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Full text of "Department of State bulletin"

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\,l. XXXIV, No. 875 
April 2, 1956 




RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 1957 MUTUAL SECURITY 
PROGRAM 
Message of President Eisenhotoer to the Congress ...... 54S 

Statement by Under Secretary Hoover 550 

A^REPORT ON ASIA • Address by Secretary Dulles .... 539 

A CRUCIAL CONTEST WITH THE COMMUNIST 

WORLD • by Deputy Under Secretary Murphy ...... 556 

VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER COSTELLO OF 

IRELAND • Statements and Addresses by the Prime 
Minister 560 

CLARIFICATION OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD NORTH 

AFRICA • by Ambassador C. Douglas Dillon 553 



For index see inside back cover 



Boston Public Li'trary 
Cuperin— '^""* of Doc.^msnts 

MAY 9 - 1956 







iJne z/^e/ia/»i(^me'n^ o^ c/tct^e 



bulletin 



VoL.XXXIV,No.875 • Publication 6313 



April 2, 1956 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Qovernment Printing OQlce 

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The printing of this publication has been 
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the Budget (January 19, 1965). 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may 
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or State Bdlletin as the source will be 
appreciated. 



The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Public Services Division, provides the 
public and interested ufiencies of 
the Government with information on 
developments in the field of foreign 
relations and on the tcork of the 
Department of State and the Foreign 
Service. The BULLETIN includes se- 
lected press releases on foreign policy, 
issued by the White House and the 
Department, and statements and ad- 
dresses made by the President and by 
the Secretary of State and other offi- 
cers of the Department, as well as 
special articles on various pluises of 
international affairs and the func- 
tions of tlie Department. Informa- 
tion is included concerning treaties 
and international agreements to 
which the United States is or may 
become a party and treaties of gen- 
eral international interest. 

Publications of the Department, 
United Nations documents, and legis- 
lative material in the field of inter- 
ruitional relations are listed currently. 



A Report on Asia 



Address hy Secretary Dulles ^ 



I have just returned from a 19-day trip which 
took me to 10 countries of Asia. It gave me the 
chance to talk intimately with the leaders of each 
of these 10 countries. That is a great aid to good 
international relations. We can, of course, write 
each other notes. But talking face to face is the 
best way yet invented for enabling men to under- 
stand each other. 

I also took part in the annual meeting, held 
this year at Tokyo, of the heads of our 14 United 
States missions in the Far East area.^ I discussed 
our policies with them and answered their ques- 
tions and received their suggestions. 

The particular reason why I took this trip at 
this time was that the Council of the Southeast 
Asia Treaty Organization — Seato, for short — was 
meeting in Pakistan. That treaty, you may re- 
call, was made at Manila in 1954 ^ to deter Com- 
munist aggression which was then threatening 
ominously in Southeast Asia. We have a Coun- 
cil meeting each year, attended by the Foreign 
Ministers of the eight member countries. Last 
year our Ministerial Council met at Bangkok.^ 
This year we met in Pakistan. 

We had a good meeting which further devel- 
oped the organization and gave it increased stat- 
ure. We feel confident that our combined 
strength and vigilance will safeguard the treaty 
area against open armed aggression. We also be- 

'Made to the Nation over radio and television on 
Mar. 23 (press release 159). 

" For text of communique issued at close of Tokyo 
meeting, see p. 543. 

'For text of treaty, see Bui>u:tin of Sept. 20, 1954, 
p. 893. 

•/Bid., Mar. 7, 1955, p. 371. 



lieve that this shield will make it more possible 
for the member countries to develop, individually 
and collectively, their economic and social 
welfare.^ 

After 4 days in Pakistan, I went on to visit In- 
dia, Ceylon, Indonesia, Thailand, Viet-Nam, the 
Philippines, Formosa (Taiwan), Korea, and 
Japan. These 10 countries I visited have a total 
population of over 700 million people, or almost 
one-third of the total population of the earth. 
More than 600 million of these people were colonial 
people until as recently as the close of World War 
II. Now they are independent nations. 

Several of them are only now completing their 
new political institutions. For example, while we 
were in Pakistan that country adopted its first 
constitution. In Indonesia the first government 
based on national elections was in process of for- 
mation. On the day I left Viet-Nam, a popularly 
elected Constituent Assembly was meeting to 
frame a constitution. 

This building and testing of new political proc- 
esses is the outstanding and exciting characteris- 
tic of the area I visited. 

Another characteristic is the determination to 
develop the economic potentials of the area. So 
far, productivity is low. The average income 
amounts to about $100 a year. The people expect 
their new governments to improve their living 
conditions. 

There are some who doubt the determination 
or ability of these free Asian nations to preserve 
and develop their political independence and also 

° For text of communique issued at Karachi, see ibxA., 
Mar. 19, 1956, p. 447. For the First Annual Report of the 
Council Representatives, see ibi^.. Mar. 12, 1956, p. 403. 



»ij>t\\ 2, 7956 



539 



to make that independence serve to improve social 
and economic conditions. I do not share that 
doubt. But I do come back with tlie strength- 
ened conviction that the United States can help 
the Asian countries to achieve both of these goals. 
Also, I feel sure that it is in our own interest 
to provide that help. 

I should like to give you a country-by-country 
report. But there is hardly time for that. So 
I shall give some general conclusions. 

Political Independence 

Let me speak first of the jjroblem of political 
independence in Asia. We need to be aware of 
how proud the peoples of Asia are to be free of 
foreign domination and how sensitive they are 
to any hint of encroachments from without. Also, 
let us remember that, while loe think first of the 
danger that stems from international communism, 
many of theyn think first of possible encroach- 
ments from the West, for that is the rule they have 
actually known at firsthand. 

But I found that the leaders are quite aware 
of the danger of penetration by international 
communism and of the fact that Soviet and Chi- 
nese Communist economic lures generally go with 
a hook and line that leads to Moscow or Peiping. 
Some take more eifective precautions than others 
to avoid being caught. But none of the leaders 
is blind to this danger. 

They all desire help which will in fact preserve 
their independence and develop their free insti- 
tutions. But they want to be very sure that that 
help does not subtract from their sovereignty or 
retard their development by involving them in 
controversies that do not directly concern them. 

The United States is able sympathetically to 
understand that attitude. We ourselves were 
once a colony. Our struggle for independence 
is the first chapter of histoi-y that is learned by 
every American boy and girl. Also, in our early 
days we too saw our first task as that of internal 
development, and only changed conditions have 
made it apparent that international security is 
best assured by collective efforts. 

That story of America is well known in Asia. 
George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, and Abra- 
ham Lincoln are honored names, and it is signifi- 
cant that the President of Indonesia, in his open- 
ing address to the Bandung conference, invoked 
the memory of Paul Revere and the principles of 
the American Revolution. 



All of this creates a bond of sympathy and 
helps to make possible a good understanding be- 
tween us and them. Our historical experience is 
an asset of priceless value in Asia. 

Many of the countries of Asia feel that their 
independence is better assured if they participate 
with us in arrangements for mutual security. 
Then we help them develop their national forces 
and they share the deterrent of our mobile military 
power. There are such arrangements — bilateral 
or multilateral — with 7 of the 10 countries I 
visited — Pakistan, Thailand, Viet-Nam, the Phil- 
ippines, free China, Japan, and Korea. Three of 
the countries I visited — India, Ceylon, and Indo- 
nesia — have preferred not to join regional security 
arrangements. That choice also we respect. The 
United States does not seek ties of mutual defense 
with any comitry whatsoever unless that country 
believes that this application of the principle of 
collective security will better assure its inde- 
pendence. 

Economic and Social Development 

Let me turn now from the problem of political 
indejjendence to the problem of economic and 
social development. Here, too, the conduct and 
example of the United States provide an inspira- 
tion and a responsibility. 

The United States has itself realized an eco- 
nomic miracle. Our population of about 165 mil- 
lion produces nearly half of all the goods that are 
produced in the world. 

When contrasted with our example, the produc- 
tion of forced labor pales into relative insignifi- 
cance. 

There is, of course, no magic formula for repro- 
ducing elsewhere economic productivity like ours. 
It is not to be had merely for the wanting, or 
merely by the installation of machines. It is a 
product of widespread education, of an ingrained 
spirit of enterprise, and of savings which provide 
more efficient tools for labor. 

I did not find that the Asian leaders expect that! 
either they, or we, or all of us in combination will 
be able to change their economies overnight. ButI 
I did find in Asia a natural and powerful urge' 
to get on a path which surely, even though slowly, 
leads upward to better economic and social 
conditions. 

If we wish to see the free world preserved and 
enlarged, we must help, or forces of despotism 
will take control. The day is past when the 



540 



Department of State Bulletin 



peoples of Asia will tolerate leadei'ship which 
keeps them on a dead center economically and so- 
cially, and when each generation merely ekes out 
a bare subsistence, with a brief life expectancy, 
and passes on to the next generation only the same 
bleak prospect. 

U.S. Mutual Security Programs 

The United States has already come to see that 
its own self-interest is served by helping others 
improve their economic condition. Our Nation 
provides this help in many ways, public and pri- 
vate, throughout the free world. For 10 years 
now we have had mutual security programs, and 
for the last 3 years, following the completion of 
the Marshall plan for Europe, much attention has 
been given to Asia. 

One component of our mutual security program 
is technical assistance. It helps others to develop 
new techniques. This is a good program manned 
by loyal and competent persons. But it is a pro- 
gram which could be enlarged and improved. 

For example, I found a widespread desire in 
Asia to learn the English language. This knowl- 
edge is eagerly sought for as opening the door to 
a valued literature in both cultural and technical 
fields. 

The Soviet Union has been specializing for many 
years on training technicians. These technicians 
are at the same time thoroughly indoctrinated in 
communism so that they can serve also as political 
|| agents. All of these teclmicians are at the com- 
mand of the Soviet Government, which can direct 
them to go wherever it wills. It is trying to in- 
sinuate them into key posts in lands which they 
hope to dominate. 

In the case of the United States the Government 
can appeal, but it cannot command. Also it can- 
not match the financial rewards of private busi- 
ness. The answer, it seems to me, must be found 
in a greater recognition on the part of our people 
of the inner or spiritual satisfactions to be gained 
by public service and aiding in the cause of human 
welfare. 
■I In the past, missionaries, doctors, and educators 
' in large numbers carried our faith and our knowl- 
edge to other people under conditions involving 
great hardship and sacrifice. There are many 
Americans today who are doing that very thing. 
tj In the 38 countries which I have visited since 
becoming Secretary of State I have almost always 
talked with gatherings of the Americans of our 



Foreign Service and related services. I have often 
found them serving under conditions of hardship. 
But also I have found that they derive satis- 
factions which are not readily to be found under 
conditions of greater ease and material prosperity 
at home. 

It is my earnest hope that more of our young 
men and women who are specially qualified to 
help others to help themselves will engage in this 
great adventure. 

In addition to technical assistance we have eco- 
nomic programs of other sorts. We have pro- 
grams which help our allies to bear the cost of 
their defense establishments, which vitally sup- 
plement our own. 

Then we have surplus commodity programs 
which under proper conditions can do much good. 
It is necessary to avoid unfair competition with 
countries which historically depend upon the sales 
abroad of their own agricultural surplus. But I 
was impressed with the fact that, subject to this 
qualification, our surpluses can do much to bring 
a better life to Asian people. For example, we 
have just concluded an agreement with Indonesia 
for delivery of surplus commodities of a value of 
some $95 million,'' and we are just beginning a 
milk program for the children of Ceylon. 

These programs involving military support, 
technical assistance, and surplus commodities are 
of great impoi'tance and contribute to preserving 
and developing the Asian economies. But by 
themselves they are not sufficient to enable the 
free Asian countries to make their economies more 
diversified or lessen their dependence on others for 
manufactured goods. The present lack of diversi- 
fication and industrialization is the weakness 
which Asian leaders above all want to cure. That 
aspect of the matter requires more emphasis. 
Japan should be able to help in this respect as 
one Asian nation, indeed the only Asian nation, 
which has found the way to industrialization. 

President Eisenliower has just sent to the Con- 
gress his message on the mutual security program, 
including economic assistance.' On the basis of 
my trip I am more than ever convinced of the vital 
importance of this program. It can be improved 
in ways the President has suggested. There is 
need for greater flexibility in the use of the funds 
appropriated. In addition, the United States 



'Ibid., Mar. 19, 1956, p. 469. 
' See p. 545. 



April 2, 1956 



541 



should be able to back long-range projects requir- 
ing several years for completion. This will im- 
portantly strengthen our program. 

To meet defense costs and dietary needs is im- 
portant. The one preserves independence; the 
other preserves life. But also there is need for 
more water, more fuel and electric power, more 
development of mineral resources, and more in- 
dustrial plants so that, hereafter, the people can, 
by their own efforts, raise their own living 
standards. 

To share with others our own blessings accords 
with the best and most deeply rooted of Ameri- 
can traditions. George Washington, in his Fare- 
well Address, said. 

It will be worthy of a free, enlightened, and, at no dis- 
tant period a great nation to give to mankind the mag- 
nanimous and too novel example of a people always guided 
by an exalted justice and benevolence. AVlio can doubt 
that in the course of time and things the fruits of such a 
plan would richly repay any temporary advantages which 
might be lost by a steady adherence to it? 

Our mutual security plan conforms to Wash- 
ington's prescription. Even though, to use Wash- 
ington's phrases, it loses us some temporary advan- 
tages, the fruits of that plan will, in the course of 
time, richly repay us. That plan provides the 
margin of difference between a world environment 
which is friendly and healthy and one which is 
corroded by massive discontents dangerous both to 
us and to the discontented. 

Profound Desire for Peace 

Throughout most of the countries I visited there 
is a profound desire for peace. In the case of the 
Republic of Korea and the Republic of China 
the leaders and the people would be willing to 
make almost any sacrifice to restore freedom to 
their countries as a whole. However, even there 
the will to sacrifice is tempered by knowledge 
that modern war creates such widespread devas- 
tation and so many evils that it provides no clear 
solution to any problem. 

Communist propaganda has sought diligently to 
create the impression that the United States seeks 
war and that its collective security arrangements 
are aggressive in purpose. I had no opportunity 
to judge the impact of that propaganda upon the 
people generally. But so far as concerns the 
leaders with whom I talked I found no evidence 
whatsoever that they believe that the United 
States wants war. 



The spot in the Far East where, at the moment, 
conflict most threatens is the Taiwan (Formosa) 
area. I reported to our Asian friends how, at our 
Geneva talks with the Chinese Communists, we 
were patiently but persistently striving for a re- 
ciprocal renunciation of force with particular re- 
lation to this Taiwan area. 

I found in India some fear lest our arms sup- 
plied to Pakistan, which feels endangered from 
the north, might be turned against India. I re- 
ceived the most categorical and convincing as- 
surances from the highest authorities of Pakistan 
that they have no belligerent intentions whatso- 
ever as against India. In India I publicly called 
attention to the fact that the Southeast Asia se- 
curity pact expressly prohibits any use of force 
except in defense against aggression. Also the 
agreements under which we are supplying arms 
to Pakistan explicitly provide that these arms 
shall not be used for any aggressive purpose. I 
expressed my conviction that Pakistan would 
scrujjulously observe these solemn engagements. 

I found uniformly that the Asian leaders with 
whom I talked desire the United States to be 
strong and that that strength should continue to 
be a sort of protective umbrella over other free 
nations. That was the clearest single impression 
that I received. Repeatedly I was asked whether 
it was our purpose to maintain that protective 
cover, affording new freedoms the opportunity to 
sink deep their roots and grow strong. Each time 
my reply was emphatically affirmative. And this 
reply was received with profound satisfaction. 

There is of course a great desire for disarma- 
ment, particularly since it is felt that armament 
limitation would release funds which, in part, 
would inure to the benefit of the less economically 
developed countries of the world. President 
Eisenhower's letter to Chairman Bulganin of 
March 1,* discussing disarmament, was made 
public while I was on my trip. It gave much 
satisfaction as evidence of our purpose to seek 
limitation of armament which could be verified 
and controlled. I found no one who wanted uni- 
lateral disarmament by the United States or dis- 
armament which might in fact turn out to be uni- 
lateral because of evasions by others. 

I believe that there is general realization of our 
ardent dedication to peace as well as respect for 
our determination to have the strength to insure 



' riiid.. Mar. 26, 1956, p. 514. 



542 



Department of State Bulletin 



tliat no one need feel that peace has to be bought 
by surrendering freedom to despotism. 

Asian Culture 

There is throughout the Asian peoples a desire 
for Western recognition of their dignity. 

We need to remember that although we have 
developed more rapidly than Asians in some di- 
rections, notably in industrialization, they have 
preceded us in finding many of the ways to make 
life richer. Their culture and art long antedate 
our own and in many respects have not yet been 
equaled by our own. Their handicraft is out- 
standing. They have an exceptional love and 
appreciation of beauty. They possess in full 
measure those human qualities which all admire — 
devotion to family and to country, courage, and 
willingness to sacrifice. They possess unusual 
qualities of patience, reflection, and repose. 

Therefore, let us not forget that, while we have 
material and teclinical things to give, they also 
have things to give. And if we are wise enough 
to perceive and to take what Asia has to offer, the 
balance struck between us will not be one-sided 
by any true measure of values. 

I come back from this trip encouraged. Of 
course, Soviet and Chinese economic tactics are a 
danger. Of even greater danger are their tactics 
of stirring up hatred as between free nations. But 
I feel that conditions which we wish for will pre- 
vail in the area I visited, if only we play worthily 
our part. 

The Goal We Seek 

"W^iat is it that we seek ? It is not conquest or 
domination. If that were our goal, I would have 
to conclude that it is doomed to failure. Our de- 
sire is a world in which peoples who want political 
independence shall possess it whenever they are 
capable of sustaining it and discharging its re- 
sponsibilities in accordance witli the accepted 
standards of civilized nations. That condition 
of independence is developing throughout non- 
Communist Asia, and I believe that it will con- 
tinue to develop as against assault from any quar- 
ter. 

But we also realize that political independence 
is not enough. It is a means to certain ends. One 
of these ends is the infusing of men with reason- 
able hope that, if they strive, they can build a 
better world for their childi'en and their chil- 



dren's children. That reasonable hope we can 
help to provide without any encroachment what- 
soever on the political independence of others. 
Under those conditions help will be welcome. 
Under reverse conditions, it would, I am glad to 
say, be rejected. 

Also, there is need for a new attitude toward 
the diversity that Asians provide. Differences of 
race and of culture are not measures of superiority 
or inferiority. Indeed, uniformity and conform- 
ity are conditions to be abhorred. The great rich- 
ness of our universe is due above all to its diversity. 
We may take honorable pride in our own dis- 
tinctive accomplishments. But we should equally 
be aware that the accomplisliments of others are 
a proper subject for their pride and our apprecia- 
tion. 

The future belongs to independence, not domi- 
nation; to freedom, not servitude; to diversity, 
not conformity. Acceptance of that fact will cre- 
ate between the Asians and ourselves a solid basis 
for fellowship. It will enable us, as mutual 
friends and helpers, to pursue hopefully the des- 
tiny that we share in common. 



Chiefs of Mission in Far East 
Meet at Tokyo 

Following is the text of a communique issued at 
Tokyo on March 21 after the final session of the 
3-day conference of U.S. Chiefs of Mission in the 
Far East} 

United States Chiefs of Mission in the Far East 
met under the chairmanship of Assistant Secre- 
tary of State Walter S. Eobertson from March 
19 to 21 in Tokyo. They reviewed the present 
situation in Asia, the progress made over the past 
year, and the prospects for the future. Secretary 
Dulles presided over the first session, summarizing 
developments in connection with his recent trip 
through Asia. 

The meeting revealed a general feeling of con- 
fidence based on the political, social and economic 
advances made during the past year in the free 
countries of Asia, the growing strength and vigor 
of collective security efforts against the still power- 
ful threat of Communist aggression, and the de- 
veloping sense of partnership in free Asia. 

^ For an announcement of the meeting, see Bulletin 
of Feb. 20, 1956, p. 278. 



Apr// 2, 1956 



543 



Among the significant developments during the 
past year in East Asia have been the series of free 
elections and the increasing association and practi- 
cal cooperation among free Asian nations. 

The Chiefs of Missions expressed their confident 
belief that the free Asian nations will continue to 
consolidate their independence and make progress 
in their national programs to their mutual advan- 
tage and the greater security of the free world. 



Philippines Chosen as'^Site 
for Asian Nuclear Center 

Press release 137 dated March 15 

The United States Embassy at Manila an- 
nounced on March 15 that Secretary Dulles has 
informed President Magsaysay that the Republic 
of the Philippines has been chosen as the site for 
the new Asian Nuclear Center. This center was 
proposed by the United States at the Colombo 
Plan meeting held at Singapore last October.^ 
The United States is now preparing to move 
rapidly with initial plans for the establishment 
of this center as a means of putting atomic energy 
to work for the economic and social progress of 
Asia. This action will represent an important 
step toward the further advancement of President 
Eisenhower's atoms-for-peace program. - 



1 Bulletin of Nov. 7, 1955, p. 747. 

2 The International Cooperation Administration an- 
nounced on Marcli 15 that the U.S. Government, with 
financing provided from the President's Fund for Asian 
Economic Development, is now arranging for the U.S. 
Atomic Energy Commission's Brookhaven National Lab- 
oratory to develop preliminary technical proposals as to 
how the center can best serve the needs of the region 
and as to what facilities would be required. The Brook- 
haven Laboratory, an institution with unique competence 
in the field of nuclear science, is a cooperative regional 
center uniting the facilities of nine American universities. 
In developing its proposals, the Brookhaven Laboratory 
shortly will send survey teams of experts to consult with 
scientists and government officials in Asia. The Brook- 
haven group is expected to assemble in Washington within 
the next month for a brief period of orientation. The 
survey team will then proceed to Manila to inspect pos- 
sible sites and facilities before visiting the various par- 
ticipating countries to discuss with them their principal 
fields of interest and plans for using the center. It is 
expected that detailed plans for the center will be pre- 
sented at the Colombo Plan meeting in Wellington, New 
Zealand, next October. 



Pan American Day and 
Pan American Week, 1956 

A PROCLAMATION^ 

Whereas the sixty-sixth anniversary of the founding 
of the Pan American Union, nucleus of the inter-American 
system of mutual co-operation and good will, now known 
as the Organization of American States, will be observed 
liy the twenty-one American Kepublics on Saturday, April 
14, 1956; and 

Whereas the observances commemorating this auspi- 
cious event in the history of the Western Hemisphere 
will be held throughout the week of April 8 to April 14, 
1956; and 

Whereas the American Republics stand together in fur- 
thering the maintenance of peace and the defense of free- 
dom through the Organization of American States, which 
they have built together and together uphold ; and 

Whereas the Government and the people of the United 
States of America are steadfast in adhering to the friend- 
ship uniting them with the other American Republics : 

Now, therefore, I, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, Presi- 
dent of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim 
Saturday, April 14, 1956, as Pan American Day, and the 
period from April 8 through April 14, 1956, as Pan Ameri- 
can Week ; and I urge that the people of this Nation on 
that day and throughout that week give expression to 
their cordial good wiU toward the i)eoples of the other 
American Republics and of their intention to maintain 
the principles of freedom and equality fundamental to all. 

I also invite the Governors of the States, Territories, 
and possessions of the United States of America and the 
Governor of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico to issue 
similar proclamations ; and I call upon all our citizens and 
all interested organizations to join in appropriate ob- 
servance of Pan American Day and Pan American Week, 
in testimony of the steadfast friendship which unites the 
people of the United States with the people of the other 
American Republics. 

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and 
caused the Seal of the United States of America to be 
afiixed. 

Done at the City of Washington this fifteenth day of 

March in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred 

[SE^\L] and fifty-.six, and of the Independence of the 

United States of America the one hundred and 

eightieth. 

By the President : 

Herbert Hoover, Jr. 

Acting Secretary of State 



' No. 3126 ; 21 Fed. Reg. 1763. 



544 



Department of Stale Bulletin 



Recommendations for 1957 Mutual Security Program 



MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT TO THE CON- 
GRESS 1 

To the Congress of the United States: 

For almost a decade the United States has 
moved, year by year, with growing success, to 
help fortify the economies and military strength 
of nations of the free world. Over the years this 
effort has changed in size and character in keep- 
ing with changing world affairs. Today it re- 
mains as indispensable to the security of every 
American citizen and to the building of an endur- 
ing peace as on the day it began 9 years ago. 

Today this great Nation, at the peak of its peace- 
time military and economic strength, must not 
hesitate or retreat in this vital undertaking. Nor 
can we subordinate this program to local concerns 
or collateral issues, on the unsound premise that 
steady progress through this jirogram for 9 years 
makes it no longer necessary. 

We cannot now falter in our quest for peace. 

The need for a mutual security program is 
urgent because there are still nations that are eager 
to strive with us for peace and freedom but, with- 
out our help, lack the means of doing so. 

The need is urgent because there are still forces 
hostile to freedom that compel the free world to 
maintain adequate and coordinated military 
power to deter aggi'ession. 

The need is urgent because there are still peo- 
ples who aspire to sustain their freedom but con- 
front economic obstacles that are beyond their 
capabilities of surmomiting alone. 

These facts are as fundamental to our own se- 
curity and well-being as the maintenance of our 
own armed forces. 

Our goal is clear — an enduring peace with jus- 

' H. Doc. 358, 84th Cong., 2d sess., transmitted on Mar. 
19. For the section on the mutual security program in 
President Eisenhower's budget message for the fiscal year 
1957, see Bui-letin of Jan. 30, 1956, p. 150. 



tice. To achieve it will continue to require effort, 
skill, patience, and sacrifice. Toward it we must 
and will strive constantly by every means avail- 
able to us. 

We must continue to work with other countries 
to insure that each free nation remains free, se- 
cure from external aggression and subversion, and 
able to develop a society marked by human wel- 
fare, individual liberty, and a rising standard of 
living. We must continue to maintain our eco- 
nomic and military strength at home. We must 
continue to stimulate expansion of trade and in- 
vestment in the free world. We must continue 
helping to build the productive capacities of free 
nations through public loans and guarantees of 
private investment. We must continue to provide 
technical knowledge and essential materials to 
speed the advance of other nations in peaceful uses 
of the atom. We must continue our cultural and 
educational exchanges to expand mutual knowl- 
edge and understanding. We must continue and 
intensify our information programs so that the 
peoples of the world may know our peaceful 
purposes and our love of human liberty. And 
through our mutual security programs we must 
continue helping to create in the free world condi- 
tions in which freedom can survive and develop, 
and free nations can maintain the defensive 
strength necessary to deter aggression. 

Peace with justice remains the sole objective of 
our mutual security programs. We have no other 
interest to advance. We have no desire or intent 
to subjugate or subvert other peoples — no purpose 
to change their chosen political, economic, or cul- 
tural patterns — no wish to make any of them our 
satellites. We seek only to further the cause of 
freedom and independence and to develop the mil- 
itary strength necessary to protect and defend 
it, in the interest of peace. 

To help a free country to maintain forces neces- 
sary for the protection of its freedom and inde- 



Apri; 2, 1956 



545 



pendence but beyond those which it can alone sup- 
port may mean foregoing some domestic expendi- 
ture. To help a less developed nation in its initial 
steps toward an economy that can sustain freedom 
and independence and provide opportunity for 
higher living standards may mean postponement 
of desirable projects here in this country. We 
must continue willing to make these sacrifices, for 
the benefits we gain in the interests of peace are 
well worth the price. The mutual security pro- 
gram is a demand of the highest priority upon 
our resources. 

Because our people and the peoples of other 
nations in the free world have been willing to 
make the necessary sacrifices, the past mutual se- 
curity programs have achieved a real measure of 
success. By combined effort the free world has 
advanced toward stability and toward economic 
strength. It has achieved the power and the will 
to resist aggression. Collective security arrange- 
ments have brought into existence free world de- 
fense forces and facilities far greater than those 
which we, by our unaided efforts, could have raised 
and maintained from our own resources without a 
crushing burden of taxation on our people. In 
their economic aspects, our programs have made 
significant advances toward the solution of many 
problems of the free world. Without this assist- 
ance many other nations, beyond doubt, if existing 
at all, would exist today only in the grip of 
chaos. Moreover, we ourselves are more secure, 
more prosperous, better fitted to go forward in 
the common enterprise of freedom than ever 
before. 

Significant testimony to the success of our mu- 
tual security programs appears in the new turns 
and developments of Soviet policy. Aggression 
through force appears to have been put aside, at 
least temporarily, and the Communists are now 
making trade approaches to many nations of the 
free world. 

The Soviet maneuver, which is still developing, 
includes offers of bilateral trade arrangements 
which may involve provision of arms and capital 
goods as well as technical assistance. Had we 
any reason to believe that the Soviet leaders had 
abandoned their sinister objectives, and now shared 
our own high purpose of helping other nations 
to develop freedom and independence, we would 
welcome the new Soviet program, for it appears 
to have aspects of normal trade expansion and 

546 



business competition. Its danger for us and for 
other free nations, however, lies in the traditional 
Soviet objectives and in the entanglements to 
which acceptance of their offers may lead. 

Even while we welcome respite from the Soviet 
policy of threat and violence, we must take care- 
ful stock of what still remains of it. The vast 
Soviet military establishment has not been 
scrapped. On the contrary, tlie Soviets and their 
Communist allies are increasing the strength and 
effectiveness of their armed forces and are pro- 
viding them with equipment of the most modern 
design. The threat implicit in this huge aggre- 
gation of military power still casts an ominous 
shadow over the world. There is nothing here 
to warrant a slackening of our efforts to strengthen 
the common defense of the free world. 

In its new departures in foreign policy, we see* 
that the Soviet Union continues in its familiarl 
pattern of ceaseless probing for opportunities tol 
exploit political and economic weaknesses. We 
cannot view otherwise the arms traffic in areas 
where tensions are high and the peace is in danger. 
We cannot view otherwise the extension of credits 
hand in hand with exploitation of ancient ani- 
mosities and new hatreds in a world already over- 
burdened with them. 

We must therefore assume that Soviet ex- 
pansionism has merely taken on a somewhat dif- 
ferent guise and that its fundamental objective is 
still to disrupt and in the end to dominate the free 
nations. With Soviet leaders openly proclaiming 
their world aim, it would be folly for us and our 
friends to relax our collective efforts toward sta- 
bility and security. 

Needless to say, we do not intend to permit 
specific Soviet moves to control our activities. 
Our mutual security program, conceived in the 
common interests of the free nations, must go 
ahead affirmatively along tested lines to meet the 
common need. "Wliere changes now give promise 
of making the program more responsive to the 
need and more effective, I am recommending 
changes. 

The authorizations and appropriations I an 
recommending for fiscal year 1957 are designee 
to carry forward the program toward the goal w< 
seek. 

I recommend that the Congress authorize ap 
propriations of $4,672,475,000 in accordance witl 
the scliedule attached. In a separate letter to thi 

Department of State Bulletii 



I 



Speaker of tlie House of Representatives,^ I am 
requesting the appropriation of $4,859,975,000 for 
the same fiscal year to cover these recommended 
authorizations together with authorizations 
granted but not fully used in prior years. Certain 
aspects of this program require special attention. 

Continuity and Flexibility 

We should be able to assure the nations of the 
free world that we will continue to participate in 
particular nonmilitary projects and enterprises 
which will take a number of years to complete. 
Such assurance from us will help these nations to 
mobilize their own funds for projects which will 
contribute to an important degree to their eco- 
nomic strength, to enlist public and private loans 
and investment, and to plan ahead intelligently. 
It will be difficult for these nations to organize 
such projects unless mutual security program sup- 
port can be relied on for more than a single year. 

I request authority of the Congress to make 
commitments up to ten years in length to assist 
less developed countries in long term projects im- 
portant to their development. Funds to fulfill 
such commitments would come from appropria- 
tions for nonmilitary mutual security, and would 
not exceed an aggregate of $100 million in any 
year. 

The mutual security program, in a world in 
which events move with great rapidity, requires 
that flexible authority exist for the use of funds 
made available by the Congress. Section 401 of 
the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, 
provides such flexibility with respect to the funds 
appropriated, or transferred, for use pursuant to 
that section. It provides a valuable means of 
meeting numerous unforeseeable requirements for 
assistance without the necessity for postponing or 
reducing other urgently needed programs. 

A year ago the Congress appropriated a special 
Presidential fund of $100 million to be used under 
section 401. For fiscal year 1957, I request the 
authorization of an appropriation of a further 
$100 million for this special fund. I also ask 
that the authority of the President to transfer 
other mutual security funds for use under the 
provisions of section 401 be increased. With re- 
spect to at least $100 million in this special fimd, 
I urge that the maximum degree of flexibility be 
authorized for its expenditure whenever the Presi- 

jl ' H. Doc. 360, 84tli Cong., 2(1 sess. 



dent determines that the use of sums in this man- 
ner is important to the security of the United 
States. 

The Middle East and Africa are areas in which 
it is especially important to build new strength 
friendly to us. There is need for an adequate fund 
M'hich can be used to assist in meeting special 
economic problems that may arise in those regions. 
The United States must be in a position to act 
promptly to help the governments in this area in 
their efforts to find solutions for economic and 
social problems. I therefore recommend creation 
of a special fund of $100 million to be available 
for use in any part of the Middle East or Africa 
for nonmilitaiy mutual security programs which 
will advance the cause of free world security and 
economic strength. 

In 1955, the President's fund for Asian eco- 
nomic development was established. The sum of 
$100 million was then appropriated for it and 
authorization was given for the appropriation of 
a further $100 million. It is now desirable that 
the whole of the funds authorized be made avail- 
able, and I shall request the appropriation of the 
remaining $100 million. 

Advanced Weapons Systems 

I recommend that about $530 million be made 
available to enable the Department of Defense to 
begin a progi'am of aiding our allies in developing 
an even more effective defense based on an im- 
proved and better coordinated early warning and 
communications system and utilizing advanced 
weapons systems, including missiles, now being 
procured for our troops. 

These advanced weapons, which are purely de- 
fensive in character, pose no threat to any nation 
which does not initiate aggression. They are de- 
signed to give warning of, and repel, such aggres- 
sion — and by their potential effectiveness to 
deter it. 

The sum of $195 million has been included ini- 
tially for Nato countries in the fiscal year 1957 
program. The eventual distribution of the bal- 
ance of the advanced weapons included in the 1957 
program will be made on the basis of later judg- 
ment as to their most effective employment world- 
wide. 

Our defense methods cannot be static in view 
of the constant growth of the military potential 
of the Communists. We and our allies must keep 
our defenses adequate to meet new methods of 



April 2, J 956 



547 



attack. Because of the rapidity of scientific ad- 
vances, it is likely that the content of this advanced 
weapons program will be modified from time to 
time. 

Europe 

The program for the Nato countries of Europe 
(excluding Greece and Turkey) is primarily one 
of military assistance. This includes the ad- 
vanced weapons I have mentioned. Although our 
allies have made great progress in building up 
their defense forces, military grant assistance is 
still necessary in most countries to assist them in 
maintaining equipment and replacing materiel 
lost by attrition. No economic assistance is pro- 
posed for any European country in the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization. A small amount 
of technical exchange assistance is proposed. 

Continued economic support is required for 
Berlin, and military and economic support for 
Spain and Yugoslavia. 

Middle East, Africa, and Asia 

In Asia and the Middle East, serious risk of 
aggression still exists. The program recommends 
aggregate military assistance of approximately 
$1,640 million for countries in these regions which 
must maintain substantial forces in the field to 
resist possible attacks. The military assistance 
which we propose will support the objectives of 
various mutual defense pacts, including Seato, 
to which the United States is a party. 

In these areas, the problems of building security 
are economic as well as military. Many of the 
nations in the area do not now have the resources 
required for a minimum rate of economic growth. 
They are striving to create the standards of living 
under which their economies can develop. This 
is a long-term process, in which their own efforts 
will play the major part, but in which our help 
can be crucial. 

The program, accordingly, proposes economic 
help to those of our allies whose own resources 
cannot support their essential defense effort. This 
help is designed, as in former years, in part to 
assist projects of a nonmilitary character which 
further defense activities, in part to help build 
internal resources and economic stability, and in 
part to contribute to the recipient's programs of 
economic development. 

Provision is also made for economic assistance 



to nations in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia, 
which receive no military assistance, where such 
economic assistance will contribute to their eco- 
nomic strength and thus to their ability to retain 
their independence. This program is of the ut- 
most importance to the security of the fi-ee world. 
The program for fiscal year 1957 also provides 
for continuing our teclinical cooperation and as- 
sistance in less-developed countries. 

Latin America 

We propose to strengthen further the friendly 
relationships which exist with our sister Republics 
to the south. I recommend that we continue to 
encourage by technical assistance the programs, 
initiated by Latin American nations, to make 
better use of their own resources. "We should also 
continue our participation in the technical assist- 
ance activities of the Organization of American 
States. 

In special circumstances, when loans from the 
Export-Import Bank and the "World Bank are not 
available to countries facing critical situations, 
the mutual security program has assisted in meet- 
ing temporary economic problems, as in the case 
of two countries where it is proposed that such 
assistance be continued in the next fiscal year. 

Military assistance in Latin America should be 
continued where needed in order to provide stand- 
ardized equipment, maintenance of equipment al- 
ready furnished, and training in the use of such 
equipment. 

United Nations and Other Special Programs 

The United States should continue its support 
of the United Nations Expanded Technical As- 
sistance Program, the United Nations Childi'en's 
Fund, and the United Nations Relief and AVorks 
Agency, which provides relief and rehabilitation 
of the Arab refugees from Palestine. 

Provision is also made for continuing our sup- 
port of the program of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees and the work of the 
Intergovernmental Committee for European Mi- 
gration. Authorizations for continuing our own 
Government's program for care and resettlement 
of escapees from communism, and our program 
of paying the ocean freight costs of shipment both 
of relief supplies donated to our voluntary relief 
agencies and of surplus agricultural commodities, 
are also reconunended. 



548 



Department of State Bulletin 



Size of the Program 

The request for military assistance authoriza- 
tion in fiscal year 1957 is substantially larger than 
the requests and appropriations for this purpose 
for the past 2 years. The lower level of appro- 
priations for fiscal years 1955 and 1956 will, by 
the end of the current fiscal year, have brought 
about reduction in unexpended balances over the 
2-year period by approximately $2i/^ billion to $3 
billion. Now, however, in order to maintain the 
flow of military assistance in 1958 and 1959 an in- 
crease in the appropriation for fiscal year 1957 is 
required. 

A substantial period of "lead" time is required 
to translate appropriated funds into actual pay- 
ment for, and deliveries of, nearly all items of 
military equipment. This year, for the first time, 
more than $500 million are included in the mili- 
tary assistance program for advanced weapons. 
These weapons, because of their complexity, have 
even longer lead times. 

On the economic side of the program, appro- 
priations for the last 2 years have been approxi- 
mately at the same rate as expenditures. The 
amounts requested this year for economic assist- 
ance are larger principally because of the new 
fund proposed for the Middle East and Africa 
and because of heavier emphasis on programs in 
Asia. 

Other Aspects of the Program 

The mutual security program for fiscal year 
1957 proposes continued procurement within the 
United States of surplus agricultural commodities 
for use abroad. In addition, large amounts of 
such commodities are moving abroad under the 
Agi'icultural Trade Development and Assistance 
Act for the mutual benefit of this and other coun- 
tries. This latter effort has been considered in 
the development of the 1957 mutual security pro- 
gram requirements, and every effort is being made 
to coordinate the two programs. 

In the request for appropriations to carry out 
the fiscal year 1957 program, I am urging that 
Congress permit greater flexibility in the obliga- 
tion of appropriations, in order that there may 
be more thorough planning of expenditures and 
more time allowed for necessary negotiation of 
contracts with suppliers and of arrangements with 
other nations. 



FY 1957 MUTUAL SECURITY PROGRAM 



Authorization and Appropriation Request" 



TiUe and Section 


FY mr 

Authorization 
Request 


FY 1957 

Appropriation 

Request 


Title I— Mutual Defense Assistance: 

Cfiapter 1 — Military Assistance 

Sec. 103 (a) (3)— General Authorization . 

Sec. 104— Infrastructure 


$2. 925. 000. 000 
''(75,000.000) 


$2, 925. 000. 000 
b 75. 000. 000 


Total— Chapter 1 

Chapter S — Defense Support 
Sec. 131 (c): 

(1) Europe 


2, 925, 000, 000 

78, 700. 000 
170.000.000 
882, 000, 000 


"3,000,000,000 
78. 700. 000 


(2) Near East and Africa 

(3) Asia 


170. 000, 000 
882, 000, 000 






TOTAI^TITLE I 


1, 130, 700, 000 
4,055.700.000 


1, 130, 700, 000 
4,130,700,000 


Title II— Development Aiaistanc€: 

Sec. 201 (c) 

(1) Near East and Africa 

(2) Asia 


63,000,000 
80, 000. 000 
27. 000, 000 


63,000,000 
SO. 000. 000 


(3) Latin America 


27. 000. 000 






TOTAL— TITLE II 


170, 000, 000 


170. 000. 000 


Title III— Technical Cooperation: 

Sec. 304 (b)— General Authorization . . 
Sec. 306— -Multilateral Technical Coop- 
eration; 

(a) United Nations Expanded Pro- 
gram of Technical Assistance .... 

(b) Organization of American States . 


140,500,000 

15,500.000 
1, 500, 000 


140, 500, 000 

15,500,000 
1, 500, 000 


TOTAI^TITLE III 


157, 500, 000 


157, 500, 000 


Title 1\— Other Programs: 

Sec. 401 (b)— Special Presidential Fund . 
Sec. 403 (b) — Special Assistance in Joint 


$100, 000. 000 
12, 200, 000 

i (12,500,000) 
2, 300, 000 
7,000,000 
10, 000, 000 

» (45,300,000) 

1,400,000 
14, 000, 000 
1,175,000 

35,250,000 

(100,000,000) 

100, 000, 000 
5,950,000 


$100, 000, 000 
12,200,000 

12, 500, 000 
2, 300. 000 
7. 000 000 


Sec. 405 — Migrants, Refugees and Es- 
capees; 

(a) Intergovernmental Committee for 
European Migration 

(c) United Nations Refugee Fund . . 


Sec. 406(b)— Children's Welfare 

Sec. 407 (b) — Palestine Refugees in the 
Near East 


10, 000, 000 
• (45, 300, 000) 


Sec. 408— North Atlantic Treaty Organi- 




See. 409— Ocean Freight Charges; 

(c) Volimtary Relief Shipments . . . 

(d) Surplus Agricultural Commodities . 

Sec. 410— Control Act Expenses 

Sec. 411 (b)— Administrative and Other 

Expenses (Other than Chapter 1 of 


1, 400, 000 
14,000,000 
1, 175, 000 

35. 250, 000 


Sec. 418 (b)— President's Fund for Asian 
Economic Development 

Sec. 420— Special Authorization for the 
Middle East and Africa 

Sec. 10— Foreign Reactor Projects .... 


100, 000, 000 

100,000.000 
5, 950, 000 


TOTAL— TITLE IV 


259, 276, 000 


401,776,000 


GRAND TOTAI^ALL TITLES. . . . 


$4,672,475,000 


$4,859,975,000 



■ Title and section references are, with one exception, to the Mutual Se- 
cm'ity Act of 1964 as it would be cumulatively amended by the proposed 
Mutual Security Act of 1956. The exception is the section reference for 
"Foreign Reactor Projects", which is to the proposed Mutual Security 
Act of 1956. 

!> 1957 authorization not being requested as Sec. 104 of the Mutual Secunty 
Act of 1954 authorized the appropriation of $321 million in mstallments prior 
to Jtme 30, 1958. In FY 1955 $100 million was appropriated. An additional 
$122 million was appropriated in FY 1956 leavmg an imappropriated au- 
thorization of $99 raiUion. The 1957 appropriation request will leave an 
unappropriated authorization balance of $24 million. 

o For FY 1967 Direct Forces Support has been consolidated with "Military 
A ssis t niics ' ' 

<• Continuing authorization provided under Sec. 405 (a) of the Mutual 
Security Act of 1954. 

" Estimated unobligated balance of FY 1956 funds for which carry-over 
authority is requested. 



April 2, 7956 



549 



Conclusion 

The mutual security program is vitally impor- 
tant to our people. Its cost is not disproportionate 
to our Nation's resources and to our national 
income. That cost is a low price to pay for the 
security and vastly greater chances for world 
peace which the program provides. 

The mutual security program is an indispen- 
sable part of our national effort to meet affirma- 
tively the challenge of all the forces which threaten 
the independence of the free world and to over- 
come the conditions which make peace insecure 
and progress difficult. 

dwight d. elsenhoweb 

The White House, 
March 19, 1956. 



STATEMENT BY UNDER SECRETARY HOOVERS 

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, 
I come before your Committee this morning in 
support of the President's program for mutual 
security. I do not intend to go into any great 
detail. The Secretary of State, who is returning 
to Washington tomorrow, plans to appear before 
you shortly to report on the Seato meeting in 
Karachi and his trip through 10 of the countries 
in the Near and Far East. He will undoubtedly 
touch upon the importance of this program in the 
areas he has visited. Mr. Hollister, the Director 
of IcA, who is with me this morning, will discuss 
the details of the proposed program which is be- 
fore your Committee. I do, however, wish to take 
this opportunity to express my conviction that the 
mutual security program is a fundamental and 
essential aspect of the conduct of our foreign pol- 
icy today. 

Importance of the Mutual Security Program 

Many of the members of this Committee have 
recently visited the areas whose problems and 
needs will be considered in connection with this 
program, and I am sure that no one on the Com- 
mittee is unaware of the tremendous importance 
of the program. It is vital to the security of the 
United States and of the whole of the free world. 
We are looked upon for leadership in the free 
world, and the consequences of what we do or fail 

'Made before the House Committee on Foreign Af- 
fairs on Mar. 20 (press release 150) . 



550 



to do with respect to the mutual security program 
reach far beyond our own national frontiers. 

The world today is one in which we and our 
friends cannot relax our collective efforts for sta- 
bility and security. There is no basis for any 
hope that the long-range objectives of interna- 
tional communism for world domination have been 
abandoned. We must, therefore, place continued 
reliance on the mutual security program and its 
provisions for continued economic and military 
assistance. 

We seek, on the one hand, to make outright ag- 
gression unprofitable, and thus unlikely. To this 
end, we have supported mutual defense agree- 
ments throughout the world and have supplied 
arms, materiel, and training to assist in the de- 
fense of friendly nations. 

Without abandoning defensive efforts, we seek, 
at the same time, to help the construction of 
healthy economies and free institutions and thus 
to promote stability and minimize the threat of 
subversion. 

The Soviet New Look 

The Soviet Government continues to pursue its 
overall aim of Communist domination. The Com- 
mittee will recall that Mr. Khrushchev stated 
frankly to the Supreme Soviet 2 months ago that 
"we never renounced and we will never renounce 
our ideas, our struggle for the victory of com- 
munism." But we need to keep in mind in our 
consideration of the program this year that the 
emphasis on Soviet tactics has shifted from pri- 
mary reliance on force to a campaign of political 
and economic blandishment. 

In this campaign the Soviet Union and its satel- 
lites have expanded their trade relations with the 
free world, they have offered their technical and 
advisory services to the less industrialized coun- 
tries, and they have provided long-term low- 
interest loans for economic development. By 
themselves these activities are more or less legiti- 
mate, but they are being carried on in combination 
with efforts to stir up local controversies and strife 
and with pressures to disrupt and destroy the 
security arrangements that have been constructed 
in the free world. The immediate Soviet goal is 
quite clearly one of isolating the countries of the 
free world from the U.S. This much accom- 
plished, the goal of outright conquest or subversion 
would be greatly advanced. » 



Department of State Bulletin 



I 



I 



We must view the new Soviet campaign with 
concern for it is aimed at the welfare and free- 
dom of all the independent countries. We are 
not presenting the mutual security program as an 
answer to the Soviet activities, but we do need to 
make our own program, which is of long standing, 
as effective an instrument for aiding the cause of 
independence and freedom as is possible. 

Key New Provisions 

Our own security depends upon the security of 
the free world. This security, in turn, depends 
directly upon the ability of the free nations to 
maintain their independence and to strengthen 
their free institutions. These continue to be our 
aims. From the founding of our country we have 
been deeply devoted to the cause of freedom. In 
this new phase of our struggle to achieve an en- 
vironment of freedom, when many nations of the 
free world desperately need assistance in their 
efforts to achieve security and healthy economic 
development, it is vital that we have in the mutual 
security program a larger measure of flexibility. 

Changes occur in the world at a very rapid pace. 
We cannot forecast them in advance, but it is 
vital to our national security that we have the 
ability to adapt the mutual security program to 
reflect changes. That presents a major dilemma. 
Because of the long lead time necessary to the 
effective administration of this program, the pro- 
posals we are making today for fiscal year '57 
will not be implemented before early 1958. That 
is a period of almost 2 years. It is obvious that, 
to meet the conditions existing then, there be a 
degi'ee of flexibility in the legislation now. 

The President has accordingly requested a 
greater flexibility in his authority to use funds 
made available for this program by the Congress. 
Some measure of flexibility is provided in the 
present legislation. But we consider it of the ut- 
most importance to the efficient and economic ac- 
complisloment of our objectives that the President 
be given even wider discretion for future years. 

The President has also asked the Congress for 
authority to make certain commitments of a 
longer-term nature in assisting countries to carry 
out a restricted number of important projects. 
These commitments would be met from nonmili- 
tary mutual security appropriations. We are not 
asking for additional appropriations. It is con- 
templated that this kind of assistance will be fur- 

April 2, 1956 



nished in special cases where the recipient country 
cannot carry out a major project with its own re- 
sources. I have in mind such projects as river 
development, improvement of ports, highways, 
railroads, or other means of communication, and 
important large industrial projects. Works of 
this kind generally require a number of years for 
completion. Wliere we provide aid for these pur- 
poses, it is essential that the recipient country be 
given reasonable assurance that our aid may be 
continued for the period of time necessary for 
completion of the projects and so long as the pur- 
poses of the free world are served thereby. Only 
with assurances of this type of support will these 
countries be able to develop additional financing 
from other sources. 

Rate of Expenditure 

The purpose of the proposed program is to carry 
on at approximately the same rate of expenditure 
as last year and the year before. In view of the 
increased threat of Communist economic pene- 
tration in the free world, we cannot afford to re- 
duce our efforts at this time. 

The requested increase in appropriation from 
$2.7 billion in fiscal year 1956 to $4.9 billion in 
fiscal year 1957 does not imply a corresponding 
increase in expenditures. The details of this situ- 
ation will be brought out later in the hearings. 
But I wish to make the basic facts clear at this 
time. 

The $4.9 billion figure is made up of two parts : 
First is the defense-support and economic pro- 
gram amounting to $1.9 billion. This compares 
to a fiscal 1956 request of $1.8 billion and a final 
appropriation of $1.7 billion. The second part is 
the military and direct-forces support program 
of $3 billion. This compares to a fiscal 1956 re- 
quest of $1.7 billion, and a final appropriation of 
$1 billion, which was less than half of the annual 
rate of expenditure. 

To recapitulate, the increased request this year 
of $4.9 billion, as compared to the appropriation 
last year of $2.7 billion, or a difference of $2.2 
billion, is made up as follows : 

(a) increase in defense support and economic 
aid— $200 million ; 

(b) increase in military and direct-forces sup- 
port— $2.0 billion. 

The increase of $200 million in defense support 



551 



and economic aid is requested to cover a prudent 
and moderate increase in the program for the 
Middle East, South and Southeast Asia, and the 
Far East. This represents an increase of approxi- 
mately 12 percent in the size of the program 
for this year. One-half of this increase, or $100 
million, is requested for use as a special fund in 
the Middle East and Africa, with emphasis on the 
Baghdad Pact countries, while the other half is 
needed in Asia and the Far East. 

The increase of $2 billion in military and direct- 
forces support will bring to $3 billion the amount 
requested for these purjjoses for fiscal year '57. 
This sum is designed to provide for one extra 
year's military expenditures at the average annual 
rate at which tlie Department of Defense is now 
expending funds for military assistance. In ad- 
dition, there is requested authorization of $530 
million for advanced weapons, for most of which 
there have been no prior appropriations. 

A detailed explanation of the various programs 
will be given, of course, in the hearings that are to 
follow. My purpose in presenting the basic figures 
at this time is to place the major aspects of the 
program in their proper perspective. 

Again, I would like to reiterate that the purpose 
of the proposed program is to maintain approxi- 
mately the same rate of expenditure during fiscal 
year 1957 as in the years 1955 and 1956. The fact 
that increased authorizations are required in order 
to maintain the same expenditures, particularly 
in the military program, will be brought out later 
by Mr. Gray and other witnesses from the Depart- 
ment of Defense. 



lem we face and the proposal of the executive 
branch for the solution of that problem. It is 
our earnest hope the Committee will approve this 
program. 



Visit of Deputy Prime Minister 
of Rhodesia and Nyasaland 

The Department of State amiounced on March 
24 (press release 160) that Sir Roy Welensky, 
Deputy Prime Minister of the Federation of Rho- 
desia and Nyasaland, will visit "Washington March 
25-30, mider the auspices of the International Ex- 
change of Persons Program. Principal purpose 
of the tour is to familiarize Sir Roy with the 
United States and particularly with its transpor- 
tation and manufacturing industries as well as to 
afford him the opportunity to confer with U.S. 
Government transportation, labor, and business 
leaders. 

Deputy Prime Minister Welensky arrived in 
New York March 17 and has just completed visits 
to Pittsburgh and Chicago. While in Washington 
he will confer with officials of the Departments of 
State, Commerce, and Labor, Members of Con- 
gress, and labor and transportation officials. Fol- 
lowing his stay here, the Deputy Prime Minister 
will fly to California via Denver, Colo., and will 
also visit the Grand Canyon, Texas, and the Ten- 
nessee Valley. After another visit in New York, 
from April 12-21, he will fly to Canada. 



Conclusion 

Mr. Hollister plans to discuss with you the de- 
tailed legislative provisions which we are request- 
ing for this 1957 program. Altogether we believe 
that these appropriations, subject to the approval 
of Congress, will : 

(1) provide adequate means to continue to 
strengthen our allies ; 

(2) continue soundly and affirmatively our eco- 
nomic i^rogram, which in itself is the best answer 
to new Soviet activities; 

(3) achieve a greater measure of flexibility so 
urgently needed; 

(4) supply a limited element of continuity in 
our aid program. 

I have presented in very brief outline the prob- 



Congratuiatory Messages on Signing 
of French-Tunisian Protocol 

Message From U.S. Consul General to Bey of Tunis' 

Press release 154 dated March 22 

My Government wishes to convey to His High- 
ness the Bey, to the members of the Tunisian 
Government, and to the people of Tunisia its con- 
gratulations on the signature of the Protocol of 
Agreement of March 20 between the Governments 
of Tunisia and France, and on the recognition of 
Tunisian independence as embodied therein. 

My Government desires to express its particular 

' Delivered on Mar. 22 by Morris N. Hughes, Consul 
General of the United States in Tunis, to Sidi Mohammed 
Lamine Pasha, Bey of Tunis. 



552 



Department of State Bulletin if,j 



admiration for the courage and realism of those 
who once again have proven steadfast in adhering 
to tlie principle of peaceful negotiation. In fol- 
lowing the paths of friendship which have led to 
the signature of this solemn act, the leaders of 
Tunisia give proof to the world of their devotion 
to the real welfare of the inhabitants of their 
country. 

° Delivered on Mar. 22 by the American Embassy at 
Paris. 



Message From U.S. Ambassador 
to French Foreign Office ' 

Press release 155 dated March 22 

My Government desires to pay new homage to 
the realism and magnanimity of those who have 
made i>ossible the Franco-Tunisian Protocol of 
Agreement, signed on March 20, and to the role of 
France, which has proven once again her dedica- 
tion to the i^rogress of North Africa and to the 
aspirations of its people. 



Clarification of U.S. Policy Toward North Africa 

iy C. Douglas Dillon 
Ambassador to France ^ 



I am glad to have the opportunity to speak 
to you today. Recently I have noticed in France 
an increasing misimderstanding of United States 
policy toward North Africa. Such misunder- 
standing is a matter of serious concern to us all 
and should not be allowed to continue. In an at- 
tempt to clarify this situation I am going to de- 
sci'ibe briefly the basic views of my Government 
regarding the problems which France is facing in 
that area. 

I think you will all agree that there are today 
a number of people in France who seem to feel 
that the United States has not been adequately 
supporting France in North Africa or, worse still, 
that we have even contemplated the possibility 
of replacing her in that area. Nothing could be 
farther from the truth. Ever since I have been 
here in Paris my Government has loyally sup- 
ported the French Government in its search for 
solutions to North African problems — solutions 
that will make possible long-term, close coopera- 
tion between France and the Moslem communi- 
ties of Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria. The United 
States has consistently supported France when 
North African subjects have been discussed in 
the United Nations. The most recent instance 

I was our strong support last fall of the position 
that Algeria is an internal French problem and 

I therefore not appropriate for discussion by the 
U. N.^ In addition, when last year the important 

' Translation of address delivered in French before the 
Diplomatic Press Association at Paris, France, on Mar. 20. 

April 2, 7956 

379843—56 3 



question of helicopters was brought to our atten- 
tion, we responded promptly and favorably to 
the requests of the French Government. Never 
once since I have been in Paris have I had a specific 
complaint from any member of any French gov- 
ernment or, for that matter, from any informed 
Frenchman regarding any action taken by the 
United States Government in North Africa. 

I say "United States Government" advisedly, 
because I do not mean to say that Frenchmen 
have not occasionally siioken to me about the ac- 
tions of a few private American citizens in the 
North African area. But I have two observations 
to make on this score: First, if one looks at the 
overall picture, any actions taken by the few pri- 
vate American citizens who have had anything 
to do with North Africa are clearly of very minor 
importance in the drama of the past few years; 
second, and even more important, I am sure that 
you will all agree with me that in free countries 
such as France and the United States, where 
there is no governmental control over the thoughts 
and words of our citizens, it is most important 
to distinguish clearly and sharply between the ac- 
tion of the nation as such taken by its govern- 
ment and the actions or words of private individ- 
uals. There has been a tendency in France to 
confuse the two when talking of American policy 
in North Africa, and I ask you to help in guard- 
ing against this error. 



' Bm-LETIN of Oct. 3, 1955, p. 546. 



553 



Witli tliis background, how is it possible that 
so much misunderstanding should have arisen? 
Misunderstanding between peoples almost inevit- 
ably means that there must be some fault on both 
sides. I have looked hard at the American posi- 
tion in this matter, and I think that I may have 
found one of the causes. That is that, until now, 
there have been very few public expressions of 
United States policy in this area. On the one 
hand we have felt that Algeria was primarily a 
French afl'air and on the other that the relation- 
ships between France and Morocco and Tunisia 
were matters to be settled between the French 
Government on the one hand and the Moroccan 
and Tunisian Governments on the other. We 
thought that public expression of our views would 
be considered to be undue interference in other 
people's aft'airs, and accordingly we have kept si- 
lent. While we have repeatedly given assurance 
in private to the French Government that we sup- 
ported their etl'orts to reach liberal and mutually 
acceptable solutions in the area, our policy of 
avoiding public expression of our views may have 
contributed to a misunderstanding of our position. 

I hope today that I can do something to rectify 
this situation. May I suggest, on the other hand, 
that we Americans, when judged by the record of 
our longtime friendship and cooperation as well 
as our sacrifices on the fields of France during the 
last two wars, may deserve a greater degree of con- 
fidence than has been shown us by certain circles 
of public opinion. 

Tunisia and Morocco 

Now let me elaborate a little on our policies. 
First, let us look at Tunisia and Morocco. With 
these two countries the French Government, ani- 
mated by the liberal traditions for which France is 
justly famous, has concluded agreements. In the 
first agreement — that with Tunisia — a long step 
was taken toward independence. There followed 
the recerit agreement according full independence 
to Morocco.' And we have just learned that new 
negotiations perfecting the independence of 
Tunisia have been successfully completed. These 
agreements should usher in a new era of close in- 
terdependence between those two countries and 
France. They have been greeted with applause 
and thanksgiving throughout the free world. 



' Ibid., Mar. 19, 1956, p. 466. 



What does this newly acquired status of inde- 
pendence mean ? It simply means that henceforth 
the relationships between France on the one hand 
and Morocco and Tunisia on the other will be 
freely negotiated as between sovereign equals. We 
certainly hope that these new relationships will 
not weaken but rather will strengthen the close 
ties that have bound France and these two lands 
together in a common destiny. I am certain that 
the Tunisian and Moroccan people must realize 
that they owe their remarkable economic and so- 
cial development of recent years to French initia- 
tive and to French investment. 

My Government was particularly happy to 
learn that the recent negotiations with Tunisia 
and ^Morocco opened up the prospect of a con- 
tinued close relationshijj between the Govern- 
ments and people of France and these two coun- 
tries. The United States wholeheartedly supports 
such a relationship of freely negotiated interde- 
pendence. We believe it is a necessity in the world 
of today, when it has become difficult if not impos- 
sible for any country to stand alone. 

You have all heard that the people of the United 
States are anticolonialist by tradition. That is 
true, and we are proud of it. But what does this 
mean? It means that we believe, as I am sure 
the people and Government of France believe, that 
the less-favored peoples of the world should be 
brought forward as rapidly as possible to a state 
of freedom in which they can freely and rationally 
choose their own destiny. Such freedom of choice 
can take many forms. It by no means requires a 
rupture between the peoples that have newly ac- 
quired their freedom and those that have led them 
along the path to this freedom. May I point, for 
example, to the decisions of the peoples of Paki- 
stan, India, and Ceylon to stay on as members of 
the British Commonwealth in their capacity as 
sovereign nations? May I point to the free de- 
cision of the people of Puerto Rico to maintain an 
even closer relationship with the United States? 

Therefore, it should come as no surprise when I 
say that the United States hopes for and favors 
the continuation of the closest possible interde- 
pendence between France and ^Morocco and 
Tunisia. May I also say, once and for all, and 
with the greatest clarity and force, that the United 
States has no desire to interfere in any way with 
the close relationship between France and these 



554 



Deparimenf of State Bulletin 



two countries — a relationship which we look upon 
as one of the bulwarks of the free world. 

Algeria 

Now let me turn for a moment to Algeria. Here 
the problem is quite different and the solution 
must undoubtedly be different. The four depart- 
ments of Algeria are French territory. There are 
1,200,000 Frenchmen living in Algeria alongside 
8,000,000 Moslems, and this coexistence in itself 
poses a most complex and difficult problem. 

Wliile my Government has been, and is, well 
aware of this problem, it is fair to say that public 
opinion in the United States has not been ade- 
quately informed regarding the French commu- 
nity in Algeria. The size of this community, the 
extent of its participation in all phases of Algerian 
life, and the length of its history in Algeria are 
now becoming better known to the American 
people, and with this knowledge is coming greater 
understanding and sympathy for the problems you 
face in Algeria. I can assure you that France 
has our profound sympathy and support in its 
attempt to work out a liberal solution to this diffi- 
cult problem of coexistence. 

The French contribution in North Africa, the 
great advances in hygiene and public health, the 
building of roads and hospitals, the multitude of 
costly and ingenious programs that have made 
barren areas fruitful — these are all elements of a 
dramatic story that is not well enough known 
abroad. The soaring population increases in 
Algeria and throughout North Africa over the 
past decades are in themselves testimony to these 
achievements. France can and should be proud 
of her efforts in North Africa. It would be help- 
ful if she were to make a greater effort to spread 
the knowledge of these good works throughout the 
world. 

Now, to return again to Algeria, there the 
French Government has proposed a liberal pro- 
gram, the basic element of which is a search for 
new arrangements for the continued coexistence 
of the French and Moslem communities — new ar- 
rangements to be freely arrived at by discussion 
between the chosen leaders of the Moslem com- 
munity and the representatives of France and the 
French community in Algeria. The French Gov- 
ernment has solemnly promised free elections for 
the purpose of choosing these leaders. Such elec- 
tions are wholly consistent with the ideals of 



liberty and justice which are held so dear by both 
the French and American people. But we all 
know that elections cannot take place while dis- 
order reigns. Hence, we in the United States 
fervently hope that peace and order will come soon 
to the Algerian countryside so that progress can 
be made toward the liberal solution sought by the 
French Govennnent. 

U.S. Support for France 

My countrymen have always been shocked by 
blind acts of terrorism, and those who take part 
in such activity should not for a moment imagine 
that they have the support of my Government or 
of any segment of our public opinion. May I 
repeat so that there can be no possible misunder- 
standing: The United States stands solidly be- 
hind France in her search for a liberal and equi- 
table solution of the problems in Algeria. 

We recognize that there have been external in- 
fluences at work trj'ing to undermine the French 
position throughout North Africa. I hope that 
what I have just said will be of help in enabling 
the people of France to differentiate sharply be- 
tween her friends and her foes, between the friends 
and allies who support her in her search for liberal 
and fair solutions, and those who have sought to 
destroy every possibility of a continuing relation- 
ship between France and the Moslem communities 
throughout North Africa. 

Finally, I would like to ask your help in one 
concrete matter, which I feel is in the best interests 
of France as well as of my own country. It is 
undeniable that the terrorists and those who seek 
simply to drive France from North Africa are 
encouraged by any indication that there may be 
differences between France and her allies, in par- 
ticular the United States, regarding North African 
policy. There have been articles in the press 
stressing that differences of opinion exist in this 
matter between France and the United States. 
Such articles can only serve to encourage the ene- 
mies of France. I hope that after the explanation 
which I have just given of United States policy in 
North Africa you will feel able to join with me 
in an effort to dissipate the misunderstandings of 
the past and to let everyone realize that France, 
in its search for liberal solutions that will insure 
the continuance of its presence in North Africa, 
has the wholehearted support of the United States 
Government. 



April 2, 1956 



555 



A Crucial Contest With the Communist World 



I 



hy Deputy Under Secretary Murphy ' 



The part George Washington University plays 
in this community more than bears out the wisdom 
of the first President of our country in sponsoring 
the idea of a university located in the Capital of 
the Nation. Of course, George Washington's wish 
was not for a university devoted exclusively to the 
training of civil servants, important as that is. 
His desire also was for a university providing 
"education in all branches of polite literature : in 
arts and sciences. . . ." 

The 14 colleges, schools, and divisions of the 
University, including medicine, law, engineering, 
education, j^harmacy, and government, as well as 
the 4-year course in liberal arts, have fulfilled 
his wisli more completely than he might have 
dreamed. The graduates of these schools and dis- 
ciplines, whether or not they go into the Govern- 
ment, contribute richly to the life and wealth of 
our area and Nation. 

We sometimes fail to appreciate the contribu- 
tion made by our system of higher education, not 
only to the internal needs and culture of our 
country but to our understanding of foreign af- 
fairs. The strength of our society depends in 
large part on the intelligence and training of our 
people, on the mixing of technical and profes- 
sional skills, and on the ability of all our people to 
analyze and comprehend the economic, political, 
and social forces at work in the world today. 

We not only rely on technical training and on 
scientific skills for the enrichment of our society. 
The liberal arts, the inquiring mind, the well- 
rounded individual are perhaps of more funda- 
mental significance in our kind of country. The 

'Address made before the George Washington Uni- 
versity Alumni Luncheon at Washington, D. C, on Mar. 
24 (press release 157 dated Mar. 2.S). 



Founding Fathers who drew up the charter for 
our Nation reflected in high degree this attitude 
of inquiry, this wide variety of skills, intelligence, 
and experience. Our higlier education today is de- 
voted to the idea of the well-rounded man. 

By comparison we note that the Soviet system 
does not have this breadth of purpose. It is pro- 
ducing technicians, engineers, and men of science 
in growing, if not disturbing, abundance. The 
broad intellectual needs of a developed and well- 
balanced society are seemingly neglected and even 
repressed in the Soviet Union. In this way it ac- 
complishes the purpose of the state to progress 
rapidly in technical and economic fields. This 
onesidedness in Soviet education and training rep- 
resents a certain danger to the free world. It re- 
sults in almost complete acceptance of dogmas and 
of opinions handed down from above usually with- 
out question and without understanding. 

Recent Communist Party Congress 

We liave witnessed a further startling example 
of this onesidedness at the recent 20th Congress of 
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union at Mos- 
cow. This relates to the Stalin story, about which 
we are still lacking factual information. The 
news of this apparent development has leaked to 
the outside world in a peculiar fashion. We still 
do not possess the text of the speech said to have 
been made by Klirushchev at the Party Congress 
meeting in February, but it is reported that Khru- 
shchev delivered a lengthy denunciation of his 
former master. As a result of tliat speech Joseph 
Stalin apparently has now become an outcast, a 
pariali, where but a very few short years ago he 
was the demigod, the physical and spiritual ruler 
of all the Russians. If reports are accurate, this 



556 



Department of State Bulletin |p^| 



rewriting of history, which the 200 million people 
of tlie Soviet Union may be reluctantly forced to 
accept, is a spectacle we have seen before and one 
that makes us cherish more dearly than ever our 
system of free inquiry and broad education. 

The 20th Congress of the Communist Party was 
in many respects a valuable performance for us to 
watch, even though we do not as yet know the en- 
tire story or understand its implications. During 
the 3 years and 4 months since the 19th Communist 
Party Congress, many changes had occurred on 
the Soviet scene. The most important, of course, 
was the death of Stalin in 1953, ending a 29-year 
rule and paving the way for a new phase in Soviet 
history. In this same period collective leadership 
in top party organs, or perhaps more accurately 
collective dictatorship, a form of oligarchy, be- 
came the guiding principle of the Government. 
At the same time, Khrushchev succeeded in mov- 
ing to the forefront of the ruling group. 

The purge of Beria brought the police under 
firiner party control. The armed forces received 
a greater share of prestige and recognition. Agri- 
culture remained a weak point and became the 
target for sustained special attention. A new 
stress on consumers' goods was short-lived as the 
regime reaffirmed the priority of heavy industry. 

The first Soviet thermonuclear test explosion, 
the appearance of new long-range bombers and 
supersonic fighters, the development of guided 
missiles, the modernization and reequipment of 
ground forces, the continued emphasis on new 
naval construction — all testified to the further 
increase of Soviet military power since 1952. 

In foreign affairs, the Soviets moved toward 
new international relationships which gave them 
more flexibility, whether or not they reflected any 
fundamental change in Communist strategy. 
This new posture was most dramatically expressed 
at the "summit" meeting last summer in Geneva. 
.The Soviets sought to create an image of the 
U.S.S.R. as a peace-loving power by a number of 
diplomatic gestures and by offering to remove 
a few barriers to communication with the non- 
Communist world. The wars in Korea and Indo- 
china were ended, an Austrian treaty was signed, 
relations with West Germany were established. 
The U.S.S.R. warmed up its approach to Yugo- 
slavia and to a number of non-Communist coun- 
tries stretching from the Arctic to the Indian 
Ocean. They employed new means — arms, cred- 
its, machines, and technicians — in a new political 

April 2, 7956 

379843 — 56 4 



offensive against less-developed non-Communist 
countries. 

Against this background, more than 1,400 dele- 
gates to the 20th Communist Party Congress, as 
well as delegates from 55 foreign Communist 
Parties, assembled in the Great Hall of the 
Kremlin in February. 

The highlight and main innovation of the 20th 
Congi-ess was the first formal public criticism of 
Stalin by his successors. In the nearly 3 years 
since his death, Stalin's stature had been progres- 
sively reduced by withholding adulation from 
him and concentrating it on Lenin, but previous 
to the Congress there had been no official public 
criticism. 

The criticism of Stalin centered on methods of 
rule, but it also involved policy decisions. Caustic 
references were made to one-man decision-making, 
leader-worship, overcentralization, mistakes in 
economic jjolicies, ossified conduct of foreign 
relations, distortions of ideology, propaganda in 
Soviet history, unhealthy developments in Soviet 
law, and arbitrariness in law enforcement. 

A second important result of the conference was 
to put the official stamp of approval on the present 
organization of rule as well as on recent poli- 
cies. The emphasis on collectivity in leadership 
plus the criticism of one-man rule may have been 
designed to make it more difficult for any Soviet 
leader to set himself apart from the other mem- 
bers of the ruling clique. Nevertheless, it may be 
significant that the new Central Committee ex- 
panded the party presidium to include members 
with ties to Khrushchev. In addition, it enlarged 
the party secretariat, which is directed by Khrush- 
chev, and tied that body and the presidium 
even more closely together through overlapping 
of membership. 

"Peaceful Coexistence" 

In the field of foreign affairs, the Soviet rulers 
claimed success for their new policies and promised 
that they would be pursued even more vigorously. 
Their basic premise they defined as peaceful co- 
existence as the only alternative to "the most de- 
structive war in history." 

Their apparent plan is to cultivate friendly re- 
lations with most countries, including the major 
"Western Powers, but not at the cost of conces- 
sions. They apparently will make special efforts 
in less-developed areas and among foreign socialist 
groups. 



557 



Their immediate aim was made clear : to under- 
mine Western defense efforts and further to ex- 
tend Soviet influence. Their ultimate goal was 
expressed by speaker after speaker with even 
greater optimism than in the past: "The ideas of 
communism will triumph without war." 

The Soviet rulers gave a nimiber of reasons for 
their confidence. They cited growing Soviet mili- 
tary power as a deterrent to Western aggression. 
They depicted increasing Soviet economic strength 
as a symbol of the success of communism. They 
lumped into a "zone of peace" the neutral coun- 
tries, which together with the Sino-Soviet bloc 
they consider as proof that a majority of mankind 
is moving toward "peace"' and socialism. 

The speeches at the Communist Congress 
showed awareness of the contradiction between co- 
existence and continuing Communist-capitalist 
conflict. Unwilling to discard either, the Soviet 
leaders sought to appear both respectable and revo- 
lutionary by adjusting their ideological garb. The 
doctrine of the inevitability of war was modified 
to stress the preventability of war. The doctrine 
of the necessity of the violent overthrow of capital- 
ism was shaded to sanction a "nonviolent" par- 
liamentary seizure of power. These adjustments 
were intended to reassure non-Communists of the 
seriousness of Soviet ideas on coexistence and to 
make clear to Communists that coexistence means 
neither relaxation nor reformism. Coexistence, it 
was stressed, is a state-to-state concept, which in- 
volves no reconciliation with "bourgeois" ideas. 

Within the U.S.S.R. the priority of heavy in- 
dustry and the maintenance of a high level of 
armaments continue to demand sacrifices from the 
pojjulation, since the threat of war is assumed still 
to exist. Outside the U.S.S.R., the Soviet speakers 
declared, Soviet efforts to improve relations with 
foreign governments are not to be interpreted by 
local Communists as undercutting their efforts to 
come to power. A period of coexistence, they 
maintain, will still provide chances for revolution. 

As we see it, these were the highlights of the 
Soviet Congress. These are the features which 
the Communist leaders themselves thought most 
significant about the Soviet Union. Now we 
might try to look at the world scene more objec- 
tively. 

Several important elements in combination have 
been instrumental in bringing about the changes 
in Soviet policy and strategy dramatized by the 
20th Communist Congress. The death of Stalin 



opened the door for new leaders to try out new 
ideas and to get out from under Stalin's dead 
weight. Very real increases in Soviet industrial 
capacity have given them both greater confidence 
in their power of control and the ability to expand 
their economic operations. The development and 
testing of thermonuclear weapons in the hands of 
both sides perhaps has persuaded some that the 
prospect of another world war is more remote. 
Finally — and this is most significant — we must 
bear in mind that, if the Soviets have in fact 
shifted to new methods and new points of attack, 
it is because the strength and firmness of the free 
nations frustrated their old methods of intimida- 
tion and aggression. 

Challenge in Western Europe 

The primary aim of the Soviets from 1945 until 
rather recently was to take over Western Europe 
through dividing and weakening it by subversion 
and threats. Europe is the site of the world's most 
highly developed industrial plant outside the 
United States. The combined industrial capacity 
of Western Europe and the United States is 
greater by a ratio of seven to two than the capacity 
of the Communist empire. Control of Western 
Europe, however, would give the Communists a 
lead of five to four. In population, in geography, 
in military power, and in political, economic, and 
cultural leadership. Western Europe was and is 
the most valuable prize in the world for the Com- 
munist imperialists. 

To meet their challenge, we and our allies in 
Europe built our military capacity to a point 
where it was sufficient to deter an attack. Our 
foreign aid at first prevented economic collapse 
and has now produced record prosperity. The 
North Atlantic Treaty provided a warning system 
against any Communist attempt to move against 
the European nations one by one. 

The joining of a rearmed and prosperous Ger- 
many with a unified and strong Nato was the 
signal that the 10-year Soviet effort to weaken, 
divide, and conquer the richest prize in the world 
had failed. The problem now is to retain that 
unity and strength. 

In addition to their efforts at conquest in Eu- 
rope, the Communists also attempted, by violence, 
threats, and subversion, to forward their aggres- 
sive aims in the Far East. 

In Korea 3 years ago the Communists were 
made to understand that, if they failed to reach 



558 



Departmenf of State Bulletin 



I 



an agreement for an early cease-fire, they would 
run the risk of retaliation massive enough to cost 
them far more than war could gain. Today Korea 
is at peace. 

In the Formosa Strait a year ago, the Chinese 
Communists were aggressively pressing tlieir 
claims to the offshore islands of Quemoy and 
Matsu and to Formosa. The President sought and 
obtained from Congress the overwhelming assur- 
ance that the might of this country would be used 
if necessary to guard the peace. AVar has not 
broken out in the Formosa Strait. 

Appeal to Colonial Peoples 

It is said that a good general forces his opponent 
to meet him on ground that is favorable to him. 
The Soviets are now appealing to colonial and 
former colonial peoples who are searching for 
economic strength and political prestige. As a 
former colony which won its own freedom and 
has helped other nations to achieve theirs, the 
United States can make a strong case for our sys- 
tem against the "new colonialism'" of the Com- 
munist empire. We are challenged, in effect, to 
live up to our own heritage. I believe we are 
meeting that challenge. 

The Soviets are now imitating our efforts to 
help other countries build economic strength. 
Our efforts in this field have enjoyed much suc- 
cess during the past 10 years. There is no ground 
upon which we are better equipped by experience 
and productive capacity to place our efforts up 
against theirs. Our 160 million people, working 
in freedom, produce over three times as much as 
do the 220 million of the Soviet Union, working 
in servitude. Again we are meeting the challenge, 
and I am confident we will succeed. It is an ex- 
pensive and trying experience for our Nation be- 
cause our competitors tactics involve deceptive 
practices. The Stalinist open military aggression 
is supplanted by political and economic subversion 
cloaked in langiuige of peace and friendly cooper- 
ation. We have known how to deal with military 
aggression. We are even better equipped to deal 
with the present form of competition. 

We are on the high ground in this crucial con- 
test with the Communist world. Our reserves — 
military, economic, and political — are vast. Our 
methods have been tested and proven through 10 
years of post-war competition. As President 
Eisenhower has said, 

The sum of our International effort should he this : the 

April 2, J 956 



waging of peace, with as much resourcefulness, with as 
great a sense of dedication and urgency as we have ever 
mustered in defense of our country in time of war. In 
this effort, our weapon is not force. Our weapons are 
the principles and ideas embodied in our historic tradi- 
tions, applied with the same vigor that in the past made 
America a living promise of freedom for all mankind." 

Those party bosses who oppose us, by contrast, 
are on the low ground, on the quicksands and 
broken terrain of Soviet colonialism in all its bru- 
tality, bad faith, and oppi'ession. Neither mate- 
rially nor morally can they match our potential. 
We enjoy the support of our people in our efforts. 
I should doubt that the Communist leadership is 
entirely confident of support of the masses. We 
do not intend that they shall outwit or outdistance 
us in this crucial test. 

We will hope and work for the day when conflict 
of any kind may cease, when all may join in 
peaceful efforts toward peaceful ends, when Rus- 
sia itself will be governed by men who put the 
welfare of the Russian people above world con- 
quest. But as long as there is to be conflict, we 
are on the high ground, and if we have faith in 
ourselves and our system, if we are brave, re- 
sourceful, and patient, we will win through. I 
know that we here today, as graduates of a uni- 
versity with a proud record in our Nation's 
history, will play a vital part in this epic struggle. 



Soviet Payment of Damages 
for U.S. Navy Plane 

Press release 148 dated March 19 

The following is the text of a note delivered 
hy the Soviet Embassy in Washington to the De- 
partment of State on March 16, 1956, in reply 
to the United States note of January 6, 1966^ re- 
questing payment of damages for the destniction 
of a United States Navy Neptune plane on June 
32, 1955. 

[Translation] 

The Embassy of the U.S.S.R. presents its com- 
pliments to the Department of State of the U.S.A. 
and, referring to the State Department's note of 
January 6 of this year, has the honor to state the 
following. 

The State Department's note asserts that the 



'Bulletin of Jan. 16, 1956, p. 79. 
' Bulletin of Jan. 16, 1956, p. 94. 



559 



American military aircraft of the "Neptune" type 
referred to in the note did not violate the state 
frontier of the U.S.S.R. 

In this connection, the Embassy considers it 
necessary to recall that on June 25, 1955, in the 
statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of 
the U.S.S.R., V. M. Molotov, to the Secretary of 
State of the U.S.A., Mr. Dulles,= factual data were 
communicated regarding the violation of the 
U.S.S.R. state frontier by an American military 
aircraft of the "Xeptune" type. 



The present note reaffirms the above-mentioned 
statement concerning the circumstances of the vio- 
lation of the U.S.S.R. state frontier by an Ameri- 
can military aircraft. 

In accordance with the agreement which has 
been reached and with the request contained in 
the State Department's note of January 6 of this 
year, there is enclosed a check in the amount of 
$724,947.68 in reimbursement for 50 percent of 
the total amount of the damages borne by the 
American side. 



Visit of Prime Minister Costeilo of Ireland 



Following are texts of statements and addresses 
made during the visit to Washington of John A. 
Costeilo, Prime Minister of Ireland, from March 
U to 17. 



WELCOME AT NATIONAL AIRPORT 

Press release 136 dated March 14 

Statement by Vice President Nixon 

Mr. Prime Minister, it is a very great privilege 
and honor for me to welcome you to Washington, 
D.C., and the United States on behalf of Presi- 
dent Eisenhower and on behalf of all the Ameri- 
can people. 

It seems to me rather symbolic that you are ar- 
riving in this season of the year, because, as you 
will note, in just a few days you will find virtually 
all Americans blossoming out in the green, and not 
onlj- those of Irish persuasion and descent but 
others who have great affection for those who are 
Irish. Consequently, perhaps, it is not too inap- 
propriate that you are arriving on a day on which 
the rain is falling very heavily in Washington, 
because that means that we will have rain today 
and a very green and happy St. Patrick's Day on 
Saturday of this week. 

In any event, may I say that, as j-ou know, we 
have many bonds of friendship between our two 
countries and our peoples. Those of Irish de- 
scent have contributed tremendously to the United 
States in many fields and particularly, as you will 

' Ihid., July 18, 1955, p. 100. 



note in Washington, in the fields of statesmanship 
and politics. 

So welcome, and we trust that your visit, though 
it is brief here, will be one of warmliearted friend- 
ship every place you go. 

Response by Prime Minister Costeilo 

Mr. Vice President, when I was listening to your 
very kind words of welcome, I felt that you should 
have been in my position as having kissed the 
Blarney stone. I aiJj^reciate the warmth of the 
welcome that has been extended to me this morn- 
ing and appreciate that that welcome is given 
from the American people to the Irish nation and 
the Irish people. 

Of course, even the great American Nation 
which has achieved so much can as j'et not control 
the weather. We have a saying in Ireland, going 
back for many centuries — I will give you the Eng- 
lish and not the Irish expression — that St. Pati-ick 
took the cold stone out of the water. The old 
legend was that the water was heated by hot stones, 
and of course they grew cold and the water grew 
cold. But St. Patrick took it out and, accord- 
ingly, after St. Patrick's Da}' the weather will 
get fine. 

I regret I can't promise you the weather will 
get fine before St. Patrick's Day. 

The reason that I have come here to the United 
States once again, where I have so many friends 
and where there are so many people friendly to 
my country, is one not as coming to a foreign coun- 
try but as coming to a country in which we have 



560 



Deparfmenf of State BuUetin 



much in common and in which we are really part 
of the American race. We always remember the 
welcome that was given to our people in bad times, 
and we hope that they gave, as your Vice President 
has said, good and substantial and ample return 
for the warmth and welcome and the shelter they 
got here in bad times in building up this great 
American Nation. 

You have given me a welcome as representative 
of the Irish Government and the Irish people. 
On their behalf and as their representative, I 
thank you for the warmth of your welcome and 
bring you their affectionate greetings and the 
warmest admiration for this great United States 
of America. 



ADDRESS BY THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE 
SENATE, MARCH 15 > 

I wish to express my appreciation of the honor 
you have done me by inviting me to appear here 
and address you today. Your invitation is but 
another of the many friendly gestures which your 
great country has extended to mine, gestures which 
spring from, and go far to perpetuate, those close 
and intimate ties which bind our countries. It is 
my earnest desire — and my firm intention, insofar 
as any effort of mine can bring it about — that my 
short stay amongst you will help to nourish and 
foster those ties, so that in the future, as in the 
past, there may exist between our two countries 
full community of sympathy and interest notwith- 
standing the 3,000 miles of ocean that separate 
but paradoxically unite us. 

Tlie ties which unite our countries sjiring from 
a common outlook and from common ideals, based 
on a Christian, democratic, and free way of life. 
This is not surprising, as Ireland's spiritual em- 
pire, consisting of many millions of persons of 
Irish birth or descent scattered in every corner 
of the globe, is nowhere so powerful as in your 
country. It is this sense of basic community of 
the spirit between our two countries which serves 
to keep alive today the older historical ties which 
for centuries past have constituted a bond between 
us. 

In the United States of America, we see the 
mightiest upholder of the traditional values of the 
West. In the veins of this great people flows the 

' Reprinted from Covg. Rec. of Mar. 15, p. 4307. 



blood of many European races, and the Irish have 
contributed a more than proportionate share. It 
is not long, in historical time, since America was 
created as a new Nation, "conceived in liberty," 
but even then predestined to greatness. In her 
growth and in the achievements of her people, she 
has, however, far outstripped the older nations 
from which she drew her origins. She has become 
a giant among the nations of the world, splendid 
in her youth and majestic in her strength. 

I bring to you the greetings of a very old na- 
tion, though one not long emerged into the light 
of freedom from centuries of darkness and near 
despair. We are proud to claim our place as a 
people who contributed not a little to the creation 
and development of your great country, and we 
gladly acknowledge that our contribution has 
been abundantly repaid in the sympathy and sup- 
port which we have always received from you in 
time of need. 

At a time when freedom seemed for us, at home, 
a dissolving dream, Ireland's sons played a signifi- 
cant part in the attainment of liberty in this land 
of yours. It is, I think, pardonable for us to feel 
some of the pride that gladdens a parent whose 
son has grown to manhood in strength and fame 
and good repute. 

Ours is a small country, yours a mighty one. 
But we have much in common. We, like you, have 
a tradition of devotion to those principles of 
freedom, Christian justice and humanity which 
are facing, in the world of today, a challenge more 
powerful and menacing than any that has opposed 
them in the past. It can scarcely be doubted that 
the almost miraculous development of your coun- 
try is a manifestation of God's providence, which 
never leaves His people without a defender strong 
enough to meet the evil forces of the time. We 
see in you a Nation, magnificent in its youthful 
vigor, well fitted to bear the tremendous burden 
which, in the course of history, has fallen upon 
its shoulders. Yours is the power and yours, 
therefore, the responsibility to insure that, in these 
days of great danger, freedom "shall not perish 
from the earth." 

Ireland may claim to be qualified, better per- 
haps than any other nation, to serve as a link 
between the Old World and the New. She is 
herself an ancient European nation, and her peo- 
ple are steeped in the Christian traditions of 
European culture. Once situated at the edge of 



Apr/; 2, J 956 



561 



the known world, she now finds herself rather 
at its center, between Europe and America. Such 
influence as she possesses cannot, in view of her 
size, be founded in material strength. Bather is 
it a spiritual influence, which, though without the 
support of big battalions, has an importance which 
the Christian democracies of the world will not 
ignore. How fortunate these democracies are 
that in your great country they have found a happy 
alliance of the big battalions with that same 
spiritual strength. 

Millions of our people have found here a sec- 
ond home. In the recent as well as in the more 
distant past, many of her sons have fought and 
died for America. I want, however, to mention 
an Irishman who, nominally, at least, fought 
against your country. His name was Richard 
Fitzpatrick. 

I seek through you the permission of Congress 
to present to the Library of Congress five un- 
published letters which Fitzpatrick wrote to his 
brother, the Second Earl of Upper Ossory, dur- 
ing your War of Independence. These letters are 
a small Irish contribution to the study of the 
history of the United States, but they have a wider 
significance, which is my excuse for bringing them 
to your attention today. 

The outbreak of the War of Independence 
found Richard Fitzpatrick a captain in the 
British Army. As an intimate friend of Charles 
James Fox, the great Whig leader, his whole in- 
clinations were against the attempt to subdue the 
American people, but when ordered abroad to war 
his sense of duty forbade him to resign his com- 
mission. 

His letters do not concern themselves much with 
the incidents of the campaign. They are for the 
most part a series of reflections on the merits, con- 
duct, and probable issue of the war. 

Fitzpatrick, as a member of Parliament, must 
have many times listened to the rolling periods of 
his fellow Irishman Edmund Burke, the greatest 
mind of the age, and one of the greatest political 
thinkers of all time. Burke had not yet declared 
the age of chivalry to be gone, and it is not sur- 
prising that a man of feeling and intelligence who 
lived and moved in such an environment as did 
Fitzpatrick should detest a situation which made 
him the instrument of an ignoble cause, "a situ- 
ation," says Fitzpatrick, "where I am obliged to 
be constantly acting in direct opposition to all my 
feelings, principles and opinions." 



"I grow every day," he cries, "more and more 
disgusted with the folly and iniquity of the cause 
in which I am condemned to serve." 

Xeither is it surprising that Fitzpatrick's ex- 
perience of the American character and temper 
should lead him to the conclusion that the war 
could have only one outcome. 

Shrewd though many of his judgments were, 
they pale into insignificance beside a remark which 
he made when Congi'ess struck a medal in com- 
memoration of the Convention of Saratoga. On 
that occasion, he said : 

There is a greatness and a dignity in all the proceed- 
ings of this people that makes us contemptible indeed. I 
am well convinced they will be the lirst and greatest 
people there ever was an example of in the history of 
mankind. 

I doubt if history holds a comparable instance 
of such prescience. It was this near prophecy on 
the part of a private and comparatively obscure 
observer of the scene 180 years ago that first 
prompted the trustees of the National Library 
of Ireland and myself to feel that the proper cus- 
todian of these historic manuscripts should not be 
the National Library of Ireland, whence I am 
their bearer, but the Library of Congress. 

Gentlemen, today the world looks to you as 
"the first and greatest people there ever was an 
example of in the history of mankind." IMay your 
actions always be worthy of the responsibility thus 
thrust upon you, and may there always be a "great- 
ness and dignity in your proceedings" that will 
match those shown by your stouthearted fore- 
fathers in their critical hour. 

That is my wish for you in presenting you with 
this gift from a small nation which is deeply in 
your debt but, you will permit me to say, whose 
sons and daughters have played their part in mak- 
ing you what you are — the greatest Nation in the 
world. 



ADDRESS TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 
MARCH 15 ' 

I am deeply honored by the invitation to address 
your assembly. I am sensible that you are hon- 
oring not me but the Irish Government and the 
whole Irish peojile, whose spokesman I am today. 

I bring a message of good will from a young 

= nid., p. 4236. 



562 



Department of Sfofe Bulletin 



republic, which is an old nation, to your young 
Nation, the oldest republic on earth. 

At the outset of my remarks, and before I ad- 
dress you on the topics I wish to cover in my ad- 
dress today, I seek your permission to present to 
tlie Library of Congress five unpublished letters 
which Richard Fitzpatrick wrote to his brother, 
the Second Earl of Upper Ossory during your 
War of Independence. These letters were pur- 
chased by the trustees of our National Library of 
Ireland and were lodged in the National Library. 
The originals of these letters go back to 1777. 
Eichard Fitzpatrick, who wrote those letters, the 
originals of which are in this small case, was an 
Irishman fighting with the British Army against 
the army of the forthcoming United States of 
America. He did not like this task, but as a soldier 
he felt bound to obey the orders to fight in a cause 
of which he did not approve. During the course 
of his campaigning against the soldiers of the 
American Republic, he wrote some letters to his 
brother in which he expressed the opinion that the 
British people were fighting a battle in which they 
should not be engaged. He also indicated what 
his view would be of the outcome of the struggle. 

I ask you to permit me to present the originals 
of these letters to the Library of Congress. They 
are remarkable for the fact they are so old, still 
more remarkable for the fact they are the candid 
and self-critical expressions of a soldier who was 
fighting against an army who were themselves 
struggling for independence, but they are really 
remarkable, outstandingly remarkable, for one 
particular passage which I ask your permission to 
read to you and which in itself furnishes me with 
an excuse, if an excuse were needed, and certainly 
with a justification, for asking that your Library 
shall have custody of these historic documents 
rather than our National Library of Ireland. 

In one of his letters, giving expression to his 
views after Congress had struck a medal in com- 
memoration of the Convention of Saratoga, he 
said: 

There is a greatness and a dignity in all the proceedings 
of this people that makes us contemptible indeed. I am 
well convinced they will be the first and greatest people 
there ever was an example of in the history of mankind. 

I am presenting you with this small gift as the 
representative of a small nation to this Nation 
which has fulfilled the prophecy Fitzpatrick made 
180 years ago. 

I take leave to express the conviction that your 



actions will always be worthy of the responsibility 
which has been thrust upon you and that there 
will always be in the proceedings of this great 
Nation a "greatness and dignity in your proceed- 
ings" that will continue to keep you "the first and 
greatest people there ever was an example of in 
the history of mankind." 

Your countrymen are well aware that they 
occupy a very special place in the hearts of all 
Irishmen, a position due as much to Irish admira- 
tion of the achievements and attainments of the 
United States as to the many associations our two 
countries have in common. 

You have been the world's exemplar of liberty 
and the course you have so brilliantly traveled 
many in the rest of the world have been content 
but to follow. Your magnificent political institu- 
tions, the creation of your youthful genius, have 
been the model not less for us in Dublin than for 
the other centers of the civilized world. Yours 
has been the idea of a fundamental document pro- 
tecting, with a carefully balanced arrangement of 
political power, the fundamental human rights. 
^Vhat a noble conception of man has inspired your 
Constitution, yet how well founded it is on the 
earth. The idealism has not vanished like a dream 
but has remained the angelic part of a truly human 
institution. 

For your Founding Fathers, to whose broodings 
political philosophers of every age return for in- 
spiration, were not merely tliinkers but men of 
action, too: If theoretical, practical also. They 
knew the nature of man, so wittily disclosed by 
G. K. Chesterton, who said : 

There is one little defect about man, the image of God, 
the wonder of the world and the paragon of animals, he 
is not to be trusted. 

This fine distrust, a lawyer's shrewdness, is writ 
large over your Constitution. The men wlio made 
it built well on sound foundations : and what they 
built has endured. 

It has been said that growth is the only evi- 
dence of life. What amazing, unexampled growth 
has not your history shown. What abounding life 
does not your country display. May your future 
repeat the miracles of your past and well will 
humanity be served. Your present hospitality 
is but another happy instance of those many 
friendly gestures toward Ireland which the United 
States has made in the ptast. It is not very many 
years ago since it was my pleasant duty to ex- 



April 2, 1956 



563 



press our thanks for the generous help which we 
received under Marshall aid. But the help which 
America gave Ireland did not start with Marshall 
aid. Long before Marshall aid was thought of, 
American support sustained the Irish people. 

Ages ago, long before America was discovered 
by Europe, it was imagined by Irish seers as I- 
Breasail — The Island of Great Desire — a fertile 
land of alluring loveliness; in the terrible centu- 
ries of Ireland's misfortune when "Hope had 
grown gray hairs, Hope had mourning on," this 
memory remained. Then out into the miraculous 
sunsets of the west coast of Ireland went many an 
Irish family to reach this Island of Great Desire, 
and truly were they not mistaken in their jour- 
neys, for abounding hospitality and consolation 
in plenty awaited them and a fine future of noble 
living. Ajid it is our boast that our emigrants 
have contributed not insignificantly to the build- 
ing up of America. We allow ourselves, therefore, 
to feel that we, too, may to an extent share your 
greatness. 

All small nations owe a special debt of gratitude 
to the United States for its strong and unceas- 
ing efforts for world peace. Through your efforts 
we have been spared the unlimited horrors of 
modern war and have thereby been able to main- 
tain unscathed our Christian, democratic, and 
free way of life. 

It has been your honor to have exercised the 
greatest power on earth in accordance with the 
high principles of justice. It has, indeed, been 
well said that you ai'e apt for power. If you do 
but maintain your power as the servant of your 
rectitude, the world's future will be in good hands. 
I pray that it may be so. You will not need en- 
couragement from me to ignore the misunder- 
standings and misrepresentations with which your 
foreign policy has been met in certain lands, for 
ingratitude is the first of the sins of man. But 
I can assure you that the free critical intelligence 
of my countrymen has not faulted your intention. 

History has inextricably intertwined the for- 
tunes of our two countries, and it is an easy task 
to come on such a mission as mine. I have the 
sense of having traveled far only to find myself 
at home. It was the Irish statesman, Henry Grat- 
tan, who said that the ocean unites, and in the 
west of my country we say that the next parish 
is America. 

Time has not fulfilled nor realized the optimist's 
dream. Its passage has not exclusively brought 



564 



improvement to the human situation. Indeed, 
some of the developments we have witnessed have 
confronted mankind with the ultimate decisions 
about life. Nevertheless, it was your great Amer- 
ican judge, Oliver Wendell Holmes, who said : 

I think it not improbable tliat man, like the grub that 
prepares a chamber for the winged thing It never has 
seen but is to be — that man may have cosmic destinies 
that he does not understand. 

This has been the heart of the Christian message, 
imparted to all of us, that man has such cosmic 
destinies ; and it is good that the people of America 
and of Ireland can share together the Christian 
hope. 



Atoms-for-Peace Agreement Signed 
by Ireland and U.S. 

On March 16 the Atomic Energy Commission 
and the Department of State (press release 141) 
announced that representatives of Ireland and 
the United States had on that day signed a pro- 
posed agreement for cooperation in research in the 
peaceful uses of atomic energy.^ The agreement 
was negotiated within the framework of Presi- 
dent Eisenhower's atoms-for-peace program. 

The agreement was signed for Ireland by Am- 
bassador John J. Hearne. The Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of State for European Affairs, C. Burke 
Elbrick, and I^wis Strauss, Chairman of the 
Atomic Energy Commission, signed for the United 
States. 

Under the proposed agreement, the Government 
of Ireland will receive information as to the de- 
sign, construction, and operation of research re- 
actors and their use as research, development, and 
engineering tools. It is contemplated that pri- 
vate American citizens and organizations would be 
authorized to supply to the Irish Government, or 
to authorized private persons under its jurisdic- 
tion, appropriate equipment and services. 

The proposed agreement further provides that 
the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission will lease to 
the Irish Government for use in research reactors 
up to 6 kilograms (13.2 pounds) of contained 
U-235 in uranium enriched up to a maximum of 
20 percent U-235. Ireland assumes resix)nsil)ility 
for using and safeguarding the fissionable mate- " 
rial in accordance with the terms of the proposed 

' For text of a similar agreement with Turkey, Ini- 
tialed on May 3, 1955, see Bitlletin of July 11, 1955, p. 55. A 

Deparlmenf of Sfafe BuUelin (Im 



J 



agreement. The agreement provides for the ex- 
change of unclassified information in tlie research 
reactor field, related health and safety problems, 
and on the use of radioactive isotopes in physical 
and biological research, medical therapy, agri- 
culture, and industry. 

Looking to the future, the agi'eement expresses 
the hope and expectation of the parties that this 
initial agreement for cooperation will lead to con- 
sideration of further cooperation in the peaceful 
uses of atomic energy. 

This proposed cooperative agreement will en- 
able the Irish to enliance their own country's train- 
ing and experience in nuclear science and engi- 
neering for the development of peaceful uses of 
atomic energy, including civilian nuclear power 
within the framework of the atoms-for-peace 
program. 

Under the provisions of the U.S. Atomic Energy 
Act of 1954, certain procedural steps must be 
taken by the executive and legislative branches of 
the United States Government before the agree- 
ment signed may enter into force. 



Earthquake Disaster in Lebanon 

Following are the texts of messages sent to 
President Camille Chamoun of Lebanon iy Presi- 
dent Eisenhower on March 19 ( White House press 
release dated March 20) and hy Acting Secretary 
Hoover on March 17 {press release llfi) . 

Message From President Eisenhower 

News of the tragic consequences of the earth- 
quakes in Lebanon has been received with sorrow 
and concern throughout the United States. On 
behalf of the American people I send deepest sym- 
pathy to Your Excellency and to all those who 
are suffering in this disaster. 

Message From Acting Secretary Hoover 

The news of Lebanon's earthquake disaster has 
been yidely reported in the U.S. On behalf of 
this Government and the American people, I 
hasten to send Your Excellency heartfelt condo- 
lences on the loss of lives that has resulted and 
deepest sympathy to the bereaved families and 
others in distress, particularly in Chauf and the 
villages of Mt. Lebanon and South Lebanon. 



Prime Minister of India 
To Visit United States 

White House press release dated March 20 

The Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal 
Nehru, has accepted the President's invitation to 
visit the United States. It has now been found 
that a visit immediately following the conclusion 
of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Confer- 
ence in London would be mutually agreeable. 

It is expected that Mr. Nehru will arrive in the 
United States on July 6 or 7 and will depart on 
July 10 or 11. The visit will be an informal one, 
and discussions between the President and Prime 
Minister Nehru will cover matters of mutual in- 
terest between the two countries. 

The President has offered to have the Presi- 
dential plane bring the Prime Minister from Lon- 
don and return him there upon completion of 
his visit. 



CongratuBatory Messages to Pakistan 
on Republic Day 



MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT EISENHOWER 

White House press release dated March 22 

The President sent the follotoing letter on March 
21 to General IsJcander Mirsa, President of 
Pakistan, on the occasion of the celebration of Re- 
public Day, Pakistan's new national holiday, 
March 23, 1966. 

Dear Mr. President: On the occasion of 
Pakistan's establishment as a Republic within the 
Commonwealth, I send my greetings and best 
wishes, as well as those of the j^eople of the United 
States, to you and through you to the people of 
Pakistan. The United States will be represented 
at the attendant ceremonies by the United States 
Ambassador to Pakistan [Horace A. Hildreth] 
and by a Special Representative, the Honorable 
Jefferson Caffery, one of our most distinguished 
citizens. 

The inauguration of Pakistan's constitution 
represents an important milestone in Pakistan's 
development as a modern, democratic state, re- 
sponsive to the needs and aspirations of its people. 
The long efforts of Pakistan's leaders in drafting a 



April 2, 1956 



565 



constitution based on democratic principles have 
culminated in well-deserved success. Because of 
the close ties of friendship between our countries, 
the people of the United States are particularly 
happy to send expressions of good will on this 
memorable day in Pakistan's history. 

I am confident that under your inspiring leader- 
ship Pakistan will continue to make progress in 
advancing the welfare of its people. 

May I exjjress my good wishes for success in 
these worthy endeavors. 
Sincerely, 

DwiGHT D. Eisenhower 

MESSAGES FROM SECRETARY DULLES 

Press release 156 dated March 22 

Secretary Dulles on March 21 addressed the fol- 
lowing congratulatory messages to Prime Minister 
Chaudhri Mohamad Ali and Foreign Minister 
Hamidul Huq Ghoudhury of Pakistan. 

Secretary Dulles to the Prime Minister 

Dear Mr. Prime Minister : I want to extend to 
you my warmest congratulations on the coming 
into effect of Pakistan's constitution and the estab- 
lishment of Pakistan as a Republic within the 
Commonwealth. Despite formidable difficulties 
Pakistan has established an impressive record of 
achievement in many fields since its independence 
but a few years ago. The adoption of a constitu- 
tion represents another important stride in 
Pakistan's advance. It is our belief that the estab- 
lishment of a Republic in Pakistan marks the be- 
ginning of a new era of progi-ess and growth for 
your country. 

I greatly enjoyed my recent visit to Pakistan on 
the occasion of our successful Seato meeting. I 
shall long cherish the kindness and hospitality ex- 
tended to me by the people of Pakistan. 
Sincerely yours, 

John Foster Dulles 

Secretary Dulles to the Foreign Minister 

Dear Mr. Minister: On the occasion of 
Pakistan's establislunent as a Republic within the 
Commonwealth I offer my best wishes to you and 
to the people of Pakistan. The adoption of a con- 
stitution guaranteeing the preservation of funda- 
mental human rights is evidence of your country's 
deep attachment to democratic principles and is an 



566 



event of which all the people of Pakistan may be 
truly proud. 

The United States looks forward to a continua- 
tion of the close cooperation wliich has charac- 
terized our common exertions for safeguarding the 
peace. Pakistan's contribution to the collective 
defense efforts of the free woi-ld is a reassurance 
to its friends and I am sure it is also a source of 
pride to Pakistan's own leaders and people. 
Sincerely yours, 

John Foster Dulles 



Note to Japanese Government 
on Pacific Nuclear Tests 

Press release 158 dated March 23 

Following is the text of a note concerning th£ 
forthcoming nuclear tests in the Pacific which was 
delivered iy the Department of State to the Em- 
bassy of Japan on March 19. 

The Acting Secretary of State presents his com- 
pliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of 
Japan and has the honor to refer to the note from 
the Embassy of Japan dated January 25, 1956,^ 
requesting assurances of compensation in the event 
of damage or economic loss arising from the forth- 
coming nuclear tests in the Pacific, and the Em- 
bassy's note dated February 14, 1956,' transmit- 
ting the resolutions of the Japanese Diet urging 
suspension of nuclear tests and expressing the 
strong wish of the Government of Japan that 
earnest consideration be given to the realization 
of the desire of the people of Japan as expressed 
in these resolutions. 

The United States is second to none in its desire 
for the safeguarded control and reduction of 
armaments, including nuclear weapons. Presi- 
dent Eisenhower has led the way toward world 
cooperation to achieve this goal. In his address 
to the United Nations General Assembly on De- 
cember 8, 1953,^ he stated, 

. . . the United States pledges before you — and therefore 
before Ihe world — its determination to help solve the fear- 
ful atomic dilemma — to devote its entire heart and mind 
to find the way by which tie miraculous inventiveness of 
man shall not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated 
to his life. 

At the Summit Conference in Geneva last sum- 



' Not printed. 

' Bulletin of Dee. 21, 1953, p. 847. 



Department of State Bulletin 






mer, President Eisenhower proposed an exchange 
of bhieprints and a system of aerial inspection.^ 
Most recently, in his letter of March 1, 1956, to 
Premier Bulganin of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Kepublics,^ the President stated that : 

In my judgment, our efforts must be directed especially 
to bringing under control tbe nuclear threat. As an im- 
portant step for this purpose and assuming the satisfactory 
operation of our air and ground inspection system, the 
United States would be prepared to work out, with other 
nations, suitable and safeguarded arrangements so that 
future production of fissionable materials anywhere in 
the world would no longer be used to increase the stock- 
piles of explosive weapons. With this could be combined 
my proposal of December 8, 1953, "to begin now and con- 
tinue to make joint contributions" from existing stockpiles 
of normal uranium and fissionable materials to an inter- 
national atomic agency. These measures, if carried out 
adequately, would reverse the present trend toward a 
constant increase in nuclear weapons overhanging the 
world. My ultimate hope is that all production of fission- 
able materials anywhere in the world will be devoted ex- 
clusively to peaceful purposes. 

The United States recognizes and strongly sym- 
pathizes with the humane motivations which in- 
spired the resolutions of the Japanese Diet, but is 
constrained to point out that the problem of sus- 
pending nuclear weapons tests cannot be treated 
separately from the establishment of a safe- 
guarded and controlled disarmament program. 

The United States Government is convinced 
tliat the proposed nuclear tests are vital to its own 
defense and the defense of the free world because 
the possession and competence in the use of nuclear 
weapons by leading nations of the free world are 
the chief deterrent to aggression and to war. In- 
ternational agreement to abandon tests without 
effective safeguards against the clandestine de- 
velopment of new weapons would involve a reli- 
ance by the United States upon the good intentions 
of certain nations not justified by the record of 
their actions in the past. 

The United States Government is convinced 
that no world-wide health hazard exists from the 
past or planned tests. In this connection the 
United States proposed a resolution ' unanimously 
adopted by the United Nations Tenth General 
Assembly establishing a scientific committee on 
radiation, of which Japan is a member, to facili- 



='/6i(i., Aug. 1,1955, p. 173. 
' lUd., Mar. 26, 1956, p. 514. 
' For text, see ibid., Nov. 21, 1955, p. 855. 



tate jDooling and distribution of all available scien- 
tific data on the effects of radiation upon man and 
his environment. During the forthcoming tests 
the United States will make every effort to elimi- 
nate any danger and to minimize any inconven- 
ience to maritime commerce and fishing. 

It cannot be regarded as established on the basis 
of present information that substantial economic 
losses will result from the establishment of the 
danger area. Military exercises are a traditional 
use of the high seas, and the Government of the 
United States considers that inconvenience for 
other traditional uses which may result therefrom 
is not compensable as a matter of right. 

In view of precautions which will attend the 
tests and the widespread dissemination of infor- 
mation with respect to maximum permissible 
levels of radiation, the United States Government 
anticipates no economic losses from radioactive 
contamination of marine life. 

The United States Government is prepared, 
however, in the interest of the fullest understand- 
ing and cooperation between the two countries : 

1. To examine with the Japanese Government 
the consequences for Japanese maritime activities 
resulting from establishment of the danger area, 
to which end consultations have already begun ; 

2. To make its experts available for any further 
consultations which the Japanese Government 
may desire upon radiation standards and maxi- 
mum permissible levels of radiation, and to con- 
sider arrangements for maximum feasible ex- 
change of information on the effects of radiation 
on marine life ; and 

3. If after the test series has ended, any evidence 
is officially presented that substantial economic 
losses for Japan or Japanese nationals have been 
incurred as a result of establishment of the danger 
area and the tests, to give fm-ther consideration to 
the question of compensation in the light of any 
such evidence. 

In conclusion the Acting Secretary wishes to 
give the assurance that the United States continues 
only such tests as are essential to the strength of 
the free world defense and security. It has sought 
and will continue to seek with renewed efforts a 
system for a safe-guarded and controlled disarm- 
ament program which ultimately may lead to the 
type of action envisaged by the resolutions of the 
Japanese Diet. 



April 2, J 956 



567 



Visa Applications Cut Off for Refugees 
Indigenous to Far East 

Press release 147 dated March 19 

Because of the heavy oversubscription for the 
3,000 visas allotted by the Kefugee Relief Act 
to refugees who are indigenous to the Far East, the 
Department of State announced on March 19 that 
it will accept no new applications for such visas 
after midnight March 26, 1956. 

As of March 9, 1956, 1,863 of the 3,000 visas 
had been issued and the number of applications on 
hand greatly exceeds the number of visas remain- 
ing to be issued. 

In instructions to the consulates. Pierce J. Ge- 
rety, Deputy Administrator of the act, empha- 
sized that : 

1. The cutoff would not apply to orphan appli- 
cants residing in the Far East who are processed 
under another section of the act. 

2. The cutoff would not apply to nonindigenous 
refugees residing in the Far East or to refugees of 
Chinese ethnic origin who have passports en- 
dorsed by the Chinese Government. These cases 
are processed imder other sections of the Refugee 
Relief Act. 

3. Since assurances for refugees indigenous to 
the Far East received after the cutoff' date will 
not be processed under the Refugee Relief Act, 
such assurances will be sent to the appropriate 
consular authorities to permit the applicant to es- 
tablish a priority registration date mider the nor- 
mal annual quota of the Immigration and Nation- 
ality Act. 

Similar cutoffs have been announced by the De- 
partment of State for Greece and Italy,^ where 
sufficient cases are on hand to cover the 17,000 
visas allocated to Greece and the 60,000 visas 
allocated to Italy under the Refugee Relief Act. 

As of March 9, 1956, the total worldwide issu- 
ance of visas under the Refugee Relief Act was 
89,742. Despite the assured success of the pro- 
gram in Greece, Italy, and in the indigenous refu- 
gee category in the Far East, sponsors continue 
to be needed f oi' refugees in Germany, the Nether- 
lands, and Austria, as well as for refugees in 
Italy and Greece who have been processed but are 
still lacking sponsors. 



^ Bulletin of Dec. 5, 1955, p. 917, and Jan. 2, 1956, p. 16. 
568 



Eximbank Credit to Philippines 
for Industrial Growth 

A credit of $65 million for development of the 
economy of the Republic of the Philippines was 
announced on March 8 by Samuel C. Waugh, 
president of the Export-Import Bank of Wash- 
ington, at a joint press conference with Miguel 
Cuaderno, governor of the Central Bank of the 
Philippines. 

The credit was authorized by the Board of Di- 
rectors of the Export-Import Bank for the pur- 
pose of contributing to the industrial growth and 
financial progress of the Philippines through a 
series of loans for expansion and diversification of 
the economy of the Republic. The Board also ex- 
pressed its particular pleasure, in view of the 
close friendship which exists between the Philip- 
pines and the United States, in being able to make 
this financial assistance available as an expression 
of confidence of the U.S. Government in the future 
prospects of the Philippines. 

The loans will be made to either public agencies 
or private concerns and will provide for purchase 
in the United States, for export, of machinery, 
equipment, material, and services required for 
various projects. 

Fifty million dollars will be made available di- 
rectly in favor of public and private entities to 
assist them in financing large-scale projects that 
may be apjiroved on a case-by-case basis by the 
Eximbank. 

Fifteen million dollars will relate primarily to 
small private industrial-expansion projects and 
will be made available either directly in favor of 
the Central Bank of the Philippines or upon rec- 
ommendation of the Central Bank and approval 
of the Export-Import Bank, to the Rehabilitation 
Finance Corporation, Philippine National Bank, 
and commercial banks in the Philippines. These 
credits are for the purpose of enabling the Central 
Bank to assist Philippine enterprises in meeting 
dollar requirements of appropriate transactions 
and for the purpose of enabling the Central Bank 
and public and private Philippine lending institu- 
tions to assist Philippine enterprises in connection 
with purchases in the United States. 

The Export- Import Bank indicated it is pre- 
pared to consider the following general types of 
developments for financing under the credit 
authorization : 

Department of State Bulletin 



1. Projects designed to reduce Philippine de- 
pendence on imported raw materials and find out- 
lets for its growing labor surplus ; 

2. Development of timber and mineral resources 
in order to reduce the country's dependence on a 
few agricultural products as the chief source of 
foreign exchange; 

3. Expansion of basic service industries, such 
as power and transportation, to service a gi'owing 
economy; and 

4. Reduction of future foreign-exchange re- 
quirements through development of industries 
consuming domestic materials or imported mate- 
rials at an earlier processing stage. 

Terms of the loans will vary, depending upon 
the nature of each. Smaller loans, coming under 
the $15 million aspect of the program, will run in 
general for 5 years, while loans in the $50 million 
part of the pi'ogram, for larger projects, will be 
of longer duration. Interest rates also will vary 
slightly, case by case. 

Mr. Waugh advised Governor Cuaderno that, 
in establishing the $65 million credit, it is the 
Eximbank's hope that the Philippine Govern- 
ment and private enterjDrises in the Philippines 
will be able to make use of credit through specific 
loans in the immediate future to the mutual ad- 
vantage of both nations. 

Under the administration of President Magsay- 
say the Philippine Government has encouraged 
an industrial development program which will 
greatly strengthen the economic stability of the 
Republic. Under this program the hydroelectric 
potential of the Agno River in northern Luzon is 
under development and the proposed Binga Dam 
is now under consideration. 

The new $65 million credit is in addition to $5 
million Eximbank credit extended in 1954 to 
lending institutions in the Philippines, upon rec- 
ommendation of the Central Bank. 



U.S. Proposal to Burma 

To Exchange Technicians for Rice 

The U.S. Government has proposed to the Gov- 
ernment of the Union of Burma an agreement 
under which the United States would exchange 
the services of American technicians for about 
10,000 tons of rice, the International Cooperation 

April 2, 1956 



Administration announced on March 12. The new 
technicians-for-rice agreement proposed by the 
United States would enable Burma to pay for the 
services of needed technicians which, because of a 
shortage of dollar resei'ves, it could not otherwise 
obtain. 

Upon conclusion of such an agreement, the 
United States would immediately make $1 million 
available to Burma to enable its Government to 
hire U.S. technicians. Burma would then repay 
the United States in local currency. It is antici- 
pated that this local currency would then be used 
to provide up to 10,000 tons of rice for shipment 
to Pakistan to help avert a severe food shortage in 
East Pakistan. The United States has already 
agreed to provide about 165,000 tons of U.S. sur- 
plus rice to Pakistan under titles I and II of Public 
Law 480 to meet the food shortage. 

Recently Burma concluded an agreement with 
the United States under which it will buy about 
$21 million worth of U.S. surplus cotton, dairy 
products, tobacco, and fruit.' Payments for these 
commodities, too, will be in Burmese currency. 
This agreement, under title I of Public Law 480, 
will permit Burma to increase consumer imports 
without drawing on its limited dollar foreign- 
exchange reserves. 

There is no U.S. aid program in Burma at pres- 
ent. From 1950 to 1953, however, about $19 mil- 
lion was spent by the United States in technical 
cooperation programs there. Since that time the 
Burmese Goveriunent has continued to employ the 
services of several groups of U.S. technicians orig- 
inally sent to Burma through the U.S. technical 
cooperation program. 



Escape-Clause Relief on Acid-Grade 
Fluorspar Held Unnecessary 

White House press release d-ited March 20 
White House Announcement 

The President on March 20 announced that he 
has acted on the United States Tariff Commis- 
sion's report of its escape-clause investigation re- 
lating to acid-grade fluorspar by accepting as the 
findings of the Tariff Commission the findings of 
the three Commissioners who concluded that the 



' BtJLLETiN of Feb. 20, 1956, p. 308. 



569 



domestic industry is not present!}' experiencing 
serious injury, that it is not faced with a threat of 
serious injury, and that escape-clause relief is not 
warranted. The other three Commissioners found 
no present serious injury but did find a threat of 
such injury and recommended that the 1951 con- 
cession on acid-grade fluorspar, reducing the tariff 
from $5.60 per long ton to $2.10 per long ton, be 
withdrawn in full. 

Under present law, in escape-clause cases where 
the Tariff Commission is equally divided, the 
President is authorized to accept the findings of 
eitlier half of the Commission as the findings of 
the Commission. 

The President's decision was taken only after 
he had consulted with interested departments and 
agencies in the executive branch of the Govern- 
ment. 

This application for escape-clause relief is sepa- 
rate and distinct from the domestic industry's ap- 
plication under last year's so-called national 
security amendment to the Trade Agreements 
Extension Act of 1951. The latter application is 
still pending before the Director of the Office of 
Defense Mobilization. 

The Tariff Commission's report was submitted 
to the President on January 18, 1956.^ 

The text of the President's letters to the Chair- 
men of the Senate Finance and the House Ways 
and Means Committees [Senator Harry F. Byrd 
and Representative Jere Cooper] is as follows: 

Text of President's Letter to Chairmen of Congres- 
sional Committees 

Dear Mr. Chairman : The United States Tariff 
Commission on January 18, 1956 submitted to me 
a report of its escape clause investigation relating 
to acid grade fluorspar. The Commission's inves- 
tigation was made pursuant to Section 7 of the 
Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, as 
amended. 

The members of the Commission are equally di- 
vided on the question of whether relief is war- 
ranted. Under present law, I am authorized to 
consider the findings of either group of Commis- 
sioners as the findings of the Commission. 

The three Commissioners who concluded that 
escape clause relief is warranted found no existing 
serious injury to the domestic acid grade fluorspar 

'Copies may be obtained from tbe U.S. Tariff Commis- 
sion, Washington 25. D.C. 



industry but did find a threat of such injury. 
These three Commissioners recommend that the 
tariff on imports of acid grade fluorspar, which 
was reduced in 1951 from $5.60 per long ton to 
$2.10 per long ton, be restored in full. 

The other three Commissioners do not find that 
the domestic industry is currently experi- 
encing serious injury, nor do they find it threat- 
ened with serious injury. They report that they 
do not detect any strong probability that the con- 
ditions of the industry in the immediate future 
will be less favorable than at present. They con- 
clude that no basis exists for granting escape 
clause relief. 

After full consultation with interested depart- 
ments and agencies of the Executive Branch, I 
have decided to accept, as the findings of the 
Commission, the findings of the three Commis- 
sioners who held no escape clause relief to be neces- 
sary at this time. 

This application for escape clause relief is sep- 
arate and distinct from the domestic industry's 
application under last year's so-called national se- 
curity amendment to the Trade Agi'eements Ex- 
tension Act of 1951. The latter application is 
pending before the Director of the Office of De- 
fense Mobilization. 
Sincerely, 

DwiGHT D. Eisenhower 



Current Legislation on Foreign Policy: 
84th Congress, 2d Session 

Japanese-American Evacuation Claims Act. Report to 
accompany H. R. 7763. H. Rept. 1809, February 23, 
1956. 15 pp. 

Situation in the Middle East. Hearing before the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations. February 24, 1956. 
73 pp. 

Further Amending Section 20 of the Trading with the 
Enemy Act, Relating to Fees of Agents, Attorneys, and 
Representatives. Report to accompany S. 1146. S. 
Rept. 1603, ITebruary 27, 1956. 4 pp. 

Cargo Preference and Its Relation to the Farm Surplus 
Disposal Program. Report pursuant to section 136 of 
the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Public Law 
601, 79th Congress. H. Rept. 1818, February 27, 1956. 
30 pp. 

Reorganization of the Passport OflBce. Report of the 
Senate Committee on Government Operations. S. Reptj 
1604, March 1, 1956. 25 pp. 

Reorganization of the Passport Office. Report to accom- 
pany S. ,S;!40. S. Rept. 1605, March 1, 1956. 8 pp. 

Exemption of Certain Foreign Travel from Tax on Trans- 
portation of Persons. Report to accompany H. R. 5265. 
S. Rept. 1607, March 1, 1956. 12 pp. 

Amending the United States Information and Exchange 
Act of 1948, as Amended. Report to accompany S. 2562. 
S. Rept. 1608, March 1, 1956. 5 pp. 



570 



Deparfmenf of State Bulletin 



INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES 



Calendar of Meetings ' 

Adjourned During March 1956 

U.N. Trusteeship Council: Standing Committee on Petitions . . . New York Jan. 3- Mar. 31* 

ICAO Special North Atlantic Regional Air Navigation Meeting . . Paris Feb. 20-Mar. 3 

U.N. Trusteeship Council: Standing Committee on Administrative New York Feb. 21-Mar. 31* 

Unions. 

Inter-American Travel Congresses: 2d Meeting of Permanent Exec- Lima Feb. 27- Mar. 3 

utive Committee. 

International Telecommunication Union: Meeting of Chairmen of Geneva Feb. 29-Mar. 8 

Seven CCIT and CCIF Study Groups. 

ITU International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR): Study New York Mar. 5-18 

Group XI, Color Television Demonstrations. 

U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Human Rights: 12th Session . . . New York Mar. 5-29 

SEATO Council Karachi Mar. 6-8 

ILO Governing Body: 131st Session Geneva Mar. 6-10 

U.N. ECAFE Subcommittee on Electric Power Bangalore Mar. 7-12 

Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences: 1st Meeting of 'Turrialba (Costa Rica) . . . Mar. 8-10 

Technical Advisory Council. 

UNICEF Executive Board and Program Committee New York Mar. 12-23 

WMO Regional Association VI (Europe) : 2d Session Dubrovnik (Yugoslavia) . . Mar. 12-24 

U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Status of Women: 10th Session . . Geneva Mar. 12-28 

U.N. Scientific Committee on Effects of Atomic Radiation: 1st New York Mar. 14-24 

Session. 

Inter- American Specialized Conference on the Conservation of the Ciudad Trujillo (Dominican Mar. 15-28 

Natural Resources of the Continental Shelf and Marine Waters. Republic). 

U.N. ECE Coal Committee Geneva Mar. 21-22 

U.N. ECAFE Railway Subcommittee: 4th Session New Delhi Mar. 25-31 

Meeting of Canadian-Mexioan-United States Heads of Government White Sulphur Springs (W. Mar. 26-28 

Va.). 

U.N. ECE Timber Committee Geneva Mar. 26-28 

I In Session as of Marcli 31, 1956 

North Pacific Fur Seal Conference Washington Nov. 28- 

International Fair for Peace and Progress Ciudad Trujillo (Dominican Dec. 20- 

Republic) . 

GATT Contracting Parties: 1956 Tariff Negotiations Geneva Jan. 18- 

U.N. Trusteeship Council: 17th Session New York Feb. 7- 

U.N. International Wheat Conference: 2d Session Geneva Feb. 20- 

International Atomic Energy Agency: Working Level Meeting on Washington Feb. 27- 

Draft Statute. 

U.N. Disarmament Commission: Subcommittee of Five (recon- London Mar. 19- 

vened). 

8th International Congress of the Vineyard and Wines Santiago Mar. 21- 

4th International Exhibition of Drawings and Engravings Lugano (Switzerland). . . . Mar. 29- 

U.N. ECAFE: 4th Regional Conference of Statisticians Bangkok Mar. 29- 

Scheduled April 1-June 30, 1956 

ICAO: 3d Caribbean Regional Air Navigation Meeting Ciudad Trujillo (Dominican Apr. 3- 

Republic). 

' Prepared in the Ofl5ce of International Conferences, Mar. 23, 1956. Asterisks indicate tentative dates and places. 
Following is a list of abbreviations: U.N., United Nations; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; CCIT, 
International Telegraphic Consultative Committee (Comity consultatif international tdlegraphique) ; CCiF, International 
Telephone Consultative Committee (Comity consultatif international t61(5phonique) ; ITU, International Telecommuni- 
cation Union; CCIR, International Radio Consultative Committee (Comitc consultatif international des radiocommuni- 
cations) ; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; SE.ATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization; ILO, International Labor 
Organization; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; UNICEF, United Nations Children's Fund; 
WIVIO, World Meteorological Organization, ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; GATT, General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; FAO, Food and Agri- 
culture Organization; UPU, Universal Postal Union; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; SUNFED, Special 
United Nations Fund for Economic Development; ECLA, Economic Commission for Latin America; UNREF, United 
Nations Refugee Fund; WHO, World Health Organization; CIGRE, Conference Internationale des grands reseaux elec- 
triques; PASO, Pan American Sanitary^Organization. 

April 2, 1956 571 



Calendar of Meetings — Continued 

Scheduled April 1-June 30, 1956 — Continued 

ITU International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR) : Study London Apr. 3- 

Group XI, Color Television Demonstrations. 

ILO Petroleum Committee: 5th Session (reconvened) Geneva Apr. 4— 

U.N. Economic Commission for Europe: 11th Session Geneva Apr. 5- 

International Exhibition on Instrumentation-Automation Oslo Apr. 9- 

UNESCO Executive Board: 43d Session Madrid Apr. 9- 

ITU International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR) : Study The Hague Apr. 10- 

Group XI, Color Television Demonstrations. 

6th Inter-American Travel Congress San Jos6 (Costa Rica) . . . Apr. 12- 

FAO Committee on Commodity Problems: Working Party of Con- Rome Apr. 16- 

sultative Subcommittee on Rice. 

U.N. ECOSOC Statistical Commission: 9th Session New York Apr. 1&- 

WMO Executive Committee: 8th Session Geneva Apr. 17- 

U.N. Economic and Social Council: 21st Session New York Apr. 17- 

ITU International Telegraphic Consultative Committee (CCIT) : London Apr. 17- 

h'- Study Group IV, Phototelegraphy and Facsimile. 

UNESCO Conference on Asian-U. S. Cultural Relations United States Apr. 19- 

ITU Administrative Council: 11th Session Geneva Apr. 21- 

9th International Film Festival Cannes Apr. 23- 

South Pacific Conference: 3d Session Suva (Fiji) Apr. 23- 

ITU International Telegraphic Consultative Committee: Study London Apr. 23- 

Group V, Joint CCIT/CCIR Committee on Phototelegraphy. 

U.N. International Law Commission: 8th Session Geneva Apr. 23- 

U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Narcotic Drugs: 11th Session . . . Geneva Apr. 23- 

UNESCO Regional Conference on Free and Compulsory Education Lima Apr. 23- 

iu Latin America. 

Inter-American Port and Harbor Conference San Jos6 (Costa Rica) . . . Apr. 25- 

WMO Eastern Caribbean Hurricane Committee: 4th Session . . . Ciudad Trujillo (Dominican Apr. 25- 

Republic). 

U. N. Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Terri- New York Apr. 27- 

tories: 7th Session. 

5th International Philatelic Exhibition New York Apr. 28- 

ILO Coal Mines Committee: 6th Session Istanbul Apr. 30- 

UPU Executive and Liaison Committee Bern Apr. 30- 

International Sugar Council: 8th Session London April 

2d International Congress of Tribunals of Accounts Brussels* May 1*- 

Inter-American Cultural Council: 2d Meeting Lima May 3- 

Inter- American Ministers of Education: 2d Meeting Lima May 3- 

NATO: Ministerial Meeting of the Council Paris May 4- 

South Pacific Commission: 15th Session Suva (Fiji) May 4- 

UNESCO Intergovernmental Meeting on International Principles Palermo (Italy) May 4- 

Governing Archeological Excavations. 

U. N. ECOSOC Commission on International Commodity Trade: New York May 7- 

3d Session. 

U. N. Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of SUNFED: 1st New York May 7- 

Meeting. 

U. N. Trusteeship Council: Standing Committee on Petitions . . . New York May 7- 

International Cotton Advisory Committee: 15th Plenary Meeting . Washington May 8- 

9th World Health Assembly ." Geneva May 8- 

UNESCO Regional Seminar on Curriculum for Latin America . . Lima May 9- 

ILO Building, Civil Engineering, and Public Works Committee: 5th Geneva May 14- 

Session. 

U. N. ECE Housing Committee and Working Parties Geneva May 14- 

U. N. ECLA Committee of the Wliole: 5th Meeting Santiago May 19- 

Inter- American Technical Cacao Committee: 6th Meeting .... Salvador (Brazil) May 20*- 

UNESCO Conference on Cultural Integration of Immigrants . . . Caracas May 20- 

4th International Congress of Mediterranean Citrus Growers . . . Israel May 20- 

U. N. International Sugar Conference New York May 21- 

Caribbean Commission: 22d Meeting Cayenne (French Guiana) . May 21*- 

U. N. ECAFE Working Party of Senior Geologists on the Prepara- Tokyo May 22- 

tion of a Regional Geological Map for Asia and the Far East: 

2d Meeting. 

WMO Working Group on International Radiosonde Comparisons . Payerne (Switzerland) . . . May 23- 

FAO Technical Advisory Committee on Desert Locust Control: 6th Rome May 23- 

Session. 

UNREF Standing Program Subcommittee: 3d Session Geneva May 23- 

UNESCO Meeting of Experts on Radioisotopes Paris May 25- 

WHO Executive Board: 18th Session Geneva May 28- 

ILO Governing Bodv: 132d Session (and Committees) Geneva May 28- 

UNREF Executive "Committee: 3d Session Geneva May 28- 

34th Padua International Fair Padua (Italy) May 29- 

16th International Conference on Large Electric High Tension Sys- Paris May 30- 

tems (CIGRE). 

572 Department of State Bulletin 



Calendar of Meetings — Continued 



Scheduled April 1-June 30, 1956 — Continued 

U.N. ECAFE Subcommittee on Minerals Resources Development: 
2d Session. 

U.N. ECE Steel Committee 

() Inter-American Commission of Women : 1 1th General Assembly . . 

International Seed Testing Association: 11th Congress (Executive 
Committee Meetings June 1 and 10). 

U.N. Trusteeship Council: 18th Session 

PASO Executive Committee: 28th Meeting 

International Labor Conference (ILO) : 39th Session 

International Commission for Criminal Police: 25th General Meet- 



ing. 
International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries: 

Annual Meeting. 

World Power Conference: 5th Plenary Session 

FAO Committee on Commodity Problems: 27th Session . . . 

ICAO Assembly: 10th Session 

5th International Congress on Bridge and Structural Engineering 

U.N. ECE Coal Trade Subcommittee 

U.N. ECE Conference of European Statisticians 

UNESCO Intergovernmental Copyright Committee 

U.N. ECE Coal Classification Working Party 

International Meeting of Tonnage Measurement Experts . . . 



6th 



Tokyo May 30- 

(Undetermined) May 

Ciudad Trujillo (Dominican June 1- 

Repubhc). 

Paris June 4— 

New York June 4- 

Washington June 5- 

Geneva June 6- 

Vienna June 7- 

HaUfax June 11- 

Vienna June 17- 

Rome June 18- 

Caracas- June 19- 

Lisbon June 25- 

Geneva June 25- 

Geneva June 25- 

Paris June 25- 

Geneva .... June 26- 

Copenhagen . June 



Progress in the Territory 
of French Togoland 

Statement hy Benjamin Gerig ^ 

The most important single development in the 
life of the Togolese people under French adminis- 
tration is the imminent, fateful, and far-reaching 
choice which they will soon make concerning their 
political future. 

We were aware, of course, that following upon 
the events in the Gold Coast and British Togo 
a similar development in French Togo would nec- 
essarily take place. But mitil we heard the state- 
ment of the distinguished representative of France 
a few days ago we were still thinking in terms of 
years rather than months. 

Now, however, we are confronted with a situa- 
tion which in the very near future will require 
the Trusteeship Council and the General Assem- 
bly to cooperate with the Administering Authority 
in presenting to the people of French Togo the 
freedom to choose their destiny. 

We cannot but pause a moment to reflect what 
all this means to the people of Togo, to the Ad- 
ministering Authority, to the United Nations, and 
to the world. Freedom to choose one's destiny is 



" Made in the U.N. Trusteeship Council on Feb. 28 (U.S./ 
D.N. press release 2360). Mr. Gerig is Deputy U.S. Rep- 
resentative on the Trusteeship Council. 



a tremendous opportunity. It is an opportunity 
which in the past has sometimes been too long 
delayed, or perhaps denied altogether. Indeed, 
there are vast multitudes of people today who still 
hope to be able to make such a choice — and, I may 
add, they are not all in Africa. 

But to those who are given the opportunity it 
is also a tremendous responsibility. For a deci- 
sion of this kind once made cannot easily be un- 
done, and, indeed, it has elements of finality which 
will affect a people for all time to come. We feel, 
therefore, that as far as the Trusteeship Council 
is concerned in the matter we at least will want to 
exercise our part with the greatest care, conscious 
that we are dealing with destiny. 

New Technique of International Cooperation 

There will be many practical details to be 
worked out as experience in the case of British 
Togo has shown. We are imdoubtedly develop- 
ing a new teclinique of international cooperation, 
or, if you like, a kind of jurisprudence wliich, as 
our experience accumulates, will enable us to 
smooth the way for other people who, in their turn, 
will emerge to take their places among the free 
peoples of the world. 

Mr. President, as we listened to the thoughtful 
remarks of the two distinguished representatives 
of France, we were impressed with the way in 



Apr;; 2, J 956 



573 



which the Administering Authority is hiying the 
gi'oundwork for the people of this territory. No 
one knows, of course, what tlie people of French 
Togo will choose as to their future: association 
with France, with neighboring territories in 
Africa, or with some other state. We ourselves 
were not altogether clear as to what the status of 
a trust territory is, or would be, with respect to 
the French Union. We therefoi'e appreciated the 
clear-cut answer of the distinguished representa- 
tive of France to our question on this point when 
he said that an act of association between trust 
territories and the French Union would provide 
for the right of withdrawal. Thus, one of the 
choices which the Togolese people will have to 
make will permit them to exercise a relationship 
which is not only freely chosen but which will give 
them the basic attribute of independence. Indeed, 
Mr. President, my delegation considers that at 
the moment freedom of choice is offered to a people 
in a trust territory it is in fact as well as in theory 
exercising for that moment an act of independence. 
We know, of course, of a number of territories 
whose people have considered that complete inde- 
pendence is less desirable than some form of asso- 
ciation with another state or group of states — an 
association in which they may voluntarily transfer 
certain powers to another state to be exercised on 
their behalf. But whether this choice or any of 
the five outlined by the distinguished representa- 
tive of France is made, the occasion will be a 
momentous one for the people of Togoland. 

On the question of the time and method of 
granting freedom of choice, my delegation has 
only one comment. We consider that, when a 
people has shown itself to have the capacity to de- 
termine its future, the choice should be offered 
even before such people have all the institutions 
and attributes of a fully self-governing nation. 
We believe that in most cases self-determination 
should precede full self-government or independ- 
ence and that self-government or independence, 
or even the rejection of these goals, is a matter 
which people should freely be given the oppor- 
tunity to choose. Thus, we believe that the ex- 
perience which the United Nations has already 
gained in this matter tends to support the thesis 
put forward so logically and forcefully by the 
French delegation. 

And now I wish to comment, but only briefly, 
on several matters in the political, economic, social, 
and educational field. 



574 



Political Reforms 

The efforts of the Administering Authority to 
introduce political reforms throughout the Terri- 
tory of French Togoland during 1955 have been 
noted by my delegation with approval, and we 
would urge the progressive extension and expan- 
sion of the powers of the Territorial Assembly, 
as rapidly as possible, so that it may become a 
truly effective legislative organ representing the 
indigenous population. Likewise, we look for- 
ward to an extension of the powers of the Govern- 
ment Council — which is at present considered by 
the Government of France as a forerunner of a 
Cabinet — so that the Council may soon acquire the 
status of an executive body responsible to the 
Assembly. 

It is urged, moreover, that continued efforts be 
made to expand the powers of the District and 
Municipal Councils and to make them more rep- 
resentative of the indigenous inhabitants by the 
application of universal suffrage in the very near 
future. 



Economic Development 

As a supplement to the important developments 
in the political field which have occurred during 
the past year, the United States wishes to com- 
mend the Administration generally on its con- 
tinued efforts to improve the economy of the ter- 
ritory. It is a well recognized fact that, without 
economic progress, developments in the political, 
social, and educational fields would have little 
meaning since it is only with an adequate stand- 
ard of living that the population will have the 
desire or capacity to jirogress in other fields. 

We were encouraged during the debate on eco- 
nomic conditions to learn that recent discoveries 
in the territory of deposits of phosphate, bauxite, I' 
iron, and other minerals may be an important f 
factor in the territory's more rapid economic ad- [' 
vancement. We shall await with interest further 
details of these developments as well as efforts of 
the Administration to provide a port for the ter- 
ritory. Recognition by the Administering Au- 
thority that industries should be increased and ex- 
panded has likewise been noted by my delegation 
as an encouraging sign. In this connection, we 
would suggest that attention be given in the near 
future to the establishment of a meat industry 
which would be of benefit to the inhabitants. 



! 



(1 



1, 



m 



Kill 






Further efforts worthy of mention and commenda- kjjjj 
Department of State Bulletin ^i^ 



ol 



tion are the introduction of more protein into the 
indigenous diet by the development of a fish-farm- 
ing industry, measures taken to increase the de- 
velopment of crops, to protect plants, and to 
improve generally the yield and methods of 
cultivation. 

Moreover, the increase of indigenous participa- 
tion in the economic life of the territory through 
small rural development schemes — including 
works in the field of agriculture, irrigation, drain- 
age, soil conservation, and markets — ^have been 
noted with approval. We should like to suggest 
that, in addition to the measures already taken 
to improve the road network, attention should 
be given by the Administering Authority particu- 
larly to improving and developing secondary and 
feeder roads which will be extremely important to 
the overall progress and development of the 
territory. 

Lastly, my delegation would urge that the Ad- 
ministration continue to give serious considera- 
tion to the jjossibility of following up the Ten- 
Year Plan, which will end in 1957, by another plan 
on the same line so that there will be no stoppage 
of progress in the field of economic development. 

Health and Medical Services 

Steps taken in the field of health and medical 
services have been noted with approval by my 
delegation — and especially the measures taken to 
combat various diseases throughout the territory. 
The adoption of a family allowance plan during 
1955 pursuant to the labor code of 1952 — as an aid 
in helping to reorganize the family structure and 
to improve the status of women — is also considered 
as a constructive measure. My delegation would 
like to suggest in the field of social progress that 
further attention be devoted by the Administering 
Authority to the suggestion of the Visiting Mis- 
sion to improve the conditions in the penal institu- 
tions throughout the territory. 

On the unduly protracted discussion as to what 

! is meant by the term "elite," it is our opinion that 

*"1 the differences of view which are expressed reflect 

r I a difference in semantics rather than of substance. 

w'^l French and English usages of the terra "elite" 

iTitflare markedly different. But we believe that in 

every society leaders in every walk of life will 

lift emerge. And this leadership will become en- 

»iibT 'trusted with the political, economic, and social 

life of the people. It cannot be otherwise in 

French Togoland. 



risf 



In conclusion, my delegation believes that the 
rapid political progress now under way in the 
territory reemphasizes the urgent need for better 
facilities for higher education. We were pleased 
to note that 69 scholarships for study in France 
were awarded to pupils from secondary schools in 
1954. In view of the territory's growing need 
for qualified African personnel, however, we hope 
that ways and means will be found to provide addi- 
tional higher educational facilities for Togoland- 
ers, both in France and in Africa. 

On the whole, we consider, therefore, that the 
outlook for the Territory of French Togoland is 
one of hopeful progress in all major fields; and 
while we realize that much remains to be done, we 
consider that the Administering Authority merits 
the sympathetic support and commendation of 
the Trusteeship Council for the constructive guid- 
ance which it is giving to the peoples of this 
territory. 



Attainment by Trust Territories 

of Self- Government or Independence 

Statements iy Benjamin Gerig ^ 

U.S. VIEWS ON COLONIALISM 

U.S./U.N. press release 2361 dated February 29 

The trend of the present-day aspects of colonial- 
ism was clearly brought out at the Bandung 
conference, to which the representatives of the 
Soviet Union just referred. There it was pointed 
out by a number of speakers, and rightly, that, 
while colonialism was receding in other parts of 
the world, a new and worse form of colonialistic 
imperialism was developing in Eastern Europe 
and elsewhere. 

We agree with the Soviet representative that we 
cannot overlook the problem of colonialism. As 
to one type of colonialism, the Trusteeship 
Council is doing constructive work — not always, 
I am sorry to say, with the amount of disin- 
terestedness which would be desirable. But on 
the whole I believe our work has been effective. 

Now as to the proposal of the Soviet delegate 
on attainment of self-government, we adopted a 
resolution at our previous session on this question, 
the main paragraph of which instructs the Draft- 

' Made in the U.N. Trusteeship Council on Feb. 29 and 
Mar. 1. 



llApri/ 2, 1956 



575 



ing Committee to prepare appropriate conclu- 
sions and recommendations on this subject.^ 

Mr. President, the General Assembly in its later 
resolution ^ requested the Council to insure that 
the procedure devised by it should be fully com- 
plied with and called on the Council to imple- 
ment our own resolution. "We have certainly 
begun to do that, but our new method has not yet 
even had the time to prove itself in one session, 
while the Soviet representative is now proposing 
that it be set aside for something else. 

The U.S. delegation thinks that the present 
resolution now on the books should be given time 
to work out, and we believe that the method pro- 
posed will work effectively. Therefore, my dele- 
gation proposes that the Council take note of the 
General Assembly resolution.* 

With respect to the reference which the Soviet 
delegate made on the question of nuclear testing, 
I don't know whether the Council considers that 
that subject has any relevance to the item now 
under discussion. We feel that there is no rela- 
tion, but the Council may wish to decide on this 
matter and we will have an opportunity to discuss 
it at that time. 

NUCLEAR TESTS IN TRUST TERRITORIES 

U.S./U.N. press release 2363 dated March 1 

Everyone, of course, understands the propa- 
ganda motives which lie behind the proposal of 
the Soviet representative regarding the holding 
of nuclear tests in trust territories. "Wlien the 
proposal was made yesterday, I said that we could 
not see what relevance a proposal concerning nu- 
clear testing could have with the item of attain- 
ment of self-government or independence, which 
was then under consideration. We believe his 
proposal was, and still is, out of order. However, 
we will waive this point, reserving our position on 

'U.N. doc. T/Res/1254(xvi). 

'U.N. doc. A/Res/946(x). 

'A U.S.-sponsored resolution (T/L.6-10/Rev. 1) was 
adopted by the Council on Mar. 16 by a vote of 10-2-2. It 
takes note of General As.sembly resolution 04G(X), in- 
structs the drafting committees on the annual reports of 
Trust Territories to prepare "appropriate draft conclu- 
sions and recommendations concerning the question of the 
attainment by the Trust Territories of self-government or 
independence," and reqiiests the Secretary-General to pre- 
pare a separate section of the Council's report to the Gen- 
eral Assembly "containing the information indicated in the 
General Assembly resolutions referred to above, and the 
conclusions and recommendations of the Council thereon." 



576 



the procedure, and we are fully prepared to deal 
with the subject forthwith. 

Let me state first of all that we of this Council 
must continue to hope that those organs of the 
United Nations which are working to bring about 
an effective plan of armaments control will reach 
a basis of agreement so that the testing of such 
weapons now being carried on by the United King- 
dom and the U.S.A., and which were conducted 
within the last 4 months by the Soviet Union, will 
become unnecessary. 

Mr. President, let me repeat what everyone 
knows, that in the absence of effective interna- 
tional agreement, safeguarded by adequate inspec- 
tion to limit or control armaments, preparations 
must still be made to develop methods of defense 
against nuclear attack, and for the maintenance 
of international peace and security. 

It is not my purpose — and we think the Trustee- 
ship Council would in any case not be the place — 
to debate tlie broad issues involved in the question 
of nuclear tests as they are being carried on by 
various countries. Otlier organs of the United 
Nations are dealing with the disarmament prob- 
lem, of which this question is a part, and the 
United States will contribute everything within 
its power in these bodies to achieve an effective 
solution. 

Indeed, since 1946, when the general question 
first came before the United Nations, my Govern- 
ment has urged the adoption of an effective and 
dependably controlled program of disarmament. 
The day tliis progi-am becomes a reality, nuclear 
testing will become unnecessary. 

Mr. President, certain aspects of this question 
were before the Trusteeship Council in July 1954 
in connection with nuclear testing at the Pacific 
Proving Grounds. At that time this Council rec- 
ommended that "if the Administering Authority 
considers it necessary in the interests of world 
peace and security to conduct further nuclear ex- 
periments in the Territory, it take such precau- , 
tions as will ensure that no inhabitants of the ■ 
Territory are again endangered. . . ." ^ 

With respect to the forthcoming tests, my Gov- 
ernment, in conformity with the resolution which 
the United States unreservedly supported, will ' 
see to it that all feasible precautions are taken to 
avoid endangering any inhabitants of the terri- 
tory or any other peoples and will notify air and 



K 



F 



' Bulletin of July 26, 1954, p. 139. j, ji 

Department of State Bulhtlnmi 



sea traffic of the details of the warning area well 
in advance of the commencement of the operations. 
For these reasons my delegation considers that 
the proposal of the Soviet Union should be re- 
jected. As far as the trust territory under U.S. 
administration is concerned, the question is en- 
tirely covered by the previous resolution to which 
I have referred. My delegation will consequently 
vote against the Soviet draft resolution.* 



TREATY INFORMATION 



Technology Agreement With Japan 

Press release 153 dated Marcli 22 

The Department of State announced on March 
22 the signing of an agreement with Japan to 
facilitate the exchange of patent rights and tech- 
nical information for defense purposes. The 
agreement was signed in Tokyo, March 22, 1956, 
by Mamoru Shigemitsu, Jaipanese Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, and by Jolin M. Allison, United 
States Ambassador. It will enter into force upon 
receipt by the United States of notification that 
Japan has approved the agreement in accordance 
with its legal procedures. 

The agreement is expected to foster the ex- 
change of technology for defense purposes be- 
tween the two Governments and between the pri- 
vate industries of the two countries. Thus it 
should be of reciprocal benefit in pi'oviding for 
national defense and in contributing to mutual 
* defense. 
' The agreement is the latest to be signed of a 
'" series being negotiated with the Nato countries 
f' and with Japan. Other agreements of this nature 
have been signed with Italy,^ the United King- 



* On Mar. 2 the Soviet representative withdrew his pro- 
posal (U.N. doc. T/L. &i2 dated Feb. 29). 

'Oct. 3, 19.j2; provisionally in force. 

'Jan. 19, 19.53. For text see Treaties and Other Inter- 
national Acts Series 2773. 

'Bulletin of Nov. 8, 1954, p. 712. 

'Ibid., July 11, 19.5.5, p. 84. 

'Ibid., Jan. 16, 1956, p. 104. 



dom,^ Belgium,^ Norway,* the Netherlands,* 
Greece,* and the Federal Republic of Germany.^ 

These agreements recognize that privately 
owned technology should, to the greatest extent 
practicable, be exchanged through commercial 
agreements between owners and users. They also 
stipulate that rights of private owners of patents 
and technical information should be fully recog- 
nized and protected in accordance with laws ap- 
plicable to such rights. Other provisions are in- 
tended to assure fair treatment of private owners 
when they deal directly with a foreign govern- 
ment and also in cases in which private informa- 
tion communicated through government channels 
might be used or disclosed without authorization. 
Tlie agreements also provide for the establishment 
of arrangements by which owners of patentable 
inventions placed under secrecy by one govern- 
ment may obtain comparable protection in the 
other country. 

The agreements also provide that, as a general 
rule, government-owned inventions shall be inter- 
changed for defense purposes on a royalty-free 
basis. 

Each of the agreements provides for the es- 
tablisliment of a Technical Property Committee to 
be composed of a representative of each Govern- 
ment. The Technical Property Committee is 
charged with general responsibility for making 
recommendations to the two Governments on any 
matters relating to the agreement which are 
brought before the committee by either Govern- 
ment, either on its own behalf or on behalf of its 
nationals. One of the specific functions of the 
committee is to make recommendations to the Gov- 
ernments, either in particular cases or in general, 
concerning disparities in their laws affecting tlie 
compensation of owners of patents and technical 
information. 

Policy guidance for the United States repre- 
sentatives on the Technical Property Committees 
is provided by the Interagency Teclmical Prop- 
erty Committee for Defense, which is chaired by 
the Department of Defense and includes repre- 
sentatives of the Departments of State, Justice, 
and Commerce, the International Cooperation Ad- 
ministration, and the Government Patents Board. 
This coimnittee is assisted by an industry advisory 
gz'oup representing major sectors of American in- 
dustry concerned with defense production. 



^,^,Apn7 2, J 956 



577 



Current Actions 

MULTILATERAL 

White Slave Traffic 

Agreement for the repression of the trade in white women. 
Signed at Paris May IS, 1904. Entered into force July 
18,1905. 35 Stat. 1979. 
Adherence deposited: Mexico, February 21, 1956. 

BILATERAL 

Bolivia 

Agreement providing for an informational media guar- 
anty program pursuant to section 1011 of the United 
States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 
1948, as amended (62 Stat. 6; 68 Stat. 862). Effected 
by exchange of notes at La Paz February 27 and March 
10, 1956. Entered into force March 10, 1956. 

Germany 

Arrangement concerning the exchange of information 
relating to the illicit traffic in narcotics. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Washington January 17 and 
August 24, 1955, and March 7, 1956. Entered into 
force March 7, 1956. 

Iceland 

Agreement relating to tlie addition of tuna to the types 
of fish excepted from item 718 (b) of schedule II of the 
trade agreement of August 27, 1943 (57 Stat. 1075). 
Effected by exchange of notes at Reykjavik March 5 
and 6, 1956. Enters into force April 14, 1956. 

Ireland 

Agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic 
energy. Signed at Washington March 16, 1956. Enters 
into force on the day on which each Government shall 
receive from the other Government written notifica- 
tion that it has complied with all statutory and con- 
stitutional requirements. 

Japan 

Agreement to facilitate interchange of patent rights and 
technical information for defense purposes. Signed at 
Tokyo March 22, 1956. Enters into force upon receipt 
by the United States of notification that Japan has 
approved the agreement in accordance with its legal 
procedures. 

Pakistan 

Agreement amending article II of the surplus agricultural 
commodities agreement of January 18, 1955 (TIAS 
3184). Signed at Karachi February 9 and 25, 1956. 
Entered into force February 25, 1956. 

Peru 

Agreement extending for a period of 4 years from July 31, 
1956, the naval mission agreement of July 31, 1940 
(54 Stat. 2344), as extended. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Washington January 27 and March 14, 1956. 
Entered into force March 14, 1956. 



PUBLICATIONS 



Recent Releases 

For sale hy the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Gov- 
ernment Printing Office, Washinyton 25, D. C. Address 
requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, ex- 
cept in the cdse of free publications, which may he ob- 
tained from the Department of State. 

Mutual Defense Assistance, Disposition of Equipment 
and Materiel. TIAS 3447. Pub. 6244. 3 pp. 5^. 

Understanding between the United States and Iraq. Ex- 
change of notes — Signed at Baghdad December 3, 1955. 
Entered into force December 3, 1955. 

Technical Cooperation, Program for Economic Develop- 
ment in the Departments of Caldas, Cauca, and Valle del 
Cauca. TIAS 3451. Pub. 6249. 10 pp. 10«(. 

Agreement between the United States and Colombia. Eix- 
change of notes — Signed at Bogota July 29 and November 
15 and 28, 1955. Entered into force November 28, 1955. 

Mexican Agricultural Workers. TIAS 3454. Pub. 6252. 

5 pp. 50. 

Agi-eement between the United States and Mexico, ex- 
tending agreement of August 11, 1951, as amended and 
extended. Exchange of notes — Dated at Mexico December 
23, 1955. Entered into force December 23, 1955. 

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 3455. Pub. 

6253. 2 pp. o(,K 

Agreement between the United States and Spain, amend- 
ing agreement of April 20, 1955 — Signed at Madrid Octo- 
ber 20, 1055. Entered into force October 20, 1955. 

Air Transport Services. TIAS 3456. Pub. 6254. 2 pp. 5^. 

Agreement between the United States and Canada, amend- 
ing schedule 2 of agreement of June 4, 1949. Exchange of 
notes — Dated at Ottawa November 22 and December 20, 
1955. Entered into force December 20, 1955 

Technical Cooperation, Additional Assistance for Artibo-«|,, 
nite Valley Project. TIAS 3457. Pub. 6255. 5 pp. 5^.K 

Agreement between the United States and Haiti. Ex-f 
change of notes — Signed at Washington December 27| 
and 28, 1955. Entered into force December 28, 1955. 

Defense, Use of Practice Bombing Range Near Cuxhaven 
(Germany) by United States Air Force. TIAS 3458. Pub.J 
6258. 4 pp. 5«;. 

Agreement between the United States and the Federal' 
Republic of Germany, supplementing agreement of August 

6 and 28, 1954, as amended. Exchange of notes — Dated 



at Bonn/Bad Godesberg and Bonn November 7, 14, anc 
29, 1955. Entered into force November 29, 1955. 



578 



Department of State Bullelh 



ki 






April 2, 1956 



Index 



Vol. XXXIV, No. 875 



Africa 

Clarification of U.S. Policy Toward North Africa 
(Dillon) 

Visit of Deputy Prime Minister of Rhodesia and Nyasa- 
land 

Agricnltnre. U.S. Proposal to Burma To Exchange Tech- 
nicians for Rice 



American Republics. Pan American Day and Pan Ameri- 
can Week, 1956 (text of proclamation) 

Asia 

Chiefs of Mission in Far East Meet at Tokyo 

A Report on Asia (Dulles) 

Visa Applications Cut Off for Refugees Indigenous to 
Far East 

Atomic Energy 

Atoms-for-Peace Agreement Signed by Ireland and U. S. . 
Ntite to Japanese Government on Pacific Nuclear Tests . 
Philippines Chosen as Site for Asian Nuclear Center . 

Burma. U.S. Proposal to Burma To Exchange Technicians 
for Ilice 

Claims and Property. Soviet Payment of Damages for 
U.S. Navy Plane (text of Soviet note) 

Congress, The 

Current Legislation 

Escape-Clause Relief on Acid-Grade Fluorspar Held Un- 
necessary (Eisenhower) 

Recommendations for 1957 Mutual Security Program 
(Eisenhower, Hoover) 

Economic Affairs 

Escape-Clause Relief on Acid-Grade Fluorspar Held Un- 
necessary (Eisenhower) 

Eximbauk Credit to Philippines for Industrial Growth . 

France 

Clarification of U.S. Policy Toward North Africa 

(Dillon) 

Congratulatory Messages on Signing of French-Tunisian 

Protocol (Hughes, Dillon) 

Progress in the Territory of French Togoland (Gerig) . 

India. Prime Minister of India To Visit United States . 

International Organizations and Meetings. Calendar of 
Meetings 

ffreland 

(Atoms-for-Peace Agreement Signed by Ireland and U.S. . 

Visit of Prime Minister Costello of Ireland (Nixon, 

Costello) 

(Japan 

Kote to Japanese Government on Pacific Nuclear Tests . 
( technology Agreement With Japan 

Lebanon. Earthquake Disaster in Lebanon (Eisenhower, 
t Hoover) 

ililitary Affairs. Soviet Payment of Damages for U.S. 
Navy Plane (text of Soviet note) 

Mataal Security 

Recniunien(hitions for 1957 
(Eisenhower, Hoover) . 

.4 Keport on Asia (Dulles) .' .' 

rechuology Agreement With Japan 

Von-Self-Governing Territories 

Attainment by Trust Territories of Self-GOTernment or 

Independence (Gerig) 

Progress in the Territory of French Togoland (Gerig) . 

Pakistan. Congratulatory Messages to Pakistan on Re- 
public Day (Eisenhower, Dulles) 



Mutual Security Program 



Philippines 

Jsimbank Credit to Philippines for Industrial Growth . 
:'ljilippines Chosen as Site for Asian Nuclear Center . . 

'residential Documents 

^Jiigratulatory Messages to Pakistan on Republic Day . 

'earthquake Disaster in Lebanon 

Escape-Clause Relief on Acid-Grade Fluorspar Held Un- 
necessary 

'an American Day and Pan American Week, 1956 ! '. '. 
tecommendations for 1957 Mutual Security Program . . 

'nblications. Recent Releases 



553 
552 

569 

544 

543 
539 

568 

564 
566 
544 

569 

559 

570 
569 
545 



569 

568 



553 

552 
573 

565 

571 

564 
560 

566 
577 

565 

559 



545 
539 
577 



575 
573 



565 



568 
544 



565 
565 

569 
544 
545 

578 



Refngees and Displaced Persons. Visa Applications Cut Off 

for Refugees Indigenous to Far East 568 

Treaty Information 

Atoms-for-Peace Agreement Signed by Ireland and U.S. . 564 

Current Actions 578 

Technology Agreement With Japan 577 

Tunisia. Congratulatory Messages on Signing of French- 
Tunisian Protocol (Hughes, Dillon) 552 

United Nations 

Attainment by Trust Territories of Self-Government or 

Independence (Gerig) 575 

Progress in the Territory of French Togoland (Gerig) . 573 

U.S.S.R. 

A Crucial Contest With the Communist World (Murphy) . 556 
Soviet Payment of Damages for U.S. Navy Plane (text of 

Soviet note) 559 

Name Index 

Costello, John A 560 

Dillon, C. Douglas 553 

Dulles, Secretary 539, 566 

Eisenhower. President 544, 545, 565, 570 

Gerig, Benjamin 573, 575 

Hoover, Herbert. Jr 550,565 

Hughes, Morris N 552 

Murphy, Robert 556 

Nehru, Jawaharlal 565 

Nixon, Richard M 560 

Welensky, Roy 552 



Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: March 19-25 

Releases m.-jy be obtained from the News Division, 
Department of State, Washington 25, D. C. 

Press releases issued prior to March 19 which ap- 
pear in thi.s issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 136 of 
March 14, 137 of March 15, and 141 of March 16. 

Subject 

Conant : "Freedom and Slavery in a 
Divided Germany." 

Cutoff of visa applications in Far East. 

Soviet payment in Neptune case. 

Hoover message on Lebanon earth- 
tjualie disaster. 

Hoover testimony on mutual security 
program. 

Mills nominated Ambassador to Af- 
ghanistan. 

Assignments of economic officers in 
Europe. 

Technology agreement with Japan. 

Message to Bey of Tunis. 

Message to France on Tunisia. 

Dulles messages on PalJistan Kepublic 
Day. 

Murphy : "A Crucial Contest With the 
Communist World." 

Note to Japan on Pacific nuclear tests. 

Dulles : "A Report on Asia." 

Visit of Deputy Premier of Federa- 
tion of Rhodesia and Nyasaland 
(rewrite). 

* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the BtJLLEniN. 



No. 


Date 


tl46 


3/19 


147 
148 
149 


3/19 
3/19 
3/17 


150 


3/20 


*151 


3/20 


*152 


3/21 


153 
154 
155 
156 


3/22 
3/22 
3/22 
3/22 


157 


3/23 


158 
159 
160 


3/23 
3/23 

3/24 



U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: I9S6 




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Government Printing Office 

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Washington 25, D. C. 



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Seato is a defensive alliance by which Australia, France, 
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Vol. XXXIV, No. 876 



April 9, 1956 




FREEDOM AND:SLAVERY IN A DIVIDED GERMANY 

• by Ambassador James B, Conant 583 

TASKS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FOREIGN 

SERVICE • Remarks by Secretary Dulles 588 

EAST-WEST TRADE • Statement by Under Secretary 

Hoover 619 

AN OUTLINE OF THE MUTUAL SECURITY PRO- 
GRAM FOR 1957 • Statement by John B. Hollister ... 605 

THE DEVELOPMENT OF UNITED STATES POLICY 
IN THE NEAR EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA 

DURING 1955: PART III • Article by Harry N. 
Howard 593 



For index see inside back cover 



;t:r)er 



ntcrT^e.Tit of Documents 

MAY 9 - 1956 



,Jne z/^eha^yl^C'Tit ci^^ c/ta^e 







bulletin 



Vol. XXXIV, No. 876 • Publication 6314 
April 9, 1956 



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Note: Contents of this publication are not 
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Freedom and Slavery in a Divided Germany 



hy James B. Gonant 

Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany ^ 



When I last had the honor of being the Charter 
Day speaker 16 years ago, I spoke as a college 
president and I spoke about education. Having 
deserted the ranks of university administrators 3 
years ago, I now find myself speaking as the 
United States Ambassador to the Federal Re- 
public of Germany on the topic "Freedom and 
Slavery in a Divided Germany." 

If anybody had predicted in March 1940 that 
I should once again be invited to be a Charter Day 
speaker, I would have been highly flattered by the 
suggestion. But if anyone had predicted that I 
should be speaking as ambassador to a sovereign 
German nation with which we were bound in a 
military alliance, I would certainly have pro- 
claimed the would-be prophet an utter idiot ! For 
in 1940 Adolf Hitler's grip on Germany seemed 
unshakable; he had already invaded Poland after 
having overrun Austria and Czechoslovakia; 
World War II was in its first stages. I was among 
the many Americans who had long detested and 
loathed everything that Hitler and his cohorts 
stood for in Germany, and I was among those who 
were fearful that Germany under his control 
would soon conquer and enslave all Western 
Europe. Therefore, in those days any suggestion 
of my being an ambassador to Germany would 
have seemed not only ridiculous but highly 
repugnant. 

Now, I must confess that my knowledge of 
Germany in 1940 was incomplete. I did not 
realize that there existed at that very moment a 
not inconsiderable number of important Germans 
who felt exactly as I did about Adolf Hitler, his 
methods and his goals. But even if I had been 



^Charter Day address made at the University of Cali- 
fornia, Berkeley, CaUf., on Mar. 23 (press release 146 
dated Mar. 19). 



better informed about the internal situation in 
Germany, I could not have foreseen that, within 
two decades, from the ranks of the then dissenters 
from national socialism would come the leaders 
of a free Germany and that these leaders would 
determine the mood of a large proportion of the 
German people. 

In 1940 few Americans had ever heard of one 
Konrad Adenauer, who had bravely defied Adolf 
Hitler shortly before the Nazis seized the govern- 
ment and, as a consequence of his stand, had been 
driven out of office as Mayor of Cologne. Today 
everyone knows and honors the name of Chan- 
cellor Adenauer; but I suggest that it is impor- 
tant to remember that he, the present Chancellor 
of the Federal Republic of Germany, as well as the 
President of the Federal Republic of Germany, 
Theodor Heuss, and not a few of the political lead- 
ers in the separate states and in the Federal Re- 
public, were during the entire Nazi period lit- 
erally in danger of their lives. To me it is the first 
prerequisite for understanding Germany today to 
realize that these facts have had enormous influ- 
ence on the history of that country since 1945. 

The Spirit of Germany Today 

The spirit of Germany today is the spirit of 
a people who have repudiated the tyranny and 
brutality of the period of the Nazi rule. Perhaps 
some of my audience, still thinking in terms of 
1945, may question this generalization. If so, I 
suggest you have failed to understand how Hitler 
and his followers completely discredited them- 
selves by their actions during the last few years 
of the total war. 

The barbarous revenge which Hitler took after 
the attempt to destroy him by a bomb on July 20, 
1944, his senseless last-ditch resistance in Berlin 



Apr]] 9, 1956 



583 



when the war was clearly lost, his repeated state- 
ments that he would bring all Germany down in 
ruins about him, his orders to flood the mines and 
destroy the industry (orders which were never 
carried out) , all of these things are well known in 
Germany and have left their mark. So too have 
the revelations of the horrors of the concentration 
camps and the slaughter of the Jews. Therefore, 
speaking as a reporter of the German scene, I 
think it correct to state that the legend of Hitler 
and the Nazis is completely dead. If there should 
be another significant right radical movement in 
Germany, such a movement, I feel sure, will not 
employ the symbols of the Nazis or claim any con- 
nection with their history, their slogans, or their 
goals. 

I have dipped back into the history of the ter- 
rible years between 1933 and 1945 because I be- 
lieve that in order to understand Germany today 
one must first of all understand the mood in which 
most articulate Germans regard their immediate 
past. The second prerequisite for understanding 
our new ally, the Federal Republic of Germany, 
is to realize what has happened and is now hap- 
pening in the Soviet Zone. In other words, one 
must realize that, while some 50 million Germans 
are enjoying freedom, another 17 million are suf- 
fering under the slavery of an imposed conmiu- 
nistic system. Not only does the Iron Curtain 
run right through Germany, but the city of Ber- 
lin itself is split between a free Berlin protected 
by American, British, and French troops and an 
Eastern Sector ruled as is the zone by a puppet 
regime subservient to the Soviet masters. 

Contrasting Political Systems 

If one wants to study the contrast between a 
free society and the modern form of tyranny which 
finds its prototype in Soviet Russia, one cannot do 
better than to examine Germany today. Indeed 
if one wants to examine the situation in miniature, 
the city of Berlin provides the best example, for 
here the Iron Curtain is transparent ; one can see 
for oneself in the Soviet Sector what communism 
in action is really like. "Wliether one is interested 
in political science, economics, education, or the 
arts and letters, the contrast between the Soviet 
Zone of Germany and the Soviet Sector of Berlin 
on the one hand, and the Federal Republic of 
Germany and free Berlin on the other, is the con- 
trast of night and day. 

584 



Take, for example, the two political systems. 
In the Federal Republic freely elected state legis- 
lative assemblies and a freely elected national as- 
sembly, the Bundestag, successfully govern a dem- 
ocratic society; rival political parties wage elec- 
tion campaigns much as they do here in the United 
States. In the Soviet Zone the government is in 
theory based on an elected assembly and, in addi- 
tion to the Communist Party, in theoiy there are 
parties with other labels. Actually all political 
activity is but a puppet show with the controls 
in Soviet hands; there is neither freedom of as- 
sembly, of speech, nor of the press. 

The regime in the Soviet Zone carries the name 
"The German Democratic Republic," but what a 
travesty of democracy is actually in operation is 
evident from the election of a year ago. Like all 
elections in Soviet Russia and the satellite states, 
this election was a farce. A single ballot with a 
single list of candidates was handed to each voter 
as he entered the election booth ; he or she was ex- 
pected to deposit it forthwith in a ballot box ; the 
only opportunity the voter had for registering a 
dissent was to go over to a special corner and ask 
for a piece of paper and pencil to indicate dis- 
approval of the list. It is hardly necessary to 
point out that the officials in the booth were cer- 
tain to report any voter who acted as if he were 
living in a free land. Everyone in a police state 
is under duress; it is not surprising that a vast 
majority of the population of the Soviet Zone 
went to the polls and cast the required ballot. 
"Wliether, as reported, 99.9 percent of the voters 
voted yes, no one can say, but, when one considers 
the penalties of failure to toe the line, the figure 
may be factually correct. 

If there were free elections in the zone, there is 
little doubt that the communistic regime would be 
repudiated by an overwhelming vote. You will 
recall that on June 17, 2 years ago, a spontaneous 
uprising in East Berlin could only be put down 
by the Soviets' bringing in troops and tanks. The 
spirit of freedom which was symbolized by those 
young men who threw stones at the Soviet tanks 
still burns strongly, not only in East Berlin but 
throughout the zone — of that fact there can be 
no doubt. 

Over the last 3 or 4 years more than a million 
Germans have left the Soviet Zone — the refugees 
still swarm through Berlin at the rate of nearly 
a thousand a day. In an attempt to diminish this 
flood the government of the so-called "German 

Department of Sfafe Bulletin 



Democratic Republic" recently condemned to 
death two of its citizens because they were alleged 
to have advised their compatriots to migrate to 
the Federal Republic of Germany. This bar- 
barous sentence was denounced by a unanimous 
resolution of the Bundestag, the elected assembly 
of the Federal Republic of Germany. As a con- 
sequence of this protest and the incensed public 
opinion in the free world, the sentences have been 
commuted to life imprisonment, but they still re- 
main an example of the ruthlessness and brutality 
of a government of Soviet agents. 

If time permitted, I would like to tell you of 
the way the schools and the universities in the 
Soviet Zone have been remodeled to fit the Com- 
mmiist pattern, how all publications must con- 
form to the official line, how the industries have 
been nationalized and agriculture reshaped to 
conform to Communist ideology. Nationaliza- 
tion of industry, for example, has proceeded ahead 
of plan, and 85 percent of industrial output now 
comes from nationalized plants. In heavy indus- 
try the percentage is even higher — 94 percent. 
I only wish that those who in some free nations 
appear still to harbor illusions about the nature 
of communism would go to Berlin and visit there 
for a few days and talk to the refugees who have 
come from what the Communists declare to bo 
a workers' paradise but M-hich, in fact, is a terror- 
ized society of slaves. 

Prosperity in Western Germany 

In terms not only of freedom but also in terms 
of material prosperity there is a striking contrast 
between the Soviet Zone and the Federal Republic 
of Germany. What private initiative can do 
under a stable political system with a stable cur- 
rency has been demonstrated once again by the 
rebuilding of Western Germany. Recovery has 
proceeded at a most astonishing pace. Today 
there is little if any unemployment in Western 
Germany, the factories are rmming full blast, the 
export markets are expanding. Prosperity is to 
be seen at every turn. 

In the Soviet Zone, on the other hand, there 
are recurrent crises and food shortages: Despite 
the Five- Year-Plan promise to discontinue food 
rationing by 1953, rationing of meat, fats, sugar, 
milk, and potatoes continues, and shortages of 
these and many other food items are chronic, 
sometimes so severe that even the basic ration re- 
quirements cannot be covered for certain prod- 



ucts. This is partly due, of course, to the use of 
Commimist methods in agriculture, whose failure 
is reflected by the fact that crop yields in the zone 
are an average of 20 percent lower per hectare 
than in West Germany. Luxury goods are high 
priced and scarce; automobiles, in comparison to 
Western Germany, are rarely to be seen. 

When one realizes that these contrasts are before 
the eyes of the German voters, one is not surprised 
that the Communist vote in West Berlin and in 
the Federal Republic of Germany has been almost 
negligible. The Soviet model of so-called "de- 
mocracy" has no appeal to the Germans who can 
freely express their view. 

The Bundestag election of 1953 was higlily sig- 
nificant in this regard. Neither the Communist 
Party nor the right radical parties polled enough 
votes to place a single member in the national 
legislative assembly (the Bundestag). The elec- 
tion in free Berlin of the State Assembly in De- 
cember 1954 was equally decisive as showing a 
repudiation of radicalism of the right and left. 
There can be no doubt about the fact that a vast 
majority of the citizens of Germany who are free 
to vote have repeatedly demonstrated their com- 
mitment to a political system based on the dignity 
of the individual, private ownership of property, 
and parliamentary democracy which insures free- 
dom of speech, religion, and the press. 

Many Americans who have reported on Ger- 
many in the last few years have emphasized the re- 
markable prosperity of the Federal Republic. 
Indeed those who last saw the ruined German 
cities in 1946 can hardly believe their eyes when 
they revisit the same spots today. How was the 
amazing recovery accomplished, many ask. The 
answer is that several factors were involved. The 
currency reform of 1948 — an act of the three 
Western occupying powers — was the first essen- 
tial ; closely related was the creation of a govern- 
ment with a banking system that issued a stable 
currency. Indeed, if anyone ever needed evidence 
as to the importance of sound money, the recent 
history of Germany provides the material. From 
the close of the war until the summer of 1948 very 
little progress was made in rebuilding the cities 
and industrial plants, trade was largely on a barter 
basis, the stores were almost empty. But as soon 
as the new currency was introduced into the three 
Western zones, conditions changed almost over- 
night; people began to work, trade to function, 
recovery began. 



April 9, 1956 



585 



A year after the currency reform the first elec- 
tions under a new constitution were held, and 
shortly thereafter Adenauer was elected Chan- 
cellor by the Bundestag. The economic policy of 
his government — the policy of his Minister for 
Economics, Professor Erhard — proved admirably 
suited for the tasks which lay ahead. Private 
initiative and competition were encouraged, so- 
cialization of industry was rejected, tax laws were 
passed which enabled industry to put back its 
profits into plant reconstruction. And it has been 
largely by plowing back profits that the industrial 
recovery has taken place. 

Of course, the impetus given by American aid 
through the Marshall plan was of the greatest 
importance, and that this is so is freely acknowl- 
edged by Germans in all walks of life. All told, 
the American taxpayer has contributed some $3.5 
billion to the reconstruction of Germany. But I 
might note that no new aid has been given for 
the last 4 years except for the city of Berlin, whose 
situation as an outpost of freedom presents us 
with special problems. 

To the factors I have mentioned should be 
added three others in explaining German recov- 
ery. First, the attitude of the labor leaders who 
during the critical years refrained from pushing 
demands for increased wages. Second, the esprit 
de corps of the technical staff and working force 
in many factories which enabled these plants to 
start functioning again as soon as equipment could 
be put in order and raw materials obtained. 
Third, the well-known desire of the German people 
to work hard and effectively once a sound basis 
is at hand. 

Political Developments 

To describe the material reconstruction and eco- 
nomic recovery of Western Germany without men- 
tioning the political developments of the critical 
years, 1946 to 1951, would be to present a dis- 
torted picture. For unless there had been a rapid 
and satisfactory building of representative gov- 
eriunent, there would be no sovereign Germany 
today. The process started in the Western zones 
with the election of state legislative assemblies, 
which elections gave an opportunity for rival po- 
litical parties to present programs to the voters. 
Early in 1948 the three Western occupying jiowers 
authorized the governments of the separate states 
(then 10 in number) to convene an assembly 
charged with the task of drafting a constitution. 



or Basic Law, for a federated republic. A year 
later such a Basic Law was submitted to the sep- 
arate stat«s and ratified bj' a majority of the as- 
semblies. Then followed in the summer of 1949 
a national election of representatives of the lower 
house, the Bundestag, which in turn elected Kon- 
rad Adenauer as Chancellor that fall. The Basic 
Law provides for a national election every 4 years, 
and the second election took place in WSo, return- 
ing Chancellor Adenauer and his coalition govern- 
ment to power with a large majority. 

It would take too long to describe in detail the 
federal structure of the German Government. 
But there are one or two points of special interest. 
The upper house, the Bundesrat, is composed of 
delegates from the state governments, who vote 
as the state governments direct, each state hav- 
ing a certain number of votes allocated to it which 
are always cast as a unit. But not all laws passed 
by the lower house require the concurrence of the 
upper house — only those which affect the individ- 
ual states. A supreme court has the power of de- 
claring unconstitutional laws which in the opinion 
of the majority of the judges are contrary to the 
provisions of the Basic Law. Thus, this federated 
governmental structure is somewhat analogous to 
our own. 

At the same time, the Basic Laws provide for 
a parliamentary government, not a government of 
divided powei's as in the United States. But in 
order to avoid that plague of rapidly changing 
governments wliich has disturbed other European 
countries, the Basic Law contains a unique pro- 
vision. It is provided that a vote of no confidence 
in the Chancellor can only be presented as part 
of a motion which names his successor, and this 
motion must be adopted by a majority of the 
Bundestag by secret ballot. There is little doubt 
that this provision gave stability to the first gov- 
ernment of Chancellor Adenauer, which came into 
power by only a one-vote margin. 

The political history as well as the economic 
history of the last 10 years in West Germany is 
thus the story of the successful efforts of a free 
people. But even more striking is the record of 
the assimilation of more than 11 million expellees 
and refugees. When the war ended, about 40 mil- 
lion Germans were living within the area now 
under the jurisdiction of the Federal Republic. 
Into this portion of Germany came within a few 
months nearly 8 million Germans from the East. 
The job of finding living quarters and work for 



586 



Department of State Bulletin 



this influx can be imagined. In addition, more 
than 2 million Germans have fled from the Soviet 
Zone, many literally in danger of their lives. 

The danger that all these displaced families and 
individuals would form an unassimilated and 
hence dissatisfied fifth of the population was 
great. If this occurred, a breeding ground for 
radicalism of the right or left would clearly be 
at hand. Recognizing what was involved, the 
problem of the refugees was given high priority 
by the Federal Government and the separate 
states, each of which took its quota. Just as a 
bit of "social engineering," if I may use the term, 
the work of the officials involved in the gigantic 
task of resettlement deserves the highest praise. 
Today it is estimated that well over three-fourths 
of the refugees are fairly well integrated into new 
communities and have found suitable employment. 

Our New Ally 

Earlier in my remarks I spoke of the Federal 
Republic of Germany as our new ally. I referred, 
of course, to the fact that last May Germany be- 
came sovereign and entered the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization. The process of building 
up a German armed force as part of this organi- 
zation is now under way. And I may remark in 
passing that all the political parties are endeavor- 
ing to see to it that this army will not be a "state 
within a state." There is much concern with how 
a free democratic nation can have a large armed 
force which is both effective, completely loyal, and 
under civilian control. If concern with a prob- 
lem will produce the right solution, this difficult 
question will be correctly answered by fi'ee Ger- 
many today. 

Though our formal partnership with Germany 
as fellow members of Nato only began last May, 
we have been in fact allied with the free Germans 
in resisting Soviet aggression since the days of 
the Berlin blockade in 1948 and 1949. The suc- 
cess of the airlift and the brave stand of the in- 
habitants of Berlin made possible a significant 
victory for the free world. Furthermore, the 
struggle transformed the relationship of the 
American Armed Forces to the population. Le- 
gally our status continued to be that of an occupy- 
ing power. Actually, it was clear to all, we were 
in Berlin as a defending power. A partnership 
between Germans and Americans developed in 
the beleaguered city, and after the blockade was 



lifted the new relationship continued and grad- 
ually spread to cities and towns in the American 
Zone. 

After the invasion of Korea more than one high 
ranking official begged us to increase our military 
strength in Germany. We did so early in 1951, 
and this fact in itself was evidence that, while the 
legal status remained unchanged, our soldiers 
henceforth could only be regarded as defenders. 
Discussion soon started as to how the Germans 
themselves could participate in the defense of 
Europe by once again organizing military forces. 
In the meantime the formal relation remained un- 
changed, but the spirit was altered ; the German 
Government agreed to continue to pay what was 
known as occupation costs but which were recog- 
nized as in fact the Federal Republic's contribu- 
tion to the defense of Europe. 

I am told by those who were then in Europe 
that the winter of 1950-51 was a period of great 
fear. The possibility the Soviets might overrun 
an almost defenseless Germany and France was 
evident for all to see. Then came the strengthen- 
ing of our forces, the appointment of General 
Eisenhower as Commander in Chief of Nato; 
anxiety gradually diminished. But it has taken 
far longer than anyone then imagined to end for- 
mally the occupation of the territory of the Fed- 
eral Republic and provide a legal basis for a 
German armed contribution. 

At the moment it is only in the Soviet Zone that 
any large number of Germans are in imiform and 
carrying arms. The puppet government has 
armed and trained some 100,000 of its youth. One 
may well doubt whether these soldiers are either 
honored or respected by the population. Yet be- 
cause the power of the police state in the Soviet 
Zone is backed by the presence of Russian troops, 
tliere can be no question but that the regime has 
physical domination of the unfortunate inhabi- 
tants of the enslaved part of Germany. 

The Future of Germany 

"What of the future, you may ask. We are al- 
lied to the free peoples of Germany today in de- 
fense of Europe. The only government entitled 
to speak for them, the freely elected Government 
of the Federal Republic, is by its own declaration 
a provisional government, for it has been elected 
by only the inhabitants of what were once the 
American, British, and French Zones. Wliile 
praising its accomplishments and welcoming it as 



April 9, 1956 



587 



a partner, we must at the same time hope for its 
replacement by an all-German govermnent freely 
elected by the inhabitants of the Soviet Zone as 
well as by those of the Federal Republic. This 
is the paradox of the present, a result of the tragic 
split of Germany today. 

As the Governments of the United States, Great 
Britain, and France have repeatedly declared, 
there can be no hope of lasting peace and security 
in the world until German reunification is 
achieved, until an all-German government is estab- 
lished in Berlin. Wlien that day comes, the his- 
tory of the Federal Eepublic will have been con- 
cluded. 

I have tried to tell you something of its present 
achievements, material, political, and spiritual. 
It has restored the German people to a position 
of respect among free nations ; it is now our ally 
in the gigantic struggle of our times; its prob- 
lems are our problems. To cooperate effectively 
the United States and the Federal Republic must 
seek to understand each other. 



Tasks and Responsibilities 
of the Foreign Service 

Remarks hy Secretary Dulles ^ 

I am happy by my presence here to testify to 
the tremendous importance which I attach to the 
Foreign Service of the United States and my grati- 
fication that so many persons, some for the first 
time and others in midcareer, are going out into 
it with the special qualifications that you get 
from tlie Institute. 

As perhaps many of you know, my family has 
been identified with the Foreign Service of the 
United States for a long time, going back several 
generations. But when I recall some of those 
earlier days, I think how different the tasks and 
responsibilities were then from what they are 
today. They are just totally incomparable. 

I have traveled about a good bit, as you may 
have heard. I have been to a total, I believe, of 
38 foreign countries, and in each of those coun- 
tries I have made it a practice to ask the Am- 
bassador to bring together the members of the 
Foreign Service and of the related United States 



' Made on Mar. 29 at graduation exercises for Foreign 
Service officers graduating from the Foreign Service In- 
stitute (press release 167). 



services in that country. I have tried to take ad- 
vantage of my presence to have a little talk with 
them and to tell them what I think about the 
Foreign Service and its responsibilities today. 

To a greater extent than ever before in our 
history, the fate of our own national future — and 
I think one can fairly say of the future of most 
of the free world — rests upon the group of people 
who make up the Foreign Service of the United 
States. In time of war that responsibility rests 
upon the military services primarily. In time of 
assured peace the task of the diplomat — of the 
Foreign Service officer — may be an amiable one, 
reflecting what it was in the earlier days to which 
I referred. But in times like these the responsi- 
bilities of representing the United States abroad 
have become immense. There is today what is 
called a "cold" war. There is a struggle going 
on which is worldwide in scope. The danger con- 
stantly exists that that struggle could break from 
the so-called cold war into a hot war. We must 
realize that in every post the loss of the so-called 
cold war could have grave consequences not only 
in that country but in adjoining countries. 

As I was just saying to Secretary Henderson as 
we were coming down here from my office — there 
is no single post today that is not of great im- 
portance. I think there are about 80. The num- 
ber is increasing as new countries come into being. 
We have a few new countries every year now. At 
every one of these posts the problems are major 
and important, and a loss there — a breakthrough 
there — could have serious consequences, just as in 
time of war a breakthrough by the enemy at any 
point could have serious consequences all along 
the line. So it is today. 

Now, it used to be said that the practice of 
diplomacy for the people in the field is not com- 
plicated — that all they need to do is to deliver 
notes and to receive notes. But nothing could be 
further from the truth today. I believe that we 
perhaps went through a period when that was the 
case. But as things are now, on the basis of my 
observation, the personal qualities of the members 
of our Foreign Service are often the decisive ele- 
ment. It is particularly important that they de- 
velop the ability to make decisions, to report their 
observations and opinions in an understandable 
way, and to understand the point of view of their 
own Government or that of the Government to 
which they are accredited, as the case may be. 

I find that on my trips abroad it is most helpful 



588 



Department of State Bulletin 



to talk face to face with the Foreign Ministers of 
other countries. After such talks I am able to 
understand better their point of view and to ob- 
tain a better understanding of the despatches and 
cables that come to me. I can do that kind of 
thing in a certain number of countries once in a 
while. But the big task of helping me to such an 
understanding, of assisting me in obtaining the 
proper background, rests upon our Foreign Serv- 
ice officers. They have the task not only of under- 
standing and intei'preting accurately the point of 
view of the country to which they are accredited 
but equally the task of understanding the United 
States point of view and transmitting that in an 
acceptable way. 

It is sometimes easy for a Foreign Service offi- 
cer to get to feel that his job is to please the coun- 
try to which he is accredited. It is of course his 
job to keep on good relations with the peoples of 
the country to which he is accredited. But he 
must never forget that he is serving the United 
States. And it is vital that he have the capacity to 
understand United States foreign policy and to 
realize that that foreign policy is, as far as we 
can make it so, a coherent one. We don't make 
our foreign policy just to please the people of 
country "X," or country "Y," or country "Z." It 
may please country "X" and it may not please 
country "Y." "Well, that is tough on the Foreign 
Service people that live in country "Y." But it is 
a part of their job sometimes to face a tough 
situation. 

We receive reports — reports of the kind that 
some of you people who are graduating here today 
will be making from diil'erent posts. We put 
those reports together with similar reports that 
come in from other posts and use them in formu- 
lating our policy. When our policy decision goes 
out, it may not be the thing that you recommended. 
You may feel disappointed about it. It may make 
your job harder. But remember that the over- 
all strategies and policies are made by giving con- 
sideration to many factors. If something comes 
to you that you don't like, it's because we in the 
Department have received information from other 
sources which has led us to believe that the policy 
upon which we have decided is the best policy in 
the interest of the United States. Your job is to 
understand and make that policy understandable 
to the leaders of the governments to which you are 
accredited. That is a task which cannot be per- 
formed merely by delivering written notes or by 



receiving written notes. A personal element has 
reappeared today in these relationships to a very 
marked degree indeed. 

An illustration of the importance of personal 
relationships is the meeting which I attended the 
last 2 or 3 days at AVhite Sulphur Springs, where 
for the first time in history the President of the 
United States has met with the Heads of Govern- 
ment of the two countries to the north and south 
of us. What was our purpose? It was not to 
solve any problems. We had no concrete prob- 
lems on our agenda. It was to create conditions 
which would make problems which may arise more 
solvable. You who are in foreign posts will find 
that your task is not just to solve some concrete 
problem, although there will be plenty of prob- 
lems, but that you may also have the task of cre- 
ating relationships, creating understanding, so 
that when particular problems arise the atmos- 
phere will be such as to make those problems more 
solvable. This will be a tremendously exciting 
job. 

Those of you who are in the midcareer group 
already know the fascination, the burdens, the 
tasks, the responsibilities of the Service and are 
better qualifying yourselves to solve them as you 
go into senior positions. Some of you are just 
completing your beginning course and will be as- 
suming these tasks and responsibilities for the 
first time. 

I congratulate both gi'oups. I congratulate you 
not only on what you have accomplished to date 
but upon the future that lies ahead of you, the 
future which will not always be easy. 

In the talk I made last Friday night, after I 
came back from Asia,^ I emphasized that we must 
have more people who are willing to take on tasks 
of this sort, recognizing that the sacrifices are con- 
siderable, recognizing that they cannot be re- 
warded in material things since they are not sell- 
ing themselves in a market place to the highest 
bidder. We must have more people who recog- 
nize that it is the great American tradition to 
carry the American message, the knowledge of 
the American way of life and our ideals, to the 
four corners of the globe. That is what our Na- 
tion was founded for, really. 

The opening paragraphs of The Federalist pa- 
pers point out that it seems to be reserved for the 
American people by their example to show the 
other peoples of the world how a free form of so- 

= Bttlletin of Apr. 2, 19.56, p. 539. 



Apr// 9, 1956 



589 



ciety can be organized and that upon the success 
or failure of our experiment will depend the wel- 
fare of all humanity. That has been the concept 
of our Nation since its earliest days. It is the 
task of those of you who are graduating today 
to carry out that great American tradition. In 
this Institute you have been qualifying better to 
perform this task. I am sure that in carrying it 
out you will have satisfactions which can be 
gained in no other way. 



Canadian-IVlexicati-U.S. Meeting 
at White Sulphur Springs 

At the meeting of the Canadian-Mexican-United 
States Heads of Government at Wliite Sulphur 
Springs, W. Va., March 26 to 28, the three coun- 
tries were represented by the following delega- 
tions: 

Canada 

Louis S. St. Iiaurent, Prime Minister of Canada 

Lester B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs 

of Canada 
Arnold D. P. Heeney, Ambassador of Canada to the 

United States 
John W. Holmes, Assistant Under Secretary of State for 

External Affairs of Canada 

Mexico 

Adolfo Ruiz Cortines, President of the United Mexican 

States 
Luis Padilla Nervo, Minister of Foreign Relations of 

Mexico 
Manuel Tello, Ambassador of Mexico to the United States 

United States 

Dwight D. Elsenhower, President of the United States 

John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State of the United 

States 
Livingston T. Merchant, Assistant Secretary of State 
Henry F. Holland, Assistant Secretary of State 
Francis White, Ambassador of the United States to 

Mexico 
R. Douglas Stuart, Ambassador of the United States to 

Canada 



U. S. Makes Final Payment 
to U. N. Refugee Fund 

D.S./D.N. press release 2377 dated March 27 

Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., U.S. Eepresentative 
to the United Nations, on March 27 transmitted 
to the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
a check for $261,000 representuig the final pay- 

590 



ment by the United States on its 1955 pledge to 
the U.N. Refugee Fund. This brings to $1,006,000 
this country's 1955 contribution to the program 
which is designed to find permanent solutions to 
the problem of the European refugees made home- 
less by war and the political upheavals which fol- 
lowed. 

The U.S. pledge was for $1,200,000 for the cal- 
endar year 1955, but this was made on the under- 
standing that the U.S. contribution should not ex- 
ceed one-third of all governmental contributions 
to the fund. 

The President has recently asked Congress for 
an appropriation of $1,500,000 for the program 
for 1956 on a similar basis and has also requested 
that the unexpended balance for 1955 be carried 
over for use in 1956. In addition, the President 
has requested $800,000 for the first 6 months of 
1957; if appropriated, these funds would facili- 
tate advance planning for the program. 



Atoms-for-Peace Agreement 
With Thailand Signed 

Folloioing are the texts of statements made at 
Bangkok on March 13 hy Secretary Dulles and 
Prince Wan Waithayakon, Foreign Minister of 
Thailand, on the occasion of the signing of a Thair- 
U.S. agreement on the civil uses of atomAc energy. 



STATEMENT BY SECRETARY DULLES 

Today, with the signing of this agreement on 
the civil uses of atomic energy, Thailand and the 
United States have forged yet another link in their 
partnership for peace and human well-being. As 
we all know, this partnership goes back over a 
century. I am proud that American doctors, edu- 
cators, and experts in many fields have worked 
with Thai doctors, nurses, teachers, and tech- 
nicians to put to use the scientific advances in 
medicine and other fields. These Thai and 
American pioneers built the Thai- American part- 
nership on the solid foundations of mutual help 
and mutual respect as they labored together. With 
the inception of the Thai-U.S. economic coopera- 
tion program, this Thai-American joint effort was 
expanded and accelerated as new scientific dis- 
coveries and new skills were brought to bear in 
Thailand in the fields of agriculture, public health, 

Department of State Bulletin 



education, and transportation. Thai and Ameri- 
can experts, working side by side, have evolved 
improved breeds of rice, rid wide areas of malaria 
and other diseases, expanded water supplies and 
communications, and made higher education avail- 
able to many. In turn, Thailand has shared its 
skills in many of these fields with its neighbors 
and fellow members of the United Nations while 
in turn receiving aid in certain fields from inter- 
national organizations as well as the United 
States. We can look with deep satisfaction upon 
our joint achievements while pushing forward 
with the task of continuing to improve the con- 
ditions under which men live. 

Now science has put a wonderful new force 
within our grasp — the untold energy of the atom. 
The President of the United States, by his per- 
sonal sponsorship of the atoms-for-peace pro- 
gram, has shown the United States desire to share 
this knowledge and help provide equipment to its 
friends so that by pooling efforts the benefits of 
atomic science may be sooner and more effectively 
realized. To this end the United States has 
worked earnestly with the other nations prin- 
cipally involved toward the establisliment of an 
international atomic energy agency. Represent- 
atives both of Thailand and the United States 
have attended and contributed to a very successful 
international conference on peaceful uses of 
atomic energy held under the auspices of the 
United Nations in Geneva last summer. The 
United States has concluded a series of bilateral 
agreements with other nations of the free world 
providing for cooperative efforts in this vast new 
field. In signing this agreement here today, 
Thailand joins in this program designed to ad- 
vance the fi'ontiers of science for the benefit of 
mankind. This program is imaginative, excit- 
ing, and realistic. The agreement lays a basis 
for further cooperation between Thailand and the 
United States in this important field, including 
the establishment of an experimental reactor in 
Thailand. Radioisotopes to fight the ravages of 
disease can thus be made available to Thai hos- 
pitals and medical schools. A major source of 
training in this important technology would thus 
be set up in Thailand ; eight Thai scientists have 
already gone to the United States for training in 
the fundamentals of atomic science. 

We must not expect atomic science to work any 
sudden far-reaching miracles. We must carefully 
build up common knowledge, work out common 



problems, develop and share skills. Progress may 
well be slow in the beginning as we explore the 
complexities of atomic science. Here or any- 
where it is a long path from the scientific labora- 
tory to the engineering drawing board and to the 
completion of any project in this field. Yet ex- 
plorations in this field of atomic energy to date 
give stirring indications of the potential benefits 
to all men which we may some day realize. As 
we strive forward, we must display those char- 
acteristics of resourcefulness, devotion to duty, in- 
dustry, and mutual assistance and cooperation 
which characterized the work of those Thai and 
Americans who pioneered in the fields of medicine 
and applied sciences here in Thailand. 



STATEMENT BY PRINCE WAN 

It was indeed a great day in history, pregnant 
with unlimited possibilities of benefit to mankind, 
when President Eisenhower annoimced to the 
world through the United Nations his atoms-for- 
peace program. It stands as a landmark in his- 
tory because it marks the determination of man 
to harness this new potential source of energy for 
peaceful uses. It opens up a wide vista of untold 
benefits that will accrue to mankind. With the 
lofty spirit that inspires the American people 
your Government now offers to let the world share 
in the knowledge and experience you have gained 
in this new field of science. 

In this spirit your Government has already 
opened up your institutes to provide training for 
scientists from other coimtries. As you men- 
tioned, eight Thai scientists have already gone 
to the United States for this purpose and more 
will follow. An atomic research library is also 
being made available free to Thailand. I under- 
stand that the materials are already here and will 
shortly be presented by your Ambassador to His 
Majesty's Government. 

And now comes this agreement for cooperation 
between our two Governments in the establish- 
ment of an experimental reactor in Thailand and 
in making available to Thailand the requisite ma- 
terials for experiments in research in the peace- 
ful uses of nuclear energy to the end that diseases 
may be fought and other uses in agriculture and 
industry might follow later on. 

We recognize that, in your offer to let the world 
share in the program for peaceful uses of nuclear 



April 9, 1956 



591 



energy, your Government is moved purely by the 
noble desire to promote the happiness of mankind. 
As you aptly put it, Mr. Secretary, the program 
initiated by the agreement which we have just 
signed is designed to advance the frontier of sci- 
ence for tlie benefit of mankind. It is indeed 
imaginative, exciting, realistic, and, I might add, 
also extremely generous. We are deeply grateful 
for this assistance and gladly accept it in the spirit 
in which it is offered, for we know that no sinister 
motive lies behind it. It is offered to us in the 
same selfless spirit that moved American mission- 
aries and other humanitarian workers, men and 
women, to devote their untiring efforts, for well 
over a century now, to help our people in the pro- 
motion of their health and welfare. 

Mr. Secretary, this agreement is yet another 
testimony of the unshakable resolve of your Gov- 
ernment to promote the progress of mankind so 
that men can live in freedom and have the neces- 
sary conditions to develop their freedom. It is 
also another landmark in the history of Thai- 
American relationships which have grown and are 
growing ever closer and firmer every day. I am 
indeed proud and highly honored to be able to 
participate with you, Mr. Secretary of State, in 
this historical event. 



Sale of 129 Tons of Heavy Water 
in Atoms-for-Peace Program 

The Atomic Energy Commission on March 13 
announced approval of the sale of 129 tons of 
heavy water to six nations for assistance in their 
peacetime applications of atomic energy. Six- 
teen tons of the material have been shipped abroad. 

The initial consignments of 11 tons to Great 
Britain and 5 to France were manufactured at 
the Commission's plant at Dana, Ind. Heavy 



water also is produced at its facilities in South 
Carolina. All sales are at the price of $28 per 
pound announced August 8, 1955. 

Included in the 129-ton total was an additional 
11 tons for the Government of India. An original 
order of 10 tons for India, announced February 
12, 1955,^ was the first to be approved for this 
special reactor material under the President's 
atoms-for-peace program. The 21 tons will be 
used by the Government of India in a research 
reactor which the Government of Canada has an- 
nounced it plans to give India under the Colombo 
Plan. 

The total amounts approved for sale are as 
follows: United Kingdom, 50 tons; France, 30; 
India, 21; Australia, 11; Italy, 10; and Switzer- 
land, up to 7, with 2 tons to be delivered by Au- 
gust 1957. 

Britain will use the material in several of its 
civilian research reactors. The Swiss order is to 
go to Reactor, Ltd., the private group which car- 
ries on nuclear research in Switzerland and op- 
erates the pool-type research reactor purchased 
from the United States at the close of the atoms- 
for-peace confei-ence in Geneva last August. 

Heavy water is used as a moderator in several 
types of reactors to slow down the speed of neu- 
trons emitted in the splitting of atoms of the 
fissionable uranium-235. 



Mr. Allyn To Be U.S. Rep resentative 
to Eleventh Session of ECE ^ 

The Senate on March 28 confirmed Stanley C. 
Allyn to be a representative of the United States 
to the 11th session of the Economic Commission 
for Europe. 



' Bulletin of Mar. 7, 1955, p. 396. 



592 



Deparfmenf of State Bulletin] 



The Development of United States Policy in the Near East, 
South Asia, and Africa During 1955: Part III ' 

hy Harry N. Howard 



MUTUAL SECURITY PROGRAMS AND U.S. 
TECHNICAL AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE 

Broad Character of United States Programs 

There was continued recognition, during the 
course of 1955, of the positive necessity of techni- 
cal and economic assistance, especially in such 
underdeveloped areas as those of the Near East, 
South Asia, and Africa. Although the Soviet 
Government spoke much of technical and economic 
assistance, particularly during 1955, it had not 
participated in the United Nations Technical As- 
sistance Program, hitherto condemned as a de- 
sign for colonial exploitation, until 1953 and then 
under restrictions and with a very small con- 
tribution.- On the contrary, the United States 
has long engaged, both directly and through the 
United Nations, its specialized agencies, and re- 
gional organizations, in constructive programs of 
assistance. U.S. participation is based on the 
realization that the maintenance of international 
peace and security, the preservation of the politi- 
cal independence and territorial integrity of states, 
the promotion of political stability, and the 
processes of orderly change are all interconnected. 

The record of the United States in this field is an 
impressive one. Between July 1, 194:5, and Sep- 
tember 30, 1955, the total of United States grants 
and credits to other nations reached $52,287,000,- 
000, of whicli no less than $41,340,000,000 was in 
net grants. Some $17,248,000,000 went for eco- 



' For Part I of this article, dealing with political issues, 
see BuLiETiN of Mar. 19, 1956, p. 452 ; for Part II, on prob- 
lems of regional security, see i6i(J., Mar. 26, 1956, p. 510. 
Mr. Howard is United Nations adviser for the Bureau of 
Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs. 

^'For a U.S. statement on Soviet participation, see 
Bulletin of Mar. 5, 1956, p. 395. 

Apr!/ 9, 1956 



nomic and technical assistance, famine relief, and 
other urgent relief. Of these amounts, grants 
and credits in the Near East and Africa totaled 
$4,466,000,000, the net grants reaching $3,934,000,- 
000 and credits $532,000,000. In South Asia, 
grants and credits totaled $548,000,000, with the 
net grants standing at $280,000,000. A more de- 
tailed picture of the situation in the Near East, 
South Asia, and Africa as a whole may be seen 
from the accompanying table.^ 

Summary of Net U.S. Orants and Credits 
in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa (1945-1955) * 



Greece 

Turkey 

Iran 

Egypt 

Israel 

Jordan 

Liberia 

Unspecified (Near East and 

Africa) 

Afghanistan 

India 

Pakistan 

Unspecified (South Asia) . . . . 

Totals by Area 

Near East and Africa . . . . 

South Asia 

Near East, South Asia and 
Africa 



Net Grants 


Net Credits 


$1,208,000,000 


$81,100,000 


226,000,000 


94,000,000 


147,000,000 


54,000.000 


26, COO. 000 


4, 000, 000 


233,000,000 


137,000,000 


25,000,000 




6,000,000 


19,000,000 


189,000,000 


-7,000,000 


3,000,000 


26,000,000 


116,000,000 


228, 000, 000 


142,000,000 


16,000,000 


19,000,000 




$1,967,000,000 


$532,000,000 


280,000,000 


268, 000, 000 


$2,247,000,000 


$800, COO, 000 



Net Total 



$1,289,000,000 
320,000,000 
201,000,000 
30,000,000 
370. 000, 000 
25,000,000 
25, 000, 000 

182, 000, 000 

29,000,000 

344, 000, 000 

167,000,000 

19,000,000 



$2,499,000,000 
648, 000, 000 

$3, 047, 000, 000 



" This article does not cover the contribution of the De- 
partment of State International Educational Exchange 
Service in this area. For a brief account of activities 
under this program, see The International Exchange Pro- 
gram, 15th Semiannual Report to Congress (Department 
of State publication 6293, 1956). 

* Department of Commerce, Foreign Grants and Credits 
bij the United States Oovernment, September 1955 quar- 
ter, tables 1 and 2. Net figures cited here differ from 
certain of the individual country figures cited below be- 
cause they are computed on another basis. 

593 



A potentially important phase of the broad U.S. 
program was the initialing of a series of atoms- 
for-peace agi'eements with Turkey (May 3), Ijcb- 
anon (June 2), Israel (June 3), Pakistan (June 
15), and Greece (June 22). Under these agree- 
ments, the governments concerned were to receive 
information concerning the design, construction, 
and operation of research reactors and their use 
as research, development, and engineering tools; 
the United States Atomic Energy Commission 
was to lease up to 6 kilograms (13.2 pounds) of 
contained U-235 in uranimn enriched up to a max- 
imum of 20 percent U-235. The agreements also 
provided for exchange of unclassified informa- 
tion in the research reactor field, and on the use 
of radioactive isotopes in physical and biological 
research, medical therapy, agriculture, and indus- 
try. The agreements would enable the countries 
involved to acquire valuable training and experi- 
ence in nuclear science and engineering for the 
development of peaceful uses of atomic energy, 
including civilian nuclear power." 

Assistance Programs During 1955 

The programs of economic and technical as- 
sistance during 1955 were within the broad frame- 
work which had been elaborated over the years. 
As President Eisenhower explained in his foreign 
economic policy message to the Congress on Jan- 
uary 10, the self-interest of the United States re- 
quired "economic strength among our allies" and 
"economic growth in underdeveloped areas" in 
order to "lessen international instability growing 
out of the vulnerability of such areas to Commu- 
nist penetration and subversion." ^ 

President Eisenhower's theme was carried for- 
ward in his recommendations for the 1956 mutual 
security program, transmitted to the Congress on 
April 20, in which there was considerable stress 
on the problems of the Near East, South Asia, 
and Africa.'' All told, the President recommended 
that Congress approve funds totaling $3,530,000,- 
000 for the mutual security program, of which 
$712,500,000 was for economic programs, includ- 
ing $172,000,000 for a continuation of technical 



cooperation programs, $175,500,000 for special 
programs, and $165,000,000 for development as- 
sistance; $179,000,000 was to be allocated to the 
Middle East. In all, about $812,500,000, or about 
25 percent, was requested for nonmilitary pro- 
grams. In a statement of May 5 before tlie Senate 
Committee on Foreign Eelations, Secretary 
Dulles declared : 

International communism is pressing hard to extend its 
influence in Asian countries which laeli the economic 
strength to support an adequate defense establishment 
and to provide the necessary foundation of political sta- 
bility and steadily improving living standards.' 

Mr. Dulles was convinced that a continuation of 
this "investment of strength" under the mutual 
security program could meet the Soviet challenge. 
In the end, the Congress appropriated some 
$2,700,000,000 for fiscal year 1956, including J 
$1,700,000,000 for defense support, development ' 
assistance, technical assistance, and other pro- 
grams. It may be observed that, of these funds, 
some $113,700,000 was designed for defense sup- 
port in the Near East and Africa, $73,000,000 was 
to go for development assistance in that area, and 
the general authorization for teclmical coopera- 
tion amounted to $127,500,000. Other items of 
interest were the appropriations of $14,500,000 
for the U.N. Children's Fund (Unickf), some 
$62,000,000 for the U.N. Relief and Works Agency 
for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (Unrwa) , 
and $100,000,000 for the President's Fund for 
Asian Economic Development. For all purposes 
except direct military assistance, approximately 
$317,000,000 was allocated to the Near East, South 
Asia, and Africa during 1955.° ij 

4 

Assistance to Greece, Turltey, and Iran 

Greece and Turkey had been the subject of spe- 
cial American assistance, designed to strengthen 



' For text of the agreement with Turkey, which entered 
into force on June 10, see Bulletin of July 11, 1955, p. 55. 
The agreement with Lebanon entered into force on July 
18 ; that with Israel on July 12 ; Pakistan on Aug. 11 ; and 
Greece on Aug. 4, 19.").'). 

' Bulletin of Jan. 24, 1955, p. 119. 

' nid., May 2, 1955, p. 711. 



• IMd., May 23, 1955, p. 855. See also the Secretary's 
statement of May 25 before the House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, ibid., June 6, 1955, p. 911, and that of 
Harold E. Stassen before the House Committee on June 
8, 1955, ibid., July 4, 1955, p. 29. 

° For a summary of the uses to which mutual security 
funds were put in individual countries during the first 
half of 1955, see Report to Congress on the Mutual Secu- 
rity Program for the Six Months Ended June 30, 1955, 
H. Doc. 266, 84th Cong., 1st sess., p. 20 (Pakistan), p. 21 
(India), p. 22 (Afghanistan and Nepal), p. 25 (Greece 
and Turkey), p. 26 (Iran), p. 27 (Arab States and Israel), 
and p. 32 (Africa). 



594 



Depattmeni of State Bulletin 



their defensive positions and to preserve their po- 
litical independence and territorial integrity. De- 
spite serious difficulties between Greece and Tur- 
key concerning Cyprus, Greek and Turkish armed 
forces continued to constitute an essential ele- 
ment in the Western defense system. Both were 
members of Nato and the Balkan Alliance, and 
Turkey was a signatory of the Baghdad Pact 
(1955). 

Among the noteworthy undertakings for 
strengthening the Greek economy was an electric 
power project, which provided Greece for the first 
time with a unified electric power generating and 
grid system, more than doubling the prewar out- 
put.'" It was announced on June 24 that new aid 
totaling $19,200,000, partly in the form of a loan, 
had been made available to Greece to help meet 
the economic pressures arising from earthquake 
damage." 

The United States also continued to assist Tur- 
key during 1955. Under an agreement of Novem- 
ber 1954, supplemented on April 28, 1955," $29 
million worth of American surplus agricultural 
products was to be shipped to Turkey, in view of 
a crop failure and diminished foreign exchange, 
the effects of which were felt during 1955. In 
order not to jeopardize either Turkey's military 
position or its achievements under the program 
since 1950, the United States agreed in June to 
increase the defense-support program in fiscal 
1955 from $70 million to $100 million, the addi- 
tional $30 million to assist Turkey during the 
emergency period and to provide for imports of 
raw materials, basic commodities, and spare parts 
for its industrial establishment. 

It was announced on January 17, 1956, that, at 
the request of the United States and the Republic 
of Turkey, Clarence B. Randall, the eminent in- 
dustrialist and special consultant to President 
Eisenhower on foreign economic policy, had 
agreed to visit Turkey late in January to discuss 
economic problems of interest to both countries. 
It was expected that Mr. Randall's visit would 
greatly contribute to the further development of 
American-Turkish economic relations and to the 



" Direct American participation in the project ended on 
July 15, 1955. On June 10 Greece signed an agreement 
with the United States for defense use of technology, de- 
signed to foster the exchange of technology for defense 
purposes { Bulletin of July 11, 1955, p. 84) . 

" Bulletin of July 18, 1955, p. 100. 

''Ibid., May 16, 1955, p. 814. 



advancement of mutual understanding in this 
realm.'' 

Although the oil settlement of October 1954 had 
started the flow of substantial oil revenues to Iran 
by 1955, financial assistance was still necessary to 
meet urgent needs. The Foreign Operations Ad- 
ministration (now the International Cooperation 
Administration), for example, made a loan of 
$32 million for defense purposes, government em- 
ployee payrolls, and other expenses. There was 
increasing evidence of the success of technical as- 
sistance in Iran during 1955. A program for the 
control of malaria had been launched 4 years 
before by U.S. health technicians; by 1955, the 
Iranians themselves were carrying on most of 
the work. Similarly, U.S. technicians had taught 
the tecliniques of livestock crossbreeding to Min- 
istry of Agriculture employees, who in turn were 
spreading the knowledge to rural areas. A 
teacher-training program was now being carried 
out by the Ministry of Education, involving some 
12,000 teachers, or about 40 percent of the Iranian 
teaching staff. There was also progress in the 
field of public administration, and an Institute of 
Administrative Affairs was opened at the Uni- 
versity of Tehran in January 1955.'* 

Assistance to the Middle East 

The United States has also engaged in signifi- 
cant development projects in the Middle East. In 
the case of Egypt, which had initiated a compre- 
hensive 10-year economic development program, 
for example, the United States made available a 
total of $40 million in development assistance dur- 
ing fiscal year 1955, and, in addition, $2 million 
was allocated for technical cooperation. The 
American program stressed, among other things, 
railway and highway improvement. A loan agree- 
ment provided for repayment of $7 million of the 

"/bid., Jan. 30, 1956, p. 171. Siuce the beginning of 
1948 Turkey has received $463 million in economic as- 
sistance from the United States for development assist- 
ance related to the upkeep of its armed forces and for 
technical assistance. During the same period, Turkey 
has borrowed some $25 million from the Export-Import 
Bank and about $63 million from the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development, while short-term 
government and commercial debts in Europe were esti- 
mated at about $150 million. 

" For text of a U.S.-Iranian agreement signed on Feb. 
20, 1956, on surplus agricultural commodities, see Treaties 
and Other International Acts Series 3506. On Feb. 26, 
1956, the Export-Import Bank signed a $14 miUion credit 
agreement with Iran for railroad improvement. 



April 9, 1956 



595 



$40 million, and, as its share of the cost of the 
projects, Egypt was to spend the equivalent of 
$43 million from its resources. 

In addition, the United States, together with 
the United Kingdom and other countries, was 
much interested in the project for the construction 
of the High Aswan Dam on the Nile River, both 
for hydroelectric and for irrigation purposes, the 
total cost of which, over a 20-year period, was 
estimated at some $1 billion. During a visit to the 
United States by the Egyptian Minister of Fi- 
nance, Abdel Moneim El Kaissouni, the problem 
of the dam was discussed, and on December 17, 
1955, it was announced that the United States and 
the United Kingdom had assured the Egyptian 
Government of their support of the project, "which 
would be of inestimable importance in the devel- 
opment of the Egyptian economy and in the im- 
provement of the welfare of the Egyptian people." 
The assistance was to take the form of gi-ants 
toward defraying foreign exchange costs of the 
initial stages of the construction, involving the 
coffer dam, the foundations for the primary dam, 
and auxiliary work. Assurance was also given, 
subject to legislative authority, that the United 
States and the United Kingdom were prepared 
"to consider sympathetically in the light of then 
existing circmnstances further support toward 
financing the later stages to supplement World 
Bank financing." " 

The problem of assistance to Iraq differed from 
that of aid to Egypt both because of the former's 
signature of the Baghdad Pact and because of 
its oil revenues of about $140 million a year. How- 
ever, the United States has assisted in develop- 
ing Iraqi military potential under the mutual 
defense agreement of 1954. 

The primary key to Iraqi development lies in 
harnessing the waters of the Tigris-Euphrates 
river system; construction is now under way on 
a series of dams. Iraq initiated its second Five- 
Year Plan on April 1, 1955, and the Iraqi De- 
velopment Board proposed that the equivalent of 
some $800 million be made available from petro- 
leum to finance the program, much of the empha- 
sis of which was on projects to raise living 
standards. Under the technical cooperation 
program in Iraq an agricultural college was estab- 



lished at Abu Ghraib with the assistance of tech- 
nicians from the University of Arizona, while the 
Teclmical Institute at Baghdad was established 
with similar assistance from the Bradley Institute 
of Technology. 

With its limited resources and the presence of 
some 450,000 Arab refugees from Palestine, Jor- 
dan continued to be confronted with serious eco- 
nomic problems. During 1955 the United States 
made $5 million available to the Jordanian de- 
velopment program, $3.6 million of it in the form 
of local currency purchased with pounds sterling 
generated from the sale of American coal to the 
United Kingdom. The assistance took the form 
of road construction, afforestation, and water- 
spreading activities ; some 50 miles of roads were 
completed, about 5,000 acres of formerly unpro- 
ductive land were brought under cultivation, and 
many thousands of new trees were planted. Some 
$2,200,000 was provided for technical cooperation, 
with projects in agriculture, natural resources, 
health, and education. Nineteen agricultural cen- 
ters serving 300 villages are now in operation in 
Jordan. Sound beginnings have been made in 
education, and about 100 Jordanian trainees in the 
field of education have been sent abroad.^^ 

During 1955, a large part of the program in 
Lebanon was designed to assist in improving the 
Lebanese road system, in view of its importance 
to the country's economic development. An agree- 
ment in June 1955 provided for $5,700,000 to help 
finance construction of a modern highway from 
Beirut to the Syrian border, connecting with the 
road to Damascus, one of the important highways 
in the Middle East. While the Lebanese Govern- 
ment was to pay the major cost, $5 million of 
American assistance was to be in the form of a 
15-year loan at 3 percent, which the Lebanese Gov- 
ernment has not yet taken up. The remaining 
$700,000 was to be used to purchase American 
i-oad-building equipment and to finance an engi- 
neering survey by an American firm. Other forms 
of assistance included provision of $1.4 million 
for improved agricultural equipment, the estab- 
lishment of 30 agricultural extension offices under 



" Bulletin of Dec. 26, 1955, p. 1050. For the agricul- 
tural commodities agreement with Egypt signed Dec. 14, 
1955, see Treaties and Other International Acts Series 
3439. 

596 



" On Oct. 30, 1955, the Jordanian Parliament approved 
an agreement permitting Edwin W. Pauley, an Independ- 
ent American petroleum producer, to explore Jordan for 
oil. It provided for 50 percent sharing after payment of 
exploration expenditures and for cancellation after 8 
months If oil was not found ; all oil wells were to become 
the exclusive property of Jordan after 55 years. 

Department of State Bulletin 



the guidance of American extension specialists, 
the establishment of the Lebanon Industry Insti- 
tute, and the setting up of the National Litani 
Board for the development of the Litani Kiver.^' 

The United States also continued to support the 
program of assistance to Arab refugees under 
Unrwa. Some 900,000 refugees were involved, 
about 300,000 of whom were completely supported 
by Unrwa in camps, while the rest received both 
food rations and basic medical services, at an 
average cost of $28 per annum.^* It is partly 
in connection with the refugee problem that the 
United States has sought to promote the develop- 
ment of the Jordan River Valley, which would 
permit the irrigation of some 225,000 acres of 
land in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Israel and 
make possible eventual settlement of some 200,000 
refugees. 

At the same time, the United States continued 
its assistance to Israel, with special attention to 
programs for orderly industrial development. 
The program for 1955 centered on projects de- 
signed to make maximum use of local raw ma- 
terials, without neglecting agriculture." On 
April 29 an agreement was signed with Israel 
providing for the sale of $8.3 million worth of sur- 
plus commodities, including 50,000 metric tons 
of wheat and 40,000 metric tons of feed grains. 
The Israeli pounds derived from the purchase of 
these commodities were to be used for various 
purposes, including American expenditures in Is- 
rael; some were to be loaned for the purpose of 
economic development in Israel.-" 

Neither Yemen nor Saudi Arabia received eco- 
nomic or technical assistance during 1955 from the 
United States. By 1954, however, Saudi Arabia 
was receiving royalties from the Arabian Ameri- 
can Oil Company at the rate of about $260 million 
annually. As President Eisenliower declared on 
August 11, 1955, when receiving the credentials 
of Saudi Arabian Ambassador Sheikh Abdullah 
al-Khayall, "from the earliest years of our coun- 

"It was announced on Mar. 2, 1956, that an Export- 
Import Bank loan of $105,000 to Syria would assure the 
beginning of a program to bring a dependable supply of 
drinking water to various parts of Syria. 

'' See also U.N. docs. A/2978 and Add. 1, A/2989, A/3057. 

" Israel also receives large-scale assistance from unof- 
ficial sources in the United States. During 1955, for ex- 
ample, some $42,318,500 was subscribed in Israel bonds, 
bringing the total sold since 1951 to $216,594,450. 

"" BiXLETiN of May 16, 1955, p. 815. 

April 9, 7956 

380727—56 3 



try, traders, doctors, and educators have gone [to 
the Middle East] to contribute, through their 
careers, to the growth and development of the 
area." '^ 

On November 22, it was announced that Yemen 
had granted a concession to the Yemen Develop- 
ment Corporation, the first oil and mineral con- 
cession in the history of the country. The 30- 
year agreement provided for exclusive explora- 
tion and development rights over 40,000 square 
miles, or the northern two-thirds of the country, 
with the exception of the narrow coastal strip 
(Tihana). All net profits were to be divided 
equally, but the agreement could be voided if com- 
mercial quantities either of petroleum or minerals 
were not found within 6 years. 

Assistance in Africa 

Among the projects of economic and technical 
assistance in Africa, examples may be cited from 
Liberia, Ethiopia, and Libya. Classes began in the 
new Booker T. Washington Institute in Liberia 
during August 1955. The project was launched 
under a contract with Prairie View (Texas) Agri- 
cultural and Mechanical College, wloich provided 
assistance in improving teaching methods and 
planning an educational curriculum. A project 
for demonstrating the teclmiques of growing 
swamp rice was completed in 1955, with the results 
disseminated in many parts of Liberia tlii'ough an 
agricultural extension system organized with 
American assistance. 

A joint Ethiopian-American educational com- 
mission made a thorough examination of Etliio- 
pian educational needs, through the technical as- 
sistance program. The educational program in 
agriculture and the mechanical arts was already 
showing results in Ethiopia. The 3-year-old 
Jimma Agricultural Secondary School and the 
Handicraft School at Addis Ababa, were financed 
entirely by the Ethiopian Government, except for 
the cost of American technicians. In addition, 
an apprentice trade school was established at Ad- 
dis Ababa by technicians fi'om the Oklahoma Agri- 
cultural and Mechanical College, as part of a 
program for developing agricultural and mechan- 
ical training. On October 3 the Export-Import 
Bank announced that it would establish a $24 mil- 
lion credit in Ethiopia's favor for the develop- 



^ Department of State press release 486, Aug. 11, 1955 
(not printed). 

597 



ment of commercial airfields and aviation facili- 
ties throughout the country.^^ 

On presenting his credentials as Ambassador, 
Sayyid Saddiq Muntasser, on May 6, 1955, noted 
that the Libyan people had placed much trust in 
the friendship of the United States and recalled 
the role which the United States had played dur- 
ing the consideration of the future of Libya in the 
United Nations. Ambassador Muntasser also 
noted that the decision to recognize the legitimate 
right of self-determination had been made on 
American soil. But independence had not solved 
all problems, and Libya still counted on the as- 
sistance of the United States to overcome some of 
its difficulties to insure its complete independence 
in all fields. President Eisenhower replied that 
he was aware of the complex problems facing 
Libya and indicated that the United States was 
"deeply sympathetic" with the efforts which were 
being made to raise Libyan standards of living.^^ 

The Libyan-American Reconstiniction Commis- 
sion, with an American as executive director, was 
established to help supervise American economic 
assistance. Under a revised technical assistance 
agreement, projects were being integrated within 
Libyan government departments to pave the way 
for Libya to assume greater responsibility for 
project activities. Preventive and other public 
health services were introduced by the Libyan- 
American Joint Service in Public Health. 

The International Cooperation Administration 
announced on August 1 that it would ship 6,800 
tons of surplus American wheat to Libya in an 
emergency move to relieve distress occasioned by 
a poor grain harvest, and on September 2 a further 
agreement was signed covering an additional 
grant of 6,000 tons and bringing to 45,000 tons the 
total of wheat shipments authorized over a period 
of some 20 months.''* 

Assistance in South Asia 

In South Asia, where the Soviet Union made 
considerable propaganda with large offers of as- 
sistance during the fall of 1955, the United States 



had long been active under the United Nations 
and its own bilateral programs. 

Both military and economic assistance has been 
rendered to Pakistan, which has taken a firm posi- 
tion on the side of the free world, within the 
framework both of the Southeast Asia Collective 
Defense Treaty and the Baghdad Pact. In the 6 
years ending on June 30, 1955, the United States 
provided Pakistan with some $361,850,000 in eco- 
nomic assistance. Because of its urgent need for 
assistance, some $71.8 million — $20 million on a 
loan basis — was provided during fiscal year 1955, 
of which $40 million was for commodity imports. 
The program also included $20 million for defense 
support, $5.5 million for flood relief, $5.3 million 
for technical assistance projects, and $1 million for 
fi-eight costs in ocean transport of surplus agri- 
cultural commodities. 

The technical assistance program in Pakistan 
during 1955 included projects directed toward im- 
provement of transportation and industry. 
Among other things, Pakistan International Air- 
lines and Pan American World Airways signed 
an agreement in May providing for American 
technical assistance in expanding Pakistan's air 
transportation system, and a group of American 
technicians assisted in this work. American tech- 
nicians also cooperated in agricultural produc- 
tion, land reclamation, public health, vocational 
education, and the community development pro- 
gram. The United States assisted in designing a 
multipurpose hydroelectric dam to be constructed 
on the Karnafuli River in East Pakistan, electric 
power from which will stimulate industrial devel- 
opment and also contribute to flood control and 
irrigation. In May the United States and Pald- 
stan signed an agreement making possible guar- 
anties for private investments in Pakistan, de- 
signed to encourage private industry.^^ 

During the latter part of 1955, India was visited 
by Premier Nikolai Bulganin and Party Secre- 
tary Nikita Khrushchev and also received tanta- 
lizing offers of Soviet economic and teclmical as- 



" Bui-LETiN of Oct. 17, 1955, p. 617. 

^Department of State press release 244, May 6, 1955 
(not printed). 

" Bulletin of Aug. 15, 1955, p. 26.3, and Sept. 12, 1955, 
p. 427. For a U. S.-Libyan agreement on relief supplies 
and equipment, see Treaties and Other International Acts 
Series 3480. 



=° Bulletin of Jan. 24, 1955, p. 157, and June 20, 1955, 
p. 1018. Greece, Israel, and Turkey have signed similar 
agreements with respect to the protection of private 
investments. 

For a U.S.-Pakistan agreement on mutual security 
signed Jan. 11, 1955, see Treaties and Other International 
Acts Series 3183 ; for an agreement on surplus agricul- 
tural commodities signed Jan. 18, 1955, see TIAS 3184; 
for a technical cooperation agreement signed Jan. 18, 
1955, see TIAS 3185. 



598 



Department of State Bulletin 



sistance.=^ The United States, for its part, had 
long engaged in programs of economic and tech- 
nical assistance in India. Indeed, since 1951, the 
United States had provided India with gross as- 
sistance totaling more than $500 million, divided 
almost equally between grants and loans. In all 
there were more than 50 joint projects, toward the 
completion of which India was contributing about 
$400 million. In addition, American foundations 
and voluntary agencies have contributed some $48 
million to various projects in India. 

While the problems with regard to India were 
complicated, results were already evident in a 
number of fields, involving both agriculture and 
industry. During fiscal year 1955, the United 
States allocated $84.3 million to Indian projects, 
of which $45 million was on a loan basis. Of 
$69.1 million in development assistance funds 
made available during 1955, $30 million was pro- 
gramed for cotton and wheat purchases in the 
United States ; the rupees acquired by the United 
States from these purchases were part of the $45 
million loan and were to be utilized for the de- 
velopment of power, river valley projects, and 
other joint projects. 

Technical assistance projects continued to stress 
conmiunity development and increased agricul- 
tural production. Contracts were negotiated 
with five American universities and colleges for 
technical support to several Indian states and ag- 
ricultural institutions. A village water supply 
and sanitation system was inaugurated and at- 
tention given to small irrigation projects, soil con- 
servation, and farm management. The Univer- 
sity of Tennessee was to assist Indian women's 
colleges in home economics; the University of 
Texas was to cooperate in the establishment of 
teacher-training institutions in the field of sec- 
ondary education. 

There were also other forms of assistance. Up 
to June 1955, for example, some $38,875,000 had 
been earmarked for the purchase of railway roll- 
ing stock and locomotives, and early in September 
450 freight cars were received under the American 
aid program. On October 4 the United States 
and India announced an exchange of notes cover- 
ing the extension of emergency assistance totaling 
$4.7 million in the form of 10,000 tons of wheat 



and 10,000 tons of rice from the stocks of the Com- 
modity Credit Corporation to help relieve victims 
of flood disaster in northeast India." On Janu- 
ary 5, 1956, the fourth anniversary of the assist- 
ance program in India, a new agreement was 
signed, providing $10 million for importation of 
100,000 tons of steel and 6,000 tons of DDT for 
malaria control.-' 

During the Bulganin-Khrushchev visit to Af- 
ghanistan in December 1955, much was made of 
the annomicement of a $100-million Soviet loan 
to Afghanistan and of the reaffirmation of Afghan- 
istan's "neutral" policy .^^ On the other hand, the 
United States has endeavored over the years, al- 
though on a relatively small scale, to assist Af- 
ghanistan in a variety of ways. Through the 
Export-Import Bank, loans totaling $39,500,000 
were made for the multipurpose Helmand Valley 
project for irrigation, flood control, and power 
development. In addition, some $4 million had 
been granted in the form of technical assistance. 

During 1955 stress continued to be placed on 
the Helmand River project, and a group of Amer- 
ican experts assisted in such technical projects as 
engineering, agriculture, health and sanitation, 
community development, and public administra- 
tion. Moreover, under contract with the Foreign 
Operations Administration, Columbia University 
Teachers College sent a group of four specialists 
to Kabul to assist the Ministry of Education in 
teacher training and general education. The Uni- 
versity of Wyoming sent 23 specialists to assist in 
technical education and agriculture ; helped in the 
establisliment of the Afghanistan Institute of Ap- 
plied Science, with two subsidiary schools, the 
Afghan Institute of Technology and the Voca- 
tional Agricultui-al School; and aided the Min- 
istry of Agi-iculture in research and demonstra- 
tion. The Near East Foundation, long experienced 
in such matters, assisted in a project for commu- 
nity development in Afghan villages. 

Work in Nepal during 1955 looked primarily 



^ India and the Soviet Union had signed a loan agree- 
ment on Feb. 2, 1955, for the construction of a 1-miUion- 
ton steel plant in central India at a cost of some $91 mil- 
lion to be completed by 1960. 



=' Bulletin of Oct. 17, 1955, p. 617. 

''The steel import brought to 700,000 tons the total 
which India had obtained from the United States. The 
first 4 of 100 locomotives arrived at Bombay on Jan. 
3, 1956; for an address by Ambassador John Sherman 
Cooper on that occasion, see Bulletin of Feb. 6, 1956, 
p. 205. For text of air transport agreement signed with 
India on Feb. 3, see ibid., Feb. 13, 1956, p. 26-1. 

™ Since 1954 the Soviet Union had loaned some $14 
million to Afghanistan for road construction, storage 
tanks, flour mills, etc. 



April 9, 7956 



599 



toward reparation of flood devastation, and a 
project for reclamation in the Rapti Valley, where 
an area of some 130,000 acres was to be opened for 
resettlement, was undertaken. The village im- 
provement program involved six development 
centers, which have trained more than 175 Nepa- 
lese to demonstrate more effective use of insecti- 
cides, fertilizers, and farm implements. Assistance 
was also given in the field of public health. The 
University of Oregon assisted in an educational 
project, under wliich more than 100 villagers were 
trained as teachers to work in schools throughout 
Nepal. Since 1951 approximately $6 million in 

Export-Import Bank 



U.S. aid has gone to Nepal, including $1.5 million 
in flood relief. 

Export-Import Bank Loans 

Even before the inauguration of the American 
program for technical and economic assistance, 
the Export-Import Bank of Washington had au- 
thorized a number of loans in the Near East, South 
Asia, and Africa for the economic development of 
countries in that area. By July 1, 1955, these 
loans were substantially as shown in the accompa- 
nying table. 
Loans, 1946-1955 3° 



Country 


Date 


Authorized Credit 


Purpose 


Egypt 

Fertilizer and Chemical Industries of 

Egypt. 
Egyptian Spinners (Barclays Bank 

D. C. 0.). 
United Spinning and Weaving Co., S. A. E. 


7/16/47 

5/6/55 

6/13/55 


$7, 250, 000 
60, 000 
25, 000 


Construction of fertilizer plant 

Textile equipment (Whitin Machine Works) 

Textile equipment (Whitin Machine Works) 


Total 


$7, 335, 000 






1/9/46 

6/13/55 

12/16/54 




Greece 

Kingdom of Greece 


$25, 000, 000 
300, 000 
625, 000 


U. S. products and services. Some $10,436,- 

687.39 cancelled 
Crawler tractors with angle-dozers and 


Kingdom of Greece 


Piraiki-Patraiki Industrie de Coton, S. A . 


motor graders 
Textile machinery 


Total 


$25, 925, 000 






11/11/54 

1/19/49 

3/9/49 

3/16/49 

3/23/49 

9/7/49 
10/26/49 




Iran 

Government of Iran 


$53, 000, 000 

$70, 000, 000 

9, 535, 243 

25, 000, 000 

5, 000, 000 

5, 464, 757 
20, 000, 000 


Economic development 

Agricultural production 
Transportation. Some $544.52 cancelled 
Housing materials 


Israel 

State of Israel 


State of Israel 


State of Israel 


State of Israel 


Telecommunications equipment. Some 


State of Israel 


$1,256.10 canceUed 
Development of ports 


State of Israel 






Total 


$135, 000, 000 






1/3/46 
7/20/50 




Saudi Arabia 

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 


$25, 000, 000 
15, 000, 000 


Raw materials and equipment. Some 

$15,000,000 cancelled 
Public works and development projects. 

Some $10,232,483.60 cancelled 


Total 


$40, 000, 000 




10/13/48 
1/26/46 
3/16/49 
5/25/49 




Turkey 

Sumer Bank (Republic of Turkey) . . . 

Republic of Turkey 

Etibank (Republic of Turkey) 

Republic of Turkey 


$417, 584. 33 
431, 263. 64 
104, 000 
3, 750, 000 


(International General Electric Co.) 

State seaways and harbors 

Ingersoll Rand Co. 

State railways. Some $37,155.58 canceUed 



'" Export-Import Bank of Washington, Twentieth Semiannual Report to Congress for the Period January-June 196B, 
appendix C. Loans in Africa as a whole totaled $198,669,661.60 and in Asia $632,676,462.89. 



600 



Department of State Bulletin 



Export-Import Bank Loans, 1945-1955 — Continued 



Country 



Turkey — Continued 

Republic of Turkey 

Republic of Turkey 

Republic of Turkey 

Etibank (Republic of Turkey) 
Etibank (Republic of Turkey) 



Republic of Turkey 

Republic of Turkey 

Cukurova Itholat ve Ithracat, T. A. O . 



Total , 
Afghanistan 



Royal Government of Afghanistan. 
Royal Government of Afghanistan. 



Total .... 
Ethiopia 

Ethiopian Empire. 
Ethiopian Empire. 



Total 



Liberia 

Republic of Liberia . 
Republic of Liberia . 
Republic of Liberia . 



Total 



Date 



5/25/49 
11/19/54 
8/31/49 
9/28/49 
3/17/55 



11/26/47 

11/4/54 

1/6/55 



11/23/49 
4/29/54 



6/22/50 
7/10/46 



1/11/51 
6/14/51 
1/20/55 



Authorized Credit 



$4, 250, 000 
500, 000 
999, 524. 92 
500, 000 
78.5, 000 



8, 000, 000 
4, 235, 000 
1, 020, 000 



$24, 992, 372. 89 



$21, 000, 000 
18, 500, 000 



$39, 500, 000 



$1, 000, 000 
2, 000, 000 



$3, 000, 000 



$5, 000, 000 

1, 350, 000 

15, 000, 000 



$21, 350, 000 



Purpose 



State seaways and harbors 

State seaways and harbors 

U.S. rails and accessories 

Earth-moving equipment 

Materials, equipment and service for coal 

washing plant (McNally Pittsburg Mfg. 

Corp.) 
Reconversion of vessels. Some $819.74 

cancelled 
Equipment, storage and handling of grain 

(Colombian Steel Tank Co.) 
Spare parts for tractors (Caterpillar Tractor 

Co.). Some $1,020,000 cancelled 



Construction of dam and canal 
Heknand River Valley Development 



Aircraft and spare parts. Some $27,731.82 

cancelled 
Communication equipment and industrial 

machinery. Some $250,027.57 cancelled 



Highway improvement and construction 
Water supply and sewerage system 
Highway construction projects 



U.S. Support for U.N. Assistance Programs 

The United States continued during 1955 to 
contribute in major degree to United Nations pro- 
grams of technical assistance, many of which were 
concentrated in the Near East, South Asia, and 
Africa.^^ It also maintained its contributions to 
various United Nations agencies such as the Food 
and Agriculture Organization (Fao), World 
Health Organization (Who), United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organiza- 
tion (Unesco), and Unicef which have given 
basic assistance to underdeveloped areas in a wide 
variety of ways.^^ 

The United States on December 5, 1955, com- 
pleted the action required for membership in the 
International Finance Corporation, established 



^ See U.S. Participation in the U.N.: Report hy the Presi- 
dent to the Congress for the Year 1954 (Department of 
State publication 5769), pp. 235-39, for tables of contribu- 
tions. 



under Kesolution 823 (IX) of the General 
Assembly .^^ This country, as in the past, made a 
large contribution to the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, which assisted 



" In general see U.N. docs. A/2943 : Report of the Eco- 
nomic and Social Council covering the period from 7 
August 1954 to 5 August 1955, passim; E/2740 (ST/BCA/ 
32) : Economic Developments in the Middle East, 1945- 
1954, passim: ST/TAA/SER.C/21 : Fourth United 
Nations Social Welfare Seminar for Aral States in the 
Middle East (Baghdad, 6-21 March 1954) ; ST/TAA/K/ 
Israel/4: United Nations Technical Assistance Pro- 
gramme, Revenue Administration and Policy in Israel 
(Second Report) ; Seeds of Progress: Stories of Technical 
Assistance (1955); E/ON.5/303/Eev. l/ST/SOA/26: 
Social Progress Through Community Development 
(1955). 

^ BtriXETiN of Jan. 9, 1956, p. 54. The charter of the 
International Finance Corporation requires a subscrip- 
tion of $75,000,000 before the corporation can come into 
being; by Jan. 10, 1956, $56,761,000 had been sub- 
scribed. Egypt was the first Middle Eastern country to 
complete action for membership (Dec. 16, 1955). 



April 9, J 956 



601 



in a number of development programs in the Near 
East, South Asia, and Africa. By June 30, 1955, 
out of an authorized capital of $10,000,000,000, 
some $9,028,000,000 had been subscribed." The 
United States had subscribed $635,000,000, with 
31,750 shares in the amount of $3,175,000,000. By 



" Afghanistan and Israel became members of the IBRD 
(luring 1955. 



September 30, 1955, effective loans reached $1,837,- 
262,49-1, of which $317,310,000, as illustrated in the 
table below, were for development purposes in the 
Near East, South Asia, and Africa. A develop- 
ment survey was completed in Syria during 1955 
and one was organized in Jordan.^^ 



"^ See also U.N. docs. A/2906 and A/3065 for material on 
the proposed Special United Nations Fund for Economic 
Development. 



Loans of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1949-1955 '^ 



Country 



Ceylon 
India 



India (Guarantor) 

Indian Iron & Steel Company 

Tata Hydro, Andhra and Tata Power 
Companies 
India (Guarantor) 

Industrial Credit and Investment Corp. 
of India 
Iraq 

Lebanon (Guarantor) 

Litani River Authority 

Pakistan (Guarantor) 

Sui Gas Transmission Co 

Karachi Electric Supply Corporation, Ltd . 

Karnaphuli Paper Mills, Ltd 

Trustees of the Port of Karachi 

Turkey 

First Tranche 

Second Tranche 



Turkey (Guarantor) 

Industrial Development Bank of Turkey . 

Industrial Development Bank of Turkey . 

Ethiopia 



Total 



Date 



7/9/54 
8/18/49 

9/29/49 

4/18/50 

1/23/53 

12/18/52 
11/19/54 

3/14/55 
6/15/50 

8/25/55 

6/2/54 
6/20/55 

8/4/55 
8/4/55 
7/7/50 
7/7/,50 
2/26/54 
6/18/52 

10/19/.50 

9/10/53 

9/13/50 
9/13/50 
2/19/51 



Original 
Amount 



$19, 110,000 
34, 000, 000 

10, 000, 000 

18, 500, 000 

19, 500, 000 

31, 500, 000 
16, 200, 000 

10, 000, 000 

12, 800, 000 

27, 000, 000 

14, 000, 000 

13, 800, 000 
4, 200, 000 

14, 800, 000 
3, 900, 000 

12, 500, 000 

3, 800, 000 

25, 200, 000 

9, 000, 000 

9, 000, 000 

.5, 000, 000 
2, 000, 000 
1, 500, 000 



$317, 310, 000 



Purpose 



Electrical power development 

Railway rehabilitation. Some $1,200,000 

cancelled or refunded 
Agricultural development. Some $2,796,187 

cancelled or refunded 
Electric power development. Some $690,000 

cancelled or refunded 
Electric power development, fiood control and 

irrigation. Some $9,000,000 cancelled or 

refunded 

Expansion of iron and steel production facili- 
ties 
Electric power development 



Foreign exchange for development of private 

industry 
Construction of a flood control project. Some 

$6, 506, 054 cancelled or refunded 

Electric power development and irrigation 

Construction of natural gas transmission line 

Electric power development 

Construction of paper and pulp mill 

Port construction and development 

Construction of grain storage facilities 

Port construction and development 

Port construction and development 

Electric power development, irrigation and 

flood control. Some $2,356,000 cancelled 

or refunded 

Foreign exchange for development of private 

industry 
Foreign exchange for development of private 

industry 
Highway rehabilitation 
Foreign exchange for Development Bank 
Rehabilitation and extension of telephone and 

telegraph systems 



^'International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Tenth Anmial Report 1954-1955, appendix F. See also 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development press release 427 (Nov. 3, 1955), Financial Statements for First 
Quarter ending September 30, 1955. In addition to the above, the IBRD on Aug. 26, 1955, made a loan of $10 million for 
electric power in Algeria and on Mar. 5, 1956, announced that it was sending a survey mission to the Trust Territory of 
Somaliland. 



602 



Deporfmenf of Sfafe Bulletin 



Reflections of United States Policy 

That the United States continued to look upon 
the problems of stability and security in the Near 
East, South Asia, and Africa from a broadly 
based point of view, and that it was prepared to 
meet the new challenges which had arisen, was 
indicated by a number of developments toward 
the end of 1955 and the beginning of 1956. The 
American attitude was reflected in the unanimous 
view of the United States delegation to the Tenth 
Session of the General Assembly of the United 
Nations that economic and social questions were 
"assuming increasing importance on the interna- 
tional scene" and had moved to the forefront in 
"the struggle between Communism and freedom," 
particularly since the Soviet Union was using 
"economic and social collaboration as a means for 
jumping military as well as political barriers," as 
in India, Egypt, and Burma, for example. The 
delegation believed that the United States should 
counter the Soviet efforts, not by outbidding it 
in sheer amounts of economic assistance but "by 
making newly independent and newly articulate 
peoples feel that they can best satisfy their wants 
by becoming and remaining part of the community 
of free nations." The delegation warned that the 
United States was "in a contest in the field of 
economic development of underdeveloped coun- 
tries which is bitterly competitive" and that de- 
feat in this contest "could be as disastrous as de- 
feat in an armaments race." ^' 
I President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles en- 
' dorsed these views. Mr. Dulles had already de- 
clared, on December 20, that the United States 
sought no monopoly in the field of economic as- 
sistance and welcomed "any grant of economic 
aid" which invigorated less developed countries 
and made them more independent, as had been the 
aim of American policy since the Second World 
War. Not one country had "lost any particle of 
freedom or independence" as a result of American 
assistance. Mr. Dulles hoped that Soviet assist- 
ance was "not offered as a Trojan horse to pene- 
trate, and then take over, independent countries" ; 
he felt that the experienced statesmen of the areas 
j concerned were well aware of the dangers.'*' 
President Eisenhower sounded a similar note in 
his state of the Union message on January 5, 1956, 
declaring that the mutual security program must 
be sustained and fortified and noting that "because 
the conditions of poverty and unrest in less de- 



veloped areas make their people a special target 
of international communism, there is a need to 
help them achieve the economic growth and sta- 
bility necessary to preserve their independence 
against Communist threats and enticements." ^ 



THE OUTLOOK IN UNITED STATES POLICY 

Such were the major developments in United 
States policy during 1955. As the year drew to 
a close and another dawned, it was clear that the 
problems were as manifold, complex, and per- 
sistent as they had been in the past and that there 
were no simple or easy solutions to any of them. 
There was a recognition of the basic elements in 
the situation in the discussions between Prime 
Minister Eden and President Eisenhower, Jan- 
uaiy 30 to February 1, 1956, in which the problems 
of the Near East, South Asia, and Africa were 
both broadly and specifically discussed. 

It was agreed that every effort should be made 
to reduce the sources of misunderstanding between 
the Middle Eastern nations, whose peoples should 
be helped to achieve "their legitimate aspira- 
tions." Similarly, an Arab-Israel settlement was 
considered urgent, but possible only if both sides 
were "willing to reconcile the positions" liitherto 
taken. The United States and the United King- 
dom reiterated their willingness to contribute to a 
settlement through financial assistance on the 
Arab refugee problem and guaranties of "agreed 
frontiers," reaffirmed the Tripartite Declaration 
of May 25, 1950, and announced arrangements for 
discussions, with French participation, as to "the 
nature of the action" to be taken in the event of 
violence. It was also clear that security in the 
Middle East could not rest upon arms alone but 
must be based on the establishment of good neigh- 
borly relations. Soviet policy in arms supplies to 
Middle Eastern countries was viewed as addmg to 



^ BuiiETiN Of Jan. 23, 1956, p. 117. 

™ For transcripts of the Secretary's news conferences 
of Dec. 20, 1955, and Jan. 11, 1956, see ibid., Jan. 2, 1956, 
p. S, and Jan. 23, 1956, p. 118. Mr. Dulles indicated that 
mutual security requests for the next fiscal year would 
total about $4,900,000,000, of which about $1,900,000,000 
would be for the economic part of the program. See also 
the transcript of the Secretary's press conference of Jan. 
17, 1956, ibid., Jan. 30, 1956, p. 155. 

'^ Hid., Jan. 16, 1956, p. 79. See also excerpts from the 
President's budget message, ihid., Jan. 30, 1956, p. 147, and 
his message transmitting the 1957 mutual security pro- 
gram, ihid., Apr. 2, 1956, p. 545. 



AprW 9, J 956 



603 



the tensions and increasing the risk of war — a 
risk wliich the United States and the United 
Kingdom desired to mitigate. In that interest 
they fully supported the U.N. Truce Supervision 
Organization and were ready favorably to con- 
sider "recommendations for any necessary en- 
largement . . . and improvement of its capabili- 
ties." They were also agreed concerning the sig- 
nificance of the Baghdad Pact, and the United 
States indicated that it would "continue to give 
solid support to the purposes ... of the Pact" 
and that its observers would "play a constructive 
part in the work of its committees." The belief 
was expressed that difficulties in Arabia and the 
region of the Persian Gulf could be solved 
through "friendly discussions." 

The Declaration of Washington, which ema- 
nated from these discussions, reaffirmed the goal 
of self-government and independence of "all coun- 
tries whose people desire and are capable of sus- 
taining an independent existence" and noted that, 
in striking contrast to the Soviet record in Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia, 600 million people "in 
nearly a score of lands" had attained nationliood 
since World War II with American and British 
assistance and that many more millions were 
"being helped surely and steadily toward self- 
government." Since political independence alone 
was insufficient, the need for technical and eco- 
nomic assistance was recognized, and it was 
stressed, again in contrast to Soviet aggrandize- 
ment, that the United Kingdom and the United 
States had "not sought nor desired extension of 
either economic or political power." It was also 
pointed out that Soviet aims had not changed, that 
"militai-y and political force" had been used in the 
past, and that now "economic inducements" had 
been added to the "methods of penetration." 
There were a warning lest underdeveloped nations 
lose their independence through "threat, promise 
or enticement" and a notice that some 50 nations 
which cherished their freedom had "drawn to- 
gether in voluntary associations for their collec- 
tive security." *" 

"For texts of communique and Declaration, see ihid., 
Feb. 13, 1956, p. 231. 



The policy of the United States was reconfirmed 
both generally and specifically on a number of oc- 
casions in the period immediately following the 
Anglo-American discussions, whether with regard 
to North Africa, Middle East security and the 
shipment of arms, South Asia, the Soviet chal- 
lenge in the area, or the problems of economic 
development. Secretary Dulles suggested to the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 
24, 1956, that Israel's security could be better as- 
sured, in the long run, through measures — includ- 
ing reliance on the United Nations — other than 
the acquisition of additional arms in circum- 
stances which might "exacerbate the situation." 
He did not exclude the possibility, however, of 
arms shipments, either to Israel or to the Arab 
States, at a time when it would "preserve the 
peace." " 

President Eisenhower reiterated this position at 
his news conferences on March 7 and 15, empha- 
sizing that the United States was trying to avoid 
the initiation of an arms race in the Middle East, 
stressing the need for action under the United j 
Nations and for the avoidance of incidents, and 1 
noting continued adherence to the Tripartite Dec- 
laration of May 1950. At the same time, the Pres- 
ident indicated that the conflict between the Com- 
munist and the free worlds was now undergoing a 
"very great broadening" into the economic and 
political fields, a very serious development which 
demanded "flexibility" in the American foreign 
assistance program.*^ 



"Ibid., Mar. 5, 1956, p. 368. See also the Secretary's 
statements of Feb. 7, ibid., Feb. 20, 1956, p. 279, and of Feb. 
28, ibid.. Mar. 12, 1956, p. 409. See also the correspond- , 
ence of Secretary Dulles with certain members of Con- | 
gress, ibid., Feb. 20, 1956, p. 285. For the Department's 
statement of Feb. 18, concerning the shipment of IS tanks 
to Saudi Arabia under the Mutual Defense Assistance 
Act of 1949 and the Mutual Security Act of 1954, see ibid., 
Feb. 27, 1956, p. 325. 

" See also Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, "First 
Annual Report of the Council Representatives, March 
1956," ibid.. Mar. 12, 1956, p. 403, and the iinal communique 
of the SEATO Council meeting at Karachi, Mar. 8, 1956, 
ibid., Mar. 10, 1956, p. 447. 



604 



Deparfmenf of Sfafe Bulletin 



An Outline of the Mutual Security Program for 1957 



Statement iy John B. Hollister 

Director, International Cooperation Administration ^ 



I am glad, Mr. Chairman, to have the oppor- 
tunity to appear before you in support of the 
President's request for authority for funds to 
carry out the mutual security program in fiscal 
year 1957. This request, as the President has in- 
dicated in his message,^ is for the national defense 
and for a program which is a vital part of the 
foreign policy of the United States. 

As you know, I became Director of the Inter- 
national Cooperation Administration in June 
1955. Full realization of the scope of the mutual 
security program in all its aspects has come only 
by 8 months' experience in day-to-day operations 
and by visiting each of the principal regions in 
wliich the program is carried out in cooperation 
with our foreign allies and friends. I have held 
regional meetings witli the chiefs of our missions 
in Europe, the Near East and Africa, and in Latin 
America. I have personally visited each Far 
Eastern country in which we carry on a mission 
and have seen some of the work being conducted 
in representative nations in other parts of the 
world. Altogether, I have visited personally 17 
of the 50 countries where the Ica has missions. 

These meetings and visits were essential to a 
proper understanding of what this Govermnent 
was trying to do in various parts of the world, 
and it has given me a basis for appreciating the 
many problems which confront us. I am glad 
that a number of members of this committee, since 
the Congress adjourned last summer and in prior 
years, have been able to see some of the mutual 
security programs in actual operation, for I am 
sure that such firsthand observation is a great 
help to understanding the need of the assistance 
and the problems that beset us in furnishing it. 



' Made before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs 
on Mar. 20. 

°BuixETiN of Apr. 2, 1956, p. 545. 



The mutual security program is a large global 
operation. No industrial company in the United 
States spends anywhere near as much to deliver 
as many varied items and services in as many dif- 
ferent places abroad. 

Administrative Setup 

The program, as this committee well knows, is 
both military and nonmilitary. In this program, 
the Director of Ica performs two distinct roles. 
One of these is as head of a semiautonomous oper- 
ating agency within the State Department. This 
agency is charged with the development and exe- 
cution of most of the nonmilitary aspects of the 
program. With respect to the nonmilitary phases 
of the mutual security program, Ica administers 
the operations through a planning and adminis- 
trative staff in Washington and through several 
thousand representatives in the field. 

The other role of the Director is that of coordi- 
nator of the whole program. This is not by virtue 
of his position as head of Ica but by special dele- 
gation of the Secretary of State. Under this 
delegation it is the duty of the Director of Ica to 
coordinate all elements of the mutual security 
program. In all foreign policy matters, I take 
guidance from the Secretary of State. 

The Director in his coordinating activities must 
see that the whole problem in each country is ex- 
amined and is taken into account and that the 
program in all of its aspects — policy, economic, 
and military — is properly designed to accomplish 
the objectives of the program. Accordingly, in 
presenting our requests for funds for your con- 
sideration, we will try to describe fully to you the 
problems of each region and country as a whole, in 
aU its aspects. We will plan to have here at all 
times (1) a representative of the State Depart- 



Aptil 9, 1956 



605 



ment for the region under discussion who can 
answer your questions on foreign policy; (2) a 
representative of the Department of Defense who 
can inform you about the military situation and 
program; and (3) a regional representative of 
IcA to explain the economic and nonmilitary pro- 



Program To Meet All Aspects of Problem 

"We feel that the program should be viewed as 
a whole, as a balanced effort to meet the Commu- 
nist challenge for world domination which today 
threatens the peace and security of the United 
States and the rest of the free world. This chal- 
lenge has existed since World War II and now 
for nearly a decade has been the major problem 
confronting the United States, to which many 
other problems of our Government are related in 
one way or another. 

In meeting the Communist threat affirmatively, 
we must recognize that the threat itself will con- 
tinue to have many different aspects despite the 
Soviet tactics of shifting from time to time the 
emphasis from one form of offensive to another. 
In the period 1947 to 1953 the Soviets aroused 
well-founded fears of armed aggression through 
all the free world. Today, although their pri- 
mary effort appears to be economic, there is no 
indication that the war preparations have ceased. 
There can, therefore, be no relaxation in our own 
military effort, nor in those of our allies, nor in 
our support of those allies. At the same time we 
must go forward with our own foreign economic 
aid program, the success of which will be the 
best answer to the new Soviet economic activities. 

The total program (to be met out of new ap- 
propriated funds) presented for fiscal year 1957 
is $4.86 billion. Of this, $3 billion is for mili- 
tary assistance. The balance of $1,860 million is 
nonmilitary, although much of it directly supports 
military effort. 

I refer you to a chart which shows the approxi- 
mate distribution of the fiscal year 1957 program 
by function. The military assistance funds ($3 
billion) will go for administration and expendi- 
ture to the Department of Defense. The items for 
defense support, development assistance, and tech- 
nical cooperation will be allotted for administra- 
tion and expenditure by the International Cooper- 
ation Administration. 

Military assistance now includes what was for- 



merly called direct-forces support — that is, the 
furnishing of consumable supplies, services, com- 
modities, etc., to allies' military forces, as well as 
the provision of equipment, weapons, and training. 

Defense swpport is furnished to certain countries 
eligible for military assistance. It is the name 
which, as a result of previous congressional his- 
tory, is applied to all forms of nonmilitary as- 
sistance (except technical cooperation) in coun- 
tries where there is a substantial military assist- 
ance program. It includes aid for civilian-type 
projects and activities which directly support the 
military program of the country (for example, 
highways, ports, communications) and also more 
general assistance which makes it possible for a 
country to maintain agreed force levels without 
seriously adverse economic or political conse- 
quences. At the same time, defense support is 
designed to contribute to building up the recipient , 
country's internal strength, making possible prog- 
ress toward improved living standards. 

Development assistance is the term generally 
used to define all forms of aid, except technical 
cooperation, which are furnished in countries 
where we have no substantial military aid pro- 
gram. It is furnished to certain countries with 
which we have no military agi'eements to promote 
their economic development. 

Technical cooperation consists of programs for 
sharing technical knowledge and skills with less 
developed countries. These programs are carried 
on through direct arrangements between the 
United States Government and individual gov- 
ernments usually referred to as "host" govern- 
ments, as well as through the United Nations and 
through the Organization of American States. 
Under the technical cooperation programs, tech- 
nicians and experts are sent from the United States 
to work overseas with host government officials 
and to help host governments develop their own 
teclmical resources for economic and social de- 
velopment. Our teclmicians are supported, when 
necessary, by supplies and equipment sent from the 
United States for demonstration purposes. For- 
eign nationals are also brought to the United 
States (or other countries) for training or ad- 
vanced study in technical specialties. This tech- 
nical exchange program is operative equally in 
countries which are eligible for military aid and 
those which are not. Much of it is carried on 
through contracts with American universities 



606 



Department of State Bulletin 



MUTUAL S£CUfi/Ty PROGRAMS S/ FUNCmN 



President's Contingency Fund 
Asian Development Fund 



Development 
Assistance ""^Z $|62 

6% 




President's Contingency Fund 
Middle East a Africo Fund' 
Asion Development Fund $100 

Development j^^-^*'-'* 
Assistance Si/"^-i -, - 

.1* 



other 



$2,703 MILLION 




H.860 MILLION 



Note: The figure of $4,860 million for the 1957 appropriation request excludes programs of $105 million to be 
financed from reappropriations or funds remaining available in 1957. 



under which technicians and specialists are sup- 
plied. All of it is on a joint basis. 

There are some further circumstances which 
should be mentioned in this connection, as failure 
to understand them may lead to confusion about 
the total of the figures just mentioned. In addi- 
tion to the new f mids requested for appropriation, 
we expect to have on hand on June 30, 1956, an 
unobligated balance of $45 million in the Pales- 
tine Refugee Fund, which we ask be carried over. 
We estimate that there will be an miobligated bal- 
ance in the Asian fund of about $60 million, 
wliich is available for 2 more years. We expect 
that this smn will be programed and wholly ob- 
ligated in fiscal year 1957. 

The Military Program 

For the description and details of the purely 
military part of the program, you will hear from 
representatives of the Department of Defense. 
However, as coordinator of the mutual security 
program, there are some aspects of that program 
on which I wish to comment. 

1. The military program has been developed 



country by country, with careful consideration of 
the entire situation in each region and comitry. 

(a) In determining the military assistance to 
be furnished to a country, we have tried to con- 
sider all aspects of that country's status, including 
the nature of the risks and dangers to the comitry 
itself and the relationship of such risks and dan- 
gers to the security position of the free world. 

(b) We have considered what nonmilitary 
projects are necessary to give direct support to 
the military effort. 

(c) We have considered the capacity of the 
country to produce internally or to procure else- 
where and pay for equipment which it needs. 

(d) Equally, if a country cannot, without 
either injury to its economy or outside aid, main- 
tain agreed forces and adequate political stability 
important to the security of the United States 
and the free world, we must frame our nonmili- 
tary programs in a way which helps to make 
possible the maintenance of the desired defense 
strength. 

(e) We must give attention to the very prac- 
tical consideration which exists in many coun- 



Apn7 9, 1956 



607 



tries — 'Wliat is tlie maximum defense expenditure 
which the country can make without endangering 
the economic health and progress of the country? 
In countries with low per capita incomes, this is 
important because the peoples of the less devel- 
oped countries have reasonable aspirations for 
better conditions which should be satisfied as fully 
as practicable if the countries are to remain stable 
components of the free world. 

(f) The military-assistance program in each 
country, and action in carrying out the progi-ams 
of prior years, must be related closely to the cur- 
rent U.S. foreigii policy with reference to that 
country and to developments in the general world 
situation. 

We have met with great cooperation from all 
the agencies involved in trying to tie all aspects 
of the program together. 

2. The military program has a new aspect this 
year — the commencement of a major effort to 
equip the forces of our allies with very advanced 
weapons. This will involve the provision of about 
$530 million worth of advanced weapons for those 
countries receiving military assistance who can 
use them effectively in defense of the free world. 

A portion of the funds for these advanced 
weapons has already been earmarked for Nato 
countries in the illustrative fiscal year 1957 pro- 
gram. Tlie balance has not been distributed in 
such specific fashion but will be allocated after 
further study of their most useful and effective 
employment. 

While the problems of each country are differ- 
ent, it is more convenient to discuss them in re- 
gional categories, which is the historical method 
of treatment. 

Europe: NATO 

Our earliest mutual security problems in the 
period following World War II were encountered 
in Europe. The Marshall plan, inaugurated in 
1947, helped put Europe on the road to economic 
recovery, and that recovery continues. At the 
same time the military foi-ces of the Nato coun- 
tries have been strengthened rapidly. 

The aid request for Nato countries (excluding 
Greece and Turkey) in fiscal year 1957 is almost 
entirely military. For the second successive year 
no defense support or related aid, vnth the excep- 
tion of a small amount for technical exchange, is 
being requested for any of these countries. 



The need for military assistance is based pri- 
marily on two main considerations. 

The first consideration is strategic. The secu- 
rity of Western Europe is vital to the security of 
the United States. Western Europe is a first line 
of our defense, and our divisions stationed there 
are testimony to this fact. Western Europe has 
the largest reserve of skilled manpower and, next 
to the United States, the greatest industrial po- 
tential in the world. It has a large pool of trained 
forces under anns. Its air and naval bases are 
vital to the defense of this country. 

The second consideration is economic. Not- 
withstanding Western Eui'ope's economic im- 
provement, the heavy expense of creating and 
maintaining an adequate defense in the area im- 
poses a severe strain on the resources of many of 
the Nato countries. The high cost of advanced 
weapons, coupled with the annual recurring costs 
of maintaining the defense establisliment already 
built up, therefore, make the continuation of some 
United States military assistance to them desira- 
ble. Without this assistance, the effectiveness of 
their forces would not be maintained. Equip- u 
ment would deteriorate and fall into disrepair for 
lack of spare parts, or become obsolescent. 

In their own defense expenditures Nato coun- 
tries have continued at a high level despite the 
fact United States economic aid to these countries 
has ceased. 

The expenditures which the European countries 
are now undertaking for their own defense are 
very substantial indeed. The total outlay for 
European defense establishments from 1949 to 
1955 amounts to about $72 billion. Of this total, 
about $10 billion is represented by United States 
aid. In other words, the Nato countries are 
footing the bill for about 85 percent of their 
total defense expenditures. Moreover, since troop 
pay in Europe is very much lower than in the 
United States, the human and material resources 
actually devoted to defense by the Europeans are 
substantially larger than these figures would in- 
dicate, by our yardstick. Likewise, the forces ac- 
tually maintained through this expenditure are 
significantly larger than those that we could main- 
tain for the same expenditure. 

In the coming fiscal year, of the military as- 
sistance proposed for Western Europe, the greater 
part will go to the Nato comitries. This will be 
increased by the amount of any of the unallocated 
reserve of advanced weapons which may be as- 



608 



Deparfment of State Bulletin 



signed for use by Nato forces. In the light of all 
the circumstances, including the advantage to the 
free world of maintaining force strength and 
quality of equipment, the help proposed to the 
European nations in Nato is not disproportionate 
to the benefit to us as a nation, nor does the 
European effort as a whole represent less than a 
reasonable share of the common defense effort. 

Although no defense support or economic aid 
as such is proposed for these countries in fiscal 
year 1957, we are requesting $11/^ million for sup- 
port of the European Productivity Agency, an 
arm of the Oeec [Organization for European 
Economic Cooperation]. Through this agency, 
the Oeec countries are working together to adapt 
and apply the best American and European tech- 
nical experience to the development of more dy- 
namic economies in Europe, thereby strengthen- 
ing the economic base for Western defense. 

West Berlin, Spain, Yugosiavia 

The second group of European countries with 
which we are concerned comprises West Berlin, 
Spain, and Yugoslavia. All three of these lie, 
politically and geographically speaking, on the 
peri2Dhery of Western Europe. They are not 
members of Nato and Oeec although Spain and 
Yugoslavia are observers in the latter organiza- 
tion. Spain and Yugoslavia have not benefited 
as fully from the European recovery as the other 
comitries, and their standards of living are appre- 
ciably below those of other European areas. Yet 
each of these coimtries is making a substantial 
contribution to the military, political, or psycho- 
logical defense of the West, and each is joined 
with us in strong mutual security interest. 

Spain is cooperating with us in the construction 
of important air and naval bases ; 

Yugoslavia, despite a common frontier with 
four Iron Curtain countries, continues to set an 
important example by guarding its independence 
from Soviet domination, and is a member of the 
Balkan Pact M'ith Greece and Turkey— both Nato 
members, though generally considered "Near 
East" countries; 

West Berlin stands as an outpost of the free 
world— a symbol of freedom far behind the Iron 
Curtain. 

These are the three special situations for which 
defense support and related assistance is proposed. 
Along with the $11/2 million for the European 
Productivity Agency, the nonmilitary aid pro- 



posed comes to $90 million. This is a slight re- 
duction from funds available for similar pro- 
grams for fiscal year 1956 and a reduction of more 
than 50 percent from similar programs for fiscal 
year 1955. 

IVIiddie East, Africa, and Asia 

Turning from Europe to the Middle East, 
Africa, and Asia, the situation becomes much 
more complex and much more varied. In these 
areas we have a large nmnber of new nations, some 
of them recently emerged from colonial status. 
In most of these comatries the levels of living 
standards, annual gross national product, indus- 
trial capacity, and per capita income are low in 
comparison to the more prosperous parts of the 
free world. 

Some of these nations, such as Korea, Laos, 
Viet-Nam, Cambodia, and Taiwan, have recently 
suffered from the effects of war or are faced by 
large Communist forces at their borders, or both. 
There is great need for many of them to main- 
tain substantial defense forces. This poses an 
economic problem of substantial proportions, for 
the military expenditure in many cases is totally 
beyond their resources. Nevertheless, they and 
the free world need this military effort so that 
they can remain free of external aggression and 
can put down armed internal subversion. 

Many of these allies of ours, and also other 
nations of the free world not receiving military 
assistance, are faced with internal economic prob- 
lems which would confront them even if they 
made no military effort. Their peoples, with un- 
satisfactory living conditions, are aspiring to a 
level above an austere subsistence standard. They 
look to their leaders for a degree of economic prog- 
ress which is beyond their powers to achieve mi- 
assisted. We thus must face the problem of non- 
military assistance of an economic character : 

(a) To maintain the defense efforts of our less 
prosperous allies at desired levels, and 

(b) To assist some of our allies, and also vari- 
ous less developed, uncommitted free nations, to 
strike at those conditions of poverty, disease, and 
low living standards which tend to create unrest 
and instability and which, if not improved, can 
lead to disorder or collapse which would threaten 
world peace. 

Our allies want to be strong. If they are to be 
strong, we cannot see them bowed by an unbear- 
able defense burden beyond their capacities and 



Apri7 9, 1956 



609 



unable to meet the reasonable aspirations of their 
peoples for progress. 

In the case of uncommitted nations, we achieve 
an important objective in the interests of the se- 
curity of the United States and the free world if 
we can succeed in helping them to make the prog- 
ress which will keep alive their desire for inde- 
pendence as responsible and developing members 
of the free world. We have no desire to impose 
our way of life upon them. Our sole purpose is 
to help them to develop the internal economic con- 
ditions in which free institutions can prosper. 
We hope to keep them from throwing their weight 
into the balance against the free world and on the 
side of communism. 

The problem has been greatly complicated by 
the increased economic activities of the Soviet bloc 
in relation to the free nations. Communist offers 
of economic, military, and technical help have a 
strong appeal for nations which need assistance 
badly, and we, therefore, must expect many of 
these offers, where they are sufficiently attractive, 
to be accepted. Such acceptance involves dangers 
as well as material benefits. It increases the op- 



portunities for Communist penetration; it fre- 
quently places the Soviet Union in a falsely favor- 
able light; it may tie the recipient unduly to the 
Communist bloc; it will be capitalized upon by 
the Communists to proclaim their unselfish inter- 
est in the economic welfare of others. 

We must take this danger with the utmost of 
seriousness. Some of the peoples throughout the 
Middle East and Asia are all too likely to accept 
the Communist propaganda line, which puts the 
blame on free-world nations for the existence of 
obstacles between present hard economic realities 
and their own economic aspirations. For many 
leaders in the region, the first direct contact with 
the Soviet Government itself has been with the 
new 1956 model of Soviet "traveling salesman" 
diplomat who smilingly and seductively offers on 
easy terms the capital and technical and military 
help they desire. These Soviet offers have in- 
cluded arms to Egypt, Afghanistan, and other 
countries and machinery, food, industrial plants, 
and technicians to many other countries around 
the world. While we have no intention of com- 
peting with the U.S.S.R., offer by offer — for to 



TOTAL MUTUAL SBCUim MmRAM BY RE&ON 

(MILITARY AND NON- MILITARY COMBINED) 

FYI%7 
FYI9X 



Lotin America> 

$77 

(3%) 




*2,943 MILLION 




*4,965 MILLION 



Note: The figure of $2,943 million for fiscal 1956 includes programs of $240 million financed from reappropriation 
of funds. The figure of $4,965 for fiscal 1957 includes programs of $105 million to be financed from reappropriations 
or funds remaining available in 1957. 

610 l>epat\mQn\ of S/ofe Bulletin 



do so would be to abandon independence and 
judgment — ^yet we must take account of the new 
approach which Soviet tyranny has adopted to 
court the Moslem, Asiatic, and African worlds. 

Our policy, I believe, should be to continue to 
support projects and progi-ams which, in the light 
of our best judgment and experience, contribute 
to freedom and sound development in these areas. 
We should not be stampeded into proposing proj- 
ects beyond the capacity and energies of any 
nation — for, unlike the Soviets, we care about their 
future and will not deliberately entice a nation 
into the quicksands of overexjjansion or inflation. 
We must recognize that pressing human misery 
has made many a nation nearsighted to the hu- 
man tragedy of the concentration camps, slave 
labor, and brutal rigidity that lies back of the 
Soviet offers of arms and aid and Soviet methods 
of obtaining industrial advances. We must imder- 
stand that responsible leaders in the newly devel- 
oping region, no matter how moderate or how pro- 
free- world they may be themselves, must make sub- 
stantial deliveries on programs of development in 
order to continue as leaders in their nations. Our 
program must recognize such circumstances. It 
in fact does so by helping to provide the kind of 
aid needed to carry forward sound development 
programs at a rate and in a volume adapted to 
the capacity of countries to maintain effectively, 
and in terms of the economic and political circum- 
stances that these countries, their peoples, and their 
leaders face. 

Before discussing the various countries of the 
Middle East, Africa, and Asia in more detail, I 
want to make two points which affect our programs 
in these areas. 

1. Great ■flexibility of action on the part of the 
United States is needed to meet situations as they 
arise. 

These areas are in a volatile stage of develop- 
ment and change. New problems are arising 
daily, and old problems are constantly taking on 
new aspects. We should be in a position to take 
prompt action to deal with those situations where 
assistance is wise, before others, hostile to free- 
world objectives, exploit them dangerously. 

2. Some of these problems are long-range. To 
be most effective, we should be in a position to 
make reasonable nonmilitary commitments ex- 
tending beyond the span of a single fiscal year. 
The President mentioned this problem in his mes- 
sage, and I shall discuss it later. 



MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA 

I turn now to the situation in the Middle East 
and Africa in greater detail. As examples of 
some of our problems, let me mention a few in- 
dividual situations. 

Turkey's assumption of an extraordinarily 
large military burden — she is presently contrib- 
uting a substantial part of the ground forces of 
Nato — merits our continued support. The com- 
bination of the demands of the defense establish- 
ment and the costs of accelerated development has 
brought about serious economic strain. The Gov- 
ernment of Turkey has recently announced a sta- 
bilization program containing those elements of 
economic reform which can contribute to financial 
balance if properly carried out. 

The oil of Iran is beginning to add substantially 
to that coimtry's capital development, but in the 
next year or so Iran will still need help in meeting 
the heavy costs of government that are occasioned 
by large military expenditures and the needs for 
development. 

We support the Egyptian Government's deter- 
mination to build a better life for her people. To 
bring fruition to their strivings for the common 
decencies of life, Egyptians need aid to provide 
long-range buildup of their resources, such as the 
High Aswan Dam will accomplish. At the same 
time, Egypt must satisfy immediate needs so that 
there will be a "long-range" future with which 
we can cooperate. Our relationship with this 
great Moslem state depends on our understanding 
of both future and present economic requirements 
in connection with which Egypt needs external 
help. 

In the Arah States and in Israel, we hope that 
our programs, which are designed to accelerate 
desperately needed economic development and to 
provide a partial answer to the pitiful plight of 
the refugees from Israel, will also help in the solu- 
tion of the bitter controversies that now plague 
the whole Near East. We are prepared to sup- 
port any programs or projects that hold real 
promise of constructive progress on these prob- 
lems, including broad support for regional proj- 
ects that will harness the energy and equitably 
distribute the waters of the Jordan River or facili- 
tate tlie resettlement of refugees. 

MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA FUND 

Three factors in particular create a special need 
for the capacity for flexible action on the economic 



April 9, 7956 



611 



front in the Middle East and Africa. The first 
is the increased Soviet activity in the area. The 
second factor is a past pattern, which there is 
every likelihood will continue to repeat itself in 
the future, of frequent and sudden economic crises 
in certain countries of the region. The third con- 
sideration is the fact that many of the major 
problems of the region with which our aid pro- 
grams must deal are of a kind which concern two 
or more countries. This means, when given the 
sensitive political issues involved in the relation- 
ships among some of these countries, that the exact 
timing and character of the eventual solutions to 
these problems cannot be accurately forecast, nor 
the precise manner in which our aid can contrib- 
ute. 

We need to have available a fund which is not 
programed in detail, far in advance and country 
by country. This should be available during the 
coming fiscal year for carrying out major country 
and regional projects which seem of particular 
importance in solving economic problems and in 
maintaining peace and stability. Such a fund 
would place the United States in a position to give 
highly desirable economic assistance, without hav- 
ing to divert funds earmarked for some other spe- 
cific purpose. Such a fund would avoid the 
necessity of transferring funds to high-priority 
projects suddenly developing, at the expense of 
soundly conceived country programs which have 
been carefully presented for your approval as 
illustrative programs. 

The President suggests a fund of $100 million. 
"We would expect to have it obligated in the course 
of the coming fiscal year. Some of it would doubt- 
less be applied in aid of projects which we are 
already considering but which have not at the 
moment developed to a point where we are able 
to present them as part of our specific illustrative 
programs. Some of the fund would doubtless be 
applied to meet emergency situations. 

SOUTH ASIA 

In the light of PaJcistari's commitment to the 
free world both in the Seato [Southeast Asia 
Treaty Organization] and the Baghdad Pact, her 
efforts to maintain adequate defenses and to build 
economic strength deserve our strong support, for 
Pakistan's strength and freedom are a center link 
to a chain that guards free Asia. 

Consistent with our policy of helping to 



strengthen free nations which are striving to main- 
tain their independence and which require help 
in achieving a rate of economic growth adequate 
for the minimum needs of their people, we plan 
to assist India in carrying out its second 5-year 
development program, which is to be initiated this 
year. It is important for the United States to 
give continued assistance as evidence of our in- 
terest in and friendship for the Indian people, thus 
helping a great nation, devoted to the principles 
of freedom, to make the economic advances which 
are essential to its welfare. 

FAR EAST 

The mutual security progi'am in the Far East 
currently includes programs for Korea, Taiwan, 
.Japan, the Philippines, Thailand, Viet-Nam, 
Cambodia, Laos, and Indonesia. In general, the 
reasons which I have already advanced for as- 
sistance to the less developed countries of the 
Middle East, Africa, and South Asia apply with 
equal force to all our Far Eastern friends and 
allies, except, in part, in the case of Japan, which 
is the only highly industrialized country in the 
Far East. 

The major part of the total aid proposed for 
the Far East would go to Korea, Taiwan, Viet- | 
Nam, Cambodia, and Laos. Each of these coun- 
tries is now maintaining large military forces 
which it requires for its self-defense. These forces 
are larger, in some cases many times larger, than 
those which these comitries can raise and support 
with their own resources alone. Over the past 
several years we have helped them to develop and 
maintain these forces through the provision of 
all types of aid. As a result, the strength and 
effectiveness of these forces has increased vei-y 
greatly, but this strengtli and effectiveness cannot 
be sustained without continuing aid of considera- 
ble magnitude. Modern forces are far more ex- 
pensive to maintain than primitive ones. More- 
over, expanded forces require new facilities such 
as airfields, naval bases, and barracks. These 
countries, with their very limited resources, can- 
not meet the high costs involved out of their own 
revenues. 

Some of these same nations, like Korea and 
Viet-Nam, have also faced the problem of recov- 
ering from the effects of war and of caring for 
and absorbing a gi'eat influx of refugees. They 
lack the foreign exchange to import consmner 
goods, industrial raw materials, machinery and 



612 



Departmenf of S/ofe Bu//efin 



spare parts which their j)resent economies need. 
They also face the necessity of increasing their 
own capacity for self-support and of making a 
beginning at the long task of economic develop- 
ment to raise living standards. 

These countries will necessarily receive substan- 
tial military assistance under the 1957 program. 
The threat of further Communist aggression is not 
by any means removed, and it is unfortunate that, 
in countries with so much need for economic 
progi-ess, it is necessary for the free world to spend 
such large amounts for military pui'poses. In the 
present state of the world this cannot be avoided. 

The aid program for Korea continues to be the 
largest single aid program currently being con- 
ducted by the United States. This is true of both 
its military and nonmilitary components. This 
is partly because Korea has the largest single 
army in the Far East and one which is well beyond 
the capacity of Korea to support unaided. This 
army is largely composed of battle-trained vet- 
erans, and it has been created, and then main- 
tained, at its present effective strength only by 
huge volumes of continuing military aid and 
defense support. 

PRESIDENT'S FUND FOR ASIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 

A year ago, the Congress authorized appropria- 
tions of $200 million for Asian economic develop- 
ment, but only $100 million was appropriated. 
This year the President has requested appropria- 
tion of the remaining $100 million. This commit- 
tee is not called upon for any action now upon this 
request since the appropriation has been author- 
ized. 

The Congress knew that planning the expendi- 
ture of this money would take some time, and the 
funds appropriated were therefore made available 

I for a 3-year period. 

I The first major expenditure from this fund will 
probably be for a regional nuclear research and 
training center to be located in the Philippines 
for the benefit of Asians. This was announced 
only last week.^ The Brookhaven National Lab- 
oi'atory will start off a comprehensive survey of 
this next month. Other projects under study in- 

Ij volve communications, mineral-resources develop- 
ment, production improvement, rail and water 
transportation, and various regional teclinical 
training centers. 



'Ibid., p. 544. 
April 9, 7956 



Latin America 

The fiscal year 1957 program recommends con- 
tinuance of our technical cooperation programs in 
Latin America. These are effective in assisting 
the self-reliant governments and peoples of Latin 
American countries in their own development ac- 
tivities. These governments are striving to 
achieve higher health, social, and economic stand- 
ards, and the technical assistance we have been 
able to furnish has been warmly received and gen- 
erously acknowledged. 

The programs are designed to assist the peoples 
in each country to develop and utilize more effec- 
tively their tremendous human and natural re- 
sources. The progi-ams are cooperative in that 
our representatives and those of the host govern- 
ment work side by side and are supported by the 
pooled contributions of both countries. 

In a recent trip to several Latin American coun- 
tries I gained the impression that the broad ob- 
jectives of the mutual security program are being 
achieved in generous measure. In each country, 
whether it was in the palace or the foreign office 
or in some jungle area of the interior, the answer 
to the question "Wlao is carrying out this pro- 
gram?" was invariably— "we"— "your people and 
our people." This is the partnership spirit with 
which our people are carrying out the progi-am, 
and it is gratifying to me to find that it is shared 
by those with whom we work. I think you can 
feel assured that these technical assistance pro- 
grams are a source of genuine good will between 
the United States and Latin America. 

Other Activities 

We assist, as you know, various projects han- 
dled through U.N. agencies. In dollar amount 
our contributions to these agencies are included 
in the fiscal year program for a total of $27,800,000. 

Witnesses directly concerned with supervising 
and operating these programs will testify about 
them. They are in general comparable in size to 
the programs of earlier years. 

It has been the policy of the United States to 
participate in these efforts of the United Nations 
as well as those of other international organiza- 
tions to deal with certain problems of economic 
development and to meet the serious difficulties 
of certain especially needy people whose problems 
are best handled through multilateral action. We 
propose support of (a) our own program for 

613 



fRBS Asm fMPORTANCE 



WORLD MANPOWER 

Free World = 1.8 Billion 




Mft^JsWA 



re wi/uui/i/y 



Soviet Bloc = 0.9 Billion 



■ 100 Million P*op1« 



U.S. DEPENDENCE ON IMPORTS FROM ASIA 

(Imports from Asio os Percent of Totol US. Imports in 1954) 




Copro Tea Rubber Jute Manilo Spices ISn Mon- Tung- 
Hemp gonese sten 



DEFENSE EXPENDITURES 

( As Percent of FY 1956 Budget ) 




58% 



PRINCIPALIS. EXPORTS TO FREE ASIA 
1954 

971 ( $ Millions) 

^^^ 259 




Grains Textiles Chemicals 



Mochinery Cotton 

r^r r% (%"' r^° f^r- 

Pwcont of Total U.S. Exports 




escapees from communism, (b) the work of the 
Intergovernmental Committee for European Mi- 
gration (Icem), and (c) the program of paying 
ocean freight costs on donated relief supplies. 
These humanitarian programs are part of this 
Government's general support of collective action 
in the solution of important world social and 
economic problems, some arising out of World 
War II. 



The Need of Flexibility 

I have already referred to the need of flexibility 
to deal with the problems which confront us. 
This need will be apparent if I review for you 
briefly our planning and program cycle. 

Ordinarily we come before your committee in 
the late spring. Incidentally, we are here before 
you earlier this year than in any year since 1952. 



Hearings before this committee, the Senate For- 
eign Relations Committee, and the two Appropria- 
tions Committees are thorough and comjilete, and 
we develop for your benefit illustrative programs 
which indicate the purpose for which we are ask- 
ing very large sums of money. 

Tliese illustrative programs, when they reach 
you, have gone through a long process. Already 
the country teams in the countries involved are 
working on the early stages of the planning for 
the fiscal year 1958. Much of the planning at 
the country level for the 1957 fiscal year program 
was done a year ago. These country programs, 
both military and economic, then receive a very 
thorougli screening in the field and in Washing- 
ton. Priorities among the projects are then de- 
termined. Those least useful and with least 
promise are eliminated, and the program require- 
ments are reconciled with fiscal needs. The Bu- 



614 



Department of Sfafe Bulletin 



reau of the Budget thereafter participates in ex- 
tended hearings on the programs as developed, and 
they are again further refined. Thus, funds ac- 
tually appropriated in the late spring or early 
summer of 1956 for the fiscal year 1967 program 
will be based on planning which started in the 
spring of 1955. 

Appropriation of funds does not end our plan- 
ning process. The Congress frequently makes 
changes in the program. This necessitates an 
extended further program review to adjust the 
illustrative programs to congressional action and 
to changes in the general world or country situa- 
tion. It takes time to make allocations of funds to 
particular programs and situations. Usually we 
do not get the funds in form to be used imtil No- 
vember or December of the calendar year in which 
the appropriations are made. After that, we 
must begin the long process of negotiation, first 
with other governments and later with contrac- 
tors, designed to insure that we spend the money 
you have granted to us with wisdom and frugality. 
The negotiation camiot be started (particularly 
with foreign governments) vmtil we know we have 
money to spend. This is particularly true with 
respect to country programs, including the sale 
of agricultural commodities or the use of loans as 
part of the program, for, in general, the agreement 
with such a country is on a "package" basis. Both 
for the Defense Department and for Ica, this puts 
us on a very tight time schedule — and forces active 
negotiation work by a busy staff just at the time 
when it is preparing to present the program of 
the next succeeding fiscal year to you. 

This presentation is a very intricate task indeed. 
The large presentation documents which come to 
you each year do not write themselves. They in- 
volve a vast amount of careful writing, checking 
of figures, interdepartmental coordination and 
clearances, and editing. The Defense and Ica 
program and operating staffs have been working 
steadily on the documents which you have before 
you for over 2 months and at the same time have 
been pressing to carry out the obligating of fiscal 
year 1956 fmads. The same people must work 
on both tasks, for they are the only people who 
have the detailed knowledge to do this. The sit- 
uation is particularly difficult because section 106 
of the appropriation act provides that not more 
than 20 percent of the funds made available xmder 
the act may be obligated or reserved during the 
last 2 months of the fiscal year. 



I wish to make two principal points on the basis 
of this description of the cycle. 

First, a period of 1^^ years to 2 years thus 
elapses between (a) initial planning and (b) obli- 
gation of funds. This means a substantial time 
lag between ascertainment of requirements and 
obligation of fimds. New and substantial re- 
quirements can develop rapidly in the interim. 
We can meet these new requirements mider pres- 
ent legislation in two ways. 

1. We can transfer funds from other carefully 
prepared programs. This is undesirable because 
it means abandoiunent or postponement of care- 
fully planned programs of assistance which are 
badly needed. 

2. We can use the $100-million President's con- 
tingency fund under section 401. This is our most 
valuable flexible asset in carrying out mutual se- 
curity objectives, and we should save this for the 
most serious emergencies and unprogramed calls 
on our funds. The proposal of an additional 
Middle East and Africa fund, which I have al- 
ready mentioned, in essence would give us a fur- 
ther available source of emergency funds for use 
in this region. Although this fund would be ear- 
marked for use in a particular area of the world, 
it is a region in which unexpected need for funds 
is especially likely to arise. 

Second, the planning and program cycle which 
I have described shows that the time available for 
obligation of mutual security funds is very short 
indeed, especially when 80 percent of them must, 
under the provisions of the present appropriation 
law, be obligated during the first 10 months of the 
fiscal year. I believe the taxpayers would get 
better value for their money and the conduct of the 
mutual security program would be improved if the 
Congress were to adopt the following recommen- 
dations : 

(a) Make military assistance funds available 
on a "no year" basis as in the case of most other 
military procurement funds expended by the De- 
partment of Defense ; 

(b) Provide that at least 25 percent of nonmili- 
taiy Mutual Security Act funds shall remain 
available until September 30 following the end of 
the fiscal year (i. e. be 15-month funds). 

I feel sure that the present provision limiting 
obligations in May and June to 20 percent of ap- 
propriations for the year exerts undue and un- 
necessary pressures for early obligation of funds 
which inevitably lead to hasty action. In essence. 



Apr// 9, J 956 



615 



the present provision moves the pressure for last- 
minute obli<^!ition of funds forward from June 30 
to April 30, thus worsening the situation instead 
of improving it. I hope that the appropriations 
committees will see fit to relieve us of this require- 
ment. 

Further flexibility is needed in another wholly 
dilferent direction. At the present time, the Presi- 
dent is authorized to use under the provisions of 
section 401 of the Mutual Security Act (Presi- 
dent's Special Fund), without regard to the pro- 
visions of the act itself or of any other statute for 
which funds are appropriated under the act: 

(a) $100 million specifically appropriated under 
the act for fiscal yenv 1956 ; and 

(b) $50 million of any other mutual security 
funds appropriated for fiscal year 1956. 

This provision has enabled us to move promptly 
to carry out the purposes of the act in a luimber 
of critical situations where these purposes could 
not otherwise be accomplished within one or more 
of the normal restrictions of the Mutual Security 
Act and of certain other statutes. 

We believe that the ability to act rapidly in an 
imrestricted fashion will prove to be even more 
necessary in the year which lies ahead. Accord- 
ingly, the President has recommended the broad- 
ening of the valuable authority provided by sec- 
tion 401 in three respects. 

First, he has requested that the amount which 
is subject to the provisions of section 401 should 
be increased from $150 million (composed of a 
specific appropriation for fiscal year 1956 under 
section 401 of $100 million and any other $50 
million of fiscal year 1956 mutual security funds) 
to $300 million (composed of a new specific ap- 
propriation of $100 million for fiscal year 1957 
under section 401 and any other $200 million of 
fiscal j-ear 1957 mutual security funds). This 
would mean that $300 million, or about 6 percent, 
of the total mutual security funds requested for 
fiscal year 1957 would be subject to the high de- 
gree of flexibility now afforded by section 401. 

Second, the President has requested that he be 
given authority to use not in excess of $100 million 
of the funds available under section 401 without 
regard to the requirements of any act, if the Pres- 
ident determines that such use would be important 
to the security of the United States. This provi- 
sion would be similar to the broad exemption al- 
ready furnished by section 404 of the act with 
respect to the funds provided under that section. 



Third, he has requested that the amount of funds 
which may be allocated under section 401 to any 
one nation in any one fiscal year be increased from 
$20 million to $40 million. 

These three changes would be an important ad- 
dition to the authority of the Department of De- 
fense and of IcA to move rapidly and flexibly to 
take necessary action in cases which may arise. i 

Long-Term Commitments 

The President has recommended that, for non- 
military projects of significance or importance, 
the President be authorized to make commitments 
for not over 10 years. The funds to fulfill such 
commitments would come from appropriations foi 
nonmilitary purposes and would not exceed $100 
million in any one year. I 

The significant feature of the requested author- ' 
ity would be that the President would be able to 
give to other nations assurance, backed by con- 
gressional approval, that annually an agreed 
United States contribution to the projects in ques- 
tion will be made within and subject to the limits 
of the funds made available annually. j 

The Aswan Dam has frequently been cited as an I 
example of the type of project in contemplation. 
Although in the initial stages of this project use 
of the requested new commitment authority may 
not be involved, it does serve to illustrate the pos- 
sible use of the requested authority. 

This project is a large river development in- 
volving many facets (irrigation, power, transpor- 
tation, flood control, related agricultural enter- 
prises, and service activities) all of which in the 
aggregate constitute a long-range development 
project, partly to be financed by the country to be 
benefited and partlj^ by assistance progi'ams and 
international loans. All these elements of such 
an enterprise must be pulled together into a sound 
arrangement for its financing. To obtain one part 
of the financing there must be assurance of the 
availability of the balance. The government of 
the country concerned must know that the project 
is financially feasible before it can safely go for- 
ward or even plan on a firm basis. 

Other types of projects for which such a power 
would be useful involve harbor development, road 
systems, inland waterways, power systems, com- 
munications systems, industrial and educational 
centers, with their respective related and subsidi- 
ary schemes. If these are to be carried out over 
a period of years, there is no need of actual ap- 



616 



Deparfmenf of State Bulletin 



propriations until the year in which the funds are 
actually to be obligated approaches. However, we 
do request the authority, at an earlier date, to 
make commitments not amomiting to binding con- 
tract authoHty but backed by the assurance of the 
Congress that these are undertakings for which 
we expect later to make appropriations. This 
authority may prove to be a very powerful and 
useful mutual-security instrument in the difficult 
years lying immediately ahead. 

From personal experience in the House of Rep- 
resentatives, I know and understand the congres- 
sional reluctance to permit long-term arrange- 
ments. The Congress likes to review proposed 
appropriations on an annual basis and to check on 
the expenditure of previously granted funds be- 
fore granting new authority. This opportunity 
to review will not be completely lost under the 
proposal, for annual appropriations must be 
made. 

In the face of greatly increased Communist ac- 
tivity in the economic field, those charged with 
the execution of our mutual security programs are 



going to need every reasonable tool to accomplish 
their objectives. The Communist leaders can act 
on dictatorial fiat without accountability to any- 
one. They need not give thought to any wishes 
of their own people or to their crying need for 
consumer goods. We seek no sucli autocratic 
power. 



Agricultural Commodities 

Under section 402 of the 1954 act, as amended, 
$300 million is to be used in the current fiscal year 
to finance the export and sale for foreign curren- 
cies of surplus agricultural conunodities produced 
in the United States. If we fail to arrange for 
such exports in the full amount, to the extent of 
our failure we cannot use our appropriations. 
To that extent the mutual security program of the 
United States and its allies is curtailed, and care- 
fully planned projects must be scrapped or 
postponed. 

In fiscal year 1956 we hope to reach the $300- 
million mark, but may fall short. Whatever fig- 
ure we reach will be only after much effort and 



PROGRAM BY REGION 



($Millions) 



MILITARY 




Europe 
$760 
125%) 



FY 1957 Program --$3,000 Million 
NGN- MILITARY 



Lotin America 
ser 

13%) 




FY 1957 Program- -$1,965 Million 



2,352 




LATIN AMERICA 



47 



77 



97 



EUROPE 



385 




851 

M 



NEAR EAST 8 AFRICA 

884 















«» 




40( 




412 






^105*^ 








296 



NON- 


REGIONAL 




781 


529 


' ^ 




:i2l : 


:J 




'^5 




r~i 


-174 




ZI6. 





1955 1956 „ 1957 , 

(Pfoposea ProgrOffil 

U S Fiscol reors 
*$47.am;il!o(t of ih« ilOOmiUion Sp.ciol Preildar-tial Fund moudad 



1955 1956" 1957 

IPropoMd Program) 



I profram ligurti. 



April 9, 1956 



617 



in the face of many difficulties. In these situa- 
tions, we must always try to avoid hurting nor- 
mal export markets for United States agricultural 
products or for the products of our allies and 
friends. If we did cause such injury, we would 
do damage to the very cause of free-world security 
and stability we are trying to serve. This limits 
our opportunities. The 50-50 shipping provision 
also sometimes makes the problem difficult, par- 
ticularly our efforts to work out triangular ar- 
rangements. The shift of the mutual security 
economic program toward less developed coun- 
tries, which ai'e predominantly agricultural and 
therefore need our surpluses less, also accentuates 
the problem. 

I therefore ask that the requirement of section 
402 for the coming fiscal year be set at $250 mil- 
lion. We shall do our utmost to carry out the 
purposes of section 402, but we do not want to see 
useful projects abandoned for lack of funds, 
merely because under current world conditions we 
find it impossible to reach some arbitrary goal. 

Loans 

In the administration of the mutual security 
program it has been this Government's policy to 
encourage the financing of nonmilitary projects 
and activities by private investment or through 
public lending institutions such as the Export- 
Import Bank and the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development. This policy 
has been considered and applied in formulating 
the program for fiscal year 1957. Unfortunately, 
loan financing of this character has not been avail- 
able in adequate amoimts to meet the requirements 
for capital even in many countries whose econ- 
omies are sufficiently stable to indicate capacity 
for repayment. 

Under the mutual security program, we have 
provided our assistance in the form of loans rather 
than grants, so far as this was consistent with 
the attainment of mutual security objectives. We 
have tried to make sure that loans did not supplant 
those which might be available from the public 
lending institutions or replace potential private 
capital investment, if that possibility exists. Con- 
sequently, we have restricted the use of mutual 
security loans to situations in which the transac- 
tion would not take place at all unless on terms 
substantially more liberal than those available 
from the public lending institutions. The efforts 



this year to increase the volume of loans actually 
made under the mutual security program have 
been disappointing. It has been foimd that the 
attempted substitution of a loan for a grant is 
frequently, either for political or economic rea- 
sons, inconsistent with the attainment of mutual 
security objectives, unless the terms of such loans 
are so liberal as in effect to constitute partial 
grants. 

Unexpended Balances 

At a later stage of these hearings, the appro- 
priate accounting officers of the Defense Depart- 
ment and of IcA will discuss in detail the status 
of past appropriations and the unexpended bal- 
ances of prior appropriations which we antici- 
pate at the end of fiscal year 1956. 

My present estimate, on the basis of information 
furnished by the Department of Defense, is that i 
the balance of unexpended military assistance ap- 
propriations on June 30, 1956, will be about $4.8 
billion. This balance will represent a decline in 
the 2-year period since June 30, 1954, of about $2.9 
billion. It will be equal to about 2 years of mili- 
taiy assistance expenditures at the average rate 
for the fiscal years 1955 and 1956. 

On the nonmilitary side, on June 30, 1956, there 
will probably be a slight decline in unexpended 
balances from the levels prevailing at the end of 
June 1955 and June 1954. This balance will be 
equal to about 1 year's expenditure at the average 
rate now prevailing. 

The new military assistance authorization re- 
quested is equal to about 1 year of expenditures 
($2.4 billion) at the present rate plus the $530 
million requested for advanced weapons of a type 
for which, in general, no previous appropriations 
have been made. The nonmilitary authorization 
requested is equal to about 1 year of expenditures 
at the current rate. 

I'his, ladies and gentlemen, is a summary of my 
vie\.rs on this vast program. The needs for sucl 
a program were never greater. The usefulness of 
it seems to me to be borne out by the news we 
read in each day's newspapers. We shall try to 
give you in the days to come a full picture of every 
aspect of the program. We think that the facts 
which you will hear in testimony and will find in 
written form in the presentation books will be 
more convincing than any expression of opinion 
anj'one can give you. 






<618 



Department of State Bulletin 



East-West Trade 



Statement ty Under Secretary Hoover ^ 



You have asked me to appear today to give in- 
formation on the matter of East-West trade. 

At the outset there should be a clear understand- 
ing of the type of East-West trade with which we 
are here concerned. We do not refer to trade 
between the United States and the Communist 
bloc, for controls on our trade with the Commu- 
nists are not in question. What we are dealing 
with here is trade between our allies and the Com- 
munist countries. The only effective way in 
which we can control that trade is through the 
power of persuasion. 

We have offered to give your subcommittee — 
and we repeat our offer — all necessary and appro- 
priate information about such trade. The issue 
between us seems to be that the subcommittee in- 
sists that all of this information be given in pub- 
lic session. We, on the contrary, feel that certain 
portions should only be given to the Congress on 
a classified basis. To make this information pub- 
lic would violate our agreements with our allies 
and would be prejudicial to our national security 
interests. 

In any consideration of our system of interna- 
tional controls it is essential to remember that 
these controls depend entirely upon a system of 
volimtary cooperation among the free nations of 
the West. Thus, the 1954 revision of the Interna- 
tional Control List had to be negotiated and agree- 
ment reached with all 14 of our allies.- 

In those negotiations neither the United States 
nor any of the other participants got everything 
they wanted. The State Department, as well as 
the other interested Departments, was not happy 

' Alade on Mar. 26 before the Senate Permanent Sub- 
committee on Investigations (press release 161). 

^ For a Foreign Operations Administration announce- 
ment on the 1954 revisions, see Bulletin of Sept. 13, 1954, 
p. 372. 



to see many items deleted from the control list. 
By the same token, some of our allies were not 
happy to see some items retained. We did suc- 
ceed in retaining on the list highly strategic items 
which could not be controlled successfully without 
international agreement. We also succeeded in 
achieving our other major objective, the setting 
up of a more efl'ective enforcement system. With- 
out agreement among all 15 nations it would not 
have been possible to have any International Con- 
trol List at all. 

Thus all the responsible agencies are in full sup- 
port of Governor Stassen's statement that the 
1954 negotiations achieved a net security advan- 
tage for the United States, under all the circum- 
stances then prevailing, and that the results were 
in the best interests of the United States. 

Some criticism has been directed, during the 
course of these hearings, at our allies for the posi- 
tion taken by them with regard to East- West trade 
controls. They, as well as we, were seeking to 
achieve a balance between the beneficial effects of 
peaceful trade and the dangers of unrestricted 
trade in strategic items. Sometimes we dis- 
agreed, as free nations often do, as to where to 
strike that balance. Our negotiations in 1954 
were on the whole a successful effort to resolve 
this problem. 

It has been suggested that we might have been 
more successful if we had used more than the 
power of persuasion. President Eisenhower an- 
swered that contention on December 2, 1953,' as 
follows : 

The easiest thing to do with great power is to abuse 
it, to use it to excess. This most powerful of the free 
nations must not permit itself to grow weary of the 
processes of negotiation and adjustment that are funda- 



' lUd., Dec. 14, 1953, p. 811. 



^l^rW 9, 1956 



619 



mental to freedom. If it should turn impatiently to co- 
ercion of other free nations, our brand of coercion, so 
far as our friends are concerned, would be a mark of the 
imperialist rather than of the leader. 

During the course of this investigation, com- 
plaints have been made that the executive branch 
has withheld information about the 1954 negotia- 
tions which the Congress has a right to know. I 
do not think the record will sustain that point. 

On February 14 I appeared before your sub- 
committee in executive session. I offered full co- 
operation to the subcommittee and explained that 
much of the information sought could only be 
given in executive session in order to protect our 
national security. The subcommittee did not re- 
spond to that offer but instead proceeded with 
open hearings. 

Therefore, on February 20 a letter was sent to 
the chairman on behalf of the Departments of 
State, Defense, and Commerce and the Interna- 
tional Cooperation Administration.* That letter 
is in the record of these hearings. It pointed out 
that most of the documents involved in these in- 
ternational negotiations were classified and highly 
sensitive and that they involved our relations with 
other governments. It was further stated that 
in many instances we had given a specific commit- 
ment to keep the participation of a particular na- 
tion in this program secret. The letter concluded 
that, for these reasons, the International List could 
not be made public but full information as to items 
on the List could be offered to the subcommittee 
in executive session and on a classified basis. 

In a further effort to clarify our position a 
letter was addressed to the chairman on INIarch 
23,* pointing out that the information already of- 
fered would give the subcommittee, on a classified 
basis, every item on the International List. I 
would like to enter that letter into the record at 
this time. It stated we were ready to give the 
subcommittee the List itself on a classified basis 
and to discuss tlie 1954 revisions of that List with 
the subcommittee in executive session. 

Our request is not unusual. We are only ask- 
ing to follow the same procedure followed by the 
other committees of the Congress. In matters 
involving foreign relations, officials from the re- 
sponsible Departments meet in executive session 
on frequent occasions with the appropriate con- 
gressional committees to testify on classified niat- 



' Not printed here. 
620 



ters that affect the national interest. That is all 
that is being requested in this instance. 

We believe that this position is essential if a 
system of international trade controls is to be 
maintained. That system rests on a voluntary 
agreement among ourselves and 14 of our allies. 
When the agreement was negotiated in 1954, it 
was decided by the 15 negotiating countries that 
the International List and the negotiations which 
established it were to be classified. Some of our 
allies would only consent to participate in the 
negotiations on the basis of a specific commitment 
to that effect. Pursuant to that agreement and 
under security regulations issued by the Secre- 
tary of State, the International List and the docu- 
ments on which that List was based were classi- 
fied. 

I have personally examined the documents in- 
volved, and it is my considered judgment that to 
declassify the material would not only be a breach 
of faith which would be prejudicial to our for- 
eign relations but that it could seriously risk de- 
stroying the entire agreement upon which our 
system of controls now rests. Furthermore, it 
would jeopardize our ability to conduct further 
negotiations on this or any other subject in the 
future. For these reasons the executive branch 
must respectfully decline to declassify the Inter- 
national List, it is, however, as stated previ- 
ously, available to the subcommittee on a classified 
basis. 

In arriving at this conclusion a number of other 
factors had to be considered. Our allies know 
that tliey must trade if they are going to survive. 
Many of them have had a substantial trade pat- 
tern with countries now within the Communist 
bloc, extending back over a period of a century 
or more. They are under constant pressure from 
their parliaments, trade unions, and industrial 
interests to expand their trade. They regard 
trade-control lists as an obstacle to such expansion. 
That attitude is reflected in their negotiations 
with us. We have done our best to resist those 
pressures. Our task would be made far more 
difficult if the International List were published 
at this time. 

Another factor has to do with Communist propa- 
ganda. East-West trade controls are a major 
target area today for Eed propaganda. The Com- 
munists are seeking every opportunity to divide 
the free nations on this issue. Were the Inter- 

Department of Stale Bulletin 



national List to be published, it would become a 
target for attack by Communists and left-wing 
groups within the participating countries. The 
combination of parliamentary, trade union, and 
business pressures, spurred on by subversive 
groups directed by the Communists, could, in our 
judgment, jeopardize the entire international sys- 
tem of controls. 

It has been claimed that the International List 
is already public and known to the Soviets. What 
is known to the Soviets is, of course, a matter of 
speculation. No doubt they do have some infor- 
mation as to items which are controlled. That 
does not seem to be a valid reason why they should 
be given all the information. 

It has also been contended that the British 
Board of Trade List is identical to the Interna- 
tional List. That contention is not correct. The 
items on the British list vary in significant details 
from those on the International List. The Brit- 
ish list does not include the surveillance list nor 
the amounts of the quantitative control list. Na- 
tional lists are published by a nvunber of other 
countries — among them the Italians, the Cana- 
dians, and ourselves. None of these lists are the 
same, and none of them are the International List. 

There is one other aspect of this problem that 
should be mentioned. It is referred to in our 
letter of March 23. The working papers of the 
Joint Operating Committee are internal commu- 
nications and working papers of an advisory na- 
ture which are historically retained within the 
executive branch. These files and working papers 
we are not in a position to make available to the 
subcommittee. The Secretary of Commerce is 
prepared to discuss this aspect of the matter later 
in the hearing. 

We regret that the balance of the information 
now being requested by your subcommittee can 
only be furnished on a classified basis. To de- 
classify it would jeopardize our foreign relations 
and be prejudicial to the national interest. There 
is no effort on our part to withhold from the Con- 
gress any information which it should rightfully 
have. Our only interest is to see to it that the in- 
formation is made available in such a way as to 
protect the best interests of the United States. 

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, may we repeat 
that we desire to cooperate with your committee 
to the fullest extent possible in your consideration 
of this important subject. 



TREATY INFORMATION 



Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation 
Treaty With Netherlands 

Press release 164 dated March 27 

A treaty of friendship, commerce, and naviga- 
tion between the United States and the Kingdom 
of the Netherlands was signed at The Hague on 
March 27. The American Ambassador, H. Free- 
man Matthews, signed on behalf of the United 
States. The Netherlands signers were Dr. J. W. 
Beyen, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Dr. J. M. 
A. H. Luns, Minister Without Portfolio. 

The new treaty affirms the friendly and coop- 
erative spirit prevailing between the two coun- 
tries and reflects the important business and com- 
mercial interests which have developed in their 
economic relations. The broad and liberal provi- 
sions embodied in the treaty represent a set of 
principles designed to promote the continued 
growth of those relations along mutually bene- 
ficial lines. 

The new treaty contains 27 articles, together 
with a protocol and exchange of notes, and covers 
a wide range of subject matter. In brief, each 
of the two countries : 

(1) agrees to accord within its territories, to 
citizens and corporations of the other, treatment 
no less favorable than it accords to its own citi- 
zens and corporations with respect to engaging in 
commercial, industrial, and financial activities; 

(2) formally endorses standards regarding the 
protection of persons, their projierty and inter- 
ests, that reflect the most enlightened legal and 
constitutional principles ; 

(3) recognizes the need for special attention to 
stimulate the international movement of invest- 
ment capital ; and 

(4) reasserts its adherence to the principles of 
nondiscriminatory treatment of trade and ship- 
ping. 

This treaty is the sixth of its type to have been 
concluded between the United States and Euro- 
pean countries since World War II. It represents 
another step in a program pursued by this Gov- 



April 9, 7956 



621 



ernment for the modernization of its commercial 
treaty structure and the establislunent of legal 
conditions favorable to foreign investment. 

Similarly, tlie treaty is responsive to the im- 
portant interest which the Netherlands has in in- 
ternational commei'ce and investment, both as re- 
ceiver and as supplier of goods and capital, and 
reflects the policies which that country has de- 
veloped to attract American capital. A large 
number of American firms have established 
branches or factories in the Netherlands in re- 
cent years, and Netherlands firms likewise have 
substantial and expanding investments in the 
United States. 

The treaty will be transmitted as soon as pos- 
sible to the Senate for advice and consent to rati- 
fication and, when the ratification processes of 
both countries have been completed, will enter 
into force one month after exchange of ratifi- 
cations. Provision is made regarding the exten- 
sion of the treaty to Surinam and the Netherlands 
Antilles upon the election of those territories 
communicated through the Netherlands Govern- 
ment. 

Current Actions 

MULTILATERAL 

Genocide 

Convention on the prevention and punishment of the 
crime of genocide. Done at Paris December 9, 1948.' 
Accession deposited: Afghanistan, March 22, 1956. 

Labor 

Convention (No. SO) for the partial revision of the con- 
ventions adopted by the General Conference of the In- 
ternational Labor Organizaticm at its first 28 sessions. 
Done at Montreal October 9, 1946. Entered into force 
May 28, 1947 (TIAS 1810). 
Ratification deposited: Bulgaria, November 7, 1955. 

North Atlantic Treaty 

Agreement between the parties to the North Atlantic 
Treaty for cooperation regarding atomic information. 
Signed at Paris June 22, 1955. 
Notification of beinii bound hy terms of the agreement: 

Turkey, March 29, 1956. 
Entered into force: March 29, 1956. 

Safety at Sea 

Convention on safety of life at sea. Signed at London 
June 10, 1948. Entered into force November 19, 1952. 
TIAS 2495. 

Acceptances deposited: Brazil, January 17, 1956; Vene- 
zuela, February 8, 1956. 



Regulations for preventing collisions at sea. Done at Lon- 
don June 10, 1948. Entered into force January 1, 1954. 
TIAS 2899. 
Acceptance deposited: Uruguay, August 18, 1955. 

Slave Trade 

I'rotocol amending the slavery convention signed at 
Geneva September 2.j, 1926 (46 Stat. 2183), and annex. 
Done at New York December 7, 1953. Entered into 
force for the United States March 7, 1956. 
Proclaimed by the President: March 16, 1956. 

Trade and Commerce 

Fifth protocol of rectifications and modifications to the 

texts of the schedules to the General Agreement on 

Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 3, 1955. 

Will enter into force on the day it has been signed by 

all the contracting parties to the general agreement. 

Signatures: Haiti, Indonesia, Italy, Netherlands, New 

Zealand, Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 

United States of America,^ December 3, 1955 ; Union 

of South Africa, December 5, 1955 ; Finland, January 

4, 1956 ; Belgium, February 16, 1956. 



BILATERAL 

Italy 

Agreement amending the surplus agricultural commodi- 
ties agreement of May 23, 1955 (TIAS 3249) by provid- 
ing that funds may also be used for the purchase of corn 
and feed grains. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Rome August 30 and September 2, 1955. Entered into 
force September 2, 1955. 

Netherlands V 

Treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation, with 
protocol and exchange of notes. Signed at The Hague 
March 27, 1956. Enters into force one month after the 
day of exchange of ratifications. 

Philippines 

Agreement providing for disposition of equipment and ma- 
terial furnished by the United States under the mili- 
tary assistance agreement of March 21, 1947 (TIAS 
1662). Effected by exchange of notes at Manila July 
27, 1953, and March 3, 1956. Entered into force March 
3, 1956. 

Spain 

Agreement supplementing the surplus agricultural com- 
modities agreement of March 5, 1956 (TIAS 3510) by 
providing for the exchange and use of funds acquired 
from the purchase of fertilizer by Spain from Austria. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Madrid March 18 
and 17, 1956. Entered into force March 17, 1956. 

Agreement supplementing the surplus agricultural com- 
modities agreement of March 5, 1956 (TIAS 3510) by 
providing for the resale of wheat to Switzerland. 
Signed at Madrid March 20, 1956. Entered into force . 
March 20, 1956. 

Thailand 

Agreement for the sale and purchase of tin concentrates. 

Signed at Bangkok March 12, 1956. Entered into force 

March 12, 1956. 
Agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic 

energy. Signed at Bangkok March 13, 1956. Entered 

into force March 13, 1956. 



' Not in force for the United States. 



' With a reservation. 



622 



Deparfment of State Bulletin 



April 9, 1956 I n 

Africa. The Development of United States Policy 
in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa During 
1955: Part III (Howard) 593 

Asia. The Development of United States Policy 
in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa During 
1955: Part III (Howard) 593 

Atomic Energy 

Atoms-for-Peace Agreement With Thailand Signed 

(Dulles, Waithayakon) 590 

Sale of 129 Tons of Heavy Water in Atoms-for- 
Peace Program 592 

Canada. Canadlan-Mexican-U.S. Meeting at White 

Sulphur Springs 590 

Congress, The 

East- West Trade (Hoover) 619 

An Outline of the Mutual Security Program for 

1957 (Hollister) 605 

Economic Affairs 

East-West Trade (Hoover) 619 

Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Treaty With 
Netherlands 621 

Mr. Allyn To Be U.S. Representative to Eleventh 

Session of ECE 592 

Foreign Service. Tasks and Eesponsibilities of the 
Foreign Service (Dulles) 588 

Germany. Freedom and Slavery in a Divided Ger- 
many (Conant) 583 

International Organizations and Meetings 

Canadian-Mexican-U.S. Meeting at White Sulphur 

Springs 590 

Mr. Allyn To Be U.S. Representative to Eleventh 

Session of ECE 592 

Mexico. Canadian-Mexican-U.S. Meeting at White 

Sulphur Springs 590 

Mutual Security 

An Outline of the Mutual Security Program for 1957 

(Hollister) 605 

The Development of United States Policy in the 
Near East, South Asia, and Africa During 1955 : 
Part III (Howard) 593 

Near East. The Development of United States 
Policy in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa 
During 1955: Part III (Howard) 593 



d ex 



Vol. XXXIV, No. 876 



Netherlands. Friendship, Commerce, and Naviga- 
tion Treaty With Netherlands 621 

Refugees and Displaced Persons. U.S. Makes Final 

Payment to U.N. Refugee Fund 590 

Thailand. Atoms-for-Peace Agreement With 

Thailand Signed (Dulles, Waithayakon) . . . 590 
Treaty Information 
Atoms-for-Peace Agreement With Thailand Signed 

(Dulles, Waithayakon) 590 

Current Treaty Actions 622 

Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Treaty With 

Netherlands 621 

United Nations. U.S. Makes Final Payment to 

U.N. Refugee Fund 590 

Name Index 

Allyn, Stanley C 592 

Conant, James B 583 

Dulles, Secretary 588,590 

Hollister, John B 605 

Hoover, Herbert, Jr 619 

Howard, Harry N 593 

Waithayakon, Prince Wan 591 



Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: March 26-April 1 

Releases may be obtained from the News Division, 
Department of State, Washington 25, D.C. 

Press release issued prior to March 26 which ap- 
pears in this issue of the Bulletin is No. 146 of 
March 19. 

No. Date Subject 

161 3/26 Hoover: East- West trade. 

*162 3/27 Educational exchange. 

*163 3/27 Educational exchange. 

164 3/27 Commercial treaty with Netherlands. 

*165 3/29 Foreign Service training courses. 

*166 3/29 Pinkerton nominated Ambassador to 
the Sudan. 

167 3/29 Dulles : remarks at FSO graduation. 



* Not printed. 




United States 
Government Printing Office 

DIVISION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS 

Washington 25, D. C. 



PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE TO AVOID 

PAYMENT OF POSTAGE. 9300 

(GPO) 



OFFICIAL BUSINESS 



A recent release in the popular Background series 



Thailand 



the 

Department 

of 

State 





Thailand is a predominantly agricultural country of small 
rural communities and relatively few cities and large towns. 
The agricultural economy is based almost entirely on small- 
scale, peasant-type family operations, with a majority of the 
farm operators holding title to their land. 

Long known to the world as Siam, this southeastern country 
of magnificent scenery, of great fertility, and of a 1 argely 
homogeneous population has never been a colony, even though 
in the past her neighbors on every side have fallen under 
foreign rule. 

Today, true to its historical tradition, Thailand is determined 
to resist all Communist imperialist efforts to infiltrate and 
subvert it, and to impose upon it the new colonialism of world 
communism. 

This 15-page illustrated pamphlet tells about the land, the 
people, and the industries of this nation that is a little smaller 
than Texas with a population of approximately 20 million, and 
discusses briefly the role of Thailand in world affairs. 

Copies of this publication may be purchased from the 
Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington 25, D. C. 



Publication 6296 



10 cents 



Order Forr.i 

To: Supt. of Do«"jii~;nls 
Govt. I'lintJng Office 
Washington 25, D.C. Please send me copies of Thailand. 

Name: 

EncloBed find; „ . , , 

Street Address: 

% , 

(ettsh, check, or City, Zone, and State : 

money order). 



^ 



7 .>...' 



'j/ie/ ^efia/i^Smmii/ ^£^ t/ta/te^ 




ol. XXXIV, No. 877 



April 16, 1956 



-Wi®'*'^ o«. 




THE MESSAGE OF AMERICA • Remarks by President 

Eisenhower 633 

SIGNIFICANCE OF NEW SOVIET LINE CONCERN- 
ING STALIN ERA • A^eios Conference Statement by- 
Secretary Dulles 637 

THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC 

TREATY ORGANIZATION • by Deputy Under 
Secretary Murphy 644 

SECURITY COUNCIL AGREES UNANIMOUSLY ON 
U.S. PROPOSAL TO SEND SECRETARY-GEN- 
ERAL HAMMARSKJOLD TO MIDDLE EAST • 

Statements by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., and Text 

of Resolution 627 



For index see inside back cover 



Bnston Public Li'-vary 
Cuperinte-Jflent of Documents 

MAY 9 - 1956 




bulletin 



Vol. XXXIV.No. 877 • Publication 6317 
AprU, 16, 1956 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing OtBce 

Washington 25, D.C. 

Price: 

62 Issues, domestic $7.50, foreign $10.25 

Single copy, 20 cents 

The printing of this publication has been 
approved by the Director of the Bureau of 
the Budget (January 19, 1955). 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein miiy 
be reprinted. Citation of the Department 
or State Bulletin as the source will be 
appreciated* 



The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Public Services Division, provides the 
public and interested agencies of 
the Government with information on 
developments in the field of foreign 
relations and on the vcork of the 
Department of State and the Foreign 
Service. The BULLETIN includes se- 
lected press releases on foreign policy, 
issued by the White House and the 
Department, and statements and ad- 
dresses nuide by the President and by 
the Secretary of State and other offi- 
cers of the Department, as well as 
special articles on various phases of 
international affairs and the func- 
tions of the Department. Informa- 
tion is included concerning treaties 
and international agreements to 
which the United States is or may 
become a party and treaties of gen- 
eral international interest. 

Publications of the Department, 
United Nations documents, and legis- 
lative material in the field of interna- 
tional relations are listed currently. 



Security Council Agrees Unanimously on U.S. Proposal To Send 
Secretary-General Hammarskjold to Middle East 



Following is the text of a letter of March 20 
froTu Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., U.S. 
Representative to the United Nations, to the Pres- 
ident of the Security Council, Sir Pier son Dixon, 
requesting a meeting of the Council to consider 
the Palestine question, together with a series of 
stateinents by Ajnbassador Lodge during the Se- 
curity Council debate. On April 4 the Council 
adopted unanimously a U.S. -sponsored resolution 
on this agenda item {see box) . 



LETTER TO PRESIDENT OF SECURITY COUNCIL 

U.S./D.N. press release 2372 dated March 20 

I have the honor on behalf of the Government 
of the United States to request you to convene a 
meeting of the Security Council as soon as possible 
to consider the following agenda item : 

The Palestine Question : Status of Compliance Given 
to the General Armistice Agreements and the Resolutions 
of the Security Council adopted During the Past Year. 

The Government of the United States has be- 
come increasingly concerned over recent develop- 
ments in the Palestine area which may well endan- 
ger the maintenance of international peace and 
security. Information relating to the build-up of 
armed forces on either side of the Armistice De- 
marcation Lines leads the United States to believe 
that the parties may not be fully complying with 
the provisions of their Armistice Agreements 
which stipulate limitations upon armed forces in 
or near the Demilitarized Zones and the Demarca- 
tion Lines. 

The instances of firing across and otherwise 
violating the Demarcation Lines are recurring at 
a dangerous rate. Despite the earnest efforts of 
the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Or- 
ganization the parties have not agreed to proposals 



which he has put forward to them on his own 
initiative or as a result of the Security Council's 
resolutions of 30 March 1955,^ 8 September 1955," 
and 19 January 1956.^ These three resolutions 
had the unanimous support of the Security Coun- 
cil and it should therefore be a matter of genuine 
concern to each of its Members to ascertain the 
extent of compliance being given to them. It is 
a matter of deep concern to the Government of the 
United States and it, therefore, requests urgent 
and early action by the Security Council to con- 
sider the situation now prevailing in the Palestine 
area. 



STATEMENT OF MARCH 26 

U.S./U.N. press release 2376 dated March 26 

The United Nations has been dealing with the 
Palestine question almost continuously since April 
2, 1947. 

Since August 11, 1949, when the last of the armi- 
stice agreements between Israel and the Arab 
States had been signed and all had been approved, 
the Security Council has met on the Palestine 
question 90 different times. No other question has 
so occupied the attention of the Council. No other 
question has so persistently challenged United 
Nations efforts. 

Today, the 26th of March, 1956, 7 years since 
the armistice agreements were signed, the Pales- 
tine question is still unsolved. In fact, during 
recent months the situation has deteriorated and 
the world is alarmed at the prospects which it sees 
in the Near East. 



' Bulletin of Apr. 18, 1955, p. 662. 
' Ibid., Sept. 19, 1955, p. 459. 
' Ibid., Jan. 30, 1956, p. 183. 



April 16, 1956 



627 



Resolution on Palestine Question ' 

Thv ticcurity Council. 

Recalling its resolutions of 30 March 1955, 8 Sep- 
tember 1955, and 19 January 1956, 

RecaUinr/ that in each of these resolutions the 
Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organiza- 
tion and the parties to the General Armistice Agree- 
ments concerned were requested by the Council to 
undertake certain specific steps for the purpose of 
ensuring that the tensions along the Armistice lines 
should be reduced, 

Noting with grave concern that despite the efforts 
of the Chief of Staff the proposed steps have not 
been carried out, 

1. ConKiders that the situation now prevailing 
lietween the parties concerning the enforcement of 
the Armistice Agreements and the compliance given 
to the above-mentioned resolutions of the Council 
is such that its continuatice is likely to endanger 
the maintenance of international peace and 
security, 

2. Requests the Secretary-General to undertake, 
as a matter of urgent concern, a survey of the vari- 
ous aspects of enforcement of and compliance with 
the four General Armistice Agreements and the 
Council's resolutions under reference; 

.3. Requests the Secretary -General to arrange with 
the parties for the adoption of any measures which 
after discussion with the parties and with the Chief 
of Staff he considers would reduce existing tensions 
along the Armistice Demarcation Lines, includins 
the following points : 

(a) Withdrawal of their forces from the Armi- 
stice Demarcation Lines ; 

(b) Full freedom of movement for observers 
along the Armistice Pemarcation Lines and in the 
Demilitarized Zones and in the Defensive Areas; 

(c) Establishment of local arrangements for the 
prevention of incidents and the prompt detection of 
any violations of the Armistice Agreements; 

4. Calls upon the parties to the General Armistice 
Agreements to co-operate with the Secretary- 
(ieneral in the implementation of this resolution: 

5. Requests the Secretary -General to report to 
the Council in his discretion but not later than one 
month from this date on the implementation given 
to this resolution in order to assist the Council in 
considering what further action may be required. 



'U.N. doc. S/3,575: adopted unanimously by tlu 
Security Council on Apr. 4. 



This need not have been the case. In the 
opinion of the United States progress had, until 
recently, been made, and we thought that most of 
the basic issues underlying tlie uneasy truce in 
Piilestine were coming nearer to a solution. 
United Nations efforts in the General Assembly, 



628 



in the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, 
in the Security Council, and in the Truce Super- 
vision Organization were producing hopeful signs 
of progi-ess, and the trend was toward peace. That 
trend, unfortunately, has recently been reversed. 

It would be wrong to conclude tliat the United 
Nations has failed in its responsibilities. War 
has not come again to the Holy Land, and we trust 
that it never will. The indispensable factor in 
preventing hostilities thus far has been the United 
Nations. The present alarming situation chal- 
lenges this organization again to find new means 
of arresting the present grave trend. This organ- 
ization cannot fail to accept that challenge — which 
has certainly never been more serious than it is at 
this moment. 

The Ignited States, having taken fully into ac- 
count all of the circumstances of the present sit- 
uation, is convinced that through this organiza- 
tion the present tensions must be eliminated and 
the prospect for peace restored. We have not 
sought to come before the Council at this time 
with any indictment or bill of particulars, or any 
detailed assessment of the blames and shortcom- 
ings of one or the other of the participants in or 
outside of the area of conflict. We have felt in- 
stead that the situation is much too serious for us 
to lose any time in setting into motion the full 
authority of the United Nations to deal with the 
present ominous drift. 

We propose, therefore, that the Council request 
the Secretary-General to inidertake immediately 
a personal investigation of ways and means of 
settling the numerous problems which stand in 
the way of peace. 

In these circumstances it is clear that the United 
Nations cannot be inactive or indifferent. The 
United States believes that in the first instance 
United Nations efforts should be concentrated on 
full compliance with the armistice agreements by 
Israel and the Arab States and on the carrying 
out in detail of the Security Council's resolutions 
of 30 March 195.5, 8 September 1955, and 19 Jan- 
uary 195C. Each of these resolutions had the 
unanimous support of the members of this Coun- 
cil. They represent the combined judgment of the 
members as to the essential steps to be taken to 
reduce the tensions. There is no question in our 
mind that, if these steps had been carried out, 
we woidd not now have the serious situation which 
confronts us. All the more reason, therefore, that 
they should be curried out. 

Department of State Bulletin 



We therefore propose in the draft resohition 
befoie the Council* that the Seci'etary-General 
undertake as a matter of urgency discussions with 
the parties and tlie Chief of Staff of the Ti-uce 
Supervision Organization, General Burns, to find 
ways and means to put these resolutions and the 
proposals which they embody into immediate 
effect. 

We feel that tliese measures can and must be 
given special consideration. The Chief of Staff' 
has repeatedly emphasized the primary impor- 
tance of several of these measures. We feel that 
they deserve an honest chance. General Burns" 
efforts must therefore have our continued and full 
backing, and the proposal that we have placed be- 
fore this Council would give him exactly that. 

The draft resolution proposed by the United 
States is not intended in any way to derogate 
from the overall responsibility of the Security 
Council in this question. We would expect the 
Council to continue to follow with the greatest 
concern the developments in the area and to hold 
itself in readiness to deal at any time with any 
problem which might arise. 

We have therefore proposed in the draft reso- 
lution that the Secretary-General should report 
to the Security Council not later than one month 
from the date of tlie adoption of the resolution, 
at which time the Council would consider what 
further steps might be necessary or desirable for 
it to take. 

Mr. President, the United States believes that 
each member of the Council will i-ecognize the 
need for the kind of action which we have pro- 
posed. We trust that each member of the Coun- 
cil and the parties will recognize the good faith 
with wliich this proposal is brought forward and 
will lend to the Secretary-General their full sup- 
port. Clearly this is in the mutual interest of us 
all. Anything less can only lead to our mutual 
detriment. 



STATEMENT OF MARCH 28 

U.S./U.X. press release 2381 dated March 28 

Let me first thank the representatives of Cuba, 
of Belgium, and of Cliina for yielding to me for 
these few moments so that I may make this state- 
ment. I appreciate their courtesy. 

Mr. President, when we adjourned on Monday, 



* U.N. doc. S/3562 dated Mar. 21. 
^ April 76, 7956 



it was the Council's understanding that after 
today's meeting we would meet again on Tuesday, 
Ajjril 3. I trust that on April 3 we will come to 
a vote after having heard further statements 
by the members of the Council or such statements 
as the j)arties care to make. That is my iinder- 
standing of the sense of the meeting last Monday. 

In view of certain remarks which have been 
made to me since then, it may be helpful if I now 
make a few words of explanation. 

Frankly, the United States draft seemed to 
us to be so simple and clear that there could be 
no misunderstanding as to our intention. Indeed, 
it has come as something of a surprise that anyone 
could find in it any hidden meaning. That would 
be a baseless suspicion indeed. 

Our draft resolution speaks for itself. Its 
meaning is right on the surface. The course which 
we advocate is a normal procedure. It is what 
we would expect to have done in our case if we 
were in a similar situation. I do not believe I 
can put it any more plainly than that. 

Note also, please, gentlemen, that each member 
of the Council has supported the resolutions on 
which the United States draft is based. In other 
words they have been unanimously endorsed. 
That is a significant fact. And note also that the 
j>arties to tlie Palestine question have themselves 
in recent months expressed growing concern at 
what they feared to be developments on the part 
of the otlier side inimical to themselves. 

Now, feeling as we did that this concern was 
shared by all, we believed there would be — and 
that there should be — prompt approval of our 
initiative to bring about discussions between the 
Secretary-General and the parties to find agreed 
measures for reducing the tensions and carrying 
out the armistice agreements. 

Now, let me repeat, there are no hidden meanings 
in this, and if you search from now vmtil dooms- 
day with a magnifying glass the only purpose 
you will find is to prevent war. That, after all — 
I need hardly say it in this room — is the first 
purpose of the United Nations. 

As I said on Monday, we do not propose to 
review the issues in the Palestine question, and we 
do not feel that others would wish to do so in 
view of the urgent need for action. This, too, is 
reflected in the very limited nature of our text. 

We wanted two things : to act promptly in the 
face of a gravely worsening situation, and, in act- 



629 



ing promptly, to indicate, with the Security Coun- 
cil's endorsement, certain steps which the 
Secretary-General and the parties might take to 
carry out the provisions of the armistice agree- 
ments. These are not new purposes; the unani- 
mous resolutions of the Security Council, to which 
our draft resolution refers, likewise had as their 
purpose the effective functioning of the armistice. 
That is our sole purpose. Surely no one would 
deny that, unless the armistice agreements can be 
effectively carried out, a grave tlireat to the peace 
may result. 

We had hoped that at the end of today's meeting 
the Security Council would have approved the 
mission by the Secretary-General which we pro- 
pose, and that he could pack his bags and leave 
right away. But we did not wish to give gi'ound 
for anyone to say that he had been rushed — even 
though the proposal is so simple that the more 
than 8 days which have elapsed since it was given 
to the Council members and to the parties seems 
more than enough. 

Mr. President, we hope that the Security Coun- 
cil will act speedily and that our resolution will 
be approved by the Council and the parties. It 
is in all truth a good-faith effort for peace. 



FIRST STATEMENT OF APRIL 3 

U.S./D.N. press release 2384 dated April 3 

I am confident that there is no basic misunder- 
standing, either by the parties to the armistice 
agreement or by the members of the Security 
Council, as to the intention of the United States 
in bringing the pending draft resolution before 
the Council. 

But certain questions have been asked which I 
am glad to answer and which may, I believe, be 
summarized as follows: 

a) Are the measures which the Secretary- 
General might recommend for discussion with the 
parties and the Chief of Staff to be within the 
framework of the General Armistice Agreements ? 

b) Is the proposal contained in paragraph 3 (a) 
of the draft resolution to be considered applicable 
in general, or where appropriate and in accordance 
with local conditions? 

c) Are the demilitarized zones and defensive 
areas referred to in paragraph 3 (b) those zones 
and areas as defined in the armistice agreements? 

d) Do the various aspects of compliance with 



the General Armistice Agreements which the 
Secretary-General is requested to survey refer to 
matters outside the General Armistice Agreements 
or only to those matters with which the Truce 
Supervision Organization is expected to deal? 

e) Is it intended that the Secretary-General 
should undertake to amend the armistice agree- 
ments ? 

f) Are the arrangements referred to in para- 
graph 3 (c) arrangements in the nature of agree- 
ments by the parties or in the nature of added 
forces and machinery ? 

g) Does the request to the Secretary-General to 
report in his discretion refer to the timing or to tlie 
nature of the report ? 

These questions can first be answered by recall- 
ing my original statement to the Council on Mon- 
day, Marcli 26th. In describing the objectives of 
the United States I stated that, in the present cir- 
cumstances, it is clear that the United Nations 
cannot be inactive or indifferent. I went on to 
say, therefore, that "the United States believes 
that in the first instance United Nations efforts 
should be concentrated on full compliance with 
the armistice agreements by Israel and the Arab 
States and on the carrying out in detail of the 
Security Council's resolutions of 30 March 1955, 
8 September 1955, and 19 January 1956." I 
pointed out, moreover, that "each of these resolu- 
tions had the unanimous support of the members 
of this Council. They represent the combined 
judgment of the members as to the essential steps 
to be taken to reduce the tensions." I said further 
that "there is no question in our mind that, if these 
steps had been carried out, we would not now have 
the serious situation which confronts us. All the 
more reason, therefore, that they should be car- 
ried out." I said in this same connection that "we 
therefore propose in the draft resolution before 
the Council that the Secretary-General undertake 
as a matter of urgency discussions with the parties 
and the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision 
Organization, General Burns, to find ways and 
means to put these resolutions and the proposals 
which they embody into immediate effect. We 
feel that these measures can and must be given 
special consideration." 

These quotations from my statement introduc- 
ing the draft resolution are the core of the United 
States position, but, to make that position immis- 
takably clear, I siJoke again at our last meeting 



630 



Deparfmenf of State Bulletin 



to emphasize our concern and to place our pro- 
posal in its proper perspective. Thus, at the meet- 
ing of Wednesday, the 28th of March, I again 
summarized our position as follows : "We wanted 
two things: to act promptly in the face of a 
gravely worsening situation, and, in acting 
promptly, to indicate, with the Security Council's 
endorsement, certain steps which the Secretary- 
General and the parties might take to carry out 
the provisions of the armistice agreements. These 
are not new purposes; the unanimous resolutions 
of the Security Council, to which our draft res- 
olution refers, likewise had as their purpose the 
effective functioning of the armistice. That is 
our sole purpose. Surely no one would deny that, 
unless the armistice agreements can be effectively 
carried out, a grave threat to the peace may result." 

I believe that it is fair to say that this ade- 
quately summarizes the United States position. 
In reviewing the questions which have been placed 
before the Council by the parties, it seems to us 
each of these questions is answered by the state- 
ments I have referred to. 

The representative of the United Kingdom put 
the case even more simply when he said "first 
things must come first." In speaking of those 
matters which must receive immediate attention. 
Sir Pierson Dixon went on to say that these were 
problems in which "if one cannot move forward, 
one finds one's self slipping back." 

It has been this backward trend which the 
United States wished to halt. We see no other 
way of preventing such a backward trend at this 
moment than by providing for strict compliance 
with the armistice agreements between the parties 
and the resolutions of the Security Council to 
which I have referred. 

Wliat we are dealing with now are the imme- 
diate problems standing in the way of peace and 
which concern the compliance of the parties with 
the General Armistice Agreements and the carry- 
ing out of measures which the Security Council 
has already endorsed, in its recent resolutions, for 
insuring compliance with those agreements. 

I repeat that this is the immediate problem, 
and this is the immediate purpose of the United 
States initiative. 

Now to be even more specific : the draft resolu- 
tion envisages that the Secretary-General should 
arrange, after discussion with the parties and the 
Chief of Staff, for measures entirely within the 



framework of the General Armistice Agreements 
and the resolutions under reference. 

Such measures would, of course, be applicable 
where, by agreement between the Secretary-Gen- 
eral and the parties, they consider conditions 
warrant. 

The references in the draft resolution to the 
demilitarized zones and defensive areas are nat- 
urally those defined in the armistice agreements. 

The various aspects of compliance with the 
armistice agreements which the Secretary-General 
is requested to survey refer only to matters which 
would come within the natural purview of the ar- 
mistice machinery and the Truce Supervision 
Organization. 

The arrangements referred to in paragraph 3 
(c) would, of course, be arrangements as agreed 
between the parties and the Secretary-General. 

It would not be a service to the Secretary-Gen- 
eral or to the parties directly concerned to 
enumerate further the problems or the measures 
with which together they might wish to deal or 
those with which he should not deal. We feel 
that, with the clear understanding that the mission 
of the Secretary-General is governed by the 
Security Council's resolutions and the armistice 
agreements, such a spelling out is not necessary nor 
indeed desirable. The kind of undertaking which 
we are asking the Secretary-General to undertake 
becomes quite clear when seen in this context. 

I hope that these explanations will be received 
by the parties in the same spirit of cooperation 
as they are given. It lies with the parties in the 
end to determine the success or the failure of the 
Secretary-General's mission. It will be for them 
to determine in the final analysis the steps to be 
taken. 

The Secretary-General naturally cannot amend 
or set aside the undertakings of the parties in the 
General Armistice Agreements. As members of 
the United Nations and as sovereign nations the 
parties share with the members of the Security 
Council the responsibility for determining what 
can best be accomplished. 

The Security Council is, of course, not relin- 
quishing its primary responsibility for maintain- 
ing international peace and security in adopting 
the draft resolution proposed by the United States. 

The resolution requests the Secretary-General to 
report not later than one month from the date of 
its adoption. He may report sooner if he considers 



April 16, 1956 



631 



it desirable. This is wliat the phrase "in liis dis- 
cretion'' refers to. 

In tlie light of the Secretary-General's report 
and of the situation then prevailing, the Council 
would have to consider whether any further action 
was required and what that action might be. The 
"Cnited States would not presume to say what the 
Council should do a month from now. "We can 
and do hope that further action concerning com- 
pliance witii the armistice agreements and the 
carrying out of these resolutions will not be 
necessary. 

This attempts to lie a completely categorical and 
responsive reply to the questions whicli have been 
raised by representatives of the parties to the 
armistice agreement. 



SECOND STATEMENT OF APRIL 3 

r.S./U.N. press release 2385 dated April 3 

In accordance with the custom whereby the 
sponsor of a proposition is expected to express 
himself on amendments, and as a matter of fact 
in response to at least one request which has been 
made, I make this statement on the subject of the 
amendments which have been introduced by the 
representative of the Soviet Union. 

The amendments to the draft resolution which 
have been put forward by the Soviet Union are 
not only in the opinion of the United States not 
in any way necessary ; they also do not seem par- 
ticularly desirable. Without making a detailed 
analysis now, it is perhaps enough to say that 
these amendments are not improvements. This 
is, I think, an understatement. 

Amendment No. 1 goes back into the past with- 
out accomplishing anything constructive thereby. 

Amendment No. 2 is fallacious because it is 
clear that failure to comply with three unanimous 
resolutions of the Security Council is in the words 
of the resolution "likely" to endanger peace. Now 
surely it is not exaggei'ated to say that noncom- 
pliance with three unanimous resolutions is 
"likely" to endanger peace. It seems none too 
strong. 

Amendment No. 3 seems to us to put the cart 
before the horse. Obviously thei'e must be dis- 
cussion before there is concordance. To say that 
concordance must precede discussion seems to us 
to be a non sequitur. Paragraph 3 as drafted 
clearly means that agreement of the parties will 



be necessary for the adoption of measures for re- 
ducing tensions. 

The words "in the defensive areas" as now in- 
cluded in the draft resolution make quite clear 
that the defensive areas are those areas provided 
for in the armistice agreements. The Soviet rep- 
resentative's amendment in this respect is unnec- 
essary, I submit, and I understood the Soviet rep- 
resentative to say he would not insist upon it. 

The objectives of the pending jjioposal have, 
I think, been made clear beyond any shadow of a 
doubt. The draft resolution is addressed to a 
clear and present danger. Our sole intent is to 
dispatch the Secretary-General to the area so as 
to reduce the growing tension. We believe that 
the present text of the draft resolution is sufficient 
in its present form, and, as everj' member here 
knows, it was very carefully written. 

We also believe that the governments in the 
area are prepared to accept the resolution as it is, 
and we think that the debate that has taken place 
here today and in preceding days has made that 
clear. 

As the sponsor of the draft resolution, there- 
fore, we believe it is desirable not to accept 
amendments.^ 



FIRST STATEMENT OF APRIL 4 

U.S. /U.N. press release 2386 dated April 4 

There of course is nothing wrong with the 
Government of the United States communicating 
with 3 countries or 30 countries in an effort to 
keep the peace — and I note that the Soviet repre- 
sentative did not say there was anything wrong 
with it. This proposal we have here today is not 
a 3-nation proposition. We hope it will soon be- 
come an 11-nation proiJosition. 

Gentlemen, in view of the fact that yesterday I 
gave my arguments against the Soviet amend- 
ments, and in view of the fact that the objections 
to these amendments have been very eloquently 
explained by the representatives of Peru, the 
I'nited Kingdom, France, and Australia. I will 
not take any more time of the Council to argue 
against them further. 

I perhaps might say that the capitalizing of the 
phrase "Defensive Areas" is not an amendment. 
It is a typographical rectification. The position 

"The amendments proposed by the U.S.S.R. (U.N. doc. 
S/3r>74 dated Apr. 3) were rejected on Apr. 4. 



632 



Department of State Bulletin 



of the United States is still in opposition to 
amendments. 



SECOND STATEMENT OF APRIL ^ 

U.S./U.N. press release 2386 dated April 4 

Before we adjourn this meeting, perhaps the 
members of the Security Council will forgive me 
if I express my appreciation to the members and 
to the representatives of the parties for the tone 
which they have all observed here; for the high 
level and the high plane on which this vitally im- 
portant and delicate matter has been discussed. 

To be President of this Security Council is one 
of the great honors that can come to a man. but for 
me, in this particular case, it is something more 
than an honor." It has been a very precious ex- 
perience indeed to have the cooperation of all of 
the distinguished men who are seated around this 
table. I shall always remember it and wish to 
express my thanks to you for it. 

Let me finally say to you, Mr. Secretary-Gen- 
eral, and I feel sure I speak for everyone present 
when I do so, that as you leave on this mission you 
curry with you not only good wishes and our hopes, 
but our heartfelt confidence and high regard and 
great expectations for your success. 

Visit of Spanish Minister 
of Foreign Affairs 

The Department of State announced on April 
5 (press release 175) that Alberto Martin Artajo, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain, and Seiiora 
de Martin Artajo would be accompanied by the 
following party chiring their visit to the United 
States from April 9 to April 18: 

Jose M. de Areilza, Count of Motrico, Ambassador of Spain 

to the United States 
Countess of Motrico 
General Francisco Fernandez-Longoria Gonzales, Chief of 

Staff, Spanish Air Force 
Seiit)ra de Fernandez-Longoria 

Juan de his Barcenas, Director General of Foreign Policy 
Seiiora de las Barcenas 
Juan .lose Rovira Sauchez-Herrero, Director General of 

Economic Cooperation 
Aurelio Valls, Press Section, Foreign Ministry 



'Mr. Lodge became President of the Security Council 
for the month of April. 

Apr// ?6, 1956 



Tiie Message of America 

Remarks hy President Eisenhower'^ 

I think it was last year, gentlemen, when I met 
with the Advertising Council,^ that I made the 
request that the Council would try to do some- 
thing about extending their good work to helping 
the Government solve some of its problems in 
the foreign field. 

Xot only has the record of the past year shown 
that they took me seriously, but I am particularly 
delighted that this year they brought some of their 
bosses along with them so that they can get edu- 
cated also, because we are talking about one of 
the most pressing problems with which the Gov- 
ernment — indeed with which the whole Nation — 
is confronted constantly. There is nothing that 
takes place at home of any great importance — 
if it is a difficult problem, at least — that is not 
caused by or at least is colored by some foreign 
consideration. 

During this past year the Advertising Council 
got together a team of experts and went over the 
whole series of factors involved in these prob- 
lems and came up with some very fine suggestions. 
The one I want to mention particularly — a prod- 
uct of their imagination — was the exhibit of 
"People's Capitalism." I don't know how many 
of you have seen it, but to me it is the kind of 
message that America ought to be carrying abroad. 
I would have liked to have seen some kind of ad- 
jective put between "people's" and "capitalism" — 
something of the order of — if not "democratic," 
something of the order of "competitive"' or some- 
thing of that kind. But in any event, the exhibit 
itself shows what the system of capitalism will 
do for a people. AVhat it has done in this country 
in a very, very short time, measured by historical 
units, is a very telling thing. 

I actually could hope that the truth that it ex- 
emplifies and shows could be brought home to our 
own people as well as to those abroad for whom it 
was designed. Because I think too often we forget 
some of the features of our own system that have 
been so responsible for the place this Nation has 
reached. So before I leave that part of what I 



^Made before the 12th annual Washington Conference 
of the Advertising Council on Apr. 3 (White House press 
release). 

■ BtiLLETiN of Apr. 11, 1955, p. 600. 

633 



L 



wanted to say to you, my thanks to the agencies 
for the time and talent they have contributed and 
are continuing to contribute througli the media — 
enlisting the space on radio and television — and 
for the good work of all, particularly to the busi- 
nessmen supporters of what the Council has been 
doing, with the Goverimient as its principal 
beneficiary. 

Now, when we consider this system of which we 
are so proud, we recognize that, like all things 
human, it is neither perfect nor does it sustain it- 
self forever without the people who are living in 
it and are part of it doing something about it. 
Internally and externally any form of government, 
and particularly self-government, is always sub- 
ject to some kind of attack, particularly successful 
government that has brought material prosperity 
in the measure which ours has. Internally we 
watch that government, we watch it very carefully. 
We watch particularly the Federal Government to 
see that it doesn't transgress into fields from 
which it should abstain, except only in those cases 
where the changing miracle of industrial life 
brings about problems that are not solvable by com- 
munities, by private enterprise, or by individuals. 

There we try to stick to the old Lincolnian dic- 
tum that it is the fmiction of government to do 
for people those things they could not do for 
themselves and to stay out of things in places 
where the people can do things for themselves. 
We would hope, therefore, to have wisdom in 
government to help distinguish this line beyond 
which government should not go and yet be 
courageous in doing those things that it should do. 

Likewise, we should hope always for more wis- 
dom in business leadership, not only in the busi- 
ness man and in business management but in their 
concert with labor, so that in the individual com- 
pany or the corporation — particularly the influ- 
ential ones — we do not make decisions that damage 
us and the Idnd of system that we are trying to 
run. That can easily be done within the corpora- 
tion just as well as it can within the Congress or 
within some regulatory commission. 

Using Our Influence Abroad 

Now, let us turn our eyes abroad. There is an 
old story about the man in a town who owned the 
factory on which the living of the community 
depended. He built a great house on the hill, and 
all the rest of the people lived in the plain below 
in fairly meager circmnstances. The climax of 



the story was, when things began to go bad, that 
the man on top found that he was not safe except 
onh' as the people below were contented and be- 
lieved that they were advancing. When they be- 
came depressed and lost their morale, and the 
company began to fail, this man fell further than 
the others because he had a greater distance to go. 

Within a certain degree, that story has ap- 
plicability in the world today. The United States 
cannot live alone — a paragon of prosperity — with 
all the rest of the world sinking lower and lower 
in its standards of living. 

There are many ways in which we can use our 
influence to make certain that other peoples recog- 
nize the virtues of a free, competitive capitalistic 
system rather than take the shortcut — the spuri- 
ous and false road that is offered them by the 
communistic ideology. 

You see, in many of these less developed areas 
of the world, there is a very great ambition to in- 
dustrialize themselves. Now the Communist 
comes along and says : well, you see what we were 
40 years ago? Look what communism has done 
for us. And today we can bring to you this steel 
mill or help you with this dam, or do this or that. 

There is a very great appeal, because of the 
very rapid transformation that on the surface, at 
least, and under forms of dictatorship has been 
accomplished in Russia. The man who is listen- 
ing to the story doesn't understand that under- 
neath this great facade of industrial organization 
there is slavery, hmnan misery, rather than hu- 
man happiness — no opportunity for a man to 
realize his own spiritual, moral, physical, and 
economic aspirations through his own efforts. He 
obeys. He is regimented. But they don't say 
that. As a matter of fact, it is not of importance 
at the moment, because it is only in such a society 
as ours, based upon the dignity of man, that the 
importance of that kind of thing to humans is 
recognized and catered to. 

And so we must carry not only a material mes- 
sage to the world of what the kind of enterprise 
we have — the kind of system — can do for a people. 
We must carry those moral values, spiritual values 
of the worth of man — what he is entitled to as an 
individual. We must say not merely what this 
or that state would do if they would follow that 
line, because I think it is not to be denied, if you j 
would give the communistic system to any back-! 
ward country, with a complete dictator who could! 
direct everything without question, he could make, 



634 



Department of State Bulletin 



on the short run, more rapid progi'ess than could 
we by the cooperative method that is inherent in 
democracy. 

So I think that we must realize that, unless we 
do these things in the world, someone else will do 
them through false doctrines. And we finally will 
reach more and more that place where we are iso- 
lated from the rest of the world, with the whole 
world in a position possibly of envy and then of 
hatred, open antagonisms, that will reflect itself in 
first, let us say, refusal to trade, then breaking off 
relations, and finally and ultimately in a very, very 
serious thing. 

There is plenty of time for us to do it if we start 
now and keep doing it. That is the reason that I 
am so delighted that the Advertising Council has 
directed itself in its efforts along this path. 

Governmental officials are busy. They are con- 
stantly putting out "fires." They are on the Hill 
answering why they need this money or that 
money, or sometimes why they don't need this or 
that that someone is trying to give to them. This 
is a new phenomenon, and ordinarily applies only 
to election year. 

The need in government is time to think, with the 
ability of people to do it. Now by the selection of 
these people of the Advertising Council they are 
able to supplement the work of government and so 
to assist it, to point out new, imaginative ways of 
how the message of America can be carried. 

Promoting Better Understanding 

I assure you that that message must be carried, 
not only in the ways I have indicated but it must 
be expressed also in the readiness to help wherever 
possible on good, sound business arrangements. 
In other words, let us not forget for one instant 
that, wlien we are putting $36 or $37 billion of 
expenditures every year into arms and armaments, 
those arms and armaments alone, remember, can 
never take us forward — they will merely defend 
what we have got. 

But when you talk about something that pro- 
motes a business arrangement — trade — when you 
can talk about something that promotes a better 
understanding between us and the people of the 
iliddle East, or the people of Africa, or anybody 
else, then you are talking about something con- 
structive, something that yields results over the 



years to come. It will not be merely something 
essentially sterile and negative so far as our capac- 
ity for raising human standards is concerned. We 
will not be merely acting like a policeman to pro- 
tect what we already have. Of course, protection 
is necessary. It is just as necessary in this day and 
time as it can possibly be. But let us not make the 
ignorant, uninformed decision that only in arma- 
ments are we going to find the solution of our 
foreign problems. 

And since we have been favored by the system 
that our forefathers gave us, by the resources that 
God gave us, by the good fortune we have of hav- 
ing been born and raised here through the finest 
educational and health systems in the world, and 
so on, let us use our brains to make certain we sus- 
tain our position by helping everybody else to 
realize their own aspirations and legitimate am- 
bitions. Not necessarily in the exact pattern of 
this country — of course not. Nobody starts from 
the same place, and no other nation would possibly 
reach the same end. 

But we can preach and show that we believe in 
the dignity of man, in the independence of nations, 
the right of people to determine for themselves 
their own faith. We can help. Every dollar we 
put into this kind of thing, if it is intelligently 
spent, is to my mind, in the long rmi, worth any 
five we put just in sheer defense because in the 
long run it is a constructive thing. It is a de- 
veloping thing, the kind of development America 
has done at home and which we must help do 
abroad. 

So, all of these words, all of these thoughts, my 
friends, give you the depth of my sincerity when 
I say thank you for coming here, thank you for 
helping. The people that talk to you today will 
come not merely to give you a briefing of what 
they are doing, but in doing so would hope that 
from you they will get reactions — in other words, 
what would you do ? 

Government is nothing but individuals. Every 
one of the individuals in government belongs to 
you. He is your "boy" in some form or other. 
You put him there directly or indirectly. So the 
job is still that of the American people, and I 
couldn't conceive of any job in this world being 
in better hands than that of the American people. 

Thank you very much. 



April 16, 1956 



635 



1 



Crusade for Freedom 

White House press release dated March 27 

The following letter from the President wa.f 
handed by Mrs. Dwight D. Eifienhower to Wil- 
liam A. Greene, President of the Crusade for 
Freedom, in a ceremomj at the White House, 
March 27, 1956. 

Dear Mr. Greene : The captive European peo- 
ples behind the Iron Curtain — Poles, Czechoslo- 
vaks, Bulfjarians, Rumanians, Albanians, and 
residents of the Baltic States — are constantly 
bombarded by Communist propaganda designed 
to break their will to resist and destroy their 
liope for a better future. 

In the continuing work of combating such prop- 
aganda. Radio Free Europe, the radio arm of the 
Crusade for Freedom, plays a major and effective 
role. Day in and day out its broadcasts extend 
the hand of friendship and hope to the people 
behind the Curtain, assuring them that their 
plight has not been forgotten by the free world 
and fortifying their devotion to liberty. 

To the National Committee for a Free Europe, 
I extend congratulations on this and the other 
valuable activities of the organization, with my 
best wishes for success in enlisting, through the 
Crusade for Freedom, the support of the Ameri- 
can people. I am confident they will respond gen- 
erously and thus forward this vital work for the 
cause of freedom and peace. 
Sincerely, 

Dwight D. Eisenhoaver 

Exchange of Messages Following 
White Sulphur Springs Meeting 

The White House on April 2 made pttblic the 
following exchanges of messages, one between 
President Eisenhotver and Louis -St. Laurent, 
Prime Minister of Canada, and the other between 
the President and Adolf o Ruiz Corf in es. President 
of Mexico. 

President Eisenhower to Prime Minister St. Laurent 

March 31, 1956 

Dear Mr. Prime Minister: Thank you for 
your warm and thoughtful letter on our meeting 
Avith the President of Mexico at Wliite Sulphur 
Springs. 

I liope you enjoyed the occasion as much as I 



did, and I am confident that all three of us pi'ofited 
from the friendly and informal talks tliat we had. 
Tliese talks will surely bring even closer the inti- 
mate relations between our three countries. 
With warm regard. 



Sincerely, 



Dwight D. Eisenhower 



The Right Honorable 
LotTis St. Laurent 

Pnme Minister of Canada 
Ottawa 

Prime Minister St, Laurent to President Eisenhower 

Ottawa, March 28, 1956 

Dear Mr. President: Immediately on my re- 
turn I want you to know how much I enjoyed our 
informal meeting and liow delighted I was to see 
you looking so well and in such good spirits. 

"We had a pleasant, smooth flight home and ar- 
rived in Ottawa at 3 p. m. 

Thank you for affording me the opportunity of 
the talks with you and the President of Mexico 
and may you continue to enjoy your present good 
health. 

With warm personal regards, I am. 
Yours sincerely, 

Louis St. Laurent 

President Eisenhower to President Ruiz Cortines 

April 2, 1956 

His Excellency 

Adolfo Ruiz Cortines 
President of Mexico 

I am deeply grateful for the kind message wliich 
you so thoughtfully sent me on your return to 
Mexico City from "\^liite Sulphur Springs. It was 
a source of great satisfaction to me that you and 
the Prime Minister of Canada found it possible to 
join me in our recent informal meeting and that 
you gave me the opportunity to renew our personal 
friendship. I feel sure that such contact will 
furtlier strengthen the friendh' ties wliich have so 
long and happily been maintained through the 
usual diplomatic interchange. 

In extending my every wish for j'our continued 
welJ-being, I renew to Your Excellency the assur- 
ances of my personal consideration and highest 
esteem. 

Dwight D. Eisenih>wer 



636 



Department of State Bulletin 



President Ruiz Cortines to President Eisenhower 

Mexico City, March 29, 1956 

His Excellency 

DwiGHT D. Eisenhower 
President of the United States of Ameiica 

On returning to my country I have the honor to 
convey to Your Excellency the expression of my 
deep satisfaction at the friendly personal contacts 
which upon your happy initiative we have just had 
at White Sulphur Springs and which inaugurate 
an era of personal relationship between the Ameri- 
can Chiefs of State to the benefit of our countries. 
I take particular pleasure also in expressing to you 
my sincere gratitude for the innumerable manifes- 
tations which I received of your very cordial hos- 
pitality and your sincere and wholehearted friend- 
ship. I beg Your Excellency to accept the 
assurance of my cordial consideration and sincere 
regards. 

Adolfo Ruiz Cortines 
President of the United Mexican States 

Letters of Credence 

Liberia 

The newly appointed Ambassador of Liberia, 
George Arthur Padmore, presented his credentials 
to President Eisenhower on April 7. For the text 
of the Ambassador's remarks and the text of the 
President's reply, see Department of State press 
release 181. 



Delegation to Baghdad Pact 
Council Meeting 

Press release 180 dated April 6 

The United States has demonstrated in many 
ways its desire to cooperate in the achievement of 
the objectives of the Baghdad Pact, which coincide 
with our objectives in this area and elsewhere — of 
peace, security, and welfare. "While the I'nited 
States has not itself adhered to the pact, we have, 
at the request of the members — Turkey, Iraq. Iran, 
Pakistan, and the United Kingdom — maintained 
continuing liaison witli the organization and have 
had observers in attendance at its various meetings. 

In line with this policy, the United States is 



sending a delegation to the meeting of the Bagh- 
dad Pact Council in Tehran from April 16 to 20. 
The American delegation will be headed by Deputy 
Under Secretary of State Loy W. Henderson. 

Mr. Henderson will be accompanied to Tehran 
by a special economic adviser and will be joined by 
Selden Chapin, U.S. Ambassador to Iran, and by 
Waldemar J. Gallman, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, 
togttlier with advisers drawn from the staffs of the 
American Embassies in Tehran and Baghdad. 

T)ie group of U.S. military observers at the 
meeting will be headed by Adm. John H. Cassady, 
Commander in Chief of the Eastern Atlantic and 
Mediterranean Forces, who attended the last meet- 
ing of the Council.^ He will be accompanied by 
senior representatives of each of the military 
services. 

Significance of New Soviet Line 
Concerning Stalin Era 

Neivs Confererwe Statement hy Secretary Dulles 

Press release 171 dated April 3 

The official Soviet line, which seems to repudiate 
the last two decades of Stalin's rule, is higUy 
significant. It is too early to judge its full mean- 
ing, but some important conclusions are now 
possible. 

The Soviet rulers must know that the brutal 
and arbitrary rule of the Stalin era led to a gi"eat 
yearning by the subject peoples for legality and 
personal security, for tolerance of differences of 
opinion, and for government genuinely dedicated 
to the welfare of the governed. 

Also the Soviet rulers must now see that their 
foreign policies encounter effective resistance when 
they are identified with the use of violence. 

The essential question is this: Are the Soviet 
rulers now attacking the basic causes of this 
domestic discontent and foreign distrust, or is 
their purpose merely to allay this discontent and 
distrust by blaming them on the past? The 
downgrading of Stalin does not of itself demon- 
strate that the Soviet regime has basically changed 
its domestic or foreign policies. The present 
rulers have, to be sure, somewhat modified or 
masked the harshness of their policies. But a dic- 
tatorship is a dictatorship whether it be that of 



' Bulletin of Jan. 2, 1956, p. 16. 



AptW 16, 7956 



637 



one man or several. And the new Five- Year Plan 
shows a continuing purpose to magnify the might 
of the Soviet State at the expense of the well- 
being of most of the people who are ruled. 

In the field of foreign policy the Soviet rulers 
have taken a few forward steps, notably the be- 
lated liberation of Austria. But they continue 
other predatory policies. They forcibly hold 
East Germany detached from Germany as a whole. 
The East European nations are still subjugated by 
Soviet rule. They have not renounced their ef- 
forts to subvert free governments. In Asia the 
present Soviet rulers seek to stir up bitterness 
and, in the Near East, increase the danger of hos- 
tilities. In the Far East they are seeking to coerce 
Japan to accept a peace treaty on Soviet terms. 
These and other current actions fall far short of 
the accepted code of international conduct. 

Nevertheless, the fact that the Soviet rulers now 
denounce much of the past gives cause for hope, 
because it demonstrates that liberalizing influ- 
ences from within and without can bring about 
peaceful change. If the free world retains its 
strength, its faith and unity, then subversion can- 
not win where force and brutality failed. And 
the yearnings of the subject peoples are not to 
be satisfied merely by a rewriting of past history. 
Thus we can hope for ultimate changes more 
fundamental than any that have so far been re- 
vealed. The United States, and indeed all the 
free nations, will eagerly welcome the coming 
of that day. 



Visit of French Foreign Minister 

News Conference Statement hy Secretary Duller 

Press release 170 dated April 3 

I am very pleased to announce that the French 
Foreign Minister, Mr. Christian Pineau, has ac- 
cepted an invitation to visit Washington. I have 
had the possibility of such a visit in mind for some 
time and first discussed it with Minister Pineau 
when we met recently at Karachi. The dates for 
the visit have now been set, and Minister Pineau 
will be here from June 18 to June 20 inclusive. 
We will have a further exchange of views on sub- 
jects of mutual interest to our two countries. The 
visit will also provide an occasion for high officials 
of the United States Government to meet the 
French Foreign Minister. 



Transcript of Secretary Dulles' 
News Conference 

Press release 172 dated April 3 

Secretary Dulles: I have two prepared state- 
ments to make.^ . . . Now if you have any ques- 
tions. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us whether there 
has been any change in our policy on IsraeVs re- 
quest for jet fighters and other armaments? 

A. The policy in that respect remains substan- 
tially as it was when I explained it to the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee about a month ago 
[February 24].^ 

Q. Mr. Secretary, is the new version of the 
Bricher amendment, which is known as the Dirh- 
sen version, acceptable to the administration? 

A. The President has not made, as far as I am 
aware, any definite statement on that subject, and 
imtil he does I would prefer not myself to speak of 
it. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, a story out of Tokyo yester- 
day indicated that the Japanese Embassy here has 
been directed to protest to the State Department 
about the enactment of State laws which are ap- 
parently designed to boycott Japanese goods. 
Have you heard of this, first,- and, secondly, what 
can you do about it? 

A. Well, I am aware of the problem that you 
refer to. We have not yet received any protest, 
as far as I am aware, from the Japanese Govern- 
ment. There is involved a question of trade trea- 
ties, discrimination, and tliere is a possibility of 
setting up forces here which could be very inimical 
to the operation of our most-favored-nation policy 
with respect to trade. But, as I say, until we re- 
ceive the protest, until we have had a further 
chance to study the matter in the light of our 
treaty engagements and in the light of our policies, 
I wouldn't want to say what our final conclusion 
will be. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, according to a UP report the 
French Prime Minister, Guy Mollet, said yester- 
day that the United States was taking the wrong 
approach to German unification refusing to put 



' These statements were also issued separately as press 
releases 170 (see adjoining column) and 171 (seep. 637). 
" Bulletin of Jlar. 5, 19.56, p. 368. 



638 



Deparimenf of State Bulletin 



disarmament first. I was wondering whether you 
have some comment on that. 

A. Well, you know, I find as I go around the 
world, and as I read the papei-s, that there is a good 
deal of criticism in other countries, big countries, 
little countries, of United States policy in various 
of its phases, and I feel that the fact tliat those 
criticisms are made, freely made, is one of the 
greatest tributes to the United States that could 
be made. Because all those countries know that 
they can criticize the United States without any 
fear of any reprisals or that we will change the 
principles which actuate us. We are not trying 
to run a popularity contest, and we don't give or 
withhold assistance on the basis of whether people 
say nice things about us or not. I think the finest 
tribute that could be paid to a country as powerful 
as the United States is that nobody fears to criti- 
cize us. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you return to the 
Bricker amendment? I believe the President said 
that he was not going to discuss it with us at the 
press conference until he talked to you about it. 
Has he talked to you, and have you taken a posi- 
tion on it? 

A. Well, he has talked to the Attorney Gen- 
eral, but whether he has taken a final position 
yet, I don't know. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us what is the 
legislative status of the Bricker amendment? 
Does the ad^ninistration have to decide very soon 
its position on it? 

A. I imderstand that the present version of the 
Constitutional amendment has been reported out 
of committee. I do not think that it is as yet on 
the calendar, nor do I know what the action will 
be about whether to put it on the calendar and, if 
so, when. So that I will j ust say that as far as I 
am now aware it is not on the calendar, and it is 
not a matter of immediate urgency. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, the freedom to criticize us 
seems to have taken a tangible form in Icelamd. 
Could you discuss the resolution of the Icelandic 
Parliament in favor of moving American forces 
out of Iceland? 

A. Well, I think that the resolution reflects an 
understandable desire on the part of the Members 
of Parliament to reduce to a minimum the presence 

April 16, 1956 



of foreign troops there. Of course, the resolution 
itself, as you know, has no operative effect inter- 
nationally, and I do not anticipate that there will 
be any decisive action now taken in that matter. 
Certainly, there is no occasion for any for, I think, 
a year and a half. But the problem of Iceland 
has always been a difficult one because Iceland is 
a quite small country. It has a population of, I 
think, about 160,000, and in that small population 
even a modest amount of forces from a foreign 
land makes a considerable impact. If you were 
to put it into relative terms, I would say that the 
situation is as though there were 6,000,000 foreign, 
non-English-speaking troops in the United States. 
Well, as the years go by there would, naturally, 
grow up a desire perhaps to reduce that, and a 
desire to be sure that the Government did not con- 
tinue it beyond the time that it was necessai-y. 
There is, I think, a feeling in Iceland that perhaps 
the recent Soviet moves make this less necessary. 
Undoubtedly, that whole problem will be discussed 
over the coming months. But I do not think that 
it is reflective of anything other than a desire to 
minimize the presence of foreign troops insofar 
as it can safely be done. The question of how 
safely it can be done is a matter which would 
probably be discussed at some of our Nato 
meetings. 

Situation in Near East 

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you discuss your views 
on the present situation in the Middle East with 
respect to the chances of avoiding a war? 

A. It is, of course, basic to United States policy, 
first, that war in that area should be avoided, and, 
secondly, that nothing should happen to subvert 
the genuine independence of the countries of that 
area. Peace and independence for that area are 
two basic points of our policy. 

I have the feeling that the resolution which is 
up before the Security Council now, and which 
was introduced by the United States, will con- 
tribute appreciably to minimizing the risk of war 
in the area.^ 

Wlien I spoke on this subject before the Senate 
Foreign Kelations Committee at the time that I 
have already alluded to, I emphasized my thought 
that the United Nations had a very peculiar re- 
sponsibility toward Israel and the maintenance of 



' See p. 628. 



639 



4 



peace, because the State of Israel liad to an extent 
been sponsored by the United Nations and tlie 
truce and armistice agreements had been spon- 
sored bv the T^nited Xations. I felt, therefore, 
that the United Nations should assume increasing 
responsibility. 

The resolution that we introduced, if it is 
adopted, as I am hopeful it will be (perhaps today 
or more likely tomorrow), will, I think, add ap- 
preciably to the assurance of peace in that part of 
the world, and to that extent it will mark, I think, 
real progress. 

Q. Mr. Secretary., the British Foreign Office has 
criticized Premier Nasser of Egypt on the ground 
that he has hecome rather anti-Western and has 
particularly made difficulties for Britain and 
France in the area. Are you aioare of any such 
conduct on Nasser'' s part? 

A. In so far as I have been aware of Nasser's 
public and official statements, I would say that he 
was actuated primarily by a desire to maintain the 
genuine independence of the area — the same desire 
that I expressed. Of course, it is never possible 
to make final judgments merely on the basis of 
what people say. But I am not disposed to feel 
that there is any irrevocable decision on the part 
of the Government of Egypt to repudiate its ties 
with the West or to accept anything like vassalage 
to the Soviet Union. 

Q. May I ask one more question on this area: 
There have been reports published within the last 
day or so that the United States Govemm,ent is 
considering separating from IsraeVs arms re- 
quests certain requests for electronic equipment, 
chiefly radar, and approving that on the ground 
that it is purely defensive. Cam, you comment on 
these reports? 

A. No, I'm afraid not. If that analysis is under 
way, it is at a level which hasn't yet come to my 
attention. 

Q. Mr. Secretai^, getting back to your previous 
answer, does your answer msan that IsraeVs arms 
requests have been turned down? 

A. No. 

Q. Does it inean they are still open? 

A. I would have to ask you to let me stand pretty 
much on the statement which I made before the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee in public 



640 



hearing about a month ago. Jly difficulty, ladies 
and gentlemen, is this : that whenever I speak on 
that subject I find that every single word and 
phrase that I use is compared very, very closely 
with something I may have said a month ago, and 
if I don't use precisely the same words then it is 
inferred that we have changed our policy. 

Now it is not possible for me — my memory isn't 
good enough — to repeat exactly in verbatim terms 
what I said a month ago. And if I try to repeat 
it in approximately the same terms, that wouldn't 
be good enough because the differences, however 
slight, would be studied with a view to seeing if 
they don't hide some change of policy. 

Now, broadly speaking, our policy is as I ex- 
pressed it at that time, and I think rather than at- 
tempt to restate it in what might be slightly differ- 
ent words from which inferences might unjustifi- 
ably be drawn, I would just rather stand on that 
previous statement. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you care to tell us who 
makes this interpretation? 

A. I would say that those interpretations — I am 
not criticizing them — those interpretations are 
made by the interested parties who, quite properly, 
are seeking to detect, if possible, any changes in our 
policy. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you please corrmient on 
the exception that the Netherlands appears to have 
taken to some of your statements in Djakarta? 

A. "Well, I had a friendly talk, yesterday I think 
it was, with the Dutch Ambassador here and, I 
think, clarified the situation. I believe that the 
position which I took at Djakarta was a position 
whicli, by and large, is in the interest of the United 
States and all of the free nations, and I hope that 
there will be a better understanding of what I said 
and did there. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you comment specif - 
cally on the Jungschlaeger* case, particularly the 
charge that an American Embassy plane had been 
used to fly atnmimitiori to the rebels? 

A. It is not our practice to conament in general 
upon cases that are pending before courts. There 
are a great many of these cases all around the 



' Leou Jungschlaeger, retired Dutch naval captain on 
trial in Indonesia for alleged subversive activities against ' 
tlie Indonesian Government. 



Deparfment of State Bulletin 



f\ 



world, and, in the main, it is oui- policy to avoid 
comment on cases either at home or abroad that 
are pending before tlie courts. As far as the refer- 
ence to the use of a United States plane is con- 
cerned, I understand that has been publicly and 
officially denied by the United States Embassy. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your appearance hefore the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee [in executive 
session on March £3] you spoke of the Japanese 
talhing about the use of American foreign aid to 
help them in their payments program both in the 
United States and Asia. Has anything further 
developed on that? 

A. No. That theme has been reported by me 
to our economic people here in the State Depart- 
ment and to the Ica [International Cooperation 
Administration], and they are studying it to see 
■what they may conclude as to feasibility of a i^rac- 
tical application of that general thesis that we 
should seek to coordinate our economic aid with 
such economic aid as may result from Japanese 
reparation payments and the like. 

Free-World Unity 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your prepared statement 
you said something about if the free world main- 
tains its unity in the face of the Soviet changes. 
We talked a lot here about criticism from a variety 
of nations. Do you have any apprehensions the 
free world will maintain its unity in the face of 
the Soviet change? 

A. I am convinced that the free world will main- 
tain its unity. Now unity is something which has 
to be carefully differentiated from conformity. 
That is the difference between our system and the 
Soviet Communist system — at least, as it has been 
expounded up to the present time. Whether they 
will change that or not I don't know. But the old 
Soviet Communist line has been that there had 
to be complete conformity and that no differences 
of opinion were tolerated. In a free society the 
situation is the reverse of that. We tolerate and 
welcome differences of opinion, and, indeed, if 
there wei-e no differences of opinion in a free so- 
ciety there would be something badly wrong with 
it. Therefore, the unity and vigor of a free so- 
cietj' is not to be judged by the absence of criticism 
and comments; on the contrary, I think it is a 
sign of vigor that these comments and criticisms 
occur. 

April 16, 7956 

381545—56 3 



Now, there is of course some danger always that 
a change of tactics such as is now going on in the 
Soviet Union, where — as I put it — it may be that 
old policies are merely being masked, may tem- 
porarily have a deceptive effect. But one of the 
encouraging impressions that I gained from my 
trip to Asia is that there is a very large measure 
of alertness to the possibility of danger from new 
Soviet tactics. Therefore, I returned from this 
trip convinced that, at least in so far as that part 
of the world was concerned, there is a very good 
hope that the unity of the free nations will be pre- 
served. Not, as I say, in the form of a conformity, 
or domination, or some nations being satellites to 
others — goodness knows we don't want any sat- 
ellites. But the kind of unity which means that 
they are free from Soviet Communist or Chinese 
Communist domination and within that freedom 
each lives its own independent life. I believe that 
situation is going to prevail. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, it has been reported that the 
United States would not oppose other Western 
countries selling ar'ms to Israel. Would you ex- 
plain to us the difference — whether the arms come 
from, the United States or other Western coun- 
tries? 

A. The United States is following its policy in 
relation to that area for reasons that seem to us 
to be most conducive to our particular ability to 
exert influence for the peace and independence 
of the area of which I spoke. But the same con- 
siderations which apply to the United States do 
not necessarily apply to other countries, and there 
is certainly no desire on the part of the United 
States to dictate to other countries what their 
policy should be. 

Policy on Use of Troops 

Q. Mr. Secretary, on that same subject how do 
you interpret the May 25, 1950, declaration in so 
far as it may involve the u^se of our own troops to 
put down any acts of aggression in that part of 
the world? Are you free, for example, without 
congressional sanction? 

A. Whether we are free or not is a Constitu- 
tional question. It is very strongly the disposi- 
tion of President Eisenhower, as I think you all 
know, to resolve any of those doubts in favor of 
going to Congress, assmning that Congress is in 
session and can be expected to act promptly, or 



641 



could be called into session promptly. I would 
think that, in the absence of an emergency of such 
a character, congressional consultation and action 
would be impractical and the President would 
not be disposed to act without such consultation 
and concurrence by the Congress. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, didn't the 1950 declaration 
commit Britain, France, and the United States to 
follow a common folicy? 

A. It laid down certain principles which each 
accepted as a broad guide to its policies. Those 
principles were, however, so general in their terms 
that it is not easy to apply them to particulars, 
and of course the situation has changed since that 
time in view of the fact that the Soviet Union is 
now a large purveyor of arms in that area. 

Q. Would the considtations yoti were talking 
about he of the kind that took place before the 
Korean War or at the time the Korean War oc- 
curred tvith congressional leaders, or are you 
syeahing of some other kind of consultations with 
Congress? 

A. Well, I thought I coupled two words — I 
thought I said consultation and approval, al- 
though possibly if Congress was not in session and 
an emergency arose then there might be consulta- 
tions alone. But I would think, in the light of 
what the President has said in the past, that he 
would not normally expect to use the armed forces 
of the United States in the area where there has 
been no congressional approval given either 
through a resolution or through a treaty. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, does this Goveminent believe 
that the shipinent of some small anns to Israel by 
other countries would contribute to the stability 
of the area? 

A. It might do so. That is a difficult question 
to answer in the abstract, but certainly the United 
States has no view to the contrary which would 
lead it to interpose any objections. 

"Problems of Leninism" 

Q. Mr. Secretary, it has been indicated to its in 
the past you regarded Stalin''s Problems of Lenin- 
ism as one of tfie basic texts in Soviet policy. I 
uionder if recent events would lead you to subscribe 
to that in the light of recent events. 

A. I still have it on my desk both here and at 
my house because, in so far as I am aware, the 



Soviets, while they have attempted to disavow 
much of Stalin's program and many of his acts, 
have not themselves come up with any substitute. 
There is this to be observed — that the portion of 
Stalin's rule which is apparently being most vig- 
orously disavowed is, roughly speaking, the last 
20 years. The Problems of Leninism, runs up- 
as I recall — to 1939, and most of the book embraces 
statements, speeches, etc., made by Stalin prior to 
1937. It may be, therefore, that the greater part 
of that book will be preserved. Certainly, I don't 
think one is justified in assuming that it all will 
go, particularly as the book purports in large part 
to be a statement of Lenin's doctrine. 

Lenin wrote so voluminously that one can 
delve into his books and arrive at almost any con- 
clusion you wish by picking and choosing. Stalin 
picked and chose, but much of the book is a quota- 
tion from or an elucidation of Lenin's writings. 
Therefore, I think it is not possible yet to conclude 
that that volume, or the gi-eat«r part of it, may 
not be preserved as a working model for the Com- 
munists. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, has this Government ever 
been able to get hold of the text or a summary of 
the secret Khrushchev speech or any party instruc- 
tions on which you perhaps based your original 
statements? 

A. We have not as yet been able to get a full 
text or written excerpts from it. We do think we 
have, through indirection, a pretty good idea as 
to what was said there. But obviously it is in- 
complete because it was a very long speech and 
the recollections which we are able to draw upon 
are secondhand and somewhat fragmentary. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, about Premier Nasser^s state- 
ment, how' do you regard Premier Nasser^s state- 
ment in the Neio York Times that he still was 
iceighing the Soviet offer to build the Aswan dam; 
secondly, are you aware of a change in heart in 
Egypt in making a prompt start on the dam? 

A. In so far as I am aware, there is no program 
for making a prompt start, and, indeed, some of 
the preconditions to a start are still under dis- 
cussion. 

Q. Mr. Seoretaiy, in reply to an earlier ques- 
tion you said that you thought the President u^ould 
leant congressional approval by either a resolution 
or a treaty in order to u.se forces in some foreign 
area — 



642 



Department of State Bulletin 



A. In the absence of an emergency in which 
the national interest was involved, and there 
wasn't time to get congressional action. 

Q. I loauld like to ash a question. Do you have 
any flan or does the President have a plan to ash 
Congress for such a resolution applying to the 
Middle East or, alternatively, do you kntnc of any 
emergency lohich might require action in the ab- 
sence of congressional approval? 

A. I will answer those questions in reverse order 
because it is easier. The first is that we do not 
know of any such emergency, and since we do not 
know of it we do not have any present plans to seek 
congressional action. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, earlier yoti said, I believe, in 
answer to a question that IsraeVs request for arms 
has not been twmed down. Has the United States 
decided to meet this request on the part of Israel? 

A. No, it has not made an affirmative decision. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, on the basis of \chat you said 
regarding Stalinh loritings on Problems of Lenin- 
ism, are you implying there is primarily a change 
of methodology in the Soviet administration and, 
if so, could not a change of methodology, loillitigly 
or unimllingly, lead to a change of substance in 
their policies? 

A. Yes, I believe so, and that is the basis for the 
hope which I expressed in the next-to-last sentence 
of the statement which I read to you. 

U.S. Policy Toward Indonesia 

Q. Mr. Secretary, with respect to the fnction be- 
tween the Netherlands and the United States, 
could you ansiver these tioo questiom: A Christian 
Science Monitor editorial recently suggested that 
the United States should be careful not to take over 
economic responsibilities in Indonesia where the 
Netherlands is forced to leave off, and the second 
question is this: There is a growing sentiment in 
the Netherlands that the neutrality of the United 
States regarding Netherlands New Guinea is about 
to be over. Could you comment on that one? 

A. Well, as far as economic assistance is con- 
cerned, the United States has no desire or intention 
of taking over the Dutch industrial position in 



Indonesia, if that is the subject of your question. 
Indonesia was a colony, and there was a very large 
amount of Netherlands capital which was in there. 
There is no desire or purpose on the part of the 
United States, governmentally or through en- 
couraging private business, to take over that dom- 
inant economic position which the Dutch enjoyed. 

We are giving a certain amount of economic 
assistance to Indonesia. Just before I was there we 
signed a Public Law 480 arrangement witli Indo- 
nesia which involved approximately $95 million 
worth of agricultural surplus goods.'^ So we are 
sympathetic to assisting Indonesia wliere it desires 
such assistance. But certainly we do not expect 
to take over the Dutch commercial position in 
Indonesia. 

I think there were two parts of that question. I 
have forgotten what the second part was. 

Q. It concerned Netherlands New Guinea. So 
far the United States delegation to the United 
Nations, at least in recent years, has taken a posi- 
tion of absolute neutrality. Some fears are being 
expressed that is no longer the case. 

A. We expect to continue to take a position of 
neutrality because that is our general policy with 
relation to these highly controversial matters 
which involve countries both of whom are friends 
and where we ourselves are not directly involved. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, what does the administration 
expect Congress loill do on long-range foreign aid 
programs? Are you doing anything about it — 
trying to sell the idea? 

A. Yes, I am doing a good deal publicly and 
privately. You will find I made two public 
speeches of a nationwide character, within the last 
6 weeks I think, which dealt with that subject." 
I emphasized it in my appearances before the For- 
eign Afl'airs and Foreign Eelations Committees 
after I returned, and I have talked privately to a 
number of Senators and Congressmen about it. 
My belief is that there will be congressional action 
in tliis respect which will enable us to go forward 
on long-range projects with confidence. 



' Bulletin of Mar. 19, 1956, p. 469. 

" nid.. Mar. 5, 1956, p. 363, and Apr. 2, 1956, p. 539. 



Apr;/ 16, 7956 



643 



The Foundations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 



hy Deputy Under Secretary Mwrphy ^ 



This coming Wednesday it will be exactly 7 
years since that April 4, 1949, when the repre- 
sentatives of 12 nations gathered in Washington 
to sign the North Atlantic Treaty. It is fitting 
that we pause on this occasion to see what prog- 
ress we have made and to look forward to some 
of the problems facing the Atlantic community. 

It is particularly fitting that this symposium 
be held here in Norfolk. Your city is one of the 
first to which our ancestors came from across the 
Atlantic 300 years ago. Today Norfolk may be 
described as one of the capitals of the Atlantic 
community, since one of Nato's two major in- 
tegrated command systems is located here. The 
other is the Nato headquarters in Paris. Just 
2 weeks ago I had a chance to talk over the sit- 
uation in Europe with General [Alfred M.] 
Gruenther, the Supreme Commander for Europe 
stationed in Paris, and I look forward today to 
renewing my long acquaintance with Admiral 
[Jerauld] Wright, the distinguished Supreme 
Allied Commander in the Atlantic. 

We in Washington feel special gratitude to the 
College of William and Mary and to the Norfolk 
Chamber of Commerce for your sponsorship of 
these meetings — the one last August and the one 
beginning today — on the organization and pur- 
poses of Nato. Through this kind of discussion 
and study we will all better understand one of our 
country's most important activities in the inter- 
national field. By your example you can help 
other Americans appreciate the significance of our 
Atlantic alliance. 



' Address made at a symposium on NATO sponsored by 
the College of William and Mary and the Norfolk Cham- 
ber of Commerce at Norfolk, Va., on Apr. 2 (press release 
168). 



This symposimn is an important step in that 
direction, and I am honored that you asked me 
to introduce your valuable discussions. Bather 
than dwell on the general outline of Nato's or- 
ganization and development, with which we are 
fairly well acquainted, we might talk about some 
of the principles and concepts which lie behind 
the North Atlantic Treaty and some of the reasons 
why Nato has become a vital force in world 
affairs. 

It is important that we keep in mind these 
fundamental facts about our Atlantic alliance. 
We will then be better able to meet some of the 
questions we have been hearing recently about 
Nato. And it is worth remembering that much 
of the talk about Nato comes from greater public 
interest and a wider knowledge about our security 
problems. This is all to the good and in our 
national interest. 

All of us are familiar with some of the doubts 
and questions raised during the last few months. 
Some people complain that the United States is 
devoting a great deal of money and manpower to 
protecting Europe and is not getting enough in 
return. Others argue that Nato — and in fact the 
whole concept of collective security — -is being 
rendered obsolete by the development of the hy- 
drogen bomb and other weapons of massive de- 
struction. Still others suggest that the recent 
shift in Soviet tactics has greatly lessened the 
danger of war and therefore reduced the need for 
programs and relationships which have developed 
through Nato. 

In my opinion, all these doubts and questions 
have their roots in misconceptions about the prem- 
ises of the Atlantic alliance and about the true 
character of the international situation now con- 



I 



644 



Department of Slate Bulletin 



fronting this country. The best way to clear up 
these misconceptions is to take a good look at 
Nato's background — to review some of the basic 
considerations which led to its formation and 
which make it so valuable today. 

Nato has not arisen fi-om a single foundation but 
rather from several firm-bedded foundations. 
The main building blocks of Nato ai'e three : the 
awareness of a common heritage, the presence of 
a common danger, and a common determination to 
resist it. These three elements have blended to 
provide a solid basis for the most extensive and 
most powerful association of free peoples that 
history has ever known. 

A Common Heritage 

It is difficult to overestimate the importance of 
what we might call the "human" foundations of 
Nato. By this, I refer to the multiplicity of spirit- 
ual, cultural, and personal ties that link the North 
Atlantic peoples. "We should always remember 
that Nato did not create the Atlantic community. 
Rather, it was the fact that a community already 
existed which made Nato possible. The common 
heritage underlying Nato began nearly 500 years 
ago with the voyages of discovery and explora- 
tion, and the passing centuries have steadily 
tightened the attachment of North America to 
Europe. Let me give you a few examples. 

According to the 19.50 census, there were more 
than 33 million people living in the United States 
who either were bom abroad or had parents born 
abroad. Of this number, nearly half came from 
the 14 other Nato countries. Of the remainder of 
our population, an even larger percentage can 
trace their ancesti-y back to one of the Nato 
nations. 

"We Americans have developed over the years a 
political and constitutional structure that is 
peculiarly our own. But its basic principles, in- 
cluding rejjresentative government, restraints on 
governmental authority, and guaranties of human 
and pro]ierty rights, had European origins. Most 
of our European allies, despite varying political 
structures, still govern themselves under these 
basic principles. In simple terms, we and our al- 
lies share a devotion to the concepts of human 
freedom and political liberty. These concepts are 
what set the free nations apart in the world today. 

A look at the content of our educational pro- 
grams shows even more concretely our common 



8 April ?6, 7 



956 



heritage with "Western and Southern Europe. 
Here at "William and Mary, the second oldest uni- 
versity in the country and one of our best, we find 
as in other American universities numerous studies 
in literature, science, art, and the social sciences. 
If we forget for a moment the portion of this ac- 
cumulated knowledge that has been produced by 
the minds and hands of our own countrymen, we 
will quickly recognize that the greatest part of the 
remainder has come from the Nato countries of 
Europe. Our whole culture is an Atlantic culture. 
It would be possible to offer many additional 
examples, but those I have given are sufficient to 
illustrate my thesis that the Atlantic community 
was a living reality long before the relationship 
was formalized by intergovernmental organiza- 
tions. Perhaps the most vivid demonstration of 
this community relationship was provided by our 
experience in the First and Second "World "Wars. 
In both instances the American people, after try- 
ing to avoid involvement in military hostilities, 
discovered painfully that the fate of Europe was 
indissolubly linked with our own. The bonds of 
blood, friendship, and tradition are not easily 
broken. 

A Common Danger 

In the period after 1945, another crisis arose. 
This danger threatened every one of the Atlantic 
nations. The Nazi dream of world empire was 
shattered, but in the process a large part of the 
Eurasian land mass fell into the hands of the ruth- 
less Communist dictatorship. "Within a matter of 
months. Western hopes that the Soviet Union 
would restore freedom to the areas occupied by 
its armies and would cooperate in the establishing 
of a lasting peace were dashed. 

Not only did the Soviet rulers make clear their 
determination to hold fast to their conquests and 
to exploit the newly acquired resources and peo- 
ples for the aggrandizement of Soviet j^ower, but 
they made equally clear their intention to continue 
the expansion of Communist power into other 
areas. INIoreover, it was evident that the Com- 
munist bloc possessed powerful capabilities for 
carrying out these intentions. The external pres- 
sures of Soviet imperialism were reinforced by the 
internal pressures exerted by pro-Communist ele- 
ments within free societies. Guns were supple- 
mented by propaganda. The specter of political 
chaos was magnified by the risk of economic col- 



645 



lapse. Communism attacked on all fronts at the 
same time. Its purpose was to destroy every 
vestige of resistance to a Communist-dominated 
-world. The situation in 1948 and 1949 was des- 
perate. 



Something had to be done. 



A Common Response 

The common civilization of tlie Atlantic com- 
munity was challenged by a common danger, and 
this inspired a common response. The Atlantic 
nations cooperated in various ways to meet the 
danger. Tlu-ough the Marshall plan and the Or- 
ganization for European Economic Cooperation, 
they labored to restore Western Europe's economic 
health and thereby lay a basis for political sta- 
bility. Through the Brussels Treaty, five Euro- 
pean nations began the construction of a common 
defense system. But it was painfully evident 
that even the utmost toil and sacrifice on the part 
of the Brussels Treaty powers would not be ade- 
quate to produce defenses capable of holding the 
Soviet colossus in check. Just as North American 
support had proved necessary to European eco- 
nomic recovery, so did North American participa- 
tion prove essential to an effective defense 
arrangement. The North Atlantic Treaty was the 
result. 

The North Atlantic Treaty was negotiated by 
the United States and the 11 other original sig- 
natories : Great Britain, Canada, France, Belgium, 
the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Iceland, Norway, 
Denmark, Portugal, and Italy. Since that time 
Greece, Turkey, and most recently the Federal 
Republic of Germany have acceded to the treaty, 
making a total of 15 members. The main deter- 
rent to aggression, completely apart from the 
military strength which was later assembled, lay 
in the unity of purpose which the treaty demon- 
strated. Secretary Dulles, then a member of the 
United States delegation to the United Nations, 
clearly set forth tliis view wlien, during the hear- 
ings on the ratification of the treaty, he said: 

The treaty takes away from an aggressor one choice 
that he used to have: the choice of making war on the 
parties singly, one by one. If he chooses to fight one 
party to this pact, he must fight them all, and all at the 
same time. 

The Principle of Collective Security 

It is clear that the common danger confronting 
the Atlantic nations provided the immediate 
stimulus for Nato. But the existence of a com- 



646 



mon danger is only a part of the story. Even 
more important is tlie fact that the Atlantic pow- 
ers, in combination, possess a capacity for re- 
sponding to this danger far greater tlian any one 
of them possesses alone. Of all the tangible and 
intangible elements that have joined together to 
produce Nato, the most significant is the simple 
fact that "Western Europe and Northern America 
need each other — that an amalgamation of their 
human and material resources is vital to the safety 
and well-being of both. 

Since the end of World War II, there has been 
little question in the minds of most Europeans 
about the need for American cooperation and sup- 
port. Most of them have found it painfully ob- 
vious that collective security is the only real se- 
curity available. But among Americans the need 
for Europe's cooperation and support is sometimes 
less clearly understood. Old-style isolationism 
has virtually died out in America, but there are 
still a number of our people who are inclined to 
doubt that we get much out of collective security 
arrangements and who suspect that the United 
States protects and assists others while receiving 
little or nothing in return. This is a fallacy and 
probably engenders more mistaken thinking about 
foreign policy tlian any other single misconcep- 
tion. I think it would be useful, therefore, to 
examine the strategic value of the combination of 
Nato resources primarily from the standpoint of 
America's own national self-interests. 

Stripped to its essence, the justification for Nato 
is a simple exercise in elementary arithmetic. 
North America and free Europe combined now 
produce about 70 percent of the world's manu- 
factured goods, while the entire Soviet bloc, in- 
cluding China, produces only about 20 percent. 
On the other hand, Soviet control of the territory 
and resources of Western Europe would give the 
Soviet bloc 50 percent of the total world's indus- 
trial production, as against North America's 40 
percent. The Atlantic nations, so long as they 
are joined together, are in a position to maintain 
decisive industrial superiority over the Soviet bloc 
for an indefinite period of years. Soviet domina- 
tion of Western Europe would rapidly shift the 
industrial balance to the Communist side. 

One of our great deficiencies in the global strug- 
gle witli communism is manpower. The popula- 
tion of the Communist bloc outnumbers the Ameri- 
can population by a margin of 5 to 1. But with 
free Europe and North America joined together, 

Department of State Bulletin 

I 



this margin is reduced to approximately 2 to 1. 
The extent to which the manpower of our 
Eurijpean allies suj^plements the manpower of the 
United States is vividly illustrated by the armed 
forces of the two areas. The United States has 
about 3 million men under ai-ms. Our Nato allies 
are now adding another 3i/^ million to the total 
military manpower available for free-world de- 
fense. We do not know exactly how many men 
the Communist countries have under arms, but a 
fair estimate would be about IO14 million. 

Our European allies also contribute substantial 
sea and air strength, as well as naval and air bases, 
to the common defense. There are now more than 
150 Nato air bases in the European area. These 
bases are indispensable for defense and retaliation 
against aggression. We should note that our Nato 
allies have not only contributed the land for these 
bases but have paid most of the cost of their 
construction. 

Not the least of free Europe's potential contribu- 
tions to the strength and well-being of the Atlantic 
community is Europe's scientific and technological 
capacity. It is worth recalling the nationalities 
of the scientists who contributed to the original 
development of the atomic bomb. The list reads 
almost like a Nato rollcall ; for example, Fermi of 
Italy, Bohr of Denmark, Cockcroft of England. 

Finally, I think it is time to lay at rest the myth 
that the cost of the Nato program rests primarily 
upon the shoulders of the American taxpayer. It 
is true that our defense expenditures are much 
greater than those of other countries, but it is also 
true that our national income is nearly three times 
as great as that of all the other Nato nations com- 
bined. Americans know that the United States 
has made very large contributions to the equipment 
and training of the military forces of our European 
allies. But relatively few Americans realize that 
these allies are now spending $6 from their own 
budget to match every dollar's worth of U.S. assis- 
tance they receive from us. All told, they are con- 
tributing about $12 billion a year to the common 
defense program. And $12 billion "ain't hay," 
even in this age of astronomical budgets. It is a 
very substantial contribution to the common 
defense. 

These are some of the facts which explain the 

origin of the North Atlantic Treaty and why it 

is important to us. And just as significant as the 

I series of commitments which the member nations 



have given to assist one another in the event of 
aggression is the wide range of collective activity 
in which they are already engaged. Wliile most 
of this activity is directed toward the maintenance 
and improvement of military defense, there have 
been significant advances toward closer political 
and cultural cooperation as well. 

Nato, with its 15 members, is a cornerstone of 
our foreign policy, linking the power of North 
America with that of Western and Southern 
Europe. We have other important alliances. 
In this hemisphere we have the Organization of 
American States, the oldest regional system in 
the world, and the Rio Pact, which bind us to- 
gether with 20 Latin American Republics for 
cooperation and joint defense. In Asia we are 
members of Seato, still a new organization, which 
is steadily gathering strength. We have impor- 
tant bilateral pacts with the Republic of China, 
Korea, the Philippines, Japan, and Spain, and 
we have a trilateral security treaty with Australia 
and New Zealand. The U.S. today is fortified 
by security arrangements with more than 40 
countries. Although we are not members of the 
Baghdad Pact, wliich is the very newest defense 
organization, including Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Pakis- 
tan, and the United Kingdom, we have a deep 
interest in its success. The United States has 
entered into these defense alliances to meet the 
danger we and our friends face in many parts of 
the world. Our ability to meet this danger is 
much more powerful than it was even a few years 
ago. But the danger has not significantly 
abated. 

Shift in Soviet Tactics 

This is true even though during the last year 
we have witnessed what appears to be a rather 
striking shift in Soviet tactics. Wliile the Com- 
munist leaders have always employed a variety 
of techniques to pursue their objective of world 
domination, up until recently they had relied 
largely on the use or threatened use of military 
force. As a result of the increasing unity and 
strength of free nations, there are indications that 
they have now reached a better appreciation of the 
suicidal risks of warfare and are beginning to 
place much more emphasis on the use of political, 
economic, and psychological teclmiques in the 
unending Communist struggle against the free 
world. 



\ April 16, 7956 



647 



There is a lot we still do not know about what 
is iroin<r on in the Soviet Union. "We do not know 
whether they are changing their policies. In cer- 
tain vital areas like the unification of Germany, 
they appear to have made no change. On the 
other hand, they appear to be trying to change 
their approach and diplomatic methods, particu- 
larly as they deal with Soutli Asia and the Near 
East. They seem to be stepping \ip their over- 
tures toward Western Europe. Toward Japan, 
however, they are still using the heavy hand and 
their old technique of diplomatic coercion. They 
have not in the slightest relaxed their control over 
the satellite nations. 

The Stalin story is currently the most spectacu- 
lar example of the Soviet enigma. We know that 
Stalin's disciples and collaborators are now 
blackening his name. Prarda, on Mai'ch the 28th, 
told the world that Stalin lacked personal mod- 
esty, that he did not cut short the glorifications and 
praises addressed to him, and that all this violated 
the principles of Marx and Lenin, who, according 
to Pravda, taught that the ])eople must have the 
right to elect their responsible leaders. 

There are a lot of good reasons why the present 
Soviet rulers would want to push Stalin off his 
pedestal. They may well have found it necessary 
to revitalize the political and economic machinery 
of the Soviet Union, and by attacking Stalin 
they may hope to shock the Communist Party and 
the people of the Soviet Union into an awareness 
that a new response is expected, that the people 
on down the line in the Soviet hierarchy must 
take on greater initiative and responsibility. 
They probably want to stimulate the productive 
and creative abilities of Soviet engineers, scien- 
tists, and artists, who were never sure that Stalin 
might not change the line and put them out of 
business. And we cannot forget that the men in 
Moscow probably feared the wrath of Stalin, 
knowing what they Imew about the purges and the 
secret police. They may also feel this new line 
will be appealing to non-Communists and espe- 
cially to socialists abroad, and that it will get them 
out from under the domineering rigidities of 
Stalin's foreign policy. 

Time will tell us more about the "cult of the 
individual"' and about the adjustments going on 
in Russia. 

It would be foolhardy, however, to assume that 
the Communists have changed their objective. We 



have almost no evidence that the basic totalitarian 
features of the Soviet state have changed in any 
way. Nevertheless, we can hope that they have 
decided to reduce their emphasis on militai-y 
strength and threat of force as major instruments 
of policy. Such a shift would be an advantageous 
development from the standpoint of the United 
States and other free nations. The objective of 
U.S. policy is to achieve in peace the blessings of 
liberty, and thus any genuine indication that the 
danger of armed Communist aggression has di- 
minished would be welcome. We have no reason 
to doubt the fundamental capacity of free societies 
to compete with communism by peaceful means. 
At the same time, there are two things we should 
keep firmly in mind when we try to figure out 
where we stand today. 

Communist Capability for Aggression 

First, we should remember that the Communist 
bloc still retains a tremendous capaiility for mili- 
tary aggression. It has a substantial superiority 
in military manpower. It is rapidly developing 
more modern weapons and a modem technology, 
including an ominous atomic potential. The 
Communists possess the capacity to engage in new 
military adventures at any time, either on a gen- 
eral or local scale. As long as this capacity exists, 
it is obvious that the United States and other free 
nations must be watchful of their freedom and 
safety. 

Second, even if the Communists remain cautious 
about military adventures, we cannot afford to dis- 
count the enormous stakes involved in the bitter 
political and economic contest which they are de- 
termined to continue waging against the free 
world. In terms of the ultimate fate of free civili- 
zation, this new strategy is no less dangerous than 
the old. In some ways, it is even more difficult to 
combat, because it is more subtle, more complex, 
and geared to a longer time period. We should 
not make the fatal mistake of assuming that a 
seeming Communist de-emphasis of military 
methods of conquest will allow us to take a holiday 
from the struggle for freedom. On the contrary, 
this struggle may become more intense and will 
certainly tax our imagination, energy, and patience 
to the utmost. Our ability to achieve success in 
this struggle, like our ability to maintain an ade- 
quate defense posture, will depend in large measure 
upon our cooperation with other free nations. 
The principle of collective security is as valid to- 



648 



Department of State Bulletin 



day in the political field as it ever was in the mili- 
tary field. 

I think it is clear that the Xato countries have no 
reason to de-emphasize their defense programs. 
Actually, these very progrrams have been a princi- 
pal factor in bringing about the recent shift in 
Soviet tactics. Our current situation reminds me 
of a story I once heard about a highway that went 
through a mountain village. There was a very 
high cliff at a sharp turn in the highway, and quite 
a number of travelers failed to make it. There 
was considerable agitation for a project to build a 
fence at this point, and this was eventually done. 
After several years had gone by, however, a 
traveler happened to be passing through the vil- 
lage and noticed that the fence had been removed. 
He stopped to ask one of the natives about it and 
received a very simple explanation. "We kept the 
fence there for about .3 years," the old fellow said, 
"but nobody fell off the cliff any more, so we took 
it down." 

Maintaining Our Guard 

I feel sure that both the United States and its 
allies recognize that this is no time to take down 
our fences. We must maintain our guard as long 
as a threat exists. Even though we hope that the 
Soviet rulers have come to recognize the horrors of 
modern warfare, we have no guaranty that they 
will indefinitely desist from military adventures, 
especially if they are tempted by military weak- 
nesses in neighboring nations. 

As I said in the beginning of this discussion, this 
examination of N.\to"s background will help us to 
give positive answers to any of the doubts or ques- 
tions raised about the Nato relationship. Nato 
remains vital to the interests of Americans and 
Europeans alike. The onrush of modern tech- 
nology has not lessened the need for collective 
strength and collective effort. The new wind 
blowing from Moscow remains chilly. We must 
always be prepared for stormy weather. 

To those who express concern about the oc- 
casional differences of opinion among our Xato 
allies, I would like to say this. I have never 
known even a closely knit family that did not 
have an occasional quarrel. There will be dis- 
agreement among individuals and nations as long 
as independent thinking survives, and independ- 
ence of thought is one of the things we Americans 
and our allies are most determined to preserve. 
It is true, of course, that frictions and disagree- 



ments could weaken the effectiveness of an alli- 
ance. We must do everything we can to minimize 
and resolve differences of this kind, but we must 
never exaggerate their importance. Even the 
most important differences among the Atlantic 
nations cannot begin to match the significance of 
our common interest in peace and survival. 

I do not propose at this time to speculate about 
the direction which N.\to may take in future years. 
You here today, with your interest and expert 
knowledge about Nato, are well qualified to do 
this. I will confine myself, in conclusion, to ex- 
pressing my deep conviction that the Atlantic 
relationshii^, whatever the fluctuations of circum- 
stance, will endure and grow. Nato's founda- 
tions are solid, and its accomplishments are sub- 
stantial. I know that you here in Norfolk will 
continue your efforts to help it grow even stronger. 

NATO Fellowship Awarded 
to American Woman 

The Department of State announced on April i 
(press release 173) that M. ilargaret Ball, pro- 
fessor of political science, Wellesley College, 
AVellesley, Mass., is the U.S. winner of one of 
the 11 Nato research fellowships offered by the 
North Atlantic Council. Simultaneous announce- 
ment of the award was made at Nato headquar- 
ters in Paris. 

The Nato Fellowship and Scholarship Program 
was announced last July in implementation of 
article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which pro- 
vides for cooperation in nonmilitary fields. It 
is designed to promote the study of historical, 
political, constitutional, legal, social, cultural, 
linguistic, economic, and strategic problems which 
will reveal the common heritage and historical ex- 
perience of the Atlantic covuitries, as well as the 
jD resent needs and future develoj^ment of the North 
Atlantic area considered as a community. Can- 
didates for these first awards to be made under 
the program were selected by a committee under 
the chairmanship of Ambassador L. D. Wilgress, 
Canadian Permanent Representative to Nato, who 
is also chairman of the Nato Committee on In- 
formation and Cultural Relations. Other mem- 
bers of the committee were James B. Conant, U.S. 
Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany 
and formerly president of Har\ard University; 
Robert Marjolin, professor at Nancj- University 
and formerly Secretary-General of the Organiza- 



April 16, 7956 



649 



tion for European Economic Cooperation ; Alberto 
Tarchiani, formerly Italian Ambassador to the 
United States; and II. U. "Willink, master of 
Magdalene College, Cambridge, and formerly 
vice-chancellor of Cambridge University. The 
Conference Board of Associated Research Coun- 
cils assisted the Department in recommending a 
panel of American candidates to be considered by 
the selection committee. 

Miss Ball's research will be on the general sub- 
ject of Nato and the Western European union 
movement. She expects to leave this coming 
autumn to spend the 4-month period of the fellow- 
ship in London, Paris, Bomi, and other European 
capitals. 



U.S., Netherlands Begin Negotiation 
of Air Transport Agreement 

Press release 176 dated April 5 

The Governments of the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands and the United States began nego- 
tiation of an air transport agreement in Wash- 
ington on April 5. 

The chairman of the delegation of the Kingdom 
of the Netherlands is Dr. J. J. Spanjaard, Di- 
rector of the Netherlands Department of Civil 
Aviation. The delegation also includes repre- 
sentatives of the Governments of Surinam and 
of the Netherlands Antilles. The opening session 
was also attended by the Netherlands Ambassador 
to the United States, Dr. J. H. van Eoijen. 

Chairman of the U.S. delegation is Thorsten 
V. Kalijarvi, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State 
for Economic Affairs. The vice chairman is Har- 
mar Denny, member of the Civil Aeronautics 
Board. The U.S. delegation is composed of of- 
ficials from the Department of State and the Civil 
Aeronautics Board. 

There has never been a bilateral air transport 
agreement between the United States and the 
Netherlands. At present Royal Dutch Airlines 
(Klm) operates from Amsterdam to New York 
and from Curasao to Miami under permits granted 
directly to the airline by the U.S. Government. 
Similarly, Pan American Airways operates from 
New York to Amsterdam and beyond to Frank- 
fort, Germany, from New York to Surinam and 
beyond, and from New York and Miami to Cu- 



rasao and beyond under permits granted directly 
to the airline by the Government of the Kingdom 
of the Netherlands. 



Transfer of Escapee Program 
to Department of State 

White House press release dated March 24 
WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT 

President Eisenliower on ]March 24 issued an 
Executive order authorizing the Secretary of 
State to carry out the functions pertaining to the 
United States Escapee Progi-am through any offi- 
cer or agency of the Department of State.^ It is I 
contemplated that this program, which is pres- 
ently being administered by the International Co- 
operation Administration, will be transferred to 
the Bui-eau of Security and Consular Affairs in J 
the De^Jartment of State. The Escapee Program « 
is designed to provide immediate assistance for 
people fleeing from behind the Iron Curtain and 
for their eventual reestablishment in Europe or 
overseas. During its 4 years of operation the 
program has assisted nearly 25,000 persons to 
resettle in the free world. 

The contemplated transfer will consolidate this 
humanitarian program with the related refugee 
functions already administered by the Bureau of 
Security and Consular Affairs. The Deputy Ad- 
ministrator of the Bureau, who is responsible for 
the administration of the Refugee Relief Program, 
will also direct the Escapee Program and repre- 
sent the United States on the Intergoverimiental 
Committee for European Migration. 

Within the International Cooperation Admin- 
istration the Office of the Deputy Director for 
Refugees, Migration, and Voluntary Assistance 
has been abolished. Those functions in this field 
which remain the responsibility of the Director of 
the International Cooperation Administration 
have been transferred to the Office of the Deputy 
Director for Technical Services. These functions 
are concerned with registration of and relation- 
ships with U.S. voluntai-y agencies which partici- 
pate in international relief and rehabilitation proj- 



' For an article on the Escapee Program by Mrs. Dorothy 
D. Houghton, see Btjlletin of Mar. 14, 1955, p. 415. 



650 



Deparfmenf of State Bulletin 



ects, and with staff support for the Advisory Com- 
mittee on Voluntary Foreign Aid. 

This change was recommended by a joint State- 
IcA task force studying organizational relation- 
sliips concerning these activities. The proposed 
transfer has the approval of the Secretary of State 
and the full concurrence of John B. Hollister, 
Director of the Intex-national Cooperation Admin- 
istration. 



EXECUTIVE ORDER 10663 ' 

Administration of the Escapee Pbogbam 

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Mutual 
Security Act of 1954 (68 Stat. 832), as amended, includ- 
ing particularly sections 521 and 525 thereof, it is ordered 
as follows : 

Sec. 1. Section 1&4 of Executive Order No. 10610 
of May 9, 1955 (20 F. R. 3181),° is hereby amended by 
adding at the end thereof a new subsection (c) reading as 
follows : 

"(c) The Secretary of State may carry out the func- 
tions now financed pursuant to section 405 (d) of the 
Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, through any 
officer or agency of the Department of State." 

Sec. 2. There is hereby terminated the duty of the 
Director of the International Cooperation Administration 
(under section 103 (c) of Executive Order No. 10575 of 
November 6, 1954 (19 F. E. 7251),* as affected by Execu- 
tive Order No. 10610) to assist the Secretary of State 
in formulating and presenting the policy of the United 
States with respect to the assistance programs of the Inter- 
governmental Committee for European Migration, the 
United Nations Refugee Fund, and the United Nations 
Children's Fund. 

Sec. 3. The Secretary of State is hereby authorized 
to transfer or assign to any agency or agencies of the 
Department of State such offices, officers, and personnel, 
and so much of the property and records, of the Inter- 
national Cooperation Administration as he may deem 
necessary for the administration by the said agency or 
agencies of the functions referred to in section 104 (c) 
of Executive Order No. 10610, as amended by this order. 

Sec. 4. This order shall become effective on the first 
day of the first month commencing after the date hereof. 



/^ Cjls^ L'cZU Cj-iCj,^ A^Kj.^ 



The White House, 
March 21,, 1956. 



fl 



'21 Fed. Reg. 1845. 

' Bulletin of May 30, 1955, p. 889. 

*Iiid., Dec. 13, 1954, p. 914. 



Foreign Service Institute 
Advisory Committee 

Press release 177 dated April 6 

The Department of State announced on April 6 
the appointment of the following persons to serve 
as members of an advisoi-y committee to the 
Foreign Service Institute : 

Mrs. Prances P. Bolton, U. S. House of Representatives 
Ellsworth Bunker, President, The American National Red 

Cross 
Robert D. Calkins, President, The Brookings Institution, 

Washington, B.C. 
Robert Cutler, Director, Old Colony Trust, Boston, Mass. 
Clyde K. Kluckhohn, Director, Laboratory of Social 

Sciences, Harvard University 
William L. Langer, Chairman, Committee on Regional 

Studies, Harvard University 
Charles E. Saltzman, Henry Sears & Company, New York, 

N.Y. 
Henry M. Wriston, Director, The American Assembly, 

Columbia University 

The Foreign Service Institute has statutory re- 
sponsibility for training in the Department of 
State. It is concerned with indoctrination and 
training of newly commissioned Foreign Service 
officers in the intricacies of a diplomatic and con- 
sular career and also with the responsibility of pre- 
parijig officers in mid-career for positions of 
greater importance in the Service. Additionally, 
the Institute provides training in many languages, 
conducts courses in economics and administration, 
and is responsible for university assignments in 
pursuit of greater proficiency in such areas as po- 
litical science, management, and economics. It also 
furnishes to other officers and employees of the 
Government such training in the field of foreign 
relations as is needed. 

I'he committee will meet periodically for the 
purpose of advising the Director of the Institute 
on all phases of training. 



Negotiations Concerning Debts 
of City of Berlin 

Press release 169 dated April 3 

Final arrangements have now been completed 
to permit the opening of negotiations for the settle- 
ment of the external debts owed by the City of 
Berlin and by public utility enterprises owned or 
controlled by Berlin. 



April 16, 1956 



651 



These arrangements amplify the agi'eement re- 
ferred to in the Department of State's press re- 
lease 8 of January 5, 1956/ which lifted the 
restrictions of article 5 (5) of the Agreement on 
German External Debts of February 27, 1953,- on 
the settlement of the Berlin external debts. The 
arrangements were made in similar exchanges of 
notes between the United States, British, and 
French Embassies at Bonn and the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Ger- 
many. The text of the note sent by the United 
States Embassy to the Foreign Ministry and an 
unoiScial translation of the reply follow. 

Note From U.S. Embassy at Bonn 

No. ?,8G 

The Embassy of the United States of America 
presents its compliments to the Federal Ministry 
for Foreign Affaii-s and has the honour to refer 
to the Ministry's note number 507-519-746- 
71284/55 of the 13th of August, 1955, and to the 
Embassy's note number 94 of August 29, 1955 on 
the subject of the settlement of the debts of the 
City of Berlin and of the Berlin public utility 
enterprises. 

In the opinion of the United States Government, 
the exchange of notes referred to constitutes the 
agreement provided for in Article 5 (5) of the 
Tendon Debt Agreement that negotiations on 
the settlement of these debts are now considered to 
be practicable. The Ministry has now raised in- 
formally with the British, French and American 
Embassies the question of the form of the negotia- 
tions provided for in Article 5(5). 

The United States Government considers that, 
with the lifting of the exclusion provided in 
Article 5 (5) , the terms of the London Debt Agi-ee- 
ment and the appropriate annexes are applicable 
to the settlement of the external debts of the City 
of Berlin and of the Berlin public utility enter- 
prises; and in particular, that the external bonded 
debts of the City of Berlin fall under Annex I, 
the bonded debts of the public utilities under 
Annex II and the miscellaneous debts of the City 
and of the public utilities, under Annex IV. It, 
therefore, believes that no further intergovern- 
mental conference is required, but that negotia- 
tions may now be imdertaken between the debtors 
and the creditor I'epresentatives. 



' Bulletin of Jan. 16, 1956, p. 93. 
' S. Exec. D, SSd Cong., 1st sess. 



The question of the actual terms of settlement 
of these debts will naturally be one of the principal 
objects of the proposed negotiations. The United 
States Government believes that the text of the 
Agi'eement and the annexes provides ample flexi- 
bility to take into account the special political 
and economic position of Berlin. 

If the Federal Government is in agreement 
with the views presented above, it is suggested 
that this note, the identical notes from the British 
and French Embassies and the replies of the Fed- 
eral Ministrj- for Foreign Affairs constitute an 
interpretation of the London Debt Agreement, and 
that certified copies of these notes be deposited 
with the Government of the United Kingdom. 

The Embassy of the United States of America 
avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the 
Federal ^Ministry for Foreign Affairs the assur- 
ance of its highest consideration. 
American Embassy, Bonn, Bud Godesherg, Feb- 
ruary 29, 19-56. 

Note Verbale From German Foreign Ministry 

50T-519-T4G-5-5-7.3S35/56 

The Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs has 
the honor to acknowledge to the Embassy of the 
United States of America the receipt of its Note 
Verbale No. 386 of February 29, 1956 concerning 
the debts of the City of Berlin and of the Berlin 
jniblic utility enterprises and to reply as follows 
with reference to the Note Verbale of the Federal 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs of August 13, 1955 — 
507-519-746-71284/55— and to the Note of the 
Embassy of the United States of America of Au- 
gust 29, 1955 — No. 94 — concerning the same sub- 
ject : 

In the opinion of the Government of the Federal 
Republic of Germany the exchange of notes men- 
tioned above constitutes the agreement provided 
for in Article 5 (5) of the London Debt Agree- 
ment that negotiations on the settlement of these 
debts are now considered to be expedient. The 
Embassy of the United States of America, the 
Royal British Embassy and the French Embassy 
have in tlie meantime informally discussed with 
the Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs the ques- 
tion of the form in which the negotiations pro- 
vided for in Article 5 (5) are to take place. 

The Government of the Federal Republic of Ger- 
many considers that, after the lifting of the defer- 
ment provided by Article 5 (5). the terms of the 
London Debt Agreement and the appropriate an- 



652 



Deparfmenf of Sfofe Bo//ef/n 



nexes are applicable to the settlement of the ex- 
ternal debts of the City of Berlin and of the Berlin 
public utility enterprises. It is, in particular, of 
the opinion that the external bonded debts of the 
City of Berlin are to be dealt with under Annex I, 
the bonded debts of the public utilities under An- 
nex II. and that the miscellaneous debts of the City 
of Berlin and the Berlin public enterprises come 
under Annex IV. It, therefoi-e, believes that no 
further intergovernmental conference is required, 
and that negotiations can now be opened between 
the debtors and the ci'editor representatives. 

The question of the actual terms of settlement of 
these debts will naturallj- be one of the principal 
subjects of the proposed negotiations. The Gov- 
ernment of the Federal Eepublic of Germany be- 
lieves that the text of the Agreement and its 
annexes provides an ample margin to take into 
account the special political and economic position 
of Berlin. 

The Government of the Federal Eepublic of 
Germany is in agreement with the opinion of the 
Government of the United States of America that 
tlie three identical notes of the United States Em- 
bassy, tlie Eo}-al British Embassy and the French 
Embassy, dated February 29, 1956, and this Note 
as well as the two identical notes to the Eoyal 
British Embassy and the French Embassy con- 
stitute an interpretation of the London Debt 
Agreement, and that certified copies of these Notes 
should be deposited with the Government of the 
United Kingdom. 

Tiie Federal Ministry for Foreign Afl'airs avails 
itself of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy 
of the United States of America the assurance of 
its highest consideration. 

Boxx, March 2, 1956 

Question of Amending Proclamation 
Limiting Dairy Imports 

White House press release dated March 21 

The President announced on March 21 that the 
proclamation limiting imports of certain manu- 
factured dairy products could not, on the basis of 
the United States Tarifl' Commission's recent 
limited investigation, be amended to include cer- 
tain imports of cheeses not now considered subject 
to the terms of the proclamation. The President 
agreed with the majority of the Tariti' Commission 

A.pn\ J 6, 1956 



that the amendments requested by the Department 
of Agriculture could be considered only after a 
full-scale investigation under section 22 of the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended. The 
Tariff Commission's investigation of last year was 
made pursuant to subsection (d) of section 22, 
which provides only for the modification of exist- 
ing proclamations when "changed circumstances"' 
so require. 

Proclamation 3019, which was issued on June 
8, 1053,^ established annual import quotas for cer- 
tain manufactured dairy products, including 
specified types of cheeses. Some imports of Ital- 
ian-type cheeses, either because of the ingredients 
they contain or because of the way in which they 
are packaged, have not been regarded by the 
Bureau of Customs as subject to Proclamation 
3019. The Department of Agriculture has viewed 
tliese cheeses as indistinguishable from those ad- 
mittedly covered by the proclamation and has 
sought to have such importations brought within 
the purview of the proclamation. On April 7, 
1955, the President, pursuant to a request from the 
Department of Agriculture, directed the Tariff 
Commission to make a supplemental investigation 
pursuant to subsection (d) of section 22 to deter- 
mine whether modification of Proclamation 3019 
was warranted. - 

The Tariff Commission reported its findings 
and conclusions to the Pi'esident in July 1955.^ 
The majority and minority of the Commission 
divided on a legal issue, namely, whether the re- 
quested amendments to the proclamation to in- 
clude cheeses not now considered under restriction 
could be accomplished pursuant to subsection (cl) 
of section 22, or whether such amendments should 
be the subject of a new, full-scale investigation 
under subsections (a) and (b) of section 22. The 
President requested the advice of the Attorney 
General on this question, and it was his opinion 
that the requested amendments should not be made 
on the basis of the limited investigation under sub- 
section (d) . This was also the view of the major- 
ity of the Tarifi' Commission. After reviewing 
the case further, the President concurred with the 
conclusion of the Tariff Commission majority. 



1 Btjixetin of June 29, 1953, p. 919. 

= Ibid., May 16, 19.55, p. 815. 

^ Copies of the Tariff Commission's report may be olj- 
tained from the U.S. Tariff Commission. Washington 25, 
D.C. 



653 



l! 



The advisability of requesting a new investiga- 
tion under subsections (a) and (b) of section 22 is 
currently under study in the Department of 
Agriculture. 



Increased Duty on Imports 
of Canned Tuna in Brine 



WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT 

White House press release dated March 17 

The President on March 16 issued a proclama- 
tion providing that the duty on imports of tuna 
canned in brine shall automatically increase from 
121,^ percent to 25 percent ad valorem whenever 
in any year such imports exceed 20 percent of 
the previous year's U.S. pack of canned tuna of 
all varieties. 

The proclamation gives effect to an exchange of 
notes with Iceland^ which withdraws tuna canned 
in brine from the 1943 trade agreement with that 
country and to an invocation of the right reserved 
by the United States in the General Agreement 
on Tariifs and Trade to increase the duty on tuna 
canned in brine. 

In any calendar year the increased duty would 
apply only to those imports in excess of the stated 
20 percent and only for the remainder of that year. 
Imports in any year up to the 20 percent break- 
point would be subject to the 121/4 percent ad 
valorem rate. Because the President's proclama- 
tion will become effective on April 14, 1956, it 
provides that the increased rate of duty will apply 
this year if and when imports of tuna canned in 
brine after the April 14 date exceed 15 percent 
of last year's domestic pack of canned tuna. 

In the 1943 trade agreement with Iceland, the 
United States reduced from 25 percent ad valorem 
to 1214 percent ad valorem the duty on certain 
miscellaneous canned fish, including such fish 
canned in brine, dutiable under tariff paragraph 
718 (b) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended. 
This concession was intended primarily to cover 
■certain speciality camied fish produced in Iceland. 
When tuna canned in brine became an article of 
international trade after the war, United States 
imports of this product were classified as miscel- 



^ Not printed. 
«54 



laneous canned fish under tariff paragraph 718 (b) 
and subject to this reduced rate in the Icelandic 
agreement. The withdrawal of this item from the 
Icelandic agreement in no way affects the con- 
cession granted on other fish specialties of primary 
interest to Iceland. 

In the 1955 trade agreement negotiations in- 
volving Japan's accession to the General Agree- 
ment on Tariffs and Trade, the United States 
agreed not to increase the existing rate of 121^ 
percent ad valorem applying to imports of tuna 
canned in brine, subject to the reservation of a 
right to impose a higher rate of duty on imports 
in any calendar year in excess of 20 percent of 
the domestic pack of canned tuna during the pre- 
ceding year. This reservation has now been in- 
voked. Because annual imports of tuna canned 
in brine are not at present amounting to 20 percent 
of the domestic tuna pack, no immediate applica- 
tion of the increased duty will follow upon the 
President's action. 

PROCLAMATION 3128 2 

TERMINATING IN PART THE ICELANDIC TRADE 
AGREEMENT PROCLAMATIONS AND SUPPLE- 
MENTING PROCLAMATION NO. 3105 OP JULY 22, 
19.55 

1. Wherbias, under authority of section 350(a) of the 
Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, the President on August 
27, 1943, entered into a trade agreement with the Regent 
of Iceland, including two schedules annexed thereto (5T 
Stat. 107S), and by proclamation of September 30, 1943 
(57 Stat. 1075), he proclaimed the said trade agreement, 
which proclamation has been supplemented by proclama- 
tion of October 22, 1943 (57 Stat. 1098) ; 

2. Whereas item 718(b) of Schedule II of the said 
trade agreement reads as follows : 



United 
States 

Tariff Act 
of 1930 

paragraph 



Description of Article 



Rate of Duty 



718 (b) Fish, prepared or preserved In any man- 

ner, when packed In air-tight containers 
weighing with their contents not more 
than fifteen pounds each (except fish 
packed in oil or In oil and other sub- 
stances) : 
Any of the foregoing (except herring, 12H% ad valorem | 

smoked or kippered or In tomato 

sauce, packed in immediate containers 

weighing with their contents more 

than one pound each, and except 

salmon and anchovies) 



' 21 Fed. Reg. 1793. 



Department of State Bulletin ^ 



3. Whereas the Government of the United States and 
the Government of Iceland by an exchange of notes dated 
March 5 and 6, 1956, have agreed to the withdrawal, 
effective April 14, 1956, of tuna from said item 718(b), 
with the result that the said item shall thereafter read 
as follows : 



United 
States 

Tariff Act 
of 1930 

paragraph 



Description of Article 



Rate of Duty 



718 (b) Fish, prepared or preserved in any man- 12H% ad valorem 

ner, when packed In air-tight containers 
weighing with their contents not more 
than fifteen pounds each (except fish 
packed in oU or in oil and other sub- 
stances; except herring, smoked or kip- 
pered or in tomato sauce, packed In im- 
mediate containers weighing with their 
contents more than one pound each; 
and except salmon, anchovies, and tuna) 

4. Whereas, under the authority of the said section 
350(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, the President 
on June 8, 1955, entered into a trade agreement providing 
for the accession of Japan to the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade," which trade agreement consists of 
the Protocol of Terms of Accession of Japan to the Gen- 
eral Agreement, including Schedule XX contained in An- 
nex A thereto, and by Proclamation No. 3105 of July 
22, 1955 (20 F. R. 5379),' he proclaimed the said trade 
agreement, which proclamation was supplemented by a 
notification of August 22, 1955 from the President to the 
Secretary of the Treasury (20 F. R. 6211) ;' 

5. Whereas item 718(b) in Part I of the said Schedule 
XX reads as follows : 



United 



Tariff Act 

of 1930 
paragraph 



Description of Article 



Rate of Duty 



718 (b) Fish, prepared or preserved in any man- 

ner, when packed in ah-tlght containers 
weighing with their contents not more 
than 15 pounds each (except fish packed 
in oil or in oil and other substances) : 

Tuna 12H% ad val. 

NOTE: The United States reserves 
the right to increase the rate of duty 
on fish of the foregoing description 
which are entered In any calendar 
year in excess of an aggregate quan- 
tity equal to 20 per centum of the 
United States pack of canned ttma 
fish durmg the immediately pre- 
ceding calendar year, as reported by 
the United States Fish and Wildlife 
Service. 

6. Whereas on March 16, 1956 the Government of the 
United States notified the Executive Secretary to the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES to the General Agreement on 



' BuLi-ETiN of June 27, 1955, p. 1053. 
' Ibid., Aug. 8, 1955, p. 226. 
" Ibid., Sept. 5, 1955, p. 397. 

April 16, 1956 



Tariffs and Trade that it invoked the reservation con- 
tained in the note to the said item 718(b) set forth in the 
fifth recital of this proclamation, effective April 14, 1956 ; 
and 

7. Whereas the first general note to the said Schedule 
XX specified in the fourth recital of this proclamation 
provides that the provisions of that schedule are subject 
to the following general note to Schedule XX to the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, of October 30, 
1947 (61 Stat. (pt. 5) A1362) : 

4. If any tariff quota provided for in this Schedule, other than 
those provided for in items 771, becomes effective after the 
beginning of a period specified as the quota year, the quantity 
of the quota product entitled to enter under the quota during 
the unexpired portion of the quota year shall be the annual 
quota quantity less Me thereof for each full calendar month that 
has expired in such period : 

Now, therefore, I, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, Presi- 
dent of the United of America, acting under and by virtue 
of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the 
statutes, including the said section 350 of the Tariff Act 
of 1930, as amended, do proclaim as follows : 

Part I 
In accordance with the exchange of notes specified in 
the third recital of this proclamation, I liereby terminate 
in part the proclamations of September 30, 1943, and 
October 22, 1943, referred to in the first recital of this proc- 
lamation, insofar as such proclamations apply to tuna 
provided for in the said item 718(b) set forth in the second 
recital of this proclamation, such termination to be effec- 
tive at the close of business on April 14, 1956, with the re- 
sult that the rate of duty specified in the said item 718 (b) 
BhaU thereafter apply only to the articles provided for in 
the said item as set forth in the third recital of this 
proclamation. 

Part II 

In accordance with the notification specified in the sixth 
recital of this proclamation I hereby terminate in part, 
effective at the close of business on April 14, 1956, the said 
proclamation of July 22, 1955, and the said notification of 
August 22, 1955, referred to in the fourth recital, insofar 
as such proclamation and notification apply to tuna pro- 
vided for in the said item 71S(b) set forth in the fifth 
recital which are entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, 
for consumption in the calendar year 1956 after April 14, 
1956 in excess of an aggregate quantity equal to 15 per 
centum of the United States pack of canned tuna during 
the calendar year 1955, as reported by the United States 
Fish and Wildlife Service, and in any calendar year after 
1956 in excess of an aggregate quantity equal to 20 per 
centum of the United States pack of canned tuna fish dur- 
ing the immediately preceding calendar year, as so re- 
ported, with the result that such tuna in excess of such 15 
or 20 per centum of the United States pack shall be duti- 
able at 25 per centum ad valorem, the full rate provided 
for in paragraph 718(b) of the Tariff Act of 1930 (46 Stat, 
(pt. 1) 633). 

In witness whebeof, I have hereunto set my hand and 
caused the Seal of the United States of America to he 
affixed. 

655 



Do.NK at the City of Wasliiufrton this sixteenth day of 

Mai-ch. ill tile year of our Lord nineteen hundred 

[SEALj anil lifty-.six. and of the Independence of the 

United States of Anicrira the one hundred and 

eightieth. 

By the President : 

Herbert Hoover, Jr. 

ActiiKj i<('cretiiry of State 



U.S. Presents Atomic Energy Library 
to the United Nations 

STATEMENT BY HENRY CABOT LODGE, JR. 
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE U.N.' 

U.S./U.N. press release 2379 dated March 28 

"Wlien speaking of atomic energy, we have be- 
come accustomed to talking in terms of reactors 
and megatons, kilograms of fissionable materials, 
and millions of dollars for equipment and research. 
Today we are talking only of books — but books 
are the bedrock of scientific progress. 

The library which the United States Govern- 
ment has the honor of presenting to the United 
Nations today contains 45 volumes of information 
on basic research in atomic energy as well as many 
thousands of articles and technical reports pub- 
lislied in this country and abroad. There are also 
many thousands of cards which index and de- 
scribe all the nonclassified literature of the Atomic 
Energy Commission. This library will be kept 
up to date by the Atomic Energy Commission as 
new material becomes available. 

In a statement made on the floor of the General 
Assembly on November 5, 1954,= I announced that 
the United States was prepared to make available 
to other countries the vast amount of documen- 
tation on atomic energy that was already freely 
published — totaling more than 200,000 pages of 
information. I suggested that we would be able 
to give 10 libraries containing these documents to 
countries interested in using them. 



' Made at U.N. Headquarters on Mar. 28 on the occasion 
of the pte.sentation of an .\tomie Energy Lihrary to the 
United Nations. 

= Bi-LLETIN of Nov. 15, 19.^4, II. 742. 



Since that time, not 10 but more than 40 coun- 
tries have recpiested these libraries; 33 have al- 
ready been presented, and the others are on their 
way. Several more have been given to regional 
and international organizations interested in 
atomic energy development. 

Our only request in return is that other co- 
oj^erating nations send us their collections of of- 
ficial nonseeret papers to be placed in appropriate 
libraries in the United States. 

The United States program of using the atom 
for man's betterment rather than for his destruc- 
tion has proceeded along two lines of action : mak- 
ing facilities available and making information 
available. As President Eisenhower has said, our 
purpose is to spark the creative and inventive 
skills, to put them to work for the betterment of 
the conditions under which men must live. The 
President has also stressed that this must be a 
joint effort — "a continued partnership of the 
world's best minds." 

For these reasons, it is a pleasure for me today 
to present to the United Nations Headquarters this 
library, symbolized by this one volume, for the use 
of the United Nations Secretariat and the dele- 
gations of member countries. ■ 

DESCRIPTION OF LIBRARY 

U.S./U.N. press release 2380 dated March 28 

This is a technical library of nonclassified data 
on nuclear energy and its applications. It is a 
comprehensive collection containing the equiva- 
lent of about 300 feet of library shelving and was 
developed by the Technical Information Service 
of the Atomic Energy Commission as one of the 
several Commission projects supporting the Presi- 
dent's atoms-for-peace program. In it is to be 
found not only information unique to nuclear re- 
actor technology and nuclear physics but also the 
recorded impact of atomic energy in such fields 
as chemistry, metallurgy, ceramics, electronics, 
biology, medicine, and agriculture. 

The library, which weighs approximately 1,000 
pounds, consists of about 10,000 Atomic Energy 
Commission research and development reports, 
6,500 of which are on microcards; 34 bound vol- 
umes of scientific and technical texts on nuclear 
theory ; and 11 bound volumes of abstracts of some I 
50,000 reports and articles published in this coun- 
try and abroad. Also included are approximately 



656 



Department of State Bulletinl 



55,000 index cards. The library will be kept cur- 
rent and additional reports will be supplied as they 
are issued. 

The library is one of 44 that have been presented 
or are in the process of being presented by the 
United States under the atoms-for-peace program. 
Previous recipients are: 

Italy Netherlands The Council for Euro- 
Spaiu New Zealand pean Nuclear Re- 
Australia Portugal search (Switzerland) 
Swedeu Peru Chile 
Greece Soutli Africa Republic of China 
Egypt Israel Dominican Republic 
Burma Norway Haiti 
Denmarli India Lebanon 
Austria Argentina Pakistan 
Philippines France Switzerland 
Finland Japan Thailand 
Turkey Brazil Uruguay 

United Nations Library 
(Geneva) 

Other libraries are in transit to : 



Ceylon 


Guatemala 


^'enezuela 


Korea 


Costa Rica 


Iceland 


Luxembourg 


Iraq 





U.S. Requests ECOSOC Study 
of Economic Uses of Atom 

lI.S./r.N. press release 2375 dated March 26 

The United States on March 26 requested the 
inclusion of a new item on the agenda of the 21st 
Session of the Economic and Social Council re- 
lating to "Studies on Atomic Energy as a Factor 
in Economic Development." 

Text of the note follows : 

The Representative of the United States of America to 
the United Nations presents hi.s compliments to the Sec- 
retary General of the United Nations and has the honor 
to propose, in accordance with Rule 13 of the Rules of 
Procedure of the Economic and Social Council, inclusion 
of the following topic as a sub-item to Item 5 (Economic 
Development of Underdeveloped Countries) of the agenda 
of the Twenty-first Session of the Council : Studies on 
Atomic Encrgii as <i Factor in Economic Development. 

The United States is proposing this item, as a matter 
of urgency, with a view to having prepared for submission 
to the Council at an early session an analysis and evalua- 
tion of reports and materials available concerning the 
possible uses of atomic energy for purposes of eco- 
nomic development, particularly of the underdeveloix'd 
countries. 

The United States will in due course submit a draft 
resolution on this matter for consideration of the Council. 

Dr. John C. Baker, the United States Eepre- 
5entative to the Economic and Social Council, ex- 



plained the purpose of this proposal in the follow- 
ing statement : 

"A number of public, private, national, and 
international agencies and organizations are inter- 
ested in the applications of atomic energy to eco- 
nomic development. It would be a help to realistic 
economic planning by private and public bodies 
if information on the economic aspects of this 
new and cliallenging subject could be coordinated 
and brought into one place. 

"The United States believes that the Economic 
and Social Council at this stage is the appropriate 
organ for taking stock of the many reports and 
studies which are being made on the potentialities 
of atomic energy for economic development. The 
United States Government, therefore, has re- 
quested that the above item be placed on the pro- 
visional agenda of the 21st Session of Ecosoc." 



U.S. Delegations to 
International Conferences 

Inter-American Travel Congress 

The Department of State announced on April 
6 (press release 174) that the U.S. Government 
will be represented at the Sixth Inter- American 
Travel Congress, which will meet at San Jose, 
Costa Eica, April 12-22, 1956, by a delegation 
composed of the following representatives of U.S. 
Government agencies and of private groups con- 
cerned with travel matters : 

Chairman 

Henry H. Kelly, Special Assistant on International Travel, 
Bureau of Foreign Commerce, Department of Com- 
merce 

Vice Chairman 

Charles P. Nolan, OflScer in Charge, Transportation and 

Communications, OflRce of Regional American Affairs, 

Department of State 

Members 

Malcolm Hope, Chief, General Engineering Program, Divi- 
sion of Sanitary Engineering Services, U.S. Public 

Health Service 
Godfrey Macdonald. Vice President, Grace Lines, Inc., 

for the American Merchant Marine Institute, Inc.^ 

New York, N.T. 
William P. McGrath. Executive Vice President, American 

Society of Travel Agents, New York, N.Y. 
Parks B. Pedrick, Vice President. Mississippi Shipping 

Co., for the American Merchant Marine Institute, Inc., 

New York, N.Y. 



April ?6, 7956 



657 



Norman J. Pliilion, Colonial Airlines, for the Air Trans- 
port Association of America, New York, N.X. 

Russell E. Singer, Executive Vice President, American 
Automobile Association, Washington, D.C. 

Kuud Stowman, Special Consultant, Division of Sanitary 
Engineering Services, Bureau of State Services, U.S. 
Public Health Service 

The Sixth Congress will consider reports of its 
technical committees on (1) research and organi- 
zation, (2) removal of travel barriers, (3) travel 
plant (i. e. hotels), and (4) tourist-travel promo- 
tion. 

Current Treaty Actions 

MULTILATERAL 

Automotive Traffic 

Convention concerning customs facilities for touring. 

Done at New York .Tune 4, 1954.' 

Ratification deposited: Austria, March 30, 1956. 
Customs convention on temporary importation of private 

road vehicles. Done at New York June 4, 1954.' 

Ratification deposited: Austria, March 30, 1956. 

Slave Trade 

Protocol amending the slavery convention signed at 
Geneva September 25, 1926 (46 Stat. 21S3), and annex. 
Done at New York December 7, 1953. Entered into 
force for the United States March 7, 1956. 
Signature: Burma, March 14, 1956. 

Telecommunications 

International telecommunication convention. Signed at 

Buenos Aires December 22, 1952. Entered into force 

January 1, 1954. TIAS 3266. 

Ratifications deposited: Byelorussian Soviet Socialist 
Republic, February 21, 1956; Jordan, February 23, 
1956. 

Notification by Federal Republic of Germany of exten- 
sion to: Land Berlin (efCective date to be the same 
as that for the Federal Republic, i. e. July 26, 1955). 

Trade and Commerce 

Fourth protocol of rectifications and modifications to an- 
nexes and texts of schedules to the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva, March 7, 1955.' 
Siynature: Dominican Republic, March 6, 1956. 

Protocol of organizational amendments to the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva 
March 10, 1955.' 
Signature: Australia, March 2, 1956. 

Protocol amending part I and articles XXIX and XXX of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at 
Geneva March 10, 1955.' 
Signature: Australia, March 2, 1956. 

Protocol amending preamble and parts II and III of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at 
Geneva March 10, 1955.' 
Signature: Australia, March 2, 1956. 

War Criminals 

Penal administrative agreement. Concluded at Bonn and 
deemed to have entered into force May 5, 1955. 
Signatures: France, September 29, 1955; Federal Re- 
public of Germany, November 1, 1955 ; United States, 
December 20, 1955 ; United Kingdom, December 22, 
1955. 



BILATERAL 

Austria 

Agreement outlining the procedure for financing the de- 
livery of nitrogenous fertilizer to Spain pursuant to the 
agricultural commodities agreement of February 7, 1956 
( TIAS .3505 ) . Effected by exchange of letters at Vienna 
March 5 and 6, 1956. Entered into force March 6, 1956. 

Finland 

Agreement supplementing the surplus agricultural com- 
modities agreement of May 6, 1955 (TIAS 3248) by pro- 
viding for the purchase of additional commodities, and 
exchange of notes. Signed at Helsinki March 26, 1956. 
Entered into force March 26, 1956. 

Agreement amending articles II and III of the surplus 
agricultural commodities agreement of May 6, 1955 
(TIAS 3248). Effected by exchange of notes at Hel- 
sinki March 26, 1956. Entered into force March 26, 1956. 

Netherlands 

Agreement extending the agreement of April 11, 1947 
(TIAS 1777) relating to American war graves in the 
Netherlands. Effected by exchange of notes at The 
Hague January 14 and August 29, 1955, and March 9, 
1956. Enters into force on the date of receipt by the 
United States of notification of constitutional approval 
by the Netherlands. 

Spain 

Parcel iwst agreement. Signed at Madrid July 16 and at 
Washington August 30, 1955. Ratified and approved by 
the President September 23, 1955. 

Entered into force: January 1, 1956 (the date "mutually 
settled between the Adminisrations of the two coun- 
tries"). 



THE DEPARTMENT 



Resignations 

On March 21 President Eisenhower accepted the resig- 
nation of Christian A. Herter, Jr., as General Counsel of 
the International Cooperation Administration. The ef- 
fective date of the resignation was March 19. For the 
texts of Mr. Herter's letter of resignation and the Presi- 
dent's reply, see White House press release dated March 21. 



FOREIGN SERVICE 



' Not in force. 



658 



Confirmations 

The Senate on March 28 confirmed Dempster Mcintosh 
to be Ambassador to Venezuela. 

The Senate on March 28 confirmed Sheldon T. MiUs to 
be Ambassador to Afghanistan. 

The Senate on March 28 confirmed Jefferson Patterson 
to be Ambassador to Uruguay. 

Depart/nenf of State Bulletin 



April 16, 1956 Index 

Afghanistsn. Mills confirmed as Ambassador .... 658 

Agriculture. Question of Amending Proclamation Limit- 
ing Dairy Imports 653 

American Republics. Inter-American Travel Congress . 657 

Atomic Energy 

U..S. Presents Atomic Energ.v Library to United Nations 

(Lodge) ■ 656 

U..S. Requests ECOSOC Study o( Economic Uses of Atom . 657 

CRiiadB. Bxchango of Messages Following White Sulphur 
Springs Meeting (Eisenhower, St. Laurent, Ruiz Cor- 
tintt.) 636 

Economic Affairs 

Increased Duty on Imports of Canned Tuna in Brine (text 

of proclamation) 654 

Inter-American Travel Congress 657 

Negotiati'US Concerning Debts of City of Berlin . . . 651 
U.S., Netherlands Begin Negotiation of Air Transport 

Agreement 650 

Educational Exchange. NATO Fellowship Awarded to 

American Woman 649 

Europe. Crusade for Freedom (Eisenhower) 636 

Foreign Service 

Confirmations (Mcintosh, Mills, Patterson) 658 

Foreign Service Institute Advisory Committee .... 651 

France. Visit of French Foreign Minister (Dulles) . . 638 

Germany. Negotiations Concerning Debts of City of Ber- 
lin 651 

Iceland 

Increased Duty on Imports of Canned Tuna in Brine (text 

of proclamation) 654 

Transcript uf Secretary Dulles' News Conference . . . 638 

Indonesia. Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Confer- 
ence 638 

International Information 

Crusade for Freedom (Eisenhower) 636 

•The Message of America (Eisenhower) 633 

International Organizations and Meetings 

Delegation to Baghdad Pact Council Meeting .... 637 

Inter-American Travel Congress 657 

Japan. Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference . 638 

Liberia. Letters of Credence (Padmore) 637 

Mexico. Exchange of Messages Following White Sulphur 
Springs Meeting (Eisenhower, St. Laurent, Ruiz Cor- 
tines) 636 

Near East 

Delegation to Baghdad Pact Council Meeting .... 637 
Security Council Agrees Unanimously on U.S. Proposal 
To Send Secretary -General Hammarskjoid to Middle 
East (Lodge, text of resolution) 627 

Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference . . . 638 

Netherlands 

Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference . . . 638 
U.S., Netherlands Begin Negotiation of Air Transport 

Agreement 650 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

The Fnundation.s of the North Atlantic Treaty Organ- 
ization (Murphy) 644 

NATO Fellowship Awarded to American Woman . . . 649 

Presidential Documents 

Crusade for Freedom 636 

Exchange of Messages Following White Sulphur Springs 

Meeting 636 

Increased Duty on Imports of Canned Tuna iii Brine '. '. 654 

The Message of America 633 

Transfer of Escapee Program to Department of State . . 651 
Refugees and Displaced Persons. Transfer of Escapee Pro- 
gram to Department of State (text of Executive order) . 650 



Vol. XXXIV, No. 877 



Spain. Visit of Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs . . 633 

State, Department of 

Resignation (Herter) 658 

Transfer of Escapee Program to Department of State 

(text of Executive order) 650 

Treaty Information. Current Actions 658 

U.S.S.R. 

Significance of New Soviet Line Concerning Stalin Era 

(Dulles) 637 

Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference . . . 638 

United Nations 

Security Council Agrees Unanimously on U.S. Proposal 
To Send Secretary-General Hammarskjoid to Middle 

East (Lodge, text of rescihition ) 627 

U.S. Presents Atomic Energy Library to the United 

Nations (Lodge) 656 

U.S. Requests ECOSOC Study of Economic Uses of Atom . 657 

Uruguay. Patterson confirmed as Ambassador .... 658 

Venezuela. Mcintosh confirmed as Ambassador .... 658 

Name Index 

Baker, John C 657 

Ball, M. Margaret 649 

Dulles, Secretary 637, 638 

Eisenhower, President 633, 636, 651, 654 

Henderson, Loy 637 

Herter, Christian A., Jr 658 

Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr 627, 656 

Martin Artajo, Alberto 633 

Mcintosh, Dempster 658 

Mills, Sheldon T 658 

Murphy, Robert 644 

Padmore, George Arthur 637 

Patterson, Jefferson 658 

Ruiz Cortines, .\dolfo 637 

St. Laurent, Louis 636 



Check List of Department of State 


Press Releases: April 2-8 


Releases 


may be obtained from the News Division, 


Departmeut of State, Washington 25, D.C. | 


No. 


Date 


Subject 


16S 


4/2 


Murphy : Nato symiMsium at Norfolk. 


169 


4/3 


External debts of Berlin. 


170 


4/3 


Dulles : visit of Foreign Minister Pineau. 


171 


4/3 


Dulles : Soviet repudiation of Stalin. 


172 


V3 


Dulles : news conference transcript. 


173 


4/4 


American winner of Nato fellowship 
(rewrite). 


174 


4/5 


Delegation to Inter-American Travel 
Congress (rewrite). 


175 


4/5 


Visit of Spanisli Foreign Minister 
(rewrite). 


176 


4/5 


U.S.-Netherlands aviation talks. 


177 


4/6 


Advisory Committee to Foreign Service 
Institute. 


tl78 


4/6 


Phleger : New York Bar Association. 


*17!> 


4/6 


Japan credentials. 


ISO 


■V6 


Delegation to Baghdad Pact Council 
meeting. 


INI 


4/7 


Liberia credentials (rewrite). 
nted. 


* Not pri 


t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 



U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, t95E 



{ 





United States 
Government Printing Office 

DIVISION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS 

Washington 25, D. C. 



PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE TO AVOID 

PAYMENT OP POSTAOE. f30O 

(GPOl 



OFFICIAL BUSINESS 



A recent release in the popular Background series 



Thailand 



the 

Department 

of 

State 



Thailand is a predominantly agricultural country of small 
rural communities and relatively few cities and large towns. 
The agricultural economy is based almost entirely on small- 
scale, peasant-type family operations, with a majority of the 
farm operators holding title to their land. 

Long known to the world as Siam, this southeastern country 
of magnificent scenery, of great fertility, and of a largely 
homogeneous poj)ulation has never been a colony, even though 
in the past her neighbors on every side have fallen under 
foreign rule. 

Today, true to its historical tradition, Thailand is determined 
to resist all Communist imperialist efforts to infiltrate and 
subvert it, and to impose upon it the new colonialism of world 
communism. 

This 15-page illustrated pamphlet tells about the land, the 
people, and the industries of this nation that is a little smaller 
than Texas with a population of approximately 20 million, and 
discusses briefly the role of Thailand in world affairs. 

Copies of this publication may be purchased from the 
Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington 25, D. C. 



Publication 6296 



10 cents 



Order Form 

To: Supt. of Documents 
Govt. Printing Office 
Washington 25, D.C. 



Please send me copies of Thailand. 



Enclosed And: 



(eash, check, or 
money order). 



Name: 

Street Address: 

City, Zone, and State : 



DEPOSITORY 



^Ae/ ^eAcf/i^lme/yit/ m/ tnwte/ 




Vol. XXXIV, No. 878 



AprU 23, 1956 




FIFTY YEARS OF PROGRESS IN INTERNATIONAL 

LAW • by Herman Phleger, Legal Adviser 663 

A REPORT ON GERMANY • by Ambassador James B. 

Conant 669 

THE MUTUAL SECURITY PROGRAM FOR EUROPE • 

Statement by C. Burke Elbrick 674 

THE INTER-AMERICAN PARTNERSHIP • by Milton S. 

Eisenhower 682 



For index see inside bach cover 



Boston Public Library 
SuperintcndoTit of Documents 

MAY 2 2 1956 



rjne z/^e/vci'yl^e'nt €£ C/tcil^e 




■•tmO' 



bulletin 



Vol. XXXIV, No. 878 • Publication 6326 
April 23, 1956 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington 25, D.C. 

Price: 

52 Issues, domestic $7.50, foreign $10.25 

Single copy, 20 cents 

The printing of this publication has been 
approved by the Director of the Bureau of 
the Budget (January 19, 1955). 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may 
be reprinted. Citation of the Department 
OF State Bulletin as the source will be 
appreciated. 



The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Public Services Division, provides the 
public and interested agencies of 
the Government with information on 
developments in the field of foreign 
relations and on the work of the 
Department of State and the Foreign 
Service. The BULLETIN includes se- 
lected press releases on foreign policy, 
issued by the White House and the 
Department, and statements and ad- 
dresses made by the President and by 
the Secretary of State and other offi- 
cers of the Department, as well as 
special articles on varioits phases of 
internatioruil affairs and the func- 
tions of the Department. Informa- 
tion is included concerning treaties 
and international agreements to 
which the United States is or may 
become a party and treaties of gen- 
eral international interest. 

Publications of the Department, 
United Nations documents, and legis- 
lative material in the field of inter- 
national relations are listed currently. 



Fifty Years of Progress in International Law 



hy Herman Phleger 
Legal Adviser ^ 



There is a special significance in this regional 
meeting of the American Society of International 
Law. It was in this city, and at the New York 
Bar Association, that the Society was organized 
on January 12, 1906. 

This is therefore the 50th anniversary of the 
founding of tlie Society. 

Birthdays are not only times for celebration; 
they are also times for appraisal. 

In this case the appraisal might be of two kinds : 
one as to how well the Society has achieved the 
objectives of its founding; the other as to what 
progress has been made in the field of interna- 
tional law during the life of the Society. 

I know we will all agree that the Society is to 
be congratulated on its achievements during its 
first 50 years. Having in mind the aphorism that 
the first 50 years are the hardest, I know that 
the Society can confidently look forward to an 
ever-increasing contribution in its chosen fields. 

Progress in International Law 

What has been the progress of international law 
during the past 50 years ? My comment must be 
brief and general. 

I recall some years ago hearing Sir Norman 
Birkett observe that in an early edition of Anson 
on Contracts the illustration given of contracts 
Void because of impossibility of performance was 
"as though one were to midertake to fly the 
! Atlantic." 



' Address made before the Association of the Bar of the 

City of New York at a regional meeting celebrating the 

50th anniversary of the American Society of International 

j Law at New Toik, N.Y., on Apr. 9 ( press release 178 

dated Apr. 6). 



I have myself seen in a 1919 edition of Anson 
the illustration given thus : 

SupiMse the defendant had promised to pay 100 pounds, 
but only on condition that X shall reach the moon. Here 
the act to be performed by the defendant is quite possible, 
but the act to be performed by X is not. Here no duty 
or liability is created. 

By the passage of a short span, of years the 
impossible has become possible. 

A promise to reach the moon replacing an un- 
dertaking to fly the Atlantic, as; an example of 
a promise impossible to perform, will no doubt 
in turn give way to a new example. 

This progression does not represent progress 
in law but progress in science; Thoi legal prin- 
ciple has remained the same. Only the appli- 
cation of the principle has changed with the 
changing times. 

But there are legal pi-inciples which do change, 
and the last 50 years have witnessed a funda- 
mental change in one principle of international 
law that affects us all. 

Fifty years ago war was accepted as a legitimate 
instrument of national policy. Learned writers 
asserted its legality. Collective efforts were 
largely devoted to ameliorating the harsh condi- 
tions of war — agreeing on the rules of the game, 
so to speak. The Hague Conventions and the later 
Geneva Conventions regidating the treatment of 
prisoners of war represented efforts to make war 
endurable, since its abolition seemed impossible. 

But two world wars and the harnessing of 
nuclear energy have progressively convinced the 
world of the necessity for providing an effective 
means of preventing aggressive war. The at- 
tempt to reach this objective has resulted in the 
establishing of a new principle of international 



Apn\ 23, 1956 



663 



law and the taking of steps to implement that 
principle. 

The new legal principle is that aggressive war 
is illegal. The implementation has taken various 
forms : (lie League of Nations, the United Nations, 
and tribunals to apply and administer interna- 
tional law, to name the more obvious. 

Aggressive War Becomes Illegal 

The experience of World War I resulted in the 
League of Nations and its principle of collective 
security with its objective "to promote interna- 
tional cooperation and to achieve international 
peace and security." It was intended to replace 
the system of the balance of power by a system of 
collective responsibility for the future peace. 

In the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 the parties 
condemned recourse to war and renounced it as an 
instrument of national policy. They agreed not 
to seek to settle conflicts by any but pacific means. 
Sixty-five nations have ratified this treaty, and it 
is in force today. 

From the standpoint of international law this 
treaty was a revolutionary development. At face 
value it was the agreement of the world commu- 
nity that aggressive war would be a breach of 
solemn treaty obligations. 

Yet 10 years later World War II was under way. 

I cannot refrain from quoting the following 
from Senator [George "Wliarton] Pepper's admir- 
able autobiography. He wrote, speaking of the 
spring of 1928 : 

During our brief sojourn in Paris, tlie Kellogg-Briand 
Pact was signed at the French Foreign Office in an atmos- 
phere of optimism. Mrs. Pepper and I were guests at the 
Embassy at a brilliant dinner given by Ambassador Her- 
riek to Ambassador Kellogg. My incurable lack of faith 
in international promises made me less enthusiastic than 
the rest of the company. They felt, or pretended to feel, 
that war had at last received its death warrant. 

Then came the Second World War and — from 
its ashes — the United Nations. By its charter its 
members agree to settle their international dis- 
putes by peaceful means and to refrain from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial in- 
tegrity or political independence of any state. 

I think it can be fairly said that the charter 
confirmed the fact that the principle accepted in 
1900 that war was a legitimate instrument of na- 
tional policy had been replaced by the principle 
that aggressive war is illegal under international 
law. 



This was a fundamental change in international 
law, and it has taken place during the 50-year 
existence of this Society. 

But those years have witnessed more than a 
fundamental change in a principle of interna- 
tional law. They have also witnessed persistent 
attempts to provide the means of carrying that 
principle into effect. 

These attempts have taken, in general, two 
forms. One, to provide a system of collective 
security with sanctions against an aggressor. The A 
other consisted of an attempt to provide a system i* 
of international tribunals available for the ad- 
judication and settlement of disputes between 
states. 

In addition international tribunals were estab- 
lished for the trial of war criminals. I refer to 
the Nuremberg tribunal established in 1945 by 
the agreement of 23 nations and to the interna- 
tional tribunal for the trial of Japanese war 
criminals. 

Modern developments in warfare and the atom 
bomb have made clear how ineffective as a deter- 
rent to war is the postwar pmiishment of individ- 
uals. Indeed, if we were to have another world 
war, there would be few left to act as judges, 
even if there were enough vanquished still alive 
to stand in the dock. 

This emphasizes the necessity of settling differ- 
ences peacefully when they arise, so they will not 
develop into controversies which nations believe 
can only be honorably settled by war, and the 
necessity of having machinery to settle such 
disputes. 

Adjudication of International Disputes 

But machinery is not enough, just as treaties 
renouncing war were not enough. If we are to 
settle international disputes by peaceful means, 
we must not only have the machinery to settle 
them, but states must use this machinery. 

That there now exist fully adequate and avail- 
able means for settlement of disputes by these 
means is obvious. 

For a half century we have had the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration at The Hague. 

The United Nations Charter, in chapter VI, 
offers an array of remedies, through the Security 
Council and the General Assembly, for states in- 
volved in disputes or situations whose continuance 
is likely to endanger international peace. 



664 



Department of State Bulletin 



Commencing in 1921 with the Permanent Court 
of International Justice, succeeded in 1945 by the 
International Court of Justice, a court has been 
available for the adjudication of disputes be- 
tween states. Some 33 states, including the United 
States, have now accepted the compulsory juris- 
diction of that Court. 

In addition, there has been available tradi- 
tional ad hoc arbitration which has served so well 
over the years to resolve disputes between nations. 

Reluctance of States To Adjudicate Disputes 

With this weaUh of machinery for the settle- 
ment of international disputes, I would like to re- 
port that their utilization is customary and a 
matter of course. But the contrary appears to be 
the case. There seems to be a natural reluctance 
on the part of foreign offices to submit differences 
to judicial examination and adjudication, or to 
arbitration. 

In 1937 John Bassett Moore wrote : 

In spite of all suppositions and postprandial boasts 
to the contrary, it is a fact that nations have not during 
the past half century shown an increasing disposition to 
submit to judicial determination disputes involving what 
they conceive to be their important interests. 

Today, almost 20 years later, the same observa- 
tion could be made with equal truth. In the past 
2 years the United States has filed four applica- 
tions with the Recorder of the International Court 
of Justice, one against Hungary,^ one against 
Czechoslovakia,^ and two against Soviet Russia,* 
arising out of the shooting down of planes. In 
each instance the respondent government has re- 
fused to submit to the jurisdiction of the Court.^ 

In another instance, where the United States 
proposed resort to the Court, it was met with the 
suggestion that friends should not litigate their 
differences but should compose them. A sound 
philosophy, but there has been no composition and 
none seems likely. 

I would suggest that if we wish to establish 
the rule of law we mi;st not only have the law, 
which we do have, but we must also establish the 
habit and custom of being willing to be bound 
by it according to the judgment of an independent 
tribunal. What good does it do to say we agree 

" Bulletin of Mar. 22, 1954, p. 449. 

'lUi., Apr. IS, 19.55, p. 648. 

V6t(f., Mar. 22, 1954, p. 449, and July 11, 1955, p. 65. 

'/6!(?., July 26, 1954, p. 130, and Mar. 26, 1956, p. 513. 



with the law and then refuse to submit our dif- 
ferences to impartial adjudication of the facts 
and the agreed law ? 

Much has been done in this field, but much more 
could be and must be done if the adjudication 
of international disputes is to make a significant 
contribution to our goal of international peace 
and the rule of law. 



U.S.-U.K. Record of Submissions 

Our guest of this evening [Sir Lionel Fred- 
erick Heald, M. P., former Attorney-General 
of the United Kingdom] comes from a nation 
that has a long and distinguished record of sub- 
mission to arbitration and adjudication in the 
international field. 

The arbitration of the Alabama Claims in 1872 
is a landmark in this field. It was followed by 
the arbitration of the Venezuela dispute in 1904 
and then by the North Atlantic Fisheries Arbitra- 
tion in 1910. 

The docket of the International Court of Jus- 
tice records that the United Kingdom has been 
a party to more proceedings there than any other 
state. It has had 13 contentious cases before the 
present Court and its predecessor. It has par- 
ticipated in 12 of the advisory-opinion proceed- 
ings before these two Courts. It has had 7 cases 
before tribimals of the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration. 

I might at the same time note that the United 
States has been a party to 6 contentious proceed- 
ings before the present World Court, has par- 
ticipated in all 10 of the advisory-opinion pro- 
ceedings there, and has had 6 cases before tri- 
bimals of the Permanent Court of Arbitration. 

That the United States and the United King- 
dom have been disposed to engage in a relatively 
sizable volume of international litigation does 
not mean that our two countries are contentious 
by nature. It is simply indicative of a belief that 
differences should be dealt with on their merits. 
Wliere differences on legal questions have resisted 
settlement by discussion, we have preferred to 
have them decided by impartial arbiters. 

This has not been the practice in the conduct 
of foreign affairs by many governments. Un- 
settled disputes have not been referred to an in- 
ternational tribmial for decision and have been 
allowed to trouble the relations of the parties for 
an indefinite length of time. The rule of law 



hpxW 23, ?956 



665 



will not be established so loiif^ as governments 
insist on "waginif their law" through economic, 
political, and other pressures, and are unwilling 
to submit to impartial adjudication. 

I believe it can be fairly said that relations be- 
tween our country and the United Kingdom have 
long been conducted on the basis of law and justice. 
This happy tradition has certa,inly been favored 
by the ties of history and language, by the heritage 
of our legal system, and by a common disposition 
to view situations on their merits and find prac- 
tical solutions to difficulties. Our two countries 
have been associated for common ends in war and 
in peace. Today they are working together in 
many arsas to preserve peace and advance the 
realization of human values. 

Problems of the Future 

We cannot honestly be satisfied that the United 
Nations system as it operates today creates a 
■working regime of law throughout the world. But 
the present organization of the international com- 
munity must, of course, be appraised as a stage in 
development and not as a final condition to be ac- 
cepted or rejected. 

Tlie problem of keeping international peace is 
ciirrently being approached from the direction of 
control over armaments and control over national 
military cnpabilities in such a way that no nation 
will feel it desirable to embark on aggressive 
adventures. 

The task of raising worldwide levels of eco- 
nomic development and standards of living is be- 
ing pursued today in various cooperative interna- 
tional enterprises, soon to be increased by the addi- 
tion of a ne-w one — the International Atomic 
Energy Agency. 

As we look ahead, the next 50 years promise no 
diminution of difficult problems to cope witli. 
Doubtless some that most concern us now will have 
disappeared or receded in importance by the end of 
another half century. New problems are likely to 
come to the forefront. The achievements of 
science and technology constantly demand a re- 
doubling of effort in politics and law to avoid a 
fatal lagging behind. There can already be dis- 
cerned future problems in means of subsistence for 
the earth's growing population and in the develop- 
ment of exploration and travel beyond presently 
known terrestrial limita 

The world will have increasing need for wider 

666 



understanding of international relationships and 
for intelligent designs to promote general well- 
being. This Society and its coimterparts the 
world over will not want for ample opportunities 
of useful employment. ^ 



Conversations With Spanish Minister 
of Foreign Affairs 

Following are the texts of statements made at 
Washington on the arrival of Alberto Martin 
Artujo, the Spanish Minister of Foreign Afiairs, 
on April 9 and of a communique issued on April 
12 at the coneliision of his talks with Secretary 
Dulles. 



WELCOME AT NATIONAL AIRPORT 

Press release 185 dated AprU 9 
statement by Secretary Dulles 

Mr. Minister, it is indeed a very great pleasure 
to welcome you here with your wife and the 
other members of your party. The last time that 
I saw you was in Madrid about 6 months ago 
[November 1, 1955], and I shall never forget the 
great cordiality of the welcome which I received 
there from the Head of your State, General 
Franco, and from yourself and the other Ministers 
and from the people of Madrid, who made known 
their cordial reception of me. 

I asked then that you should, if possible, come 
to visit us, and I am delighted indeed that that 
hope of mine has now come to pass. I think that 
perhaps my visit to Madrid did a little something 
to evidence the esteem in which the American 
people hold the great nation of Spain. I believe 
that your visit here, Mr. Minister, you, your wife 
and daughter, and the other members of your 
party, will enable us still further to build the type 
of friendship and good relations wliich now exist 
so happily between our two countries. 

We welcome you here and we are glad you will 
see something of our country. And we are con- 
fident that out of this trip will come further good 
will between us. 

Response by Spanish Foreign Minister 

The last time I was in America was when I was 
a young man and I came to visit Wasliington and 

Deparimenf of State Bulletin 



New York with the International Congress of 
Students. 

Today I come to return the yisit to Madrid of 
Secretary of State Dulles, who has proven how 
much can be accomplished when diplomats sit 
down face to face and talk plainly. 

Friendship between the American and Spanish 
peoples increases as personal knowledge increases, 
and that is one of the reasons why I have come 
to you. 

I think this friendship between Spain and 
America is important. As you know, we signed 
agreements in the fall of 1953. I would like to 
examine with members of your Govermnent their 
application so far, and also to discuss various 
aspects of world problems which affect our two 
nations. 

And now, to work! 

TEXT OF JOINT COMMUNIQUE 

Press release 193 dated April 12 

During the official visit to Washington of Seiior 
Don Alberto Martin Artajo, the Foreign Minister 
of Spain, conversations were held between him and 
the Secretary of State, Mr. John Foster Dulles, 
and other officials of the United States Govern- 
ment. These talks were on matters of specific 
mutual interest to both countries as well as on 
questions of general interest to their respective 
foreign policies, including the situation in the 
Near East. 

The conversations, which were conducted in an 
atmosphere of imderstanding and cordiality, have 
rendered a valuable contribution to the strength- 
ening of the ties of friendship and cooperation 
that hapi^ily already exist between the two coun- 
tries. Among other topics, the Foreign Minister 
and the Secretary of State reviewed the results of 
the mutual defense and economic aid agreements 
signed between Spain and the United States on 
September 26, 1953. They noted with satisfaction 
the progress made in implementing these agree- 
ments, which constitute a significant contribution 
to western security. The Minister also reviewed 
for the Secretary's information the recent negotia- 
tions in Madrid between the Spanish Government 
and that of the Sultan of Morocco. The Secre- 
tary of State expressed his satisfaction with Span- 
ish recognition of the unity and independence of 
Morocco. 



Spanish-Moroccan Declaration 

Press release 186 dated April 10 

Department Announcement 

On April 7, 1956, the Foreign Minister of Spain 
and the Prime Minister of Morocco signed a joint 
declaration which recognized the independence 
and unity of Morocco and defined the basis for 
future relations between the two countries. 

The U.S. Goverimient has instructed its repre- 
sentatives in Spain and Morocco to express our 
sincere congratulations for the success of the re- 
cent negotiations and our hope for an era of 
fruitful collaboration between the two nations. 

Message to Acting Foreign Minister of Spain' 

My Government desires to express its congratu- 
lations to your Government on the occasion of the 
signing April 7 of a joint declaration which recog- 
nizes the independence and the unity of Morocco. 
It is gratifying to pay tribute to the realism and 
statesmanship which has made possible a new era 
of collaboration between the two nations. 

Message to Sultan of Morocco^ 

I have been instructed to convey to His Majesty 
the Sultan, to the members of his Government 
and to the Moroccan people my Government's 
congratulations on the successful conclusion of 
negotiations with the Spanish Government and to 
express the hope for an era of fruitful collabo- 
ration between the two nations. 

Text of Declaration' 

[Unofficial translation] 

The Spanish Government and His Imperial Majesty 
Mohammed V, Sultan of Morocco, in the desire of estab- 
lishing an especially friendly relationship, on a basis of 
reciprocity ; of strengthening their relations of secular 
friendship and of consolidating peace in the area in 
which their respective countries are located, have agreed 
to make public the following declaration : 

1. The Spanish Government and His Imperial Majesty 
Mohammed V, Sultan of Morocco, considering that the 



' Delivered by the American Charge d' Affaires at Madrid 
on Apr. 10. 

- Transmitted to His Cheriflan Majesty Mohammed V 
on Apr. 10 in the name of the U.S. diplomatic agent in 
Morocco. 

° Signed at Madrid on Apr. 7 by Foreign Minister Alberto 
Martin Artajo of Spain and Premier Embarek Bekkai of 
Morocco. 



Apr;; 23, 1956 



667 



regime established in Morocco in 1912 does not correspond 
to present reality, declare that the agreement signed in 
Madrid on November 27, 1912, cannot determine Hispano- 
Moroccan relations in the future. 

2. In consequence, the Spanish Government recognizes 
the independence of Morocco, proclaimed by His Im- 
perial Majesty Sultan Mohammed V, and its full sov- 
ereignty, together with all the attributes of the same, 
Including its own diplomatic service and army ; reiterates 
its wish to respect the territorial unity of the Empire, 
which is guaranteed by international treaties ; and under- 
takes to take the necessary measures to effectuate it. 
Moreover, the Spanish Government undertakes to lend 
to His Imperial Majesty the Sultan the aid and assistance 
which will be determined as necessary by common agree- 
ment, especially with regard to foreign relations and to 
defense. 

3. The negotiations entered upon in Madrid between 
the Spanish Government and His Imperial Majesty Mo- 
hammed V have as their objective the conclusion of new 
agreements between two sovereign and equal parties, 
with the purposes of defining their free cooperation in 
the field of their common interests. These agreements 
will also guarantee, in keeping with the above-mentioned 
particularly friendly spirit, the freedoms and rights of 
the Spaniards residing in Morocco and of the Moroccans 
residing in Spain, in the private, economic, cultural and 
social domains, on a basis of reciprocity and of respect 
for their respective sovereignties. 

4. The Spanish Government and His Imperial Majesty 
the Sultan agree that, until the above-mentioned agree- 
ments come into effect, relations between Spain and 
Morocco will be determined by the additional protocol to 
the present declaration. 

ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL 

1. The legislative power is exercised in sovereign man- 
ner by His Majesty the Sultan. The representative of 
Spain in Rabat will be advised of all proposed daliirs and 
decrees which affect Spanish interests and may make 
appropriate observations. 

2. The powers exercised up to now by the Spanish 
authorities in Morocco will be transferred to the Moroc- 
can Government, in accordance with the modalities which 
are fixed by common agreement. The prerogatives of 
Spanish officials in Morocco will be preserved. 

3. The Spanish Government will lend its assistance to 
the Moroccan Government toward the organization of its 
own army. The present status of the Spanish Army in 
Morocco will be preserved during the period of transition. 

4. The present status of the peseta will not be altered 
until the conclusion of a new agreement on this matter. 

5. As of the time of the present declaration, visas and 
all administrative formalities required up to now for 
the travel of persons from one zone to the other will 
be eliminated. 

6. The Spanish Government will continue to assume the 
protection abroad of the interests of Moroccans native to 
the zone formerly defined by the agreement of November 
27, 1912, and residing abroad, until such time as the 
Government of His Majesty the Sultan assimies this 
responsibility. 



U.S. Policy in Middle East 

Statement hy Jatnes C. Hagerty 
Press Secretary to the President 

White House Office (Augusta, Ga.) press release dated April 9 

Before leaving the White House, the President 
met with the Secretary of State for a discussion of 
repeated incidents of liostility in the Middle East. 

The President and the Secretary of State regard 
the situation with the utmost seriousness. 

In their discussions concerning the area, they 
are guided by fundamental principles of United 
States foreign policy which are designed to pro- 
mote and strengthen world peace. Therefore : 

1. The United States will support in fullest 
measure the mission of the Secretary-General of 
the United Nations to the area pursuant to the 
unanimous action of the Security Council,^ the 
body on which all the members of the United Na- 
tions liave conferred primary responsibility for 
the maintenance of international peace and secur- 
ity. The United States trusts that all United 
Nations member countries, including particularly 
the states directly involved, will similarly support 
that mission of peace. 

2. The United States, in accordance with its 
responsibilities mider the charter of the United 
Nations, will observe its commitments within con- 
stitutional means to oppose any aggression in the 
area. 

3. Tlie United States is likewise determined to 
support and assist any nation which might be sub- 
jected to such aggression. The United States is 
confident that other nations will act similarly in 
the cause of peace. 

NATO Atomic Information Agreement 
Enters Into Force 

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization an- 
nounced at Paris on April 10 that the Nato Agree- 
ment for Cooperation Regarding Atomic Inform- 
ation went into force on March 29, 1956, with the 
completion of notifications by all Nato govern- 
ments that they were bound by the ternis of the 
agreement. The agreement, signed at Paris on 
June 22, 1955, by representatives of the Nato 
nations, provides that the United States and other 
Nato members may make various categories of 
atomic information available to the organization. 

' Bulletin of Apr. 16, 1956, p. 627. 



668 



Department of State Bulletin 



A Report on Germany 



hy James B. Conant 

Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany ^ 



The title of my remarks is "A Eeport on Ger- 
many." That may sound as if I proposed to de- 
liver a lecture on the history of the nation to which 
I am accredited as Ambassador of the United 
States ; and since college presidents are not noted 
for the brevity of their remarks you may conclude 
you are in for at least an hour's session. But have 
no fear. "Wliat I have to say can be said in less 
than 30 minutes for I propose to consider primar- 
ily the present situation and the problems which 
we and the German people face together. To this 
audience, so well informed on world affairs, it is 
unnecessary to describe in detail the developments 
of the last 10 years which have resulted in the Ger- 
many of today. 

I have said, the Germany of today. Yet it would 
have been more accurate to say, the three Ger- 
manys of today. For there is first of all the 
Federal Republic of Germany, a sovereign nation 
of 50 million, with which we are allied as members 
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; the 
territory of this Federal Republic comprises what 
were once the American, British, and French zones 
of occupation. The second part of Germany is 
the part that lies to the east of the frontier wliich 
separates the Soviet zone of occupation from the 
Federal Republic of Germany. Within this area 
lies the Soviet zone of occupation, a land whei'e 
some 17 million Germans are ruled by the Com- 
munist puppet regime set up by the Soviet au- 
thorities ; this is the land of tyranny, whereas the 
Federal Republic of Germany is the land of free- 
dom. And then there is Berlin, that city with 
which we Americans have had such close relations 
smce the days of the blockade, a city which itself 



^Address made before the Los Angeles World Affairs 
Council on Mar. 28. 



is divided between the three Western sectors — the 
American, the British, and the French — still in 
occupation status but nevertheless governed by a 
freely elected German Government, and the East 
sector controlled, like the zone, by the Russians 
through their henchmen. 

I could devote a very long speech indeed to the 
history of the Federal Republic of Germany ; yet 
this history is very short. The Federal Republic 
itself is less than 7 years old ; its sovereignty dates 
only from last May. The phenomenal industrial 
recovery of this part of Germany is well known ; 
so too is the remarkably rapid rebuilding of the 
cities. Wliat is less well known, perhaps, are the 
steps by which a stable representative system of 
government has evolved. Separate states with 
freely elected legislatures were created in the zones 
of the three Western powers. Then in 1948 dele- 
gates from the states met to draft a constitution, 
or Basic Law, for the federal system. This Basic 
Law, approved by the three Western occupying 
powers, was then adopted by the state legislatures 
in 1949. That sunmier the first national parlia- 
ment, or Bundestag, was elected, which in turn 
elected Konrad Adenauer as Chancellor. He was 
reelected 4 years later by the second Bundestag, 
which came into being following the second na- 
tional election. The third national election, by the 
way, will be held in the summer of 1957, and this 
future event is already casting its shadow over 
German politics. Parliamentary democracy in 
the federal government and the states has provided 
a stable political framework within which a free 
competitive economy has flourished and the basic 
rit'hts of citizens have been protected. Wliatever 
may be the currents and crosscurrents of German 
internal politics in the coming years, I have no 
worry that the framework will be endangered. 



Aoril 23, 1956 



669 



Last May, you will recall, the Federal Republic 
of Germany, wlien it became a sovereign nation, 
joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 
In so doing it undertook the responsibility of shar- 
ing with the other members, including the United 
States, the burden of defending Europe. To ful- 
fill this responsibility an armed force is in process 
of formation. The process has been slower than 
many imagined it would be 18 months ago when 
the treaties were signed in Paris. But it is well to 
remember that the Germans had to start the build- 
ing of their armed forces completely anew. There 
was no vestige of the old German Army, Navy, or 
Air Force left after the surrender; furthennore, 
for the first few postwar years few, if any, thought 
of rearming Germany. Quite the contrary. In- 
deed, the opposition party in the Bundestag (the 
Social Democrats) questioned the legality of a 
militai-y force even as part of a European army; 
only in 1954 was the Basic Law amended so as to 
clarify this point. (An amendment of the Basic 
Law requires a two-thirds vote of the Bundestag 
as well as the upper house, the Bundesrat, where 
the states are represented.) "Within the past 
month the Government and the opposition have 
agreed on certain further amendments to the Basic 
Law which will provide the legal basis for the Ger- 
man armed forces and insure that the ultimate 
control is in civilian hands. These amendments 
have just been adopted. In this task of drafting 
the necessary laws almost all political leaders 
have had the same ideal in mind : They have 
wanted to create a military establishment very dif- 
ferent from those of the past ; they desire that the 
new army, navy, and air force shall be firmly 
under the control of a parliamentary government. 

We, the United States and the Federal Republic, 
are now partners on an equal basis ; we partake in 
the defense of Europe and indeed the Atlantic 
community. This means we share military and 
economic problems; we must each do our part in 
keeping the free world sturdy and healthy and 
ever on the alert. This is no easy undertaking, 
and differences of opinion among allies are pro- 
verbial, but the Nato oi'ganization has already 
proved its ability to reconcile conflicting views. 
The same procedures can be used, if needed, to 
make any adjustments required when a year from 
now numbers of German youth begin to stand 
side by side with American, British, French, and 
other soldiers of the Atlantic community in the 
defense of Europe. So I shall not report further 



on our common problems as members of Nato 
but rather direct your attention to our common 
problems that exist because of the division of Ger- 
many and the position of Berlin. 

German Reunification 

As President Eisenhower and Secretary of State 
Dulles have said on more than one occasion, there 
can be no hope for lasting peace and security in 
Europe until a reunification of Germany is 
acliieved. This same jioint of view has been re- 
peatedly emphasized likewise by the heads of the 
British and the French Governments. It is 
hardly necessary to state that reunification is the 
number-one goal of all the inhabitants of Ger- 
many, whether they be in the Federal Republic 
of German}' or in the Soviet Zone itself. To be 
sure, in making this statement I must add that a 
small percentage of the East Zone inhabitants who 
are convinced Communists or who have thrown in 
their lot irrevocably with the Soviet authorities 
envisage a revmification of Germany in terms quite 
different than do the vast majority of their coun- 
trymen. These Soviet agents would like a re- 
unified Germany which in fact would be another 
Soviet satellite state. 

To interpret properly the present attitude of 
the Russians toward reunification, one must bear 
in niind their policy of supporting the satellite 
regime in the Soviet Zone. Their immediate goal 
appears to be to force the recognition by the free 
world, in law or in fact, of the legitimacy of their 
so-called German Democratic Republic, which at 
present has standing only among Russia's satellite 
nations. The Communist regime, completely sub- 
servient to the Soviets, claims to represent the in- 
habitants. But, as everyone knows, the so-called 
elections by which this government was put in 
power were travesties of free elections. What the 
unfortunate Germans who must suffer under the 
tyranny of this communistic rule really think of 
their German rulers was evidenced by the uprising 
of .Time 17, 1953. This spontaneous protest, start- 
ing in East Berlin, was ruthlessly put down by 
Russian tanks and soldiei-s, but there is every 
reason to believe that the spirit is by no means 
dead. Wlien free elections are held in the Soviet 
Zone, you may be certain that the Communist j 
Party and its allies will receive not more than a 
very small fraction of the votes. I say, when free 
elections are held, for such free elections of an all- 
Gernum government are the first necessary step to 



670 



Department of State Bulletin 



reuHification. This is the firm position of the 
three Western powers and the Federal Govern- 
ment. But I shall return to this subject in a 
moment. Let me ask you to direct your attention 
to Berlin. 

Ever since the blockade, the people of Berlin 
and the people of the United States have been 
partners in their resistance to Soviet aggression. 
The successful breaking of the blockade was due 
to the brave stand of the Berliners and the effec- 
tiveness of the American Air Force aided by our 
British and French allies. This was accom- 
plished, you remember, in '48 and '49. The 
Soviets then solemnly agreed that access to the 
city should be unhampered, and for the last 7 years 
traffic between free Germany and free Berlin by 
means of rail, water, and road has been relatively 
unhindered. But within the last year the Rus- 
sians claim to have transferred to their puppet 
regime, the so-called German Democratic Repub- 
lic, all control and jurisdiction over traffic to Ber- 
lin. This claim has been strongly rejected by our 
Government, the British, and the French. We 
have pointed out on more than one occasion that 
the Soviet Government cannot in tliis fashion es- 
cape responsibility for carrying out the solemn 
undertakings which they themselves have entered 
into. Therefore we shall continue to hold the 
Soviets to their promise. We shall insist that 
there be no hindrance to the flow of goods and 
peo):)le from free Germany to Berlin. 

Not only have the Soviets claimed they could 
and would transfer to their German agents their 
authority over the roads to Berlin, but they have 
made a similar claim as to the Soviet sector of 
Berlin itself. Here again their international ob- 
ligations are quite clear : free circulation through- 
out all the sectors of Berlin was a firm agreement 
when Berlin was first occupied by the Four Pow- 
ers. That the Soviets see to it that this continues 
is a matter on which the three Western powers 
insist. 



Unique Position of Berlin 

I am glad to report that, in spite of its strange 
position, a unique position I might say, of being an 
island of freedom in a sea of tyranny, free Ber- 
lin — that is, West Berlin — has prospei-ed since the 
days of the blockade. Thanks in no small measure 
to American initiative and American aid, indus- 
tries have ex|ianded, trade has increased, unem- 



ployment has steadily diminished. The spirit of 
the Berliners continues bold and confident. 
Those who can freely express their opinion, the 2 
million in West Berlin, are quick to demonstrate 
tlieir realization of what Communist tyranny 
really means. One has only to cross the sector 
border into East Berlin to see communism at work, 
and it is a most depressing and disquieting spec- 
tacle, I can assure you. Indeed, I have often said 
that Berlin was a city that should be visited by 
any who had illusions about what communism is 
in fact. A short visit to Berlin would demon- 
strate to all but convinced members of the party 
that the Soviet system is a system of brutal sup- 
pression of freedom, a police state based on fear. 

In Berlin one can z'eadily compare the eco- 
nomic, political, and cultural aspeeis of the two 
parts of the world whichi aa'© divided by the Iron 
Curtain. In this city tlae curtaia is transparent. 
And this is one of the reasons, why Berlin is so 
important. Here at least, some oif the. unfortunate 
Germans who live, under thei Communist dictator- 
sliip can view an, example of the. world of freedcwa. 
From here, uneensored news flow/S through the 
American radio station RIA-S to the inhabitaojits 
of the zone, naost of witom Cxon listen, in ^ite of 
Soviet attempts at jamming. The Iron Curtain 
between the zmis ajad the Federal Republic^ on 
the other hand, is not transparent. Ttnere are only 
four border crossing-points; everywhere else 
armed guards, barbed wire, plowed' strips sepa- 
rate the enslav«d Germans from their friends and 
relatives in the West In some communities the 
sealed border runs right thix)ugli a village. In 
one spot I visited, a town lies in the zone and the 
railroad station is in the Federal Republic aad 
hence no longer of any use; foi- in order to go 
from the town to the station one would have to 
travel many miles to the one border crossing in 
that area and then, if the necessary papers were 
in order, one could cross and again travel back 
along the border to the station. 

Yet the Soviet Zone is far more accessible than 
any other territory lying the other side of the Iron 
Curtain. A great number of Germans travel back 
and forth through the four crossing-points in or- 
der to visit relatives and friends. And this traf- 
fic is at present encouraged by the Soviets and 
their agents since they are trying to win the re- 
spect if not the affection of all Germans. They 
are trying particularly to convince the working- 
man that they are in the process of creating a 



April 23, 1956 



671 



"workers' paradise" in their so-called Democratic 
Republic. Last summer buses were sent through 
one of the crossing-points to pick up children in 
border towns who were invited for a 3-week va- 
cation at no expense in this "workers' paradise." 
And the camps where these youths were enter- 
tained — propaganda centers in fact — I have heard 
were extremely good. How lasting will be the ef- 
fects of such exposure to Soviet Zone propaganda 
is an open question. 

Soviet'Formula for Reunification 

Unless I am much mistaken, we are going to see 
many such efforts; more propaganda will flow 
from the East to the West. It will be claimed 
that the German Democratic Republic provides 
more opportunities for the worker and farmer, 
more cultural developments, and, above all, is 
working for peace and a unified Germany in con- 
trast to the Government of the Federal Republic. 
One of the slogans that is painted on the walls of 
the official buildings of the Soviet sector of Berlin 
demands that "Germans sit around one table." 
This is the Soviets' formula for reunification ; they 
demand that representatives of their puppet gov- 
ernment meet with representatives of the Federal 
Republic of Germany and work out a formula for 
reunification. To anyone who knows the history 
of what happened in Poland, Rumania, Czecho- 
slovakia, and the other satellite countries it is 
quite clear what the real aims of such a confer- 
ence would be. Such a meeting of Russian agents 
and free Germans could make no progress toward 
reunification in freedom; it could only serve to 
build up the prestige of the puppet government 
and thus be one step toward a kind of reunifica- 
tion that would be an extension of the Soviet sys- 
tem of tyranny well into the heart of Western 
Europe. 

But the propaganda line embodied in the slogan 
"Germans around one table" has certain disad- 
vantages from the Soviet point of view and, conse- 
quently, certain advantages for us in the free 
world which we should endeavor to make appar- 
ent. It means that the border crossing-points 
where Germans from the West can visit their 
relatives in the East and vice versa must be kept 
open by the Soviets. This in turn means that what 
goes on in the Soviet Zone of Germany is far more 
exposed to the view of the entire world than what 
goes on in such satellite countries as Poland or 



Czechoslovakia. In other words the Iron Curtain 
in Germany is at a few points somewhat porous. 
This fact we must make tlie most of. It behooves 
us to follow very carefuUy aU that transpires in 
the Soviet Zone and to direct world opinion to the 
shocking contrast between the Soviets' professed 
intentions and their actual deeds. For when one 
examines the true situation in the Soviet Zone, one 
encomiters a record of brutal disregard of human 
rights which must shock all except those who are 
hardened by long years of exposure to Communist 
discipline. 

Let me give you one example : Nearly a thousand 
Germans leave the Soviet Zone every day, mainly 
through Berlin, prefen-ing to abandon all their 
worldly goods than to suffer longer their loss of 
liberty. This fact is in itself ample proof of the 
real situation in this so-called democratic land. 
Refugees are a double embarrassment to the Soviet 
henchmen. They regret to see their labor force 
diminished by the departure of able-bodied youth 
and tliey realize the refugees are clear evidence of 
the hate and mistrust with which the government 
is regarded by the people. As a consequence meas- 
ures are being taken to check the flow. Recently 
two individuals were prosecuted for having al- 
legedly advised some of their neighbors to migrate 
to the Federal Republic of Germany. These un- 
fortunates were found guilty by an authoritarian 
court and condemned to death — condemned to die 
for the supposed crime of asking a fellow German 
to move from one city to another! The outcry 
from West Germany and from the free world 
seems to have shaken the authorities in East Berlin 
a bit, for the sentences have now been commuted 
to life. But even prison terms for such offenses, or 
the fact that the alleged advice was regarded as an 
offense, is hard to square with the slogan "Germans 
around one table !" 

Soviet Zone — the Achilles Heel 

The Soviet Zone then is to my mind the Achilles 
heel of the Soviet satellite system. We in the free 
world should take advantage of this fact. We 
should use every occasion to expose the fact that 
the Russians are exploiting this portion of the 
German population, and exploiting is the proper 
word. The living standards are low ; the economy 
is arranged for the benefit of the Soviet system 
and not for the Germans who do the work; the 
uranium mines are being depleted; the youth are 



672 



Department of State Bulletin 



I 



being forcibly recruited for an army which will 
reinforce the other satellite contingents. Brutal 
sentences are still meted out ; the tales of the refu- 
gees are tales of a terrorized poiDulation. How 
can this day-by-day behavior of the Soviets' agents 
in East Germany be squared with the present 
Soviet words about peace and friendly relations 
with the West ? The simple answer is, it cannot. 
And this fact to my mind should be continually 
emphasized in every discussion of international 
problems. The conscience of the free world must 
be quickened to the injustice of a divided Ger- 
many. 

Let me conclude by turning your attention once 
again to the city of Berlin. This city has stood 
out boldly against Russian tlu'eats for 10 years 
and more; today it is remarkably strong consid- 
ering its past ordeals. But the future of Berlin is 
as a capital city of a reimited Gei-many. For the 
long run this is the only solution of the so-called 
Berlin problem, for the Western powers will cer- 
tainly never desert the Berliners as long as they 
are in danger, which means as long as Germany is 
divided. The free Berliners, the three Western 
occupying powers, and the Federal Republic of 
Germany work closely together to support Ber- 
lin; we share the common task of preparing for 
the day when the present capital of the Federal 
Republic at Bonn will cease to exist and a new 
freely elected all-German government will take 
up its quarters in Berlin. 

I have spoken of a new, freely elected, all- 
German govermnent because the present Federal 
Republic of Germany is, by its own declaration, 
only a provisional, caretaker government. It is 
the only government today which can speak for 
all the German people, as it is the only freely 
elected government. Nevertheless, its competence 
is restricted by its own desires and in agreement 
with the three Western powers. Because it has 
not derived its mandate from the voters in the 
Soviet Zone as well as from those in the three 
former Western zones, it cannot speak for Ger- 
many in a discussion of such matters as the final 
boundaries of Germany and the terms of a peace 
treaty. These are affairs which must be left to an 
all-German government which can speak for all 
the German people. Therefore, today in talking 
about Germany we meet a paradoxical situation. 
We welcome the opportunity of cooperating on a 
most friendly basis with the German government 



in Bonn, we look forward to its military contribu- 
tion to the defense of the free world, but at the 
same time we hope for its replacement by an all- 
German government in Berlin. 

We have a strong and reliable ally in the Ger- 
man people — of that I have not the slightest doubt. 
Those who can now speak for the free population 
speak in terms of a close alliance witli the West. 
I have no fear that if the free world remains 
strong economically, politically, and militarily 
there will be any reversal of this policy. The 
peoples of the free European nations, of Great 
Britain, and of the United States are now united. 
In this unity there is strength. This strength 
constitutes a bulwark against furtlier Soviet ag- 
gression. In the not too distant future I believe 
tliis strength, coupled with a continued exposure 
of the true conditions in the Soviet Zone, must 
bring about a reunification of Germany ; and with 
that reunification will come hope for a more 
peaceful world. 



Current Legislation on Foreign Policy: 
84th Congress, 2d Session 

Technical Assistance Programs. Hearing before a sub- 
committee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Rela- 
tions. Part 2, January 23, 1956. 35 pp. 

Operation and Administration of the Cargo Preference 
Act. Hearings before the House Committee on Mer- 
chant Marine and Fisheries on Public Law 664, 83d 
Cong., 2d sess. January 31, February 1-16, 1956. 601 
pp. 

Operation of Article VII, NATO Status of Forces Treaty. 
Hearing before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee 
on Armed Services to review, for the period December 
1, 1954, to November 30, 1955, the operation of article 
VII of the agreement between the parties to the North 
Atlantic Treaty regarding the status of their forces. 
February 9, 1956. 47 pp. 

International Cultural Exchange and Trade Fair Partici- 
pation Act of 1956. Hearing before the Senate Com- 
mittee on Foreign Relations on S. 3116 and S. 3172, 
bills to provide for the promotion and strengthening 
of international relations through cultural and athletic 
exchanges and participation in international fairs and 
festivals. February 21, 1956. 39 pp. 

Regulation of Exports. Hearings before the House Com- 
mittee on Banking and Currency on H. R. 9052. Febru- 
arv 23, March 5 and 6, 1956. 182 pp. 

Control and Reduction of Armaments. Hearing before 
a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations pursuant to S. Res. 93, S4th Cong. Part 2, 
Februarv 29, 1956. 33 pp. 

Reorganization of the Passport Office. Report to ac- 
company S. 3340. S. Rept. 1605, March 1, 1956. 8 pp. 

Joint Economic Report. Report of the Joint Committee 
on the Economic Report on the January 1956 Economic 
Report of the President with supplemental and minority 
views and the economic outlook for 1956 prepared by 
the committee staff. S. Rept. 1606, March 1, 1956. 116 
pp. 



April 23, J 956 



673 



The Mutual Security Program for Europe 



Statement by C, Burke Elhrick 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs ^ 



4 

I 



Acting Secretary Hoover lias already discussed 
with you the concepts underlying the mutual se- 
curity progi'am as a whole.^ My purpose today 
is to discuss in somewhat more detail the aspects 
of the program that relate to the European area. 

With relatively minor exceptions, the proposed 
mutual security program in Europe is devoted 
entirely to military defense. More specifically, it 
is primarily designed to maintain and strengthen 
the defensive power of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization. Apart from a minor technical ex- 
change program, no economic aid, defense sup- 
port, or other economic-type assistance is being 
proposed for any of the Nato countries covered 
by the European section of this legislation. Eco- 
nomic-type assistance is requested only for two 
non-NATO countries — Spain and Yugoslavia — 
which face unusual economic difficulties in con- 
nection with their defense efforts. A moderate 
sum is also requested to meet special circumstances 
connected with the maintenance of our vital po- 
sition in West Berlin. 

This program is being put forw-ard at a time 
when the contest between the Communist bloc and 
the free world has entered a new phase. Mr. 
Hoover has already described the rather striking 
shift in Soviet strategy and tactics, which seems to 
involve a de-emphasis of military techniques of 
aggression in favor of a stepped-up campaign to 
spread Communist power and influence by non- 
military means. This change in tactics will have 

' Made before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs 
on Mar. 27. 

"For President Eisenliower's message to tlie Congress 
on the mutual security program for 1957 and a statement 
by Under Secretary Hoover, see Bulletin of Apr. 2, 1956, 
p. 545. For a statement by John B. Hollister, see ibiA., 
Apr. 9, 1956, p. 605. 



significant implications for our policies through- 
out the world. Free nations will be required to 
give greater attention to erecting and maintaining 
adequate political, economic, and psychological 
defenses against communism, and to preserving 
the unity which the Soviet bloc is trying so hard 
to shatter. A large part of the mutual security 
program now proposed, as Mr. Hoover has pointed 
out, is designed to assist friendly nations of Asia, 
Africa, and South America in economic develop- 
ment. At the same time, we should not make the 
fatal error of assuming that we can now ignore the 
military potentialities of the Soviet bloc. The 
Soviet military threat is still with us and is likely 
to remain with us for a long time. 

If we are correct in the supposition that the 
Soviet rulers have indeed become more reluctant 
to assume the suicidal risks of modern warfare, 
we have every reason to be pleased. American 
interests will be served by doing whatever we can 
to make sure that Soviet thinking continues along 
these lines. Wliile we have no present grounds 
for believing that basic Soviet objectives have 
altered, nor for assiuning that the struggle to check 
Communist political, economic, and psychological 
])enetration is likely to be short or easy, I think 
we all agree that this kind of struggle is infinitely 
preferable to all-out military hostilities. Since 
the change in Soviet tactics has largely been in- 
duced by the growing strength and unity achieved 
under our collective security policies, it is impera- 
tive that these policies be continued without any 
modification of purpose or relaxation of effort. 

However charming may be the smiles that adorn 
the faces of Soviet diplomats, however melodious 
may be the siren songs of Communist propaganda, 
and however temptuig may be the economic bait 



674 



Departmeni of State Bullelin 



which they are holding out to some of the less 
developed nations, we cannot i<inore the hard 
fact that the Soviet Union and its satellites are 
maintaining enormous military capabilities. They 
have an overwhelming superioritj* in military man- 
power, and they are making rapid strides in devel- 
oping their potential for nuclear warfare. They 
are also making other ominous technological ad- 
vances. All told, they possess the capacity to 
launch a dangerous military attack at any time, 
either general or local. We have no assurance 
whatever that they will indefinitely refrain from 
military adventures, particularly if military weak- 
nesses in neighboring nations should appear to 
offer them attractive opportunities for cheap con- 
quests. So long as the Soviet rulers retain and 
increase their capacity for military aggression, we 
cannot afford to base U.S. policies on their an- 
nounced intentions. We camiot gamble our very 
survival upon the mysterious mental processes of 
the men in the Kremlin. 

Every Member of the Congress is already fa- 
miliar with tlie size and cost of the national defense 
establishment which the U.S. is maintaining for 
the purpose of deterring aggression. But we rec- 
ognized long ago that the preservation of security 
and peace is not a task for the United States alone. 
It is neither possible nor desirable that the bur- 
dens of free- world defense should be borne exclu- 
sively by the American soldier and American 
taxpayer. Therefore, it has been a major ob- 
jective of our foreign policy to supplement and 
reinforce American defensive power by securing 
the cooperation of other free nations who share 
our determination to preserve peace and freedom 
and who are willmg and able to contribute to the 
attainment of this objective. In brief, we have 
recognized that the only real security available 
to ourselves or to anyone else is collective security. 

The free nations of Europe represent a most 
important source of support. The peoples of 
these nations are skilled in modern technology 
and are capable of developing and using modern 
weapons. They possess substantial industrial 
and economic resources. Because of their geo- 
graphic position they are in a position to provide 
bases strategically situated for deterring or 
countering a Soviet attack. Most important of 
all, in my opinion, is the fact that these nations 
share our belief in freedom, our cultural and moral 
traditions, and our determination to make all 
reasonable sacrifices to assure peace. We have 



therefore joined together with 14 nations in a 
connnon defense system, the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization. Through this alliance, we 
are seeking to achieve an efficient combination and 
utilization of our individual resources in a man- 
ner that will increase the security of all. 

Progress Under NATO 

I have no hesitation in saying that Nato has 
been a highly successful undertaking. Within a 
relatively short period of time, the potential Euro- 
pean contribution to international peace and se- 
curity has been translated into actuality. We 
liave faced many complex problems and difficul- 
ties, of course, and have many problems still ahead 
of us. When we look at the Nato program in the 
perspective of the past 7 years, however, we can 
see that remarkable progress has been made. This 
progress is reflected not only in the number of 
men under arms, the availability of weapons and 
equipment, the establishment of bases, the im- 
provement of organization, training, and deploy- 
ment, and similar advances of a strictly military 
nature, but also in the growth of general political 
cohesion. It is also noteworthy that the Nato 
defense buildup has been accomplished without 
jiroducing an intolerable economic strain on any 
of the member governments. In fact, it has been 
accomplished during a period when the overall 
European economic position has been steadily im- 
proving. 

On balance, 1955 has been a good year for Nato. 
Despite political difficulties encountered by certain 
governments and occasional disagreement among 
members of the alliance, the basic military opera- 
tions of Nato have moved forward smoothly. 
These operations receive few headlines, since they 
are rarely spectacular. Once the major political 
and strategic decisions have been made, the day- 
to-day job of building, maintaining, and improv- 
ing Western defenses has tended to become more 
routine and less exciting. But this job has lost 
none of its importance, and it is being done. 

Probably the most notable event of 1955 was the 
final ratification of the Paris Agreement which 
restored sovereignty to the German Federal Re- 
public and brought this gi-eat nation into the 
Nato family. The same agreements established 
the Western European Union, closely linked to 
Nato, to exercise special armament controls 
among the seven member comitries. The signifi- 



AptW 23, 1956 



675 



cance of this achievement goes beyond the addi- 
tion to Nato of Germany's sizable military poten- 
tial. Equally important was the fact that the 
Pans Agreements afford a new foundation for 
friendly and cooperative relations between France 
and Germany, which should do a great deal to 
consolidate the unity of the Atlantic community 
as a whole. It is not a coincidence that the radical 
transformation of Soviet tactics which paved the 
way for the two Geneva conferences began con- 
currently with the ratification of the Paris Agree- 
ments, thus affording a striking demonstration of 
the validity of our policies. 

There have been other gratifying developments 
in the European area during 1955, some of which 
are only indirectly connected with the Nato pro- 
gram but all of which are intimately related to 
our overall policies of building strength and unity. 
One of the most important was the signing of the 
Austrian Treaty, after 8 years of wearisome ne- 
gotiations with the Soviet Government. This 
treaty not only restored Austrian independence 
but had added significance as the first concrete in- 
dication of a change in Soviet tactics. It marked 
the first time since World War II that Soviet 
troops have taken a backward step. 

Special attention is also being given to the 
political ties that bind the Atlantic allies. There 
were five Nato ministerial meetings during 1955, 
the largest nmnber ever held in any one year. 
Three of these meetings were devoted primarily 
to general political consultation — to a broad ex- 
change of views on international problems and 
individual attitudes toward these problems. I 
believe the consultations held before the two 
Geneva conferences, in particular, contributed 
materially to the solidarity of the Western govern- 
ments in dealing with the issues considered at 
these conferences. 

Soviet Efforts To Destroy Atlantic Alliance 

It is no secret that the Soviet bloc is engaged in 
a major effort to divide and destroy the Atlantic 
alliance. The dissolution of Nato stands high on 
the Communist list of objectives, as demonstrated 
by their words and actions in nearly all recent 
international negotiations, including the smnmit 
conference. They are using every available means 
to stir up old rivalries and to magnify and exploit 
the minor differences that inevitably arise even 
among the closest allies. They are also seeking to 
delude members of the alliance into a relaxation of 



their defense efforts, both military and nonmili- 
tary, and to persuade them that neutrality offers 
a cheaper and moi'e comfortable course than con- 
tinued adherence to the Atlantic system. 

It would be an excess of optimism to assume 
that these Communist maneuvers have no prospect 
of achieving results. There are differences among 
allies. There are pressures in allied covnitries, as 
in every democratic country, to relieve the tax- 
payers of some of the burdens of defense. There 
is a certain amount of neutralist sentiment in 
Western Europe. To some extent, all these things 
lend themselves to Communist exploitation. But 
in terms of the policies and actions of allied gov- 
ernments, it is noteworthy that the Soviet cam- 
paign of division and enticement has not yet 
produced any significant impact upon the solidar- 
ity of the Atlantic alliance. Not only did the 
three Western govermnents at Geneva maintain 
unshakable harmony on fundamental issues, but 
their general viewpoint was also supported by the 
other Atlantic partners. Nor have the new Soviet 
tactics yet caused any noticeable relaxation in al- 
lied defense efforts. The combined defense ex- 
penditures, for example, of the European Nato 
countries are expected to remain at approximately 
the same levels next year as this year. 



European Integration 

One very hopeful development in Europe is 
the revival of the movement toward political and 
economic integration among the European na- 
tions themselves. The Congress is already fa- 
miliar with the successful establishment of 
supranational authority over the production and 
marketing of coal and steel. The movement re- 
ceived something of a setback when the plan for 
a European Defense Community failed to receive 
parliamentary approval, but is now showing new 
signs of life. Several eminent European states- 
men are currently working on proposals for a 
multinational pooling of atomic power and also 
for further steps toward a broad common market. 
As you can understand, we are watching these 
efforts with the greatest interest and sympathy. 
There can be no doubt that the achievement of a 
closely integrated European community would j 
tend to consolidate and strengthen the Atlantic 
alliance as a whole. 

As Secretary Dulles has pointed out on more 
than one occasion, the most significant thing about 



676 



Deparfmenf of Sfafe Bulletin 



(he Atlantic alliance is not so much what has 
happened as what has not happened. Before 
Nato began, we were harassed by a long series of 
crises in Europe, such as the Communist war in 
Greece, the Berlin blockade, the Czechoslovak 
coup, military threats against Norway and Tur- 
key, and so forth. Since Nato came into being 
there have been no military hostilities of any kind 
in the European area and the Communists have 

I not gained a single inch of additional territory. 
I think this speaks for itself. 

In reciting the progress made through Nato, it 
is not my purpose to imply that all our difficulties 
have suddenly vanished. We will continue to 
face a great many problems. Nato is not the kind 
of operation that we can ever expect to wrap up 
and forget about. It requires constant attention 
and constant ellort by all members of the alliance, 
including ourselves. 

Maintenance of Military Defenses 

The mutual security program proposed for fiscal 
year 1957 is directed toward two of Nato's most 
pressing and most continuous problems — the 
maintenance and the progressive modernization 
of its military defenses. Even the best military 
system cannot stand still. Weapons and equip- 
ment wear out or become obsolete, and military 
plans require constant revision. These problems 
have always existed, but they have been greatly 
magnified by the incredible sweep of modern 
technology. "\^^iile our information about the 
rate of Soviet scientific and technical advancement 
is not as precise as we would like, we know enough 
to be certain that the continued value of free- world 
defense forces will depend largely upon our col- 
lective ability to maintain up-to-date equipment 
and facilities, to replace wornout or obsolete items, 
and to keep pace with the furious advances of 
science and technology. 

Another current defense problem receiving 
Nato attention, of course, is the buildup of Ger- 
man military contingents. Since this buildup is 
beginning from scratch, many different things 
have to be done, ranging from the enactment of 
basic legislation to the actual recruitment, organ- 
ization, equipment, and training of military forces. 
This process will necessarily be gradual, but steady 
progress is being made. The mutual security pro- 
gi'am recommended for fiscal year 1957 contains 
no additional funds for the German buildup, since 

AprW 23, 7956 

382436 — 56 3 



the currently planned U.S. contribution to this 
program has already been obligated from previous 
appropriations. 

T'he military problems I have mentioned are 
now receiving intensive attention by Nato military 
planners. The Defense Ministers of all member 
countries, including Secretary of Defense Wilson, 
held a meeting in October to consider some of these 
problems, and a subsequent meeting of senior mili- 
tary authorities and the Nato commanders was 
completed in Paris around March 1. The central 
problem upon which both these meetings focused 
is the adaptation of the Nato defense system to the 
ever-changing requirements and techniques of 
modern warfare. This problem is gravely com- 
plicated by the limited financial resources avail- 
able. While it is clear to all that this adaptation 
is essentially evolutionary and that no sudden and 
drastic displacement of either plans or machinery 
is in prospect, it is necessary that the process move 
forA\ard with minimum delay. 

Most of the funds requested for Nato during 
fiscal year 1957 fall under the heading of "main- 
tenance." They will be used to service, repair, and 
replace facilities and equipment already produced 
and to provide training in the use of such equip- 
ment and facilities. Some of the funds, in addi- 
tion, are designed to make more modern weapons 
and equipment available to our allies, with par- 
ticular emphasis on the improvement of European 
air defenses and early warning systems. 

Modernization of Military Defenses 

There are approximately $525 million in this 
program set aside for advanced weapons, of which 
$195 million have already been planned for allo- 
cation to Europe. The value to the Europeans, 
both in military and in psychological terms, of 
acquiring guided missiles and more advanced types 
of aircraft and electronic equipment cannot be 
overestimated. Furthermore, it is to our own 
benefit that we make these more modern weapons 
available as a means of insuring that American 
troops in Europe will have at their side well- 
equipped forces equally able to mount an effective 
defense. 

There is no question but that the Europeans 
have become increasingly concerned about the 
rapid changes in the technology of modem warfare 
and their limited ability to keep pace with the 
newer developments. Apart from the British and, 



677 



to a lesser extent, the French, oiu' Em-opean allies 
do not have the resources necessary to devote to 
the large-scale research and development of new 
weapons. Consequently, most European countries 
are looking primarily to the United States to help 
them keep pace with the growing capabilities of 
the Soviet bloc forces. By sharing the newer 
weapons as they are developed and produced, we 
can make it possible for them to participate more 
effectively in the defense of Western Europe and 
thus to strengthen the deterrent power of the 
alliance. 

Officials of the Department of Defense will be 
prepared to give you more detailed information 
about the projected use of these funds and the 
military purposes to be served. I will confine 
myself to a few general observations. First, I 
think it is obvious that the Nato alliance, one of 
the mainstays of our security, can be preserved 
over a long period of time only if our European 
partners remain convinced that it offei's them 
real protection and that their own contributions 
to the common defense serve a useful purpose. 
This conviction, in turn, will depend upon a rea- 
sonable assurance that their defense efforts will 
actually be meaningful within the context of mod- 
ern instruments and techniques of warfare. Our 
allies already know that there are certain key 
items that they cannot produce for themselves and 
cannot readily accumulate the dollars to buy. 
Unless they are able to secure, maintain, and re- 
place these things, they will feel that a large part 
of what they are able to do for themselves would 
be waste effort. 

European Contribution to Mutual Security 

I want to emphasize the fact that the things 
our allies are doing for themselves add up to a 
very substantial total. Two years ago Secretary 
Dulles pointed out that our European allies were 
spending for defense purposes the equivalent of 
three dollars from their own budgets for every 
dollar's worth of aid received from the United 
States. A recent analysis by my staff indicates 
that these countries are now spending the equiva- 
lent of six dollars of their own money for each 
dollar of U.S. aid received. Their total defense 
expenditures last year came to more than $12 bil- 
lion, which is an altogether creditable showing for 
a group of nations whose combined gross national 
incomes add up to less than one-half of the U.S. 



national income. These expenditures, together 
with the men they have placed under arms, the 
outijut of their factories and laboratories, and the 
bases they have provided, add substantially to the 
security of the United States as well as the security 
of Europe. It seems to me a matter of ordinary 
common sense — a sound business proposition, if 
you will — for the United States to continue pro- 
viding certain weapons, equipment, and training 
which will multiply the effectiveness of these 
European efforts and produce more total defense 
than would otherwise be available. 

This is the fundamental justification for the 
whole program. Without the program of the 
character and magnitude being requested, some of 
these countries would undoubtedly feel that they 
just couldn't accomplish enough to make their 
efforts and sacrifices worth while. Some would 
lack many key items of equipment and would 
face insuperable difficulties in trying to build 
balanced forces capable of effective action under 
modern conditions of warfare. The real defen- 
sive power produced b}' their own commitments 
of money and manpower would be greatly re- 
duced and there would be almost irresistible 
temptation to reduce these commitments. The 
final result would be a drastic weakening of the 
whole Atlantic system. In terms of the total 
defensive power available to America and the free 
world, we would clearly lose more than we would 
save by not having this military assistance pro- 
gram being requested. 

Please understand that I am not making gloomy 
predictions. On the contrary, I believe the general 
outlook in Europe is fairly bright. I only want 
to emphasize the fact that Nato represents a tre- 
mendous asset for the security of the entire free 
world, including our own country. We have al- 
ready made a large investment in protecting and 
increasing the value of this asset. The program 
now being presented to you is designed to make 
certain that neither the investment nor the asset 
itself is lost. 

Spain, Yugoslavia, Berlin 

I mentioned earlier that a moderate portion of 
the assistance proposed for the European area in 
fiscal year 1967 is designed to provide economic- 
type support to certain non-NAXo areas. The larg- 
est amount is proposed for support of the Spanish 
defense program. Spain's defense efforts are 



678 



Department of State Bulletin 



L 



closely related to the U.S.-Spanish agreements for 
the construction and joint use of a series of im- 
portant strategic air and naval bases. Therefore, 
we have a considerable interest in the effective- 
ness of these ellorts. We also recognize that 
Spain, which did not participate in the Marshall 
plan nor the early military defense assistance pro- 
grams, faces unusual economic difficulties in carry- 
ing out its defense plans. 

A smaller amount is proposed to support Yugo- 
slav defense efforts. While Yugoslavia is not al- 
lied with the U.S., we have a definite interest in 
Yugoslavia's ability to maintain the independent 
position which it has achieved with great risk and 
saci-ifice. Yugoslavia is the only country that has 
successfully broken away from the Soviet camp. 
The measure of this success is best illustrated by 
the fervent campaign wliich the Soviet rulers are 
now waging to entice Yugoslavia back into the 
Soviet spider's web. But the Yugoslavs know 
from experience what this means, and their na- 
tion stands today as a vivid reminder to the satel- 
lite areas that it is still possible for enslaved peoples 
to regain national existence. Yugoslavia is al- 
ready spending a larger percentage of its national 
income for defense than any other country in free 
Europe, and the moderate assistance contemplated 
in this program is intended to help Yugoslavia 
continue to maintain this defense program with- 
out unbearable economic strain. 

As in past years, we are also requesting special 
economic assistance for programs in West Berlin. 
The strategic and psychological importance of this 
key Western outpost is well known, especially to 
those Members of the Congress who have had an 
opportunity to visit the area. West Berlin will 
continue to face extraordinary economic difficul- 
ties because of its geographic position, and we arc 
determined to provide all necessary support to al- 
leviate these difficulties and assure West Berlin's 
survival. 

In conclusion, I merely want to repeat my con- 
viction that the P^uropean section of the proposed 
mutual security program represents a good in- 
vestment in our own national security. It has paid 
off in the past and we ha.ve every reason to antici- 



pate that it will pay handsome dividends in the 
future. 



Appointments to Advisory Group 
on Refugee Relief Program 

The Department of State announced on April 
(press release 182) that George Meany, Presi- 
dent of the Ajnerican Federation of Labor and 
Congress of Industrial Organizations, and Joseph 
Gimma, partner in the New York investment firm 
of Hornblower & Weeks, had been appointed to 
the Public Advisory Group of the Refugee Relief 
Program.^ Mr. Meany will be the official repi-e- 
sentative of the Afl-Cio; Mr. Gimma will serve 
as a public member. 

Other members of the group are : 

Mssr. Edward E. Swanstrom, National Catholic Welfare 
Confereute, Chairman of the Refugee Relief Program 
Committee of the American Council of Voluntary Agen- 
cies for Foreign Service 

Roland Elliott, Director, Immigration Services, Church 
World Service, First Vice Chairman of the Refugee 
Relief Program Committee of the American Council of 
Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service 

Miss Cordelia Cox, Lutheran Refugee Service, Second 
Vice Chairman of the Refugee Relief Program Commit- 
tee of the American Council of Voluntary Agencies for 
Foreign Service 

.\rthur Greenleigh, Executive Director, United Hi as 
Service, Inc. 

Dr. William S. Bernard, Executive Director, American 
Federation of International Institutes, Inc. 

Dr. Jan Papanek, President of the American Fimd for 
Czechoslovak Refugees, Inc. 

Abram G. Becker, Executive Director, International Res- 
cue Committee 

Walter H. Bieringer, Canton, Mass., Vice President, 
Plymouth Rubber Company, and Chairman of the Mas- 
.saehusetts Governor's Committee for Refugees 

Jlrs. Dorothy D. Houghton, Red Oak, Iowa, former Dep- 
uty Director of the International Cooperation Admin- 
istration 

The Rev. Clyde N. Rogers, Columbus, Ohio, Ohio Council 
of Churches, and Chairman of the Ohio Governor's Com- 
mittee for the Refugee Program 

Clark L. Brody, Lansing, Mich., Executive Vice President 
of the Michigan Farm Bureau 



' For background, see Bulletin of Aug. 29, IGS.^J, p. 36-3. 



April 23, 1956 



679 



Hungary Accepts U.S. Offer 
of Emergency Food Aid 

Press release 101 dated April 12 

Under the President's authorization, an oiler 
of emergency food aid to victims in Hungai-y of 
the effects of the recent European cold wave was 
presented to the Hungarian Government on Feb- 
ruary 23, 1956.^ The offer was not accepted at 
that time. In view of the increasing severity of 
flood conditions in that country and the conse- 
quent widespread hardships, it was renewed on 
March 23 by the American Minister to Hungary, 
Christian M. Ravndal. 

The Hungarian Governmeint informed Min- 
ister Ravndal on March 27 of its acceptance of 
the United States offer of food aid. 

The U.S. Government is taking prompt steps, 
with the cooperation of the League of Red Cross 
Societies, to determine what existing need may 
be met under the emergency food-aid offer and to 
institute appropriate arrangements for carrying 
out such aid as soon as possible. 

In undertaking this program, the U.S. Govern- 
ment is motivated by its friendly regard for the 
Hungarian people and by the traditional desire of 
the American jieople to alleviate suffering wher- 
ever it may occur. 



Triangular Sales of Farm Products 
to Italy and Austria 

The International Cooperation Administration 
announced on March 31 that it has arranged two 
'"triangular" transactions involving sales of U.S. 
agricultural commodities to Italy and Austria. 
The local currencies generated by the sale of the 
agricultural commodities will finance the purchase 
of goods in Italy and Austria needed by other 
countries participating in the mutual security 
program. 

Under agreements signed recently with Italy 
and Austria, each of the two nations will purchase 
up to $5 million worth of agricultural commodi- 
ties, paying for them in local currencies. The 
lira and schilling proceeds of the sales will be de- 
posited to the account of the U.S. Government. 
IcA will make these funds available to countries 
where the United States has defense or economic 



' Bulletin of Mar. 5, 1956, p. 367. 



680 



assistance programs which require commodities 
available in Italy and Austria. When purchases 
of such goods in Italy and Austria are agreed 
upon, they will be financed with the U.S.-owned 
lira and schilling funds and the "triangular" 
iiansaction will be completed. 

Procurement authorizations for the agricultural 
commodities to be sold to Italy and Austria will 
be issued later by Ica. 

The agreements with Italy and Austria were 
made under section 402 of the ilutual Security 
•Vet. This section requires that at least $300 mil- 
lion of the funds authorized for the mutual se- 
i-iirity program during the current fiscal year be 
used to finance the sale of surplus U.S. agricul- 
tural commodities for foreign currencies. The 
local currency proceeds are to be used for mutual 
security purjjoses. 

To date this year, more than $200 million of 
these commodities have been authorized by Ica 
to more than a dozen countries. 



U.S. Aid to Libya 

Press release 184 dated April 9 

In extended support of Libyan economic devel- 
opment projects, to which it has been contributing 
since 1954, the LT.S. Government will grant Libya 
$5 million from this fiscal year's mutual security 
funds. This is in addition to the $12 million in 
aid which the United States has provided Libya 
since 1954. 

The United States has also informed Libya that 
it will grant that country another 5,000 tons of 
relief grain, bringing the total help of this nature 
in fiscal year 1956 to 25,000 tons. 

The Government of Libya has also been told 
that in fiscal year 1957 the U.S. Government would 
be prepared, subject to congressional authoriza- 
tion, to provide an additional $7 million in eco- 
nomic development assistance, relief wheat as 
needed up to 25,000 tons, and the military equip- 
ment for expansion of the Libyan Army by an 
additional 1,000 men after a U.S. military survey 
team has determined the requirements. 

On being informed of the U.S. decision outlined 
above, the Libyan Prime Minister stated publicly 
on April 7 : 

"While making with pleasure and satisfaction 
this announcement of American aid, I feel it is 

Department of State Bulletin 



i 



my duty to emphasize the spirit of understanding 
shown by the American Government toward 
Libya's needs and the sincere collaboration ex- 
tended for meeting them. 

"In the name of the Libyan Government and 
people I extend my sincere thanks to the Govern- 
ment of the United States of America with our 
deep appreciation for their valued assistance 
which will not fail to have far-reaching effects on 
the i^rogress of our country and on raising the 
standard of our people." 



New ICA Loan to Turkey 

A loan of $25 million to Turkey was announced 
by the International Cooperation Administration 
on April 8. This brings the total of U.S. aid to 
Turkey during the 1956 fiscal year, including 
iirants and a gift of emergency food supplies, to 
$54,885,000. These funds are being used as 
follows : 

— $37.5 million, composed of the $25 million 
loan and a grant of $12.5 million, to finance the 
import of commodities such as alloys, chemicals, 
pliarmaceuticals, and spare parts for industrial, 
mining, agricultural, and highway equipment and 
vehicles. 

— $2 million in technical cooperation grants. 

— $14 million worth of emergency food supplies 
donated by tlie United States to stave off shortages 
resulting from recent floods, an earthquake, and 
a disastrous fire. The food includes 40,000 tons 
of wheat and quantities of butter, cheese, pow- 
dered milk, flour, and rice taken from U.S. agri- 
cultural reserves. 

— $1,385,000 as a grant to pay the costs of ocean 
transportation for the emergency food shipments. 

The agreement covering the loan was signed for 
Turkey by Ambassador Haydar Gork. Signing 
for the United States was Samuel C. Waugh, pres- 
ident of the Export-Import Bank of Washington, 
whicli administers Ica loans. 

In announcing the $14 million gift of food sup- 
plies on March 26, Ica said that, since January, 
25,000 tons of Turkey's grain supply had been dis- 
tributed free to disaster victims; an additional 
free distribution was to be made during March 
and April. The wheat included in the U.S. gift 



would be used to replenish Turkish stocks from 
which the free distribution was made. 

The other gift foods from the United States — 
3,600 tons of powdered milk, 2,615 tons of butter, 
2,615 tons of cheese, 1,000 tons of flour, and 250 
tons of rice — will be distributed fi-ee to needy per- 
sons. The food is being supplied under title II 
of the Agricultural Trade Development and As- 
sistance Act (P. L. 480). 

The new loan agreement brings total economic 
aid to Turkey since the United States began pro- 
viding such assistance in 1947 to more than one- 
half billion dollars. The United States has been 
helping Turkey in its efforts to improve the stand- 
ard of living of its people and, at the same time, 
to assume increasing responsibility for the support 
of its defense efforts. 

The greater part of U.S. aid to Turkey has been 
directed toward such projects as development and 
improvement of transportation, communications 
and power facilities, mineral resources, and the 
increase of industrial capacity. Aid also has been 
given in various agricultural fields, including im- 
provement of farm management. 

In the field of technical cooperation, a recent 
major project has been assistance in helping Tur- 
key establish a new university at Erzurum in the 
eastern part of the country. This project is being 
carried out under contract with the University of 
Nebraska. Emphasizing education in the agri- 
cultural sciences, the new institution has been 
named Ataturk University in honor of Turkey's 
first president, Kemal Ataturk. 



Vice President of Brazil 
To Visit U.S. 

The Department of State announced on April 13 
(press release 196) that Vice President Joao Goul- 
art of Brazil will visit the United States during 
the period April 30-May 17, 1956. The invitation 
was extended on behalf of the U.S. Government by 
Vice President Nixon during Mr. Nixon's recent 
trip to Brazil. 

Mr. Goulart will be an official guest of the U.S. 
Government in Washington during tlie period 
April 30-May 3 and will stay at Blair House. He 
then expects to make a private tour of several 
major U.S. cities. 



April 23, 7956 



681 



The I titer- American Partnership 



by Milton S. Eisenhower ' 



Three years ago, in this beautiful House of the 
Americas, President Eisenhower expi'essed his 
profound personal dedication to doing all he could 
to perfect the understanding and trust upon which 
the American community of nations must rest. 

He stated also his desire to visit the other 
American Republics and know them better. 
Since he could not himself make a prolonged tour, 
he sent me as his personal representative to South 
America. Soon afterward he asked Vice Presi- 
dent Nixon to make a similar good-will visit to 
Middle America. 

I look upon my own tour of Latin America as 
one of the most rewarding experiences of my life. 
I had abundant opportunity to deepen my under- 
standing of major problems in candid discussions 
with leaders of government, labor, business, agi'i- 
culture, and cultural institutions. I observed and 
studied Latin America's remarkable achievements 
and thus came to appreciate Latin America's de- 
termination to be a mighty, progressive factor in 
the defense of freedom and the extension of peace. 
On the basis of a continental perspective de- 
veloped on the trip I submitted, upon my return, 
numerous recommendations for strengthening 
hemispheric solidarity — recommendations which 
met with approval and were incorporated into 
United States policy .= 

It is therefore with a renewal of the pride and 
pleasure I felt during the period of intensive 
work in 1953 tliat, again as the President's per- 
sonal representative, I come here today to par- 
ticipate in these Pan American Day ceremonies. 



' Address made at the Pan American Union, Washing- 
ton, D.C., on Pan American Day, Apr. 14 (OAS press 
release). Mr. Eisenhower spoke as the personal repre- 
sentative of the President. 

= BULLETIN of Nov. 23, 19.53, p. 69.5. 

682 



It is especially gratifying to be with you wlien 
the Council is lionoring a distinguished fellow 
citizen who worked so diligently for hemispheric 
cooperation, Cordell Hull. For him, continuous 
cooperation among the Americas was a pilot proj- 
ect for all nations. Speaking of the inter- Ameri- 
can system on this day 13 years ago, in this same 
House of the Americas, Secretary Hull declared 
that "the practice of equity is not a design for a 
liemisphere but is a rule for living in a free and 
peaceful world." ^ 

Implicit in Mr. Hull's statement is a concept 
tliat is fundamental to the foreign policy of the 
United States as it applies to the other American 
Republics. It is the conviction that mutually 
helpful, friendly, and abiding relationships among 
all the American peoples are of transcendent im- 
portance and that these relationships do indeed 
afford a working model for the rest of mankind. 



Historical Nature of Inter-American Cooperation 

It is not especially remarkable that one of our 
Secretaries of State voiced this belief; but it is 
significant that our Secretaries have been saying 
it generation after generation. Whichever of our 
political parties has been in power, whoever has 
been the incumbent of the "Wliite House, whatever 
has been the state of world affairs, we have ad- 
hered firmly to the belief that on the hearth of the 
American family of nations must burn a steadfast 
flame to warm and illuminate mankind. 

Our first Secretary of State, Thomas Jefferson, 
said, "We have the same object, the success of 
representative government. Nor are we acting 
for ourselves alone, but for the whole human race." 



' Ibid., Apr. 17, 1943, p. 322. 

Department of State Bulletin 



Secretary Elihu Root, at the Third Interna- 
tional Conference of American States in 1906, 
urged tlie American peoples to show the world 
tiiat liberty is the twin sister of a just peace. "Let 
us unite,'* he urged, "in creating . . . and making 
effective an ail-American public opinion whose 
power shall influence international wrong, [and] 
bring us ever nearer to the perfection of ordered 
liberty." 

In 1925 Secretary Charles Evans Hughes em- 
pliasized that hemispheric cooperation, while based 
on mutual self-interest of the American Republics, 
does not isolate our peoples from the rest of the 
world. On the contrary, he said, our hemispheric 
cooperation "in itself constitutes a most important 
contribution to world peace.'' 

And only last year Secretary John Foster Dulles 
expressed this truth in another way here at the 
Pan American Union, saying: "This great inter- 
American system, which was first a vision and a 
dream and then an expression of faith, has become 
in our time the most solid international organiza- 
tion of free peoples on earth . . . beneficial to all 
mankind." * 

Abiding Family Relationship 

Tliis persistent view of our Secretaries of 
State — that the family relationship among the 
American nations is of an abiding nature and is an 
example for all mankind — has long been shared by 
our Congress and our Chief Executives. Presi- 
dents Thomas Jefferson, John Quincy Adams, 
Abraham Lincobi, Herbert Hoover, Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, Dwight D. Eisenhower — all have been 
inspired by the power, the peaceful achievement, 
and growing potential of the inter-American 
frafernity of nations. 

I have thought it worth while to emphasize the 
historical nature of our friendship and coopera- 
tion, for the overt propagandists and the covert 
subversives of today contend that ours is an 
ephemeral solidarity; that there does not really 
exist a solid basis for continuing harmony; and 
that our mask of pretension will one day be cast 
aside to reveal the real creature, the hostile im- 
perialist. Nearly everyone in the Americas recog- 
nizes this kind of talk for what it is : a calculated, 
malicious misrepresentation to serve the purposes 
of a clever world conspiracy which holds our 
deepest spiritual convictions in contempt and 

* Ibid., May 2, 1955, p. 728. 



Solidarity of tlie Western Hemisphere 

Press release 195 dated April 13 

President Eisenhower has is.sued a proclamation ' 
designating the period April 8-14 as Pan A-merican 
Week, and Saturday, April 14, as Pan American Day. 
In his proclamation, the President calls attention 
to the fact that April 14 will mark the sixty-sixth 
anniversary of the founding of the Pan American 
Union, the forerunner of the great inter-American 
system now known asi the Organization of American 
States. 

During the past year there have been many ex- 
amples of the friendly cooperation and common 
purpose which has been traditionally a hallmark of 
United States relations with the countries of this 
hemisphere. Several friendly visits were exchanged 
by representatives of our respective governments. 
A number of important new agreements were signed 
looking to the development of peaceful iises of 
atomic energy in the Western Hemisphere and 
providing for mutual economic and technical 
assistance. 

The efficacy and great moral influence of the 
peace machinery of the OAS were again demon- 
strated when it was used successfully to bring 
about a solution of a difficult situation which had 
arisen between two of our neighbor governments. 

Further progi-ess was made in the construction 
of the Inter-American Highway in Central America, 
which now is expected to be completed within 2 
years. 

The United States on its part was privileged to 
lend assistance in connection with the floods which 
struck in parts of Mexico and Honduras, and the 
polio epidemic in Argentina. We ourselves received 
aid from several of our neighbor republics when 
floods and hurricanes hit our northeast coast in 
the summer of 1955. 

The solidarity of the sister republics of this 
hemisphere is based on faith. First and foremost, 
it is faith in the institutions all are pledged to 
defend. Secondly, and equally, it is faith in one 
another. It is in such spirit that the governments 
and peoples of the 21 American Republics join 
together to celebrate this Pan American Week. 

' Bulletin of Apr. 2, 1956, p. .544. 



which seeks, by coercion and subversion, to control 
the destiny of mankind. 

Our cooperation not only has a proud, long liis- 
tory; it also possesses the assurance of a beneficial 
future. For it is grounded firmly on mutuality in 
our relations. As I stated in my report to my 
brother and his associates in the Federal Govern- 
ment, our solidarity is based, first upon a genuine 
understanding of one another — an understanding 
that permeates not only governments but also the 



April 23, 7956 



683 



great masses of all our peoples. It is based, second, 
upon the closely related requisites of mutual re- 
spect and the sovereign equality of states. This is 
especially important in relations between large and 
small, powerful and weak nations, for nations, like 
people, have dignity and pride; only if each re- 
spects the rights, aspirations, cultures, sensibil- 
ities, and equal legal rights of the others can there 
be permanence in their friendship. Our coopera- 
tion is based upon another fundamental : mutual 
security. This is imperative in our threatened 
world. Tliis concept, indeed, originated among 
the American family of nations and was formal- 
ized, as all know, in the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro 
of 1947. And the other great requisite for our con- 
tinuing cooperation is firm adlierence to common 
goals — the goals of peace, liberty, independence, 
rising levels of well-being, and the attainment of 
spiritual values. 

But while we may be satisfied that the elements 
of our hemispheric unity are correct and firmly es- 
tablished, we recognize that much remains to be 
done, and no doubt always will remain to be done, 
if our unity is to yield the constructive results we 
all desire. 

Fortunately, much has been accomplished in the 
past several years to improve relationships; es- 
pecially has a great deal been done to improve 
mutual understanding and to strengthen economic 
cooperation. 

Heightened U.S. Interest 

Never has interest in my country in all phases 
of inter-American relations been so widespread 
as it is now. This heightened interest was no 
doubt caused to some extent by the anxiety our 
people felt for a time at the Communist threat 
that was so narrowly averted in one American 
nation. 

But it is due also, I am sure, to an increasing 
awai'eness of our economic, political, military, 
and cultural interdependence; to the widespread 
publicity given to the inter-American conferences 
at Caracas, Rio, and Ciudad Trujillo; to the swift 
steps taken by the Organization of American 
States to settle quickly three serious disputes 
among member nations ; to a tremendous increase 
in the exchange-of -persons programs, and to the 
modest additional support of American schools in 
Latin America ; to the most welcome visits to the 
United States of the President of Uruguay, the 



President of Guatemala, the President-elect of 
Brazil, the President of Mexico, and the Prime 
Minister of Canada; to the visits of our Vice 
President to Middle America and Brazil ; and to 
the visits of our Assistant Secretary of State to 
every Republic of Latin America. 

In addition to meetings at high official levels, 
genuine mutual understanding is being continu- 
ally enhanced by the exchange of literally thou- 
sands of students, business and professional men 
and women, and a rising tide of tourists. 

The United States Information Agency has ex- 
panded its programs of intellectual and cultural 
cooperation in Latin America. More books than 
ever before are being translated from Portuguese 
and Spanish into English, and vice versa. Latin 
American music has invaded the theaters, clubs, 
and homes of my country as a welcome retaliation 
for the infiltration of United States jive and rock- 
and-roll into every nook and corner of the Latin 
American Republics. And at tliis moment, exhib- 
its of Argentinean, Chilean, Peruvian, Venezuelan, 
and Caribbean arts are being shown in many 
parts of the United States. 

Most of all, however, mutual understanding is 
being increased through the growing voliune of 
material in the press and on the radio and tele- 
vision; in every country of the American com- 
munity our people are being exposed to informa- 
tion and ideas about all the other countries of the 
hemisphere. 

Increased understanding and mutual respect, 
valuable in themselves, have also effectively 
strengthened economic cooperation — the real key 
to better relations among our countries and 
peoples. 

Consistent Economic Programs 

The most important recommendation I made in 
my report to the President nearly 3 years ago was 
that the United States adopt and adhere to trade 
policies with Latin America which possess sta- 
bility and a minimum of mechanisms permitting 
the imposition of increased tariffs or quotas. I 
emphasized that real cooperation in this hemi- 
sphere can flow only from intelligent adlierence to 
consistent economic programs, honorably and j 
continuously observed. 

I can proudly say today that both by congres- 
sional enactments and by firm policies established 
by the executive branch of the United States Gov- 



684 



Department of State Bulletin 



ernment, gi-eater stability has been infused into our 
trade, financial, and other economic relationships. 
Assurance of access to the great market of the 
United States, with a minimum of changes in the 

j rules, is the most effective guaranty of economic 
stability in Latin America. Similar assurance 
tliat the other nations of this hemisphere can con- 
tinue to buy much of our surplus production is an 
essential of economic prosperity in the United 
States. 

In the last several years, too, the United States 
Government has recognized that public and pri- 
vate lending for sound development projects must 
go forward on a substantial scale. Production and 
productivity are increasing more rapidly in Latin 
America than anywhere else in the world. This 
advance creates an insatiable demand for capital. 
We of the United States are placing greatest 
reliance, as we should, upon a flow of private 
capital for investment. That flow can be encour- 
aged best by the Latin American nations them- 
selves. Nonetheless, the United States has an- 
nounced repeatedly in the last several years that 
it favors public loans to finance those sound proj- 
ects for which private financing is not available. 
Indeed, we have assm-ed all nations of Latin 
America that we will do everything we can to 
satisfy all applications for sound economic-de- 
velopment loans for which capital is not reason- 
ably available either from private sources or from 
the International Bank. Both the Export-Im- 
port Bank and the International Banli, I am told, 

; have ample funds to lend ; indeed, they are pre- 

' pared to process applications greatly in excess of 
those now on hand. 

Since its creation in 1934, the Export-Import 
Bank has authorized loans totaling more than 
$2,500,000,000. Some 20 months ago the Bank 
announced a new policy designed to expand its 
activities in Latin America. In the next full 

I year, loans to Latin America increased by more 
than 500 percent to $284,000,000, or 58 percent of 
the Bank's total loans. The Export-Import Bank 
can be counted on to continue to make important 
contributions to the economic development of this 

I hemisphere. 

Inter- American cooperation is developing pro- 
grams of atomic energy for peaceful purposes — 

' cooperation which may one day be recognized as 
a significant turning point in history. For nu- 
clear science may bring productive energy to 
many nations wliich now suffer a serious deficiency 



and which are constantly having difficulty with 
foreign exchange because of the imperative need 
to import oil, coal, and other fuels. 

Truly impressive progress has been made on 
the construction of the Inter- American Highway ; 
through greatly increased appropriations the 
United States is contributing a major share of the 
cost of what may soon become the most traveled 
artery of the Americas. Additional programs 
of technical assistance have been worked out in 
education, agriculture, public health, and related 
fields. 

Many of our countries, the United States among 
them, have suffered in recent years from such 
natural disasters as floods, hurricanes, and epi- 
demics of disease; all countries, including the 
United States, have received prompt and gener- 
ous assistance from other American peoples. 
This aid has been, indeed, a persuasive demonstra- 
tion of the heart of America. 

It is a long story, this story of inter- American 
cooperation for better health, better education, 
better living conditions; for peace, for freedom, 
for order, and for independence. 

It has been said, and justly said, that inter- 
American neighborliness is not only the policy of 
the American govermnents but also a state of 
mind of all our peoples. I am sure this is so. 
But while we have made traditional the practice 
of proclaiming this fact anew every year on Pan 
American Day, I believe all of us here would agree 
that this attitude must in fact guide our actions 
every day of every year. 



Good Partners 

So far as the United States is concerned, I 
think I may confidently say that our state of mind 
in this regard is better than ever before. The de- 
velopment is sufficient that we have had to find 
words to describe our thinking. We have gradu- 
ally dropped the phrase "good neighbor'' and 
have substituted, with sincerity, the phrase "good 
partner." 

This signifies much more than a difference of 
words. It underscores a new approach to the 
problems we share. 

As neighbors, each American Eepublic tried in 
the economic field to adopt policies and follow 
courses which would not prejudice the interests 
of the other members of the total community. 
Each sought in good faith to respond construc- 



April 23, J 956 



685 



tively to requests for cooperation and assistance 
from othei-s. In the United States the good- 
neijilibor policy gave a new and meaningful direc- 
tion to our hemispheric programs and relations. 

That policy has logically carried us to the re- 
lationship that exists and must exist between us 
today — a relationship which is so close that it can 
no longer accurately be described as that of neigh- 
bors. So interdependent are our destinies today 
that each American Republic must recognize its 
direct, continuing, and even selfish interest in the 
solution of the critical problems of every other 
member of the family. We must now be depend- 
able, honorable partners in a great and lasting 
enterprise — the peaceful independence, the pros- 
perity, and the happiness of all our peoples — 
peoples with great and marvelous cultural divers- 
ity but with equally great and inescapable 
interdependent goals. 

In the spirit of partnership we have in recent 
years made substantial progress toward better 
understanding and mutual respect, and improved 
political, military, and economic cooperation. 
That must give us all deep satisfaction. As I said 
in concluding my report on Latin America to 
President Eisenhower : 

"Working together, the nations of this Hem- 
isphere can, if history should so decree, stand 
firmly against any enemy in war, and prosper 
mightily together in times of peace." 



World Trade Week, 1956 

A PROCLAMATION* 

Whereas it is the continuing desire of the people of 
the United States to strengthen our ties of friendship 
with all nations of the free world and to foster under- 
standing and cooperation among them ; and 

Whehseas international trade, travel, and investment 
make vital contributions to international stability and 
the mutual development of resources, security, and cul- 
ture ; and 

Whereas the expansion of international social, cul- 
tural, and business relationships promotes the imity and 
solidarity of the nations of the free world ; and 

Whereas the national interest requires that we join 
with friendly nations in dealing with our trade problems 
on a cooperative basis : 

Now, THEREFORE, I, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, Pres- 
ident of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim 
the week lieginning May 20, 195f), as World Trade Week; 
and I request the appropriate officials of the Federal Gov- 



'No. 3130: 21 Fed. Reg. 19153. 



ernment and of the several States, Territories, possessions, 
and municipalities of the United States to cooperate in 
the observance of that week. 

I also urge business, labor, agricultural, educational, 
and civic groujis, as well as people in the United States 
generally, to observe World Trade Week with gatherings, 
discussions, exhibits, ceremonies, and other appropriate 
activities designed to promote continuing awareness of 
the importance of world trade to our economy and our 
relations with other nations. 

In WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and 
caused the Seal of the United States of America to be 
aflBxed. 

Done at the City of Washington this twenty-fourth 

day of March in the year of our Lord nineteen 

[seal] hundred and tifty-six, and of the Independence 

of the United States of America the one hundred 

and eightieth. 

By the President : 

John Foster Dotles 
Secretary of State 



Western Europe Cuts Curbs 
on Dollar-Area imports 

The International Cooperation Administration 
armounced on March 28 that substantial progress 
in relaxing restrictions on imports into AV^estem 
Eui-ope from the dollar area had been reported 
that day by the Organization for European Eco- 
nomic Cooperation. As of January 1, 1956, some 
54 percent of all private imports by the 17 Oeeo 
member countries from the United States and 
Canada, based on their dollar value, were free of 
quantitative restrictions. Tliis compares with 
only 11 percent free of such restrictions at the 
beginning of 1953. 

The progi-ess report brought an expression of 
approval from John B. Hollister, Director of the 
International Cooperation Administration, who 
headed the U.S, delegation to the recent Oeec 
Council meeting at Paris. 

"This report," said Mr. Hollister, "constitutes 
positive evidence that Western European coun- 
tries are following through on their commitment 
under the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade, to remove restrictions on imports as their 
external financial position improves. The United 
States Government is pleased to note this progress 
in AVestern Europe." 



686 



Department of State Bulletin 



On tlie whole, the level of liberalization has been 
hiflher for food and feedstuft's and for raw mate- 
1, rial than for manufactured goods. 

For the first 9 months of 1955, member coun- 
tries' total imports from the United States and 
Canada were 40 percent above those of the cor- 
responding period in 1954, while their total im- 
ports from all sources showed a 15 percent rise. 

The increase in dollar imports contributed to 
an enlargement of the trade deficit with the 
United States and Canada, since member country 
exports did not increase correspondingly. How- 
ever, there was an overall increase in gold and 
dollar holdings in 1955 by more than $800 million, 
due primarily to American military expenditures. 

With regard to so-called "invisible" transac- 
tions, such as payments for sei-Ances and ware- 
housing charged for goods in international trade, 
returns on foreign investments, business travel, 
etc., the report indicates that liberalization with 
respect to the dollar area is more general and more 
extensive than in the case of commodity trade. 

The Oeec report is entitled Liheralization of 
Europe's Dollar Trade. It is based on replies of 
member countries to a questionnaire, on docu- 
ments relating to commercial policies, and on dis- 
cussions between government representatives from 
the United States, Canada, and the Western Euro- 
pean countries. 

Oeec member countries are Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ire- 
land, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Nor- 
way, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and 
the United Kingdom. Canada and the United 
States are associate members. 



Tariff Negotiations With Finland, 
France, Dominican Republic 

Press release 194 dated April 12 

I The United States has concluded negotiations 
with the Dominican Republic, Finland, and 
France whereby these countries withdrew or modi- 
fied under article XXVIII of the General Agree- 
ment on Tariffs and Trade a number of tariff con- 
cessions pi'eviously granted to the United States. 
Although no changes in U.S. tariff rates were in- 
volved, the negotiations permitted the United 
States to obtain new concessions from the tln-ee 
coimtries designed to offset the concessions with- 



dra-.vn or modified and to maintain the previous 
level of reciprocal concessions. 

At specified but infrequent intervals and in ac- 
cordance with established procedures, the contract- 
ing parties of the general agi-eement are per- 
mitted to withdraw or modify tariff concessions 
previously granted. These concessions are either 
reductions in tariff rates or agreements not to in- 
crease these rates. In such cases, the contracting 
party with whom the concession was originally 
negotiated or any other contracting party having 
a substantial trade interest in the concessionary 
item has the right to negotiate for new concessions 
with the objective of reestablishing the previous 
level of concessions. 

In such negotiations a variety of factors is con- 
sidered in assessing the compensatory concessions 
offered for those withdrawn or modified. The 
trade value of the products affected is one item. 
Another is the extent and severity of modifications 
and withdrawals contrasted with the probable 
trade-expansion potential of the compensatory 
concessions which might be granted. The exis- 
tence and operation of quantitative restrictions 
maj' also be significant, as well as different 
methods of valuing the same product, i. e., whether 
as an import on the one hand or as an expoi-t on the 
other. An examination of all pertinent factors is, 
therefore, conducted before a new balance is struck 
in order to assure that compensatory offei-s in 
reality maintain the existing level of reciprocal 
concessions. 

United States participation in these negotiations 
was guided by the recommendations of the Inter- 
departmental Committee on Trade Agreements, 
the group which advises the President on trade 
agreement matters. 

A summary of the principal changes involved 
in the j^resent set of negotiations follows.^ 

Dominican Rep^iblic. The Dominican Repub- 
lic modified three concessions made to the United 
States relating to paints and varnishes. With 
regard to varnishes, the modification consisted 
wholly in revising the Dominican tariff classifi- 
cation of this commodity, breaking up the pre- 
vious "basket" item into a number of categories, 



' For details, see Department of State publication 6324. 
Results of similar negotiations with 16 other countries 
will be found in Department of State publications 5881, 
6001, 6201, and 6291. 



April 23, 1956 



687 



without increasing the duty for any of tlie com- 
ponent parts. The paint and pigment category 
was similarly revised, but duties in this instance 
were, in general, increased. Imports by the Do- 
minican Eepublic from the United States for this 
latter group of paints and pigments were $559,000 
in 1954. 

To compensate for these increases, the Domini- 
can Eepublic reduced concession ai-y rates already 
granted on six items and provided new concessions 
on five items. Imports from the United States of 
these 11 items by the Dominican Eepublic in 1954 
amounted to $543,000, of which the most important 
were cigarette tobacco and wheat semolina. 

Finland. Finnish rates of duty on 17 items, 
directly negotiated with the United States, were 
increased and rebound at the higher rates. In 
1954 Finland imported nearly $600,000 of all of 
these items from the United States, the most im- 
portant being certain varieties of fruit preserves 
and preparations, compressors and air piunps, and 
miscellaneous machinery and apparatus. 

In return, Finland made concessions on 11 items. 
In four instances duties were reduced and re- 
bound; in seven, concessions on new items were 
gr inted. Imports from the United States of these 
11 items by Finland amounted to $819,000 in 1954. 
Lubricating oils and tinned sheet iron and steel 
comprised the principal part of this trade. 

France. Of the 14 tariff concessions modified 
by France, six were originally negotiated with the 
United States. All of these modifications in- 
creased French import duties. According to 
French statistics for 1953, the latest data sup- 
plied, imports of these items from the United 
States amounted to $283,000, the preponderant 
part being unsweetened fruit and vegetable juices. 
United States trade data showed exports of 
$238,000 for all 14 items to France in 1954. 

As compensation, France reduced duties on four 
items and bound rates on two others. French sta- 
tistics indicated imports of these items from the 
United States to be $1,791,000 in 1953, most of 
them being fresh oranges. United States statistics 
for 1954 listed exports of $4G6,000 for all of these 
items, fresh oranges again ranking as the prin- 
cipal item. As an additional concession, France 
agreed not to seek compensation for the United 
States withdrawal in August 1955 of its tariff con- 
cession on bicycles. 



Continuation of Rate of Duty 
on Imports of Hatters' Fur 

White House press release dated March 29 

The President on ilarch 29 concurred with 
the Tariff Commission's recent finding that no 
formal investigation should be instituted at this 
time to determine whether the tariff should be 
reduced on imports of hatters' fur.' The Presi- 
dent found, with the Tariff Commission, that 
there is no sufficient reason at this time to reopen 
the escape-clause action which resulted in an in- 
crease of the duty on imports of hatters' fur. 
The President's decision means that the increased 
rate of duty established in 1952 as a result of 
escape-clause action will continue to apply with- 
out reduction or other modification. 

The President's action was taken after the views 
of all interested departments and agencies of the 
executive branch had been received and studied. 
The Tariff Commission's report was made pur- 
suant to Executive Order 10401, which requires 
periodic review of actions taken under the escape 
clause. It was transmitted to the President on 
February 6, 1956. 

The tariff' on hatters' fur was reduced as the 
result of trade agreement negotiations in 1935 
and again in 1948. Effective February 9, 1952, 
the tariff on imports of hatters' fur was increased 
as the result of an escape-clause action to its pres- 
ent rate of 471/20 per pound but not less than 15 
jiercent nor more than 35 percent ad valorem. 

The Tariff Commission's report constitutes its 
third periodic review of the escape-clause action 
taken on this product. 



U.S. Delegations to 
international Conferences 

Inter-American Port and Harbor Conference 

The Department of State annoimced on April 
11 (press release 187) that the U.S. Government 
will be represented at the Inter- American Port 
and Harbor Conference, which will meet at San 
Jose, Costa Eica, April 25-May 6, 1956, by a 



' Copies of the Tariff Commission's report may be ob- 
tained from the U.S. Tariff Commission, Washington 25, 
B.C. 



688 



Deparfment of Sfafe Bulletin 



delegation composed of the following representa- 
tives of U.S. Government agencies and of private 
groups concerned with port administration and 
maritime transportation : 

Chairman 

Charles P. Nolan, Officer in Charge, Transportation and 
Communications, OflBce of Regional American Af- 
fairs, Department of State 

Vice Chairman 

Howard J. Marsden, Chief, Division of Port Develop- 
ment, Maritime Administration, Department of 
Commerce 

Advisers 

Benjamin P. Clark, Commander, TJSCG, Chief, Port Se- 
curity Section, United States Coast Guard, Depart- 
ment of the Treasury 

J. Eugene Kennedy, Assistant Collector of Customs, Balti- 
more, Md., Department of the Treasury 

George J. Leovy, American Merchant Marine Institute, 
New York, N.Y. 

Robert E. Mayer, President, Pacific American Steamship 
Association, San Francisco, Calif. 

Matthew C. O'Hearn, American Merchant Marine Insti- 
tute, Washington, D.C. 

Jerrold P. Turner, President, American Association of 
Port Authorities, Mobile, Ala. 

The purpose of the meeting is to bring together 
qualified technical experts of the American Ee- 
publics to discuss matters relating to port admin- 
istration, port practices and regulations, terminal 
operation (including warehousing), cargo han- 
dling, cargo loss prevention, port congestion, port 
modernization, and free-trade zones. 



Marshall Islanders' Petition 
on Nuclear Tests in Pacific 

STATEMENT BY BENJAMIN GERIG < 

The United States delegation has just been in- 
formed by the Department of State that a petition 
concerning the forthcoming nuclear tests to be 
held at the Pacific Proving Grounds was received 
by the chairman of the Visiting Mission from the 
Marshallese Congress Hold-Over Committee. 

In accordance with rule 84, paragraphs 1 and 2, 
the original was sent to the Secretary-General 



'Made in the Trusteeship Council on Mar. 20 (U.S./ 
U.N. press release 2371). Mr. Gerig is Deputy U.S. Rep- 
resentative in the Trusteeship Council. 



and a copy to the United Nations Acting High 
Commissioner of the Pacific Trust Territory. We 
assume that the original has been or will shortly 
be received by the Secretary-General and will be 
made available to the Trusteeship Council. 

The petitioners in effect reiterate their petition 
of April 20, 1954,2 expressing the desire that the 
nuclear tests should cease or that, if considered 
necessary in the interest of world peace and se- 
curity, should be conducted with all feasible pre- 
caution. I may say parenthetically that all such 
precautions are being taken. 

Mr. President, we can all imderstand the feel- 
ings of these people, and we share with them the 
hope that a fully safeguarded disarmament pro- 
gram, including an "open sky" agreement, will be 
reached which will make such testing unneces- 
sary. Although we have already discussed the 
essentials of this problem and although the peti- 
tion raises no new questions, the United States 
delegation wishes to make clear that it is prepared 
to have the Council discuss the petition at the 
present session if it desires to do so.^ 



OBSERVATIONS OF THE U. S. GOVERNMENT AS 
ADMINISTERING AUTHORITY « 

Nothing would please the Administering Au- 
thority more than to be able to comply with the 
wishes of the Marshallese people that nuclear tests 
be discontinued in their islands, but this is not yet 
possible. The Marshallese people can, however, 
be assured that the decision to hold further tests in 
these islands was considered a matter of such grav- 
ity that it was taken by President Eisenhower him- 
self. Moreover, it was not taken until very care- 
ful and comprehensive studies were made that 

- BtTLLETiN of June 7, 1954, p. 887. 

' On Mar. 29 the Council, by a vote of 9 to 4, approved 
the proposal of its Standing Committee on Petitions 
(U.N. doc. T/L. 649) that the Council draw to the peti- 
tioners' attention the observations of the Administering 
Authority ; reaffirm its resolution of 1954; and recommend 
that all necessary measures should be taken "to guard 
against any possible dangers," "to settle forthwith all 
justified claims by the inhabitants of Bikini and Eniwetok 
relating to their temporary displacement" in connection 
with the earlier nuclear tests which were held in the 
Pacific Proving Grounds in 1954, and "to compensate the 
families which may have to be temporarily evacuated, 
for any losses which may result from further nuclear 
weapons tests." 

' U.N. doc. T/OBS.10/5 dated Mar. 26. 



April 23, 1956 



689 



convinced him tliiit there was at present no prac- 
ticable alternative. 

lender President Eisenhower's leadership, the 
United States is earnestly seeking, along with 
other Governments, a fully safeguarded disarma- 
ment agreement whicii would make such tests un- 
necessary. Until such an agreement has been 
reached and as long as there is the threat of ag- 
gression, elementary prudence requires the United 
States to continue its tests. It is the conviction of 
the United States that it has a responsibility not 
only to its people but to all the peoples of the free 
world to maintain at a maximum its capacity to 
deter aggression and preserve peace. Thus it be- 
lieves that, under present circumstances, further 
tests are, in the words of the petitioners, "abso- 
lutolv necessary for the eventual well being of all 
the people of this world". 

The question remains as to whether such tests 
could not be conducted elsewhere than in the Trust 
Territory of the Pacific Islands. An exhaustive 
examination of alternative sites in the United 
States and in other parts of the world was under- 
taken. The conclusion reached was that there was 
no other technically suitable site available to the 
United States where such complete safeguards 
agairist possible hazards could be taken. 

Even after this conclusion was reached, there 
was no decision to hold further tests in the islands 
until a system of precautionary measures was 
worked out that gave convincing assurance that no 
human being, inhabitant of the Trust Territory 
or otherwise would be in any way endangered by 
the tests. 

Thus the Administering Authority believes 
that, although the United States Government is 
regrettably unable to comply M'ith the first re- 
quest of the petitioners, so far as is humanly pos- 
sible the authorities are complying with the sec- 
ond, namely that "all possible jsrecautionary 
measures be taken before such weapons are ex- 
ploded". 

To begin with, a danger area has been estab- 
lished. The boundaries of this area and the date 
they become effective have been continually pub- 
licized since 1 March by all available means, not 
only in the Trust Territory but to all parts of the 
world. Every effort has been made to see that 
the people of the Trust Territory, as well as all 
other people, are aware well in advance that it 
will be dangerous to enter this area after 20 April. 
Such warnings alone will not be relied on. Elabo- 



rate sea and air patrols before each test wiU be 
conducted to make sure that no vessel or aircraft 
has strayed into the area. 

The Administering Authority would like to re- 
fer to the statement on 12 January 1956 of the 
Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission to 
the effect that 

The forthcoming series of nuclear tests at the Eniwe- 
tok Proving Grounds, as announced today by the Com- 
mission and the Department of Defense, will involve 
weapons generally smaller in yield than those tested 
during the 1954 test series. 

It is anticipated that the energy release of the largest 
test will be substantially below that of the maximum 
1954 test. 

The timing of all test shots will be governed 
by the judgement of weather experts assisted by 
new devices and techniques. The precautions 
that will be taken will ensure that '"fallout" will 
occur only in the danger area, which does not in- 
clude inhabited islands. 

Among the steps that will be taken are the 
following : 

1. Improved techniques will provide for more 
reliable weather predictions. The number of 
weather stations in the Pacific will be increased, 
aircraft will fly at high altitude to collect weather 
data and new type weather balloons and rockets 
will ascend to greater altitudes to gather weather 
data. Recently developed computers have mech- 
anized most of the computational problems of 
predicting fallovf patterns, permitting forecasts 
to be made much more rapidly than heretofore. 

2. Following each detonation, aerial flights will 
be initiated to accomplish a quick radiological 
survey of the islands and surrounding seas. 

3. There will be U.S. Air Weather Service and 
U.S. Public Health Service personnel present on 
sixteen islands for monitoring purposes. They 
will be equipped with adequate radiological mon- 
itoring devices and two-way radios. These islands 
are as follows : Eongerik, Tarawa, Wotho, Utirik, 
Majuro, Kusaie, Ujelang, Midway, Kwajalein, Iwo 
Jima, Guam, Johnson, Truk, Wake, Ponape, and 
Rongelap. 

4. Radioactive clouds caused by the tests will 
be tracked by airplanes to check on their course. 

In paragraph 2 (a) of their petition the Mar- 
shallese request that "all human beings and their 
valuable possessions be transported to safe dis- 
tances fii-st, before such explosions occur". It will 
not be necessary to evacuate any of the Marshallese 



690 



Department of State Bulletin 



people from their present homes prior to the tests. 
It is fully expected that no evacuation will be 
called for during or after the tests, but in con- 
formity with pood planning complete plans have 
been ])repared for emergency evacuation of the 
inhabitants. 

In paragraph 2 (b) the petitioners request that 
"all the people living in this area be instructed in 
safety measures", and in paragraph 2 (d) they 
ask that "courses be taught to Marshallese Medical 
Practitioners and Health-Aides which will be use- 
ful in the detecting of and the circumventing of 
preventable dangers". These requests are being 
met in the following way : Scientific personnel who 
are trained radiological monitors equipped with 
radiation detection devices and two-way radios 
and fully acquainted with the necessary safety 
precautions will be stationed on the sixteen islands 
mentioned above. Medical doctors will also be 
in the area. Prior to and during the new series 
of tests training will be given to Marshallese med- 
ical practitioners and health aides in all neceasary 
precautionary measures. 

In paragraph 2 (c) the petitioners request that 
"adequate funds be set aside to pay for the pos- 
sessions of the people in case they will have to be 
moved from their homes. This will include lands, 
houses and whatever possessions they cannot take 
witli them, so that the unsatisfactory arrange- 
ments for the Bikinians and Enewetak people 
shall not be i-epeated." It is not anticipated that 
any of the inhabitants will have to be moved from 
their homes; however, should this prove necessary 
or should the inhabitants sutTer any other hard- 
ship as a result of the tests, adequate funds as well 
as other facilities will be available to make appro- 
priate compensation. 

The United States is pleased to note the peti- 
tioners' opinion that the people of Rongelap, who 
were evacuated from their homes after the last 
tests, have been well cared for by the Administer- 
ing Authority in their temporai-y location at Ejit. 
The ITnited States Special Representative de- 
scribed in some detail to the sixteenth session of the 
Council ^ the measures being taken to care for the 
displaced Rongelapese. He made clear that the 
Administration is at the same time acutely aware 
that these temporary arrangements do not provide 
a normal existence for these people. He indicated 
that it was the Administration's intention to re- 



patriate them as soon as scientific surveys indicate 
tliat there will be no danger to the inhabitants in 
so doing. Several such surveys have been made, 
one very recently, and it is now hoped that this 
move can be made in the early autumn. 

One of the most difficult questions referred to by 
tlie petitioners is that of the land claims in the 
Marshall Islands, including those of the people of 
Bikini and Eniwetok. It is true that in the com- 
plicated process of settling land claims in the 
Territory greater progress has been made in other 
districts than in the Marshall Islands District. 
This situation results from greater availability of 
land in these other areas than in the Marshalls. 
Recently, however, agreement has been reached 
within the United States Government on general 
terms under which compensation in the Marshalls 
and elsewhere will be possible. Administrative 
arrangements are now being worked out pursuant 
to this agreement in order to permit early satisfac- 
tion of the claims. It should be recalled, however, 
that both the Bikini and Eniwetok people have 
been relocated on other land that has been deeded 
to them and have been given considerable assist- 
ance in their resettlement and readjustment. 

The Administering Authority deeply appreci- 
ates the friendly sentiments towards the United 
States expressed by the petitioners, all of them 
members of the Marshallese Congress. The Ad- 
ministering Authority hopes that, despite the hard 
decision tliat the United States Government has 
felt obliged to make, the other measures described 
will reassure them that the Administering Au- 
thority is exercising its trust with the highest pos- 
sible sense of responsibility, conditioned only by 
its broader responsibility for world peace and 
security. 



PETITION FROM MARSHALLESE CONGRESS 
HOLD-OVER COMMITTEE » 

Letter From Sir John Macpherson ' to U.N. Secretary- 
General 

Majuro, 11 March 1956 

In accordance with rule 84 paragraph 1 of the rules 
of procedure of the Ti-usteeship Council, I have the 
honour to transmit to you a communication dated 9 
March 19.56 from the Marshallese Congress Hold-Over 
Committee which was received by the Visiting Mission 
to the Trust Territories in the Pacific. 



' Bulletin of July 2.5, 1955, p. 153. 



' U.N. doe. T/PET. 10/29 dated Mar. 20. 
' Chairman of U.N. Visiting Mission. 



April 23, 1956 



691 



1 



A copy of this communication has been transmitted 
to the Acting High Commissioner of the Trust Territory. 

In transmitting the present communication to the Sec- 
retary-General, the Mission wishes to record the circum- 
stances in whicli it was received. 

On 8 March 19.50, the Mission held a meeting at Majuro 
with the members of the Marshallese Congress Hold- 
Over Committee in the course of which a wide range of 
matters came under discussion. The Committee stated 
that the people of the Marshall Islands had been in- 
formed officially that further nuclear tests would take 
place in the near future in the Trust Territory. The 
Committee wished to go on record before the Visiting 
Mission that they reiterated the position they had taken 
when they presented their petition in April 1954, namely : 
(a) that nuclear explosion tests in the Marshalls be 
discontinued; (b) that if these experiments were abso- 
lutely necessary for the eventual well-being of all the 
people of the world and could not take place elsewhere, 
all measures enumerated in their petition (T/PET. 10/28) 
should be taken. 

On the following day the Mission held a private meet- 
ing of its own to discuss several matters. During this 
meeting, doubts were expressed as to whether it was the 
intention of the Hold-Over Committee that their state- 
ment should be brought to the attention of the Trusteeship 
Council prior to the completion of the Visiting Mission's 
report. In order to clarify the situation, the Mission 
called in a representative of the Hold-Over Committee 
who stated that the Committee wished to have its views 
brought to the immediate attention of the Trusteeship 
Council and was prepared to put them in writing. On 10 
March the Mission received the present communication. 

The Mission also desires to record that during a dis- 
cussion with him, the Acting High Commissioner informed 
the Mission that all possible precautions were being taken 
to ensure the safety and the well-being of the people in 
the vicinity of the test area. 

It is requested that the present letter be transmitted 
to the members of the Trusteeship Council at the same 
time as the attached communication. 

John Macpherson 



Text of Petition 



March 9th, 1956 



To : The United Nations Visiting Mission 

From : The Marshallese Congress Hold-Over Commit- 
tee 

Subject : Ee-iteration of the Marshallese people's petition 
to the United Nations, dated April 20th, 1954, 
regarding the explosion of lethal weapons 
within our home islands. 

In view of the official announcement to the Marshallese 
people of the coming nuclear test in this area in the 
not too distant future, we, the members of the Marshall- 
ese Congress Hold-Over Committee and other interested 
leaders of our people re-itei'ate our petition of April 20th, 
1954, which dealt with the explosion of lethal weapons 
within our home islands. 

Our petition emphatically stated that : 



1. All the experiments with lethal weapons within 
this area be immediately ceased. 

2. If the experiments with said weapons should be 
judged absolutely necessary for the eventual well being of 
all the people of this world and cannot be stopped or 
changed to other areas due to the unavailability of other 
locations, we then submit the following suggestions: 

(a) All possible precautionary measures be taken be- 
fore such weapons are exploded. All human beings and 
their valuable possessions be transported to safe distancea 
lirst, before such explosions occur. 

(b) All the people living in this area be instructed in 
safety measures. The people of Rongelab would have 
avoided much danger if they had known not to drink 
the waters on their home island after the radio-active 
dusts had settled on them. 

(c) Adequate funds be set aside to pay for the pos- 
sessions of the people in case they will have to be moved 
from their homes. This will include lands, houses and 
whatever possessions they cannot take with them, so 
that the unsatisfactory arrangements for the Bikinians 
and Bnewetak people shall not be repeated. 

(d) Courses be taught to Marshallese Medical Prac- 
titioners and Health-Aides which will be useful in the 
detecting of and the circumventing of preventable 
dangers. 

Our request Number 1 was not heeded, another test 
will soon be made. Request Number 2, to some degree, 
has been taken care of to the satisfaction of the Mar- 
shallese people. The Rongelab people are well subsisted 
and housed, and the medical care rendered them is ex- 
cellent, yet, they are still on the small island of Ejit: 
but together with the Administering Authority, the re- 
sponsible Rongelab leaders, and other Marshallese realize 
that long living in an abnormal existence is detrimental 
to their society. They were told that they will soon be 
going back to their home island, Rongelab, and with them, 
the other Marshallese are looking forward to the fulfill- 
ment of this promise. 

Bikini and Enewetak, like all the other land claims 
in the Marshall Islands, have not been compensated for, 
or returned to the owners. We should like to repeat here 
that, "Land means a great deal to the Marshallese. It 
means more than just a place where you can plant your 
food crops and build your houses ; or a place where you 
can bury your dead. It is the very life of the people. 
Take away their land and their spirits go also." 

Therefore, we, the members of the Marshallese Con- 
gress Hold-Over Committee, who are empowered by the 
Marshallese Congress to act in its name when it is not 
in session and which is in turn a group of members 
representing all the municipalities in the Marshalls, due 
to the undiminishing threat to our life, liberty, happiness 
and po-ssession of land, do hereby submit this document 
to the United Nations Visiting Mission with the request 
that they send this on to the United Nations Trustee- 
ship Council as soon as possible, which with its knowledge 
of our great concern may then act on our urgent plea and 
take all steps within its power to help remedy the situ- 
ation. 

In closing, we, the members of the Marshallese Con- 
gress Hold-Over Committee want to make it very clear to 



692 



Department of State Bulletin 



the United Nations Visiting Mission that this should not 
be interpreted as a reflection of the Trust Territory 
Government's deliberate ill-treatment of the Marshallese 
people or be misconstrued as a repudiation of the United 
States as our governing agency for the United Nations 
under the trusteeship Agreement, for aside from repeat- 
ing our plea to have the nuclear tests within our home 
islands stopped as we are fearful of the danger these 
lethal weapons can and have inflicted on people living in 
the Marshalls, and the deep concern we have for the 
number of people who have been dispossessed of land, 
we have found the Administering Authority the most 
aitreeable one we ever had. 

Respectfully submitted, 

1. Kabtja Kabua 7. Henet Samtjel 

2. Atlan Anien (absent) 8. Jiblock 

3. DwiGHT Heine 9. Aiseia David 

4. Robert Reimers 10. Amata Kabua 

."i. C. DoMiNicK 11. Lazarus Simon (absent) 

6. Namu Ermis (absent) 12. Lajibiu (absent) 



Current U.N. Documents: 
A Selected Bibliography 



Security Council 

Letter Dated 21 January 1956 from the Minister of Ex- 
ternal Affairs of the Sudan Addressed to the Secretary- 

; General Concerning the Application of the Sudan for 
Admission to Membership in the United Nations and 
Declaration Accepting Obligations Under the Charter. 
S/3543, January 30, 1954. 3 pp. mimeo. 

Letter Dated 10 February 1956 from the Representative of 
Saudi Arabia Addressed to the President of the Security 
Council. S/354S, February 10, 1956. 2 pp. mimeo. 

Letter Dated 6 March 1956 from the Representative of 
Israel addressed to the President of the Security 
Council. S/3554, March 7, 1956. 3 pp. mimeo. 

General Assembly 

Unref Executive Committee. Revised Plan of Opera- 
tions (1956) (Submitted by the High Commissioner). 
A/AC.79/21, November 28, 1955. 131 pp. mimeo. 

Information From Non-Self-Governing Territories : Sum- 
mary and Analysis of Information Transmitted under 
Article 73e of the Charter. Report of the Secretary- 
' General. Indian Ocean Territories. A/3107, December 
22, 1955. 90 pp. mimeo. 

Information From Xon-Self-Governing Territories : Sum- 
mary and Analysis of Infonnation Transmitted Under 
Article 73e of the Charter. Report of the Secretary- 
General. Asian Territories [Brunei, Federation of 
Malaya, Hong Kong, North Borneo, Sarawali, Singa- 
pore.] A/3108, February 1.5, 1956. 138 pp. mimeo. 

Information From Non-Self-Governing Territories : Sum- 
mary and Analysis of Information Transmitted Under 
Article 73e of the Charter. Report of the Secretary- 
General. Central African Territories [Belgian Congo, 
French Equatorial Africa, Northern Rhodesia, Nyasa- 
land]. A/3109, January 16, 1956. 132 pp. mimeo. 

Information From Non-Self-Governing Territories : Sum- 
mary and Analysis of Information Transmitted Under 
Article 73e of the Charter. Report of the Secretary- 
General. East African Territories [British Somali- 
land, French Somaliland, Kenya, Uganda, Zanzibar]. 
A/3110, February 1, 1956. 109 pp. mimeo. 

Information From Non-Self-Governing Territories : Sum- 



mary and Analysis of Information Transmitted Under 
Article 73e of the Charter. Report of the Secretary- 
General. West African Territories [French West 
Africa, Gambia, Gold Coast, Nigeria, Sierra Leone]. 
A/3113, January 23, 1956. 149 pp. mimeo. 

Information From Non-Self-Governing Territories : Sum- 
mary and Analysis of Information Transmitted Under 
Article 73e of the Charter. Report of the Secretary- 
General. Other Territories [Aden, Cyprus, Falkland 
Islands, Gibraltar, Saint Helena]. A/3114, February 8, 
1956. 90 pp. mimeo. 

Application of the Sudan For Admission to Membership in 
the United Nations. Letters dated 21 and 12 January 
1956 from the Minister of External Affairs of the Sudan 
addressed to the Secretary-General. A/3117, January 
31, 1956. 3 pp. mimeo. 



Economic and Social Council 

Rural Electrification. Propaganda (sales promotion) 
methods at present applied in the various countries. 
E/ECE/219, E/ECE/EP/177, November 1955. 48 pp. 
mimeo. 

Forced Labour. Report by the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations and the Director-General of the Inter- 
national Labour Office. E/2S15, December 15, 1955. 
356 pp. mimeo. 

Commission on the Status of Women. Information Con- 
cerning the Status of Women in Trust Territories 
(Report by the Secretary-General). E/CN.6/273, Jan- 
uary 10, 1956. 20 pp. mimeo. 

Commission on Narcotic Drugs. The Proposed Single 
Convention on Narcotic Drugs (The International Drug 
Convention). Views of Governments on (i) the pro- 
cedure for amending the Single Convention, and (ii) the 
question of reservations. E/CN.7/308, January 17, 
1956. 20 pp. mimeo. 

Commission on the Status of Women. Status of Women 
in Family Law. Report of the Secretary-General based 
on replies from Governments to Part HI of the Ques- 
tionnaire on the Legal Status and Treatment of Women. 
E/CN.6/185/Add. 15, January 19, 1956. 27 pp. mimeo. 

Commission on the Status of Women. Technical As- 
sistance : Summary of Selected Projects Affecting the 
Status of Women and Selected List of Materials. 
Memorandum by the Secretary-General. E/CN.6/274, 
January 24, 1956. 63 pp. mimeo. 

Commission on the Status of Women. Opportunities for 
Women in Handicrafts and Cottage Industries. Prog- 
ress Report prepared by the International Labour Of- 
fice. E/CN.6/282, January 26, 1956. 11 pp. mimeo. 

Report of the Eighth Session of the Sub-Commission on 
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Mi- 
norities to the Commission on Human Rights. New 
York, 3 to 20 January 1956. E/CN.4/721, E/CN.4/ 
Sub.2/177, January 31, 1956. 71 pp. mimeo. 

International Co-operation on Cartography. Report of 
the Secretary-General. E/2823, February 2, 1956. 45 
pp. mimeo. 

Commission on the Status of Women. Opportunities for 
Gii'ls in Vocational and Technical Education. Report 
prepared jointly by the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization and by the Inter- 
national Labour Organisation. E/CN.6/280, February 
2, 1956. 101 pp. mimeo. 

Statistical Commission. General Conclusions Concern- 
ing Statistical Aspects of International Definition and 
Measurement of Levels of Living (Memorandum pre- 
pared by the Secretary-General). E/CN.3/214, Febru- 
ary 2, 1956. 19 pp. mimeo. 

Statistical Commission. Observations Made by a Study 
Group on Measurement of Levels of Health, in Con- 
nexion with International Definition and Measurement 
of Standards and Levels of Living (Summary account 
prepared by the World Health Organization). B/CN. 
3/213/Add. 4, February 7, 1956. 4 pp. mimeo. 



April 23, 1956 



693 



Conimission on the Status of Women. Equal Remunera- 
tion for Men and Women for Work of Equal Value. 
Ueixirt piepaied by the International Labour Office. 
E/CN.()/2S;j, February 9, l!J.j(J. 11 pp. mimeo. 

Statistical Commission. Statistics of the Distribution of 
Income (Memorandum prepared by the Secretary- 
General). E/CN.3/208, Feliruary 10, 19.56. 50 pp. 
mimeo. 

Slavery. Draft Supplementar.v Convention on the Abo- 
lition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and 
Practices Similar to Slavery : Report of the Committee 
Appointed by Resolution 564 (XIX). New York, 16 
January to 6 February 1956. E/2S24, February 15, 
1056. 76 pp. mimeo. 

International Co-operation with respect to Water Re- 
source Develojanent. Rejiort by the Secretary-General. 
E/2827, February 23, 1056. 43 pp. mimeo. 



TREATY INFORMATION 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 



Colombia 

Agreement providing for disposition of equipment and 
materials furnished by the United States under the 
military assistance agreement of April 17, 1952 (TIAS 
240(;), and no longer required by Colombia. Effected 
by exchange of notes at Bogotd February 22 and March 
14, 1956. Entered into force March 14, 1956. 

France 

Agicemcnt relating to the grant of plots of land located - 
in France for the creation of permanent military ceme- 
teries or the construction of war memorials, with an- 
nexes. Signed at Paris March 19, 1956. Entered into 
force March 19, 1956. 

Uruguay 

General agreement for a program of technical coopera- 
tion. Signed at Montevideo March 23, 1956. Will enter 
into force on date Uruguay notifies the United States 
of its ratification. 

Viet-Nam 

Agreement providing for direct forces support pursuant 
to economic cooperation agreement of September 7, 
1951 (TIAS 2346). Effected by exchange of notes at 
Saigon February 21 and March 7, 1955. Entered into 
force March 7, 1955. 

Agreement relating to the disposition of equipment and 
materials furnished by the United States found surplus 
to the needs of the Vietnamese armed forces. Effected 
by exchange of notes at Saigon March 1 and May 10, 
19.'35. Entered into force Slay 10, 1955. 



Bills of Lading 

International convention for unification of certain rules 
relating to bills of lading, and protocol of signature. 
Done at Brussels August 25, 1924. Entered into force 
June 2, 1931. 51 Stat. 2.33. 
Accession deposited: Turkey, July 4, 1955. 

Cultural Property 

Convention for protection of cultural property in the 

event of armed conflict, and regulations of execution. 

Done at The Hague May 14, 19.54." 

Ratifications deposited: San Marino, February 9, 1956; 
Burma, February 10, 1956. 
Protocol for the protection of cultural property in the 

event of armed conflict. Done at The Hague May 14, 

1954.' 

Ratifications deposited: San Marino, February 9, 1956; 
Burma, February 10, 1956. 

Genocide 

Convention on the prevention and punishment of the 
crime of genocide. Done at Paris December 9, 1948. 
Entered into force January 12, 1951.'' 
Ratification deposited: Burma, March 14, 1956. 



BILATERAL 

Chile 

Agreement providing an interim arrangement for certain 
tran.sactions pending the entry into force of the sur- 
plus agricultural commodities agreement of March 13, 
19.56. Effected by exchange of notes at Santiago March 
20 and 26, 1956. Entered into force March 26, 1956. 

China 

Agreement regarding passport visas and visa fees. Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at Taipei December 20. 1955, 
and February 20, 1956. Entered into force February 
20, 1956. 

694 



THE FOREIGN SERVICE 



First Career Ambassadors Sworn In 

In simultaneous ceremonies at Washington, The Hague, 
and Rio de Janeiro, the United States' first four Career 
Ambassadors took the oath of oflice on April 9. They 
are : James Clement Dunn, Ambassador to Brazil ; Loy 
W. Henderson, Deputy Under Secretary for Adminis- 
tration ; H. Freeman Matthews, Ambassador to the 
Netherlands ; and Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Sec- 
retary of State. All four are veteran career Foreign 
Service officers. (For biographic details, see press re- 
lense 1.S3 dated April 9.) 

The class of career ambassador was created by Public 
Law 250, 84th Congress. Under the terms of the law, 
nominees for appointment to the class must have had at 
least 15 years of Government service in a position of re- 
sponsibility, including at least 3 years as a career min- 
ister, and must have rendered exceptionally distinguished 
service to the Government. 



Confirmations 

The Senate on April 12 confirmed Lowell C. Pinkerton 
to be Ambassador to the Sudan. 



' Not in force. 

' Not in force for the United States. 



Department of State Bulletin 



April 23, 1956 



Ind 



e X 



Vol. XXXIV, No. 878 



American Republics 

The Inter-American Partnership (Milton Eisenhower)^ . . 682 

Inter-American Port and Harbor Conference 688 

Solidarity of Westera Hemisphere 683 

Atomic Enersry 

Marshall Islanders' Petition on Nuclear Tests in Pacific 

(Gerig, text of petition) 680 

NATO Atomic Information Agreement Enters Into Force . 668 

Austria. Triangular Sales of Farm Products to Italy and 

Austria 680 

Brazil. Vice President of Brazil To Visit U.S 681 

Congress, The 

Current Legislation 673 

The Mutual Security Program for Europe (Elbrick) . . 674 

Dominican Republic. Tariff Negotiations With Finland, 

France, Dominican Republic 687 

Economic Affairs 

Continuation of Rate of Duty on Imports of Hatters' Fur . 688 
Tariff Negotiations With Finland, France, Dominican 

Republic 687 

Triangular Sales of Farm Products to Italy and Austria . 680 

World Trade Week (text of proclamation) 686 

Western Europe Cuts Curbs on Dollar-Area Imports . . 686 

Europe 

The Mutual Security Program for Europe (Elbrick) . . 674 
Western Europe Cuts Curbs on Dollar-Area Imports . . 686 

Finland. Tariff Negotiations With Finland, France, 

Dominicau Republic 687 

Foreign Service 

Confirmations (Pinkerton) 694 

First Career Ambassadors Sworn In (594 

France. Tariff Negotiations With Finland, France, Do- 
minican Republic 687 

Germany. A Report on Germany (Conant)i 669 

Hungary. .Hungary Accepts U.S. Offer of Emergency Food 

Aid 680 

International Law. Fifty Years of Progress in Interna- 
tional Law (Phleger) 663 

International Organizations and Meetings. Inter-American 

Port and Harbor Conference 688 

Italy. Triangular Sales of Farm Products to Italy and 

Austria 680 

Libya. U.S. Aid to Libya 680 

Morocco. Spanish-Moroccan Declaration (texts of mes- 
sages, declaration, and protocol) 667 

Mutual Security 

The Mutual Security Program for Europe (Elbrick) . . 674 

New ICA Loan to Turkey 681 

U.S. Aid to Libya 680 

Near East. U.S. Policy in Middle East (Hagerty) . . . 668 

Non-Self-Governing Territories. Marshall Islanders' Peti- 
tion on Nuclear Tests in Paciiie (Gerig, text of peti- 
tion) 689 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

The Mutual Security Program for Europe (Elbrick) . . 674 
NATO Atomic Information Agreement Enters Into Force . 668 

Presidential Documents. World Trade Week 686 

Refugees and Displaced Persons. Appointments to Advis- 
Refugees and Displaced Persons. Appointments to Advi- 
sory Group on liefugee Relief Program 679 

Spain 

Conversations With Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs 

(Dulles. Martin Artajo, text of joint communique) . . 666 

Spanish-Moroccan Declaration (texts of messages, declara- 
tion, and protocol) 667 

Sudan. Pinkerton confirmed as ambassador 694 



Treaty Information 

Current Actions 694 

NATO Atomic Information Agreement Enters Into Force '. 668 

Turkey. New ICA Loan to Turkey 681 

United Nations 

Current U.N. Documents 693 

Marshall Islanders' Petition on Nuclear Tests in Pacific 

(Gerig, text of petition) 689 

U.S. Policy in Middle East (Hagerty) '. 668 

Name Indew 

Conant, James B 869 

Dulles, Secretary \ \ 666 

Dunn, James Clement ] 694 

Eisenhower, Milton S [ 682 

Eisenhower, President ' " ego 

Elbrick. C. Burke [ 674 

Gerig, Benjamin ' 689 

Goulart, JoSo 681 

Hagerty, James C ', 668 

Henderson, Loy W 694 

Macpherson, John ] 691 

Martin Artajo. Alberto . 666 

Matthews. H. Freeman 694 

Murphy, Robert '. 694 

Phleger, Herman 663 

Pinkerton, Lowell C 694 



Check List off Department off State 


Press Releases: April 9-15 


Releases may be obtained from the News Division, 


Department of State, Washington 25, D.C. 


Press release issued prior to April 9 which ap- 


pears 


in this issue of the Bulletin is No. 178 of 


April 6. 




No. 


Date 


Subject 


182 


4/9 


Advisers on Refugee Relief Program. 


183 


4/9 


Ceremonies for career ambassadors 
(rewrite). 


184 


4/9 


U.S. aid to Libya. 


18.5 


4/9 


Welcome to Spanish Foreign Minister. 


180 


4/10 


Spanish-Moroccan declaration. 


187 


4/11 


Inter-American Port and Harbor Con- 
ference (rewrite). 


*188 


4/11 


Merchant nominated Ambassador to 
Canada. 


*189 


4/12 


Mills sworn in as Ambassador to 
Afghanistan. 


tl90 


4/12 


Foreign Relations volume. 


191 


4/12 


U.S. food aid offer to Hungary. 


tl92 


4/12 


Holland : "Ideological Aspects of the 
Communist Prolilem." 


in.-? 


4/12 


U.S.-Spanish communique. 


194 


4/12 


Negotiations under GATT. 


195 


4/13 


Pan American Day and Week. 


190 


V13 


Visit of Brazilian Vice President. 


*197 


4/13 


Holland : "The Soviet Policy of Peace- 
ful Coexistence." 

ted. 


*Not prin 


tHeld foi 


a later issue of the BuLLE'nN. 




the 

Department 

of 



State 




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OFFICIAL BUSINESS 



Available in pamphlet form — two recent statements by Fran- 
cis 0. Wilcox, Assistant Secretary for International Organiza- 
tion Affairs. 

The United Nations: Some New Perspectives After Ten Years 

This address before the National Press Club, January 13, 
1956, assesses the implications for U.S. foreign policy of recent 
developments affecting the United Nations. Among its topics 
are the impact of the Bandung conference and the Geneva 
summit conference, the admission of new members to the 
United Nations, peaceful uses of atomic energy, disarmament, 
economic assistance to underdeveloped countries, and review 
of the United Nations Charter. 



Publication 6047 



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The Soviet Challenge and the United Nations 

This address was made before the Annual Convention of the 
American Association of Junior Colleges at New York City, 
March 9, 1956. It deals with the new look in Soviet tactics 
which became manifest at the Geneva summit conference and 
was shown in the rewriting of some of the Stalinist dogma by 
the Soviet 20th Congress. The pamphlet discusses why Soviet 
tactics have changed, what the challenge of the new Soviet 
strategy means to the United Nations, and what colleges and 
universities can do about it. It emphasizes that study of the 
United Nations is of great importance in the teaching of inter- 
national affairs, and examines facts and fallacies about the 
United Nations. 

Publication 6310 15 cents 

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y/ie' ^e^iu^^f^fhnem^ /(w t/ta£e^ 




. XXXIV, No. 879 
April 30, 1956 




OUR QUEST FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM • Address 

by President Eisenhower 699 

DEVELOPING NATO IN PEACE • Address by Secretary 

Dulles 706 

THE SOVIET REAPPRAISAL OF STALIN • by Deputy 

Under Secretary Murphy 719 

OBJECTIVES [OF, THE MUTUAL SECURITY PRO- 
GRAM IN ASIA • Statement by Assistant Secretary 
Robertson . . . .f 723 

UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY IN AFRICA • by 

Assistant Secretary Allen 716 



For index see inside back cover 



Boston Public Library- 
Superintendent of Docuraentt 



MAY 2 2 1956 



^ne z/^e/i€i'»i{^i€'nt c^ C/lctle 




bulletin 



Vol. XXXIV, No. 879 • Publication 6329 



April 30, 1956 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington 25, D.C. 

Price: 

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Single copy, 20 cents 

The printing of this publication has been 
approved by the Director of the Bureau of 
the Budget (January 19, 1955). 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and Items contained herein may 
be reprinted. Citation of the Department 
or State Bdlletin as the source will be 
appreciated. 



The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a tveekly publication issued by the 
Public Services Division, provides the 
public and interested agencies of 
the Government with information on 
developments in the field of foreign 
relations and on the work of the 
Department of Stute and the Foreign 
Service. The BULLETIN includes se- 
lected press releases on foreign policy, 
issued by the White House and the 
Department, and statements and ad- 
dresses made by the President and by 
the Secretary of State and other offi- 
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Publications of the Department, 
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Our Quest for Peace and Freedom 



Address hy President Eisenhower' 



Three years ago, when I last talked to you, 
stories from battlefields and fighting fronts 
crowded the front pages of our press. Human 
freedom was under direct assault in important 
sectors by the disciples of communistic dictator- 
ship. Violence and aggression were brutal daily 
facts for millions of human beings. Fear of glo- 
bal war, of a nuclear holocaust, darkened the fu- 
ture. To many, the chance for a just and enduring 
peace seemed hopeless. 

Today, only 3 years later, we have reason for 
cautious hope that a new, a fruitful, a peaceful 
era for mankind can emerge from a haunted 
decade. The world breathes a little more easily 
today. 

The prudent man will not delude himself that 
his hope for peace guarantees the realization of 
peace. Even with genuine good will, time and 
effort will be needed to correct the injustices, to 
cure the dangerous sores that plague the earth to- 
day. And the future alone can show whether tlie 
Communists really want to move toward a just 
and stable peace. 

Yet not for many years has there been such 
promise that patient, imaginative, enterprising 
effort could gradually be rewarded in steady de- 
crease in the dread of war ; in an economic surge 
that will raise the living standards of all the world ; 
in growing confidence that liberty and justice 
will one day overcome statism ; in the better under- 
standing among all peoples that is the essential 
prelude to true peace. 

This week marks the anniversary of one of the 
most important events in freedom's progress. 

' Made before the American Society of Newspaper Edi- 
tors and broadcast over radio and television at Wasbing- 
ton, D. C, on Apr. 21 (White House press release). 



One hundred eighty-one years ago on April 19th, 
our forefathers started a revolution that still goes 
on. The shots at Concord, as Emerson wrote, 
were heard "round the world." 

The echoes of Concord still stir men's minds. 

The Bandung meeting, last year, of Asian and 
African leaders bears witness to Emerson's vision. 
There, almost two centuries after Concord, and 
halfway round the earth. President Sukarno of 
Indonesia opened the conference with an eloquent 
tribute to Paul Revere and to the spirit of the 
American Revolution. 

Wliy do the musket shots of a few embattled 
farmers at the Concord bridge still ring out in 
far-off lands? 

The reason is clear. 

Concord was far more than a local uprising to 
redress immediate grievances. The enduring 
meaning of Concord lies in the ideas that inspired 
the historic stand there. Concord is the symbol 
of certain basic convictions about the relationship 
of man to the state. 

Those convictions were founded in a firm belief 
in the spiritual worth of the individual. He must 
be free to think, to speak, and to worship accord- 
ing to his conscience. He must enjoy equality 
before the law. He must have a fair chance to 
develop and use his talents. The purpose of gov- 
ernment is to serve its citizens in freedom. 

Our forefathers did not claim to have discov- 
ered novel principles. They looked on their find- 
ings as universal values, the common property of 
all mankind. 

These deep convictions have always guided us 
as a Nation. They have taken deep root else- 
where in the Western World. In the 19th century 
they inspired a great surge of freedom through- 



Apti] 30, J 956 



699 



out Western Europe and in our own hemisphere. 

These ideas of freedom are still the truly revo- 
lutionary political principles abroad in the world. 
They appeal to the timeless aspirations of man- 
kind. In some regions they flourish ; in some they 
are officially outlawed. But everywhere, to some 
degree, they stir and inspire humanity. 

The all'airs of men do not stand still. The ideas 
of freedom will grow in vigor and influence — or 
they will gradually wither and die. If the area 
of freedom shrinks, the results for us will be tragic. 
Only if freedom continues to flourish will man 
realize the prosperity, the happiness, the enduring 
peace he seeks. 

Newly Independent Nations 

The appeal of the ideas of freedom has been 
shown dramatically during the past decade. In 
that time, 18 nations, totaling some G50 million 
people — a quarter of the human race — have gained 
independence. 

In manifold ways these nations differ widely 
from each other and from us. They are the heirs 
of many ancient cultures and national traditions. 
All of the great religions of the world are found 
among them. Their peoples speak in a hundred 
tongues. 

Yet they share in common with all free countries 
the basic and universal values that inspired our 
Nation's founders. 

They believe deeply in the right of self-govern- 
ment. 

They believe deeply in the dignity of man. 

They aspire to improve the welfare of the indi- 
vidual, as a basic aim of organized society. 

The new nations have many of the sensitivities 
that marked our own early years as a free Nation. 
They are proud of their independence and quick 
to resent any slight to their sovereignty. Some 
of them are concerned to avoid involvements with 
other nations, as we were for many years. 

Certainly we Americans should understand and 
respect these points of view. "We must accept the 
right of each nation to choose its own path to the 
future. 

All of these countries are faced with immense 
obstacles and difficulties. Freedom and human 
dignity must rest upon a satisfactory economic 
base. Yet in many of these new nations, incomes 
average less than $100 per year. Abject poverty 
blinds men's eyes to the beauty of freedom's ideals. 



Hopelessness makes men prey to any promise of a 
better existence, even the most false and spurious. 

Of ttimes the peoples of these countries expected 
independence itself to produce rapid material 
progress. Their political leaders are therefore 
under heavy pressure to find shortcuts and quick 
answers to the problems facing them. 

Under these conditions, we cannot expect that 
the vision of a free society will go unchallenged. 
The Communists, aware of unsatisfied desires for 
better conditions of life, falsely pretend they can 
rapidly solve the problems of economic develop- 
ment and industrialization. They hold up the 
Soviet Union as a model and a guide. But the 
Communists conceal the terrible human costs that 
characterize their ruthless system of dictatorship 
and forced labor. 

"We have a vital interest in assuring that newly 
independent nations preserve and consolidate the 
free institutions of their choice. 

The prospects for peace are brightest when 
enlightened self-governing peoples control the 
policy of nations. Peoples do not want war. 
Eulers beyond the reach of popular control are 
more likely to engage in reckless adventures and 
to raise the grim threat of war. The spread of 
freedom enhances the prospect for durable peace. 

That prospect would be dimmed or destroyed 
should freedom be forced into steady retreat. 
Then the remaining free societies, our own among 
them, would one day find themselves beleaguered 
and imperiled. We would face once again the 
dread prospect of paj'ing dearly in blood for our 
own survival. 

In every corner of the globe, it is far less costly 
to sustain freedom than to recover it when lost. 

Moreover, our own well-being is bound up in 
the well-being of other free nations. We cannot 
prosper in peace if we are isolated from the rest 
of the world. If our economy is to continue to 
flourish and grow, our Nation will need more 
trade, not less. The steady growth of other na- 
tions, especially the less developed coimtries, will 
create new and growing demands for goods and 
services. It will produce an environment which 
will benefit both them and us. 

Indeed, Atlanta, Pittsburgh, Seattle — every 
American town and farm — has a stake in the suc- 
cess or failure of these new nations — a stake al- 
most impossible to exaggerate. 

If these new nations are to achieve economic 
progress with freedom, they will have to provide 



700 



Department of State Bulletin 



I'nany of the necessary ingi-edients for themselves. 

Only these peoples and their leaders can sup- 
ply the initiative and determination essential for 
success. And they must mobilize the larger part 
of the resources they require. 

But these nations are gravely lacking in trained 
men for management, production, education, and 
1 he professions. Their institutions for such train- 
ing are limited. Hence they are handicapped in 
trying to extend modern techniques to agriculture, 
industry, and other fields. 

They also face shortages of capital and foreign 
excliange, even tliough they strain to mobilize 
their own resources. Private foreign investment 
should be utilized as much as feasible; but, for 
many areas, it will clearly fall far short of the 
requirements. Moreover, their tasli of improving 
conditions of life is made the more diificult by 
tlieir large and steadily increasing populations. 

Inevitably tliese nations must look abroad for 
assistance, as ours did for so many years. They 
want lielp, first of all, in real and enduring friend- 
ship. They want help in training skilled people 
and in securing investment capital to supplement 
their own resources. For such help they will 
look to us as the most prosperous and advanced 
economy of the world. 

Foresight will compel an understanding re- 
sponse from us. In our own enlightened interest 
we can and must do much to help others in pur- 
suit of their legitimate aspirations. 

Further, we must recognize that economic and 
technical assistance cannot be a transitory policy. 
The problems of economic progi'ess are not to be 
solved in a single spurt. Our efforts must be sus- 
tained over a number of years. 

To do tlie most good, some part of our material 
help will have to be f urnislied on a long-term basis 
which these nations can plan on. For some pur- 
poses, commitments on a strictly annual basis are 
not sufficient. It takes time to complete major 
projects like hydroelectric and reclamation de- 
velopments. If the new nations can plan on some 
part of our help for several years, they will be 
better able to mobilize resoui-ces of their own and 
assistance from others. 

Furtliermore, our assistance must be used 
flexibly to fit needs and plans as they develop. 
We must be ready to adapt our help promptly to 
meet changing conditions. 

The development program for mutual security 
now before the Congress is based on these consid- 



erations. It seeks from the Congress the addi- 
tional authority tliat would add essential flexi- 
bility and continuity to a part — a modest part — 
of the program. The amounts requested are the 
practicable minimum. In its entirety it is not, 
I assure you, an excessive program. It is in our 
national interest, in the fullest sense of that term. 

"Collective" Dictatorship in U.S.S.R. 

The ideas of freedom are at work, even where 
they are officially rejected. As we know, Lenin 
and his successors, true to Communist doctrine, 
based the Soviet State on tlie denial of these ideas. 
Yet the new Soviet rulers who took over 3 years 
ago have had to reckon with the force of these 
ideas, botli at home and abi-oad. 

The situation the new regime inherited from the 
dead Stalin apparently caused it to reappraise 
many of his mistakes. 

Having lived under his one-man rule, they have 
espoused the concept of "collective" dictatorship. 
But dictatorship it still remains. They have de- 
nounced Stalin for some of the more flagrant ex- 
cesses of his brutal rule. But the individual citi- 
zen still lacks the most elementary safeguards of 
a free society. The desire for a better life is still 
being sacrificed to the insatiable demands of the 
state. 

In foreign affairs, the new regime has seemingly 
moderated the policy of violence and hostility 
which has caused the free nations to band together 
to defend their independence and liberties. For 
the present, at least, it relies more on political and 
economic means to spread its influence abroad. In 
the last year, it has embarked upon a campaign of 
lending and trade agreements directed especially 
toward the newly developing countries. 

It is still too early to assess in any final way 
whether the Soviet regime wishes to provide a 
real basis for stable and enduring relations. 

Despite tlie changes so far, much of Stalin's 
foreign policy remains unchanged. The major in- 
ternational issues which have troubled the post- 
war world are still unsolved. More basic changes 
in Soviet policy will have to take place before the 
free nations can afford to relax their vigilance. 

Guidelines for Future 

At Concord, our forebears undertook the strug- 
gle for freedom in this country. History has now 
called us to special tasks for sustaining and ad- 
vancing this great cause in the world. 



April 30, 1956 



701 



As we take stock of our position and of the prob- 
lems that lie ahead, we must chart our course by 
three main guidelines: 

First: We must inainta'm a collective shield 
against aggression to allow the free peoples to 
seek their valued goals in safety. 

We can take some cautious comfort in the signs 
that the Soviet rulers may have relegated military 
aggression to the background and adopted less 
violent methods to promote their aims. Neverthe- 
less, Soviet military power continues to grow. 
Their forces are being rapidly modernized and 
equipped with nuclear weapons and long-range 
delivery systems. 

So long as freedom is threatened and armaments 
are not controlled, it is essential for us to keep a 
strong military establishment ourselves and 
strengthen the bonds of collective security. 

Without help from us, many of our allies could 
not afford to equip and maintain the forces needed 
for self-defense. Assistance to them is part of 
our proper contribution to the systems of common 
defense. If those systems did not exist, we would 
have to bear much greater costs ourselves. Thus, 
in aiding our allies the mutual security program 
also advances our own security interests. 

We hold our military strength only to guard 
against aggression and to insure that the world 
remains at peace. War in our time has become 
an anachronism. Whatever the case in the past, 
war in the future can serve no useful purpose. A 
war which became general, as any limited action 
might, could only result in the virtual destruction 
of mankind. 

Hence our search must be unceasing for a system 
to regulate and reduce armaments under reliable 
safeguards. So far, the Soviet Union has refused 
to accept such safeguards. But even now we are 
earnestly negotiating toward this end. The prob- 
lems involved are difficult and complex. We can- 
not afford to underestimate them. But we cannot 
slacken our efforts to lift the burden of armaments 
and to remove their threat. 

If effective measures of disarmament could be 
agi-eed upon, think how the world could be trans- 
formed ! Atomic energy used for peace — not 
war — could bring about the development of a new 
industrial age. Far more human energy and out- 
put could be devoted to reducing poverty and need. 
To that end, as I said to you 3 years ago, we would 
"join with all nations in devoting a substantial 



percentage of the savings achieved by disarma- 
ment to a fund for world aid and reconstruction." 
Of even more importance, the pall of mutual 
suspicions, fear, and hatred that covers the earth 
would be swept away in favor of confidence, 
prosperity, and human happiness. 

Our second guideline: Within the free conu- 
7nunity, ice ynust he a helpful and considerate 
partner in creating conditions whei'c freedom will 
flourish. 

Beyond defense, the crucial task of the free 
nations is to work together in constructive ways 
to advance the welfare of their peoples. Arms 
alone can give the world no permanent peace, no 
confident security. Arms are solely for defense — 
to protect from violent assault what we already 
have. They are only a costly insurance. They 
cannot add to human progress. Indeed, no matter 
how massive, arms by themselves would not pre- 
vent vital sections of the world from falling prey 
to Communist blandishment or subversion. 

If we are to preserve freedom here, it must like- 
wise thrive in other important areas of the earth. 
For the welfare of ourselves and others, we must, 
therefore, help the rest of the free world achieve 
its aspirations. For our mutual benefit, we must 
join in building for greater future prosperity, for 
more human liberty, and for lasting peace. 

Within the Atlantic community, our aim must 
be to strengtlien the close bonds which have stead- 
ily developed since the war. On Monday next the 
Secretary of State will speak on this topic. 

In the less developed nations, the urgent need 
is for economic and social progress for their peo- 
ples. Tonight I have spoken particularly about 
the newer nations of Asia and Africa which face 
such urgent problems. Of equal importance is 
continuing progress in other areas, especially by 
our neighbors in Latin America, who are our fast 
friends. These developing nations need the full 
measure of our help in understanding and re- 
sources. 

The steady progress of the free world also de- 
pends on the healthy flow of peaceful trade. Our 
example will be of crucial importance in freeing 
the channels of such trade from wasteful re- 
straints. We can take an important step to that 
end by joining the Organization for Trade Co- 
operation. Our national interest will be served by 
passage of the legislation for that purpose now 
pending in the Congress. 



702 



Department of State Bulletin 



Another important task is in helping to resolve 
disputes between friends we value highly. Such 
disputes impair the unity of the free nations and 
impede their advance. In these situations, each 
side would like the United States to back its point 
of view without reservation. But for us to do so 
could seldom contribute to the settling of the dis- 
putes. It would only sharpen the bitter enmities 
between the opposing sides and impair our value 
in helping to reach a fair solution. 

Our aim and effort must be to assist in temper- 
ing the fears and antagonisms which lead to such 
disputes. 

My words apply with special force to the 
troubled area of the Middle East. We will do all 
in our power — through the United Nations when- 
ever possible — to prevent resort to violence there. 
We are determined to support and assist any na- 
tion in that area which might be subjected to ag- 
gression. We will strive untiringly to build the 
foundations for stable peace in the whole region. 

In these and many other constructive ways, our 
Nation must help to build an environment con- 
genial to freedom. 

Our third guideline is this: We must seek, by 
every peaceful means, to induce the Soviet bloc to 
correct existing injustices and genuinely to pursue 
peaceful purposes in its relations with other na- 
tions. 

I As I have said, many of the wrongs of Stalin 
against other nations still prevail under his suc- 
cessors. Despite the efforts of the West at Berlin 

II and Geneva, Germany is still divided by the Soviet 
' veto of free all-German elections. The satellite 

nations of Eastern Europe are still ruled by Soviet 
puppets. In Asia, Korea remains divided and 
stable peace has not yet been achieved. 

We must be tireless in our efforts to remedy these 
injustices and to resolve the disputes that divide 
the world. These knotty problems will yield to 
patient and sincere effort. We stand ready to 
explore all avenues for their just settlement. We 
will not grow weary in our quest for peaceful 
remedies for the enslavement or wrongful division 
of once-free nations. 

The interests and purposes of the United States 
and of the free world do not conflict with the 
legitimate interests of the Russian nation or the 
aspirations of its people. A Soviet government 
genuinely devoted to these purposes can have 
friendly relations with the United States and the 



free world for the asking. We will welcome that 
day. 

Need for Devoted Effort 

We cannot doubt that the current of world his- 
tory flows toward freedom. In the long run dic- 
tatorship and despotism must give way. We can 
take courage from that sure knowledge. 

But as a wise American, Mr. Justice Holmes, 
once said : "The inevitable comes to pass through 
effort." We should take these words to heart 
in our quest for peace and freedom. These great 
aspirations of humanity will be brought about — 
but only by devoted human effort. 

Concord is a symbol of the faith, courage, and 
sacrifice on which the victory of freedom depends. 
We in our day must strive with the same dedica- 
tion that brought the militiamen to the Concord 
bridge. If we do so, freedom will surely prevail. 

[After the President went off the air, he spoke to the 
society as follows:] 

To give you my feeling about what I would like 
to say now, I will tell you a story of when I was a 
young lieutenant in a regiment on the Mexican 
border. There was not a great deal to do in those 
days, and some people indulged in acquaintance- 
ship with John Barleycorn more than they should. 

One morning a couple of us young second lieu- 
tenants were up as usual long before the captains 
were, and we were standing by one captain's tent 
as he got his feet out of the bunk. He was sitting 
there on the edge of it with his head in his hands, 
and he says r "I am nothing but a mountain goat. 
All I do is jump from jag to jag." 

Now any man who through 35 minutes or 30 
minutes has been trying to hit the high spots of the 
world today, and America's position in the inter- 
national situation, certainly feels that he has been 
jumping from jag to jag on the mountain tops. 

So I wanted rather to come off" the summit of 
those high spots and talk with you for just a few 
minutes about some of the very great intricacies 
in this problem that we call developing foreign 
policies and in implementing them throughout the 
world. 

Now I think there is no use explaining the cold 
war. We all have pretty clear ideas of what is 
going on. But one thing that we do worry about 
is : Who is wimiing and who is losing ? 

Well, I don't think anybody knows, because 
the situation differs in every single corner of the 



April 30, 1956 



703 



globe. I have heard many people at home here 
say tluit we are losing the cold war every day. 
Others take exactly tlie opposite view, and these 
more hopefid ones can point to some facts rather 
than merely allegations about our prestige abroad, 
or how many friends do we have, and that sort of 
thing. 

Change in Soviet Policy 

For example, wlij- was there such a sudden 
change in the Soviet policy ? They are out — their 
basic aim is to conquer the world — through world 
revolution if possible, but in any way. Their 
doctrine — anyone that has read any of their books 
knows that their doctrine is lies, deceit, subver- 
sion, war if necessary, but in any way: conquer 
the world. And that has not changed. 

But they changed their policies very markedly. 
They were depending on force and the threat of 
force only. And suddenly they have gone into an 
entirely different attitude. They are going into 
the economic and political fields and are really 
wearing smiles around the world instead of some 
of the bitter faces to which we have become 
accustomed. 

Now any time a policy is winning and the people 
are completely satisfied with it, you don't change. 
If you change policies that markedly, you destroy 
old idols, as they have been busy doing. You do 
it only when you think a great change is neces- 
sary. So I think we can take some comfort; at 
least we can give careful consideration to the very 
fact they had to change their policies. 

And I think the whole free world is trying to 
test and determine the sincerity of that plan, in 
order that the free nations themselves, in pur- 
suing their own policies, will make certain that 
they are not surprised in any place. 

But from the Communists — we look at some of 
the advances we think they have made, but let 
us remember : They did not conquer Korea, which 
they announced they were going to do. They 
were stopped finally in the northern part of Viet- 
Nam, and Diem, the leader of the southern Viet- 
Nam, the southern Vietnamese, is doing splendidly 
and a much better figure in that field than anyone 
even dared to hope. 

The Iranian situation, which only a few short 
years ago looked so desperate that each morning 
we thought we would wake up and read in our 
newspapers that Mossadegh had let them under 



the Iron Curtain, has not become satisfactory, 
but that crisis has passed and it is much better, 

The difficulty in Egypt between our British 
friends and our Egyptian friends over the big base 
was finally settled. 

The Trieste problem, which had plagued the 
world for many years, if not an ideal solution, 
has had a practical solution. 

The first bridgehead that communism had suc- 
ceeded, or practically succeeded, in establishing 
in our hemisphere has been thrown out. 

These are cold-war victories, because the pur- 
poses of the Russians were defeated. 

Now they have attempted to go into economic 
fields, and here their unity of action, brought 
about by the fact they are a single government, 
is creating new problems. > 

Free-World Economic Problems 

A group of free nations can stay together fairly 

easily when you have got a definite threat to their 
very existence right in their faces. As long as the 
Germans, for example, were powerful and aggres- 
sive in Europe in the Second World War, there 
was no great trouble in keeping the other nations 
pretty well together in policy and in action. But 
when those are lifted and j'ou go into the economic 
field, each of us — each country — has its own eco- 
nomic problems of itself; now it becomes very 
difficult for a group of free nations through spon- 
taneous cooperation to achieve a unity to oppose 
the other man. 

Let me take one example, just to show you how 
these things work out. Let us take Japan. There 
is no one in this room that needs a blueprint of 
how important it is to us that Japan stay out- 
side the Iron Curtain. A nation of 90 million 
industrious and inventive people, tied in with 
Communist China and with the Soviets, would 
indeed pose a thi-eat to us that would be very grave 
indeed. 

Japan is 90 million people living on fewer arable 
acres than there are in the State of California. 
How are they going to live? Well, they have 
got to trade. They have got to deal with other 
people outside. We won't trade with them. 
Every day — well, if not every day, every week — 
there come to government, including to my desk, 
pleas for greater protection against Japanese 
goods. 

Now this is not wholly one-sided, because some 



704 



Deparfment of Sfofe Bulletin 



of our citizens have found out that last year — I 
think my figures are correct — while we were buy- 
ing 60 million dollars' worth of cotton textile 
goods from Japan, they bought 120 million dol- 
lars' worth of our cotton. So even that problem 
is not clear in exactly what you should do. 

But anyway, we won't trade with them, so they 
can't make a living with us except on a minor scale. 
Iiut we get tired, properly — we can't be trying to 
sustain any other nation just with our money. So 
A\ e don't just give them the millions by whicli they 
(an go and buy all the things they need abroad. 

But the next thing we come up against : We are 
\ery certain in our own minds that some of these 
nations — not all the United States people, but 
some of them, are very loud in their denunciation 
of any country that trades with tlie Communist 
countries. So the Japanese can't trade with their 
natural markets, with Manchuria and China. So 
linally all of those southeastern markets, all the 
S(nitlieastern Asian markets, have been largely 
destroyed; they are so poor they can't support 
Japan. 

So what does Japan do ? Where are we chasing 
lit'r? Chasing her to one place. She has to look 
less and less to us and more to her mainland next 
to her. She has to, now, begin to look rather long- 
ingly unless something is done. Now that is the 
kind of cross-purpose that comes up, and this goes 
on around the world. Britain and France and 
Germany, indeed every country with which we 
deal has some problem different economically 
from our own. 

So we have a real job in trying to get agreed 
policies among the free nations and then to imple- 
ment them. 

Need for Information 

And I come, then, to the real purpose for ask- 
ing you people to listen to me for a few minutes 
more after my rather long, prepared address. 

It is this : Our Nation is called to leadership — 
and I am not going to argue the point, I know you 
all understand — leadership in the world, to lead 
it toward freedom, to keep expanding our areas of 
freedom and not allow the Communist cloud to 
engidf us little by little. 

Now when a nation leads, it is not enough that 
even an entire government, legislative and execu- 
tive, should see this problem as one. That doesn't 
make it a truly national policy in anything that is 

April 30, 7956 



as long-term, as vital, as is required in national 
leadership of the whole world. Every citizen has 
a job that he cannot delegate. He cannot delegate 
it to the most powerful and the most influential 
political leaders. He must take his part in getting 
himself informed. 

Wliat I want to say is this: There is nothing 
more important in the world today than that 
America — 167 million Americans — shall be in- 
formed on the basic facts in this whole struggle. 

We ought to get it as far away from dema- 
goguery, from political partisanship, from every 
extraneous influence that we possibly can. Just 
get the naked truth to these peoxale with interpre- 
tation through editorial pages, and so on, to let 
them see the relation of one fact to another. 

There are no easy panaceas. You can't say, 
"We simply won't trade with the Communist na- 
tions" — make that work for all of us. In fact, 
to make such a statement is, to my mind, giving 
up one of the great strengths for which the Yankee 
has always been noted — he is a good trader. 

In that kind of trade, who gets the best of it? 

We should think of those things and not try to 
pull out any slogan, any single idea, that will meet 
this situation. All that is necessary is to get the 
facts to the American people. 

The other is to get, so far as we possibly 
can, the facts of America's purposes — her inten- 
tions, her disinterested motives, her lack of am- 
bition for other territory and increased domina- 
tion — to the world. We must get it out to the 
world. 

This is difficult because all over the world we 
don't have you people. We don't have American 
newspapers. Some of our wire services reach part 
way, but very inadequately. The United States 
Information Service is merely to help. It would 
be far better did we not have to depend on it at 
all. It should even itself depend on private media 
wherever it can reach them in other countries. 

This information should go out abroad, just as 
at home, through the processes of a free people 
so far as possible, and government should only 
support that effort. 

One more point, and I am finished. 

The world changes, and in these days it changes 
rapidly. A policy that was good 6 months ago is 
not necessarily now of any validity. It is neces- 
sary that we find better, more effective ways of 
keeping ourselves in tune witli the world's needs 

705 



and helping to educate the world to know that it 
itself — each nation — must do the major part of 
the job. Any outsider can merely be helpful, can 
give moral and some little physical support — ma- 
terial support. 

But the sums that we put out are a bagatelle 
compared to what is needed and what these peo- 
ple, most of them impoverished, must provide for 
themselves if the whole free world is to advance. 

Now there are different kinds of means, one of 
which, I should think, would be getting together 
and keeping a sort of rotating advisory body of 
citizens, who are not burdened with the general 



Developing NATO in Peace 



and never-ending cares of office, to devote their 
brains to the job in partnership with government. 
We must constantly keep "up to snuff" because 
if we don't we are bound to lose. We must be 
ahead of the problem. We must see its major 
parts. We must get its critical factors set up so 
that we understand them thoroughly in simple 
fashion, and then we must pursue a conunon course 
vigorously, persistently, and with readiness to 
make whatever sacrifies may be demanded. 

And then, I say, we will be worthy of the 
farmers of Concord. 



Address hy Secretary Dulles ^ 



I feel honored to speak before this important 
gathering of our free press. We share a great re- 
sponsibility. I believe that the public should be as 
fully informed as possible about what we are doing 
m the State Department and what our foreign 
policy is. Under our form of government the 
effectiveness of our Nation's foreign policy de- 
pends in large measure upon public understanding 
and support. And our free society would indeed 
be in trouble without the diligent reporting and 
alert appraisal of world events that you make 
possible. 

We are at a point in time when important events 
occurring in rapid succession change the scene in 
Europe, in the Near East, in Asia, and in Eussia. 
It seems that this second postwar decade upon 
which we have entered will mark a new phase in 
the struggle between the forces of despotism and 
the forces of freedom. 

The first postwar decade was marked by two 
sharply contrasting trends. In those parts of 
the world where the West had been politically 
dominant, freedom flo\irished and independence 
spread. Over 650 million people who were non- 
self-governing in 1945 have now become 18 inde- 
pendent and sovereign nations. 

^ Made before the annual luncheon of the Associated 
Press at New York, N. T., on April 23 (press release 210). 



On the other hand, during that decade the 
Soviet type of Communist despotism, which in 
1945 ruled only 200 million people, aggressively 
extended its rule to an additional 700 million peo- 
ple belonging to what had been 13 independent 
nations. 

Inevitably these opposing trends to freedom 
and to despotism led to a sharp cleavage of the 
world. In response to the Soviet policies of vio- 
lent expansion, the free nations drew close to- 
gether. They submerged any differences of their 
own in the face of the threat of open aggression 
from without. Since they could not depend on 
the United Nations Security Council, because of 
Soviet veto power, they created their own collec- 
tive security associations. Forty-five free-world 
nations joined with others for collective defense^ 

These arrangements, backed by United States 
mobile striking power, have constituted a great 
deterrent to the open use of violence. 

Also, the free peoples built moral bulwarks. 
They unitedly condemned the violent and intol- 
erant practices of Soviet communism and made 
manifest their repugnance of Soviet despotism 
and its tactics. They subjected the Soviet and 
Chinese Communists to a kind of moral, social, 
and — to some extent — economic ostracism. 

By such measures the free world found the 



706 



Department of State Bulletin 



ways to halt the Soviets in their hot pursuit of 
the free nations one by one. 

But the policies of the free world were never 
designed to be purely defensive. Freedom is in- 
lierently dynamic and expansive. We renounce 
I ho use of force and violence to promote freedom. 
Ihit we have sought in manifold other ways that 
Ivussia should be governed in accordance with 
civilized standards. 

We reject the idea that we are dedicated to per- 
petual hatred of Russia. What we hate is the 
I'vil that Eussia's rulers do. The arbitrary 
despotism of a police state, governmental intoler- 
ance and enforced conformity, the enslavement of 
people for the magnification of the state, the use 
of violence and the threat of violence in inter- 
national relations, the use of fraud and trickery 
to corrupt and overthrow free governments — these 
are the things which we abhor and against which 
we stand. But United States foreign policy is 
not merely negative. We seek, above all, to ad- 
vance the inevitable day when the historic friend- 
ship between the Russian and American peoples 
can again be fully manifested. Therefore, we take 
deep satisfaction from the fact that we can today 
see within Russia some signs of light which could 
mark the dawning of that new day. 

Soviet "New Look" 

The Soviet rulers who have replaced Stalin seem 
to have concluded that the time had come to pre- 
sent a "new look" at home and abroad. 

In much of the world the Soviet rulers now 
seek to present an aspect of conciliation. They 
talk softly of "peacefrd coexistence" and often 
gear their diplomatic activity to economic "aid" — 
so-called — rather than to threats of violence. 

Within the Soviet Union there is a change which 
is even more significant because, while Soviet 
foreign policy is readily reversible, it is not so easy 
to erase the consequences of internal liberalization. 

Stalin, the brutal demigod, has been dethroned. 
"Collective leadership" now replaces one-man 
despotism. Violence is no longer preached as the 
only way. The sway of the secret police has, it 
seems, been curtailed. There is greater tolerance 
of independent thinking, and even the heresy of 
"Titoism" has been made respectable. There is 
an obvious effort to give individuals a sense of 
greater freedom and security and to respect the 
demands inherent in the higher and broader edu- 
cation of many of the Russian people. 



Vicious doctrinal works such as Stalin's Short 
History of the Communist Party have been with- 
drawn from circulation, and the fate of Stalin's 
Problems of Leninism remains in doubt. Those 
are the two works which for the last 20 years have 
been the "bible" of Soviet and world communism. 
Soviet doctrine and history are currently being 
rewritten. 

This must please at least the Russian school 
children, for they are excused from taking ex- 
aminations in history. No one yet knows the 
"correct" answers. 

Appraisal of Soviet Shift 

It is important to appraise what these changes 
mean and also what they do not mean. 

They mean, I think, that unity and strength of 
the free nations have shown the Soviet rulers the 
futility of their policies of violence. Also they 
must mean that forces for liberalization are at 
work within the Soviet bloc and are powerful 
enough to require some response, or at least the 
appearance of response. 

All of this is immensely important. It is more 
than the free world dared hope for a few years 
ago. 

But satisfaction must be restrained. 

True, Stalin has been demoted. But we do not 
yet see, in the Soviet bloc, the reality of representa- 
tive government or respect for the basic aspira- 
tions of the peoples. 

The Soviet rulers profess to have renounced 
violence. But they press feverishly to develop 
their military establishment, particularly nuclear 
weapons and the means for their delivery. 

The countries of Eastern Europe, including; 
East Germany, are still under the iron heel of 
Soviet force. 

In Asia and the Near East the Soviet rulers have 
become merchants of hatred and fomenters of 
violence. 

In relation to Japan, Soviet foreign policy is 
still ugly in its asjDect. 

In some places Soviet foreign policy is baited 
with economic lures which may superficially seem 
attractive. But close scrutiny shows that the bait 
is attached to a hook and that the hook is attached 
to a line and that the other end of the line is pur- 
posefully held by Moscow. 

And, if they have admitted some of the lies and 
false testimony which marked political trials of 
the Stalin era, they have failed to repudiate two 



April 30, 7956 



707 



of the most outrageous lies ever perpetrated by 
any government, and both perpetrated by Stalin — 
the lie that South Korea was the aggressor in the 
Korean War and the lie that the United Nations 
forces in that war used germ warfare against the 
Chinese Communists. 

Khrushchev said last December, "We never re- 
nounced and we will never renounce our ideas, our 
struggle for the victory of communism."' So long 
as that victory is the Soviet goal ; so long as it is 
backed by a vast military establishment and the 
underground apparatus of international com- 
munism ; so long as these instruments are at the 
absolute disposal of despots who repudiate moral 
principles as restraint upon their conduct — so long 
as this combination exists, it would be folly for 
the free nations to consider that they can safely 
lower their guai'd and fall apart. 

I have often said in relation to the Soviet Com- 
munist jDroblem that the moment of greatest 
danger would be the moment when we relaxed. 
Never was that statement more relevant than it is 
today. If Ave treat the frospect of success as 
being itself a complete success, that could turn 
into an ultimate disaster. 

The Task of the Free Nations 

To say that is not to say that we should act as 
though nothing had happened. We cannot and 
would not set the clock back. There is no longer 
the mood of fear that gripped the free world when 
in quick succession there occurred the Communist 
guerrilla war against Greece, the seizure of 
Czechoslovakia, the blockade of Berlin, and the 
armed attack upon the Republic of Korea. We 
would not, if we could, smother the hope that a 
benign transformation may have begim. 

Our new task is to build more on hope and less 
on fear. That is, of course, a more difficult task. 

Fear makes easy the tasks of diplomats, for 
then the fearful draw together and seek the pro- 
tection of collective strength. 

Soviet rulers and their agents, in their new 
garb, have somewhat greater acceptability and 
therefore more chance for mischief. 

Allies no longer feel the same compulsion to 
submerge differences as when they faced together 
a clear and present danger. 

Collective security arrangements, born prima- 
rily out of fear of armed aggression, seem to some 
less important now than 5 years ago. 



Neutralism can now be plausibly portrayed as 
a safe and even profitable course. ( 

Tender these conditions our tasks are harder — ^ 
so much so that some people deplore the recent 
developments because they confuse what, until | 
then, had been a rather simple scene. 

That is not our view. Of course war, and dan- 
ger of war, is a simplifier. When the issue is "who 
dies and who lives?" all other issues seem unim- 
portant. But we do not want simplicity at that 
price. Nor do we intend to invoke needless fears 
and a sense of emergency because that would make 
our tasks more simple. 

We cannot undo the changes that have come 
ujion the world. And we do not want to reverse 
what holds so much of promise, merely because 
it also holds some risk of loss. Our task is not 
to seek to reverse change but to build construc- 
tively upon all the changes that hold a possibility 
of good. In that way we may make our hopes 
come true. 

Because Soviet military capabilities remain so 
vast and because their intentions are subject to 
rapid change, we must maintain our vigilance and 
our strength. But also we must increase the unity 
and dynamism of the free world by greater em- 
phasis on cooperation for something rather than 
merely against something. Let us exalt freedom 
by showing better what freedom can do. 

President Eisenhower, speaking day before yes- 
terday, outlined the task which lies before the free 
nations of the world. He empliasized that task 
as it relates to the newly independent and newly 
develofDing nations of the world. 

There is also need to maintain and develop 
the strength and vitality of the older free-world 
nations. Here, too, there is vast opportunity. 
Our peoples have many common aspirations and 
interests that go far beyond the instinct of self- 
preservation and which we can more surely achieve 
if we work together than if we work apart. We 
can, in association, form major steppingstones 
along the path to universal peace and justice and 
human welfare. 

We had all hoped that the United Nations would 
establish order on a universal basis. It has in- 
deed done much in this respect, and certainly 
we should do nothing to detract from the United 
Nations. It remains the cornerstone of United 
States foreign policy. 

But the United Nations was never expected to 
be an exclusive means for developing world order. 



708 



Deparfment of State Bulletin 



The charter itself looks to regional and collective 
defense organizations to play a major role in tliis 
great task. 

Exploring the Possibilities of NATO 

The Organization of American States illustrates 
the possibilities of a regional organization. It 
talves accoimt of external perils. But it concen- 
trates primarily upon its own positive accomplish- 
ments. 

That Organization traces its origins back 66 
years to when the Pan American Union was 
founded. It is held together by considerations 
which long preceded, and which will long succeed, 
the fear of Soviet armed attack. 

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is an- 
other organization which, in its own distinctive 
way, contains the possibilities of great develop- 
ment. It was, to be sure, conceived primarily as 
a military alliance, and that aspect of the organi- 
zation remains vitally important. But the Or- 
ganization can and should be more. 

The Canadian Government has notably espoused 
this iDoint of view, and at last December's min- 
isterial meeting of the Council both the French 
and Italian delegations introduced resolutions 
along this line. I expect that this matter will be 
dealt with further at next week's ministerial meet- 
ing to be held in Paris. 

We basically have so much in common that we 
should be able to do more in common. 

All of our peoples embrace a religious faith 
which makes atheistic materialism abhorrent to 
them. "We have a common sense of moral values. 

Our political institutions predominantly reflect 
democratic conceptions which had their origin in 
Greece and legal institutions which had their 
origin in Rome. 

Our economies are similar. We all believe in 
and encourage the jJrivate ownership of property, 
and there is a large and flourishing private trade 
between our countries. 

Our educational systems are much the same and 
provide a broad basis for the free exchange of 
views and the gaining of common understanding. 

Not only do we have this firm and broad founda- 
tion, but also we hold in common many guiding 
principles of action which should enable us to 
develop practically our fellowship. 

We all believe that the days are past when any 
part of the world, or any particular civilization, 
should dominate others. Several of the members 



of NATO are more than Atlantic countries. The 
United Kingdom, for example, is a member of 
the British Commonwealth. The United States 
is a nation of the Americas and a Pacific nation. 
We are today members not only of NATO but of 
the Organization of American States, of the South- 
east Asia Treaty Organization, and several other 
collective defense treaties in the Pacific. We are 
associated with the Baghdad Pact. All NATO 
members would, I think, agree that NATO should 
not attempt to represent the totality of their poli- 
cies. 

AVe all believe that no government has just pow- 
ers except as it derives them from the consent of 
the governed. At the same time we all recognize 
that political independence is illusory unless those 
who obtain it are able to sustain it and carry its 
responsibilities. Also we reject the conception 
which would prevent different races from freely 
uniting in one political system. Under these con- 
ditions we all strive to advance the historic evo- 
lution of non-self-governing peoples to self-gov- 
ernment or independence. 

We believe that the spirit which in the last 
decade has provided so many non-self-governing 
peoples with political independence ought also to 
operate peacefully to stimulate independence for 
those subject to the ruthless colonialism of Soviet 
Russia. Peace and welfare in Europe require 
that East Germany should be allowed to unite in 
freedom with the Federal Republic and that the 
nations of Eastern Europe should once again be 
independent. 

We believe in the closer integration of some 
Western European countries, such as is represented 
by the Coal and Steel Community, by the Western 
European Union created by the Brussels Treaty, 
and by the prospective development of "Euratom," 
the means whereby the members of the Coal and 
Steel Community would apply like community 
principles to the development of atomic energy 
for peaceful purposes. Such European integra- 
tion, and the development of NATO, are comple- 
mentary and not mutually exclusive processes. 

The NATO members believe in the princiijle of 
political consultation between allies and are in- 
creasingly practicing it in the NATO Council. 
Every NATO country, of course, has certain vital 
national interests that may sometimes require in- 
dependent judgment. Some of us have grave 
worldwide responsibilities that cannot be effec- 
tively discharged unless there is a capability of 



April 30, 1956 



709 



prompt decision and corresponding action. Our 
consultations must be designed to assure essential 
harmony in our viewpoints on fundamentals. But 
the processes of consultation should never enmesh 
us in a procedural web so that we fall victim to 
the ability of despotisms to act suddenly and with 
all their might. 

None of our governments is predatory. We 
want military power to be used as a community 
force to prevent aggression and not as a national 
force for aggrandizement. Indeed, the amended 
Brussels Treaty for Western European Union al- 
ready sets an example in armament limitation that 
we can ask the whole world to follow. 

No NATO member, I suppose, wishes to drift 
into some new and ill-defined relationship which 
could be provocative of future misunderstandings. 
But the unanimity of our thinking upon the great 
basic issues makes it apparent that the time has 
come to advance NATO from its initial phase into 
the totality of its meaning. 



statesmanship was to find ways whereby the West 
can maintain its solidarity. Much — indeed, very 
much — has been done. But more can still be done 
to make sure that the good in Western civilization 
is not again negated by differences. 

The peoples who make up the Atlantic com-- 
munity ought, in increased unity, to I'esume their 
greatness ; and true greatness is not to be measured 
by ability to impose on others what they do not 
want but by ability to find new ways whereby all 
men can better realize their aspirations. 

The North Atlantic Treaty already serves as 
an indispensable and vital instrument of the 
Atlantic community. But the time has, I believe, 
come to consider whether its organization does 
not need to be further developed if it is adequately 
to serve the needs of this and coming generations. 
If that be the common desire of the NATO mem- 
ber nations, the United States will join eagerly in 
exploring the possibilities which now beckon us 
forward. 



The Mission of the West 

Western civilization has made an immense con- 
tribution to the welfare of the whole world. It has 
been a dynamic force which, like everything 
human, has made its mistakes. But on the whole 
it has reflected an enlightened view of the nature 
of man and of his God-given right to enjoy life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Further- 
more, the Western view of the nature of man has 
made it inevitable that its influence should on the 
whole be a liberalizing influence. Some nations 
take pride in the size of their domain and the 
number of people under their rule. But the West- 
ern nations can feel that their greatest success was 
to have brought to much of the world a knowledge, 
a political freedom, and an economic opportunity 
which it had never enjoyed before. 

But the mission of the West is not completed. 
More independence needs to be perfected. More 
economic development needs to be planned and 
supported throughout the world. More sense of 
equality and human brotherhood needs to be de- 
veloped. Also, the West needs to appreciate better 
how rich are the gifts other civilizations have to 
offer. 

The historic weakness of the West has been its 
disunity. Out of this disunity came wars which 
have taken the lifeblood of its fuiest j-outh and 
weakened its economies. A major task of postwar 

710 



Transcript of Secretary Dulles' 
News Conference 

Press release 198 dated April 17 

Secretary Dulles: I have no statement of my 
own to volunteer, so I am ready for questions. 

Middle East 

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you have any comment on 
an announceinent from, the Soviet Foreign Office 
that the Soviet Union is frepared to support 
United Nations measures for peace in the Middle 

East? 

A. That was brought to my attention about 15 
minutes ago, and I do not yet have the full text 
of the Soviet statement, and we have learned in 
these matters that it is important to read the fine 
print. That I do not yet have. But I would say 
this: The United States took the position some 
time ago that this was properly a matter of con- 
cern for the United Nations. I emphasized that 
very strongly in my testimony before the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee on February 24,^ and 
since then the United States introduced the reso- 
lution into the Security Council which was unani- 
mously ado]3ted" and pursuant to which Secre- 



' Bulletin of Mar. 5, 1956, p. 368. 
"^ /6td., Apr. 16, 1956, p. 627. 



i 



{ieparXmenX of State Bulletin 

f 



tary-General Hammarskjold is now on his mission 
in the Near East. Last week the President is- 
sued liis statement from Augusta^ emphasizing 
our full support of the United Nations and of the 
Hammarskjold mission and calling upon all mem- 
bers of the United Nations also to give that sup- 
port. If it turns out that this Soviet statement 
is responsive to the President's appeal and that 
there is a genuine Soviet desire to support and 
back up the United Nations in this matter, that 
would, of course, be welcomed by the United States. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, Jias there teen any diplomatic 
effort on the part of this Government to contact 
the Russians in the aftermath of the President's 
statement to get their reactions to V.N. action? 

A. There has been no specific diplomatic pro- 
cedure of that kind. Of course, our Embassy at 
Moscow was advised of the President's statement. 

Q. It was not conveyed to Premier Bulganin in 
any personal tnessage or anything like that? 

A. No. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been jnuch specula- 
tion in this connection with the so-called down- 
grading of the Three-Power Declaration of 1960. 
Will you tell us what the United States Govern- 
ments position is on that declaration today? 

A. Well, the position is the same, I think, as it 
has always been. The declaration of 1950 itself 
called for action — I think it said — consistently 
with the obligations of the parties as members of 
the United Nations, and called for action within 
or without the United Nations. Now the United 
Nations Charter itself provides that the Security 
Council has "primary responsibility" for the main- 
tenance of international peace and security. So 
when the 1950 declaration said the action would 
be taken "consistently with their obligations as 
members of the United Nations," it made it quite 
clear, I think, that we looked upon the U.N. Secu- 
rity Council as the primary means of avoiding 
hostilities and maintaining peace and security. 
That is the interpretation the United States has 
always put upon it and we believe that it is prefer- 
able to act within the United Nations. That is, as 
I say, the way which I think the declaration itself 
indicates as the i^referable way to act. Now if 
that shouldn't work, then we would have a new 



'lUd., Apr. 23, 1956, p. 668. 



situation. But, generally speaking, the action 
which is now being taken through the United 
Nations we regard as consistent with the 1950 
declaration and not in derogation of that declara- 
tion. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, have the reports of Mr. Ham- 
marshjoWs mission thus far indicated to you a 
sense or indication of success in stopping the hos- 
tilities so that it might he possible now to move 
forward along the lines suggested in the Ru^ssian 
statement toiuard the actual settlevfient of the 
Palestine problem? 

A. Well, I think it would be overoptimistic to 
feel that the immediate troubles have been so fully 
cleared away that we are yet at the point of deal- 
ing with the problem broadly along the lines of, 
for example, my August 2G speech.^ I think that 
Mr. Hammarskjold feels that he has made good 
progress, but he has by no means completed yet 
the first phase of his activity, which is to establish 
procedures and dispositions there which will ex- 
clude the likelihood of future border incidents, 
commando raids, and the like, which build up ten- 
sion and ill will on both sides to a point where 
long-range settlements are almost out of the im- 
mediate question. Now the mandate from the 
Security Council contemplated he should work 
out such things as arriving at a greater freedom 
of movement for the armistice observers there, 
for perhaps a drawing apart of the forces along 
the ai-mistice line so they would not be in direct 
contact with each other. And while he has, I 
think, made a good start, it would be premature 
to say that that phase of his work has been com- 
pleted or even that successful completion is defi- 
nitely assured. 

Q. Sir, when the time comes, if it does, when it 
is possible to think in terms of permanent settle- 
ment, is it our position that this is primarily a U.N. 
responsibility or one between Israel and her 
neighbors directly? 

A. Well, obviously the problem is one in which 
the parties at immediate interest are Israel and 
the neighboring Arab States, and no one could or 
should try to impose forcibly any solution upon 
them. On the other hand, it is certainly a situa- 
tion where the United Nations can play a con- 
siderable role. There was established, you may 

*nm., Sept. 5, 1955, p. 378. 



kptW 30, 1956 



711 



remember, some years ago — I think it was in 
1948 — a U.N. commission, which has been rather 
inactive, which was composed of Turkey, France, 
and the United States, to play a role in this con- 
ciliation effort between the two sides.^ In the 
speech of mine of August 2G which outlined a i^lan 
which had been previously discussed with a num- 
ber of other nations, we indicated there that there 
would be an important role for the United Nations 
to play. We spoke of a United Nations role, in 
which the United States would participate, de- 
signed to accomplish the dual purpose of helping 
to solve the refugee problem and also to produce 
more land whicli could be cultivated. Those are, 
in a way, two sides of the same coin. That, we 
thought, would be a United Nations operation 
in the first instance, although it would require 
financial support from member countries like the 
United States. We also spoke of a guaranty of 
the result and a situation in which we suggested 
there would be a United Nations guaranty par- 
ticipated in by member nations. So we have al- 
ways assumed that, while the solution would, as 
I say, in the first instance be a direct problem for 
the parties, it might in fact not be possible for 
them to arrive at a solution without assets from 
outside — financial assets and assets in the form of 
strong guaranties. Those would be necessary in- 
gredients of any final settlement and they could 
best be contributed by or through the United 
Nations. 



Communism in Latin America 

Q. Mr. Secretary, hoo of the officials of the Gov- 
ernment, Mr. Broionell and your own associate, 
Mr. Holland, have discussed the Communist situa- 
tion this week in speeches to the Inter- American 
Bar Association. Does that mean that there is a 
growing concern about communism. 171 that area, 
and will you give us your views on the Communist 
situation in Latin America? 

A. I am not aware of any growing concern. 
Indeed, my concern today is not nearly as great 
as it was at a time when international communism 
had virtually gotten control of Guatemala. The 
Caracas Declaration of 195-4, which provided that, 
if international communism got control of the 



" For text of the General Assembly resolution establish- 
ing the Conciliation Commission for Palestine, see ihid., 
Dec. 12, 1948, p. 726, and Dec. 20, 1948, p. 793. 



political institutions of any American state, that 
would be a threat to the peace and security of us 
all, has created a political background against 
which Communist activity has become less. Now 
they realize that if they should succeed in any 
one country all the rest of the countries would be 
prepared to work against them. We saw the in- 
fluence of that resolution shortly afterward in 
what happened in Guatemala. I want to inject 
here that, as perhaps you know, just a day or two 
ago [April 5] the Government of the Argentine, 
which had abstained on that resolution at Caracas, 
declared its adhesion to that declaration, and that 
is very warmly welcomed by the TTnited States. 
Now that Caracas resolution provided, among 
other things, for certain implementing machinery 
in the way of exchange of information between 
the countries about subversive activities and the 
like. There has not been as effective a buildup 
of that exchange mechanism as we would have 
hoped, and we are trying constantly to keep that 
antisubversive exchange of information growing. 
It is not because we have any new fears of the 
situation, but because, as I have said time and 
again, the moment of greatest danger would be 
the moment that we relaxed. We do not intend 
to I'elax. 



Japanese Textile Imports 

Q. Mr. Secretary, Japan has expressed concern 
at laws in two of our sovereign states which they 
feel are aimed at Japanese textile imports, and 
they feel that it is a violation of our treaty of 
friendship, commerce, and navigation. Can you 
say if the United States intends to reply shortly to 
that a?id lohat our feeling is about it? 

A. We are replying to the note.* We share 
the concern that you refer to. It seems to us that 
the action could be a very serious threat, not just 
to Japanese trade but to our own foreign trade. 
Our trade all over the world — and it is, as you 
know, huge — is protected against discrimination 
and boycott by these very same treaties. These 
treaties are what enable our own business to oper- 
ate with dependability throughout the whole 
world. If there should be violations of those 
treaties on om side, we would have to anticipate 
that there would perhaps be reciprocal action on 
other sides and that it would seriously imperil the 



" For text of Japanese note and U.S. reply, see p. 728. 



712 



Deparfmenf of Sfate Bulletin 



whole world structure of multilateral trade which 
the United States has supported for quite a few 
years now and upon which we believe a great deal 
of the prosperity of the United States and the 
growing strength of all the free world is based. 
Therefore, we do look on the situation with very 
great concern. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, there Tms been a report of 
Representative Celler which says the Egyptia/)is 
are due to buy si,x submarines from the Soviet 
bloc. Has any such report about submarines from 
the Commamists reached the State DeparPment? 

A. We have heard the same reports that prob- 
ably have come to Representative Celler, but 
whether, in fact, there is an arrangement for sub- 
marines and whether it has been carried out we do 
not know. 

Q. Mr. Secretain/, have you given any indica- 
tion of your views on the Israeli request for jet 
planes made to Canada? Have the Canadians 
been informed whether you loould appreciate their 
filing that request? 

A. The Canadians are aware of the fact that 
there is no intention or desire of the United States 
to try to establish a worldwide boycott of the 
Government of Israel as far as arms are concerned. 
Our own policy is based on certain considerations 
which are, in some respects at least, distinctive to 
ourselves and not necessarily a pattern which we 
think all the world should follow, certainly not a 
pattern which we are trying to impose upon other 
countries of the world. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you just mentioned reference 
to soTne machinery to implement the Caracas 
Declaration. I wonder if you propose to use this 
machinery to keep toatch on the recent Soviet trade 
offers made to Latin Americans to see that they 
are not axicompanied by political penetration. 

A. We have to rely primarily upon the vigilance 
of the countries concerned where the subject mat- 
ter is one which is out in the open, as it is when 
trade agreements are involved. The United 
iJ States doesn't try to impose its views on others in 
those respects. The type of machinery I referred 
to is designed to counter underground activities 
by international communism. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been some talk the 
past several days of the United Nations Security 
Council meeting in Geneva or Rome or some place 

April 30, 1956 

383217—56 3 



in Europe to hear Mr. Hofnvmarskjold^s report on 
his mission and take the next step. What is the 
United States position on that? 

A. The United States position on that is that it 
is entirely a matter for the Secui'ity Council itself 
to decide where it wants to meet. It can meet 
other than in New York. It has met, as I recall, 
both in London and Paris in the past, and, if it is 
the desire of the members generally to meet some- 
where else, the United States would not oppose 
that. 

Q. We donH take a strong position one way or 
another? 

A. No. 

Cyprus 

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you regard putting 
Cyprus under NATO as a feasible temporary 
arrangement? 

A. No, I would doubt that would be feasible 
because, you see, Nato is not, I might say, a cor- 
porate entity. Nato is an organization where a 
lot of sovereign states gather to discuss things but 
it has no corporate existence, you might say. It 
is like the United Nations. When the United Na- 
tions exercises its trusteeship, it always does it 
through some one or more countries. It picks one 
of the member countries to exercise the trustee- 
ship on its behalf because the United Nations does 
not act of itself. It isn't a supergovernment which 
has itself authority, with operating functions and 
responsibilities. The same is true of Nato. There 
is a group of what we call "permanent representa- 
tives" that meet and exchange views. But that is 
a group which can take no action except by unani- 
mous consent of all the governments concerned. 
And to put a situation like Cyprus under the ad- 
ministration of a council of— what is it now — 15 
nations acting through representatives who have 
to discuss everything at great length, and cannot 
agree on anything except after lengthy discussion, 
is not an effective form of government. 

Q. Has that been suggested to you? 

A. I have heard of the idea, but it has not been 
suggested as far as I am aware in any official 
way by any government. 

Q. Both you and the President have talked re- 
cently of the necessity of gearing our sights for 
longer-term foreign aid, but opposition on the 

713 



Hill seems to he more rather than less. What is 
the administration doing at this point to jmsh the 
program, of foreign aid? Or is it? 

A. Yes, we are workiiifr actively on that mat- 
ter. The presentations have begun before the For- 
eign Affairs Committee and I discussed the sit- 
uation with Chairman Richards of the committee 
a few days ago. He felt the presentations had 
been effective although of course he did not attempt 
in any way to forecast the committee action. The 
President may be discussing this problem in his 
talk that he is making on Saturday although that 
talk has not yet been linalized. But I know he 
has had in mind at least referring to the subject 
at that time. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you think it will he pos- 
sible to reach a solution of our prohlems in the 
Middle East without the consultation and partici- 
pation of the Soviet Union? 

A. Well, to the extent we work this problem 
out through the United Nations and the United 
Nations Assembly, or Security Council — presum- 
ably the United Nations Security Council — that 
automatically does involve a certain participation 
with the Soviet Union because the Soviet Union 
is inescapably a member of both those bodies. 

Q. The Sudanese have indicated they are ask- 
ing the Russians for technical assistance. Do you 
anticipate a widespread and successful Soviet drive 
through the technical assistance program? 

A. Well, I would expect there will be a Soviet 
drive, but I have no reason to think it will be 
successful. Recently the efforts which they made 
in relation to Libya have received a setback, and 
I think there is the same skepticism in most of 
the African countries that there is in other coun- 
tries of the "hookers" in Soviet technical assistance. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Spanish Foreign Minister 
said in New York yesterday that he thought the 
United States would supply the Spanish Army 
with the most modern weapons. Did he make such 
a request while he was here? 

A. Not to me. He did have talks, I believe, with 
some of the defense people and Admiral Radford. 
I don't know what he said there. - 

Q. 'Would you comment on the visit this week 
to London of Bulganin and Khrushchev, with par- 
ticnlm" reference to talks on the kind of question 
we have heen discussing here? 

714 



A. No, I think it would not be appropriate for 
me to comment on that matter. '■ 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee hearing Chairman liichards presented 
a somewhat new concept of handling foreign aid, 
that is, that the United States follow somewhat in 
the footsteps of the Soviet. For instance, the 
Soviets come to Sudan or Libya — come to these 
countries and say, "TFe will put up so much money 
to build a dam^'' etc., and the United States says, 
^"Go ahead and take that and then we will come 
along and we will supply you with what the 
Russians don't mahe up and when they let you 
down,''"' etc. What is your thought on that? Mr. 
Richards seriously presented that in a hearing now 
going on. 

A. Well, I am not familiar with that presenta- 
tion of that point of view, and I would prefer not 
to comment on it. I presume all these hearings 
have been in executive session, haven't they? 

Q. No, not all that I know of. 

A. Was this presentation made at a public 
hearing? 

Q. No. Well, as you well knoio, Mr. Secretai^, 
a lot of things that go on behind closed doors later 
become public. 

Germany 

Q. Mr. Secretary, does this Government favor 
the diplomatic talks on revmification that Germany 
intends to begin soon with the Soviet Union 
through its A7nbassador in Moscow? 

A. I don't understand that there is any German 
proposal to negotiate with the Soviet Union for 
reunification. I understand that what Foreign 
Minister von Brentano said was in answer to a 
question as to whether they thought of inviting 
Bulganin to come to Bonn to discuss reunification. 
He said there was no necessity to invite him to 
come now that they have diplomatic representa- 
tion — they have embassies in both places. But, as 
I read what he said, I did not interpret it as mean- 
ing there was any present intention of carrying 
on negotiations ; in fact, I think he expressly said 
that any steps in that direction would only be 
taken in agreement with the Western powers. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you believe that the West- 
em powers were wrong at the last Foreign Minis- 
ters meeting to put German reninifwation ahead of 
German secunty as you did? ■ 

Department of State Bulletin 



A. No, I think we were right in doing that. Ex- 
cuse me. I think perliaps I misinterpreted your 
question, or did not answer it quite responsibly. 
I thought you were referring to putting German 
reunification ahead of disarmament. 

Q. Yes. I incorrectly stated the question. That 
is what I meant to say. 

A. That is what I thought, and my answer goes 
to what you meant to say. 

Q. I didnH know you were a mind reader. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Yugoslav Ambassador 
said last week he thinks war loill he avoided in the 
Middle East. Do you think that is an overopti- 
mistic statement, or do you share that view? 

A. I will certainly accept one-half of it, that 
war can be avoided. 

Q. You think it will he, and you have reason 
for helieving sof 

A. I certainly am not going to be said to feel 
that I think there will be war in the Near East be- 
cause I think that the chances are that there will 
not be war. But I think it would be rash to say 
now that there was no risk whatever of hostilities 
in that area. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, to go hack a minute to the 
Soviet trade offers, it was said in Geneva last week 
that they are considerahly more realistic now than 
they have heen in the past. I wonder, if that is the 
case, whether you think the same as you indi- 
cated — that Soviet trade offers will continue, es- 
pecially in Latin America? 

A. I don't feel that I can make a very clear 
answer to that question. All that I can say is that 
we have been having occasional talks here with the 
Ambassadors of the other 20 American Republics, 
and we talk about these problems and there seems 
to be a general consensus of thinking that there are 
danger's in this situation and the need to approach 
the problem in a very cautious way. But I 
couldn't speak for all and each of these countries 
as to what they will do. 

Special Study of Foreign Aid 

Q. Mr. Secretary, I understand that Chairman 
George proposed over the weekend the creation 
of some sort of special high-level group to study 
foreign aid. Do you think this ivill he a good idea? 



A. I think that the time has probably come 
when it would be useful to have a comprehensive 
study made of this whole problem, both from the 
standpoint of our own machinery for conducting 
the aid and the effectiveness of the present ma- 
chinery, and also from the standpoint of the Soviet 
activities and the extent to which those may be 
relevant to our progi-am. There is the question, 
for example, of whether more should be done in 
terms of loans and less in terms of grants. There 
is the question of whether or not more should be 
given through international agencies like the 
United Nations or whether they should be done 
wholly on a bilateral basis or done through re- 
gional organizations. There is a great mass of 
serious problems of that sort which have been 
growing up over the past few years. The adminis- 
tration, I may say, is itself making plans to ex- 
plore that problem and Senator George's think- 
ing actually parallels thinking that has been going 
on within the administration itself. I would think 
that we would be receptive to working out some 
program of that sort which would, I hope, com- 
mand the confidence of the country and of the Con- 
gress. The question of just how to set it up raises 
questions but I do believe that the time is here 
when a comprehensive examination of that pro- 
gram is due. 

Q. Would that he hy a commission outside the 
adminis tra tion ? 

A. I don't want to express myself at this time 
as to the machinery which would be best adapted 
because we have no clear conclusions within the 
administrative or executive department on that 
subject ourselves. And, whatever we did, we 
would Mant to concert with the thinking of Con- 
gress so, as I say, the result would carry a good 
deal of confidence not only in the country as a 
whole but in the Congress. So I don't want to 
pronounce today on the machinery. 

Q. When would it he held, Mr. Secretary? 

A. I would think the studies ought to be, as 
Senator George has I think indicated, carried on 
between the present, or whenever the committee, 
commission, or whatever it is, is set up, and next 
January when the Congress would reconvene. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, there have heen reports Paul 
Hoffman came to you a few weeks ago and asked 
you for your opinion about setting up a citizens'' 



April 30, 1956 



715 



council on foreign aid and you turned it down. 
Is that correct? 

A. It is true that Mr. Hoffman did come to me 
and did talk about that subject but it has not been 



turned down. That is one of the ideas that is in 
tlie hopper and which we are thinking about in 
line with what I described as the thinking of the 
administration on this subject. 



I 



United States Foreign Policy in Africa 



by George F. Allen 

Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs 



The problems confronting United States for- 
eign policy in the vast continent of Africa are at 
least as varied and manifold as the different stages 
of evolution of the various countries making up 
that continent. I would not presume to add to 
the information about Africa which has been 
proffered to you by the specialists in this field 
during the past 48 hours. Instead, I believe the 
most useful contribution I can offer to this sym- 
posium is to attempt to place the policy problems 
confronting the United States in Africa in per- 
spective as we see them and then to analyze for 
you briefly and in broad strokes the unique aspects 
of the problems confronting us in Africa and the 
basic principles from which we approach their 
solution. 

A responsible foreign policy toward Africa re- 
quires of the United States a deep understanding 
of the aspirations and problems of the individual 
African countries both in their relationship with 
the European powers and in their urge toward 
self-determination so that we may lend our good 
offices and assistance in promoting an orderly 
progress toward independence and nationhood. 

Africa'in World Perspective 

In recent years the principle that the developed 
countries have a moral obligation to aid the less 
developed countries, such as those of Africa, has 
become almost universally recognized, even taken 

' Address made before the American Academy of Po- 
litical and Social Science at Philadelpliia, Pa., on Apr. 21 
(press release 206 dated Apr. 20). 



for granted. There is a sound basis for the va- 
lidity of this principle. In a world wherein all 
countries and continents are becoming next-door 
neighbors, glaring disparities in living standards 
can produce tensions and animosities easily fanned 
into conflict. In its postwar policies the United 
States has been actively pursuing peace by trying 
to mitigate such tensions. More recently even 
the Soviet Union has begun belatedly to make ges- 
tures of cooperation and assistance toward the 
underdeveloped countries. While this constitutes 
an important change in Soviet tactics, it remains 
to be seen whether the change is consistent with 
the basic Communist objective of world domi- 
nation. 

All this is highly pertinent to the consideration 
of African problems. Besides the disturbing ele- 
ment introduced in the Middle East by the Czech 
arms deal with Egypt, the Soviets, either directly 
or indirectly, have made overtures to Libya, Ethi- 
opia, and Liberia ; and there is evidence of Com- 
munist activity in areas as widely separated as 
the Sudan and the Union of South Africa. We 
would be betraying our position of leadership of 
the free world if we assumed that these initiatives 
are in the pursuit of normal, responsible foreign 
relations. The old familiar pattern of exploiting 
and championing local dissent and grievances to 
create chaos and confusion is too fresh in our 
minds. 

The terms "imperialism" and "colonialism" can 
be correctly used to describe a relationship, which 
existed more in the past than at present, between 



716 



Department of State Bulletin 



the metropolitan powers and their colonies, a rela- 
tionship which most of the free- world powers have 
J already rejected in principle. 

Hardly a day passes that some further evidence 
of the passing of colonialism does not appear in 
the press. Morocco and Tunisia both obtained 
their independence last month. A Moroccan Gov- 
ernment is now operating in Eabat, and an all- 
Tunisian Government in Tunis. This month 
Tunisia held it« fii-st national elections. As for 
Morocco, the United States has never ceased to 
recognize the sovereignty of the Sultan and the 
United States alone has always maintained a 
diplomatic representative in Tangier. 

Colonialism 

The United States attitude toward colonialism 
is known. In the light of our historical origins 
and our traditions this attitude could hardly be 
different. But the application of this principle 
to present-day foreign-policy problems all over 
the world requires patient understanding and a 
high sense of responsibility regarding the ulti- 
mate and basic security interests of the United 
States. All of the so-called colonial powers repre- 
sented on the continent of Africa are our friends 
and allies in the worldwide contest between the 
free and Communist worlds. Relationships estab- 
lished by them with countries in Africa date from 
an era when the concepts of international rela- 
tions were diiferent. No one but a demagogue 
would deny that basic advantages were brought 
to the African territories by this process of open- 
ing wider horizons and that, in fact, the impetus 
toward modern nationhood grew out of these con- 
tacts with Western civilization. 

Furthermore, in the course of this relationship 
between the metropolitan powers and the African 
territories, there grew up interlocking economic 
relations, the violent disruption of which would 
seriously weaken our European allies. Similarly, 
a sudden break of these lifelines would create con- 
ditions of political and economic instability most 
harmfvil to our African friends. It is more largely 
a question of transforming this relationship into 
a cooperative endeavor by which the newly emerg- 
ing states in Africa achieve and maintain their 
national self-respect and apply in their own way 
the benefits of their national resources to improv- 
ing the lot of their own people. A strong, free, 
and friendly Africa is extremely important to 



United States security. Our security interests and 
our moral interests are both effectively served by 
the same general line of action — we need friendly 
and cooperative relations with Europe and Africa, 
just as their own interests require the maintenance 
of intimate ties with each other. 

In Africa our allies are aware of the basic atti- 
tude of the United States toward colonialism, but 
they are equally aware of our intention to work 
as friends of both sides toward an orderly solution 
of these problems. Great Britain has publicly 
announced its policy of helping the countries of 
Africa toward independence, and its record in 
Asia is an earnest of its sincerity. In line with 
its policy as a responsible power, however, it does 
not wish to create perhaps greater problems by 
precipitate action which granting of immediate 
independence might create. This is a time when 
political vacuums are a great danger to world 
peace. 

In North Africa, France has recently recog- 
nized the independence of Morocco and Tunisia ' 
and is engaged in trying to find a liberal solution 
to the problem of Algeria. Spain has also recog- 
nized the independence of its zone of Morocco,^ 
and that country has now the opportunity to be- 
come unified. Both Spain and France are en- 
gaged in working out arrangements by which the 
mutual economic benefits derived from their past 
association with Morocco can be continued in the 
light of the new relationship. In other areas of 
Africa, France is also looking toward creating 
a new relationship with the groups which are 
gradually developing a higher degree of political 
consciousness. The Belgians have recently estab- 
lished two universities in the Belgian Congo to 
meet the educational needs of the Congolese. 

Nationalism 

The United States attitude toward nationalism 
is not so easily definable. After World War II, 
when the threat of international communism en- 
dangered our security. United States opinion was 
inclined toward promoting a greater faith in fed- 
erations in Europe which cut across — and, we 
hoped, would eventually obliterate — nationalistic 
rivalries. But in other areas of the world we 
recognized the strength of nationalism in resisting 



= Bulletin of Mar. 19, 1956, p. 466, and Apr. 2, 1956, 
p. 552. 
' Ibid., Apr. 23, 1956, p. 667. 



April 30, 1956 



717 



the threat of international communism. Com- 
munism cynically exploits the passions of revolt 
for the sole purpose of creating unrest, cliaos, and 
revolution so that the small organized minority 
may seize power and permanently bury the in- 
stincts of healthy nationalism under the require- 
ments of blind and absolute obedience to Moscow. 
This issue assumes a special importance in Africa, 
where the varying degrees of political experience, 
tlie large amount of illiteracy, and the insecurity 
of the individual in the process of exchanging his 
old loyalties for new ones make the population 
particularly vulnerable to exploitation of this is- 
sue by unprincipled demagogues. 

Again tlie principle of understanding and re- 
sponsibility in the conduct of foreign relations 
should guide us and other nations in relations with 
the countries of Africa so that the elements of na- 
tionalism which contribute toward genuine inde- 
pendence and stability will be encouraged and 
those which tend to be purely negative, anarchic, 
and disruptive be curbed. 

Racialism 

In the light of experience which the United 
States is undergoing domestically in developing 
harmonious race relations, I think it behooves us 
to approach the problem of race elsewhere in the 
world in all humility. This aspect of relations 
between people of different races living together 
in multiracial states involves deep-seated emo- 
tions and prejudices which can only be overcome 
gradually. The principle for which the United 
States stands and is known throughout the world 
is perfectly clear: it is embodied in our Constitu- 
tion and in our Bill of Eights. But it is equally 
clear that the application of force and oppression 
can only exacerbate the issue. 

The vast continent of Africa illustrates this 
problem in all its facets, from countries in which 
the intermingling of races on an equal basis has 
become an accepted and unquestioned fact to 
countries in which an attempt is being made to 
legislate segregation down to its last logical conse- 
cjuence. The problem is infinitely complicated in 
Africa by the presence of groups who wield politi- 
cal and economic power but who are not other- 
wise identified witli the country and people among 
whom they live. This tends to confuse the issue 
of racialism with questions of political, economic, 
social, and cultural discrimination and makes the 



approach to a solution of the problem more diffi- 
cult by making it virtually impossible to isolate 
the issue from all the other problems. 

Again it behooves us not to become identified 
with any of the conflicting factions but rather, 
while preserving our adherence to our own basic 
principle of racial equality, to attempt to exert a 
moderating influence upon the extremists and to 
oppose those who are exploiting these tensions for 
ulterior purposes. 

Challenge to U.S. Diplomacy 

The continent of Africa presents a wide variety 
of foreign polic}^ problems to the United States, 
as varied as the number of countries and territories 
it comprises and as complicated as the degree of 
emergence toward independent statehood and the 
complexity of relationships with the different 
metropolitan powers with which the various states 
are associated. Yet there is a unifying factor 
in this diversity: the entire continent is under- 
going simultaneously, even if in varying degrees, 
a transformation along political, economic, socio- 
logical, and racial lines. The substitution of new 
ties for old tribal or family relationships in order 
to assure security for the individual, the exchange 
of old values for new ones in the attempt to ob- 
tain social and economic status, the growing desire 
for political self-expression, and the need for de- 
veloping new approaches to produce stability in 
multiracial groups devoted to common economic 
and political goals — all these combine to create 
a condition of ferment and potential progress 
which is a real challenge to American diplomacy. 

The United States, as a nation, has no selfish 
interests in Africa except the preservation of our 
own security, which we consider, in present world 
circumstances, inextricably bound up with the kind 
of future the African countries desire for them- 
selves. We are dedicated to the preservation of 
world peace, which we consider an indispensable 
corollary to the kind of development Africa needs. 
Because of our origins and traditions we are basi- 
cally in sympathy with the desire for independ- 
ence and nationhood of the emerging states, but 
we are also friends and allies of the powers who 
must help to shape this new status. This places 
us in a position from which we hope and believe 
our influence can be exerted to make the trans- 
formation of Africa a process of orderly evolu- 
tion and not one of violent revolution. 



I 



718 



Department of State Bulletin 



The Soviet Reappraisal of Stalin 



by Deputy Under Secretary Murphy'^ 



Your society was founded in 1922, and at that 
time I was a young officer in the Foreign Service 
of the Department of State. During the years 
which have elapsed, we have witnessed tremendous 
improvements in the coverage and dissemination 
of news. At my first post in Bern, Switzerland, 
at the end of World War I, we had only sketchy 
and infrequent reports on developments in Wash- 
ington and elsewhere. The contrast between those 
days and the present — with the almost instantane- 
ous coverage that you give to world affairs today — 
is enormous, as is its impact on the conduct of our 
foreign affairs. Perhaps no other single item has 
affected the techniques of diplomacy as has the 
tempo and completeness of your activities in the 
information field. 

In our small way, we in the Department of State 
are indebted to you for j'our valuable coverage of 
international affairs. Our modern society would 
be hard pressed to maintain its strength and its 
freedom without the intelligent reporting and 
keen appraisal of world events that you make 
possible. 

Perhaps the greatest difference between our 
form of civilization and that of the Communist- 
controlled powers is in our respective concepts 
of the role and function of news media. To us full 
information and freedom of expression are pri- 
mary. Without them we would not have the in- 
foi'med public oiDinion on which our society de- 
pends. Communist countries hy their structure 
are unable to have full and free information. 
Their leaders cannot tolerate it. Their media of 
expression are designed to present the views of the 
ruling group. Only carefully selected items of 

' Address made before the American Society of News- 
paper Editors at Washington, D. C, on Apr. 19 (press 
release 205). 



news are disseminated, and the important items are 
scrupulously edited either to generate public con- 
fidence in the governing group or to inflame resent- 
ment against enemies.of the state, real or imagi- 
nary. The people of Russia and Communist-domi- 
nated countries live in a world that closely re- 
sembles the nightmare described by George Orwell 
in 198^. What news they are allowed to read and 
hear is presented to them to develop a state of 
mind or point of view carefully chosen for them 
in advance by the ruling group. 

We have recently witnessed a rather ostentatious 
reapjDraisal of Stalin, resulting in his denigration 
and downgrading. In this performance we have 
an exceptionally clear example of Soviet treatment 
of the news and their concept of the role of the 
news media in Communist society. 

Rise and Fall of Stalin Cult 

For 25 years all members of Communist-con- 
trolled countries, whether within the Soviet Union 
or without, had been increasingly conditioned to 
the acceptance of Stalin as the all-wise and the 
always-right. Any outward manifestation of less 
than complete belief in Stalin's wisdom and coi*- 
rectness led to mipleasantness. For 25 years 
Communists at home and abroad were indoctri- 
nated in this credo. Stalin's views of history and 
science. Communist doctrine, the arts, and litera- 
ture were the only views possible for Soviet or 
Communist-controlled citizens to have or at least 
to express. Cities and momitains, factories and 
industrial plants, theaters, stadiums were named 
in his honor. Art galleries, public buildings, 
offices, and private homes were decorated with his 
pictures and his statues. "V^Hiat was deemed good 
in the Communist world was associated with 
Stalin. And what was evil and what was daneer- 



AprW 30, 7956 



719 



ll 



ous was deviation, no matter how slight, from any 
view on any subject that Stalin might have had 
or was likely to have. 

In the course of the 3 years since Stalin's death 
the present Soviet oligarchy decided to "shrink"' 
Stalin, to devalue him and to change the worship 
of his name. The process of Stalin's devaluation 
provides a spectacular example of the difference 
in the ways in which our respective systems of 
news dissemination function. 

You are no doubt weary of references to the 
February meeting in Moscow of the 20th Congress 
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Be- 
fore this meeting there had been hints and sug- 
gestions that Stalin was no longer regarded by 
the Politburo with the traditional worshipful 
reverence. There were imiuendoes on occasion 
that some parts of Stalin's foreign policy had been 
less than perfect. But the symbol of Stalin, the 
all-wise and the impeccable, had been treated 
gingerly. On his birthday anniversary last De- 
cember all of the important Soviet news media 
referred to him as enjoying a secure and lasting 
place in the trinity. His name was, as always, 
coupled with those of Marx and Lenin. In Janu- 
ary, at a series of lesser Party congresses, this 
treatment of him continued. 

Denunciation at Party Congress 

Just as the 20th Congress of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union was to meet, there came 
an indication that the dam was about to break. 
The Congress opened with a minute of silent re- 
membrance for three comrades who had died since 
the 19th Congress. The three were Stalin, Gott- 
wald, and Tokuda. The pairing of the great 
Stalin with these lesser foreign figures was in 
itself an insult. Then, during the Congress, his 
name was mentioned less than a half dozen times 
during the 11 days of speechmaking. In one 
speech by Mikoyan, Stalin was mentioned only 
once, though his policies were severely criticized. 
Wlien the texts of the speeches made at the Con- 
gress were published, it was obvious that he had 
been under severe attack. But the detailed de- 
nunciation of Stalin was saved for a climax speech 
by Khrushchev at a closed session on the last day. 

Seven weeks have elapsed since then, and the 
Soviet press has not yet printed the Khrushchev 
speech. Nor have they printed all the charges 
made in the speeches, nor the widespread criticism 



that has since been made of Stalin by satellite 
leaders. Khrushchev's speech was made on Febru- 
ary 25th and is said to have lasted for 21/2 hours. 
You have seen public reports that the text runs to 
60 pages. Yet up to now the people of the Soviet 
Union have not been told of the speech or even of 
the fact of its delivery. I am sure the Soviet 
Ambassador will not mind if I say that I expressed 
to him our interest in seeing the text. 

Campaign of Defamation 

As you luiow, Khrushchev's secret speech was 
apparently the signal for a general campaign of 
defamation of Stalin throughout the Communist 
satellite comitries. In almost all these countries 
there has been severe, definite, and personal criti- 
cism of Stalin and his policies, yet it was not until 
March 28 that Pravda denounced some of the 
evils of the Stalin regime. "Wliile the satellite 
countries have been allowed to be free in their 
post-Congress criticism and while foreign cor- 
respondents in Moscow have been allowed to re- 
fer to the Khrushchev speech since March 17, the 
Russian press has been under heavy wraps. 

The manner in which the devaluation of Stalin 
has been handled by the Soviet press is hard for 
Americans to conceive. In our eyes this treat- 
ment of news verges on the burlesque, yet we 
know and understand that the leaders of the Soviet 
Union do not embark on any such major change 
in the accepted dogma of their system without the 
most careful and calculated preparation. It is 
usually done with all the abandon of a careful 
chess player. The Soviet leaders had to make a 
major and dangerous decision when they started 
their process of devaluation. Apparently they are 
willing to risk the consequences of a period of con- 
fusion and doubt. Apparently they are confi- 
dent that they will be able to use their news media 
for persuasion and at the same time their various 
means of coercion to keep their people in line mitil 
a new mythology has been established. We even 
have reports that examinations in Soviet history 
are being suspended in Russian schools because 
the teachers do not know what history is correct. 

'Wliy are the Soviet leaders doing this? Does 
it mean any real change in Soviet policy? The 
answers to these questions gradually unfold. It 
is onr opinion that this is a carefully planned op- 
eration conducted largely for internal, domestic 
reasons. Its impact abroad is incidental and may 
even risk losses and Party discomfort. But the 



\ 



720 



Department of State Bulletin 



I 



major stakes in this instance are inside the Soviet 
Union, where the dead weight of the Stalin ap- 
paratus and heritage had to be lifted in order that 
the Party program could breathe again and move 
forward. The Soviet leadei-s are not easily em- 
barrassed by criticisms or ridicule from abroad, 
but they are relentlessly vigilant to protect their 
primary source of power at home. The cult of 
Stalin was corrupting that power. It had to be 
destroyed. On the foreign front they move 
blandly ahead, with successive maneuvers — a new 
disarmament jDroposal, an announcement of the 
dissolution of the Cominform which is really 
a long overdue obituary, a dramatic plug for 
credit in the Middle East, a Bulganin and 
Khrushchev visit here and there. They are confi- 
dent in the ability of the free world soon to forget 
the purge of Stalin as the purge of the old 
Bolshevists was forgotten. But the leadership 
never forgets its source of power. 

Perhaps you may recall a celebrated passage 
from Sir Winston Churchill's speech at Massa- 
chusetts Institute of Technology back in 1949, 
at a time when tlie power of the Soviet threatened 
the whole of Western Europe. Sir Winston, 
speaking in parables, wanted to make the point 
that unforeseen events mitigate the course of his- 
tory, and he did it in tliis way : 

Four or five hundred years ago Europe seemed about 
to be conquered by the Mongols. Two great battles were 
fought almost on the same day near Vienna and in Poland. 
In both of these the chivalry and armed power of Europe 
were completely shattered by the Asiatic hordes. It 
seemed that nothing could avert the doom of the famous 
continent from which modern civilization and culture 
have spread throughout the world. But at the critical 
moment the Great Khan died. The succession was vacant 
and the Mongol armies and their leaders trooped back on 
their ponies across the 7,000 miles which separated them 
from their capital in order to choose a successor. They 
never returned 'til now. 

Now I would not imply from this that the in- 
heritors of the power of Josef Stalin (he was 
once described as Genghis Khan with a tele- 
phone ! ) have fallen out to any crippling degree — 
although the death of Beria and his friends and 
the rehabilitation of many both living and dead 
indicate deep subsurface disturbances. We can 
be sharply aware of the fact that the Soviet Union 
is in process of radical transition from one-man 
rule to group dictatorship. This might be called 
a process of institutionalizing a dictatorship. 
This is perhaps the essence of the counterrevolu- 
tion going on in Eussia today. 

April 30, 1956 



Eule by committee instead of by single dictator 
inevitably has brought about a certain loosening 
in the chain of command. The differing ways the 
satellites have reacted to the anti-Stalin campaign 
is just one case in point. Official rehabilitation 
of Stalin victims — as in Hungary and Bulgaria — 
is one end of the spectrmn. A tendency to blame 
all past excesses on officials of the Beria stripe is 
another. The dissolution of the Cominform, long 
since a fact but only announced 2 days ago, is an 
index of a trend. 

In the Department of State we do not assume 
that the Communists have changed their basic ob- 
jectives. We have no evidence that they have. 
We recall that Karl Marx, nearly 100 years ago, 
aptly said that "the policy of Eussia is change- 
less ... its methods, its tactics, its maneuvers 
may change, but the polar star of its policy — world 
domination — is a fixed star." 

Nevertheless, the Soviet leaders today are re- 
ducing their emphasis on military strength and 
threat of force as major instruments of policy. 
They are shifting and diversifying their methods. 
Such a shift may be an advantageous development 
from the standpoint of the United States and 
other free nations. 

Implications for U.S. Policy 

A principal objective of United States foreign 
policy is to prevent a devastating war. We would 
welcome any genuine indication that the danger 
of armed Communist aggression has diminished. 
We have no reason to doubt the fundamental ca- 
pacity of free societies to compete with communism 
by peaceful means. At the same time, there are 
two facts we should keep firmly in mind when we 
try to figure out where we stand today. 

First we should remember that the Communist 
bloc retains a tremendous capability of military 
aggression. It has a substantial superiority in 
military manpower. It is rapidly developing 
more modern weapons and a modern technology, 
including, of course, an ominous atomic potential. 
The Communists possess the capacity to engage in 
new military ventures at any time, either on a 
general or local scale. As long as this capacity 
exists, it is obvious that neither the United States 
nor other free nations can afford to risk their 
freedom and safety on an optimistic reassessment 
of Communist intentions. 

Secondly, even if the Communists remain cau- 
tious about military ventures, we camiot afford to 



721 



discount the vast stakes involved in the bitter 
political and economic contests which they are 
determined to wage against the free world. In 
terms of the ultimate fate of free civilization, 
this new strategy is no less dangerous than the old. 
We assume it to be equally hostile but more decep- 
tive to combat. It is more subtle, more complex, 
and geared to a longer time period. We should 
not make what could be the fatal mistake of assum- 
ing that a Communist deemphasis on military 
methods of conquest will allow us to take a holi- 
day. On tlie contrary, the struggle to protect 
our freedom may become moi'e intense and will 
certainly tax our imagination, our resources, and 
our patience. Our ability to achieve success, like 
our ability to maintain an adequate defense pos- 
ture, will depend in large measure upon our co- 
operation with other free nations. The principle 
of collective security is as valid today in the 
political-economic field as it ever was in the mili- 
tary field. 

We are interested in what may have changed 
within the Soviet Union. It is even more impor- 
tant to remember what has not changed in tlie 
Soviet Union. 

First: The power for political decision is still 
vested in a few men. The people of the U.S.S.R. 
have no voice in political decisions. 

Second: The U.S.S.R. is the most heavily armed 
nation in the world, and it is continuing to develop 
new weapons. 

Third: The power structure of the U.S.S.R. 
is bolstered by an ideology that is basically hostile 
to any system it is unable to control. 

It is still much too soon to make any final 
appraisal of what tliis internal change means. 
Stalin has been criticized for his domestic mis- 
takes. He has been criticized for not preparing 
the Soviet Union against attack from Germany. 
His foreign policy, the injustices committed 
abroad, have not been subject to the same wither- 
ing reexamination. There has been no indication 
that a free Germany will be allowed to unite. 
There is little indication of a new attitude toward 
Japan. There has been no indication that the 
satellite countries will be free. 

There is one development that clearly seems to 
stem from the emerging Soviet system of insti- 
tutionalizing, of group dictatorship. That is a 
return to the processes of diplomacy. 

You have perhaps seen the announcement just 
made by Secretary-General Hammarskjold that 



Egypt and Israel have agreed to an unconditional 
cease-fire on their borders. This is indeed a wel- 
come development. It reflects credit upon the i 
parties immediately concerned, upon the efforts of H 
Mr. Hammarskjold, and, if I may say so, on the 
President and tlie Secretary of State, because the ■ 
United States wanted this dispute settled through | 
the United Nations. In the course of this talk I 
have not had the occasion to touch on the Middle 
East, although I can assure you I am not unaware 
of a certain focusing of interest there on your 
part and by others. But I suggest that the 
metliods by whicli the new economic-political con- 
flict is being waged are increasingly through dip- 
lomatic channels, and in the Middle East that is 
especially true. 

And because the prevention of war is the ulti- 
mate goal of the diplomat, the lifelong purpose 
to which his life is dedicated, perhaps we may hope 
that this may be progress, even though very small 
progress, toward the true peace for which you in 
your important field and we in the State Depart- 
ment all long and for which we all strive. 



Israel and Egypt Agree 
To Observe Armistice 

Statement by Rem^j Cabot Lodge, Jr. 
U.S. Representative to the United Nations 

U.S. /U.N. press release 2390 dated April 19 

The United States pointed out in the Security 
Council on April 3^ that unless the armistice 
agreements can be effectively carried out, a grave 
threat to the peace may result. 

It is heartening evidence of the good faith of the 
parties that it has been possible for the Secretary- 
General to annoimce that both Israel and Egypt 
have notified the Chief of Staff of the U.N. Truce 
Supervision Organization of orders issued in im- 
plementation of assurances for the observation of 
article 2 (2) of the Egyptian-Israeli Armistice 
Agreement. 

Tliis word of progress coming from the Secre- 
tary-General is most welcome and sliows that he 
is discharging well the mandate given him by the 
Security Council on April 4.^ 

' Bulletin of Apr. 16, 1956, p. 630. 

' Ibid., p. 628. t 



722 



Department of State Bulletin 



Objectives of the Mutual Security Program in Asia 



Statement hy Walter S. Robertson 
Assistant Secretai-y for Far Eastern Affairs ' 



I appreciate the opportunity to appear in sup- 
port of the Far East portion of the proposed 
mutual security program for the fiscal year 1957. 

In the area with which we are concerned today, 
the United States is extending aid under the 
mutual security program to nine countries — Ja- 
pan, Korea, Taiwan, Philippines, Indonesia, Viet- 
Nam, Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand. I should 
like to make a general statement highlighting the 
situation in the region and the political considera- 
tions that make it so important for the United 
States to continue these programs. After that, 
the specific programs will be summarized for you 
by Dr. Raymond Moyer, Ica [International Co- 
operation Administration] Regional Director for 
the Far East, and by Deputy Assistant Secretary 
McGuire of the Department of Defense. 

The area we are talking about — the free- world 
Far East — is a region only in a geographical sense. 
There are greater differences than similarities be- 
tween the countries except that they, all but one, 
share the common problem of being underde- 
veloped by Western standards. In the area are 
nearly 300 million people, most of whom are small 
farmers with an average holding of about one to 
two acres. The variation in population density is 
dramatic, ranging from 16 per square mile in Laos 
to 1,000 or more in some parts of Java and Japan. 
Nobody really knows what the per capita income 
is, but the best estimates we have run from about 
$50 a year in the poorest country to $300 a year in 
the richest country. 

The area provides the free world with about 92 
percent of its abaca, 88 percent of its natural 



i 



'Made before the Committee on Foreign Affairs of tlie 
House of Representatives on Apr. 11. 

April 30, 1956 



rubber, 41 percent of its rice, 66 percent of its 
copra, and 65 percent of its tin. There is still a 
tremendous potential of available minerals — oil, 
bauxite, iron ore, chromium, tin, manganese, sul- 
fur, nickel, etc. 

Politically the area is characterized by a very 
strong spirit of nationalism and independence. 
These nations are determined no longer to be re- 
garded at home or abroad as second-class citizens. 
To many of them the colonialism they have experi- 
enced appears to be more of a menace than the 
threat of communism. 

The primary objective of our policy in the Far 
East can be stated quite simply. It is to strengthen 
the free world and to curb the power and prevent 
the expansion of communism. The mutual se- 
curity program is an increasingly essential factor 
in the attainment of that objective. 

The people of these comitries have aspirations 
for a better life which they are determined to ful- 
fill. This program, through technical and eco- 
nomic-development assistance, is helping them to 
achieve these objectives. The military assistance 
part of the program is assisting them in maintain- 
ing internal order and security and in creating a 
first line of defense against aggression while they 
build up in a nonmilitary sense internally. But 
it is the success or failure of this mutual security 
program, in giving these nations hope that they 
will be more secure and better off tomorrow than 
they are today, that will determine whether they 
sulccumb to the blandishments of communism. 
This hope, if it is to last, must be firmly grounded 
in their own experience that progress is being 
made ; that they are, in fact, better off today than 
they were yesterday; and that, when tomorrow 
becomes today, the same thing will be true. 

723 



As Secretary Dulles said upon his return from 
his recent trip to the Far East : - 

The (lay is past when the peoples of Asia will tolerate 
leadcrshiit which keeps them on a dead center eco- 
ncjiiiiciiUy and socially, and when each generation merely 
ekes out a hare suljsistence, with a Ijrief life expectancy, 
and passes on to the next generation only the same bleak 
prospect. 

As you know, I had the privilege of accompany- 
ing Secretary Dulles on his recent trip. The 
situation in this part of the world is still serious; 
there are still many points of tension; but there 
is general improvement in free-world competence 
to deal with these tensions. Doubtless there will 
be setbacks from time to time, but the general 
course is one of progress. 

The Asian leaders whom we saw uniformly de- 
sired to preserve the independence of their coun- 
tries. They too recognized that political inde- 
pendence of itself is not enough. Eight out of 
ten countries we visited were anti-Communist. 
Those two which call themselves neutrals, how- 
ever, were also appreciative of United States aid 
and the help that United States policy affords 
them in preserving their independence. Faith 
and hope are the stuff of which free nations are 
made. Our aid programs are assisting the govern- 
ments of free Asian countries in making such faith 
and hope possible. 

For well over a year the forces of armed aggres- 
sion in the area have been held in check. This fact, 
and the radical change in Soviet tactics in recent 
months, are, in my opinion, evidence of the effec- 
tiveness of the courses of action we have been 
following. Millions of free Asians have, in conse- 
quence, enjoyed a measure of peace even though 
living under the constant threat of a renewal of 
armed aggression. That threat remains deadly 
serious throughout the region as it did a year ago. 
Let us look at it squarely. 

Nature of Communist Threat 

In Korea the Communists have not slackened 
the buildup of their con^bat capability in the 
north. Chinese Communist troops are still in oc- 
cupation of North Korea. They have introduced, 
in flagrant violation of the armistice agreement, 
a modern jet air force and new types and larger 
quantities of other equipment that greatly increase 
their striking power. The experience with aggres- 

' BuiiETiN of Apr. 2, 1956, p. 539. 



sion in 1950, the enormous stake which the United 
States and the United Nations have in a free and 
independent Korea, and this threat posed by the 
Communists to the north make it essential that 
we maintain our guard in Korea. We cannot be 
complacent in this situation. 

Opposite Taiwan, the Chinese Communists are 
building 10 airfields between Shanghai and Can- 
ton to accommodate jet planes, multiplying their 
gun positions, and constructing a military railroad 
into the port of Amoy. 

The Korean story is repeated in Viet-Nam, 
where, in callous violation of the Geneva agree- 
ment of 1954, the effective strength of the fighting 
forces of the Viet Minh has approximately doubled 
since the cease-fire and it is reported that artillery 
firepower has been increased some sixfold. 
Equipment and training are being furnished by 
the Chinese Conmiunists. 

In other parts of the region the Communist 
tactics are more insidious, but the threat is none- 
theless real and menacing. 

In Japan, that industrial powerhouse which is 
a prime Communist target, the Communist Party 
is a legal entity with a following estimated at 
close to 1 million. One of the few gestures in the 
Far East toward the spirit of Geneva was made 
by this organization when in July 1955 it re- 
nounced past "errors" of violence and extremism. 
This lipservice would have meant more if the 
Party had not maintained an underground or- 
ganization with a paramilitary arm which they 
have used for purposes of espionage, sabotage, 
and the instigation of mass violence. 

In Laos, the Pathet Lao, flaunting the Geneva 
agreement, continue to occupy the major parts of 
two northern provinces. They send their agents 
into other parts of the country to stir up trouble 
and subvert the legitimate government. 

In Thailand, the people recognize the potential 
threat to them of continued occupation of these 
Lao provinces and see beyond in adjacent Red 
China the "Greater Thai State" created by the 
Communists. There they see a former Thai 
premier calling upon people of the Thai race 
living in Thailand, Laos, and Burma to over- 
throw their free government and substitute 
communism. 

In Singapore, Communist elements have made 
disturbing advances particularly in the fields of 
education and labor with their tactics of violence 
and subversion. In the Federation of Malaya, the 



724 



Department of State Bulletin 



British are still fighting their long war against 
Communist guerrilla terrorism. 

In Indonesia, a country which 8 years ago put 
down forcefully an attempted Communist mili- 
tary coup, the Communists have succeeded in 
I'eestablishing themselves in the political sphere 
and in the recent general elections polled 16 per- 
cent of the vote and emerged as Indonesia's fourth 
largest party. However, on the plus side, a new 
non-Communist goveriunent coalition has been 
formed which includes all major non-Communist 
elements. 
i In Burma, the Soviet bloc has moved swiftly 
and adroitly to exploit the situation there. Faced 
with a large, burdensome surphis of rice, Burma 
has been forced to find markets in any quarter. 
In consequence, Burma is one of the nentrals that 
were singled out for special courtship by Bulganin 
and Khrushchev with offers of technicians, equip- 
ment for agricultural and industrial development, 
schools, and cultural exchanges. During a recent 
visit, Mikoyan initialed an agreement with Burma 
by which the Soviets will supply capital and other 
goods as well as "technical services" in exchange 
for 400,000 tons of rice annually for 4 years. 

Finally, throughout the area, internal pressures 
in the form of subversion and economic and 
psychological warfare are being brought to bear 
in every country in the Far East. 

Progress Made in Last Year 

It is clear that there is much to be done. It is 
also true that much has been done and that genuine 
progress has been made in the last year. 

A little less than a year ago, when the aid pro- 
gram for fiscal year 1956 was presented before this 
committee, you were informed of the tremendous 
odds against which the newly independent Gov- 
ernment of Viet-Nam was fighting. It was faced 
with the military and subversion threat of the 
Communists to the north of the I7th parallel ; it 
was confronted with internal strife. There was 
the ominous challenge to the government's control 
posed by the armed, self-seeking, political-religious 
sects ; there was the urgent necessity for resettling 
hundreds of thousands of refugees who had fled 
Communist domination following the military 
partition. The problems were well-nigh over- 
whelming. The program you approved at that 
time has made possible our continued support of 
this new republic in the economic and military 
sphere. We can, I believe, take great satisfaction 



in the remarkable improvement in the situation 
which without our contribution, we believe, would 
have been impossible. 

We now find a firmly entrenched nationalist 
government under the leatlership of President 
Diem. This government has proved its capacity 
not only to survive in the face of Communist sub- 
versive efforts but to assume the responsibilities 
of independence. The Diem government has 
achieved a decisive victory in the recent elections 
for the Assembly, which is now meeting to ratify a 
constitution for free Viet-Nam. 

Our own efforts in Viet-Nam are directed in the 
first place toward helping to strengthen internal 
security forces. These consist of a regular army 
of about 150,000 men, a mobile civil guard of 
about 45,000, and local defense units which are 
being formed to give protection against sub- 
version on the village level. We are providing 
budgetary support and equipment for these forces 
and have a mission assisting in the training of the 
army. We are also helping to organize, train, 
and equip the Vietnamese police forces. Some 
600,000 refugees who fled to South Viet-Nam to 
escape the Viet Minh are being resettled on pro- 
ductive lands with the assistance of funds made 
available by our aid program. In various ways 
under "defense support" our program also pro- 
vides assistance to the Vietnamese Government 
designed to strengthen the economy and provide a 
better future for the peoples in that area. 

In Korea, we are demonstrating with other 
nations of the United Nations that a free nation 
can successfully be defended against Communist 
acrorression and can be i-econstructed and built up 
to defend itself. Our aid progi-am is the major 
factor in the support of the Korean Army, which 
is now the fourth largest in the world and the 
largest among the free nations of Asia. That army 
has obviously become an eft'ective deterrent against 
further aggression by the Red Chinese and North 
Korean armies entrenched beyond the 38th paral- 
lel. Korea's 21 divisions, which we believe con- 
tinue to be essential, are far beyond its ability to 
support. Even without the burdens of this mili- 
tary force, Korea would need outside economic 
assistance for several years to come to complete 
the rehabilitation of the country and develop the 
economy so that it can ultimately become self- 
supporting. 

Taiwan continues to occupy a position of key 
importance in the free world's island chain of 



April 30, 1956 



725 



defense in the western Pacific. We continue to 
regard its defense as essential to the non-Com- 
munist countries of the Far East, as well as of 
the United States itself. As the Communists con- 
tinue to improve and expand their military estab- 
lishment on the mainland, the defensive signifi- 
cance of Taiwan assumes even greater importance 
than heretofore. 

The Government of the Republic of China pro- 
vides a source of hope for the mainland Chinese 
and an alternative focal point for their loyalty. It 
also furnishes a political alternative to Commu- 
nist influence for some 13 million overseas Chinese 
residing in strategic parts of Southeast Asia. As 
the Peiping regime intensifies its repression and 
murder at home and subversive actions abroad, 
the maintenance of a China that is free and inde- 
pendent assumes an ever-increasing importance. 

During the past j'ear good progress has been 
made in strengthening the defensive capability of 
the forces on Taiwan and in stabilizing the econ- 
omy. Substantial assistance from the United 
States continues to be necessary, however, since 
the economic resources of Taiwan are still limited 
in relation to the increasing population and the 
large defense establishment. 

Economic Value of Defense Support 

At this point, let me interpolate a moment. It 
should be clear to all of us that the term "defense 
support" covers programs important to economic 
development as well as to military objectives. A 
highway, an airport, a harbor, a bridge, a factory 
may in the first instance be vital for the military 
purposes, but its construction in most instances also 
contributes a much-needed economic item. Fur- 
thermore, as in Taiwan, the necessity for capital 
development to support military requirements 
goes hand in hand with an important objective we 
all have very much in mind — to reduce the burden 
on the U.S. taxpayer. As the economy of a comi- 
try strengthens, it is self-evident that it can do 
more for itself and the need for grant aid corre- 
sjjondingly declines. 

Turning to Japan, while much remains to be 
done, during the past 2 years Japan's self-defense 
forces have grown in size and have obtained useful 
training. The ground forces, numbering 150,000, 
are regarded as adequate for the maintenance of 
internal security but are not yet either quantita- 
tively or qualitatively adequate for the defense of 
Japan. The Japanese Government, strengthened 



726 



^ 



by the merger of the two conservative parties last 
fall, has under study specific plans wMch would 
improve the country's ability to defend itself un- 
aided. These plans have not yet been approved. 
The assistance for Japan contemplated under the 
mutual security program will continue the help 
given heretofore in the organization, training, and 
equipping of Japan's self-defense forces. Japan's 
economic recovery and its growing self-defense 
capabilities have already made it an asset to the 
free world. Further advance and development 
should enable Japan to assume a greater share of 
its own defense responsibilities and will permit 
redeployment of certain American forces presently 
stationed in Japan. 

We regard the Philippine Eepublic as an in- 
creasingly important partner in the collective de- 
fense arrangements in the Pacific area. The inter- 
nal threat of armed communism has been generally 
overcome, thus making it possible for President 
Magsaysay to proceed with his plans for the eco- 
nomic development of his country. Through con- 
tinued U.S. aid programs we are assisting Philip- 
pine efforts to strengthen the main weaknessess of 
the economy — the rate of industrial development 
and backward rural conditions. We are also pro- 
viding lielp to improve the defensive capabilities 
of the armed forces. 

Cambodia has made good progress in dealing 
with elements inside the country which had been 
a threat to internal stability. Our aid is assist- 
ing Cambodia to strengthen its armed forces in 
accordance with the expressed desire of the Cam- 
bodians to defend the independence of their coim- 
try and to build up an effective internal security 
force to thwart subversion. Our program is 
assisting in strengthening the civilian economy 
by improving inland waterways, irrigation, and 
land reclamation and constructing a highway from 
the capital city to a port on the Cambodian 
coast. 

Eegionally in the Far East, the mutual security 
program for fiscal year 1957 seeks to advance the 
objectives of the network of mutual-defense 
treaties that has been created in the Pacific area. 
The program provides equipment, training, and 
economic support essential for the military and 
police forces, as well as aid for economic devel- 
opment purposes. Our mutual-defense treaties 
are designed to deter the aggressor and to give 
greater assurance and confidence to the participat- 
ing governments. Those arrangements are mak- I 

Department of State Bulletin 



ing a real contribution to the security of the area 
and to the hopes and aspirations of Asian people 
generally. This was deeply impressed on all of 
us who accompanied Secretary Dulles to the 
Karachi meeting of the Seato Council of Minis- 
ters. After a most thorough review of the activ- 
ities carried forwai-d during the first year under 
Seato — a year devoted necessarily to preparatory 
measures — it was apparent on all sides that a high 
sense of optimism, based on solid achievements, 
prevails among the treaty members.^ 

We can anticipate that during the months 
ahead many of the free people of Asia, especially 
those in the newly independent countries, will 
receive a variety of enticements from the Soviets 
masquerading as their bounteous benefactor. The 
Soviets will hold themselves out as ready, willing, 
and able to solve all their problems with the Soviet 
brand of military, economic, and technical assist- 
ance. We propose to meet this challenge by con- 
tinuing our own constructive aid programs in the 
Far East on the same sound principles that have 
been the foundation for those programs in the 
past. While not departing from the main course 
we have charted, we will be better equipped to help 
the free countries of Asia deal with this new Soviet 
drive, as well as with other situations that may 
well develop, if the requested authority for 
increased flexibility can be written into the 
legislation. 

On the whole, I believe we can all derive genuine 
satisfaction from the collective strength that the 
free nations of Asia have been able, with our help, 
to achieve. The job is by no means finished, how- 
ever, nor have the threats to security lessened. 
In our own interest, as well as theirs, we must 
continue our help to them at a rate and in a manner 
adequate to the needs of the developing situation. 

U.S. Policy Toward Cambodia 

Press release 204 dated April 19 

Following is the text of a letter from Secretary 
Dulles to Foreign Minister Nong Kimny of Gam/- 
iodia delivered on April 19 at Phnom Penh iy 
American Arribassador Robert McGlintock. 

Deae Mr. Foreign Minister: I am disturbed 
to learn that recent statements from various quar- 
ters have given increasing publicity to allegations 

' For text of the Council's first annual report, see ihid.. 
Mar. 12, 1956, p. 403. 



that the United States has been attempting to 
coerce Cambodia into the Seato alliance under the 
penalty of withholding economic aid, and that 
the United States has obliged the independent and 
friendly nations of Viet-Nam and Thailand to 
impose measures of economic warfare upon Cam- 
bodia for the same alleged end. 

I regret that these allegations have been made 
since they are utterly false and could harm the 
friendly relations existing between our two 
countries. 

The American Ambassador on April 2 officially 
advised Their Majesties the King and Queen of 
Cambodia that the United States at no time had 
made any official public observation on Cambodian 
foreign policy. United States policy in Cam- 
bodia is based on a simple precept: That is, the 
United States through its military and economic 
aid programs seeks to assist the Cambodian Gov- 
ernment in its endeavor to maintain the sovereign 
independence of the Kingdom. This assistance is 
extended only at the wish of the Royal Cambodian 
Government, which officially requested military 
aid on May 20, 1954 and military and economic aid 
on September 1, 1954. 

Although the United States believes that the 
free nations can most effectively meet the threat 
of Communist aggression through collective de- 
fense, nevertheless United States policy recognizes 
that certain countries, though determined to de- 
fend themselves against aggression or subversion 
of their independence, have preferred not to join 
regional security arrangements. That choice we 
respect. The United States does not seek ties 
of mutual defense with any country unless that 
country believes that this application of the prin- 
ciple of collective security will better assure its 
independence. 

Eecognition of the position of these countries 
in no way prevents the maintenance of close and 
cordial relations with them. In giving economic 
and military assistance to friendly countries to 
improve their capacity to defend themselves 
against aggression or subversion, the United States 
is guided primarily by consideration of its own 
national interests. It considers it to be in its 
national interest to help in the economic and social 
advancement of all free nations. 

I trust that this letter will dispose of the false 
allegations concerning our policy, which, I venture 
to repeat, aims only at assisting free nations to 
preserve their liberty and independence. 



April 30, 1956 



727 



May I take this occasion to extend warm per- 
sonal greetings and best wishes for success in the 
new mission to which you have been called.^ 



State Legislation Regarding 
Japanese Textiles 

I'ress release 109 dated April 17 

Following are the texts of a Japanese Embassy 
note of April 4 concerning legislation in South 
Carolina regarding Japanese textiles, and of the 
Department of State's note of April 16 in reply. 

Japanese Note 

Tlie Ambassador of Japan presents his compli- 
ments to the Honorable the Secretary of State and 
has the honor to draw the attention of the latter to 
tlie following facts. 

The Senate and the House of Representatives 
in the State of South Carolina passed a bill on 
March 6, 1956 whicli requires all wholesale and 
retail establishments in the State dealing in Jaj)- 
anese textile goods, or garments made tlierefrom, 
to display a sign "Japanese Textiles Sold Here". 
The bill was approved by the Governor of the 
State on March 8, 1956 and has since become effec- 
tive. Furthermore, it is reported that the State 
legislature by resolution has requested the other 
southern and New England states, where the tex- 
tile industry is prominent, to take similar steps. 

The above-mentioned legislation discriminates 
against the sale of Japanese textile goods in the 
State of South Carolina. Such discrimination, in 
the view of the Japanese Government, is in contra- 
vention of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce 
and Navigation between Japan and the United 
States which provides, in Article 16, that products 
of either party shall be accorded, within the terri- 
tories of the other party, national treatment and 
most-favored-nation treatment in all matters 
affecting internal taxation, sale, distribution, 
storage and use. 

As the Secretary of State already knows, the 
Government of Japan and the Japanese textile 
industries concerned, in view of strong complaints 
by the American cotton textile industries against 
increased imports of Japanese products and moti- 
vated by the sincere desire to settle the problem 

' Mr. Nong Bamny became Foreign Minister in early 
April. 



amicably, voluntarily started to control the export 
of cotton goods to the United States in January 
1956.^ The voluntary initiation of this control 
required great sacrifice on tlie Japanese side. It 
resulted in the cancellation of a considerable num- 
ber of outstanding contracts, which had been con- 
cluded before the export quota was set, with the 
consequent serious economic impact upon the tex- I 
tile industries concerned, particularly the medium 
and small enterprises. Yet these efforts have now 
been met by the discrimination imposed in the 
State of South Carolina. Furthermore, it is 
feared that similar steps might be taken by other 
states. The Government of Japan is deeply con- 
cerned about the adverse effects such discrimina- 
tory action might have upon the friendly relation- 
ship between the two nations. 

In view of the foregoing, the Ambassador, 
under instructions from the Government of Japan, 
has furtlier the honor to request the Government 
of the United States urgently to take appropriate 
measures to meet this regrettable situation and to 
prevent similar situations from arising in other 
states. 

Embassy of Japan, 
"Washington, April I^, 1956. 

United States Note 

The Secretary of State presents his compliments 
to His Excellency the Ambassador of Japan and 
has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of his 
note of April 4, 1956, concerning legislation en- 
acted by the State of South Carolina which re- 
quires all wholesale and retail establishments in 
that State dealing with Japanese textile goods or 
garments made therefrom to display a sign "Jap- 
anese Textiles Sold Here". The views of the Jap- 
anese Government that this legislation discrim- 
inates against the sale of Japanese textile goods in 
South Carolina and that such discrimination is in 
contravention of Article XVI of the Treaty of 
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between 
the United States and Japan have received the 
most careful consideration. 

It is the policy of the United States Government 
to effect the orderly elimination of unnecessary 

^ For an exchange of correspondence between Secretary 
Dulles and Senator Margaret Chase Smith on cotton 
textile imports from Japan, see Bulletin of Dec. 26, 1955, 
p. 1064. 



728 



Deparfmenf of State Bulletin 



and artificial restraints on international trade. 
The United States Government has made con- 
tinued effoi'ts to brinp about a full acceptance of 
Japan as a member of the world trading commu- 
nity. The considerable degree of success that has 
attended these eft'orts is a source of deep satisfac- 
tion to this Government, which regards the 
healthy and sound expansion of Japan's commerce 
as beneficial to the economies not only of the 
United States and Japan but of all the countries 
of the free world. In addition, the United States 
Government has contributed to a liigher level of 
trade between the two countries, notably through 
the negotiation of mutually advantageous tariff 
reductions, the absence of quantitative i-estrictions 
on imports and the conclusion of the Treaty of 
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation to which 
the Ambassador's note refers. Tlie results of this 
policy are reflected in the expansion of trade be- 
tween the United States and Japan during recent 
years. 

The United States Government has noted the 
action taken by the Government of Japan which 
voluntarily imposed quotas on the export of cotton 
goods to the United States starting from January 
1956. It is aware that this vohmtary action in- 
volved difficulties for an important segment of tlie 
Japanese economy. 

Because of its conviction that a higher level of 
trade on a mutually beneficial basis between the 
United States and Japan is advantageous not only 
from an economic but also from a political aaid 
security point of view, this Goveniment is opposed 
to attempts to frustrate tliat development. With 
respect to the South Carolina law referred to in 
the Ambassador's note and the recently enacted 
law in Alabama, the United States Government 
must depend upon proceedings brought by inter- 
ested parties in appropriate courts to uphold the 
validity of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce 
and Navigation. The fact that this is the regular 
procedure under the constitutional system of the 
United States for securing authoritative determi- 
nations regarding the consistency of state laws 
with treaties is always pointed out by the United 
States representatives during the negotiation of 
such treaties. 

The Government of the United States shares the 
concern of the Government of Japan about the ad- 
verse effects which laws such as those now enacted 
in South Carolina and Alabama might have upon 



tlie friendly relations between the two nations. 
Accordingly, the Secretary of State has the honor 
to inform the Ambassador of Japan that he com- 
municated with the Governor of Alabama con- 
cerning the political, economic and legal problems 
connected with such laws in order to make the 
Governor aware of the adverse effects of the bill 
while it was awaiting his signature. The Secre- 
tary of State has the honor further to inform the 
Ambassador of Japan that he is forwarding an 
expression of concern to the Governor of South 
Carolina together with a copy of this note and the 
Ambassador's note referred to above. 

The Department of State, 
Washington, D. C, April 16, 1956. 



Conclusion of 12-Nation Talks 
on Atomic Energy Agency 

FINAL COMMUNIQUE DATED APRIL 18 

The twelve-nation Working Level Meeting to- 
day unanimously adopted the text for a Statute 
for the proposed International Atomic Energy 
Agency which will be presented for consideration 
at an International Conference to be convened in 
September at U.N. Headquarters in New York. 

While several delegations participating in this 
meeting reserved their positions on certain details, 
all delegations voted in favor of the Statute as a 
whole. 

The twelve-nation group is composed of the fol- 
lowing countries: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, 
Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Portugal, 
Union of South Africa, Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics, United Kingdom and United States. It 
met for eighteen sessions from February 27 to 
April IS, 1956 to consider a previous draft Statute 
circulated on August 22, 1955 ^ in the light of 
comments received from other countries during 
discussions at the Tenth General Assembly of the 
United Nations and subsequently. 

This Working Level Meeting is the most recent 
in a series of negotiations on an international 
atomic energy agency which grew out of a pro- 
posal made by President Eisenhower to the Gen- 
eral Assembly of the United Nations on December 
8, 1953. 



' Bulletin of Oct. 24, 1955, p. 666. 



AprW 30, 1956 



729 



Detailed arrangements for the September Con- 
ference will be worked out at meetings of the 
negotiating group at the adviser level. 



Progress in the French Cameroons 

Statement hy Benjwmin Gerig ^ 

The general impression gained by the United 
States delegation after reviewing conditions in 
the French Cameroons is that substantial prog- 
ress has been made in the economic, social, and 
educational fields. We are confident that within 
the very near future the Administering Authority 
will be able to raise the political status of the in- 
habitants to the level existing in the economic, 
social, and educational fields. 

It is our feeling that the inhabitants of the ter- 
ritory are capable and willing to accept new re- 
sponsibilities in the political field. As a first step, 
my delegation would like to urge that the Admin- 
istering Authority take positive and energetic 
steps to implement as soon as possible the con- 
stitutional improvements elaborated in the bill on 
constitutional reform drafted in 1953. We believe 
that a reappraisal of this bill might be well war- 
ranted to determine whether its various provi- 
sions envisaged to reform the political situation 
in the territory are, in view of the important de- 
velopments of the past year, adequate to allow the 
inliabitants to assume sufficient political responsi- 
bility. 

We hope, moreover, that the feeling of increased 
antagonism and hostility between the north and 
south which resulted from the May riots will soon 
be eliminated as the result of continued efforts by 
the Administering Authority to develop the terri- 
tory in all fields, and particularly by increased 
educational efforts of the inhabitants of all sec- 
tions of the population. We realize that in this 
"hinge of Africa," where many races and cultures 
merge, there is likely to be some friction among 
the different groups. However, we feel confident 
that such a situation may be solved by the con- 
tinued efforts of the Administering Authority to 
foster a national consciousness. 

In this connection, we should like to pay tribute 
to the measures already suggested by the Admin- 



'Made in the Trusteeship Council on Mar. 22 (U.S./ 
U.N. press rele.ise 2314). Mr. Gerig is Deputy U.S. Rep- 
resentative in the Trusteeship Council. 

730 



istering Authority to remove the difl'erences be- 
tween the two sections of the territory. In short, 
these include a program to increase the contact 
between all people of the territory and to raise the 
standard of living and education of the people in 
the north in order to diminish the misunderstand- 
ings which have occurred toward those of the 
south. We feel that these efforts, which are elab- 
orated on page 41 of the Visiting Mission Report 
(T/1231) , should be commended by the Council as 
realistic efforts on the part of the Administering 
Authority to assist the development of the terri- 
tory toward self-government or independence. 

The notable achievements of the Administering 
Authority to develop and spread municipal and 
local government institutions should also be com- 
mended by this Council. In the field of local 
government, while it has been noted that much 
progress has occurred in the southern forest areas 
and in the progressive Bamileke and Bamoun tri- 
bal areas, my delegation feels that continued and 
additional efforts of the Administering Author- 
ity — despite initial opposition by the popula- 
tion — are warranted in order to democratize the 
local government institutions in the predomi- 
nantly Moslem north. 

We look forward with expectation to the insti- 
tution of the single electoral college which the 
representative of France informed us would be 
effective in the very near future. We should also 
like to associate ourselves with the expression of i 
satisfaction voiced by the Visiting Mission at the f 
steps taken to date by the Administering Author- 
ity to broaden the base of the electorate in the 
territory. We feel that the Council as a whole has 
been pleased by the increase in the number of the 
electors during the last 6 years from 50,000 to 
750,000 and hope that the Council of the Republic 
will soon take action on the draft law which would 
give universal suffrage to the territory. 

The United States delegation has taken note 
with satisfaction that in almost every phase of its 
economic life the Cameroons under French Admin- 
istration is making solid advancement despite the 
difficulties presented by the land and the climate. 
From the new hydroelectric plant at Edea, which 
we understand is the third largest in the French 
Union, down to the small sawmills, progress is 
evident everywhere in this agriculturally rich, yet 
sparsely populated, territory. 

We note especially the intensive measures being 

Department of State Bulletin 



taken by tlie Administration to acquaint the 
African with modern metliods of cultivation, 
marketing, and the maintenance of quality 
through the "Societes Africaines de Prevoyance" 
(Sap), the "Secteurs de Modernisation," and the 
"Postes de Paysaimat." In this connection, we 
noted the findings of the Visiting Mission that, in 
the south, dependence of whole regions on such 
single crops as coffee and cocoa was currently 
causing widespread hardship due to the low world- 
market prices for those commodities. To meet 
this hardship, we believe that the Administering 
Authority should consider the formation of 
stabilization fimds and that further efforts should 
be made to diversify the food crops. 

^Yi^ realize the difficulties encomitered by the 
administration in establishing an effective forest 
conservation policy because of the noncooperation 
of the population with respect to classification of 
forests. We feel nonetheless that the Trusteeship 
Council should once again draw the attention of 
the inhabitants to the wisdom and necessity for 
urgent action by the Administering Authority in 
attempting to implement this policy of reforesta- 
tion and classification of forests. It is our hope 
that, as a result of a continued educational pro- 
gram, the inhabitants will cease their resistance to 
such a commendable program of activity. 

Other noteworthy efforts undertaken by the 
Administering Authority in the economic field and 
worthy of commendation by the Council are its 
efforts to increase the standard of living of the 
population, the promotion of cotton and rice cul- 
tivation, improvement of livestock and pasturage, 
evidences of new progress in the promotion of 
small industries, efforts to develop the cooperative 
movement, agricultural experimentation, stock- 
breeding, road and bridgebuilding, the introduc- 
tion of fish farming, and improvements in com- 
mimications. It is our hope that, as a result of the 
operation of the new electrical plants, there will, 
in the near f utui"e, be an increase in the establish- 
ment of secondary industries throughout the 
territory. 

My delegation was pleased to learn of the de- 
velopments in medicine and public health through- 
out the Cameroons. The generous cooperation of 
the Administering Authority in subsidizing hos- 
pitals and dispensaries of the religious missions — 
which has set a record rarely equaled in Africa — 
should be commended. At the same time we are 



concerned over the scarcity of medical supplies 
in the hospitals and dispensaries in the territory. 

Further developments in the social field of 
which the Council should take note are the ad- 
vances in the field of public and cooperative hous- 
ing, attempts to hold down the cost of living, the 
encouraging inroads being made against the 
"bride price" practice, and the many new com- 
munity centers for teaching domestic science. As 
a requisite to complete abolishment of the "bride 
price," we feel that continued education of girls 
with this view in mind is necessary. We should 
like to urge that the Administering Authority 
continue its campaign to reduce alcoholism 
throughout the south and that efforts be made to 
improve sanitary conditions in the prisons. In 
this connection also, we hope that increased at- 
tention may be given to the necessity of bringing 
offenders more quickly to trial. 

Generally speaking, few African territories can 
equal the record achieved by the French in the 
Cameroons for the percentage of school-age chil- 
dren actually enrolled in schools. The overall 
average is an impressive 55 percent, a figure which 
is, however, unevenly distributed geographically, 
ranging from 86 percent in parts of the south to 
6 percent in parts of the north. Yet it will be 
noted that everywhere in the north where the 
Mission visited it was met by demands for new 
schools. This must be considered as a promising 
omen, and we should like to support the sugges- 
tion of the Visiting Mission that the Council 
"commend the Administering Authority for its 
successful educational campaigns in the north 
and to urge it to continue to make every effort to 
satisfy this keen desire for knowledge by appor- 
tioning, in the future, more funds for schools and 
teachers in the northern area and to apply regu- 
lations regarding school-age as flexibly as pos- 
sible." 

Finally, we should like to express our apprecia- 
tion for the successful efforts of the administra- 
tion to adapt education to the local environment, 
particularly with respect to curricula, textbooks, 
and teaching methods, and to promote technical 
training of the inhabitants. The notable increase 
in schools and teachers throughout the territory 
as well as a substantial increase in the number of 
pupils enrolled in the schools, including girls, is 
indeed an encouraging sign. 



April 30, J 956 



731 



Ray T. Kickok Appointed Chairman 
of U.S. Committee for U.N. 

Press release 201 dated April IS 

Secretary Dulles on April 18 announced the ap- 
pointment of Ray T. Hickok of Rochester, N. Y., 
as 1956 chairman of the U.S. Committee for the 
United Nations. Mr. Hickok is chairman of the 
board of directors and president of the Hickok 
Manufacturing Company. 

Prior to this appointment, Mr. Plickok has 
served for the past 2 years as a member of the 
executive committee of the U.S. Committee for 
the United Nations. He is a member of the fi- 
nance committee of the Committee for Economic 
Development and holds office in a number of busi- 
ness and civic associations, including the Young 
Presidents' Organization, of which he was founder 
and first president. 

In inviting Mr. Hickok to serve as chairman, 
Secretary Dulles pointed out the importance of 
the progi-am of the U.S. Committee for the United 
Nations as evidence of our firm support of the 
United Nations in the United States. 

Mr. Hickok, in accepting the appointment, said 
he did so because he is "deeply convinced that 
the United Nations constitutes a major hope for 
an orderly and peaceful world." He said : "Every 
effort that can be made to increase public aware- 
ness and education about the United Nations is 
both worth while and necessary." 

The U.S. Committee for the United Nations 
was established in 1948 by the U.S. Government 
in response to a U.N. General Assembly resolution 
which called upon member nations to observe Oc- 
tober 24 annually as United Nations Day. The 
Committee is composed of more than 130 na- 
tional organizations representing ci^-ic, business, 
labor, agriculture, veterans, religion, education, 
welfare, youth, women, and trade. Its primary 
purpose is to promote and coordinate citizen pro- 
grams across the Nation in obseiwance of United 
Nations Day in an effort to increase public under- 
standing and support of the United Nations. 

The chairman of the Committee is appointed an- 
nually by the Secretary of State. Mr. Hickok as 
the ninth chairman succeeds James S. McDonnell, 
Jr., president of the McDonnell Aircraft Cor- 
poration of St. Louis, Mo. Chairmen in the 
3 previous years were Morehead Patterson, 
president, American Machine and Foundry Com- 






pany; Thomas J. Watson, Jr., president, Inte* 
national Business Machines Corporation; and 
Frank L. Weil, Weil, Gotshal and Manges. 



Senate Confirms Deputy Representative 



? 



in U.N. Security Council 

The Senate on April 12 confirmed James W. 
Barco to be a deputy representative of the United 
States in the Security Council of the United 
Nations. 



U.S. Delegations to 
International Conferences 

South Pacific Conference 

The Department of State announced on April 
21 (press release 208) that the U.S. Government 
will be represented at the third session of the' 
South Pacific Conference, which will meet at Suva, 
Fiji, April 23-May 4, 1956, by the following ob- 
server delegation : 

United States Cntnjnissioner 

Knowles A. Ryerson, Dean of the College of Agriculture^ 
University of California, Berkeley, Calif. 

Advisers 

Edna H. Barr, Office of Dependent Area Affairs, Depart- 
ment of State 

Arthur S. Osborne, M. D., International Health Repre- 
sentative, Division of International Health, Public 
Health Service, Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare 

The Conference, an auxiliary body to the South 
Pacific Commission, meets every 3 years in one of 
the territories of the area and is composed of dele- 
gates, alternates, and advisers from the 19 depend- 
ent territories. It was provided for in order to 
associate with the work of the Commission repre- 
sentatives of the local inhabitants and of official 
and nonofficial institutions in the South Pacific 
area. These representatives meet together to 
consider their common problems of health, educa- 
tion, and general economic and social welfare, and 
to make recommendations for solving these prob- 
lems on a regional basis. The commissioners and 
advisers from the member governments attend as 
observers for the purpose of advising the delegates 
from their respective dependent territories. 

Guam and American Samoa are the only U.S. 
possessions that fall within the scope of the South 



732 



Deparfmenf of Sfale Bulletin 



Pacific Commission. Tlie Trust Territory of the 
Pacific Islands, under U.S. administration, also 
lias been brought within the scope of the Com- 
mission. 

The first session of the South Pacific Conference 
was held at Suva, Fiji, in 1950, and the second 
session was held at Noumea, New Caledonia, April 
15-27, 1953. 

The substantive items of the agenda for the 
third session provide for consideration of (1) 
topics in the field of industrial and commercial 
progress and develojDment, such as (a) progress 
of indigenous industries, (b) j^roblems of modern- 
izing and mechanizing industrial and commercial 
enterprises, (c) processing of agricultural and 
marine products; (2) farming systems, including 
the place of livestock, in the South Pacific; (3) 
cooperative societies and credit unions as a means 
of promoting the welfare of the South Pacific 
j^eople; (4) infant and maternal welfare, having 
regard to social services, community organiza- 
tions, and the improving of living conditions; 
and (5) encouragement and retention, where use- 
ful, of indigenous arts, customs, and culture. 

At the close of the third session of the South 
Pacific Conference, the commissioners and ad- 
visers of the member governments of the South 
Pacific Commission will meet to consider the rec- 
ommendations made at the Conference. 



Notification bp France of extension to: Overseas France, 
from February 28, 1056. 
Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consulta- 
tive Organization. Signed at Geneva March 6, 1948.^ 
Acceptance withdraimi: Greece, March 26, 1956. 

Trade and Commerce 

Fifth protocol of rectifications and modifications to the 
text.s of the schedules to the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 3, 1955. '■ 
Signatures: Luxembourg, March 2, 1956; Sweden, 

March 6, 1956; United Kingdom, March 8, 1956; 

Austria, March 9, 1956. 



BILATERAL 
France 

Agreement relating to the establishment and operation of 
a rawinsonde observation station on the island of 
Guadeloupe in the French West Indies. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Paris March 23, 1956. Enters 
into force on the date representatives of the Weather 
Bureau and the Mi5t^orologie Nationale sign a memo- 
randum of arrangement embodying the technical details. 

Germany 

Air transport agreement, and exchange of notes. Signed 
at Washington July 7, 1955. 
Entered into force: April 16, 1956 (date of receipt by 

the United States of notification of approval by the 

Federal Republic of Germany). 



THE FOREIGN SERVICE 



TREATY INFORMATION 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 
Germany 

Agreement on German external debts. Signed at London 
Februarv 27, 1953. Entered into force September 16, 
1953. TIAS 2792. 
Ratification deposited: Yugoslavia, March 15, 1956. 

Property 

Convention for the protection of industrial property. 
Signed at London June 2, 1934. Entered into force 
August 1, 1938. 53 Stat. 1748. 
Adherence effective: Monaco, April 29, 1956. 

Shipping 

International leadline convention. Signed at London 
July 5, 1930. Entered into force January 1, 1933. 47 
Stat. 2228. 



Resignations 

Homer Ferguson as Ambassador to the Republic of the 
Philippines, effective April 8. 



PUBLICATIONS 



Foreign Relations Volume 

Press release 190 dated April 12 

The Department of State on April 21 released 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1938, Vol- 
ume V, The Ainerican Ee publics. This is the final 
volume of the Foreign Relations series of five vol- 
umes for the year. 

The first part of this volume consists of a gen- 
eral section treating multilateral subjects. These 



' Not in force. 



April 30, 1956 



733 



n 



include the Eighth International Conference of 
American States at Lima, the Chaco dispute be- 
tween Bolivia and Paraguay, conciliation of dif- 
ferences between the Dominican Republic and 
Haiti, a dispute between the United Kingdom and 
Guatemala with respect to British Honduras, and 
boundary disputes between Argentina and Chile, 
Ecuador and Peru, and Honduras and Nicaragua. 
The Conference of American States was notable 
for the adoption of the Declaration of the Prin- 
ciples of the Solidarity of America, generally 
known as the Declaration of Lima. 

The remainder of this volume deals with bi- 
lateral relations of the United States with in- 
dividual American Republics, the topics being 
arranged under country headings. The subject 
given most attention is that of trade agreements, 
negotiations of that nature being recorded with 10 
countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Do- 
minican Republic, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Peru, 
Uruguay, and Venezuela. Other topics treated 
include military missions, protection of business 
interests, exchange restrictions, debts, and claims. 

Copies of volume V (v, 995 pp.) may be pur- 
chased from the Superintendent of Documents, 
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, 
D. C, for $4.25 each. 



Recent Releases 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Gov- 
ernment Printing Office, Washinpton 25, D. C. Address 
requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, ex- 
cept in the case of free publications, which may be ob- 
tained from the Department of State. 

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 3459. Pub. 
6259. 18 pp. 10c'. 

Agreement between the United States and Argentina — 
Signed at Buenos Aires December 21, 1955. Entered into 
force December 21, 1955. 

Atomic Energy, Cooperation for Civil Uses. TIAS 3461. 
Pub. 6257. 6 pp. 5^. 

Agreement between the United States and the Nether- 
lands — Signed at Washington July 18, 1955. Entered 
into force December 30, 1955. 

Technical Cooperation, Program of Housing. TIAS 3462. 

Put). 6264. 4 pp. 5^. 

Agreement between the United States and Colombia, ex- 
tending agreement of June 24 and 30, 1954. Exchange 



of notes — Signed at Bogota December 1 and 21, 1955. En- i. 
tered into force December 21, 1055 ; operative retroac- ' 
tively April 26, 1955. 

Passport Visas. TIAS 3463. Pub. 6267. 4 pp. 5^. { 

Agreement between the United States and Pakistan, re- 
vising agreement of October 10 and 18, 1949, as revised. 
Exchanges of notes — Dated at Karachi August 4, Octo- * 
ber 20, November 25 and 29, 1955. Entered into force 
December 1, 1955. 

Atomic Energy, Cooperation for Civil Uses. TIAS 3465. 
Pub. 6209. 26 pp. 15^. 

Agreement between the United States and Japan — Signed 
at AVashington November 14, 1955. Entered into force 
December 27, 1955. 

Mutual Defense Assistance, Return of Unusable Materiel. 

TIAS 3467. Pub. 6276. 2 pp. 5«S. 

Agreement between the United States and Norway. Ex- 
change of notes — Dated at Oslo December 12 and 28, 1950. 
Entered into force December 28, 1950. 

Mutual Defense Assistance, Disposition of Surplus Equip- 
ment and Material. TIAS 3468. Pub. 6277. 3 pp. 5^. 

Agreement between the United States and Norway, sup- 
plementing agreement of December 12 and 28, 1950. Ex- 
change of notes — Dated at Oslo May 15 and June 26, 1953. 
Entered into force June 26, 1953. 

Atomic Energy, Cooperation for Civil Uses. TIAS 3476.* 
6 pp. 5^. 

Agreement between the United States and Uruguay — 
Signed at Washington January 13, 1956. Entered into 
force January 13, 1956. 

Atomic Energy, Cooperation for Civil Uses. TIAS 3477. 

Pub. None. 6 pp. 50. 

Agreement between the United States and Sweden — ■ 
Signed at Washington January 18, 1956. Entered into 
force January 18, 1956. 

Financial Arrangements for Furnishing Certain Supplies 
and Services to Naval Vessels. TIAS 3479. Pub. None. 
8 pp. 100. 

Agreement between the United States and Cuba — Signed 
at Habana January 10, 1956. Date of entry into force: 
April 9, 1956. 

Relief Supplies and Equipment, Duty-Free Entry and 
Exemption From Internal Taxation. TIAS 3480. Pub. 

None. 5 pp. 5t}. 

Agreement between the United States and Libya. Ex- 
change of notes — Signed at Tripoli December 6 and 22, 
1955. Entered into force December 22, 1955. 

Atomic Energy, Cooperation for Civil Uses. TIAS 3483. 

Pub. Ninie. 6 pp. 50 

Agreement between the United States and Peru — Signed 
at Washington January 25, 1956. Entered into force 
January 25, 1956. 



' Assignment of publication numbers to the TIAS series 
pamphlets was discontinued with TIAS 3474. 



734 



Department of State Bulletin 



April 30, 1956 Index 

Africa 

Progress in the French Cameroons (Gerig) . . . 730 
United States Foreign Policy in Africa (Allen) . 71G 
American Principles. Our Quest for Peace and 

Freedom (Eisenhower) 699 

American Republics 

Foreign Relations Volume 733 

Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference . 710 

Asia 

Objectives of the Mutual Security Program in Asia 

(Robertson) "^23 

South Pacific Conference 732 

Atomic Energy. Conclusion of 12-Nation Talks on 

Atomic Energy Agency (text of communique) . 729 
Cambodia. U.S. Policy Toward Cambodia (DuUes) . 727 
Cyprus. Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Con- 
ference ''^10 

Economic Affairs. State Legislation Regarding 
Japanese Textiles (texts of notes) 728 

Egypt. Israel and Egypt Agree To Observe Armis- 
tice (Lodge) 722 

Foreign Service. Resignations (Ferguson) . . . 733 

France. Progress in the French Cameroons 

(Gerig) 730 

International Organizations and Meetings. South 
Pacific Conference 732 

Israel. Israel and Egypt Agree To Observe Armis- 
tice (Lodge) 722 

Japan 

State Legislation Regarding Japanese Textiles 

(texts of notes) 728 

Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference . 710 
Mutual Security 

Developing NATO in Peace (Dulles) 706 

Objectives of the Mutual Security Program in Asia 

(Robertson) 723 

Our Quest for Peace and Freedom (Eisenhower) . 699 
Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference . 710 
Near East. Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News 

Conference 710 

Non-Self-Governing Territories 

Progress in the French Cameroons (Gerig) . . . 730 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Developing 

NATO in Peace (Dulles) 706 

Philippines. Resignation of Ambassador Fergu- 
son 733 

Presidential Documents. Our Quest for Peace and 

Freedom 699 

Publications 

Foreign Relations Volume 733 

Recent Releases 734 

Treaty Information. Current Actions 733 

U.S.S.R. 

Developing NATO in Peace (Dulles) 706 



Vol. XXXIV, No. 879 



Our Quest for Peace and Freedom (Eisenhower) . 699 

The Soviet Reappraisal of Stalin (Murphy) . . . 719 

Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference . 710 

United Nations 

Conclusion of 12-Natiou Talks on Atomic Energy 

Agency (text of communique) 729 

Israel and Egypt Agree To Observe Armistice 

(Lodge) 722 

Progress in the French Cameroons (Gerig) . . 730 

Ray T. Hickok Appointed Chairman of U.S. Com- 
mittee for the U.N 732 

Senate Confirms Deputy Representative in U.N. 

Security Council 732 

Name Index 

Allen, George V 716 

Barco, James W 732 

Dulles, Secretary 706, 710, 727 

Eisenhower, President 699 

Ferguson, Homer 733 

Gerig, Benjamin 730 

Hickok, Ray T 732 

Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr 722 

Murphy, Robert 719 

Robertson, Walter S 723 



Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: April 16-22 

Releases may be obtained from the News Division, 
Department of State, Washington 25, D. C. 

Press release issued prior to April 16 which 
appears in this issue of the Bulletin is No. 190 of 
April 12. 

Subject 

Dulles : news conference transcript. 
Notes on State legislation on Japanese 

textiles. 
Henderson, Seager : statements at 

Baghdad Pact Council meeting. 
Hickok appointed Chairman of U.S. 

Committee for U.N. 
Pinkerton sworn in as Ambassador to 

Sudan. 
Warren sworn in as Ambassador to 

Turkey. 
Dulles letter to Cambodian Foreign 

Minister. 
Slurphy : "The Soviet Reappraisal of 

Stalin." 
Allen : "U.S. Foreign Policy in Africa." 
Delegation to UNESCO education con- 
ference. 
Delegation to South Pacific Conference. 
Delegation to Inter-American Meeting 

of Ministers of Education. 

*Not printed. 

fHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin. 



No. 


Date 


198 
199 


4/17 
4/17 


1200 


4/17 


201 


4/18 


*202 


4/19 


*203 


4/19 


204 


4/19 


205 


4/19 


206 

t207 


4/20 
4/21 


208 
t209 


4/21 
4/21 




the 

Department 

of 

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The United Nations: Some New Perspectives After Ten Years 

This address before the National Press Club, January 13, 
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developments affecting the United Nations. Among its topics 
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The Soviet Challenge and the United Nations 

This address was made before the Annual Convention of the 
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March 9, 1956. It deals with the new look in Soviet tactics 
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was shown in the rewriting of some of the Stalinist dogma by 
the Soviet 20th Congress. The pamphlet discusses why Soviet 
tactics have changed, what the challenge of the new Soviet 
strategy means to the United Nations, and what colleges and 
universities can do about it. It emphasizes that study of the 
United Nations is of great importance in the teaching of inter- 
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United Nations. 

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^rie/ U)efi<M(i^e7it 4w CHaie/ 




Vol. XXXIV, No. 880 



May 7, 1956 



^BNX Oj» 





THE INSTITUTIONALIZING OF PEACE • Address 

by Secretary Dulles 739 

THE PURGE OF STALINISM • by Allen W. Dulles . . 758 

THE U.S. STAKE IN WORLD TRADE • by Secretary 

of Commerce Sinclair Weeks 767 

PROPOSED REVISION OF IMMIGRATION AND 

NATIONALITY ACT • Statement by Secretary Dulles . 773 

TEACHER DEVELOPMENT WORKSHOP AT THE 
UNIVERSITY OF PUERTO RICO • Article by 

Howard H. Russell 778 



For index see inside back cover 



Boston Public Li'orair 
Superintendent of Documents 

MAY 2 2 1956 




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bulletini 



Vol. XXXIV, No. 880 • Publication 6331 
May 7, 1956 



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The Institutionalizing of Peace 

Address by Secretary Dulles ' 



I It is a conspicuous honor to address this 50th 
annual meeting of the American Society of Inter- 
national Law. The first meeting was addressed 
by the then Secretary of State, Elihu Root, the 
initial president of your society. Mr. Root pos- 
sessed one of the finest legal minds this country or 
any other country has ever kiiown, and he made 
outstanding contributions to the development of 
international law. Two of the original vice presi- 
dents of the society were former Secretaries of 
State — John W. Foster, my grandfather, and 
Richard Olney. That tradition of close associa- 
tion of the society with the Department of State 
has been continuous. It is clue to that tradition 
that I am today an honorai-y president of your 
society and afforded the opportunity of speaking 
on this important anniversary. 

Befoi'e coming here, I reread Secretary Root's 
address and I was struck by the way in which 
history repeats itself. That address discussed au- 
thoritatively the treatymaking power and con- 
cretely the relation of that power to a State law 
which seemed to violate our treaty of 1894 with 
Japan. Today we are still discussing the treaty- 
making power, and much the same issue that Mr. 
Root discussed is raised by recent State laws which 
seem to contravene our 1953 treaty with Japan. 

Secretary Root concluded his address with a 
powerful plea for a spirit of international friend- 
ship and treaty observance without which, he said, 
■'there can never be a world of peace." 

I turn now to the broad problem of achieving 
;he "world of peace" of which Secretary Root 
jpoke. That problem today overshadows all other 



I * Made before the 50th annual meeting of the American 
['Society of International Law at Washington, D.C., on 



ipr. 



(press release 216). 



May 7, 1956 



problems, because the instruments of war have 
become so powerful that their full use would de- 
stroy vast segments of the human race. 

It is particularly fitting that this problem should 
be considered in this society of international 
lawyers, because the problem will never be solved 
without the help of those members of the legal 
profession who are also students of international 
affairs. Lawyers have always had a special apti- 
tude in the formulation of political institutions; 
and that is an art which is demanded at this 
juncture in world affairs. Peace should not de- 
pend upon the winds of emotion being friendly and 
fair; or upon the deterrent of fear; or upon the 
skills and improvisations of diplomacy. Now, as 
never before, peace must be solid, and to be solid it 
needs to be an institution. 

Until recent years it has been war, not peace, 
that has been an institution. It has been the 
means whereby international change has been 
effected. Not only has war been lawful, but the 
concept of the "just war" has been deeply rooted 
in our moral and political code. 

By the latter part of the 19th century, states- 
men began to take note of the heavy economic 
burden of armament and of the increasing de- 
struction that could be wrought by armament. 
This led to the calling of the Hague Peace Con- 
ferences of 1899 and 1907. These conferences did 
not, however, attempt to abolish or replace the war 
system. Rather they sought to assure that war 
would continue to be a tolerable institution. It 
was sought that war .should interfere as little as 
possible with the lives and with the businesses of 
civilians ; that private property should be immune 
from seizure in time of war; that blockade should 
be used only in exceptional circumstances; that 
contraband be limited so that peaceful trade could 

739 



go on ; and to "prohibit the discharge of projectiles 
and explosives from balloons." 

Mr. Foster attended the second Hague Peace 
Conference, and through him I became one of the 
junior secretaries of the conference. I well re- 
member those days, and particularly the debate 
which took place between various of the delega- 
tions as to whether or not humanizing war tended 
to reduce resort to war. I recall that it was then 
the German delegation that held the thesis which 
reappears today — that peace is more apt to pre- 
vail if war is terrible, because then all will avoid it. 

You may recall that a third Hague conference 
was planned for 1914. But World War I came 
instead. At its close, an exhausted world sought 
for the first time to institutionalize peace. 

The League Effort 

The League of Nations was designed to es- 
tablish, at least in rudimentary form, those institu- 
tional elements which enable mature democratic 
societies to preserve order and observe justice. 

In the national state, order is maintained and 
violence is prevented primarily (1) by laws, writ- 
ten or unwritten, which reflect the moral judgment 
of the community subject thereto; (2) by political 
machinery to change these laws from time to time 
so that, as conditions change, laws will continue to 
meet the test of justice and not perpetuate obsolete 
concepts; (3) by an executive body to administer 
law; (4) by courts which settle disputes of a jus- 
ticiable character in accordance with law; (5) 
by superior public force which deters violence by 
its ability to apprehend and punish adequately any 
who breach or defy the law; and (6) by a state of 
public well-being sufficient so that the people heed 
the dictates of reason and of prudence and are not 
driven by a sense of desperation to follow ways of 
violence. 

The League of Nations had, in its Assembly, the 
rough equivalent of a broadly based legislative 
body, but requiring unanimity for most action. 
That Assembly was authorized to advise a recon- 
sideration of treaties which might become inap- 
plicable and of international conditions whose 
continuance might endanger the peace. The 
Council and the Secretariat of the League I'epre- 
sented a form of executive power. There was a 
Permanent Court of International Justice to hear 
and settle international disputes. A measure of 
police power was to be found in the provisions for 



740 



sanctions to be applied in the case of illegal resort 
to war. There was a call for "equitable treatment 
for commerce." 

The Pact of Paris 

The United States, although it largely inspired 
this effort to institutionalize peace, did not join 
it. We initiated another project wliich super- 
ficially seemed easier and simpler — that was to 
abolish war. By the Pact of Paris of 1928 over 
60 nations of the world, including all the great 
powers, renounced war as an instrument of na- 
tional policy and agreed to settle all disputes or 
conflicts by pacific means. 

This pact marks a milestone in history in that 
for the first time war was made illegal. But also 
that pact demonstrated the futility of attempting, 
merely by the stroke of a pen, to abolish an insti- 
tution as deeply rooted as the war system, when 
no adequate compensating institutions were 
brought into being to replace it. 

In an effort to put "teeth" into the Pact of 
Paris, Secretary Stimson in 1932 proposed the 
doctrine of nonrecognition of "any situation, 
treaty, or agreement which may be brouglit about 
by means contrary to the covenants and obliga- 
tions of the Pact of Paris of August 27, 1928." 
But aggressors continued to find the fruits of 
their aggression to be quite palatable, even though 
others denied their right to such enjoyment. 

Limitation of Armament 

xVnother field of endeavor during the interwar 
period was that of the limitation of armament. 
It was argued that, since modern war cannot be 
waged without armament, the likelihood of war 
is reduced as armaments are reduced. Guided by 
that simple proposition, the victors of World War 
I sought first of all to disarm and keep disarmed 
the defeated nations. At the same time they kept 
up a search of ways and means to lessen arma- 
ments for everyone. The League of Nations was 
active in the field of disarmament, with the United 
States participating in certain phases of its work. 
In addition, there were efforts at naval disarma- 
ment undertaken largely on the initiative of the 
United States. There resulted a certain measure 
of agreement among the leading naval powers on 
limitations of specific categories of ships. But 
the broader problems of disarmament proved baf- 
fling:. 



Department of State BuUetin Igy 



The United Nations 

All of these efforts became engulfed by World 
War II. TVHien that war was nearing its end, 51 
nations gathered at San Francisco in a new ef- 
fort to institutionalize peace so as to "save suc- 
ceeding generations from the scourge of war." 

The pattern of this new etl'ort followed the pat- 
tern of effort after the First World War. The 
League of Nations was replaced by the United 
Nations, and the covenant by the charter. There 
is, as under the League, a Council and an Assem- 
bly. The Permanent Court of International Jus- 
tice is replaced by the International Court of 
Justice. This time the renunciation of war, which 
was found in the Pact of Paris but not in the 
League Covenant, is in substance written into the 
charter of the United Nations (article 2 (4)). 
The quasi-legislative function, which was embod- 
ied in the authority of the League's Assembly to 
consider the revision of treaties and international 
conditions, is replaced by articles 13 and 14 of the 
charter which, among other things, call for "the 
progressive development of international law and 
its codification" and which authorize the General 
Assembly to "recommend measures for the peace- 
ful adjustment of any situation, regardless of ori- 
gin, which it deems likely to impair the general 
welfare or friendly relations among nations." The 
charter makes limitation of armament a goal, as 
did the Treaty of Versailles. 

Of course, no constitution is self-executing. 
The League provisions were inadequately imple- 
mented. We may properly and usefully ask: 
How well are the charter provisions being imple- 
mented ? 

The Development of International Law 

First of all, there is the problem of law. The 
charter itself establishes some basic international 
law, notably by article 2, which deals with sov- 
ereign equality, the settlement of international 
I disputes by peaceful means, and the renunciation 
lof the threat or use of force. Chapter XI, dealing 
, with non-self-governing territories, also contains 
I an important enimciation of legal principle. 

Article 13, as we have noted, calls for "develop- 
nient of international law and its codification." 
Under this provision the General Assembly has 
established the International Law Commission, 
which has since 1949 met annually to carry out 
this provision of the charter. Much useful work 

May 7, 1956 



has been accomplished by the Commission. But 
progress in incorporating its proposals into the 
body of international law has so far been minimal. 

There is, as you well know, a considerable body 
of so-called treaty law, represented by treaties 
as between the nations. But not all treaties repre- 
sent "law" in the sense we here use the term. Some 
treaties are multilateral and prescribe agreed rules 
of conduct in relation to such matters as the treat- 
ment of aliens and international trade. Other 
treaties, usually bilateral, represent merely bar- 
gains and are not law in the sense of being a rule 
of conduct formulated in response to a community 
sentiment. They are somewhat the counterpart of 
private contracts within a national society. There 
has occurred a healthy growth in the multilateral, 
lawmaking type of treaty. 

There is also a body of world opinion which, 
when it is crystallized and brought to bear on 
particular situations, plays a role equivalent to 
our "common law." There has been gratifying 
progress in developing this kind of community 
judgment, and the gatherings of the nations at the 
General Assembly of the United Nations greatly 
promote this result. There international conduct 
is judged, sometimes formally but more often 
informally; and even the most powerful nations 
feel it expedient to be able to represent their con- 
duct as conforming to this body of world opinion. 
While there is good progress, it must be ad- 
mitted that the total of international law still falls 
far short of what is needed to institutionalize 
peace. 

Peaceful Change 

Then there is the matter of peaceful means to 
effect international change. We have referred to 
article 14 of the charter, which authorizes the 
General Assembly to recommend change. Of 
course, power to recommend change is consider- 
ably less than power to encu;t change. Neverthe- 
less, the power to recommend, when exercised in a 
responsible way by a great majority of the nations 
of the world, is a considerable power, and many 
Assembly recommendations have been transformed 
into fact. 

It must, however, be recognized that debates in 
the General Assembly in relation to resolutions 
calling for change tend to be emotional, and votes 
are sometimes cast not on the basis of impartial 
study and judgment of the facts but rather on the 
basis of the political alinement of the members 



741 



and sometimes on tlie basis of what one might 
refer to as international "logi-olling." Sometimes 
Assembly debate is counterproductive and makes 
change less likely because it arouses nationalistic 
sentiments. Indeed, it sometimes seems that world 
opinion is more powerful when it is sensed than 
when the United Nations tries to formulate it in an 
Assembly resolution. 

There are vast potentialities in article 14, but 
these potentialities are not yet sufficiently well 
developed so that peaceful change is a well-ordered 
function of the Assembly. 

Change to and From Independence 

World opinion bears particularly upon the con- 
duct of those peoples who, in the words of our 
Declaration of Independence, feel they owe "a de- 
cent respect to tlie opinions of mankind." It is 
largely through this force, which found expression 
in chapter XI of the charter, that there has oc- 
curred the greatest peaceful evolution that history 
has ever known. During the 11 years since "World 
"War II ended and the United Nations Charter 
came into force, over 650 million people have 
gained a new political independence, now repre- 
sented by 18 newly sovereign nations. Other non- 
self-governing peoples are at the threshold of in- 
dependence. 

It is highly encouraging that these vast changes 
should have come about peacefully. It demon- 
strates dramatically that a very large measure 
of jieacef ul change is possible. But also we must 
record the fact that these changes only took place 
within the free nations and that elsewhere there 
has been an obstinate resistance to the moral pres- 
sure for change toward independence and self- 
government. 

There is not, in the world as a whole, any ade- 
quate assurance of peaceful change. 

Enforcement of Law and Order 

Let us turn now to the problem of the adminis- 
tration and enforcement of law. "We have in the 
United Nations Security Council a body which, 
by the charter, is given primary responsibility for 
the maintenance of international peace and secu- 
rity. The charter contemplates (article 43) that 
the Security Council shall have at its disposal 
armed forces necessary for maintaining peace. 

Unfortunately, the charter scheme for a Secu- 
rity Council action backed by an international 



police force has, up to now, not been realized be- 
cause of the so-called veto power. Thereby con- 
fidence in the Security Council has been badly 
shaken and its usefulness impaired. 

In an effort to meet that situation the General 
Assembly adopted in 1950 a resolution known as 
"Uniting for Peace." It asked the members vol- 
untarily to hold in readiness armed contingents 
available for United Nations use in maintaining 
international peace and security. Also the Assem- 
bly set up a procedure for meeting on 24 hours' 
notice in the event of a threat to the peace and a 
paralysis of the Security Council through exercise 
of the veto power. 

This partially compensates for the undependa- 
bility of the Security Council as a law enforce- 
ment body. However, the General Assembly is 
primarily a deliberative body and includes so 
many members that it cannot serve effectively as 
an executive or enforcement agency. 

As further moves to reinforce the processes for 
peace, 45 nations have joined in collective security 
arrangements under article 51 of the charter, 
which acknowledges the inherent right of col- 
lective self-defense against armed attack. Most 
of these collective security arrangements are 
backed by the mobile striking power of the United 
States. These arrangements go far to deny ag- 
gressors the opportunity to follow the typical pat- 
tern of aggression which consists of picking up 
weaker nations one by one. 

The Judicial Process 

Let us turn now to the judicial process. Here 
we find that, despite much lipservice to that 
process, most nations prefer to seek the settlement 
of their disputes by diplomatic means, or perhaps 
they prefer to keep the disputes open for domestic 
political reasons. In the 10 years since the new J 
International Court of Justice has been in being, 
there have been 21 contentious cases brought be- 
fore the Court. There have been only 9 judg- 
ments on the merits ; 2 cases are pending ; and the 
remaining 10 have been disposed of without a de- 
cision, principally because the respondent has de- 
nied jurisdiction and refused to appear. During 
the same period of time there have been 8 ad- 
visory opinions delivered, and 2 requests for ad- 
visory opinions are pending. This post-"World 
"War II record, as far as contentious cases are 
concerned, approximates the record of the Per- 



742 



Department of Sfofe Bulletin 



manent Court of International Justice, which sat 
for 23 years between the First and Second World 
Wars and dealt with 22 cases on the merits. How- 
ever, relatively more advisory opinions were ren- 
dered by the Permanent Court. 

It is significant that, with all the disputes which 
exist in the world, there are only two contentious 
cases now on the docket of the International Court 
of Justice. It is demonstrated that nations are 
reluctant to settle serious disputes on the basis of 
rules of law. 

Economic Weil-Being 

There remains to consider the conditions of 
human welfare. 

On the whole there has been a vast improvement 
in economic conditions throughout the world dur- 
ing the first postwar decade. Much of this is due 
to the fact that the economically mature states 
have practiced an enlightened self-interest where- 
by they have assisted others and have encouraged 
multilateral trade on a most-favored-nation basis. 
Thirty-five nations work through the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to promote world 
trade on a multilateral basis. The United Na- 
tions has economic commissions for Europe, Asia, 
and South America. 

On tlie other hand, it must be recognized that 
all of this effort rests upon a fragile international 
basis. It is open to the nations to escape from 
their present tariffs and to create obstacles which 
would seriously interfere with world trade and 
gravely disrupt the economic life of many coun- 
tries. 

The danger of this is increased by the fact that 
the domestic impact of imports is always plain 
and identifiable and the role of such impoi'ts in 
paying for exports is not so readily apparent. 
World economy is in no sense organized to a 
point where any one nation can feel that the wel- 
fare of its people is free from grave hazard at 
the will of other nations. 

The Present Inadequacy 

If one were to summarize the present state of 
affairs, it could permissibly be concluded that con- 
siderable progress, even unprecedented progress, 
has been made in some of the essentials of an inter- 
national order. There is more international law 
than ever before. There are greater enforcement 
possibilities than ever before, particularly in terms 



of deterrence to open armed aggression. There 
is more peaceful change than ever before. 

But even if we recognize, as we gladly do, that 
international society is moving in a sound direc- 
tion, we must, I think, seriously ask ourselves 
whether we have adequately learned, and are with 
sufficient rapidity applying, the lessons of his- 
tory. Humanity survived through World War II, 
despite the failure after World War I. But we 
cannot be sure that we shall be given a second re- 
prieve. The new nature of warfare, as exem- 
plified by the atomic bomb which burst upon a 
stai-tled world just after the United Nations Char- 
ter was signed, gave notice that there may not be 
an amplitude of time with which to seek progress 
by the timid route of pragmatic trial and error. 

The Need for More International Law 

The foregoing analysis suggests that there are 
certain areas which particularly require develop- 
ment at the present time. 

One such area is the field of international law. 
There needs to be a greater and more significant 
body of such law. Popular attention tends to 
focus upon the police functions of an interna- 
tional order. These are more spectacular than 
law itself. But law is absolutely essential to pre- 
vent despotism. A policeman must know whom 
he is to apprehend and why, and a citizen must 
know when he can count upon the policeman 
to protect him and when he must fear arrest. 
Without law a policeman, whatever uniform he 
wears, is a despot or a tool of despotism. 

This necessity for law creates a perplexing prob- 
lem because so much of the world is ruled by 
those who do not believe in law in our sense of 
the word. "Law," within the Communist bloc, 
is considered the means whereby those in power 
maintain their power and destroy their enemies. 
Since communism is materialistic and atheistic, 
its leaders cannot accept the view that law repre- 
sents man's efforts to apply to human affairs prin- 
ciples of justice which derive from a higher being. 
For them there is no natural or moral law. 
Neither can they understand the concept of rulers 
being themselves subject to law since, by their 
creed, the rulers are themselves the source of law. 

Nevertheless, there is some glimmering of hope 
in this respect. Eecent developments within the 
Soviet Union indicate an effort to provide greater 
personal security than existed when everyone was 



lAay 7, 1956 



743 



subject to liquidation through the secret police at 
the will of an enemy who possessed the greater 
power. Vyshinsky's code of "trial by confession" 
rather than by evidence is being repudiated. So, 
despite the Communist doctrinal rejection of our 
concept of law, there may be emerging a de facto 
acceptance of law as a protection of the individual 
against the capricious will of those in authority. 

It is also a fact that on the international plane 
the Soviet rulers, if only grudgingly and as a mat- 
ter of expediency, take some account of the 
opinions of mankind. And these, as we have ob- 
served, can form a body of common or unwritten 
international law. 

Therefore, it is not hopele-ss to seek to develop a 
greater body of law even on a universal basis. 

In view, however, of the great difficulty of gain- 
ing multilateral acceptance of formal codifications 
of international law, we shall have to place much 
reliance upon unwritten law. This, in turn, re- 
quires constant education of public opinion, so 
that it will reflect a sound judgment about inter- 
national conduct. There needs also to be improve- 
ment of the processes of the United Nations Gen- 
eral Assembly so that, when it acts in a quasi- 
legislative or judicial capacity, it will comply with 
such high standards as evoked the Anglo-Saxon 
concept of the King's conscience which the Equity 
Chancellor was to apply. 

There can also be a useful development of law 
among the free-world nations as a whole and 
also among those groups of free nations as nat- 
urally draw together. The Organization of 
American States has already done much to develop 
a body of American law and precedent which 
helps to keep peace and order in the new world. 

The Need for More Peaceful Change 

When we consider the question of law, we must 
always consider it jointly with the problem of 
peaceful change. Law does not conduce to peace 
if it merely perpetuates the status quo after that 
status has ceased to serve the needs of a vital and 
changing community. So far, force or the threat 
of force has been by far the most effective means 
of bringing about change. If force is to be eradi- 
cated, adequate means for peaceful change must 
exist. "^Vlaile, as we have seen, peaceful change has 
already occurred to an unprecedented degi-ee in the 
evolution of subject peoples to independence, there 
still remains danger of war from efforts to perpet- 



uate situations which by any standard of equity 
ought to be changed. 

This makes it of the utmost importance that 
nations be responsive to informed world opinion 
and that the "peaceful adjustment" article of the 
United Nations Charter (article 14) should be put 
to better use. 

The Stabilization of International Trade 

Another area which needs concentrated atten- 
tion is the area of international trade. There is 
often a lack of appreciation of the close relation- 
ship which exists between international trade and 
the problem of war or peace. That relationship 
seems better understood by Soviet political stu- 
dents. They consider that the vicissitudes of 
trade under the capitalistic system are its greatest 
weakness and provide them with their best chance 
to overthrow that system. 

The last important publication of Stalin be- 
fore he died ^ argued that war between the Com- 
munist world and the capitalistic world might not 
be inevitable because the capitalistic world would 
almost surely war within itself. This, Stalin con- 
tended, would take place as a result of the quarrels 
which would develop out of the need of the indus- 
trial countries of the "West to find markets for 
their goods, given the addition of Germany and 
Japan as major industrial producers and the sub- 
traction of the Soviet-Chinese Communist world 
as free markets for the "West. 

One of the most recent and authoritative Soviet 
Communist publications is that brought out in 
1954 under the title of Political Economy? It 
deals thoroughly with the relationship of trade to 
international relations and the issues of war and 
peace. 

"Wlien we think of the causes of the Second 
"World War, we tend to identify them with the 
personalities of Hitler and the Japanese war lords. 
But we would do well to go behind them to the 
economic condition that brought Hitler and the 
Japanese war lords into power in the early 1930's. 
Edmond "\^ermeil, an outstanding French student 
of Germany, in his book, Germany's Three Reichs, 
said that the economic crisis "suffices in itself to 



"Economic Prohlems of Socialism in the V.S.S.R. 
(Oct. 30, 1952). 

' Textbook published by the Academy of Sciences, 
U.S.S.R. (1954). 



744 



Department of State Bulletin 






explain the final triumph of Hitlerism in 1930." 
John ^Vlieeler-Bennett, outstanding British his- 
torian, in his book, Munich — Prologue to Tragedy, 
wrote, "The forces of nationalism . . . revived 
■with renewed vigor under the influence of eco- 
nomic disaster." And G. C. Allen of the Univer- 
sity of London, writing in the book. The Industri- 
alization of Japan, said, "The sufferings incidental 
to the depression brought discredit on the [lib- 
eral] government"; and Hugh Borton of Colum- 
bia University in his book on Japan, speaking of 
the Japanese Premier's efforts in 1931 to keep the 
war lords under control, wrote, "Unfortunately for 
him and for liberalism in Japan, he came to power 
just when the world depression struck Japan. . . . 
The cry of the militarists that Japan's economic 
ills could be cured only by direct action in China 
and by the exploitation of Manchuria fell on sym- 
pathetic ears." 

As we pointed out, economic conditions since 
World War II have, on the whole, been sound 
within the free world and there has been a definite 
rising of standards of living. But there seems 
as yet no adequate popular or even political 
realization of how vital it is for peace that this 
trend should continue. 

Any serious interruption of international trade 
could readily again bring reckless men to power 
in hai'd-hit countries, demanding for their coun- 
tries the resources and markets needed for eco- 
nomic well-being. This could precipitate world 
war III. 

We have noted the need for peaceful change. 
Of all forms of change, that of national boundaries 
is the most difficult to effect peacefully. But the 
need for change of boundaries becomes less if 
boundaries are not barriers to the reasonable flow 
of trade and movement of persons and ideas. The 
more boundaries are barriers, the more need there 
is to change them and the more difficult it is to 
accomplish the peaceful change which is the only 
alternative to violent change. 

Armament as Community Power 

I have left to the last the problem of armament. 
This is in some ways the most important and in 
many ways the most complex of the components 
of institutionalized peace. 

There exists today, primarily in the possession 
of the Soviet Union and the United States, vast 
power of atomic and thermonuclear weapons. 



However, these two nations do not possess a mo- 
nopoly. The United Kingdom also is developing 
nuclear weapons. And as atomic energy becomes 
used for peacetime purposes, others will have op- 
portunity to get the weapons material which is a 
byproduct of the production of nuclear power. 

Nations are working today on several fronts in 
an effort to bring nuclear power under interna- 
tional control. There is the Disarmament Sub- 
committee of the United Nations, now negotiating 
at London, and the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, in process of formation pursuant to Presi- 
dent Eisenhower's atoms- for-peace proposal of 
1953. 

The task of controlling atomic power to exclude 
the possibility of diversion to military use of the 
byproduct material is, however, very difficult. 
Science has yet to devise means to assure effective 
supervision, control, and accounting for byprod- 
uct fissionable material. 

I do not intend to go into the highly compli- 
cated problem of general limitation of armament, 
a problem found insoluble after World War I. 
Here, I think, we must rely, in part at least, upon 
a lessening of political tensions and such recipro- 
cal fear-dispelling knowledge as could result from 
President Eisenhower's "open skies" plan. If it 
be possible to create an atmosphere free of fear, 
that will facilitate arms limitation because na- 
tions will no longer feel it necessary or expedient 
to spend vast sums upon their armament. Indeed, 
under these conditions, it would be practically im- 
possible to prevent substantial reductions of 
armaments. 

There is, however, one aspect of the matter which 
I would touch upon tonight. That is the relation- 
ship between the powerful new weapons and the 
establishment of an effective international force 
to deter and, if need be, punish violations of in- 
ternational law. 

How will it be possible to make commimity 
power superior to that of the lawbreaker if in- 
dividual nations possess atomic and nuclear weap- 
ons and the means of their delivery ? 

The answer, it seems, must be found in growing 
recognition that destructive power such as that 
now represented by atomic and nuclear weapons 
is so great a power that it is clothed with a public 
and community interest. Such power ought never 
to be the tool of any single nation, to promote 
its national objectives or to permit it to defy 
community law and order. Unless that concept 



May 7, 7956 



745 



is accepted, it is impossible for peace ever to be- 
come a stable and dependable institution. 

The United States has already made clear its 
own purpose never to use the vast new power 
which comes from new weapons and new means 
of delivery except in the defense of principles 
which the whole world accepts. These principles 
are established by tlie charter of the United Na- 
tions, which requires that "nations shall refrain 
in their international relations from the threat or 
use of force," and wliich also recognizes that na- 
tions have an "inherent right of individual and 
collective self-defense" as against armed attack. 

It is generally accepted by the free-world 
peoples that the United States means what it says 
in these respects. They believe it not merely be- 
cause we say it but because what we say conforms 
to the traditions of our Nation and to the moral 
principles which our people and their government 
generally espouse. 

The same cannot be said of the Soviet Union, 
where power is despotic and exercised by those who 
deny the existence of moral law or of principles 
superior to the self-interest of the dictators. 
Nevertheless, the time must come when the Soviet 
rulers, if only as a matter of expediency and in 
deference to what should be incessant demands 
of world opinion, will be prepared to take steps 
to assure that the new power of modern weapons 
is in fact subjected to the will of the community. 

It may seem that this prospect is remote. But 
when we consider the many startling changes 
which from time to time have occurred within the 
Soviet Union, we need not regard this particular 
prospect as wholly visionary. 

In the meantime, and in order that we may set 
an example which will be influential, the United 
States itself, I suggest, should increasingly make 
clear, by word and deed, through the United Na- 
tions and through collective-defense associations 
to which we belong, that it is our intent that this 
new power be used only in defense of principles 
to which the community of nations subscribes. 

Paragraph 5 of the Vandenberg Resolution 
(1948) called for progi'ess along two fronts, 
"maximum efforts to obtain agreements to provide 
the United Nations with armed forces" and also 
"agreement . . . upon universal regulation and 
reduction of armaments" of member nations. 
Progress along these two lines, building com- 
munity power and diminishing purely national 



power, is necessary to the establishment of inter- 
national law and order. 

The Task Is Imperative 

When we review the task of making peace a 
stable institution through processes of law and 
justice, and enforcement thereof, it is easy to be- 
come discouraged. AVe must not, however, admit 
of discouragement, because the task is much too 
important. The fact that the task is difficult, and 
that the road to the goal may be long, is a reason 
not for delay or for despair but rather for greater 
urgency and for greater effort. 

There is much to be done and much that can 
be promptly done. "\Miere universality may not 
be practical, we can find in regional and collective- 
defense associations an area where notable prog- 
ress can be made. These associations can serve 
as important steppingstones toward a universal 
order. They can, as between their own members, 
develop such principles of conduct as we have re- 
ferred to, and they can make force into a sanction 
for these principles, thus making it serve the com- 
munity. 

The essential thing is not that the ultimate goal 
be immediately reached but that the peoples of 
the world demonstrate the vision and the ca- 
pacity to move steadily and hopefully toward that 
goal. The spectacle of men working together in 
fellowship on great tasks of creation is itself a 
powerful influence for peace and order. Tliat ac- 
tivity deters the unruly from seeking by violence 
to interrupt a process which carries with it the 
hopes of all mankind. 

We need not assume that we are set to run a 
hopeless race with time. We can gain time by 
intermediate efforts such as I describe. Also, 
what may seem to be far away today may be 
reached much more quickly than we might sup- 
pose. There has been a great evolution in thinking 
in the last three decades. Already there is prog- 
ress such as the world has never known before. 
Also, never befoi-e was there such an awareness of 
the need as now flows from a knowledge of the 
nuclear menace. '\Aniereas, in the pa.st, it seemed 
reckless to take chances for peace, today it is reck- 
less not to do so. ; 

We must assume, as our working hypothesis, 
that what is necessary is possible. And we must 
prove it so. 



746 



Department of Stale Bulletin 



Transcript of Secretary Dulles' 
News Conference 

Press release 212 dated April 24 

Q. Mr. Secretary, tliere has ieen a Jot of in- 
terest and speculation on your remarks in New 
York yesterday about expanding the operation or 
p^irpose of NATO} This interest has ieen in- 
creased iy the fact that in this conference several 
weeks ago you talked rather negatively about what 
can be done. Will you give us sovi-e of your fur- 
ther ideas on this subject? 

A. I do not feel that I can properly at this time 
fill in very much what I said yesterday. Broadly 
speaking, it is our view, and I think has been our 
view, that an organization of this kind either 
grows or tends to dry up. And we believe that the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization ought to be 
in the class of organizations which grow ratlier 
than those which dry up because they only were 
designed to serve a limited purpose which may in 
due course be fulfilled. 

As I indicated yesterday, I believe that there is 
a basis for continuing vitality in the Atlantic 
community comparable to that which brought into 
being the Pan American Union and the Organiza- 
tion of American States, which have been in exist- 
ence for over 66 years and which will go on, I 
guess, for a great many more years. 

Now, I do not think that there was an incon- 
sistency in what I said yesterday with what I said 
in my earlier press conference.^ I did say at that 
earlier press conference that I felt that certain 
types of activity in relation to economic trade as 
between the members of Nato could perhaps be 
better carried on through the Oeec [Organiza- 
tion for European Economic Cooperation], which 
includes in the main the members of Nato and 
also one or two other countries who are not mem- 
bers of Nato. But I did not intend in that par- 
ticular remark, which I still stand by, to indicate 
that there was no opportunity for the growth and 
vitality of Nato. 

Now, I don't want to discuss the details because 
we are only one of 15 members of the North At- 
lantic Treaty Organization. This matter will 
undoubtedly be discussed rather actively next 



• Bulletin of Apr. 30, 195C, p. 706. 

' For transcript of Feb. 28 press conference, see ibid., 
Mar. 12, 1956, p. 409. 

lAay 7, 1956 



week in Paris, and I think that it is appropriate 
that we should have an exchange of views around 
the Council table with our partners and learn 
more of their views before we attempt to refine 
and define our own. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, NATO is essentially operated 
as a military organization. It woidd appear that 
political and economic possibilities are the only 
other two. Are you thiidcing more, broadly speak- 
ing, in the economic or the political line in your 
latest remarks'i 

A. Well, I would say we are thinking on both. 

Q. But you do feel that OEEC is the mare 
proper way to handle economic matters? 

A. Economic matters as within Europe. But 
there are also economic problems which could con- 
ceivably relate to activities between Nato coun- 
tries, or some of them, and non-European coun- 
tries. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us whether the 
United States Government plans to take to the 
next NATO meeting any specific plans or pro- 
posals for expansion or development of NATO or 
whether we are just going luith an open mind on 
the matter? 

A. Well, we will go with some thoughts to ex- 
change, yes. I may say that the general concept of 
my speech was discussed with the permanent rep- 
resentatives at Paris, who make up the Nato 
permanent Council there, about a week ago, before 
I made my speech, because I wanted to be sure 
there would be a general receptivity to that point 
of view, and I found that there was. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, are you thinking of the kind 
of political development of the organization, for 
example, that might make it possible, for instance, 
to consider such problems aw Cyprus, and so on? 

A. Well, now you're pimiing me down a little 
bit more closely than I care for. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, lohen you said economic ques- 
tions and non-European countries, had you in 
mind underdeveloped areas which might be as- 
sisted by NATO or areas such as the Middle East 
upon which NATO is dependent for its fuel? 

A. I would think that both of those aspects of 
the matter should be considered. Whether thei-e 
is agreement to deal with them or not I wouldn't 

747 



know. But I think probably they should be dis- 
cussed. It is certainly relevant, I would think, 
to the Atlantic community, and to Nato that much 
of its economy depends upon oil that comes from 
the Middle East and if that was cut off you would 
be cutting off an element upon which Nato is very 
dependent as a military organization. That is one 
aspect of the matter. 

There are also possibilities of joint efforts which 
might include all or some of the Nato countries 
to assist in neighboring areas such as North Africa. 
The French have made proposals along that line. 
I don't want to imply that those proposals would 
be acceptable, but I merely mention them as indi- 
cating the possible range of thinking. 

NATO and OAS 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in general terms when you 
point out OAS as an organization which NATO 
may grow to he like, do you have in mind agen- 
cies like the Inter-American Peace Commission, 
which deals with regional disputes, and the Eco- 
nomic and Social Council? 

A. Well, again, I prefer not to go into that at 
this time. I would say this : I do not suggest that 
there should be any exact patterning of Nato to 
correspond with the Organization of American 
States. I was careful in my remarks yesterday 
to say, after speaking of the Organization of Am- 
erican States, that Nato or the Atlantic community 
might grow in its own distinctive way. I used the 
word "distinctive" for the very purpose of indi- 
cating that it would not necessarily be exactly the 
same pattern. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, one of the characteristics of 
the Organization of A7nerican States in this hem- 
isphere has heen ivithin the limit of the area and 
its universality. Do you anticipate any change in 
the basic character of NATO which would make 
it have appeal to all the non-Communist countries 
in the European area? I mean such countries, 
specifically, as Switzerland and Sweden. 

A. Well, I do not contemplate the membership 
of such countries in Nato because Nato is a de- 
fensive military alliance. Its military activities 
are major and for some time probably will be a 
major phase of its activities, and in view of the 
neutral status which those countries have elected 
to take I could hardly expect that they would ac- 
tually join Nato. 



Q. How about Spain ? Do you envisage Spain 
as being a partner? 



A. Well, as far as the United States is con- 
cerned, we would be verj' happy to see Spain 
a member of Nato. And if the broadening of 
Nato activities makes that easier, that would, 
from our standpoint, be one of the good byprod- 
ucts of it. But, of course, there is some difference 
of opinion within Nato about Spain, and we are 
not trying to press our views, or force our views, 
upon other countries. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you tell us why there is 
a feeling among NATO countries today that there 
is a danger of its drying up? 

A. I don't think I said that they felt that there 
was a danger of its drying up. What I said re- 
ferred to a law of nature that it is inevitable that 
things either grow or they do tend to dry up. And 
an organization which is created to meet an emer- 
gency or a special situation tends to diminish in 
vigor as it is judged that the occasion for its com- 
ing into being disappears. 

Now, then, the question is, do we consider Nato 
as an organization which was created and which 
has its life only for the duration of the threat 
that brought it into being ? If so, you do not look 
ahead through long vistas of time. Or you con- 
sider that Nato is an organization which reflects 
the spirit of Western civilization, which has been 
a great and vital factor in the world for a great 
many years but the efficacy of which, as I pointed 
out in my speech, has been greatly diminished by D 
the disimity as between its members. A great ' 
task of postwar statesmanship is to heal the dis- j, 
unities which in the past have so often been the! 
cause of war. We have had wars which have come 
out of the West almost every generation for a good ^Ilie 
many years. 

Now, a great deal has already been done to heal 
that breach — through bringing the Federal Re- 
public of Germany into Nato ; through the Brus- 
sels Treaty, which now creates what is called 
Western Euro^Dean Union. But if the divisions' 
of Western Europe are healed by organizations < 
wliich themselves are looked upon as emergency'! 
and temporary organizations, then you have not' 
got the element for a permanent healing of those [ 
divisions and the creation of unity. So I think it jj^ 
is important, from the standpoint of the long-i — . 
range future of Europe and the avoidance of ' 'A 



Mi 
till 



A. 



748 



Department of Slate Bulletin !% 



what has in the past been a frequent cause of war, 
that the things that tie together the countries of 
Western Europe have the quality of permanency 
and not be merely emergency ties. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been a good 
■deal of criticism at home and abroad to the e-ffect 
\that o^ir approach to world affairs has been over- 
militarized. Could it be that your speech yester- 
day indicates that you are at least explonng the 
possibility of a different em^phasis without sacri- 
f^ing the military — that you''re thinking of in- 
creasing the accent on the economic and political 
approach? 

A. I think that that would be a fair interpre- 
tation of what the President said on Saturday ' 
and what I said on Monday. In certain parts of 
the world, at least, it seems that the Soviet activi- 
ties are putting less emphasis upon violent means 
and more emphasis upon other means. Perhaps 
that appraisal needs a little adjustment, in the 
light of Khrushchev's outburst in London yester- 
day. But in the main there is an effort to elim- 
inate from their doctrine, and perhajis to some 
extent fiom their practice, the Stalin thesis that 
only violence would serve. As I perhaps have 
quoted or paraphrased here before, Stalin said 
that anybody who believed that communism, 
Soviet conmiunism, can achieve its goal without 
resort to violence has either gone out of his mind 
or else does not understand the basic funda- 
mentals of Communist philosophy. Well, now 
apparently they are trying to get away from that 
point of view, both doctrinally and to some extent, 
I believe, in practice. And it's necessary and ap- 
propriate that we should, I think, adapt our tac- 
tics to the changes in Soviet Communist tactics. 

The Cold War 

Q. Mr. Secretary., in that connection., it was the 
consensus of a group of American newspaper 
editors in Washington last week that the United 
States is losing the cold war. On tlie same day, 
the President expressed the opinion that exactly 
the opposite was true. Can you spell out for v^ 
some of the toays in which we may be countering 
the cold war? 

A. Well, of course, when you approach the ques- 
tion of whether we are winning or losing the cold 
war, I suppose the first thing to determine is, what 



do you mean by the "cold war"? As I tried to 
point out yesterday, the cold war is not simply 
a defensive operation. If by cold war you mean 
merely to keep alive hatred of Kussia, or to keep 
the Russians permanently ostracized and to deny 
them any access to the free world, then I suppose 
it could be judged that we are not winning the 
cold war. But that is not my concept at all of 
what the cold war is. 

The cold war basically is an effort, first of all, 
to do away with the great danger of hot war. I 
notice that the same people who said we were 
losing the cold war also agi-eed that there was 
very much less danger of war than there has been 
before. Well, if you call that losing, it's not my 
definition of losing. And we also, of course, pri- 
marily are looking to the day when Russia will be 
something that we can be friends with and not 
have to treat as enemies. And there has de- 
veloped a beginning at least of a change within 
the Soviet Union. The change that has happened 
outside, which causes some to fear, is responsive 
to what the world judges has happened inside. 
It is widely judged, rightly or wrongly, but the 
fact is it is widely judged by responsible people, 
that the Soviet Union is not to be feared as much 
now as it was before. And if, in fact, the Soviet 
Union is not as much to be feared as it was, if it 
has become more tolerant, if it has put aside the 
use of violence, if it is beginning to move in a 
liberal way within, then I would call that progress 
toward victory in the cold war. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your last press conference * 
you pointed out that the fine print has to be read 
on the Moscow statement on the Middle East. I 
wonder if that reading of the fine print has been 
completed and you can give us your assessment 
of that statement. 

A. Yes, I can say I have now read the fine print 
and my impression is about the same as I ex- 
pressed last week. It does seem to me that the 
statement is responsive to President Eisenhower's 
statement.^ Now, when I say responsive to, I 
don't mean to say that it is in response to, which 
is slightly different. I don't mean to say that the 
Soviets made their statement because President 
Eisenhower made his statement. But the Soviet 
statement does, it seems to me, fit in with and 



■ Ilid., Apr. 30, 1956, p. 699. 



May 7, 7956 



* Ihid., p. 710. 

'Issued at Augusta, Ga., on Apr. 9; see ihid., Apr. 23, 
p. 668. 

749 



in that sense is responsive to President Eisen- 
hower's statement, which called upon all of the 
member nations to support tlie Hammarskjold 
mission and the efforts of the United Nations in 
this respect. And I think to the extent that the 
statement seems to commit the Soviet Union to 
the support of the Hammarskjold mission and to 
the handling of this matter in the United Nations, 
and we can hope a handling which would exclude 
its use of the veto power in the Security Council, 
that is all in the right direction. 

Relations With the Philippines 

Q. Mr. Secretary, reports from the Philippines, 
including an AP dispatch, tell of the dissatisfac- 
tion with the prospective nominees for United 
States Ambassador there. Other reports tell of 
a rising anti-Ainerican sentim,ent. We are ac- 
cused of treating the Philippines as an orphan. 
The New York Times recently described the situa- 
tion as "senmis, if not critical." The question is, 
do we give weight to Philippine public sentiment 
and its impact on friendly United States-Philip- 
pine relations in our diplomatic and other deal- 
ings with them? 

A. We attach the greatest of importance to 
good relations with the Philippines, and I be- 
lieve that the relations at the present time are 
basically good, although I am not unaware of 
the fact that some are critical of the United States 
because they do not feel that we are cutting the 
Philippines in sufficiently upon our economic aid 
program. 

"Wlien I was in Manila on my last trip, a month 
ago, I was quite aware of the criticism that was 
made in that respect. There was a good deal of 
attention paid to a chart which was drawn from a 
United States newspaper which, for example, 
showed a list of the countries that had received the 
greatest aid from the United States. The chart 
gave 10 countries, and the Philippines was last on 
that list. That was interpreted in some quarters 
as indicating that we were, as you put it, treating 
it as an "orphan." Well, the chart did not mean 
that. It picked the 10 countries that have gotten 
the most aid and merely lumped together the 
others, some 45, who had gotten less aid. The 
whole purport of the chart was to show that the 
Philippines was among the 10 who had gotten 
the most aid out of the approximately 50 who had 

750 



been aided. And even there the chart was inaccu- 
rate because it showed the total aid as approxi- 
mately $1 billion, whereas the actual amount of 
economic aid, including loans and U.S. expendi- 
tures in the Philippines, is about $2.5 billion. 

Also there is — very naturally, perhaps — mis- 
understanding as to the nature of our aid. We 
don't give foreign aid like a generous grandparent 
to his grandchildren on Christmas Day, who 
passes out checks to the favorite grandchildren 
and gives the biggest check to the one that he loves 
the most. This is a serious business — where we 
are trying to build up defenses against the dangers 
of Soviet communism. In Asia there is still a 
very considerable military danger, and the trend 
to renunciation of violence which I spoke of in 
relation to the Soviet Union is not fully apparent 
yet as far as Communist China is concerned. The 
great bulk of our aid in that part of the world is 
going to Korea, to Taiwan, and to Viet-Nam, 
which are three danger points. There are there 
actual wars suspended by armistices but not sus- 
pended by formal peace, and there is actual shoot- 
ing going on sporadically around Taiwan. When 
we give help to those countries to hold back the 
military threat of the Chinese Communists, we 
are by that very fact helping the Philippines, 
which itself is in an exposed position. If we didn't 
help Korea. Taiwan, and Viet-Nam, as we are 
doing, the Philippines would be very much worse 
off. So that our program in those countries is 
also in aid of the Philippines. These things are 
not fully undei-stood. We are trying to make them 
more clearly understood, because we greatly value 
Philippine friendship. 

I think you made some reference at the begin- 
ning of your question to the acceptability of our 
new Ambassador. 

Q. Yes. 

A. Well, I understand that the agrement on 
him has been received.® 

Q. Mr. Secretary, testimony before a congres- 
sional: committee la.^t toeeh about the Soviet sailors 
who have gone back to the Soviet Union indicated 
that Mr. Sobolev and his associates of the Soviet 
delegation in the United Nations may have in- 
dulged in activities not necessarily consistent with 
his position as a United Nations representative 



'Albert F. Nufer was nominated to be Ambassador to 
the Philippines on Apr. 25. 

Deparfmenf of Sfa/e Bulletin 



I 



here. Does the State Department plam to protest 
action in that respect? 

A. "Well, that depends upon wliat the facts de- 
velop to be. I understand that situation is being 
examined by the Dejaartment of Justice and the 
FBI. It falls within their jurisdiction, and I do 
not yet have any report. Of course, if the re- 
port justifies it, we would make protest. [See p. 
765.] 

Q. Mr. Secretai'y, have you made any investiga- 
tion to 'find out why these five seamen went hack 
to Russia? 

A. Well, that investigation is what is going on. 
But that investigation is conducted not by the 
State Department but by the Department of Jus- 
tice. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in regard to the changes in 
Russia, is there any evidence of any hind that the 
Russians are modifying their hold on the satel- 
lites? 

A. There is no evidence that they are voluntarily 
modifying their hold. I would say that there is 
a little evidence that their hold is getting some- 
what weaker, not because they want it to be so 
but because the changes that have occurred in the 
Soviet policy have put a certain premium now 
upon Titoism. And while we think always in 
terms of tlie effect of Soviet policy in creating neu- 
tralism in the free-world camp, the acceptance 
now of Titoism in the Soviet camp has a certain 
disturbing influence upon the Soviet hold over the 
satellites who think that perhaps Tito is getting 
the best of both worlds and that seems to be en- 
tirely acceptable now to the Soviet Union ; there- 
fore, why shouldn't they follow on that same path ? 
So I do think that, while the Soviets have not 
indicated any policy of relinquishing their hold, 
their hold is becoming looser. 



the most effective lines, and so forth. That state- 
ment of the President was in pursuance of the 
same thought. We are studying that whole ques- 
tion rather intensely at the present time, and I 
hope that within a few days we may be able to 
come up with some concrete proposals in that 
sense. We are, of course, in that respect, taking 
account of the point of view which has been ex- 
pressed in Congi-ess by Senator George in rela- 
tion to the Foreign Relations Committee. We 
know that, also. Congressman Richards and the 
Foreign Afl'airs Committee are interested in that 

problem. 

• 

Q. Will this hoard he confined strictly to foreign 
aid, Mr. Secretary, or a hroader range? 

A. Well, it is primarily conceived of in terms 
of foreign aid. Did you mean to imply economic 
aid as distinguished from military ? 

Q. No. It seemed to me that the President was 
suggesting a hoard which ivould consider a wider 
range of foreign prohlems rather than — 

A. No, I think he was only thinking of it in 
terms of the foreign aid, and perhaps primarily 
the economic aspect of it. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, to go hack, if we may for a 
second, to the Middle East, are ive or would we 
attempt to discourage Israel from resuming dig- 
ging in the so-called demilitarized zone on the 
Jordan River project? 

A. Well, the situation still is, I suppose, juridi- 
cally the same as it was when that project was in- 
terrupted about 3 years ago, at the behest of the 
United Nations, of General Bennike, then the 
Chairman of the Armistice Conamission, on the 
ground that it was a violation of the armistice. 
And I don't know of anything that has happened 
to change that juridical position since then. 



Proposed Advisory Board 

Q. Mr. Secretary, President Eisenhower Satur- 
<Iay night suggested some sort of rotating advis- 
ory hoard for foreign policy. Have you given any 
thought to a plan like that? Do you know what 
he meant? 

A. Yes, I think I know what he meant. I spoke 
here last week of the fact that we recognized the 
desirability of having a study made of the for- 
eign aid and whether it is being conducted along 



Policy Toward U.S.S.R. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your discussion of the cold 
war, you say you 7'eject — if I heard it correctly — 
the idea of keeping alive the hatred of the Soviet 
Union. The President has said, I helieve, that 
the Russian hasic concept of world com/munism 
has not changed despite these surface changes. 
And you attach a numher of "ifs^^ to the possihility 
of changes within the Soviet Union. What, sir, 
should he the attitude of the average American 



May 7, 1956 



751 



toward the Soviet Union in this context? What 
do we do about exchange of students? The Uni- 
versity of Chicago wanted to invite a Russian 
student^ which was not permitted, according to the 
story. Do we have, as yet, a new concept of the 
American posture, so to speak, toward Russia? 

A. We are adopting a somewhat more liberal 
policy in that respect than was the case a year or 
more ago. On the other hand, we do in the ap- 
plication of our policy consider not merely the 
question of whether or not a particular action 
would be good or even tolerable, as between our 
two countries, but we also take into account the 
effect of our example upon other countries who 
perhaps might not be able to have the same re- 
lationship without their getting into difficulties. 
The Soviets are very prone to turn to a smaller, 
weaker country, and say, "Well, we had this kind 
of relationship with the United States. Wliy 
don't you do the same ? If the United States does 
it, well, why not you ?" Now, it may very well be 
that the Soviet Union has projects to ensnare that 
smaller and weaker country which would be pro- 
moted if that country had the same kind of re- 
lationship which we could have with impunity. 
Therefore, we take into account not merely the 
question of whether or not what we do would be 
tolerable as between our two countries, but what 
use the Soviet Union can make of that example 
when it tvirns to a third country and says, "Well, 
now, the United States set the example; why 
shouldn't you follow it?" 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in London the other day Mr. 
Khrushchev and Mr. Bulganin reportedly said that 
that nnas the half-way stop on the way to America 
and that they xoould like to come here after the 
election. Has any thought been given to asking 
them? 

A. Well, I am not aware of any such thought 
being given to their coming here, and possibly 
after they have had this experience with the half- 
way stop they might not want to go all the rest 
of the way. (Laughter) 

Q. Have loe given any thought to inviting Mr. 
Zhukov here? 

A. Not that I know of. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, when do you plan to leave 
for Paris? 

A. On next Tuesday afternoon. 



Communism and Nationalism 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you referred to certain 
changes in the Soviet Union as putting a premium 
on Titoism. Could you specify for us which par- 
ticular changes you have in mind? 

A. Of course, the most important characteristic 
of Titoism is the fact that it recognizes that com- 
munism can be a national organization, not neces- 
sarily an international organization. That was 
the thesis which was held in Russia by Bukharin 
and his associates, who were purged and executed 
in the 1930"s because they took the view that you 
could have communism within a country but did 
not necessarily have to be a part of what is com- 
monly called international communism. 

The view then held by Stalin was that you could 
not have communism just within one country but 
that you had to have communism as a dynamic 
movement which was trying to get control of all 
countries. In that sense Stalin's communism was 
incompatible with nationalism. Indeed, Stalin 
himself said that Soviet communism is the most 
international of all organizations because it tries 
to break down all of the national boundaries. As 
against tliis some people held the view that com- 
munism could be a national phenomenon rather 
than an international phenomenon. That was the 
view that Tito held, and he broke with Stalin on 
that issue because Moscow did not admit his right 
to have a national communistic state which would 
primarily be dedicated to the welfare of Yugo- 
slavia. 

If the Soviet Communists now say that it is all 
right to have communism on a national basis, that 
offers a great prospect to the Poles, the Czechs, 
and so forth, who would much rather have their 
own national brand of communism than be run 
by Moscow. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, Mr. Khrushchev seems to 
have created some excitement in Britain yesterday 
with a remark, about working on a guided missile 
with an atomic or hydrogen warhead. Do you 
have any comment on this remark of his? 

A. Well, that is not primarily within my area. 
I think it is no secret that they have been working 
on tliis for some time. I just checked, for curios- 
ity, this morning to see what the interpretation of 
Mr. Khrushchev's remark was as being given out 
by the Soviet press, because there was some ques- 
tion as to just what he had said. And I just was 



752 



Department of State Bulletin 



given, as I came down here, a note which says that 
the Soviet radio reports it as follows : "I also think 
that we are not behind in the development of 
guided missiles," which is a slightly more moder- 
ate statement than what was reported by some as 
the version of what he said. 

Q. Mr. Secretary., I believe Isaac Stem, a young 
American violinist, is going to the Soviet Union 
next Saturday for a I^-weeh tour. This is in re- 
turn for some very successful Russian appearances 
lie re. Do you think this favors the thawing of 
relations, or does it create some erroneous impres- 
sions here — the way you felt, I believe, about the 
agricultural mission at one point? 

A. No, I would think that the exchange of 
genuine artists would probably be a good thing. 
Of course, if the artists are spies in disguise, that's 
another matter. But a genuine artist, I believe, 
can go about the world, and it is good for every- 
l)ody to have fine music made available. 

Q. Thanh you, sir. 



Second Meeting of Council 
of Baglidad Pact Organization 

Following are texts of statements m,ade by 
United States observers during the second meeting 
of the Baghdad Pact Cowncil at Tehran, April 
10-20, together with the final communique issued 
on April 20. ^ 

STATEMENT BY LOY W. HENDERSON ^ 

Press release 200 dated April 17 

I take this occasion to express on behalf of the 
delegation of the United States our deep apprecia- 
tion of the courtesies and consideration which we 
are receiving from our kind hosts, the Government 
of Iran, and of the effective measures which have 
been taken for the organization of this meeting. 

I take pleasure in bringing to you today the 
greetings of the President of the United States, 
the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of De- 



^ For text of the communique issued after the Council's 
first meeting, see Bulletin of Jan. 2, 1956, p. 16. 

^ Made before the Council on Apr. 16. Deputy Under 
."Secretary Henderson headed the U.S. delegation to the 
meeting. 

lAa^ 7, J 956 

384047—56 3 



fense on this occasion of the second meeting of the 
Council of the Baghdad Pact Organization. 

It means much to me personally again to be in 
the Middle East and to have the opportunity to 
meet so many old friends and to make new friends 
from countries whose friendship my own country 
values so highly. 

Our delegation considers it a privilege to be able 
to sit with such a distinguished group of repre- 
sentatives of friendly nations which, like the 
United States, are so deeply interested in the main- 
tenance of the peace and security of the Middle 
East on a basis which would assure the preserva- 
tion of the territorial integrity and the independ- 
ence of the various nations of the area and would 
ailord the peoples of the area maximum opportu- 
nities for political, economic, and social develop- 
ment. 

Ambassadors Chapin and Gallman, Admiral 
Cassady, Mr. Seager, and I, together with the 
staffs which accompany us, are prepared to con- 
tribute to your deliberations and to assist in the 
work of your committees. We are anxious to do 
here all that is possible and appropriate to i^ro- 
mote the achievement of our common objective. 

At a time when the peace of the world is threat- 
ened in numerous areas by divisive conflicts, we 
look with hope toward those groups of nations 
which have banded together for their common 
security and welfare. We desire to work with 
such groups and so to strengthen them that they 
will demonstrate to other nations in the area that 
such cooperation is the true road to the achieve- 
ment of national aspirations. 

The American people are increasingly happy to 
work with the nations grouped in the Baghdad 
Pact in their cooperative efforts in the Middle 
East. In planning for the bilateral programs of 
economic and military assistance which we have 
with each of the Pact nations, we are taking 
strongly into account the courageous and un- 
equivocal steps you have taken in forming this 
association. We have come prepared to discuss 
the supplementing of these bilateral programs 
through a program of broader economic coopera- 
tion coordinated through the Pact Organization. 
We will be pleased to carry back with us to our 
Government any suggestions which you may make 
for closer cooperation in the many fields of com- 
mon endeavor which the Pact has opened. 

We are certain, however, that we express the 
feelings of all who are here represented when we 

753 



say that it is our sincere desire to retain close, 
friendly, and effective ties with other nations of 
the area. We believe the Pact, based as it is on 
friendship toward all and hostility toward none, 
serves the interests of the area as a whole and 
provides no reason for impairing the good re- 
lations we all wish to maintain with your neigh- 
bors. In our relations with the other nations we 
shall continue to make clear our firm support for 
the Pact and our belief that it represents an ef- 
fective organization for area cooperation and 
defense. 

My colleagues and I look forward to a reward- 
ing and stimulating conference with you during 
this meetinc 



STATEMENT BY CEDRIC SEAGER3 

Press release 200 dated April 17 

The United States is deeply interested in the 
countries of the Baghdad Pact and their economic 
and social advancement. The United States will 
continue its assistance to these and other Middle 
East countries to raise their standards of living 
and safeguard their freedom and independence. 
Significant steps are being taken by all the Pact 
members to strengthen their internal economies. 
The economic progress which is being made holds 
encouraging promise for the future. 

The United States believes that the work of the 
Economic Committee of the Baghdad Pact is con- 
tributing effectively toward the advancement of 
development programs which will bring greater 
prosperity and greater economic stability for all. 
The United States has followed with gi-eat and 
sympathetic interest the work of the Economic 
Committee and its subcommittees. They have 
assessed a broad range of subjects of common 
interest on which cooperative action is desirable. 
At its current session the Economic Committee 
has given stimulus to the progress which is being 
made in the economic development of the countries 
of the Pact. The United States looks forward 
with pleasure to a continuation of its cooperation 
with the members of the Pact, and I feel assured 
from this meeting that the Economic Committee 
is determined to carry forward the task it has 



' Made at the closing session of the Council's Economic 
Committee on Apr. 11. Mr. Seager is Regional Director 
for the Near East, South Asia, and Africa, International 
Cooperation Administration. 



undertaken. I congratulate the Economic Com- 
mittee on its excellent work. 



CLOSING STATEMENT BY MR. HENDERSON, 
APRIL 20 

On behalf of the United States observers I again 
desire to express our appreciation to His Im- 
perial Majesty, the Shahinshah, and his Govern- 
ment for the warmth of their welcome, their hos- 
pitality, and for the excellent facilities made avail- 
able to us. 

Prime Minister Ala has chaired our meetings 
with the statesmansliip and ability for which he 
has long been famous. We wish to congratulate 
the Secretariat which, under the capable direction 
of the Secretary-General, has done a superb job 
in its reporting and in making the necessary ar- 
rangements to permit the meetings to run 
smoothly. 

Our participation in this meeting has been stim- 
ulating and inspiring. We have been deeply im- 
pressed by the restraint, wisdom, and understand- 
ing displayed by all of the delegations. We are 
firmly convinced that any area which can pro- 
duce the statesmanship which has been evidenced 
at this meeting is certain to play a significant 
and beneficial role in world affairs. 

As we bid you adieu we have the warm feeling 
which comes from being among friends. You 
may be sure that we, the United States observers, 
will faithfully convey to our Government the 
views wliich have been expressed to us. We wish 
all of you continued success in the implementing 
of this Pact which means so much to the security 
and welfare of the peoples of this area. 



TEXT OF FINAL COMMUNIQUE 

The Council of the Baghdad Pact held its second meet- 
ing of Ministers in Tehran from 16th to 10th April, 1956, 
under the Chairmanship of His Excellency Hussein Ala, 
Prime Minister of Iran. 

2. The meeting was attended by the Prime Ministers 
and Foreign Ministers of Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and Tur- 
key and by the Minister of Defence of the United King- 
dom. The United States were represented by a dele- 
gation of observers headed by the Hon. Loy Henderson, 
Deputy Under Secretary of State. 

3. The Council emphasised that their several Gov- 
ernments adhered firmly to the principles that inspired 
the United Nations Charter. The Baghdad Pact was 



754 



Department of Sfafe Bulletin 



fully in conformity with those principles. Its object was 
to assist in achieving the Charter's primary purpose of 
maintaining international peace and security and pro- 
moting human welfare. The Pact was wholly defensive 
in character. While its members were determined to 
defend themselves against aggression, they desired at the 
same time to live in peace with all Governments and 
all peoples. 

4. The Council had before it the task of considering 
the reports and recommendations of various committees 
of the Baghdad Pact Organisation, and of reviewing the 
international political situation especially from the point 
of view of its repercussions on the Pact area. 

5. In the light of their thorough review of the political 
situation, the Council considered that although there was 
a change of tactics, the basic objectives of international 
communism remained unchanged. Its activities in the 
area required that the free world continue to exercise 
unceasing vigilance if its solidarity was to be maintained 
and freedom and peace were to be preserved. There 
could be no relaxation of measures designed to strengthen 
the defensive capacity of this area. In the view of the 
Council, the criticism and attacks from neutralist and 
other sources directed against the Baghdad Pact and other 
similar organisations created to provide for the legitimate 
defence and peaceful development of their member na- 
tions, spring largely from lack of knowledge and mis- 
understanding of its true purposes. It is the hope of 
the Council that as these purposes become better known, 
these criticisms will give way to sympathetic and active 
co-operation and that the Baghdad Pact will become, as 
it is Intended to tele, a unifying factor among the peoples 
in the region who wish to preserve a free and democratic 
way of life. Meanwhile, these criticisms and attacks can 
only help to keep the region divided and weak and mem- 
ber countries decided to counter them actively and 
resolutely. 

6. Specific problems which were causing tension in this 
area were also discussed thoroughly and frankly in a 
spirit of mutual comprehension. In particular, the Coun- 
cil emphasised the need for an early settlement of the 
Palestine and Kashmir disputes. 

7. In the midst of this troulJled political situation, it 
was the Council's conviction that the Baghdad Pact offered 
the best means of safeguarding the peace and stability 
and of promoting the welfare and unity of the area, whilst 
at the same time it effectively served the cause of world 
peace. Urgent steps must, therefore, be taken to 
strengthen this Pact. For this purpose, member coun- 
tries in this area must be equipped with the means for 
developing their military and economic strength and the 
Pact must yield positive visible results. At the same 
time, systematic elTorts should be made to create a better 
vmderstanding of the Pact among the nations which are 
opposing it. 

8. The Council adopted the report of the Economic 
Committee and the various resolutions submitted by it. 
These provide for the establishment of a Centre for im- 
parting training in the use of agricultural machinery 
and in methods of soil and water conservation, for es- 
tablishing joint training centres for anti-malaria opera- 
tions and health education, for undertaking jointly by two 



or more countries surveys in the field of locusts and pests, 
for co-ordination of research in certain fields, and for 
exchange of technical personnel and of information on 
scientific and technical subjects. The Council agreed 
that it was necessary to implement the resolutions with- 
out delay, particularly those relating to projects which 
are likely to yield early and visible results and to promote 
the well being of the people in the Pact area. The Coun- 
cil noted with satisfaction that the Atomic Energy Centre 
was expected to open at Baghdad in January, 19.57. 

9. The Council drew special attention to the importance 
of joint projects of mutual interest to one or more mem- 
ber countries. It was decided that a technical Committee 
comprising members of each of the interested Govern- 
ments should take place at Ankara to make a preliminary 
study of the possibility of a joint development plan of 
the water resources of the Tigi-is and Euphrates basin 
and to make recommendations for the carrying out of any 
further detailed studies which may be required. The 
possibilities of development of mineral resources in the 
eastern parts of Iran and the timber reserve in Caspian 
provinces by the joint efforts of Iran and Pakistan were 
noted. The Council also decided to set up a working 
party to meet in June, 1956, at Tehran to consider the 
means whereby regional projects of interest to two or 
more members of the Pact could be studied and imple- 
mented through economic and technical assistance. The 
Council recognised the far reaching need for regional co- 
operation and joint projects in the fields of industry and 
communications. 

10. The Council noted that the Economic Committee 
would undertake a detailed study of the pattern of pro- 
duction and trade between member countries with a view 
to promoting trade within the Pact area. The Council 
considered that notwithstanding the fact that the needs of 
the member countries in the Pact area were at present 
similar, there was .scope for expansion of trade in this 
area in the immediate future. In this connection, Paki- 
stan's recent offer to buy dates from Iraq was welcomed. 

11. The Council recognised the importance of technical 
assistance between member countries. The Council agreed 
that the Secretariat shoidd co-ordinate this work on the 
basis of the offers already received by the Economic 
Committee. It noted that the United Kingdom and 
Pakistan had offered technical assistance. 

12. The Council welcomed the active participation of 
the United States in the work of the Pact Organisation. 
The Council considered that the active and continuing 
support of the United States for the Pact and its objec- 
tives was an essential factor in the strengthening and 
development of the member countries and in the realisa- 
tion of their peaceful aims. The United States reaffirmed 
its solid support of the Pact and stated that it would 
continue to lend support to the individual and collective 
efforts of the Member nations to attain the political, de- 
fensive, economic and social objectives of the Pact. 

13. The United States, on the invitation of the Council, 
became a full member of the Economic Committee and 
the Counter Subversion Committee. The terms of refer- 
ence of these two Committees provide for the extension 
of membership to non-signatory governments at the dis- 
cretion of the Council. 



May 7, 1956 



755 



14. The United States delegate to the Economic Com- 
mittee reaffirmed the intention of his country to continue 
its bilateral technical and economic assistance to the 
member nations, and indicated that the United States 
would consider waj's of assisting joint projects under- 
taken by members of the Kconomic Committee of the Pact. 

15. The United States observer to the Military Com- 
mittee offered to establish a Military Liaison group at the 
permanent Headquarters of the Baghdad Pact, headed 
by a Flag or General OflBcer. The Council welcomed and 
accepted this proposal. 

10. The United States observers expressed their Gov- 
ernment's intention of continuing its military assistance 
to the member countries. 

17. The Council considered that there Is a threat of 
subversion in this area and agreed that it can be met 
most effectively by co-operation among members of the 
Pact. To this end the Council decided to establish a 
permanent organisation under the administrative control 
of the Secretary General. The Council recognised that 
while the threat of subversion could be countered with 
measures designed to expose its real nature and give the 
widest publicity to the aim and activities of the Pact, 
the essence of combating subversion lay in the eradica- 
tion of the conditions in which it thrives, namely, eco- 
nomic under-developmeat and defensive weakness. Both 
must be remedied as soon as possible. 

18. In the light of the common determination that the 
territorial integrity of the Member states of the Pact shall 
be defended the Military Committee decided to expedite 
all necessary further mea.sures for the defence of the 
Baghdad Pact countries. The Council considered the re- 
port of the Committee and noted that considerable progress 
had already been achieved in the military sphere. 

19. The Council decided that its next meeting at Minis- 
terial level should be held at Karachi in the month of 
January, 1957, and that in the meanwhile the Council 
will continue to meet regularly at the Deputies' level. 



Visit of Vice President of Brazil 

The Department of State announced on April 
26 (press release 220) that the members of the 
party of Joao Goulart, Vice President of Brazil, 
who will visit Washington from April 30 to May 
3, will be as follows : 

Joao Goulart, Vice President of the Republic of the United 
States of Brazil ; Senhora Goulart 

Joao Lima Teixeira, Senator from the State of Bahia 

Fernando Ferrari, Federal Deputy from the State of Rio 
Grande do Sul 

Roberto Silveira, Lieutenant Governor of the State of Rio 
de Janeiro 

Geraldo Eulalio Nascimento e Silva, Foreign Service Offi- 
cer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 

Eugenio Caillar, Executive Secretary to the Vice President 

Yara Vargas Lopes, Secretary to Senhora Goulart 

The party will leave Washington on May 3 for 



756 



a 2-week private tour which will include visits 
to the King Ranch in Texas, Kansas City, Detroit, 
and New York. 



Change in NATO Command 

Following are texts of statements and docu- 
ments relating to the retirement of Gen. Alfred 
M. Gruenther, Supreme Allied Commander, 
Europe, and the appointment of Gen. Lauris 
Norstad as his successor. 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT OF APRIL 13 

White House Office (Augusta, Ga.) press release 

The White House today announced that the 
President has witli deep regret accepted the re- 
quest of General Alfred M. Gruenther for retire- 
ment from the United States Army toward the 
end of this year. 

General Gruenther is at present serving as 
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, under ap- 
pointment by the North Atlantic Council. The 
Council has acceded to the President's request 
that General Gruenther be released from 
this Nato Command upon retirement. 

The "White House also announced that, in re- 
sponse to a subsequent request by the North At- 
lantic Council, the President has nominated and 
the Council has approved the appointment of Gen- 
eral Lauris Norstad, United States Air Force, as 
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, in succes- 
sion to General Gruenther. The appointment will 
take effect at a date to be decided later. 

In a letter to General Gruenther, the President 
said, "The announcement of your decision to re- 
quest relief as Supreme Allied Commander, 
Europe, and to retire from active military service 
will be received with great disappointment by our 
European Allies and by the American people. All 
appreciate the magnificent contribution you have 
made toward the fulfillment of the objectives of 
Nato and, I am certain, will wish to join with me 
in congratulating you on your performance. 
You have been intimately associated with Nato 
since its inception. To your task as Supreme 
Allied Commander, Europe, you brought a wealth 
of military experience and a unique quality of 
leadership which you have unselfishly and with 
great distinction employed in improving the effec- 

Department of State Bulletin 



tiveness and solidarity of the forces under your 
command." 

In the letter nominating General Norstad, the 
President said, "General Norstad is an officer of 
outstanding ability. He has the special qualifica- 
tion of long years of experience in Europe, cul- 
minating in almost three years of devoted service 
as Air Deputy to Saceub. The confidence placed 
in him by the Member Nations has been amply 
demonstrated. It is our common purpose to deter 
and, if need be, defend against aggression so that 
mankind maj^ live and prosper in freedom. I am 
confident that under General Norstad's leadership 
this high resolve will continue to be steadfastly 
upheld." 



ANNOUNCEMENT BY NORTH ATLANTIC COUN- 
CIL, APRIL 13 

1. The North Atlantic Council have been in- 
formed of the contents of a communication from 
the President of the United States of America to 
the Secretary General and Vice-Chairman of the 
Council, in which he asked that the member gov- 
ernments should agree to the release at his own 
request towards the end of this year of General 
Alfred M. Gruenther from his assignment as 
Supreme Allied Commander Europe in order to 
permit his retirement from active duty. 

2. The Council agreed with great regret to re- 
lease General Gruenther from his assignment as 
Supreme Allied Commander Europe. They rec- 
ognised that General Gruenther had fully dis- 
charged the trust reposed in him by the Council 
when, in May 1953, they appointed him as Su- 
preme Allied Commander Europe. They ex- 
pressed to General Gruenther, in the name of the 
governments represented on the Council, lasting 
gratitude for the distinguished service rendered 
by him. 

3. The Council then unanimously decided to re- 
quest the President of the United States of 
America to nominate an officer of the US Armed 
Forces for appointment by the Council as Su- 
preme Allied Commander Europe to succeed Gen- 
eral Gruenther. The request was immediately 
transmitted to the President of the United States, 
who informed the Council of his nomination of 
General Lauris Norstad for consideration by the 
Council as successor to General Gruenther. 

4. The Council at a meeting this afternoon 



unanimously adopted a resolution declaring that 
they reposed the greatest faith in General Norstad 
and appointed him Supreme Allied Commander 
Europe, as successor to General Gruenther, with 
the same powers and functions. The appointment 
will become efl:'ective towards the end of this year. 

Annex I. Letter Fkom the President of the United 
States to Lord Ismat 

10th April, 1956 

Dear Lord Ismat, 

I am addressing you as Vice-Chairman of the North 
Atlantic Council with the request that appropriate action 
be taken at an early date to secure the release toward the 
end of this year of General Alfred M. Gruenther from 
assignment as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. In 
mailing this request through you to the Member Nations 
who appointed him, I asli that they give favorable con- 
sideration to his release. 

Personal considerations have led General Gruenther 
to request retirement from active duty in the Armed 
Forces of the United States toward the end of this year. 
I believe his distinguished career of dedicated national 
and international service has earned for him the right to 
have his request granted. 

The steady growth of Communist armed strength, com- 
pelling the NATO Nations to maintain their deterrent and 
defensive strength, emphasizes the continued necessity 
for outstanding leadership at SHAPE. The Council will 
shortly proceed to appoint an able officer to the vacancy 
created by General Gruenther's retirement. Surely the 
Nation invited to nominate a successor will propose its 
most eligible officer available. 

Afforded the same high degree of trust and cooperation 
that Nations have extended to General Gruenther, the 
new SACEUR will, I am confident, be successful in 
carrying out his vital responsibilities. 
Sincerely, 

Dwight D. Eisenhower 

The Kight Honorable Lord Ismat, G.C.B., C.H., D.S.O., 

Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, 
Palais de Chaillot, 
Paris. 

Annex II. Counctl Resolution Accepting the Relief 
OP General Alfred M. Gruenther and Requesting 
Nomination of a US Officer To Be His Successor 

The North Atlantic Council : 

Having considered a communication by the President 
of the United States to the Secretary General and Vice- 
Chairman of the Council requesting him to initiate ap- 
propriate action to secure the release of General Alfred M. 
Gruenther from assignment as Supreme Allied Com- 
mander Europe, 

Agrees with great regret to the release towards the 
end of this year of General Gruenther from as.signment 
as Supreme Allied Commander Europe ; 

Recognises that General Gruenther has fully discharged 
the trust reposed in him by the North Atlantic Council 



May 7, J 956 



757 



wlien in May li>ri3, the Council appointed liim Supreme 
Allied Ck)minander Europe ; 

Expressed to General Gruenther, in the name of the 
Governments represented on the Council, lasting gratitude 
for the distinguished service rendered by him ; 

Unanimously requests the President of the United 
States to nominate an officer of the Armed Forces of tlie 
United States for appointment by the Council as Supreme 
Allied Commander Burojie to succeed General Gruentlier, 
at a date to be decided later. 

Annex III. Letter From the President of the United 
States to Lord Ismay 

13th April, 1956 
Dear Lord Ismat, 

Pursuant to tlie request of the North Atlantic Council 
that I nominate an otfieer of the Armed Forces of the 
United States for appointment b.v the Council as Supreme 



Allied Commander, Europe, to succeed General Alfred M. 
Gruenther, I hereby nominate General Laurls Norstad. 

General Norstad is an officer of outstanding ability. 
He has the special qualification of long years of ex- 
perience in Europe, culminating in almost three years of 
devoted service as Air Deputy to SACEUR. The con- 
fidence placed in him by the Member Nations has been 
amply demonstrated. 

It is our common purpose to deter and, if need be, de- 
fend against aggression so that mankind may live and 
prosper in freedom. I am confident tliat under General 
Norstad's leadership this high resolve virill continue to 
Ije steadfastly upheld. 
Sincerely, 

Dwight D. Eise.\hower 

The Right Honorable Lord Ismat, G.C.B., C.H., D.S.O., 
Secretary Genrral of the 

North Atliintic Trciity Orgaiiiziitioii. 



The Purge of Stalinism 



hy AlUn W. Dulles 

Director of Central Intelligence ^ 



There is never a dull moment in my job as 
Director of Central Intelligence. Events which 
seem to defy analysis happen somewhere in the 
world every day. Few trends seem to follow a 
predictable course. 

These last few weeks there have been develop- 
ments in the Soviet Union which have puzzled all 
the expex'ts who generally have ready answers — 
sometimes more ready than accurate — to explain 
Soviet conduct. Just at a time when some are say- 
ing that everything is going wrong with foreign 
policy in the free-world countries but that every- 
thing in the Soviet Union is progressing according 
to some gi"eat master design, the Soviet collective 
leadership, as they call it, comes forward to beat 
their collective breasts and indulge in the most 
extreme self-criticism. 

The men in the Kremlin now tell us that all 
they said earlier about events in the U.S.S.R. 
during the 20 years preceding Stalin's death is 
quite wrong; that in fact this was an era of in- 



' Address made before the Los Angeles World Affairs 
Council on Apr. 13. 



famy, crime, and shame. They admit that their 
jiast adulation of Stalin was based on fear, not 
on fact. The man they themselves used to call 
the "glorious Stalin, genius of mankind" is now 
being publicly accused of "grave errors" and pri- 
vately described as a malicious monster. 

The Soviet leaders do not very clearly explain 
why the new collective leaders waited for 3 years 
after Stalin's death to tell it to their people. 
They do not make a very satisfactory showing as 
to why they themselves sat acquiescent in the seats 
of the mighty during all the period of Stalin's 
dictatorship, exercising great powers as members 
of his inner circle. 

Possibly, as Khrushchev is reported to have ad- 
mitted, the price of nonconformity was a bullet in 
the head. This is a very human excuse but a poor 
qualification for high office on the part of those 
who now assert the rights and prerogatives of 
leadership. In the free world, where we aspire to 
build on the great traditions of the past, not to re- 
pudiate them, we revere as our heroes and leaders 
those wlio refused to conform, whatever the risks, 
when the principles of liberty were at stake. 



758 



Department of State Bulletin 



In the U.S.S.R., evidently, acquiescing in 
crime as the price of simple survival under a 
political tyrant is sanctioned as legitimate con- 
duct. As they put it : "The point was not to save 
one's own life ; the point was to save the revolu- 
tion." 

Years of Stalin's Power 

Before going further into the details of this 
strange development in the Soviet Union it may 
be worth wliile to review briefly what had been 
taking place there during the years of Stalin's 
power. Here we may find clues as to why the 
men in the Kremlin now take the serious risks of 
repudiating their late hero for having put the 
individual above party and substituting a per- 
sonal dictatorship for a collective one. 

Stalin himself ran through a series of revolu- 
tionary combinations, somewhat akin to collec- 
tive leaderships, during the 1920's. For example, 
in 1924t-25 he combined with Zinoviev and 
Kamenev against Trotsky. From 1925-27, a new 
alliance between Stalin, Bukharin, and Eykov 
was formed and routed a Trotsky-Zinoviev- 
Kamenev combination. And finally, from 1927- 
29, Stalin worked with Molotov, Voroshilov, 
Mikoyan, and others to crush Stalin's recent 
allies, Bukharin and Eykov. 

It was during the 10 years which preceded 
Eussia's entry into World War II that Stalin com- 
pleted the consolidation of his control over the 
Communist Party machinery. By that time he 
had placed his loyal stooges in all important posi- 
tions of authority throughout the Soviet Union 
and the army was brought under political control. 

Among the major charges said to have been 
leveled against Stalin by Khrushchev is the charge 
that in the late thirties he deliberately liquidated 
Marshal Tukhachevsky and thousands of the best 
officers in the Soviet Army, presumably to insure 
his political control of the military apparatus. 
Certainly today there is good reason to believe 
that Mai-shal Tukhachevsky was falsely accused 
of conniving with the Germans. There is some 
evidence that there was a clever German plot to 
discredit Tukhachevsky, which happened to fit in 
with Stalin's own plans. 

We do know that during and after the war there 
was burning resentment among the Soviet profes- 
sional soldiers at Stalin's interference in the con- 
duct of the war, his unjust and capricious be- 
littling of heroes such as Zhukov, and his arrogant 



claims to personal credit for Soviet victories. A 
senior Soviet general, for example, is recently re- 
ported as having privately branded their so-called 
documentary film, "The Fall of Berlin," which 
shows Stalin as the great military mastermind, as 
a "tissue of lies." 

Today the collective dictatorship is assiduously 
repairing the injured dignity of the military and 
incorporating its leadership into Conununist 
Party membership. They must realize that, fol- 
lowing the usual pattern of revolutions, the mili- 
tary leaders might tire of being the pawn of 
dictators, whether individual or collective. 

But whatever the faults of Stalin in the prewar 
decade, one can hardly ascribe them to his old age 
or senility. Stalin was then in his prime. Fur- 
thermore, one can hardly believe that the acts of 
the dictator in a war from which he emerged as a 
hero are the motivating causes for the present 
attempt to liquidate his memory. In fact, the most 
recent Soviet pronouncements are tending to refer 
to "good" and "bad" Stalin eras. Naturally, there 
is no desire to repudiate such measures as farm 
collectivization and the rapid industrialization 
under the Five- Year Plans, which are so closely 
associated with his name. The beginning of the 
"bad" period was in 1"934, when the great Stalin 
purges began. If they denounce his war record, 
the purpose here must be to eliminate him from 
the hero class and to give the military some of the 
credit he had arrogated to himself. 

But to find the real reasons for the de-Staliniza- 
tion campaign, we must, I believe, look to the more 
recent past, particularly to the hard autocratic 
period during the last 6 or 7 years of Stalin's life. 
Here we find two major motivations for cutting 
away from Stalin worship. 

Internationally, from about 1947 onward to the 
time of his death, Stalin's often bellicose policy in 
the international field had been a failure and had 
tended to unite the free world against international 
communism. Domestically during this period his 
police state was meeting ever-increasing disfavor, 
not only with the helpless people but with the top 
politicians, generals, and industrial managei-s who 
were essential to the working of the Soviet system. 
This began to create problems for the regime. 

The International Problem 

First, let us look at the international picture. 
In the immediate postwar era, riding the crest of 
the common victory and maintaining military 



May 7, 1956 



759 



strength and power, Soviet policy had notable suc- 
cesses. It consolidated the grip on the European 
satellites and helped the Chinese Communists to 
victory. 

But beginning with about 1947 in Europe, some- 
what later in Asia, the free world at last began to 
realize the implications of the forward drive of 
international communism and started to take 
countermeasures, and tlie tide began to turn. 

"\^Tiat happened in these years? The Marshall 
plan, which Stalin and Molotov indignantly re- 
jected and tried to defeat, was put into effect, and 
Europe was saved from economic chaos. In 
Greece, the Soviet effort to take over by guerrilla 
tactics was thwarted. 

"\^lien the Soviet attempted to take over Berlin 
and destroy this outpost of "Western freedom, the 
Berlin blockade was frustrated by the airlift, and 
West Berlin remains a show window of what the 
free world can do. Tito survived his ejection from 
the Cominform and the wrath of Stalin and struck 
back with telling criticisms of Stalinist policy — 
almost identical with what Soviet leader's are now 
themselves saying. 

Later the North Atlantic alliance was organized, 
and despite Soviet threats the way was opened 
for German rearmament in close union with the 
West. 

Thus frustrated in the European field Stalin 
turned to the Far East and, working with the 
North Korean and Chinese Communists, at- 
tempted to take over Korea as the first step toward 
driving America from the western Pacific. Again 
the Communists were blocked, and, most im- 
portant of all, an alarmed and awakened Ameri- 
can public opinion proceeded to the defensive 
rearmament of this country. Our nuclear power 
was vastly increased. 

It is understandable that Stalin's successors 
should have found it convenient to place upon him 
the blame for Greece, Berlin, Korea, Yugoslavia, 
German rearmament, and the like and, in particu- 
lar, for tlie generally hard Soviet line which has 
led to the buildup of American defense forces and 
Nato. It was these successes which led the 
Soviet Union to conclude that a peace treaty with 
Austria was necessary to build up their badly 
shattered reputation as peacemongers and to pre- 
pare the way for a summit conference, their pil- 
grimage of penitence to Belgrade, and their effort 
to line the Socialist parties into new popular 
fronts. 



The Domestic Situation 

But the foreign scene alone by no means explains 
the urge the present Kremlin leaders felt to break 
with the hard Stalinist past. They were already 
making progress in allowing the memory of Stalin 
to fade in international i-ecognition and prestige 
without going to the extreme of total desti-uction 
of the Stalin myth with their own people. Thus 
the clue to their present policy lies more in the 
internal Soviet situation than in the requirements 
of their foreign policy. 

Domestically they have been caught in a di- 
lemma. In order to compete with the Western 
World in the fields of science and industry, which 
was vitally important for their economic growth 
and their rearmament program, it was essential for 
the Soviet to speed up the education of their peo- 
ple, especially in the scientific and technical field. 
After Stalin's death the regime encouraged more 
objectivity in scientific inquiry and put on the 
shelf some pseudoscientists such as Lysenko. 
After all, they had found out early in the game 
that in the present nuclear age one could not fool 
around with scientists who tailored their art to 
the whims of Marxism. 

Obviously, the Soviet leaders could not limit 
their educational processes to the scientific fields, 
and more and more young men and women are 
graduating from schools which correspond to our 
high schools and colleges and are taking advanced 
degrees comparable to our degrees of Master of 
Arts and Doctor of Philosophy. Even with all 
the indoctrination in Communist teachings which 
they give to their young students it is impossible 
to prevent education from developing the criti- 
cal faculties which every thinking human being 
possesses. 

Furthermore, as part of their new campaign of 
sweetness and light, they have found it wise to 
take down some of the bars which have impeded 
travel between the Soviet Union and the free 
countries; and while the Iron Curtain still re- 
mains and there is a careful selective process as 
to those who are permitted to leave the Soviet 
Union or to visit it, it is obvious that today there 
is far more contact between the people of the 
U. S. S. R. and outside countries than at any time 
in recent years. 

All this has tended to build up pressures upon 
the Soviet rulers to create an impression, not only 
internationally but also domestically, that a dicta- 
torship of the Stalin type was dead forever. 



760 



Department of Sfafe Bvlletin 



The Soviet leaders are trying to meet their ex- 
tei-nal and internal dilemmas by finding a con- 
venient "devil" which they can use to explain 
away past Soviet sins to the world abroad and 
to their own people, as well as to demonstrate that 
the present rulers of the Soviet are different men- 
tally and morally than they were under Stalin. 
Tims they hope that their own people will ac- 
cept their protestations that the days of govern- 
ment by arbitrary policymaking, secret trials, de- 
portations, and prison camps are over. Further- 
more, they are again promising that they will do 
something to raise the standard of living so that 
the promise of individual freedom will be seasoned 
with a gi'eater share of consmners goods and a 
more abundant life. 

Threat to Communist Party 

The extent of the opposition to the Stalinist- 
type regime must have been gaged by the Kremlin 
as far stronger and deeper among the Russian 
people than we had dared to hope. Nonetheless, 
the destruction of the Stalin myth carries with 
it a very real threat to the internal discipline and 
units of the Soviet Communist Party and the 
international Communist movement. 

That calculated risk must have been taken de- 
liberately by men who knew they had to have a 
scapegoat if they were to hope to preserve the 
dictatorship on which their own power and very 
survival rested. By attacking the personal sym- 
bol of Stalin and the worst excesses of his rule, 
they hope to be able to preserve many of the essen- 
tials of the Stalinist system — now labeling it 
Leninism — the monopoly of all power by a single 
party, the complete subordination of the courts 
and individual rights to arbitrary Party decree, 
the governmental control of the press and of all 
organs of public information. 

Basic Structure To Be Preserved 

This basic structure is meant to be preserved 
intact. Already the regime has publicly warned 
that some "rotten elements" have taken the de- 
Stalinization campaign too literally and are "try- 
ing to question the correctness of the Party's 
policy." This, Pravda thundered, is "petty bour- 
geois licentiousness" of a kind the "Party has 
never tolerated and will never tolerate." A dead 
and dishonored Stalin, therefore, is likely to be 
merely a device — here possibly a Trojan corpse 



rather than a Trojan horse — with which the long- 
suffering Russian people are, I fear, to be deceived 
in tlieir expectation of a freer and better life. 

Obviously the Soviet rulers concluded that it 
would take something more than a mere repetition 
of the old cliches to have any effect. Apparently 
this necessity was deemed to be urgent and impel- 
ling. They had tried to do the trick with the 
liquidation of Beria, but the secrecy surrounding 
his execution was hardly a persuasive bit of evi- 
dence of a new dawn of liberty. It was in the 
worst tradition of the Stalin era — and he, after 
all, generally gave his victims at least a drumhead 
public trial. 

The degradation of Stalin, if the Soviet pro- 
gram had worked as the leaders had apparently 
planned it, was to be under strict Party discipline. 
But it seems to have got out of hand. When 
Khrushchev briefed the Party leaders assembled 
at the 20th Congress in Moscow at a secret meeting 
on February 25th, the representatives of foreign 
Commimist Parties were excluded but the Party 
leaders from all parts of the U.S.S.R. were 
there. They were to take the gospel by word of 
mouth to the local precinct leaders. What was 
planned, apparently, was a gradual process of 
burying the dead leader's memory. Different 
medicine was to be reserved for the faithful fol- 
lowers of Stalin in the satellites, each according 
to their needs. 

Something may have gone wrong with this care- 
ful planning. It is possible that difficult questions 
were posed by those Party workers who had been 
taught for decades to worship Stalin and who 
knew that Khrushchev, Bulganin, and the whole 
Politburo owed their positions to him. On the 
other hand, Khrushchev may have deliberately 
planned to give the Party the "shock treatment" to 
give more conviction to the "new men" and "new 
times" theory. 

At any rate, whatever may have been the plan, 
the reports are unanimous, as published in the 
l^ress of every free country without effective denial 
from Moscow, that Khrushchev ended up by 
branding Stalin not only as a heartless dictator 
but as a tyrant and murderer, an incompetent 
military leader whose bungling in both war and 
peace had brought the Soviet Union to the verge 
of ruin. In the same breath, Stalin, the leading 
theoretician of communism for the past 25 years, 
was labeled a heretic and his interpretations of 
the Marxist-Leninist philosophy were rejected. 



May 7, 7956 



761 



It may be well at this point to consider the posi- 
tion and charactei" of the men who liave now 
brought these charges. All of them had been for 
many long years prominently associated with 
Stalin's policies. Some had been his hatchetmen 
in many of the less savory acts of his checkered 
career. Certainly no leader in history ever took 
such elaborate precautions as Stalin to insure that 
the men around him were loyal beyond the shadow 
of a doubt. That his henclimen, now that he is 
dead, so bitterly repudiated Stalin is a commen- 
tary on the totalitarian system of government it- 
self and the leaders it breeds. 

Position and Character of the Accusers 

The main attack on Stalin's record was made by 
the Party Secretary, Nikita Khrushchev. He had 
held key jobs under Stalin since 1935 and had 
organized and carried through, for Stalin, the 
purges in the Ukraine. In January of 1938, he was 
named as alternate member of the Politburo and 
has been a full member of that body since 1939. 
Without wavering, he followed the Stalinist lines 
and on the dictator's 70th birthday, December 21, 
1949, he had this to say : 

Hail to the father, sage teacher, and brilliant leader 
of the Party, the Soviet people, and the toilers of all 
the world, Comrade Stalin. 

The number-two man in the anti-Stalin crusade 
has been Anastas Mikoyan. In fact, he was the 
first at the recent 20th Congress to criticize Stalin 
by name. Mikoyan held key jobs under Stalin for 
approximately 30 years. Stalin installed him as 
Commissar of Trade and made him candidate 
member of the Politburo in 1926, when Mikoyan 
was 31 — the j'oungest person ever to attain I'olit- 
buro rank. He has adjusted to every turn of the 
Soviet policy line and remained in the front 
political ranks ever since. 

Others who have been parties to this great de- 
bunking exercise were, of course, Bulganin, who 
had worked with Stalin since 1931; Kaganovich, 
who had been at his side since 1924; Malenkov, 
who had been a member of his personal secretariat 
for some 25 years, whose career was made by 
Stalin; and, finally, Molotov, the longest Stalin 
associate of them all. He had worked with the 
dictator since about 1912 in the early days of the 
illegal Communist conspiracy. 

There is good reason to believe that Molotov has 



joined the ranks of Stalin detractors with reluc- 
tance. Certainly a Stalinist at heart, he must have 
viewed recent events with a heavy heart and with 
the knowledge that the recent deviations of which 
he has been openly accused are a prelude to his 
gradual retirement from the duties of his office. 
I incline to believe that Molotov's real sentiments 
are those he expressed at Stalin's grave and then 
more recently when, after Malenkov's demotion in 
1954, he exuberantly reaffirmed his faith in Stalin- 
ist principles. 

All of these men, while they now find it con- 
venient to dissociate themselves from the dead 
tyrant, show no intention of accepting the normal 
consequences of long association with a repudiated 
leader and a discredited policy nor of relinquish- 
ing the benefits they acquired under Stalin and the 
power which they are now enjoying as his pupils 
and successors. 

The leaders of the Soviet Union today are walk- 
ing a dangerous tightrope. They are trying to 
discredit Stalin without discrediting the Com- 
munist Party, which he led so long, or the men who 
worked with him. Human memories are short and 
perhaps they may succeed in this maneuver. But 
surely many a Communist will question the good 
faith of these leadere. The reversal is too abrupt 
to invite confidence. After all, it was only a little 
over 3 years ago, on March 9, 1953, that Stalin was 
buried. At that time these men who are now 
castigating him joined in the most lavish tribute 
and they brought together in Moscow the Com- 
munist leaders of China and the European satel- 
lites to do him homage. 

This is what his short-time heir, Georgi Malen- 
kov, had to say : 

The policy of Stalin will live for ages and thankful 
posterity will praise his name just as we do. . . . C!om- 
rade Stalin, a great thinker of our epoch, creatively de- 
veloped in new historical conditions the teachings of 
Marxism-Leninism. Stalin's name justly stands with the 
names of the greatest people in all the history of man- 
kind-JIars-Engels-Lenin. 

The Chinese Communists and the Moscow-des- 
ignated rulers of the EurojDean satellites who at- 
tended Stalin's funeral must now have some ques- 
tion in their minds today as to the forthrightness 
of the present Kremlin leaders who induced them 
to join in this homage. Eecently, the Chinese 
Communists spent several weeks before publish- 
ing their acceptance of Moscow views of the late 
Soviet dictator. 



762 



Department of State Bulletin 



Basis for Questioning Their Sincerity 

Certainly it is not for us to defend the Stalinist 
dictatorship, its cruelties and perversions, as 
against its present detractoi-s. We do have a 
right, however, to question the sincerity of those 
who today tell us that for 20 years and more they 
were a party to foisting on the world a tissue of 
lies and deceit. 

Their sincerity is basically to be questioned on 
three counts. First, they have been willing to 
rriticize and condemn only carefully selected 
faults of the Stalin regime. They have spe- 
cifically endorsed acts that both within Russia 
and in the world at large caused the most wide- 
sjiread and terrible human suifering : for example, 
the deliberate starvation of the Russian peasantry 
during the collectivization campaign of the early 
tliirties; and the exploitation of the captive 
peoples of the eastern European satellites, where 
proud and independent nations were crushed in 
defiance of solemn international obligations. 
Mikoyan at the 20th Congress even had the 
clfrontery to boast of the Czech coup as an ex- 
ample of how Communist parties can come to 
power by "peaceful" and "parliamentary" means. 
Secondly, they have failed to repudiate the 
arbitrary dictatorial rule that allows life and 
death issues to be settled by a handful of men — 
whether by one or a half-dozen matters not to the 
Russian peasant. 

The 20th Congress in its mireal and sheep- 
like unanimity was an example of the fact that 
the present four-, five-, or six-man leadership in- 
tends to permit little real debate and criticism of 
basic policy. Not one voice was raised to protest 
the decree designed to force the peasants on the col- 
lective farms to devote all their efi'orts to the 
collective by severely limiting the time allowed 
for work on their private plots. The widespread 
opposition to this decree that must exist among 
the Russian farmers went unrepresented and un- 
heard as the last Party Congress proceeded to 
rubberstamp every resolution put before it. 

Thirdly , whatever improvements have been 
made in assuring the personal security and wel- 
fare of the individual Russian, that progi'ess is 
dependent on the whim of the Presidium, popu- 
larly known as the Politburo. The stick can be 
used later if the carrot doesn't work. 

W[\at we now have is a kind of "mutual protec- 
tive association" among a few men who suffered 



under Stalin so long that they are willing to co- 
opei-ate to keep the full police power of the state 
out of the hands of any one man. There is no 
hint that any ordinary Russian who tries to dis- 
sent against the regime will escape the wrath 
of Servo's gunmen any more than he would have 
escaped when Beria was alive. If necessary to 
preserve their own skins, these men might return 
to unrestricted terror like ducks to water. It was 
their native element for years. 

The final and real test of the intentions of the 
Soviet leaders will remain their willingness to ac- 
cept those basic institutional changes that can give 
the Russian people and the world in general genu- 
ine assurance that a one-man — or three- or four- 
man — dictatorship cannot again plot in secret the 
massive domestic or international crimes of the 
recent past. 

In the end, opposition parties, an independent 
judiciary, and a free press are the only real safe- 
guards against successive dictators, each with his 
own power lust and a new cult of personality. 

Problems the Communists Face 

The problems which this right-about-face pre- 
sents for the worldwide Communist movement 
both within and outside of the U.S.S.R. are im- 
mense. Here are a few of them: 

Stalin was not only the dictator of his country 
for more than two decades ; he was also hailed as 
its great military leader in war, its prophet, and 
the interpreter of Marxist-Leninist doctrine. His 
writings, particularly the Prohlems of Leninism 
and the Short Histai^j of the Commmiist Party, 
are scattered in tens of millions of copies through- 
out the Communist world. It will be years before 
they can be removed from circulation. In fact, 
all Soviet history for the past 30 years must now 
be rewritten. They won't be able to handle this 
quite as they did in the case of Beria. Here they 
sent to all holders of the Soviet encyclopedia in- 
structions to excise the pages praising Beria and 
insert a puffed-up story on the Bering Straits 
(which fitted in in proper alphabetical order). 

Stalin's name is on thousands of streets and 
squares. Cities and towns bear his name through- 
out the Communist world. For the people of the 
Soviet Union, Stalingrad stands as the symbol of 
their victory over Hitlerism. Will his name re- 
main here and elsewhere, or will the attempt be 
made to blot it out ? 



May 7, 1956 



763 



Stalin's henchmen were put in key positions 
throughout the length and breadth of the Soviet 
Union. They hold key places in the European 
satellite regimes. Each and every one of these ap- 
pointees must today fear not only for his future 
but for his life. 

Already political idols are toppling or at least 
swaying in the wind from Moscow — in Bulgaria, 
in Hungary, in Poland. Names of former leaders 
who crossed Stalin are coming back into i-epute 
daily, and political circles in the satellites are 
plainly in confusion and near panic trying to 
figure out where the line of propriety will be 
drawn next. 

As Alfred Robens, a leader of the British Labor 
Party, recently remarked, "How do you correct 
the mistake of having shot a man? Do you re- 
store him to the history books or give him a post- 
humous reward?" 

The problem of justifying past crimes is es- 
pecially difficult in the foreign Communist parties, 
such as those in France and Italy, where local 
leaders clung to Stalin's coattails and did his bid- 
ding without having the excuse of tlie pistol at 
their head. These men could have denounced 
Stalin's crimes earlier and lived — unlike the men 
in Moscow. "^^Hiy did they not do so? This is 
the question we ought to keep asking every Italian 
tempted to play ball with Togliatti. 

And what about the reputation of Trotsky, a key 
Stalinist victim, still on the Soviet blacklist? 
Here and there, in places as far distant from each 
otlier as Ceylon and Bolivia, his followers are 
meeting to stage a comeback, and the view is being 
tolerated, at least, in the satellites that he was not 
a traitor but merely a misguided and erroneous 
would-be leader. 

And what about the numerous \'iolations of those 
international agreements signed by Stalin? "Was 
he a "devil" when he made them, or when he broke 
them, or both? 

The Soviet people well remember that Stalin 
himself started as. one of a triumvirate not very 
different from the collective leadership of which 
the Soviet leaders now boast. How can the Soviet 
people themselves be sure that this small group 
of men in the Politburo who exercise complete 
and arbitrary control over the lives of all the 
peoples of the U.S.S.R. will not, in the course 
of a few years, again lead to a personal dictator- 
sliip with all the vices that they now attribute to 
Stalinism? Is it not the system itself rather tlian 



the "cult of personality" that breeds tyranny and 
cruelty and ends in the revolution devouring its 
own children ? 

And, finally, is it not possible that the Soviet 
people, with the leaven of education they are re- 
ceiving, will demand some decisive share in the 
selection of their own leadership and some checks 
and balances against the danger of tyrannical 
dictatorship and the "cult of personality"? 

All Marxists have been trained in the dogma 
that hinnan beings are the products of their en- 
vironment. Might not Soviet ^Marxists begin to 
think there is something wrong with a political en- 
vironment in which, over the years, an incredible 
percentage of the most influential leaders — includ- 
ing Trotsky, Zinoviev, Bukliarin, Beria, and now 
Stalin — have turned out to be criminals? Might 
not the Soviet people, and even some of their 
present or future leaders, come to believe that 
"power corrupts and absolute power corrupts 
absolutely" ? 

In Moscow the pictures of Stalin are gradually 
disappearing. I am told that the Red Army 
theater has solved the problem of filling the space 
formerly occupied by an enormous portrait in an 
ingenious way that may be symbolic. On the wall 
where Stalin's picture used to hang is now a huge 
mirror. Any ambitious leader can see himself in 
Stalin's place. Might this not prove to be the 
curse of the Stalinist system — one which cannot be 
easily escaped by pious resolves? 

The only element of power in the Soviet Union 
which is not directly implicated in the excesses and 
atrocities of Stalin, namely the military leader- 
ship, may have something to say about all this. 
While there is nothing concrete to suggest it now, 
some day a "man on horseback" might fancy him- 
self in that mirror. 

Weighing the Issues 

When the present Soviet leaders took the risks 
involved in their present policj', they must have 
carefully weiglied tlie consequences. They must 
liave realized the grave issues it would raise in 
the Communist world outside of tlie U.S.S.R., 
among the Party faithful in every free country, 
and among their own peoples. 

Abroad they probably hoped there would be 
some counterbalancing advantages. If it would 
bring about a feeling of relaxation in the free 
world, defensive rearmament here and among our 



764 



Departmenf of State Bulletin 



allies might slow down, defensive alliances might 
tend to weaken, the possibility of peaceful coex- 
istence, for which everyone yearns, might be more 
and more accepted. All this they hoped would 
give them time to build up their own strength, 
economic and military. If we are naive, then the 
Soviet Union may get some international benefits 
from their present tactics. 

But there is another side to the picture which 
bears pondering. The Soviet leaders may have 
had no real alternative and took the course which 
they felt held out the best chance of keeping their 
own power. The Kremlin leaders, as I mentioned, 
were under heavy domestic pressures to do some- 
thing to persuade their people that a new era was 
in the making. During recent years the leavening 
process of education has developed the critical 
faculties of millions of Russians. The Kremlin 
can no longer sell the old line to all of their people. 
They must now not only rewrite the history of 
Stalin but rewrite the story they have been tell- 
ing their people about the outside world. 

These leaders — Khrushchev, Bulganin, Mi- 
koyan, Kaganovich — have got over the hump of 
Stalin's death without losing their grip on his 
power. They profess a great deal of confidence 
in their ability to perpetuate the system of collec- 
tive dictatorship they have instituted by basing 
it more bi-oadly on the top layer of elite Party 
managers, generals, engineers, and intellectuals 
who have a stake in the Soviet regime. 

Only time can tell whether the present lead- 
ers with their past close association with Stalin- 
ism really can do this and make the Soviet dicta- 
torship work without going much farther and 
giving their people something more than mere 
lipservice in the direction of the right to free 
speech, free worship, and protection for the in- 
dividual from arbitrary action. 

Possibly what we are seeing will end up as a 
temporary period of attempted fraud on the Rus- 
sian people, a cloak to sell them a collective dicta- 
torship as against a personal dictatorship. Pos- 
sibly it is a first hesitant step toward giving a 
greater number of the Russian people a chance to 
share in the decisions which shape their destinies. 
I am sure the Russian leaders themselves do not 
know how their effort to "de-Stalinize" the So- 
viet Union will turn out. I am also sure they 
would be dismayed if they thought they were pav- 
ing the way for the establishment in Russia of 



what we could call a decent and responsible gov- 
ernment. 

The Communists, despite their self-confidence, 
do not and will not control the fate of mankind. 
In the face of firm free-world resistance to their 
international barbarities and exposure of their 
political frauds and malpractices, at home and 
abroad, and under the pressure of their own peo- 
ple, there may be a gradual move toward more 
normal modes of life and behavior. If so, then 
hopes of world peace will be given a mighty im- 
pulse forward. This possibility the free world 
must watch prayerfully, alert to opportunities for 
peace provided by progress in this direction. We 
must be equally alert to perceive and denounce the 
dangers implicit in the fraud of a mere attempt to 
bury a shabby past. 



Departure of Former Seamen 
of Soviet Tanker 

Press release 217 dated AprU 25 

At the request of the Department of State, 
Soviet Ambassador Georgi Zaroubin called on As- 
sistant Secretary Livingston Merchant this after- 
noon. The Ambassador was handed a note 
concerning the departure from the United States 
of five former seamen of the Soviet tanker 
T'uafse.} The text of the note follows : 

"The Secretary of State presents his compli- 
ments to His Excellency the Ambassador of the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and has the 
honor to refer to the circumstances surroimding 
the departure from the United States for the 
Soviet Union on April 7, 1956 of five former sea- 
men of the Soviet tanker Tuapse. 

"It has been determined after thorough investi- 
gation that members of the Soviet Delegation to 
the United Nations assumed authority and en- 
gaged in activities with respect to the seamen 
which are incompatible with the status of the 
Soviet Delegation. In this regard the conduct of 
Aleksandr K. Guryanov and Nikolai Turkin was 
particularly objectionable. Ambassador Arkady 
Sobolev himself insisted on intervening, despite 
the presence of an accredited representative from 
the Soviet Embassy in AVashington, during the 
interview conducted at Idlewild by the authorities 



' For background, see Buli-etin of July 12, 1954, p. 51 ; 
July 26, 1954, p. 131 ; and Aug. 22, 1955, p. 302. 



May 7, 1956 



765 



of the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
prior to departure of the seamen. 

"It is considered that members of the Soviet 
Delegation to the United Nations thereby per- 
formed acts of an improper character exceeding 
the scope of their official capacity and thereby 
abused the privilege of their residence in contra- 
vention of the terms of tlie Headquarters Agi'ee- 
ment between the United States and the United 
Nations. 

"It is requested that the Soviet Government in- 
struct Ambassador Arkady Sobolev and his staff 
henceforth to adhere to their recognized functions. 
In view of the special character of the activities 
of Aleksandr K. Guryanov and Nikolai Turkin, 
the Soviet Government is informed that their 
presence in the United States is no longer desir- 
able. It is accordingly requested that Aleksandr 
K. Guryanov make expeditious arrangements to 
leave the United States. On the same grounds the 
request for a return visa for Nikolai Turkin to 
reenter the United States is hereby refused." 

Export Controls Simplified 
for European Soviet Bloc 

The Department of Commerce announced on 
April 27 the simplification of certain export con- 
trols by the establishment of a new general license 
order under which shipment from a select roster 
of peaceful goods can be made to the U.S.S.E. and 
its European satellites without the filing of export 
license applications.^ The action came in the form 
of an initial listing of some 700 nonstrategic items 
in over 57 commodity categories which U.S. ex- 
porters may now ship under general license to the 
European Soviet bloc. 

All of the goods included on the new roster are 
of the type that would be approved for export 
under existing licensing policy. The new general 
license procedure in no way reflects a change in 
the policy of banning strategic goods to the Soviet 
bloc. The main purpose is to reduce the paper 
burden on the American export community and the 
Government by eliminating the previous require- 
ment of separate forms for each shipment, and 
thereby to facilitate increased peaceful commerce. 

In announcing the action, Secretary of Com- 
merce Sinclair Weeks said : 



' For detailed announcement, see Bureau of Foreign 
Commerce Current Export Bulletin 7C3. 



Today's simplification in licensing procedures in respect 
to the European Soviet bloc is designed to carry out the 
Government's objective, first announced by President 
Eisenhower at Geneva last July, "to create conditions 
which will encourage nations to increase the exchange of 
peaceful goods throughout the world." This objective 
subsequently was advanced at the Foreign Ministers 
Conference in Geneva last October when Secretary of 
State John Foster Dulles Indicated the intention of the 
United States Government to simplify export control 
procedures on shipments of peaceful goods to the Soviet 
bloc. 

The new arrangement will broaden opportunities for 
Increased trade by providing U.S. exporters with a roster 
of peaceful goods which will not require the granting by 
the Commerce D.^partment of individual, specific licenses 
for shipment to the Soviet bloc. 

It should be noted that our ban on strategic exports 
continues and that U.S.-origin commodities not on the 
new general license roster will continue to reciuire indi- 
vidual licenses for shipment to the U.S.S.R. or its satellites 
and may not be reexported to Communist-controlled areas 
without clearance from the Bureau of Foreign Commerce. 
Also, the total embargo against all shipments to Com- 
munist China and North Korea remains unchanged. All 
shipments to the Communist-controlled areas of Viet-Nam 
and Laos, as well as the maritime provinces of the U.S.S.R., 
continue to require individual export licenses. 

Included in the new general license list are 
selected items in the following categories: bev- 
erages, rubber products, drugs and pharmaceuti- 
cals, fibers, wood, paper products, glass, clay 
products, cutlery, hardware, cork, electrical house- 
hold appliances, commercial refrigerating equip- 
ment, office machines, dyes, leather, hides and 
skins, pigments, paints, chemical specialties, soil 
improvement compounds, soap and toiletries, 
photographic equipment, plumbing fixtures, opti- 
cal goods, musical instruments, toys, dental equip- 
ment, jewelry, lamps, sponges, notions, beauty and 
barber .supplies, and shoe findings. The listed 
items may be shipped imder general license to the 
following destinations : Albania, Bulgaria, 
Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Outer Mongolia, Poland and 
Danzig, Rumania, and the Union of Soviet So- 
cialist Republics, except the maritime provinces 
(Far Eastern seaports) of the U.S.S.R. 

A substantial increase in the volume of licensing 
to the Soviet bloc took place in the first quarter of 
1956, according to statistics prepared for inclusion 
in a forthcoming report by Secretary Weeks on 
export control operations. Licenses granted for 
Soviet-bloc destinations totaled $8,788,543 in the 
first quarter of 1956, compared with $1,624,856 in 
the fourth quarter of 1955, and $4,968,322 in the 



766 



Department of Slate Bulletin 



initial quarter of 1955. The bulk of first-quarter 
1956 licensing to the bloc consisted of agricultural 
products and equipment, which together accounted 
for $7,294,844 of the total licensed. 

Actual shipments, however, have not as yet re- 
flected tlie increase in licensing. U.S. exports to 
the European Soviet bloc totaled $1,151,000 in the 
fourth quarter of 1955, compared with $1,051,000 
shipped during the third quarter of 1955. 



For the year 1955, U.S. exports to the bloc were 
valued at $7,248,000, as compared with $6,120,000 
for 1954, and $1,776,000 for 1953. The 1955 and 
1954 totals included $4,743,000 of food grains, in- 
secticides, and drugs shipped to Hungary, Czecho- 
slovakia, and East Germany under the President's 
flood-relief program for the Danube basin. In 
1947 and 1948, U.S. exports to the bloc were val- 
ued, respectively, at $339,857,000 and $123,241,000. 



The U.S. Stake in World Trade 



iy Sinclair Weeks 
Secretary of Coranierce ^ 



Whenever I come to New Orleans I cannot help 
reflecting on the stroke of destiny which, in the 
early days of the Republic, brought New Orleans 
and the trans-Mississippi Valley into the United 
States. 

But for a twist of fate on the international 
chessboard, but for Napoleon's colonial ambitions 
which made Louisiana French, but for those far- 
off European events which turned Napoleon's 
mind away from the New World, this gi-eat coun- 
try as we know it today might never have been. 

"WHiat good fortune it was for us to have had in 
Paris at the critical moment a skilled and coura- 
geous negotiator ready to strike, in his country's 
interest, while the iron was hot. And — if a New 
England Republican may make so bold as to praise 
a Southern Democrat — what a magnificent vision 
of the future moved Thomas Jefferson bravely to 
accept the challenge of the moment and lead our 
country toward its destiny. 

This is your annual Mississip^ji Valley World 
Trade Conference, and as we gather here today 
I need not remind you that one of the principal 
functions of the Commerce Depai-tment is to fos- 
ter, promote, and develop world trade. Presum- 
ably, this relationship is what prompted you to 
invite me. 

It is stating the obvious to repeat that the 

"^ Address made before the Mississippi Valley World 
Trade Conference at New Orleans, La., on Apr. 10 (De- 
partment of Commerce press release). 



United States has a tremendous stake in world 
trade in economic terms as well as in security 
terms. Forty million acres of American farm- 
land today find overseas markets for their prod- 
ucts. Ten percent of U.S. manufactured goods 
are exported. Upwards of 4 million American 
workers and their families rely on foreign trade. 
On the imjjort side, we must look abroad for many 
essentials, including manganese, chrome, and tin. 
Eighty percent of our newsprint, 100 percent of 
our industrial diamonds, 100 percent of our vital 
nickel supply must be imported. Food products 
too are important items in the import list. They 
include almost 100 percent of our coffee, tea, cocoa, 
and bananas. 

The United States stake in exports continues 
unabated. For example, last year, without con- 
sidering at all the unpact of foreign aid, United 
States manufacturers alone sold abroad a wide 
range of products, in the total amoimt of approxi- 
mately $10 billion. This, of course, reflects the 
fact that we can and do compete successfully in 
markets throughout the world. 

But in this process American industries are 
confronted in many foreign markets with restric- 
tions which continually limit the opportunities 
to sell their products. In the absence of such re- 
strictions, which include, among other things, 
quotas, special taxes, and exchange restrictions — 
in other words, under conditions of normal com- 
mercial competition — American manufacturers 



hhay 7, 1956 



767 



would have sold abroad even more than the $10 
billion figure just referred to. Our industries do 
not seek special governmental advantages in sell- 
ing their products in foreign markets; they 
seek only to be allowed to compete fairly in for- 
eign markets on the commercial merits of their 
products. 

These are all among the factors which influence 
the dynamic foreign-trade policy of the President 
and his administration. Let me summarize the 
main elements of this program : 

1. In accord with the terms of H. K. 1,= 
adopted last year, the reciprocal and modest re- 
duction of unnecessary barriers to world trade 
and payments. 

2. The creation of a healthy business climate 
for stimulating investment abroad, particularly 
in the less developed areas of the world. 

3. The encouragement of tourism to enable the 
peoples of the world to get to know and under- 
stand each other better. 

4. The participation by the Government and 
American businessmen in trade fairs throughout 
the free world to carry the message of the Ameri- 
can way of life and the products of free enterprise 
to foreign shores. 

One of the most useful devices we have found 
for carrying through this program is the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Gatt). 

Objectives of GATT 

Wliat does the Gait stand for? The Gatt— 
the largest and most comprehensive trade agree- 
ment in history — is an agreement among 35 na- 
tions reflecting principles which have for good 
reason been cardinal points of United States trade 
policy. The Department of Commerce plays an 
important role in the policy formulations of 
United States-GATT relations. 

First of all, Gatt contains for each member 
country an item-by-item list of tariff rates which 
that country agrees not to exceed in charging du- 
ties on imports from the remaining Gatt coun- 
tries. Collectively, these lists cover almost 60,000 
items, embracing a large share of world trade. 
The remainder of the agreement consists of a set 
of "general provisions" which each country agrees 
to observe in international trade. An important 

' Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1955. 



purpose of these general rules, which restrain the 
use of such things as taxes, quotas, subsidies, and 
administrative procedures, is to insure that these 
devices will not be used to nullify the intended 
value for members of the tariff-rate agreements. 

Gatt objectives closely correspond to estab- 
lished principles of American commercial policy — 
principles which include the most-favored-nation 
treatment, for example, which the United States 
in its own interest has long urged upon other na- 
tions. Generally speaking, however, as far as 
Gatt is concerned, it is better from every stand- 
point to have 35 nations join in one agreement 
than to have to go through the motions 35 sepa- 
rate times with 35 separate agreements finally 
arrived at. For example, Department mathema- 
ticians tell me that, if we had to negotiate entirely 
through bilateral agreements, it would require 
approximately 595 separate treaties. 

The combination of such negotiations produces 
results not possible in a series of separate bilateral 
agreements and, to my mind, certainly makes it 
possible for the United States to obtain greater 
trade benefits than could otherwise be achieved. 

The OTC 

There is now pending before the Congress a bill 
(H. R. 5550) to authorize the President to accept 
United States membership in the Organization 
for Trade Cooperation (Otc).^ The main func- 
tion of this organization would be to administer 
the Gati. In addition, it would provide a forum 
for discussion of other trade problems, with each 
government remaining entirely free to adopt or 
reject recommendations growing out of such dis- 
cussion. It would also assemble and publish data 
on world trade. 

The Department of Commerce has an important 
interest in Otc, and because of this I have care- 
fully reviewed the proposal for it from every 
angle. Both as a member of the President's Cabi- 
net and as a former manufacturer I earnestly hope 
that the Congress will approve this vital legisla- 
tion promptly. 

So long as it is the policy of this Government 
to carry on foieign trade under the aegis of recip- 

' For a Department of State memorandum on legal as- 
pects of the GATT and OTC, see Cmg. Rec. of Apr. 2.3, 
1956, p. 60SS. See also The Agreement on the Organisation 
for Trade Cooperation, Report of tbe Committee on Ways 
and Jleans, House of Representatives, To Accompany H.R. 
5550 ; H. Kept. 2007, 84th Cong., 2d sess., Apr. 18, 1956. 



I 



768 



Department of State Bulletin 



rocal trade agreements and to do it by the Gatt 
process, I am convinced that the creation of the 
Otc will enable American industry and trade to 
derive additional and increased benefits from the 
(tatt and the tariif concessions we have received. 
The agieement for the Otc has been so drafted 
that United States interests are fully safe- 
guarded.* Otc would not be supranational. It 
could not change a single tariff rate. It could not 
impose new obligations on the United States with- 
out our consent. 

This whole proposition is essentially very 
simple. The Otc would provide machinery to en- 
able the Gatt nations to do better those things 
which the Gatt already provides for. It would 
not extend the Gatt provisions to any additional 
aspects of trade, nor would the Otc take any new 
kinds of action on aspects already covered by 
Gatt. The new macliinery to administer Gatt 
is designed solely to enable the member nations to 
take more promptly and more effectively those 
joint actions already provided for in Gatt, with 
respect to those tariff and trade matters already 
covered by Gatt. 

Gatt and Otc project into the international 
arena trade-policy objectives with which the 
United States has long been associated. 

We cannot lose by cooperating with our friends 
in the trade area of our foreign relations, just as 
we cooperate with them in a variety of other direc- 
tions. We cannot stand at arm's length fi'om 
them in this field and hope to meet the unanimity 
of action which the Soviet Union and its satellites 
achieve by force and terror. 

Trade Controls 

When we speak of the Soviet bloc, it brings to 
mind the other and perhaps darker aspect of our 
foreign-trade policy — the use of controls by the 
United States and our friends to avoid a signifi- 
cant free-world contribution to the buildup of the 
Soviet war potential. 

I hope we may some day see the kind of govern- 
ment and the kind of policy in the Soviet Union 
which would make it possible to bring that nation 
and its present satellites fully into the family of 
friendly nations. That day is not yet here, and 
until it arrives we cannot afford to lower our 
guard. 



* For text, see Buhetin of Apr. 4, 1955, p. 579. 
May 7, 1956 



The destruction of the cult of Stalinism means 
only, perhaps, that a policy of naked aggression is 
being replaced by a more subtle and insidious ef- 
fort to achieve world Communist domination 
through propaganda, infiltration, and economic 
penetration. The lures and enticements put out 
by the Communist leaders are devices to trap the 
unwary as the spider traps the fly. A true index 
of Soviet policy may lie in a statement reportedly 
made by Khrushchev last September as follows : 

We value trade least for economic reasons and most for 
political purposes as a means of promoting relations be- 
tween our countries. 

We do not, of course, want to reject out of hand 
such opportunities as may arise to reduce world 
tensions. We must ever be alert to carry forward 
the principles of peace and peaceful exchanges 
among nations which President Eisenhower has 
dedicated himself to achieve. 

The problem of East-West trade — how, when, 
and to what extent it shall be carried on — becomes 
a complex issue of international relations. In- 
dividual transactions or groups of transactions 
must be viewed from tlie perspective of our total 
foreign and national security policy. The results 
should be of a kind which brings the greatest ad- 
vantage and the greatest relative strength to the 
free world. 

Perhaps a specific example of Soviet tactics 
may illustrate the problem. Last month (March 
4) the newspapers reported that an American 
firm had made a licensing agreement to produce 
in the United States a Soviet-designed turbodrill 
for drilling oil and gas wells. This device was 
heralded as being much more efficient than Ameri- 
can oil rigs and as a sign of Soviet willingness 
to exchange their teclmical advances with those 
of the United States. 

Much less attention was given at first to the 
quid pro quo desired by the Eussians from us, 
namely, the technological information needed 
for producing advanced types of boring bits for 
drilling wells. 

From the Soviet point of view this type of 
"exchange" is designed to create the impression 
of a fair exchange, in contrast with earlier at- 
tempts at one-way acquisition of Western proto- 
types. But on closer examination — of the type 
which this Government always gives to such pro- 
posals — an appraisal must be made as to whether 
this exchange might not open the door for the 



769 



Soviets to the whole range of developments in 
American oil production technology. In this type 
of "exchange" would the Soviets stand to profit 
more, because of their state control over domestic 
technical data and because they might latch on 
to an industry in which they are, on balance, in 
an inferior position technologically? 

Charting the right course in the deadly serious 
economic contest between East and West requires 
the greatest wisdom and ingenuity that our policy- 
makers can muster. From a national security 
standpoint, this whole business of East-West 
trade and trade restrictions has caused a great 
deal of misunderstanding not only here in the 
United States but among free-world countries as 
well. 

Investigation of East-West Trade 

I have recently done some testifying on East- 
West trade before the Senate Permanent Subcom- 
mittee on Investigations. The committee was 
particularly interested in the revisions in East- 
West international trade controls which took place 
in 1954. 

The hearings were heated. Aside from ques- 
tioning the policy followed in 1954, the hearings 
involved issues relating to the constitutional sepa- 
ration of powers as between executive and legis- 
lative and to the conduct of affairs within the 
executive branch. I should like to discuss with 
you some of the points made in the hearings.^ 

First, I want to say that naturally the committee 
has every right to make such an investigation. 
In fact, I think it is completely appropriate that 
constant surveillance of the executive be main- 
tained by Congress. But even here it has been 
difficult to prevent gross misunderstanding of the 
issues involved, of the policies which are main- 
tained, and of the results achieved. 

Secondly, I should make it absolutely clear that 
the inquiry had no relationship whatsoever to U.S. 
export controls on goods shipped from the United 
States. We have our own controls, and they were 
not in question. The committee was concerned 
solely with the products which our allies ship in 
East- West trade and with the voluntary multi- 
national controls set up by our allies in agreement 
with us. 

Controls maintained by the United States on 
shipments to the European Soviet bloc and Com- 

' For a statement made before the committee by Under 
Secretary Hoover, see ibid., Apr. 9, 1956, p. 619. 



munist China are stricter than those of our allies. 
We have an embargo on all exports to Communist 
China and North Korea. 

No shipments can be made to the European 
Communist bloc from the United States without 
first obtaining an export license through the De- 
partment of Commerce. Such licenses are auto- 
matically denied on items \\hich are in short sup- 
ply in the United States or which are, generally 
speaking, of strategic nature. "When items in 
either of these categories are exported to friendly 
foreign countries, determination is made in ad- 
vance that transshipment to the Communists is 
not to be expected. 

Shipments of peaceful goods to the European 
Soviet bloc are authorized through the granting 
of export licenses. Such trade is relatively small 
in volume, however. 

I have mentioned earlier that other free-world 
countries working together and with us maintain 
similar restrictions on trade with the Soviets. 
Their restrictions are of a more liberal order, how- 
ever, than are ours. Many items are thus shipped 
to the Russians from European countries which 
the United States would not itself ship to them. 
Some of these items are strategic in nature. 

During its investigation the Senate committee 
has frequently referred to the difference in 
stringency between U.S. controls and multilateral 
controls over shipments to the Reds. The infer- 
ence has been drawn from time to time that we 
are somehow to blame for the fact that the Com- 
munists have been able to obtain materials of 
strategic significance from others which they can- 
not buy from us. 

When I appeared before the conunittee I made it 
clear that if I had my way all free-world coun- 
tries would exercise the equivalent in restrictions 
over the sale of strategic goods to the Soviets as 
those maintained by the United States. I stated 
further that to the best of my knowledge this same 
position had been consistently maintained by every 
interested department in our Government. 

I also reported, however, that no power on earth 
is available beyond the power of persuasion to 
control the economic activities of other nations. 
If I remember correctly, I cited to the committee 
by way of illustration the old adage, "You can 
lead a horse to water, but you can't make him 
drink." 

Much as I believe that it is in the free-world in- 
terest to keep these controls strict, I think, how- 



770 



Department of State Bulletin 



I ever, it must be recognized in all fairness that we 
cannot compare our situation in the United States 
to that of European countries without finding 
tremendous pressures there for different policies 
in terms of East-West trade. 

^ Modification of European Controls 

Thus in August 1954 the multilateral controls 
maintained by European countries as a limitation 
upon exports to the Communist bloc were sub- 
stantially modified. This modification resulted 
in a shortening of the list of items under multi- 
national control. 

What were some of the reasons which led to this 
modification? 

It must be recognized that there are historic 
patterns and other factors affecting the East- West 
trade interests of European free-world countries 
which are far different from those which apply in 
the United States. For example, Department of 
Commerce statistics show that, while U.S. exports 
represent only approximately 3.5 percent of our 
gross national product, the United Kingdom re- 
lies upon exports for 15.6 percent of its G. N. P. 
The pressure for international trade in the United 
Kingdom is based on the long-established fact 
that without adequate trade Britain cannot sur- 
vive, let alone maintain a decent standard of liv- 
ing or a satisfactory national defense. 

Other European countries lean heavily upon 
foreign trade. Individual export items become 
vitally significant to the economic welfare of these 
countries and result in heavy pressures for trade 
expansion. 

As an illustration, the shipment of 2,000 tons 
of soft unalloyed aluminum by Norway to the 
Soviet bloc was a required concession as a means 
of providing a market in the bloc for otherwise 
unsalable seafood products — a major export item. 
Denmark is called upon to sell butter abroad or 
suffer disastrous results in its domestic economy. 
But in order to sell its butter to the Soviets, Den- 
mark is called upon to supply merchant ships. 
West Germany finds it difficult to become com- 
pletely separated in an economic sense from East 
Germany. 

Much of the story of the revisions of the con- 
trols in 1954, the reasons for them and the results, 
has been made available to the public in reports 
issued by IMr. Stassen, the Battle Act Administra- 
tor in 1954, and by myself. Additional informa- 
tion classified for reasons of national security has 

Aioy 7, 1956 



been made available on this basis to six commit- 
tees of the Congress and is being offered to the 
Investigations Subconunittee on the same basis. 

Certain papers of a highly sensitive nature 
which cover intelligence information, matter re- 
lating to international negotiations, and internal 
working papers of the executive branch could not 
be furnished. To do so would reveal information 
classified for the purpose of withholding it from 
the Soviet bloc. 

Now, I am sure that you will all agree with me 
that, insofar as possible, we should not give the 
Communists even a scrap of infoi-mation which 
would be of significant value to them in the cold 
war, any more than we should let them have 
conunodities of strategic significance. 

If closely guarded information were to be publi- 
cized in open hearing, the entire proceedings could 
be observed by agents of hostile powers and the 
entire public record could be reported abroad by 
representatives of the Communist press. We do 
not want to bare to the Communist nations some of 
our secret knowledge of their needs and deficien- 
cies and those of our allies and ourselves. We do 
not want to tell them our own strategic and short- 
supply reasons for control or decontrol. 

In the general area of separation of powers let 
me cite in conclusion some chapter and verse on 
the reasons why the executive branch declines cer- 
tain informational material to the Congress. 

At every level of the executive branch of the 
Government, issues are vigorously debated, and it 
is only human nature that there will be sharjj 
differences of opinion. The same thing I am sure 
happens in the executive sessions of congressional 
committees. It happens in the internal delibera- 
tions of the Supreme Court. Does the Congress 
or the Court offer such discussion to public 
scrutiny ? 

Among such operations are preliminary re- 
search, undigested data subject to later appraisal, 
early drafts of memoranda as yet unchecked for 
errors, incomplete surveys which give only a 
fractional part of the final report, and other initial 
thinking and recommendations which must later 
be levised and perfected or overruled because of 
new facts or circumstances. Revelation of such 
embryonic data ripped from context would give 
an utterly false picture of a situation. 

All of us want the unbiased and candid advice 
of our staffs and subordinates. No organization, 
no government, no military commander could 



771 



operate efficiently if all the scraps of paper and 
advices and recommendations of staffs and sub- 
ordinates were to be cast in the public view. If 
this were done, it would no longer be possible for 
tliose charged with action to obtain candid and 
energetic expressions of opinion at advisory levels 
in tlie Government. Rather it might create 
among subordinates a yes-man complex or a fear 
of standing by one's own sincere convictions. 

It boils down to this : The position of the execu- 
tive branch is : 

1. that we have not witlnheld facts which could 
properly be released, 

2. that in the national interest we have refused to 
disclose, except in executive session, certain secrets 
which potential enemies might use to injure the 
United States and our allies, and 

3. we decline under any conditions to make avail- 
able internal executive working papers. 

So, although we have kept the Congress and the 
public informed, I have described both practical 
reasons and security reasons which made it impos- 
sible to comply witli all of the demands of the 
Senate subcommittee. 

Underlying this whole issue is the historic 
principle of the separation of powers in our Gov- 
eriunent, one of the constitutional foundation 
stones of this Republic. 

From George Washington down to Dwight 
Eisenhower, Presidents have found it necessary, in 
obedience to their oaths of office, to maintain the 
proper constitutional balance between the execu- 
tive and legislative branches. In this way only — 
with vigorous forthright leadership — can our 
countiy go forward on the principles which made 
our Nation great and which today make it the hope 
and inspiration of the free world. 



U.S. Farm Goods Sold to Germany 
in Triangular Transaction 

The International Cooperation Administration 
announced on April 27 that it had arranged an 
$8-million triangular transaction involving sales 
of U.S. agricultural commodities to the Federal 
Republic of Germany. Germany will purchase 
from the United States $7 million worth of coarse 
grains — corn, barley, grain sorghums, and oats — 
paying for them in deutschemarks. An additional 
$1 million has been authorized for shipping costs. 



The deutschemarks derived from the sale of the 
products in Germany will be deposited to the ac- 
count of the U.S. Government. Ica will make 
these funds available to countries where the United 
States has defense or economic-assistance pro- 
grams requiring goods available in Germany. 
AVlien purchases of such goods in Germany are 
agreed upon, they will be financed with the U.S.- 
owned deutschemarks and the triangular transac- 
tion will be completed. 

The trade with Germany was made under sec- 
tion 402 of the Mutual Security Act. This section 
requires that at least $300 million of the funds 
authorized for the mutual security progi-am dur- 
ing the current fiscal year be used to finance the 
sale of surplus U.S. agricultural commodities for 
foreign currencies. The local currency proceeds 
are to be used for mutual security purposes. To 
date this year, more than $285 million of these 
commodities have been authorized by Ica to 20 
countries. 



U.S. Aid to Philippines for 1956 
Emphasizes Rural Development 

The International Cooperation Administration 
announced on April 22 that the $29.1 million in 
aid wliich the United States is providing to the 
Philippines during the 1956 fiscal year is being 
used in the following manner : 

■ — $4.2 million to support an expanded rural de- 
velopment program. 

— $7.6 million to import equipment and com- 
modities needed for projects to expand and di- 
V'ersify the base of the Philippine economy — in 
particular, rural road construction (principally 
on the island of Mindanao), port and harbor im- 
provements, rural health units, and water supply 
and land development projects. 

— $6.7 million, proceeds from the sale of U.S. 
agricultural commodities, which was loaned to the 
Philippine Government for relending through 
commercial banks to help expand small- and 
medium-size industries. 

— $5.9 million for technical cooperation, includ- 
ing the financing of contractual services of U.S. 
firms and universities for assistance in advancing 
public administration, education, agriculture, 
labor, and industry ; training Filipino teclinicians 
in the U.S. ; technical advisory services of U.S. 
Government personnel; and supplies and equip- 



772 



Department of State Bulletin 



ment for demonstration and instruction in all 
major fields of activity. 

— $4.7 million to continue the military con- 
struction progi'am begun in fiscal 1955 in con- 
nection with the reorganization of the Philippine 
Army. 

Most of the U.S. assistance is in support of 
President Magsaysay's comprehensive economic 
development program, for which that country has 
budgeted $79.5 million of its own funds this fiscal 
year to encourage industrialization under private 
business, to improve government services, and to 
expand transportation and communications fa- 
cilities. The main emphasis, however, of joint 
U.S.-Philippine efforts is to improve the living 
conditions and earning capacity of the rural popu- 
lation, who make up 70 percent of the Philippines' 
total population of 22 million. 

The United States has conducted an organized 
aid program in the Philippines since July 1950, 
following 5 years of cooperation in rehabilitating 
the war-damaged country. The 6-year nonmili- 
tary aid total of over $137 million has been more 
than matched by Philippine funds used in the 
same program. Each year the Philippine Gov- 
ernment has taken over and assumed responsibility 
for the support and administration of an increas- 
ing mnnber of projects initiated with the help 
of U.S. aid funds. 

Here are some of the results since 1950 of this 
mutual undertaking : 

Puhlic health. New American drugs, scientific 
treatment, and hygiene are beginning to wipe out 
scourges — malaria, trachoma, tuberculosis, and 
others — which have plagued villagers for genera- 
tions. 

Agiiculture. Philippine agricultural agents, 
whose organization has been patterned after the 
U.S. Agricultural Extension Service, are showing 
farmers how to increase crop yields through the 
use of better farming practices, implements, fer- 
tilizers, and plant varieties, so that food consump- 
tion can be increased. 

Education. New and better schools, established 
with help from such American universities as 
Stanford, Cornell, and the University of MicM- 
gan, under Ica sponsorship, are giving young Fili- 
pinos an opportunity to obtain a better education. 

Industry. In 1955, the rate of new industrial 
development doubled the IDoi rate largely as a 
result of U.S. teclmical assistance and U.S. loans. 



THE CONGRESS 



Proposed Revision of Immigration 
and Nationality Act 

Statement hy Secretary Dulles ^ 

First of all, I wish to affirm my belief that re- 
vision of the Immigration and Nationality Act is 
necessary and desirable in the interests of the 
United States. The present law contains inequi- 
ties and imperfections. I concur wholly with the 
President that it is in our national interest to pro- 
vide for increased immigi-ation to our land and to 
do so under equitable laws. 

Obviously, I do not mean to imply that the pres- 
ent law is all bad. As a matter of fact, the Depart- 
mental officers charged with responsibility for the 
application of this law advise me that, technically, 
it represents a vast improvement over the nu- 
merous statutes which governed prior to its en- 
actment in 1952. 

I believe, however, that much improvement is 
still possible. For that reason, I am here today 
to support the proposals which the President has 
made to the Congress and which are embodied in 
the bills which this subcommittee is considering. 

Many of the items in these bills have to do with 
domestic subjects within the competence of the 
Attorney General. He has discussed the detailed 
provisions of the bills with the subcommittee. I 
desire to support his statement with, however, 
particular emphasis on the foreign policy aspect 
of the legislation. 

There are three principal items in this category 
which I should like to discuss. One is the na- 
tional-origins system of determining quotas. An- 
other is the recommendation to forgive certain 
mortgaged quotas. The third is the proposal 
which would permit the waiving of the finger- 
printing requirement for those who apply for non- 
immigrant visas. 

The President has recommended, in view of our 
expanding economy and high standard of living, 
that we increase our quota immigration by ap- 



'Made before the Subcommittee on Immigration of 
tbe Senate Judiciary Committee on Apr. 25 (press re- 
lease 213). For the President's message on immigration 
legislation, see Bulletin of Feb. 20, 1956, p. 275. 



May 7, 1956 



773 



proxiniatuly Gr),()()() numbei"s to a total of approxi- 
mately 21!) ,000 annually. I fully support the 
President's recommendations in this respect. 

However, my primary concern as Secretary of 
State is that whatever overall quota is adoj^ted 
by the Congress be apportioned equitably. Our 
quota restrictions should not discriminate among 
persons merely on the basis of their national ori- 
gin, nor should the restrictions discriminate un- 
fairly against any of the friendly nations which 
have an interest in common with us in the defense 
of the free world. The present system of deter- 
mining quotas is ofi'ensive on both counts. 

Discrimination Under Present Quota System 

He would, indeed, be bold to the point of reck- 
lessness who would identify any national-origins 
group as unable to contribute to the vigor of our 
society. Yet in actual operation the national- 
origins system denies to many of our citizens privi- 
leges which are accorded to other citizens and, 
in fact, to some resident aliens. For example, any 
American citizen or any resident alien who has a 
brother born in England, or Germany, or Ireland, 
or any country having a current quota, may bring 
his brother to the United States without encotm- 
tering any delay whatsoever. However, under the 
present law, an American citizen who has a brother 
born in Italy, or Spain, or Greece, or the Philip- 
pines, or in any of a score of other countries, may 
not bring his brother to this country as an immi- 
grant except after a waiting period varying from 
many months to many years. In my opinion, the 
national-origins system, which draws a distinction 
between the blood of one person and the blood of 
another, cannot be reconciled with the fundamen- 
tal concepts of our Declaration of Independence 
which, as Abraham Lincoln said, applied not only 
to this country but to all men and meant "that all 
should have an equal chance."' 

It is easy to understand, therefore, the depth of 
the resentment that is felt by many of our own 
citizens who are denied the opportunity to re- 
unite their families in the United States. This 
feeling has its reflection overseas, particularly in 
those countries where many desire to become 
United States citizens, where honorable persons, 
willing and eager to make their home in the United 
States, know that they cannot do so except after 
a wait of many years, while other persons similarly 
situated l)ut living in more fa.vored countries, can 



do so without delay. The impact of this situation 
is felt in our relationships with friendly nations 
every day. It is particularly awkward and diffi- 
cult to explain when, year after year, large num- 
bers of authorized quota numbers go unused and 
yet no relaxation is allowed in the limitations 
placed on immigration from those countries which 
most need our assistance in this regard, and which 
we desire to assist. 

The problem which confronts us, therefore, is 
to find a method of distribution of our quota num- 
bers which is more reasonable than the national- 
origins system. I realize the inherent difficulty 
in fairly apportioning quota numbers under an 
overall ceiling. Traditionally, and as a practical 
matter, this has been and continues to be a sub- 
ject for congressional determination. Therefore, 
I fully support the recommendation that the Con- 
gress immediately appropriate sufficient funds to 
explore thoroughly this entire problem and to de- 
vise a system of quotas which is not tied to the 
discriminatory national-origins concept. 

Interim Measures 

However, I believe that the necessity for the 
alleviation of certain flagrant discriminations con- 
tained in the present system is pressing. I support 
the President's recommendations for interim 
measures which will alleviate as much as possible 
the inequities which the Department of State en- 
counters in applying the provisions of the present 
law. 

I believe that the method by which the President 
has computed, and suggested allocation of, the 
recommended ceiling of 210,000 is fair and reason- 
able. Under the President's proposed temporary 
system, no country will be allocated a smaller 
quota than it has under the present law and the 
inequity which results when large numbers of 
authorized quota numbers go unused will be cor- 
rected by the pooling of the unused numbers on an 
annual regional basis. If this system of pooling 
unused numbers is adopted, the large waiting lists 
of preference applicants, who have a priority that 
is largely theoretical under the present law, can 
be realistically attacked. 

Another feature of the President's proposal on 
which I would comment is the recommendation 
for an allotment of 5,000 quota numbers annually 
to be placed in a special pool, without regard to 
national origins, to fulfill our needs for persons 



I 



774 



Department of State Bulletin 



liaving special skills who may be desirable refugees 
or escapees. The most practical method by which 
this Government is able presently to grant asylum 
to escapees is through the Refugee Eelief Act. 
AVheii that act expires, there will be no special 
method by which this Government can offer asy- 
lum to any of the desirable escapees from behind 
the Iron Curtain. We attach great importance to 
urgent action on this provision. 

Forgiving Certain Mortgaged Quotas 

Another item which the Department strongly 
supports is that recommendation which would 
forgive mortgages placed on certain quotas under 
the terms of previous legislation. It is damaging 
to our foreign relations, for example, that Greece — 
a Nato ally — has one-half of its annual quota of 
308 mortgaged for the next 61 years. 

Fingerprinting Requirement 

Now a few words with respect to the waiver of 
the lingerprinting requirement. Our recommen- 
dation is based primarily on the fact that, in most 
friendly countries in Europe, citizens may not be 
fingerprinted until they have been convicted of a 
criminal offense. The idea, which has recently 
become acceptable in the United States, of the 
desirability of having one's fingerprints on file as 
a means of positive identification in case of a 
disaster, has not caught on outside of this country. 
Because the taking of fingerprints connotes sus- 
picion of criminal activity in many countries, we 
find that in fact we are requiring our friends to 
provide us with a record wliicli their own govern- 
ments require only of convicted criminals. I think 
it is easy to perceive why to many visitors this is 
a distasteful requirement. It would facilitate not 
only the travel of these desirable visitors but the 
fostering of good relations between ourselves and 
friendly populations if the Congress would be 
willing to drop the mandatory aspects of this re- 
quirement which, as the Attorney General said, is 
not necessary to the safety or security of this 
country. 

Incidentally, I might mention that our attitude 
in recommending a provision for waiver is not, by 
any means, based on the intransigence of the 
Soviet Union and its satellites with respect to this 
question. 

I wish to say one final woi-d about the Refugee 
Relief Program. I took great satisfaction last 
week, Mr. Chairman, in announcing the issuance 



of the 100,000th visa under this program. We are 
now issuing visas at a rate of approximately 
2,000 a week, and we can say with conviction tliat 
tlie available allotments of visas for most of the 
countries involved will be used before the act ex- 
I)ires. During tlie early days of the program 
many critics made gloomy predictions that it 
would be a total failure, and indeed the task of ac- 
comjilishment has not been easy. For this reason, 
I am particularly pleased by this tangible evidence 
that the act is being successfully administered to 
acliieve the ends which were intended for it. 

Nevertheless, we are still hampered by certain 
needless difficulties. As you know, the President 
made 10 proposals for amendment of the Refugee 
Relief Act during the last session.^ Other con- 
structive suggestions have since been made. The 
need for amendment becomes greater as the final 
date of the act approaches. I therefore urge in 
the strongest terms that the Congress give im- 
mediate attention to this matter. 



Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 



84th Congress, 2d Session 

Status of Forces Agreements. Hearings before the House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs on H. J. Res. 309 and 
similar measures providing for the revision of the Status 
of Forces Agreement and certain other treaties and in- 
ternational agreements, or the withdrawal of the United 
States from such treaties and agreements, so that 
foreign countries will not have criminal jurisdiction 
over American armed forces personnel stationed within 
their boundaries. Part 2, January 31, February 1 and 2, 
19.")0. 497 pp. 

Cotton Imports, Exports, and Minimum Acreage Allot- 
ments. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Cotton 
of the House Committee on Agriculture on H. R. 8658, 
8659, 8322, and 8703