revolu-
tion."
Years of Stalin's Power
Before going further into the details of this
strange development in the Soviet Union it may
be worth wliile to review briefly what had been
taking place there during the years of Stalin's
power. Here we may find clues as to why the
men in the Kremlin now take the serious risks of
repudiating their late hero for having put the
individual above party and substituting a per-
sonal dictatorship for a collective one.
Stalin himself ran through a series of revolu-
tionary combinations, somewhat akin to collec-
tive leaderships, during the 1920's. For example,
in 1924t-25 he combined with Zinoviev and
Kamenev against Trotsky. From 1925-27, a new
alliance between Stalin, Bukharin, and Eykov
was formed and routed a Trotsky-Zinoviev-
Kamenev combination. And finally, from 1927-
29, Stalin worked with Molotov, Voroshilov,
Mikoyan, and others to crush Stalin's recent
allies, Bukharin and Eykov.
It was during the 10 years which preceded
Eussia's entry into World War II that Stalin com-
pleted the consolidation of his control over the
Communist Party machinery. By that time he
had placed his loyal stooges in all important posi-
tions of authority throughout the Soviet Union
and the army was brought under political control.
Among the major charges said to have been
leveled against Stalin by Khrushchev is the charge
that in the late thirties he deliberately liquidated
Marshal Tukhachevsky and thousands of the best
officers in the Soviet Army, presumably to insure
his political control of the military apparatus.
Certainly today there is good reason to believe
that Mai-shal Tukhachevsky was falsely accused
of conniving with the Germans. There is some
evidence that there was a clever German plot to
discredit Tukhachevsky, which happened to fit in
with Stalin's own plans.
We do know that during and after the war there
was burning resentment among the Soviet profes-
sional soldiers at Stalin's interference in the con-
duct of the war, his unjust and capricious be-
littling of heroes such as Zhukov, and his arrogant
claims to personal credit for Soviet victories. A
senior Soviet general, for example, is recently re-
ported as having privately branded their so-called
documentary film, "The Fall of Berlin," which
shows Stalin as the great military mastermind, as
a "tissue of lies."
Today the collective dictatorship is assiduously
repairing the injured dignity of the military and
incorporating its leadership into Conununist
Party membership. They must realize that, fol-
lowing the usual pattern of revolutions, the mili-
tary leaders might tire of being the pawn of
dictators, whether individual or collective.
But whatever the faults of Stalin in the prewar
decade, one can hardly ascribe them to his old age
or senility. Stalin was then in his prime. Fur-
thermore, one can hardly believe that the acts of
the dictator in a war from which he emerged as a
hero are the motivating causes for the present
attempt to liquidate his memory. In fact, the most
recent Soviet pronouncements are tending to refer
to "good" and "bad" Stalin eras. Naturally, there
is no desire to repudiate such measures as farm
collectivization and the rapid industrialization
under the Five- Year Plans, which are so closely
associated with his name. The beginning of the
"bad" period was in 1"934, when the great Stalin
purges began. If they denounce his war record,
the purpose here must be to eliminate him from
the hero class and to give the military some of the
credit he had arrogated to himself.
But to find the real reasons for the de-Staliniza-
tion campaign, we must, I believe, look to the more
recent past, particularly to the hard autocratic
period during the last 6 or 7 years of Stalin's life.
Here we find two major motivations for cutting
away from Stalin worship.
Internationally, from about 1947 onward to the
time of his death, Stalin's often bellicose policy in
the international field had been a failure and had
tended to unite the free world against international
communism. Domestically during this period his
police state was meeting ever-increasing disfavor,
not only with the helpless people but with the top
politicians, generals, and industrial managei-s who
were essential to the working of the Soviet system.
This began to create problems for the regime.
The International Problem
First, let us look at the international picture.
In the immediate postwar era, riding the crest of
the common victory and maintaining military
May 7, 1956
759
strength and power, Soviet policy had notable suc-
cesses. It consolidated the grip on the European
satellites and helped the Chinese Communists to
victory.
But beginning with about 1947 in Europe, some-
what later in Asia, the free world at last began to
realize the implications of the forward drive of
international communism and started to take
countermeasures, and tlie tide began to turn.
"\^Tiat happened in these years? The Marshall
plan, which Stalin and Molotov indignantly re-
jected and tried to defeat, was put into effect, and
Europe was saved from economic chaos. In
Greece, the Soviet effort to take over by guerrilla
tactics was thwarted.
"\^lien the Soviet attempted to take over Berlin
and destroy this outpost of "Western freedom, the
Berlin blockade was frustrated by the airlift, and
West Berlin remains a show window of what the
free world can do. Tito survived his ejection from
the Cominform and the wrath of Stalin and struck
back with telling criticisms of Stalinist policy —
almost identical with what Soviet leader's are now
themselves saying.
Later the North Atlantic alliance was organized,
and despite Soviet threats the way was opened
for German rearmament in close union with the
West.
Thus frustrated in the European field Stalin
turned to the Far East and, working with the
North Korean and Chinese Communists, at-
tempted to take over Korea as the first step toward
driving America from the western Pacific. Again
the Communists were blocked, and, most im-
portant of all, an alarmed and awakened Ameri-
can public opinion proceeded to the defensive
rearmament of this country. Our nuclear power
was vastly increased.
It is understandable that Stalin's successors
should have found it convenient to place upon him
the blame for Greece, Berlin, Korea, Yugoslavia,
German rearmament, and the like and, in particu-
lar, for tlie generally hard Soviet line which has
led to the buildup of American defense forces and
Nato. It was these successes which led the
Soviet Union to conclude that a peace treaty with
Austria was necessary to build up their badly
shattered reputation as peacemongers and to pre-
pare the way for a summit conference, their pil-
grimage of penitence to Belgrade, and their effort
to line the Socialist parties into new popular
fronts.
The Domestic Situation
But the foreign scene alone by no means explains
the urge the present Kremlin leaders felt to break
with the hard Stalinist past. They were already
making progress in allowing the memory of Stalin
to fade in international i-ecognition and prestige
without going to the extreme of total desti-uction
of the Stalin myth with their own people. Thus
the clue to their present policy lies more in the
internal Soviet situation than in the requirements
of their foreign policy.
Domestically they have been caught in a di-
lemma. In order to compete with the Western
World in the fields of science and industry, which
was vitally important for their economic growth
and their rearmament program, it was essential for
the Soviet to speed up the education of their peo-
ple, especially in the scientific and technical field.
After Stalin's death the regime encouraged more
objectivity in scientific inquiry and put on the
shelf some pseudoscientists such as Lysenko.
After all, they had found out early in the game
that in the present nuclear age one could not fool
around with scientists who tailored their art to
the whims of Marxism.
Obviously, the Soviet leaders could not limit
their educational processes to the scientific fields,
and more and more young men and women are
graduating from schools which correspond to our
high schools and colleges and are taking advanced
degrees comparable to our degrees of Master of
Arts and Doctor of Philosophy. Even with all
the indoctrination in Communist teachings which
they give to their young students it is impossible
to prevent education from developing the criti-
cal faculties which every thinking human being
possesses.
Furthermore, as part of their new campaign of
sweetness and light, they have found it wise to
take down some of the bars which have impeded
travel between the Soviet Union and the free
countries; and while the Iron Curtain still re-
mains and there is a careful selective process as
to those who are permitted to leave the Soviet
Union or to visit it, it is obvious that today there
is far more contact between the people of the
U. S. S. R. and outside countries than at any time
in recent years.
All this has tended to build up pressures upon
the Soviet rulers to create an impression, not only
internationally but also domestically, that a dicta-
torship of the Stalin type was dead forever.
760
Department of Sfafe Bvlletin
The Soviet leaders are trying to meet their ex-
tei-nal and internal dilemmas by finding a con-
venient "devil" which they can use to explain
away past Soviet sins to the world abroad and
to their own people, as well as to demonstrate that
the present rulers of the Soviet are different men-
tally and morally than they were under Stalin.
Tims they hope that their own people will ac-
cept their protestations that the days of govern-
ment by arbitrary policymaking, secret trials, de-
portations, and prison camps are over. Further-
more, they are again promising that they will do
something to raise the standard of living so that
the promise of individual freedom will be seasoned
with a gi'eater share of consmners goods and a
more abundant life.
Threat to Communist Party
The extent of the opposition to the Stalinist-
type regime must have been gaged by the Kremlin
as far stronger and deeper among the Russian
people than we had dared to hope. Nonetheless,
the destruction of the Stalin myth carries with
it a very real threat to the internal discipline and
units of the Soviet Communist Party and the
international Communist movement.
That calculated risk must have been taken de-
liberately by men who knew they had to have a
scapegoat if they were to hope to preserve the
dictatorship on which their own power and very
survival rested. By attacking the personal sym-
bol of Stalin and the worst excesses of his rule,
they hope to be able to preserve many of the essen-
tials of the Stalinist system — now labeling it
Leninism — the monopoly of all power by a single
party, the complete subordination of the courts
and individual rights to arbitrary Party decree,
the governmental control of the press and of all
organs of public information.
Basic Structure To Be Preserved
This basic structure is meant to be preserved
intact. Already the regime has publicly warned
that some "rotten elements" have taken the de-
Stalinization campaign too literally and are "try-
ing to question the correctness of the Party's
policy." This, Pravda thundered, is "petty bour-
geois licentiousness" of a kind the "Party has
never tolerated and will never tolerate." A dead
and dishonored Stalin, therefore, is likely to be
merely a device — here possibly a Trojan corpse
rather than a Trojan horse — with which the long-
suffering Russian people are, I fear, to be deceived
in tlieir expectation of a freer and better life.
Obviously the Soviet rulers concluded that it
would take something more than a mere repetition
of the old cliches to have any effect. Apparently
this necessity was deemed to be urgent and impel-
ling. They had tried to do the trick with the
liquidation of Beria, but the secrecy surrounding
his execution was hardly a persuasive bit of evi-
dence of a new dawn of liberty. It was in the
worst tradition of the Stalin era — and he, after
all, generally gave his victims at least a drumhead
public trial.
The degradation of Stalin, if the Soviet pro-
gram had worked as the leaders had apparently
planned it, was to be under strict Party discipline.
But it seems to have got out of hand. When
Khrushchev briefed the Party leaders assembled
at the 20th Congress in Moscow at a secret meeting
on February 25th, the representatives of foreign
Commimist Parties were excluded but the Party
leaders from all parts of the U.S.S.R. were
there. They were to take the gospel by word of
mouth to the local precinct leaders. What was
planned, apparently, was a gradual process of
burying the dead leader's memory. Different
medicine was to be reserved for the faithful fol-
lowers of Stalin in the satellites, each according
to their needs.
Something may have gone wrong with this care-
ful planning. It is possible that difficult questions
were posed by those Party workers who had been
taught for decades to worship Stalin and who
knew that Khrushchev, Bulganin, and the whole
Politburo owed their positions to him. On the
other hand, Khrushchev may have deliberately
planned to give the Party the "shock treatment" to
give more conviction to the "new men" and "new
times" theory.
At any rate, whatever may have been the plan,
the reports are unanimous, as published in the
l^ress of every free country without effective denial
from Moscow, that Khrushchev ended up by
branding Stalin not only as a heartless dictator
but as a tyrant and murderer, an incompetent
military leader whose bungling in both war and
peace had brought the Soviet Union to the verge
of ruin. In the same breath, Stalin, the leading
theoretician of communism for the past 25 years,
was labeled a heretic and his interpretations of
the Marxist-Leninist philosophy were rejected.
May 7, 7956
761
It may be well at this point to consider the posi-
tion and charactei" of the men who liave now
brought these charges. All of them had been for
many long years prominently associated with
Stalin's policies. Some had been his hatchetmen
in many of the less savory acts of his checkered
career. Certainly no leader in history ever took
such elaborate precautions as Stalin to insure that
the men around him were loyal beyond the shadow
of a doubt. That his henclimen, now that he is
dead, so bitterly repudiated Stalin is a commen-
tary on the totalitarian system of government it-
self and the leaders it breeds.
Position and Character of the Accusers
The main attack on Stalin's record was made by
the Party Secretary, Nikita Khrushchev. He had
held key jobs under Stalin since 1935 and had
organized and carried through, for Stalin, the
purges in the Ukraine. In January of 1938, he was
named as alternate member of the Politburo and
has been a full member of that body since 1939.
Without wavering, he followed the Stalinist lines
and on the dictator's 70th birthday, December 21,
1949, he had this to say :
Hail to the father, sage teacher, and brilliant leader
of the Party, the Soviet people, and the toilers of all
the world, Comrade Stalin.
The number-two man in the anti-Stalin crusade
has been Anastas Mikoyan. In fact, he was the
first at the recent 20th Congress to criticize Stalin
by name. Mikoyan held key jobs under Stalin for
approximately 30 years. Stalin installed him as
Commissar of Trade and made him candidate
member of the Politburo in 1926, when Mikoyan
was 31 — the j'oungest person ever to attain I'olit-
buro rank. He has adjusted to every turn of the
Soviet policy line and remained in the front
political ranks ever since.
Others who have been parties to this great de-
bunking exercise were, of course, Bulganin, who
had worked with Stalin since 1931; Kaganovich,
who had been at his side since 1924; Malenkov,
who had been a member of his personal secretariat
for some 25 years, whose career was made by
Stalin; and, finally, Molotov, the longest Stalin
associate of them all. He had worked with the
dictator since about 1912 in the early days of the
illegal Communist conspiracy.
There is good reason to believe that Molotov has
joined the ranks of Stalin detractors with reluc-
tance. Certainly a Stalinist at heart, he must have
viewed recent events with a heavy heart and with
the knowledge that the recent deviations of which
he has been openly accused are a prelude to his
gradual retirement from the duties of his office.
I incline to believe that Molotov's real sentiments
are those he expressed at Stalin's grave and then
more recently when, after Malenkov's demotion in
1954, he exuberantly reaffirmed his faith in Stalin-
ist principles.
All of these men, while they now find it con-
venient to dissociate themselves from the dead
tyrant, show no intention of accepting the normal
consequences of long association with a repudiated
leader and a discredited policy nor of relinquish-
ing the benefits they acquired under Stalin and the
power which they are now enjoying as his pupils
and successors.
The leaders of the Soviet Union today are walk-
ing a dangerous tightrope. They are trying to
discredit Stalin without discrediting the Com-
munist Party, which he led so long, or the men who
worked with him. Human memories are short and
perhaps they may succeed in this maneuver. But
surely many a Communist will question the good
faith of these leadere. The reversal is too abrupt
to invite confidence. After all, it was only a little
over 3 years ago, on March 9, 1953, that Stalin was
buried. At that time these men who are now
castigating him joined in the most lavish tribute
and they brought together in Moscow the Com-
munist leaders of China and the European satel-
lites to do him homage.
This is what his short-time heir, Georgi Malen-
kov, had to say :
The policy of Stalin will live for ages and thankful
posterity will praise his name just as we do. . . . C!om-
rade Stalin, a great thinker of our epoch, creatively de-
veloped in new historical conditions the teachings of
Marxism-Leninism. Stalin's name justly stands with the
names of the greatest people in all the history of man-
kind-JIars-Engels-Lenin.
The Chinese Communists and the Moscow-des-
ignated rulers of the EurojDean satellites who at-
tended Stalin's funeral must now have some ques-
tion in their minds today as to the forthrightness
of the present Kremlin leaders who induced them
to join in this homage. Eecently, the Chinese
Communists spent several weeks before publish-
ing their acceptance of Moscow views of the late
Soviet dictator.
762
Department of State Bulletin
Basis for Questioning Their Sincerity
Certainly it is not for us to defend the Stalinist
dictatorship, its cruelties and perversions, as
against its present detractoi-s. We do have a
right, however, to question the sincerity of those
who today tell us that for 20 years and more they
were a party to foisting on the world a tissue of
lies and deceit.
Their sincerity is basically to be questioned on
three counts. First, they have been willing to
rriticize and condemn only carefully selected
faults of the Stalin regime. They have spe-
cifically endorsed acts that both within Russia
and in the world at large caused the most wide-
sjiread and terrible human suifering : for example,
the deliberate starvation of the Russian peasantry
during the collectivization campaign of the early
tliirties; and the exploitation of the captive
peoples of the eastern European satellites, where
proud and independent nations were crushed in
defiance of solemn international obligations.
Mikoyan at the 20th Congress even had the
clfrontery to boast of the Czech coup as an ex-
ample of how Communist parties can come to
power by "peaceful" and "parliamentary" means.
Secondly, they have failed to repudiate the
arbitrary dictatorial rule that allows life and
death issues to be settled by a handful of men —
whether by one or a half-dozen matters not to the
Russian peasant.
The 20th Congress in its mireal and sheep-
like unanimity was an example of the fact that
the present four-, five-, or six-man leadership in-
tends to permit little real debate and criticism of
basic policy. Not one voice was raised to protest
the decree designed to force the peasants on the col-
lective farms to devote all their efi'orts to the
collective by severely limiting the time allowed
for work on their private plots. The widespread
opposition to this decree that must exist among
the Russian farmers went unrepresented and un-
heard as the last Party Congress proceeded to
rubberstamp every resolution put before it.
Thirdly , whatever improvements have been
made in assuring the personal security and wel-
fare of the individual Russian, that progi'ess is
dependent on the whim of the Presidium, popu-
larly known as the Politburo. The stick can be
used later if the carrot doesn't work.
W[\at we now have is a kind of "mutual protec-
tive association" among a few men who suffered
under Stalin so long that they are willing to co-
opei-ate to keep the full police power of the state
out of the hands of any one man. There is no
hint that any ordinary Russian who tries to dis-
sent against the regime will escape the wrath
of Servo's gunmen any more than he would have
escaped when Beria was alive. If necessary to
preserve their own skins, these men might return
to unrestricted terror like ducks to water. It was
their native element for years.
The final and real test of the intentions of the
Soviet leaders will remain their willingness to ac-
cept those basic institutional changes that can give
the Russian people and the world in general genu-
ine assurance that a one-man — or three- or four-
man — dictatorship cannot again plot in secret the
massive domestic or international crimes of the
recent past.
In the end, opposition parties, an independent
judiciary, and a free press are the only real safe-
guards against successive dictators, each with his
own power lust and a new cult of personality.
Problems the Communists Face
The problems which this right-about-face pre-
sents for the worldwide Communist movement
both within and outside of the U.S.S.R. are im-
mense. Here are a few of them:
Stalin was not only the dictator of his country
for more than two decades ; he was also hailed as
its great military leader in war, its prophet, and
the interpreter of Marxist-Leninist doctrine. His
writings, particularly the Prohlems of Leninism
and the Short Histai^j of the Commmiist Party,
are scattered in tens of millions of copies through-
out the Communist world. It will be years before
they can be removed from circulation. In fact,
all Soviet history for the past 30 years must now
be rewritten. They won't be able to handle this
quite as they did in the case of Beria. Here they
sent to all holders of the Soviet encyclopedia in-
structions to excise the pages praising Beria and
insert a puffed-up story on the Bering Straits
(which fitted in in proper alphabetical order).
Stalin's name is on thousands of streets and
squares. Cities and towns bear his name through-
out the Communist world. For the people of the
Soviet Union, Stalingrad stands as the symbol of
their victory over Hitlerism. Will his name re-
main here and elsewhere, or will the attempt be
made to blot it out ?
May 7, 1956
763
Stalin's henchmen were put in key positions
throughout the length and breadth of the Soviet
Union. They hold key places in the European
satellite regimes. Each and every one of these ap-
pointees must today fear not only for his future
but for his life.
Already political idols are toppling or at least
swaying in the wind from Moscow — in Bulgaria,
in Hungary, in Poland. Names of former leaders
who crossed Stalin are coming back into i-epute
daily, and political circles in the satellites are
plainly in confusion and near panic trying to
figure out where the line of propriety will be
drawn next.
As Alfred Robens, a leader of the British Labor
Party, recently remarked, "How do you correct
the mistake of having shot a man? Do you re-
store him to the history books or give him a post-
humous reward?"
The problem of justifying past crimes is es-
pecially difficult in the foreign Communist parties,
such as those in France and Italy, where local
leaders clung to Stalin's coattails and did his bid-
ding without having the excuse of tlie pistol at
their head. These men could have denounced
Stalin's crimes earlier and lived — unlike the men
in Moscow. "^^Hiy did they not do so? This is
the question we ought to keep asking every Italian
tempted to play ball with Togliatti.
And what about the reputation of Trotsky, a key
Stalinist victim, still on the Soviet blacklist?
Here and there, in places as far distant from each
otlier as Ceylon and Bolivia, his followers are
meeting to stage a comeback, and the view is being
tolerated, at least, in the satellites that he was not
a traitor but merely a misguided and erroneous
would-be leader.
And what about the numerous \'iolations of those
international agreements signed by Stalin? "Was
he a "devil" when he made them, or when he broke
them, or both?
The Soviet people well remember that Stalin
himself started as. one of a triumvirate not very
different from the collective leadership of which
the Soviet leaders now boast. How can the Soviet
people themselves be sure that this small group
of men in the Politburo who exercise complete
and arbitrary control over the lives of all the
peoples of the U.S.S.R. will not, in the course
of a few years, again lead to a personal dictator-
sliip with all the vices that they now attribute to
Stalinism? Is it not the system itself rather tlian
the "cult of personality" that breeds tyranny and
cruelty and ends in the revolution devouring its
own children ?
And, finally, is it not possible that the Soviet
people, with the leaven of education they are re-
ceiving, will demand some decisive share in the
selection of their own leadership and some checks
and balances against the danger of tyrannical
dictatorship and the "cult of personality"?
All Marxists have been trained in the dogma
that hinnan beings are the products of their en-
vironment. Might not Soviet ^Marxists begin to
think there is something wrong with a political en-
vironment in which, over the years, an incredible
percentage of the most influential leaders — includ-
ing Trotsky, Zinoviev, Bukliarin, Beria, and now
Stalin — have turned out to be criminals? Might
not the Soviet people, and even some of their
present or future leaders, come to believe that
"power corrupts and absolute power corrupts
absolutely" ?
In Moscow the pictures of Stalin are gradually
disappearing. I am told that the Red Army
theater has solved the problem of filling the space
formerly occupied by an enormous portrait in an
ingenious way that may be symbolic. On the wall
where Stalin's picture used to hang is now a huge
mirror. Any ambitious leader can see himself in
Stalin's place. Might this not prove to be the
curse of the Stalinist system — one which cannot be
easily escaped by pious resolves?
The only element of power in the Soviet Union
which is not directly implicated in the excesses and
atrocities of Stalin, namely the military leader-
ship, may have something to say about all this.
While there is nothing concrete to suggest it now,
some day a "man on horseback" might fancy him-
self in that mirror.
Weighing the Issues
When the present Soviet leaders took the risks
involved in their present policj', they must have
carefully weiglied tlie consequences. They must
liave realized the grave issues it would raise in
the Communist world outside of tlie U.S.S.R.,
among the Party faithful in every free country,
and among their own peoples.
Abroad they probably hoped there would be
some counterbalancing advantages. If it would
bring about a feeling of relaxation in the free
world, defensive rearmament here and among our
764
Departmenf of State Bulletin
allies might slow down, defensive alliances might
tend to weaken, the possibility of peaceful coex-
istence, for which everyone yearns, might be more
and more accepted. All this they hoped would
give them time to build up their own strength,
economic and military. If we are naive, then the
Soviet Union may get some international benefits
from their present tactics.
But there is another side to the picture which
bears pondering. The Soviet leaders may have
had no real alternative and took the course which
they felt held out the best chance of keeping their
own power. The Kremlin leaders, as I mentioned,
were under heavy domestic pressures to do some-
thing to persuade their people that a new era was
in the making. During recent years the leavening
process of education has developed the critical
faculties of millions of Russians. The Kremlin
can no longer sell the old line to all of their people.
They must now not only rewrite the history of
Stalin but rewrite the story they have been tell-
ing their people about the outside world.
These leaders — Khrushchev, Bulganin, Mi-
koyan, Kaganovich — have got over the hump of
Stalin's death without losing their grip on his
power. They profess a great deal of confidence
in their ability to perpetuate the system of collec-
tive dictatorship they have instituted by basing
it more bi-oadly on the top layer of elite Party
managers, generals, engineers, and intellectuals
who have a stake in the Soviet regime.
Only time can tell whether the present lead-
ers with their past close association with Stalin-
ism really can do this and make the Soviet dicta-
torship work without going much farther and
giving their people something more than mere
lipservice in the direction of the right to free
speech, free worship, and protection for the in-
dividual from arbitrary action.
Possibly what we are seeing will end up as a
temporary period of attempted fraud on the Rus-
sian people, a cloak to sell them a collective dicta-
torship as against a personal dictatorship. Pos-
sibly it is a first hesitant step toward giving a
greater number of the Russian people a chance to
share in the decisions which shape their destinies.
I am sure the Russian leaders themselves do not
know how their effort to "de-Stalinize" the So-
viet Union will turn out. I am also sure they
would be dismayed if they thought they were pav-
ing the way for the establishment in Russia of
what we could call a decent and responsible gov-
ernment.
The Communists, despite their self-confidence,
do not and will not control the fate of mankind.
In the face of firm free-world resistance to their
international barbarities and exposure of their
political frauds and malpractices, at home and
abroad, and under the pressure of their own peo-
ple, there may be a gradual move toward more
normal modes of life and behavior. If so, then
hopes of world peace will be given a mighty im-
pulse forward. This possibility the free world
must watch prayerfully, alert to opportunities for
peace provided by progress in this direction. We
must be equally alert to perceive and denounce the
dangers implicit in the fraud of a mere attempt to
bury a shabby past.
Departure of Former Seamen
of Soviet Tanker
Press release 217 dated AprU 25
At the request of the Department of State,
Soviet Ambassador Georgi Zaroubin called on As-
sistant Secretary Livingston Merchant this after-
noon. The Ambassador was handed a note
concerning the departure from the United States
of five former seamen of the Soviet tanker
T'uafse.} The text of the note follows :
"The Secretary of State presents his compli-
ments to His Excellency the Ambassador of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and has the
honor to refer to the circumstances surroimding
the departure from the United States for the
Soviet Union on April 7, 1956 of five former sea-
men of the Soviet tanker Tuapse.
"It has been determined after thorough investi-
gation that members of the Soviet Delegation to
the United Nations assumed authority and en-
gaged in activities with respect to the seamen
which are incompatible with the status of the
Soviet Delegation. In this regard the conduct of
Aleksandr K. Guryanov and Nikolai Turkin was
particularly objectionable. Ambassador Arkady
Sobolev himself insisted on intervening, despite
the presence of an accredited representative from
the Soviet Embassy in AVashington, during the
interview conducted at Idlewild by the authorities
' For background, see Buli-etin of July 12, 1954, p. 51 ;
July 26, 1954, p. 131 ; and Aug. 22, 1955, p. 302.
May 7, 1956
765
of the Immigration and Naturalization Service
prior to departure of the seamen.
"It is considered that members of the Soviet
Delegation to the United Nations thereby per-
formed acts of an improper character exceeding
the scope of their official capacity and thereby
abused the privilege of their residence in contra-
vention of the terms of tlie Headquarters Agi'ee-
ment between the United States and the United
Nations.
"It is requested that the Soviet Government in-
struct Ambassador Arkady Sobolev and his staff
henceforth to adhere to their recognized functions.
In view of the special character of the activities
of Aleksandr K. Guryanov and Nikolai Turkin,
the Soviet Government is informed that their
presence in the United States is no longer desir-
able. It is accordingly requested that Aleksandr
K. Guryanov make expeditious arrangements to
leave the United States. On the same grounds the
request for a return visa for Nikolai Turkin to
reenter the United States is hereby refused."
Export Controls Simplified
for European Soviet Bloc
The Department of Commerce announced on
April 27 the simplification of certain export con-
trols by the establishment of a new general license
order under which shipment from a select roster
of peaceful goods can be made to the U.S.S.E. and
its European satellites without the filing of export
license applications.^ The action came in the form
of an initial listing of some 700 nonstrategic items
in over 57 commodity categories which U.S. ex-
porters may now ship under general license to the
European Soviet bloc.
All of the goods included on the new roster are
of the type that would be approved for export
under existing licensing policy. The new general
license procedure in no way reflects a change in
the policy of banning strategic goods to the Soviet
bloc. The main purpose is to reduce the paper
burden on the American export community and the
Government by eliminating the previous require-
ment of separate forms for each shipment, and
thereby to facilitate increased peaceful commerce.
In announcing the action, Secretary of Com-
merce Sinclair Weeks said :
' For detailed announcement, see Bureau of Foreign
Commerce Current Export Bulletin 7C3.
Today's simplification in licensing procedures in respect
to the European Soviet bloc is designed to carry out the
Government's objective, first announced by President
Eisenhower at Geneva last July, "to create conditions
which will encourage nations to increase the exchange of
peaceful goods throughout the world." This objective
subsequently was advanced at the Foreign Ministers
Conference in Geneva last October when Secretary of
State John Foster Dulles Indicated the intention of the
United States Government to simplify export control
procedures on shipments of peaceful goods to the Soviet
bloc.
The new arrangement will broaden opportunities for
Increased trade by providing U.S. exporters with a roster
of peaceful goods which will not require the granting by
the Commerce D.^partment of individual, specific licenses
for shipment to the Soviet bloc.
It should be noted that our ban on strategic exports
continues and that U.S.-origin commodities not on the
new general license roster will continue to reciuire indi-
vidual licenses for shipment to the U.S.S.R. or its satellites
and may not be reexported to Communist-controlled areas
without clearance from the Bureau of Foreign Commerce.
Also, the total embargo against all shipments to Com-
munist China and North Korea remains unchanged. All
shipments to the Communist-controlled areas of Viet-Nam
and Laos, as well as the maritime provinces of the U.S.S.R.,
continue to require individual export licenses.
Included in the new general license list are
selected items in the following categories: bev-
erages, rubber products, drugs and pharmaceuti-
cals, fibers, wood, paper products, glass, clay
products, cutlery, hardware, cork, electrical house-
hold appliances, commercial refrigerating equip-
ment, office machines, dyes, leather, hides and
skins, pigments, paints, chemical specialties, soil
improvement compounds, soap and toiletries,
photographic equipment, plumbing fixtures, opti-
cal goods, musical instruments, toys, dental equip-
ment, jewelry, lamps, sponges, notions, beauty and
barber .supplies, and shoe findings. The listed
items may be shipped imder general license to the
following destinations : Albania, Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Outer Mongolia, Poland and
Danzig, Rumania, and the Union of Soviet So-
cialist Republics, except the maritime provinces
(Far Eastern seaports) of the U.S.S.R.
A substantial increase in the volume of licensing
to the Soviet bloc took place in the first quarter of
1956, according to statistics prepared for inclusion
in a forthcoming report by Secretary Weeks on
export control operations. Licenses granted for
Soviet-bloc destinations totaled $8,788,543 in the
first quarter of 1956, compared with $1,624,856 in
the fourth quarter of 1955, and $4,968,322 in the
766
Department of Slate Bulletin
initial quarter of 1955. The bulk of first-quarter
1956 licensing to the bloc consisted of agricultural
products and equipment, which together accounted
for $7,294,844 of the total licensed.
Actual shipments, however, have not as yet re-
flected tlie increase in licensing. U.S. exports to
the European Soviet bloc totaled $1,151,000 in the
fourth quarter of 1955, compared with $1,051,000
shipped during the third quarter of 1955.
For the year 1955, U.S. exports to the bloc were
valued at $7,248,000, as compared with $6,120,000
for 1954, and $1,776,000 for 1953. The 1955 and
1954 totals included $4,743,000 of food grains, in-
secticides, and drugs shipped to Hungary, Czecho-
slovakia, and East Germany under the President's
flood-relief program for the Danube basin. In
1947 and 1948, U.S. exports to the bloc were val-
ued, respectively, at $339,857,000 and $123,241,000.
The U.S. Stake in World Trade
iy Sinclair Weeks
Secretary of Coranierce ^
Whenever I come to New Orleans I cannot help
reflecting on the stroke of destiny which, in the
early days of the Republic, brought New Orleans
and the trans-Mississippi Valley into the United
States.
But for a twist of fate on the international
chessboard, but for Napoleon's colonial ambitions
which made Louisiana French, but for those far-
off European events which turned Napoleon's
mind away from the New World, this gi-eat coun-
try as we know it today might never have been.
"WHiat good fortune it was for us to have had in
Paris at the critical moment a skilled and coura-
geous negotiator ready to strike, in his country's
interest, while the iron was hot. And — if a New
England Republican may make so bold as to praise
a Southern Democrat — what a magnificent vision
of the future moved Thomas Jefferson bravely to
accept the challenge of the moment and lead our
country toward its destiny.
This is your annual Mississip^ji Valley World
Trade Conference, and as we gather here today
I need not remind you that one of the principal
functions of the Commerce Depai-tment is to fos-
ter, promote, and develop world trade. Presum-
ably, this relationship is what prompted you to
invite me.
It is stating the obvious to repeat that the
"^ Address made before the Mississippi Valley World
Trade Conference at New Orleans, La., on Apr. 10 (De-
partment of Commerce press release).
United States has a tremendous stake in world
trade in economic terms as well as in security
terms. Forty million acres of American farm-
land today find overseas markets for their prod-
ucts. Ten percent of U.S. manufactured goods
are exported. Upwards of 4 million American
workers and their families rely on foreign trade.
On the imjjort side, we must look abroad for many
essentials, including manganese, chrome, and tin.
Eighty percent of our newsprint, 100 percent of
our industrial diamonds, 100 percent of our vital
nickel supply must be imported. Food products
too are important items in the import list. They
include almost 100 percent of our coffee, tea, cocoa,
and bananas.
The United States stake in exports continues
unabated. For example, last year, without con-
sidering at all the unpact of foreign aid, United
States manufacturers alone sold abroad a wide
range of products, in the total amoimt of approxi-
mately $10 billion. This, of course, reflects the
fact that we can and do compete successfully in
markets throughout the world.
But in this process American industries are
confronted in many foreign markets with restric-
tions which continually limit the opportunities
to sell their products. In the absence of such re-
strictions, which include, among other things,
quotas, special taxes, and exchange restrictions —
in other words, under conditions of normal com-
mercial competition — American manufacturers
hhay 7, 1956
767
would have sold abroad even more than the $10
billion figure just referred to. Our industries do
not seek special governmental advantages in sell-
ing their products in foreign markets; they
seek only to be allowed to compete fairly in for-
eign markets on the commercial merits of their
products.
These are all among the factors which influence
the dynamic foreign-trade policy of the President
and his administration. Let me summarize the
main elements of this program :
1. In accord with the terms of H. K. 1,=
adopted last year, the reciprocal and modest re-
duction of unnecessary barriers to world trade
and payments.
2. The creation of a healthy business climate
for stimulating investment abroad, particularly
in the less developed areas of the world.
3. The encouragement of tourism to enable the
peoples of the world to get to know and under-
stand each other better.
4. The participation by the Government and
American businessmen in trade fairs throughout
the free world to carry the message of the Ameri-
can way of life and the products of free enterprise
to foreign shores.
One of the most useful devices we have found
for carrying through this program is the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Gatt).
Objectives of GATT
Wliat does the Gait stand for? The Gatt—
the largest and most comprehensive trade agree-
ment in history — is an agreement among 35 na-
tions reflecting principles which have for good
reason been cardinal points of United States trade
policy. The Department of Commerce plays an
important role in the policy formulations of
United States-GATT relations.
First of all, Gatt contains for each member
country an item-by-item list of tariff rates which
that country agrees not to exceed in charging du-
ties on imports from the remaining Gatt coun-
tries. Collectively, these lists cover almost 60,000
items, embracing a large share of world trade.
The remainder of the agreement consists of a set
of "general provisions" which each country agrees
to observe in international trade. An important
' Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1955.
purpose of these general rules, which restrain the
use of such things as taxes, quotas, subsidies, and
administrative procedures, is to insure that these
devices will not be used to nullify the intended
value for members of the tariff-rate agreements.
Gatt objectives closely correspond to estab-
lished principles of American commercial policy —
principles which include the most-favored-nation
treatment, for example, which the United States
in its own interest has long urged upon other na-
tions. Generally speaking, however, as far as
Gatt is concerned, it is better from every stand-
point to have 35 nations join in one agreement
than to have to go through the motions 35 sepa-
rate times with 35 separate agreements finally
arrived at. For example, Department mathema-
ticians tell me that, if we had to negotiate entirely
through bilateral agreements, it would require
approximately 595 separate treaties.
The combination of such negotiations produces
results not possible in a series of separate bilateral
agreements and, to my mind, certainly makes it
possible for the United States to obtain greater
trade benefits than could otherwise be achieved.
The OTC
There is now pending before the Congress a bill
(H. R. 5550) to authorize the President to accept
United States membership in the Organization
for Trade Cooperation (Otc).^ The main func-
tion of this organization would be to administer
the Gati. In addition, it would provide a forum
for discussion of other trade problems, with each
government remaining entirely free to adopt or
reject recommendations growing out of such dis-
cussion. It would also assemble and publish data
on world trade.
The Department of Commerce has an important
interest in Otc, and because of this I have care-
fully reviewed the proposal for it from every
angle. Both as a member of the President's Cabi-
net and as a former manufacturer I earnestly hope
that the Congress will approve this vital legisla-
tion promptly.
So long as it is the policy of this Government
to carry on foieign trade under the aegis of recip-
' For a Department of State memorandum on legal as-
pects of the GATT and OTC, see Cmg. Rec. of Apr. 2.3,
1956, p. 60SS. See also The Agreement on the Organisation
for Trade Cooperation, Report of tbe Committee on Ways
and Jleans, House of Representatives, To Accompany H.R.
5550 ; H. Kept. 2007, 84th Cong., 2d sess., Apr. 18, 1956.
I
768
Department of State Bulletin
rocal trade agreements and to do it by the Gatt
process, I am convinced that the creation of the
Otc will enable American industry and trade to
derive additional and increased benefits from the
(tatt and the tariif concessions we have received.
The agieement for the Otc has been so drafted
that United States interests are fully safe-
guarded.* Otc would not be supranational. It
could not change a single tariff rate. It could not
impose new obligations on the United States with-
out our consent.
This whole proposition is essentially very
simple. The Otc would provide machinery to en-
able the Gatt nations to do better those things
which the Gatt already provides for. It would
not extend the Gatt provisions to any additional
aspects of trade, nor would the Otc take any new
kinds of action on aspects already covered by
Gatt. The new macliinery to administer Gatt
is designed solely to enable the member nations to
take more promptly and more effectively those
joint actions already provided for in Gatt, with
respect to those tariff and trade matters already
covered by Gatt.
Gatt and Otc project into the international
arena trade-policy objectives with which the
United States has long been associated.
We cannot lose by cooperating with our friends
in the trade area of our foreign relations, just as
we cooperate with them in a variety of other direc-
tions. We cannot stand at arm's length fi'om
them in this field and hope to meet the unanimity
of action which the Soviet Union and its satellites
achieve by force and terror.
Trade Controls
When we speak of the Soviet bloc, it brings to
mind the other and perhaps darker aspect of our
foreign-trade policy — the use of controls by the
United States and our friends to avoid a signifi-
cant free-world contribution to the buildup of the
Soviet war potential.
I hope we may some day see the kind of govern-
ment and the kind of policy in the Soviet Union
which would make it possible to bring that nation
and its present satellites fully into the family of
friendly nations. That day is not yet here, and
until it arrives we cannot afford to lower our
guard.
* For text, see Buhetin of Apr. 4, 1955, p. 579.
May 7, 1956
The destruction of the cult of Stalinism means
only, perhaps, that a policy of naked aggression is
being replaced by a more subtle and insidious ef-
fort to achieve world Communist domination
through propaganda, infiltration, and economic
penetration. The lures and enticements put out
by the Communist leaders are devices to trap the
unwary as the spider traps the fly. A true index
of Soviet policy may lie in a statement reportedly
made by Khrushchev last September as follows :
We value trade least for economic reasons and most for
political purposes as a means of promoting relations be-
tween our countries.
We do not, of course, want to reject out of hand
such opportunities as may arise to reduce world
tensions. We must ever be alert to carry forward
the principles of peace and peaceful exchanges
among nations which President Eisenhower has
dedicated himself to achieve.
The problem of East-West trade — how, when,
and to what extent it shall be carried on — becomes
a complex issue of international relations. In-
dividual transactions or groups of transactions
must be viewed from tlie perspective of our total
foreign and national security policy. The results
should be of a kind which brings the greatest ad-
vantage and the greatest relative strength to the
free world.
Perhaps a specific example of Soviet tactics
may illustrate the problem. Last month (March
4) the newspapers reported that an American
firm had made a licensing agreement to produce
in the United States a Soviet-designed turbodrill
for drilling oil and gas wells. This device was
heralded as being much more efficient than Ameri-
can oil rigs and as a sign of Soviet willingness
to exchange their teclmical advances with those
of the United States.
Much less attention was given at first to the
quid pro quo desired by the Eussians from us,
namely, the technological information needed
for producing advanced types of boring bits for
drilling wells.
From the Soviet point of view this type of
"exchange" is designed to create the impression
of a fair exchange, in contrast with earlier at-
tempts at one-way acquisition of Western proto-
types. But on closer examination — of the type
which this Government always gives to such pro-
posals — an appraisal must be made as to whether
this exchange might not open the door for the
769
Soviets to the whole range of developments in
American oil production technology. In this type
of "exchange" would the Soviets stand to profit
more, because of their state control over domestic
technical data and because they might latch on
to an industry in which they are, on balance, in
an inferior position technologically?
Charting the right course in the deadly serious
economic contest between East and West requires
the greatest wisdom and ingenuity that our policy-
makers can muster. From a national security
standpoint, this whole business of East-West
trade and trade restrictions has caused a great
deal of misunderstanding not only here in the
United States but among free-world countries as
well.
Investigation of East-West Trade
I have recently done some testifying on East-
West trade before the Senate Permanent Subcom-
mittee on Investigations. The committee was
particularly interested in the revisions in East-
West international trade controls which took place
in 1954.
The hearings were heated. Aside from ques-
tioning the policy followed in 1954, the hearings
involved issues relating to the constitutional sepa-
ration of powers as between executive and legis-
lative and to the conduct of affairs within the
executive branch. I should like to discuss with
you some of the points made in the hearings.^
First, I want to say that naturally the committee
has every right to make such an investigation.
In fact, I think it is completely appropriate that
constant surveillance of the executive be main-
tained by Congress. But even here it has been
difficult to prevent gross misunderstanding of the
issues involved, of the policies which are main-
tained, and of the results achieved.
Secondly, I should make it absolutely clear that
the inquiry had no relationship whatsoever to U.S.
export controls on goods shipped from the United
States. We have our own controls, and they were
not in question. The committee was concerned
solely with the products which our allies ship in
East- West trade and with the voluntary multi-
national controls set up by our allies in agreement
with us.
Controls maintained by the United States on
shipments to the European Soviet bloc and Com-
' For a statement made before the committee by Under
Secretary Hoover, see ibid., Apr. 9, 1956, p. 619.
munist China are stricter than those of our allies.
We have an embargo on all exports to Communist
China and North Korea.
No shipments can be made to the European
Communist bloc from the United States without
first obtaining an export license through the De-
partment of Commerce. Such licenses are auto-
matically denied on items \\hich are in short sup-
ply in the United States or which are, generally
speaking, of strategic nature. "When items in
either of these categories are exported to friendly
foreign countries, determination is made in ad-
vance that transshipment to the Communists is
not to be expected.
Shipments of peaceful goods to the European
Soviet bloc are authorized through the granting
of export licenses. Such trade is relatively small
in volume, however.
I have mentioned earlier that other free-world
countries working together and with us maintain
similar restrictions on trade with the Soviets.
Their restrictions are of a more liberal order, how-
ever, than are ours. Many items are thus shipped
to the Russians from European countries which
the United States would not itself ship to them.
Some of these items are strategic in nature.
During its investigation the Senate committee
has frequently referred to the difference in
stringency between U.S. controls and multilateral
controls over shipments to the Reds. The infer-
ence has been drawn from time to time that we
are somehow to blame for the fact that the Com-
munists have been able to obtain materials of
strategic significance from others which they can-
not buy from us.
When I appeared before the conunittee I made it
clear that if I had my way all free-world coun-
tries would exercise the equivalent in restrictions
over the sale of strategic goods to the Soviets as
those maintained by the United States. I stated
further that to the best of my knowledge this same
position had been consistently maintained by every
interested department in our Government.
I also reported, however, that no power on earth
is available beyond the power of persuasion to
control the economic activities of other nations.
If I remember correctly, I cited to the committee
by way of illustration the old adage, "You can
lead a horse to water, but you can't make him
drink."
Much as I believe that it is in the free-world in-
terest to keep these controls strict, I think, how-
770
Department of State Bulletin
I ever, it must be recognized in all fairness that we
cannot compare our situation in the United States
to that of European countries without finding
tremendous pressures there for different policies
in terms of East-West trade.
^ Modification of European Controls
Thus in August 1954 the multilateral controls
maintained by European countries as a limitation
upon exports to the Communist bloc were sub-
stantially modified. This modification resulted
in a shortening of the list of items under multi-
national control.
What were some of the reasons which led to this
modification?
It must be recognized that there are historic
patterns and other factors affecting the East- West
trade interests of European free-world countries
which are far different from those which apply in
the United States. For example, Department of
Commerce statistics show that, while U.S. exports
represent only approximately 3.5 percent of our
gross national product, the United Kingdom re-
lies upon exports for 15.6 percent of its G. N. P.
The pressure for international trade in the United
Kingdom is based on the long-established fact
that without adequate trade Britain cannot sur-
vive, let alone maintain a decent standard of liv-
ing or a satisfactory national defense.
Other European countries lean heavily upon
foreign trade. Individual export items become
vitally significant to the economic welfare of these
countries and result in heavy pressures for trade
expansion.
As an illustration, the shipment of 2,000 tons
of soft unalloyed aluminum by Norway to the
Soviet bloc was a required concession as a means
of providing a market in the bloc for otherwise
unsalable seafood products — a major export item.
Denmark is called upon to sell butter abroad or
suffer disastrous results in its domestic economy.
But in order to sell its butter to the Soviets, Den-
mark is called upon to supply merchant ships.
West Germany finds it difficult to become com-
pletely separated in an economic sense from East
Germany.
Much of the story of the revisions of the con-
trols in 1954, the reasons for them and the results,
has been made available to the public in reports
issued by IMr. Stassen, the Battle Act Administra-
tor in 1954, and by myself. Additional informa-
tion classified for reasons of national security has
Aioy 7, 1956
been made available on this basis to six commit-
tees of the Congress and is being offered to the
Investigations Subconunittee on the same basis.
Certain papers of a highly sensitive nature
which cover intelligence information, matter re-
lating to international negotiations, and internal
working papers of the executive branch could not
be furnished. To do so would reveal information
classified for the purpose of withholding it from
the Soviet bloc.
Now, I am sure that you will all agree with me
that, insofar as possible, we should not give the
Communists even a scrap of infoi-mation which
would be of significant value to them in the cold
war, any more than we should let them have
conunodities of strategic significance.
If closely guarded information were to be publi-
cized in open hearing, the entire proceedings could
be observed by agents of hostile powers and the
entire public record could be reported abroad by
representatives of the Communist press. We do
not want to bare to the Communist nations some of
our secret knowledge of their needs and deficien-
cies and those of our allies and ourselves. We do
not want to tell them our own strategic and short-
supply reasons for control or decontrol.
In the general area of separation of powers let
me cite in conclusion some chapter and verse on
the reasons why the executive branch declines cer-
tain informational material to the Congress.
At every level of the executive branch of the
Government, issues are vigorously debated, and it
is only human nature that there will be sharjj
differences of opinion. The same thing I am sure
happens in the executive sessions of congressional
committees. It happens in the internal delibera-
tions of the Supreme Court. Does the Congress
or the Court offer such discussion to public
scrutiny ?
Among such operations are preliminary re-
search, undigested data subject to later appraisal,
early drafts of memoranda as yet unchecked for
errors, incomplete surveys which give only a
fractional part of the final report, and other initial
thinking and recommendations which must later
be levised and perfected or overruled because of
new facts or circumstances. Revelation of such
embryonic data ripped from context would give
an utterly false picture of a situation.
All of us want the unbiased and candid advice
of our staffs and subordinates. No organization,
no government, no military commander could
771
operate efficiently if all the scraps of paper and
advices and recommendations of staffs and sub-
ordinates were to be cast in the public view. If
this were done, it would no longer be possible for
tliose charged with action to obtain candid and
energetic expressions of opinion at advisory levels
in tlie Government. Rather it might create
among subordinates a yes-man complex or a fear
of standing by one's own sincere convictions.
It boils down to this : The position of the execu-
tive branch is :
1. that we have not witlnheld facts which could
properly be released,
2. that in the national interest we have refused to
disclose, except in executive session, certain secrets
which potential enemies might use to injure the
United States and our allies, and
3. we decline under any conditions to make avail-
able internal executive working papers.
So, although we have kept the Congress and the
public informed, I have described both practical
reasons and security reasons which made it impos-
sible to comply witli all of the demands of the
Senate subcommittee.
Underlying this whole issue is the historic
principle of the separation of powers in our Gov-
eriunent, one of the constitutional foundation
stones of this Republic.
From George Washington down to Dwight
Eisenhower, Presidents have found it necessary, in
obedience to their oaths of office, to maintain the
proper constitutional balance between the execu-
tive and legislative branches. In this way only —
with vigorous forthright leadership — can our
countiy go forward on the principles which made
our Nation great and which today make it the hope
and inspiration of the free world.
U.S. Farm Goods Sold to Germany
in Triangular Transaction
The International Cooperation Administration
announced on April 27 that it had arranged an
$8-million triangular transaction involving sales
of U.S. agricultural commodities to the Federal
Republic of Germany. Germany will purchase
from the United States $7 million worth of coarse
grains — corn, barley, grain sorghums, and oats —
paying for them in deutschemarks. An additional
$1 million has been authorized for shipping costs.
The deutschemarks derived from the sale of the
products in Germany will be deposited to the ac-
count of the U.S. Government. Ica will make
these funds available to countries where the United
States has defense or economic-assistance pro-
grams requiring goods available in Germany.
AVlien purchases of such goods in Germany are
agreed upon, they will be financed with the U.S.-
owned deutschemarks and the triangular transac-
tion will be completed.
The trade with Germany was made under sec-
tion 402 of the Mutual Security Act. This section
requires that at least $300 million of the funds
authorized for the mutual security progi-am dur-
ing the current fiscal year be used to finance the
sale of surplus U.S. agricultural commodities for
foreign currencies. The local currency proceeds
are to be used for mutual security purposes. To
date this year, more than $285 million of these
commodities have been authorized by Ica to 20
countries.
U.S. Aid to Philippines for 1956
Emphasizes Rural Development
The International Cooperation Administration
announced on April 22 that the $29.1 million in
aid wliich the United States is providing to the
Philippines during the 1956 fiscal year is being
used in the following manner :
■ — $4.2 million to support an expanded rural de-
velopment program.
— $7.6 million to import equipment and com-
modities needed for projects to expand and di-
V'ersify the base of the Philippine economy — in
particular, rural road construction (principally
on the island of Mindanao), port and harbor im-
provements, rural health units, and water supply
and land development projects.
— $6.7 million, proceeds from the sale of U.S.
agricultural commodities, which was loaned to the
Philippine Government for relending through
commercial banks to help expand small- and
medium-size industries.
— $5.9 million for technical cooperation, includ-
ing the financing of contractual services of U.S.
firms and universities for assistance in advancing
public administration, education, agriculture,
labor, and industry ; training Filipino teclinicians
in the U.S. ; technical advisory services of U.S.
Government personnel; and supplies and equip-
772
Department of State Bulletin
ment for demonstration and instruction in all
major fields of activity.
— $4.7 million to continue the military con-
struction progi'am begun in fiscal 1955 in con-
nection with the reorganization of the Philippine
Army.
Most of the U.S. assistance is in support of
President Magsaysay's comprehensive economic
development program, for which that country has
budgeted $79.5 million of its own funds this fiscal
year to encourage industrialization under private
business, to improve government services, and to
expand transportation and communications fa-
cilities. The main emphasis, however, of joint
U.S.-Philippine efforts is to improve the living
conditions and earning capacity of the rural popu-
lation, who make up 70 percent of the Philippines'
total population of 22 million.
The United States has conducted an organized
aid program in the Philippines since July 1950,
following 5 years of cooperation in rehabilitating
the war-damaged country. The 6-year nonmili-
tary aid total of over $137 million has been more
than matched by Philippine funds used in the
same program. Each year the Philippine Gov-
ernment has taken over and assumed responsibility
for the support and administration of an increas-
ing mnnber of projects initiated with the help
of U.S. aid funds.
Here are some of the results since 1950 of this
mutual undertaking :
Puhlic health. New American drugs, scientific
treatment, and hygiene are beginning to wipe out
scourges — malaria, trachoma, tuberculosis, and
others — which have plagued villagers for genera-
tions.
Agiiculture. Philippine agricultural agents,
whose organization has been patterned after the
U.S. Agricultural Extension Service, are showing
farmers how to increase crop yields through the
use of better farming practices, implements, fer-
tilizers, and plant varieties, so that food consump-
tion can be increased.
Education. New and better schools, established
with help from such American universities as
Stanford, Cornell, and the University of MicM-
gan, under Ica sponsorship, are giving young Fili-
pinos an opportunity to obtain a better education.
Industry. In 1955, the rate of new industrial
development doubled the IDoi rate largely as a
result of U.S. teclmical assistance and U.S. loans.
THE CONGRESS
Proposed Revision of Immigration
and Nationality Act
Statement hy Secretary Dulles ^
First of all, I wish to affirm my belief that re-
vision of the Immigration and Nationality Act is
necessary and desirable in the interests of the
United States. The present law contains inequi-
ties and imperfections. I concur wholly with the
President that it is in our national interest to pro-
vide for increased immigi-ation to our land and to
do so under equitable laws.
Obviously, I do not mean to imply that the pres-
ent law is all bad. As a matter of fact, the Depart-
mental officers charged with responsibility for the
application of this law advise me that, technically,
it represents a vast improvement over the nu-
merous statutes which governed prior to its en-
actment in 1952.
I believe, however, that much improvement is
still possible. For that reason, I am here today
to support the proposals which the President has
made to the Congress and which are embodied in
the bills which this subcommittee is considering.
Many of the items in these bills have to do with
domestic subjects within the competence of the
Attorney General. He has discussed the detailed
provisions of the bills with the subcommittee. I
desire to support his statement with, however,
particular emphasis on the foreign policy aspect
of the legislation.
There are three principal items in this category
which I should like to discuss. One is the na-
tional-origins system of determining quotas. An-
other is the recommendation to forgive certain
mortgaged quotas. The third is the proposal
which would permit the waiving of the finger-
printing requirement for those who apply for non-
immigrant visas.
The President has recommended, in view of our
expanding economy and high standard of living,
that we increase our quota immigration by ap-
'Made before the Subcommittee on Immigration of
tbe Senate Judiciary Committee on Apr. 25 (press re-
lease 213). For the President's message on immigration
legislation, see Bulletin of Feb. 20, 1956, p. 275.
May 7, 1956
773
proxiniatuly Gr),()()() numbei"s to a total of approxi-
mately 21!) ,000 annually. I fully support the
President's recommendations in this respect.
However, my primary concern as Secretary of
State is that whatever overall quota is adoj^ted
by the Congress be apportioned equitably. Our
quota restrictions should not discriminate among
persons merely on the basis of their national ori-
gin, nor should the restrictions discriminate un-
fairly against any of the friendly nations which
have an interest in common with us in the defense
of the free world. The present system of deter-
mining quotas is ofi'ensive on both counts.
Discrimination Under Present Quota System
He would, indeed, be bold to the point of reck-
lessness who would identify any national-origins
group as unable to contribute to the vigor of our
society. Yet in actual operation the national-
origins system denies to many of our citizens privi-
leges which are accorded to other citizens and,
in fact, to some resident aliens. For example, any
American citizen or any resident alien who has a
brother born in England, or Germany, or Ireland,
or any country having a current quota, may bring
his brother to the United States without encotm-
tering any delay whatsoever. However, under the
present law, an American citizen who has a brother
born in Italy, or Spain, or Greece, or the Philip-
pines, or in any of a score of other countries, may
not bring his brother to this country as an immi-
grant except after a waiting period varying from
many months to many years. In my opinion, the
national-origins system, which draws a distinction
between the blood of one person and the blood of
another, cannot be reconciled with the fundamen-
tal concepts of our Declaration of Independence
which, as Abraham Lincoln said, applied not only
to this country but to all men and meant "that all
should have an equal chance."'
It is easy to understand, therefore, the depth of
the resentment that is felt by many of our own
citizens who are denied the opportunity to re-
unite their families in the United States. This
feeling has its reflection overseas, particularly in
those countries where many desire to become
United States citizens, where honorable persons,
willing and eager to make their home in the United
States, know that they cannot do so except after
a wait of many years, while other persons similarly
situated l)ut living in more fa.vored countries, can
do so without delay. The impact of this situation
is felt in our relationships with friendly nations
every day. It is particularly awkward and diffi-
cult to explain when, year after year, large num-
bers of authorized quota numbers go unused and
yet no relaxation is allowed in the limitations
placed on immigration from those countries which
most need our assistance in this regard, and which
we desire to assist.
The problem which confronts us, therefore, is
to find a method of distribution of our quota num-
bers which is more reasonable than the national-
origins system. I realize the inherent difficulty
in fairly apportioning quota numbers under an
overall ceiling. Traditionally, and as a practical
matter, this has been and continues to be a sub-
ject for congressional determination. Therefore,
I fully support the recommendation that the Con-
gress immediately appropriate sufficient funds to
explore thoroughly this entire problem and to de-
vise a system of quotas which is not tied to the
discriminatory national-origins concept.
Interim Measures
However, I believe that the necessity for the
alleviation of certain flagrant discriminations con-
tained in the present system is pressing. I support
the President's recommendations for interim
measures which will alleviate as much as possible
the inequities which the Department of State en-
counters in applying the provisions of the present
law.
I believe that the metho 
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