I
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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ViL 5P
ICIAL
KLY RECORD
FED STATES
EIGN POLICY .
1 ^ ^'S-
/ Rec'd \
INDEX
f JAN 15 W-'^
V B. P. Ly/
VOLUME XXXVIII: Numbers
967-992
Issue
Number Date of Issue
Pages
967
Jan. 6, 1958
I- 44
968
Jan. 13, 1958
45- 80
969
Jan. 20,1958
81- 112
970
Jan. 27,1958
113- 156
971
Feb. 3, 1958
157- 200
972
Feb. 10,1958
201- 240
973
Feb. 17, 1958
241- 280
974
Feb. 24,1958
281- 320
975
Mar. 3, 1958
321- 364
976
Mar. 10, 1958
365- 408
977
Mar. 17, 1958
409- 448
978
Mar. 24, 1958
449- 496
979
Mar. 31, 1958
497- 540
980
Apr. 7, 1958
S41- 588
981
Apr. 14,1958
589- 636
982
Apr. 21, 1958
637- 676
983
Apr. 28,1958
677- 712
984
May 5, 1958
713- 752
985
May 12, 1958
753- 796
986
May 19,1958
797- 846
987
May 26,1958
847- 892
988
June 2, 1958
893- 936
989
June 9, 1958
937- 984
990
June 16, 1958
985-1032
J 991
June 23, 1958
1033-1080
} 992
June 30, 1958
1081-1128
.■^STC;>^
i ; PQBvJC
)
1 ^ili^nAr^
J
Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings — Continued
Scheduled April 1-June 30, 19S&— Continued
Committee (CCIR) : U.S.S.:
ITU International Radio Consultativ
Study Group XI (Television).
GATT Balance-of-Payments Consultations Geneva
June
International Tonnage Measurements Experts: 6th Meeting
UNREF Executive Committee: 8th Session
UNREF Standing Program Subcommittee: 7th Session . . . .
U.N. ECOSOC Technical Assistance Committee
UNESCO Meeting on Standardization of Educational Statistics ,
Hamburg June
Geneva June*
Geneva June*
Geneva June
Paris June
The Law of the Sea
Statement hy Arthur H. Dean
Ohairman, U.S. Delegation, U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea^
As the representative of the United States of
America, it is my pleasure on behalf of my dele-
gation, to extend my Government's congratula-
tions to the chairman,^ vice chairman,^ and rap-
porteur * on their election to their posts on this
important committee and to express our pleasure
at working with such distinguished colleagues.
My delegation wishes also to express its feeling
of appreciation to the able members of the
International Law Commission and its special
rapporteur,^ who have labored so well and
intelligently over the yeare on the articles on
the law of the sea which are now before us.*
In addition, my delegation wishes to thank the
' Made in Committee I on Mar. 11. For an announce-
ment of the U.S. delegation, see Bulletin of Mar. 10,
1958, p. 404 ; for text of U.N. resolution convoking the
conference, see iliid., Jan. 14, 1957, p. 61.
2K. H. Bailey (Australia).
' Sergio Gutierrez Olivos (Chile).
"Vladimir Koretsky (Ukrainian S.S.R.).
" J. P. A. Frangois.
' For text of "articles concerning the law of the sea"
as adopted by the International Law Commission at its
eighth session at Geneva, Switzerland, April 23-July 4,
1956, see U.N. doc. A/3159. The three articles to which
Mr. Dean specifically refers in this statement read as
follows :
Article S
1. The Commission recognizes that international prac-
tice is not uniform as regards the delimitation of the
territorial sea.
2. The Commission considers that international law
does not permit an extension of the territorial sea be-
yond twelve miles.
3. The Commission, without taking any decision as to
the breadth of the territorial sea up to that limit, notes,
on the one hand, that many States have fixed a breadth
greater than three miles and, on the other hand, that
574
many States do not recognize such a breadth when that
of their own territorial sea is less.
4. The Commission considers that the breadth of the
territorial sea should be fixed by an international
conference.
Article 27
The high seas being open to all nations, no State may
validly purport to subject any part of them to its sover-
eignty. Freedom of the high seas comprises, inter alia :
(1) Freedom of navigation ;
(2) Freedom of fishing ;
(3) Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipel
(4) Freedom to fly over the high seas.
Article 66
1. In a zone of the high seas contiguous to its terri-
torial sea, the coastal State may exercise the control
necessary to
(a) Prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal or
sanitary regulations within its territory or territorial sea
(6) Punish infringement of the above regulations com-
mitted within its territory or territorial sea.
2. The contiguous zone may not extend beyond twelvf
miles from the baseline from which the breadth of th(
territorial sea is measured.
It is,
W ij ;
Deii!
^ple o:
Btllls E
kr
h.
members of the secretariat and other experts who
have placed in our hands procedural and sub-
stantive material necessary to a proper considera-
tion of the problems posed by this Conference on
the Law of the Sea.
The world regrets the failure of the Hague
conference of 1930. The United States of
America considers that this conference affords
the nations of the world, large and small, a new
opportunity to bring order out of some of the
chaotic conditions which exist with I'espect to the
law of the sea, as well as to advance the develop-
ment of international law.
In view of the many complex and sometimes
controversial subjects before us, these objectives
can only be achieved by the greatest of good will
and cooperation among all concerned. Indeed,
the law of the sea is of vital concern to all states,
large and small, maritime and noimiaritime,
coastal and landlocked.
It is the purpose of the United States delegation
to do everything it can to assist in our task, and it
welcomes consultation and discussion with other
delegations on all matters of mutual interest.
Mr. Chairman, my delegation considers that two
matters before Committee I are of such impor-
tance as to be the key to the general success of this
conference. They are, first, the breadth of the ter-
ritorial sea and, second, the contiguous zone.
Solutions of the problems implicit in these ar-
ticles 3 and 66 would make the work of this com-
mittee a milestone in the development of interna-
tional law. My delegation believes that with
patience, understanding, and good nature such
agi'eement can be reached.
It is related that Queen Elizabeth of England
said in 1580 : "The use of the sea is common to
all ; neither can a title to the ocean belong to any
people or private persons, forasmuch as neither
nature nor public use permit any possession
thereof." So we who "go down to the sea in ships"
and do business in great waters and see the wonders
.jj ifjri of the Lord in the deep are greatly concerned about
e c»»it» these matters.
For, and I state it merely as a fact, the coast-
lines of the continental United States stretch for
(onfsome 12,000 miles, and the coastlines of Alaska and
he Aleutian Islands, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico
idd many more miles to this figure. Our mer-
hant fleets traverse the seven seas, and our mer-
,e8*li
KptW 7, 7958
chant-fleet tonnage of approximately 23,500,000
tons is about 22 percent of the world figures set
forth in Lloyd's Register as of July 1, 1957. Con-
sequently, our interest in the law of the sea and in
this conference is not a casual one.
Our views are based on historic practice and
experience with rules that have been tested by
time. They have been reached, I hope, in good
spirit, with the voice of reason and with due re-
gard to the sometimes conflicting requirements
of stability and change. They truly represent our
best efforts to reach just and equitable solutions
to common problems.
But we are dealing in some respects with a
mathematical equation. For whatever you add to
an individual state's territorial waters you sub-
tract inevitably from the high seas, the common
property of all, large or small. The law of mathe-
matics is, I am afraid, as binding on new nations
as on old.
Let us examine together a few of our common
problems.
Now, for example, if you lump islands into an
archipelago and utilize a straight baseline system
connecting the outermost points of such islands
and then draw a 12-mile area around the entire
archipelago, you unilaterally attempt to convert
into territorial waters or possibly even internal
waters vast areas of the high seas formerly freely
used for centuries by the ships of all countries.
And, unhappily, you lend encouragement to others
to go and do likewise.
Thus the threat to the free and continued use
of the high seas becomes enormous. And you
can't disguise it by labeling what is essentially re-
strictive, and detrimental to the general welfare,
as being progressive ; or disguise the shackling of
liberty for all by calling it "new thought" or
"realistic development" or "progress" or tlie "new
concepts of new states."
By asking us to be generous and to accept such
restrictions in the freedom of the seas, you ask us
to be generous with other persons' property, held
in common for the benefit of all peoples.
But, just as my delegation is prepared to listen
with understanding and sympathy to the expres-
sion of views of the smallest countries, be tliey
landlocked or nonmaritime, and to their prob-
lems, so too my delegation expresses the hope that
its views and those of other maritime powers
with experience will be received fully and fairly
in the light of their intrinsic merits.
575
Breadth of the Territorial Sea
The position of the United States of America
concerning the breadth of the territorial sea is
determined by its attitude toward the doctrine of
the freedom of the seas. There is no doctrine of
international law more universally recognized
than the principle that the high seas are the com-
mon property of all and that no part of them can
be unilaterally appropriated by any state to its
own use without the concurrence of other states.
In this day of improved methods of transpor-
tation and communication, which have served to
bring countries ever closer together, it is vitally
important that the international highways of the
sea and of the superjacent air should not be
brouglit under the restrictive domination or con-
trol of individual states, however wortliy their
motives. I repeat, any such proposals which
would result in restricting the freedom of the seas
would not be progress but rather retrogression.
We sincerely believe tliat this doctrine, in its
widest implication, is the principle fairest to all,
large and small. Tlie doctrine of the freedom of
the seas is not a mere historical relic of the so-
called time when maritime law was developed by
the great powers.
There have been suggestions here that the in-
terests of small and large states in these matters
are different.
The history of the United States and of the
3-mile limit is a living refutation of such sug-
gestions.
Almost from the day of its emergence from
colonial status into independent statehood, the
United States of America has stood for freedom
of the seas. In notes drafted by Thomas Jeffer-
son in 1793 in his capacity as Secretary of State
in the course of "friendly conferences and expla-
nations with other powers," and basing his de-
cisions in part on treaties already entered into, he
announced that the United States was for a 3-
mile limit of territorial sea.
It was important to the United States as a
newly emerged country of approximately
3,900,000 people to be assured of freedom for its
ships and its nationals on the high seas. And it
has fought to maintain that freedom. Freedom
is important to all, perhaps of even greater im-
portance to the small state than to the large. This
is no less true of freedom of the seas than of any
other freedom.
We are grateful to the distinguished delegate of
Peru for noting my country's consistent advocacy
of this principle through all stages of our histori-
cal development.
Of the many states which presently adhere to
the 3-mile rule and have done so in the past, there
are many small states. Indeed, the doctrine was
born of the desire of a small state for equal rights
on the high seas.
Let us examine briefly some of the benefits which
are our common heritage in the high seas, since
our decisions here may affect these priceless
benefits. For purposes of illustration only, this
preliminary discussion is limited to but three of
the freedoms of the high seas declared in article 27
of the ILC draft.
Navigation
The freedom of navigation on the high seas
means the essential liberty of maritime transpor-
tation and communication unfettered by the re-
quirement of consent by any foreign state. And
the bridge of understanding which this creates be-
tween us was eloquently noted here by the dis-
tinguished delegate of Sweden.
To this freedom, sturdy fishing communities
owe their livelihood. To this freedom many of us
owe our economic strength and our opportunity
in other fields.
The merchant fleets of the world represent not
only profit to commercial interests but the only
means by which the essentials of life can be trans-
ported readily to countries where there is a mar-
ket. For the most precious commodity is of little
value if there is no market for it where it is
found. It must be transported as cheaply as pos-
sible to its buyer. Thus, freedom of the high seas
is as important to the seller or producer as to the
buyer.
Ship bottoms have carried food, clothes, med-
icine, and indeed the very means of national sur-
vival to virtually every country here represented.
Now the question before us is, which breadth
gives the maximum fi'eedom of navigation of tlie
high seas in keeping with the ever-increasing sea
communications of the modern-day world^ — a
3-mile-limit territorial sea or a wider breadth?
It is idle to assert that because of the existence]
of the right of innocent passage freedom of navi
gation does not suffer by an extension of th(
territorial sea.
576
Department of Slate BuUet'ir,
The United States of America attaches the
utmost importance to this historic right and be-
lieves that an unequivocal declaration should be
made in our articles thereon. The right of inno-
cent passage in territorial waters, however, is itself
a recognition of the fact that freedom of naviga-
tion is restricted by the existence of a territorial
sea under state sovereignty. And the doctrine of
innocent passage is an effort to alleviate that
situation.
If, as some say, the peaceful passage of foreign
vessels through their territorial waters is guaran-
teed as long and insofar as it is not contrary to
the sovereignty or harmful to the security of the
coastal state, isn't there only a restricted right of
innocent passage?
I submit that this extension of territorial waters
to greater limits with this qualification as to the
right of innocent passage is not equivalent to the
right previously existing on the high seas.
Does this movement to wider breadth for the
territorial sea, with consequent encroachment upon
the high seas, represent progress? Isn't keeping
the high seas as large an ai-ea as possible in the
interests of all people — res communis, as Grotius
termed it — just as desirable a goal as it was when
Grotius first advocated it in 1609 ?
For those vessels which seek to avoid contact
with the territorial sea for reasons of their own
or because such contact may be forbidden by the
coastal state, the difficulties and uncertainties of
navigation and piloting increase geometrically
with extensions of the territorial sea beyond 3
miles.
Let us pause to examine a few hard facts com-
mon to us all that must be encountered if the
territorial seas were extended to, say, 12 miles.
Many landmarks, for instance, employed in vis-
ual piloting still necessary for small craft of all
states are just not visible at a range of 12 miles.
Indeed, it is estimated that only 20 percent of the
world's lighthouses have a range of 12 miles or
more.
We are greatly concerned that this conference
sliould not impose this pall of darkness and its
frightening possibilities on small craft.
Moreover, radar navigation at 12 miles and be-
yond is of only marginal utility in most instances.
This is so because many objects normally used for
radar navigation are unidentifiable at such dis-
"'"' April 7, J 958
tance. Further, it would be impossible for many
small boats such as fishing boats to anchor at
deptlis noi'mally found outside a 12-mile limit, as
they could not carry sufficient cable or appropriate
anchors.
Tlius, safety of navigation is greatest witli a
3-mile limit.
Efforts by merchant ships to avoid violating the
coastal states' regulations in extended territorial
waters will inevitably lead to longer, less economi-
cal runs and to increased shipping costs, less rev-
enues to the producers of the products carried, and
higher prices to the consumer. Economic dislo-
cations and substitution of products are inevitable.
These considerations are not to be lightly dis-
missed. As such difficulties materialize, the in-
creased shippers' costs will inevitably be borne by
the countries dependent upon seaborne commerce
for their economic existence.
In addition, any extension of the breadth of the
territorial sea would impose a burden on the coastal
state to patrol effectively the larger area. This
burden would carry with it an increase in the fiscal
expenditures of tlie coastal state stemming from
an increased workload, in both merchant-marine
safety and law enforcement.
For example, the United States estimates an ap-
proximate initial capital outlay of $8,000,000 and
an increase in annual operating cost of $1,500,000
per each hundred miles of coast, in the case of an
extension of the territorial sea from 3 to 12 miles,
or an increase of annual expenditure of some $180,-
000,000 for our continental coastlines alone. These
figures to me are somewhat appalling.
While on the matter of costs, I wonder how many
other nations have made estimates of their own as
to what it would cost to extend navigational aids
such as buoys, gongs, whistles, fog signals, groan-
ers, channel markers, and the like to 12 miles and
to change the necessary charts and piloting man-
uals which mariners must have on board when at
sea. The figures would be very interesting. We
would like to see them.
I submit, any failure by a state to exercise effec-
tive control over an area to which it has laid claim
would risk the incurrence of international embar-
rassment to the state asserting the claim. Sporadic
attempts at enforcement would have only the un-
desirable result of increasing international tension
and perhaps in decisions unfavorable to the coastal
state.
577
Now I realize there are certain facile attractions
for a state neutral in time of war in having the
right to extend the territorial seas to a 12-mile
limit. However, in the unhappy event of a future
conflict, which God forbid, neutrality and the in-
ternational law pertinent thereto will be matters
which may have to be taken into account.
Now, of course, if it could safely be assumed that
all contending belligerents would respect the ter-
ritorial sea of a neutral, the possibility of hostile
incursions into neutral coastal areas would be ma-
terially lessened. But I think, rather, the possi-
bility, at least, cannot be excluded that certain bel-
ligerents in any future war would be even less in-
clined to accord complete respect to a 12-mile
coastal belt of neutral waters than to a 3-mile
zone — particularly in view of the probable inabil-
ity of the neutral to control the broader belt.
The problem of the neutral with a 12-mile ter-
ritorial sea in maintaining its neutrality is fur-
ther demonstrated by the greatly increased ocean
areas which would have to be patrolled to insure
the inviolability of its sovereignty.
The possible attractiveness of neutral waters to
a belligerent may be easily demonstrated. For
reasons of its own safety a submarine will seldom
attempt to operate within 3 miles of shore. The
hazards to a submerged submarine are usually
lessened materially as the distance from shore in-
creases.
Thus, a belligerent submarine would look upon
a neutral with a broad territorial sea as olfering a
particularly attractive haven if she were hard
pressed by antisubmarine aircraft or surface ves-
sels of the enemy operating on the high seas which
could not legally enter such ten-itorial sea. Fur-
ther, other combatant types might be enticed to
enter the territorial waters of a neutral hoping to
find a safe refuge from pursuit by enemy forces.
There is another factor which would seiwe to
lure belligerent vessels within 12 miles of a neutral
coast. For reasons already discussed, navigation
at a distance of 12 miles from shore is less exact
and almost impossible in case of fog. Captains
and masters are accordingly strongly disposed to
navigate at a distance less than 12 miles from
charted navigational objects on shore.
In view of all of these considerations, violation
of the neutrality of a state with a 12-mile terri-
torial sea in time of international conflict would
appear to be increased rather than otherwise.
578
Fishing
I turn now to the second of the freedoms I shall
discuss.
Coastal states almost imiversally deny to na-
tionals of other states the right to fish in their ter-
ritorial sea. If that territorial sea is extended and
the high seas thereby diminished, a great and in-
expensive source of food in that area is thereby
denied to other people in the world. And this
would occur at a time when population figures
are mounting at an ever-increasing rate.
It is estimated that a general extension of the
territorial sea by 1 mile reduces the area of the
high seas, where freedom of fishing and other
freedoms exist, by an estimated 280,000 square
miles. Likewise, it is estimated that a general ex-
tension of the territorial sea by an additional 9
miles would reduce the area of the high seas by
2,500,000 square miles, an area roughly equal to
the size of the United States of America.
I would suggest that expressing this reduction
in terms of percentage is most misleading, as a
mile near the coast both from a navigational and
fishing standpoint is far more important relatively
than a greater number of miles on the high seas.
Further, a large percentage of the world's catch
of fish is taken off or near coasts, reefs, shelves,
shoals, or banks. For example, approximately
56.7 percent of the fish caught off the United States
coast are caught within a breadth of 3 miles.
Now, unilateral extensions of the territorial sea
in general or in specific areas violate the existing
rights of all other states. Of this there can be no
doubt.
Only recently, an example of this was provided
in the Far East, where by the drawing of an arbi-
trary line 115 miles long enclosing thousands of
square miles of sea and the assertion of a 12-mile
territorial sea beyond that line, an area tradition-
ally open to all states, large and small, was sud-
denly claimed by unilateral act of the coastal state
to be mare claiisum and off limits to all other]
peoples, some of whom had traditionally sought!
their means of living in the area.
So far as I am informed no other country in thel
world asserts exclusive right to a so-called bay!
with a mouth of this size.
My Government has filed formal protests to this
declaration.^
JuiXETiN of Mar. 24, 1958, p. 461.
Department of State Bulletin
I have already adverted to the situation created
by the Indonesian dechiration of December 1957.
Obviously if in the name of progress we were
to consider that the 3-mile limit is obsolete, just
where would the matter stop if each state were free
to suit its own economic or alleged security in-
terests? The free seas would soon look like a
patchwork quilt with "no trespassing" signs
posted in all directions to bewilder the poor
Air Navigation
I now want to discuss the third freedom of the
seas.
The freedom to fly over the high seas of the
world, which belongs to all peoples and states
alike, is denied entirely in the airspace over the
territorial sea unless the coastal state gives its con-
sent. The vital importance of the right of over-
flight is spotlighted in the airspace over interna-
tional straits in accordance with the Convention
on International Civil Aviation of December 7,
1944, which became effective as to 73 states on
April 4, 1947.
Let me point out — there is no right of innocent
passage for aircraft over territorial seas as distinct
from the right of innocent passage for vessels
through such seas. Thus any extension of the
territorial sea beyond 3 miles will result pro tanto
in diminishing freedom of flight.
The effect of this in straits and other narrow
seas might well be pondered closely by looking at
an atlas of the world. I suggest that you take a
pair of dividers and measure the distance across
the Straits of Gibraltar north and south. If you
extend territorial waters to 6 miles each way,
there is no area of high seas remaining. Or I sug-
gest you try extending various coastlines all over
the world in each direction by 6 or 12 miles and
I .jjj|draw comparable lines accordingly around islands
jujior, if you choose, archipelagos, and see what you
,|j(Ihave done to the freedom of the high seas, the
"'ght to overfly and the right to fish.
As the distinguished delegate from Greece so
learly pointed out, an extension of his counti-y's
;erritorial sea to 12 miles would be equivalent to
Josing the Aegean Sea.
These are hard, cold facts which must be ex-
imined by new states as well as the so-called great
DOwers.
the V
- Inght
itotliii
,„lle,i, Ipri/ 7, 7958
Now, sir, and distinguished delegates of nations
new and old, we are still governed by the physical
facts of the universe. The number of feet in a
nautical mile and the parallels of latitude and
meridians of longitude are fixed. And as for the
bi-eadth of 3 miles for territorial sea being obsolete
because of the doctrine of hot pursuit, that doc-
trine, I submit, is just as relevant to a 12-mile as
to a 3-mile zone. It all depends on where the
pursuit starts.
I have mentioned but a few of the benefits which
the freedom of the high seas bestows on all states.
Let us consider carefully chart by chart, strait
by strait, and island by island any proposal to set
in motion or accelerate the erosion of these free-
doms for some supposed temporary or local
benefit.
Let us also not lose sight of the fact that rights
create obligations and an increase in territorial
limitations is no exception. For there can be only
loss of national prestige for a state which provides
inadequately for the needs and safety of interna-
tional navigation in its territorial waters or is
unable to assert full sovereign control over a wide
territorial sea.
Finally, a word to those states advocating the
permissibility of a state setting the breadth of its
territorial sea from 3 to 12 miles according to
its own opinion as to its own needs.
This position in the opinion of my delegation is
exactly equivalent to a vote for 12 miles. Indeed,
it is, I think, a myth to say that the adoption of
article 3, subdivision 2, of the ILC draft gives
nations flexibility up to 12 miles, because it is
i-eadily apparent, I believe, that the maximum in-
evitably would tend to become the minimum.
Because navigators must not only know where
they are but where they have a right to go and
what they can do, I submit it is not plausible to
expect that states which respect the equal rights
of others to the high seas up to 3 miles from their
shores will long suffer being barred from a sea
area adjacent to the shores of others four times
that wide. Increase may breed increase and re-
striction restriction, and the chain reaction thus
set in motion will result in the maximum claim by
all.
Moreover, as there is neither logic nor tradition
in a 12-mile limit, what reason is there to expect
temiination there? Carried to its logical con-
clusion such course of action will run its due
579
course, and the freedom of the high seas, so valu-
able to us all and especially to the small countries,
will vanish — and be gone with the wind.
In sucli a situation, isn't it at least possible to
speculate that those with large economic re-
sources may be able to fend for themselves better
than the small ?
Legal Case for the Three-Mile Limit
The legal case for the S-mile or 1-marine-
league limit has been cogently set forth here by
the distinguished delegates of a number of other
states, including the distinguished delegates of
France, Great Britain, Greece, the Netherlands,
and Jajjan, a number of whom have made refer-
ence to the decision of the International Court of
Justice in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case,^
to the effect that the validity of the delimitation
of the territorial sea with respect to other states
is determined by international law although inter-
national law must, of course, be implemented by
municipal legislation. It is the view of my
Government, without elaboration or citation of
authorities or making an extended legal argu-
ment at this time, that the 3-mile rule is estab-
lislied international law; that it is the only
breadth of territorial watcre on which there
has ever been anything like common agreement ;
and that unilateral acts of states claiming greater
territorial seas are not only not sanctioned by any
principle of international law but are indeed in
conflict with the universally accepted principle
of the freedom of the seas.
There is universal agreement that each state is
entitled to a territorial sea of a breadth of 3 miles,
or 1 marine league. But this cannot be said of any
claim to a greater breadth, each of which claims
has been protested by many states. This fact
was recognized in the report of the International
Law Commission covering the work of its seventh
session wlien it stated that "international law does
not require states to recognize a breadth [of terri-
torial sea] beyond three miles." "
The United States regards this to be the true
legal situation. Further, it considers that there is
no obligation on the part of states adhering to the
I.C.J. Report, Dec. 18, 1951, pp. 116, 132.
' U.N. doc. A/2934, p. 16.
3-mile rule to recognize claims on the part of other
states to a greater breadth of territorial sea.
Since the right of states to a 3-mile territorial
sea is imiversally recognized, and since in its view
the greatest freedom of tlie seas is in the interest
of all states, large and small, the delegation of the
United States of America proposes that article 3
of the ILC draft be changed to an unequivocal
declaration of restraint tliat the breadth of the ter-
ritorial sea shall not exceed 3 miles or 1 marine
league.
Other Articles Concerning the Limitation of the
Territorial Sea and Innocent Passage
The delegation of the United States of America
is in substantial agreement with most of the other
articles of the ILC draft relating to the delimita-
tion of the ten-itorial sea and the riglit of iimocent
passage.
We will have certain modifications, drafting
changes, and amendments to suggest at the proper
time in the interests of clarity and in consonance
with achieving the greatest freedom of the seas
for all of us. But we will submit them in the
hope of being helpful and cooperative in our
efforts here.
"VVe shall make a further statement in Commit-
tee II with respect to the articles of the ILC draft
referred to that committee.
Contiguous Zone
I said at the start of this statement that the
United States of America attached the utmost im-
portance to article 66 relating to the contiguous
zone.
My Government is not unmindful of and, in-
deed, is highly sympathetic with the problems
which concern a large number of the coastal states
and which have led them in the past to certain
unilateral actions in high-seas areas for the pri-
mary purpose of conservation of tlie fish stocks off
tlieir coasts.
We submit that these needs, which have been so
eloquently expressed by some of our friends from
Latin America, may be fully and adequately met
by means other than through extensions of the
territorial sea, which extensions violate the rights
and freedoms of all countries. We are prepared
to be helpful in working out a constinictive
solution.
Department of State Bulletin
iltarwe!
mi
tiiiifd i
"tferfiif,
i'oir tli
^it add
It is to take care of the legitimate needs of many
countries that the United States attaches deep sig-
nificance to article 66 and also to the articles on
fisheiy conservation which are under the jurisdic-
tion of the Third Committee.
We also attach significance to the problem of
the continental shelf, wliich is under the juris-
diction of the Fourth Committee, and to the
problems of landlocked countries, under the juris-
diction of the Fifth Committee, and shall make
appropriate statements in each of these several
committees.
It is the belief of the United States tliat these
rules set down by the International Law Com-
mission may be molded to give full and sufficient
remedy to the genuine needs and to make possible
a more fruitful exploitation of the resources of the
sea for the benefit of all mankind.
We sincerely trust tliat this conference will not
prove what Victor Hugo said about the sea in his
famous novel Ninety-three^ book II, chapter 7 :
The sea never tells what it means to do. There is
everything in this abyss, even chicanery. One might al-
most say that the sea had designs ; it advances and re-
treats, it proposes and retracts, it prepares a squall and
then gives up its plan, it promises destruction and does
not keep its word. It threatens the North, and .striljes
the South.
No, indeed.
Testing of Nuclear Weapons on High Seas
tl)j Now let me turn for just a moment to another
jjjj. problem. Since the problem of the testing of nu-
slear weapons on tlie high seas has been raised
in the debate in this committee, as well as in other
lommittees, I should like vei-y briefly to clarify the
United States position on this matter at this
!onference.
Now the real danger to the world lies in the
)ossible use of nuclear weapons and not in some
light addition to the natural forces of radio-
ctivity. While the United States of America con-
lucts its tests in a manner recognized as being con-
onant with international law, it should also be
bundantly clear to this conference that we have
epeatedly offered to enter into arrangements em-
odying meaningful and effective measures for the
antrol of nuclear weajDons.
Unfortunately no agreement has yet been
jached which would make this possible.
lieenso
Ijfrom
ely Bie'
;oftl"
iri/ 7, 1958
Because of its paramount importance to all
mankind, this subject should continue to be dealt
with in the established United Nations organs cre-
ated specifically to deal with the problems of
weapons control.
We must all hope that further negotiations on
disarmament, of which the nuclear testing prob-
lem is but one element, will produce satisfactory
results in the interests of humanity. But in line,
I trust, with tlie position the distinguished repre-
sentative of India tentatively indicated here the
other day, I question whether we are a proper
body to intervene in this negotiating process.
We are experts assembled here to undertake a
task which is great enough in its scope to tax all
our resources. We should not, I submit, compli-
cate the delicate work of other agencies in the field
of disarmament by the intrusion of our pro-
nouncements and in effect prejudice our work of
attempting to codify the law of the sea by em-
barking on an undertaking with such enormous
implications.
So, in conclusion, permit me to say that we look
forward to working with you, sir, and with you,
the distinguished delegates of the conference, in
a spirit of helpful and cooperative enterprise so
that we may make a real and fruitful contribu-
tion to the development of international law.
Tliank you.
U.S. Questions Continuing Prosecution
of Hungarian Patriots
FoUowing is an exchange of correspondence ie-
tiveen the U.S. Mission to the United Nations and
the Hungarian Mission to the United Nations, to-
gether tvith a U.S. statement of March IS, con-
cerning the continuing prosecution of persons who
participated in the Hungarian up-rising of October
and Novcmier 1956.
U.S. Letter of February 11
Dear Mr. Ambassador: It has no doubt been
evident to your Mission from the debates and dis-
cussions which have taken place during the Sec-
ond Emergency Special Session and the Eleventh
and Twelfth Sessions of the General Assembly
that current developments in Hungary are being
followed with deep concern throughout the world.
Information which has been made known through
581
oiScial Hungarian news media concerning the con-
tinning prosecution of persons who participated
in the popular uprising of October and November
1956 has occasioned widespread anxiety. It had
been hoped that the Hungarian authorities would
heed the repeated calls by the United Nations for
a cessation of repi'essive measures against the
Hungarian people and implement an amnesty
which would make normal life possible for those
who are being held or who are threatened with
possible arrest for having supported what was
clearly a national manifestation. Such a hope
now appeai-s illusory in the light of the unequivo-
cal statement of Mr. [Premier Janos] Kadar be-
fore the Hungarian Parliament on January 27,
1958, rejecting any thouglit of sucli an amnesty.
Under these circumstances persistent reports of
further unannounced trials, imprisonments, and
executions inevitably gain credence.
On December 17, 1957, your Mission issued a
press release in which it stated that if the United
States Representative were "really interested in
ascertaining what was happening in Hungary", he
had "tlie opportunity to ask for authentic infor-
mation through the proper channels". In view of
the worldwide concern over the situation in Hun-
gary—a concern whicli is shared by the Ameri-
can people — I have decided to take advantage of
this suggestion and ask you the following
questions.
1. Wliat are the present circumstances of Major
General Pal Maleter, Major General Istvan Ko-
vacs and Colonel Miklos Szucs, all of whom were
members of the Plungarian Delegation appointed
by the Hungarian Government in November 1956
to negotiate with a Soviet Delegation on the ques-
tion of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from
Hungai"y ?
2. "What are the present circumstances of the
following individuals and their families who,
upon relinquishing asylum in the Yugoslav Em-
bassy in Budapest, were apprehended by Soviet
military authorities : Imre Nagy, Geza Losonczy,
Zoltan Szanto, Ferenc Donath, I. [Gabor] Tanc-
zos, Sandor Haraszti, Ferenc Janosi, Gyorgy
Fazekas, Jozsef Szilagyi, Peter Erdos, Zoltan Vas,
Julia Eajk, Ferenc Nador, Szilard Ujhelyi and
Miklos Vasarhelyi ?
3. "What are the present circumstances of San-
dor Kopacsi, formerly chief of the Budapest
Police?
4. "Wliat are the present circumstances of Dom-
inik Kosary, a former professor of history at
Budapest University who is well known in the
United States through his history of Hungary
which was published here ?
5. What are the present circumstances of Istvan
Bibo, Minister of State in the Hungarian Gov-
ernment announced November 3, 1956 ?
These questions pertain only to a small number
of individuals whose fate is being followed with
particular interest because of their prominence or
the circumstances connected with their disappear-
ance from public life. It is my sincere belief,
however, that a forthright and full reply to these
questions would help not only to clarify the cur-
rent situation in Hungary but also to afford mil-
lions of interested people throughout the world
a clearer understanding of the present intentions
of the Hungarian authorities.
Sincerely yours,
James J. Wadsworth
Acting United States Representative
to the United Nations
Hungarian Letter of February 17
Dear Mk. Ambassador : I have the honour to acknowl-
edge the receipt of your letter of February 11, 1958.
Please let me assure you that I will, at the earliest pos-
sible date, forward it to the Hungarian authorities hav-
ing competence in the matter.
Sincerely yours,
Peter Mod
Permanent Representative
U.S. Letter of March 6
Dear ]\Ir. Ambassador : You will recall that on
February 11, 1958, the Acting United States Eep- ,
resentative to the United Nations addressed a
letter to you as Permanent Eepresentative of
Hungary to the United Nations in which a number
of questions were raised concerning the present
circumstances of certain prominent Hungarians,
and that you acknowledged receipt of this letter
on February 17, 1958. The United States Mission
has as yet received no reply to this inquiry. I
would like therefore to take this occasion to ex-
press again my earnest hope that a reply will be
forthcoming in the near future.
Sincerely yours,
Henrt Cabot Lodge
United States Representative
to the United Nations
Department of State Bulletin
Hungarian Letter of March 13
Dear Mr. Ambassador : With reference to the letters of
February 11 and March G, 1958 of the United States
Mission I should lllse to express to you the willingness
of the Permanent Mission of the Hungarian People's
Ifjj Republic to co-operate with your Mission in every ques-
tion that might improve the relations between our coun-
tries and advance the great cause of mankind. In your
letter of February 11 I have recognized your endeavour
correct the mistalje made in the statement of .your
delegation at the XII session of the General Assembly
of the United Nations, to which alludes the quotation
in your letter from our press release of December 17,
19."i7. It is to be regretted, however, that this Intention
cannot reassert itself in your letter.
Firstly, the letter contains such prejudiced statements,
in presence of which no constructive exchange of views
can be conducted with anyone.
Secondly, yoii fail to take note of the fact that by mak-
ing use in a distorted way of the questions involved,
your Mission already tried to incite hostile public senti-
ment against Hungary on the basis of rumours which
t had not previously controlled. This mistake naturally
cannot be considered as cancelled in view of subsequent
inquiry.
Thirdly, the wording of your questions makes the
appearance as if you and your Mission wanted to inter-
fere in the domestic affairs of Hungary. My Mission can-
not co-operate in confirming such an appearance.
Let me assure you again that the Hungarian Mission
will always be prepared to co-operate with the United
States, with your Mission, in every question that leads
us nearer to an easing of tension and strengthening of
peace.
Sincerely yours,
Peter Mod
Permanent Representative
U.S. Statement of March 15
D.S./D.N. press release 2888
This latest letter from the Hungarian repre-
sentative is an obvious attempt to evade an answer
to our specific questions. In our letter of Febru-
ary 11 we asked about the present circumstances
of prominent Hungarians who were named in our
letter. We asked about tliem because they had
disappeared from public view and this has caused
widespread concern.
Our inquiry was invited by the Hungarian Mis-
sion itself. Yet the Hungarian authorities have
refused to answer it.
This refusal recalls earlier actions by tlie same
regime: their refusal to permit the United Na-
tions Special Committee to enter Hungary to
carry out the mandate given to it by the General
Assembly ; their refusal to cooperate with the As-
April 7, 1958
serably's Special Representative, Prince Wan of
Thailand; and their refusal to accept the letter
whicli the Special Committee addressed to tlieir
United Nations Mission last December. In every
case their i-ef usal has demonstrated that they have
something to hide about the situation in Hungary.
World opinion has recognized as just the as-
pirations of the Hungarian people to regain their
independence. This new reply by the Hungarian
Mission to our letters will only increase the anx-
iety of world opinion about what is going on in
Hungary.
U.S.-Euratom Discussions
Press release 135 dated March 19
A joint U.S.-European Atomic Energy Com-
munity (EUR ATOM) working party will con-
vene at Luxembourg on March 20 with instruc-
tions to pay special attention to the possibility of
initiating at an early date a joint program for
the development of full-scale prototype power re-
actors. Tlie U.S. delegation includes Depart-
ment of State and Atomic Energy Commission
officials. This meeting, which will continue to
April 3, is a prelude to the visit of Louis Armand,
President of EURATOM, to the United States
tliis spring^ to discuss the possibilities of close
cooperation between tlie U.S. Government and the
European Atomic Energy Community in the fields
in which EURATOM will be engaged in order
to develop the peaceful uses of atomic energy.
Ambassador W. Walton Butterworth, U.S.
Representative to the European Atomic Energy
Community, will head the U.S. group, while Max
Kohnstamm, Special Assistant to the EURATOM
President, will head the European group.
The Atomic Energy Commission representa-
tives will include R. W. Cook, Deputy General
Manager; A. J. Vander Weyden, Deputy Di-
rector, Division of International Affairs; Paul C.
Fine, Director, Office of Operations Analysis and
Plaiming; Frank K. Pittman, Director, Office of
Industrial Development; Louis Roddis, Deputy
Director, Reactor Development; Nelson F. Siev-
ering, Jr., Assistant to Director, Division of Re-
actor Development ; Edwin E. Ferguson, Deputy
General Counsel; Harold D. Bengelsdorf, Euro-
pean Branch, Division of International Affairs;
For background, see Bulletin of Mar. 17, 19.58, p.
and Amasa Bishop, AEC Scientific Representa-
tive in Paris.
Eepresentatives from the Department of State
will he J. Robert Schaetzel, Office of Special As-
sistant to the Secretary for Atomic Energy ; Stan-
ley D. Metzger, Deputy Legal Adviser; Stanley
Cleveland, Office of European Regional Affairs;
Mortimer J. Goldstein, Assistant Chief, Interna-
tional Finance Division; and Louis Boochever,
U.S. ISIission to the European Conmiunities.
U.S. Proposes Broadening
UNICEF Aid to Child Welfare
Statement by Katherine Oettinger '
UNICEF aid is at the present time directed
almost exclusively toward improving the health
of mothers and children. This is so because of the
enormous toll which disease and malnutrition take
in lives of mothers and children in many parts of
the world. There are, however, many social and
environmental factors that adversely affect chil-
dren and which contribute directly or indirectly
to their physical and mental ill health. In its aid
to commmiity development UNICEF has shown
its understanding of the broad meaning of the
term "child welfare." Might it not, however, be
appropriate to consider ways in which UNICEF
programs could be extended more directly in the
area of social services for children ?
One area for which aid is urgently needed and
which seems highly appropriate for LTNICEF
assistance is that of children living wholly or in
part away from their own homes. I refer to
children in residential institutions or who spend
their days in day-care centers while their mothers
work.
Throughout the world at least several million
children are deprived of normal home life and are
living in institutions. Some are homeless children
whose parents are dead, have deserted, or are
unable to provide care. The most universal
method of care for children outside their own
home is in congregate or specialized residential
institutions. Such institutions exist to some ex-
tent in most countries.
' Made before the Executive Board of the U.N. Chil-
dren's Fund on Mar. 6 (U.S./U.N. press release 2879).
Mrs. Oettinger is the U.S. Representative on the Execu-
tive Board.
584
Rapid urbanization is a worldwide phenomenon,
and experience in many j^arts of the world, even
the least advanced, indicates this usually results
in significant increases in the numbers of children
for whom some form of care outside their own
family circles has to be provided.
In the UNICEF-aided countries, in the im-
mediate future, it can be anticipated that the need
for such care will be increasing, and this type of
care will be the only practical method of meeting
such need.
In addition, many infants and preschool chil
dren of working mothers are being cared for in
day-nursery and creche programs in countries ex-
periencing industrialization or otherwise needing
the labor of women.
In crowded cities the growing employment of
women increases the need for such services. The
longstanding problem of care of children while
mothers work in the fields remains. In some
established maternal and child-welfare centers
there is a begimiing use of day-care centers as an
opportunity to train mothers and at the same time
improve the environment by providing better nu-
trition and other care for children.
The kind of care these children get varies tre-
mendously in both types of services. In some
institutions children leceive excellent physical
and emotional care, family ties are preserved for
them, and they have opportunity to share in com-
munity life. Others are housed and fed for many
years without regard for their social and emo-
tional needs, especially in preparing them to re-
sume life in the community. And still others are
confined in unhygienic quarters where they are
subject to exposure to contagious diseases which
take a heavy toll of life, or they are inadequately
fed and cared for so that their growth and de-
velopment are impeded.
The dangers to physical and mental healtli are
known to be veiy great for children living in
institutions, particularly for long periods of time.
In some countries an effort is made ta develop
adoption and foster-family care for younger chil-
dren, but in many countries institutional care will
be the only means of providing for dependent and
neglected children for many years. To quote*
from the U.N. document The Institutional Care
of Children:^
U.N. doc. ST/SOA/31 dated August 1956.
Department of State Bulletin
piim.
iflliOil 1
lersof
lociaU
paMS
hwa'
Tkl'i
nioJife
iKle(|ti;v
emotioi
hoiifli
ml*
life as;
Tie
wjiiet
eridenc
inimpi
ininav
monni
nmuki
tempt I
graiips.
Won
ffientini
jsistai
in piisl
miflit,
liti «!
tttkic;
uarilj
Wl
and p'ni
iiwH
Mvi
Mtliori;
kh
Ttlopin;
fcrclii
Wers,
fflfip,
daonst
%of
nwitij;
H
Iprri
Oftiilr];
niijp'^.
hi I
. . in many countries where poverty is still a major
problem, and where rapid industrialization and urban-
ization are altering the family structure, growing num-
bers of children in need of care may come to the
attention of the community. In these instances, where
social services ou the whole are at an early stage of
development, the establishment of institutional care pro-
no- grammes for children is likely to increase in the near
future as the most practical immediate method of action.
while in
UlleW
There are many way;? institutional care can be
modified and improved so that it provides more
adequately for children's physical, mental, and
emotional needs, so that some of the benefits of
home life can be preserved, and so that the child
can be better prepared to enter into community
eediiig life as an adult.
The report referred to above, prepared at tlie
request of the Social Commission, provides ample
evidence of the interest of a number of countries
improving the quality of care cliildren receive
in institutions. It points out the major and com-
mon need for better trained staff and cites a
umber of trends in programs, such as tlie at-
tempt to care for children in small, family-like
groups.
Would it not now be possible to consider imple-
tre- menting some international action to give some
assistance to countries wishing and needing help
in pushing forward in this area? UNICEF
might, in some cases, be in a position to assist
with equipment, supplies, and training, but the
ij teclmical skill for developing a program lies pri-
marily in the Bureau of Social Affairs. The
World Health Organization, through its maternal
and child-health staffs, would also have technical
advice to contribute.
My suggestion is, thei-efore, that the Board
authorize the administration to seek the help of
the Bureau of Social Affairs and WHO in de-
veloping a possible program of UNICEF aid
for children in institutions and in day-care
centers. Such a program should be started ou
an experimental basis, using pilot projects to
demonstrate the value of such aid and to try out
ways of providing it effectively. By the March
meeting of 1959, I would hope the Board could
have before it a plan for consideration on a policy
level.
A program of aid in institutional and day care
of children should be looked on as only a begin-
ning phase in a broader program of child welfare
or social services for children. Ultimately, I
hope, UNICEF can develop a comprehensive
policy of appropriate aid in this area. Tliis
broader goal should be kept in mind during the
study of ways for developing this segment for
improving the conditions under which children
live and grow.
Mrs. Oettinger and Mrs. Taubman
To Represent U.S. on UNICEF Board
The Wliite House amiomiced on February 28
that the President had on that day appointed
Katherine Brownell Oettinger, Chief of the Chil-
dren's Bureau, Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare, to be representative of the United
States on the Executive Board of the United Na-
tions Children's Fund.
On the same day the President appointed Eliza-
beth Clare Taubman to be alternate representative
of the United States on the Executive Board of
the U.N. Children's Fund.
Current U.N. Documents
A Selected Bibliography^
Security Council
Letter Dated 13 February 1958 from the Permanent
Representative of Tunisia to the President of the
Security Council. S/3952, February 13, 1958. 3 pp.
mimeo.
Letter Dated 14 February 1958 from the Permanent
Representative of France to the President of the Se-
curity Council. S/3954, February 14, 1958. 3 pp.
mimeo.
Letter Dated 14 February 1958 from the Representative
of Israel Addressed to the President of the Security
Council. S/3955, February 14, 1958. 1 p. mimeo.
Letter Dated 17 February 1958 from the Permanent
Representative of Tunisia Addressed to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations for the Attention of
the President of the Security Council. S/3957, Febru-
ary 17, 1958. 2 pp. mimeo.
Trusteeship Council
Examination of the Annual Report on the Administration
of the Trust Territory of Tanganyika. Supplementary
information submitted by the Administering Authority.
T/1349, January 21, 1958. 10 pp. mimeo.
Examination of the Annual Report on the Administration
Printed materials may be secured in the United States
from the International Documents Service, Columbia Uni-
versity Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y. Other
materials (mimeographed or proce-ssed documents) may
be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United
States.
April 7, 1958
of the Trust Territory of the Cameroons Under British
Administration. Supplementary Information submitted
by the Administering Authority. T/1350, January 21,
1958. 9 pp. mimeo.
Examination of the Annual Report on the Trust Territory
of Ruanda-Urundl for the Year 1956. Observations by
the United Nations Educational, Scientlflc and Cultural
Organization. T/1352, January 28, 1958. 13 pp. mimeo.
Examination of the Annual Report on the Trust Territory
of the Cameroons Under British Administration for the
Year 1956. T/1353, January 30, 1958. 7 pp. mimeo.
Examination of the Annual Report on the Trust Territory
of the Cameroons Under French Administration, 1956.
Observations of the United Nations Educational, Scien-
tific and Cultural Organization. T/1354, January 30,
1958. 14 pp. mimeo.
Examination of the Annual Report on the Trust Territory
of Tanganyika for the Year 1956. Observations of the
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization. T/1355, January 30, 1958. 11 pp. mimeo.
Conditions in the Trust Territory of the Cameroons Under
French Administration. Working paper prepared by the
Secretariat. T/L.813, February 4, 1958. 28 pp. mimeo.
Economic and Social Council
Economic Commission for Latin America. The Economic
Development of Bolivia. (Summary and Extracts).
E/CN.12/448, April 30, 1957. 156 pp. mimeo.
Economic Commis.sion for Asia and the Far East. Com-
mittee on Industry and Natural Resources. Report of
the Third Session of the Sub-committee on Mineral Re-
sources Development. E/CN.11/I&NR/5 (E/CN.ll/
I&NR/Sub.3/5), December 2, 1957. 43 pp. mimeo.
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East. Inland
Transport Committee. Bituminous Construction Ter-
minology. E/CN.ll/TRANS/Sub.2/28, December 4,
1957. 35 pp. mimeo.
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East. Inland
Transport Committee. Report of the Inland Waterway
Sub-Committee (Fourth Session) to the Inland Trans-
port Committee (Seventh Session). E/CN.ll/TRANS/-
132, December 9, 1957. 34 pp. mimeo.
Statistical Commission. International Programme of
Social Statistics. Memorandum prepared by the Sec-
retary-General, in collaboration with the Food and Agri-
cultural Organization, International Labour Office,
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization and World Health Organization. E/CN.-
3/239, January 6, 1958. 46 pp. mimeo.
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East.
UNESCO Activities in 1957 and Work Plans for 1958 of
Interest to the Economic Commission for Asia and the
Far East. Report by the United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization. E/CN.11/467,
January 10, 1958. 21 pp. mimeo.
Statistical Commission. National Income Accounting in
Countries at a Very Early Stage of Economic Develop-
ment. Memorandum prepared by the Secretary-General.
E/CN.3/256, January 14, 1958. 12 pp. mimeo.
Commission on Human Rights. Periodic Reports on Hu-
man Rights. Report submitted by UNESCO.
E/CN.4/758/Add. 2, January 15, 1958. 74 pp. mimeo.
Commission on Human Rights. Study of Discrimination
In Education. Note by the Secretary-General. E/CN.-
4/760, January 17, 1958. 5 pp. mimeo.
Commission on Human Rights. Study of the Right of
Everyone To Be Free from Arbitrary Arrest, Detention
and Exile. E/CN.4/763, January 17, 1958. 19 pp.
mimeo.
1960 World Population Census Programme. Progress Re-
port. E/CN.3/237/Add. 1 ST/STAT/P/L.23/Rev. 1,
January 20, 1958. 27 pp. mimeo.
Commission on the Status of Women. Nationality of
Married Women. Memorandum bv the Secretar.v-Gen-
eral. E/CN.6/254/Add. 4, January 20, 1958. 10 pp.
mimeo.
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Slavery
Protocol amending the slavery convention signed at Ge-
neva September 2.5, 1926 (46 Stat. 2183), and annex.
Done at New York December 7, 1953. Entered Intt
force for the United States March 7, 1956 (TIAS
3532).
Acceptance deposited: Hungary, February 26, 1958.
BILATERAL
British Guiana
Agreement for the exchange of international money or
ders. Signed at Georgetown October 8 and at Washing-
ton November 4, 1957.
Entered into force: January 1, 1958.
Ireland
Agreement amending annex to air transport servicei
agreement of February 3, 1945 (EAS 460). E£fecte<
by exchange of notes at Dublin March 4, 1958. En
tered into force March 4, 1958.
Israel
Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agree
meut of November 7, 1957 (TIAS 3945). EflEected b:
exchange of notes at Washington January 29 am
February 4, 1958. Entered Into force February 4, 1958
Philippines
Agreement concerning claims arising in connection witl
SEATO maneuvers during February and March 195S
Effected by exchange of aide memoire at Manila Febru
ary 20, 1958. Entered into force February 20, 1958.
ipril"
DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE
Confirmations
The Senate on March 10 confirmed Raymond A. Bar
to be Ambassador to the United Arab Republic.
The Senate on March 10 confirmed Homer M. Bying;
ton, Jr., Ambassador to the Federation of Malaya, t
serve as the representative of the United States to thi
14th session of the Economic Commission for Asia and
Far East of the Economic and Social Council of thii
United Nations.
586
Designations
James Byrd Pilcher as Consul General at Hong Konti
(For biographic details, see Department press release 13
dated March 18.)
Department of Slate Bullelii
Views of
EstaWi
tion C
Edncalio
Prosva
ti'ml'u
nori
India
Ma ati
(Mtei
■•leniitio
lion.- f,Y
taeraalii
J'matio
ECJTE
shins
April 7, 1958
American Principles. India and the United States
Worli for Peace (Lodge)
Asia. Pitcher designated as consul general at
Hong Kong
Atomic Energy
Atomic Policy in the Space Age (McKinney) . .
U.S.-EURATOM discussions (delegation) ....
Claims and Property. Deadline for Filing Claims
Against Germany
Congress, The
Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign
Policy
President Reports to Congress on Lend-Lease
Operations
Views of the Department of State on Proposal To
Establish an International Development Associa-
tion (EHllon)
Department and Foreign Service
Confirmations (Byington, Hare)
Designations (Pilcher)
Disarmament. India and the United States Work
for Peace (Lodge)
Economic Affairs
President Reports to Congress on Lend-Lease
Operations
Views of the Department of State on Proposal To
Establish an International Development Associa-
tion (Dillon)
Educational Exchange. U.S. Expands Exchange
Program for Scientific Training
Europe. U.S.-EURATOM Discussions (delegation)
Germany
a?tee- Deadline for Filing Claims Against Germany . . .
nfleil b.v|West Reaffirms Principle of Control of Soviet
Flights Over West Germany (Bruce)
Health, Education, and Welfare
Mrs. Oettinger and Mrs. Taubman To Represent
U.S. on UNICEF Board
U.S. Proposes Broadening UNICEF Aid to Child
Welfare (Oettinger)
Hungary. U.S. Questions Continuing Prosecution
of Hungarian Patriots (Lodge, Mod, Wadsworth).
Immigration and Naturalization. Our Immigra-
tion Policies and the International Scene (O'Con-
India
India and the United States Worlj for Peace
(Lodge)
Vice President of India Visits United States . . .
International Information. U.S.-Soviet Negotia-
tions for Exchange of Films
International Law. The Law of the Sea (Dean) .
1 Hill International Organizations and Conferences
Atomic Policy in the Space Age (McKinney). . .
Byington confirmed as U.S. representative to
ECAFE
:i\>?' " Calendar of International Conferences and Meet-
fsto* ings
Iijjdilii Confirmations (Byington) '.
m Mrs. Oettinger and Mrs. Taubman To Represent
' U.S. on UNICEF Board
U.S.-EURATOM Discu.ssions (delegation) . '. '. '.
U.S. Proposes Broadening UNICEF Aid to Child
Welfare (Oettinger)
Mutual Security. U.S. Expands Exchange Program
jjlK for Scientific Training
eleasel3 Presidential Documents. President Reports to
Congress on Lend-Lease Operations
Index
Vol. XXXVIII, No. 980
554
586
571
570
Sl.Bfi*
554
559
552
574
572
58(5
585
583
584
563
570
Science. U.S. Expands Exchange Program for Sci-
entific Training 5(53
Treaty Information. Current Actions 586
United Arab Republic. Hare confirmed a.s am-
bassador 586
United Nations
Current U.N. Documents 585
India and the United States Worli for Peace
(Lodge) 554
The Law of the Sea (Dean) 574
U.S. Questions Continuing Prosecution of Hungarian
Patriots (Lodge, Mod, Wadsworth) 581
U.S.S.R.
U.S. Awaits Reply From U.S.S.R. on Summit Meet-
ing (Department statement) 551
U.S.-Soviet Negotiations for Exchange of Films . . 552
West ReaflJrms Principle of Control of Soviet
Flights Over West Germany (Bruce) .... 653
Name Index
Bruce, David K. E 5.53
Byington, Homer M., Jr 586
Dean, Arthur H 574
Dillon, Douglas 564
Eisenhower, President 57O
Hare, Raymond A 586
Lodge, Henry Cabot 554, 582
McKinney, Robert M 543
Mod, Peter 532
O'Connor, Roderie L 560
Oettinger, Katherine Brownell 584, 585
Pilcher, James Byrd 586
Radhakrishnan, Sarvapalli 559
Taubman, Elizabeth Clare 585
Wadsworth, James J 581
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: March 17-23
Press releases may be obtained from the News
Division, Department of State, Washington 25,
D. C.
Releases issued prior to March 17 which appear
in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 123 of March
13 and 126 and 127 of March 14.
No. Date Sabject
*130 3/17 Horace H. Smith nominated Ambassa-
dor to Laos (biographic details).
Pilcher designated Consul General at
Hong Kong (rewrite).
Dillon : International Development As-
sociation.
Educational exchange.
Eleanor Dulles: "Labor Rejects Com-
munism— East Germany."
U.S.-EURATOM discussions.
ICA scientific training program.
Rubottom : U.S. relations with Latin
America.
Deadline for filing claims against Ger-
many.
Barnes sworn in as Special Assistant
for Mutual Security Coordination
(biographic details).
U.S.-Soviet negotiations for film ex-
change.
Visit of President-elect of Costa Rica.
3/18
3/19
3/19
3/19
131
132
•133
tl34
135 3/19
136 3/20
tl37 3/20
138 3/20
3/20
•139
140
'141
3/21
3/21
*Not printed.
tHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin.
United States
Government Printing Office
DIVISION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS
Washington 25, D. C.
OFFICIAL BUSINESS
PAYMENT OF
American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955
Basic Documents
the
Department
of
State
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To: Supt. of Documents
Govt. Printing Office
Washington 25, D.C.
(cash, check, or
money order).
The recent release of Volume II completes the publication of this
two-volume compilation, which presents in convenient reference form
the basic published documents regarding American foreign relations
for the 6-year period of 1950 to 1955.
Documents in the two volumes are arranged under 20 subject
headings :
I - Principles and objectives of American foreign policy
II -The United Nations
III - Postwar settlements
IV - Armistice agreements: Near East, Korea, Indo-China
V- Basic security treaties of the United States
VI - European regional arrangements
VII - Middle Eastern regional arrangements
VIII - Western Hemisphere developments
IX -Western Europe
X- Germany, Austria, and European security
XI -The Soviet Union
XII - Eastern European Communist regimes and the Baltic states
XIII -Near and Middle East, South Asia, and Africa
XIV -The Far East and Southeast Asia
XV - Korea
XVI - Disarmament and the control of atomic energy
XVII - Foreign economic policies — trade and tariffs
XVIII - Foreign aid — economic, military, technological
XIX - International information and educational exchange programs
XX - Organization and special responsibilities of the Department of
State and the Foreign Service
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send me copies of American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic
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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Vol. XXXVIII, No. 981
AprU 14, 1958
THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM: ITS RELA-
TION TO NATIONAL WELL-BEING AND SECU-
RITY • Address by President Eisenhower and Remarks by
Secretary Dulles and Deputy Under Secretary Dillon .... 591
EXTENDING THE RECIPROCAL TRADE AGREE-
MENTS LEGISLATION • Statement by Deputy Under
Secretary Dillon 626
SECRETARY DULLES' NEWS CONFERENCE OF
MARCH 25 602
INTERDEPENDENCE, BASIC CONCEPT OF THE
MUTUAL SECURITY PROGRAM • Statement by
Secretary Dulles 622
BASIC PRINCIPLES GOVERNING UNITED STATES
RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA • by Assistant
Secretary Rubottom 608
LABOR REJECTS COMMUNISM— EAST GERMANY •
by Eleanor Lansing Dulles 615
For index see inside back cover
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Boston Public Library
Superintrr.'leTit of Dooiimo
APR 28 195^
Vol. XXXVIII, No. 981 • Pubucation 6627
April 14, 1958
For sale by the Superintendent ot Documents
U.S. Qovemment Printing Office
Wasblngton 25, D.O.
Price:
62 Issues, domestic $7.60, foreign $10.25
Single copy, 20 cents
The printing of this publication has been
approved by the Director of the Bureau of
the Budget (January 20, 1958).
Note: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and items contahied herein may
be reprinted. Citation of the Depaetment
OF State BtrLLETiN as the source will be
appreciated.
Tlie Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the
Public Services Division, provides the
public and interested agencies of
the Government with information on
developments in the field of foreign
relations and on tlie work of the
Department of State and the Foreign
Service. The BULLETIN includes se-
lected press releases on foreign policy,
issued by tlie White House and the
Department, and statements and ad-
dresses made by the President and by
the Secretary of State and other
officers of tlw Department, as tcell as
special articles on various pluises of
international affairs and the func-
tions of the Department. Informa-
tion is included concerning treaties
and international agreements to
which the United States is or may
become a party and treaties of gen-
eral international interest.
Publications of tlie Department,
United Nations documents, and legis-
lative material in the field of inter-
national relations are listed currently.
The Trade Agreements Program: Its Relation
to National Well-Being and Security
Following is the text of an address viade hy
President Eisenhower at the National Conference
of Organizations on International Trade Policy
at Washington, D. C, on Mar. 27, together with
reinarks made iy Secretary Dulles and Deputy
Under Secretary Douglas Dillon at the same,
meeting.
ADDRESS BY PRESIDENT EISENHOWER
White House press release dated March 27
I am indeed honored to join tonight with this
great gathering of citizens from all parts of the
Nation. You have come here to demonstrate tlie
strength of your support for an enlightened trade
policy that promotes jobs at home and peace in
tlie world. My gi'ateful thanks go to you for
this magnificent bipartisan citizen effort to rouse
Americans to the gi-eat stake all of us liave in
widening and deepening the channels of world
trade.
This cause that draws us together tonight does
not readily command the headlines. Like so many
other good things, the benefits of trade are some-
how taken for granted and are assumed to be a
normal part of life. On the other hand, the
special domestic problems to which world trade
sometimes gives rise, in terms of impact on par-
ticular industries, are real and identifiable and
demanding of action. But I think it is quite
necessary for all of us to remember this one fact :
No single, separate part or area of America can
ever prosper, no matter what tariffs we miglit
erect, unless the United States of America as a
whole prospers.
Now, you and I believe firmly that our reciprocal
trade program is good for America, and so we have
an obligation to our fellow citizens to set forth our
kptW 14, 1958
views fairly and so convincingly as we may. If
we do so, I am confident that the countrywide sup-
port of this program will be reflected in the Con-
gress. And that is where fateful decisions about
its whole future will shortly be taken.
We know that the American people will always
do what they think is important and necessary to
do. Our task is to make sure the importance of
expanding trade is miderstood by all of us.
Now^, in searching for what is best for 173 mil-
lion Americans, we must recognize that questions
concerning reciprocal trade have been raised by
conscientious Members of Congress and others
deeply concerned with the economic welfare of
their particular communities. On Capitol Hill the
most potent arguments against trade legislation
are likely to be its effect on the industries of
specific States and districts.
So, in the effort to dispel honest doubts about the
reciprocal trade legislation's great value to the
entire nation, we sliould first hammer home the
fact that safeguards in the law are being
strengthened to cope with the uneven impact of
import competition.
Next we should point out that the authority to
make trade concessions to others in our national
interest is permissive, not mandatory. It applies
to individual products and will be used only on a
case-by-case basis, after full review of all factors
involved.
Likewise, we should present this commonsense
arithmetic: The defeat of the trade agreements
program would destroy far more jobs and more
job opportunities in agriculture, in manufacturing,
and in transportation than it could possibly ever
preserve.
We should make everyone aware of the deadly
peril impending if, through blindness, America
and the free world are robbed of adequate economic
591
defense against Communist penetration. I doubt
that anyone would favor tearing down our trade
program were he to have on his conscience full
knowledge of such grave hazards.
We can be heartened because in districts, States,
and Nation a growing majority is finding that far
stronger reasons can be advanced for an effective
extension of the trade agreements legislation than
the excuses made for rejecting or crippling it.
Both job security and national security demand
an enlightened trade policy. So compelling and
justifiable are these individual and collective
reasons that even those who previously opposed
reciprocal trade should see the need of changing
from their former position and so measure up to
this inescapable duty of our day.
An informed and observant public would dis-
approve of anyone who insisted on clinging to
old, outmoded ideas which cannot solve crucial
new problems. But that same public would wel-
come and praise everyone in public or private life
for changing his mind in the best interests of 173
million Americans.
Importance of U.S. Export Trade
Now let me be specific.
Our reciprocal trade program is good for Amer-
ica. It strengthens our own economy, and it
strengthens the economy of the free world and
thus reinforces our security against external
danger.
The United States is the greatest trading nation.
Last year the world's export trade amounted to
about $100 billion. We exported a fifth of that
enormous total. This vast flow of commerce to
and from our shores is vital to our economy.
Consider these facts.
World trade makes jobs for at least 4i/^ million
American workers. At a time of slack in the
economy like the present these jobs should not be
placed in jeopardy by crippling our trade pro-
gram. The presence here tonight of representa-
tives of the great labor organizations of America
underscores this point.
Export trade, in the most recent year for which
we have data, is big, important business. It was
greater than all consumer purchases of furniture
and household equipment. It was greater than
all residential nonfarm building or as great as
the sale of all steel-mill products in this country.
Such sample facts as these indicate why the great
592
business organizations of America are represented
here tonight.
We shipped abroad last year, for example, over
a tenth of our machine-tool production, almost
a fifth of our motor trucks and coaches, over a
quarter of our construction and mining equip-
ment. And that is why so many manufacturers,
small and large, are represented here tonight.
Foreign markets provide an indispensable out-
let for our farm output. In the most recent mar-
keting year, with the aid of special programs,
over half of our wheat, cotton, and rice went
abroad. So did over a third of our soybean pro-
duction, a quarter of our tobacco, and a fifth of
our lard output. Those and other farm exports
benefited not only farmers. The movement re-
quired financing, inland transportation, storage,
and ocean transportation for 36 million tons of
cargo. That was enough farm produce to fill
800,000 freight cars and 3,600 cargo ships. Now,
those activities mean jobs — lots of jobs.
And for those who may wonder what the con-
nection is between these farm exports and our
reciprocal trade pi'ogram let me cite this fact:
Nearly four-fifths of these record farm exports
went to countries with which we have agreements
under that program. Loss of income from over-
seas markets would deal a hard blow to farm
families. And such facts as these indicate why
the gi-eat farm organizations of our country are
represented here tonight.
Now this brief review of our huge export busi-
ness evidences an inescapable truth : Trade is good
for all America — for its workers, its businessmen,
and its farmers.
Role of Imports
Now, what of the other side of the trade —
imports ?
In discussion of trade problems some people
seem to be for exports and against imports. They
apparently assume that we can continue to sell
even though we refuse to buy. But let me remind
you, our farmers, our workers, and businessmen
cannot use draclimas, rupees, lire, francs, or other
foreign currencies for their purchases in this coim-
try. Consequently they cannot accept those cur-
rencies for the goods they ship abroad. They can
accept only dollars. In the same way, if other na-
tions are to buy our exports to them, they must get
Department of Stale Bvlletin
dollars earned by their exports to us. This means
giving them an opportunity to sell in the Ameri-
can market on a reasonable basis.
Our import needs are great — $13 billion last
year. We obtained from abroad most of our
supplies of tin, mica, asbestos, platinum, nickel,
and newsprint. Part of our requirements for iron
ore, petroleum, copper, raw wool, bauxite, burlap,
and other materials must be obtained outside this
country. Such imports keep our factory wheels
turning and assembly lines moving.
We also import some foods and manufactured
goods. They are not as essential to us as are in-
dustrial materials. Nevertheless America wants
them. Americans are entitled to a reasonable
chance to buy them. Selling customers what they
want is the way American stores keep in business.
And that is why representatives of consumer
groups are here tonight.
Since imports of manufactured goods are the
center of much of the trade controverey, we should
keep one fact clearly in mind : Last year we im-
ported $3% billion of manufactured goods; we
exported $10i/^ billion — nearly four times as much.
Now, of course, we want, under the law, to accord
manufacturing industries relief from demon-
strated injury or the threat of injury due to im-
ports. But, if we seek to do this by ill-advised
measures such as broad and rigid systems of quotas
or unconscionable tariffs, we should consider the
consequences upon our 4-to-l interest in exports
of these goods. Now, other countries have their
trade problems too. As we and they have learned
to our mutual regret, everybody can play the
costly game of trade restrictions.
The choice is plain: It is reciprocity or re-
taliation.
Strengthening the Economy of the Free World
Important as our trade program is to building
a stronger nation here at home, it is equally impor-
tant in building a strong neighborhood of nations
where we can be secure.
Our first line of defense against potential attack
is an effective deterrent power widely based in the
free world. The dispersal of this power is a key
aspect of our defense. But dispersal requires co-
operation among the free nations — not merely
military cooperation but in all the ways which
make our allies strong.
April 14, 1958
It may be trite to say that trade is a two-way
street, but is it trite to say that cooperative se-
curity is a two-way street ? By no means. Allies
are needed, and we need them to be sturdy — relia-
ble. Sturdy allies need progressive economies, not
merely to bear the burden of defensive armament
but also to satisfy the needs and aspirations of
their people.
This fact requires a clear understanding on our
part that, for most of these nations, foreign trade
is vital to their economies and therefore to our
security. Some of these nations are limited in
natural resources ; their markets at home are small.
In many instances their economies are much less
developed than is ours. Trade is truly their
economic lifeblood. The United States must con-
tinue to make it possible for them to trade with
others and with us on a reasonable basis.
The American people have long been keenly
aware of the Communist military threat. Our
people are determined to maintain ample retali-
atory power to deter armed aggression. But we
must make certain that our people clearly recog-
nize the danger of the Communist economic drive
among developing countries — offering the carrot
and hiding the stick.
That danger is real, and it is growing. The
Communists are deterred from military adven-
ture by the defensive forces we and our partners
have built. They now seek, through economic
penetration and subversion, their purposes of
ceaseless expansion.
The character of the Soviet economic offensive
is clear: To the leaders of Communist imperial-
ism economic relations are merely another way of
gaining political control over nations that have
become economically dependent upon the Com-
munist bloc.
It is the Communist system — the Communist
system, rather than things— that the Kremlin is
determined to export.
It is the system of economic freedom that the
Kremlin is determined to destroy.
If, through utilizing trade and aid, the Com-
munists can tempt free nations one by one into
their spider web, they will have paved the way
for political victory, for world domination. And
they will have made progress toward their great
goal of economic encirclement of the United
States.
593
Now, though Soviet resources do not by any
means match our own, yet they are enabled by
despotic rule to concentrate those resources effec-
tively for special purposes. By forced investment,
heavy industrialization, and the repression of
consumer needs the Soviet bloc is producing on
a growing scale the goods and capital equipment
which many of the newer nations must have if
they are to be increasingly effective allies of the
United States.
Now, the Soviet capacity to export is coupled
by a willingness to import. The Soviets are offer-
ing to receive raw materials and other products
which free nations have to sell. Thus the Com-
munist bloc is becoming an important supplier of
capital and equipment, especially to the newer
nations, but its principal export is still Com-
munist imperialism.
Now, communism, like all other forms of dicta-
torship, is a reactionary movement. This we
know. Yet reaction has more than once in the
past enjoyed periods of marked success. Can we
be sure that reactionary communism will not suc-
ceed in tempting many nations to exchange free-
dom for glittering — and sometimes realistic — op-
portunities for material betterment ?
We cannot at all be sure of this unless we see
to it that economic freedom is allowed to operate
effectively, that the benefits of economic advance
in the free world are diffused and spread to others.
And this means trade.
If free and needy nations cannot find room and
opportunity to trade within the free world, they
will surely, inexorably turn to trade with the
Communist world.
For to live they must trade. It's as simple as
tliat.
Proposals for Extending Program
This brings us directly to the proposals for the
extension of the reciprocal trade progi-am. This
program was inaugurated by a great American,
Cordell Hull, almost a quarter of a century ago.
It has been extended and strengthened no less than
10 times. It has become a prime impetus to eco-
nomic cooperation and to flourishing world trade.
It strengthens freedom as against despotism.
To move forward along the road on which we
have thus far advanced, I have recommended to
the Congress a 5-year extension of the Trade
Agreements Act.^ I have requested authority to
negotiate reductions in tariff's, on the basis of the
"peril point" procedure, by 5 percent of existing
rates a year, during this 5-year interval. I have
further recommended strengthening the "escape
clause" and "peril point" procedures to recognize
more fully and promptly the need for relief in
cases where injury to a domestic industry due to
trade concessions is established under the law.
Now, this program has been attacked as both
too little and too much, depending on the side of
the arginnent any individual has taken. But this
fact may suggest that it is about right.
In my opinion the authority requested in the
bills introduced by Eepresentatives Mills and
Kean,^ embodying these proposals, is necessary
to the continued success of the program. So, too,
is the 5-year extension period essential to the con-
tinuity and stability of our trade relations.
There is a mistaken belief spread among some
people that the 5-year proposal was merely intro-
duced as a bargaining position. I should like to
set the record straight. It is a proposal dictated
by the facts.
Among these facts the greatest is a special one :
A great Common Market is now being formed by
six nations of Western Europe. The^e countri&s
will in due course eliminate all barriers to trade
among themselves and act toward all the rest of
the world as a single economy. That means a com-
mon tariff applying to imports from the rest of
the world, including the United States. It is ex-
pected that important steps toward this common
tariff will become effective during 1962 — up to 41/^
years from the renewal date of our reciprocal
trade legislation this summer. If we are to serve
the interests of American buyere and sellers, the
President must have from the Congress adequate
authority and given a sufficient time to prepare
and conduct negotiations with the Common
Market authorities. I can conceive of no other
single fact so important as this as a reason for ex-
tending the act for 5 years. In the national in-
terest this timetable dictates a minimum extension
of the law for this period.
The good of America will not be served by just
any kind of extension bill. It must be a good bill.
For text of the President's message recommending
extension of the Trade Agreements Act, see Bdxletin of
Feb. 17, 19.58, p. 263.
' H. R. 10368 and 10369.
Department of Stale Bulletin
It must be an effective bill. Such a bill is before
the Congress.
Now, the issue before the Congress and the
American people in this spring of 1958 is a mo-
mentous one: Will we through apathy or igno-
rance see our trade program killed outright or
gutted by amendments? Will we weaken our-
selves by returning to the law of the jungle in
trade relations between nations ?
Or will the program be extended and
strengthened ?
The choice is clear.
I repeat : This program is good for America.
It is good for America on straight XDOcketbook
grounds. It is good today because it will help
protect millions of jobs. It is good tomorrow be-
cause more trade means more jobs.
It is good for America, too, because it helps
build the road to peace.
Finally, this program is vital to our national se-
curity. Eeti-eat on this program would make dan-
gerously difficult the holding together of our
alliances and our collective-security arrangements.
Less trade means more trouble.
We cannot find safety in economic isolationism
at a time when the world is shrinking. For us to
cower behind new trade walls of our own building
would be to abandon a great destiny to those
less blind to the events and tides now surging in
the affaii-s of men.
America will not choose that road, for it is a
downward-leading road to a diminishing Amer-
ica— isolated, encircled, and at bay in a world
made over in the image of an alien philosophy.
Rather, America will move forward strongly
along the clear road to greater strength at home,
expanding trade with other free nations, greater
security and opportunity in a friendlier world for
this and for succeeding generations.
This is a great and continuing mission in which
you and I and every American can have a part.
I am proud that we can do so, because I believe
in doing so we will be, in some partial way, worthy
of the great traditions that have been given to us
by our Founding Fathers and those who have fol-
lowed them. We can serve this great nation to-
day by keeping our country firmly on its chosen
course of fostering lifegiving trade among the
nations. And on that same course we shall move
ever nearer to permanent security and to an endur-
ing peace with right and with justice for all.
April 14, 7958
REMARKS BY SECRETARY DULLES
Press release 15G dated March 27
I am glad to discuss with you the Reciprocal
Trade Agreements Act. Its extension is, I believe,
essential to our national security. For the act
symbolizes throughout the woi-ld the pi-inciple that
it is better for peoples to work together than for
each to try to be self-sufficient. That principle of
interdependence is the cornerstone of free-world
policy.
Cooperation To Deter Aggression
The United States is today confronted witli a
possibility of physical assault heretofore unknown.
Hydrogen bombs, with an explosive power suffi-
cient to destroy whole populations, can be delivered
across ocean-spanning distances within a matter
of hours, if not minutes. American communities
are now subject to major devastation from weap-
ons launched from foreign soil.
How is this danger to be held in check and peace
maintained? It is by having such power to re-
taliate against armed aggression that such aggres-
sion obviously would not pay. But today power
to retaliate is not adequate unless it is dispersed.
If our retaliatory power were located only in the
United States, it would not be a dependable deter-
rent for it might be largely obliterated by a sudden
blow. It takes cooperation all around the world
to assure that Soviet armed aggression will b/e
deterred.
We have that kind of cooperation today. But
military cooperation cannot be isolated from eco-
nomic cooperation. The United States is at once
the largest consumer and the largest producer of
the goods that enter into the markets of the free
world. The flow of trade across our borders is
not only important to us ; it is the very lifeblood
of the economies of our partners and allies. With-
out it they cannot live or prosper.
If we seem to ignore that fact or to be indifferent
to its implications, we cannot expect the conse-
quences to be purely economic. The consequences
would be political and military and would dis-
rupt the relationships upon which our national
security depends.
Political-Economic Threat
To the physical danger of armed attack there
l>as now been added another, and probably more
595
imminent, danger. That is the danger created
by the new political-economic offensives of inter-
national communism. They seek to subvert one
country after another until finally the United
States is isolated and its economy so depressed
that, to use Mr. Stalin's words of 1924, the United
States "will consider it expedient 'voluntarily' to
make substantial concessions to the proletariat."
The Soviet rulers have been rapidly industrial-
izing their country by forced draft methods which
impose severe austerity on most of the Russian
people. Today the Soviet Union and such an
industrialized satellite as Czechoslovakia can
supply the rest of the world with manufactured
goods in increasing quantity and variety, import-
ing in return the agricultural and mineral prod-
ucts which many of the free nations have to sell.
The glowing Soviet prospectus of assured markets
and low interest rate credits attracts many nations
toward a relationship which would give the Soviet
Union at first economic and then political domi-
nance. This attraction to the Soviet system will
become irresistible if the United States does not
afford a reasonable trade alternative.
"A Noble Strategy of Victory"
Some elements of United States industry seek
to improve their competitive position by implying
that any competition from abroad, merely because
it is "foreign," should on that account be de-
barred. We cannot accept that viewpoint with-
out endangering our whole nation. There are, of
course, cases where foreign competition should be
restrained, and is restrained, by protective action.
But a general disposition to exclude foreign goods
whenever they are competitive would gravely dis-
rupt economic, political, and spiritual relation-
ships which are required for our own welfare and
for the defense of our peace and freedom.
It is neither un-American nor unpatriotic to
have national policies designed to assure a con-
genial and friendly world environment. Since
our earliest days it has been, and now is, accepted
United States doctrine that our own peace and
security interlock with conditions elsewliere. We
have, when needed, paid a great price in blood
and treasure to prevent other lands from falling
under the control of hostile despotisms.
The United States has, by treaties or joint con-
gressional resolutions, proclaimed, as regards
nearly 50 nations, that the peace and security of
the United States would be endangered if these
other nations were to fall into the clutches of Com-
munist imperialism. But the Communists are not
going to keep "hands off" merely because of bold
treaty words or resounding congressional procla-
mations. The Russian and Chinese Commimists
are tough. Our words will command respect only
if we are seen to be ready to back them up.
If we are to avoid the grim alternatives of
war or surrender, we must have the national
policies and actions represented by our mutual
security progi-am and by the Trade Agreements
Act. With these measures, the United States and
its allies can peacefully win the cold war. Presi-
dent Eisenhower said last December in Paris:
"There is a noble strategy of victory — not victory
over any peoples but victory for all peoples." '
However, this result will not be achieved unless
the free-world nations stand firm on the policies
that create a unity which nullifies both the mili-
tary and the political-economic threats which now
stem from Communist imperialism.
The imperialist leaders have, or believe they
have, one asset on their side — that is the tendency
of the democracies to get tired and not to be willing
to persist in the efforts that are required to sustain
free- world unity and strength. If that unity ever
collapses, then the Communists could feel that vic-
tory was within their grasp. The essential is that
we hold fast to policies which have demonstrated
their worth and which, if persisted in, will assure
that the ultimate victory will not be that of the
despots but of the people.
Four Illustrations
To illustrate my point, let us consider our trade
relations with four key countries within the free
world — to the north, south, east, and west.
To the north lies Canada, with which we are
inescapably interdependent for the defense of the
continent. Two-thirds of Canada's foreign trade
is with the United States. Last year Canada
bought almost $4 billion of American goods and
sold to us almost $3 billion of goods. If the peo-
ple and Government of Canada were to come to
believe that it is our policy to make this trade bal-
ance still more adverse to them, that would inevi-
tably and adversely affect our joint defense of
North America.
' Bulletin of Jan. 6, 1958, p. 3.
596
To the south there is Venezuela, with its supplies
of petroleum. Venezuelan oil helped to win
World War II. It sustained our efforts in the
Korean war. Venezuela imported from the
United States about a billion dollare' worth of
goods in 1957. We imported from Venezuela some
$900 million worth. Surely the national security
would not be served if we were to give Venezuelans
the impression that we intend drastically to reduce
our purchases from them.
In Europe I take the United Kingdom as an
example. The British are our partners in NATO
and in SEATO. We are joined with them in vital
and varied cooperation throughout much of the
world. The United Kingdom cannot live without
large jiarticipation in international trade. If the
United States were to set off a chain reaction, in
terms of trade restrictions, the effect would be little
short of disastrous — on them and on us.
In the Far East there is Japan, an industrial na-
tion of 90 million people compressed into a natu-
rally poor area the size of California. Japan, too,
must live by exchanging manufactured products
for raw materials and foodstuffs. The Commu-
nists strive to bring Japan's industrial power, the
only such power in the Far East, within their own
orbit of control. The Japanese have steadfastly
refused to be drawn into this subservience. But
we must help Japan meet its great need for a broad
market, primarily within the free world, which
will allow her to satisfy the economic wants of her
people. In 1957 we sold Japan about $1.25 billion
of goods and bought from her some $600 million.
Surely it is clear that excessive restrictions against
the trade of Japan could create in Japan condi-
tions dangerous to our own security.
Trade and National Security
In the modern world it is not possible to con-
sider trade apart from the whole complex of our
international relations and our national security in
a world that is fraught with danger. When we
speak of the future of our trade agreements legis-
lation, we are speaking of an instrument which is
vital to the whole of our foreign relations. It is
an instrument needed to prevent a "hot" war and
to win the "cold" war.
Surely a system that contributes so much to our
political and military security, which, through
"peril point" and "escape" procedures, realistically
April 14, 7958
takes account of the needs of our domestic indus-
try, and which provides our farmers and indus-
trial workers with vast markets, should be
effectively continued. The Trade Agreements Act
stands as a worldwide symbol of enlightened
statesmanship. Failure to renew and strengthen
that act as the President has requested would set
back the clock and endanger our Republic and
each and every person in it.
I ask you to recall the period of the early thir-
ties. It was a time of economic depression here
at home, and we sought relief by raising our tariffs
and devaluing our currency without regard to the
serious impact of our acts upon others who were
largely dependent on international trade.
Wliat was the outcome? We did not get the
domestic relief we expected. And our conduct
and example seemed to otliers to justify, if not re-
quire, the practice of "each for himself ; the devil
take the hindmost."
Nations like Germany and Japan fell under ex-
treme nationalistic leadership that professed to
believe that only by expanding their national do-
mains at the expense of weaker neighbors could
they assure their people a well-being no longer
available by normal methods of peaceful trade.
Finally, the devil caught up with us all in terms
of world war. Humanity paid, in rivers of blood
and moimtains of gold, for its follies.
May we be spared the folly that would repeat
that tragic past.
REMARKS BY MR. DILLON
Press release 153 dated March 27
I have been asked to discuss two closely related
subjects, first, the Soviet economic offensive and,
second, the European Common Market. I think
it will simplify matters if I discuss these topics
separately, relating each to the reciprocal trade
agreements program as I go along.
Soviet Economic Offensive
Let's begm with the economic offensive which
the Soviet Union has launched. Today the main
threat to the peace, security, and welfare of the
American people is the threat of international
communism. The threat has two barrels — both
loaded.
The first barrel is the military threat. We are
all pretty well aware of Soviet military strength.
597
We know that the Soviet bloc has at its
the largest peacetime army in history. We know
that the Soviet Union is maintaining a submarine
fleet three times larger than ours. We know that
the submarine fleet and the army are backed up
by tactical and intermediate missiles with nuclear
warheads. We know that the Soviet Union is
racing to perfect an intercontinental ballistic
missile.
But, in spite of all of this, I believe that the
other barrel of this loaded gim is a greater threat
to the security of the United States and the free
world. I am talking about the Soviet economic
offensive. This ofl'ensive is a new technique to
gain domination of the world.
Back in 1924 Lenin said: "First we will take
Eastern Europe, next the masses of Asia, and
finally we will encircle the last bastion of capi-
talism— the United States. We shall not have to
attack it ; it will fall like overripe fruit into our
hands."
The Soviet Union has never changed its ad-
mitted goal of world rule.
The Soviet economic offensive coincided with
tlie death of Stalin. The bluster, bullying, and
bullets of the Stalin era have been put in a skele-
ton closet. "Sweetness and light" is the new
policy. The Soviet Union is now speaking softly
and professing friendship. They want to be
brothers with the less developed nations, particu-
larly those which are strategically located.
Let no one take lightly this new technique of try-
ing to win countries by subversion and economic
penetration instead of armed aggression. The
Soviets are entering this economic cold war with
the same drive and determination that they showed
in forcing the countries of Eastern Europe be-
liind the Iron Curtain.
Starting from zero in 1954, Soviet-bloc economic
assistance to the less developed nations had risen to
$1.6 billion by the end of 1957. The package deal
which the Soviet offers contains long-term loans at
low interest rates. Almost without exception the
development projects require Soviet-bloc indus-
trial equipment and many Soviet-bloc technicians
to help move the country in the general direction of
the Soviet orbit. The loan provisions usually per-
mit repayment in goods or raw materials which the
debtor country has available, as an alternative to
payment in convertible currencies.
598
This economic offensive has increased Soviet-
bloc trade with the less developed nations, both
imports and exports, from $840 million in 1954 to
probably double that figure — about $1.7 billion in
1957; and the number of trade agreements signed
has leaped from 49 to 147. Soviet-bloc trade with
the whole of the free world has increased from $3.6
billion in 1954 to about $6.1 billion in 1957.
Let me make it clear that this Soviet economic
offensive is no sudden spurt which we have a right
to expect will fall off. The industrial growth of
the Soviet Union is moving along at a pace more
than twice that of the United States. Their rate
of industrial growth is 9 or 10 percent a year com-
pared to America's 4 percent. Five years from
now Russia's industrial production may well reach
a figure well over $100 billion.
There is no secret about how the Soviet Union
has become a world economic threat. They have
accomplished it by the simple process of denying
their own citizens everything but the basic necessi-
ties of life. Automobiles, washing machines, re-
frigerators, and television sets are things the aver-
age Eussian scarcely dreams of possessing. His
per capita income of $308 a year compared to our
own of nearly $2,500 a year keeps the Russian's
nose to the grindstone. The Soviet leaders are
ruthlessly sacrificing the immediate welfare of
their people to increase rapidly the physical assets
of communism.
Now we in the United States would not be jus-
tified in viewing with alarm the Soviet economic
offensive if its real purpose and intention was to
help the less developed nations. But Khrushchev
hiuLself has assured us that the Soviet Union is
not guided by lofty motives or a desire for sound
economic relations. In 1955 he told a group of
Congressmen, "We [meaning Soviet Russia] value
trade least for economic reasons and most for po-
litical purposes."
The goals of the Soviet trade offensive are not
hidden behind the Iron Curtain. They are crystal
clear. They are:
To create economic dependence on the Soviet
bloc;
To spread Communist economic ideology ;
To weaken and disrupt economic relations
among free-world countries ;
And, finally, to pave the way for ultimate Com-
munist political domination.
Deparfment of Sfate Bulletin
Challenge to Free Enterprise
The basic question to be answered is: How
should the United States meet this Soviet economic
offensive? What steps are in our national inter-
ts?
Should we match barter deal with barter deal?
Should we alter our concept of the interdependence
of nations? Is free-enterprise buying and selling
obsolete in international trade ?
Tlie answer is clearly "No." The economic cold
war that we are engaged in is not a battle for any
given market or for the products of a particular
country. We are in a war that pits the competi-
tive free-enterprise system against Soviet statism.
The fundamental concept of the role of govern-
ment in society is at stake.
The reciprocal trade program is much more
than just a symbol of international cooperation
among the nations of the free world. It is the
cutting edge of the sword in this world economic
struggle.
Under the reciprocal trade program America's
exports in 1957 rose to another all-time high. The
figure was $19 billion. Face to face with that
figure can anyone deny the importance of foreign
trade to the United States ?
But, in spite of that figure and in spite of the
fact that we are the world's largest trading nation,
trade is more important to many other nations
than to us. Exports account for 16 percent of
the total economic output of the United Kingdom,
for instance. For Belgium and some other free-
world countries exports are even more important.
In the less developed nations the ability to export
raw materials and foodstuffs to the markets of the
free M'orld is the chief means by which they can
got machinery and equipment. These newly de-
veloping nations need these tools to beat back
poverty, disease, and ignorance.
The stakes were never higher. If the leaders
of these young nations cannot satisfy the aspira-
tions of tlieir peoples through trade with the free
world, they will be forced to trade with the Soviet
bloc. If we fail to extend our reciprocal trade
agreements program, we will serve notice on the
world that we lack confidence in ourselves and in
our future. There is no lack of confidence in the
Soviet camp. If we surrender the offensive to the
Soviet bloc, it is not likely that they will give us
an opportunity again to grab the ball and run
with it.
April 14, 1958
Yesterday morning Secretary Dulles received a
letter signed by 11 of our ambassadors stationed
in the Far East. I would like to read to you
some excerpts from this letter :
We wish to express unanimous agreement that a serious
threat to the position of the free world in the Far East
lies in the subversive capabilities of the Communist move-
ment. These capabilities feed upon poverty and despair,
and we are witnessing in Asia the intensive and increas-
ing efforts of the Sino-Soviet bloc at economic penetra-
tion and subversion through loans at liberal terms, allur-
ing promises of trade, and the ready willingness to supply
Communist technicians to assist the less developed coun-
tries with their economic problems. . . . We believe the
extension of the Trade Agreements Act is ... of the ut-
most importance. ... all of the countries in the region
need to trade for their livelihood and for their further
economic development. Most of them are heavily de-
pendent upon trade with the United States, directly or
indirectly. The United States is the largest exporter as
well as the largest imiwrter in the world. It follows that
the kind of trade policy followed by the United States will
be a major determinant as to whether the free countries
of the Far East will be able to achieve the level of eco-
nomic development and human welfare prerequisite to
durable political stability under free government in the
region. . . . Without the instruments of foreign aid and
trade, we shall be to a great extent defenseless in the eco-
nomic warfare that has been declared against the people
of the United States and the free world.
We are confronted, then, with a dangerous and
powerful economic offensive by the Soviet Union
aimed at breaking up trading relationships among
the free nations as a means of furthering the ob-
jective of world domination by international
communism. The issue is whether the nations
of the free world will meet the Soviet trade threat
in the only way it can be met. Will they, in other
words, now move to strengthen the free-world
trading community by further action to reduce
the barriers which still impede the flow of goods
among themselves ?
Formation of European Common Market
The answer to this question hangs in the bal-
ance on both sid&s of the Atlantic — in the Euro-
pean Economic Community, wliere a great new
Common Market is being formed, and in the
United States, where our Congress is debating
the future of the trade agreements program. The
decisions which we will make, and those which
our European friends will make, are directly re-
lated to each other.
Let me explain.
599
A year ago last Tuesday six nations of West-
ern Europe — France, Germany, Italy, Belgium,
the Netherlands, and Luxembourg— signed at
Rome a treaty to merge their separate economic
systems into one. That treaty has now been rati-
fied by all of the legislatures of the six govern-
ments, so that it is a binding commitment on their
peoples.
The Eome Treaty is not a mere statement of
good intentions. It is an explicit document which
sets forth precisely and in detail the steps that
will be taken to create a fully integrated European
Economic Community. We may be sure, there-
fore, that this is no paper plan but a genuine
undertaking to achieve the economic unity of the
six member nations.
In the field of tariffs and trade the European
Economic Community will constitute a Common
Market. There will be complete free trade within
the Common Market, and a single uniform tariff
will be applied to imports into the Common Mar-
ket from the United States and other countries.
In short, six nations will become as one nation so
far as tariffs and trade are concerned.
This truly revolutionary movement will not be
completed all at once. Some 12 or 15 years will
be required to transform the six countries into a
single trading entity. But the process will begin
soon. The next 4 or 5 years will be the formative
years of the European Economic Community.
It will be during these formative years that key
decisions will be made affecting the future tariff
and trade policy of a new trading nation on the
world economic scene.
The importance of the Common Market to the
trade of the free world can hardly be exaggerated.
The European Economic Community will combine
nations now having a total population of some
160 million people — among the most skilled, in-
telligent, and hard-working people the world pos-
sesses. These nations have a gross national prod-
uct of over $140 billion. They are, moreover,
great world trading nations, much more so in re-
lation to their economic activity than is the United
States. In 1957 the six countries together im-
ported $14 billions of goods from the rest of the
world, excluding their imports from each other.
This was more than $1 billion larger than the
total import trade of the United States in that
year.
We have been used to thinking of the United
States as the most important of the world trad-
600
ing nations. And so we are, as of today. We must
now begin to realize, however, that with the forma-
tion of the European Economic Community there
will be a second great market whose influence on
the currents of trade within the free world will
compare with, and perhaps even exceed, our own.
Importance of U.S.-Common Market Cooperation
What is the meaning of these facts and statis-
tics? Their meaning, surely, is this: If free-
world trade is to be nourished and made to flow
more freely, the United States and the European
Economic Community must join hands to bring
about that result.
Now, the European Common Market holds great
promise for the long-term development of world
trade. Internal free trade within the six coun-
tries, and the stimulus to productivity v.'hich in-
tensified competition will bring, will create a
strong upsurge in the production and income of
the members of the European Economic Com-
mmiity. And out of this will grow a greater
capacity to import and to export. That is one
of the reasons why the United States, since the
early days of the Marshall plan, has consistently
supported the goal of European economic
integration.
Yet there are two important conditions which
must be met if these beneficial results are to be
achieved.
One is that the tariff and trade policy of the
Common Market should not be restrictive but
should be directed to the lowering of world trade
barriers in general. The other is that during the
formative period of the Common Market the
Common Market tariff' should be made as low as
possible in order to ease the trade adjustments for
other countries, including the United States, that
will inevitably take place as industries located
within the Common Market gain an increasing
tariff advantage over imports from the outside.
The members of the European Economic
Community have declared themselves willing to
do their part.
First, they have agreed to adhere to the rules
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
which require that the Common Market tariff
may not be higher or more restrictive, on tht
whole, than the separate national tariff's previ-
ously in effect.
This is a valuable safeguard which prevents the
Common Market tariff from moving up\varcl. It
does nothing, however, to bring the Common
Market tariff down, and that is what is now
needed in the interests of the trade of the free
world as a whole. Reductions in the Common
Market tariff can be accomplished only through
further reciprocal tariff negotiations between the
members of the European Economic Community,
the United States, and the other members of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
On this point the members of the European
Economic Community have also given evidence
of their willingness to cooperate. In article 18
of the Rome Treaty they have stated that :
Member States hereby declare their willingness to con-
tribute to the development of international commerce
and the reduction of barriers to trade by entering into
reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements di-
rected to the reduction of customs duties below the
general level which they could claim as a result of the
establishment of a customs union between themselves.
And so we come back across the Atlantic to the
reciprocal trade agreements legislation now before
the Congress of the United States. For, if Con-
approves the proposal of President Eisen-
hower for a 5-year extension of the Trade Agree-
ments Act, we will have the authority we need to
negotiate with the Common Market during its
formative years, thereby advancing the economic
interests of the United States and of the rest of the
world. I would like to emphasize that the usual
3-year extension of the trade agreements legisla-
tion will not be enough for this purpose. The
timetable for formulating and implementing the
?'™ Common Market tariff is such that, if the Trade
Agreements Act were extended for only 3 years,
it would expire before our negotiations with the
Common Market countries could be completed.
If the Trade Agreements Act is not extended for
the necessary period, or with adequate authority
to offer meaningful tariff concessions, we shall be
ide.
condemned to a policy of standstill and drift. We
shall have missed our main chance to move forward
confidently and surely in strengthening the trading
system of the free nations in the face of the eco-
nomic challenge hurled at us by international
communism.
The importance of the trade agreements pro-
gram to our vital national interests is very great.
Failure to extend the Trade Agreements Act as the
President has proposed could be one of the most
costly failures in our history.
U.S. Nuclear Tests To Demonstrate
Reduction in Radioactive Fallout
Statement hy President Elsenhoioer
White House press release dated March 26
In line with what I said to the press on July 3,
1957, the United States will demonstrate the
progress our scientists are achieving in reducing
radioactive fallout from nuclear explosions.
To this end, for the first time at any test, we
are planning to invite the United Nations to select
a group of qualified scientific observers to witness
at the Pacific Proving Groimd this summer a
large nuclear explosion in which radioactive fall-
out will be drastically reduced.
"\Ye will also invite, as we have on occasions
in the past, a representative group of United
States and foreign news-media correspondents.
The United States scientists have been making
progress in reducing radioactive fallout from nu-
clear explosions in the hope and belief that basic
advances in both the peaceful and military uses
of nuclear energy will thus be achieved. The
advantages to mankind of continued progress in
this field are obvious.
The United States has always publicly an-
nounced in advance its nuclear testing progi'ams.
We trust that the forthcoming tests will provide
valuable information to the world.
,l,jli,Apri7 M, 1958
601
Secretary Dulles' News Conference of March 25
Press release 150 dated March 25
Secretary Dulles: Questions, please?
Q. Mr. Secretary, when you read the exchange
of notes on the subject of a swrwiit conference
over the last week or so, ifs difficult to find any-
thing particularly new in this whole situation.
How do you estimate %uhere we now stmtd on the
frohl^m of a sumvmit conference?
A. It has not yet been possible for me to study
thoroughly and in detail the Soviet note, which I
only received last night. But it does seem as
though the Soviets were seeking to exact a ter-
ribly higli political price as a condition to having
a summit meeting. Now, as you know, President
Eisenhower has made perfectly clear that he wants
to have a summit meeting if there is any reason-
able chance of reaching substantial agreements
which will ease the international situation and
make peace more likely. But it's more and more
apparent, and has been revealed, I think, by this
exchange of correspondence, that the Soviets are
demanding a very high political jirice as a condi-
tion to having such a meeting, and tlie question is
whether there is enough hope out of such a meet-
ing to justify paying the jjolitical price which the
Soviets seem to be exacting.
I have jotted down here, quite hurriedly, some
of the price tags that they seem to be putting on
it, and I would like to read tliose to you, if I may,
to illustrate my points : '
1. The equating of certain Eastern European
governments, such as Czechoslovakia and Ku-
mania, with such Western governments as the
United Kingdom, France, and Italy ;
2. Acceptance of the legitimacy of the East
German puppet regime and acquiescence in the
continued division of Germany ;
' The following five paragraphs were also released sep-
arately as press release 149 dated Mar. 25.
602
3. Ending the agreed joint responsibility of
the four former occupying powers of Germany for
the reunification of Germany, a responsibility that
was reaffirmed at Geneva in 1955 ;
4. Acceptance of the Soviet claim for numerical
"parity" in bodies dealing with matters, such as
disax-mament, within tlie competence of the United
Nations General Assembly — a "parity" wliich, if
conceded, would give the Soviets a veto power in
many functions of the General Assembly, enabling
them to evade the will of tlie great majority and
thus further to weaken the United Nations by, in
important respects, importing into the General
Assembly the same weaknesses that have crippled
the Security Council ;
5. The acceptance of an agenda so formulated
that virtually every item^ — 9 out of 11 — implies
acceptance of a basic Soviet thesis that the West-
ern powers reject.
Now in making clear this price tag, I do not
want to imply that I think that there will not be a
summit conference.
Q. Could we explore that a little further, Mr.
Secretary? You and the President, as you have
already indicated, have taken a firm and con-
sistent line that there should not ie a sumtnit
conference without, as you put it, meaningful
preparation. Regardless of the height of these
prices — the price tags that you have just enu-
merated— the Soviets, if we can believe what we
read, seem to have been making a good deal of
progress in enlisting support in the neutrals and
even among our allies for a summit meeting Tnore
or less on their terms. Is the administration pre-
pared to go on with its position indefinitely, or is
there a danger tJiat you might have to cave in and
accept some kind of a compromise arrangement
for a summit conference that you do not now
loant?
A.. I do not think there is any prospect of wluxt
you refer to as a "cave-in." On the other hand, in
36 matters there is always a field for legitimate
give-and-take. Nobody should just lay down an
ultimatum. And if the Soviets have laid down an
ultimatum, then I think that the situation looks
very dark indeed. I think it's fair still to assume
that they are negotiating and that many of these
things they talk about are negotiable. To explore
that is the function of this i^reparatory work. We
don't intend to take this last note as necessarily
the last word. If it is the last word, then — I was
going to say, "It is the last word." (Laughter)
Q. Mr. Secretary, home there been through
rivate diplomatic channels, such as the respective
anibassadors, any indications of any loilUngness to
negotiate? You say you think they are negotiable,
'but the terms you list do not appear to indicate
that.
A. There have been no informal talks with the
ambassadors on this matter. But in answering
that question I don't want to set a precedent to in-
dicate that I would always answer it. The great-
hope m situations like this lies occasionally
in having some talks which are not publicized and
which may indicate a ground for hope that would
disappear if it were exposed at an early and in-
fantile condition to the harsh rays of the sun.
(Laughter)
Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us, sir, whether
the Soviet conditions for a summit conference, as
they noio stand, do constitute turning a su?nmit
meeting into a ^^spectacle"?
A. I would say that, if those terms were ac-
;epted, it would turn the summit meeting into
something much worse than a "spectacle." It
would mean that on the way to the summit we
ivoidd have lost our shirt. Perhaps that would
•esult in a "spectacle." (Laughter)
I Q. Mr. Secretary, Lester Pearson of Canada
J has suggested that the NATO countries should
,^ lecide among themselves on a firm pattern for
, 'bargaining with the Soviet Union and let the
., United States do the talking for them if there
j thould be a summit conference. How do you feel
,, ibout that idea?
if, A. That would be primarily up to the allied
countries to decide. It would be putting a very
lin 4pri7 J 4, 7958
heavy responsibility on the United States and
one that we, I think, would be reluctant to assume,
although in advance of the event I wonld not want
to slam the door to .such a possibility.
Agenda for Summit Meeting
Q. Mr. Secretary, in the note from the Soviet
Govei'nment of yesterday, they referred to the
possibility of discussing a German peace treaty
and also a pact between the Warsaw powers and
the NATO powers. Now, as agenda items, do those
two points not open the whole question of the re-
unification of Germany and, also, the position of
Eastern Europe, which you want to discuss?
A. I would feel rather that they t«nd pretty
much to close the door to the kind of thing that
we want to discuss. The Soviet, at least, would
interpret such an agenda item as luniting the dis-
cussion to the particular matters ; namely, a peace
treaty involving both Germanics and equating
of the Warsaw Pact with the NATO group. I
would be extremely concerned to see the agenda
accepted in that form without at least making
clear that we interpret the agenda as opening up
the possibility of discussing these other items.
You will recall that at the last summit conference
at Geneva there was a very prolonged and rather
sharp exchange of views at the restricted meet-
ing with respect to the label and title to be given
to these topics. And finally we compromised
upon a title that was called "European Security
and Germany," and that, we felt, was broad enough
to open up the kind of subjects that you refer to."
If we now accepted a narrowing of that agenda
item, as the Soviets propose, certainly they would
argue that we had agreed to forgo at this time any
discussion of the reunification of Germany. In-
deed, they are quite categorical, and have been
in the whole series of notes that they have put out,
that they do not consider that the reunification
of Germany is discussable. If we accept such an
agenda item with their interpretation on it, I
would think that — while, of course, nobody is
there physically to prevent the heads of Western
governments from uttering words, and we could
probably use those words "reunification of Ger-
Por text of the Directive to Foreign Ministers, see
Bulletin of Aug. 1, 1955, p. 176.
many" — I am quite sure it would be contended
on the other side that the terms of the conference
have implicitly, or, indeed, explicitly, excluded
that.
Q. Mr. Secretary, your Manila press conference
remarks gave the impression that you felt that
one possibility for negotiation was in the disarma-
ment field and that you might he prepared to
discuss that as a single agenda ite^n, assuming the
deadlock on the other items continues. Is that a
correct impr'ession?
And, secondly, on the question of outer space,
lohich was initially advanced here — the control of
outer space — are we prepared to have a U.N.
agency control this, and are we prepared to put
exploration of outer space under such a U.N.
agency, with or without Soviet participation?
A. Your first question calls for this answer:
that it is not a correct interpretation of what I
said at Manila that we would accept a summit
conference with only one item on the agenda,
that is, disarmament. We would feel that it would
be quite important to resume the discussion of
some of the — or, indeed, all of the items that
constituted the last agenda at the summit meeting,
and that, as I put it, to bury those items of the
first summit meeting in a second summit meeting
would be a very undesirable procedure.
Now on the second question, about the control
of outer space by the United Nations, you may
recall that at my talk, and in answer to questions,
at the Press Club here in "Washington, I advo-
cated the control of outer space by an organiza-
tion under, and created by, and responsible to, the
United Nations.'
Q. Mr. Secretary, a few questions hack you said
that you felt thnt the Soviet position on the
agenda was negotiahle. Is it your position that
the agenda as you have now described it is also
A. I indicated that all of these matters are, I
think, subject to negotiation and that I was not
in the position on behalf of the United States of
laying down any ultimatum.
Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us if our view
will continue to be that lower-level discussions
which make progress in easing some of the exist-
ing disputes are indispensable in order to deter-
mine whether a surrmiit conference will be worth
while?
A. We believe that preparatory talks through
ambassadors and/or foreign ministers are an in-
dispensable prerequisite to a summit meeting. I
do not see how otherwise it is possible to meet the
test which the Soviets themselves laid down,
namely, that any new summit meeting should
deal with matters which seemed to be susceptible
of solution. In our aide memoire * we asked the
Soviet Government to indicate the matters which
they thought were susceptible of solution in the
light of the known position of the United States
and other allied powers. There was no particular
response to that. They say — I think there is a
statement there — that they regret that the United
States has not made clear its position on some
of these matters. One would think that they had
not read the letters which President Eisenhower
wrote to President Bulganin, which do make clear
our position on these matters.
Q. Mr. Secretary, would the United States ac-
cept an agenda item using the same language as
the previous summit meeting on European se-
curity and Germany, and is it correct that it is
^'■Germany'''' or '■''German reunification"?
A. The label on the item was "European Se-
curity and Germany." Under that label there
appeared a rather full discussion of German re-
unification. So it is quite apparent that that
label carries with it the concept of German re-
unification. Also, that is made clear in the pre-
ceding sentence, the prelude which leads up to
that, where the powers, it is said, recognize the
close link between European security and the re-
unification of Germany.
Q. Would toe accept such an item for the agenda,
then?
A. I don't want to be absolutely categorical
about any of these matters. I think that, when
I have said that we thought that a second summit
meeting should begin where the last one left off, it
is fairly clear what our view is. But these matters
are all subject to discussion with our allies. There
is another meeting of the NATO Council on this
general subject, I believe, tomorrow. I don't like
to take unilaterally positions which ought in the
first instance to be discussed with our allies.
' lUd., Feb. 3, 1958, p. 159.
' For text, see ibid.. Mar. 24, 1958, p. 457.
Department of Stale Bulletin
hil H
Q. Mr. Secretain/, xcould you list one or two
items which you think are the most negotiable?
{Laughter)
A. I would find it difficult to do that, I am
afraid.
Q. Mr. Secretary., could you cut through all this
talk about agenda and explain to us whether you
would accept the proposition that at the meeting
in the preliminary phase anybody there could talk
about anything he wanted to?
A. At the summit meeting ?
Q. No, the preliminary meeting.
A. I think that, if the prelirainaiy meetings are
exchanges of views through diplomatic channels
or through meeting of foreign ministers, this
whole area should be discussed without any prior
limitations.
Q. Would you accept that at the suminit itself?
A. I think that that could not be answered in ad-
vance. I think much would depend upon what
came out of those preliminary talks. I think we
have made quite clear on a number of occasions
that, if it is apparent that a summit meeting could
only lead to a sharpening of differences, then it is
better not to have one. And if, indeed, at a sum-
mit meeting the talk is going to be in the same tone
and language of the last Soviet note, then it would
seem to me to be a great mistake to have a summit
meeting, because that would not allay tensions but
only increase them. The tone of the Soviet notes
has been increasingly harsh, and, if that is to be a
preview of the summit, you better not have any
summit. I think it must be made clear through
preliminary talks that a summit meeting would
serve a constructive purpose and not a destructive
purpose; and, if the preliminary talks indicate
that it would serve a destructive purpose, then it is
better not to have it.
Liaison Between NATO and OAS
Q. Mr. Secretary, at the NATO meeting in De-
cember you suggested a closer liaison among the
free-world organizations,^ and since then there has
been so?n.e correspondence betiveen NATO and the
Organization of American States — between the
Secretaries General — which some Latin Ameri-
cans have termed as rather insipid because they
merely propose an exchange of information which
was already available through the libraries of the
April 14, J 958
460259—58 3
tioo organizations, and there has been some com^-
ment that you seemed to have launched the idea
and then let it wither away. Are you prepared to
see it through and develop into something con-
structive, or are you just going to let it just stand
on the books? What are your plans?
A. I think all things start in a modest way and
that that does not necessarily presage their wither-
ing away. It depends upon how the idea develops.
I have always thought and believed that this thing
would have to start in a rather modest way. We
have never wanted to try to bring about an organic
unity of these different organizations. Informal
contacts between the Secretaries General, for ex-
ample, where they talk together, would indicate
whether or not it would be useful to go forward
and, if so, along what lines. I may say I am en-
tirely satisfied with the progress that has been
made to date and with the likelihood that there
will be a beginning of contacts.
You say that information has been in the li-
braries. That is quite true. But it has been in
the libraries outside of a context of some kind of
association between the different organizations.
The fact that this proposal even in its present
modest form is evoking a great deal of attention
and even discussion within the different organiza-
tions shows that there is in it a significance far
different from the fact that you can go into li-
braries and read about some of these things.
Q. Mr. Secretary, if we may climb back to the
summit for a moment, do you believe that the
price tag put up by the Soviets as it now stands is
too high?
A. I do.
Q. Do you think that the latest note in effect
has advanced or reversed prospects of the summit
meeting?
A. I think it has not advanced them any, and it
seems to me to have made it apparent that a con-
tinuation of this public note-writing is not going
to advance matters.
Indonesia
Q. Mr. Secretary, can you tell us what is going
on out in Indonesia? Our Ambassador seems to
have a riot on his hands, a sort of student demon-
stration.
■Ibid., Jan. 6, 1958, p. 8.
A. I understood there were some demonstra-
tions there.
Q. They grahled a Danish ship, and the Gov-
ernment there seems to he intensifying its
anti- American attitude. These demonstrations
and riots are certainly not accidental.
A. I don't think that such demonstrations neces-
sarily reflect or in fact do reflect any governmental
impetus. Rioting goes on in quit© a lot of places.
There were even riots, you remember, in Taipei
not so long ago, which I am sure did not reflect
any anti-American feeling on the part of the Gov-
ernment. It was due to a local incident. I was out
in Taipei just 2 weeks ago, and certainly there
was no vestige anywhere whatever of any anti-
American feeling, I would say, among the people,
as far as I could judge — certainly not among the
Government. I wouldn't attach too much impor-
tance to these student riots. I remember when I
was a student at the Sorbonne in Paris I used to go
out and riot occasionally. (Laughter)
Q. On whose side., sir?
A. I can't remember now which side it was on.
That shows how students just like to riot for the
fun of it. (Laughter)
Q. Can you tell us something about the sub-
stance and the purpose of your talks xoith the
Minister of Economy of Germany, Mr. Erhardf "
A. We welcomed here the visit of the Deputy
Chancellor, and we talked veiy largely about eco-
nomic problems, which is an area in which he is
particularly familiar and where he is at least
partly responsible, perhaps largely responsible, for
policies which have brought about a very re-
markable economic recovery in postwar Germany.
There are quite a number of problems relating to
the Common Market and the Free Trade Area
which can have potential repercussions upon the
United States and American business. Those were
the things which we primarily discussed.
Middle East
Q. Mr. Secretary, tliere have been reports of
some changes in administrative policy within
Arabia — transfer of certain functions to
' Ludwig Erhard, Minister of Economics of the Federal
Republic of Germany, conferred with officials in Washing-
ton Mar. 2't-26.
606
Prince Faisal. Would you give us your appraisal
of this situation as regards our relationship, or the
relationship of the Westeim countries, to Saudi
Arabia? Do you think this indicates any change
or any imTuinent change in relationships between
our country and Saudi Arabia?
A. No. We do not consider that this involves
any change in relations. It is not easy to evaluate
what has happened, and there are a number of in-
terpretations that are put upon it, all of them of a
speculative character. I think it is to be borne in
mind that Prince Faisal has in the past been
Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs.
He gave up those f mictions because of illness. He
came to the United States, as you will recall, to
have medical attention. While here, he met with
the President and with me. We have no reason
whatever to believe that he is animated by anti-
American sentiments. He goes back there to re-
sume functions wliich he had exercised before his
illness required him to lay them down. So that,
as far as that is concerned, what has happened is
quite a normal development.
Now, I would add this, that the whole situation
in the Arab world is in a state of evolution and
it is not easy to evaluate any event that occurs
there because the situation is considerably in flux.
The creation of the United Arab Republic and the
Federation and matters of that sort all inject new
elements, new forces, into the situation. And it re-
quires close observation and attention. But we
have no reason at the moment to put any unusual
evaluation upon what has happened in Saudi
Arabia.
Q. Would you relate this in any way to the
announcement by the Saud Government at the
international mantime law meeting that it con-
siders its waters around Aqaba national rather
than international?
A. That has been the position of the Govern-
ment of Saudi Arabia for a long time. And that
proposition will be involved, not in terms of spe-
cifics but in terms of the general propositions that
are being discussed. As you know, the positioni
of the United States historically has been, and
is, that full territorial rights do not extend more
than 3 miles. There is a strong movement to
bring about acceptance of a change in that ruk
of international law. The United States believes
Department of State Bulletin
that the 3-mile limit should be sustained and that
is the position of our delegation at Geneva.^
Q. Mr. Secretary, this month it has been a year
since the public expression of certain hopes and
expectations that led to the withdrawal of Israeli
forces from the Gaza Strip and Sharm-el-Sheikh.
I want to say, can you tell us, in your view, if these
hopes and expectations with regard to the specific
issue involved at the time, you are satisfied toith
what has happened since then?
A. As far as the issues that were involved at
the time of the withdrawal of Israeli forces and
the deployment of United Nations Emergency
Forces there, the results have fully fulfilled our
maximum expectations. There has been peace
and order in the area, and the United Nations
forces there have played a very useful, indeed
indispensable, role. I think it is now recognized
that, while both sides — both Israel and Egypt —
had great concei-n about that solution in the be-
ginning and about the principles which we ad-
vocated very strongly, there is now a realization
on both sides that our position at that time was
sound and that events have justified the position
that we then took.
Q. Mr. Secretary, can you tell us something at
this time about Mr. Murphy'' s mission to Paris
and Tunis; and, second, what is your position re-
garding the project of the Mediterranean pact
which has been suggested by Gaillard?
A. Mr. Murphy and Mr. Beeley of the United
Kingdom, after having spent some days in Tunis
in talking with the Tunisian Government and with
President Bourguiba, have returned to Paris with
a formulation which has been agreed to by Presi-
dent Bourguiba and which we think takes con-
siderable account of the preoccupations of both
sides on this situation. It has been presented to
the French Cabinet and is being discussed and
considered. We do not know yet what the final
' For a statement made by U.S. Representative Arthur
H. Dean on Mar. 11 at the D.N. Conference on the Law
of the Sea at Geneva, Switzerland, see ibiA., Apr. 7,
19.58, p. .574.
official reaction of the French Government will
be. Perhaps that will be forthcoming within a
matter of hours or days. We hope that it will
lead to a solution there of the immediate problem,
although of course the major problems will take
some time to resolve.
I want to take this occasion to say that I think
Deputy Under Secretary Murphy and his British
colleague have done a very fine job to date. I
don't know whether their mission will be crowned
with success or not. But whether or not it is
crowned with success, they have already dealt with
many problems that looked as though they were
totally insoluble and have brought them into a
compass which at least offers some reasonable
hope. They have done a superb diplomatic job.
Q. Mr. Secretary, to follmo up that question, in
your Manila conference you said that the Western
Mediterranean defense and economic pact would
be constructive if the development of that concept
were in a manner which is compatible with the
complete independence of all of the countries
involved. Did you mean to include Algeria with-
in tliat phrase of ^'■independence of all of the
countries involved''''?
A. No. I was speaking of the then independ-
ent countries and that the Mediterranean pact
should not in any way impinge upon the existing
independence of the countries of the area. I think
I also made reference to the fact that there has to
be acceptance, within the concept of independence,
of the concept also of interdependence. As I
emphasized yesterday in my testimony before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee,^ the concept
of interdependence today is vital and anyone who
pushes the doctrine of independence to such a
point as to deny the practice of interdependence
is in fact jeopardizing his own independence.
But I did not intend by that statement to carry
any implication, one way or another, about the
future of Algeria.
Q. Thank you, sir.
' See p. 622.
e)i« ^P"' »4, 1958
607
Basic Principles Governing United States Relations With Latin America
hy Roy R. Rubottom, Jr.
Assistant Secretary for 1 7\ier- American Affairs '
Today I would like to state as simply as possible
the policy which guides United States relations
with Latin America. Our Government has con-
sistently placed the highest priority on maintain-
ing and further extending our excellent relations
with this vast neighboring area. This is a bi-
partisan policy and one which has broad public
support throughout the United States. It is a
policy which we strongly adhere to and which
we keep under continuing study in order that we
may be prepared to meet whatever exigency arises.
It is one which has already stood the test of time.
Yes, and also the vicissitudes of war and economic
depression.
Those of us who are charged with the responsi-
bility for the conduct of this policy strive to be
as alert as possible to the political, social, and eco-
nomic developments to which United States policy
must respond. Recently there has been more than
the usual amount of public attention paid to our
relations with Latin America. This is heartening.
Early in March the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions of the Senate, which is conducting a review
of United States foreign policy, held open hear-
ings to discuss our relations with Latin America.
Governor Munoz Marin of Puerto Rico appeared
before the committee, and I was also called to
testify .= Now let me state the policy.
The United States not only desires, but feels
the need, to establish the closest and most friendly
relations with the Latin American peoples and
their governments. This need arises out of more
Address made at Tyler Junior College, Tyler, Tex.,
on Mar. 21 (press release 137 dated Mar. 20).
' For text of Mr. Rubottom's statement, see Bulletin of
Mar. 31, 1958, p. 518.
than self-interest. It is a need that springs from
one and the same root and has been a long time
growing. It is, in fact, as old as the earliest colo-
nization of the Western Hemisphere. Sometimes
we think so much about differences — in language,
national origin, aspects of religion and customs —
that we forget the identities. However, one of the
most striking things about the Americas is how
much they have in common. There is no other
group of peoples so numerous, no other area of
the globe so extensive, of which this could be truth-
fully said. Here in a world which really was a
New World for our forefathei-s, a tremendous
experiment was undertaken with results decisive
for human history. We began as groups of ex-
plorers and settlers. We had a period of coloniza-
tion. We felt the need of independence and won
it. Because we believed in the dignity and free-
dom of man, we established constitutional democ-
racies. And "we" means all of the American
Republics — the United States and the 20 sister
nations.
In view of this parallel experience, our ma-
chinery of inter- American cooperation developed
naturally — indeed, almost inevitably. Wlien we
speak of the American family of nations, we are
voicing a fundamental truth. Since it is truth, it
follows that our own cooperation with the other
American Republics is based on genuine affec-
tion for our friends, which we hope is reciprocated.
This affection applies to each of the 20 countries
whose considerable differences and distinctive
characters we fully recognize while, at the same
time, we greatly treasure, as each of them does,
our common membership in the Organization of
American States, which President Eisenhower has
608
Department of Stale Bulletin
called "the most successfully sustained adventure
in international community living that the world
has ever seen."
We hold deeply to the belief that the people of
the various countries in the hemisphere have the
right to choose their own political destiny: The
policy of nonintervention, which we strongly up-
hold, is one of the cornerstones of the inter- Amer-
ican system. Our commitment to this policy, how-
ever, does not lessen our own dedication to democ-
racy in its real and, I might add, American sense,
and "we are in a position to feel — and we do feel —
satisfaction and pleasure when the people of any
countiy determinedly choose the road of democ-
racy and freedom.'' ^ Here we should remind our-
selves of the obligation we have to overcome our
own shortcomings and improve upon the example
which we are expected to set. We should also
recognize that no two governments, any more than
two individuals, can be exactly alike. Thus we
should not be surprised when the emerging pat-
terns of government differ from country to
country .
We acknowledge the high stakes for our neigh-
bors as well as ourselves in maintaining tlue secu-
rity of this hemisphere. We hope no aggressor
will ever dare attack the nations of the free world,
but we cannot rule out this possibility. In addi-
tion to recognizing the right of each country to
take the measures necessary for self-defense, all 21
of the American Republics are joined together
under the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal
Assistance, known as the Rio Treaty, which is the
first of the regional collective-security pacts of the
free world. Under this treaty each of the Amer-
ican Republics recognizes that an attack on any
one constitutes an attack on all and accepts the
obligation to assist in meeting the attack.
Economic Interdependence
In the realm of economic relationships we rec-
ognize our interdependence with Latin America.
Our own economic well-being, certainly if it is to
be lasting, is inextricably intertwined with that of
Latin America. This mutual well-being is, I am
glad to say, based primarily on trade. This is a
proud relationship. More than one-fifth of our
exports now go to Latin America, a business worth
approximately $4 billion to the United States in
' Ibi'l., p. 520.
April 14, 1958
1957 and almost as much in 1956. On the other
hand, almost 50 percent of all of Latin America's
exports were to the United States last year, the
total amount being nearly in balance with the
above $4 billion figure. This is big business, and
we want to keep it that way ; you can rest assured
that Latin America feels the same way about it,
and would like to see those figures increased.
Right now Latin America is observing closely eco-
nomic trends in the United States, and with ample
justification, just as you are. Every Latin Amer-
ican ambassador in Washington is anxiously
watching our own efforts to overcome the present
problem and is praying that we will be successful
in turning business upward again.
There has been a severe decline in prices in some
of the goods sold us by Latin America, notably in
nonfcrrous metals, although other products have
been affected. Coffee is Latin America's main con-
cern, if one considers that 15 countries produce
coffee and that 6 of these are dependent on that
product for most of their foreign exchange. How-
ever, it makes no difference whether the affected
product is coffee, copper, lead, zinc, tin, or some-
thing else. ^Vlien prices drop sharply, people in
every walk of life in the producing countries are
adversely affected. We can and should be sympa-
thetic to these serious problems in Latin America,
just as we know they are to our own problems in
the United States. It is in our common interest to
find solutions to these common problems.
One of our most im.portant tools in finding
mutually beneficial solutions is the Trade Agree-
ments Act. With the authority of this act, first
enacted in 1934, behind us, we can negotiate agree-
ments to reduce government-imposed barriers to
trade. Without this authority we would find our-
selves in an economic jungle in which the only
remedy for each injury or fancied injury in the
field of trade would be not negotiation but re-
taliation. Latin America is watching with tre-
mendous interest the debate which is now going
on. The effects of the decision ultimately taken
by Congress will have far-reaching repercussions
in our foreign relations, both psychological and
real.
Private Economic Cooperation
But obviously our entire economic relationsliip
is not based on trade alone. United States firms
have been investing their capital in Latin America
609
on a constantly increasing scale. This kind of
private economic cooperation is helping to speed
the developnaent of Latin America, just as foreign
investment, mostly European, participated in the
growth of our own country. During the last few
years United States investoi-s have been pouring
approximately one-half billion dollars per year
into Latin America, and the total is now more
than $81/^ billion. Not only have these invest-
ments been increasing rapidly, but they are going
into diversified manufacturing and service in-
dustries as well as the production of vitally
needed raw materials. A recent study by the De-
partment of Commerce,* using data compiled
through 1955, revealed that in that year United
States companies operating in Latin America paid
salaries totaling $1 billion to 625,000 employees,
of whom only 9,000 came from the United States.
These companies in the same year paid slightly
more than $1 billion in taxes to the host govern-
ments in Latin America. Their sales abroad for
dollars went over the $2-billion mai'k during that
year.
The United States, of course, believes in private
enterprise because of its proven success. We also
know that private investors are willing to com-
mit large amounts of capital in almost any area
where conditions promise mutually beneficial re-
sults ; it is also self-evident that there is a limited
amomit of public money available. Therefore,
we have recognized, most recently at the Buenos
Aires Economic Conference, that the additional
great sums required for the development of Latin
America can only be supplied through a com-
bination of private and public funds. Thus we
say that, if private capital is available in adequate
amounts and on reasonable terms for a given
project, it is our policy now, as it has been for
years, not to have our public lending agencies
compete with such capital. This policy is not
pointed at any given industi-y but applies across
the board. Notwithstanding our deeply held feel-
ing regarding private enterprise, we recognize
the absolute right of any other counti-y to pursue
whatever means it deems best for developing its
resources.
* U.S. Investments in the Latin American Economy, pub-
lished by the OflBce of Business Economics, U.S. Depart-
ment of Commerce, and available from the Superintendent
of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Wash-
ington 25, D. C. ; price $1.75.
Other Sources of Capital
In addition to the roles of trade and investment
in Latin America, the United States acknowledges
the importance of providing loans to our neigh-
bors. During the past decade United States di-
rect loans to Latin America, under the auspices
of the Export-Import Bank, have amounted to
more than $2 billion. At the same time additional
United States public funds have been going to
Latin America through our participation in the
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund,
the technical assistance programs of the United
Nations and the Organization of American States,
and through other organizations relying heavily
upon the United States for financial support.
But to speak expressly about the direct United
States cooperation through the Export-Import
Bank, it is the operating principle of that institu-
tion that no economically sound development
project in Latin America shall fail for lack of
access to capital from other sources to cover its
dollar needs. Between 1953 and 1957 the banlf
authorized credits to governments and private
companies in the amount of $1,354,000,000. Re-
cent loans have been as little as $50,000 and as
large as one to Brazil of $100 million for the
modernization of its railroad system. Every one
of our sister Eepublics shared in these credits
during this period, and, I might add, their record
of repayment is on the whole excellent.
Anotlier newer source of capital is now provided
through the sale for local currency of our surplus
agricultural products. Under Public Law 480,
adopted by Congress in 1954, the value of loan
agreements with Latin American countries signed
through 1957 totaled $222 million and the emer-
gency grants of surplus agricultural products ag-
gregated $31 million. An important feature of
these loans is the provision that enables the pur-
chasing country to borrow back for its economic
development a large part of the money paid to the
United States for the products received. Thus the
recipient country receives a three-way advantage:
(1) the surplus products themselves; (2) the dol-
lar savings, since payments can be made in their
own currency; and (3) the loan of a large portion
of the sales proceeds over a long period of time
and at a low interest rate.
Stabilization credits provide another example
of how public funds are used in our economic co-
operation with Latin America. These credits, or
standbys, as they are called, are made available to
610
Dspartmenf of State Bulletin
I <nmtries to help them ease the strain on their re-
st rves and maintain the value of their currencies
while they are attempting to achieve financial sta-
bility. The standby credits are usually "package"
arrangements, with participation by the United
States Government, the International Monetary
Fund, and, frequently, private United States
banks. During 1953-1957 direct participation by
the United States Government alone in standby
credits aggregated $115% million.
Another means of extending United States co-
operation to Latin American countries has been
that of providing emergency grant aid when they
were unable to meet their needs with their own re-
sources. These emergencies have arisen from
natural disasters such as earthquakes or hurricanes
or from unforeseen economic or political situa-
tions. Since 1954 this aid, provided under our mu-
tual security program, has totaled $75 million. In
addition, easy-term loans were made under Sena-
tor Smathers' amendment totaling $12.8 million
to seven Latin American countries for certain de-
velopment projects in the fields of health, sanita-
tion, and education.
Still another type of direct United States Gov-
ernment cooperation is that offered by congres-
sional appropriations for the United States
share — which is two-thirds — in the cost of the In-
ter-American Highway, extending from the Guate-
malan border with Mexico down to the Panama
Canal. Since 1953 appropriations have amounted
to more than $81 million, and Congress is being
asked this year to approve another $10 million.
This year for the first time the United States
has funds available under the Development Loan
Fund. Several applications from Latin American
countries are now being considered by the admin-
istrators of this fund, and approval of some of
those projects is expected shortly. The fund is
designed primarily to extend loans for financing
projects in the free world which contribute to eco-
nomic development and which cannot otherwise be
financed by existing international or private insti-
tutions. These loans may be repaid in either local
currency or dollars and are relatively long-term
and at reasonable interest rates.
Technical Cooperation
In speaking of our economic policy toward
Latin America I have purposely left until last the
mention of our long record of technical coopera-
tion in Latin America. This program, started in
April 14, 7958
1942, probably yields more human-intei-est epi-
sodes than any of the othere, not to mention the
long-teiTn practical contribution it is making in
our relations with Latin America. In it, scientists,
teclmicians, and other experts from the United
States team up with their counterparts in Latin
American countries to carry out cooperative pro-
grams in agriculture, public health, education,
transportation, housing, community development,
public administration, and in other areas vital to
a country's welfare. A remote tropical jungle can
be the setting for one program and a high, arid
plateau the location of another. In practically
every instance the host government for these proj-
ects contributes considerably more to their financ-
ing than the United States Government; so you
can visualize the constructive work going on
when I tell you that in the past 5 years our
share alone amounted to $125 million. However,
even if we had before us complete figures from all
countries, the total, though imposing, would be no
index to the accomplishments of this program.
The exchange of ideas and technical know-how
cannot be reckoned in terms of dollars, and no one
can foresee the value of the changes which will
follow the improved health conditions, new agri-
cultural techniques, increased productivity, and
other positive results growing out of this type of
partnership.
Now, having stated the policy and the instru-
ments at our disposal for executing it, I would like
to describe briefly some typical problems. Under-
lying our approach to these, of course, is the most
fimdamental ingredient of all for constructive
foreign relations — the desire to cooperate with our
friends. This bears repeating again and again.
Tiie Importance of Coffee
I have already referred to coffee. Let us ex-
amine it in more detail.
As important as coffee is to those of us who love
both the taste and the aroma of a cup in the
morning — or any other time — coffee is even more
important to our friends to the south. As I men-
tioned earlier, 6 of the 15 coffee-producing coun-
tries depend on coffee for most of their foreign
exchange to buy what they need in the United
States. The United States is the principal con-
sumer of coffee.
Except for a period of 6 years, beginning in
April 1941, when quotas on imports were first im-
posed, and continuing througli the removal of
price controls in 1947, coffee has been subject to the
normal laws of supply and demand. There was
a time in 1954 when coffee prices in tlie United
States to the consumer rose to such a point as to
encounter rather severe resistance. Nobody, cer-
tainly not the countries which depend on coffee
for their foreigia exchange and the livelihood of
their people, wants to see coffee priced out of the
market. On the other hand, I do not think that
the American housewife, any more than the Gov-
ernment of the United States, wants to see a dis-
astrous price decline which would have even more
disastrous effects on the countries where coffee is
produced and, ultimately, on the quality and quan-
tity of the product that we have come to depend
upon to help us get started on our day's work.
Given the importance of coffee, what is going
on in this industry ? The price of mild coffee fell
almost 20 cents a pound between January and
October last year, when the new crop came in.
Sales were being made at less tlian 50 cents a
pound, which was below tlie support prices guar-
anteed producers by their governments and lower
than the average prices for any year since 1949.
With a large crop coming to market this year and
a still larger one forecast for next year, tliey were
understandably worried, and the principal Latin
American producing countries met in Mexico City
in October of last year to consider what they
should do. Tlie chief i-esult of that meeting was
a coordinated effort on their part to stabilize
coffee prices. This they did by establishing ex-
port quotas and agreeing to place on the market
only as much as could be sold at what producers
regarded as a reasonable price. The plan has
been in operation now for about 5 months, and
prices are currently about 53 to 54 cents a pound —
about what they averaged in 1951 and 1952.
Later, at Rio de Janeiro in January of this
year, the American coffee-producing coinitries met
with the African coffee producers to discuss the
problem on a worldwide basis. The principal
consuming countries of Europe were represented,
and the United States sent an official observer.
The leading buyers of coffee in the United States,
members of the National Coffee Association, were
also represented by an observer. The result of
that meeting was the establishment of a world
coffee organization, the main purposes of which
are to promote the increased consumption of
coffee, as one method of attacking the problem
of overproduction, and to pi-ovide a place where
the supply-and-demand situation can be kept con-
stantly imder review.
Now the United States is searching for the
most useful means of cooperating with its Latin
American friends on the problem of coffee. In
some respects our approach to the problem is dif-
ferent from theirs ; in fact, we have quite frankly
disagreed witli some of their efforts to maintain
prices at levels which might operate to reduce
consumption. But tliese disagreements have been
in the context of a deep and abiding friendship,
and we are searching for means of agreement
rather than concentrating on the disagreements.
The problem is under urgent and continuing study
in the Department of State, and I am confident
that we will find a means to work with Latin
America on this problem of transcendental im-
portance.
The Problem of Oil
While in Texas, I should not overlook the prob-
lem of oil. This, my home State, along with
other oil-producing regions of the world, is faced
with the problem of reestablishing the petroleum
production and marketing relationships which
were seriously disrupted when we in the Western
Hemisphere expanded to meet the supply deficit
created by the Suez crisis. The problem was fur-
ther complicated by the decline experienced in the
United States domestic demand following the
Suez crisis and which still continues. We cer-
tainly hope that the problem will not be one of
long duration.
Meanwhile our Government, with the coopera-
tion of an overwhelming majority of crude-oil
importers, instituted a new program of voluntary
import limitations last July which has worked
very well indeed, even acknowledging the two or
three exceptions where cooperation has not been
forthcoming. This program, of course, magnifies
the fact that the oil problem is not confined to
the United States. It is of great significance to
two of our Western Hemisphere partners and
friends, Venezuela and Canada, on whom we rely
for part of our needs for oil and other vital prod-
ucts, both in normal and emergency periods.
Now what do good friends do wlien they find
a common problem? They sit down together to
seek a mutually satisfactory solution.
I visited Venezuela about 3 weeks ago and ex-
plored this problem with the Provisional Gov-
612
Department of Slate Bulletin
ernment, certain political and business leaders in
tlie country, and others. I found a disposition on
the part of our Venezuelan friends to engage in
the kind of frank discussion which should help us
find a solution to the problem. The same attitude
has been shown by our Canadian friends. I am
happy to report tliat consultations on the teclinical
level have I'ecently been held in Caracas and in
Washington in which my outstanding friend and
fellow-Texan, General Ernest O. Thompson, took
part. Tliis is the essence of tlie approach that we
people of the Americas take to find solutions to
problems, and I am sure that this effort will not
fail.
Now let us take up another type of problem.
Let us assume there is a Latin American country
whose exports consist of 50 percent in coffee and
50 percent in nonferrous metals. It finds that
because of the decline in prices of one or both of
these commodities, and also because of lessening
demand abroad, there is a sharp reduction in its
income from exports. Its foreign-exchange defi-
cit for the coming year is estimated at about
$50 million. Let us also assume that this country
has drawn down its reserves in the previous year
and that it has only $20 million left with which to
meet the anticipated deficit.
In all likelihood a senior official would be sent
to Washington to lay tliis problem before the In-
ternational Monetary Fund and tlie United States
financial authorities. He would describe his
country's situation and work out a program
jointly witli the IMF staff for dealing with it,
subject to the concurrence of his Government and
the Board of Directors of the IMF. In general
this country would strive for austerity in its im-
ports and would seek to maintain a balanced budg-
et and a tight rein on credit. In some instances
wliere the applicant country's currency has been
kept at an artificially low rate of exchange, it may
offer to let the rate fluctuate and find its own level,
thus reducing some of the drain on foreign ex-
change.
The measures I just mentioned may sliow, on
examination, that policies to reduce imports and
promote exports will only reduce the deficit $25
million instead of $50 million. The International
Monetary Fund, having concluded that the pro-
gram adopted by the country is adequate and that
the deficit is temporary in nature, is willing to put
up $15 million to help cover that gap. Another
$10 million might be obtained from private bank-
April 14, 1958
ing sources in the United States. If so, that
makes a package which covers a $25 million
deficit.
In some cases, however, the country may not be
able to raise an additional $10 million in New
York and it may be necessary to turn to other
sources to make up tliis package. The country,
for example, because of a local shortage may need
wheat and other farm products and be eligible
under United States Public Law 480 to obtain
$10 million wortli of these from our surplus stocks
on very long credit terms. In some cases it might
even be necessary to ask the Export-Import Bank
to make available the last component of the total
deficit in order to finance the flow of essential
United States imports into that country.
Generally the agencies contributing toward the
$25-million gap desire that the IMF contribution
come first, since the fund was set up precisely for
the purpose of helping countries wliich have tem-
porary balance-of-payments problems. At times
these agencies work out arrangements whereby
drawings on them are made in some agreed-upon
relationship to the drawings on the IMF and the
private banks.
The foregoing represents how the United States
Government, in cooperation with international
and private financial institutions, assists a country
which might otherwise have to reduce imports to
such an extent that the economic development of
the country would suffer.
I wish to stress that there is deep concern and
good will inherent in the United States approach
to economic cooperation with Latin America.
Soviet-Bloc Efforts in Latin America
Now to refer briefly to a subject which has re-
ceived some public notice :
There is evidence that the Soviet Union is in-
tensifying its economic and political offensive in
many parts of tlie world, including Latin Amer-
ica. The Kremlin's propaganda professes sincere
interest in trade expansion. Yet, in actual fact,
Soviet-bloc trade with Latin America has been de-
clining in recent years, primarily because of the
failure of the Soviets to deliver acceptable, com-
petitively priced goods as a counterpart to those
raw materials received by them from Latin
America.
Although there have been numerous reports of
Soviet-bloc "offers" of trade, capital, and teclinical
613
assistance, it remains to be seen whether these will
meet with general acceptance or whether they will
actually materialize as serious propositions. This
is said because of the vague and illusive character
of the offers, as well as because of Latin American
governmental prudence based on past experience
with Soviet promises.
Nevertheless, I do not wish to minimize the
gravity of the challenge for the United States
posed by the Soviet-bloc efforts in Latin America
or its capacity to choose selected targets for an
economic offensive. This will require sustained
vigilance and care on the part of the countries
approached, and I am confident that our hemi-
sphere partners will not be found lacking.
I have tried today to convey to you a concise
idea of the basic principles governing our rela-
tions with Latin America. I have endeavored to
make clear the needs and situations — the types of
problems— to which United States policy must re-
spond. I have spoken of the friendly spirit in
which all the American Republics work together
to solve our mutual problems. We in Washington
are resolved to dedicate our best efforts to insuring
that this spirit of inter- American solidarity is fur-
ther strengthened, and we humbly ask the guid-
ance of Almighty God in our task.
President-Elect of Costa Rica
Visits United States
The Department of State announced on March
24 (press release 146) the following members of
the party accompanying Mario Echandi Jimenez,
President-elect of the Republic of Costa Rica,
during his visit to Washington, D. C, March
26-29 :
Seuora de Echandi
Gonzalo J. Pacio, Ambassador of Costa Rica, and Senora
de Facio
Alfredo Hernandez Velio and Seiiora de Hernandez
.Torge Borbon Castro and Senora de Castro
Joaquin Vargas Gene and Seiiora de Vargas
Tomas Federico Guardia Herrero and Senora de Guardia
Wiley T. Buchanan, Jr., Chief of Protocol of the United
States
U.S. Economic Aid to Spain
Increased by $15 Million
Press release 148 dated March 25
The American Ambassador at Madrid, John
Davis Lodge, informed the Spanish Government
on March 25 that the United States has made avail-
able to Spain an additional $15 million in economic
assistance. Ambassador Lodge told Foreign
Minister Fernando Maria Castiella that the Em-
bassy had received official announcement of the
increase approved by President Eisenhower.
The new funds, made available under the terms
of the Mutual Security Act, bring the total of the
defense support program for Spain to $56 million
for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1958. The $15
million increase for this year brings the total
economic aid to Spain under the mutual security
program to $356 million since the signing of the
1953 Spanish- American defense agreements.*
The entire program is designed to bolster the
Spanish economy in the interests of mutual de-
fense. The economic program has emphasized
railroad rehabilitation, electric power develop-
ment, agriculture, and technical assistance.
More recently, in order to help maintain a high
level of industrial production and to insure the
adequacy of domestic supply, this jjrogram has
supported Spain's economy by providing indus-
trial raw materials and essential agricultural com-
modities. In accordance with the desire of the
Government of Spain, the additional $15 million
granted to Spain will be used primarily to finance
the imports of industrial raw materials.
Ambassador Lodge also informed Foreign Min-
ister Castiella that he was authorized to negotiate
an amendment to the January 17 agreement for
the sale of U.S. surplus products which will per-
mit Spain to buy for pesetas 23,800 additional
bales of short-staple cotton valued at approxi-
mately $4 million.
For text, see Bulletin of Oct. 5, 1953, p.
Department of Stale Bulletin
Labor Rejects Communism— East Germany
by Eleanor Lansing Dulles
Special Assistant to the Director,
Ice of German Affairs '
Labor Knows the Price of Communism
Labor does not like communism. There was a
ime when it would not have been easy to prove
this statement. Those were the days when it
eemed possible that the organized economic sys-
:em which raised the peasant and serf of Eastern
Europe and put them in a factory or woi-kshop
would substantially improve their lot.
There has been, at least in statistics and to some
Bxtent in i-eal values, an improvement in the living
standards of many thousands in Russia. Because
londitions before the revolution were primitive,
;he economic changes were defended by some as
worth the price of dictatorehip.
Later, in 1947 and 1948, when the Communists
tried to apply their methods to more highly in-
dustrialized countries, such as Czechoslovakia and
Germany, the real meaning of the system of con-
trols became evident to the workers in the oc-
3upied countries and they came to fear both for
;heir welfare and, more important, for the free-
doms won over the centuries.
This basic attitude of labor has been evident in
many places but nowhere more clearly than in the
part of Germany occupied by the Communist
troops. Here, more than elsewhere, the flaws in
the Communist system can be analyzed. Because
conditions are in so many respects comparable, the
glaring differences between the two parts of Ger-
many in productivity, in consumption, in worker-
management relations, and in civil rights are of
striking significance.
' Address made before the International Relations Coun-
11 at St. Mary's College, South Bend, Ind., on Mar. 21
press release 134 dated Mar. 19) .
t(pn\ 14, 7958
Here, in 1958, one finds on two sides of the
artificial and temporary frontier workers of the
same tradition, skills, and habits of life. Here
are millions of Germans differing in no essential
respect from each other except the political re-
gimes and the economic consequences created by
these regimes.
The facts of economic repression under com-
munism become evident in the statistics of con-
sumption and production, in rationing, and now
have been brought into the open in the recent de-
bates between the rulers. The workers speak for
themselves, whenever possible, at times in active
revolt or when they escape as refugees.
The Russians learned to fear the free choice of
the people, either voting as individuals or acting
through union groups, shop committees, or other
forms of voluntary cooperation. In 1945 they
tried the experiment of permitting elections in
Hungary and in Austria. These votes were an
overwhelming repudiation of communism, and the
experiment has not been tried again by the Com-
munists. Now they even try to prevent the travel
or communication of East Germans with the out-
side world, and they visit penalties on the friends
and families of those who flee from their tyranny.
Today, after decisions last August to press to-
ward complete socialization of industry and agri-
culture, there is a split in the Communist leader-
ship on policy. There are some in the ruling
group who argue that the Germans will not submit
to tyrannical restrictions and slavelike conditions
in mine and factory. Others, in spite of warnings
of danger of revolt, insist upon more discipline
and more severe penalties.
615
One worker in East Germany, endeavoring to
sum up the present situation, said recently, "The
Soviets can warp an economy, but they cannot win
the support of the people or make their part of
the world a decent place to live in without basi-
cally altering their system." The question now,
of vital importance to all of us, is whether they
can or will modify their system in Germany or
elsewhere.
Why the Germans Reject Communism
The workei-s in Germany reject the restrictions
and oppression of communism, as does labor in
all the industrialized countries who have experi-
enced the benefits of an advanced economic and
political society. Whatever accomplishments
labor may have expected several decades ago from
a government which promised the worker-state,
experience has now demonstrated the losses in
position and in opportunity which they have al-
ready suffered, and they are fearful for the future.
The reasons why communism has not been able
to win popular support can be grouped under
three main headings. While these are more ap-
plicable to the Western democracies, at the present
time, they become increasingly significant for all
countries as the world potential for production
and consumption continues to rise. The problems
which the Soviets are now facing in their zone of
occupation in Germany cast a shadow which will
fall on many Communist lands in the coming
decade.
Because of their broad significance, it is worth
analyzing the areas of main grievance of labor in
Germany today: the failure to have responsible
and democratic relations with management, the
deterioration of working conditions, and the de-
plorable living standards. These three concerns,
if considered as a framework for more specific
issues, may be said to be the major causes of unrest,
defiance, and continuing hatred of the Eussians
and their agents in Germany. These represent the
flaws inherent in the Communist systeni which
will now, and in the future, prevent its forward
progress. Only recently have they begun to dis-
turb the Kremlin in Russia, itself, in a manner
apparent to the outside world. Before the im-
provement in wages and the extension of educa-
tion to large groups, considerations of this sort
were unimportant. Now they can be left out of
account nowhere.
616
It is not only occupied Germany and the outer
fringes of the bloc that are in a state of suppressed
revolt. Throughout the satellite countries there
are stirrings and questionings as to the incentives
to produce, the right to share the fruits of modern
industry and science, and the desire to participate
in decisions. These are ideas that cannot be kept
within national borders.
In the denial of these rights and responsibilities
to those who have known good living conditions
and in the contrast between the East and West
portions of Germany, a nation with unified tradi-
tions and purposes, there can be no permanence.
In this ferment are found the ingredients of ulti-
mate Communist destruction. Here, in Germany,
one can see the difference between the two systems.
Here, incontrovertibly, the cost of the Communist
system in terms of human values is evident.
The Lack of Worker Representation
The original Soviet concept of worker relation
to industry and to the state location of authority
was so different from that of the Western World
that it was largely misunderstood outside of Rus-
sia. The Soviet constitution of 1936 indicates that
the workers are the state and the workers' state
governs all. There are no dependable provisions
for dealing with questions of wages, hours, or
methods of work. One of the rare constructive
welfare functions they perform in Russia — and
this applies to the East Zone of Germany also —
is to administer worker vacations.
In general, plans affecting the lives of individ-
uals and occupational groups, and conditions in
factories or mines or workshops, are settled in the
authoritarian hierarchy of the Council of National
Economy. Such workers' unions as are permitted
to exist are more a formal recognition of the exist-
ence of the working force than instrmnents for
improving conditions.
In their occupied zone the Russians began toltopi
realize in 1946 and 1947 that the tradition of reall Hh
bargaining was strong. They were dealing withi
dedicated and experienced labor leaders, particu-
larly in Berlin. At that time they considered per-
mitting unions to function on a limited basis,
They developed and actually put into effect in a
few cases a special system of Works Councils, and!
then, in a matter of months, they recognized the
danger of establishing organs of potential resist-
ance and decided to allow the plan to lapse. The adtaj,
Department of State Builetir-
hi :
vorkers' groups for the past 10 years have had to
naintain their existence in an inconspicuous and
mrecognized manner.
Now, in 1958, after 12 years of Soviet occupation,
t is not possible for workers to meet in free as-
embly. Plans to improve the lot of the man and
voman in industry, discussed from time to time,
ive been as often abandoned by the Soviets.
The Soviets have never dared to permit open
ilections in trade unions or in other groups. Those
vho continue to advise and lead the workers, in
lefiance of the totalitarian state, do what they can
ft mobserved — without scheduled meetings, without
isible financial support, and without any means
o speak for the riglits and needs of the craftsmen
nd laborers who are their fellows. At present
list here is much evidence of unrest in the zone.
The controlled labor organization, the so-called
^'ree German Federation of Trade Unions, in the
5ast Zone is not able to influence elections or work-
ng conditions or develop an active leadership. It
lioi s a Communist showpiece with no substance; it
ritj las little meaning to workers brought up in the
)rl( jerman tradition. Its spokesmen merely parrot
ins he words of the sinister and powerful leader of
hal he party, Ulbricht.
tati The unwillingness of the Berliners to accept
bus Communist domination was evident even in 1946
01 md 1947. Observers of postwar Berlin testify
hat the lessons of 1933 had been well learned. The
truggle of the union leader against Kremlin rep-
•esentatives in 1946 was brought to a climax in
^larch with the openly expressed opposition to the
]i lingle voting list. This list would have merged
sii Socialist and Communist Parties, but, supported
)y the Western Allies, the city rejected the pro-
)osal. This expression of independence and op-
rt )osition to the new dictatorship was possible in
Berlin because of the position there of the three
fo! Western powers— the United States, the United
kingdom, and France. They were in a position
o protect free speech and prevent a reign of terror
al vith the threat of arrest and kidnaping.
The decision of the Soviets not to risk genuine
slections after 1945 is a basic element of their pol-
cy and relates to their stand on reunification.
It is reasonable to assume that only an awareness
in 1 ;hat the tide of opinion is rumiing strongly against
i hem can lead the Soviets to a change in method
li( md policy. This they are beginning to discover
n the East Zone. Thus the superficial short-run
T!ie idvantages they think they gained in repressing
kitXpril 14, 1958
free expression and representation may lead to un-
manageable conditions. Those same workers who
helped stem the further advance of communism in
1946 and 1947 may help to demonstrate the need
for freedom by their unwillingness to yield in
spirit in the decade that lies ahead.
Working Conditions Unacceptable
The conditions in the workshops themselves are
a genuine cause of frustration and bitterness to
the German workman. This is a major cause for
his lack of tolerance of the Soviets and their
system. Even Sputnik has been regarded with
cynicism in view of the Soviets' inability to pro-
vide the households with the simj^ler necessities or
to set up high-grade machinery.
There are, of course, a number of exceptions.
The favored industries are well equipped. Work
of high quality is being carried on in a number of
places. In general, however, there are signs of
breakdowns in agriculture and in many industries.
Construction and transportation are of poor qual-
ity. The manpower shortage, accentuated by the
flow of refugees, compounds the difficulties.
The Communist nilers of East Germany have
recently shown some awareness of the unsatis-
factory working conditions. In fact, the purges
and upheavals of 1958 r.re directly related to con-
troversy over working conditions and labor re-
quirements. The workers were promised shorter
hours. Within the party and outside there has
been heated discussion of norms, which are the
standards set for output per worker. The regime
has made minor upward adjustments in money
wages, but any real gain in purchasing power
has been, for the most part, illusory because of
the shortage of consumer goods.
The net improvement for the worker in in-
dustry has been negligible. The theoretical nor-
mal hours of 45 per week are stretched by ad-
ditional hours and production requirements to
meet the norms.
Meanwhile, the productivity standards, subject
to continuing resistance on the part of the
workers, have been increased while the actual
productivity fails to gain. Tools and machinery
in many industries, and generally in agriculture,
have deteriorated rather than improved in the
past 5 years. The worker under these pressures
is forced to increase his exertion to keep wages up
617
and keep hours down and still is 30 or 40 percent
less well off than his fellow worker in West
Germany.
The Communists are now facing this problem.
For almost the first time they are givhig thought
to the question of incentives in their handling
of Grerman problems. It would be unwise to as-
sume that the present low level of production
will continue. As the result of present conflicts
of views and criticisms of conditions, concessions
will probably be made of necessity. The main
point to observe, which will be watched by the
world at large, is whether there will be a loosen-
ing of restrictions and a significant reduction of
oppressive measures.
Recent reports of the economic administrators
and politicians conferring on these economic
questions show a recognition of the continuing
dilemma. There are complaints of failure to im-
prove economic conditions leading in January and
February to purges of some half dozen leading
officials. Meanwhile, labor shortages are serious
and are likely to keep productivity well below
standards. Indifference or flight are continuing
factors.
Genuine improvement of wages and hours has
been postponed from year to year. Even accord-
ing to Communist claims output per worker is
increasing slowly in most industries and overall
production remains low, except in certain seg-
ments, and equipment and raw materials inade-
quate. Some of the Communist central officials
say that there may be a complete breakdown be-
cause of the lack of balance between equipment,
raw materials, and labor.
The Communist rulers of East Germany, by
any standards, have a real problem on their hands
in attempting to check the flight of able-bodied
workers, as thousands a month take refuge in
the Federal Republic and Berlin. ■ The first flood
of migration reached a peak when an average of
5,000 a week left the zone in 1953. At that time
it was considered that the refugees were motivated
mainly by the fact that their political independ-
ence had been drastically curtailed and that their
lives as upstanding and freethinking Germans
would bring reprisals and perhaps political cap-
tivity. Now, in 1958, the continuing steady stream
of refugees from Soviet-occupied territory ap-
pears to be more largely caused by the intolerable
economic and labor conditions which prevail.
Thus, workers in factories and in mines, on rail-
618
roads and construction jobs find themselves unable
to hold their own as craftsmen, as heads of fam-
ilies, and as free men in a difficult struggle with
inadequate equipment, low-grade materials, and
unfavorable working and living conditions. They
have compared prewar, wartime, and postwar
factory standards both in the East Zone and,
through their friends and associates, with those
in the Federal Republic.
Above all, they are impressed by the striking
difference between the two parts of Germany.
Those who become hopeless with regard to main-
taining their individual position as groups are
likely to go West. For this reason, in the large
numbers of the refugees probably more than 30
percent are able-bodied young men, at the peak of
their working potential, who are seeking not only
a more favorable political climate but also decent
trade-union activities and reasonable working
conditions. As the numbers continue to add to the
labor supply of the Federal Republic, the authori-
ties in the Soviet-occupied territory find them-
selves short of both skilled and unskilled labor
and are becoming more restive.
It is largely this drain of manpower and lack
of incentive which disturbs the balance and limits
economic capacity. There are combined with
these a political and prestige factor in the large
refugee stream, making it a source of humiliation
to the regime. In the past 6 months the Commu-
nists have endeavored to limit travel within the
zone and between the zones. This has lessened in-
cidental travel but has not changed the numbers
leaving the zone permanently. The Soviets are
aware of the fact that the mere permission to
leave home is a privilege; denying it increases the
feeling of bitterness — granting it might increase
the ease with which the workers can slip from
their grasp. No matter what action they take,
many visit Berlin or ci'oss the zonal boundaries to
make their homes in the West. The fact that the
restrictions have not greatly diminished the flow of
refugees but have led to serious resentment on the
part of the entire population increases the need
for police controls.
In agriculture the situation is even worse than
in industry. Equipment is at the point of break-
down. Seed is poor, fertilizer scarce. Yields in
most crops are far below prewar. Tliousands of
acres are abandoned each year, and, by 1958, the
stream of refugees to the West has seriously
handicapped agriculture.
Department of State Bulletin
Conditions such as these in industry and agri-
culture led to the widespread revolt of June-July
1953. At that time scores of towns and cities wei-e
involved. Thousands of workers attempted to ex-
press their demands for decent working condi-
tions. The first spark of revolt was struck among
the masons on the scaffolds of Stalinallee in East
Berlin. The regime had announced a few days
pi"eviously an increase in the norms, the output
required per worker. This arbitrary act led to the
spontaneous formation of a committee which went
from their place of work in Stalinallee to the Min-
istry to request an adjustment to meet reasonable
requirements of the workers.
The chosen representatives of the masons and
allied building workers marched to the head-
quarters of the German Democratic Republic with
their grievance. They were summarily denied a
hearing. Refused admittance to the labor offices,
they were then joined by thousands, demonstrated
in the streets, burned the posters with pictures of
Commimists and misleading posters and slogans.
The thousands of Germans had their hour of pro-
test and their days of rebellion in Berlin and
elsewhere throughout the zone in more than 250
towns and villages.
Throughout the zone, in Berlin and in the
smaller cities, they were run down by tanks, shot
by machine guns, dispersed by force, and in many
cases imprisoned. From that time, with no respite,
labor relations in the zone then and now have been
at gunpoint and in the shadow of the political
prison.
Living Conditions
The miserable living conditions of the majority
of the workers in the Soviet-occupied zone
constitute the third source of resentment against
communism.
In a country where family ties are still of prime
importance and where tradition has set high
standards of home life, the privations of today in
East Germany are particularly painful. The
pride in house and garden, in church and school,
is gone. In many respects the worker is in a strait-
jacket. He cannot choose freely where to live,
where to work, his occupation, or his recreation.
If he, in a rare case, has a motorcycle and takes
his girl out on a Sunday ride, he must watch
carefully that he follows a permissible route and
does not cross the zonal border. His athletics and
recreation are under supervision; his education
and his religious activities are restricted and
closely watched.
Rationing, of course, continues in the Soviet
Zone. Meat, fats, cheese, and sugar are in short
supply. Clothing is expensive and of poor quality.
Many East Germans come to Berlin to buy shoes
and suits, overcoats and other key articles of wear-
ing apparel.
The difference in material standards for the av-
erage man in the East Zone has been estimated as
approximately 30 percent below that in the Fed-
eral Republic and perhaps 60 percent below that
of average workers in the United States. If lux-
uries like butter, coffee, woolens, high-grade meat
are taken into account, prices converted on the
basis of hours of work are approximately four
times as high. For example, woolen material costs
approximately 9 hours of work per meter in the
Federal Republic and 40 hours in the Soviet Zone.
Many other examples could be given. For
instance, coffee in the Federal Republic costs the
equivalent of 4 hours of work a pound and 15 to
30 hours in the East Zone.
The nonmaterial standards are even more dis-
tressing than lack of goods and services. The
church and school are perhaps the most seriously
blighted by the Communist rule. Efforts are made
to keep the young people out of the Sunday
schools and to force them to take an atheist oath.
The selection of teachers is said to be more and
more on the basis of party membership, with
teaching warped to the party line.
These are the repressions of communism which
have made the worker look on the system with
bitterness. These are the human deprivations
which will, in the long iim, be the undoing of the
tyranny wherever men see any hope of freedom.
The Meaning of Labor's Attitude Toward Commu-
nism
The comparison of the regime's slavery and
freedom, in the East and in the West of Germany,
which reveals the basic differences in the working
and living of the people under two systems, does
not lead to any easy optimism. Unfortunately,
the outlook for an improvement in conditions in
the East Zone to bring them up to levels in the
West is extremely remote. There is no immediate
prospect of a relief for those under Communist
control from the oppressive conditions they must
endure.
April 14, 7958
619
The fact of their continued resistance to both
form and substance of the tyrannical regime under
which they are living is, however, a bright and
shining sign of hmnan faith that their resistance
has meaning for the future. The kind of strength
which is required to face the risks and hardships
of the present with only a distant prospect of
better days is impressive not only to their relatives
and friends in West Germany but also to all of
us who can help shape our own destinies. The
workers in East Germany have not weakened in
any substantial degree even though the organiza-
tions which are permitted to them are meaningless
and even though their voices cannot now be heard
in tlie planning of their economy or in the deci-
sions which determine their welfare.
The testimony of those who visit the East Zone
and of the refugees who have fled in search of
the opportunities which are the heritage of free
men and the very complaints of the Communist
press all demonstrate the continued vitality of the
spirit of the anti-Communist majority. The re-
sistance of these men and women will always be
considered as one more chapter in the history of
men's struggle for civil and human rights. While
some individuals may not live to realize the hopes
for which they are now fighting, human beings
everywhere should be strengthened in their fight
for a better world by the firm purpose and the
amazing courage of those who have stood out
against the Communist regime in East Germany.
The workers, who had most to gain, some thought,
from changes in an economic system of the 19th
century, now know that the foundation on which
their future welfare must be built is a genuine
system of representation with the opportunity for
each individual to act according to his conscience
and speak according to his belief.
Requirements Eased on Exports
of Technical Data
Simplification of regulations covering unclassi-
fied technical data exportable under general
license, including scientific and educational infor-
mation and published material, was announced on
March 7 by the Bureau of Foreign Commerce,
U.S. Department of Commerce. The amended
regulations now permit this type of material to be
exported by mail or otherwise without indicating
on the letter or parcel the general license authori-
zation under which the export is made.
In announcing removal of this requirement, the
Bureau indicated that the amendment was one as-
pect of the Department's broader program to pro-
mote the collection and dissemination of scientific
and educational information within the United
States and between the United States and foreign
countries.
Letters of Credence
Australia
The newly appointed Ambassador of Australia,
Howard Beale, presented his credentials to Presi-
dent Eisenhower on March 27. For texts of the
Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply,
see Department of State press release 154.
Nonoay
The newly appointed Ambassador of Norway,
Paul Gruda Koht, presented his credentials to
President Eisenhower on March 27. For texts of
the Ambassador's remarks and the President's
reply, see Department of State press release 155.
Venezuela
The newly appointed Ambassador of Venezuela,
Hector Santaella, presented his credentials to
President Eisenhower on March 26. For texts of
the Ambassador's remarks and the President's re-
ply, see Department of State press release 151.
President Postpones Tariff Action
on Stainless-Steel Flatware
White House press release dated March 7
White House Announcement
The President on March 7 announced that in
the escape-clause case involving stainless-steel
table flatware he had decided that a full evalu-
ation of Japan's voluntary limitation of shipments
to the United States was necessary since this
voluntary limitation signifies an important reduc-
tion of the volume of imports and thus holds con-
siderable promise of relieving the situation of
domestic producers. The President, tlierefore,
requested the Tariff Commission to keep this
matter under review and to report to him as soon
as practicable after December 31 with particular
reference to the experience of the domestic in-
dustry in 1958, during which the Japanese limita-
620
tion on exports to the United States will have been
in effect.
The President set forth his action and the rea-
sons for it in identical lettei-s to the chairmen of
the House Ways and Means Committee and the
Senate Finance Committee.
Letter to Chairmen of Congressional Committees *
March 7, 1958
Dear ]\Ir. Chairman: Under Section 7 of the
Trade Agi-eements Extension Act of 1951, as
amended, the United States Tai-iff Commission
reported to me on January 10, 1958 its finding
that the domestic producers of stainless steel table
flatware were experiencing serious injury as a re-
sult of increased imports.
I have carefully studied the facts of this case,
and I have had the benefit of the advice of the
Trade Policy Committee and various departments
and agencies of the Executive Branch.
Although entirely satisfactory information is
not available, especially for the year 1957, the
Tariff Commission's report demonstrates a strik-
ing upward trend in impoils with important
consequences for domestic producers. Bearing on
this situation, however, are two significant de-
velopments that the Commission has not had an
opportmiity to appraise fully. Japan, which
accounted for more than ninety per cent of our
imports in 1956, has limited its flatware exports
to the United States. The first action in this re-
gard set a limit of 5.9 million dozen for the year
beginning last October first. The Government of
Japan has now informed this Government that it
has decided to limit Japanese shipments to the
United States to 5.5 million dozen for the current
calendar year.
These developments signify an important re-
duction in the volume of imports and thus hold
considerable promise of relieving the situation of
domestic producers. Because of this, I have con-
" Addressed to Sen. Harry Flood Byrd, chairman of the
Senate Committee on Finance, and Rep. Wilbur D. Mills,
chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee.
eluded, after a thorough examination of the facts
of this case, that a full evaluation of these devel-
opments is required and that action at this time
on the Commission's recommendations is inad-
visable.
In order that the necessai-y evaluation might be
as precise as possible, I have asked the Secretary
of Commerce to see that appropriate information
on flatware imports is officially collected and tab-
ulated.
I am, moreover, requesting the Tariff Commis-
sion to keep this matter under review and to re-
port to me as soon as practicable after December
thirty -first with particular reference to the exper-
ience of the domestic industry in 1958 during
which the Japanese limitation on exports to the
United States will have been in effect. In the
event that unusual circumstances require, I shall
call upon the Commission for a report at an ear-
lier date.
Sincerely,
DwiGHT D. Eisenhower
Letter to Edgar B. Brossard, Chairman, U.S. Tariff
Commission
March 7, 1958
Dear Mr. Chairman : For the reasons set forth
in the enclosed copy of my letter of today to the
Chainnan of the Senate Finance and the House
Ways and Means Committees, I have concluded
that action at this time is inadvisable on the Tariff
Commission's recommendation of January 10,
1958 concerning stainless steel table flatware.
I request the Commission, however, to keep this
matter under review and to report to me as soon
as practicable after December thirty-first with
particular reference to the experience of the do-
mestic industry in 1958 during which the Jap-
anese limitations on exports to the United States
will have been in effect.
In the event that unusual circumstances require,
I shall call upon the Commission for a report on
an earlier date.
Sincerely,
DwiGiiT D. Eisenhower
April 14, 1958
621
THE CONGRESS
Interdependence, Basic Concept of the Mutual Security Program
Statement hy Secretary Dulles '
I appear on behalf of the mutual security pro-
gram as recommended by the Pi-esident for tlie
fiscal year 1959.^
I. General Considerations
This program is a continuation of tested security
measures that have had their birth and growth
during the postwar years. It has provided peace
and the opportunity which flows from a world
enviroimient of healthy societies of free men.
Without this program our peace would be gravely
endangered and opportunity would disappear as
hostile communism more and moi'e closely en-
circled us until we became a beleaguered garrison
state.
The basic concept of our mutual security pro-
gram is the concept of interdependence. The free
nations, assaulted by Communist imperialism,
must help each other if they are not to succumb,
one by one.
We automatically accept that concept of inter-
dependence in the case of open war. During the
First World War there were 27 Allied and Asso-
ciated Powers. We helped each other, militarily
and economically, to win victory. During the
Second World War 47 nations united their full
resources, military and economic, in the cause of
victory.
Now we are engaged in a cold war. We shall
' Made before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
on Mar. 24 (pre.ss release 144).
' For President Eisenhower's message to Congress, see
Bulletin of Mar. 10, 1958, p. 367. For statements made
before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs by Secre-
tary Dulles and ICA Director James H. Smith, Jr., see
ihid., Mar. 17, 195S, p. 427, and Mar. 31, 19.58, p. 527.
not emerge victorious unless, in this type of war
also, we apply the concept of interdependence.
The soundness of mutual security is no longer a
theory. It is a proven fact. Until its principles
began to be ai^plied, international communism took
over nation after nation. Since the postwar
collective-defense system began to be forged, inter-
national communism has neither taken over, nor
subjected to armed attack, any nation which par-
ticipated in that system. All members have con-
tributed to security, and all have received security.
II. The Soviet Economic-Political Offensive
Until a few years ago Communist imperialism
relied primarily on a policy of threats, bluster,
or armed action. Now the Communist leaders
follow a new technique. Where they formerly
treated all free nations as enemies, they now pro-
fess the greatest friendship toward them — par-
ticularly toward those which seek economic
development.
In pureuing this course, backed with capital
and skilled manpower, they have made offers of
economic help to nations in all parts of the globe.^
They and other bloc nations have already entered
into agreements with 16 nonbloc nations for lines
of credit or grants totaling nearly $1.G billion in
economic assistance and an additional $400 mil-
lion for military assistance. They are also en-
gaged in vigorous efforts to increase their trade
with nations in all parts of the free world.
' For a statement on economic activities of the Soviet
bloc in less developed countries made before the committee
on Mar. 3 by Deputy Under Secretary Dillon, see ibid..
Mar. 24, 1958, p. 469.
622
Department of Slate Bulletin
Mr. Khrushchev has recently said:
We declare \var ui)on you — excuse me for using such
an expression — in the peaceful field of trade. We de-
clare a war we will win over the United States. The
threat to the United States is not the ICBM, but in the
field of i)eaceful production. We are relentless in this,
and it will prove the superiority of our system.
That is a warning to be heeded. It means that,
while we must, of course, deter war — whether
general nuclear war or limited war — we must also
prevent Communist absorption or envelopment
of free nations by the more subtle means of eco-
nomic penetration and political subversion.
III. Deterring War
First let us consider the problem of deterring
war. We have treaties with over 40 natioiis which
pledge aid to be given and received if armed at-
tack occurs. These promises are important. But
there is need also of military strength-in-being.
Our program of mutual security has that as one
of its principal purposes.
By this program our allies have vastly in-
creased the effectiveness and numbers of their
forces. We have contributed primarily weapons
and material up to about $20 billion, while na-
tions associated with us in the collective-defense
effort have made defense expenditures totaling
$122 billion.
We have gained great reinforcement of the most
powerful deterrent to aggression, that is, our
strategic air force and our naval might. This
great power is heavily dependent on dispersed
bases around the world. These are supplied by
many of our allies and friends as part of their
contribution to our mutual security effort.
Great as this mobile strategic power is, we can-
not be sure that it alone will deter all aggression.
The free world must also have local forces to
resist local aggression and give mobile power the
opportunity for deployment. Our associates in
mutual security are willing to provide the great
bulk of the needed conventional forces if we will
provide some of the necessary arms and. in cer-
tain countries, some of the economic strength
needed to support their military establishments.
The peace of our country and the peace of evei-y
free nation in the world today rests in the most
literal sense on the combining of the forces of the
United States with the forces of the rest of the
April 14, 1958
free world. Together they create an arch on
which rests the safety of our homes and loved
ones. The military-assistance and defense-sup-
port aspects of the mutual security program are
the keystones in this security arch.
IV. The Development Need
It is not sufficient, as I indicated earlier, for us
to rely solely on military defensive power. To
achieve peace and security we must also counter
the Communist efforts to manipulate for their own
ends the intense economic aspirations of peoples in
newly independent and less developed nations.
I have heard it said that we must not enter into
a competition with the Soviet bloc in this field.
My reply is that we are not entering into a com-
petition with them. They are entering into com-
petition with us. They are attempting to take
over and pervert for their own uses the normal
processes whereby, historically, nations that are
not yet developed borrow abroad to get their own
capital development under way. For example, in
our own country's early history we borrowed great
sums from foreign private investors with which we
started our own transportation and industrial de-
velopment.
We favor today the greatest possible partici-
pation by private capital in the development of
the less developed areas of the world. However,
the political risks in many of these countries are
greater than private persons will assume. Un-
less there is to be a lapse in what have been the
normal and historic means of developing less de-
velopetl countries, our governmental fimds must
play a part. Failure to provide these funds would
place great victories within the Commimist grasp.
V. The Mutual Security Program in Fiscal Year 19S9
If these are the challenges which confront us,
what then must we do to sunnount them and go
forward ?
An essential part of the answer is in the Presi-
dent's proposals now before you.
First, to maintain the peace we must maintain
the military strength of the free world as a deter-
rent to Communist armed aggression.
The President has asked $1.8 billion for mili-
tary assistance. Of this amoimt the great bulk
will go to our NATO allies, essentially for mod-
ernization and missiles, and to Asian countries,
623
such as Korea, Pakistan, Taiwan, and Iran, which
are separated from the full power of the Soviet
bloc only by a border gate or a narrow strait.
The details of this military assistance program
and its essential role in support of our own de-
fense effort were presented to this committee last
week by representatives of the Department of
Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Closely related to our military assistance is our
defense support program, for which the President
has requested $835 million.
Defense support is proposed for 12 nations, 70
percent intended for 4 countries : Korea, Taiwan,
Viet- Nam, and Turkey.
These 12 nations are collectively providing 3
million armed men in ground, air, and naval units
located at strategic points around the perimeter
of the Commimist bloc. None of the 12 has the
economic strength to support forces of the size we
believe important to our common defense without
the proposed economic assistance from us.
The second great purpose of our mutual se-
curity program is to deal realistically with the
need of the peoples of the newly developing na-
tions to make economic progress. We have the
instruments for this in our well-established tech-
nical cooperation program and our newly created
Development Loan Fund.
This year we propose a moderate expansion in
our technical cooperation, primarily to increase ac-
tivity in a few countries where we now have pro-
grams and to undertake new programs in nations
which have recently gained independence. The
total requested for this program for 1959 is $142
million.
In addition we are requesting an increased au-
thorization for the United Nations Technical
Assistance Program, to include participation in
the important new special projects fund ap-
proved by the last General Assembly * and a con-
tinuation of our regular program through the
Organization of American States.
Our other vital instrument for promoting eco-
nomic development is the Development Loan
Fund. It was recommended to the Congress last
year, upon the basis of numerous public and pri-
vate studies — particularly the excellent study and
report by the Senate Special Committee on
Foreign Aid — that a loan agency be established
* lUa., Jan. 13, 1958, p. 57.
624
which would make it possible for the United
States to help friendly nations develop their econ-
omies on a basis of self-help and mutual
cooperation.
The Congress appropriated $300 million for the
fund last year and authorized the appropriation
of $625 million for the coming fiscal year. Since
the appropriation of the funds for fiscal year 1959
is already authorized, your committee will not be
called upon to act on the authorization. Never-
theless, I would like to take advantage of this
occasion to make clear my belief that it is im-
mensely important that the full amount of these
funds be made available as part of the capital of
the Development Loan Fund. They are as im-
portant for the future safety of our country as
any dollars appropriated for weapons.
The committee of conference on the authoriz-
ing bill last year recommended that the fund
should in the future be established as a corpora-
tion. This is in accord with the views of the
executive branch, and we recommend to the Con-
gi-ess that this be done, in a form that will assure
that lending by the fund will be fully coordinated
with the foreign-policy interests of the Depart-
ment of State, the mutual security activities of
the ICA [International Cooperation Administra-
tion], and the lending of the Export-Import Bank
and the International Bank.
For the special assistance program we are re-
questing $212 million. This aid is designed to
meet certain important needs which cannot be met
out of the other categories of aid. These needs
include help to maintain political and economic
stability in certain nations where we do not sup-
port substantial military forces and which are not
therefore eligible for assistance under defense
support. Special assistance is also designed to
support such activities as assistance to West
Berlin, to continue the worldwide malaria-eradi-
cation program, and for other important uses.
Perhaps one of our most important needs is the
ability to respond to new situations and new re-
quirements which may arise in the course of the
coming fiscal year. The President has asked a
$200-million contingency fund for needs of this
nature. It would be reckless, in the light of con-
ditions existing in the world today and the virtual
certainty of Communist cold-war initiatives that
we cannot now foresee, to leave the President with-
out an emergency fund of at least this size.
Department of State Bulletin
Other programs, for which the President re-
quests in the aggregate $106.6 million, will be
dealt with in detail by subsequent witi
VI. The U. S. Economic Recession
I know that many people — Members of this
Congress and their constituents — are concerned
about the cost of our mutual security program and
about what is often referred to as a "foreign give-
away." This is even more true when there is an
employment and business recession here in the
United States and when there is much that needs
to be done here at home.
I think we might all bear in mind three things :
First, this is no "giveaway" program but an
absolutely essential part of our great national
effort to maintain peace and opportunity for our
country. Not to have this program would be a
"giveaway." We would then indeed "give away"
to communism the control of a dozen or so nations
with their hundreds of millions of people. We
would indeed "give away" bases essential to our
national peace and security. We would indeed
"give away" the access which we and other nations
have to essential resources and to trade upon which
our own well-being depends.
Second, unquestionably we all wish for addi-
tional roads, schools, reclamation projects, and
other facilities here at home. But we will gain
little and lose much if, in our drive for them, we
recklessly tear down the very structure of the
free world which makes it possible for us to en-
joy in peace and freedom the material blessings
we now have.
Third, although the fundamental purpose of
this program is to provide for the security of our
nation, our families, and ourselves, it has added
value of special significance now : Its effect is to
counter economic recession. The great bulk of
our mutual security funds — over three-fourths —
are spent in the United States in the first instance.
As one of the studies made for you last year
showed, in 1955 some 600,000 jobs were provided
by the program for American farmers and work-
ers. The remainder, after aiding the economy of
one of our allies, returns sooner or later, and
mostly sooner, to be spent in the United States for
the products of United States industries and ag-
riculture. To cut these funds would be to cut
employment here at home, as well as to endanger
our security.
Apri/ 74, 1958
VII. Duration of Program
In conclusion let us consider a question often
asked : "Will this jirogram have to go on forever?"
The answer, I suggest, is this :
I hope and believe that the concept of collective
security is here to stay. Every civilized com-
munity applies that concept domestically. No
longer does each family stand as the sole protector
of their own home. There is a common contribu-
tion to a collective police force, fire department,
sanitary department, and the like. Only the
society of nations has been so backward and primi-
tive as to go on practicing the obsolete security
conception of each nation standing alone. And
the result has been a harvest of recurring wars.
We had hoped that the United Nations would
provide the needed collective security on a uni-
versal basis. In time it may do so. But the
Soviets with their veto power now block that.
And Chairman Bulganin recently told President
Eisenhower that the Soviet Union would not yield
an inch on the matter of veto power.^
But the practice of collective security must and
will go on. Otherwise wars are inevitable and
freedom is in constant jeopardy.
But even though the concept of collective secu-
rity is permanent, that does not mean that the
sums spent on security, be it national or collective,
have to be permanently at the present level. We
are striving to achieve a limitation of armaments
and to find solutions for the basic political prob-
lems that give rise to tensions. If the Com-
munists will negotiate in good faith toward these
ends, we believe that progress can be made wliich
will make it safe to spend far less on armaments
than is now the case.
As far as economic cooperation is concerned, we
can expect that, as political stability increases,
private capital will play a steadily increasing role.
Private capital from the moi-e industrialized comi-
tries has in the past flowed in substantial quan-
tities to the less developed areas and can be ex-
pected to do so again.
Vlil. Conclusion
We are living today in an historic era of great
change.
^ For texts of the Soviet letter of Feb. 1, 1958, and the
President's reply of Feb. 15, see iUi., Mar. 10, 1958, p. 373.
625
(1) There is the march toward independence of
colonial peoples. Since World War II, 20 nations
with a population of about 750 million people have
achieved their independence. These people, as
well as the people of other less developed nations,
are determined that they must and will have eco-
nomic progress.
(2) There has been the revolutionary, and re-
aetionaiy, threat of international communism. It
has within little more than a generation subjected
all or major parts of 17 nations and nearly 1 billion
people to a new type of dictatorship, the dictator-
ship of a hai-sh, materialistic creed. The outward
thrust of that movement has been somewhat
stayed. But the Communist dictators, exploiting
the vast human and material resources they con-
trol, still seek to extend their conquests around
the globe.
(3) Within the Sino-Soviet world there are
growing and, in the long run, irresistible demands
wliich are incompatible with the creed and prac-
tice of orthodox communism. The subject nations
increasingly demand more national independence ;
and a steadily increasing number of individuals
seek greater personal security, increased freedom
of choice, and more independence of thought.
This mounting tide has already altered somewhat
the complexion of Communist rule in Soviet Rus-
sia, and it has openly challenged that rule in such
captive countries as Hungary, Poland, and East
Germany.
(4) To these three forces must be added a
fourth — the force of the enlightened conduct and
example of the United States.
We must cooperate with the healtliy evolution
toward independence of colonial peoples and as-
sist in the achievement of economic progress and
of freedom that will be sustained ;
We must continue to hold in check the still ag-
gressive and predatory ambitions of international
communism; and
We must encourage by peaceful means the adap-
tation of Sino-Soviet govermnent to the aspira-
tions of the people. The rate of such adaptation
will largely depend on whether the present type
of rule gains, or is denied, enhanced prestige
through external conquests.
Without the policies represented by the mutual
security program and without adequate funds to
carry out these policies, we camiot do these things.
World trends hostile or imf avorable to us would
gain the supremacy. There could be a new and
prolonged "dark age."
This mutual security program is our response to
a challenge which threatens our survival as a na-
tion and the survival in the world of the ideals
for which our nation was founded. It is, there-
fore, a progi-am which cannot be allowed to fail.
Extending the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Legislation
Statement iy Douglas Dillon .
Deputy Under Secretary for Economic Affairs '
I welcome this opportunity to appear before the
Committee on Ways and Means. I am here to
present, on behalf of the Department of State,
additional information in sujjport of the Presi-
dent's proposals for the extension of the reciprocal
trade agreements legislation.^ I intend to deal
with certain questions which have arisen in the
' Made before the House Committee on Ways and Means
on Mar. 24 (press release 143).
626
" For text of the President's message to Congress on
continuation of the trade agreements program, see
Bulletin of Feb. 17, 19.58, p. 263 ; for statements made
before the committee by Secretary of Commerce Sinclair
Weeks on Feb. 17 and by Secretary Dulles on Feb. 24, see
ibid.. Alar. 17, 1958, p. 432.
Department of State Bulletin
cmuse of tlie committee's hearings and which are
of vital importance to our international economic
relations.
First, it has been asked: Of what use is the
trade agreements legislation in countering the
threat of international communism ?
Second, it has been asked : "UHiat relationship is
there between the creation of the new Economic
Community in Westeni Europe and the trade
agreements legislation that makes it necessary for
us to extend the legislation for a period of as long
as 5 years, thus departing from past practice?
The answers to these questions lie at the heart
of the legislative proposals you are now consider-
ing. I would like to take them up in order.
I. RECIPROCAL TRADE AND THE SOVIET
ECONOMIC OFFENSIVE
It is evident that the safety, freedom, and wel-
fare of the American people will depend upon
their ability to meet and overcome the threat pre-
sented by international communism. This threat
exists not merely because the Soviet leaders have
stated over and over again their determination to
install the Soviet Communist system throughout
the world. Such a declaration of purpose could be
ignored or treated lightly if there were no visible
means to carry it into effect. But the threat is real
because the Soviet leaders now possess a large res-
ervoir of physical power with which to implement
their objectives.
International communism now has nearly a bil-
lion people under its domination. The gi'oss na-
tional product of the Soviet bloc, including Com-
munist China, is of the order of $280 billion a
year. About $175 billion of this annual amount
is produced in the Soviet Union. The rate of eco-
nomic growth of the Soviet Union is now about
7 percent a year, which compares with a growth
rate of about 4 percent a year for the United
States.
The industrial growth of the Soviet Union is
especially noteworthy. It is growing at a rate of
about 10 percent a year, Avhich compares with a
rate of about 4 percent a year for the United
States. Industrial output in the Soviet Union is
now about $68 billion a year, which makes the
Soviet Union the second gx-eatest industrial power
in the world. By 1963— that is to say, 5 years
i from now — its industrial production may reach a
April 14, 1958
figure of over $100 billion. The Soviet Union
achieves these growth rates by depriving the Rus-
sian people of the consumers goods and the better
living standards that would otherwise be theii-s.
The Soviet leaders are ruthlessly sacrificing the
immediate welfare of their people so as to increase
the physical assets under their control.
Since World War II the United States and its
allies have been chiefly concerned over the Soviet
military threat, which arises from the existence of
large Communist military forces and the will-
ingness to use them wherever the defenses of the
free world are weak or uncertain. This threat
continues, but it has now been broadened to in-
clude an economic threat as well. Within the last
4 years the Soviet bloc has launched a large-scale
offensive directed at the countries of the free
world.
Communist Trade-and-Aid Drive
Soviet-bloc economic assistance to less developed
countries outside the bloc has risen from zero in
1954 to a total of $1.6 billion by the end of 1957.
This assistance is being extended in the form of
long-term loans, bearing low rates of interest,
which are tied to the use of Soviet-bloc industrial
equipment and technical personnel in develop-
ment projects within the less developed countries.
The repayment provisions of these loan agree-
ments usually permit the debtor countries to make
repayment in the goods which they have available
for export as an alternative to payment in con-
vertible currencies.
Soviet-bloc trade with countries outside the bloc
has also risen rapidly in this period. The exports
of the bloc to the free world as a whole in-
creased from $1.8 billion in 1954 to about $3.2 bil-
lion in 1957, a gain of 80 percent, and bloc im-
ports from the free world increased in about the
same degree.
The pattern of the Soviet trade offensive in the
less developed countries stands out even more
clearly. The total trade of the Soviet bloc with
the less developed countries of the free world
amounted to $840 million in 1954. In 1957 it was
probably double that figure — an estimated $1.7
billion. There were 49 trade and payment agree-
ments between the bloc and these countries at
the end of 1953. By the end of 1957 there were
147 such agreements, an increase of 98 over the 4-
year period.
627
The economic-assistance activities of the Soviet
bloc clearly contribute to an expanding bloc trade
program. As Soviet loans and credits are drawn
down by the recipient comitries, imports into
these countries from the bloc will tend to mcrease
further. And as these countries begin to pay off
their financial obligations to the bloc, which they
are usually allowed to do in goods, their exports
to the bloc will also tend to increase.
The economic basis of the Communist trade-
and-aid drive lies in the fact that the bloc's indus-
trial growth is enabling it to supply in increasing
quantities the capital equipment and manufac-
tured goods which many free-world countries
must import, and in the fact that the bloc is able
and willing to accept in return many kinds of raw
materials and foodstuffs which free-world coun-
tries Iiave for sale and for which they sometimes
have difficulty in finding markets.
Now there is nothing wrong with trade or aid
as such. The question is rather the purpose to
which the Soviet trade-and-aid programs are
likely to be put. The Soviet leaders have made it
abundantly clear that the purpose is political.
^Vllat they are aiming for is to create economic
dependence upon the Soviet bloc, to spread Com-
munist economic ideology, to weaken and disrupt
economic relations among free-world countries,
and to pave the way for ultimate Communist po-
litical domination. In 1955 Mr. Khrushchev told
a group of visiting United States Congressmen,
"We value trade least for economic reasons and
most for political purposes."
A few weeks ago I made a detailed statement
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
on the Soviet economic offensive in the less devel-
oped countries.^ This statement was based on a
detailed study of this subject which is now in
preparation in the Department of State and
which should be available shortly. If the com-
mittee so desires, my statement can be made avail-
able for the record of these hearings.
Meeting the Economic Challenge
How should the United States defend its na-
tional interests in the face of this Soviet economic
offensive? Should it attempt to match Soviet
trade deals by itself engaging in selective barter
an-angeraents, state trading, and other forms of
' Ibid., Mar. 24, 1958, p. 469.
628
economic warfare aimed specifically at frustrat-
ing Soviet economic moves ?
The answer to that question is clearly "no."
The economic challenge presented by the Soviet
bloc is not one of this deal or that deal. Fimda-
mentally it is not a question of whether the So-
viets or ourselves gain in one market or another.
On the contrary, the Soviet economic challenge
runs to the whole of the basic economic philoso-
phy of the United States on which our foreign
economic policy rests. It is, in short, a challenge
whicli asserts that the economic system based on
free, competitive enterprise which we espouse will
not succeed in commanding the continuing sup-
port of the people of the free world and that the
Commimist economic system will prove its
superiority.
There is only one way to meet the Soviet eco-
nomic challenge which is compatible with the
preservation of our political institutions and our
national ideals. That way is to make sure that
our system, based on concepts of economic free-
dom and competitive enterprise, is given the
chance to work. If we will do this, there can be
no doubt as to which system will win out in the
long run. It will be ours.
Now it is often said that the trade agreements
progi'am is a symbol of international trade co-
operation among the free-world countries. It is
much more than that. It is a working instrument
through which a large number of the most im-
portant trading countries outside the Communist
bloc have achieved great progress in reducing j
barriers to trade within the free world. When
the free world is menaced as never before by an j
overall economic, political, and military threat ^
from international communism, it is essential that j
this process of opening up the channels of trade
which link the economies of the free world
should not grind to a halt.
Trade is economically important to the United
States. It is vital to most of the other countries
of the free world. Exports account for 16 per-
cent of the total economic output of the United
Kingdom. For Belgium and some other coun-
tries of Western Europe the percentage is even
higher. For the people of Japan trade makes
the difference between well-being and starvation.
For the less developed countries, exports of raw
materials and foodstuffs to the markets of the
free world are the primary means by which they
can obtain the machinery and equipment which
Department of State Bulletin ,1^,
they must have for their economic development.
If the governments of the free countries cannot
satisfy the basic economic needs and aspirations
of their people through growing trade within the
free world, they will be compelled to turn more
and more to trade with the Soviet bloc.
It may be asked whether we have not already
done enough. But the Soviet challenge is a
dynamic one. It will not be met by a standstill
policy on our part. Our gi-eat strength lies in the
productivity and vitality of the competitive enter-
prise system which today prevails throughout
most of the free world. Unless we permit our
free-enterprise system to work fully and freely,
we will be shackling ourselves in the face of the
dangerous and powerful economic offensive of the
Soviet Union. This explains why the President's
proposals are so vital to our foreign policy in the
continuing contest with Soviet imperialism.
This brings me to my second question, namely,
the European Common Market and its relation-
ship to the legislation before you.
II. TRADE AGREEMENTS LEGISLATION AND THE
EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET
The United States, Western Europe, and Ja-
pan are the three great industrial centers of the
free world. A complex network of trade relation-
ships connects these areas with one another and
each of them with the less industrially advanced
countries of Latin America, Asia, the Middle
East, and Africa. Following 1929 this trading
system broke down under the combined impact
of the depression and the emergence of extreme
economic nationalism. Since those days the sys-
tem has been gi-adually rebuilt. Once again we
have a significant degree of integration among the
free-world economies so that developments within
one of the three industrial centers can seriously
affect the rest of the structure.
The creation in Western Europe of a European
Economic Community, which will merge the
economies of Germany, France, Italy, Belgium,
the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, is therefore of
great significance to international trade as a whole
and to the economies of the many countries which
depend upon such trade. The European Eco-
nomic Community, which was established by the
Rome Treaty of March 1957, embraces a popula-
tion of 160 million people. The total gross na-
tional product of the six member countries
April 14, J 958
amounted to $140 billion in 195G. The imports
of the six countries from the rest of the world,
excluding trade among themselves, amounted to
$14 billion in 1957, which was over $1 billion
larger than the total import trade of the United
States. The 1957 imports of the six from the
United States alone amounted to $3.1 billion dur-
ing 1957. Taken together the Common Market
countries are a close second to Canada as a market
for our exports, and they account for approxi-
mately one dollar in every six of our total export
trade.
The European Economic Community, when
fully established, will have completely free trade
within the Community and a single uniform tariff
on imports into the Community from other
countries.
It is the height of this tariff that is of concern
to other countries, including the LTnited States.
I believe that other witnesses have already testi-
fied that we have assurances through our partici-
pation in GATT that the Common Market tariff
will not be higher on the whole than the average
of the separate national tariffs previously in effect
and that increases in national tariffs necessary to
arrive at a Community tariff will be matched
by decreases. These are valuable safeguards
which will help to assure satisfactory trade re-
lationships between the European Economic
Community and other GATT countries.
Yet what is often lost sight of is the impact of
the elimination of all tariff barriers within the
Community. By creating a single market roughly
comparable in size to the American market, Eu-
ropean manufacturei-s will be able to expand pro-
duction and so to cut their costs. This will
inevitably lead to trade adjustments which will
affect, with more or less severity, the exports of
other countries to the Common Market area, de-
pending on the height of the common tariff. The
only way to ease these adjustments is to reduce
the level of the external tariff of the Common
Market below the average of present rates pro-
vided for by GATT. To take a single illustra-
tion: It will be a great deal easier for an
American exporter of sewing machines to France
to face the new competition created by duty-free
entry into France of Italian sewing machines if
the tariff which the American exporter has to
pay is only 6 percent instead of 12 percent.
The United States and other exporting coun-
tries therefore have a direct and important eco-
629
630
Department of State Bulletii
lomic interest in obtaining reductions in the rates
af the proposed Common Market tariff which are
of particular concern to their export trade. Such
I -eductions can, of course, be obtained only
;hrough reciprocal tariff negotiations.
There is a further important consideration.
W^hatever the level of the Common Market tariff
to be, its general nature will be settled within
the next 4 to 5 years. Any reductions which the
United States and other countries may see, even
an a reciprocal basis, will be much harder to obtain
f the Common Market area has already become
accustomed to the operation of a higher tariff.
The best chance we will have to achieve the re-
ductions that are important to our export trade
will be to negotiate them before the new tariff has
become solidly established.
It is primarily for this reason that the Presi-
dent has requested a 5-year extension of the Trade
A-greements Act. In order that there should be
no doubt as to the relationship between these ne-
gotiations and the request for a 5-year extension,
should like to explain it in some detail.
Common Market Timetable
First let me describe the procedure and time-
table for the establishment of the Common Mar-
Then I will explain how United States ne-
gotiations would fit into these procedures and
this timetable during each of the 5 years for which
the trade agreements authority is being requested.
The procedure to be followed in forming the
European Common Market may be envisaged as
two separate but substantially simultaneous series
of tariff adjustments, one internal and the other
external.
With respect to the internal tariffs, that is, the
duties which the six countries now apply on their
imports from each other, these are to be gradu-
ally reduced until they are entirely eliminated
and complete free trade exists within the Com-
mon Market. The first step in reducing these in-
ternal tariffs will be taken next January 1, when
internal duties are to be reduced by 10 percent
from their present height. On July 1, 1960,
there will be a second 10 percent reduction, and
by the end of 1961 the reduction of internal tar-
iffs will reach 30 percent. By the end of 1965
it will reach 60 percent, and reductions will con-
tinue in stages with the complete elimination of
,,|efii April 14, 7958
internal tariffs being scheduled for the end of
1972 at the latest.
After the first of next year, therefore, goods
produced within any Common Market country
will have a steadily increasing advantage within
the rest of the Common Market over American
and other free- world goods.
With respect to external tariffs, that is to say,
the second of the two series of tariff adjustments,
the plan is as follows :
Step one will be to establish a proposed. — and
I underline the word proposed — external tariff
for the Common Market as a whole. This
would be a single uniform set of tariff rates ap-
plying to imports into any of the six countries
just as the United States tariff applies to imports
into all customs districts of the continental
United States. For purposes of simplicity I will
call this the target common tariff.
The rates of duty to be provided for in the tar-
get common tariff are to be determined partly by
a formula established in the Rome Treaty, partly
by schedules specifically provided for in the Rome
Treaty itself, and partly by negotiations among
the six countries.
For those rates to be established by formula,
the method used is that of a simple arithmetic
average. To take an example: There are now
separate tariffs for ball bearings in the Common
Market — a rate of 6 percent in Benelux, one of
28 percent in France, one of 15 percent in Ger-
many, and one of 25 percent in Italy. These four
rates are added together, and the sum total is di-
vided by four, yielding a Common Market rate
of 18 percent.
The negotiations for the target common tariff
will take some time to complete. The European
Economic Community has informed us that they
expect to have the entire target tariff available
for examination sometime during the latter part
of 1959.
The second step in the procedure for establish-
ing the external tariff of the Common Market will
be to test the target tariff which I have just de-
scribed against the rules and criteria provided for
in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
taking into consideration the views of other coun-
tries, including the United States, toward whom
the Common Market countries have assumed
GATT obligations.
631
632
Deparfment of Stafe Bullefh
In examining the target tariff proposed by the
Common Market countries, the other GATT
ountries will want to be satisfied on the two main
»oints :
They will want to assure themselves that the
arget tariff is not on the whole higher or more
estrictive than the separate tariff schedules pre-
iously in effect.
They will also want to be sure that, wherever
Common Market country, in order to arrive at
de new single tariff, intends to increase the duty
in a product on which it has granted a tariff con-
ession, there is adequate compensation in the
orm of a duty reduction elsewhere in the tariffs
if the countries forming the Common Market,
ither on the same product or on a product of
'.quivalent interest to them.
I wish to reemphasize at this point that neither
he United States nor any other GATT country
las the right to insist that the Common Market
iountries reduce the general level of the Common
Harket tariff. They can only insist that the gen-
ral level not be higher or more restrictive than
,he present average level and that increases on con-
;ession items be matched by equivalent decreases.
We come now to the third step, during which
;he external tariff of the Common Market begins
io be applied and begins to have an effect on the
ictual flow of trade.
This third step is to be taken on January 1,
1962, when the Rome Treaty requires that the first
concrete measures to put the Common Market
tariff into eft'ect must take place. On that date
member countries will be required to eliminate 30
percent of the difference between their national
tariff rate and the new Common Market rate,
rhei'eafter, over succeeding years, similar adjust-
ments will be periodically made, some upwards
and some downwards in the different countries,
that by June 1, 1973, at the latest, a single
uniform tariff around the whole of the Common
Market will be achieved.
The timetable which I have described means
that the customary 3-year extension of the Trade
Agreements Act would not enable the United
States to participate in reciprocal tariff negotia-
tions with the Common Market during its forma-
tive period. If the act were to be extended for
only 3 years, it would expire before negotiations
could be completed. Under such circumstances
it would be unwise to enter into them at all.
April 14, 7958
Steps in U.S. Negotiations
It may be useful to an understanding of this
point to outline the negotiating steps that would
be followed by the United States during each of
the 5 years for which the authority is being re-
quested. I have here a chart on which the mem-
bers of the committee can observe the various nego-
tiating steps for each of the 5 years 1958-1963. If
the committee so desires, we will be glad to have
this chart reproduced in a form suitable for in-
clusion in the printed record of the hearings.
During the first year, from June 1958 to June
1959, we would seek the agreement of the Com-
mon Market countries and of other GATT coun-
tries to hold a general round of tariff negotiations
which would include reciprocal tariff' concessions
by the Common Market comitries below the level
of the common tariff which would otherwise pre-
vail. It would not be possible to reach interna-
tional agreement to hold such negotiations unless
the other governments concerned were sure that
the United States possessed adequate bargaining
power for the full period required for negotiation.
During the second year, we would receive the
completed proposed common tariff, that is to say,
the target tariff to which I have already referred,
and undertake our analysis of it so as to be sure
that it met the requirements of the GATT and so
as to determine what concessions we would want
to request in order to best preserve our export
markets. During the latter part of this period,
that is to say, during the fii-st half of 1960, we
would begin our final preparations for negotia-
tions, including the issuance of a public notice of
intention to negotiate and the holding of public
hearings on the items on which we might be pre-
pared to grant concessions.
During the first part of the third year, that is,
between June 1960 and January 1961, we would
complete our own preparations, and lists of re-
quests for concessions would be exchanged among
all participating countries with a view toward
starting active negotiations by January 1961, if at
all possible. This would be a very tight schedule
to meet, but eveiy effort must be made to complete
negotiations prior to the entry into force of the
first tariff adjustments toward the new Common
Market tariff on January 1, 1962. Previous gen-
eral tariff negotiations at Geneva in 1947 and at
Torquay in 1951 took 7 montlis to complete. In
view of the complexity of the negotiations with
the Common Market, in which eveiy concession
granted by the Common Market will require prior
agreement among the six governments concerned,
we must count on at least 1 full year of negotia-
tions.
Thus, allowing no time whatsoever for slippage,
the earliest possible date for completion of these
negotiations will be January 1, 1962, a full 3i/^
years from the expiration of the present act. A
far more realistic date would be June 30, 1962.
We are asking for a fifth year to June 30, 1963, in
order to provide a safe margin for the delays
that will inevitably arise during the course of the
negotiations.
For these reasons, Mr. Chairman, it is the firm
conviction of the Department of State that an ex-
tension of this legislation for a full 5 years is
necessary if tariff negotiations are to be conducted
with the European Economic Community, there-
by advancing American economic interests and
those of the free world as a whole.
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Automotive Traffic
Convention concerning customs facilities for touring.
Done at New York June 4, 1954. Entered into force
September 11, 19.57. TIAS 3879.
Ratiflcation deposited: Netherlands (for Realm in
Europe, Surinam, Netherlands Antilles, and Nether-
lands New Guinea), March 7, 1958.
Customs convention on temporary importation of private
road vehicles. Done at New York June 4, 19.>1. En-
tered into force December 15, 1957. TIAS 3943.
Ratiflcation deposited: Netherlands (for Realm in
Europe, Surinam, Netherlands Antilles, and Nether-
lands New Guinea ) , March 7, 1958.
Trade and Commerce
International convention to facilitate the importation of
commercial samples and advertising material. Dated
at Geneva November 7, 19.52. Entered into force No-
vember 20, 1955 ; for the United States October 17, 1957.
TIAS 3920.
Accession deposited: Italy, February 20, 19.58.
BILATERAL
Philippines
Interim arrangement permitting the exploitation of min
eral resources within the Fort Stotsenberg MUitarj
Reservation. Effected by exchange of notes at Manila
April 8, 1957. Entered into force April 8, 1957.
ifiilH
DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE
26 confirmed the following :
to be Ambassador to the Republl
Confirmations
The Senate on Marc
James S. Moose, Jr.
of the Sudan.
Robert Newbegln to he Ambassador to Honduras.
Horace II. Smith to be Ambassador to the Kingdom o
Laos.
Robert P. Woodward to be Ambassador to Uruguay.
PUBLICATIONS
Imgiesi
to Si
rii!.
Iipirm
liiii!
iWii
pit Tri
M
Recent Releases
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Gov
ernment Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. Addres
requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, ex
ce.pt in the case of free publications, which may be ob
tained from the Department of State.
Participation of the United States Government in Inter
national Conferences— July 1, 1955-June 30, 1956. Put
6.548. International Organization and Conference Seriei
I, 34. xi, 205 pp. 55<;.
A record of the official participation of the U.S. Govern
ment in multilateral international conferences and meet
ings of international organizations during the perioc
July 1, 1955-June 20, 1956.
Employment Information — United States Department o
State. Pub. 6564. Department and Foreign Service Se
ries 71. 31 pp. Limited distribution.
A pamphlet outlining the requirements for employmen
in the Department of State, both at home and abroad
and the manner in which appointments are made to thi
Departmental Service and to the Foreign Service.
Career Opportunities in the U.S. Foreign Service. Pub
6566. Department and Foreign Service Series 72. 22 pp
1.5(#.
A pamphlet outlining the opportunities that exist foi
young men and women to become career officers in the
Foreign Service of the United States.
Deporfmenf of %tate Bullef'ir
lit!
ki :
k-
ftei
SlIOjI '
K.
il 14, 1958
'i.fMfmerican Republics. Basic Principles Governing
United States Relations With Latin America
(Rubottom)
tomic Energy. U.S. Nuclear Tests to Demonstrate
Reduction in Radioactive Fallout (Eisen-
hower)
ustralia. Letters of Credence (Beale) ....
ommunism. Labor Rejects Communism — East
Germany (Eleanor Dulles)
ongress, The
xtending the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Leg-
islation (Dillon)
aterdependence, Basic Concept of the Mutual Se-
curity Program (Dulles)
osta Rica. President-Elect of Costa Rica Visits
United States
lepartment and Foreign Service. Confirmations
(Moose, Newbegin, Smith, Woodward) . . .
isarmament. Secretary Dulles' News Conference
of March 25
'Conomic Affairs
asic Principles Governing United States Rela-
tions With Latin America (Rubottom) . . .
^tending the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Leg-
islation (Dillon)
resident Postpones Tariff Action on Stainless-
Steel Flatware
requirements Eased on Exports of Technical Data .
'he Trade Agreements Program : Its Relation to
National Weil-Being and Security (Eisen-
hower, Dulles, Dillon)
Europe. The Trade Agreements Program : Its Re-
lation to National Well-Being and Security
(Eisenhower, Dulles, Dillon)
(r«1
liim
"j^jitermany
jabor Rejects Communism — East Germany
(Eleanor Dulles)
Secretary Dulles' News Conference of March 25 .
Serief londuras. Newbegin confirmed as ambassador .
ndonesia. Secretary Dulles' News Conference of
March 25
an. President Postpones Tariff Action on Stain-
less-Steel Flatware
Goteffl
periM
Aos. Smith confirmed as ambas.sador
nenl o|IiddIe East. Secretary Dulles' News Conference
of March 25
futual Security
iiKnlpasic Principles Governing United States Relations
With Latin America (Rubottom)
nterdependence, Basic Concept of the Mutual Se-
curity Progi-am (Dulles)
Pi)*|j.S. Economic Aid to Spain Increased by $15
Million
'lorway. Letters of Credence (Koht)
jlsl ft' 'residential Documents
"' "president Postpcmes Tariff Action on
Steel Flatware
The Trade Agreements Program : Its Relation to
National Well-Being and Security
J.S. Nuclear Tests to Demonstrate Reduction in
Radioactive Fallout
Ind
GOl
620
622
614
634
602
620
620
634
602
620
634
614
620
620
591
e X Vol. XXXVIII, No. 981
Publications. Recent Releases 634
Science. U.S. Nuclear Tests to Demonstrate Reduc-
tion in Radioactive Fallout (Eisenhower) . . 601
Spain. U.S. Economic Aid to Spain Increased by
.$15 Million 614
Sudan. Moose confirmed as ambassador .... 634
Treaty Information. Current Actions 634
Tunisia. Secretary Dulles' News Conference of
Jlarch 25 602
U.S.S.R.
Extending the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Leg-
islation (Dillon) 626
Secretary Dulles' News Conference of March 25 . 602
Uruguay. Woodward confirmed as ambassador . 634
Venezuela. Letters of Credence (Santaella) . . 620
Name Index
Beale, Howard 620
Dillon, Douglas 597,626
Dulles, Eleanor Lansing 615
Dulles, Secretary 595,602,622
Behandi Jimenez, Mario 614
Eisenhower, President 591,601,620
Koht, Paul Gruda 620
Moose, James S., Jr 634
Newbegin, Robert 634
Rubottom, Roy R., Jr 608
Santaella, Hector 620
Smith, Horace H 634
Woodward, Robert F 634
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: March 24-30
Press releases may be obtained from the News
Division, Department of State, Washington 25,
D. C.
Releases issued prior to March 24 which appear
in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 134 of March
1!) and 137 of March 20.
No. Date
*142 3/24
143 3/24
144 3/24
tl45 3/24
140 3/24
tl47 3/25
148 3/25
149 3/25
150 3/25
151 3/26
*152 3/26
154 3/27
155 3/27
156 3/27
Subject
Educational exchange.
Dillon: House Ways and Means Com-
mittee.
Dulles : Senate Foreign Relations
Committee.
Wilcox: "The United Nations: Chal-
lenges of a New Age."
Visit of President-elect of Co.sta Rica
(rewrite).
Rubottom : "The American Discovery
of America."
U.S. grants .$15 million to Spain.
Dulles : Soviet conditions for summit
meeting (combined with No. 150).
Dulles : news conference.
Venezuela credentials (rewrite).
Nominations to rank of career minis-
ter.
Dillon : national conference on inter-
national trade policy.
Australia credentials (rewrite).
Norway credentials (rewrite).
Dulles : national conference on inter-
national trade policy.
Plan for payment of U.S. claims
against Germany.
*Not printed.
fHeld for a later issue of the Bitlletin.
the
lepartment
of
State
Order Form
United States
Government Printing Office
DiVISION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS
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OFFICIAL BUSINESS
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Meeting of Heads of Government
Paris, December 1957
TEXTS OF STATEMENTS
The Heads of Government of the North Atlantic Treaty Organ-
ization met in Paris from December 16 to 19, 1957, for the first top-level
meeting of the North Atlantic Comicil since the founding of the
Alliance more than 8 years before. They came together because they
desired to increase the effectiveness of NATO in relation to current
international political, military, and economic problems arising out of
the policies of the Soviet Union.
This new Department of State publication contains statements
made by President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles before
and after the meeting; the addresses delivered by Prime Minister
Bech, Premier Gaillard, and President Eisenhower at the opening
public session ; the statements made by Secretary General Spaak and
the Heads of Government at the first business session ; and the Dec-
laration and Communique issued on the final day.
Copies of the publication may be purchased from the Superin-
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Publication 6606
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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Vol. XXXVIII, No. 982
Rec'd
APR 28 1958
B. P. L.
Apra 21, 1958
SECRETARY DULLES' NEWS CONFERENCE OF
APRIL 1 639
U.S. VIEWS ON SOVIET ANNOUNCEMENT OF CES-
SATION OF BOMB TESTS • Department Statement
and Text of Soviet Decree 646
WESTERN POWERS ISSUE DECLARATION ON SUM-
MIT MEETING
Department Announcement and Text of Three-Power Decla-
ration 648
Letterof Premier Bulganin to President Eisenhower, March 3 . 648
Soviet Aide Memoire, March 24 652
THE AMERICAN DISCOVERY OF AMERICA • by Assist-
ant Secretary Rubottom 656
THE UNITED NATIONS: CHALLENGES OF A NEW
AGE • by Assistant Secretary Wilcox 664
For index see inside back cover
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Qovemment Printing Office
Washington 26, D.O.
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Note: Contents of this publication are not
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be reprinted. Citation of the Department
or State Bulletin as the source will be
appreciated.
Vol. XXXVIII, No. 982 • Pubucation 6630
April 21, 1958
The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the
Public Services Division, provides the
public and interested agencies of
the Government with information on
developments in the field of foreign
relations and on the work of the
Department of State and the Foreign
Service. The BULLETIN includes se-
lected press releases on foreign policy,
issued by the White House and the
Department, and statements and ad-
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officers of the Department, as well as
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Publications of the Department,
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national relations are listed currently.
Secretary Dulles' News Conference of April 1
Press release 164 dated April 1
Secretary Dulles : I am ready for questions.
Q. Mr. Secretary^ yesterday \oas the Soviet an-
nouncement about suspending nuclear tests. ^ A
lot of the practical aspects of this seem to he miss-
ing. For example., do you have any information
through diplomatic channels as to when the sus-
pension would become effective and how long it
would last, under what circumstances it might he
tei^mAnatedf If you don't have such information,
which would hear up details of it, are we correct
in reading into yesterday''s statement the implica-
tion that in your view this whole announcement
is just phony?
A. The last part is easier to answer than the
first. We do not think that there is anything new
of substance in the statement made yesterday by
Mr. [Andrei A.] Gromyko [Soviet Foreign
Minister] .
To go to the earlier part of your question, we
have no information through diplomatic channels
or any other channels as to the details of the pro-
posed suspension. The Soviets have just con-
cluded their most intensive series of tests, and it
would be normal, almost inevitable, that there
would be a considerable lapse between that series
of tests and the inauguration of a new series of
tests. We have always found that that was in-
evitable in our own practice. We have not had
any tests for some little time. We are resuming
some the latter part of this month, I believe. So
that some periodic suspensions of testing are, from
a teclmical standpoint, a necessity.
Now the Soviets say tliat they will suspend test-
ing but that, if we resume testing, they reserve the
right to resume it. Now, of course, they know
^ For a Department statement on the Soviet announce-
ment, see p. 646.
April 21, 1958
that we have this series of tests which has been
planned and announced for many months and
which will start in the very near future. There-
fore, as far as the language of the pronouncement
is concerned, they would be free to resume tests
at any time in the light of the fact that we expect
to begin testing within the next few weeks.
Q. Mr. Secretary, what is the United States
policy on the nuclear testing? For example, have
any of the studies been concluded within the ad-
ministration on the possibility of our halting such
tests?
A. We have always been willing to halt tests as
part of a program which would lead to the effec-
tive elimination of nuclear weapons from the
arsenals of the nations. Now, the problem has been
whether or not to suspend testing without any
such elimination. That raises some very serious
problems which have been known and discussed
for some time.
The actual situation today is that the Soviet
Union has, as we have, enough large thermonuclear
weapons to destroy the other and perhaps a large
part of humanity. The Soviet Union is willing
apparently to let it go at that. We are not willing
to let it go at that. We want to do either of two
things : either to cut down on tliis and to eliminate
nuclear weapons effectively from the international
arsenals, or, if that is not going to be done, to de-
velop the weapons so that they can be effectively
used as a defensive weapon without a mass destruc-
tion of humanity. Either course seems to us to be
one which we could choose. We prefer the first
choice — have always preferred the first choice.
The Baruch plan, offered some 10 years ago,
would have prevented any thermonuclear atomic
weapons. The Eisenhower proposals for atoms-
for-peace, followed by the more detailed proposals
639
made in the Disarmament Subcommittee,^ would
have led to the gradual elimination under effective
controls of nuclear weapons through the transfer
from war stocks to peace stocks of the existing
stockpiles. That is what we want; that is what
we are going to try to get; but that, so far, the
Soviet Union has rejected.
Now if that rejection is final and we have to go
along with this situation, then, as a country which
is governed by humane considerations, which do
not always apply to some other coimtries and gov-
ernments, we want to get away, if we can, from
having these weapons inevitably involve a vast
destruction of humanity and turn them into
smaller, tactical, cleaner weapons which can be
used effectively for defensive purposes without this
great possible danger to humanity. Also, I may
say, develop their uses for peaceful purposes.
Our first preference, of course, is the original
preference indicated by the Baruch plan and by
our more recent plans to have an effective way of
getting rid of them. If you can't do that, then the
question is, do you keep them only in such shape
that they then threaten the existence of humanity
or do you refine them, develop them into distinc-
tive, discriminating weapons which can be used
defensively for military purposes ?
Q. Mr. Sec7-etary, it was reported on the Moscoiv
proposal in an Italian neiospaper that Mr. Khru-
shchev stated, ''''United States atomic hoses under-
mine Italy^s security iecause they might hecome
a means for attacking other countries without
Italian knowledge.'''' I wonder, Mr. Secretary,
whether you care to say anything about such
statements?
A. The reference, I suppose, is to the possible
establishment of intermediate-missiles bases in
Italy?
Q. Yes.
A. I may say, if that is the case, first, there is
no such agreement at the present time. And the
pattern for any such agreements has been set by
our arrangement with the United Kingdom,^
where it is expressly stipulated that there cannot
be any use of those bases except with the consent
and participation of the Government of the
United Kingdom, and the same would presumably
apply to Italy.
'■ Bui-LETIN of Sept. 16, 1957, p. 451.
' Ihid., Mar. 17, 1958, p. 418.
640
Development of Smaller, Cleaner Weapons
Q. Mr. Secretary, what is your understanding
from the scientific advice you have as to how long
it would take, in terms of testing, for the United
States to develop a weapon, a smaller, cleaner,
tactical weapon, if that is the choice that has to
he made?
A. I don't recall that any date has been put on
this by our advisers. I think we will know a great
deal more about it after the conclusion of the now
projected series of tests. It is never possible in
advance of testing to know just what the tests will
show. But we would hope, at least, that much
of the information that we want will be obtained
from tlie present series of tests.
Now there is another aspect of the matter, which
probably will not be resolved by the present series
of tests, and that is the possible use of nuclear
power to create a defense against intercontinental
or intermediate missiles. That is a phase of the
matter which has not yet developed to a point
where we would, I think, expect to get any defini-
tive results out of the present series. But, as far
as it relates to the making of smaller, cleaner
weapons, it could very well be that that area
would be pretty well exhausted by the present
series of tests or perhaps supplementary tests that
might be conducted entirely in a sealed compart-
ment underground so that there would be no dan
ger at all of any fallout or effect on human life.
Q. Mr. Secretary, do we have any evidence of
the nature of this recent series of Soviet tests,
specifically whether or not they may have tested
the smaller, cleaner, defensive type of tueapons
you are talking about?
A. Well, our knowledge, of course, depends
upon what we pick up. And, for instance, we
know what we know, but we don't know what we
don't know. Now we cannot know whether or not
there have been tests of which we have not gained
any knowledge by the instruments that we have
outside for detection purposes. The information
that we have indicates that the tests have covered
a considerable range from the smaller type meas-
ured in kilotons to the larger type measured in
megatons. But it is entirely possible that there
have been tests of still smaller weapons — that we
haven't, perhaps, picked up yet. That we don't
know.
Department of State Bulletin
Q. Have any of these tests been announced
within the Soviet Union — / inean, since Fehruary
22?
A. I think, in fact I am quite certain, that there
has been no announcement made within the Soviet
Union. There was one announcement made some
months ago in the Soviet Union of a single test.
But in the main these tests have been conducted
in an atmosphere of complete secrecy, insofar as
the Soviet Union could impose complete secrecy,
and that has been total insofar as its own people
have been concerned, with the one exception which,
I think, occurred last fall.
Q. Mr. Secretary, when you say there was no
substance — / think that was the phrase you
used — in this announcement of yesterday, what do
you mean by that?
A. What I mean by that is that it has added
nothing to what has been known for quite a long
time — that is, that the Soviet Union would like
to bring about a cessation of testing on the part
of the United States and itself and the United
Kingdom and any third countries. They want to
do that, however, quite apart from and unrelated
to any program for doing away with the weapons
themselves. Now they talk about banning the
bomb and so forth, but they have neither proposed
nor have they been willing to accept any program
which would effectively bring about any diminu-
tion in the accumulation of weapons stockpiles.
Q. Mr. Secretary, didn't they make such a pro-
posal last August 29?
A. No, not that I am aware of. We jjroposed
a cutoff in the use of fissionable material. We also
proposed that weapons stocks be diminished in
some proportion to be agreed upon. We didn't
say on a basis of equality. We pointed out that
probably we have larger stocks of fissionable ma-
terial than the Soviets had and therefore that we
would assume that their contribution fi-om war
stocks to peace stocks should be proportionately
less than our own. But they have never accepted
either of those proposals.
Q. Mr. Secretary, in one of your previous com-
ments I believe you said — you referred to the now
projected series of tests. Is any thought being
given to calling off these tests?
A. No, no thought has been given to calling
them off.
April 27, 7958
The Three-Power Declaration
Q. Mr. Secretary, on another point: The word-
ing of the three-power declaration, which was sent
to Moscow yesterday,* has given rise to some
puzzlement as to whether the difference in lan-
guage used indicates that the United States Gov-
ernment has agreed to soften its position some-
lohat on the kind of lower level talks that we
envision. Could I ask, sir, whether it is still our
position that lower level diplomatic discussions,
either on an ambassadorial or a foreign-miiiisters
level, which succeed in narroioing the differences
on substantive foreign-policy questions, are neces-
sary before we decide to go to a summit meeting?
A. Yes, that is still our position, and I thought
that that was made reasonably clear by the an-
nouncement yesterday. It said, in effect, as I
recall, that there was a need to try to reduce inter-
national tensions and to settle some of the great
problems of the world, and that, if a suixmiit
meeting would promote that result, it would be
desirable. But before we could tell whether or
not a summit meeting would produce that result,
it would be necessary to have these exploratory
talks at the level, first and primarily, of the am-
bassadors— the diplomatic level — and then a meet-
ing of foreign ministers shortly preceding a
summit conference, if there was to be one.
Q. Mr. Secretary, on the meeting of foreign
ministers, that statement seemed to indicate that
the foreign ministers would, if they met, merely
set a place and a time and determine the composi-
tion of the conference. Do you contemplate that
the foreign ministers would meet to examine the
issues, as it also states, in addition to doing these
things which seem to be the same conditions as
the Soviets have set doiim for a foreign ministers'
meeting?
A. We would expect that the exploration of the
issues would be primarily conducted at diplomatic
levels. That position of ours was made clear, I
think, in our aide memoire of March 6th.= At
that time we referred to the Soviet suggestion that
the meeting of foreign ministers would be limited
to this, and we said we did not object to that as
long as this work was done through diplomatic
channels. And as a matter of fact I think I have
' For text, see p. 648.
■ BuiXETiN of Mar. 24,
641
made clear a good many times that a prolonged
meeting of foreign ministers, which would have
to discuss tlie pros and cons of all these issues, is
the last thing in the world that I personally would
want to get into.
Propaganda Advantages Weighed
Q. Mr. Secretary.^ regardless of the validity, or
lack of it, of Mr. Gromyho''s announeeTnent yes-
terday, do you not agree that it is a fact that it
has put us sharply — "ms" meaning the West —
sharply on the defensive, from a propaganda point
of vieio? And is it not necessary for us to re-
spond in a way beyond the initial apparent impact
of calling it little more than an April FooVs 'joke?
A. I think that it has given them a certain
propaganda victory, or at least a success, and I
may say that in that respect we are not surprised.
"We had a meeting recently of the principal top
oiBcials involved in this situation with President
Eisenhower. And we discussed very seriously this
prospect and the question of whether it would be
wise and prudent and in the best interests of the
United States to try to steal a march on the Soviets
by ourselves announcing a suspension of testing,
at least for a time. We weighed very carefully all
the pros and cons, and particularly some of these
things that I have alluded to — the fact that miless
there can be a program which goes to the heart
of this problem, namely, the existence of nuclear
weapons, we really ouglit to try to make these
weapons into something that could be usable with-
out vast human destruction and which could make
progress toward their utility as more of a tactical
weapon.
Now I don't say that they ever wUl be a very
nice thing to be hit by. But it wasn't very nice
to be hit by all the bombing that hit Berlin or by
the fire bombs that were dropped on Tokyo. But
there is a difference between a weapon which will
destroy on impact a very considerable area and a
weapon which through fallout will destroy or im-
pair human life through areas of a tliousand miles
or more of diameter. We considered this prob-
lem, and we decided that we could not, in fairness
to our responsibilities and our duties to the Ameri-
can people, perhaps to humanity, desist in a pro-
gram which we believe to be sound, merely for
propaganda advantages. We deliberately ac-
cepted this propaganda thrust, knowing we were
642
going to have to take it, rather than do something
which we felt was basically imsound.
Now we operate, I think, imder some disad-
vantages from a propaganda standpoint. We op-
erate under conditions that are totally different
from those which surromid the Soviet Union.
We operate, as is visible right here, in terms
of a free and independent and highly intelligent
press. If I came before you with something that
was a phony, you would recognize it in a minute
and tear it apart publicly.
We operate in terms of an opposition political
party, which is alert and prepared to expose, here
at home and for reporting abroad, anything wliich
does not seem to be thoroughly sound.
We o^jerate in terms of an American public
opinion which is higUy intelligent and properly
critical of its Government — when I say "critical,"
I don't mean necessarily antagonistic but which
holds government up to liigh standards.
And we operate with allies who have to be con-
sidted; they are not just dummies that we can
lay down the law to, like the Soviet satellites
are.
Now all of those conditions make it very diffi-
cult for us to carry on a type of propaganda
such as the Soviets carry on. I don't say that we
are doing the best job that we can do — I know
we are not; we ought to do it better. But I do
say that we face conditions which are totally dif-
ferent from those of the Soviet Union, and 1
thank God that we do. I woidchi't for a minute
give up, in order to get a propaganda advantage
in the world, any of these things I have talked
about. I wouldn't give up our free press; I
wouldn't give up our intelligent political opposi
tion; I wouldn't give up the dedication of the
American people to high principles; and I
wouldn't give up our allies' being free people that
we have to work with, pei-suade, consult with,
and we just can't shoot from the hip without re-
gard to their views.
Now I think these things which we cherish so
much, which are an inherent part of our free
world, have to be retained and not sacrificed in an
effort to get propaganda advantage. And, in-
deed, I don't think we could get a pure propa-
ganda advantage in the face of those conditions
of our free society, which we honor and cherish
and which we would never forgo merely to get
conditions for a more effective propaganda.
Deparfment of Stafe Bullefin
I recall back in tlie United Nations in '49, I
think it was, when Mr. Vyshinsky made a great
speech. He said, "We are not using atomic en-
ergy for war purposes ; we are only using atomic
energy to move mountains, to shift rivers, for
irrigation purposes," and so forth and so on.
Wliy, it was just a wonderful speech. There
wasn't a single word of truth in it, and it was
never printed, of course, in the Soviet Union.
Well, do we want to have conditions where we
can pull off jjropaganda stunts of that sort?
Surely we do not.
Here you had yesterday the Head of the Gov-
ernment of the Soviet Union quietly removed—
not a word of praise, not a word of blame, not
a word of explanation. He just goes back to
being a teller in a bank. (Laughter) Well, we
don't want conditions like that in this country.
Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us lohether
this meeting of which you spoke was last week?
A. Well now, when you fix me on the date, I
can't say. It was withm 10 days or 2 weeks.
Q. Mr. Secretary, returning to those alterna-
tives that you outlined at the beginning, are toe
to understand you to mean that, xohen we have
achieved a smaller, cleaner, tactical bomb, we will
then be prepared to eliminate from our atomic
arsenal the megaton bombs and the kiloton bombs?
A. Well, this operation that I refer to involves
a considerable making over of existing weapons
into smaller or cleaner weapons. In other words,
it is a process of transformation. You don't
throw them away; the material is too valuable.
Q. But will loe not retain any of the megaton
bombs and kiloton bombs in the arsenal?
A. I just don't know what the program is in
that respect, and it is quite a long ways off be-
fore we coidd get to that, and I think that is a
rather academic question at the moment. I as-
siune we might retain some, but tliat will be a
military decision, probably to be made maybe 5
or 10 years from now.
Question of Sharing Nuclear Information
Q. Mr. Secretary, there is considerable doubt
on the Hill about the administration's proposal
to share nuclear military infonnation with allied
governments.'^ The chief point of opposition ap-
April 27, 7958
pears to be a fear that this will encourage the
development of fourth-country nuclear powers.
Can you give any assurance that it is not this
Gov eminent'' s intention to do anything that would
help fourth nuclear powers, beginning with
France?
A. The program which we have, which per-
mits of sharing some of our nuclear knowledge
with our allies, is not designed to, nor would it
be used primarily to, expand the number of coun-
tries which have nuclear weapons. However, the
idea that we can stop that expansion by trying
to keep our information secret is illusoiy. To-
day, with atomic material increasingly being used
for power purposes around the world, with in-
creasing knowledge about the art, it is no gi-eat
trick. It takes some money, but almost anybody
who has enough money and some reasonably ed-
ucated scientists can make at least a crude atomic
or nuclear weapon, and the crude ones are the
worst from the standpoint of their damaging ef-
fect on vast masses of people.
I believe myself that a program which enables
the United States with discrimination to share its
knowledge is more apt to keej) the development of
nuclear weajjons under control than a very futile
effort, thinking that we can stop this movement
by not sharing our knowledge. And, of course,
not sharing our knowledge with some countries —
like the United Kingdom, which has already got
a program of this sort — strikes me as a complete
folly. All that it does is it calls for a vast du-
plication of expense. It is very silly for the
United Kingdom, which is cooperating with us
in this type of program, to have to spend hun-
dreds of millions of jDomids to learn something
which we can give it for nothing, and then we
may have to help them out economically in order
to make up for the minecessary financial burden
that we imposed upon them for nuclear weapons.
Inter-American Relations
Q. Mr. Secretary, on the subject of inter-
American relations, the current opinion of Presi-
dents of Latin America is that they want more
vigorous aid as ivell as private investment from the
U7iited States, and also there is a great preoccupa-
' For a statement by Deputy Under Secretary Murphy,
see ibid., Feb. 24, 1958, p. 312.
643
tion with the present slump in raw-materials prices
and with the threats of duties on some of their ex-
ports in the United States. Would you care to
comment on this and to tell us perhaps lohat you're
thinking in terms of meeting these prohlems?
A. We are quite aware of this concern, and in-
deed we share it. This decline in the prices for
raw materials hits not only them but it also hits
us in many respects. And the problem of how to
deal with it is a difficult one which is being studied
actively by Mr. Dillon, our Deputy for Economic
Affairs, by the Secretary of the Treasury, by the
Export-Import Bank, and by other agencies of the
Government. Wlienever a recession occurs which
carries with it a decline in the price of raw ma-
terials, that is particularly injurious to countries
which do not have a diversified economy and which
depend primarily upon a one- or two-crop export.
We are very sympathetic with the problems that
arise there. The situation has happened before.
But I think that we will be alert to do what we can
to take care of the need by trying to minimize re-
strictions on their exports to the United States and
by trying to take care of their needs to import from
the United States, perhaps through the Export-
Import Bank, which is designed partly for that
purpose.
Q. Mr. Secretary, can I go hack to a previous
question that you answered, referring to the meet-
ing with the President, at which you discussed the
possibility of suspending tests. Was that occasion
the first time that the administration seriously dis-
cussed the matter, or was the administration, as it
was reported, discussing it at the time during the
campaign in ''56 when Adlai Stevenson made his
proposal to suspend tests?
A. I would say that this possibility of suspend-
ing tests has been almost under constant review
for the last 2 or 3 years and that' this particular
meeting was nothing unique or unusual. This
particular meeting was a review of the situation
occasioned by our foreknowledge that probably the
Soviets, as soon as they completed their tests,
would make some kind of a gesture which would
have propaganda effect but would not, in fact,
have any practical effect, as far as we can judge,
upon what they would be doing.
As I said, they would naturally suspend tests
upon the completion of one series until they were
ready for another. And to say that they will re-
sume, if we go on with our tests, is virtually to say
that they are going to resume. Therefore there
was nothing in it but propaganda. But we recog-
nized that it was a propaganda move which could
have, probably would have, considerable effect.
The question was whether we should try to meet it.
For the reason that I have given, we couldn't meet
it the way they meet it. They met it by saying
things that don't have any substance. We can't
and wouldn't want to meet it by saying things that
don't have any real substance. Under our form
of society we can't do it, I may say.
I referred to some of the elements which are
permanent in our society, I hope, which prevent
that kind of thing. I want to say also that never
have I known a man who was so dedicated to truth
and sincerity and faith in the goodness of man as
President Eisenhower. Wlien he deals with these
things, you get a standard of judgment which is
just so remote from any consideration of pure
propaganda or phoniness that it just can't exist in
the same room with him.
Q. Mr. Secretary, there is a widespread feeling
that the United States is more than just a little
favorable toward the rebels on Sumatra. Would
you say, please, what our feeling is toward the rebel
movement on Sumatra and if there is any further
thought being given to the blockade which exists
on both sides of Sumatra?
A. The United States views this trouble in Su-
matra as an internal matter. We try to be ab-
solutely correct in our international proceedings
and attitude toward it. And I would not want to
say anything which might be looked upon as a
departure from that liigh standard.
Q. Mr. Secretary, do we have any information
that the Indonesian Central Government has re-
ceived aid from the Soviets?
A. Yes, we do have.
Israel-United Arab Republic Border Dispute
Q. Mr. Secretary, in view of the recent fiareups
along the border between Israel and the Syrian
part of the United Arab Republic, are you coru-
sidering the advisability of proposing to station
the United Nations Emergency Forces along that
border too?
A. I don't know of any consideration being
given to that proposal at the present time. I would
Department of Sfafe Bulletin
hope, and we have considerable reason to hope, that
this matter can be settled through the United Na-
tions machinery that is already there. You see, the
problem arises primarily from the fact that there
is this work being done. An irrigation project is
under way. The question is, does it or does it not
impinge upon the demilitarized zone?
Now, the precise limits of the demilitarized zone
are not altogether clear. And what you're talking
about is a question of, as I understand it, a few
hundred yards. There is a plan to have a survey
made which would permit of delimiting with
greater accuracy just exactly what are the boun-
daries of the neutralized zone, and there is an in-
dication of the willingness of the Israeli Govern-
ment to comply with whatever is the result of that
survey. So I would hope that the matter could be
worked out in an amicable way and without such a
rather major operation that would be required to
establish new units of the UNEF in that area.
Q . Mr. Secretary, could we follow up an earlier
question? You replied "yes" when the question
was ashed if you had any information as to Soviet
shipments of arms to the Central Government of
Indonesia.
A. Wait a minute, I don't think it was a question
of shipments of arms.
Q. Shipment of aid.
A. Aid, yes.
Q. Well, sir, could you then ansiver the question,
will you explain what information you have about
this aid, what type it is, and the extent of it?
A. Well, there was a credit of $100 million which
was opened in favor of the Government of In-
donesia by the Soviet Union some months ago.
That credit is now being drawn upon in terms of
various supplies, first of which, as far as I am
aware, are certain ships which have recently ar-
rived in Djakarta.
Q. Mr. Secretary, it was announced yesterday,
I believe, that large areas of the Soviet Union, in-
cluding the Ukraine and the Caucasus and South-
(west Asian area, have been banned to travel by
foreigners. Have we any information as to why
or whafs going on? That is apparently a large
area.
A. No, I have not heard from our intelligence
people any analysis of that.
'" April 27, 7958
Effect of Canadian Elections
Q. Mr. Secretary, what effect do you see the
Canadian election results having upon United
States-Canadian relations?
A. I think that, whatever the outcome of the
elections might have been, there would have been
a continuance of the good relations which we have
been having with the Government of Canada and
which we expect to have. In saying that, I don't
deny the fact that there are between us problems ;
there always have been problems between us. I
mentioned them here before in some detail. The
working out of those problems is something to
which we must dedicate ourselves, and will. But
we know from recent experiences with the Con-
servative Government since it has been in power
that their Government is composed of men of good
will — we know that ours is too. And we are con-
fident that any problems there are will be worked
out because we are all, both sides, dedicated to the
proposition that we must get along together.
Q. Mr. Secretary, in the event of a shift of mega-
ton bombs to smaller bombs, what then happens to
the policy of massive retaliation when the United
States moves on the offensive and deals out wide-
spread destruction?
A. Well, I don't know what you mean by the
United States moving to the offensive. We never
intend to initiate any attack, and the question is, if
we are attacked, what do we do ? Wlien I say "we
are attacked," that includes our allies, to whose
defense we are committed. Now, obviously, I
would say that, if there is an attack upon us which
involves a massive use of nuclear weapons, we
would respond in kind. If the attack is of a kind
which could be dealt with by smaller weapons and
if we have them — and that is one of the things that
we are exploring through these tests — then it
could be dealt with in that way and would not in-
volve this mterchange of nuclear weapons so
dangerous to such vast segments of humanity.
Q. Mr. Secretary, Mr. Khrushchev, in an inter
view with the Italian newspaper II Tempo on Fri
day, made this comment about a summit. He said
'■'■The Government of the Soviet Union has been
blamed for not having lived up to its promises, but
it must be noted that the Soviet Union at no time
promised reunification of Germany through free
645
elections as Secretary Dvlles and others imagine!'''
Could you coimnent on that, sir?
A. Well, I can only comment by reciting, I tliink
with substantial accuracy, the exact words which
Mr. Khrushchev agreed on, and those were : they
agreed — that means the participants at the summit
conference — that Germany should be reunified by
free elections in conformity with the national in-
terests of the German people and of European se-
curity.'' Now, there was certainly some agreement
there because the very word "agreed" is used in
that particular statement. And it is also demon-
strable that nothing has happened as a result of
that agreement. Therefore, it seems to me that the
conclusion from those two facts is that somebody
has welshed on an agreement.
Q. Thank ymi, sir.
Ninth Anniversary of NATO
Message of Secretary Dulles
us together. We must maintain our defensive
strength. We must continue, with patience and
determination, our search for a just and lasting
peace.
There can be no doubt that the strength and
unity achieved through NATO has already
greatly lessened the danger of war. But the peace
we seek means more than the mere absence of war.
It should be a positive condition of justice and
well-being.
As we have shown we are willing to seize every
reasonable opportunity of advancing the cause of
a just jDcace through genuine negotiations. While
we continue oiu- search for the reality of peace,
I am confident that we will steadfastly refuse to
be satisfied with the mere mirage.
NATO's past record gives us every reason for
confidence that our Alliance will prove successful
in meeting the challenges of the future. As we
enter this tenth year, I reaffirm the dedication of
the United States to the principles and purposes
of NATO. I would also like to send our special
thanks to you and to the entire International
Staff for the devoted work done in the past year.
Press release 170 dated April 4
Following is the text of a message from Secre-
tary Dulles to the Secretary General of NATO,
Paul-Henri Spook, on the occasion of the ninth
anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty.
I send you and your colleagues on the North
Atlantic Coimcil warmest good wishes on the
ninth aimiversary of the signing of the North
Atlantic Treaty.
At this time it is, I believe, particularly im-
portant to recall the great progress made by
NATO during the past nine years. It is doubtful
that human history records any instance in which
a group of independent states, through collective
action, have accomplished so much in so brief a
period.
Wliile recalling the achievements of the past we
look to the promises and the challenges of the fu-
ture. We must constantly seek to strengthen the
bonds of understanding and cooperation that hold
' For text of the directive issued to the Big Four Foreign
Ministers at the conclusion of the Heads of Government
Meeting at Geneva, July 18-23, 1955, see ibid.. Aug. 1,
1955, p. 176.
U.S. Views on Soviet Announcement
of Cessation of Bomb Tests
Following is a Dejyartment statement of March
31 regarding an announcement hy the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics that it would terminate
tests in the Soviet Union of all types of atomic
and nuclear loeapons.
DEPARTMENT STATEMENT
Press release 158 dated March 31
The Soviet statement about nuclear testing will,
of course, be studied in detail. But some general
observations can be made at once.
The Soviet statement comes on the heels of an
intensive series of secret Soviet tests. They
should arouse world opinion to the need to deal
in an orderly and dependable way with the test-
ing and related aspects of the disarmament prob-
lem.
Soviet official propaganda incessantly seeks to
create abroad the image of a peace-loving Soviet
646
Department of State Bulletin
Government. But that same Government openly
defies the United Nations with respect to both the
substance and the procedure of disarmament.
The charter of the United Nations gives that
organization broad authority with reference to
principles of disarmament and the regulation of
armaments. In the exercise of that authority the
United Nations General Assembly has, by an
overwhelming vote, approved a comprehensive
first-stage disarmament proposal and called on
the nations concerned to begin at once technical
studies as to how these proposals might be car-
ried out.^ These studies included the studies
needed for a supervised suspension of nuclear
testing. The United States stands ready in-
stantly to respond to that resolution. But the
Soviet Union refuses to comply.
The same General Assembly reconstituted and
Bnlarged its Disarmament Commission. The
United States wants that Commission to carry
Dut its mandate. But the Soviet Union boycotts
the Commission.
The charter makes the Security Council re-
sponsible for formulating plans for the establish-
ment of a system for the regulation of armaments.
The United States has recently proposed to the
Soviet Union that this responsibility be dis-
charged.^ But the Soviet Union refuses to co-
operate.
The Soviet Government declines to deal with
the subject of armament in any of the several
ways prescribed by the United Nations Charter.
It prefers elusive formulations of its own.
It is elemental that free nations which want to
remain free will not, and should not, forgo their
indispensable collective capacity to deter and de-
fend against aggression merely in reliance on a
Soviet statement of intentions for which there is
no system of verification, which can be evaded in
secrecy and altered at will.
The United States again calls on the Soviet
Union to deal with the vital problem of disarma-
ment in an orderly way, in accordance with the
United Nations Charter, to which the signature
of the Soviet Union is affixed. That charter con-
stitutes a solemn agreement. If it is nullified by
the Soviet Union, why should the world place con-
fidence in new Soviet engagements ?
TEXT OF SOVIET DECREE'
The question of the cessation of atomic and hydrogen
weapon tests gains a greater significance for the cause of
peace and the welfare of the people with every year and
with every month. At the present moment the cessa-
tion of tests is demanded by the overwhelming majority
of the world's population.
Despite the fact that for many years now people have
persisted in their demands for the termination of these
tests, the tests continue to be held, a circumstance which
leads to the creation of new types of lethal nuclear
weapons, increases the concentration of radioactive ele-
ments in air and soil, poisons human organisms, and
threatens the normal development of further generations.
The Soviet Union has made persistent and consistent
efforts aimed at reaching agreement with the powers in
possession of atomic and hydrogen weapons, on the sub-
ject of immediate and unconditional termination of
nuclear tests. For this purpose the U.S.S.R. Supreme
Soviet and the Soviet Government reiterated over the
past few years concrete proposals for terminating the
tests, on the basis of which an accord on this matter
could have been achieved a long time ago.
In the appeal to the U.S. Congress and the British Par-
liament of May 10, lOST," the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet
called upon the U.S. Congress and the British Parliament
to cooperate in concluding an agreement between the
governments of the U.S.S.R., the United States, and Great
Britain on an immediate termination of the experimental
explosion of atomic and hydrogen bombs. At its last
session, in December 1957, the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet,
expressing the striving of the Soviet people toward
peace, proposed that the U.S.S.R., Great Britain, and the
United States take upon themselves the obligation to ter-
minate, from Jan. 1, 1958, all tests of atomic and hy-
drogen weapons.
However, the United States and Great Britain did not
respond to these proposals of the U.S.S.R. Consequently,
experimental explosions of atomic and hydrogen bombs
are continuing in various parts of the globe as before, a
fact which bears witness to the further intensification in
the field of production of ever more dangerous types of
mass destruction weapons.
Guided by the endeavor to make a practical beginning
to a universal termination of atomic and hydrogen
weapon tests, and thus to make the first step in the di-
rection of the final salvation of mankind from the threat
of destructive atomic war, the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet
decides :
1. To terminate tests in the Soviet Union of all tyiies
of atomic and nuclear weapons. The U.S.S.R. Supreme
Soviet expects that the parliaments of other states in
possession of atomic and hydrogen weapons will, on their
' Bulletin of Dec. 16, 1957, p. 961.
' Ibid., Mar. 31, 1958, p. 516.
April 21, 1958
^ Passed by the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. on Mar.
31 following an address by the Soviet Foreign Minister,
Andrei A. Gromyko.
' Not printed.
647
part, do everything in their power in order that experi-
mental explosions of these types of weapons will be termi-
nated also in those countries.
2. To charge the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers with
undertaking the necessary measures aimed at the imple-
mentation of the first point of this decision and with
making an approach to the governments of other states
possessing atomic and hydrogen weapons with an appeal
for the adoption of analogous measures so as to secure
the termination of atomic and hydrogen tests everywhere
and forever.
Should the other powers that possess atomic and hydro-
gen weapons continue to test these weapons, then the Gov-
ernment of the Soviet Union will, understandably, act
freely in the question of the testing of atomic and hydro-
gen weapons in the Soviet Union, in conformity with the
above mentioned circumstances, and bearing the interests
of the security of the Soviet Union in mind.
The U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet sincerely hopes that the
Initiative of the Soviet Union for the cessation of nuclear
weapons tests will receive due support from the parlia-
ments of other states and is profoundly convinced that
if, in response to the decision of the Soviet Union, other
states possessing nuclear weapons should in their turn
cease testing these weapons, then by this very act an im-
portant practical stride will have been taken on the road
to the consolidation of peace and the strengthening of
the security of all peoples.
Such a step would undoubtedly have great significance
as regards the restoring of the whole of the international
situation to health and would be conducive to the libera-
tion of mankind from oppressive alarm for the fate of
the world, for the fate of future generations.
The Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. Moscow, the Kremlin,
Mar. 31, 1958.
Western Powers Issue Declaration
on Summit Meeting
Following is a Department announcement with
the text of a three-power declaration regarding a
summit meeting {press release 159) , together with
a letter of March 3 from Soviet Premier Bulganin
to President Eisenhower and a Soviet aide mem-
oire of March 2^..
DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT, MARCH 31
Tlie following is the text of an identical declara-
tion presented to the Soviet Government at noon
today, e.s.t., by the British, French, and United
States Ambassadors in Moscow.
The declaration has received the unanimous
approval of the Council of the North Atlantic Al-
liance. It expresses the common position of the
member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization.
TEXT OF THREE-POWER DECLARATION
The present international situation requires that
a serious attempt be made to reach agreement on
the main problems affecting attainment of peace
and stability in the world. In the circumstances
a summit meeting is desirable if it would provide
opportunity for conducting serious discussions of
major problems and would be an effective means
of reaching agreement on significant subjects.
It is clear that, before a summit meeting can
meet in these conditions, preparatory work is
required.
This preparatory work could best be performed
by exchanges through diplomatic channels lead-
ing to a meeting between foreign ministers.
The main purpose of this preparatory work
should be to examine the position of the various
governments on the major questions at issue be-
tween them and to establish what subjects should
be submitted for examination by heads of govern-
ment. It would not be the purpose of these pre-
paratory talks to reach decisions but to bring out,
by general discussion, the possibilities of
agreement.
The foreign ministers, assuming they have con-
cluded the preparatory work to their satisfac-
tion, would reach agreement on the date and place
of the summit meeting and decide on its
composition.
If this procedure is acceptable to the Soviet
Government, it is suggested that diplomatic ex-
changes should start in Moscow in the second
half of April.
LETTER OF PREMIER BULGANIN TO PRESIDENT
EISENHOWER, MARCH 3
Official translation
Dear Mr. Pbesident : I have received your message of
February 15,^ and I deem it necessary to express some
views regarding the questions touched upon in your
message.
It has been almost three months since the Soviet Gov-
ernment, concerned about the development of the inter-
national situation, which development is dangerous to the
cause of peace, made a proposal to convene a conference
of top government ofiicials to solve a number of problems
of immediate urgency and to determine through joint
For text, see Bulletin of Mar. 10,
p. 373.
648
Deparfmenf of State Bulletin <pril
efforts effective methods of easing international tension
and of ending tlie "cold war" situation.
It is obvious even now that the idea of conducting
negotiations at the highest level has met with approval
and support on the part of governments and wide public
circles in many countries. This is all the more under-
standable because the supreme interests of all peoples — •
the interests of the preservation and strengthening of
peace — insistently demand that an end be put to a fur-
ther drift toward war, that the atmosphere of suspicion,
threats, and military preparations be dispelled, and that
a path of peaceful coexistence and businesslilie coopera-
tion of all states be embarked upon.
In our letters to each other during recent months we
have exchanged views in regard to the holding of a sum-
mit conference, and I consider that this exchange of views
has had a positive significanee and has played a definite
role in the preparation of such a meeting. Above all, our
correspondence has shown that the governments of our
two countries hold the general opinion that a conference
of top government officials is desirable and that its suc-
cessful outcome can exert a favorable influence on the
entire international situation. Furthermore, we have had
an opportunity to present in a preliminary way our views
with regard to a number of specific problems, which is
useful in itself, since it facilitates the search for a mu-
tually acceptable basis of negotiations.
In your message of February 15 you state, Mr. Presi-
dent, that the Soviet Government insists that only its
own proposals be discussed by the participants in the
conference and that it refuses to consider the questions
proposed for discussion by the Government of the United
States. This is, however, an altogether erroneous inter-
pretation of the position of the Soviet Government. Ac-
tually, the presentation of problems which we propose for
discussion at a summit meeting has by no means been
dictated by any special interests of the Soviet Union.
They are international problems which have not arisen
just today, problems the solution of which has been long
awaited and demanded by the peoples.
Are the American people less interested than the people
of the Soviet Union or of other countries, for example, in
a renunciation by states of the use of atomic and hydrogen
bombs, in having nuclear weapons tests terminated at long
last or in having the states take coordinated measures
toward preventing a surprise attack? Are the British
and French, the inhabitants of West Germany, or the Bel-
gians less interested than the Russians, Poles, Czechs, or
the inhabitants of East Germany in the conclusion of a
nonaggression pact between NATO member states and
the parties to the Warsaw Treaty, or in the initiation by
both sides, by mutual agreement, of a reduction in the
number of foreign troops in Germany, or in creating in
the center of Europe a wide zone which would be free of
nuclear weapons and excluded from the sphere of the
use of atomic, hydrogen, and rocket weapons? Can one
believe that only the Soviet Union of all the states is in-
terested in the creation of a healthier international politi-
cal atmosphere, to which end it is necessary to stop the
war propaganda which is poisoning the minds of the
people in a number of countries? It is also quite obvious
April 27, 1958
that it would be in the interest of all states to have a free
development of international trade based on the principle
of mutual advantage without any artificial barriers, and
to stabilize the situation in the Near and Middle East
through a renunciation by the great powers of any inter-
ference in the internal affairs of the countries in that
area, which more than once has already been a hotbed
of dangerous conflicts.
We believe it is the duty of aU statesmen who are really
concerned over the fate of the world to contribute in
every possible way toward achieving an agreement on
these pressing problems. There are no insurmountable
obstacles to the solution of all these problems. Only one
thing is required — a willingness of the participants in
the negotiations to display realism and a desire actually
to achieve a relaxation of international tension, which
things are so necessary under present conditions.
The only factor that motivates the Soviet Government
in its proposal for consideration of these problems is
the conviction that under present conditions it would be
best to begin a general lessening of international tension
by solving the most immediate problems, which could be
completely solved even now without harm to the interests
of any individual state. We see a confirmation of the
correctness of this viewpoint in the fact that the Soviet
Union's proposals have found a sympathetic response
and support on the part of governments and wide public
circles in many countries, both in the East and in the
West.
Furthermore, we by no means believe, nor have we ever
stated, that only the topics proposed for discussion by
the Soviet Union can be considered at a summit meeting.
I should like to remind you that in our proposals of Janu-
ary 8 ^ there was a direct statement concerning the willing-
ness of the Soviet Government also to discuss, by mutual
agreement, such additional constructive proposals con-
tributing to a termination of the '-cold war" as might be
presented by the other participants in the meeting.
However, this does not mean that we can agree to dis-
cuss matters that are in the sphere of internal affairs of
other states, the consideration of which could have no
results other than a still further aggravation of the rela-
tions between states. Precisely in this category belong
such matters as the situation in the countries of Eastern
Europe and the unification into a single state of the
German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of
Germany. You, Mr. President, are familiar with the
viewpoint of the Soviet Government in this respect, and it
is hardly necessary to speak of this again in detail. A
discussion of such questions would mean inadmissible
interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states,
to which the Soviet Union will never in any case agree.
The legitimate question arises as to why proposals are
directed to the Soviet Government to discuss the internal
affairs of third countries that are sovereign states and
with which both the United States of America and the
Soviet Union have normal diplomatic relations. In fact,
if the Government of the U.S.A. has any uncertainties
with regard to the internal structure of this or that coun-
try of Eastern Europe, there exists, as you are aware, a
'Not printed.
649
practice, developed through the centuries, of clarifying
such questions not by interfering in the internal affairs
of other countries but by making use of ordinary diplo-
matic channels. We do not consider it possible to assume
the role of judges and decide questions pertaining to the
internal structure of other countries. We are likewise
unable to recognize such a right for any other state, and
we consider inadmissible not only the discussion hut even
the mere presentation of such questions.
We have no doubt that if someone were to propose an
international conference for the discussion of the internal
political situation in France, Italy, Turkey, Canada, or in
the United States itself, for example, such a proposal
would meet with the most emphatic objection on your part.
To include questions of this kind in the agenda of a summit
conference would certainly mean foredooming this con-
ference to failure, and this we do not desire at all.
I should like to add that, if we, for our part, put forward
a number of questions which in the opinion of the Soviet
Government should be considered at the conference, we do
not at all consider the list of these questions definitive.
As I have already communicated to you, Mr. President,
the Soviet Government has always been prepared to dis-
cuss also at a summit conference, by common consent, any
other constructive proposals for ending the "cold war"
that might be submitted by other participants at the
conference.
My colleagues and I have closely studied the considera-
tions contained in your messages. The Soviet Government
agrees to discuss the following questions as well at a
summit conference :
We are prepared to discuss the questions of prohibiting
the use of outer space for military purposes and the liqui-
dation of alien military bases on foreign territories. I
think you will agree that the reaching of an agreement on
this important question would greatly reduce the danger
of a sudden outbreak of war and would be an important
step toward ensuring conditions for a tranquil and peace-
ful life among nations.
The Soviet Government also considers it possible to dis-
cuss the matter of concluding a German peace treaty.
We propose that the governments of the German Demo-
cratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany be
invited to participate in the discussion of this problem.
Of cour.se, the problem of uniting the G.D.R. and the F.R.G.
in a single state, which falls completely within the compe-
tence of these two German states, cannot, as the Soviet
Government has already stated repeatedly, be the subject
of discussion at the forthcoming summit conference.
We agree that at a summit conference there should also
be a discussion of the questions of developing ties and
contacts among countries. The Soviet Government has
Invariably been in favor of every possible development of
such contacts. It shares the views expressed in your
message of February 15 concerning the importance of such
contacts. I should like to emphasize that for its part the
Soviet Government attaches great significance to the
maintenance of systematic personal contacts between top
government officials for the exchange of views concerning
current international problems in the interests of improv-
ing relations between states and of strengthening mutual
trust and consolidating universal peace.
650
Likewise, ^^'e are not opposed to having an exchange of
views regarding ways of strengthening the U.N. ; we have
merely expressed certain considerations of principle which
we have in this respect.
I have already had occasion to explain why we consider
unacceptable the proposal that our two governments re-
nounce the principle of unanimity of the permanent mem-
bers of the U.N. Security Council in deciding certain
questions in that body. We cannot agree at all with the
claim that the only thing in question is the procedural
aspect of the matter, although, as is well known, this
aspect also has important significance in settling great
political problems. We are firmly convinced that the
implementation of measures proposed by you would in
practice lead to the use of the Security Council in the
interests of one or several powers to the detriment of the
interests of other states, to undermining the various prin-
ciples of unanimity of the great powers which have the
basic responsibility for maintaining international peace,
that principle on which the U.N. is founded and which
represents the basic guarantee for the normal activity and
the very existence of the U.N. It is a well-known fact
that in the development of this principle the Government
of the U.S.A. itself played an active role. One cannot
fail to see that at the present time the preservation of
this principle is still more necessary than it was thirteen
years ago, when the U.N. was created.
The Soviet Government has set forth its viewpoint, not
only concerning problems subject to discussion but also
regarding the participants, the time of convening, and
certain other problems. Unfortunately, we do not yet
know the viewpoint of the Government of the U.S.A. con-
cerning these matters ; there is no mention of this even
in your message of February 1.5.
As to the method of preparation for the conference, the
necessity for which has now been expressed by the heads
of the governments of all the largest states, the Soviet
government feels that all ways and means should be used
that might expedite such preparations. It i
that an agreement can be reached through diplomatic
channels on certain questions relating thereto, and these
opportunities should, of course, be utilized. At the same
time we take into account the fact that the Government
of the United States and certain other governments have
declared themselves in favor of calling a Foreign M
isters' conference as one of the preparatory measures for
a summit conference. If you consider that a Foreign
Jlinisters' conference would serve and would help to ex-
pedite the convening of a conference of top government
officials with the participation of the heads of govern-
ment, then we are prepared to comply with such a desire.
We are proceeding on the premise that the convening ofl
a siimmit conference as soon as possible fulfills the hopes
of all peoples.
Since the parties agree on the desirability of expedit
ing the preparation of a summit conference, we propose
to call a Foreign Ministers' meeting in April, and we
consider that it should prepare the agenda for a summit
conference, determine who should participate in it, and
decide when and where it should be held. It would be
advisable to decide all these questions as soon as
Department of State Bulletin
I must say, Mr. President, that the present state of
preparation of the summit conference causes us deflnlte
concern. The lack of a reply from the Government of
the United States to a number of concrete proposals from
the Soviet Government concerning preparations for the
conference, and also the fact that the Government of the
United States continues knowingly to submit unaccept-
able questions, all of this obviously delays the convening
of the conference.
We are all the more alarmed since, in addition to de-
laying a decision on the question of convening the con-
ference, the governments of the United States and of cer-
tain other NATO member states are stepping up the
tempo of practical measures in the sphere of military
preparations, which cannot but aggravate international
tension. I have in mind particularly a recently signed
agreement between the United States and Great Britain
on the establishment of bases in the territory of the lat-
ter for launching American medium-range rockets,^ and
also the announcement of the convening in Paris, in April
of this year, of a conference of Defense Ministers of the
NATO nations for the purpose of studying such questions
as setting up rocket bases in the territories of NATO
member countries, stockpiling atomic weapons in those
countries, and the transfer of atomic weapons to NATO
members.
We note that the press of certain Western powers has
recently stated openly that the United States will not
consent to a summit conference until agreements have
been reached concerning the establishment of American
rocket bases in the territory of the West European NATO
member countries.
All of this results in a very strange situation : on the
one hand, assertions are being made regarding readiness
to make efforts toward relaxing international tension and
lessening the danger of war; on the other hand, military
preparations are being made with feverish haste, which
can only increase international tension and the danger of
war.
How should we, Mr. President, under these conditions,
evaluate the situation which has been created? Should
we judge the true intentions of the Government of the
United States and of certain other NATO nations by their
words or by their deeds? It seems to us that if we are
all agreed that it is necessary to hold a summit con-
ference to study urgent international questions, then at
least measures should not be taken that might only im-
pede the convening of such a conference and render more
complicated the solution of the problems facing it.
I cannot, Mr. President, overlook certain statements,
chiefly concerning questions of Soviet-American relations,
contained in your communication of February 15. I do
not wish to dwell on the tone in which certain passages
of that communication were written, since a contest in
sharp words cannot be useful in finding ways to relax
international tension.
First of all, I must say that the statements concerning
the Socialist order of society, the domestic and foreign
policy of the Socialist states, and the mutual relations
= Bulletin of Mar. 17, 1958, p. 418.
April 21, 1958
between them as contained in your communication are
not in conformity with actual reality.
We are, of course, aware that you are opposed to the
ideas of communism and the principles underlying the
social system in the Soviet Union and other Socialist coun-
tries. We do not expect our views on questions of social
development to coincide. However, while you maintain
that the proponents of the ideology which you also support
have the right to criticize the Socialist system in every
way, you construe the criticism of capitalist social orders
made by Communists in the Soviet Union as proof that
the Soviet Government is not endeavoring to improve re-
lations with the United States of America.
This question deserves special consideration. We have
more than once emphasized how dangerous it would be
to the cause of peace to bring ideological disagreements
into the sphere of relations between states. We cannot
come into agreement in the ideological sphere. You pre-
fer the capitalistic system while we have never concealed
our negative attitude toward capitalism, and we are
firmly convinced that only socialism can ensure true free-
dom and equality for all men and the most complete
development of society, both materially and morally. The
polemics between the adherents of the two ideologies is
perfectly natural. But does that mean that between the
Soviet Union and the United States of America there
cannot exist normal or even good and friendly relations?
Of course it does not. Otherwise, the prospects of pre-
serving peace would be dark indeed. The experience of
the Soviet Union, which maintains good relations with
many states, based on mutual respect and trust, which
states have a different social order from that of the Soviet
Union, is suflScient proof that a difference in social systems
is not an obstacle in such matters.
As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, we not only
consider an improvement in our relations with the U.S.A.
possible and desirable, despite the difference in the social
systems of our two countries, but on more than one oc-
casion we have put forward concrete proposals to that end.
We fully share your opinion on the desirability of taking
steps to enable our peoples to become better acquainted.
We can only welcome your proposal that influential
citizens of the Soviet Union visit the United States of
America for the purpose of becoming familiar with the
life of the American people. For our part, we shall be
glad if prominent Americans come to the Soviet Union
to see how the Soviet people live. This can only be re-
garded as useful. It is well known, for example, that
many Americans, including prominent public figures of
the U.S.A., after a visit to the Soviet Union, have ad-
mitted publicly how erroneous was their previous opin-
ion concerning the life of the Soviet people.
I shall recall in this connection that the Supreme Soviet
of the U.S.S.R. proposed to the Congress of the U.S.A.
two years ago an exchange of their parliamentary delega-
tions. It can hardly be denied that such an exchange
would contribute to a mutual understanding of life in our
two countries. Unfortunately, Mr. President, this pro-
posal has not yet received any reply. The question arises
as to how this can be reconciled with the desires expressed
in your message regarding a development of mutual con-
651
tacts. If the position of the American side in regard to
this question has now changed, such a change can only
be welcomed.
We also welcome your statement that the recently con-
cluded Soviet-American agreement on exchanges in the
fields of culture, technology, and education* should be
fully utilized to improve the relations between our coun-
tries. As you know, we on our part are ready to go even
further in this respect; it is precisely this desire that
dictated our proposal to conclude a treaty of friendship
and cooperation between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A.
There is no doubt that the development of Soviet-
American contacts and ties will facilitate a strengthening
of mutual understanding between our two countries, in
the interests of peace and international cooperation. On
the other hand, it is obvious that any attempts deliberately
to sow distrust and kindle animosity between the peoples
of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., as well as any endeavor
to consign to oblivion the historical traditions of friend-
ship between our peoples, may lead to consequences that
would be dangerous, and not only for our two countries
alone. It is precisely for that reason that we cannot fail
to react when voices are heard in the United States
preaching the idea of a "preventive war," an armed at-
tack on the Soviet Union. You write that you know of
no one in the United States that comes forth with such
appeals. Unfortunately, there are such people, and such
appeals are heard in the U.S.A.
For example, the idea of a "preventive war" against the
U.S.S.R. has been discussed in the American press for
several weeks, an idea which, as attested by such well-
known American commentators as Hanson Baldwin,
Arthur Krock, and Drew Pearson, is contained in a secret
report presented to the National Security Council of the
U.S.A. by the so-called "Gaither Committee." Comment-
ing on this report, Baldwin, military commentator of the
"New York Times," writes that "since the launching of
the Soviet sputniks one hears again in Washington,
though in muted tones, the old talk about a preventive
war, made easier to swallow by the new term of 'pre-
ventive retaliation', — that is to say, attacking the Soviet
Union first."
How can all this be evaluated, Mr. President? We do
not know what precise recommendations are contained in
the report of the "Gaither Committee," but one thing is
clear : this report provoked a public discussion in the
U.S.A. of the idea of a "preventive war." Such persons
as Lawrence, editor of the widely circulated magazine
"United States News and World Report," and Puleston,
former Director of American Naval Intelligence of the
U.S.A., and others came forth with open propaganda for
aggression against the Soviet Union.
Of course, we do not confuse the statements of such
persons with the official policy of the U.S.A. But the
security of the Soviet Union does not allow us to ignore
completely statements of this kind, especially since the
Government of the U.S.A. did not condemn the statements
in question. In our opinion there is danger and harm in
the very fact that such ideas are suggested to the Ameri-
can people on the printed page, read by millions of Ameri-
cans. It is hardly necessary to emphasize the fact that
propaganda of this kind runs counter to any improvement
in the relations between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.
Lastly, I cannot fail to reject the unfounded assertions
contained in your message of February 15 to the effect
that responsibility for the fact that nuclear energy is
being used at present primarily for military rather than
for peaceful purposes rests with the Soviet Union. In
reality it was not the Soviet Union that was the first to
begin the production of atomic weapons and it was not
the Soviet Union that used this weapon of mass destruc-
tion. From the very beginning the Soviet Union has de-
manded that the manufacture and use of nuclear weapons
be prohibited and that existing stocks be destroyed. As
early as June 19, 1946 the Soviet Government presented
to the U.N. for consideration a draft international con-
vention which provided for these measures. We have in-
sisted on this for 12 years. However, the Government of
the United States refuses even to this very day to agree
to the prohibition of nuclear weapons.
I solemnly declare, Mr. President, that the Soviet Union
is prepared to sign even tomorrow an agreement on the
total prohibition of all types of nuclear weapons, on the
cessation of their manufacture, their elimination from
armaments, and the destruction of all available stocks of
such weapons under appropriate international control.
The peoples expect of their leaders, who are responsible
for the destiny of their countries, concrete action to avert
the threat of atomic war and to strengthen peace. Millions
of people ardently hope that our two countries will make
a definite contribution to the establishment of a healthier
international situation, and that they will decisively turn
from the "cold war" and the armaments race toward peace-
ful cooperation on the part of all states. We consider that
a conference of top government officials, with participa-
tion of heads of government, can and must be an important
step in that very direction. Now, when there is agreement
in principle between states on such a meeting, it is espe-
cially necessary to concentrate our joint efforts on the prac-
tical preparations for it, with a view to making such a
meeting possible in the very near future.
We hope, Mr. President, that the considerations of the
Soviet Government concerning the preparation and the
holding of a summit meeting will meet with a favorable
attitude on the part of the Government of the U.S.A.
Respectfully,
n. bulganin
March 3, 1958
SOVBET AIDE MEMOIRE, MARCH 24'
The Soviet Government has attentively examined the
considerations set forth by the U.S. Government in its
aide memoire of March 6, 1958," which is a reply to the
aide memoire of the Soviet Government of February 28 ' on
the question of preparing a meeting at the highest level.
' Ihid., Feb. 17, 1958, p. 243.
^Handed to U.S. Ambassador Llewellyn E. Thompson
at Moscow on Mar. 24 by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei
A. Gromyko.
° Bulletin of Mar. 24, 1958, p. 457.
' md., p. 459.
Department of Stale Bulletin
As is known, the Soviet Government, concerned as it
is over International developments which have taken a
turn dangerous to the cause of peace, proposed at the
close of 1957 to call a meeting of leading statesmen to
solve a number of urgent problems and to define through
joint efforts effective ways to reduce international ten-
sion and to end the state of "cold war."
The Soviet Government notes that the U.S. Govern-
ment, referring In its aide memoire to the purpose of
a summit meeting, also proclaims that it desires this
meeting to take meaningful decisions which would initiate
the settlement of at least some important political prob-
lems and lead to the establishment of international cli-
mate of cooperation and good will.
However, one must admit that while the Soviet Gov-
ernment, after proposing to call a meeting of leading
statesmen, has taken several concrete steps to meet the
wishes of the U.S. Government and of other Western
powers, both with regard to the questions which should
be examined at a summit meeting and with regard to
the procedure of preparing this meeting, the U.S. Gov-
ernment, as evident from its aide memoire, is trying in
fact to bring the entire question of a summit meeting
back to the initial position.
The Soviet Government has proposed that the summit
meeting should discuss such pressing international prob-
lems, agreement on which seems feasible at this meeting
and the settlement of which could lay the foundations
for better mutual understanding among states and for
the settlement of other international problems.
It Is the deep conviction of the Soviet Government that
the following are the questions of great international
significance which must be given priority : immediate end-
ing of tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons ; renuncia-
tion of the use of nuclear weapons by the U.9.S.E., the
United States and Great Britain ; establishment of a zone
free from nuclear and rocket weapons in Central Europe ;
signing of a nonaggression agreement between states
belonging to the North Atlantic alliance and the Warsaw
treaty member states ; reduction of the numerical strength
of foreign troops stationed on the territory of Germany
and In other European states; drafting of an agreement
on questions involved in the prevention of surprise at-
tack ; measures for extending international trade ; ending
of war propaganda ; ways to reduce tension in the area of
the Near and Middle East.
Are there any grounds to claim that only the Soviet
Union is interested in a positive solution of the above
questions and that for the peoples of other countries, in-
cluding the United States, these questions are of a lesser
importance? The questions listed above have been posed
by life itself, by the entire trend of development of Inter-
national relations in the past few years. If we are to be
guided by the interests of consolidating peace, there can be
no other opinion but that it would be equally to the benefit
of the U.S.S.R., the United States, Great Britain, France,
and other countries if agreed measures were adopted to
lessen the danger of rocket-nuclear war, to end the arma-
ment race, to abolish tension in international relations
caused by the "cold war," and to diminish the danger of
conflicts in those areas of the world where, in view of the
tension existing there, such conflicts are especially liable
to break out.
The Soviet Government gave full consideration to the
wishes of the U.S. Government and the governments of
other Western powers regarding the questions they would
like to propose for discussion at a summit meeting.
Guided by the desire to pave the way for a meeting at
the highest level and taking note of the considerations of
the Western powers, the Soviet Government announced
its consent to discuss at a summit meeting the problem of
forbidding the use of outer space for warlike purposes
and of scrapping foreign military bases on the territories
of other countries. Moreover, the Soviet Government de-
clared that it was prepared to discuss the problem of con-
cluding a German peace treaty and of the development of
ties and contacts among countries.
Thus, the problems which the Soviet Government pro-
poses for discussion at the summit meeting also take into
account those proposals of the U.S. Government on which
useful negotiations could be conducted for the purpose of
reducing the tension in the international climate. There-
fore, one cannot agree with the contention made in the aide
memoire of the U.S. Government that the Soviet Govern-
ment claims a veto power in determining the range of prob-
lems to be examined at the summit meeting or special
privilege and powers at the conference itself. Such an
arbitrary interpretation of the Soviet Union's position
with regard to the preparation of the international meeting
has nothing to do with the actual state of affairs.
In its aide memoire the U.S. Government declares that
it is guided by serious intentions in considering questions
pertaining to preparations for a summit meeting. It goes
without saying that such an intention is only commendable.
It is surprising, however, that the U.S. Government
admits the possibility of the summit meeting being turned
into a kind of theatrical show, a spectacle. It should be
noted that such pronouncements about a summit confer-
ence, on which the i)eoples pin so much ho|)e, are strange,
to say the least. Even if some Western circles do have an
intention to smear the idea of a meeting at the highest
level, it is to be hoped that this doe.s not reflect the position
of the U.S. Government.
As to the Soviet Government, it has stated more than
once that it attaches exceptionally great importance to the
salutary effect on the entire international climate and to
the important contribution to the cause of peace which
a meeting with the participation of the heads of govern-
ment would have.
Further, what constructive approach to a summit meet-
ing on the part of the U.S. Government can we talk about
if it continues insisting on the discu.ssion of the so-called
problem of the situation in East European countries. It
is difficult to believe that the U.S. Government does not
realize that such a proposal cannot but be resolutely con-
demned by the Soviet Union and those countries, the situa-
tion in which it would like to make the subject of
discussion at an international conference. The very fact
that this question is being posed is in.sultlng to these states
and impermissible in international relations.
No one has given the United States or any other
country the power to appear in the role of judges who
decide whether a given country should or should not
April 21, 7958
46117B — 58 S
653
have its social and state system chosen by its people.
He who today, guided by his hostility to socialism, poses
the question of changing the social system In East Eu-
roi>eau countries, pushes the world into the road of
kindling enmity among peoples, the road of war. But
then it is pertinent to ask: What do international ne-
gotiations and a summit meeting for reducing interna-
tional tension have to do with that?
The Soviet Government has already more than once
pointed out how dangerous to the cause of peace it would
be to carry ideological differences into the sphere of
international relations. This viewpoint finds ever wider
international recognition and was reflected in particular
in the unanimous decision of the I2th session of the U.N.
General Assembly on the problem of peaceful coexistence
of states. Nevertheless, the aide memoire of the U.S.
Government lays stress on differences of an ideological
nature and at the same time alleges that "international
communism" is the main cause of tension.
Were we to discuss the irreconcilable, fundamental
differences existing between social systems, the differ-
ences between capitalism and socialism, where would
this lead us and what would be the chances of rap-
prochement between states? Unquestionably, in that
case, the gap between the states of East and West would
become even deeper, and the winners would be those who
are sowing enmity and di-scord in international relations.
As to the real cause of tension in present-day inter-
national relations, it is an open secret that this cause is
the policy of "cold war" conducted by the Western powers,
the forming of aggressive military alignments and the
continually increasing armament race which daily leads
to an ever greater build-up in the armament of states
and which has already created an enormous machinery
of extermination. Who would deny today that were
this machinery brought into action, it would spell untold
disasters for mankind.
Neither can the problem of unifying the G.D.R. and
the Federal German Republic into a single state be the
subject of a summit discussi(m, because this matter i.s
entirely within the competence of the two German states
themselves. If an aggravation of relations between states
were the aim, the proposal to discuss the question of an
international conference would be understandable. How-
ever, the Soviet Government believes that the participants
of the conference should proceed from the interests of its
success and refrain from suggesting questions which
would jeopardize the convocation of such a conference.
The Soviet Government considers it of great importance
that an agreement on practical questions of preparing
for a summit conference be reached in the nearest future.
In his message of January 12, 1958,' President Eisen-
hower said that he was also prepared to meet Soviet
leaders to discuss proposals which were introduced by
the Soviet Government for summit discussion. As has
been noted above, the Soviet Government has also ex-
pressed its readiness to discuss at a top-level conference
a number of questions advanced by the American
Government.
Unfortunately, the American aide memoire does not
reply to the Soviet Government's proposal of February 28
concerning the summit agenda. The American Govern-
ment confines itself to the statement that any new
conference of the heads of government should not ignore
the previous conference, that a new summit conference
should begin where the Geneva Conference of the heads
of government left off.
But it becomes obvious that such an approach com-
pletely ignores the fact that considerable time has elapsed
since the Geneva Conference and the international situ-
ation has changed substantially. That is why the Soviet
Government has proposed that, in line with the current
world situation, a new approach should be made to the
solution of pressing international problems.
The Soviet Government takes into account that under
the present circumstances a summit conference would find
it difficult to reach agreement on all pressing international
problems. We have projwsed that the conference focus
its attention first and foremost on the most urgent
problems who.se solution would initiate an improve-
ment of the international situation as a whole. The
e.xamlnation of other problems could be postponed until
a subsequent stage of talks between the states. Thus,
taking into account the lessons of the past and desirous
of preventing the thwarting of the important cause of
relaxing international tensions, we proposed that a new
approach be made to the solution of unsettled interna-
tional problems and that the method of gradual solution
of these problems be adopted as the most realistic and
justified.
The Soviet Government believes that the settlement
of the question it has proposed for summit discussion
would be in complete accord with the desires of the
peoples and would be an important start in radically
changing the Intel-national situation and terminating the
cold war.
Inasmuch as the aide memoire of the U.S. Government
fails to give an impartial account of the state of affairs
in connection with the discussion of the disarmament
problem In the United Nations," it must be recalled that
it was the Western powers which, at the 12th session of
the U.N. General Assembly, rejected the proposal for such
a composition of the U.N. Disarmament Commission as
would allow due consideration for the views of U.N.
member countries.
Instead of patiently searching for mutually acceptable
decisions, the session, under manifest pressure, adopted
a resolution envisaging a composition of the Disarmament
Commission in which the absolute majority belongs to
proponents of the military alignments of the Western
powers.
Thus, the Western powers made use of their majority
for obviously unreasonable purposes and have actually
vetoed disarmament talks and made the achievement of
fruitful results Impossible.
Is It possible in fact to make progress in the disarma-
ment problem by imposing decisions which are advan-
' Ihi/i.. .Ian. 27, 1958, p. 12
654
° For statements by U.S. Representative Henry Cabot
Lodge at the 12th session of the U.N. General Assembly,
together with texts of three U.N. resolutions on disarma-
ment, see ibid., Dec. 16, 1957, p. 961.
Department of State Bulletin
tageous to one of the sides, to one alignment of iwwers,
and infringe on the lawful interests of the other side?
It is clear that no state can allow the infringement of its
national interests, regardless of the number of unaccept-
able decisions the participants of the Western military
alignment could wish to impose on it by using their
majority.
Today, with the existence of two social systems, there
can be no other policy but a reasonable policy of search-
ing for mutually acceptable decisions which neither place
anyone at an advantage nor infringe on the security inter-
ests of the others. There is no need in this case to dwell
in detail on the disarmament problem, because the Soviet
Government has already set forth its position with suffi-
cient clarity in its messages to the U.S. Government.
The aide memoire of the U.S. Government cannot but
disappoint anyone who regards summit talks as a de-
pendable means of relaxing international tensions and
terminating the cold war which the peoples have come tu
hate. The Soviet Government, proceeding from the need
for the earliest completion of preparations for a summit
conference, would like to have the U.S. Government set
forth its views on the questions which the Soviet Union
has proposed for discussion at the forthcoming summit
conference, as the Soviet Government has done with
respect to the American proposals.
The Soviet Government believes it equally necessary
that the question of the composition of the summit con-
ference, its date and place be agi-eed upon in the nearest
future.
Guided by its desire to speed up the preparations for a
summit conference and proceeding from the fact that all
means and ways to bring about the earliest agreement
should be used for this purpose, the Soviet Government
has consented to a foreign ministers conference to prepare
a top-level meeting of the heads of government and has
suggested that the ministers conference be held in April
1958.
At the same time, it has proceeded from the fact that the
range of issues subject to discussion by the ministers
should be limited to problems relating to the organiza-
tional side of preparations for a summit meeting — agenda,
composition of the summit meeting, time, and place.
A discussion of the substance of the questions advanced,
in the opinion of the Soviet Government, should be left
to the summit meeting with the participation of the heads
of government. It can hardly be doubted that a meeting
of the heads of government invested with the broadest
powers and much less hindered by the instructions usual
in such cases, has better chances of success, particularly
when its aim is to change the general trend in international
relations and to turn them toward liquidation of existing
tensions.
On the other hand, if the foreign ministers conference
is entrusted with examination of the substance of the
issues there is every reason to fear that this, far from
facilitating, may on the contrary retard the convocation
of a summit meeting and complicate the achievement of
an agreement on the questions discussed. It is contrary
to logic to recognize the need and usefulness of a summit
conference and at the same time do everything to retard
April 21, 1958
such a conference further and further or to make its very
convocation doubtful on the pretext that at the preliminary
stage the conference of foreign ministers came up against
contradictions which can hardly be overcome.
The Soviet Government hoiies that the U.S. Government
will study with due attention the considerations set forth
above concerning the need to start without further pro-
crastination a concrete discussion of questions of prepar-
ing and convening both a ministers conference and a
summit conference.
White House Lists Some Proposals
Rejected or Ignored by U.S.S.R.
Wlilte House jjicss release dated April 2
A Partial Listing of Some of the United States
Proposals Which Have Been Kejected or Ig-
nored by the Soviet Union
1. Baruch Plan for Inteimational Control of the
Atom
Presented to the U.N. Atomic Energy Com-
mission June 14, 1946.^
2. Preparation of ReaJlstic Measures for Inspec-
tion and Control
Proposal for the inauguration of technical stud-
ies on inspection related to nuclear weapons tests,
cessation of production of fissionable materials for
weapons purposes, and peaceful use of outer space.
All were included in August 29, 1957, proposals
made in London during the meeting of the U.N.
Disarmament Subcommittee.^
3. Open-Skies Proposal
Open-skies proposal, presented at Geneva Sum-
mit Conference, July 21, 1955.' Three variants of
aerial and groimd inspection zones related to the
open-skies proposal were included in proposals on
August 29, 1957.
4. Peaceful Use of Outer Space
Proposal for peaceful use of outer space, pre-
sented in speech by Ambassador Lodge to General
Assembly on January 14, 1957,^ and by the Presi-
dent in his letter of January 12, 1958, to Premier
Bulganin.^
Bulletin of June 23, 1946, p. 1057.
■■ Ibid., Sept. 16, 1957, p. 451.
' Ibid., Aug. 1, 1955, p. 173.
' Ibid., Feb. 11, 1957, p. 225.
' Ibid., Jan. 27, 1958, p. 122.
655
5. Transfer of Nucleau Weapon Stocks to Peace-
ful Uses
Proposal foi- cutting off production of fission-
able materials for weapons purposes and for the
transfer of fissionable materials from weapons to
nonweapons purposes, included in August 29,
1957, proposals.
6. Freedom of Travel
Proposal for the abolition of closed zones for
foreigners, made in note to the Soviet Union on
November 11, 1957,^
7. Limitation of U.N. Veto
Proposal to refrain from using the veto power
to prevent the Security Council from proposing
methods for tlie pacific settlement of disputes pur-
suant to chapter VI of the U.N. Charter, made in
the President's letter to Premier Bulganin, Jan-
uary 12, 1958.
' Ibid., Dec. 9, 1957, p. 934.
The American Discovery of America
by Roy R. Rubottom, Jr.
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American A/fain
If the place for our inter- American discussion
this evening is appropriate, the time is even more
so. We are already within a new age — the atomic
era — undertaking explorations of scientific fron-
tiers even more vast than the geographical
frontiers of 1492. America then was the gateway
to a new knowledge of the earth. Our present
gateway opens on the sheer abyss of space.
The American discovery of America, with all
that it connotes of solidarity and stability and
cooperation in the Western Hemisphere, is a
steadying element for the rest of the world, as well
as for ourselves, in this greatest adventure of the
human mind and body.
The subject we have posed naturally brings up
the questions : When did America begin ? When
Columbus glimpsed San Salvador on an October
dawn in 1492? With the aborigines who had
lived and roamed these lands for centuries before
his coming? With the first settlements, the first
explorations ?
In the cultural sense — and I am not using the
word as a technical term of anthropology but with
the concept that culture is "acquainting ourselves
with the best that has been known and said in the
world" — America certainly did not begin with the
'Address made at Baylor University, Waco, Tex.,
Mar. 26 (press release 147 dated Mar. 25).
Indians. The splendid Indian civilizations were
not yet "American" cultui-e, although, even when
fragmented, they were eventually to become a part
of it. Until that time, they were still aboriginal.
Nor did America begin with the discovery and
those first small, insecure settlements clinging to
the coast and looking back to the homelands in
Spain or England or France. Those settlers were
still European.
Someone has suggested that the first real Ameri-
can was the Inca, Garcilasso de la Vega in Peru,
whose parents were an Inca princess and a Spanish
conquistador, and who wrote in Spanish of his
mother's people. He was perhaps the first
American writer ; but there were Americans before
him. It seems to me that America became a real-
ity in the second generation of those settlers —
whatever their ancestry and wherever they were —
who, instead of gazing back toward Europe with
the idea of someday returning there, faced the New
World wilderness and realized that in it lay their
own future and the home of their children's
children's children.
The first Americans were frontiersmen; they
had to be. That was true on both sides of the Rio
Grande, whether the ancestor had come over in
the Santa Maria, the Nina, the Hercules, the May-
flower, or a later vessel. It is an important factor,
because the frontier attitude — enterprising, inde-
Deparfmenf of Sfafe Bulletin
pendent, and persistent — and the frontier charac-
teristics— energy, fortitude, cooperation — have
become hemisphere determinants. We should
add to the list faith in one's self, faith in one's
neighbors, and faith in God. Without that triple
strength the dream of America could never liave
been transformed into the American reality.
These are all fundamental qualities. However
they may have varied proportionally from time
to time and from area to area, they have been in-
strumental in shaping the destiny of the American
peoples. They motivated the conquest of the
wilderness : the deep forests, the immense prairies,
the agonizing heights of those mountain ranges
that must have seemed invincible. Thi'oughout
the hemisphere those qualities were basic in our
declarations of independence, our wars for free-
dom, our development into constitutional de-
mocracies. They underlie our hemispherewide
objective of peace with liberty. They are the ex-
planation, because they have given us a fun-
damental unity, of our successful inter- American
system, which is the method of the international
conference table, where free nations meet freely,
as equals, to resolve their mutual problems.
Inter-American Solidarity
It is a remarkable thing that one immensely im-
portant national policy is traditional and con-
stant in all the American Eepublics. This is the
policy of inter-American solidarity as a guaranty
of mutual security. A concomitant is the belief
in inter- American cultural relations as a means
of bringing about that understanding among our
peoples which is essential to their continuing
solidarity.
There is no other comparable group of peo-
ples with such a mutual policy upheld through
generations, although, fortunately, other nations
are taking heed and striving to follow the inter-
American example. The inter- American system,
one of the major consequences of the American
discovery of America, has afforded the rest of the
world not only a working model for the United
Nations but a long series of established, well-
tested precedents. In this hemisphere all our Re-
publics uphold the dual policies of inter- American
solidarity and the cultural cooperation that is our
instrumentality for mutual discovery. In none of
our countries have these policies ever been merely
partisan or even merely national. Together they
form one traditional hemisphere policy, tena-
ciously adhered to by all our governments because
it embodies a deeply held conviction of all our
peoples.
The proofs of this are written into our 21 na-
tional histories. They are so many that it is im-
possible to advance them all here today, even on the
part of just one country — our own. But we
could call the roll of our Presidents, beginning
with George Washington, and hear them speak to
this thesis one by one. Washington's admonition
in his Farewell Address against entangling alli-
ances is frequently cited. Let us remember also
that in that same address he assured his fellow
citizens that "harmony, liberal intercourse with all
nations are recommended by policy, humanity, and
interest." Thomas Jefferson pointed to "the ad-
vantages of a cordial fraternization among all the
American nations."' John Quincy Adams said of
United States participation in the Congress of
Panama convoked by Bolivar: "It may be that,
with the lapse of centuries, no other opportunity
so favorable will be presented to the Goverimient
of the United States to subserve the benevolent
purposes of Divine Providence, to dispense the
promised blessings of the Redeemer of mankind, to
promote the prevalence in future ages of peace on
earth and good will to man, as will now be placed
in their power by participating in the delibera-
tions of this Congress." Abraham Lincoln advo-
cated "strengthening our ties of good will and
good neighborliness with Latin America." Her-
bert Hoover said that "cultural currents not only
contribute to better luiderstanding but also em-
phasize the essential unity of interest of the Ameri-
can Republics." Franklin D. Roosevelt declared
in his First Inaugural Address that he "would
dedicate this nation to the policy of the good neigh-
bor." President Eisenhower has energetically and
consistently furthered the concept that in the
Western Hemisphere the bonds which unite us
as sovereign equals who are working side by side
for the betterment of all of us — nations and citi-
zens— have elevated this neighborly relationship to
one of genuine partnership.
It would be easy to cite parallel statements in
support of inter- American cultural as well as po-
litical cooperation made by our Secretaries of State
in illustrious succession from Thomas Jefferson
to John Foster Dulles. Instead of quoting ex-
hortations, however, no matter how apt and inspir-
Aprll 2T, 1958
657
iag, let us take a quick look at the record. What
have we done and what are we doing to bring about
and extend the mutual discovery of America which
gives rise to this productive partnership of good
neighbors?
From our own standpoint, that of the United
States, I would say that we have done a great deal,
though still not nearly enough, to increase under-
standing and good will through cultural relation-
ships— which is to say, to make and follow road-
maps of mutual discovery. There are three angles
of approach in estimating the accomplisliment.
First, there is our official United States program
of cultural relations with the other American Ke-
publics. Second, there is our participation in the
cultural programs of the Organization of Ameri-
can States, our multilateral inter-American sys-
tem. Third is the important cumulative contri-
bution toward discovery, toward understanding,
made on a people-to-people basis through private
institutions — such as Baylor University — and pri-
vate citizens — such as yourselves.
Precedent for U.S. Technical Cooperation Programs
It is an interesting, but not surprising, fact that
our Government's present large worldwide pro-
grams of educational exchange and information
began, like so many others, within our American
family of nations. The first such official United
States program was established in 1938, a year
dark with global threats of war. In order to
strengthen the hemisphere solidarity which was
the safeguard of the American peoples, the United
States Government at that time set up an Inter-
departmental Committee on Scientific and Cul-
tural Cooperation with the other American Re-
publics and created in the Department of State
a Division of Cultural Relations, likewise focused
at first on Latin America. Both agencies, from
the beginning, invited and encouraged the cooper-
ation of private citizens and institutions.
At first the State Department's cultural pro-
gram concentrated largely on what, in official
language, we term the "exchange of persons."
This interchange included visits to and from Latin
America of students and teachers, leaders of
thought and opinion, specialists in fields ranging
from medicine to music, from journalism to an-
thropology. It was all part of the discovery on
our part of how Latin Americans think and feel
and act, and of their similar discovery of us. And
it all added up in the same colimm : solidarity —
with, let us be frank, an occasional minor erasure
or correction here and there.
The Office of the Coordinator of Inter- American
Affairs was created in 1941 to coordinate, further
stimulate, and activate inter- American activities.
Two of its early accomplishments were establish-
ment of the Inter- American Educational Founda-
tion and the Inter- American Trade Scholarship
Program. The Coordinator's office, and later the
Institute of Inter- American Affairs, served among
other things as precedent and seedbed for our Gov-
ernment's present worldwide technical coopera-
tion programs.
It is beside the point of our brief presentation
to go into details of post- World War II reorgani-
zations which brought the Coordinator's office into
the State Department framework, later developed
the global International Cooperation Adminis-
tration, and established the United States Infor-
mation Agency as a massive independent entity,
also worldwide in scope. However, I think it is
important to note that all these programs, whether
short-range in scope because of pressing wartime
urgencies, or long-range, looking toward the
eventual years of peace, employed the informa-
tional media constantly — press, radio, motion
pictures, and, lately, television. At the present
time worldwide programs in these media, as well
as supervision of United States libraries and bi-
national centers abroad, and related activities, are
under the direction of USIA, the United States
Information Agency, which works in close cooper-
ation with the Department of State. The Depart-
ment continues to further bilateral programs of
exchange of persons in educational, scientific, and
cultural fields under the Fulbright and Smith-
Mundt Acts and related legislation, while tech-
nical-training exchanges are an important part of
the International Cooperation Administration.
The binational centers to which I refer are
highly important groups. They afford a meeting
place for citizens of the host country who wish
to learn more about the United States and for
resident United States citizens who wish to learn
more about the host country. In this enterprise
of mutual American discoveiy, English classes
are an amazingly important factor. It would
surprise you to see the thousands — and I mean
thousands, literally — of all ages and from every
658
Deparlment of State Bulletin
walk of life, who line up to pay a fee and enroll
for courses in the English language. Last year —
1957 — a grand total of 75,204 students were en-
rolled in the other American Eepublics at these
binational centers for the study of English.
Everybody in Latin America seems to want to
learn it. I wish we had as many persons in our
country clamoring to learn Spanish or Portu-
guese. Here in Texas we make a pretty good
showing in that respect. But it is still not enough.
Other important factors are the United States
schools in Latin America — organized and operated
by private citizens, usually not for profit — which
are helping a large number of young people and
their parents really to discover America. Future
leaders in political and many other fields will
come from those schools. Just one such privately
operated United States school, at La Paz, Bolivia,
has graduated the present President of that coun-
try, his Foreign Minister, another Cabinet mem-
ber, and the Bolivian Ambassador to the United
States.
Our cultural relations programs, in addition to
the interchanges which I have noted, have many
other aspects. They encourage two-way art and
scientific exhibits, for example, and the transla-
tion and publication of books. In several Latin
American countries enlargement of the programs
has been facilitated by the extension to this hem-
isphere of the Fulbright Act. As you probably
know, this measure provides for educational ex-
change on funds made available in foreign cur-
rencies obtained from the sale abroad of surplus
agricultural commodities under terms of Public
Law 480.
Furthermore, and very especially and very em-
phatically, our Government is furthering an en-
tirely new phase of the American discovery of
America: the mutual investigation and utiliza-
tion of every means by which nuclear energy may
be employed for the peace and benefit of this
hemisphere and all the rest of the world.
If this governmental program of cultural re-
lations seems somewhat stark and dry in a quick
rundown like this, let me assure you that, if we
had the time, I could give you a dozen vivid
human-interest stories to illustrate every phase.
A good many of them would be from my own
firsthand observations in Colombia, Venezuela,
Mexico, and elsewhere.
April 21, 1958
OAS Cultural Activities
So far we have been looking at our official bi-
lateral cultural relations with the other American
Kepublics. Those are the programs which the
United States carries on with each of the other
American Republics separately, through goveni-
ment-to-government agreement. At the same time,
of course, we are also engaged in the multi-
lateral imdertakings of the Organization of
American States, agreed upon and carried out by
the American Eepublics working together. Our
own bilateral programs are correlated with, but
do not duplicate, them.
The Organization of American States is, as you
know, a voluntaiy association of the 21 American
Republics. Its seat is the Pan American Union,
which is the name both of the permanent secre-
tariat and of the beautiful building that houses
it at Washington. The pui-poses of the OAS, as
set forth in its charter, are :
To strengthen the peace and security of the
continent ;
To prevent possible causes of difficulties and to
ensure the pacific settlement of disputes that may
arise among the Member States ;
To provide for common action on the part of
those States in the event of aggression ;
To seek the solution of political, juridical and
economic problems that may arise among them;
and
To promote, by cooperative action, their eco-
nomic, social and cultural development.
The OAS cultural relationships are worked out
through the Cultural Affairs Department of the
Pan American Union and through the Inter-
American Cultural Council. This Council has 21
members, one for each of the American Republics,
appointed by the respective governments. The
first United States representative on this Inter-
American Cultural Council, which was created by
the Ninth Inter- American Conference at Bogota
in 1948, was the eminent historian. Dr. Lewis
Hanke, now director of the Institute of Latin
American Affairs at the University of Texas. Our
present representative is a distinguished educator,
Dr. Mary P. Holleran. The Cultural Council
meets every 3 years, and its subsidiary five-mem-
ber Committee for Cultural Action functions
during the interim.
659
Just as the Presidents of the United States and
their Secretaries of State have successively at-
tested their faith in inter- American underetand-
ing and friendship as measures of foreign policy,
so have successive inter-American conferences
voiced the same conviction. This is no fair-
weather attitude, pleasant words when the skies
are clear. The impressive fact is that, when inter-
national clouds are darkest, the American Re-
publics show themselves to be more than ever
convinced of the immense, immediate — I should
like to use a good emphatic Spanish term here —
imprescindible importance of their cultural rela-
tionships. Here again, although we have not time
for a complete rollcall, let me cite some significant
instances :
The first meeting of the Foreign Ministers of
the American Republics at Panama in 1939 pref-
aced its General Declaration of Neutrality in the
European conflict by reaffirming "the spiritual
unity" of the peoples of America. The Declara-
tion of Mexico adopted by the Inter- American
Conference on Problems of War and Peace at
Mexico City in 1945 declared that "education
and material well-being are indispensable to the
development of democracy" and that "the inter-
American community is dedicated to the ideals of
universal cooperation." The Inter-American
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (model for the
NATO and SEATO agreements), adopted in 1947
by the Inter- American Conference for the Main-
tenance of Continental Peace and Security, is
predicated on the desire of the American peoples
and their governments for "consolidating and
strengthening their relations of friendship and
good neighborliness."
As regards specific OAS cultural relations ac-
tivities, I think we may say that the multilateral
cultural program began effectively 22 years ago
with the Convention for the Promotion of Inter-
American Cultural Relations adopted by the
Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance
of Peace at Buenos Aires. It provided for in-
terchange of students and teachers, since hemi-
sphere peace would be fortified by greater mutual
knowledge of the people and institutions of the
countries represented, and a more consistent edu-
cational solidarity on the American continent.
The United States delegation presented to that
conference a declaration of principles which
stressed the fact that the American Republics
"have a common likeness in their democratic form
of government and . . . common ideals of peace
and justice" and that they share the objective
of "harmonious development of their commerce
and their cultural aspirations in the various fields
of political, economic, social, scientific and artistic
activities."
This emphasis on education underlies the whole
of the OAS cultural program. Fundamental
education and libraries were the main themes of
the first meeting of the Inter- American Cultural
Council, and educational problems likewise domi-
nated its second meeting in 1956.
The Committee of Presidential Representatives,
which was created at President Eisenhower's sug-
gestion to explore ways of extending the influence
and effectiveness of the Organization of American
States, related most of its recommendations to
education. Two major items were proposals for
a sizable system of OAS scholarships and for ex-
ploration of the peacetime uses of atomic energy.
With regard to both proposals, much recent
progress has been made. In our own country the
United States Atomic Energy Commission, while
expanding and augmenting its training programs
to increase the supply of United States scientists
and engineers, is also providing training assist-
ance to friendly nations. Latin American stu-
dents ai"e among those who have received such
training at the International School of Nuclear
Science and Engineering at Argonne, near Chi-
cago, and the Oak Ridge Institute of Nuclear
Studies in Tennessee. Furthermore, the United
States Atomic Energy Commission has inaugu-
rated with the University of Puerto Ric« a special
progi-am of assistance and collaboration. This is
expected to become a nuclear research and train-
ing center helpful to many countries of the hemi-
sphere. The American peoples are united in their
great purpose of advancing by every means within
their power the development of atomic energy
for the purposes of peace.
The recommendation of the Presidential Repre-
sentatives for a multilateral scholarship program
has already been agreed upon by the Organization
of American States. It is expected to be in oper-
ation by September of this year. Beginning with
170 fellowships, the number will be increased as
rapidly as possible to 500 a year. Their purpose
is to contribute to the economic, social, scientific,
and cultural development of our 21 Republics.
660
DepaTtmenf of State Bulletin
Fellowships will be granted for study only in edu-
cational and training centers outside tlie appli-
cant's country of permanent residence. It is all
part of our great adventure of mutual discovery.
In the areas of natural resources, agricultural
and industrial development, and improved living
standards the Organization of American States
carries on economic, social, and cultural projects
through its several subordinate councils and spe-
cialized organizations. They deal with problems
of housing and city planning, cooperatives, social
work, labor, social security, and migration. They
are all means toward our mutual hemispherewide
American discovery of America.
People-to-People Program
When we look into nongovernmental pro-
grams— the contributions of private individuals,
groups, institutions — we find that the American
discovery of America began as a people-to-people
enterprise long before it was officially sanctioned
as government-to-government policy.
We have noted that in the Organization of
American States the cultural relations program
was inaugurated by the Convention for the Pro-
motion of Inter-American Cultural Eelations in
1936 and that the United States own official cul-
tural relations program was launched 2 years
later. But as a people-to-people activity our in-
ter-American cultural program is as old as the
United States.
In the first period of our national life Benja-
min Franklin, to take one example, was an inter-
American person-to-person program in himself.
He not only studied Spanish assiduously but en-
couraged the teaching of the Spanish language
and the translation and publication of books
about other areas of this hemisphere. He also
favored building up library collections dealing
with Spain and Latin America. At his instance
the American Philosophical Society, of which he
was the guiding spirit, invited Alejandro Ram-
irez, a Hispanic botanist who had done consider-
able work in the Caribbean ai-ea, to become a cor-
responding member. Reciprocally, the Spanish
Academy of History in 1784 elected Franklin as
its first member in the young United States.
Years later a member of the Spanish Cortes was
a guest in Franklin's home in Philadelphia,
where he had an exceptional opportunity to meet
leaders in national life and to see for himself how
April 2?, 7958
our new Republic was functioning. Wlien he re-
turned to Madrid in May 1816, he described his
visit eloquently and paid admiring tribute to our
way of life in a long speech before his fellow
parliamentarians.
And in this connection I should like to specu-
late on some exchanges of persons which never
occurred but which, if they had taken place, might
have altered the attitude of thousands of Latin
Americans toward the United States during the
initial years of the present century. During that
period we were often criticized as being crass
money-grubbers whose motivations were material-
ism and utilitarianism. And which of our repre-
sentative great men was often mentioned as the
uninspired and uninspiring prophet of that un-
enlightened code? Well, the name that came up
most frequently as the typical materialist was
none other than that of Benjamin Franklin ! I
hope such delusions have long since been clcnred
up. I am sure that any of our Latin American
neighbors who might still have any misconceptions
of the kind would be helped toward a real dis-
covery of our America if they came to visit us.
They could find here for themselves the living
heritage bequeathed us by that wise, witty, and
genial founding father, Benjamin Franklin, who
had the newspaperman's inquiring mind, the in-
ventor's imaginative dexterity, the statesman's
patient sagacity, and the patriot's indomitable
faith. We conceive Franklin to have been dedi-
cated, upright — hardheaded, yes — but also a great-
hearted idealist, who, against all odds, in a hostile
England and a reluctant France, proclaimed the
doctrine of American freedom because "Our cause
is the cause of mankind !"
We citizens of the United States, especially
those of us who have not had the good fortune to
visit our southern neighbors, also hold certain
misconceptions sometimes about them. Many of
these can be overcome by study and reading as
well as personal contact with Latin Americans
who visit us. If I may cite a personal experience,
I recall that despite several years of study of
Spanish in high school and university I had only
a vague notion of what was Latin America until
1937 when, as Assistant Dean of Student Life at
the University of Texas, I began to have direct
dealings with Latin American students at the
University of Texas. Some of them were visitors
in our land, as in the case of the Farmer Fellows,
661
who were studying there while a group of Texas
students were studying at the University of
Mexico in exchange. Others were my fellow
Texans, born in this country but of direct Latin
American descent. Kegardless of their land of
birth, they were uniformly attractive and quick
to make friends. I am happy to recite this per-
sonal testimonial of the results in one instance of
a people-to-i^eople program carried out right in
this State.
Our fellow citizens are rapidly overcoming their
lack of knowledge about Latin America. They
are traveling to Mexico especially and to many
other countries in ever-increasing numbers. The
coin which they leave behind, to the tune of about
$375 million per year, certainly has two sides.
There is the economic side, which, we hope, helps
to overcome the chronic dollar scarcity in tlie
area — dollars which are usually respent in the
United States. There is also the cultural and
spiritual side growing out of the thousands of
daily human contacts which are involved in this
travel. Over the long run this may be even more
important tlian the financial side of the coin.
There is one particular kind of travel, by a
necessarily limited group of people, which I would
like to cite as having umisual value. It is that
being carried out by our respective parliamen-
tarians. We in the State Department derive con-
structive ideas from the travels undertaken by our
own Senators and Congressmen to Latin America.
Conversely, in the last few years we have had an
increasing number of their colleagues visit us
from Latin America, most of them as our State
Department's special guests under the official ex-
change program. For example, I can recall sev-
eral profitable discussions in the past 2 years with
visiting parliamentarians from Brazil, Chile,
Peru, and Uruguay.
Wliat we have begun to call the people-to-
people program — as we have seen, it had been go-
ing on spontaneously without a name since co-
lonial times — is a channeling and coordination,
insofar as possible, of unofficial and often infor-
mal international relations. In September 1956
President Eisenhower called for "the active sup-
port of thousands of independent private groups
and institutions, and millions of individual Amer-
icans acting through person-to-person communi-
cations." In this program every citizen can take
part and, in fact, must take part at some time
and in some way, whetlier or not he realizes that
he is doing so. It is a very important aspect of
America. The impression left in Guadalajara by
a visitor from "Waco ; the hospitality shown to or
withheld from a Peruvian student; inter- Ameri-
can exhibitions of paintings or of livestock; the
Garden Clubs of Texas cooperating with the
Garden Club of Chile ; the picture albums sent to
and received from Latin America by Camp Fire
Girls; the meeting of the Inter- American Bar
Association at Dallas; the working out together
of recipes for a regional dish or of blueprints for
an atomic reactor — all such things are fragments,
large and small, of a whole which, when put to-
gether entire, is the hemisphere itself.
A Real-Life Story
Perhaps a little story from real life will sum
this up better than statistics would. It is a true
story. It happened a year or so ago, and it hap-
pened to Texans. To my mind this incident which
really occurred symbolizes the friendship that ce-
ments inter-American solidarity. It demon-
strates the generosity and good will of people
in another neighboring Republic^ — in this case,
Colombia — not by interchanges on a high official
level but by what is often far more revealing : an
instantaneous response from the heart,.
The scene was the Colombian Andes, the month,
January. An SA-16 unit of our Air Reserve
Group at Albrook Field, Panama, crashed during
a search for a privately owned United States
plane from Texas which had been reported miss-
ing in the area. Two members of the SA-16 crew
were killed outright, and a third was mortally in-
jured. The nearest town, a small agricultural
community called Jardin, had fewer than a thou-
sand inliabitants.
The authorities at Jardin immediately tele-
phoned the news of the disaster to the nearest city,
which communicated with Albrook so that a sec-
ond air rescue plane could be sent at once. How-
ever, Jardin itself is not accessible by air except
by helicopters. Ambulances had to be sent in
from 5 hours away by a difficult mountain road,,
and other help was dispatched by automobile
from the United States consulate at Medellin.
Before any of our own people could arrive, how-
ever, practically the whole town of Jai-din had
dropped every other employment for the time
being in order to assist in the rescue. The two
Department of State Bulletin
physicians at tlie small local hospital, which had
been built by the townspeoiDle themselves, worked
imceasingly for 48 hours or more. The women of
the town, in a noble spirit of compassion and
Christian tenderness, collected red and white and
blue cloth and sewed together American flags to
cover our dead. ^Vlien the limited hospital sup-
ply of drugs, bandages, and the like was ex-
hausted, volunteer workers slipped out quietly
and bought supplies with their own scanty funds
and without any idea of comjDensation. In fact,
from first to last, all efforts on the part of a
United States citizen, whether in official or pri-
vate capacity, to reimburse these good Samaritans
for the services so generously given were unavail-
ing. Instead, the Mayor of Jardin, the two doc-
tors, and the people m general spoke proudly of
the high estimate which they placed on spiritual
values. "It is our sincere pleasure to be able to
do something for the great North American na-
tion," they said. The Mayor added that the citi-
zens of Jardin would like, however, to make one
request, and one only, of the United States. The
one thing which they wanted from us, in symbol
of the vuidying friendship between our coimtries,
to fly over their little hospital alongside the flags
of their own country, Colombia, and the Red
Cross, was a United States flag !
Dr. Milton Eisenhower
To Visit Central America
WhUe House press release dated March 29
The President announced on March 29 that Dr.
Milton S. Eisenhower is planning to make a good-
will visit in June, as personal representative of the
President, to Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras,
Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Panama.
Exact dates and details for the arrangements
will be announced later. This will be the third
good-will visit to our neighbor nations to the south
by Dr. Eisenhower. In 1953 he toured the 10 coun-
tries of South America, and in 1957 he visited
Mexico.
U.S. Operations Mission
To Be Opened in Sudan
The Department of State announced on April 3
(press release 167) that under a new agreement
between the Government of the United States and
the Government of the Sudan a U.S. economic as-
sistance mission, headed by Robert W. Kitchen, Jr.,
is scheduled to arrive at Khartoum April 13 or 14
to open an International Cooperation Administra-
tion operations office there.
The bilateral agreement, signed March 31 at
Khartoum by representatives of the two Govern-
ments, provides a framework for U.S. economic
and teclmical assistance to the Sudan in the fields
of agriculture, vocational education, road develop-
ment, and communication.
Ghana Requests Establishment
of U.S. Operations Mission
Press release 175 dated April 4
Agreement has been reached with the Govern-
ment of Ghana for the establislunent of a United
States Operations Mission in that country, the De-
partment of State announced on April 4.
The mission will conduct a technical cooperation
program in the year-old African republic, with
primary emphasis in the field of agriculture. Pro-
jects are being initiated to help expand Ghana's
cattle industry, to develop an agricultural exten-
sion service, to establish a veterinarian school and
farmers' training institutes, and to conduct fur-
ther surveys of the country's agricultural and live-
stock potential. The program also includes
training in the United States for officials from the
agriculture, labor, and geological departments of
the Government.
Details of the program were worked out follow-
ing a study undertaken at the request of the Gov-
ernment of Ghana by a survey team from the
International Cooperation Administration. In a
meeting on April 1 the Ghana Cabinet gave formal
approval of the projects and requested the estab-
lishment of a mission.
April 27, 1958
663
The United Nations: Clialienges of a New Age
hy Francis 0. Wilcox
Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs '
I am particularly pleased to meet with you to-
night. It is encouraging to me that groups of
responsible citizens such as the New Hampshire
Council on World Affairs are taking a keen and
active interest in international relations and their
grave implications for both the present and the
future.
The New Age
Today we live in a world which is in every sense
on the threshold of a new age — the space age. It
is an era which holds implications and challenges
for man far greater than those of the 15th and
16th century age of discovery and exploration.
We all recognize today what a significant age that
was although very few people at the time were
aware of it. It was an era of tremendous scien-
tific achievement and expansion of horizons of
man's knowledge. Whole continents were settled.
New states and empires came into being. The re-
sults of all this — and some of the problems which
arose in that period — are still with us today.
There is, however, a fundamental difference be-
tween the new age which we are entering and the
age of exploration and discovery.' The signifi-
cance of improved navigation and commerce in
that period was apparent only to a privileged few.
In sharp contrast, millions of people throughout
the world today are keenly aware of the fact that
we are on the eve of a new age in history.
This was particularly evident to me during a
trip abroad from which I have just returned.
Everywhere I traveled — to the Near East, South-
east Asia, and elsewhere in the Far East — people
' Address made before the New Hampshire Council on
World Affairs at Manchester, N. H., on Mar. 24 (press
release 14.5).
appeared to recognize that recent scientific and
technological advancements of the new age de-
mand, to use the words of President Eisenhower,
that a way be found "by which the miraculous in-
ventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to his
death, but consecrated to his life." ^
I would like to discuss with you some of the
major challenges which confront both the United
States and the United Nations in this new era.
There is no doubt that the United Nations today
is man's best hope for meeting many of these
challenges. The United States regards the United
Nations as a cornerstone in its development of a
sound and imaginative foreign policy to cope with
the impact of these challenges.
Technological Challenges
In the technological field man is on the verge
of conquering outer space. At this moment, aa
you know, three artificial satellites — Sputnik, Ex-
plorer, and Vanguard — are circling the earth.
Men put them there. These, together with the
ICBM and other missiles, are only the beginning
of a new era of scientific and technological ad-
vances which until recently have been relegated
to the realm of the Sunday supplements and comic
books. Developments in the field of outer space
will inevitably shrink the universe of which we
here on earth are but an infinitesimal part. The
mysteries of other planets will gradually be
imfolded.
In addition, man soon will become the master of
matter and energy. Research on the atom al-
ready has opened up new limitless vistas in many
areas of human endeavoi-. Progress in atomic
' Bulletin of Dec. 21, 1953, p. 851.
Department of State Bulletin
energy will affect almost every facet of our daily
lives — the power which runs our factories, the
wares which they produce, the homes we live in,
even the food we eat. A promising start is under
way in the international development and control
of this fabulous resource through the establish-
ment of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
These technological and scientific developments
serve to reemphasize the increasing interdepend-
ence of man, his institutions, and his international
organizations. They bring into sharper relief
than ever before the absolute necessity for a com-
mon international approach to meet common
problems.
Political Challenges
This new age, along with its technological and
scientific developments, has produced equally far-
reaching political challenges. They are not as ap-
parent nor as spectacular, but they are certainly
as real and as urgent.
Unfortunately we are accustomed to thinking
of the world as being divided into power blocs.
As a result we have tended to overlook a fact of
vital importance. While it is true that the world
is divided into power blocs, militarily, it is at the
same time developing politically into a multi-
national society with new challenges and new
problems which demand the same common ap-
proach by the nations of the world as do those in
the scientific and technological field.
These challenges stem from the steadily in-
creasing number of newly independent countries ;
they consist of the many new issues which arise
from conflicting aspirations of these nations. We
have only to look around us to see daily evidence
of the disputes associated with the crumbling of
ancient empires and the vigorous nationalism and
intense anticolonialism of newly emerging states.
Nor is the new nationalism the only seedbed for
new issues in the political field.
In many new nations the population in one
generation has been undergoing almost overnight
a social and economic transformation which re-
quired centuries in Western Europe. Africa is
a case in point. In this vast territory peoples are
eagerly seeking recognition of their national
identities. You can be certain that what happens
in Africa in the next decade will influence pro-
foundly the future course of events of this world
in which we live.
April 27, 7958
The Soviet Challenge
Finally, there is an even more formidable
challenge of constant and increasing concern to
all free men. I refer, of course, to the increased
power of the Soviet Union as it crosses the thresh-
old of the new age.
This new Soviet power confronts us with many
far-reaching problems. Sputniks I and II have
provided a striking demonstration of tlie Soviet
Union's capabilities in the scientific and techno-
logical fields. But these capabilities, according
to our best scientific information, have been ac-
companied by the development of certain types
of missiles, notably the ICBM. The Soviets have
given top priority to training more scientists
and more engineers in their schools and univer-
sities. Their efforts in this respect, when com-
pared with our own, are a source of serious con-
cern. Certainly our own free democratic society
is far better equipped to explore scientific truth
and thus provide the necessary capabilities for
the advancement of mankind. Yet the Soviet
Union — dictatorship that it is — has demonstrated
to the world that it can mobilize both its man-
power and resources for the education of highly
qualified scientists and engineers and encourage
their scientific and teclinological achievements,
although it may be at the expense of a broad edu-
cation for all the people.
The Soviets are posing a serious challenge on
still another front through the misuse for im-
perialistic purposes of their rapidly growing
economy. In four decades, and at great sacrifice
to the material well-being of its people, the Soviet
Union has developed an industrial base that is
second only to that of the United States. And
today it is still expanding. The Soviet gross na-
tional product, for example, is increasing approx-
imately 6 to 7 percent aimually. During the past
decade its output of electric power rose from 56.5
billion to 210 billion kilowatt hours and oil pro-
duction from 26 million to 98 million metric tons.
Now, of course, the Soviet Union is fully aware
of the aspirations of newly developing nations
for economic and social progi-ess. With this in
mind it has utilized its economic strength and
has embarked on a campaign of economic pene-
tration and political subversion of these countries,
particularly in the Near East and Asia. In the
past 21/2 years, according to Department of State
estimates, the Sino-Soviet bloc has committed the
665
equivalent of $1,900,000,000 in economic and
military assistance to these new states. Energetic
efforts by the Communist bloc to negotiate trade
and payments agreements have more than
doubled its trade with these coimtries since 1954.
With a gi'eat deal of fanfare the Soviets have
bought agricultural products from coimtries
which have had temporary difficulties in disposing
of their surpluses in free-world markets.
This Communist economic offensive has made
American trade and assistance programs more
important than ever before. The Mutual Security
and Trade Agi-eements Acts, which President
Eisenhower called "the iron imperatives of peace"
and which are now under study by Congress, pro-
vide potent weapons in meeting this new economic
threat.
I know that some of our jjeople vigorously at-
tack our foreign aid program. They have con-
demned it as a "giveaway" program, and they have
deplored the fact that we continue, over a period
of years, to send our aid abroad.
This is to seriously miscalculate the nature of
the challenge we face. We must never underesti-
mate the determination of the Soviet Union to
convert the uncommitted nations to the Commu-
nist system. Without an adequate foreign aid
program we would be faced with an impossible
task in our attempt to help keep the free world
free.
My point is that the Soviet Union is moving into
the new age aggi"essively on all fronts. Backed
with enhanced power, it has injected into its for-
eign policy on the one hand a new demanding and
threatening tone and, on the other hand, blandish-
ments of good will and peaceful intent. This re-
quires bold mitiative on our part as well as swift
countermoves. Otherwise the free world will be
faced with the grim prospect of a vei-y serious
reversal in the balance of power.
The U. N. and Technological Challenges
The miplications of man's ultimate mastery of
the atom and conquest of outer space are awe-
some in magnitude. There is no doubt the
United Nations provides tlie most effective instru-
ment to insure that these conquests will be de-
voted to peacefid purposes. The peacefid uses of
outer space must be assured, and its use for mili-
tary purposes must be prevented. Immediate ex-
ploratory work is necessary to establish the
competence of the United Nations in this field.
Secretai-y of State Dulles, in advocating that
outer space should be dedicated to peace, ^ has said
that
. . . there is an opportunity here which is almost stag-
gering in its possible implications — its implications if we
do it, and its tragic implications if we do not do it.
In this connection you will recall our efforts
which began over a decade ago to insure the peace-
ful uses of atomic energy when we had a monopoly
on atomic weapons. As early as 1946, when the
atomic age was in its infancy, the United States
took the unprecedented step of offering to relin-
quish that monopoly and vest it in an international
authority with complete control over the manu-
facture and use of dangerous atomic energy ma-
terials. As you know, the Soviets turned that
offer down. Consequently it is now impossible,
owing to the passage of time and the refinement
of scientific techniques, to account for past produc-
tion of fissionable materials. Thus a great hu-
manitarian opportunity slipped by. The world
cannot afford to let a mistake like that happen
again.
Once again we have made a new proposal, this
time relating to cooperation in the use of outer
space. President Eisenhower in his letter of Jan-
uary 12 to Soviet Premier Bulganin " stated the
United States position when he declared :
Should not outer space be dedicated to the peaceful
uses of mankind and denied to the purposes of war?
That is my proposal.
Once again the choice lies with the Soviets.
It is my firm conviction that, given assurance
of peaceful uses of outer-space development, the
possibilities for the advancement of mankind are
enormous. It is, of course, impossible at present
to assess the full impact on our lives of the ex-
ploration and exploitation of outer space. But
there are a number of significant possibilities
which already are becoming apparent and, in
fact, in certain instances are predicted as certain-
ties by our scientists.
We are told, for example, that artificial satel-
lites, reporting back to earth, will enable us to
study the mysteries of the universe for the first
time unimpeded by the distortions of the earth's
atmosphere. New knowledge of the behavior of
the sun and of radiations which interfere with
V6i(/., Feb. 3, 1958, p. 166.
' Ibid., Jan. 27, 1958, p. 122.
Department of Stale Bulletin
-adio communications will be acquired. This will
nean eventual improvements in means of com-
nunication, with satellites being used as radio
:elay points. For the first time reliable radio
communication, unhampered by disturbances in
;he atmosphere and ionosphere, may be possible
between the most distant points on earth. A
worldwide system of television will be feasible.
Navigational and air-safety aids beyond anything
now conceived will become realities. Weather
forecasting will be immeasurably improved
hrough the study of cloud patterns on a plane-
ary scale. Even weather control through the use
jf space platforms may be a possibility.
AYe are also told that the impact of new knowl-
3dge gained from studies conducted from such
s^antage points may have a revolutionary effect
an medicine, nutrition, agriculture, food preserva-
tion, and other fields intimately connected with
man's welfare.
These are but a few of the breathtaking pros-
pects which this age may open up. Do they not
represent a prize worth attaining — for all man-
kind ? This prize is within the reach of man, pro-
vided international agreement can be achieved on
the peaceful exploitation of outer space as pro-
posed by the President and Secretary Dulles.
The question now is how best to achieve such
agreement. Naturally a prime requisite is Soviet
willingness to cooperate.
We hope that the announcement made by the
Soviet Union last week presages a somewhat more
positive attitude toward the repeated efforts of
the United States over the past 14 months to move
toward agreement on the peaceful uses of outer
space. The fact that the Soviets have tied in un-
related conditions with their proposals on outer
space, however, is not encouraging. Nevertheless,
their proposals on space will reqviire and will re-
ceive the most careful study by the United States.
Unfortunately sovereign states cannot always
counted upon to do the logical thing. It would
seem logical, however, to try to agree upon cer-
tain fundamentals now while our activities in
outer space are just beginning. Once the great
powers have moved further into outer space, their
positions may become hardened and it may be
far more difficult to secure agreement. We can
see the danger ahead ; now is the time to avert it.
One thing we will need to do is to develop some
simple rules of conduct for the use of outer space.
Apr/7 27, 7958
We have such rules for the use of the high seas
and for the air space above us. But the creation
of rules for the use of outer space is a far more
complex matter. One has only to consider the
terrific speed by which a satellite circles about the
earth, passing over many countries in its flight.
What rights do the states launching such missiles
have to use outer space ? And what rights, if any,
do the states have over which the satellites pass?
Is it feasible to claim jurisdiction over space that
never stands still over any nation? One has only
to raise these questions to realize their complexity.
It would be tragic indeed if outer space were
used in such a way as to intensify the arms race
and magnify even further the danger that could
come to mankind from the uncontrolled use of
missiles and nuclear weapons in outer space.
Achievement of the possibilities inherent in the
conquering of outer space would have a tremen-
dous effect on the relations between nations. The
scientific and material advantages would benefit
all mankind. The demonstration of good faith
and good will provided by cooperation on both
sides of the Iron Curtain would materially assist in
the relaxation of tensions which now grip the
world.
The Challenge of Disarmament
In this connection one logically thinks of the
problem of disarmament. The quest for agree-
ment on this most complex of man's problems be-
comes increasingly a race between time and catas-
trophe— and time may be running out. The
United States record in this quest is one of earnest
endeavor. The record spreads over more than a
decade and has been punctuated by such United
States initiatives as the offer we made in 1946 to
internationalize atomic energy and President
Eisenhower's "open skies" proposal made at the
Geneva Summit Conference in 1955. This same
record consists of months, in fact years, of patient
negotiation in the United Nations to arrive at
some reasonable accommodation which will pro-
vide an effective system of limitation and control
of all types of armaments, conventional as well as
nuclear.
The subcommittee of the United Nations Dis-
armament Commission met last year in London
71 times over a period of 5I/2 months, the longest
session in its history. During these months of
difficult negotiations apparent progress was being
667
made in narrowing the areas of disagreement be-
tween the Soviet Union and the West. There ap-
peared to be some reason for hope that a limited
first-stage agreement could be arrived at which
would eliminate the danger of surprise attack and
lessen the threat of nuclear war. New and prac-
tical proposals to this end were advanced by the
United States, the United Kingdom, France, and
Canada.
Then came an abrupt hardening of the Soviet
attitude. When the Western proposals were in-
troduced, the Soviets refused to discuss them in
the subcommittee. Nevertheless, the proposals
were overwhelmingly endorsed by the General
Assembly last November.^ As a conciliatory
gesture and as an expression of its earnest desires
to have disarmament talks resumed, the Assembly
agreed to expand the Disarmament Commission
from 12 to 25 members. The Soviet response was
to serve notice that it would boycott any future
meetings of the Disarmament Commission and its
subcommittee.
The Soviet Union has sought to make consider-
able propaganda of its easy slogan of "ban the
bomb." We, however, are not interested in
slogans. We seek an effective disarmament pro-
gram. To us, this means control and control
means inspection. To us, the manufacture of
nuclear weapons — not merely the cessation of nu-
clear tests — is the heart of the problem.
However, in spite of Soviet intransigence, we
shall persist in concert with our NATO allies and
other members of the United Nations in our ef-
forts to arrive at a reasonable solution which will
give to man everywhere freedom from anxiety
and an opportunity to pursue the arts of peace.
We hope to persuade even the Soviets that this
would be in their own interests as well. For that,
in the last analysis, is what we seek — security for
all.
The immediate problem is to get serious dis-
armament talks under way once again. This is
our objective. With this in mind the United
States earlier this month, and after consultations
with other United Nations members, suggested
informally to the Soviet representatives at the
United Nations steps which could lead to an early
resumption of the discussions and also insure the
continuing responsibility of the United Nations
in this field. We suggested to the U.S.S.R. that
the enlarged Disarmament Commission hold dis-
cussions in line with the resolution adopted by an
overwhelming majority of the Assembly in 1957.
We believe that the Disarmament Commission
should meet in spite of the Soviet Government's
announced intention to boycott such a meeting.
In addition, the United States also proposed to
the U.S.S.R. that, if the Disarmament Commis-
sion discussions were unproductive, a procedural
meeting of the Security Council should be con-
vened in order to insure a proper link between
the United Nations and any disarmament ne-
gotiations which might be held later. As you
may recall, the Security Council, under the terms
of the charter, is charged with the responsibility
of achieving a regulation of armaments. Con-
sideration of the problem by the Council would
enable it to adopt appropriate procedural steps
which could lead to an early resumption of the
talks in other channels. These steps, rather than
blocking the way to resuming the discussions,
actually would pave the way and increase the
possibility for serious negotiations.
The opposition of the Soviet Union to the re-
sumption of discussions in the Disarmament Com-
mission constitutes a continued defiance of the
General Assembly's resolution. The U.S.S.R. in
refusing to consider disarmament, even on a pro-
cedural basis, appears to no longer regard the
United Nations as the responsible channel for
dealing with the problem. We, for our part, are
not willing to abandon the United Nations in its
quest to find means to resume the disarmament
talks."
The Summit Meeting
The Soviet Government ostensibly desires a
heads-of-government meeting for a discussion of
a number of pressing international issues, includ-
ing the disarmament question. I can assure you
that the United States is ready to take part in
such a meeting if advance preparations provide
evidence that high-level talks would lead to agi'ee-
ment. The agreements we seek are those which
would actually resolve issues, lessen international
tensions, and respond to the hopes of men
everywhere.
' IMd., Dee. 16, 1957, p. 961.
" For text of a U.S. statement on resumption of disarma-
ment talks, see ibid.. Mar. 31, 1958, p. 516.
Department of State Bulletin
«Piii
I do not need to point out that recent Soviet
declarations relating to the disarmament problem
are hardly calculated to attain these goals. How-
ever, I can assure you that the United States will
continue its efforts by every reasonable means to
bring about a resumption of serious disarmament
discussions.
One can, of course, understand the basic reasons
Soviet leaders are so attached to the idea of a
summit meeting. Mr. Khrushchev, in particular,
has persistently sought to identify himself with
the world's quest for peace. A summit meeting
would provide him with the most solemn and in-
fluential forum for him to repeat his pronounce-
ments about world peace. Even if no agreement
were reached, this exercise would be of consider-
able value to the Soviet cause.
We and our allies, on our part, recognize the
dangers as well as the possible advantages that
might flow from holding a summit conference.
We do not want such a meeting to increase ten-
sions rather than reduce them. We do not want
it to spread disillusionment and misunderstand-
ing. We have made it unmistakably clear, there-
fore, that we would be willing to participate in a
summit conference provided there is good evidence
that fruitful results can be obtained.
It would seem to me that there are at least two
prerequisites for such a meeting : First of all, there
must, of course, be some agreement upon the items
to be discussed. Secondly, there should be suffi-
cient exploration of these items in advance of the
conference to indicate that positive results can be
achieved.
The U.N. and Political Challenges
If it is true that the United Nations is essential
in meeting the technological challenges of the new
age, it is more vital than ever as a forum in which
political challenges can be placed in their proper
perspective and adjusted on the basis of reasonable
compromise.
The society of nations, as I said earlier, is still
characterized by the existence of sovereign, inde-
pendent states, the principal new factor being that
there are more of them. More than 20 new na-
■>' itions have achieved their sovereignty since the end
' 3f World War II. The United Nations, as you
(mow, was established in 1945 with 51 member
states. Its roster had risen to 60 by 1955 and by
last year to a total of 82 members. The recent
merger of Egypt and Syria has, of course, reduced
this number by one, that is, to 81 members at pres-
ent. Accordingly, the political problems arising
from the conflicts of national interests of these new
sovereign states have increased proportionately.
The United Nations has played a fundamental role
in dealing with these new issues.
Consider, for example, how the United Nations
has been dealing with the Tunisian crisis. Here
is a really serious situation containing all the
political characteristics of the new era in which we
live — nationalism, anticolonialism, and Soviet im-
perialism seeking fertile ground to extend its
harmful influence. Tensions were running ex-
tremely high. The incident which touched off the
crisis occurred on February 8th. The Security
Council met on February 18th.'' The conflict was
channelized into the United Nations, and quiet
and effective diplomacy persuaded Tunisia and
France to accept the good offices of the United
States and the United Kingdom to assist the par-
ties to resume peaceful negotiations.
The significance of the United Nations role in
the crisis was aptly described by Ambassador
James J. Wadsworth, who declared that
It is ... a good augury for the future that the parties
to the proceedings now before this Council are endeavor-
ing, as suggested by article 33, to settle peacefully the
differences noted in their cross-submissions to the Coun-
cil and the other outstanding problems between them by
means of their own choice.
I agree; it is indeed a "good augury," not only
in the Tunisian crisis but in a larger sense for the
future. The Security Council and article 33 of
the charter have proved invaluable instruments
in dealing with situations which are likely to en-
danger the maintenance of peace and security.
The vital role of the Security Council also was
clearly demonstrated in the case of the Egyptian-
Sudanese border dispute. Wliile the elements of
this issue were quite obscure and were different
from those in the Tunisian crisis, the fact is that
the Security Council dealt effectively with a dan-
gerous situation threatening the peace in the area.
Here was a complicated border dispute which
suddenly erupted between a newly sovereign na-
tion and an old one. On January 29 Egypt re-
quested that the Sudan Government hand over
certain border territories. The Arab Union
' lUd., Mar. 10, 1958, p. 372.
\pnl 21, J 958
669
plebiscite was to take place on February 20, and
the Sudan parliamentary elections were to take
place on February 28. Acrimonious charges in-
volving alleged troop movements and seizures were
leveled from both sides. Tension rose. On
February 20 the Sudanese Eepresentative at the
United Nations lodged a complaint with the Secre-
tary-General. The Security Council met on
February 21, only 24 hours later.^
In the meantime the Egyptian Government had
indicated that it did not intend to conduct the
plebiscite in the disputed area. Moreover, after
a short debate in the Council, the Egyptian Eepre-
sentative announced Egypt's willingness to nego-
tiate with the Sudan in the spirit of article 33
after the Sudanese elections. Council action,
therefore, had a moderating influence, and peace-
ful conditions prevail at the moment.
These two recent issues demonstrate the ver-
satility of the United Nations macliinery in deal-
ing quickly and effectively with the political
stresses and strains inherent in the new age. In
both instances jiassion gave way to moderation
and potential violence to peaceful discussion. Op-
portunity for reasonable accommodation was af-
forded in the one case through use of "good offices"
and in the other through negotiation between the
parties themselves. The existence of the United
Nations and its machinery had a significant in-
fluence on the situation. What is even more im-
portant is the fact that in both cases the Security
Council still remains seized of the question and
can bring further useful influence to bear, if need
be, for peaceful settlement.
I am convinced that the versatility of the
United Nations demonstrated in these two crises
can be exploited further and the utility of the
United Nations proportionately increased pro-
vided there is a willmgness among its members
to resort to its machinery instead of to the trust
of force.
The Changing Role of the United Nations
If the machinery of the United Nations is to be
fully utilized, we first must recognize that it has
changed in responding to new political conditions.
In this way we can better assess how it may be
adapted to fulfill its purpose, namely "to save
succeeding generations from the scourge of war."
' Ibid., Mar. 24, 1958, p. 491.
670
As you may recall, the role of the United Na-
tions, as originally envisaged, was enforcement of
the peace. The Security Council was designed as
the action arm of the United Nations for this pur-
pose. However, the cleavages between the Soviet
orbit and the free world over a 10-year period and
an endless use of the veto by the U.S.S.E. seriously
crippled the effectiveness of the Security Council.
The Assembly gradually assumed greater impor-
tance in this field, particularly in view of its in-
creased membership.
For example, it was the General Assembly which
created the United Nations Emergency' Force,
which has been so effective as an influence for peace
in the Gaza Strip and Sharm-el-Sheikh area. The
charter wisely provided that the General Assem-
bly could "discuss any questions or any matters
within the scope of the present Charter or relating
to the powers and functions of any organs pro-
vided for in the present Charter. ..." This has
enabled the Assembly, backed up by its increased
membership, to assimie a role far more potent than
that originally foreseen. Tliis development is an
example of the vitality and adaptability of th&
United Nations in responding to the changing po-
litical facts of life.
But the increased importance of the Assembly
need not detract from the continued need to re-
vitalize the Security Council. This prompted'
President Eisenhower in his letter of January 12
to Premier Bulganin to propose that '
should make it the policy of our two governments
at least not to use veto power to prevent the Se-
curity Council from proposing methods for the
pacific settlement of disputes pursuant to Chapter
VI." By such action the United Nations would
be strengthened and would become, as the Presi
dent suggested, "the effective instrument of
and justice that was the original design."
In this connection I might recall that the United
States as early as 1948 submitted to the Interim
Committee of the General Assembly concrete and
detailed proposals designed to improve the func-
tioning of the Security Council. Unfortunately,
however, the Soviets were unwilling to consider
any categories of questions on which they would
agree not to use the veto. We hope that in the
months ahead the Soviets will see the wisdom oi
strengthening the United Nations by agreeing to
restriction of the veto with respect to the peaceful
DepaMment of State Bulletin
Ifitl
Wit
pi't element of disputes. The cause of world peace
would profit immensely if the Soviet Union would
permit the Security Council to play the elTective
role which the framers of the charter intended.
Concluding Comments
It is clear to me that the United Nations has
served the interests of the United States and world
peace. As an instrument of collective security it
repelled Communist aggression successfully in
Korea. In the field of pacific settlement it has
alleviated many disputes containing the seeds of
war. It has provided us with a powerful forum
to present our viewpoint and refute Soviet propa-
ganda. It has channeled national aspirations to-
ward independence or self-government through
evolutionary processes. It has made modest but
constructive attacks on the root causes of war —
economic, social, and cultural — through the Eco-
nomic and Social Council, the Human Rights
Commission, and the specialized agencies and the
technical assistance program.
It is equally clear that the United Nations has
shown a remarkable capacity to adjust to rapidly
changing political and economic conditions. It
has demonstrated that it is a flexible organization
that can be adapted to the new age that is upon us.
It is not too much to say that it can, with intelli-
gent leadership, do a great deal to help give shape
and order to the political landscape of tlus new
era upon which we are entering.
But the United Nations is, after all, an organi-
zation of sovereign states. It can do no more than
its member states are willing to have it do. We
must, therefore, look ahead with the wisdom and
the imagination which the times require. We
must give to the United Nations the vitality it
needs to nurture and encourage peace in a world
in which change is both fi'equent and profound.
In this respect we would do well to recall the
words of Abraham Lincoln in another era of
great challenge :
We shall uobly save or meanly lose the last best hope
of earth.
The United Nations, with all its imperfections,
remains the best hope of earth for the achievement
of world peace. It is up to us, and the other
members of the United Nations, to bring that
hope to its full fruition.
April 21, 7958
Germany Extends Deadline
for Restitution Claims
Press release 171 dated April 4
The American Embassy at Bonn has reported
that the deadline for filing claims under the Fed-
eral Law for the Settlement of Monetary Restitu-
tion Claims against the German Reich has been
extended to December 31, 1958.^
The law which has now been extended modi-
fied the German Federal Restitution Law and
opened the way for the filing of certain categories
of monetary restitution claims by former Nazi
persecutees who have been unable to obtain com-
pensation under previous legislation. The modi-
fications relate to claims arising from unlawful
taking by certain German entities of tangible or
intangible property which at the time of the tak-
ing was "identifiable" within the meaning of resti-
tution legislation but which cannot be restituted
because of loss, damage, or deterioration. The
modifications are believed to be of particular in-
terest to individuals who sustained losses due to
confiscation of identifiable property outside West
Germany which property was subsequently sent
into West Germany or Berlin. The development
is considered of significance in cases where special
levies or discriminatory taxes were collected
through seizure of such property. Knowledge of
the final location of the property is not required.^
President Determines Tariff Quota
on Wool-Fabric Imports for 1958
White House Announcement
White House press release dated March 7
The President has determined the application
for 1958 of the tariff quota on imports of most
woolen and worsted fabrics established by his
proclamation of Sef)tember 28, 1956,^ which in-
voked the so-called Geneva wool-fabric reserva-
tion. At the same time, the President noted the
many problems involved in the wool -fabric tariff
" For background, see Bihxetin of Oct. 7, 1957, p. 581.
' The Department of State has available an Information
sheet giving further details of the German legislation
which will be furnished upon request.
' For text, see Bulletin of Oct. 8, 1956, p. 556.
671
quota for the domestic woolen industry, for Amer-
ican clothing manufacturers, and for imijorters,
and requested the Trade Policy Committee,
through its chairman, the Secretary of Commerce,
to undertake a special review of the alternatives
to the present arrangements under which wool-
fabric tarifl's are applied.
Pursuant to his 1956 proclamation the Presi-
dent notified the Secretary of the Treasury of his
decision that the "breakpoint" of the tariff quota
is to be 14.2 million pounds for 1958.
Until 1958 imports reach the breakpoint, the
rates of duty remain at 300 or 371/^0 per pound
(depending upon the nature of the fabric) plus
20 percent or 25 percent ad valorem (again de-
pending upon the nature of the fabric) . Imports
during 1958 in excess of the breakpoint will be
subject to an ad valorem duty of the full 45 per-
cent allowed by the Geneva reservation. The spe-
cific duty (cents per pound) is not affected. The
President amended the 1956 proclamation to pro-
vide that the overquota rate shall be 30 percent
for imports of handwoven fabrics less than 30
inches wide and for imports of "religious" fabrics.
If imports during 1958 exceed 14.2 million
pounds, the higher rates of duty will go into ef-
fect for the remainder of 1958, terminating at the
end of 1958.
The Geneva wool-fabric reservation is a right
that was reserved by the United States in a 1947
multilateral trade agreement at Geneva. Under
that reservation the ad valorem rates of duty ap-
plicable to most woolen and worsted fabrics en-
tering the country may be increased when such
imports, in any year, exceed an amount deter-
mined by the President to be not less than 5 per-
cent of the average annual United States produc-
tion of similar fabrics for the three preceding cal-
endar years. The 1947 tariff concession and the
reservation apply to woolen and worsted fabrics
dutiable under paragraphs 1108 and 1109 (a) of
the Tariff Act of 1930, as modified. Most woolen
and worsted fabrics entering the United States are
dutiable under these paragraphs. The Presi-
dent's action applies only to imports of such
fabrics.
In considering this matter the President had
the advice of the Trade Policy Committee and
other departments and agencies of the executive
branch.
Letter to the Secretary of Commerce
March 7, 1958
Dear Mk. Secretary: Under the so-called
Geneva Wool Fabric Reservation, I have deter-
mined the 1958 breakpoint for the tarifl' quota
established by Proclamation 3160 of September
28, 1956. I have also modified tliat Proclamation
with respect to certain special fabrics.
In considering this matter, I am impressed once
more with the many problems involved in the ap-
plication of the wool fabric tariff quota. I am
also mindful of the various proposals for meeting
these problems that have been advanced by the
domestic woolen industry, American clothing
manufacturers, and importers. As you know,
these proposals have included suggestions for
varying the duty, applying the tariff' quota, or
computing separate breakpoints on a fabric cate-
gory or periodic basis.
I am aware of the difficulties that have con-
fronted the Trade Policy Committee in consider-
ing these proposals, such as the fact that the appli-
cation of the tariff quota on a fabric basis wouki
be contrary to the Reservation. Clearly, more
work is needed on these questions. Accordingly,
I approve the recommendation of the Trade Pol-
icy Committee in this respect and request a special
review and early report to me of the alternatives
to the present arrangements under which wool
fabric tariffs are applied.
Sincerely,
DwiGHT D. Eisenhower
The Honorable Sinclair Weeks
Secretary of Commerce
Washington, D. C.
Letter to the Secretary of the Treasury
March 7, 1958
Dear Mr. Secretary: Proclamation No. 3160
of September 28, 1956, as amended by the procla-
mation of March 7, 1958, provides for tlie increase
of the ad valorem part of the duty in the case of
any of the fabrics described in item 1108 or item
1109 (a) in Part I of Schedule XX to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Geneva — 1947)
or in item 1109 (a) in Part I of that Schedule
(Torquay— 1951) entered, or withdrawn from
warehouse, for consimiption in any calendar year
Department of State Bulletin
following December 31, 1957, in excess of a quan-
tity to be notified by the President to the Secre-
tary of the Treasury.
Pursuant to paragraph 1 of that proclamation,
as amended, I hereby notify you that for the calen-
dar year 1958 the quantity of such fabrics on
imports in excess of which the ad valorem part
of the rate will be increased as provided for in the
seventh recital of that proclamation, as amended,
si Kill be 14,200,000 pounds.
On the basis of presently available information,
I find this quantity to be not less than 5 per
centum of the average annual ijroduction in the
United States during the three immediately pre-
ceding calendar years of fabrics similar to such
fabrics. Although it is believed that the final
statistics will not alter this finding, in the event
tliat they do, I shall notify you as to the revised
quantity figure.
Sincerely,
DwiGHT D. Eisenhower
The Honorable Robekt B. Anderson
Secretary of the Treasury
Washington, D. C.
Proclamation 3225 <
Amendment op Proclamation No. 3160 Relating to
Certain Woolen Textiles
1. Whereas, by Proclamation No. 3160 of September 28,
1956 (3 CFR, 19.56 Siipp., p. 44), the President announced
the invocation by the Government of the United States of
America of the reservation contained in the note to item
1108 In Part I of Schedule XX annexed to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (61 Stat. (pt. 5) A 11,
A 1274), and proclaimed that the ad valorem part of the
rate applicable to fabrics described in item 1108 or Item
1109 (a) in Part I of Schedule XX to the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (61 Stat. (pt. 5) A 1274), or
in item 1109 (a) in Part I of Schedule XX to the Torquay
Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(3 UST (pt. 1) 615, 1186), entered, or withdrawn from
warehouse, for consumption in excess of certain quantities
would be 45 per centum ; and
2. Whereas I find that, effective January 1, 1958, it
will be appropriate to carry out the said General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade that the ad valorem part of
the rate be 30 per centum ad valorem in the case of any
of the fabrics described in the said item 1108 or 1109 (a)
in Part I of Schedule XX to the said General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade which are described in paragraph
* 23 Fed. Reg. 1687.
(a) of the seventh recital of the said proclamation of
September 28, 1956, as amended by paragraph 2 of this
proclamation :
Now, therefore, I, DwiQHT D. Eisenhower, President
of the United States of America, acting under and by vir-
tue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and
the Statutes, including section 350 of the Tariff Act of 19.30,
as amended (ch. 474, 49 Stat. 943; ch. 209, 59 Stat. 410;
ch. 169, 69 Stat. 162; 19 U. S. C. 1351) do proclaim that
the said proclamation of September 28, 1956, is hereby
amended as follows :
1. The sixth recital is deleted.
2. The seventh recital is amended to read as follows :
"7. Whereas I find that following December 31, 1957,
until otherwise proclaimed by the President, it will be ap-
propriate to carry out the trade agreements specified in
the first and third recitals of this proclamation that
"(a) the ad valorem part of the rate be 30 per centum
ad valorem in the case of any of the fabrics de-
scribed in the said item 1108 or item 1109 (a) in
Part I of Schedule XX to the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade set forth in the second recital
of this proclamation which are
"(i) hand-woven fabrics with a loom width of less
than 30 inches, or
"(ii) serges, weighing not over 6 ounces per square
yard, and nuns' veilings and other woven fab-
rics, weighing not over 4 ounces per square
yard ; all of the foregoing described in this
clause (ii) wholly or in chief value of wool of
the sheep, valued at over $4 per pound, in solid
colors, imported to be used in the manufacture
of apparel for members of religious orders, and
"(b) that the ad valorem part of the rate be 45 per
centum ad valorem in the case of any other of
the fabrics described in the said item 1108 or
item 1109 (a), or in the case of any of the fabrics
described in the said item 1109 (a) in Part I of
Schedule XX to the Torquay Protocol set forth in
the fourth recital of this proclamation,
excepting in each case articles dutiable at rates applicable
to such fabrics by virtue of any provision of the Tariff Act
of 1930, as amended, other than paragraph 1108 or 1109
(a) if any of the foregoing fabrics described in this
recital are entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for
consumption in any calendar year after that total aggre-
gate quantity by weight of such fabrics which .shall have
been notified by the President to the Secretary of the
Treasury, and published in the Federal Register, has been
so entered or withdrawn during such calendar year;
which quantity the President shall have found to be not
less than 5 per centum of the average annual production
in the United States during the three immediately preced-
ing calendar years of fabrics similar to such fabrics ; and"
3. Paragraph 1 is amended to read as follows :
"1. In order to carry out the said trade agreements
specified in the first and third recitals of this proclama-
tion, until otherwise proclaimed by the President, the ad
valorem part of the rate which shall be applied to the
AptW 27, 7958
673
said fabrics described in the seventh recital of this proc-
lamation entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for
eonsumi)tion in excess of a quantity notified to the Sec-
retary of the Treasury pursuant to that recital shall be
the percentage ad valorem specified for such fabrics in the
recital ;"
In witness whekeof, I have hereunto set my hand and
caused the Seal of the United States of America to be
affixed.
Done at the City of Washington this seventh day of
March in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred
[sEAi] and fifty-eight, and of the Independence of the
United States of America the one hundred and
eighty-second.
/O U^J»-yLi~ZjU-<u^ /Cto^
By the President :
Chbistian a. Heeteb
Acting Secretary of State
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Finance
Articles of agreement of the International Finance Cor-
poration. Done at Washington May 25, 1955. Entered
into force July 20, 1956. TIAS 3620.
Signature and acceptance: Federation of Malaya, March
20, 1958.
BILATERAL
Colombia
Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of
19.54, as amended (68 Stat. 455; 7 U. S. C. 1701-1709),
with memorandum of understanding and exchange of
notes. Signed at BogotA March 14, 1958. Entered into
force March 14, 1958.
Jordan
Agreement amending the agreement of July 10 and Sep-
tember 24, 1956 (TIAS 3663) relating to an investment
guaranty program, and providing war risk guaranties
under section 413 (b) (4) of the Mutual Security Act
of 1054, as amended (68 Stat. 832, 847; 22 U. S. C.
1933). Effected by exchange of notes at Amman No-
vember 20, 1957, and February 22, 1958. Entered into
force February 22, 1958.
Philippines
Agreement concerning claims arising in connection with
SEATO maneuvers during March and April 1957.
Effected by exchange of aide meinoire at Manila Feb-
ruary 6, 1957. Entered into force February 6, 1957.
674
DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE
Designations
Aaron S. Brown as Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Personnel, effective April 3.
Leon L. Cowles as Deputy Director of Personnel, ef-
fective April 3.
Donald Edgar as Deputy Director of the International
Educational Exchange Service, effective April 7.
Henry S. Villard as U.S. Representative to Interna-
tional Organizations and U.S. Consul General at Geneva,
Switzerland. (For biographic details, see press release
173 dated April 4.)
PUBLICATIONS
Recent Releases
For sale ly the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Gov-
ernment Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. Address
requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents,
except in the case of free publications, which may be
obtained from the Department of State.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. TIAS 3930.
95 pp. 30(f.
Protocol amending the preamble and parts II and III of
the agreement of October 30, 1947, between the United
States of America and Other Governments — Done at
Geneva March 10, 1955. Entered into force in part Oc-
tober 7, 1957.
International Sugar Protocol. TIAS 3937. 79 pp. 30^.
Between the United States of America and Other Gov-
ernments, amending agreement of October 1, 1953 — Dated
at London December 1, 1956. Entered into force with
respect to the United States of America September 25,
1957.
Customs Convention on the Temporary Importation of
Private Road Vehicles. TIAS 3943. 106 pp. 35(J.
Between the United States of America and Other Govern-
ments—Opened for signature at the Headquarters of the
United Nations, New York, June 4, 1954. Entered into
force December 15, 1957.
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation. TIAS 3947. 65
pp. 25«(.
Treaty and protocol between the United States of America
and the Republic of Korea — Signed at Seoul November
28, 1956. Entered into force November 7, 1957.
Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 3959. 7 pp.
10(f.
Agreement, with memorandum of understanding and note,
between the United States of America and Greece —
Signed at Athens December 18, 1957. Entered into force
December 18, 1957.
Department of State Bulletin
April 21, 1958
Ind
e X
Vol. XXXVIII, No. 982
American Republics
The American Discovery of America (Rubottom) . 656
Dr. Milton Eisenhower To Visit Central America . 663
Atomic Energy
Secretary Dulles' News Conference of April 1 . . 639
U.S. Views on Soviet Announcement of Cessation
of Bomb Tests (Department statement, text of
Soviet decree) 646
White House Lists Some Proposals Rejected or
Ignored by U.S.S.R 655
Claims and Property. Germany Extends Deadline
for Restitution Claims 671
Department and Foreign Service. Designations
(Brown, Cowles, Edgar, Villard) 674
Disarmament
Secretary Dulles' News Conference of April 1 . . 639
The United Nations : Challenges of a New Age
(Wilcox) 664
White -House Lists Some Proposals Rejected or
Ignored by U.S.S.R 655
Economic Affairs. President Determines Tariff
Quota on Wool-Fabric Imports for 1958 (texts
of letters, proclamation) 671
Educational Exchange. The American Discovery of
America (Rubottom) 656
France. Western Powers Issue Declaration on
Summit Meeting (3-power declaration, Bulganin
letter, Soviet aide memoire) 648
Germany. Germany Extends Deadline or Resti-
tution Claims 671
Ghana. Ghana Requests Establishment of U.S.
Operations Mission 663
International Organizations and Conferences.
Villard designated U.S. Representative to Inter-
national Organizations 674
Mutual Security
Ghana Requests Establishment of U.S. Operations
Mission 663
The United Nations: Challenges of a New Age
(Wilcox) 664
U.S. Operations Mission To Be Opened In Sudan . 663
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Ninth Anni-
versary of NATO 646
Presidential Documents. President Determines
Tariff Quota on Wool-Fabric Imports for 1958 . 671
Publications. Recent Releases 674
Science. The United Nations : Challenges of a New
Age (Wilcox) 664
Sudan. U.S. Operations Mission To Be Opened in
Sudan 663
Switzerland. Villard designated U.S. Consul Gen-
eral at Geneva 674
Treaty Information. Current Actions 674
U.S.S.R.
Secretary Dulles' News Conference of April 1 . . 639
The United Nations: Challenges of a New Age
(Wilcox) gg.
U.S. Views on Soviet Announcement of Cessation
of Bomb Tests (Department statement, text of
Soviet decree) 646
Western Powers Issue Declaration on Summit Meet-
ing (3-power declaration, Bulganin letter, Soviet
aide memoire) 648
White House Lists Some Proposals Rejected or
Ignored by U.S.S.R 655
United Kingdom. Western Powers Issue Declara-
tion on Summit Meeting (3-power declaration,
Bulganin letter, Soviet aide memoire) .... 648
United Nations. The United Nations: Challenges
of a New Age (Wilcox) 664
Name Index
Brown, Aaron S 674
Bulganin, Nikolai 648
Cowles, Leon L 674
Dulles, Secretary 639,646
Edgar, Donald 674
Eisenhower, Milton 663
Ei-senhower, President 671
Rubottom, Roy R., Jr 656
Villard, Henry S 674
Wilcox, Francis O 664
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: March 31-April 6
Press releases may be obtained from the News
Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.
Releases issued prior to March 31 which appear
in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 145 of March
24 and 147 of March 25.
Subject
Department statement on nuclear
testing.
Three-power declaration on simamit
meeting.
Educational exchange.
Educational exchange.
Howe nominated Ambassador to Chile
(biographic details).
Mann : "The Trade Agreements Pro-
gram and American Prosperity."
Dulles : news conference.
Manley appointment (rewrite).
7th annual awards ceremony.
Economic assistance agreement with
Sudan (rewrite).
ICA insures investment of U.S. firm in
U.K.
Joint U.S.-EURATOM statement.
Dulles : 9th anniversary of NATO.
Germans extend date for filing restitu-
tion claims.
Delegation to ECE (rewrite).
Villard designation (rewrite).
Evans named Civil Servant of the
Year.
U.S. technical cooperation mission to
Ghana.
No.
Date
158
3/31
1.59
3/31 '
*160
*161
*162
3/31 1
3/31
3/31
tl63
4/1
ICA
tl65
*im
167
4/1
4/2
4/2
4/3
*168
4/3
tl69
170
171
4/3 .
4/4
4/4
tl72
173
*174
4/4
4/4
4/4
175
4/4
the
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OFFICIAL BUSINESS
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Meeting of Heads of Government
Paris, December 1957
TEXTS OF STATEMENTS
The Heads of Government of the North Atlantic Treaty Organ-
ization met in Paris from December 16 to 19, 1957, for the first top-level
meeting of the Nortli Atlantic Council since the founding of the
Alliance more than 8 years before. They came together because they
desired to increase the effectiveness of NATO in relation to current
international political, military, and economic problems arising out of
the policies of the Soviet Union.
This new Department of State publication contains statements
made by President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles before
and after the meeting; the addresses delivered by Prime Minister
Bech, Premier Gaillard, and President Eisenhower at the opening
public session ; the statements made by Secretary General Spaak and
the Heads of Government at the first business session ; and the Dec-
laration and Commmiique issued on the final day.
Copies of the publication may be purchased from the Superin-
tendent of Docimients, U.S. Government Printing OfEce, Washington
25, D.C., for 50 cents each.
Publication 6606
50 cents
To: Supt. of Documents
Govt. Printing Office
Washington 25, D.C. Please send me copies of North Atlantic Treaty Organization Meet-
ing of Heads of Government, Paris, December 1957.
Name:
Enclosed And:
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(cash, cheek, or
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19SS
Vol. XXXVIII, No. 983
AprU 28, 1958
.Y RECORD
PRESIDENT ASKS U.S.S.R. TO AGREE TO BEGIN
STUDY OF SPECIFIC DISARMAMENT CONTROL
MEASURES • Exchange of Correspondence Between
President Eisenhower and Premier Khrushchev 679
SECRETARY DULLES' NEWS CONFERENCE OF
APRIL 8 682
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION THROUGH
AVIATION • Address by Secretary Dulles 689
THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM AND AMER-
ICAN PROSPERITY • by Assistant Secretary Mann . . 692
THE MUTUAL SECURITY PROGRAM IN THE FAR
EAST • Statement by Assistant Secretary Robertson . . . 698
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OF U.S. CLAIMS AGAINST GERMANY AND
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Vol. XXXVIII, No. 983 • Publication 6635
April 28, 1958
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President Asks U.S.S.R. To Agree To Begin Study
of Specific Disarmament Control IVIeasures
Following is an exchange of correspondence be-
tween President Eisenhower and Nikita Khrush-
chev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Repuhlics.
THE PRESIDENT TO PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV
iWhlte House press release dated April 8
April 8, 1958
Dear Mr. Chairman : I have your communica-
tion of April 4 repeating, in substance, the
already widely publicized statement of the Soviet
Government with reference to the suspension of
nuclear testing.^
It seems peculiar that the Soviet Union, having
just concluded a series of tests of unprecedented
intensity, should now, in bold headlines, say that it
will not test again, but add, in small type, that it
may test again if the United States carries out its
already long announced and now imminent series
of tests.
The timing, wording, and manner of the Soviet
declaration cannot but raise questions as to its real
significance.
The position of the United States on this matter
of testing is well-known. For several years we
have been seeking a dependable ending to the ac-
ciunulation of nuclear weapons and a dependable
beginning of the steady reduction of existing
weapons stockpiles. This was my "Atoms for
Peace" proposal, made in 1953 before the United
Nations. Surely, the heart of the nuclear problem
is not the mere testing of weapons, but the weap-
' For text of a decree passed by the Supreme Soviet of
the U.S.S.K. on Mar. 31, see Bulletin of Apr. 21, 195S,
p. 647.
(Apr// 28, 7958
ons themselves. If weapons are dependably dealt
with, then it is natural to suspend their testing.
However, the Soviet Union continues to reject the
concept of an internationally supervised program
to end weapons production and to reduce weapons
stocks. Under those circumstances of the Soviets'
making, the United States seeks to develop the
defensive rather than the offensive capabilities of
nuclear power and to learn how to minimize the
fissionable fallout.
It goes without saying that these experiments,
so far as the United States is concerned, are so
conducted that they cannot appreciably affect
human health.
Perhaps, Mr. Chairman, you recall the Joint
Declaration made by the Governments of the
United Kingdom and the United States at Ber-
muda on March 24, 1957.^ We then declared that
we would conduct nuclear tests only in such a
manner as would keep world radiation from ris-
ing to more than a small fraction of the levels
that might be hazardous. We went on to say that
we would continue publicly announcing our test
series well in advance of their occurrence with in-
formation as to their location and general timing.
We further said that we would be willing to
register with the United Nations advance notice
of our intention to conduct future nuclear tests
and to permit limited international observation
of such tests if the Soviet Union would do the
same.
The Soviet Union has never responded to that
invitation. Its latest series of tests was conducted
behind a cloak of secrecy, so far as the Soviet
Union could make it so. Nevertheless, as I re-
' For text, see iUd., Apr. 8, 1957, p. 561.
679
cently stated,' it is the intention of the United
States to invite observation by the United Nations
of certain of our forthcoming tests.
Not only did the Soviet Union ignore our Ber-
muda proposal on testing, but it has persistently
rejected the substance of my "Atoms for Peace"
proposal. It refuses to agree to an internationally
supervised cut-off of the use of new fissionable
material for weapons purposes and the reduction
of existing weapons stocks by tranfers to peaceful
purposes. During the five years since I first pro-
posed "Atoms for Peace", the destructive power
in our nuclear arsenals has steadily mounted, and
a dependably controlled reduction of that power
becomes ever more difficult.
Mr. Chairman, now that you have become head
of the Soviet Government, will you not reconsider
your Government's position and accept my pro-
posal that fissionable materials henceforth be man-
ufactured only for peaceful purposes ?
If the Soviet Union is as peace-loving as it pro-
fesses, surely it would want to bring about an
internationally supervised diversion of fissionable
material from weapons purposes to peace pur-
poses.
If the Soviet Union is unwilling to accept
"Atoms for Peace", there are other outstanding
proposals by which the Soviet Union can advance
the cause of peace. You will recall, Mr. Chair-
man, my "Open Skies" proposal made to you and
Chairman Bulganin in Geneva in 1955.* You will
also recall my proposals for the international use
of outer space for peaceful purposes emphasized
in my recent correspondence with Chairman
Bulganin.' These proposals await Soviet
acceptance.
The United States is also prepared, in advance
of agTeement upon any one or more of the out-
standing "disarmament" propositions, to work
with the Soviet Union, and others as appropriate,
on the technical problems involved in interna-
tional controls. We both recognize that inter-
national control would be necessary. Indeed, your
present letter to me speaks of "the establishment
of the necessary international control for the dis-
continuance of tests".
■ What is "necessary"? The question raises
problems of considerable complexity, given the
' Ibid., Apr. 14, 1958, p. 601.
* IMd., Aug, 1, 1955, p. 173.
' IMd., Mar. 10, 1958, p. 373.
present possibility of conducting some types o:
tests imder conditions of secrecy.
If there is ever to be an agreed limitation or sus-
pension of testing, and the United States hopes
and believes that this will in due course come
about as part of a broad disarmament agreement,
plans for international control should be in in-
stant readiness. Why should we not at once put
our technicians to work to study together and ad-
vise as to what specific control measures are neces-
sary if there is to be a dependable and agi-eed
disarmament program ?
The United Nations General Assembly has
called for technical disarmament studies, in rela-
tion both to nuclear and conventional armaments
The United States says "yes". I urge, Mr. Chair-
man, that the Soviet Union should also say "yes"
Then we can at once begin the preliminaries neces-
sary to larger things.
Sincerely,
DwiGHT D. Eisenhower
BtilH
ftmtb
liKtion
680
PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV TO THE PRESIDENT
Official translation
Dear Mr. President : One of the most urgent problems
in present international relations which very deeply agi
tates millions of people in all countries of the world is
that of the necessity of the immediate discontinuance ol
tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons of various kinds ifsfe-.
It is easy to understand the deep alarm which the con
tinuing experimental explosions of nuclear weapons arousi
among all strata of society, from political personages
scientists, and specialists to ordinary people, the ranii
and-file workers of city and village, to mothers of families
These tests stimulate the armaments race and promoti
the development of new and ever more destructive am
deadly kinds of nuclear weapons, and thereby still fur
ther intensify the threat of atomic war which hangs
mankind.
Moreover, systematic explosions of atomic and hydro
gen weapons for experimental purposes even now, ii
peacetime, are causing damage to the health of peaceful
unsuspecting, and entirely innocent inhabitants of varioui
countries. In the petition signed by 9235 scientists of 4'
countries, including many prominent scientists of th(
United States of America and of the Soviet Union, an(
delivered in January of this year to the Secretary Genera
of the United Nations, it is stated that each test of a nu
clear bomb increases the quantity of radioactive fallout
thereby causing harm to the health of people throughon
the entire world and threatening the normal developmen
of coming generations.
Taking all this into account, the Soviet government ha;
come to the conclusion that it is impossible to postpont
Department of State Bulletin
«WJ|
any longer the solution of the question concerning the dis-
continuance of nuclear weapon tests because it is impos-
sible to allow the health of the people to be irreparably
harmed.
Today only three powers so far — the U.S.S.R., the
U.S.A., and Great Britain — possess nuclear weapons, and
therefore an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear
weapon tests is comparatively easy to reach. However,
if the tests are not now discontinued, then after some time
other countries may become possessors of nuclear weapons
and under such conditions it will of course be a more com-
plicated matter to reach an agreement on the discontinu-
ance of the tests.
During the last three years the Soviet government has
repeatedly approached the governments of the United
States of America and of Great Britain with proposals to
discontinue tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons. In
as much as both the Government of the United States and
the Government of Great Britain have not wished to agree
to discontinue nuclear tests without specifying a time
limit, the Soviet Union advanced a proposal of its own,
that is, to discontinue these tests, at first even for a limited
time, for two or three years, for example. The proposals
of the U.S.S.R. on this question provide for the establish-
ment of the necessary international control for the dis-
continuance of tests.
Despite all this, it has unfortunately been impossible
up to now to come to an agreement for settling the ques-
tion concerning an unconditioual and immediate discon-
tinuance of nuclear tests, or even concerning a temporary
suspension.
Guided by the desire to make a practical beginning to
the discontinuance of tests of atomic and hydrogen weap-
ons everywhere and thereby take the first step in the
direction of a final liberation of mankind from the threat
of a destructive atomic war, the Supreme Soviet of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has decreed the dis-
continuance in the Soviet Union of tests of all kinds of
atomic and hydrogen weapons.
The Soviet Government, implementing this decree of
the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., decided to discon-
tinue unilaterally, as of March SI, 1958, tests of any kind
of atomic and hydrogen weapons.
The Soviet Government addresses to the Government
of the United States of America, and also to the Govern-
ment of Great Britain, a proposal to join in these
measures.
If the governments of the countries which now have
nuclear weapons at their disposal support this proposal
of the U.S.S.R. and in their turn adopt a decision to re-
nounce further tests, then the question which so deeply
agitates the peoples of the whole world will finally be re-
solved and a great step will thereby be taken toward the
establishment of genuine trust among states and toward
the strengthening of peace.
However, if the governments of the countries with the
nuclear weapons at their disposal do not wish to respond
to this decision of the Soviet Government and prefer to
leave things as they were before and continue experiments
with atomic and hydrogen weapons, then in such case the
Soviet Union, in the interests of ensuring its own safety,
will of course have no alternative other than that of con-
sidering itself freed from any obligation undertaken by
it in regard to the discontinuance of nuclear tests. The
Soviet Government would not like to see matters take
such a course.
The Government of the U.S.S.R. expresses the sincere
hope that the Government of the United States of America
will join in the initiative of the Soviet Union and will
thereby make possible the discontinuance forever of nu-
clear weapon tests everywhere.
In the opinion of the Soviet Government it would be
appropriate if our two countries — the U.S.S.R. and the
U.S.A., which were the first to create atomic and hydro-
gen weapons and to possess considerable stocks of these
weapons— would come forth as leaders in the noble cause
of the immediate cessation of nuclear tests.
This first practical step on the path toward the protec-
tion of mankind against the calamities with which It is
threatened by modern nuclear weapons would enormously
facilitate the advance toward a solution of the problem,
that is, the complete liberation of peoples from the threat
of an atomic war. Hardly anyone will deny that the dis-
continuance of experiments with atomic and hydrogen
weapons would greatly improve the international political
atmosphere as a whole and would create more favorable
conditions for the settlement of other unsolved
international problems.
Permit me, Mr. President, to express the hope that the
proposals of the Soviet Government stated above will
meet with a favorable attitude on the part of the
Government of the United States of America.
With sincere esteem,
N. Khrushchev
April !,, i958
His Excellency
DwiGHT D. Eisenhower,
President of the United States of America,
Washington, B.C.
April 28, 1958
Secretary Dulles' News Conference of April 8
Press release 179 dated April 8
Secretary Dulles: You will, I think, have in your
hands by now the text of President Eisenhower's
reply to his first communication from Chair-
man Khrushchev in the place of Chairman
Bulganin.^
The heart of that lies in the last paragraph
which again presses the Soviet Union at least to
begin some of the technical studies about super-
vision and control which we both agree are the
necessary prelude to any agreement on control or
limitation of armaments or inspection against sur-
prise attack. We see no reason at all why, if
there is really good faith on the part of the Soviet
Union — and we trust there is — at least the techni-
cal studies should not now be gotten under way.
We will await a reply on that, as we also await
a reply to the three-power note or memorandum
communicated to the Soviet Government now
about 10 days ago ^ inviting the beginning of
diplomatic talks to see whether or not a summit
conference can usefully be held.
Now for your questions.
Q. Mr. Secretary, do you have any idea xohat is
meant hy Premier Khrushchev'' s public references
to the possibility of international supervision over
the suspeiision of atomic-energy tests?
A. No, we don't know, and that is one of the
reasons why it would be useful to have these techni-
cal studies to find out whether we. are thinking at
all in the same terms. We have conducted here
in our own Government intensive technical studies
to ascertain what would be necessary to have a de-
pendable agreement on, let's say, the suspension of
testing, and we have that work now pretty well
completed.
A recent report was made by a group which had
' See p. 679.
' For text, see Bulletin of Apr. 21, 1958, p. 648.
'James R. Killian, Jr., Special Assistant to the Presi-
dent for Science and Teclinology.
682
been set up by Dr. Killian ^ to study that very sub-
ject. We don't know whether we are thinking
along the same lines at all as the Soviet Union.
When we talk about international supervision, I
notice, for example, the press reported yesterday
the intention of the Soviet Union to use nuclear
power for explosion in tunnels and various under-
ground areas ostensibly for civil purposes.
You cannot tell from a distance of several thou-
sand miles whetlier an explosion of that character
is actually for civil purposes or whether it is for
military jiurposes. So that there would have to
be, we think, a considerable degree of inspection.
The teams would have to have some mobility to
establish a supervision of a cessation of testing
that was effective. But whether or not the Soviet
Union is thinking along those lines we don't know.
That is the reason why we think it would be useful
to get started at least on some of the technical
studies while the other problems are being de-
bated— the questions of principle.
Q. Mr. Secretary, in the Presidents letter he
asked Chah'man Khrushchev to reconsider his
Governments position and accept a proposal that
fissionable material can be manufactured only for
peaceful purposes. Do you anticipate the Rus-
sians might unilaterally announce a reduction or
cutoff of this fissionable material, and would that
satisfy his request?
A. No, it would not satisfy. You asked
whether the Soviets might announce it. I would
not attempt myself to put any limits on what
they miglit announce. The question of wliat they
might allow to be supervised, controlled, and
checked is a totally different matter. An an-
nouncement which assures no element of super-
vision or control must, I think, be judged, in the
absence of further evidence, as primarily propa-
ganda material rather than a move which is de-
signed actually to allay concern or to assure others
that a new situation has been created.
Deparfment of Sfa/e Bvlletin
ici
Probability of Detection
Q. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned the Killian
study. Is it the conclusion of that study, and
therefore the adinini-stratiori's, that inspection and
control is possible to eliminate the degree of risk
to a point lohich this Government would accept?
A. Very definitely they come to the conchisiou
that a fairly complex system is required to elim-
inate totally the risk — I don't think they believe
that any system of supervision would be proof
against all possible evasions. But I think there
is one factor that we can properly take into ac-
count; namely, that if there is an agreement to
suspend, an international agreement coupled with
sufficient supervision so that there would be a high
degree of probability that evasion would be de-
tected, then that of itself creates a considerable
likeliliood that evasion will not be attempted.
That is because the consequences of an evasion
that gets caught might be so serious as to more
than balance out the advantages of the surrepti-
tious testing.
Q. In fact you are rejecting the contention that
the Russians could cheat on any inspection sys-
tem. Is that correct?
A. No, I think I said that the report indicates
that there cannot be absolutely 100 percent as-
surance of detection of everything. But I also
suggested, I think, that that is perhaps not neces-
sary if you create a high probability that an
evasion would be detected. We doubt whether
the advantage to be gained from such an at-
tempted secret test would more than balance out
the risk that would be involved if you get caught.
Q. Mr. Secretary, would such a system require
an exemption for civil purposes or the develop-
ment of atomic explosions for use in petroleum
exploitation and digging up harhors and canals,
et cetera?
A. I tliink there would have to be a sufficient
supervision to determine whether a nuclear ex-
plosion was in fact for civil purposes or wliether
it was an explosion of weapons under the guise of
being for civil purposes.
Q. What I mean, there would have to he an
exemption to allow continuance of this benign —
or do we propose to forgo those?
A. No, I don't think they should be forgone.
I think the advantages would be so great there
should remain the possibility of the use of nuclear
power for civilian purposes of that sort. But,
if there is to be an agreement that they will not
explode for weapons purposes, then there must
be some way of deciding which the particular
explosion is.
Detection Stations
Q. Mr. Secretary, when you talk of the high
degree of probability that such tests could be de-
tected, are you talking in terms of having in-
spection within the territory of the Soviet Union
and the United States and not a ring of stations
around the border states?
A. That is correct. There would have to be a
number of stations within the areas of possible
explosion with a degree of mobility to permit
them to go to an area where there was a suspicious
development to ascertain whether or not it was
an earthquake or an explosion and, if it was an
explosion, whether it is for civil purposes or for
military ^Durposes.
Q. Mr. Secretary, can you tell us if this report
indicates that no hydrogen megaton-range ex-
plosion can be detected from, outside countries
loithout inspection or whether this is referring
to atomic tests?
A. I do not think we yet know the degree of
detectability from a distance of explosions at a
very high altitude. I don't think there is enough
knowledge about that so that I can give a positive
answer to the question.
Q. What about supervision against the cutoff?
What about inspection to make sure the fissionable
material is cut off from production? Do we have
any knowledge yet there is a feasible inspection
to get cutoff of fissionable material?
A. Yes, we have made studies on that subject
and are of the opinion there can be a reasonably
effective protection there. I would say that, as
the use of nuclear power grows for civilian pur-
poses— for nonmilitary purjDoses — the degree of
risk that must be taken is even greater than in
the case of supervising against the test explosions.
To get anything approaching complete protection,
it would require a degree of inspection into fac-
tories, plants, and power plants, and the like,
which probably would not be veiy practical. But
we do believe again that it is possible to have a
AptW 28, J 958
683
degree of inspection which gives a sufficient de-
gree of exposure so that cutoff would be ac-
ceptable.
I think, in this whole area, we have to recognize
that certain risks must be taken. There are risks
if you do, and there are risks if you don't. Cer-
tainly to allow this whole atomic-nuclear develop-
ment to go ahead without any control, without any
supervision at all, that involves very great risks
too. So one has to balance the risks on one side
and the other and strike something that would
be acceptable.
Q. Mr. Secretary, to pursue tlmt question of
nonmilitary explosion — in a speech last week Sen-
ator Humphrey said tluzt testimony before his
disarmament subcoTnmittee had disclosed the same
technology which might make nuclear explosives
usable in peaceful pursuits might also be applied
to making weapons with vast dimensions of radio-
active fallout. Therefore it would not be neces-
sary to allow Tuitions to continue tests of so-called
clean weapons but only to allow an international
agency or an agency under international control
to develop nuclear explosives for peaceful pur-
poses. Could you comment on that?
A. I am afraid that I might make some mis-
take if I commented on that. This whole field is so
highly technical that really I think questions of
that sort should probably be addressed to the
Atomic Energy Commission. I don't have the
technical knowledge which would enable me to
judge the accuracy of that statement.
Q. Mr. Secretary, will the Killian report be
made public and, if not, why not?
A. I just don't know whether it is going to be
made public or not. If not, I am sure there will
be good reasons for it. (Laughter)
Q. Mr. Secretary, what order or number of sta-
tions within the area inside tKe Soviet Union
would be required to give a sufficient degree of
protection on testing?
A. You are wanting to prejudge the answer to
the last question. That is in the Killian report.
If I understand correctly, you ask the estimate of
the number, the character of the stations that
would be required in various countries. Is that
your question?
Q. Well, specifically in the case of the Soviet
Union, Mr. Stassen, while he was, I believe, still
in an official position in the Government, used a
figure of the order of 20 or ^4- of something like
that. It is a question which comes up so much
that any specific information which we could rely
on would be useful.
A. I would say this, that the estimates have
gone up since the time that the study was made
that was reflected in Mr. Stassen's report that you
refer to.
Q. Mr. Secretary, in regard to U.S. policy i%
the Middle East the view has been expressea
rather xoidely of late that the United States haa
a choice of two courses toward Nasser, either tc
try to block the further spread of his influence ir
that part of the world or to try to get along with
him, and that we aren't doing one or the other
Could you comment on that, sir?
A. I think we are getting along with him, as f ai
as I am aware.
Policy on Arms Shipments to Indonesia
Q. Mr. Secretary, the Foreign Minister of Indo
nesia this morning called in your Ambassador
Howard Jones, to take exception to a statemen,
that Mr. [Lincoln] White [Chief of the Newi
Division] made yesterday in the course of whicl
he said that the U.S. regretted Indonesia's buyint.
Communist arms for possible use in killing Indo
nesians who openly opposed the growing influeno
of communism in Indonesia. The Foreign Min
ister ashed Mr. Jones for clarification of that
which he interprets as United States Governmen
siding with the rebels to some extent. I realist
you havenH had Mr. Jones'' relay from the Foreigi
Minister yet, probably, but I wonder if ym
could clarify the U.S. attitude on this arm,
deal particularly. Is that accurate, as statei
yesterday?
A. The United States has a broad policy witl
respect to arms, which, I am sorry to say, seem;
not to be shared by the Soviet-bloc countries. Wi
believe that arms should be supplied to a countr
from without only in accordance with certaii
fairly well-defined principles. One of these i
the need of a country to have defense against pos
sible aggression from without. The other is Xa
have small arms which would be required for i
normal police force and the forces required t(
maintam internal order against subversive activi
Department of State Bulleth
ties and the like which would not be of great pro-
portions and not stimulated from abroad. But
we do not believe that the promiscuous sjjreading
of large amounts of major armaments around the
world is a sound or a healthy practice. We try
not to indulge in that ourselves. And we would
be glad if others followed the same practice. That
is the principle that has guided us in general in
different parts of the world. I would not say that
there is any principle that I can define here with
sufficient elaboration to cover every possible con-
tingency, and perhaps every rule has its exception.
But, broadly speaking, those are our principles.
A spreading of arms, which may be primarily de-
signed for offensive operations, is not something
that we approve of.
Q. Mr. Secretary, does this mean that the
United States would turn down a new request from
the Indonesian Government for arms?
A. Turn down a new request ?
Q. Yes.
A. Tliere is, I think, [a report of a new request,
but that has not yet been actually received] . We
got a request back last July, as I recall, for a very
large amount of arms indeed. We asked the Indo-
nesian Government for certain clarifications about
that request. It turned out that what they were
requesting was an amount of arms of the value
between $600 million and $700 million. Shortly
after that there were statements made about the
West New Guinea or West Irian situation, which-
ever you call it, which came with the failure of
Indonesia to get a two-thirds vote for a United
Nations resolution which they wanted. These
statements indicated that they might want to use
force to produce the result which they had failed
to get through the peaceful processes of the
United Nations. In the light of those indications
which came from Indonesia it did not seem that
it would fit in with the United States policy to
allow the export of any such vast quantity of arms
as the Indonesian Government has referred to, nor
did it seem to be any likelihood at all that there
was in any quarter a threat of aggression against
Indonesia which would require any such quantity
of arms. That was the situation which continued
until later on when the revolt broke out, and it did
not seem wise to the United States to be in the
position of supplying arms to either side of
April 28, ?958
that civil revolution. That conforms, generally
speaking, to our policy.
Q. Mr. Secretary., last weeh you told us that the
Indonesian crisis was an internal matter and that
the United States attitude had to he absolutely
correct. Does yesterday^s statement indicate a
change in this attitude?
A. No; I am sure it is still our view that the
situation there is primarily an internal one, and
we intend to conform scrupulously to the prin-
ciples of international law that apply to such a
situation. It is quite true that the Soviet bloc is
now supplying large amounts of arms under con-
ditions which we hardly think is good interna-
tional practice. But I use "good" in the sense of
standards of judgment which are beyond those of
accepted international law at the present time.
We do not question that what is going on is within
the compass of accepted principles of interna-
tional law. They do not conform to what would
be and has been United States policy with respect
to the disposal of arms around the world.
Q. Mr. Secretary, have we received a request for
arms from the Indonesian rehels in Sumatra?
A. No, we have not.
Psychological Warfare
Q. Mr. Secretary, President Eisenhower sug-
gested at his la^t press conference we might have
a fsychological warfare expert in the Department.
Are there any plans along that line?
A. No, there are no plans along that line. The
problem is a very difficult one because I don't think
that you can separate psychological warfare from
the substantive work that we are doing. That can
be done perhaps in the Soviet Union, where they
can conduct psychological warfare as a separate
compartment and isolate it from what they are
doing in terms of their own policy, foreign or
domestic. They conduct psychological warfare
on that basis. As I pointed out before, they say
one thing in France about their attitude toward
Algeria; they say another thing in Algeria and
North Africa as to their attitude toward Algeria,
They put their psychological warfare in compart-
ments, and they conduct it purely from a propa-
ganda standpoint as to what they think will win
favor in different parts of the world. They do
that almost irrespective of what, in fact, they are
685
doing as a matter of policy, both international and
domestic. Now we can't operate on that basis.
We can't have propaganda which is any better
than, or any different from, what we actually are
doing as a matter of policy and a matter of
practice. So that, while I think we can present
our case moi-e effectively than we have been doing,
I don't think we can do it by trying to put propa-
ganda in a totally separate compartment from
policymaking and operations.
Q. On that point, propaganda and policy are
so closely connected, is there any plan to revitalize
your own policy-planning hoard?
A. We are thinking of what we can do to try to
operate more effectively in this field. I think
that we are registering some improvement. Now
you take the President's reply in this letter to
Khrushchev. We got the Soviet note in a Russian
text late Friday afternoon. We got it translated
by Saturday morning. We got a reply completed
by Monday noon and on its way to Moscow, the
intervening days being tlie Saturday before Easter
and Easter Sunday itself. And in the course of
that time we consulted with the United Kingdom,
which had received a similar note, and we also
informed our NATO allies. Now I think that is
a fairly good record, at least as far as making
a quick reply is concerned. We are trying to do
things like that, to speed up.
Now I would add this, when you speed up, par-
ticularly when you do it over an Easter weekend,
you don't have as good an opportunity to consult
with everybody as you like. You might have to
sacrifice a little bit of perfection in getting out a
quick reply. But I think, on the whole, that it is
important to deal with these things quickly, and I
think that what we did over this Easter weekend
is a demonstration that at least in one respect we
are trying to speed up our operations so as not to
give the Soviet propaganda line a free run for as
long a time as has often been the case in the past.
We had a statement ready, ^ in anticipation of
Mr. Gromyko's speech, which was released in-
stantly, as soon as we got the substance of what
he was saying, and we emphasized the fact that
the Soviets, although they talk a lot about want-
ing to have disarmament and so forth, are in effect
defying at almost every level the United Nations,
• Bulletin of Apr. 21, 1958, p.
686
which is the agreed forum for dealing with these
things.
I do believe that as a result of experience we
are improving our tecliniques somewhat, not in
terms of trying to match them in kind, because we
can't and don't want to match them in kind, but in
terms of trying to get our viewpoint out more
quickly and more effectively. We are studying
the whole area with a view to trying to improve
our techniques.
Free- World Propaganda Initiative
Q. Mr. Secretary, these are replies. Is it pos-
sible in a free world or in a democracy to tahe the
initiative?
A. Well, it is in a sense a reply, but it is also an
initiative. The series of exchanges that have been
taking place here go back now to such a remote
date that it is almost impossible to know which is
the chicken and which is the egg from that stand-
point. (Laughter)
Q. Mr. Secretary, in vieio of the proMem thai
you outline, why would it not ie wise to appoint
one or two or several people full time to the joh oj
psychological warfare ? I think most of us realize
that a good propaganda, so-called, is based mainly
on a good policy. But do you thinh enough at-
tention has been paid to articulating this policy f
Do you think enough attention has been paid, for
example, to making sure that the sentences in the
various Government announcements and letters
that we put out are clearly written so that people
can understand them? I was just wondering lohai
view you have on that. (Laughter)
A. Well, I don't know whether a professor oJ
English would be a great addition to our propa
ganda effort. I think, you know, when you trj
to get linguistic perfection, you lose something
of the thrust that comes when people express
themselves more or less spontaneously, ever
though the English isn't always perfect. Perhaps
that is not exactly what you meant. Perhaps yoi
think that some expert in writing could enabh
us to express ourselves moi-e effectively than w(
do.
Q. Mr. Secretary, as a case in point, what Mr
[John] Scali [of the Associated Press] said, dc
loe understand by the statement of the Presideni
this morning that we xoould consider, on these
Department of Stale Bulletin
technical group studies, meeting with them on just
the technical group concerned with suspension of
tests, or do we want several study groups set up?
A. I think that almost any testing or supervis-
ing system requires, at least at the beginning, a
number of studies which would be applicable to
all. You have got questions as to who conducts
them, the nationals of what comitry, the means
of commimication, et cetera. There ai-e a number
of problems of that sort which are common to all.
So that I think we could make a useful start with-
out seeming to give a priority or exclusiveness to
one as against another.
Q. Mr. Secretary, are you saying that the Presi-
dent, in the reply before this last note or the note
before that,^ said to Mr. Bulganin that perhaps
we should stop this dialogue, this letter-writing
debate, and that since they have not stopped it,
toe are changing our policy and are going to out-
write them; we are going to say, okay, if you want
it that way, we toill do better? Is that what
you're saying, in effect, has happened within the
last few weeks?
A. I don't think that there is any change in our
view that, if there is a sincere desire to get into
agreement on some of these matters and get started
on something, the way to do it is not by writing
public letters which purport to be signed by the
head of the Soviet Government and directed to
the head of another. We believe that that is an
effort to put the thing on a propaganda plane
rather than upon a plane of sincere effort. Never-
theless, if they persist in doing this, I think we
have to reply somewhat in kind, although we
would very much prefer to have these matters
dealt with on a level where we could really ex-
pect to make some progress rather than on a level
which is primarily a propaganda level.
I would point out that there is a slight gain,
perhaps, in that, I think, the last letter from Mr.
Khrushchev is approximately one-third of the
length of the last letter from Bulganin.
(Laughter)
Disarmament
Q. Mr. Secretary, in this letter today, is it a fair
reading that the United States is now prepared
to accept or to limit its disarmament package to
the matters discussed here — that is, test stis-
pension, production off cut, and stockpile reduc-
tion, all with inspection? That is also unclear
in the semantics as to whether we would be pre-
pared to accept those things separate from all the
other issues that were in the London package.
A. No, I think you will find a reference made
in one place to being as part of "a broad disarma-
ment agreement" and in another place a refei-ence
to "nuclear and conventional armaments." We
are not prepared to abandon the position that the
program upon which we are embarked ought to
cover as many aspects of disarmament as is pos-
sible, including the conventional, which are, as
I pointed out here before, of very great impor-
tance to some of our European allies, and they
would be very reluctant to see the nuclear prob-
lem dealt with apart from the conventional.
Now that doesn't mean that we are not pre-
pared to take up technical studies whic.li would
deal Just with the nuclear problem. Also, I have
already indicated we would be prepared to deal
with technical studies dealing with the problem
of outer space quite apart from anything else.
Q. Mr. Secretary, what information do you
have on the arrest of seven American newsmen in
Ouba, and what is your reaction to this report?
A. Well, the only information I have is that I
heard it over a radio this morning just before I
left my house to come to the office.
Q. Are any steps being taken, do you know, on
the behalf of these people?
A. I couldn't tell you that. It's too recent.
Q. Mr. Secretary, in connection with this busi-
ness of speeding up in the American Governments
responses and initiatives in the propaganda, psy-
chological-warfare field, is there any thought
being given to not only responding quickly but
anticipating possible Soviet moves, and putting
out some sort of statement which might take all
the sting out of the possible effect of what the
Soviets might do?
A. Yes. I pointed out at my last press con-
ference " that we gave quite a lot of study to the
possibility of giving out a statement designed to
anticipate Mr. Gromyko's statement. In view of
the uncertainty as to just what his statement
5 ma.. Mar. 10, 1958, p. 373.
April 28, 1958
'/6i(i., Apr. 21, 1958, p.
would be and the difficulty of establishing a posi-
tion which would effectively counteract that, par-
ticularly in view of our allied relationships, we
had decided not to do that particular thing.
But that doesn't mean that we would not do it
wherever we have a clear field in which to do it.
Q. Mr. Secretary^ as you indicate, there has
been no change in the American disarmament po-
sition so far as breaking up the package and so
on; would not these talks he a continuation of
the London talks which broke down in deadlock?
A. No, because the London talks that broke
down in deadlock broke down because of disagree-
ment on the basic principles that were involved.
Now we have always felt it would be useful, and
might perhaps be helpful in reaching an agree-
ment on principles, if we started at it from the
other end, that is, see what we would actually do
to carry out any agreement. I think, if we could
find an area of agreement there and a climate of
good will, that that would help us very much
perhaps to reach an agreement on principles.
U.S. Position on Suspension of Tests
Q. Mr. Secretary, it isn't yet clear, at least to
me, whether the Russians will maintain their uni-
lateral suspension of nuclear tests after our forth-
coming tests. But I take it, from the discussion
of the package and discussion of the continuing
necessity for impection, that that would make no
difference as far as we are concerned, that toe
would still not be ready to join in any unilateral
suspension of tests ivithout inspection. Is my im-
pression correct?
A. Well, as far as your doubt about the mean-
ing of the Soviet statement, I think that is a doubt
which all reasonable men can share. They have
certainly left that open, by what President Eisen-
hower refers to as the "small type," to go on test-
ing after what would be a normal interval of sus-
pension. We all of us, who are doing these
things, have a period of preparation and then a
period of activation. There has to be an interval
of about 6 months in between. They have had
roughly a period of 6 months or so of very in-
tensive testing which is now drawing to an end.
In the normal course of events they would not
have any more testing until next fall. We have
had a period of suspension of about 6 months.
We will now have a period of testing which will
end in the late summer. So that, if they want to,
they can pick up again quite in the normal course,
without breaking their stride at all, on the ground
that we have not responded to their suggestion
that we should stop the present tests. Now that
answers the first question that you put. I have
forgotten by now what the second half was.
Q. The second was, should they maintain their
suspension of tests even after we complete our
series, would we then be ready to join them in
that, or, as I conclude from tohat has been said
today, toe would still not be ready to join them?
A. We would not suspend testing merely on
the basis of their declaration, without supervision
and control, unless and until we came to the con-
clusion that we had gained from the testing sub-
stantially all of the information that we needed in
order to make cleaner weapons and smaller weap-
ons and the like. Now whether or not that may
be tlie case, following the next series of tests, I
just can't tell. Nobody can tell, because we don't
know what the tests are going to disclose.
Q. Is it a hope that, if these tests are completed
successfully, they may provide enough informa-
tion so that loithout any great risk we could go
ahead and suspend testing for some time to come.
A. I think that we all hope that. I would say
that, on the basis of what I learned, there is a
likelihood that there will be a need for some fur-
ther testing in some of the areas which probably
will not be fully explored by the next series of
t«sts. So you have to make a difference between
hope and expectation. I think that we would be
happily surprised if we got all the information
we needed out of this series of tests, but we may
get most of it.
Q. Mr. Secretary, in connection with the ship-
ment of arms, the Department, I think, suspended
a shipment of arms to Cuba recently which the
Cuban Government wanted somewhat for the pur-
poses you outlined a mom,ent ago. Can you tell
me whether the Department has completed its
study of the need for those arms by the Govern-
ment of Cuba and what its decision is?
A. No. I don't know that the study has been
completed. As you point out, the action was
taken in accord with the broad policy I have in-
dicated, that we allow arms to go to other coun-
tries primarily to meet international defense re-
Department of State Bullel'm
quirements — in this case, the needs of hemispheric
defense, where Cuba has a very definite role as-
signed to it. But we don't like to have large
shipments of arms, particularly of a large caliber,
as distinguished from just small arms that might
bo required by normal police force — we don't like
to liave those go where the purpose is to conduct
a civil war.
Q. Thank you, sir.
International Cooperation
Through Aviation
Address by Secretary Dulles ^
The central theme of your conference is "The
Humanities of Aviation." That is a most ap-
propriate subject for exploration at this time.
Too frequently the humanitarian role of aviation
is lost sight of because of emphasis on the destruc-
tive potentiality of aircraft. Your discussions
here can help to counteract the misconception that
aviation developments are primarily of military
significance. Such groups as yours prove that
modern aviation has given the peoples of the world
an unparalleled opportunity to learn to cooperate
instead of to fight.
The United States attaches the greatest impor-
tance to international cooperation through avia-
tion. But it should be clear to all of us that that
cooperation can only be effective if firmly based on
sound principles. Cooperation cannot long last
in a climate of arbitrary government decisions.
The way to real cooperation lies in acceptance of
the proposition that civil aviation should be de-
signed to permit maximum contact and under-
standing among the peoples of the world.
The United States seeks to respond to this
fundamental concept. President Eisenhower has
frequently expressed his strong conviction that all
the world benefits from international travel by
people in all walks of life. No better formula for
arousing mutual interest and creating mutual un-
derstanding has been found than physical and
spiritual contact among the peoples of the world.
'Made before the Aero Club of Washington and the
delegates to the 51st annual conference of the FM^ration
Aironautiqve Internationale at Washington, D. C, on
Apr. 9 (press release 184).
It makes little difference whether international
travel is motivated by business, cultural, scien-
tific, or purely recreational interests. The fact is
that the international contact resulting from such
travel, in each instance, dispels prejudices and
narrows the gulf between people of different na-
tionalities. The speed, convenience, and economy
of aviation have now brought international travel
within the reach of many people to whom it was
previously denied. Thus we progress toward a
truly international world.
As the complexities of world politics multiply,
the importance of air communications in intergov-
ernmental relations increases proportionately.
My own experience as an air passenger offers evi-
dence on this point. Those who have kept track
of my whereabouts estimate that since my appoint-
ment as Secretary of State in 1953 I have traveled
nearly 500,000 miles by air, almost 90 percent of
that internationally. And despite some impres-
sions to the contrary I am not the only high gov-
ernment ofiicial who travels.
Aviation interests have recognized their broad
responsibilities to facilitate and encourage the in-
ternational interchange of passengers, mail, and
cargo in every way at their command. They
have thereby made a great contribution to the
development of broader perspectives in the people
of the world.
It is significant to note that the Federation
Aeronautique Internationale charter, written over
half a century ago, foresaw that aeronautics
should be developed
By making evident the essentially international spirit
of aeronautics as a powerful instrument for uniting the
peoples of the world ;
and
By encouraging and developing solidarity and mutual
assistance in the field of aeronautics among the nations
of the world.
The farsighted drafters of your charter merit
praise for the goals they set for us.
Today aviation is able to defy natural barriers
between nations. But it cannot ignore modem-
day principles of airspace sovereignty. Inter-
national aviation, despite its ability to surmount
the physical limitations of earlier days, cannot
exist without international cooperation. Such co-
operation is not limited purely to the interchange
of air privileges and the reduction of entry for-
malities but must also include mutual exchanges
AprW 28, J 958
689
of knowledge and techniques in the field of avia-
tion. Aviation cannot survive in a world where
skills are the exclusive asset of a few. Skills and
equipment to meet the ancillary requirements of
telecommunications, navigational facilities and
services, and operational practices must be avail-
able all about the globe on a relatively uniform
basis.
Technical Cooperation in Aviation
Nations less advanced in the art of modern
aviation desire to meet accepted standards and
practices. Also the more advanced nations de-
sire to see those standards established everywhere.
There results a broad use of technical assistance
projects which seek to achieve mutual benefit by
equalizing proficiency at the most highly de-
veloped level.
The United Stat«s seeks to contribute in this
respect. As of today we are maintaining civil-
aviation assistance groups assigned to 26 countries
and offering cooperative services to a total of 46
countries. In addition it has been made possible
for aviation specialists from 44 foreign lands to
come to the United States to observe and learn
our way of doing things in all phases of aviation
activities. At the same time we have also learned
from them.
Technical cooperation in the aviation world has
not been limited to bilateral arrangements. The
remarkable postwar development of civil avia-
tion can, in substantial part, be attributed to mul-
tilateral enterprise and foresight. Tlie efforts of
the International Civil Aviation Organization in
setting standards to meet international aviation
requirements have proven indispensable. Fur-
thermore, its contribution to the accomplishment
of those standards is glowing evidence of what
can be achieved through united effort toward mu-
tually advantageous objectives. . The Interna-
tional Air Transport Association, too, has proven
that even the highly competitive international
airline industry has much to gain through co-
operation. Only through pooling of the world's
skills have we achieved the aeronautical knowledge
we have today.
The modern turbojet engine is a good example
of what international cooperation can produce.
The aeronautical scientists and engineers of many
countries have contributed to the international
development of the original invention. Although
690
born in wartime and originally limited in use tu
military aircraft, this type of propulsion was
perfected through mutual exchanges of technical
data and cooperation of objectives. It is destined
in the near future to revolutionize civil aviation
as we know it today.
In many other respects do we see the interrela-
tion of military and civil aviation. The military
provision of supplementary air-navigation facili-
ties and services, of communications and meteor-
ological services, and of other aids to civil air
operations materially benefits the orderly expan-
sion of these operations. And where do we look
for search-and-rescue support ? Military aviation
offers unstinting assistance in the protection of
life. Too little note is given to the wide range
of military mercy missions in the international
fields of disaster relief, agricultural crises, re-
gional emergencies, and the like, except by the
immediate beneficiaries. These activities certainly
come under the heading of international coopera-
tion of the highest degree. They demonstrate the
basic unity of spirit in the field of aviation.
Military aviation's contributions to the civilian
population, however, do not stop at the purely
tangible acts of cooperation and assistance. Avia-
tion is a dynamic field in which each experience,
each bit of knowledge or information, each devel-
opment has an overall significance. Advances in
the aeronautical sciences mean improvement in
the reliability and performance of aircraft opera-
tion whether they be designed for military or
civil uses.
Guidelines of U.S. Policy
Wliat the future holds in this vast and challeng-
ing area of human endeavor is as yet unknown.
But the guidelines of United States policy have
been clearlj^ laid down. In a very deep sense they
stem from President Eisenhower's statement at
the time he made his proposals at the United
Nations General Assembly concerning the peace-
ful uses of atomic power : ^
. . . the United States pledges before you — and there-
fore before the world ... to devote its entire heart and
mind to find the way by which the miraculous inventive-
ness of man shall not be dedicated to his death, but con-
secrated to his life.
The spirit of American policy in matters that
more especially concern this gathering is the
• Bulletin of Dec. 21, 1953, p. 847.
Department of State Bulletin
same : President Eisenhower's open-skies proposals
at Geneva in 1955 opened np a new role for aviation
in the maintenance of world peace. Aerial photo-
graphy by unarmed, peaceful planes was urged,
in this Geneva statement, as the start of a broader
system of inspection which could well be the foun-
dation of effective disarmament. The Soviet
Union has, for nearly 3 years, evaded a clear re-
sponse. But we have not given up hope or deter-
mination that aviation shall make its distinctive
contribution to peace. Indeed we see no other
way by which so much security against surprise
attack can be achieved and a solid basis thus pro-
vided for reduction of armaments. President
Eisenhower again yesterday urged Chairman
Khrushchev to accept the open-skies proposal.^
We earnestly hope that in this way aviation will
be permitted to make the immense contribution
to peace of which it is capable.
The governments of the free world are inspired
by concepts that are markedly similar to those
which underlie the charter of the Federation Aero-
nautique Internationale : the desire to be of service
and a sense of comradeship in such service ; belief
in the inherent goodness of man and his deep wish
for true peace ; belief in the unity and partnei'ship
of the free nations as defenders of the peace ; and
belief that aviation can indispensably serve all of
the world in the search for the peace and security
and community that all men want.
Anniversary of Fall of Bataan
Following is the text of a message sent on April
8 hy President Eisenhower to President Carlos P.
Garcia of the Philippines on the occasion of Ba-
taan Day, April 9.
White House press release dated April 8
Dear Mk. President : On this 16th Anniversary
of the Fall of Bataan, an event which we commem-
orate with sadness, but with pride, I extend best
wishes to you and to the people of the Philippines
on behalf of the people of the United States.
The symbol of Bataan, the offering of the ulti-
mate sacrifice by friends for one another, is an
ideal so rarely witnessed that it will inspire f ree-
' See p. 679.
April 28, ?958
dom-loving men always. That togetlier we have
carried on our struggle for the preservation of
liberty with justice does honor to the memory of
our fallen sons and comrades.
Our mutual friendship has been nourished by
the spirit of Bataan. May it continue to grow.
Sincerely,
Davight D. Eisenhower
U.S. Grants Wheat to Tunisia
Press release 186 dated April 10
A grant of up to 20,000 tons of U.S. wheat to
help relieve the critical unemployment situation
in Tunisia was announced on April 10 by the De-
partment of State. About one-third of the work
force in Tunisia is presently unemployed.
The grain will be made available to the North
African country by the International Coopera-
tion Administration under provisions of title II of
the Agricultural Trade Development and Assist-
ance Act (Public Law 480). This provision,
which ICA administers, authorizes the use of sur-
plus U.S. agricultural commodities for emergency
purposes.
The wheat will be used by the Government of
Tunisia as payment in kind to persons given em-
ployment on the governmental development pro-
jects now being launched to relieve unemployment
in the country. The Govei-nment of Tunisia it-
self has earmarked the equivalent of $2.4 million of
its own resources to support the employment pro-
gram in which the grain will be used.
It is estimated that the proposed joint Tunisian-
U.S. employment program will give jobs to an
average of 40,000 Tunisians, or approximately 10
percent of those now out of work, for a period of
5 months. Since the average Tunisian worker
has four to five dependents, this will mean that
more than 200,000 people will benefit directly.
The ICA document formally making the wheat
available to the Tunisian Government was signed
on April 9 by the Tunisian Ambassador to the
United States, Mongi Slim.
The wheat will be shipped in two vessels, each
carrying 10,000 tons. Arrangements are now be-
ing made to start moving the grain from the
United States to Tunisia as soon as possible, prob-
ably within 2 or 3 weeks.
691
The Trade Agreements Program and American Prosperity
ly Thomas C. Mann
Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs ^
Tlie subject I want to talk about with you, the
trade agreements program, is as important to
Texas as to any other State in the Nation.- In
October 1957 the vahie of the commercial exports
and imports, excluding military shipments,
handled by the seaports of Texas totaled, just in
that one month, $165 million. The magnificent
Houston ship channel has made that city the Na-
tion's second largest port in tonnage of cargo
handled. Texas farms and industries are depend-
ent on foreign trade both for markets and for
sources of supply.
And as it is with Texas, so it is with the Nation.
It was in recognition of the importance of foreign
trade to our national prosperity that Congress
first passed the Trade Agreements Act in 1934.
Then the executive branch and Congress were
seeking ways to end the disastrous decline in our
foreign trade which had resulted from the high,
rigid tariffs of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act and
from the restrictive measures which other nations
had taken in retaliation. Foreign trade was
rightly regarded as a means of hastening the end
of the great depression.
Today, 24 years later, we are in another eco-
nomic decline. Surely we must not repeat the
errors of the past. If we do, we can expect to see
again a decline not only in the foreign trade of the
United States but in world trade, and this will
'Address made before the Owens Foundation Confer-
ence on International Trade and Economic Development
at Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Tex., on Apr. 2
(press release 163 dated Apr. 1).
' For an address made by President Eisenhower at the
National Conference of Organizations on International
Trade Policy, together with remarks made by Secretary
Dulles and Deputy Under Secretary Dillon at the same
meeting, see Bulletin of Apr. 14, 1958, p. 591.
692
seriously deepen the recession at home and extend
its effects over the entire free world.
As a result of our liberal trade policy, our
exports climbed from $2.1 billion in 1934 to a
record $19.5 billion in 1957. This means that ex-
ports now form a larger share of our national
product than the building of nonfarm homes, the
production of automobiles, the production of fur-
niture and other household equipment, or the pro-
duction for sale of all farm crops. Exports in
1956 equaled in value our output of crude or pre-
pared minerals and approached the value of con-
sumer purchases of clothing and shoes. We are
familiar with what a small decline in automobile
production can mean to our economy; we need to
be more familiar with the equally serious effects
of a drop in U.S. exports.
Imports have also increased since 1934 — from
$1.7 billion then to $13.0 billion in 1957. Their
contribution to American prosperity lies in the
fact that we are dependent on imports for many
materials essential to American industry, from
tin to industrial diamonds, and many commodities
highly desired by the American palate, from cof-
fee to bananas. And, of course, imports are the
primary means by which other coimtries earn the
dollars with which to buy our exports. Without
a high level of imports, a high level of exports
would be impossible.
How Foreign Trade Affects Individual Interests
But my experience has been that many people
who are willing to concede the importance of
foreign trade to that vast abstraction, the Ameri-
can economy, still fail to see the importance of
trade to their own lives, as businessmen, farmers,
workers, or consumers. The contribution of for-
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far greater tlian the business it provides to those
engaged directly in the handling of exjiorts and
imports. Almost every important industry ex-
jxirts part of its production. Eleven percent of
our output of machine tools, 14 percent of our
coal, 19 percent of our trucks, 26 percent of our
construction and mining equipment, 29 percent of
our sulphur — much of that, of course, from
Texas — and 33 percent of our civilian aircraft are
sold abroad.
These industries, and others with a lesser stake
in export markets, could not continue to operate
without imports. We now obtain from abroad
one-quarter of our iron ore, one-third of our cop-
per and rubber, and most of our newsprint and
aluminum. Still other materials, most of them
unfamiliar to the general public but no less es-
sential to the industries which require them, are
entirely or almost entirely imported. In this
category are such minerals as tin, nickel, manga-
nese, chrome, antimony, cobalt, tungsten, cad-
mium, mica, and asbestos.
And, of course, for every business and industry
that is dependent on exports and imports there
are the employees of that business, whose jobs
depend wholly or partly on a high level of foreign
trade. Government statisticians have estimated
that in 1952 some 976,000 farmers and other agri-
cultural workers and about 2,150,000 nonagricul-
tural employees were engaged in production for
export. Another 450,000 people were engaged in
the transportation and distribution of imports,
and about 800,000 were employed in the first proc-
essing of imported materials, that is, in working
up imports which came into this country either as
raw materials or as semifinished goods. A total
of 4,376,000 were thus estimated to be directly or
indirectly dependent on foreign trade for their
livelihood. This figure is estimated to stand today
at about 414 million persons, or about 7 percent of
the labor force. Deprive these people of their jobs
and you would double the number of unemployed,
even in this recession period.
The number of workers dependent upon exports
in specific industries can, of course, range far
above the national average. A 1947 study indi-
cated that 13 percent of the employees of the
chemical industry, 13 percent of those employed
in the coal and petroleum-products industry, 15
percent of the textile-mill workers, 17 percent of
April 28, 1958
462029—58 3
those in the iron and steel industry, and 20 per-
cent of those employed in manufacturing agricul-
tural, mining, and construction machinery owed
their jobs to exports.
I have mentioned the farmer in passing, but his
interest in world trade deserves particular men-
tion, if for no other reason than that his stake in
foreigii trade has been one of long standing. Un-
fortunately, the American farmer has been
threatened in recent years by the loss of many of
his traditional foreign markets, due to a combina-
tion of domestic prices which were above the
world market level and increased agricultural
production in other countries. Special programs
have been found necessary to enable the farmer to
hold his place in world trade. In the 1956-57
crop year these programs were particularly suc-
cessful, and more than 85 percent of our rice pro-
duction, almost 54 percent of our wheat, 26 per-
cent of our tobacco, and 61 percent of our cotton
were exported. But no amount of special pro-
grams to assist agricultural exports will avail if
the produce of other countries is excluded from
our markets. Japan, for instance, cannot remain
the biggest single purchaser of American cotton
if every Japanese product which begins to sell well
in this country is suddenly barred. With farm
exports, as with industrial products, we must buy
if we want to sell.
Businessmen, workers, farmers — all have an in-
terest in foreign trade. But one major group,
the biggest and most important group of all, has
not been mentioned : the American consumer. He
benefits from the lower prices and greater variety
of goods which imports make available to him.
Anything made out of sugar would be much more
expensive if imports of sugar were cut off. The
price of an American automobile would be
sharply increased if imported iron ore were un-
available, and both price and quality would be
affected if some of the rarer metals and minerals
could not be obtained.
The Case for Renewal of the Trade Agreements Act
A high and rising level of foreign trade is
therefore important not only to the American
economy as a whole but to our individual interests
as businessmen, employees, farmers, consumers.
The President's authority to promote an expand-
ing foreign trade by means of agreements with
other nations for the reciprocal reduction of tar-
693
iffs and other barriers to trade expires, as you
know, on June 30 of this year. Even if no case
for renewal of the Trade Agreements Act could
be made except on the basis of its direct contribu-
tion to the American economy and American
prosperity, renewal would be clearly justified.
But, in the circumstances in which the United
States finds itself today, there are few pieces of
legislation which we can afford to consider purely
from the domestic point of view, without regard
for their effect on the rest of the free world. For
the prosperity of the United States depends, in
the long run, on the prosperity of the rest of the
world. We cannot be an island of wealth in a
sea of poverty ; we cannot be an oasis of peace and
stability in a desert of chaos and conflict. This is
no longer a matter of serious public debate in the
United States. But what does need wider recog-
nition in this country is the degree to which sound
trade policies contribute to the economic well-
being of the free world and therefore to the
strength and unity of the Western alliances. For
we may be sure that in the long term cohesion be-
tween allies and friends rests on mutuality of in-
terests and that it cannot survive on sentiment
and words alone.
Most other countries are smaller and less di-
versified economically than the United States.
They must import a much larger share of what
they need. They can do this only if their exports
are correspondingly large in relation to their out-
put.
For the major industrial countries, such as the
United Kingdom, West Germany, and France, the
ratio of exports to gross national production is
two to four times as great as for the United
States. For smaller advanced nations, such as
Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzer-
land, it is five to nine times as great. For many
of the less developed countries expoi"ts are the
largest single component of the market part of
their economy. Ceylon must sell its natural rub-
ber, Iceland must sell its fish, Burma must sell its
rice, and Uruguay its wool.
The United States is the world's largest market
and principal trading nation. To any nation,
therefore, for which trade is important, trade
with the United States is almost automatically
important as well. Trade with the United States
means the difference between prosperity or de-
pression to many countries. Over two-thirds of
the total exports of Colombia, Mexico, and Cuba
694
go to the United States. For Canada the ratio
amounts to 60 percent, while for Brazil and the
Philippines it is at least 50 percent.
For many particular commodities the United
States is the dominant market. For example,
Chile sends two-thirds of her total copper produc-
tion to the United States; Cuba sells us half of
her sugar ; Indonesia sells one-quarter of her rub-
ber; Bolivia, one-third of her tin; Brazil, over
one-half of her coffee production.
This is why the Trade Agreements Act is the
cornerstone of American foreign economic policy
and is looked upon all over the world as the sym-
bol of American determination to maintain its
leadership. In the eyes of foreign countries pas-
sage or hamstringing of this act is our choice be-
tween cooperation and isolationism.
European Economic Integration
There is still another reason why a continua-
tion of two-way trade is vital to us. Six of our
Western European allies — France, the Federal
Republic of Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Neth-
erlands, and Luxembourg — have recently made
their choice in favor of greater cooperation. On
January 1 they joined together in a customs
union, or Common Market. Over a period of 12
to 15 years the six countries will eliminate all bar-
riers to internal trade and establish a common tar-
iff against outside countries. Clearly this will
give some advantage to producers inside the Com-
mon Market over their competitors outside; but
the extent of this advantage depends in large part
upon the height of the common tariff. And the
height of the common tariff will depend on our
authority to negotiate reductions on a reciprocal
basis. This is one of the reasons why the Presi-
dent has asked Congress to extend the Trade
Agreements Act for 5 years and to permit him to
reduce tariffs, in return for equivalent concessions
from other nations, by a maximum of 5 percent
each year.^
Tariff negotiations on a scale in keeping with
our expoi'ts to the six, which reached $2.9 billion
in 1956, require time to prepare and time to carry
' For text of the President's message to Congress, see
ibid., Feb. 17, 1958, p. 263; for statements made before
the House Committee on Ways and Means by Secretary
Dulles and Secretary of Commerce Sinclair Weeks, see
ibid., Mar. 17, 19.58, p. 432; for a statement by Deputy
Under Secretary Dillon before the same committee, see
ibid., Apr. 14, 1958, p. 626.
Department of State Bulletin
out. Therefore, not only the authority to negotiate
but also sufficient time for effective negotiation is
essential. A 5-year extension of the Trade Agree-
ments Act will provide that necessary time and
will enable the United States to exercise a liberal
influence throughout the first and most formative
stage of the Common Market's development.
The movement toward European economic inte-
gration is continuing. The 17 nations which be-
long to the Organization for European Economic
Cooperation, including the six Common Market
countries, are now negotiating a free-trade area.
The creation of so large an area in which goods
could be freely traded will surely have significant
repercussions upon United States interests. As in
the case of the Common Market, we want to make
sure that the free-trade area will increase rather
than decrease its members' trade with the outside
world. And as with the Common Market, the
strength of our position in dealing with the free-
trade area will depend on how strong a Trade
Agreements Act we are given by Congress.
It would be an act of sheer folly, with unalter-
able consequences, if we, at a time when vast new
trading areas are being created, were to shut our-
selves off from the rest of the world by a protec-
tionist policy. No responsible and informed per-
son that I know proposes that we do so. But a
danger exists that we shall drift into a practice of
"isolationism by exceptions" — liberal trade in
theory and word but protectionist in practice. Ex-
ceptions are, of course, necessary, and I can assure
you that the administration is not only conscious
of its responsibilities to American industry but, in
the 6 months that I have had an opportunity to ob-
serve the problem at close hand, it has taken
prompt action to protect American business from
injury in numerous ways that seldom are known
to the general public. But we must take care to
prevent a situation where the exceptions cease to
frove the rule and instead iecome the rule.
Striking a Balance
I would be less than candid if I spoke to a Texas
audience on foreign trade and did not mention oil.
Our national interest requires that we maintain
adequate domestic petroleimi reserves and a
healthy domestic industry which has the resources
to exploit those reserves and the incentive to con-
tinue the constant process of exploration and de-
velopment. Our national defense also requires
that our friends and allies not be deprived of the
essential income which they derive from their oil
exports to the United States and that we not de-
prive ourselves of access to their oil. In spite of the
great reserves in this State and others, the Nation
will in the future be increasingly dependent on
foreign supplies. The President has therefore
had to consider not only the need of the Nation
in this temporary period of oversupply but the
long-term needs of the Nation as well. I know
you will join with me in hoping that the experience
of the next few months will prove that the formula
which has been announced is fair and effective,
just as I know you will share my conviction that,
if new remedies are needed, they will be found.
We must seek to strike some rational balance be-
tween complete dependence on domestic produc-
tion and what might be an overdependence on
foreign sources of supply. I think the President's
Cabinet Committee on Oil Imports, headed by
Secretary of Commerce Weeks, has struck such a
balance for the present period.
To simi up, two-way trade:
(a) combats economic recession and promotes
the economic process of the American economy ;
(b) strengthens and unites the free world and
thereby promotes our security ; and
(c) can, if we allow it to do so, guarantee our
access to the markets of the new trading
communities being formed in Western Europe.
May we have the vision and the courage to
serve our country by doing our part to defend the
trade agreements program against the attacks
which are being made on it from every side
WorBd Trade Week, 1958
A PROCLAMATION'
Whereas world trade is vital to the economic growth
and national security of the United States; and
Whereas the export trade of the United States pro-
vides employment for millions of Americans and is an
indispensable outlet for the products of our farms and
factories ; and
Whereas imports into the United States help to keep
factory wheels turning and assembly lines moving for
our national defense, and are essential to the domestic
economy of our Nation ; and
' No. 32.30 ; 23 Fed. Reg. 2319.
April 28, ?958
Whereas world trade contributes to the economic
strength and development of the free nations of the
world, and is therefore a pjwerful force for the advance-
ment of peace;
Now, THEREFORE, I, DwiGHT D. EISENHOWER, President
of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim the
week beginning May 18, 1958, as World Trade Week ;
and I request the appropriate officials of the Federal
Government and of the several States, Territories, posses-
sions, and municipalities of the United States to cooperate
in the observance of that week.
I also urge business, labor, agricultural, educational,
and civic groups, as well as the people of the United
States generally, to observe World Trade Week with
gatherings, discussions, exhibits, ceremonies, and other
appropriate activities designed to promote continuing
awareness of the importance of world trade to our econ-
omy and our relations with other nations.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and
caused the Seal of the United States of America to be
affixed.
Done at the City of Washington this 7th day of April
in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and
[seal] fifty-eight, and of the Independence of the
United States of America the one hundred
and eighty-second.
XJ <.JL>y-/'^XJO~iC.u^A/u..y^
the President:
John Foster Dulles
Secretary of State
United States World Trade Fair
A PROCLAMATION'
Whereas the Second Annual United States World
Trade Fair is to be held at New York, New York, from
May 7 to May 17, 1958, inclusive, for the purposes of ex-
hibiting and promoting the sale of foreign and domestic
products to the American trade and to the public ; and
Whereas the Congress, by a joint resolution approved
March 28, 1958 (72 Stat. 70), has authorized the Presi-
dent, by proclamation or in such other manner as he
may deem proper, to invite the States of the Union and
foreign countries to participate in the Second Annual
United States World Trade Fair ; and
Whereas this exhibition and trade gathering will tend
to encourage further development of international trade
and to foster friendly relations among participating
nations :
Now, THEREFORE, I, DwiGHT D. EISENHOWER, President
of the United States of America, do hereby invite the
States of the Union and foreign countries to participate
in the Second Annual United States World Trade Fair
to be held in the Coliseum in New York, New York, from
May 7 to May 17, 1958, inclusive.
In WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and
caused the Seal of the United States of America to be
affixed.
Done at the City of Washington this 9th day of April
in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and
[SEAL] fifty-eight, and of the Independence of the
United States of America the one hundred
and eighty-second.
XJ C«-fy L'i'ZjG-iuu^ /Cio.^
the President :
John Foster Dulles
Secretary of State
President Asl<s Furtlier Report
on Umbrella-Frame Tariff
White Honse press release dated March 12
White House Announcement
The President, on March 12 requested the Tariff
Commission to submit a supplemental report in
the escape-clause case involving umbrella frames.
The Tariff Commission had reported to the
President on January 14, 1958, that three mem-
bers of the Commission found that escape-clause
relief was warranted, that two members reached
a contrary conclusion, and that one commissioner
did not participate.
In identical letters to the chairmen of the House
Ways and Means Committee and the Senate
Finance Committee, the President noted some of
the salient facts of the case and said that, although
some clear interpretations could be drawn from
the present record, the domestic producers and
other parties should be given the opportunity to
present further information before he made his
final decision in this case.
Letter to Chairmen of Congressional Committees >
Dear Mr. Chairman: Under Section 7 of the
Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, as
amended, the United States Tariff Commission
submitted to me on January 14, 1958 its report on
umbrella frames. Three members of the Commis-
sion found that the domestic producers were
' No. 3232 ; 23 Fed. Reg. 2397.
696
' Identical letters were sent to Senator Harry F. Byrd,
chairman of the Senate Committee on Finance, and Repre-
sentative Wilbur D. Mills, chairman of the House Com-
mittee on Ways a
Department of State Bulletin
experiencing serious injury; two Commission
members reached a contrary conclusion ; and one
Commissioner did not participate in this case.
I have carefully considered the Tariff Commis-
sion report and have had the advice of the Trade
Policy Committee and other departments and
agencies of the Executive Branch.
The tariff concession on umbrella frames and
their components came into effect in 1951. In late
1955, domestic producers announced prices for
1956 that ranged up to 30 percent above 1955
prices. In late 1955, imports began to increase
and continued sharply upward in 1956, totaling
344 thousand dozen for 1956. In May of that year,
the domestic industry adjusted its prices down-
ward from the higher levels that it had recently
set. The level of imports dropped markedly dur-
ing the last two months of 1956, and total imports
in 1957 were less than half as much as those of 1956.
The industry's profits reflect this pattern. The
Commission's report shows that the industry's net
profits for 1955 amounted to 7.6 percent of net
sales. With the substantial rise in both domestic
prices and imports in 1956, losses were experi-
enced by two of the four domestic firms that re-
ported. During the most recent financial period
covered by the Commission's report, the first five
months of 1957 when imports were at a much
lower level than in the preceding year, the in-
dustry as a whole showed a moderate profit. Two
of the Commissionei's suggested that the reported
profits for early 1957 understate the position of
the industry on two grounds: First, one of the
companies included in the industry average was
undergoing operational reorganization and its fi-
nancial experience was quite out-of-line with the
other companies ; second, the industry usually does
better in the latter part of the year, and this, of
course, is not taken into account by early figures.
Although some clear interpretations can be
drawn from the present record, I have concluded
that before my final decision is made the domestic
producers and other parties should be given the
opportunity to present further information on the
industry's experience in recent months. Addi-
tional data on the industry's financial experience
and the import pattern through the first quarter
of 1958 should clarify the situation and enable a
better resolution of the points of difference set
forth in the minority and majority opinions of the
Tariff Commission report.
April 28, 1958
I am, therefore, requesting the Commission to
submit a supplemental report including data on
the period ending March thirty-first and also in-
cluding such other material as the Commissioners
deem appropriate in view of the above.
Sincerely,
DwiGHT D. Eisenhower
Letter to Edgar B. Brossard, Chairman, U.S. Tariff
Commission
Dear Mr. Chairman : I have carefully studied
the Tariff Commission's report of January 14,
1958 concerning umbrella frames.
As set forth in the enclosed copy of my letter
of today to the Chairmen of the Senate Finance
and House Ways and Means Committees, I have
concluded that it woidd be useful to have addi-
tional data on the industry's financial experience
and the import pattern during recent months.
I request the Commission, tlierefore, to submit
a supplemental report including data on the
period ending March thirty-first and also includ-
ing such other material as the Commissioners deem
appropriate.
Sincerely,
DwiGHT D. Eisenhower
Great Lakes Fishery Commission
Meets at Washington
The Department of State announced on April
9 (press release 181) that the Great Lakes Fishery
Commission, established by treaty between the
United States and Canada, will meet at Wash-
ington April 9 and 10. The principal function
of the Commission is the eradication of the sea
lamprey predator which has so effectively de-
stroyed most of the valuable food fishes of the
ujiper Great Lakes.
Chairman of the Commission is L. P. Voigt,
Conservation Director of the State of Wisconsin.
Other U.S. members are Claude Ver Duin, Mayor
of Grand Haven, Mich., and Donald L. McKernan,
Director of the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries
of the Department of the Interior.
The Canadian Commissioners are A. L. Prit-
chard. Director of the Conservation and Develop-
ment Service of the Department of Fisheries, Ot-
tawa ; A. O. Blackhurst, Manager of the Ontario
Council of Commercial Fisheries, Port Dover,
Ontario; and W. J. K. Harkness, Cliief of the Di-
vision of Fish and Wildlife of the Ontario De-
partment of Lands and Forests, Toronto.
On hand to report progress and plans on behalf
of the two government agencies which are con-
ducting tlie Commission's program will be W. A.
Kennedy of Canada and J. W. Moflett of the U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Sei'vice. They will be accom-
panied by top members of their scientific staffs.
State conservation agencies will be represented by
Albert Hazzard of Pennsylvania, Mason Law-
rence of New York, and Lee Roach of Ohio.
The principal method used to control the lam-
prey is the blocking of streams tributary to the
lakes. The lampreys are killed by electrical weirs
on their upstream migration to spawning grounds.
Another method has been the subject of experi-
mentation, and very liopeful results are being ob-
tained. This is the introduction into the streams
of selective toxicants which kill the lampreys and
their larvae but do not harm fish or leave a poison-
ous residue dangerous to human or animal life.
Perfecting of this system will speed the work of
lamprey control and bring nearer the time of re-
liabilitation of the lake trout and other com-
mercial and sports fisheries.
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THE CONGRESS
The IVIutual Security Program in the Far East
Statement iy Walter S. Robertson
Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs ^
I am glad of the opportunity to appear before
you in support of the mutual security program on
a scale which will not cripple its objectives. This
committee is acutely aware of the importance to
the security of the United States and the free
world of the continued freedom and independence
of the non-Communist countries of the Far East.
In our judgment the mutual security program is a
bulwark of their freedom and is vital to our own
safety.
I shall address my remarks to the foreign-
policy considerations which govern our activities
in the Far East under the Mutual Security Act.
As program operations are conducted by the De-
partment of Defense and the International Co-
operation Administration, the specific programs
will be covered by the statements of Capt. Berton
A. Bobbins, Jr., United States Navy, Far East
Regional Director for International Security
Affairs, Department of Defense, and by Dr. Ray-
mond T. Moyer, ICA Regional Director for the
Far East.
The Secretary of State recently said that we live
in an historic era of change. He drew attention
to two great forces at work : Communist imperial-
ism and the "drive for progress" on the part of the
ex-colonial peoples and those of the less developed
countries.- These forces are conspicuously pres-
ent in the Far East.
Communism rose to immense power in the area
when mainland China fell in 1949. Today Com-
munist China with its 600 million people, large
army, and modern air force regards its neighbors
as potential satellites or provinces. It plans to
make them so. The 12 million relatively unassimi-
lated overseas Chinese in the countries of South-
^ Made before the Senate Committee
tions on Mar. 28.
Foreign Rela-
° For a statement made by Secretary Dulles before the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, see Bui-letin of
Mar. 17, 1958, p. 427.
Department of Sfate Bulletin
*Pii2!
cast Asia offer a potential fiftli column which
Communist China is vigorously attempting to
exploit.
Eight of the 11 Asian countries of the Far East-
ern area have achieved their independence since
the Second World War. They are determined to
remain free. They are sensitive to any conceiv-
able impingement upon their sovereignty. Their
peoples demand of their governments economic
progress, and their conservative leaders are under
great pressure to show evidence of it quickly. De-
spite the ever-present military threat, a new
emphasis has been placed upon economic develop-
ment. Leaders of these countries must be able to
answer the Communist assertion that only com-
munism can provide them economic progress
quickly.
More than a third of the earth's population — 900
million people — dwell in the land and ocean area
stretching from Japan, China, and Korea south-
ward through Southeast Asia to Australia and
New Zealand. Here there are great contrasts in de-
velopment— Japan, Australia, and New Zealand
on the one hand and some of the least economically
developed countries in the world on the other.
Here exists the greatest variety of cultures, creeds,
and backgrounds of any of the major world areas.
Here are areas of the greatest and of the least
population pressure. Here are countries with
abundant natural resources and others where hu-
man resources constitute the only significant pro-
duction factor. In free Asia are some of the most
steadfast friends of the United States. In Com-
mimist Asia are some of its most unyielding foes.
Japan is the only great industrial complex
among the Asian countries and one of the four
greatest industrial areas of the world. Its people
are energetic and resourceful. They are pursuing
a democratic way of life. Japan is a bastion of
the free world. Upon its alinement with the free
world depends much of the security position of
the free world in Asia. Southeast Asia is rich in
agricultural products and the raw materials of
industry. Taiwan and the Philippines are in-
dispensable to the island defense chain upon
which we rely. The Republic of Cliina is a major
obstacle to the consolidation of Communist power
in mainland China and to the extension of Com-
nnuiist domination over the important commu-
niiies of overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia.
April 28, J 958
The position of the Republic of China in the
United Nations has remained firm. It would be
well to remember, when people speak of our
isolated position with regard to Red China, that
43 nations of the world recognize the Republic of
China as the lawful government of China. Only
17 non-Communist nations so recognize the
Peiping regime. During the year the Republic
of China established diplomatic relations with
five additional countries. There were about 6,000
overseas Chinese students studying in Taiwan,
while the numbers going to Communist China de-
clined, and hundreds of disillusioned students
have made their way out of mainland China.
The Republic of Korea stands as a symbol of
determined military resistance to Communist ag-
gression. I need not add that the prestige, honor,
and safety of the free world are heavily engaged
in Korea.
The free nations of the Far East have more
than one and three-fourths million men under
arms, who, together with our own forces, con-
stitute the free-world defense against Communist
overt aggression in that area. These countries
cannot support these forces unaided. Hence, the
mutual security program provides substantial
military aid and economic assistance within the
defense-support category. Seventy-one percent
of the fiscal year 1959 global defense-support re-
quest is proposed for Far Eastern countries.
Three countries, Korea, Taiwan, Viet-Nam, ac-
count for 60 percent.
The Communist Tactical Shift
In considering what I might report to the com-
mittee as the outstanding developments in the
Far East during this last year, I concluded that
there had been no real changes in the basic situa-
tion. There are, of course, important events
which tend to reveal and emphasize the nature of
the basic situation. This is another way of say-
ing that our grave problems in the Far East are
still with us. Perhaps the most significant trend
was the increasing emphasis placed upon eco-
nomic development by countries of this area, ac-
companied by the stepped-up activity of the
U.S.S.R. and other Communist countries in the
field of foreign economic assistance and trade. In
their Manila communique of March 13^ the
SEATO powers drew attention to this Com-
'Ibid., Mar. 31, 195S. p. 504.
munist tactical shift away from direct military
measures to enlarged economic, political, and cul-
tural activities.
I wish I could say that the Communist threat
had receded in the Far East and that the posi-
tion of the free countries with our help had cor-
respondingly unproved. I am obliged to say,
however, that tlie situation will permit of no
complacency. It requires and will require tire-
less effort and constant vigilance. Communist
imperialism has no timetable. It has time. It
conceives of its expansion in terms of decades and
generations. It believes it can wear us out — that
we will tire of the struggle and the cost and let
down our guard until too late to raise it again.
I am sure that you will agree that, however dif-
ficult the road may be, the United States must be
prepared to persist indefinitely in whatever
measures are necessary to meet the challenge we
face today. I am confident that the American
people will make whatever sacrifices are necessary
once the issues are clarified and made known to
them. To make sure that they are informed im-
poses a grave responsibility upon those in whom
they have placed their trust.
Highlights of the Existing Situation
Permit me to liighlight the existing situation in
the Far East :
1. There is still no evidence of any weakening
of Moscow-Peiping solidarity. On the contrary,
Mao Tse-tung ringingly reaffirmed the close bonds
between the two countries at the 40th anniversary
of the Soviet Revolution, where he publicly ac-
claimed Moscow's undisputed leadership of the
Communist world.
2. No country's boundary has been changed in
this year by Communist aggression. No country
has fallen prey to Communist subversion.
3. The Communists remain strong in north
Korea with approximately 650,000 troops and
some 600 to 700 modern airplanes. Even if the
Chinese Communists do withdraw from north
Korea following their recent propaganda an-
nouncement of intention to do so, their with-
drawal would be only to a point behind the Yalu
from which their return could be made with great
speed. The Communists remain strong in Viet-
Nam, with a puppet army in north Viet-Nam of
from 350,000 to 400,000 men. On the Chinese
mainland the Chinese Communists have an army
700
of some 3 million men and hundreds of modern
airplanes. They are steadily building up their
military capabilities across the strait from Tai-
wan, where they have prepared jet airfields, rail-
roads, and troop dispositions. In all our discus-
sions with the Communist Chinese authorities in
Geneva in an effort to arrange the repatriation of
imprisoned Americans, including an accounting
for some 450 missing military personnel, those
authorities have for more than 2 years refused to
renounce their intention to take Taiwan by force
of arms if need
4. Subversive efforts are continuous in all free
Asian countries. A softening process is being ap-
plied on the political, economic, and social front
in anticipation of the day when large, sudden
gains may be possible by military, revolutionary,
or other means. In south Korea, in south Viet
Nam, in Laos, in Cambodia, in Thailand, in
Burma, in Malaya, in Indonesia, the machinery
of subversion is employed conspicuously by the
Communists for whatever gain it may bring. The
increased strength of the Communists in Indo-
nesia highlights the serious position there just at
a time when lack of unity in the Government has
led to potentially widespread civil strife, with
communism and Communist participation in gov-
ernment among the main issues.
5. On the economic front international com-
munism bids for the favor of the aspiring, under-
developed countries with offers of aid and prom-
ises of economic progress.*
The Soviet Union has now begim to back u;
its propaganda line with genuine economic de- ippronii
velopment assistance in some areas. It has made [W
offers of assistance to many individual countries, liiaf
At the recent Communist-dominated Afro-Asian
meeting in Cairo the Soviet Union offered im- ttlietri
limited "aid without strings" to all coimtries inaPoc, It
Asia and Africa
At the meeting in Kuala Lumpur this month "iitu
of the U.N. Economic Commission for Asia and ^^
the Far East, the Soviet Union stressed Soviet
readiness to expand trade-and-aid relations with fmn
the countries of the region. It urged the more JUntiyii
extensive use of Soviet teclmicians in the de-
velopment of these coimtries. And it offered ^ki<i
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'For a statement made by Deputy Under Secretarj
Dillon before the committee regarding the economic ae
tivities of the Soviet bloc in less developed countries, see
iUd., Mar. 24, 1958, p. 469.
Department of State Bulletin
Wo
<W2I
technical training in the Soviet Union to a sub-
stantial number of students from the region.
The Soviet Union also indicated its readiness to
consider long-term purchase contracts for pri-
.mary commodities. This latter suggestion probes
a sensitive economic wound of the moment, as the
Asian countries that are exporters of primary
commodities are increasingly concerned over the
recently declining value of such exports.
The objective of the Communist economic of-
fensive is to gain prestige and influence in the
underdeveloped countries, to identify national-
ism and economic progress with adherence to
communism, and to open the door to subversive
agents operating under the guise of technicians.
Kespect for Soviet science and technology was
greatly augmented in the Far East by the recent
Soviet demonstrations of competence in space
technology.
Only three countries, Burma, Indonesia, and
Cambodia, have so far accepted aid offers from
Communist-bloc countries. Since 1955 Burma has
accepted $38 million in proffered credit aid from
the Soviet Union and $4 million from Communist
China. Indonesia, after protracted deliberation
and in view of its deteriorating economic position,
finally in February 1958 accepted with parlia-
mentary approval a loan of $100 million from the
Soviet Union negotiated in September 1956, of
which about one-half will finance the purchase of
ships from the U.S.S.E. Indonesia has also re-
ceived a total of $9.4 million in credits from East
Germany and Czechoslovakia and a recent offer
approximating $35 million from Communist
China. Cambodia has received a grant of $22
million from Communist China.
Communist China is playing an increasing role
in the trade-and-aid offensive of the Communist
bloc. It is expected to furnish 15 percent of the
aid promised by the bloc to Far East countries,
and it accounts for a high proportion of bloc
trade with free Asian countries.
6. A delicate situation exists in Laos. The 1954
Geneva accords ^ provided for unification of the
coiuitry rnider the central government. The Com-
munist-dominated Pathet Lao, however, refused
to turn over to the Royal Government the two
provinces under their armed control, using their
defiance of this international agreement to nego-
tiate successfully in November 1957 a coalition
' Ibid., Aug. 2, 1954, p. 164.
April 28, 1958
government which netted them two cabinet posi-
tions, other administrative participation, and
legal status as a political party. This may extend
Communist influence dangerously in Laos.
7. Cambodia's foreign policy continues to be
based on neutrality, and that country continues
to show a determination to remain free and inde-
pendent. In a speech to Cambodian students in
Paris last October, Prince Sihanouk made this
significant statement :
Without American aid . . . inmunerable consequences
would be in store for us. . . . At least for the present
no replacement is possible except to become a satellite.
Have we the means to be free once communized? . . .
It is a question of the existence of our very race.
8. In our defense-support and teclinical-coop-
eration programs throughout the Far East we
have made necessary, if unspectacular, contribu-
tions to economic and political stability, to the
defense posture, or to the economic development
of the countries according to the nature of their
problems and the specific applications of assist-
ance. Our technical-cooperation programs in the
several countries of the Far East are generating
benefits which will be realized gradually and will
remain indefinitely.
There are many factors affecting political sta-
bility in the underdeveloped countries besides the
economic. However, over a period of years —
a decade or more — the popular test of the success
of national leadership may well be the adequacy
of the rate of economic progress. If conserva-
tive or middle-of-the-road leadership does not
produce the popularly desired result, the peoples
of these countries may be expected to listen atten-
tively to the glowing, if illusory, promises of the
extreme left. International communism takes
full advantage of any opportunity to lend credi-
bility to the loud claims of leftist contestants for
populai- political support.
Meeting the Threats of Communist Imperialism
In the current struggle the shifting of emphasis
to the economic front does not exclude the possi-
bility of a return to direct military action where
lassitude on the part of the free world invites such
an action. We cannot afford fatigue, and, if we
understand our problem, we will never let fatigue
influciice our judgment.
To meet the array of threats which Commmiist
imperialism presents to the United States and to
701
the free world in the Far East, it remains our
policy:
1. to deter, and where necessary to repel. Com-
munist military expansion and infiltration by
maintaining an adequately strong free- world mil-
itary posture. It is in furtherance of this policy
that we have negotiated security treaties with
Japan and the Eepublics of the Philippines,
Korea, and China, that we joined with seven other
nations in the SEATO treaty of alliance against
aggression in Southeast Asia and with Australia
and New Zealand in the ANZUS defensive
alliance.
2. to assist the free nations of the Far East to
achieve internal security and political stability
and to promote improved conditions of life for
their people.
Without tlie mutual security program our pres-
ent free- world posture in the Far East could not
be maintained. This program is in three prin-
cipal phases. These are military aid, defense sup-
port, and economic aid. Economic aid in this
sense includes both technical cooperation and eco-
nomic development assistance from the Develop-
ment Loan Fund.
In order that the peaceful life of a country
may flourish and economic progress be realized,
there must be political stability, freedom from
the threat of military attack or insurrection, and
sufficient resources available to finance economic
development. If domestic resources — financial,
human, and material — are drained away by de-
fense expenditures, little or nothing may remain
for long-term growth and development. And yet,
in the presence of the Communist threat, the de-
fense posture is a prerequisite of an independent
national life.
The defense posture of any country is a complex
of political, military, economic, and human fac-
tors. Weakness of one aspect ma.y be fatal to the
whole. United States military aid provides equip-
ment and training for the armed forces of the
recipient countries which comprise the first line
of defense of their national security and independ-
ence. Defense support adds current strength to
bolster and maintain the continuity of their eco-
nomic life so that they can support tliese necessary
defense establishments without economic de-
terioration.
Without the security provided by such assist-
ance, neither political stability nor economic prog-
702
ress would be possible. In some countries, even
with tliis assistance, private capital, both domestic
and foreign, is impeded by the danger of aggres-
sion from making its essential contribution to eco-
nomic development. In such cases the lending
authority of the Development Loan Fund provides
necessary long-term financing otherwise unobtain-
able from free-world sources. I cannot emphasize
too strongly the importance of this fund having
ample resources to assist in so helping under-
developed countries.
The mutual security program is a direct response
to the Communist challenge. The only alternative
to American aid in the Far East today is Commu-
nist aid. And we can be certain that, wherever or
whenever we step out, the Communists stand
eager and ready to step in. If we should eliminate
ourselves, we should be removing for the Commu-
nists the last obstacle blocking their road to the
complete domination of Asia. The mutual secu-
rity program in the Far East remains one of thei
great imperatives of our foreign policy.
Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy
85th Congress, 1st Session
Message from the President of the United States trans-
mitting the 38th Report to Congress on Lend-Lease Op-
erations for the year ending December 31, 1958.
H. Doe. 199, March 10, 1958. 39 pp.
SSth Congress, 2d Session
Review of Foreign Policy, 1958. Hearings before the Sen-
ate Committee on Foreign Relations. Part I, February
3-March 10, 1958. 417 pp.
Increase Lending Authority of Export-Import Bank.
Hearings before the House Committee on Banking and
Currency on H.R. 10459. February 25 and 26, 1958.
71pp.
Extension of Export Control Act of 1949. Hearing before
the House Committee on Banking and Currency on
H.R. 10127. March 4, 1958. 39 pp.
Mutual Security Act of 1958. Hearings before the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs on draft legislation to
amend further the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as
amended, and for otlier purposes. Part V, March 7
and 11, 1958. 103 pp.
Export Control Act Extension. Hearing before the Sen-
ate Committee on Banking and Currency on S. 3093, a
bill to extend for an additional period of 2 years the
authority to regulate exports contained in the Export
Control Act of 1949. March 13, 1958. 38 pp.
Export Control Act Extension. Report to accompany S.
3093. S. Rept. 1427, March 26, 1958. 3 pp.
Department of State Bulletin
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Plan Submitted to Congress for Payment of U. S. Claims
Against Germany and Return of Vested German Assets
DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT
Press release 157 datea March 29
The Department of State has delivered to the
cliairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee and
to the chairman of the House Interstate and
Foreign Commerce Committee a letter dated
March 28, 1958, submitting on behalf of the execu-
tive branch an outline of a proposal designed to
provide the basis for a solution to the problems of
vested German assets and the unsatisfied war-
damage claims of American nationals against Ger-
many arising out of World War II. The plan is
designed to provide for the payment of all legiti-
mate American war-damage claims against Ger-
many and an equitable monetary return to the
former owners of vested German assets.
The program, as outlined in the letter to the
Congress, would authorize:
1. The earmarking of $100 million for the pay-
ment of such legitimate American claims ;
2. A return of up to $10,000, as a matter of grace,
to natural persons who were former owners of
vested German property ;
3. The use of any remaining funds from vested
German assets to complete the payment of Ameri-
can damage claims, and thereafter for pro rata
return to the former owners of vested German
properties, including those owners ineligible for
the $10,000 return, such as corporations.
This program would be financed from the pro-
ceeds of vested assets supplemented by an appro-
priation of $100 million. This appropriation
would restore in the assets account a substantial
part of the proceeds from former German assets
used to pay American claims vs. Japan. American
claims against Germany which prove to be in ex-
cess would also be made available for the pro rata
April 28, J 958
return to the former owners of vested German
properties.
LETTER TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES
March 28, 1958
Dear Senatok Eastland : ^ There is submitted
herewith an Administration proposal designed to
provide the basis for a solution to the long un-
resolved problems of vested German assets and of
the war damage claims of American nationals
against Germany arising out of World War II.
Proposals offering a solution to these problems
were submitted on behalf of the Executive Branch
to the 84th Congress and to the First Session of the
85th Congress. These have received consideration
in your committee and in the House Interstate and
Foreign Commerce Committee, but no legislation
regarding them has as yet been enacted.
Although provision has been made for dealing^
with war claims of American nationals against
other former enemy states, no provision has been
made by the United States Government for war
claims of American nationals against Germany
except those of prisoners of war, and merchant sea-
men. In addition, the vesting program has im-
250sed hardships on numerous German nationals
who had small pi'operties in this country prior to
World War II and it appears desirable, in the in-
terests of our relations with Germany, to take
action to alleviate these hardships.
The German Federal Government has on a num-
ber of occasions indicated to this Government its
hope that legislation could be enacted on the sub-
' A similar letter was sent to Representative Oren Harris,
chairman of the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce
Committee.
ject of the return of vested assets. It has welcomed
the $10,000 return program heretofore proposed by
the Executive Branch. At the same time, it has
expressed the hope that it would prove possible to
go beyond the limited return contemplated in the
Administration's previous proposals. Tlie subject
was last raised with the President by Chancellor
Adenauer on the occasion of his visit to Washing-
ton in May of last year, as a result of which a new
study of tlie problem was undertaken by the Ad-
ministiation. An announcement was made by the
Wliite House in July of 1957 ^ that supplementary
proposals regarding these matters would be sub-
mitted at the next session of Congress. The objec-
tive to be sought was the payment of all legitimate
American war claims against Germany and an
equitable monetary return to former owners of
vested German assets.
It would obviously be desirable to arrange a
final settlement of the unsatisfied claims of Ameri-
can nationals against Germany for World War II
losses. It would also be in the interest of our re-
lations with the Federal Eepublic of Germany to
achieve a final and mutually satisfactory solution
to the problem of vested German assets. Wliat can
be done in both instances depends essentially on the
determination of what funds can be made avail-
able.
Pursuant to various agreements which the
United States has entered into over a period of
time (the Paris Eeparation Agi-eement of 1946,^
the London Debt Settlement of 1953,^ and the Paris
Agreements of 1954 ^), the proceeds of vested Ger-
man assets constitute the only presently existing
fmids available for payment of American war
claims against Germany. Under the terms of the
agreements to which I have referred, the United
States Government has agreed not to seek com-
pensation for such claims from the German Fed-
eral Government. These latter two agreements
followed the policy expressed in the War Claims
Act of 1948 under which the proceeds of vested
assets were to be devoted to the settlement of
American war claims.
Wliile it is difficult to give any firm figure either
of the amount of claims which might be filed or
the amount which after due examination would be
= Bulletin of Aug. 19, 1957, p. 300.
' For text, see ibid., Jan. 27, 1946, p. 114.
' Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2792.
° For text, see S. Doc. 11, 84th Cong., 1st sess.
actually allowed, the Foreign Claims Settlement
Commission has recently estimated that a reason-
ably adequate program for the payment of the
war damage claims of American nationals against
Germany could be carried out within the limits
of $100 million. The cost of a return of up to
$10,000 to natural persons who were former own-
ers of vested German properties would be approx-
imately $50 million. Thus at least $150 million
would be necessary to implement a program for
the payment of legitimate American war damage
claims and for a $10,000 return. Sums beyond
this total would be required to complete an Amer-
ican claims program, should $100 million prove
inadequate for this purpose, and to provide an
equitable monetary return to all former owners
of vested German assets not receiving a full re-
turn under the $10,000 program, including cor-
porations.
Proceeds from vested assets are presently avail-
able in the amount of approximately $83 million
according to the Office of Alien Property. This
is manifestly not enough to cover an American
claims program and the $10,000 return program.
Ultimately some further funds might become
available from reserves totalling $179 million now
maintained by the Office of Alien Property for
litigation and claims payable out of vested assets
under existing legislation. The most substantial
reserve is that of $100 million for the General
Aniline and Film litigation.
As a result of the pooling of vested German
and Japanese assets for the purpose of paying
those claims provided for in the War Claims Act
of 1948, a sum of approximately $125 million de-
riving from German assets was in effect used to
pay claims against Japan. In order to secure a
final and equitable settlement of the claims and
assets problems the Administration is prepared to
seek from the Congress an appropriation of $100
million for a claims and assets program, as a res-
toration of a substantial part of the former Ger-
man assets used to pay American claims against
Japan. The Administration would not be pre-
pared to seek an appropriation beyond this
amount for this pui-pose.
The presently available proceeds from vested
assets ($83 million) together with the restoration
of a substantial part ($100 million) of the former
German assets used to pay claims against Japan
would make $183 million immediately available
for a program for the payment of the claims of
Department of State Bulletin
lonofti
Worli
Mai:-
American nationals against Gennany and for an
equitable monetary return of vested German as-
sets to their former owners. The total estimated
cost of an initial American claims program and a
$10,000 return to former individual owners would
be approximately $150 million leaving about $33
million for the settlement of any unpaid awards
to American claimants, and to the extent not re-
quired for those awards, for fro rata distribution
among the former owners of German properties,
with the prospects that some further funds might
eventually become available from vested assets as
reserves are liquidated. If the payment of legit-
imate American claims in full required less than
$100 million, a further sum would then become
available for distribution among the former own-
ers of German properties. It is believed that if
funds are made available in this order of magni-
tude a final settlement can be reached which will
take into account, and provide a fair and equi-
table treatment of the interests of, both the Amer-
ican claimants and the former owners of German
properties.
It is not intended that this recommendation in-
clude vested Japanese assets with respect to which
the existing circumstances are substantially dif-
ferent. It appears that the value of vested Ger-
man assets exceeds the amount of American war
claims against Germany which have already been
paid or which should appropriately be paid out of
the proceeds from such assets. On the other hand,
the amount of American war claims against Japan
which have already been paid by the United
States Government exceeds by far the value of the
vested Japanese assets.
In accordance with the above, it is recom-
mended on behalf of the Administration that the
Congress give favorable consideration to a solu-
tion of the problem of vested German assets and
the World War II damage claims of American
nationals against Germany which would: (1) au-
thorize the setting aside of $100 million for the
payment of such legitimate American claims; (2)
authorize a return of up to $10,000, as a matter of
grace, to natural persons who were former owners
of vested German properties ; (3) provide that the
remaining funds from vested German assets, and
any sums realized in the future from vested Ger-
man assets, which are available after the require-
ments of the $10,000 program are met, be used first
to complete the compensation of American war
AptW 28, 7958
damage claimants in full in the event tlie initial
fund of $100 million proves insufficient and, sec-
ond, to efi'ect a fro rata return, as a matter of
grace, to the former owners of vested German
properties not receiving a full return under the
$10,000 program; (4) provide that if the $100
million fund is more than sufficient for the satis-
faction of American war damage claimants in
full, the remaining balance be included with the
funds from vested German assets devoted to the
fro rata return. It is further proposed that this
program be financed from the proceeds of vested
German assets, including presently reserved assets
which may in the future become free of claims,
litigation, or other present obligations, supple-
mented by an appropriation of $100 million,
representing a substantial part of the proceeds
from German assets used for the payment of
American claims against Japan. This program
contemplates the expeditious liquidation of vested
properties.
In connection with the proposed return, it may
be noted that the Federal Republic of Germany
has been informed of the United States view that
such a return should not be regarded as a prec-
edent with respect to other allied countries.
The legislation should give the Administration
discretionary authority to work out with the Ger-
man Government arrangements with regard to the
return of vested assets which would, to the maxi-
mum extent possible, relieve the United States
Government of the burden of acbiiinistration.
The returns of up to $10,000 would be made by the
United States Government, with maximum Ger-
man assistance. The fro rata returns in excess of
$10,000 might be dealt with on a lump sum basis,
depending upon what arrangements could be made
with the German Government. Returns to former
owners who are now American nationals in all
instances should be made directly by the United
States Government. In other respects, such as the
provisions relating to copyrights, trademarks,
property subject to agreement with other coun-
tries, war criminals, and the coverage of the claims
program, the legislation should follow the lines
of previous Administration proposals. In addi-
tion, provision should be made for the divesting
of unliquidated interests which the United States
still holds in estates and trusts so that there can
be terminated the continuing participation of the
United States for an indefinite period in the ad-
ministration of these estates and trusts.
705
Almost thirteen years have passed since the end
of the war. It is essential that action be taken
promptly if many of the original American claim-
ants, and the original owners of German vested
properties, are to derive during their lifetimes any
of the benefits which a solution of these problems
would afford. The program outlined above would
provide, at long last, compensation to American
citizens for losses and damages suffered during
World War II and attributable to Germany. In
addition it would resolve a troublesome problem
in the field of our foreign relations and would
strengthen our ties of friendship with the Federal
Kepublic of Germany.
I respectfully request that early consideration
be given to the enactment of legislation embodying
the program outlined above. A similar letter is
being sent to the Chairman of tlie House Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce Committee.
There is enclosed a statement of the events and
legislative background leading to the recommenda-
tion of this program.
The Bureau of the Budget advises that the
above proposals are in accord with the program of
the President.
Sincerely yours,
For the Secretary of State:
William B. Macojiber, Jr.
Assistant Secretary
The Honorable
James O. Eastland,
Chairman,
Committee on the Judiciary,
United States Senate.
Background Statement
March 17, 1958
Vested German Assets and Payment of American Wab
Damage Claims Against Germany
By the first War Powers Act of December 18, 1941,
Congress amended the Trading With the Enemy Act of
1917 to grant the President extensive powers to vest as-
sets in the United States owned by foreign countries or
their nationals. The 1917 Act already contained pro-
visions for the return of such of the property to be vested
as might ultimately prove to be owned by non-enemies.
However, neither the 1917 Act nor the 1941 Act provided
for the disposition of World War II vested assets finally
determined to be owned by enemy governments or their
nationals. That matter was left open.
Early in 1942 the President created the Office of Alien
Property Custodian as an independent agency and dele-
gated to the Alien Property Custodian the power to vest
706
property other than securities, cash and credits. In June
194.5, the Custodian's vesting power was expanded to in-
clude German and Japanese-owned securities, cash and
credits. As a result, substantially all the German and
Japanese assets known to be in the United States as of
December 7, 1941, were vested by the Custodian or by his
successor, the Attorney General.
In January 1946 the United States and 17 allied nations
other than the Soviet Union and Poland executed the
Paris Reparation Agreement whereby they agreed upon
the division of the limited German assets in kind avail-
able to them as reparation from Germany, including Ger-
man external assets located within the respective signa-
tory countries. The 18 Allies agreed to hold or dispose
of these external assets in such a way as to preclude
their return to German ownership or control. This pro-
gram was formulated in light of the allied experience
after World War I when the attempt in effect to exact teital
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reparation from Germany's current production failed and:
led to Germany's default on its obligations. Moreover, it
was clear after the end of World War II that the United!
States would have to provide major assistance to Germany
to prevent disease and unrest. This country, therefore,
favored measures which would limit Germany's Worldl lid itlieriii
War II reparation to its external assets and other assets-
in kind, thus relieving Germany of reparation payments!
from current production and avoiding the indirect
financing of reparation by the United States. The Parisi
Reparation Agreement met this objective.
In 1946 Congress enacted section 32 of the Trading?
With the Enemy Act authorizing returns of vested prop-
erty to persons having merely technical enemy status and) Watlir
to enemy nationals who were persecuted by their own
governments. In the same year, Congress added section
34 to the Act, providing for the payment of pre-vesting
debt claims of Americans again-st enemy nationals whose
property was vested.
By the War Claims Act of 1948 Congress added section
39 to the Trading With the Enemy Act, providing that
German and Japanese assets not returnable under section ''estedsj
32 should, after the payment of debt claims therefrom,
be retained by the United States without compensation to
the former owners. In addition, the War Claims Act of
1948 gave jiriority to the use of the net proceeds of liqui-
dation of this retained property for the payment of com-
pensation to American civilian internees of the Japanese
to American servicemen captured by the forces of Ger-
many, Japan and other governments which failed to pro- i.,
vide adequate subsistence as required by the Geneva (^
Convention and to certain Philippine religious organiza-
tions which had rendered aid to American personnelt te„ij^^
This Act did not provide for the payment of war claims WsiCt-^
of Americans arising out of war-caused property damage Hiclaia,,
but authorized a study of the problem. The Attornej
General has advanced a total of $22-5,000,000 from the
proceeds of vested assets for purposes Df the War Claims
Act of 1948. Thus that Act constituted a Congressional
disposition of the German and Japanese assets vested un-
der the Trading With the Enemy Act during World Wai
II. Furthermore, that Act, in effect, gave confirmation tc
the reparation program set forth in the Paris Reparation
Its wfre i
ffftatio
'■'iXotf
Department of State 6u//ef/nft(p,jjj
Agreement by devoting German external assets to the sat-
isfaction of certain American war claims.
The Bonn Convention of 19;')2 for the Settlement of
Matters Arising out of the War and the Occupation, be-
tween the Federal Republic of Germany and the United
States, Britain and France also afiSrmed the policy of the
Paris Reparation Agreement. In that Convention the
Federal Republic of Germany agreed to compensate its
own nationals for their loss of external assets by the vest-
ing and other action of the Allied Powers. For their
part, these countries gave the Federal Republic a commit-
ment that they would not assert any claims for reparation
against its current production. These provisions of the
Bonn Convention were carried forward and approved in
the Paris Protocol of 19.54 which was approved by the
Senate April 1, 195.5, and came into force on May 5, 1955.
On July 17, 1954, Chancellor Adenauer wrote to the
President to enlist his support for legislation which
had been introduced in Congress for the general return
of vested German assets." The Chancellor referred to the
hardships suffered by many of the German individuals
whose property had been vested. He mentioned old
people, pensioners and beneficiaries of Insurance policies
and inheritances in particular and urged that alleviation
of these hardship cases would make a considerable con-
tribution to furthering the friendship between the peoples
of the United States and Germany. The President's reply
of August 7, 1954, referred to the fact that the Allied
Governments decided to look to German assets in their
territories as a principal source for the payment of their
claims against Germany. The President expressed
sympathy with individuals in straitened circumstances
in Germany for whom the operation of the vesting pro-
gram in the United States had created particular hard-
ship. He pointed out that American nationals who had
suffered losses arising out of the war had received no
compensation, also with resultant hardship in many cases.
Finally, the President stated that although none of the
bills then pending in Congress with regard to the return
of vested assets had the approval of his Administration,
the problem was receiving earnest consideration and he
hoped that a fair, equitable and satisfactory solution
could be achieved. The matter was also raised by
Chancellor Adenauer with the President during the
former's visit to Washington in October, 1954,' and con-
versations between representatives of the two Govern-
ments were agreed on.
As a result, the Executive Branch formulated a plan
wliicb was subsequently incorporated in a draft bill sub-
mitted to the 84th Congress.' Prior to the submission of
tli.it liill, representatives of the United States and the
Fciliral Republic of Germany discussed the matter of
vested German assets and the related problem of American
w;ir claims against Germany.' During these discussions
" For texts of Mr. Adenauer's letter and the President's
; reply, see Bulletin of Aug. 23, 1954, p. 269.
si^ ' Ihid., Nov. 8, 1954, p. 680.
Wl 'For a statement made on Nov. 29, 1955, before the
iif|] Senate Judiciary Committee by Deputy Under Secretary
V ' Murphy, see ihid., Dec. 12, 1955, p. 971.
° For text of a joint statement is-sued following the
U.S. ^German discussions, see ihid., Mar. 14, 1955, p. 437.
representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany were
informed that the Executive Branch would recommend a
limited return of vested assets to natural persons up to
a maximum of $10,000 as a matter of grace for the pur-
pose of alleviating the cases of hardship caused by vest-
ing. The United States representatives pointed out that
this action would result in a full return to approximately
90 per cent of the former owners whose property had been
vested and would achieve the equitable solution sought
by the President. The United States representatives ex-
pres.sed the hope that in addition to relieving hardships
of an appreciable number of German people, this action
would serve to make even more secure the ties between the
United States and Germany. The representatives of the
German Federal Government expressed the hope that the
proposed return would subsequently be followed by a
wider program. They were informed, however, that the
Administration did not envisage a broader return than
was contained in the proposed recommendation.
At the time of the submi.ssion of the Administration pro-
posal in 1955, it appeared that between $50 and $60 million
might be realized from the liquidation of German and
Japanese assets, over and above the amounts which had
already been paid into the War Claims Fund pursuant to
the War Claims Act of 1948, as amended, and the amounts
required to pay claims which might be asserted under the
Trading With the Enemy Act. It was then calculated that
a return of up to $10,000 to former individual owners of
vested German and Japanese assets would require ap-
proximately $60 million. There was therefore need for
finding some arrangement for financing the payment of
claims of American nationals against Germany if any
measures of partial return of vested assets were to be
contemplated.
As a result of the pooling of vested German and
Japanese assets for the purpose of paying those claims
provided for in the War Claims Act of 1948, it was then
estimated that the sum of approximately $100 million
deriving from German assets had in effect been used to pay
claims against Japan. This use of German as.sets to pay
claims against Japan thus drastically reduced the funds
which would otherwise have been available at the discre-
tion of Congress to pay American property damage claims
against Germany. It was therefore proposed that the sum
of $100 million be restored from governmental funds to
pay war claims against Germany.
The subject of the disposition to be made of the vested
assets and of American claims against Germany was again
considered by the Administration in the early part of 1957.
At that time it appeared that larger sums would be avail-
able from the liquidation of assets than had previously
been estimated. It was calculated that the sum of $108
million was immediately available and that a substantial
additional amount might become available out of funds
held in reserve against unresolved claims, litigation and
other obligations. It was therefore recommended by
the Administration, in letters sent to the Vice President
and the Speaker of the House from the Chairman of the
Foreign Claims Settlement Commission under date of
April 3, 1957, that returns be made up to $10,000 to the
former individual owners of German and Japanese prop-
erties, as previously recommended, and that the remainder
April 28, 7958
707
of the proceeds of vested assets be used to meet the war
damage claims of American nationals against Germany.
Thereafter, a new study of the problem was made by the
Administration. On July 31, 1957, the White House an-
nounced the intention of the Administration to submit to
the next session of Congress a supplementary plan which
would provide for the payment in full of all legitimate
war claims of Americans against Germany and would
permit, as an act of grace, an equitable monetary return
to former owners of vested assets.
He w
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INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
U.S. and Canada Advocate Principle
of Abstention in Fishing
Press release ISO dated April 11
2'he following statement was released at Geneva
on April 11 by the U.S. delegation to the U.N.
Conference on the Law of the Sea.^
The United States and Canada have introduced
a proposal for a new article in the proposed codi-
fied law of the sea, as well as certain clianges in
one section of the draft proposal drawn up by the
International Law Commission. The proposal is
aimed specifically at filling a gap in the ILC draft
and through it increasing the world's supply of a
major food — fish.
The joint U.S.-Canadian proposal would make
the principle of abstention an essential conserva-
tion procedure in certain fishing situations. It
would provide an incentive for all states to restore,
maintain, and further develop fisliery production.
It would give meaning to a concept that is neces-
sai-y if the world is to obtain full utilization of the
resources of the sea.
In advancing the procedure, the sponsors have
emphasized three basic considerations :
1. The states fishing the resource must have
added to the productivity of the resource by con-
structive conservation measures.
2. The states fishing the resource must utilize
the resource fully, so that the introduction of
more fishing effort will not produce more fish.
3. Any question as to the fulfillment of these
prerequisite conditions would be subject to test-
' For a statement by Arthur H. Dean, chairman of the
U.S. delegation, see Bxilletin of Apr. 7, 1958, p. 574.
ing by any interested state, and disputes regard-
ing their existence would be settled in an objective,,
expeditious manner.
The concept and practice of abstention in fishing'
has grown out of the experience, sometimes in-
dividually, often jointly, of the United States and
Canada. Since 1923 both these nations have
through major expenditures and severe restraints
on their own fishermen saved from disastrous de-
pletion and, in fact, made major advances m the
quantitative catch of several major fish crops. By
research, scientific management, construction of
costly fishways, and forgoing of water-power proj-
ects, the United States and Canada have jointly
built up the salmon, halibut, and fur-seal resources
of the Northeast Pacific.
Of equal importance is the fact that abstention
would apply only to specific stocks of fish, not to
areas of the sea. It would not touch upon gen-
eral fishing activities in an area but would affect
only the harvesting of the particular stock of
which qualifies for abstention procedures. Nor
would it limit a coastal state adjacent to a high
seas area where the abstention procedure is being
carried out, even though nationals of that coastal
state had not previously participated in the fish
ery. The doctrine could not prevent but rather
would promote the fuU utilization of a fishery ^p^<^'
resource
Abstention is a highly beneficial conservation
concept which encourages countries to make th(
investment in talent, time, money, and self-denial
necessary to develop the productivity of the re-
sources of the sea. Lacking this or some equiva^
lent procedure, nations will have little or no pro-
tection and resultingly little or no incentive to
Department of State Bulletin j|p,j.
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Pirtmerit,
lioffifcrt:
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undertake expensive programs for developing, re-
storing, and maintaining such resources.
The world as a whole has a great deal to gain
by accepting abstention as a general rule. The
United States Government considers the concept
essential to any complete set of articles on high-
seas fisheries conservation.
Ambassador Burgess Concludes
Consultations in Washington
Press release 1S5 dated AprL 11
Ambassador W. Kandolph Burgess, U.S. Kepre-
sentative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion and European Eegional Organizations, left
on April 11 to return to his post in Paris after
extensive consultations in Washington.
In tlie interest of improvement in political con-
sultation in NATO, the communique issued by the
Heads of Government of the NATO countries at
their meeting in Paris last December ^ expressed
their intention to keep their permanent representa-
tives in Paris fully informed of all government
policies which materially affect the alliance and
its members.
Ambassador Burgess during his stay in Wash-
ington attended meetings of the Cabinet and of
the National Security Council. He also met on
several occasions with Secretary Dulles, Secretary
of the Treasury Robert B. Anderson, Secretary of
Defense Neil H. McElroy, and numerous other
officials of the State Department, the Defense De-
partment, and other Government agencies. His
discussions with Government officials covered
major subjects of current interest to the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, including prepara-
tions for the conference of NATO defense minis-
ters which will be held at Paris April 15-17,
preparations for the NATO foreign ministers'
meeting to be held at Copenhagen May 5-7, and
consultations now in progress in NATO regard-
ing possible discussions with the Soviets.
Ambassador Burgess also discussed with Gov-
ernment officials and representatives of business
and finance current economic problems relating
to the work of the Organization for European
Economic Cooperation (OEEC), with which the
United States is closely associated.
U.S.-Euratom Working Party
Concludes Discussions
Following is the text of a joint statement re-
leased at Washington and Luxembourg on April
3 at the conclusion of meetings of a joint U.S.-
Europeaii Atomic Energy Commission working
party, which convened at Luxembourg on March
20.
Press release 169 dated April 3
A joint working party composed of representa-
tives of the Commission of the European Atomic
Energy Community (EUEATOM) and the Gov-
ernment of the United States has today concluded
a series of meetings in Luxembourg.^
This group has been studying the means whereby
a joint EURATOM-United States nuclear power
program might be developed. The objective would
be to initiate promptly a program aimed at bring-
ing into operation by 1963 a number of large-scale
nuclear power plants to be built within the com-
munity, primarily of the pressurized and boiling
water types, and having a total installed capacity
of approximately one million kilowatts of elec-
tricity.
The group also has been examining the principal
aspects of a supporting joint research and develop-
ment program which would be centered on these
reactors.
The program would be designed to encourage
maximum participation by the industries of the
Community and of the United States.
Substantial progress has been made toward
these objectives and it is planned that there will
be further discussion of the proposed joint pro-
gram in Washington later in April.
Dr. Manley Named Senior Adviser
to U.S. Representative to IAEA
The Department of State announced on April
2 (press release 165) the appointment of John
Henry Manley, formerly research adviser at the
University of California's Los Alamos Scientific
Laboratory, to be senior technical adviser to Rob-
' For text, see Bulletin of Jan. 6, 1958, p. 12.
Apttl 28, J 958
' For a Department announcement and names of mem-
bers of the U.S. delegation, see Bulletin of Apr. 7, 1958,
P.5S3.
709
ert M. McKinney, U.S. Representative to the
International Atomic Energy Agency and U.S.
member of the Agency's 23-nation Board of
Governors.
The International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) came into being in 1957 as an outgrowth
of President Eisenhower's atoms-for-i:)eace pro-
posal. United States participation in the IAEA
is coordinated by a permanent mission located at
Vienna, Austria, headquarters of the Agency.
Dr. Manley will join the mission in time to
attend tlie meeting of the Board of Governors of
tlie IAEA scheduled to convene at Vienna, April
24, 1958.
U. S. Delegations to
International Conferences
13th Session, Economic Commission for Europe
The Department of State announced on April 4
(press release 172) that Henry J. Heinz II, presi-
dent of H. J. Heinz Company, was sworn in as
the U.S. Rejiresentative to the 13th session of the
U.N. Economic Commission for Europe (ECE),
scheduled to be held at Geneva, Switzerland, April
9-25, 1958.^ I\Ir. Heinz served as a public member
of the U.S. delegation to the 12th session of the
Contracting Parties of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and^Trade (GATT), which met at Geneva
in October 1957. In 1954 he headed the U.S.
Special Economic Mission to Pakistan.
The Department also announced that Mr. Heinz'
principal advisers will be John W. Evans of the
American Embassy, London, and George Tesoro,
Senior Economic Officer, U.S. Resident Delega-
tion to International Organizations, Geneva.
The ECE is one of the three regional commis-
sions established by the United Nations to deal
with the special economic problems of its area and
to contribute to better living standards in the world
as a whole.
At its 13th session the Commission will review
the activities of its committees, which cover the
fields of agriculture, coal, electric power, housing,
industry and materials, inland transport, man-
power, steel, timber, and trade. The Annual Sur-
vey of Europe, as prepared by the secretariat on
its own responsibility, will also be reviewed.
Mr. Heinz was confirmed by the Senate on Apr. 2.
710
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
IVIULTILATERAL
Atomic Energy
Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Done at New York October 26, 1956. Entered into force
July 29, 19.57. TIAS 3873.
Ratifications deposited: Ecuador, March 3, 1958; Mex-
ico, April 7, 1958.
Aviation
Convention on international civil aviation. Done at Chi-
cago December 7, 1944. Entered into force April 4,
1947. TIAS 1591.
Adherence deposited: Federation of Malaya, April 7,
1958.
Finance
Articles of agreement of the International Finance Cor-
poration. Done at Washington May 25, 1955. Entered
into force July 20, 1956. TIAS 3620.
Signature and acceptance: Ghana, April 3, 1958.
Genocide
Convention on the prevention and punishment of the
crime of genocide. Done at Paris December 9, 1948.
Entered into force January 12, 1951.'
Accession deposited: Austria, March 19, 1958.
Property
Convention for the protection of industrial property.
Signed at London June 2, 1934. Entered into force
August 1, 1938. 53 Stat. 1748.
Adherence effective: Haiti, July 1, 1958.
Shipping
Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consult-
ative Organization. Signed at Geneva March 6, 1948.*
Acceptance deposited: Japan, March 17, 1958.
Slavery
Slavery convention signed at Geneva September ;
(46 Stat. 2183), as amended by the protocol of
ber7, 1953 (TIAS 3532).
Accession deposited: Ceylon, March 21, 1958.
BILATERAL
Agreement providing for economic, technical, and related
assistance to the Sudan. Effected by exchange of notes
at Khartoum March 31, 1958. Entered into force March
31, 1958.
Union of South Africa
Agreement supplementing the passport visa agreement of
March 28 and April 3, 1956 (TIAS 3544). Effected by
exchange of notes at Pretoria March 31, 1958. Entered
into force April 1, 1958.
' Not i
'Not :
force for the United States.
I force.
Department of State Bulletin
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April 28, 1958
Index
Vol. XXXVIII, No. 98^
Asia. The Mutual Security Program in the Far
East (Robertson)
> Atomic Enerpry
Dr. Manley Named Senior Adviser to U.S. Repre-
sentative to IAEA
President Asks U.S.S.R. To Agree To Begin Study
of Specific Disarmament Control Measures (Eis-
enhower, Khrushchev, text of letters) ....
Secretary Dulles' News Conference of April 8 . .
U.S.-EURATOM Working Party Concludes Discus-
sions (text of joint statement)
Aviation. International Cooperation Through Avi-
ation (Dulles)
anada
reat Lakes Fishery Commission Meets at Wash-
ington
J.S. and Canada Advocate Principle of Abstention
in Fishing
laims and Property. Plan Submitted to Congress
for Payment of U.S. Claim.s Against Germany
and Return of Vested German Assets (text of
letter and background statement)
Communism. The Mutual Security Program in
the Far J^ast (Robertson)
IJongress, The
Jongressional Documents Relating to Foreign
Policy
he Mutual Security Program in the Far East
(Robertson)
Ian Submitted to Congress for Payment of U.S.
Claims Against Germany and Return of Vested
German Assets (text of letter and background
statement)
disarmament
resident Asks U.S.S.R. To Agree To Begin Study of
Specific Disarmament Control Measures (Eisen-
hower, Khrushchev, text of letters)
Secretary Dulles' News Conference of April 8 . .
Economic Affairs
President Asks Further Report on Umbrella-Frame
Tariff
Che Trade Agreements Program and American
Prosperity (Mann)
Dnited States World Trade Fair (text of proclama-
tion)
World Trade Week, 1958 (text of proclamation) .
Burope
L3th Session, Economic Commission for Europe
(U.S. delegation)
D.S.-EURATOM Working Party Concludes Discu.s-
sions (text of joint statement)
ermany. Plan Submitted to Congress for Pay-
ment of U.S. Claims Against Germany and Re-
turn of Vested Germany Assets (text of letter
and background statement)
Indonesia. Secretary Dulles' News Conference of
April 8
International Law. U.S. and Canada Advocate
Principle of Abstention in Fishing
[nternational Organizations and Conferences
Dr. Manley Named Senior Adviser to U. S. Rep-
resentative to IAEA
reat Lakes Fishery Commission Meets at Wash-
ington
I3th Session, Economic Commission for Europe
(U.S. delegation)
U.S.-EURATOM Working Party Concludes Discus-
sions (text of joint statement)
Mutual Security
The Mutual Security Program in the Far East
(Robertson)
D.S. Grants Wheat to Tunisia
679
682
710
709
709
697
710
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Ambassa-
dor Burgess Concludes Consultations in Wash-
ington 709'
Philippines. Anniversary of Fall of Bataan (Eis-
enhower) 691
Presidential Documents
Anniversary of Fall of Bataan 691
President Asks Further Report on Umbrella-Frame
Tariff 696
President Asks U.S.S.R. To Agree To Begin Study
of Specific Disarmament Control Measures . . 679
United States World Trade Fair 696
World Trade Week, 1958 695
Treaty Information. Current Actions 710
Tunisia. U.S. Grants Wheat to Tunisia .... 691
U.S.S.R.
President Asks U.S.S.R. To Agree To Begin Study
of Specific Disarmament Control Measures (Eis-
enhower, Khrushchev, text of letters) .... 679-
Secretary Dulles' News Conference of April 8 . . 682
United Nations. U.S. and Canada Advocate Prin-
ciple of Abstention in Fishing 708
Name Index
Burgess, W. Randolph 709
Dulles, Secretary 682,689
Eisenhower, President 679,691,695,696
Khrushchev, Nikita 680
Maeomber, William B., Jr 70a
Manley, John Henry 709
Mann, Thomas C 692
Robertson, Walter S 698
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: April 7-13
Press releases may be obtained from the News
Division, Department of State, Washington 25,
D. C.
Releases issued prior to April 7 which appear in
this issue of the BtnxExiN are Nos. 157 of March
29, 163 of April 1, 165 of April 2, 169 of April 3, and
172 of April 4.
No. Date Subject
tl76 4/7 Reduction of life sentences of 10 Jap-
anese.
tl77 4/7 SEATO research fellowships.
tl78 4/7 Seattle to be site for Colombo Plan
meeting.
179 4/8 Dulles : news conference.
tlSO 4/9 Dillon: "Impact of Mutual Security
Program on the U.S. Economy."
181 4/9 Great Lakes Fishery Commission.
tl82 4/9 Reply of "Sixteen" to Chinese Commu-
nist statement on Korea.
tl83 4/9 Herter : "International Trade and Our
National Security."
184 4/9 Dulles: "International Cooperation
Through Aviation."
185 4/11 Burgess concludes consultations in
Washington.
186 4/10 U.S. grants wheat to Tunisia.
tl87 4/11 U.S. Consulate at Nicosia raised to
Consulate General (rewrite).
*188 4/11 Educational exchange.
189 4/11 Explanation of abstention in fishing.
*190 4/12 Secretary Dulles to speak at Minne-
.sota Statehood Day.
* Not printed.
t Held for a later issue of the Bctlletin.
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ipartment
of
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^KLY RECORD
Vol. XXXVIII, No. 984 ^. May 5, 1958
THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF INDEPENDENCE •
Address by Secretary Dulles 715
SECRETARY DULLES' NEWS CONFERENCE OF
APRIL 15 719
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND OUR NATIONAL
SECURITY • by Under Secretary Herter 731
IMPACT OF MUTUAL SECURITY PROGRAM ON
THE UNITED STATES ECONOMY • by Deputy Under
Secretary Dillon 736
SHARING NUCLEAR KNOWLEDGE WITH OUR NATO
ALLIES • Statement by Secretary Dulles 740
For index see inside back cover
& DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Vol. XXXVIII, No. 984 • Pcbucation 6639
May 5, 1958
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Note; Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and Items contained hereto may
be reprinted. Citation of the Department
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appreciated.
The Department of State BULLETIN,
a tceekly publication issued by the
Public Services Division, provides the
public and interested agencies of
the Government with information on
developments in the field of foreign
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The Interdependence of Independence
Address hy Secretary Dulles '■
It is for me a high privilege to greet you in this
House of the Americas. Here we are each among
friends and at home. Words can scarcely express
iow fortunate we are in this hemisphere, how
greatly blessed, to have this kind of association,
which has no counterpart in all the world and in-
ieed in all history.
It was 50 years ago when the cornerstone of
this our home building was laid on May 11, 1908.
The late Ambassador Joaquim Nabuco of Brazil
said that day that the United States, by virtue
of b-eing made the host of the permanent seat of
the Pan American Union, had received the highest
tribute ever paid to this Kepublic. We are still
deeply conscious of that high honor and shall strive
constantly to merit it.
This day, April 14, is being observed in our
American Republics as Pan American Day. It
is an annual festival of freedom, friendship, and
good will which has acquired unique significance
for the American peoples.
The United States gives striking proof of this.
President Hoover first proclaimed Pan American
Day in 1931, and since then its observance has
grown year by year. It has become a people's
festival, not merely a celebration by the govern-
ment. One day has proved to be not enough for
all of the ceremonies prepared in the name of
hemisphere friendship throughout our land. Con-
sequently, 3 years ago President Eisenhower made
the now traditional proclamation of Pan American
Day a proclamation of Pan American Week as
' Made at Pan American Day ceremonies at the Pan
American Union, Washington, D. C, on Apr. 14 (press
release 101).
May 5, 7958
well.- And let me call your attention to the geo-
graphic range of our United States commemora-
tion. In addition to the President's proclamation,
we now have governors' proclamations as well
from Alaska to Florida and from Guam to the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
Our present commemoration of Pan American
Day takes on a special significance. For this
year is the 10th anniversary of the Charter of the
Organization of American States. Through that
organization the inter-American system finds the
framework for its constructive international de-
liberation and cooperation. It thus becomes a
great contemporary force for the extension and
maintenance of peace, not in this hemisphere alone
but throughout the world. And it is not for our
present troubled era only but for the future of
the human race as well.
The Organization of American States is unique
because of the degree to which it combines the inde-
pendence of our countries with recognition of their
interdependence. We have learned that inter-
dependence must be practiced if worthwhile inde-
pendence is to be preserved.
At the beginning of our history as separate na-
tional entities, our wills and our energies were
directed primarily toward securing our independ-
ence. The right of men in the New World to live
in freedom, subject only to the dictates of moral
law and not the whims of overseas rulers, inspired
our forefathers to epic struggles. This burning
desire for freedom enabled the troops of Bolivar
' For President Eisenhower's proclamation of Pan Amer-
ican Day and Pan American Weelc, 1958, see Bulletin of
Feb. 10, 1958, p. 217.
and San Martin to endure incredible hardships
in scaling the wmdswept passes of the Andes.
The same determination held together the small
band of devoted soldiers under the leadership of
George Washington through the bitter winter at
Valley Forge. The forces of tyranny could not
match the valor, resourcefulness, and steadfast-
ness of the patriots. Through their struggles
throughout this hemisphere the independence of
the New World was achieved.
Monroe Doctrine
But just as the individual, however independ-
ent, cannot live wholly alone but shares the life
of a society, so the newly created nations of the
Western Hemisphere found that they could not
maintain their independence in isolation from each
other. The Holy Alliance, imder the leadership
of the Russian Czar, threatened to reconquer the
liberated colonies in Latin America and to en-
croach upon the northwest of the North American
Continent. It was that situation which led Presi-
dent James Monroe, the 200th anniversary of
whose birth is celebrated this month, to enunciate
the first major statement of United States foreign
policy. He declared that the peace and safety of
the United States would be endangered if the
European despots attempted to extend their sys-
tems to any part of this hemisphere.
That was the first great proclamation of inter-
dependence. It was, at its inception, a unilateral
proclamation. But it stated a concept of broad
applicability. Thus it became, by a logical his-
torical evolution, multilateral and mutual in ac-
ceptance throughout the American Republics.
That evolution has been speeded by the recur-
rence of external dangers. During the First
World War we drew together in substantial unity.
Then, in the 1930's and 1940's, when human free-
dom was again menaced by an aggressive totali-
tarian power, the American states rapidly closed
ranks to present a unified front. At Buenos
Aires in 1936, at Lima in 1938, at Panama in 1939,
at Habana in 1940, and at Chapultepec in 1945 the
principles of American solidarity against foreign
aggression were laid down. The natural cul-
mination was the Inter- American Treaty of Re-
ciprocal Assistance— the Rio Treaty of 1947 —
providing that an attack against any American
state would be considered as an attack against all.
716
Collective-Defense Structure
Despite victory in World War II the need for
maintaining our collective-defense structure is as
great as ever. A new menace grew as interna-
tional communism pursued its goal of world
conquest. It manifestly has predatory designs
against this hemisphere, and it views the existence
of inter-American solidarity as an insuperable
barrier to its aggressive plans. Through agents,
overt and secret, communism strives incessantly
to open a breach in our bastion.
In the face of this serious threat the Tenth
Inter- American Conference at Caracas, in 1954,
made its memorable Declaration of Solidarity of
the American States.^ It declared that the domi-
nation or control by the international Communist
movement of the political institutions of any
American state would threaten us all and en-
danger the peace of America. Thus again the'
American Republics marshaled the political andl
moral force of America against the efforts of an
alien despotism to extend its system to this hemi-
sphere and to intervene in our affairs.
Nowhere in the world has a group of nations
so proudly won and preserved its independi
Also, nowhere in the world have nations so fully
developed the concepts of interdependence. In^
terdependence is not only made explicit, as by the
declarations mentioned, but it is implicit in those
portions of our charter which call for consulta-
tion and cooperation in the solution of political.
juridical, and economic problems and for the 1^.^^,,
Ti»
peaceful settlement of international controversies.
The Organization of American States does,
moreover, aid in the achievement of the basic prin-
ciples of the American states even when it
not have direct responsibility as an organization i ,°!
for putting them into effect. In the basic docu-
ments of the Organization of American States
and in the deliberations of its conferences, the
fundamental ideals and common objectives havt
been set forth and clarified. Progress toward
their realization depends not only on collective
action but on the individual action of the
ber countries in the exercise of their responsibilitj
for national development.
Take, for example, the ideal of representative
government based upon respect for human rights,
ItflliS
liter
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m a
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ifilities
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igrame
tai pre
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'Ibid., Apr. 26, 1954, p. 638.
Depa.-fmenf of State Bulletin loys
That concept has commanded the allegiance of
the peoples of all our countries. It has been
proclaimed on numerous occasions and is in-
scribed in the charter.
Yet the statesmen of the American community
have learned that democracy because of its very
nature cannot be imposed from without but must
be nourished from witliin each country. The
principle of nonintervention is, therefore, entirely
consistent with the principle of encouraging rep-
resentative government and respect for human
rights.
Interdependence has cultural and economic as
well as political and security aspects. The In-
ter-American Committee of Presidential Repre-
sentatives, resulting from the 1956 Panama
meeting of the Presidents, has worked fruitfully
in this field. The Committee concluded its ses-
sions with a meeting in this very hall about one
year ago.'' Since that time the task of convert-
ing the Committee's recommendations into
realities has been going forward. The Govern-
ments of the American Republics have expressed
agreement in principle with the recommendations,
and provision has been made for a substantial
start. I understand that the Council has laid the
foundations for a greatly expanded program of
fellowships under OAS auspices. It is also set-
ting up an Inter- American Nuclear Energy Com-
mission, ^ which should play a significant role in
assisting the American Governments to develop
the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
These and the other worthwhile projects cur-
rently being worked out have excellent prospects
of succeeding in "making our Organization of
American States a more effective instrument in
se fields of cooperative effort that affect the
welfare of our peoples."^ The United States
rejoices that so promising a start has been made,
and we take this occasion to express to the mem-
bers of the Council, as well as to the Secretary
General and his able assistants, our appreciation of
their conscientious and fruitful labors.
For a statement by President Eisenhower and a
Committee announcement made at the conclusion of the
meeting, see Hid., June 24, 1957, p. 1014.
" lUd., Dec. 16, 1957, p. 976.
'For an address by President Eisenhower at PanamA,
Tuly 22, 1956, see iUd., Aug. 6, 1956, p. 219.
May 5, 1958
Economic Aspects of Interdependence
Now I should like also to refer to the economic
aspects of our interdependence. This, too, is very
much of a reality— a reality not yet adequately
organized. Today conditions vary considerably
among the 21 Republics of the Western Hemi-
sphere. America as a whole continues to move for-
ward— irresistibly. In some countries the pace
of growth has hardly diminished in spite of less
hospitable world conditions, so powerfid have
been the vital internal forces of progress. In
otliers, including the United States, the rate of
growth has perceptibly slowed down. A few
countries are experiencing serious financial
difficulties.
A major cause of these difficulties is the severe
contraction of demand for certain basic commod-
ities which has led, in turn, to lower prices. This
has cut sharply into the foreign-exchange earn-
ings of some countries. They have had to reduce
imports or accumulate commercial arrearages —
or both. Nearly all have had to utilize reserves
heavily.
Certain of the factors bearing on the economic
difficulties are beyond the power of governments
to change. Consumer habits cannot be coerced —
at least in our Republics— and artificial stimulants
often make the patient sicker. However, the
United States Government realizes the potential
consequences of violent fluctuations in the prices
of Latin America's exports, and we are daily
searching for ways and means to contribute to-
ward a solution of economic problems.
One problem involves petroleum, a commodity
of greatest importance in the economies of all our
countries, whether as producers or as consumers.
The world is faced with a readjustment of market-
ing relationships, distorted at the time of the
Suez crisis and complicated by a decline in de-
mand. In view of this situation the United States
Government, with the cooperation of the import-
ing companies, has inaugurated a program of
voluntary limitations on the amount of crude pe-
troleum to be imported into the United States.
I would like to make two points in this connection :
We have consulted regarding this program with
our friends in Venezuela, who are our principal
foreign suppliers, and we have also kept the Cana-
dian Government informed of these developments.
My second point is this : Despite drastic cutbacks
717
in our domestic production we endeavor to insure
to foreign petroleum the same percentage of our
domestic market it normally occupies.
This is the spirit in which we try to meet the
difficult problems of the present economic situa-
tion. When consumption declines, we strive not
to shift all of the burden onto weaker nations.
We seek to share it fairly, believing that this is
in our enlightened self-interest.
I can assure you that we are truly anxious to
help within the limits of what is sound and within
our governmental capabilities. And we are al-
ways ready to discuss with our neighbors these
mutual problems in an effort to find practical and
acceptable solutions. Our great stimulus in this
quest is our desire to promote a better way of life
for all our peoples, on whom the future of Ameri-
ca depends.
Rio Treaty, the Model for NATO
Our inter-American system has a significance
which surpasses the bounds of this hemisphere.
It is well known, for example, that the Rio Treaty
served as the model for the North Atlantic Treaty,
which created the North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation. Quite understandably, NATO was at first
compelled to concentrate largely on combating the
threat of military aggression. But recently, de-
spite the persistence of this danger, increased at-
tention has been given to developing the scope of
that orgamzation. President Eisenhower, speak-
ing in Paris last December at the NATO meeting,^
said this :
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was created
in response to a military threat. Yet NATO should not
for all time be primarily a collective-defense organization.
We hope and believe that the time will come when its
defense aspect will be minor and perhaps even unneces-
sary. . . . We should so shape this association, and our
respective parts in it, that it permanently serves to pro-
mote harmony not only between us but also between our-
selves and other people and areas of the world.
It requires no great gift of detection to deter-
mine the origin of that concept. Its origin is
right here, in the Organization of American
States.
' Ibid., Jan. 6, 1958, p. 6.
Our organization, too, has its collective- defense
aspects. But they are minor. We have devel-
oped our association along many other lines. In-
deed, never before in history has a group of
nations of comparable number enjoyed, in organ-
ized form, so high a measure of fellowship and
harmony. Thus we set an example from which
others can profitably learn. I believe that the
inter- American system for the peaceful solution
of disputes has in it elements which could
adapted to solve some of the thorny problems
which too often emerge elsewhere, with conse
quences that might even affect this hemisphere.
I am glad, therefore, that Dr. [Jose] Mora, the
Secretary General of our organization, has replied;
in an affirmative vein to NATO's suggestion for
an interchange of information. As we help*
others, we may help ourselves.
If there be any who believe that inter- Ameri-
can solidarity is something at which we toss bou-
quets of words every April 14 and forget for the
rest of the year, it would be well for them to look
at the record. It is a continuous advancing rec-
ord of positive accomplishment resulting fromi
day-by-day efforts. It shows our united deter-
mination to make America a happier, better home
for Americans.
In our endeavors may we never lose sight of the
basic truth that cannot be too often stated: The
independence of the American Republics is safe
guarded by their recognition of their interde-
pendence. Solidarity could not exist if our ;
pies had not consciously determined to achieve it
In our time solidarity is built on many interde-
pendent factors — political, cultural, economic. In
the beginning, however, there was but one power-
ful factor: the stubborn will for self-determina
tion. That was a positive element at our very
roots as free peoples. It was inherent in our na-
ture as pioneers, peoples of the ever-advancing
frontiers toward ever-enlarging horizons. It was
a moral force in each American nation. It was
also a unifying bond of kinship. The founders^
of our Republics renewed their faith in their own
purpose of freedom by witnessing the dedication
of others to that purpose. May the American Re-
publics never forget that dedication, nor ever
waver in that faith.
Depar'ment of State Bulletin
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Secretary Dulles' News Conference of April 15
Press release 193 dated April 15
Secretary Dulles : I recall that 2 or 3 weeks ago
I spoke of the able diplomacy with which Mr.
IMurphy and Mr. Beeley were carrying on their
good-offices mission as between France and Tu-
nisia.^ I want to repeat that expression of high
approval today when happily there is a greater
prospect than when I spoke of the success of their
mission. The outcome, of course, is still uncer-
tain; but as far as the good-offices mission can
function at the governmental level, they have suc-
ceeded in reaching an agreement which is in the
great interest, we believe, of the governments con-
cerned and, indeed, of all the world.
Q. Mr. Secretary, there has heen some criticism
in France that the arrangements which they are
proposing are hostile to the interests of France —
that tlie United States is talcing a hostile line.
A. I am aware of the fact that there are rumors
that circulate in France and have various origins
which suggest that the United States has some
devious purpose of trying to take over the French
position in North Africa. When the President
and I were in Paris at the NATO meeting last
December, we were aware of those rumors and
the President rejected them with indignation, I
may say, and I am prepared to reject them with
the same degree of indignation.
The fact is that there are economic and cultural
ties of a long historic background between France
and North Africa which we believe to be a basis
for fruitful cooperation between Western Europe
and North Africa, and the last thing in the world
we would want to do is disrupt those relationships.
I recall that the NATO meeting I referred to
took cognizance of those relationships and re-
ferred to them as a useful basis for friendly
cooperation between Western Europe and North
Africa.^ The United States fully subscribes to
that view, and never for one instant do any other
influences operate to make our policy as regards
that area. The idea that we are operating there
in some devious way to take over North Africa
in the interests of American corporations is just
about as far from the truth as any statement could
be.
Prospects for Meeting With U.S.S.R.
Q. Mr. Secretary, the reports from the Paris
NATO meeting seem to indicate that the 'West-
ern countries have agreed to meet the Russians
on the diplomatic level provided the Russians will
not have any prior conditions and in fact that we
are not ashing prior conditions with that level.
Is that correct?
A. Well, it is partially correct but only par-
tially correct. You say we are willing to meet
the Russians at the diplomatic level. You may
recall it is we who have been urging the Russians
to meet at the diplomatic level. I recall that at
my meeting before the Press Club last January ^
I urged that this preparatory work should be got-
ten away from the business of public exchanges
between heads of government — gotten down to a
lower level — and I said preferably the diplomatic
level. It was our proposal, made some 2 weeks
ago to the Soviet Union,* that we should carry
on these talks at the diplomatic level.
The Soviet Union indicated they were prepared
to accept that, but they attached conditions which
are unacceptable to the Western powers. Now I
think it is likely — I hope it is likely — that talks
will now be conducted at the diplomatic level, and
' Bulletin of Apr. 14, 1958, p. 607.
May 5, 1958
-Ibid., Jan. 6, 1958, p. 13.
V6id., Feb. 3, 1958, p. 159.
' For text of three-power declaration of Mar. 31, see
ibid., Apr. 21, 1958, p. 648.
719
I suppose the first thing they may talk about is
what they are going to talk about.
Q. Mr. Secretary, does that mean the issue of
whether or not you will talk about substantive
matters is not now resolved and that you will go
to this meeting to see if you can resolve them?
A. The latest Soviet memorandum/ while
agreeing to our proposal to talk at the diplomatic
level, indicated they were not willing to talk at
the diplomatic level, or indeed at any other meet-
ing short of the summit meeting itself, about mat-
ters of substance. So that issue is not resolved.
Q. What is our position as of today on that
point as to the talks at the diplomatic level?
A. Our position is precisely what was set out
in the three-power declaration handed in in Mos-
cow 2 weeks ago.
Q. In other words, we are still saying that at
this diplomatic level there nmst be talks as to sub-
stance or we will not meet at this level?
A. Well, I wouldn't put it quite that way. We
are proposing to conduct the preparatory talks
now at the diplomatic level. The Soviets agree
they will talk at the diplomatic level, and we are
not yet in agreement as to what we will talk about.
Q. Mr. Secretary, if the Soviets 7'efuse to enter
into substantive talks at a lower level or at the am-
bassador level or foreign-minister level, will we
decline to attend a summit meeting?
A. Well, I am not prepared to give a categorical
answer to that question at this time. U.S. views
have been fully set forth by the President. After
all, it is a "summit" meeting. That means it is
his meeting. He would be going to it, and I cannot
say on his behalf just what he will do. He has
spoken for himself on that subject, and that is
for all the world to know.
Q. Will the diplomatic talks start in Moscow on
Thursday of this week?
A. I do not know, and that has not been decided
yet. The terms of our next communication to the
Soviet Union have not yet been fully concerted.
We are working on them at the present time. I do
not know whether they will be ready in time to
permit of the diplomats to start talking this week
or not.
Q. Is it clear, Mr. Secretary, the diplomatic
talks at the diplomatic level, when, as, and if they
occur, will be fou/r-power talks?
A. That is what we proposed, and, as far as that
aspect of the matter is concerned, it is apparently
what the Soviets accept.
Question of Agenda
Q. Mr. Secretary, in practical terms what has
been your experience about the ability to stick to
any agenda set in the first place with the Russians?
Is this a realistic p-rocedure to believe that it can
be kept to an agenda?
A. Well, I don't think that we would ourselves
want to have an agenda so rigid that we were pre-
cluded from talking about some of the matters
which we believe are of vital importance for the
peace of the world. Even though these were not
accepted as a topic for agreed discussion in the
sense there was preliminary agreement that they
could be fruitfully discussed with a good prospect
of agreement, we might still want to be able to
talk about them.
You will recall at the last summit meeting there
were opening statements of a general character
which were made. In his opening statement Presi-
dent Eisenhower, among other things, spoke of
the problem created by the situation in Eastern
Europe and the inability of those nations there
to have governments of their own choosing.'* Now,
Mr. Bulganin came back and said they were not
willing to discuss it. But the President had made
his point in his opening address. I would suppose
that, following that pattern, if there were a sum-
mit meeting there would be an opportunity for the
Heads of Governments there to open up, at least,
by saying the things that were on their minds.
But then the question is, are you going to get on
to anything at all where there is a prospect of
agreement ?
You will recall that Mr. Bulganin, when head
of the Soviet state, said that the conference should
concentrate on matters as to which the known posi-
tions of the states indicated a likelihood of agree-
ment. There isn't yet a sufficient exploration to
indicate what, if any, matters might lend them-
selves to agreement, given the "known position"
of the states. I think there needs to be a further
° See p. 728.
720
• Bulletin of Aug. 1, 1955, p. 171.
Department of State Bulletin
exploration of that matter before agreeing on
those items of the agenda where we would pre-
sumably try to reach at least a framework of an
agreement.
I doubt whether it is possible at a summit meet-
ing to reach a detailed agreement about many of
these matters. They are tremendously compli-
cated, particularly the subjects of armaments and
the like. But the outline of agreement — the basic
positions — could perhaps be agreed to in some
areas. I think that is a possibility which we need
to explore because, as President Eisenhower said,
if all that is going to happen at the summit meet-
ing is that they sit around the table and glare at
each other, that would not be a profitable
operation.
Q. Mr. Secretary, isn't what you are descrihing
the same kind of summit tneeting toe had the last
time with the icehreaking meeting at the summit
followed 6y, / 'presume, the foreign ministers''
meeting to fill in this outline you describe?
A. Well, that would involve a considerable
change in what now seems to be the agreed con-
cept of such a meeting. The last summit meeting
started out with an invitation from the three
Western powers to meet, and they said it would
not be expected that at that meeting any agree-
ments would be reached but that they might agree
upon topics as to which they would instruct their
foreign ministers to try to reach an agreement.
Now, the Soviet proposal for a summit meet-
ing is that the meeting should concentrate on mat-
ters as to which the known positions of the states
indicate a likelihood of agreement at the summit
meeting. In other words, whereas the first sum-
mit meeting did not purport to be a meeting to
reach any agreement at all, but only to agi'ee on
areas which might be usefully explored, now the
matter has been reversed making necessary some
preparatory work. And, indeed, you have been
having a measure of preparatory work in the ex-
changes of diplomatic notes that have been taking
place and the exchange of letters between the
Heads of Governments. But in further prepara-
tory work we should try to discover whether or
not there are important matters as to which the
known positions of the states indicate a likelihood
of agreement at the summit meeting.
Q. Mr. Secretary, if you had to make hook on
this summit meeting now, with the iasehall season
and the racing season on us, what would you say
are the chances of its taking place?
A. Well, I wouldn't want to publicly admit
that I am a gambler. (Laughter)
Q. Mr. Secretary, in very real terms donH your
remarks add up more or less to the following as
being our position: that we do not want and don't
thi7ik that toe should have a summit meeting with-
out proper preparation, hut that we donH see any
real way to stop having it on terms that we donH
like?
A. No, I don't think that what I have said adds
up to that. I hope not.
Q. Mr. Secretary, are you satisfied with this
question of the summit conference and other as-
pects of foreign policy — are you satisfied with the
degree of understanding and support you are get-
ting from the Senate today?
A. It seems to me that there is a very under-
standing attitude on the part of Congress with
respect to this summit meeting. We have tried
to keep in touch with each other. I am having a
meeting this afternoon with the chairman and a
subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee
to discuss this matter further. But I think that
there is a very considerable degree of under-
standing of, agreement with, and support for the
position that we have been taking on this matter.
Q. Mr. Secretary, earlier you were asked, if the
Soviets refused to enter into substantive discus-
sions at a lower level, would the United States de-
cline to go into a summit meeting, and you said
you couldn't answer categorically. Now, sir, do
you think it is possible to have lower-level meet-
ings vihich do not go into substance and yet make
an adequate preparation for a summit meeting?
A. Well, I think that it is possible to have ex-
ploratory talks which would throw light at least
upon whether or not it is likely that an agreement
could be reached on some aspects of the so-called
question. That could be done without necessarily
getting into the details of such an agreement. A
good deal in these matters depends upon the at-
titude, the approach, the temper of the Soviet
Union. Clues can be obtained as to its probable
attitude without necessarily probing into all as-
pects and having the i's dotted and the t's crossed.
Q. Mr. Secretary, would it be necessary to ob-
tain a reply from Russia to the note which will go
May 5, J 958
forward later this week 'before the 'Western diplo-
mats sit down to any talks in Moscow?
A. Not as far as we are concerned. We have
been ready, are ready, and will remain ready to
talk at the diplomatic level. That is what we
have been trying to do. You might say we have
been ti-ying as far as this preparatory work is
concerned to get down from the summit and get
down to rock bottom where perhaps we can do
something more effective. This preparatory work
for the summit meeting started in exchanges of
letters between the Heads of Government. Then
it was carried on by the exchanges of notes be-
tween the foreign ministries. Now it may be get-
ting down to the diplomatic level, which is what I
have always argued for. And as we get down
from the summit, as far as the preparatory work
is concerned, I think that there is more chance of
doing some useful preparatory work. So we
stand ready at all times to talk about this business
at the diplomatic level.
Q. Mr. Secretary, are not the Russians likely to
point to the hogging down of this preparatory
work and say that this proves the futility of talk-
ing on a lower level and that these matters can
therefore he solved only at the summit?
A. Well, we haven't started talking on this level
yet; so it is a little premature to say that it is
futile.
Q. Mr. Secretary, on what topic is Amhassador
Thompson and his two colleagues in Moscow—
on what topics are they prepared to discuss in a
preparatory nature? Are you thinking of dis-
armament, Germany, Eastern Europe, the Middle
East, or what?
A. The President in his January letter to Chair-
man Bulganin ^ indicated a number of topics which
the President put forward as possible topics for
discussion. That letter had been submitted to and
approved by NATO before it was sent. So tliat
that probably constitutes at least a preliminary
indication of the position we would take so far
as the preparation of an agenda is concerned.
Middle East
Q. Mr. Secretary, how do you view the growing
unrest in the Middle East? I am refernng pai^-
' ma., Jan. 27, 1958, p. 122.
722
ticuZarly to the reports of threat of civil war in
Lehanon, demonstrations in Gaza against King
Hussein, and what I consider intensified name-
calling from. Cairo against those nations not join-
ing in the United Arab Republic?
A. Well, it is difficult to evaluate those particu-
lar instances you refer to, and indeed I have no
evaluation of them. They only happened within
the last 24 hours. But when you speak about grow-
ing unrest, I am afraid that is a little of an
exaggeration, because there has been quite a con-
siderable amount of unrest in that area for some
little time now.
Q. I said '■'■intensified.''''
A. I am not sure it is intensified over what it
has been.
Latin America
Q. Mr. Secretary, a number of Latin Ameri-
can diplomats have expressed disappointment that
you did not take advantage of your speech at the
Pan American Union yesterday * to make a ma-
jor pronouncement of our intentions toioard that
area. In fact, they believe that it would have
given us a decided psychological advantage in
the Tnounting contest to win Latin America's
friendship by the Soviet Union. I wonder if you
would care to comment on tlmt?
A. I think that in my speech yesterday I broke
a considerable amount of new ground in relation
to the handling of economic problems which con-
cern this hemisphere — the United States and the
other American Republics. I think that that
speech deserves to be rather carefully evaluated
in that respect, because it does mark a consider-
able advance over what has been our position in
many of these respects heretofore. Now you can-
not come out unilaterally with some detailed pro-
gram which involves other countries. Undoubt-
edly there has got to be quite a lot of work to be
done if it is to be possible to implement the gen-
eral concepts that I referred to. I talked about
consultation, which is something that we have
been rather hesitant to do in the past. I am not
just referring to the recent past, indeed, to the
long past. I referred to a desire to share the
burdens of any recession fairly and not tiy to
impose them just upon weaker countries. The
For text, see p. 715.
Department of State Bulletin
general principles that I enunciated there are of
extreme importance and I think will bear fruit.
All the fruit isn't borne when the tree is planted.
Q. Mr. Secretary, do you have any information
hearing on Soviet efforts, if any, to launch a third
earth satellite and lohy no such satellite has been
launched up to now?
A. No. I have no firm information about that,
only speculation. I think it is fair to conclude
that they have had some difSculties, perhaps, or
else they would have launched another satellite
before now. But that is largely in the area of
speculation — perhaps you might say, an educated
guess. But it is not supported by any firm evi-
dence that we have.
Q. Mr. Secretary, in your remarks on Latin
American economy, are they to he interpreted as
meaning that the United States has changed its
long-time position of allowing xoorld prices on
primary products to seek their own level in a free
market and that we are going to agree to some
form of world support not only for coffee hut for
tin, ruhher, and all the other products that are
depressed at this period?
A. I think that the action that we have taken
with respect to petroleum, which I spoke con-
cretely about yesterday, indicates a willingness
to have this problem handled in some kind of a
cooperative way, mutually acceptable to the pro-
ducers in this country, I hope, and also to pro-
ducers abroad.
Now each one of these situations has to be dealt
with on its own merits. You can deal with pe-
troleum in one way because there are a relatively
small number of importing companies to be
brought into a so-called "volimtary" program —
a voluntary program with a certain amount of
teeth in it. But each situation stands on its own
footing. We have, of course, an arrangement
about sugar. Well, that is possible because of
certain conditions which prevail in the sugar in-
dustry. I wouldn't say that there is any one pat-
tern which is applicable to all industries. Each
has to be studied by itself. But the general ap-
proach of trying to find a program which is fair
to all and which mitigates the grievous conse-
quences of a decline, that is something which we
are prepared to do. That perhaps is an advance
somewhat over our past policy.
May 5, J 958
Q. Mr. Secretary, can you say a review of the
United States policy toward the acquisition of
land on Okinawa is under way and, if so, how
far that may go? It has heen a suhject of great
concern to the Okinawans.
A. The High Commissioner announced, I think,
in his address of a few days ago that a review
was under way, and I confirm that such a review
is under way. It would be premature to indicate
what the result of that review will be, but the fact
that it is under review does indicate that we have
taken note of the fact that the present policy did
not seem to win complete favor among the
Okinawans.
Q. Mr. Secretary, on another point, there have
heen reports that one of the reasons that the Rus-
sians announced their nuclear han was because of
a nuclear accident or miscalculation. Do we have
any reason or any evidence ichatever which might
suggest that this is true?
A. I would doubt if that is the explanation.
U.S. Relations With Egypt
Q. Mr. Secretary, hack in the Middle East, sir,
there is a feeling in some diplomatic quarters that
we are seeing a few faint signs that perhaps our
relations toward Egypt are hack on the road to-
ward improvement. Do you detect any signs of
that, sir, and, if so, what are they?
A. I am told that there has been some modera-
tion of the tone of the press and radio of the
U. A. R. as regards the United States. That
would be a favorable sign, I would think.
Q. Mr. Secretary, on that point, it has heen
reported that this Government is seriously con-
sidering unfreezing the funds of the Egyptian
Government. Is that true?
A. No, it is not correct. On that particular
item, as you will recall, the reason for the freez-
ing was to have a fund which would protect Amer-
ican shipping companies from double jeopardy if
it should be held in the courts of this country that
they had improperly paid the Egyptian Canal
Authority whereas they should have paid the
Universal Suez Canal Company. There are law-
suits, I think, pending or in prospect, which raise
that issue. Therefore we took the position that to
protect our people against double jeopardy we
723
would want to keep a fund here available to pro-
tect them, unless and until it seemed that there
would be a direct settlement between the Uni-
versal Canal Company and the Egyptian
Government.
Now, a first meeting was held to try to bring
about such a settlement. The parties found them-
selves quite apart. A second meeting is to be held,
I think, in the quite near future. We hope, and
indeed have some reason to believe, that the posi-
tion of the parties will have by that time come
somewhat closer together. If it should seem that
an agreement is likely, we would then reconsider
our policy.
Q. Mr. Secretary., if you do not believe that we
are going to he pushed into a summit conference
against your will, could you not he more specific
in explaining what our minimum terms are? This
phrase ^''proper preparation''' covers an awful lot
of things.
A. I understand that. But I also ask you to
understand that in this matter we are not just
operating on our own. If we were operating on
our own, we would be able to make our position
quite clear, I think. But I believe and think that
almost everybody believes that it is worth while
to maintain our alliances, particularly, in this
matter, our NATO alliance. You cannot have an
alliance as between free nations if one nation is
just attempting to go on its own and dictate to
the others. Therefore, in this matter, which is of
deep concern to the governments of our allies in
Europe, we take some account of their views. We
do not attempt just to impose our views upon
them. And if I were to attempt here unilaterally,
just for the United States, to lay down a firm line
which we were going to take without regard to
what their views were, I think I would not be
faithful to the alliance and to the principles which
we agreed upon last December.
Last December we had this summit meeting
in NATO and we agreed there among ourselves
we would seek to avoid making statements or
taking public jjositions which were of concern to
others without prior consultation. We are trying
faithfully to live up to that, and I think we have
lived up to it faithfully. But, if I were here to
make the statement that you call for, that would
be a repudiation of what we agreed to last
December.
724
Ambassador Thompson's Instructions
Q. Mr. Secretary, in connection with the possi-
bility of an a7nbassadorial meeting looking toward
the ^''summit'''' in Moscow, is it desirable or neces-
sary to have Ambassador Thompson come home
for consultations with you before starting out?
A. I don't think it's necessary for him to come
back before starting out. I would think it would
probably be desirable, if the meetings get under
way and do get down to a discussion of some of
these matters which may come up for an agenda
proposal. At some stage it might be useful for
him to come back. But we don't think it would
be necessary for him to come back at least before
we take the initial step.
Q. I wonder, Mr. Secretary, if you could in-
dicate when the Western reply may go forward
to Moscow?
A. No, I can't indicate that with any definite-
ness. It's being worked on today. I can't fore-
see whether there will be agreement today, or
maybe tomorrow. I don't think that the obstacles,
the differences, between us are of any major char-
acter at all. We are all agreed as to the substance
of it. Indeed, the position is essentially a restate-
ment of what we said in the three-power declara-
tion made at Moscow previously. Each of the
governments has suggested a text. There are
naturally slight variations between those texts.
They are not matters of substance. They are
being ironed out. We may reach an agreement
I
11
iitte
idtl
hs m
calle
tht di
irslcu
pirpos
tkanges
signed,
today, maybe tomorrow, maybe the day after,
don't anticipate any long delay.
Q. Mr. Secretary, I hope you will forgive me
if I say Vm still not clear in my mind as to what
likely to happen in Moscow this week or nea
when the Ambassadors sit down luith Foreign
Minister Gromyko; and without wishing to go
into matters which have not yet been agreed upon
with our allies, I just wish to ask about some-
thing which we have presumably agreed in sub-
stance with our allies. I put this specific que8~
tion: When the Ambassadors meet in Moscow
with the Soviet Foreign Minister, if, as could be
assumed, Gromyko first raises the question of date
and preparations for a foreign ministers^ con-
ference and then for a summit conference, would
our Ambassador be authorized to discuss the prep-
arations for the sumvmit meeting before and unless
Department of State Bulletin
to, of.
pirjMse
really 3
Fort:
Ikt pn
into pii
seeiiijK
(liiiien-
'Bit
iliWei
ttetliei
Hireh-
««»S,
thirc has been some discussion of tlie matters of
substance tohich we wish to raise regarding an
agenda?
A. He has no present authority to do that and
would probably seek further instructions if the
matter should develop in that way.
Soviet Misuse of Diplomatic Machinery
(J. Mr. Secretary, there has been a great deal
of talk, and especially in the newspapers, that we
are not anywhere near keeping up xoith the power
and influence of Russian propaganda. The in-
ference of so-called nuclear testing, xoith people
trembling on the edge — do you think that would
presumably indicate that we should seek to im-
prove our own propaganda?
A. I think that we are becoming more effective
in this respect. I think it's important to bear in
mind that up until recent days the United States
has never thought, nor indeed have any of the
so-called civilized nations of the world thought,
that diplomatic commmiications were designed,
or should be designed, primarily for propaganda
purposes. We have always considered that these
exchanges, and indeed most conspicuously ex-
changes between heads of government, were de-
signed, generally on a highly confidential basis,
sincerely to achieve some practical result. So
you have a long tradition, not only of this coun-
try but of all of the countries which have shared
in the development of diplomacy and international
law, of carrying on diplomatic discussions not for
purposes of propaganda but for the purposes of
really achieving agreements.
For the first time that I know of in all history
that process has been debauched and prostituted
into purely an organ of propaganda. There
seems to be no desire whatever to use this ma-
chinery really to get to an agreement but merely
to use it for propaganda purposes. Now it takes
a little while to adjust our processes to meet that.
Whether we should meet it fully or not, I am not
entirely convinced. For I do believe that there
should be honesty and integrity in terms of these
diplomatic notes and exchanges if the nations of
the world are ever going to get along together. I
think that what has been going on here is most
dangerous from the standpoint of peace. It's
done, I know, in the name of peace. But when,
May 5, 1958
for the sake of a temporary propaganda advan-
tage, a nation uses the only way which nations
have of really exchanging views and getting to-
gether— uses that not for the purpose of really
getting together but only for propaganda pur-
poses, you're destroying one of the frail reeds
upon which the peace of the world often rests.
How far should we pursue that course? I'm
not entirely clear. I am clear on the fact that in
some way and in some manner we should find a
more effective way to meet this propaganda. And
I believe that we are going to be able to do it.
And I believe that in the long run the nations of
the world, including the neutrals, will listen more,
and pay more heed, to what we do and a little
less attention to just what is said.
I was talking here yesterday in this room to
this meeting of an international group of editors
[International Press Institute], and I recalled the
fact that Hitler in the thirties used to make the
most impassioned speeches about "peace." And
he persuaded many people in the world of his ded-
ication to peace. Now there are a good many
people, particularly in the newly developing coun-
tries, the newly independent countries, who are
just for the first time getting into the stream of
international affairs, who haven't had tlie oppor-
tunity to become mature in these matters, and
Soviet propaganda initially is having a kind of
a field day in those areas.
I don't think that this is anything permanent.
I think we can deal with it. But I don't know
whether we should deal with it by matching them
in terms of debauching, debasing, the means
whereby nations which have differences of a criti-
cal nature may perhaps resolve those differences.
If we destroy that process, we will have destroyed
something which is very vital to the world. And
I say that nations which profess to want peace,
and which in the process of making these profes-
sions destroy the mechanics by which peace is
historically preserved, may have to pay a heavy
price for what they are doing.
Q...Mr. Secretary, did you read Mr. Khru-
shchev^s 9,000-word letter to Lord Russell?
A. Yes, I read it.
Q. Did you read in it the fact that ifs filled
with more falsity and more nonsense and aimed
at infltiencing less developed nations than any-
thing that has come out in a long time?
725
A. Well, I would have been glad to say that
except I thought the publication probably would
not have published it if I had said it. But let
me say this : As I read that letter, the heart of it
was this: that there is no difference between
nations which have no moral standards and those
who have moral standards, because sometimes those
nations don't completely live up to their moral
standards. I say there is the biggest gulf that
you could think of between people who have stand-
ards, even though they deviate from them, and
those who do not even profess to have them.
Question of Spending for Propaganda Purposes
Q. Mr. Secretary, in testimony lefore Congress
recently — recent testimony before Congress — yoxi,
said tliat it was doubtful whether it was worth
while to investigate or put too much money and
time in getting to the moon second. Does that in-
clude that you imply the Russians would get to the
moon soon, first?
A. I believe that again there is a question of how
much you spend on what essentially has a propa-
ganda value or is done for propaganda purposes.
The money that it takes to do these things comes
out of the sweat and labor of people, and broadly
speaking we think people who sweat and labor
are entitled to get something back for it in terms
of a little better economic livelihood. To have
them do this merely for propaganda purposes is
a matter of some question.
I have referred here several times to the monu-
ments that were built in the past by the great
despots, the Pyramids of Egypt, the Colosseum
of Rome, the palaces of the French kings in France.
Those all had an impressive propaganda value.
But all of them were made of the sweat and labor
of people who were compelled to do this in order
to glorify their rulers. Now we don't want to get
into that kind of business. If and as it develops
that there may be scientific value in doing this
thing, I suppose we will do it — although this is
not primarily in my area, I may say. But I do
not think that, just because the Russians may be
doing it, we necessarily ought to do it. AVe must
not allow ourselves to be made over into the pat-
tern of the thing that we hate. There is always a
tendency to do that. There is always a danger
that you make yourselves over into the image of
the thing that you are fighting in order to fight it
better. We have to fight it some other way. But
that does not mean I'm against going to the moon.
(Laughter)
Q. Mr. Secretary, in your earlier statement on
propaganda and peacemaking, you use the words
'•'■debauched and prostituted'''' with respect to the
meaning of peaceful processes. And at a later point
you referred to Soviet propaganda. Are you say-
ing in this statement that it is the Soviet propa-
ganda techniques which have debauched and
prostituted the peacemaking processes?
A. I meant to say that, when you use what his-
torically had been the established means whereby
people communicate with each other for vital
purposes of trying to reach agreement and main-
taining a condition of peace, when you turn
those processes into instruments of propaganda, I
think you're doing a great harm to the real ma-
chinery whereby the world has historically en-
deavored, inadequately, to keep the peace. Time
after time those processes have served a very im-
portant, indeed a vital, purpose. And I hate to
see them converted just into instruments of propa-
ganda. Does that answer your question ?
Q. Well, Fm trying to get at what agency is
so converting them.
A. The Soviet Union is.
Q. Mr. Secretary, how do you explain the fact
that lue give aid to so many countries and in these
countries — /'m thinking now in terms of Lebanon,
which has always indicated friendship for the
West — that even there it appears that we are criti-
cized for actions that we take. Isn't there some-
thing in us and the way that we give aid that brings
forth these criticisms, or does the fault lie else-
where?
A. I think that the fault is found probably in
many causes. The fact that assistance is received
does not provide any immunity against criticism.
Indeed, sometimes perhaps it promotes criticism.
We don't give aid, as I have often said, merely as
a means of buying gratitude. Gratitude is not
obtained in that way. Nor is that our purpose.
We give assistance and provide aid to enable coun-
tries to maintain their independence. If they
maintain their independence, that is what we want.
If they use their independence to criticize us, that
is their right.
Q. Thank you, sir.
Department of Sfafe Bulletin
U.S., U.K., and France Ready
To Begin Talks at Moscow
THREE-POWER STATEMENT OF APRIL 16
Press release 195 dated April 16
Following is the text of an identical statement
presented to the Soviet Gover-nment on April 16
by the British, French, and United States Ain-
hassadors at Moscoxo, in reply to the Soviet aide
memoir e of April 11, 1958.
The United States, British and French Gov-
ernments have studied the Aide Memoire com-
municated to their Ambassadors in Moscow on
April 11. They note that the Soviet Government
has accepted their proposal that the preparatory
work for a Summit meeting could best be per-
formed by exchanges through diplomatic chan-
nels leading to a meeting between Foreign Minis-
ters. They also note that the Soviet Government
agi'ees that these exchanges should begin in Mos-
cow as soon as possible. The "Western Powers
for their part will be ready to begin on April 17.
It is clear from the Soviet Government's Aide
Memoire that there are still substantial differ-
ences of opinion between the Soviet Government
and the Western Governments as to the precise
character and scope of the preparatory work.
In the first place, our Foreign Ministers can-
not absent themselves from their countries for a
prolonged period. Thus, it is essential that the
diplomatic talks in Moscow should be concerned
not only with plans for a meeting of Foreign Min-
isters but with examining the positions of the vari-
ous governments on the major questions at issue
between them and with carrying on discussions de-
signed to bring out the possibilities of agreement
on them. Even if such diplomatic talks do not
result in complete agreement they would greatly
facilitate the task of the Foreign Ministers.
As regards a Summit meeting the Western Gov-
ernments hold the view that such a meeting will
not be fruitful unless the ground has been thor-
oughly prepared in advance and it is clear from
this preparatory work that there is broad agree-
ment on the nature and order of the agenda, and
a real desire among all who participate in the
meeting to make practical progress towards a
settlement of the differences between us. There
must be reasonable prospect of achieving concrete
results on specific issues. Satisfactory completion
of the preparatory work must therefore precede
arrangements for such a meeting.
Tliis approach is in consonance with the state-
ment made by the Head of the Soviet Govern-
ment on February 1, 1958 ^ that a Summit meeting
should be "concentrated on the most urgent prob-
lems, with regard to which the known positions
of states provide a certain degree of assurance as
to their positive solution at this time." Up to
the present, the exchange of views on this matter
has been conducted solely through published cor-
respondence and has not yet established any de-
gree of assurance that agreement on urgent prob-
lems could be reached. Thus, there is plainly need
for preparatory work beyond mere matters of
organization.
It is the view of the Western Governments that
the differences of opinion mentioned above should
be the first subject of discussion between the
Soviet Government and the Western Ambassa-
dors in Moscow. Such discussion may be more
likely to lead to agreement than a furtlier ex-
change of public commmiications. That is our
hope.
The Western Ambassadors will, for this pur-
pose, make themselves available to the Soviet
Ministry of Foreign Affairs on April 17.
WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT OF APRIL 11
White House press release dated April 11
The United States has received at Moscow a
reply to the declaration which the United States
made on March 31st ^ in conjunction with the Gov-
ernments of France and the United Kingdom with
reference to preparatory work through diplomatic
channels to determine whether a summit meeting
would serve a useful purpose.
The Soviet reply is manifestly not an acce^jtance
to this Western proposal. It proposes that the dip-
lomatic preparatory work shall not deal at all with
a summit meeting but only with the time, place,
and composition of a subsequent meeting of for-
eign ministers.
The implications of the note will of course be
carefully studied.
Bulletin of Mar. 10, 1958, p. 376.
IMd., Apr. 21, 1958, p. 648.
Moy 5, 7958
SOVIET AIDE MEMOIRE OF APRIL 11
The Government of the Soviet Union has examined
with all attention the joint statement of the Governments
of the United States of America, Great Britain, and
France of Mar. 31, made in connection with the Soviet
Government's proposal regarding the speeding up of
preparations for a summit conference, contained in the
Soviet Government's aide memoire of Mar. 24, 1958."
The Soviet Government notes that although the gov-
ernments of the three powers also state that the present
day international situation demands the making of serious
efforts with a view to reaching agreement on the funda-
mental international problems and the consolidation of
general peace, and that it renders desirable the convoca-
tion of a high level conference, they, in essence, avoid
replying to the Soviet Union's concrete proposals about
the convocation of such a conference made as far back as
December 1957.'
As was pointed out in the Soviet Government's aide
memoires of Feb. 28^ and Mar. 24, 1958, the main task
at present is the speediest completion of preparatory work
for a summit conference. The Soviet Government deems
it necessary to organize a meeting of ministers of foreign
affairs in April in order to carry out this work.
It is with regret that one is forced to admit that the
governments of the three powers are causing delays over
the talks to prepare a high level conference.
With a view to the speediest completion of preparatory
work regarding the convocation of the summit conference
the Soviet Government deems it necessary at present to
reach agreement on, first of all, the question of holding
the meeting of ministers of foreign affairs not later than
the end of April or the middle of May 1958. In this con-
nection it is borne in mind that all preparatory work
through diplomatic channels must be completed by that
time. For this reason, the Soviet Government deems it
expedient to restrict the exchange of views through diplo-
matic channels to a minimum of questions relating di-
rectly to the organization of a meeting of ministers of
foreign affairs, that is, questions of the date and place
of the ministers meeting and the composition of its
participants.
Striving for a most rapid completion of preparatory
work for the summit conference, the Soviet Union, as is
known, long ago submitted for consideration by the
Governments of the United States, Great Britain, and
Prance, its proposals on the question of a summit con-
ference agenda, the composition of its participants, and
the place and date of holding it. The Soviet Government
expects that the Governments of the United States, Great
Britain, and France will give in the near future a definite
reply to these concrete proposals.
As regards the meeting of ministers of foreign affairs,
these ministers — in the opinion of the Soviet Govern-
ment— must reach agreement on the question of date,
venue, and composition of a high level conference, and
'Ibid., p. 652.
' Ibid., Jan. 27, 1958, p. 127.
■/6i(?., Mar. 24, 1958, p. 459.
determining the range of questions which will be con-
sidered at the conference.
In this connection it is not excluded that while attend-
ing to preparations for the high level conference, the
ministers may if necessary and if generally agreed, ex-
change opinions on certain of the problems proposed by
the parties for inclusion in the agenda of the summit con-
ference, for the purpose of determining whether it is
expedient to include a given question in the summit con-
ference agenda.
It is self-evident that the question of the convocation
of a high level conference cannot be linked with the re-
sults of the meeting of ministers of foreign affairs. The
Soviet Government bases itself on the argument that all
parties to the meeting will strive to achieve positive re-
sults. The Soviet Government, on its part, will do every-
thing possible for this aim to be achieved. However, if
the ministers are unable to reach the necessary agreement
on questions of preparations for a summit conference, this
would not signify in any way that the necessity of having
such a conference has become less pressing.
The present tense international situation demands the
speedy settlement of ripe international problems ; in these
conditions it would be incorrect to make the convocation
of a high level conference depend on the results of a
meeting of ministers of foreign affairs. It is perfectly
obvious that difficulties which may appear during the
ministers conference can and must be overcome at a con-
ference of statesmen invested with wider powers.
Guided by the aforesaid, the Soviet Government ex-
presses readiness to begin in Moscow on Apr. 17 the ex-
change of views about preparations for a meeting of minis-
ters of foreign affairs.
U.S. Denies Soviet Charge
of Provocative Flights in Polar Region
On April 18 Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei
A. Gromyko charged in a nexos conference that
U.S. nuclear-armed bombers had made ^'■provoca-
tive'^ flights across the Arctic toward the Soviet
Union. Following is the text of a Department
statement read to news correspondents on the same
day by Joseph W. Reap., acting chief of the News
Division.
It is categorically denied that the U.S. Air
Force is conducting provocative flights over the
Polar regions or in the vicinity of the U.S.S.R.
Mr. Gromyko's charges appear to be an attempt
to raise fears of mankind in tlie nuclear age.
"WHiat we do is public knowledge; what happens
behind the Iron Curtain menacing to the free
world is carefully hidden by the Soviets. We will
be glad to discuss this question in the United
Nations, as we are always willing to discuss there
Department of State Bulletin
any charge made against us. The United States
is ready and willing to work with all nations of
the world to reduce tensions and particularly the
fear of sudden surprise attacli. The U.S. pro-
posals for increasing protection against surprise
attack have had as their aim not merely protec-
tion of one side against the other, but also have
been designed to give each side knowledge of the
activity of the other so as to reduce fears and
misjudgments. Until these fears are banished,
the United States must take all steps necessary to
protect the free world from being overwhelmed by
a surprise attack.
The Strategic Air Command is the mainstay of
the free world's deterrent position. It has been
successful in accomplishing this mission for the
past decade. It can only accomplish its mission
of deterrence in the future if it is well known that
it is so trained, so equipped, and so situated that
it cannot be surprised and destroyed on the ground
by an enemy. Therefore, it has in the past, and
will continue in the future, to maintain its high
state of efficiency through constant practice. All
these training exercises, however, are designed to
maintain the force within areas which by no
stretch of the unagination could be considered
provocative to the U.S.S.K. So far the SAC force
has never been launched except in carefully
planned and controlled exercises and practices.
Should there be a real alert, based on a warning
of a possible attack, the force would be launched
under a procedure which makes certain that no
SAC airplane can pass beyond proper bounds
far from the Soviet Union or its satellites without
additional unequivocal orders which can come
only from the President of the United States.
The procedures are in no sense provocative and
could not possibly be the accidental cause of war.
U.S. Policy Regarding Algeria
Remains Unchanged
FoUovnng is n Defartrmemt statement read to
nev's eorrespondents on April 18 by Stuart Lillico,
■press officer.
In view of the fact that the status of the good-
offices mission ' i? now in suspense, it would be
inappropriate for the United States to make any
comments with regard to the French-Tunisian
dispute at this time.
The Acting Secretary [Mr. Herter] informed
the French Ambassador [Herve Alphand] this
morning that press speculation to the effect that
there has been a basic change of United States
policy with respect to Algeria is without founda-
tion. As the United States Government has long
made it known, the United States is greatly con-
cerned by the Algerian conflict and attaches the
highest importance to the need for a peaceful,
democratic, and just solution. It has always been
the hope of the United States Government, and
still is, that France itself will be able to work
out such a solution, which is of great interest to
all of the countries of the free world.
NATO Defense Ministers
Conclude Discussions
Following is the text of a final commimique re-
leased at Paris on April 17 at the conclusion of the
NATO Defense Ministers^ conference
In accordance with the decision taken at the
Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council
held at the level of Heads of Government on 19th
December last,^ the Defense Ministers of the
NATO member countries met at the Palais de
Chaillot, under the Chairmanship of the Secre-
tary General, Monsieur P. H. Spaak, on 15th, 16th
and 17th April, 1958.
2. The Ministers heard full and valuable reports
by the Military Committee, the Standing Group
and the Supreme Allied Commanders on the
present state of the forces of the Alliance, on the
progressive introduction of the most modern
weapons and equipment and on the forces needed
for NATO defense in the years ahead. They also
heard progress reports on projects initiated by the
Heads of Government in December. On the basis
of these reports a most useful discussion took place
between the Ministers and the NATO military
authorities.
3. In order to meet the continuing efforts made by
the Soviet leaders to equip their large forces with
For h.Tfkeround, see Bulletin of Mar. 10. 1958, p. 372.
Bulletin of Jan. 6, 1958, p. 3.
Aloy 5, r958
462884—58 3
729
the most modern weapons the Ministers discussed
ways and means of making the best of the resources
of the Alliance and of achieving greater effective-
ness for its forces. They confirmed their support
of the basic NATO strategy for the preservation
of peace and for the defense of member countries.
This defensive strategy continues to be founded
on the concept of a strong deterrent, comprising
the shield, with its conventional and nuclear ele-
ments, and the nuclear retaliatory forces.
4. The JNIinisters also were in agreement on certain
measures to achieve greater co-ordination and to
widen co-operation among member countries, both
with respect to defense research, development and
production and to the organization of forces.
5. The Ministers are confident after these discus-
sions, which confirmed their unity and common
purpose, that the progressive modernization of
NATO forces, on the basis of the agreed strategic
plans, will enable the Alliance to maintain its de-
fensive strength while efforts continue to be made
to re-establish international confidence through ef-
fective, controlled disarmament.
Secretary Dulles To Visit Berlin
After NATO Ministerial Meeting
Press release 197 dated April 16
The Department of State announced on April
16 that the Secretary of State will visit Berlin
briefly at the conclusion of the NATO Ministerial
Meeting at Copenhagen.
The Secretary expects to arrive at Berlin in
the late morning of May 8. He will be the guest
of honor at a lunch given by the Governing Mayor
of Berlin, Willy Brandt. Late in the afternoon
of May 8 he expects to leave Berlin for Paris, where
he will attend a meeting of the U.S. ambassadors
in Europe.
Senator Case To Represent U.S.
at Berlin Congress Hall Ceremonies
The Department of State announced on April 19
(press release 203 dated April 18) that Senator
Clifford Case will represent the United States at
Berlin on April 26 at the ceremonies passing title
730
to the Berlin Senat of the Benjamin Franklin Con-
gress Hall, built for the 1957 International Build-
ing Exposition.
At the ceremonies President Heuss will deliver
the principal speech for the Federal Republic of
Germany. Presiding over the ceremonies will be
Ralph Walker, chairman of the Benjamin Frank-
lin Foundation and former president of the Ameri-
can Institute of Architects, who was named in 1957
by the AIA as "Architect of the Century." Mr.
Walker will present the key to the Congress Hall
to Mayor Willy Brandt to conclude the ceremonies.
The Benjamin Franklin Foundation was created
in 1955 in Berlin to act as the agent for the U.S.
Government, the Federal Republic of Germany,
and the Berlin Senat to design and construct a
Congress Hall dedicated to the freedom of speech.
The building was opened in September 1957 dur-
ing the International Building Exposition and was
especially dedicated to Benjamin Franklin with
his quotation :
. . . God grant that not only the love of liberty, but a
thorough knowledge of the rights of men, may pervade
all the nations of the earth, so that a philosopher may
set his foot anywhere on its surface, and say. This is
my country.
The building itself, designed by American archi-
tect Hugh Stubbins, has already become one of
the landmarks of Berlin. Characterized by its
soaring roof, it includes an auditorium seating
1,200 people, a modern theater, indoor and outdoor
restaurants, and multilingual facilities for simul-
taneous translation.
Letters of Credence
Aiistria
The newly appointed Ambassador of Austria,
Wilfried Platzer, presented his credentials to
President Eisenliower on April 18. For texts of
the Ambassador's remarks and the President's
reply, see Department of State press release 201.
Cuba
The newly appointed Ambassador of Cuba,
Nicolas Arroyo y Marquez, presented his creden-
tials to President Eisenhower on April 16. For
texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the Presi-
dent's reply, see Department of State press release
194.
Department of State Bulletin
International Trade and Our National Security
hy Under Secretary Eerter '
President Eisenhower and Mr. Dulles asked me
to tell you of their keen interest in this great civic
enterprise. The benefits of a fair such as this ex-
tend throughout the United States. In the most
practical way possible, you are demonstrating the
interdependence of nations. Our foreign policy
is based on the belief that no nation is an island
unto itself and, in bringing nations and peoples
and goods closer together, you are furthering the
aims of this Government.
Trade fairs hark back to ancient days. There
is a Biblical reference in the Book of Esther to a
fair lasting 180 days conducted by Xerxes, King of
the Persians, for the purpose of displaying "the
riches of his kingdom." This was 500 B.C.
Through the ages, trade fairs played an important
role in establishing many of the important trading
centers of Europe — Frankfort, Leipzig, Lyon,
Brussels. They became crossroads of traffic in the
very same sense that this great city of Seattle is
a "gateway to the Orient."
We can trace the history of fairs from medieval
times through the Middle Ages down to the pres-
ent— from stalls and booths and bazaars and shows
to the great industrial exhibitions of today. But
there is an essential difference between fail's today
and in olden times.
This is a geographical difference. In Europe
distances between countries like Belgium or Hol-
land or, for that matter, almost any country in
western or central Europe are comparatively
short. Because of the difficulties of transportation
and the small area and population of each coun-
try, the producers of goods a few hundred
1 Address made before the Seventh Annual Washington
State International Trade Fair at Seattle, Wash., on Apr.
11 (press release 183 dated Apr. 9).
May 5, 7958
years ago had to rely on outlets in neighboring
countries.
The mid-20th century has changed aU this. The
world is the market for the man with the better
mousetrap. You can fly that mousetrap from
Bangkok to Seattle in 44 hours.
This is a mixed blessing. In less than 44 hours
a military plane carrying an atomic or hydrogen
bomb can also deliver its cargo to any city in the
world. This, together with the threat of ballistic
missiles, makes it all too evident that the United
States is no longer protected by its Atlantic and
Pacific Oceans. From a space-age viewpoint,
Moscow is just about as close as your nearest
shopping center.
Now, the foreign policy of the United States
reflects this fundamental fact — and that is that
the security and prosperity of this Nation cannot
be separated from that of other nations.
Communist Strategy
We live in a troubled world, but we have no
trouble in locating the threat to our peace and
security. The threat is international commimism.
The threat is not new. It is as old as communism
itself. Thirty-five years ago, Lenin said :
First we will take Eastern Europe, next the masses of
Asia, and finally we will encircle the last bastion of
capitalism— the United States. We shall not have to
attack it; it will fall like overripe fruit Into our hands.
Now that is very specific and very direct; and I
don't think I need to point out to this audience
that communism has accomplished the first step.
What the mapmakers called Eastern Europe 20
years ago is behind the Iron Curtain.
This Lenin statement is Communist doctrine.
It charts the strategy, and it has been like a polar
731
star to the succession of rulers in the Kremlin.
World domination was and is the goal.
While attempting to lull the free world into a
sense of false security, the Sino-Soviet bloc has
developed the largest standing army in the liis-
tory of the world. They have built a submarine
fleet more than three times larger than our own.
And they back up this army and navy with an
array of tactical and intermediate missiles. Wliile
protesting their peaceful intentions, they work
night and day to develop the so-called ultimate
weapon— the intercontinental ballistic missile.
This is the military threat of communism. It
is not dreamed up by any alarmist. It exists to-
day— now — and it is very, very formidable.
In view of the record of international com-
munism, a record filled with treacliery and broken
promises, simple prudence would dictate that the
United States and the rest of the free world
counter this threat. This we have done and will
continue to do. Briefly, I would like to tell you
how.
First, we have strengthened, modernized, and
streamlined our own military establishment. The
more than 2,600,000 men and women in the Army,
Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force are equipped
with the latest nuclear weapons, atomic subma-
rines, guided-missile ships, fighters, bombers, and
ballistic missiles. This combined force, dis-
persed, ready for action, and capable of instant re-
taliation, is a mighty deterrent to any would-be
aggressor.
The Mutual Security Program, a Shield of Additional
Strength
But we have not stopped here. Under the mu-
tual security program we have built a shield of
additional strength to protect the free nations of
the world.
Using our basic theory of the interdependence
of nations, we have established military alliances
with 42 nations of the free world. We have bi-
lateral treaties with Korea, free China, Japan, and
the Philippines and multilateral agreements
through the Organization of American States, the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, and the
Australia-New Zealand-United States treaty
called ANZUS.
During the past 7 years we have contributed
$20 billion in mutual defense assistance to our
free-world allies. But during this same period of
time our partners in these defensive alliances have
contributed $122 billion to develop the strength
of the free world. In addition to helping us with
manpower problems tiiat would greatly weaken
our economy if we had to go it alone, our allies
have provided more than 250 major overseas bases.
This massive defensive strength has brought to
a halt outright armed aggression by the forces of
international communism. The weapons of bully-
ing and bullets have been put in the skeleton
closet — probably the largest skeleton closet in all
history.
Soviet Economic Offensive
Communism is now probing in another di-
rection with new weapons. I am talking about
the new Soviet economic offensive.^ Instead of
bombast and bluster, the Communists now talk
softly. They coax and use blandishments. Listen
to this statement by a Eussian delegate at the re-
cent Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference
in Cairo :
We do not seek to get any advantages We are ready
to help you as brother helps brother, without any Interest
whatever, for we know from our own experience how
difficult it is to get rid of need.
I think the martyrs of Hungary and Poland
and Czechoslovakia and Rumania and Latvia and
Estonia and Lithuania and Bulgaria bear silent
witness to the tragedy of believing that "brother
act." Getting rid of the Communists is harder
than getting rid of need.
The sometimes voluble Khrushchev let slip the
real intention of the economic offensive of the
Soviet Union when he told a group of Congress-
men who interviewed him : "We value trade least
for economic reasons and most for political pur-
poses."
But, unbelievable as it may seem, nations which
have waited centuries for independence are edg-
ing perilously close to the spider's web. With
long-term loans at low interest rates, the Soviet
bloc has doubled its trade with the less developed
nations in 3 years from $840 million in 1954 to
about $1.7 billion in 1957; and the number of
trade agreements in this 3-year period has leaped
-For a statement by Deputy Under Secretary Dillon
on Soviet-bloc economic activities in less developed coun-
tries, see BuixETiN of Mar. 24, 1958, p. 469.
732
Department of State Bulletin
from 49 to 147. The ink is scarcely dry on these
agreements before the first planeload of Soviet
technicians arrives to begin the job of veering the
country toward communism.
President Eisenhower, in a message to Con-
gress,' made it clear how we as Americans must
regard this new threat. This is what the Presi-
dent said :
If the purpose of Soviet aid to any country were simply
to help it overcome economic difficulties without Infring-
ing its freedom, such aid could be welcomed as forwarding
the free world purpose of economic growth. But there
is nothing in the history of international communism to
indicate this can be the case. Until such evidence is
forthcoming, we and other free nations must assume that
Soviet bloc aid is a new, subtle, and long-runge Instrument
directed toward the same old purpose of drawing its re-
cipient away from the community of free nations and ulti-
mately into the Communist orbit.
Now, the greatest mistake we could make would
be to assume that this Soviet economic offensive is
something that will pass in the night, that it is a
"flash in the pan," that it will peter out. It is
being pursued with the same determination, the
same ruthlessness, the same disregard for the truth,
and with the same tenacity that the Soviet Union
has demonstrated in its military buildup.
The mutual security program is a counter to this
threat, too. We are working with the less de-
veloped nations to help them find their "place in
the sun." Most of these nations need higher levels
of health, education, and sanitation. They need to
learn new methods of agriculture, of irrigation,
of conservation. They need nurses, doctors,
teachers, engineers, administrators. Through our
teclmical cooperation program we are helping in
all of these areas.
Development Loan Fund
We are not trying to prime the pump of these
underdeveloped countries. We are helping them
to get the basic industry — the pump itself — for
them to prime. Most of tlaese developing coun-
tries do not yet have the basic facilities to attract
private risk capital. They lack good harbors,
port facilities, roads, communications, power, rail-
ways. To help fill the vacuum we established late
last year the Development Loan Fund as a part of
the mutual security program.
The Development Loan Fund lends money for
specific, economically sound, and teclinically fea-
sible projects. It does not extend credit when
other financing is available on reasonable terms.
It concentrates on long-range, economic-growth
projects. Applications for nearly $2 billion in
such projects are now being carefully screened.
Only $300 million was appropriated last year, and
$625 million has been requested for this year.
There are strong moral and humanitarian rea-
sons for this effort to help hundreds of millions
of people rid themselves of dirt, disease, and des-
pair, but there are strong reasons from an eco-
nomic, self-interest standpoint too. This one-third
of the world's population constitutes a tremendous
potential market for the goods of America, the
world's largest trading nation.
Let me say a few words about world trade and
America's relation to it. I am a Yankee from
Massachusetts. From my State about a century
ago, clipper ships set sail on voyages round the
world. Those beautiful clipper ships helped to
build not only Massachusetts but the entire United
States of America. Today America is the world's
largest exporter and the world's largest importer.
Our two-way trade in 1957 reached the staggering
total of $32 billion, an all-time high in any
nation's history.
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Program
This world record was accomplished within the
framework of the reciprocal trade agreements
program. Twenty-five years ago, Cordell Hull,
a great American, established this program. It
has become Imown as a symbol of international
trade cooperation. The reciprocal trade agree-
ments program has been renewed by Congress 10
times, and it is before Congress for renewal now.
The President of the United States has requested
that it be renewed again, this time for 5 years.*
Strong voices are being raised against the pro-
gram by those who think, rightly or wrongly, that
the trade agreements program is injurious to their
particular industry. Less than a month ago about
1,300 leaders from all walks of life and from all
sections of the country gathered. in Washington
^Ihid., Mar. 10, 1958, p. 367.
May 5, 1958
'Ibid., Feb. 17, 1958, p. 263; for statements by Secre-
tary of Commerce Sinclair Weeks, Secretary Dulles, and
Deputy Under Secretary Dillon, see ibid.. Mar. 17, 1958,
p. 432, and Apr. 14, 1958, p. 626.
733
to voice their support of the reciprocal trade
agreements program.^ Theirs was the "grass
roots" voice of America, but whetlier it will con-
tinue to be heard over the daily cries of the self-
interest groups remains to be seen.
Here is an example of the situation we face.
In the month of February 114 textile concerns in
Japan went bankrupt. Now, my own State of
Massachusetts is one of the leading textile States
in the Nation. We have unemployment in the
textile industry in Massachusetts at the present
time, and all of us naturally have a greater con-
cern for the problems of our own citizens than for
those of our friends overseas.
But let's just consider this fact : Japan is Amer-
ica's second best customer for the products of
our farms and factories. Last year it was better
than a billion-dollar customer, but its trade deficit
with the United States was $624 million. The
effect of Japan's purchases is felt in every corner
of the U.S.A. And when you have a billion-
dollar-a-year customer who shows signs of ailing,
it's time to call the doctor and get a good diag-
nosis.
^Vliat's wrong is obvious. Japan needs desper-
ately gi-eater access to the American market.
Japan is the most industrialized nation in Asia.
They are a dependable ally. Faced with 90 mil-
lion people to support in an area smaller than
California, and with few natural resources of her
own, Japan must trade to live. If the West closes
the trade door in Japan's face, Japan must turn
to the Communist bloc.
Tliis situation illustrates vividly the interre-
lationship between international trade and secu-
rity. We cannot have strong partners in our
free-world alliance unless we give them a chance
to build strong economies through trade.
This is the problem — how to safeguard the Na-
tion's defense through effective alliances while
adequately protecting American business interests.
There is no perfect way to accomplish both ob-
jectives. However, I believe that the reciprocal
trade agreements program, with its built-in pro-
tections, is the most practical way.
If we do not make it possible for the nations of
the free world to trade with us, they have no
' For an address made at the conference b.v President
Eisenhower and remarks by Secretary Dulles and Mr.
Dillon, see ibid., Apr. 14, 1958, p. 591.
alternative but to trade with the Soviet Union.
As a supporter of this program has so aptly said,
"This is the cold algebra of sense and reason."
Klirushchev is confident that our democratic sys-
tem will force the nations of the free world into
his hands. Last November he said :
The threat to the United States is not the ICBM, but
in the field of peaceful production. We are relentless in
this, and it will prove the superiority of our system.
Tliis is a warning to be heeded. What could
be greater folly than to push the nations of the
free world into the crushing embrace of the Rus-
sian bear?
This economic cold war will be won in the field
of trade. It will be won by dedicated men and
women like yourselves, working toward the com-
mon goal of national freedom and trade freedom.
I have unbounded faith in the outcome of this
struggle.
Reply of "Sixteen" to Chinese
Communist Statement on Korea
Following is a DeparPnient anTWuncement re-
garding a note transmitted to Chinese Communist
authorities on April 9 hy the United Kingdom
Government on behalf of the Governments of the
countries which have contributed forces to the
U.N. Command in Korea, together with a letter
of transmittal of April 10 from U.S. Representa-
tive Henry Cabot Lodge to the Secretary-General
of the United Nations and the text of the note.
DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT
Press release 182 dated April 9
The LTnited States Government, in consultation
with other governments which contributed forces
to the United Nations Command in Korea, has
given careful consideration to the Chinese Com-
munist statement of February 7^ transmitted
through the British Charge d'Affaires in Peiping.
This statement reiterated a north Korean state-
ment of February 5,^ concerning Korean tmifica-
tion, and made reference to the holding of elections
for that purpose.
Scalion i
In tie
lie estib
jemwrit
raited J
be ofo
toiditut
fladto!
stated til
' Not printed.
Department of Sfafe Bulletin
Upon concluding their consultations, the gov-
ernments concerned requested the British Govern-
ment to inform the Chinese Communist authorities
of their views, and of their interest in having clari-
fication of certain points in the Communists'
proposals.
In their consultations the governments con-
cerned reaffirmed that their aim in Korea is to see
the establishment of a unified, independent, and
democratic Korea, in accordance with relevant
United Nations resolutions.^ To this end, as they
have often stated, they wish to see free elections
held under United Nations supervision for the
constitution of a National Assembly. They were
glad to note that the Communist authorities have
stated that they also favor free elections, and they
■welcomed the announcement that Chinese Com-
munist forces are to be withdrawn from north
Korea.
There appears to the governments concerned,
however, to be some doubt as to the precise inter-
pretations to be placed on the Communist pro-
posals. A variety of statements is reported to
have been made, for example, by north Korean
representatives in Peiping and Moscow, to the
effect that the "purpose of supervision by a neutral
nations organization was to see that all political
parties and public figures in both north and south
Korea would have freedom of action, speech, pub-
lication, assembly, and association," but that "such
supervision should not intervene in the elections."
Since these interpretations appear to call for some
clarification, the governments concerned believe
that it would be useful to know whether, when the
north Koreans speak of a "neutral nations organi-
zation" to supervise the elections, they accept that
these should be held under United Nations aus-
pices and that there should be adequate supervision
not only of the preliminaries but also of the elec-
tions themselves. They would also be glad to
know whether it is accepted that representation
in the new National Assembly shall be in propor-
tion to the indigenous population.
The govermnents concerned have asked the
British Government, in informing the Chinese
Communist authorities of their views, to state that
'For statements made in the 12th session of the Gen-
eral Assembly by Representative Walter H. Judd and the
test of a U.N. resolution of Nov. 29, 1957, see Bulletin
of Dec. 16, 1957, p. 966.
if the Communists will provide clarification of the
points mentioned with such other details of the
proposals as may be relevant, they will be given
careful consideration.
A copy of the British Government's communi-
cation is being transmitted to the United Nations.
TRANSMITTAL TO UNITED NATIONS
U.S. /U.N. press release 2894 dated April 10
Ambassador Lodge's Letter
The Representative of the United States to the
United Nations presents his compliments to the
Secretary General of the United Nations and has
the honor to transmit on behalf of the United
States Government, in its capacity as the Unified
Command, a copy of the note which the United
Kingdom Government transmitted to the Chinese
Communist authorities, on April 9, 1958, on be-
half of the governments of the countries which
have contributed forces to the United Nations
Conunand in Korea. The note of the United
Kingdom Government was in reply to the Chinese
Communist statement issued in Peiping on Febru-
ary 7, 1968, which had been communicated to
these governments.
It is requested that this communication and
the attached copy of the note be circulated to all
members of the United Nations as a General As-
sembly document.
Text of Note
Her Majesty's Charg6 d'Affaires presents his compli-
ments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and, on instruc-
tions from Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs, has the honour to state that, as requested
by the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs on February 7,
the statement on Korea made on that date by the Govern-
ment of the People's Republic of China has been com-
municated to the Governments of the countries which
have contributed forces for the United Nations force in
Korea, who, after consultation, have requested Her
Majesty's Government to reply on their behalf.
The Governments of the countries which have con-
tributed forces for the United Nations force in Korea
have noted the statement made by the North Korean
authorities on February 5 and that made by the People's
Republic of China and communicated to Her Britannic
Majesty's Charge d'Affaires In Peking on February 7.
They have given careful study to these statements and
to the proposals made therein.
The Governments concerned reaflBrm that their aim in
Korea is to see the establishment of a unified. Independent
May 5, 7958
735
and democratic Korea, in accordance with relevant United
Nations resolutions. To this end, as they have often
stated, they wish to see free elections held under United
Nations supervision for the constitution of a National As-
sembly. They are glad to note that the North Korean
authorities and the People's Republic of China also favour
free elections and they welcome the announcement that
Chinese forces are to be withdrawn from North Korea.
There appears, however, to be some doubt as to the
precise interpretation to be placed on the North Korean
proposals. A variety of statements is reported to have
been made, for example, by North Korean representatives
in Peking and Moscow, to the effect that the "purpose of
supervision by a neutral nations organization was to see
that all political parties and public figures in both North
and South Korea would have freedom of action, speech,
publication, assembly and association" but that "such
supervision should not intervene in the elections". These
interpretations appear to call for some clarification and
the Governments of the countries concerned would be
glad to know whether, when the North Korean authori-
ties speak of a "neutral nations organization" to supervise
the elections, they accept that these should be held under
United Nations auspices and that there should be adequate
supervision not only of the preliminaries but also of the
elections them-selves. They would also be glad to know
whether it is accepte<l that representation in the new
National Assembly shall be in proportion to the indigenous
population.
If the People's Republic of China will seek from the
North Korean authorities clarification of the points men-
tioned above with such other details of the Korean
proposals as may be relevant, they will be given careful
consideration.
A copy of this reply is being transmitted to the United
Nations.
Sentences of Japanese Parolees
Reduced to Time Served
Press release 176 dated April 7
The U.S. Government and other governments
concerned, having considered recommendations of
the Japanese Government on a case-by-case basis
and in consultation with each other, have in-
formed the Japanese Government of their decision
to reduce to the time served as of April 7, 1958,
the life sentences imposed by the International
Military Tribunal for the Far East upon Sadao
Araki, Shunroku Plata, Naoki Hoshino, Okinori
Kaya, Koichi Kido, Takasumi Oka, Hiroshi
Oahima, Kenryo Sato, Shigetaro Shimada, and
Teiichi Suzuki. All of them had previously been
released from prison on parole.
The Japanese Government had made recom-
mendations, in accordance with the provisions of
article 11 of the treaty of peace with Japan signed
at San Francisco on September 8, 1951,^ based on
the good behavior of the parolees during their
confinement and while on parole, and based also
on the fact that all of them are now of advanced ^ !
Impact of Mutual Security Program
on the United States Economy
hy Deputy Under Secretary Dillon ^
It was suggested that I speak on the mutual
security program, a subject as timely as it is
important. In the time at my disposal I doubt
if I could cover the many aspects of this program
and do justice to any of them. I would prefer
to discuss certain of our objectives and give you
some idea of the impact of the mutual security
progi-am on the economy of the United States.
This is a subject that falls rather directly into
my bailiwick. Under a recent reorganization at
the Department of State I was assigned responsi-
bility for coordinating the mutual security pro-
gram with other related foreign policies and pro-
grams. This coordinating responsibility includes
the activities of the International Cooperation Ad-
ministration and the military assistance program
of the Department of Defense.
The objective of this newly assigned responsi-
bility is to insure that our foreign economic policy
travels in the same direction as our foreign policy.
As I am sure you gentlemen know, both policies
have the same goal and that goal is to advance
the security and well-being of the United States
and its people.
In my travels and talks in various parts of the
country— and in Washington, too — I frequently
get the impression that people think there is noth-
ing "mutual" in the mutual security program.
They seem to feel that we take our national budget,
decide somewhat arbitrarily that 5 percent of it
should be allotted to this thing called "foreign
aid," and that we then hand over this sum of
736
' For text, .see BrrrxETiN of Aug. 27, 1S51, p. 349.
' Address made before the National Security Industrial
Association at Washington, D. C, on Apr. 10 (press re-
lease 180 dated Apr. 9).
Department of State Bulletin
money for the nations of the free world to spend
as they see fit— with perhaps a modest amount of
supervision.
The exact opposite is the truth of the matter.
This year we are asking the Congress for $3,942
billion.^ Of this amount, $2,635 billion is for
military assistance and defense support.
The estimates of the needs of the free-world
nations in building up their defensive strength are
not supplied by the recipient countries. The
military estimates are drawn up by the Depart-
ment of Defense acting through military assist-
ance advisory groups assigned to the country or
area. The United States makes the final decision
of who gets how much in every instance. And we
control the purse strings and continue to control
them every step of the way.
The estimates for teclmical cooperation and the
other forms of grant assistance are made by
specialists within the International Cooperation
Administration, with the help of area and coun-
try specialists from the Department of State.
And again let me say — we control the spending.
The purpose of the mutual security program
can be simply stated. We seek peaceful progress
among the entire community of nations. There
is nothing altruistic about this. Peace is in our
national self-interest.
Two Challenges to Peaceful Progress
We face two challenges to peaceful progress in
the world we live in. The first of these is the
military challenge of the Soviet bloc. To meet
this challenge we have entered into a system of
defensive alliances with 42 nations of the free
world. And, as the strongest link in this de-
fensive chain, we are playing the dominant role
in building total strength to deter further Com-
munist expansion. We do not play the dominant
role from a money or manpower standpoint-
only in materiel. Since 1950 we have spent ap-
proximately $20 billion to build the military
strength of our free-world allies. During this
same time these allies have spent more than $122
billion, or better than $6 for every dollar we have
' For President Eisenhower's message to Congress re-
questing continuation of the mutual security program,
see Bulletin of Mar. 10, 1958, p. 367 ; for statements by
Secretary Dulles and ICA Director James H. Smith, Jr.,
before congressional committees, see ibid., Mar. 17, 1958,
p. 427 ; Mar. 31, 1958, p. 527 ; and Apr. 14, 1958, p. 622.
May 5, J 958
spent. Their contribution in manpower comes
to more than 3i/^ million men under arms, a total
considerably larger than the entire armed forces
of the United States.
The second challenge we face in striving for
peaceful progress is an economic one. Since
World War II, 20 new nations have come into
being. These 20 nations have about 750 million
people. They total nearly one-third of the
world's population. Each of these nations has
emerged from years, sometimes centuries, of
colonial status. Each has had a close, intimate,
personal relationship with disease, ignorance, and
poverty.
The United States has been trying to help the
peoples of the less developed nations since the
end of World War II. During Joseph Stalin's
lifetime Russia showed not the slightest interest
in the hopes and aspirations of these peoples.
But since Stalin's death in 1953 the Soviet Union
has "discovered" the existence of the 750 million
people in these 20 nations. Instead of bluster,
bullying, and bullets the Communists have turned
to blandishments in an effort to win the newly
independent countries. In some places they have
made considerable headway.
The Communists are mounting this offensive
with tlie same zeal, the same determination, and
the same disregard for truth that seem to char-
acterize their actions. They tell the less developed
nations that our democracy is a "freak," a "phony."
They don't tell them that 6 percent of the world's
peoples living under this democracy produce 40
percent of the world's goods. As Winston
Churchill might say, "Some freak, some phony !"
This economic cold war between the Soviet Un-
ion and the United States is waxing warm. They
have wooed the less developed nations with $1.6
billion in loans and grants during the past 3 years
with the obvious purpose of leading them away
from the free world and into the Soviet camp.*
We cannot lose this cold war without gravely en-
dangering our national security. The challenge is
fully as important as the military challenge. If
these new nations slip one by one into the Soviet
orbit, we will become beleaguered, encircled, and
finally strangled. It is certain that our standard
of living will change radically if the immense raw-
' For a statement by Mr. Dillon on Soviet-bloc economic
activities, see iMd., Mar. 24, 1958, p. 469.
737
material resources of the Middle East and Far
East are denied us. It is certain, too, that the
Soviet Union does not intend to figlit this eco-
nomic war according to any Marquis of Queens-
berry rules.
Our chief reliance in this economic competition
is on the Development Loan Fund, through which
we can lend mutual security funds to the newly
developing countries for projects that will help
them along on the road toward industrial de-
velopment. These loans can be made on an attrac-
tive basis, often repayable in local currency, and
they fill a need which cannot be met by other loan-
ing agencies such as the Export-Import Bank and
the World Bank. We are asking $625 million for
this project. Without these funds we would be
entering the ring against the Soviets with one hand
tied behind our backs.
Most people in America today appear to have
given up on the 19th-century concept that the At-
lantic and Pacific Oceans constitute a heaven-sent
protection from attack. In the world we live in,
Chicago is 6i^ hours from Moscow by bomber,
and Washington, D. C, may well be 6i/^ minutes
from a missile fired by submarine.
Today we understand that tliere is an interde-
pendence of nations. Space weapons make dis-
tant peoples our neighbors. The theory of dis-
persal of men and bases and the need for strong
allies seem readily apparent. And these are the
goals of the mutual security program.
Now some of you may feel that the mutual se-
curity program is well worth while but hardly
the kind of activity we should be indulging in
when 5.2 million Americans are reported to be
looking for work.
This program involves the security of the
United States, directly and indirectly, now and
for the future. We are not now and must never
be in the position of being unable to afford our
own security. The entire mutual security pro-
gram costs each of us the equivalent of an airmail
stamp a day; and I might point out that the
$3.9 billion for this year's program is about one-
fourth of what we spend each year for liquor and
tobacco.
If anybody thinks the mutual security program
is a "do good" charitable proposition, they might
be interested in what General Nathan Twining,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has to say
about it :
738
The cold facts of the matter are that the security of the
United States depends upon our collective security sys-
tem, which, in turn, depends upon our military assistance
program. There may be some alternative to collective
security and military assistance. Alaybe those who make
the broad charge that all money spent in this area goes
down the rathole know what the alternative is, but so far
no responsible military man has been able to think of it.
A Plank in the Antirecession Drive
But, aside from the security aspects of the mat-
ter, the mutual security program can be considered
a very strong plank in the antirecession drive.
According to Mr. [Mansfield D.] Sprague, As-
sistant Secretary of Defense, approximately 85
cents of every dollar spent under the military as-
sistance program will be spent right here in the
United States. We estimate that between 75 and
80 cents of every dollar of mutual security funds
will be used to buy the products of American farms
and factories. And practically all the rest of the
money will sooner or later return to bolster our
economy.
I would like to use a few dollars-and-cents fig-
vtres to give you an idea of just what this program
means to the industry of the United States and to
our entire economy. Here are some of our pur-
chases in 1 year in the United States.
Machinery and equipment
Iron and steel
Bread grains
Cotton
Chemicals
Petroleum
Motor vehicles
$70 million
$35 million
$94 million
$84 million
$25 million
$35 million
$20 million
$20 million
— and listen to this one —
Military equipment $1,443 billion
Now, I don't need to point out to this group that
this $1,443 billion for military equipment fans out
to hundreds of subcontractors and suppliers in
every walk of American life. A recent non-Gov-
ernment witness before Congress stated that, in
his opinion, 1 million jobs were directly or indi-
rectly due to the mutual security program. Those
of us directly connected with this program have
never used a figure higher than 600,000 jobs. But
whichever figure you prefer is very sizable; and
this hardly seems to be the time to put any of
these workers into the job pool.
In addition to the direct purchases which I
have mentioned is the tidy simi of $58 million
which was paid last year to U.S. flag exporters to
Department of State Bulletin
( any the goods of the mutual security program to
tlie nations of the free world.
Let me make it clear that we are not trying to
buy friends luider the mutual security program.
We are not trying to give everyone our American
standard of living. We are trying to build
strong allies, allies whose strength combined with
ours will deter aggression in any part of the
world. We are trying to help the peoples of Asia,
Africa, and Latin America to achieve a decent
standard of living.
It is in our own national self-interest to get
these hundreds of millions of people into the mar-
ket place of the world, where they can buy the
goods of the world's largest trader — America.
This program to improve the buying power of
one-third of the world's population should appeal
to every businessman.
A Tough Foe and a Tough Battle
This economic war with Eussia is a challenge
to you as businessmen. We are the world's larg-
est exporter and the world's largest importer.
We have the highest standard of living in the his-
tory of the world, and we are unquestionably the
world's most privileged people.
We are being challenged in a field where we are
the defending champion. We are being chal-
lenged by a nation whose own standard of living
is lower than that of some of the countries she
rules. We are being challenged by a nation
whose per capita income is $308 as compared to
our per capita income of nearly $2,500.
But we are also being challenged by the nation
with the second highest gross national product in
the world. And Soviet industrial strength is
growing at a rate of 10 percent a year versus our
own growth of 4 percent. We are being chal-
lenged by the nation with the largest standing
peacetime army and the largest fleet of subma-
rines in the history of the world. We are being
challenged by a godless nation that has never dis-
avowed its objective of world domination.
In 1924 Lenin said: "First we will take East-
ern Europe, next the masses of Asia, and finally
we will encircle the last bastion of capitalism —
the United States. We shall not have to attack
it; it will fall like overripe fruit into our hands."
There is the blueprint, and the Soviets have ac-
complished the first objective — the seizure of
Eastern Europe. We face a tough foe and a
tough battle.
AVe cannot afford to be complacent about our
own security. And we cannot afford to be indif-
ferent to the needs of our allies. We must wage
this economic war with all our resources, both hu-
man and material. We must fight with all the
ingenuity that our inventors and scientists and
businessmen can command. As President Eisen-
hower has said, we must "wage total peace" to
beat the Soviets at their game of "total cold war."
I urge you to join and support this Nation's
effort to achieve peaceful progress through the
mutual security program.
President Approves Duty-Free Entry
of Automobiles for Sliow Purposes
Statement hy President Eisenhower
White House press release dated April 16
I have today [April IGJ approved H.E. 776,
"To permit temjiorary free importation of auto-
mobiles and parts of automobiles when intended
solely for show purposes," in the interest of mak-
ing the privileges it grants available at the earliest
date and because I believe that increasing the op-
portmiities for the display of foreign products
would be of benefit to the United States.
I wish, however, to call attention to the fact
that the measure makes the allowance of reciprocal
privileges by a foreign nation a condition to the
granting of the benefits of the bill to that nation
by the United States. In this respect it is incon-
sistent with our obligation to accord miconditional
most-favored-nation treatment with respect to
customs duties to a great many countries of the
world. This obligation is contained in most of
our treaties of friendship, conamerce and naviga-
tion and trade agreements. If we grant the
privilege of temporary duty-free importation to
automobiles from any country, we are, therefore,
obligated to grant identical treatment to many
other countries, whether or not they permit tem-
porary duty-free importation of automobiles from
the United States.
I therefore urge that the Congress give con-
sideration to the early enactment of legislation
amending H.E. 776 to eliminate the reciprocal
privilege requirement.
May 5, J 958
739
THE CONGRESS
Sharing Nuclear Knowledge With Our NATO Allies
Statement hy Secretary Dulles ^
I welcome the opportunity to testify here to the
importance of the proposed amendments of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954. These amendments
are indispensable, both to our collective security
policies and to our disarmament policies.
I shall direct myself primarily to these two
aspects of the matter.
I.
United States defensive policy is one of col-
lective defense. This is authorized by the United
Nations Charter, and it is, indeed, necessary to
our national safety. We have collective defense
arrangements with many nations. The most
highly developed military organization is under
the North Atlantic Treaty. Its protection of the
vital European area depends upon two compo-
nents. One is the deterrent of our strategic strik-
ing power. The other is the "shield" of NATO
forces in the area.
During recent years primai-y stress has been
placed upon the deterrent of retaliatory striking
power, with less emphasis accorded the shield.
There were two reasons for this. The decisive
superiority of the United States in the field of
nuclear weapons made our strategic deterrent
highly effective. Also a "shield" of conventional
forces could not indefinitely match the much
greater conventional forces that could be amassed
by the Sino-Soviet bloc.
However, that situation is now changing. The
Soviet Union itself possesses a large nuclear strik-
Made before the Subcommittee on Agreements for
Cooperation of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
on Apr. 17 (press release 199) in connection with S. 3474
and H. R. 11426 (amendments to the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954). For a statement by Deputy Under Secretary
Murphy before the subcommittee on Jan. 31, see Bul-
letin of Feb. 24, 1958, p. 312.
ing power. Also, new ways are being found by
our scientists whereby nuclear power can increas-
ingly be used in smaller tactical weapons.
Through such weapons we and our allies can
obtain an additional direct deterrent to Soviet
attack upon European territory. This latter de-
velopment was expounded by the President and
myself at the NATO meeting of last December ^
as opening up new possibilities of strengthening
the "shield" component of our military efforts.
However, as nuclear weapons acquire more and
more tactical significance and can enhance the
capabilities of the "shield," there is increasing
need for a broader sharing of nuclear knowledge
with our allies. Only thus will it be possible for
them to participate, to a significant degree, in
the development of defensive planning and their
own defense should they be attacked.
In our opinion it is not necessary for the United
States, in peacetime, to deliver to the national
control of our NATO allies complete nuclear
weapons or the nuclear components of these weap-
ons, and we are not proposing that course. We
do believe that it is necessary for the United States
to maintain in Europe nuclear warheads deployed
under United States custody in accordance with
NATO defensive planning and subject to release,
under Presidential authority, and use by the ap-
propriate NATO Supreme Allied Commander in
the event of hostilities. This assumes the existence
of nuclear-capable NATO forces. NATO has
been doing its part toward building up such forces.
Our part is to give them knowledge so that these
forces could, in war, be operational.
As the President and I pointed out in Paris,
there cannot be these nuclear-capable NATO
forces or the necessary military planning without
supplying our NATO allies with more nuclear
- IhUl., Jan. 6,
p. 3.
740
Department of Sfate Bulletin
know-how than is possible under the present law.
So we said in Paris :
Another ingredient of an effective NATO nuclear force
she mid be a common body of knowledge about nuclear
weapons and military doctrine for their employment to
permit their confident and responsible use.
We believe that our NATO allies should share more
information as to military nuclear matters. Broader
understanding is needed as to the weapons themselves,
their effects, and the present and prospective state of
this still new military science. The legislative changes
we are proposing to the United States Congress would
permit the exchanges of information needed to accom-
plish this.
The NATO Heads of Government unanimously
agreed with our "stockpile" proposal and decided
to proceed with NATO defense planning and
training on this basis.
Let me point out that, unless our Government is
able to share its nuclear knowledge more fully
with our allies, grave consequences may result.
Our NATO allies may either intensively seek to
develop nuclear weapons capacity for themselves
or move toward neutrality, or at least nonpar-
ticipation, in what should be a common military
effort. The first alternative would divert the ef-
forts of our allies into a needless and costly dupli-
cation of what we have already achieved. The
second alternative of neutrality or nonparticipa-
tion would place a far greater burden on the
United States and radically alter the power
balance with serious damage to our vital security
interests.
Let me repeat. United States policy does not
seek to spread nuclear weapons around the world
beyond United States control.
"What United States policy seeks, and what these
amendments would permit, are :
Common defense planning in NATO, which can
take place only if the Allied Commanders know
the effective use of nuclear weapons and the ca-
pabilities of the Soviet Union which may have
to be met ;
Adequate training of NATO allied forces so
that in the event of hostilities those forces could
effectively use nuclear weapons ;
The making available to our allies of nuclear
reactors which can be used for the propulsion of
naval craft ; and
In the case of an ally which already has a nu-
clear weapons capability, the exchange of nuclear-
weapons information and the provision of
materials for the making of nuclear weapons.
May 5, 7958
IL
A special element of our collective security
policy is our relationship with the United King-
dom. Great Britain now has a considerable nu-
clear weapons capability, and it is just common
sense for us to be able to exchange weapons in-
fomiation and provide materials where it is to
the mutual advantage. We can thus avoid waste-
ful duplication and make the most efficient use of
the conunon resources of the alliance. This co-
operation with the United Kingdom in military
technology would not be a one-way street. The
scientists and engineers of the United Kingdom
have made outstanding contributions to the weap-
ons used by the forces of the United States and
the free world in such fields as jet engines, radar,
and aircraft-carrier design. Even though their
nuclear weapons program is of smaller dimensions
than our own, we can be confident that their scien-
tists will make important contributions to a co-
operative effort.
The Soviet Union now knows the secrets of
nuclear weapons design. Nevertheless, for years
the United Kingdom has been forced to follow the
sterile course of reworking ground already covered
by the United States and known to the Soviet
Union. It is time to reinstate a more fruitful
United States-United Kingdom nuclear weapons
collaboration within the framework of expanding
nuclear cooperation with other NATO allies wliich
can create nuclear-capable forces and can help-
fully participate in planning a modern defense of
their territories.
III.
I now turn to the bearing of the pre
amendments upon our disarmament or, to be more
accurate, "limitations of armaments" policies.
I understand that concern has been expressed lest
these amendments would promote the spread of
nuclear weapons throughout the world, thus mak-
ing it more difficult to set up international controls
and perhaps bringing nuclear weapons into the
hands of those who might perhaps use them ir-
responsibly.
I have in the past expressed emphatically our
deep concern that there should not be a promiscu-
ous spread of nuclear weapons. We do not want
such weapons to get into the hands of irresponsible
dictators and become possible instruments of inter-
national blackmail. An ever-present threat of
741
that character would make the world a grim place
in which to live.
We would delude ourselves, however, if we con-
cluded that this somber development could be pre-
vented, or even retarded, by rejecting these amend-
ments of the Atomic Energy Act. Materials
needed to make nuclear weapons are becoming in-
creasingly available as nuclear power plants are
built. The knowledge needed to turn these ma-
terials into weapons has been independently at-
tained by three countries, and the scientists of
many other countries have the skills to enable them
to do the same. The only effective preventive is
that the development of nuclear weapons should
be brought under international control.
There is today understandable resistance on the
part of otlier free-world countries to an inter-
national agreement which would have the effect,
if not the purpose, of perpetuating for all time
their present nuclear-weapons inferiority without
the mitigation which would be made possible by
these amendments. Other free nations would un-
derstandably find it difficult to accept that result,
and the United States does not want to seem to be
seeking to impose it.
The situation is altered if the United States can
and will deploy nuclear weapons for common de-
fensive use in case of armed aggression and share
knowledge which will make our allies partners in
this endeavor. Failure to do this will create re-
sistance, perhaps insuperable resistance, to the
international control needed to prevent, over com-
ing yeai-s, the promiscuous spreading and possible
irresponsible use of nuclear weapons.
There is another thought which I would like to
express in this connection. The Soviet Union is
making extreme efforts to bring it about that the
free-world nations of the Eurasian continent will
be limited to conventional weapons as against the
nuclear weapons capability of the Soviet Union.
If it can succeed in this effort, it will have already
achieved a one-sided disarmament which involves
no controls or limitations whatever on the Soviet
Union but only limitation upon the neighboring
nations of the Eurasian continent. Under these
circumstances there will be much less incentive for
the Soviet Union to seek a balanced limitation of
armament.
On this point the NATO communique of last
December ^ had this to say :
'Ibid., p. 12.
742
The Soviet leaders, while preventing a general dis-
armament agreement, have made it clear that the most
modern and destructive weapons, including missiles of
all kinds, are being introduced in the Soviet armed forces.
In the Soviet view, all European nations except the
U.S.S.R. should, without waiting for general disarmament,
renounce nuclear weapons and missiles and rely on arms
of the pre-atomic age.
As long as the Soviet Union persists in this attitude,
we have no alternative but to remain vigilant and to look
to our defences. We are therefore resolved to achieve
the most effective pattern of NATO military defensive
strength, taking into account the most recent develop-
ments in weapons and techniques.
To this end, NATO has decided to establish stocks of
nuclear warheads, which will be readily available for
the defence of the Alliance in case of need.
To realize this concept requires the amendments
now proposed to this act. Not thus to amend the
act would in effect make the United States a part-
ner with the Soviet Union in imposing on our
NATO allies such an incapacity to use nuclear tac-
tical weapons that Soviet dominance over Western
Europe would be largely achieved and little in-
centive would be left for the Soviet Union to limit
its own armament. And our NATO allies will not
feel the strength and confidence needed to pursue
vigorous anti-Communist policies if they feel that
they are dominated by a Soviet nuclear weapons
capability and that we will not share our nuclear
capability with them, even to the modest extent
required to enable them to share in the planning
of a nuclear defense and make them capable
of using nuclear weapons received from us if
hostilities should occur.
On the other hand, if these amendments are
enacted, we will not have disarmed our allies and
the Soviet Union will have an incentive, otherwise
lacking, to achieve balanced and multilateral limi-
tation of armament.
IV.
In conclusion, I urge most strongly that this
committee should recommend to the Congress the
adoption of the proposed amendments to the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
It will enable us to build up what otherwise may
become a disintegrating collective-defense effort.
It will make our allies more willing to accejit
and the Soviet Union more willing to grant a
balanced program of disarmament with control of
nuclear-weapons testing and nuclear-weapons
making.
Departmsnt of Sfate Bulletin
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings
Adjourned During April 1958
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Human Rights: 14th Session ....
U.N. Preparatory Committee on the Special Fund
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on the Status of Women: 12th Session . .
U.N. ECAFE/FAO Working Party on Food and Agricultural Price
Policies.
UNESCO Intergovernmental Advisory Committee for the Major
Project on the Extension of Primary Education in Latin America:
2d Meeting.
U.N. ECLA Committee of the Whole: 6th Session
WMORegional Association V (Southwest Pacific): 2d Session . . . .
U.N. Economic Commission for Europe: 13th Session
2d Conference on Home Economics in the Countries Served by the
Caribbean Commission.
2d FAO Technical Meeting on Control of Sunn Pest
ILO Textiles Committee: 6th Session
GATT Intersessional Committee
FAO European Commission on Foot and Mouth Disease
International Sugar Council: Executive Committee
FAO Joint Subcommission on Mediterranean Forestry Problems . . .
International Sugar Council: Statistical Committee
International Sugar Council: 15th Session
InlSession as ofSApril 30, 1958
GATT Tariff Negotiations With Brazil
U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea
U.N. Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Terri-
tories: 9th Session.
U.N. Economic and Social Council: 25th Session
Brussels Universal and International Exhibition of 1958
ITU Administrative Council: 13th Session
UNESCO Executive Board: 50th Session
4th FAO Conference on Mechanical Wood Technology
IAEA Board of Governors
Pan American Highway Congresses: 3d Meeting of Permanent
Executive Committee.
U.N. ECOSOC Statistical Commission: 10th Session
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Narcotic Drugs: 13th Session . . .
ILO International Labor Conference: 41st (Maritime) Session . . .
WMO Executive Committee: 10th Session
Scheduled May 1-July 31, 1958
11th International Cannes Film Festival
NATO: Ministerial Session of the Council
U.N. Trusteeship Council: Standing Committee on Petitions . . .
New York Mar. 10-Apr. 4
New York Mar. 11- Apr. 4
Geneva Mar. 17- Apr. 4
New Delhi Mar. 21-Apr. 3
Panamd Mar. 2&-Apr. 2
Santiago Apr. 7-9
Manila Apr. 7-19
Geneva Apr. 9-25
Trinidad, B. W. I Apr. 10-18
Tehran Apr. 14-23
Geneva Apr. 14-25
Geneva Apr. 14-28
Rome Apr. 17-18
London Apr. 17 (1 day)
Madrid Apr. 17-21
London Apr. 21 (1 day)
London Apr. 22-25
Geneva Feb. 14-
Geneva Feb. 24-
New York Apr. 14-
New York Apr. 15-
Brussels Apr. 17-
Geneva Apr. 21-
Paris Apr. 21-
Madrid Apr. 22-
Vienna Apr. 24-
Washington Apr. 25-
New York Apr. 28-
Geneva Apr. 28-
Geneva Apr. 29-
Geneva Apr. 29-
Cannes May 2-
Copenhagen May 5-
New York May 6-
1 Prepared in the OflSce of International Conferences, Apr. 16, 1958. Asterisks indicate tentative dates. Following
is a list of abbreviations: CCEP, Commission consultative des etudes postales; CCIR, Comity consultatif international
des radiocommunications; CCITT, Comity consultatif international t616graphique et t616phonique; ECAFE, Economic
Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECLA, Economic Commission for Latin
America; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade; IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; IBE, International Bureau of Education; ICAO,
International Civil Aviation Organization; ICEM, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration; ILO, Inter-
national Labor Organization; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion; U. N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; UNREF,
United Nations Refugee Fund; UPU, Univer.sal Postal Union; WHO, World Health Organization; WMO, World Mete-
orological Organization.
May 5, 7958
Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings — Continued
Scheduled May 1-July 31, 1958— Continued
U.N. Advisory Committee on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy . . .
ICEM Council: 8th Session
FAO Cocoa Group: 3d Session
ITU International Telephone and Telegraph Consultative Committee
(CCITT) : Study Group VIII Working Party.
UPU Consultative Commission on Postal Matters (CCEP) : 1st Meet-
ing of Administrative Council.
U.N. ECE Electric Power Committee
ICAO Assembly: 11th (Limited) Session
U.N. Conference on International Commercial Arbitration
nth World Health Assembly
U.N. ECE Ad Hoc Working Party on Gas Problems: 4th Session .
ITU International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR): Study
Group XI (Television).
UNES(50 Special Intergovernmental Committee on the Preparation
of a New Convention for the International Exchange of Publications.
International Cotton Advisory Committee: 17th Plenary Meeting . .
FAO Group on Grains: 3d Session
Inter-American Juridical Committee
International Labor Conference: 42d Session
12th International Ornithological Congress
U.N. ECE Steel Committee and Working Parties
International Commission for Northwest Atlantic Fisheries: 8th
Meeting.
International Rubber Study Group: 14th Meeting
U.N. Trusteeship Council: 22d Session
U.N. Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation: 5th
Session.
FAO Desert Locust Control Committee: 5th Session
IAEA Board of Governors
5th International Electronic Nuclear Energy Exhibition and Con-
ference.
FAO Desert Locust Control Technical Advisory Committee: 8th
Session.
WHO Executive Board: 22d Session
U.N. ECE Housing Committee: 16th Session
6th Inter- American Seminar on Overall Planning for Education . . .
U.N. ECE Coal Trade Subcommittee
International Whaling Commission: 10th Meeting
International Wheat Council: 24th Session
ILO Governing Body: 139th Session
8th Berlin Film Festival
GATT Balance-of-Payments Consultations
U.N. ECOSOC Technical Assistance Committee
UNREF Executive Committee: 8th Session
UNREF Standing Program Subcommittee: 7th Session
International Tonnage Measurements Experts: 6th Meeting ....
U.N. Committee on South-West Africa: 6th Session
U.N. Economic and Social Council: 26th Session
ICAO Airworthiness Committee: 2d Meeting
Joint UNESCO/IBE International Conference on Public Education:
21st Session.
U.N. ECAFE Working Party on Coordination of Transport
Inter- American Technical Committee on Cacao: 7th Meeting
15th International Congress of Zoology
International Union of Architects: 5th Congress
South Pacific Commission: Technical Conference on Cooperatives
4th FAO Inter-American Meeting on •Livestock Production
Interparliamentary Union: 47th Conference
Baghdad Pact Ministerial Council: 5th Meeting
U.N. ECAFE Seminar on Regional Planning in Relationship t(
Urbanization and Industrialization.
Ad Hoc Committee for the Revision of the Agreement for Establish
ment of the Caribbean Commission.
Inter-American Child Institute: Directing Council
International Union of Biological Sciences: 13th General Assembly .
Geneva May 7-
Geneva May 7-
Hamburg May 16-
Warsaw May 19-
Brussels May 19-
Geneva May 19-
Montreal May 20-
New York May 20-
Minneapolis May 26-
Geneva May 28-
Moscow May 28-
Brussels May 28-
London June 2-
Rome June 2-
Rio de Janeiro June 2-
Geneva June 4-
Helsinki June 5-
Geneva June 9-
Halifax, Nova Scotia .... June 9-
Hamburg June 9-
New York June 9-
New York June 9-
Rome June 10-
Vienna June 16-
Rome June 16-
Rome June 16-
Minneapolis June 16-
Geneva June 16-
Washington June 23-
Geneva June 23-
The Hague June 23-
London June 25-
Geneva June 26-
Berlin June 27-
Geneva June
Geneva June
Geneva June*
Geneva June
Hamburg June*
New York July 1-
Geneva July 1-
Montreal July 3-
Geneva July 7-
Bangkok July 8-
Palmira, Colombia .... July 13-
London July 16-
Moscow July 20-
Port Moresby, New Guinea . July 21-
Jamaica July 22-
Rio de Janeiro July 24-
London July 28-
Tokyo July 28-
Trinidad, B. W. I July
Montevideo July
London July*
744
Department of State Bulletin "ti
U.S. Supports Special Fund
for Economic Development
Statement hy Chnsto-pher H. Phillips ^
I should like to take this occasion briefly to em-
phasize one or two points which are basic to my
delegation's approach to the task before this com-
.nittee. Let me make it clear that this is not in-
tciided to be an exposition of our detailed views
on the organization and operation of the Special
Fund. I shall discuss our thinking in these re-
spects during our reading of the views and sug-
gestions presented by the Secretary-General.^
At the General Assembly my Government was
convinced that the United Nations had before it
a realistic opportunity to embark on new impor-
tant action to assist the less developed countries by
making available technical aid of a kind not pos-
sible under the Expanded Program of Technical
Assistance. To this end the United States delega-
tion proposed, and the General Assembly voted
unanimously for, the establishment of a Special
Fund.^ My Government continues to be firmly
convinced that, with the full support of all mem-
bers of the United Nations, the Special Fund can
and will make a significant contribution to the
economic development of the less developed
countries.
In order to do so, however, it must be able to de-
vote its resources to projects of considerable scope
or depth, perhaps involving financial commit-
ments by the fund over rather long periods of time
and perhaps involving relatively large amounts
of supplies and equipment. One of the important
results of such concentrated effort by the Special
Fund would be, we are convinced, to facilitate
new capital investment of all types — private and
public, national and international^ — by creating
conditions in the underdeveloped countries which
would make such investment either feasible or
more effective, thereby helping to increase the flow
of capital resources to the underdeveloped coun-
tries, the basic need for which we all recognize.
' Made in the U.N. Committee for the Special Fund on
Mar. 12 (U.S./U.N. press release 2884). Mr. Phillips is
U.S. Representative on the committee.
" According to a committee decision, remarlss other
than the opening statements will not be made public.
" Bulletin of Jan. 13, 1958, p. 71.
Aloy 5, J 958
If we are to avoid scattering the Special Fund's
resources over a multitude of small projects, it will
be necessary to avoid such procedures, which have
become integral aspects of the Expanded Program
of Technical Assistance, as country programing
and allocations to participating agencies. This
is why the United States agreed at the General
Assembly that the Special Fund, though an ex-
tension of present United Nations activities,
should be separate and distinct from the Expanded
Technical Assistance Program. This continues
to be the position of my delegation, and, as I have
indicated, I shall discuss how we feel this might
be accomplished when the committee gets into
detailed discussion of the organization and opera-
tions of the Special Fund.
General Assembly Resolution 1219 spoke of the
possibility of having available for total United
Nations technical assistance activities the sum of
$100 million. This is the target which my Gov-
ernment has utilized in taking steps to assure
that the United States will be in a position to con-
tribute its share of this intensified effort to spur
economic development. My Government sin-
cerely hopes that the figure of $100 million will
quickly be converted from a target figure into re-
sources actually available to assist the underde-
veloped countries. It has, therefore, requested the
Congress for an authorization of $38 million as a
United States contribution toward a combined
1959 program of $100 million. Such a contribu-
tion is, of course, subject to congressional approval,
and any United States contribution will be subject
to the percentage limitation provided for by law.
Speaking to the press on December 16 on the
accomplishment of the last General Assembly, the
Secretary-General stated :
I would highlight, first of all, the Special Projects Fund
decision which opens new possibilities for the development
of economic assistance. ... I, of course, regard this as
a major achievement. I may remind you of the fact that
the United States representative, in commenting upon it,
used the word "milestone," which is a very strong word,
and I for one would agree with him.
Mr. Chairman, my delegation will do its best
in cooperation with other members of this com-
mittee to help translate the General Assembly
resolution into the kind of concrete action which
we believe will pay great dividends in terms
of the economic development of underdeveloped
coimtries.
745
Developments in Trust Territory
of Tanganyil<a
Statement hy Mason Sears
U.S. Representative on the Trusteeship Council '
Because of Great Britain's outstanding success
in transforming its former empire into a common-
wealth of free and independent nations, it is hard
to understand how there could be any doubt in
Tanganyika about its own political future. But
apparently there is.
The Visiting Mission reports that among polit-
ically conscious Africans there is still an expression
of fear about the future. Obviously they do not
like the present multiracial system in the Legisla-
tive Council because it gives the small immigrant
minorities, representing less than 2 percent of the
population, 66 percent of the elected members.
According to the Visiting Mission there are some
Africans who fear this may become a permanent
feature of the constitution. Under the Trusteeship
Agreement, however, it would be absolutely im-
possible. No final constitution can be proposed for
Tanganyika by Great Britain without consulting
the freely expressed wishes of the people, and this
must be done in a manner which can be approved
by the United Nations itself.
The United States delegation appreciates that
the Administering Authority has made many
helpful declarations on this subject. Nevertheless
it is to be hoped that the Government will make
further and continuous efforts to correct this un-
necessary misimderstanding and promote political
stability.
Can anyone doubt that Tanganyika is and al-
ways will be overwhelmingly African and under
international agreement must be developed along
democratic lines — which means primarily as an
African state?
It is true that the forthcoming elections for the
Legislative Council will be held on the present
multiracial basis. But this is only a transitional
stage in progress toward the kind of one-man, one-
vote system which is found in Great Britain and
in many other independent nations.
In any case, the Administering Authority has
announced that a committee to recommend revi-
sions of the constitution will be appointed in IQSS'
and will review the parity system. It is hoped that
^Made before the Trusteeship Council on Mar. 11
(U.S./U.N. press release 2882).
746
this committee will propose such adjustments in worli
the voting procedure as will provide the African
population with a more proportionate representa-
tion.
In addition, the United States delegation hopes
that it will recommend steps which will lead to-
ward the goal of universal suffrage with the leastl
possible delay.
We have also been much interested in the worki
which has been done to promote the organization
of town and district councils. It was encouragingi pjtiw
to learn that the administration desires to se&
these local councils established as rapidly as pos-
sible in all districts of Tanganyika. Now that
the process has begun, it may well have a snow-
balling effect upon the way it spreads throughout
the Territory.
Considering the Territory as a whole the United!
States delegation does not wish to emphasize the
speed or direction of the political growth ofl
Tanganyika so much as the smootliness of its
progress. The direction, of course, is toward
self-government, as is mandatory under the
charter. The speed of progress, however, will, ini
the last analysis, be inci'easingly subjected to con-
tinental as well as territorial influences. But th«
smoothness of the operation will depend on racial
good will and upon the ability of all sides to fore-
see and prepare for the human adjustments whichi
must be made if the trusteeship is to end ini
harmony.
Mr. Lennox-Boyd, the Colonial Secretary fori
Great Britain, put his finger on this problem last
June in the House of Commons. He stated that
the »
Africar
Ob"
Btnt ii
poliiiKi
learn ol
iietlif
][m
a Mil
Myrj
ices liai
HeA.
popiilai
thiii^.
strons
)ti
store fi
steai
cans an
penden
tlieir ii
But,
Gorem
tions tc
tbilic
of \k
theksi
llr.
refer tc
Tanjii
. . . just as the Africans are faced with tremendous T
problems of mental and spiritual adjustment when-
plunged into western education and the modern world
simultaneously, so the members of the more advanced ■
races in Africa are also faced with tremendous problemsl jias sa
of adjustment as more and more educated Africans begin! „f j
to emerge. There is very real danger that not enough!
members of the advanced races will make this adjust-
ment quickly enough, and that the resentments that this
will cause will encourage a growing tendency toward
racialism from the other side. This is a very real danger
which we should be imprudent to ignore.
If the necessary adjustments cannot be effec-
tively made, all communities in Tanganyika will
be the losers. The advancement of living stand-
ards and the place of Tanganyika m a free so-
Deparfmenf of State Bulletin
«oy5,
ciety would be seriously endangered without
financial and technical support from the outside
world. On the other hand, the contribution of
the outside world to the development of Tan-
ganyika would be rapidly destroyed without
African support.
Obviously the progress of economic develop-
ment in the Territory is essential to its ultimate
political freedom. It is therefore encouraging to
learn of the many satisfactory developments dur-
ing the past year.
More and more Africans appear to be partici-
pating in the marketing of primary produce and
in retail trade. African cooperatives have shown
a remarkable increase and continue to be success-
fully managed. Expenditures for economic serv-
ices have been increasing for a number of years.
The Administering Authority and the African
population should be commended for all of these
things. They are laying the basis for an ever
stronger and more educated Tanganyika.
Mr. President, tremendous developments are in
store for Africa during the period immediately
ahead. In this period perhaps 60 million Afri-
cans are likely to become citizens of free and inde-
pendent countries. These developments will have
their inevitable impact on Tanganyika.
But, considering the skill which the British
Government has shown in helping so many na-
tions to become independent, there should not be
the slightest doubt about the ability and the desire
of the Administering Authority to meet every
new situation in a realistic way and to put it to
the best advantage of Tanganyika.
Mr. President, before closing I would like to
refer to the outgoing and incoming governors of
Tanganyika.
When the present governor. Sir Edward Twin-
ing, retires from the governorship next spring, he
should have the satisfaction of knowing that he
has made a lasting contribution to the building
of a Tanganyikan nation. He will be followed
in office by another distinguished British admin-
istrator. Sir Richard Turnbull, who has spent
much of his active life in promoting the interests
of the African people. He has made intensive
studies of African affairs and has come to be
recognized as an outstanding authority on some
of their customs and ambitions. The United
States delegation wishes him success in the work
of helping Tanganyika prepare for independence.
We also hope that he will have the continued
advice and assistance of Mr. Fletcher-Cooke, who,
together with Sir Andrew Cohen, the distin-
guished representative of the United Kingdom,
has discharged his duties before this Council
with marked ability.
Seattle Selected as Site
for Colombo Plan Meeting
Press release 178 dated April 7
The Department of State announced on April
7 that Seattle, Wash., has been selected as the site
for the tenth meeting of the Colombo Plan in
the fall of 1958. The ninth meeting of the 18-
nation Consultative Committee on Cooperative
Economic Development in South and Southeast
Asia (Colomjjo Plan), held at Saigon, Viet-Nam,
in October 1957, unanimously accepted the United
States proposal that the Committee next meet in
the United States.^
The purpose of the meeting at Seattle will be to
review the progress, consider the problem of de-
velopment, and survey the economic position of
the member countries of South and Southeast
Asia. The amiual meeting of the Consultative
Committee provides an opportunity for exchang-
ing views on development problems of mutual
interest and provides a framework within which
an international cooperative effort can be pro-
moted to assist the countries of the area to accel-
erate their development.
The higlilight of the Seattle conference will be
the Ministerial Meeting. This meeting, of about
5 days' duration, will be preceded by a 2-week
meeting of officials to prepare material for minis-
terial consideration.
The United States became a member of the Con-
sultative Committee in 1951 and has since that
time participated in the annual meetings. The
other member govermnents of the Colombo Plan
are Australia, Burma, Canada, Cambodia, Cey-
lon, India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaya, Ne-
pal, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines,
Thailand, the United Kingdom (together with
Singapore and British Borneo), and Viet-Nam.
' Bulletin of Nov. 11, 1057, p. 755, and Dec. 2, 1957, p.
May 5, 1958
SEATO Announces New Series
of Research Fellowships
PresB release 177 dated April 7
The Department of State on April 7 released
information received from the SEATO headquar-
ters at Bangkok, Thailand, concerning the new
series of research fellowships to be awarded under
the cultural program of the Southeast Asia Treaty
Organization for 1958-59. The object of the fel-
lowship program is to sponsor research into social,
economic, political, cultural, scientific, and edu-
cational problems as a means of giving an insight
into the present needs and future development of
the area. Ten to fifteen fellowships will be
awarded to nationals of the SEATO member
states.
The fellowships will include a monthly allow-
ance of $400 and tourist-class air travel to and
from the countries in which the research is con-
ducted. Candidates must possess high academic
qualifications, preferably of the doctoral level or
equivalent, and must have had several years of
professional experience. Published material will
also be taken into consideration in making the
awards. Applications must be submitted not
later than August 1, 1958, to the SEATO na-
tional office in the candidates' country of citizen-
ship. The Department of State has designated
the Comjnittee on International Exchange of
Persons, Conference Board of Associated Re-
search Councils, 2101 Constitution Avenue NW.,
Washington, D.C., to receive and screen the ap-
plications of United States citizens. This com-
mittee will recommend candidates to the Depart-
ment and the President's Board of Foreign
Scholarships. The Board will then nominate a
panel to be forwarded to the SEATO headquar-
ters in Bangkok, where final selections will be
made. The awards will be announced in No-
vember 1958.
Eleven fellowships were awarded by SEATO
in January of this year as part of its 1957-58 pro-
gram of cultural relations. A number of the fel-
lows have already started work on their research
projects.
The Council of Ministers of the Southeast Asia
Treaty Organization at its fourth annual meeting
held at Manila in March agreed to continue and
expand the program of cultural activities.^
Among the new projects to be initiated is the ap- I
pointment of professors at imiversities of the
Asian member states and of traveling lecturers.
Current U.N. Documents:
A Selected Bibliography^
Economic and Social Council
Commission on the Status of Women. Consent to Mar-
riage and Age of Marriage. Report by the Secretary-
General. E/CN.6/317, January 20, 1958. 27 pp. mimeo.
Statistical Commission. Draft Revised International
Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Ac-
tivities. E/CN.3/243, January 22, 1958. 73 pp. mimeo.
Commission on the Status of Women. Information Con-
cerning the Status of Women in Non-Self-Governing
Territories. Report by the Secretary-General. E/CN.-
6/318, January 22, 1958. 11 pp. mimeo.
Commission on the Status of Women. Equal Remunera-
tion for Men and Women Workers for Work of Equal
Value. E/CN.6/322, January 22, 1958. 38 pp. mimeo.
Statistical Commission. Basic Industrial Statistics — A
Progress Report. A memorandum by the Secretary-
General. E/CN.3/242, January 23, 1958. 11 pp. mimeo.
Commission on the Status of Women. Age of Retirement
and Right to Pension. Report by the Secretary -General.
E/CN.6/321. January 23, 19.58. 12 pp. mimeo
Commission on the Status of Women. Technical As-
sistance Programmes in Relation to the Status of
Women. Report by the Secretary-General. E/CN.6/326,
January 23, 1958. 14 pp. mimeo.
Commission on Human Rights. Periodic Reports on Hu-
man Rights. Reports by the Specialized Agencies.
E/CN.4/758, January 24, 1958. 3 pp. mimeo.
Commission on the Status of Women. Access of Women
to Education. UNESCO activities in 1957 of special
interest to women. Report prepared by the United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organiza-
tion. E/CN.6/320, January 24, 1958. 19 pp. mimeo.
Commission on the Status of Women. Information Con-
cerning the Status of Women in Trust Territories. Re-
port by the Secretary-General. E/CN.6/319, January
28,1958. 38 pp. mimeo.
Commission on the Status of Women. Working Women,
Including Working Mothers With Family Responsibili-
ties. Report by the Secretary-General. E/CN.6/324,
January 28, 1958. 41 pp. mimeo.
Commission on the Status of Women. Access of Women to
Higher Education. Report prepared by the United Na-
tions Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
in collaboration with the International Federation of
University Women. E/CN.6/327, January 28, 1958. 66
pp. mimeo.
Statistical Commission. Draft Revisions to the Inter-
national Standards in Basic Industrial Statistics.
E/CN.3/242/ Add. 1, January 29, 1958. 43 pp. mimeo.
' For text of final communique, see Bui.letin of Mar. 31,
1958, p. 504.
- Printed materials may be secured in the United States
from the International Documents Service, Columbia Uni-
versity Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y. Other
materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may
be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United
States.
Department of State Bulletin
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Aviation
Protocol amending articles 48 (a), 49 (e), and 61 of the
convention on international civil aviation (TIAS 1591)
by providing that sessions of the Assembly of the Inter-
national Civil Aviation Organization shall be held not
less than once in 3 years instead of annually. Done at
Montreal June 14, 1954. Entered into force December
12, 1956. TIAS 3756.
Ratifications deposited: Viet-Nam, December 30, 1957;
Italy, March 24, 1958.
Duties and Rights of States
Protocol to the convention on duties and rights of states
in event of civil strife, signed at Habana February 20,
1928 (46 Stat. 2749). Opened for signature at the Pan
American Union May 1, 1957.'
Signature: El Salvador, March 27, 1958.
Finance
Articles of agreement of the International Monetary
Fund. Opened for signature at Washington December
27, 1945. Entered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS
1501.
Signature and acceptance: Tunisia, April 14, 1958.
Articles of agreement of the International Bank for Re-
construction and Development. Opened for signature at
Washington December 27, 1945. Entered into force
December 27, 1945. TIAS 1502.
Signature and acceptance : Tunisia, April 14, 1958.
Maritime
Protocol terminating the convention of May 31, 1865 (14
Stat. 679) concerning the Cape Spartel lighthouse,
and transferring the control, operation, and administra-
tion of the lighthouse to the Government of Morocco.
Signed at Tangier March 31, 1958. Entered into force
March 31, 1958.
Signatures: Belgium, France, Italy, Morocco, Nether-
lands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden. United Kingdom,
United States.
Narcotic Drugs
Protocol for limiting and regulating the cultivation of the
poppy plant, the production of, international and whole-
sale trade in, and use of opium. Dated at New Yorli
June 23, 1953.'
Accession deposited: Argentina, March 24, 1958.
Shipping
Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consulta-
tive Organization. Signed at Geneva March 6, 1948.
Entered into force March 11, 1958, for: Argentina,
Australia, Belgium (metropolitan territories only),
Burma, Canada, Dominican Republic, Ecuador (with
Not in force for the United States.
Not in force.
declaration), France, Haiti, Honduras, Iran, Ireland,
Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico (with reservation), Neth-
erlands (including Surinam, Netherlands Antilles, and
Netherlands New Guinea), Switzerland (with reser-
vation). United Arab Republic, United Kingdom, and
United States (with reservation).
Whaling
I'rotocol amending the international whaling convention of
1946 (TIAS 1849). Done at Washington November 19,
1956.=
Ratification deposited: France, April 14, 1958.
Technical Cooperation Agreements
Signed for West Indies Islands
The Department of State on April 18 (press
release 202) announced the signing of two tech-
nical cooperation agreements relating to the
British West Indies, one with Trinidad and
Tobago, and another with the other eastern West
Indian territory islands including the Leewards,
Windwards, and Barbados. The ceremony took
place at the International Cooperation Adminis-
tration with Rollin S. Atwood, President of the
Institute of Inter- American Affairs, acting for
the U.S. Government and R. W. Jackling, Coun-
selor, Head of Chancery of the British Embassy,
signing on behalf of the West Indian Governments
concerned.
The technical cooperation programs in Trinidad
and the eastern Caribbean are expected to include
such activities as housing, agriculture, health, nat-
ural resources, communications, public adminis-
tration, and technical education. Donald R.
Laidig has been designated as ICA field represent-
ative, for the purpose of implementing these new
programs, with headquarters in Trinidad, which
is also the seat of the new Federal Government.
In connection with signature of the agreements,
it was noted that these are the first technical coop-
eration assistance agreements concluded respect-
ing member territories of the new Federation of
The West Indies since the Federation came into
being on January 3, 1958, and held its first parlia-
mentary election on March 25. The agreements
represent another concrete example of United
States readiness to assist the Federation. With the
technical assistance program already in effect with
Jamaica, these agreements now extend technical
assistance to all of the Federation.
May 5, 7958
749
DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE
Consulate at Nicosia Elevated
to Consulate General
The Department of State aniiounced on AprU 11 (press
release 187) the elevation of the American Consulate at
Nicosia, Cyprus, to the rank of Consulate General, effec-
tive April 13, 1058. Taylor G. Belcher will continue as
principal oflBcer.
PUBLICATIONS
Recent Releases
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, V. S. Gov-
ernment Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Address
requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, ex-
cept in the case of free puWcations, which may he ob-
tained from the Department of State.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization Meeting of Heads
of Government, Paris, December 1957. Pub. 6606. Inter-
national Organization and Conference Series I, 35. xx,
117 pp. 50!f.
A volume containing the texts of statements, addresses,
etc., made by Heads of Government at the meeting of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization held in Paris from
December 16 to 19, 1957.
Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 3961. 16 pp.
100.
Agreement, with memorandum of understanding and ex-
changes of notes, between the United States of America
and Pakistan — Signed at Karachi November 15, 19.57.
Entered into force November 15, 1957.
Financial Agreement. TIAS 3962. 2 pp. 5^.
Between the United States of America and the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, amend-
ing agreement of December 6, 19-15— Signed at Washing-
ton March 6, 1957. Entered into force April 25, 1957.
Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 3963. 2 pp.
Agreement between the United States of America and
Italy, amending agreement of May 23, 1955. Exchange
of notes — Dated at Rome December 2 and 11, 1957. En-
tered into force December 11, 1957.
Uranium Reconnaissance. TIAS 3964. 9 pp. 10^.
Agreement between the United States of America and
Brazil, replacing agreement of August 3, 1955. Exchange
of notes — Signed at Washington December 26, 1957. En-
tered into force December 26, 1957.
750
Claims— Damages Arising From SEATO Maneuvers and
Ground Field Training Exercises. TIAS 3965. 7 pp.
100.
Agreement between the United States of America and
the Republic of the Philippines. Exchange of aide
memoire — Dated at Manila November 1, 1957. Entered
into force November 1, 1957.
Mutual Defense Assistance — Disposition of Equipment
and Materials. TIAS 3966. 6 pp. 50.
Agreement between the United States of America and
Guatemala. Exchange of notes — Signed at Guatemala
December 16, 1957. Entered into force December 16,
1957.
Foreign Service Personnel — Free Entry Privileges. TIAS
3967. 6 pp. 50.
Agreement between the United States of America and
Ecuador. Exchange of notes — Signed at Quito October
22 and November 6, 1957, with related note — Signed No-
vember 11, 1957. Entered into force November 6, 1957.
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: April 14-20
Press releases may be obtained from the News
Division, Washington 25, D. C.
Releases issued prior to April 14 which appear
in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 176, 177, and
178 of April 7, 180, 182, and 183 of April 9, and 187
of April 11.
No. Date Subject
191 4/14 Dulles : Pan American Day.
*192 4/14 President of Chile to visit U.S.
193 4/15 Dulles : news conference.
194 4/16 Cuba credentials (rewrite).
195 4/16 D.S.-U.K.-French reply to Soviet aide
memoire.
tl96 4/16 McKinney : "Atoms for Power : Inter-
national Status."
197 4/16 Dulles to visit Berlin.
tl98 4/17 Holmes : "The United States and Mid-
dle Africa."
199 4/17 Dulles : statement on revising Atomic
Energy Act.
t200 4/17 Dulles : message to Prime Minister
Nkrumah.
201 4/18 Austria credentials (rewrite).
202 4/18 Technical cooperation agreements with
West Indies islands.
203 4/18 Senator Case to represent U.S. at
Berlin ceremony (rewrite).
* Not printed.
t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.
Correction
Bulletin of March 24, 1958, p. 470 : The reference
to Ethiopia as a recipient of Sino-Soviet bloc eco-
nomic assistance should be deleted from Table I.
The totals in that table should be adjusted accord-
ingly.
Department of State Bulletin
lav 5, 1958 I n d
.frioa. Developments in Trust Territory of
Tanganyika (Sears) 746
Jgeria. U.S. Policy Regarding Algeria Kemains
Unchanged (Department statement) 729
imerlcan Republics
'he Interdependence of Independence (Dulles) . . 715
ecretary Dulles' News Conference of April 15 . . 719
isia. Seattle Selected as Site for Colombo Plan
Meeting 747
Ltomic Energy. Sharing Nuclear Knowledge With
Our NATO Allies (Dulles) 740
Lustria. Letters of Credence (Platzer) .... 730
'hina, Communist. Reply of "Sixteen" to Chinese
Communist Statement on Korea 734
Congress, The
'resident Approves Duty-Free Entry of Automo-
biles for Show Purposes 739
Sharing Nuclear Knowledge With Our NATO
Allies (Dulles) 740
;;uba. Letters of Credence (Arroyo y Marquez) . 730
;;yprus. Consulate at Nicosia Elevated to Con-
sulate General 750
Department and Foreign Service. Consulate at
Nicosia Elevated to Consulate General .... 750
Economic Affairs
mpact of Mutual Security Program on the United
States Economy (Dillon) 736
International Trade and Our National Security
(Herter) 731
President Approves Duty-Free Entry of Automo-
biles for Show Purposes 739
U.S. Supports Special Fund for Economic Develop-
ment (Phillips) 745
Educational Exchange. SEATO Announces New
Series of Research Fellowships 748
Egypt. Secretary Dulles' News Conference of April
15 719
France
Secretary Dulles' News Conference of April 15 . . 719
U.S. Policy Regarding Algeria Remains Unchanged
(Department statement) 729
U.S., U.K., and France Ready To Begin Talks at
Moscow (three-power statement and Soviet aide
memoire) 727
Germany
Secretary Dulles To Visit Berlin After NATO Min-
isterial Meeting 730
Senator Case To Represent U.S. at Berlin Congress
Hall Ceremonies 730
International Organizations and Conferences
Calendar of International Conferences and Meet-
ings 743
Seattle Selected as Site for Colombo Plan Meeting . 747
Japan. Sentences of Japanese Parolees Reduced to
Time Served 736
Korea. Reply of "Sixteen" to Chinese Communist
Statement on Korea 734
Military Affairs. U.S. Denies Soviet Charge of Pro-
vocative Plights in Polar Region (Department
statement) 728
e X Vol. XXXVIII, No. 984
Mutual Security
Impact of Mutual Security Program on the United
States Economy (Dillon) 736
International Trade and Our National Security
(Herter) 731
Technical Cooperation Agreements Signed for West
Indies Islands 749
Non-Self -Governing Territories. Developments in
Trust Territory of Tanganyika (Sears) . . . 746
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NATO Defense Ministers Conclude Discussions
(Text of final communique) 729
Sharing Nuclear Knowledge With Our NATO Allies
(Dulles) 740
Presidential Documents. President Approves
Duty-Free Entry of Automobiles for Show Pur-
poses 739
Publications. Recent Releases 750
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. SEATO An-
nounces New Series of Research Fellowships . . 748
Treaty Information
Current Actions 749
Technical Cooperation Agreements Signed for West
Indies Islands 749
U.S.S.R.
Impact of Mutual Security Program on the United
States Economy (Dillon) 736
Secretary Dulles' News Conference of April 15 . . 719
U.S. Denies Soviet Charge of Provocative Flights in
Polar Region (Department statement) .... 728
U.S., U.K., and France Ready To Begin Talks at
Moscow (three-power statement and Soviet aide
memoire) 727
United Kingdom
Consulate at Nicosia Elevated to Consulate General . 750
Development in Trust Territory of Tanganyika
(Sears) 746
U.S., U.K., and France Ready To Begin Talks at
Moscow (three-power statement and Soviet aide
memoire) 727
United Nations
Current U.N. Documents 748
Developments in Trust Territory of Tanganyika
(Sears) 746
Reply of "Sixteen" to Chinese Communist State-
ment on Korea 734
U.S. Supports Special Fund for Economic Develop-
ment (Phillips) 745
West Indies, Federation of. Technical Cooperation
Agreements Signed for West Indies Islands . . 749
Name Index
Arroyo y Marquez, Nicolas 730
Case, Senator Clifford 730
Dillon, Douglas 736
Dulles, Secretary 715, 719, 730, 740
Eisenhower, President 7.39
Herter, Christian A 731
Lodge, Henry Cabot 735
Phillips, Christopher H 745
Platzer, Wilfried 730
Sears, Mason 746
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DEPOSfTORY
Vol. XXXVIII, No. 985 May 12, 1958
OUR EXPERIIVIENT IN HUMAN LIBERTY • Address
by Secretary Dulles 755
SECURITY COUNCIL HEARS SOVIET COMPLAINT
ON U.S. MILITARY FLIGHTS; U.S.S.R. WITH-
DRAWS DRAFT RESOLUTION • Statement by
Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge 760
TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE OEEC o by Under
Secretary Herter 789
THE UNITED STATES AND MIDDLE AFRICA • by
Julius C. Holmes 764
"FREEDOM FROM FEAR" • by Assistant Secretary
Robertson 770
THE PEOPLE WHO WAGE THE PEACE • An Account
of the History and Mission of the Foreign Service by
Assistant Secretary Rubottom 772
For index see inside back cover
TflCTrePlRTMENT OF STATE
Boston Pu'.)lic Library
Superint'^"'^ nt of Oocumc
JUN 9 - 1958
Vol. XXXVIII, No. 985 • Publication 6641
May 12, 1958
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington 25, D.O.
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Stogie copy, 20 cents
The printing of this publication has been
approved by the Director of the Bureau of
the Budget (January 20, 1958).
Note: Contents of this pubUcatlon are not
copyrighted and Items contatoed herein may
be reprinted. Citation of the Depabtment
o? State Bulletin as the source will be
appreciated.
The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the
Public Services Division, provides the
public and interested agencies of
the Government with inforrrmtion on
developments in the field of foreign
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Publications of the Department,
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Our Experiment in Human Liberty
Address hy Secretary Dulles '
I am here first of all to express my deep re-
spect for the military chaplains of the United
States. You sustain the faith of those upon whom
patriotism and duty place the heaviest demands.
They must, in time of war, sacrifice their lives.
And in time of peace they accept discipline and
danger in order to maintain the forces needed to
deter aggression and to preserve the peace.
You yourselves, the chaplains, sacrifice much
and often risk much to perform your high mis-
sion. Your dedication is a noble one. You serve
the spiritual life of the individual. Also you cul-
tivate the spiritual values which collectively are
the distinctive characteristic of our Nation and
of the civilization of which we form part.
Material Things Not a Primary Goal
Jesus pointed out that, in his time, the nations
of the world were giving priority to material
things. He called upon men to seek first the
Kingdom of God. Material things would then
be added unto them. But such things would be
a byproduct, not a primary goal.
It is of the greatest importance to bear that dis-
tinction in mind as we face the challenge of an
atheistic society which avowedly puts first the
search for material things.
The American people are naturally competitive,
and that is a good thing. During recent decades
we have scored so many "firsts" in so many fields
of endeavor that we feel chagrined if in any
field we are outdone. We react even more strongly
when we are outdone by those who are hostile to
us, who challenge us and who gloat when they
' Made before the Military Chaplains' Association of the
U.S.A. at New York, N. Y., on Apr. 22 (press release
210 dated Apr. 23).
May J 2, 1958
outdo us. There is little doubt, for example, that
Sputnik I made it apparent that we had become
too complacent. We need at times to be jolted
into realization of the fact that our leadership in
any field is not automatic. It requires effort and
sacrifice. We have need today for greater en-
deavor and greater sacrifice. But also there is
need to be careful lest, in a purely competitive
spirit, we be swept away from our basic spiritual
moorings. We must not put first such material
successes as are avowedly the goals of Soviet
communism.
"Communism" in the Soviet Union
I should like to interpolate here a comment
about the word "Communist." In relation to the
Soviet rulers and their practices we are using the
title that the ruling party within the Soviet Union
applies itself. However, "communism" is not
actually practiced within the Soviet Union, and
the challenge we face does not come from those
who follow the lofty maxim "from each according
to his abilities, to each according to his needs."
When the Soviet constitution was last amended,
there was a discussion on whether to introduce
that maxim into the constitution. That proposal
was rejected on the ground that Soviet society
was not yet ready for that high standard, and I
fear indeed that it is not.
The humanitarian concepts of "mercy" and of
"need" and of "justice" have little place in the So-
viet system. Material productivity— "work" — is
the oiBcial goal. There is, of course, a small privi-
leged class. But the people generally are provided
for only to the extent needed to make them com-
petent physical workers for the state. They are
bound under severe penalties to labor, as directed
755
by their rulers, in order to achieve the material
levels set for them not by their needs but by the
state.
One of the goals of Soviet communism, probably
its primary goal, is to achieve the world's greatest
military establishment and then be able to frighten
others into a mood of subservience. The Soviet
Union devotes more than 15 percent of its gross
national product to military purposes. Soviet
propaganda seeks, for the most part, to divert at-
tention from the magnitude of that military eilort.
It talks about "peace" and about "disarmament."
But it also makes crude military threats whenever
that seems likely to serve its ambitions.
The Soviet Government has not made one sin-
gle serious proposal to limit modern armament.
It has rejected or evaded many such proposals
made to it. The Soviet Government now boasts
that it has the world's greatest capacity for long-
range massive destruction. We question the ac-
curacy of that boast. But we do not question that
the Soviet Union has in its power to create and
indeed has already created a very great militai-y
potential.
A second Soviet goal is to excel in the field of
science and scientific applications. Here again
they boast that they are already supreme in terms
of numbers of their scientists and in terms of spec-
tacular scientific accomplishments, such as the first
manmade earth satellite. Some aspects of their
claims are questionable. But we cannot question
that, when a despotism makes mass education a
matter of science and directs its most qualified
youth into that channel, it can obtain very great
scientific results indeed.
Throughout the ages despots have achieved the
spectacular. The Pharaohs had their pyramids,
the Roman emperors had their colosseums for their
gladiator battles, the kings of France had their
palaces. No doubt the rulers of Russia can pro-
duce the equivalent, in modern terms.
I turn now to a third Soviet goal. Their rulers
say that the Soviet Union will become the world's
greatest producer of consumers goods. Stalin
said that the Soviet Union should be a country
"fully saturated with consumers goods." Khrush-
chev repeats the same theme and boasts that the
Soviet Union in this field too will outdo the United
States. He admits that to achieve that goal will
take time. But who can say that a purely ma-
terialistic society may not, perhaps, produce
ill for"
Ictive*
mrstw
be iii«'
leliiiid '
pii^uii^
Iftoiia
lirilv. ^
only u«'
(tnta?* '
kytlief
Feneed
Iractioi!
Soviet [•
mpeof
if fttnri
iklcour
greatly, perhaps most greatly, in purely material
things ?
U.S. Rejects Goal of Military Supremacy
Faced by such materialistic challenges, the es-
sential is that our society should not accept the'
premises of these challenges. We should not com-
pete under the rules that that challenger lays down
We should not make ourselves over into the imaget
of the very thing we hate. We find the atheistic,
militaristic, and materialistic creed of Soviet com-
munism to be repugnant to us. Let us be sure that
we do not copy it.
We must not accept an armaments race, as if to
be the greatest military power were a worthy or
even acceptable goal.
We must not seek that scientific education and
scientific applications monopolize the minds of our
youth, as though other values did not matter.
We must not accept the quantity of consumers
goods — automobiles, washing machines, refrigera-
tors, radios, and the like — to be the decisive meas-
ure of our society, as though its spiritual content
were unimportant.
Sometimes it is indispensable for a nation, as
for an individual, to say "no." And those are
some of the "no's" which our Nation should em-
phatically and, indeed, proudly utter.
We say "no" to making it our goal to be the
world's greatest military jjower and to be able
militarily to dominate the world. Twice within
this century war effort has made us incomparably
the greatest military power. And each time, when
peace came, we quickly abandoned that role. We
do not seek it now. Today our military establish-
ment, in terms of deterrents, is probably supreme.
We hope so. But our military goal is, as put by
George Washington and repeatedly reaffirmed by
Dwight D. Eisenhower, to have a "respectable
military posture" — that is, a military establish-
ment that others will treat with respect.
Too often we have not had that — with tragic
results. Militaristic despots have treated us with
contempt, as a military cipher that they did not
need to take into account in their calculations.
As a result there have been wars that might per-
haps have been avoided.
Today we have, and I trust will continue to
have, a military posture that others do respect.
It safeguards the peace not merely for our
Department of Sfafe Bulletin n,. ..
bur for others who join with us to establish col-
lei-tivo security against aggression. In this sense
our strength is a sacred trust for the benefit of
fill' men who band together to create a shield
lii'hind which they can carry on their peaceful
pursuits.
If today we wanted to dominate the world mili-
tarily, we have it within our power. We need
only take, for military purposes, the same per-
centage of our national production that is taken
by the Soviet Union of its national production.
We need only impose on our people some small
fraction of the austerity that is imposed on the
Soviet peoples. I do not doubt that the Ameri-
can people would readily accept greater sacrifice
if future developments made that needed to en-
able our nation to maintain a respectable military
posture. But God forbid that the day should ever
come when the American people became a mili-
taristic people, seeking military might as an end
in itself.
We can rejoice that we reject, for ourselves,
the military goals that the Soviet rulers set for
themselves.
Educational Goals
Let us turn to the matter of education.
We say "no" to education being nationalized
with a view to producing the greatest possible
number of scientists. We do not look upon edu-
cation as a process whereby the minds of our
youth are manipulated by government so that
they can better serve to glorify the state. Our
primary goal in the field of education is to train
minds so that the individual can more surely and
more fully achieve his God-given potentialities.
No doubt our educational system has deficien-
cies. These ought to be remedied. Also, no
doubt, we need more scientists, and we shall have
them. This is an era of scientific breakthroughs.
It challenges the imagination and effort of men.
We would be far gone in decadence if our youth
were not stimulated by what today opens up for
exploration. But we do not forget that our edu-
cational system should also produce those who
are well versed in the humanities. I certainly
do not need to remind this gathering that our
Nation needs more and better theological semi-
naries and more and better students in them. For
religion is the foundation of our society.
The Soviet Union, obsessed by its material-
istic dogma and seeking exhibits to glorify its
despotisms, is creating a society of educational
unbalance. Probably in that way it will achieve
some spectacular results, designed to promote its
expansionist ambitions. But such unbalance is
unnatural and fraught with unpredictable con-
sequences.
For our part it can, I think, be said with con-
fidence that our educational system will continue
to be a balanced one, that it will not concentrate
wholly on the sciences, and that it will not be
operated by the Federal Government in order to
enable that Government to produce mere servants
to aid it in scientific and military exploits.
We can rejoice that we reject, for ourselves, the
goal that the Soviet rulers have set themselves,
that is, to make all education primarily a matter
of scientific specialization in the interest of state
glorification and militarization.
Productivity of Free Labor
Let us turn now to the matter of producing
consumers goods. It is tempting for us to accept
the Soviet challenge to make the material pro-
ductivity of our respective systems the test by
which we shall be judged. Today we produce
many times as much consumers goods as does the
Soviet Union, and we expect that it will continue
to be that way. But I know of no inlierent
reason why a materialistic despotism miglit not
produce as much as does a spiritual society of
freedom.
Our own rate of production could perhaps be
increased if it were not that labor is free and
authorized, and indeed encouraged, to organize
and bargain for hours and conditions of labor. We
have long since abolished slave labor and have
ceased to treat labor as a commodity.
We believe that free labor, using the constantly
perfected machinery that free enterprise supplies,
will always achieve unrivaled productivity. But
that, if it happens, is a byproduct. We do not
want labor to be free merely because thereby it is
more productive. We want labor to be free be-
cause freedom is its right.
We can rejoice that we do not give material
productivity the priority given it by Soviet des-
potism. We have demonstrated that free men,
working at tasks of their choice imder conditions
May 72, 1958
largely of their making, have achieved the great-
est measure of productivity yet known. All the
world can see that adequate, indeed ample, pro-
ductivity can be achieved without enslavement
and without the surrender of freedom. It is pos-
sible to have both productivity and freedom.
The Positive Ciiallenge
It is, of course, not enough to be negative and
to refuse to accept the militaristic and materialis-
tic goals of Communist imperialism. We also
have a positive challenge of our own.
Tlie American people have always had qualities
of the spirit that could be, and were, projected
far and wide. Our Nation was founded as an
experiment in human liberty. Its institutions
reflected the belief of our founders that men had
their origin and destiny in God; that they were
endowed by Him with certain inalienable rights
and had duties prescribed by moral law ; and that
human institutions ought .primarily to help men
develop their God-given possibilities. We be-
lieved that, if we built on that spiritual founda-
tion, we would be showing men everywhere the
way to a better and more abundant life.
We realized that vision. There developed here
an area of spiritual, intellectual, and economic
vigor the like of which the world had never seen.
It was no exclusive preserve; indeed, world mis-
sion was a central theme. Millions were wel-
comed from other lands, to share equally the op-
portunities of the founders and their heirs.
Through missionary activities, the establishment
of schools and colleges, and through travel, Amer-
ican ideals were carried throughout the world.
We gave aid and comfort to those elsewhere who
sought to follow in our way and to develop so-
cieties of greater freedom.
Material things were added unto us. Our po-
litical institutions worked. That was because
they rested upon what George Washington said
were the "indispensable supports" of representa-
tive government, that is, morality and religion.
And, he added, it could not be assumed that
morality would long prevail without religion.
Our people enjoyed an extraordinary degi-ee of
personal liberty. That was because the individ-
uals making up our society generally accepted
voluntarily the moral law and the self-discipline,
self-restraint, and duty to fellow man that the
moral law enjoins.
758
I recall a debate that I had with Mr. Vyshinsky
in the United Nations in 1946. He said, "It is
indispensable to bring a limitation to the will and
to the action of men." Therefore, he argued,
some men must have power to rule others. If one
denies the existence of moral law, as do the Com-
munists, then dictatorship is the only logical form
of society. But a society that accepts moral law
need not be ruled by men. It can make govern-
ment its servant, not its master ; it can make gov-
ernment the means of doing collectively what
needs to be done, and what cannot will be done
individually. That is what the American people
have done, and that is their great challenge to
the world of despots.
I hear it asserted today that the qualities that
made America honored and judged great through-
out the world no longer have an adequate appeal
and that we must invent something new in order
to compete with Soviet dictatorship and its
materialism.
My first reaction is that faith is not something
put on, taken off, or changed merely to please
others.
My second reaction is to challenge the correct-
ness of the assertion. It may be that, partly
through our own faults and partly through Com-
munist publicizing of our faults, the image of
America has become distorted in much of the
world. Our individual freedom is made to ap-
pear as individual license and a casting aside of
those restraints that moral law enjoins and that
every society needs.
Sales talk based on the number of automobiles,
radios, and telephones o-wned by our people fails
to win converts, for that is the language of the
materialists. Our capitalistic form of society is
made to appear as one devoid of social
responsibility.
I do not believe that hiunan nature throughout
the world has greatly changed from what it was
when "the great American experiment" in free-
dom caught the imagination of men everywhere.
I am afraid that the fault, if any, may be here at
home in that we ourselves have lost track of the
close connection between our faith and our works
and that we attempt to justify our society and
to make it appealing without regard to the spirit-
ual concepts which underlie it and make it work.
So many material things have been added unto
us that what originally were secondary byprod-
Department of State Bulletin
ialthics
l^cal to
llisprim
uds now seem to rank as j^rimary. And if mate-
rial things are to be made primary, then it is
loizical to have a materialistic creed that justifies
this primacy.
A\'oodrow Wilson, shortly before he died, wrote
of the challenge of the doctrines and practices of
communism. He concluded :
The sum of the whole matter is this, that our civiliza-
tion cannot survive materially unless it be redeemed
spiritually. . . . Here is the final challenge to our
churches, to our political organizations, and to our cap-
italists—to everyone who fears God or loves his country.
Making Freedom Dynamic
The response of our free and spiritual society
to this challenge of a materialistic despotism must
above all come from individuals rather than from
government. That must be so because what is
being tested is the merit of a free, spiritual so-
ciety as against a materialistic despotism. There
is, of course, a role for government. But the pres-
ent test can never be won by freedom if, to win it,
freedom has more and more to abdicate and to
speak and act only through government. Only
individuals, by their conduct and example, can
make freedom a dynamic, persuasive, and wanted
thing. And individuals will do that only if they
are under the influence of moral principles and
great religious concepts such as those represented
by the faith of you, the military chaplains of the
United States, and to you we pay all honor.
U.S., U.K., and France Suggest
Joint Meetings at Moscow
Press release 21C dated April 24
Following is the text of an identical statement
presented to the Soviet Government on April S4-
by the British, French, and United States Ambas-
sadors at Moscow.
In their joint communication of March 31 ^ the
United States, French and United Kingdom Gov-
ernments proposed to the Soviet Government, in
connection with arrangements for a summit meet-
ing, that the preparatory work could best be per-
formed by exchanges through diplomatic channels,
leading to a meeting between Foreign Ministers.
The Soviet Government's reply, dated April 1 1,^
refers to the joint communication of the three
powers and expresses readiness to begin an ex-
change of views in Moscow on the preparations
for the Foreign Ministers' meeting. There is
nothing in this reply which suggests that the
Soviet Government had any other plan in view
than dealing with the three powers jointly in mak-
ing the necessary arrangements for the Foreign
Ministers' meeting.
The three Governments were therefore surprised
when, in his interviews with their respective
Ambassadors, the Soviet Foreign Minister made
it clear that he was not prepared to hold joint
discussions with the three Ambassadors.
As the three powers have already stated, their
view is that the main purpose of the preparatory
work should be to examine the position of the
various Governments on the major questions at
issue between them and to establish what subjects
should be submitted for examination by Heads of
Government. It would not be the purpose of these
preparatory talks to reach decisions, but to bring
out by general discussion the possibilities of
agreement.
The three powers consider that, as a matter of
practical procedure, the necessary preparations
can be advanced more rapidly by joint meetings
rather than by a series of separate interviews. In
this way unnecessary complications and delay
would be avoided. They wish therefore to suggest
to the Soviet Government that joint meetings be-
tween the three Ambassadors and the Soviet For-
eign Minister should begin immediately in order
to make the necessary preparations for the For-
eign Ministers' meeting.
The three Governments think that such joint
meetings should first discuss the agenda for a
summit meeting for the purposes described in the
fourth paragraph of this message, and then, at
the appropriate time, discuss the date and place
of a Foreign Ministers' meeting and what coun-
tries should be invited to be represented at this
meeting.
In conclusion, the three Governments wish to
express their hope that the Soviet Government
will feel able to give favorable consideration to
the above proposal as offering a prospect of early
progress by means of a simple and straight-for-
ward procedure.
' Bulletin of Apr. 21, 1958, p. 64S
May 12, 7958
■ Ibid., May 5, 1958, p. 728.
759
Security Council Hears Soviet Complaint on U.S. Military Flights;
U.S.S.R. Withdraws Draft Resolution
The U.N. Security Council met on April 21 at the request of the U.S.S.R.
to consider a question submitted hy the Soviet Union concerning '■'■Urgent
measures to put an end to fights iy United States military aircraft armed
with atomic and hydrogen tombs in the direction of the frontiers of the
Soviet Union.'''' The representative of the U.S.S.R. introduced a draft
resolution {U.N. doc. S/3993) calling upon the United States '■'■to refrain
from sending its military aircraft carrying atomic and hydrogen bomhs
towards the frontiers of other States for the purpose of creating a threat to
their security or staging military demonstrations.'''' At the close of the
debate the Soviet representative withdrew his draft resolution. Following
is the text of the statement made at the meeting by U.S. Representative
Henry Cabot Lodge {U.S./U.N. press release
Gentlemen of the Council, it scarcely needs to
be said that the pendmg Soviet charge is untrue.
We have done nothing which is in any way dan-
gerous to peace. The Soviet Kepresentative has
not adduced one single fact. We have done
nothing that is not wholly consistent with the
so-called "peaceful coexistence resolution." ^ We
trust that the Soviet resolution will not be
adopted.
Indeed, nothing that the United States has
done can be regarded by men who are honest witli
themselves and with others as anything except
the inescapable requirements of legitimate self-
defense. This self-defense was undertaken in the
face of continued resistance to countless efforts on
our part over a period of more than 10 years to
negotiate and througli negotiation to settle the
differences which divide us. We have tried again
and again and have failed each time to discover
any willingness on the part of the Soviet Union
to take positive steps toward easing tension, elim-
inating fear, and freeing all of our resources for
constructive, peaceful purposes. Our concern is
that we see once more, although we will never lose
Bulletin of Jan. 20, 1958, p. 104.
hope, the somber pattern of the last decade in the
events of the last weeks.
In recent months the Soviet Union, turning its
back on the United Nations, on the Disarmament
Commission, on the Security Council, on the deci-
sion of the General Assembly, on the normal uses
of diplomacy, on all the machinery available for
consultation and negotiation, has demanded that
there be a meeting of heads of government for the
professed purpose of easing tension and solving
the 25roblems that divide us. We are engaged at
the highest levels in diplomatic exchanges with
the Soviet Government to find possibilities of
agreement by which the cause of peace can be
achieved. As President Eisenhower's published
statements on this make clear, the United States
in all these exchanges has had a single end in
view: to make possible significant discussions in
the interest of world peace. The fact that
charges of an alleged United States threat to the
peace should be made at the moment when our
representatives are once more trying to resume
serious discussions with the Soviet Union is
deeply ijerplexing.
The United States Government wholeheartedly
regrets that the Soviet Union at a moment when
Department of Sfafe Bulletin
its liniders are proclaiming theii" desire for a meet-
iiii;- of heads of government should have taken
this action.
It is against this background that I would ask
till' members of this Council to view the issue pre-
si'utt'd by the Soviet complaint.
Guarding Against Surprise Attack
A cardinal aspect of our defense is to guard
ai:ainst the possibility of a surprise attack. The
iiiiiuense destructive jjower of modern weapons
jiiakos it at least theoretically possible to wipe out
the military capacity of a country in a single co-
(jiilinated strike against all its defense installa-
tions. The United States has only one conceiv-
able course in such circumstances. Until all fears
of surprise attack are banished by effective inter-
national arrangements, we are compelled to take
all steps necessary to protect ourselves from being
overwhelmed. In order to deter aggression all
nations which wish to retain their freedom must
maintain strong and alert forces incapable of
being destroyed by a surprise attack however
skillfully delivered.
Now, the Strategic Air Command is the main-
stay of all nations who wish to maintain their in-
dependent existence. It has successfully carried
out its mission for the past 10 years. It can only
accomplish its mission of deterrence if it is known
that the Command is so trained, so equipped, and
so situated that it cannot be surprised and de-
stroyed on the gi'ound. Tlie awesome power of
modeni weapons makes a surj^rise attack abso-
lutely unthinkable. Yet today we are confronted
by a totalitarian state which has the capacity to
strike without warning, without the knowledge of
its people, by the decision of a few men who are
unaccountable to the Soviet people.
It is precisely these circumstances which make
it mandatory for us to maintain our Strategic
Air Command in its high state of efficiency
through constant practice. All of these training
exercises, however, are designed to maintain the
force within areas which by no stretch of the
imagination could be considered provocative to
the Soviet Union. Aircraft of the Strategic Air
Command have never been launched except in a
carefully planned and controlled way. A pro-
cedure is followed which insures that no Strategic
Air Command airplane can pass beyond its proper
bounds, far from the Soviet Union or its satel-
May 12, 1958
lites, without additional unequivocal orders, and
these orders, gentlemen, can only come personally
from the President of the United States. The
routes which are flown and the procedures which
are followed are not only in no sense provocative ;
they could not possibly be the accidental causes
of war.
Aggressive Policies of Soviet Union
Xow why has it been necessary for the United
States, which has the greatest possible interest in
peace, to erect at tremendous expense this system
of defense by means of military aircraft? The
American people are reluctant to spend money
for military purposes. After each war in the
past we have relapsed into virtually total un-
preparedness. What caused us, reluctantly, to
build our present defense system was the aggres-
sive policies of the Soviet Union. This defense
system is maintained because the policies of the
Soviet Union are still aggressive.
Recent examples of this are: that the Soviet
Union proclaims its intention to communize the
world; that in 1957 it threatened atomic devasta-
tion against 22 nations; and that it has brutally
suppressed freedom in Hungary and continues to
enslave most of Eastern Europe. In the face of
this conduct and of the continued refusal of the
Soviet Union to negotiate seriously on disarma-
ment, of course we cannot be defenseless.
The United States has no aggressive intention
against any country. Our open system of gov-
ernment and our collective-security arrangements
make it impossible. President Eisenhower has
repeatedly emphasized that the United States will
never attack another country. The United States
fully accepts the obligations set forth in the
charter of the United Nations. Our words and
our deeds speak for themselves. Time and again
we have demonstrated our good faith and our
steadfast desire to build and to maintain peace.
We have kept trying— even though the Soviet
Union has repeatedly rejected our efforts, often
out of hand. We have never hesitated to expose
any aspect of our foreign policy to public dis-
cussion in the United Nations or elsewhere.
Frankly, gentlemen, I wish as much could be said
of the Soviet Union.
Now as long as it is necessary for our safety
that we maintain a Strategic Air Command, we
761
intend to keep it at all times in a state of effi-
ciency. We shall also keep it under the strict
control which I have described. Numerous in-
dividuals and groups, including representatives
of foreign governments, have had an opportunity
to visit and to see at first hand the operation of
the Strategic Air Command. They have seen
and recognize the effective controls under which
this force operates. These things are matters of
public knowledge. What we do is known
throughout the world. What the Soviet Union
does is carefully veiled in secrecy.
U.S. Proposal for Aerial Inspection
The American people, and the Government
which they have freely chosen, have been seeking
for the last 12 years a way to be rid of these
elaborate and burdensome defense preparations
and to do so in safety. That is why President
Eisenhower at Geneva in 1955 proposed that the
Soviet Union agree with us to mutual inspection
of each other's territory by aerial sentinels in an
open sky. This proposal was designed to guard
against surprise attack.
Now note this : that if such a mutual inspection
system could be put into effect, no massive air
attack could be launched in secret. The fear of
war would decrease, and a gi-eat step forward
would be taken toward the reduction of expen-
sive and deadly armaments. But the Soviet
Union has refused to join hands with us in set-
ting up a true inspection system.
Since President Eisenhower made this pro-
posal, we have suggested to the Soviet Union a
wide range of choices on how and where to be-
gin. During the meetings of the Disarmament
Subcommittee in London a year ago, we proposed
an inspection system covering all the continental
United States, Alaska, Canada, and the Soviet
Union. AVe also proposed an alternative in case
the Soviet Union wished to start on a smaller
basis — namely, that we start the open-sky system
in the Arctic region.
Now one might have thought that the Soviet
Union would have welcomed the proposal concern-
ing the Arctic. But far from welcoming it, they
treated it with scorn. In June 1957 in Helsinki
Mr. Khrushchev said, "Much has been made of
photographing the Arctic from the air as a be-
ginning, but this sounds totally comical." In
762
August of that same year Mr. Mikoyan was
even more derisive when he said, "What can one
control from the air beyond the Arctic Circle other
than the number of polar bears who, as is known,
for the time being do not intend to attack anyone?"
That was the Soviet attitude toward an inspection
system which would have made it virtually im-
possible to launch a surprise attack over the polar
regions.
Other Proposals to Which Soviets Could Respond
Now I stress the open-sky plan because it is
so directly relevant to the pending charge. But
this is not the only proposal to which the Soviet
Union has failed to give a constructive response.
Thus if the Soviets are seeking a means to con-
tribute to peace and particularly to disarmament,
there is much that they can do.
They can say "yes" to President Eisenhower's
proposal made as recently as April 8th of this
month,^ which, incidentally, has been withheld
from the Soviet people, to join in technical dis-
armament studies by which, as the President said,
"we can at once begin the preliminaries necessary
to larger things."
The Soviet statement of April 18 ^ says that the
Soviet people are indignant at the activities of
the United States Air Force. If this indeed is
true, this indignation can only be based on the
partial and often distorted information which the
Soviet Government permits them to have because,
as I have just said, the Soviet Government denied
publication to the Russian people of the Presi-
dent's proposal of April 8. The Soviet Union
could, in fact, change their negative attitude to-
ward the five-point disarmament plan which was
overwhelmingly endorsed by the 12th General As-
sembly last December^ — and which the Soviet
Union and its satellites were the only nations here
to oppose.
The Soviet Union could agree to a meeting of
the Disarmament Commission, which was enlarged
by the last General Assembly for the expressed
purpose of meeting their views, and in the reason-
able belief that it would do so, and which they have
nonetheless spurned.
'For text, see ibid., Apr. 28, 1958, p. 679.
' For text of a statement of Apr. 18 by Soviet Foreign
Minister Andrei A. Gromyljo, see U.N. doc. S/3991.
' Bulletin of Dec. 16, 1957, p. 961.
Department of Sfafe Bulletin
And they can carry on true diplomatic discus-
sion in Moscow in the serious vein which the world
situation requires.
This Soviet move reminds one of the trumped-
up charges of the past. It continues the policy of
constantly singling out the United States for vili-
fication. It leads to the conclusion that what the
Soviet Union is after is to weaken and to tear down
the United States and, with it, all countries, large
and small, which value their freedom.
How often in all these speeches which we have
heard here has the United States been condemned
for adhering to so-called "positions of strength" !
And how clear this makes it to the whole world
that what the Soviet Union actually wants is to
put the United States in a position of weakness !
Against all these assaults we have done much
more than simply to remain militarily strong.
Year after year we have made new proposals and
started fresh approaches to the profound issues
which have plagued our relations with the Soviet
Union. The Baruch plan, the atoms-for-peace
plan, the open-sky plan, the proposals on the unifi-
cation of Germany and of Korea, the proposals
for free exchange of information and ideas, the
proposals which led to the liberation of Austria —
these are a few of our initiatives. And, let me say,
we will never stop trying for peace.
I suggest that the representatives of the Soviet
Union ask themselves what they gain by tactics
such as they are employing here. Think for a
moment of the billions of rubles which they have
spent on propaganda, money which could have
gone to constructive purposes for the Russian
people.
What have they got to show as a result of this
great propaganda effort? At no time has the
Soviet Union ever been able to get the support of
the United Nations for any of its major propa-
ganda themes. Future historians will record that
the Soviet Union has not gained by the course
which they have pursued. Their interest in a
peaceful world is just as great as ours. Some day,
I am sure, they will give up their dream of world
revolution and help man's natural evolution to take
place. Some day they will see that it would be
better for them, as well as for the rest of the world,
if they were to cease these tactics and if they were
to come around the table and try to help solve the
world's problems.
May 72, 7958
Over this weekend I have come to sense some
of the heartache that exists among representa-
tives of governments here at the United Nations —
many of them being governments which are not
allies of ours — because of the effect of this latest
move on the outlook for peaceful, significant
negotiations. But we will never get discouraged
and we will never stop trying. And we say to you
that to calumniate the United States, as you are
doing today, is not the action of someone who
wants a summit conference to succeed — not the
action of someone who wants peace.'^
News-Media Representatives
Invited To Observe Detonation
Press release 220 dated April 25
The Department of State announced on April
25 that each of the other 14 countries ^ represented
on the United Nations Scientific Committee on
the Effects of Atomic Radiation which accepts the
invitation to send a scientific observer to one of
the detonations of the Hardtack series is being
invited to designate one news-media representative
to observe the same detonation.
On March 26, 1958, President Eisenhower an-
nounced this Government's intention to invite a
group of scientific and news-media repi'esentatives
to observe a detonation demonstrating the prog-
ress U.S. scientists are achieving in reducing
radioactive fallout from nuclear explosions.^ The
After the Soviet representative withdrew his draft
resolution. Ambassador Lodge made the following state-
ment (U.S./U.N. press release 2907) in his capacity as
President of the Security Council for the month of April :
"Let the record show that the present occupant of the
Chair did not engage in any unheard-of procedure ; that
the rules which he followed are not contrary to usage;
that what he did was not unprecedented and did not
suppress free speech ; that what he did was to carry out
the regular order in the democratic way, which is that,
when a member makes a proposal, it is put to the vote.
That is the way things have always been done in the
Security Council.
"The fact of the matter is that the Soviet representative
did not have the votes — and all of us can give our reasons
why he did not have the votes."
' Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada,
Czechoslovakia, Trance, India, Japan, Mexico, Sweden,
United Arab Republic, United Kingdom, Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics.
' Bulletin of Apr. 14, 1958, p. 601.
763
detonation which the scientific observers and
U.S. and foreign news-media representatives are
being invited to observe will take place in July
or early August 1958.
The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission is simul-
taneously releasing information concerning the
extension of invitations to U.S. news media to
observe the detonation.
The United States and Middle Africa
hy Julius 0. Holmes
Special Assistant to the Secretary ^
In view of the vastness of Africa, the great ex-
tent of its problems, and the limited time available,
I shall confine my discussion of "The United States
and Middle Africa" to a single topic — that of the
movement of African nationalism, which is strong
and swift.
For our purposes this morning I shall define
"Middle Africa" arbitrarily as all of the continent
except the Mediterranean states and Algeria in the
north and the Union of South Africa at the south-
ern extremity. This area — considerably larger
than the whole of the United States — has a popu-
lation estimated at 140 million and consists entirely
of dependent or United Nations trust territories,
with the exception of the independent states of the
Sudan, Ethiopia, Liberia, and Ghana.
Political, social, and economic developments in
Middle Africa are uneven. Some areas are very
advanced; others are just awakening to the urge
for self-assertion. Metropolitan powers respon-
sible for most of the area pursue diveree policies
based on different philosophies. As a result
nationalism throughout the region is neither uni-
form nor simple.
Complicating the development of nationalism in
Middle Africa are tribal conflicts on the one hand
and tribal loyalties on the other; strains between
different races living side by side in the same terri-
tory ; and threats from extraneous forces inimical
to orderly, evolutionary advancement. Where
electorates have developed, the African often tends
to vote for and follow personalities rather than
Xjrograms, and leaders crying "Africa for the
Africans" and "an end to colonialism" are the ones
most likely to have a popular following.
Yet, despite these negative aspects and complica-
tions, nationalism and the trend to self-govei'n-
ment are strongly manifest in contemporary Mid-
dle Africa. Resurgent nationalism, of course, is a
worldwide, postwar development which began in
Asia, swept through the Middle East and across
North Africa, and is now a powerful force
throughout the rest of the African continent.
This movement resulted in the creation — or re-
creation, to be more precise in some cases — of 20
new nations with a population of about 750 million
people. Of these 20 new countries, 5 are in Africa.
Indicative perhaps of the growing consciousness
of their common interests, representatives from
eight of the nine independent states of Africa ' are
now meeting in a Pan- African conference at
Accra, discussing mutual problems and means of
increasing cultural, economic, political, and social
cooperation throughout the continent. The out-
come of this conference, which was called by Prime
Minister Nkrumah of Ghana, will be closely
studied by all those interested in African political
evolution.
Befoi'e we turn to an examination of the trend
toward self-government among the dependent
Middle African territories, it is important to re-
call that Africa's first republic, Liberia, will this
year celebrate its 111th anniversary and that
Ethiopia's history as an independent African en-
tity dates back to Biblical times.
Trust Territories Ready for Release From Tutelage
As examples of slightly differing stages of na-
tionalist development, let us first consider four of
the six U.N. trust territories, all but one of which
were German colonies until World War I and
mandates of the League of Nations until World
War II. Under terms of the United Nations
Charter, each administering power is charged
with promoting tlie advancement of its trust ter-
ritories toward self-government or independence.
As a consequence, some are now about ready to be
released from tutelage.
Among those in this category is Somalia, a for-
mer Italian colony, which after a brief period un-
der British administration after World War II
'Address made before the Pittsburgh Foreign Policy
Associ.ition, Pittsburgh, Pa., on Apr. 18 (press release 198
dated Apr. 17).
The Union of South Africa declined an invitation to
attend the conference.
764
Department of Sfafe Bulletin
Secretary Dulles' Message
on the Pan-African Conference
Tress release 200 dated AprU 17
Following is the text of Secretary Dulles' message
to Prime Minister Kwame Nkruniah of Ghana de-
livered on the eve of the Pan-African Conference,
which opened at Accra April 15.
Dear Mr. Prime Ministeb : As representatives of
eight indepeudent African states assemble in Accra
ou your invitation to discuss mutual problems and
develop new modes of cooperation, I take this op-
portunity t(i extend my heartiest good VFishes and
hopes for the success of the Conference.
Through you, I wish to assure the African nations
that they can count on the sympathetic interest of
the people and government of the United States.
The United States will continue to stand ready to
support the constructive efforts of the states of
Africa to achieve a stable, prosperous community,
conscious of its interdependence vFithin the family
of nations and dedicated to the principles of the
United Nations Charter.
Sincerely yours,
JoHX Foster Dulles.
became an Italian tiiist territory in 1950 and is
scheduled by General Assembly resolution to be-
come independent in 1960. This country, on the
horn of Africa, populated by 1 million people,
largely Muslim, elected its first legislative assem-
bly of 70 members in February 1956 and has been
governed by a ministerial government headed by
Prime ISIinister Abdullahi Issa of the majority
Somali Youth League Party since May of that
year. Elections will be held soon for a new legis-
lative assembly, which will be charged with
preparing the constitution for the new state. Ee-
lations between the Somalis and the Italian
Tru.steeship Administration are excellent, and
there is no reason to question that the orderly
transition of this country to full independence
will be achieved as anticipated.
A U.N. supei-visory staff will be present when
citizens of the French west African Republic of
Togo vote on April 27 for nn enlarged chamber
of deputies, instituted as a result of recent liberal
amendments to the constitutional statute. The
new chamber, which will meet after this month's
elections, will probably expi-ess its views regard-
ing the future status of Togo and determine
whether to request the U.N. General Assembly to :
(1) terminate the trusteeship agreement or (2)
continue under the trusteeship.
May 12, 7958
The French Trust Territory of Cameroun, to
which the French have, as in the case of Togo,
liberally awarded autonomy in many matters but
not including foreign affairs, defense, and cur-
rency, has its own flag and national anthem, an
indigenous civil service, and a developing judicial
system. The political evolution of the Cameroun,
however, has been complicated by the uprising of
a small group of Communist-led rebels — the UPC
(Union des populations camerounaises) — who de-
mand that the French negotiate with them on
the questions of immediate independence. This
element is confined to a small jungle coastal area,
liowever, and is not considered sufficiently strong
either to threaten or to overthi'ow the present
Camerounian Government.
The much smaller British Cameroons are di-
vided into two administrative areas: northern
Cameroons, which is expected to join the north-
ern region of Nigeria with which it is now as-
sociated, and southern Cameroons, larger and more
populous, which, on the one hand, has a history
of political association with Nigeria that began
with the First World War and, on the other, has
tribal kinship with neighboring peoples in the
French Cameroun. These two British areas will
also be called upon in the near future to deter-
mine : (1 ) whether they will join the new Nigerian
nation, expected to become independent within
the British Commonwealth in 1960; (2) continue
under U.N. trusteeship; or (3) join with a fully
self-governing French Cameroun.
Progress toward comi^lete self-government in
Middle Africa is not limited to U.N. trust terri-
tories, however. Great strides are being taken
toward full local autonomy in other French and
British territories.
France's Imaginative Policy in Tropical Africa
France is to be commended for its imaginative
policy in tropical Africa since World War II.
The constitution for the Fourth French Eepublic
confers citizenship on the African inhabitants
of French territories. Through the new loi cadre,
or "framework law," put into effect early in
1957 — and not to be confused with the special
7oi cadre approved for Algeria last winter —
Africans are now brought into political activity""
at all levels from the municipal, territorial, and
federal legislatures in Africa to French Union and
national legislative bodies in Paris.
765
In French West and Equatorial Africa, French
Somaliland, and Madagascar, representatives,
mainly African, were elected to legislative assem-
blies in March 1957 on the basis of universal adult
suffrage and a single electoral roll. African cab-
inet ministers and French associates are now work-
ing side by side in harmony and cooperation in
each of these territories.
A unique development of perhaps major impor-
tance in African political evolution has recently
unfolded in the federation of the eight huge terri-
tories of French West Africa, which has a popula-
tion of about 19 million and is about eight times
the size of France.
Two of the leading African parties of this feder-
ation— the African Socialist Movement and the
African Convention — and five smaller regional
groups, at meetings held recently in Paris and
Dakar, decided to merge into a single political
movement and to present the following three-
point program to the French Government :
1. Creation of two "democratic federations of
territories": French West Africa and French
Equatorial Africa; and complete internal auton-
omy for all French African territories, whether
federated or not ;
2. The "right to independence" for the two
federations; and
3. Amendment of the French Constitution to
transform the French Union into a confederal
republic in which metropolitan France, the two
federations, and the remaining nonf ederated Afri-
can territories would be equal partners.
Although the outcome of this ambitious pro-
posal is uncertain, it illustrates one of the many
forms that the movement toward fuller auton-
omy in Afi-ica can take and demonstrates the
understanding which enlightened African leaders
have of the interdependence of Africa and West-
ern Europe.
Britain Encouraging Self-Government
Great Britain, too, has been consistently encour-
aging the development of self-government in its
dependent territories. A major problem facing
British East and Central African territories, how-
ever, is the promotion of harmonious relations and
policies among the many races and diverse tribal
and religious groups living side by side.
Fortunately in the case of the British West
African Federation of Nigeria the racial issue
hardly exists. Of the total population of almost
34 million — making Nigeria the most populous
political entity in Africa — only 16,000 are non-
Africans, and these are transient or temporary
commercial, professional, or civil service ele-
ments. This country, which includes three large
federal regions — the western, eastern, and north-
ern, with the latter containing more than half the
population — is scheduled to determine with Great
Britain in 1960 the exact timetable for its mde-
pendence within the British Commonwealth.
Nigeria totlay has both regional and federal min-
isterial governments, the latter headed by a fed-
eral Prime Minister. Although the Federation
faces numerous unresolved problems, such as the
separatist tendencies among the three regions, the
major emphasis throughout the territory is on
achieving independence in 1960.
In that same year the presently self-governing
central African Federation of Rhodesia and Ny-
asaland will work out with the British Govern-
ment the next constitutional step to be taken along
the road to full Commonwealth status. The great
problem facing this rich, industrious federation
of three territories with a population of 7.3 million,
including about 300,000 Europeans and 30,000
Asians, is the achievement of a successful racial
policy. There has been notable progress in de-
veloping harmonious race relations in the Fed-
eration, particularly in Southern Rhodesia, in the
last 10 years. It is to be hoped that the declared
policy of racial partnership, in which the African
is to be brought gradually forward to an equal
status in political and economic fields, will suc-
ceed. The question is simply whether progress
will be fast enough to satisfy the increasingly
vocal Africans or too fast to be acceptable to the
present dominant white minority.
Time does not permit a comparative analysis of
the current political situation in the remaining
British, French, Belgian, Portuguese, and Span-
ish territories of this vast region. However, in
all of these areas the force of nationalism — the
self-conscious African desire to assert his iden-
tity— is at work, although the degree of pressure
, being developed and the results of that pressure
vary greatly.
We can readily conclude that this emergent na-
tionalism will soon transform the political map of
Deparfmenf of State Bulletin
Affica, beginning not later than 1960 in Somalia
and probably Nigeria and steadily continuing in
other territories in the years to follow. A new
relationship will therefore develop between the
once dark continent and Europe. We are con-
lident that, with wise, f arsighted, and resjionsible
leadership on both sides, this new relationship will
bring enduring political, cultural, and trade ties
redounding to the mutual benefit.
U.S. Position on African Nationalism
There should be no misunderstanding about the
United States position on the subject of African
nationalism. As Secretary Dulles has declared on
numerous occasions, the United States recognizes
that the "shift from colonialism to independence"
is in process and the United States role "is to try
to see that the process moves forward in a construc-
tive, evolutionary way."
The United States recognizes the tremendous
contribution which the European metropolitan
powers have made and are continuing to make to
the economic, social, and political development of
modern Africa. The United States seeks neither
to displace any European state in Africa nor to
promote premature independence movements
there. On the other hand, we believe that the
irrevocable trend toward self-government requires
the support and understanding of the United
Nations and the free world to remain in construc-
tive, mutually beneficial, evolutionary channels.
With greater freedom always comes greater re-
sponsibility. We believe that the emerging peoples
of Africa, including the newly independent na-
tions, must recognize their responsibilities to the
world community, with which they are interde-
pendent. We feel that responsible leaders in ter-
ritories now gaining greater degrees of local
autonomy must also realize that premature inde-
pendence can be as harmful as prolongation of a
dependent status.
A vast expectancy develops among dependent
peoples as they move toward the threshold of in-
dependence. Current African leadership is mod-
erate and friendly to the West. But clearly the
ability of these moderate leaders to continue to
cooperate with the West will depend principally
on what the West does in enabling them to meet
the legitimate and mounting aspirations of their
people by insuring the steady economic, social, and
cultural development of their countries.
Increasingly, the African is looking beyond the
confines of his continent for ideas, assistance, and
even leadership. Conversely, new ideas, knowing
no boundaries, are reaching Africans of every
walk of life, even in the bush and the jungle. And
these new ideas are not all coming from the West.
It is evident that we regard it far better, in the
African's interest and in ours, that these ideas,
this assistance, and this leadership should come
from the West to which Africa is, by the very
nature of its recent history and development,
normally oriented.
The United States has much to offer Africa.
We ai-e dedicated to the ideals of democracy and
government by consent of the governed, to the
preservation of world peace and prosperity —
ideals which the African respects and seeks to
follow.
The future of Africa rests, of course, primarily
with the Africans. Large sections of Middle
Africa, nevertheless, are still primarily the re-
sponsibility of the European metropolitan powers.
The United States must, as the African expects,
apply its ideals to its foreign policy. We must,
as the European expects, contribute to the main-
tenance of African stability.
In short, we must do our part to help Africa
develop along the moderate, evolutionary path to
progress, strength, and stability. We are now
laying the groundwork in Washington to do
this — with increased economic aid, improved for-
eign service, educational exchange, and informa-
tion programs, and encouragement of private busi-
ness and philanthropic endeavor.
This we consider to be an expression of the
theme of your forum: world leadership. True
leadership in Africa, to be mutually fruitful,
must take the form of partnership, a partnership
of close cooperation with Africans and other mem-
bers of the free world, dedicated to furthering the
economic, social, and political advancement of this
old continent which is new in its awakening.
United States Asks Departure
of Czechoslovak Attache
Press release 205 dated April 21
On April 17, 1958, Joseph R. Jacyno, Second
Secretary of the American Embassy at Prague,
May 12, ?958
767
was improperly detained by three Czechoslovak
plainclothes men while visiting a friend to whom
he had taken musical recordings. The frameup
perpetrated by the Czechoslovak secret police re-
sulted in a note from the Czechoslovak Ministry
of Foreign Affairs on April 18, 1958, which or-
dered Mr. Jacyno to leave Czechoslovakia imme-
diately.
The Department of State on April 21 sent the
following note to the Czechoslovak Ambassador
in Washington :
"The Secretary of State presents his compli-
ments to His Excellency the Ambassador of the
Czechoslovak Eepublic and has the honor to in-
form him that the continued presence in this
country of Dr. Koman Skokan, Commercial At-
tache, is no longer acceptable to the Govenunent
of the United States. The Secretary of State
would appreciate the Ambassador's cooperation
in arranging for the immediate departure of Dr.
Skokan."
The New Federation of The West Indies
hy Frederick W. Jaridrey
Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs '
I appreciate very much being invited to join you
tonight in saluting the new federation of The
West Indies. I know that the Under Secretary
of State and your former Governor, ilr. Herter,
feels with me that it is most appropriate to honor
tliis occasion in Boston, a city which for so many
years has enjoyed ties with the West Indies.
Not only has Boston traded directly with these
islands for a considerable period, but it was often
by way of the West Indies that cargo and pas-
senger ships from Europe came to New England.
It was in the West Indies that these ships made
their first landfall and received their first welcome
to the New World. After an exhausting crossing
of the Atlantic, the Caribbean stop offered pas-
sengers and crew alike an opportmiity to ref resli
themselves in a friendly atmosphere. That
' Address made at the West Indian Federation Celebra-
tion Dinner at Boston, Mass., on Apr. 22 (press release
207).
friendly atmosphere and fine climate still attract
many to the islands and will, I am sure, continue
to be a major economic asset to the federation.
Just as our past historical ties with the indi-
vidual islands of the West Indies were most cor-
dial, so now we look forward to a mutually happy
relationship with the new federation.
As I am sure you all know, we are keenly inter-
ested in the progress of a people toward nation-
hood through the lawful processes of democracy.
In the light of our own i^olitical heritage and
experience, in which Boston played an early role,
it is only natui'al that our foreign policy should
reflect this keen interest. We are anxious to
assist those who are moving toward self-govern-
ment to the extent we can through such means as
are at our disposal, sharing with them the experi-
ence and technical skills we have accumulated.
It is with this tradition and interest that we stand
ready, in cooperation with the United Kingdom,
to assist The West Indies.
In tiiese days the West is frequently accused of
a desire to obstruct the progress of dependent ter-
ritories toward independence, and much propa-
ganda is devoted to charges of imperialism. All
one needs to do is examine a map to discover how
far the West, led by the United Kingdom, has
gone in just the opposite direction. A new type
of relationship has been developed. In terms of
this relationship, the United Kingdom, as a true
"mother country," has tried with marked success
to prepare the people of such territories for self-
government and independence. The list of coun-
tries which have thus acquired their independence,
just since the war, is most impressive — India,
Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon, the Sudan, Ghana, and
most recently Malaya.
The union of the West Indies islands in the
federation is acknowledged as an important step
in this same progi'ession from a status of depend-
ence to one of independence within the Common-
wealth. We desire to associate ourselves with this
process and to work closely with our British allies
in helping The West Indies to achieve statehood
imder the most favorable conditions possible.
Where there is evidence that a people and its
leaders have the political maturity to guide their
own future through democratic institutions, we
wish them the greatest success. As far as The
West Indies is concerned, we have full confidence
Deporfmenf of Stafe Bulletin
in tlie ability and integrity of its national leadei-s,
;ii;il the federation is to be congratulated for
choosing Sir Grantley Adams, an experienced and
devoted statesman, as it:s first Prime Minister.
Although, as I have already mentioned, our
connections with the Caribbean area were his-
torically in terms largely of trade, they have, in
more recent times, involved visits to the area by
many of our people, both as traders and as
tourists. Since the early days of the last war they
have also involved a number of important defense
relationships. We recognize that these arrange-
ments, important to our own defense and that of
the Western Hemisphere — and indeed of major
value to the free world's security system — have
caused certain concern within The West Indies.
It might be noted in connection with one aspect
of this problem that approximately 75 percent of
the total land acquired by the United States in
tJie West Indies since 1941 has, in fact, been
turned back to the local governments for agricul-
tural and other uses. The people of The West
Indies can be sure that we are mindful of their
needs for land and will continue to turn it back
whenever the requirements of defense permit.
As well, there are certain positive advantages
which accrue as a result of our defense relation-
ship with The West Indies. I do not speak alone
of the revenues which result from the presence of
United States defense installations in the area.
Fully as important is the opportunity which these
associations give us both to develop a higher de-
gree of mutual understanding and a sense of our
interdependence.
Although the territories of The West Indies
have great beauty and are endowed with natural
resources, the standard of living still needs to be
improved. The problem of populatioii in relation
to developed resources is a serious matter and
clearly calls for further economic development.
We are desirous to assist in attacking this prob-
lem. To this end we are prepared to consider
ways in which we may be able to help the new
federation. Today we have also annomiced that
immigration quotas to the United States from
The West Indies will be increased by 100 percent.^
U.S. To Discuss Assistance
to Tlie West Indies
Press release 213 dated April 24
The U.S. Government has advised the Government
of Great Britain of its interest in the new federa-
tion of The West Indies. It is the United States
desire to foster the success of the federation and
to assist, where practicable, its balanced economic
growth. Accordingly it has requested the British
Government to advise the Government of The West
Indies that the United States would welcome in
Washington a group representing The West Indies
to discuss ways in which the U.S. Government may
liest assist the Federal Government and through it
tlie people of the new federation.
On April 18 technical assistance agreements were
signed at Washington extending American aid to
the eastern territories of the federation.' With the
technical assistance agreement already in effect
with Jamaica, these agreements now extend ar-
rangements for technical assistance to all of the
federation.
Bulletin of May 5, 1958, p. 749.
'On Apr. 22 the Department of State instructed its
consulates at Barbados, Kingston, and Port-of-Spain that
they could make available to the local press an announce-
ment of the increase in the subquotas for The West Indies
under the mother-country. quota.
These are tokens of our friendship. They are evi-
dence of our faith and belief that The West Indies
will, in the not too distant future, be an important
and prosperous member of the Western Hemi-
sphere, as well as a full member of the British
Commonwealth of Nations.
As evidence of our good wishes for the success
of the federation, I should like to read Secretary
Dulles' message of January 3 to Lord Hailes on
the occasion of his investiture as the first Governor
General of the federation :
It is with pleasure that I send greetings, on behalf of
the President of the United States and of all Americans,
on this important occasion.
Your investiture as the first Governor-General of the
Federation of The West Indies marks an historic step
which the American people note with deep satisfaction.
We and the people of the Federation have much in com-
mon— respect for law, for the rights of the individual,
and a strong love of freedom. We look forward to being
good neighbors.
The ties of culture and of commerce, of brotherhood
and tradition which bind us will, I know, grow even
stronger under the Federation whose birth you celebrate
today.
I thank you for allowing me to join with you
in this salute to The West Indies.
May 72, 7958
463648—58—
769
"Freedom From Fear"
ly Walter S. Robertson
Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs ^
^Yhen the "four freedoms" were enunciated in
1941, tlie world was faced with problems not un-
like those which beset it today. Dangers then
flared from the ruthless ambitions of a few in-
dividuals. Tyrants were sweeping away free-
doms on three continents for the sake of amassing
dictatorial power. In the face of this the world
drew courage from America's declaration of faith
that the four basic freedoms must prevail.
Courage and resolution were demanded of mil-
lions in those days. Kesistance to evil men's
schemes found inspiration in the deeds and exam-
ple of many men, especially leaders such as the
Philippines' Brigadier General Carlos P. Komulo,
now become a distinguished world figure whom
we delight to honor here tonight.
Some months after the Atlantic Charter
adopted the "four freedoms" and held them high
as a beacon of hope to mankind, Carlos Romulo
demonstrated with personal action that to achieve
those freedoms meant to fight for them. And he
fought his fight without fear. He fought val-
iantly to bring about the end of the danger of
those times and the beginning of an era in which
man no longer need suffer from fear.
That battle was won. An era of peace dawned.
Fear of the dictators vanished, and the world or-
ganized itself in a promising association dedicated
to preservation of the "four freedoms." Carlos
Romulo appropriately became a prime figure in
the United Nations, serving with great distinction
as president of the General Assembly in 1949-50.
But unhappily disillusionment came. "We soon
discovered there was not, after all, a unanimity
among nations in the yearning for a truly free
world. Something worse than brutal ambition
exposed itself in opposition to all freedoms.
Free men again rallied against the new threat.
But it still exists, and so it is that now, in 1958,
we find ourselves once again in the tragic
circumstance of being oppressed by fear.
It is indeed an unhappy paradox that in this
amazing world of today, where new discoveries
1 Address made at the Four Freedoms Dinner at New
York, N. Y., on Apr. 21 (press release 204).
and inventions offer promise of an exciting and
fabulous future, mankind should look into that
future with deep anxiety. Science has opened
so many new doors to us and shown us such breath-
taking vistas that we are incapable of compre-
hending the kind of world now possible for our-
selves and future generations. We already
marvel at the advances so far made. Life is now
not only longer and more pleasant in its relief
from many old scourges and plagues; it is also
more exhilarating, more comfortable, and in
many respects less arduous.
The prospect of a better life has, of course, a
special appeal to the hundreds of millions of
people throughout the world who only in recent
years have emerged from the darkness of out-
moded systems. For them the urge merely to
catch up with the rest of us is the basis for vi-
brant and determined national movements. For
these awakened masses, too, the miracles of scien-
tific advance in the last dozen years seem to open
limitless possibilities, and their spirits are up-
lifted thereby.
A Fear of Nuclear Conflict
Mankind's optimism, however, is universally
sobered by other realities. There is no certainty
that the bright future will be realized ; there is no
sure confidence that the joys of scientific develop-
ment will be available for human beings. A fear
of nuclear conflict dampens the spirits of people
the world over. The specter of devastation and
poisoned atmosphere causes deep and universal
anxiety. This fear stems from an inability to en-
vision the outcome of the current world tension.
Tlie fear is of the consequences of a conflict so
extended that it will engulf most of humanity and
inevitably will affect all peoples everywhere.
We who are dedicated to the "four freedoms"
are party to this conflict. We are party to it
precisely because of our dedication. It is a con-
flict between our determination to maintain free-
dom for all individuals and a relentless conspir-
acy against that freedom — the conspiracy of inter-
national communism.
Mankind fears how this conflict will be re-
solved. Some feel it must erupt into mass
destruction. There may be some who believe the
defeat of freedom's forces is inevitable because of
the driving force of the disciplined conspirators
and because of free men's apparent irresolution
Department of State Bulletin
:ii;<l divergence of action. I submit, however, that
thi're need be no despondency on this score. I
caimot concede that nations are so unable to gov-
ern tlieir relationships that they must inevitably
obliterate themselves over their differences.
The problem is mamnade. A manmade solu-
tion must and can be found. I am sure that close
analysis of how man thinks and reacts will sug-
gest that solution. Yet we must not minimize
the danger. The steady growth of the Com-
munist conspiracy to take over the world and re-
sliape it in its own image is frighteningly
impressive. It has indeed become a gargantuan
menace in its 40 years of evil development and
expansion. But I assert that it is not invincible.
Wlrile it shows undeniable strengths, it also ex-
poses its weaknesses. I do not despair of thwart-
ing its objectives. Nor do I subscribe to the pessi-
mistic contention that the conspiracy will destroy
everything rather than permit itself to fail.
Scientific advancements are proof that man is
continually learning. He now has harnessed
many elements of nature and learned to direct
them to his own benefit. Moreover, he is con-
tinuing to learn about himself. In the 40 years
that the Communists have pursued their con-
spiracy, we have learned much about it. We
know precisely how it works. We also have
learned the immensely valuable lesson, thougli we
have learned it at great cost, that the conspiracy
can be stopped with the weapons it fears most:
strength and determined unity. With these
weapons we already have obliged the enemy to
change his tactics. He no longer blusters and
threatens military invasions. He poses rather as
a lover of peace and democracy, and, while offer-
ing a smiling countenance, he moves as relent-
lessly as ever on his course of subversion,
enticement, and propaganda. He exploits our
differences with one another and seeks to divert
our attention.
These weapons of ours — strength and unity —
need now to be reinforced with alertness and re-
newed determination. We know our enemy.
Unremitting opposition, sparked by clear mider-
standing of his methods and his objectives, can
stop the Communist conspirator's march, no
matter what tactic he chooses. We can do it, that
is, if we do not relax our vigil nor reduce our
strength. We could fail, however, if, even for a
short time, we were to let down our guard in the
May 72, 1958
mistaken impression the new smiling approach
means he no longer seeks to engulf us. We must
ever remember that our enemy lias not changed.
He has given up none of his gains. Examination
of his inducements reveals benefits only to himself.
He has not abandoned his intention to obliterate
our freedom. We therefore cannot for a moment
be distracted from the threat of destruction that
is aimed at our individual liberties and at our con-
cept of acceptable civilization.
Also, no matter how compelling the circum-
stances that tend to divert us from a steadfast
course, we cannot, if we are successfully to coun-
ter the Communist conspiracy, afford to be over-
impressed with considerations of temporary
expediency. Specifically, we must be ready to
pay the cost in taxes ; we must be constant in our
determination to stand by reliable allies ; we must
persevere in the maintenance of our own and our
allies' military strength; we must continue
patiently our program of assisting the economic
growth of those newly developing nations that
are so eager to catch up with us, for as they gain
in strength they will present additional deter-
rents to the Communist plotters. Properly as-
sisted, they can be relied upon to defend their
own liberty and thus prove great assets in the
struggle for freedom everywhere.
No Need To Whistle in the Dark
Those who seek "freedom from fear" in today's
world can take heart from the comradeship of this
great union against threatening conspiracy.
There is no need to whistle in the dark. There
is no need to pose in bravery, any more than to
cower in a sense of impending doom. Our union
is well armed materially, and it is invincible in
its spirit.
The greatest encouragement of all should be in
the knowledge tliat the will for freedom never
dies. Throughout human history the yearning
to be free and to stay free has led to great deeds.
Less than 20 years ago it united men around the
world. Carlos Eomulo, who along with his
countrymen so courageously upheld the cause
of freedom, wrote during that conflict :
The essence of our world struggle is that all men shall
be free.
It is the essence of our struggle today. And
he was never more right than when he also wrote :
771
To create peace we must devote to it the same en-
thusiasm and industry we have shown in our preparations
for war.
He saw the need to approach a task such as
ours with enthusiasm. If we sometimes approach
the present task too grimly, it may be because we
know the stakes are high and the danger is great.
But there is cause for confidence, and this con-
fidence should give us enthusiasm. Certainly the
brightness which the future could hold for us
justifies an enthusiastic approach to the achieve-
ment of it. I am sure that, if we persist in seeing
our problem clearly and maintain an unclouded
vision of our goal, we can substitute a resolute
and fearless enthusiasm for our anxiety over the
future.
In short, by a renewed determination and re-
affirmed dedication of purpose we can achieve
that "freedom from fear" for which all men yearn
and which is essential to the fulfillment of man-
kind's most cherished hopes.
It is in this sense that we can proclaim with
Franklin Roosevelt that there is nothing to fear
but fear itself.
The People Who Wage the Peace
AN ACCOUNT OF THE HISTORY AND MISSION OF THE FOREIGN SERVICE
hy Roy R. Rubottom, Jr.
Assistant Secretary for Inter- Amencan Affairs ^
The 24th Secretary of State, William H. Seward,
once explained the appointment of a certain pri-
vate citizen to a diplomatic post in these words:
"Sir, some persons are sent abroad because they
are needed abroad, and some are sent because they
are not wanted at home." It's about the first cate-
gory, the people who wage the peace — the Foreign
Service of the United States of America — that I
speak to you today.
Under our constitutional system the President
makes United States foreign policy. He relies in
particular for advice and guidance on the Secre-
tary of State, who is also charged with coordinat-
ing the formulation and execution of the
President's program. A number of Federal agen-
cies share the implementation of the President's
foreign-policy decisions. They include the De-
partment of Defense, the Office of Defense Mobili-
zation, the United States Information Agency, the
International Cooperation Administration, and
the Central Intelligence Agency. Other depart-
ments, such as Treasury, Justice, Commerce, Agri-
culture, and Labor, as well as the Atomic Energy
Commission, also are concerned with certain
aspects of United States foreign relations.
Address made before the Great Issues Forum at South-
ern Methodist University, Dallas, Tex., on Mar. 25.
But, of course, it is the Department of State, led
by the Secretary of State, which by law and prac-
tice must bear the main and, I might add, awesome
burden of insuring in peacetime that our country's
interests are protected and strengthened. At home
and in 87 countries abroad State Department per-
sonnel are on the job — and it's a 24-hour job, too.
Our code rooms in Washington and in our larger
embassies never close. A telegram which arrives
captioned NIACT, meaning "night action," results
in an immediate telephone call, nights and week-
ends, regardless of the hour, to the home of a State
Department official. Weekends, too, in Washing-
ton and at all overseas posts, a duty officer is always
available, and there's no overtime pay involved
either. At those few places where one-man points
are located— Belo Horizonte, Brazil, for example —
the American consul is, in reality, never off duty.
The Department of State, I might point out,
although historically the oldest and consequently
in precedence the first, is next to the smallest execu-
tive department, both in terms of personnel and
money spent. This year's budget of $193 million
must be stretched literally around the world, in-
cluding special United States missions at the seat
of the United Nations in New York, the Organiza-
tion of American States in Washington, the North
Department of State Bulletin
Atlantic Treaty Organization in Paris, and so on.
By way of contrast, a squadron of B-52 bombers
costs around $120 million and a Forrestal-type air-
craft carrier runs around $220 million.
I've been talking about State Department em-
pl(jyees. "Wliere does the Foreign Service come
in ? Let me try, without becoming too technical,
to explain their relationship.
Until very recently the differentiation could be
made that, generally speaking, civil-service em-
ployees manned State Department offices in Wash-
ington while Foreign Service employees ran State
Department offices abroad — embassies, legations,
consulates general, and consulates. Thus, an inter-
change of both domestic and foreign experience
was rarely possible in the Department of State.
Since 1954, however, virtually all officer positions
which are directly concerned with the conduct of
United States foreign affairs, both in the Depart-
ment— which means Washington — and overseas,
are staffed by Foreign Service officers. The result,
in effect, is that Foreign Service officers now move
freely from Washington to the field and back as
the needs of efficient administration dictate.
Tradition of the Foreign Service
Our Foreign Service has a tradition going back
to the founding of the Eepublic. The American
diplomatic service preceded the consular service
by more than 4 years. The first diplomatic agent
sent abroad by our Government was Silas Deane,
who went to France in 1776 in the guise of a mer-
chant. Benjamin Franklin and John Adams had
to take time out from their diplomatic negotia-
tions at the Court of Louis XVI in 1778 to help
shipwrecked American seamen. The consular
service dates from the appointment of William
Palfrey as Consul to France in 1780 and was thus
nearly 10 years old when Thomas Jefferson took
office as the first Secretary of State.
Some of our other great statesmen, John Jay,
James Monroe, John Quincy Adams, also repre-
sented the fledgling nation abroad. Of the first
six Presidents of the United States, four had
previous diplomatic experience. Interestingly
enough, the middle of the 19th century found some
of our most illustrious literary figures also serving
the United States in foreign lands. One can cite
James Russell Lowell, Minister to Spain and later
to the Court of St. James ; Nathaniel Hawthorne,
Moy 12, 1958
Consul at Liverpool ; Washington Irving, Minister
to Spain; and Bret Harte, Consul at Glasgow.
Because our country was a part of the New
World, our diplomatic and consular services were,
of course, among the latest of their kind. By some
accounts there were agents who performed con-
sular functions as long ago as the days of Tyre and
Carthage. But the consul as we know him prob-
ably derives from the consular tribunals, consules
artis maris, of the medieval cities of Italy and
southern France. These tribunals settled quarrels
arising at sea, and still looming large among a
consul's duties today are the care and protection of
American vessels and seamen. The first consuls
fostered trade and commerce and protected the in-
terests of their fellow countrymen in foreign lands.
For a time, too, they held court and exercised
judicial powers for settling disputes among their
nationals.
The diplomat, as a representative of one head of
state accredited to another sovereign, has an
equally misty origin. Certain early writers trace
the first ambassadors to God himself, who created
the angels to be His legates. But the real be-
gimiings of diplomacy, involving intercourse be-
tween nations, the rise of permanent missions, and
the development of a diplomatic hierarchy, are
more clearly traceable to Italy during the Middle
Ages. You will recall that Florence counted
among her envoys Dante, Petrarch, Boccaccio, and,
later, Machiavelli.
Undoubtedly because diplomacy was associated
with kings and courts, intrigue and rivalries, the
Continental Congress and subsequently the early
Presidents chose our first diplomats carefully and
well. Thanks to their achievements in establish-
ing mutual understandings with Old World states,
we first won assistance to gain independence
and, then, safeguards for our sovereignty. What
has been termed the golden age of American diplo-
macy helped preserve the United States through its
vulnerable youth until it could develop strength
and self-sufficiency as a nation.
But with the advance of the 19th century, the
United States became increasingly preoccupied
with domestic affairs. We grew so rapidly that
both need and fear of Europe were outgrown.
Few people cared about the kind of representation
our country had abroad. Only gradually did the
feeling spread that the United States needed a
professional foreign service. But not until early
773
in this century was anything done to stop the prac-
tice of making appointments on political or per-
sonal grounds. Steps were also taken to increase
inadequate salaries and allowances, which had
obliged appointees to draw on private fimds of
their own.
It was only 34 years ago that the organization
known as the Foreign Service of the United States
of America actually came into being through the
amalgamation of the diplomatic and consular
services. The Eogers Act, in effect, provided the
first statutory foundation for a disciplined and
dedicated body of career officers at the service of
the President and the Secretary of State.
To illustrate how the Foreign Service and its
members fit into the Department of State organi-
zation, I want to employ a few figures. The grand
total of Department of State American personnel,
by most recent counts, is 12,847. Of this number,
8,035 are in the Foreign Service. The Foreign
Service, in turn, can be divided statistically. The
principal representatives of the United States
Government in foreign countries are usually
Foreign Service officers, who now total 3,430.
They are supported by the Foreign Service Re-
serve corps and the Foreign Service Staff corps.
When the need arises for highly specialized skills
or experience, the Secretary has authority to make
special appointments of Foreign Service Reserve
officers. There are now 739 of them, limited by
legislation to a maximum term of 5 years. The
Foreign Service Staff corps is also career, with
both officers and clerks. Its size has been con-
siderably reduced as part of the 1954 Department
of State reorganization recommended by the Sec-
retary's Public Committee on Personnel headed by
Dr. Henry M. Wriston. There are now 1,273
Foreign Service Staff officers. The balance of the
Staff corps handles stenographic, clerical, techni-
cal, and custodial work of the Foreign Service.
In addition I should mention here, not only for
the sake of the record but to give credit where it
is due, that the Foreign Service employs at its 279
posts abroad 9,337 foreign nationals. Many of
these local employees have decades of invaluable
experience.
How Foreign Service Officers Are Seiected
Unlike many other countries, the United States
does not require that aspiring Foreign Service
officers present certificates of any kind ; although
the overwhelming majority are college gi-aduates,
yet there is no kind of diploma which will qualify
one automatically. Foreign Service officers are
selected through competitive examination, open
to any American citizen 20 to 31 years of age.
First comes the written examination, which takes
one day and consists of four parts — English ex-
pression, general ability, general background, and
modern language. The oral examination, for
those who pass the written, usually runs an hour
and a half and is conducted by a three-man panel.
Ha^dng successfully completed his written and
oral tests, the candidate is given a physical ex-
amination. Foreign Service officers being sub-
ject to assignment anywhere, certain disorders
which do not seriously interfere with work at
home may disqualify one for foreign service.
Qualified candidates are also given the i-egular
background investigation required of all prospec-
tive Department of State employees. This investi-
gation seeks to assure that a person's character,
reliability, and loyalty are such that he can be
trusted with the responsibility of United States
Government employment.
You will get some idea of the selective nature
of the Foreign Service examination process from
the following summary : Of 2,616 young men and
women who took the written tests last June, 556
passed. So far, 279 of this successful 21 percent
have gone on to take the oral : 55 were accepted;
16 were deferred — probably to make up foreign-
language deficiencies; and 208 failed.
There is not only competition, as you have just
seen, to enter the Foreign Service. There is also
competition to stay in — and to advance. Nom-
inated by the President of the United States and
confirmed by the United States Senate, Foreign
Service officers enter in class 8. They can rise to
class 1, then to career minister and career ambas-
sador. Each year every officer is rated by selec-
tion boards in comparison with all the others in
his class. A number with the highest ratings are
promoted. Unless an officer is promoted after a
certain number of years, he faces separation. As
in the military services, it's either "up — or out."
Almost two-tliirds of our ambassadors and minis-
ters today came up from the ranks — some without
the benefit of a university education, I might add.
Of the Department's three Deputy Under Secre-
taries, two are Foreign Service officers. Some-
times Foreign Service officers are assigned as As-
sistant Secretaries of State.
774
Department of State Bulletin
A Foreign Service officer, when appointed by
the President, receives three titles : one as a For-
eign Service officer, one as a diplomatic officer,
and one as a consular officer. The first determines
his class ; use of the others depends on his assign-
ment. His salary is based on his class in the
Foreign Service, not his post or his job. For ex-
ample, in Washington he may be assigned as
Bolivian desk officer in the Bureau of Inter-
American Affairs; later he may be sent to Tijuana
as consul and then to Caracas as Second Secretary
of Embassy. Barring a promotion from, say, class
5 to 4, meanwhile, his salary in all three places
would be the same.
Before this student audience, some of whom I
hope will seek to join me as career officers in the
Foreign Service of the United States, I should
like to emphasize how, in a sense, it is a profession
which, while requiring careful preparation, does
not lend itself to exact textbooks. There are a
number of institutions of higher learning which
concentrate on international relations, even specif-
ically in Foreign Service. Yet there are no spe-
cific courses on how to become a Foreign Service
officer. The reason is evident when it is noted
that the written examination covers: (1) correct-
ness, effectiveness, sensitivity, and organization in
written English; (2) ability to read and to in-
terpret tabular and quantitative data ; (3) under-
standing of the ideas and concepts basic to the
development of the United States and other coun-
tries; and (4) ability to read with comprehension
French, German, Russian, or Spanish.
During the oral examination the panel studies
the candidate's personality, resourcefulness, and
versatility. It probes the breadth and depth of
his interests, his ability to express and defend his
views, his ability to work with people, and, in
general, his suitability as a representative of the
United States abroad. The candidate is judged
primarily on his ability to express clearly and un-
derstandably thoughtful opinions based on facts
at his disposal rather than on the factual accuracy
of his answers. He is asked about American his-
tory and geography, economic theoi-y, current
events, the United States and foreign govern-
ments, and cultural developments. His motiva-
tion for entering the Foreign Service, his outside
intei-ests, and his general personality are also
taken into account.
Once a Foreign Service officer, one's education
only begins. His work requires intimate knowl-
edge of the political customs, governmental f onns,
and cultural patterns of people who may work,
think, and worship in a manner quite different
from our own. Understanding in these matters
cannot be acquired quickly or easily. It must be
the result of continuous and supervised growth
through experience, study, social contact, and per-
ceptive observation.
Career Planning and In-Service Training
Career planning and in-service training of For-
eign Service officers have a high priority in the
Department of State. A career development and
counseling staff in the Office of Personnel has un-
der constant review the records of individual
officers, to whom they are readily available for
advice and assistance. The Department's For-
eign Service Institute offers a wide range of
courses. All newly appointed officers must attend
a 3-month, full-time basic course prior to their
first assignment. There are numerous types of
part- and full-time orientation and substantive
courses, ranging in duration from half a day to 9
months.
It may sm-^^rise you to know that this morning
88 Foreign Service officers, before putting in a full
day's work in the Department, voluntarily spent
from 7 : 30 to 9 o'clock studying either French,
German, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish, or Russian.
This goes on 5 days a week. Another 83, with
the Department paying their tuition, go after
work to one of the various Washington imiver-
sities offering night extension classes. And final
grades go into their personnel folders for con-
sideration in connection with pi'omotions.
During the last fiscal year the Institute assigned
27 selected Foreign Service officers of unusual
promise to seven colleges and universities for ad-
vanced economics and political science courses.
An additional 29 studied at the National War
College and other colleges maintained by the
United States Armed Forces. The Institute pro-
vides instruction 4 to 6 hours daily in 25 lan-
guages, including Hausa and Vietnamese, and
also maintains full-time language progi-ams a'
schools in Mexico, France, and Germany and Ian
guage and area programs for Arabic, Chinese, and
Japanese in Lebanon, Formosa, and Japan. In
all there are now 99 Foreign Service officers train-
ing to become what we call language-and-area
tAay 12, 1958
775
specialists for Eastern Europe and the Near and
Far East.
Tliis increasing recognition of the need for For-
eign Service officers with specialized advanced
ti-aining and experience bespeaks the realinement
of power and commitment following World "War
II which affected profoundly the position of the
United States in world affairs. The functions of
the Foreign Service, as envisaged in the classical
image by the Kogers Act of 1924, were to repre-
sent the United States abroad, to report signifi-
cant developments in foreign countries, and to
extend official protection as required to American
nationals and interests. Tliese functions still con-
tinue, but added to them have been many others
of varying degrees of specialization which For-
eign Service officers are expected to perform in
connection with the postwar expanded responsi-
bilities of the United States Government. There-
fore, we now find ourselves engaged in higlily
technical studies. Negotiation and elaboration of
complicated agreements of economic, scientific, or
military character is another new task. We re-
port on social and labor problems and participate
in multilateral organizations.
I could expand at some length on the many
other new functions which would at one time have
been considered the exception but are now the
rule in modem diplomacy. But I should rather
emphasize that this expansion of scope has been
accompanied by an increase in volume of prob-
lems. This has required considerable decentrali-
zation of organization, thereby placing impor-
tance on individuals and their judgment. In the
light of this important development the sugges-
tion that Foreign Service officers are merely mes-
senger boys at the end of a telegraph line is com-
pletely fallacious.
Correction of this and similar misconceptions
of what Foreign Service officers do as well as who
they are is difficult, due to the very nature of their
work. Eegrettably, they are too little known to
most of their fellow Americans. Their lives are
spent predominantly around the face of the globe,
often at personal hardship and even danger,
broken by occasional assignments in Washington
and irregular brief periods of home leave with
their families in other parts of the United States.
Actually the Foreign Service Officer corps is
representative of every area of our country and
every walk of life. There is no monopoly of Ivy
776
Leaguers nor of any other smgle small group.
All in all they represent a thoroughly American
cross section of hard-working, do\vn-to-earth,
straightforward men and women whose main dif-
ference from the rest of the population is that
they are professionally concerned with upholding
United States interests abroad. Tempering tliis
concern is a healthy perspective to make them
realize that eveiything they do in the field of for-
eign affairs should stem from domestic funda-
mentals right here in the United States.
Foreign Service Heroes
To speak of danger in the Foreign Service is
not mere rhetoric. A flag-flanked plaque on one
marble-lined wall in the lobby of the Department
of State Building in Washington testifies to the
death of 71 diplomatic and consular officers of the
United States "who while on active duty lost their
lives under heroic or tragic circumstances." This
honor roll of Foreign Service heroes is headed by
the name of William Palfrey — "lost at sea 1780."
The last name on the list is that of David Le
Breton, Jr., "drowned saving lives — Tunis 1953."
In the 173 years spanning these two names and
dates, the words "lost at sea" have been inscribed
under seven names. Forty-two were killed by fe-
vers and diseases, such as yellow fever, malaria,
cholera, and smallpox. Exhaustion and exposure,
suffered on the job, have claimed three others.
Four have been murdered. Six gave their lives
trying to save others. Volcanic eruptions and
earthquakes killed another seven. And, reflect-
ing United States efforts to mediate recent civil
disturbances, one was shot by a sniper and an-
other was killed by gimfire.
This list does not include more than a score of
Foreign Service officers who have been killed in
recent years while flying from one post of assign-
ment to another. Since 1942 three diplomatic
couriers have died in plane crashes. Some of you
may recall a crash near Vienna in October 1955
when a courier, disregarding serious internal in-
juries, extensive burns, and intense pain, salvaged
his diplomatic pouch before extricating himself
from tlie burning wreckage. Despite pain and
shock he refused all medical attention after arrival
in a hospital until he delivered his pouch into safe
hands.
Of course, I do not mean to imply that the life
of the average Foreign Service officer verges on
Deparfmsnf of State Bulletin
deatli's door every day. Rather than dangerous
adventure, his lot more often is dull hardship.
Trying climate, absence of modern conveniences,
lack of medical facilities, isolation, and hazards
to health and bodily safety — from one to all of
these factors may plague his daily existence. At
times, I confess, there is also a lighter side. Of
the experiences of the wife of a Foi-eign Service
officer, the Saturday Evening Post wrote this head-
line several years ago: "Disinfected in Ethiopia,
terrorized in Tunisia, and pinched by a Very Im-
portant Foreigner — all in the line of duty."
Even where life offers the more normal ameni-
ties, a Foi-eign Service officer often has compara-
tively little time to call his own. Not for a moment
can he forget his primary obligation, which is
not only to strengthen understanding and friendly
relations between the United States and the coun-
try in which he serves but also to strengthen the
global position of the United States. The fulfill-
ment of this obligation, which entails presenting
the United States position to foreign officials and
influential citizens as well as to sound out their
views, depends principally on personal contacts
and interchange. Personal contacts take time and,
in great numbers, can be exhausting. Social func-
tions, while an important part of his duties, may
afford little pleasure when crowded together and
attended out of necessity. Spending a quiet eve-
ning with his family becomes a privilege dependent
on the absence of official exigencies.
This brings us to another of the canards involv-
ing striped pants. I would be less than candid if
I did not admit that sometimes — but not often —
Foreign Service officers wear formal dress on cer-
tain ceremonial occasions. But nearly everyone
I know usually outgrows the outfit before he has
a chance to wear it out. Wearing striped pants,
when required, is a part of protocol, and protocol
simply means following certain rules and pi^o-
cedures in order to regularize and facilitate re-
lations with other people. That is especially im-
portant with people of other countries and other
civilizations, whose customs, including dress, may
differ widely from our own.
But whatever the dress of a Foreign Service
officer at any particular time and on any particular
occasion, you can be sure that he feels deeply both
the honor and responsibility of participation in
our Nation's first line of defense. Deprived of
the possibility of spending his life in a hometown.
May 12, 1958
the wide world is his hometown. Certainly the
frequent changes of post to which Foreign Service
officers are subject offer them the pleasure of travel
and the stimulation of association with new peoples
and places. But it also means endless farewells —
and that isn't so pleasant.
One of my colleagues tells this illustrative
story: About to leave a post in Spain, a friend
said : "You know, when we say goodbye next week,
it will be very sad. Since I probably won't ever
see you again, it will be like going to your fu-
neral." My colleague, touched by this sentiment,
had the inspiration to reply: "What of me!
Wlien I have to say goodbye to all the friends I
have made here, it will be as if I am attending
scores of funerals simultaneously."
Threefold Role of Women
At this point, before the distaff side of the audi-
ence complains, I want to emphasize the threefold
role of growing importance in the Foreign Serv-
ice being played by women. First, as Foreign
Service officers, they number 306, led by the
United States Ambassador to Norway, Frances
E. Willis, with 31 years' experience. Second, 70
percent of the Foreign Service Staff corps is fe-
male. Without their efficient assistance in mak-
ing the wheels of organization turn, the Foreign
Service would be as a car without an engine.
Third, but far from least, are the wives. While
this is a subject which, I am certain, Mrs. Ru-
bottom could discuss far better than I, permit me
these few words of praise for helping their hus-
bands do their job better.
On arrival at a new post, for instance, husband
can go right into an already functioning office, but
wife has to find and set up a new home and a new
life for herself and family under strange and
sometimes difficult circumstances. She has to as-
sume a heavy load of representational responsi-
bilities and obligations dictated by ever-present
protocol. Nevertheless she usually finds time to
indulge also in such typical American women's
activities as organizing and conducting charity
benefits and community betterment projects of all
kinds. It's no secret that a Foreign Service offi-
cer is judged not only on his own merits and de-
merits but also those of his wife.
Foreign Service children also deserve their
share of credit and praise. If they haven't been
bom abroad, they are reared in various foreign
777
lands. They start school in one language and
may go on to finish in a second or third; mean-
while, they have been learning to speak English
at home with their families. They have to learn
to make and lose friends with unexpected rapid-
ity, and home for them, too, is where they hang
their hats. Their good spirits and equanimity
in the face of the inevitable minor, if not major,
disasters that accompany this kind of semino-
madic existence are a constant source of inspira-
tion and comfort to us adults, I assure you. And
let's admit one of their most vital contributions :
Thanks to their quick proficiency in languages,
we parents often make shameful use of them as
interpreters until our trailing linguistic abilities
finally catch up.
I have tried in this siunmary scanning of the
United States Foreign Service to give you, as I
stated at the start, a factual account of its his-
tory, its mission, its members. Foreign Sei-vice
officers are no supermen, but neither are they
"cookie pushers." In full conscience they have
chosen to dedicate themselves to the loyal service
of their country, if need be, in farflung, isolated,
and disease-ridden posts. (Let me point out here
that over one-third of the 279 Foreign Service
posts have living conditions classified officially as
"hardship." Sixty percent have fewer than 15
American personnel.)
The Foreign Service of the Department of State
is in a very real sense the official "eyes and ears"
of the United States Government abroad ; it is, in
fact, our first line of defense in peacetime. For-
eign Service officers, if they have any request of
Americans at home, do not ask increased benefits
or higher salaries. They would rather receive
your moral support and confidence and possibly
a minimum of recognition as they wage peace and
defend freedom on distant ramparts for their fel-
low countrymen and all mankind.
President Heuss of Germany
To Visit United States
The Department of State announced on April
24 (press release 212) that arrangements had been
completed for the arrival at Washington on June
4 of Tlieodor Heuss, President of the Federal
Republic of Germany, who will visit the United
States at the invitation of President Eisenliower.
President Heuss and his party will remain in
Washington until Jime 7, when they will begin a
trip schedided to include visits to Philadelphia,
Pa., Hanover, N. H., Detroit, Mich., Chicago, 111.,
San Francisco, Calif., the Grand Canyon National
Park, Williamsburg and Charlottesville, Va., and
New York, N. Y. They will leave from New York
on June 23.
Mutual Security and World Trade
hy Deputy Under Secretary Dillon ^
For the past 10 years the rapidly developing
military might of the Soviet bloc has threatened
the peace and security of the world. Actually,
the threat of international communism has been
with us from the dawn of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics. To explain what I mean,
here are two statements made by Lenin shortly be-
fore his death in 1924. This is what he said :
As long as capitalism aud socialism exist, we cannot
live in peace ; in the end, one or the other will triumph — a
funeral dirge will be sung over the Soviet Republic or
world capitalism.
Now that statement covers a lot of territory —
the entire world. It refers to Great Britain and
France and Latin America and Asia as well as to
the United States.
But Lenin's other effort at prophecy was very
specific. Here it is:
First we will take Eastern Europe, next the masses of
Asia, and finally we will encircle the last bastion of
capitalism — the United States. We shall not have to
attack it ; it will fall like overripe fruit into our hands.
I don't need to point out to this audience that
the Soviet Union has accomplished the first step.
Alost of what the mapmakers called Eastern
Europe 20 years ago now lies behind the Iron Cur-
tain. And the Soviet Union is still following the
strategy and the doctrine laid down by Lenin
more than a quarter of a century ago.
The military potential of the Soviet Union to-
day is impressive. At their disposal is the largest
peacetime standing army in the history of the
world. They have a submarine fleet six times
larger than our own. Tactical and intermediate-
' Address made before the National Machine Tool Build-
ers' Association at Chicago, 111., on Apr. 24 (press release
209dated Apr. 23).
Departmsnt of Siafe Bulletin
range missiles with nuclear warheads back up this
menace. "We know that Soviet scientists are work-
ing around the clock to perfect an intercontinental
ballistic missile.
This is the military threat of international com-
munism.
We are countering this threat. Very briefly, I
would like to tell you how.
First, we have strengthened and modernized our
own military establislunent. The more than
2,600,000 men and women in the Army, Navy, Air
Force, and Marine Corps are equipped with the
latest nuclear weapons, atomic submarines, guided-
missile ships, fighters, bombers, and ballistic
missiles. This combined force, dispersed, ready
for action, and capable of instant retaliation, is a
mighty deterrent to any aggressor.
But we have not stopped there. The world to-
day is a world of interdependence among nations.
No nation — not even the United States — can go
it alone.
That is why we have joined with other nations
to further our mutual security against Commu-
nist military aggression. We have established mil-
itary alliances with 42 nations of the free world,
either through bilateral treaties such as those with
Japan and the Philippines or through multilat-
eral arrangements such as the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization and the Eio Pact with our
Latin American friends.
During the past 7 years the United States has
contributed $20 billion in mutual defense assist-
ance to its free-world allies. But — and this is the
significant point for the American citizen to fully
understand — during this same period our partners
in these defensive alliances have expended $122
billion of their own funds to develop and main-
tain their military strength. No one, therefore,
can honestly call our military assistance a give-
away program; and no one can deny that it is
mutual.
An equally important contribution of our allies
has been in making real estate available for our
joint defense. On the real estate loaned for Amer-
ican forces we have constructed more than 250
major overseas bases. From these bases the Stra-
tegic Air Command and the Navy can launch
forces capable of destroying any aggressor.
This power in being has earned the respect of
the Soviet Union. Mr. Khrushchev knows that,
because of the free-world defense system main-
tained by the United States and its allies, a third
world war would mean the end of civilization
rather than the victoi-y of commimism. The
Soviet leaders are realists. They know that civi-
lization is at the crossroads and that the survivors
of another war miglit be reduced to living in caves
and throwing rocks at each other.
Soviet Economic Offensive
The Kremlin rulers, well aware that new ef-
forts at military conquest could result in the de-
struction of the Soviet homeland, have neverthe-
less not changed their ultimate objective, which
is world domination. They have only shifted their
tactics. They have now added a new and formid-
able weapon to the Soviet arsenal. I am not re-
ferring to the earth satellites but to the Soviet
economic offensive. This got under way shortly
after the death of Stalin in 1953. It has been
gaining in momentum ever since.
The Soviet economic offensive is presented with
colorful propaganda. I would like to read to you
just one sentence from a statement made by a
Eussian delegate at the recent Afro-Asian Peo-
ples' Solidarity Conference in Cairo :
We are ready to help you as brother helps brother,
without any interest whatever, for we know from our own
experience how difficult it is to get rid of need.
Language such as this seems transparent to us.
We wonder how other people can believe these
soft words coming from the brutal oppressors of
Hungary. Unfortunately such blandishments are
too often believed in the less developed areas of
the world. For the Soviet leaders are not relying
upon propaganda alone. They have now launched
a massive program of trade and economic assist-
ance designed to swing the less developed coun-
tries into the Communist orbit.
Starting from zero in 1954, Soviet-bloc economic
assistance to the less developed nations had risen
to $1.6 billion by the end of 1957. Soviet-bloo
loans are being used to finance such projects as a
steel mill and electric power station in India ; ship-
yards and textile mills in Egypt ; a sugar factory
in Ceylon; and many other enterprises in these
and other less developed countries. The Soviet
bloc has also increased its trade with the less
developed nations from $840 million in 1954 to
about $1.7 billion in 1957 — more than double; and
the number of trade agreements signed has leaped
from 49 to 147.
May ?2, 1958
779
President Eisenhower in a message to Congress "
made it clear how we as Americans must regard
this new threat. Here is what the President said :
If the purpose of Soviet aid to any country were siraply
to help it overcome economic difficulties without infring-
ing its freedom, such aid could be welcomed as forward-
ing the free world purpose of economic growth. But there
is nothing in the history of international communism to
indicate this can be the case. Until such evidence is
forthcoming, we and other free nations must assume that
Soviet bloc aid is a new, subtle, and long-range instru-
ment directed toward the same old purpose of drawing
its recipient away from the community of free nations and
ultimately into the Communist orbit.
Now the greatest mistake we could make would
be to assume that this Soviet economic offensive
is something that "will pass in the night" — that
it is a "flash in the pan" — ^that it will peter out.
The industrial growth of the Soviet Union is
moving along at a pace more than twice that of
the United States. Their rate of industrial
gi-owth is 9 or 10 percent a year compared to
America's 4 percent. Five years from now Kus-
sia's industrial production may well reach a figure
of over $100 billion.
Despite their propaganda there are a nimiber
of things which the men in the Kremlin cannot
hide behind the Iron Curtain. The Soviets have
not tried to hide from us their determination to
weaken United States friendship with the newly
developing nations and at the same time increase
the dependence of these young nations on the
Soviet bloc.
Countering the Threat
Now, what are we doing under the mutual se-
curity program to counter this Soviet economic
threat?
Since "World War II, 20 new independent na-
tions have been created. These new countries
represent about 750 million people — almost one-
third of the world's population. Within their
boundaries lie immense natural resources, some
of them scarcely tapped.
These newly independent countries have lived
with poverty, disease, hunger, and despair since
the dawn of man. But in winning their inde-
pendence they have set in motion a powerful force.
It has been called the "revolution of rising ex-
pectations." These new nations know that the
' BxiLLETiN of Mar. 10, 1958, p.
780
rest of the world lives far better than they do.
Their own per capita income of about $75 a year
is barely sufficient to provide subsistence.
But despair has given way to hope and an im-
patient determination to find "a place in the sim."
Intense nationalism characterizes these young
nations. The leaders of these 750 million people
are being pressured to produce a higher standard
of living — and quickly. We are working with
these less developed nations in an effort to help
them help themselves.
They need higher levels of health, education,
and sanitation. They need to learn new methods
of agriculture, of irrigation, of conservation.
They need nurses, doctors, teachers, engineers,
administrators. Through our technical coopera-
tion program we are helping in all of these areas.
There are strong moral and humanitarian rea-
sons for this effort to bring these hundreds of mil-
lions of people into the community of modern free
nations. But there are even more compelling
reasons from a self-interest standpoint. If the
less developed countries should turn to commu-
nism in a mistaken effort to speed up their devel-
opment, our own security would be gravely en-
dangered. Moreover, this one-third of the earth's
population represents both a source of vitally
needed raw materials for our economy and a tre-
mendous potential market for the goods of
America, the world's largest trading nation.
Development Loan Fund
We are not trying to "prime the pump" of these
underdeveloped coimtries. We are helping them
to get the basic industry — the pump itself — for
them to prime. Most of these new countries do not
yet have the basic facilities required before they
can attract private "risk capital." They lack
good harbors, port facilities, roads, communica-
tions, power, railways.
To help meet the needs of these countries we
established late last year the Development Loan
Fund, as a part of the mutual security program.
Congress appropriated $300 million last year for
this fund, and this year we are requesting an ad-
ditional $625 million.
The Development Loan Fund lends money for
specific, economically sound, and technically feasi-
ble projects. It does not extend credit when other
financing is available on reasonable terms. It con-
centrates on long-range, economic-growth projects.
Department of State Bulletin
Ai)plications for more than $1.5 billion in such
projects are now being carefully screened.
The total budget for the mutual security pro-
gram for the coming fiscal year is $3,942 billion.
The military aspects of the program represent
about two-thirds of this total, and the economic
part the other third.
Now, in my talks and travels I get the impres-
sion that most Americans believe in the mutual
security program but feel that because of eco-
nomic troubles on the home front we may not be
able to afford the full program.
There are two fallacies to this line of reasoning.
First of all, this program is vital to our national
security, and the United States must always be
able to afford whatever it costs to maintain its
own security and freedom.
Second, the mutual security program is today
a very strong bulwark in our efforts to pull Amer-
ica out of the recession. Eighty cents of every
dollar spent on our mutual security program is
spent right here in the United States.
Here are a few figures showing purchases from
American farms and factories in just 1 year
under the MSP :
Irou and steel
Bread grains
Chemicals
Cotton
Motor vehicles
Petroleum
Coal
$35 million
$94 million
$25 million
$84 million
$20 million
$35 million
$20 million
— and military equipment, the sum of $1,443 bil-
lion. Now I am sure you gentlemen know that the
effect of these purchases is felt by hundreds of sub-
contractors and suppliers in every walk of Ameri-
can life, including, of course, your own very vital
industry.
As a matter of fact, in the last fiscal year the
International Cooperation Administration fi-
nanced the purchase by foreign governments of
$70 million worth of machinery and equipment,
including $2.5 million in machine tools. During
the current fiscal year ICA's financing of Ameri-
can machine-tool exports has already amounted
to $1,184,000.
In addition to these direct purchases the mutual
security program benefits other segments of the
economy. For example, United States flag ship-
pers received $58 million last year for carrying
MSP goods overseas.
Any cut in the sums requested for the mutual
security program will be reflected directly in
smaller orders for American factories. What
sense does this make at a time when we are striv-
ing to keep the wheels of industry turning? It
is estimated that about 600,000 jobs are directly or
indirectly due to the mutual security program.
This hardly seems the time to add these workers
to the ranks of the unemployed.
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Program
In connection with the hundi-eds of millions of
dollars of American-made goods that are shipped
abroad under the mutual security program, I
would like to say just a few words about the re-
ciprocal trade agreements program. As you
know, this is now before Congress for renewal.
I know that this industry is concerned about
machine-tool imports. Mr. Olsen and Mr. Lun-
dell, who are here from the Department of
Commerce, are experts in the field of machine
tools, and I am not ; but I would like for you to
consider two or three facts.
Trade statistics show that machine-tool imports
to the United States increased from $22 million m
1954 to $36 million in 1957, but U.S. exports of
machine tools increased during this same period
from $121.5 million to $183 million. This industry
not only has an export balance of $147 million, but
this balance is actually larger than it was in 1954,
when it was only $99.5 million.
Under the reciprocal trade agreements program
the United States has become the largest exporter
and the largest importer in the world. In 1957
our exports totaled $19.5 billion while imports
were $13 billion.
AVe often hear about import competition in this
country, but we seldom hear the other side of the
story. For example, in the month of February,
114 Japanese textile concerns went bankrupt.
Now I am not asking you to worry about these
114 firms or about the thousands of employees who
lost their jobs when these concerns closed their
doors. But the cold algebra of trade shows that
Japan is our second best export customer — better
than a billion-dollar-a-year customer. And when
a billion-dollar-a-year customer shows signs of
sickness, we had better take an interest.
Japan desperately needs a "smoothing out" of
her trade relations with the United States. Last
May 12, 1958
781
year her trade deficit with the United States was
$624 million. Japan is the most industrialized
nation in Asia, and the Japanese are a dependable
ally in the Far East. The situation in which
Japan finds herself— 90 million people to support
in an area less than the size of California and with
few natural resources — illustrates vividly the
interrelationship between trade and defense.
I use Japan only as an illustration. We could
move around the world and point to many others —
in "Western Europe, in Latin America, in Asia.
Wherever we look, we find that international trade
is of vital interest to nations whose well-being and
security is essential to our own. Trade and na-
tional security cannot be separated in the modern
world.
To safeguard the Nation's defense through ef-
fective alliances while at the same time adequately
protecting American business interests is the chal-
lenge we face. I believe that the reciprocal trade
agreements program with its built-in protections
can accomplish both purposes. I believe, too, that
if the businessmen of the United States lose con-
fidence in their ability to meet world competition,
at home and abroad, we will see the new nations
move one by one into the Soviet orbit, taking with
them resources vital to our own economy. This
would leave America encircled and beleaguered.
Eventually it would mean the end of the freedom
we hold so dear.
This is the problem. The stakes were never
higher. We face a ruthless and determined foe.
The machine-tool industry has played a major
role in the history of this country, in peace and
in war. To win this economic struggle with the
Soviet Union we will need from you all the skills,
all the resourcefulness, all the ingenuity, and all
the daring which you can summon.
Above all we need from you and from every
American industry renewed confidence — confi-
dence in the free-enterprise system and confidence
in the trading system that has made us the envy
of the world. This cold war is one for America's
businessmen to win. It is down our alley. I have
unbounded faith in the outcome.
U.S. Sends Medical Supplies
to East Pakistan
The Department of State annoimced on April
23 (press release 208) that the United States is
sending emergency medical supplies to East Pak-
istan to help combat serious outbreaks there of
smallpox and cholera.
The shipments, which have already started by
commercial air express, are in response to a re-
quest from the Government of East Pakistan,
which is the most populous section of the Repub-
lic of Pakistan. Pakistan is comprised of the two
provinces of East Pakistan and West Pakistan,
which are separated by 1,000 miles of Indian ter-
ritory. No outbreaks of the diseases have been
i-eported from West Pakistan.
Reports from Dacca, provincial capital of East
Pakistan, indicate that the incidence of the dis-
eases in the eastern province has reached as many
as 1,900 cases of smallpox in one week, with about
750 deaths, and 330 cases of cholera with more
than 200 deaths in the same period. The reports
describe the outbreaks as epidemic in proportion.
The medical supplies being procured by the
International Cooperation Administration for
air express to East Pakistan include 6 million
doses of smallpox vaccine, 1 million tablets of
sulfadiazine, 1 million tablets of sulfaguanidine,
and 12,000 hypodermic needles.
Depar/menf of State Bulletin
Atoms for Power: International Status
hy Robert McKinney
U.S. Representative to the Inteimational Atomic Energy Agency ■
I have been asked to si^eak on some of the broad
international political and economic implications
of atomic power. A few prefatory remarks about
the new world organization in this field would
therefore seem in order.
The charter of the International Atomic Energy
Agency is the product of unanimous agreement be-
tween 82 nations which belong to the United Na-
tions or its specialized agencies. At present it
has been ratified by the governments of 65 nations.
We are an independent world agency, autonomous,
and associated with but not a subsidiary of the
United Nations.
We are not a political assembly. We are not a
trade association. We are a technical operation
which may eventually pay its own way. Depend-
ing on the particular circumstance, we may func-
tion as manufacturer, wholesaler, distributor,
broker, as purveyor of scientific, technical, engi-
neering, auditing, or financial services, or as a re-
search complex.
The Agency will sponsor research throughout
the world, it will assist in reactor construction,
and it will handle isotopes and reactor fuels. Un-
doubtedly at a later period it will have its own
processing and storage plant. International regu-
lation of waste disposal and establishment of
radiological standards are Agency business. The
Agency will conduct an extensive training pro-
gram aimed particularly at developing a body of
atomic specialists in the less advanced countries
able to carry on their national programs.
Let us think of the International Atomic Energy
Agency, therefore, as a business, as a new but
practical venture in which the member nations
'Address made before the Southwestern Assembly,
sponsored by the Riee Institute, at Bracketville, Tex., on
Apr. 18 (press release 196 dated Apr. 16).
have invested in the firm expectation that we will
earn a good return.
I should note that only 9 out of 65 member na-
tions, 3 out of 23 governors, and 4 out of 26 senior
Agency officials are from Iron Curtain countries.
Certainly our balance of geographical representa-
tion will make ideological subversion most difficult.
If the performance during our first 6 months is
any indication, I believe the board members and
Agency officers now working together will surprise
us by their progress. And our high enthusiasm
cannot help but bring about an understanding
which will make itself strongly felt in negotiations
among our member nations in other fields.
Atomic Training
The relatively few people now at work in atomic
fields throughout the world largely chose their
vocations and finished their university training
before nuclear energy had been given much at-
tention by our basic educational systems. In con-
sequence, many of those now pioneering on this
exciting frontier have entered from other fields,
often too late and with too little background for
their own fullest attainment and satisfaction.
Our hopes for the future must rest on our abil-
ity to interest young people in science and engi-
neering, particularly in the peaceful uses of atomic
energy. The attractions are many and great. Al-
ready atomic energy has attracted some of the
world's most brilliant minds. Yet I am convinced
that the really gi-eat figures of the atomic age are
still to come. It is the young men and women in
high school and college laboratories today who
will be the Nobel Prize winners of tomorrow.
And some of them will undoubtedly owe the prizes
for their atomic discoveries to the training pro-
grams the IAEA is establishing today.
hAay 72, 1958
783
Many countries have already made construc-
tive contributions to the Agency's training pro-
grams. For our part the United States has con-
tributed $1 million in fellowships. We plan to
contribute a research reactor and laboratory fa-
cilities. Such essentials as these are not "give-
aways." Instead they represent a planned and
balanced scheduling of the things we have to do
today to insure that the next generation of nu-
clear workers will be equal to their tasks.
The Less Advanced Countries
The Agency statute specifically charges us with
a responsibility for assisting the less advanced
countries with their atomic programs for electric
power, medicine, agriculture, industry, and re-
search. New and underdeveloped nations are
acutely conscious of the potential benefits of
atomic energy. They are resolved that they shall
not be passed over by the atomic age as they feel
they were by the industrial revolution. Eegard-
less of the poverty of their means, they aspire to
earn their share and not be petitioners for an
atomic dole. Anxiety that nuclear energy was
destined to become just one more big-power ad-
vantage explains why the President's creative
pi'oposal of 4 years ago for creation of the Agency
uncovered such abundant response.
We hope to give these countries the benefit of
our long and costly experience in nuclear develop-
ment. A pooling effort such as the Agency pro-
vides will mean for these countries a great saving
in time, resources, and money.
The Need for Atomic Power
Evei-ywhere, every day, need for electricity is
growing, 2:)articularly in fuel-shoi-t nations. For
example, Italy, with 12 million kilowatts of elec-
tric generating capacity now installed, sees her
liower demand doubling in 9 years. Turkey,
which has only one-half million kilowatts of in-
stalled capacity, sees her requirements doubling
in less than 5 years. Careful surveys of future
jiower requirements in many countries convince
us that the world demand for electric power would
at least double over the next 10 years — given any
expectation of meeting that demand.
Without atomic power that expectation cannot
be fulfilled. Four out of every ten people in the
784
world live in countries where any significant ex-
pansion of electric output is impossible unless that
expansion is based on the uncertainty of imported
fuels. As I see it, this means that through the
Agency and otherwise we must stimulate the early
construction of civilian atomic power plants
abroad in as many countries as are able to make use
of them.
The essential raw material of the Agency is nu-
clear fuel for firing civilian atomic power plants
abroad. We will not have carried out one of the
main charges laid upon the Agency by our found-
ing nations unless and vmtil we have made civil-
ian atomic power an important contributor to the
energy needs of a world at peace. If all goes well,
by far the largest part of our business will be
eventually devoted to dealing in one way or
another with enriched and natural uranium, with
thorium and plutonium.
Here for the first time, by international agree-
ment, we liave at hand the means for furnishing
dependable supplies of nuclear fuels and reactor
materials to fill the world's otherwise inevitable
energy deficit. Certainly there is no comparable
international organization which can assume long-
term obligations for supply of conventional
fuels — that is, of oil and coal — stable in quantity
and stable in price. So, when viewed in perspec-
tive, the Agency takes on truly great significance.
World Technological Leadership
The goal of the United States must be to main-
tain and contiiniously make visible world tech-
nological leadership in all fields. If we are the
first to make civilian atomic power cheap, safe,
and simple, we will have won an important ad-
vantage in this struggle. But if another nation
does so first, the defeat will be even more impor-
tant, for it could be taken, by extension, as evi-
dence that we are no longer first in the military
atomic field. This is true because atomic military
developments are necessarily shrouded in secrecy.
There can, however, be firsthand observation of
atomic supremacy in the peaceful uses of atomic
energJ^ The degree of leadership displayed in
civilian atomic energy may be projected by many
into estimates of military nuclear strength.
Because of tlie way world opinion works, it
seems to me necessary for the United States to
establish and hold world leadership in civilian
Departmenf of Sfaie BuUefin
:U(iiiiic power as a cornerstone to technological
leadership because we want to do all we can to
insure that our military atomic capability remains
a deterrent to aggression. It is essential that the
world be kept aware of this leadership. In this
endeavor there can be no better evidence of leader-
ship than reactors of American design or fired
with American fuels feeding electricity into
light globes and electric motors throughout the
world. Over the long run news stories of new re-
actors built abroad will do more than news stories
from weapons proving grounds.
And the task of demonstrating leadership in
nuclear power development is one which our
friends and allies in the free world must help to
bear. For our pait we can provide people, know-
how, and materials for research and development
and testing; we have built and can continue to
build demonstration plants here in the United
States. For their i^art our friends and allies must,
by building additional demonstration plants, help
gather the body of broad operating experience
which can only come from actually running on-
the-line atomic power stations. Our friends can-
not, and I am sure they will not, sit back and play
no part in this competition. The stakes are as
high for them as they are for us. Nor can any of
us do our parts by often establishing goals for
atomic power development but seldom starting
actual construction.
The Icepack Begins To Break
The reactor construction programs which are
now shaping up in Western Europe, Great
Britain, and Japan give promise that the icepack
in which atomic power has long been frozen is
finally breaking and that international collabora-
tion will give great impetus to these and other
programs for civilian atomic power, leading to
actual on-the-line operation of more civilian re-
actors at an earlier date than was thought pos-
sible even a few months ago.
An extensive market is beginning to take defi-
nite form, and American industry's stake in it is
real. Because the International Atomic Energy
Agency will be an international focal point for all
these projects, by assuring that potential weapons
materials are accounted for and through other
forms of support and assistance, the Agency can-
not help but be a focal point in the American
atomic energy industry. In one or another of the
Agency's activities throughout the world our
presently suffering atomic industrialists will see
new markets and new help to their salesmen.
But the manufacturing volume implied by the
growth of civilian atomic power programs
throughout the world is only part of the benefits
the United States can expect. International col-
laboration in the peaceful uses of atomic energy
invariably and inevitably is accomplished by a
further release from the restraints of atomic se-
crecy. Perhaps the most noteworthy example oc-
curred in connection with the first Geneva con-
ference in 1955. I feel confident that the second
Geneva conference will be the occasion for further
presentation of new data on exploitation of both
fission and possible fusion power. And there can
be no doubt that the efl'ect of our joint activities
in Vienna, as need is demonstrated and confidence
gained, will be the gradual but positive broaden-
ing of existing atomic knowledge and the genera-
tion of new knowledge.
Problems of Reactor Development
As I said a moment ago, what we need most of
all to speed our search for low-cost reactors is a
large body of actual operating data from plants
designed for civilian purposes. We all know the
difficulties involved in dealing with new systems
as expensive as reactors. Every atomic decision,
by business or government, has many ramifications.
How will the i-esearch and development be fi-
nanced? "What about fuel costs and buy-back
prices ? Who should have first crack at being per-
mitted to sponsor specific projects ? Should pub-
lic-power enterprises be given priority, or should
they bid competitively against private utility sys-
tems ? "Wliere should the first reactors be located ?
Wliat are the potential hazards to people who live
near these reactors, and how should these risks be
insured ?
In our United States program each atomic power
demonstration plant is a special case, characterized
by its own special problems and special design.
A few precedents are being established in limited
areas, but the large sums of money involved make
it imperative that, until our experience is bi'oader,
these precedents be regarded as part of a develop-
mental and transitional phase of the progress
toward economic nuclear power.
May 72, 7958
785
Advantages of an International Program
Not all problems of domestic recictor develop-
ment apply in making decisions about atomic
power programs abroad. Yet reactor-operating
data developed abroad would make a marked con-
tribution to the body of technical knowledge and
fund of operating experience required to hasten
low-cost atomic jiower here in the United States.
Such an international atomic power demonstra-
tion program, however, carries with it the further
important values I touched upon before.
International development of nuclear power,
under the American and now the Agency concept,
will be accompanied by the means of insuring
against diversion to military purposes. This re-
quires a sound and certain inspection system. Our
proposals to this effect during negotiation of the
statute were first received with misunderstanding
and apprehension by many governments. Yet
in the end it was unanimously acknowledged that
such controls were indispensable to an atmosphere
of mutual confidence in which the peaceful uses
of atomic energy could flourish.
What International Inspection Means
The nations which foimded the IAEA were
willing to pay the price for controls, even if it
included outside audit. What was achieved was
indeed a political breakthrough. For the first
time East and West agreed that an international
body should have an insjiection system as an in-
tegral jjart of enforcing international agreements.
Foreseeing the growth of civilian atomic power
throughout the world, our statute provides that
the Agency inspectors "shall have access at all
times to all places and data and to any person who
by reason of his occupation deals with materials,
equipment, or facilities which are required by this
statute to be safeguarded, as necessary to account
for source and special fissionable materials sup-
plied and fissionable products and to determine
whether there is compliance with the undertaking
against use in furtherance of any military
purpose. . . ."2
Already have the somewhat teclmical phrases
of the Agency statute covering safeguards been
spelled out in black and white in this world's great
'For text of IAEA statute, see Bulletin of Nov. 19,
1956, p. 820.
languages. To men like you, their deep meaning
requires no interpretation. But let me para-
phrase them in the basic language of hope, so that
men in tlie street do not find themselves over-
whelmed by the scare headlines of the space age :
We now have the prospect that men and women
everywhere can watch the building up of supplies
of nuclear fuels in the hands of their neighbors
or even of their potential enemies without fear
that they will be used as weapons against them.
For this interpretation of our statute into the
language of hope to achieve its full meaning, the
International Atomic Energy Agency must and
will now get on with the task of designing spe-
cific procedures which will be workable and com-
patible with teclmical and economic considera-
tions. The criteria employed in the system so
designed I am sure will have worldwide applica-
tion. Compatible standards must be applied not
only in Agency projects but also in atomic plants
brought into being under regional or bilateral ar-
rangements. This step is a matter of the highest
priority because it can lead eventually to our real
goal of universal atomic inspection. Looking to
this ultimate goal, we will press for early coordi-
nation by the Agency's Board of Governors of
measures to develop a materials-accountability
program, including the important first step of
training Agency inspector personnel.
Civilian Atomic Power vs. Military Stockpiles
As I come toward the end of my remarks, I
should like to summarize and emphasize the rea-
sons why civilian atomic power is one of the main
product lines of the International Atomic Energy
Agency.
One reason is that atomic power holds promise
of becoming profitable because it alone can make
available an extensive new energy source to fuel-
short, energy-hungry nations.
Another reason is the significant considera-
tion that, if fissionable materials in substantial
amounts are devoted to the generation of civilian
atomic power under an arms-control agreement,
the world can create a device — backed up by a
real profit motive — which will siphon off nuclear
materials from weapons stockpiles. This will not
only lessen military potentials throughout the
world ; it will convert an extremely costly compo-
nent of these militai-y potentials — fissionable ma-
Department of Sfafe Bulletin
terials — from a sterile status into a status of fi-
nancial gain and economic benefit.
There is a third important reason. There must
bo uniform, worldwide rules for health and
safety in the atomic field in order to remove this
controversial subject from the arena of national
political bias and ideological propaganda. When
mankind intrudes on nature's balance of matter,
there sometimes result dangerous sources of radi-
ation, the malignancy of which cannot be extin-
guished or shortened. The most extreme form
of radiation danger would, of course, arise from
a war fought with nuclear weapons. Certainly
hazards inherent in using radiation to treat or
diagnose man's diseases, accidents involving
atomic plants, or in weapons tests, for that mat-
ter, would be microscopic by comparison. In this
problem of radiation we will all agree that the
world must move into every aspect of the atomic
age with caution, lest we open a Pandora's box
to plague our children.
It takes all kinds of people to make a world —
even to make a single field such as atomic energy.
In the West many people are working to bring
forth to fruition the promise of peaceful applica-
tions of the atom. I am sure there are some folks
on the other side of the Iron Curtain who want to
do the same thing.
There can only be one answer on either side of
the Iron Curtain to the problem of controlling
hazards of radiation. That answer is obvious,
simple, and direct : practical and feasible interna-
tional standards strictly enforced. That the
International Atomic Energy Agency is the pio-
neer in the field of world atomic regulation and is
empowered by its statute to move broadly in the
entire field of radiation hazards is genuine cause
for worldwide enthusiasm about this new organi-
zation.
I do not mean to imply by what I have said here
tonight that civilian atomic power is any panacea.
I would be the first to agree that, by itself, civilian
atomic power is certainly not the answer to the
world's quest for peace. Our quest for peace will
test our genius to develop many different but com-
plementary mechanisms. If we do succeed in
ending the threats to civilization inherent in atomic
war — and we must — we will owe our success to the
sum total of the workable mechanisms which we
devise. Here we lay open the fundamental
Moy 72, J 958
problem of our age — that progress in human tech-
nology has seriously outstripped progress in hu-
man relations. While science has led the way to
new conquests in both the microcosmos and the
macrocosmos, with pushbutton war ever more
feasible, the nature of international relations is
such that we can expect no equivalent mockup for
pushbutton peace. Our hopes boil down to the
hope for political breakthroughs by men intent on
achieving international understanding.
Some folks think the United States objective of
diverting fissionable materials from military to
peaceful uses is no more than a pious, unattain-
able dream. Because of what I have already seen
of the Agency's operation, however, I do not share
these doubts. I have been convinced by the evi-
dence. Bit by bit this evidence piles up in the
earnest conversations among earnest men about
what we have been thinking in long, wakeful
flights to Vienna from Ankara, Karachi, Djakarta,
Seoul, Tokyo, Washington, Rio de Janeiro, Stock-
holm, London, Paris, Rome, Bucharest, and
Moscow. None can realize better than we the great
pressures on the nations most advanced in nuclear
technology — that is, on those nations now able to
make weapon materials in quantity — to get on with
concrete action for using substantial amounts of
these weapon materials for civilian atomic power.
These pressures come not only from the forces of
world opinion ; they come also from the deep, dia-
strophic forces of history.
By itself and alone, propaganda can make no
answer to these pressures. They will intensify
until countered by action. And the climax of these
forces and counterforces approaches because the
world has now created in "Vienna a proving ground
in which the technical prowess and the moral de-
termination of the great powers are on permanent,
continuous, open demonstration in side-by-side
comparison for judgment by men of all nations.
This proving ground is no place for disembodied
promises. Like the proving ground of any other
practical business, it must be filled by real, live
products which people can see and touch. Because
the world has the Agency as a proving ground,
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will not be
able to convince anybody that its known allocations
of uranium 235 to civilian purposes, and particu-
larly the 50 kilograms offered to the Agency, are
in any way comparable to the dedication by the
787
United States of America of 100,000 kilograms to
these uses. Half of our commitment is earmarked
for power plants abroad. Five thousand kilo-
grams is our commitment to start the IAEA in
business, and we have also offered to match the
commitments of other nations until mid-1960.
No juggling with figures can overcome the sig-
nificance of this offer. In fact, as a result of side-
by-side comparison at the Agency proving ground,
the world has begun to realize that the Soviet offer
to contribute to the growth of international
civilian atomic power must be increased — sub-
stantially increased. Otherwise the parsimonious
offer of reactor fuel and the Soviet claim that they
have curtailed tlieir military potential by suspend-
ing weapons tests, standing side by side, will make
each other look hollower with every passing day.
And if the world had at hand a like oppor-
tunity for comparison and inspection in the mili-
tary atomic field, it would soon leani that the
Soviet pronouncement now current in the head-
lines is only the peculiar way of saying, Moscow
style, that Russian bomb experts must return to
shop and laboratory to work on their 1959 and
1960 models. Only by this process of continuing,
open comparison in both peaceful and military
atomic fields will the U.S.S.E. be forced into bona
fide agreements, enforceable by inspection.
Conclusion
How great have been the peaceful atomic
achievements of the United States the world is
only now beginning even faintly to understand.
These achievements, however, will become visible
to the world at large as the International Atomic
Energy Agency moves toward its objective of ap-
plying the peaceful atomic achievements of all
nations on a worldwide scale.
Success in this endeavor could eventually point
the way to intei-national cooperation on the limi-
tation of nuclear armaments.
Establishing international standards for health
and safety of workers, communities, and nations
involved in reactor operation leads logically to
international studies of general radiation hazards.
Misuses for propaganda poison the wellsprings
of every household in the world. I therefore hope
that it is as clear to you as it is clear to me that.
just as the threat to peace lies in the hostile uses of
atomic energy, our real promise lies in the peaceful
President Asks Reexamination
of Cotton Import Quota
White House press release dated April 8
The President has requested the U.S. Tariff
Commission to reexamine the quota upon imports
of cotton having a staple length of fi/g inches or
more. The President asked the Commission to
determine whether changed circumstances require
the modification of the quota to carry out the pur-
poses of section 22 of the Agricultural Adjust-
ment Act, as amended. The Commission will in-
clude in its consideration the possible subdivision
of the quota on such bases as physical quality,
value, or use.
President's Letter to Chairman of Tariff Commission
Dear Mr. Chairman : I have been advised by
the Secretary of Agriculture that changed cir-
cumstances require modification of the quota es-
tablished under Section 22 of the Agricultural
Adjustment Act, as amended, upon cotton having
a staple length of 1% inches or more.
The changed circumstances are the entry within
the quota of large and increasing quantities of
Mexican upland cotton having staple lengths of
less than 1% inches. This results in the exclu-
sion of substantial quantities of cotton having a
staple length of 1% inches or more.
The United States Tariff Commission is re-
quested to undertake an investigation under Sec-
tion 22 (d) of the Agricultural Adjustment Act,
as amended, and re-examine the quota upon cotton
having a staple length of li/s inches or more to
determine whether changed circumstances require
the modification of the quota to carry out the pur-
poses of Section 22. The Commission should in-
clude in its consideration the possible subdivision
of the quota on the basis of physical qualities, value,
use, or other basis. The Commission's findings
should be completed as soon as practicable.
Smcerely,
DwaOIIT D. ElSENHO-\VEH
Department of Sfafe Bulletin
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
Tenth Anniversary of the OEEC
hy Under Secretary Herter '
It is with great pleasure that I bring you on
this memorable occasion greetings and congratu-
lations from President Eisenhower and Secretary
of State Dulles.
We in the United States have felt ourselves
particularly close to the OEEC. This is partly
because tlie OEEC was originated in response to
United States efforts to help Europe in its eco-
nomic recovery after World War II. But it is
also a recognition of the important part the
OEEC has played and continues to play in fur-
thering the stability and strength of the free
world.
The 10th anniversary of the OEEC is an es-
pecially happy occasion for me personally. It
was my good fortune to play a small part in the
work which created the OEEC and helped West-
ern Europe on its way to the remarkable recovery
which has taken place in the last 10 years. In
June 1947, when General Marshall made his his-
toric call for cooperation in solving the imminent
and ominous problems with which the nations of
Europe were faced, I was serving in the House of
Representatives of the United States Congress.
Several montlis earlier I had filed a resolution for
the creation of a special committee of the House
of Representatives to make a study of the needs
of the European nations for assistance from the
United States as well as the impact of such as-
sistance on the domestic economy of the United
States.
After General Marshall's speech tlie Congress
took up my resolution and some weeks later passed
it by a large bipartisan vote. The committee was
authorized to travel to Europe to make its studies,
' Address made at official ceremonies observing the lOtli
anniversary of the founding of the Organization for
European Economic Cooperation at Paris on Apr. 2.5
(press release 215 dated Apr. 24) .
May J 2, J 958
and I had the honor to be appointed vice chairman
of that committee and, in the absence of the chair-
man, to lead it on its mission abroad. At that
time it was our privilege to work very closely
with many of you who are here today. In our
study of Western Europe's needs and potentiali-
ties we came unanimously to the inescapable con-
clusion that only through cooperation, through
working closely together, shoulder to shoulder,
could the countries of Europe bring their econo-
mies to the point where they would again meet
the needs of their peoples and, equally important,
go on to meet these peoples' growing aspirations.
I remember in particular in those days the hope-
lessness that was felt by many people, both in
my country and in Europe, who feared the situ-
ation in Europe was already beyond remedy.
There were those who argued that we should do
nothing because nothing could be done — that the
situation in Western Europe had deteriorated to
a point where its economy and political structure
alike would inevitably collapse. It sounds odd to-
day, but there were even a few people who shrank
from the idea of a powerful initiative to cure
the situation, on the grounds that a joint Western
effort of this kind might give offense to the Soviet
Union. Fortunately we did not listen to the coun-
sels of despair and timidity. We were firmly
convinced then — as we are today — that Western
civilization has both the jight of survival and the
means of survival.
At this point I would like to point out a his-
torical fact of some significance. The initiatives
which came from the United States Government
through General Marshall and the visits made
by tlie members of the committee of whicli I was
acting chairman contemplated that aid fur-
nished by the United States should be available
to all the nations of Europe. The Soviet Gov-
ernment decreed that this should not be and so
exercised its influence that including the nations
of Eastern Europe was rendered impossible.
From that time the division of Eastern Europe
and Western Europe can be clearly dated.
789
In April of 1948 the Congress of the United
States adopted the Economic Cooperation Act.
The nations of Western Europe welcomed this
action and responded a few days later by estab-
lishing the Organization for European Economic
Cooperation. Thus was provided a formal
framework for the cooperative eilorts that had
already begun during the preceding months.
Continuing Usefulness of OEEC
In creating the OEEC, the countries of West-
ern Europe recognized the need to solve their
economic problems as a group, to permit exam-
ination of their national economic policies in a
European forum, and to remove barriers to trade.
The usefulness of the Organization tlierefore did
not end when, in the ensuing years, the economic
recovery program reached and surpassed its
goals. The value of coojieration in the economic
field had been made so evident that the Organi-
zation became the framework for vital new pro-
grams for freeing trade and payments among the
member countries and for finding joint solutions
to many of the common problems that stood in the
way of Europe's pi'ogress.
I cannot in this brief message hope to cover
fully, or even to mention, all of the aspects of the
OEEC's work that have fostered the well-being
and the spirit of cooperation of Western Europe
and the entire Atlantic Community. The
OEEC's many committees, working groups, and
other subsidiary bodies have all contributed in
full measure to this overall goal. Tlie work of
the Organization touches on almost every sphere
of European economic endeavor, and we recognize
and appreciate its versatility and efficiency.
I do want to mention, however, the OEEC's
great accomplishments in the liberalization of
trade among the member countries. By coor-
dination and persuasion it has played a major role
in swelling European trade and in setting goals
for the removal of barriers to commerce within
Western Europe. We sincerely hope that all of
the member nations will be able to move rapidly
toward the fulfillment of those goals. We be-
lieve at the same time that it is in the interest of
all that this freedom from restriction should be
extended as rapidly as possible to imports from
other areas of the world.
New payments arrangements were a necessary
corollary to this increased international flow of
790
goods. The European Payments Union has
proven itself to be a valuable instrument, not only
by facilitating the financial aspects of European
recovery but also by providing a forum within
which the financial problems of the member coun-
tries could be thoroughly explored and means of
assistance agreed on in times of general and in-
dividual crisis and need.
Since the peaceful conquest of the atom is of
such importance to us all, I would also like to pay
brief tribute to OEEC work in this field, cul-
minating in the recent establishment of the
European Nuclear Energy Agency. The United
States wishes the agency well and hopes to par-
ticipate as may be appropriate in activities under-
taken under its aegis.
There are two other phases of the OEEC's
current activity that are of particular interest
to my own country at this time.
There are, first, the efforts that the member
countries have made together, with the support of
the United States, to apply the tools of produc-
tivity to the age-old problem of producing goods
in greater abundance and at prices within the
reach of all. The participants in the program
of the European Productivity Agency have
demonstrated their increasing interest as the po-
tentialities of these techniques have become ap-
parent. I am sure that we shall develop an in-
creasingly close and fruitful collaboration in the
field — to the benefit of all.
There are also the steps that we are taking with
you in the scientific manpower program, which
is aimed at developing one of our inestimably
precious resources — our specialists, trained in
the vital fields of science and technology, and our
young people looking forward to service in these
spheres. Here also cooperation in education and
utilization is essential and will lead to greater
strength, prosperity, and security for all of our
countries.
In addition to the obvious practical accomplish-
ments of the OEEC, it has had other less tangible
but equally significant results. To men faced with
a disintegrating economy and society it opened
vistas of hope. The continued achievements of
the OEEC gave courage and pride and a renewed
sense of destiny to many people in many Euro-
pean countries. These people had felt previously
that they were floundering in an effoi't to find
solutions to their national problems rather than
Deparfment of State Bulletin
moving with purpose and direction. The suc-
cess of this mutual undertaking instilled a heart-
ening confidence in men that common problems
could be solved by a common will and by co-
operative efforts. And it created a resolve that
such will and such efforts should not be lacking
in the future.
U.S. Interest in OEEC
The United States has maintained a deep in-
terest in the OEEC since its inception. In addi-
tion to watching its progress with much satisfac-
tion, the United States has closely associated it-
self with the work of the Organization and has,
wherever appropriate, participated regularly and
with deep interest in its activities. This sym-
pathetic interest in the activities of the OEEC
has been founded on the same recognition of the
need for unity and strength in Europe that
prompted our initiative in 1947. This has in fact
constituted for many years a central feature of
our foreign policy.
It is in this context that we have given our
strong support to the historic efforts of six of the
European nations to find in economic integration
a basis for increasing political unity. This sup-
port continues as these countries now enter a new
stage in their progi'ess toward unity — the success-
ful establislunent of two new European com-
mimities, one in the field of broad economic inte-
gration, the other in the vital area of nuclear en-
ergy development. Tlie understanding, confi-
dence, and experience which have developed in
building the OEEC surely contributed substan-
tially to the later formation of the European Coal
and Steel Community and more recently to the
European Economic Community and to EURA-
TOM.
It is in this same context of support for Euro-
pean unity that I wish also to emphasize the deep
interest of the United States in the patient, imag-
inative, and constructive efforts now under way
within the OEEC framework to establish a sys-
tem of association between the other 11 countries
of the Organization and the 6-nation European
Economic Community. We hope that these ef-
forts will result in multilateral arrangements, mu-
tually satisfactory to the member countries, that
will lead in time to a broader union. We trust
that, in the interests of Europe and of other areas,
May 72, 7958
the arrangements will be such as to promote a
long-term expansion of trade with the rest of the
world in keeping with our common international
obligations. The United States has given strong
support to every postwar proposal which has held
promise of strengthening Europe economically
and reinforcing its cohesion, thereby strengthen-
ing the free world. In keeping with this general
aim I wish to state here today that the United
States warmly supports the European Free Trade
Area negotiations and wishes them success.
Looking ahead now for a moment we can fore-
see a future that offers the hope of untold benefits
for mankind. Many things remain to be done,
however. Our first task is to preserve both the
principle and the fact of cooperation. There will
always be some people, both in Europe and in
America, who will try to deal with any economic
problem or difficulty by headlong retreat into iso-
lation. But, if the Western World learned any-
thing from the painful period between the two
World Wars, it learned the utter insanity of this
kind of approach. I am sure we all recognize
today that there is no longer such a thing as self-
sufficiency. None of us can hope to solve eco-
nomic problems without the cooperation of
others.
By preserving and extending the cooperation
we have so successfully acliieved we can approach
with confidence our second great task — the main-
tenance and progressive improvement of our
overall economic health. A sound and expand-
ing economic life is not only essential to the hap-
piness and well-being of our peoples but also to
their security and, in fact, to their very survival.
In a world threatened by the danger of subver-
sion as well as the danger of military aggi-ession,
we cannot afford economic weakness any more
than we can afford military weakness. We must
work together to develop our resources, to pro-
mote the flow of free- world trade, to build up our
scientific and technological capabilities, to solve
our fiscal problems, and to do all the otlier things
tliat may be needed to assure the material and
spiritual strength upon which Western civiliza-
tion depends.
Finally, we must stand ready to use our own
strength to help build political and economic
strength in other parts of the free world. We
can never consider ourselves secure as long as
many areas of the earth still suffer poverty, sick-
791
ness, and ignorance. The encouragement of eco-
nomic and technical development in these areas
is not a job for any one of us alone but for all of
the industrialized countries who are interested in
promoting the true welfare and independence of
these areas. It is our duty to share with the
peoples of less developed countries the fruits of
our technological advancement and to help them
achieve their potential for development and
growth. In this way we will not only enable
these peoples to withstand the malevolent forces
loose in today's world but will also be building a
positive relationship between them and our-
selves— a relationship that will serve our mutual
interests for many years to come.
Mr. Chairman, distinguished guests, let me
extend to the OEEC once more our sincere con-
gratulations and best wishes on the successful
conclusion of its first 10 years. May the Organi-
zation continue to fulfill its evolving role in Eu-
rope for many years to come. Ajid may our
association with it continue to be as fruitful and
cordial as it has been during the past decade.
U.S. Participation in Work of ECE
Statement hy Heni^ J. Heinz II ^
I wish to take advantage of your earlier invita-
tion to the delegates to make general statements
concerning the work of the committees even
though we have now passed to the discussion of
the work of the individual committees. I think
the United States has demonstrated by its cooper-
ation in the work of these committees the imjjor-
tance which it attaches to their endeavors, and I
wish to join the other delegates in expressing our
appreciation for the excellent work produced by
the chairman and members of these committees
and by the secretariat.
We have no specific proposal to make at this
time with regard to the work of the committees
in general but will be more precise about the re-
ports of the individual committees at the appro-
priate time. However, since the delegate of the
U.S.S.R. took the occasion on this item on the
■ Made at the 13th session of the Economic Commission
for Europe at Geneva, Switzerland, on Apr. 11. Mr.
Heinz was U.S. delegate to the 13th session.
agenda to make some very general comments on
the work of the Commission itself, I do wish to
comment briefly on certain points he made.
The representative of the U.S.S.R. referred to
his Government's desire for peace and supported
this by reference to certain proposals which his
Government has made. May I suggest that the
Economic Commission for Europe is scarcely the
appropriate forum from which to provoke a de-
bate on the relative dedication of various govern-
ments to peace. I would remind the Commission
of the proposals tliat have been made by the
Western countries for utilizing the machinery of
the United Nations in an effort to achieve a rea-
sonable and safe basis for disarmament.
The Governments of the United States and of
Western Europe have demonstrated in many ways
that tliey yield to no country in their conviction
that expanding trade is essential not only to the
peace but to the prosperity of the world as a
whole. I am sure I do not need to cite the efforts
which liave been made in ECE by these countries
and in the GATT, which it is well known is open
to universal membership. Speaking for my own
Government, the pursuit by the United States of
liberal trade practices has been made clear, not
only by words but actions, with but one qualifica-
tion. Tliis qualification is that, no matter how
strong our convictions are as to the importance of
trade, I think all sovereign governments would
agree that at all times considerations of national
security must also be taken into account.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I feel I should make
some reference to the remarks of the Soviet dele-
gate concerning the present business recession in
the United States. I shall not try to forecast
coming events, but I should like to place this re-
cession in some perspective.
I am sure all the delegates here are aware that
the decline whicli has taken place in United States
business activity has been relatively modest and
that it is a decline from the highest levels of in-
come and production we have ever attained.
From the standpoint of human welfare (about
which the delegate of the U.S.S.R. expressed such
concern), it is worth while to call to the attention
of the delegates the fact that personal incomes
have fallen only one-third as much as total na-
tional output. Moreover, substantial unemploy-
ment-compensation programs, other social-welfare
benefits, and the relatively high level of savings
Department of State Bulletin
aiuong working people have alleviated a large part
of tlie problems.
Naturally, Europe is interested in the level of
business and employment in the United States.
Tin- Government of the United States has already
taken important action to speed recovery, and the
President lias indicated that the Government is
ready to take whatever action is necessary to foster
economic recovery and growth.
I\Ir. Chairman, the United States is convinced
that the Economic Commission for Europe and
its subsidiary bodies offer an excellent forum for
appropriate discussion and necessary action in the
solution of mutual economic problems and ex-
panding the European economy.
We have noted with satisfaction the increasing
availability to the Commission of statistical and
other data, particularly from the U.S.S.R. and
other countries of Eastern Europe. We hope that
this trend will continue to the point that informa-
tion submitted by all member countries of ECE
will be comparable. The United States has made
available its know-how and experience to the sub-
sidiary bodies of the Commission and has sent
leading representatives of American industi-y and
government to these meetings. And, Mr. Chair-
man, we wish to assure you that the United States
will continue to take an active role in the work
of the Commission.
TREATY INFORMATION
U.S. and Sweden Sign Amendment
to Nuclear Energy Agreement
The Governments of Sweden and the United
States on April 25 signed an amendment to tlie
agreement for cooperation between tlie two coun-
tries concerning peaceful applications of nuclear
energy which has been in effect since January 18,
1956.^ Assistant Secretary of State C. Burke El-
brick and Chairman of the Atomic Energy Com-
mission Lewis E. Strauss signed the amendment
for the United States, and Ambassador Erik
Boheman signed for Sweden.
' Bulletin of Jan. 30, 1956, p. 181.
May 72, 1958
The amendment extends the term of the agree-
ment to 10 years from the effective date of the
amendment. It will provide for the transfer over
the duration of the agreement of up to 200 kilo-
grams of uranium enriched in the fissionable iso-
tope U-235 for fueling research reactors and a
materials-testing reactor.
The great majority of this material will be uti-
lized in a 30,000-kilowatt materials-testing reactor
being designed and constructed by the Nuclear
Products-Erco Division of ACF Industries, Inc.,
and to be located at the Swedish research center
at Studsvik, about 70 miles south of Stockholm.
The expected completion date is the fall of 1958.
The amendment will become effective after all
of the statutory requirements of both nations have
been fulfilled.
Exchange of Ratifications
of Commercial Treaty With Nicaragua
Press release 217 dated April 21
Eatifications were exchanged on April 24 of the
treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation
between the United States and the Eepublic of
Nicaragua. The treaty was signed at Managua
on January 21, 1956.^ The exchange also took
place in the Nicaraguan capital. The treaty will
by its terms enter into force one month from the
date of the exchange of ratifications.
The treaty consists of 25 articles and a protocol.
In these provisions each of the two governments
(1) agrees to accord, within its territories, to
citizens and corporations of the other country
treatment no less favorable than it accords to its
own citizens and corporations with respect to
many commercial and industrial pursuits; (2)
affirms its adherence to the principles of nondis-
criminatory treatment of trade and shipping; (3)
subscribes to fundamental guaranties assuring
personal and property rights ; and (4) recognizes
the need for special attention to the problems of
stimulating the flow of private capital investment
for economic development. The treaty deals with
the following broad subjects: (1) entry, travel,
and residence; (2) basic personal freedoms; (3)
guaranties with respect to property rights; (4)
the conduct and control of business enterprises;
Bulletin of Jan. 30, 1956, p. 174.
793
(5) taxation; (6) exchange restrictions; (7) the
exchange of goods; (8) navigation; (9) excep-
tions, territorial applicability, and miscellaneous
matters.
This treaty with Nicaragua is the 16th com-
mercial treaty negotiated by the United States
since the current program was initiated at the end
of AVorld War II.
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Narcotic Drugs
Convention for limiting the manufacture and regulating
the distribution of narcotic drugs, concluded at Geneva
July 13, 1931, as amended by protocol signed at Lak«
Success December 11, 1946. Entered into force July
9, 1933, and December 11, 1946. 48 Stat. 1543 ; 61 Stat.
2230; 62 Stat. 1796.
Accession deposited: Indonesia, April 3, 1958.
Sugar
Protocol amending the international sugar agreement
(TIAS 3177), with annex. Done at London December
1, 1956. Entered into force January 1, 1957; for the
United States September 25, 1957. TIAS 3937.
Ratification deposited: Haiti, February 6, 1958.
BILATERAL
Greece
Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agree-
ment of December 18, 1957 (TIAS 3959). Effected by
exchange of notes at Athens March 20 and April 3,
19.58. Entered into force April 3, 1958.
Italy
Research and power reactor agreement concerning civil
uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington July 3,
1957.
Entered into force: April 15, 1958 (date each govern-
ment received from the other written notification that
it has complied with statutory and constitutional re-
quirements).
Research reactor agreement concerning civil uses of
atomic energy. Signed at Washington July 28, 1955.
Entered into force July 28, 1955. TIAS 3312.
Terminated: April 15, 1958 (superseded by agreement
of July 3, 1957, supra).
Peru
Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of
1954, as amended (68 Stat. 455; 7 U. S. C. 1701-1709),
with memorandums of understanding and exchanges of
notes. Effected by exchange of notes at Lima April 9,
1958. Entered into force April 9, 1958.
Sweden
Agreement amending research reactor agreement concern-
ing civil uses of atomic energy of January 18, 1956, as
amended (TIAS 3477 and 3775). Signed at Washing-
ton April 25, 1958. Enters into force on date on which
each government receives from the other written noti-
fication that it has complied with statutory and con-
stitutional requirements.
794
DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE
Confirmations
The Senate on April 22 confirmed Walter Howe to be
Ambassador to Chile and Whiting Willauer to be Ambas-
sador to Costa Rica.
Designations
Selden Chapin as Deputy Commandant for Foreign
Affairs of the National War College, effective about July
15. (For biographic details, see Department of State
press release 218 dated April 24.)
Cliecit List of Department of State
Press Releases: April 21-27
Press releases may be obtained from the News
Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.
Releases issuetl prior to April 21 which appear
in this issue of the Bui-letin are Nos. 196 of April
16 and 198 and 200 of April 17.
No.
Date
Subject
204
4/21
Robertson: "Freedom from Fear."
205
4/21
Czechoslovak attach^ asked to leave
U.S.
*206
4/21
U.S. resolution on fishing approved by
U.N. conference committee.
207
4/22
Jandrey : West Indies federation.
208
4/23
Emergency medical assistance to East
Pakistan (rewrite).
209
4/23
Dillon: "Mutual Security and World
Trade."
210
4/23
Dulles: Military Chaplains' Associa-
tion.
*211
4/23
ICA insures investment of Chicago
firm.
Itinerary for visit of President of
212
4/24
German Federal Republic (rewrite).
213
4/24
U. S. and West Indies to discuss
assistance.
t214
4/24
Renegotiation of fruit and vegetable
concessions by Canada.
215
4/24
Herter : 10th anniversary of founding
of OEEC.
216
4/24
Tripartite statement presented to
U.S.S.R.
217
4/24
Treaty of friendship with Nicaragua.
»218
4/24
Chapin designation (biographic de-
tails).
219
4/25
U.S.-Sweden atomic energy agreement
amended.
220
4/25
Foreign newsmen invited to observe
U.S. nuclear tests.
t221
4/25
Jandrey: "Nationalism and Collective
Security."
t222
4/25
Palmer: "Nationalism in Africa."
*223
4/25
Delegation to inauguration of Presi-
dent of Argentina.
t224
4/26
Becker: "Some Political Problems of
the Legal Adviser."
ted.
*Xot prin
t Held for
a later issue of the Bulletin.
Department of State Bulletin
VLiy 12, 1958
Ind
ex
Vol. XXXVIII, No. 985
Africa
3e( rt'tary Dulles' Message on the Pan-African Con-
ference 765
riio United States and Middle Africa (Holmes) . 764
American Principles
'Freedom From Fear" (Robertson) 770
3ur Experiment in Human Liberty (Dulles) . . . 755
atomic Energy
A.toms for Power: International Status (Mc-
Kinney) 783
News-Media Representatives Invited To Observe
Detonation 763
U.S. and Sweden Sign Amendment to Nuclear
Energy Agreement 793
Chile. Howe confirmed as ambassador 794
Communism. Our Exi)eriment in Human Liberty
(Dulles) 755
Costa Rica. Willauer confirmed as ambassador . 794
Czechoslovakia. United States Asks Departure of
Czechoslovak Attach^ 767
Department and Foreign Service
Confirmations (Howe, Willauer) 794
Designations (Chapin) 794
The People Who Wage the Peace (Rubottom) . . 772
Economic Affairs
Mutual Security and World Trade (Dillon) ... 778
President Asks Reexamination of Cotton Import
Quota 788
Europe
Tenth Anniversary of the OEEC (Herter) .... 789
U.S. Participation in Work of ECE (Heinz) ... 792
France. U.S., U.K., and France Suggest Joint Meet-
ings at Moscow (tripartite statement) .... 759
Germany. President Heuss of Germany To Visit
United States 778
Ghana. Secretary Dulles' Message on the Pan-
African Conference 765
International Organizations and Conferences
Atoms for Power: International Status (Mc-
Kiuney) 783
Tenth Anniversary of the OEEC (Herter) ... 789
U.S. Participation in Work of ECE (Heinz) ... 792
Military Affairs. Security Council Hears Soviet
Complaint on U.S. Military Flights; U.S.S.R.
Withdraws Draft Resolution (Lodge) .... 760
Mutual Security
Mutual Security and World Trade (Dillon) . . . 778
TJ.S. Sends Medical Supplies to East Pakistan . . 782
U.S. To Discuss Assistance to The West Indies . . 769
Nicaragua. Exchange of Ratifications of Commer-
cial Treaty With Nicaragua 793
Non-Self -Governing Territories. The United
States and Middle Africa (Holmes) 764
Pakistan. U.S. Sends Medical Supplies to East
Pakistan 782
Presidential Documents. President Asks Reexami-
nation of Cotton Import Quota 788
Science. News-Media Representatives Invited To
Observe Detonation 763
Sweden. U.S. and Sweden Sign Amendment to
Nuclear Energy Agreement 793
Treaty Information
Current Treaty Actions 794
Exchange of Ratifications of Commercial Treaty
With Nicaragua 793
U.S. and Sweden Sign Amendment to Nuclear
Energy Agreement 793
U.S.S.R.
Security Council Hears Soviet Complaint on U.S.
Military Flights; U.S.S.R. Withdraws Draft
Resolution (Lodge) 760
U.S., U.K., and France Suggest Joint Meetings at
Moscow (tripartite statement) 759
United Kingdom
The New Federation of The West Indies ( Jandrey). 768
U.S. To Discuss Assistance to The West Indies . . 769
U.S., U.K., and France Suggest Joint Meetings at
Moscow (tripartite statement) 759
United Nations. Security Council Hears Soviet
Complaint on U.S. Military Flights; U.S.S.R.
Withdraws Draft Resolution (Lodge) .... 760
West Indies, The
The New Federation of The West Indies (Jandrey) . 768
U.S. To Discuss Assistance to the West Indies . . 769
Name Index
Chapin, Selden 794
Dillon, Douglas 778
Dulles, Secretary 755, 765, 769
Eisenhower, President 788
Heinz, Henry J., II 792
Herter, Christian A 789
Heuss, Theodor 778
Holmes, Julius C 764
Howe, Walter 794
Jandrey, Frederick W 768
Lodge, Henry Cabot 760
McKinney, Robert 783
Robertson, Walter S 770
Rubottom, Roy R., Jr 772
Willauer, Whiting 794
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Vol. XXXVIII, No. 986
May 19, 1958
THE STRATEGY OF PEACE • /Address by Secretary Dulles . 799
SECRETARY DULLES' NEWS CONFERENCE OF
MAY 1 804
PRESIDENT URGES U.S.S.R. TO SUPPORT U.S.
PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERNATIONAL INSPEC-
TION SYSTEM IN ARCTIC • Exchange of Correspond-
ence Between President Eisenhower and Premier
Khrushchev 811
U.S. RECOMMENDS ARCTIC ZONE OF INSPECTION
AGAINST SURPRISE ATTACK; U.S.S.R. CASTS
83d VETO • Statements by Ambassador Henry Cabot
Lodge 816
U.S. REPLIES TO POLISH NOTE ON RAPACKI PLAN
U.S. Note of May 3 821
Polish Note of February 14 822
NATIONALISM IN AFRICA • by Deputy Assistant Secretary
Palmer 824
SOME POLITICAL PROBLEMS OF THE LEGAL
ADVISER • by Loftus Becker 832
For index see inside back cover
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Vol. XXXVIII, No. 986 • Publication 6644
May 19, 1958
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
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The Strategy of Peace
Address hy Secretary Dulles ^
There is nothing mysterious about the goals of
United States foreign policy. It seeks to defend
and advance the interests of the United States.
These interests are of several kinds :
(1) There is the life of our people and the
physical safety of our homeland. These would be
endangered by war.
(2) There is the well-being of our economy.
This would be gravely impaired if hostile forces
dictated the pattern of world trade.
(3) There is the integrity of the principles for
which our nation was founded. Our nation is
more than population, more than real estate. Our
nation represents ideals. These ideals are an in-
tegral part of America, to be defended and pro-
moted by our foreign policy.
Now let me comment briefly on these three as-
pects of our foreign policy.
Peace
We defend our people and our homeland against
armed attack by having the power to hit back
hard at anyone who attacks us or our allies. This
causes any potential aggressor to pause, for he
knows that he could not, by aggression, gain as
much as he would stand to lose. In order to have
that assured capacity to strike back we need co-
operation with other countries.
Potential aggressors need to be put on notice
that they cannot, witli impunity, pick up nations
one by one, leaving the United States to the last,
when even we will be relatively weak. Accord-
' Made before the Atomic Power Institute sponsored by
the New Hampshire Council on World Affairs at Durham,
N. H., on May 2 (press release 239 and 239-A).
May 79, J 958
ingly, we have made collective-defense treaties
and similar arrangements with nearly 50 other
coimtries. These commit each nation to helji the
other in the event of armed attack.
A further benefit from these arrangements is
that under them the burden of the military effort
is shared. For example, the ground forces of the
cooperating free-world nations amount to about
5.6 million men. But only about 950,000 of these
are American.
Also our Strategic Air Command is afforded
well dispersed positions around the world. This
dispersal greatly increases the effectiveness of the
deterrent.
Our collective-security arrangements are serv-
iced by our mutual security program. It supplies
our allies with a certain amount of military equip-
ment. In a few cases it lielps them fuaancially to
maintain military establislmients whicli are
needed but which their economies are too poor to
support without some outside help. And we pro-
vide development assistance to certain less devel-
oped free-world countries. We do that to lielp
them build their societies on the principles of
freedom and to escape pressure to turn to the
Communist bloc with the peril to liberty which
that involves.
The Soviet Union tries hard to disrupt our de-
fensive efforts. It portrays the United States
as militaristic and our collective-defense group-
ings as "aggressive militaiy blocs."
Of course, as you and I know, the American
people are among the least militaristic of any peo-
ple in tlie world. George Wasliington called upon
us to maintain what he called a "respectable de-
fensive posture." By that he meant a military
799
posture strong enough so that others would re-
spect it. Unfortunately, we have not always done
that. At times our military strength has been
so negligible that militaristic despots treated us
as a cipher, not to be taken into accouiit in their
aggi'essive plan.
We are trying not to commit that fault again.
We do not mtend to make ourselves weak merely
because the Soviet imperialists urge that we do
so to prove our "idealism."
Our collective arrangements are defensive, as
specifically authorized by the United Nations
Charter. These groupings are more than expedi-
ents. They introduce a fresh concept into the
structure of world order.
Within our own country and every civilized
country, local security is sought on a collective
basis. We unite to provide a central police force,
a central fire department, and the like.
Now at last, within the free world, we are be-
gimiing to apply that enlightened collective con-
cept. In that way weaker nations can be made
secure from being picked up one by one. In that
way a strong nation can avoid having to become
a garrison state and, even then, being encircled
and strangled as a result of the smaller nations
being picked up one by one. On a collective basis
nations get maximum security at minimum cost.
No doubt our people would not hesitate to pro-
vide the vast funds needed for our solitary de-
fense, and our youth, if necessai'y, would give a
greatly increased measure of their time to mili-
tary service. But even with that maximum effort
we would be less secure.
Every American who wants to see his country
safe and solvent ought to get out and actively
support our mutual security program now before
the Congress.
Economic Welfare
Our foi-eign policy also tries to assure our peo-
ple a prosperous home economy. That depends
in good part upon foreign trade. Our exports
are running at a rate approaching $20 billion
a year. Our foreign trade employs about 4.5
million people. Our imports provide many im-
portant things that we need and could not readily,
or at all, produce here at home. Furthermore,
our trade relations help to keep the free world
together. Without ample trade with the United
States many countries would be virtually forced
bloc.
The major expression of our foreign trad(
policy is the Keciprocal Trade Agreements Act.i
The principle of the act was first adopted in 1934,
and 10 times the Congress has acted to renew it,
Under it our trade has flourished. In 1934 our
total foreign trade — exports and imports — a,
amounted to $3.7 billion. Last year it amounted
to $32.4 billion, excluding military exports.
The latest renewal expires next month, and fur-
ther extension is now being sought from the Con-
gress. Failure to extend would be a major dis-
aster. A very few might temporarily benefit,
But veiy many, and in the long run all, would
suffer gravely.
Surely we do not want to go back to the early
1930's. Then our high tariti and monetary deval-
uation policies wreaked havoc upon international
trade and boosted into power, in Germany and
Japan, extreme nationalists who later plunged the
world into World War II.
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Every American who wants to see his country j,|jj
mofa
economically sound, who wants allies, and who
wants peace should work for the extension of oui
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act.
Ideals
Let me speak now about our efforts to promote
the ideals of America.
Our nation was founded by men of religious
faith. They believed that our Declaration of
Independence was not merely rhetoric but truth
and that all men were in fact endowed by their
Creator with certain inalienable rights. They be-
lieved that they had a mission to help men every-
where to have the opportunity to exercise their
God-given rights.
Under the impulsion of their faith and works
there developed here an area of unusual spiritual,
intellectual, and economic vigor. It became
known as the Great American Experiment. The
ideals that stimulated it have been projected
throughout the world. They have more than once-
helped to turn back the tides of despotism,
America would not be America if it were'
stripped of such idealism
The values of personal liberty are, of course,
best demonstrated by individuals. It is they who
have liberty, and it is their use of liberty that
can make it a dynamic force. On the other hand,
Department of State Bulletin
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their misuse of liberty plays into the hands of
despots. That means that individuals should ex-
se self-discipline and self-sacrifice and not turn
liberty into license. The individual deportment
of free Americans is the most decisive force, for
good or evil, in the present contest with despotism.
I do not imply that government has no part to
play. It too can find ways to reflect the ideals
of the people whom it serves.
Government may not interfere in the internal
affairs of other comitries. That is contrary to
accepted international law and practice and for-
bidden by many of our treaty engagements. But
your Government can, and does, make clear to all
the world what are the ideals for which our nation
was founded.
We can, and do, refuse through our Government
to give official sanction to the oppression of other
peoples and the denial to them of the rights by
which they are endowed by their Creator.
Your Government can, and does, see to it that
captive peoples know that they are not forgotten
and that their hopes for freedom have the sanc-
tion of a vast mass of world opinion.
World Order
One of the ways to protect and advance the in-
terests of our people is by strengthening the fabric
of world order. Peace will never be secure until
there is an adequate body of international law, and
effective means of enforcing that law, and means
of changing that law as needed to promote justice.
The United Nations was a great step forward.
It was largely a United States initiative. But its
Security Council is hobbled by the veto power.
President Eisenhower recently proposed that
the permanent members of the Security Council
should exercise greater restraint in the use of the
veto power. The Soviet Union reacted violently
against that proposal. Nevertheless, we shall per-
sist in seeking to strengthen the United Nations.
We seek, under its auspices, a rule of law for
such newly developing areas as Antarctica and
outer space. A law-of-the-sea conference has
just been concluded at Geneva as an effort to cre-
ate and modernize international law. The 86 na-
tions attending reached agreement on important
segments of that law. We are making progi-ess
in this field.
Still, the United Nations has not yet found the
way to guarantee law and order. That is why we
May 19, 7958
have to maintain the system of regional collective-
defense arrangements to which I have referred
and which the charter authorizes. It is our ar-
dent hope, however, that the United Nations can
more and more be the framework within which all
may find justice and peace.
Agreements With the U.S.S.R.
In the meanwhile, there is an immediate prob-
lem that concerns us greatly : Can we reach agree-
ments with the Soviet Government which would
mitigate the sharpness of our conflict and reduce
the danger of friction which could flare into war ?
I can assure you that that is constantly in our
minds. There are, however, great difficulties.
For one thing, the Communists do not look
upon agreements as we do. We consider our-
selves bound to live up to our agreements. This
is important because nations, unlike individuals,
are under no superior force that compels them to
live up to their promises.
But the Communists feel no obligation to per-
form their agreements. They have broken one
agreement after another, confirming what Lenin
said that, to the Communists, "promises are like
pie crusts, made to be broken." It would obvi-
ously be reckless for tlie free world to weaken it-
self merely in reliance of Soviet promises to per-
form in the future.
A second obstacle is that the purposes of the
Communist rulers are so basically acquisitive and
aggressive that there is very little common ground
between them and us.
Recent exchanges of views with the Soviet
Union disclose their negotiating goals. They
want :
(1) Our acceptance of Soviet Communist dom-
ination of the nations of Eastern Europe. They
want us to abandon there the concept of our Dec-
lai-ation of Independence and the explicit pro-
visions of the Atlantic Charter and of the Yalta
agreements, that the peoples of these countries are
entitled to choose the form of government under
which they will live ;
(2) Our acceptance of the continued partition
of Germany, or its reunification only on condi-
tions that would give the Communist puppet re-
gime in East Germany an opportunity to extend
its rule over all of Germany ;
(3) Liquidation of our collective-defense asso-
ciations, such as NATO, and abandonment by the
801
United States of the concept and practice of col-
lective security ;
(4) United States recognition of Communist
Cliina, its seating in the United Nations with veto
power on the Security Council, and acknowledg-
ment of the Chinese Communist claim to Taiwan
(Formosa) ;
(5) Elimination of the present trade controls
by which the free world avoids sending strategic
war goods into the Sino-Soviet bloc.
Each of these objectives represents an immense
gain for the Soviet Union and a great loss to the
free world. Soviet propaganda suggests that, if
we would accept these losses, then the Commu-
nists might end the cold war. However, Mr.
Khrushchev has, in other contexts, stated that it
was inevitable that the cold war should go on and
he intended that it should go on.
It would be reckless to weaken the free world
on the gamble that that would end the cold war.
It is more likely that it would continue under far
more difficult conditions for us.
A few days ago Mr. Khrushchev said in Moscow :
"We Bolsheviks are ravenous people. Wliat we
achieved through struggles in the past is not suffi-
cient for us. We want more — tomorrow." They
already have a billion people — and are still rav-
enous. I wonder how many more they need be-
fore their appetite is sated.
Now I do not, of course, conclude that there are
no areas for useful agreement.
In 1953 we made an armistice agreement with
the Communists which ended the fighting in
Korea.
In 1955 we, with the British and the French,
concluded with the Soviet Union the state treaty
that liberated Austria.
Earlier tliis year the United States concluded
with the Soviet Union a cultural exchange agree-
ment of limited scope.
We believe that there can be other carefully
negotiated agreements of mutual interest. We
have been trying hard to get an agreement for
reciprocal inspection in the Arctic area. The
Soviet Government professed to fear our air
maneuvers in the north. It took these alleged
fears to the United Nations Security Council and
complained of our activities.^ We explained that
we needed to keep some planes in the air all the
time because we fear that a massive and sudden ^^''■'
surprise attack might be launched over the top ofl •"'"^"
the world. So to allay both feai-s we proposed' In'*''
international inspection on both sides of the I '
Arctic area to give assurance tliat there could
not be any surprise or accidental attack.^ The
matter came to a vote just a few hours ago. Tern
of the 11 members of the Security Council sup-
ported our proposal. There was only one vote
against — that of the Soviet Union. But that one
negative vote constituted a veto. So, at the choice
of the Soviet Union, the fears and risks continue
They continue for one reason alone, and that is
because the Soviet Union rejects international in-
spection against surprise attack.
The significance of that is frightening. The
result is tragic. It means that at the will anc
choice of the Soviet Union we have to go on liv-
ing on the edge of an awful abyss from which w(
could, so readily, be rescued if only the Soviei
Union did not insist upon retaining for itself tht
possibility of massive surprise attack.
But we refuse to be discouraged. We remair
willmg to join in any dependable arrangemem
which will reduce the risk of surprise or acci
dental attack or, on a fair basis, reduce"
armaments.
The Strategy of Victory
We must, however, assume tliat we face a lonj
period of effort, sacrifice, and strain. That wil
come to an end when tlie Soviet rulers moderate
their imperialist and ideological urges.
Today the Soviet Commiuiist rulers seek to im
plement their materialistic doctrine. They be
lieve that human beings are in effect materia
particles to be fitted together as cogs in some well
oiled machine. Also they believe that that "fit
ting together" should be carried out thi-oughoul
the world under Soviet Communist dictation
They profess to believe that this would assure
world harmony, peace, and maximum produc-
tivity. All of this is a way of rationalizing the
usual desire of despots for more and more power
Experience, however, is teaching the Sovielt
rulers what has been taught so many times before
that man is not just a vivacious particle of matter
Men have souls and minds and individuality
They can never for long be forced into con-
tot DC
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' BuiXETiN of May 12, 1958, p. 760.
' See p.
Department of State Bulletin
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I forinity. The Soviet Communist Party has
f) undertaken the impossible, as they are beginning
-] to learn.
They are learning a lesson in the satellite coun-
tries. A former adherent, Yugoslavia, is inde-
pendent. In the other Eastern European coun-
tries there is a sustamed and growing demand for
independence. It has manifested itself in violent
outbreaks tliat occurred in 1953 in East Germany
and in 1956 in Poland and, most conspicuously,
icJin Hungary in late 1956. There has been a con-
iiie stant flow of refugees from East Germany into
West Germany.
In the case of the revolts and in the case of
the refugees it is the youth who figure most
largely. Throughout their mature lives they
have never known anything but intense Commu-
nist indoctrination and discipline. But love of
God and love of country still sui-vive. Human
differences still persist. No materialistic regime
111 can wholly or permanently crush them out.
Sooner or later the Soviet rulers are going to
have to face up to these practical facts. Indeed
there are occasional signs that they are already
begimiing to do so.
Even within the Soviet Union itself the Com-
munist Party finds that human beings cannot be
forced into a single mold of conformity. Under
Stalin this was sought to be effected by the brutal
terrorism of the secret police. There was a re-
vulsion against that, and the system has been
moderated.
As the Soviet Union competes in the field of
modem weapons and modern industrial tech-
niques, increasing niunbers have to be given a
high degree of education. Thus there is devel-
oped an intelligentsia. And minds trained for
one purpose cannot be kept thinking merely in
the channels that the party chooses. They think
about other matters, including the unsoundness of
the Communist dogma and the cheapness of Com-
munist slogans.
There is more personal security and independ-
ent thinking within the Soviet Union now than
there has ever been since the October 1917
revolution.
The Soviet economic centralization has proved
unworkable, and now there is economic decentrali-
zation. This means more local administration of
affairs, with more regard to local differences and
local habits.
May 19, 1958
There has also been a change in the foreign pol-
icies of the Soviet Union. In 1939, and between
1945 and 1950, it resorted primarily to violence.
It attacked Poland and Finland. It took over
Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia by military occu-
pation. It assisted, and in some cases instigated.
Communist warfare in China, Greece, Malaya, the
Philippines, Burma, and Indochina. It used
force or the threat of force to take over Czecho-
slovakia and to blockade Berlin. It backed open
war in Korea.
But these violent techniques no longer pay off.
They are checked by the free-world network of
collective security. So the Soviet rulei-s now
smile and pretend to be friends and to adopt what
they hope will be winning ways, giving aid in the
form of trade, technicians, and loans, and giving
pleasure through ballets and the like. In this
way the Soviet Union has gained increased influ-
ence and acceptability as against the time when
it only growled and bared its teeth. But it is
impossible to go on smiling for a long time with-
out its having an internal effect on character. In
the long run a nation, like an individual, tends to
become what it pretends to be-
The essential is that, for this long run, the free
world should stay strong and united. It must be
willing to make the sacrifices needed to prevent
the Soviet rulers from gaining external victories
bringing new victims into the Commimist camp.
That would enhance the prestige of the Connnu-
nist extremists and embolden them and enable
them to hold back the evolutionary trends at work
within the Soviet bloc.
The United States, as the strongest of the free
nations, can contribute immensely to giving evo-
lutionary forces of freedom a chance to make
themselves decisively felt.
President Eisenliower, speaking at Paris last
December at the NATO meeting, said that "there
is a noble strategy of victory — not victory over
any peoples but victory for all peoples."^
Tlie essential is that the American people hold
fast to the ideals bequeathed us by our foundere
and implement those ideals with courage that is
traditional with us. We shall need a sustained,
sacrificial effort. We may have to do some of
the things that we do in war — but without the
killing and being killed.
Bulletin of Jan. 6, 1958, p. i
803
Wliy should we not make that effort? The
stakes are perhaps the greatest for which men
have ever had to strive, in peace or in war. And,
if we strive aright, tliese stakes can be won in
peace, without the awful horror of world war
III. Surely for the averting of war and the safe-
guarding of freedom men should be willing
to make a sustained and sacrificial effort. We can
do so in confidence that peaceful victory is at-
tamable and that our efforts can bring the day
when the dark shadows which now oppress hu-
manity will give way to an era of light and
gladness.
l
Secretary Dulles' News Conference of May 1
Press release 236 dated May 1
/Secretary Dulles: I have a statement which I
would like to make. I understand that copies of
it have been made available to you.^
I should like to make some observations regard-
ing the United States resolution before the United
Nations Security Council, which calls for the es-
tablishment of an Arctic inspection zone.^
The establislunent of international inspection
in an Arctic zone is proposed by the United States
not as a maneuver, not as propaganda, but in a
sincere effort to meet the admitted problems of a
particular area. The United States, not only pub-
licly but privately, has done its best to make clear
to the Soviet Government the sincerity of its i^ur-
pose and its desire to avoid turning this grave
matter into a propaganda battle.
The Soviet Government has said that it is wor-
ried by the flights of United States aircraft in this
area. We have said that we need to keep planes
aloft because we are fearful that the Soviets may
launch a nuclear attack against us over the top of
the world.^ It seemed to us that, if both sides are
animated by really peaceful intentions, there is a
natural solution — that is to have international
inspection which would allay the fears on both
sides. If the Soviets do not have bomber and mis-
sile bases in the north of their comitry available for
a sudden surprise attack upon the United States,
' The following six paragraphs were also released sepa-
rately as press release 234 dated May 1.
' See p. 816.
' For a statement made In the Security Council on Apr.
21 by U.S. Representative Henry Cabot Lodge, see Bul-
letin of May 12, 1958, p. 760.
804
then our own problem of security is greatly altered.
Perhaps we would then feel it safe greatly to mini-
mize the flights of which the Soviet Union com-
plains. In any event the Soviet Union would
know that any United States flights are so safe-
guarded, beyond risk of misadventure, that they
eannot be a threat to the Soviet Union unless the
Soviet Union first attacks.
The establishment of one important zone of
international inspection, as proposed by the United
States, would be a constructive first step toward
easing world tensions. It is a step that can be
taken at once without awaiting any high-level
conference. The United States believes that an
addition, along the lines proposed by Sweden, is
totally consistent with this initiative. It is also
consistent with the position taken by the United
States regarding a possible heads-of-government
meeting.
We continue to believe that the present situa-
tion requires that every attempt be made to reach
agreement on the main problems affecting the
maintenance of peace and stability in the world.
In the circumstances a summit meeting would be
desirable if it would provide opportunity for
conducting serious discussions of major problems
and would be an effective means of reaching
agreement on significant subjects. Before a sum-
mit meeting can take place, however, preparatory
work is required so that some assurance can be
given that meaningful agreements can be
achieved.
We believe the discussions initiated by certain
governments in Moscow can constitute a useful
prior preparatory phase before any possible sum-
Deparfment of State Bulletin
Ill it meeting. Similarly, we believe that the steps
contemplated by the United States resolution be-
fore the Council, in addition to their intrinsic
merit, could also serve, as the Swedish Govern-
ment suggests, as a useful prelude for the dis-
"^ cussion of the disarmament problem at any
possible summit meeting. We therefore hope
that the U.S.S.R. will agree to sit down with
the interested states at once to begin the necessary
technical discussions looking toward the establish-
ment of an Arctic inspection zone.
Q. Mr. Secretary, if the Russians were to ac-
cept an Arctic inspection system, would we aban-
don or modify our present '''■fail safe'''' system?
A. I say in this statement that the question of
what we would do would depend upon what we
learn as a result of inspection. I cannot tell you
in advance what that would be.
Q. Mr. Secretary, the reason I ash the ques-
tion— if there were an inspection system, it would
seem to he inconsistent with the takeoff flights
of plants in the Arctic at a time when the inspec-
tor would he there, and it would he difficult to
see how the present system of u/nilateral flights,
hased on our radar installations, could he con-
tinued if there were international inspection.
A. I have the strong belief that, if there were
established this international inspection system,
it would, in fact, lead to a considerable modifica-
tion of our practices. That assumes that we do
not find, or the international inspection system
does not find, something that is so alarming that
it makes it necessary to continue. On that as-
sumption, and the assumption the inspection sys-
tem would give us a more effective notice of a
possible attack than we get now when we are
dependent on radar information, which is not
always reliable in the fii*st instance — then I
would think the other precautions would be
moderated.
The Inspection Area
Q. Mr. Secretary, the Russian reaction — Mr.
Groinyko^s reaction — the other day was, in part,
that it did not include any of the United States
excluding Alaska tohereas it includes part of the
Soviet Union. Is the area descrihed hy Mr.
Lodge in the United Nations negotiable, or is it
that area of the Arctic and nothing else?
May 19, 1958
A. Well, I don't think it is anytliing that we
would haggle about in detail. A few changes or
variations here and there, I suppose, would not
be objectionable. But, broadly speaking, this is
the area which we thiitk should be covered now,
and we do not want to get into areas which are
remote from that particular area and which carry
with them a whole new set of political problems.
This area was thought of as a useful beginning
place for two reasons: first because it is an area
of very high strategic importance, second because
it is relatively free from the political complications
that exist, for example, in Europe; so, consistently
with that principle, we would want to stick at this
stage to that particular area.
I don't say that the particular details are sacro-
sanct. For instance, our resolution suggests that
we woidd be glad to include the portions of Sweden
and of Finland and, I think, a little bit of Iceland,
which ai'e not in the zone as was originally pro-
posed. That indicates that we are not totally in-
flexible on the subject.
Q. Mr. Secretary, to clarify one point, you said
our flights would depend on whether we found
something so alarming as to warrant their continu-
ation. Is it likely the Russians would leave, in an
area to he inspected, something so alarming as to
warrant continuation of the American flights?
A. I think it unlikely. I think it almost certain
that, if there were inspection, that would allay the
fears of sudden surprise attack to a degree that
might make these flights unnecessary.
Q. Mr. Secretary, you said in your statement
you thought this plan could he put into effect with-
out awaiting any high-level conference. If the
Soviets continue to insist that this he discussed at
a summit conference, would we have any ohjection?
A. Well, of course we don't know yet whether
there will be any summit conference. If there is
going to be a summit conference and if the pre-
paratory work shapes up in that way, I assume
that it would be something we would be prepared
to discuss. I will say that the attitude of the Soviet
Union at this time toward that matter would, I
suppose, have a bearing upon or influence our own
thinking as to the value of the summit conference.
Q. Mr. Secretary, you said in your statement
that the seriousness of the purpose of the United
States has heen put forward hoth privately and
805
publicly. Caidd you illustrate what you meant hy
that? Was it a message from the President to
Pi'ime Minister Khrushche v f
A. There was a message which I gave to the
Soviet Ambassador here on Saturday afternoon,
which I made with the authority of the President.
There was also a private meeting at about the
same time in New York between Ambassador
Lodge and Mr. Sobolev, the Soviet delegate to the
United Nations.
Q. ^Yas the Soviet reaction in private as shocked
amd hostile as it was in public?
A. I would say that there was not the use of
some of the extravagant phrases that were used by
Mr. Gromyko. But the initial reaction wasn't
exactly heartwarming. (Laughter)
Q. These two incidents you just spoke of, Mr.
Secretar'y — does it indicate, in your opinion, any
new phase in developments between this Govern-
ment and the Soviet Government in the context of
actually getting off the ground in private con-
versati^ons?
A. Well, I can hardly overstate my view that,
if something of this sort [Arctic inspection zone]
got started, it might mark a real turning point in
this whole cold- war situation. I attach very great
importance to it, and that is the reason why we
have tried so hard to avoid seeming to make it a
propaganda exercise or just a maneuver. We have
tried to make it clear to the Soviet Union that we
did take this very seriously and we are extremely
anxious, if possible, to make good.
You see, this offer to get started, at least with
teclmicians, on this area has been along the lines
we have been thinking about for some time. If
we could get started even at that level, and as a
preliminaiy to any heads-of-government meeting,
it would make it much more likely that a heads-
of-government meeting could do something sub-
stantial.
If there is no preliminary work which clears
away the underbrush in some of these matters, it
is not very easy for me to see the ability of the
heads of government themselves to make any
meanmgful decision. It would be a good deal, I
am afraid, like the last smnmit meeting, where
the heads of government agreed on a directive
to be carried out by the foreign ministers. The
foreign ministers found themselves imable to
carry it out, so the whole effect was zero.
Q. Mr. Secretary, did the Ambassador on Sat-
urday indicate, as Mr. Sobolev did on Tuesday,
that any agreement on an Arctic zone must be
part of a package deal and their package, which
includes a banning of nuclear weapons altogether?
A. I did not get any immediate response from
the Ambassador when I informed him about this.
U. S. Disarmament "Package" Broken
Q. Mr. Secretary, the fact that you offered this
separately — does it mean that to an extent we
have broken our own package?
A. Yes, it means to that extent we have broken
the package. However, as you will recall, the
original proposal of President Eisenhower for an
open-skies inspection system * and his acceptance,
as a supplement of that, of the Soviet proposal for
ground posts = was put forward as a prelude to
what you might call disarmament talks. You see,
an inspection system is not disarmament. It
doesn't take any arms away from anybody. But
it could create, and I believe it would create, an
atmosphere under which a genuine disarmament
would, in fact, take place. It was put forward
by President Eisenhower at Geneva in 1955 as a
step which, if taken, would make it possible there-
after to take disarmament steps. So that, while
it was included as part of the total package that
was presented to the Soviets last August in Lon-
don,^ it has never, in the contemplation of the
United States, been a step which we would be un-
willing to take unless other steps were also taken
We were willing to take it believing, if it were
taken, other steps, in fact, would be taken.
naKt
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(illlOEI
ion of
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Q. Have other parts of the package also beer^
separated out or broken, Mr. Secretary?
A. Only to the extent of our willingness to begir
technical studies of the problems involved withoulf J"""™
prejudice — as it was put in our last note to the ^''^
Soviet Union ' — to the position of any governmeni
as to their interdependence or separability.
Q. That means that the testing issue and thtt nUtatcs
cutoff of production of fissionable materials arc
still linked together?
' Ibid., Aug. 1, 1955, p. 173.
■ Ibid., Oct. 24, 1955, p. 643.
' Ibid., Sept. 16, 1957, p. 451.
Seep. 811.
Department of State Bulleth Moy|;
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A. They have not yet been disjointed, although
we are prepared to have studies carried on as to
low you would supervise a suspension of tests
without anybody being committed on the proposi-
tion of whether or not that was to be intercon-
lected with the cutoff, for example, of fissionable
naterial or other aspects of the disarmament
package.
Q. Are those studies to be conducted within this
Government, or are these international studies that
fou are talking about?
A. Well, those would have to be conducted, pre-
sumably, on an international basis — the ones you
ire speaking about.
Helations With the United Arab Repubiic
Q. Mr. Secretary, if you could change the sub-
tect for a moment, sir, the Suez Canal compensa-
tion issv^ has been settled, and we have unblocked
Egypt's funds in this counti^. On the other hand.
President Nasser has gone on a visit to Russia. I
wonder, sir, if you xuould care to give us your
thinking as to tvhat all this portends in terms of
Americans relations with the United Arab Republic
In the im/mediate or near future.
A. The unblocking of these funds ^ came about
because the reason for their blocking ceased to
exist. They were blocked, in the first instance,
because of the fact that there was an unresolved
legal controversy between the Suez Canal Com-
pany and the Egyptian Canal Authority as to
who was entitled to collect tolls. There was a
danger that American ships, which were paying
the tolls to the Egyptian Canal Authority, might
still be subject to being sued and a judgment given
against them in the American courts on the theory
that the confiscation decree was not effective and
they should pay the canal company. I have
pointed out, I think, several times that tliat was
the reason why the funds wei'e blocked and when
that situation came to an end they would be
unblocked. Therefore, I would not think it was
wise to try to read into the unblocking any sig-
j^nificance beyond what automatically attaches to
it because of the fact that the reason for the block-
ing has ceased ; therefore, the unblocking becomes
virtually automatic.
Now, as far as our general relations are con-
cerned, I have said here before that we hope to get
Ma/ 19, 1958
along in a correct, friendly way with the United
Arab Kepublic. We recognized it on the assump-
tion that it would conduct itself in a way that
would be consistent with the peace and security
of the area, and on that assumption we would
expect to have normal and, we hope, friendly
relations.
Q. Mr. Secretary, on the occasion of Nasser^s
visit to Moscow one of the leading Soviet eco-
nomic papers came out with a major article di-
rected to the Arab nations, pointing out that
their resources are being exploited for the benefit
of the capitalist world, according to this article,
and suggesting that they take some action to take
over their oil themselves and also hinting that,
if they do, they will not be left in the position of
the Iranians, unable to exploit them, meaning
Soviet technicians would come, perhaps, and help
them. I wonder if you could give us your com-
ment on the significance of this report at the time
xvhen Nasser is in Moscoiv.
A. The problem as to the use of the oil re-
sources relates not to the technical problem of
being able to produce the oil or refine it. Many
people can do that. The problem is the market-
ing of the oil. The Soviet Union cannot provide
a market for the oil. It is itself an exporter of
petroleum products. The problem is to find the
marketing facilities. Wlien the Abadan refinery
was closed down, the difficulty arose for Iran be-
cause the seizure was not recognized as legal and,
in consequence, the companies which had the dis-
tributing facilities, the marketing facilities, re-
fused to handle the oil. If anyone thinks that
a pool of oil in the Middle East is of value by
itself, I think he is mistaken. The value is de-
rived not only from the oil but from facilities for
distributing and marketing.
Why U. S. Bombers Are Kept Aloft
Q. Mr. Secretary, can you give us some of the
reasons why this Arctic inspection system toould
make it safe for us to curtail our SAC flights,
our bomber flights?
A. If there were international facilities which
satisfied us by inspection, which is more depend-
able than radar inspection at a distance, that
there were not, in fact, any plane or missile bases
prepared for the takeoff of planes or missiles to-
ward the United States, then that would diminish
807
the occasion to have our planes constantly in the
air. Tliey are in the air now because of the fact
that, with a growing missile capacity, they could
be destroyed on the ground over a large area with
virtually no notice — a matter of 10 or 15 minutes,
during which planes could not be gotten oif the
ground. Therefore, it is prudent to keep a cer-
tain number of planes flying as against that risk.
Now, if an inspection system demonstrates that
that risk is not present, then the reason for keeping
the planes aloft would correspondingly diminish.
Q. Mr. Secretary., about a month or 6 weeks
ago Mr. Gromyko and the Kremlin were mak-
ing various proposals along easing East-West ten-
sions and you were standing where you are tww
and saying this was a lot of propaganda. Now
Mr. Gromyko seems to he in the same position;
he is calling news conferences in the Narkomindel
and saying that our proposals on the Arctic in-
spection plan are also propaganda. Now, I won-
der, did this happen because of a change of our
policy, or a change of their policy, or a little of
both, or what?
A. You mean as to why they call it propa-
ganda ?
Q. No, the position seems to have been changed.
I would like to know your assessment.
A. The circumstances are that we have con-
ducted this operation in a way which is designed
to make as clear as we can that it was not a
propaganda exercise but we were seeking an
honest result. We talked to the Soviets about
it 2 days before we introduced our resolution.
We would have been willing to talk about it
with them outside to any extent that they wanted.
I think that kind of approach differentiates it a
good deal from when you write a letter pui-ported
to be signed by the head of the Soviet Govern-
ment to the President of the United States and
then publish it before we can get it translated.
"Soldiers of Fortune" in Indonesia
Q. Mr. Secretary, I want to ask you a question
about Indonesia. Yesterday the President said
there were American soldiers of fortune, as he
put it, meddling in the Indonesian rebellion. Can
you tell me whether this Government has any way
of stopping that, any control over American
citizens?
808
A. I don't think that the President said that
there were Americans there because, as a matter
of fact, I don't think we know. He said that it
could be they were there. There are Americans
around the world who engage in such enterpi-ises.
I know today we are alerted to the fact that it
may be possible that some Americans are flying
Soviet arms into Yemen. I don't know whether
they are or are not. But that is also a conceivably
possible thing that we cannot control. And we
have no legal obligation to control the activities
of Americans of this character.
Q. Mr. Secretary, when we first put fonoard
the Arctic inspection plan in London, it loas
linked with an alternative, a suggestion, that we
would open up the whole of the United States wnfe'"'
exchange for the whole of the Soviet Union for
inspection. It was also linked loith a sugges-
tion for a smaller — in fact, several alternatives —
smaller inspection areas in Europe. Do we still
stand on those proposals?
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A. Yes, we do.
Q. Mr. Secretary, in connection with your re-
marks on Indonesia there, that we have no legcHi
obligation to control Americans who might be erir
gaged in this, is this the substance of your an-
swer to Prime Minister Djuanda? He asked thatkmii,
the United States make every move possible to
order its citizens out of that area, to tell them, to
stop assisting this rebellion. Has there been a re-
ply to that, and would this be the substance of itf
A. We have made no reply as yet. As a mat- Hnn
ter of fact, I have not seen the full text of the) I
conversation that took place between the Foreign^ wolrei] r
Minister and our Ambassador yesterday, which,: srred i
I think, shortly followed the public statement that 'clnite/l
was made by the Prime Minister. We will givp "« are ;
very serious consideration to any proposals thalr'^fii
were made to us by the Indonesian Foreign Min-I"™* "^e (
A, I >^
peeiilaijT
ister. As the President said yesterday, it is oui
pui-pose to conduct ourselves in this affair in the %
most correct way
W«Si!f-:c
Q. Mr. Secretary, how does this Govemmen.
view the proposal of the Tangier meeting for tht
establishment of an Algerian govemment-in.
exile, so-called, and hotv much do you assess — hon f
much will the coming NATO meeting in Copen\
hagen, in your assessment, be involved in th
North African question?
Department of State Bulletir Hoy |;
Ur,;
A. I doubt if we will get involved in it at all,
or the same reason which leads me not to want
0 get involved in it here, and that is that there is
t the present time no French Government. Ef-
orts are being made to form a French Govern-
aent, and I think it would be undesirable to
uffle the waters, by mischance, at a time when
here is no French Government. I do not know
who will represent France at the meeting or
whether the French Foreign Minister, Mr. Pineau,
?ill be there or not. It is quite possible he will
LOt be there. But I understand, in any event,
f he is there, he will not feel in a position to par-
icipate in any discussion of the Algerian matter.
Q. I asked the question regarding Tangier, Mr.
'Secretary, because yesterday there were a lot of
peculative reports to the effect that this Gov-
rnment toouldnH look with disfavor on the estab-
iishment of some kind of Algerian government-
n-exile. Were those speculative reports com-
pletely wrong?
A. I would not attach credence to that
peculation.
Q. Mr. Secretary, in the light of Mr. Ham-
nMrskjold^s statement to the Security Council on
^uesday, does the United States Govemtnent still
■onsider the Soviet suspension of nuclear tests as
; propaganda gimmick?
A. It was certainly handled in that way. And
don't think one can tell what, if any, sincerity
as back of it until we see what happens, if in-
leed we can see what happens.
One of the aspects of the statement was that it
nvolved no inspection and, secondly, that it re-
erved the right to resume testing if and when
he United States or the United Kingdom test.
Ve are going to be testing right away, so
whether there is anything in there beyond propa-
;anda we do not know at the present time.
Q. Mr. Secretary, you have been represented in
ome press reports recently as being on the op-
posite side of the question from Admiral Strauss *
m the nuclear test halt issue. Can you tell us
ohether or not there is any accuracy in those re-
ports, and could you outline some of your think-
ng on the advisability of halting nuclear tests
rom a foreign-policy point of viewf
A. I think I should not do that for this reason:
There are many angles to this question of the sus-
pension of testing. There is a judgment of the
relative technical positions of the United States
and the Soviet Union. There is a military judg-
ment, you might say, as to whether, given our
different postures and the fact that they presum-
ably will use their weapons only for an attack
whereas we would need them for defensive pur-
poses, whether any technical discrepancy in our
favor is adequate and adequately takes account
of the different needs of our two countries. There
is the question of what future testing might be
expected to produce and how valuable it is. There
is a question of our international relations, the
question of the attitude of tlie United Kingdom
and other countries who are interested in this
field and may desire themselves to be more quali-
fied nuclear powers, the question of public rela-
tions with many other countries.
Now, we all of us in Government — Admiral
Strauss, the Secretary of Defense, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Dr. Killian,^" myself — we each
contribute from our own field of interest and con-
cern to the estimating of this problem, which is
then decided by the President. He has not yet
taken any decision. Any point of view of mine
would be reflective of only part of the problem,
and I recognize quite well that there are other
aspects of the problem with which I am not in-
dependently familiar. So I would think it unwise
to present here just one aspect of the problem
before the matter has been considered by the
President.
NATO Council Meeting
Q. Mr. Secretary, what do you expect to accom-
plish at the NATO meeting which you loill at-
tend beginning, I think, on Monday?
A. These spring meetings of the NATO Coun-
cil attended by the foreign ministers are usually
meetings which are designed primarily to have
an exchange of views about the general interna-
tional situation, particularly relations between
East and West as it affects the NATO area. They
do not generally deal with specific problems or
reach specific decisions. But by bringing about
an exchange of views and a common understand-
• Lewis L. Strauss, Chairman of tlie U.S. Atomic Energy
Jommission.
lay 79, 7958
"James R. Killian, Jr., Special Assistant to the Pres-
ident for Science and Technology.
ing of the basic elements of the problem, it makes
it more likely that the actions of the particular
countries will be in harmony with each other.
That is the main purpose that will be served here.
Now it may be that because of the pendency of
the question of whether or not to have a summit
conference and the nature of the talks going on at
Moscow and the studies being conducted under the
auspices of NATO, as against the possibility that
there may be a suimnit conference, it may be that
that will come up for particular consideration at
this time. But basically it is to have an exchange
of views between the different foreign ministers
to be sure that we see the general situation alike
or, if initially we don't see it alike, to try and
iron out our differences so that the action which
we take will be taken from a common premise.
Q. Mr. Secretary, you said, in answer to an
earlier question, that you would not attach any
credence to speculation that we loould not looh
with disfavor on the formation of an Algerian
govemment-in-exile. Does that mean, sir, that we
would he opposed to such, to the formation of
such a government, or that we just believe ifs
none of our business at this stage?
A. This meeting, as I recall — wasn't that the
Tangier meeting to which the question was asked ?
Q. Yes.
A. That was a meeting of parties and not of
governments, and we have not given any particu-
lar consideration to the conclusions that were
arrived at.
Q. Mr. Secretary, have we received any re-
sponses from the nations which we invited to send
scientists to the Pacific tests, and, if not, what
kind of response do we expect to receive from the
Soviet-bloc nations?
A. We have not received any responses from
any of the nations involved. As I understand it,
we communicated our invitation to the Secretary-
General, who in turn transmitted it to the nations
that were members of this scientific body. None
of them have made a response as yet. I recall, I
think, that there were some remarks made in
Moscow which indicated that there was doubt as
to Soviet acceptance of the invitation. But I
know no more about that than you do who have
read those press reports.
Q. Mr. Secretary, in tlie light of the impor-
tance that you have attached to making a first
step on inspection of the Arctic, would it be an
undue risk in your judgment to offer a tempo-
rary suspension of SAC bomber flights into the
Arctic, pending negotiations on this question?
A. I would not want to answer that here be-
cause I would be encroaching into a field which is
primarily that of the military and where I do not
know what the reasons are or whether they would
think that it was undue risk or not. I just think
that is out of my proper area.
Q. Mr. Secretary, the Secretary of the Interior
presented to the Senate the other day a plan for
stabilization of minerals in this country, which
has been received with some encouragement in
countries which produce similar minerals, but
they are not sure that it means that we are to em-
bark on a no-tariff policy. Could you explain
something of that plan to us.
DiAE
atioDO
April t
live IB]
Yom
A. I think that the purpose was pretty ade-
quately explained by Secretary Seaton when he
made his statement to the congressional commit-
tee that he was before. I think he indicated there
that it was our hope and expectation that such a
program would avoid any new tariffs or quotas
upon the minerals in question and that, indeed, the
plan for subsidy was an alternative to that and»J "Wer lo
there would not be both of them.
There is some duty, I think, on copper, which
is more or less automatic, which comes back on the
30th of June. I don't really know just what the
United ;
supportu
position on that is. But I think that, as far as4 j,^ j^j^
any new duties are concerned or new quotas, thisi pj^j ,
plan is intended to be an alternative and that bothi ^ , ■
reliefs would not be available. j ,
Q. Thank you, sir. Waseof
dice lie ;
iiltimateli
Departmsnt of Stafe BuUetit %I9,
President Urges U.S.S.R. To Support U.S. Proposal
for an International Inspection System in Arctic
Following is an exchange of cort'espondence be-
tween President Eisenhower and Nikita Khru-
shchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
THE PRESIDENT TO PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV
White House press release dated April 28
April 28, 1958
Dear Mr. Chairman : I have your communi-
cation of April twenty-second in reply to mine of
April eighth.^ I regret that it is not an affirma-
tive response to my proposal.
You refer in your letter to the question raised
recently by the Soviet Union in the United Na-
tions Security Council which also touches upon
the disarmament question.^ I am sure that you
would agree that with the growing capabilities
in the Soviet Union and the United States of mas-
sive surprise attack it is necessary to establish
measures to allay fears. The United States has
just asked the Security Council to reconvene in
order to consider the establishment of an interna-
tional inspection system for the Arctic zone." The
United States has submitted a constructive pro-
posal to this end. I urge you to join with us in
supporting the resolution of the United States
now before the Council. Your support of this
proposal and subsequent cooperation would help
to achieve a significant first step. It would help
to reduce tensions, it would contribute to an in-
crease of confidence among states, and help to re-
duce the mutual fears of surprise attack.
The United States is determined that we will
ultimately reach an agreement on disarmament.
• Bulletin of Apr. 28, 1958, p. 679.
' Ibid., May 12, 1958, p. 760.
' See p. 816.
May 19, 7958
In my letter of April eighth, I again proposed an
internationally supervised cutoff of the use of new
fissionable materials for weapons purposes and
the reduction of existing weapons stocks by trans-
fer to peaceful purposes; an agreed limitation or
suspension of testing ; "open skies", and the inter-
national use of outer space for peaceful purposes.
As an effective means of moving toward ulti-
mate agreement on these matters and other dis-
armament matters, I proposed that we start our
t«chnical people to work immediately upon the
practical problems involved. These studies were
called for by the United Nations General Assem-
bly. They would include the practical problems
of supervision and control which, you and I agree,
are in any event indispensable to dependable dis-
armament agreements.
The solution of these practical problems will
take time. I am unhappy that valuable time is
now being wasted.
You say that we must first reach a final politi-
cal agreement before it is worthwhile even to ini-
tiate the technical studies. But such studies
would, in fact, facilitate the reaching of the final
agreement you state you desire.
For example, why could not designated tech-
nical people agree on what would be required so
that you would know if we violated an agreement
to suspend testing and we would know if you
should commit a violation ?
Would not both sides be in a better position
to reach agreements if we had a common accepted
understanding as to feasibility of detection or as
to method of inspecting against surprise attack?
Studies of this kind are the necessary prelimi-
naries to putting political decisions actually into
effect. The completion of such teclinical studies
in advance of a political agreement would obviate
a considerable period of delay and uncertainty.
In other words, with the practicalities already
811
worked out, the political agreement could begin
to operate very shortly after it was signed and
ratified.
I re-emphasize that these studies are without
prejudice to our respective positions on the timing
and interdependence of various aspects of
disarmament.
Mr. Chairman, my offer to you still and always
will remain open. I hope you will reconsider
and accept it. In that way we both can make an
important contribution to the cause of just and
lasting peace.
Sincerely,
DwiGHT D. Eisenhower
PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV TO THE PRESIDENT
Official translation
Dear Mb. President : I have received your message of
April 8, containing a reply to my message to you in
which, on behalf of the Soviet Government, I called upon
the Government of the United States of America to join
in the decision of the Soviet Union to terminate the
testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons.
Why did the Soviet Union make this decision?
First, because we deem it necessary to terminate at
long last a situation where as a result of atomic and
hydrogen weapons tests the health and life of human
beings are subjected to a constant and ever-increasing
danger even in peacetime.
Secondly, for the purpose of putting an end to the pro-
duction of ever more terrible means of destruction, since
the production of new and even more destructive types
of weapons in itself increases the threat of atomic war.
Thirdly, because we regard a cessation of the testing
of atomic and hydrogen weapons by states as the first
practical step which is not only fully practicable at the
present time but would also make it possible to break the
deadlock in which the problem of disarmament now finds
itself.
More than enough has already been said concerning the
desirability of disarmament. Concrete deeds are what is
needed now. A cessation of tests of atomic and hydro-
gen weapons by all states possessing such weapons would
be such a concrete deed. Such a measure would be ap-
propriate for the beginning, if only for the reason that
its execution would not prejudice the defense interests
of any of the powers possessing nuclear weapons— the
U.S.S.R., the United States of America, or the United
Kingdom — and would, on the contrary, greatly strengthen
the feeling of security of all nations.
Finally, it is our deep conviction that the realization
of such a step would mark the beginning of a real change
in all international relations, a change in their develop-
ment in the direction of creating a feeling of trust among
nations, which is so necessary for the solution of other
international problems and for strengthening peace.
812
The initiative of the Soviet Union has created a situa-
tion where the solution of the question concerning a
cessation of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests depends
entirely on the governments of two powers, of the United
States of America and of the United Kingdom, since,
aside from the Soviet Union, only these powers possess
such weapons at the present time. It is for this very
reason that we address you and Mr. Macmillan, Prime
Minister of the United Kingdom, with an appeal to sup-
port this initiative of the Soviet Union and also to termi-
nate nuclear weapons tests.
Your negative reply to my message has caused pro-
found disappointment among us. I shall not speak of
the tone of the message or of the inclusion in it of a
number of assertions in which the position of the U.S.S.R.
on the problem of disarmament is knowingly distorted.
The main point is that In your reply we have found
no statement concerning the willingness of the United
States of America to follow the example of the Soviet
Union and to terminate, in its turn, the testing of nu-
clear and hydrogen weapons.
Moreover, in your message an attempt Is made to cast
doubt on the sincerity of the step taken by the Soviet
Union. To be frank, I became perplexed when I learned
that in a statement at your press conference of April 2
you evaluated the decision of the supreme organ of the
Soviet state as a "propaganda gesture." How can an
act aimed at erecting the first barrier against the nuclear
armaments race and at protecting the life and health
of mankind from the danger of atomic radiation be called
propaganda?
In your message you deemed it necessary to state that
the Soviet Union had adopted this decision after having
conducted tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons. But
is it not a fact that the United States of America has
conducted a considerably greater number of tests of nu-
clear weapons than has the Soviet Union? Did not the
United States of America have the opportunity after any
of these tests to display initiative in the matter of termi-
nating further tests? I can assure you, Mr. President,
that if the United States had been the first to take such
a step, we would have welcomed it sincerely.
It is well known that negotiations among states on the
question of terminating nuclear weapons tests have not
yet resulted in any agreement. But does this mean that
we must resign ourselves to the present situation and
undertake no steps to achieve a solution of this prob-
lem? Of course not. Peoples demand of us practical
steps, and it is the duty of statesmen to do everything In
their power to bring about a realization of the aspira-
tions of peoples.
In such an important matter as the cessation of atomic
and hydrogen weapons tests someone had to take the
first step. We have taken that step, and we are waiting
for the Government of the United States of America to
follow our example. If we proceed on the principle of
strengthening peace and preventing the threat of nuclear
war, it should be stated directly that there are no reasons
which would prevent the Government of the United States
of America from taking such a step.
Indeed, can a cessation of atomic and hydrogen
weapons tests by the United States, following a similar
Department of State Bulletin
step by the Soviet Union, really prejudice in any way
the interests of security or the prestige of the United
States? Unquestionably, it cannot. If the point is that
the United States needs tests to perfect atomic and
hydrogen weapons, then, since the United States has
already conducted a considerably greater number of
these tests than has the Soviet Union, it follows that in
this respect also the United States would lose nothing
at all by terminating the testing of nuclear and hydrogen
weapons in a situation where the Soviet Union has
already ceased such tests.
With the testing of atomic weapons terminated, all
parties would find themselves in an equal position, from
the standpoint of their security interests. One could object
to terminating nuclear weapons tests in the event, for
instance, that one of the parties would like to obtain
military or strategic advantages over the other party.
However, I believe that you, Mr. President, agree that
none of the parties should strive toward such an ob-
jective.
As to the matter of prestige, I believe that yon will
agree with me that a power acting in the interest of
strengthening peace will never impair its prestige. On
the contrary, peoples will only be grateful to any state
if it undertakes actions directed toward strengthening
peace. It is never too late for good deeds.
In your reply you speak of the possibility of conduct-
ing certain types of tests in secrecy, thereby giving us
to vmderstand that it will be impossible to verify the
suspension of tests and that deception is possible here.
We cannot agree with this appraisal, for in reality
the situation is quite different. It is a known fact that
at the present time there do exist such apparatus, such
Instruments, and such methods of detection as to make
it possible to record any explosions of atomic and hydro-
gen weapons, wherever they may be detonated. You
have even spoken of this yourself. Thus, no state can
violate its commitment to cease testing atomic and hydro-
gen weapons without other states becoming apprised
of this violation.
It should be added to the foregoing that the Soviet
Government not only does not object to the establish-
ment of a system of control over the cessation of atomic
and hydrogen weapons tests but has even introduced
its own specific proposals in this regard. Unfortunately,
the Western Powers have not accepted the propo.?al of
the Soviet Union, and it has not yet been possible to
reach an agreement on the matter of control over the
cessation of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests.
There is no need for me to put particular emphasis
here on the enormous moral and political responsibility
which would be assumed by states declaring a cessation
of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests. Is it conceiv-
able that in time some state might violate the obligations
assumed, knowing beforehand that it would thus ex-
pose itself in the eyes of nations?
You also say that the cessation of nuclear weapons
tests must be part of a broad agreement on disarma-
ment. It is entirely impossible to agree with this
statement, considering the many years of experience of
essentially fruitless negotiations on problems of dis-
armament Authoritative scientists are already giving
May 19, 7958
464416—58 8
warnings concerning the dangerous consequences of radio-
active fallout for the health of people throughout the
entire globe.
What then, Mr. President, awaits us In the future, if
along with conversations about disarmament the testing
of ever more powerful means of destruction continues?
Is it not obvious that the baneful character of radioactive
particles which fall out in nuclear weapons tests will
not be diminished at all by the fact that the conducting
of these or other tests will be announced in advance
and that representatives of various countries will be
present at these tests?
Only one thing can put an end to the increasing threat
to the health of human beings, and that is the cessation
of tests of any kind of atomic and hydrogen weapons.
Such a decision by three powers in possession of these
weapons would be, at the same time, a great practical
contribution to the cause oC lessening international ten-
sion and strengthening trust and confidence in relations
between states. There is no doubt that if the U.S.A. and
Great Britain would follow the example of the Soviet
Union and cease testing atomic and hydrogen weapons,
this would also undoubtedly contribute to the settlement
of other unsolved international problems, including that
of disarmament.
These are my observations on the matter of ceasing
the testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons.
In your message, Mr. President, you recall, as if to
counterbalance the proposal of the U.S.S.R. to cease test-
ing atomic and hydrogen weapons, your previous pro-
posals regarding "open skies," the use of outer space for
peaceful purposes, and the cessation of production of
fissionable materials for military purposes.
In this connection I should like to state that the posi-
tion of the Soviet Union on all these questions is well
known.
We have already stated repeatedly, and we do so again,
that the flights of aircraft of one country over the terri-
tory of another, provided for by the "open sky" plan,
would contribute nothing to the solution of the problem
of disarmament.
The peoples of our countries will hardly feel more
secure or acquire peace and tranquillity from the fact
that American aircraft will be flying over our country
from one end to the other and that Soviet aircraft will
be plowing through American skies under circumstances
where attitudes of tension and mistrust prevail. Is it
not more correct to assume the opposite?
Under conditions where all our proposals to prohibit
atomic and hydrogen weapons or at least to renounce
their use are categorically rejected, where preparation is
being made for atomic warfare, as is proven by decisions
of the December session of NATO and by the continuing,
intensive construction of newer and newer military bases
which, according to the candid admission of certain politi-
cal and military figures of the U.S.A. and other countries
belonging to NATO, are designed for inflicting an "atomic
blow" against the Soviet Union — under these conditions
aerial photography might increase international tension
and suspicion among nations. This would not only fail
to contribute to the liquidation of the "cold war" and
813
the establishment of friendly relations among states but
would play into the hands of forces which are attempting
to find a pretext to engulf himianity in a destructive
atomic war.
In this connection I should like to state that the Soviet
Union could not fail to note the report that the miUtary
command of the U.S.A. has already repeatedly sent
aircraft of the Strategic Air Command with a hydrogen
bomb load in the direction of the U.S.S.R. According to
these reports, the orders for the flight of the aircraft
were issued in connection with reports from American
radar stations to the effect that Soviet guided missiles
were allegedly approaching the territory of the U.S.A.
Of course, no Soviet missiles have threatened or do
threaten the U.S.A., and the American radar stations'
signals were in error, as was to be expected.
There is no special need for me to speak of what a
serious danger to the cause of peace is represented by
such flights of American aircraft with a hydrogen bomb
load toward the borders of the Soviet Union. Is it not
clear that in such a situation a simple error in trans-
mitting signals may cause a world catastrophe?
Imagine for a minute, Mr. President, what would hap-
pen if the Soviet command, acting in a manner similar
to that in which the American military command is now
acting, should send aircraft with an atomic and hydrogen
bomb load in the direction of the U.S.A., citing the fact
that radar stations are sending signals of the approach
of American military aircraft, or if the Soviet military
command, in reply to the provocative flights of American
aircraft, should in its turn decide to send Soviet military
aircraft with a hydrogen bomb load in the direction of
the United States of America. And yet such flights of
Soviet aircraft under these conditions would be abso-
lutely justified.
It suflices to present the problem in this manner to
make it clear how dangerous such actions of the Ameri-
can command are. You may say that I am too sharp in
my description when I speak of these irresponsible and
provocative actions of the American military command.
However, I speak of this in this way only because I am
compelled to do so by my alarm when I think that, in
the atmosphere of the military psychosis which is so char-
acteristic of certain circles in your country, a world
tragedy, with millions and millions of human victims,
could develop, unexpected by any of us.
We expect from the Government of the United States
that it will put an immediate end to this dangerous play-
ing with fire.
Furthermore, I should like to touch upon the matter of
the use of outer space for peaceful purposes.
In the course of the exchange of views in connection
with the preparations for convening a summit confer-
ence, you proposed that the question of the prohibition
of the use of outer space for military purposes be dis-
cussed at that meeting. We seriously considered this
proposal of yours, and we stated that we were prepared
to consider at a summit meeting the question of the pro-
hibition of the use of outer space for military purposes
and the liquidation of military bases in foreign terri-
tories. In this connection we proceed from the premise
that any solution of this problem must take into account
the security of the Soviet Union, the United States of
America, and other coimtries. The proposal of the Soviet
government for the prohibition of the use of outer space
for military purposes, the liquidation of bases in foreign
territories, and international cooperation in the field of
the study of outer space meets this objective. We are
prepared to conclude an agreement which would provide
for the prohibition of the use of outer space for military
purposes and would permit the launching of rockets into
outer space only in accordance with an agreed interna-
tional program of scientific research. At the same time,
we cannot ignore the fact that atomic and hydrogen
weapons can be delivered to the target not only by
means of intercontinental rockets but also by means of
intermediate and short-range rockets, as well as by means
of conventional bombers stationed at the numerous Amer-
ican military bases located in areas adjacent to the Soviet
Union.
Your proposal for the use of outer space for peaceful
purposes provides, in fact, for the prohibition of intercon-
tinental ballistic missiles alone, leaving aside the other
important aspects of this problem. It is easy to see that
you propose such a solution of the question as would
correspond to the interests of the security of the United
States alone, but would not provide any measures that
would remove the threat to the security of the Soviet
Union or to that of many other states created by the
existence of niunerous American military bases in foreign
territories. The essence of your proposal is to prevent,
through the prohibition of intercontinental ballistic mis-
siles, a nuclear counterblow through outer space from
being delivered against yourselves. Of course, it is im-
possible to agree to such an inequitable solution, which
would put one side in a privileged position with regard
to the other. Therefore we stated that an agreement on
the prohibition of the use of outer space for military
purposes must also provide for the liquidation of mili-
tary bases located in foreign territories, and primarily
in Europe, in the Near and Middle East, and in North
Africa.
Such a solution of the problem, in our opinion, is equi-
table because it fully meets the interests of security of
the United States, of the Soviet Union, and of other
countries, and offers no advantage to any of them. As
for the states on the territories of which American mili-
tary bases are located, it may be said with assurance
that they would only profit from such a solution of the
problem, in as much as a liquidation of bases would
fully meet the interests of the national security of these
states by averting the deadly peril which could threaten
their populations in case of war.
In your message, Mr. President, you pass over our
proposal in complete silence and state that you await
the acceptance of your proposal by the Soviet Govern-
ment. An impression is created that it is desired to im-
pose upon us a solution of the problem of the use of
outer space such as would correspond to the interests
of the United States alone and would completely ignore
the interests of the Soviet Union. Such a one-sided ap-
proach is absolutely inadmissible in negotiations between
814
Department of State Bulletin
indei)€ndent states and, of course, cannot lead to the
achievement of an agreement.
In your letter, Mr. President, in touching upon the
question of the peaceful use of atomic energy, you
attempt to present the matter in such a way as to create
the impression that the United States of America is
the champion of the peaceful use of atomic energy. How-
ever, the actual facts do not bear this out. Indeed, on
the basis of facts, one cannot fail to recognize that the
Soviet Union is a resolute advocate of the idea that
atomic energy must not serve the purpose of exterminat-
ing human beings but should rather be fully directed
toward serving the peaceful needs of humanity. Since
the early days of this problem the Soviet Government
has consistently striven in the United Nations for a
prohibition of the use of all kinds of atomic and hydro-
gen weapons, for the elimination of these arms from
the armaments of states, for the destruction of the stock-
piles thereof, and for the discontinuance of the manu-
facture of such weapons and the establishment of
international control over the execution of these
measures.
What has prevented the acceptance of this proposal,
the aim of which was to lay a foundation for the use
of atomic energy exclusively for peaceful purposes? As
is well known, the United States, together with its
Western allies, also since the early days of this problem,
has objected to these proposals and has prevented their
acceptance, continuing to build its foreign policy on the
use of nuclear arms. Thus, a deep abyss has appeared
between the words of the United States about its desire
to direct its atomic energy toward peaceful purposes,
. and its deeds.
It is understandable that the Soviet Union, which
considers it its sacred duty to rescue mankind from
the threat of a destructive atomic war, could not and
cannot agree to such proposals, which would lead away
from the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons
and would play into the hands of those forces which
strive to have the threat of atomic war constantly hang
over mankind like the sword of Damocles.
Unfortunately, your letter of April 8 also contains
no proposals directed toward the solution of the problem
of disarmament and removal of the threat of nuclear
war. Instead of that you proposed that we engage in
a study of the question concerning the necessary meas-
ures of control by appointing appropriate experts for
this purpose. But is it possible for technical experts
to contribute anything to the solution of the problem
of disarmament if no agreement between Governments
has been reached on this point? During the thirteen
years of negotiations on disarmament hundreds of
speeches were delivered and mountains of paper were
written on the subject of control, but this did not bring
us one step closer to the solution of the problem of
disarmament. It is impossible to permit the solution of
May 79, 7958
the problem of disarmament itself to be endlessly delayed
under the pretext of studying the problems of control.
The Soviet Union has not only never objected to
control but also repeatedly introduced proposals itself
concerning the establishment of a reliable system of
control over the execution of specific measures for dis-
armament. However, the refusal of the Western Powers
to take any practical disarmament steps made the prob-
lem of control aimless, because it is of course, impossible
to control the execution by states of commitments which
do not exist.
The present international situation demands of all
states — and, above all, of the great powers, which bear
the main responsibility for the destinies of the world—
not general phrases about the desirability of disarm-
ament but concrete action in this field.
The Soviet Union has made its contribution to the
cause of lessening international tension, to the cause of
peace. From now on not a single atomic bomb nor a
single hydrogen bomb will be exploded by the Soviet
Union unless the United States and United Kingdom
compel us to do so. We address the Governments of the
United States and Great Britain with the appeal : do not
commence a chain reaction of experimental explosions of
atomic and hydrogen bombs.
The solution of the problem of whether an end will be
put to nuclear tests forever or whether these tests will
continue poisoning the air and increasing the threat of
the outbreak of a destructive atomic war now depends
on two powers only, the United States of America and
Great Britain, and the governments of the United States
and the United Kingdom bear a great responsibility be-
fore the entire world.
Perhaps, Mr. President, you do not share all the con-
siderations presented by me, but I should still like to
express a desire : would it not be possible to put an end
to polemics on this subject, close the book on the past, and
agree that the United States of America and Great
Britain will discontinue atomic and hydrogen weapons
tests, just as the Soviet Union has done?
I assure you that humanity would breathe a deep sigh
of relief if all three powers which manufacture atomic
and hydrogen weapons would stop the tests of such
It is our profound hope, Mr. President, that you will
use all your authority and influence for these noble
aims.
With sincere respect,
N. Khbushchev
The Kremlin, Moscow, A'pril 22, 1958
[Initialed:] MM
His Excellency
DWIGHT D. ElSENHOWEE,
President of the United States of America,
Washington, D.O.
815
U.S. Recommends Arctic Zone of Inspection Against Surprise Attacit;
U.S.S.R. Casts 83d Veto
The U.N. Security Council met on April 29 and May 2 to consider a draft
resolution submitted hy the United States recommending establishment of
a '■'■zone of international inspection against surprise attack, comprising the
area north of the Arctic Circle . . ." and a draft resolution submitted by
the U.S.S.R. calling upon the United States "to refrain from sending its
military aircraft carrying atomic and hydrogen bombs towards the frontiers
of other States for the purpose of creating a threat to their security or stag-
ing military demonstrations^ Following are the texts of three statements
made at these sessions by U.S. Representative Henry Cabot Lodge.
OPENING STATEMENT BY MR. LODGE, APRIL 29
U.S./U.N. press release 2918 dated AprU 29
I begin my presentation to the Security Council
this morning by referring to the letter which Pres-
ident Eisenhower sent to Chairman Khrushchev
yesterday.^ In that letter he stated :
The United States has just asked the Security Council
to reconvene in order to consider the establishmeni: of
an international inspection system for the Arctic zone.
The United States has submitted a constructive proposal
to this end. I urge you to join vrith us in supporting the
resolution of the United States now before the Council.
Tour support of this proposal and subsequent cooperation
would help to achieve a significant first step. It would
help to reduce tensions, it would contribute to an in-
crease of confidence among states, and help to reduce
the mutual fears of surprise attack.
The United States has asked the Security Coun-
cil to meet today to take a step which we believe
can, in all truth, swiftly and significantly lessen
the danger to world peace.
Last week the Security Council met to consider
the complaint of the Soviet Union that flights by
the United States military aircraft made in the
direction of the Soviet frontiers constituted a
threat to the security of nations.' We believe the
Council's discussions were useful in that they
" See p. 811.
• BxjLLETiN of May 12, ]
demonstrated beyond question that the Soviet
charges were groundless. We showed that the
activities of United States military aircraft repre-
sent purely defensive measures which are alto-
gether reasonable and necessaiy in view of the
conditions with which they must cope.
Our flights are a necessary defensive measure
against massive surprise attack, and it follows
therefore that, if the danger of such attack were
removed, the need for this defense would be cor-
respondingly lessened. The United States and
many other independent nations have been con-
cerned for a long time about the possibility of
such an attack. We must continue to be con-
cerned vmtil a workable solution is found. De-
spite the strictures made against the United States
by the Soviet Union last week, Soviet emphasis
upon this problem leads us to hope that the Soviet
Union may this week be prepared constructively
to join hands with the rest of us.
The awesome destructive power of modem ar-
maments makes it at least theoretically possible
to wipe out the military capacity of a state —
even one of the greatest powers — in a single at-
tack. But such an attack must come without
warning if it is to succeed. If there is a way to
guard against such massive surprise attack or to
allay fear of such an attack — and the United
States believes that there is — we here must leave
no stone unturned in our effort to find it. In re-
Department of State Bulletin
convening the Security Council today on the item
submitted by the Soviet Union, the United States
hopes to find such a way.
Finding means to guard against surprise attack
can have an important beai'ing on tlie prospect
for future progress on the lowering of tensions
and tlie continued maintenance of international
peace. If each country knew for certain that
there was no possibility of a surprise attack being
launched against it, the fear of war would de-
crease and we could move forward toward impor-
tant disarmament measures. The time is long
overdue for such a begiiming.
The United States believes that, given good
faith and willingness to engage in purposeful
negotiations, the time has come to agree to inter-
national inspection to remove the fear of sur-
prise attack in the vital Arctic region. Assum-
ing that the Soviet Union meant what it said
last week concerning its fears of surprise attack
and knowing that other countries do truly fear
the prospect of such an attack, we must try to
eliminate this danger. We seek a measure which
would give us a start toward making great sur-
prise attack virtually impossible, which conse-
quently would reduce the scale of military activ-
ity and which could ease the way to significant
arms reduction. We propose going ahead with
this proposal for an inspection zone in the Arctic
without awaiting agi^eement on disarmament as
a whole. This is entirely consistent with the orig-
inal "open skies" proposal made by President
Eisenhower in Geneva in 1955, wliich we have
always been ready to accept as an independent
measure. Our present proposal in no way dimin-
ishes our belief that discussions should be renewed
urgently on the general question of disarmament.
During the Council's discussion last week, var-
ious representatives referred to the need to deal
with the problem of suqjrise attack. Tlie Cana-
dian representative reaffirmed his Government's
willingness to cooperate in measures of inspection
and control involving Canadian territory. He
emphasized that it was open to the Soviet Union
"to bring about an improveinent in the interna-
tional situation ... by concerning itself with
cooperation in the Arctic region on a system of
control and inspection." The representative of
Japan urged the states concerned to make a se-
rious effort to resume disarmament negotiations,
along with "ways and means to prevent surprise
attack."
In a statement of the Soviet Foreign Minister,
which was circulated as document S/3991 at the
request of the Soviet delegation, Mr. Gromyko
made reference to the possibility of a flight of
United States aircraft approaching the frontiers
of the Soviet Union, in which case, Mr. Gromyko
says, "the need to ensure the safety of the Soviet
people would require the U.S.S.R. to take im-
mediate measures to remove the approaching
threat." Now, although we have made it whoUy
clear that the United States will not attack any
country, yet, if Mr. Gromyko's statement repre-
sents a sincere concern — no matter how ground-
less— surely the Soviet Union will agree that the
establishment of an acceptable system of inspec-
tion would be desirable. Let us attack the cause
of the Soviet concerns, not their symptoms.
Surely this is what Soviet Premier Khrushchev
had in mind when he said last November: "Our
belief and our position is today that conditions
should be created that would preclude the possi-
bility of a surprise attack by some countries
against others." The United States believes that
what is now needed is the will to take construc-
tive action.
Geography makes it apparent that inspection
in the Arctic area can be at least the fii-st line
of approach to the problem of surprise attack.
We are loath to believe that the Soviet Govern-
ment really wants to deny to its people the kind
of safeguards which would make surprise attack
virtually impossible. We trust that Mr. Sobolev
favored providing such safeguards when he re-
ferred to the Soviet Union's wish "to promote an
improvement in the international situation and
to establish the necessary trust among States"
and when he stated that the Council should take
"steps designed to reduce the threat of war."
Background of U.S. Proposals
Now, gentlemen, let me review briefly some of
the background of the proposals we are making
today.
In July 1955, at the Geneva smnmit meeting.
President Eisenhower introduced a proposal
which called for "open skies" inspection over
the United States and the U.S.S.E. and a mutual
exchange of blueprints between the two coun-
tries.^ At that time he said:
' Ihid., Aug. 1, 1955, p. 173.
May 79, 7958
817
The United States is ready to proceed in tlie study and
testing of a reliable system of inspections and reporting
and, when that system is proved, then to reduce arma-
ments with all others to the extent that the system will
provide assured results.
This lie envisaged as a practical step which would
reduce the danger of surprise attack, reduce ten-
sion, and thus create an atmosphere which could
lead to further progress. Also at the Geneva con-
ference, former Soviet Premier Bulganin re-
affirmed an earlier Soviet proposal for a system
of ground control posts. We recognized this as
a sound measure at the time, and President Eisen-
hower, on October 11, 1955, wrote to Mr.
Bulganin : *
I have not forgotten your proposal having to do with
stationing inspection teams at key points in our countries,
and if you feel this would help to create the better spirit
I refer to, we could accept that too.
Since the President's Geneva proposal, the
United States, along with other countries, has
continued to emphasize the importance of aerial
and ground inspection.
In Secretary Dulles' words of May 29, 1957.° we
were "trying to get something started quickly;
and as far as we are concernd, we will take any
area which is sufficiently free of political com-
plications so that the whole process does not get
bogged down." To this end the United States
suggested that we make a beginning in the Arctic
region, where Soviet and American territory sig-
nificantly adjoins.
No action was taken at that time. Then came
the Soviet agenda item of last week. Clearly it
gave new significance to this earlier Arctic zone
proposal. After careful consideration we con-
cluded that this proposal was applicable to present
circumstances.
Let me make clear that this United States pro-
posal is made entirely apart from the general
topic of disarmament. The United States is not
now attempting to bring the subject of disarma-
ment before the Security Cotmcil. There is be-
fore the Security Council an alleged "threat to
the peace." We want to dispel any possibOity
of fear that the peace will be disturbed even
accidentally.
' lUd., Oct. 24, 1955, p. 643.
'For the transcript of Secretary Dulles' news confer-
ence of May 29, 1957, see iUd., June 17, 1957, p. 961.
818
Tlie United States has never considered that
inspection against surprise attack was in itself
"disarmament." The President put forward his
"open skies" proposal as a prelude to disarma-
ment, as something that might make disarmament
easier. But it was never a part of disarmament,
and we do not now put forward this proposal as
an entering wedge to bring the disarmament pro-
posal before the Security Council, although we do
recognize that, under article 26 of the charter, the
Security Coimcil does have responsibility for the
establishment of a system for the regulation of
armaments. However, that is not now being
brought before the Council.
Provisions of U.S. Resolution
Now let me talk about the provisions of the
resolution which the United States has in-
troduced.
It looks toward an agreement establishing mu-
tually acceptable safeguards against surprise
attack m an important area.
It recommends prompt establishment of a north-
ern zone of inspection against surprise attack.
It calls upon five countries, which engaged in
lengthy negotiations on this problem last year, to-
gether with Denmark and Norway, both of whom
have also concurred concerning their territories, to
designate representatives to participate in im-
mediate discussions "with a view to agreeing on
the technical arrangements required." This pro-
posal would also apply to any other states having
territory north of the Arctic Circle which desire
to have such territoi*y included in the inspection
zone.
The zone open to inspection would include all
territory north of the Arctic Circle of the Soviet
Union, Canada, the United States (that is,
Alaska), Denmark (that is, Greenland), and Nor-
way; all the territory of Canada, the United
States, and the Soviet Union west of 140 degrees
west longitude, east of 160 degrees east longitude,
and north of 50 degrees north latitude ; all the re-
mainder of the Kamchatka Peninsula ; and all of
the Aleutian and Kurile Islands. This proposed
inspection zone encompasses a principal area over
which the bulk of any attack might pass. We
believe that this vital region should be brought
under international inspection.
The United States is openminded about the
technical arrangements for such an international
Department of State Bulletin
inspection system. This is a matter to be worked
out during the course of discussions among the
participating states. That is why we have pro-
posed that technical discussions on this matter be-
gin as soon as possible.
Let me emphasize several impoitant considera-
tions regarding an inspection system in the Arctic
zone : It should be an agreed international system
and not just a national system; any such system
should include some means of advance notification
of flights and any other movements of military
significance in the Arctic zone; there should be
radar monitoring of all such flights ; and the con-
cept of ground inspection posts, as suggested by
the Soviet Union, should be included.
In order to make possible tlie inclusion of
several additional segments of territory within the
Arctic Circle which are not specifically covered,
we have provided in this resolution for the par-
ticipation in our discussions of such other states
as have territoi-y within this area and desire its
inclusion in the zone of inspection.
The resolution makes clear that the states con-
cerned must work out the actual inspection sys-
tem, which means that the final product must be
satisfactory to all of them. And this provision
protects us all.
The United States believes that mutually ac-
ceptable arrangements along these or similar lines
can be devised, that our proposal is serious, and
that it affords a reasonable basis for a discussion
which can lead to an agreement.
If we can proceed gradually and first experi-
ment with limited measures of aerial and ground
inspection, it should facilitate the subsequent ex-
pansion of inspection. Once this limited inspec-
tion system has proved its value and begun to
rebuild mutual confidence, any suspicions that
ulterior motives undei'lie proposals for aerial-
inspection arrangements should be removed, once
and for all.
We urge all members of the Council — and all
countries concerned — to join in making this be-
ginning. Let us at least lessen our worry — our
mutual worry — over surprise attack. Let us cre-
ate by our action in this Coimcil today that mutual
confidence so essential to progress toward peace.
Let us begin the long-sought, long-awaited, and
long-hoped-for step which will lead us and other
nations of the world to the just and durable ]
all mankind seeks.
Gentlemen, this session of this Security Council
here in New York today could mark the turn in
the road for which humanity has been looking.
Let us reassure the world by reacliing agreement
on this important matter. Let us rise to the
occasion.
STATEMENT ON SWEDISH AMENDMENT, MAY 2
U.S./U.N. press release 2922 dated May 2
The United States accepts the amendment sub-
mitted by the representative of Sweden.* In do-
ing so, I would like to suggest a change to the
representative of Sweden. I hope that he would
agree that the word "the" before the word "sum-
mit" could be changed to the word "a." The
paragraph would then read :
Expresses the view that such discussions might serve
as a useful basis for the deliberations on the disarm-
ament problem at a summit conference on the convening
of which talks are in progress.
REBUTTAL STATEMENT, MAY 2
U.S. /U.N. press release 2924 dated May 2
The Soviet representative has characterized the
United States proposal as merely an intelligence-
collection scheme. Obviously, this proposal
would, if put into effect, collect new information.
But what is of utmost importance is that such
information would be collected under inter-
national auspices as part of an internationally
approved system, to which the states concerned
would all have to agree. It is precisely this lack
of openness and information about intentions
and military capabilities that creates the present
tensions and fears. As long as we try to
keep this secrecy and maintain this secrecy, the
present situation will not improve.
The Soviet representative has dwelt on the
danger of an accidental outbreak of war and has
suggested that this could only occur as a result
of an American error. But it is common knowl-
edge, Mr. President, that the Soviet Union has
also a long-range air force and it also has nuclear
weapons. If the Soviet leaders are, in fact, ap-
' U.N. doe. S/3998 dated Apr. 29.
May 79, 7958
Draft Resolution on Arctic
Inspection Zone^
The Security Council,
Considering further the Item of the U.S.S.R. of
18 April 1958,
Noting the development, particularly in the Soviet
Union and the United States of America, of grow-
ing capabilities of massive surprise attack,
Believing that the establishment of measures to
allay fears of such massive surprise attack would
help reduce tensions and would contribute to the
increase of confidence among States,
Noting the statements of certain members of the
Council regarding the particular significance of the
Arctic area.
Recommends that there be promptly established
the Northern zone of international inspection
against surprise attack, comprising the area north
of the Arctic Circle with certain exceptions and
additions, that was considered by the United Nations
Disarmament Sub-Committee of Canada, France,
the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom and the United
States during August 1957 ;
Calls upon the five States mentioned, together
with Denmark and Norway, and any other States
having territory north of the Arctic Circle which
desire to have such territory included in the zone
of international inspection, at once to designate
representatives to participate In immediate discus-
sions with a view to agreeing on the technical
arrangements required ;
Expresses the view that such discussions might
serve as a useful basis for the deliberations on the
disarmament problem at a summit conference on
the convening of which talks are in progress ;
Decides to keep this matter on its agenda for
such further consideration as may be required.
'U.N. doc. S/3995 as amended; 10 members of
the Security Council voted in favor of the resolu-
tion, but it was defeated by a Soviet veto.
prehensive about an accidental outbreak of war,
it is difficult to understand their objection to an
arrangement which would so manifestly reduce
the likelihood of an outbreak of war. If we
could, with the aid of the United Nations and the
ingenuity of our scientists, erect a great wall of
vigilance in the Arctic wastes, surely many of
our apprehensions would be reduced.
Let me add one word of agreement with one
of the comments of the Soviet representative.
We have never claimed that the disarmament
problem can be solved by vote. We agree that
negotiations are needed. We have submitted pro-
posals on all aspects of disarmament. We are
ready and anxious to begin discussions of this
problem again, either in the United Nations Dis-
armament Commission or as part of the pre-
paratory discussions looking toward a possible
conference of heads of government. But here
and now an important start could be made
through the discussions which are called for in
the pending resolution.
The question has been raised whether the area
described in the resolution is subject to negotia-
tion. I said in my statement last Tuesday that
we believe our proposal affords a reasonable basis
for a discussion which can lead to an agreement.
Of course our Geneva "open skies" proposal also
remains open. The Arctic is the area which we
think should be covered now. As Secretary of
State Dulles commented yesterday,^ we thought
of this area as a useful begimiing place because
it is an area of strategic unportance and because
it is relatively free from the political complica-
tions that exist elsewhere. For these reasons we
think this is the area on which to concentrate.
But, Mr. President, I stress this: We are not
inflexible. This is shown by the fact that our
proposal makes possible the inclusion of other
ai-eas within the Arctic, such as those of Sweden
and Finland. The point is that, since Soviet con-
cern related specifically to the Arctic region, this
seemed to be the logical place to start. But ob-
viously tliere are more ways than one in which
to work this out.
Finally, Mr. President, I would like to repeat
the thought which I submitted at an earlier meet-
ing of the Coimcil: that an inspection system
which would give reassurance about surprise at-
tack might make our flights unnecessary. Secre-
tary Dulles said yesterday that such an inspection
system "would, in fact, lead to a considerable
modification of our practices."
I say to Mr. Sobolev, if, therefore, you really
mean what you say about your objection to Ameri-
can flights, your course is perfectly clear: you
have but to vote for the United States resolution.*
' For the transcript of Secretary Dulles' news confer-
ence of May 1, 1958, see p. 804.
" Following the Soviet veto of the U.S. draft resolution
(S/3995 as amended), the Security Council rejected the
Soviet draft resolution (S/3997) by a vote of 1 to 9, with
1 abstention (Sweden).
Department of State Bulletin
U.S. Replies to Polish Note
on Rapacki Plan
U.S. NOTE OF MAY 3
Press release 242 dated May 4
United States Amhassador to Poland Jacob D.
Beam delivered on May 3 the U.S. Govet^menfs
reply to the Ra-packi plan proposals elaborated
in the memorandum attached to tlie Polish Gov-
emmenfs note of February H. Ambassador
Beam handed the U.S. note to Polish Deputy For-
eign Minister Jozef Winiewicz. The text of the
UjS. reply is as follows:
Excellency : I have the honoi- to acknowledge
the receipt of Mr. Rapacki's note of February 14,
1958, enclosing a memorandum elaborating on the
Polish Government's proposals concerning the es-
tablisliment of a denuclearized zone in Central
Europe.
Recognizing that the initiative of the Polish
Government stems from a desire to contribute to
the attauiment of a stable and durable peace, my
Government has given these proposals serious and
careful consideration. On the basis of this study
it has concluded that they are too limited in scope
to reduce the danger of nuclear war or provide
a dependable basis for the security of Europe.
They neither deal with the essential question of
the continued production of nuclear weapons by
the present nuclear powers nor take into account
the fact that present scientific techniques are not
adequate to detect existing nuclear weapons. The
proposed plan does not affect the central sources
of power capable of launching a nuclear attack,
and thus its effectiveness would be dependent on
the good intentions of coimtries outside the area.
The proposals overlook the central problems of
European security because they provide no meth-
od for balanced and equitable limitations of mili-
tai-y capabilities and would perpetuate the basic
cause of tension in Europe by accepting the con-
tinuation of the division of Germany.
An agreement limited to the exclusion of nu-
clear weapons from the territory indicated by
your Government without other types of limita-
tion would, even if it were capable of being in-
spected, endanger the security of the Western Eu-
ropean countries in view of the large and widely
deployed military forces of the Soviet Union.
Unless equipped with nuclear weapons, Western
forces in Germany would find themselves under
present circumstances at a great disadvantage to
the numerically greater mass of Soviet troops sta-
tioned within easy distance of Western Europe
which are, as the Soviet leadei-s made clear, being
equipped with the most modern and destructive
weapons, including missiles of all kinds.
The considerations outlined above have caused
the United States ui association with other West-
ern Powers to propose that nations stop produc-
ing material for nuclear weapons, cease testing
such weapons and begin to reduce present stock-
piles. The United States has further proposed
broader areas of inspection against surprise at-
tack, including an area in Europe, roughly from
the United Kingdom to the Ural mountains. We
remain willing to do this. You will recall, more-
over, that the Western nations offered at the Lon-
don disarmament negotiations to discuss a more
limited zone in Europe. With regard to missiles
you will recall that over a year and a half ago
the United States proposed that we begin to study
the inspection and control needed to assure the
exclusive peaceful use of outer space now threat-
ened by the development of such devices as inter-
continental and intermediate range ballistic
The United States, in association with other
Western Powers, has also proposed that a com-
prehensive and effective European security ar-
rangement be established in conjunction with the
reunification of Germany. The proposed ar-
rangements would provide for limitations on both
forces and armaments, measures for the preven-
tion of surprise attack in the area, and assurances
of reaction in the event of aggression.
Your note speaks of the existence of opposing
military groupings in Central Europe as being re-
sponsible for tensions in the area. It should not
be necessary for me to recall that the present di-
vision of Europe stems primarily from the de-
cision of the Soviet Union not to permit Eastern
European nations to participate in the European
Recovery Plan. Nor need I repeat the many as-
surances given as to the defensive character of
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization which
is reflected in its entire organizational and com-
mand structure. The entire histoiy of its cre-
ation and development testify to this, though per-
sistent efforts are made in some quarters to por-
tray it otherwise.
May 79, 7958
In the absence of effective arrangements either
general or regional in character which would pro-
mote real security and in view of the present pol-
icies and armaments of the Soviet Union, the
countries of Western Europe along with Canada
and ourselves, joined in alliance with them, have
no other recourse than to develop the required
pattern of integrated NATO military strength
and to utilize for defensive purposes modern de-
velopments in weapons and techniques.
The views which I have presented above on
behalf of my Government point out the basic rea-
sons why the United States considers that the
Polish Government's proposals for establisliing a
denuclearized zone in Central Europe would not
serve to advance their expressed objectives.
Nevertheless, the United States appreciates the
initiative of the Polish Government in seeking a
solution to these problems. It hopes that this
exchange of con-espondence will enable the Polish
Government better to understand American pro-
posals in the fields of European security and dis-
armament. I trust that the improved relations
between Poland and the United States will serve
as a basis for a better understanding between our
two countries on these problems, as well as on
other matters.
POLISH NOTE OF FEBRUARY 14 >
I wish to refer to the conversation which I had on
December 9, 1957, with the Charge d'Affaires of the
Embassy of the United States in Warsaw. In this con-
versation I have presented the position of the Polish
Government in respect to the tendencies to malse the
nuclear armaments In Europe universal and particularly
towards the acceleration of armaments in Western Ger-
many. The threat of further complications, primarily in
Central Europe, where the opposing military groupings
come into a direct contact and the apparent danger of
an increase in the international tension have prompted
the Polish Government to initiate at that time direct
discussions through diplomatic channels on the Polish
proposal submitted to the United Nations General As-
sembly on October 2, 1957, concerning the establishment
of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe.
This proposal has evolied a wide interest in govern-
ment and political circles as well as in the broad strata
of public opinion in many countries.
Tailing into account a number of opinions expressed
in declarations made in connection with the Polish pro-
posal and with the view to facilitate negotiations, the
Polish Government has resolved to present a more de-
tailed elaboration of its proposal. This finds its ex-
pression in the attached memorandum which is simul-
taneously being transmitted by the Polish Government to
the governments of France, Great Britain and the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics as well as to the govern-
ments of other interested countries.
The Polish Government is conscious of the fact that the
solution of the problem of disarmament on a world-wide
scale requires, first of all, negotiations among the great
powers and other countries concerned. Therefore, the
Polish Government supports the proposal of the U.S.S.R.
government concerning a meeting on the highest level of
leading statesmen with the participation of heads of
governments. Such a meeting could also result in reach-
ing an agreement on the que.stion of the establishment of
a denuclearized zone in Central Europe, should an agree-
ment among the countries concerned not be reached in
the meantime. In any event the initiation at present of
discussions on the question of a denuclearized zone in
Central Europe would contribute to p. successful course of
the above mentioned meeting.
The Polish Government expresses the hope that the
Government of the United States will study the attached
memorandum and that the proposals contained in it wiU
meet with the understanding of the Government of the
United States. The Polish Government on its part would
be prepared to continue the exchange of views on this
problem with the Government of the United States.
Memokandum
On October 2, 1957, the Government of the Polish
People's Republic presented to the General Assembly of
the United Nations a proposal concerning the establish-
ment of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe. The
governments of Czechoslovakia and of the German
Democratic Republic declared their readiness to accede
to that zone.
The Government of the Polish People's Republic pro-
ceeded with the conviction that the establi.sbment of
the proposed denuclearized zone could lead to an im-
provement in the international atmosphere and facilitate
broader discussions on disarmament as well as the solu-
tion of other controversial internal issues, while the
continuation of nuclear armaments and making them
universal could only lead to a further solidifying of the
division of Europe into opposing blocks and to a further
complication of this situation, especially in Central
Handed to Ambassador Beam at Warsaw on Feb. 14
by Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapaeki.
In December 1957 the Government of the Polish
People's Republic .renewed its proposal through diplo-
matic channels. '"
Considering the wWe repercussions which the Polish
initiative has evokecfarid taking into account the prop-
ositions emerging from the discussion which has de-
veloped on this proposal, the Government of the Polish
People's Republic hereby presents a more detailed
elaboration of its proposal, which may facilitate the
opening of negotiations and reaching of an agreement
on this subject.
Department of State Bulletin
I. The proposed zones should include the territory
of: Poland, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Repub-
lic and German Federal Republic. In this territory nu-
clear weapons would neither be manufactured nor
stockpiled, the equipment and installatijns designed for
their servicing would not be located there; the use of
nuclear weapons against the territory of this zone would
be prohibited.
II. The contents of the obligations arising from the
establishment of the denuclearized zone would be based
upon the following premises :
1. The states included in this zone would undertake
the obligation not to manufacture, maintain nor import
for their own use and not to permit the location on
their territories of nuclear weapons of any type, as well
as not to install nor to admit to their territories of
installations and equipment designed for servicing nu-
clear weapons, including missiles' launching equipment.
2. The four powers (France, United States, Great
Britain, and U.S.S.R.) would undertake the following
obligations :
(A) Not to maintain nuclear weapons in the arma-
ments of their forces stationed on the territories of
states included in this zone; neither to maintain nor
to install on the territories of these states any installa-
tions or equipment designed for servicing nuclear
weapons, including missiles' launching equipment.
(B) Not to transfer in any manner and under any
reason whatsoever, nuclear weapons nor installations
and equipment designed for servicing nuclear weapons —
to governments or other organs in this area.
3. The powers which have at their disposal nuclear
weapons should undertake the obligation not tb use these
weapons against the territory of the zone or against any
targets situated in this zone.
Thus the powers would undertake the obligation to
respect the status of the zone as an area in which there
should be no nuclear weapons and against which nuclear
weapons should not be used.
4. Other states, whose forces are stationed on the ter-
ritory of any state included in the zone, would also under-
take the obligation not to maintain nuclear weapons in
the armaments of these forces and not to transfer such
weapons to governments or to other organs in this area.
Neither will they install equipment or installations de-
signed for the servicing of nuclear weapons, including
missiles' launching equipment, on the territories of states
in the zone nor will they transfer them to governments
or other organs in this area.
The manner and procedure for the implementation of
these obligations could be the subject of detailed mutual
stipulations.
III. In order to ensure the effectiveness and implemen-
tation of the obligations contained in Part II, paragraphs
1-2 and 4, the states concerned would undertake to
create a system of broad and effective control in the
area of the proposed zone and submit themselves to its
functioning.
1. This system could comprise ground as well as aerial
control. Adequate control posts, with rights and pos-
sibilities of action which would ensure the effectiveness
of inspection, could also be established.
The details and forms of the implementation of control
can be agreed upon on the basis of the experience ac-
quired up to the present time in this field, as well as on
the basis of proposals submitted by various states in the
course of the disarmament negotiations, in the form and
to the extent in which they can be adapted to the area
of the zone.
The system of control established for the denuclearized
zone could provide useful experience for the realization
of broader disarmament agreement.
2. For the purpose of supervising the implementation
of the proposed obligations an adequate control ma-
chinery should be established. There could participate
In it, for example, representatives appointed/not exclud-
ing additional personal appointments/by organs of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization and of the Warsaw
Treaty. Nationals or representatives of states, which do
not belong to any military grouping in Europe, could also
participate in it.
The piocedure of the establishment, operation and re-
porting of the control organs can be the subject of further
mutual stipulations.
IV. The most simple form of embodying the obligations
of states included in the zone wovdd be the conclusion of
an appropriate international convention. To avoid, how-
ever, implications, which some states might find in such
a solution, it can be arranged that :
1. These obligations be embodied in the form of four
unilateral declarations, bearing the character of an in-
ternational obligation deposited with a mutually agreed
upon depository state.
2. The obligations of great powers be embodied in the
form of a mutual document or unilateral declaration/as
mentioned above in paragraph 1/ ;
3. The obligations of other states, whose armed forces
are stationed in the area of the zone, be embodied in
the form of unilateral declarations/as mentioned above
in paragraph 1/.
On the basis of the above proiMsals the government
of the Polish People's Republic suggests to initiate nego-
tiations for the purpose of a further detailed elaboration
of the plan for the establishment of the denuclearize
zone, of the documents and guarantees related to it as
well as of the means of implementation of the undertaken
obligations.
The government of the Polish People's Republic has
reasons to state that acceptance of the proposal con-
cerning the establishment of a denuclearized zone in
Central Europe will facilitate the reaching of an agree-
ment relating to the adequate reduction of conventional
armaments and of foreign armed forces stationed on the
territory of the states included in the zone.
May 79, 7958
823
Nationalism in Africa
Palmer 2d
Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs '
The sense of privilege that I feel at the oppor-
tunity to speak at tliis distinguished institution
of higher learning is reinforced by my recog-
nition of the importance that the Institute of
Ethnic Studies is attaching to the problems
attendant upon "Nationalism in Africa," my
subject today. This emphasis is perhaps best
illustrated by a fact : Within a few short years the
Continent of Africa has trebled its participation
in the community of nations. In the light of this
development I do not need to point out to such
an audience as this that the urge to create a
national entity and to exercise the prerogatives
of self-government is, at least in major portions
of the continent, probably the major political,
economic, and social force in Africa today. This
pervasive inner drive is weaving profound
changes in the fabric of African societies and, in
its international aspect, has the most direct and
fundamental importance for the rest of the
world — Europe, first of all, but assuredly also
for both Asia and the Americas. Any effort
to foresee the character of world society a decade
hence must certainly take account, as a primary
consideration, of nationalism in Africa.
We cannot expect to find, in our study of
Africa, many generalizations that wiU serve as
a common key to full interpretation of the vari-
ous national dramas which are unfolding on this
continent. The geographic sweep is too immense,
the contact with different European or Middle
Eastern cultures too compartmented and varied,
and the basic cultural, ethnic, and politico-
economic heritage too diverse to expect too much
' Address made before the Institute of Ethnic Studies
at Georgetown University, Washington, D. C, on Apr.
2.5 (press release 222).
from the search for generalizations about Africa
as a whole.
With these reservations in mmd, however,
there are certain observations about Africa as a
whole that contribute much to our understanding
of the various national movements there. Many
of these, it seems to me, originate in the fact that
the time span of so much of Africa's self-expres-
sion has been compressed into the last 2 decades.
Every state in Africa today was deeply affected
by, if not actually conceived in, the aftermath of
World War II. The sweep of large sections of
Asia toward nationalism, the development of the
cold war between the Soviet bloc and the Western
World, the rise of the United Nations, and a new
emphasis on international collaboration in a truly
mutual sense, as well as the peculiar economic
problems of our era, have obviously left their
mark on African nationalism, the more so
because it had so few expressions before these
developments.
I would like to speak to you today, first,
about the way some of these external factors
have influenced nationalism in Africa and then
about a number of considerations of a more in-
digenous nature. My remarks will relate pri-
marily to Africa south of the Sahara, where the
greatest number of new states are being readied
to emerge, but they also have similar application
to the North African area in many instances.
In the main the influences of world events in
this decade have been salutary ones for an orderly
development of African nationalism. The pri-
mary reason for this is that those European states
which are dedicated to a policy of transferring
administrative powers and responsibilities to the
new African nations have, by and large, accurately
Department of State Bulletin
read the lessons of the liistory of our times. They
have subordinated their own more narrowly na-
tional interests and muffled their instruments of
power in recognition of a larger world and regional
interest in which progress through cooperation is
the keynote. This breadth of vision by the former
administering powers need not be attributed only
to altruism in order to be commended. Rather, the
fact that it reflects a true community of interest
indicates that there is a more effective and reliable
basis for collaboration in a relationship based on
equality than one based on a subordinate status.
Trends Toward Beneficial Collaboration
Even in these favorable circumstances, it is also
to their great credit that the leaders and peoples of
the new Africa are displaying a comprehension of
opportunities wliich often equals and sometimes
even surpasses that of the older states with which
they are developing channels of beneficial collabo-
ration. These possibilities, in fact, hold great hope
that, in the next decade, African nationalism in
general will continue to move in this direction,
first because this trend will be consistent with the
mainstream of world affairs and secondly because
it will become increasingly apparent that a very
great potential for the benefit of the inhabitants of
that continent can best be realized within the con-
text of such collaboration.
To take this optimistic view is not to ignore the
day-to-day problems over which European and
African states have their differences. Mankind is
not perfect, and the search for a new equilibrium
has never been without blind alleys and pitfalls
anywhere or any time in human history. But the
long series of great wars during the last hundred
years has demonstrated convincingly — not least of
all to the African peoples — the futility and de-
structiveness of self-centered nationalism, devoted
to autarky, vengeance, and solutions by force.
There is, in fact, a basis for the hope that, given
continued mature and moderate leaders and under-
standing by the administering powers, the transi-
tion of much of Africa will be so rapid that the new
states which emerge may leapfrog the early de-
structive phase which nationalism has often dem-
onstrated in other regions and fall more naturally
into stride with the free world's widespread trend
toward a cooperation transcending national bor-
ders. Certainly there can be no question as to the
desirability of such a trend, and it is inherent in
May 19, 7958
our policy that we give appropriate encourage-
ment to such mutually beneficial collaboration.
At the same time, we must realistically recognize
that any initiative for such relationships must
come freely and voluntarily from the new states
themselves if a firm basis is to be established on
which to build.
There are, of course, compelling factors of vital
national interest which tie Africa and Europe to-
gether. As new African states come to self-gov-
ermnent and independence, it is natural and ad-
visable that the benefits inherent in their former
relationship with the metropolitan powers be fully
explored as a basis for future mutually advan-
tageous collaboration. With and beyond these
considerations, it is possible also to envisage a
healthy trend toward closer regional ties, sought
fi'eely and independently by states having similar
interests and recognizing in cooperation of this
sort an opportimity to strengthen capacities for
true national self-expression.
Ghana's decision to seek membership in the
British Commonwealth is a clear-cut example of
the first trend. The conference of African states
just concluded at Accra is a timely example of
the second. One can hardly refrain from con-
trasting these developments as authoritative ex-
pressions of nationalism in Africa with the Soviet
relationship with Eastern Europe and with the
Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference in Cairo last
December. You will recall that virtually all Afri-
can governments refrained from official representa-
tion at the latter meeting — a decision wliich con-
stituted clear recognition that the directors of this
conference were obviously preoccupied with ul-
terior motives. Their use of almost every na-
tionalistic cliche to paint the Soviet bloc in a sanc-
timonious light and the Western World as the
epitome of evil was labored and transparent.
Their purpose, of couree, had nothing to do in
reality with Africa. In fact, it is clear that the
Cairo meeting was nothing more than an obvious
and abortive effort to foist a non-African initia-
tive and non-African interests on African gov-
ernments. As such, it was essentially an anti-
nationalistic imdertaking.
There is every reason to believe that the states
of Africa will jealously defend their independ-
ence and will not permit its compromise through
entanglement with the devious political designs
of the Soviet bloc. As many neighboring states
825
have found, Communist imperialism is a much
heavier yoke than even the earlier Western models.
Moreover, this Soviet product continues in very
active manufacture these days, whereas the West-
em World is closing out this commodity as
obsolete.
Communist influence on African nationalism
has, in a positive sense, been comparatively small
up to the present time. In one or two isolated
cases it has succeeded in a degree of penetration
of national movements which will counsel careful
attention by dedicated Africans. By and large,
however, the African nationalist has been astute
to realize the conspiratorial nature of interna-
tional communism and its incompatibility with
true national independence.
Since the efforts of international communism
to penetrate have been largely unsuccessful, its
agents have sought to spread their influence by
less direct means. For example, there are thou-
sands of African students in Western Europe, and
the Communists are making a continuing effort
to capture their minds and divert their energies
from constructive nationalism to the false doc-
trine of international communism. Practically
all of these students are strong nationalists, and,
by appearing to support their nationalist aspira-
tions, the Communists often gain a sympathetic
hearing. The admirable quality of idealism in
African students, in common with students the
world over, unfortunately induces some of them
to take Communist propaganda at its face value,
their experience being as yet inadequate to re-
veal the reality behind the sham. Here is a chal-
lenge to the Western World to recognize in Afri-
can students in our midst the national leaders of
tomorrow and to give them freely of our time and
sympathetic attention. Georgetown and other
leading American universities deserve high credit
for their contribution to this field.
Constructive Role of the United Nations
There can be no doubt that the United Nations
has been an immensely constructive force in the
development of responsible nationalism in Africa,
both before and after independence. The trust
territories, of course, have been most directly af-
fected. Under the terms of the United Nations
Charter, each administering power is charged
with promoting the advancement of its trust ter-
ritories toward self-government or independence.
A.S a result of progress in this respect, the for-
mer British Togo opted to join Ghana, Somalia
is due to obtain its independence in 1960, and the
other trust territories in Africa are evolving rap-
idly toward the ultimate objectives of the trus-
teeship system, either as separate entities or in
association with neighboring states.
At the same time that the United Nations has
provided opportimities for African nationalism to
appeal to international conscience, it has also in-
duced a sense of responsibility m holding out the
prospect of membership in the community of na-
tions when statehood is realized. Once member-
ship in the United Nations has been obtained, it
provides a framework for continued responsi-
bility, as well as security, by relieving, at least
to a degree, the moderate leaders of the new state
from excessive preoccupation with the danger of
external attack and, conversely, enabling them in
domestic politics to demonstrate more easily the
danger of resorting to national adventure them-
selves. Nor should we fail to point out that the
close observation of Soviet policy and actions
which the U.N. forum affords to African govern-
ments has, as for example in the case of Hun-
gary, helped vividly to bring home to them the
harsli reality which lies behind the fagade of
Soviet pretensions to support nationalist causes.
In another sense, also, the U.N. Charter will,
I feel sure, play a most salutary and necessary
role in African affairs, in providing a guide for
the peaceful solution — either outside or within the
organization — of disputes arising from boundaries
which were drawn (and often ill defined) in a
different international context. There are few
frontiei-s in Africa which were drawn originally
with an adequate knowledge of etlmic, economic,
and even geogi-aphic considerations. It is not al-
ways easy for political leaders to withstand ex-
tremist pressures — with their attendant short-
term domestic political rewards — to engage in
an old-fashioned border dispute or to encourage
a dubious irredentism. This is not to say that
there may not be cases in which territorial ad-
justments will be necessary, desirable, and in ac-
cordance with the desires and interests of the
nations and populations concerned. But the abil-
ity to rise above mere chauvinism — of which there
Iiave been many heartening demonstrations al-
ready— may well be one of the key considerations
in assessing the ultimate success of African na-
826
Department of Stale Bulletin
tionalism in terms of a better life for the Afri-
can peoples. In this regard, a salutary emphasis
on a cooperative regional approach to the ex-
ploitation of natural resources lying in frontier
or disputed areas may well offer a touchstone by
which many of the difficult territorial questions
can be reduced to negotiable terms.
In much of Africa south of tlie Sahara, the
concept of a nation has not hitherto existed in
the historical experience of the area. The na-
tional vision, in fact, often materializes only in
the course of, and almost as a means of, acquir-
ing governmental autonomy. In this respect, the
movement often has the explicit or implicit bless-
ing of the administering authorities, and in such
cases the construction of the nation becomes a
cooperative venture of indigenous and external
forces. But, however nurtured, the concept of
the nation has amazing capacity for taking root
and flourishing in this virgin territory. The he-
roes of the national movement acquire by their
successes the stature wliich enables them to ex-
ert an appeal and influence throughout the extent
of their territory. There can, in short, be little
doubt that the national self-consciousness formed
in this fashion, under conditions prevailing in
Africa and the rest of the world today, is no less
real and viable than nationalisms which have the
sanction of long histories.
Rivalries Between Traditionalists and Modernists
I would like now, with your indulgence, to turn
to some considerations about African natiojialism
which are primarily indigenous in nature.
Even where transition from a colonial to a self-
governing or independent status has evolved
smoothly and favorably, internal divisions are
likely to emerge once the new state is established.
Newly formed nations or nascent national move-
ments in Africa, as elsewhere in the world, nor-
mally undergo a serious struggle between domes-
tic factions for control of the national destiny.
Just as the effort to obtain or to force the pace of
concessions from the former colonial power
tended to galvanize the national movement into
existence, so later does this confrontation serve as
a basis of rivalry for popular appeal between
nationalist parties. This is one issue that is easy
to dramatize. Thus, and not necessarily related
to the merits, a former colonial power sometimes
continues as the apparent target of vocal sections
of nationalist agitation long after much greater or
more serious problems have come to confront the
new state. In many cases, however, the responsi-
bilities of government begin to weigh heavily on
the party in power, which may become increasingly
aware of tlie importance to the national existence
of the continuance of close and mutually beneficial
economic and cultural ties with the former metro-
pole. In some cases, the prospect of power even
tends to mitigate extremist tendencies by opposi-
tion elements. There may thus emerge a moderate
and responsible concept of the national interest
based on the continuance of close and friendly
cooperation with the former administering power.
In these circumstances domestic rivalries revolve
around both personalities and issues, but the ma-
jority arise over the pace and direction of social
change. A major distinction arises between what
we might distinguish as traditionalists and mod-
ernists. Within each group, moreover, there are
usually moderate factions favoring evolutionary
tactics opposed to those extremists who would
assert more drastic methods.
Traditionalists, who fear loss of position, influ-
ence, or prestige in a rapidly changing world,
seek to retain or even return to the old social and
political systems. At most, they would concede
the changes in power distribution which have al-
ready taken place, while seeking to preserve as
long as possible the remnants of what power still
remains to them. In their more extreme form,
such traditionalist movements may aspire to revert
completely to the social and political patterns
which prevailed before the advent of colonial rule.
The modernists, on the other hand, find the tra-
ditional institutions inadequate and seek to recast
their societies in a Western image. The modern-
ists tend to divide into conservatives and radicals,
these terms being used in an African rather than
Western context. For example, both groups tend
to advocate what they call "socialism," with the
conservatives leaning toward state supervision of
the economy, while the radicals favor state owner-
ship and operation; both reflect basic African
social concepts in their rejection of individualism
and acceptance of a considerable degree of authori-
tarianism in the interest of the community.
Africa's nontraditional conservatives generally
retain status in the traditional society at the same
time that they accept Western political and eco-
May 79, J 958
827
nomic and cultural values as offering the best
method to maintain and expand their influence.
They tend to dominate the civil service, the pro-
fessions, and trade, to the extent these activities
are open to them. Some hedge their acceptance
of modernization with the proviso that it be imple-
mented on a slow and piecemeal basis. At the
opposite end of the conservative spectrum are lead-
ers who seek to enlarge the impact of the West as
rapidly as possible, in their desire to obtain for
their people the scientific enlightenment, the mate-
rial advantages, and the modern governmental and
social structure which they believe essential in
their country for fulfillment of the promises and
hopes raised by independence.
Africa's minority of radicals is largely composed
of young men who have failed to find, in the tradi-
tional patterns of African society or in the mod-
ifications proposed by the conservatives, outlets
commensurate with their skills and ambitions.
Consequently, they seek a far-reaching revision of
traditional institutions in a manner which is often
considerably influenced by the more extreme by-
ways of Marxist socialism. Although there are
some African extremists of African Communist
persuasion, most of the radical minority in Afri-
can nationalism tends to reject the leadership of
theU.S.S.R.
As we have previously noted, some or all of these
various nationalist groups tend to coalesce and
submerge their fundamental differences in favor of
a common front in the preindependence period.
The prevailing outlook of the coalition, especially
if a long and bitter struggle is involved, tends to
become that of the most dynamic partner. Then,
when independence is achieved, this partner may
be reluctant to concede to the other factions a share
in governmental power. In fact, there is often a
tendency to consolidate power at the expense of
opposition elements. It is at this point that a
danger exists of discarding traditional values and
of impugning the motives of other groups who
may be equally dedicated and capable of contrib-
uting to the national interest and well-being. If
these assets are destroyed, what may appear to
emerge as a monolithic expression of the national
will may be less strong than the system it replaced.
At the same time, there are sometimes different
shades of opmion built into such monopolistic
political movements, with certain elements per-
forming a similar function to that of a "loyal
828
opposition." On balance, it would appear that
the pressure of problems affecting the new Afri-
can states is such that, without the free and effec-
tive mobilization of all responsible sectors of na-
tional opinion in the common interest, the ability
of the new state to meet the exigencies of history
may be placed in jeopardy.
Problems of Tribal Tensions
Similar considerations apply to the problem of
racialism, tribal rivalries, and religious discrimi-
nation. It has been pointed out that in British
East Africa tribal tensions have been as serious a
problem as interracial stresses. In Kenya there
is a history of hostility among the tribes which
frequently erupted into warfare before the advent
of British control. Even more than half a cen-
tury later, the antagonisms thus generated are far
from having disappeared. In Uganda, where the
racial problem is negligible, a serious difficulty in
the political evolution of the country is the rivalry
between the province of the Buganda tribe — large,
advanced, and prosperous — and the less highly
developed three other provinces. Tanganyika has
a somewhat similar (although less acute) problem
in the disparities between, for example, the pros-
perous and advanced Wachagga and the various
other African peoples of the Trust Territory.
These ancient tribal antipathies are slowly
breaking down under the impact of social and eco-
nomic progress. Urbanization, in particular, is
having its effect. Although about 85 percent of
all Africans still live in rural areas, more and more
young men every year are leaving farms and vil-
lages to join the labor force in the towns and
cities, in the mines, and on the great estates. In so
doing they often move in one step through a span
in development that elsewhere took himdreds of
years.
These migrants inevitably feel insecure when
faced with the impersonal and competitive life of
the industrial world. They have a sense of being
torn in two directions : The old ties and traditions
draw them back; the material and philosophical
rewards of the modern world pull them forward.
The forward attraction, in the long run, usually
proves to be the stronger.
Where statehood has not been long or firmly
established, African nationalism seems to grow in
proportion as tribal loyalties and intertribal divi-
Departmenl of Sfafe Bulletin
sions are weakened. This phenomenon has, in
recent years, become apparent even in the hetero-
geneous East African territories where African
nationalism is beginning to cut across intertribal
lines. Just as the pull of the city is gradually
proving stronger than loyalty to the rural village,
so is modern nationalism slowly proving stronger
than the traditional tribal divisions. If this unity
is to be carried over successfully into the era of
independence, magnanimity and tolerance will be
required of the African national leader in par-
ticularly large measure.
Interracial Stresses
Kacialism in Africa takes many forms, all of
them divisive to a regrettable degree but most of
them presently under what is remarkable control
considering the stresses involved. We may note in
this connection not only misunderstanding and
friction between Africans and Europeans but also
between Asians and Africans, between Arabs and
Negroes.
While African nationalism heretofore has been
closely concerned with African relationships with
Europeans, this problem has, to the great credit of
both sides, tended to reduce itself to relative ob-
scurity as independence has become an accom-
plished fact. In the independent states of North
Africa, for example, where the European and Arab
populations live side by side, the two communities
have within a few short years developed a remark-
able capacity for getting along together and ad-
justing to the new roles brought by independence.
In some cases, in fact, this compatibility on the
scene has actually exceeded that prevailing be-
tween the respective governments. In any event,
such experiences represent a hopeful sign for the
future of better community relations elsewhere on
the continent.
It is often pointed out that relationships between
Europeans and Africans have been strained pri-
marily in areas where Europeans have come as per-
manent settlers in large numbers, generally where
the climate and the economic potential have fa-
vored European settlement, such as in the Union
of South Africa, the Federation of Rhodesia and
Nyasaland, and Kenya. In contrast, racial prob-
lems have been relatively minor or temporary in
those regions where white settlers are few and
where the role of the European has been almost
exclusively that of administrator, missionary,
teacher, or teclmician. Apparently, therefore, it
is not contact between Europeans and Africans
per se which gives rise to the most serious racial
problems but an actual or potential economic and
social competition between these two permanently
established racial groups.
It would be both wrong and futile to draw
from these comments any inference that it was
an historical error for Europeans to settle per-
manently on African soil. This would be to
dismiss the great benefits which the industry,
imagination, and skills of the European settlers
have brought to their African neighbors. As a
moral judgment, it would ignore the facts that
the European settlement occurred largely on land
which was not being utilized by the Africans
and that the countries involved are, in most cases,
the only homes the Europeans know. More im-
portantly, such a conclusion would imply a lack
of confidence that men of differing races and
colors, living side by side, can work out a com-
mon destiny based on ideals of partnership,
brotherhood, and justice. This objective is, of
course, difficult of realization, and, in the light of
our own experience in developing harmonious
race relations and balancing precept with prac-
tice, it behooves us to approach racial problems
elsewhere in the world in all humility. At the
same time we must reject the pessimistic premise
that racial partnership is an impossible ideal.
Insofar as racial problems are a basic con-
sideration in the development of African na-
tionalism, their solution will undoubtedly assist
the ability of the administering autliorities to
come to harmonious terms with that nationalism.
This is proving to be a slow and difficult process
in such territories as Kenya and the Federation
of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. But we may take
encouragement from the fact that the declared
policy of the Governments of these territories
is one of racial partnership and achievement of
a harmonious and mutually beneficial plural
society.
The Course of African Nationalism
Nationalism as a force makes one think of a
mighty river, inexorable in its movement to empty
into the sea, whether through an even and bene-
ficial flow in an orderly channel or through a
sudden floodtide of destructive energy.
Thus far, at least, the course of African
nationalism, especially when compared with the
May ?9, 7958
829
development of other continents, has, in most
instances, been a remarkably somid and reason-
able one. The African national movements
which led their countries to statehood in the post-
war period have to a gi-atifying degree controlled
the temptations, usual to their historical position,
of chauvinism, blind rejection of constructive ex-
ternal influence, and neglect of economic needs
for eye-catching but sterile political maneuvere.
The leaders of African states in this decade have,
by and large, assured themselves of a distin-
guished place in their national histories — and in
international esteem — by virtue of statesmanlike
moderation and ability to plan soundly for their
countries' futures. Nor should we for a moment
forget that in many cases it has been the far-
sightetl policies of the metropolitan powere them-
selves which have given the impetus to this
wholesome development. I think it is not too
early to conclude that the faith that prompted
their decisions has been fully justified.
If future developments are characterized by
the same moderation, restraint, and sense of re-
sponsibility by both African nationalism and the
administering powers, there is every reason to
be confident of the future peace, stability, and
prosperity of an African continent cooperating
voluntarily and fruitfully with the rest of the
free world.
U.S. Acts To Revoke Egyptian
Assets Control Regulations
Press release 233 dated April 30
The Department of State has been informed of
the signature in Eome on April 29 of an agree-
ment covering the terms to be embodied in a final
settlement between the United Arab Republic and
the Universal Suez Canal Company.
The United States has made clear that the prin-
cipal reason for the freezing of certain Egyptian
and canal company assets in this coimtry has been
the uncertain legal situation resulting from the
dispute between the Government of Egypt and
the company and the risk of double jeopardy to
which American users of the Suez Canal might
thus be exposed. It has also been indicated that,
if an agreement or substantial progress toward an
agreement were reached on this matter, thereby
830
clarifying the legal situation, the United States
would expect to release the blocked fimds of the
United Arab Republic and the Suez Canal
Company.
The Rome agreement, which the United States
welcomes, is considered to satisfy the above con-
ditions. The Treasury has been informed of the
Department's views and has taken action to re-
voke the Egyptian Assets Control Regulations,
effective May 1, 1958.
U.S-Soviet Discussions
On Exchange of Films
Press release 230 dated April 29
The Soviet and U.S. delegations which started
meetings at Washington a month ago^ on the
film section of the U.S.S.R.-U.S. cultural affairs
agreement ^ have decided to postpone further dis-
cussions imtil a later date. The time and place
for the reconvened sessions will be determined
through diplomatic channels within 30 days.
The two delegations screened a number of films
from each country and feel that a basis has been
laid for definite future arrangements to carry out
the objectives of the two Governments. Most of
the emphasis during the discussions so far has
related to the selection, terms, and conditions for
the purchase and sale of motion pictures.
The Motion Picture Export Association of
America has been acting as the agent of MPEAA
member companies to license U.S. films, while
Sovexportfilm represents the Soviet film industry.
Independent U.S. motion picture companies and
their films have also been included in the
discussions.
A number of specific understandings were
reached :
1. Films are to be licensed in each country for a
period of 5 years ;
2. Licensing of pictures shall be on a flat-smn,
dollar, cash basis ;
3. Each side has tlie right to approve the dub-
bing and subtitling of the other's pictures.
Tentative views were expressed on other aspects
of the film section, but discussions were tem-
BuiXETiN of Apr. 7, 1958, p. 552.
' For text of agreement, see ibid., Feb. 17, 1958, p. 243.
Department of Stale Bulletin
porarily put aside until there is definite agreement
on the purchase and sale of pictures.
The Soviet delegation consisted of Aleksandr
Slavnov, of the Soviet Ministry of Culture;
Aleksandr Davydov, director; and Yuri Dobro-
khotov, of Sovexportfilm. Mr. Slavnov returned
to Moscow on April 26. Messrs. Davydov and
Dobrokliotov return April 30.
The U.S. delegation consisted of Eric Johnston,
president, Motion Picture Association of America,
and Turner B. Shelton, director, Motion Picture
Service, U.S. Information Agency.
Freedom Under Law
Statement hy President Eisenhower ^
White House press release dated April 30
Thursday — May first— has by proclamation
been designated "Law Day." ^ The reason is to
remind us all that we as Americans live, every day
of our lives, under a rule of law.
Fi-eedom under law is like the air we breathe.
People take it for granted and are unaware of
it — imtil they are deprived of it. Wliat does the
rule of law mean to us in everyday life? Let me
quote the eloquent words of Burke :
The poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to
all the forces of the Crown. It may be frail ; its roof may
shake ; the wind may blow through it ; the storms may
enter; the rain may enter — but the King of England
cannot enter ; all his forces dare not cross the threshold
of that ruined tenement !
But the rule of law does more than msure free-
dom from high-handed action by rulers. It in-
sures justice between man and man — however
humble the one and however powerful the other.
A man with five dollars in the bank can call to
account the corporation with five billion dollars
in assets — and the two will be heard as equals be-
fore the law. The law, however, has not stopped
here. It has moved to meet the needs of the times.
True, it is good that the King cannot enter un-
bidden into the ruined cottage. But it is not good
that men should live in ruined cottages.
The law in our times also does its part to build
a society in which the homes of workers will be
invaded neither by the sovereign's troops nor by
' Recorded in advance for television and radio ob-
servance of Law Day.
'■ Bulletin of Feb. 24, 1958, p. 293.
May 79, 1958
the storms and winds of insecurity and poverty.
It does this not by paternalism, welfarism, and
handouts but by creating a framework of fair play
within which conscientious, hardworking men
and women can freely obtain a just return for
their efforts.
This return includes not only good wages and
working conditions but insurance as a right
against the insecurities of injury, unemployment,
and old age. In the words of a great American
lawyer :
The law must be stable, but it must not stand still.
Another direction in which the rule of law is
moving is that of displacing force in relations
among sovereign countries. We have an Inter-
national Court of Justice. We have seen the
exercise of an international police function, both
in the United Nations force in Korea and in the
United Nations force assigned to the Gaza Strip.
We have agreements in article 2 of the United
Nations Charter to the most fundamental con-
cepts of international conduct.
We have elaborate rules of international law- —
far more complete and detailed than most people
realize. More than once nations have solemnly
outlawed war as an instrument of national policy,
most recently in the charter of the United Nations.
We have, in short, at least the structure and ma-
chinery of an international rule of law which
could displace the use of force. Wliat we need
now is the universal will to accept peaceful set-
tlement of disputes in a framework of law.
As for our own country, we have shown by our
actions that we will neither initiate the use of
force or tolerate its use by others in violation of
the solemn agreement of the United Nations
Charter. Indeed, as we contemplate the destruc-
tive potentialities of any future large-scale resort
to force, any thoughtful man or nation is driven
to a sober conclusion.
In a very real sense the world no longer has a
choice between force and law. If civilization is
to survive, it must choose the rule of law. On this
Law Day, then, we honor not only the principle
of the rule of law but also those judges, legisla-
tors, lawyers, and law-abiding citizens who ac-
tively work to preserve our liberties under law.
Let history record that on Law Day free man's
faith in the rule of law and justice is greater than
ever before. And let us trust that this faith will
be vindicated for the benefit of all mankind.
831
Some Political Problems of the Legal Adviser
hy Loftus Becker
Legal Adviser '
The topic that you have chosen for discussion
at this meeting of the society — "International Law
and the Political Process"— has a very real mean-
ing for those of us who are charged with legal
responsibilities in the Department. One of the
first things that we learn is that abstract concep-
tions of international law, as it should be, must, of
necessity, be qualified in application by the reali-
ties of the political process.
I know that there are those who assert that in-
ternational law, in order to be worth its salt, must
be based solely upon logic and principle. But
international law, notwithstanding the reasoned
tlieses of the commentators, consists, in the last
analysis, of those principles upon which sovereign
nations can agree. Such agreement is seldom, if
ever, reached without regard to the political
process.
Please do not imply from my remarks that I
would throw logic and principle overboard in
favor of pure political pragmatism. There is,
however, a mean, a balancing between legal theory
and political capabilities, that must be taken into
account both in the formulation and in the appli-
cation of the principles of international law.
The panel discussions upon which you have been
engaged here are by no means abstract or academic
insofar as the office of the Legal Adviser is con-
cerned. The first time that I looked over your
program I was impressed to note that important
problems under each of the topics under discus-
sion here had been brought before me personally,
even though I have been with the Department for
only a short time. That is the reason for the
subject I have chosen, for I thought that it might
' Address made before the American Society of Inter-
national Law at Washington, D.C., on Apr. 26 (press
release 224).
be of interest to you to have explained the con-
text in which such problems are presented to the
Legal Adviser.
Very often the Department of State is urged
in the strongest terms to make a greater effort
to induce other nations to refer their disputes to
established international tribunals. We are, of
course, in complete sympathy with these pro-
posals and seize upon every opportunity to do
just that.
One of the major political problems which we
encounter in so doing arises from the fact that
the submission of the United States to the com-
pulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice contains a reservation, commonly referred
to as the "Connally rider." This, as you know, is
to the effect that this Government's submission to
the Court's jurisdiction does not apply to disputes
with regard to matters which are essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of the United
States of America, as determined hy the United
States of America. A number of other states have
reservations similar to or identical with that of
the United States, while still others have an even
broader reservation with respect to the matters
which may be kept from the Court by unilateral
determination.
I shall not attempt to interpret the precise
meaning of the United States reservation under
the Connally rider, but it is clearly more restric-
tive than a reservation of the right not to submit
matters essentially within the domestic jurisdic-
tion of the United States, as determined hy the
principles of international law.
There can be little doubt that reservations of
this type have tended to minimize tiie number of
disputes determined by the International Court
of Justice, particularly in view of the possibility
Deparfmenf of Sfafe Bulletin
that a state whicli does not have such a n
tion may, when sued by one wliich does, invoke
the doctrine of "reciprocity."
So long as the Connally rider continues in ex-
istence, it is the obligation of the Department
of State to act in accordance with its provisions.
The question of whether or not this rider should
be deleted or watei'ed down is essentially political.
Specifically, the issue is whether the United
States, in order to promote a more widespread
recoui-se to the legal pi-ocesses of the Court, is
willing to take the lead in sacrificing to some ex-
tent its ability to make a unilateral determination
of what is or is not a matter essentially within
its domestic jurisdiction. Those of you who be-
lieve that it should must seek your relief through
political processes.
Personally, I believe that such an effort would
be worth while, for we cannot in all honesty urge
upon others a course of action which we ourselves
are not prepared to adopt. Moreover, I have a
serious question whether "as determined by the
United States of America," if fairly applied,
would mean any more in the way of excluding
the International Court from passing upon truly
domestic issues than the words "as determined
by the principles of international law."
When I stated that it is the obligation of the
Department of State to act in accordance with
the provisions of the Connally rider so long as
that reservation is on the books, I did not intend
to state or imply that we in the Department
regard it as our duty to determine that all mat-
ters involving the United States brought before
the International Court are of "essentially do-
mestic concern."
The Interhandel Case
A case in point is the position taken by the
Department of State, in conjunction with the
Department of Justice, in the preliminary stages
of the well-known Interhandel case now pending
before the International Court of Justice. Since
the case is now pending before the Court, it would
not be appropriate for me to discuss its merits.
It is appropriate, however, for me to inform you
as to the position that this Government took on
the issue of the jurisdiction of the Court to in-
dicate interim measures, since, so far as I have
been able to ascertain, there has been some mis-
understanding on this point in the public mind.
May 19, 1958
Shortly after Switzerland filed its application
against the United States,^ it requested that the
Court indicate certain interim measures to be ob-
served by the United States during the pendency
of the international proceeding. One of the
measures requested was an indication that the
United States Government should not during this
period sell certain vested shares of General Ani-
line & Film Corporation.
In responding to this request the United States
Govermnent infonned the Court that it had de-
termined that the matter of the sale of the Gen-
eral Aniline & Film shares was one of "essentially
domestic concern" and that, therefore, the Court
lacked tlie power to give any indication as to what
the United States should do respecting the sale
of these shares. The Court agreed with the
United States in result, but, in so doing, the ma-
jority of the Court relied not upon our rationale
but upon certain supervening circumstances, in-
cluding the granting of certiorari by the Supreme
Court of the United States in a domestic case
involving Interhandel.
I cannot and do not wish to discuss the merits
of the Court's decision. The one thing that I
wish to make clear is that, in arguing our case
before the Court, I, as agent for the United States,
was authorized as a matter of policy to make the
foUowmg statement, and I quote from the tran-
script of the oral argument :
The United States Government by its Preliminary Ob-
jection of October 9, 1957, does not intend to imply that
it envisages use of paragraph (b) of the Condition dated
August 14, 1946, with respect to all aspects of the Inter-
handel controversy which may be involved in the sub-
mission of October 1, 1957. The United States Govern-
ment will in due course, upon further study, disclose its
position in these respects in further detail.
The United States Government intends, during the
pendency of future proceedings on the Application filed
by Switzerland on October 1, 1957, not to dispose of the
proceeds which will be derived from the sale of the shares
of General Aniline & Film. In that connection, it is our
duty to point out to the Court that under the Constitu-
tion of the United States the legislative and judicial
branches of the United States Government are independ-
ent and they cannot be legally bound by a statement of
= The Swiss application to the Court followed the re-
fusal of the United States to arbitrate respecting the
matter under the Washington Accord of 1946 or the
U.S.-Swiss treaty of 1931. For text of a U.S. note of
Jan. 11, 1957, and accompanying memorandum setting
forth detailed reasons for the U.S. position, see Bulletin
of Mar. 4, 1957, p. 350.
833
intention on the part of the Executive Branch of the
United States Government which I represent.
The point is tliis. It was made plain to the
Court that the sole issue in the Interhandel case,
to which the original preliminaiy objection based
upon the Connally rider was addressed, was
whether or not the United States was entitled to
make a sale of the General Aniline & Film shares
while the case before the International Court was
pending.
The United States has not as yet indicated its
position with respect to the remaining issues in
the case. It will do so at the appropriate time,
namely, at the time additional preliminary ob-
jections are filed, if any are to be filed. In the
meantime we have assured the Court that our re-
liance upon the Connally rider on the single issue
of the sale of the General Aniline & Film shares
should not be taken as any indication that our
Government will rely upon that reservation in
order completely to defeat the jurisdiction of the
International Court.
Naturally I cannot here indicate the position
that the United States will take upon each of the
remaining issues of the case. I would suggest,
however, that those who have been critical of the
position taken by the United States in this pro-
ceeding reserve further comment until that posi-
tion has finally been disclosed.
The Girard Case
Turning now to another subject, that of juris-
diction over American armed forces stationed
abroad, I recall vividly that the Girard case be-
came a national issue during my first week in the
Department. That case, as you all know, was a
hard case, which might well have made bad law.
Strong public pressures were exerted upon the two
Departments concerned — State and Defense^ —
and upon the Congress. Such pressures were based
upon a misunderstanding or a refusal to under-
stand the applicable rule of international law that
any sovereign state has the right to impose such
conditions as it sees fit upon the stationing of
foreign troops within its territory.
There was no doubt in our mind as to the appli-
cable principle of international law and, as well,
no doubt as to the fact that the United States
Government, acting in accordance with the pro-
visions of an agreement with Japan, had made a
commitment which it could not in honor retract.
Because of this we felt impelled to stand upon
the law and to fulfill our international commit-
ment, despite the heavy political pressures brought
to bear upon us. That is what we did, and our
view as to the law was sustained by the Supreme
Court.
The lesson to be drawn from the Girard case, as
I view it, is that there are instances where the
stated requirements of the political process cannot
be reconciled with established principles of inter-
national law. In such a case the Legal Adviser
may be overruled, but he cannot acquiesce.
Conference on Law of the Sea
Now I should like to discuss with you some
personal observations as to the conditions under
which international law is being formulated
today.
On February 24, 1958, there was convened in
Geneva, Switzerland, an International Conference
on the Law of the Sea. Eighty-six states are par-
ticipating in this conference, which is now draw-
ing to a close — more than double the number that
attended the Hague conference of 1930. We re-
gard this conference as one of the most important
of those convened since the end of World War II.
Perhaps the most important single issue that
came before this conference was the breadth of
the territorial sea in which a state may exercise
sovereign rights.^ That is the sole issue to which
I shall advert this evening.
As all of you know, the United States adopted
a 3-mile limit for its territorial sea in 1793 and
our Government has not since departed from that
position. The United States Government believes
that the 3-mile limit, which affords a maximum
freedom of the seas, is in the best interests of all
states — lai'ge and small, old and new.
By the latter part of the 19th century or the
early part of the 20tli century, the 3-mile limit
was firmly established as customary international
law. It has been the consistent position of the
Department of State that no greater breadth of
territorial sea can be justified in international law,
and numerous protests have been filed on this basis
when broader claims have been asserted.
" For a joint statement by Secretary Dulles and Secre-
tary of Defense Charles E. Wilson, see ibid., June 24, 1957,
p. 1000.
' For a statement by Arthur H. Dean, chairman of the
U.S. delegation, see iUd., Apr. 7, 1958, p. 574.
834
Department of State Bulletin
There have, of course, been various states which
have asserted from time to time a right to a
broader territorial sea— to 6, to 12, and even to
200 miles. In some instances such broader claims
have been based upon security grounds, as, for ex-
ample, m the case of the U.S.S.R., which claims
12 miles. In other instances these broader claims
were based upon the alleged economic require-
ments of the coastal states, which maintained that
they were entitled to appropriate to their own use
all fishing gromids lying between 3 and 12 miles
off their coasts or even farther, even though such
offshore fishing grounds had theretofore been re-
garded as the common property of all nations.
Insofar as the United States is concerned, such
unilateral appropriations of vast areas of the
high seas are contrary to the common good, con-
trary to our own security interests, and contrary
to the valuable economic interests of our overseas
fishing industry.
Unfortunately, at Greneva, from which I have
just now returned, there was a minimum of de-
bate and even less inclination to vote upon the
merits, as principles of international law, of the
various specific proposals submitted for confer-
ence approval. The reasons for this are even more
important than the proposals made and the vari-
ous votes cast for or against them, which I shall
not attempt to detail.
The principle of the freedom of the seas, with
its corollary, the 3-mile limit, was established
before many of the states represented at the
Geneva conference had gained tlieir independence.
In large measure at the conference such states
made no serious effort to weigh the advantages
they might retain by maintaining the freedom
of the seas as against the disadvantages of an
extension of territorial seas, such as the obliga-
tion of patrolling such an expanded territorial
sea. They opposed the 3-mile limit upon the
groimd that it had been adopted by tlie major
maritime powers before they had come into ex-
istence. For that reason alone, the preexisting
rule had to be changed. That was regarded as
progi-ess.
Such states, moreover, took the position that
they must be free to fix the breadth of their terri-
torial sea up to 12 miles or to exercise exclusive
fishing control for the same distance from their
coasts because that was the only rule that would
be consistent with their dignity and sovereignty
as new nations.
May 19, 7958
These same new states regarded the freedom
of the high seas — rather than as a common
heritage — as a legal fiction invented by the major
maritime nations, or their lawyers, in order to
rob the populations of newly created nations of
the living resources of the seas located off their
coasts. Those other states which desired to fish
up to 3 miles off the coasts of these newly created
nations, or to overfly the high seas between 3 and
12 miles off their coasts without express per-
mission, were regarded as motivated wholly by
selfish motives. The use of large mother or can-
nery sliips off coastal waters was frequently de-
nounced as a means of taking the bread out of
the mouths of local coastal fishermen operating
out of port on small boats on a 1-day basis.
They were wholly unmoved by the fact that
a nation such as Portugal had fished for centuries
on tlie high seas off the coasts of other nations
and relied upon such fishing for the protein in
the diet of its population, particularly the poorer
elements thereof.
Those who opposed a coastal state's legal right
to annex neighboring areas of the high seas in
order to improve its economic position — addi-
tional land being unavailable — were denoimced as
reactionary or predatory.
These same new nations viewed as progressive
and desirable — because it constituted a change
from the existing order— the Mexican proposal,
supported without deviation by the entire Soviet
bloc, that the territorial sea could be fixed by the
coastal state anywhere between 3 and 12 miles
off its coast.
Bloc Voting
"With these views there was combined the prac-
tice of bloc voting. The entire Soviet bloc came
to the conference instructed to support a 12-mile
limit and never deviated from this position from
beginning to end of the conference. The Arab
bloc in its entirety was also pledged to the 12-mile
limit, and the members of that bloc had no hesi-
tance in declaring that their position was princi-
pally motivated by their desire to close off the
Gulf of Aqaba. Argument or persuasion, even
with the most friendly members of that bloc, was
wholly wasted. A vote against this principle by
any member of the bloc for any reason whatever
was regarded as disloyalty to the bloc.
835
In caucuses of the Afro-Asian and the Latin
American blocs every effort was made to exert
pressure to insure that members of the bloc would
vote as a unit. Even countries to which the
United States had extended extensive aid and
which have a long record of friendship with the
United States deemed themselves bound to vote
solidly with the other bloc members. Nations
which indicated an intention to vote in favor of
the United States, contrary to the bloc, were
threatened with economic reprisals.
In one instance, in Committee I, when it ap-
peared that the chairman was about to announce
a tie vote on the optional 3- to 12-mile proposal
advanced by Mexico, one delegate favoring this
proposal ran to the seat of a South American
delegate and sought to coerce him into changing
his vote from abstention to an affinnative vote in
favor of the Mexican proposal not only by shout-
ing at him but also by lifting his arm in order to
attract the attention of the chair. I am glad to
note that, even though the other delegate was co-
erced into making this attempt, the chairman
ruled that the vote, once having been made and
recorded, could not thereafter be changed, and his
ruling was sustained on appeal by a vote of 48 to
17 with 17 abstentions. The tactics used in that
instance clearly shocked the conscience of the con-
ference.
These, I regret to say, are the practicalities of
the development of one branch of international
law today. Principle, reason, and persuasion, as
well as common security interests of the utmost
importance, are subordinated to "ward politics*'
of the most ruthless character. Wliether we like
it or not, this is a political reality of which we
must take account.
We are fortunate, indeed, that, notwithstanding
the attitudes and practices that I have just de-
scribed, the compromise proposal made by the
United States at Geneva gained the largest ma-
jority of any of those voted upon in plenary ses-
sion (45-33-7), although none received the two-
thirds required for conference approval. This, I
should like to make plain, we owe to the outstand-
ing performance of the United States delegation
under the leadership of Mr. Arthur Dean of New
York, who is well known to most of those here
present. This result could not have been accom-
plished, moreover, had not a number of our good
friends firmly resisted bloc pressure to vote
against us.
836
The United States Government has made it
plain that unless the conference approved its com-
promise proposal — involving a 6-mile territorial
sea with a contiguous fishing zone of an addi-
tional 6 miles, in which historical fishing rights
would have to be respected by the coastal state —
this Government would continue to conform, and
to expect others to conform, to the 3-mile limit
now firmly established as customary international
law. It is interesting to note that, as among the
3-, 6-, and 12-mile limits, the 3-mile limit was the
only one that was not expressly rejected by the
Geneva conference.
The attitudes and activities of the newly
formed nations and the members of blocs at the
Geneva conference pose a serious and continuing
problem for which I have no immediate answer.
Such attitudes and activities in the political
sphere are regrettable, but they are even more rep-
rehensible when they appear at a conference ded-
icated to the statement, the codification, or the
formulation of sound international law.
I do not wish to end upon too gloomy a note.
Tlie 86 nations represented at Geneva did get to-
gether constructively in order to agree upon many
important facets of the law of the sea. These in-
cluded agreement upon important rules relating to
fisheries, to the high seas generally, and to the
continental shelf, the last mentioned being the
first time agreement has been reached upon this
principle.
As far as this Government is concerned, the
United States comes out of the Geneva conference
with a greatly enhanced international reputation.
I was deeply impressed by the fact that speaker
after speaker, even those wlio were opposing the
United States proposal, paid tribute to the hon-
esty and sincerity of the United States and its
clearly demonstrated willingness to compromise
and, in so doing, to sacrifice valuable interests of
its own. The attitude of our Government and its
delegation compared most favorably with the
monolithic immobility of the U.S.S.R. and its
bloc. Again, we owe a deep debt of gratitude to
Mr. Dean and the members of the delegation and
their advisers.
As a closing note, I may inform you that the
next political problem upon which the Legal Ad-
viser will have occasion to speak involves, not the
depths of the sea, but the far reaches of outer
space.
Department of Stale Bulletin
Import Quota on Tung Nuts
White House press release dated April 28
WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT
The President has adopted the unanimous
recommendation of the U.S. Tariff Commission
in the case of tung nuts. Accordingly, the Presi-
dent issued a proclamation subjecting imports
of tung nuts to the existing quota on imports of
tung oil established by the President's proclama-
tion of September 9, 1957,' under section 22 of
the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended.
On February 19, 1958,^ the President requested
the Tariff Commission to investigate the need for
restricting imports of tung nuts. The Commis-
sion reported on March 19, 1958, its unanimous
findings and recommendation. The Commission's
investigation and report were made pui-suant to
section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act,
as amended, which authorizes the limitation of
imports that interfere with the price-support pro-
grams of the Department of Agriculture.
The proclamation also makes a technical ad-
justment which provides that only direct ship-
ments from supplying countries may be imported
under the quota on tung oil and tung nuts.
PROCLAMATION 32363
Imposing Import Quotas on Tung Nuts
Whereas, pursuant to section 22 of the Agricultural
Adjustment Act, as amended (7 U.S.C. 624), tlie Secre-
tary of Agriculture advised me lie had reason to believe
that tuug nuts are practically certain to be imported
into the United States under such conditions and in such
quantities as to render ineffective, or materially inter-
fere with, the price-support program undertaken by the
Department of Agriculture with respect to tung nuts
and tung oil, or to reduce substantially the amount of
products processed in the United States from domestic
tung nuts or tung oil with respect to which such program
of the Department of Agriculture is being undertaken ;
and
Whereas, on February 19, 10.58, I caused the United
States Tariff Commission to make an investigation
under the said section 22 with respect to this matter;
and
Whereas the said Tariff Commission has made such
investigation, and has reported to me its findings and
recommendation made in connection therewith ; and
' Bulletin of Sept. 30, 1957, p. 542.
' Ibid., Mar. 24, 1958, p. 468.
' 23 Fed. Reg. 2959.
May 19, 7958
Whereas, on the basis of the said investigation and
report of the Tariff Commission, I find that tung nuts
are practically certain to be Imported into the United
States under such conditions and in such quantities as
to interfere materially with the said price-support pro-
gram ; and
Whereas I find and declare that the imposition of the
limitations on imports of tung nuts hereinafter pro-
claimed is shown by such investigation of the Tariff
Commission to be necessary in order that the entry of
tung nuts will not materially interfere with the said
price-support program ; and
Whereas, on September 9, 1957, I issued Proclamation
No. 3200 (22 F. R. 7265) limiting the quantity of tung
oil that may be entered, or withdrawn from warehouse,
for consumption during the periods specified in that proc-
lamation; and
Whereas I find that the limitations on imports of tung
nuts hereinafter proclaimed will not reduce the per-
missible total quantity of tung nuts which may be entered,
or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption to pro-
portionately less than 50 per centum of the average
annual quantity of tung nuts entered during the rep-
resentative period from November 1, 1952, to October 31,
1956, inclusive :
Now, therefore, I, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, Presi-
dent of the United States of America, acting under and by
virtue of the authority vested in me by section 22 of the
Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended, do hereby pro-
claim that no tung nuts shall be permitted to be entered,
or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption in any
quota period specified in the proclamation of September
9, 1957, after the total aggregate quantity of tung nuts
and tung oil entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for
consumption in any such quota period has reached, in
terms of oil, the equivalent of the quota for tung oil speci-
fied in that proclamation for such quota period. For
the purposes of this proclamation the oil content of tung
nuts shall be computed on the basis of 15.9 pounds for
each 100 pounds of whole nuts, and on the basis of 35.8
pounds of oil for each 100 pounds of decorticated nuts.
In order to assure equitable treatment to supplying
countries, all tung oil and tung nuts entered, or with-
drawn from warehouse, for consumption pursuant to the
proclamation of September 9, 1957, or this proclamation,
shall have been a direct shipment destined to the United
States on an original through bill of lading from the
country of production.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand
and caused the Seal of the United States of America to
be affixed.
Done at the City of Washington this 28th day of April
in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and
[seal] fifty-eight, and of the Independence of the
United States of America the one hundred and
eighty-second.
By the President:
John Foster Dulles
Secretary of State
/_) Cx*.^ id/^^CA<-c.- Ayt*.'^^
837
Renegotiation of Fruit and Vegetable
Concessions by Canada
Press release 214 dated April 24
DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT
The Committee for Reciprocity Information on
trade agreement matters is requesting views from
interested persons on certain additional modifica-
tions of tarifl' concessions which Canada proposes
to negotiate under the General Agi-eement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) . Views are requested
with respect to the attached list of fruit and vege-
table concessions to be modified. No U.S. tariff
reductions are involved.
On September 16, 1957, and again on November
8, 1957, the Committee for Eeciprocity Informa-
tion announced U.S. participation in tariff negoti-
ations at Geneva arising from the desire of Canada
and other countries to modify or withdraw certain
of their GATT concessions.^ In addition, Canada
has announced its intention to negotiate the modi-
fication of concessions on certain fresh and canned
fi-uits and vegetables. Most of these concessions
were initially negotiated with the United States.
The proposed modifications consist chiefly of in-
creases of the higher specific rates of duty now
applicable during particular seasons and of the
length of the period for which such higher sea-
sonal rates of duty are applied.
During July, August, and September 1957 the
Canadian Tariff Board held public hearings in
the course of an investigation ordered by the
Minister of Finance respecting the production,
distribution, and imports of fruits and vegetables.
The Board recommended certain tariff changes,
which are shown on the attached listing. These
recommendations do not necessarily represent the
views of the Canadian Government.
Under procedures established by the Contract-
ing Parties to the agreement, a country proposing
to renegotiate a concession by modifying or with-
drawing it is required to negotiate regarding com-
pensatory adjustments with the country with
' Bulletin of Oct. 7, 1957, p. 581, and Nov. 25, 1957, p.
which the concession was originally negotiated and
with any other country having a principal supply-
ing interest in the concession item. It is required
to consult with countries having a substantial
trade interest. In such negotiations the country
proposing the modification or withdrawal usually
offers new concessions by way of compensation.
If no settlement is possible on the basis of such
new concessions as may be offered, the countries
adversely affected may withdraw or make upward
adjustment of one or more concessions to the first
country which are of a value substantially equiv-
alent to the concession which the first country is
modifying or withdrawing.
The Committee for Eeciprocity Information is
an interagency group which receives the views of
interested persons regarding proposed or existing
trade agreements. The committee consists of a
member of the U.S. Tariff Commission and repre-
sentatives from the Departments of Agriculture,
Commerce, Defense, Interior, Labor, State, and
Treasury, and the International Cooperation Ad-
ministration.
In preparation for the proposed negotiations
with Canada the Committee for Reciprocity In-
formation would welcome views from interested
partias with regard to the possible effect on U.S.
trade of modification or withdrawal of the conces-
sions on the items in the attached list. In addition
the committee invites the submission of views re-
garding concessions which the United States might
seek from Canada as compensation, as well as
views concerning possible upward adjustment in
U.S. rates of duty on commodities of which Can-
ada is an important supplier and which are now
the subject of concessions to Canada in the General
Agreement.
Views on the foregoing matters should be sub-
mitted to the Committee for Reciprocity Informa-
tion by the close of business on June 16, 1958. All
communications, in 15 copies, should be addressed
to : The Secretary of the Committee for Reciproc-
ity Information, Tariff Commission Building,
Washington 25, D. C.
If any interested party considers that his views
cannot be adequately expressed to the committee in
a written brief, he should make this known to the
secretary of the committee, who will then arrange
for oral presentation before the committee.
Department of State Bulletin
LIST OF ITEMS
GATT Concessions on Certain Fresh and Canned Fruits and Vegetables Proposed for Modification by Canada
Description of product
Tariff item
number
New potatoes (January 1-June 14, inclusive)
Onions, in their natural state, n. o. p., per lb. (40
weeks maximum)
Mushrooms, fresh . . . per pound (52 weeks
maximum)
Mushrooms, dried or otherwise preserved
Asparagus . . . per pound (8 weeks maximum)
Brussels sprouts
Cabbage . . . per pound (Split period: maxi-
mum 26 weeks)
Carrots . . . per pound (Split period: maxi-
mum 26 weeks)
Cauliflower, fresh . . . per pound (12 weeks
maximum)
Celery . . . per pound (Split period: maximum
24 weeks)
Cucumbers (except for pickling) . . . per pound
(12 weeks maximum)
Lettuce . . . per pound (Split period: maximum
18 weeks)
Witloof or endive
Eggplant
Peppers
Parsnips
Corn on the cob
Canned asparagus
Asparagus, frozen
Brussels sprouts, frozen
Apricots . . . per pound (10 weeks maximum)
Cherries, sour . . . per pound (7 weeks maximuin)
Cranberries .... per pound (12 weeks maxi-
mum)
Peaches . . . per pound (9 weeks maximum)
Pears . . . per pound (15 weeks maximum)
Fresh prunes . . . per pound (10 weeks maxi-
mum)
Cranberry jelly and cranberry sauce or preserve
per pound
. per pound
. per pound
. per pound
. per pound
. per pound
. per pound
The Canadian Tariff Board also recommended an additional duty of 5 percent on green beans, brussels sprouts,
carrots, beets, cauliflower, lettuce, peas, parsnips, or corn on the cob, when imported during the period of application of the
seasonal specific duty, in packages weighing 5 pounds or less.
83 (b)
84 (b)
85 (a)
85 (b)
87(a)
87(c)
87(d)
EX87 (e)
87(f)
87(g)
87 (h)
87 (i)
EX 87 (p)
87 (q)
EX 87 (r)
EX 87 (r)
EX 87 (r)
EX 89 (e)
EX 90 (e)
EX 90 (e)
92 (a)
EX 92 (b)
92(c)
92(d)
92(e)
EX 92 (f)
EX 105 (f)
EX 105 (i)
EX 105 (i)
109 (a)
EX 106 (b)
EX 106 (e)
EX 106 (e)
Cherries, frozen
Peaches, frozen
Peaches, canned
Apricots, canned
Cherries, canned
Prunes, canned
Present rate of
Canadian TarifiF Board
duty
recommendations*
Free
No duty-free period
l^or 10 p. c.
l}i^ Spht period: maximum 44 weeks
3^(S or 10 p. c.
H
mi p. c.
15 p. c.
3H(S or 10 p. c.
3'/^^ - 14 weeks maximum
10 p. c.
30-16 weeks maximum
%o^ - SpUt period: maximum 30 weeks
YM or 10 p. c.
\i or 10 p. c.
10 - Split period: maximum 40 weeks
Yd or 10 p. c.
Yii - Split period: maximum 20 weeks
Ifior 10 P.O.
20 - Split period: maximum 24 weeks
2H)S or 10 p. c.
2>i0 - Split period: maximum 22 weeks
.85fi or 10 p. c.
.850 - SpUt period: maximum 26 weeks
Free
10 p. c.
Free
10 p. c.
10 p. c.
10-8 weeks maximum
10 p. c.
10 - Split period: maximum 36 weeks
VM - 8 weeks maximum
10 p. c.
15 p. c.
22H p. c.
17H p. c.
22^^ p. c.
17H p. c.
22^/^ p. c.
1^ or 10 p. c.
ilH
2ji or 10 p. c.
30 - 10 weeks maximum
H or 10 P.O.
20
iHji or 10 p. c.
20
1(4 or 10 p. c.
10 - 22 weeks maximum
Ifi or 10 p. c.
1K0 - 12 weeks maximum
3^
3H«S
2«i
30
2I
2%^
20
2^0
2fi
2^0
H
1H0
H
1H0
* Report by the Tariff Board Relative to the Investigation Ordered by the Minister of Finance Respecting Fruits and Vege-
tables, Reference No. 124, Oct. 15, 1957.
The Board recommends no change in the off-season rate of duty of 10 percent ad valorem where it is at present applied.
The recommendations of the Canadian Tariff Board do not necessarily represent the views of the Canadian Govern-
ment.
May 19, 1958
839
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
President Amends Procedures
on U.S. Citizens Employed by U.N.
press release dated April 23
WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT
The President on April 23 issued an Executive
order relating to investigation of U.S. citizens
employed or being considei'ed for employment
on the secretariat of the United Nations.
Heretofore it has been required, under Execu-
tive Order No. 10422,^ that a full field investiga-
tion be conducted by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation in all cases involving U.S. citizens
employed or being considered for employment
on the internationally recruited staff of the United
Nations for a period exceeding 90 days. The
order issued on April 23 transfers the jurisdic-
tion to investigate these cases to the Civil Service
Commission. However, the Commission will con-
tinue to refer to the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion for a full field investigation cases in which
there is developed derogatory information
reflecting on the loyalty of the individual
concerned.
The change effected by this order implements
one of the recommendations of the Commission
on Government Security (the Wright Commis-
sion). It is anticipated that the time elapsing
between the initiation and completion of an in-
vestigation will be shortened considerably under
the order and that substantial annual savings in
expenditures for investigations will be realized.
EXECUTIVE ORDER 10763 ^
Amendment of Executhts Order No. 10422, as Amended,
Prescribino Procedures for Making Available to the
Secretary General of the United Nations Certain
Information Concerning United States Citizens
Employed or Being Considered for Employment on
the Secretariat of the United Nations
' Bulletin of Jan. 12, 1953, p.
' 23 Fed. Reg. 2767.
By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Con
stitution, statutes, and treaties of the United States,
including the Charter of the United Nations, and as
President of the United States, it is ordered that para-
graphs 2, 3, and 4 of Part I of Executive Order No.
10422 of January 9, 1953, as amended by Executive Order
No. 104-59' of June 2, 1953, be, and they are hereby,
amended to read as follows :
"2. The Secretary of State shall forward the informa-
tion received from the Secretary General of the United
Nations to the United States Civil Service Commission
and the Commission shall conduct an investigation.
"3. The investigation conducted by the Civil Service
Commission shall be a full background investigation
conforming to the investigative standards of the Civil
Service Commission, and shall include reference to the
following :
(a) Federal Bureau of Investigation files.
( b ) Civil Service Commission files.
(c) Military and naval intelligence files as appropriate.
(d) The files of any other appropriate Government in-
vestigative or intelligence agency.
(e) The files of appropriate committees of the Con-
gress.
(f) Local law-enforcement flies at the place of resi-
dence and employment of the person, including municipal,
county, and State law-enforcement files.
(g) Schools and colleges attended by the person,
(h) Former employers of the person.
(i) References given by the person.
(j) Any other appropriate source.
However, in the case of short-term employees whose em-
ployment does not e.xceed ninety days, such investigation
need not include reference to subparagraphs (f) through
(j) of this paragraph.
"4. Whenever information disclosed with respect to
any person being investigated is derogatory, within the
standard set forth in Part II of this order, the United
States Civil Service Commission shall forward such in-
formation to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and
the Bureau shall conduct a full field investigation of such
person."
This order shall become effective on July 1. 1958.
X^ (-JS-^ L-iZJ Lf-^u^^ A^n.<j-r^
The White House,
April 2S, 1958.
' Bulletin of June 22, 1953,
840
Department of State Bulletin
9th Plenary Assembly of CCIR
To Meet at Los Angeles in 1959
The Department of State announced on April
28 (press release 227) the acceptance of Mayor
Norris Poulson's invitation to hold the 9th plenary
assembly of the International Radio Consultative
Committee (CCIR) at Los Angeles, Calif., from
April 2 to 30, 1959.
The International Radio Consultative Commit-
tee is one of the principal organs of the Interna-
tional Telecommunication Union (ITU) and is
concerned with the improvement of radio com-
munications throughout the world. The work of
the CCIR [Comite consultatif international des
radiocommiuiications] is carried on largely by
special study groups which examine technical radio
questions. Meeting every 3 years, the plenary
assemblies of the CCIR adopt the recommenda-
tions of these study groups, formulate a program
of study-group activity for the 3-year period mitil
the next assembly, and decide administrative and
budgetary matters for the operation of the CCIR.
The plenary assembly will provide an excellent
formn for the exchange of information between
American radio communications experts and their
counterparts from all over the world. Official
delegations from some 50 countries as well as
representatives from private operating agencies,
international organizations, science, and industry
are expected to attend the CCIR plenary assembly.
TREATY INFORMATION
President Withdraws Certain Treaties
From the Senate
Message of President Eisenhower
White House press release dated April 22
To the Senate of the United States: With a view
to further study and consideration of certain trea-
ties in the light of developments since they were
formulated, and in order to assist the Senate in
placing its Treaty Calendar on a relatively cur-
rent basis, I desire to withdraw from the Senate
the following treaties and understandmg :
Executive 0, 80th Congress, 1st Session —
Conciliation treaty between the United States of
America and the Republic of the Philippines, signed at
Manila November 16, 1946.
Executive T, 80th Congi-ess, 1st Session-
Convention Concerning Social Security for Seafarers,
adopted by the International Labor Conference, Seattle,
.June 6-29, 1946 (ILO Convention No. 70).
Executive HH, 80th Congress, 1st Session—
Inter-American Convention on the Rights of the Author
in Literary, Scientific, and Artistic Worlis, signed at
Washington June 22, 1946 (Inter-American Copyright
Convention).
Executive G, 81st Congress, 1st Session —
Convention Concerning Statistics of Wages and Hours
of Worlj in the Principal Mining and Manufacturing
Industries, Including Building and Construction, and
in Agriculture, adopted by the International Labor
Conference, Geneva, June 2-22, 1938 (ILO Convention
No. 63).
Executive B, 82d Congress, 1st Session-
Convention Concerning the Organization of the Employ-
ment Service, adopted by the International Labor Con-
ference, San Francisco, June 17- July 10, 1948 (ILO
Convention No. 88).
Executive H, 82d Congress, 1st Session —
Understanding with respect to ILO Convention No. 63,
concerning statistics of wages and hours of work in
principal mining and manufacturing industries, includ-
ing building and construction, and in agriculture.
Executive J, 82d Congress, 1st Session —
Convention Concerning Vacation Holidays With Pay
for Seafarers, adopted by the International Labor Con-
ference, Geneva, June 8-July 2, 1949 (ILO Convention
No. 91).
Executive K, 82d Congress, 1st Session-
Convention Concerning Crew Accommodations on Board
Ship (revised 1949), adopted by the International Labor
Conference, Geneva, June 8-July 2, 1949 (ILO Conven-
tion No. 92).
Executive L, 82d Congress, 1st Session —
Convention Concerning Wages, Hours of Worls on Board
Ship and Manning (revised 1949), adopted by the Inter-
national Labor Conference, Geneva, June 8-July 2, 1949
(ILO Convention No. 93).
If found to be desirable in the light of the fur-
ther study and consideration, one or more of the
treaties listed above may be resubmitted with a
fresh appraisal of their provisions.
DwiGHT D. Eisenhower
The White House,
April 22, 1958
May 19, 1958
Agreement Concluded With Argentina
on Meteorological Sampling Tests
Press release 226 dated April 28
The United States and Argentina have conduded
an agreement under which the U.S. Air Force is
authorized to conduct in Argentuia, for a period
of about 18 months, meteorological sampling tests
in the upper troposphere and lower stratosphere.
The U.S. Air Force unit will consist of approxi-
mately 150 members and equipment necessary to
insure successful completion of its scientific re-
search task.
The final conclusions drawn from the tests,
which will be available upon completion of the pro-
gram, are expected to be of general scientific value
and will be furnished to the Government of Argen-
tina. It is believed that the scientific data gained
will make the sampling program of benefit to both
countries. The valuable support extended by the
Argentine Government and the Argentine Air
Force to this scientific research mission is another
example of the cooperative spirit existing between
the two countries.
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Atomic Energy
Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Done at New York October 26, 1956. Entered into force
July 29, 1957. TIAS 3873.
Ratification deposited: Belgium, April 29, 1958.
Finance
Articles of agreement of the International Monetary
Fund. Opened for signature at Washington December
27, 1945. Entered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS
1501.
Signature and acceptance: Morocco, April 25, 1958.
Articles of agreement of the International Bank for Re-
construction and Development. Opened for signature
at Washington December 27, 1945. Entered into force
December 27, 1945. TIAS 1502.
Signature and acceptance: Morocco, April 25, 1958.
Property
Convention for the protection of industrial property.
Signed at London June 2, 1934. Entered into force
August 1, 1938. 53 Stat. 1748.
Adherence effective: Ireland, May 14, 1958.
Safety at Sea
Agreement regarding financial support of the North At-
lantic ice patrol. Opened for signature at Washington
January 4, 1956. Entered into force July 5, 1956.
TIAS 3597.
Acceptance deposited: Liberia, April 23, 1958.
BILATERAL
Brazil
Reciprocal trade agreement. Signed at Washington Feb-
ruary 2, 1935. Entered into force January 1, 1936. 49
Stat. 3808.
Terminates: June 19, 1958.*
Agreement supplementing reciprocal trade agreement.
Effected by exchange of notes at Rio de Janeiro April
17, 1935. Entered into force January 1, 1936. 49 Stat.
3808.
Terminates: June 19, 1958.'
Agreement supplementing the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade of October 30, 1947 (TIAS 1700).
Effected by exchange of notes at Rio de Janeiro June
30, 1948. Entered into force June 30, 1948. TIAS
1811.
Terminates: June 19, 1958.'
Colombia
Agreement amending the memorandum of understand-
ing attached to the agricultural commodities agreement
of March 14, 1958 (TIAS 4015). Effected by exchange
of notes at Bogota March 20 and April 23, 1958. En-
tered into force April 23, 1958.
Agreement further amending the memorandum of imder-
standing attached to the agricultural commodities
agreement of March 14, 1958 (TIAS 4015). Effected
by exchange of notes at Bogota April 10 and 23, 1958.
Entered into force April 23, 1958.
Iran
Air transport agreement. Signed at Tehran January 16,
1957.
Entered into force: April 17, 1958 (date of receipt by
the United States of notification by Iran of its
ratification).
Nicaragua
Treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation, and
protocol. Signed at Managua January 21, 1956.
Ratifications exchanged: April 24, 1958.
Enters into force: May 24, 1958.
Philippines
Agreements supplementing and amending the military as-
sistance agreement of April 27, 1955 (TIAS 3231), as
amended. Effected by exchange of notes at Manila
April 14, 1958. Entered into force April 14, 1958.
Spain
Agreement supplementing the agricultural commodities
agreement of January 27, 1958 (TIAS 4010). Signed
at Madrid April 10, 1958. Entered into force April
10, 1958.
' Notice of intention to terminate given by Brazil Dec.
19, 1957.
842
Department of Sfafe BuUefin
May 19, 1958
Index
Vol. XXXVIII, No. 986
Africa. Nationalism In Africa (Palmer) .... 824
American Principles
Freedom Under Law (Eisenhower) 831
The Strategy of Peace (DuUes) 799
Argentina. Agreement Concluded With Argentina
on Meteorological Sampling Tests 842
Atomic Energy
Secretary Dulles' News Conference of May 1 . . . 804
U.S. Replies to Polish Note on Rapacki Plan (texts
of notes) 821
Canada. Renegotiation of Fruit and Vegetable Con-
cessions by Canada 838
Congress, The. President Withdraws Certain
Treaties From the Senate 841
Disarmament
President Urges U.S.S.R. To Support U.S. Proposal
for an International Inspection System in Arctic
(Eisenhower, Khrushchev) 811
Secretary Dulles' News Conference of May 1 . . . 804
U.S. Recommends Arctic Zone of Inspection Against
Surprise Attack ; U.S.S.R. Casts 83d Veto (Lodge,
text of resolution) 816
U.S. Replies to Polish Note on Rapacki Plan (texts
of notes) 821
Economic Afifairs
Import Quota on Tung Nuts ( text of proclamation ) . 837
Renegotiation of Fruit and Vegetable Concessions
by Canada 838
Some Political Problems of the Legal Adviser
(Becker) 832
U.S. Acts To Revoke Egyptian Assets Control
Regulations 830
Eg^ypt. U.S. Acts To Revoke Egyptian Assets Con-
trol Regulations 830
Europe. U.S. Replies to Polish Note on Rapacki
Plan (texts of notes) 821
Indonesia. Secretary Dulles' News Conference of
May 1 804
International Information. U.S.-Soviet Discus-
sions on Exchange of Films 830
International Law
Freedom Under Law (Eisenhower) 831
Some Political Problems of the Legal Adviser
(Becker) 832
International Organizations and Conferences.
9th Plenary Assembly of CCIR To Meet at Los
Angeles in 1959 841
Poland. U.S. Replies to Polish Note on Rapacki
Plan (texts of notes) 821
PresidentiaJ Documents
Freedom Under Law 831
Import Quota on Tung Nuts 837
President Amends Procedures on U.S. Citizens
Employed by U.N 840
President Urges U.S.S.R. To Support U.S. Proposal
for an International Inspection System in
Arctic 811
President Withdraws Certain Treaties From the
Senate 841
Treaty Information
Agreement Concluded With Argentina on Meteor-
ological Sampling Tests 842
Current Actions . . 842
President Withdraws Certain Treaties From the
Senate 841
U.S.S.R.
President Urges U.S.S.R. To Support U.S. Proposal
for an International Inspection System in Arctic
(Eisenhower, Khrushchev) 811
Secretary Dulles' News Conference of May 1 . . . 804
The Strategy of Peace (Dulles) 799
U.S. Recommends Arctic Zone of Inspection Against
Surprise Attack; U.S.S.R. Casts 83d Veto (Lodge,
text of resolution) 816
U.S.-Soviet Discussions on Exchange of Films . . 830
United Nations
Nationalism in Africa (Palmer) 824
President Amends Procedures on U.S. Citizens
Employed by U.N. (text of Executive order) . . 840
Secretary Dulles' News Conference of May 1 . . . 804
U.S. Recommends Arctic Zone of Inspection Against
Surprise Attack ; U.S.S.R. Casts 83d Veto (Lodge,
text of resolution) 816
Name Index
Becker, Loftus 832
Dulles, Secretary 799, 804
Eisenhower, President .... 811,831,837,840,841
Khrushchev, Nikita 812
Lodge, Henry Cabot 816
Palmer, Joseph 2d 824
Check List off Department of State
Press Releases: April 2S-May 4
Press releases may be obtained from the News
Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.
Releases issued prior to April 28 which appear
in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 214 of April
24, 222 of April 25, and 224 of April 26.
No. Date Subject
t225 4/28 Delegation to NATO ministerial meet-
ing.
226 4/28 U.S.-Argentine agreement on meteor-
ological sampling tests.
CCIR assembly to be held at Los An-
geles (rewrite).
Delegation to 41st (maritime) session
of International Labor Conference
(rewrite).
Five FSO's sworn In as career minis-
ters.
U.S.-Soviet meetings on film ex-
changes.
Shipment of pesticide to Iran.
Merchant, Whiteman to receive Na-
tional Civil Service League awards.
U.S. release of blocked Egyptian funds.
Dulles: Arctic inspection zone (com-
bined with No. 236).
Holmes: "The United States and
Africa : An Official Viewpoint."
Dulles : news conference.
Dulles: departure for NATO meeting.
Robertson: Senate Foreign Relations
Committee.
Dulles : "The Strategy of Peace."
Partial revision of above text.
Haitian financial mission.
Tripartite statement on summit meet-
ing.
Reply to Polish note on Rapacki Plan.
Delegation to inauguration of Costa
Rican President.
♦Not printed.
tHeld for a later issue of the BtJLLETiN.
227
4/28 <
t228
4/29 ]
♦229
4/30
230
4/29
♦231
♦232
4/30
4/30
233
234
4/30 1
5/1
t235
5/1 1
236
t237
t238
5/1
5/2
5/2
239 .5/2 1
239-A .5/2
t240 5/2
t241 5/3
242
♦243
5/4
5/2
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TREATIES IN FORCE
A List of Treaties
and Other International Agreements
of the United States
in Force on January 1, 1958
This publication is a guide to treaties and other international
agreements in force between the United States and other countries at
the beginning of the current year.
The list includes bilateral treaties and other agreements, ar-
ranged by comitry or other political entity, and multilateral treaties
and other agreements, arranged by subject with names of countries
which have become parties. Date of signature, date of entry into
force for the United States, and citations to texts are furnished for
each agreement.
Documents affecting international copyright relations of the
United States are listed in the appendix.
Information on current treaty actions, supplementing the infor-
mation contained in Treaties in Force, is published weekly in the
Department of State Bulletin.
The new edition of Treaties in Force (266 pp.) is for sale by the
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Wasliington 25, D. C, for $1.25 a copy.
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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Vol. XXXVIII, No. 987
May 26, 1958
OUR CHANGING WORLD • Address by Secretary Dulles . 847
NATO MINISTERIAL COUNCIL MEETS AT
COPENHAGEN 850
THE LESSONS OF BERLIN • Address by Secretary Dulles . 854
THE CONTRIBUTION OF TRADE TO THE CAUSE OF
PEACE • by Deputy Under Secretary Dillon 881
THE UNITED STATES AND AFRICA: AN OFFICUL
VIE\^TOINT • by Julius C. Holmes 857
NATI0NALIS:M and collective security • by
Frederick W. Jandrey 863
NATIONALISM AND THE UNITED NATIONS • Article
by Wallace Irwin, Jr 872
PROMOTING PROGRESS IN HUMAN RIGHTS • State-
ment by Mrs. Oswald B. Lord 884
For index see inside back cover
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Boston Public Library
Superintcnrl-nt of Documents
JUL 8 - 1958
Vol. XXXVIII, No. 987 • Publication 6646
May 26, 1958
For lale by the Superintendent ot Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington 26, D.O.
Prick:
62 issues, domestic $7.60, foreign $10.25
Single copy, 20 cents
The printing of this publication has been
approved by the Director of the Bureau of
the Budget (January 20, 1958).
Note: Contents of thU publication are not
copyrighted and Items contatoed herein may
be reprinted. Citation of the Department
0» State Bdixetin as the source will be
appreciated.
The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the
Public Services Division, provides the
public and interested agencies of
the Government tcith information on
developments in the field of foreign
relations and on the work of the
Department of Slate and the Foreign
Service. The BULLETIN includes se-
lected press releases on foreign policy,
issued by t/te White House and the
Department, and statements and ad-
dresses made by the President and by
the Secretary of State and other
officers of the Department, as well as
special articles on various phases of
international affairs and the func-
tions of the Department. Informa-
tion is included concerning treaties
and international agreements to
tvhich the United States is or may
become a party and treaties of gen-
eral international interest.
Publications of the Department,
United Nations documents, and legis-
lative material in the field of inter-
national relations are listed currently.
Our Changing World
Address hy Secretary Dulles '■
I have just arrived a few minutes ago from
Europe. I attended, at Copenhagen, a meeting
of the foreign ministers of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization.- That beautiful city of tra-
dition and culture is a vivid reminder of the high
ideals and vigorous endeavors by which Europe
enriched our own American heritage. From
Copenhagen I went to Berlin and saw that citadel
of freedom being sustained by the stalwart people
of Germany. Minnesota bears the imprint of
the North Atlantic nations. One finds here the
Viking zest for adventure, industry, thriftiness,
devotion to the rights of the individual, and love
of liberty.
One of the outstanding characteristics of the
Scandinavian people has been that, on the one
hand, they are stubborn when it comes to funda-
mental principles and, on the other hand, they
readily change the political framework within
which those principles make themselves manifest.
For example, three of the five Scandinavian polit-
ical units as we know them today assumed their
present national independence only within this ceri-
tury — Norway, 1905; Finland, 1917; and Iceland,
1944 — but within a somewhat kaleidoscopic po-
litical scene they have ever maintained spiritual
and cultural solidarity. That is the theme I
would empliasize today. We live in a world of
change. Indeed, change is the law of life, and
vitality is often measured by change. That, how-
ever, does not mean that everything changes.
There are basic truths which are enduring and to
which we must hold fast if change is to be orderly
and conducive to good.
Sometimes rigidity and flexibility are posed as
concepts that are mutually exclusive. Actually
they can and should go hand in hand. Enduring
concepts of justice and right provide the dyna-
mism that assures both the fact of change and the
character of change.
The United States has sought to play worthily
its part in a world wliere change is inevitable
and where change can be made benign if it re-
flects fundamental concepts as to the proper rela-
tion of man to God and of man to man.
Our nation was founded by men of faith. They
sought here not just to build a secure home for
themselves but to conduct a great experiment in
human liberty, the impact of which would be felt
throughout the world. They were imbued with
a sense of mission. When our nation was small,
at its beginning, we conceived that our ability
to change the world would be primarily through
the influence of our conduct and example. We
built our society as one of extraordinary politi-
cal, economic, and spiritual vigor. It did, indeed,
attract attention all around the world and thus
influenced the course of world events. We grew
in stature, largely because sharing was a central
theme. We welcomed here those from other lands
to partake equally the advantages and opportuni-
ties of the founders. The original States did not
make of themselves a closed preserve. Their
union was open to adherence by others, and the
13 original States on the Atlantic seaboard became
48 spanning a continent.
As our nation has grown, the whole world has
shrunk under the impact of new means and speeds
of travel and communication. The world of to-
day is relatively much smaller than was our con-
tinent 100 years ago. Under these changed condi-
lay 26, 7958
847
tions our nation continues to seek to propagate the
enduring concepts of our founders.
Our States could not liave survived in peaceful
prosperity had each asserted total independence
and rejected interdependence. Likewise, in the
world of today nations cannot survive in peaceful
prosperity if each emphasizes only independence
and neglects interdependence.
Those whose spirit faithfully reproduces the
spirit of the past— be it the past of the North
Atlantic or of the United States— must seek to
apply on a worldwide basis this principle of inter-
dependence.
United Nations
The United Nations represents such an effort.
It exerts a great influence throughout the world.
Nevertheless it fails to satisfy all of the needs of
the nations. Its Security Council can be ren-
dered impotent by the veto of any one of the five
permanent members. Nine days ago the Soviet
Union cast its 83d veto ^ and thereby struck a
grave blow to the good neighborliness and har-
mony which the charter prescribes.
The General Assembly makes recommendations,
but it cannot act. Its influence is great with those
countries which have what our Declaration of In-
dependence calls a "decent respect to tlie opinions
of mankind." But it is otherwise with nations
which lack such respect. For example, the Gen-
eral Assembly resolutions with regard to Korea
have been ignored to this day by the Soviet Union
and by Communist China, and its resolutions with
respect to Hungary have been defied by the Soviet
Union.
Tlie United States does its very best to support
the United Nations. But for the reason I have
indicated it has been necessary to supplement the
United Nations by other security measures. These
have taken the form, principally, of collective de-
fense associations, as specifically authorized by the
United Nations Charter.
One of these collective security arrangements is
established by the North Atlantic Treaty. The
foreign ministers of the 15 NATO countries have
just been meeting in Copenhagen. That meeting
has provided a good demonstration of consulta-
tion and coordination without the sacrifice of
independence.
There are, of course, other such associations.
Bulletin of May 19, 19.58, p. 816.
848
There is the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization —
SEATO— the Baghdad Pact, and the oldest of all,
the Pan American Union, now the Organization
of American States.
By participation in such regional and defensive
groupings the nations supplement the United
Nations where it is weak.
Mutual Security Program
A further expression of the principle of inter-
dependence is our mutual security pi'ogram, some-
times called foreign aid. We have been conduct-
ing this program in various forms now for 10
years since the first such major program, the Mar-
shall plan, was adopted. That plan was de-
signed to bring economic recovery to a Europe
that had been dislocated and devastated by war.
The nations which originally benefited from that
European recovery plan no longer need economic
aid. Their economies flourish, and they have be-
come important trade customers of the United
States, contributing greatly to our own economic
welfare. They also contribute significantly to
the collective military establishment of NATO.
Our 1948 investment in Europe has paid off many
times over.
Today our mutual security programs serve pri-
marily to provide military assistance, and in a few
cases financial assistance, to equip and maintain
armed forces needed to protect areas which are
vitally important to the free world, including the
United States. For example, the cooperating
free-world countries have gi-ound forces of about
5.6 million men. But less than one million ol
these are Americans. Nearly 5 million are fi'om
other lands. They are to some extent equipped
and otherwise helped out by our mutual security
program.
I can assure you that it is far cheaper to ge'
security that way than for the United States to
raise and maintain the additional military forcei
that we would need if we stood alone.
"We are providing a certain amount of eco
nomic assistance — principally in the form of loan;
not gifts — to the less developed countries and par
ticularly the newly independent countries. The,
are desperately eager to improve the lot of thei
people. They want to do this in freedom. Bu<
if they cannot find the way in freedom, they wil
be under strong compulsion to accept the
ance of the Soviet Union in building a materia]
istic totalitarian society. These Soviet offers ar
Department of State Bullet!
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alluring on their face. But they are motivated —
and conditioned — by a desire to subvert the genu-
ine independence of the countries which accept
them. That would be tragic for them and for us.
Our nation wants and needs an environment of
freedom. We dare not sit idly by to be more and
more closely encircled by a hostile despotism
Avhich seeks to strangle us.
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Program
Collective security measures cannot alone suffice
to serve our ideals. The independence and pros-
perity of nations must also be served and enriched
by trading the products of their labors. In the
modern world, trade is inevitably a part of the
whole complex of a nation's international rela-
tions and, indeed, of its security. In the United
States we have given recognition and expression
to this fact through our reciprocal trade agree-
ments program. That program, originated 24
years ago and since extended 10 times by the
Congress, provides our farmers and our industrial
workers with assured markets throughout the
world. Since the program was inaugurated, our
foreign trade has expanded nearly tenfold. The
program is not just one of tariff reduction; it
realistically takes account of the needs of some
segments of our economy by providing restraints
on foreign competition where protection is justi-
fied by the totality of our national interest.
Our reciprocal trade program not only contrib-
utes to our economic welfare. It contributes to
our political and military security. To see this
one needs only recall the period of the early thir-
ties. We then sought relief from economic de-
pression by raising our tariffs and devaluing our
currency, without regard to the effect on others
who were largely dependent on international
trade. We did not get the relief we expected at
home. But worse than that was the fact that our
example was taken by others, notably Germany
and Japan, as justification for policies of extreme
nationalism and of expansion, on the theory that
economic livelihood was no longer attainable by
normal methods of peaceful trade.
We cannot afford now to risk repetition of the
disaster that followed that period. The renewal
of the reciprocal trade agreements legislation is
necessary both for our economic welfare and for
our peace.
We seek also to apply the principle of inter-
May 26, 1958
dependence to the fields newly opened by science
and exploration. There is the vast new area of
physical power now made possible by the splitting
of the atom. There we seek such international
controls and safeguards as will assure "atoms for
peace" and, as President Eisenhower put it, "find
the way by which the miraculous inventiveness of
man shall not be dedicated to his death, but con-
secrated to his life."
Take outer space. It is now for the first time
becoming accessible to the devices of man, and
soon to man himself. We seek that the new world
beyond the limits of our earthly sphere shall be
used only for peaceful purposes and not for pur-
poses of war.
Then there is the continent of Antarctica now
being intensively explored by the scientists of
many countries cooperating in the Geophysical
Year. We propose to establish in Antarctica an
international regime which will prevent the mon-
opolizing of any part of this new continent for
the military purposes of any nation but assure an
"open door" for the peaceful pursuits of all man-
kind.
Then, if we look north, we see new arteries of
travel opening up over north polar regions. We
want to see established in the neighborhood an
international system of inspection so that none
need fear that these new polar routes will be
traveled by bombers or by missiles unleashing sur-
prise attack. We want only peaceful travel along
these new paths, such as is developed by our
Scandinavian friends to bring our nations closer.
Adapting to Change
In such ways as these we seek to carry forward
in this foreshortened world the dynamic con-
cepts of our founders. The spirit is the same —
the spirit of the Viking, the spirit of the Ameri-
can frontiersman, constantly seeking new hori-
zons, facing new challenges, and responding to
them. These responses manifest our recognition
of the fact that change is inevitable, that it is
the law of life, and those who do not adapt
themselves to change, who only oppose it blindly,
not only lose the thrill of adventure and the joy
of creation but are themselves destroyed by
change.
As we thus partake of change, we strive that
that change shall reflect certain values that are
timeless and unchangeable. We hold to the basic
truths expressed by all the great religions — that
849
man is spiritual, having his origin and his destiny
m God. "We hold to certain political applications
of those truths, as proclaimed by the Magna
Charta, the Declaration of the Eights of Man, and
our own Declaration of Independence.
We continue to believe tliat men are indeed en-
dowed by their Creator with certain inalienable
rights including the right to life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness and that just government
derives its powers from the consent of the gov-
erned. And we believe, as Abraham Lincoln said
of our Declaration of Independence, that its prin-
ciples mean "liberty not alone to the people of this
country, but hope to all the world, for all future
time. It was that which gave promise that in due
time the weights would be lifted from the shoul-
ders of all men. . . ."
These are principles that are challenged today
by the adherents of materialistic atheism. In the
face of that challenge we do not stubbornly stand
still. We continue to pursue the path of change.
But we do not change our principles.
In that respect we are unchanging, steadfast,
and uncompromising. Only thus can we be true
to the ideals brought to this nation from so many
lands by God-fearing peoples, who consolidated
here a new nation, who began here a new experi-
ment, and who, through those who inherit the
great tradition, bring a new and dynamic ap-
proach to the problems of an ever-changing
world.
NATO IVlinisterial Council
Meets at Copenhagen
Following is the text of tlve -final communique
issued at Copenhagen on May 7 following a 3-day
meeting of the Ministerial Council of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, together with a
statement made by Secretary Dulles upon his de-
parture from Washington on May 2 and an an-
nouncement of the VjS. delegation.
TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE
Press release 251 dated May 7
The North Atlantic Council lield its spring min-
isterial meeting in Copenhagen from May 5 to 7,
1958.
850
2. The Foreign Ministers of the fifteen NATO
countries liave deepened and strengthened their
mutual understanding and their unity of purpose.
NATO, a defensive organization, is now much
more than merely a military alliance. It is be-
coming a true community of free nations.
Within this community, to a degree unprecedented
in history, countries are carrying out a policy of
close cooperation in peacetime without abandon-
ing their independence. This development is one
of the most significant and promising events of
our time.
3. The Council reviewed the activities of the
alliance and examined the international situation.
For the first subject of discussion, the Council had
before it the report submitted by the Secretary
General. The Council was in agreement with this
analysis of tlie work of the alliance in the past
year. They agreed in particular that the out-
standing achievement had been the remarkable
progress made in the strengthening of political
consultation. This has been successfully applied
to an increasing number of problems and has led
to coordination of policy on major questions of
common interest. The Council also expressed its
satisfaction with the results of the recent confer-
ence of Defence Ministers and with the good start
made in tlie field of scientific cooperation.
4. The Ministers recognized that political unity
and the efficient organization of defence were not
enough. Economic cooperation is also essential
between the members of the alliance. Every ef-
fort should be made to ensure economic pros-
perity, notably by the expansion of international
trade and by aid to underdeveloped countries.
Consultations on methods and macliinery for such
cooperation will take place within the alliance.
The Ministers attach special importance to the
successful conclusion of the economic negotiations
now being undertaken and to the establishment
of close ties between the European countries and
the whole free world.
5. During their consideration of the interna-
tional situation the Ministers had a discussion on
the question of a possible summit conference.
Tlie Council believes that summit meetings are de-
sirable if they offer prospects of reaching settle-
ments on important questions. The Council con-
siders that conferences at the summit are not the
only way, or necessarily the best way, of conduct-
Deparfmeni of State Bulletin
ing negotiations or reducing international ten-
sions. In any event, such conferences must be
properly prepared and take place in a favorable
atmosphere.
6. The Ministers regretted that during the last
few weeks the Soviet Union has made the prep-
arations for a possible summit conference more
difficult by posing unreasonable conditions. The
Soviet Union has recently aggravated interna-
tional tension by its veto in the Security Coun-
cil of the United States proposals to reduce the
risks of surprise attack over the Arctic.^
7. Despite the disappointment and doubts to
which the Soviet attitude gives rise, the NATO
Governments will not be discouraged nor give up
their attachment to the principle of negotiation.
8. Should a summit conference take place at
this time it should consider certain important
problems, among others the German problem,
which were identified by the Heads of Govern-
ments meeting at Geneva in 1955 and on which,
unfortunately, little or no progress towards a so-
lution has been made. Controlled disarmament,
desired so ardently by all peoples, should be one of
the main questions on the agenda. The propos-
als made by the Western Powers on 29th August,
1957 and approved by a large majority in the
United Nations could afford a reasonable basis
for this discussion.
9. The Council expressed the hope that it might
yet prove possible, in spite of repeated Soviet
refusal, to inaugurate expert technical discussions,
between representatives of the Soviet Union and
of the Western Powers principally concerned, on
detailed measures on control over disarmament.
Agreement on measures necessary, for example, to
prevent surprise attack or to detect nuclear ex-
plosions might go far towards demonstrating the
possibility of agreement on disarmament, improv-
ing its prospects and accelerating its application
when reached. In order to prepare the way for
such agreement the Council will consider the pos-
sibility of carrying out studies and experiments
on tlie technical problems of inspection and
control.
10. In conclusion, the Ministers confirmed the
full agreement of their governments on the basic
principles of the alliance, its goals and the meth-
ods of obtaining them.
' Bulletin of May 19, 1958, p. 816.
May 26, J 958
STATEMENT BY SECRETARY DULLES
Press release 237 dated May 2
As in past years I am going to meet with the
other Foreign Ministers of the NATO countries.
Together we will take stock of progress made
since the Heads of Government met in Paris last
December, and we will discuss the problems which
lie ahead.
Our meeting this spring takes place in the an-
cient and beautiful city of Copenhagen.
During the course of this meeting we expect to
review the international situation in the light of
current developments with particular reference to
the various subjects of interest to the North At-
lantic Treaty Organization.
NATO has for 9 years made its vital contribu-
tion to the preservation of peace and stability in
Europe, We now face new challenges in this
common endeavor. I am confident that we will
face these challenges firmly resolved to maintain
and develop the effectiveness of our defense while
we continue in our search for just and lasting
peace.
On the way home from Copenhagen I will stop
in Berlin for a few hours to observe the progress
which has been made in this remarkable city since
my last visit there in 1954. Thereafter I will go
to Paris for a day, where I will attend the regu-
lar annual meeting of American ambassadors to
Western European governments.
U.S. DELEGATION
Press release 225 dated AprU 28
The U.S. Representative at the meeting of
NATO Foreign Ministers scheduled to be held at
Copenhagen May 5-7 will be Secretary of State
John Foster Dulles.
In addition to the Secretary of State the U.S.
delegation will consist of the following :
Andrew H. Berding, Assistant Secretary of State for Pub-
lie Affairs
W. Randolpli Burgess, U.S. Permanent Representative to
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Philip K. Crowe, Special Assistant to the Secretary of
State
C. Burke Elbrick, Assistant Secretary of State for Euro-
pean Affairs
Philip J. Farley, Special Assistant to the Secretary of
State
Edward L. Freers, Director, Office of Eastern European
Affairs
851
Joseph N. Greene, Special Assistant to the Secretary of
State
John S. Guthrie, Office of the Assistant Secretary of De-
fense for International Security AfCairs
Robert H. McBride, Deputy Director, Office of European
Regional Affairs
Frederick E. Nolting, Jr., Deputy U.S. Representative to
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Val Peterson, American Ambassador to Denmark
William J. Porter, Director, Office of Northern African
Affairs
G. Frederick Reinhardt, Counselor of the Department of
State
Jacques J. Reinstein, Director, Office of German Affairs
Gerard C. Smith, Assistant Secretary of State for Policy
Planning
Mansfield D. Sprague, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs
B. E. L. Timmons, Director, Office of European Regional
Affairs
U.S., U.K., and France Agree
to Separate Talks at Moscow
TRIPARTITE STATEMENT OF MAY 3
Press release 241 dated May 3
Folloioing is the text of an identical statement
-presented to the Soviet Government on May 3
hy the Britvih, French, and United States Am-
bassadors at Moscow.
The Governments of the United States, United
Kingdom and France have noted with regret that
the Soviet Government, in its Aide Memoire of
April 26, has rejected their proposal for joint
meetings between the three Ambassadors and the
Soviet Foreign Minister to begin the preparatory
work for a Summit meeting and, in doing so, has
raised an unnecessary obstacle in the task of carry-
ing this work forward. As the Soviet Govern-
ment points out in its Aide Memoire, no progi-ess
has been made toward agreement on the range of
questions to be dealt with nor in determining what
questions offer prospects for agreement.
The three powers have not changed their view
that progress could be made more rapidly by joint
meetings rather than by a series of separate in-
terviews. Since they desire to move ahead with
the work itself, however, and in view of the fact
that the Soviet Government agrees that the Am-
bassadors will discuss substantive issues, they are
prepared to meet the Soviet Government's prefer-
852
ence for separate interviews. Their acceptance
of this procedure, however, does not prejudge in
any way the composition of any future meetings.
Following the discussion of the agenda for a Sum-
mit meeting as proposed in the tripartite state-
ment of April 24,^ the three Ambassadors will be
prepared to discuss the matter of a date and place
of a Foreign Ministers' meeting and what coun-
tries should be invited to be represented at this
meeting.
The three Ambassadors, therefore, stand ready
to meet the Soviet Foreign Minister for this pur-
pose.
SOVIET AIDE MEMOIRE OF APRIL 26 >
Dnoffleial translation
The Soviet Government has studied the considerations
of the Government of the United States set forth in its
statements of Apr. 16 ' and 24 in connection with the
Soviet Government's proposal for earliest completion of
preparations for a summit meeting made in its aide-
memoire of Apr. 11, 1958.'
The aforementioned statements made it clear that the
Government of the United States has agreed to the Soviet
proposal to begin an exchange of opinion in Moscow on
preparing a foreign ministers meeting. At the same time,
a study of the statements leads to the conclusion that
the governments of the United States, Great Britain, and
France are actually acting in such a way as to delay the
convocation of a summit meeting indefinitely.
The Soviet Government considers it necessary to draw
attention to the fact that though more than four months
have elapsed since the Soviet Union introduced its pro-
posal to hold a summit conference, the Government of
the United States, like the governments of Great Britain
and France, has not yet replied to the questions pertain-
ing to preparations for such a conference, namely, its
date, place, and composition. The coordination of the
range of questions to be discussed at the conference is in
no better state.
The exchange of opinion which has so far taken place
with the Western powers, including talks by the Soviet
Foreign Minister with the ambassadors of the United
States, Great Britain, and France on Apr. 17 and 18, does
not allow a determination of what questions, in their
opinion, are ripe for discussion which could yield positive
results.
As is known, the Soviet Government, for its part, has
not only introduced concrete proposals about a summit
agenda as well as about other issues pertaining to the
' Bulletin of May 12, 1958, p. 759.
^Handed to U.S. Ambassador Llewellyn E. Thompson
at Moscow on Apr. 26 by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei
A. Gromyko.
'Bulletin of May 5, 1958, p. 727.
'Ibid., p. 728.
Department of State Bulletin
convocation of the conference, but has also met the de-
sires of the Western powers half way by agreeing to
carry out preparatory work for the conference through
diplomatic channels and a meeting of the ministers of
foreign affairs.
At the moment the main task is the earliest completion
of the preparatory work for a summit conference which
should insure a decisive turn toward an improvement of
the international climate as a whole. In this connection
the Soviet Government reaffirms its considerations set
forth in its aide-memoire of Apr. 11 on the question of
speeding up the preparations for a summit meeting.
As for the exchange of opinion through diplomatic
channels on the preparations for a foreign ministers
meeting, it is intended that that exchange of opinion
should concentrate on issues pertaining directly to the
organization of that meeting, namely, the time and place
of the foreign ministers meeting and its composition.
It is not precluded that during the meeting at the am-
bassadorial level, and in the course of the foreign min-
isters conference, an exchange of opinion may be held,
in case of necessity and by common agreement, on some
of the issues which the sides propose to place on the
summit agenda in order to explore the advisability of
placing this or that question on the agenda of such a
conference and the possibility of adopting mutually ac-
ceptable decisions on them.
As for the question touched upon in the statements of
the governments of the United States, Great Britain, and
France on Apr. 24 concerning joint talks between a Soviet
representative and the three ambassador.s, that state-
ment makes it clear that the governments of the three
powers are now proposing to hold joint meetings of the
three ambassadors with the Soviet Foreign Minister to
carry out the necessary preparations for a foreign min-
isters meeting.
That proposal, which, incidentally, the Western powers
had not advanced in any of their previous documents,
cannot be considered acceptable because such a con-
ference would be tantamount to a four-power conference
in which three states of the North Atlantic alliance and
only one state of the Warsaw treaty organization would
be taking part. This circumstance was already pointed
out by the Foreign Minister in his talks with the three
ambassadors. It was stressed that this might give rise
to certain complications in the talks and therefore should
be avoided.
The Soviet Government considers it necessary to state
that, as before, it regards a preliminary exchange of
opinion through diplomatic channels by means of talks
between the Soviet Foreign Minister with each of the
ambassadors separately to be the most expedient and
conforming to the standing practice of exchanging opin-
ion through diplomatic channels in such cases.
If, however, the governments of the three powers
should prefer to exchange opinions through diplomatic
channels in some other form, in the form of a conference
of ambassadors in Mo.scow with the Soviet Foreign Min-
ister, in that case the parity principle should be adhered
to as the basic principle in determining the composition
of a summit conference with the participation of the
heads of government, which would preclude any discrim-
ination and would guarantee their equality.
Needless to say, at the summit conference, or in the
course of its preparation, no questions may be solved by
a vote, by an adoption of decisions by a formal majority
vote.
But at the conference, at which an exchange of opinion
will be held for the purpose of arriving at decisions ac-
ceptable to both sides, both sides should naturally be
represented equally and only such an approach is objec-
tive and justified.
In this connection the Soviet Government proposes that
a conference of ambassadors with the representative of
the U.S.S.R., together with the ambassadors of the
United States, Great Britain, and France, should also be
attended by the ambassadors of Poland and Czecho-
slovakia. This was announced by the Soviet Foreign
Minister in his talks with the ambassadors of Great
Britain and France on Apr. 18.
The conference of such composition would take due
cognizance of the parity principle and guarantee the
equality of the sides so necessary for a fruitful prepara-
tion of a summit meeting. The prestige of the sides
would also be fully maintained.
The Soviet Government believes that the course of
preparations it has proposed facilitates the convocation
of a summit conference in the nearest future if, natur-
ally, such a conference is sincerely desired.
The Soviet Government would like to hope that an
exchange of opinion through diplomatic channels would
help the earliest solution of that issue.
In conformity with the above, the Soviet Foreign Min-
ister is prepared to meet the ambassadors as soon as they
are ready.
Eighty-first Anniversary
of Rumanian Independence
Press release 255 dated May 9
Rumanians throughout the world will celebrate
on May 10 the 81st anniversary of Rumania's
achievement of national independence in 1877.
This event, which followed upon long years of
struggle by the Rumanian people against foreign
domination, enabled Rumania to take its rightful
place as a sovereign member of the community of
nations.
The Government and people of the United
States extend warm greetings to Rumanians
everywhere on the occasion of the observance of
this traditional Rumanian national holiday. The
memory and the meaning of this historic date
cannot fail, despite all difficulties, to sustain the
faith of the Rumanian people in the ideals of
freedom and their aspirations for a truly inde-
pendent national existence.
May 26, 1958
853
The Lessons of Berlin
Address hy Secretary Dulles '
It is an inspiration to be again in Berlin —
my fourth visit since the end of World War II.
I was here a few months after the close of
hostilities. I then saw Berlin as a mass of rubble.
It seemed that the city was beyond the possibility
of reconstruction. I felt at the time that the
plight of Berlin presented a challenge which was
beyond iiuman response. But that almost un-
believable challenge was in fact met through a
display of human energy and human faith which
has few parallels in history.
Then, in 1948, 1 rode the airlift to Berlin. The
Soviet Union was at that time imposing an eco-
nomic blockade which it seemed would force the
city to succumb. But the courage and resource-
fulness of the people of Berlin, and of the free
nations which mounted and sustained the airlift,
demonstrated that freedom had a resourcefulness
and resilience which the despots had grossly un-
derestimated. Berlin was not isolated. The at-
tempted blockade was abandoned, and Berlin
continued proudly to demonstrate within the cap-
tive world the good fruits of freedom.
I was next here in January 1954 to attend the
four-power conference which it was hoped would
bring about the reunification of Germany in free-
dom and the liberation of Austria. We were
spurred in our effort by the tragic events of the
preceding June and July, when the workei-s in
East Berlin and the Soviet-occupied zone rose in
a rebellion usually known as "June 17." This
spontaneous, courageous, and brutally repressed
demand by the workers for decent conditions made
it the more urgent that the alien occupation should
' Made at a reception given in Mr. Dulles' honor by the
Berlin city government at Berlin, Germany, on May 8
(press release 253).
be ended and the liberation of Germany
accomplished.
The AVestern representatives struggled val-
iantly, but in vain. The conference failed to
achieve its specific goals. But the conference it-
self was not a vain thing. All the world Judged
the issues, and I said on my return home from
that conference,^ the conference "cleared the way
for other things. . . . The unification and the
strengthening of West Europe may now go on."
It did, in fact, go on. Sovereignty was restored to
the Federal Republic of Germany ; it became a full
member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion and a party to the Treaty for Western Euro-
pean Unity. And today the Federal Republic not
only helps to build the institutions which, mili-
tarily and economically, will unify Western
Europe, but, under its great Chancellor Adenauer,
it plays a major role in the councils of the free
world.
Today I am in Berlin for the fourth postwar
visit and marvel at the accomplishments of your
people, who, in the face of unprecedented handi-
caps, make Berlin a center of cultural and in-
tellectual life and of industry. On behalf of the
President and people of the United States, I say
"all honor" to the people of Free Berlin. It has
been for us a privilege and an inspiration to be
associated with you.
On the basis of my experience, Berlin ought to
be required visiting, or, if that is impossible, the
story of postwar Berlin ought to be required read-
irig, by all who would understand the significance
of the worldwide struggle which now preoccupies
so much of the human race.
' Bulletin of Mar. 8, 1954, p. 343.
Department of State Bulletin
Berlin, a Tragic Symbol
A first lesson of Berlin is taught by your en-
vironment. You live here encircled by a sur-
rounding ring of Communist rule. Your position
in this respect is itself a tragic symbol of dis-
regard for the pledged word. The Potsdam
agreements of 1945 made it perfectly clear
that the purpose of the military occupation
was not to dismember Germany or permanently to
divide it. And indeed until recently the Soviet
Union admitted that it sliared a responsibility
to bring about the reunification of Germany.
At the Geneva summit meeting of July 1955
President Eisenhower, together with the Prime
Ministers of France and the United Kingdom,
obtained formal recognition by the heads of
the Soviet Government, including Mr. Khru-
slichev, that the four powers had "common respon-
sibility for the settlement of the German question
and the i-e-unification of Germany," and they
agreed that "the settlement of the German ques-
tion and the re-unification of Germany by means
of free elections" should be carried out." Those
engagements, it now seems, are evaded by the
Soviet Union.
This illustrates the great difSculty of dealing
witli the Soviet Union.
Most governments believe that a moral sanction
attaches to their engagements. They do not
undertake solemn and precise international under-
takings except with the intention of carrying
them out. Their record of performances is not
always perfect. But at least they do not look
upon the making and their breaking of agree-
ments as a legitimate teclmique for advancing
their interests.
In the case of the Soviet Union it is otherwise.
Its rulers are atheistic materialists. So far as
they are concerned, their agreements carry no
moral sanction. It often seems as though they
treat the making and breaking of agreements as
a legitimate international technique and that
their promises are, as Lenin said, "like pie crusts,
made to be broken."
That is why we find it so difficult to make prog-
ress in resolving political problems and in achiev-
ing limitation of armament. The attitude of the
Soviet Union toward its agreements constitutes
a grave obstacle.
You yourselves here in Berlin, you who are a
•/6i(J., Aug. 1,1955, p. 176.
May 26, 1958
living exhibit of Soviet violations of international
agreements, surely understand. And your plight
ought to teach the world that it is reckless to make
concessions in reliance on Soviet promises merely
because those promises are alluring.
Also you here see about you the tragic results
of the application of the Communist thesis tliat
individuals are not spiritual beings but merely
physical particles to be used to promote the glori-
fication of the Soviet Communist state and the
extension of its dominion throughout the world.
The steady flow of refugees from East Germany
which continues at the high level of about 20,000
per month is an indisputable demonstration of
which of our societies provides the most in the
way of human opportunity, both in terms of eco-
nomic livelihood and in terms of spiritual and
cultural satisfaction. This steady flight from the
East to West is the more significant because those
who seek the West are in large part young jjeople
who throughout most of their mature lives have
been subjected to the intense application of Com-
munist doctrine and practice.
The Lesson of Faith
A second lesson that Berlin teaches is the im-
mense capacity of human beings who are endowed
with faith.
To me one of the most inspiring portions of the
Holy Scripture is found in the letter of Paul to
the Hebrews, where he recounts the great acts
of faith which had marked the history of the
Hebrew people. He concludes, "Seeing we also
are compassed about with so great a cloud of wit-
nesses, ... let us run with steadfastness the race
that is set before us."
Surely the people of Berlin are writing a new
and epic chapter in the history of steadfast faith
and works. And even since these lines were writ-
ten, you face a new obstacle in the arbitrary action
of the Communist authorities in imposing what
in effect is a confiscatory tax on waterway traffic
between East and West Germany. But in the face
of such discouragements and obstacles the like of
which few have ever had to encounter, you have
rebuilt your city from its rubble. You have
established here your Free University. You
have reconstructed the Hall of the Technical Uni-
versity within the shattered ruins of its former
imposing structure. You have rebuilt the Hansa
Viertel as one of the most impressive urban de-
velopments in Europe. You have rebuilt your
855
churches. And there has been a revival of drama,
music, and of religious and intellectual life which
demonstrates that the physical shackles to which
you were subjected could be broken, and were
broken, by faith in your great destiny and by hope
and expectation of a richer and freer life to come.
No one can see the West Berlin of today with-
out recognizing the extraordinary courage and
inspiration that is making Berlin one of the great
cities of Europe. .
Let me say to you that I believe that your frath
and hope in the future are not misplaced and will
be rewarded.
I recall the somber meeting here in 1954 when
the Soviet delegation adamantly opposed both
the liberation of Austria and the reunification of
Germany. But in 1955 the Soviet Union sud-
denly decided to liberate Austria. That decision
came as a surprise and in reversal of the uncom-
promising position which the Soviet Government
had held for nearly a decade.
It shows that we need not despair for Germany
and for Berlin. The day will come when, prob-
ably unexpectedly and without predictability, the
Geneva pledge of 1955 will be fulfilled and Ger-
many will be reunified in freedom.
Cooperative Action of the Free
A third lesson of Berlin is that there is a vast
potential in the spiritual unity and practical co-
operation of those everywhere who love freedom.
Free Berlin and free Germany would never have
achieved their present advances without the faith
and works of their own people. But ecjually in-
dispensable was the support of other free peoples.
Americans are proud of the part they have been
privileged to play in this connection. The first
clearing of the city and the reestablislunent of the
basic facilities— light, heat, power, sewers, and
transport — were all carried out with German labor
and planning and with financial contributions
from the United States.
The airlift which surmounted the Soviet block-
ade was conducted by the Western powei-s.
Following the end of the blockade there has
been a well-planned development in the way of
construction, both industrial and cultural, in all
of which the United States has been glad to help.
Here in Berlin cooperation has become real in
stone and mortar, in halls of learning, m places of
work and conference, in labor and in recreation.
Perhaps most important of all is the shield of
power behind which these tasks of peace are car-
ried forward. I recall here the declaration which
the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom and
France and I made on October 3, WSi." We said :
The security and welfare of Berlin and tbe maintenance
of the position of the Three Powers there are regarded
by the Three Powers as essential elements of the peace
of the free world in the present international situation.
Accordingly thev will maintain armed forces within the
territory of Berlin as long as their responsibilities require
it They therefore reaffirm that they will treat any attack
against Berlin from any quarter as an attack upon their
forces and themselves.
I went over that declaration with President
Eisenhower an hour before I left. AVe read it to-
gether. He authorized me to say that it stands
and can be reaffirmed as a declaration of the solemn
determination of the United States.
I know that the people of Berlin realize how
significant for them has been the military deter-
rent whicli has provided the shield behind which
their works of peace have gone forward. I hope
that you and others will realize that the peace and
security of all of the free world equally depend
upon sucli a shield.
The Soviet Government is attempting by every
device of propaganda to compel the abandonment
of that shield. It claims that those who create
that shield are proved by that fact to be evil mili-
tarists. It claims that those who draw together
to get protection from that shield are "aggressive
groupings." It claims that those who seek only
defense should prove it by renouncing all but
inferior weapons, leaving modem weapons to be
a monopoly of those who have a tragically long
record of expansion by the use of violence.
It claims that certain of our aerial defense pre-
cautions are dangerous and frightening. But
when we try to make it possible to revise them
on the basis of reciprocal international inspection
that will give a large measure of assurance against
surprise attack, the Soviets say "nyet." They did
so again at the United Nations Security Council
la.sb week.^
The Soviet Union professes not to want to use
nuclear weapons but insists upon continuing at
The
* Ibid., Oct. 11, 1954, p. 521.
" Ibid., May 19, 1958, p. 816.
Department of Sfafe Bulletin
a feverish pace to multiply such weapons in its
own arsenals. It calls the free world to rely upon
Soviet promises not to use its nuclear weapons in
the event of war despite the long record of broken
promises to which I have alluded.
This Communist propaganda line is designed to
produce a world dominated by the military power
of the Sino-Soviet bloc. Freedom would have no
adequate defense. There is a duty to look behind
words that somid alluring and to see and reject
the underlying plot against freedom.
I hope that the lessons of Berlin — the lesson
taught by its surroundings, the lesson taught by
its faith, and the lesson taught by the cooperative
action of the free — will be applied to the larger
context of world affairs.
All peoples in all the world, including the peo-
ples of the Soviet Union, look with horror at the
prospect of a new war. All would take any
dependable steps to reduce that prospect and,
above all, to eliminate the new weapons which
threaten humanity with virtual extinction. But
Berlin teaches that there cannot be confidence in
mere Soviet Commimist promises, that there can-
not be safety in weakness. It also teaches that
man is a spiritual being able, by faith, to perform
miracles and that men of faith are not prepared
to succumb to a rule that is atheistic and mili-
taristic merely in the hope of thus insuring con-
tinued existence.
All men who are free — and all who having lost
freedom would regain it — can pay homage to
Berlin and learn and apply the lessons that it
teaches.
The United States and Africa: An Official Viewpoint
l)y Julius C. Holmes
Special Assistant to the Secretary '■
It is a very great honor to be asked to make the
opening address of the American Assembly on the
vital topic of "The United States and Africa."
As the ancient Greeks sought the heights of
Mars Hill as conducive to clear discussions of the
affairs of state, so we, through the courtesy of
Columbia University, have the idyllic setting of
Arden House on this beautiful Ramapo mountain
top to inspire thoughtful analysis of the many
issues concerning Africa and the United States.
Let us hope that, like the ancient Greek philoso-
phers, we, too, shall have the necessary vision to
discern the forests from the trees as we look at
Africa's broad panorama during the next 3 days.
The scholarly papers that have been prepared
for this conference on all phases of our relations
with Africa and of the contemporary scene there
leave very little of either a fundamental or a de-
tailed nature untouched. However, one event that
made before the American Assembly (Colum-
bia University) at Arden House, Harriman, N.Y., on May 1
( press release 2.35 ) .
has occurred since these papers were prepared is
worthy of our attention this evening. That is the
Pan-African Conference held at Accra [Ghana]
from April 15 to 22 on the invitation of Prime
Minister Nkrumah. At this meeting major Af-
rican objectives were set forth by authentic spokes-
men of the independent African peoples. It is my
purpose this evening to consider some of these ob-
jectives and United States policy relatmg to them.
You will recall that the eight countries sending
representatives to Accra were, besides Ghana:
Liberia, Ethiopia, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, the
Sudan, and the United Arab Eepublic. As the his-
toric meeting closed, a member of one of the dele-
gations declared : "Africa has spoken. It is for
the rest of the world to respond." Before we do
so, let us review what Africa has said.
In their resolution entitled "Exchange of Views
on Foreign Policy" the Accra delegates stated in
part that the conference "believes that as long as
the fundamental unity of outlook on foreign pol-
icy is preserved, the independent African states
May 26, 1958
857
will be able to assert a distinctly African person-
ality which will speak with a concerted voice in
the cause of peace in cooperation with other peace-
loving nations at the United Nations and other
mternational forums."
We Americans welcome the constructive contri-
butions which the independent African nations
can make in international forums and councils.
But what of this new "African personality"?
What are its essential characteristics ?
Judging by the 11 resolutions and final com-
munique adopted at Accra, it would appear that
the new "African personality" which was enun-
ciated at this conference is something vigorous,
but comparatively moderate ; zealous to strengthen
and safeguard its independence, sovereignty, and
territorial integrity ; anxious to eliminate colonial-
ism and racial discrimination rapidly from its
continent; vitally interested in advancing its
domain economically, socially, and culturally ; and
intent on playing an important and responsible
role in world affairs.
We should remind ourselves, of course, that
there is no personality, including our own, with-
out failings and negative aspects. The African
personality is no exception. It should not be as-
sumed, further, that the United States is in agree-
ment with all that has been said or advocated at
Accra. Indeed, thei-e were a few resolutions which
might have been wiser and more constructive had
they been somewhat more restrained. Neverthe-
less, we are in the happy position of finding our-
selves in broad agreement — or at least broad under-
standing— with much of what emerged from
Accra.
The general attitude of the United States toward
independent Africa was well expressed by Secre-
tary Dulles in the following personal message to
Prime Minister Nkrumah delivered at the opening
of the Accra gathering : ^
. . . Through you, I wish to assure the African nations
that they can count on the sympathetic interest of the
people and government of the United States. The United
States will continue to stand ready to support the con-
structive efforts of the states of Africa to achieve a stable,
prosperous community, conscious of its Interdependence
within the family of nations and dedicated to the princi-
ples of the United Nations Charter.
Even though all of Africa was not represented
at Accra, it is fitting that we address ourselves to
a few major subjects raised there.
Transition From Colonialism to Self-Government
In an important resolution the conference
urged speedy termination of colonialism on the
African Continent. The United States has long
recognized that old-fashioned, 19th-century co-
lonialism is dying — dying by mutual consent of
both Africans and Europeans. We believe that
the transition from current, progressively liberal
colonialism to self-government and eventual self-
determination should be completed in an orderly
manner, witli the speed of its evolution being
determined by the capacity of local populations
to assume and discharge the responsibilities of
government. This, of course, is not the counsel
of perfection. Decisions must be balanced and
mutually reached.
President Eisenhower, in his second inaugural
address,^ voiced a great truth about our role
in this dynamic development when he said:
The American experiment has for generations fired
the passion and the courage of millions elsewhere seek-
ing freedom, equality, and opportunity. . . . These hopes
that we have helped to inspire we can help to fulfill.
He also warned :
. . . wherever in the world a people knows desperate
want, there must appear at least the spark of hope —
the hope of progress — or there will surely rise at last
the flames of conflict.
The United States role in the dynamic trend
toward self-government in Africa, then, might
be stated somewhat as follows : As a responsible
world power and friend of European and African
alike, we believe that we can assist peaceful Afri-
can political evolution on the one hand by sup-
porting liberal metropolitan measures designed to
provide African self-government and eventual au-
tonomy, and on the other by encouraging, insofar
as we are able, moderate African leaders who rec-
ognize the benefit to their own people of following
the evolutionary rather than the revolutionary ap-
proach to social, political, and economic progress.
As entire books and certainly full-length
speeches could be devoted to the complicated sub-
ject of African nationalism, I, of necessity, must
limit myself to a few observations on the subject.
Bulletin of May 12, 1958, p. 765.
858
'Ibid., Feb. 11, 1957, p. 211.
Department ot State Bulletin
The most pertinent point I can stress is that
Africa's basic ethnic, cultural, economic, and po-
litical heritage is so diverse, its geography so vast,
its contact with different European, Middle East-
ern, and Asian cultures so varied tliat most
generalizations about African nationalism are
subject to serious reservations.
In addition, the broad divisions of the African
continent must be recognized. Among these are :
(1) the difference between the Arab-Berber Medi-
terranean coast and the territory south of the
Sahara; (2) the differences among the colonial
policies and administrations of Great Britain,
France, Belgium, Portugal, and Spain; and (3)
the differences between colonial territories with
a large white-settler population and those with
a small or transient white population. The
Union of South Africa, an independent member
of the British Commonwealth since 1910, falls
into still another category.
The African desire for speed in cutting the
strings of metropolitan control is understandable
in view of the "revolution of rising expectations"
that now grips most of the continent. But it
behooves all responsible African leaders to con-
sider seriously the numerous pitfalls that confront
a newly independent state today and to realize
that premature independence can carry with it
more dangers than a temporary prolongation of
a dependent status.
African dependent areas today vary greatly in
the degree of their assimilation of Western insti-
tutions and culture. In my opinion one of the most
difficult problems impairing the modernization of
Africa and disturbing its stability and orderly evo-
lution is detribalization.
Africans are being pulled away from a long-
accepted way of life toward a more complicated
existence which produces many stresses and strains.
The change to modernity involves the abrupt aban-
donment of ancient folkways which provided a
sense of social, economic, and even religious secu-
rity and the attempt to take on a new set of rules
of life. This transition is uprooting the African
violently from the old and leaving him groping for
new principles to give meaning to his place in
society. New loyalties must replace the old, and
it is in the search for the new that much of Africa's
turbulence arises.
Other problems that must be overcome by terri-
tories rushing pellmell toward local autonomy and
eventual self-determination are developing eco-
fAay 26, 1958
nomic viability; training educated civil adminis-
trators; constructing sound, broadly based eco-
nomic, social, cultural, and political institutions;
and, above all, accumulating basic experience in
practical self-government prior to attaining full
autonomy.
Yet, despite these problems, it is possible that
one result of Africa's lack of "national" histories,
and above all its capsuling into decades what other
continents have taken centuries to achieve, may be
the development of larger independent political
structures, such as federations or confederations,
that will bring the continent quickly into step with
the 20th-century movement toward supranational
collaboration.
In French West Africa, for example, two major
and five regional African parties recently merged
into a single political movement and called on the
French Government: (1) to create and recognize
the right of independence of the federations of
French West and Equatorial Africa; (2) to au-
thorize complete internal autonomy for all French
African territories; and (3) to amend the French
constitution to transform the French Union into a
confederal republic in which metropolitan France,
the two federations, and remaining nonfederated
African territories would be equal partners.
In a word, these African leaders, while stressing
their demand for equality and independence,
nevertheless clearly demonstrated their under-
standing of the basic interdependence of Africa
and France.
In this connection and in view of the importance
which the United States places on recognition of
interdependence, it is encouraging to note that the
United Nations constitutes a stabilizing force for
African nationalism. The U.N. Charter, to which
the Accra conferees dedicated themselves in their
first resolution, provides opportunities for African
nationalism to appeal to world opinion; holds out
the stabilizing prospect of U.N. membership when
independence is achieved; and creates, through
membership, a framework of responsibility and
security for newborn independent regimes.
The charter also provides the means for peaceful
solution of disputes that will surely arise from
arbitrarily drawn boundaries, tends to relieve Af-
rica's moderate leaders from concern with the dan-
gers of external attack, and assists them in pre-
venting the buildup of domestic pressures to launch
unprofitable aggressive campaigns.
859
The United Nations trusteeship system, finally,
charges each administering power with promoting
the development of its trust territories toward
self-government or independence.
To sum up : The movement toward self-govern-
ment is now going forward in Africa along lines
based on the Western European parliamentary
system of government. Social and economic ad-
vances are guided by concepts which Africans
have acquired from Europeans and which were
developed over the centuries and were suited to
and expressive of Europeans. It is, however, in-
contestable that in time political, social, and eco-
nomic systems will evolve in Africa that are con-
sistent with and expressive of the distinctive
African personality. We may confidently antici-
pate that this African system will preserve the
essentials of democracy and the luiiversal concept
of the dignity of man.
Although one seldom hears kind words for
colonialism today, I am sure that, if the liistorians
among us were to project themselves forward an-
other decade or two, they would probably empha-
size what the colonial powers brought to Africa
rather than what they took from it. My recent
trip aroimd the continent convinced me that both
Africa and the world owe the metropolitan pow-
ers a great debt for the administrative techniques,
methods of economic development, the great cap-
ital investment and construction, and the educa-
tional and public-health measures they have
brought the area.
Although at the moment the African may look
principally at the defects in these contributions —
and there have been differing standards of Euro-
pean performance throughout the continent — the
day may come, following his present mood of
great expectations, when the African may well
look back with satisfaction and gratitude on his
associations with the metropolitan powers. How-
ever, let there be no mistake about the African
atmosphere of 1958 for, although the manner of
expression will vary with the area, the general
theme is : "Better the ragged shirt of self-govern-
ment than the warm blanket of colonial protec-
tion."
In the long run, of course, the primary factor
in African nationalist development is the African
himself. He alone will finally determine his own
future. Let us help him on the road to peaceful,
860
orderly progi-ess and fruitful collaboration be-
tween Africa and the free world.
The Question of Algeria
There is a cloud on the African horizon, much
bigger than a man's hand : the question of Algeria.
The Pan- African Conference expressed deep con-
cern over this question, among other things urg-
ing France "to recognize the right of the people
of Algeria to independence and self-determina-
tion."
There is perhaps no problem in all of Africa
today which disturbs more people and nations
than the question of Algeria. The United States
most certainly is gravely preoccupied with the
situation there. Many hours of debate at the
United Nations General Assembly have exposed
the pertinent aspects of this serious and compli-
cated matter that deeply involves the interests of
two areas of great importance to both the United
States and the whole free world — France and
North Africa.
As we have stated on more than one occasion,
and I repeat again this evening, the United States
has consistently favored a "peaceful, democratic,
and just solution" of the Algerian problem. We
sincerely hope that no avenue will be left imex-
plored to bring about such a solution.
It is my firm belief, based on some personal
experience in both North Africa and France, that
this above all is a situation that urgently re-
quires more than usual patience and farsighted
statesmanship on the pait of all concerned. Be-
tween metropolitan France and Algeria there is
a genuine community of interests founded on his-
torical association, geography, and mutual ad-
vantage. Tliese are assets important to the free
world and should not be lost.
The Problem of Racialism
Another cloud hanging over the prospects for
fruitful collaboration between Africa and the free
world is the problem of racialism. The Accra
conference condemned in strongest terms the prac-
tice of racial discrimination and segregation all
over the world and called for its speedy elimina-
tion from Africa.
Tlie United States opposes racial discrimina-
tion and segregation. Our Constitution and our
Bill of Eights affirm the principle of racial equal-
Department of State Bulletin Mgy;
ity and nondiscrimination. These principles have
been reaffirmed recently by the Supreme Court
and the Piesident. We are attempting to solve
our very real problems at home by the process
of orderly law enforcement.
But in view of our difficulties in squaring prac-
tice with precept, it is imperative that we bear in
mind that our moral influence on other nations
in the question of racial policy is in direct rela-
tion to our achievements at home. We must
therefore be humble and, while adhering stead-
fastly to our basic principles, attempt to exert a
moderating influence upon extremists and oppose
those who seek to exploit racial tensions for ul-
terior purposes, always avoiding, as we are bound
to do by our historic tradition and by the United
Nations Charter, unwarranted interference in the
mternal affairs of other countries.
Let us examine, for a moment, racialism in
Africa today and see if we cannot ascertain the
root of the problem.
Although there has been racial friction from
time to time throughout the continent, the prin-
cipal strain between Europeans and Africans de-
velops mainly in areas where there are many per-
manent European settlers. This is particularly
true in the east and the south. Racial problems,
on the other hand, have been relatively minor or
temporary in such regions as West Africa, where
white settlers are few or where the European has
come almost exclusively as an administrator, mis-
sionary, teacher, trader, or technician.
We can conclude then that it is probably not
contact between African and European fer se
which gives rise to serious racial problems but
economic and social competition between these two
permanently established racial groups, the Afri-
can frankly envious of the higher European liv-
ing standard and detennined to improve his lot
and increase his share of his country's national
product.
The need, obviously, is for the development of a
sense of multiracial cooperation based on the ideals
of brotherhood and equal justice. It is also essen-
tial for all concerned to demonstrate the necessary
faith that men of differing races can live side by
side and work out a mutually beneficial destiny.
There can be no doubt that the European settler
has shown the less advanced African much that he
can emulate. European industry, imagination.
skill, and development have all shown or provided
the xVfrican a way of life that will contribute to
his long-term progress.
We cannot, however, ignore the dangers inherent
in any failure to meet the problem of harmonious
relationships between the many races inhabiting
Africa's dependent and independent territories.
African Economic and Social Cooperation
The Pan-African Conference recommended nu-
merous measures to increase African regional eco-
nomic and social cooperation.
The United States recognizes the pressing need
for regional and international cooperation in Af-
rica's economic and social development. Through
our own mutual security and reciprocal trade pro-
grams, which have been in effect some years now,
we are demonstrating clear recognition of our in-
terdependence and mutuality of interest with other
nations of the free world, including the African
nations.
Africa's economic and social problems are so
numerous, its need for capital, technical assistance,
and economic development so gi'eat, that no one
nation can possibly fill the requirement. It will
clearly call for a great cooperative effort of all
nations of the free world.
The United States has shown a clear willingness
to help in this effort in every way possible and is
providing economic, technical, and military assist-
ance as well as Export- Import Bank and Develop-
ment Loan Fund loans to various independent and
dependent African territories. The United States
is also contributing substantially to such U.N. ac-
tivities as those of the International Bank for Re-
construction and Development and the U.N.
Expanded Technical Assistance Program. In ad-
dition we have supported creation of the new U.N.
Economic Commission for Africa and have an-
nounced that we are agreeable to becoming asso-
ciated with the new multinational Fund for
Mutual Assistance in Africa South of the Sahara
(FAMA) if such association is desired by the
member nations.
All of these governmental activities are neces-
sary and good. But in order to build a sound and
enduring economy, investment and expanding
trade are called for. And here private enterprise
must play its part.
American business is finding many opportunities
May 26, 1958
861
in Africa and is i^lanning new investments there to
the mutual benefit of both Africa and the com-
panies concerned. American private foundations
and institutions are also expanding their African
operations in such basic fields as public health, edu-
cation, community development, and race relations.
American newspapers and magazines are increas-
ing their staffs and communications with the con-
tinent, thus improving their reporting to the
American public and business community on cur-
rent developments in the increasingly active area.
We cannot stress too heavily how imperative it
is that the free world help the moderate regimes
now in power in Africa to provide their peoples
with the essentials of economic progress — with an
increasing share of the wealth that lies in their
soil and forests and which their labor is producing.
Africa today is generally friendly to the West.
Threatening this attitude, however, are forces
which would win the area away from its natural
Western orientation to Communist domination or
neutralist uncertainty. We must not lose time in
Africa. We must anticipate events and meet them
before they develop critical proportions.
Let no one assume, however, that the West is
asleep. The European metropolitan powers have
already committed extensive resources to African
economic development and are now trying to
strengthen, diversify, and improve the internal
economic structure of their dependent territories.
The United States, for its part, plans to continue
providing aid to Africa, and Congress has been
asked for increased funds for this purpose in fiscal
year 1959. It must remain crystal clear to all that
the United States has a basic interest in African
stability, that this in turn is clearly dependent on
continuous progress, and that we must contribute
to that progress.
Time has obviously forced me to omit comment
on many other African objectives and problems
set forth at the Pan-African Conference at Accra.
But I am sure that during the course of the next
3 days we shall have ample opportunity to discuss
them all.
Meanwhile, a few conclusions may be in order.
Opportunities for World Cooperation
First, we must see opportmiities in Africa, not
problems.
Africa's resources, human and material, are
vastly underdeveloped. We must strengthen the
moderate regimes now in power by assisting them
in the constructive process of developing their new
nations.
Second, free-world leadership is being chal-
lenged in Africa today and requii-es vision,
dynamism, and fidelity to principle to maintain its
vigor and strength.
Moscow Eadio in a broadcast on April 19 said
of U.S. intentions in Africa :
With the assistance of the slogan of anticolonialism,
which they have been disseminating with increasing fre-
quency in recent times, the United States is attempting
to grab the countries which are liberating themselves from
the chains of old colonialism and to put them under their
domination. Further they are making numerous endeav-
ors to weaken the positions of their European friends in
the colonies and to fill the vacuums thus created.
The United States has no fear of such lies. We
know that our strength and our leadership are
based on honest relations with all nations and
on respect for the free way of life and luunan
dignity. We are ready to be measured by the
universal standard: "By their fruits ye shall
Imow them."
Third, the United States contribution to the
achievement of constructive African objectives
must be to assist the underdeveloped, emerging
African states as one would a member of his own
family. Many speak of enlightened self-interest
as motivating U.S. policies in Africa — and so
be it! But I ask why we should be ashamed of
offering Africa friendship for friendship's sake?
Is there anything weak about believing and fol-
lowing your own instinctive ideals ? Our history
is one of generosity, and we can take pride in
continuing it.
Africa is on the move. We are prepared to
move with it as generous and imderstanding part-
ners in all endeavors designed to further world
cooperation, prosperity, and peace.
Department of State Bulletin
Nationalism and Collective Security
hy Frederick TF. Jandrey
Deputy Asshtant Secretary for European Affairs '
I hope to turn the spotlight on a subject which
needs some ilhimination and which vitally affects
the everyday work of the American diplomat. It
is my thesis that the movement toward collective
security and the nationalist movement represent
two of the most significant developments of our
era and that these two trends are essentially use-
ful and harmonious.
Our first task is one of definition. Although the
concept of collective security is much newer than
the idea of nationalism, the former is easier to
define. In essence the development of the concept
of collective security proceeds from an awareness
of the fact that an individual nation — whether
great or small, strong or weak — is no longer capa-
ble alone of assuring peace, safety, and freedom
to its peoples. On the basis of this fact, the na-
tions of the world have undertaken various kinds
of cooperative arrangements in order to deter
aggression, achieve peace and stability, and pro-
mote the well-being of their populations.
These arrangements have taken two basic pat-
terns— worldwide and regional. The first major
attempt at a worldwide arrangement, of course,
was the League of Nations. Today, the League
is generally regarded as having been a failure.
The memory of World War II is still too recent
for us to dispute this reputation. The League had
many weaknesses, not the least of which was its
failure to include all the major powers in its
membership.
In retrospect it is interesting to note that the
League did manage to achieve certain limited
Address made before the Institute of Ethnic Studies
at Georgetown University, Washington, D. C, on Apr.
25 (press release 221).
successes. Out of a total of 63 disputes submitted
to it, the League settled 36 and assisted in arbitrat-
ing 18 others. But it failed — or, more correctly,
its members failed — miserably in dealing with
aggressions by the big powers. It appeared
equally helpless in dealing with the seemingly
irresistible series of events leading to the Second
World War, in the flames of which the League
itself perished.
Those who blueprinted the United Nations at
the end of World War II made a successful effort
to cure many of the defects which had doomed
the League. The United Nations today is a going
concern, an important fact of international life,
with far greater prestige and influence than the
League ever attained. It has a substantial record
of accomplishment in the field of international
security, as well as a record of having contrib-
uted to human advancement and well-being in
many other fields.
One of the most important activities of the
United Nations, moreover, is to promote the
orderly attainment of self-government or inde-
pendence for all peoples and to familiarize them
with the principles and techniques of our inter-
national society, including those of the United
Nations and the concept of collective security.
The United Nations provides a means for influenc-
ing order and progress among states and peoples
while g-uiding inevitable change constructively.
We have reason to expect that the United Nations
system will become ever more important and
vital in the years ahead, because its purposes are
responsible to the desires of men and women every-
where for the maintenance of peace and security ;
for the pacific settlement of disputes ; for economic
advancement and social progress; for civil and
May 26, 7958
863
political rights; and for the self-determination
of nations and peoples.
United Nations Limitations
The United Nations, however, mirrors the world
we live in, and, in the present climate, it is evident
that the United Nations has its limitations as a
collective-security agency. Major power relation-
ships are not such as to permit the full operation
of the U.N", security system. The U.N. force com-
prising national contingents which was contem-
plated by the U.N. Charter has not been estab-
lished, and the Soviet attitude continues to make
that plan impractical. Nevertheless, the U.N. has
shown that it can respond to emergencies, as when
it established the United Nations Command in
Korea and repelled the Communist aggression.
It responded again when a United Nations
Emergency Force was desired in the Near East.
Whenever the members are willing to take the
necessary collective action, the United Nations
can provide the desired forum, the necessary
recommendations, and the appropriate agency.
It is true that the Security Council has not
played the primary role that was envisaged for
it. The Soviet Union's abuse of the permanent
member's veto in the Security Council, where the
Soviet representative has exercised the veto 82
of the 86 times it has been used, has led to this
result. It has, however, contributed also to the
growth of the veto-free General Assembly, which
is equipped to recommend collective measures, in-
cluding the use of armed force, if the Security
Council fails to perform its fiuiction.
The United Nations limitations are not me-
chanical. They flow from the basic fact that
among the 81 sovereign members there are many
divergent interests, which in particular situations
may outweigh their common interest in universal
security. Moreover, the U.N. has had to develop
in an misettled postwar era in which the princi-
pal problems have arisen from fundamental dis-
agreements concerning the very nature of the
desired postwar order. The problem of greatest
concern to us, of course, has been the Soviet drive
to communize the world.
Regional Collective-Security Arrangements
The U.N. Charter recognizes the right of mem-
bers to individual and collective self-defense, and
it provides for regional arrangements to supple-
ment the U.N. security system. In the situation
we have faced over the last 10 years, particularly
since the Communist takeover of Czeclioslovakia,
the free nations have found it essential to bolster
or establish various regional collective-security
arrangements in order to strengthen their posture.
These regional arrangements today provide the
free world its primaiy protection against the So-
viet drive for a Soviet world, because they con-
stitute today the principal institutions available
to the free world or the United Nations for col-
lective-security action.
The most important of these arrangements, in
the order of their establishment, are the Organi-
zation of American States, the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization, the Southeast Asia Treaty
Organization, and the Baghdad Pact. While
these regional systems differ among themselves in
membership, structure, and function, they have
certain important elements in common, including
their relationship to the United Nations system.
None of them involves any surrender of sover-
eignty on the part of the member states. At the
same time, their size and selective membership
permit a much higher degree of cohesion than is
possible in the larger and more heterogeneous
forum of the U.N.
Each of the regional arrangements is specifi-
cally designed to enable the member states more
effectively to resist aggression, and each recog-
nizes that the principal source of aggression is
the Soviet empire. Each regional system em-
bodies the principle of mutual assistance in the
event of aggression. It is also significant that
these regional arrangements represent sometliing
more than a mutual exchange of pledges to take
action in the event of anned attack. They pro-
vide for a continuous peacetime working relation-
ship among the members.
Equally important is the fact that the regional
arrangements not only look toward military co-
operation among their members but also toward
extensive political and economic and cultural co-
operation. This flows from a general recogni-
tion that Soviet aggression itself is not limited
to a threat of military attack but embodies a va-
riety of political, economic, and psycliological
techniques.
The regional collective-security arrangements I
liave mentioned also difi'er considerably as to the
type and degree of cooperation undertaken.
Department of State BuHetin
NATO has gone furthest in the direction of uni-
fied action. Here we have a sizable collective-
defense force under international command ; joint
strategic planning; a commonly developed and
financed system of bases and other military fa-
cilities; mutual efforts in military production;
and various other collective activities aimed at
achieving a high level of defensive power that
can be maintained in a constant state of readi-
ness. This defense activity is matched by a great
deal of cooperative activity in political, economic,
and other matters. Political consultations with-
in NATO, for example, have attained a degree
of intimacy and detail that is probably miprece-
dented among 15 sovereign governments. Sim-
ilarly, the NATO countries are now embarking
on certain potentially far-reaching experiments
in scientific and technological cooperation. There
are other examples that I will not try to describe
at this time.
The regional systems of collective security, taken
all together, clearly represent the free world's
main barrier to Soviet ambitions. Partly for this
reason, these regional systems have become sub-
jects of controversy. Their very effectiveness has
made them the targets of an unceasing propa-
ganda attack by the Communists. In any case,
it is the regional system of collective security that
I will consider primarily in examining the rela-
tionship between collective security and the con-
cept of nationalism.
Combinations and Contradictions of Nationalism
As we turn to a consideration of nationalism,
I must repeat my observation that nationalism is
difficult to define. The term embodies a wide
range of concepts and emotions. It applies to a
primitive native who is just beginning to feel a
vague discontent toward tlie presence of for-
eigners, just as it applies to an American who
sternly demands that our Government "go it
alone." It includes the zealous pride that citi-
zens of a newly independent state feel in their
new institutions, just as it includes the pride that
a European may feel in his country's overseas em-
pire. It lay at the core of our forefathers' strug-
gle for independence, just as it also lay at the
core of the hideous Nazi dream of world conquest.
It embraces the gradual evolution of a colonial
people toward freedom and dignity, just as it also
embraces the ineradicable yearning for a restora-
tion of national freedom among those who have
lost that freedom, such as the enslaved peoples
of most of Eastern Europe.
Nationalism is a bmidle of combinations and
contradictions. It may be compounded of the
deepest love and most vicious hatred of which
the human being is capable. Sometimes nation-
alism is inseparable from racial and religious
passions. Sometimes it pushes all other passions
and loyalties into the backgroimd. Sometimes it
is a fountainhead of progress and sometimes a
cesspool of retrogression. Evei^thing depends
upon the form it takes, and it takes many forms.
But the most important fact about nationalism
is simply the fact that it exists. We may admire
it or deplore it, but we cannot escape it. It is
one of the most powerful forces of our age and,
in the long ran, may well prove to be the most
powerful of all.
As we all know, the most dynamic manifesta-
tion of the nationalist spirit in our generation is
found in Asia and Africa. On these two conti-
nents, 20 countries have attained national inde-
pendence during the last 15 years. There are
several additional territories, primarily in Africa,
which are standing today on the threshold of self-
government.
To some students of history, it may seem an
anomaly that the fierce upsurge of the national
spirit in Asia and Africa is taking place at the
same time that many of tlie older nations of
Europe, North Africa, and South America are be-
coming increasingly aware of the limitations upon
the capacity of any individual nation to shape its
own destiny. But this difference of attitudes is
wholly understandable. Most Western nations
achieved national independence long ago. They
have had many years to learn that national self-
sufficiency is a myth and to develop aspirations
that cannot be satisfied within the confines of na-
tional boundaries. Their freedom to choose be-
tween a purely national and a collective approach
to their problems, including the possible choice of
supernational arrangements, has long been taken
for granted. On the other hand, most of the
peoples of Africa and Asia have just attained — or
have not yet attained — the precious privilege of
self-determination. To many of them, national
independence means the end of a long and arduous
road and has an intrinsic quality that transcends
mere politics. The need for close political and
May 26, 1958
865
economic association with other states — which
many of the emerging peoples fully recognize —
often cannot be fulfilled until they feel completely
secure in the possession and exercise of their right
of choice. In brief their political development
must be expected to follow the same basic pattern
found in the histories of the older nations — in
that national consciousness must usually precede
international consciousness.
I do not want to imply that 20th-century
nationalism is confined to the continents of Asia
and Africa. Some of the nations of Western
Europe, in past years, have exhibited forms of
nationalism more extreme and dangerous than
have been seen anywhere else on the globe. I
need not dwell at length upon the deadly virus of
nazism and fascism. Even today, despite their
sharper awareness of the dangers of excessive
nationalism and their recent drive toward new
forms of association, most of the countries of West-
ern Europe and the Western Hemisphere have
deep-rooted nationalist feelings. We would do
well not to forget this fact, for many things would
be inexplicable without it. The present dilemma
in Algeria, for example, requires consideration of
French nationalism as much as Algerian national-
ism. Similarly, much of the Communist propa-
ganda now being directed toward the Western
nations is designed to arouse latent nationalist
passions in opposition to collective security and
other cooperative endeavors. Nevertheless, I
think we cannot avoid recognizing as a fact that
the appeal and impetus of nationalism in Asia and
Africa today are more fundamental and more in-
tense than what we find in most Western countries.
To many of the newly emerging peoples, na-
tionalism is a religion, a magical answer to all
human strivings. Those scholars who are inclined
to accept the facile assumption that economic mo-
tives are the prime determinants of human be-
havior will find little support for. their theories
in a spectacle of thousands of hungry and ragged
human beings demonstrating their readiness to
subordinate everything to their urge for national
identity and freedom.
In reality, of course, the emerging peoples see
no conflict between the desire for self-determina-
tion and their personal and social aspirations.
They believe independence will automatically
mean more bread, more clothes, more education,
better health, and greater personal freedom and
dignity. In some instances these expectations will
be realized. In otliers, the peoples concerned will
be badly disappointed and disillusioned.
Exaggerated expectations represent one of the
very real problems produced by the wave of
nationalism. Modern-day nationalism also pre-
sents certain other problems which we should ex-
amine objectively and frankly.
U.S. Policy on Self-Determination
Wlien I stress the problems presented by na-
tionalism, I do not want to imply that the exist-
ence of such problems would justify an effort on
the part of the United States or any other nation
to obstruct evolution toward self-determination.
This would be a losing game, even if we wanted
to attempt it, and the United States most cer-
tainly does not. On the contrary, I doubt that
any other nation in history has been so thoroughly
committed to the principle of self-determination.
We took a strong initiative to have this principle
inscribed in the United Nations Charter. We
have also used our influence repeatedly to make
self-determination a reality in particular situa-
tions. Tlie records of history — which cannot be
obliterated by any quantity of malicious propa-
ganda— show clearly that the United States made
a major contribution to the acliievement of in-
dependence by a large number of African and
Asian states during the past 15 years.
Self-determination, of course, is not synony-
mous with nationality. Essentially, it means the
right to choose. The peoples of some territories
may determine that their best interests are served
by maintaining a tight political relationship with
the mother country or perhaps by uniting their
destiny with that of another state. Other peo-
ples may decide that independence is the only
status acceptable to them. We cannot quarrel
with either choice so long as the peoples concerned
are able to exercise this choice in a free and or-
derly manner. Wliere formerly dependent terri-
tories have chosen independence, we have not only
welcomed them into the community of nations but
have also in many instances given concrete as-
sistance to help establish a firm foundation for
their national existence.
Our country's devotion to self-determination
has been manifest in other ways. Our record
with respect to our own former territories, such
as the Philippines and Puerto Rico, is one of
Department of Stale Bulletin
whicli we can be justly proud. We have also
worked unceasingly to encourage the restoration
of self-determination for the peoples of Eastern
Europe, and we will never abandon tliis goal.
In some parts of the world there lias been a re-
grettable lack of concern about the enslavement
of Eastern European peoples, but we are con-
vinced that the validity of the principle of self-
determination is not limited to any race or con-
tinent. Whenever the curtain of tyranny is low-
ered on any people, we hope that all peoples who
are seeking to establish or maintain their own
right of self-determination will understand "for
whom the bell tolls."
I think we realize that the concept of self-
detennination is not as simple as it sounds. It
is sometimes difficult, for example, to determine
what groups are properly covered by the word
"people," or what areas are encompassed by the
concept of a "n.ation." Similarly, we find that
the freedom of one segment of a people to choose
self-determination may vitally affect the freedom
of associated peoples. But these considerations
do not impair the fundamental validity of the
principle itself.
It is equally important to recognize that the
spirit of nationalism, which so often underlies the
urge for self-detei'mination, is intrinsically a valu-
able and productive force. Without national
pride and devotion, a great deal of man's cultural,
social, and technical progress might have been
impossible. The "nation" will probably remain
the principal focal point of mankind's political,
social, and economic life for many years to come.
However, as I said before, a clear and balanced
view of modern international relations requires
us to be aware of the problems and dangers of
nationalism as well as its virtues — to be aware of
the perils as well as the opportunities created by
the nationalist revolution.
In the first place, we must recognize that the
peoples of some dependent areas are likely to ex-
perience great difficulties in acliieving or sustain-
ing an independent political existence and may
find advantages in considering alternative po-
litical relationships. One fairly common prob-
lem is the lack of economic viability. Another
may be the absence of any real sense of national
identity. Some areas are made up of groups
which have little in common except, in some in-
stances, a common resentment toward their for-
eign rulers. This alone is obviously not a strong
foundation for statehood.
The free world needs to give the most careful
and sympathetic attention to areas where tlie ca-
pacity for national existence is questionable. We
all know that a colonial territory seething with
revolt represents a festering sore which may
threaten the health and stability of an entire
region. But a nominally independent state
which cannot sustain its national existence may
be equally malignant. In the final analysis, of
course, the peoples concerned must make their
own choice. All we can do is to make available
our experience and cooperation, both in connec-
tion with the making of the choice and in lielping
to maximize the success of the course chosen.
Danger of Premature Independence
Another closely related problem emerging from
the nationalist movement is the danger of pre-
mature independence. Even where a particular
area has a good prospect of eventually maintain-
ing an independent existence, this prospect may
be seriously endangered if it attains nominal
sovereignty before its peoples are prepared for
the tasks and responsibilities that accompany
sovereignty.
There is no objective standard, of course, by
which a people's readiness for self-government
can be measured. Even with the best of motives,
the natural tendency of a metropolitan authority
is to insist that the dependent territory should
"wait a little longer." By the same token, a de-
pendent people is likely to overestimate its ca-
pacity for self-government.
The need for continued help and guidance by the
metropolitan powers in many dependent areas is
widely recognized. In some areas the very idea
of a national community relationship has not yet
crystallized. There are areas where the popula-
tion is just learning to deal with disease, famine,
floods, insect plagues, and other forces of nature.
There are areas which need substantial help in
developing their economic resources. There are
areas which cannot alone undertake the burdens
of military defense. There are areas where there
is still much work to be done in establishing mod-
ern forms of political and social administration.
In other words, there are several dependent areas
where the sudden withdrawal of foreign presence
May 26, 1958
867
and cooperation would be dangerous to the people
concerned and to the whole world.
The biggest danger of premature independence
is that it can lead all too easily to the loss of in-
dependence itself. It is no secret that there are
malevolent forces loose in the modern world.
Every new state must inevitably engage in politi-
cal experimentation. Experimentation is one of
the saci-ed privileges of freedom. But the risks
of failure are much greater today than they were
a generation ago. "Wlienever a newly independ-
ent state stumbles and falls, the buzzards circling
overhead are ever ready to swoop down for the
remains.
It is in the interest of the United States, of the
Western World, and of the dependent peoples
themselves that there be a steady and orderly
movement toward self-government in Africa and
Asia. Wliere the people of a territory wish to
retain political ties with Europe, they should be
able to make this choice freely. Wliere they
choose independence, they should have a fonn of
independence that will endure and grow.
I have placed considerable emphasis upon the
danger of premature independence. But there is
a parallel danger which is no less acute — namely,
that self-determination in some instances may be
too long delayed. The states which administer
dependent territories liave accepted the obliga-
tion to help prepare these territories for self-gov-
ernment. The United States believes that this
preparation should follow a pattern of orderly
evolution. But tlie principle of "orderly evolu-
tion" should never be used as an excuse for pro-
crastination.
Whenever any dependent people reaches a stage
of material and psychological preparedness to de-
termine its own destiny, unreasonable delay in the
exercise of self-determination may have disastrous
consequences. Prolonged delay may convert an
orderly nationalist trend into an eruption of ir-
responsibility and violence. It may cause a legit-
imate nationalist movement to be infiltrated and
pervei-ted by Communists or by agents of other
imperialisms. It may utterly destroy all pros-
pects of continued political and economic associa-
tion between the territory and the administering
power, thus damaging both parties. Moreover,
we have ample evidence that "delaying actions" of
this kind are almost never successful. It is like
trying to put a cork into a volcano.
Need for Continuing Free-World Relationships
Another problem sometimes arising from na-
tionalism is the disruption of fi-ee- world relation-
ships. Just as nationalism often originates as a
resentment toward the dominant presence of for-
eign authorities, so it may, in its most extreme
form, involve an attempt to achieve total isola-
tion fi-om foreign influences. In the name of
national autonomy, long-standing political and
cultural links may be broken, common-defense
arrangements canceled, mutually beneficial trad-
ing relationships destroyed, and mutually bene-
ficial investments prohibited or confiscated. At a
time when the free world needs maximum unity
in order to survive, the nationalist spirit may be
used as an instrument of division and dispersion.
The newly independent states, of course, have no
monopoly on this kind of nationalism. Even in
our own country there are some who, at the first
hint of economic difficulty, are quick to suggest
that we cut down foi'eign investments, place bar-
riers on imports, and eliminate foreign aid. But
wherever it may be found, this aspect of national-
ism is injurious. Our own national security and
well-being is closely linked with the strength and
prosperity of nations in all parts of the world.
This means that we have an important stake in
the relations of these nations with one another.
We recognize, for example, the jjolitical and eco-
nomic interests which several of our European
allies have in Africa and Asia and the continuing
interests which many newly independent states
have in maintaining a close relationship with
Europe. Europe needs raw materials and mar-
kets, just as the less developed areas need Euro-
pean manufactures, technical skills, and educa-
tional facilities.
Still another problem connected with national-
ism is the frequent failure to understand that
sovereignty involves obligations and responsi-
bilities as well as rights and privileges. This is
often a hard lesson for newly emerging peoples
to learn. Young nations have a habit of being
somewhat uninhibited. Our own was no excep-
tion. We can recall that the War of 1812 was
fought over issues that might easily have been
settled through quiet negotiation by a nation less
sensitive to insults and less eager to demonstrate
its muscle. But we were "feeling our oats," just
as many other newly independent peoples have
done before and since.
Deparfment of State Bulletin
The struggle for national existence typically
unleashes powerful emotional energies, and these
energies do not subside with the attainment of
statehood. In America's own history our vast
revolutionary energies found an outlet in the
westward movement, but in many new nations no
such convenient diversion is possible. The result
may be a period of internal turmoil and attempts
at external expansion.
Communism's Danger to Nationalism
Related to tlie problems I have already men-
tioned is another danger wliich oversliadows tliem
all. This is not so much a danger arising froTn
nationalism as it is a danger to nationalism. I re-
fer to the possibility that particular national
movements may be perverted by the international
Communist conspiracy and, in the process of per-
version, destroyed.
Fundamentally, of course, nationalism and
communism are wholly antithetical. On the one
hand, we know that a deep and enlightened na-
tional consciousness can be one of the strongest
psychological bulwarks against commimism. On
the other, we know that connnunism always seeks
to destroy the independent nation — and eventually
to make all nations provinces of a imiversal Com-
mvmist empii-e. In 1947 Stalin himself revealed
the true aim of Soviet policy when he said :
Let us hope that . . . the new confederate state will
be another decisive step toward the amalgamation of the
toilers of the whole world into a single World Socialist
Soviet Republic.
But we do not need to rely upon abstract ex-
pressions of Conmiunist philosophy to compre-
hend Soviet purposes. The postwar liistory of
Eastern Europe offers unmistakable evidence of
the Soviet Union's destructive designs. A num-
ber of ancient and proud nations have been ut-
terly crushed, some formally integrated into the
U.S.S.R. and others permitted to retain only
tlie hollow shell of national existence. The ef-
forts of local populations to regain self-determi-
nation have been ruthlessly stamped out, as in
Hungary and the Soviet Zone of Germany.
While the Soviet rulers will not tolerate na-
tionalism within their own system, they have
nevertheless found nationalism in other areas po-
tentially useful to their program of conquest.
First, of course, they appreciate the impetus of
nationalism and wisli to ride witli the tide — to
create tlie false impression tliat nationalism and
communism are natural allies. Second, they
know that a period of national revolution is al-
most always a time of political and social tur-
moil and that Communists have a unique oppor-
tunity to pour acid on troubled waters. By the
same token, a period of social uplieaval enables
Communist agents and sympathizers to gain re-
spectability, to infiltrate legitimate nationalist or-
ganizations, and to spread Communist ideas.
Third, the Soviet strategists hope that nationalist
movements in certain areas will result in the cre-
ation of weak and unstable states which will be
unable to resist Communist penetration and which
will eventually disintegrate, leaving the Commu-
nists to pick up the pieces. Finally, even in areas
where the prospect of a Communist takeover is
remote, the Soviet rulers hope that nationalism
can be used to destroy established political and
economic ties among the free nations, to create
cleavages and strains, and thereby to weaken the
free world's total powers of resistance.
Tims, nationalism offers the Communists a wide
range of opportunities, '\\niere they see a depend-
ent territory seeking independence, they hope, as
a maximum, to set in motion a train of events
which will ultimately convert this area into a
Soviet colony. As a minimum, they hope to drive
a wedge between this territory and the West. In
either case, the Soviet Union would be the winner.
Soviet purposes and tactics are but dimly un-
derstood in many newly emerging areas, where
an obsession with Western colonialism has blinded
many nationalists to the infinitely greater threat
of Soviet imperialism. During the last 15 years,
about 750 million people formerly under Western
rule have gained independence. During this same
15 years, more than 800 million people have been
added to the Communist empire. The Western
colonial systems are rapidly giving way to new
relationships, while the Soviet colonial system is
relentlessly pressing forward in all directions. It
would be one of the profound disasters of human
history if the great movement toward self-deter-
mination should prove no more than an illusory
interval between Western rule and a form of
degradation and slavery much more terrible than
any people subject to Western rule have ever
known.
May 26, 7958
869
Collective Security and Nationalism
Tlie United States Government is committed to
the belief tliat the aversion of this tragedy re-
quires maximum unity of spirit and action among
the peoples of tlie free world. To a considerable
extent, this unity has been pursued through col-
lective-security arrangements. This brings me di-
rectly to the question of the relationship between
collective security and nationalism.
I think it is obvious at the outset that there is
no real conflict or inconsistency between the na-
tional idea and the concept of collective security.
All our collective-security systems are made up
of free and sovereign nations. Moreover, the basic
purpose of collective security is to preserve
the nation — not to compromise or destroy it. The
underlying principle of collective security is
simply the fact, demonstrated time and again,
that the safety of the individual nation, the main-
tenance of its position in world affairs, and the
attainment of the aspirations of its people can
only be assured tlirough association with other
nations. John Donne said that all mankind is
one continent, and the passage of 300 years has
gradually turned this observation from an ex-
pression of poetic idealism to an expression of
inescapable fact.
It must be recognized, of course, that the con-
junction of the two concepts sometimes presents
difficulties. There is a conflict, an inexorable con-
flict, between collective security and the kind of
nationalism that causes a country to ignore obli-
gations and responsibilities or to engage in im-
perialism against its neighbors. But this form
of nationalism, fortunately, is not very prevalent.
There is also a conflict between collective se-
curity and the obsolete notion that a nation is
able to isolate itself from the world or to mam-
tain complete freedom of action in its relations
with other nations. This aspect of nationalism
is familiar even here in America. It is reflected
by those persons who scorn the processes of con-
sultation between the United States and its allies
and who demand that even the tiniest American
interest be given absolute precedence over all for-
eign interests. It is reflected by those who oppose
foreign trade, foreign aid, foreign assignments of
American troops, cultural exchanges, and other
acts aimed at increasing the total strength and
cohesion of the free world. It is reflected by
870
those who ask repeatedly why the United States
does not "compel" one or another of its allies to
knuckle under to American policies.
Now I fervently believe tliat the development
of our collective-security systems has afforded
vast rewards to America and its allies alike, but
I don't want to suggest that anyone is getting
something for nothing. Collective security isn't
"for free." Whenever you join together with
others in any enterprise, you automatically as-
sume certain limitations on your own freedom of
action and certain obligations toward the other
fellow. This is true of a bridge club or a Boy
Scout troop, and it is certainly no less true of
NATO, SEATO, or the OAS.
There are some who have confused the re-
straints and obligations of collective security with
a loss of sovereignty. In fact, this may be one
reason why certain states have been reluctant to
enter into collective-security arrangements. But
the comparison is false. As a practical matter,
no individual nation ever has complete freedom
of action in international affairs. Its power and
influence are limited, and its alternative courses
of action are limited. In actuality, a nation's
ability to exert effective influence on the course
of international events is enhanced rather than
diminished by cooperation with other nations. As
long as I am a citizen of the United States, there
are going to be certain legal and social limitations
on my freedom of action. But I have a lot more
genuine freedom of action than I would have if
I tried to live alone on a desert island. Most of
us wouldn't make very good Kobinson Crusoes.
All told, I would say that there are no serious
conflicts between collective security and respon-
sible nationalism. This conclusion is underscored
by the fact that virtually all countries have ac-
cepted United Nations membership and that
nearly two-thirds of the nations of the free world
have entered into one or more of the regional
collective-security arrangements. This includes
several of the newly independent states, who have
suffered no impairment of nationality nor weak-
ening of national spirit by their commitment to
collective security.
At the same time, we must try to understand
the attitudes of other states which are not yet
prepared to undertake such commitments.
Among some of the newly independent
Deparfment of State Bulletin
I have noted, there is much suspicion and fear of
regional collective-security systems. A state
which has only recently gained independence may
feel tliat any close relationship with other nations
is a threat to that independence. This may be
especially true where a former governing power
is involved. Similarly a state, whether new or
old, may feel that it can retain greater influence
or maneuverability through a neutral policy than
through the principle of collective security. Or
again, certain states may fail to recognize any
threat to their existence which would justify col-
lective action. One of the most unfortunate
myths current in certain parts of the world is the
notion that the Soviet empire and the Western
nations represent two great "blocs" which are en-
gaged in a struggle for power and that other na-
tions have no significant stake in the outcome of
this struggle.
We fully respect the right of any state to choose
neutrality. We would never try to compel a na-
tion to join a collective-security system against
its will. But this does not mean that we are
obliged to agree with its reasoning.
U.S. Commitment to Collective Security
It would have been comparatively easy for the
United States itself to have retreated to a policy
of neutrality and isolation after World War II.
We had ample precedent in a history of isolation.
Our immediate survival and safety were probably
in less immediate danger than the safety and sur-
vival of any other nation. We were strong; we
were free ; we were prosperous. We had no terri-
torial designs nor compulsion to assert our power
and prestige. If we liad been shortsighted and
lazy, we might very well have sat on our hands
and watched Soviet imperialism gobble up the
nations of Europe, Asia, and Africa one by one.
Fortunately for ourselves — and fortunately for
the whole world — we took a more f arsighted view.
We recognized that, in the long run, we could not
survive unless the free world as a whole sur-
vived— that we could not live forever as an iso-
lated island in a Communist ocean. So we com-
mitted ourselves to help other free nations to
survive. This is the sole basis of the so-called
"power struggle" in which we are said to be en-
gaged. Allies and neutrals alike have drawn im-
May 26, 1958
mense benefits from our commitment to collective
security.
But just as we ourselves have recognized our
inability to "go it alone," so do we believe that, in
the long run, no free nation can successfully go
it alone. We can understand how a newly inde-
pendent state may be jealous of its position. We
can understand that some devout nationalists may
be sincerely fearful of international association.
Wliere nationalism leads to a choice of neutrality,
we will respect that choice. But this does not
mean that neutrality can be preserved. The So-
viet Union and its Communist handymen have
never respected either neutrality or nationality.
To them, a neutral is simply a potential victim.
The Soviet rulers are well aware that the im-
pulse of nationalism is mighty. They are equally
aware that their designs for world conquest have
been held in check primarily by the collective-se-
curity systems established by tlie free world. It
is natural and inevitable, therefore, that Com-
munist propaganda should strive constantly to
convince the world that collective security is in-
consistent with the pursuit of national aspira-
tions. The phrase "divide and conquer" is as
old as history, but rarely has the principle been
used to such effect as by the Soviet schemers.
Where they are unable to capture and control the
movement toward national independence, they are
determined at least to make sure that emerging
nations deny themselves the political, economic,
and military protection that collective security
offers.
I do not believe the Communists will succeed
in this maneuver. Time is on our side, for time
brings knowledge and understanding. I believe
that nationalism is a healthy instinct and that it
will diligently seek out and choose the pathway
of its own survival. With the passing years, we
have good reason to hope that those governments
and peoples most devoted to their national exist-
ence will, for this very reason, be most ready to
protect that existence through collective action.
Both the new and the older forms of national
society still have a lot to learn — about each other
and about the perilous world we inhabit. We
must live together and learn together until we
have the mutual understanding and trust that will
permit us to work together and survive together.
871
Nationarism and the United Nations
hy Wallace Invin, Jr
If one were to ask an educated, liberal-minded
young person today what the relation is between
nationalism and the United Nations, he might well
receive an answer something like this : "National-
ism is a political disease from which the world has
been suffering for about 200 years, and the United
Nations is an institution which can cure that dis-
ease and bring us peace, if it is only given a
chance."
Such an answer is good but not good enough.
There is truth in it, but there is also a simplifica-
tion and distox'tion of the drama of history.
Both in theory and in practice the United Na-
tions is far from being an enemy of nationalism
or a victor over nationalism. It is rather an in-
stitution which has come into being during a cer-
tain phase of the history of nations. The United
Nations and the nations which compose it, being
human institutions, may be either good or bad —
depending on the use made of them and on tlie
human qualities which go into them.
Anyone who has visited the United Nations
knows how austere the United Nations architec-
ture is in design and ornament. It is simple and
massive but almost expressionless in most of its
aspects. Except for the General Assembly Hall,
the interiors especially seem almost self-effacing
• Mr. Irwin., author of the above article.,
is Director of Pvhlic Services at the U.S.
Mission to the United Nations in New York.
His article is based upon an address made at
Elmhurst College, Elmhurst, III., on Febru-
ary 21 as the concluding lectwre in a series
entitled '•''The Spirit of Nationalism in an
rnternational Order."
872
in their simplicity. Among the blank walls and
angles and rectangles of quiet colors, most of the
decoration is national in origin — murals, rugs, cur-
tains, sculpture, and other works of art from many
of the member states.
The United States has made its contribution, of
course, the most important part of which is the
headquarters site itself. From the big windows
in the North Lounge, where much diplomatic busi-
ness is done, delegates can look out at the East
Kiver, with its incessant commercial traffic and its
wheeling gulls, and at the Queensborough Bridge
and the skyline of industiial New York.
Thus the austere, somewhat colorless, almost
transparent United Nations buildings take most of
their color and variety from the decorative con-
tributions of member nations — and from the
American environment which surrounds them on
every side.
All this is a reflection, in design and decoration,
of political facts. Evidently human history has
not reached a point when we can speak of a world
culture. Instead, the United Nations — aestheti-
cally as well as politically — seems to provide a sort
of neutral gi-ound against which the sovereign na-
tions of the world express themselves. In art as
in politics, their self-expression makes a mixture
which is sometimes pleasing and harmonious, and
sometimes not.
But there is something more to the United Na-
tions than that. The great sloping dome of the
General Assembly Hall with its huge ribs of gilt,
like enormous golden wings spread high above the
delegates' desks, and between those wings the high,
dark marble rostrum, and above that the enormous
emblem of the United Nations in white on a field
of gold — all that gives an effect of great majesty.
Insofar as architecture and design can speak, that
Department of Sfafe Bulletin
hall seems to say that the nations whose repre-
sentatives meet there have made themselves
morally subject to something higher than them-
selves: some single thing which all acknowledge
through the clashes of culture and tradition, of
doctrine, and of the quest for domination.
Symbol of the Oneness of Man
That single thing, of course, is not a govern-
ment— not even remotely. It is an idea : the one-
ness of mankind. That idea is seen very differ-
ently in different cultures. Some see it in a
religious context, some in a secular context; to
some it is a moral imperative, to others a distant
ideal or even possibly a threadbare slogan; to
some it suggests vast social and political changes,
to othei-s it suggests preserving what they have.
The common denominator, the vital minimum
thing which it suggests and even commands to all
members, is that there shall be no great war. The
even greater goal which it sets before all nations
is that, in the words of the charter, they shall
"live together in peace with one another as good
neighbors."
In whatever terms the common goal may be de-
fined, it is certainly one of the striking facts of
our incredible century that, in the name of this
goal, there have come together every year in that
great hall, before the eyes of all the world's people,
the spokesmen and ranking ministers of nearly
eveiy sovereign government in the world. The
diversity of background and of attitude, even on
fundamentals, is so great as to be almost chaotic.
There are Europeans, with experience of great
power and rich civilization, creators of modern
nationalism, still in the forward ranks of nations
in spite of the price they have paid in terrible
wars.
There is the Commonwealth under British lead-
ership, a free association which provides valuable
links between the Atlantic region and other coun-
tries in other regions and acts as a vehicle for the
spread of Britain's great liberal institutions
through what was once her colonial empire.
There are Americans, heirs to the liberal politi-
cal philosophies of the Mediterranean and Atlan-
tic, on whom history has now laid a tremendous
burden of world leadership.
There are Latin Americans, with a long tradi-
tion of liberal nationalism and a rapidly growing
civilization unlike any other.
I May 26, 1958
There are the Arab States, heirs of imperial
Islam, foi'merly under European influence and
now in a ferment of growth and change and con-
flict, struggling to express their own national and
cultural identities amid the shocks of great-power
politics.
There are African and Asian countries with a
great variety of ancient cultures, not long ago
existing in the shadows of world history or as
bit players in a European drama but now much
closer to the center of the stage and claiming what
they consider the rightful dignity and benefits of
their new national status.
Finally, there are the states dominated by Soviet
communism, whose rulers remain committed to a
total world revolution and look on the United
Nations as expressing that stage of "coexistence"
among states preliminary to the world victory
which they say will one day be theirs.
Twelve years ago 51 of these member states
gathered in London for the fii'st session of the
United Nations General Assembly. At the last
General Assembly meeting in New York there
were 82 — more than half again as many. Among
them there is much deep conflict, but there is also
that very broad sense of a single human com-
munity.
The United Nations, then, is a symbol of the
oneness of mankind and of the vmiversal longing
for a lasting peace. That symbolic power is one
source of the United Nations authority — an au-
thority so great that in 12 years not one single
member state, whatever the provocation or how-
ever deep the cleavage involved, has taken the step
of resigning its membership.
Impact on World Affairs
More than that, the United Nations is an effec-
tively functioning arganization — a going concern
which gets things done. Here are a few of the
important events in which United Nations action
has played a significant part :
1. The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran
in 1946.
2. Tlie dispute between India and Pakistan
over Kashmir, which has smoldered ever since
1947 but has been prevented from breaking out
into a shooting war.
3. The Palestine conflict, which from 1949 un-
til the fighting in 1956 remained in a state of
truce because of United Nations supervision.
873
4. The war to defend Korea against Commu-
nist aggression from 1950 to 1953— a war to which
the United Nations made important contributions
of troops, supplies, and moral support.
5. The Suez crisis of 1956-57, m which the
United Nations brought about a withdrawal of
the attacking forces, posted a United Nations
Emergency Force at the two most dangerous
points of tension, cleared the Suez Canal of the
wrecks which had been sunk in it— and, by all
these steps, managed to avert the imminent dan-
ger of a larger war.
There are political debits in the ledger too, of
course. Korea remains divided by Communist
stubbornness. The tragedy of Hungary taxed the
United Nations heavily, although its moral stand
on the issue exerted a lasting ellect on world
opinion. In Palestine, although there is now
practically no shooting, many basic difficulties re-
main. Disputes over Cyprus, Algeria, and West
New Guinea are still with us. But, considering
that the United Nations is a place of last resort
where the world's most intractable political prob-
lems wind up, the political record is not alto-
gether bad.
There are other United Nations achievements
outside the strictly political sphere :
1. The United Nations has can-ied on a big
refugee care and resettlement program in Europe,
a program arising out of World War II and pro-
longed by the continuing flow of refugees from
communism.
2. The United Nations maintains at a subsist-
ence level nearly 1,000,000 Arab refugees from
Palestine — a barely humane answer to a problem
whose real solution lies in the political realm.
3. The United Nations operates a most effective
technical assistance program in underdeveloped
countries, and the International Bank — a United
Nations specialized agency- — has lent many hun-
dreds of millions for economic development
projects.
4. The United Nations laid the foundations for
the International Atomic Energy Agency, which
is now operating in Vienna in line with the atoms-
for-peace proposal which President Eisenhower
made to the General Assembly in 1953.
5. Finally, and not least important, the United
Nations oversees administration of 11 trust terri-
tories in Africa and the Pacific Ocean area, terri-
tories which under the charter are to be brought to
874
self-government or independence. The new state
of Ghana in West Africa, which is now a member
of the United Nations, includes the former Trust
Territory of British Togoland, which voted in a
United Nations plebiscite to join with Ghana.
Two years from now Somaliland, another trust
territory, is also scheduled to join the United
Nations as a sovereign state.
In fact, the United Nations Charter provides
for advancement not only of the 11 trust terri-
tories but of all non-self-governing territories.
Reports are made regularly by governing coun-
tries to the United Nations, and the debates on
them — though they may attract little attention in
New York^are big news in the African and Asian
countries. Some of these territories will soon join
the community of independent nations and take
their seats in the United Nations.
That list of activities and achievements is
enough to show that the United Nations is not
only a powerful symbol but also an important
center of practical influence in the affairs of
nations.
Combining for a Common Purpose
This influence comes mainly from the sovereign
member states, who by diplomacy and debate com-
bine their own influence to pursue common pur-
poses through the United Nations. They act un-
der the United Nations Charter, the most solemn
treaty in existence, which provides both a general
code of conduct for member states and a book of
rules of organization and procedure. They have
in New York a convenient meeting place, a place
where they can harmonize their actions on a
worldwide scale. They have a most potent prop-
aganda forum in which contending sides can
strive for the backing of world opinion. And
they have important diplomatic facilities not
otherwise available to sovereign nations — notably,
a Secretary -General with a unique position in
world diplomacy, a position Mr. Dag Hammar-
skjold has used on several occasions to great effect.
Now a word about national power. Since the
United Nations depends for its effectiveness on
member states, its methods of operating have to
take into account the very imeven distribution of
power among nations. Originally this was done
by assigning basic responsibility for keeping the
peace — in other words, police power — to the Se-
curity Council, where the United States, Britain,
Department of State Bulletin
France, China, and the Soviet Union each have
the veto, the po^Yer to prevent action by voting
"no." But the frequent use of that veto — 83 times
by tlie Soviet Union alone — has caused a transfer
of much U. N. peace activity to the General
Assembly.
Now the General Assembly, in its formal organ-
ization and rules of procedure, takes hardly any
account of power realities. Each of the 81 mem-
bers has just one vote, regardless of size or wealth
or pojiulation. But in practice the leadership of
the big powers is just as evident in the General
Assembly and shows much the same patterns
there as elsewhere in the world. Actually the in-
fluence of each member in the General Assembly
depends on many factors, but one of the greatest
of these is certainly national power and the ac-
knowledged responsibilities which flow from
power.
Aiiotlier important factor is how well a nation
is trusted and the extent to which other nations
believe that it shares their purposes.
The United States, in the 12 years of United
Nations history, has, of course, not had every-
thing its own way. But it has never lost a deci-
sion on any matter of first-rate importance.
The Soviet Union, on the other hand, is re-
spected because of its power but comparatively
isolated because of its known purposes. Unlike
any other member, it controls outright an actual
bloc of votes — its own and those of its satellites
in Eastern Europe, making a total of 9. But out-
side of that bloc Moscow has very little positive
influence. When it comes to a resolution on which
the Soviets are at odds with the Western nations,
the most they can hope for outside their own em-
pire is that perhaps 10 or 15 countries of Asia,
Africa, and the Middle East will abstain from
voting.
The moral influence of the General Assembly
would not exist if the middle and small powers
did not also have a great share in the General
Assembly's proceedings. They are not by any
means helpless followers in a game of follow-the-
leader. They make up to a great extent for their
relative individual weakness by their numbers and
by their ability to combine.
Combinations in the United Nations tend to
follow certain established patterns, although there
is a good deal of variation from one issue to the
next. There is a longstanding and quite formal-
ized caucus of the 20 Latin American countries.
It does not impose voting discipline on substantive
issues, but it is a vehicle for concerting views and
tactics voluntarily. In 1955 the countries of the
Afro-Asian region — the so-called Bandung
group — formed their own caucus at the United
Nations. It has 29 members and is effective in
concerting its members' tactics on questions where
most of them agree — notably questions with a
colonial aspect and questions relating to economic
development.
There are other caucuses and groupings, more or
less formal. Within the Afro- Asian group, the
Arab States at times meet separately. On some
matters the countries of Western Europe occa-
sionally meet. The Commonwealth countries,
under British leadership, also meet frequently
among themselves. And, of course, the Soviet
Union meets often with its followers to pass the
word — a process of command and obedience which
can scarcely be compared to a democratic caucus.
For the United States the consulting process is
constant and is far more complex than these
caucus arrangements would suggest. The United
States controls only one vote — its own — as United
Nations voting records amply prove. The United
States belongs to no caucus. During the General
Assembly the U.S. delegation holds many special
tactical meetings with cosponsors on important
resolutions, in which the language of the resolu-
tion and all the tactics connected with it are
thoroughly aired. There are hardly any delega-
tions among the 81 with which the United States
does not consult now and then.
"Harmonizing the Actions of Nations"
Sometimes it is quite difficult to keep in a single
focus, so to speak, these activities at the United
Nations and all the other, more familiar events
of international politics. The United Nations is
still a relative novelty on the world stage, and its
actual functioning is still somewhat obscured by
the cloud of almost Utopian glory in which it was
born. It would be a tremendous pity if the United
Nations were ever to lose that special quality of
idealism, which is one of its priceless assets. But
it would be just as great a pity if the United Na-
tions work were to lose its vital relation to the
hard, often ugly world of struggling nations, be-
cause if that ever happened its whole reason for
being would disappear.
May 26, 1958
875
On that heading the present picture is by no
means discouraging. The most hopeful signs, per-
haps, are those which show how much serious, top-
level effort by ambassadors, foreign ministers, and
even heads of leading governments can go into
the framing of an important General Assembly
resolution. Wlien the Assembly takes a position,
say, on such a matter as terms for final settlement
of the Korean question; or whether an interna-
tional atoms-for-peace agency should be estab-
lished; or whether to set up a new United Nations
fund to spur economic development in preindus-
trial countries; or what ought to be done about
the crushing of freedom in Hungary, the future of
tlie Suez Canal, or the argument over Cyprus —
these positions usually represent a remarkable
amount of serious diplomacy by many govern-
ments. It is true enough that a General Assembly
resolution is legally no more than a recommenda-
tion ; but what gives it force is that it is a solemn
commitment, made in full view of the world, not
only by the United Nations as a whole but by
every government voting for it. For years after
its adoption it will stand as an authentic state-
ment of policy by the community of nations. Thus
the resolution-making process is at the core of
what the charter calls "liarmonizing the actions
of nations."
There are wise limits to what the United Na-
tions may undertake in this business of "har-
monizing." The charter forbids the United
Nations — which, after all, is not a government —
to intervene in any matter "essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of any state." In some
cases, such as those of Algeria and Cyprus, where
a claim of domestic jurisdiction is made but where
the matter in question has become a cause of
public concern abroad, the Assembly holds a de-
bate in which both sides can compete for the sup-
port of world opinion but refrains from expressing
itself on terms or means of settlement.
There is another wise restraint which the char-
ter places on the United Nations as an organiza-
tion. It provides in article 33 that the parties to
any dispute, before they ask the United Nations
to take it on, shall first try negotiation, concilia-
tion, mediation, arbitration, or judicial settlement.
Thus the United Nations as a code of conduct ex-
tends much further than does the United Nations
as a piece of machinery.
The present trouble between France and Tunisia
876
illustrates this principle. Both sides, rather than
arguing the matter out in the United Nations,
have accepted the good offices of the United States
and the United Kingdom. Sometimes procedures
of this kind are criticized as "bypassing the United
Nations," but in fact they are United Nations
action at its best. A more immediate resort to
direct United Nations action, in fact, could prop-
erly be criticized as bypassing the charter.
Certainly that is as it should be. It would make
no more sense for United Nations rules of be-
havior to apply only within the portals of the
United Nations itself than for Christian ethics to
apply only in church.
Over and above these charter limits there are,
naturally, faults and weaknesses at the United
Nations which are purely human. There is now
and then an emotional attack by one nation against
another, motivated at least in part by considera-
tions of domestic politics. There is a preoccupa-
tion, perhaps excessive, with treaty law as a sov-
ereign cure for all the world's ills. There is a
vast amount of speeclunaking — some of it very
moving, some of it of doubtful value to mankind,
but all of it much better than making war. And
there is, perhaps, the same mixture of brilliance
and wrongheadedness, nobility and meanness of
soul, that can be found among the members of
most parliaments around the world: the same
pressures, careful ambiguities, temporary alli-
ances, horse trading, bluffing, rounding up votes,
motions to adjourn, writing and amending resolu-
tions. The delegates who do it know what an
exhausting and frustrating process this can some-
times be.
Nobody can say accurately, of course, how much
it is all worth. But without a doubt the United
Nations is one of the great centers of influence in
the world today, perhaps ranking with the leading
sovereign nations in the massiveness of its impact
on world affairs.
Among some students of international politics
there is a tendency to believe tliat influence with-
out power — real physical power — is nonexistent.
Yet here is the United Nations, possessing no real
power of its own, radiating influence. That in-
fluence is, of course, a synthesis of the influence of
its membei's; but the whole is certainly greater
than its parts.
Actually, between the United Nations and its
members the currents of influence flow both ways.
Department of State Bulletin
Member states individually contribute their in-
fluence to the proceedings and, in turn, are in-
fluenced in their own policies by what the United
Nations says and does. Repeatedly, in many dif-
ferent situations, proceedings at the United Na-
tions imbue national policies with a forbeai-ance
from violent conflict, a willingness to bear with
stubborn wrongs, an awareness of universal human
values, and a readiness to join in cooperative
ventures for the common good. Wlien two powers
are locked in a dispute, the more disinterested
speakers in the United Nations debate constantly
urge patience and restraint, argue for peace, ofl'er
means for settlement. They are almost like the
chorus in a Greek drama, criticizing the main
action, passing judgment on it, reminding the
protagonist of his duty, warning him against
yielding to passion. At their best they are the
authentic voice of the United Nations. And of-
tentimes, also, that authentic voice speaks through
the greatly respected Secretary-General.
Let us suppose for a moment that the influence
exerted through the United Nations could some-
how be measured as a percentage of all the influ-
ences that govern international affairs. In tliis
day and age it would be hard to imagine the United
Nations and all its progi-ams as exerting more
than 2 or 5 or conceivably 10 percent of the total.
But, whatever the quantity, it is certainly in the
main a benign influence. It would be a rash man
who would say, in the precarious state of the
world's affairs, that this 2 or 5 or 10 percent will
not tip the balance between disaster and success
for the community of nations.
An Age of Simultaneous Revolutions
Bearing in mind this picture of the place which
the United Nations occupies in world affairs, we
can now take a closer look to see how nationalism
fits into the picture. From the United Nations
vantage point it appears as one of the most dy-
namic and powerful forces in the world today — a
force full of promise and also, no doubt, full of
danger.
There are other forces, of course. We seem to
be living through an age of several simultaneous
revolutions, with all of which the United Nations
is involved.
One revolution is scientific and technical. It
has become technically possible to imify mankind
in a single civilization — or to destroy a very large
part of the human race. The atomic energy work
generated by the United Nations, and the innu-
merable technical and scientific activities of the
United Nations specialized agencies, are factors in
keeping this revolution on the right track. An-
other factor is the constant search in the United
Nations for a safe and workable program of dis-
armament— one of the great focal issues which the
organization has faced throughout its existence.
Secondly, there is a revolution in the emergence
of new nations — a transformation of great areas
from Morocco to Indonesia and the Philippines
from colonial dependency into self-government
and independence. The peoples of 19 United Na-
tions member states in Africa, the Middle East,
and Asia have personal experience of living under
the tutelage of Great Britain, France, the Nether-
lands, or the United States," and the process is by
no means finished. All these countries take their
United Nations membership very seriously. In it
they find not only a symbol of their sovereignty
but a world pattern of cooperation which deeply
influences their framework of ideas. And in their
United Nations association with older nations they
are reminded that liberty must be more than what
Wilson once called "an insurgent madness in the
blood" — that it cannot survive without the disci-
pline of responsible government.
Then there is a third revolution which goes
along with the first two — a revolution in the econ-
omies of the preindustrial countries and, even
more, a revolution in their material aspirations.
The idea of achieving material progress is very
closely bound up with national feelings and some-
times, unfortunately, with strong suspicion of the
very countries which can best help. In its eco-
nomic and technical aid work the United Nations
has shown a great ability to overcome that
suspicion.
The word "revolution" itself suggests violence
and destruction. It is up to our generation — not
just in America but everywhere — to control these
revolutionary energies, especially those of na-
tionalism, so that violent destruction does not
occur. Our problem is something like that of the
scientists who had to subdue the force of the atom
bomb so that it would produce electric power
' Great Britain: Burma, Ceylon, Egj-pt, Ghana, India,
Iraq (until 1932), Jordan, Libya (with France), Malaya,
Pakistan, Sudan; Prance: Cambodia, Laos, Lebanon,
Morocco (with Spain), Syria, Tunisia; Netherlands:
Indonesia ; United States: Philippines.
May 26, 7958
877
instead of death. "We have to see that the explo-
sive political forces of our time are directed into
peaceful, constructive channels. In that effort
the United Nations is a real asset.
Now to appreciate the complexity of our prob-
lem we have to remember that modern national-
ism did not come into existence until after the
common people had begun to take part in public
affairs. Then states which had been dynastic
monarchies were transformed into nations, with
symbols and traditions which a whole people
could be induced to uphold and cherish — and even
to give their lives for. All this was originally an
English and a European growth and an American
growth; but now it has spread over most of tlie
world, and it has released enormous energies in all
departments of life.
However, this entrance of great masses of peo-
ple on the stage of history has had more than one
revolutionary result. It made possible national-
ism, but it also made possible satanic political
spasms like Hitlerism and the imperial adven-
tures of the Japanese military a generation ago.
Furthermore, it made possible Soviet communism.
The Pressures of Communism
I mentioned three contemporary revolutions —
the technical, the anticolonial, and the economic.
All these are at least potentially benign. If they
are managed right, they can greatly strengthen
and enrich our community of nations. But the
Communist revolution is something outside the
community of nations — in fact, it is a mortal
challenge to the community.
Within the Soviet empire Moscow gives no
tolerance to nationalists. In the case of Hungary
it did not hesitate to make a bloody example of
them. Outside its own empire Moscow does its
best to exploit and manipulate nationalist feelings
for its own purposes. Its purpose, today as in
Lenin's day, seems to be to see to it that commu-
nism— a system under which nationalism and
liberty are impossible — will inherit the earth.
Over a year ago, after listening to the United
Nations debates on the Hungarian revolution, one
thoughtful reporter 2 wrote:
There can be little doubt that the communist world has
put itself on record as being a super-state, allegiance to
which is held more important than allegiance to national
sovereisnty or to the United Nations, and this raises a
'Christopher Rand in The New Yorker, Jan. 19, 1957.
878
doctrinal point that might conceivably undermine the
Red countries' whole position in the United Nations.
It is quite true that the proclaimed policies and
philosophy of the Soviet leaders are fundamen-
tally at odds with national loyalties and with the
United Nations ; and yet this fact does not wholly
undermine the Soviet Union's position either in
the United Nations or in the free world. The
explanation for this riddle lies partly in the
power position of the Communist state and partly
in its protean ability to speak everywhere in ap-
pealing accents— including the accents of Afro-
Asian nationalism. But it also seems to lie partly
in the national experience of different countries —
the kind of experience which forms the attitudes
of a wliole generation as mere study and persua-
sion can never do. Among many people in free
Europe war is a tragic personal experience and the
idea of another war is more vivid by far than the
less familiar idea of conquest by communism.
Among many millions in the Afro-Asian world
the burning desire to complete the transition from
the colonial age, and the consciousness of poverty,
create feelings stronger than any fears which re-
ports about communism can arouse. Thus bar-
riers exist within the non-Communist world which
prevent a unified response to the pressures and
appeals of communism.
Those barriers are a luxury we can scarcely af-
ford. If freedom is to prevail against the total
challenge of communism, freedom must find a
better and stronger political house in which to live.
That house is the community of free nations, and
our chief task in the non-Communist world is to
build and perfect that community. This requires
several kinds of effort.
It requires much creative work to complete
peacefully the transition of dependent territories
to self-government and political equality — and, in
some cases, to national independence.
It requires solutions to deep political conflicts
among nations, like those in Palestine and Kash-
mir.
It requires steady and sound answers to the
demand of half the world for economic develop-
ment and prosperous trade.
It requires the most faithful attention to the
United Nations, both as an organization and as a
state of mind, in order that the community of
nations may steadily develop both a method and
a i^hilosophy for living together.
Department of State Bulletin
Finally, it requires something which private
individuals and institutions can best provide —
contacts and working relations in the arts, in
science and engineering, in education, in the
churches, in many fields — so that those barriers
which hold nations apart can be pierced in the way
that has the most lasting effects : individual human
contact.
If we can succeed in all these fields, perhaps the
most stubborn and tragic problem of all can also
be made to yield: the problem of the alienation
of that third of the world now ruled by world
communism. Until it does yield, it seems certain
that the community of nations will be living under
constant strain and pressure.
The Role of the United States
How should the United States fit into this com-
munity of sovereign nations? And what happens
to American nationalism in the process?
Recently a college senior in a magazine article
said tliat American youth, presumably including
himself, is "probably the least nationalistic youth
in the world." That is not too surprising a state-
ment coming from a generation whose parents al-
lowed Adolf Hitler to ruin a great part of the
world under a banner marked "national social-
ism." Evidently, too, the way our friends abroad
observe and criticize all our imperfections has
made an impression among the youth of today
and has helped to raise up a generation which,
nationally speaking, is self-conscious and self-
critical. Self-criticism is healthy, but we have to
move beyond mere self-criticism because we as a
nation have inherited a burden of leadership
whetlier we like it or not, and the uncomplimen-
tary things which are said about us abroad — some
of which are true and some false — are not going
to relieve us of that burden.
Now, if nationalism means arrogance, if it
means combativeness and a desire for domination,
if it means glorifying one's own country at the
expense of others, then it does not fit at all into the
picture of a true community of nations. But
there is another kind of nationalism which is not
only welcome in the community of nations but is
essential to it. In no country is it more essential
than in the United States. This nationalism is a
love of country which is also a vehicle for uni-
versal values. The American tradition is precisely
that. We inherited our political ideas from the
May 26, 7958
French Enlightenment, from the English Glori-
ous Revolution, and, in a more fundamental sense
still, from the Christian religion with its ante-
cedents in Hebrew prophecy. That was our birth-
right of ideas. In our Declaration of Independ-
ence it was stated not tliat Americans are better
than anybody but that all men are created equal.
When Lincoln meditated on that Declaration, he
found in it something giving "liberty not alone to
the people of this country, but hope to all the
world, for all future time."
Our independence, based on that principle of
universal liberty and equality, lit a spark which
spread immediately to France and thence through-
out Europe and Latin America within little more
than a generation. In the present day it is still
the chief inspiration for new nations throughout
the African and Asian Continents.
Not our great power alone but this heritage of
humane values explains why we are more widely
trusted than the Soviet Union and why much
better things are expected of us.
But what form should our leadership take?
History has already answered that question to a
considerable extent. Certainly we cannot be an
imperial power ; it is not in the mainstream of our
tradition, it would destroy much of our title to
moral leadership, and in any case the whole cur-
rent of history is running the other way. What-
ever the humane and statesmanlike accomplish-
ments of the colonial era — and they are many —
this option is simply not open to us.
Nor can we contemplate regulating the affairs of
the world through a sort of concert or oligarchy
of great powers, as was done by the Concert of
Europe after the Napoleonic Wars. This system,
too, had its virtues while it lasted, but it is not in
our tradition. Besides, an entente between us and
the Soviet Union, affecting the destinies of third
countries, is unthinkable because we have no com-
munity of purpose with Soviet communism.
The alternative which is most natural to us is
that which our own American leadership since
World War II has done so much to create and
develop: the United Nations system. In this
system the necessity of national power is recog-
nized, but it is subordinated to universal ethical
principles and it is moderated by the daily prac-
tice of accommodation among nations. In this
system great powers are looked to for leadership —
none more than America — but power is regarded
879
as a responsibility, not as a title to special
privilege.
The most famous part of the United Nations
Charter is its preamble, and deservedly so, because
it sums up the spirit of the whole document. It
speaks of preventing a renewal of "the scourge
of war"; of "fundamental human rights" and "the
dignity and worth of the human person" ; of "the
equal rights of men and women and of nations
large and small"; of "justice . . . treaties . . .
international law"; of "social progress and better
standards of life in larger freedom."
IVIost of these ideals date from the begimiing of
the great era of nation states nearly two centuries
ago, in which our own Nation was born. Now they
form, so to speak, the soul of the United Nations,
and imder this United Nations banner ax-e
gathered the most diverse members, many of them
younger than the United Nations itself and only
beginning to conquer their heritage as sovereign
states. They form a conscious community, how-
ever imperfect and vuhnerable and half-realized
that community may be.
The United Nations has not killed off national-
ism and is not likely to do so. But it has already
begun to temper nationalism. It has powerfully
influenced the world environment in which our
own American Nation, and many other nations too,
seek to play their part in history. Those who
serve its member states in the spirit of the charter
like to believe that they are thereby doing a serv-
ice to humanity as well. How good a service it
is, only time will tell.
Haitian Mission Concludes
Financial Discussions
Press release 240 dated May 2
A special mission of Haitian Government offi-
cials has completed a 2-week visit to Washington
to discuss financial and economic matters with
officials of the U.S. Government, including the
Department of State, the Treasury Department,
the International Cooperation Administration, the
Export-Import Bank, and the Development Loan
Fund. The Haitian mission was headed by the
Minister of Finance, Fritz Thebaud, and included
the Minister of Agriculture, Henri Marc-Charles ;
the Chief Counselor of the High Court of
Accounts, Jules Blanchet; the Secretary of the
Council on Natural Resources and Economic De-
velopment, Louis Leveque; and Senator Arthur
Bonhomme. In addition to discussions with this
Government, the visitors consulted various finan-
cial institutions. The talks were carried out in
the warm and friendly atmosphere which has tra-
ditionally marked relations between Haiti and the
United States.
As a result of discussions of loan arrangements
with the Export-Import Bank, the Government
of Haiti will regularize its repayments and inter-
est charges on a $27 million credit. This credit
from the Export-Import Bank, initially approved
in 1949, has assisted in financing construction of
the Peligre Dam and an irrigation system in the
Artibonite Valley, potentially Haiti's greatest
productive area. Approximately $24 million of
this credit have been drawn to date. Haiti will
carry out a long-studied plan to reorganize the
ODVA [Organisme du development de la
Vallee de I'Artibonite — Artibonite Valley Author-
ity] which is expected to result in greater effective-
ness of that Authority's operations.
The Haitian delegation discussed with officials
of the Export-Import Bank, the International Co-
operation Administration, and the Development
Loan Fund plans to enhance the economic con-
tributions of the Artibonite Valley and to insure
the well-being of its 70,000 residents. There was
general agreement that the ODVA should resume
construction, particulai'ly in the drainage areas,
at the earliest possible date. These U.S. agencies
are cooperating with ODVA wherever possible
and appropriate.
The International Cooperation Administration
agreed to make available to the Government of
Haiti $2 million in fiscal year 1958 special assist-
ance funds for completion and construction of
projects, such as farm-to-market roads, small
bridges and river crossings, and irrigation and
water-supply systems to supplement the Govern-
ment of Haiti's economic development program.
The $2 million will also help alleviate Haiti's
shortage of dollars, caused by a series of natural,
political, and economic difficulties since Hurri-
cane Hazel devastated the country in 1954. U.S.
economic assistance is making an important con-
tribution to the attempt to restore economic sta-
bility in Haiti, one of the prime objectives of the
administration of Haitian President Duvalier.
The joint discussions with the financial delega-
tion have also resulted in ICA increasing by
$625,000 to a fiscal year 1958 total of $1.5 million
Department of State BuUelin
the cooperative technical-assistance program in
the fields of agriculture, health, education, and
public works. This increase includes studies to
be made for the integrated economic development
of Haiti's historically significant Cap Haitien
area.
The Development Loan Fund indicated its read-
iness to consider financial assistance to Haiti in
the form of loans for sound project proposals
received from the Government of Haiti and pri-
vate sources and for which adequate financing
from other sources is not available. Specific proj-
ect applications for agricultural processing and
transportation facilities are being drafted for sub-
mission to the DLF and for certain other key
economic development jirojects intended to help
diversify and expand the Haitian economy.
The Contribution of Trade
to the Cause of Peace
hy Douglas Dillon
Deputy Under Secretary for Economic Affairs ^
It is a great pleasure for me to be here with
you at this dinner on the eve of the opening of
the Second Annual World Trade Fair of the City
of New York. It is fitting that this World Trade
Fair should be held in New York, one of the
greatest ports in the world. Last year about
thirty cents out of every dollar of America's ex-
port trade steamed past the Statue of Liberty en
route to the Seven Seas.
We hear a good deal these days about this
"shrinking world." But it is not missiles that
have made neighbors of distant countries. It is
the trading system of the modern world. Here
in the United States we are learning that the
Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans are not walls
which separate us from other peoples. They are
highways to progress, to prosperity, and to peace.
We are learning one of the fundamental laws of
nature. We are learning that tlie world's eco-
nomic life, like its organic life, is closely interre-
lated. We are learning that the economy of the
United States camiot continue healthy and secure
if the economies of Africa or Europe or Latin
' Address made at a dinner preceding the opening of the
World Trade Fair at New York, N. T., on May 6 (press
release 244 dated May 5) .
America are unhealthy or insecure. We are be-
ginning to understand tlie powerful, irresistible
force of hundreds of millions of people seeking an
end to centuries of poverty, ignorance, and disease.
They have been eking out a living from the soil
since the dawn of history. Now they are on the
march.
For more than a decade we in the United States
have been working with these peoples of the
newly developing nations of the world to help
them speed the transition from the hoe to the
tractor and from ox power to Diesel power.
Through the mutual security program of the
United States, we are working in every corner of
the world to help other peoples achieve a higher
standard of living, a more diversified economy, a
stronger industrial base, and a longer life span.
Our mutual security program has sometimes
been referred to here in the United States as a
"giveaway." This is no "giveaway." This is an
investment in the future of the United States and
of the world.
I am an investment banker by trade, and I
speak as an investment banker when I say that
today's less developed nations are tomorrow's
richest economic and political asset. One out of
every four persons on this earth earns only about
one dollar a week. One out of every three goes
to bed hungry every night. We are helping these
people escape from the grinding scourge of pov-
erty. We are helping them to find a richer life
in conditions of freedom. For we know that, un-
less they do, our own freedom and well-being will
be endangered. That is the meaning, that is the
purpose, of our mutual security program.
A second mighty weapon in our fight for a
sounder world economy is the reciprocal trade
agreements program.
The foreign economic policy of the United
States has deep roots in the reciprocal trade
agreements program. Its basic premise is that in-
ternational trade shall be allowed to expand in
response to market forces, without unjustifiable
Government interference. 'Wlien it was first pro-
posed by Cordell Hull in 1934, it was a bold step—
a pioneering effort to demonstrate in a practical
manner that everyone is better off by exchanging
goods than by trying to be self-sufficient.
Today reciprocal trade is a tried and proven
program. Under it exports of the United States
have leaped from $2.1 billion in 1934 to $19.5
May 26, 7958
881
billion in 1957, and our imports have grown from
$1.6 billion to $13.5 billion. In other ^yords, our
exports today are more than nine times what they
were in 1934 and our imports are eight times
greater.
The Trade Agreements Act is now before Con-
gress for renewal. The act has been renewed 10
times in the past, and President Eisenhower is
now requesting a 5-year extension in order that
we may conduct beneficial trade negotiations with
the great European Common Market which will
soon become a reality.
In spite of the impressive world trade record
built up under the Trade Agreements Act, voices
are being raised against its renewal. This is a
free country, and criticism of the Government is
one of our favorite pastimes. We would not have
it any other way. But all too frequently opposi-
tion to the trade agreements program is based on
unjustified fears. And often our trade agree-
ments are made the scapegoat for other economic
problems besetting domestic industry.
The reciprocal trade agreements program has
been a bridge between the United States and the
world. Every man, woman, and child in this
country has benefited from the trade stimulated
by this creative concept. I seriously doubt if this
great World Trade Fair would be opening to-
morrow if the United States had built up its tariff
walls instead of breaking down artificial barriers
to trade.
The Trade Agreements Act expresses in a very
real sense the interdependence of nations. If we
are to achieve the world prosperity and security
that all of us so earnestly desire, it is axiomatic
that we must give our customers abroad — the
countries represented at this World Trade Fair
and others too — the opportunity to earn the for-
eign exchange they need to buy our American
products.
Trade and more trade is vital to peace and pro-
gress. Trade creates understanding — understand-
ing of each other's problems and aspirations.
This fair is designed to stimulate trade. In so
doing it will contribute mightily to better inter-
national relations. It will contribute to the cause
of peace which we are striving to make secure
for mankind. I congratulate all of you citizens
of New York who have had a hand in creating
this new and important institution, and I wish
you every success this year and in the future.
882
President Increases Tariff
on Clinical Tliermometers
White House press release dated April 21
WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT
The President on April 21 accepted the recom-
mendation of the United States Tariff Commis-
sion in the case of clinical thermometers. Ac-
cordingly, the President issued a proclamation
under the escape clause increasing the tariff on
imports of clinical thermometers to 85 percent
ad valorem.
The Tariff Commission reported to the Presi-
dent on February 21, 1958, that the domestic in-
dustry was suffering serious injury. The Com-
mission recommended, with two members dissent-
ing, that the tariff be increased under section 7 of
the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, as
amended.
PROCLAMATION 3235 >
Withdrawal of Trade Agreement Concession on
Certain Clinical Thermometers
1. Whereas, pursuant to the authority vested In him
by the Constitution and the statutes, including section 350
of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (19 U. S. C. 1351),
the President, on April 21, 1951, entered into a trade agree-
ment providing, among other things, for the accession to
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (61 Stat.
(Parts 5 and 6) A7, All, and A2051) of certain foreign
countries, which trade agreement consists of the Torquay
Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
including the annexes thereto, hereinafter referred to as
the "Torquay Protocol" (3 UST 615) ;
2. Whereas Schedule XX in Annex A to the said Tor-
quay Protocol (3 UST 1125) became a schedule to the said
General Agreement in accordance with paragraph 3 of the
Torquay Protocol (3 UST 616) ;
3. Whereas, by Proclamation No. 2929 of June 2, 1951
(65 Stat. cl2), the President proclaimed such modification
of existing duties and other import restrictions of the
United States and such continuance of existing customs
or excise treatment of articles imported into the United
States as were then found to be required or appropriate to
carry out the Torquay Protocol, which proclamation has
been supplemented by several notifications of the President
to the Secretary of the Treasury, including a notification
of September 10, 1951 (3 CFR, 1951 Supp., p. 537), as
amended by a notification of September 20, 1951 (3 CFR,
1951 Supp., p. 539) ;
23 Fed. Reg. 2721.
Department of State Bulletin
4. Whereas item 218 (a) in Part I of the said Schedule
XX (3 UST 1144) reads as follows:
Biological, chemical, metallurgical, pharma
ceutical, and surgical articles and utensils of
all kinds, including all scientific articles,
and utensils, whetLer used for experimental
purposes in hospitals, laboratories, schools
or universities, colleges, orotheiwise, all the
foregotog (except articles provided for in
paragraph 217 or 218 (e). Tariff Act of 1930),
finished or unfinished, wholly or to chief
value of glass.
5. Whereas, in ac-eordance with Article II of the said
General Agreement and by virtue of the said proclama-
tion of June 2, 1951, and the said notification of Septem-
ber 10, 1951, as amended, the United States rate of duty
applicable to clinical thermometers, finished or unfin-
ished, wholly or in chief value of glass, provided for in
paragraph 218 (a) of the Tariff Act of 1930 and in-
cluded in the said item 218 (a), is 421^ per centum ad
valorem, as specified in the said item 218 (a), which duty
refiects the tariff concession granted in the said General
Agreement with respect to such products ;
6. Whereas the United States Tariff Commission has
submitted to me a report of its Investigation No. 63
under section 7 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act
of 1951, as amended (19 U. S. C. 1364), on the basis of
which investigation and a hearing duly held in connec-
tion therewith the said Commission has found that, as a
result in part of the duty reflecting the concession
granted thereon in the said General Agreement, clinical
thermometers, finished or unfinished, wholly or in chief
value of glass, provided for in the said item 218 (a), are
being imported into the United States in such increased
quantities, both actual and relative, as to cause serious
injury to the domestic industry producing like or directly
competitive products ;
7. Whereas the said Tariff Commission has further
found that in order to remedy the serious injury to the
said domestic industry it is neces.sary that there be ap-
plied to such thermometers, for an indefinite period, a
duty of 85 per centum ad valorem, and has recommended
the withdrawal, for an indefinite period, of the tariff con-
cession granted in the said General Agreement with
respect to such thermometers ; and
8. Whereas the rate of duty on such thermometers
expressly fixed by statute in paragraph 218 (a) of the
Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U. S. C. 1001) is 85 per centum ad
valorem, which rate of duty will become applicable to
such thermometers if the tariff concession thereon, set
forth in the said item 218 (a), is withdrawn:
Now, THEREFORE, I, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, Pres-
ident of the United States of America, acting under the
authority vested in me by section 350 of the Tariff Act of
1930, as amended, and by section 7 (c) of the Trade
Agreements Extension Act of 1951, as amended, and in
May 26, 1958
accordance with the provisions of Article XIX of the said
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, do proclaim
that, effective after the close of business on May 21, 1958,
and until the President otherwise proclaims, the tariff
concession granted in the said General Agreement with
respect to clinical thermometers, finished or unfinished,
wholly or in chief value of glass, provided for in said
item 218 (a), shall be withdrawn, and the said Proclama-
tion No. 2929 of June 2, 1951, and the said notification of
September 10, 1951, as amended by the said notification
of September 20, 1951, shall be suspended insofar as they
establish a rate of duty to be applied to the clinical
thermometers provided for in the said item 218 (a) on
which the concession is withdrawn by this proclamation.
In WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand
and caused the Seal of the United States of America to
be affixed.
Done at the City of Washington this 21st day of April
in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and
[seal] fifty-eight, and of the Independence of the
United States of America the one hundred and
eighty-second.
XJ Cx*-^ /-/^^6<-<-o-. A/u,,^^
■y the President:
Christian A. Herter
Acting Secretary of State
Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy
85th Congress, 2d Session
Mutual Security Act of 1958. Hearings before the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs on draft legislation to
amend further the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as
amended, and for other purposes. Part IV, March 5
and 6, 1958, 195 pp. ; Part VI, March 12, 1958, 123 pp. ;
Part VII, March 13, 19.J8, 28 pp. ; Part VIII, March 13
and 14, 1958, 154 pp. ; and Part IX, March 18-20, 1958,
185 pp.
Amendments to Trading With the Enemy Act. Hearing
before a subcommittee of the House Committee on In-
terstate and Foreign Commerce on H. R. 10327, H. R.
6766, and H. R. 78.30. March 13, 1958. 70 pp.
Suspension of Duties on Metal Scrap. Report to accom-
pany H.R. 10015. H. Rept. 1575, March 27, 1958.
4 pp.
Amending Section 39 of the Trading With the Enemy
Act. Report to accompany H.R. 11668. H. Rept. 1590,
April 1, 1958. 10 pp.
Communication from the President of the United States
transmitting proposed appropriations for the fiscal year
1959, in the amount of $3,942,092,500, for mutual assist-
ance programs. H. Doc. 363, April 1, 1958. 4 pp.
Report on the Twelfth Session of the General Assembly
of the United Nations by A. S. J. Carnahan and Walter
H. Judd of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs pur-
suant to H. Res. 29, a resolution authorizing the com-
mittee to conduct thorough studies and investigations
of all matters coming within the jurisdiction of such
committee. H. Rept. 1611, April 16, 1958. 188 pp.
883
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
Promoting Progress in Human Riglits
Statement hy Mrs. Osiuald B. Lord
V.S. Representative in the Hwman Rights Commission '
As we in the United Nations Commission on
Human Eights enter our discussion of progress
in human rights, I believe people throughout the
world look to us for candor, for guidance, and
for hope. Both the United Nations Charter and
the Declaration of Human Rights are solidly
based on the proposition that the individual has
an inherent dignity, that every man and woman
has inherent rights which are not rightfully
abridged by governments or other individuals.
Nevertheless, in such times as our own the desire
in many countries for security, for national sta-
bility, or promotion of national interests crowds
in upon the area of rights which are guaranteed
to each individual. In other countries such con-
siderations result in failure to carry out in prac-
tice what has been declared in theory. In still
other countries the interests of the state as a whole
have become so overinflated that not even a pre-
tense is made of guaranteeing rights against state
power.
In such times it is appropriate, indeed essen-
tial, that such a body as this Human Eights Com-
mission represent a counterforce by assessing the
condition of human rights in order to encourage
future progress.
The story of mankind is a story of the struggle
for increasing political freedom and economic
abundance. In each of the cultures represented
at this Commission there have been milestones
along the path toward an increasing standard
of liuman rights and freedoms.
People for centuries have yearned for both se-
'Made in the Commission on Apr. 1 (U.S. /U.N. press
release 2891).
curity and adventure — for peace and freedom.
Other bodies of the United Nations are primarily
concerned with achieving peaceful relations
among nations. It is their task to take up the
political disputes which are often at the heart of
violations of human rights. It is their task to
deal with individual violations of human rights
which may be threats to international peace. We
in the Human Eights Conmnission have the task
of setting the goals for which men should aim
and of discovering the techniques to achieve them.
It would be gratifying to all of us here if we
could achieve the fundamental freedoms which
the charter and the declaration speak of by pass-
ing resolutions, or even by drafting conventions
or treaties. But unfortunately peaceful progress
toward human rights depends above everything
else on changing the beliefs and ideas by which
men live. Ideas and beliefs change slowly.
In the process of promoting progress in human
rights good laws are essential, but they are not
enough. Frequently a community or a country
may have good laws but ruthless administra-
tion. It may state the noblest ideals in its
legislation but in practice eliminate any defense
for individual rights against intrusions by the
state.
"Human rights" are a bundle of relationships
starting with personal and family attitudes,
spreading to church and social alEliations, to
schools, to legal systems, and eventually to the
basic pliilosophy of governments. That is why
human rights cannot be controlled solely by law,
nor should they be judged solely by legalisms.
The state of human rights in a country is largely
Deparfmenf of State Bulletin
affected by what nongovernmental organizations
do and by what individual citizens do. We in
the United States consider the work of local citi-
zens and nongovernmental organizations to be
the key part in the process by which we strive
for the realization of human rights.
Mr. Chairman, the Commission now has before
it the fii-st triennial report on the condition of
human rights.^ It is obviously up to govern-
ments— my own included — to make available ma-
terial sufficiently in advance for proper process-
ing. It is regrettable that only 35 countries have
responded to the Secretary-General's request for
information. I would like to suggest, therefore,
that the Commission begin discussion of the tri-
ennial report this year and finish the debate next
year. I shall come back to this suggestion at tlie
end of my statement.
Encouraging Developments in Many Countries
During the 3 years under consideration there
have been a few cases when countries have made
great strides forward and others where unhappy
strides backward have been taken. For other
countries the record is more mixed. Certainly,
however, the examples of progress are numerous
and encouraging.
The report before us shows that progress can
come and it can come rapidly. Thomas Jefferson
in 1825 caught the spirit of another time in words
which sound very modern :
All eyes are opened or opening to the rights of man.
The general spread of science has already laid open to
every view the palpable truth that the mass of mankind
has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a
favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride them
legitimately by the Grace of God.
It is encouraging in my opinion to note how
many countries during the period under review
included in their constitution statements of fim-
damental rights guaranteed to their citizens in
keeping witli the provisions of the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights. Nepal, in the Gov-
ernment of Nepal Act of 1951 with the subsequent
amendments of 1954, is one striking example.
Another is the statement of fundamental rights
in the constitution of Pakistan of Febru-
ary 29, 1956.
The Austrian State Treaty, which became a
' U.N. doe. E/CN.4/757 and Adds. 1, 2, 3, and 4.
May 26, 1958
part of the municipal law of Austria, reaffirmed
the principle of equality of all citizens before the
law.
On November 18, 1955, His Majesty Mohammed
V presented the fundamental statement of policy
for the newly independent state of Morocco. He
referred expressly to the objective of a demo-
cratic regime free from all racial discrimination
and inspired by the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.
In the constitution of the Republic of Korea
of July 12, 1948, chapter II contains 22 articles
presenting the "Rights and Duties of Citizens."
In clear language are stated the human rights
presented in the Universal Declaration. During
the period of the reports before us the constitu-
tion of the Republic of Korea was amended for
the second time since its adoption in 1948 to pro-
vide, among other things, for popular referen-
dum of certain types of legislation upon a petition
of 5,000 qualified voters.
In Denmark a comprehensive act now empowers
the lower house of the legislature to appoint a
commissioner to investigate a complaint by an
individual concerning official faults or negligence
in public duty.
The tremendous increase in communications
facilities today has contributed to the danger
that rights of privacy will be invaded. In the
United States the legality of wiretapping of tele-
phone conversations was the subject of a far-
reaching decision by the United States Supreme
Court. The Supreme Court restricted this prac-
tice even when carried on by law-enforcement
officers. An important judicial decision in Swit-
zerland on the secrecy of correspondence sup-
ported a magistrate's refusal to divert telegrams
and mail of a suspected individual even to the
law-enforcement authorities. The Federal Court
of Justice in the Federal Republic of Germany
ruled that personal papers of a confidential nature
were entitled to the same kind of protection as
copyright works, to be published only with the
author's permission. And in France the privacy
of an individual in a judicial proceeding was
protected by an act making it an offense to photo-
graph, broadcast, or televise judicial proceedings.
A number of countries took action to establish
or extend the right to vote for women. Suffrage
was granted to women in Cambodia, Colombia,
Ethiopia, Laos, and Nicaragua and extended in
885
Honduras, Peru, and Haiti. The right was also
established for women in Ghana and Malaya.
The interest of governments in the field of
liealth and social security has shown a tremendous
increase in the number of provisions covering
benefits for retirement, compensation, and
insurance.
We see from the report by UNESCO ^^ tliat
article 27, which provides the right to participate
freely in the cultural life of the community, has
been also considerably extended during the 3
years under review. Italy, for example, has writ-
ten into its constitution a provision to protect
linguistic minorities. In India any group of
citizens having a distinct language, script, or cul-
ture has the right to conserve it.
Adult education is a growing concern in many
countries. To mention India again, we find that
some 75,000 literacy classes have been established
with an enrollment of over 600,000. In 1956 the
President of Viet-Nam called upon the entire
population to join in evening courses for workers
with participation by all the country's intellec-
tuals. The state of Israel reports great emphasis
on the teacliing of language and fundamental edu-
cation, as well as vocational and professional
education for new immigi-ants. A number of
countries report active efforts to encourage and
assist writers through literary funds and also
through the purchase of prize-winning books for
distribution to schools and public libraries.
Others report success in bringing books and ex-
hibits to rural areas by mobile libraries.
Civil Liberties in the United States
If I may refer to the United States again, our
Constitution sets forth the basic human rights
which may not be invaded by governmental au-
tliority. These basic rights, generally designated
as "civil liberties" or "political rights," include
the right to life, liberty, freedom of expression,
conscience, and assembly, the right to a fair trial
and to participate freely in the government. It
is the function of the courts, which are independ-
ent of the executive and the legislature, to review
all alleged violations of these basic rights, and
the courts' decisions, after full and fair hearings,
are final. There is, of course, an appeals system
whereby rulings by lower courts may be reviewed
' U.N. doc. E/CN.4/758.
«86
by higher courts, all the way up to the United
States Supreme Court.
The United States reports to the United Nations
Yearbook on Human Rights cite many cases which
show how our courts are ever watcliful of the
i-ights of the individual. It has always been our
belief that civil liberties can be safeguarded for
all only when the riglits of every individual are
safeguarded.
A moment ago I mentioned that there had been
examples during the 3 years under review where
events had taken place of fundamental impor-
tance for human rights. We in the United States
feel tliat one of these was the unanimous decision
in the case of Brown v. The Board of Education
of Topeka handed down May 17, 1954. In this
case the United States Supreme Court decided
that segregation on the basis of race in all pub-
licly supported schools is unconstitutional because
it is inconsistent with the guaranty in the Con-
stitution of the "equal protection of the laws."
By this decision the school system in 17 States
was declared to be inconsistent with the Consti-
tution. The Court recognized that a social change
of such a sweeping character would require many
adjustments and recognized that time would be
needed to implement its decision. But the Court
said a reasonable start should be made, and in
1955 the Supreme Court again stated that the
decision should be carried out "with reasonable
speed."
Before 1954 all Negro children were attending
public schools daily in the 17 southern States as
elsewhere. Since 1896 the Court had permitted
States to maintain "separate but equal" facilities
for Negro and white public schools. "Wliat we are
now reaching for is something more— something
far more subtle and difficult — namely, psycholog-
ical equality.
At the present time the great majority of our
schools are fully integrated. In 31 of our 48
States all children have attended the same public
schools without distinction because of race, color,
or creed. In 10 other States integration is pro-
gressing and in most cases without commotion,
without difficulty, without law suits. In these 10
border States almost 25 percent of tlie 3,000 bi-
racial school districts have begun to place Negro
and white children in the same classes. In some
areas such as the Nation's Capital and the State
of West "Virginia all formerly separate but equal
Department of State Bulletin
schools have been integrated. In Kentucky 75 per-
cent of the State has now integrated schools, with
only two incidents of friction in some 200 counties.
As for higher education, in April 1957 it was
estimated that in 1956 there were 196,000 non-
white students between the ages of 14 and 34
enrolled in colleges or universities. This repre-
sented an increase of about 620 percent over non-
white enrollments in 1930. While the 1956 figure
includes all nonwhites, the vast majority are
Negroes. The rate of increase in the number of
nonwhite institutions of higher learning is cur-
rently reported to be about six times that of the
number of white students. In 1951 it was re-
ported that 6 out of ever}' 1,000 Negroes of all
ages were enrolled in colleges or universities. The
percentage would be higher now, but even the
1951 figure is a very large one, and as a matter of
fact it represents the existence of greater oppor-
tunities for higher education among the members
of a single segment of our population than are
offered by almost any other country to all of its
people.
We are witnessing today nothing short of a
peaceful social revolution. Some say progress has
been too swift for orderly adjustments, others say
it has been too slow; but none would deny tliat a
social revolution is in progress. As the publisher
of a Negro magazine recently said, "The Negro
has made more progress in the last 10 years than
any other group of people in the world — and I
cannot think of any major field in which the
Negro has not achieved success in the past few
years."
Economic and Social Development
In the field of economic, social, and cultural de-
velopment there is a great deal I could report
since under the years covered by our study the
American people attained a level of well-being
surpassing anything known before. President
Eisenhower in his annual economic report of Jan-
uary 1957 concerning major economic and social
developments during the years 1953-56* pointed
out that the enormous productive power of the
American economy has made possible the release
of more time for creative personal development as
well as for the more complete enjoyment of ma-
terial things. Mr. Eisenhower also said:
* H. Doc. 29, 85th Cong., 1st sess.
Moreover our free economy gives indispensable -sup-
port to the form of political life that we cherish. There
are instructive parallels between our political and eco-
nomic institutions. No form of government offers greater
opportunity for individual expression, or places heavier
reliance on individual leadership and integrity. Sim-
ilarly no type of economic system offers greater oppor-
tunity for individual achievement or places heavier
responsibilities on the individual.
Let me refer to certain other facts of American
economic life during the period under discussion,
facts which have fundamental social significance.
The share of the national income going to
wages, salaries, social-security benefits, and re-
lated payments increased during the period from
73.8 percent to 75.8 percent.
A growing proportion of our people own their
own homes : 60 percent of our homes were owned
by their occupants in 1956 compared to 55 percent
in 1950.
Significant gains were also made in health and
life expectancy. Some 116 million persons were
covered in 1956 by hospital insurance and 101 mil-
lion by some insurance against the cost of surgical
care.
Social security was extended through a number
of acts of Congress. By the end of 1956, 9 out of
every 10 workers were covered or eligible for cov-
erage under old-age, survivors, and disability in-
surance. In addition, private pension plans now
cover about 15 million workers.
Mr. Chairman, the developments in many coun-
tries to which I have referred represent the open
pages of progress in the book of human rights. I
wish it were possible for us to limit ourselves only
to the frank and honest discussions which these
bright pages make possible.
Unfortunately there are also dark pages of re-
pression in this same book.
It would be cynical and unreal beyond belief if
we were to pretend that the specter of Hungary
does not sit silently at this table today. I do not
intend here to detail the tragedy hinted at in the
report submitted by Hungary or to single out
those responsible. The United Nations itself has
already done this far more effectively than I
could, and the world knows from its report — as
each of us here today knows — the truth.
Nor do I suggest that tragic Hungary is the
only chapter in the amials of human rights which
records a sad lack of progress or an even sadder
regression in the field of human rights today.
May 26, 1958
887
Elsewhere there are peoples whose sufferings call
out to us — often mutely — that they should not be
forgotten. And we will certainly not forget them.
Our Commission this year can only begin the
discussion of periodic reports. There is too much
to be reported, too much to be studied, and too
much to be discussed for the Commission to com-
plete consideration of this item in one session. I
propose, therefore, that we decide to continue our
discussion next year. Many governments, includ-
ing my own, have been slow in submitting infor-
mation. We would be failing to deal with many
replies and would be dealing with others too
quickly if we didn't continue our discussion next
year.
I began my remarks by referring to the fact
that human rights are an organic aspect of all of
life's activities, not just matters for laws and
courts. To make progress in human rights, we
must emphasize what will affect the practices and
beliefs by which men live. In future reports the
Commission should ask governments increasingly
to indicate practices as well as legislation in their
replies.
Mr. Chairman, we have before us examples of
progress during 3 years. Our task is not only to
debate what has happened but to note what needs
to be done and press ahead. Our task is to seek
those places where we can assist in making prog-
ress. Our task is to note the progress being made.
By so doing we can find light to shine on dark
places where human rights are now dimmed.
U.S. Delegations to
International Conferences
Alternate
David H. Popper, Deputy U.S. Representative for Inter-
national Organizations, American Consulate General,
Geneva, Switzerland
Advisers
Harry J. Gardner, Lieutenant, U.S. Coast Guard, Mer-
chant Marine Detail Office, London, England
Leo J. Gehrig, Assistant Chief for Professional Services,
Division of Hospitals, Bureau of Medical Services, De-
partment of Health, Education, and Welfare
Joseph P. Goldberg, Special Assistant to the Commis-
sioner, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Department of
Labor
Edward L. Keenan, Deputy Director, Bureau of Employ-
ment Security, Department of Labor
Graham W. McGowan, Special Assistant to the Secretary
of Commerce
William L. Morrison, Commander, U.S. Coast Guard, De-
partment of the Treasury
M. K. O'Sullivan, Captain, Maritime Administration, De-
partment of Commerce
George Tobias, Attach^ for International Labor Affairs,
American Consulate General, Geneva, Switzerland
Representing the Employees op the United States
Delegate
Ralph E. Casey, President, American Merchant Marine
Institute, Inc., New York, N.Y.
Advisers
Albert B. Benson, Secretary-Treasurer, Pacific American
Tankship Association, San Francisco, Calif.
Edward S. Bischoff, Employee Relations Manager, Ma-
rine Transportation Department, Socony Mobil Oil
Company, Inc., New York, N.Y.
John E. Murphy, American President Lines, San Fran-
cisco, Calif.
Maitland S. Pennington, Assistant Vice President, Moore-
McCormack Lines, Inc., New York, N.Y.
Halert C. Shepheard, Rear Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard
(Retired), Washington, D. C.
Lyndon Spencer, Vice Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard (Re-
tired), President, Lake Carriers' Association, Cleve-
land, Ohio
41st CMaritime) Session, International Labor
Conference
The Department of State announced on April
29 (press release 228) the following U.S. delega-
tion to the 41st (maritime) session of the Inter-
national Labor Conference to be held at Geneva,
Switzerland, April 29 to May 16.
Representing the Government of the United States
Delegates
Albert Charles Jacobs, chairman, Special Assistant to the
Secretary of Labor
Louis S. Rothschild, Under Secretary of Commerce foi
Transportation
888
Representing the Workers of the United States
John Hawk, Secretary-Treasurer, Seafarers Interna-
tional Union of North America — A and G District, San
Francisco, Calif.
Advisers
Elmer Cope, International Representative of Economics
and International Affairs, United Steel Workers of
America, Washington, D. C.
Wesley A. Ferron, Member, National Marine Engineers'
Beneficial Association Executive Committee, and Busi-
ness Manager, NMEBA No. 97, San Francisco, Calif.
Peter Henle, Associate Director of Research, American
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Or-
ganizations, Washington, D. C.
Department of State Bulletin
Laue Kirkland, Assistant Director, Social Security Divi-
sion, American Federation of Labor and Congress of
Industrial Organizations, Washington, D. C.
R. D. Lurvey, Captain, President pro tem, International
Organization of Masters, Mates and Pilots, Boston,
Mass.
Secretanj of Delegation
William Kelley, Office of International Conferences, De-
partment of State
The International Labor Conference is the prin-
cipal policymaking organ of the International
Labor Organization (ILO), a specialized agency
of tlie United Nations comprising 79 member
countries. This session of the International Labor
Conference, which is being convened by the Gov-
erning Body of the ILO, is a special meeting de-
voted exclusively to maritime matters. Such mari-
time sessions are held at approximately 10-year
intervals, the last having met at Seattle in 1946.
The agenda of the conference, as determined
by the Governing Body witii the recommenda-
tions of the Joint Maritime Commission, is as
follows: the Director-General's report; general
revision of the Wages, Hours of Work and Man-
ning (Sea) Convention (Revised) 1949; engage-
ment of seafarers through regularly established
employment offices; flag transfer in relation to
social conditions and safety; contents of ships'
medicine chests and medical advice by radio to
ships at sea; jurisdiction over the suspension of
officers' certificates of competency ; and reciprocal
or international recognition of seafarers' national
identity cards.
The maritime session will be followed by the 42d
annual session of the International Labor Con-
ference convening at Geneva on June 4.
ECE Committee on Electric Power
The Department of State announced on May
7 (press release 250) that John E. Corette, presi-
dent and general manager of the Montana Power
Company, Butte, Mont., will again serve as U.S.
Delegate to the Committee on Electric Power,
which will convene its 16th session at Geneva,
Switzerland on May 19.
Established in 1947, the Committee on Electric
Power is one of tlie subsidiary organs of the
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe,
in whose work all the European countries as well
as the United States participate. At the coming
session the Committee will examine the factors in-
fluencing future development of electric power
with a view to identifying problems that require
international action such as the legal and admin-
istrative difficulties hampering the transfer of
power across frontiers.
ECE Working Party on Gas Problems
The Department of State announced on May 8
(press release 254) the designation of Edward G.
Boyer of Norristown, Pa., as the U.S. Delegate to
the 4th session of the Working Party on Gas
Problems of the United Nations Economic Com-
mission for Europe to be held at Geneva, Switzer-
land, May 28-30.
The Working Party provides a forum where ex-
perts in the field of gas production may meet
periodically to consider and discuss problems of
common interest. Discussions in the coming ses-
sion will concern papers on the improvement of
the flexibility of gas production ; legal protection
of international gas pipelines; liquefying, trans-
porting, and regasifying of natural gas; and ex-
change of experience on variation in gas demand
according to temperature and on charging for gas
on a thermal basis. Tlie Working Party will also
consider the discussions and decisions of the 13th
session of the Economic Commission relevant to its
work program.
Current U. N. Documents:
A Selected Bibliography^
Economic and Social Council
Statistical Commission. Progress Report on Balance of
Payments Statistics. Memorandum prepared by Balance
of Payments Division of the International Monetary
Fund. E/CN.3/2r)3, January 30, 1908. 11 pp. mimeo.
Statistical Commission. The International Standard
ClassiHcation of Occupations. Memorandum prepared
by the International Labour Office. B/CN.3/251, Jan-
uary 31, 1958. 3 pp. mimeo.
Statistical Commission. Problems of Adapting External
Trade Statistics for Special Types of Economic .Analysis.
Memorandum by the Secretary-General. E/CN. 3/235,
February 3, 1958. 15 rip- niimeo.
Oommission on Human Rights. Study on Discrimination
in Education. Note by the Secretary-General. E/CN.3/
760/Add. 2, February 5, 1!).")8. 5 pp. mimeo.
Consideration of the Establishment of an Economic Com-
mission for Africa. Note by the Secretary-General.
E/3052, February 6, 1958. 39 pp. mimeo.
' Printed materials may be secured in the United States
from the International Documents Service, Columbia I'ni-
versity Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y. Other
materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may
be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United
States.
May 26, 1958
889
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Aviation
Convention on international civil aviation. Done at Chi-
cago December 7, 1944. Entered into force April 4,
1947. TIAS 1591.
Ratification deposited: Costa Rica, May 1, 1958.
International air services transit agreement. Signed at
Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force for the
United States February 8, 1945. 59 Stat. 1693.
Acceptance deposited: Costa Rica, May 1, 1958.
Cultural Property
Convention for the protection of cultural property in the
event of armed conflict, and regulations of execution.
Done at The Hague May 14, 1954. Entered into force
August 7, 1956."
Ratification deposited: Rumania, March 21, 1958.
Protocol for the protection of cultural property in the
event of armed conflict. Done at The Hague May 14,
1954. Entered into force August 7, 1956.'
Accession deposited: Rumania, March 21, 1958.
BILATERAL
Argentina
Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agree-
ment of April 2.5, 1955 (TIAS 3247). Effected by ex-
change of notes at Buenos Aires April 11 and 22, 1958.
Entered into force April 24, 1958.
Bolivia
Military assistance agreement. Effected by exchange of
notes at La Paz March 21 and April 22, 1958. Entered
into force April 22, 1958.
Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of
1954, as amended (68 Stat. 455; 7 U. S. C. 1701-1709),
with memorandum of understanding. Signed at Taipei
April 18, 1958. Entered into force April 18, 1958.
PUBLICATIONS
Foreign Relations Volume
Press release 248 dated May 6
The Department of State on May 10 released
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1939, Vol-
' Not in force for the United States.
890
ume V, The American Republics. This is the Jast
of a series of five volumes of diplomatic docu-
ments to be published for the year 1939.
About one-fourth of the documentation printed
in this volume relates to multilateral subjects,
chiefly with respect to official actions taken or pro-
posed by the various American states in their
concern over the outbreak of war in Europe and
its possible extension to the Western Hemisphere.
The remaining three-fourths of the volume cov-
ers the relations of the United States with individ-
ual American Republics. Four subjects dominate
the correspondence: economic cooperation, debt
payments, financial assistance, and ti'ade agree-
ments.
Copies of this volume (v, 827 pp.) may be
obtained from the Government Printing Office,
Washington 25, D. C, for $4 each.
Recent Releases
For sale hy the Superintendent of Documents, V. S. Oov-
ernmcnt Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Address
requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, ex-
cept in the case of free publications, which may be ob-
tained from the Department of State.
Cultural, Technical, and Educational Exchanges. TIAS
3975. 27 pp. 15(f.
Agreement, with exchange of letters, between the United
States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics— Signed at Washington January 27, 1958. En-
tered into force January 27, 1958.
Weather Stations— Betio Island. TIAS 3976. 3 pp. 5^.
Agreement between the United States of America and
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ire-
land. Exchange of notes — Signed at Washington Jan-
uary 20, 1958. Entered into force January 20, 1958.
Extension of Charter Lease of United States Vessels to
Japan. TIAS 3977. 16 pp. 10(».
Agreement between the United States of America and
Japan. Exchange of notes — Signed at Tokyo January
13, 1958. Entered into force January 13, 1958.
Scholarship Exchange Program. TIAS 3978. 7 pp. 100.
Agreement between the United States of America and
Ireland, supplementing agreement of June 17, 1954 —
Signed at Dublin March 16, 1957. Entered into force De-
cember 23, 1957.
Mutual Aid Settlement. TIAS
4 pp. 5^.
Agreement between the United States of America and
France — Signed at Washington January 30, 1958. En-
tered into force January 30, 1958.
Mutual Defense Assistance— Equipment, Materials, and
Services. TIAS 3980. 8 pp. 10(!.
Understanding, with exchange of letters, between the
United States of America and Prance, relating to agree-
ment of January 27, 1950 — Signed at Washington Janu-
ary 30, 1958. Entered into force January 30, 1958.
Department of State Bulletin
May 26, 1958 I n <
Africa
Nationalism and Collective Security (Jandrey) . . 863
The United States and Africa: An Official View-
point (Holmes) 857
American Principles. Our Changing World
(Dulles) 847
American Republics. Foreign Relations Volume . 890
Asia. Nationalism and Collective Security (Jan-
drey) 863
Communism. Nationalism and Collective Security
(Jandrey) 863
Congress, The. Congressional Documents Relating
to Foreign Policy 883
Economic Affairs
The Contribution of Trade to the Cause of Peace
(Dillon) 881
ECE Committee on Electric Power (delegate) . . 889
ECE Working Party on Gas Problems (delegate) . 889
tian Mission Concludes Financial Discussions . 880
President Increases Tariff on Clinical Thermom-
eters (text of proclamation) 882
France. U.S., U.K., and France Agree to Separate
Talks at Moscow (text of tripartite statement and
Soviet aide memoire) 852
Germany. The Lessons of Berlin (Dulles) . . . 854
Haiti. Haitian Mission Concludes Financial Dis-
cussions 880
Health, Education, and Welfare. Promoting Prog-
ress in Human Rights (Lord) 884
International Organizations and Conferences
ECE Committee on Electric Power (delegate) . . 889
ECE Working Party on Gas Problems (delegate) . 889
41st (Maritime) Session of ILO (delegation) . . 888
Nationalism and Collective Security (Jandrey) . . 863
NATO Ministerial Council Meets at Copenhagen
(Dulles, text of communique, delegation) . . . 850
Mutual Security
The Contribution of Trade to the Cause of Peace
(Dillon) S81
Haitian Mission Concludes Financial Discussions . 880
Our Changing World (Dulles) 847
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO Min-
isterial Council Meets at Copenhagen (Dulles,
textof communique, delegation) 850
Presidential Documents. President Increases
Tariff on Clinical Thermometers 882
Publications
Foreign Relations Volume 890
Recent Releases 890
Rumania. Eighty-first Anniversary of Rumanian
Independence 853
Treaty Information. Current Actions 890
e X Vol. XXXVIII, No. 987
U.S.S.R. U.S., U.K., and France Agree to Separate
Talks at Moscow (text of tripartite statement and
Soviet aide memoire) 852
United Kingdom. U.S., U.K., and Prance Agree to
Separate Talks at Moscow (text of tripartite
statement and Soviet aide memoire) 852
United Nations
Current U.N. Documents 889
Nationalism and the United Nations (Irwin) . . 872
Promoting Progress in Human Rights (Lord) . . . 884
Name Index
Boyer, Edward G 889
Corette, John E 889
Dillon, Douglas 881
Dulles, Secretary 847, 850, 8.54
Eisenhower, President 882
Holmes, Julius C 857
Irwin, V/allace, Jr 872
Jandrey, Frederick W 863
Lord, Mrs. Oswald B 884
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: May 5-H
Press releases may be obtained from the News
Division, Washington 25, D. C.
Releases issued prior to May 5 which appear in
this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 221 of April 25,
225 of April 28, 228 of April 29, 235 of May 1, 237
and 240 of May 2, and 241 of May 3.
No. Date Subject
Dillon : World Trade Fair.
Operation of Wilkes Station, Antarc-
tica.
Intersessional meeting of GATT.
Kohler : "Negotiation as an Effective
Instrument of American Foreign
Policy."
Foreign Relations volume.
Eisenhower meeting with Thai Su-
preme Commander.
Corette named delegate to ECE Elec-
tric Power Committee (rewrite).
NATO communique.
Rountree: Foreign Relations Com-
mittee.
Dulles : Berlin.
Boyer named delegate to ECE gas
committee (rewrite).
81st anniversary of Rumanian inde-
pendence.
Loan to Honduras for highways.
Assistance to Pakistan in smallpox
vaccination campaign.
Minnesota Statehood Day.
•Not printed.
tHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin.
244
t245
5/5
5/6
t246
t247
5/6
5/6
248
t249
5/6
5/7
250
5/7
251
t252
5/7
5/8
253
254
5/8
5/8
2.55
5/9
•250
•257
5/9
5/9
258
5/11
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1957
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Vol. XXXVIII, No. 988
June 2, 1958
i<
AMERICAN TRADE POLICY AND THE LESSONS OF
THE 1930's • by Assistant Secretary Mann 895
U.S. POLICIES AND PROGRAMS IN THE FAR
EAST • Statement by Assistant Secretary Robertson . . . 914
PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS OF U.S. RELATIONS
WITH THE NEAR EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND
AFRICA • Statement by Assistant Secretary Rountree . . 918
NEGOTIATION AS AN EFFECTIVE INSTRUMENT OF
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY • by Foy D. Kohler . . 901
I
U.N. PROMOTION OF EQUALITY FOR WOMEN • Report
on the 1958 Session of the Commission on the Status of
Women by Lorena B. Hahn 930
>OUCY
For index see inside back cover
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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JUL 8 -1958
Vol. XXXVIII. No. 988 • Pobucation 6649
June 2, 1958
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American Trade Policy and the Lessons of the 1930's
iy Thomas C. Mann
Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs '
One of the topics which my fellow panelists
and I have been asked to talk about this after-
noon is "The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act —
Stimulant or Depressant?" The appropriateness
and iniportance of that question in our present
period of economic setback is mideniable.
Last September the Office of the President pre-
pared a statement on the foreign economic pol-
icy of the United States.^ "The broad objective
of United States foreign economic policy," the
statement said, "is identical with that of our gen-
eral foreign policy and, in fact, of the overall
policy of the United States Government : to pro-
tect and advance the national interest, to improve
the security and well-being of the United States
and its people."
The statement divided this broad objective of
our foreign economic policy into three major
components: first, to promote the economic
strength of the United States; second, to pro-
mote the economic strength of the rest of the free
world; and third, to build and maintain cohe-
sion in the free world. These parts of our pol-
icy are inseparable. Any program which hin-
dei-s the achievement of any one of these three
objectives is clearly unwise and luisound.
The trade agreements program contributes a
basic, essential element to America's economic
strength; it is both a stimulant to, and an ex-
panding force for, our economy. Pi-esident
Eisenhower, in recommending to Congress that his
'Address made before the National Industrial Confer-
ence Board at New York, N. T., on May 15 (press re-
lease 265 dated May 14).
'For text, see Bulletin of Nov. 4, 1957, p. 723.
June 2, T958
authority to negotiate trade agreements be con-
tinued,' said,
Reciprocal trade agreements negotiated since the ad-
vent of the Trade Agreements Act have helped bring
a more vigorous, dynamic growth to our American econ-
omy. Our own economic self-interest, therefore, de-
mands a continuation of the trade agreements program.
Nothing demonstrates the accuracy of this
statement better than the experience of the
United States in foreign trade between 1930 and
1934. The Trade Agreements Act of 1934 was
not passed in a vacuum. It was written, consid-
ered, and enacted against the backgi-ound of 4
years' experience with the highest tariff wall in
our history, the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of
1930. It was the view of the executive branch
and of Congress in 1934 that the Smoot-Hawley
tariff had contributed to the depression of that
era and that the Trade Agreements Act, by ex-
panding our foreign trade, would help to bring
us out of that depression. I suggest that that
conclusion is still valid today with reference to
our present, much less severe, economic decline.
The depression of the 1930's actually began,
you will remember, in the 1920's, with a serious
decline in the prosperity of American agriculture.
Late in 1928 the United States Congress began
consideration of a bill to provide higher tariffs
on agricultural imports as a means of alleviating
the difficulties of the farmer. During tlie 18
months that elapsed before final passage of the
Smoot-Hawley tariff the depression had spread
from agriculture to every sector of American life.
' For text of the President's message, see ihid., Feb. 17,
1958, p. 263.
895
What had begun as a limited revision of the
United States tariflf soon broadened into a bill to
establish a completely new tariff.
Much of the support for the Smoot-Hawley
bill came from individuals and firms seeking to
protect their particular economic interests.
Otliers, however, supported the bill in the sincere
conviction that a high tariff would somehow "ex-
port the depression." This interesting notion
arose from the assumption that high tariffs, by
excluding foreign products, would make it possi-
ble for the prohibited imports to be produced in
the United States, thereby raising the level of our
economic activity at home.
It does not seem to have occurred to the be-
lievers in this theory that foreign goods were im-
ported for many reasons — because we wanted to
sell our own products abroad, which is impossible
unless we buy from countries which wish to sell
to us ; because similar products were not produced
domestically; because the domestic product was
more expensive; or because buyers preferred the
imported product over similar ones produced at
home. If imports are to be replaced by domesti-
cally produced goods, it can only be done at in-
creased cost to the United States economy and
the United States consumer. And increased costs
and higher prices are no way to lick a depression.
The supporters of high tariffs also seem to have
ignored the importance of exports to the Ameri-
can economy and the effect on American exports
which high tariffs would have. If we exclude the
products of other nations from our markets, they
have no choice but to exclude our products from
their markets. They cannot continue to spend
dollars without some means of earning them.
This simple fact is of even greater significance
today than in 1930 because our exports are now
at a record $19.5-billion level.
Nevertheless, the Smoot-Hawley tariff was en-
acted. The debate on the bill had not been con-
fined to this country. "Well before June 1930,
when the bill became law, foreign governments
and commercial interests had expressed concern
at the proposed revision of the United States
tariff. It was obvious to many both here and
abroad that a radical hike in United States tar-
iff barriers would only intensify the world de-
pression and increase the payments and exchange
difficulties of many countries. All told, 33 foreign
nations launched formal and official protests to
the United States Government before and after
passage of the Smoot-Hawley tariff".
Reaction of Other Nations
This action on the part of the world's leading
creditor and one of the major trading nations was
an invitation to other nations to take action to
prevent the United States from exporting its un-
employment to them. AVithin a few months after
the enactment of the Smoot-Hawley tariff, many
countries had followed suit by increasing tariffs.
Some also adopted other highly effective meas-
ures for restricting imports, such as import quotas
and exchange controls, and various administra-
tive devices which retarded trade. A few specific
examples of this retaliation might be in order.
Canada reacted swiftly to the new United States
tariff and adopted the highest level of protection
in its histoi-y. The principal American exports
affected by the four upward revisions of the
Canadian tariff which were enacted between 1930
and 1932 were iron and steel, farm products, farm
implements, electrical machinery, gasoline, shoes,
paper, fertilizers, household equipment, auto-
mobiles, and chemicals. In addition Canada im-
posed "antidumping" duties and other adminis-
trative measures directed against United States
products.
Italy also reacted quickly to the drastic exten-
sion of United States protection. As in several
other countries throughout the world, there de-
veloped in Italy a boycott of selected American
goods. On June 30, 1930, Italy adopted a virtu-
ally prohibitive tariff on United States autos,
thus forcing out of business almost all dealers of
United States cars in Italy. Shortly thereafter,
United States radios and radio equipment were
effectively shut out of the Italian market by
higher tariffs. The Italian Government also re-
taliated by switching imports of raw and un-
fuiished materials from the United States to
nations which were buying reciprocally from
Italy. Between 1929 and 1931 United States
exports to Italy dropped 66 percent, while Italian
expoi-ts to this country were down 39 percent.
A week after the President signed the Tariff
Act of 1930 the Spanish Government promul-
gated a new tariff aimed principally at the United
States and France. Duties on cars were raised
Department of State Bulletin
100 to 150 percent, and those on other manu-
factured goods generally imported from the
United States were increased as much as seven-
fold. At the same time the United States lost,
for the first time since 1906, most-favored-nation
treatment by Spain.
Switzerland was particularly hard hit by
the Smoot-Hawley tariff, especially by para-
grapli 367, which had the effect of increasing
United States tariffs on certain types of watches
from 53 percent to 266 percent, and on others from
83 to 242 and U to 253 percent. The Swiss re-
acted with a surprisingly effective boycott of
American products. Between 1929 and 1931 Swiss
imports from the United States declined 45 per-
cent, compared with a fall of only 17 percent in
Switzerland's total imports. During the same
period Swiss exports to the United States fell
56 percent and her total exports 33 percent.
Within a year or two Switzerland, in effect, aban-
doned its most-favored-nation treatment of United
States imports and, in addition to raising tariffs,
established import quotas, many of which were
aimed directly at reducing the American share
of Swiss imports.
One result of the tariff competition initiated by
Smoot-Hawley was to push the world's exports
onto the few remaining low-tariff countries,
notably the United Kingdom. The United King-
dom, which had never fully recovered from the
depression of the early twenties, clung to its his-
toric free-trade position long after other countries
had retreated behind high-tariff walls and/or
reverted to quantitative restrictions and bilateral-
ism. In 1931 Britain found it necessary to aban-
don tlie gold standard ; and in 1932 a combination
of trade and payments problems, plus mounting
domestic demands for pi'otection, led to the adop-
tion of the first British general tariff in almost
a century.
In addition to the growing demands of British
industry for the protection enjoyed by their
foreign competitors, the argument was advanced
that England needed a tariff for bargaining pur-
poses in order to force down foreign tariff's and
other restrictions. Having failed to achieve an
international tariff truce through the mechanism
of the League of Nations, of which the United
States was not a member, the British were obliged
to fall back upon their own bargaining power.
which, in the absence of a general tariff providing
a basis for bilateral or multilateral negotiations,
was limited. The Smoot-Hawley tariff was not
the sole cause of Britain's adopting a general tariff,
but it substantially influenced this development.
Other countries also used the argument that higher
tariff's were needed for bargaining purposes to
justify increased levels of protection.
The British general tariff of 1932 made possible,
and the Ottawa conference of the same year firmly
established, a tariff-preference system within the
British Empire which worked to the particular
detriment of American exports. Cordell Hull
once described the Ottawa agreements as "the
greatest injury, in a commercial way, that has been
inflicted on this country since I have been in public
life." One result of the Ottawa conference was a
further deterioration of the United States export
position in Canada. The United Kingdom bene-
fited at the expense of the United States, especially
with respect to chemicals and iron and steel
products.
Shrinkage in World Trade
Total world trade fell from $68 billion in 1929
to $55 billion in 1930 and to $26.5 billion in 1932.
During the same period the foreign trade of the
United States declined from $9.6 billion in 1929
to $6.9 billion in 1930 and to under $3 billion in
1932. While not all the shrinkage in either United
States or world trade can be attributed to United
States trade barriers, there can be little doubt that
the Smoot-Hawley tariff and the retaliation it
engendered were major factors not only in the
reduction in world trade but in the general break-
down of the international economy which occurred
in the 1930's.
I find it especially interesting that, although
trade barriers adopted abroad during the depres-
sion exceeded those adopted by the United States,
foreign countries in general maintained a higher
level of imports than we did. The reason was that
the commercial policies of other governments
tended to divert their countries' imports away
from the United States, so that our exports not
only fell sharply after 1930 but declined, in rela-
tive terms, more than those of other nations. Be-
tween 1929 and 1932 the physical volume of all
foreign countries' imports fell 25 percent, but
June 2, 1958
897
imports from the United States were almost
halved.
This, then, was the background with which Con-
gress was faced in 1934 when it came to consider
the Trade Agreements Act for the first time.
Today the Congress is in the process of considering
the act for the 12th time. By leading you through
the chamber of despair which the consequences of
the Tariff Act of 1930 constitute, I do not mean to
suggest that any res^jonsible person in American
public life today advocates a return to the trade
policies of that period. I believe that we have all
learned something from history and that, regard-
less of what turn our foreign trade policies may
take, we are unlikely to repeat the mistakes of 1930.
Danger of Making New Mistakes
But there are always new issues and new circum-
stances confronting us and, therefore, always the
danger of making new mistakes. Let me speak
quite plainly. I think it will be a mistake if the
Trade Agreements Act is not renewed for 5 years,
with a delegation of authority to the President to
negotiate tariff reductions of 5 percent a year, and
without crippling amendments. And I think that
American business will be mistaking its own inter-
ests if it fails to give the President's progi'am
vigorous support.
My reasons for this view are threefold. First,
if the trade agreements program is crippled, Amer-
ican exports will be hurt — immediately in some
cases, over the longer run in others. Second, we
endanger our present close economic cooperation
with our "Western European allies. Third, we lend
a helping hand to the Communist effort to link the
economies of the underdeveloped countries insep-
arably to the economy of the Sino-Soviet bloc.
On the first point, the importance of America's
economic interest in foreign trade, I think the evi-
dence of our depression experience speaks for
itself. A United States trade policy aimed at ex-
cluding the products of other nations will be re-
taliated against swiftly and effectively, now as
then. And we have almost $20 billion worth of
export business at stake in 1958, as opposed to less
than $4 billion in 1930. Seven percent of our labor
force is dependent on foreign trade; throw these
people out of work, and we more than double the
number of unemployed.
A short while back the American Bankers Asso-
ciation joined the list of organizations which are
898
supporting the President's proposals for extension
of the trade agreements program. The statement
of the Association's Executive Council contained
these important words :
It would be fallacious and dangerous for us to try to
stimulate economic recovei-y in the United States by plac-
ing greater restrictions on the entry of products from
abroad. Such restrictions would serve to increase the
impact of the current recession on other nations of the
free world and to depress further the demand for prod-
ucts of our own export industries. By broadening the
market for our own products and stimulating world trade
in general, we can make an important contribution to the
economic well-being both of the United States and of the
entire free world.
My second point — that a reversal of our 24-year-
old trade policy could endanger our political and
economic interests in Western Europe — is also sup-
ported by the evidence of the 1930's. The British
imperial preference system is but one example of
the regional trading blocs that developed in the
disintegration of world trade which followed the
Smoot-Hawley tariff. International economic co-
operation rests on mutuality of interests. When
that mutuality of interests disappears, the fabric
of cooperation between the nations of the free
world disappears with it. It cannot survive on
sentiment and words alone.
GATT and the European Common Market
One of the major instruments of cooperation
between the free nations is the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade. The meetings of the
parties to this agreement provide an opportunity
to work out in friendly discussion the conflicts
of interest which arise in international trade.
The six-nation European Economic Coimnu-
nity, or Common Market, has just been formed.
The 17-nation European free-trade area is still
mider negotiation. These developments have
great significance in strengthening the economic
unity of this vital area of the free world. They
will help to eliminate the economic and political
rivalries which liave divided Europe for cen-
turies and will greatly stimulate the economic
progress and well-being of the area.
The EEC has already been discussed at length
in GATT meetings, and the free-trade area will
be examined in its turn when it comes into being.
You are all aware, I am sure, of the important
stake which the United States has in these dis-
cussions; the Common Market area bought $3.2
Department of State Bulletin
billion worth of United States exports in 1957,
over 17 percent of our total exports.
The GATT does not forbid tlie formation of
regional trading arrangements among its mem-
bers; indeed, it recognizes "the desirability of in-
creasing freedom of trade by the development,
through voluntary agreements, of closer integra-
tion between the economies" of member countries.
But it insists that such regional an-angements
must facilitate trade, both within and without the
region, and not raise new barriers to it.
Because of their commitment to this objective
as participants in GATT, the Common Market
countries will present our exporters with a com-
mon tariff no higher, on the average, than the
present rates. But the gi-adual elimination of all
barriers to internal trade among the six countries
will automatically place our exporters at a com-
petitive disadvantage within the area, unless we
are successful in negotiating the common external
rates below the projected averages. Thus, simply
to maintain our present export position, signifi-
cant negotiations with the Common Market must
be possible.
Adequate time to j^repare for and conclude
these negotiations, and adequate authority to
work with, are essential to success. This is one
of the reasons why the President has requested
an extension of the Trade Agreements Act for 5
years and tlie autliority to reduce our tariffs, in
return for equivalent concessions by other na-
tions, up to 25 percent.
A Challenge We Cannot Ignore
But our economic and political interests in
Western Europe are not the only ones at stake
in the debate over trade agreements legislation.
The increasingly energetic Soviet effort to achieve
economic penetration of the imderdeveloped
countries also presents a challenge we cannot
ignore.
Eetaliation against the United States follow-
ing passage of the Tariff Act of 1930 was chiefly
economic and, while damaging to many do-
mestic industries and the United States trade po-
sition in general, did not seriously threaten our
national security. Today the issues are of a
wholly different character and are more urgent
than simple commercial advantage.
With the free world and the Communist bloc
competing for the allegiance of vast numbers of
June 2, 7958
people in the less developed areas of the world,
an expansionist foreign trade policy on the part
of the United States has become more important
than ever before. Since 1955 the Soviet bloc has
skillfully combined offers of aid and trade in an
effort to develop a network of bilateral commer-
cial accords linking the Communist bloc with
key underdeveloped countries. Soviet loan
agreements with these comitries typically make
pi'ovision for commodity exports by the borrower
to the Soviet Union as one means of liquidating
the loan. This device not only paves the way
for expanded trade between the Communist
world and the underdeveloped countries; it also
provides an alternative to the conventional system
of loan repayment through the foreign-exchange
proceeds of export sales on the world market.
Consequently, any actions by free-world coun-
tries to restrict market opportunities will, di-
rectly or indirectly, have the effect of enhancing
the attractiveness of Soviet state-trading. Those
countries dependent on one or a very few com-
modities for their livelihood are particularly vul-
nerable to Soviet economic penetration whenever
the markets for those commodities are restricted.
Perhaps all that I have been tiying to say this
afternoon can be summed up in one word : inter-
dependence. We cannot adopt policies which in-
jure the interests of the rest of the free world
without, at the same time, injuring our own in-
terests. We cannot deprive other nations of
markets without losing our own markets, encour-
aging ingrown, inward-looking regional self-
sufficiency, and giving up the economic competi-
tion with the Soviets by default. We must co-
operate to survive.
Educational Exchange Agreement
With Germany Renewed
Tlie Department of State announced on May
14 (press release 260) that Heinrich von Bren-
tano, Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of
Gei-many, and U.S. Ambassador David K. E.
Bruce had on that day signed diplomatic notes
extending the Fulbright educational exchange
program in Gennany for at least 5 years. The
ceremony took place in Bonn at the Foreign
Ministry in the presence of the five German and
five American members of the U.S. Educational
Commission and representatives of the two
Governments.
The exchange of notes prolongs an agreement,
signed at Bomi on July 18, 1952, which made
available the equivalent of $5 million for ex-
changing lecturei-s, scholars, researchers, teachers,
and students in the interests of impi'oving mutual
understanding. It increases the amount specified
in the original agreement to the equivalent of
$10 million.
Under the Fulbright pi-ogram nearly 1,500 Ger-
mans visited the United States and a comparable
number of Americans traveled to the Federal Ee-
public and Berlin within the last 6 years.
During the current (1958) fiscal year there
are exchanges between the United States and 33
other countries under similar agreements.
The worldwide program dates back to 1946,
when the U.S. Congress passed a law usually re-
ferred to as the Fulbright Act after its author.
Senator J. William Fulbright. Approximately
33,000 men and women have received Fulbright
grants for study, teaching, lecturing, or research.
Mr. Dulles Exchanges Greetings
With Chancellor Adenauer
FoUounng Is the text of a telegram sent hy Sec-
retary DuUes to Konrad Adenauer, Chancellor of
the Federal RepuUic of Germany, on May 8, at
the time of Mr. Dulles' visit to Berlin, together
with the Chancellor's reply. '^
Press release 250 dated May 13
Secretary Dulles to Chancellor Adenauer
IVIat 8, 1958
Mr GOOD AND HONORED FRIEND : On the occasion
of being on German soil, I send you my greet-
ings and best Mashes. It is a heartening experi-
ence to visit this citadel of freedom. Xo one
who does so can fail to look with certainty to the
time wlien it will be the capital of a Germany re-
united in freedom.
' For text of an addres-s made by Secretary Dulles at
Berlin on May 8, see Bulleti::^ of May 26, 1958, p. 854.
900
I am sorry that my schedule is such that I
could not come to Bonn to see you. However, I
had an opportunity in Copenhagen to have a
comprehensive talk with Foreign Minister von
Brentano on important problems which confront
us in common and to learn from him of your
views. Such exchanges of views, our periodic
NATO ministerial meetings, and the continuing
process of consultation through the North Atlan-
tic Council, all contribute to that mutual imder-
standing and community of outlook which is es-
sential to the maintenance of our freedom and
security.
Dulles
Chancellor Adenauer to Secretary Dulles
M\T 13, 1958
]Mt DEAR friend: Many cordial thanks for
your visit and your talk in Berlin and your tele-
graphic greetings. Our hope and our trust in
the success of our common policy has received
thereby a further strengthening.
It was a shame that your program did not leave
you the possibility for a short stop in Bonn. Am-
bassador Bruce will have set forth for you my
views on the situation.
Like yourself, I view with great satisfaction
the cooperation in the North Atlantic Council,
which secures the harmony of our views in the
battle for peace and freedom which has been im-
posed upon us.
Adenauer
President and Secretary of State
To Visit Canada
The "\Miite House announced on May 2 that
President and Mrs. Eisenhower have accepted an
invitation from the Prime Minister of Canada,
John G. Diefenbaker, to pay an informal visit
to Ottawa from July 8 to 10.
The President and Mrs. Eisenhower will be ac-
companied by the Secretary of State and Mrs.
Dulles. During the visit President Eisenhower
will address the Members of both Houses of
Parliament at a joint session.
Department of State Bulletin
Negotiation as an Effective Instrument of American Foreign Policy
hy Foy D. Kohler
Deputy Assistant Seci^etury for European Ajfairs '
Whatever difficulties toniglit's assignment may
pose for me, at least it doesn't suffer from being
too narrow. The role of negotiation in the con-
duct of foreign relations, I would say, is roughly
equivalent to the role of an egg in an omelet.
According to my dictionary, the word "nego-
tiate" means "to transact business." More specifi-
cally, it means "to hold intercourse with a view to
coming to terms on some matter." Under this
definition it is evident that negotiation is part and
parcel of almost everything we do in the realm of
foreign affaire. It is not an occasional undertak-
ing but a constant process. It embraces an in-
credibly wide area of subject matter, ranging from
life-and-death issues to the most trivial problems
of protocol. It is necessary to the conduct of re-
lations among friends and allies as well as among
competitors and adversaries. In fact, one might
say that there are basically only two ways to con-
duct relations among states — by negotiation or by
war.
A great deal has been written about the arts
and techniques of diplomatic negotiation, dating
from the earliest stages of our civilization. It
will undoubtedly be a fitting subject of academic
inquiry for many years to come. Fortunately
you have spared me, and yourselves, from an ex-
ploration of the broader aspects of the subject by
placing it within the context of your theme of
"Soviet- American Eelations." And indeed I sus-
pect that to the average citizen these days the
term "diplomatic negotiation" acquires meaning
only when we add the phrase "with the Russians."
The achievement of successful negotiations be-
' Address made before the National Academy of Eco-
nomics and Political Science at the Broolviugs Institution,
Washington, D.C., on May 6 (press release 247).
tween the Soviet Union and the "Western nations
today absorbs the interest of millions of human
beings throughout the world.
During recent months, as we all know, this in-
terest has reached a new peak of intensity. And
it is not hard for us to imderstand the reasons.
We are painfully aware that we are living in a
dangerous world, which is also a burdensome and
expensive world. In simple dollar terms the
amount of money being spent by the American
people today for national defense and the con-
duct of foreign relations is greater than the total
national income of the country 25 years ago. Even
with this immense sacrifice our people realize that
we have not achieved security — that neither peace
nor safety has yet been assured. We are familiar
with the awesome power of modern weapons and
recognize that a major military conflict might
mean the end of civilization and perhaps of hu-
man life itself. Under these circumstances it is
not surprising that the American people and
other Western peoples are uncomfortable and
impatient.
To many thousands of these people the idea of
Soviet- Western negotiations seems to offer a magic
key to a better and safer world. Again and again
we hear the question : "Why don't you sit down
with the Russians and talk things out?" The
process of negotiation is viewed as a rosy avenue
of escape from the grim realities of the 20th cen-
tury. It vaguely represents a device for cutting
defense expenditures, reducing foreign aid, re-
turning our young men from overseas assign-
ments, lowering taxes, and eliminating the terri-
fying shadow of nuclear war. With these things
in mind, it is wholly natural for people to ask:
"Why not negotiate ? AVhat have we got to lose ?"
June 2, 7958
901
A straightforward question deserves a straight-
forward reply. As one of the many Americans
who have spent many long, late, and frustrating
hours in the process, I can answer with some feel-
ing : "That is precisely what we have been doing
for the past 15 years." I might add : "And it is
what we are continuing to do — or at least, to try
to do — every day."
How U.S.-Soviet Negotiations Are Conducted
As I have already indicated, negotiation is a
constant process, employing a variety of channels
and techniques. The 20th centuiy has witnessed
a significant extension of these channels and tech-
niques, notably a greatly increased emphasis upon
the use of multilateral diplomacy and of public
diplomacy. The Soviet leaders, in particular,
have developed considerable aptitude for these
modern forms of negotiations and have intro-
duced some less than welcome variants into the
older forms. Let us examine briefly some of the
ways in which negotiations with the Russians are
already being conducted.
First, we maintain a well-trained and fairly
elaborate diplomatic establishment in Moscow.
The Soviet Union maintains a similar establish-
ment in this country. A considerable volume of
business is regularly transacted through these
missions, which have the facilities to transact a
great deal more business if both parties wish to
do so.
The United States and the Soviet Union also
maintain diplomatic missions in many other coun-
tries. Where there are advantages in cari-ying on
diplomatic intercourse through third parties, this
is easily managed.
Let us also remember that representatives of
the United States and the Soviet Union sit to-
gether almost daily with many other governments
in various components of the United Nations sys-
tem. We sit with them not only in the General
Assembly and in the major councils and conamit-
tees but also in many subsidiary committees and
in several specialized agencies. These bodies pro-
vide the means for detailed negotiations on a large
variety of subjects.
On occasion the United States and Soviet
Union have found it profitable to establish special
bodies for the conduct of particular negotiations,
such as committees of military experts or other
technical experts. A number of negotiations in
902
Berlin, for example, have been conducted through
such channels.
We have also become increasingly aware of
some more subtle forms of negotiation. When-
ever American or Soviet leaders make a speech
or whenever they issue press statements on inter-
national problems, they are engaged in a form
of negotiation. Wlien the other side replies,
whether publicly or privately, it is, in fact, join-
ing in such negotiations. The validity and util-
ity of the Wilsonian concept — public diplomacy \
publicly arrived at — is still the subject of much
dispute, but no one can doubt that it exists and
that it plays an important part in modem rela-
tions among states.
Growtii of "Summit Diplomacy"
Finally, we should remember that we have en-
gaged in several high-level meetings with Soviet
representatives during the past 15 years, includ-
ing both meetings of foreign ministei"s and meet-
ings of heads of governments. I think we should
recognize, incidentally, that tlie emphasis upon
this kind of negotiation is also relatively modern.
Wlaile history records several notable instances
of face-to-face negotiations between kings and
other potentates in past centuries, this device lias
gained most of its impetus since the days of Wil-
son. The meetings of Roosevelt, Churchill, and
Stalin during World War II contributed signifi-
cantly to the growth of this so-called "summit
diplomacy." Today the idea of direct negotia-
tions between heads of govermnent has a dramatic
quality which sometimes causes xjeople to forget
that other means of negotiations are available and
are, in fact, in constant use.
I will not attempt at this point to analyze the
advantages and disadvantages inherent in sum-
mit negotiations. We should note only that this
is merely one of many forms of negotiation and
that it is a form which has been responsible for
a relatively tiny percentage of the major interna-
tional agreements reached during the course of
human histoiy. Nevertheless we should also re-
member that we have employed this form of nego-
tiation several times and will undoubtedly use it
in the future whenever it appears to offer oppor-
tunities that might otherwise be unavailable.
All told, I think there is solid evidence to sup-
port my contention that we have been negotiating
pretty steadily with the Soviet Union for many
Departmenf of State Bulletin
veurs. Equally significant is the fact that these
negotiations, both direct and indirect, have pro-
duced a number of important agreements and
other valuable results. Let us recall such varied
accomplishments as the withdrawal of Soviet
troops from Iran, the elimination of the Berlin
blockade, the Korean truce, the Austrian state
treaty, the arrangements for the International
Geophysical Year, and the creation of the Intei'-
national Atomic Energy Agency. Most of these
things involved a mixture of diplomatic meth-
ods— public and private, multilateral and bilat-
eral— and all of them were important. In addi-
tion, of course, there have been understandings
and agi-eements on a much larger number of sec-
ondary problems.
I feel fairly certain, however, that neither my
description of the negotiations constantly under
way between ourselves and the Russians nor my
recounting of some of the major agi-eements
reached will satisfy those who are loudly demand-
ing new negotiations between the Soviet Union
and the West. "What these people want, of course,
are not merely negotiations but results. They
want a settlement of the vital issues dividing the
planet. They want to see an end to the cold war,
to the arms burden, and to anxieties and sacri-
fices. For these reasons they proclaim that what
we need ai-e new techniques of negotiation, bold
and imaginative new ideas, and a basic change
in our attitudes.
No one can be blamed for wanting successful
results. Moreover we can certainly appreciate
the altogether human inclination to hope that these
results can be attained with a minimum of effort
and pain. But we also have a right, I think, to
ask what people really mean when they speak of
"new techniques" or "bold ideas" and of "more
flexible attitudes." The process of negotiating
with the Soviet Union involves many difficulties,
and everyone should understand that these diffi-
culties will not be removed by fuzzy generaliza-
tions.
Minor Difficulties Besetting Negotiations
It may be useful to examine some of these diffi-
culties that beset us in our negotiations witii rep-
resentatives of the Soviet Union. We might even
start the process by considering some of the things
which are frequently stressed as difficulties but
which actually are not serious impediments to
negotiation.
First among the latter is the problem of chan-
nels and techniques. As I have already indicated,
this isn't really a significant obstacle. Wliere
there is a genuine desire to reacli agreement on
any point, large or small, the means of conducting
successful negotiations are readily available. Es-
tablished channels of negotiation have been used
successfully in the past to reach agreements with
other governments on many types of important
issues, and there is no reason why these chamiels
cannot be equally effective in the future. The
United States has never insisted on one particular
channel to the exclusion of otliers. We have been
interested in substance rather than form and are
willing to use any negotiating technique or instru-
mentality which affords reasonable hope of con-
structive results.
At the same time we are forced to recognize
that the substance of particular negotiations
sometimes limits the forms that are feasible. If
we are dealing with a question of vital concern to
our allies as well as ourselves, we cannot pretend
to undertake a settlement of this question througli
bilateral discussions between the United States
and the Soviet Union. Similarly there are cer-
tain questions of worldwide interest which can
be handled effectively only through the United
Nations. We cannot, for obvious reasons, treat
any issue of universal concern as if it were a
matter to be negotiated exclusively with the Soviet
Union.
In this connection I should point out that the
Soviet Government has usually been less than en-
thusiastic about conducting serious negotiations
on a broad, multilateral basis. It recognizes that
the United Nations system affords valuable op-
portunities for Soviet propaganda and seeks to
exploit these opportunities to the fullest. We
have noted that tliese outpourings of propaganda,
in themselves, represent one technique of negotia-
tion. However, the Soviet Government has been
reluctant to reach major agi-eements within the
United Nations framework and has been espe-
cially reluctant to give weight to the expressed
opinions and judgments of a majority of United
Nations members as a basis for the pui-suit of
agreements. Since most of the world's peoples
have interests and views quite different from those
of the Soviet Government and its satellites, the
June 2, 7958
Soviet Union typically finds United Nations vot-
ing procedures quite distasteful and has flouted
United Nations recommendations more frequently
and more brazenly than any other member.
We ourselves, of course, recognize that there
are many issues -which cannot be settled by votes
in an international forum and also that there are
many issues which can be negotiated more effec-
tively in private than in public. What I want to
emphasize is not the U.N. channel of negotiation
or any other particular channel but rather the
variety of channels available. Neither the United
States nor the Soviet Union is confined to any
particular technique or procedure. Where there
is a will, there are plenty of ways open to both
of us.
Next I would like to mention the fact— fairly
obvious to us but not nearly so obvious in some
parts of the world — that negotiations between the
United States and the Soviet Union have not been
seriously impeded by popular antagonism. This
is sometimes a rather serious problem for govern-
ments whose populations have a long history of
enmity. But in our case no such history exists.
There has never been a war between the United
States and Russia. There has been no significant
history of commercial rivalry. There is no basis
for racial or religious hatred. In brief, we have
been remarkably free of the popular passions that
sometimes foment tensions between peoples and
impede agi-eements between their governments.
Another difficulty often cited is the fact that
the Soviet leaders have the reputation of being
"hard bargainers." While the description is apt,
we Americans need have no sense of inferiority
on this scoi'e. The tough Yankee trader is part
of our national legend, and their modern de-
scendants have retained much of their skill and
cunning. I realize that our population also has
a long tradition of being somewhat derisive about
American diplomacy — as characterized by the old
saw that "America never lost a war and never won
a conference." But this saying, like the saying
that "those who can, do; those who can't, teach,"
is a myth emerging from our great egalitarian
culture and cannot be supported by objective
analysis. In most situations I believe that Ameri-
cans are among the best negotiators on earth.
In lay discussions of the problems encountered
in negotiating with the Soviet Union our basic
difficulty is often attributed to a lack of under-
904
standing. It is said that tlie United States and
Russia do not adequately comprehend each other's
fundamental motives, attitudes, and anxieties.
It is contended that all we really need to do is to
know each other better — that improved mutual
understanding would automatically open the door
to peace, security, and cooperation.
Now I do not want to challenge the intrinsic
validity of this concept. The value of mutual
underetanding is one of the moral premises of
our culture, so much so, in fact, that it tends at
times to become something of a sacred cow. In
any case I happen to believe sincerely that any
real improvement in mutual understanding be-
tween two nations is never detrimental and
usually beneficial to relations between those na-
tions. At the same time I suggest that we swallow
this concept with a liberal quantity of salt.
Neither the Soviet people nor their government
is nearly so mysterious as some Westerners as-
sume, and I doiibt that our own purposes and at-
titudes are really very obscure to the Russians.
In some respects we understand each other very
well indeed. I would even go so far as to suggest
that, in the whole course of human history, it is
doubtful that any major rivals ever knew each
other better. This is probably one of the reasons
why we have a cold war on our hands and also
perhaps why the cold war has not erupted into
a hot war. To understand the other fellow may
facilitate an agreement or may render an agree-
ment virtually impossible, depending upon what
one's purposes ai'e. For myself, I would like to
learn a great deal more about the Soviet Union
and also to have the Soviet people learn more
about us, but I am not so naive as to believe that
this process will automatically bring the Soviet
and American Governments into perfect harmony.
Unreliability of Soviet Promises
Finally, it is frequently said that a principal
impediment to successful negotiation between the
United States and the Soviet Union is the pres-
ence of deep-seated suspicion and distrust on both
sides. The existence of such suspicion and dis-
trust is obvious to anyone who has ever engaged
in negotiations with the Soviet Union. But sus-
picion and distrust are symptoms rather than
causes. Distrust alone will not necessarily im-
pede successful negotiations where the other con-
ditions of agreement are present. Such negotia-
Departmenf of State Bulletin
tions may be successful either if it is clear that
the particular agreement serves the interest of
both parties or if adequate means of enforcing
the agreement are available.
Thus, while I do not regard suspicion and dis-
trust, in themselves, as insuperable obstacles to
successful negotiation with the Soviet Union, they
do give us a vital clue to the real nature of our diffi-
culties. For the first of these, in my judgment,
stems from the inescapable fact that i^romises
represent the principal coinage of international
negotiations. Sometimes an agreement will pro-
vide for an exchange of concrete objects, but
usually what is exchanged is a promise or series
of promises. The feasibility and value of any
international agi-eement, therefore, necessarily de-
pends to a large extent upon the nature and re-
liability of these promises.
I am not revealing any dark secrets when I say
that Soviet promises have not always been re-
liable. A recital of all the important promises
that the Soviet Government has broken since the
beginning of World War II would be as boring
for me as for you. However, I think we can all
agree that Soviet promises mean something less
than "money in the bank."
Unfortunately, we have not yet reached a state
of international political organization which pro-
vides for the regular enforcement of international
promises. In most instances we have nothing
comparable to the legal sanctions which govern
private business contracts. Among nations which
enjoy democratic political systems, the pressure
of public opinion, parliamentary machinery, and
domestic judicial procedures exercise a consider-
able compulsion upon a government to honor its
international undertakings. Even this pressure,
however, is imperfect, and in the Soviet Union it
is virtually nonexistent.
The unreliability of Soviet promises does not
mean, of course, that all efforts to reach agree-
ment with the Soviet Union are futile. It means
merely that we must exercise unusual care in seek-
ing to work out agreements that will be meaning-
ful. Where possible we must seek promises that
will be more or less self-enforcing — in other
words, promises supported by concrete machinery
for action. As you know, this has been our prin-
cipal emphasis in the protracted disarmament
negotiations that have been conducted wnth the
Soviet Union. We have insisted, and will con-
tinue to insist, that any disarmament agi'eement
be supported by adequate inspection and control
arrangements.
"Wliere we are dealing with subjects that do
not readily lend themselves to tlie application of
enforcement machinery, we should try to obtain
promises which the Soviet Union itself will have
a definite incentive to keep, either because the
promise is consistent with Soviet national interests
or because of the impact of world opinion. In
any case, we must always be on guard against
trading concrete political, economic, and military
assets of our own for the unsupported promises
of the Soviet Union. We certainly cannot barter
away our collective-security arrangements,
weaken our military programs, or abandon our
strategic positions in exchange for nothing more
than promises of this kind.
DiHering U.S. and Soviet Political Structures
Tlie second major difficulty involved in negotia-
tions with the Soviet Union stems from the pro-
found difference between the American and Soviet
political structures. I know this is old stuff to a
group such as we have here. If what I say is
trite, we should recognize that it has become trite
by being true. The international bargaining posi-
tion of a democratic govermnent, especially when
it maintains a partnership relation with other
free nations, is considerably different from the
position of a totalitarian government.
Some of these differences are fairly obvious.
Because of our constitutional division of govern-
mental power, as well as the pressure of a free
public opinion, no American negotiator, from the
President down, is a plenipotentiaiy in the literal
sense. Everything he does and says is subject to
examination and criticism at home. Every pledge
that he makes or fails to make is subject to one or
another form of ratification through domestic
political processes. He cannot make promises
lightly, nor can he lightly reject the reasonable
offers of others. He cannot make irresponsible
proposals or manipulate discussions for propa-
ganda purposes because his government must be
prepared to back up his actions and because his
own free press will be quick to expose any "line"
that does violence to the truth.
Most other democratic governments, of course,
have similar problems. These problems are fur-
ther complicated by the relations of democratic
June 2, J 958
905
governments with one another. On issues that
involve the vital interests of both the United
States and a number of its allies there must be
substantial agreement among the allies before ef-
fective negotiations with the Soviet Union can be
carried forward. Since our allies are partnere
rather than puj^pets, this involves additional nego-
tiation of considerable complexity and duration.
To some extent it is true that the Soviet Union
must also take account of the interests of its
satellite states, but there is no evidence that the
negotiating position of the Soviet Government has
been severely hampered by this consideration. A
master's relationship to a slave rarely involves the
same inhibitions that are found in the relationship
between two equal partners.
The basic difference between the Soviet and
American political structures accounts for much
cloudy thinking in this country about Soviet rela-
tions. To some extent every nation tends to con-
ceive of othei-s in its own image. As a
consequence we hear many generalizations about
Eussia which fail to distinguish sharply between
the Soviet rulers and the Soviet peoples. This
distinction is all important. We should always
remember that in our negotiations with Eussia we
are never dealing with the Soviet peoples or with
anyone who really represents their views. "We are
dealing with a handful of politicians who tell
their people what to think, who carefully erect
barricades against conflicting facts or ideas, and
who subject these people to so stem a discipline
that even those ideas which may filter through to
them cannot readily be translated into practical
political action. The United States, of course,
does not regard this condition as permanent. In
fact, our strongest hope for the eventual achieve-
ment of a lasting accord with the Soviet Union
rests upon our belief that the Soviet people will
ultimately gain greater freedom and influence in
the management of their own government. In the
meantime, however, we must have no delusions
about the real situation we face.
The Soviet rulers are familiar with the com-
plications and limitations inlierent in the nego-
tiatmg position of the Western governments and
naturally seek to exploit this situation to their
own advantage. They understand, for example,
that real power in the West rests with the gen-
eral public rather than with the government that
happens to be in power at any given moment.
906
Hence the Soviet leaders do not hesitate to appeal
to Western public opinion over the heads of
governments. They are equally quick to seize any
opportunity to magnify occasional differences in
interest or viewpoint among the Western govern-
ments.
This situation may help to explain recent
Soviet expressions of interest in a "suimnit meet-
ing," as opposed to other forms of negotiation.
Aware of the deep desire for peace among West-
ern peoples and of the awed apprehension result-
ing from the launching of the Sputniks, the Soviet
leadei-s undoubtedly hoped that these peoples
would pressure their own governments to enter
into a summit meeting on Soviet terms and there-
after to grant concessions which would signifi-
cantly weaken the Western strategic position.
The Soviet "Principle of Parity"
The men in the Kremlin probably have other
reasons for emphasizing a summit meeting.
Within the United Nations, as we have already
noted, Soviet propaganda themes and bargaining
positions have not been very convincing. A sum-
mit meeting would undoubtedly help the Soviet
leaders to dramatize their arguments. Wliat may
be even more important is the possibility that the
summit meeting would help to dramatize the
world position of the Soviet Union itself. True
Soviet pui"poses are usually concealed. Tlie real
"sleeper" in the current presummit negotiations
may well be that disingenuous new Soviet in-
vention which has been put forward, first by Mr.
Bulganin, then by Mr. Gromyko, as the "prin-
ciple of parity."
This new wrinkle is still "in the works," and
you will appreciate that I can at this stage only
call your attention to some of its principal ele-
ments and implications. The first thing to be
said, of course, is that this formula is both un-
precedented and quite extraneous to consideration
of the basic issues facing the world. Indeed it
may well have been advanced precisely to deflect
attention from those issues and thus avoid the
serious discussions which the Western powers are
today seeking. There is, in fact, considerable
evidence to support the hypothesis that the Soviet
leadei-s have no real interest in serious negotia-
tions and no expectation of an agreement,
particularly with respect to the issues they
themselves have chosen to emphasize. It is al-
Deparlment of Slate Bulletin
together possible that they would be perfectly
satisfied simply to arrive at such a meeting, have
their pictures taken with Western leaders, and
then go home, having demonstrated their ability
to bring the West to an unprepared summit meet-
ing and achieved their claim to this so-called
"parity."
Now it is important to note that this Soviet
concept of parity has nothing to do with sovereign
equality among states. On the contrary, it is a
concept of contrived inequality. The purpose
would seem to be the establisliment of the prin-
ciple that the Soviet Union, together with such
satellites as it selects, is entitled to negotiate with
the whole non-Communist world, or any part
thereof, on equal terms — that important inter-
national problems, whatever their nature and
geographic scope, can be settled only by negoti-
ation between two "worlds," of which one is the
Communist "world." I do not have to elaborate
to this audience the implications of this concept
in terms of Marxist-Leninist dogma. In any
event one can easily imagine that the practical
result would be a vigorous campaign to extend
the present Soviet veto in the United Nations
Security Council to a de facto veto over all other
international decisions of any consequence.
The fact that the Soviet leaders have ulterior
motives, of course, does not mean that we are
i-equired to steer clear of any summit conference.
On the contrai-y, our Government is ready and
anxious to participate in such a conference if
we find any basis for believing that it is likely
to produce constructive results. We are not in-
terested in putting on a propaganda show, and
we are certainly unwilling to limit our discussions
to those subjects which the Soviet leaders want
to talk about. At the same time we recognize
that there may be advantages in summit talks.
The international climate has changed consider-
ably in recent weeks, and, if we receive any indica-
tion that the Soviet leaders are willing to
negotiate seriously, we are fully prepared to meet
them halfway.
In general there is no reason for us to become
aspecially disturbed or excited about the propa-
ganda devices employed by the Soviet Union as
standard teclmiques of negotiation. These tech-
niques are inevitably made available by the very
nature of our "open society." Soviet techniques
sometimes produce real bargaining advantages.
but these are by no means certain or overwhelm-
ing. Actually Soviet efforts to foster confusion
and division among the Western peoples during
past years have been unsuccessful. Even the
propaganda advantages achieved by their dis-
regard of truth and their ability to make
irresponsible proposals have had a distinctly
short-term character. Falsehood has a nasty habit
of backfiring sooner or later. In the long run
the immediate advantage is usually lost in the
general atmosphere of mistrust its exposure cre-
ates. The "open society" is sometimes vulnerable
to psychological thrusts, but it also develops a
touglmess and resilience which assure durable
strength.
"Problem of Incompatible Purposes"
Of all our difficulties in negotiating with the
Soviet rulei-s the most important by far is what
my friend Professor Charles Burton Marshall has
aptly described as "the problem of incompatible
purposes." Here I am referring primarily to
long-range pui-poses rather than immediate ones.
In any negotiation the aims and objectives of
the parties are usually multiple. Our Government
normally has a variety of objectives, and so does
the other party. In fact the immediate object
of negotiation is often of minor importance in
comparison with some of our more general pur-
poses, such as the maintenance of friendship and
understanding among the negotiating govern-
ments. Every negotiating situation, therefore, re-
quires consideration of various types of objec-
tives, specific and general, immediate and long-
term.
It is also ti-ue that the aims of the parties to
any negotiation are almost never identical. Often
their objectives are quite dissimilar or even op-
posite. But successful negotiation usually re-
quires that the purposes of the negotiating parties
be at least compatible. This is the core of our
problem with the Soviet Union. Given certain
assumptions, it really isn't very hard to negotiate
a "one shot" deal with the Soviet Goverimient.
In situations where our immediate interests co-
incide and where the subject of the transaction
has little significance in terms of ultimate pur-
poses, the path to agi-eement is smooth. How-
ever, the kind of negotiation which has under-
standably aroused the greatest interest and
enthusiasm among the peoples of the world
June 2, 1958
907
is in no sense a "one shot deal." Wliat the
American people would like to havt^— and this
goes for all other peoples who are able to express
themselves— is an agreement on the basic ele-
ments of a continuing relationship. This is a
horse of another color— you might even say, a
horse of an entirely different species.
Soviet Drive for World Domination
Everything the Soviet rulers have done for the
past 15 yeare and everything they are doing at
the present time adds up to produce the inescap-
able conclusion that the Soviet Government has
not deviated from its purpose of ultimate world
domination. Every negotiation is conducted
within the framework of this purpose. From
time to time the Soviet rulers will make conces-
sions but rarely, if ever, at the expense of their
grand design. Wliere it is impossible for a par-
ticular negotiation to contribute directly to this
grand design in a significant degi-ee, they seek
to convert the negotiating situation itself into a
sort of stage setting for the pursuit of their ulti-
mate purposes.
When State Department spokesmen refer to the
Soviet campaign for world domination, we some-
times encounter a certain amount of eyebrow lift-
ing. There are some who say that the Soviet
leaders can't really be as bad as all that— who
argue that a little sympathy and tenderness on
our part might persuade the Soviet Government
to "live and let live," to concentrate on its problems
at home and forget about the rest of the world.
But there is a veritable mountain of evidence to
indicate otherwise. If there is any aspect of So-
viet policy where words and deeds coincide, it is
in their stubborn purpose to achieve the eventual
triumph of world communism. I do not need to
review for you the long history of annexation,
conquest, subversion, political and economic pene-
tration, military threat, and intervention. But I
would remind you that as recently as last Novem-
ber the Soviet leaders and their minions in their
worldwide Communist apparatus openly and
frankly reaffirmed their allegiance to the basic
goal. The declaration of the Moscow Conference
of Communist Parties at that time assures us that :
The main content of our epoch is the transition from
capitalism to socialism which was begun by the Great
October Socialist Revolution in Russia. Today more than
a third of the population of the world— more than 950,000,-
908
000 people— has taken the road of socialism and is
building a new life. . . .
The socialist states are united in a single common-
wealth by a community of interests and aims In the
struggle against imperialism and for the victory of social-
ism and communism. . . .
Lilie any progressive movement in the history of man-
kind, the Communist movement will inevitably encounter
difficulties and obstacles. However, as in the past and in
the present, so in the future, no difficulties or obstacles
can change the objective laws of historical development
or affect the great determination of the working class to
transform the old world and create a new one. . . . The
participants in the conference unanimously express their
firm confidence that, by rallying their ranks and thereby
rallying the working class and the peoples of all countries,
the Communist and Workers' Parties will undoubtedly
surmount all obstacles on the path of progress and hasten
great new victories for the cause of peace, democracy
and socialism on a world scale.
It is true tliat we should avoid oversimplifica-
tion in speaking of the Soviet drive for world
domination. When the average person thinks of
world domination, he normally has a mental pic-
ture of a psychopathic militarist who is hellbent
upon conquering the world by armed force or
perishing in the attempt. It is very doubtful that
this picture applies to the men in the Kremlin.
Experts on Soviet affairs have also pointed out
that the Soviet Government is frequently torn
between the desire to foster world revolution and
the desire to protect and advance Russia's purely
national interests. The proponents of this view
sometimes argue, for example, that a study of
traditional czarist policies can offer a better clue
to the present Soviet purposes than a study of
Marxist dialectics. There are also those who in-
sist that repeated Soviet references to the eventual
triumph of world communism should be regarded
more as expressions of a mystical faith than as
statements of practical policy and who suggest
that the Soviet rulers would be ready and even
anxious to abandon their drive for a Communist
world in exchange for solid assurances of security
in their present possessions.
All these hypotheses deserve respectful atten-
tion. It is my view, however, that none of them,
even if accepted, would relieve us from acting
upon the assumption that the Soviet rulers are
continuing to seek world domination.
In the first place, I think we realize that mili-
tarism and a program of conquest are not neces-
sarily identical twins. There is reason to hope
that the Soviet rulers are just as anxious as any-
Deparfmenf of Sfafe Bulletin
one else to avoid the catastrophe of an allout war.
But this does not mean the abandonment of their
program of aggression nor the end of the cold
war which, by definition, means a struggle con-
ducted primarily on the political, technical, eco-
nomic, and psychological planes. In simple terms
the Soviet attitude is like that of an intelligent
burglar. He doesn't want to get into a shooting
match with the householder; he just wants to
"burgle" the house. Here again, the Sov^iet
leaders speak for themselves better than I can for
them. During the recent 20th Congress of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mr.
Suslov ^ put it this way :
. . . Communists and the working class naturally pre-
fer more painless forms of transition from one social
system to another. The form of transition, however, as
has been shown here by Comrade Khrushchev, depends
on concrete historical circumstances. Moreover, the ques-
tion of whether the methods are more peaceful or more
violent depends not so much on the working class as on
the degree of resistance offered by the exploiting classes
in the process of being overthrown, unwilling voluntarily
to part with big property, political power, and other
privileges in their hands.
Soviet Efforts To Minimize Ideological Conflict
As to the potential ideological conflict between
the promotion of world revolution and the ad-
vancement of Russian national interests, I can
only say that the Soviet rulers have worked hard
to minimize any such conflict and have actually
achieved a fearful consistency between the two
concepts. We know that Soviet power underpins
the Commmiist movement almost everywhere in
the world and, in the same way, that local Com-
munist parties have repeatedly strained them-
selves— and occasionally turned flip-flops — to ad-
vance Soviet national interests. This formula
was stated in a speech by Marshal Malinovsky on
February 22 of this year :
The strength of Soviet patriotism lies in the fact that
it combines to the utmost the national interests of the
Soviet people and the army and their international obli-
gations to the workers of other countries in the struggle
for peace, democracy and socialism.
It is probable, I think, that the Soviet rulers
have a genuine interest in national security and
that they might be prepared to temper their ex-
pansionist gambits to the extent that such gambits
' Member of the Presidium and secretary of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
June 2, 1958
involve serious risk of destroying the Soviet sys-
tem. But this conflict of purpose is perhaps more
apparent than real. The Soviet rulers seem con-
vinced that a sizable number of experiments in
political and economic aggression can be carried
out with minimum risk to their present position.
Moreover we must remember that a desire for se-
curity and a desire for world domination are by
no means inconsistent from the Soviet viewpoint.
In fact there is considerable basis for supposing
that they regard world domination as the only
fully satisfactory form of security obtainable.
They may well calculate that the world has grown
too small for them to place reliance upon tradi-
tional bulwarks of security, and feel that the mas-
ters of a slave empire can never be completely se-
cure so long as a substantial part of the world
remains free and strong.
Hera again the jjroblem is complicated by the
nature of our own society. Western governments
can give the utmost assurances about refraining
from aggressive acts. In fact we have already
given such assurances. But we cannot guarantee
that the democratic idea itself will remain dor-
mant, either in the territories already conquered
by the Soviet Union or in other areas. Even if
he wanted to, the President of the United States
could not promise Khrushchev to suppress all
American newspapers that are critical of the So-
viet regime. Nor could any Western statesman,
even if he were willing, guarantee that the en-
slaved peoples of Eastern Europe will never again
rise to demand their freedom.
What I have just said helps to illustrate what
I mean in speaking of the problem of incom-
patible purposes. Some of the fundamental
things the Soviet rulers want are not ours to give.
Those who dream of a general rapprochement be-
tween Russia and the West cannot content them-
selves with asking what the Soviet Government
might be willing to give us. An even more pene-
trating question is whether we have anything to
offer — short of total surrender — that would really
satisfy basic Soviet purposes.
Does the incompatibility of Soviet and Ameri-
can purposes mean that war is inevitable ? I have
already made it clear that in my opinion a "hot
war," at least, is neither inevitable nor probable.
On the other hand, the political, economic, and
psychological struggle known as the "cold war"
is almost certain to continue until there is a funda-
mental change in long-range Soviet purposes. It
seems highly unlikely that any foreseeable efforts
at negotiation can eliminate this struggle. Once
we fully comprehend the necessity of being pre-
pared to live calmly in a state of tension and
danger for many years to come, we will be in a
much better position to do the things that are
needed to carry forward our search for lasting
peace and security, including the conduct of mean-
ingful negotiations with the Soviet Union.
No Grounds for Abandoning Hope
In analyzing the difficulties of AVestern-Soviet
negotiations I have tried to avoid any implication
that such negotiations are futile. On the con-
trary, these negotiations are often valuable and
sometimes essential. We must negotiate con-
stantly, using every means and channel that gives
promise of constructive results. We must con-
sider the institution and continuation of all pro-
grams and activities that might help to make our
negotiations more jirofitable. We must leave no
stone unturned in the search for mutually advan-
tageous agreements.
As I have pointed out, such agreements are not
impossible to find. More than once in recent years
we have engaged in lengthy, laborious, acrimo-
nious, and seemingly hopeless negotiations with
the Soviet Government on particular issues, have
talked for months and years without any sign of
progress, and then have suddenly found the So-
viet Union ready to come to terms within a mat-
ter of hours. We can never afford to become dis-
couraged, either with respect to specific issues or
with respect to the general course of Soviet pol-
icy. The basic purposes of the Soviet rulers are
almost certainly incompatible with ours at the
present time, but even the most basic purposes can
change. We must do all we can to encourage a
change.
A realistic comprehension of the difficulties in-
herent in negotiations with the Soviet Union af-
fords no grounds for an abandonment of hope.
It should serve only to prevent our hopes from
becoming delusions. Let us realize that there are
no quick and magical solutions to most interna-
tional problems. Let us understand that the proc-
ess of negotiation is continuous and that the art
of negotiation frequently involves more perspira-
tion than inspiration. Let us frankly recognize
both the advantages and disadvantages of our ne-
gotiating position and try to avoid expecting
either too much or too little. Let us constantly
keep in mind tlie true nature of Soviet purposes
and bend our imaginations to the task of finding
incentives which may induce them to alter or
modify these purposes.
Most important of all, let us understand that
such incentives will never be provided by a policy
of weakness or appeasement by the Western
powers. We cannot win the cold war with cold
feet. We must be prepared to offer reasonable
concessions in exchange for reasonable conces-
sions, yes. But let us remember that no wolf was
ever persuaded to become a vegetarian by a steady
diet of meat. We must negotiate without hesita-
tion or apology in the pursuit of our national in-
terests. We can do so in the secure knowledge
that these interests are fundamentally consistent
with the deepest aspirations of human beings
everywhere, including the Soviet peoples them-
United States Proposes Conference
on Antarctica
The 'White House released on May 3 the follow-
ing statement iy President Eisenhower, together
with the text of a U.S. note to 11 other countries
frofosing a conference to conclvde a treaty assur-
ing the continuation of scientific cooperation in
the Antarctic.
STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT EISENHOWER
The United States is dedicated to the principle
that the vast uninhabited wastes of Antarctica
shall be used only for peaceful purposes. We do
not want Antarctica to become an object of politi-
cal conflict. Accordingly, the United States has
invited 11 other countries, including the Soviet
Union, to confer with us to seek an effective joint
means of achieving this objective.
We propose that Antarctica shall be open to all
nations to conduct scientific or other peaceful ac-
tivities there. We also propose that joint admin-
istrative arrangements be worked out to insure the
successful accomplishment of these and other
peaceful purposes.
The countries which have been invited to con-
fer are those which have engaged in scientific ac-
Deparfmenf of Sfofe Bulletin
tivities in Antarctica over the past 9 montlis in
connection with the International Geophysical
Year. I know of no instance in which interna-
tional cooperation has been more successfully
demonstrated. However, the International Geo-
physical Year terminates on December 31, 1958.
Our proposal is directed at insuring that this same
kind of cooperation for the benefit of all mankind
shall be perpetuated after that date.
I am confident that our proposal will win the
wholehearted support of the peoples of all the na-
tions directly concerned, and indeed of all other
peoples of the world.
TEXT OF U.S. NOTE i
ExCELLENCT : I have the honor to refer to the splendid
example of international cooperation which can now be
observed in many parts of the world because of the co-
ordinated efforts of scientists of many countries in seek-
ing a better understanding of geophysical phenomena
during the current International Geophysical Year.
These coordinated efforts of the scientists of many lands
have as their objective a greatly increased knovrledge of
the planet on which we live and will no doubt contribute
directly and indirectly to the welfare of the human race
for many generations to come.
Among the various portions of the globe where these
cooperative scientific endeavors are being carried on with
singular success and with a sincere consciousness of the
high ideals of mankind to which they are dedicated is the
vast and relatively remote continent of Antarctica. The
scientific research being conducted in that continent by
the cooperative efforts of distinguished scientists from
many countries is producing information of practical as
well as theoretical value for all mankind.
The International Geophysical Year comes to a close at
the end of 1958. The need for coordinated scientific re-
search in Antarctica, however, will continue for many
more years into the future. Accordingly, it would ap-
pear desirable for those countries participating in the
Antarctic program of the International Geophysical Year
to reach agreement among themselves on a program to
assure the continuation of the fruitful scientific coopera-
tion referred to above. Such an arrangement could have
the additional advantage of preventing unnecessary and
undesirable political rivalries in that continent, the un-
economic expenditure of funds to defend individual
national interests, and the recurrent possibility of inter-
' Addressed to the Foreign Ministers of each of the 11
other countries participating in the International Geo-
physical Year activities in Antarctica: Argentina, Aus-
tralia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Nor-
way, the Union of South Africa, the U.S.S.R., and the
United Kingdom. Each note was signed and delivered
by the American ambassador to that country.
June 2, 7958
national misunderstanding. It would appear that if
harmonious agreement can be reached among the coun-
tries directly concerned in regard to friendly cooperation
in Antarctica, there would be advantages not only to those
countries but to all other countries as well.
The present situation in Antarctica is characterized by
diverse legal, political, and administrative concepts which
render friendly cooperation difiicult in the absence of an
understanding among the countries involved. Seven
countries have asserted claims of sovereignty to portions
of Antarctica, some of which overlap and give rise to
occasional frictions. Other countries have a direct inter-
est in that continent based on past discovery and explora-
tion, geographic proximity, sea and air transportation
routes, and other considerations.
The United States for many years has had, and at the
present time continues to have, direct and substantial
rights and interests in Antarctica. Throughout a period
of many years, commencing in the early eighteen-hun-
dreds, many areas of the Antarctic region have been dis-
covered, sighted, explored and claimed on behalf of the
United States by nationals of the United States and by
expeditions carrying the flag of the United States. During
this period, the Government of the United States and its
nationals have engaged in well-known and extensive ac-
tivities in Antarctica.
In view of the activities of the United States and its
nationals referred to above, my Government reserves all
of the rights of the United States with respect to the
Antarctic region, including the right to assert a terri-
torial claim or claims.
It is the opinion of my Government, however, that the
interests of mankind would best be served, in consonance
with the high ideals of the Charter of the United Nations,
if the countries which have a direct interest in Antarctica
were to join together in the conclusion of a treaty which
would have the following iseaceful purposes :
A. Freedom of scientific investigation throughout Ant-
arctica by citizens, organizations, and governments of
all countries; and a continuation of the international
scientific cooperation which is being carried out so suc-
cessfully during the current International Geophysical
Year.
B. International agreement to ensure that Antarctica
be used for peaceful purposes only.
C. Any other peaceful purposes not Inconsistent with
the Charter of the United Nations.
The Government of the United States is prepared to
discuss jointly with the Governments of the other coun-
tries having a direct interest In Antarctica the possibility
of concluding an agreement, which would be in the form
of a treaty, for the purpose of giving legal effect to these
high principles. It is believed that such a treaty can be
concluded without requiring any participating nation to
renounce whatever basic historic rights it may have in
Antarctica, or whatever claims of sovereignty it may have
asserted. It could be specifically provided that such basic
rights and such claims would remain unaffected while
the treaty Is In force, and that no new rights would
be acquired and no new claims made by any country
911
during the duration of the treaty. In other words, the
legal status quo in Antarctica would be frozen for the
duration of the treaty, permitting cooperation in scien-
tific and adniinistrative matters to be carried out in a
constructive manner without being hampered or affected
in any way by political considerations. Provision could
likewise be made for such joint administrative arrange-
ments as might be necessary and desirable to ensure the
successful accomplishment of the agreed objectives. The
proposed treaty would be deposited with the United Na-
tions, and the cooperation of the specialized technical
agencies of the United Nations would be sought. Such an
Arrangement would provide a firm and favorable founda-
tion for a continuation of the productive activities which
have thus far distinguished the International Geophysical
Year ; would provide an agreed basis for the maintenance
of peaceful and orderly conditions in Antarctica during
years to come; and would avoid the possibility of that
continent becoming the scene of international discord.
In the hope that the countries having a direct interest
in Antarctica will agree on the desirability of the afore-
said high objectives, and will work together in an effort
to convert them into practical realities, the Government
of the United States has the honor to invite the Govern-
ment of to participate in a Confer-
ence for this purpose to be convened at an early date at
such place as may be mutually agreeable.
Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my high-
est consideration.
U.S. and Australia To Continue
Woric at Antarctic Station
Folloiving is the text of a joint announcement
made on May 6 hy the Governments of Australia
and the United States.
Press release 245 dated April 28
The Governments of Australia and the United
States of America have agreed to cooperate in
maintaining operations at Wilkes Station, Ant-
arctica, in order that the useful scientific activi-
ties which have been carried on there during the
current International Geophysical Year may be
continued without interruption after the end of
the International Geophysical Year on December
31, 1958.
For this purpose the Government of the United
States is contributing all the buildings and facili-
ties of the Wilkes Station and all of the supplies,
fuel and food remaining at the Station at the end
of the International Geophysical Year. The
Government of Australia, on its part, has agreed
to provide the logistical and administrative serv-
ices needed for the continued operation of the
Station. Scientists from both countries will par-
ticipate in the program of technical studies, re-
search and scientific observations to be carried on
at Wilkes Station.
In harmony with the spirit of the International
Geophysical Year, scientists from all countries
are cordially invited to participate in the scien-
tific program at Wilkes Station at any time,
subject to the limitations of space, transportation,
and accommodations.
The administrative arrangements which have
been agreed upon by the two Governments have
no effect on the rights or claims asserted by either
country in Antarctica. Each Government main-
tains its traditional position in regard to such
matters.
The details of this new arrangement are cur-
rently being worked out by officials of the two
Governments, so that the operational, logistical,
and administrative functions required for the suc-
cessful operation of this Station can be continued
on January 1, 1959, without interruption of the
scientific program.
The Governments of Australia and the United
States of America jointly express their satisfac-
tion at this new manifestation of the friendly
spirit of cooperation which animates them, and
are confident that the practical results of this
agreement will redound to the benefit of world
Field Marshal Sarit off Thailand
Conffers With U.S. Officials
Meeting With President Eisenhower
The Department of State announced on May
7 (press release 249) that President Eisenhower
had met that day with Field Marshal Sarit
Thanarat (Srisdi Dhanarajata) , Supreme Com-
mander of the Armed Forces of Thailand, who re-
cently underwent a successful operation at Walter
Reed Army Medical Center. They enjoyed a
cordial exchange of views regarding means of
further strengthening the already close coopera-
tion between Thailand and the United States.
The Field Marshal returned to Washington
on May 1, following a month of rest and recupera-
tion in Florida with his wife, Madame Wichit.
He will spend the rest of the month in the capital
to meet with United States Government leaders.
912
Department of State Bulletin
Field Marshal Sarit will see Secretary Dulles;
Deputy Uuder Secretary Douglas Dillon ; Assist-
ant Secretary Walter S. Eobertson; and George
V. Allen, Director of the United States Informa-
tion Agency. He will also meet with high-rank-
ing officials of the Department of Defense and the
armed services.
Discussions will center upon political, economic,
and military mattere, relating to Thailand and
the United States, which the Royal Thai Govern-
ment had requested Field Marshal Sarit to take
up.
Meeting With Secretary Dulles
The Department of State announced on May
14 (press release 263) tJiat Secretary Dulles and
Field Marshal Sarit met that day to discuss means
of further strengthening the existing close co-
operation between Thailand and the United
States. Tliey also discussed the world situation,
with emphasis on free- world defense against Com-
munist pressures. The Ambassador of Thailand,
Thanat Khoman, and Assistant Secretary Robert-
son were present.
Further talks on these and related subjects will
be held during the next few days with Depart-
ment of State officials, including Deputy Under
Secretary Dillon and Assistant Secretary Robert-
son.
The meeting with Secretary Dulles and the
other talks to follow are an outgrowth of the
meeting between President Eisenhower and the
Field Marshal at the White House on May 7,
when they enjoyed a cordial exchange of views
on matters of mutual interest.
U.S. and Philippines Estabiisii
Mutual Defense Board
Press release 268 dated May 15
The following was released at Manila as a joint
Philippine-United States press announcement on
May 15.
The Philippine and United States Governments
today announced agi-eement on the establishment
of a Philippine-United States Mutual Defense
Board and the assignment of a Philippine mili-
tary liaison officer to the staff of the Base Com-
mander in major United States military bases in
the Philippines.
One of a continuing series of actions implement-
ing existing security and defense agreements be-
tween the two countries, today's exchange of notes
marks a major step in securing effective collabora-
tion between the two comitries in the joint effort
to improve and enhance the common defense.
As stated in the Exchange of Notes "the purpose
of this (Mutual Defense) Board is to provide con-
tinuing inter-governmental machinery for direct
liaison and consultation between appropriate
Philippine and United States authorities on mili-
tary matters of mutual concern so as to develop
and improve, through continuing military coop-
eration, the common defense of the two sovereign
countries." The Board will have Philippine and
United States co-chairmen.
The Philippine militaiy liaison officer, who will
be assigned to a major United States military base,
will cooperate with the Base Commander by ad-
vice, suggestion and/or other appropriate action
to assure observance of Philippine law and regu-
lations within the base, will advise the Base Com-
mander concerning problems involving Philippine
nationals and residents on the base, and the day-
to-day relationships between the base. Base Com-
mander and such nationals and residents. These
officers will be appointed by the Chief of Staff,
Armed Forces of the Philippines, will be under
the Administration of the Philippine Co-Chair-
raan of the Mutual Defense Board, and will submit
reports to the Board.
The agreements announced today are designed
to enable the two governments to carry out more
effectively the specified purposes and objectives
of the Mutual Defense Agreement, and are part
of the continuing effort of both governments to
further strengthen their mutual defense and to
contribute to international peace and security.
Radio-TV Exchanges With U.S.S.R.
Press release 272 dated May 16
The Department of State, pursuant to section II
(2) and (3) of the exchange agreement with the
U.S.S.R. signed January 27, 1958,^ announced on
May 16 that it is prepared to facilitate the trans-
mission to the Soviet Government of lists of re-
' For text of agreement, see Bulletin of Feb. 17, 1958,
p. 243.
iune 2, 1958
913
corded radio and TV programs or proposals for
future programs which interested companies in
the United States may wish to offer to the Soviet
Government for sale or for exchange.
Similar lists of programs prepared by the radio
and the TV authorities of the Soviet Union as suit-
able for distribution in the United States will
subsequently be made available to the interested
domestic companies.
In the submission of lists of programs a brief
description of the contents and length of broadcast
time consumed should be specified. Proposals
shoidd reach the Office of East-West Contacts of
the Department not later than June 1, 1958.
THE CONGRESS
U.S. Policies and Programs in tlie Far East
Statement iy Walter S. Robertson
Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs '■
I wish to thank you for the opportunity to
appear before this committee today to discuss our
policies and problems in the Far East. Being well
aware of the wide knowledge and understanding
which members of this committee have of the area,
I propose to confine my opening remarks to a gen-
eral evaluation of where I think we stand in the
Far East. By the term "Far East" I mean that
vast land and ocean area extending from Siberia
all the way to the South Pacific and Indian Ocean,
including Japan, Korea, China, the Philippines,
Viet-Nam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Burma,
Malaya, Indonesia, Australia, and New Zealand.
In this area live approximately 900 million
people — one-third the population of the world.
It was only a few years ago that international
communism, having acquired a huge central base
of operations in Asia by overrunning the main-
land of China, was carrying aggression directly
against certain small, free nations along or near
its borders. Force, bluster, and naked threats
were used by Communist China from 1949 to 1954
in a wide variety of military or paramilitary sit-
uations involving almost all free coimtries along
' Made before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
on May 2 (press release 238) .
its borders. We fought a bloody war to stem
Communist aggression against the Republic of
Korea. We helped shore up the defenses of free
China on Taiwan. We helped build up the mili-
tary strength of free nations in Southeast Asia.
For 4 years now the Communists have been de-
terred from outright military aggression.
But the Communists are masters of tactical
flexibility. Recognizing that strong-arm tactics
were being effectively opposed by the free world
and recognizing the success of our aid programs,
the Communists have increasingly placed their
accent since 1954 on so-called peaceful coexistence.
You are all familiar with the hallmarks of this
present coexistence campaign — good-will tours,
offers of economic aid and technical assistance,
trade fairs, cultural and sporting events — every-
thing designed to conjure up a picture before the
world of a friendly Soviet Union and of a Com-
munist China wholly innocent of any designs on
their smaller neighbors.
The purpose of this campaign is clear. It is
aimed at inducing neutralism, weakening our
alliances, and lowering the guard of those oppos-
ing Communist expansion. Meanwhile the Com-
munists make no effort to hide their hatred of the
914
Department of Sfate Bulletin
United States. Everywhere they are seeking to
stimulate anti-U.S. feeling in Asia and mobilize
opinion against the country which the Communists
correctly recognize as being the chief prop and
support of the free world.
In all these undertakings two facts stand out.
One is that there is no evidence that Peiping and
Moscow, whose military power is being steadily
expanded, have discarded force as a means for
gaining their goals. Communist resort to force
is a decided possibility whenever and wherever, in
Communist thinking, free- world countries are im-
prepared or unwilling to resist that force. The
other outstanding fact is that there is no evidence
of change in communism's declared objective of
ultimate world domination. It is of the utmost
importance that the free world not be misled, by
failing to understand this, into making basic
policy concessions to the Communists in response
to tactical maneuvers on their part.
Susceptibility to Communist Penetration
There are a number of features about the free
Far East which make it susceptible to Communist
penetration. For example, most of the Far East-
ern countries, having only won their independence
since 1945, have had limited experience in self-
government. Some of them, like Indonesia and
Laos, are still grappling with grave problems con-
nected with preservmg that newly won independ-
ence. Their recent colonial past has also left a
legacy of intense anticolonialism and nationalism.
While this may be advantageous in the sense that
it operates against at least the more obvious forms
of Communist encroachment upon these free coun-
tries, it is disadvantageous to the extent it ob-
structs regional and interregional cooperation and
complicates economic development.
Perhaps a more serious point of susceptibility to
communism is occasioned by the fact that, in the
short space of 40 years, the Soviet Union has been
transformed from a backward agrarian country
into an industrial and scientific giant. To peoples
of less developed nations seeking order, rapid
growth, and industrialization, the examples of
Russia and even of Communist China are not with-
out appeal, provided one overlooks the great sacri-
fices in life and human values involved in Russia's
and Communist China's industrial advancement.
The Communists also exploit all the antipathies
June 2, 7958
existing between various free Far Eastern coun-
tries and take advantage of the difficulties these
countries have in finding adequate markets for
their goods and capital for development.
Yet, for all these dissensions and susceptibilities,
the non-Coimnunist countries of the Far East
have this key objective in conmion : They are try-
ing to remain free — and this is basically where
their aims and interests conjoin with ours. Like
us, they have the basic national objectives of na-
tional independence, human liberty, better con-
ditions of life, and, last but not least, peace — gen-
uine peace. It is for this reason that these nations,
even though half a world away from the United
States and lying under the very shadow of the
Communist empire, look to the United States for
leadership and support.
Overall U.S. Policies
For our part we recognize that the survival and
progress of each and every one of these coun-
tries in the free world is of direct consequence to
our own national security. It is accordingly the
policy of the United States to help build up con-
ditions of security, stability, and economic prog-
ress in free Asia as rapidly as possible. Our over-
all policies may accordingly be sununarized under
two main headings : (1) security and stability and
(2) improvement of conditions of life.
1. Secmity and Stability: We have joined in
security treaties which make clear that attacks or
encroaclmients on free nations of Asia would be
considered as endangering our own peace and
safety and that we and they would act in the com-
mon defense. Together we have backed up these
commitments with military power, which is the
only language would-be aggressors understand.
The free nations of the Far East now have more
than one and three-quarters million men under
arms. These forces, together with United States
forces widely deployed across the Pacific, consti-
tute the principal deterrent to aggression. They
are essential to maintaining the peace.
Under the mutual defense assistance program
the United States is currently providing around
$650 million per year in military assistance to Far
Eastern countries— that is, in supplying hard-
ware and training — and almost an equal amount
for defense support. This defense support bol-
sters the economy, helps control inflation, and
915
helps pay for tlie armies which certain small coun-
tries with weak economies could not otherwise
afford. The bulk of this category of assistance
goes to our hard-pressed allies in Korea, Taiwan,
and Viet-Nam, for it must be remembered that it is
against these areas that Communist China and
its satellites pose their most direct military threat.
Moreover these three countries — Korea, China,
and Viet-Nam— being divided, one part free and
the other Communist-dominated, are necessarily
areas of direct challenge.
At the same time we are assisting free nations,
whether allied or neutral, in achieving internal
security and greater economic and political stabil-
ity. Certainly there can be no real progress in
satisfying mankind's aspirations for improved
standards of living without first creating such con-
ditions. I therefore trust the United States will
continue to support the development of adequate
local security and police forces, in providing
them with equipment and training and in support-
ing the economies of countries which must main-
tain security forces beyond their economic capac-
ity to support.
2. Improvement of Conditions of Life: Behind
the common-defense shield that is thus being
built up, and in the atmosphere of security and
stability we are helping to create, all the free na-
tions of Asia can today breathe more easily. They
can turn their attention to the essential task of
improving conditions of human existence, which
they all recognize to be their number-one long-
term objective.
We thoroughly sympathize with this objective
and are supporting it in the following ways :
We offer technical know-how, make grants and
loans for development projects, sell our agricul-
tural food surpluses for local currency, and then
reloan much of this money on a long-term basis.
We exchange teachers and students and train
scientists and technicians. We encourage private
investment by American industry and by the in-
dustries of other advanced free-world countries.
We also endeavor to maximize the level of free-
world trade through the promotion of liberal
trade policies and the maintenance of a high level
of economic activity.
Sino-Soviet Economic Offensive
Even if the Sino-Soviet bloc had not launched
an economic offensive designed to subvert free
916
Asia, I believe it would still be the policy of our
Government to assist less developed countries in
attaining economic health and growth for, in this
interdependent, shrinking world, their economic
welfare and ours are clearly related. The Com-
munist economic offensive only makes our efforts
in this field the more urgent. Moreover — to para-
phrase President Eisenhower's recent message to
Congress = — if the purpose of Sino-Soviet aid to
any nation were simply to help it overcome eco-
nomic difficulties without infringing its freedom,
such aid would be a welcome means of forwarding
our own purpose of facilitating economic growth.
Yet, as the President went on to say, there is
nothing in the history of international coimnunism
to indicate this Soviet-bloc aid is anything but
another Communist means of trying to draw re-
cipient countries away from the community of
free nations and ultimately into the Commimist
orbit.
To counter tliis Sino-Soviet economic offensive
while maintaining an adequate military posture
vis-a-vis the bloc, we must have an adequate and
effective mutual security program. This program
is the backbone of our security position in the Far
East. A number of countries are critically de-
pendent upon U.S. assistance programs for mili-
tary hardware, training, defense-budget support,
and the like. It is quite understandable that these
countries, as well as other free Far Eastern coun-
tries, are highly sensitive to any indication that
the United States might lose interest in them by re-
ducing its assistance programs or commitments to
help them. No one except the Communists would
rejoice were this to happen, for they stand poised
and eager to step in, when and where we step out.
Now I know that there is criticism regarding
various features of our mutual assistance pro-
gram. Some of this criticism, I believe, is entirely
valid insofar as it points to things that we could
and should correct. This we are striving to do.
But we must nevertheless recognize that there are
almost bound to be shortcomings and failings in
an assistance program of this dimension. Our
problem is to preserve patience and perspective,
while doing everything at our command to keep
the program as trim and efficient as possible in
terms of our overall objectives. Surely it would
be contrary to our interests to make serious cuts
= Bulletin of Mar. 10, 1958, p. 367.
Department of State Bulletin
in our mutual assistance program on the basis of
those instances where there was or is inefficiency
or where we appear to get less than face value for
our money. Let us not forget that imitation is the
sincerest form of flattery: The Communist eco-
nomic offensive is a real tribute to the effectiveness
of our aid programs.
Closely related to this question is the problem
of our trade policy. Rather than speak in gen-
eralities, let me cite the specific case of Japan.
Here is a country of greatest consequence to the
United States. Commercially, it is our second
largest market, purchasing in 1957 some $625 mil-
lion more of U.S. goods from the United States
than we bought from Japan. Strategically, it is
one of the world's four major industrial complexes.
Politically, it is a leader in Asia and is playing an
increasingly important role in the economic ad-
vancement of free Asia. Our relations with Japan
today are good and of great mutual benefit, but let
us be under no illusions : Japan must trade to live.
If the United States starts down the path of in-
creased trade restrictions, then other countries will
follow suit and all this will have deep and far-
reaching consequences. Having Japan's huge in-
dustrial-mercantile complex humming for Sino-
Soviet account is something the Communists
dearly seek. It would cause a significant, quite
possibly a disastrous, shift in the world's power
balance, and the secondary effects on the rest of
Asia are not hard to imagine. This illustrates
why it is so important that we take no step — such
as failure to renew the Trade Agreements Act —
which would be interpreted as U.S. moves away
from liberal trade policy toward high protection-
ism.
Where We Stand in the Far East
And now for a few concluding remarks on where
we stand in the Far East.
The best way to judge the merits of a policy
is by its results. For 8 years now, since the start
of the Korean War, the United States has played
an active role in the military, political, and eco-
nomic support of free countries in the Far East.
"VVTiat has been accomplished in that period ?
The Far East in 1950 was a discouraging sight
to all except the Communists, who had just taken
over the China mainland and were poised for fur-
ther conquest. Korea was attacked in June 1950,
and for a long time during that critical year it was
touch-and-go whether Korea could be saved from
the massed, organized Communist onslaught.
Later in 1950 the Ked Chinese invaded and occu-
pied Tibet. Malaya and the Philippines were ter-
rorized by elusive Communist groups operating
out of the jungles; Indonesia had just suppressed
a military coup sponsored by the Communists and
was still figliting a guerrilla war. There was civil
war accompanied by alarming deterioration in
Indochina and Burma.
The Far East today is obviously not all that we
would like to see. We are deeply concerned over
certain developments, such as those transpiring
right now in Indonesia. But the general picture
in the Far East today represents a vast improve-
ment over that obtaining 4 to 8 years ago. Korea
has made steady progress in rebuilding its war-
shattered economy, combating inflation, and get-
ting ahead with economic development, while at
the same time maintaining a large military estab-
lishment that has helped preserve the uneasy truce
situation and the security of the Far East area
as a whole. Japan has returned to the interna-
tional community as a nation with a free economy
equipped and prepared to contribute in a signifi-
cant way to the economic growth of free Asia. The
Republic of China remains a firm and effective ally
and a standing challenge to the attempts of Com-
munist China to fasten permanently its rule on the
Chinese people. The recent Philippine elections
supplied further evidence of that nation's strong
democratic political institutions. While there
have been some disturbing developments in Laos,
as in connection with the formation last year of
a coalition government with Communist participa-
tion, nevertheless the Royal Government has mean-
while recovered control of two provinces long
denied to it by tlie Viet Minh and Chinese Commu-
nist support of the Pathet Lao. It is also note-
worthy that Indochina and mainland Southeast
Asia as a whole have developed a better capacity to
maintain internal security and a far better under-
standing of the many-faceted Communist threat
and a capability to withstand that threat. Today
neutrality rather than neutralism characterizes the
foreign-policy position of certain nonallied South-
east Asian countries.
Over the past 10 years Australia and New
Zealand have played an increasingly useful and
constructive role in Far East affairs. SEATO is
a good, going organization with headquarters in
June 2, 1958
917
Thailand. I agree with Secretary Dulles that the
recent SEATO meeting we attended at Manila was
the best we ever had and augurs well for the future
of that important organization.
I repeat that I do not wish to leave the impres-
sion that all is well in the Far East today. Our
alliances could be stronger; our MSA program
could be more effective ; the relations between some
of our friends are in urgent need of improvement ;
the Communist economic offensive could have
serious results ; and the Indonesian situation is far
from reassuring. But I do believe there has been
a turning of the tide in the Far East. This turn of
the tide was the result of a lot of hard work and
determination on the part of free nations under
the leadership of the United States.
Persistence in our efforts will bring its rewards.
Eelaxation of our efforts will be at our peril.
Problems and Prospects of U.S. Relations
With the Near East, South Asia, and Africa
Statement hy William M. Rountree
Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs '
I welcome this opportmaity to come before you
to review United States policy with regard to the
Near East, South Asia, and Africa. In this in-
troductory statement I propose, in accordance
with your request, to summarize the situation in
the area, the current state of our relations with
some of the major entities, and the main problems
in, and prospects for, these relations.
The situation in such a large and diverse area
does not lend itself easily to generalization.
Nevertheless, despite the diversity of government
forms, political development, languages, races, re-
ligions, and geography, it is possible to point out
broad underlying factors that determine to a great
extent the nature and conduct of our foreign rela-
tions in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa.
Throughout this region there are strong forces
of impatient and emotional nationalism, often
constructive and forward-looking but sometimes
tending to extremism and political instability.
Particularly since World War II the awakened
national consciousness of the area has been accom-
panied by a steadily growing demand among the
peoples, whose standard of living ranges from low
to extremely low, for improvement in their status.
Their governments, which vary in both strength
and experience, are striving frequently with in-
' Made before the Senate Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions on May 8 (press release 252) .
adequate institutions and insufficiently organized
and trained manpower to cope with demands for
economic improvement. Some of the coimtries
have valuable natural resources and relatively
minor economic obstacles to overcome, but others,
less well endowed by nature, face extremely diffi-
cult economic problems that have existed for gen-
erations. They know also that a failure to show
significant economic progress may lead to the
overthrow of existing institutions in favor of
others promising quicker results, however spe-
ciously and at whatever costs in freedom.
To complicate this situation there are several
critical intra-area disputes which not only have
caused dangerous tension among the parties con-
cerned but also have created opportunities for in-
ternational communism to exploit by offering arms
and economic assistance on a selective basis. The
Communists have, so far, failed to make a satel-
lite of any country of this area. Nevertheless,
through their deceptions they have succeeded in
exploiting the mistaken belief of some of these
countries that they can deal closely with the So-
viet Union without risking subversion and ulti-
mate loss of independence. The Soviets have also
attempted to misuse the neutralist position of some
of these countries to achieve their own imperialist
aims and to discredit the "West. Tlie cynical na-
ture of these Soviet tactics was well exemplified
by the Soviet performance in coimection with the
Deporfmenf of State Bulletin
artificial Syrian "crisis" last year and in the Afro-
Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference in Cairo
last December.
The Soviets have an initial advantage in deal-
ing with some countries because of suspicions
arising from past association with the West, be-
cause some leaders fe«l their critical national
problems require that they accept help from any
source, and because of their unfamiliai'ity with
the methods of the Soviet Union and its inter-
national performance. Playing upon these fac-
tors the Soviets have hypocritically refrained
from joining in efforts to find constructive solu-
tions to disjjutes and instead have attempted to
play upon the feare and aspirations of one side
or the other.
Some Significant Recent Events
In a brief review it is impossible to provide
details about the situation in each of the coun-
tries of the Near East, South Asia, and Africa.
I would therefore like to underline some of the
more significant recent events.
There have been major new moves toward the
realization of Arab imity as evidenced in the
establishment early this year of the United Arab
Republic of Egypt and Syria and the pending
formation of the Arab Union composed of Jordan
and Iraq. Subsequently the Yemen joined a loose
federation with the United Arab Republic under
the designation of the United Arab States.
The maintenance of the uneasy peace between
the Arab states and Israel is assisted by the con-
tinued presence of the United Nations Emer-
gency Force in Gaza and Sinai and of United
Nations observers elsewhere in the area. A per-
manent solution to the lamentable problem of
more than 900,000 unfortunate Palestine refugees
has not yet been found, despite our persistent
effoi-ts.
Our efforts to promote the collective security of
the Middle East have continued. In January
of this year the Ankara meeting of the Baghdad
Pact allies was marked by the participation of
Secretary Dulles.^ This strategic alliance of na-
tions continues to show determination to stand
For statements by Secretary Dulles and text of com-
munique issued at the close of the meeting, see Bui^
LETIN of Feb. 17, 1958, p. 250.
resolute against the threats of international com-
munism and to cooperate in the pursuit of re-
gional peace and progress.
Our relations with tlie Government of the
United Arab Republic have posed special prob-
lems for us. We would like to see established a
basis from which more normal relations could
develop. A few days ago agreement was reached
by the United Arab Republic and the Suez Canal
Company to settle the company's compensation
claims. This by no means settles all of the prob-
lems arising from the Suez Canal nationalization,
but it is a promising development. In line with
our previous statements, we promptly released
Egyptian assets that had been frozen in the
United States as a result of the canal contro-
versy.^
In the past 2 years four African states, Ghana,
Morocco, the Sudan, and Tunisia, have joined the
older independent African states, Ethiopia, Li-
beria, Libya, and the Union of South Africa. The
emergence of these independent states in Africa
lias been largely marked by moderation and
understanding. It is to their great credit that
tlie leaders and peoples of the new Africa are
showing an objective awareness of the mutual
advantages involved in some form of continued
collaboration with Europe. Admittedly the con-
tinuation of the Algerian conflict and the feelings
of the North African peoples about it present a
great and serious obstacle to the achievement of
such collaboration.
The conference of African states at Accra last
month was a good example of a healthy trend in
Africa toward the establishment of cooperative
regional ties. Indigenously inspired and organ-
ized, the Accra conference as a display of au-
thoritative and, on the whole, responsible African
nationalism contrasted sliarply with the Soviet
and Communist Chinese attempts to control the
Cairo-held Afro- Asian Solidarity Conference for
propaganda purposes. You will recall that vir-
tually all African governments refrained from
official representation at the latter meeting. Their
decision was proved correct by the obvious and
abortive efforts made by the Soviet and Com-
munist Chinese outsiders in the Cairo meeting
to foist a non-African initiative and non-African
interests on African governments.
' Ibid., May 19, 1958, p. 830.
June 2, 7958
919
U.S. Relations With Countries of the Area
Mr. Chairman, I would like now to summarize
for you the state of our relations with the coun-
tries of this area. You are aware that the area
contains major sources of important materials
such as oil wliich are essential to us or to other
nations of the free world. Portions of tlus area
also include strategic connections and historic
crossroads that are not only involved in trade
and transportation with the rest of the world
but at the same time offer invasion paths for
would-be aggressors. We and other free nations
have well-established trade relations based upon
mutual advantage with many of these countries.
As the new nations of the Near East, South Asia,
and Africa succeed in developing their economies,
the possibilities of mutually beneficial trade will
increase. We have long realized that because of
our interdependence with the rest of the world
it is very much in our interest to help the peoples
of this area to achieve their aspirations for se-
curity and well-being.
In recognition of those interests we have made
it the principal objective of our foreign policy in
this part of the world to help the countries to
maintain their political independence and ter-
ritorial integrity against aggressors. We have
sought also to help them achieve the progressive
realization of their national aspirations by tnily
democratic and peaceful means.
In pursuing these objectives we have used a
number of instrumentalities. For example, the
economic and military assistance aspects of the
mutual security program and the new Develop-
ment Loan Fund have been of primary impor-
tance for the achievement of our economic and
military objectives throughout this area. The
mfonnation and cultural activities of the United
States Information Agency have helped us to
present a true picture of the United States and
its aims and to counteract Soviet lies and dis-
tortions. The efforts of private Americans in
missionary and philanthropic endeavors are also
important in reflecting the broad cultural and
humanitarian outlook of the American people.
Hospitals, schools, and universities demonstrate
the contribution which has been made and which
is still being made in this way. I cite particularly
the American University of Beirut as a great
center of learning.
To deal with specific situations, such as the
threat of aggression in the Middle East by states
under the control of international communism, we
have had such tools as the so-called Middle East
doctrme. This doctrme continues to be an im-
portant element in United States policy in the
Middle East. The joint resolution embodying the
doctrine forcefully expresses our policy of assist-
ing those states of the area desiring such assist-
ance to maintain their independence and integrity
against aggressors and to develop their economies."
It is thus intended to promote peace and stability.
By proclaiming the intention of the United
States to assist Middle Eastern nations to main-
tain their independence against the threat of in-
ternational communism, we believe that the resolu-
tion leaves no possibility of miscalculation in the
minds of potential Communist or Communist-con-
trolled aggressors as to the results of aggressive
action on their part.
United States relations with the new nations
of Africa are uniformly warm and friendly. We
are proud that the nations of Africa today look
to us for support for their legitimate political, eco-
nomic, and social aspirations. They are today,
for the most part, governed by moderate regimes
dedicated to the maintenance of their inde-
pendence, but those regimes must be able to dem-
onstrate to their peoples, in concrete and under-
standable terms, the advantages of cooperation
with the West and of middle-of-the-road ap-
proaches to the solution of their current press-
ing problems.
Without seeking to displace anyone in Africa,
but recognizing the necessity for encouraging the
pro-Western orientation of the peoples of that
continent, we have developed important economic,
technical, and military aid agreements with sev-
eral African countries. In Libya, Liberia, and
Ethiopia, for example, after some years of opera-
tion these programs are now showing solid
achievements in terms of better agricultural
methods, better health, better education, and more
opportunities for increased industrialization. A
United States technical-assistance program deal-
ing with agi-icultural and community develop-
ment has just been started in the new state of
Ghana. Programs are getting under way also in
Morocco and Tunisia. In this vital North African
area these programs are helping to build stability,
♦ For text of resolution, see ibid., Mar. 25, 1957, p. 481.
Department of Slate Bulletin
although the pall of the Algerian problem in-
creasingly overshadows future prospects and un-
derlines the importance of a peaceful, democratic,
and just solution.
Our longstanding close and friendly relations
with our NATO allies, Greece and Turkey, con-
tinue. Next month we are expecting a visit from
an old friend of the United States, the Shah of
Iran. With most of the other Middle Eastern
states we enjoy basically good relations today,
even though tliere are some serious disagreements
about specific issues. In the case of the United
Arab Republic there has recently seemed to be
some improvement in atmosphere. With Saudi
Arabia we continue as in the past to maintain the
special relations that began to develop toward the
close of the Second World War. We have been
liappy to extend assistance to Lebanon, where
there has been a highly successful endeavor of
people of different faiths and creeds to live and
work together. With both economic and military
assistance we are continuing to help the state of
Jordan in maintaining its courageous and suc-
cessful stand against Soviet imperialism and
other foreign subversion. We are providing tech-
nical assistance to Iraq, which is making great
progress in responding to the needs and wishes of
its people through an enlightened development
program. Iraq is also cooperating actively in the
Baglidad Pact. We have encouraged Iraq in the
maintenance of this attitude tlirough, among other
measures, provision of military assistance.
On November 29, 19.56, we reaffirmed our sup-
port of the collective efforts of the Baghdad Pact
nations to maintain their independence and stated
that we would view witli the utmost gravity a
threat to their territorial integrity or political in-
dependence. Although sevei'al of the states of this
region have chosen not to join actively with us
in building up regional collective security, we
have noted encouraging signs of a growing reali-
zation of what constitutes true neutralism and of
what wholesale Soviet offers of assistance are
really worth in the long run.
The committee will recall that, with respect to
tlie participation of nations in the area in collec-
tive-security arrangements, Greece and Turkey are
members of NATO ; Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Pak-
istan are members of the Baghdad Pact; and
Pakistan is a member of SEATO.
Israel has just celebrated the 10th anniversary
of its independence. United States assistance has
played its role in fostering the economic and hu-
man development of tliat country.
Our friendly relations with India and Pakistan
and the otlier South Asian states have been
strengtliened by an increased mutual understand-
ing of each other's objectives. With Nepal our
relations have been consistently friendly. We
maintain amicable relations with Afghanistan,
and we are looking forward in June to the visit
of Prime Minister Daud. Although Ceylon fol-
lows a nonalinement policy in foreign affairs,
U.S.-Ceylonese relations have been cordial, a cor-
diality which was augmented by an American aid
program including expeditious American relief
assistance during a flood disaster last January.
In summing up the state of our relations with
this large area, I woidd offer you the analogy of
a spectx-um. At one end are our very friendly
relationships with those close allies associated
with us in mutual-security arrangements. At the
other end, through various gradations, are those
few countries that still misconstrue our motives.
It is, of course, not a full spectrum — far from
it — for there are no Soviet satellites. Although
today there is probably considerably less danger
of the satellization of any of the Middle Eastern
states than there seemed to be several months ago,
we realize that there is room for considerable im-
provement of our relations with some of those
states. Important also, there is considerable
room for improvement in the relations among the
states themselves.
Problems Resulting From Intra-Area Disputes
Much of what I would tell you about the prob-
lems and prospects of our relations with the Near
East, South Asia, and Africa has been implied
in what I have already said in summarizing the
situation in the area and the state of our relations.
I have referred to the fact that there are several
major intra-area disputes. These disputes cause
many collateral problems and seriously aggravate
the sense of insecurity among our friends in the
area. For the most part we are not ourselves di-
rectly involved as a party to these disputes; but
in the world of today the United States, as a
leader of the free nations, cannot escape playing
a role in matters of this kind. It is our policy to
deal with all of the states of the area on a basis
of equality, impartiality, and respect. This pol-
June 2, J 958
icy is sometimes misunderstood by some of our
friends who desire our unqualified support for
their point of view.
Thus the Algerian question poses many serious
problems for us because it has arrayed France and
many of our friends in the area on opposite sides.
The principal parties to the festering Cyprus dis-
pute are, apart from the Cypriots themselves, our
good friends: Greece, Turkey, and the United
Kingdom. The Arab-Israeli tension has clouded
almost evei7 issue in the Near East and has given
rise to much bitterness and misunderstanding.
British disagreements with Saudi Arabia over the
Buraimi Oasis and with Yemen over the Aden
frontier have posed problems in our own relations.
The unresolved Kashmir question seriously ham-
pers the amelioration of relations between our
Pakistani and Indian friends.
The great rivers and waterways of this region
are also the focus of disputes. There are several
outstanding differences on the Gulf of Aqaba as
well as on the division of the waters of the Nile,
the Jordan, the Indus, and the Helmand rivers.
These disputes are bad enough in themselves, but
they also cause us harm because our friends in
ardently pursuing, understandably, their individ-
ual interests sometimes fail to understand our im-
partiality. I have already described how the
Communists use some of these disputes to try to
discredit us and to achieve propaganda advantages
for themselves at the expense of progress toward
just and peaceful solutions.
We have no quick or easy solutions to the many
problems that face us. In the last analysis the
answers must come — but, I trust, with our full
cooperation and encouragement — from the area
itself. In bettering the prospects for our relations
in this area, it is in our interest to keep in mind
four fundamental considerations :
First, to support the development of strong and
independent nations able and willing to resist the
subversive efforts of international- communism;
Second, to contribute, if requested by the na-
tions of the area, to their security, recognizing
that in a broad sense their security is our security ;
Third, to assist and encourage the countries of
the area to resolve their disputes in accordance
with the principles of the charter of the United
Nations ;
Fourth, to contribute to the economic progress
and development of the nations of the Near East,
South Asia, and Africa.
922
In following these objectives our relations will
probably still have their ujds and downs. But I
believe that the fulfillment of the national inter-
ests of the United States will flow naturally from
the pursuit and realization of these objectives.
Through them our foreign relations in the Near
East, South Asia, and Africa will be on a basis
of imderstanding and mutual respect. The re-
sources of this area will continue to be available
to the other members of the free world on con-
ditions advantageous to both the producing and
consuming countries. Vital transportation and
communications facilities will continue to be avail-
able to us. Doors will be open to cultural ex-
changes, to commercial intercourse, and to in-
creased diplomatic cooperation.
The pursuit of these objectives will thus en-
hance the peace and stability of the whole world.
President Reports to Congress
on International Travel
White House press release dated May 12
The President on May 12 sent to Congress, as
required by the Mutual Security Act of 1957, a
report ^ on the barriei-s to international travel and
the ways of promoting and facilitating such travel
in the mutual interests of the United States and
countries assisted under the Mutual Security Act.
The report was prepai'ed by Clarence B. Ran-
dall, Special Assistant to the President for For-
eign Economic Affairs, with the assistance of Gov-
ernment agencies concerned with travel.
In submitting the report to the President, Mr.
Randall pointed out that tourism has vast inter-
national cultural, political, and economic aspects
and can contribute significantly to the cause of
peace.
The report recommends that greater emphasis
be given to the operations of the United States in
the field of international travel, and specifically
create a separate travel office under the Assistant
Secretai-y of Commerce for International Affairs.
It also recommends several steps for facilitating
travel, including an increase in customs allow-
ances and in the life of the passport, and improve-
ment of accommodations to encourage moderate-
income tourists.
85th Cong., 2d sess.
Department of State Bulletin
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings <
Adjourned During May 1958
U.N. Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories: New York Apr. 14-Mav 9
9th Sr---— ^ '
U.N. Economic and Social Council: 25th Session New York Apr. 15-May 2
ITU Administrative Council: 13th Session Geneva Apr. 21-May 17
UNESCO E.xecutive Board: 60th Session Paris Apr. 21-May 24
4th FAO Conference on Mechanical Wood Technology Madrid Apr. 22-May 2
IAEA Board of Governors Vienna Apr. 24-May 3
Pan American Highway Congresses : 3d Meeting of Permanent Executive Washington Apr. 25-May 1
Committee.
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Narcotic Drugs: 13th Session Geneva Apr. 28-May 23
U.N. ECOSOC Statistical Commission: 10th Session New York Apr. 28-May 16
International Labor Conference: 41st (Maritime) Session Geneva Apr. 29-May 16
WMO Executive Committee: 10th Session Geneva Apr. 29-May 17
11th International Cannes Jilm Festival Cannes May 2-18
NATO : Ministerial Session of the Council Copenhagen May 5-7
U.N. Advisory Committee on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy: 8th Geneva May 7-8
Session.
ICEM Council: 8th Session Geneva May 7-14
U.N. Good Offices Committee on South- West Africa London May 8-22
FAO Cocoa Study Group: 3d Meeting Hamburg May 16-23
U.N. ECE Electric Power Committee: 16th Session Geneva May 19-21
ITU International Telephone and Telegraph Consultative Committee Warsaw May 19-23
(CCITT): Study Group VIII Working Party.
UPU Consultative Commission on Postal Studies (CCEP) : 1st Meeting . . Brussels May 19-29
2d Regional Meeting of Latin American National Commissions for Panamd May 25-30
UNESCO.
23d Congress for the Protection of Industrial Property Stockholm May 26-31
10th WHO Anniversary Commemorative Session Minneapolis May 26-27
FAO Legal and Constitutional Committee Rome May 28-30
U.N. ECE ^d Hoc Working Party on Gas Problems: 4th Session . . . . Geneva May 28-30
In Session as of May 31, 1958
GATT Tariff Negotiations with Brazil Geneva Feb. 14-
Brussels Universal and International Exhibition of 1958 Brussels Apr. 17-
U.N. Trusteeship Council: Standing Committee on Petitions New York May 6-
ICAO Assembly: Uth (Limited) Session Montreal May 20-
U.N. Conference on International Commercial Arbitration New York May 20-
11th World Health Assembly Minneapolis May 28-
Caribbean Commission: 26th Meeting Trinidad May 28-
FAO Regional Nutrition Meeting for Europe Rome May 28-
ITU International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR) : Study Group Moscow May 28-
XI (Television).
UNESCO Special Intergovernmental Committee on the Preparation of a Brussels May 28-
New Convention for the International Exchange of Publications.
Scheduled June 1 Through August 31, 1958
International Cotton Advisory Committee: 17th Plenary Meeting . . . London June 2-
PAO Group on Grains: 3d Session Rome June 2-
6th U.N. ECE Conference of European Statisticians Geneva June 2-
' Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, May 14, 1958. Asterisks indicate tentative dates. Following
Ls a list of abbreviations: CCEP, Commission consultative des etudes postales; CCIR, Comity consultatif international
des radiocommunieations; CCITT, Comity consultatif international t616graphique et t^l^phonique; ECE, Economic
Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization: GATT,
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; IBE, International Bureau of
Education; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ICEM, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migra-
ation; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; ITU,
International Telecommunication Union; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; PAIGH, Pan American Institute
of Geography and History; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization; UNREF, United Nations Refugee Fund; UPU, Universal Postal Union; WHO, World Health Organiza-
tion; WMO, World Meteorological Organization.
Jvne 2, 1958 923
Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings — Continued
Scheduled June 1 Through August 31, 195S—Conlinued
I MCO Preparatory Committee New York June 3-
17th International Conference on Large Electric Systems Paris June 4-
International Labor Conference: 42d Session Geneva June 4-
12th International Ornithological Congress Helsinki June 5-
International Rubber Study Group: 14th Meeting Hamburg June 9-
U.N. Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation: 5th Ses- New York June 9-
Intern'ational Commission for Northwest Atlantic Fisheries: 8th Halifax June 9-
Meeting. ^ , „
U.N. ECE Steel Committee and Working Parties Geneva June 9-
WMO Working Group on Numerical Weather Forecasting and Analysis. . Stockholm June 10-
FAO Technical Advisory Committee on Desert Locust Control: 8th Rome June 10-
Session.
IAEA Board of Governors Vienna June 16-
FAO Desert Locust Control Committee: 5th Session Rome June 16-
WHO Executive Board: 22d Session Minneapolis June 16-
5th International Electronic Nuclear Energy Exhibition and Conference . Rome June 1 6-
U.N. ECE Housing Committee: 16th Session Geneva June 16-
6th Inter-American Seminar on Overall Planning for Education .... Washington June 23-
luter-American Travel Congresses: Technical Committee of Experts on Washington June 23-
Travel Plant.
UNESCO Committee on International Standardization of Educational Paris June 23-
Statistics.
International Whaling Commission: 10th Meeting The Hague June 23-
International Wheat Council: 24th Session London June 25-
ILO Governing Body: 139th Session Geneva June 26-
8th Berlin FUm Festival Berlin June 27-
UNREF Standing Program Subcommittee: 7th Session Geneva June*
UNREF Executive Committee: 8th Session Geneva. ........ June*
International Tonnage Measurement Experts: 6th Meeting Hamburg June*
FAG International Poplar Commission: Executive Committee Rome July 1-
U.N. Economic and Social Council: 26th Session Geneva July 1-
ICAO Airworthiness Committee: 2d Meeting Montreal July 3-
Joint UNESCO/IBE International Conference on Public Education: 21st Geneva July 7-
Session.
Inter-American Travel Congresses: Technical Committee of Experts on Mexico, D.F July 7-
Toul-ist Travel Promotion.
International Union of Biological Sciences: 13th General Assembly . . London July 12-
Inter- American Technical Committee on Cacao: 7th Meeting Palmira, Colombia . . . July 13-
15th International Congress of Zoology London July 16-
International Union of Architects: 5th Congress Moscow July 20-
Inter-American Travel Congresses: Technical Committee of E.xperts on Buenos Aires July 21-
the Removal of Travel Barriers.
4th FAO Inter-American Meeting on Livestock Production Jamaica July 22-
Inter-Parliamentary Union: 47th Conference Rio de Janeiro July 24-
Baghdad Pact Ministerial Council: 5th Meeting London July 28-
Ad Hoc Committee for the Revision of the Agreement for Establishment Trinidad July*
of the Caribbean Commission.
Inter-American Travel Congresses: Permanent Executive Committee . . Lima Aug. 4-
International Union of Mathematics: 3d General Assembly St. Andrews, Scotland . Aug. 11-
International Astronomical Union: 10th General Assembly Moscow Aug. 13-
11th International Congress of Mathematicians Edinburgh Aug. 14-
UNESCO Intergovernmental Copyright Committee: 3d Session .... Geneva Aug. 18-
ICAO: Special Communications Preparatory Meeting for the ITU Radio Montreal Aug. 19-
Conference.
FAO Latin American Forestry Commission: 6th Session Guatemala Aug. 20-
19th International Exhibition of Cinematographic Art Venice Aug. 24-
12th Annual Edinburgh Film Festival Edinburgh Aug. 24-
International Union of Theoretical and Applied Mechanics Oxford, England .... Aug. 24-
PAIGH Directing Council: 3d Meeting Washington Aug. 25-
WMO Regional Association II (Asia): 2d Session Tashkent, U.S.S.R. . . August*
924 Deparfment of State Bulletin
Intersessional Meeting of GATT Contracting Nations
REVIEW OF MEETING OF INTERSESSIONAL
COMMITTEE
Press release 246 dated May 6
111 a 3-week meeting at Geneva tliat concluded
May 2 the Intersessional Committee of the 37
GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade] contracting nations carried forward the
work of bringing into harmony the trade arrange-
ments of the European Economic Community,
which is still in an early formative stage, and the
GATT framework of international trade rules
and tariff concessions. The Committee also urged
the German Government to take further steps to
eliminate quota restrictions on imports.
The Intersessional Committee held consultations
on the intensification of quantitative import re-
strictions which New Zealand had felt obliged to
make because of its worsening foreign-exchange
situation. It received the final report on the exe-
cution of the transitional provisions of the treaty
establishing the European Coal and Steel Com-
munity, which became fully operative on Febru-
ary 10, 1958, and heard a report by a representa-
tive of the OEEC [Organization for European
Economic Cooperation] on the negotiations on the
proposed European Free-Trade Area. It also
considered complaints involving Italian discrimi-
nation against imports of tractors, French sub-
sidies of wheat and flour exports, and the U.S.
escape-clause action increasing the tariff on spring
clothespins.^
Isaiah Frank, deputy director of the Office of
International Trade of the Department of State,
was the chairman of the U.S. delegation to the
meeting. The delegation consisted of representa-
tives from the Departments of State, Agriculture,
Commerce, Interior, and Treasury.
European Economic Community
The Intersessional Committee reached general
agreement that the normal procedures of the
June 2, 1958
GATT were well adapted for consideration of
trade questions relating to the EEC treaty. The
representative of the Community undertook to
refer the conclusions of the Intersessional Com-
mittee to the Council of Ministers of the EEC and
to inform the Contracting Parties of the results.
The problems raised by the association of over-
seas territories with the EEC were discussed in
detail by the Intersessional Committee, which had
before it a series of reports on specific commodities
and a general report which had been prepared by
a working party that met in Februaiy and Marcli.
These reports and the discussions that have been
carried out constitute a substantial accomplish-
ment by the Contracting Parties in their exami-
nation of the EEC treaty. There was consid-
erable support for the view that it would be most
fruitful now to direct attention to specific prac-
tical problems, leaving aside for a time the ques-
tions arising out of differing legal interpretations
of the GATT.
The chairman of the U.S. delegation reiterated
the importance the United States attaches to the
successful evolution of the European Economic
Community. He also took cognizance of the de-
sire of Contracting Parties, including the United
States, to move forward as rapidly as possible in
GATT consideration of the EEC treaty. He
noted, however, that firm judgments on some im-
portant issues were not practicable because the
institutions of the Community were still in the
process of organization and much depended on
future decisions and actions to be taken by these
institutions.
Commenting on the historic importance of the
EEC treaty, the U.S. representative noted the
similarity of the objectives of the General Agree-
ment and those of the EEC treaty in relation to
the expansion of world trade. In particular, he
expressed the view that these objectives would be
furthered if the Community set its common ex-
BULLETIN of Dec. 16, 19.57, p. 958.
ternal tariff as low as possible. The Community
was also requested to make the tariff available as
soon as possible, but not later than July 1, 1959,
and to supply information to facilitate its study
by Contracting Parties.
German Import Restrictions
The Intersessional Committee resumed the dis-
cussion begun last year on the import restrictions
still maintained by the Federal Kepublic of Ger-
many. The Contracting Parties agreed tliat tlie
Federal Republic was no longer entitled, under
the General Agi-eement, to maintain import re-
strictions for balance-of -payments reasons.
The German Government contended that, in ac-
cordance with its terms of accession to tlie Gen-
eral Agreement, it is entitled to I'estrict imports
of certain agricidtural products. Most of the
membei-s of the Intersessional Committee, after a
thorough study of the matter, did not accept the
German view.
The German Government was urged to recon-
sider its position, but the question of possible
further action by Contracting Parties was left
for consideration at the 13th session.
Other Items
In accordance with the General Agreement a
consultation was held with New Zealand because
of its intensification of import restrictions follow-
ing a sharp deterioration m its external financial
position. It was recognized that the action taken
by New Zealand was necessary to forestall a seri-
ous loss of reserves. New Zealand gave assurances
that import restrictions would be relaxed as soon
as its financial position improved.
The six European countries which form the
European Coal and Steal Community submitted
the final report required under the waiver granted
by the Contracting Parties. This report covered
developments in the last stages of the transitional
period which ended on February 10, 1958. Trib-
ute was paid to the accomplishments of the Com-
munity and confidence expressed that the spirit
of cooperation that had prevailed between the
Community and the Contracting Parties would
continue.
A complaint by the United Kingdom on the
treatment of imported agricultural machinery
(mainly tractors) by the Italian Government was
referred to a panel of conciliation. Another com-
926
plaint by Australia on French assistance to ex-
ports of wheat and flour was also referred to a
panel of conciliation.
The Intersessional Committee heard a report
on the bilateral discussions between the United
States and the Swedish and Danish Governments
on their complaint against the U.S. action increas-
ing the duty on spring clothespins.
Besides Mr. Frank as chairman, the U.S. dele-
gation consisted of the following officials:
John A. Birch, assistant chief, Trade Agreements and
Treaties Division, Department of State
Carl D. Corse, U.S. Mission to the European Communities
Morris Fields, chief. Commercial Policy and United Na-
tions Division, Department of the Treasury
Robert L. Gastiueau, director, Trade Policy Division. For-
eign Agricultural Service, Department of Agriculture
Rene Lutz, deputy director, Office of Economic Affairs,
Bureau of Foreign Commerce, Department of Commerce
Jacob M. Myerson, Office of Regional Affairs, Department
of State
Murray Ryss, Trade Agreements and Treaties Division,
Department of State
Robert B. Sarich, European Division, Bureau of Foreign
Commerce, Department of Commerce
Harry Shooshan, Technical Review Staff, Department of
the Interior
U. S. STATEMENT ON EUROPEAN ECONOMIC
COMMUNITY 2
It is now 1 year since the Contracting Parties
began their consideration of the Treaty Establish-
ing the European Economic Community. Wlren
the Intersessional Committee took up the subject
in April 1957, the treaty had only recently been
signed. "When our ministers met last October,'
the process of ratification had not yet been com-
pleted. Now this vital instrument is in force and
steps are being taken to apply its provisions. Al-
though much remains to be done, a great deal of
progress has been made in creating the Commu-
nity, in giving it form and meaning as a distinct,
new entity.
My Government has welcomed the treaties of
Rome — both the Common Market and Euratom —
as historic developments holding great promise
for the future of all our countries. Mr. Chair-
man, I would like today to reiterate the impor-
' Made on Apr. 23 at Geneva by Isaiah Frank, chairman
of the U.S. delegation.
' For a review of the 12th session of the Contracting
Parties, see Bdixetin of Dec. 23, 1957, p. 1004.
Department of State Bulletin
leniabot
ItjiT
tance we in the United States attach to the suc-
cessful evolution of the European Economic Com-
munity. Insofar as foreign trade is concerned,
the General Agreement and the Rome Treaty are
directed essentially toward the same goals.
Wlien we began our review, I think we all real-
ized that time would be requii"ed for a calm, con-
sidered study of this new development. It is mi-
doubtedly the most complex and far-reaching
single development ever to come before the Con-
tracting Parties. Despite the obvious desire, fully
shai-ed by my delegation, to move forward as rap-
idly as possible in our consideration of the treaty,
a, practical and realistic approach is required.
Representatives of the Six * and of otlier coun-
tries have repeatedly empliasized the fact that
firm judgments on some important issues were
not, and still are not, practicable. They are not
practicable because so mucli depends on future
decisions and actions to be taken in the light of
circumstances which camiot now be foreseen.
Moreover, the Community naturally has many
problems in organizing its day-to-day work and in
arranging teclinical facilities for its institutions.
The Community's decisions will have such a
widespread impact that great care in tlieir formu-
lation is of obvious importance to all Contracting
Parties.
On the other hand, it is essential that, in the
interim, our deliberations make as much progress
as possible. This is important both to the Commu-
nity and to the Contracting Parties. Despite the
anifest impossibility of settling everything in a
short time, the Contracting Parties have made
real progress in examining the Rome Treaty.
First of all, we liave studied its factual con-
tent; this, in itself, represented a considerable
task. Contracting Parties have explained their
general attitudes toward the Community and its
relationship to the GATT. Statements by minis-
ters at the 12th session, as indicated in the com-
munique, have
. shown the importance which all contracting par-
ties attach to the successful operation of the European
Economic Community in harmony with the objectives of
the General Agreement. . . .
Some countries have, however, expressed con-
ern about the possible impact of particular as-
' The six members of the European Economic Commu-
lity are Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Ger-
nany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.
lune 2, 1958
pects of the treaty on their economies. There has
been progi'ess in defining, at least on a tentative
basis, a number of specific issues. We have be-
fore us the detailed repoi-ts prepared by the four
subcommittees at the 12th session. We have also
received in the past few days tlie report of the
working party on the overseas-territories ques-
tion. I wish to join in the chairman's congratula-
tions to Mr. [Tord Bernhard] Hagen of Sweden
for the excellent job which he has done in presid-
ing over the working party. All of this adds up
to a substantial accomplishment. Nevertheless,
we must recognize tliat much remains to be done.
In explaining the Rome Treaty's significance to
the United States Congress and to the public at
large, spokesmen for our Government have
pointed to the General Agreement as the effective
instrument for dealing with any trade problems
related to the treaty. Perhaps in other countries,
too, the relationship between the treaty and the
General Agreement has been discussed in the same
sense. We must be certain that the assurances
given those to whom we are responsible will have
meaning.
Mr. Chairman, the Six have already given us
certain general assurances concerning their poli-
cies. But precisely because this matter is of such
import, because so many questions must be de-
cided by the institutions over a long period of
time, we hope that the Six will underscore and
amplify some of these points and will, moreover,
be just as specific as circumstances permit.
I would also mention the importance we attach
to close and effective cooperation between the
Contracting Parties and the European Economic
Community as the Community's commercial poli-
cies are elaborated and carried out. We do not
envisage a new kind of machinery, established
primarily or exclusively for this purpose. Rather
we have in mind the normal procedures for ex-
changing information and views along lines
which are in keeping with the best traditions of
the GATT.
The Rome Treaty is a document of unprece-
dented scope. Its provisions, taken together, con-
stitute far more than a customs imion. My
Government considers the achievement of the far-
reaching aims of the Common Market of the ut-
most importance for the future of all of us. In
examining a development of such magnitude nar-
row, sterile debat« must be avoided. Such an ap-
927
proacli could only cloud issues and impede our
work. Eather we must concentrate our efforts
along lines which will assist the development of
the European Economic Community and which
will, at the same time, protect the vital economic
interests of all Contracting Parties.
The European Economic Community is one of
the most important trading areas of the world.
Its interests do not lie in Europe alone. It must
look toward other parts of the world for markets
and for essential supplies. Therefore the Com-
munity has a strong, direct interest in maintain-
ing and in strengthening its midtilateral trading
ties.
Tariff Negotiations
Now, Mr. Chairman, I turn to some of the
specific issues of interest to us.
First, for the Community's objectives to be at-
tained the external tariff must be kept as low as
possible. High levels of trade between the Com-
munity and other countries will mean greater
freedom of choice and higher standards of living
for the more than 160 million consumers in the
Community.
At the 12th session the Six expressed their views
on the external tariff. I refer particularly to the
questions of "general incidence" and of bound
rates. We have also noted the willingness of the
Six to enter into negotiations with outside coun-
tries at some future time with a view to lowering
tariffs on a reciprocal basis. At an appropriate
time, Mr. Chairman, the Contracting Parties will
have to consider the scope and procedures for
tariff negotiations with the Six.
The Six have recognized that negotiations will
be required under article XXIV, paragraph 6.
Contracting Parties, however, cannot complete
their studies and make reasonable judgments until
the common tariff is available.
The subject of the common tariff is large and
complex. "\^1iat appears to be a somewhat dis-
tant target date for its submittal — July 1, 1959—
is actually very close in relation to the work to
be done. By this I mean that a great deal of
work — preparation and negotiation — will be
necessary between the time when the common
tariff is available and January 1, 1962, when the
first step in establishing the common tariff is
scheduled to be taken. I urge the Community and
its member states to make every effort to supply
928
the tariff earlier than July 1, 1959, if possible and,
in any case, no later than that target date.
In addition, if rational judgments are to be
made on this important matter, it will be neces-
sary for Contracting Parties to have certain sup-
plementary material on the external tariff. Our
delegation believes such explanatory material
should provide the following information: first,
a key or concordance permitting a cross-reference
and comparison of rates and commodity descrip-
tions in the common tariff and of related statistical
classifications with those in the previous indi-
vidual tariffs and statistics of the Six ; second, an
indication of all changes in rates, commodity des-
criptions, and statistical classification numbers;
third, an indication of how the common tariff
rates are derived from the previous rates ; fourth,
an exact description of the products upon which
concessions have been made in the individual
schedules of the Six; fifth, an indication of the
country or countries with which concessions were
initially negotiated and of the principal suppliers
with the amount of trade involved.
The information desired is primarily descrip-
tive and statistical in nature. Much of it will
certainly have been prepared in the computation
of the common tariff and should be readily avail-
able. Its provision by the Community will enor-
mously facilitate and speed the study of the com-
mon tariff by interested countries.
Baiance-of-Payments Restrictions
I tuni now to another aspect of the subject
before us, namely those parts of the treaty per-
taining to the use of quantitative restrictions for
balance-of-payments reasons. This is a highly
technical and important field. It will suffice at
this time simply to note our general view.
We believe that, until such time as the Com-
munity integrates the financial and economic re-
lations of the member countries so as to be
considered, in effect, a imit for balance-of-
payments purposes, the maintenance or imposi
tion of quantitative restrictions for financial
reasons should be justified on an individual
countiy basis. Thus a financially sound memberi
ought not to be looked to to maintain or impose
quantitative restrictions because of the balance-
of-payments problem of another.
This does not, in the meantime, rule out the
possibility of a common liberalization list, but
Department of State Bulletin
fflt0 3(
alsoh
such n
ITit
and pi
tion IV
in (lie I
Kiiiiitr
feir vei
affect a;
fcture.
'factual
iiatheri
tontinui,
«« «iatt(
jsrtiier;
kt 2,
we believe that any such list should represent a
floor rather than a ceiling on liberalization. In
short, each member of the Community should
continue to liberalize over and above any such
common list as rapidly as the balance-of-pay-
ments position of tliat member warrants.
Trade in Agricultural Products
Another important subject in connection with
the Rome Treaty is agriculture. Both the
General Agreement and the treaty recognize
the special problems of trade in agricultural
products.
The agricultural provisions of the treaty are
a matter of worldwide public knowledge and
interest. It is known that specific preparations
are now under way to harmonize the individual
national agricultural policies of six great nations
into a common policy for all. This common policy
will have a major influence on one of the world's
most important markets for fann products. As
trading partners of the Six, otlier countries can-
not but have a deep interest in this matter.
We note that the treaty explicitly provides,
in connection with long-term contracts, that due
account will be taken of traditional channels of
trade. It is essential that in working out its
general agricultural policies the Community bear
in mind the importance both of traditional trade
channels and the GATT objective of expanding
multilateral trade.
In our view policies and programs which take
into account the interests of other countries will
also be those mo-st likely to contribute to the
Community's agricultural objectives. I refer to
such matters as increasing productivity and as-
suring efficient utilization of resources, as speci-
fied in article 39, paragraph 1, of the treaty.
Within the framework of our usual methods
and procedures, effective channels of communica-
tion with the Community should be established
in the vital field of agriculture. This is the Com-
munity's crucial fomaative period. Over the next
few yeai-s policies will be develope^I which will
affect agricultural trade for a long time in the
future. It is not a question of legal or con-
tractual obligations; I wish to stress this point.
Kather it is a question of normal cooperation and
continuing exchanges of information and views
on matters of common concern among trading
partners.
For example, the Community has planned a
conference on agriculture, to be held at Stresa
this summer. It would be useful if, when this
conference has ended, the Six, using the normal
machinery of the Contracting Parties, could pro-
vide infonnation on the conference. It would
also be desii-able to afford Contracting Parties
some means of commenting on the information
received.
Association of Overseas Areas
Finally, Mr. Chainnan, I wish to turn to the
subject of the association of overseas areas. The
arrangements for these areas are an integral and
important part of the treaty. In considering
them let us avoid a legalistic approach and at-
tempt to deal with the subject in a practical
manner. No country's formal position need
thereby be prejudiced.
Economic development has become a basic na-
tional aspiration in many parts of the world.
Access to markets is essential if less developed
countries are to earn the foreign exchange re-
quired to finance imports necessary to their
growth. My comitry and other countries have
shown their understanding of, and support for,
the hopes of these peoples for a better life.
We are, therefore, sympathetic with the ob-
jectives of the Six, as stated in article 131 of the
treaty. The article reads in part
. . . this association shall in the first place permit
the furthering of the interest and prosperity of the
inhabitants of these countries and territories in such a
manner as to lead them to the economic, social and cul-
tural development which they expect.
We must also recognize, however, the pre-
occupation of less developed countries in other
parts of the world with the possible implications
for them of the Rome Treaty arrangements.
Where problems can be shown to exist, realis-
tic solutions are needed. It is also necessary that
such solutions be sought in a multilateral frame-
work. And any arrangements ultimately reached
must be consonant with the GATT objective of
nondiscrimination as among third countries.
The object of these arrangements should be
to prevent any significant diminution of outside
countries' present trade with the Six as a result
of the overseas territories' association. They
should also provide a reasonable opportunity for
third countries to share in increased demand re-
sulting from the Common Market.
June 2, 1958
929
How can we come to grips with this problem
in a way which will, first, avoid unproductive
debate on abstract questions; second, take cog-
nizance of the realities of the present situation;
third, assist the healthy evolution of the European
Economic Community; and fourth, assure other
countries that any trade problems they may have
as a result of the overseas-territories arrange-
ments will be settled equitably? Although we
have no readymade solutions, Mr. Chairman, I
think that the key to an answer lies in the recog-
nition that GATT principles, traditions, and
methods of procedure are flexible enough to deal
effectively with this problem.
My delegation will listen with great interest
to the views of other Contracting Parties and will
be prepared to cooperate fully in attempting to
develop useful and productive channels for our
deliberations.
U.N. Promotion of Equality for Women
REPORT ON THE 1958 SESSION OF THE COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN
hy Lorena B. Hahn
The United Nations Commission on the Status
of Women held its 12th session at Geneva March
17 to April 3, 1958. The Commission stressed
the importance of achieving political, educational,
and economic opportunities for women adequate
in practice as well as law. In addition, it gave
particular attention to marriage requirements and
projects imder the United Nations advisory serv-
ices program relating to the status of women.
The Commission decided to give priority con-
sideration in its 1959 session to the occupational
outlook for women, a study of tax legislation
applicable to women, the situation of women in
the teaching profession, and the completion of a
pamphlet on equal pay for equal work wliich
would be made available for public distribution.
For its 1960 session, the Commission requested
four further studies : one on the access of women
to public office; one on the age of marriage, free
consent of the parties to marriage, and the regis-
tration of marriage ; a study by the International
Labor Office on the removal of economic discrim-
inations against women; and a study by UN-
• Mrs. Hahn, author of the above article,
is the United States Representative on the
United Nations Commission on the Status of
Women.
930
ESCO on the access of women to out-of-school
education.
Begum Anwar Aluned of Pakistan provided
distinguislied leadership as chairman of the 1958
session of the Commission. Miss Uldarica
Manas of Cuba was elected first vice chairman;
Mrs. Zofia Dembinska of Poland, second vice
chairman ; and Mrs. Mina Ben-Zvi of Israel, rap-
porteur.
Three coimtries, Canada, Czechoslovakia, and
Japan, served on the Commission on the Status
of Women for the first time at its 1958 session.
The other 15 countries represented on the Com-
mission were Argentina, Belgium, China, Cuba,
Dominican Republic, France, Israel, Mexico,
Pakistan, Poland, Sweden, U.S.S.R, United
Kingdom, United States, and Venezuela.
Political Rights
The Commission observed that some 11 states
had not yet granted women any political rights
and expressed concern that in a number of coim-
tries where these rights had been granted to women
major obstacles continued to exist in the way
of their actual exercise. It was the general view
that further information should be obtained on
the access of women to public office, and the Secre-
tary-General was requested to provide a report on
this subject for the 1960 session of the Commis-
sion. My statement on behalf of the United
Department of State Bulletin
. States emphasized the importance of participation
by women in political oi'ganizations at the local
level as a means of making full use of their politi-
cal rights and also of participation by women in
community organizations as training for public
life. The regional seminar held in Bangkok in
August 1957 on civic responsibilities and increased
participation of Asian women in public life re-
ceived high commendation. I expressed the full
support of the United States Government for the
development of further regional seminars of this
type as a means of assisting women to have a voice
in public affairs.
Access to Higher Education
The Commission discussed a report prepared by
UNESCO in collaboration with the International
Federation of University Women based on a ques-
tionnaire sent to IFUW branches throughout the
world. Statistical information appended to the
report showed that in the majority of coimtries
the proportion of women attending institutions
of higher learning had increased significantly m
the 10-year period 1945 to 1955. The United
States called attention to the numerous confer-
ences on educational trends in this country and
such special studies as that recently published
by the National Manpower Council of Columbia
University. Since the UNESCO report observed
that scholarships for girls were seldom available
from business firms, my statement included a re-
port on the substantial amounts of money allo-
cated to grants and schools by private industry
in the United States, including the Ford Founda-
tion contribution of $400,000 in 1956.
Economic Opportunities for Women
In the field of economic opportunities for wom-
en, the Commission considered the following
four topics: (1) equal pay for equal work; (2)
the situation of working women, including work-
ing mothers, with family responsibilities; (3) the
right to rest and the right to social security ; and
(4) age of retirement and right to pension.
On equal pay for equal work the Commission
reviewed a draft pamphlet prepared by the United
Nations with the assistance of the ILO. It was
decided this draft should be revised for further
review by the Commission at its 1959 session, and
the members of the Commission were invited to
submit additional comments for this purpose.
The ILO report on equal pay for equal work
commented on the progress made in various coun-
tries in improving women's wage rates, not only
where they performed the same work as men but
also in so-called women's jobs in which few men
are employed. Information compiled by our
Bureau of Labor Statistics proved useful in this
connection since it indicated that, in the period
1940 to 1955, in a majority of occupational clas-
sifications, women's wages in the United States
had shown a higher proportionate increase than
men's wages. One of the larger tasks which re-
mains to be done in the field of equal pay is to
aid women in obtaining the necessary training
so that they can qualify for better-paid jobs now
generally held by men.
On the subject of working women with family
responsibilities, the Commission discussed reports
prepared by the ILO and the United Nations on
factors affecting the working conditions of women
in the home and on the job. The United States
statement describes the employment pattern of the
average woman worker in the United States, gen-
erally characterized by entrance into employment,
early marriage, leaving the labor market on the
birth of the first child, and return to the labor
market after the youngest child has reached school
age. A resolution adopted by the Commission
noted that a study on creches and day nurseries
was being undertaken by the International Chil-
dren's Center in Paris.
In its discussion of the right to rest and the right
to social security in the event of old age, illness,
or loss of capacity to work, the Commission con-
sidered the subject of women's hours of employ-
ment. The ILO prepared a comprehensive report
on this subject. The United States statement
called attention to the notable progress continually
being achieved in the United States through col-
lective-bargaining agreements and through such
methods as premium pay for Saturday, Sunday,
and holiday work and paid annual vacations, and
emphasized the particular value of the 5-day work
week, now almost a universal practice in the United
States, to women workers with family responsi-
bilities. On the matter of health, I noted that
more than two- thirds of the population of the
United States is protected against the cost of hos-
pital bills by private health insurance and that
more than 12 million workers are covered by health
insurance under collective-bargainuig agreements.
2, 7958
931
Considerable interest was exiaressed in retire-
ment provisions for women in the United States.
My statement pointed out that our legislation pro-
vides for voluntary rather than compulsory retire-
ment, that the age at which workers may retii'e
with full benefits is 65 for both men and women,
and further that, although under our law as
amended in 1956 women workers have the right to
retire at 62 with reduced benefits, a relatively small
proportion of women have availed themselves of
this right. Actually the average age at which
women retire in the United States is 68 — only a
few months younger than the age at which men
retire. The Commission adopted a resolution
recommending that all member states and special-
ized agencies facilitate the implementation of the
same retirement and pension age for men and
women, by vote of 10 to 0. The United States
abstained on this resolution together with seven
other representatives.
Age of Marriage
Under the general topic of the "Status of "Women
in Private Law," the Commission gave particular
attention to the need to establish a minimum age
of marriage and to require the consent of both
parties to the marriage and compulsory registra-
tion of marriage. The members of the Commis-
sion favored the establishment of a minimum age
of marriage, preferably not less than 16 years. To
obtain further information on this subject the
Commission asked the Secretary-General to cir-
culate a questionnaire to member governments and
to interested nongovernmental organizations and
report to the Commission at its 1960 session. In
this connection the Commission also asked the
Secretary-General to prepare a draft convention
on this subject for review by the Commission at its
1960 session. The United States voted against
the drafting of a convention on this topic but in
favor of the proposal of the Commission to obtain
further information on this subject.
In the discussion of age of marriage and con-
sent of marriage, the United States made use of
the summary of the recent Women's Bureau study
of marriage laws in the United States. This
study showed that the legal minimum marriage
age for women, where the consent of the parents
is not required, is 18 years in 3.S states and 21
years in 15 states. Girls who have not reached
932
the legal age may be married only if they obtain
the consent of their parents, the usual minimum
age being 16 years in 31 states. The lowest mini-
mum age for marriage with the consent of parents
is 14 years, which is in effect in 7 states.
Annual Sessions
I joined the other members of the Commission
in the adoption of a resolution favoring annual
sessions of the Commission for the present, point-
ing out that, while the United States continues to
favor biennial sessions in principle, it is not press-
ing for the implementation of this principle at
this time.
Regional Seminars
With respect to the United Nations advisory
services jjrogram in the field of human rights, the
Commission recommended that seminars on the
status of women be held annually under this pro-
gram during the next several years. The Com-
mission felt that the seminar held in Bangkok in
1957 demonstrated the particular value of regional
seminars where pai-ticipants from countries with
common interests and problems can benefit by
sharing their experience and information. Hope
was expressed that a regional seminar on civic re-
sponsibilities and increased participation of
women in public life would be held in 1959 in
either Africa or Latin America. The Commis-
sion also hoped that a regional seminar on the
family and property rights of women could be
organized in Asia in 1960 and a similar seminar
could be organized in 1961 either in Africa or
Latin America, with a seminar in Europe at a
later date. The United States offered to act as
host for a regional seminar for women if the
LTnited Nations would find this useful.
Women's organizations in consultative status
with the United Nations participated helpfully in
discussion of agenda items. Those represented in
this session were: All-Pakistan Women's Associa-
tion, Catholic International Union for Social
Service, International Alliance of Social Demo-
cratic Women, International Alliance of Women,
International Association of Penal Law, Interna-
tional Confederation of Free Trade Unions, In-
ternational Council of Women, International
Federation of Business and Professional Women,
International Federation of Christian Trade
Deparfmenf of State Bulletin
Unions, International Federation of University
Women, International Federation of Women
Lawyers, International Union for Child Welfare,
Open Door International and St. Joan's Inter-
national Social and Political Alliance, Women's
International League for Peace and Freedom,
World Federation of Democratic Youth, World
Movement of Mothers, World Young Women's
Christian Association.
U.S. Delegations to
International Conferences
loth Anniversary Commemorative Session of WHO
and 11th World Health Assembly
The Department of State announced on May
16 (press release 271) that President Eisenhower
has designated Marion B. Folsom, Secretary of
Health, Education, and Welfare, to head the U.S.
delegation to the 2-day 10th anniversary com-
memorative session of the World Health Organ-
ization (WHO) opening on May 26, 1958, at Min-
neapolis, Minn. At the same time, the President
designated Leroy E. Burney, M.D., Surgeon Gen-
eral of the Public Health Service, Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare, to be chief dele-
gate and chairman of the U.S. delegation to the
11th World Health Assembly convening at Minne-
apolis May 28-June 14, 1958.^
Francis O. Wilcox, Assistant Secretary of State
for International Organization Affairs, and
Charles Mayo, M.D., of the Mayo Clinic at
Rochester, Minn., have been designated delegates
to serve with Secretary Folsom. Dr. Mayo and
John W. Hanes, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State for Intei-national Organization Affairs,
were designated to serve with Dr. Burney as dele-
gates to the 11th World Health Assembly.
Honorary delegates and honorary members of
the delegation to tlie 10th anniversary commem-
orative session are :
Honorary Delegates:'
Hubert H. Humphrey, United States Senate
Edward J. Thye, United States Senate
■ The White House, in announcing the U.S. delegations,
included the designation of Dr. Milton S. Eisenhower as
Personal Representative of the President at the 10th
anniversary commemorative session.
' The honorary delegates, in accordance with WHO pro-
cedures, will be officially accredited as alternate U.S.
delegates.
June 2, ?958
Walter H. Judd, House of Representatives
Eugene J. McCarthy, House of Representatives
Joseph P. O'Hara, House of Representatives
Roy W. Wier, House of Representatives
Leroy E. Burney, M.D., Surgeon General, U.S. Public
Health Service, Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare
David Allman, M.D., president, American Medical Asso-
ciation
Frank G. Boudreau, M.D., director, Milbank Memorial
Fund
Ulrich Bryner, M.D., Salt Lake City, Utah
Howard B. Calderwood, Office of Economic and Social
Affairs, Department of State
Lowell T. Coggeshall, M.D., dean. Division of Biological
Sciences, University of Chicago
Albert W. Dent, president, Dillard University
Martha M. Eliot, M.D., professor, Harvard School of
Public Health
John W. Hanes, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for International Organization Affairs
Ira V. Hiscock, professor of public health, Yale
University
H. van Zile Hyde, M.D., chief. Division of International
Health, Bureau of State Services, U.S. Public Health
Service, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
Virgil T. Jackson, Sr., D.D.S., New Orleans, La.
Frank H. Krusen, M.D., professor of physical medicine
and rehabilitation, Mayo Clinic
Mrs. Oswald B. Lord, U.S. Representative to the Human
Rights Commission of the United Nations
George F. Lull, M.D., assistant to the president, American
Medical Association
Edward J. McCormick, M.D., surgeon, St. Vincent's Hos-
pital, Toledo, Ohio
Aims O. McGuinness, M.D., special assistant for health
and medical affairs, Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare
Mrs. Katherine B. Oettinger, chief. Children's Bureau,
Social Security Administration, Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare
Arthur S. Osborne, M.D., international health representa-
tive. Bureau of State Services, U.S. Public Health
Service, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
Thomas Parran, M.D., dean, Graduate School of Public
Health, School of Medicine, University of Pittsburgh
James E. Perkins, M.D., managing director. National
Tuberculosis Association
Dean Rusk, president, Rockefeller Foundation
Jonas E. Sali, M.D., Commonwealth Professor of Experi-
mental Medicine, University of Pittsburgh
Leonard A. Scheele, M.D., president, Warner-Chilcott
Laboratories, Morris Plains, N.J.
Mary Switzer, director. Office of Vocational Rehabilita-
tion, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
Herman G. Weiskotten, M.D., dean emeritus. College of
Medicine, New York State University
Louis L. Williams, M.D., consultant. Pan American Sani-
tary Bureau
Honorary Members of the Delegation: '
Donald M. Alderson, colonel, USAP, Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Health and Medical)
Ray Amberg, hospital administrator. University of
Minnesota Hospitals
Gaylord Anderson, M.D., director, School of Public
Health, University of Minnesota
Guillermo Arbona, M.D., Secretary of Health, Puerto
Rico Department of Health
R. N. Barr, M.D., secretary and executive officer, Minne-
sota Department of Health
The honorary members of the delegation, in accordance
with WHO procedures, will be officially accredited as
advisers.
Ann Burns, chief. Division of Nursing, Ohio Department
Eugene*^P. Campbell, M.D., chief, Public Health Division,
International Cooperation Administration
H. Trendley Dean, D.D.S., secretary, Council on Dental
Research, American Dental Association
Harold S. Diehl, M.D., dean, School of Medical Sciences,
University of Minnesota „. . . ^ t>- ,
Charles L. Dunham, M.D., director. Division of Biology
and Radiation, Atomic Energy Commission
Herman E. Hilleboe, M.D., Commissioner of Health, btate
Health Department, Albany, N.Y. ^ „ .
Charles A. Janeway, M.D., Thomas Morgan Rotch Profes-
sor of Pediatrics, Harvard School of Medicine
Richard K. C. Lee, M.D., president, Board of Health,
Honolulu, T.H. .
Philip E. Nelbach, executive secretary, National Citizens
Committee for the WHO, Inc.
Mrs. Owen B. Rhoads, Paoli, Pa. . , . . ^ ^.
Robert O. Waring, Office of International Administration,
Department of State
Abel Wolman, M.D., professor of sanitary engineering,
Johns Hopkins School of Public Health and Hygiene
Laurence R. Wyatt, international health representative,
Bureau of State Services, U.S. Public Health Service,
Department of Health. Education, and Welfare
The following have been named alternate dele-
gates to the 11th World Health Assembly:
Howard B. Calderwood, Office of Economic and Social
Affairs, Department of State
Lowell T. Coggeshall, M.D., dean. Division of Biological
Sciences, University of Chicago
H van Zile Hyde, M.D., chief. Division of International
Health, Bureau of State Services, U.S. Public Health
Service, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
George f! Lull, M.D., assistant to the president, Ameri-
can Medical Association
Aims C. McGuinness, M.D., special assistant for health
and medical affairs. Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare
Arthur S. Csborne, M.D., international health representa-
tive. Bureau of State Services, U.S. Public Health
Service, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
The 6 Members of Congress, named as honorary
delegates to the 10th anniversary commemorative
session, and the 18 honorary members of the dele-
gation to that session have been named as con-
gressional advisers and advisers to the U.S. dele-
gation to the 11th World Health Assembly.
Harry V. Ryder, Jr., Office of International
Conferences, Department of State, will sei-ve as
secretary of the U.S. delegation to both the com-
memorative session and the 11th World Health
This is the first time that WHO has met m the
United States smce its organization meeting at
New York in 1948. Some 300 official delegates
from among the 88 member nations of WHO will
attend the 1958 Assembly. Observers from the
United Nations, the specialized agencies, and other
intergovernmental organizations, as well as from
many nongovernmental organizations in the
health and medical fields, will also participate.
934
The 10th anniversary commemorative session
will be a ceremonial review of "Ten Years of
Health Progress."
The Assembly meets in regular annual session
and determines the policies of the Organization.
At the 11th Assembly various plenai-y sessions
will, among other things, review the work of
WHO in 1957, elect six member countries to des-
ignate health experts to fill the six annual vacan-
cies on the 18-man executive board, and review
and approve resolutions recommended by the two
main committees (Program and Budget; Admin-
istration, Finance and Legal). A plenary ses-
sion will witness the award of the 1958 Leon Ber-
nard Foundation prize to Dr. Thomas Parran,
former Surgeon General of the U.S. Public Health
Service, for outstanding achievements in the field
of public health.
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Health
Constitution of the World Health Organization. Opened
for signature at New York July 22, 1946. Entered into
force April 7, 1948. TIAS 1808.
Acceptance deposited: Federation of Malaya, April 24,
19.58.
BILATERAL
Iceland
Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of
1954, as amended (68 Stat. 455; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709),
with memorandum of understanding. Signed at Reyk-
javik May 3, 1958. Entered into force May 3, 1958.
Japan
Agreement providing for Japan's financial contributions
for United States administrative and related expenses
during the Japanese fiscal year 1958 under the mutual
defense assistance agreement of March 8, 1954 (TIAS
2957). Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo May 2,
1958. Entered into force May 2, 1958.
Nicaragua
Treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation, and pro-
tocol. Signed at Managua January 21, 1956.
into force May 24, 1958.
Proclaimed by the President: May 9, 1958.
Department of State Bulletin
U'S. Poii,
June 2, 1958
Index
Vol. XXXVIII, No. 988
Africa. Problems and Prospects of U.S. Relations
With the Near East, South Asia, and Africa
(Rountree) 918
Antarctica
U.S. and .\ustralia To Continue Work at Antarctic
Station (text of joint announcement) .... 912
United States Proposes Conference on Antarctica
(Eisenhower, text of note) 910
Asia
Problems and Prospects of U.S. Relations With the
Near East, South Asia, and Africa (Rountree) . 918
U.S. Policies and Programs in the Far East
(Robertson) 914
Australia. U.S. and Australia To Continue Work
at Antarctic Station ( text of joint announcement) 912
Canada. President and Secretary of State To Visit
Canada 900
Congress, The
President Reports to Congress on International
Travel 922
Problems and Prospects of U.S. Relations With the
Near East, South Asia, and Africa (Rountree) . 918
U.S. Policies and Programs in the Far East
(Robertson) 914
Economic Affairs
American Trade Policy and the Lessons of the
1930's (Mann) 895
Intersessional Meeting of GATT Contracting Na-
tions (Frank, review of meeting) 925
President Reiwrts to Congress on International
Travel 922
U.S. Policies and Programs in the Far East
(Robertson) 914
Educational Exchange. Educational Exchange
Agreement With Germany Renewed 899
Europe
American Trade Policy and the Lessons of the
1930's (Mann) 895
Intersessional Meeting of GATT Contracting Na-
tions (Frank, review of meeting) 925
Germany
Mr. Dulles Exchanges Greetings With Chancellor
Adenauer 900
Educational Exchange Agreement With Germany
Renewed 899
Health, Education, and Welfare
10th .\nniversary Commemorative Session of WHO
and 11th World Health Assembly (delegation) . 933
U.N. Promotion of Equality for Women (Hahn) . 930
International Information. Radio-TV Exchanges
With U.S.S.R 913
International Organizations and Conferences
Calendar of International Conferences and
Meetings 923
Intersessional Meeting of G.\TT Contracting Na-
tions (Frank, review of meeting) 925
lOth Anniversary Commemorative Session of WHO
and 11th World Health Assembly (delegation) . 933
Middle East. Problems and Prosi)ects of U.S. Re-
lations With the Near East, South Asia, and
Africa (Rountree) 918
Military Affairs. U.S. and Philippines Establish
Mutual Defense Board 913
Mutual Security
J.S. and Philippines Establish Mutual Defense
Board 913
J.S. Policies and Programs in the Far East
(Robertson) 914
hilippines. U.S. and Philippines Establish Mutual
Defense Board 913
tune 2, 1958
Presidential Documents
President Reports to Congress on International
Travel 922
United States Proposes Conference on Antarctica . 910
Science
U.S. and Australia To Continue Work at Antarctic
Station (text of joint announcement) .... 912
United States Proposes Conference on Antarctica
(Eisenhower, text of note) 910
Thailand. Field Marshal Sarit of Thailand Confers
With U.S. Officials 912
Treaty Information
Current Actions 934
Educational Exchange Agreement With Germany
Renewed 899
U.S.S.R.
Negotiation as an IDffective Instrument of American
Foreign Policy (Kohler) 901
Radio-TV Exchanges With U.S.S.R 913
United Nations. U.N. Promotion of Equality for
Women (Hahn) 930
Name Index
Adenauer, Konrad 900
Dulles, Secretary 900
Eisenhower, President 000, 910, 922
Frank, Isaiah 925
Hahn, Lorena B 930
Kohler, Foy D 901
Mann, Thomas C 895
Robertson, Walter S 914
Rountree, William M 918
Sarit Thanarat, Field Marshal 912
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: May 12-18
Press releases may be obtained from the News Di-
vision, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.
Releases issued prior to May 12 which appear in
this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 238 of May 2,
245, 246, and 247 of May 6, 249 of May 7, and 252
of May 8.
Subject
Dulles-Adenauer exchange of tele-
grams.
U.S.-German educational exchange
agreement (rewrite).
t261 5/14 Exchange of notes with Czechoslovakia
on airplane crash.
Educational exchange.
Dulles meeting with Field Marshal
Sarit.
t264 5/14 Note from Venezuela on Nixon inci-
dent.
265 5/14 Mann : "American Trade Policy and
the Lessons of the 1930's."
t2G6 .5/14 Report of Technical Joint Commission
on Chaguaramas.
Peruvian legislators to visit U.S.
Establishment of Philippines-U.S. Mu-
tual Defense Board.
Seminar for FSO's in Africa.
Development Loan Fund agreement
with Honduras.
Delegation to WHO (rewrite).
Radio-TV exchanges with U.S.S.R.
*262
Date
5/13
5/14
5/14
5/14
*267
268
t269
t270
5/14
5/15
5/15
5/16
*Not printed.
tHeld for a later issue of the Bdxxetin.
the
spartment
of
State
United States
Government Printing Office
Washington 25, D. C.
OFFICIAL BUSINESS
FOR PRIVATE USE '
flENT OF POSTAGE.
A new release in the popular Background series
Highlights of
Foreign Policy Developments
1957
Major foreign policy developments of 1957 in each geograph-
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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DEPOSITORY
Vol. XXXVIII, No. 989
June 9, 1958
t
FICIAL
:ekly record
ited states
reign policy
PRESIDENT PROPOSES MEETING OF EXPERTS
TO STUDY METHODS OF DETECTING VIOLA-
TIONS OF AN AGREEMENT ON CESSATION OF
NUCLEAR TESTS • Exchange of Correspondence
Between President Eisenhower and Premier Khrushchev . 939
SECRETARY DULLES* NEWS CONFERENCE OF
MAY 20 942
VICE PRESIDENT NIXON RETURNS FROM SOUTH
AMERICAN TOUR • Remarks by the President and
the Vice President 959
MAJOR ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM OF OUTER
SPACE • Statement by Loftus Becker, Legal Adviser . 962
A FRESH LOOK AT THE UNITED NATIONS •
Article by Joseph J. Sisco 972
For index see inside back cover
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Boston Public Library
Superintpnf1-rit of Onciiments
JUL 8 - 1958
Vol. XXXVIII, No. 989 • Pubucation 6651
June 9, 1958
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President Proposes Meeting of Experts To Study Methods of Detecting
Violations of an Agreement on Cessation of Nuclear Tests
an exchange of correspondence be-
tween President Eisenhower and Nikita Khrush-
chev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, together with
a statement made on May 11 by James C. Hagerty,
Press Secretary to the President.
THE PRESIDENT TO PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV
White House press release dated May 24
Mat 24, 1958.
Dear Mr. Chairman: I have your letter of
May 9, 1958. I note with satisfaction that you
accept, at least partially, my proposal that tech-
nical persons be designated to ascertain what
would be required to supervise and control dis-
armament agreements, all without prejudice to
our respective positions on the timing and inter-
dependence of various aspects of disarmament.
Your letter of May ninth states that "the So-
viet Government agrees to having both sides des-
ignate experts who would immediately begin a
study of methods for detecting possible violations
of an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests
with a view to having this work completed at the
earliest possible date, to be determmed in ad-
vance."
Experts from our side will be prepared to meet
with experts from your side at Geneva, if the
Swiss Government agrees, within three weeks of
our learning whether these arrangements are ac-
ceptable to you. On our side, experts would be
chosen on the basis of special competence. I have
in mind, for example, experts who might be con-
tributed not only from the United States, but
from the United Kingdom which, like the Soviet
Union and the United States, has conducted nu-
clear tests, and from France, which has advanced
June 9, 1958
plans for testing, and possibly from other coun-
tries having experts who are advanced in knowl-
edge of how to detect nuclear tests. We assume
that the experts on the side of the Soviet Union
would be similarly chosen on the basis of special
competence, so as to assure that we get scientific,
not political, conclusions.
I also suggest that the experts should be asked to
make an initial progress report within thirty days
after convening and to aim at a final report with-
in sixty days or as soon thereafter as possible.
In view of the Charter responsibilities of the
General Assembly and the Security Council of
the United Nations in the field of disarmament,
we would propose to keep the United Nations and
its appropriate organs informed of the progress
of these talks through the intermediai-y of the
Secretary General.
I will write you further shortly regarding your
statements on the problem of surprise attack and
the Arctic Zone of inspection which we have
proposed.
Sincerely,
DwiGHT D. Eisenhower
STATEMENT BY MR. HAGERTY, MAY 11
White House press release dated Ma; 11
Premier Khrushchev's letter of May 9th seems
to constitute recognition of the validity of the
position long held by the United States, the other
Western members of the United Nations Disarm-
ament Subcommittee, and the overwhelming ma-
jority of the General Assembly of the United Na-
tions that examination of the technical aspects
of disarmament measures should begin as soon
as possible and might serve as the basis for prog-
ress toward agreement on disarmament.
It is noted that the Soviet Union's acceptance
of this position relates only to discussion of the
sin-le issue of nuclear test suspension and not
to the more important elements of disarmament
which tlie General Assembly has endorsed.
It is to be hoped that this acceptance presages
agreement to begin similar discussions on other
measures of disarmament.
Premier Khrushchev's letter will of course re-
ceive careful study and will be the subject of early
consultation with our allies.
PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV TO THE PRESIDENT
Official translation
Deab Mr. President : I have received your message of
April 28.' Unfortunately, I have found in it no answer
by the United States Government to our statement on the
question of the cessation of atomic and hydrogen weapons
tests, which was the subject of my letter of April 22.
However, the necessity of solving this question is now
all the more urgent because attempts are already bemg
made to disrupt the efforts toward terminating nuclear
weapons tests universally and forever. I refer to the
nuclear bomb tests recently carried out by the United
States of America and the United Kingdom.
To be frank, the fact that the Governments of the
United States of America and the United Kingdom
deemed it possible to engage in conducting these tests
caused a feeling of regret on our part. Such actions are
in no way in accord with the peace-loving statements
recently made on more than one occasion by the Govern-
ments of the United States of America and the United
Kingdom. It is quite obvious that such actions, which
repr^esent open provocation of the will of all peoples, can
only push the world back to the initial positions in this
most Important matter and again cause a chain reaction
of experimental explosions of atomic and hydrogen
bombs. We believe that it is necessary to do everything
possible to avoid such a sequence of events.
Under these circumstances the responsibility devolving
upon the Governments of our two countries is especially
great. There is no doubt that a decision of the Govern-
ment of the United States of America to cease the testing
of nuclear weapons would be evaluated on its merits by
all the peoples of the globe as a great contribution to the
cause of easing international tension and eliminating the
threat of atomic war.
I must say frankly that it is difficult for us to under-
stand what reasons prevent the Government of the United
States from taking such a step. A cessation of nuclear
weapons tests by the United States, following the action
of the Soviet Union, would in no way prejudice the se-
curity interests of the United States and would not place
your country in an unfavorable position as compared to
' BtiLLETiN of May 19, 1958, p. 811.
'lUd., p. 812.
940
other countries. If we are going to speak of this aspect
of the problem, then a cessation of atomic and hydrogen
weapons tests by all States possessing such weapons
would rather place the Soviet Union and its Warsaw
Pact allies in an unequal position with regard to the
United States and other members of NATO, since, as you
know the U.S.S.R. has conducted a considerably lesser
number of nuclear weapons explosions than the United
States and the United Kingdom have done. Neverthe-
less, we undertook a unilateral cessation of tests in an
effort to initiate in practice the cessation of the nuclear
armaments race.
References are frequently made in the United States
of America to the fact that, in a situation where there is
lack of the necessary confidence in relations between
States an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests
could be violated and any of the parties could conduct
such tests in secret However, in this case there is no
ground for such apprehensions. The methods of detect-
Tng tests and the pertinent equipment available to mod-
ern science completely preclude such a possibility. It is
precisely for this reason that control of the observance of
an agreement on the cessation of tests would also be
easy to carry out. You, Mr. President, are familiar with
the specific proposal of the Soviet Government which was
introduced a year ago, concerning the form of such con-
trol The problems of control of the cessation of atomic
and hydrogen weapons tests in no way represent an ob-
stacle to an immediate cessation of such tests.
We believe that in the first instance it is necessary
that the United States of America and the United King-
dom cease testing atomic and hydrogen weapons, as has
already been done by the Soviet Union, and that this
basic problem be solved without delay. One cannot fail
to see that this is the shortest way toward a solution of
the problem of ceasing experimental explosions of nu-
clear weapons. In my correspondence with you I have
already expressed fears that— under present conditions,
where among States possessing nuclear weapons, no unity
of opinion exists with regard to the basic question of
the necessity of ceasing without delay the testing of
atomic and hydrogen bombs-the transfer of this problem
to technical experts for study might entail a delay in
the solution of this urgent matter. One must not close
one's eyes to the fact that such a situation could be
exploited by those who are interested in such a delay.
On the contrary, if the United States and the United
Kingdom should also decide to cease the testing of nu-
clear weapons, then this very fact would create conditions
under which each party would be interested in having all
other States which ceased the testing of atomic and
hydrogen weapons fulfill the obligations assumed by them.
Your messages indicate that you attach great impor-
tance to having experts study the technical details con-
nected with the control of the execution of an agreement
on the cessation of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests.
Taking this into account, we are prepared, in spite of
the serious doubts on our part, of which I have spoken
above, to try even this course. The Soviet Government
agrees to having both sides designate experts who would
immediately begin a study of methods for detecting pos-
Deporfmenf of Stale Bulletin
slble violations of an agreement on the cessation of nu-
clear tests with a view to having this work completed at
the earliest possible date, to be determined in advance.
At the same time I once again appeal to you, Mr. Presi-
dent, to support the initiative of the Soviet Union in the
matter of ceasing atomic and hydrogen tests and thus
make possible a final solution of this problem, which is
ardently hoped for by the peoples of all countries.
The international situation is now such as to make
particularly necessary practical action by States in the
direction of easing the existing tension. This is attested
with sufficient clarity by such dangerous and, of course —
for peacetime — extremely abnormal occurrences as regular
flights by the bombers of the United States Strategic Air
Command armed with atomic and hydrogen bombs in the
direction of the borders of the Soviet Union and over
the territories of other States, to which I have already
directed your attention in my last letter. In your mes-
sage, Mr. President, you imply that the method of pre-
venting such dangerous actions may be the establishment
of an international system of inspection for the Arctic
zone, as proposed by the United States. However, it must
be stated that this proposal by the Government of the
U.S.A. does not in any way eliminate the threat to the
cause of international peace, a threat created by the
present action of the American Air Force.
As a matter of fact, the air route over the northern
polar regions is the shortest distance between the U.S.S.R.
and the U.S.A., and is therefore an important strategic
area which has special significance in connection with the
availability of rocket weapons. It is for this very reason
that the Soviet Union, in an effort to prevent this area
from becoming a hotbed of military conflict between our
countries, considers it essential that no action be under-
taken within its confines which might lead to tragic con-
sequences. It is for this very reason that we consider
that the dangerous flights of American military aircraft
carrying atomic and hydrogen bombs in the Arctic zone
must cease. This would require only one thing: an
appropriate order by the Government of the U.S.A.
Unfortunately, the proposal of the Government of the
U.S.A. regarding the establishment of a system of in-
spection in the Arctic does not solve this question at all.
After all, in advancing this proposal the Government of
the U.S.A. did not even promise that in the event of its
acceptance flights of American atomic bombers in the
direction of the borders of the Soviet Union would be
suspended. Secretary of State Dulles of the U.S.A. spoke
recently in a conditional manner merely of the possibility
of "reducing to a minimum these flights against which
the Soviet Union protests."
We cannot fail to take into consideration one other
important circumstance : The Arctic is by no means the
only region from which an attack can be made against
our country. We must also take into account such
facts as the presence of American military bases on the
territory of a number of States not far from the borders
of the Soviet Union : for example, in England, France,
West Germany, Italy, and Turkey. Under such condi-
tions we cannot fail to draw the conclusion that the
proposal of the Government of the U.S.A. to establish an
Appointment of U.S. Technical Experts
To Study Agreement on Nuclear Tests
The Department of State announced on May 24
(press release 287) that Dr. James Brown Fisk,
Dr. Ernest O. Lawrence, and Dr. Robert F. Bacher
have been asked, and have agreed, to serve as ex-
perts from the United States to meet with experts
chosen by the Soviet Union in accordance with
President Eisenhower's letter of May 24 to Chair-
man Khrushchev. As pointed out in that letter,
there might be also experts from the United King-
dom and France and perhaps other countries ad-
vanced in knowledge of how to detect nuclear tests.
inspection zone in the Arctic was dictated not by the
desire to ensure the interests of universal peace and secu-
rity but was calculated to obtain unilateral advantages
for the United States of America. On the other hand, it
is obvious that a real solution of the problems affecting the
security interests of many States can be found only in the
event that the narrow, selfish ends of some States are
not pursued to the detriment of the interests of other
countries.
I take the liberty to remind you, Mr. President, that
the Soviet Union, in an effort to meet the U.S. position,
proposed long ago the establishment of a zone of aerial
inspection for prevention of surprise attack in Central
Europe, as well as in the Far East, and in a correspond-
ing part of the U.S.A. These proposals of ours were ob-
jective and duly considered the security interests of all
parties concerned. However, although up to that time
a great deal had been said by the U.S.A. about the de-
sirability of designating individual areas for aerial in-
spection, concrete proposals of the Soviet Union on this
question have not yet met with a positive attitude on the
part of the Government of the U.S.A. I wish to empha-
size that these proposals of the U.S.S.R. are still in effect.
I must touch upon one other matter concerning which
we should like to have complete clarity between us. The
Soviet Union has recently been reproached for not agree-
ing to the American proposal to establish an inspection
zone in the Arctic region even though the majority of
the members of the Security Council voted for this pro-
posal. Let me say frankly : the method to which the
U.S.A. resorted in the Security Council in the consideration
of the question rai.sed by the Soviet Union of the necessity
of putting an end to flights of American military air-
craft armed with atomic and hydrogen bombs in the
direction of the borders of the U.S.S.R. does not, in our
opinion, indicate any serious intention of reaching an
agreement on a mutually acceptable basis but is, rather,
an indication of attempts to exert pressure on the Soviet
Union through the u.se of a majority of the votes in the
Security Council. It is very well known that this ma-
jority in the Security Council has been formed by the
votes of countries which are in various degrees depend-
ent on the U.S.A., primarily from an economic stand-
June 9, J 958
941
point. Thus the Security Council, in its present com-
position, cannot be considered an impartial arbiter, and
this is the reason why at the present time it does not
play the Important role in the matter of maintaining
international peace and security with which it was en-
trusted by the U.N. Charter. The Soviet Government is
sincerely striving for an equitable and mutually accept-
able agreement with the U.S.A. and other Western
powers. We are striving to establish peaceful relations
between our countries and improve these relations day
by day. We were also guided by such aspirations in
taking such a step as unilateral cessation of nuclear
weapons tests and in making our proposals for calling
a meeting with the participation of heads of government.
We should like for the Government of the U.S.A. to
manifest the same desire for mutual understanding and
co-operation with us in the interests of both of our
coimtries and in the interest of universal peace. Of
course, this requires a different approach to interna-
tional affairs from that which found expression in the
recent statement by the Secretary of State of the U.S.A.
in New Hampshire, in which Mr. Dulles repeated all the
old arguments and inventions of the opponents of an
agreement with the Soviet Union, opponents of the less-
ening of international tension. To proceed in a foreign
policy on such a basis means to exclude in advance any
possibility of coming to an agreement. We should not
like to believe that this is the aim of the Government of
the U.S.A.
Tou, Mr. President, have emphasized more than once
that strengthening peace requires deeds. We fully share
this opinion and should like to hope that the Govern-
ment of the United States of America will approach the
solution of the problem of ceasing atomic and hydrogen
weapons tests in this very spirit.
With sincere respect,
N. Khrushchev
May 9, 1958.
[Initialed] M. M.
His Excellency
DWIQHT D. ElSENHOWEE,
President of the United States of
Secretary Dulles' News Conference of May 20
Press release 280 dated May 20
Secretary Dulles: Any questions?
Q. Mr. Secretary, what is your assessment of
the French crisis and its related Algerian prob-
lem?
A. I am afraid that I am not going to feel able
to talk about that situation. If I do not talk
about it, it is not because there is any indifference
on our part. I think, on the contrary, that every
American — certainly every American who knows
his history — is following the situation with the
closest attention. We await, and expect that the
French people will find, a solution of their pres-
ent problems which is in line with the great
French tradition. I feel that any utterances from
this side by me would be inappropriate at the
present time.
Q. Mr. Secretary, it seems as if the United
States is surrounded iy international troubles.
Everywhere ATuerica seems to he intensely un-
popular. Today there is talk about a need for
reframing American foreign policy. Would you
care to comment on that?
A. I think that our foreign policy must con-
stantly be adapted to new and to changing situ-
ations. It is nothing new that there are trouble
spots in the world. If a number of them happen
to come at the same time, that may be a coinci-
dence. It may be that hostile forces plan it that
way. I have constantly said that we need to
keep our foreign policy flexible and adaptable
to changing situations. But I do not believe that
there is anything basically different that we can
do.
Now there are some people who feel that we
should, in effect, adopt the Communist technique,
which is that, where you have power, you should
use it to impose conformity. The Communist
theory of peace and world order is that you have
got to bring everything imder a central power
and, in their case, the power of the Soviet Com-
munist Party and the governments that it con-
trols.
We don't believe in that kind of world, and
that is the basic difference between us. We ad-
mit of differences. If we did not admit differ-
ences— if we only believed in forced conformity —
we would have a world pei-haps for a time that
looked calmer and more serene. But it would
not be the kind of world we would want to live
in. I have said repeatedly that, if there are
Department of State Bulletin
(lilForences in the free world, this is nothing that
should surprise us. We need to take them into
aicount, particularly when fomented by hostile
I'diies, and we should do so. But I do not think
it rails for any basic change in the American poli-
lics, which are based upon our own traditions
and our own faith as to how we conduct our af-
fairs with the other countries in the world.
<J. Mr. Secretary, at the time that General
P' r,'z Jimenez fell — was ousted from power in
y< Dczuela — in January, our diplomats reported
ii-'ifli great pleasure that there was relatively little
ii lit I- American sentiment, despite the fact that
ire had been very friendly in an overt manner to
the. passing Jimenez regime. That changed at
the time Jimenez was admitted to this country
about a month ago. Would you explain to us,
perhaps, how this change of feeling — how the
Venezuelan people were allowed to drift into this
anti-American sentiment?
A. In the first place I would not say that there
is any general or preponderant anti-American
sentiment among the people of Venezuela. You
cannot judge a people on the basis of sporadic,
organized outbursts of rowdyism. I am confi-
dent that what happened there ^ is not a reflection
of the general views of the Venezuelan people.
Now there have been developments which have
made it easier for those who want to organize
these demonstrations to do so. One of them has
been the shift in the oil situation. That is an
economic cause. The oil, instead of being in short
supply, as it was during the Suez crisis, has come
into oversupply, and that has required some vol-
untaiy restrictions on oil imports into the United
States, including those from Venezuela. As an
economic factor, that has come into the situation.
Then there is a political factor in that, after
the overthrow of the 10-year rule of Jimenez, a
good many refugees came back to Venezuela and
tended to blame their situation on the United
States. Furthermore, there was a sort of vacuum
of power, which always encourages rowdyist ele-
ments to come to the forefront. We know our-
selves that, when there is not an adequate police
force, as when there is a disaster or something
which eliminates the ordinary forces of law and
order, rowdyism takes command. I do not think
it is sound to judge the basic sentiments of the
' For background, see p. 950.
June 9, J 958
Venezuelan nation and the Venezuelan people on
the basis of what took place when Mr. Nixon was
there.
Q. Mr. Secretary, in view of what you have fast
said, do you think it was wise for the Vice Presi-
dent to have gone into Caracas, especially since he
was warned of the possibility of violence and even
of assassination?
A. These things, you know, are much simpler to
judge after the event than before the event. I be-
lieve myself, in the light of what we knew before
Vice President Nixon went there, it was a quite
correct judgment on his part to go. I think, if we
had all known what was going to happen there and
had been able to foresee the events, probably he
would not have gone. But, you know, if you don't
go to places because of threats, you will be locked
up at home. I have never gone to any country in
the world, hai'dly, but what I have had threats and
there have been demonstrations of one sort or an-
other. It is so with the Vice President, who has
also visited a great many countries. If you allow
yourself to be deterred by threats of that kind, the
result is that the Communists will imprison you
at home.
I don't accept that at all. The miscalculation
in the case of the visit to Caracas was primarily a
miscalculation as to the adequacy and efficiency of
the police force. It virtually melted away at the
sight of trouble. That wasn't anticipated. I
don't know whether it could have been anticipated
or not. But if there had been an adequate han-
dling of that situation by the police, such as occurs
in most countries, there would not have been any
reason whatever to have concluded that the trip
was unwise to have undertaken.
Now we can see, in the light of after events, that
that might perhaps have been foreseen. The
police force that had been maintained under
Estrada had been virtually liquidated, and we see
now that the substitute police that had been created
was inadequate and did not know how to cope with
the type of organized rowdy mob such as the Com-
munist agitators put on.
U.S. Policy of Noninterference
Q. On the subject of Latin America, it has been
reported that Vice President Nixon feels strongly
one of the chief shortcomings of our policy in
Latin America is apparently ou/r friendly support
943
of dictator governments. First of all, do you
agree with that assessment, and, secondly, is there
anything we can do about that?
A. We try to conduct our relations with all the
governments of the world on the basis of dealing
with the government which is, in fact, in power,
unless we have reasons, as we have in Communist
China, for not recognizing it. (Laughter)
On the basis of noninterference with the internal
affairs of countries and in the case of South
America — Latin America — if we tried to deal with
those governments on the basis of our appraisal
as to whether they were a good government or a
bad government, whether they were a dictatorial
or not a dictatorial government, we would find
ourselves, I am afraid, deeply enmeshed in their
internal affairs.
As you know, one of the cardinal doctrines for
this hemisphere, which is affirmed and reaffirmed
on every occasion by the American Republics, is
the doctrine of noninterference in the internal
affairs of other countries. Their economic and
political interdependence with the United States
is such that to a peculiar degree — a greater degree
than probably any other area in the world — if we
attempted to adjust our relations according to our
appraisal of their government, we would become
involved in their internal affairs.
I would like to point out there is no clearcut
distinction. You can talk about dictators and
nondictators, but it isn't quite as easy to classify
on that basis. There are quasi-dictators and
almost-dictators and "dictators of the proletariat"
and all sorts of things in gradations. If you begin
to grade and say, if it is a certain type of govern-
ment, you give 100 percent support, and, if it is
not quite as good by our standards, you give 90
percent, and, if it is less good, you give 70 percent
support, that would get us involved in an in-
tolerable situation.
It is obvious the American Government and the
American nation and the American people like to
see governments which rest upon the consent of
the governed and where the governed are educated
people able to carry the responsibilities of self-
govermnent. Wlierever that exists, there almost
automatically results a closer and more intimate
friendly relationship than where that doesn't exist.
But any formula whereby we try to apply a sort
of slide rule to their governments would be, in
fact, an interference in their internal affairs.
Q. Mr. Secretary, does that apply to Guate-
mala, and, for example, we are in a sense interfer-
ing in the Government of Lebanon in that we are
supporting it. We do have a positive policy of
helping governments that we like, wouldn't you
say?
A. We respond to the requests of governments
which are friendly more than we do to govern-
ments that are unfriendly. Tliat is quite true.
We take into account the friendliness of govern-
ments. But we do not take into account the
question of the particular degree upon which they
have our form of democracy. We deal with the
Government of Yugoslavia and give it a consider-
able amount of assistance or aid. That doesn't
mean that we are in iavor of the internal type of
government that they have in Yugoslavia.
Outlook for Summit Meeting
Q. Mr. Secretary, in view of the recent events,
what is the outlook now for a summit meeting this
summer or fall?
A. I think that it is more certain than ever
before that there will be a summit meeting if — but
will not be a summit meeting unless — it is demon-
strable that such a meeting would, in fact, serve
an important purpose not otherwise attainable.
Now that was one of the important decisions that
was taken by the NATO meeting at Copenhagen,^
where they said that we recognize that a summit
meeting is not the only way, and not necessarily
the best way, to arrive at agreements. At first,
you know, when the Soviets put forward this idea
of a summit meeting, there was a sort of a
psychological attraction to it, as if in some way,
if you only met at the summit, everything would
be readily solved. Well, that was always an illu-
sion. I don't think it was ever an illusion that
carried away the American people. But it was an
illusion which took firmer hold on many of the
peoples of Europe.
Now I think that the exchanges that have taken
place between our governments, between the Soviet
Government and the United States and other gov-
ernments, which have tried to probe more deeply
into the question, "If you have a summit meeting,
' For text of communique issued at the close of the meet-
ing of the NATO Ministerial Council, see Bulletin of
May 26, 1958, p. 850.
Department of Stale Bulletin
what are you going to do, what are you going to
talk about, what are the prospects of getting some-
where?"— all of that has been a very educational
process, and there is not the same sort of emotional
fervor about the summit that there was.
Now that doesn't mean that there won't be a
summit meeting. But it does mean it is going to
appraised calmly, quietly, on its merits. It
does mean we are not going to be swept forward
on an emotional wave.
Q. Mr. Secretary, recently there was a Soviet
agreement to enter into technical discussions with
the United States on prohlems involved in policing
a nuclear- test suspension. When do you think
those technical discussions might actually begin?
A. There are still quite a few problems to be
resolved before they can begin. We were gratified
that the Soviet Union accepted, even though in
small part. President Eisenhower's proposal to get
going on the basis of teclinical experts. But the
question of where they shall meet, their terms of
reference, and things of that sort are still to be
resolved.
I would think it likely — I would hope at least —
that the talks could get going within 3 or 4 weeks.
We will, I think, unless there is some unforeseen
obstacle, be making our reply, which will bring
this matter down into very concrete terms, during
the course of the current week.' And unless,
therefore, some new roadblocks are thrown in the
way by the Soviet Union, it would only take the
time that is required to make the physical prep-
arations. You have to choose your people, you
have to give them terms of reference, you have to
find a place for them to function — matters of that
sort have to be dealt with. But I would think
that it would be a fair guess — as I say, unless un-
foreseen obstacles occurred — it could be done in 3
or 4 weeks.
The Middle East Resolution
Q. Mr. Secretary, during the earlier phases of
the Lebanese crisis there seemed to he some non-
understanding as to whether the Eisenhower doc-
trine applied in this case. Hoxoever, it seems that
later we came to feel that we liked Lebanon, al-
though the Eisenhower doctrine probably did not
specifically apply, and therefore would aid her if
requested. I wonder if you could clear up this
confusion that some of us have, sir?
A. I suppose that by the Eisenhower doctrine
you refer to the Middle East resolution that was
adopted by the Congress.'' That resolution con-
tains several provisions. It is not just one thing.
It authorizes the United States to assist economi-
cally and militarily nations which want such as-
sistance in order to preserve their independence.
It says that the independence and integrity of
these nations of the Middle East is vital to world
peace and the national interest of the United
States. It says that, if they are attacked from
a country under tlie control of international com-
munism, then the President is authorized, upon
request, to send forces to resist that attack.
Now we do not consider imder the present state
of affairs that there is likely to be an attack, an
armed attack, from a country which we would con-
sider under the control of international commu-
nism. That doesn't mean, however, that there is
nothing that can be done. There is the provision
of the Middle East resolution which says that the
independence of these countries is vital to peace
and the national interest of the United States.
That is certainly a mandate to do something if we
think that our peace and vital interests are en-
dangered from any quailer.
There is the basic right, and almost duty, at the
request or with the consent of a government, to
assist in the protection of American life and prop-
erty. There is the program of military assistance
which we render to many countries, including
Lebanon, in terms of giving them equipment and
certain measures of military training and tech-
niques and helping them train teclinicians to use
this equipment. So that there are a number of
areas of possible action if the situation calls for
it.
I would say that we are not anxious to have a
situation which would be in any sense a pretext
for introducing American forces into the area.
We hope and believe that that will not be called
for, and the situation, to date, does not suggest that
it would be called for.
The Situation in Indonesia
Q. Mr. Secretary, the Indonesian Government
has suggested that, if you personally would m,ake
For text, see p.
iune 9, J 958
' Bulletin of Mar. 25, 1957, p. 481.
945
a strong statement about '■^outside'''' — as they call
it — ^'■intervention''' in Indonesia's civil war, the
situation would improve. There have also been
reports that the Red Chinese would offer to send
volunteers to Indonesia. Would you care to com-
ment on the situation, sir?
A. I would say this : that tlie United States be-
lieves that the situation in Indonesia can be and
should be dealt with as an Indonesian problem.
The United States itself is a nation which has
suffered civil war, and we have sympathy and
regret when another country undergoes the
losses in life and the economic dislocations
that are incidental to civil war. But we do
believe that the situation can be and should be
dealt with as an Indonesian matter by the Indo-
nesians without intrusion from without, and we
do hope that there will be quickly restored peace
and stability in the Indonesian Kepublic.
Q. Mr. Secretary, there have been a good deal
of differences over the estimates of intervention
in the Lebanese crisis by the United Arab Repub-
lic. Would you give ws your estimate of the
amount of intervention by the U.A.R.?
A. The Government of Lebanon, which is the
best judge of this matter, seems to feel, on the
basis of what seems to us to be serious evidence,
that there is such interference.
Q. Mr. Secretary, you indicated several weeks
ago that a problem in the Government right now
was the question of a unilateral suspension by the
United States of nuclear testing arid that this had
not been quite resolved. I should like to ask you
whether the possibility and hope of discussing
with the Russians a supervised end of testing is
having any effect on our consideration of a uni-
lateral suspension?
A. That situation has not altered as far as our
own governmental position is concerned from
what it was at the earlier date that you allude to.
I think, obviously, the results of the investigation
by experts of what would be required, and
whether that would be acceptable, would have
some bearing on the question. But on the basic
policy as to whether or not to suspend testing
there has been no change in the Government's offi-
cial position.
Q. Mr. Secretary, I would like to clear up one
point on this Middle East doctrine or Middle
946
East policy you talked about a while ago. You
said that there is a provision in the resolution
which states that the independence of the coun-
tries of the Middle East is vital to security of the
United States — the peace and security of the
United States.
A. Yes. That's the so-called Mansfield amend-
ment.
Q. Yes. Then you said that this surely is a
mandate to do something if we think that the
peace and security of those countries is threatened
from any quarter. Does this represent a broaden-
ing by interpretation of the possibility of action
to be taken under that resolution? The reason I
ask is that I think most of us had always believed
that the authority of the resolution applied almost
exclusively to actions against international com-
munism.
A. You recall that, as the resolution was sent
up to the Congress by the President," there was
not in the resolution the particular sentence to
which I refer; that was introduced by the Con-
gress itself. And I assume that the introduction
of that resolution had a meaning and had a sig-
nificance. You cannot, as a matter of legislative
history, assume that, when you put a new sentence
into a resolution, it is utterly meaningless. We
assume that the Congress does not do things that
are utterly meaningless. (Laughter)
Q. Mr. Secretary, you spoke
A. Excuse me, this gentleman
Importance of U.S.-Latin American Relations
Q. Sir, it has been said that our relations with
Latin America have been in the category of ^'■al-
loays important'''' and that now since the Nixon
incident it has assumed a proportion of '■Hop pri-
ority,^'' and I wondered if you would care to spell
out any difference in the two categories, if there
is su£h a category?
A. I am not awai'e of having said what you
attribute to me.
Q. No, sir, I didn't attribute it to you — but it
has been said that that
"For text of proposed resolution, see ibid., Jan.
1957, p. 128.
Department of Stale Bulletin
A. I would like to say this : that relations with
Latin America have never been in any subordi-
nated category. In many respects we have given
them primary importance, particularly over re-
cent years. Now let me give you some examples,
first pointing out that the fact that the Organiza-
tion of American States is centered here in
Washington and the cooperation of American
states is centered here in Washington means that,
when you deal with those problems, it doesn't at-
tract the same attention that it does if I travel to
Ankara to a meeting of the Baghdad Pact, or I
travel to Copenhagen for a meeting of the NATO,
or if I travel to Manila for a meeting of SEATO.
These things are done less conspicuously because
they are done mostly in Washington. But the
fact that they are done in Washington does not
mean that they are not done or that they do not
have significance.
Now we have developed within that group of
American Republics a system of meeting together
to discuss the problems of the Americas and of
the world which has no parallel anywhere else.
Going back now for several years we meet here
on fairly frequent occasions — I would say more
frequently than do the ministers and ambassa-
dors of most other organizations — to discuss prob-
lems of common concern. I have been having
these meetings up in my office here. The Presi-
dent has had one or two such meetings at the
White House. I remember I had a similar meet-
ing out at San Francisco in 1955 at the time of
the tenth anniversary of the founding of the
United Nations. Also we have meetings here at
the office of the Organization of American States,
where I went down and spoke a few weeks ago.*
I suppose we devote as much time and thought to
the problems of the Americas as we do to the
problems of any other region in the world. I
say it is less conspicuous because it is done quietly
here in Washington and does not entail arrival
statements and departure statements and all the
business that goes with these trips. But there
has never been a downgrading.
Now there is another point that I want to make,
which is the fact that our relations with the
American Republics are more on a basis of private
activity and relatively less on a basis of govem-
'For text of Secretary Dulles' address on Pan
American Day, see ibid., May 5, 1958, p. 715.
June 9, 7958
mental activity than with certain other areas
of the world. There is a tremendous private
trade.
Now when the Soviets talk about "aid," they
include trade. If we included trade, the figures
would be massive. There is more private trade
between the United States and Latin America
than between any of the other — more than Can-
ada and more than any other country in the
world, if you lump the Latin American countries
together.
There is a big flow of private American capital
that goes to these countries, and there are very
large loans by the Export-Import Bank. So that
the activities in relation to Latin America are not
all reflected by activities that take place here in
the Department of State. It is a very good thing
that that is the case. It is abnormal, imder our
form of society, to have to deal with other coun-
tries through these special grant-aid. Government-
sponsored projects, and so forth. It is a healthy
thing, and good for both of us, that so much can
be done in this other way. But when you are
thinking about what is done, the level of interest
and concern, don't write off the tremendous vol-
ume of private trade, the tremendous volume of
private capital, and the loaning facilities of the
Export-Import Bank. If you take all those
things into account, you will see that the interest
and concern of the United States with Latin
America is very great indeed.
Protection of U.S. Nationals in Lebanon
Q. What plans do you have to protect our na-
tionals in Lebanon if it should develop that the
present government cannot give them adequate
protection? And would these plans in any way
be ajfected by present Soviet threats against any
outside interference in the Middle East area?
A. I'll answer your last question first. We are
not deterred anywhere in the world from doing
what we think is right and our duty, by any
Soviet threats. Now what we would do if Amer-
ican life and property was endangered would de-
pend, of course, in the first instance upon what
we were requested to do by the Government of
Lebanon. We do not introduce American forces
into foreign countries except on the invitation of
the lawful government of the state concerned.
As I indicated earlier, we do not — while we are
making preparations, as we always make prep-
arations, against contingencies however remote —
we do not have any present reason to anticipate
there will be the need for that.
Q. Mr. Secretary., the last part of our 1950 Tri-
partite Declaration on the Middle East ' also men-
tions the independence and territorial integrity
of the nations of the area. Do you regard that
as applicable also as part of the Eisenhower
doctrine?
A. We do regard it as applicable. We don't re-
gard it as powerful, you might say, as the phrase
in the Middle East resolution that I referred to,
because that Tripartite Declaration has never had
specific congressional approval. We have always
considered that whether action under that, or an-
other declaration that President Eisenhower made,
I think, in '56,® dealing with these problems, that
the constitutional power of the President to act
under those was not as great as though they
had received express congressional approval. The
Middle East resolution has received congressional
approval, and therefore we consider that it is a
stronger mandate and it gives the President a
greater authority than if it would purely have
been a declaration by the President himself.
Q. Mr. Secretary, the Italian Government is
supposed to ask for a seat in the United Nations
Security Council. In view of this, do you have
any comment on it by the Anfierican Government?
A. I would say this: The Italian Government
has come to play a very important and very con-
structive role in world affairs. Its counsel, for
example, in NATO is wise counsel, which is
heeded by the other members of NATO. It has
important positions strategically because of its lo-
cation in the Mediterranean area, and, by every
test that I can think of, Italy is well qualified to
be a member of the Security Council.
Now you know that the policy of the United
States is not to commit itself in advance as to
just how it will vote in elections. But I do want
to say that there is no reservation on the part of
the United States as to the high measure of quali-
For text, see ihid., June 15, 1953, p. 834, footnote 2.
'For a White House statement of Apr. 9, 1956, see
iUd., Apr. 23, 1956, p. 668.
fication which Italy has for membership in the
Security Council.
Q. You spohe about what the Government of
Lebanon considers serious evidence that there has
been interference by the U.A.R. And yet there
has been no appeal at this time, sir, to the Security
Council. Could you tell us whether, in view of
this outside interference, we are suggesting to the
Government of the United Arab Republic tliat it
should stop this outside interference?
A. My impression is that the United States
considers that it is up to the Government of
Lebanon to try to get the U.A.R. to stop. And
while the Government of Lebanon has talked with
us about the matter and about possible action in
the United Nations, it has made no decision on
that point as yet.
Q. Mr. Secretary, when you speak about this
interference as perhaps coming from the U.A.R.,
do you mean to absolve the Coinmunists from
any complicity in this affair at all?
A. No, I wouldn't want to do that. (Laughter)
Communist China's Trade Relations With Japan
Q. Mr. Secretary, Japan is having an election
within a few days. Would you discuss the im-
plications of Communist China's cancellation of
all its trade relations with Japan and also our
reciprocal trade bill, which is hanging fire at the
moment?
A. I'd comment on your first question as follows :
The Communists have never made any secret of
the fact that their trade and economic policies are
motivated primarily by political considerations.
Mr. Khrushchev said to a group of American
Congressmen in Moscow not long ago — he said,
"Trade with us is primarily political, not eco-
nomic." That is always the case. And I think
what has happened here in the case of Japan
has been a rather dramatic demonstration of the
fact that, unless through a trade arrangement
they could gain what they considered to be im-
portant political advantages, they were not in-
terested in the trade.
Now you asked me also about the status of the
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act.
Q. Yes, sir.
Department of Stale Bulletin
A. Well, that is under very active considera-
tion by the Congress at the present time, and the
bill is, I think, in the process of being marked up.
We hope it will come out in a form wiiich is ac-
ceptable and which will continue the tradition —
I would say the very great tradition — which is
embodied in this legislation since it was first
adopted nearly 25 years ago. That stands, as I
have often said, as a symbol in the free world,
and to haul down that symbol at the present time
would be a great disaster.
President Nasser's Visit to Russia
Q. Mr. Secretary, I wonder if you could eval-
uate for us the visit of President Nasser to Rus-
sia, particularly the statement of Mr. Khrushchev
that he would support President Nasser in his
ambitions to unite the Arabs. I wonder if you
could tell us lohat you think that means for us in
the future and if it would change our attitude to-
ward Mr. Nasser.
A. Possibly I have said that the official com-
muniques after these visits are somewhat like an
iceberg— about one-eighth is above the surface
and seven-eighths is below. Now I can't evaluate
what took place without knowing more than I
now know about the seven-eighths which is be-
low the surface— whether what you refer to was
just a point of view expressed to please President
Nasser or whether there was a real purpose be-
hind it. Without being able to evaluate what
really went on behind the scenes, I would not
want to attempt to evaluate what was allowed
to appear.
Q. Mr. Secretary, in order to prevent any mis-
interpretation Vm wondering if you could tell us
whether it is now your position that the Mans-
field amendment to the Mid-East resolution gives
the adm,inistration clear authority to go to the
defence of an independent government in the
Middle East without further recourse to the Con-
gress. And, by going to the defense, I mean the
actual use of troops.
A. I would not want to give a categorical yes-
or-no answer to that particular question. All I
say is that, when the Congress by an overwhelm-
ing votes declares that the independence and in-
tegrity of a certain country is vital to the peace
and national interest of the United States, that
is certainly a meaningful declaration and it places
upon the President a greater responsibility to pro-
tect, in that area, the peace and interests of the
United States than would have been the case had
there not been such a declaration. Now when you
come to apply that to a given state of facts, which
is at the moment hypothetical, I would not want
to commit myself. We hope and believe that the
circumstances will not become such as to make it
necessary to do so.
Q. Mr. Secretary, to follow up on Mr. [John']
ScaWs [of the Associated Press] question, since
you do not absolve the Communists from their
responsibility in agitating in Lebanon and since
you have indicated earlier that the United Arab
Republic may also be responsible for some of
Lebanon^s troubles, would you consider that per-
haps these two elements are joined in the present
disorders in Lebanon?
A. It might very well be.
Q. Mr. Secretary, do you personally favor the
restrictions that have been put on the collecting
of news in the Department?
A. Now you're getting out of my depth a bit.
I'm not familiar with what took place in this
respect. My understanding is that there has al-
ways been a standing rule in the State Depart-
ment that officers who had conversations with
other persons were supposed to make a memo-
randum of conversation, and that is a rule which
I myself try scrupulously to comply with. And
my understanding is that there has been a tend-
ency to breach that rule and what has been
sought is to bring the practice back into con-
formity with what has been for 10, 20, 30 years a
standing rule of the Department.
Q. Mr. Secretary, does a State Department of-
ficer have to be with the reporters when they are
seeking news from the middle level?
A. Well, those are our State Department of-
ficers, aren't they ?
Q. No, I mean a press officer.
A. I just don't know.
Q. Mr. Secretary, it has been suggested that
maybe some of the problems of the United States
arise from the fact that you are overburdened.
Vd like to read a comment by a very prominent
June 9, 1958
949
commentator in this moming^s paper saying that
"Mr. Dulles has more problems to decide than any
Tnan can possibly attend to and know about and
master." Would you care to give us your reac-
tion to that? (Laughter)
A. Well, I'm afraid my reaction might be prej-
udiced. (Laughter) I thuik only you, and ulti-
mately history, can give the answer to that ques-
tion.
Q. Thank you, sir.
Vice President Nixon Returns
From South American Tour
Following is the text of remarks made by Presi-
dent Eisenhower and Vice President Nixon at the
airport at Washington, B.C., on May 15 {White
House press release) .
REMARKS BY PRESIDENT EISENHOWER
Mr. Vice President, Mrs. Nixon, and our
friends : Some weeks ago I asked the Vice Presi-
dent and Mrs. Nixon to go to Argentina to repre-
sent me and the Government at the inauguration
of their new President. And thereafter he visited
seven other countries in Latin America in order
to discuss with the leaders some of our common
problems and to help in reaching a better under-
standing of those problems so that our friend-
ships would be solidified — made stronger.^
Through this entire trip he has conducted him-
self effectively, efficiently, and with great dignity
and has performed to the satisfaction, not only
of us, but of our sister coimtries that he was
sent to.
There have been, during the course of this trip,
some unpleasant incidents. Some of them came to
'The Vice President and Mrs. Nixon, accompanied by
Assistant Secretary of State Roy R. Rubottom, Jr.,
Samuel C. Waugh, president of the Export-Import Bank
of Washington, Maurice Bernbaum, director of the Office
of South American Affairs, Department of State (trip
manager), and members of the Vice President's staff, left
Washington on April 27, visited Uruguay, Argentina,
Paraguay, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, and Vene-
zuela, and returned to Washington on May 15. During
the visits at Lima, Peru, and Caracas, Venezuela, the
Vice President and some members of his party were the
object of hostile public demonstrations.
950
the point that there was danger — not only to the
Vice President but to Mrs. Nixon — real danger
and risk of harm and even worse.
Now I want to make one thing clear: The oc-
currence of these incidents has in no way impaired
the friendship — the traditional friendship — be-
tween the United States and any other single one
of our sister republics to the south. There could
be no more dramatic proof this morning of the
truth of this statement than the presence here
in this crowd of the ambassadors of our sister re-
publics in the south who have been among the
most enthusiastic welcomers of our Vice President
and his wife.
And so I repeat America's affection for the peo-
ples of those countries. The governmental rela-
tionships between them are as close as ever. And
more than this, as one Latin American ambassa-
dor said to me this morning, "Really, our whole
situation — our situation of cooperation and
brotherhood among ourselves — is strengthened be-
cause of the fact that we stand together in con-
demning any kind of Commimist leadership of
such incidents as endangered our beloved Vice
President and his wife."
All America welcomes them home. And in
doing so — through its welcome — it means to say
to all of our friends and other nations to the
south, we send you our warm greetings and hope
that some of you will come back to pay to us the
call that the Nixons have paid upon you.
REMARKS BY VICE PRESIDENT NIXON
Mr. President and our friends who have so
honored us by coming to the airport in such great
numbers today : There is very little that I can add
to what the President has said so eloquently just
now.
As you know, we left the United States 18 days
ago on a trip which was to take us to eight coun-
tries in South America, none of which we had
visited before. And may I say that on all the
trips that Pat and I have taken around the world
we have been tremendously proud to represent the
President of the United States— to represent the
people of the United States— in what we believe
are the real motives of our people in the whole
area of foreign policy and our relations with
other comitries. And we were proud to do so on
tliis trip.
Department of State Bulletin
There were occasions, as the President said,
when some incidents occurred. (And I remember,
before I left, one of my good friends said, "Well,
you are very fortunate to get away from the
Senate for a nice vacation for 18 days.") But
may I say that, as the President just emphasized,
while there were incidents — incidents in wliich a
very small, violent, vocal minority wei'e able to
enlist the support of some innocent people who
were misled as to what the United States' inten-
tions really were — I can tell you, from my obsei-va-
tions in each one of the countries we visited, that
the great majority of the people — the great ma-
jority in all walks of life — are friendly to the
United States today. And this is true of every one
of the countries.
Now, this doesn't mean that all the people of
these countries agree with all the policies of the
United States because I can assure you that in
countiy after country, in the great universities,
and in conversations with government leaders and
labor leaders, I found that there were many areas
where people disagreed with what we were doing.
And it was my purpose to try to explain to them
what our policies were — to try to get away from
some of the misapprehensions which existed.
Sometimes we were able to do so — sometimes we
succeeded, and perhaps sometimes we did not.
But may I say in that connection that, as far
as this part of the world is concerned, first, there
is no area of the world with which we are more
closely associated — there is no area of the world
which is more important as far as the United
States is concerned — than these, our closest neigh-
bors in the American hemisphere. And may I
say also that we can be tremendously proud of
the fact that they have supported us as partners
and friends in the United Nations in vote after
vote, as well as in other areas.
Before I left, I said that one rule we must
never forget in international relations, as well as
in political and business affairs, is that we must
never take our friends for granted. We do not
take our friends for granted in Latin America.
We don't think that we ever have, but some of
them may have gotten the impression that we did.
And may I say, in that connection, that what we
must get across tliere, as well as in other parts of
the world, is this very simple message: that we,
the Government and people of the United States,
want for other peoples just what we have for
Venezuelan Note on Caracas Incidents *
Unofficial translation
Embassy of Venezuela
Washington, D. C.
May 13, 1958
Excellency : I have the honor to address Tour
Excellency, in accordance with instructions from
my Government, in order to inform you that the
Government of Venezuela has taken all the meas-
ures necessary for guaranteeing the personal safety
of His Excellency Vice President Richard M. Nixon,
his wife, and the members of his entourage, and
for avoiding repetition of the lamentable occur-
rences which took place this morning in Caracas
and for which I present to the Government of Your
Excellency in the name of the Government of
Venezuela the most sincere apologies.
I take advantage of this occasion to reiterate to
Your Excellency expressions of my highest consid-
eration and respect.
Eduakdo a. Acosta H.
Ghargi d' Affaires ad interim
To His Excellency
John Foster Dulles
Secretary of State
Washington 25, D. C.
Delivered at Washington at 10 : 1.5
May 14 (press release 264).
on
ourselves — independence for our country, freedom
for our people, and the greatest possibilities for
economic progress tliat can be devised.
In Latin America we have an area which is in
a sense in a state of evolution, and as far as the
people there are concerned, tliey are concerned,
as they should be, about poverty and misery and
disease which exists in so many places. They are
determined to do something about it. They are
moving toward democracy and freedom — some-
times slowly, but no question surely. They are
moving toward economic progress. And the
United States is, and should be, proud to work
with them as partners in moving toward democ-
racy— toward freedom — and in helping them and
working with them for economic progress.
As the President has said, and as I repeated
over and over again in every country, at every
imiversity that I met with, the only war the peo-
ple of the United States want to wage is a war
against poverty, misery, and disease, wherever it
exists in the world.
And now this is not the time, of course, to re-
port on observations and conclusions. I shall have
June 9, 7958
951
the opportunity to meet with the President and
the Secretary of State and others in government
at a later time to go into specific matters. But
may I say a personal word at this time to those
of you who have come here: We have taken many
trips over the past 5 years — I think over 40 coun-
tries, perhaps 45 — but I can tell you that certainly
nothing could be more heartwarming than to see
this crowd today — the ambassadors who represent
the countries that we visited, and others as well,
the Members of the Cabinet, and people in the
Government, our colleagues in the House and the
Senate, and, as well, this wonderful group of stu-
dents from the universities and colleges in this
area.
And may I say that we are always very proud
to represent the United States, but I don't think
that either of us has ever been as moved as we
are at this time, returning as we do.
I remember yesterday, late in the evening, as
we drove through the streets of San Juan, Puerto
Rico, with Governor Muhoz Marin, that our car
was stopped on a couple of occasions by the
crowds in the streets. I remember that men and
women put their hands to the windows of the car.
We finally got out and walked with them, and
this is what they said : "Welcome home, Mr. Vice
President — or Mr. Nixon — or Mrs. Nixon — God
bless the United States."
May I say that we have enjoyed our visits to
other countries. It has been a great experience,
but certainly there is no greater experience than
to return home to see our friends, our family,
and to realize how blessed this country is — blessed
with freedom, blessed with economic opportunity,
blessed with stability in its government, and with
fine leadership, whether that leadership is fur-
nished by one of our great parties or by the other.
So with that, may I say again, Mr. President,
how deeply we have been moved by this recep-
tion, by your coming as you have to the airport.
I don't know how adequately to express our
thanks. We would like to have the time to shake
hands and to add a few thousand to tliose that
we have met in other parts of the world, but that
is not possible today.
May I just say, thank you again — and never for-
get what a great privilege it is to be an Ameri-
can citizen and to live in the United States.
Review of Recent Anti-American Demonstrations
Statement by Deputy Under Secretary Murphy ^
In accordance with your invitation of May 16
I am appearing in behalf of the Department of
State to discuss with the committee in executive
session the recent incidents in Lebanon, South
America, and elsewhere. I would say fii-st that
the Department is grateful to the committee for
this opportunity both to provide whatever in-
formation it can and especially to have the benefit
of the committee's wisdom in matters which are
of pressing importance to our country. It is my
purpose to reply frankly to any questions about
which information is immediately available to
me. Where I do not have it, effort will be made
to supply it promptly.
' Made before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
on May 19 and released by the committee.
We all share, I believe, your distress over the
indigiaities suffered by the Vice President of the
United States in Peru and Venezuela during the
course of his recent tour of eight South American
countries. As you know, his tour was incident toi
the Vice President's attendance at the inaugura-
tion of President Frondizi of our sister Republic
of the Argentine at Buenos Aires.
It should be said that the purpose of the Vice
President's tour was to promote better under-
standing and good will between this country and
our southern neighbors. They had been kind
enough to extend invitations, in most instances
quite insistent invitations. The Vice President's
acceptance was in accordance with practice of
long standing to exchange visits of prominent
Department of Stale Bulletin
personalities between our countries. It reflected
among other things a desire to demonstrate the
importance and vahie this country attaches to
close and friendly relations with our sister repub-
lics to the south. It was based on an awareness
of the importance of firsthand exchanges of views
with government officials and other opinion lead-
ers. The Vice President, with tireless energy, suc-
cessfully made similar trips to Southeast Asia
and to Africa and Central America. These trips
have gained political advantages of considerable
importance to us.
In discussing this subject pei-haps you will agree
that we should examine the manner in which it
fits into the general pattern of world affairs. At
present our country is involved in a highly com-
petitive situation. There continues a worldwide
wave of nationalism. This has found expression
in the creation since the war of some 20 new
nations. In other areas additional countries are
in the formative stage. In still other areas the
old order is in process of change. This fermenta-
tion often pi'ovokes conflicts and offers oppor-
tunity both for constructive effort as well as
exploitation by political opportunists. There is
evident a worldwide ground swell of desire for a
better life. This often generates intense resent-
ments, envy, and even hatreds. There is the in-
evitable distrust by the have-nots of those who
have. There is also the implacable crusade of the
ideologists intent on destroying the capitalist sys-
tem of free enterprise and individual democratic
liberties. They are determined to replace it by
applying the principles of Marxism-Leninism in
the promotion of the totalitarian state. The
Soviet Union not without success blends this
effort of international communism with skillful
promotion of old-fashioned Eussian expansionism.
Communist Efforts To Foster Anti-Americanism
The Soviet regime and the world Communist
movement since their inception have constantly
sought to exploit — in Marxist language — "con-
tradictions" or differences both between "leading
imperialist powers" and between "imperialist"
and "colonial" or underdeveloped countries. The
dominant theme in these provocative efforts since
World War II has been anti- Americanism.
Under the leadership of the Soviet Union the
world Communist movement has made energetic
efforts to organize and exploit hostile sentiments
June 9, J 958
466732—58 8
toward the United States. American "ruling
circles" are depicted in Communist propaganda
as the dominant imperialist force in the world,
everywhere seeking to oppress smaller nations and
to undermine the influence of other "imperialist"
countries — notably France and the Netherlands,
but also including the United Kingdom — in order
to extend the domination of American capital.
The anti-American orientation of the world Com-
munist movement was clearly evidenced in the
November 1957 Moscow "Declaration" of 12 Com-
munist parties and "Peace Manifesto" signed by
65 Communist parties, which singled out the
United States as the main threat to "peace" and
called for united action to fight for "peace," i.e.,
the interests of the Soviet bloc.
The Soviet Government itself has directly used
its propaganda and diplomatic apparatus to foster
anti-American sentiments. In areas such as Latin
America, where the United States represents the
leading outside influence, Soviet efforts have long
concentrated on channeling local resentments into
resentment against the United States. In South
Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa, where
other Western countries are prominently involved,
the Soviet line has been that the United States
is the principal enemy of the local countries, some-
times using other Western powers as its "tools"
but always seeking to supplant their positions.
Similarly, the Soviet Government has persistently
sought to turn French, British, or Italian opin-
ion, as the case may be, against the United States.
In regard to recent manifestations of anti-
American sentiments in South America, Algeria,
Lebanon, Indonesia, and Burma, the anti- Ameri-
can content in Soviet propaganda directed at these
areas has been at a high level for a considerable
period of time. There was no marked step-up in
Moscow's propaganda immediately prior to the
events in these areas, either in the degree of atten-
tion to the United States or in the violence of its
charges, although in several cases Soviet propa-
ganda media have sought to exploit these events
after they occurred to the discredit of the United
States.
There is no evidence at present of a Soviet effort
to effect a coordinated worldwide demonstration
of anti-Americanism coinciding with Vice Presi-
dent Nixon's visit to Latin America. While there
is evidence of direct Communist complicity in sev-
eral of the recent anti-American incidents — in
953
South America, Indonesia, and Burma— the cir-
cumstances leading up to these incidents occurred
more or less independently of Moscow's will.
Thus the coincidence of these outbreaks, so far as
their timing is concerned, would seem to be largely
accidental. However, all of the recent incidents
are related in that there has been a conscious, con-
tinuous effort by the Soviet Union to exploit and
exacerbate potential or actual misunderstandings
in these areas about the United States. These
incidents, particularly those in which there was
direct Communist involvement, demonstrate the
scope and intensity of Soviet long-term efforts to
discredit the United States.
Security Measures
Those of you who personally have had experi-
ence with mob action and group violence need
no reminder that the element of surprise fre-
quently plays an important role. Not so long ago
in our own Capital of Washington we witnessed
a savage attempt on the life of our President then
in residence at Blair House. We also shared
the mdignation of the Congress over the dastardly
shooting in the House of Representatives of sev-
eral of its distinguished Members. We were
aware of the possibility of such dangers. Our
security measures were believed adequate. Yet
even in our solidly established system grave inci-
dents like those were possible. How much more
so is it time in those countries where freshly estab-
lished governments have not had time or others
have been unable for various reasons to develop
adequate security organizations. The recent de-
plorable assassination of the President of our
sister Eepublic of Guatemala is a tragic case in
point.
South America
Problems and issues in Latin America were
known, and the Vice President was briefed on
them. There was nothing in the past history of
U.S.-Latin American relations to indicate the pos-
sibility of substantial violence against our repre-
sentatives. In addition, innate Latin American
courtesy and their respect for the guest relation-
ship of persons coming to their homes or country
were taken into consideration. After Lima and
the embarrassment which the incidents there had
caused to both the Government and most Peru-
vians, it was felt that the governments and public
opinion in the remaining countries would do their
utmost to prevent similar embarrassments. As the
tour progressed, and particularly after Peru, the
increasing amoimt of Communist-inspired and
directed tactics was known and reported and the
increasing possibility of trouble in Venezuela
was understood. It was also miderstood by the
governments concerned.
Prior to Lima it was not even deemed necessary
to seek any specific assurances of adequate secu-
rity. After Lima the assurances given by the
Ecuadoran, Colombian, and Venezuelan Govern-
ments appeared adequate, as they proved to be in
Ecuador and Colombia. It seems evident that the
trouble in Caracas was caused by the intensive
exploitation by Coiiununist and other anti-
American elements of grievances against our
policies and the failure to take adequate measures
to prevent demonstrations and activities of which
the Government was fully forewarned by its own
security people and by reports from our embassies
and investigative agencies.
I tliink it is important to emphasize that, wliile
there has been a known resentment in Latin Amer-
ica over certain issues and protests concerning
them could be expected, this is the first time that
minority groups have been able to exploit these
issues to incite actual violence against an im-
portant American representative. This is some-
thing new in Latin America, and therefore it was
not expected.
There is considerable evidence that the demon-
strations in the various countries visited by the
Vice President followed a pattern and were Com-
munist inspired and staged. Slogans on the ban-
ners carried by students and others were similar.
"Little Rock," "Guatemala," "Yankee Imperial-
ism," "Wall Street Agents," "McCarthyism,"
"Colonialism," "Nixon Go Home" were among
those repeated. The tactics were much the same,
with young students urged on by older persons
leading the activities. Intelligence reports from
Latin American capitals also support the conclu-
sion of a leading Communist role in the demon-
strations.
There is no indication of miusual efforts by
Radio Moscow to step up its exploitation of anti-
American sentuuents immediately prior to or dur-
ing the Vice President's trip. Although Soviet
commentaries carried the normal type of anti-
954
Department of State Bulletin
American statements and Soviet-bloc propaganda
output to Latin America increased somewhat — a
normal occurrence during any major event — the
demonstrations and scattered violence were not
excessively stressed during Mr. Nixon's trip.
Moscow Radio warned its Latin audiences of the
"exploitative" motives of the Vice President's
trip, designed to counter the "discontent over U.S.
policies." The majority of the commentaries re-
lied to a great extent on quotations from Ameri-
can newspapers and stressed that even the U.S.
press "has been forced to admit" that the anti-
U.S. demonstrations are not the intrigues of Com-
munists but the result of U.S. "discriminatory"
economic policy toward Latin America. With-
out attacking the Vice President personally, the
Moscow propaganda machine asserted that
"Nixon's fiasco was actually the fiasco of U.S.
policy toward Latin America."
On May 15, according to FBIS [Foreign
Broadcasting Information Service], Radio Mos-
cow began in earnest to exploit the anti-American
incidents during the Nixon tour. However, Ra-
dio Moscow directed no commentaries at Latin
American audiences, the target of most of Mos-
cow's comments prior to the Caracas events. In
these latest efforts Moscow is attempting to ex-
ploit the incidents to foster anti-Americanism in
other areas of the world.
Uruguay
We knew, took into account, and reported to
the Vice President before his departure the fol-
lowing matters: information concerning Uru-
guayan resentment of U.S. economic policies, par-
ticularly the comitervailing duty on wool tops;
the fact that the Soviet-bloc diplomatic missions
in Uruguay have been active in many sectors of
Uruguay; the fact that recent approaches have
been made to Uniguay by the Soviets for in-
creased economic intercourse; and finally that
there was a possibility of student antipathy or
even anti-U.S. demonstrations at the imiversity.
There was no indication that violence would
ensue, and there was none. The Vice President
was able by debating with the students to win
them over, and his visit to the university ended
with a resounding ovation and acclaim for his
forthrightness in standing up to the students in
friendly discussion.
Argentina
Tlie political situation in Argentina and the
circumstances surrounding the Frondizi govern-
ment were explained in briefings to the Vice
President. The delicate political situation caused
by the coming into power of a new government,
the activities outside of Argentina by Peron, and
the fact that the Communist Party in Argentina
had become the largest in the hemisphere were
all included in the briefings and fully discussed.
There were rumors that pro-Peron or other
groups might stage demonstrations in opposition
to the Vice President. The economic difficulties
facing President Frondizi, the difficulties with
economic problems which might involve the
United States, were discussed before the Vice
President left and were discussed by him with
Argentine leaders in that country.
There was no indication that any violence could
be expected, nor did any occur. On the con-
trary, the reception accorded to the Vice Presi-
dent in Argentina was extremely friendly.
The minor incidents in connection with the late
arrival at the swearing-in ceremonies of Presi-
dent Frondizi, in which there were scattered boos
for Mr. Nixon, were higlilighted in the United
States press but were given little importance in
Buenos Aires.
Paraguay
Vice President Nixon was aware that in Para-
guay there might be some attempt at demonstra-
tions— or in other countries — on the question of
a visit to the present Paraguayan Government.
Recent attempts by opposition groups to over-
throw the Stroessner regime had been the subject
of intelligence and embassy reports several weeks
before the Vice President departed. These facts
were included in briefings, as were matters regard-
ing anti-Paraguayan acts involving the provi-
sional government of Argentina which was in
power prior to Frondizi's inauguration. The
warm reception given to the Vice President in
Paraguay was anticipated, and there were no un-
toward incidents to mar the visit.
Bolivia
The tense political situation which has existed
in Bolivia in recent months and which broke out
into disturbances in the mining areas in March,
Jane 9, J 958
955
involving mainly the two factions of the govern-
ing MNK [Nationalist Revolutionary Movement]
Party, were also included in briefmgs of the Vice
President. Bolivia's difficult economic situation,
the part which the United States is playing in
helping to solve Bolivia's problems, the difficulties
involving the mine owners of the expropriated
mines (including U.S. owners) and the Bolivian
Government, were well known. The existence of
Communist and Trotskyite groups in Bolivia and
the dangers which the Vice President's party
might possibly encounter in passing through the
narrow streets of La Paz were explained in brief-
ings with the Vice President and to the Secret
Service. The potential of Conmiunists to incite
anti-U.S. actions in Bolivia was considered but
not deemed sufficiently strong to cause any change
in plans.
There was no violence in Bolivia, and the hos-
tile demonstrations were negligible. The fact
that there was no violence there was a factor in
considerations concerning the rest of the tour.
Dissatisfaction in Pei-u over the U.S. restric-
tions and tariffs on certain basic agricultural
commodities exported by Peru is of long standing.
More recently, threatened restrictions on lead,
zinc, and copper had led to bitter criticism. This
was further inflamed by the report of the United
States Tariff Commission on lead and zinc. Re-
cent strikes, demonstrations, and lawless acts in
various parts of Peru, for which the Communists
were in a large measure responsible, had been re-
ported by embassy and intelligence sources and
were part of briefings held on Peru. The fact
that there had been increased lawlessness within
Peru in recent months was also known and con-
sidered. The status of the Univei-sity of San
Marcos as an autonomous university, proud of
its independence and heritage, was also known.
There was, however, nothing in intelligence re-
ports to indicate the real possibility of violence
in Peru. Demonstrations were considered pos-
sible. The fact that anti-U.S. demonstrations of
the nature which occurred have not heretofore
been known in Lima and the historic ability of
the Peruvian Government to contend with law-
lessness were important factors taken into con-
sideration in making decisions on the visit to
Peru. Peru's record of close association and ties
with the United States is historical.
At the time of the Peruvian visit, mounting
evidence of the possibility of student demonstra-
tions was known.
The anti-U.S. demonstrations were the result of
a small minority, estimated between 30 and 40 per-
sons, obviously Commimist led and inspired. They
did not represent the attitude of Peruvians, much
less that of the Peruvian Government. The dem-
onstrations seemed to snowball once they were in-
cited, and there is no evidence that large mass
demonstrations were planned.
Ecuador
Intelligence reports received prior to the arrival
of the Vice President in Ecuador showed that
the Communists had undertaken considerable
planning and as of May 9 their activities had
been limited to fly sheets and wall paintings. It
had been expected that anti-Nixon demonstrations
might include throwing of water and fruit.
Elaborate plans to embarrass the Vice President
during his visit to the Central University failed
to materialize because the visit was canceled.
Other Communist plans in Ecuador by students
were said to include :
1. Presentation of what would appear to be an
honorary diploma but actually would portray im-
perialist domination of Ecuador.
2. A receiving line to turn its back on Mr.
Nixon upon his arrival.
3. A Communist student leader to read a list
of United States acts of intervention in Latin
America during the past 50 years.
4. Students to walk out on Mr. Nixon if there
had been any attempt to quiet Communist speak-
ers.
Intelligence reports indicated that other plans,
which did not materialize because of the Ecua-
doran Government's excellent security efforts and
apparent poor Communist organization, included
shouting squads along Mr. Nixon's travel route,
throwing of water and rotten fruit, and display
of derisive signs. Pedro Saad, Secretary Gen-
eral of the Communist Party in Ecuador, ordered
no violence, according to reports, but he hoped
a riot would occur at the football game.
Mr. Nixon's planned meeting with Communist
and other labor leaders was canceled. This can-
956
Deparfment of State Bvlletin
cellation was due in part to the Embassy's de-
cision that such a meeting would not bo produc-
tive and might give Commmiist leaders a propa-
ganda weapon. Communist plans to challenge
Mr. Nixon to meet labor leaders publicly in Com-
munist-controlled quarters did not materialize.
Two important factors in the failure of any
demonstrations in Ecuador are believed to be the
excellent security measures adopted by the Ecua-
doran Government and the fact that Ecuadorans
made an attempt to counteract the incidents in
Peru. In any event, the reception in Ecuador
was cordial.
Colombia
During the past 10 years Colombia has been
the scene of much violence, including the famed
Bogotazo of 1948. Deaths are reported to have
totaled some 200,000 in Colombia during this pe-
riod, due to guerrilla activities and other politi-
cal violence. The political situation in Bogota
prior to the start of Vice President Nixon's tour
was a confused one. Elections were scheduled for
May 4, but no candidate had been chosen one week
before the elections. The nomination by both the
Conservative and Liberal Parties of Dr. Alberto
Lleras Camargo produced a profound effect and
gave civilian groups high hopes for political sta-
bility. Lleras' nomination, however, evoked a re-
action in certain circles. During the last days of
April General Rojas Pinilla moved to the Carib-
bean from Europe, and there was an attempted
coup by sympathizers of Rojas on May 2. De-
tails of this attempt were reported to the Vice
President in Buenos Aires and elsewhere en route,
and the political implications and chances of po-
litical turmoil in Colombia were fully explained.
A rumor that an attempt might be made to
assassinate the Vice President was reported to
Embassy Bogota prior to the Vice President's ar-
rival. Rumors of possible student and Commu-
nist demonstrations were also reported. A de-
tailed report dated May 10 from reliable sources
concerning Commmiist and Communist-front
groups' attempts to organize student demonstra-
tions was recorded and the Vice President's party
informed. This report included plans to dis-
tribute leaflets; plans to demonstrate at wreath-
laying ceremonies; alleged plans to throw toma-
toes, eggs, etc., and to "duplicate the Lima stu-
June 9, J 958
dent incident." There were meetings of Commu-
nists to arrange for these demonstrations, and
there was some talk of having weapons and a pos-
sible assassination attempt. This information
was relayed to the Nixon party. It was stated
that Communists would play an insignificant part
and that the gi'eatest danger came from the follow-
ers of ex-dictator Rojas Pinilla in order to discredit
the present Government. The assassination talk
was assessed as being largely bravado. It was
concluded that it was not probable that serious
incidents would occur because the Colombian Gov-
ernment was aware of the possible dangers and
was well prepared to meet any trouble.
The reports in Colombia centered largely on
Colombia's own political turbulence and on ru-
mors which arose following tlie incidents in Lima.
The failure of an attempted coup on May 2 and
the subsequent election of President Lleras
Camargo on May 4, as scheduled, helped dissipate
concern over any serious trouble in Colombia.
None occurred. Consideration nevertheless was
given to the cumulative chain reaction which
seemed to be building up as tlie tour progressed.
This fact was assessed, along with the assurances
given by the Colombian authorities. It was de-
cided that there was a possibility of demonstra-
tions but that the Colombian authorities were
prepared to keep them under control. The few
minor demonstrations were completely over-
shadowed by the friendly reception accorded the
Vice President. This reception was particularly
warm and friendly in the workers' and poorer
districts, where some thought trouble might have
been anticipated.
Venezuela
From the very start it had been anticipated
that there might be more danger of disturbances
in Venezuela than in any other place. This was
made known to the Secret Service officers accom-
panying the Vice President prior to the party's
departure from the U.S., and it was also made
known to the Vice President. The unsettled po-
litical situation in Venezuela which has existed
since the overthrow of the Perez Jimenez regime
in January had been the subject of many reports.
The rapid return of the Communists to Venezuela
from exile and their intense activity in labor, stu-
dent, and other civilian sectors following the over-
957
throw of Perez Jimenez were reported and con-
sidered in planning the visit. In Febniary a re-
port was received from non-Communist labor
leaders that the Communists were back in force
in Venezuela and working very assiduously in the
labor field. The prominent role played by Com-
munists in organizing opposition to the Perez
Jimenez regime and the Communists' efforts to
discredit the United States were well known. The
many facets of Venezuelan political difficulties,
including the delicate balance between the civilian
and military power in Venezuela, were also
known.
The Venezuelan criticism of U.S. voluntary re-
strictions on petroleum imports, the inflammabil-
ity of this issue in Venezuela, the protest by many
Venezuelans and particularly leftist groups
against the issuance by the United States of visas
to ex-President Perez Jimenez and his security
chief, Pedro Estrada, were reported to the Nixon
party both before and during the trip. The agi-
tation of univereity students on the visa issue, as
well as their criticism of the United States for al-
legedly supporting the Batista regime in Cuba,
were also fully reported and taken into con-
sideration in deciding on the visit to Venezuela
and the question of a visit to the imiversity.
On April 22, prior to the departure of the Vice
President, a report was received that there might
be demonstrations at the University of Caracas.
As Vice President Nixon's tour progressed,
and particularly after the events in Lima, in-
creased reports concerning the possibility of se-
rious disturbances at the university in Caracas
fomented by the Communists were received. The
Embassy consulted witli the Venezuelan Govern-
ment Junta, and the Junta recommended that the
Vice President cancel his proposed visit to the
imiversity. The Vice President agreed to do this
and requested that the Venezuelan Government
make public the fact that disturbances might be
anticipated.
A report that rumors were being received of
a possible assassination attempt at Caracas
against the Vice President was sent ahead to the
Nixon party by telegram on May 9.
By May 11 rather complete reports concerning
preparations being made by students and others
in Venezuela for anti-U.S. demonstrations were
being received and forwarded on a regular basis
to the Nixon party and, through the Embassy, to
the Venezuelan Goverimient. Details of these
preparations and renewed recommendations that
the Vice President not visit the University of
Caracas were accompanied by assurances from
the Venezuelan Government that it was aware of
these plans and was prepared to accord full pro-
tection.
On May 13 a report was received that the Min-
ister of Education had received assurances from
all political parties, including the Communists,
that they would avoid acts of violence during the
Vice President's visit to Caracas.
Three reports of possible assassination attempts
were forwarded to the Vice President, and the
matter was made public by the Secret Service on
the eve of the Vice President's departure from
Colombia for Caracas.
On May 10 an intelligence report commented
that it believed the student manifestations would
be limited to a strong verbal harassment without
resort to physical violence but that this could not
be guaranteed. In a telephone conversation with
the Department on May 13, Ambassador Sparks
reported that the University visit had been can-
celed and that, while difficulties in Caracas might
be anticipated, the Government was taking secu-
rity measures.
In view of the total of the foregoing informa-
tion, it was recognized that demonstrations might
occur in Venezuela. The cumulative effect of the
demonstrations in Lima among the students was
discussed and considered in planning for tlie visit
to Caracas. It was also considered that the
events in Lima might cause the Venezuelan Gov-
ernment to take more precautions in order to
avoid similar demonstrations. On the basis of
assurances by the Venezuelan Government of its
security measures, violence in Caracas was not
anticipated. The intensity of the demonstrations
which followed and the failure of the Venezuelan
security forces to act effectively were not foreseen.
Lebanon
AVe do not believe that the subversive activities
now going on in I^banon in an effort to over-
throw the regime of President Cliamoun and the
destruction of the USIS library in Tripoli and
the USIS reading room in Beirut are part of a
coordinated Communist effort connected with
the attacks on Vice President Nixon in South
America and the developments in Algeria.
Department of Slate Bulletin
The principal source of instigation for the
troubles in Lebanon are extremist nationalist ele-
ments inside and outside Lebanon aided and
abetted by violent propaganda from Radio Cairo
and Radio Damascus. This is supplemented by
arms and armed men infiltrating from the Syrian
sector of the United Arab Republic. The pur-
pose of this attack is to overthrow the pro-
Western regime of President Chamoun. We
have no doubt that Communist elements in
Lebanon are helping to fan the flames of this
insurrection, as it would seem most unnatural for
them not to seize upon this opportunity to create
trouble for the United States and for a country
friendly to the United States. We are inclined
to believe that the troubles in Lebanon, although
they are doubtless being exploited by the Com-
munists, arise out of developments primarily con-
cerning tlie Near Eastern Arab world and are not
directly connected with the situation in Algeria
or recent events in South America.
The USIS installations Avere burned by the ex-
tremist mobs, perhaps with Communist participa-
tion, because they were easily accessible symbols
of the principal Western power and the nation
which symbolizes the political principles to which
the present Lebanese Government has given its
support. The Arab extremist nationalists oppose
what they consider to be U.S. efforts to line up the
Arab world on the U.S. side in the East^West
struggle. The Soviet Union through inflamma-
tory broadcasts in the Arabic language is attempt-
ing to exacerbate the situation in Lebanon.
There is also little doubt that the Soviet Union is
attempting also to influence Cairo and Damascus
in their propaganda and other activity directed
against the present Government of Lebanon.
The earliest available Soviet broadcast on the
Lebanese crisis — May 12 in Arabic— consisted of
a news account of events and a direct comment that
"it is difficult for anyone to deny that the foreign
policy imposed on Lebanon by the Eisenhower
doctrine has brought forth dangerous and destruc-
tive consequences." An Arabic broadcast of May
14 declared that the United States seems ready to
interfere in Lebanon's "internal affairs" and
charged that the "colonialists," whose alleged prac-
tice is that of describing popular movements as
Communist, are seeking to intervene in Lebanon.
The broadcast added that the Lebanese people will
give "an appropriate answer to the American
colonialists." On May 15 Radio Moscow charged
the United States, according to the Associated
Press, with open interference in Lebanon's internal
affairs and asserted that the Lebanese authorities
were "planning to use these American weapons
to fight the anti-imperialist popular movement."
Algeria
There is no indication that the recent develop-
ments in Algeria have been in any way related to
other simultaneous disturbances in the world. Nor
is there any indication that the Algerian incidents
were directly Communist inspired.
The Algerian explosion is an expression of the
intensity of feelings on the part of the French,
particularly those in Algeria, on this neuralgic
issue. There has always been a possibility, of
which we were long aware, that the French settlers
in Algeria might try to take matters in their own
hands, if they suspected that the French Govern-
ment might change its policy on Algeria.
A series of circumstances combined to favor
the events which occurred last Tuesday. There
was an absence of governmental authority, given
the Cabinet crisis and the absence of Minister La-
coste from Algiers. The French settlers feared,
moreover, that the designated French Prime Min-
ister, Pierre Pflimlin, might negotiate with the
Algerian rebels. They therefore decided to hold
massive protest demonstrations to discourage
Pflimlin's investiture.
The demonstrators were estimated at around
50,000 and, incited by extremist elements, soon got
out of hand. In addition to ransacking our USIS
offices, the mobs finally took over the local gov-
ernment building, the Ministry for Algeria. It
was at that point that the military came upon the
scene and took over control, setting up a Com-
mittee of Public Safety.
It is, of course, possible that this coup was
planned well in advance and not the sudden result
of xmpremeditated mob action. If so, it was
planned by French settlers and certain French
military elements — neither of whom, to our
knowledge, have any sympathies with the Com-
mimists. That these events occurred on May 13
was due to the fact that it was the day that
Pflimlin was scheduled to come up for Parliamen-
tary investiture.
The ransacking of the USIS library was only
June 9, 7958
959
an offshoot of the larger action by the mobs. The
library is centrally located on the ground floor
along one of the main streets of Algiers. Certain
elements among the French settlers have felt that
we were not solidly behind France's insistence on
maintaining Algeria as an integral part of France.
It is likely that in the mood they were in at that
time some of the demonstrators were incited by
extremist elements to wreck the USIS premises.
There have been no indications that these ele-
ments were Communist or Communist inspired.
The Soviet propaganda line in regard to Al-
geria is designed to excite anti-U.S. sentiments
among the French. Moscow has consistently al-
leged that the U.S. sought to oust France from
North Africa and to install itself there militarily,
politically, and economically. Sahara oil is said
to inflame U.S. desires and North African bases
to play an important role in U.S. strategic de-
signs. Such moves as the supplying of arms by
the U.S. to Tunisia and the good-offices mission
were said to have the aims of increasing U.S.
domination over the area. According to Kadio
Moscow, the U.S. "intends to supersede France
in North Africa as in Indochina." Moscow has
simultaneously attempted to create hostility to
the U.S. among Algerian Arabs by charging that
the U.S. was attempting to supplant France as the
colonial master. There has been, however, no
marked intensification of anti-American propa-
ganda in connection with the Algerian coup.
Burma
According to a preliminary check of Soviet-bloc
propaganda output, there has been no unusual
propaganda activity on the part of the U.S.S.E.
or Communist China in connection with the inci-
dent which took place before the U.S. Embassy
in Rangoon on May 12. According to the Em-
bassy report, about 100 persons paused for 3 or
4 minutes before the chancery while parading in
formation along the street returning from a
nearby meetmg of the Communist-front World
Peace Congress. The crowd stopped only long
enough to leave some placards bearing slogans
against SEATO and against nuclear weapons, in-
cluding one in English reading, "American war-
mongers—don't interfere in our internal affairs."
Local press treatment of the incident was entirely
perfunctory.
960
Indonesia
Since the Indonesian rebellion in February, So-
viet propaganda in close consort with that of the
PKI (Communist Party of Indonesia) has por-
trayed the issue to Indonesians as one between pa-
triotic defense of Indonesian nationalism and
sovereignty on the one hand and foreign-inspired
imperialism on the other. The U.S. is identified as
the major inspirer of the "separatists" and is
charged with intervening by military aid to the
rebels.
The increasing trend of the propaganda toward
pinpointing the U.S. as the major force of inter-
vention is seen in the Soviet Government's state-
ment of May 14 in which it charged :
... in a number of Instances weapons have been and
are being delivered to ttie rebels directly from the U.S.
... a number of U.S. leaders, Secretary of State Dulles
among them, unequivocally called for the setting up of
a new government in Indonesia. ... In the light of the
events taking place in Indonesia, It is difficult to assess
such statements otherwise than as direct incitement to
the overthrow of the legitimate Indonesian Government
Tlie PKI has consistently echoed the main lines
of Soviet propaganda against the U.S., relating
them specifically to the internal scene. The over-
all goal has been to identify the U.S. as the real
national enemy behind the rebels and the PKI
as the foremost patriotic party. Taking advan-
tage of the momentum generated by Premier
Djuanda's April 30 statement and Sukarno's May
2 speech charging intervention and taking the
U.S. to task, Indonesian Communists have initi-
ated threats of direct action against U.S. interests.
PKI Secretary General Aidit, in a May 1 telegram
to the U.S. Embassy, threatened action against
U.S. economic interests in Indonesia if U.S. arms
to rebels were not stopped. In a speech published
May 6, Aidit threatened that the PKI would
launch a campaign for taking over U.S. enter-
prises in Indonesia as was done with the Dutch
unless the U.S. stopped arms to the rebels.
A Communist-dominated "mass movement to
oppose foreign intervention" was organized on
May 7 — probably a crystallization of an "Anti-
Foreign Intervention Group" formed on May 4
by Communist unions, youth, and student front
groups — and called for a mass rally on May 16
in front of the U.S. Embassy to protest U.S. in-
tervention. The rally was subsequently postponed
to May 20. The group may be identical with an
Department of State Bulletin
"Anti-Foreign Intervention Movement" which
on May 9 reportedly cabled 20 international organ-
izations throughout the world asking for "soli-
darity" in condemning foreign intervention in
Indonesia.
Japan
There occurred recently a massive but peaceful
manifestation, reportedly involving some 40,000
persons, before our Embassy in Tokyo. This was
a protest against continued testing of nuclear
weapons. This is an active popular issue in Japan
resulting from wartime experience as a target of
atomic weapons. In this case there is no clearcut
evidence of Communist direction. It is an issue
agitated by the U.S.S.R. on a worldwide basis.
There is continuous effort by Communists to ex-
ploit the issue locally against the United States.
Letters of Credence
Afghanistan
The newly appointed Ambassador of Afghani-
stan, Mohammad Hashim Maiwandwal, presented
his credentials to President Eisenhower on May
23. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and
the President's reply, see Department of State
press release 285.
Iran
The newly appointed Ambassador of Iran, All
Gholi Ardalan, presented his credentials to Presi-
dent Eisenhower on May 22. For texts of the
Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply,
see Department of State press release 283.
Mr. Katzen To Observe Program
for Use of Funds in Israel
Press release 282 dated May 21
The Department of State announced on May
21 that Bernard Katzen, special consultant, has
been asked to proceed to Israel to observe the pro-
gram for the expenditure of certain funds in
Israel currency which have accrued to this Gov-
ernment as a result of the operations of the infor-
mational media guaranty program in Israel.
It will be recalled that in 1956 Mr. Katzen was
entrusted with a mission to Israel by the Secre-
Jyne 9, 1958
tary ^ for the purpose of recommending projects in
which these funds might be expended to further
the common interests of the United States and
Israel. Upon completion of his mission, Mr.
Katzen reported to the Secretary and made cer-
tain recommendations for a number of educa-
tional, cultural, and scientific projects. These
recommendations were accepted by the Depart-
ment of State, and the necessary appropriations
were authorized by the Congress. The American
Embassy at Tel Aviv is currently engaged in the
implementation of the recommended projects.
Mr. Katzen will remain about 3 weeks in Israel,
after which he will submit his observations and
comments to the Department in Washington.
U.S. issues Statement on Report
on Trinidad Naval Base
Press release 266 dated May 14
The U.S. Government considers the report of
the Technical Joint Commission on Chagua-
ramas,^ which has been made public today, a con-
scientious effort to reach an objective conclusion
on the economic, technical, and strategic aspects
involved in relocating the U.S. naval base. It is
appreciative of the thoroughness with which
members of the Commission examined the matter
for 21/2 months and the clarity with which they
expressed their conclusions.
The principal conclusions to be drawn from the
report are that the U.S. naval base in the Eastern
Caribbean should be located on the Gulf of Paria
to fulfill its strategic and military functions ; that
the military superiority of Chaguaramas over any
alternative site together with the expense and
time required to establish a base at an alternative
site make it impracticable to consider relocating
the U.S. naval base at Chaguaramas ; and that its
partition is also not practicable.
The U.S. Government believes that these con-
clusions should settle the Chaguaramas question
so that the countries concerned can proceed with-
out hindrance to develop their relationships in a
constructive manner.
^ Bulletin of Feb. 6, 1956, p. 207.
*The commission was composed of representatives of
Trinidad, the United Kingdom, the United States, and The
West Indies.
961
IVIajor Aspects of the Problem of Outer Space
Statement hy Loftus Becker
Legal Adviser ^
The Department of State has a deep and abid-
ing interest in the problems of outer space. What
the United States Government should do with
respect to this entirely new field of activity, with
its as yet unexplored potentialities, poses highly
important questions of national policy and of de-
fense policy. It also inevitably poses highly im-
portant questions of foreign policy.
In my testimony today I propose, after refer-
ring very briefly to certain basic principles, to
discuss four major aspects of the problem of
outer space. These are as follows :
1. the problem of insuring that outer space is
used for peaceful purposes only ;
2. possible international cooperation in outer
space;
3. international law affecting outer space; and
4. the pending bill.
Basic Principles
The basic pattern of our existing foreign pol-
icy with respect to space is no different from that
which we have with respect to international re-
lations here on the earth. In conformity with
our undertakings under article 1 of the United
Nations Charter, it is our purpose to insure that—
in space as on the earth — international peace and
security are maintained and that international
disputes or situations which might lead to a
breach of the peace are adjusted or settled in con-
formity with the principles of justice and inter-
national law.
'Made before the Special Senate Committee on Space
and Astronautics on May 14.
We are in favor of international cooperation in
solving international problems. At the same
time we are dedicated to the maintenance of the
legitimate national interests of the United States,
and we hold firm to our inherent right of indi-
vidual and collective self-defense against armed
attack, which is fully recognized imder article
51 of the United Nations Charter.
I believe that my testimony today will demon-
strate that the Department's policy with respect
to outer space is wholly consistent with the basic
principles I have just described.
The Problem of Insuring That Outer Space Is Used
for Peaceful Purposes Only
The most immediate problem in the field of
space foreign policy is how to insure that outer
space is used for peaceful purposes only. As your
chairman [Senator Lyndon B. Johnson] put it in
his opening statement before this committee :
The challenge of the atomic age, at the beginning, was
to harness a vast destructive power to prevent its use
in war.
The challenge of the space age, at the beginning now,
is to open a new frontier to permit its use for peace.
You are doubtless well aware that the United
States Government has already taken an initia-
tive in this field. The United States recognized
the importance of determining now what steps
can be taken to assure that missiles and other
outer-space vehicles, already in tlie development
stage, will be utilized solely for peaceful purposes.
This recognition stemmed from the fact that
today these military space instruments are in the
early stages of development. With the passage
Deparfmenf of Sfafe Bulletin
of time and their continuous growth and refine-
ment, the problem of effective international con-
trol becomes more difficult. This point is best
illustrated by a similar historical problem. In
1946 international control of the military use of
nuclear energy could have been attained with rel-
ative ease. Today, as we well know, control of
the atom has become a much more vastly compli-
cated and difficult task.
Fully cognizant of this lesson of history, the
United States proposed to the United Nations on
January 14, 1957,^ that:
... the first step toward the objective of assuring
that future developments in outer space would be de-
voted exclusively to peaceful and sclentiflc purposes
would be to bring the testing of such objects under Inter-
national inspection and participation.
This was the first recognition by any nation of
the immediate need to deal with this compelling
problem.
Since that time we have repeatedly stressed the
need — and our willingness — to reach agreement
in this vital area. During the 1957 United Na-
tions Disarmament Subcommittee meetings in
London, in concert with our allies, we formally
proposed beginning measures to control, for
peaceful purposes, the sending of objects through
outer space. This proposal reflected our earlier
expressions of concern over the dangers of sur-
prise attack and the outbreak of accidental war.
It represents an extension upward of our aerial
and ground inspection proposals. This proposal
was designed to allay these same dangers which
are inherent in the continued growth and pro-
liferation of missile-delivery systems.
Again, in January of this year. President
Eisenhower in a letter to former Premier Bul-
ganin ' expressed our concern and our desire to
reach agreement on this matter. I should like
to quote from that letter, which reads in part :
I propose that we agree that outer space should be
used only for peaceful purposes. We face a decisive
moment in history in relation to this matter. Both the
Soviet Union and the United States are now using outer
space for the testing of missiles designed for military
purposes. The time to stop is now.
I recall to you that a decade ago, when the United
States had a monopoly of atomic weapons and of atomic
experience, we offered to renounce the making of atomic
weapons and to make the use of atomic energy an inter-
national asset for peaceful purposes only. If only that
offer had been accepted by the Soviet Union, there would
not now be the danger from nuclear weapons which you
describe.
The nations of the world face today another choice per-
haps even more momentous than that of 1948. That re-
lates to the use of outer space. Let us this time, and
in time, make the right choice, the peaceful choice.
Today we have pending before the Disarma-
ment Commission of the United Nations a pro-
posal set forth at London in August 1957.* It
stands as one of five basic principles overwhelm-
ingly endorsed by the United Nations as the basis
for continued disarmament negotiations. This
proposal calls for nations to cooperate in the
establishment of a technical committee to study
the design of an inspection system which would
effectively cover the field of ballistic missiles and
other outer-space objects to assure their develop-
ment for exclusively scientific and peaceful pur-
poses. Moreover, we have offered to join immedi-
ately in such a study, on a multilateral basis,
without awaiting the conclusion of negotiations
on other substantive proposals.
The Department of State believes that this pro-
posal represents a significant first step toward
preventing the use of outer space for military
purposes. We intend to continue to emphasize
the need to turn this proposal into constructive
action.
Possible International Cooperation In Outer Space
I turn now to our second major area of interest,
namely, the challenging opportunities for inter-
national cooperation in outer-space study and ex-
ploration. As you have heard from previous wit-
nesses, this new venture into our universe opens
a vast area for programs of scientific study and
exploration.
At this time I have in mind certain projects
from which every nation in the world can bene-
fit: radio-relay satellites which will provide for
near-perfect worldwide radio; TV and radio-
telephone service; weather-charting satellites
' Bulletin of Feb. 11, 1957, p. 225.
'/6irf., Jan. 27, 1958, p. 122.
Jwne 9, I 952
*For text of Western proposals, see ibid., Sept. 16,
1957, p. 451 ; for a statement by Ambassador Henry Cabot
Lodge in the Disarmament Commission on Sept. 30, 1957,
see ibid., Oct. 21, 1957, p. 631 ; for statements by Ambas-
sador Lodge in the 12th session of the General Assembly,
together with texts of U.N. resolutions on disarmament,
see ibid., Dec. 16, 1957, p. 961.
963
which will afford early warning against natural
catastrophe; aids to navigation which will enable
aircraft and ships to chart their way over the
surface of the earth with great accuracy and
speed ; construction of space platforms as takeoff
points for further outer-space exploration; and
manned moon-rocket flights to the moon and
other planets. These are but a few of the many
valuable programs we can anticipate.
Tliese programs can have far-reaching interna-
tional implications. Without proper interna-
tional coordination and cooperation such activi-
ties could lead to involved international problems
and could project narrow rivalries into this new
field.
Here, however, as with the military implica-
tions, one significant fact is readily apparent.
The national programs of the two nations now
having the technological capability to carry out
outer-space exploration are still in their early de-
velopmental stage. This limitation will not long
exist. Thus, early action is essential if we are
to thwart narrow national objectives.
There are, moreover, certain technological rela-
tionships between areas of potential international
cooperation and the military programs which in-
volve outer space. A most obvious illustration of
this is the close relationship between the missile-
propulsion systems and the means of putting sci-
entific satellites into orbits. Yet it makes clear
that an international program of scientific study
and exploration is related to efforts to assure the
use of outer space for peaceful purposes. There
are many other highly technical considerations
of this order involved here. Such considerations
at the present time are under very active study
within the Government.
The Department of State feels, however, that
there are possible arrangements for international
cooperation in the peaceful scientific and tech-
nological areas of outer-space activity. These
arrangements could be pursued independently of
control arrangements over military uses of outer
space. Such cooperation would avoid conflicts
of exclusively national programs. It would al-
low for necessary coordination of activities, thus
assuring the most productive efforts. It would
facilitate progress through a combmation of ef-
forts which would greatly accelerate scientific
discoveries. It would provide a means by which
many nations would participate in this new ven-
ture. It would insure that the scientific study of
outer space is carried on in the classic tradition
of scientific openness. Finally, such cooperation
would set the pattern for further space activities,
thus assuring the world of a logical and peaceful
progression into the reaches of outer space.
To foster and guide the cooperative efforts that
are possible, we believe it to be axiomatic that
some appropriate international machinery should
be created. Its principal responsibility would be
to promote and to coordinate efforts in the field
of outer space. Its functions might include,
among other things, the establishment of certain
international space regulations, the collection and
exchange of information, and appropriate plan-
ning and coordinating of outer-space research and
exploration. To undertake these functions prop-
erly, the agency might well be established under
the auspices of the United Nations but, in any
event, should have a suitable and necessary re-
lationship with the United Nations and with
other international organizations such as the
World Meteorological Organization. In this re-
spect a precedent has already been set. I refer
specifically to the International Atomic Energy
Agency. As you are aware, this Agency has the
task of both promoting international exchange
and scientific cooperation, as well as assuring that
nuclear materials in its possession are used ex-
clusively for peaceful purposes. There is no rea-
son to believe that a space organization formu-
lated along similar lines could not be just as ef-
fective— or more effective, since we have this
IAEA experience from which to draw.
At this time we envisage no obstacles, political
or technical, which would preclude the establish-
ment of such an international system of coopera-
tion and coordination. We, in fact, believe that
only through the creation of such an interna-
tional organization will the interests of science
and humanity be amply protected and assured.
I should add that international space cooperation
is already imbued with some encouraging possi-
bilities of collective action. In March of this
year the Soviet Union placed on the provisional
agenda of the 13th General Assembly an item
calling for, among other things, "the establish-
ment of a United Nations agency for international
cooperation in the study of cosmic space." This
could mean that the first imperative step has been
taken — recognition of the need for international
Department of State Butletin
cooperation in this field. If this is so, it allows
for an initial atmosphere of hope. Yet, even
here, there remain mitial problems. This pro-
posal I have just quoted is tied to a broad in-
ternational agreement which includes, among
other things, a provision for the elimination of
foreign military bases. That is an old Soviet
proposal and one we are not prepared to accept.
Further, we see no link between international
space cooperation and elimination of foreign
bases. Thus, it is clear that a number of other
steps must be taken before we can gain the stag-
gering opportunities and benefits which await a
peaceful, international venture into this new
world.
We have yet to reach a practical agreement
which offers assurance that space shall be devoted
to peaceful purposes and that there shall be in-
ternational cooperation in exploring its infinite
bounds. Until a satisfactory agreement has been
reached, we in the State Department shall main-
tain and preserve every national right of the
United States in the atmosphere and in space.
International Law Affecting Outer Space
a. Article 51 of the United Nations Charter
I have read a number of articles in which it is
stated that the only international agreement re-
lating to space or to the atmosphere is the Chi-
cago Convention of 1944, relating to civil avia-
tion matters. I have seen it asserted that there
is no international law with respect to space out-
side the atmosphere.
I regard such statements as incorrect because
of the specific provisions of article 51 of the
United Nations Charter, to which I have pre-
viously referred. Under that provision each of
the members of the United Nations reserved its
"inherent right" of individual or collective self-
defense against armed attack.
Now the origin of an armed attack against the
United States, or the particular point in space
through which it would have to pass in order to
reach the United States or one of its collective-
security partners, is completely immaterial. The
United States is prepared at all times to react
to protect itself against an aimed attack, whether
that attack originates in outer space or passes
through outer space in order to reach the United
States.
If and when the United States takes such ac-
tion, it will be exercising a riglit which it has
under international law, because that law in the
last analysis is what nations will agree to. And
the inherent right of individual and collective
self-defense has been recognized as a fundamen-
tal principle of international law in the United
Nations Charter.
b. Implications of the International Geophysical
Tear
There is another misconception with respect to
the rights of the United States in tliis sphere
that I should like to correct. I have several times
seen it stated that we do not have any right to
protest or take any action with respect to satel-
lites because of the events relating to the Inter-
national Geophysical Year. Now, the facts are
these :
The arrangements with respect to the Interna-
tional Geophysical Year were not made on an
intergovernmental basis. They were arrange-
ments made between scientific bodies in a private
capacity. It is true that certain governments,
uacluding the Soviet Union and the United States,
announced in advance that during the Interna-
tional Geophysical Year they intended to place
objects in orbit around the earth. And it was
also stated in connection with these announce-
ments that the purpose of these satellites would
be for scientific investigation. No nation pro-
tested these announcements.
It follows, therefore, that the only conclusion
that can be reached with respect to the arrange-
ments regarding the International Geophysical
Year is that there is an implied agreement that,
for the period of the International Geophysical
Year, it is permissible to put into orbit satellites
designed for scientific purposes. Once the year is
over, rights in this field will liave to be deter-
mined by whatever agreement may be reached
with respect to such objects.
c. Is There Any Agreed Upper Limit of
Sovereignty?
The next question of international law which I
would like to mention is the position of the United
States regarding its sovereignty upwards. There
are those who have argued that the sovereignty
of the United States ends with the outer limits
June 9, 7958
of the atmosphere and that space outside the at-
mosphere is either free to all or should possibly
be conceded to be within the sovereignty of one or
another interiiational organization.
The United States Government has not rec-
ognized any top or upper limit to its sovereignty.
This position has been taken entirely aside from
article 51 of the United Nations Charter and any
limitations that may be inherent in that, such as
"armed attack."
It is true that, in such international agree-
ments as the Chicago Convention of 1944, the
parties thereto recognize that each of them "has
complete and exclusive sovereignty of the air-
space above its territory." But it is important
to note that there is nowhere in the Chicago Con-
vention of 1944 or other international agreements
comparable thereto any definition of what is
meant by the term "airspace."
I do not wish to take, nor has the State De-
partment ever officially taken, a definitive posi-
tion as to how this term "airspace" should be
defined. I think it important to note, however,
that one of the suggestions that has been made
in this regard is that the airspace should be de-
fined to include that portion of space above the
earth in which there is any atmosphere. I am
informed that astronomically the earth's atmos-
phere extends 10,000 miles above its surface.
It follows that it would be perfectly rational
for us to maintain that under the Chicago Con-
vention the sovereignty of the United States ex-
tends 10,000 miles from the surface of the earth,
an area which would comprehend the area
in which all of the satellites up to this point have
entered. At any rate, that type of definition
would afford us enough elbowroom for discussion.
Furthermore, although the United States, in its
domestic law as well as agreements such as the
Chicago Convention, has plainly asserted its com-
plete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace
above its territory, at no time have we conceded
that we have no rights in the higher regions of
space. One rationale for this position which
seems to me self-sufficient was that the United
States had no need to define its position with re-
spect to what rights, if any, it might possess out-
side the earth's atmosphere until such time as
mankind had demonstrated a capability of ex-
isting outside the atmosphere.
Even after such a capability is demonstrated,
there will be no imperative requirement in inter-
national law that the United States make any
claims of sovereignty in order to protect its rights.
A very apt analogy is afforded by the Antarc-
tic. There, for many, many years, the United
States has been engaged in activities which under
established principles of international law, with-
out any question whatsoever, created rights upon
which the United States would be justified in as-
serting territorial claims, that is to say, claims
to sovereignty over one or more areas of the
Antarctic. Notwithstanding this fact the United
States has not asserted any claim of sovereignty
over any portion of ' Antarctica, although the
United States has, at the same time, made it plain
that it did not recognize any such claims made
by other states.
Nonetheless, the United States has been con-
sistent in asserting that under international law
and practice its activities in the Antarctic Con-
tinent have entitled it to rights in that area which
it has at all times expressly reserved. It is the
position of the United States Government, and
one well founded in international law, that the
fact that the United States has not based a claim
of sovereignty over one or more areas of Antarc-
tica, upon the basis of the activities it has engaged
in there, in no way derogates from the rights that
were established by its activities.
So, too, in outer space the United States has
already engaged in activities which, it could be
asserted, have given to it certain rights as dis-
tinguished from those states who have not en-
gaged in such activities. Up to this time the
United States has made no claims of sovereignty
based upon such activities.
As in the situation with respect to Antarctica,
this should not be interpreted as any concession
of any kind whatsoever on the part of the United
States that its activities have not given it certain
rights in space which, in turn, could be relied
upon as the basis of a claim of sovereignty.
d. Should Space Laio Be Codified at This Time?
I would like now to turn to the question of
whether or not the law of space should be codified
at this time.
As you know, the development or the tendency
of development of the common law as it is ap-
plied in the United Kingdom and the United
States and a number of other countries has been
966
Department of State Bulletin
oil a case-to-case basis. Speaking very generally,
it lias been felt that the soimdest way to progress
in the extremely complex field of the law is by
means of specific decisions on specific questions
presented by specific-fact situations. Even in
those states which applied the principles of the
civil law, it is recognized that a body of law can
only be created upon a broader body of ascer-
tained fact.
Moreover, there are very great risks in attempt-
ing to transmute a body of law based upon one
determined set of facts into a body of law with
respect to which the basic facts have not been
determined.
Accordingly, we are inclined to view with great
reserve any such suggestions as that the princi-
ples of the law of space should be codified now or
that the principles of tlie law of the sea should be
applied in space, until we ascertain many more
facts with respect to conditions in space. Basi-
cally, it is the position of our Government that
the law of space should be based upon the facts
of space and that there is very much more that
we have to learn about the conditions existing in
space before we shall be in a position to say what
shall be tlie legal principles applicable thereto.
The Space Agency Bill
I have attempted to demonstrate to you that
the Department of State has a great interest in
the subject of space and particularly its relation-
ship to problems of foreign policy, foreign re-
lations, and international law in this new field.
It is the expectation of the Department that its
studies and activities with respect to space would
continue as before, following the establisliment of
the space agency provided for in the administra-
tion's bill. The difference would be that we
would have a central point within the Government
to which we could turn for enlightenment on non-
military research and developments in space and
with whom we could cooperate in the develop-
ment and implementation of meaningful plans for
international cooperation in the peaceful exploita-
tion of space for the benefit of all mankind. We
believe that this was contemplated by the bill, as
introduced, since it would be inferred that inter-
national cooperation would be effectuated through
the normal channel therefor, namely, the Depart-
ment of State.
We understand that it has been proposed that
the bill be amended to include as one of the ac-
tivities that the proposed agency may engage upon
a program of international cooperation. It is
our understanding tliat the specific language pro-
posed reads as follows :
The agency may under foreign policy guidance by the
Department of State engage in a program of international
cooperation in work done pursuant to this Act and in the
peaceful application of the results thereof, pursuant to
agreements negotiated by the Department of State, or
approved by that Department.
We also understand that this proposed amend-
ment has the approval of the administration. I
should like to state that it is entirely satisfactory
to the Department of State. I believe that what
I have already said will have indicated that this
Department is fully in accord with a program of
international cooperation in the field of space, so
long as that can be accomplished with due regard
for the common defense and security of the United
States.
Mr. Chairman, in commenting upon a space
proposal made by tlie President in a letter to for-
mer Chairman Bulganin, you stated :
I agree with the President that outer space must be
dedicated to the advancement rather than to the destruc-
tion of manlcind. It is the obligation of responsible lead-
ership to proceed to specific proposals that will convert
a noble goal into a noble reality.
We in the Department of State fully concur
Avith your statement. We regard the opening of
the space age as a time of great opportunity for
mankind. We shall make every effort to insure
that the keynote of space internationally is peace
and cooperation rather than strife. We Iiope that
other nations will join us in that high effort.
Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy
85th Congress, 2d Session
Renewal of Trade Agreements Act. Hearings before the
House Committee on Ways and Means. Part 1, Febru-
ary 17-March 7, 1958, 1,499 pp. ; Part 2, March 10-25,
1958, 1,434 pp.
Mutual Security Act of 1958. Hearings before the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs on draft legislation to
amend further the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as
amended, and for other purposes. February 18-April
June 9, 7958
967
Part XVI, additional appendix and index. EcOnOmiC GrOWth in 3 Divided World
16, 195S,
123 pp.
Control and Reduction of Armaments. Hearings before
a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, pursuant to S. Res. 93, S. Res. 185, and S.
Res. 2S6, 84th Cong., S. Res. 61 and S. Res. 241, 85th
Cong. Part 16, March 12 and 25, 1958. 64 pp.
International Development Association. Hearings before
a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking
and Currency on S. Res. 264, a resolution to promote the
establishment of an International Development Associ-
ation in cooperation with the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development. March 18-20, 1958.
350 pp.
Mutual Security Act of 1958. Hearings before the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations on S. 3318 to amend
further the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended,
and for other purposes. March 19-April 2, 1958. 806
pp.
Mutual Security Act of 1958. Hearings before the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs on draft legislation to
amend further the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as
amended, and for other purposes. Part X, March 25
and 26, 1958. 114 pp. ; Part XI, March 27 and 31, 1958,
106 pp. ; Part XII, April 1, 1958, 125 pp. ; Part XIII,
April 15 and 16, 1958, 90 pp. ; Part XIV, 66 pp. ; Part
XV, Appendix, 25 pp.
United States Contributions to International Organiza-
tions. Letter from the Secretary of State transmitting
the sixth report on the extent and disposition of United
States contributions to international organizations for
the fiscal year 1957, pursuant to Public Law 806, 81st
Congress. H. Doc. 360, March 28, 1958. 101 pp.
Extending Greetings to the Federal Legislature of the
West Indies. Reports to accompany S. Con. Res. 77
and H. Con. Res. 298. S. Rept. 1435, April 15, 1958,
2 pp. ; H. Rept. 1613, April 17, 1958, 2 pp.
Extension of Wool Act. Report to accompany S. 2861.
S. Rept. 1460, April 21, 1958. 8 pp.
Recruitment and Training for the Foreign Service of the
United States. Staff study for the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations. S. Doc. 91, April 22, 1958. 197 pp.
Conference of Leading Representative Citizens of NATO
Countries. Report to accompany S. Con. Res. 62. S.
Rept. 1470, April 24, 1958. 3 pp.
Temporary Suspension of Duty on Certain Alumina and
Bauxite. Report to accompany H. R. 9917. S. Rept.
1484, April 28, 1958. 3 pp.
Duty on Pistols and Revolvers Not Capable of Firing
Fixed Ammunition. Report to accompany H. R. 1126.
S. Rept. 1481, April 28, 1958. 2 pp.
Duty on Harpsichords and Clavichords. Report to ac-
company H. R. 5208. S. Rept. 1482, April 28, 1958. 4 pp.
Suspension of Duty on Certain Shoe Lathes. Report to
accompany H. R. 10792. S. Rept. 1487, April 28, 1958.
2 pp.
Temporary Suspension of Import Duties on Certain Coarse
Wool. Report to accompany H. R. 2151. S. Rept. 1490,
April 28, 1958. 5 pp.
Transfer of Amorphous Graphite From- Dutiable List to
Free List. Report to accompany H. R. 2783. S. Rept.
1491, April 28, 1958. 3 pp.
Emigration of Refugees and Escapees. Report of the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary made by its Sub-
committee To Investigate Problems Connected With the
Emigration of Refugees and Escapees pursuant to S.
Res. 53, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., as extended. S. Rept.
1493, April 28, 1958. 4 pp.
Recording the Admission of Certain Hungarian Refugees.
Report to accompany H. R. 11033. H. Rept. 1661, April
28,1958. 30 pp.
Safety of Life at Sea Study. Report pursuant to sec.
136 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Pub-
Uc Law 601, 79th Cong. H. Rept. 1675, April 30, 1958.
5 pp.
hy Deputy Under Secretary Dillon i
I am highly honored to have this opportvmity
to talk with you today. The Foreign Policy As-
sociation is playing a vital role in the Nation.
Your work can and must continue to grow in
importance. During the past year I have been
struck by the fact that our greatest difficulty in
evolving and carrying out effective foreign eco-
nomic policy lies in the general lack of under-
standing of what we are trying to accomplish.
It has not proved too difficult to convince people
once they know the facts. But the amount of
misinformation or lack of information in this
field is hard to exaggerate. Tlie survival of our
free-enterprise system, our own survival as a free
nation, may well depend on our reactions to the
economic problems facing the world today.
Hence the great importance of your organization
in bringing about objective discussion of the facts
and issues and so a wider understanding among
the American people.
Today I would like you to join me in taking
an overall look at what lies ahead in this field.
Last year the Committee for Economic Develop-
ment asked a number of distinguished economists
and statesmen a significant question. The Com-
mittee inquired, "What is the most important
economic problem to be faced by the United States
in the next 20 years?" They received 48 different
answers. These answers naturally covered a wide
spectrum of opinion. Tliey ranged from the view
of a well-known authority on military strategy,
that world disarmament was the most important
economic question, to the view of a well-known
economist, that what was most needed was an im-
provement in the quality of leisure time. Some —
mostly those writing from abroad — spoke of the
great importance of the foreign economic policy
of the United States. Others prefeiTed to com-
ment on some aspect of our internal economic
situation.
My own answer to this question, if I had been
asked, would have been the subject we are dis-
cussing today: "Economic Growth in a Divided
World."
' Address made before the Foreign Policy Association
at New York, N. Y., on May 21 (press release 277 dated
May 20).
968
Department of State Bulletin
During the past year I have become deeply
impressed by the overshadowing importance to
the United States of meeting the Communist
challenge in the less developed countries.
The Communists control nearly a billion of the
21/^ billion people who inhabit the earth. In
North America, Western Europe, and Japan — the
industrial heart of the free world— there are
about 600 million people. Most of the remainder
of the world's population, over 1 billion people,
live in the less developed countries.
In my judgment the most important economic
question facing the United States is: What eco-
nomic system will these 1 billion people of the
less developed countries ultimately choose in their
struggle against poverty? Will they succumb to
the antihuman, materialistic system which has
been thrown up by 40 years of communism? Or
will they find the way to economic well-being
through the principles of individual liberty and
political democracy which Western civilization
has painfully evolved through centuries of effort?
Whether the verdict will go to the Communist
system or to the Western system of freedom will,
I believe, be heavily influenced by the effort which
the industrialized countries of the West are pre-
pared to put forth in helping the less developed
areas to achieve an adequate rate of economic
growth.
Most of the billion people who live in less de-
veloped lands are literally crushed by poverty.
Many of them have incomes of little more than a
dollar a week. But they no longer believe that
their miserable lot is the unchangeable result of an
inscrutable fate. They are aware as never before
in history that their condition can be changed by
human effort. It is no wonder that in many of
these countries economic development is rapidly
becoming the dominant, driving political iorce.
There can be little doubt that, unless the govern-
ments of these countries are successful in meeting
the insistent demands of their people for a better
life, they will be replaced.
Communist Economic Offensive
For the past 10 years, ever since the enunciation
of the famous point 4 policy, the United States
has been working to help these peoples. We rec-
ognize our responsibility to lend a helping hand
and our self-interest in promoting a higher stand-
ard of living throughout these areas. This is and
remains our positive reason for carrying forward
our programs of economic and technical assistance
in the less developed areas. But within the last
3 or 4 years a new factor has entered tlie picture.
The Soviet Union lias come to recognize the force
of this political tide and has determined to harness
it to the chariot of Commmiist imperialism. They
have seen an opportunity to achieve by economic
means what they have been miable to accomplish
by military power.^
The Communists are now engaged in a large-
scale economic offensive in the less developed areas.
The main impact is being felt in Asia and the
Near East. The weapons are economic assistance,
trade, and technical help.
In 3 years the Communists have extended to less
developed nations nearly $1.7 billion in long-term,
low-interest loans for economic development.
Their trade agi-eements with the less developed
countries have jumped from 49 in 1953 to 147 in
1957, a gain of nearly 100. Last year the trade
turnover between the Soviet bloc and these coun-
tries was 50 percent greater than it had been 2
years previously, and it is continuing to increase.
Some 2,300 Communist technicians are on the job
in less developed countries, and about 2,000 stu-
dents from the less developed areas are being
trained in Moscow, Prague, and other bloc centers.
It would be comforting to believe that the for-
eign economic programs of the bloc will break
down because of inefficiency, poor equipment, slow
deliveries, and the like. But there is no sign
that this will be so. On the contrary, there is
eveiy indication that the bloc programs are being
managed with efficiency and dispatch.
Nor can we assume that the bloc assistance pro-
grams will impose such a strain on the Com-
munist economic system that they will prove to be
a flash in the pan. The fact is that the capacity
of the bloc to sustain a substantial export of eco-
nomic resources to the less developed coimtries is
growing, not receding.
Eight years ago the gross national product of
the Soviet Union was about a third of the gross
national product of the United States. Now it is
over 40 percent of ours. At present rates of
" For statements made by Mr. Dillon before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee and the House Ways and
Means Committee on the subject of the Soviet economic
offensive, see Bulletin of Mar. 24, 1958, p. 469, and Apr.
14, 1958, p. 627.
June 9, 1958
969
growth in the two countries, we may expect that
Soviet output in 1962, 4 years from now, will rise
to about 50 percent of our own. '\^Tiile our
economy has been growing at roughly 4 percent
per year, theirs has been increasing at 6 or 7 per-
cent. In industiy — that is to say, manufactm-ing
and mining — the gap between growth rates is even
larger. Ours is about 4 percent, while their rate
is closer to 10 percent.
The reason for these differential rates is very
simple. The Soviets, by severely repressing indi-
vidual consumption, plow back into investment a
mucli higher proportion of their annual output
than we do. And of the total investment so
plowed back they allocate a much higher propor-
tion than we do to industry and a much smaller
proportion to such things as housing.
These figures mean that we must expect that the
Soviet Union, together with the rest of the Com-
munist bloc, will be increasingly capable of pro-
viding economic resources on a large scale to the
less developed comitries and that the variety of
the goods which they are able to supply will grow.
It may be asked, why should we be so concerned
about Communist assistance to the less developed
countries? Ai'e we worried about cloak-and-
dagger subversion? Are we afraid that the less
developed countries will become so economically
dependent upon the Soviet bloc that they cannot
maintain their political freedom ?
Both of these are legitimate concerns. For ex-
ample, the massive Communist assistance to the
United Arab Republic and Yemen could breed a
dangerous degree of economic dependence.
But the main danger lies in the export of the
Communist economic system as such. The main
danger is that the less developed countries, in their
desperate efforts to improve their economic lot,
will be beguiled into the fatal shortcut to paradise
proclaimed by Communist propaganda and ideol-
ogy. Through aid and trade the material end
product of the Communist system is brought up
close, while the machinery of human degradation
which lies behind it remains concealed.
Just as Hitler, in Mein Kainpf, outlined in ad-
vance his campaign against the democracies, so the
Communists are making their intent abundantly
clear. Here is Khrushchev speaking to the less
developed countries last month. He spoke, ironi-
cally enough, from prostrate Hungary. This is
what he said :
970
We boldly challenge the capitalist world. Let us com-
pete to see who can reach the highest level of productive
forces, who will produce more per capita, who will insure
the highest material and cultural standard of living for
the people, where are the best opportunities created for
the development of all the capabilities of man ; which-
ever regime insures the best conditions for the peoples, that
regime will win. We are convinced that it is the more
progressive socialist regime that will win. The future is
with our socialist system. Capitalism is at its ebb, head-
ing for collapse. This does not mean that it is already
lying down with its legs stretched out ; much work has
yet to be done to bring it to such a state. But this is in-
evitable, just as death inevitably comes to a living organ-
ism or plant after a specific stage of development.
U.S. Response to the Soviet Challenge
Now, how should the United States respond to
the Soviet bid to capture the allegiance of the
people of the less developed countries ?
One thing, I am sure, we should not do. And
that is, we should not try to counter the Com-
munists on a deal-for-deal basis. We ought not to
try to beat communism by imitating it or by react-
ing blindly to it. This is a battle of systems — the
free system is allowed to work in the ways that
are natural to it, as fully and effectively as possible.
The less developed countries are fully prepared
to bear the major burden of their own economic
development. But to acquire the industrial tech-
niques and the machinery and equipment which
they cannot yet make for themselves they need
help from the industrialized countries. As the
greatest industrialized counti-y of the world we
must accept the responsibility for leadership in
this field.
This means that we must lift our sights. In the
fields of international development assistance, in-
ternational finance, world trade, and private in-
vestment, we must find ways of doing more than
we are doing now. For, unless we meet the chal-
lenge of the times, our own safety — let alone our
economic well-being — will surely be placed in the
gravest danger.
Here are some of the things I have in mind
when I say we should raise our sights:
First, we should envisage a substantial increase
in the level of development assistance extended by
the United States to the less developed countries.
Last year Congress established the Development
Loan Fund to enable the United States to extend
loans to underdeveloped countries on a flexible
Department of State Bulletin
basis which would not overburden their balance of
payments or compete with private enterprise or
established lending institutions. Congress gave
the Development Loan Fund an initial appropri-
ation of $300 million and also authorized, but did
not appropriate, an additional $625 million for
the coming year. The President has now asked
that this additional amount be appropriated. The
fund has only been in active operation since the
first of the year. We are lending at an annual
rate of about $600 million. This appropriation
will allow us to maintain our present rate of lend-
ing for another year.
Applications for loans submitted to the De-
velopment Loan Fund already amount to some
$2 billion, and an additional $1 billion are ex-
pected during the coming year.
For the future, I believe that we should con-
template a higher level of lending from the De-
velopment Loan Fund — something on the order
of $1 billion a year. I believe that such an amount
could be spent wisely in stimulating development
abroad and would be warranted by considerations
of our national security.
Second, we should encourage the other indus-
trialized countries of the free world to step up
their efforts to help the development of the less
developed countries. United States financial sup-
port for an International Development Associa-
tion affiliated with the World Bank, as recently
suggested by Senator Monroney,^ may well be a
useful method to achieve this objective.
Third, we should consider the devotion of
greater resources to international financial sta-
bility, having especially in mind the needs of
the less developed countries. In periods of de-
clining prices for primary commodities, the
foreign-exchange earnings of many less developed
countries — Latin America provides several ex-
amples— are frequently reduced to emergency
levels and external help is needed in order to fore-
stall serious economic crises. The Intei-national
Monetary Fund has an outstanding record in
stabilization lending and in promoting sound
financial policies in its member countries. How-
' For a statement by Mr. Dillon on Mar. 19 before the
Subcommittee on International Affairs of the Senate
Committee on Banking and Currency, see ibid., Apr. 7,
1958, p. .5C4.
June 9, 1958
ever, the fund's financial resources are limited by
the size of national contributions agreed upon
more than 13 years ago, and meanwhile world
trade has increased greatly in both volume and
value.
Fourth, we should enact the 5-year renewal of
the trade agreements legislation which President
Eisenhower has recommended and which the
House Ways and Means Committee has now ap-
proved. Larger trade with the free world is an
essential source of development funds for the less
developed countries and a sustaining economic
force vitally needed in the free world as a whole.
Finally, I believe that we can and must find
new ways to promote American private invest-
ment abroad. We need much closer cooperation
between government and private business. I am
frequently told that this is a well-worn field, that
the obstacles are too great, and that little more
can be done than is now being done. I refuse to
accept this judgment and believe that a fresh ef-
fort must be made if the United States is to
utilize its most effective energies in meeting the
Soviet economic challenge.
If we do these things, I am convinced that the
outlook is bright. Our free-enterprise system wiU
once again prove its worth, and we will see a
steady growth in the prosperity of the free peoples
of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The institu-
tions of democratic freedom will everywhere
grow stronger. We will make for our children a
world at once more secure and more prosperous
than anything yet seen by man.
President of the Philippines
To Visit the United States
The Department of State announced on May 19
(press release 276) that arrangements had been
completed for the arrival at Washington on June
17 of Carlos P. Garcia, President of the Republic
of the Philippines, who will visit the United
States at the invitation of President Eisenhower.
President Garcia and his party will remain in
Washington until June 20, when they will begin
a trip scheduled to include visits to Chicago, New
York, Phoenix, Los Angeles, and San Francisco.
They will leave from San Francisco on June 29.
A Fresh Look at the United Nations
hy Joseph J. Sisco
During the past several months President
Eisenhower and the Soviet Premier have ex-
changed a series of letters. One of the topics of
this high-level correspondence was the question
of how to strengthen the United Nations. This
is not surprising. An exchange of views in these
critical days between the leaders of the two
strongest powers of the world regarding the
United Nations is symbolic of the important role
this organization has assumed since its birth in
1945.
To understand why the United Nations is im-
portant and how it is important as a force for
world peace, a balanced assessment is essential —
an assessment of the fundamental political
forces and technological developments which are
fast remolding the world and its institutions — an
assessment of both the capacities and the limita-
tions of the United Nations.
What are some of the fundamentals regarding
this organization which each of us should bear
in mind in trying to determine how the United
Nations has served the interests of the United
States and the cause of world peace? There are
a few fundamentals regarding the United Nations,
both old and new, which merit at least passing
reference here.
First and foremost is the impact of teclmo-
logical developments which have had a profound
• Mr. Sisco is officer in charge of United
Nations political affairs. The above article
is hosed upon an address made before the
McBride Lecture Foundation at Western
Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio, on
April 21, 1958.
effect on modern international relations. Com-
munications today are universalized. The oceans
no longer divide us from other countries in the-
world. Nations are living in each other's back-
yards.
Moreover, man is now on the verge of conquer-
ing outer space. The orbiting of satellites and
the development of the intercontinental ballistic
missile mark the begiiming of a new era of science
and technology.
These technological advances have a very deep
significance for us all. They serve to reemphasize
the increasing interdependence of man and h
institutions. The interdependence of nations to-
day makes international organization an absolute
necessity. It also lays down one inexorable con
dition : It means that for the United States there
can be no isolation. It confirms that the peace,
security, and well-being of our nation are in
extricably bound with the peace, security, and
well-being of other members of the international
community. It underscores the need for a com-
mon attack on common problems.
A second fundamental part of any balanced
assessment of the United Nations relates to its
membership. The United Nations is not a super-
state which can impose its will on member states.
The United Nations is a voluntary association of
sovereign and equal states in which agreement
is derived through common consent. The au-
thority it may exercise comes from the action of
its member states.
Power as a Factor in World Politics
Moreover, tlie United Nations is an organiza-
tion intimately concerned with the considerations
of power as a factor in world politics. As Ameri-
cans, we are acutely conscious of the importance
Department of Stafe Bulletin
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f our own power in the world today. In the
United Nations power is linked in many respects
with responsibility. The United Nations is a
nirror of the world as it is, and, if it sometimes
•eflects an ugly image, it is not because of the mir-
■or but because of the world itself. International
institutions, like national institutions, reflect
imderlying conditions. The United Nations re-
flects in large measure the political, economic, and
social conditions of the world as they confront
as today. This attests to its viability as an in-
iernational organization.
It is a mistake to consider the U.N. as an or-
ganization which prevents states from pursuing
their own national interests through peaceful
aaeans.
True and legitimate national self-interest sel-
dom suffers from justifying itself within the
framework of a general international organiza-
bion. In an interdependent society, and particu-
larly in these days of atomic and hydrogen bombs
ind long-range missiles, self-aggrandizement does
not promote self-interest but could promote self-
destruction. Within the broad framework of the
barter, states are free to pursue their national
and international interests, in and outside the
United Nations, with all the resources of diplo-
macy and statesmanship at their command. The
existence of the United Nations does not in any
sense dispense with the need for skilled and imag-
inative statesmanship and diplomacy. In fact
there is a surprising amount of realistic, quiet
diplomacy which goes on day in and day out
under the aegis of the United Nations before is-
actually burst forth in the public forum of
the Security Council or the General Assembly.
No one at all familiar with the actualities of the
United Nations would take at face value the ap-
pearances of openness and spontaneity in its de-
liberations. Quiet diplomacy is an essential part
of its workings.
A fourth factor which has had a marked in-
fluence on the United Nations relates to the kinds
of international problems it is asked to consider.
The United Nations has become in many in-
stances an avenue of last resort. Issues have nor-
mally reached a critical stage between parties
before they become a subject of United Nations
consideration. This organization has played an
important role in putting out fires that arise in
the form of international disputes.
June 9, J 958
We should avoid underestimating the value of
the United Nations even if it has not measured
up fully on occasion. For the plain fact is that
many of our international problems today are
susceptible of only modest solution — rarely com-
plete or ideal solutions. In these days of fre-
quently occurring crises the United Nations can-
not be a cure-all. The existence of an interna-
tional organization does not mean that we have
a made-to-order, all-purpose formula for solving
the innumerable issues of international relations.
The search for an all-purpose formula is illusory.
If we realize this, if we appreciate fully that
there are no easy answers to international prob-
lems, I believe we can arrive at a more balanced
understanding of why the United Nations can
succeed in certain instances and is limited in
others. The United Nations has served well and
often as a tranquilizer, but the ultimate and more
permanent remedies still rest with the attitudes
and actions of states.
Influence of World Opinion
Another fundamental worth mentioning is that
the primary tools of the United Nations today are
persuasion, exhortation, negotiation, and concilia-
tion— backed by world opinion. While the in-
fluence of world opinion is far from negligible,
member states can give it due weight or flout it.
Negotiations can be promoted by world opinion
or can be made more difficult by it. World opin-
ion can unite states on crucial issues. It also can
divide them.
A final general consideration relates to the re-
cent enlargement of the United Nations. The
United Nations is a very different organization
from that conceived in San Francisco in 1945. It
has grown from an original membership of 51
to a total of 81.
We must face frankly that the increased diver-
sity and size of the United Nations make it more
difficult to achieve a consensus. The relative
strength in the United Nations of the Latin
American members has been weakened. If the
states of Africa and Asia stand together, as they
have from time to time, they can prevent a two-
thirds vote on important issues. This is par-
ticulai'ly significant since in the past decade the
General Assembly has assumed an increasingly
more important role than the Security Coimcil.
973
This need not be a cause for gloom or pessimism.
The United Nations has demonstrated a remark-
able capacity for flexibility and adjustment in the
face of new circumstances. The new alinements,
both actual and potential, in the United Nations
set a premium on reasonable policies reflecting the
overall interests of the international community.
This gives the United States tremendous oppor-
tunity for constructive leadership.
I am happy to note that the American people
have come to realize this fact. Our State Depart-
ment analyses show clearly that the American
people are giving full support to the United
Nations. More important, this support is no
longer based on the roseate conception of the
United Nations prevalent in the days of San
Francisco. The American people have moved
from an overly optimistic evaluation of the United
Nations to a balanced view — one which embraces
both the capacities and limitations of this organi-
zation. This is a healthy development and a good
augury for the future strengthening of the
organization.
This is the framework in which we should con-
sider the record of the past decade and a few of
the current problems confronting the United
Nations.
Briefly stated the record since 1945 represents
both successes and failures. President Eisen-
hower has summed up the record cogently in this
way:'
That there have been failures in attempts to solve in-
ternational difficulties by the principles of the charter,
none can deny. That there have been victories, only the
willfully blind can fail to see. But clear it is that with-
out the United Nations the failures would still have
been written as failures into history. And, cer-
tainly, without this organization the victories could not
have been achieved. . . .
In my view, the United Nations has served our
interests and has been a positive force for peace in
at least four ways.
Basis for Collective Action
First, the United Nations has provided, at least
in one important instance, a reasonable basis for
collective action. We are all familiar with the
role played by the United Nations in repelling the
Communist aggression in Korea. Admittedly,
' BuixETiN of July 4, 1955, p. 3.
974
the Korean action was an imperfect application of
the prmciple of collective security. Nevertheless
it is worth repeating that for the first time in
history collective action through an international
organization did work successfully on the battle-
field, and this was done without resorting to
global war.
However, after having said this, it is consider-
ably more difficult to assess the future role of the
United Nations in the field of collective security.
The continuing serious differences between the
Soviet Union and the United States, and the un-
willingness of member states to regard advance
commitments in support of future collective ac-
tion as being in their national interest, compel
us to rely primarily on regional collective self-
defense organizations such as the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization. These arrangements are
within the framework of the charter. They sup-
port its objectives. Moreover, they are serving
the forces of peace until such time as conditions
may become more conducive to the development
of collective security going beyond regional ar-
rangements.
The most important requisite of an adequate
United Nations system for preventing and de-
terring aggression is what might be called a con-
sumer demand for it — recognition by governments
and peoples that in this age of increasing inter-
dependence and nuclear weapons peace is the first
need of every nation and that the United Nations
can aid and supplement the individual efforts of
nations to achieve this objective. It remains to
be seen whether this awareness is sufficient to stim-
ulate the consumer demand. We know that bal-
listic missiles combined with nuclear warheads
could mean destruction of civilization. The les-
son to be learned from the era of Sputniks and
Explorers and intercontinental missiles is in effect
a solemn warning — find the road to peace or be
destroyed. This lesson may yet develop the req-
uisite consumer demand that would make the
concept of collective security a more practical
political reality.
Settling Disputes by Peaceful Means
There is a second tangible way in which the
United Nations is serving our interests and those
of peace. It is in the field of pacific settlement.
During its first decade the United Nations made
vital contributions to the maintenance of
Department of State Bulletin
For example, it helped to bring about the Soviet
withdrawal from Iran. Its conciliatory efforts
were an important factor in achieving an inde-
pendent Indonesia. It contributed to an allevia-
tion of a dangerous Communist threat in Greece.
It negotiated a cease-fire between Israel and the
Arab states. It arranged a cease-fire in Kashmir
and has ever since policed a truce between India
and Pakistan. It settled the fate of the former
Italian colonies; Libya is independent, Somaliland
is expected to achieve this goal in 1960, and Eritrea
has entered into a federal relationship with
Ethiopia. Finally, it provided the diplomatic
channel in which the Berlin blockade crisis could
be discussed and resolved.
In more recent years the stream of serious situa-
tions brought to the United Nations has not
diminished. In Hiuigary the United Nations did
not succeed in causing a withdrawal of Soviet
forces. However, it did establish conclusively in
the eyes of world opinion the brutal suppression of
the Hungarian people and condemned the Soviet
Union for its action. The Soviet Union is still
feeling the sting of the Assembly's censure, as evi-
denced by Mr. Klirushchev's recent remarks in
Budapest.
In the serious crisis in the Middle East in the
fall of 1956, the focus of world opinion in the
United Nations played a substantial part in bring-
ing about the withdrawal of foreign forces from
Egypt. At the same time the United Nations
established an Emergency Force which for over
a year has maintained peaceful conditions along
the armistice demarcation line between Israel and
Egypt and in the Gaza and Sharm el-Sheikh areas.
Moreover, a fleet of over 40 ships under the super-
vision of the United Nations cleared the Suez
Canal. Today this vital artery of world com-
merce is carrying its normal traffic.
I cannot overemphasize the importance of the
United Nations, and particularly of the role played
by Secretary-General Hammarskjold, in the Mid-
dle East. The stabilizing influence of the United
Nations Emergency Force is only one of several
United Nations institutions operating in this area.
The United Nations Relief and Works Agency con-
tinues to care for over 900,000 refugees and to help
them become self-supporting members of a more
viable economic community. The Truce Supervi-
sion Organization maintains an uneasy peace and
polices the Arab-Israeli Armistice Agreements.
June 9, J 958
Through the quiet and effective efforts of Secre-
tary-General Hammarskjold the United Nations
has time and again prevented local incidents be-
tween Arabs and Israelis in the area of the de-
militarized zones from mushrooming into more
serious outbreaks of fighting which could have
engulfed all of us. Moreover, the United Nations
can be expected to and must play a crucial role in
any future Middle Eastern settlement.
The peacemaking record I have sketched is not
unimpressive for a fledgling organization of 12
years which was conceived in preatomic days, has
withstood the scars of cold war, and faces the chal-
lenges of outer space. Many of the problems I
have mentioned contained the seeds of war. Some
of the crises continue in a dangerous stage, but in
many instances the trend has been reversed.
There are two very current examples. Just 2
months ago Sudan appealed to the Security Coun-
cil because Egypt had claimed certain border areas
north of the 22d parallel. Egypt had announced
its intention to hold the Arab Republic plebiscite
in the disputed border area. There were charges
of troop movements, real or otherwise, as tension
increased.
Wliile on the surface all that occurred was a
short debate in the Security Council,^ actually the
fact that Sudan took recourse in Council proceed-
ings had important results. Egypt called off the
plebiscite in the disputed territory and agreed to
negotiate the dispute with Sudan in the spirit of
article 33 of the charter. World opinion as mani-
fested in the Council had an important moderating
influence.
A more serious situation is posed in the dispute
between two of our closest friends, Tunisia and
France. You will recall that the incident which
touched off the crisis was the French bombing of
the village of Sakiet in Tunisia last February.
Timisia brought the matter to the Council charg-
ing France with aggression. France in turn sub-
mitted a counterclaim charging the Tunisians
with harboring and aiding Algerian rebels.
After France and Tunisia requested the good
offices of the United States and United Kingdom,
Council members took note of the willingness of
the parties to try to settle their differences in the
' For a statement by Deputy U. S. Representative James
J. Wadsworth, see ihid., Mar. 24, 1958, p. 491.
975
spirit of article 33 of the charter.^ U.S. Deputy
Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy and
U.K. Assistant Under Secretary of State Harold
Beeley sought patiently to bring the parties to-
gether. Discussions revealed a substantial area of
agreement. However, with the fall of the French
Government the good offices have been suspended.
It is unclear at the moment, therefore, how the
situation will evolve and how further progress
can be made.
Nevertheless these two current cases illustrate
how the existence and the proper use of the United
Nations machinery can promote peaceful adjust-
ment, in one instance by stimulating direct nego-
tiations and in another through the use of good
offices.
A Forum for United States Views
The United Nations serves our interests and
those of world peace in still another way, and that
is through its value as a forum of world opinion.
It is too seldom realized that the source of
political authority, whether national or interna-
tional, is the public opinion behind it. The power
of the sword, the power of the purse, the power
of the laws — these are basic political powers.
But in the last analysis they are probably de-
pendent on the power of the word.
The United Nations provides the United States
with maximum opportunity to put forward the
American point of view and to influence the views
of other states.
One of the best examples of its utility as a
sounding board for the message of America may
be seen from the striking effect of President
Eisenhower's proposal in 1953 to promote the
peaceful uses of the atom. It is significant that
President Eisenhower made use of the United
Nations forum for his atoms-for-peace proposal.
The United States initiative in this field captured
the world's imagination. It led to the establish-
ment of the International Atomic Energy Agency,
which is no longer a blueprint but a going concern.
And today the United States is faced with a
similar challenge in the field of outer space.
There is little doubt that the United Nations will
play an important role in any efforts seeking to
msure its peaceful utilization.
Just last month the Killian report* gave us
the bold outlines of what to expect. This report
is not science fiction but a sober and realistic
analysis made by leading scientists. It shows
how space technology can extend man's knowl-
edge of the earth, the solar system, and the uni-
verse.
An earth satellite, we are told, can sample the
new environment through which it moves. It can
see the earth as it has never been seen before. It
can relay information that could never other-
wise reach the earth's surface because of the in-
tervening atmosphere;
For the first time it will be possible to measure
magnetic fields and electric currents. Satellites
will give us a detailed, three-dimensional picture
of the earth's gravity and its magnetic field.
Physicists will be able to conduct a crucial gravity
experiment which will test an important predic-
tion made by Einstein's general theory of rela-
tivity— that a clock will run faster as the gravita-
tional field around it is reduced. We will know
more about cosmic rays since we will be able to
detect the rays before they shatter themselves
against the earth's atmosphere. We will learn
about the effect of weightlessness on physiological
and psychological functions.
Present weather stations on land and sea can
keep only about 10 percent of the atmosphere un-
der surveillance, but two or three weather satel-
lites could make a cloud inventory of the whole
globe every few hours. From this inventory
meteorologists believe they could spot large
storms. We will be able to get a closeup of the
moon. Today television cannot practically be
beamed more than a few hundred miles because
the wave lengths needed to carry it will not bend
around the earth. Satellites may be able to serve
as high-flying relay stations, and we may be able
to develop intercontinental television. These are
only a few of the awesome possibilities mentioned
by the Killian report.
At the last General Assembly the United States
proposed that the U.S.S.R. join in a study of an
inspection system "designed to ensure that the
sending of objects through outer space will be ex-
" Ibid., Mar. 10, 1958, p. 372.
976
The White House released on Mar. 26 an "Introduction
to Outer Space" prepared by the President's Science Ad-
visory Committee, of which Dr. James R. Killian is
chairman.
Departmenf of Sfafe Bulletin
clusively for peaceful and scientific purposes." °
President Eisenhower in a letter to Soviet Pre-
mier Bulganin last January ^ proposed that "outer
space be dedicated to the peaceful uses of man-
kind and denied to the purpose of war." Secre-
tary Dulles a few days later noted the need for
some kind of international commission under the
auspices of the United Nations.'
If international agreement is to be achieved,
the United States and the Soviet Union will have
to cooperate. We hope that the Soviet proposals
of last month which have been submitted to the
General Assembly for consideration this fall are
signs of a positive attitude. However, the So-
viets have tied in with their proposals on outer
space a condition that the United States withdraw
from its overseas bases.
The stakes are high. It will be desirable for
the United States to make further proposals in-
dicative of our intention to develop a practical
program to insure peaceful utilization of outer
space. Proposals in this field affect the interests
of all states. They provide the raw material for
capturing the imagination of millions in every
corner of the globe. The United States is fully
aware of these realities. We are also aware of
many practical problems which should not be
underestimated. Wliat is meant by the words
"outer space" ? Is it possible at this early stage to
draw up meaningful legal rules to govern the use
of outer space ? Are there joint undertakings now
that can be pursued in the field of research, ex-
change of information, and the launching of
space platforms, or must these await a disarma-
ment agreement ?
Tliese questions point up the difficulties. Nev-
ertheless, as further United States proposals are
made, I am confident that our position will be
second to none. And the General Assembly will
provide us with a golden opportunity to lead the
way. We can — and I am confident we will —
meet the challenge.
It is true, of course, that Communist spokesmen
also use the United Nations platform. We need
not be defensive about the fact that the Soviet-
bloc spokesmen use the organization as a sounding
' Bulletin of Dec. 16, 1957, p. 962.
'Ibid., Jan. 27, 1958, p. 122.
'/6W., Feb. 3, 1958, p. 166.
June 9, J 958
board for the Communist line. The important
point about the United Nations forum is that it
is one in which we can immediately and force-
fully answer Communist claims. The ability to
meet and defeat Communist propaganda on an
intellectual level in the United Nations is a
source of real strength and support for us wher-
ever men are able to listen.
Let me give a recent example. At the General
Assembly last fall Syria charged that Turkey
was pi-eparing to launch an attack across Syria's
borders. As the Assembly debate evolved, it be-
came clear that the Soviets were behind this move
and their purpose was to stir up an artificial war
scare and to use the situation to attack United
States policy in the Middle East. The Assembly
refused to support the charges.*
This process of revealing tlie nature of Com-
munist attacks, often by self-exposure, is con-
stantly going on in the United Nations.
The Communists may scorn public opinion in
their own countries, but they cannot escape it in
the United Nations.
Attack on Social and Economic Problems
We have dealt so far with how the United
Nations contributes to our security. We have
spoken of the utility of the United Nations in the
field of pacific settlement and as a molder of world
opinion. Now let me turn for a moment to the
long-range attacks of the United Nations on var-
ious economic and social problems. If we are to
focus on prevention instead of cure, we have to get
down to the fundamental root causes of war:
poverty, disease, and poor living conditions. All
of these normally cause instability.
The work of the United Nations in the economic
and social field goes on undramatically. It does
not make headlines since the headlines emphasize
the political differences rather than the quiet ad-
vances being made to increase the general welfare
of peoples everywhere. The ultimate objective is
to establish a more secure peace by improving
standards of life for all.
In considering the United Nations achievements
in this field and how they might be enlarged, it is
well to bear in mind that the economic develop-
ment of a comitry depends primarily on action
'/6id., Nov. 18, 1957, p. 775.
977
taken by that country itself. At best the United
Nations can only lend a helping hand. For
example :
1. By bringing jjersons with different view-
points and experiences into active, creative contact
with one another, the United Nations stimulates
both the enlargement and the dissemination of
knowledge and the imderstanding of economic
development and how to achieve it.
2. Through its recommendations for national
action to promote economic development, the
United Nations strengthens the hands of groujis
sponsoring such action within the different coim-
tries. This may be effective in promoting ac-
ceptance of appropriate policies both in the less
developed countries and in the economically ad-
vanced nations whose cooperation is needed to
make rapid development possible.
3. By sponsoring international agreements the
United Nations can assist in promoting the eco-
nomic well-being of underdeveloped countries.
4. By providing an instrumentality for chan-
neling technical knowledge and assistance from
economically advanced to less developed countries
the United Nations can directly aid economic
development.
The United Nations has to its credit some very
real achievements in the four areas which I have
mentioned. Few pereons, however, would con-
tend that it has done all it might have done.
Criticisms of its shortcomings should be tempered,
however, by recognition of the fact that the
United Nations can do only what its member states
wish it to do and are prei^ared to support by
necessary national action.
Let me give just one graphic example of the
important role of the United Nations in this field.
In Southeast Asia, Food and Agi-iculture Or-
ganization technicians have taught farmers how
to grow edible carp in rice paddies, thus supple-
menting existing food supplies with a new and
valuable protein resource.
This is merely illustrative of projects under-
taken by the specialized agencies. They are not
"giveaway" projects. They are primarily de-
signed to help people help themselves. Being a
good neighbor in the modern world is nothing
more than sound common sense. American know-
how, American food, American money, American
equipment, wisely spent in United Nations enter-
978
prises around the world — when added to our own
purely national programs — is certainly all to the
good in terms of our national interest. It gives
people something to fight for as well as some-
thing to fight with. It builds markets and cuts
down the need for direct American aid.
The U.N. in the New Era
The practical potentialities of the United
Nations were obscured in the days of the San Fran-
cisco conference. The impression was then cur
rent that the great powers, dedicated to a uni-
versally accepted Inoral law, unaffected bj
considerations of power, would maintain peace and
good will on earth. In the past few years a num-
ber of serious students of world affairs have re-
minded us that world law cannot be found in the
clouds ; that upon this earth we must give heed to
the problems of power and of national interest
and that there is need of skilled diplomacy directed
to the solution of pressing and dangerous conflicts
of power and interest. These reminders are timely
correctives to the notion that the United Nations
stands aloof, unaffected in its work by the mundane
struggle of men and nations. But it would be a
grave misfortune if a reappraisal of the United
Nations in light of these analyses were to weaken
rather than strengthen our support of the United
Nations.
We are living in the 20th century, which has
been called "the century of total war." If such
a war were to occur, only Toynbee's pygmies and
Eskimoes might be left to describe it more appro-
priately as "the century of total destruction."
The United Nations can help to prevent such a
frightful development. The world, and particu-
larly the United States, has much to gain from
the successful functioning of the United Nations.
Our purpose is to support it whenever the cause of
peace is served. The United Nations has demon-
strated tremendous flexibility. Flexibility as well
as steadfastness of purpose will be required in the
new era. As we enter the new age of Sputniks and
Explorers, it would be well to keep before us the
words of Abraham Lincoln at the beginning of an-
other new age 100 years ago. He said : ". . . the
dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the
stormy present. The occasion is piled high with
difficulties, and we must arise with the occasion.
As our cause is new, so must we think and act
anew."
Departmenf of Sfafe Bulletin
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TREATY INFORMATION
U.S. and Canada Agree on NORAD
Organization and Operations
Press release 274 dated May 19
DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT
On May 12, 1958, Canada and the United
States concluded an exchange of notes regarding
:he principles to govern the future organization
md operations of the North American Air De-
fense Command (NOKAD). The notes were
signed by Acting Secretary Herter for the United
States and Ambassador N. A. Eobertson for
Canada. The Canadian note sets forth the prin-
:;iples to be adopted mider this agreement. The
United States reply expresses concurrence with
the principles and agrees that the exchange of
notes shall constitute an agreement between the
two Governments.
Announcement of the establishment of an inte-
grated Canada-United States Air Defense Com-
mand was made August 1, 1957.' Since that time
NORAD has been operating on an interim basis,
with headquarters at Colorado Springs, pending
the conclusion of the formal governmental agree-
ment between the two countries. Gen. Earl E.
Partridge, USAF, and Air Marshal C. Roy
Slemon, RCAF, who have been serving as com-
mander in chief and deputy coimnander of
NORAD respectively, will continue in their pres-
ent capacities.
TEXT OF CANADIAN NOTE
iSHINGTON, D. C.
12th May 1958
Sib, I have the honour to refer to discussions which
have taken place between the Canadian and the United
States authorities concerning the necessity for integration
of operational control of Canadian and United States air
defences and, in particular, to the study and recommenda-
tions of the Canada-United States Military Study Group.
These studies led to the joint announcement on August
Bulletin of Aug. 19, 1957, p. 306.
June 9, 1958
1, 1957, by the Minister of National Defence of Canada
and the Secretary of Defense of the United States indi-
cating that our two Governments had agreed to the set-
ting up of a system of integrated operational control for
the air defences in the continental United States, Canada
and Alaska under an integrated command responsible
to the Chiefs of Staff of both countries. Pursuant to the
announcement of August 1, 1957, an integrated head-
quarters known as the North American Air Defence Com-
mand (NORAD) has been established on an interim basis
at Colorado Springs, Colorado.
For some years prior to the establishment of NORAD,
it had been recognized that the air defence of Canada and
the United States must be considered as a single problem.
However, arrangements which existed between Canada
and the United States provided only for the coordina-
tion of separate Canadian and United States air defence
plans, but did not provide for the authoritative control of
all air defence weapons which must be employed against
an attacker.
The advent of nuclear weapons, the great improve-
ments in the means of effecting their delivery, and the
requirements of the air defence control systems demand
rapid decisions to keep pace with the speed and tempo
of technological developments. To counter the threat
and to achieve maximum effectiveness of the air defence
system, defensive operations must commence as early as
possible and enemy forces must be kept constantly en-
gaged. Arrangements for the coordination of national
plans requiring consultation between national command-
ers before implementation had become inadequate in the
face of the possible sudden attack, with little or no
warning. It was essential, therefore, to have in existence
in peacetime an organization, including the weapons,
facilities and command structure, which could operate at
the outset of hostilities in accordance with a single air
defence plan approved in advance by national authorities.
Studies made by representatives of our two Govern-
ments led to the conclusion that the problem of the air
defence of our two countries could best be met by dele-
gating to an integrated headquarters the task of exer-
cising operational control over combat units of the na-
tional forces made available for the air defence of the
two countries. Furthermore, the principle of an inte-
grated headquarters exercising operational control over
assigned forces has been well established in various parts
of the North Atlantic Treaty area. The Canada-United
States region is an integral part of the NATO area. In
support of the strategic objectives established in NATO for
the Canada-United States region and in accordance with
the provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty, our two Gov-
ernments have, by establishing the North American Air
Defence Command (NORAD), recognized the desirability
of integrating headquarters exercising operational control
over assigned air defence forces. The agreed integration is
intended to assist the two Governments to develop and
maintain their individual and collective capacity to re-
sist air attack on their territories in North America In
mutual self-defence.
The two Governments consider that the establishment
of integrated air defence arrangements of the nature de-
979
scribed increases the importance of the fullest possible
consultation between the two Governments on all matters
affecting the joint defence of North America, and that
defence cooperation between them can be worthed out on
a mutually satisfactory basis only if such consultation is
regularly and consistently undertaken.
In view of the foregoing considerations and on the basis
of the experience gained in the operation on an interim
basis of the North American Air Defence Command, my
Government proposes that the following principles should
govern the future organization and operations of the North
American Air Defence Command.
1. The Commander-in-Chief NORAD (CINCNORAD)
will be responsible to the Chiefs of Staff Committee of
Canada and the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States,
who in turn are responsible to their respective Govern-
ments. He will operate within a concept of air defence
approved by the appropriate authorities of our two Gov-
ernments, who will bear in mind their objectives In the
defence of the Canada-United States region of the NATO
area.
2. The North American Air Defence Command will in-
clude such combat units and individuals as are specifically
allocated to it by the two Governments. The jurisdiction
of the Commander-in-Chief, NORAD, over those units
and individuals is limited to operation control as herein-
after defined.
3. "Operational control" is the power to direct, coordi-
nate, and control the operational activities of forces as-
signed, attached or otherwise made available. No per-
manent changes of station would be made without ap-
proval of the higher national authority concerned. Tem-
porary reinforcement from one area to another, including
the crossing of the international boundary, to meet opera-
tional requirements will be within the authority of com-
manders having operational control. The basic command
organization for the air defence forces of the two countries,
including administration, discipline, internal organization
and unit training, shall be exercised by national com-
manders responsible to their national authorities.
4. The appointment of CINCNORAD and his Deputy
must be approved by the Canadian and United States Gov-
ernments. They will not be from the same country, and
CINCNORAD staff shall be an integrated joint staff com-
posed of officers of both countries. During the absence of
CINCNORAD, command will pass to the Deputy Com-
mander.
5. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization will continue
to be kept informed through the Canada-United States
Regional Planning Group of arrangements for the air de-
fence of North America.
6. The plans and procedures to be followed by NORAD
in wartime shall be formulated and approved in peace-
time by appropriate national authorities and shall be
capable of rapid implementation in an emergency. Any
plans or procedures recommended by NORAD which bear
on the responsibilities of civilian departments or agencies
of the two Governments shall be referred for decision by
the appropriate military authorities to those agencies and
departments and may be the subject of intergovernmental
coordination.
980
|,S.and
or First
7. Terms of reference for CINCNORAD and his Dep-
uty will be consistent with the foregoing principles.
Changes in these terms of reference may be made by
agreement between the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Com-
mittee and the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, with
approval of higher authority as appropriate, providedl
that these changes are in consonance with the principlesi reloplDf^
set out in this note.
8. The question of the financing of expenditures con-
nected with the operation of the integrated headquarters
of the North American Air Defence Command will be
settled by mutual agreement between appropriate agen-
cies of the two Governments.
9. The North American Air Defence Command shalKly
be maintained in operation for a period of ten years-
or such shorter period as shall be agreed by both coun-
tries in the light of their mutual defence interests, and!
their objectives under the terms of the North Atlantic
Treaty. The terms of this agreement may be reviewedtJCortes.
upon request of either country at any time.
10. The Agreement between parties to the North At-
lantic Treaty regarding the status of their forces signedl "^
in London on June 19, 19rpl, shall apply.
11. The release to the public of information by
CINCNORAD on matters of interest to Canada and the
United States will in all cases be the subject of prior
consultation and agreement between appropriate agen-
cies of the two Governments.
If the United States Government concurs in the prin-
ciples set out above, I propose that this note and your
reply should constitute an agreement between our two
Governments effective from the date of your reply.
Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest
consideration.
N. A. ROBEETSON
The Honourable John Fosteh Dulles,
Secretary of State of the United States,
Washington, D. C.
TEXT OF U.S. NOTE
Mat 12, 1958
Excellency : I have the honor to refer to your Ex-
cellency's note No. 263 of May 12, 1958 proposing on be-
half of the Canadian Government certain principles to
govern the future organization and operation of the North
American Air Defense Command (NORAD).
I am pleased to inform you that my Government con-
curs in the principles set forth in your note. My Gov-
ernment further agrees with your proposal that your
note and this reply shall constitute an agreement be-
tween the two Governments effective today.
Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my
highest consideration.
For the Secretary of State :
Christian A. Hekteb
His Excellency
Norman Robertson,
Ambassador of Canada.
Department of State Bulletin
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I.S. and Honduras Sign Agreement
or First Loan From New Fund
ress release 270 dated May 16
The first agreement for a loan from the new De-
elopment Loan Fund was signed on May 16 be-
ween the United States and tlie Central American
lepublic of Honduras. The fund was authorized
)y Congress to provide an additional source of fi-
lancing to help friendly foreign nations to de-
velop their economic resources and thus increase
heir productive capacity.
Honduras will use the $5 million provided un-
ler this agreement to help finance construction of
, new 45-mile paved highway to connect Puerto
]!ortes, the coimtry's main Caribbean port, with
he Honduran national road network and in im-
proving Honduras' important Western and Soutli-
srn Highways.
The agreement was signed for Honduras by
Fernando Villar, Minister of Economy and Fi-
lance, and by Dempster Mcintosh, Manager of
he Development Loan Fund, for the United
States. Among those witnessing the signing cer-
jmony at DLF headquarters were Roberto Rami-
rez, president of the Central Bank of Honduras;
Lempira Bonilla, economic counselor of the Em-
bassy; and Rollin S. Atwood, regional director
of Latin American operations of the International
Cooperation Administration, which has a mutual
security assistance program in Honduras.
The $5 million which Honduras is receiving
from the DLF will be used to finance the local-
currency costs of highway projects estimated to
cost $10.5 million (21 million lempiras). The
remaining $5.5 million is being provided by a loan
from the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development to finance the cost of imported
equipment, materials, and services.
The DLF loan is for a period of 20 years at an
interest rate of 314 percent. A significant fea-
ture, in addition to the relatively low interest rate,
is provision for repayment of the dollar loan in
lempiras — Honduran currency.
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Cultural Property
Protocol for the protection of cultural property In the
event of armed conflict. Done at The Hague May 14,
1954. Entered into force August 7, 1956.'
Accession deposited: Israel, April 1, 1958.
Narcotic Drugs
Protocol for limiting and regulating the cultivation of
the poppy plant, the production of, international and
wholesale trade in, and use of opium. Dated at New
York June 23, 1953."
Ratification deposited: Korea, April 29, 1958.
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries
International convention for the Northwest Atlantic
Fisheries. Dated at Washington Feljruary 8, 1949.
Entered into force July 3, 1950. TIAS 2089.
Adherence deposited: Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-
lics, April 10, 1958.
Property
Convention for the protection of industrial property.
Signed at London June 2, 1934. Entered into force
August 1, 1938. 53 Stat. 1748.
Adherence effective: Australia, June 2, 1958.
Trade and Commerce
Seventh protocol of rectifications and modifications to the
texts of the schedules to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 30,
1957."
Sic/natures: Sweden, March 4, 1958; Federation of
Rhodesia and Nyasaland, April 29, 1958.
United Nations
Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scien-
tific and Cultural Organization. Done at London No-
vember 16, 1945. Entered into force November 4, 1946.
TIAS 1580.
Signature: Ghana, April 11, 1958.'
Weather
Convention of the World Meteorological Organization.
Done at Washington October 11, 1947. Entered Into
force March 23, 1950. TIAS 2052.
Accession deposited: Federation of Malaya. May 19.
1958.
BILATERAL
Argentina
Agreement establishing a United States Air Force mission
to conduct high level meteorological tests in Argentina.
Effected by exchange of notes at Buenos Aires April 23
and 28, 1958. Entered into force April 28, 1958.
Canada
Agreement relating to organization and operations of the
North American Air Defense Command. Effected by
exchange of notes at Washington May 12, 1958. En-
tered into force May 12, 1958.
Italy
Agreement relating to the improvement of the child feed-
ing program carried out by the Amministrazione per le
Attivita' Assistenziali Italiane e Internazionali, with
annex. Effected by exchange of notes at Rome May 8,
1958. Entered into force May 8, 1958.
Korea
Agreement amending research reactor agreement concern-
ing civil uses of atomic energy of February 3, 1956
June 9, 7958
" Not in force for the United States.
" Not in force.
'The instrument of acceptance by Ghana having been
deposited, the constitution entered into force for Ghana
Apr. 11, 1958.
981
(TIAS 3490). Signed at Washington March 14, 1958.
Entered into force: May 22, 1958 (date on which each
government received from the other written notifica-
tion that it had complied with statutory and con-
stitutional requirements).
New Zealand
Agreement relating to the abolition of visa fees and the
extension of the period of validity in certain types of
nonimmigrant visas. Effected by exchange of notes at
Wellington December 16, 1957 and May 2 and 5, 1958.
Entered into force June 1, 1958.
Philippines
Agreement for the establishment of a Mutual Defense
Board and the assignment of Philippine mUitary liaison
officers to United States military bases in the Philip-
pines. Effected by exchange of notes at Manila May
15, 1958. Entered into force May 15, 1958.
DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE
20 FSO's Leave for Seminar in Africa
The Department of State announced on May 15 (press
release 269) that a group of 20 Foreign Service officers
would leave for Africa on May 29 to take part in a 3-
month seminar which will give them a broader under-
standing of the problems and peoples of Africa south of
the Sahara.
The seminar, conducted under the direction of the For-
eign Service Institute, is being presented for the first time
and is designed to meet the growing need for a greater
understanding of Africa on the part of United States
Government officials.
The seminar is being conducted in close cooperation
with universities and government institutions in various
parts of Sub-Saharan Africa and has been made pos-
sible by a grant of funds from the Ford Foundation.
Appointments
Abbot Low Moffat as director of the International
Cooperation Administration operations mission in Ghana,
effective May 19. (For biographic details, see Depart-
ment of State press release 275 dated May 19. )
PUBLICATIONS
Recent Releases
For sale ly the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Oov-
ernment Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. Address
requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, ex-
cept in the case of free puMications, which may 6e ob-
tained from the Department of State.
982
International TraflSc in Arms— Regulations Issued by the
Secretary of State Governing Registration and Licens-
ing Under Section 414 of the Mutual Security Act of
1954 and Related Laws. Pub. 6587. 48 pp. 25<f.
A pamphlet containing the regulations governing the in-
ternational traffic in arms, ammunition, and implements
of war and technical data relating thereto.
Questions and Answers on the Mutual Security Program.
Pub. 6613. General Foreign Policy Series 125. 20 pp.
15!*.
A pamphlet answering the questions commonly asked con-
cerning the Mutual Security Program of the United
States.
Facts About Foreign Trade. Pub. 6617. Commercial
Policy Series 166. 17 pp. 15«;.
A pamphlet containing a series of charts demonstrating
the importance to the U.S. economy of our exports and
imports.
Organization of American States. Pub. 6625. Interna-
tional Organization and Conference Series II, American
Republics 15. 20 pp. 15^.
A pamphlet outlining the history, organization, and func-
tions of the Organization of American States.
9,1«
f ) Igkati-'H^'
ipjoiDtnieiii
>resideDt P
Methods 0
ot Cess'
EJSertyJ
Wtion.
Or?uiai
Biiraii. Bt
tasJa. r
giniia:;'.:
[J)ii|Tess,Ti
)ii{i«saoi
Policj .
ilot Asp*
[Mtv
Ciiecl( List of Department of State
Press Releases: May 19-25
Press releases may be obtained from the News
Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.
Releases issued prior to May 19 which appear in
this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 264, and 266 of
May 14,
No.
t273
Date
5/19
277 5/20
of May 15, and 270 of May 16.
Subject
U.S. protests Soviet action on John A.
Baker.
U.S.-Canadian exchange of notes on
NOBAD.
Moffat named USOM director in
Ghana (rewrite).
Visit of Philippine President (re-
write).
Dillon: "Economic Growth in a Di-
vided World."
DLF authorizes loans to 5 countries.
Palmer: "The United States and
Emerging Africa."
DuUes: news conference.
U.S. mining experts to visit Soviet
Union.
Katzen to observe informational me-
dia guaranty program in Israel.
Iran credentials (rewrite).
President's semiannual report on mu-
tual security program.
Afghanistan credentials (rewrite).
U.S. note to Soviets on travel regu-
lations.
Experts on nuclear tests chosen to
meet with Soviet experts (rewrite).
"Not printed.
tHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin.
t278
t279
5/20 ]
5/20
280
1281
5/20
5/20
282
5/21
283
•284
5/22
5/22
285
t286
5/23
5/24
287
5/24
ippciini!:
Secrdiry 1
Gkaia. !1'
Iran, b
Israel,
of r-j;
Japan,
stratio.
Department of State Bulletin
kyil, une 9, 1958
km,
''N fghanistan. Letters of Credence (Maiwandwal) .
frica. 20 FSO's Leave for Seminar in Africa
Jgeria. Review of Recent Anti-American Demon-
strations (Murphy)
merican Republics
:eview of Recent Anti-American Demonstrations
(Murpliy)
ecretary Dulles' News Conference of May 20
ice President Nixon Returns From Soutli American
Tour (Eisenliower, Nixon)
itomic Energy
ppointment of U.S. Technical Experts To Study
Agreement on Nuclear Tests
'resident Proposes Meeting of Experts To Study
Methods of Detecting Violations of an Agreement
on Cessation of Nuclear Tests (Eisenhower,
Hagerty, Khrushchev )
iviation. U.S. and Canada Agree on NORAD
Organization and Operations (texts of notes)
Surma. Review of Recent Anti-American Demon-
strations (Murphy)
;;anada. U.S. and Canada Agree on NORAD Or-
ganization and Operations (texts of notes) . .
Congress, The
ongressional Documents Relating to Foreign
Policy
ilajor Aspects of the Problem of Outer Space
(Becker)
leview of Recent Anti-American Demonstrations
(Murphy)
Department and Foreign Service
Appointments ( Moffat )
iO FSO's Leave for Seminar in Africa
Economic Affairs
Economic Growth in a Divided World (Dillon)
Secretary Dulles' News Conference of May 20
Ghana. Moffat named USOM director
Index
Vol. XXXVIII, No. 989
942
950
952
979
967
962
952
Honduras. U.S. and Honduras Sign Agreement for
Fir.st Loan From New Fund
Indonesia
Review of Recent Anti-American Demonstrations
(Murphy)
Secretary Dulles' News Conference of May 20 . .
International Information. Mr. Katzen To Observe
Program for Use of Funds in Israel
International Law. Major Aspects of the Problem
of Outer Space (Becker)
Iran. Letters of Credence (Ardalan)
Israel. Mr. Katzen To Observe Program for Use
of Funds in Israel
Japan. Review of Recent Anti-American Demon-
strations (Murphy)
Lebanon. Review of Recent Anti-American Demon-
strations (Murphy)
Middle East. Secretary Dulles' News Conference
of May 20
962
961
961
952
952
942
Military Affairs
U.S. and Canada Agree on NORAD Organization
and Operations (texts of notes) 979
U.S. Issues Statement on Report on Trinidad Naval
Base 961
Mutual Security
Economic Growth in a Divided World (Dillon) . . 968
U.S. and Honduras Sign Agreement for First Loan
From New Fund 981
Philippines. President of the Philippines To Visit
the United States 971
Presidential Documents. President Proposes Meet-
ing of Experts To Study Methods of Detecting
Violations of an Agreement on Cessation of
Nuclear Tests 939
Publications. Recent Releases 982
Science. Major Aspects of the Problem of Outer
Space (Becker) 932
Treaty Information
Current Actions 981
U.S. and Canada Agree on NORAD Organization
and Operations (texts of notes) 979
U.S. and Honduras Sign Agreement for First Loan
From New Fund ggi
U.S.S.R.
Appointment of U.S. Technical Experts To Study
Agreement on Nuclear Tests 941
President Proposes Meeting of Experts To Study
Methods of Detecting Violations of an Agree-
ment on Cessation of Nuclear Tests (Eisenhower,
Hagerty, Khrushchev) 939
United Nations. A Fresh Look at the United
Nations (Sisco) 972
Venezuela. Venezuelan Note on Caracas Incidents . 951
West Indies, The. U.S. Issues Statement on Report
on Trinidad Naval Base 961
Name Index
Acosta H., Eduardo A 951
Ardalan, Ali Gholi 961
Bacher, Robert F 941
Becker, Loftus 962
Dillon, Douglas 968
Dulles, Secretary 942
Eisenhower, President 939, 950
Fisk, James Brown 941
Garcia, Carlos P 971
Hagerty, James C 939
Herter, Christian A 980
Katzen, Bernard 961
Khrushchev, Nikita 940
Lawrence, Ernest O 941
Maiwandwal, Mohammad Hashim 961
Moffat, Abbot Low 982
Murphy, Robert 952
Nixon, Vice President 950
Robertson, N. A 979
Sisco, Joseph J 972
k*****^
the
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of
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To: Supt. of Documents
Govt. Printing Office
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United States
Government Printing Office
DIVISION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS
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OFFICIAL BUSINESS
TREATIES IN FORCE
A List of Treaties
and Other International Agreements
of the United States
in^^Force on January 1, 1958
This publication is a guide to treaties and other international
agreements in force between the United States and other countries at
the beginning of the current year.
The list includes bilateral treaties and other agreements, ar-
ranged by country or other political entity, and multilateral treaties
and other agreements, arranged by subject with names of countries
which have become parties. Date of signature, date of entry into
force for the United States, and citations to texts are furnished for
each agreement.
Documents affecting international copyright relations of the
United States are listed in the appendix.
Information on current treaty actions, supplementing the infor-
mation contained in Treaties in Force, is published weekly in the
Department of State Bulletin.
The new edition of Treaties in Force (266 pp.) is for sale by the
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington 25, D. C, for $1.25 a copy.
Publication 6626
$1.25
Please send me copies of Treaties in Force.
(cash, check, or
money order).
Name:
Street Address:
City, Zone, and State:
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Vol. XXXVIII, No. 990 / .Q^j'ijVne 16, 1958
^•
THE FIRST TEN YEARS OF THE WORLD HEALTH
ORGANIZATION
Remarks by Assistant Secretary Wilcox 987
Address by Dr. Milton Eisenhower 989
THE UNITED STATES AND EMERGING AFRICA •
by Joseph Palmer 2d 993
UNITED STATES RELATIONS WITH CANADA •
Statem,ent by Ambassador Livingston T. Merchant 999
U. S. REPLIES TO CZECHOSLOVAK CHARGES CON-
CERNING FREE EUROPE COMMITTEE BAL-
LOONS • Department Announcement and Texts of V. S.
and Czechoslovak ISotes 1010
For index see inside back cover
THE DERARTIVIENT OF S
Vol. XXXVIII, No. 990 • Pubucation 6653
June 16, 1958
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington 26, D.O.
Peice:
62 Issues, domestic $7.60, foreign $10.26
Single copy, 20 cents
The printing of this publication has been
approved by the Director of the Bureau of
the Budget (January 20, 1968).
Note: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and Items contained herein may
be reprinted. Citation of the Depaetment
or State Bdlletin as the source will be
appreciated.
The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the
Public Services Division, provides the
public and interested agencies of
the Government with information on
developments in the field of foreign
relations and on the work of the
Department of State and the Foreign
Service. The BULLETIN includes se-
lected press releases on foreign policy,
issued by the White House and the
Department, and statements and ad-
dresses made by the President and by
the Secretary of State and other
officers of the Department, as well as
special articles on various plmses of
international affairs and the func-
tions of the Department. Informa-
tion is included concerning treaties
and international agreements to
which the United States is or may
become a party and treaties of gen-
eral international interest.
Publications of the Department,
United Nations documents, and legis-
lative material in the field of inter-
national relations are listed currently.
The First Ten Years of the World Health Organization
lOTH ANNIVERSARY COMMEMORATIVE SESSION OF WHO
MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., MAY 26-27, 1958
Following is the text of remarks made hefore
the 10th anniversary co^nmemorative session of
the World Health Organization at Minneapolis by
Francis 0. Wilcox, Assistant Secretary for Inter-
national Organization Affairs, together with an
address by Milton Eisenhower, president of the
Johns Hopkins University. Dr. Eisenhower was
the personal representative of the President at the
session, and Mr. Wilcox was a U.S. delegate.^
REMARKS BY MR. WILCOX, MAY 26
It gives me great pleasure to be the first to wel-
come you on behalf of the Government and the
people of the United States to this 10th anniver-
sary commemorative session of the World Health
Organization. Dr. Milton Eisenhower, the per-
sonal representative of the President, will have
more to say in this regard when he addresses you
tomorrow.
The people and the Government of the United
States are deeply honored to have the opportunity
of serving as hosts to the World Health Assembly.
Your presence here is an expression of the keen
interest of the United States in the World Health
Organization, and I am certain that it will stim-
ulate in the people of our country an even greater
awareness of the vital and far-reaching work being
done by this organization.
In my capacity as Assistant Secretary of State
in charge of international organization affairs, I
am constantly concerned with that relatively new
dimension of international relations — multilateral
diplomacy. Although this is a comparatively
young branch of the art of diplomacy, it has been
rightfully called "the diplomacy of the future."
' For other members of the U.S. delegation, see Bulletin
of June 2, 1958, p. 933.
June 16, 7958
Many of its tecliniques are still in the formative
stage, and a certain amount of trial and error are
still involved; but, as an indication of what we
may expect in the future from multilateral coop-
eration, I know of nothing more encouraging than
the story of the success of the first 10 years of the
World Health Organization.
The WHO has a record of solid achievement.
The combined efforts of doctors, scientists, and
public-health administrators of its member coun-
tries have built an ever-increasing storehouse of
knowledge and experience which today is avail-
able to millions of people throughout the world
for the improvement of their health and well-
being. These efforts have produced significant
gains in the constant fight against many com-
municable diseases.
Although the battle against communicable dis-
ease is the most dramatic aspect of the work of
the World Health Organization, the development
of public-health services may prove to be its most
important contribution to the welfare of man-
kind, for effective public-health services will be
able to prevent the very diseases which we are
now fighting to control. Laying the foundations
in coimtries where none existed and strengthening
them where they did exist, the Organization is
now directing a great part of its activity into this
all-important field. Here, too, the story is one of
accomplishment, particularly in the less developed
areas of the world — rural health services estab-
lished, hospital administrators and nurses trained,
rehabilitation programs and physical therapy
schools in operation.
A great measure of this rapid accomplishment
is due to the close cooperation which has existed
between the WHO and other branches of the
United Nations system. Working closely with
the Food and Agriculture Organization, the WHO
987
has made steady progress in the solution of serious
health problems created by nutritional deficien-
cies. It has joined forces with the International
Labor Organization in helping to improve indus-
trial medicine. In cooperation with the United
Nations Children's Fund, it has made vital contri-
butions in improving the tragic plight of two-
thirds of the world's 900 million children who lack
adequate food, shelter, and protection against dis-
ease. Given continued support for the work of
WHO, there is real reason to believe that much
of the burden of disease now holding back man's
progress can be brought under effective control
and in some cases eradicated.
A Blend of Idealism and Practicality
This progress of the WHO, in my opinion, has
been possible because it has achieved a remarkably
happy blend of the highest idealism with the
soundest of practical operating techniques. It
has not attempted to bite off more than it can
chew. It has exercised praiseworthy realism in
recognizing the limits within which it has to work
and in concentrating its efforts and designing pro-
grams geared to available resources. These pro-
grams not only have had gi-eat impact in the pres-
ent but also serve as clear evidence of what can
be expected in the future.
In your lifetime and mine, if present trends
continue, this world of ours will be literally burst-
ing at the seams. Population is increasing at such
an explosive rate that it will confront man with
a tremendous challenge in providing food and
clothing and adequate medical care for our teem-
ing billions. It is estimated that eveiy week now
1.8 million new births occur. Every hour that
passes welcomes 11,000 new babies into the world,
and life expectancy is increasing by leaps and
bounds.
Now, I am weU aware of the argument that the
WHO, through its efforts to improve health
standards, is exacerbating the world's population
problem rather than making it better. Why
should we make an all-out effort to improve infant
mortality rates and to increase man's longevity,
the argument runs, when there are already more
people in the world than can presently be sus-
tained at a decent level of living?
Quite apart from the moral aspects of this prob-
lem, it remains a fact that people who are racked
with fever, or weak from debilitating di;
988
cannot make substantial contributions to their
nation's productivity. The World Health Organ-
ization is helping to give people in many lands
strength and enei-gy to build and produce and
grow the things man needs to live a more abun-
dant life.
It is highly encouraging to note that in the last
few years world food production, at long last, has
begmi to outstrip the rapid increase in popula-
tion. Overall food production in 1956 increased
by close to 3 percent over the previous year, while
world population increased only by 1.7 percent.
It is significant, I think, that some of the substan-
tial increases in production occurred in former
malarial areas where the work of the WHO has
been particularly active and effective.
Thus, the WHO is not only saving lives, but it
is helping to move the world ever closer to the
time when evei-y human being can enjoy life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.
In the years to come the WHO will be called
upon to assume increasing responsibilities in a
variety of areas relating to public health. There
will no doubt be increased efforts to eliminate or
alleviate cardiovascular diseases, cancer, diabetes,
arthritis, i-heumatism, influenza, and poliomyeli-
tis, as well as certain tropical diseases. We can
expect increased attention in such important fields
as the prevention of emotional and mental disor-
ders, occupational health, food and drug services,
and the health aspects of nuclear energy. These
will be the great medical problems of tomorrow.
A Contribution to Peace
In addition to the contribution which the WHO
is making toward improving standards of health
and productivity in the world, it is making still
another contribution to peace which is somewhat
more subtle but perhaps no less significant. Ad-
mittedly, the political activities of the General
Assembly and the Security Council are far more
glamorous than the economic and social work of
the United Nations. The WHO seldom makes
front-page headlines, and its efforts are carried
on without a great deal of fanfare. But the
WHO, in its quiet and effective way, is doing
much to encourage nations to work together to
solve their mutual problems. In the long nm,
this growing habit of working together will have
a lasting impact upon the solution of problems in
the political field.
Department of State Bulletin
It is well to keep in mind that disease is inter-
aational, in the worst sense of the word. Germs
?o from one country to another without passports
3r visas, and their incursions in this respect are
seldom noticed. Moreover, DDT-spraying pro-
grams certainly do not have the public impact of
the launching of an earth satellite or an outer-
5pace missile. But these and other WHO efforts
are equally as important, in the long run, as many
3f the drama-packed conferences in the political
!ield. Through steady cooperation of this kind,
we can make significant contributions to the Crea-
don of those conditions in the world which will
form the basis of a lasting peace.
In the field of health we have passed the point
af no return. International cooperation is not
Dnly sensible and desirable; it is essential.
In this connection I would be derelict in my
duty if I did not avail myself of this opportunity
to express my deep admiration for the outstanding
work of two great leaders, Dag Hammarskjold,
Secretary-General of the United Nations, and Dr.
[Marcolino G.] Candau, Director General of the
World Health Organization. In their respective
jurisdictions, these two men — aided by their able
staffs — have given mistintingly of their time and
their talents to further the cause of peace and to
move the world ahead in its eternal quest for
human betterment. They prove again that prog-
ress does not always originate with the great
powers; they demonstrate once more the imique
and invaluable contribution which the smaller
states can make to the United Nations.
The World Health Organization has launched
a program to improve the health of mankind on a
scale imknown in history. Its achievements al-
ready have provided a preview of the almost
limitless possibilities for international cooperation
in the field of public health. If the new develop-
ments in the scientific and teclinological fields are
devoted to the well-being of mankind everywhere,
I am firmly convinced that the day will come
when many of the diseases which are common
today throughout the world will be miknown to
successive generations.
In conclusion, Mr. President, may I say to all
the delegations represented here that I sincerely
hope that your stay in the United States will be
most pleasant and productive. I wish you every
success in your deliberations.
June 76, 7958
ADDRESS BY DR. EISENHOWER, MAY 27
White House press release dated May 27
The President of the United States has asked
me to bring you the following
Personally and on behalf of the people of the United
States, I extend to you, the delegates of governments of so
many countries, a warm welcome. You have come here
from all corners of the world to deal with very human
and personal problems that affect us all. I wish you
notable success.
The 10th Anniversary Commemorative Session of the
World Health Organization directs our attention to the
fact that the nations of the world are working together
in harmony for the improvement of the living conditions
of all peoples. As a result of the work of the World
Health Organization and the stimulating leadership it
has given to its member states, millions the world over
are spared from disease and suffering that would have
been their lot. The United States is proud of its part
and the part of its health leaders in this mutual en-
deavor. We look forward to even greater accomplish-
ments in the control of disease, in the building of health
services and in the opening of new avenues of medical
knowledge through research. We look to the World
Health Organization with confidence as a proven instru-
ment through which the nations and the peoples of the
world can combine their efforts, in friendship, toward
the building of true peace.
DwiGHT D. Eisenhower
For myself, may I say that it is a genuine
privilege to address the 10th anniversary com-
memorative session of the World Health As-
sembly.
It is for good reason that the World Health
Organization has won the respect of nations and
the confidence and trust of people everywhere.
The health of the individual is precious to the
individual and to those dear to him. The health
of the community and the state, to a considerable
extent, depends on the health of the individual.
An organization dedicated to improving human
health and composed of so many of the world's
nations working together in peaceful endeavor
surely must succeed in its aim. The fact that
its success has been so rapid must be credited to
the foundations on which it was built. The
founders of the World Health Organization
recognized the problems and the need to extend
the scope of international health activities beyond
those which were carried out by its predecessors,
the International Office of Public Health and the
League of Nations Health Organization. The
achievements of these past 10 years are largely
989
due to the vision and dedication of those who
have given the World Health Organization lead-
ership and direction. The very structure of the
Organization, with its far-reaching network for
tapping the knowledge and resources of the
world's experts in health and making these avail-
able to the health authorities of the world, has
been a pattern for successful international co-
operation.
We congratulate the World Health Organiza-
tion for what it has accomplished in these few
years. Its modest beginnings, at a time when
the world was struggling to emerge from the
devastation of war, had the undeniably friendly
effect of speeding the recovery of those who had
been sorely hurt, helping them on the road to a
better future.
Tuberculosis, yaws and the other treponema-
toses, malaria, and malnutrition are now the
subject of intensive effort on the part of the coun-
tries and regions in which they exist. The
catalyst— the assistance of the World Health Or-
ganization— is gradually being transferred from
these increasingly self-sustaining programs to
newer, urgent progi-ams in other areas. Thus, 10
years ago, yaws was the cliief health problem of
Haiti. Thirty-five to forty percent of the popula-
tion was afflicted. Today yaws is practically ex-
tinct there, thaiiks to local initiative and interna-
tional assistance.
The United States has been closely associated
with who's growth and development. Some
who are here today helped in drafting its con-
stitution. Our public-health profession has given
of its time and efforts without stint to further its
aims. Many have acted as consultants in WHO
programs, and more have served as members of
expert panels.
Public-health work, perhaps more than any
other human endeavor, is conducive to intimate
international cooperation. Disease is no respecter
of national boundaries. Nations can acquire health
without depriving any other nation of these
A Pattern for Peaceful Cooperation
The demonstration by the World Health Or-
ganization of the potentiality of such friendly and
productive mutual work by nations has set a pat-
tern for peaceful cooperation in other fields.
As president of the Jolms Hopkins University,
990
I am proud to acknowledge a thread of kinship
between our School of Hygiene and Public Health
and the World Health Organization. The found-
ers of the university recognized the vital im-
portance of medical science and the health of
people and the universal nature of progress in
these fields. From the earliest days of the mii-
versitj', its interests have extended beyond national
boimdaries. Many of the graduates of our school
represented their countries in the founding of this
gi'eat international organization. Your distin-
guished Director General is one of our graduates.
Many members of the staff of the Organization
are alumni of the Jolins Hopkins, and the names
of many of the delegates to this World Health
Assembly are familiar to us as former students.
The International Center concerned with trepo-
nematoses is located at Hopkins, and our faculty,
in collaboration with the World Health Organiza-
tion, has made contributions to the control of these
diseases. Research in such problems as poliomyeli-
tis, malaria, yellow fever, cancer, and heart disease
is carried on at the university and gives promise
of further improvement in the health of the people
of the world. We are proud of the part we have
played in the development of this effective inter-
national agency.
This 10th anniversary celebration should re-
mind the peoples of the world of the tremendous
advances made in medical science in recent years
and especially in the prevention of disease and
disability. Peoples everywhere should know that
the World Health Organization has had a pro-
found influence on these developments and that
this influence will grow with the years.
They should know, too, that the Organization
has pioneered in developing effective techniques
of international action in the control of those dis-
eases for which we now have effective preventive
measures. These techniques include technical as-
sistance and internationally coordinated efforts,
demonstration of methods, trainmg, and ex-
change of experience.
With this background of achievement the
AYorld Health Organization during the next 3
weeks will be looking into the future. Such
forward look suggests two general areas in which
further advance can be predicted. First, eradica-
tion of those diseases that we now know hoio to
control and, second, of equal importance, the dis-
covery of measures for the ultimate conquest of
Department of Slate Bulletin
other diseases that we do Twt yet know how to
control.
The World Health Organization has stimulated
the imagination of men everywhere by boldly
embarking upon a campaign to eradicate one of
the most extensive diseases to which man is
prone — malaria. It was my privilege, as pei-sonal
representative of our President, to present to the
Director of the Pan American Sanitary Bureau
early in 1957 an initial special contribution to this
campaign." Since then, as you know, the United
States has made further contributions to the
^^"JIO Malaria Eradication Special Account and
to the Pan American Sanitary Organization.
These will help to attain the ultimate goal but
are not alone sufficient to the needs. The Presi-
dent of tlie United States in his state of the Union
message of January 9, 1958,^ invited other nations
to join in this campaign. It is our hope that
many will do so in order that the peoples of the
world, who have faith in this gi'eat eradication
effort of the "World Health Organization, will not
be disappointed. In addition to the deep human
significance of this campaign, it is a test of the
ability of nations to join forces in an all-out at-
tack upon a great killer. "V^'^len the WHO ini-
tiated its work in this field, malaria afflicted some
300 million persons a year. Three million died
each year from malaria. Now the incidence has
been cut in half and the death rate halved as
well. But the challenge of full and final victory
remains.
The World Health Organization has also been
occupied during the past decade with the conquest
of other diseases for which the control methods
are known. "Wlien the WHO took the world stage
in health following the war, new methods and
agents were ready at hand, while actual control
of disease had in many places deteriorated. The
WHO brought the new together with the old
with triumphant effect — penicillin in yaws, DDT
in malaria, BCG in tuberculosis. New methods
were introduced promptly to speed the accom-
plishment. We confidently expect WHO to ex-
pand this worldwide activity.
As the infectious diseases, the historic scourges
of mankind, are gradually brought under control
and eradicated, we find other problems moving
into the foreground of our concern. Two such are
' Bulletin of Apr. 8, 1957, p. 565.
■ lUA., Jan. 27, 1958, p. 115.
i" June 16, 1958
heart disease and cancer. A certain amount is
known about both — enough so that tlie vast im-
charted areas of knowledge concerning them are
recognized, as an explorer recognizes the borders
of a new continent.
Yet we know that intensive exploration will
solve the mysteries of heart disease and of cancer —
that a way will he found. It is even now a ques-
tion of when, not whether. Where is almost im-
material. For the man or woman who achieves
the final breakthrough may come forward in any
part of the world.
The great medical advances over the last cen-
tury evoke names from many countries: Pasteur
and the Curies of France, Koch and Ehrlich of
Germany, Noguchi of Japan, Fleming of Britain,
Houssay of Argentina, Pavlov of Russia, Florey
of Australia, Semmelweiss of Austria, the Mayos
and Salk of the United States. India has given us
the tranquilizei-s ; Switzerland, DDT; Germany,
the sulfa drugs.
What great names and what countries will take
their places on the high pediment of future medi-
cal history we do not yet know. But what is clear
is that, whoever they are, wherever they are, their
achievements will be based on the shared knowl-
edge of scientists everywhere and will benefit aU
mankind.
U.S. Proposal for Research Study
I wish to submit a proposal for your thoughtful
consideration. I pi'opose that the WHO conduct
a special study during the coming year — through
a staff selected for the purpose, working with the
world's leaders in medical research — to determine
how it may most effectively perform its fullest role
in research. If this seems to you to offer promise,
Secretai-y Folsom * has told me that the Depart-
ment of Health, Education, and Welfare, on be-
half of the United States, is prepared to make a
special grant to the Organization for such a pre-
liminary study. From this study, emphasizing
initially cancer and heart disease, we would an-
ticipate the emergence of a plan that would merit
the support of member states. Furthermore, the
United States is prepared to consider providing
substantial support for any somid program that
may result from the study.
'Marion B. Folsom, Secretary of Health, Education,
and Welfare, was head of the U.S. delegation to the 10th
anniversary commemorative session.
991
In research the World Health Organization has
been a stimulator and coordinator, not a doer.
This is as it should be, and we should assure that
it can play this key role with full effect.
The first steps toward the coordination of re-
search have already been taken. By the end of
last year, the WHO had establislied close work-
ing relationships with 1,800 institutions and labo-
ratories. It was making use of 35 expert panels
in as many fields, with a total membership
of 1,400 health experts. It thus is able to stimu-
late and coordinate research in a wide variety of
fields through laboratories in many lands. WHO
facilitation of interchange of ideas and informa-
tion in 1957 included worldwide or regional tech-
nical conferences, seminars and expert committees
in cancer, addiction-producing drugs, heart dis-
ease, malaria, insect resistance to insecticides,
atomic energy, mental health, yellow fever, pro-
fessional education, and other fields.
The sum total of these research activities rep-
resents only a small percentage of the Organiza-
tion's budget. Tlieir significance, however,
cannot be measured in terms of the amounts spent.
One example of this important type of work which
has impressed me was the rapid development of an
effective preventive vaccine against Asian in-
fluenza last year. This was the direct result of
having an internationally coordinated network of
laboratories that received reports on its occur-
rence and determined the prevalence of the causa-
tive virus strain.
The record is impressive. But much more is
needed.
We need more rapid excliange of ideas and in-
formation between laboratories and scientists. We
need more opportunities for scientists to meet to-
gether and discuss freely their work and their
problems. We need to find the gaps in research
and fill them. We need to develop research
workers and give them scope and opportunity.
We must search world-wide to know where disease
occurs and why. We must test, in tlie laboratory,
empirical observations that are made in the field
and in the hospitals. We must examine those ma-
terials and ideas that have persisted through the
centuries as traditions and superstitions in the
folklore of the world.
It is our expectation that out of the special
study which I have proposed the world can,
through the WHO, address itself more vigorously
to finding solutions to the great unsolved myster-
ies of disease. Thus again the WHO would es-
tablisli international patterns of effort which
might lead, as President Eisenhower suggested
last January, to "a full-scale cooperative program
of science for peace."
A reexamination and intensification of its re-
search role is one of the significant challenges be-
fore the World Health Organization. The
United States has faitli in the will and ability of
the WHO to meet this challenge. Our faitli in
the future is based on the perfonnance of the
past — indeed on a decade of accomplislunent
which it is our pride and our privilege to cele-
brate today.
U.S. Recognizes Establishment
of Arab Union
Press release 293 dated May 28
The Government of the United States of
America has today [May 28] recognized that the
necessary constitutional and legislative measures
have been taken by Iraq and by the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan for the establishment of the
Arab Union and has extended its good wishes to
the Union on this occasion.
The Government of the United States lias been
informed that until the time when the Union
takes over the central functions of the two King-
doms, pursuant to the provisions of the consti-
tution of the Arab Union, their external affairs
will remain as they are at the present time. The
matter of the accreditation by the United States
of an ambassador to the Arab Union and by the
Arab Union to the United States does not, there-
fore, arise for the present.
Deparfmenf of Sfafe Bulletin
The United States and Emerging Africa
6y Joseph Palmer M
Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs '
The march of events diu-ing the last few years
and months has brought the erstwhile "dark" con-
tinent into the center of the world arena. I am
sure that as a result of the lectures you have
heard during participation in this pioneermg
course on "Africa South of the Sahara" you, too,
will agree with Vice President Nixon's statement
in his report to the President on his trip to the
area last year tliat "the emergence of a free and
independent Africa is as important to us in the
long run as it is to the people of that continent." ^
I have been asked to outline United States
policy toward Africa. I shall therefore attempt
to speak in general terms but know that you will
bear in mind that there are, in fact, many Af ricas,
even south of the Sahara, and our policy has to be
molded to fit the facts and circumstances of the
different regions and the particular countries and
territories there.
For our purposes tonight, I should like to begin
by outlining five facts which stand out in the
postwar world and which have peculiar pertinence
for Africa and must therefore be considered in
any formulation of United States policy toward
that continent. These are :
One, that there is increasing recognition that no
state can live alone in splendid isolation as a com-
pact self-sufficient island. The independent states
and emerging territories of Africa miderstand
their interdependence with the other nations of the
free woi'ld but seek full recognition and equal
status within the fi'amework of that interdepend-
ence.
'Address made at New Tork University, New Torli,
N.Y., on May 20 (press release 279).
" Bulletin of Apr. 22, 1957, p. 635.
Two, that nationalism is a major world political
force — a force which has resulted in the postwar
creation or reestablishment in Asia and Africa of
20 independent nations inliabited by approxi-
mately three-quarters of a billion people. Of
these 20 new states, 5 are African. We can all
agree that nationalism in its moderate form can be
constructive and bring great benefit to those who
guide it wisely. At the same time we are also
aware that the last 20 years are replete with ex-
amples of the dangei-s which this force poses in
extremist hands.
Three, that the races of the world — of all colors
— are increasingly awakening to the fact they can-
not afford to think and act in exclusive terms.
This is a matter of ui-gent and immediate impor-
tance in those African states and territories where
two or more races live side by side.
Four, that one-third of the world is now living
under Communist domination, which has brought
600 million people under a new and sinister im-
perialism since World War II. This imperial-
ism is now girding itself to threaten Africa.
Five, that a new fact has played an increasing
role in international relations in the last decade or
so — the diplomacy of "peoples speaking to peo-
ples." This unofficial, private diplomacy has be-
come increasingly important in postwar Africa.
I would like to devote the remainder of the
hour to discussing the application of these facts
to United States policy in Africa.
Interdependence
First, the fact of interdependence.
Improved communications are fast making
long remote Africans close neighbors of the rest
of the world, including the United States. Along
witli this development has come a clear apprecia-
tion of how interrelated is free- world security and
how dilifrent we must be to stand ready in all
parts of the world to Iielp create the conditions of
stability, prosperity, and security which are so
vital to our own well-being. World peace and
prosperity are indivisible, and we Americans
share with other like-minded nations great respon-
sibilities in many areas far from our shores in
implementation of this concept.
The interdependence of Africa and Western
Europe is indisputable. The two continents are
essentially complementary areas. The economies
of the Western European powers would suffer
greatly if they M^ere denied access to African mar-
kets, raw materials, and investment opportuni-
ties. Africa, on the other hand, cannot expand
its less highly developed economies without tech-
nical know-how, capital accumulations, export
markets, and finished goods such as those which
Western European and other free-world c<)un-
tries are in a position to provide.
Without exception the European metropolitan
powers recognize the importance of a continued
relationship between them and their African ter-
ritories, however widely they may differ in the
philosophies underlying their policies in their
overseas territories and in the methodology em-
ployed to achieve this objective. Similarly, the
moderate African regimes now in power recog-
nize in most cases the mutual advantage of the
continuance of close ties with the Western World.
The evolution of mutually satisfactory arrange-
ments, adjusted to changed conditions, may well
be decisive in detennining the future stability and
prosperity of both continents.
The United States and the Western World have
a basic interest in increased African economic de-
velopment, which is clearly essential to its sound
political evolution. The size, divei-sity, and needs
of the continent are so great as to require the sym-
pathetic attention of all the countries in the free
world in a position to help, for the needs are be-
yond the capability of any one counti-y to meet.
Nor should one forget that, whereas private cap-
ital can make a tremendous contribution, it can-
not always do this job alone.
The metropolitan powers themselves have rec-
ognized this problem and have committed exten-
sive resources to economic and social development
largely for the projects which are not considered
bankable either by private capital or international
agencies.
The United Nations, through its extended tech-
nical assistance program, through loans from the
International Bank for Reconstruction and De-
velopment, and through other forms of technical
assistance from its affiliated World Health Or-
ganization, Food and Agriculture Organization,
United Nations Children's Fund, and Interna-
tional Labor Organization, is contributing sub-
stantially to African social and economic
development.
The United States has also demonstrated its
willingness to assist in this giant task to the ex-
tent that it can, taking into account the heavy
demands which are made upon it on a worldwide
basis. We have been providing and intend to
continue to provide, in accordance with adminis-
tration policy and subject to congressional ap-
proval, assistance to African countries.
Nationalism
Despite — and not necessarily inconsistent
with — the very practical recognition of the im-
portance of interdependence, it is evident that the
dynamic trend in postwar Africa is the movement
toward self-government and independence.
This great movement is both old and new. For
example, Liberia this July celebrates its 111th
independence day while Ethiopia's independence
dates back to Biblical times. In their postwar
manifestations the same forces which began in
Asia and the Middle East and swept across North
Africa have now spread to sub-Sahara Africa,
where on March 6 last year we saw Ghana gain
its independence and thereby join the new nations
of Libya, the Sudan, Morocco, and Tunisia, all of
which have acquired their independence since
1951.
It is obvious that the success which the free
world demonstrates in accommodating itself to
this dynamic African nationalism may well be
decisive in determining the future orientation of
the continent.
An important indication of the current trend
of African nationalism is found in the resolutions
adopted by the representatives of the eight inde-
pendent African states attending the pan-African
conference held at Accra from April 15 to 22 on
the invitation of Prime Minister Nkrumah.
These resolutions made clear that, generally
Departmenf of State Bulletin
speaking, independent Africa today is led by
moderate men; is zealous to strengthen and safe-
guard its independence, sovereignty, and terri-
torial integrity ; is vitally interested in advancing
itself economically, socially, and culturally; and
is intent on playing an important and responsible
I'ole in world affairs. Although we are not in
accord with all that was said or advocated at
Acci'a, we happily find ourselves in broad agree-
ment— or at least broad understanding — with
much that emerged from the conference.
Despite the dynamic trend of African national-
ism, however, there are still large areas of the
continent where the impact of Western civiliza-
tion has left less of an imprint and the African
remains politically inarticulate. Consequently the
current problem is how to create the most desir-
able conditions for orderly development by edu-
cating an informed, discriminating citizenry,
building durable representative institutions, and
creating a stable economic and social structure in
the veiy limited time available before pressures
become too great to control.
In general it would appear that the present
tempo of African development — the transforma-
tion to self-government and to independence — is
proceeding at a rate conunensurate with the re-
quirements of the situation in most areas.
The United Nations has been an immensely
constructive force in this development. The tnist
teri'itories, of course, have been most directly af-
fected. Under terms of the United Nations Char-
ter, each administering power is charged with
promoting the advancement of its trust teiTitories
toward self-goverimient or independence. As a
result of progress in this respect, the former Brit-
ish Togoland voted to join Ghana in 1057, the
Italian East African Trust Territory of Somalia
is due to obtain its independence in 1960, and
other African trust territories such as French
Togo and Cameroun are evolving rapidly toward
the ultimate objectives of the trusteeship system.
The United Nations has not only pi'ovided op-
portunities for African nationalism to appeal to
international conscience; it has also induced a
sense of responsibility in holding out the prospect
of membership in the community of nations when
statehood is realized. Once membersliip in the
United Nations has been obtained, it provides a
framework for continued responsibility, as well
as security, by relieving leaders of new states
June 76, J 958
from excessive preoccupation with the danger of
external attack. Conversely, the obligations of
United Nations membership also enable African
leadei-s to demonstrate more easily to their citi-
zens the danger of resorting to national adven-
ture themselves.
The United Nations Charter, I feel sure, will
also play a most salutary and necessary role in
African affairs by providing a guide for the
peaceful solution of any disputes which may arise
from boundaries wliich were drawn originally
with inadequate consideration of ethnic, eco-
nomic, and even geographic factors. It is not
always easy for political leaders to witlistand ex-
tremist pressures to engage in an old-fashioned
border dispute or to encourage a dubious irredent-
ism. This is not to say that there may not
be cases in which territorial adjustments will be
necessary, desirable, and in accordance with the
desires and interests of the nations and popula-
tions concerned. But the ability to rise above
mere chauvinism — of which there have been many
heartening demonstrations already — may well be
one of the key indices in assessing the ultimate
success of African nationalism in bringing a
better life to the peoples of Africa. In this regard
a salutary emphasis on a cooperative regional ap-
proach to the exploitation of natural resources
lying in frontier or disputed areas may well offer a
means by which many of the difficult territorial
questions can be reduced to negotiable terms.
The concept of a nation has not hitherto existed
in the historical experience of much of Africa
south of the Sahara. The national vision, in fact,
often materializes only in the course of — and al-
most as a means of — acquiring goverimiental
autonomy. In this respect the national movement
often has the explicit or implicit understanding
of the administering authorities, and in such cases
the construction of the nation becomes a coopera-
tive venture of indigenous and external forces.
But, however nurtured, the concept of the nation
has amazing capacity for taking root and flourish-
ing in this virgin African territory. The heroes
of the national movement acquire by their suc-
cesses the stature which enables them to exert
an appeal and influence throughout the extent of
their territory. There can, in short, be little
doubt that tlie national self-consciousness formed
in this fashion, under the time-contracted condi-
tions prevailing in Africa today, is no less real
995
and viable than that nationalism on other con-
tinents which has the sanction of a long history.
The course of African nationalism, thus far at
least, and particularly when compared with the
development in other parts of the world, has in
most instances been a remarkably sound and rea-
sonable one. The African national movements
which led their countries to statehood in the post-
war period have to a gratifying degree controlled
the temptations, usual to their historical position,
of chauvinism, blind rejection of constructive ex-
ternal influence, and neglect of economic needs
for eye-catching but sterile political maneuvers.
Contemporary Afi-ican national leaders have
by and large assured themselves of a distinguished
place in their national histories — and in interna-
tional esteem — by virtue of statesmanlike modera-
tion and ability to plan soundly for their
countries' futures. Nor should we for a moment
forget that in many cases it has been the far-
sighted policies of the metropolitan powers them-
selves which have given the impetus to this whole-
some development.
The United States favors the orderly transition
from colonial to self-governing status in African
territories. We emphasize in this connection that
self-government and independence carry with
them grave responsibilities to the world commu-
nity and that therefore neither status should be
conferred or acquired lightly. We soberly recog-
nize that in the long run premature independence
may contain as many dangers for Africa as the
temporary postponement of this status.
We may conclude that nascent African nation-
alism means not only the remodeling of the po-
litical map of Africa in the years immediately
ahead but also the transformation of the relation-
ship between the European colonial powers and
Africans. Mutually beneficial relationships are
being sought and found, as we have already noted
in discussing the importance of interdependence.
Racialism and Tribai Rivalries
Complicating the trend toward self-govern-
ment and independence, however, are the problems
of racialism and tribal rivalries. Of Africa's
more than 220 million people, only about 6 million
are European and approximately 750,000 Asian.
Up to 800 tribes are included in the African popu-
lation.
In British East Africa tribal tensions have been
996
as serious a problem as interracial stresses. In
Kenya there is a history of hostility among the
tribes which frequently erupted into warfare be-
fore the British assumetl control. Even more than
half a century later the antagonisms thus gen-
erated are far from healed. In Uganda, where
the racial problem is negligible, a serious difficulty
in the political evolution of the country is the
rivalry between the province of the Buganda tribe
and the three other provinces. Tanganyika has a
somewhat similar, although less acute, problem
in the disparities between, for example, the Wa-
chagga and the various other African peoples of
the trust territory.
Kacialism in Africa takes many forms, all of
them divisive to a regrettable degree but most
of them presently under what is remarkable con-
trol, considering the stresses involved. We may
note in this connection not only misunderstand-
ing and friction between Africans and Europeans
but also between Asians and Africans, between
Arabs and Negroes.
It is often pointed out tliat relationships be-
tween Europeans and Africans have been strained
primarily in areas where Europeans have come as
permanent settlers in large numbers, generally
where the climate and the economic potential have
favored European settlement. In contrast, racial
problems have been relatively minor or tem-
porary in those regions where white settlers are
few and where the role of the European has been
almost exclusively that of administrator, mis-
sionary, teacher, trader, or technician. Ap-
parently, therefore, it is not contact between Euro-
peans and xlfricans per se which gives rise to the
most serious racial problems but an actual or
potential economic and social competition be-
tween these two permanently established racial
groups.
It would be both wrong and futile to draw from
these comments any inference that it was historical
error for Europeans to settle permanently on
African soil. This would be to dismiss the great
benefits which the industry, imagination, and
skills of the European settlers have brought to
their African neighbors. As a moral judgment it
would ignore the facts that the European settle-
ment occurred largely on land which was not being
utilized by the Africans and that the countries
involved are in most cases the only homes the
Europeans know. More importantly, such a con-
Deparfmenf of Sfafe Bulletin
elusion would imply a lack of confidence that men
of differing races and colors, living side by side,
can work out a common destiny based on ideals of
partnership, brotherhood, and justice. Although
this objective is, of coui-se, difficult of realization,
we must reject the pessimistic premise that racial
partnership is an impossible ideal.
There is no simple panacea for the race problem,
and it would be presumptuous of us to propose
one. We are attempting to solve our own race
problems at home in accordance with our tradi-
tions and by a lawful process. We do not intend
to become identified with any conflicting element
in Africa. We do seek to exert a moderating in-
fluence upon all extremists, for we know from
experience that the solution of interracial relation-
ships requires light, not heat ; patience, not midue
pressure.
Communist Imperialism
Casting its shadow over all aspects of contem-
porary Africa is the divisive effort of Soviet im-
perialism to destroy the cooperative ventures of
the free world and to subvert the area to its own
design. At the recent Afi-o- Asian Solidarity Con-
ference in Cairo, the Communists served notice
that Africa is to be a major arena for their future
anticolonial activity. To implement this program
they have established a new apparatus in Cairo
for agitation and subversive activities throughout
the continent.
It is clear that the immediate Communist ob-
jective in Africa is to deny the continent to the
West through fanning anticolonialism, national-
ism, and racism, encouraging neutralism, and
proffering economic assistance cynically billed
as being "without strings." The Communists have
in fact shown some progress in penetrating indi-
vidual African labor organizations, youth groups,
and nationalist organizations. They have assidu-
ously cultivated students, particularly those study-
ing in Europe and the United Arab Republic, with
some success. They have also been successful in
the last 2 years in signing trade agreements with
most of the independent African states. Perhaps
the best example of the sort of situation to which
we must be alert is to be found in the French-
administered U.N. Trust Territory of Cameroim,
where a Commmiist-influenced outlawed minority
party has for the past few years attempted to
June 76, 1958
overthrow by force the freely elected indigenous
government.
On the other hand, and despite some new com-
mercial agreements, Communist trade with Africa
is still at a comparatively low level ; no Communist
parties of importance exist openly anywhere ; and
African trade-union movements have affiliated
with the ICFTU rather than with the Communist-
dominated WFTU. In short, the African has
shown a refreshing and heartening reserve toward
Soviet blandishments.
However, we must not allow this comparatively
favorable situation to give rise to complacency.
We must recognize that the greatest danger of
Communist penetration of Africa arises not so
much from direct Communist activity as from
Western attitudes and deeds. Should the West
falter in its determination and its ability to show
steady progress in the process of accommodation
to the range of problems which you have been
studying here at New York University these last
few months — nationalism, racial problems, eco-
nomic and social development — the road for Com-
munist exploitation will be opened. I am
confident, however, that there is too much wisdom
in Africa and in the free world to permit this to
happen.
"Peoples to Peoples" Diplomacy
Obviously the solution of Africa's many prob-
lems is going to require a great cooperative effort.
And this effort cannot be limited to the public
sector alone. It will require the utilization of
that developing postwar international weapon —
"peoples to peoples" diplomacy.
The activities of American missionaries in
Africa are a prime example of the effectiveness of
the private sector in achieving U.S. objectives in
Africa. Not only have 5,000 American mission-
aries brought an understanding of Christian
ethics, but they have also made a major contribu-
tion to the basic medical, educational, and com-
munity facilities of Africa. In many cases they
have pioneered these fields and have penetrated
far into the interior of the continent to bring their
services to remote populations. Even today they
continue to be responsible for a large part of the
education which the African receives. Our ob-
ligation and Africa's debt to the missionary are
immeasurable in material terms.
997
Historically, American interest in Africa has re-
volved around private trade and humanitarian ac-
tivities. The American Colonization Society, a
private group, was chartered in 1816 by the United
States Congress to help settle on the west coast of
Africa men who had regained their freedom in
this country. Liberia, the area selected, was first
settled in 1822 with both public and private funds.
Subsequently, in 1847, Liberia became the first
African republic.
The contribution of the United States Govern-
ment to Liberian educational, agricultural, public
health, sanitation, highway, and port development
has been considerable since World War II. In
addition American private enterprise has assisted
substantially the efforts of the Liberian Govern-
ment to promote this growth and development of
the economy. For example, the rubber and iron
exports produced by U.S. firms operating in Li-
beria provided that country with 4.5 percent of its
total revenue in 1956. This is indeed a tribute
both to private initiative and to the Liberian Gov-
ernment, which recognized the importance of fos-
tering an atmosphere conducive to such progress.
American private-entei-prise contribution to the
development of African territories has not been
limited purely to trade and revenue. U.S. busi-
ness firms have provided health facilities, techni-
cal training, demonstration of American business
methods, as well as education, housing, and coop-
erative marketing arrangements for their employ-
ees and dependents.
But it is not only in the traditional fields of
trade, investment, and missionary activity that
private initiative is helping achieve U.S. objec-
tives in the continent; it is in other fields, where
peoples go directly to peoples, as well. In addi-
tion to the American Government's exchange-of-
persons programs, there are the activities of the
many private groups now engaged in this field.
The Carnegie, Ford, and Rockefeller Founda-
tions, the Phelps-Stokes Fund, the Wenner-Gren
Fomidation, the Institute of International Edu-
cation, the African-American Institute, and the
Twentieth Century Fund are among those help-
ing Africa and Africans in the fields of education,
aid to students, social and race-relations research,
village community development, and public
health.
Time does not permit my listing all the organi-
zations interested and engaged in African affairs,
but before I leave this subject I must add my ap-
preciation for the role being played by more and
more American universities and colleges, such as
New York University, which are offering courses
and organized studies in African affairs to edu-
cate our youth in the history, problems, and pros-
pects of this great continent.
Conclusions
Some conclusions are perhaps now in order:
First, a stable interdependent relationship be-
tween Africa and the West will emerge in the
long run only to the extent that it is based on
considerations of dignity, sovereignty, equality,
and mutual advantage, both as among peoples and
among states.
Second, we of the West must convince the Afri-
cans that we desire close, friendly, equal relation-
ships for the value of those associations per se
and not solely for any advantage which may ac-
crue to us in the balance-of-power situation in the
world today. The West must, at the same time,
continue to recognize the foi-ce of nationalism
and, as partners, to encourage its evolution into
constructive, responsible channels.
Third, while avoiding identification with any
faction in Africa and preserving our basic prin-
ciple of racial equality, we should continue to ex-
ert a moderating influence as appropriate and
oppose those who seek to exploit racial tensions in
Africa for ulterior purposes. In our own experi-
ence in this country, we must continue to demon-
strate by example our ability to make progress in
developing beneficial and harmonious racial rela-
tionships.
Fourth, the Communists give evidence of gird-
ing themselves for a determined effort to deny
Africa to the free world. The success of the West
in preventing this may depend less on our ability
to convince the Africans of the dangers of com-
munism than on our demonstrating to them in
positive terms the advantages of cooperation with
the West.
Finally, the United States Government alone
cannot achieve all the objectives in Africa of this
nation and its free- world associates. It is essen-
tial that "peoples to peoples" diplomacy — the
whole private-enterprise system — assist in doing
the total job. This diplomacy truly represents
the full strength, the unique versatility — in fact,
the very soul — of America.
Department of State BuHetin
United States Relations With Canada
Statement iy Livingston T. Merchant
Ambassador to Canada ^
Mr. Chairman, I greatly appreciate this oppor-
tunity of appearing before the Foreign Relations
Committee to report on our relations with Can-
ada. I know the deep interest which you have in
our friendly neighbor and ally to the north, and I
welcome your concern that all possible steps be
taken to preserve and strengthen the close rela-
tionships which have developed between our two
countries over the years.
I
It is almost exactly 2 years ago that I took up
my post in Ottawa as United States Ambassador
to Canada. Before my arrival I had some famil-
iarity with the country through visits, both of-
ficial and personal. I had many Canadian
friends. In addition, in the 3 years or so from
1953 to 1956, during which I served as Assistant
Secretai-y of State, I had been responsible to the
Secretary of State for our relations with Canada.
There has never been any doubt in my mind
that from every point of view there is no friendly
country with wliich our relations are more im-
portant than our relations with Canada. This is
true for many reasons : geography ; magnitude of
the trade between us; the size of the investments
citizens of each country own in the other; the
unique position of Canada as the North American
member of the British Commonwealth of Nations ;
the influence of Canada's voice in organizations
such as the United Nations, the North Atlantic
Council, the Organization for European Economic
Cooperation, and the Colombo Plan, in all of
which we also are represented; and, finally, be-
cause the nature of the military tlireat which con-
Made before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
on May 16.
iune 16, J 958
fronts us has impelled us both into common,
cooperative arrangements for jointly defending
this continent.
I have likewise at no time had doubts as to the
fundamental feeling of friendliness existing be-
tween Canadians and the people of our own coun-
try. One should not, however, overlook the fact
that, arising from different histories and partic-
ularly the disparity in size between our popula-
tions and our economies, there exists in the minds
of practically all Canadians, never far from the
surface, the sort of apprehension which I think
we ourselves would have if across our border there
were 10 times as many active, energetic, and at
times restless people burdened with worldwide
responsibilities in a troubled time and hence turn-
ing to our concerns only a fraction of the attention
that we would believe they deserved. I have heard
on all sides in Canada, from Newfoundland to
Vancouver, and from all sorts of people the com-
plaint that the United States takes Canada for
granted. They don't like it; in fact, nobody
wants to be taken for granted.
The variety and complexity of our points of
contact and relationship with Canada mean that
there are problems between us every day. Some
of these arise in the sector of private business,
some in our goverimiental relations. On the
whole, I think I can say that our relations have
been excellent and remain so. Certainly we could
not possibly look for more effective cooperation
than exists in our common defense efforts. As an
example of this, within the past few days notes
have been exchanged between the two Govern-
ments formalizing the arrangements for the joint
air defense of tlie continent.^ Certainly no coun-
For text of notes, see Bulletin of June 9, 19!
999
try is stouter than Canada in its support of the
same principles of freedom and justice that we be-
lieve in both in the United Nations and in other
multilateral forums.
Having said that, I must add that, in my judg-
ment, there have been for a year or more signs of
a change in climate or temperature in our rela-
tions. This change which I think I detect is re-
flected in steadily growing criticism of certain
policies of the United States Government and of
actions which are assumed to reflect policies of the
United States Government. Nonetheless, there is,
as I have said, a basic friendliness and reciprocal
respect between our two countries and a recogni-
tion on the part of each that there is an inescapable
need for the other. This underlying attitude,
however, provides no guaranty that our relations
will be always smooth. I am certain that we can
solve all the problems that arise between us. It
will, however, require on our part — as well as on
the part of Canada — the devotion of the time and
attention necessary to study the facts, to learn the
other's point of view, and then to find answers
which are consciously equitable to both.
I am, therefore, especially pleased that this com-
mittee has chosen to study United States relations
with Canada and that Canada is the one country
to be the subject of a separate and individual
study by this committee. Also a source of deep
satisfaction to me have been several recent study
trips to Canada by Members of the Congress, in-
cluding one last October by the distinguished
chairman of this committee [Senator Theodore
Francis Green] . I sincerely believe that such con-
gressional visits to Canada are of inestimable
value in promoting a better mutual understanding
on both sides of the border of our respective prob-
lems and viewpoints. I earnestly hope that Mem-
bers of both Houses of the Congress will consider
more trips of this sort to Canada in the near
future.
II
The geographic facts of life have inextricably
linked the political, economic, and defense inter-
ests of the United States and Canada. With no
other foreign country are the relations of the
United States as close as with Canada. Because
of the wide range of common interests between
the two countries, the areas of possible friction are
great. This increases the importance and magni-
tude of the task of the maintenance of satisfactory
relations.
1000
The disparity in population and power between
Canada and the United States has understandably
created a defensive reaction on the part of Cana-
dians which takes the form of sensitivity to any
real or fancied slight to Canadian sovereignty.
Notwithstanding the basic soundness of present
Canadian-United States relations, there is in this
rapidly developing nation a growing conscious-
ness of national destiny and nationalism. The
United States must be constantly attentive to this
development and continue to exercise great care
in all aspects of ' relations with this country.
United States representatives both at home and in
Canada must be alert to forestall local irritations
or criticisms.
The growing nationalism in Canada can result
in difficulties, particularly if knowingly or un-
knowingly the United States or its representatives
act in ways which appear to Canadians to infringe
on their sovereignty or appear to overlook eco-
nomic interests which Canadians regard as vital.
Canadian sensitivity to the actions and policies of
the United States is one of the political realities
which cannot be overlooked in handling the prob-
lems inherent in the close relations between the
two countries. This is particularly true of prob-
lems arising in connection with plans for the de-
fense of the North American Continent.
The tremendous importance of Canada, because
of its location, to the security of the United
States is self-evident. Joint defense arrange-
ments with Canada are more extensive and more
complex than with any other single country. In
essence the two countries are defended coopera-
tively and on a continental basis. Annual
United States defense expenditures on old and
new projects in Canada are at least half a billion
dollars a year. Substantial numbers of the
United States Armed Forces are stationed in
Canada. The major part of this personnel,
money, and materiel is committed to the bases in
Newfoundland. A large amount is in such proj-
ects as the Distant Early Warning radar net-
work built across northern Canada at an estimated
cost of $300 million. In addition there are many
other joint projects involving men, equipment,
and dollars on a lesser scale. These projects re-
quire constant and careful attention because of
questions and difficulties over customs duties,
labor laws, and personnel and because of problems
with employees, dependents, transportation, and
related matters. All of these require close co-
Deparfmenf of Stafe Bulletin
operation with the Canadian Government and as-
siduous effort on the part of the United States to
respect and understand the viewpoints of our
Canadian host and ally.
Another important area of joint interest is the
development of the power and water resources of
streams and waterways which lie between or in
both the United States and Canada. There are
some 40 streams which cross the international
border. For optimum development complete co-
operation is required between our two countries.
Steady progress or successful arrangements
have been made in a considerable number of these
involved cases. Among the complex problems
outstanding are those relating to the Kootenay,
Columbia, and Yukon Rivers, all of which rise in
Canada. The development of the Columbia
Eiver basin, for example, involves diverse public
and private entities on both sides of the border.
A solution depends on the completion of joint
engineering studies, which are due to be finished
this fall, and on the extent to which both parties
are able to proceed objectively toward a mutually
advantageous agreement.
A major example of what is possible in the way
of solution to transboundary water matters is the
St. Lawrence Seaway, a difficult problem ulti-
mately transformed into a magnificent engineer-
ing achievement with enormous benefits for both
countries. The Seaway will be officially opened
early next summer.
Canada's emergence since World War II as an
important factor on the international scene has
been one of the remarkable developments of the
postwar period. Canada plays a major role in
NATO, in the United Nations and its organs, in
the Colombo Plan, and in the Commonwealth.
In Indochina it is a member of the International
Control Commissions. In the Middle East Gen-
eral Burns, a Canadian, was until recently Chief
of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervi-
sion Organization and is now Commander of the
United Nations Emergency Force. Canada is a
close friend of the United States and a stanch
supporter of the free world.
A unique factor in our relations with Canada
is that Canadians are informed, as no other peo-
ple are, regarding events and developments in
the United States. As unfortunately so often is
the case abroad, they are particularly well in-
formed about our failings and weaknesses and
June 76, 7958
467759—58 3
somewhat less conscious of our achievements and
qualities. On the other hand, they feel deeply,
and perhaps justifiably, that we in the United
States are relatively uninformed on develop-
ments and the pattern of life and government in
Canada.
Ill
Canada, as far as trade is concerned, is the
best customer of the United States. With a total
foreign trade in 1957 of $10.4 billion, of which
imports were $5.6 billion and exports $4.8 billion,
Canada has the highest per capita foreign trade
of any country in the world and this trade is
of corresponding importance to its economy.
Two-thirds, or $6.9 billion, of Canada's entire
foreign trade was with the United States. Im-
ports from the United States were $4 billion, con-
stituting 73 percent of total Canadian imports.
Exports CO the United States were $2.9 billion, or
60 percent of total Canadian exports. Thus in
1957 Canada had a so-called unfavorable balance
of trade with the United States of $1.1 billion.
This dramatic — and, from the Canadian point of
view, unfavorable — balance of trade increases the
intensity of the Canadian reaction to any pro-
posed measures by the United States to restrict
imports of goods and commodities which Canada
produces, such as oil, lead, zinc, and copper. This
heavy dependence on external trade also adds to
Canada's resentment over the impact of United
States surplus agricultural sales on Canadian ex-
ports of wheat to its traditional markets. I will
say more on this later.
In 1957 over a fifth of total United States for-
eign trade was with Canada. This includes 19.1
percent of United States exports— nearly four
times the amount shipped to the United King-
dom, our next best customer — and 22.3 jiercent of
United States imports — over four times the
amount imported from Brazil, our next most im-
portant supplier. United States foreign trade
with Canada was greater than with the whole of
South America and nearly as great as with all of
Western Europe, excluding the United Kingdom.
To illustrate the importance to us of Canada
as a trading partner, Canada is a major supplier
to the United States of such raw and semiproc-
essed products as newsprint, pulp and pulpwood,
nonferrous metals — nickel, aluminum, copper —
fissionable materials, sawmill products, fish, and
iron ore. Canada in turn provides an important
1001
market for United States manufactures, par-
ticularly industrial machinery, automobiles,
trucks, tractors and parts, electrical machinery
and apparatus, chemicals, iron and steel-mill
products and metal manufactures, petroleum
products, as well as fruits, vegetables, and other
foodstuffs.
United States citizens have approximately $8
billion in dii-ect investment in Canada. In addi-
tion they hold over $4 billion of Canadian Gov-
ernment and municipal bonds and other portfolio
investments. This total long-term private invest-
ment represents about two-fifths of total United
States private long-term foreign investment. The
extent of United States control over Canadian nat-
ural resources and industry implicit in this direct
investment of United States capital is a matter
of deep concern to Canadians. Moreover, the
concern is intensified by the concentration of this
investment in certain key sectors of the Canadian
economy.
IV
As a result of the importance of our economic
relationship, the following five aspects of Ca-
nadian-United States economic relations are of
mounting anxiety to the Canadian Government
and people :
1. The United States-Canadian trade 'balance.
Canada annually buys far more goods and serv-
ices from the United States than it sells to us. I
should note, however, that in the past 6 months
this excess of Canadian purchases over exports
to us has declined.
2. The magnitude of United States direct
equity investment in Canada. Canadians worry
aloud over the extent of United States control
over Canadian natural resources and industry and
the alleged restriction of opportunity for Ca-
nadians to participate in the ownerehip and man-
agement of wholly owned United States subsid-
iaries in Canada.
3. Protectionist trends in the United States.
The Canadians realize that any additional pro-
tectionist measures will increase the existing im-
balance of trade. Many Canadians consider the
United States tariff the major reason why Ca-
nadian exports are largeJy raw or semiprocessed
rather than products processed in Canada.
4. United States wheat disposal policies. This
has been a major irritant between tlie two coun-
1002
tries. "VVlieat is far greater in importance to the
Canadian economy than to the United States.
For the year ending June 30, 1957, United States
wheat stocks were reduced by 125 million bushels,
from 1,034 million to 909 million. In the same
period Canadian stocks increased by 143 million
bushels, from 580 million bushels to 723 million
bushels for the Canadian crop year ending July
31. About 44 percent of Canadian wheat is
farm-stored, and farmers are unable to obtain
payment for it until it can be delivered to the
local elevator. Canadians consider that we "give
away" our surplus wheat, drawing on our greater
resources to pay our wheat fanners, and thereby
undermine Canada's export trade in wheat. Can-
ada cannot afford to give away much wheat; it
is far too essential an element of Canada's ex-
port trade.
5. Oil. Canadians have watched happily but
warily United States capital come to develop
Canada's western oil resources. They know their
resources cannot be effectively developed unless
there is access to their natural market in the
northern and western United States. Canadians
hope that we will keep this market open to their
oil, and they have trouble understanding our
reasons for limiting oil imports. They consider
themselves closely linked with us in defense, as
indeed they are. They ask why oil is different
from air defense.
During both last year's and this year's election
campaigns. Prime Minister Diefenbaker has per-
sistently advocated vigorous remedies and strong
approaches to the United States in finding solu-
tions for these problems. Since becoming Prime
Minister on June 21, 1957, he has reiterated his
determination to increase Canada's wheat sales;
to correct, at least partially, the imbalance of
trade between Canada and the United States and
the heavy dependence of Canada on the United
States market; to insure that future inflow of
investment capital into Canada is used for what
he terms "tlie benefit of Canada and the Ca-
nadians"; and to promote greater processing in
Canada of Canadian natural resources. Mr. Die-
fenbaker can be expected to continue to protest
eloquently and with vigor what he considei-s pro-
tectionist actions by the United States, while at the
same time yielding to protectionist pressure groups
Department of State Bulletin
in Canada by imposing restrictions on certain cate-
gories of imports. Canadian officials have repeat-
edly reaffirmed Canada's intention to observe its
connnitments under the General Agreement on
Tarift's and Trade. At the same time they point
out that the flexibility of their commercial agi'ee-
ments provides "certain areas of maneuverability."
Canadian producers of agricultural and min-
eral products, and especially of manufactured
goods, have been pressing their Government for
action to give protection to Canadian-produced
goods through tariffs, subsidies, quotas, or other
means, primarily against American competition.
For example, the Canadian Manufacturers Asso-
ciation has launched a "Buy Canadian" cam-
paign; Alberta oil producers want a subsidized
pipeline; and fruit and vegetable growers are
clamoring against what they claim is United
States "dumping." Canadian port and trans-
portation interests are also alert to the possibility
of persuading the Govennnent to help them too.
We have important economic interests in the
Canadian market. I do not believe that we can
expect to hold our position there unless the
United States Government pursues liberal trad-
ing policies. The Canadian Government will
take care of Canadian interests as it sees them.
Our hope must be that it will continue to consider
Canadian interests best served by expanded trade
and investment in a cooperative environment.
VI
You will note that I have placed the greatest
emphasis in this report on our economic relations
with Canada. I have done so because the prob-
lems which arise from our economic relations are
today uppermost in the minds of the Canadian
Government and people. I say soberly and seri-
ously that, if we do not take all feasible steps to
minimize what the Canadians regard as the
harmful aspects of our economic policies, the con-
sequences will be adverse to our otherwise basi-
cally good and close relations with Canada. They
will also be harmful to our own economy in dol-
lars and cents. I sincerely hope that mutually
satisfactory solutions may be found. In this re-
gard, for example, Canadians have been watching
closely the debate in the United States on the re-
newal of the Trade Agreements Act, the extension
of which will connote to them evidence of our de-
sire to cooperate with Canada in the economic
field. Such action will serve to moderate the real
danger of a rising protectionist trend in Canada.
The Conservative victories in the June 10, 1957,
and March 31, 1958, Canadian elections inevitably
will lead to a reexamination of major Canadian
Government policies with significant implications
for the entire spectrum of United States-Cana-
dian relations. The strongly nationalistic atti-
tude of the Conservatives may complicate the
maintenance of relatively easy relations with the
United States. Nevertheless I am convinced that
with good will, effort, and attention on our part
to Canadian problems and viewpoints we can
overcome any difficulties which may arise.
VII
In conclusion I would like to say a word on two
subjects. The first is the character of United
States representation in Canada and the second
on what the Congress and in particular this com-
mittee might do to maintain and improve our ex-
isting relations with Canada.
We have, of coui'se, an Embassy in Canada's
capital, Ottawa. In a sense it is one of the few
prewar-type embassies in that there is attached to
it no MAAG [Military Assistance Advisory
Group], no ICA [International Cooperation Ad-
ministration] mission, and no USIA [U.S. In-
formation Agency] mission. As you know, Can-
ada receives from us no mutual defense assistance
and no economic aid. During the war and after,
Canada paid cash for everything it received from
us. Canada has never been the beneficiary of any
lend-lease or assistance program. In fact, Can-
ada has a very substantial program of its own in
both military and economic aid. Canada's assist-
ance to other members of NATO in the form of
weapons and military aid has been over a billion
dollars. Translated into terms of our own popu-
lation, this is the equivalent of more than 10 bil-
lion U.S. dollars. Similarly, Canada's economic
assistance to other countries, notably through the
Colombo Plan, is and has been roughly compara-
ble to our own economic aid program in the same
area, if one adjusts for the difference in popula-
tion between the United States and Canada.
Consequently there is in our Embassy no need for
a MAAG or an ICA mission. I might say, how-
ever, that it is my strong desire that a small
ITSIA mission be established in Canada, work-
in.'j; closely, of course, with the Embassy.
June 76, 7958
1003
We also have across Canada, from Newfound-
land to Vancouver, 12 consular posts. The com-
petence and the devotion to duty of the entire offi-
cial staff throughout all of Canada is of the high-
est order. I am proud of them, and I think, as
you come individually to know them, you will be
too.
Now, for some of the things which it seems to
me the Congress in its area of responsibility can
do to help our relations.
First, I would hope that all of you would
maintain a continuing interest in Canada and in
its problems. Canada is a proud and independ-
ent country. Any implication— however friendly
and well-meant^that Canada is sort of a 49th
state infuriates Canadians. They are rightly
proud of their country, its bigness, and its future.
In fact, they like occasionally to point out to
Texans that 6 out of their 10 provinces are larger
than Texas. I hope that increasingly Members
of the Congress and particularly of this commit-
tee will visit Canada for the purpose of meeting
Canadian officials and business and labor leaders,
coming to know the country, its people, and its
concerns.
Secondly, I beg that you bear in mind Canada
and its importance to us in the consideration of
any future legislation which may affect directly
or indirectly Canada's national life, economy, and
interests. Obviously we must legislate in the in-
terest of the United States and not primarily in
the interest of any foreign country. Notwith-
standing, our interest must always be an enlight-
ened self-interest, and it is to our clear advantage
to consider the effect a bill may have on Canadian
interests and take into account the Canadian point
of view. If the resultant legislation may not be
all that the Canadians would wish, at least this
result should not come from negligence or inad-
vertence or failure adequately to consult the Cana-
dian Government in advance.
And then I would like to leave this final thought
with you: Every informed Canadian in Govern-
ment and in private life is watching intently the
progress of the legislation now before the Con-
gress for the extension of our Trade Agreements
Act. If tragically that act should fail or be muti-
lated in passage, the Canadians are going to draw
a very important conclusion from such a disaster.
They are going to conclude that we are not a
reliable trading partner and that our great and
1004
farsighted program of trade liberalization is
dead. The consequences which would then flow
from such a Canadian conclusion would have, I
think, an immeasurable effect on our position as
exporter to the Canadian market and on the avail-
ability to us of Canada as a dependable supplier
of vital goods and materials and, last, not least,
might adversely affect the general tone and char-
acter of our relationship in the defense of this
continent. If I may close on an understatement —
these consequences would not be good for the
United States.
Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy
SSth Congress, 2d Session
Control and Reduction of Armaments. Hearing before
a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations pursuant to S. Res. 93, S. Res. 185, and S. Res.
286, 84th Congress ; S. Res. 61 and S. Res. 241, SSth Con-
gress. Part 17, April 16 and 17, 1958. 162 pp.
Mutual Security Act of 1958. Report of the House Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs on H. R. 12181 to amend fur-
ther the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, and
for other purposes. H. Rept. 1696, May 7, 1958.
124 pp.
Mutual Security Program in Laos. Hearings before the
Subcommittee on the Far East and the Pacific of the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs. May 7 and 8,
1958. 78 pp.
Message from the President of the United States trans-
mitting a report on the barriers to international travel
and ways and means of promoting, developing, en-
couraging, and facilitating such travel. H. Doc. 381,
May 12, 1958. 52 pp.
Report of the delegation appointed to attend the Com-
monwealth Parliamentary Association Meeting in New
Delhi, India, December 9-10, 1957. S. Doc. 100, May
12, 1958. 35 pp.
Importation of Certain Sound Recordings and Film. Re-
port to accompany H. R. 7454. S. Rept. 1554, May 12,
19.58. 4 pp.
Inviting International Civil Aviation Organization To
Hold Its Twelfth Assembly In United States. Report
to accompany S. J. Res. 166. S. Rept. 1584, May 14,
1958. 6 pp.
Authorizing the Transfer of Naval Vessels to Friendly
Foreign Countries. Report to accompany S. 3506. S.
Rept. 1583, May 14, 1958. 7 pp.
Second Annual Report on the Trade Agreements Pro-
gram. Jlessage from the President of the United States
transmitting the second annual report on the operation
of the trade agreements program, pursuant to section
350 (e) (i) of the Tariff Act of 1930 as amended
by section 3 (d) of the Trade Agreements Extension
Act of 1955. H. Doc. 384, May 19, 1958. 55 pp.
Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1958. Report of the
House Committee on Ways and Means to accompany
H. R. 12591. a bill to extend the authority of the Presi-
dent to enter into trade agreements under section 350
of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, and for other
purposes. H. Rept. 1761, May 21, 1958. 135 pp.
Department of State Bulletin
Suspension of Duties on Metal Scrap. Report to accom-
pany H. R. 10015. S. Rept. 1618, May 21, 1958. 4 pp.
Authorizing Appropriation of an Additional Sum Re-
<iuired for Completion of the Inter-American Highway.
Report to accompany H. R. 7870, May 21, 1958. 7 pp.
The National Space Program. Report of the Select Com-
mittee on Astronautics and Space Exploration. H.
Rept. 1758, May 21, 1958. 236 pp.
Report of the special study mission to Canada compris-
ing Brooljs Hays and Franlc M. Coffin of the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs, pursuant to H. Res. 29,
a resolution authorizing the Committee on Foreign Af-
fairs to conduct thorough studies and investigations of
all matters coming within the jurisdiction of such com-
mittee. H. Rept. 1766, May 22, 1958. 15 pp.
Report to Congress on the Mutual Security Program for
the Six Months Ended December 31, 1957. H. Doc.
368, May 22, 1958. 32 pp.
Inviting International Civil Aviation Organization To
Hold Its Twelfth Assembly in the United States. Re-
port to accompany S. J. Res. 166. H. Rept. 1768,
May 23, 1958. 4 pp.
Relative to the Establishment of Plans for the Peaceful
Exploration of Outer Space. Report to accompany H.
Con. Res. 332. H. Rept. 1769, May 23, 1958. 2 pp.
HJstablishment of the National Space Program. Report
of the Select Committee on Astronautics and Space Ex-
ploration on H. R. 12575. H. Rept. 1770, May 24, 1948.
39 pp.
National Aeronautics and Space Act. Hearings before the
Senate Special Committee on Space and Astronautics
on S. 3609, a bill to provide for research into problems
of flight within and outside the earth's atmosphere, and
for other purposes. Part 1, May 6-8, 1958, 245 pp.;
Part 2, May 13-15, 1958 ; 166 pp.
Relative to the Establishment of Plans for the Peaceful
Exploration of Outer Space. Hearing before the Sub-
committee on National Security and Scientitic Develop-
ments Affecting Foreign Policy of the House Committee
on Foreign Affairs on H. Con. Res. 326, a concurrent
resolution relative to plans for the peaceful exploration
of outer space. May 20, 1958. 34 pp.
The Mutual Security Act of 1958. Report of the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations on H. R. 12181 to-
gether with individual views. S. Rept. 1627, May 26,
1958. 90 pp.
Amending the Act of August 5, 1953, Creating the Corregi-
dor Bataan Memorial Commission. Report to accom-
pany H. R. 10069. H. Rept. 1771, May 26, 1958. 5 pp.
Authorizing the Appropriation of Funds to Finance the
1961 Meeting of the Permanent International Associa-
tion of Navigation Congresses. Report to accompany
H. R. 11305. H. Rept. 1832, May 29, 1958. 2 pp.
Report of the Special Study Mission to the Near East and
Africa comprising Wayne L. Hays, chairman, Barratt
O'Hara, and Marguerite Stitt Church of the Hou.se Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs. H. Rept. 1834, May 29, 1958.
38 pp.
Authorizing the Appointment of One Additional Assistant
Secretary of State. Report to accompany S. 1832. H.
Rept. 1843, June 2, 1958. 5 pp.
U.S. Protests Soviet Action
Concerning American Diplomat
Presa release 273 dated May 19
On May 17, 195&, the day following his return
to Moscow, Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson
called on Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko to
protest the action of the Soviet Government 3 days
June 16, 1958
earlier in declaring Jolm A. Baker, Jr., a second
secretary of the American Embassy in Moscow,
persona, non grata.
The American Embassy first learned of this
Soviet action on May 14, 1958, when the chief of
the American section of the Soviet Ministry of
Foreign Affairs summoned the American Charge
d'Afl'aires ad interim to his office and read the fol-
lowing :
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has information that
Second Secretary of Embassy John A. Baker, who last
year was permitted to attend lectures in the historical
faculty of the Moscow University, has systematically vio-
lated the norms of behavior for diplomatic representatives.
Inasmuch as this behavior does not correspond to his
status as an accredited diplomatic representative, his fur-
ther presence in the Soviet Union is considered
undesirable.
The Soviet official added tliat he understood Mr.
Baker was outside the Soviet Union, and, there-
fore, the reentiy visa granted him before he left
should be considered annulled. (Mr. Baker had
departed Moscow a few days previously for West-
ern Europe and was due to return to his post at
Moscow by the first of June.)
No explanation of this action was given to the
American Charge except to admit that the Soviet
complaint of improper behavior centered around
his conduct at the Moscow University, where Mr.
Baker was attending a weekly lecture course on
Kussian medieval history.
In his protest to Foreign Minister Gromyko,
Ambassador Thompson was unable to obtain any
details regarding Mr. Baker's alleged improper
conduct. Mr. Gromyko merely reiterated the al-
legations that Mr. Baker's conduct had violated
the norms of diplomatic conduct applicable in any
country and expressed the hope that the conduct
of Embassy officers would be such that similar
measures would not be necessary in the future.
Ambassador Thompson pointed out that the
Embassy had taken great pains to assure that of-
ficers conducted themselves in a manner com-
patible with their status as diplomatic represent-
atives; that he knew Mr. Baker to be an able and
discreet officer; and that, lacking knowledge of
what conduct had incurred Soviet displeasure, the
Embassy would not know how to avoid such
developments in the future.
In the absence of any further explanation, the
American Government can only surmise that the
1005
friendly contacts which grew up between the 30-
yeai--old American diplomat and his Soviet fellow
students became a source of embarrassment or con-
cern to Soviet authorities.
The treatment accorded Mr. Baker contrasts
sharply with the free opportunity enjoyed by
Soviet diplomats in this country to attend courses
at American universities, dependent only on ad-
mission policies of the universities themselves.
During the past academic year at least 10 Soviet
officials have attended university courses in Wash-
ington or New York.
United States Mining Experts
Visit Soviet Union
Press release 281 dated May 20
In accordance with the U.S.-U.S.S.K. exchange
agreement of January 27, 1958,^ a delegation of
19 American steel and iron-mining experts, or-
ganized and financed by the American Iron and
Steel Institute, will leave on May 22 to observe
steel and mining installations throughout the
Soviet Union. Reciprocally, a Soviet delegation
will visit the United States sometime this summer.
The American delegation, headed by Edward
Ryerson, director and former chairman of In-
land Steel Company, and John A. Stephens, vice
president of the United States Steel Corporation,
will spend a month visiting steel installations in
Zaporozhe, Dnepropetrovsk, Krivoi Rog, Voro-
shilovsk in the Dombas, Sverdlovsk, Stalinsk,
Tula, Magnitogorsk, Nikopol, and Moscow. Iron-
mining facilities to be visited include those lo-
cated at Kursk, Krivoi Rog, Kerch, Sokolov-
Serbay, Tula, Magnitogorsk, Stalinsk, Leningrad,
and Moscow.
Following are additional meriibers of the
American delegation :
James B. Austin, administrative vice president for re-
search and teclinology, United States Steel Corpora-
tion
Floyd S. Eckhardt, assistant general manager, Lacka-
wanna Plant, Bethlehem Steel Company
Michael O. Holowaty, chief research engineer, Research
and Development Department, Indiana Harbor Works,
Inland Steel Company
Stephen M. Jenks, administrative vice president for cen-
tral operations. United States Steel Corporation
Everett L. Joppa, general manager. Lake Superior Iron
Mining Division, Pickands Mather and Company
Kenneth C. McCutcheon, consultant, Armco Steel Cor-
poration
Norwood B. Melcher, chief, Pyrometallurgical Labora-
tory, Bureau of Mines, Department of the Interior
Gunther Mohling, chief metallurgist. Research Labora-
tory, Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corporation
F. M. Rich, general manager, Indiana Harbor Works,
Inland Steel Company
Earl C. Smith, director of research and chief metal-
lurgist. Republic Steel Corporation
Julius H. Strassburger, assistant vice president for en-
gineering. National Steel Corporation
Irwin H. Such, editor in chief. Steel magazine
George F. Sullivan, editor. Iron Age magazine
Dmitri N. Vedensky, director of research and develop-
ment. The M. A. Hanna Company
Michael F. Yarotsky, division superintendent for steel
production, South Works, United States Steel Cor-
poration
M. Gardner Clark, professor, New York State School of
Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University
Merle R. Thompson, secretary. Foreign Relations Com-
mittee, American Iron and Steel Institute
U.S. Proposes Easing Travel Bans
on Reciprocal Basis With U.S.S.R.
Press release 286 dated May 24 (for release May 25)
DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT
In a note delivered on May 22, 1958, to the So-
viet Embassy at AVashington the U.S. Govern-
ment offei-ed to open any or all of the areas in the
United States closed to Soviet travel on the basis
of reciprocity for equivalent closed areas in the
Soviet Union. The U.S. note also offered to
open, on the basis of reciprocity, any or all of the
25 largest cities of the United States closed to So-
viet travel and a number of closed automobile
routes.
In its note the Department of State pointed
out that the U.S. Govermnent remains firm in its
preference for the complete abolition of closed
zones and that it continues to await a reply to its
proposal of November 11, 1957,^ to abolish them.
For text, see Bulletin of Feb. 17, 1958, p. 243.
1006
' Bulletin of Dec. 9, 1957,
Department of State Bulletin
Wlien the U.S. Government instituted travel
restrictions in 1952,^ it stated that these restric-
tions were imposed in response to Soviet restric-
tions, which had already been in effect for a num-
ber of 3'eai-s. Since that time, the U.S. Govern-
ment has repeatedly proposed that the Soviet and
United States Governments consider liberalizing
travel restrictions on a reciprocal basis. On Au-
gust 28, 1957,^ the Soviet Government stated its
willingness to discuss this question, and, in reply,
the U.S. Government proposed the total abolition
of closed zones on November 11, 1957. The So-
viet Government has neither replied to the U.S.
counterproposal nor put forward any proposals
of its own to open any closed areas in the Soviet
Union.
U.S. NOTE OF MAY 22
The Secretary of State presents his compli-
ments to His Excellency the Ambassador of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and has the
honor to refer to the not« of November 11, 1957
from the Department of State concerning travel
regulations in the Soviet Union and the United
States. After making reference to the Soviet
Foreign Ministry's note No. 335/Pr of August 28,
1957 in which the Ministry stated that it was
ready to discuss the question of opening a num-
ber of cities and localities in the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics for visits by foreigners on a
basis of reciprocity, the Department's note stated
that the United States Government would prefer
the mutual abolition of all zones in the United
States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-
lics which are closed to travel or visits by citizens
of the other country. The United States Govern-
ment proposed the abolition of these closed zones.
The Soviet Government has not yet made a reply
to this proposal of the Government of the United
States.
In view of tlie failure of the Soviet Govern-
ment to respond to the proposal of the United
States to abolish closed zones, and with the ob-
jective of facilitating an agreement to open at
least some areas on a reciprocal basis, the Govem-
'/6i(i., Mar. 24, 1952, p. 451.
' Ibid., Dec. 9, 1957, p. 936.
June 76, J 958
ment of the United States liereby proposes a par-
tial easing of travel restrictions. This proposal
is made without prejudice to the proposal to abol-
ish closed zones contained in tlie United States
note of November 11, 1957. The Government of
the United States remains finn in its preference
for the abolition of closed zones and wishes to
state that it continues to await a reply to its
proposal of November 11, 1957.
In the absence of any specific proposals from
the Soviet Government concerning a partial eas-
ing of travel restrictions, tlie Government of the
United States for its part has prepared certain
concrete proposals to tliis end for the considera-
tion of the Soviet Government.
All closed areas in the United States have been
divided into individual groupings of States or
zones and each of these groupings has been paired
with approximately equivalent closed areas in
the Soviet Union. The United States Government
is prepared immediately to open any or all of these
areas in the United States to Soviet travel and
visits on the basis of a reciprocal opening of the
paired Soviet areas. A list of these areas is
enclosed.
Each of the twenty-five largest cities in the
United States which are presently closed has been
paired with an equivalent closed Soviet city. The
United States Government is prepared immedi-
ately to open any or all of these cities in the
United States to Soviet travel and visits on the
basis of a reciprocal opening of the paired Soviet
city or cities. A list of these cities is enclosed.
Finally, a number of automobile routes through
closed zones in the United States have been paired
with equivalent automobile routes in the Soviet
Union. The United States is prepared immedi-
ately to open any or all of these automobile routes
to Soviet travel on the basis of reciprocity. A list
of these automobile routes is enclosed.
The views of the Soviet Government on these
proposals would be appreciated.
Department of State,
Washington, May 22, 1958.
Enclosures :
1. List ot closed areas In the Soviet Union and the United
States (List A).
2. List of twenty-flve closed cities in the Soviet Union and the
United States (List B).
3. List of automobile routes in the Soviet Union and the
United States (LlstC).
1007
List A
Closed Areas in the Soviet Union
U.S.S.R. (oblasts, unless otherwise noted) *
, Moscow 1-
Kaluga
Vladimir
Leningrad ^•
Western oblasts of Ukrainian S.S.R.
Gorki 3-
Mordvinian A.S.S.R.
, Molotov 4.
Sverdlovsk
Chelyabinsk
Udmurt A.S.S.R.
, Taimyr National Okrug 5.
AND THE United States
V.8.A.'
Maryland
Primorski Krai 6-
Kamchatka
Chukchi National Okrug
Khabarovski Krai
Buryat-Mongol A.S.S.R. 7.
The Apsheronski Peninsula and the raions of the Azer-
baidzhan S.S.R. located south of the automobile high-
way Baku-Kirovabad-Tbilisi
Nakhichevan A.S.S.R.
Water travel on the Yenisei River
Dzhambul, Taldy-Kurgansk, Alma-Ata, Karaganda, Pav- 8.
lodar, and Semipalatinsk (Kazakh S.S.R.)
Frunze, Issyk-Kul, Talas, and Tyan-Shan (Kirgiz S.S.R.)
Tashkent (Uzbek S.S.R.)
Tadzhik S.S.R.
Kara-Kalpak A.S.S.R. 9.
Krasnovodisk (Turkmen S.S.R.)
Astrakhan
Stalingrad
Gurev and Zapadno-Kazakhstan (Kazakh S.S.R.)
, 25-kilometer zone along the frontier of the Soviet Union 10.
with Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan
, 25-kilometer zone along the frontier of the Soviet Union 11.
with Norway and Finland
All of closed area within radius of 125 miles from Moscow 12.
All of closed area within radius of 125 miles from 13,
Leningrad
New Hampshire
Rhode Island
Connecticut
Nebraska
Kansas
Pennsylvania
New Jersey
Delaware
North Dakota
South Dakota
South Carolina
Georgia
Florida
Arizona***
Nevada
Alabama
New York State
Massachusetts
Virginia
West Virginia
Washington
Idaho
Montana
Northern Texas
Oklahoma
Kentucky
Southern Indiana
Missouri
Western & Southern Illinois
Iowa
Southeastern Texas***
Louisiana
Colorado
New Mexico***
California***
Ohio***
Michigan***
Northern Indiana
Northeastern Illinois
Wisconsin***
10. 25-kilometer zone along the frontier of the Soviet Union 10. 15-mile zone along Mexican border as specified In
Department's note of January 3, 1955*
11. 25-kilometer zone along the frontier of the Soviet Union 11. 15-mile zone along shores of Great Lakes as specified
in Enclosure 1 of Department's note of January 3,
1955
12. All of closed area within radius of 125 miles from Moscow 12. All of closed area within 125 miles from Washington,
District of Columbia
13. All of closed area within radius of 125 miles from 13. All of closed area within 125 miles from New York,
New York
(*) Soviet administrative units are listed by the names given them in the Soviet notes of June 22, 1953° and
August 28, 1957, which together with the Soviet note of November 12, 1053 informed the United States Government
of Soviet closed areas. It is possible that the names and the delineation of some areas may have been changed since
the time of the notes cited above. In some cases open cities and routes and other open places exist in otherwise closed
areas. The closed areas are to be understood in each case to be all closed areas in that part of the Soviet Union included
in the Soviet area listed, as of the time of the Soviet notes referred to above.
(**) The areas included in each State or region of a State listed are those areas which were closed to travel by
Soviet citizens by the notes of the United States Government of January 3, 1955 and November 11, 1957. In some
cases only a small part of a State or region of a State listed is closed to travel by Soviet citizens. In some cases, too,
open cities and routes and other open places exist in otherwise closed areas.
(***) Not including 15-mile border zones as specified in Department's note of January 3, 1955.
* Ibid., Jan. 31, 1955, p. 193.
'Ibid., p. 197.
1008
Department of State Bulletin
Closed Cities in the Soviet Union and the United States
1. Novosibirsk
2. Sverdlovsk
3. Chelyabinsk
4. Molotov
5. Omsk
6. Yerevan
7. Karaganda
8. Krasnoyarsk
9. Nizhnly Tagil
10. Magnitogorsk
11. Izhevsk
12. Tomsk
13. Vladivostok
14. Ulan-Ude
15. Kopeysk
IG. Dzerzhinsk
17. Zlatoust
18. Semipalatinsk
19. Kamensk-Ural'skiy
20. Sevastopol
21. Orekhovo-Zuyevo
22. Leninakan
23. Voroshilov
24. Nikolaev
25. Kerch
U.S.A.
Los Angeles, California (partially open)
Detroit, Michigan
San Francisco, California
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
Seattle, Washington
Newark, New Jersey
Dallas, Texas
Indianapolis, Indiana
Memphis, Tennessee
Oakland, California
Columbus, Ohio
Louisville, Kentucky
San Diego, California
Rochester, New York
Atlanta, Georgia
Birmingham, Alabama
St. Paul, Minnesota
Toledo. Ohio
Akron, Ohio
Long Beach, California
Providence, Rhode Island
Dayton, Ohio
Syracuse, New York
Norfolk, Virginia
Hartford, Connecticut
(*) The names of Soviet cities are given as they appear in Narodnoe Khozyaistvo, State Statistical Publishing
House, Moscow, 1956.
List C
Closed Automobile Routes in the Soviet Union and the United States
U.S.S.R.
Direct highway from Moscow 1
Any two of following highways from Mos-
cow to open area : Volokolamsk, Dmitrov
Enthusiasts', Ryazan, Kashira, Kaluga.
Any of three highways named in 2 above.
U.S.A.
Smolensk. 1. U.S. Highway 111 from Baltimore, Maryland to Harrisburg, Pennsyl-
vania ; U.S. Highway 15 from Harri-sburg to edge of open zone south
of Williamsport, Pennsylvania ; New York State Thruway from east
edge of Erie County, New York to Buffalo, New York ; Highways 265
and 324 from Buffalo to Niagara Falls, New York.
2. Following route from W^ashington, District of Columbia: Highway
U.S. 240 and U.S. 40 to Hancock, Maryland ; U.S. 522 to Warfords-
burg, Pennsylvania ; Pa. 126 to Pennsylvania Turnpike ; Pennsylvania
Turnpike to Ohio state line; Ohio Turnpike to U.S. 21; U.S. 21 to
Cleveland, Ohio.
3. Route described in 2 above from Washington to Cleveland, plus Ohio
Turnpike from Junction with U.S. 21 to Indiana state Une, Indiana
Turnpike to Illinois state line.
June 16, 1958
1009
U.S. Replies to Czechoslovak Charges
Concerning Free Europe Committee Balloons
Press release 261 dated May 14
DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT
John M. Allison, American Ambassador to
Czechoslovakia, delivered on May 14 to the
Czechoslovak Government a note in reply to two
not&s of the Czechoslovak Government, dated
June 19, 1956, and February 20, 1957. The
Czechoslovak Government had, in its first note,
made a demand on the U.S. Government for
5,525,374 Czechoslovak crowns on the charjje tliat
the U.S. Government was responsible for an
alleged crash of a Czechoslovak Airlines DC-3
type passenger aircraft on January 18, 1956, in
eastern Czechoslovakia.
In a note of October 9, 1956, the United States
had reserved a reply to this claim pending an
answer from the Czechoslovak Government to cer-
tain questions concerning the details of the alleged
crash. That note had requested a copy of the
report of the special commission which the
Czechoslovak Government alleged had investi-
gated the causes of the crash and permission for
accredited U.S. investigators to examine the
origination of all documents, visit and inspect
the scene of the crash, make checks on the infor-
mation available, and make photographs neces-
sary to a comprehensive investigation of the facts
relating to the crash and its causes. In its note
of reply of February 20, 1957, the Czechoslovak
Government refused to supply any of the infor-
mation requested or to permit any investigation;
it alleged that the airplane was Czechoslovak, the
flight was domestic, and the passengers were
Czechoslovak citizens, but reassei-ted its demand
on the United States for payment in full. It
gave, however, a resume of the alleged facts.
The U.S. Government's note, delivered on May
14, is the result of careful investigation of the
allegations of both Czechoslovak notes. It points
out that, in view of the Czechoslovak Govern-
ment's refusal to permit an investigation by the
U.S. Government, the legal presumption must
prevail that the Czechoslovak Government's claim
is, in fact, not supported by any evidence and
certainly not by the evidence found by the in-
vestigating commission. These facts alone, it is
pointed out, would justify the rejection of the
claim.
Inasmuch, however, the note proceeds, as the
alleged crash is claimed to have involved large
loss of life, and other considerations, the U.S.
Government has made its own investigation.
The United States has found that the account
of the incident in the Czechoslovak Government's
note is "a confection of some fact with much
fiction." Specifically it points out that the alleged
Free Europe Committee balloon, claimed to liave
been carrying propaganda leaflets for distribu-
tion in Czechoslovakia and claimed to have col-
lided with the airplane, causing it to crash, does
not correspond in description with the types of
balloons used by the Free Europe Committee. It
also points out that the pamphlets allegedly
found near the scene of the crash by the Czecho-
slovak investigators were flown into Czechoslo-
vakia the day after the crash or long before the
crash, and would in no circumstances be near the
scene of the crash and at the time of the crash,
or at any time which would cause them to be
present there. This is supported by numerous
facts cited in the note.
The U.S. Government further points out that,
apart from the doubts that the Czechoslovak air-
craft involved was truly a DC-3, experiments
with a DC-3 caused to collide with Free Europe
Committee balloons have shown that disabling of
the aircraft, particularly by injury to the antenna
1010
Department of State Bulletin
( which the Czechoslovak Government claims was
the only part of the aircraft hit by the balloon)
is not possible. It points out that the Czecho-
slovak Government itself found no injury to the
control mechanism of the crashed aircraft when
it was examined. The note points out further
the Czechoslovak Government's account is in-
herently improbable and that there are "a good
many other more likely explanations for the crash
of January 18, 1956, than the speculation con-
tained in the note of February 20, 1957."
The U.S. note then considers the likely ex-
planations of the crash, all based on actual evi-
dence which U.S. investigators have found.
These are the following :
First, the Czechoslovak Airlines authorities dis-
patched the plane to fly, according to the Czech-
oslovak Government's account, in lack of visibil-
ity under circumstances in which the airport of
destination, the Poprad airfield in the High Tatra
Mountains, could not be seen from the air, in
extremely high wind velocity, in icing conditions,
and with a maximum load. It points out tliat
the aiiTraft must have been blown off couree and
crashed into a hill 12.6 miles north of the alleged
point of destination. It is obvious that the pilot
did not see where he was and had not corrected
for the actual heavy turbulence and bad weather
encountered.
Secondly, the note points out, the Czechoslovak
Government had itself admitted to press reporters
at a press conference in Prague on February 21,
1956, that the pilot had no visibility.
Thirdly, the physical description of the crash
contained in the Czechoslovak note of Febniary
20, 1957, shows that the ignition system had prob-
ably suffered failure and there was not enough
fuel to carry the pilot on to a safe landing. The
U.S. note points out that the airfield of destina-
tion was not suitable for any landing in such
weather, being just a soddy field "drenched witli
winter rain and snow, having no concrete run-
way but only some grass in summer, lying be-
tween two rows of high mountains, and useful
only in good weather."
Fourth, a meteorological study shows that the
altimeter settings on the airplane were between
450 and 600 feet too low in altitude, an error
which would be sufficient to cause the pilot to
miscalculate the height of the hill into which the
airplane crashed.
June 16, 1958
The note points out that the Czechoslovak Gov-
ernment's account of the flight seems fanciful
(the entire crew died in the crash) and especially
discredits the dispatcher at Bratislava. It indi-
cates that the crew should never have attempted
a landing, but should have returned to tlieir
home base when they found tlie nature of tlie
weather, assuming even that they were compelled
to depart from Bratislava on the ordei-s of the
dispatcher.
Finally, the note gives a most likely explana-
tion. It says that a tnie investigation would
show that the aircraft ovei-flew an area in the
Tatra Mountains, beyond its route, which has
been increasingly militarized and subject to se-
curity control, and flew over antiaircraft bat-
teries. It points out that shooting by antiair-
craft batteries in itself explains the sounds felt
by the four survivors who were passengere, and
the crash into the hillside.
The note then analyzes the timing of the Czech-
oslovak Government's campaign based on the al-
leged incident of January 18, 1956. It points
out that on the very morning following the crash
the Czechoslovak Government informed the
press, prior to any investigation, of the ostensibly
domestic disaster. The Government said that the
results of the investigation which would be made
wovild be sent to the International Civil Aviation
Organization. This campaign was built up until
the date when the alleged results of the investi-
gation were made public.
The Czechoslovak Government's case having
fallen to the ground, and its assertions of fact
being without foundation, the U.S. Government
reserves "for some future appropriate occasion a
discussion of the various, now irrelevant, legal
assertions made in both of the Czechoslovak
notes" and "further states that nothing in the
present note is to be construed as admitting the
validity, in whole or in part, of any of the legal
propositions made by the Czechoslovak Govern-
ment on the subject of this note."
The conclusion of the note states that it is up
to the Czechoslovak Government if it wishes to
"resort to the international forum provided by
the International Court of Justice." The note
throughout states that the U.S. Government is
prepared to prove all of its assertions of fact "in
an appropriate proceeding in a competent judi-
cial forum."
1011
U.S. NOTE OF MAY 14, 1958
The Embassy of the United States of America presents
its compliments to the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and, under instructions from the United States
Government, has the honor to refer further to the Min-
istry's note No. 123.330/56-ABO/l of June 19, 1936 and
its Note No. 105.578/57-ABO/l of February 20, 1957 con-
cerning the Czechoslovak Government's claim of compensa-
tion from the United States Government for damages on
account of a crash of a Czechoslovak Airlines aircraft
alleged to have taken place on January 18, 1956 near
Levoca in Slovakia.
The Ministry's last mentioned note purports to reply to
the Embassy's note No. 117 of October 9, 1956 on the same
subject. The Embassy's note, among other things, sought
from the Czechoslovak Government factual data in the
exclusive possession of the Czechoslovak Government re-
lating to the alleged air crash. The data which were
sought were necessary to enable the United States Gov-
ernment to reply comprehensively to the Ministry's note
of June 19, 1956 ; they were fully specified in the note of
October 9, 1956 in eight numbered paragraphs ; and they
included a copy of the full report of the Special Commis-
sion which the Czechoslovak Government alleged investi-
gated the causes of the crash of January 18, 1956 under
appointment by the Ministry of Transport. In addition,
the Embassy's note requested the Czechoslovak Govern-
ment in as much as no representative of the United States
Government had participated in any way in the alleged in-
vestigation, to permit investigators accredited by the
United States Government to examine the originals of all
documents, visit and inspect the scene of the crash, make
checks on the information available and make photographs
necessary to a comprehensive investigation of the facts
relating to the crash and its causes. Since the Czechoslo-
vak Government sought from the United States Govern-
ment damages in the amount of 5,525,374 crowns, a
substantial sum, as well as the admission of liability for
the deaths and injuries which the Czechoslovak Govern-
ment alleged had occurred, these requests were reasonable
and were in accordance with accepted international prac-
tice and due process of law.
The United States Government must, therefore, express
its surprise at the refusal of the Czechoslovak Govern-
ment in its note of February 20, 1957 eitlier to provide
the data requested, all of which are reasonably necessary
in order that experts may come to a considered and
intelligent conclusion as to the ti-ue cause of the air crash
alleged to have taken place near Levoca on January 18.
1956, or to permit accredited United States Government
experts to check the statements of fact made by the
Czechoslovak Government in this connection. These state-
ments were made on a number of occasions, both in its
notes to the United States Government on this subject
as well as in variant versions given in its press and its
radio broadcasts and to the International Civil Aviation
Organization and the Secretary General of the United
Nations. The unwillingness of the Czechoslovak Govern-
ment to make available to the United States Government
the report of the Investigating Commission and its sup-
porting evidentiary material is all the more surprising
1012
since it appears that the Czechoslovak Government, in its
official press, claims that the Investigating Commission
which wrote the report (as stated in Rude Pravo Feb-
ruary 22, 1956), spent at least a month in its investigation
of the incident, and its representatives in interviews with
press correspondents of Czechoslovakia and of other coun-
tries have referred frequently to the alleged contents of
the report (see, for example, Rucle Pravo, February 26,
1956 ; New York Times despatch from Prague, February
22, 1956 ; London Daily Worker despatch from Prague,
February 22, 1956 ; Renter's despatch from Prague, Feb-
ruary 22, 1956 ; Agence France Presse despatch from
Prague, February 22, 1956, Prague Radio broadcast of
February 21, 1956, 1800 hours).
It is, of course, true that the Czechoslovak Government
claims in its note of February 20, 1957 "that the inves-
tigation of a crash that has occurred on Czechoslovak
territory, especially the crash of a Czechoslovak airliner
carrying only Czechoslovak citizens, is under the existing
provisions of international air law a matter of exclusive
jurisdiction of the Czechoslovak authorities," and uses this
as an excuse for not providing the United States Gov-
ernment, whom it charges with responsibility for the air
crash under international law, with the factual evidence
upon which the claim is based. The United States Gov-
ernment notes that while the crash is thus claimed to be
domestic for the purposes of evidence that it ever occurred
or how it occurred, the Czechoslovak Government con-
siders it sufficiently international to have preferred an
international claim against the United States Government
and to have complained to the Council of the International
Civil Aviation Organization and to the Secretary General
of the United Nations, and to have conducted an inter-
national propaganda campaign exhibiting alleged evidence
to support its claim, which it now declines to subject to
closer examination.
From a juridical standpoint, the failure and refusal of
the Czechoslovak Government to supply the material upon
which it bases its charge as to the cause of the alleged
crash of January 18, 19.56, must, in these circumstances,
call for the application of the well known legal presumi>-
tion in such cases. That presumption is that the conclu-
sion asserted by the Czechoslovak Government, namely
that the crash of January 18, 1956 was caused by a collision
with a Free Europe Committee balloon, is, in fact, not
supported by any evidence and certainly not by the evi-
dence found by the Investigating Commission. This pre-
sumption is supported by the fact that the Czechoslovak
Government has indeed used this alleged incident purely
along propaganda lines.
The foregoing considerations are in themselves suffi-
cient to justify a complete rejection of the Czechoslovak
Government's claim for damages, regardless of other
legal and factual considerations which demonstrate the
Czechoslovak Government's claim to be without any
merit.
In as much, however, as the incident of January 18,
1956, is claimed to have involved large loss of life
as well as material damage, and in view of the Czecho-
slovak Government's representations to International
bodies and public opinion, the United States Govern-
Deparfmenf of State Bulletin
meut has attempted within the limits of its capabilities,
considering the restrictions placed upon it by the
Czechoslovak Government, to investigate the facts as
well as the propositions of law asserted or implicit in
the Czechoslovak Government's note of February 20,
1957, and its related note of June 19, 1956.
On the basis of this investigation, the United States
Government avails itself of this opportunity to state
that the Czechoslovak Government's claim is rejected as
wholly unfounded and that it is prepared to prove by
legal evidence and proper legal argumentation in an ap-
propriate proceeding in a competent judicial forum, and
it charges, the following :
The Facts:
As to the Czechoslovak Allegations of Facts Concerning
the Incident of January 18, 1956.
The United States Government's investigation of the
allegations contained in the Czechoslovak Government's
note of February 20, 1957, compels it, for reasons of
which the more prominent will appear below, to describe
the account of the incident in that note to be a con-
fection of some fact with much fiction.
A.
There emerge from the account two objectively veri-
fiable allegations which are critical to the Czechoslovak
Government's claim and which the United States Govern-
ment has been fully able to investigate objectively.
The Czechoslovak Government asserts that the crash
of the Czechoslovak Airlines "DC-3 type" aircraft was the
result of a collision between the aircraft while engaged
in an attempt to land at the Poprad-Tatry airfield in the
mountains in Eastern Slovakia and a Free Europe Com-
mittee balloon carrying certain leaflets for distribution
within Czechoslovakia by dispersal in the air. The Free
Europe Committee activities with respect to balloons
and leaflets have been investigated fully with these alle-
gations in mind.
The Czechoslovak Government states in its note of
February 20, 1957, as it has stated in other correspond-
ence and in other forums, that its Investigating Com-
mission came to the conclusion that there had been a
collision between a Free Europe Committee balloon and
the DC-3 in question because during the investigation
"the remnants of a balloon" were discovered "in the
vicinity of the crash". The note states that the place
of discovery was at two kilometers southeast of the
crash. It says that one part of the balloon, measuring
"about 30 square meters, was found hanging on a tree
about four meters from the ground" and that "another
part of the balloon skin was found after the thaw in a
wooded area about 400 meters east of the place of the
crash". It further states that "in the vicinity" there
were found "60 or 70 copies of a bilingual leaflet marked
'Slobodna Europd' No. 42."
In other accounts, this story of the Czechoslovak Gov-
ernment is somewhat magnified. It has been stated that
three pieces — not just two — of the balloon skin were
found ; that they were found "with the aid of the local
witnesses" ; and that the Investigating Commission, in its
report, came to the conclusion that the airplane crashed
because it collided in the forepart of Its fuselage with
"the balloon load, the remains of which were found near
the scene of the catastrophe". (See, for example, Rude
Pravo, February 23, 1956.)
Since the Czechoslovak Government refuses to permit
the United States Government to examine the original
report, it is difiicult to follow the reasoning of the Special
Investigating Commission report, which allegedly led it
to the conclusion. But several facts emerge as certain.
First : the account of the alleged collision is completely
speculative. There are no witnesses who claim to have
seen any balloon in flight at the place, or at the time, or
on a collision course, or much less to have seen any con-
tact with any balloon or any part of any balloon with
the airplane. As will be seen below, there are many
other explanations of the crash of the aircraft into the
mountainside of Skapova Hill which are much more con-
sistent with the known facts and even with the recital
of the facts in the Czechoslovak note.
In the second place : the plastic skin of the balloon
described as being part of a Free Europe Committee
balloon which collided and caused the crash is definitely
not, as the United States Government is prepared to
prove by legal evidence in an appropriate judicial forum,
part of any balloon used by the Free Europe Committee at
any time during the period of the alleged crash of Janu-
ary 18, 1956. The total square meter measurements of
the plastic shroud of the balloons flown by the Free
Europe Committee during the period of the alleged
crash — specifically the day after the crash and four days
before the crash — which were known as S-130 or P-130,
were a maximum of 15.1 square meters for the entire
envelope, completely deflated and spread out in a single
sheet, and had a laid flat square foot measurement of no
more than 130 square feet. Hence, a measurement of
30 square meters for a piece of a balloon demonstrates
that wherever the Czechoslovak authorities in charge of
the so-called investigation allegedly found the portion of
the balloon shroud described, it did not come from any
Free Europe Committee balloon which could possibly have
crashed with the aircraft on January 18, 1956. The ad-
dition to this piece of one, or two, additional pieces
makes the allegations all the more unfounded. In this
connection, the United States Government further notes
that the Czechoslovak Government has not permitted
United States Government representatives to examine the
pieces of the shroud of the balloon allegedly responsible
for the collision.
Third : the United States Government is ready to prove
by legal evidence in an appropriate judicial forum that
no pamphlets entitled "Slobodnd EuropS." or "Svobodnd
Europd" were sent into Czechoslovakia by the Free
Europe Committee balloons at any time so that they
could be in the air attached to any balloon on January
18, 1956. There were never indeed any pamphlets
marked "No. 42". There were, however, pamphlets of
closely similar designation, "C-42", sent into Czecho-
slovakia by the Free Europe Committee by small bal-
loons—S-130 or P-130— on January 19, 1956, the day
after the alleged crash, and a few were sent in several
days before the alleged crash. But it is impossible that
June 16, 7958
1013
any Free Europe Committee balloon carrying such
pamphlets could have been in the air at the time and
place or altitude of the alleged collision on January 18,
1956.
Fourth: the meteorological calculations which have
been made by expert authority indicate that weather con-
ditions during January 18, 1956, at 1447-1450 hours Cen-
tral European time, the time alleged by the Czechoslovak
Government to have been the time of the crash, were
such that even if Free Europe Committee balloons carry-
ing leaflets had been launched by the Free Europe Com-
mittee, which they were not, they would not have been
within or near the territory of the Czechoslovak Re-
public.
Fifth : The United States Government is not only per-
suaded that the so-called balloon shroud, allegedly
found during the Investigating Commission's short in-
quiry, was not that of any Free Europe Committee bal-
loon flown at any relevant time in the vicinity of the
crash or the alleged collision but it has legal evidence
that the Czechoslovak Government itself engaged in the
practice of flying balloons for various purposes, military
and non-military, in that very vicinity.
Finally : The total pamphlet load carried by any Free
Europe Committee balloon on or around January 18,
1956, did not exceed approximately three pounds. This
-would make a package of approximately 175 leaflets of
the C-42 type. They were held together loosely by a
piece of soft cotton string attached to the bottom of the
"balloon so as to disperse easily on the inversion of the
balloon at a very high floating altitude of not less than
approximately 18,000 feet. As the pamphlets dispersed,
the balloon shroud moved on and then descended as a de-
flated shroud by an emptying of its hydrogen content.
It was therefore not possible for a balloon carrying
leaflets to hit any airplane at 1228 meters, which appears
to be given by the Czechoslovak note of February 20,
1957, as the maximum height at which the alleged crash
took place ; or to do so in the altitude of the final descent
and approach for landing at the Poprad-Tatry airfield,
during which the airplane is alleged to have crashed.
It appears therefore conclusive that the alleged bal-
loon shroud and the pamphlets described as "No. 42"
-were objects which had no relation to the alleged crash
■and do not contribute any "evidence" to support the
otherwise completely speculative charge of a crash or
collision of the airplane with a Free Europe Committee
pamphlet-carrying balloon. This conclusion is rein-
forced by the fact that the United States Government
requested in vain, in its note of October 9, 1956, to which
the Czechoslovak Government's note of February 20, 19.57,
purports to be a reply, "copies of all photographs taken
of . . . the balloon claimed to have caused the collision
and the literature claimed to have been found with the
balloon at the time of its discovery by the investigating
commission." The Czechoslovak Government further re-
fused to permit the objects to be seen or photographs of
them to be made by United States representatives.
As a result of investigation and experimentation, the
United States Government is prepared to produce legal
evidence demonstrating that even if, contrary to the fact,
the airplane in question had collided with any Free Eu-
rope Committee balloon, or any part of such a balloon,
flown into or near Czechoslovakia on January 18, 1956,
or the period around it, the impact would not have
affected the flight of the aircraft alleged to have crashed.
This would be true assuming even that the aircraft in-
volved was a DC-3 aircraft of which the United States
Government has no evidence.
1. Although the Free Europe Committee delivered leaflet
communications to Czechoslovakia from approximately
July 1953 to November 14, 1956, in large enough num-
bers to cause a considerable campaign against the Free
Europe Committee by the Czechoslovak Government and
associated governments, the first allegation of any col-
lision of a balloon with anything in the air was made
after January 19, 1956.
The United States Government, upon receipt of the
Czechoslovak Government's complaint with respect to the
alleged crash of January 18, 1956, made intensive inquiry
on the subject of the possibility and consequence of
impacts in such cases. It has received unequivocal evi-
dence that even if a Free Europe Committee balloon of
the type described were to collide with a DC-3 the col-
lision would have no effect whatever on the aircraft.
Apart from this, collision is aeronautically of remote pos-
sibility and considering the wide separation of altitudes
at which civil aircraft have been flown in Czechoslovakia
and Free Europe Committee balloons have been flown
there, it is practically impossible.
Indeed, it is highly unlikely that, particularly in the
type of weather in which the "DC-3 type" aircraft
involved was being flown on January 18, 1956 — one of
substantially complete invisibility — the balloon or its load
would be either noticed or felt. Should a DC-3 hit any
portion of the balloon shroud, the immediate effect would
be to cause a rupture in the shroud, and the immediate
dissipation of the hydrogen without any effect on the air-
craft. If the leaflet package, loosely held as described,
had collided, the pamphlets would have immediately sep-
arated and dispersed. If any portion of the shroud or the
pamphlets had hit the propeller, the shroud would have
been cut to pieces and the pamphlets would have been
torn into small pieces. In any event no contact of the
balloon and its leaflet load would, at the speed and
altitude of a DC-3 in flight, do more than touch the DC-3
without any injurious impact or effect whatever on the
control mechanism or the functioning of the aircraft, or
for that matter, even the sensitivity of the passengers or
crew.
2. The subject of the manner and effect of operations
of the Free Europe Committee pamphlet-carrying balloons
has been fully discussed by the Free Europe Committee
in a document submitted to the International Civil Avia-
tion Organization entitled "Free Europe Committee, Inc.
Statement Concerning 'Releasing of Balloons Across Inter-
national Boundarie.s', ICAO Paper C-WP/2371, 12/3/56,
dated April 1, 1957." The document concerns itself with
the largest type of balloon used by the Free Europe Com-
mittee, an S-260 (that is, containing 260 square feet
laid out flat), carrying approximately 3.5 pounds of
Deparfmenf of State Bulletin
a similarly loosely held bundle. The United
States Government has found that the facts recited in
the document are fully supported by legal evidence.
The Czechoslovak Government itself had publicly an-
nounced that its aircraft had been engaged in the prac-
tice of ramming balloons in the air without ill effect on
the ramming aircraft (See Rude Pravo, September 5,
1955.) A similar practice, with ill effect only when par-
ticipating aircraft hit each other instead of balloons,
has been noted in Hungary. (See, for example, Esti
Hirlap, October 8, 1957).
3. The Czechoslovak Government's speculation concern-
ing the cause of the crash is more specific. It alleges
first that "several" or "a few" minutes (Czechoslovak
note of February 20, 1957, page 23, and Riiile Pravo of
February 26, 1956) or "just a few" minutes (Rude Pravo
of February 23, 1956) before the crash, the surviving
passengers say they felt a "strong shock." The Czecho-
slovak Government's multiple accounts in other propa-
ganda contexts vary as to the amount of time but the
time given is never given as less than "one or two minutes
later" — understandably this minimum version is in a
letter to the International Civil Aviation Organization
as published in Rude Pravo February 23, 1956.
The Czechoslovak Government concludes that this
"strong shock" was the loss of the radio antenna ; and
that this "shock" was the consequence of a collision be-
tween a Free Europe Committee balloon or some part of
it and the mast of the antenna. It is stated further that
since the wires of the aerial were missing and could not
be found by the Investigating Commission in the area of
the crash, the conclusion was reached "that the whole
aerial system had been damaged already during the flight
by impact with a heavier object," and that this "heavier
object" could only have been "the load of the balloon."
It is clear from the further language of the note that by
the "load of the balloon" the Czechoslovak Government
means the pamphlet load carried by the hydrogen filled
shroud of a Free Europe Committee balloon.
As has already been seen, such a load did not during
this period exceed three pounds. Indeed the type of
balloon plus its load then used by the Free Europe Com-
mittee did not, in total, weigh more than 5.07 pounds.
It is diflicult to understand what the Czechoslovak In-
vestigating Commission can seriously mean when it says
that the airplane collided with a "heavier object."
Heavier than what? It is clear, beyond a peradventure
of doubt, that the entire body of the Free Europe Com-
mittee balloon flown on or around January 18, 1956 was
not heavier than any relevant portion of the DC-3 air-
craft and certainly not heavier than the antenna installa-
tion consisting of metal posts and wires, which was cer-
tainly constantly subject to encounter with forces of
greater magnitude and density in its continuous flight.
The United States Government has made considerable
inquiry into the questions, first, of the characteristics of
the loss of radio antennas of the type described in the
note of February 20, 1957, and, secondly, on the effect
of injuries by impact of external objects upon DC-3 air-
craft in flight.
a. As to aerial antennas : It is obvious that the loss of
an antenna of the type described in the note of Febru-
June 16, T958
ary 20, 1957 could in no case affect the control of the
aircraft. It would certainly not affect the flight of the
aircraft in question. Indeed, the damage allegedly suf-
fered by the aircraft in the crash, as described in the
note of February 20, 1957, shows no damage whatever to
the control mechanism ; the note says that the rudder
and vertical stabilizer were found intact, even after the
plane had crashed into the trees and the ground.
Radio antennas such as those on DC-3 type aircraft
occasionally corrode and get lost in flight, snapping off
without any external contact whatever, but simply in
consequence of metal fatigue, vibration, icing or any
combination of similar factors, all of which could have
happened to the antenna in question, particularly during
the weather of ice and rain through which the aircraft
flew on January 18, 19.56.
All the foregoing is common knowledge in the aviation
industry and among aviators.
One reason why the aerial could not be found, if in
fact it could not be found, was that it disappeared con-
siderably before the time of the alleged crash during the
flight, snapping off first at the one end to which it was
attached and then at the other, as a consequence of in-
flight wind forces. Indeed, it may also have wrapped
itself up in the trees during the collision on Skapova Hill
in the crash.
b. The sturdiness of the DC-3 in flight is well estab-
lished and universally known in the history of aviation.
The DC-3 first used in the United States Army Air Corps
and continued by the United States Air Force under the
name of C-A7, is believed to be the world's most popular
airplane because of its sturdiness and safety. It was
manufactured by the Douglas Aircraft Company of Cali-
fornia beginning in 1935 and went into airline service
in 1936. Large numbers of DC-3 aircraft were sought
from the United States Government by, and given by it
to, other governments, including the Government of
Czechoslovakia, at the end of World War II and others
were sold in the international aircraft market to eager
buyers. The Douglas Aircraft Manufacttiring Company
even licensed foreign companies and governments to man-
ufacture copies.
It is well established, as the Czechoslovak Airlines and
the Czechoslovak Government well know, that DC-3's
can fly and land safely though they have suffered far
more serious damage to their control mechanisms and
though they have been hit by forces far stronger than a
three pound package of pamphlets or a Free Europe
Committee ballooon. This is widely known and it is
the reason why DC-3's are still flown throughout the
world in civil aviation although built as early as 1935
or based on plans of that era.
It is therefore wrong to assume that even if, contrary
to the fact, any portion of a Free Europe Committee
balloon or its pamphlet load collided with any portion of
the DC-3, the pilot would have lost control of his air-
craft for any period of time, particularly for "minutes,"
even for as few as "one or two minutes."
c. But it is even more incredible that, as the Czecho-
slovak Government's note of February 20, 1957 and its
1015
other widespread though varying accounts suggest, the
effect of the contact was psychological on the pilot, caus-
ing him to lose control for "a few minutes." It is hardly
conceivable that a pilot, even with lesser qualifications
than those ascribed in the note of February 20, 1957 to
Vladimir Drab or the co-pilot Vaclav Frana, would have
either lost control on the impact of the 3.5 pound loosely
packed bunch of paper pamphlets on an antenna wire
or having lost control would not have immediately re-
gained it in a matter of a second or two.
As any person with even limited experience in air-
plane flight will know, the very letting down of the wheels
of the aircraft while approaching for a landing, particu-
larly under the circumstances described in the note of
February 20, 1957, will cause a much greater "shock"
than would be experienced by the impact of a bird on an
antenna or on any other part of the aircraft.
The United States Government will have more to say
on this subject below but it is prepared to demonstrate
in any appropriate judicial forum, with the support of
appropriate legal evidence, that the account and con-
clusion given in the Czechoslovak Government's note of
February 20, 1957, are unsupported by any substantial
evidence. The true explanation of the alleged crash lies
along entirely different lines.
The United States Government again notes that the
Czechoslovak Government has refused to permit the
United States Government and its representatives to see
the actual report of the Investigating Commission.
Any serious competent commission investigating an
airplane crash would have considered a good many other
more likely explanations for the crash of January 18,
1956, than the speculation contained in the note of Feb-
ruary 20, 1957.
II
The Facts:
As to the Likely Explanations of the Crash
As has been indicated, the United States Government,
within the limitations set by the obstructions of the
Czechoslovak Government, has sought to ascertain more
likely explanations of the crash, based on the assumption
of some veracity in the Czechoslovak Government's tech-
nical account of the flight, the weather, the physical de-
scription of the wreckage and also evidence of credible
character which has come into the United States Govern-
ment's possession. These lead to a conclusion which
throws the liability for the crash directly on the Czecho-
slovak Airlines.
It is the solemn and considered conclusion of the
United States Government that these findings lay the
Czechoslovak Airlines open to the charge of having caused
the deaths and injuries of the crew and passengers by
what must be described, at the minimum, as a very gross
type of negligence.
A.
The United States Government has had the note of
February 20, 1957 carefully examined and evaluated by
experts in DC-3 operations. Based on the acceptance
for purposes of discussion of the Czechoslovak Govern-
ment's account of the flight from Bratislava on Jan-
1016
uary 18, 1956, the conclusion is reached that pilot Drab
and his crew and passengers were dispatched by Czecho-
slovak Airlines authorities at Bratislava with orders to
fly over the treacherous high mountains to Poprad-
Tatry Airport in zero visibility, under circumstances in
which the airport at Poprad could not be seen from
the air by the pilot, in an extremely high wind velocity,
with a maximum load and in icing conditions. In view
particularly of the fact that effective navigational aids
were absent in the area of alleged destination, these con-
ditions necessarily would have caused the pilot to overfly
Tatry Airfield and be carried much farther northeast
than he intended.
The only way for the aircraft to have crashed into
Skapova Hill, which is 21 kilometers or 12.6 miles north
of the track to Tatry airfield near Poprad, was to have
flown there. But Skapova Hill was not on or near the
track of any safe instrument letdown approach to the
Poprad-Tatry Airport. This is obvious even though the
Czechoslovak Government has failed to publish or make
known to the United States Government the outstanding
instrument letdown approach pattern for that airport.
The only logical conclusion mu.st be that the pilot did
not correct, in his management of the airplane, for the
direction and velocity of the wind he actually encoun-
tered in flight, and that he was not briefed prior to
flight on the true weather conditions he would encounter
en route.
In paragraph 16, page 22 of the note of February 20,
1957, it is stated that the pilot started his descent for
landing at Tatry Airfield at 1441 hours, leaving 3,000 me-
ters (9,842.6 feet) above sea level. It further says that
at 1445.5 hours he reported that he was in a procedure
turn at 2,000 meters (6,562 feet) above sea level and was
descending to the minimum altitude of 1300 meters (4,265
feet) above sea level. Had he descended to the 1300
minimum, he should have cleared the area of the crash,
which was 1100 meters, by 200 meters. Yet the pilot
crashed at this point. It is obvious that the pilot did
not know where he was and did not know that he was
as far away from the safe instrument letdown approach
pattern for the Poprad-Tatry Airfield as Skapova Hill.
Obviously he had not corrected for his wind and had
been blown off his course. He encountered heavy turbu-
lence, probably exacerbated by the strong winds over the
hills, and made rapid descents (which also might have
made the passengers believe they were experiencing
strong shocks).
These facts alone explain the crash.
B.
The Czechoslovak Government stated in its note of
February 20, 1957 that at Tatry Airfield on January 18,
1956 (page 8, paragraph 4) among other things the
visibility was 20 kilometers at the lower base of clouds
840 meters above the ground at 1330 ; at 14.30 the visibility
was 20 kilometers at the lower base of clouds 500 meters
above the ground and Ys at the lower base 700 meters
above the ground; while at 1455 visibility was 20 kilo-
meters, overcast % at the lower base of clouds 500 meters
above the ground; and at the next layer of clouds %
and 700 meters above the ground. It gives other data, all
Department of State Bulletin
(if which to a meteorologist show that there was freezing
temperature and complete invisibility of the ground and
surrounding area to the pilot in the cockpit as he flew the
plane which allegedly crashed. In this connection, the
United States Government wishes to point out that these
statements are particularly misleading in suggesting 20
kilometers visibility when the Czechoslovak authorities
were fully aware, and had in fact so stated in the press
conference in which the first specific propaganda state-
ment on this subject was issued in Prague, on February
21, 1956, that the pilot had no visibility. The press ref-
erences have been stated above. It is true that the rep-
resentative of the Ministry of Transport then stated, in
reply to questions, that the visibility was 22 meters ; but
it is hardly likely that even this figure, which in sub-
stance means zero visibility, was reported to the ground
by the aircraft. This conclusion is particularly valid in
view of the fact that the Czechoslovak Government has
refused to permit the United States Government to see
the radio logs of communication between the aircraft and
the ground.
It is also true that the Czechoslovak note states that
the Tatry airfield had a navigation aid known as a
Lorenz beacon. But it is well known that a Lorenz beacon
would be of little use to a pilot flying in invisibility, in
distress, blown off course by strong unforecast winds, far
away from the airfield at which he was allegedly trying
to land, particularly in an area characterized by high
mountains, deep valleys, local gusts of vertical winds, as
well as thermal and other turbulence caused by the gen-
eral bad weather and by other adverse local winds.
The United States Government has also had the phys-
ical description of the crashed aircraft, allegedly dis-
covered by the Investigating Commission, examined by
experts.
The description in the note of the condition of the
two blades of the left propeller (that is, "bent rearward"),
of the third blade (that is, canted "slightly forward") and
of the three blades of the right propeller (that is, "bent
forward"), indicates that the left propeller blades had no
power while some power was being delivered to the other
blades. From this, either or both of two conclusions may
be inferred : First, that the ignition system of the left
engine failed; second, that there was not enough fuel
to provide the power necessary to keep the airplane from
crashing into Skapova Hill.
It is true that the Czechoslovak note of February 20,
1957 recites that it was determined that the pilot in com-
mand "determined the amount of fuel necessary for the
flight as 1800 liters." The Czechoslovak Government does
not say, however, whether the pilot received 1800 liters
of fuel for the flight, which was a 45 minute flight. 1800
liters in any case would add enough weight to make the
aircraft dangerously heavy, as shown by the other weight
factors described in the note.
The United States Government bears in mind, also, the
notorious fact that the Czechoslovak Government and the
Czechoslovak Airlines, since the defection from Czecho.slo-
vakia began of Czechoslovak pilots seeking to escape in
their aircraft, have engaged In the practice of reducing
the amount of fuel on domestic flights to little above the
amount necessary for the projected flight. With 1800
liters, this pilot could have flown over the Tatra moun-
tains to Krakow, Poland, or back to Bratislava, or to
some other safer and better situated field than the dan-
gerous sod drenched with winter rain and snow, having
no concrete runway but only some grass in summer, lying
between two rows of high mountains, and useful only in
good weather in the summertime, which was the Tatry
airfield on January 18, 1956.
A close meteorological study of the statements made in
the note of February 20, 1957 and known meteorological
data for the time and place of the alleged crash shows
that the altimeters of the aircraft were not adjusted to
the actual landing conditions at Tatry airfield. On page
14 of the note, it is stated that the altimeter settings of
the radio operator's and co-pilot's altimeters were re-
spectively 936 millibars and 941 millibars. Assuming
this to be the fact, these settings were probably intended
to correspond to the station pressure at the proposed
landing field. From this it has been expertly concluded
that the sea level pressure value at Tatry airfield at 1430
Central European time on January 18, 1956 was 1003
millibars and the value for the station pressure at the
airfield was 919.5 millibars.
It appears therefore that the two altimeter settings
given in the Czechoslovak Government's note were in
error by approximately 15 and 20 millibars which rep-
resents an error in altitude of 4.50 and 600 feet respec-
tively. This means that the altimeters would indicate
to the pilots and crew that the airplane was flying 4.'i0
and 600 feet higher than the plane actually was at the
time.
Since, as the Czechoslovak Government's note of Feb-
ruary 20, 1957 substantially admits, all hills and moun-
tains in the vicinity of Tatry airfield were obscured and
covered by clouds, the errors in the altimeters would in
themselves be suflicient to account for the crash of the
aircraft into Skapova Hill, as alleged In the Czecho-
slovak Government's notes.
Together with this, it should not be forgotten that even
if the pilot had noticed that the bottom of his aircraft
was scraping tree tops, (another explanation for the
"sudden shock" felt by the surviving passengers "a few
minutes" before the crash), the aircraft might not, in
truth, as has already been indicated, have had enough
engine power, or enough fuel, to climb rapidly and avert
a crash. Since the note of February 20, 1957 does not
allege post-crash fire, it may very well be that fuel ex-
haustion had occurred even though slight amounts of
fuel might have been found in the tanks after the crash.
The note of February 20. 1957, with all its misleading
statements, makes clear, as do the other well known
meteorological data available in public sources, that the
entire Tatra area, at the altitude at which the aircraft
which crashed was flying, was one of icing conditions.
This means that wholly apart from any failure of the
June 16. 1958
1017
ignition system or lack of fuel, the controls and mecha-
nism for ascent, which would be necessary to avoid a
crash or to increase altitude suddenly, were not efficiently
operative. This is particularly true in the light of the
implications of the Czechoslovak Government's account
indicating that the aircraft carried excessive weight as
has been noted above.
In this connection, an impartial investigator would
have to credit the hypothesis that in truth the weather
conditions were such in the entire area that the airplane
could not have attempted with assurance of safety to
land in any airfield in the area.
The Czechoslovak Government's note states that the
airfield at Kosice, much superior for landing in bad
weather to the Tatry airfield near Poprad, was closed
even before the airplane set off from Bratislava. There-
fore the airfield at Presov, which would likely be in worse
condition than Kosice, was closed. It is significant that
no military concrete runway was made available by the
Czechoslovak authorities to this civil aircraft loaded with
passengers though the aircraft was in great distress in
consequence of having been dispatched by the Bratislava
Czechoslovak Airlines authorities.
Although the point may not be material, it is difficult to
credit the Czechoslovak Government's statement that the
aircraft was dispatched from Bratislava direct to Tatry
airfield. It seems hardly credible that in the weather
known to have existed at the time of departure and en
route the pilot would be directed to take the summer
course of flight from Bratislava to Tatry, since this was
usable with safety only in good visibility and optimum
flight conditions. This route would require flight over
the high mountains over Sliac to the small summer resort
air-field used for the Tatra resort hotel customers near
the Bat'a factory at Svit, called Tatry airport. It is
more likely that in such weather a competent dispatcher
and a competent pilot would cause the aircraft to fly the
normal course over the low lands from Bratislava to
Kosice, if he had to fly at all, hoping — although for this
there is no meteorological forecast evidence — for a pos-
sible improvement of landing conditions at destination.
The United States Government is inclined to accept the
opinion that this must have been what happened and
that not being able to land at Kosice, the pilot attempted
or requested permission to land at other landing places
without success. He thus must have been told by radio
at Poprad that he could not laud there either. He there-
fore either was flying around in the air in the general
neighborhood of Poprad in the hope of improvement of
landing conditions, or he had been directed by Poprad
control to try to fly to the airfield at Krakow, Poland ;
the fact is in any case that he hit the mountainside. It
was in the direction toward Krakow, according to the
note of February 20, 1957, that the airplane was found
to lie when it crashed.
The Czechoslovak Government's account of the flight,
if it is true, discredits the dispatcher at Bratislava. The
United States Government expresses its surprise at the
attempt of the Czechoslovak authorities, and the Czecho-
slovak Airlines, recounted in the note of February 20,
1957, to land an aircraft with crew and passengers at a
tiny summertime sod airfield, possessing no reliable navi-
gational aids and lying between two masses of dangerous
high mountains, particularly when superior landing
strips were available elsewhere.
The United States Government is aware that the
Czechoslovak Government's note of February 20, 1957
attempts to prove the possibility of safe landing by citing
an alleged landing fifteen minutes earlier by another air-
craft. The United States Government has found no in-
dependent substantiation that another DC-3, like the
one scheduled by the published time table of the Czecho-
slovak Airlines to fly to Kosice from Prague, had also been
diverted to Tatry airfield, and had landed safely. But
even if true, the fact, of course, proves nothing with
respect to the difficulties of the aircraft which crashed.
Not only was the course of the Prague-Kosice aircraft
flight different, but presumably the very fact that it
landed first would cause the second aircraft to hover in
the surrounding air space, to wait, buffeted by high winds
and in worsening freezing conditions and growing in-
visibility, making the likelihood of its own safe landing
continuously less.
F.
The note of February 20, 1957 makes the claim directly
and by innuendo that mechanical and crew failure could
not have accounted for the crash because of the efficiency
of the aircraft and the efficiency of the crew. On this
subject the United States Government makes the follow-
ing observations :
1. With respect to the aircraft :
a. As to the air frame: The aircraft is described as
a "DC-3 type." It is described as having the air frame
serial number 23523.
The United States Government is also aware that the
Czechoslovak Airline's time table advertised the flight
as being a "Douglas DC-3."
The United States Government has checked with the
Douglas Manufacturing Company and finds that no model
of the Douglas DC-3 aircraft was manufactured with
such a serial number. The serial number 23523 was given
to a bomber delivered to the United States Army Air
Corps in 1944, and was long since dismantled in the
United States.
However, the United States Government's records show
that a cargo DC-3 type aircraft bearing a number 42-
23523, but carrying engines different in serial numbers
from those described in the Czechoslovak Government's
last note, was sold to the Czechoslovak Government on
December 20, 1946.
The point is material since the obvious purpose of the
Czechoslovak Government was to make it appear that
the aircraft which crashed was of the sturdiness uni-
versally known to characterize DC-3 civil aircraft and
the C^7, its military counterpart. For this reason the
refusal of the Czechoslovak Government to permit an
examination of the wreckage is material.
It is now known that aircraft built to look like DC-3's
were manufactured in the Soviet Union, and were used
in Czechoslovakia among other countries. Whatever the
physical attributes of such air frames might be, they
1018
Department of Sfofe Bulletin
cannot claim ipso facto the established sturdiness of the
DC-3 of the United States Douglas Aircraft Company.
b. As to the engines : The note of February 20, 1957
further states that the aircraft had two Pratt and Whit-
ney "type" Twin-Wasp engines, of the R-1830-92 type.
It gives their serial numbers as CP-2i54206 (in the English
version of the note, but 354206 in the Czechoslovak lan-
guage version of the note) and 353165.
The records of the Pratt and Whitney Company made
available to the United States Government show that
engines bearing these numbers were sold to the United
States Army Air Corps on September 30, 1943. Engines
of these numbers were not attached to the DC-3 air-
frame, according to the records of the United States
Government.
c. The Czechoslovak Government has permitted no in-
spection of the maintenance records of the airplane and
its parts. It appears obvious from the foregoing that the
airplane which crashed on January 18, 19,56 would not be
entitled to claim prima facie color of eflSciency such as
that which the Czechoslovak Government's note of Febru-
ary 20, 1957 seeks to attach to the aircraft which crashed.
2. With respect to the crew :
The United States Government is impressed by the
fact that the Czechoslovak Government's note of Febru-
ary 20, 1957 characterizes each member of the crew as
having been rated "excellent" without any exception.
Apart from the reserve which this universality of "ex-
cellence" in the crew itself engenders, the United States
Government cannot fail to point out that the behavior —
assuming it to have been voluntary — of the pilot and
co-pilot during the fateful trip of January 18, 1956,
would, in any expert forum, detract considerably from
the acceptance of the qualification of each of them as
"excellent". The crew are described as having taken
off in zero visibility and extremely bad weather, carrying
an extremely heavy load, with their destination an air-
field of the type which has been described and without
an alternate airfield.
Assuming that the pilot had no alternative but to
obey the orders of the dispatcher (whose rating the
Czechoslovak note of February 20, 1957 does not give
and who must be characterized as far less than "ex-
cellent"), a careful pilot and co-pilot would have turned
back to Bratislava when they became aware of what
the flying conditions to and over their destination ac-
tually were.
G.
Sworn testimony and other evidence now in the pos-
session of the United States Government provide a fur-
ther and most likely explanation of the circumstances
of the crash of January 18, 1956.
The United States Government has noted with inter-
est the detail of the account in the Czechoslovak Gov-
ernment's note of February 20, 1957 of the landing
pattern around Tatry airfield performed by the air-
craft which crashed. In fact, the airplane was obvi-
ously many miles away from any landing pattern ; it
was near Skapova Hill.
The United States Government believes that a thor-
ough investigation, such as the Czechoslovak Govern-
ment has refused to permit the United States Govern-
ment to make, would show that the aircraft which
crashed overflew in its blind flight the area of the
Tatra mountains east of Kezmarok, flying in a north-
easterly direction over the village of Torysky.
This area, particularly beginning with the village of
Lubica, southeast of Kezmarok, has for several years
become increasingly a zone of intense military activity
and installation, closed to outsiders. Its civilian popu-
lation has been expelled and resettled elsewhere while
military installations of variety and high security classi-
fication have been built, particularly in the direction
toward the Polish frontier.
The Torysky area has been particularly militarized
and subjected to strict security regulations. The area
had been formerly used from time to time for maneuvers
by troops and aircraft in maneuver season, including
aviation personnel. But its use has now been extended —
and had been before January 18, 1956 — to permanent
military installations obviously looking toward the Po-
lish border and also serving as fortifications for the pro-
tection of access to the Soviet Union.
The area over which the aircraft flew, east of Kez-
marok, was unauthorized for this flight. The military
personnel on the ground included anti-aircraft battery
operators concerned with protection against unauthor-
ized overflight.
The fact that the Czechoslovak Government has re-
fused not only to permit the United States Government
to see the aircraft in its state of wreckage but even to
see photographs of the fuselage, in the light of the fore-
going, strengthens the possibility that this aircraft may
also have been subject to anti-aircraft artillery fire in
its overflight of this restricted military area. The im-
pacts of anti-aircraft shell fragments hitting the fuse-
lage of the plane could well constitute the "strong shocks"
which the surviving passengers say they felt a "few
minutes" before the crash. This, in fact, in itself would
have caused the plane to make a sudden turn and the
pilot to lose control, fall into the trees on Skapova Hill
and crash into the ground, causing the injuries and
deaths which took place.
H.
The United States Government has ascertained and
wishes to call attention to the fact that the Czechoslovak
Government Ministry of Transport announced the fact
of the aircrash, which appeared to be that of a domestic
airliner on a domestic flight, the day following the crash,
on January 19, 19.56, and within several hours of the
news reaching Prague. In response to press inquiry on
that day, the Ministry of Transport stated that a spe-
cial investigation commission would be appointed to in-
vestigate the causes of the crash and that the report of
the commission would be sent to the International Civil
Aviation Organization, which was in Montreal, Canada.
In any case, this was approximately the first time that
any domestic air crash of a Czechoslovak Airline had
ever been reported in the Czechoslovak official press un-
der the present Communist regime. A campaign to
arouse public domestic and international opinion and to
suggest that there were international implications began
immediately and speedily, with a gradual buildup until
June 16, 1958
1019
a press conference nominally held by the Ministry of
Transport of February 21, 1956, followed by a propa-
ganda campaign of considerable magnitude. The point
cannot be overlooked that the Czechoslovak Government
appears to have been waiting with a ready program for
any airplane crash to take place to launch the campaign.
Promptly on January 21, 1956, the Czechoslovak Govern-
ment, over the name of the "Director General of Civil
Aviation", sent a cable to the European OflBce of the
International Civil Aviation Organization in Paris saying,
in part, that domestic and international air traffic over
Czechoslovak territory had "in the last few days" been
endangered "by the invasion of free balloons of large
size" and requesting steps be taken to remove the hazard.
The Czechoslovak Government began a campaign
simultaneously to make international airlines believe that
flight in nighttime or in bad weather might result in
crashes with balloons. This had the obvious result of a
circular inquiry by the International Air Transport
Association.
It is revealing of the organized propaganda campaign
that on February 1, 1956, the Communist German
Deutschlandsender in East Germany at 2010 GMT, In a
commentary by one Wolfgang Dost, stated that "last week
a Czechoslovak transport aircraft crashed after colliding
with a United States propaganda balloon." He had con-
fused the date but that appears to serve the more to
indicate tliat a concerted program of exploitation had
already been delivered by appropriate authorities to the
propaganda departments of the governments associated
with the Czechoslovak Government in attacking the Free
Europe Committee.
On February 7, while the month-long investigation was
still pending, the Czecho.slovak Minister for Foreign
Affairs sent a cablegram to the Secretary General of the
United Nations with a long list of grievances concerning
balloon traffic. It said that "balloon traffic had become
a serious hazard to air traffic over Czechoslovakia in the
domestic air routes as well as in the space of international
air routes." Then it made the following statement:
"On January 18, 1956, a passenger aircraft of the
Czechoslovak Airlines crashed near Levoca in Slovakia.
In this catastrophe, which is still being investigated, 22
passengers were killed and 4 passengers suffered grave
injuries."
It is significant that on September 11, 1956, the then
Polish Government also announced an air crash, this in
alleged consequence of a collision on August 8, 1956 be-
tween a Free Europe Committee balloon and a jet air-
craft; and that on July 28, 1956, the Hungarian Govern-
ment announced an air crash, this as the alleged result
of a collision on July 19, 19.56 between an aircraft and a
Free Europe Committee balloon. Both novel stories may
be deemed to have the purpose of strengthening the
credibility of the alleged incident of January 18, 1956
and to build up the program described looking toward
action by the International Civil Aviation Organization,
on which the Czechoslovak Government was embarked.
I.
The established facts, therefore, show beyond a perad-
venture of doubt that the alleged crash of January 18,
1956 had no causal relation whatsoever with a Free
Europe Committee balloon or its pamphlet load. On the
contrary, such investigation as has been possible points
clearly to the fact that the authorities in Bratislava who,
according to the note of February 20, 1957, dispatched
the crew and passengers of the aircraft OK-WDZ, called
a DC-3 type, in freezing weather, strong winds and zero
visibility to a small soggy dirt airfield sunk between dan-
gerous mountain ranges, were guilty of what must be
characterized, if the facts recited in the February 20,
1957 note are true, as homicidal negligence.
There is no need therefore to discuss the subsidiary
questions as to measure of damages. It is suitable, how-
ever, that a note should be made here in this record of
the fact that although, according to the communication of
February 20, 19.57, the crash took place at precisely 1450
hours, that is in the early afternoon, they did not — as in-
vestigation has disclosed — succor the wounded and the
injured and save lives until past midnight, on January
19, 19.56. Instead, the Czechoslovak authorities appar-
ently proceeded to discuss — and no doubt to obtain clear-
ance for — the exploitation of the incident. They were
already, immediately in the working office hours of Janu-
ary 19, 1956, apparently embarking on a program of
propaganda tying the Free Europe Committee to the
disaster. The note of February 20, 1957 glosses over
this time delay with a statement that in addition to the
survivors "all the other passengers suffered fatal in-
juries and by the time the wreckage was reached, they
were already dead".
Ill
Questions of Lata
In view of the foregoing, the Czechoslovak Govern-
ment's charge of liability having fallen on the issues of
fact, the questions of law that are raised by the notes
of June 19, 1956 and February 20, 1957 do not call for
reply. The United States reserves for some future ap-
propriate occasion a discussion of the various, now ir-
relevant, legal assertions made in both of the Czecho-
slovak notes to which reference has been made. The
United States Government further states that nothing
in the present note is to be construed as admitting the
validity, in whole or in part, of any of the legal propo-
sitions made by the Czechoslovak Government on the
subject of this note.
Nor is it necessary to discuss the question whether any
aggrieved person, or the Czechoslovak Government, should
not have exhausted the remedies available to them in
the Courts of the United States which have jurisdiction
over the Free Europe Committee, Inc., and which have
the means and the practice of providing for full judicial
hearing, judicial determination and collection of damages.
IV
Conclusion
The United States Government considers that the con-
troversy between it and the Czechoslovak Government on
the subject of the incident of January 18, 1956 is, in re-
spect to diplomatic negotiations, closed and that the
Department of Stale Bulletin
channels of diplomacy have been thoroughly exhausted.
Whether the Czechoslovak Government wishes now to re-
sort to the international judicial forum provided by the
International Court of Justice, the United States Gov-
ernment leaves to the determination of the Czechoslovak
Government. In that event the United States Govern-
ment will give further consideration to the matter.
The Embassy avails itself of this opportunity to renew
to the Ministry the assurances of its consideration.
CZECHOSLOVAK NOTE OF FEBRUARY 20, 1957
Unofficial translation
MiNiSTBY OP Foreign Affairs
No. 105.578/57-ABO/l
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compli-
ments to the Embassy of the United States of America
and with reference to the Embassy's note No. 117 of Oc-
tober 9, 1956, concerning the crash of the Czechoslovak
transport aircraft, has the honor to advise on instruc-
tions of the Government of the Czechoslovak Republic as
follows :
The Czechoslovak Government has taken note of the
fact that compared with its note of April 10, 1956, the
Government of the United States has somewhat revised
its position and that, according to its communication, it
has carefully studied the notes dated February 24 ' and
June 19, 1956, in which the Czechoslovak Government
raised a sharp protest in connection with the crash of a
Czechoslovak airliner, caused by the airliner's collision
with a balloon launched unlawfully into the Czechoslovak
airspace by an American organization, and asked the
United States of America for compensation of the damage
caused.
The Government of the Czechoslovak Republic, however,
cannot consider even the above quoted note of the United
States Government as satisfactory. The Government of
the United States refers, in the first place, to its previous
notes in which it tried to defend the unlawful launching
of balloons with provocative literature into Czechoslovak
airspace and adopted towards this activity hostile to
Czechoslovakia a position indicating that it backs and
supports it. The Government of the Czechoslovak Re-
public has refuted already many times the false and
provocative allegations contained in the notes of the
United States Government in this matter, and if the
United States Government has deemed it necessary to
refer to them again in its last note, this fact cannot but
raise doubts as to the manner in which the United States
Government is approaching a matter as grave as an air
crash that had caused the death of 22 passengers and all
crew members.
The Government of the United States has requested
also many data, a number of which is unnecessary for
the study of the causes of the air crash. The demands
made in this connection are of such a nature that the
Government of the Czechoslovak Republic deems it neces-
Not printed.
June 76, 1958
sary to point out that the investigation of a crash that
has occurred on Czechoslovak territory, especially the
crash of a Czecho.slovak airliner carrying only Czecho-
slovak citizens, is under the existing provisions of inter-
national air law a matter of exclusive jurisdiction of the
Czechoslovak authorities. The results of the investigation
carried out by these authorities have been already com-
municated to the Government of the United States.
In its above note the Government of the United States
has avoided a clear recognition of its resiMnsibility under
international law for the activities of the so-called Free
Europe Committee, which is an American organization
registered with the American authorities. The Govern-
ment of the United States has made the statement of its
position on this fundamental question, which is a separate
question from that of the concrete consequences of the
above mentioned activities, conditional on the supply by
the Czechoslovak authorities of technical, meteorological
and other data relating to the air crash of January 18,
1956. These data, however, are quite irrelevant as re-
gards the evaluation of the general question of the re-
sponsibility, under international law, of the United States
Government for the activities of the said American
organization. This responsibility of the United States
Government is quite indisputable under international
law.
It must be noted at the same time that the request for
detailed information concerning the air crash indicates
in itself that the Government of the United States starts
in fact from the recognition of its responsibility under
international law for the activities of the American or-
ganization which had caused the air crash by the launch-
ing of balloons into the Czechoslovak airspace.
The divergence between the fact that on one hand the
Government of the United States avoids a clear recog-
nition of this responsibility and the fact that on the other
hand it makes a request which involves such a recognition,
is so clear and so serious that the Czechoslovak Govern-
ment would be fully entitled to ask the Government of the
United States that prior to any request for data concern-
ing the said air crash it state openly its position on this
question of international law and to recognize expressly
its responsibility for the activities of the so-called "Free
Europe Committee".
In order, however, to facilitate and expedite the con-
sideration of the claim for compensation of the damages,
the Government of the Czechoslovak Republic wishes to
provide, despite its above reservations regarding the note
of the United States Government of October 9, 1956, the
following additional data concerning the crash of the air-
craft of the Czechoslovak Airlines which occurred on
January 18, 1956 :
1) The transport aircraft which crashed was a DC-3
type aircraft bearing the registration mark OK-"WDZ ; its
airframe serial number was 23523. The right engine was
a Twin-Wasp R-1830-92 type bearing the serial No. CP-
254206; the left engine was of the same type and had the
serial No. 353165. The aircraft was registered in the Air-
craft Register under No. 1346 and its Certificate of Air-
worthiness was valid until March 10, 1956. The maximum
permissible weight of the aircraft was 11,880 kgs and the
actual take-ofC weight at its take-ofC on January 18, 1956
1021
was 11,844 kgs. The flight time of the airframe since its
manufacture was 8,839 hrs., since its last major overhaul
on December 29, 1954, 888 hrs., and since the last "B"
/75-hour/ inspection on December 22, 1955, 51 hrs. The
right engine had a flight time since manufacture of 4,953
hrs. and since last inspection 22 hrs. ; the left engine had a
total flight time of 5,197 hrs. and since last inspection 119
hrs. After its preceding flight the aircraft was thoroughly
serviced and prior to its take-off to its last flight it was
again serviced and checked. No defects had been reported
on the previous flights.
2) On the flight during which the crash occurred the
aircraft had the following crew: Pilot-in-command
Vladimir Drab, co-pilot Viiclav Friina, radio operator
Vlado Jorfk, flight engineer Rudolf Ruzicka. Vladimir
DrSb, a pilot with minima No. 1. had very good flight ex-
perience. Examined of his knowledge of flight techniques
on September 17, 1955, September 22, 1955 and October 7,
1955, he passed with excellent marks. By the end of 1955
he had flown a total of 6,742 hours, of which 176 hours
were flown on 121 flights in the last three months. He
held a valid license authorizing him to operate aircraft
of the DC-3 type as pilot-in-command. Vdclav FrS,na
passed into the category of co-pilot on July 18, 1955. He
passed the periodical examinations of flight techniques on
December 13, 1955 and January 14, 1956 with excellent
results. By the end of 1955 he had flown a total of 1,810
hours, of which 176 hours had been flown on 135 flights in
the last three months. He held a valid license author-
izing him to fly as co-pilot on DC-3 aircraft. Vlado
Jorik was re-examined of his knowledge of aeronautical
communications on August 13 and 14, 1955 and on Decem-
ber 14, 1955, and was classified as excellent. By the end
of 1955 he had flown a total of 2,905 hours, of which 197
hours had been flown on 132 flights in the last three months.
He had a valid license authorizing him to fly as radio
operator on DC-3 type aircraft. Rudolf Ruzicka received
excellent marks in the practical and theoretical exam-
inations of flight engineers which he passed on January
21 and 23, 1954. He received favorable mention in the
Circular of Ordinances issued by the Chief of the Civil
Aviation Directorate, No. 9 of February 22, 1954. He had
flown a total of 9,473 hours, 184 of which had been flown
on 111 flights in the last three months. He held a valid
license of flight engineer on DO-3 aircraft. All members
of the crew were killed in the crash.
3) The following passengers travelled in the aircraft
on its last flight: Laura JarnS, born December 14, 1912,
married ; Anna I'aulinyovii, born March 4, 1910, married ;
Ing. Vladimir Puchy, born August 5, 1922, married ;
Antonin Figula, born July 27, 1914, married ; Frantisek
Tlaskal, born September 24, 1902, married : Karel Kaspar,
born March 26, 1902, married ; Ing. Jan Iznk, born
October 20, 1902, married ; Stefan Kantor, born July 10,
1915, married ; Bohumil Nocifir, born November 8, 1918,
married ; Dr. Vladimir Jelinek, born November 17, 1913,
married ; Helena Kaloudova, born September 16, 1917,
unmarried; Marta Balcova, born July 1, 1929, unmar-
ried; Josef Bansky, born December 31, 1919, married;
Antonin Siegrid, born June 14, 1908, married : Anna
Lorinsova, born September 9, 1922, married ; Dr. Ladislav
1022
Drobn^, born August 26, 1914, married; Josef Baranfk,
born June 2, 1912, married ; jan Marisciak, born March
11, 1919, married; Stefan Hak, born August 10, 1904,
married ; Jaroslav Sevra, bom December 4, 1923 ; Juraj
Vehec, born April 22, 1913, married ; Bartolomej Bavoldr,
born September 29, 1914, married. Passengers Laura
JarnS, Anna Paulinyova. Ing. Vladimir Puch.f and
Antonin Figula suffered heavy injuries in the crash. All
the other passengers suffered fatal injuries and by the
time the wreckage was reached they were already dead.
4) The following weather conditions existed at the
Tatry Airfield on January 18, 1956 : At 13,30 GET : wind
direction 240°, wind velocity 6 m/sec, visibility 20 km,
overcast 8/8, lower base of clouds 840 meters above
ground, temperature -|-5°C, dew point +1°C ; at 14,30
CET : wind direction 240°, wind velocity 8 m/sec, visi-
bility 20 km, overcast 3/8, lower base of clouds 500
meters above ground, next layer of clouds 7/8 with lower
base 700 meters above ground, temperature -f5°C, dew
point +2°C; at 14,.55 CET: wind direction 240°, wind
velocity 9 m/sec, visibility 20 km, overcast %, lower base
of clouds 500 meters above ground, next layer of clouds
Vs with lower base 700 meters above ground, temperature
+5°C, dewpoint +2°C, drizzling rain. The following
weather conditions were recorded by the adjoining meteor-
ological stations : Lomnick# Stit /2,630 meters above sea
level/ recorded at 13,00 CET : wind direction 290°, wind
velocity 7m/sec, gusts of 14m/sec, visibility 60 km, below
the station a cloud exiianse with the upper limit reaching
2,000 to 2,500 meters above sea level, above the station
cloudy 6/8 600 to 1,000 meters above ground, temperature
— 2°C, dew point — 12°C, no icing conditions; at 16,00
CET: wind direction 290°, wind velocity 17 m/sec, gusts
of 30 ni/sec. visibility 200 m, station in clouds, tempera-
ture — 3°C, dew point — 3°C, no icing conditions. The
station at Svermovo /geographical position 48°51'N,
20°11'E/ lying in the altitude of 900 meters above sea
level recorded the following weather conditions at 14,00
CET : wind direction 230°, wind velocity 7 m/sec, visi-
bility 2 km, slight drizzle, overcast 8/8, lower base of
clouds 60 meters above ground, all surrounding moun-
tains and slopes in clouds, temperature -|-1°C; at 15,00
CET: wind direction 270°, wind velocity 8 m/sec, visi-
bility 3 km, moderate rain, overcast 8/8, lower base of
clouds 60 meters above ground, all surrounding moun-
tains and slopes in clouds. Freezing level in free atmos-
phere was 2,400 meters above sea level after a
temperature correction to the free atmosphere in the
mountains. The correction was obtained after a compari-
son of the result of a radio sonde released from the Tatry
Airfield in the morning with the observations carried out
by the mountain stations.
5) The aircraft carried the following navigational and
communication equipment on board : Liaison transmitter
with dynamotor and tuning units ; Liaison receiver ; S-
10-L transmitter with an aerial tuning device and dyna-
motor ; 3-4 Mc/s Command transmitter ; 4-5.3 Mc/s
Command transmitter ; 3-6 Me/s Command receiver ;
6-9.1 Mc/s Command receiver; 190-250 Kc/s Com-
mand receiver ; radio-compass with control box and
inverter; 74 Mc/s marker receiver; SBA/Lorenz/equij)-
Departmenf of Sfafe Bulletin
ment with marker beacon receiver 38 Mc/s. The follow-
ing ground equipment was available: transmitter and
receiver on the frequency 3917.5 Kc/s; SBA equip-
ment/Lorenz/ ; marker beacon transmitter operating
on the frequency 38 Mc/s; NDB medium-wave at Sliac
and Tatry ; medium-wave D-flnders. Air to ground com-
lication was maintained throughout the flight on
short- and medium-wave channels. En-route navigation
was done by medium-wave direction finders, the NDBs
t Sliac and Tatry, and by radio compass which was
used to check the course of the flight. All the ecjuipment
as in perfect order.
6) A detailed investigation of the wreckage has shown
that at the point of impact the aircraft was complete
uKl had lost no basic part. The wing.*!, the tail planes
iiicliuling the control surfaces, the ailerons, engines and
piopellers were all found in the place of impact. The
left wing was broken about 1 meter from where it joins
the centre wing section. The outer i)art of the wing
rested on the rear part of the fuselage where it was
again broken so that the wing tip was on the right side
of the fuselage. All parts of the left wing were torn
and deformed by the impact of the wing on a tree. The
right wing was torn away at the spotlight when it hit
the foot of a tree. The rest of the wing rested in upside
down iwsition along the fuselage. About two meters
from its tip the wing was broken and hung down. The
centre wing .section was pu.shed into the left side of the
fuselage. The left engine was torn away from its fitting
and thrown to the right front so that its front part faced
the aircraft. The rear engine cover was embedded in
the grovmd, the engine accessories were damaged or
destroyed. The propeller reduction gear was torn away
from the front part of the engine cover. The engine wais
not jammed. There were signs of a fire around the
carburettor, which flamed up apparently on the ground
after the impact and did not last long. The right engine
was torn away from its fitting and thrown to the right
front. Four cylinders on the right bottom were torn
away, the same as the front part of the cover including
the propeller reduction gear. Some of the engine acces-
sories were damaged. The engine did not jam. The
exhaust tube was deformed and damaged. There were
signs of a fire around the carburettor, but the fire did
not spread. The left propeller was torn away together
with the propeller reduction gear and was found on the
left side of the fuselage in an opposite direction to that
of the flight at about the level of the cabin door. Two
blades were bent backwards and one slightly forward.
The blades were set roughly in cruising position. The
right propeller was found with a iwrt of the propeller
reduction gear near the rear part of the fuselage at its
right side. The blades were bent forward. Their setting
corresponded roughly to cruising conditions. The rear
part of the fuselage was unbroken to the level of the
third window from the rear. From there to the front
It was broken and torn. The monoeockle was split on
hitting four large trees into two parts all the way to
the place of the holder of the aerial of the main radio
station. The front part of the fuselage was completely
crushed. The centre wing section was pushed with its
front part up into the fuselage. All the pas.senger seats
June 16, 1958
were torn off the floor and thrown out with the exception
of five seats which were left in the cabin. The rear part
of the fuselage was mostly undamaged and was com-
pletely empty. Not found among the accessories in the
wreckage was the holder of the aerial and the aerial
of the main radio station and the Command station;
these parts could not be found even in the near vicinity
of the crash.
7) The cockpit was completely destroyed. Parts of
the cockpit ceiling were found in the shapeless mass of
wreckage in the front, and parts of the cockpit floor,
including the steering equipment, were found somewhat
to the left rear. The elevator trimmer was found in a
position of -1°, while the rudder trimmer was set at
2° left. The left gas lever was roughly in a position
corresponding to cruising conditions. The right gas lever
was pushed more forward towards full throttle and was
bent by the impact somewhat to the left. The left mix-
ture control lever was secured in a position correspond-
ing to poor mixture. The right mixture control lever
was pushed fully forward and was bent to the left by
the impact /it could not be moved/. The left fuel cock
was found in a position between the right and left main
tanks, while the right fuel cock in the position "right
main tank". The master magnetto switch was turned
on. The magnetto switch of the left engine was found
in "on" position for both magnettos, while the magnetto
switch of the right engine was "on" for the right mag-
netto. The lever of the propeller speed governor of the
left engine was found in a position about a width of the
diameter of the lever knob behind the position corre-
sponding to cruising conditions. The lever of the pro-
peller speed governor of the right engine was in a posi-
tion corresponding to cruising conditions. The carburet-
tor air-warming control levers were not secured and the
safety device was damaged. The static pressure bleed
cock was in "cabin" position; the lever was apparently
forced into this position by the impact. It was bent
down and could not be moved. The battery switch was
on, the heating of one Pitot tube was switched on, while
the other was switched off ; the de-icing of the propellers
was in "off" position. The radio compass was switched
on the same as the "Fasten your safety belts" and "No
smoking" sign. The SBA equipment was switched on
on the pilot's switch panel.
8) The instruments on the instrument panel were
mostly broken. All three altimeters were found. The
relatively best preserved of them was the radio opera-
tor's altimeter, but its setting screw was broken away ;
when found, the altimeter indicated the pressure of 936
mb ; the altitude indicated at the time of its finding was
860 meters. The co-pilot's altimeter, which was partly
broken and the gauge of which was missing, indicated
the pressure of 941 mb. Only remnants of the captain's
altimeter were found, and nothing could be ascertained
from them. The rudder was undamaged and could be
easily turned. The left half of the elevator was broken
at its outer part together with the stabilizer; the right
half was only slightly damaged. The ailerons remained
in their fittings but were broken, the same as the wing.
The control cables in the rear part of the fuselage were
undamaged; they were slack but stayed in the control
1023
pulleys. The trimming tabs were deflected in a position
corresponding to the setting in the cockpit. The under-
carriage was out and was damaged by the impact ; it was
secured, however, in the "out" position. The rear wheel
was practically undamaged. The fuel tanks were de-
formed, but there were no leaks. All contained fuel,
with the exception of the right rear tank, from which
fuel leaked out through the purging valve which was
torn away. The left oil tank was completely destroyed ;
It was pushed up towards the fuselage and the oil flowed
out. The front part of the right oil tank was destroyed
and the rear part was deformed ; it was lifted up and its
upper part was damaged. Some of the oil remained in
the tank. Both oil coolers were torn away and damaged.
The battery was completely broken and the wiring in the
front part of the aircraft was torn and destroyed.
9) After the examination of the radio equipment which
was not completely destroyed in the crash, the following
was found : the Liaison transmitter, serial No. 1005, was
tuned to the frequency of 333.5 Kc/s ; the transmitter it-
self and the exchangeable tuning units were considerably
damaged. The Liaison receiver, serial No. 1023, was
tuned to the frequency of 338 Kc/s ; the front panel and
the side walls were considerably damaged. The Com-
mand transmitter, serial No. 0017, was tuned to the fre-
quency of 3923 Kc/s ; it was completely destroyed by the
impact. The Command transmitter, serial No. 1147, was
tuned to the frequency of 5600 Kc/s and was also com-
pletely destroyed. The Command receiver, serial No.
0338, was tuned to the frequency of 3917 Kc/s and was
destroyed by the impact. The front panel of the radio
compass, serial No. 1003, was damaged. The tuning ca-
pacitor, including the worm gear, was torn out, so that
from the position of the tuning capacitor it could not be
ascertained to which frequency it was tuned at the mo-
ment of the crash. The upper part of the cover was
indented, thus deforming the first high-frequency unit.
The deformation of the cover caused several short cir-
cuits between the trimmers and the frame. When tested,
the equipment functioned but with a considerably reduced
input sensitivity caused by the damage.
10) The detailed examination of the wreckage of the
aircraft ascertained the fact that it was complete at the
place of impact, with the exception of the aerial holder
and the aerial of the main radio station and the Com-
mand radio station. The positions of the gas levers, the
mixture control levers, the speed governor levers, the mag-
netto switches in the "on" position, and of the fuel valves
show that as far as the engines are concerned, the air-
craft had no defects. The complete condition of the
wings and all controls as well as the setting of the trim-
ming tabs, which corresponded to the positions of the
respective controls in the cockpit, indicate that the air-
craft was in perfect order also as regards the fuselage.
The fact that the undercarriage was down and that the
sign "Fasten your safety belts" and "No smoking" was
switched on show that the aircraft was preparing for a
normal landing at the airport. The technical examina-
tion thus indicates that: a) the aircraft had no technical
defect during the flight, which could have caused the
crash ; b ) the fact that the aerial system was not found
1024
in the wreckage shows that in the last stage of the flight
the cockpit was damaged and the aerial was torn off by
a collision with a heavier object.
11) In considering the causes which might have
brought about such a collision, it was pointed out to the
investigating commission that on the day of the crash
a larger number of balloons of the type used by Ameri-
can organizations for the unlawful sending of printed
matter over the territory of the Czechoslovak Republic
had been spotted over Central Slovakia.
Further investigation ascertained the following facts :
On .January 17 and 18, 1956 winds in the direction of
230° to 300° and a velocity of 37 to 83 km per hour pre-
vailed in the altitude of 1,500 to 3,000 meters over the
territory of Western Germany, Austria and Czechoslo-
vakia. This southwesterly to northwesterly wind enabled
the launching of balloons from the west over the terri-
tory of the Czechoslovak Republic. On January 17, 18
and 19, 1956 — i. e. on the day of the crash, a day before
and a day after it — balloons of the so-called "Free Europe
Committee" were spotted e. g. in the following areas :
Blatna, Horsuv Tyn, Susice, Stod, Klatovy, Domazlice,
Saratice, Povazska Bystrica, Bytca, Turcianske Teplice,
Rajee, Ruzomberok, Kezmarok, Levice, Mikulas, Hradek,
Levoca, Zilina, as well as in the area of the Tatry Moun-
tains. The printed matter which had dropped on those
days on Czechoslovak territory was marked "Svobodna
Europa" or "Slobodna Europa". It was printed partly
in the Czech and partly in the Slovak languages and was
numbered 40, 41 and 42.
12) According to statements of witnesses, balloons had
been spotted on the day of the crash also directly in the
area of the disaster. Between 7 and 8 a. m. witnesses
.spotted a balloon cari-ying a load over the town of Pop-
rad which lies 27 kilometers west-southwest of the place
of the crash. Two groups of three balloons each were
spotted about 3 p. m. in the area of the town of Kezma-
rok which is about 18 kilometers west of the place of the
crash. Moreover, a larger group of balloons appeared
around noon over the town of Levice which is about 160
kilometers southwest of the place of the crash ; at that
time a strong wind was blowing from the area of Levice
in a 240° course, i. e., towards the area of the crash.
These data indicate clearly that in the afternoon hours
of January 18, 1956, several groups of balloons drifted in
the area of the crash.
13) A search of the terrain in the vicinity of the crash
discovered remnants of a torn balloon and its load.
About 2 kilometers east-southeast from the place of the
crash, i. e. in the direction from which the airliner had
been flying, a part of the plastic skin of a balloon, meas-
uring about 30 square meters, was found hanging on a
tree about 4 meters from the ground. In the vicinity
about 60 to 70 copies of a bilingual leaflet marked
"Slobodna Eur6pa" No. 42 were found spread over the
ground. Another part of the balloon skin was found
after the thaw in a wooded area about 400 meters east of
the place of the crash.
14) After examining the wreckage of the aircraft, a
study of the records of the ground control services and
the remnants of the records on board, a search of the
Deporfmenf of Sfafe Bullefin
vicinity of the crash, and after hearing witnesses from
imong the local population, members of the ground per-
ionnel of the airports and ground control stations with
ivhich the airliner had maintained contact, as well as the
:rew of the aircraft of the Czechoslovak Airlines, regis-
ration mark OK-WDP, which had lauded at the Tatry
iirfield at 14,34 hours ou the same day, i. e., about 15
Jiinutes before the crash of the OK-WDZ airliner, the
nvestigating commission carried out a reconstruction of
;he flight of the crashed airliner. The airliner's crew
was to carry out on January 18, 1956, the flight on the
Praha-Bratislava-Kosice route, which is marked as flight
No. OK 07. Before the flight the crew made the usual
pre-flight preparations on the Prague airfield and these
preparations were checked by the navigator of the air-
field. The crew was notified of a change in the call signs
of the radio beacon at the Kosiee airfield and of a change
in the frequency of the radio beacon at Sliac. Prior to
he flight the crew was briefed on the weather situa-
tion and the weather forecast for the route and the ter-
minal airfield, and it picked up a written weather fore-
cast for the flight. At the Bratislava airfield the crew
received instructions to carry out a flight on the Brati-
slava-Tatry route because the weather situation at the
Kosiee arifield did not correspond to the prescribed
weather minima ; for the same reason the OK-WDP air-
liner which was to fly to Kosiee as flight No. OK 05 was
also rerouted to the Tatry Airfield. After receiving his
Instructions to fly to the Tatry Airfield, the pilot-in-com-
mand ascertained the number of passengers and the ear-
informed himself of the weather situation and the
forecast for the flight at the meteorological service, and
determined the amount of fuel necessary for the flight
as 1,800 liters. The co-pilot and the radio operator
made the preparations for the flight to the Tatry Air-
field according to the route forecast which they received
from the meteorological service. Together with the
flight permit, they received from the area control center
the latest data concerning the actual weather conditions
at the Tatry Airfield. The flight engineer supervised the
fuelling of the airliner. All the prescribed regulations
were observed at the take-off of the OK-WDZ airliner
from the Bratislava airfield. The Tatry Airfield gave
permission for the airliner's landing, no weather condi-
tions dangerous to the flight had been forecast for the
route or area of the airfield by the meteorological serv-
ice. The weather conditions at the Tatry Airfield cor-
responded to the valid weather minima. There were no
defects on either the aircraft or the radio-navigational
equipment of the Tatry Airfield. The aircraft was
equipped with the usual instruments required for con-
trolled approach to the Tatry Airfield, and the crew had
the required qualifications.
15) The OK-WDZ airliner took off from the Brati-
slava airfield at 13,56 hour.s. Prior to the take-off it re-
ceived from the airfield control tower at Bratislava on
the frequency 3,917.5 Kc/s take-off clearance and instruc-
tions for the ascent. At 14,08 hours the aircraft estab-
lished contact with the area control center Bratislava
on the frequency 4,689.5 Kc/s. After take-off it steered
into the course of 073° and ascended to the flight level
of 3,000 meters /the altimeter being set for standard
June 16, 1958
pressure/. It reached this altitude at 14,11 hours. At
14,26 hours the aircraft changed over to the Sliac di-
rection finder on the frequency 333 Kc/s, and at 14,27
hours it announced its overflight of the Sliac airfield.
It also requested that the SBA equipment and the NDB
at the Tatry Airfield be switched on. From the Sliac
direction finder it received a report on the weather con-
ditions at the Tatry Airfield. After passing over the
Sliac airfield, the aircraft proceeded ou the course 000°
to the Tatry Airfield, still at 3,000 meters. At 14,37
hours it established contact with the Tatry direction
finder, received a weather report and tuned in ou the
frequency 3,917.5 Kc/s. The aircraft arrived over the
Tatry Airfield at 14,41 hours.
16) After arriving over the Tatry Airfield, the aircraft
began its controlled approach at 14,41 hours. For this
purpose it used the SBA equipment, the switching on
of which it had previously requested. According to cal-
culations the time necessary for the flight from the be-
ginning of the approach to the standard procedure turn
has been set at 5.5 if there is no wind. In view of the
expected vv'lnd the crew shortened this time by about
one minute, i. e., to 4.5 minutes. The actual wind in the
area of descent reached a velocity of over 100 kilo-
meters per hour blowing in the probable direction of
240° ; it had this velocity even at lower altitudes above
ground. At about 14,45% hours the crew began the
standard procedure turn 1,300 meters above the level
of the Tatry Airfield. After completing the turn, which
took about 2 to 2.5 minutes, the aircraft set a course
to the airfield, left the altitude of 1.300 meters above
the level of the Tatry Airfield, i. e., 2,000 meters above
sea level, and began its descent to the altitude of 650
meters above the level of the airfield, at which altitude
it was to fly over the SBA outer marker /radio beacon
operating on the frequency of 38 Mc/s, which lies about
5 kilometers east of the airfield. In normal flight the
aircraft could not descend from the time it completed
the procedure turn /14.47 to 14.48 hours/ until the time
it hit the ground /14.50 hours/, i. e., within two to three
minutes, from the altitude of 2,000 meters above sea level
to the altitude of 1,100 meters above sea level at which
it crashed, i. e., by 900 meters.
17) Until the time the aircraft completed the stand-
ard procedure turn the flight was normal ; this is shown
by the normal radio contact and by the record of the
aircraft's radio operator on the completion of the proce-
dure turn and the reception of the information concern-
ing the direction of the runway and the direction and
velocity of the wind at the Tatry Airfield. This indi-
cates that the sudden drop in altitude and the change
in the aircraft's course were caused by external influ-
ence. The passengers who survived the crash do, in
fact, conflrm that a few minutes before the crash they
felt a strong shock, an unusual swerving of the aircraft
and its rapid descent. The aerial of the main radio sta-
tion, which was not found either in the wreckage or in
the vicinity of the place of crash, could not have been
torn away by impact on the trees, the tops of which the
aircraft had brushed only with its front and bottom
parts before hitting the slope. In the place where the
aerial holder is flxed the fuselage was damaged in such
1025
a way that the holder would have had to be found iu
the wreckage if it were torn away only after the air-
craft had hit the ground. The rear part of the fuselage,
including the fin, was not damaged, but despite this fact
the wires of the aerial were missing. Thus the commi.s-
sion reached the conclusion that the whole aerial system
had been damaged already during the flight by impact
with a heavier object. Such an object could have been
only the load of the balloon, the remnants of which were
found near the place of the crash. The aircraft appar-
ently hit the bottom of the balloon and its load with
the upper front of its fuselage, and the collision caused a
partial damage of the aircraft and a loss of speed, and
disturbed the normal controlled descent of the aircraft.
The unexpected impact on the fuselage probably caused at
least a temporary loss of control over the maintenance
of the correct course, and reduced substantially the over-
all maneuverability of the aircraft. Thus it happened
that the aircraft swerved into a course of about 310°,
slipped into a steep glide and in one or two minutes
hit the Skapovd Hill.
18) The aircraft was found northeast from point 1228
Skapova. The heading of the aircraft at the impact was
about 300°. Judging from the way in which the aircraft
broke the trees and from the general conditions of the
place of cra.sh, the aircraft's course of approach had
been about 310° ; the aircraft first crashed with its left
wing into the crown of a large tree and thus turned sev-
eral degrees to the left. The first impact of the air-
craft on the tree tops occurred at a distance of 30 to 40
meters from the spot where it hit the ground, which lies
at the altitude of about 1,100 meters above sea level.
19) On the basis of the results of the investigation,
the investigation commission reached the conclusion that
the crash of the OK-WDZ airliner was caused by a col-
lision of the aircraft with a balloon launched unlaw-
fully into Czechoslovak airspace by the American or-
ganization called the "Free Europe Committee". This
conclusion has been confinned both by the reconstruc-
tion of the flight and by the discovery of the remnants
of a balloon in the vicinity of the crash.
The above data exceed by far the extent of information
sufiicing to convince the Government of the United States
of America of the correctness of the conclusions reached
by the Czechoslovak investigating commission and of the
fact that the crash of the transport aircraft of the Czech-
oslovak Airlines, which occurred on January 18, 1956, is
the tragic result of the activities of the said American
organization, of activities constituting a gross violation of
international law, for which the Government of the United
States bears full responsibility under international law.
The Government of the Czechoslovak Republic demands
therefore most emphatically that the Government of the
United States of America take immediately steps to com-
pensate the damages caused to Czechoslovak citizens and
to the Czechoslovak Airlines by this air disaster, which
amount to 5,52.5,374 crowns.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs avails itself of this
opportunity to renew to the Embassy of the United States
of America the assurance of its consideration.
Pbaha, February 20, 1957.
U.S. NOTE OF OCTOBER 9, 1956
The Embassy of the United States of America presents
its compliments to the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, and, under Instructions of the United States Gov-
ernment, has the honor to refer to the Ministry's Note No.
123.330/56-ABO/l of June 19, 1956.
The United States Government addresses itself to the
Czechoslovak Government's charge that the United States
Government is liable for the crash of a Czechoslovak Air-
lines passenger aircraft on January 18, 1956 near Levoca
in Slovakia on the ground, among others, that the crash
was due to the collision of the aircraft with a balloon
launched into Czechoslovak airspace by the Free Europe
Committee, and to the Czechoslovak Government's de-
mand of compensation for damages on account of the
crash totaling 5,.52.5,374 Kcs.
The United States Government has studied the Czech-
oslovak Government's note of June 19, 1956, as well as
the Czechoslovak Government's note of February 24, 1956
on the same subject, with considerable care. The United
States Government's position on the questions raised in
these two notes of the Czechoslovak Government respect-
ing the activities of the Free Europe Committee, a private
organization, has been fully and completely set forth in
the interchange of diplomatic correspondence with the
Czechoslovak Government on this subject, particularly in
the United States Government's notes of July 31, 1953, '
May 24, 19.54 ' and May 18, 1955.* Aside from the ques-
tion regarding the alleged legal liability of the Govern-
ment of the United States for allegedly wrongful acts by
a private entity, the Free Europe Committee, there re-
mains the critical question whether the incident was, in
fact, the proximate result of a collision between the
Czechoslovak aircraft and a Free Europe Committee
balloon. The communications received from the Czecho-
slovak Government on this subject contain statements
which must be characterized as mere conclusions, inade-
quate in themselves to support the charge that the crash
was due to any collision with a balloon or that it was a
Free Europe Committee balloon which collided with the
aircraft.
In view of the reported loss of life and injury which
was involved in the incident and the Czechoslovak Gov-
ernment's insistence on its version of the facts, the United
States Government desires to study all the available
evidence and to arrive at its own conclusion only after
such study.
For this purpose, the United States Government re-
quires, and requests the Czechoslovak Government to
make available in original or duly certified form, the
following documents :
1. The full report, together with all supporting eviden-
tiary and related material, of the special commission
appointed by the Ministry of Transport which in-
vestigated the cau.ses of the crash of the Czechoslovak
Airlines aircraft on January 18, 1956.
' For text, see Bulletin of Aug. 17, 1953, p. 210.
' For text, see iUd., June 7, 1954, p. 881.
'Not printed.
1026
Department of State Bulletin
2. A copy of the flight plan filed by the pilot of the
ircraft in question at the origin of the flight, together
rith all instructions issued to the pilot en route and all
hanges in the flight plan requested or reported, whether
n writing or by radio, covering the entire flight from
rigin to destination and to the points of diversion and
rash.
A full transcript of all weather observations and
eports of weather conditions as observed on the ground
md at all altitudes aloft between the point and time of
>rigin and the point and time of destination as well as
he point and time of crash as found and reported by
rround observers and by all aircraft in flight (including
he DC-3 aircraft involved in the crash), giving aU mete-
)rological data recorded, including winds, visibility, tem-
jeratures, rain, snow and ice conditions, cloud conditions,
ind the like.
4. Copies of all the radio log entries of ground radio
stations and of aircraft in the air and, if available, of aU
he entries of the logs kept on board the aircraft which
rashed relating to the flight of the DC-3 aircraft in-
irolved. There should be included transcripts of all con-
rersations with the aircraft in flight from the time of
origin to the time of crash, giving the time of each
?onversation, positions reported or observed, all evidence
3f communications and of attempts at communication
with or by the aircraft, such as messages from the
aircraft as well as messages and conversations conducted
by other stations in the area of flight and crash, in-
eluding particularly but not exclusively, stations at Brati-
slava, Zvolen, Kosiee, Presov and Spisska Nova Ves.
5. Copies of all photographs taken of the wreckage
of the aircraft, of the balloon claimed to have caused
the collision and the literature claimed to have been
found with the balloon at the time of its discovery by
the investigating commission.
6. A copy of the maintenance record of the aircraft
for a period covering not less than fifteen days prior
to the accident, showing the technical and operational
condition of the aircraft and all its equipment and parts,
and showing repairs, adjustments of mechanical parts,
and electronic and electrical action advised or made with
reference to the aircraft and its equipment and parts,
7. A copy of the instrument approach procedure for
the airfield to which the aircraft was flying, described in
the Czechoslovak Government's note of February 24,
1956 as the Tatry Airfield (but assumed to be the air-
port shown on maps of Slovakia as Poprad), a descrip-
tion of all the navigational aids available in working
order on the ground for use of the aircraft making its
instrument approach and the capacity of each of such
navigational aids, together with a description of the type
and capacity of the usable navigational equipment avail-
able on board the aircraft. The radio frequencies in use
during the flight at the ground station and the frequen-
cies used by the aircraft in communication with the
ground station should also be given.
8. If not included among the foregoing documents, the
Czechoslovak Government is requested specifically to
state in detail the evidence upon which the conclusion
was reached, as stated in the note of February 24, 1956,
June 76, 7958
that the aircraft was "In perfect technical order", that
"its fiight had been quite normal" up to the time of the
approach and, that "it completed the prescribed procedure
turn in its controlled approach to the Tatry Airfield".
The Czechoslovak Government is also requested to state
specifically the reasons for the diversion of the aircraft
from its destination at Kosiee to Poprad.
The Czechoslovak Government is further requested,
particularly inasmuch as no representative of the United
States Government participated in any way in the in-
vestigation, to permit investigators accredited by the
United States Government at their discretion: (1) to ex-
amine the originals of all documents, (2) to visit and in-
spect the scene of the crash and make checks upon the
information available at ground stations, including the
Tatry Airfield and other places in the vicinity of the
route of flight at which information concerning the flight
and the crash may be available, and (3) to make photo-
copies of all documents and take photographs of all ob-
jects and places involved.
When the Czechoslovak Government has responded to
the foregoing requests, the United States Government
will, after careful consideration and study, reply in de-
tail with respect to the points raised by the Czechoslovak
Government's notes of June 19, 1956 and February 24,
1956.
The Embassy avails itself of this opportunity to renew
to the Ministry the assurances of its consideration.
CZECHOSLOVAK NOTE OF JUNE 19, 1956
Unofficial translation
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
No. 123.330/56-ABO/l
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compli-
ments to the Embassy of the United States of America
with reference to its Note of February 24, 1956 concern-
ing the crash of a Czechoslovak passenger aircraft caused
by a balloon as well as to the Embassy's Note No. 385
of April 10, 1956, has the honour to advise the following :
In its Note of February 24, the Ministry of Foreign
AfCairs, on instructions of the Government of the Czecho-
slovak Republic, informed the Embassy of the United
States of America that on January 18, 1956, a passenger
aircraft of the Czechoslovak Airlines crashed near Levoca
in Slovakia, in which crash 22 persons were killed and 4
passengers suffered heavy injuries. The investigation
established that this catastrophy had been caused by a
collision of the aircraft with a balloon launched over
Czechoslovakia territory by American organizations from
bases in Western Germany. The Government of the
Czechoslovak Kepublic at the same time again expressed
its emphatic protest against the launching of any bal-
loons into the Czechoslovak air space, requested the Gov-
ernment of the United States of America to take the
necessary measures so that the persons who by this ac-
tivity had caused the crash of the aircraft in Slovakia be
punished with utmost severity and reserved its right to
raise against the Government of the United States of
1027
America, which together with the Government of the Ger-
man Federal Republic, bears full responsibility for these
activities under international law, claims for the com-
pensation of all damage caused to Czechoslovak citizens
and enterprises by the sending of balloons into the
Czechoslovak air space.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs notes that the Gov-
ernment of the United States of America, in its Note of
April 10, avoids making any reply on the merit of the
Czechoslovak Note of February 24, concerning the crash
of the Czechoslovak passenger aircraft and seeks to shift
responsibility for the laimching of balloons over Czecho-
slovak territory which caused the airplane accident to
"a private American organization" to which it apparently
would wish to leave the taking of a position on the entire
matter. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs cannot, of
course, consider the statement of the Chairman of the
Board of the so-called "Free Europe Committee" a reply
to its Note addressed to the Embassy of the United States
of America and refuses to take note thereof.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs further notes that the
Government of the United States not only hesitates to
give a substantive reply to the data and requirements set
forth in the Czechoslovak Note of February 24, but has
likewise refrained from stating its own position with
regard to the statement of the so-called "Free Europe
Committee". This cannot fail to give the impression that
the Government of the United States of America, itself,
has serious doubts as to the contents of this provocative
statement and is reluctant to associate itself with the
assertions of the so-called "Free Europe Committee".
The Government of the United States is apparently well
aware of the fact that the "reasons" which allegedly
have obliged the "Free Europe Committee" to launch
balloons over Czechoslovak territory are completely ir-
relevant under international law and can in no way justify
the flagrant violation of Czechoslovak air space, nor can
they lessen the responsibility of the United States of
America for the crash of the Czechoslovak passenger air-
craft caused by a balloon of an American organization
launched illegally over the territory of Czechoslovakia.
The responsibility of the United States of America for
the launching of balloons into Czechoslovak air space and
for the damages caused thereby to the lives and health
of Czechoslovak citizens as well as to Czechoslovak proi>
erty, primarily in connection with the crash of the
Czechoslovak passenger aircraft on January 18, 19.56 is
beyond any dispute under international law. This fol-
lows, in particular, from these reasons and facts :
1/ The sovereignty of a State over its territory and air
space is one of the fundamental principles of interna-
tional law. This principle has found expression in a
number of international conventions, inter alia, also in
the Convention on International Civil Aviation of 1944.
Article 1 of this Convention provides : "The Contracting
States recognize that every State has complete and
exclusive sovereignty over the air space above its terri-
tory". The United States of America and Czechoslovakia
are both Signatories to the aforesaid Convention and
Members of the International Civil Aviation Organization
formed under this Convention. By their signature to the
1028
Convention on International Civil Aviation the United '
States of America explicitly and specifically undertook an
obligation under international law to recognize Czecho-
slovakia's complete and exclusive sovereignty over Czecho-
slovak air space and to refrain from any activities
infringing upon this sovereign right. The launching of
any balloons into Czechoslovak air space constitutes a
flagrant violation of this obligation.
The launching of balloons into Czechoslovak air space
is equally contrary to Article 8 of the aforesaid Con-
vention dealing with aircraft without a pilot and stipulat-
ing an explicit prohibition of the flight of such aircraft
over the territory of a Contracting State without special
authorization by that State.
The Government of the United States of America knows
full well that Czechoslovakia has not given its authoriza-
tion for the launching of balloons into Czechoslovak air
space, and has, on the contrary, repeatedly raised em-
phatic protest against the launching of balloons over
Czechoslovak territory ever since 19.53. The Government
of the United States, however, has thus far not taken
any steps against the launching of balloons into Czechoslo-
vak air space, but on the contrary has given every pos-
sible support to these activities. Such an attitude with
regard to fundamental provisions of international law
and explicitly accepted contractual obligations Is in dia-
metral opposition to the Charter of the United Nations
Organization.
2/ The American organization which has assumed the
name "Free Europe Committee" has launched and is
launching over Czechoslovak territory balloons up to 15
meters in diameter bearing a load of up to 180 kilograms.
Balloons of this size have been publicly exhibited in
Czechoslovakia and likewise described by correspondents
of the foreign press.
The Czechoslovak authorities have at their disposal the
statements of the pilots and other witnesses which prove
that the balloons fly at cruising altitudes of commercial
aircraft. This is likewise confirmed by the observations
of the air personnel of foreign airlines cited in publicly
accessible documents of the International Air Transport
Association, as for instance in its Circular of April 20,
1956.
In its documents the International Air Transport As-
sociation has likewise confirmed the fact that the bal-
loons launched by the so-called "Free Europe Committee"
constitute an aeronautical hazard. In a letter of April
13, 1956 in which the Director-General of the Interna-
tional Air Transport Association, Sir William P. Hildred,
has addressed himself in this matter to the Secretary-
General of the International Civil Aviation Organization,
Mr. G. Ljungberg, it is said with reference to the launch-
ing of balloons that "At the present time, an aeronautical
hazard exists which is causing considerable apprehen-
sion among Member Airlines". That is also why lATA
has requested ICAO "to investigate this matter with all
speed, in order that civil airline operations may resume
without hindrance or risk of collision".
3/ The so-called "Free Europe Committee" which
launches balloons into Czechoslovak air space styles
itself as a "private American organization", incorporated
Department of State Bulletin
ili^tn the State of New York in 1949, and the Government of
the United States of America makes reference to the pri-
vate nature of this organization whenever it wishes to
elude responsibility under international law for the sub-
versive activity of this organization. Yet it is a matter of
i( sublic knowledge that this is an organization formed
a especially for the purposes of "cold war", designed to carry
Dut hostile activities and subversive propaganda against
P Czechoslovakia and other countries of People's Democ-
racy. There exist a number of documents on the true
ila|. character and activities of this organization as well as on
raft its relations with the Government of the United States of
America.
However, be the legal status of the so-called "Free
Europe Committee" in the United States formally what-
o. ever it may, under international law there applies the
Jit generally recognized principle that a State bears re-
sponsibility not only for its own action, for the action
ter of its Government and Agencies, but also for the action
It of private persons and organizations carried out at the
irder, with the concurrence or support of the Govern-
ment, as well as for any unlawful action of private per-
sons and organizations which the State concerned has not
prevented although it is bound to do so under interna-
tional law. If the action of private persons or organiza-
tions has constituted a violation of international law, the
Grovernment which exercises sovereignty over any such
persons or organizations, bears responsibility for such
action, if it has not fulfilled its obligation to prevent any
violation of international law. There can be no doubt
hat both under the general principles of international
law and pursuant to accepted contractual commitments
the Government of the United States has the obligation
to prevent the violation of Czechcslovak air space by any
ons or organizations over which it exercises sover-
,l„|eignty, the more so since the Czechoslovak Government
las repeatedly and for a considerable period of time
irawn the attention of the Government of the United
States to the unlawful activities violating Czechoslovak
air space. It is, however, a matter of general knowledge
that the Government of the United States of America not
only does nothing to prevent the subversive activities of
the so-called "Free Europe Committee", but that these
activities are carried out with the concurrence of the
Government of the United States and with its full sup-
port in every respect. Under international law responsi-
bility for the violations of Czechoslovak air space
committed by the American organization, the so-called
Free Europe Committee", as well as for the damages
caused by such violation of international law, therefore
rests with the Government of the United States of
America.
On the basis of all these facts the Government of the
Czechoslovak Republic demands that the Government of
the United States of America compensate for the damage
caused to Czechoslovak nationals and the Czechoslovak
Airlines by the disaster of the passenger aircraft which
crashed near Levoca, in Slovakia, on January 18, 1956
due to the collision of the aircraft with a balloon
launched unlawfully into Czechoslovak air space by the
American organization, the so-called "Free Europe Com-
June 16, 1958
mittee" ; according to preliminary data the total damages
come to 5,525,374 kcs out of which sum the amount of
4,970,703 kcs represents compensation for damages in-
curred by the passengers on board of the aircraft, even-
tually by their dependents, and the amount of 554.671 kcs
compensation for the damages incurred by the Czecho-
slovak Airlines. Moreover, the Czechoslovak Govern-
ment insists on its demand that the United States of
America punish the persons who by their activity have
caused this tragic disaster in the course of which 22
persons were killed and 4 passengers suffered serious
injuries with utmost severity.
The Government of the Czechoslovak Republic con-
siders the reply of the P^mbassy of the United States
of America to its Note of February 24 as completely
unsatisfactory, fully maintains the position expressed
in this Note and calls upon the Government of the United
States with all emphasis to take without delay the nec-
essary measures to prevent the launching of balloons
into Czechoslovak air-space and thereby to check the
activities which constitute a serious hazard to air traffic
over Czechoslovak territory and a threat to the lives,
health and property of Czechoslovak citizens.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs avails itself of this
opportunity to renew to the Embassy of the United States
of America the assurance of its high consideration.
Pbaha, June 19, 1956
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Cultural Property
Convention for the protection of cultural property in the
event of armed conflict, and regulations of execution.
Done at The Hague May 14, 1954. Entered into force
August 7, 1956.'
Ratification deposited: Syria, March 6, 1958.
Accession deposited- Holy See, February 24, 1958.
Protocol for the protection of cultural property in the
event of armed conflict. Done at The Hague May 14,
1954. Entered into force August 7, 1956."
Ratification deposited: Syria, March 6, 1958.
Accession deposited: Holy See, February 24, 1958.
Narcotic Drugs
Protocol bringing under international control drugs out-
side the scope of the convention limiting the manufac-
ture and regulating the distribution of narcotic drugs
concluded at Geneva July 13, 1931 (48 Stat. 1543), as
amended (61 Stat. 2230; 62 Stat. 1796). Done at
Paris November 19, 1948. Entered into force Decem-
ber 1, 1949. TIAS 2308.
Acceptance deposited: Jordan, May 7, 1958.
Not in force for the United States.
1029
Protocol for limiting and regulating the cultivation of the
poppy plant, the production of, international and whole-
sale trade in, and use of opium. Dated at New York
June 23, 1953.=
Acceptance deposited: Jordan, May 7, 1958.
BILATERAL
Saudi Arabia
Economic assistance agreement for the expansion of the
Port of Dammam. Effected by exchange of notes at
Jidda March 1 and May 1, 1958. Entered into force
May 1, 1958.
Recent Releases
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, V. 8. Gov-
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Treaties in Force — A List of Treaties and Other Inter-
national Agreements of the United States in Force on
January 1, 1958. Pub. 6626. 266 pp. $1.25.
This publication contains a list of treaties and other in-
ternational agreements to which the United States has
become a party and which were in force on January 1,
1958.
Highlights of Foreign Policy Developments — 1957. Pub.
6631. General Foreign Policy Series 126. 22 pp. 20(*.
Another issue in the popular Background series, this
pamphlet discusses basic objectives and major develop-
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Defense — Release of Air Bases and Training of German
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Agreement between the United States of America and the
Federal Republic of Germany. Exchange of notes —
Signed at Bonn December 10, 1957. Entered into force
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Mutual Defense Assistance — Facilities Assistance Pro-
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Ethiopia. Exchange of notes — Dated at Addis Ababa
December 26, 1957. Entered into force December 26,
1957.
Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 3970.
5<f.
2 pp.
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dl
T
Yugoslavia, amending agreement of November 3, 1951
as amended— Signed at Belgrade December 27, 195?
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Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 3971. 15 pi
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United States Educational Commission in Japan. TIAiK J^J.
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the United States of America and the Republic of "
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1030
Department of State Bulleth
nu- 16, 1958
Index
Vol. XXXVIII, No. 990
frica. The United States and Emerging Africa
(Palmer)
-ab Union. U.S. Recognizes Establishment of
Arab Union
tnada. United States Relations With Canada
(Merchant)
aims and Property. U.S. Replies to Czechoslo-
vak Charges Concerning Free Europe Committee
Balloons (texts of notes)
mgress, The
mgressioual Documents Relating to Foreign
Policy
lited States Relations With Canada (Mer-
chant)
echoslovakia. U.S. Replies to Czechoslovak
I'haiges Concerning Free Europe Committee
Ballcions (texts of notes)
■paitment and Foreign Service. U.S. Protests
Soviet Action Concerning American Diplomat .
onomic Affairs. United States Relations With
'iiuada (Merchant)
ucational Exchange. United States Mining Ex-
lerts Visit Soviet Union
alth. Education, and Welfare. The First Ten
if ears of the World Health Organization (Wilcox,
Hilton Eisenhower)
;ernational Information. U.S. Replies to Czech-
)slovak Charges Concerning Free Europe Com-
aittee Balloons (texts of notes)
ernational Organizations and Conferences. The
rirst Ten Tears of the World Health Organiza-
;ion (Wilcox, Milton Eisenhovrer)
iq. U.S. Recognizes Establishment of Arab
Jnion
fdan. U.S. Recognizes Establishment of Arab
llnion
n-Self-Governing Territories. The United
states and Emerging Africa (Palmer) ....
blications. Recent Releases
eaty Information. Current Actions
1010
1005
U.S.S.R.
United States Mining Experts Visit Soviet Union . 1006
U.S. Proposes Easing Travel Bans on Reciprocal
Basis With U.S.S.R. (text of note) 1006
U.S. Protests Soviet Action Concerning American
Diplomat 1005
United Nations. The United States and Emerging
Africa (Palmer) 993
Name Index
Baker, John A., Jr 1005
Eisenhower, Milton 989
Merchant, Livingston T 999
Palmer, Joseph 2d 993
Wilcox, Francis 0 987
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: IViay 26~Jurie 1
Press releases may be obtained from the News Di-
vision, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.
Releases issued prior to May 26 which appear in
this issue of the Btjixetin are Nos. 261 of May 14,
273 of May 19, 279 and 281 of May 20, and 286 of
May 24.
Subject
ICA insures U.S. firm's investment in
French subsidiary.
Wailes nominated Ambassador to Iran.
Delegation to Caribbean Commission
(rewrite).
Itinerary for visit of President Heuss.
Holmes: "Africa's Challenge to the
Free World."
Statement on Arab Union.
Delegation to International Labor
Conference (rewrite).
$10 million loan to Burma.
Educational exchange.
Exchange of notes with U.S.S.R. on
medical cooperation.
*Not printed.
fHeld for a later issue of the Bitlletin.
No.
*288
Date
5/26
*289
t290
5/27
5/27
t291
t292
5/28
5/28
293
t294
5/28
5/28
■^295
*296
t297
5/29
5/29
5/29
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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Vol. XXXVIII, No. 991
Rec'd
JUL 2 1958
B, P. U
June^l958
THE CHALLENGE OF CHANGE • Statement by Sec
retary Dulles ^^^^
U.S. POLICIES AND PROGRAMS IN EUROPE • State-
ment by Assistant Secretary Elbrick 1056
THE BATTLEFIELD OF IDEAS • by Assistant Secre-
tary Berding 1043
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION TO SOLVE FOOD
AND AGRICULTURAL PROBLEMS: NINTH
SESSION OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE
FAO • Article by Ralph S. Roberts 1066
PROPOSED TREATY OPENS WAY FOR INTERNA-
TIONAL BUS AND TRUCK OPERATIONS ON
PAN AMERICAN HIGHWAY SYSTEM • Article
by H. H. Kelly 1052
For index see inside back cover
Vol. XXXVIII, No. 991 • Publication 6656
June 23, 1958
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U.S. Qovernment Printing Office
Washington 26, D.C.
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the Budget (January 20, 1958).
Note: Contents of this publication are not
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OF State Bulletin as the source will be
appreciated.
The Department of State BULLETIN,
a iceekly publication issued by t/ic
Public Services Division, provides the
public and interested agencies of
the Government with information on
developments in the field of foreign
relations and on the work of the
Department of State and the Foreign
Service. The BULLETIN includes se-
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issued by the White House and the
Department, and statements and ad-
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the Secretary of State and other
officers of the Department, as well as
special articles on various phases of
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The Challenge of Change
THE BASIC PHILOSOPHY, THE RATIONALE. WHICH UNDERLIES U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
Statement hy Secretary Dulles
Mr. Chainnan : My associates in charge of re-
gional and economic affairs have made detailed
expositions of United States foreign policy in
relation to particular subjects. I shall present the
basic philosophy, the rationale, which underlies
those policies.
I. Our Basic Goals
United States foreign policy is designed to
protect and promote the interests of the United
States in the international field. It is based upon
certain facts and convictions:
(a) That the peoples of the world universally
desire the elimination of war and the establish-
ment of a just peace ;
(b) That the designs of aggressive Communist
imperialism pose a continuous threat to every
nation of the free world, including our own ;
(c) That the security of this nation can be
maintained only by the spiritual, economic, and
military strength of the free world, with this
nation a powerful partner committed to this
purpose ;
(d) That change is the law of life, for
nations as well as for men, and that no political,
economic, or social system survives unless it
proves its continuing worth in the face of ever-
changing circumstances ;
(e) That the effectiveness of our collective-
security measures depends upon the economic
advancement of the less developed parts of the
' Made before the Senate Foreign Relations Commit-
tee on .Tune 6 (press release 309) .
free world, which strengthens their purpose and
ability to sustain their independence;
(f) That in all international associations and
combinations within the free world, of which the
United States is a member, it considers all na-
tions, including itself, as equals. The sovereignty
of no nation will ever be limited or diminished by
any act of the United States.
The interests of the United States, which our
foreign policy would safeguard and promote,
include :
The lives and homes of our people; their
confidence and peace of mind; their economic
well-being; and their ideals.
These interests are n.ot mutually exclusive;
rather they are overlapping and interdependent.
Yet, of them, ideals rank first.
Our people have never hesitated to sacrifice
life, property, and economic well-being in order
tliat our ideals should not perish from the earth.
So we often have a narrow path to tread. We
must avoid war and still stand both firm and
affirmative for what we deem to be just and right.
Success in our purposes requires that we have
vision to see, hearts to understand, and minds to
resolve the problems of the world in which we
live.
II. The Challenge of Change
We face the cliallenge of change. Long-
established political relationships are evaporat-
ing; massive fresh human aspirations demand new
responses; physical limitations within and with-
out this globe are being swept away by the ad-
vances of science.
June 23, 7958
1035
1. We are witnessing a political revolution that
is drastic and worldwide in its repercussions.
For 500 years Europe was predominant in tlie
world through a political system known as co-
lonialism, backed by preponderant industrial and
military power.
That political system is now in process of rapid
transformation. Within the last 15 years 700
million people of 20 countries have won political
independence. This trend will continue.
But stability is not achieved and a new order
comfortably established merely by the grant of
political independence. That is but the begimiing
of a two-phased struggle.
To preserve political independence requires a
people who themselves exercise self-restraint and
who acquire education. Without these qualities,
political independence may mean but a brief tran-
sition from benevolent colonialism to ruthless
dictatorship.
The second front is the economic front. The
grant of independence has generated mass aspira-
tions, which have spread contagiously to all who,
having been bogged down for centuries in a
morass of abject poverty, demand a prospect for
rising in the economic scale.
Thus, we face a world new both in terms of its
political structure and its economic demands.
2. We face another new world in terms of
physical power. The splitting of the atom re-
vealed sources of power so vast, so omnipresent,
as to imply a new industrial revolution. Also it
changes the very nature of war, in that general
war now would menace the very existence of
human life upon this planet.
3. A third new world opens in terms of outer
space. Throughout history, until now, man has
assumed that the atmosphere put a limit on man's
reach. Now his satellites and missiles go far be-
yond. Soon they will be carrying human beings
far beyond. Just what this means we do not
know. We sense but dimly what we realize must
be new possibilities of infinite purport.
4. Even on this globe, old areas take on new
aspects. Wliat were barriers of forbidding cold
and ice now, in the north, offer the routes whereby
many can most quickly establish contact with
each other. And in the south, Antarctica, probed
by the Geophysical Year, reveals a new and ex-
citing possibility of service to mankind.
1036
5. And peace must be better assured within the
society of nations.
Today no international wars are being fought.
For that we can be thankful. But our peace is a
precarious peace, because it depends too much on
individual and national restraints, upon accurate
calculations, and upon avoidance of miscalcula-
tions and mischances. It is not sufficiently rooted
in a system of law, order, and justice.
Unless we build a better international order,
all of the new prospects which beckon mankind
forward and upward will come to the naught of
a blackout that has no ending.
III. The Goals of International Communism
These challenges of a changing world are the
more demanding of us because international com-
munism seeks to dominate the change and thereby
itself ride to world rule.
It professes a creed which, it claims, shows the
way to assured peace and great productivity.
According to it, human beings are animated par-
ticles of matter ; order and maximum productivity
require that they be directed in accordance with
a master plan which will assure conformity of
thought and act, and eliminate the discords in-
herent in a society whicli gives freedom of thought
and choice to the individual human being. The
Soviet Communist Party, as the "general staff
of the world proletariat," would devise and ad-
minister the worldwide master plan.
International communism emphasizes science
and scientific applications. It seeks to dominate
the world with a military establislunent so power-
ful that its will will not be challenged. It strives
for superiority in all material ways, including
economic productivity. It makes intensive efforts
in the new fields of nuclear energy and in the
exploration of outer space.
Thus, the challenge of change that confronts
us offers, not a choice between freedom and stag-
nation, or even between freedom and chaos. The
choice is between freedom and a world in which
great power, strong discipline, and a materialistic
creed are combined to end everywhere the exercise
of human freedom.
IV. Our Responses to the Challenge of Change
The United States responds to the challenge of
change. As an equal among equals, and in willing
partnership with others, we play a positive and
Deparfment of State Bulletin
creative part. We do so not merely as a counter
to Communist imperialism. We do so because
to play such a part is natural to us and comports
with our great tradition. We do so in no partisan
mood, but with policies that reflect solid biparti-
san cooperation.
The Independence Movement
1. On September 8, 1954, at Manila, acting
under the inspiration of President Magsaysay, the
United States and other Western powers joined
with free Asian nations to proclaim the Pacific
Charter.- The signatories declared :
. . . they uphold the principle of equal rights and
self-determination of peoples and they will earnestly
strive by every peaceful means to promote self-govern-
ment and to secure the independence of all countries
whose peoples desire It and are able to undertake its
responsibilities.
We realize full well that the solid establishment
of independence is a hard task. We take evei'y
appropriate occasion to assist it.
We encourage educational exchanges and
"leader" visits.
We provide technical assistance, both bilaterally
and through the United Nations.
We provide funds for economic development.
Private capital plays the primary role, but the
Export-Import Bank and the Development Loan
Fund are essential supplements.
The leaders of the new countries are not blind
to the danger to independence that stems from
international communism. They seek to find, in
freedom, the way to solve their comitries' prob-
lems. They look to the United States as the na-
tion from which they can most dependably obtain
assistance which will add to, not subtract from,
their lasting independence.
A toins for Peace
2. The United States pioneers in the world of
the atom. Our first concern is that this incredibly
great force shall not be used for human destruc-
tion.
In 1946, when atomic power was still our monop-
oly, we sought through the Baruch plan such in-
ternational control as would assure that atomic
power would never be an instrument of war.
The Soviet Union rejected that proposal. We
nevertheless continue our efforts. President
Eisenhower's atoms-for-peace proposal, made to
the United Nations in 1953, finally led to positive
results which should grow with time.
The International Atomic Energy Agency was
established in 1957 with a present membership of
66 nations, including the U.S.S.R. But that
government still fails to join to implement that
vital part of the President's proposal which would
have drawn down nuclear war stocks for peace
stocks under international control.
We continue to press the Soviet Union in that
respect.
We continue to develop and to spread the peace-
ful uses of atomic energy.
We have made bilateral arrangements with 39
nations and have supplied research reactors to 16
nations. Negotiations ai-e under way with others.
We are developing close and constructive re-
lations with EURATOM, the atomic agency of
six Western European nations.
President Eisenhower expressed, in 1953, to the
United Nations our determination "to find the
way by which the miraculous inventiveness of
man shall not be dedicated to his death, but con-
secrated to his life."
We are doing much to assure that the new world
of power which is developing will, in fact, serve
that noble purpose.
Outer Space for Peace
3. We also give leadership in planning for the
use of the new world of outer space. I recall
President Eisenhower's letter of January 13, 1958,
to Mr. Bulganin,^ where he said :
I now make, Mr. Chairman, a proposal to solve what
I consider to be the most important problem which faces
the world today.
I propose that we agree that outer space should be used
only for peaceful purposes. We face a decisive moment
in history in relation to this matter.
So far the Soviet reply has been evasive. But
we feel confident that our viewpoint will prevail,
if for no other reason than that the Soviet Union
will finally see its own welfare in that result.
Meanwhile we plan our civilian space agency,
legislation for which is now before the Congress.*
It will help us devise and implement programs
for the peaceful use of outer space.
' Bulletin of Sept. 20, 1954, p.
Jone 23, 7958
ViM., Jan. 27, m'JS, p. 126.
* For a statement by Lof tus Becker, Legal Adviser, see
ihid., June 9, 1958, p. 962.
1037
The Polar Areas
4. In Antarctica we have actively participated
in the scientific studies of the Geophysical Year.
We have become deeply impressed with the dan-
ger if that unfolding continent should become a
scene of international rivalry and if its physical
possibilities were to be used to threaten world
peace and security. So the United States has
proposed that a conference be held to negotiate a
treaty guaranteeing peaceful use of Antarctica
and continued international scientific cooperation
there.' We invited 11 countries which had here-
tofore shown particular interest in Antarctica, in-
cluding the Soviet Union. All of them have re-
plied favorably.
We look upon the north polar region as another
changing area which should be organized for
peace.
Mr. Khrushchev has pointed out to us that "the
air route over the northern polar regions is the
shortest distance between the U.S.S.R. and the
U.S.A., and is therefore an important strategic
area which has special significance in connection
with the availability of rocket weapons." "
That fact makes it the more imperative that
these new routes of rapid communication shall be
only peaceful and not carry threats leading to
new fears, new armaments, and more "prepared-
ness."
We recently proposed to the United Nations
Security Council to initiate in this area President
Eisenhower's open-skies proposal." We were sup-
ported by all of the members of the Council ex-
cept the Soviet Union. We shall persist to assure
that the new world of the Arctic shall be im-
pressed into the service of peace, not of war. Our
concept is so sound and just, and so much in the
interest of all mankind, that we expect the Soviets
to come to accept it, as they already accept the
principle of reserving Antarctica for peace.
The Organization of Peace
5. Our most intensive efforts are those de-
signed to create a world where peace is stably
ensconced.
(a) The United Nations is, of course, a primary-
reliance, and it has well served the cause of peace.
' lUd., June 2, 1958, p. 910.
■/6i(«., June 9, 1958, p. 941.
' lUa., May 19, 19.58, p. 816.
1038
Through the collective action of its membei-s, ag-
gression in Korea was repelled. Through the
United Nations, peace was restored in the Middle
East.
We strive m all possible ways to invigorate the
processes of the United Nations and have, under
difficult circumstances, shown our loyalty to its
principles. There are, however, built-in limita-
tions.
The Soviet Union does not share the concepts
of justice and of law which are enjoined upon
the organization. It has "veto" power in the
Security Council. Invoking a so-called "prin-
ciple of parity," it boycotts the General As-
sembly's Disarmament Commission because it can-
not count upon enough votes on the Commission
to control, at least negatively, its proceedings.
Where the Soviet Union cannot legally block
United Nations action, it flouts such actions as
cross its will, as, for example, in the case of armed
attack on Korea and on Hungary.
(b) Since the United Nations cannot depend-
ably safeguard the peace, freedom, and independ-
ence of the nations, we must, and do, build else-
where.
Tlie United States has its own military estab-
lishment. This has two principal components.
One is the Strategic Air Forces, so organized as
to be able to wreak great destruction upon tlie
Soviet Union should it initiate armed aggression
against the United States or its allies. This is
an effective deterrent to general war.
It is essential that we sliould have this capacity
to deter war. But we are not tempted into mili-
tary buildups merely out of a competitive desire
to be superior at every point to those who glory
in military grandeur. We seek what George
Washington called "a respectable military pos-
ture," that is, a military establisliment that others
will treat with respect.
A second component is those forces, land, sea,
and air, which, of course, have indispensable roles
in case of general war and could, if need be, par-
ticipate in limited hostilities.
Our military establishment is, however, more
than national. The time for military isolation
has passed, as we live in a new world of national
interdependence. Our military establisliment is
charged with a trust for the benefit of many other
nations.
The United States has made cooperative de-
Deparfmenf of Sfafe Bu//ef/n
fense treaties with 42 other nations. Further com-
mittals of United States power are autliorized by
the Formosa and Middle East resolutions.
The deterrent power of the United States thus
acts as a shield to protect all nations with which
we have or may make such arrangements. Sena-
tor Vandenberg, speaking in 1949 of the North
Atlantic Treaty, said, "It spells out the conclusive
warning that independent freedom is not an
orphan in this western world, and that no
armed aggression will have a chance to win." ^
That warning lias now been extended all around
the globe, so as to eliminate the risk of miscalcula-
tions which have often tempted military despots to
"take a chance" — a chance which, in fact, often
meant war.
The system of collective defense that the free
nations have built is not one-sided. It is not just
a United States gift to the world. Other nations
contribute importantly. They provide bases
which greatly increase the effectiveness of our
deterrent power. They contribute the bulk of
the ground forces. They provide, what is most
important of all, a courageous will to resist power-
ful forces which often knock threateningly at
their very doorstep.
This collective security system we are helping
to build is no mere temporary expedient. It is a
constructive evolution which should persist until
it becomes possible to make the United Nations
security processes both universal and dependable.
Originally our collective defense arrangements
were conceived of primarily as purely military
alliances. However, the latest NATO communi-
que ^ had this to say :
NATO, a defensive organization, is now much more
than merely a military alliance. It is becoming a true
community of free nations. Within this community, to a
degree unprecedented in history, countries are carrying
out a policy of close cooperation in peacetime without
abandoning their independence. This development is one
of the most significant and promising events of our time.
(c) Our collective security arrangements are
buttressed and made viable by our mutual security
program. It supplies our allies with a certain
amount of military equipment. In some cases it
helps them financially to maintain military es-
tablishments which are needed but which their
' Ibid., July 18, 1949, p. 61.
• Ibid., May 26, 1958, p. 850.
June 23, 1958
economies are too poor to support without some
outside help.
The free-world collective defense arrangements
now cover virtually all the areas which are liable
to direct military attack by the forces of Com-
numist imperialism. They effectively deter such
attacks.
Economic Well- Being
6. We see that the world of today requires bet-
ter economic health than was tolerable in past
times.
International trade is more than ever important.
Our own foreign trade is now approximately $32.4
billion a year and provides employment to 41/2
million of our farmers and workers. Interna-
tional trade is even more vital to the economic life
of many other free- world countries.
A principal instrumentality and the outstand-
ing symbol of our attitude to international trade
is our Trade Agreements Act. The principle of
the act was first adopted in 1934, and 10 times
the Congress acted to renew it. Any failure now
to renew it would be a grave blow to the world's
economy, including our own, and it could be fatal
to security.
Puhllc Law JfSO
7. Our great agricultural productivity now
serves the humanitarian needs of a changing
world. The time was when starvation was chronic
in many densely populated areas. Now the pro-
ductivity of our farmers produces surpluses which
provide other free nations with the wherewithal
to prevent vast starvation no longer tolerable by
the standards to which the free world now ad-
licres. Under Public Law 480 we have, since 1954,
provided other nations with an aggregate of
nearly $3 billion worth of our agricultural prod-
ucts. To a small extent this is provided on a
grant basis to meet special emergencies. For the
most part it is provided against payment in local
currency. The local currency is put to work to
help develop the local economies so that they will
in the future be better able to meet their own re-
quirements. All this is done with care to avoid
disturbing the normal pattern of commercial trade.
The Economic Problem
8. We do much to solve the economic problems
of this changing world. I have referred to the
promotion of international trade, the Export-Im-
port Bank, the Development Loan Fund, economic
1039
aspects of mutual security, P. L. 480, etc. But
economic problems still confront us.
If the Soviet Union decides to use its increasing
industrial productivity primarily to serve the
goals of international commimism, we may face
acute problems.
It now stands to gain too much from the ad-
verse impact on certain countries, as of Latin
America, of rapidly shifting free- world prices and
fluctuating free-world markets.
There is another type of danger if the Soviet
state engages in rutl\less competition with private
free-world concerns which, to survive, must make
a profit.
Over a range of economic relations among the
countries of the free world we shall need to seek
out new initiatives to bring greater economic
strength and unity. We shall be looking for the
means to create a larger flow of private capital
to the less developed countries, to make develop-
ment assistance more effective, to bring about in-
creased financial stability, and to cope with the
serious problems which sometimes arise in com-
modity trade.
Dharmament
9. We are not content with a world where the
potentials of destruction not only absorb vast eco-
nomic effort but would, if unleashed, endanger all
human life. So we strive for "disarmament,"
meaning measures of international inspection to
diminish the danger of massive surprise attack
and actual limitations or reductions of various
types of armament. President Eisenhower's open-
skies proposal of 1955 brought worldwide hope.
But the Soviet Union has persistently evaded con-
crete inspection proposals.
With equal persistence it rejects or evades all
proposals, such as our comprehensive proposal of
last August, ^° which would effectively limit or re-
duce Soviet military power. It tries to cover its
tracks by noisily calling on others to practice pac-
ifism and nonresistance and by advocating the gen-
eral cessation of nuclear- weapons tests — which of
course mvolves no armament reduction whatso-
ever.
A principal obstacle to agreements in the field
of disanuament has been the reluctance of the
Soviet Union to accept any internal controls. It
has, however, now at long last agreed that there
should be a study of the techniques required to
control an agreement to suspend nuclear testing."
This may provide a vital clue and pave the way
to arrangements which will make surprise at-
tack less likely and make it possible to reduce
armaments equitably and dependably.
Agreements With the Soviet Union
10. The United States does not exclude the pos-
sibility of achieving significant agreements with
the Soviet Union in certain areas of mutual in-
terest. Within the past 5 years we have made
several agreements with the Communists, notably
the agreement that ended the Korean hostilities
and the agreement that liberated Austria. But:
We do not believe that the "cold war" can be
ended by a formula of words, so long as the basic
creed of international communism requires world
rule.
We do not believe that we should alter our posi-
tion merely in reliance of Soviet promises. These
have too often proved midependable and have en-
trapped and even proved fatal to those who have
relied thereon.
We do believe that the Soviet Union, like the
United States, would like to reduce the economic
burden of modern armaments. We also believe
that the Soviet Union, mider present conditions,
does not want war. Therefore, some common
ground exists.
We have been encouraged by the Soviet Govern-
ment's acceptance of our proposal to study what
would be required to supervise at least one aspect
of a possible disarmament agreement. We have
also been encouraged by their acceptance of our
proposal with reference to Antarctica. We be-
lieve that, if we patiently persist along sound
lines, some significant agreements may emerge.
Whether or not a summit conference would be
productive of such agreements remains to be seen.
That matter is being intensively explored at Mos-
cow at the present time.
V. The Free-World Balance Sheet
I have outlined some of the more important and
constructive measures being taken by the United
States, usually in cooperation with our allies, to
assure that the challenge of change will be met by
those who believe in a spii'itual world, a world
'"/ftirf., Aug. 19, 19.57, p. 303.
1040
/;^iVi., JimeO, 1958, p. 939.
Deparfment of State Bulletin
where nations are independent and where indi-
viduals are free.
I see a prospect that provides good ground for
hope. We are not being tossed about rudderless
on a sea of cliange. We are guiding and influenc-
ing the character of change so that it shall be con-
structive.
I realize full well that our record is not perfect.
We have no doubt done some things we should
not have done and not done all that we should
have done. But we have moved positively and
creatively to bring to the new worlds about us the
basic values wluch this nation was founded to
preserve.
I am not unmindful of occurrences which in-
duce a mood of discouragement.
The free world seems dominated more by dif-
ferences than by harmony.
Almost constantly its foreign policies become
open political issues and afford our enemies the
opportunity to sow discord.
Freedom almost recklessly gives its mortal
enemies freedom to seek to destroy freedom.
All this is infinitely perplexing and exhaust-
ing. It is easy to feel a sense of frustration.
But we need constantly to remember that the
hallmark of freedom is diversity. The United
States does not seek the kind of imity that has to
be bought and paid for, or that would flow from
our using our power to coerce other free nations
and to impose our will. The United States as-
sociates itself with those who, as a matter of con-
viction, want to share in common effort on behalf
of independence and freedom.
But we would rather stand alone than be ac-
companied by those who were with us only under
the influence of a carrot or a stick.
The essential is, not that diversity be wiped
out, but that it be seen in the perspective of a
world where, if differences disrupt cooperation,
freedom and independence also go.
We should go on developing organs and prac-
tices of consultation. Much of the irritation that
shows itself is due to misunderstanding.
Materialistic despotisms, with their iron dis-
cipline, their mechanistic performances, their
hard and shiny exterior, have always seemed to
have the advantage over democracies which visi-
bly stumble and falter, which advertise their dif-
ferences to all the world, and which seem to
survive only by good luck.
June 23, 7958
The fact is that the despotisms are always
weaker than they appear and the democracies are
usually stronger than they seem.
VI. The Communist Balance Sheet
International communism not only has assets;
it also has liabilities. The Communist rulers are
faced by grave and, in the long run, insoluble
problems.
(1) One dilemma is foimd in the main citadel
— Moscow. The Soviet Union has increased edu-
cation, particularly in terms of scientific theory
and of applications. But minds which can find
the ways to penetrate outer space can also pene-
trate the fallacies of Marxism.
(2) A second dilemma is economic. There is
an increasing demand on the part of the ruled
peoples for more consumer goods, for more of the
fruits of their labor. The time will come when
the Soviet rulers will have to do more for the
welfare of their own people.
(3) There is within the Soviet Union a growing
demand for greater personal security. Already
there has been some relaxation of Stalin's brutal
police-state methods. And in that less frighten-
ing atmosphere individualism tends to grow.
(4) In the satellite countries of Eastern
Europe outbreaks, such as have occurred in East
Berlin and East Germany, in Poland and in Hun-
gary, show that nationalism and individualism
are not extinguished even by massive and sus-
tained pressures.
The Soviet rulers must either grant more inde-
pendence, and thus liberate forces which oppose
the existing regimes, or else they must revert to
the Stalinist tactics of oppression with increased
likelihood of violent revolt.
The vacillating policy of international com-
munism toward Yugoslavia illustrates the
dilemma. In 1955 international communism,
reversing its position, acquiesced in Yugoslav
independence. But that shift had such disturb-
mg repercussions on other Eastern European
states that now international communism again
reverses itself and seeks, by threats and economic
pressures, again to subject Yugoslavia to Mos-
cow's rule.
(5) The basic weakness of international com-
munism is strikingly demonstrated by the fact
that, whenever an opportunity is given for
1041
peoples to move into, or away from, a Communist
area, the movement is always away.
During the Hungarian rebellion 200,000
escaped to freedom.
In Germany over 3 million have gone from
East to West.
In Korea over 3 million have gone from the
North to the South.
In Viet-Nam nearly 1 million went from the
North to the South.
Of the Chinese Communist prisoners taken in
Korea, two-thirds rejected repatriation, and from
Communist China they flee to Hong Kong and
Macao.
Such movements, at so many different times
and places, show that thei'e is something basically
repellent in the Communist rule.
The Communist rulere have shown an immense
capacity to extend their rule. But nowhere have
they developed a capacity to make their rule
genuinely and freely acceptable to the ruled.
(6) Soviet policy faces a grave dilemma in
terras of its foreign policy. Brute force no
longer brings results in the face of free-world
collective defenses. The Soviet rulers have
therefore switched to policies which, overtly, are
policies of friendliness and not obviously
designed to be predatory. By so doing they
develop a vested interest in respectability.
That is a trend which we welcome and encour-
age. It may bring nearer the day when Soviet
leaders will be primarily interested in improving
the welfare of their own people and there will
be an end to the unnatural exploitation of the
ruled peoples by international communism.
Then our relations may be happily dominated by
the natural good will and friendship that has
always prevailed between the American and
Russian people.
VII. The Strategy of Victory
President Eisenhower, speaking at Paris last
December,'^ said,
There is a noble strategy of victory — not victory over
any peoples but victory for all peoples.
We find that strategy of victory in the mani-
fold opportunities that open up before us— in the
new world of political independence ; in the new
world of atomic power ; in the new world of outer
"/6id., Jan. 6, :
1042
I
space; in the new polar areas; and, above all, ii
the organized cooperation of free peoples wherebj
they preserve peace and promote welfare.
An essential part in this strategy of victorj
must be played by the American people as indi
viduals.
In a struggle where freedom is the issue govern
ment cannot carry all of the responsibility. Gov
ernments of the free can do much, and we do not*
shirk our task. But the best exponents of free"
dom are free people. Our pride is not in whai
government does but in what government does
not do. Religion, the greatest single force, is di
vorced from state control or influence. Our sys
tem of education is local and free from federa
government influence. Labor organizes itself foi
its own protection. Our business is privately con
ducted. Our most potent ambassadors are no
tliose who have that official title but the millions'
of individual Americans who each year trave
about the world giving and receiving impressions
establishing contacts, and exchanging ideas.
Last month I was ui Berlin. At the Town Hal
we stood in silence while the Freedom Bell wai
tolled. The bell bears this inscription, "That thi:
world under God shall have a new birth of free
dom." The bell was donated by individual sub'
scriptions, largely by schoolchildren of Americai
If, indeed, there is to be a new birth of freedom
in the world, and if everywhere bells of freedom
are triumphantly to ring, then it will have to bo
through the efforts of the individuals who, having;
freedom, cherish it, ennoble it, and make it a dy
namic force throughout the world.
Dr. Eisenhower Delays Trip
to Central America
Press release 305 dated June 4
As was announced on March 29, 1958, Dr. Mil
ton S. Eisenhower has been planning to make i
factfinding trip as personal representative of tht
President in response to invitations extended hin:
by the Governments of Guatemala, El Salvador
Nicaragua, Honduras, Costa Rica, and Panama
Up until now it has not been possible to schedixle
the visits at mutually convenient dates for all oi
the countries concerned. Dr. Eisenhower \
delay his trip in the expectation that satisfactory
dates can shortly be arranged for travel to the
six countries concerned.
TheB
Department of State Bulletin
it?b
The Battlefield of ideas
Jy Andrew H. Berding
Assistant Secretary for Puhlic Affa
In the last few weeks we have witnessed nu-
merous events that have caused a certain amount of
inquiry as to where we stand in the psychological
■field, whether our methods are adequate, whether
the means we employ are sufficiently skillful,
whether we are going to take any new actions or
follow any new procedures in this psychological
field. We have seen what happened in Latin
America; we have seen rioting in Algiers and
Lebanon; and the question arises: What is the
world attitude toward the United States and what
are we doing about it ?
I think there are a certain number of points
that we should make in what undoubtedly is a
very vital sector of foreign affairs. I think it is
a fact that we have reached a military stalemate
more or less with the Soviets. There is a kind of
balance of military power which lessens the likeli-
hood of military adventure on their part. At the
same time, that military balance conduces to a
greater effort on their part in other fields — that
is, political, economic, and psychological — because
it is an undoubted fact that they have not given
up their basic ideal, which is dominance of the
world. If they can't achieve it militarily, then
they will still seek to achieve it through other
means and along other patterns.
Beginning some 8 months ago — that is, October
4, when the Sputnik went up — we have seen So-
viet propaganda very much to the forefront. I^t
me pay tribute — honest tribute — to the skill with
which they conduct propaganda. They are no
' Remarks made at Washington, D.C., on May 23 before
representatives of national nongovernmental organiza-
tions at a conference on foreign affairs arranged by the
Department of State.
June 23, ?958
mean antagonist in this field. They make use of
every opportunity. Take Sputnik, for instance:
It was just about 48 houi-s after Sputnik went up
that they were putting out lists of the foreign
cities over which Sputnik would pass. And it
isn't at all odd or curious that they should have
mentioned two cities particularly. One was Little
Rock, and another was Bandung. Little Eock, of
course, has been very gi-eatly in the world's news.
Bandung was the seat of the Afro- Asian confer-
ence that was conducted a couple of years ago and
which the Soviets had sought to use then and still
seek to use as a kind of sounding board for their
propaganda to the Asiatic and African peoples.
So right away they were using Sputnik for all the
propaganda advantage they could get out of it.
Operational Advantages of the Soviet Union
Of course the Soviets do have certain advan-
tages in the propaganda field that we don't have.
Sometimes you may wonder whether you would
call these advantages, but there is no doubt that
certain values accrue to them because of these fac-
tors that I want to mention.
I think the first is that they have — and seem
to need to have — no regard whatever for the
truth. They can say one thing in one part of the
world and something 180° opposite in another
part of the world right at the same time. Now,
obviously, we can't do that, and we don't want to
do that. Certainly, if we did, we would be called
very quickly into question. But the fact remains
that the truth is no obstacle in Soviet propaganda.
Another advantage they have is that they can
take the action they want to take without the need
to consult anyone. We feel that, when we take
action or make statements, we need to consult our
1043
close allies, possibly all the members of a given
group of states in a mutual security arrangement,
like, say, NATO. "We also feel the need— in fact,
the requirement — to consult witli other elements
in our own Government. We feel the need to con-
sult with Congress often because we have to go
to Congress for approval of and authorization of
the action we want to take or the financing of the
action that we would like to decide upon.
The Soviets liave no sucli compulsion. They
get the appropriations for their propaganda effort
without the need to justify any request. We
estimate, for instance, that they spend more money
on jamming the Voice of America than the Voice
of America spends for all its output. That con-
clusion is not reached by guesswork. We know
the approximate number of transmitters engaged
in this jamming operation., and we can figure out
the cost of transmitters and the cost of operation,
and the like. It adds up to a surprising total,
which, as I say, is more than that expended by the
whole of the Voice of America program.
Imagine our going to Congress and asking for
enough money to jam Soviet broadcasts and speci-
fying a sum that would more than total the cost of
all their broadcasts ! Not that we would want to
jam their broadcasts — we don't feel that they pro-
duce any particular effect in the United States
anyway.
Effects of a Controlled Press
A third advantage that the Soviets have is the
fact that there is a controlled press in the Soviet
Union. Now, I say immediately, thank the good
Lord for the fact that we have a free press in the
United States. It is a foundation of our democ-
racy. I don't think om- democracy could exist
without a free press. But the Soviets can draw
from their controlled press certain factors on their
side.
Because they don't have to inform their own
people of certain things, they can transmit those
ideas overseas with far less restraint than would
otherwise be the case. I will give you an example
by turning it into reverse. Suppose for the sake
of argument that we had wanted to make the an-
nouncement the Soviets made about unilateral sus-
pension of nuclear tests. Let's say that all the
circumstances were the same except that they
existed on our side. Let's say that we ourselves
had just completed a veiy extensive series of tests,
1044
and let's say that we knew that the Soviets were
going to have in the near future a series of tests
on their part, and then we came out with our an-
noimcement. Now what would have been the
effect?
I am quite sure that our press would have
caught us up on that right away and labeled it a
phony maneuver. We had just completed a series, j
The Soviets were about to start a series, and then
we were saying what the Soviets said, that if the
other side continued testing we would resume test-
ing. In other words, it would have had very little
meaning.
I have written many headlines in my newspaper
career, and I jotted down two headlines that I
think would have come out of such an American
announcement. I think they would have been
quite typical. One is, "Test Ban Branded Hoax."
The other is, "Atom Decision a Phony."
Also there would have been many speeches up
on the "Hill" branding this as a hoax and a phony.
Wliat would have been the result? The Soviet
propaganda would have picked all that up. They
wouldn't have had to charge that we liad commit-
ted a hoax, that we were uttering a phony. They
would have had all the quotations they needed
from the American press and from speakers in
and out of Government. We couldn't possibly
have achieved the effect that tlie Soviets achieved
with their announcement of the unilateral sus-
pension of testing.
Let me say in that connection that I feel that we
were given over here too much the impression that
the Soviet announcement was a great propaganda
triumph. I think the foreign press saw through
the announcement. According to the survey that
we made, the foreign press saw the loopholes in
that Soviet announcement and called attention
to them. And the Soviets, I myself am convinced,
did not produce the effect, the full effect, that they
had hoped for.
Failures Never Reported
Another aspect of that controlled press is that
you never hear anything about Soviet failures.
I am sure, for instance, that the Soviets had Sput-
nik failures before they had the Sputnik success.
But you never heard anything about those. I
wouldn't be at all surprised if they had had Sput-
nik failures following the first two and before —
after some considerable delay — they put this third
Departmenf of Sfate Bulletin
one in orbit. But if that was the case, of course
you heard nothing about it.
There is complete suppression of news in the
Soviet Union. None of the output of our com-
mercial press and none of our own official Govern-
ment output is released in the Soviet Union. On
the other hand, Soviet propaganda makes use of
many quotations and speeches and the like made
in this country which are critical of Government
pi )1 icies. Frequently they don't even have to write
tiieir own commentaries. The commentaries in
essence ai-e a compilation of statements made on
this side which are critical of various actions of
the United States Government. All the Soviets
have to do is to select tlie material, put it together,
and broadcast or disseminate it in some way or
other.
One further advantage of a controlled press is
that, because that press does not publish material
which is disadvantageous to the Soviet Union or
which is critical of the social system in the Soviet
Union — and by that I mean stories of crime, dis-
sension, internal struggle, and the like — there is
nothing that the press stationed there has to pick
up and send overseas. Quite the contrary is the
case here. When I go abroad on these various in-
ternational conferences, I am sometimes appalled
at the news that comes out of the United States
and appears in the foreign press. Now, it is the
truth about what happens here, and it is the news.
But it so often is about murder, kidnaping, loose
morals in Hollywood, and the like. I am not say-
ing that it shouldn't be sent. I am saying that
you get that kind of stuff out of the United States,
but you don't get it out of the Soviet Union.
Now I think the same organizations that send
that kind of material out from the United States
would send the same kind from the Soviet Union
if they had it, for I believe they choose material
solely on the basis of news judgment. But the
Soviets control what goes out of the Soviet Union,
and they suppress the sources of the news. I have
no doubt that there is crime in the Soviet Union.
Where there are human beings there probably will
always be crime, and probably there is as much
glaring crime in the Soviet Union as there is in
the United States, but you don't ever read about it.
I will give you one example of that. You re-
member the Little Rock incident. Well, every
day both American and foreign press associations
were sending thousands upon thousands of words
June 23, 1958
overseas about all the incidents happening at
Little Rock. The Soviet Union has had episodes
of racial suppression that are a thousand times
more intense and brutal than what has happened
in the United States, but none of that news has
gone ovei-seas — certainly not out of the Soviet
Union. From time to time you will hear refer-
ences to it. Maybe a refugee, long after, will tell
about it. But the world does not have that same
impression of racial difficulty in the Soviet Union
that it has of racial difficulty m the United States.
The Advantage of the "Prodigal Son"
I have been talking mostly about operational
advantages that the Soviet Union has. There are
also a few natural advantages. To one I will give
the title, "the prodigal son." The Soviet Union,
I think, IS regarded by far more people in the
world than is the United States as the possible
starter of a war. I think public-opinion polls in
various comitries bear that out. Now if that is the
case and people think that the Soviet Union is
much more likely to start a war than the United
States, then talk about peace by the Soviet Union
is received with greater acclaim than talk about
peace by the United States. The Soviet Union is
the one that would start war ? Well, then, all the
more do people welcome talk about peace by the
Soviet Union. It has been one of the major
themes of the Soviet Union, and it has made a cer-
tain impact on the world — this constant talk that
it is the Soviet Union which is the great proponent
of peace and that the United States, ruled by this
Wall Street clique, is the warmongering nation
desirous of war and putting obstacles in the way
of any efforts to reach peace.
Another natural advantage that they have is
the fact that we have had a higher standard of
behavior throughout history, and therefore people
of other countries expect more of us than they
do of the Soviet Union. Moreover, we are a
far wealthier nation; so people look to us for
greater economic benefits and grants and loans,
and the like, and if they don't receive them and
don't receive them in the amount that they would
like to become accustomed to, then there is often
a feeling of dissatisfaction, sometimes even resent-
ment.
There is also the fact that we ourselves threw
off colonial rule, and therefore nations that have
1045
nationalist and even supemationalist views think
tliat we should automatically be with them 100
percent regardless of what our friendships with
other nations might be. We threw off colonial
rule, so wliy are we not with them 100 percent
wlien tliey want to be independent? Wliether
they have reached the point wliere they could
possibly be independent or not does not seem to
matter.
And of course many peoples resent our liigli
standard of living and what seems to them an
undue preoccupation with military security.
Soviet Propaganda Techniques
Soviet propaganda is interesting in some ways.
Wlien you study it, it is most revealing. One ap-
proach they always adopt is what I call the ac-
cusatory line. They are always accusing, always
attacking. They veiy seldom defend. And with
many people that makes a certain impression.
Another approach is that a great percentage
of their material is devoted to the idea of "divide
and rule" — create dissension : create dissension be-
tween the United States and Great Britain; cre-
ate dissension between Great Britain and tiie con-
tinental countries, dissension between France and
Germany, dissension between agricultural coun-
tries and industrial countries, dissension between
Eastern countries and Western countries; and
never lose an opportunity to sow seeds of doubt
and resentment between and among countries
wliich seek to remain together.
Another interesting line they follow is what I
call the "wave of the future." It is sometimes
called the "bandwagon" teclmique. It appears in
many of Klirushchev's speeclies wliere he seeks to
give the impression that the future is the Soviets",
that at some time they will surpass us in produc-
tion in this and that commodity, and the like.
Wliat he is trying to sell to other countries is the
idea that, since the Soviet system is the wave of
the future, they should get on the bandwagon
now. "Don't wait, get on tlie bandwagon now and
go ahead with us." And we will find that theme,
I think, being developed evermore by the Soviet
Union and particularly by Khrushchev — that
they are the wave of the future.
And of course they use every means at tlieir dis-
posal to put over a propaganda message. I was
very much interested the other day in a report I
had from Mr. Wilkinson " here, who had been to
the Brussels World Fair just a couple of weeks
ago. He gave me just a couple of paragrajjhs
about the American pavilion and the Soviet pa-
vilion, and I would like to read them to you :
The American and the Soviet pavilions at the Brussels
World Fair provide a gootl case in point on the use of
.Soviet propaganda on all occasions. You take our pa-
vilion for what it is. The American story is there in
simple disi>lay cases, in color television, in store windows,
and in art and crafts exhibits. But you have to absorb it.
In the Soviet pavilion, great, icy monolith that it is,
you see what the U.S.S.R. would like to be, would like
the world to think it is : massive machinery ; a statue
of Lenin 50 feet high ; happy children in photos, each al-
lowed— so the captions say — to pick his or her profession
at will. Only we know it isn't so. And incidentally eveiy
bit of space that is in the Soviet pavilion has a propa-
ganda message on it. Tou come out feeling stunned by
the weight of it.
That, I tliink, is a pretty good description of a
propaganda effort.
The Meaning of Words
I want to speak for a moment about words. I
think sometimes we are taken in by certain words
that the Soviets use. Take the word "socialism,"
for example. The Soviets constantly speak of
their system as a socialist system. It is not. In
essence it is a Commimist system. And we pick
up that terminology too much. You remember
last year, when Khrushchev made his TV address,
he made the prediction : "Your children will live
under a socialist goverimient." American edi-
torials by the scores thereupon very bitterly at-
tacked that theoi-y. Really, what should have
been said was that he made the prediction that our
children would live imder a Commmiist system.
Now the reason this word causes difficulty, if we
pick it up and use it like that, is that there ai-e
some very fine socialist governments in the world
witli whom we are eitlier allied or on very friendly
terms, like tliose in the Scandinavian countries.
And Neliru says he has a socialist government.
So there is nothing the Soviets would like better
than to have us lump all those socialist countries
together with the "Commies." And there is no
reason why we should play their game.
We fuid in our newspapers and on our radio the
' J. Burke Wilkinson, Deputy
Public Affairs.
Secretary for
1046
Department of State Bulletin
erm "People's Democracy" — "The People's
)emocracy of Czechoslovakia," or something like
hat. It is no more a people's government, it is
lo more a democracy, than the wildest comparison
'. could possibly think of, but you fuid it used
housands of times in our press.
And then, too, when it comes to words, what an
dvantage they have with those simple slogans
;hat they adopt : "ban the bomb" or "ban testing."
3ur disarmament proposals are more far-reaching
jy a wide degree than their proposals, but the
Soviets constantly get a great propaganda advan-
tage through those simple slogans that mean noth-
ing. You can't ban the use of the bomb, for no
one would agree to it. We certainly couldn't
trust the Soviets in that field. But, as I say, with
words they do gain certain advantages.
Words vs. Actions
With all these propaganda advantages tliat the
Soviet Union enjoys, there is one important
thing we should keep in mind and that is
that results are produced not so much by words
as by actions. I would say that words account
for no more than 10 percent of impact; actions
account for probably 90 percent. Of course the
Soviets have been skillful at combining action and
words.
I think we, too, are beginning to learn the
value of a combination of action and words. We
showed it certainly in the atoms-for-peace pro-
gram. We took action. First, the President made
his speech of December 1953 to the United Na-
tions, making the specific proposal of an inter-
national agency to which we would contribute
fissionable material if other nations would do
likewise. Then we had bilateral agreements
with about 30 nations for the provision of
atomic materials and reactor stations, and the
like. The Atomic Energy Commission gave
atomic libraries to many nations.
At the same time a very vigorous worldwide
propaganda campaign was put on by the U.S.
Information Agency. Or you may call it an
information program, if you like. That had a
curious result. The day after the President made
his speech in the General Assembly, the Soviet
Union through Eadio Moscow turned down his
proposal bluntly and sharply. But the campaign
of action and words kept going, and finally a
year and a half later, at the summit conference,
June 23, 1958
Bulganin promised that the Soviet Union would
join the atomic energy agency and would make
a contribution of fissionable materials. And that
agency, as you know, has come into being.
Another example of the combination of action
and words was the President's open-skies pro-
posal. I think, as I say, we are learning the lesson
of action combined with words.
People sometimes ask who has the initiative in
the cold wai-. Well, I would like to answer that
on the basis of what I was just saying: action 90
pei-cent, words 10 percent. Often we get the im-
pression that the Soviets have the initiative simply
because they have sent another letter or something
like that. We oui-selves have taken the initiative
on the substantive side again and again and
again — in the disarmament field literally a dozen
times, going right back to Barney Baruch's pro-
posals in 1946 and 1947. And in many other ways
we have taken the initiative in action. So I re-
fuse to believe that the Soviets have the initiative
in this field even though there is this constant
outpouring of effort.
Sometimes, frankly, I think the outpouring
backfires a little bit, as in the Bulganin-Khrush-
chev exchange of letters with the President, where
we began, through the very letters themselves,
to become aware of what the Soviets' true ideas
were with regard to a summit conference. I think
those letters served a useful purpose from our
point of view.
Where We Stand
There are a few basic factors that enable us
to see where" we stand in the cold war, or the
battlefield of ideas, whatever you want to call it.
One such basic factor is the fact that tliere is
a certain suspicion among many peoples, and par-
ticularly among educated peoples, of what the
Soviet Union does and says. I think there is,
generally speaking, more disposition to place
credence in our actions and words than in those
of the Soviet Union.
Anotlier basic factor is that people are more
inclined to rely on American promises. I think
also that the greater devotion we have to hu-
manity and to human life, for instance, is some-
thing that inclines people in our favor.
At the same time, I think we must adopt the
conclusion that Secretary Dulles has : We are not
seeking — we are not asking — to be loved. We are
1047
asking and we are seeking to be respected. It is
oftentimes quite difficult for a big, powerful, and
wealthy country to be loved. They say no one
loves a millionaire. But it is possible for that big,
wealthy, powerful country to be respected.
I found myself a little surprised at the almost
incredible degree of unity we found at the recent
NATO conference at Copenhagen. Foreign min-
ister after foreign minister was adopting the
same attitude we had with regard to such basic
issues as a summit conference. And I think there
is that feeling of unity among certain nations
of the free world. It is something that is ab-
solutely antagonistic to Soviet wishes. If there
is one thing that seems to rile them more than
anything else, it is this idea of unity of certain
groups of states in the free world.
The Soviet Union has had some disasters in
this field in the last few years: Hungary is cer-
tainly one, and the worldwide effect produced by
that; East Germany is another; Poland is
another ; and Yugoslavia is another. The flow of
refugees from East Europe to West Europe is
another case in point.
I firmly believe that, when the chips are down,
we still can count on a friendly feeling in the
majority of the peoples of the world and the active
support of the nations whose support we need.
The Role of the Citizen
I don't want to conclude without one further
thought. Every time I meet with a group like
this, there are several people who say, "Well now,
that is all well and good and interesting enough,
but what can I do?" Let me say that there is a
lot that people like yourselves can do in a situa-
tion like this, for in a cold war we can all be
soldiers.
I will give you a few examples.
There are thousands of foreign students com-
ing to the United States eveiy year. There is
nothing that makes a greater impression on those
students than being received in American homes.
Many of you could do that.
Many of you travel, go to foreign countries.
I should think you would take every occasion to
talk with foreign peoples and make them ac-
quainted with our basic ideals and our thinking.
You yourselves, of course, want to keep well
informed on foreign policy, and this visit to
Washington that you are making now is, in my
opinion, a wonderful step in that direction. It is
really heartwarming that so many of you have
come from such long distances — Los Angeles and
the like — to attend these briefings in the De-
partment and to talk with us. We try not to talk
to you but to talk with you.
Many of your organizations have connections
abroad, with branches or with corresponding or-
ganizations. Those contacts can well be de-
veloped to the benefit of our country. You are
likewise in correspondence with many foreigners.
I think that certainly should be stimulated and
developed. And you have your publications,
many of which go abroad. Adequate descriptions
of American life in those publications can often
produce a very fine effect abroad. They are your
views; they are not United States Govermnent
views. They are what you are saying, and that is
significant. That private message is, in my
opinion, very important.
There is also a very extensive system of people-
to-people contacts that President Eisenhower
started. Many different committees in different
aspects of American life are in contact with cor-
responding sectors of life overseas and in many
cases producing excellent results.
These are just a few of the things that you as
private citizens can do. In conclusion I say that
there are many, many things, and many more than
I mentioned, that you can do which would be of
great help in winning the victory on this battle-
field of ideas.
U.S. and U.S.S.R. Exchange Notes
on Medical Cooperation
Press release 297 dated May 29
DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT
The Department of State on May 29 released
the texts of notes exchanged with the Soviet
Union concerning suggestions made by President
Eisenhower for international cooperation in the
struggle against disease. These suggestions in
the President's state of the Union message on
Januai-y 9, 1958,^ invited the Soviet Union to join
with the United States and other nations in the
existent campaign against malaria and in other
' Bulletin of Jan. 27, 1958, p. 115.
Department of State Bulletin
campaigns against illnesses such as heart disease
and cancer.
In a note delivered May 26, 1958, the Depart-
ment of State expressed gratification at the posi-
tive response given in a note from the Soviet Em-
bassy dated May 19, 1958. The note contained
specific suggestions for cooperative measures in
the field of public health and indicated that the
Soviet Union was prepared to cooperate in the
programs of the World Health Organization.
The Department's note in reply pointed out that
the United States was presenting proposals to the
World Health Organization relating to a coopera-
tive program of research, with initial emphasis
on cancer and heart disease, and expressed the
hope that the Soviet Union would support these
proposals and cooperate in the proposed i)rogi-am.
Should some aspects of the Soviet suggestions
not be covered by the current progi-ams of the
World Health Organization or those adopted in
the near future, the Department expressed will-
ingness to discuss these aspects under the arrange-
ments established for Soviet-American discussions
of exchanges between the two countries.
The American note pointed out that the recent
agreement on exchanges between the United States
and the Soviet Union ^ provided for exchanges of
medical delegations, reciprocal trips of medical
specialists, and the exchange of medical films and
medical journals. These features of the agreement
are being actively developed at present. A delega-
tion of American women doctors has been visiting
medical installations in the Soviet Union in reci-
procity for a previous visit by Soviet women doc-
tors to the United States. Exchanges of medical
publications are being expanded. Plans are being
developed for American medical scientists to
deliver lectures at Soviet medical institutes and
for Soviet scientists to reciprocate. An exchange
of teclmical films on medical subjects is mider
discussion.
The American proposals to the WHO, men-
tioned in the Department's note, were outlined by
Dr. Milton Eisenhower on May 27, 1958, at the
current session of the World Health Assembly
at Minneapolis.^ Dr. Eisenhower proposed that
the WHO conduct a special study during the com-
ing year to determine how it may most effectively
perform its fullest role in international coopera-
' For text, see md., Feb. 17, 1958, p. 243.
' Ibid., June 16, 1958, p. 989.
tive research, with initial emphasis on cancer and
heart disease. He stated that the United States
is prepared to make a special grant for such a
study and would consider providing substantial
sui^port for any sound program resulting from
it. He also reaffirmed United States support for
the current campaign sponsored by WHO against
malaria. Dr. Eisenhower praised the great strides
which have been made in this cooperative effort,
which has already halved the incidence of malaria
and saved millions of lives. He recalled the Presi-
dent's invitation for nations, including the Soviet
Union, which were not yet participating to join
in this international effort and expressed the hope
that many would do so.
U.S. NOTE OF MAY 26
The Department of State acknowledges the receipt of
note No. 14 dated May 19, 1958 from the Embassy of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
The Department is gratified that the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics has found it possible to respond posi-
tively to the suggestion which President Eisenhower
made in his State of the Union Message on January 9,
1958 that the Soviet Union join with the United States
and other nations in the existent campaign against
malaria and in other campaigns against illnesses such as
cancer and heart disease. As the Embassy's note states,
the President's suggestions were discussed during the
negotiations on the agreement between the United States
of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
concerning cultural, technological and educational ex-
changes. It was agreed during the discussion that the
exchange of opinions on the President's suggestions
would be continued. The agreement on exchanges be-
tween the United States of America and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics in the cultural, technological
and educational fields which was signed on January 27,
1958, provides for certain exchanges of medical delega-
tions in 1958-59, reciprocal trips of medical specialists
and the exchange of medical films and medical journals.
The Embassy's note contains certain specific proposals
for further cooperative measures in 1958-60 in the field
of public health. The note also refers to the World
Health Organization as an organization through which
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is prepared to
cooperate with other nations in this field. The Depart-
ment considers that some aspects of the proposals in the
Embassy's note might most appropriately be discussed
and carried out through the World Health Organization.
At the forthcoming Commemorative Tenth Anniversary
Session of the World Health Assembly at Minneapolis the
United States will have certain proposals to present re-
lating to a cooperative program of research, with initial
emphasis on cancer and heart disease. The United States
hopes that other governments, including the Government
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, will find it
June 23, 1958
468549—58—
1049
to support these proposals and to cooperate In
the proposed program.
Some aspects of the proposals set forth in the Em-
bassy's note may not be encompassed by the cooperative
measures which the World Health Assembly has adopted
or may adopt. The Department is prepared to discuss
these aspects of the Soviet proposals under the arrange-
ments established for Soviet-American discussions of cul-
tural, technical, and educational exchanges between our
two countries.
Department of State,
Washington, May 26, 195S
SOVIET NOTE OF MAY 19
Unofficial translation
Embassy op the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
No. 14
The Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-
lics presents its compliments to the Department of State
of the United States of America and upon instructions
from the Soviet Government has the honor to communi-
cate the following :
During the Soviet-American negotiations about work-
ing out an agreement between the USSR and the USA
concerning exchanges in the field of culture, technology,
and education, the question was touched upon as to
whether the USSR and the USA should agree upon unit-
ing their efforts in the struggle against cancer, vascular
heart ailments, and malaria, and it was agreed that an
exchange of opinions on this question would be continued.
As is well known, the Soviet Union joined the World
Health Organization for the purpose of co-operating with
other countries in improving and preserving the health
of all nations, and it also co-operates with other coun-
tries in the field of public health even outside the frame-
work of this organization.
At the suggestion of the Soviet Union there were also
included measures in the field of public health in the
agreement between the USSR and the USA for ex-
changes in the field of culture, technology, and educa-
tion, which was concluded on January 27, 1958. In par-
ticular, the agreement provides for the exchange between
the USSR and the USA of medical delegations in 19.58-
59, reciprocal trips of specialists for giving lectures in
the field of medicine, and the exchange of medical films
and medical journals.
The Soviet Government considers that in addition to
the measures which have been provided for by the said
agreement the Soviet Union and the United States might
also agree on adopting other measures in the field of
public health.
For the consideration of the Government of the USA
the Soviet Government introduces the proposal to agree
on carrying out the following measures in 1958-60:
Mutual exchange of plans and results of scientific re-
search on the development of the problems of cancer
and vascular heart ailments of scientific research insti-
tutes of the USSR and the USA.
Periodic sending of leading American specialists in
cancer problems and vascular heart ailments to the
USSR and of Soviet specialists to the USA for a more
profound study of the setup of scientific research.
A mutual publication of works by American research
men in Soviet journals and of works by Soviet research
men in American journals on cancer problems and vas-
cular heart ailments.
Organization of mixed Soviet-American groups for
combatting malaria and smallpox, to be sent, with the
consent of the respective governments, to the regions of
Africa and South America where those illnesses are
endemic.
The Soviet Government would appreciate a prompt
reply to the above-mentioned proposals and, on its part,
is prepared to examine the proposals that might be pre-
sented by the American side.
Washington, May 19, 195S
U.S. To Distribute Magazine
in Poland
Press release 300 dated June 2
On May 30 the United States and Poland ex-
changed notes providing for the distribution in
Poland of a monthly Polish-language magazine
to be published by the U.S. Government. The
magazine will be devoted to presenting various as-
pects of life in the United States. The Polish
Government has informed the U.S. Government
of its plans for the possible distribution of a simi-
lar magazine in the United States.
Soviet Diplomat Declared
Persona Non Grata
Press release 314 dated June 7
Department Announcement
On June 6, 1958, the United States Government
declared Nikolai I. Kurochkin, a third secretary
of the Soviet Embassy, persona non grata. This
action was taken because Mr. Kurochkin was
found to have paid hundreds of dollars to an
American citizen for the improper procurement
of United States Army manuals and other mate-
rials. Some of the docim:ients he sought were
classified as high as "secret." The Soviet
Embassy had already been advised that activity
of this kind would not be condoned. On Janu-
ary 14, 1957, when Major Yuri P. Krylov of the
1050
Department of Stale Bulletin
Soviet Embassy was expelled for similar actions,^
the Department of State requested the Soviet
Embassy to insure that procurement of materials
and documents by means of improper payments to
American citizens be discontinued immediately.
Notwithstanding this specific request, Mr. Kuroch-
kin has engaged in this practice during the past
months.
Text of U.S. Aide Memoire'
The Department of State infoi-ms the Embassy
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that
the Government of the United States has ascer-
tained that Mr. Nikolai I. Kurochkin, Third Sec-
retary of the Embassy of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, has engaged in highly im-
proper activities incompatible with his diplo-
matic status. Mr. Kurochkin has paid hundreds
of dollars to an American citizen for the im-
proper procurement of United States Ai-my manu-
als and other materials. Some of the dociunents
he sought were classified.
Mr. Kurochkin's continued presence in the
United States is no longer considered acceptable
and the Embassy is requested to arrange for Ms
immediate departure.
U.S. To Provide Cobalt Equipment
for Hospital in Thailand
Press release 303 dated June 3
Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern
Affairs Walter S. Robertson on June 3 informed
Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat (Srisdi Dhanara-
jata), Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces
of Thailand, that the U.S. Government will pro-
vide cobalt-60 teletherapy equipment to the
Siriraj Hospital at Bangkok.^ The amioimce-
ment was made in a brief ceremony in which As-
' Bulletin of Feb. 4, 1957, p. 181.
'Handed by Foy D. Kohler, Deputy Assistant Secre-
tary for European Affairs, to Sergei R. Striganov,
Counselor of the Soviet Embassy, on June 6.
' For announcement of meetings of Field Marshal Sarlt
with President Elsenhower and Secretary Dulles, see
Bulletin of June 2, 1958, p. 912.
sistant Secretary Robertson presented Field
Marshal Sarit a letter describing the facility.
The equipment, which is used in the treatment
of cancer, was requested by the Thai Government.
The Field Marshal was accompanied by the
Ambassador of Thailand, Thanat Khoman, and
Dr. and Mrs. Chamlong Harinsuta of the staff of
Siriraj Hospital. Also present were representa-
tives of the Atomic Energy Commission, the In-
ternational Cooperation Administration, and the
Walter Reed Army Medical Center.
Mr. Robertson said that tlie provision of the
cobalt teletherapy equipment is evidence of United
States interest in sharing scientific knowledge
with other countries. He also stated :
The United States is happy to participate with an ally
In the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization in developing
knowledge and experience in the peaceful uses of atomic
energy for the benefit of mankind.
The cobalt equipment is part of a project for
the peaceful uses of atomic energy under which
the U.S. Government is furnishing certain other
equipment to Thailand for nuclear research and
training.
Although many cobalt machines are in use in
U.S. hospitals, other institutions in this country
are awaiting their tunis for the cobalt, which re-
quires 2 years for processing at the National Re-
actor Testing Station in Idaho. In Bangkok the
unit, complete with cobalt, will supplement present
X-ray equipment and permit the treatment of ad-
ditional patients.
The cobalt unit is a small piece of radioactive
metal at the center of a large ball of lead or other
heavy shielding. This unit must be supported
by a machine in such a way that its powerful beam
can be directed as desired in the treatment of a
particular patient. The machines offer several
radiological and instrumental advantages over
conventional X-ray therapy equipment. The ra-
diological advantages are less reaction of the skin,
less discomfort to the patient when deep therapy
is necessary, and increased penetration into the
body for treatment of deep-seated lesions. The
instrumental advantages are simplicity of opera-
tion, no special power supply requirements, and
mechanical reliability.
June 23, 1958
1051
Proposed Treaty Opens Way for International Bus and Truck Operations
on Pan American Highway System
ly H. H. Kelly
Drafting of a new treaty to permit interna-
tional operation of buses and trucks on the Pan
American Highway System, traversing the entire
length of North, Central, and South America,
was accomplished at a meeting of the Permanent
Executive Committee of the Pan American High-
way Congresses held at the Pan American Union,
Washmgton, D.C., April 25-May 1, 1958.
This new intergovernmental instrument bears
the title "Draft Agreement on International
Commercial Motor Vehicle Traffic on the Pan
American Highway System." ^ It is the first of
its kind and scope in the Americas, and its prep-
aration is especially timely in view of the antici-
pated opening to through traffic in 1959 of the
segment of the overall system known as the
Inter-American Highway, a modern 3,200-mile
route between the United States-Mexico border
and the Panama Canal Zone.^ Its eventual
adoption by the American Republics will consti-
tute an important factor in the economic develop-
ment of the countries concerned.
The agreement has been referred to the Inter-
American Economic and Social Council for study.
If approved by that body and by the Council of
• Mr. Kelly is Director of the Interna-
tional Travel Division, Bureau of Foreign
Coimnerce, U.S. Department of Commerce.
He was an adviser to the U.S. delegation to
the meeting of the Permanent Executive
Committee of the Pan American Highway
Congresses reported in the above article and
served as chairman of the subcommittee
which drafted the agreement described.
the Organization of American States, it will be
submitted to the 21 American Republics for signa-
ture and ratification and will come into force
after ratification by 4 states. In the case of the
United States, such ratification will require the
advice and consent of the United States Senate.
So far as actual operations are concerned, the
agreement is expected to prove of most immediate
interest to the eight countries touched by the
Inter-American Highway — the United States,
Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nica-
ragua, Costa Rica, and Panama. On portions of
the Pan American Highway System in South
America which are already passable for large
vehicles, the agreement may also have immediate
' Copies of the draft agreement may be obtained from
the Pan American Union, Wasliington 6, D.C.
'The Pan American Highway System is a far-looliing
project for continuous highway connections from Alasl^a
to Argentina. The Alaska Highway already provides a
connection from the United States north to Fairbanks.
In the United States there is no expectation of designat-
ing a single highway or highways as units in the system ;
instead, the entire network of modern highways in this
country will doubtless be regarded as offering a wealth
of possible routes for north and south travel. There are
now several highway points of entry into Mexico, and
these converge at or near Mexico City, from where a road
continues south to the Guatemala border. Here begins
the new route officially designated by congressional leg-
islation as the Inter-American Highway. It traverses
the five Central American Republics and Panama, a total
distance of about 1,600 miles. South of the Panama
Canal Zone into Colombia lies the undeveloped Darien
area, presenting a 400-mile construction problem as yet
unsolved. In South America there are numerous high-
ways, not all interconnected, which are open to trafiic as
far as Chile and Argentina, and these are parts of the
Pan American Highway System.
Departmeni of State Bulletin
mterest as a means of regularizing and encourag-
ing the beneficial development of bus and truck
traffic. The first applications for permits to op-
erate on the Inter-American Highway are ex-
pected to be submitted to the designated govern-
mental authorities as soon as the agreement
comes into effect. Tliereafter, the expected de-
velopment of commercial motor vehicle traffic ■will
be watched with interest throughout the Western
Hemisphere and the world.
Background
Soon after World War II widespread interest
arose in measures to facilitate international mo-
toring on a worldwide scale. In 1949 the United
Nations promulgated a Convention on Eoad
Traffic/ which has been ratified to date by 36 na-
tions. The United States, which ratified in 1952,
was the first so to act. This convention applied
primarily to private passenger automobiles, al-
though it contained an annex setting forth the
maximum permissible dimensions and weight of
large buses and trucks. As progress proceeded
on the Inter-American Highway in this hemi-
sphere— on which the U.S. Government has al-
ready expended $128 million, with the Central
American Republics and Panama contributing
about half as much— the need for special arrange-
ments to cover buses and trucks became apparent.
The Pan American Highway Congresses and
the Inter-American Travel Congresses, working
imder the aegis of the Organization of American
States, made initial recommendations on the prob-
lem in generalized tenns. U.S. Government of-
ficials held discussions with the authorities of var-
ious countries along the route. The American
Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators,
composed of the officials of 48 States and the Dis-
trict of Columbia who have responsibility for
regulations applicable to motor vehicles and
drivers, adopted resolutions favoring conclusion
of an inter- American agreement on bus and truck
operations. In August 1957 an initial draft, pre-
pared by a working group of representatives of
the interested Government agencies at Washing-
ton,'* was submitted by the United States delega-
tion to the Seventh Pan American Higliway Con-
gress at Panama, II. P., for purposes of discussion,
and that assembly referred the matter to its ex-
ecutive committee for preparation of a final draft.
This task was performed at the meeting at Wash-
ington April 25-May 1, the drafting work being
done by a subcommittee composed of representa-
tives of Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and the United
States. The resulting final draft was approved
unanimously by the executive committee, whose
membership includes the four comitries named
above, together with Argentina, Brazil, Panama,
Peru, and Venezuela.
Mexican Reservation
A single country found it necessary to file a
reservation on one section of the agreement, re-
lating to the granting of operating rights and
to tlie freedom of in-transit traffic. This was
Mexico, whose special problem in this respect was
well recognized by the other members of the ex-
ecutive committee. One-half of the total mileage
of the Inter-American Highway lies in Mexico,
and that country has constnicted its part of the
highway entirely with its own fmids. The Mex-
ican delegation explained that the price of gaso-
line is low in Mexico and the gas-tax receipts
available for road purposes are correspondingly
scanty, while the diesel fuel used by large com-
mercial veliicles is not taxed at all. Furthermore,
the present laws of Mexico virtually prohibit op-
eration by foreign commercial vehicles or drivers
except in certain special cases.
Since Mexico has such a large section of the
highway and since it lies between the United
States and the other countries traversed by the
route, its strategic importance to the successful
operation of the new agreement is manifest. On
tlie other hand, Mexican operators will presum-
ably wish to benefit from the agreement in oper-
ations north to the United States and south to
other covmtries. This is the basic problem that
confronts Mexico under the agreement and one
that can only be corrected by changes in Mexican
legislation, in the view of that country's delega-
tion.
"For background, see Bulletin of Dec. 12, 1949, p.
875a. An earlier instrument of regional scope Is the Con-
vention on the Regulation of Inter-American Automotive
Traffic (Washington 1943), which provided a useful basis
for many of the provisions of the world document of 1949.
June 23, 7958
'Bureau of Customs, Bureau of Foreign Commerce,
Bureau of Public Roads, Immigration and Naturalization
Service, Interstate Commerce Commission, and Depart-
ment of State.
1053
Details of the Agreement
Because of its "ijioneer" nature the entire text
of the agreement is worthy of careful study by
all of those interested in international transporta-
tion matters. However, a brief summary of its
principal provisions may be made.
The document contains 21 articles and 3 an-
nexes. A preamble states :
The Contracting States, desirous of encouraging and
promoting the fullest possible utilization of the Pan
American Highway System for the international ex-
change of persons and goods in order that all the coun-
tries served by it may receive mutual economic and
social benefits, have agreed upon the following provi-
sions. . . .
The first four articles contain general provi-
sions, including definitions, exclusion of cabotage
operations, and assurance of nondiscrimination.
Two basic definitions are of special importance:
"International traflic" means any commercial trans-
portation of passengers or property between a point or
place in one country and a place in another country. . . .
"Pan American Highway System" means the highway,
or highways, within a Contracting State, which has, or
have been designated by that State as being a part of
the Pan American Highway System, including adjacent
city streets and feeder roads to a distance of not less
than one mile from the line of the Pan American High-
way. In the absence of such designation by a Contract-
ing State, all roads in that State will be considered as
parts of the Pan American Highway System.
Article 5 establishes the Permanent Executive
Committee of the Pan American Highway Con-
gresses, tlirough its secretariat, as a coordinating
body for the purpose of supplying appropriate in-
formation to the Contracting States.
Article 6 requires that each motor vehicle be
registered by the state or subdivision thereof in
■which the registrant has domicile, in the manner
prescribed by its legislation, and that each veliicle
shall display a registration number and an identi-
fying sign to show the country of initial registra-
tion.
Article 7 sets up the procedure for filing appli-
cation for permission to operate, with a provision
that the application shall be filed through diplo-
matic and/or consular channels on a prescribed
form. Paragraph 3 of this article, to which the
Mexican delegation filed its reservation, reads as
follows :
If need therefor is found to exist, each Contracting
State may limit the number of carriers or vehicles per-
mitted to operate in international commercial motor
vehicle trafBc, it being understood that any such limitation
will be taken into account by the other Contracting States
in granting operating rights, on a basis of reciprocity.
This provision shall not apply to in-transit traffic.
Article 8 provides that each Contracting State
may establish financial responsibility or insurance
requirements.
Articles 9 and 10 specify certain special customs
regulations for vehicles and cargoes.
Article 11 provides that every driver operating
mider the provisions of the agreement "shall be
subject to the laws and regulations of each Con-
tracting State in whicli he operates," with the
additional proviso that the Contracting States
"agree to facilitate, within the framework of their
respective laws, the entry and departure of such
drivers."
Articles 12 and 13 establish the principle of full
reciprocity on vehicle identification plates and
drivers' licenses, each participating country recog-
nizing validity of the others' plates and licenses
without additional fees. However, "each Con-
tracting State may require a driver to possess an
adequate knowledge of the language of that
State."
Article 14, on taxation, may be quoted in full :
Each for-hire or private carrier in international com-
mercial motor vehicle trafiic shall either purchase motor
fuel in each Contracting State in an amount necessary for
the operation of the vehicle in said State or pay the State
tax on the amount of such fuel which would have been
purchased in such State. The rate per gallon or litre of
such motor fuel tax shall not be in excess of that which
is applicable to domestic motor vehicles of the State. The
collection of such tax shall be the responsibility of each
Contracting State.
Article 15 specifies, through an annex, that the
permissible maximum dimensions and weights of
motor vehicles in international traffic shall be iden-
tical with those established by the Convention on
Road Traffic of 1949 (Geneva), permitting a maxi-
mmn overall width of 8.2 feet, height of 12.5 feet,
overall length ranging from 33 to 36 feet, and
length of articulated vehicles from 46 to 72 feet
(the latter figure being subject to a provision that
a Contractmg State may limit the number of
trailers).
Article 16 provides that each driver and vehicle
shall be subject to the laws and regulations rela-
tive to safety of operation in any of the Contract-
ing States in which he or it is operating.
Article 17 recognizes the right of the Contract-
ing States to apply measures required to maintain
Department of State Bulletin
international peace and security or protect the
national interest.
Articles 18 to 21 embody the usual provisions
relative to the ratification and entry into force of
the agreement.
Annex A suggests, subject to confirmation by the
respective states, the identifying letters showing
national origin of the vehicle. Examples are
"COL" for Colombia, "GUA" for Guatemala,
"MEX" for Mexico, and "USA" for the United
States. In this annex a provision for the future
is embodied in a footnote which reads :
If additional countries (such as Canada) eventually
become parties to this Agreement, appropriate symbols
shall be provided for them.
Annex B is a standard form of "Application for
Commercial Motor Vehicle Permit To Operate in
International Trafiic on the Pan American High-
way System." It embodies in eight sections the
necessary identifying description of the applicant
and his vehicles and the proposed type and scope
of operations.
Annex C sets forth the permissible maximum
dimensions and weight of vehicles operating under
the agreement. Its provisions are identical with
those in the worldwide instrument in this field,
the 1949 Convention on Eoad Traffic.
Development Loan Funds Authorized
for Projects in Five Countries
The Department of State announced on May 20
(press release 278) that the Development Loan
Fmid has been authorized to establish eight loans,
totaling $39,386,000, for economic development
purposes in five coimtries — Ceylon, the Republic
of China, Israel, Pakistan, and Turkey.
Three of the loans, totaling $6,386 million, are
for the Republic of China on Taiwan ; two, total-
ing $2.5 million, for Ceylon; one of $15 million
for Israel ; one of $5.5 million for Pakistan ; and
one of $10 million for Turkey. Dempster Mc-
intosh, Manager of the Development Loan Fund,
said he expected the formal agreements for these
loans to be executed in the near future.
These loans bring to $119,386,000 the total of
authorized loans aimounced mider the DLF pro-
gram.^ The fund was established last year by the
Congress to help finance economic development
projects in the newly developing countries of the
free world and to encourage the participation by
private investment and enterprise in the develop-
ment of these areas.
The funds to be made available under these
loans will be used to assist the five countries in-
volved, both through private enterprise and gov-
ernmental operations, to finance the purchase of
equipment and materials needed for a varied list
of development projects. Terms of the loans will
vary according to the type of the agreement being
negotiated.
President Approves
Payment to Denmark
Following is the text of a statement made by
President Eisenhower on a'p-pro'oing S. 2448, an
act which av,thonzes a payment to Denmark in
connection with the requisitioning by the United
States of JfO Danish ships in 1941. -
White House press release dated June 6
I am particularly gi-atified that the Congress
has enacted this legislation authorizing the full
and final settlement of an extremely complicated
problem that has been outstanding between the
United States and Denmark for 17 years. It is
notable that the discussions between the two coun-
tries have throughout been characterized by an
unremitting desire to arrive at a mutually ac-
ceptable settlement and by the patience and under-
standing traditionally characterizing relations
between the United States and Denmark, its close
ally.
' For Department announcements of DLF loans to
India and Honduras, see B01XETIN of Mar. 24, 1958, p. 464,
and June 9, 1958, p. 981.
^ For a statement made by Under Secretary Herter
before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on May 21,
195", see Buixetin of June 24, 1957, p. 1020.
June 23, 1958
THE CONGRESS
U.S. Policies and Programs in Europe
Statement by C. Burke Elbrick
Assistant Secretary for European Affairs '
It is a privilege to be able to discuss with you
once again our policies and problems in the part
of the world covered by the European bureau of
the Department of State. As you know, my
bureau deals with two broad areas which are
fundamentally different but which are both of
the utmost significance to American interests.
The first of these — Communist Europe — repre-
sents the main threat to our freedom, security, and
well-being. The second— free Europe — consti-
tutes our principal source of external strength and
support.
With the members of this committee it is hardly
necessary for me to undertake any detailed ex-
position of our basic European policies. You
gentlemen know these policies as well as I do.
You have contributed to their development and
implementation over a period of years. At this
time, therefore, I think it would be most useful
for us to concentrate on the application of these
policies to the current situation in Europe.
During recent weeks there has been consider-
able talk about the need for a general revision
of our foreign policies, both in Europe and else-
where. This talk is inevitable when our Govern-
ment faces a critical situation abroad. To some
extent the demand for change is altogether reason-
able. As Secretary Dulles has pointed out, our
policies are never static. They are constantly
being reexamined to meet the changing world
situation. While this fact may not be widely
understood by the general public, I am sure it
is obvious to the members of this committee.
'Made before the Senate Foreign Relations Commit-
tee on Jmie 3 ( press release 302 ) .
1056
With respect to our really basic foreign policies,
however, I believe demands for change must be
viewed with considerable caution. These basic
policies are grounded in basic American interests
and are tailored to the hard facts of the inter-
national situation as it actually exists. Unless
there is a far-reaching cliange in our national
interests or in the fundamental character of the
international situation itself, a radical change
in basic policy would be a perilous experiment.
U.S. Relations With Soviet Europe
Let us examine first our relations with the
Soviet Union and the part of Europe under Soviet
control. Here our fundamental purposes are rela-
tively simple to express, although immensely com-
plicated to cany into effect. We want to prevent
the spread of international communism dominated
by the U.S.S.R., which means that we must con-
stantly resist the further expansion of Soviet ter-
ritory, power, and influence. We want to avoid
military conflict. Wlierever possible, we want to
settle our differences with the Soviet Government
through peaceful negotiation. We want to en-
courage the development of conditions which will
permit the enslaved peoples within the Soviet sys-
tem to regain their freedom. We want to pro-
mote better imderstanding between people living
in the Soviet orbit and free peoples. Finally, we
want to create incentives wliich will induce the
Soviet Union gradually to alter its basic policies —
to abandon its ambitions for a universal empire
and to enter sincerely into peaceful and construc-
tive cooperation with the rest of the world.
In several important respects we have made
Department of Slate Bulletin
significant progress toward the realization of these
purposes during the past 10 yeare. There has
been no war on the European Continent. Since
the beginning of the North Atlantic Treaty in
April 194!), the Communists have made no teiTi-
torial gains in the European area. Communist
political influence in the free nations of Europe
has substantially lessened. Behind the Iron Cur-
tain Soviet rule has encountered increasing popu-
lar resistance, as demonstrated by the violent
uprisings in East Germany and Hungary. Yugo-
slavia has established and maintained its inde-
pendence from Soviet control, and Poland has
demonstrated a heartening tendency toward
greater freedom of action.
There has been a significant expansion of con-
tacts between the Western peoples and the peoples
under Soviet rule. You will recall that on Janu-
ary 27 of this year we concluded an exchange
agreement with the Soviet Government which pro-
vided for a series of exchanges of persons in the
cultural, educational, and athletic fields over the
next 2 years.^ As a result of that agreement, for
example, there will be for the first time in the
recent histoiy of our relations with the Soviet
Union American students studying this fall in
Soviet universities and Soviet students enrolled
in American institutions. Much remains to be
done, of course, especially in removing the ob-
stacles to the free flow of information to the
Soviet peoples, but we hope to make some progress
toward this objective by pressing for implementa-
tion of those sections of the agreement of Janu-
ary 27 which relate to exchanges of radio-TV
programs on world events, reciprocal purchase
and sale of films, and improved distribution of
Amerika magazine.
At the same time we must recognize that these
favorable developments are offset by certain con-
siderations that are distinctly unfavorable. The
most important single factor in our relations with
the Soviet Union remains unchanged. All avail-
able evidence indicates that the Soviet rulers are
still firmly determined to achieve world domina-
tion through whatever means may be required.
It is true, I think, that the gi-owing strength
and unity of the free world has stretched out the
Soviet timetable of conquest. We know that the
Soviet strategists have always thought and
' For text, see Bulletin of Feb. 17, 1958, p. 243.
June 23, 1958
planned in fairly long-range terms, but conditions
during the early postwar period seemed to offer
them opportimities for immediate success in a
number of critical areas. They were tempted to
grab while the grabbing was good. Today the
grabbing is no longer good in the European area,
and Soviet strategy to absorb the vital territory,
manpower, resources, and industrial facilities of
free Europe has had to take account of this fact.
While there is no doubt that the Soviet rulers wiU
remain alert to any new opportunities for quick
and cheap victories that may arise, military or
otherwise, they are clearly planning in terms of
years and decades and are concentrating their im-
mediate attention primarily upon promoting neu-
tralism m Europe, seeking to break up NATO and
other Western cooperative arrangements, exploit-
ing weak spots in the European economic and
social structure, and attempting to outflank and
strangle free Europe by achieving Commimist
domination of Asia and Africa.
It is also true, I feel sure, that the Soviet rulers
would greatly prefer to achieve their ambitions
without the risk of all-out warfare. They have
come to realize that direct military aggression
would invite a nuclear catastrophe, and they are
therefore concentrating more heavily upon polit-
ical, economic, and psychological aggression.
Nevertheless they have continued to proclaim
world empire as their ultimate goal, and, as long
as this remains their objective, the peace and se-
curity of the world will be constantly threatened.
We must also recognize that the Soviet capac-
ity to wage its cold war against the free world
has substantially increased. The overall Soviet
economy has grown stronger, and the Soviet
rulers have clearly indicated their willingness to
use a sizable portion of their economic power to
finance aid and trade programs designed to pene-
trate and ensnare free nations. The remarkable
advances of Soviet science and technology are
familiar to all of us. Finally we must remember
that the Soviet Union is still maintaining an
enormous military establishment, supported by
nuclear power and missiles, as well as the more
conventional military forces. While they im-
doubtedly hesitate to use this military power
under present circumstances, we could expect this
hesitation to vanish rapidly if we and our allies
should permit ourselves to be weakened to the
point where the Soviet rulera might have reason
to believe they could destroy us with minimum
damage to themselves.
In view of the situation I have described, I feel
considerable assurance in saying that our basic
policies toward the Soviet Union are sound. We
frequently hear demands for more boldness in our
relations with Russia— and simultaneously hear
counterdemands for more flexibility — but these
demands are rarely translated into specifics. I do
not believe that any sane American who is famil-
iar with the horror of modem warfare would
propose that we pui-sue our interests through
suicidal military adventures. On the other hand,
I do not believe that any American who is con-
cerned with our ultimate survival would suggest
that we abandon our resistance to Soviet expan-
sionism. We have no alternative but to steer a
course between these extremes, and that is ex-
actly what we are now doing.
The Role of Negotiation
Some people have repeatedly emjjhasized the
importance of negotiations with the Soviet Union
as a means of achieving a peaceful settlement
of differences. This emphasis is altogether
proper, but I think we should remember two
things. First is the simple fact that negotiation
with the Soviet Government is not a "one shot"
deal but a constant process. In one way or an-
other we are almost continuously engaged in
negotiations with the Soviet Union. We nego-
tiate through our diplomatic missions, through
the United Nations, through the U.N. specialized
agencies, through special coimnittees of experts,
and even by means of public statements. We
have participated in one meeting of heads of gov-
ernments and are fully prepared to hold an-
other if it appears that such a meeting offers any
reasonable prospect of constructive results.
Whether or not such a meeting takes place, how-
ever, we should understand that negotiations
with the Soviet Union will continue through a
variety of channels. Wliere the Soviet rulers
have a genuine desire to reach agreement on any
subject, there are plenty of ways and means
available.
Next we should remember that there are inevi-
table limitations upon what we can expect from
any kind of negotiations with the Soviet Govern-
ment. These limitations stem first from the fact
that most international agreements necessarily
1058
involve promises and that Communist promises
are not what we would call gilt-edged collateral.
They stem also from the fact that the Soviet
rulers do not truly repi-esent their own people, or
any other people, and that the peoples under their
control have relatively little practical influence
upon the policies and actions of their rulers.
Finally, they stem from the fact that the funda-
mental Soviet goal of world domination, which
lies behind all their negotiations and other inter-
national activities, is utterly incompatible with
our own interest in peace and security. These
limitations do not mean, of course, that we should
abandon efforts at negotiation.
In the past we have been able to reach accord
with the Soviet Government on several important
matters, such as the Austrian state treaty, the
cessation of the Berlin blockade, the recent ex-
change program, and the establishment of the In-
ternational Atomic Energy Agency. I am con-
vinced that other valuable agreements are possible
in the future. But we should be aware of the fact
that we can never expect a complete settlement
with the Soviet Union without a fundamental
change in the Soviet Union's own purposes. We
certainly cannot enter into any agreement which
implies an abandonment of resistance to Commu-
nist imperialism.
There are also those in this country and abroad
who insist the United States and its Western
allies should demonstrate a greater readiness to
make concessions to Soviet demands. I'm not
sure I know exactly what this means. We should
always be prepared, of course, to match Soviet
concessions with concessions of our own, provided
these result in a genuine improvement in the out-
look for peace and security, or provided they give
the Soviet Government real incentives to alter its
attitudes and designs. But we should also \m-
derstand that such incentives are unlikely to be
provided by a policy of appeasement. The
Soviet rulers will never call off their program of
world conquest so long as they feel they have a
good chance of being successful. Therefore we
Iiave nothing to gain and much to lose by con-
cessions which merely whet their appetites or
which enlarge their capacity for pursuing their
goals.
"While we are always ready to meet the Soviet
half way in the search for a lasting peace, there
are several things that we simply cannot afford
Department of State Bulletin
to do. We cannot be satisfied with a mere illu-
sion of peace. We cannot accept empty words as
a substitute for the concrete arrangements upon
-which a workable peace must depend. We cannot
accept the permanent enslavement of any nation
which wants its freedom. We cannot break up
our collective-security systems nor weaken the
bonds of unity with our allies. Most of all, we
cannot barter away the solid military, economic,
and political strength which we and our allies
have achieved in exchange for shallow promises.
There is nothing we could do that would be more
dangerous to world peace than to give the Soviet
rulers the mistaken impression that free nations
are too stupid, too decadent, or too weak to resist.
Military and Non military Aspects of Defense
It has been said on occasion that we are devot-
ing too much effort to the military aspects of
defense — that we need to give more attention to
the fierce political, economic, and psychological
offensive which the Soviet Union is waging against
the free world. I think both the executive branch
and the Congress have long been aware of the
grave dangers presented by the nonmilitary tech-
niques of aggression employed by the Soviet
Union. In Europe, for example, we should recall
that we luidertook the Marshall plan to restore
Europe's economy some time before we began
the NATO military buildup. It is also true, I
believe, that the Soviet shift of emphasis from
military to nonmilitary expansion is one of the
most striking developments of recent years and
that we must be prepared to adapt our own poli-
cies to meet the new situation. We need to tighten
our collective-security relationships, extend polit-
ical consultation with friendly nations, improve
the effectiveness of our programs of economic as-
sistance, maintain realistic trade policies,
strengthen our informational and cultural opera-
tions, and do many other things. But we should
also understand that the need for greater effort
in the political, economic, and psychological fields
does not justify less effort in the field of military
defense. There is no reason to believe the shift
in Soviet tactics was occasioned by any sudden
burst of tenderness or generosity. It was almost
certainly based upon their recognition of the fact
that military adventures have become too danger-
ous. This, in turn, resulted from the position of
military strength which the United States and
its allies have attained. We should remember
that, despite Soviet announcements of force cuts,
there have been no real reductions in overall So-
viet military power. In fact, modern weapons
have increased this power, and a renewal of Soviet
military pressure could occur at any time. Let
us lead them not into temptation. Nobody should
discount the importance of the nonmilitary aspects
of the cold war, but I think every sane person
would rather fight the battle against communism
on this front than to be compelled to fight with
missiles and nuclear weapons. Only by keeping
our military defenses strong can we have reason-
able assurance that Soviet aggressive action will
be confined to other channels. Strong military
defenses, in fact, are the indispensable founda-
tion of all our diplomatic, economic, cultural, and
informational efforts to stop the nonmilitary ad-
vances of communism.
U.S. Relations With Free Europe
Our prospects for success in carrying out our
policies toward Soviet Europe depend to a con-
siderable degree upon our relations with free
Europe. In this important area, also, our basic
purposes are fairly simple. We want the nations
of free Europe to remain free. We want them to
be strong — strong enough to provide for the well-
being of their peoples, strong enough to protect
themselves against Communist political and eco-
nomic penetration, strong enough to give us real
help in maintaining an adequate system of mili-
tary defense. We want to see the nations of free
Europe attain maximum cooperation among them-
selves and also want them to cooperate with us on
a broad Atlantic basis. We want friendship, un-
derstanding, and mutually beneficial commercial
and cultural relationships between the European
countries and the United States. Finally, we
want our European friends to use their consider-
able resources and influence in non-European
areas to promote peace, freedom, strength, and
unity among the peoples of the free world as a
whole.
Here again I do not believe there is much doubt
about the general success of our policies during
the last 10 years. I have already mentioned the
fact that the Communists have failed to capture
any of these countries and that Communist influ-
ence inside their borders has appreciably dimin-
ished. I am sure the members of this committee
June 23, 7958
1059
are also familiar with the gigantic strides these
countries have taken toward greater strength and
stability. They have made a truly remarkable re-
covery from the economic chaos which threatened
them 10 years ago. Most of them have also
achieved a measure of political stability that once
seemed impossible. Through NATO they are now
making a substantial contribution not only to
their own military defense but to the total de-
fensive power available for the protection of the
entire free world. They have granted independ-
ence to a number of former colonies in Africa and
Asia and are gradually evolving new political and
economic relationships with other dependent
areas. This process has been extremely difficult
and is all the more laudable for this reason.
Meanwliile the nations of free Europe have
made tremendous progress in the development of
cooperative relationships with one another. The
OEEC is a valuable substitute for the economic
nationalism that characterized the last generation.
The Community of Six represents a bold new ex-
periment in supranational integration which is
moving step by step toward a united Europe.
This cooperation within Europe is matched by
growing cooperation between Euroj^e and North
America. As you know, the joint nulitary effort
developed under NATO is steadily being extended
to political, economic, and psychological activities.
I believe the recent NATO meeting at Copenha-
gen, from which I returned a few days ago,
marked a new peak of Atlantic political unity.^
Wlien I speak of the political unity achieved
within NATO, I do not mean to suggest that there
are no disagreements among the members. You
all know that disagreements frequently exist,
sometimes on fairly important issues. It is not
surprising that 15 sovereign nations will often
have differing attitudes and interests with respect
to specific problems. Wliat is surprising is the
remarkable measure of agreement attained on
fundamentals. Our processes of political consul-
tation are not designed to elimiimte all differences
but rather to achieve an essential accord in basic
policy and action despite these differences. In
this we have done very well indeed. I doubt that
human history records any other mstance in
which 15 independent nations have managed to
' For text of final communique issued at Coi>enhagen on
May 7 following a meeting of the NATO Ministerial
Council, see ihiO.., May 26, 1958, p. 850.
1060
work together so effectively and to maintain such
a closely knit community of purpose.
All things considered, I would not hesitate to
say that the success of our policies in Western
Europe during the last 10 years has been little
short of miraculous. At the same time, of course,
we cannot blind ourselves to the fact that our
European friends still face a number of serious
problems. Despite the substantial improvement
of European production and trade the economies
of several countries are subject to severe and con-
stant strain. Communist influence, despite its
decline, remains too strong for comfort in certain
areas of Western Europe. Little concrete prog-
ress has yet been made toward the important
objective of German reunification, without which
there can be no enduring stability in central
Europe. There is evidence of a significant volume
of neutralist sentiment in some countries, and this
sentiment is constantly being stimulated and ex-
ploited by Communist elements.
The relations between certain European na-
tions and their overseas territories, as you know,
still produce a number of exceedingly complex
problems. The United States has consistently
sought to promote the orderly evolution of de-
pendent peoples to self-government. At the same
time we have been aware that premature in-
dependence and irresponsible nationalism may
present grave dangers to the dependent peoples
themselves, as well as to the whole free world. We
have also hoped that the peoples evolving toward
self-govenunent will voluntarily choose to main-
tain intimate political, economic, and cultural ties
with the nations of Europe. Our policies with
respect to these matters have not always been
satisfactory to our European allies, and we have
sometimes been critical of their own policies and
practices. On the whole, however, we have recog-
nized that the processes of political and social
evolution are not easy, and we feel that the Euro-
pean govermnents have made long strides in deal-
ing with the intricate problems involved.
Even in the field of military defense we and our
allies are a long way from being out of the woods.
Science and technology move at a breathtaking
pace, and military weapons and facilities are
growing more complicated and more expensive
every day. The maintenance, improvement, and
progressive modernization of NATO forces will
continue to present problems of tremendous mag-
Deparfmenf of Stale Bullefin
nitude. Ill addition we are confronted by the
i':iit that the German defense buildup has been
slower than expected and that the French have
considered it necessary to divert a large portion
of France's military forces to Algeria. The
NATO defense program certainly caimot be
taken for granted, and there is no basis for any
relaxation of interest or effort.
Finally, we know that certain European govern-
ments have had difficulties of an internal nature.
France, in particular, has been going through a
severe domestic political crisis.
For obvious reasons I would prefer to avoid
making extensive comment on the internal French
situation at this time. It would be inappropriate
for Americans to do or say anything which might
be construed as interference in a matter that is
essentially the concern of the Frencli peoj^le them-
selves, or which might complicate the enormous
tasks facing the De Gaulle government. I do
not want to suggest any lack of interest in the
situation nor to gloss over the seriousness of the
problems that may arise from recent events in
France. It has been necessary for us to give
this situation a great deal of thought and to fol-
low developments very closely. At the same time,
I think, Americans would do well to avoid going
off the deep end in considering the possible effects
of the French situation upon the Western World
as a whole. We should view this situation in the
broad perspective of history. I am convinced of
the profound dedication of the French people
and their government to the cause of human free-
dom. I am equally convinced that the basic in-
terests of the French nation are inextricably tied
up with the future of the European community
and the Atlantic community. The Western World
needs France, just as France needs its association
with the Western World. France has played a
leading role thus far in the building up of West-
em defense, and I do not believe that any French
government, other than a government under Com-
munist control, would wish to try to undermine
or halt the progress that is being made.
Dealing With the Current Problems
With respect to the various other problems I
have mentioned I believe that we should take a
similarly calm and constructive attitude. We
should not try to sweep any of these problems
under the rug. On the other hand, we should not
June 23, 1958
exaggerate their difficulty. Here again I feel
that perspective is essential, because we are going
to have to live with some of these problems for
a long time to come.
Actually, none of the problems that we face
today in Western Europe is nearly so difficult
as those we faced 10 years ago. I remember when
a number of people sincerely opposed the Mar-
shall plan with the argument that European eco-
nomic recoveiy was hopeless and that any effort
to promote recovery would simply amount to
pouring money down a rathole. I remember when
NATO was also opposed on the grounds that
Europe was politically and militarily indefensible
and that any effort to build an effective defensive
structure would be a waste of effort. If we had
followed these counsels of despair, we probably
would not be sitting here today discussing our
policies of Western Europe because Western
Europe would already have been lost to the
free world.
In dealing with the current problems of free
Europe I believe our policies should follow the
same general patterns that have been successful
in the past. Wliile economic aid to Europe has
been virtually eliminated, with the exception of
assistance recently given France, we must keep
the European economic picture under close ob-
servation and must take account of the need for
European economic health in developing our own
financial and commercial policies. We must do
our part in maintaining the NATO defense struc-
ture and must continue to help our allies to
improve and modernize their forces. We must
develop further the processes of political con-
sultation in NATO in order to insure a funda-
mental unity of policy and action among the
member governments. We must explore con-
stantly with our allies the possibilities of joint
effort in all fields of endeavor where a combina-
tion of skills and resources may offer mutual
advantage. In particular, I believe we should
give full support to the recent NATO program
for scientific cooperation.
We must encourage our European allies to
settle occasional differences among themselves in
a peaceful and constructive manner. Without in-
terfering in the internal affairs of friendly na-
tions, we should use our influence to promote
political and social stability. We should en-
courage our friends to adopt progressive and re-
1061
alistic policies in dealing with their territorial and
economic interests in other parts of the world.
"We should continue our cultural and information
programs, both as a means of counteracting Com-
munist propaganda and as a means of inspiring a
greater unity of spirit throughout the Atlantic
community. One of the strongest bulwarks of
Atlantic cooperation is the widespread and direct
contact that has developed among the peoples
themselves — among businessmen, professional
bodies, labor groups, legislatoi-s, and many other
elements of national populations. These contacts
produce a kind of understanding and community
of interest that could never be achieved through
governmental contacts alone.
In carrying forward our multiple policies and
programs in the European area we must give con-
stant consideration to new methods and techniques
of operation. In the final analysis, however, there
is no substitute for old-fashioned diplomacy — for
the ability to move rapidly and decisively in all
fields of common interest, for the day-to-day dip-
lomatic cooperation on a host of little problems
which, if effectively handled, we can keep from
becoming big problems. It may be trite to say
that diplomacy is not only our first but our only
satisfactory line of defense, but I believe the state-
ment is nevertheless true.
All things considered, I would say that our Eu-
ropean policies have paid off. I believe they will
continue to pay off in the future. I do not mean
to imply, of course, that there is no room for im-
provement. As I have already indicated, all our
policies and programs are in a constant state of
revision. We must always be on the alert for
better ways of doing things. However, I honestly
believe that our hasic policies are on the right
track and that our principal task is to improve
their practical application to particular situations.
We cannot expect that these policies are going
to result in an immediate relaxation of interna-
tional tensions or a sudden termination of the
cold war. On the contrary, I think we should
face up to the fact that an early end to the cold
war just doesn't seem to be in the cards. The
road ahead will probably be long and hard, with
many twists and turns, but we already know better
than to expect any smooth-surfaced freeway to
peace and survival. We will certainly make mis-
takes, and the enemies of freedom will do every-
thing they can to capitalize on these mistakes.
However, I am sure that the Soviet rulers are not
nearly so hopeful about any particular mistakes
we may make as they are hopeful that we wiE
ultimately quit trying. It is their fondest dream
that we will eventually "run out of gas" — that we
will succumb to a sort of "cold-war weariness" —
that we will become "fed up" with a troublesome
and perplexing international situation and decide
to let the world go by default. A major part of
our job is to convince them that this dream is
never going to come true. If we display the same
energy, imagination, and determination that we
have shown in the past, we have reason for con-
fidence that we can meet the challenges of the
future.
The Problem of Development
of the Upper Columbia River
Statement hy Douglas McKay ^
I am Douglas McKay, chainnan of the United
States Section of the International Joint Com-
mission, United States and Canada. I appear
before the committee in response to the letter of
the chairman of the Committee on Interior and
Insular Affairs, dated February 25, requesting
that I testify to provide details of the develop-
ments within the International Joint Commission
on the Upper Columbia problem since the previ-
ous hearings of this committee, which were con-
cluded on May 23, 1956.
As requested, I will outline the developments
in the International Joint Commission in this
statement. In addition, I have obtained the con-
currence of our Canadian colleagues to furnish
the committee with a copy of the verbatim tran-
script of the proceedings within the Conmiission
at the four regular semiannual meetings and one
special meeting, which are the only occasions
since May 1956 at which there have been discus-
sions of the Columbia River problems. Accord-
ingly, a copy of the proceedings at those meetings
has been furnished for the use of the committee
and its staff.
In general, since May 1956 the United States
Made before the Senate Committee on Interior and
Insular Affairs and a special subcommittee of the Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations on Upper Columbia River
development on May 7.
Department of State Bulletin
Section of the International Joint Commission
has continued to press for tlie earliest possible
solution of the problems of development of the
Columbia Basin to the mutual satisfaction of all
interests concerned in botli Canada and the United
States. The role of the International Joint
Commission in dealing with these problems is
twofold :
First, we have the responsibility for investiga-
tion and report to the Governments of Canada
and tlie United States on the possibilities for such
development of water resources of the Columbia
as would be practicable and in the public interest
from the points of view of the two Governments.
The Commission has tliis responsibility under a
reference dated Marcli 9, 1944, from the two
Governments pursuant to article IX of the
Boundary Waters Treaty.
The Commission's second responsibility is to
consider and take action on an application from
the Government of the United States for approval
of the construction of the Libby project pursuant
to article IV of the 1909 treaty.
I will outline the developments of the last 2
yeare under each of these responsibilities.
Progress under the 1944 reference has been dis-
couragingly slow but, fortunately, has increased
considerably in tempo in the last few years. Due
to the comprehensive studies completed in 1948
in the United States for the Columbia River Re-
view Report,^ the United States was in a favor-
able position to participate in joint planning
under tlie reference very soon after it was ap-
proved by the two Governments. Canada, how-
ever, was not in such a fortunate position and had
to embark on many basic mapping and data-
gathering projects before undertaking surveys
and studies of specific development possibili-
ties. The rate at which studies of the possibilities
in Canada have been undertaken has, of course,
been a matter for determination by Canada, and,
according to the infonnation furnished to us from
time to time in the formal progress reports under
the reference and in the information obtauied
from the chairman of the Canadian Section of
the Commission, sufficient information on the
projects in Canada will become available in the
next several months to peraiit submission of a
report to the Commission by the International
' H. Doc. 531, 81st Cong.
June 23, 7958
Columbia River Engineering Board in December
1958. Fortunately the United States has been
able to provide complete and up-to-date informa-
tion for its part in this international report by
virtue of the current review of the 1948 report
on the Columbia which is nearing completion and
is scheduled to be received by the Chief of En-
gineers in July of this year.
The report which the Commission expects to
receive from tlie International Columbia River
Engineering Board in December will contain, in
addition to the general appraisal of the needs
and possibilities for development of a compre-
hensive plan on an international basis, specific
analyses of three plans known as sequences 7, 8,
and 9, whicli encompass three general types of
possible development of the Upper Columbia
Basin :
Sequence 7 is a plan which includes the Libby
project plus development of Mica and other sites
on the Columbia in Canada witliout diversion of
the Kootenay to the Columbia.
Sequence 8 also includes the Libby project and
the Columbia developments in Canada but con-
templates partial diversion of the Kootenay to the
Columbia at Canal Flats.
Sequence 9 is a plan which does not include the
Libby project but contemplates maximum prac-
ticable diversion of the Kootenay to the Columbia.
None of the aforementioned plans involves
analyses of the possibility of diversion from the
Columbia to the Fraser, since that is a matter
beyond the scope of the reference from the two
Governments to the Commission and is a matter
being studied unilaterally by Canada.
When the international report is received by
the Commission and the Commission's report to
the two Governments is fonnulated, a proper
framework of engineering and economic data
will be available for the consideration of the two
Governments on possible joint developments and
on sharing of costs and benefits of such develop-
ments. Until such data are available, neither
Government has all the information it needs to
propose or consider specific arrangements for
joint development.
As to our second job, that of taking action on
the Libby application, the United States Section
of the Commission has, of course, been ready to
proceed at any time since submission of the
second application on May 22, 1954.
1063
Both the Government of Canada and the Gov-
ernment of the Province of British Columbia,
however, have stated in their formal statements
in response to the application that they are not
prepared to consent to or to oppose the Libby
project and are therefore not prepared to have the
Commission proceed with consideration of the
application pending completion of certain addi-
tional studies of development possibilities in
Canada. To date, neither the Government of the
United States nor the United States Section of
the International Joint Commission has been ad-
vised further with respect to the attitude of the
Governments of Canada and the Province of
British Columbia or as to their readiness for con-
sideration of the Libby application. The United
States Section of the Commission has, of course,
regularly reminded the Canadian Section of the
Commission of our urgent need for the Libby
project and of our desire for the earliest possible
action. A recapitulation of all of the circum-
stances and a reiteration of the urgency of the
matter was presented to the Canadian Section
of the Commission on April 2, 1957.' Also, a
special meeting of the Commission was proposed
by the United States Section and held in New
York in January 1958 for the purpose of clarify-
ing the United States position on possible terms
of settlement of the Libby application, about
which many misconceptions appear to have arisen.
In this special meeting, the United States Sec-
tion of the Commission gave assurance to our
Canadian colleagues of our willingness to pro-
ceed with discussions of terms of settlement for
the Libby project in the spirit of a willing buyer
and a willing seller and that we expected that re-
compense for use of natural resources of Canada
in the Libby project could be arranged on the
basis of consideration of all pertinent factors.
As the result of that special meeting, it was gen-
erally agreed among all members of the Commis-
sion that considerable progress had been made
in clarifying the respective views of interests on
both sides of the boundary. Nevertheless, no
definite information was obtained at that time as to
when the Governments of Canada and the Prov-
ince of British Columbia will be prepared to
make a further statement on the Libby project
to the Commission. The situation within the
' For text of U.S. statement, see Bdixetin of July 1,
1957, p. 34.
Commission at this time is that we have received
continued frank and discouraging statements from
the Canadian chairman to the effect that the Libby
project is unlikely to be favorably regarded by
Canada, and during meetings of the Commis-
sion we have received polite but noncommittal
statements from representatives of the Govern-
ment of Canada indicating that the further studies
considered necessary in Canada have not yet been
completed but are still under way.
The foregoing outline of the status of the Com-
mission's two functions with respect to Upper
Columbia developments indicates generally the
i-ole of the International Joint Commission in
these matters. With reference to the committee's
question as to ways in which the Commission's
role has been changed by the decision of the two
Governments to discuss this question at the diplo-
matic level, the answer is that the Commission's
role has not been changed by the action of the two
Governments referred to. The Commission's re-
sponsibilities remain as described previously, to
complete its report imder the 1944 reference and
to take action on the Libby application when and
if the Governments of Canada and the Province
of British Columbia indicate that they are ready
to have the application considered. The role of
those who are participating in the diplomatic
discussions is not a superseding role but an addi-
tional and supplementary function. Insofar
as the United States Section of the Commission
is concerned, we ape hopeful that those discus-
sions will improve understanding of the prob-
lems between the agencies of both Governments
who are concerned with these matters and may
lead to the formulation of, and agreement upon,
principles which would be useful when the Com-
mission's report is made available to the two
Governments.
Aside from the statements by members of the
Commission during its reg-ular proceedings con-
cerning which I have already advised the com-
mittee, there has been only one public statement
by a member of the U.S. Section of the Commis-
sion bearing on the Upper Cohmibia River prob-
lems, and that is a statement which I delivered at
the Pacific Northwest Regional Conference of the
American Society of International Law at the
University of Washington on April 19, 1958.
Copies of that statement have been furnished the
committee.
Department of State Bulletin
The committee's letter of February 25, 1958,
included a request for a summary of any discus-
sions or negotiations which have taken place
within the Commission relative to tlie develop-
ment of the Saint John River or any other river
resources which may be related to an overall set-
tlement of these problems.
In January 1954 the Commission submitted a
report on the Saint John River Basin to the Gov-
ernments of Canada and the United States in re-
sponse to the Governments' reference of 28 Sep-
tember 1950. That report outlined the possibili-
ties for development of the Saint John River
Basin but did not oifer any suggestions for joint
undertakings or contain any information pei-ti-
nent to the situation in the Upper Columbia at
this time. Subsequently the possibilities for de-
velopment on the Saint John in conjunction with
an analysis of the feasibility of the Passama-
quoddy Tidal Power Project have been under
consideration by the Commission pursuant to the
reference from the two Governments dated Au-
gust 2, 1956. To date, these studies have only
been concerned with an analysis of the engineer-
ing possibilities and have not extended to consid-
eration of a basis for sharing of costs and benefits
of developments in which both countries are in-
volved. I can assure the committee that, if the
studies on any other rivers should lead to dis-
cussions or negotiations which would be pertinent
to the Upper Columbia situation, it will be made
known to all concerned and will be taken fully
into account.
The chairman's letter of February 25, 1958, also
requested my comments on the position of the
chairman of the Canadian Section as presented
during his appearance before the Committee on
External Affairs of the Canadian House of Com-
mons on December 12, 13, and 16, 1957. We have,
of course, studied these and other statements of
the Canadian chairman vei-y carefully, and I must
confess that we have continued to find the state-
ments discouraging with respect to the prospects
for satisfactoi-y completion of the Commission's
two current assignments; namely, early settle-
ment of the Libby application and formulation of
mutually l>eneficial plans which do not require
divei-sion of the Columbia to the Fraser. Never-
theless we are hopeful that the completion of the
joint studies later this year will provide a frame-
June 23, 1958
work on which discussion of specific projects of
mutual benefit to both countries can be carried
on successfully. I can assure the committee that
the United States Section of the Conunission is
unanimous and steadfast in its desire to achieve
the earliest possible adoption by the two coun-
tries of mutually satisfactory plans for develop-
ment of the Upper Columbia, plans in wliich
cognizance can be taken of the costs and benefits,
upstream and downstream, which should equi-
tably be allocated to interests in each country.
We are ready to consider any procedures and any
principles by which this goal can be accomplished.
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Automotive Traffic
Convention concerning customs facilities for touring.
Done at New York June 4, 1954. Entered into force
September 11, 1957. TIAS 3879.
Ratification deposited: India, May 5, 1958.
Customs convention on temporary importation of private
road velilcles. Done at New York June 4, 1954.
Entered into force December 15, 1957. TIAS 3943.
Ratification deposited (loith reservations) : India, May
5, 1958.
BILATERAL
Burma
Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of
1954, as amended (68 Stat. 455; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709),
with exchange of notes. Signed at Rangoon May 27,
1958. Entered into force May 27, 1958.
Germany
Agreement amending the agreement of July 18, 1952
(TIAS 2553) for financing certain educational ex-
change programs. Effected by exchange of notes at
Bonn May 14, 19.58. Entered into force May 14, 1958.
Sweden
Agreement amending research reactor agreement concern-
ing civil uses of atomic energy of January 18, 19.56, as
amended (TIAS 3477 and 3775). Signed at Washing-
ton April 25, 1958.
Entered into force: June 2, 19-58 (date each govern-
ment received from the other written notification
that it has complied with statutory and constitutional
requirements).
1065
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
International Cooperation To Solve Food and Agricultural Problems
NINTH SESSION OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION
ROME, NOVEMBER 2-22, 1957
by Ralfh S. Roberts
The ninth session of the Conference of the Food
and Agriculture Organization of the United Na-
tions was held at FAO headquai-ters in Eome,
Italy, from November 2 to 22, 1957. Over 450
representatives of 76 of FAO's 77 member coun-
tries participated. The United States delegation
included representatives of the Departments of
Agricultui-e, Interior, and State, congressional
advisers, and advisers from agricultural, fisheries,
and forestry organizations.^ Forty-seven inter-
governmental and nongovernmental organiza-
tions were represented by over 70 observers.
This session of the Conference functioned
through plenary meetings and meetings of its
three major commissions dealing with: I- World
Food and Agriculture Situation; Il-Current and
Prospective Activities of the Organization; and
Ill-Constitutional, Administrative, and Finan-
cial Questions. It was, on the whole, a construc-
tive, businesslike, and efficient session.
Plenary meetings were held during the first
week to hear statements by leaders of delegations
and at other times during the course of the Con-
ference when decisions were required. In the
• Mr. Roberts, author of the above article, is
Administrative Assistant Secretary of Agricul-
ture. He was head of the U.S. delegation to
the ninth session of the FAO Conference.
plenary meetings most delegation leaders con-
fined themselves to specific topics in their state-
ments. United States Secretary of Agriculture
Ezra Taft Benson, who was in Eome for a brief
period during the Conference, presented the
United States statement. He concentrated on the
questions of (1) surplus disposal and (2) na-
tional self-sufficiency versus specialization, and
emphasized United States policy on surplus dis-
posal operations in this way :
In our export operations, we have been governed by
FAO's principles of surplus disposal and have set for
ourselves three principles: (1) We will compete fairly on
the world market. (2) We will compete in quality. (3)
We will participate in a mutually profitable international
trade that gives our customers abroad continuous oppor-
tunity to earn the foreign exchange they need to buy
our products.
Secretary Benson also took this occasion to re-
affirm support of FAO by the United States. In
this connection he observed that :
The flow and exchange of commerce and ideas between
nations is basic to maintenance of world peace and the
strengthening of economies. The exchange of ideas
through sessions of the Conference and through other
means is one of the principal values of FAO.
The finest work of FAO, it seems to me, lies not in
doing things for people, or for governments, but through
^ For a Department announcement and a list of the
U.S. delegation, see Bulletin of Nov. 18, 1957, p. 812.
Department of Slate BuUetin
inspiring, encouraging, and assisting ix^ople and govern-
ments to do tilings for themselves. In this FAO has
done an effective job since its founding. I have no doubt
that FAO will continue and improve upon this effective
role in the years that lie ahead.
WORLD FOOD AND AGRICULTURE SITUATION
Tliis general subject was discussed in plenary
meetings during the lirst full week of the Confer-
ence under two headings: disposal of surpluses
and their use for economic development, and na-
tional self-sufficiency vereus sjDecialization and the
resulting international trade. Discussions of these
subjects were continued in Commission I during
the second week of the Conference. Congressman
W. R. Poage outlined the U.S. position on the
state of food and agriculture. Congressman
Charles B. Hoeven stated the U.S. policies on
surplus disposal.
Delegations were seriously concerned about the
worsening terms of trade facing farmers both in
domestic and international markets. World sur-
pluses and their useful disposal without serious
disruption of markets was one major topic, closely
followed by concei'n about the international effect
of domestic pricing i^olicies and possible measures
to improve terms of trade. Resolutions were
adopted on each of these topics.
The U.S. delegation led off the surplus-disposal
discussion with a presentation of current activi-
ties and the philosopliies supporting their pol-
icies. It was argued that large quantities of
surplus goods had been usefully moved into con-
sumption with substantial effects on the levels of
living of underprivileged peojile and the economic
development plans of less developed areas. Dis-
ruption of markets had been minimal, and great
care had been and was being exercised to see that
our competitors were not hurt. Most delegation
comments were moderate. One conclusion was to
encourage the subconunittee on surpluses to
strengthen its operations.
In the discussion of price policies that might
lead to surpluses and other trade difficulties, ex-
porting nations took an active part. The U.S.
delegation pursued a passive role, while delega-
tions from several countries blunted some rather
drastic proposals put liefore the Conference. The
resolution finally adopted was aimed at stimulat-
ing studies in the broad field of price policy and
June 23, 1958
creating principles of national price policies.
The Conference also endorsed the intention, out-
lined by the Director General, B. R. Sen, to
arrange for three main documents to be presented
to the Economic and Social Council in the summer
of 1958 in line with requests made by that Coun-
cil and by the United Nations General Assembly :
1. A brief general report on action taken, in
line with various intergovernmental requests, on
subjects relating to food reserves ;
2. A more detailed study by tlie Director Gen-
eral on national food reserves, taking full account
of the conclusions reached by the FAO working
party on national reserves ;
3. A consolidated record on FAO expert
studies and administrative arrangements on ques-
tions of famine relief, including a brief sum-
mary review of existing intergovernmental proce-
dures and relief facilities.
The resolutions finally adopted includetl one
which requested the Director General to call to the
attention of member goverimients the existing
international machinery for stabilization of the
prices of agricultural products and the studies
made and action taken by other intergovernmental
bodies on price stabilization and on the terms of
trade.
ACTIVITIES OF FAO
Under this topic in Commission II the Confer-
ence reviewed the work of the major divisions of
the Organization, adopted the program of work,
and determined the biemaial budget for 1958-59.
Agriculture
The Conference was well satisfied with the
value, integration, coordination, and balance of
the regular program of the Agriculture Division.
No increase in its basic program had been pro-
posed by the Director General, except for the fill-
ing of two or three posts previously authorized
but vacant for most of 1956-57. The division will
be more or less involved, however, in several
expansion items, including those for strengthening
the regional offices, documentation, Mediterranean
development, rural welfare, and the peaceful uses
of atomic enei'gy.
In the general review of the basic program,
1067
notable interest was shown by many countries in
land and water management, fertilizer use, irriga-
tion, plant and animal pests and diseases, tropical
crops, extension services, and some aspects of
land-tenure problems.
A joint session of the technical committees on
agriculture and forestry endorsed a proposal for
a tour of the United States to see the work on
watershed management, as well as joint meetings
of agriculturists and foresters in Europe and in
the Far East on this subject. Other proposed ac-
tivities relating to flood control, soil erosion con-
trol, and shifting cultivation, especially in the
tropics, were suppoi-ted.
Economics
The discussion of economics was favorable to
the work of this division and indicated that dele-
gates generally gave highest priority to work on
statistics and commodity analysis. Delegates felt
that, if necessary, some adjustments might be
made in the economic analysis branch of the
division.
Fisheries
In general, the Conference felt that the Fish-
eries Division had done a good job on the current
program and endorsed it as sound, adequately
balanced, and well oriented. The pi'ogram of
work was discussed in considerable detail, but
there were no strong differences of opinion as to
the eventual recommendations.
Minor changes in the Expanded Technical As-
sistance Program and fellowship procedures were
suggested in the interest of greater eiRciency of
operations, and there was a very definite feeling
that biological projects should lead to relatively
immediate practical results. This was expressed
in the sense of giving primaiy attention to those
projects which had a direct bearing on increased
food production and fullest use of aquatic
resources.
Forestry
Major attention in forestry discussions was
focused on the proposed increases in the forestiy
budget, on the proposed Mediterranean develop-
ment project, and on the "World Forestry Con-
gress. The delegations from the United States,
Canada, the United Kingdom, and some of the
European countries pressed for priority ratings
of the various elements in tJie proposed program.
The debate on these priority ratings led to some
prolonged arguments and finally to a vote in Com-
mission II, where the priorities were retained.
There was a lively discussion of the World
Foresti-y Congress to which the United States will
be host in 1960. Numerous suggestions were of-
fered by delegations on tours and subjects of in-
terest to them which might be included in the
program of the Congress. Complete acceptance
was given to the U.S. proposal that all suggestions
should be relayed to the U.S. organizing commit-
tee for its consideration and decision. Also, a
draft resolution concerning the Congress, pre-
sented by the United States delegation, was
unanimously adopted.
Nutrition
The Conference concluded that impressive ac-
complishments had been made by the Nutrition
Division with a small staff and limited financial
resources. The proposed 1958-59 budget for this
division was approved in its entirety. Top prior-
ity was given to the provision of an additional
specialist and consultants in education in nutri-
tion and two additional regional officers in Latin
America, one for food teclmology and one for
home economics.
Special importance was attached to the food
consumption and planning work of FAO, which
assists member countries to formulate and carry
out national policies and programs concerned with
the production and consumption of food, taking
full account of the nutritional requirements of the
people. Dietary surveys among family groups are
now being made more extensively in many coun-
tries, and there is growing recognition of the need
for surveys of diets of individuals for specific nu-
tritional objectives.
Increasing interest has been shown by under-
developed countries in receiving help in adapting
modem developments in food technology and im-
proving food-preservation methods. Work on
food additives is now being carried out by FAO
and the World Health Organization.
Adequate national scientific and technical nutri-
tion services are needed for developing pi'actical
programs, and appropriate national services are
needed to coordinate activities to improve the nu-
trition of populations. In this, more emphasis on
1068
Department of State Bulletin
the training of nationals through fellowship and
other programs was urged. FAO was urged (in
collaboration with UNESCO, WHO, and
UNICEF) to encourage and assist governments
to develop suitable teacliing methods and materials
and to use WHO maternal and child-health cen-
ters and U.N. conmiimity-development activities
as opportunities for nutrition education.
Increasing assistance has been given in planning
and organizing supplementary feeding programs
and related educational activities. Since in many
countries such programs benefiting school chil-
dren, mothers, and preschool children are often
initiated with dried skim milk made available
temporarily by the United Nations Children's
Fund, simultaneous attention is given to develop-
ing local resources of foods which can replace the
imported milk.
The rapid development of the FAO home eco-
nomics program was gratifying because it can
contribute significantly to raising levels of living.
Particular stress was laid on the importance of
beginning the work in each country or region with
comprehensive surveys to gain understanding of
conditions of family living and of existing con-
tributing programs. As examples of the interest
in home economics, several countries and terri-
tories in Africa have requested assistance from
FAO in training women for participation in com-
munity development.
Information
In examining the activities in 1956-57 of the edi-
torial, audiovisual, and documents branches and
the legislative and library services of this division,
the Conference paid particular attention to clari-
fying the division's general purpose. It studied
the program of work and the budget estimates for
these branches and services for the period 1958-59,
as well as the trends of the program in their
various fields.
Great importance was attached to the need for
establishing the basic principles that must underlie
the activities of the Organization in the sphere
of information. The Conference stressed the need
to organize the activities of the division internally
so that they may all be directed toward the same
general purposes.
The Conference noted that activities in the field
of information are of a dual nature : On the one
hand, there has to be created interest and under-
standing among all people, in and outside the
farming sector, of the problems of agriculture
and particularly the role of FAO in the overall
effort to promote social and economic develop-
ment. On the other hand, it is important to dis-
seminate technical information which govern-
ments can use for the benefit of farmere and pro-
fessional agriculturists. The latter task devolves
mainly on the technical divisions, which carry it
out through the meetings they hold and through
their publications and other communications.
The creation of a favorable opmion among peo-
ple implies the supplying of more than technical
information since that alone fails to arouse suffi-
cient interest in influential circles.
The point was made that the member nations
have a responsibility that they must accept to
achieve adequate results in the Organization's in-
formation work. The Conference recognized, too,
the responsibility of the national FAO commit-
tees to advise the Organization of their needs
in regard to information material and to adapt
the latter to the different languages, mentalities,
psychology, i-equirements, and general environ-
ments of the countries concerned.
The Conference recognized that difficulties on
publications requirements of the Organization
outlined by the Director General were mainly of
a programing and budgetary nature. It re-
quested the Director General to establish pri-
orities on manuscripts in all the divisions within
the budgetary ceiling set for documents and to
eliminate the backlog as soon as possible.
In establishing future priorities, it was felt
that the Director General could be greatly aided
by a procedure whereby member governments
would take a more active part in the selection
of titles to be published and in giving advice on
how to satisfy the most urgent publication needs.
Proposed Expansions in FAO Work
Commission II reviewed a number of proposals
for major expansion in some phases of the Organ-
ization's work.
Strengthening the Regional Structure. The
first of these proposals involved measures to
strengthen tlie regional structure. The problem
of the regional organization of FAO had been
examined on several occasions by the Conference
and by the Council of FAO. However, the Di-
Ji/ne 23, 1958
1069
rector General recommended measures to assure
fuller development of regional activities and pre-
sented to the Conference detailed proposals to-
ward this end. He envisaged the strengthening
of the responsibility of the regional representa-
tives and the outposting of additional technical
officers to the regional offices, together with ap-
propriate administrative and secretarial assist-
ance. He also proposed to establish a regional
office in Africa.
The Conference considered the plan for
strengthening the regional activities of the Or-
ganization sound and desirable. At the same time
it drew attention to cei-tain difficulties which
would have to be kept in mind, particularly in
the initial stages of implementation. Special at-
tention should be paid to the qualifications of the
staff to be recruited, and this might lead to delays
in the full implementation of the proposals. The
Conference considered that such delays in recruit-
ment would be preferable to any relaxation of
standards of recruitment. Attention should also
be given toward delineation of territory covered
by regional offices.
Interagency Cooperation. The Conference de-
cided that provision for meeting new activities
requiring interagency cooperation during 1958
and 1059 should be met by establishing the un-
allocated contingencies chapter at $100,000 in the
budgets for 1958 and 1959. The original pro-
posals included provision of $50,000 for unallo-
cated contingencies and $100,000 for interagency
cooperation.
The Conference indicated that the Director
General, in using such funds, should make sure of
the importance and urgency of the projects in
relation to FAO and that FAO should tak-e the
initiative in sponsoring activities within its com-
petence that may be of interest to several agencies.
Mediterranean Developinent Project. There
was a great deal of vocal support for this project,
but there were also many words of caution. The
U.S. position was to discourage the development
by FAO of a large regional project based on
large-scale regional planning and external financ-
ing ; to recommend instead that FAO assist coun-
tries on a national basis in making surveys and
studies for better national agricultural- and fores-
try-development programs; and to suggest that a
regional technical meeting might be useful at a
later stage as a means of exchanging information
1070
and techniques. Tlie Conference finally ap-
proved the project in a somewhat reduced form
and with a considerable number of safeguards
which met in part, although not entirely, the
United States reservations.
Atomic Energy. The Conference approved
the establishment of a second professional post
within the atomic energy branch, which deals
with the applications of atomic energy in agri-
culture and food processing, and, so far as re-
sources permit, the holding of such meetings or
training courses as would be most useful to mem-
ber countries. The Conference also requested the
Director General to enter into consultations with
the Director General of the International Atomic
Energy Agency for the purpose of drawing up a
draft relationship agi'eement. In this connec-
tion the Conference also requested the FAO
Council to establish a committee composed of
government representatives to be available for
consultation by the Director General in his nego-
tiations with the designated representatives of
the Board of Governoi"s of the IAEA in prepar-
ing a final draft agreement for submission to the
10th session of the Conference.
Expanded Technical Assistance Program
Although there was considerable interest in this
subject, there could be little definitive action by
the Conference since it has no direct control over
either the resources or the programing procedure.
However, an entire day was devoted to a review of
FAO's activities under this program, with a
larger number of delegations participating than
in most previous sessions. Most of the delega-
tions commented on the technical assistance ac-
tivities carried on in their countries and, in many
cases, put forward their ideas for various im-
provements in the technical operations of these
programs.
The allocation of funds for ETAP projects in
each country is made by the Teclmical Assistance
Board, composed of representatives of all par-
ticipating agencies, including FAO, subject to
final approval by the Technical A.ssistance Com-
mittee of the Economic and Social Council and
the U.N. General Assembly. However, the Con-
ference of FAO is responsible for determining
the policies guiding FAO's participation and for
reviewing FAO's activities under ETAP for
technical soundness. The Conference made
Department of State Bulletin
recommendations for use by the Director Gen-
eral in negotiating and administering FAO's pro-
gram under ETAP and, in some cases, for con-
sideration by governments wliich are membei-s of
the TAG and General Assembly.
Regional Conferences
The Conference stressed the importance of
regional meetings as a basis for developing broad
guidelines for FAO's future activities in the re-
gions and endorsed the principle established by the
eighth session of the Conference that such regional
meetings should be held in nonconference years in
order best to fulfill the above purpose.
It was emphasized that the regional meetings
should concentrate on the broad fields of agri-
cultural policy and programing suitable for dis-
cussion by government representatives at a policy-
making level and should remain flexible within
the broad lines proposed by the Director General.
Adoption of Program of Work and Budget
The level of the budget was first discussed in
technical committees and in Commission II to
allow for full discussion prior to final considera-
tion in a plenary meeting. The Director General,
in presenting his program of work and budget
for 1958-59, to be financed from assessed contri-
butions, compared the shares for the technical as-
sistance program determined by ECOSOC and
the U.N. General Assembly for the different agen-
cies with the relative sizes of their regular
budgets devoted to the respective fields of ac-
tivity for 1957. Mr. Sen stressed the fact that
the resources available to FAO fall far short of
the services it is called upon to provide, particu-
larly if FAO is to keep in step with the educa-
tional and health-control activities which nations
are undertaking through other international
agencies. He said that therefore he was submit-
ting to the Conference what he felt was a mini-
mum program of work framed in the light of the
world's needs: $8,610,400 for 1958, which was just
over $1,000,000 for the further development of
the work program. Budget proposals, as they
actually emerged, were $8,610,400 for 1958 and
$8,818,100 for 1959, plus $11,000 in each year to
cover costs arising from increased postal rates in
Italy.
In the initial discussion in Commission II ap-
proximately 16 leaders of delegations spoke.
June 23, 1958
About half of these, mostly from developed coun-
tries, were in favor of a somewhat smaller budget
while the others, mostly from underdeveloped
countries, supported all or most of the Director
General's proposals.
The General Committee of the Conference then
examined further the procedures to be followed
and agreed upon an arrangement under which
Commission II would discuss major expansions
and attempt to reach a provisional decision on
each. This would be followed by a summariza-
tion of reports of the technical committees and
a determination on the level of the budget to be
recommended to plenai-y. Attempts would then
be made to reconcile any differences which might
exist between the total level agreed upon in Com-
mission II and provisional decisions reached on
major expansions and increases in the regular
program of work.
The U. S. delegation moved a biennial budget
of $16 million, and the Netherlands proposed an
amendment altering the figure to $17 million.
The Director General had indicated he needed
$17,450,000, including $22,000 for increased post-
al costs, but in view of discussion was prepared
to accept $17,314,500. The Netherlands amend-
ment was carried with 50 voting for, 13 (includ-
ing the United States) against, and 4 abstaining.
The countries voting with the United States were
Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Ireland, New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines,
Sweden, South Africa, and the United Kingdom.
Germany, Luxembourg, Mexico, and Pakistan ab-
stained. The 17 countries either voting against
the resolution or abstaining contribute about 70
percent of the FAO budget.
Tlie final vote in a plenary meeting on the level
of the budget for the 1958-59 biennium at
$17,000,000 was 42 votes for and 15 votes against,
with no abstentions.
CONSTITUTIONAL, ADMINISTRATIVE, AND
FINANCIAL QUESTIONS
In Commission III the Conference acted upon
the following constitutional matters: (1) recom-
mendations of the Ad Hoc Committee on Organi-
zational Structure, involving primarily the or-
ganization and structure of the FAO Council
and its relationship to the Conference on the one
hand and subsidiary bodies on the other; (2) in-
1071
crease in membership of the Council; (3) revised
elections procedures; (4) cooperation with inter-
national organizations; (5) "observer status" for
governments and international organizations;
(6) principles governing conventions and agree-
ments; (7) FAO policy and agi-eements with
regional research and training institutes; and
(8) consequential amendments to constitution
and rules of procedure.
The principal administrative and financial
questions acted upon by the Conference were con-
cei'ned with (1) review of the financial position
of the Organization, (2) working capital fund,
(3) scale of contributions for 1958-59, (4) a num-
ber of routine financial and administrative items,
and (5) biennial budgeting.
Organizational Structure of FAO
The fundamental question here for the Confer-
ence to decide was whether to accept Plan A sub-
mitted by the Ad Hoc Committee on Organiza-
tional Structure, providing for retention of the
Council as an executive body composed of 24 gov-
ernments with retention of biemiial Conference
sessions, or to accept an alternative Plan B, pro-
viding for abolition of the Council, with annual
Conference sessions and establishment of a niun-
ber of permanent Conference committees. The
Conference voted to accept Plan A.
Proposed increase in Council Membership
This proposal was made to provide an addi-
tional seat for the African region. After an ex-
tended debate in the plenary session, in which a
large number of delegations favored the objectives
of the proposal, the matter was thoroughly con-
sidered in the General Committee of the Confer-
ence. The Committee and the Conference agreed
in principle that it is desirable to increase the
membership of the Council from 24 to 25, allocat-
ing the additional seat to the African region, and
requested the Council to prepare a draft constitu-
tional amendment to be circulated to member gov-
ernments before the next Conference of FAO, in
accordance with the rules of procedure.
Methods of Election of Council Members
The Conference adopted new procedures for
Conference elections of Council members. The
1072
most important new feature was the method of '
calculation of the required majority for each elec-
tion, the purpose of which is to avoid various
types of "minority vote" elections and the use of
such devices as "plumping." Many other features
of the new procedures are an obvious improve-
ment, especially in regard to the form of ballots,
secret election booths, and scrutiny of counting.
Cooperation With International Organizations
The Conference agreed that relationships with
international governmental and nongovernmental
organizations were progressing satisfactorily, that
no change in the procedures was required, and that
emphasis should be placed on development of
practical arrangements for cooperation on specific
problems.
Granting of Observer Status
On this question the Conference adopted a re-
port of the Council, with a few minor amend-
ments, in the form of a Conference resolution, the
terms of which shall apply to all conferences and
meetings called under FAO auspices. Subsidiary
bodies of FAO which have adopted their own
rules of procedure were requested to bring their
rules into harmony with the Conference resolution
at the earliest possible date. The report provided
that, under certain specified conditions, nonmem-
bers of FAO may send observers to FAO meet-
ings, but it also provided that "Nations which
are not Members or Associate Members of the
Organization or members of the United Nations
shall not be permitted to send observers to any
meeting of the Organization." This latter provi-
sion was strongly supported by the United States
in order to rule out any possibility that repre-
sentatives of certain unrecognized regimes which
are not members of the U.N. might be invited to
FAO meetings.
Principles and Procedures Governing Conventions
and Agreements
With some modification, the Conference
adopted the Council's report which will serve as
a guide for future FAO conventions and agree-
ments and for subsidiary bodies under FAO aus-
pices. This report clarifies the purposes and
circumstances under which conventions and agree-
Deparfment of Sfafe Bulletin
iiporta
Be
, .pfe
He
dfo
todij
pertfi
^3i;
10(1 j| nents shall be drawn up and subsidiary bodies
jstablished. As an outgrowth of this particular
iiscussion, the Conference adopted a new article
KV to the constitution establishing the authority
)f the Conference to enter into agreements with
nember nations for establishment of international
ustitutions dealing with questions relating to
food and agriculture. This provision will be more
important if FAO expands its relationships with,
Eind assistance to, regional research and training
institutes.
FAO Policy Regarding Regional Research and Train-
ing Institutes
The Director General requested policy guidance
from the Conference in regard to FAO assistance
in establisliing regional research and training in-
stitutes. The Conference adopted a U.S. dele-
gation recommendation that this whole question
hould be referred to the Council as it involved
important legal, constitutional, and financial, as
well as program policy problems.
Amendments to Constitution, Rules of Procedure,
and Financial Regulations
The Conference, after deciding on the prin-
ciples and policies involved in regard to the nu-
merous constitutional and financial proposals re-
ferred to above, adopted appropriate amendments
to the constitution and a series of detailed amend-
ments and revisions to tlie rules of procedure and
financial regulations.
Scale of Contributions
The 1958 U.N. scale of contributions was adopt-
ed for FAO, with suitable adjustments owing
to differences in membership. The United States
percentage contribution for FAO for 1958-1959
is 32.51.
Election of New Members
Requests were made by the Ukrainian S.S.R.
and Hungary just before the Conference opened
to have consideration of their applications post-
poned until 1959. Ghana, the Federation of Ma-
laya, and the Polisli People's Republic were
elected to membership in FAO. Poland had
formerly been a member but, having withdrawn,
was subject to the same election procedure as new
members.
June 23, 1958
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE CONFERENCE
The breakdown of Conference sessions into
three commissions appears to be about the best
organizational arrangement that can be acliieved.
However, several problems emerging in review
of this ninth session point to ways of improving
future sessions of the FAO Conference.
For tlie Conference as a whole, the focusing of
attention more directly on substantive matters is,
to a considerable extent, a matter for govern-
ments themselves and requires continued improve-
ment in the degree of governmental preparations,
in the caliber of delegations, and in the extent to
whicli governments will utilize the FAO Con-
ference as an important forum for discussion of
national and international food and agricultural
policies. Some procedural improvements in the
planning and organization of the plenary ses-
sions and Commission I sessions could also be
made, but these alone will not achieve the ob-
jective without parallel improvements in govern-
mental participation.
The method of arriving at a budget level still
presents problems. Projects and programs of
work have been considered apart from tlieir cost
implications. Great improvement could come
from a change in procedure to take into account
both the limits which governments must place on
their expenditures and the needs of the Organi-
zation, with balanced emphasis on the two fac-
tors. AVith these considerations in mind. Con-
ference delegates should be able to work in an
environment wherein they could arrive at a mu-
tually agreeable budget level with a minimum of
time pressures or group pressures for particular
projects.
A related problem, that of closing-rush pres-
sures, might be solved in part by starting the
work of Commission II during the first week of
the Conference, with its meetings being scheduled
to avoid imdue overlapping with plenary meet-
ings.
An important problem involves most effective
use of the expert knowledge of technical mem-
bers of delegations. Faced with a going program
operated by a permanent staff and with little
time for discussions of technical questions in Con-
ference, technicians on delegations can contribute
relatively little to current programs. With care-
ful planning it should be possible for delegation
technicians to make more positive contributions
1073
in evaluating proposals for the total program of
work and, more particularly, in developing long-
range plans.
There is an evident need for much more con-
sultation among governments prior to the Confer-
ence, through the Council and other channels, if
objective, reasonable, and generally acceptable so-
lutions are to be found to many major problems.
Such consultations should, in the earlier stages,
center around positive and constructive program
proposals. At later stages financial positions
could be related to the program proposals.
President Extends Benefits
to Hydrographic Bureau
White House press release dated May 29
WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT
President Eisenhower on May 29 issued an
Executive order designating the International
Hydrogi-aphic Bureau a public international or-
ganization entitled to the benefits of the Interna-
tional Organizations Immunities Act of Decem-
ber 29, 1945.
The International Organizations Immunities
Act provides that certain privileges, exemptions,
and immunities shall be extended to such public
international organizations as shall have been
designated by the President through appropriate
Executive order and to their officers and em-
ployees and the representatives of member states
to such organizations.
The International Hydrographic Bureau began
to function actively in September 1921 as tiie out-
growth of a conference initiated by the British
Admiralty to which maritime states having hy-
drographic offices were invited to send delegates.
Tlie organization, now numbering 37 members,
has its headquarters in Monte Carlo.
The basic objectives of the International Hydro-
graphic Bureau are tlie establishment of a close
and permanent association between the hydro-
grapliic services of its members and the coordina-
tion of the hydrographic work of these services
with a view to rendering navigation safer in all
seas of the world and to obtain uniformity insofar
1074
as possible in charts and hydrographic documents
The United States has been a member of th(
International Hydrographic Bureau since 1922
U
itiol I
liw
AS aPublic International Okgan^ation EntitledIi^w ?
Sail
EXECUTIVE ORDER 10769 •
Designating the Inteenational Hydbooraphic BuKEAr
To Enjoy Certain Privileges, Exemptions, ani«
Immunities
By virtue of the authority vested in me by sectioi I
1 of the International Organizations Immunities Act
approved December 29, 1945 (59 Stat. 609), and havinj i
found that the United States participates in the Inter
national Hydrographic Bureau under the authority Oi
an act of Congress approved March 2, 1921 (41 Stat
1215), I hereby designate the International Hydro
graphic Bureau as a public international organization
entitled to enjoy the privileges, exemptions, and immuni
ties conferred by the International Organizations Im
munities Act.
The designation of the International Hydrographic
Bureau as a public international organization withii
the meaning of the International Organizations Im
munities Act shall not be deemed to abridge in an:
respect privileges, exemptions, and immunities whicl
such organization may have acquired or may acquire bi
treaty or congressional action. inljrt
kp
im
ItU:
Wtni
XJ (.JL>y/ii~ZuO-iC..i^ X*o.^
The White House,
May 29, 1958.
U.S. Delegations to
International Conferences
26th Meeting Caribbean Commission
The Department of State announced on May 2%
(press release 290) the following U.S. delegation
to the 26tli meeting of the Caribbean Commission
to be held at Trinidad, The West Indies, May 28-
June 2 :
U.S. Commissioners
Arturo Morales CarriOn, chairman, Under Secretary ol
State for the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
Leonard Brewer, St Thomas, Virgin Islands
Jos6 Trias Monge, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
23 Fed. Reg.
Department of Slate Bullef'm
Wilts
Iternate U.S. Comr,
of tijjtolard More, Office of Dependent Area Affairs, Uepart-
1&
ment of State
jLdv
Hydro
is6 Luis Colom, Director, Office of Technical Cooper-
ation, Department of State, Commonwealtli of Puerto
Rico
("redericli H. Lawtou, Office of Dei)endent Area Affairs,
Department of State
Valter W. Orebaugh, American Consul General, Port-of-
Spain, Trinidad, The West Indies
An outgrowth of tlie original Anglo-American
s Aot [Caribbean Commission, the Commission is an in-
'|>'i«i ernational advisory body. It serves to coordi-
late activities of the four member governments —
*lFrance, Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and
he United States — in their efforts to improve the
jconomic and social well-being of the inhabitants
)f their territories in the Caribbean area.
The principal items for discussion concern the
preparations for the Conference on the Revision
Df the Caribbean Commission Agreement, sched-
aled to be held at Trinidad in November 1958.
The Commission will also review technical as-
(j distance projects, primarily in the fields of edu-
iireby3ation, fisheries, forestry, and cooperatives, being
undertaken in cooperation with the International
Cooperation Administration, the Food and Agri-
culture Organization of tlie United Nations, and
the United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization.
42d Session, International Labor Conference
The Department of State announced on May 28
(press release 294) the following tripartite dele-
gation to the 42d session of the International
Labor Conference to be held at Geneva, June
4^26:
Representing the Govekxment of the United States
Delegates
James P. Mitchell, chairman, Secretary of Labor
Francis O. Wilcox, Assistant Secretary of State for In-
ternational Organization Affairs
Advisers and Sulistitxite Delegates
George C. Lodge, special assistant to the Secretary of
Labor
Graham W. McGowan, special assistant to the Secretary
of Commerce
David W. Wainhouse, counselor of embassy, American
Embassy, Vienna, Austria
Howard S. Carpenter, Near East specialist, Office of In-
June 23, 7958
ternatioual Labor Affairs, Department of Labor
Charles C. Finch, labor adviser. Bureau of Near East-
ern, South Asian and African Affairs, Department of
State
Daniel Goott, special assistant for international labor
affairs. Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Po-
litical Affairs, Department of State
Joseph E. Johnson, consultant to the Secretary of Labor
Harold J. Magnuson, chief, Occupational Health Program,
Bureau of State Services, Public Health Service, De-
partment of Health, Education, and Welfare
Marion E. Martin, commissioner, Maine Department of
Labor and Industry
Otis E. MuUiken, deputy director. Office of International
Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State
John F. Skillman, director. Division of Agricultural, Con-
struction, and Mining Equipment, Business and Defense
Services Administration, Department of Commerce
Marshall M. Smith, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Com-
merce for International Affairs
Charles B. Stewart, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Labor
for Research and Development
James F. Taylor, chief. Foreign Service Division, Office of
International Labor Affairs, Department of Labor
George Tobias, attach^ for international labor affairs,
American Consulate General, Geneva, Switzerland
Philip A. Yahner, special assistant to the Solicitor, De-
partment of Labor
Arnold Zempel, executive director. Office of International
Labor Affairs, Department of Labor
Representing the Employers of the United States
Delegate
Cola G. Parker, director, Kimberly-Clark Corp., Neenah,
Wis.
Advisers
A. Boyd Campbell, chairman of the board, Mississippi
School Supply Co., Jackson, Miss.
Charles E. Jackson, general manager. National Fisheries
Institute, Inc., Washington, D.C.
R. H. Nichols, publisher and editor. Daily Reeord,
Vernon, Tex.
Mrs. Sybyl S. Patterson, a.ssociate director. Employee
Relations Divi.sion, National Association of Manu-
facturers, New York, N.Y.
William G. Van Meter, attorney. Labor Relations and
Legal Department, Chamber of Commerce of the
United State.s, Washington, D.C.
W. H. Winans, Larchmont, N.Y.
Representing the Workers of the Uniteu States
Delegate
Rudolph Faupl, international representative, Interna-
tional Association of Machinists, Washington, D.C.
Advisers
Harry C. Bates, president, Bricklayers, Masons, and
Plasterers International Union of America, Washing-
ton, D.C.
George P. Delaney, director of organizations. Interna-
tional Union of Operating Engineers, Washington, D.C.
1075
Eugene E. Frazier, president, United States Transport
Service Employees, Chicago, III.
Isidore Nagler, vice president. International Ladies'
Garment Workers Union, New York, N.Y.
Bertrand Seidman, economist. Research Department,
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Indus-
trial Organizations, Washington, D.C.
George L. P. Weaver, assistant to the president, Inter-
national Union of Electrical, Radio, and Machine
Workers, Washington, D.C.
Secretary of Delegation
Virgil L. Moore, attach^, American Consulate General,
Geneva, Svpitzerland
The Internationcal Labor Conference is the
principal policymaking organ of the International
Labor Organization, a specialized agency of the
United Nations comprising 80 member countries.
At the annual meeting of the Conference repre-
sentatives of governments, workers, and emploj'ers
of the member countries of the ILO formulate
suggested standards for the improvement of work-
ing and living conditions around the world.
Through the other organs of the ILO the Organ-
ization also performs the functions of providing
expert advice and technical assistance in the form
of national and regional training programs, ad-
visory missions, surveys, and other direct assist-
ance to governments. The Organization also col-
lects and disseminates information about labor,
industrial, and social conditions. The functions
of the Organization cover a wide range of sub-
jects including work hours, minimum employment
age, workmen's compensation, social insurance,
paid vacation, employment services, worker mi-
gration, freedom of association, trade union
rights, and forced labor.
The 42d session of the Conference will review
the report of the Director General, which em-
phasizes the major trends in the work of the ILO
in recent years. It shows the steady growth of
oiierational activity over a period of years in
response to the practical needs of the current
world social situation and indicates the begin-
nings of a new educational approach comprising
a series of educational and promotional activities
aimed at helping to deal with certain labor and
social problems. The report also suggests the
key areas of ILO program concentration today—
the manpower, productivity, and related activities
aimed at helping in the raising of living standards
in urban and rural areas; the labor and social
security measures needed to adjust to the new
1076
conditions of industrialization and to maintain
social stability in a period of rapid economic
transition; the protection and promotion of hu
man rights in the economic and social fields with
in the province of ILO; and the technical an(
educational activities needed to facilitate socia
adjustment to technological change, including au
tomation and the industrial application o
atomic energy. The report invites comments o:*
the member governments on these subjects.
Following the Director General's report, ma jo
consideration will be given to substantive agend;
items which include discrimination in the fieh
of employment and occupation, conditions anc
employment of plantation workers, organizatioi^
of occupational health services in places of em
ployment, conditions of work of fishermen, and i
general discussion on the question of hours O)!
work.
ladia ii
ECE Steel Committee
The Department of State announced on June '
(press release 306) the ajjpointment of Harry L
Jenter of Cleveland, Ohio, vice president o
operations of the American Steel and Wire Co.
as U.S. delegate to the 20th session of the Ste&
Committee of the U.N. Economic Commission
for Europe (ECE) , to be held at Geneva, Switzer
land, June 9-13, 1958.
Discussions in the coming session will primarih
concern the long-range trends and problems ii
the European steel industry and the preparatioi
of the annual steel-market review.
ECE Housing Committee
The Department of State announced on Junn
5 (press release 307) the appointment of Mortor
Bodfish, chairman of the board and president ot
the First Federal Savings and Loan Associatior
of Chicago, 111., as the U.S. delegate to the ICtl
session of the Housing Committee of the U.N
Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), whicl
will be held at Geiieva, Switzerland, June 16-20
1958.
Discussions at this session will focus on suet
matters as financing of housing, European hous-
ing trends and policies in 1957, formulation odi
house building programs, housing for the disabled
and particular questions on urbanization and towE
planning in relation to the cost of building.
Department of State Bulletin
Ceneril
Uttfr P
mi ;urrent U.N. Documents:
^7l^ L SeSected BibEiography
I'isifitli
q1 m ecurity Council
*" letter Dated 11 April lO'iS from the Representative of
Paliistan Addressed to the President of the Security
Council. S/3987, April 11, 1958. 3 pp. ininieo.
letter Dated 24 April 1958 from the Representative of
India Addressed to the President of the Security Coun-
cil. S/3994, April 24, 1958. 2 pp. miuieo.
;etter Dated 1 May 1958 from the Representative of India
Addressed to the President of the Security Council.
S/3999, May 1, 1958. 3 pp. mimeo.
jCtter Dated 2 May 1958 from the Representative of
Yemen Addressed to the Secretary-General. S/4001,
May 2, 19.58. 2 pp. mimeo.
./etter Dated 6 May 1958 from the Representative of Pak-
istan Addressed to the President of the Security Coun-
cil. S/4003, May 6, 1958. 4 pp. mimeo.
jetter dated 7 May 1958 from the Representative of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ire-
land Addressed to the Secretary-General. S/4004,
May 7, 1958. 1 p. mimeo.
jetter Dated 22 May 1958 from the Representative of
Lebanon Addressed to the President of the Security
Council. S/4007, May 23, 1958. 1 p. mimeo.
leneral Assembly
Letter Dated 3 April 19.58 Addressed to the Secretary-
General by the Permanent Representative of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics. A/3820, April 8, 1958.
3 pp. mimeo.
Communication Dated 10 April 1958 Addressed to the
Secretary-General by the Permanent Representative of
the United States of America on Behalf of His Gov-
ernment in its Capacity as the Unified Command.
A/3821, April 10, 1958. 3 pp. mimeo.
iji^'li Disarmament Commission
nsinlLetter Dated 1 May 1958 from the Representative of
Japan Addressed to the Secretary-General. DC/138,
May 1, 1958. 3 pp. mimeo.
Economic and Social Council
United Nations Programme of Technical Assistance. Re-
port by the Secretary-General. E/3081, April 4, 1958.
34 pp. mimeo.
Economic Development of Under-Developed Countries.
Report and recommendations of the Preparatory Com-
mittee for the Special Fund. E/3098, April 22, 1958,
25 pp. mimeo.
Development and Co-Ordination of the Economic, Social
and Human Rights Programmes and Activities of the
United Nations and the Specialized Agencies as a
Whole. Co-Ordination on the National Level. Report
of the Secretary-General. E/3107, May 6, 1958. 29
pp. mimeo.
Technical Assistance in Public Administration. Report
by the Secretary-General. E/3085, May 7, 1958. 16
pp. mimeo.
Twenty-Second Report of the Administrative Committee
' Printed materials may be secured in the United States
from the International Documents Service, Columbia Uni-
versity Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N.Y. Other
materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may
be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United
States.
June 23, 7958
on Co-Ordination to the Economic and Social Council.
E/3108, May 13, 1958. 11 pp. mimeo.
Human Rights. Report of the Council Committee on the
Tenth Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights. E/3125, May 19, 1958. 13 pp. mimeo.
Statistical Commission. Report to the Economic and So-
cial Council on the tenth session of the Statistical Com-
mission held in New York from 28 April to 15 May
1958. E/3126 (B/CN.3/255, May 23, 1058). 69 pp.
Trusteeship Council
Report of the United Nations Advisory Council for the
Trust Territory of Somaliland Under Italian Adminis-
tration, covering the period from 1 April 1957 to 31
March 1958. T/1372, April 22, 1958. 110 pp. mimeo.
DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE
Appointments
Horace E. Hendenson as Special Assistant to the Deputy
Under Secretary for Administration, effective June 2.
(For biographic details, see press release 299 dated June
2.)
PUBLICATIONS
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Department of State Bulletin
% une 23, 1958
]j igriculture. International Cooperation To Solve
Food and Agricultural Problems (Roberts) . .
iinerican Republics
»r. Eisenhowier Delays Trip to Central America .
^ roposed Treaty Oijens Way for International Bus
and Truck Operations on Pan American Highway
System (Kelly)
tomic Energy. U.S. To Provide Cobalt Equipment
for Hospital in Thailand
>nada. The Problem of Development of the Upi)er
Columbia River (McKay)
Ind
ex
Vol. XXXVIII, No. 991
onjiress, The
he Challenge of Change (Dulles) ■
resident Approves Payment to Denmark ....
.S. Policies and Programs in Europe (Elbrick) .
i^Jenmark. President Approves Payment to Den-
mark
department and Forei^ Service. Appointments
(Henderson)
)isarmament. The Challenge of Change (Dulles) .
Economic Affairs
:'he Challenge of Change (Dulles)
5CE Housing Committee (delegate)
GOB Steel Committee (delegate)
:'he Problem of Development of the Upper Columbia
River (McKay)
'roposed Treaty Opens Wa.y for International Bus
and Truck Operations on Pan American Highway
System (Kelly)
Europe. U.S. Policies and Programs in Europe
(Elbrick)
aifHealth, Education, and Welfare
J.S. and U.S.S.R. Exchange Notes on Medical
Cooperation
U.S. To Provide Cobalt Equipment for Hospital in
Thailand
a International Information
The Battlefield of Ideas (Berding)
Ee U.S. To Distribute Magazine in Poland ....
International Organizations and Conferences
ECB Housing Committee (delegate)
" ECE Steel Committee (delegate)
International Cooperation To Solve Food and Agri-
cultural Problems (Roberts)
President Extends Benefits to Hydrographic Bureau
J (text of Executive order)
,, 26th Meeting, Caribbean Commission (delegation) .
42d Session, International Labor Conference (dele-
gation)
Mutual Security
The Challenge of Change (Dulles)
Development Loan Funds Authorized for Projects
in Five Countries
Poland. U.S. To Distribute Magazine in Poland . .
Presidential Documents
President Approves Payment to Denmark . . .
President Extends Benefits to Hydrographic Bureau
Publications. Recent Releases
Thailand. U.S. To Provide Cobalt Equipment for
Hospital in Thailand
1066
1042
1052
1051
1062
1035
1055
1056
1077
1035
1035
1076
1076
1052
1056
1048
1051
1076
1076
1074
1074
1055
lo.^o
Treaty Information. Current .Vctions 1005
U.S.S.R.
The Battlefield of Ideas (Berding) 104.'?
The Challenge of Change (Dulles) 1035
Soviet Diplomat Declared Persona Non Grata
(text of aide memoire) 1050
U.S. and U.S.S.R. Exchange Notes on Medical
Cooperation 1048
U.S. Policies and Programs in Europe (Elbrick) . 1056
United Nations. Current U.N. Documents . . . 1077
Name Index
Berding, Andrew H 1043
Bodfish, Morton 1076
Dulles, Secretary 1035
Eisenhower, Milton 1042
Eisenhower, President 1055, 1074
Elbrick, C. Burke 1056
Henderson, Horace E 1077
.Tenter, Harry L 1076
Kelly, H. H 1052
Kurochkin. Nikolai I 10.50
McKay, Douglas 1062
Roberts, Ralph S 1060
Check List off Department of State
Press Releases: June 2-8
Press releases m:iy be obtained from the News
Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.
Releases issued prior to June 2 which appear in
this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 278 of May 20,
21)0 of May 27, 294 of May 28, and 297 of May 29.
No. Date Subject
t2!)8 6/2 Itinerary for visit of Prime Minister
Nkrumah (rewrite).
*290 6/2 Horace E. Henderson appointed special
assistant (biographic details).
.'500 6/2 Exchange of notes with Poland on
Polish-language magazine.
ICA cholera program for Thailand.
Elbrick : policies and programs in
Europe.
Cobalt equipment for Bangkok hospital.
Foreign Relations volume.
Milton Eisenhower trip delayed.
Jenter named delegate to ECE Steel
Committee ( rewrite ) .
307 6/5 Bodfish named delegate to ECE Hous-
ing Committee (rewrite).
1308 6/5 Increase in nonimmigrant visas.
30« 6/6 Dulles: "The Challenge of Change."
*310 6/6 NATO parliamentarians visit U.S.
*311 6/6 Itinerary for President Heuss.
*312 6/6 Educational exchange.
*313 6/6 Educational exchange.
314 6/7 Soviet third secretary declared persona
non grata.
*301
302
303
t304
305
6/2
6/3
6/4
6/4
6/4
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8. P. U ^^
Vol. XXXVIII, No. 992 ^^^fff^O, 1958
PRESIDENT PROPOSES JULY 1 STARTING DATE
FOR TALKS AT GENEVA BETWEEN WESTERN
AND SOVIET TECHNICAL EXPERTS • Exchange
of Correspondence Between President Eisenhower and
Premier Khrushchev 1^83
SECRETARY DULLES' NEWS CONFERENCE OF
JUNE 10 1085
VISIT OF THEODOR HEUSS, PRESIDENT OF THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 1099
THE VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO SOUTH AMERICA
IN PERSPECTIVE • Statement by Assistant
Secretary Rubottom 11"*
AFRICA'S CHALLENGE TO THE FREE WORLD •
by Julius C. Holmes 1^92
U.N. CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA •
Statement by Arthur H. Dean HI**
Texts of Conventions, Protocol, and Resolutions HH
For index see inside back cover
I
Vol. XXXVIII, No. 992 • Pubucation 6662
June 30, 1958
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President Proposes July 1 Starting Date for Talks at Geneva
Between Western and Soviet Technical Experts
Folloioing is an exchange of correspondence he-
tween President Eisenhower and Nikita Khrush-
chev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
THE PRESIDENT TO PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV
White House press release dated June 10
June 10, 1958
Dear Mk. Chairman : I have your letter of May
30 and am glad to note you have accepted my ijro-
posal that technical experts meet to study the pos-
sibility of detecting violations of a possible agree-
ment on suspension of nuclear tests. These talks
would be undertaken without commitment as to
the final decision on the relationship of nuclear
test suspension to other more important disarma-
ment measures I have proposed.
I propose that these discussions begin on or
about July 1 in Geneva. "Wliile we appreciate
your offer to hold these tallis in Moscow, we be-
lieve that Geneva would be preferable from our
standpoint, and note that it would be acceptable
to you. The Swiss Government has agreed to
this location.
With respect to participation I suggest that ini-
tially at least we adhere to the concept expressed
in your letter of May 9, 1958, ^ where you say,
"the Soviet Government agrees to having both
sides designate experts." As indicated in my let-
ter of May 24, 1958, ^ our side at this discussion
will include experts from the United States,
United Kingdom, France and possibly from other
countries which have specialists with a thorough
knowledge in the field of detecting nuclear tests,
and we note that you have no objection to this.
With regard to the inclusion on your side of ex-
P.iLi.ETiN of June 9, 1958, p. S
' lUd., p. 939.
perts from Czechoslovakia and Poland, we have
no objection to this. With respect to experts of
nationalities not identified with either side, we
have no objection in principle to their joining later
in the discussions if it is agreed during the course
of the talks that this is necessary or useful from
the point of view of the purposes of the technical
talks.
It may be possible for the experts to produce a
final report witliin three or four weeks as you
suggest. However, I believe that there should be
enough flexibility in our arrangements to allow
a little longer time if it is needed to resolve the
complex technical issues involved.
I propose that further arrangements for the
meeting be handled through normal diplomatic
channels.
Sincerely,
DwiGHT D. Eisenhower
PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV TO THE PRESIDENT
Official translation
Dear Mb. President : I have received your message
dated May 24 in reply to my letter of May 9.
As in your preceding messages, I have, unfortunately,
found no answer to such an urgent problem as that of
immediate cessation of atomic and hydrogen weapons
tests, which was the subject of my previous messages to
you. There is no need to speak once again of the fact
that, under present conditions, with no agreement among
states possessing nuclear weapons as to the basic ques-
tion— the necessity to cease without delay the testing of
atomic and hydrogen bombs— a study by technical ex-
perts of the methods of detection of possible violations of
an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests may lead
to a delay in the solution of the main problem, namely,
that of a cessation of tests. This is a matter of serious
concern to us. At this time, therefore, when we are
agreeing on convening a meeting of experts, it would be
necessary to take steps toward having the work of the
experts completed at the earliest possible date, to be
established in advance.
June 30, 1958
1083
We agree to your proposal that the exijerts should
undertake their task within the next three weeks with a
view to beginning the work as soon as possible.
In your reply you also express yourself in favor of in-
structing the experts to prepare a report on the first re-
sults of their work within 30 days, or as soon as possible
after the expiration of that period.
The Soviet Government considers that in the interests
of the earliest possible universal cessation of nuclear
weapons tests it would be advisable to agree that the
entire work of the experts be concluded within three or
four weeks after the date of the beginning of the work
of the conference and that within this period a final
report of the experts, with their conclusions and findings,
be submitted to the governments of those states whose
experts take part in the conference.
Furthermore, you state that experts not only from the
USSR and the USA might be designated but also from
Great Britain and France and, possibly, from other
countries which have specialists with a thorough knowl-
edge in the field of detecting nuclear tests. The Soviet
Government has no objection to this, and it proposes that
experts from Czechoslovakia and Poland likewise take
part in the work of the conference.
Nor does the Soviet Government consider that the work
of the experts should be confined to this group of coun-
tries. Therefore it seems advisable to invite experts
from India also, and possibly from certain other coun-
tries, to participate in the conference.
As to the site of the conference of experts, we do, of
course, share the opinion that Geneva is a suitable place.
However, we would prefer that this conference be held
In Moscow. I can assure you, Mr. President, that all
the facilities necessary for the experts to conduct their
work will be provided in Moscow. The Soviet Govern-
ment agrees to the proposal that the Security Council,
as well as the UN General Assembly, be kept informed
through the Secretary General as to the progress of the
work of the conference of experts.
I hope, Mr. President, that the considerations I have
presented will meet with a favorable attitude on your
part.
Upon receiving a reply from you, the Soviet Govern-
ment will communicate the list of experts from the
Soviet Union who will participate in the said conference.
With sincere respect,
N. Kheushchev
May 30, 1958
[Initialed:] M. M.
His Excellency
DWIGHT D. ElSENHOWEE,
President of the United States of America,
Washington, D.C.
National Orympic Week, 1958
A PROCLAMATION'
Wheeeas the XVIIth Olympic Games of the modern
era will be held in Rome, Italy, beginning August 25 and
ending September 11, 1960; the Winter Games will be
held at Squaw Valley, California, from February 19 to
March 1, 1960 ; and the Pan American Games will be held
in Chicago, Illinois, from August 27 to September 7,
1959; and
Wheeeas in these games men and women of more than
seventy nations, and of many races, creeds, and cultural
backgrounds, will be brought together to match their
athletic abilities against one another under established
rules of sportsmanship which offer an equal opportunity
for all ; and
Whereas the Olympic and the Pan American Games of
past years have contributed In a unique way to greater
understanding and mutual respect among the peoples of
the world ; and
Wheeeas the United States Olympic Association is
presently engaged in obtaining maximum support for
the teams representing the United States at these three
athletic events ; and
Wheeeas the Congress by a joint resolution approved
June 4, 1958, has authorized and requested the President
of the United States to issue a proclamation designating
the week beginning October 13, 1958, as National Olympic
Week:
Now, THEEEFOEE, I, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, Presi-
dent of the United States of America, do hereby designate
the week beginning October 13, 1958, as National Olympic
Week ; and I urge all our citizens to give their full sup-
port to the XVIIth Olympic Games, to the Olympic Win-
ter Games of 1960, and to the Pan American Games of
1959 so that the United States will be fully and adequately
represented in these games.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and
caused the Seal of the United States of America to be
affixed.
Done at the City of Washington this 4th day of June
in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and
[seal] fifty-eight, and of the Independence of the United
States of America the one hundred and eighty-
second.
By the President:
John Foster Dulles,
Secretary of State.
No. 3244 ; 23 Fed. Reg. 4025.
1084
Departmenf of Sfafe Bullelin
Secretary Dulles' News Conference of June 10
Press release 319 dated June 10
Secretary Dulles: Any questions?
Q. Mr. Secretary, do you expect that the tech-
nical talks on atomic test suspension, which pre-
sumahly will hegin about July 1,^ at the nearest,
will foreshadow political agreement to suspend
tests?
A. I don't think that it is possible to answer
that question definitively at this stage. Ob-
viously they will have a bearing upon it. If
there is a great gap between what our technicians
say is necessary and what the Soviet technicians
say is necessary, that would almost automatically
exclude any agi-eement. On the other hand, if
we do come to an understanding, it will facilitate
an agreement to suspend testing, altliough I would
anticipate that any agreement to suspend testing,
if made, would not be an isolated agreement but
be a part of other arrangements and anticipate
that there would be progress made in other fields.
Q. Mr. Secretary, will there ie any political ad-
visers sitting with our scientific advisers? Do
you expect that the Soviet Union might want po-
litical advisers sitting with them?
A. I suspect that there will be some political
guidance given at least to the Soviet experts. Our
experts may or may not need such advice, de-
pending upon developments. Our guidance to
the United States experts, at least — I talked to
them a few days ago and told them to look upon
their job as a purely technical scientific job.
They are to come to their own conclusions as to
what is necessary to detect an explosion. Per-
haps, in the light of the Soviet proposal, they
may have to report on the evaluation of a lesser
than complete detection system — bearing on the
likelihood that there would be an evasion at-
tempted. For example, it may be they would
' See p. 1083.
iune 30, 7958
say this system isn't 100 percent perfect but it
is good enough that we would think there would
be a 75 percent chance that any evasion would be
caught. They may have to make calculations of
that sort. But we have given them complete au-
thority to work on this matter as a purely scien-
tific technical matter, to use their best judgment
and report to us accordingly. I do not antici-
pate that there will be any need for political guid-
ance. If that need arises, perhaps as a result of
proposals that might be made from the Soviet
side, then we would have to be in a position to
respond.
Q. I have in mind these talks would have to
involve geography, wouldn't they, and wouldn't
that enter into a political area?
A. I would suppose that we would want to
have — that the experts would feel we needed to
have — inspection posts with some mobility not
only in the Soviet Union but also on the main-
land of China and other areas of that sort. We
would not want to have a situation where the So-
viets merely move their testing into a neighbor-
ing territory and then it was beyond control or
clieck. So I think that, after the experts decide
wliere it is necessary to have these posts, then
there will have to be a political problem dealt
with. I would suppose, for example, they may
decide it necessary to have one in Australia and
perhaps some place in the Pacific islands, perhaps
in Communist China, perhaps in the Sahara
Desert. I don't know what their recommenda-
tions will be, but I anticipate there will be recom-
mendations made for checking sites in a number
of countries in the world that would then raise
afterward the political problem: How do you
work it out?
Q. Mr. Secretary, you just said they talked
about the possibility of putting inspection posts
in Communist China and we would probably
1085
have to have some sort of political agreement with
them on the stationing of insfectoi^s in Commu-
nist China.
Some time ago in another press conference you
said you thought you did not believe Russia would
ever entrust Communist China with any hind of
atomic testing data or testing program and, there-
fore, you did not anticipate there would ever he
a need for an agreement with Communist China
on a testing program run hy the Soviet Union.
A. Your memory of what I said is a lot better
than mine. I don't remember having said all
those things. I do think I said that I did not
believe that it was likely that the Soviets would
turn over their nuclear knowledge to the Commu-
nist Chinese or to any of the Eastern European
satellites.^ I don't think I ever said that I ex-
cluded the possibility that the Soviets might them-
selves conduct tests on Chinese Communist
territoiy.
Latin American Policy
Q. Mr. Secretary, in discussing Latin American
policy at the last press conference ^ you said: '■'■It
is obvious the American Government and the
American nation and the American people like to
see governments xohich rest upon the consent of
the governed and where the governed are educated
people able to carry the responsibilities of self-
government." Would you tell us hoto this per-
haps is made obvious in terms of our policy to-
ward those countries or in terins of our informa-
tion program?
A. I think I said that where those conditions
exist there is almost automatically a better i-e-
sponse than where those conditions do not exist.
And I was speaking in terms not merely of gov-
ernment but of private relations, travel, and the
like. I did not advocate — in fact, I think I said
we did not want to have — a slide rule whereby we
try to measure the degree of popular government
that exists in various countries, the degree of edu-
cation in various countries. But where those con-
ditions exist, there is an almost automatic spon-
taneous response.
Q. Mr. Secretary, I would like to follow it up
with the statement made today by former Presi-
' Bulletin of July 22, 1957, p. 141.
' lUa., June 9, 1958, p. 944.
1086
dent Figueres of Costa Rica that the United'*^
States seems to be ashamed to piiblicize abroad the
democracy practiced at hoine, and he suggested we
would win the Latin American people more easily
if our policies would clarify our way of life in
Latin America more clearly. Do you have any
comment?
A. I am not aware of any sense of being
ashamed of our democratic processes. On the con-
trary, I think those are the things we are ex-
tremely proud of. Now, if there is any failure
to make that apparent in Latin America, then I
think we ought to correct it. Perhaps there is
more that we can do along those lines. I would r'"'
not take any great exception to that thought, as
you quote it to me.
iff
lilteec
lilt pi
Talks With Prime Minister Macmillan
Q. Mr. Secretary, what can you tell us about the
talks with Mr. Macmillan?
A. The talks so far, I might say, if it does not
involve disrespect, have been of a rambling char-
acter. Now this afternoon we exjDect to have talks
here at the State Department which may be a little
more pointed up in terms of the economic and
financial problems of the world. I hope that Sec-
retary of the Treasury [Kobert B.] Anderson and
Mr. [Douglas] Dillon [Deputy Under Secretary
of State for Economic Affairs] will be present at
those talks. You may recall that that was a point
which the Prime Minister emphasized in his speech
at DePauw University ; it was a point to which I
directed particular attention in the statement
which I made before the Senate Foreign Kelations
Committee last Friday.^ I think we both said, in
effect, that we recognized that the area was one
of great importance; that it was necessary to
take, as I put it, new initiatives in this field, but
we were not quite clear as to just what to do. I
think the Prime Minister said that there was a
task primarily for experts, but that the statesmen,
the heads of government, could give impetus to the
experts.
Now a large part of the world's trade is done
in terms of dollars and sterling, and I think
that it is an area where there can be useful ex-
changes of views between the Government of the
United Kingdom and the Government of the
,Dill(
'Hid., June 23, 1958, p. 1035.
Department of State Bulletin
rid nited States. Aiid I hope this afternoon
ill be able to break some new ground, not in
jrms of any decisions but in terms of exchanges
f views as to how to enlarge international trade,
) stimulate increasingly the flow of investment to
lie less developed countries of the world, and, in
eneral, how to improve the economic health of the
ree nations. I would say that would probably
e our principal topic of discussion this afternoon.
Q. In that connection, Mr. Secretary, ^vhat oi-
iliii^ ection, if any, would you have to Adlai Steven-
on's specific suggestion about calling a committee
/ experts to raohilize the economic and financial
wlicies of the non- Communist world?
A. Well, all I can say is that setting up a com-
nittee of experts is, of course, a device for dealing
,vith problems which goes back for a long, long
;ime, and, certainly, we do not exclude that well-
Tied method of solving problems by setting up a
committee to solve them.
I don't know what will come out of the talks
this afternoon or of talks that may be had with
the OEEC [Organization for European Economic
Cooperation] and the World Bank and the Mone-
tary Fund — all those that are interested in this
problem. It isn't a problem that any one country
or any two countries can solve, but I think it is
possible to stimulate some new initiatives in this
field. Certainly, as the Prime Minister said last
Sunday, it is a field where expert advice is going
to be required.
Question of Expansion of IMF Resources
Q. Mr. Secretary, 2 xoeehs ago in New York Mr.
Dillon suggested that it might he a good idea to
expand the resources of the International Mone-
tary Fundi' Has the adtninistration under serious
consideration advocating an expansion of those
resources?
A. We believe that the time is approaching
when it will be important to consider whether the
resources of both the so-called World Bank and
the Monetary Fund should be increased. They
have been in business for some considerable time
now with their initial capital funds. These are
'Ibid., June 9, 1958, p. 968. For a statement by Mr.
Dillon on Mar. 19 before the Subcommittee on Interna-
tional Affairs of the Senate Committee on Banking and
Currency, see ibid., Apr. 7, 1958, p. 564.
June 30, 7958
pretty well committed, and in the normal course
of events the time would come when consideration
should be given to increasing them. We do not
have in mind any measures which would call for
any action, for example, by the present Congress
with respect to this matter. But, between now
and the end of the year, I think that these prob-
lems should be studied.
Q. Are you considering also a secondary World
Bank which would make low-interest, long-term
loans available in local currencies, sii^h as sug-
gested by Mr. [Eugene i?.] Black [president, In-
ternational Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment^ ?
A. Well, I think we would certainly consider
any proposals from a responsible source to deal
with this problem, and, certainly, Mr. Black is a
responsible source. There are all kinds of varia-
tions. There is the problem of the use of local
funds that are obtained through P. L. 480 exports
and matters of that sort. It is a very complicated
field, and there are many possibilities not yet fully
developed which ought to be studied.
Q. Mr. Secretary, is the United States prepared
to deal with East Ger)nany in trying to procure
the release of the nine Army men and the helicop-
ter forced down in Communist Germany?
A. The normal procedure which heretofore has
been followed, and followed successfully I think
on both sides, has been that in the case of
military people we deal through the military
authorities of the occupying powers. But, when
it comes to getting Americans out of a country,
we don't stand on ceremony; we deal with any
people to get them out. I may say that that does
not involve any recognition. We have been get-
ting Americans out of Communist China, not with
the completeness or rapidity that we had hoped,
but we have been getting them out through deal-
ing with the Chinese Communists. There was a
report today that I just saw as I came down here
that two moi'e have been released. I hope that's
true. When you have people kidnaped, you deal
with the kidnapers. If tlie authorities don't want
to deal with this matter through the established
channels which have been operating for the past
12 years, we will deal with them in whatever ways
necessary, but with the clear understanding that
we deal with a practical situation and that it does
not carry any implication at all of recognition.
1087
The Disarmament "Package"
Q. Mr. Secretary/, in reply to the first question
you said that any agreement to suspend nuclear
tests should be part of other arrangements that
would anticipate agreements in other fields.
Could you expand on that a hit?
A. Yes. We believe that suspension of testing,
in isolation, is a very inadequate measure. It does
not involve any disannament, or limitation of
armament, whatsoever. To call it a "disarma-
ment" measure is a misnomer. All it means is
that the arsenal of nuclear weapons that you have
is accumulating without any exact knowledge as
to what the consequences of their use would be.
Now we believe that it is extremely important
to make progress in terms of getting inspection
against surprise attack. We think it Is extremely
important to have a cutoff of fissionable material
for weapons purposes. We think it is important
also that there be some reductions in the way of
conventional weapons, particularly of a kind and
type that are readily identifiable.
We are not satisfied at all just to do sometliing
which has no implications whatever in the field
of limitation of armament and to act as tliough
tliat was a great accomplishment. We don't think
that it would be. And I think it is very unlikely
that we would do that without any prospect of
progress or any agreement on the part of the
Soviets to attempt progress in these other fields
which are far more vital.
Q. Mr. Secretary, you told the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee last Friday that there toas
active consideration being given to detaching the
idea of a nuclear-testing ban from the rest of our
disarmament package. You give the impression
now that it will not be detached from the package
and that you will insist that it be accompanied
by other measures on disarmament. Is that cor-
rect?
A. There are two ways of handling this, and
perhaps a certain confusion has arisen because of
my failure not to make it clear. Tliere are what
you might call "conditions precedent" and "con-
ditions subsequent." Now, in the package pro-
posal that we put up in London last August,^
they were tied together in the sense that they were
^^^ *^Q get started at the same time and all be
° Ibid., Sept. 16, 1957, p. 451.
agreed upon at the same tune. The separation
that is under consideration is in terms of not
necessarily insistmg that they should all be agreed
to and get started at the same time but that wei
would start perhaps at different times but withi
the understanding that there would be a freedomi
of action restored if progress was not made inj
some of these other fields.
German Unification
Q. Mr. Secretary, in the last issue of Newsweek:
it said tliat you told associates, "/ seem to be-
much stronger for unification than he is''— mean-
ing Adenauer. I was tvondering \ohether you can
confirm that.
A. I do not think that I am stronger for German
unification than Chancellor Adenauer is. I think
that there is a slight difference in our respective
positions. I can see that, quite understandably,
the Government of the Federal Eepublic does not
want to seem to be in a position of blocking dis-
ai-mament by saying that, unless there is first a
reunification of Germany, nothing can be done
in any field. None of us want to take that posi-
tion.
On the other hand, the United States is a country
which was at the last summit conference, as the
Federal Republic was not. We are a party, as the
Federal Eepublic was not, to certain agreements
at that time with the Soviet delegation. We feel,
quite independently of any other considerations,
that integrity in dealing with the Soviets and the
ability to deal with them in other respects would
be put in question if we go back again to the sum-
mit meeting and say, "Well, now, the first thing
we do, Mr. Khrushchev, is to wipe off the books
the last things we agreed to." Now that goes not
just to the question of the reunification of Ger-
many. That goes to the question of the integrity
of our agreements. It just happens that those
agreements related to the remiification of Ger-
many. But we have a certain position to claim
that the agreements of the last summit conference,
whatever they were, should not be wiped off the
books as we start, if we should start, a second sum-
mit conference.
Now, you see, that is something which is a little
apart from the particular merits of the reimifi-
cation of Germany. It goes to the question of
whether or not agreements made at the last sum-
Department of State Bulletin
mit conference, whatever they are about, should
still be a topic for discussion or whether we are
willing to see them wiped off. We are not will-
ing to do that.
Q. Mr. Secretary, for the fast few years Ad-
miral [Lewis Z.] Strauss has served as the prin-
cipal adviser to the President in the field of atomic
energy that related to atoms. Now that he is re-
signing that part of his job, could you tell us who
will serve as the principal adviser to the President
in that 1
A. Since you have mentioned the resignation
of Admiral Strauss, I would like to take the occa-
sion to pay a very high tribute to Admiral
Strauss. I think he has made an immense con-
tribution of great ability, great patriotism, and
very considerable sacrifice. I'm very sorry that
he is leaving the Government — at least leaving
in this capacity. I hope he will continue to be
available in some other capacities and carry for-
ward the thinking, in terms of atoms for peace,
to which he is so dedicated.
Now, as to the question you put as to who will
take his place, I assume that role will be taken by
his successor when he is named by the President.
Credits to Raw-Material-Producing Countries
Q. Mr. Secretary, the Foreign Minister of Co-
lombia is scheduled to arrive here Thursday
[June 12] to sign a $103-million loan. The loan
was very rapidly negotiated, and I wonder if you
could tell us whether that reflects some sense of
urgency on our part to help the raw -materials -
producing countries? Would you care to com-
ment on the negotiations in general?
A. We are tiying to help the raw-material-
producing countries both by extending credits in
appropriate cases and by trying to deal with the
problem on a somewhat more fundamental basis.
These economic troubles that confront us are, in
a sense, a tragedy of errors. In part the errors
are due to the unwitting mistakes of the produc-
ing countries themselves who, acting without ade-
quate knowledge, often go in for overproduction.
Now, you take the coffee situation. I don't
think there has been any appreciable reduction in
the amount of coffee that is being drunk by the
American people. The trouble is not that there
is a fall in consumption, but there has been over-
June 30, 1958
production largely because the producing coun-
tries have not had the statistics or the figures to
know what they were doing. And we in the past
have followed a policy of detaching ourselves
from that phase of the problem. But we are
hoping now, expecting now, to get into that phase
of the problem and to help in consultations and
discussions which will tend more to keep produc-
tion in line with consumption. And there are
similar talks that are envisaged in relation to lead
and zinc and other matters. So both in terms of
extending credits to the raw-material-producing
countries and also with respect to bringing this
problem witliin the scope of reason, we are trying
to tackle it.
Arab Nationalism
Q. Mr. Secretary, in the past you referred to
Arab nationalism in the Middle East, sir, as a
healthy development for the unity among the
Arab nations that could lead toward stability in
that area. Do you think the present aspect of
United Arab Republic nationalism as it relates
to the present troubles in Lebanon falls in this
kind of category?
A. I am afraid I must answer that question in
the negative. There is iri'ef utable evidence of the
intervention through radio and press — govern-
ment-controlled radio — in the internal affairs of
Lebanon and inciting of the people to violence.
Also there is increasingly coming in evidence that
that violence is abetted by the actual supply of
military equipment and ammunition.
Q. Mr. Secretary, on the question of world
trade again, could you relate for us the effect of
the Khrushchev letter asking for American trad-
ers to expand trading with the United States on
this whole question of new initiative in world
trade?
A. The Soviet Union, according to Chairman
Ivlirushchev, has, as he put it, declared economic
warfare on us. And that warfare is largely being
pursued by means of credit which the Soviet
Union is extending to countries to enable them to
buy Soviet goods. And now it looks as though
the Soviet Union wanted to get credit from us so
that it could more successfully pui-sue its eco-
nomic warfare against us.
1089
Q. Mr. Secretary, what consideration, if any,
has been given to inviting General de Gaulle to
come here?
A. It is an instinctive and natural desire on the
part of President Eisenliower to want to talk
again at some convenient time and place with
General de Gaulle, whom he knew in a very
friendly way during the past. It is, I think, quit«
apparent that General de Gaulle is, for the tune
being, rather preoccupied with internal prob-
lems. That means that the question of such a
meeting has not come up for any specific consid-
eration at the present time.
Inspection Posts in Communist China
Q. Mr. Secretary, we have said that we would
like inspection on the test suspension or on other
measures of disarTnament to he under the author-
ity of the United Nations, if possible. Do you
think Communist China toould agree to the estab-
lishment of inspection posts on its territory while
it is not a member of the United Nations?
A. We don't insist that it should be the United
Nations that exercises these controls. There are
other ways of having controls. I don't know
what the attitude of Communist China will be to
having control posts on its territory. It doesn't
seem to want to have outsiders in its territory. It
pretended it wanted American correspondents
there, as long as they thought we wouldn't give
them a passport. As soon as we gave them a pass-
port, they said "No." So I don't know wliat atti-
tude they will take on this matter.
Q. Mr. Secretary, you would expect, in view of
the requirement you see that at some point there
would have to he negotiations involving Red
China, would you not?
A. I think that, as far as I can see from the
initial reports to me of our experts, an adequate
system to supervise a suspension-of-testing agree-
ment would have to cover the possibility of testing
being conducted by the Soviet Union within Com-
munist China. Now, just how we deal with that,
I don't know. But the initial experts' report indi-
cates that, just as there would have to be testing
posts in the Pacific and probably in Australia and
in Africa and so forth, so there might have also
to be some in Communist China.
Q. Thank you, sir.
U.S. and Brazilian Presidents
Reaffirm Inter-American Solidarity
Following is an exchange of correspondence be-
tween President Eisenhoxoer and Juscelino Kubi-
tschek. President of the United States of
President Eisenhower to President Kubitschek
White House press release dated June 10
Juke 5, 1958
Dear JVIk. President : This morning your Am-
bassador delivered to me the letter you wrote
imder date of May twenty-eighth. I found it
intensely interesting.
To my mind you have described accurately both
the existing situation and the desirability of
corrective action. I am delighted, therefore, that
you have taken the initiative in this matter.
Wliile Your Excellency did not suggest any
specific program to improve Pan American under-
standing, it seems to me that our two Govern-
ments should consult together as soon as possible'
with a view to approaching other members of the
Pan American community, and starting promptly
on measures that would produce throughout the
continent a reaffirmation of devotion to Pan
Americanism, and better planning in promoting
the common interests and welfare of our several
countries. There is a wide range of subjects to
be discussed and explored, including, for example,
the problem of implementing more fully the Dec-
laration of Solidarity of the Tenth Inter-Ameri-
can Conference held at Caracas in 1954.^
Because I deem this matter so important, I am
instructing Mr. Roy Richard Rubottom, Jr., As-
sistant Secretary of State for Inter-American
Affairs, to deliver my letter to you personally in
Rio de Janeiro, to explore with you further your
thinking on these matters. Your thoughts and
ideas thus obtained at first hand can be the subject
of further consultation through normal diplo-
matic channels, preparatory to a later visit to
Brazil by the Secretaiy of State. With your
concurrence, Mr. Rubottom will make final ar-
rangement witli your Government for the timing
of Secretary Dulles' visit.
With assurance of my highest consideration, and
' For text, see Bulletin of Apr. 26, 1954, p. 638.
Department of State Bulletin
YonrE
ttmaii.
with best wishes for the continued well-being of
Your Excellency and of the Brazilian people, I
remain,
Sincerely,
DwiGiiT D. Eisenhower
His Excellency
Dr. Juscelino Ktjbitschek de Oliveira,
President of the United States of Brazil.
President Kubitschek to President Eisenhower
White House press release dated June 6
Mat 28, 1958
Mr. President: I want to convey to Your Ex-
cellency, on behalf of the Brazilian people as well
as for myself, an expression of sentiments of soli-
darity and esteem, the affirmation of which is be-
come necessary in view of the aggressions and
vexations undergone by Vice President Nixon
during his recent visit to countries in Latin
America.^
The widespread reaction of aversion on the part
of the governments and of public opinion in the
very nations in which occurred those reprovable
acts against the serene and courageous person of
the Vice President, constitutes proof that such
demonstrations proceeded from a factious
minority.
Nonetheless, it would be hardly feasible to con-
ceal the fact that, before world public opinion,
the ideal of Pan American unity has suffered seri-
ous impairment. Those disagreeable events,
which we deplore so much, have nevertheless im-
parted an inescapable impression that we mis-
understand each other on this Continent. The
propaganda disseminated by the tools of anti-
Americanism is apparently now directed toward
presenting such supposed misunderstandings as
actual incompatibility and even enmity between
the free countries of the American community.
Fortunately, this is far from being the truth.
It appears to me, Mr. President, that it would
be utterly inconvenient and unfair to allow this
false impression to prevail, morally weakening the
cause of democracy, to the defense of which we
are pledged.
In addressing these words to Your Excellency,
my sole purpose is to acquaint you with my deep-
seated conviction that something must be done to
restore composure to the continental unity. I
^ For backgi-ound, see Bulletin of June 9, 1958, p. 950.
June 30, 1958
have no definite and detailed plans to that effect,
but rather ideas and thoughts which I could con-
fide to Your Excellency should an early oppor-
tunity to do so arise.
I might venture at this juncture, however, that
the hour has come for us to luidertake jointly a
thorough review of the policy of mutual under-
standing on this Hemisphere and to conduct a
compreliensive reappraisal of the proceedings al-
i-eady in motion for the furtherance of Pan
American ideals in all their aspects and implica-
tions. The time has come for us to ask ourselves
the pertinent question as to whether or not all of
us are doing our utmost to weld the indestructible
union of sentiments, aspirations and interests
called for by the graveness of the world situation.
As a soldier who led democracy to victory, as
an experienced statesman and, above all as a man
sensitive to the ways of truth. Your Excellency is
in an unique position to evaluate the seriousness
of the question which I postulate with the ex-
clusive purpose of defining and subsequently
eliminating an entire range of misunderstandings
tliat are easily capable of being removed at this
moment but which may perhaps suffer a malig-
nant growth should we fail to give it proper and
timely attention.
It is hoped that the unpleasant memory of the
ordeal undergone by Vice President Nixon will be
effaced by the results of earnest efforts towards
creating something deeper and more durable for
the defense and preservation of our common
destiny.
As I have already said to Your Excellency, it
is advisable that we correct the false impression
that we are not behaving in a fraternal way in the
Americas; but besides tliis corrective effort, and
in order that it be durable and perfect, we must
search our consciences to find out if we are follow-
ing the right path in regard to Pan Americanism.
It is my earnest hope that Your Excellency will
feel that this letter was written under the impulse
of a desire to reaffirm the warm and sincere fra-
ternal sentiments which have always bound my
Countiy to the United States of America, in per-
fect attunement with tlie ideas outlined by Your
Excellency on the occasion of the meeting of the
Chief Executives of the American nations in
Panama.
May God guard Your Excellency and the
people of the United States of America.
Juscelino KuBrrscHEK
1091
Africa's Challenge to the Free World
hy Julius C. Holmes
Special Assistant to the Secretary ■
I am very happy to have this opportunity to
visit New Oi-leans and to speak on a subject
which is daily gaining greater importance,
"Africa's Challenge to the Free World."
I propose to concentrate on Middle Africa —
that area which lies south of the Sahara and
north of the Union of South Africa — but shall
take into consideration certain problems and
issues that apply to the continent as a whole. I
shall survey major elements of the political, eco-
nomic, and social challenge of Africa to the free
world and outline how the free world, and in
particular the United States, is reacting to these
challenges.
The Political Evolution of Africa
From an intensive study tour of Africa which
I made last fall I came away with one major
conclusion; namely, that the most dynamic force
currently at work on the continent is nationalism
and the trend toward self-government and inde-
pendence. The free world is challenged to ac-
commodate itself to this force in such a manner as
to insure continuing fruitful African cooperation
in the mutual interest.
The political evolution of Africa is develop-
ing mievenly and progressing at widely varying
tempos in different areas. Many areas are ad-
vanced or at least advancing ; othei-s, on the other
hand, are just awakening to the urge for self-asser-
tion. The metropolitan powers still responsible
for most of the sub-Sahara region follow varying
either sel
ffbichJS:
cjl stabiJ
thenissl^'
ceiitiii!'
TteT
fteh tl
Freni
made before the Foreign Policy Association
of New Orleans at New Orleans, La., on May 29 (press
release 292 dated May 28).
policies based on differing philosophies. As a
i-esult there is neither uniformity nor simplicity in
the African nationalist movement.
To gaiii perspective we must recognize that
current African nationalism is a part of a great
postwar development, worldwide in scope, that
began in Asia, swept across the Middle East and
North Africa, and is now a major force through
the rest of the continent. Of the 20 new nations
created — or in some cases re-created — since World
War II, 5 are in Africa. These are Morocco,
Tunisia, Libya, the Sudan, and Ghana. At this
point, too, it should be recalled that Liberia, the
continent's first republic, will be celebrating its
111th independence day this July and tJiat Ethi-
opia can trace its independence back to early
Biblical days. African nationalism, therefore, is
both old and new.
The pan-African conference held at Accra
from April 15 to 22 on invitation of Prime Min-
ister Nkrumah made clear that a major objective
of the eight independent states of Africa which
participated is to end the colonial system in the
area as rapidly as possible and to strengthen and
safeguard their own independence and territorial
integrity.
What then is the status of the more than 30
African territories that have not yet achieved
their independence? Is their development meet-
ing the political requirements of their peoples ?
Let us answer these questions by reviewing
some case examples.
An important and constructive force in the
current African trend toward self-government is
the United Nations. The purpose of the trustee-
ship system is to promote the orderly develop-
ment of these six African trust territories toward
Department of Sfofe Bulletin
I'ithor self-government or independence on a basis
^\ hich assures that they will have sufficient politi-
cal stability and economic viability to maintain
themselves under the difficult conditions of this
century.
The United Nations provides a forum through
which the peoples of the trust territories of
French Togo, British and French Cameroons,
Ruanda-Urundi, Tanganyika, and Somalia can be
heard and their wishes taken into account.
Under this system provision is also made for
periodic visiting missions to the territories under
trusteeship and also for hearing petitioners in
person at sessions of the General Assembly and
the Trusteeship Council.
Although we speak of six U.N. trust territories
in Africa, it is well to recall that there were seven,
the seventh, British Togo, having joined the
newly independent nation of Ghana early in 1957
in accordance with the will of the Togoland pop-
ulation expressed in a popular plebiscite con-
ducted imder U.N. supervision.
The Trust Territory of Somaliland under
Italian Administration is scheduled to become an
independent state in 1960 in accordance with the
trusteeship agreement entered into by the General
Assembly and Italy in 1950. Elections are sched-
uled to be held there this fall for a new legisla-
tive assembly which will be charged with
preparing the constitution for the new state. Al-
though the territoiy has two basic unsolved prob-
lems— that of a large budgetary deficit and a
disputed border with Ethiopia— there is no reason
to question that the orderly transition of this
country to full independence will be achieved as
anticipated. The disputed border problem has
been submitted to arbitration,^ and the Trustee-
ship Coimcil has been concerned with exploring
the possibilities of providing economic assistance
when independence is achieved.
As a result of a General Assembly resolution
passed in November 1957, the French Trust Ter-
ritory of Togo last month held elections to an
enlarged legislative assembly on the basis of imi-
versal suffrage. These elections resulted in vic-
tory for the former opposition parties, which
generally appear to favor independence, although
the present position of these groups, now that
'For a C.S. statement and text of a U.N. resolution,
see Bulletin of Jan. 27, 1958, p. 150.
they are in power, remains to be defined. The
territory, under its new Prime Minister, Sylvanus
Olympio, may soon be in a position to request the
United Nations to terminate the trusteeship
agreement.
Similarly, two other West African trust terri-
tories— the British Cameroons and French Cam-
eroun — are approaching achievement of the final
objectives of the trusteeship system. Within the
next few years it is expected that the future status
of these two territories will be determined on the
basis of the freely expressed wishes of the in-
habitants in close consultation with or under su-
pervision of the United Nations. This autumn a
U.N. visiting mission, including a U.S. member,
will tour the territories for the purjiose of pre-
paring recommendations to the Trusteeship
Council.
The British East African Trust Territory of
Tanganyika — largest and most populous of all
African trust territories — will hold its first na-
tional elections in 1958 and 1959 for a new, en-
larged legislative council. As soon as these elec-
tions are completed, the Tanganyika Government
intends to call a conference to review tlie consti-
tution and examine possible broadening of the
franchise.
The Trusteeship Council recently endorsed the
views of the 1957 U.N. visiting mission to Ru-
anda-Urundi that this Belgian trust territory has
achieved numerous advances and is now in a po-
sition to assimilate a still larger number of far-
reaching changes.
Progress toward self-government and inde-
pendence in Africa is not, of course, limited to
U.N. trust territories. Great forward strides are
now being taken in numerous other British and
French territories as well.
The Federation of Nigeria expects to attain full
independence in 1960. Developments in this West
African territory of more than 32 million people,
inhabiting a land equal in area to the States of
Texas, Oklahoma, and Louisiana combined, are of
prime importance to tlie whole continent. It is
reassuring to note that Nigeria's leaders have al-
ready accumulated 10 years' experience in self-
government under forward-looking British
tutelage. Under terms of the 1948 and 1954 con-
stitutions, as revised at the London conference of
1957, the federation already has acliieved a high
degree of self-government, with a federal prime
June 30, 1958
1093
minister and cabinet having full responsibility for
matters within their portfolios. The British Gov-
ernor-General, acting as the representative of the
British Crown, retains only certain very carefully
circumscribed reserve powers and is generally
bomid by the decisions of the federal cabinet. In
addition a large measure of self-government has
also been achieved by Nigeria's three federal re-
gions : the western, eastern, and northern.
Considerable progress toward autonomy has
also been made in the British East African ter-
ritory of Uganda and Sierra Leone in West Af-
rica. In Kenya, where there has been considerable
agitation over issues involving an increase of Af-
rican participation in the government of that
multiracial crown colony, the Capricorn African
Society, comprised of Europeans, Asians, and Af-
ricans, recently sponsored a 4-day conference to
consider various aspects of "education for nation-
hood." Three Kenya Government ministers par-
ticipated, and emphasis was placed on the basic
need for formation of adult education agencies
and an independent "college of citizenship" in the
colony to prepare it for further constructive ad-
vances along the road to fuller autonomy.
France's progressive policy in tropical Africa,
resulting in passage of the loi cadre or "frame-
work law" in 1957, has provided Africans with
municipal, territorial, and federal legislatures in
their own countries as well as representation in
the French Union and national legislative bodies
in Paris.
In March 1957 Africans were elected to legisla-
tive assemblies throughout French West and
Equatorial Africa, Somaliland, and Madagascar
on the basis of universal suffrage on single elec-
toral rolls. African cabinet ministers and French
associates have been working together in full co-
operation in each of these territories, and a wide-
spread recognition of the interdependence of
Africa and France has been evident. For ex-
ample, the prominent Malgache leaders of the
Madagascar Territorial Assembly, the first in
Madagascar's history to enjoy wide deliberative
and executive authority in local affairs, have called
for a program of gradual and full self-govern-
ment within the French Union, with the final
goal being a relationship with France somewhat
like the relationship of members of the British
Commonwealth with Great Britain.
1094
Racial and Tribal Conflicts
Complicating the trend toward self-government \
in Africa is the problem of racial and tribal con- 1
flicts. This problem is particularly acute in East, |
Central, and Southern Africa. In British East
Africa it has been said that tribal tensions are
as serious a problem as the interracial stresses.
But the latter is perhaps the more divisive as mis-
understandings and friction arise not only be-
tween Africans and Europeans but also between
Asians and Africans and between Negroes and
Arabs.
In general terms the major reason for increased
racial problems in East, Central, and Southern
Africa is the presence there of permanent set-
tlers in large numbers. It may be concluded
from this that it is not just contact between
Europeans, Asians, and Africans by itself that
causes racial problems but social and economic
competition among permanently established racial
groups.
It is obvious that some means of fostering racial
partnership and cooperation in a spirit of brother-
hood and justice is required. There is no simple
panacea, obviously, and we must take encourage-
ment from the efforts that are being taken to de-
velop equitable multiracial policies in some of the
areas where the problem is acute.
Another factor disturbing the trend toward
orderly evolution to self-government and inde-
pendence in Africa is Soviet imperialism, which
as recently as January, through the medium of the
Cairo Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference, notified
the world that Africa was to be its next area of
anticolonial agitation.
The Communists have made some progress in
penetrating individual African labor organiza-
tions, youth groups, and nationalist organizations
such as the Union des Populations Camerounaises
(UPC) in the French Cameroun. They have
worked hard to influence the thousands of Afri-
can students studying in Western Europe and the
United Arab Republic, bringing many to either
bloc countries or the Soviet Union on scholar-
ships and grants. They are devoting increas-
ing study and research to African subjects and
training more Soviet and Soviet-bloc specialists
in African affaire. They have been successful in
signing trade agreements with most of the inde-
pendent African states in the last 2 years. Their
Deparfment of Slafe Bulletin
purpose is to deny the continent to the free world
through fanning racism, extreme nationalism, and
anticolonialism and offering economic assistance
deceptively advertised as "witliout strings."
Despite their new commercial agreements, So-
viet and Soviet-bloc trade with Africa is still at
an extremely low level — well below that of the
United States; no Communist parties of any im-
portance exist anywhere; and African trade-
union movements have chosen to affiliate with the
International Confederation of Free Trade
Unions, headquartered in Brussels.
We cannot, however, be complacent because the
current Soviet cultural, economic, and political
offensive in Africa has not yet shown spectacular
results, for their dogged agitation and ingenuity
born of revolutionary and subversive training and
practice must be reckoned with. Our success in
meeting this challenge, therefore, will depend on
our success in helping Africa to realize its legiti-
mate political aspirations in an orderly yet pro-
gressive manner.
Africa's Economic and Social Needs
Closely related to the political and racial chal-
lenge that Africa poses to the free world are the
pressing economic and social needs of this vast
continent, which automatically constitute a ma-
jor challenge to free-world wisdom, generosity,
and good will.
Africa's economic and social problems are for-
midable. They may be smnmarized as : ( 1 ) lack
of public and private capital for investment and
development; (2) lack of technical, organization,
and executive skills and abilities; (3) lack of ade-
quate education and public-health programs; (4)
lack of transportation and communication facili-
ties; and (5) lack of diversification of national
economies.
How is the free world answering this challenge
to assist Africa in meeting such an impressive ar-
ray of needs?
First, European governments are spending be-
tween $G00 million and $700 million annually in
African areas, principally for economic assist-
ance to their dependent territories.
Second, the United Nations is contributing in
numerous ways to meeting these needs. The In-
ternational Bank for Eeconstruction and Develop-
ment, for example, has lent about $95 million to
June 30, 1958
African states and territories from 1955 through
1957 and just this month awarded Nigeria a loan
of $28 million for railroad development. The
United States, I might add, contributes at least
40 percent of the funds of the IBRD, and the
U.S.S.R., significantly, is not even a member.
The United Nations Technical Assistance Pro-
gram has been devoting more than $3 million an-
nually to Africa and is expected to expand this
program greatly in tlie coming years.
Such United Nations technical agencies as the
World Health Organization — which this year
celebrates its 10th anniversary — the Food and
Agriculture Organization, the United Nations
Children's Fund, the International Labor Organi-
zation, and the United Nations Educational, Sci-
entific and Cultural Organization are all contrib-
uting importantly to African social and economic
development.
Private investment from the free world is prov-
ing of growing significance to African economic
development. U. S. investment alone totals about
$600 million and European investment many
times that amount.
The United States Government has several
means through which it is assisting African eco-
nomic and social development. For the last 2 fis-
cal years the mutual security program alone has
provided more than $60 million annually in eco-
nomic and teclmical assistance to Morocco, Tu-
nisia, Libya, Ethiopia, Somalia, Liberia, Ghana,
and British East Africa.
In addition the Export-Import Bank has been
providing African countries with between $10 mil-
lion and $15 million annually in loans for de-
velopment.
As our African aid programs are still in their
early stages, spectacular achievements cannot yefc
be recorded. However, in Libya our development
programs of the last few years are beginning to
show good results and national output is esti-
mated to have increased almost 50 percent between
1954 and 1957. In Liberia 21 technical-assistance
projects, including an outstandingly successful
i-ural elementary-education development, have
been completed.
In the next fiscal year, for which larger aid
funds have been requested of the Congress, it is
planned to sponsor numerous technical-coopera-
tion projects in various regions of Africa in the
1095
fields of agriculture, industry, transport, educa-
tion, health, public administration, and resources
development. Wliile no funds have yet been allo-
cated to African states, it is expected that Devel-
opment Loan Fund loans to African states and
territories may run as high as $100 million an-
nually if sufficient capital is made available.
The Role of the United States in Africa
Having sui-veyed the political, economic, and
social challenge of Africa to the free world and
the United States in particular, what can we con-
clude about the success of our efforts to meet the
challenge ?
First, the political aspect of the challenge:
Having long recognized that traditional coloni-
alism is coming to an end, the United States be-
lieves that the transition to self-government and
eventual self-determination should be completed
in an orderly manner in the interests of all par-
ties involved. The capacity of local populations
to assume and discharge the responsibilities of
self-government alone should determine the speed
of this evolution.
We believe that our role in this trend in Africa
should be to support liberal European measures
designed to provide African dependent territories
self-government and eventual autonomy after
suitable preparation and experience and to encour-
age, insofar as we are able, moderate African
leaders who recognize the benefit to their own
people of evolutionary rather than revolutionary
progress. In this connection we believe that re-
sponsible African leaders should consider the dan-
gers that confront a newly independent state today
and recognize the pitfalls of premature inde-
pendence.
In view of our difficulties in solving our
own race problems by the lawful process, we must
in all humility recognize that it would be pre-
sumptuous of us to propose solutions to the race
problems of the multiracial states of Africa. We
can, however, attempt to exert a moderating
influence on all extremists and stand steadfastly
at all times for the principle of nondiscrimination
and racial equality.
To meet Soviet threats to African evolutionary
political development, we must assist the Africans
to show steady progress in meeting the problems
that now confront them. The attitude and deeds
of the free world and the United States will de-
termine how effective or ineffective the Soviet
blandislunents to Africa will be.
Second, the economic and social aspect of the
African challenge :
I have already enumerated the U.S. intention
to provide continuing economic and teclmical as-
sistance to African states that request and need
it. In addition through our educational exchange
and information programs, both of which we hope
to expand in Africa in the years immediately
ahead, we are attempting to increase mutual
understanding between Africans and Ameri-
cans— in particular to spread the understanding
of the principles and advantages of the free way
of life.
American private enterprise — business in-
terests, private and educational foimdations, in-
formation media, missionaries, students, and tour-
ists— has a major "people to people" role to play
in meeting the African social, economic, and po-
litical challenge to the free world. This private
sector is increasing its constructive activities in
Africa and I hope will continue to do so with
every passing month. It is in this section that the
strengtli of the free world is often best expressed
to Africans.
The African challenge to the free world is in
effect a challenge to us to live up to the highest
ideals and principles of freedom and justice, to
demonstrate full respect for the dignity of all
men, to support the legitimate aspirations of all
peoples to eventual self-determination and self-
government, to strengthen the sovereignty of in-
dependent nations, and to provide mutual eco-
nomic assistance for the common good — in a
phrase, to live the precepts which we preach.
The United States, as a leader in the free world,
must accept this challenge and meet it on time.
For perhaps, more than anything else, timeliness
of action will determine our success.
Prime Minister of Ghana
To Visit United States
The Department of State amiounced on June 2
(press release 298) that arrangements had been
completed for the arrival at Washington on July
23 of Kwame Nkrumah, Prime Minister of Ghana,
who will visit the United States at the invitation
of President Eisenhower.
1096
Depar/menf of State Bulletin
Prime Minister Nkrumah and his party will re-
main in Washington until July 26, when they will
begin a trip scheduled to include visits to Hershey,
Harrisburg, and Philadelpliia, Pa., New York,
N. y., and Chicago, 111. They will leave New York
for London on August 2.
With the renewed assui'ances of my highest con-
sideration, I have the honour to remain,
Mahmoud Fawzi
Minister of Foreign Affairs
of the United Arab Republic
Arab Republic and Suez Stockholders
Agree on Compensation Terms
Following is a letter of May 20 from Mahmoud
Fawzi, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the United
Arab Republic, to U.N. Secretary-General Dag
Hammarshjold, transmitting the text of the Heads
of Agreement ^ signed at Rome on April 29 in con-
nection with compensation of the Suez stoch-
holders.-
U.N. doc. A/3827, S/4014
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
20 May 1958
With reference to my letter to you on 24 April
1957,^ relating to tlie Declaration on the Suez
Canal and the Arrangements for its Operation, I
have the honour, with particular reference to
paragraph 8 of that Declaration, to enclose the
text of Heads of Agreement in connexion with
compensation of the Suez Stockholders, which
was sigiied on 29 Ajaril 1958 in Kome by the repre-
sentatives of the United Ai-ab Republic and of the
Suez Stockholders.
It is with pleasure and gi-atitude that I avail
myself of this opportunity to recall Your Ex-
cellency's, the Secretariat's and the International
Bank's co-operation in tliis connexion.
* "Heads of agreement" is a term denoting a type uf
preliminary agreement on main aspects of a problem,
with details remaining for further implementation.
' On June 11 the International Bank issued the follow-
ing statement : "Subsequent to the signature of the heads
of agreement in Rome on 29 April 19.58 by representatives
of the Government of the United Arab Republic and of
the Suez shareholders, further discussion between the
parties, with International Bank participation, has been
held in Cairo and subsequently in Paris during the past
several weeks. As a result of these discussions, agree-
ment has been reached on the text of a final agreement,
providing for the implementation of the Rome heads of
agreement. It is expected that this final agreement will
be signed about mid-July, after the necessary formalitiee
have been completed by the parties."
= Bulletin of May 13, 1957, p. 77G.
June 30, 1958
469464—58 3
TEXT OF HEADS OF AGREEMENT
The representative of the Government of the United
Arab Republic (as successor to the Government of
EgyjJt), and the representatives of the Suez stockholders,
namely, the shareholders, the holders of founder shares,
and the holders of the Parts Civiles ( Society Civile pour
le recouvrement des 15% des produits nets de la Com-
pagnie Universelle du Canal Maritime de Suez attribu^s
au Gouvernement ^gyptien), hereinafter referred to as
"the Stockholders", have agreed the following Heads of
Agreement :
1. As a full and final settlement of the compensation
due to shareholders and holders of founders shares as a
consequence of the Nationalization Law No. 285 of 1956,
and in full settlement of claims of the holders of the Parts
Civiles, the Government of the United Arab Republic
win make a payment equivalent to fE28.3 million
(Twenty-eight million and three hundred thousand Egyp-
tian pounds) and will leave all the external assets to the
Stockholders.
2. In consideration of the above, the Stockholders will
accept responsibility for all liabilities outside Egypt as
of 26 July 19,56, including liability for the service of the
outstanding debentures (principal and interest) and for
pensions in accordance with paragraph 4 (b) below.
3. The Government of the United Arab Republic con-
tinues to assume responsibility for all liabilities within
Egypt as of 26 July 1956, including liability for pensions
in accordance with paragraph 4 (a) below.
4. (a) The Government of the United Arab Republic
will assume liability for pensions, as follows:
(i) Pensions already granted as of 26 July 19.56 and
being paid by Egypt to pensioners resident in Egypt on
the date of signature of the present Heads of Agreement ;
(ii) Pensions accruing to staff who were employed in
the service on 26 July 1956 and who are still in the serv-
ice of the Suez Canal Authority, or who, having re-
mained in the Authority's service, retired on pension
after that date in accordance with the regular pensions
regulations.
(b) The Stockholders will assume liability for all
pensions other than those specified in (a) above.
(c) Each party to these Heads of Agreement will
afford facilities for the preparation of lists of individual
pensioners falling within the various categories men-
tioned in this paragraph 4 in order that the liability for
payment of pensions to each individual may be properly
determined.
(d) The Stockholders will pay to the Government of
the United Arab Republic the capital value of the pen-
sions payable to persons who, having remained In the
1097
Authority's service after 26 July 1956, retired on pension
after that date in accordance with the regular pensions
regulations, but ceased to reside in Egypt prior to the
date of the signature of these Heads of Agreement, and
who, at the date of signature of these Heads of Agree-
ment, do not receive their pension from the Stockholders,
(e) Liability for pensions after the date of signature
of these Heads of Agreement will not be affected by any
subsequent change of residence by a pensioner.
5. The payment specified in paragraph 1 will be made
as follows :
(a) An initial payment of £E5.3 million (Five million
and three hundred thousand Egyptian pounds), through
the retention by the Stockholders of the transit tolls col-
lected in Paris and in London since 26 July 1956.
(b) The balance in instalments as follows:
£E
1 January 1959, 4 m. (Four million Eg.vptian pounds)
1 January 1960, 4 m. (Four million Egyptian pounds)
1 January 1961, 4 m. (Four million Egyptian pounds)
1 January 1962, 4 m. (Four million Egyptian pounds)
1 January 1963, 4 m. (Four million Egyptian pounds)
1 January 1964, 3 m. (Three million Egyptian pounds)
6. The instalments specified in paragraph 5 (b) above
will be free of interest and will be payable in pounds
Sterling in London or in French francs in Paris, calcu-
lated at the fixed rate of US$2.8715576 to fEl. Not less
than 40 per cent of each instalment shall be payable in
pounds Sterling.
7. (a) If the Government of the United Kingdom pro-
vides a special release from Egypt's No. 2 Sterling ac-
count for the specific purpose of making advance pay-
ments on the instalments specified in paragraph 5 (b),
amounts so released will be paid over forthwith by the
Government of the United Arab Republic for application
to the payment in advance of the two next maturing in-
stalments specified in paragraph 5(b).
(b) In the event of a release by the Government of
the United Kingdom of the total of Egypt's No. 2 Sterling
account, the Government of the United Arab Republic will
pay over forthwith an appropriate amount of the funds
so released for application to the payment in advance
of the two next maturing instalments specified in para-
graph 5 (b).
(c) If either of the releases under (a) or (b) above
takes place before the effective date of the final agree-
ment referred to in paragraph 9 below, the appropriate
amounts will be paid over forthwith on the effective date.
8. The conclusion and implementation of the final agree-
ment referred to in paragraph 9 will be done in such
a way that the rights and liabilities attributed to the
Stockholders under the pre.sent Heads of Agreement are
effectively exercised and assumed by an entity acceptable
to both parties as representing regularly all the Stock-
holders and duly qualified to give full and final discharge
to the Government of the United Arab Republic.
9. In view of the fact that the present Heads of Agree-
ment have been negotiated under the good offices of the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
the Bank having accepted the capacity of the signatories
for the purposes of concluding the present Heads of Agree
ment, the parties hereby request the Bank to continue its
good offices until the conclusion and documentation of a
final agreement implementing these Heads of Agreement
and to act as fiscal agent for the purpose of receiving and
paying out the monies provided for in paragraphs 4 (d),
5(b) and 7 above.
Done in triplicate at Rome on 29 April 1958 in the
presence of a Vice-President of the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development. One copy to be re-
tained by the Government of the United Arab Republic;
one copy to be retained by the representatives of the
Suez Stockholders ; and one copy to be deposited in the
archives of the International Bank.
On behalf of the Government of the United Arab
Republic :
Abdel Galil El Emabt
On behalf of the Suez Stockholders :
J. Georges Picot
Witnessed by :
W. A. B. IixiF
Vice-President
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
U.S. Airlifts Anticholera Serum
to Thailand
Press release 318 dated June 9
The U.S. Government's offer of a plane for the
airlift to Bangkok of anticholera vaccine and
serum-producing laboratory equipment for com-
bating the growing cholera epidemic in Thailand
has made it possible to concentrate on a single
plane 20,000 pounds of vitally important material.
This serum and equipment has been provided by
the American Red Cross, the Canadian Red Cross,
the United Nations Children's Fund, and the In-
ternational Cooperation Administration.
The plane, a U.S. Air Force C-118, is scheduled
to take off from McGuire Air Force Base Termi-
nal on June 10. The Ambassador of Thailand,
Thanat Khoman, and representatives of tlie coop-
erating organizations will be present when the
plane departs.
The plane's cholera- fighting cargo will include:
Vaccine production equipment, requested by the
King of Thailand from UNICEF for the (iueen
Savabha (Pasteur) Institute in Bangkok ;
5,000 saline transfusion sets and saline solution
bottles, 2,350 pounds of de.xtrose, 500 pounds of
agar-agar, procured through UNICEF for the
King of Thailand ;
Intravenous fluid production equipment given
1098
Deparfmenf of State Bulletin
by the American Ked Cross to tlie Thai Red Cross ;
60,000 cc. vaccine given by the Canadian Red
Cross to the Thai Red Cross ;
400,000 cc. vaccine made available for distri-
bution in Thailand by the International Coopera-
tion Administration. Further deliveries of vac-
cine will be available for later shipment if needed.
All agencies and private suppliers have cooper-
ated in meeting the Thai requests with speed and
all available resources.
Visit of Tlicodor Heuss, President of tlie Federal Republic of Germany
Theodor Heuss, President of the Federal Re-
public of Gervfiany^ made a state visit to Wash-
ington June j^-7. Following are texts of the
welcoming remarks made iy President Eisen-
hotoer at the Washington National Airport on
June 4, the toasts of President Eisenhower and
President Heuss at the state dinner at the White
House on June J/., and the address made hy Presi-
dent Heuss before a joint session of the Congress
on June 5, together with a list of the members of
the official party.
WELCOMING REMARKS BY PRESIDENT EISEN-
HOWER
White House press release dated June 4
President Heuss and ladies and gentlemen:
Never before in history has the head of a German
state visited this land. So it is with unusual
warmth that I welcome you this morning to this
Capital City and to this country.
In your lifetime and mine, Mr. President, the
power of your nation and the power of this nation
have been tragically plunged into war on opposite
sides. The wounds of those wars seem to be, I
think, almost wholly cured.
So today I think that the feeling of a friend-
ship between the American people and the Ger-
man people of the Federal German Republic is
the stronger, the more intense, because of the trib-
ulations that we have been through and because of
the way our two countries have met in peaceful
conference, peaceful arrangements, to overcome
those old memories and disasters.
And so I am sure that, as you visit this country,
you will discover that the American people reflect
the same sentiments as I now give to you, which
are : Welcome here, very, very heartily.
EXCHANGE OF TOASTS
White House press release dated June 4
President Eisenhower:
President Heuss, ladies and gentlemen: Rarely
has this house had a greater honor than has come
to it this evening in the opportunity to entertain
the President of the Federal German Republic.
Never before has the head of the German state
visited this nation.
And so this evening, President Heuss, there
are people here who have come to see you because
they are old friends; they come here with an
affectionate regard for you.
All of us are here in admiration and esteem for
the nation of which you are head and for the
characteristics they reveal and you symbolize —
their dedication to freedom, to liberty, to the
rights of men.
Those are the values that tie this nation to your
people so firmly, and we feel especially tonight
that it is not only a great honor but a great privi-
lege to ask this company to rise and drink to you
a toast.
President Heuss (as reported in English by the in-
terpreter):
Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen: I think
you have said and you have done me two great
honors by saying that this house received an his-
torical honor tonight through my visit.
I have read quite a lot about American history,
but what I am getting here are living impres-
June 30, 1958
1099
sions of American history. This afternoon I was
at Mount Vernon. Tonight you were kind
enough to show me Lincohi's chair in the Lincoln
Koom. And we are surroimded by history, we
are determined by history, and we are influenced
by history.
Tonight, when I was privileged to receive to-
gether with you, Mr. President, I have seen many
faces — well-known faces, loved faces, the faces of
Americans whom I have met in Germany, at a
time when they met us with some restraint and
reserve, and perhaps also with mistrust and per-
haps also with a raised finger.
But it did not take very long before they be-
came very good friends of ours, and they sup-
ported us in our efforts to reestablish our country,
to rebuild our economy, to restrengthen our na-
tion. And I think that was the greatest achieve-
ment of the last American generation in turning-
out to be such a great helper and supporter of the
German people in their efforts to rebuild their
comitry after the misery, after the horrors of the
war through which they had been.
But I think I am going too far now — that goes
beyond an after-dinner speech. I will say some-
thing about that tomorrow in the speech I am
going to make to Congress. But because of what
you said just now, I think I was forced, I was
compelled, to make these remarks to that effect.
ADDRESS BY PRESIDENT HEUSS>
Official translation
Mr. Speaker, Mr. President, Members of the
Congress of the United States, permit me first to
make a personal remark.
I have chosen not without hesitation to address
this august assembly in my own language. I
would much rather have addressed the Congress
of the United States in English — and have es-
tablished thereby, jjerhaps, a more immediate
communication with Members of both Houses.
But I have come reluctantly to the conclusion that
my command of your language is not what it used
to be — that it has, in fact, become somewhat
rusty. I must ask your indulgence, therefore, to
allow me to speak to you in German.
I am grateful to President Eisenliower for his
' Congressional Record, June 5, 19.j8, p. 9131.
noo
invitation because it gives me an opportunity to
see for myself the reality of these United States.
I think I know a little about this country's his-
tory. I know many of its citizens and I have had
a great many discussions about the development
and mentality of the people of this vast country.
But already I feel that I shall not advance on my
visit here beyond some very modest elementary
lessons; and I, who have written a number of
books, promise you that I shall not write a book
as an expert on the United States when I return
home. Nor do I want to compete with de Toc-
queville. The dimensions to be grasped compel
humility. But I do appreciate the honor of be-
ing able to address this distinguished assembly
whose debates and acts today profoundly influence
the world's destiny. It is a world responsibility
which the American citizen has not sought but
which he does not shirk.
I shall speak to you with the utmost candor.
After Hitler's recklessness had forced the United
States as well into his war, a shadow fell upon
the American view of the German people : Every
German seemed to be a Nazi. Today there is not
much point in complaining about this distortion
of the picture. After 1945 I said to many an
officer of the occupation forces: You, who have
never experienced the meanness and technical per-
fection of a totalitarian dictatorship, you are in
tlie happy position in which you cannot even
imagine the terrible moral pressure to which a
people can be subjected. When we attempted,
after 1945, to reestablish something like public
life on the basis of justice and democracy we, too,
suffered much distress resulting from an outlook
distorted by the passions of war. After a time,
however, we saw how the reality of German life,
little by little, was understood and interpreted.
Ten years ago I said that this was something
quite new in world history: Up to May 8, 1945,
the American citizen had to pay heavy taxes in
order to destroy the German State whereas after
May 8 he had to pay taxes in order to save the
German people. But there was not merely the
taxpayer's burden which after a few years was ab-
sorbed into the grand design of the Marshall Plan
which, in turn, had evolved from the Hoover Ke-
port. In addition there was the aid given by the
individual American, by the churches, the chari-
table organizations, by the countless and uncount-
able men and women no matter whether they
Department of State Bulletin
were of German origin or not. The love of one's
fellow man dissolved fear and hatred. I do not
come to you as a petitioner. I wish simply to ex-
press my gratitude for the action which your Gov-
ernment has taken as well as for the help rendered
by millions of individual Americans. The mate-
rial side of this assistance was important but not
decisive: It gave us moral uplift and encourage-
ment. Without the help of the United States it
would have been inconceivable for 10 million Ger-
mans expelled from their homeland to be offered
food, work and shelter. The fact that week after
week several thousand people flee to the West
from intellectual and spiritual slavery in the So-
viet-occupied zone continues to weigh heavy on
the Federal Republic — their numbers have swelled
to many hundreds of thousands. That stream of
human beings is at once a lasting grievance and
a perpetual reproach.
I do not wish to take up the time at my disposal
by discussing, in terms of personalities, the Ger-
man contribution to the growth of American
statehood and the development of the American
way of life. But I think I may say this much:
The two great Presidents of the United States,
who have become legendary figures, come to
mind — George Washington knew that he could
depend on the solid work of organization done by
the German General von Steuben just as Abra-
ham Lincoln could rely on the German champion
of fi'eedom, Carl Schurz, the most prominent rep-
resentative of the many young Germans who came
to the United States in quest of those civic and po-
litical rights for which they had fought vainly in
Germany in 18-18. The liberal and idealistic ele-
ment represented by those groups was easily inte-
grated into the American historical concept. And
this concept was expanded and strengthened by
the tradition of diligent, skillful labor of the mil-
lions of people of German descent who have been
absorbed — for which they are gi-ateful, I may
say — into the substance of the American Nation.
We in Germany found ourselves in a strange
situation after 1945. The people were exhausted
and starving; the attitude of many toward the
victorious powers was "Do what you like with us."
At that time the reproach was heard — also from
this country — that the Germans were sorry for
themselves. There was something in that. But
with the coming of a sound currency and of the
Marshall Plan, people in Germany saw that tliere
June 30, 1958
was purpose again in hard work and effort. So
the Germans set to work and put life into their
economy again. In 1949 and 1950, I told promi-
nent American businessmen frequently that the
Marshall Plan funds were well invested in Ger-
many. Can you hold this against a people that
they have regained economic strength through in-
dustriousness and skill, and thanks to the eco-
nomic commonsense displayed by the United
States which was the essential condition for Ger-
man economic recovery ? I find nothing more in-
teresting than to read in some newspapers of the
Western world — though not in the United
States — that the Germans are once more becoming
imperialists because they have more or less re-
covered their share of the world's market. Surely,
there is no imperialism but much useful work in
building sturdy cranes and manufacturing medi-
cal supplies.
During the past 50 years Germany has had the
misfortune to acquire the reputation of being the
nation which embodied, so to speak, eternal un-
rest and overweening ambition. A hundred years
earlier — following the French revolution and the
first Napoleon — other countries enjoyed this repu-
tation. It would seem to me a good idea to get
rid of such cliches encountered here and there in
newspapers and schoolbooks.
We, all of us, must shed this habit of thinking,
while, at the same time, not abandoning our tra-
ditional values. The German people — who here
and there are still strangely suspected of exempli-
fying aggressive nationalism — existed as the Holy
Eoman Empire, as a European entity, imbued
with a sense of responsibility toward Europe as
a whole. And that was at a time when Spain,
Britain, France, and later Eussia, had long em-
barked upon a very concrete policy of expansion.
I do not say this because I want to engage in
polemics against historic events of bygone cen-
turies— that is always a senseless thing to do — but
in order to make the discussion about our present
situation a little easier.
It is remarkable: The Korean crisis — a scene
of secondai-y importance in the traditional Euro-
pean concept of history — has laid open, both ma-
terially and psychologically, the fundamental is-
sue— respect for law or for arbitrary power, for
violent action or for free self-determination. I
cannot here dwell on this. But I can say what the
effect has been on us in Germany. National f ree-
1101
dom — including that aspect of it which concerns
the social order — is a value which must be de-
fended. It must be defended not only by those
who are immediately affected but by all those to
whom peace is a value per se and democracy a
moral value. Believe me, it was not easy in Ger-
many to explain the duty to do military service
to the man-in-the-street who had been persuaded
by propaganda that his military service had been
some sort of crime because the supreme command
had been in the hands of criminals. And yet it
was possible to establish in people's consciousness
the natural feeling — that he who cherishes the se-
curity of his native soil and the maintenance of
freedom must also help to safeguard them.
You must not expect of me a detailed exposition
of our domestic German difficulties. National re-
unification not only remains the object of German
longing but also the prerequisite for Europe's
recovery. The slogan of coexistence may imply
the coexistence of different ideologies in different
national territories but it is absurd to base it on
a relationship of total power on the one hand and
total impotence on the other, which — look at the
situation of 1945 — disrupts a nation and denies
it democratic self-determination.
The settlement of the Saar question has shovra
that a patient policy which recognizes democratic
rights can lead to a happy result. An onerous
burden has been lifted from German-French un-
derstanding, the cornerstone for strengthening an
all-European consciousness. The German and the
French people have equally contributed to this
success and thereby have at long last brought
about a good neighborly relationship between the
two countries.
This much is evident : The Germans know where
they belong. Their histoiy, their intellectual and
Christian-religious traditions have made them
an integral part of what is called the Western
World. On this point there can be no neutrality
for us. There is something disquieting in the fear
sometimes expressed in the Western press: To-
morrow they will reach an understanding with
Soviet totalitarianism — that is what we term the
"Rapallo complex" — or in the specter sometimes
evoked in Germany : Washington and Moscow will
come to an agreement and Germany will be the
victim. It was very important to us — reassuring
in a way — that President Eisenlaower repeatedly
made it very clear how much he felt Germany's
tragic partition to be one of the heaviest mort-
gages on Europe's future. We shall never, never
forget how President Truman by means of the so-
called airlift in 1948^9, with the approval of
the entire American people, saved Germany's old
capital of Berlin — literally saved it — and thus de-
cided the fate of Europe at a crucial point. The
Germans, too, have perceived it as their duty to
participate as free and active partners in the po-
tentialities of peace and freedom implicit in this
concept of the fate of Europe. Hence, the Federal
Eepublic's loyal cooperation in the overall defense
planning of NATO. Never again in the future
shall German and American soldiers fight each
other. And we realize that the sacrifice made by
American mothers in having their sons in German
garrisons — not, indeed, for the purpose of prepar-
ing wars but to prevent them by their presence
and thereby to secure the democratic way of life
for the future — we realize that this sacrifice cor-
responds to the great sense of duty which marks
your tradition of liberty. And I am pleased to be
able to state that, apart from a few unhappy inci-
dents, many good, personal, and even, in some
cases, family connections have developed, as well
as much fruitful cooperation in the cultural and
intellectual spheres.
It is not the case — as simple-minded people
sometimes will have it — that it took two lost wars
to force the Germans into the school of democracy.
One of my pleasant memories is how a scholarly
American officer in 1945 or 1946 explained to me
that not only the Americans but also the Germans
should know more about Germany's old demo-
cratic traditions which were preserved amidst the
absolutism of the princes, and he gave me a lecture
about the self-government of the old free and im-
perial cities of Germany. I have never forgotten
this conversation, which struck a chord in my own
family tradition. That was, indeed, a great Ger-
man contribution to the evolving burgher civiliza-
tion. And here, I suppose, is the point of contact
and of mutual stimulation between the two sides.
Behind us lie the bad times when the exchange of
views and of knowledge was stopped. It is among
the agreeable experiences of our time that people,
through exchange visits, have been able to get to
know one another ; tens of thousands of Germans
were able to absorb in this coimtry the breath of
1102
Department of State Bulletin
your intellectual and political climate. And we
on our part are glad to see the many Americans
visiting our country once more — not only to see the
romantic Rliine, which 100 or 50 years ago was the
main attraction for travelers, but to acquaint
themselves with our people, their achievements
and their opinions.
I am coming to the end now, grateful that you
have listened to me with patience. Believe me
that our Germany will never again depart from
the path of democracy and freedom. It is our sin-
cere resolve to be good and dependable allies. As
an institution the office of the German Federal
President cannot be compared to that of the Presi-
dent of the United States. I would ask all those
to appreciate this who expect declarations about
such technical matters as the conclusion of a Euro-
pean security pact, methods of disarmament, and
other problems. What we must aim at is to ease
the social, economic, military, and political prob-
lems causing tension in the world — problems which
have always existed but which have been aggra-
vated since 1914. I have no illusions; I know
that the pressing questions of giving substance to
European political and economic cooperation, of
achieving enduring settlement in the Near East, of
safeguarding the free world against all dangers —
that these are not to be minimized. These issues
are full of difficulties, but examples have shown us
that tliey are capable of solution ; one need only
recall the problems of Trieste and the Saar. It is
my firm conviction that the peoples of the free
world — deeply rooted as they are in the Chris-
tian faith — possess the moral strength to maintain
their position and uphold their ideals. All that
is required is to set in motion some of the all-
pervasive forces inherent in human nature : reason,
a sense of proportion, and perhaps a little love.
MEMBERS OF OFFICIAL PARTY
The Department of State on May 28 (press
release 291) announced the members of the
official party accompanying President Heuss on
his visit to the United States.^ They are as
follows :
Heinrich von Brentano, Minister of Foreign Affairs'
Willielm Grewe, German Ambassador to tlie United States
Felix von Ecliardt, State Secretary, Cliief of tlie Govern-
ment Press and Information Office
Hans Bott, Principal Assistant to President Heuss
Sigismund Baron von Braun, Chief of Protocol
Jlaj. Gen. Martin Harliughausen, Aide to President Heuss
(Commanding General of the Air Force Group North)'
Peter Limbourg, Executive Assistant to the Minister of
Foreign Affairs'
Ernst Ludwig Heuss, son of President Heuss
Dr. Alfred Wuerz, personal physician to President Heuss
Axel Herbst, American Desk Officer, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs'
Richard Balken, First Secretary, German Embassy
Erich Raederscheidt, Press Secretary to President Heusa
Werner Ahrens, American Desk Officer, Federal Press
Office
Gunther von Hase, Press Secretary, Minister of Foreign
Affairs'
Wiley T. Buchanan, Jr., Chief of Protocol of the United
States
David K. E. Bruce, American Ambassador to Germany*
Brig. Gen. Milton F. Summerfelt, USAF, American Aide
to President Heuss '
Clement E. Conger, Acting Deputy Chief of Protocol, De-
partment of State
Robert T. Hennemeyer, Protocol Officer, Department of
State
Edward J. Savage, Press Officer, Department of State
' President Heuss left Washington on June 7 for a tour
of the United States, including stops at Philadelphia, Pa.,
Hanover, N.H., Detroit, Mich., Chicago, 111., San Fran-
cisco, Calif., the Grand Canyon National Park, Williams-
burg and Charlottesville, Va., and New York, N.Y.
'Washington only.
June 30, 7958
1103
THE CONGRESS
The Vice President's Visit to South America in Perspective
Statement hy Roy R. Rubottom, Jr.
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs '
I appreciate the opportunity of appearing be-
fore your committee today because I recognize the
significance of the inquiry you are undertaking.
There is no area of the world more important to
us than Latin America. The Department wel-
comes your inquiry, which I am certain will help
to bring into focus for the American public, for
the executive departments, and for the Congress
the need for all of us to be aware of what is hap-
pening in this part of the world and the nature
of our own vital interests which are involved.
Before proceeding with the inquiry, Mr. Chair-
man, I would be grateful if you will allow me to
comment briefly on the significance of the Vice
President's recent tour of eight South American
countries - and on the character of our interests
and relations with the countries of Latin America.
I hope that these comments will help give per-
spective to the proceedings which will follow.
In the first place I am concerned that the sensa-
tional and even dangerous character of certain
incidents which occurred on the Vice President's
trip has obscured what Mr. Nixon himself, as well
as those of us from the State Department and Mr.
Waugh, president of the Export-Import Bank,
who accompanied him, consider to have been the
positive and beneficial accomplishments of the
trip. As the Vice President has said, violence
and attempted violence is front-page news while
quiet accomplislmient is page-8 news. It is no
^Made before the Subcommittee on Latin America of
the House Foreign Affairs Committee on June 3.
' For background, see Bulletin of June 9, 1958, p. 950
and p. 952.
1104
failing of the press that this is so ; it is in the nature
of the interests of the reading public. Neverthe-
less, it remains for us today to headline the page-
8 news of the Vice President's trip so that it may,
by this committee and through it by the American
people, be evaluated against the other.
To do this let us review the activities and effects
of the Vice President's visit in each of the coun-
tries on his itinerary. We should keep in mind
that in each country he had opportunity to meet
with and discuss with government leaders the vital
issues affecting our relations. "We should also keep
in mind that in each country he had opportunity
to meet with in fair and friendly debate citizens
of those countries from all walks of life. Every-
where— and I must stress the word "every-
where"— he was accorded a genuinely friendly and
warm welcome by those people, broadly represen-
tative of their nations, who received him and who
had not been influenced by a small, insidious, and
organized minority to commit inhospitable or vio-
lent acts against him. Among all such people —
government leaders, labor leaders, students, news-
papermen, businessmen, intellectuals, and the man
in the street — we are confident that the Vice Presi-
dent's visit will be long and favorably remem-
bered. As we are likewise confident that among
the women and children of these countries — in
their homes, schools, hospitals, and orphanages —
the sympathetic, understanding visits of Mrs.
Nixon will be appreciated and not forgotten.
Uruguay
In Uruguay the Vice President's visit was out-
standingly successful, both from the point of view
Department of State Bulletin
of his discussions with government leaders and
his contacts with the people. Mr. Nixon, in an
unscheduled visit to the university, won the ap-
plause and friendly support of the student body
in general, overcoming the small number of Com-
munist-oriented students who attempted to mar
his otherwise enthusiastic reception in Monte-
video. This action, and his open, positive pre-
sentation of American aims, ideals, and policies,
was widely acclaimed in the Uruguayan and in-
ternational press as an important step toward
breaking down the Communist-inspired attitudes
implanted with some success among the politically
minded student body.
Similarly successful were the Vice President's
meeting with Uruguayan labor leaders, as well
as a hitherto unpublicized meeting with a group
of Uruguay's most prominent political leaders,
representative of the entire spectrum of opinion,
and publishers, who welcomed being consulted by
him on the issues of United States-Uruguayan
relations. In his talks with government officials
themselves Mr. Nixon explored the problems af-
fecting our governmental relations as well as the
interests of American business in that country.
Our Embassy in Montevideo has reported that the
resulting clarification of these problems will have
an important bearing on their early, positive solu-
tion. Among the problems discussed were those
affecting various American business interests in
Uruguay; United States trade policies in rela-
tion to specific Uruguayan commodities; United
States attitude toward dictatorships in Latin
America; and the significance and implications
of the Soviet economic and trade offensive.
Argentina
In Argentina the Vice President's primary mis-
sion was to represent the President and the Ameri-
can people at the inauguration of the new Argen-
tine President, Dr. Arturo Frondizi. This was an
historic occasion for the Argentine people, repre-
senting as it did for them the restoration of dem-
ocratic institutions after many years of dictatorial
denial and 2 years of careful preparation under
a caretaker-government interregnum. We have
every reason to believe that the Argentine people
recognize in our choice of the Vice President to
represent us a demonstration of our sympathetic
interest in and support for this great milestone
in their history.
June 30, 7958
The Vice President's welcome in Buenos Aires
was overwhelmingly friendly. Although his rout«
on the long drive from the airport to the heart of
the city had not been preannounced, he was en-
thusiastically greeted by thousands along the way.
One situation which arose in the course of this
visit — the Vice President's late arrival for the in-
auguration ceremonies — did not constitute a mar-
ring feature. Actually two unforeseen circum-
stances were involved: (1) the friendly enthu-
siasm of crowds along the way who so detained the
Vice President that he was late in reaching the
legislative palace and even had difficulty making
his way inside when he ai-rived and (2) the fact
that the ceremony itself was begun a few minutes
before the scheduled hour of 10 : 00 a. m. As a
matter of fact, we have a press photograph of the
President already making his inaugural address,
before a clock in the background showing 3 min-
utes to 10 : 00.
But the Vice President's trip to Buenos Aires
was not exclusively ceremonial. There, as else-
where, he undertook substantive discussions with
government leaders and friendly contact with the
people. Significant among the latter was the Vice
President's enthusiastic reception by over 2,000
labor-iinion members at an asado (Argentine bar-
becue) at a labor sport camp near Buenos Aires.
In private discussions with the new leaders of
Argentina Mr. Nixon gave assurance of our Gov-
ernment's keen interest in and support for the suc-
cess of their democratic progress and of our de-
sire to be constructively helpful in the solution
of basic problems affecting their economic recov-
ery and development. Their needs for electric
power, the restoration and expansion of transpor-
tation equipment, and the development of petro-
leum resources figured, among other topics, in
their discussion. We are confident they have at
least laid the groundwork of understanding, from
which more fruitful and constructive cooperation
between the United States and Argentina may
result.
Paraguay
In Paraguay the Vice President was acclaimed
wherever he went, in what many Paraguayans
termed the most enthusiastic reception ever ac-
corded a foreign dignitaiy. He was met by cheer-
ing throngs at every turn, addressed a special ses-
sion of the legislature held in his honor, and
1105
talked with the people, as is his custom. In
speaking to President Stroessner at a dinner given
in his honor, the Vice President underlined the
importance of the establishment of democratic
principles and institutions in Paraguay. The
President revealed his awareness of dictatorial
charges made against him, and later, in a press
conference for United States newsmen accom-
panying Mr. Nixon, President Stroessner ex-
pressed his willingness to move toward greater
freedom for the Paraguayan people.
Bolivia
No one could mistake the warmth and friendli-
ness of the Vice President's reception in La Paz,
Bolivia. Tliis country, scene of some of the most
violent political episodes the continent has ever
witnessed, and still beset by economic problems
perhaps more serious than those facing any coun-
try in the hemisphere, expressed its gratitude to
the Vice President in no uncertain terms for the
moral support and economic assistance which the
United States has given Bolivia in the last 4 years.
The 5-mile route from tlie La Paz airport to the
city was lined with cheering crowds who welcomed
Mr. Nixon with placards, miniature American
flags, and showers of confetti reminiscent of the
Wall Street ticker-tape parades. Here, as else-
where, he met with labor leaders, "opinion"
makers, students, and, by no means the least of
all, the man in the street. At the Municipal
Palace he was made an "honorary campesino"
(peasant) and was decked out with the typical
wool poncho and wool cap with ear flaps. Later,
at a special celebration organized by skilled
workers, Mr. Nixon entered into the spirit of the
occasion whei-e derbied Indian women were danc-
ing. With government officials Mr. Nixon held
important discussions on the severe problems at-
tendant to efforts to solve Bolivian economic prob-
lems, the stimulation of private investment, the
compensation for expropriated property, and the
character and scope of American aid.
It was in Lima that the first serious incident of
the trip occurred. However, as the Vice President
himself has observed, it was perhaps inevitable
that the unexpected character and violence of
the incident caused it to be magnified out of all
proportion. It has thus unfortunately obscured
the real nature of his generally cordial welcome
in Peru and the mortification and sliock of Peru-
vian officials and the vast majority of Peruvian
people over the actions of a small, organized, and
influenced minority.
This is not to suggest that there are no prob-
lems with Peru. There are problems, and they
are difficult. And by exploiting these problems
the Communists were able to organize in Peru,
in spite of the historic friendship between Peru
and the United States, the first of two attacks
on the Vice President's mission and on his person.
I shall not go deeper at this time into the nature
of this attack nor into its apparent causes. I
would, however, like to comment on otlier aspects
of the Lima visit which, I hope, will bring it into
perspective in all fairness to ourselves and to the
people of Peru who were not represented by the
actions of a tightly organized minority.
As I have said, with the exception of the in-
cident at San Marcos University and later in the
square before his hotel, the Vice President was
cordially received by the Peruvian people. His
reception at the Catholic University, where he
made an unscheduled call following the scene
at San Marcos, was genuinely friendly. So was
his reception by the people at the port of Callao
and by labor leaders and other groups with which
he met. Finally, in his discussions with Peruvian
officials he was able to review the serious issues —
largely economic problems relating to Peruvian
exports affected by United States trade policies —
which have produced resentments and frictions
in recent years.
Top officials of the Peruvian Government, re-
sponsible journalists, and literally hundreds of
Peruvians in all walks of life have in one way or
another, directly or indirectly, expressed their
deep regret for the incidents which marked the
Vice President's visit. There is ample evidence
that the Peruvian people see in these incidents a
warning of the danger of Communist subversion
and the manner in which the character, aspira-
tions, and objectives of their great majority can
be so distorted by a very, very small minority.
There is evidence, in this regard, that the nucleus
of demonstrations in Peru consisted of no more
than 50 to 75 people (the same people in each
case) and that the real leaders were probably no
more than 8 or 10.
Department of Slate BuHetin
In Quito the Vice President's visit was an un-
qualified success and did much to improve and
cement the good relations existing with Ecuador.
This country, which has in the past been the scene
of much political violence and upheaval, is now
enjoying its third successive democratically elected
administration. In addition to talks with Ecua-
doran officials on economic matters, the Vice Presi-
dent had many contacts with the people. At a
football game, for example, he was given a splen-
did ovation following his announcement of an
award of a cup for the winner of the day's game.
Colombia
In Bogota the Vice President's reception was as
friendly as anywhere on the trip, in spite of the
charged political atmosphere of that country,
which had just elected a new and distinguished
President following years of dictatorial rule and
which has been plagued with widespread guerrilla
war for many years. The streets from the airport
to the city were lined with thousands of cheering
school children dressed in their Sunday best. The
small group of unfriendly demonstrators, who ob-
viously tried to provoke incidents such as had oc-
curred in Peru, was soon swallowed up and
forgotten as the overwhelming majority of Co-
lombians made evident their good will toward Mr.
Nixon.
At a theater Mr. Nixon was accorded a tremen-
dous ovation by a packed house of labor leaders.
His visits to the workers' sections of Bogota, to a
cafeteria serving some United States surplus
foodstuffs, and to a nursery sponsored by the Co-
lombian National Manufacturers Association
created an excellent impression. Finally, his
discussions with the caretaker government, and
with the newly elected officials who will be inau-
gurated soon, helped, we are confident, to lay the
basis of improved understanding between tlie
United States and Colombia.
Venezuela
I shall say but a little about the visit to Caracas
since I know it will be explored by your com-
mittee. I would like to point out, howevei-, that,
despite the dissatisfaction probably felt by many
Venezuelans with certain economic and political
aspects of our recent relations with their country,
there is ample evidence that the violent attacks on
the Vice President were organized and spear-
headed by a small Communist minority. The
Vice President himself has suggested that true
Venezuelans would not jeer when their own na-
tional anthem was being played. This is the act
of people with another allegiance. Nor would the
true Venezuelan, who is imbued with the char-
acteristic Latin American respect for womanhood
and motherhood, engineer or participate in dem-
onstrations endangering the life of a distin-
guished lady who was a guest in their country.
These were the acts of people whose sentiments
and allegiance have been distorted by alien
concepts.
This fact was amply attested to when, on the
following day, a parade of delegations represent-
ing Venezuelans in all walks of life called volun-
tarily on the Vice President at the Embassy to ex-
press their regret and, thereafter, to engage with
him in serious, free discussion of the problems
affecting our two countries. Thus, finally, some
few Venezuelans at least were able to exercise the
privilege of free discussion, which the Commu-
nist-inspired minority tried to deny.
Importance of Political Relationships
Now, before concluding this statement, if you
will indulge me a bit longer, I would like to com-
ment briefly on the political and economic impor-
tance of the United States relationship with Latin
America. Just as what I have already said will,
I trust, help to bring the results of the Vice Presi-
dent's trip a bit more into perspective, I hope that
what I am about to say will furnish similar per-
spective for your inquiry into our relations with
this part of the world by providing the highlights
from which can be judged Latin America's im-
portance to us and our importance to Latin
America.
Our interests in this area — and they are mu-
tual— are broadly speaking political, economic,
and strategic. My concentration on these, for the
sake of brevity, should not obscure, however, the
ever-increasing importance of cultural contact and
the efforts being made in both directions to bridge
the cultural gap produced by differences in historic
evolution, by language barriers, and the like. Nor
would I wish to omit mention of our common spir-
itual ties in the Americas, which help to make of
this hemisphere a bulwark of the free world.
June 30, J 958
A glance at the map will show how interde-
pendent the United States and the 20 other Ameri-
can Republics are for their security. We form a
distinct geographic unit, relatively remote from
the rest of the world. Together we have a wide
variety of natural resources to make us self-suffi-
cient in all important respects, if necessary.
Therefore, while a free and cooperative Latin
America is a decided asset to our ovm security
and a friendly, strong United States a decided
asset to Latin American security, the converse in
either case makes one a serious liability to the
other. It is thus to the interests of us all that we
develop as a politically compatible association of
free nations, economically productive and pro-
gressive and militarily capable of defense against
any aggressor.
The value of close political relationships which
have developed over the years, and the heartening,
persistent progress of all Latin America toward
ever more democratic forms of government, which
promises to increase our compatibility and area of
understanding, evidences itself in a multitude of
ways. In world history there is no comparable
example of such a harmonious relationship be-
tween a group of smaller, less developed nations
and a larger, more powerful neighbor.
Consider, for example, the security aiforded
these nations by the firmly established and re-
spected principle of nonintervention, which is the
cardinal feature of our relations with Latin
America. Consider the atmosphere for free give
and take which it provides, in which our interests
may be pui-sued on a basis of absolute equality and
mutual respect, regardless of size and military
might. Consider also, in the context of the entire
free world, the importance of American solidarity
in defense of the policies and principles to which
we are all committed. This has made itself felt
decisively in the U.N., the OAS, and other world
consultative bodies. I need not emphasize to you
that, in addition to the example tliis affords for
peoples in other areas of the world only newly
emerged to independence and national forma-
tion— who live dangerously close to the shadow of
a totally different kind of world power — this sol-
idarity has more than once provided the margin
by which crucial free- world issues have been up-
held in these forums.
Economic Interdependence
Just a few facts, I believe, will serve to high-
light the importance of our economic interdepend-
ence. Our trade with Latin America is almost
as large as our trade with Europe — larger than our
trade with Asia or Africa — larger than our trade
with any other single area. Almost 29 percent of
all our imports ($3.7 billion) came from Latin
America in 1957, and about 24 percent of all our
exports ($4.7 billion) went to that area in that
year. Unlike some other parts of the world, al-
most all of these exports to Latin America are
paid for; only slightly more than 1 percent repre-
sents grant aid. As for the Latin American coim-
tries, they depend on us as the major market for
their exports (44.2 p)ercent in 1957) and as the
jjrimary source of their imports (48.8 percent in
1957). But so much for amount. Wliat does this
trade involve?
Coffee, sugar, and other foods account for some-
what more than one-half of Latin American ship-
ments to the United States. Copper, lead, zinc,
tin, iron ore, and a wide variety of other strate-
gically important metals total about 19 percent
while petroleum accounts for about 18 percent.
Compared to their total production, this repre-
sents a market in the United States for more than
three-fourths of their copper, two-thirds of their
coffee, one-half of their raw wool, and two-fifths
of their petroleum. In the other direction, Latin
America buys from us about 35 percent of our ex-
ports of automobiles and trucks, about one-third
of our exports of chemicals, electrical machinery,
and iron and steel-mill products, over one-fourth
of our exports of industrial machinery and tex-
tiles, and about 17 percent of our exports of
foodstuffs.
Finally, there are the private investments that
go with trade. They now total $8.5 billion in
Latin America, which is about 40 percent of all
our investment abroad, an amount exceeded only
by our investment in Canada. While these in-
vestments have increased at an average rate of
about $500 million in recent years, the figure was
$600 million in 1955. These investments, more-
ovei-, produced about $5 billion worth of goods in
1955 and accounted for the production of almost
a third of all Latin American export products in
that year. They employed 600,000 Latin Ameri-
can people in 1955 and made a net contribution
to the Latin American balance of payments of
about $1 billion the same year.
Deparfment of State Bulletin
If this trade and economic interdependence is
important to us today, think of the future — and
the not-too-distant future at that. Today our
populations are abnost in balance at about 180
million persons in the United States and the same
number in Latin America. But the rate of growth
in Latin America is about 2.5 percent per year as
against only 1.4 percent in the United States. At
this rate, by the year 2000 our own population
will be about 250 million ; the population of Latin
America will be over 500 million. Consider this
in terms of economic, political, and military power
and of markets and trade and investment. Con-
sider also the strategic, geographic relationship
involved. The importance of the area, and the
importance of mutual interdependence in every
field of contact, becomes only too self-evident.
One last point. It is high time that Americans
in general discover Latin America. It is high
time that they have brought home to them some
of the facts which I have sketched and the far
more profound picture which I am confident tliis
committee's inquiry will produce. This is no
longer an area of sambas and manana, to borrow
the Vice President's language, as it is so often
picturesquely portrayed. It is an area of dynamic
progress and vigorous people. It is an area which
can produce and support metropolitan complexes
like Buenos Aires, Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo,
and Mexico City — which together with New York
and Chicago are the six largest cities of the
hemisphere. It is an area whose governments and
peoples look to us for leadership and support,
whose ideals and aspirations are more and more
akin to our own, and who, we are confident, would
vastly prefer to walk the path of peace and prog-
ress with us rather than with any other nation.
These are the factors which have played a
dominant role in our thinking about the area and
in the continuing review of our policies toward
it. The Vice President's firsthand observations
have naturally added impetus to this review. And
we anticipate further contributions to this process
from the inquiry your important committee is
making today into our Latin American policies.
I am confident, however, that you will find that
our bipartisan policies for Latin American re-
lations are, by and large, sound in concept and
in principle.
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Automotive Traffic
Convention concerning customs facilities for touring.
Done at New York June 4, 1954. Entered into force
September 11, 1957. TIAS 3879.
Notification hy United Kingdom of extension to {with
reservations) : Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika,
January 14, 1908.
Aviation
Agreement on joint financing of certain air navigation
services in Greenland and the Faroe Islands. Done
at Geneva September 25, 1956.'
Acceptance deposited: Switzerland, May 16, 1958.
Agreement on joint financing of certain air navigation
services in Iceland. Done at Geneva September 25,
1956.'
Acceptance deposited: Switzerland, May 16, 1958.
Cultural Property
Convention for the protection of cultural property in the
event of armed conflict, and regulations of execution.
Done at The Hague May 14, 1954. Entered into force
August 7, 1956.-
Ratiflcation deposited: Italy, May 9, 1958.
Accession deposited: Thailand, May 2, 1958.
Protocol for the protection of cultural property in the
event of armed conflict. Done at The Hague May 14,
1954. Entered into force August 7, 1956.''
Ratification deposited: Italy, May 9, 1958.
Accession deposited: Thailand, May 2, 1958.
Shipping
Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Con-
sultative Organization. Signed at Geneva March 6,
194S. Entered into force March 17, 1958.
Proclaimed by the President : June 2, 1958.
Sugar
International sugar agreement. Done at London under
date of October 1, 1953. Entered into force May 5,
1954. TIAS 3177.
Accession deposited: Indonesia, February 21, 1958.
Protocol amending the international sugar agreement
(TIAS 3177), with annex. Done at London December
1, 1956. Entered into force January 1, 1957; for the
United States September 25, 1957. TIAS 3937.
Accession deposited: Indonesia, February 21, 1958.
BILATERAL
Indonesia
Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agree-
ment of March 2, 1956 (TIAS 3513). Effected by ex-
change of notes at Djakarta May 22, 1958. Entered into
force May 22, 1958.
' Not in force.
• Not in force for the United States.
June 30, 1958
Agreement for the furnishing of assistance to Iran for the
construction of an airfield and supporting facilities in
the Qazvin-Hamedau-Zenjan triangle. Effected by ex-
change of notes at Tehran May 10, 1958. Entered into
force May 10, 1958.
Philippines
Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of
1954, as amended (68 Stat. 455; 7 U. S. C. 1701-1709),
with memorandum of understanding. Signed at Ma-
nila June 3, 1958. Entered into force June 3, 1958.
Poland
Agreement relating to the distribution in Poland of a
Polish-language magazine on life in the United States.
Effected by exchange of notes at Warsaw May 30, 1958.
Entered Into force May 30, 1958.
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
U. N. Conference on the Law of the Sea
The U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea
concluded at Geneva on April 28 a 9 loeeks'' session
during luhich it had adopted four international
conventions^ a protocol thereto., and nine resolu-
tions. The conventions are presently open for sig-
nature at the United Nations Headquarters in New
York. Folloioing is a statement made hy Arthur
H. Dean., chairman of the U.S. delegation., on the
closing day of the conference, April 28, together
with texts of the conventions, protocol, and
resolutions.'^
CLOSING STATEMENT BY MR. DEAN, APRIL 28
In putting before this conference the United
States proposal rehating to the breadth of the ter-
ritorial sea and to exclusive fishing rights in a con-
tiguous zone constituting a part of the high seas,
under certain limitations recognizing certain
rights of others than the coastal state, I made it
clear that the United States regarded this as a
realistic compromise and that it was made at con-
siderable sacrifice to United States interests.^
Our proposal was made in a sincere effort to
meet other countries' points of view with the sole
purpose of achieving international agreement
on these important matters. It was an effort to
reconcile the diverse and often conflicting interests
of those coastal states desiring a larger share in
the resources of the seas off their coasts and the in-
terests of those states desiring the broadest possible
freedom of the seas.
We greatly appreciate and wish to thank all
those who supported our proposal, which received
45 votes, or some 7 votes short of the two-thirds
majority required and yet considerably greater
support than any other proposal on this subject.
Every country must be the judge of its own posi-
tion and needs, and, while we are disappointed,
we have nothing to say about the decision made
here.
Our offer to agree on a 6-mile breadth of terri-
torial sea, provided agreement could be reached
on such a breadth under cei-tain conditions, was
For a statement made by Mr. Dean on Mar. 11, see
Bulletin of Apr. 7, 1958, p. 574.
' The U.S. compromise proposal provided :
"1. The maximum breadth of the territorial sea of any
state shall be six miles.
"2. The coastal state shall in a zone having a maxi-
mum breadth of twelve miles, measured from the ap-
plicable baseline, determined as provided in these rules,
have the same rights in respect of fishing and the exploi-
tation of the living resources of the sea as it has in its
territorial sea ; provided that such rights shall be subject
to the right of the vessels of any state whose vessels
have fished regularly in that portion of the zone having
a continuous baseline and located in the same major body
of water for the period of five years immediately preceding
the signature of this Convention, to fish in the outer six
miles of that portion of the zone, under obligation to ob-
serve therein such conservation regulations as are con-
mo
Department of State Bulletin
simply an offer and nothing more. Its nonaccept-
ance leaves the preexisting situation intact.
We are happy with the 3-mile rule. In our
judgment it is the principle giving the greatest
opportunity to all nations, large and small, new
and old, coastal and landlocked, because it is the
doctrine most consistent with freedom of the seas,
a time-tested and universally recognized principle.
We have made it clear from the beginning that
in our view the 3-mile rule is and will continue to
be established international law, to which we
adhere. It is the only breadth of the territorial
sea on which there has ever been anything like
sistent with rules on fisheries adopted by this Conference
and other rules of international law.
"3. Any dispute with respect to the interpretation or
application of this article shall, at the request of any
party to the dispute, be submitted to arbitration unless
the parties agree to another method of peaceful
solution.
"4. For the purposes of this Convention the term 'mile'
means a nautical mile (which is 1,852 meters), reckoned
at sixty to one degree of latitude.
"5. As respects the parties thereto, the provisions of
paragraph 2 of this article shall be subject to such bi-
lateral or multilateral arrangements, if any, as may exist
or be entered into.
"Note : It is proposed that this article be entered into
with the express understanding that each party to the
Convention undertaljes to consider sympathetically the
request of another party to consult on the question of
whether the rights granted by this article are being exer-
cised in such manner as to work an inequity upon one or
more of the other parties and, if so, what measures should
and can be taken to remedy the situation."
While this proposal indicated the United States was
prepared to depart from its traditional adherence to the
3-mile limit in order to achieve conference agreement, Mr.
Dean made it clear that the United States would continue
to adhere to the 3-mile limit unless the conference agreed
on a change in the traditional rule. He stated, for
example :
"My government stands firmly upon the view that the
three-mile limit is fully established as a principle of inter-
national law and that this principle can only be changed
by agreement. If we do not agree, our work here will be
a nullity and no statement, or proposal or argument, will
have any effect whatsoever to extend the breadth of the
territorial sea beyond three miles."
The vote on the U.S. compromise proposal was 45 for
and 33 against, with 7 abstaining. (The Xemen delega-
tion was absent.) While the U.S. proposal narrowly
missed obtaining the necessary two-thirds majority, it
was the only proposal on the subject which obtained the
affirmative vote of an absolute majority of the 86 con-
ference participants.
common agreement. Unilateral acts of states
claiming greater territorial seas are not only not
sanctioned by any principle of international law
but are, indeed, in conflict with the universally
accepted principle of freedom of the seas.
Furthermore we have made it clear that in our
view there is no obligation on the part of states
adhering to the 3-mile rule to recognize claims
on the part of other states to a greater breadth
of territorial sea. And on that we stand.
Wliile we consider that the 3-mile rule is exist-
ing international law, nevertheless we are still op-
timistic that upon reflection the great majority
of our good friends in the international community
will come to realize that international agreement
on the breadth of the territorial sea and on fishing
rights is necessary in order that a regime of law
may be effected and that the diverse and often
conflicting interests of national states may not
jeopardize the peace of the international com-
munity.
To this end we pledge our cooperation.
We sincerely believe that such international
agreement is possible, and we shall continue to
lend our efforts to that end.
CONVENTIONS ADOPTED BY CONFERENCE
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Con-
tiguous Zone '
The States Parties to this Conventioti
Have agreed as follows :
Part I: Teebitorial Sea
Section I. General
Article 1
1. The sovereignty of a State extends, beyond its land
territory and its internal waters, to a belt of sea adjacent
to its coast, described as the territorial sea.
2. This sovereignty is exercised subject to the provi-
sions of these articles and to other rules of international
law.
Article 2
The sovereignty of a coastal State extends to the air
space over the territorial sea as well as to its bed and
subsoil.
Section II. Limits of the Territorial Sea
Article 3
Except where otherwise provided in these articles, the
normal baseline for measuring the breadth of the terri-
' Adopted Apr. 27 (U.N. doc. A/CONF. 13/L. 52).
June 30, 1958
1111
torial sea is the low-water line along the coast as marked
on large-scale charts ofiBcially recognized by the coastal
State.
Article i
1. In localities where the coast line is deeply indented
and cut into, or if there is a fringe of islands along the
coast in its immediate vicinity, the method of straight
baselines joining appropriate points may be employed In
drawing the baseline from which the breadth of the terri-
torial sea is measured.
2. The drawing of such baselines must not depart to
any appreciable extent from the general direction of
the coast, and the sea areas lying within the lines must
be sufficiently closely linked to the land domain to be
subject to the regime of internal waters.
3. Baselines shall not be drawn to and from low-tide
elevations, unless lighthouses or similar installations
which are permanently above sea level have been built
on them.
4. Where the method of straight baselines is applicable
under the provisions of paragraph 1, account may be
taken, in determining particular baselines, of economic
interests peculiar to the region concerned, the reality and
the importance of which are clearly evidenced by a long
usage.
5. The system of straight baselines may not be applied
by a State in such a manner as to cut off from the high
seas the territorial sea of another State.
6. The coastal State mu.st clearly indicate straight base-
lines on charts, to which due publicity must be given.
Article 5
1. Waters on the landward side of the baseline of the
territorial sea form part of the internal waters of the
State.
2. Where the establishment of a straight baseline in
accordance with article 4 has the effect of enclosing as
internal waters areas which previously had been con-
sidered as part of the territorial sea or of the high seas,
a right of innocent passage, as provided in articles 14
to 23, shall exist in those waters.
Article 6
The outer limit of the territorial sea is the line every
point of which is at a distance from the nearest point
of the baseline equal to the breadth of the territorial sea.
Article 7
1. This article relates only to bays the coasts of which
belong to a single State.
2. For the purposes of these articles, a bay is a well-
marked indentation whose penetration is in such pro-
portion to the width of its mouth as to contain land-
locked waters and constitute more than a mere cur-
vature of the coast. An indentation shall not, however,
be regarded as a bay unless its area is as large as, or
larger than, that of the semi-circle whose diameter is a
line drawn across the mouth of that indentation.
3. For the purpose of measurement, the area of an
indentation is that lying between the low-water mark
around the shore of the indentation and a line joining
the low-water marks of its natural entrance
1112
Where, because of the presence of islands, an indentation
has more than one mouth, the semi-circle shall be drawn
on a line as long as the sum total of the lengths of the
lines across the different mouths. Islands within an in-
dentation shall be included as if they were part of the
water area of the indentation.
4. If the distance between the low-water marks of the
natural entrance points of a bay does not exceed twenty-
four miles, a closing line may be drawn between these
two low-water marks, and the waters enclosed thereby
shall be considered as internal waters.
5. Where the distance between the low-water marks
of the natural entrance points of a bay exceeds twenty-
four miles, a straight baseline of twenty-four miles shall
be drawn within the bay in such a manner as to enclose
the maximum area of water that is possible with a line
of that length.
6. The foregoing provisions shall not apply to so-called
"historic" bays or in any case where the straight base-
line system provided for in article 4 is applied.
Article 8
For the purpose of delimiting the territorial sea, the
outermost permanent harbour works which form an in-
tegral part of the harbour system shall be regarded
as forming part of the coast.
Article 9
Roadsteads which are normally used for the loading,
unloading and anchoring of ships, and which would
otherwise be situated wholly or partly outside the outer
limit of the territorial sea, are included in the territorial
sea. The coastal State must clearly demarcate such
roadsteads and indicate them on charts together with
their boundaries, to which due publicity must be given.
Article 10
1. An island is a naturally-formed area of land, sur-
rounded by water, which is above water at high-tide.
2. The territorial sea of an island is measured in
accordance with the provisions of these articles.
Article 11
1. A low-tide elevation is a naturally-formed area of
land which is surrounded by and above water at low-
tide but submerged at high tide. Where a low-tide ele-
vation is situated wholly or partly at a distance not
exceeding the breadth of the territorial sea from the
mainland or an island, the low-water line on that eleva-
tion may be used as the baseline for measuring the
breadth of the territorial sea.
2. Where a low-tide elevation is wholly situated at a
distance exceeding the breadth of the territorial sea
from the mainland or an island, it has no territorial sea
of its own.
Article 12
1. Where the coasts of two States are opposite or ad-
jacent to each other, neither of the two States is entitled,
failing agreement between them to the contrary, to extend
its territorial sea beyond the median line every point of
which is equidistant from the nearest points on the base-
lines from which the breadth of the territorial seas of
each of the two States is measured. The provisions of
Depatimsni of Sfafe Bullefin
this paragraph shall not apply, however, where it is neces-
sary by reason of historic title or other special circum-
stances to delimit the territorial seas of the two States in
a way which is at variance with this provision.
2. The line of delimitation between the territorial seas
of two States lying opposite to each other or adjacent to
each other shall be marked on large-scale charts officially
recognized by the coastal States.
Article 13
If a river flows directly into the sea, the baseline shall
be a straight line across the mouth of the river between
points on the low-tide line of its banks.
Section II. Right of Innocent Passage
Sub-Section A. Rules applicable to All Ships
Article I4
1. Subject to the provisions of these articles, ships of all
States, whether coastal or not, shall enjoy the right of in-
nocent passage through the territorial sea.
2. Passage means navigation through the territorial sea
for the purpose either of traversing that sea without en-
tering internal waters, or of proceeding to internal
waters, or of making for the high seas from internal
waters.
3. Passage includes stopping and anchoring, but only
in so far as the same are incidental to ordinary naviga-
tion or are rendered necessary by force majeure or by
4. Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial
to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State.
Such passage shall take place in conformity with these
articles and with other rules of international law.
5. Passage of foreign fishing vessels shall not be con-
sidered innocent if they do not observe such laws and
regulations as the coastal State may make and publish
in order to prevent these vessels from fishing in the ter-
ritorial sea.
6. Submarines are required to navigate on the surface
and to show their flag.
Article 15
1. The coastal State must not hamper innocent passage
through the territorial sea.
2. The coastal State is required to give appropriate
publicity to any dangers to navigation, of which it has
knowledge, within its territorial sea.
Article 16
1. The coastal State may take the necessary steps in its
territorial sea to prevent passage which is not innocent.
2. In the case of ships proceeding to internal waters,
the coastal State shall also have the right to take the
necessary steps to prevent any breach of the conditions
to which admission of those ships to those waters is
subject.
3. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 4, the coastal
State may, without discrimination amongst foreign ships,
suspend temporarily in specified areas of its territorial
sea the innocent passage of foreign ships if such suspen-
sion is essential for the protection of its security. Such
suspension shall take effect only after having been duly
published.
4. There shall be no suspension of the innocent passage
of foreign ships through straits which are used for inter-
national navigation between one part of the high seas
and another part of the high seas or the territorial sea
of a foreign State.
Article 11
Foreign ships exercising the right of innocent passage
shall comply with the laws and regulations enacted by
the coastal State in conformity with these articles and
other rules of international law and, in particular, with
such laws and regulations relating to transport and
navigation.
Sub-Section B. Rules applicable to Merchant Ships
Article 18
1. No charge may be levied upon foreign ships by rea-
son only of their passage through the territorial sea.
2. Charges may be levied upon a foreign ship passing
through the territorial sea as payment only for specific
services rendered to the ship. These charges shall be
levied without discrimination.
Article 19
1. The criminal jurisdiction of the coastal State should
not be exercised on board a foreign ship passing through
the territorial sea to arrest any person or to conduct any
investigation in connexion with any crime committed on
board the ship during its passage, save only in the
following cases :
(a) If the consequences of the crime extend to the
coastal State ; or
(b) If the crime is of a kind to disturb the peace of
the country or the good order of the territorial sea ; or
(e) If the assistance of the local authorities has been
requested by the captain of the ship or by the consul
of the country whose flag the ship files ; or
(d) If it is necessary for the suppression of illicit
traflie in narcotic drugs.
2. The above provisions do not affect the right of the
coastal State to take any steps authorized by its laws for
the purpose of an arrest or Investigation on board a
foreign ship passing through the territorial sea after
leaving internal waters.
3. In the cases provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of
this article, the coastal State shall, if the captain so
requests, advise the consular authority of the flag State
before taking any steps, and shall facilitate contact be-
tween such authority and the ship's crew. In cases of
emergency this notification may be communicated while
the measures are being taken.
4. In considering whether or how an arrest should be
made, the local authorities shall pay due regard to the
interests of navigation.
5. The coastal State may not take any steps on board a
foreign ship passing through the territorial sea to arrest
any person or to conduct any investigation in connexion
with any crime committed before the ship entered the
territorial sea, if the ship, proceeding from a foreign port,
is only passing through the territorial sea without enter-
ing internal waters.
ivne 30, 1958
1113
Article 20
1. The coastal State should not stop or divert a foreign
ship passing through the territorial sea for the purpose
of exercising civil jurisdiction in relation to a person on
board the ship.
2. The coastal State may not levy execution against or
arrest the ship for the purpose of any civil proceedings,
save only in respect of obligations or liabilities assumed
or incurred by the ship itself in the course or for the pur-
pose of its voyage through the waters of the coastal State.
3. The provisions of the previous paragraph are vrithout
prejudice to the right of the coastal State, in accordance
with its laws, to levy execution against or to arrest, for
the purpose of any civil proceedings, a foreign ship lying
in the territorial sea, or passing through the territorial
sea after leaving internal waters.
Sub-Section C. Rules applicaUe to Oovernment Ships
other than Warships
Article 21
The rules contained in sub-sections A and B shall also
apply to government ships operated for commercial
Article 22
1. The rules contained in sub-section A and in article
19 shall apply to government ships operated for non-com-
mercial purposes.
2. With such exceptions as are contained in the pro-
visions referred to in the preceding paragraph, nothing
in these articles affects the immunities which such ships
enjoy under these articles or other rules of international
law.
Sul-Section D. Rule applicable to Warships
Article 23
If any warship does not comply with the regulations of
the coastal State concerning passage through the terri-
torial sea and disregards any request for compliance
which is made to it, the coastal State may require the
warship to leave the territorial sea.
Part II. Contiguous Zone
Article 24
1. In a zone of the high seas contiguous to its territorial
sea, the coastal State may exercise the control necessary
to:
(a) Prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, im-
migration or sanitary regulations within its territory or
territorial sea ;
(b) Punish infringement of the above regulations com-
mitted within its territory or territorial sea.
2. The contiguous zone may not extend beyond twelve
miles from the baseline from which the breadth of the
territorial sea is measured.
3. Where the coasts of two States are opposite or
adjacent to each other, neither of the two States is en-
titled, failing agreement between them to the contrary,
to extend its contiguous zone beyond the median line every
point of which is equidistant from the nearest points
on the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial
seas of the two States is measured.
Pabt III. Final Abticles
Article 25
The provisions of this Convention shall not affect con-
ventions or other international agreements already in
force, as between States Parties to them.
Article 26
This Convention shall, until 31 October 1958, be open
for signature by all States Members of the United Nations
or of any of the specialized agencies, and by any other
State invited by the General Assembly to become a Party
to the Convention.
Article 27
This Convention is subject to ratification. The instru-
ments of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary-
General of the United Nations.
Article 28
This Convention shall be open for accession by any
States belonging to any of the categories mentioned in
article 26. The instruments of accession shall be deposited
with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Article 29
1. This Convention shall come into force on the thir-
tieth day following the date of deposit of the twenty-
second instrument of ratification or accession with the
Secretary-General of the United Nations.
2. For each State ratifying or acceding to the Conven-
tion after the deposit of the twenty-second instrument
of ratification or accession, the Convention shall enter
into force on the thirtieth day after deposit by such State
of its instrument of ratification or accession.
Article SO
1. After the expiration of a period of five years from
the date on which this Convention shall enter into force,
a request for the revision of this Convention may be made
at any time by any Contracting Party by means of a
notification in writing addressed to the Secretary-General.
2. The General Assembly of the United Nations shall
decide upon the steps, if any, to be taken in respect of
such request.
Article 31
Tlie Secretary-General of the United Nations shall
inform all States Members of the United Nations and the
other States referred to in article 26 :
(a) Of signatures to this Convention and of the deposit
of instruments of ratification or accession, in accordance
with articles 26, 27 and 28.
(b) Of the date on which this Convention will come into
force, in accordance with article 29.
(c) Of requests for revision in accordance with
article 30.
1114
Department of State BuHet'in
Article 32
The original of this Convention, of which the Chinese,
English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally
authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General
of the United Nations, who shall send certified copies
thereof to all States referred to in article 26.
In witness whereof the undersigned Plenipotentiaries,
being duly authorized thereto by their respective Govern-
ments, have signed this Convention.
Done at Geneva, this twenty-ninth day of April one
thousand nine hundred and fifty-eight.
the High Seas'
The States Parties to this Convention
Desiring to codify the rules of international law relat-
ing to the high seas.
Recognizing that the United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea, held at Geneva from 24 February
to 27 April 1958, adopted the following provisions as
generally declaratory of established principles of inter-
national law.
Have agreed as follows:
Article 1
The term "high seas" means all parts of the sea that
are not included in the territorial sea or in the internal
waters of a State.
Article 2
The high seas being open to all nations, no State may
validly purport to subject any part of them to its sover-
eignty. Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the
conditions laid down by these articles and by the other
rules of international law. It comprises, inter alia, both
for coastal and non-coastal States:
(1) Freedom of navigation ;
(2) Freedom of fishing;
(3) Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines;
(4) Freedom to fly over the high seas.
These freedoms, and others which are recognized by the
general principles of international law, shall be exercised
by all States with reasonable regard to the interests of
other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high
seas.
Article 3
1. In order to enjoy the freedom of the seas on equal
terms with coastal States, States having no sea-coast
should have free access to the sea. To this end a State
situated between the sea and a State having no sea-coast
shall by common agreement with the latter and in con-
formity with existing international conventions accord :
(a) to the State having no sea-coast, on a basis of
reciprocity, free transit through their territory, and
(b) to ships flying the flag of that State treatment
equal to that accorded to their own ships, or to the ships
of any other States, as regards access to sea ports and
the use of such ports.
•Adopted Apr. 27 (U.N. doc. A/CONF. 13/L.53 and
corr. 1).
June 30, 1958
2. A State situated between the sea and the State
having no .sea-coast shall settle, by mutual agreement
with the latter, and taking into account the rights of
the coastal State or State of transit and the special con-
ditions of the State having no sea-coast, all matters
relating to freedom of transit and equal treatment in
ports, in case such States are not already parties to
existing international conventions.
Article 4
Every State, whether coastal or not, has the right to
sail ships under its flag on the high seas.
Article 5
1. Each State shall fix the conditions for the grant of
its nationality to ships, for the registration of ships in
its territory, and for the right to fly its flag. Ships have
the nationality of the State whose flag they are entitled
to fly. There must exist a genuine linli between the
State and the ship; in particular, the State must effec-
tively exercise its jurisdiction and control in adminis-
trative, technical and social matters over ships flying
its flag.
2. Each State shall issue to ships to which it has
granted the right to fly its flag documents to that effect.
Article 6
1. Ships shall sail under the flag of one State only and,
save in exceptional cases expressly provided for in inter-
national treaties or in these articles, shall be subject to
its exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas. A ship may
not change its flag during a voyage or while in a port
of call, save in the case of a real transfer of ownership
or change of registry.
2. A ship which sails under the flags of two or more
States, using them according to convenience, may not
claim any of the nationalities in question with respect
to any other State, and may be assimilated to a ship
without nationality.
Article 7
The provisions of the preceding articles do not prejudice
the question of ships employed on the official service of an
intergovernmental organization flying the flag of the
organization.
Article S
1. Warships on the high seas have complete immunity
from the jurisdiction of any State other than the flag
State.
2. For the purposes of these articles, the term "war-
ship" means a ship belonging to the naval forces of a
State and bearing the external marks distinguishing war-
ships of its nationality, under the command of an officer
duly commissioned by the government and whose name
appears in the Navy List, and manned by a crew who are
under regular naval discipline.
Article 9
Ships owned or operated by a State and used only on
government non-commercial service shall, on the high
seas, have complete immunity from the jurisdiction of
any State other than the flag State.
1115
Article 10
1. Every State shall take such measures for ships under
its flag as are necessary to ensure safety at sea with
regard inter alia to :
(a) the use of signals, the maintenance of communi-
cations and the prevention of collisions ;
(b) the manning of ships and labour conditions for
crews taking into account the applicable international
labour instruments ;
(c) the construction, equipment and seaworthiness of
ships.
2. In taking such measures each State is required to
conform to generally accepted international standards
and to take any steps which may be necessary to ensure
their observance.
Article 11
1. In the event of a collision or of any other incident
of navigation concerning a ship on the high seas, involv-
ing the penal or disciplinary responsibility of the master
or of any other person in the service of the ship, no penal
or disciplinary proceedings may be instituted against such
persons except before the judicial or administrative au-
thorities either of the flag State or of the State of which
such person is a national.
2. In disciplinary matters, the State which has issued
a master's certificate or a certificate of competence or
licence shall alone be competent, after due legal process,
to pronounce the withdrawal of such certificates, even if
the holder is not a national of the State which issued
them.
3. No arrest or detention of the ship, even as a meas-
ure of investigation, shall be ordered by any authorities
other than those of the flag State.
Article 12
1. Every State shall require the master of a ship sail-
ing under its flag, in so far as he can do so without seri-
ous danger to the ship, the crew or the passengers,
(a) to render assistance to any person found at sea in
danger of being lost ;
(b) to proceed with all possible speed to the rescue of
persons in distress if informed of their need of assistance,
in so far as such action may reasonably be expected of
him;
(c) after a collision, to render assistance to the other
ship, her crew and her passengers and, where possible,
to inform the other ship of the name of his own ship, her
port of registry and the nearest port at which she will
call.
2. Every coastal State shall promote the establishment
and maintenance of an adequate and effective search and
rescue service regarding safety on and over the sea and —
where circumstances so require — by way of mutual re-
gional arrangements co-operate with neighbouring States
for this purpose.
Article 13
Every State shall adopt effective measures to prevent
and punish the transport of slaves in ships authorized to
fly its flag, and to prevent the unlawful use of its flag
1116
for that purpose. Any slave taking refuge on board any
ship, whatever its flag, shall ipso facto be free.
Article 14
All States shall co-operate to the fullest possible ex-
tent in the repression of piracy on the high seas or in any
other place outside the jurisdiction of any State.
Article 15
Piracy consists of any of the following acts :
(1) Any illegal acts of violence, detention or any act
of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew
or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft,
and directed :
(a) On the high seas, against another ship or aircraft,
or against persons or property on board such ship or
aircraft ;
(b) Against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a
place outside the jurisdiction of any State ;
(2) Any act of voluntary participation in the opera-
tion of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts
making it a pirate ship or aircraft ;
(3) Any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating
an act described in sub-paragraph 1 or sub-paragraph 2 of
this article.
Article 16
The acts of piracy, as defined in article 15, committed
by a warship, government ship or government aircraft
whose crew has mutinied and taken control of the ship
or aircraft are assimilated to acts committed by a private
ship.
Article 11
A ship or aircraft is considered a pirate ship or aircraft
if it is intended by the persons in dominant control to be
used for the purpose of committing one of the acts re-
ferred to in article 15. The same applies if the ship or
aircraft has been used to commit any such act, so long
as it remains under the control of the iwrsons guilty of
that act.
Article IS
A ship or aircraft may retain its nationality although
it has become a pirate ship or aircraft. The retention
or loss of nationality is determined by the law of the
State from which such nationality was originally derived.
Article 19
On the high seas, or in any other place outside the
jurisdiction of any State, every Sttite may seize a pirate
ship or aircraft, or a ship taken by piracy and under the
control of pirates, and arrest the persons and seize the
property on board. The courts of the State which carried
out the seizure may decide upon the penalties to be im-
posed, and may also determine the action to be taken with
regard to the ships, aircraft or property, subject to the
rights of third parties acting in good faith.
Article 20
Where the seizure of a ship or aircraft on suspicion of
piracy has been effected without adequate grounds, the
State making the seizure shall be liable to the State the
Department of Slate Bulletin
nationality of which is possessed by the ship or aircraft,
for any loss or damage caused by the seizure.
Article 21
A seizure on account of piracy may only be carried out
by warships or military aircraft, or other ships or air-
craft on government sei-vice authorized to that effect.
Article 22
1. Except where acts of interference derive from powers
conferred by treaty, a warship which encounters a foreign
merchant ship on the high seas is not justified in boarding
her unless there is reasonable ground for suspecting :
(a) That the ship is engaged in piracy ; or
(b) That the ship is engaged in the slave trade; or
(c) That, though flying a foreign flag or refusing to
show its flag, the ship is, in reality, of the same national-
ity as the warship.
2. In the cases provided for in sub-paragraph (a), (b)
and (c) above, the warship may proceed to verify the
ship's right to fly its flag. To this end, it may send a boat
under the command of an ofl3cer to the suspected ship. If
suspicion remains after the documents have been checked,
it may proceed to a further examination on board the ship,
which must be carried out with all possible consideration.
3. If the suspicions prove to be unfounded, and provided
that the ship boarded has not committed any act justi-
fying them, it shall be compensated for any loss or damage
that may have been sustained.
Article 23
1. The hot pursuit of a foreign ship may be undertalien
when the competent authorities of the coastal State have
good reason to believe that the ship has violated the laws
and regulations of that State. Such pursuit must be
commenced when the foreign ship or one of its boats is
within the internal waters or the territorial sea or the con-
tiguous zone of the pursuing State, and may only be con-
tinued outside the territorial sea or the contiguous zone
if the pursuit has not been interrupted. It is not necessary
that, at the time when the foreign ship within the terri-
torial sea or the contiguous zone receives the order to stop,
the ship giving the order should likewise he within the
territorial sea or the contiguous zone. If the foreign ship
is within a contiguous zone, as defined in article 24 of the
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone, the pursuit may only be undertaken if there has
been a violation of the rights for the protection of which
the zone was established.
2. The right of hot pursuit ceases as soon as the ship
pursued enters the territorial sea of its own country
or of a third State.
3. Hot pursuit is not deemed to have begun unless the
pursuing ship has satisfied itself by such practicable
means as may be available that the ship pursued or one
of its boats or other craft working as a team and using
the ship pursued as a mother ship are within the limits
of the territorial sea, or as the case may be within the
contiguous zone. The pursuit may only be commenced
after a visual or auditory signal to stop has been given
at a distance which enables it to be seen or heard by the
foreign ship.
4. The right of hot pursuit may be exercised only by
warships or military aircraft, or other ships or aircraft
on government service specially authorized to that effect.
5. Where hot pursuit is effected by an aircraft:
(a) The provisions of paragraph 1 to 3 of the present
article shall apply mutatis mutandis;
(b) The aircraft giving the order to stop must itself
actively pursue the ship until a ship or aircraft of the
coastal State, summoned by the aircraft, arrives to take
over the pursuit, unless the aircraft is itself able to
arrest the ship. It does not suflice to justify an arrest on
the high seas that the ship was merely sighted by the air-
craft as an offender or suspected offender, if it was not
both ordered to stop and pursued by the aircraft itself
or other aircraft or ships which continue the pursuit
without interruption.
6. The release of a ship arrested within the jurisdiction
of a State and escorted to a port of that State for the
purposes of an enquiry before the competent authorities,
may not be claimed solely on the ground that the ship,
in the course of its voyage, was escorted across a portion
of the high seas, if the circumstances rendered this
necessary.
7. Where a ship has been stopped or arrested on the
high seas in circumstances which do not justify the exer-
cise of the right of hot pursuit, it shall be compensated
for any loss or damage that may have been thereby
sustained.
Article 2k
Every State shall draw up regulations to prevent pollu-
tion of the seas by the discharge of oil from ships or pipe-
lines or resulting from the exploitation and exploration of
the seabed and its subsoil, taking account of existing
treaty provisions on the subject.
Article 25
1. Every State shall take measures to prevent pollution
of the seas from the dumping of radioactive waste, taking
into account any standards and regulations which may
be formulated by the competent international organi-
zations.
2. All States shall co-operate with the competent inter-
national organizations in taking measures for the pre-
vention of pollution of the seas or air space above, result-
ing from any activities with radioactive materials or
other harmful agents.
Article 2G
1. All States shall be entitled to lay submarine cables
and pipelines on the bed of the high seas.
2. Subject to its right to take reasonable measures for
the exploration of the continental shelf and the exploita-
tion of its natural resources, the coastal State may not
impede the laying or maintenance of such cables or
pipelines.
3. When laying such cables or pipelines the State in
question shall pay due regard to cables or pipelines al-
ready in position on the seabed. In particular, possibili-
ties of repairing existing cables or pipelines shall not be
prejudiced.
June 30, 1958
1117
Article 27
Every State shall take the necessary legislative meas-
ures to provide that the breaking or injury by a ship
flying its flag or by a person subject to its jurisdiction
of a submarine cable beneath the high seas done wilfully
or through culpable negligence, in such a manner as to be
liable to interrupt or obstruct telegraphic or telephonic
communications, and similarly the breaking or injury of
a submarine pipeline or high-voltage power cable shall be
a punishable offence. This provision shall not apply to
any break or injury caused by persons who acted merely
with the legitimate object of saving their lives or their
ships, after having taken all necessary precautions to
avoid such break or injury.
Article 28
Every State shall take the necessary legislative meas-
ures to provide that, if persons subject to its jurisdiction
who are the owners of a cable or pipeline beneath the
high seas, in laying or repairing that cable or pipeline,
cause a break in or injury to another cable or pipeline,
they shall bear the cost of the repairs.
Article 29
Every State shall take the necessary legi.slative meas-
ures to ensure that the owners of ships who can prove
that they have sacrificed an anchor, a net or any other
fishing gear, in order to avoid injuring a submarine cable
or pipeline, shall be indemnified by the owner of the cable
or pipeline, provided that the owner of the ship has taken
all reasonable precautionary measures beforehand.
Article SO
The provisions of this Convention shall not affect Con-
ventions or other international agreements already in
force, as between States Parties to them.
Article 31
This Convention shall, until 31 October 1958, be open
for signature by all States Members of the United Nations
or of any of the Specialized Agencies, by any other State
invited to take part in the United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea, and by any other State invited by
the General Assembly to become a Party to the Con-
vention.
Article 32
This Convention is subject to ratification. The instru-
ments of ratification shall be deposited with the Secre-
tary-General of the United Nations.
Article 33
This Convention shall be open for accession by any
States belonging to any of the categories mentioned in
article 31. The instruments of accession shall be de-
posited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Article SJ,
1. This Convention shall come into force on the thir-
tieth day following the date of deposit of the twenty-
second instrument of ratification or accession with the
Secretary-General of the United Nations.
2. For each State ratifying or acceding to the Conven-
tion after the deposit of the twenty-second instrument of
ratification or accession, the Convention shall enter into
force on the thirtieth day after deposit by such State
of its instruments of ratification or accession.
Article 35
1. After the expiration of a period of five years from
the date on which this Convention shall enter into force
a request for the revision of this Convention may be made
at any time by any Contracting Party by means of a
notification in writing addressed to the Secretary-General.
2. The General Assembly of the United Nations shall de-
cide upon the steps, if any, to be taken in respect of such
request.
Article 36
The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall in-
form all States Members of the United Nations and the
other States referred to in article 31 :
(a) Of signatures to this Convention and of the deposit
of instruments of ratification or accession, in accordance
with articles 31, 32 and 33.
(b) Of the date on which this Convention will come
into force, in accordance with article 34;
(c) Of requests for revision in accordance with article
35.
Article 37
The original of this Convention of which the Chinese,
English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally
authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General
of the United Nations who shall send certified copies
thereof to all States referred to in article 31.
In icitness whereof the undersigned Plenipotentiaries,
being duly authorized thereto by their respective Govern-
ments, have signed this Convention.
Done at Geneva, this twenty-ninth day of April one
thousand nine hundred and fifty-eight.
Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Liv-
ing Resources of the High Seas '
The States Parties to this Convention,
Considering that the development of modern tech-
niques for the exploitation of the living resources of
the sea, increasing man's ability to meet the need of the
world's expanding population for food, has exposed some
of these resources to the danger of being over-exploited,
Considering also that the nature of the problems in-
volved in the conservation of the living resources of the
high seas is such that there is a clear necessity that they
be solved, whenever possible, on the basis of interna-
tional co-operation through the concerted action of all
the States concerned.
Have agreed as follows:
Article 1
1. All States have the right for their nationals to en-
gage in fishing on the high seas, subject (a) to their
treaty obligations, (b) to the interests and rights of
coastal States as provided for in this convention, and
'Adopted Apr. 26 (U.N. doc. A/COXF. 13/L. 54 and
Add. 1).
1118
Department of State Bulletin
(c) to the provisions contained in the following articles
concerning conservation of the living resources of the
high seas.
2. All States have the duty to adopt, or to co-operate
with other States in adopting, such measures for their
respective nationals as may be necessary for the con-
servation of the living resources of the high seas.
Article 2
As employed in this Convention, the expression "con-
servation of the living resources of the high seas" means
the aggregate of the measures rendering possible the
optimum sustainable yield from those resources so as to
secure a maximum supply of food and other marine
products. Conservation programmes should be formu-
lated with a view to securing in the first place a supply
of food for human consumption.
Article 3
A State whose nationals are engaged in fishing any
stock or stocks of fish or other living marine resources
in any area of the high seas where the nationals of
other States are not thus engaged shall adopt, for its
own nationals, measures in that area when necessary for
the purpose of the conservation of the living resources
affected.
Article 4
1. If the nationals of two or more States are en-
gaged in fishing the same stock or stocks of fish or other
living marine resources in any area or areas of the high
seas, these States shall, at the request of any of them,
enter into negotiations with a view to prescribing by agree-
ment for their nationals the necessary measures for the
conservation of the living resources affected.
2. If the States concerned do not reach agreement with-
in twelve months, any of the jiarties may initiate the
procedure contemplated by article 9.
Article 5
1. If, subsequent to the adoption of the measui-es re-
ferred to in articles 3 and 4, nationals of other States
engage in fishing the same stock or stocks of fish or other
living marine resources in any area or areas of the high
seas, the other States shall apply the measures, which
shall not be discriminatory in form or in fact, to their
own nationals not later than seven months after the date
on which the measures shall have been notified to the
Director General of the Food and Agriculture Organiza-
tion of the United Nations. The Director General shall
notify such measures to any State which so requests and,
in any case, to any State specified by the State initiating
the measure.
2. If these other States do not accept the measures so
adopted and if no agreement can be reached within twelve
months, any of the interested parties may initiate the
procedure contemplated by article 9. Subject to para-
graph 2 of article 10, the measures adopted shall remain
obligatory pending the decision of the special commission.
Article 6
1. A coastal State has a special interest in the mainte-
nance of the productivity of the living resources in any
area of the high seas adjacent to its territorial sea.
June 30, J 958
2. A coastal State is entitled to take part on an equal
footing in any system of research and regulation for
purposes of conservation of the living resources of the
high seas in that area, even though its nationals do not
carry on fishing there.
3. A State whose nationals are engaged in fishing in
any area of the high seas adjacent to the territorial sea
of a coastal State shall, at the request of that coastal
State, enter into negotiations with a view to prescribing
by agreement the measures necessary for the conservation
of the living resources of the higli seas in that area.
4. A State whose nationals are engaged in fishing in any
area of the high seas adjacent to the territorial sea of a
coastal State shall not enforce comservation measures in
that area which are opposed to those which have been
adopted by the coastal State, but may enter into nego-
tiations with the coastal State with a view to prescribing
by agreement the measures necessary for the conservation
of the living resources of the high seas in that area.
5. If the States concerned do not reach agreement with
respect to conservation measures within twelve mouths,
any of the parties may initiate the procedure contem-
plated by article 9.
Article 7
1. Having regard to the provisions of paragraph 1 of
article 6, any coastal State may, with a view to the main-
tenance of the productivity of the living resources of the
.sea, adopt unilateral measures of conservation appropriate
to any stock of fish or other marine resources in any area
of the high seas adjacent to its territorial sea, provided
that negotiations to that effect with the other States con-
cerned have not led to an agreement within six months.
2. The measures which the coastal State adopts under
the previous paragi-aph shall be valid as to other States
only if the following requirements are fulfilled :
(a) That there is a need for urgent application of con-
servation measures in the light of the existing knowledge
of the fishery ;
(b) That the measures adopted are based on appro-
priate scientific findings;
(c) That such measures do not discriminate in form or
in fact against foreign fishermen.
3. These measures shall remain in force pending the
settlement, in accordance with the relevant provisions
of this Convention, of any disagreement as to their
validity.
4. If the measures are not accepted by the other States
concerned, any of the parties may Initiate the procedure
contemplated by article 9. Subject to paragraph 2 of
article 10, the measures adopted shall remain obligatory
pending the decision of the special commission.
5. The principles of geographical demarcation as defined
in article 12 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and
the Contiguous Zone shall be adopted when coasts of
diflereut States are involved.
Article 8
1. Any State which, even if its nationals are not en-
gaged in fishing in an area of the high seas not adjacent
1119
to its coast, has a special interest in the conservation of
the living resources of the high seas in that area, may
request the State or States whose nationals are engaged
in fishing there to talie the necessary measures of con-
servation under articles 3 and 4 respectively, at the same
time mentioning the scientific reasons which in its opinion
make such measures necessary, and indicating its special
interest.
2. If no agreement is reached within twelve months,
such State may initiate the procedure contemplated by
article 9.
Article 9
1. Any dispute which may arise between States under
articles 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 shall, at the request of any of the
parties, be submitted for settlement to a special com-
mission of five members, unless the parties agree to seek
a solution by another method of peaceful settlement, as
provided for in Article 33 of the Charter of the United
Nations.
2. The members, one of whom shall be designated as
chairman, shall be named by agreement between the
States in dispute within three months of the request for
settlement in accordance with the provisions of this
article. Failing agreement they shall, upon the request
of any State party, be named by the Secretar.y-General
of the United Nations, within a further three-month
period, in consultation with the States in dispute and
with the President of the International Court of Justice
and the Director-General of the Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations, from amongst well-
•qualifled persons being nationals of States not involved
in the dispute and specializing in legal, administrative
or scientific questions relating to fisheries, depending
upon the nature of the dispute to be settled. Any vacancy
arising after the original appointment shall be filled in
the same manner as provided for the initial selection.
3. Any State party to proceedings under these articles
shall have the right to name one of its nationals to the
special commission, with the right to participate fully
in the proceedings on the same footing as a member
of the commission but without the right to vote or to
take part in the writing of the commission's decision.
4. The commission shall determine its own procedure,
assuring each party to the proceedings a full opportunity
to be heard and to present its case. It shall also deter-
mine how the costs and expenses shall be divided be-
tween the parties to the dispute, faiUng agreement by
the parties on this matter.
5. The special commission shall render its decision
■within a period of five months from the time it is ap-
pointed unless it decides, in case of necessity, to extend
the time limit for a period not exceeding three months.
6. The special commission shall, in reaching its de-
cision.?, adhere to these articles and to any special agree-
ments between the disputing parties regarding settlement
of the di.spute.
7. Decisions of the commission shall be by majority
vote.
Article 10
1. The special commission shall, in disputes arising
xinder article 7, apply the criteria listed in paragraph 2
of that article. In disputes under articles 4, 5, 6 and
8 the commission shall apply the following criteria,
according to the issues involved in the dispute:
(a) Common to the determination of disputes arising
imder articles 4, 5 and 6 are the requirements :
(i) That scientific findings demonstrate the necessity
of conservation measures ;
(ii) That the specific measures are based on scientific
findings and are practicable; and
(iii) That the measures do not discriminate, in form
or in fact, against fishermen of other States.
(b) Applicable to the determination of disputes arising
under article 8 is the requirement that scientific findings
demonstrate the necessity for conservation measures, or
that the conservation programme is adequate, as the
case may be.
2. The special commission may decide that pending
its award the measures in dispute shall not be applied,
provided that, in the case of disputes under article 7,
the measures shall only be suspended when it is apparent
to the commission on the basis of prima facie evidence
that the need for the urgent application of such measures
does not exist.
Article 11
The decisions of the special commission shall be bind-
ing on the States concerned and the provisions of para-
graph 2 of Article 94 of the Charter of the United Nations
shall be applicable to those decisions. If the decision
is accompanied by any recommendations, they shall
receive the greatest possible consideration.
Article 12
1. If the factual basis of the award of the special
commission is altered by substantial changes in the
conditions of the stock or stocks of fish or other living
marine resources or in methods of fishing, any of the
States concerned may request the other States to enter
into negotiations with a view to prescribing by agreement
the necessary modifications in the measures of conserva-
tion.
2. If no agreement is reached within a reasonable
period of time, any of the States concerned may again
resort to the procedure contemplated by article 9 provided
that at least two years have elapsed from the original
award.
Article 13
1. The regulation of fisheries conducted by means of
equipment embedded in the floor of the sea in areas of
the high seas adjacent to the territorial sea of a State
may be undertaken by that State where such fisheries
have long been maintained and conducted by its nationals,
provided that non-nationals are permitted to participate
in such activities on an equal footing with nationals
except in areas where such fisheries have by long usage
been exclusively enjoyed by such nationals. Such regu-
lations will not, however, affect the general status of
the areas as high seas.
2. In this article, the expression "fisheries conducted
by means of equipment embedded In the floor of the
1120
Department of State Bulletin
sea" means those fisheries using gear with supporting
members embedded in the sea floor, constructed on a
site and left there to operate permanently, or if removed,
restored each season ou the same site.
Article H
In articles 1, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8, the term "nationals" means
fishing boats or craft of any size having the nationality
of the State concerned, according to the law of that State,
irrespective of the nationality of the members of their
crews.
Article 15
This Convention shall, until SI Octoher 1958, be open
for signature by all States Members of the United Nations
or of any of the specialized agencies, and by any other
State invited by the General Assembly to become a Party
to the Convention.
Article 16
This Convention is subject to ratification. The in-
struments of ratification shall be deposited with the Secre-
tary-General of the United Nations.
Article 17
This Convention shall be open for accession by any
States belonging to any of the categories mentioned in
article 15. The instruments of accession shall be de-
posited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Article 18
1. This Convention shall come into force on the thirtieth
day following the date of deposit of the twenty-second
instrument of ratification or accession with the Secretary-
General of the United Nations.
2. For each State ratifying or acceding to the Conven-
tion after the deposit of the twenty-second instrument of
ratification or accession, the Convention shall enter into
force on the thirtieth day after deposit by such State of
its instruments of ratification or accession.
Article 19
1. At the time of signature, ratification or accession,
any State may make reservations to articles of the Con-
vention other than to articles 6, 7, 9, 10, 11 and 12
inclusive.
2. Any Contracting State making a reservation in ac-
cordance with the preceding paragraph may at any time
withdraw the reservation by a communication to that
effect addressed to the Secretary-General of the United
Nations.
Article 20
1. After the expiration of a period of five years from
the date on which this Convention shall enter into force
a request for the revision of this Convention may be made
at any time by any Contracting Party by means of a
notification in writing addressed to the Secretary-General.
2. The General Assembly of the United Nations shall
decide upon the steps, if any, to be taken in respect of
such request.
Article 21
The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall in-
form all States Members of the United Nations and the
other States referred to in article 15 :
(a) Of signatures to this Convention and of the de-
posit of instruments of ratification or accession, in accord-
ance with articles 15, 16 and 17 ;
(b) Of the date on which this Convention will come
into force, in accordance with article 18 ;
(c) Of requests for revision in accordance with article
20;
(d) Of reservations to this Convention, in accordance
with article 19.
Article 22
The original of this Convention of which the Chinese,
English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally
authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General
of the United Nations, who shall send certified copies
thereof to all States referred to in article 15.
In ivitness whereof the undersigned Plenipotentiaries,
being duly authorized thereto by their respective Gov-
ernments, have signed this Convention.
Done at Geneva, this twenty-ninth day of April one
thousand nine hundred and fifty-eight.
Convention on the Continental Shelf <
The States Parties to this Convention,
Have agreed as follows:
Article 1
For the purpose of these articles, the term "continental
shelf" is used as referring (a) to the seabed and subsoil
of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside
the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres
or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the super-
jacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural
resources of the said areas; (b) to the seabed and sub-
soil of similar submarine areas adjacent to the coasts of
islands.
Article 2
1. The coastal State exercises over the continental shelf
sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring it and ex-
ploiting its natural resources.
2. The rights referred to in par.i graph 1 of this article
are exclusive in the sense that if the coastal State does
not explore the continental shelf or exploit its natural
resources, no one may undertake these activities, or make
a claim to the continental shelf, without the express con-
sent of the coastal State.
3. The rights of the coastal State over the continental
shelf do not depend on occupation, effective or notional,
or on any express proclamation.
4. The natural resources referred to in these articles
consist of the mineral and other non-living resources of
the sea-bed and subsoil together with living organisms
belonging to sedentary species, that is to say, organisms
which, at the harvestable stage, either are immobile on or
'Adopted Apr. 26 (U.N. doc. A/CONF. 13/L. 55).
June 30, 1958
1121
under the sea-bed or are unable to move except in con-
stant physical contact with the sea-bed or the subsoil.
Article 3
The rights of the coastal State over the continental
shelf do not affect the legal status of the superjacent
waters as high seas, or that of the airspace above those
waters.
Article 4
Subject to its right to take reasonable measures for
the exploration of the continental shelf and the exploita-
tion of its natural resources, the coastal State may not im-
pede the laying or maintenance of submarine cables or
pipe lines on the continental shelf.
Article 5
1. The exploration of the continental shelf and the ex-
ploitation of its natural resources must not result in any
unjustifiable interference with navigation, fishing or the
conservation of the living resources of the sea, nor result
in any interference with fundamental oceanographic or
other scientific research carried out with the intention of
open publication.
2. Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 6 of
this article, the coastal State is entitled to construct and
maintain or operate on the continental shelf installations
and other devices necessary for its exploration and the
exploitation of its natural resources, and to establish
safety zones around such installations and devices and
to take in those zones measures necessary for their
protection.
3. The safety zones referred to in paragraph 2 of this
article may extend to a distance of 500 metres around the
installations and other devices which have been erected,
measured from each point of their outer edge. Ships of
all nationalities must respect these safety zones.
4. Such installations and devices, though under the ju-
risdiction of the coastal State, do not possess the status
of islands. They have no territorial sea of their own.
and their presence does not affect the delimitation of the
territorial sea of the coastal State.
5. Due notice must be given of the construction of
any such installations, and permanent means for giving
warning of their presence must be maintained. Any in-
stallations which are abandoned or disused must be en-
tirely removed.
6. Neither the installations or device.s, nor the safety
zones around them may be established where interference
may be caused to the use of recognized sea. lanes essential
to international navigation.
7. The coastal State is obliged to undertake, in the
safety zones, all appropriate measures for the protection
of the living resources of the sea from harmful agents.
8. The consent of the coastal State shall be obtained
in respect of any research concerning the continental
shelf and undertaken there. Nevertheless, the coastal
State shall not normally withhold its consent if the re-
quest is submitted by a qualified institution with a view
to purely scientific research into the physical or biological
characteristics of the continental shelf, subject to the pro-
viso that the coastal State shall have the right, if it so
1122
desires, to participate or to be represented in the research,
and that in any event the results shall be published.
Article 6
1. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the
territories of two or more States whose coasts are op-
posite each other, the boundary of the continental shelf
appertaining to such States shall be determined by agree-
ment between them. In the absence of agreement, and
unless another boundary line is justified by special cir-
cumstances, the boundary is the median line, every point
of which is equidistant from the nearest points of the
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea
of each State is measured.
2. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the
territories of two adjacent States, the boundary of the
continental shelf shall be determined by agreement be-
tween them. In the absence of agreement, and unless
another boundary line is justified by special circum-
stances, the boundary shall be determined by application
of the principle of equidistance from the nearest points
of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial
sea of each State is measured.
3. In delimiting the boundaries of the continental shelf,
any lines which are drawn in accordance with the prin-
ciples set out in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article should
be defined with reference to charts and geographical fea-
tures as they exist at a particular date, and reference
should be made to fixed permanent Identifiable points
on the land.
Article 7
The provisions of these articles shall not prejudice the
right of the coastal State to exploit the subsoil by means
of tunnelling irrespective of the depth of water above the
Article 8
This Convention shall, until 31 October 1958, be open
for signature by all States Members of the United Na-
tions or of any of the specialized agencies, and by any
other State invited by the General Assembly to become a
Party to the Convention.
Article 9
This Convention is subject to ratification. The instru-
ments of ratification shall be deposited with the Secre-
tary-General of the United Nations.
Article 10
This Convention shall be open for accession by any
States belonging to any of the categories mentioned in
article 8. The instruments of accession shall be deposited
with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Article 11
1. This Convention shall come into force on the thir-
tieth day following the date of deposit of the twenty-sec-
ond instrument of ratification or accession with the
Secretary-General of the United Nations.
2. For each State ratifying or acceding to the Con-
vention after the deposit of the twent.v-.second instrument
of ratification or accession, the Convention shall enter
Department of State Bulletin
into force on the thirtieth day after deposit by such
State of its instruments of ratification or accession.
Article 12
1. At the time of signature, ratification or accession,
any State may mal^e reservations to articles of the Con-
vention other than to articles 1 to 3 inclusive.
2. Any Contracting State making a reservation in ac-
cordance with the preceding paragraph may at any time
withdraw the reservation by a communication to that
efEeet addressed to the Secretary-General of the United
Nations.
Article 12
1. After the expiration of a period of five years from
the date on which this Convention shall enter into force,
a request for the revision of this Convention may be
made at any time by any Contracting Party by means of
a notification in writing addressed to the Secretary-
General.
2. The General Assembly of the United Nations shall
decide upon the steps, if any, to be taken in respect of
such request.
Article 14
The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall
inform all States Members of the United Nations and
the other States referred to in article 8 :
(a) Of signatures to this Convention and of the deposit
of instruments of ratification or accession, in accordance
with articles 8, 9 and 10.
(b) Of the date on which this Convention will come
into force, in accordance with article 11.
(c) Of requests for revision in accordance with article
13.
(d) Of reservations to this Convention, in accordance
with article 12.
Article 15
The original of this Convention, of which the Chinese,
English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally
authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General
of the United Nations, who shall send certified copies
thereof to all States referred to in article 8.
In witness whereof the undersigned plenipotentiaries,
being duly authorised thereto by their respective Govern-
ments, have signed this Convention.
Done at Geneva, this twenty-ninth day of April one
thousand nine hundred and fifty-eight.
Optional Protocol of Signature Concerning the
Compulsory Settlement of Disputes ^
The States Parties to this Protocol and to any one or
more of the Conventions on the Law of the Sea adopted
by the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
held at Geneva from 24 February 1958 to 27 April 1958,
Exjn-essing their wish to resort, in all matters con-
cerning them in respect of any dispute arising out of the
interpretation or application of any article of any Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea of 29 April 1958, to the
compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice, unless some other form of settlement is provided
'Adopted Apr. 2C (U.X. doc. A/CONF. 13/L. 57).
June 30, 1958
in the Convention or has been agreed upon by the Parties
within a reasonable period,
Have agreed as follows:
Article I
Disputes arising out of the interpretation or application
of any Convention on the Law of the Sea shall lie within
the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice, and may accordingly be brought before the Court
by an application made by any party to the dispute being
a Party to this Protocol.
Article II
This undertaking relates to all the provisions of any
Convention on the Law of the Sea except, in the Conven-
tion on Fi.shing and Conservation of Living Resources of
the High Seas, articles 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8, to which articles
9, 10, 11 and 12 of that Convention remain applicable.
Article III
The Parties may agree, within a period of tvi-o months
after one party has notified its opinion to the other that
a dispute exists, to resort not to the Court but to an
arbitral tribunal. After the expiry of the said period,
either Party to this Protocol may bring the dispute before
the Court by an application.
Article IV
1. Within the same period of two months, the Parties
to this Protocol may agree to adopt a conciliation pro-
cedure before resorting to the Court.
2. The conciliation commission shall make its recom-
mendations within five months after its appointment. If
its recommendations are not accepted by the parties to
the dispute within two months after they have been de-
livered, either party may bring the dispute before the
Court by an application.
Article V
This Protocol shall remain open for signature by all
States who become Parties to any Convention on the
Law of the Sea adopted by the United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea and is subject to ratification, where
necessary, according to the constitutional requirements of
the signatory States.
Article VI
The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall in-
form all States who become Parties to any Convention on
the Law of the Sea of signatures to this Protocol and of
the deposit of instruments of ratification in accordance
with article V.
Article VII
The original of this Protocol, of which the Chinese,
English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally
authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General
of the United Nations, who shall send certified copies
thereof to all States referred to in article V.
In witness whereof the undersigned Plenipotentiaries,
being duly authorized thereto by their respective Govern-
ments, have signed this Protocol
Done at Geneva, this twenty-ninth day of April one
thousand nine hundred and flfty-eight.
1123
RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY CONFERENCE"
Nuclear Tests on the High Seas
Resolution adopted on 27 April 195S, on the report of the
Second Committee, in connexion with article 2 of the
Convention on the High Seas
The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea,
Recalling that the Conference has been convened by the
General Assembly of the United Nations in accordance
with resolution 1105 (XI) of 21 February 1957,
Recognizing that there is a serious and genuine appre-
hension on the part of many States that nuclear explosions
constitute an infringement of the freedom of the seas,
Recognizing that the question of nuclear tests and pro-
duction is still under review by the General Assembly
under various resolutions on the subject and by the Dis-
armament Commission, and is at present under constant
review and discussion by the Governments concerned.
Decides to refer this matter to the General Assembly
for appropriate action.
Pollution of the High Seas by Radioactive Materials
Resolution adopted on 27 April 1!)5S, on the report of the
Second Committee, relating to article 25 of the Con-
vention on the High Seas
The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea,
Recognizing the need for international action in the
field of disposal of radioactive wastes in the sea,
Taking into account action which has been proposed by
various national and international bodies and studies
which have been published on the subject.
Noting that the International Commission for Radio-
logical Protection has made recommendations regarding
the maximum permissible concentration of radio iso-
topes in the human body and the maximum permissible
concentration in air and water.
Recommends that the International Atomic Energy
Agency, in consultation with existing groups and estab-
lished organs having acknowledged competence in the
field of radiological protection, should pursue whatever
studies and take whatever action is necessary to assist
States in controlling the discharge or release of radio-
active materials to the sea, in promulgating standards,
and in drawing up internationally acceptable regulations
to prevent pollution of the sea by radioactive materials
in amounts which would adversely affect man and his
marine resources.
International Fishery Conservation Conventions
Resolution adopted on 25 April I'JSS, on the report of
the Third Committee
The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea,
Taking note of the opinion of the International Tech-
nical Conference on the Conservation of the Living Re-
sources of the Sea, held in Rome in April/May 1955, as
expressed in paragraph 43 of its report, as to the efficacy
' U.N. doc. A/CONF. 13/L. .56.
1124
of international conservation organizations in furthering
the conservation of the living resources of the sea.
Believing that such organizations are valuable instru-
ments for the co-ordination of scientific effort upon the
problem of fisheries and for the making of agreements
upon conservation measures.
Recommends:
1. That States concerned should co-operate in estab-
lishing the necessary conservation regime through the
medium of such organizations covering particular areas
of the high seas or species of living marine resources and
conforming in other respects with the recommendations
contained in the report of the Rome Conference ;
2. That these organizations should be used so far as
practicable for the conduct of the negotiations between
States envisaged under articles 4, 5, 6 and 7, for the
resolution of any disagreements and for the implementa-
tion of agreed measures of conservation.
Co-Operation in Conservation Measures
Resolution adopted on 2.5 April 195S, on the report of
the Third Committee
The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea,
Taking note of the opinion of the International Tech-
nical Conference on the Conservation of the Living Re-
sources of the Sea, held in Rome in April/May 195.5, as
reported in paragraphs 43 (a), 54 and others of its
report, that any effective conservation management sys-
tem must have the participation of all States engaged
in substantial exploitation of the stock or stocks of liv-
ing marine organisms which are the object of the con-
servation management system or having a special inter-
est in the conservation of that stock or stocks,
Recommends to the coastal States that, in the cases
where a stock or stocks of fish or other living marine
resources inhabit both the fishing areas under their
jurisdiction and areas of the adjacent high seas, they
should co-operate with such international conservation
organisations as may be responsible for the development
and application of conservation measures in the adjacent
high seas, in the adoption and enforcement, as far as
practicable, of the necessary conservation measures on
fishing areas under their jurisdiction.
Humane Killing of Marine Life
Resolution adopted on 25 April 195S, on the report of
the Third Committee
The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea,
Requests States to prescribe, by all means available
to them, those methods for the capture and killing of
marine life, especially of whales and seals, which will
spare them suffering to the greatest extent possible.
Special Situations Relating to Coastal Fisheries
Resolution adopted on 26 April 1958, on the report of the
the Third Committee
The United Nations Conference on the Laic of the Sea,
Having considered the situation of countries or terri-
tories whose people are overwhelmingly dependent upon
Department of State Bulletin
coastal fisheries for their livelihood or ecoDomic develop-
ment,
Having considered also the situation of countries whose
coastal population depends primarily on coastal fisheries
for the animal protein of its diet and whose fishing
methods are mainly limited to local fishing from small
boats,
Recognizing that such situations call for exceptional
measures befitting particular needs,
Considering that, because of the limited scope and ex-
ceptional nature of those situations, any measures adopted
to meet them would be complementary to provisions
incorporated in a universal system of international law,
Believing that States should collaborate to secure just
treatment of such situations by regional agreements or
by other means of international co-operation.
Recommends:
1. That where, for the purpose of conservation, it be-
comes necessary to limit the total catch of a stock or
stocks of fish in an area of the high seas adjacent to the
territorial sea of a coastal State, any other States fishing
in that area should collaborate with the coastal State to
secure just treatment of such situation, by establishing
agreed measures which shall recognize any preferential
requirements of the coastal State resulting from its de-
pendence upon the fishery concerned while having regard
to the interests of the other States ;
2. That appropriate conciliation and arbitral procedures
shall be established for the settlement of any disagree-
Cansidcring that it has not been possible to reach agree-
ment on the breadth of the territorial sea and some other
matters which were raised in connexion with this problem,
Recognizing that, although agreements have been reach-
ed on the regime applicable to fishing and the conserva-
tion of the living resources of the high seas, it has not
been possible, in those agreements, to settle certain aspects
of a number of inherently complex questions.
Recognizing the desirability of making further efforts,
at an appropriate time, to reach agreement on those ques-
tions relating to the international law of the sea which
have been left unsettled.
Requests the General Assembly of the United Nations
to study, at its thirteenth session (1958), the advisability
of convening a second international conference of pleni-
potentiaries for further consideration of the questions left
unsettled by the present Conference.
Tribute to the International Law Commission
Resolution adopted ly the Conference on 27 April 1958
The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea,
on the conclusion of its proceedings.
Resolves:
To pay a tribute of gratitude, respect and admiration
to the International Law Commission for its excellent
work in the matter of the codification and development of
international law, in the form of various drafts and com-
mentaries of great juridical value.
Regime of Historic Waters
Resolution adopted on 27 April 1958, on the report of the
First Committee
The United Nations Conference on the Laiv of the Sea,
Considering that the International Law Commission has
not provided for the regime of historic waters, including
historic bays,
Recognising the importance of the juridical status of
such areas,
Requests the General Assembly of the United Nations
to arrange for the study of the juridical regime of historic
waters, including historic bays, and for the communica-
tion of the results of such study to all States Members
of the United Nations.
Convening of a Second United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea
Resolution adopted ly the Conference on 27 April 1958
The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea,
Considering that, on the basis of the report prepared
by the International Law Commission, it has approved
agreements and other instruments on the regime appli-
cable to fishing and the conservation of the living re-
sources of the high seas, the exploration and exploitation
of the natural resources of the continental shelf and other
matters pertaining to the general regime of the high
seas and to the free access of land-locked States to the
sea.
Current U.N. Documents:
A Selected Bibliography^
Security Council
Letter Dated 29 May 19.58 from the Representative of
Israel Addressed to the President of the Security Coun-
cil. S/4011, May 29, 1958. 4 pp. mimeo.
Letter Dated 29 May 1958 from the Representative of
Tunisia to the President of the Security Council.
S/401.3, May 29, 1958. 3 pp. mimeo.
Letter Dated 29 May 1958 from the Representative of
France to the President of the Security Council.
S/4015, May 29, 1958. 3 pp. mimeo.
Letter Dated 2 June 1958 from the Representative of
Lebanon Addressed to the President of the Security
Council. S/4018, June 2, 1958. 1 p. mimeo.
Letter Dated 1 June 1958 from the Representative of
Tunisia to the President of the Security Council.
S/4019, June 3, 1958. 3 pp. mimeo.
General Assembly
Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities. Addendum to
observations of Governments on the Draft Articles con-
cerning Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities.
A/CN.4/114/Add.l, April 15, 1958. 24 pp. mimeo.
' Printed materials may be secured in the United States
from the International Documents Service, Columbia
University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y.
Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents)
may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the
United States.
June 30, 1958
1125
Economic and Social Council
World Economic Situation. Facilities and Methods
Which Now Exist for the Conduct and Development of
Inter-Governmental Economic Consultations. Report
by the Secretary-General. E/3119, May 7, 1958. 33
pp. mimeo.
World Economic Situation. International Machinery for
Trade Co-Operation. Report by the Secretary-General.
E/3127, May 26, 1958. 8 pp. mimeo.
International Commodity Problems. Interim Co-Ordinat-
ing Committee for International Commodity Arrange-
ments. 1958 Review of International Commodity Prob-
lems. E/3118, May 28, 1958. 74 pp. mimeo.
Economic Development of Under-Developed Countries.
International Tax Problems. Taxation in Capital-Ex-
porting and Capital-Importing Countries of Foreign
Private Investments. Memorandum by the Secretary-
General. E/3074, June 3, 1958. 18 pp. mimeo.
Human Rights. Proposed Second Conference of Non-
Governmental Organizations Interested in the Eradica-
tion of Prejudice and Discrimination. Report by the
Secretary-General. E/31.30, June 3, 19.58. 6 pp. mimeo.
Economic Development of Under-Developed Countries.
International economic assistance to the under-developed
countries, 1956/.57. Report by the Secretary-General.
E/3131, June 3, 1958. 69 pp. mimeo.
Economic Development of Under-Developed Countries.
The International Plow of Private Capital, 1957. Re-
port by the Secretary-General. E/3128, June 4, 1958.
92 pp. mimeo.
United Nations Conference on International Commercial
Arbitration. Convention of the Recognition and En-
forcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards Adopted by the
Conference at Its 24th Meeting. E/Conf.26/8/Rev.l,
June 10, 1958. 7 pp. mimeo.
Pinal Act of the United Nations Conference on Inter-
national Commercial Arbitration Adopted by the Con-
ference at Its 24th Meeting. E/Conf.26/9/Rev.l, June
10, 1958. 6 pp. mimeo.
Trusteeship Council
Conditions in the Trust Territory of New Guinea. Work-
ing paper prepared by the Secretariat. T/L.851, May 3,
1958. 18 pp. mimeo.
Conditions in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.
Worlving paper prepared by the Secretariat. T/L.850,
June 29, 1958. 18 pp. mimeo.
PUBLICATIONS
DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE
Appointments
Lester W. Manning as director of the International Co-
operation Administration operations mission in Chile,
effective June 5. (For biographic details, see Depart-
ment of State press release 324 dated June 14.)
Designations
Seaborn P. Foster as deputy director of the Foreign
Service Institute, effective June 10.
1126
Foreign Relations Volume
Press release 304 dated June 4
The Department of State on June 14 released
Foreign Relations of the United States, 19Ifi, Vol-
ume III, The British Commonioealth, the Soviet
Union, the Near East and Africa. This is the
third volume to be published in a series of five
volumes covering tJie diplomacy of the United
States for the year 1940. Previous volumes pub-
lished in this series are Volume II, General,
Europe and Volume IV, The Far East. Volume
I, General and Volume V, The American Repub-
lics are still in preparation.
Copies of volume III (vi, 1,028 pp.) may be
obtained from the U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington 25, D.C., for $4.50 each.
Recent Releases
For sale Vy the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Oov-
ernment Printing Office, Washington 25, D. 0. Address
requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, ex-
cept in the case of free publications, which may be ob-
tained from the Department of State.
Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4010. 8 pp.
10<f.
Agreement between the United States of America and
Spain — Signed at Madrid January 27, 1958. Entered Into
force January 27, 1958.
Claims— Maneuvers in Laur-Dingalan Bay Area. TIAS
4011. 7 pp. 10<f.
Agreement between the United States of America and
the Republic of the Philippines. Exchange of aide
memoire — Dated at Manila February 20, 1958. Entered
into force February 20, 1958.
Guaranty of Private Investments. TIAS 4012. 4 pp. 5^.
Agreement between the United States of America and
Jordan, amending agreement of July 10 and September
24, 19.56. Exchange of notes — Signed at Amman Novem-
ber 20, 1957, and February 22, 1958. Entered into force
February 22, 1958.
Mutual Defense Assistance— Disposition of Military
Equipment and Materials. TIAS 4013. 4 pp. 5^.
Agreement between the United States of America and
Ethiopia, relating to agreement of May 22, 19.53. Ex-
change of notes — Dated at Addis Ababa January 2 and
6, 1958. Entered into force January 6, 1958.
Economic, Technical, and Related Assistance. TIAS 4014.
8 pp. 10^.
Agreement between the United States of America and the
Sudan. Exchange of notes — signed at Khartoum March
31, 1958. Entered into force March 31, 1958.
Department of State Bulletin
June 30, 1958
Ind
Vol. XXXVIII, No. 992
Africa. Africa's Challenge to the Free World
(Holmes) 1092
American Republics
Secretary Dulles' News Conference of June 10 . . 10S5
U.S. and Brazilian Presidents Reaffirm Inter-
American Solidarity (Eisenhower, Kubitschek) . 1090
The Vice President's Visit to South America in
Perspective (Rubottom) 1104
Atomic Energy
President Proposes July 1 Starting Date for Talks
at Geneva Between Western and Soviet Technical
Experts (Eisenhower, Khrushchev) 1083
Secretary Dulles' News Conference of June 10 . . 108.5
Brazil. U.S. and Brazilian Presidents Reaffirm
Inter-American Solidarity (Eisenhower
Kubitschek) 1090
Chile. Manning appointed USOM director . . . . 1126
China, Communist. Secretary Dulles' News Confer-
ence of June 10 1085
Congress, The
The Vice President's Visit to South America in
Perspective (Rubottom) 1104
Visit of Theodor Heuss, President of the Federal
Republic of Germany (text of address) . . . 1099
Department and Foreign Service
Appointments (Manning) 1126
Designations (Foster) 1126
Disarmament. Secretary Dulles' News Conference
of June 10 1085
Economic Affairs
Arab Republic and Suez Stockholders Agree on
Compensation Terms (Fawzi, text of heads of
agreement) 1097
Secretary Dulles' News Conference of June 10 . . 1085
Germany. Visit of Theodor Heuss, President of
the Federal Republic of Germany (Eisenhower,
Heuss) 1099
Ghana. Prime Minister of Ghana To Visit United
States 1096
Health, Education, and Welfare. U.S. Airlifts Anti-
cholera Serum to Thailand 1098
International Law. U.N. Conference on the Law of
the Sea (Dean, texts of conventions, protocol,
resolutions) 1110
Mutual Security. U.S. Airlifts Anticholera Serum
to Thailand 1098
Non-Self-Governing Territories. Africa's Challenge
to the Free World (Holmes) 1092
Presidential Documents
National Olympic Week, 1958 1084
President Proposes July 1 Starting Date for Talks
at Geneva Between Western and Soviet Technical
Experts 1083
U.S. and Brazilian Presidents Reaffirm Inter-
American Solidarity 1090
Visit of Theodor Heuss, President of the Federal
Republic of Germany 1099
Publications
Foreign Relations Volume 1126
Recent Releases 1126
Thailand. U.S. Airlifts Anticholera Serum to
Thailand 1098
Treaty Information. Current Actions 1109
U.S.S.R.
President Proposes July 1 Starting Date for Talks
at Geneva Between Western and Soviet Technical
Experts (Eisenhower, Khrushchev) 1083
Secretary Dulles' News Conference of June 10 . . 1085
United Arab Republic
Arab Republic and Suez Stockholders Agree on
Compensation Terms (Fawzi, text of heads of
agreement) 1097
Secretary Dulles' News Conference of June 10 . . 1085
United Kingdom. Secretary Dulles' News Confer-
ence of June 10 1085
United Nations
Current U.N. Documents 1125
U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea (Dean, texts
of conventions, protocol, resolutions) 1110
Natne Index
Dean, Arthur H 1110
Dulles, Secretary 1085
Eisenhower, President .... 1083,1084,1090,1099
Fawzi, Mahmoud 1097
Foster, Seaborn P 1126
Heuss, Theodor 1099
Holmes, Julius C 1092
Khrushchev, Nikita 1083
Kubitschek, Juscelino 1091
Manning, Lester W 1126
Nkrumah, Kwame 1096
Rubottom, Roy R., Jr 1104
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: June 9-15
Press releases may be obtained from the News
Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.
Releases issued prior to June 9 which appear in
this issue of the Buixetin are Nos. 291 and 292 of
May 28, 298 of June 2 and 304 of June 4.
No. Date Subject
*315 6/9 Mutual security program in Morocco.
Educational exchange.
Educational exchange.
Cholera supplies to Thailand.
Dulles : news conference.
Garcia itinerary.
Wilcox: "The Soviet Challenge and
American Education."
Investment guaranty in France.
Publication of study on Sino-Soviet
economic offensive.
Manning named USOM director in
Chile (biographic details).
*Not printed.
tHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin.
*316
6/9
*317
6/9
318
6/9
31!)
6/10
t320
6/13
t321
6/12
*322
6/13
t323
6/13
*324
6/14
C3l3-DEC
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JAPAN - Free World Ally
Japan has been aptly described as the northern anchor of the
free Asian defenses against communism and as holding, in its own
future, the key to tlie future of Asia.
Wliether in the common defense against Communist military
aggression or in the common eifort to build the economic strength
and well-being necessary to defend Asia against Communist corrosion
and subversion from within, Japan occupies a position of great
importance. Conversely, Commimist control of Japan would pose a
most serious threat to the survival of freedom throughout Asia.
To miderstand the importance of Japan's role, it is necessary to
know something of the coimtry itself and of the course it has been
following in the period since its recovery of full independence.
This 55-page pampldet, illustrated with photographs and maps,
provides such background information. Part I discusses the land,
the people, the Allied occupation, Japan today, U.S.-Japanese cul-
tural relations, the government, and foreign relations. Part II deals
with the economy of Japan.
Copies of Japan - Free World Ally may be purchased fi-om the
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing OiSce,
Washington 25, D.C., at 25 cents each.
Publication 6516 23 cents
Order Form
Supt. of Documents
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Washington 25 D.C. Please send me copies of Japan - Free World Ally.
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