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DISARMAMENT
The Intensified Effort, 1955-1958
This 65-page pamphlet discusses U.S. efforts over the last 3 years
to negotiate a sound disarmament agreement.
The narrative begins with a brief summary of U.S. disarmament
efforts during the decade of deadlock from 1945-55. This is followed
by an account of evolving U.S. disarmament policy during the past
3 years and of negotiations carried on within the U.N. Disarmament
Commission and its Subcommittee.
The pamphlet covers in detail the gradual development of U.S.
policy from the President's "open skies" proposal at Geneva to the
new approach presented at the 1957 London Disarmament Subcom-
mittee meetings and the U.N. General Assembly. It discusses the
long and intensive negotiations in London in 1957 and various
proposals for a first stage agreement. It ends with a brief overall
appraisal of accomplishments and prospects for the future.
Publication 6676
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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DEPOSITORY
Vol. XXXIX, No. 1006
October 6, 1958
PROBLEMS OF PFACE AND PROGRESS • Address by
Secretary Dulles 525
PRESIDENT EXPRESSES VIEWS ON MUTUAL SE-
CURITY PROGRAM • Exchange of Letters Between
President Eisenhower and Members oj Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations 546
INTERNATIONAL ORDER UNDER LAW o by Attorney
General William P. Rogers 536
PRINCIPAL PROVISIONS OF THE TRADE AGREE-
MENTS EXTENSION ACT OF 1958 • Article by
Selma G. Kallis 542
For index see inside back cover
Vol. XXXIX, No. 1006 • Publication 6709
October 6, 1958
Boston Public Library
Snper«n*"vW of Documents
OCT 2 9 1958
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington 25, D.C.
Price:
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Single copy, 20 cents
The printing of this publication has been
approved by the Director of the Bureau of
the Budget (January 20, 1958).
Note: Contonts of this publication are not
copyrighted and items contained herein may
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appreciated.
The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the
Public Services Division, provides the
pub'ic and interested agencies of
the Government with information on
developments in the field of foreign
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Department of State and the Foreign
Service. The BULLETIN includes se-
lected press releases on foreign policy,
issued by the White House and the
Department, and statements and ad-
dresses made by the President and by
the Secretary of State and other
officers of the Department, as well as
special articles on various phases of
international affairs and the func-
tions of the Department. Informa-
tion is included concerning treaties
and international agreements to
which .he United States is or may
become a party and treaties of gen-
eral international interest.
Publications of the Department,
United Nations documents, and legis-
lative material in the field of inter-
national relations are listed currently.
Problems of Peace and Progress
Address by Secretary Didles x
The United Nations, now in its 13th year, con-
tinues to work constructively for peace and order.
It has promoted the peaceful adjustment of sharp
political differences. It has advanced the inde-
pendence or self-government of peoples ready for
such responsibilities. It has stimulated economic
development and human betterment.
But much remains to be done to reinforce peace
and to hasten the progress that can then be
achieved.
I shall speak first of the problems of peace and
then of the opportunities for progress.
The Far East
Let me first turn to the situation in the Taiwan
(Formosa) Straits area.
On August 23 the Chinese Communists sud-
denly launched a heavy bombardment of the
Quemoy Islands. The artillery was largely that
supplied by the Soviet Union. Hundreds of
thousands of shells rained down on those islands
during the ensuing weeks, bringing death and de-
struction, particularly to civilians. This cannon-
ading was accompanied by attempted naval inter-
diction of the islands and by calls to the
defenders of the islands to surrender or be anni-
hilated.
There are, I know, in this situation many com-
plicating factors. But there are two facts that
are both undisputed and decisive. These are :
1. The Chinese Communist regime has never
during its 9 years of existence exercised any
1 Made before the opening session of the 13th General
Assembly at New York, N. Y., on Sept. 18 (press release
543, revised as delivered).
authority over Taiwan, the Penghus, or the Que-
moy or Matsu Islands.
2. The Chinese Communist regime is now at-
tempting to extend its authority to these areas by
the use of naked force.
The issue is thus a simple one: armed conquest.
In 1950 the United Nations met that issue
squarely. By overwhelming vote it found that the
attack of north Korea to "unify" Korea was armed
aggression. It condemned the Chinese Commu-
nist regime as an aggressor because of its part
in that armed attack.
I do not ignore the argument that todays Chi-
nese Communist attack is a "civil war" operation.
Mr. Vishinsky made a parallel argument in 1950.
He told us that the war in Korea was purely a
"civil war" and that outsiders who intervened
were "aggressors." The United Nations over-
whelmingly rejected that contention.
Also I do not ignore the fact that the offshore
islands are physically close to mainland China.
But we can scarcely accept the view that nations
are entitled to seize territory by force just because
it is near at hand.
The fact is that, when one regime attempts by
force to take additional territory which has long
been under the authority of another government,
recognized as such by a respectable part of the
world community, that is a use of force which
endangers world order.
The United States considers that Chinese Com-
munist armed aggression poses a grave threat, with
ominous implications. Surely it demonstrates
again that the Chinese Communist regime is not
"peace-loving" — to use the language of our
charter.
Ocfober 6, 7958
525
We hope that a peaceful solution can be found.
Talks are going on between the United States and
Chinese Communist Ambassadors in Warsaw. We
seek a prompt cease-fire and equitable conditions
which will eliminate provocations and leave for
peaceful resolution the different claims and coun-
terclaims that are involved.
The United States reserves the right to bring
this matter to the United Nations if it should seem
that the bilateral talks between ambassadors are
not going to succeed.
Hungary and Germany
I turn now to Hungary. There tragedy con-
tinues. The whole civilized world is shocked by
the cruel measures of terror and reprisal. The
grim hangings of former Hungarian Premier
Nagy and General Maleter were perpetrated in
shameful secrecy, violated assurances of safe con-
duct and no reprisals, and defied the resolutions of
the United Nations General Assembly.
Such reprisals are symptoms of a more basic
crime — the continued brutal suppression of the
Hungarian people by a puppet regime imposed
by Soviet military power.
The United Nations cannot let itself be dis-
couraged because its past appeals have been ig-
nored. Every government which believes in the
principle of self-determination, in fundamental
human rights, or in the protection of small nations
has a solemn duty to continue to make its position
unmistakably clear.
The Soviet Government also defies all efforts to
achieve the reunification of Germany in freedom.
Members of the United Nations which believe in
freedom and self-determination for Asia and
Africa should equally support it in Eastern
Europe.
The Near East
I turn now to the Near East.
Just 3 weeks ago the General Assembly took
unanimous action designed to ease a serious situ-
ation in the Near East. 2 Significant agreement
was reached on three crucial points.
First, states should respect the freedom, in-
dependence, and integrity of other states and
avoid fomenting civil strife;
Second, the United Nations should buttress this
pledge of noninterference in the Near East; and
Third, United Nations measures to insure the
territorial integrity and independence of these
countries would facilitate the early withdrawal
of foreign troops from Lebanon and Jordan.
It is significant that it was the Arab nations
of the Near East which themselves developed the
agreed formula. Thereby they assumed a major
responsibility. If, through deeds, the words are
given reality, there will be a new opportunity to
promote political, economic, and social welfare
in the area.
We are somewhat, but not wholly, reassured by
the course of events thus far. It has seemed
practicable, in agreement with the President and
President-elect of Lebanon, to withdraw a second
contingent of United States forces. Also, the
United States expects to discuss with the new
President of Lebanon, soon after he takes office
next Tuesday [September 23], a specific schedule
for early withdrawal of the remaining American
forces.
Our able Secretary-General, who has just
visited the area, will shortly make his report, and
we hope that it will indicate that the objectives
of our resolution are being given practical effect,
so that a schedule for early withdrawal of forces
can be carried out.
Inflammatory Propaganda
I turn now to a related proposal made by Presi-
dent Eisenhower at the emergency special ses-
sion — for monitoring of inflammatory propa-
ganda. 3
Inflammatory propaganda has been repeatedly
condemned by this organization. Nevertheless, it
persists. One of the contributory causes to recent
tension in the Near East was broadcasts from
certain countries, inciting peoples of other coun-
tries to violent acts against the established order.
It is our conviction that measures can be taken
by the United Nations which will discourage such
broadcasts. This would reinforce the solemn com-
mitment of states in the Near East to "respect the
systems of government established in the other
member States and regard them as exclusive con-
cerns of these States." 4
One possibility is a United Nations monitoring
system for radio broadcasts, from whatever
2 Bulletin of Sept. 15, 1958, p. 409.
526
' Ibid., Sept. 1, 1958, p. 337.
4 For text of U.N. resolution, see ibid., Sept. 15, 1958,
p. 411.
Department of State Bulletin
source, crossing national borders in the- Near East.
Such a system could have a salutary effect. If
propagandists realized their words are being
heard in this forum of the world, and being re-
corded here for future action, they might exercise
moderation.
I hope this Assembly will consider this problem.
United Nations Peace Force
Another matter before this session of the Gen-
eral Assembly is the possible creation of a stand-
by United Nations Peace Force. This was urged
by President Eisenhower when he addressed us
last month. ,
The United States suggests the following points
for consideration :
1. We conceive of the "Peace Force" not as a
combat force, but rather as a group that would
observe and patrol, and by its very presence make
visible the interest of the world community in the
maintenance of tranquillity. Also, we believe
that members other than the permanent members
of the Security Council can most usefully con-
tribute, personnel.
2. A small planning staff might be created
within the Secretariat to develop standby plans
for calling into being, deploying, and supporting
such a Peace Force.
3. The planning staff could develop concrete
arrangements so that a United Nations decision
to employ such a Peace Force could be promptly
implemented.
4. The costs of the standby arrangements en-
visaged should be kept small, and that should
be possible if there is no force-in-being to be
maintained.
These arrangements should make it possible to
bring together on short notice a United Nations
group to meet a need which has become evident
over recent years. They would be an important
bulwark of the pacific settlement objectives of
our charter.
Disarmament
I turn now to measures which will advance hu-
man progress as well as the cause of peace. Most
important is arms control to reduce the risk of
war and the cost of being ready for it. Today
colossal sums which could be devoted to human
betterment go into armament.
In past months there has been a significant
breakthrough on the arms control front. The
United States has long urged that verification
techniques were essential to any disarmament by
agreement, We believe that governments must
have a clear understanding of the practical capa-
bilities of a verification system. The Soviet
Union apparently has finally recognized this prin-
ciple in connection with a possible arrangement
to suspend the testing of nuclear weapons.
A technical consensus as to the necessary moni-
toring system has been reached by qualified ex-
perts of different nations. We hope now to be-
gin to negotiate at Geneva a substantive agree-
ment. 6 We do this in expectation that further
arms control arrangements will shortly come into
effect,
The General Assembly may desire, by appro-
priate resolution, to give encouragement to the
forthcoming negotiations.
The best, hope for progress in arms control now
seems to rest in taking moderate but concrete
steps to reduce the dangers of war.
I recall that, some months ago, the Soviet
Union complained in the Security Council of Arc-
tic flights of United States military aircraft. The
United States, denying that any such flights had
occurred, proposed the establishment of an inspec-
tion zone in the polar regions. 7 Such a zone
would increase security because it would lessen
the possibility of great surprise attack across the
top of the world. This beneficial proposal re-
ceived wide acclaim, and the world was shocked
when it was vetoed by the Soviet Union.
In any event we will continue to press for world-
wide measures to reduce the dangers of surprise
attack. There is now a prospect that technical
talks in this field may start in Geneva in
November.
Economic Development
I turn now to economic development,
President Eisenhower at the recent emergency
special session made a significant proposal look-
' For text of the final report of the conference of ex-
perts studying methods of detecting violations of a pos-
sible agreement on the suspension of nuclear tests, made
public at Geneva Aug. 30, see ibid., Sept. 22, 1958, p. 453.
" For an exchange of notes with the Soviet Union, see
ibid,, Sept. 29, 1958, p. 503.
'Ibid., May 12, 1958, p. 760, and May 19, 1958, p. 816.
October 6, 1958
527
ing to more rapid economic growth in the Near
East. The United States hopes that conditions
in that area will lead to the effective fulfillment
of that proposal.
Economic development is, of course, an aspira-
tion shared by all peoples. In the newly inde-
pendent nations, and indeed in many long
independent, there is a burning desire for eco-
nomic and social progress, for higher levels of
living, for freedom from the slavery of poverty.
Much has been accomplished already. The
American people admire the vigorous efforts of
the leaders and the peoples of less developed
countries to help themselves. Yet much remains
to be done.
The United States believes the time has come
for the nations of the world to take stock of ac-
complishments to date and to chart anew long-
term courses of cooperative action. We propose
that the nations dedicate the year 1959 to these
purposes.
Let me mention some of the major steps that
the United States would be prepared to take or
support in the coming year, subject to action by
Congress as appropriate :
1. The United States will carry forward its ex-
isting development financing programs on a vig-
orous and effective basis.
2. The United States will undertake increased
efforts to emphasize the constructive role that
private initiative can play in economic develop-
ment. We hope that other nations will also ex-
plore these important potentialities.
3. The United States will consider how we
might cooperate with regional development pro-
grams, where desired by the countries of the re-
gion. The wish for a regional approach should
be clearly manifested and supported by the gov-
ernments of the areas concerned, and there should
be evidence that a regional approach has advan-
tage over a bilateral approach.
4. The United States will suggest that consid-
eration be given to the advisability of increasing
the capital of the World Bank and the quotas
of the International Monetary Fund.
5. The United States is prepared to consider
the feasibility of creating an International De-
velopment Association, as an affiliate of the World
Bank, under conditions likely to assure broad and
effective support.
6. The United States is ready to provide vigor-
ous support for technical assistance. It will do so
through its own programs, through the Expanded
Technical Assistance Program of the United Na-
tions, and through a substantial initial contribu-
tion to its new Special Projects Fund. This will
greatly enlarge the technical assistance activity
of the United Nations.
7. The United States will enlist the assistance of
our universities and scientific institutions, joining
with those of other cooperating countries, to
achieve scientific and technological breakthroughs
on problems of particular concern to less de-
veloped countries.
8. The President will seek funds from the Con-
gress for health programs.
We hope that other countries may, during the
coming year, also chart long-term programs to
assist economic growth. In thus paving the way
for sound, continuing action by many countries,
1959 could become a year of outstanding initiative
in the long-term process of economic growth.
The great challenge of poverty and disease can
only be met through vigorous realistic action.
The United States stands ready to play its full
part in this great peaceful crusade.
The major obstacle to maximum economic de-
velopment is the ever-present danger of direct or
indirect aggression and the consequent stagger-
ing cost of armament and of collective security.
Wienever there is an outburst of military activ-
ity, as now in the Taiwan Straits, that is a set-
back, not merely to peace but to economic progress.
The United States feels obligated to devote to
defense programs some $45 billion a year, and
that will lead us, this year, into a large budgetary
deficit. Despite this fact we are determined to
move forward in this field of international eco-
nomic development.
Outer Space
Major strides in man's conquest of his newest
and most exciting frontier, outer space, have
taken place in the past year. How shall outer
space be used? That is of intense interest and
importance to all mankind. We must make every
effort to dedicate outer space exclusively to con-
structive pursuits.
To this end the United States, in January 1957,
528
Department of State Bulletin
proposed that interested countries seek to develop
an international system. s We recognize that
the problems involved in establishing such a sys-
tem are very complex. We cannot await a com-
prehensive disarmament agreement. Meaningful
steps can now be taken at least to assure that the
exploitation of outer space results in maximum
benefit to humanity.
Ten precious years were lost in the development
of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy before full
international cooperation was begun. We cannot
afford a similar delay in this vast new dimension
of human experience which offers perhaps an even
greater challenge and opportunity than the split-
ting of the atom.
The United States believes that the United Na-
tions should take immediate steps to prepare for
a fruitful program of international cooperation
in the peaceful uses of outer space. We suggest
that a representative committee be established
to make the necessary preparatory studies and
recommendations.
The United States is submitting to the Assem-
bly a resolution with the following significant
operative paragraph :
The General Assembly:
1. Establishes an Ad Hoc Committee consisting of
and requests it to report to the Fourteenth
General Assembly on the following :
(a) The activities and resources of the United Nations
and its specialized agencies relating to outer space ;
(b) the nature of specific projects of international co-
operation in outer space which could be undertaken
under United Nations auspices;
(c) useful United Nations organizational arrange-
ments to facilitate international cooperation in this field.
The United States hopes that this resolution
will find unanimous approval. As we reach be-
yond this planet, we should move as truly "united
nations."
Double Standards
I have discussed some of the current problems
now confronting this Assembly. I should like now
to refer to a major concern of the United States
which stems from the fact that our membership
seems sharply divided in its attitude toward this
organization.
Most members look upon the United Nations as
a means to promote world order, and they are
willing to adapt their national policies to this
great goal. But there are a potent few who parti-
cipate in the United Nations only as it gives them
an opportunity for maneuvers which will advance
their own narrow nationalistic purposes even at
the expense of world order. Otherwise they flout
the United Nations.
In the Security Council 85 vetoes have been cast
by one of the permanent members. In most of
these cases the veto vote was the only negative
vote and the vetoed proposal was objected to only
because it would have interfered with some am-
bitious objective, of the state in question.
It is difficult to reconcile that conduct with the
spirit of our charter.
In the General Assembly there is a similar pat-
tern. Most of the governments represented here
give great weight to the recommendations of this
Assembly. But there are others which defy those
recommendations whenever they interfere with
national policies. Hungary is an example.
In consequence of this there is no uniformity
in the acceptance and application of our charter
and our processes. There are tw T o different stand-
ards of conduct.
The United States believes that this double
standard is incompatible with the basic purposes
of our organization. It poses a challenge which
we shall have to meet.
A related concern is the apparent reluctance of
some nations to support those basic principles of
the charter which outlaw aggression, direct or in-
direct. Our charter by the first paragraph of the
first article calls for "suppression of acts of ag-
gression or other breaches of the peace." This
represents international law that all should recog-
nize and all should seek to enforce.
After World War I the United States, like
others, failed adequately to support world order.
But during World War II and ever since, the
United States has strongly supported that con-
cept.
President Truman, speaking in April 1951, said
"If history has taught us anything, it is that ag-
gression anywhere in the world is a threat to
peace everywhere in the world." 9 And President
' Ibid., Feb. 11. 1957, p. 225.
Ocfober 6, 7 958
1 Ibid., Apr. 16, 1951, p. G03.
529
Eisenhower, speaking last week, called upon us
to "defend the principle that armed force shall
not be used for aggressive purposes. Upon ob-
servance of that principle," he said, "depends a
lasting and just peace." 10
But the teachings of history tend to be for-
gotten. There is some evidence that we are for-
getting them here. We have our charter and our
implementing resolutions. These, when adopted,
clearly represented the will of the world commu-
nity, which this organization was prepared vigor-
ously to support. But is that still the case? If
not, that would mark the beginning of the end of
this organization and its effort to achieve world
order and world peace.
The United States as one of the great powers
continues to stand ready to dedicate that power to
world order. That is an asset which I suggest
ought not lightly to be thrown away.
Conclusion
The future of the United Nations and indeed
the prospect for the successful building of a
peaceful world depend upon the way in which
all of us here in this Assembly discharge the
solemn obligations of the charter. We have the
two great purposes which I have discussed;
namely, the maintenance of a just peace and the
development of human betterment in the world.
We need to see more clearly that progress in
raising living standards and in extending free-
doms around the world is being held back because
of aggressions engineered to advance the expan-
sionist urges of certain countries. The treasures
and energies of the nations are largely being di-
rected into a tragic and vain search for armed
security in a world in which aggression is not
yet effectively outlawed. Every aggression is not
only a threat to the fragile barrier that stands
between us and general nuclear war but also
another setback for the aspirations of mankind.
May we not hope that, if the minds and efforts
of governments concentrate more fully upon the
welfare of their own peoples and creative tasks
of universal import, the issues that divide the
world may fade away and the cold war become
a thing of the past.
' Ibid., Sept. 29, 1958, p. 481.
U.S. Rejects Soviet Note
on Far East Situation
Following are the texts of two statements re-
leased by the White House at Newport, R. /., on
September £0.
First Statement
President Eisenhower received this morning
[September 20] from the United States Embassy
in Moscow text of a lengthy communication from
Chairman Khrushchev regarding the Far Eastern
situation.
This communication is replete with false accusa-
tions ; it is couched in language that is abusive and
intemperate; it indulges in personalities; it con-
tains inadmissible threats. All of this renders the
communication unacceptable under established in-
ternational practice.
Accordingly, it has been rejected and the United
States Charge dAffaires in Moscow has been in-
structed to return the communication to the Soviet
Government.
Second Statement
The letter from Chairman Khrushchev which
the President has rejected dealt with the serious
situation that has developed in the area of Taiwan
(Formosa) since the Chinese Communists, on Au-
gust 23, began their armed attack. Mr. Khrush-
chev demanded that the United States fleet and
armed forces should at once withdraw from Tai-
wan (Formosa) and neighboring waters and "go
home." He said that unless this were done, the
Chinese Communists, with the support of the
Soviet Union, would have no choice except "the
expulsion" of United States forces.
It is tragic that Soviet military despotism
should support the use of force to achieve expan-
sionist ends.
The charter of the United Nations requires that
the nations shall settle their disputes by "peaceful
means." The United States stands ready to do
that and indeed is now seeking a peaceful solution
through ambassadorial talks at AVarsaw. But it
is not easy to negotiate under such threats as the
Soviet Union now makes. We deeply deplore the
use of such threats.
530
Department of State Bulletin
The United States considers the Soviet view-
point to be grotesque and dangerous. Indeed
only in an "upside down" world could it be argued
that it is "aggression" when the United States
cooperates with a friendly government purely for
defense but that it is "peace" for the Soviet Union
to pledge its support to the Chinese Communist
regime in its effort to acquire by armed force ter-
ritory over which it has never exercised authority.
United States Seeks Information
on Missing Airmen
DEPARTMENT STATEMENT OF SEPTEMBER 12
Press release 534 dated September 12
On September 6, 1958 the United States Gov-
ernment in a note to the Soviet Government l
requested any available information concerning
an unarmed United States Air Force C-130 trans-
port plane, carrying a crew of seventeen men,
which had disappeared on September 2, 1958, dur-
ing a flight within Turkey from Adana to Trab-
zon to Van and back to Adana.
The Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs in-
formed the American Embassy at Moscow today
that the remnants of a destroyed and burned air-
plane have been found at a point fifty-five kilo-
meters northwest of Yerevan, the capital of the
Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic, and that
judging by remains discovered there it may be
assumed that six of the members of the crew
perished.
The Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs further
declared that there was no doubt that the airplane
belongs to the United States Air Force. It al-
leged that the aircraft had penetrated for a sig-
nificant distance into Soviet air space and had
fallen within Soviet territory, and had thus in-
tentionally violated the Soviet border. The Min-
istry protested this alleged border violation and
referred to previous Soviet protests regarding
alleged similar past incidents.
Charge d' Affaires of the United States at Mos-
cow Richard H. Davis pressed the Ministry for
information about the eleven men unaccounted
for. The Ministry did not provide further in-
formation on this point. The Charge d'Affaires
requested that a further search for the missing
men be made, that an Embassy officer or other
United States official be allowed to visit the site
of the crash, and that arrangements be made to
transfer to United States authorities the remains
of the six crew members.
The investigation conducted by the United
States Air Force in Europe (USAFE) has
elicited information to the effect that an aircraft
identified as a C-130 was intercepted at about
2 : 00 P. M. on September 2 by fighter planes in
the area of the Turkish- Soviet border near Kars.
The course of the C-130 was then directed east-
ward under control of the Soviet aircraft. Fol-
lowing this the sound of an explosion was heard
and a column of smoke was seen rising from be-
hind a range of hills within Soviet territory.
Instructions are being sent to the American
Embassy at Moscow to press the Soviet Govern-
ment on an urgent basis to locate and return the
eleven members of the crew not accounted for.
U.S. NOTE OF SEPTEMBER 13
The Embassy of the United States of America presents
its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and has the honor
to refer to the Ministry's note No. 520SA of September
12, 1958, 2 in reply to the Embassy's note No. 252 of Sep-
tember 6, 1958, and to communicate the following on in-
structions from its Government :
The Soviet note states that the wreckage of a burned
and destroyed American Air Force plane has been found
55 kilometers northwest of the city of Yerevan, and that
the bodies of six members of the crew have been discov-
ered at the spot. The Ministry was informed in the
Embassy's note of September 6 that the crew of the plane
totalled 17 persons but no mention is made of the where-
abouts or fate of the remaining eleven crewmen. Infor-
mation as to their whereabouts and condition is urgently
requested. If these men have not been located, it is
requested that every effort be made to find them. The
United States Government expects full cooperation from
the Soviet Government in granting access to the crewmen
in the custody of the Soviet authorities and in returning
them at the earliest possible moment.
The Ministry's note does not identify the bodies found
with the wrecked plane. The United States Government
requests that representatives of the Embassy accompa-
nied by such technical experts as may be required to in-
vestigate the circumstances of the crash be permitted
1 For text, see Bulletin of Sept. 29, 1958, p. 505.
1 Not printed here.
October 6, 7 958
531
to visit the scene of the crash of this plane, and that
facilities be extended to them for effecting identification
of the victims of the crash and arranging for the trans-
fer of their remains to appropriate United States author-
ities.
There is no foundation for the charge contained in the
Soviet note that the C-130 aircraft intentionally violated
the frontier of the Soviet Union and the United States
Government rejects the Soviet Government's protest in
this regard. The United States Government does not
understand either earlier oral denials of any knowledge
of this incident made by an official of the Ministry or the
delay in furnishing the United States Government with
the limited information contained in the note of Septem-
ber 12, in view of the involvement of Soviet armed forces
in this incident. The investigation conducted by the
United States Air Force in Europe (USAFB) in connec-
tion with the disappearance of this plane has elicited
information to the effect that it was intercepted by three
Soviet fighter aircraft at about 2 : 00 p. m. September 2,
1958, in the region of the Turkish-Soviet frontier near
Kars, and that following interception the American plane
proceeded eastward under control of the Soviet aircraft.
Shortly after this an explosion was heard and a large
column of smoke was observed rising at a point within
Soviet territory.
The United States Government emphasizes that the
missing C-130 aircraft was an unarmed transport air-
craft clearly marked and operating on an instrument
flight plan duly filed in advance in accordance with the
regulations of the International Civil Aviation Organi-
zation. As the Government of the Union of Soviet So-
cialist Republics is aware, it is recognized international
custom when intercepting an unarmed aircraft to indi-
cate by signals that the intercepted aircraft shall follow
the intercepting aircraft to the nearest appropriate air-
field for investigation. As information available to this
Government indicates that the C-130 aircraft was inter-
cepted by Soviet Air Force planes, the United States
Government expects that complete information as to the
circumstances surrounding and following the intercep-
tion will be made available to it without further delay.
Mr. Dillon To Visit 11 Countries
The Department of State announced on Sep-
tember 18 (press release 544) that Douglas Dil-
lon, Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, was
leaving on September 19 on a trip that will take
him to 11 countries: Spain, Tunisia, Greece,
Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, India, Lebanon, Switzer-
land, Germany, and the United Kingdom.
The general purpose of Mr. Dillon's trip is to
give him an opportunity to confer with U.S.
Ambassadors and other senior U.S. Government
officials regarding operations conducted under
the mutual security program, as well as on certain
major economic problems, and to meet with senior
government officials of those countries which he
is visiting for conversations on matters of mutual
interest.
Japanese and U.S. Officials
Conclude Talks
Following are joint statements issued to the press
following meetings of visiting Japanese officials
and, U.S. officials.
JOINT STATEMENT OF SEPTEMBER 11
Press release 528 dated September 11
The Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister
of Japan met together at the Department of State
this afternoon and had a constructive exchange of
views in an atmosphere of cordiality and mutual
understanding. They reviewed the international
situation, discussed Japanese-American security
arrangements and took up other matters pending
between their two countries. Others present at
the meeting included Ambassador Asakai, Ambas-
sador MacArthur, Assistant Secretary Robertson,
Assistant Secretary (Defense) Sprague and Gen-
eral Lemnitzer.
Security problems facing the two countries were
the principal subjects of the discussion today. It
was agreed that the Japanese-American Commit-
tee on Security, whose establishment was agreed
upon in the talks between President Eisenhower
and Prime Minister Kishi last year, had been
successful in strengthening mutual cooperation
and understanding in the security field. Foreign
Minister Fujiyama pointed out at the same time
that seven years have passed since the United
States-Japan Security Treaty was signed. He
stated that with the re-established position of
Japan in the intervening years the situation has
now evolved to the point where it would be ad-
vantageous to re-examine the present security ar-
rangements with a view to adjusting them on a
basis entirely consistent with the new era in rela-
tions between the two countries affirmed by Prime
Minister Kishi and President Eisenhower in the
532
Department of State Bulletin
Joint Communique of June 21, 1957. 1 It was
agreed that the two governments will consult fur-
ther on this matter through diplomatic channels
following Mr. Fujiyama's return to Tokyo.
With respect to the Eyukyu Islands, Foreign
Minister Fujiyama welcomed the current discus-
sions taking place between the United States au-
thorities and Ryukyuan representatives looking
toward a satisfactory resolution of the land prob-
lem. Secretary Dulles expressed his understand-
ing of Japanese interest in the Ryukyus and it
was agreed that on Ryukyuan matters the two
governments would continue to exchange views
through diplomatic channels.
The Foreign Minister also touched upon spe-
cific issues among which was included the
Japanese desire for compensation of former
inhabitants of the Bonin Islands who are unable
to return to their former homes. The Secretary
assured Mr. Fujiyama that the United States is
sympathetically aware of the problem and is
studying it carefully in the hope of achieving a
reasonable solution.
Discussions will be continued tomorrow.
JOINT STATEMENT OF SEPTEMBER 12
Press release 533 dated September 12
Foreign Minister Fujiyama met today with
Secretary Dulles and Under Secretary Dillon to
discuss a wide range of subjects of interest to
Japan and the United States. Topics discussed
included United States-Japan trade relations,
Asian economic development, and the actions and
intentions of Communist China, with specific ref-
erence to the Taiwan Straits.
In connection with trade between the United
States and Japan, the Foreign Minister pointed
out the importance of trade with the United
States and other industrial nations. He noted
that, in relation to trade with the United States,
particular attention would be paid to orderly
trade and marketing procedures to avoid sudden
changes in volume and prices which might have
damaging effects. Mr. Dillon expressed apprecia-
tion of Japan's efforts in connection with orderly
trade and marketing procedures. He referred to
' For text, see Bulletin of July 8, 1957, p. 51.
the recent extension of the Trade Agreements Act
as evidence of United States interest in pursuing
liberal trade policies.
The question of the need for increasing the rate
of economic growth in South and Southeast Asia
was discussed, and opinions were exchanged with
a view to achieving such economic growth in the
interest of the free world.
In their discussion of the international situa-
tion, the Secretary and the Foreign Minister
agreed that international Communism remains the
major threat to peace in the world. They also ex-
changed views on the forthcoming session of the
General Assembly of the United Nations, and re-
cent developments in the Taiwan Straits. With
respect to the latter they agreed that the use of
force by Communist China created grave tension
in the Far East. They also agreed that the situa-
tion in the Taiwan Straits should be settled by
peaceful means and without recourse to force.
The Secretary and the Foreign Minister agreed
that their talks during the past two days have
been most helpful both in achieving closer under-
standing and in enabling a higher degree of
coordination in fields of mutual interest.
Today's meetings concluded the Washington
talks.
United States and Turkey
Hold Economic Discussions
DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT
Press release 521 dated September 9
The Minister of Finance of Turkey, Hasan
Polatkan, arrives at Washington on September
10 to discuss implementation of the recently
agreed upon financial assistance program to
Turkey with officials of the U.S. Government.
During his 3-day visit Mr. Polatkan will meet
with the Secretary of State and the Under Secre-
tary for Economic Affairs, the Secretary of the
Treasury, and senior officials of the Export-
Import Bank and the International Coopera-
tion Administration. It is expected that he
will also confer with the International Monetary
Fund and the International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development.
October 6, 1958
533
He will be accompanied by Hasan Isik, Secre-
tary General of the Turkish International Co-
operation Organization, Memduh Aytur, Director
General of the Turkish Treasury, Ziya Muez-
zinoglu, Counselor of the Turkish Treasury,
Munir Mostar, Inspector General of the Ministry
of Finance, and Fikri Diker, Assistant Director
General of the Central Bank of Turkey.
JOINT STATEMENT
Press release 535 dated September 13
A Turkish Mission headed by His Excellency,
Hasan Polatkan, the Turkish Minister of Finance
and Acting Minister of Industry, has been in
Washington the past three days as the guest of
Treasury Secretary Robert B. Anderson and
Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
C. Douglas Dillon.
In addition to talks with Secretary Anderson
and Under Secretary Dillon, Minister Polatkan
met with Mr. James H. Smith, Jr., Director,
International Cooperation Administration; Mr.
Samuel C. Waugh, President and Chairman of
the Export-Import Bank, and Mr. Dempster Mc-
intosh, Managing Director of the Development
Loan Fund. The Minister also took advantage of
his presence in Washington to visit with Mr. Per
Jacobsson, Managing Director of the Inter-
national Monetary Fund and Mr. Eugene Black,
President of the International Bank for Re-
construction and Development.
During his visit the Minister called upon the
Secretary of State.
In his talks with United States officials, Minis-
ter Polatkan reviewed the progress to date of the
economic stabilization program which the Turkish
Government introduced on August 3, 1958 and
made clear the firm determination of the Turkish
Government to carry out this program vigorously.
Officials of the United States Government were
greatly encouraged by the measures the Turkish
Government has taken and by its determination to
carry through the new program to a successful
conclusion. Given this determination it was the
view of United States officials that the stabiliza-
tion program of the Turkish Government prom-
ises to assure adequate supplies of goods to the
Turkish economy and to bring about stability and
economic strength in the future.
During the course of the talks, Minister Polat-
534
kan discussed with United States officials the ques-
tion of implementing the aid agreements with the
United States which were announced on August
3, 1 and which involved $234 million of various
forms of assistance. As a result of these talks ar-
rangements were made that $75 million would be
made available immediately to finance imports
during the remainder of 1958. In addition it was
agreed that 225 million Turkish lira, equivalent
to 25 million dollars, which has been generated
from previous sales of surplus agricultural com-
modities (P.L. 480) would be granted to the Turk-
ish Government in order to provide immediate
local currency financing.
In further implementation of the program of fi-
nancial assistance to Turkey, the Export-Import
Bank signed on September 12 an agreement with
Turkey establishing a line of credit in the amount
of $37.5 million to assist in financing projects in
the private as well as public sectors of the Turk-
ish economy. The line of credit will be available
up to December 31, 1959 and the principal amount,
rate of interest, repayment period and related con-
ditions for each project will be subject to separate
agreement between Turkey and the Export-Im-
port Bank.
Discussions with the Development Loan Fund
concerned the selection of development projects
totaling $37.5 million to be financed by the institu-
tion under the August 4 agreement. Progress was
made toward reaching agreement on projects in
the fields of mining, agriculture, power and indus-
try and final decisions are expected in the near fu-
ture. At the conclusion of the Development Loan
Fund discussions with Minister Polatkan, Am-
bassador Mcintosh signed an agreement finaliz-
ing a $10 million DLF loan to the Industrial De-
velopment Bank of Turkey which had been an-
nounced by the DLF in May of this year. This
loan is in addition to the $37.5 million of project
loans now under discussion between the Turkish
Government and the DLF.
The United States officials expressed the active
and continuing interest of the United States in
the economic development of Turkey.
Minister Polatkan was accompanied by Hasan
Isik, Assistant Secretary General for Economic
Affairs of the Foreign Ministry ; Memduh Aytur,
Director General of the Treasury; Ziya Muez-
zinoglu, Counselor to the Treasury ; Fikri Diker,
1 Bulletin of Aug. 25, 1958, p. 322.
Department of State Bulletin
Assistant Director General of the Central Bank
and Munir Mostar, Financial Inspector, Ministry
of Finance.
Indian Finance Minister
Visits United States
Press release 52G dated September 9
The Department of State announced on Sep-
tember 9 that Morarji R. Desai, Finance Minister
of the Government of India, during his 3-day visit
to "Washington, met and had discussions with the
Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury,
the Secretary of Agriculture, the Acting Secretary
of Commerce, and Douglas Dillon, Under Secre-
tary of State for Economic Affairs, Samuel C.
Waugh, President and Chairman of the Export-
Import Bank, J. H. Smith, Jr., Director, Interna-
tional Cooperation Administration, and Tom B.
Coughran, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury.
Discussion covered a wide range of topics, prin-
cipally in the economic and financial field with
particular reference to India's foreign-exchange
needs for economic development.
Mr. Desai was informed that, in connection with
recent discussions held under the auspices of the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Devel-
opment on the Indian financial problem, the
United States is prepared in the U.S. fiscal year
ending June 1959 to finance through the Devel-
opment Loan Fund a series of economic develop-
ment projects in India which are expected to total
about $100 million. Loans for these projects
would be long-term and repayable in Indian ru-
pees. In addition the Finance Minister was in-
formed that the United States is prepared to begin
discussions leading to the conclusion of an agri-
cultural commodities agreement under title I of
the Agricultural Trade Development and Assist-
ance Act (P.L. 480) which would provide for the
sale for local currency of surplus agricultural
commodities. Such an agreement would provide
food grains having an export value of about $200
million. Finally Mr. Desai was informed that the
United States has authorized its Embassy in New
Delhi to exchange notes with the Indian Govern-
ment to amend the present repayment schedule of
the $190 million wheat loan extended to India in
1951 to defer the interest and amortization pay-
ments which are due over the next 9 years.
Mr. Desai was accompanied in his meetings with
U.S. Government representatives by H. Dayal, In-
dian Charge d'Affaires ad interim, and B. K.
Nehru, Commissioner General for Economic Af-
fairs.
International Aviation Authorities
To Hold Symposium in U.S.
The Department of State announced on Sep-
tember 16 (press release 539) that an interna-
tional symposium on "The United States
Domestic Short Distance Navigation System —
VORTAC— and Its Relationship to the Interna-
tional Air Navigation System" will be held at
Washington October 1-2, 1958, and at Indianap-
olis October 3-4, 1958. Invitations have been
issued to aviation authorities of foreign govern-
ments and to other international aviation
organizations.
This international meeting is designed to
better acquaint the responsible aviation authori-
ties of governments and other aviation interests
with the bearing and distance concept of the U.S.
air-navigation and traffic-control system. The
International Civil Aviation Organization has
scheduled a special meeting for February 1959
on the subject of short-distance aids and their
relationship to other elements of the air-naviga-
tion system. The symposium is being held to
assist nations and their aviation interests in prep-
aration for the ICAO meeting.
Present plans call for the symposium to last
from October 1 to 4, with 2 days of presentation
and discussion of papers at "Washington and 2
days of demonstrations of equipment at the CAA
Technical Development Center at Indianapolis.
An operational flight demonstration will take
place during the flight from Washington to
Indianapolis.
October 6, 1958
535
International Order Under Law
by William P. Rogers
Attorney General of the United States x
It is an honor and a privilege to address the
48th biennial conference of the International Law
Association. As a representative of the Govern-
ment of the United States it is with warm pleas-
ure that I welcome you to our country and ex-
press the hope that you will have a most success-
ful conference.
Since the association was founded, it has been
the innovator, architect, and craftsman of many
important contributions within the field of inter-
national law. These contributions have been the
product of painstaking research, informed judg-
ment, and effective advocacy.
You have long recognized the necessity for the
supremacy of law and have defended it against
overwhelming and recurrent tides of recalcitrance
and inertia. It is my belief that those tides are
ebbing. I believe that we are at the threshold of
new and far-reaching developments in the fields
of both public and private international law.
The same forces that within a decade have in-
duced science to develop the atom and have
brought man to the verge of outer space are exert-
ing a relentless pressure on mankind to bring it
to its senses to prevent its self-destruction. As
President Eisenhower said, the world situation
today makes it imperative to depose the rule of
force and to enthrone the rule of law in interna-
tional differences.
Our primary concern, therefore, is the attain-
ment of peace and international order under law.
There are many hopeful signs of progress.
In this country there is a substantial step-up
in activities by such organizations as bar associa-
1 Address made before the 48th biennial conference of
the International Law Association at New York, N. Y., on
Sept. 2.
tions, foundations, and universities in working
toward greater reliance on international rules of
law. Cornell, Harvard, and Southern Methodist
University are among the institutions that have
actively been working on important phases of the
problems. The most recent development in this
field is the announcement that a Rule of Law Cen-
ter is being established under the auspices of Duke
University Law School with Mr. Arthur Larson,
a former Special Assistant to the President, as
director.
There are a number of worthwhile steps to be
taken within the not-too-distant future. As you
know, much study will be given to the possibility
of international agreements applying impartial
judicial machinery to the question of compensa-
tion for nationalization of foreign investments.
Success in this direction could have dramatic ef-
fects in facilitating vast new surges of private in-
vestment in newly developing countries.
Another worthwhile possibility is the gradual
development of effective regional international
courts, perhaps for a specific function, as in the
case of the judicial machinery of the European
Common Market.
Moreover, there is much work to be done in
bringing together in usable and convenient form
the existing international law precedents that are
now scattered in many places. As you know, the
International Law Commission is presently en-
gaged in codifying such law. If we are to live
by an international rule of law, one of the in-
dispensable steps is to clarify the law and make
it accessible, understandable, and usable. Here
again the lawyers and scholars and universities of
every country must help if the job is to be done.
536
Department of State Bulletin
Making the Rule of Law an International Reality
A part of the overall task of making the rule
of law an international reality lies in the creation
of a worldwide state of opinion which more and
more accepts law as normal in international
settlements. Designations such as "Law Day,
U.S.A.," which this year concentrated on stress-
ing the international-rule-of-law theme, may be
expanded upon and improved. There are many
other ways of working toward greater public ac-
ceptance of the rule of law in international
affairs, including the use of conferences, radio
and television shows, and thoughtful and forceful
presentations through the press and in other pub-
lications. One of the planning committee for this
conference, Henry Luce, has assumed a major role
in gaining this acceptance, not only through the
Time and Life publications but in a quiet and
effective personal way.
The United States Government has recently
taken an important step in furtherance of inter-
national order under law. It touches primarily
the field of private international law. As you
may know, Congress last month enacted legisla-
tion establishing a Commission on International
Eules of Judicial Procedure. The statutory func-
tion of the commission is to investigate and study
existing practices of judicial assistance and co-
operation between the United States and foreign
countries with a view to achieving improvements.
The scope of the commission's work will be
broad. It will investigate procedures for inter-
national judicial assistance incident to litigation,
including such matters as the service of judicial
documents, the obtaining of evidence, and the
proof of foreign law. Its objective will be to
evolve, on a reciprocal basis, procedures which
are "more readily ascertainable, efficient, econom-
ical, and expeditious." To that end, the commis-
sion is directed to draft and recommend to the
Government appropriate international agree-
ments and draft legislation.
Principles of Law Applicable to Outer Space
Another matter of increasing public concern
involves the principles of law applicable to the
exploration and development of outer space.
Today, less than 50 years after its meetings in
Europe in 1911 and 1912, your association and
others have an opportunity to aid in the formu-
lation and development of a system of interna-
tional law to meet this challenge.
The immediate problems concern matters relat-
ing to flight instrumentalities in space. Ulti-
mately the questions may require a consideration
of such complex and challenging legal problems
as those relating to the development and utiliza-
tion of the natural resources of celestial bodies
not yet within the reach of any nation or group
of nations.
Some of these questions may be: What is the
legal status of those areas of space used in the
passage of a satellite? Can existing jurispru-
dence be adapted to the problems that astro-
nautics poses? How may one ascertain the legal
status of a satellite for purposes of protection
or control, regulation of flight paths and orbits?
Can the existing principles of international air law
be applied to each zone as man is able to reach
it? Or is it advisable to lay aside for the time
being the entire problem of national sovereignty
in outer space?
Jurisdiction of International Court of Justice
One area which holds promise for progress re-
lates to the jurisdiction of the International Court
of Justice.
You will recall that, prior to adoption of the
U.N. Charter, international law did not compel
any state to submit its disputes for determination
to the International Court against its will. The
same policy was followed when the U.N. Charter
was adopted. Article 2 (7) of the charter ex-
cludes intervention by the United Nations in
matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state.
In the statute which creates the Court and which
defines its authority, it is optional for states to
accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.
When the United States filed its declaration of ac-
ceptance of the Court's jurisdiction, it attached
certain conditions to its acceptance.
Among specific limitations the declaration of
the United States stated that the jurisdiction of
the Court shall not apply to matters which are
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the
United States. No one could question this limi-
tation, for it safeguards the national independence
of a country and its internal affairs. It was also
consistent with the charter of the U.N. Further-
Ocfober 6, 7958
537
more, it was implicit in the nature of international
law itself, which the Court under its statute was
bound to apply, for, by definition, international
law governs the body of rights and duties in the
relations of states with each other and thereby
excludes itself from domestic-jurisdiction matters.
There was, however, an additional specific limi-
tation attached by the United States which created
concern among many of our statesmen and many
international lawyers of repute. This limitation
reserved the right of the United States, rather
than the Court, to determine whether a matter fell
within this country's domestic jurisdiction.
The events leading to this decision are of in-
terest, for the decision, in my judgment, needs
reexamination.
Senate Debate on International Court
The matter of domestic-jurisdiction reservations
came up during 1946 upon consideration of the
Senate resolution to accept the jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice established under
the U.N. Charter. This resolution was unani-
mously reported by the Committee on Foreign
Relations to the Senate for favorable action. Its
report recommended a reservation of "disputes
with regard to matters which are essentially with-
in the domestic jurisdiction of the United States."
In urging the Senate to adopt the resolution, the
committee expressed the hope of placing interna-
tional relations on a legal basis. It recognized
that a regime of law in the international commun-
ity could never be fully realized so long as any in-
dividual members could refuse to be bound by the
jurisdiction of the Court. To achieve this aim
it felt that the Court must have jurisdiction of
the parties and the subject matter.
The Senate committee rejected any suggestion
that the United States should reserve to itself the
right to decide what disputes were domestic. It
was its view that such a provision would be self-
defeating. If this matter were left to the decision
of each individual state, it would be possible to
withhold any case from adjudication on the plea
that it was a matter of domestic jurisdiction.
It was only after Senate Resolution 196 reached
the floor of the Senate that objections arose re-
garding the reservation of domestic jurisdiction.
The question was raised in debate as to who would
determine whether a matter was of a domestic
character not subject to the jurisdiction of the In-
ternational Court. Apprehension was expressed
that, unless it was the United States rather than
the Court which made this determination, the In-
ternational Court could readily extend its juris-
diction to various domestic issues, particularly im-
migration and trade barriers.
There were several answers to this contention
in the debate. One was that it is the function
of the Court under the compulsory-jurisdiction
clause to decide cases in accordance with estab-
lished rules of international law. Since there is
no international law dealing with the subject of
immigration and since this has been traditionally
a matter for domestic determination, it was ar-
gued that the International Court could not take
jurisdiction over this kind of case. As far as
tariffs are concerned, it was shown that, unless
the United States enters into an international
treaty subscribing to certain rights and duties,
there is no international law on the subject which
the Court may apply. Thus it was argued that
the anxiety expressed respecting possible exten-
sion of the Court's jurisdiction to such tradi-
tionally domestic matters as immigration and
trade restrictions was wholly unfounded.
Despite these arguments, the fears of those who
opposed the committee's report were accepted and
the report was overridden. The Senate voted to
reserve to the United States the right to decide
whether a matter was within its domestic juris-
diction.
When a country, rather than a court, has the
power to decide whether a matter relates to its
domestic jurisdiction, it may be difficult because
of the political realities of life for even the most
cooperative government to concede jurisdiction.
The result is that controversies over which the
court has jurisdiction can readily be converted
into controversies not within its jurisdiction by
mei-e decision of the party nation rather than by
decree of the court.
In addition, a reservation which enables one
country to decide whether domestic jurisdiction
is involved is an invitation for other countries
to assert a like limitation. Thus, similar reser-
vations permitting the declaring state to deter-
mine what is domestic have been filed by several
countries.
With this history of the domestic-jurisdiction
reservation before us, the question is whether this
type of specific reservation by several nations as
to the jurisdiction of the Court tends to impair
or enhance a rule of law in international affairs.
538
Department of State Bulletin
Should sucli reservations be retained in their pres-
ent form ? Just as domestic courts could not func-
tion effectively if parties chose not to appear, so,
too, the administration of justice by international
courts is impaired and may be nullified if the na-
tions can refuse to submit their differences to it.
It is important, too, to bear in mind that the
mere fact that a court is open for dealing with
disputes and that the parties may be compelled
to appear before it is often enough to spur parties
into settling their differences amicably out of
court. This might well be the case in some inter-
national disputes as well as in cases of a private
nature.
Effect of Domestic-Jurisdiction Reservation
In over 10 years of the Court's operation, we
have seen that the effect of one country's domes-
tic-jurisdiction reservation, unilaterally deter-
mined, has spawned many others. Tims the area
of international adjudication has been tragically
limited. We have seen the "boomerang" effect
of this type of reservation when even a nation
not having such a reservation employed it on the
basis of reciprocity.
The record of the International Court makes
it clear that this Court of distinguished jurists
has not engaged or attempted to engage in usur-
pation of jurisdiction which does not belong to it.
Nor is there any reason to believe that it ever
would. As we are aware, relatively few cases
have been before the Court.
Our courts in the United States, because of the
great increase in the volume of work, are con-
gested with cases. One could fairly say, con-
versely, that the International Court is isolated
from cases.
The time has come, I think, in the light of ex-
perience with the Court to reexamine the domestic-
jurisdiction reservation of the unilateral type to
determine if it should be retained or changed.
If retained, it might be limited in some more
reasonable way.
The International Court needs more support
if it is to succeed in the accomplishment of its
puqioses. Without some step looking toward
some enlarged jurisdiction it cannot hope to attain
the position it should occupy in the world com-
munity striving toward a ride of law and justice.
Once nations begin to submit some of their in-
ternational disputes to impartial international
October 6, 1958
482584—58 3
adjudication— and I mean as an established pro-
cedure and not as the voluntary exception — we
will have taken another important step toward
justice under an international rule of law.
We must, I believe, make more progress, even
if limited progress, toward the proposition put
forward by Woodrow Wilson in 1918 : "What we
seek is the reign of law, based upon the consent
of the governed and sustained by the organized
opinion of mankind."
U.S. and Czechoslovakia Exchange
Views on Summit Conference
U.S. NOTE OF SEPTEMBER 12'
The United States Government refers to the
memorandum of the Czechoslovak Government of
May 31 stating that Government's views with re-
gard to the holding of a Summit conference and
participation of Czechoslovakia in it.
The considerations set forth in the Czechoslovak
memorandum present an erroneous picture of the
attitude of the United States Government. The
United States does not underestimate the signifi-
cance of a Summit meeting nor is it attempting to
delay its convocation. However, the United
States attaches more importance to the achieve-
ment of genuine agreements than to the forum in
which those agreements are reached.
The unanimity reached at the Third Emergency
Special Session of the United Nations General As-
sembly 2 and the successful outcome of the techni-
cal talks at Geneva 3 demonstrate that useful agree-
ments can be attained in various appropriate ways.
With regard to a Summit conference, the United
States continues to hold that it would be desirable
if it would provide opportunity for serious dis-
cussion of major problems and if it would be an
effective means for reaching agreement on signifi-
cant subjects.
1 Delivered to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Czech-
oslovakia by the American Embassy at Prague on Sept. 12
(press release 537 dated Sept. 15).
3 For background, see Bulletin of Sept. 15, 1958, p. 409.
'For background and the text of the technical experts'
final report, see ibid., Sept. 22, 1958, p. 452.
539
A concrete effort to prepare for such a confer-
ence was made on March 31 by the three Western
powers when they invited the Soviet Government
to initiate diplomatic talks in Moscow for this pur-
pose. 4 The preparatory discussions met with diffi-
culties arising from the fact that the proposals
as to what problems shoidd be examined by the
Heads of Government put forward by both sides
were too diverse to be acceptable to either. The
Western powers attempted to resolve these difficul-
ties by proposing on May 31 5 that all specific pro-
posals be reviewed in diplomatic talks in Moscow
under general categories in order to determine
which should be submitted for examination by
Heads of Government. On July 1 6 and again on
August 22, 7 the United States, together with
France and the United Kingdom, expressed regret
that the preparatory discussions in Moscow were
at a standstill and called upon the Soviet Govern-
ment to consider the practical procedure for dis-
cussing a Summit conference agenda which they
had suggested on May 31. It is the Soviet Union
that has blocked any progress on this matter by
its failure to accept this proposal or to submit an
equally effective and workable alternative. There
is no basis for the Czechoslovak assertion that
the United States is endeavoring to delay the con-
vocation of a Summit meeting.
In discussing the Western proposal concerning
Eastern Europe, the Czechoslovak memorandum
seeks to create the impression that the Western
powers wish to interfere in the internal affairs of
the Eastern European countries. It has been the
traditional policy of the United States Govern-
ment to support the right of all countries to free-
dom and independence and the right of their
peoples to choose their own form of government.
The United States Government therefore seeks to
develop adequate guarantees against any interfer-
ence in the internal affairs of all countries and
against the use of force in the settlement of dis-
putes which may arise. In accord with this pol-
icy the United States Government agrees that the
* For text of a three-power declaration presented to the
■Soviet Government on Mar. 31, 1958, see ibid., Apr. 21,
1958, p. 648.
5 For background, see ibid., July 7, 1958, p. 12.
8 For text of a letter from the President to Premier
Khrushchev released by the White House on July 2, 1958,
see ibid., July 21, 1958, p. 95.
7 For text of U. S. note, see ibid,, Sept. 22, 1958, p. 462.
political and economic systems of the Eastern
European coimtries are the exclusive concern of
their peoples.
The United States Government believes that it
would be premature to consider the composition
of a Summit conference until the agenda for such
a conference has been agreed upon. If, after
agreement is reached on an agenda, it appears
that Czechoslovakia's participation would serve a
useful and constructive purpose, the United States
Government would welcome such participation.
The Czechoslovak Government will understand, of
course, that although many countries would likely
believe that their interests would be involved in
any discussions carried out at a Summit confer-
ence, such a conference to be effective would have
to be limited in size.
The Government of the United States agrees
that the object in determining the composition of
a Summit conference should be to promote to the
utmost the achievement of positive results, and
welcomes the Czechoslovak Government's assur-
ance that it is ready to create favorable condi-
tions for the success of a Summit, conference.
CZECHOSLOVAK MEMORANDUM OF MAY 31
Unofficial translation
Bearing in mind the interests of strengthening world
peace and security, The Government of the Czechoslovak
Republic has more than once expressed its conviction as
to the urgency of an early convocation of a summit Con-
ference which would provide a forum for discussing the
most important and most pressing international issues,
the solution of which would contribute to the relaxation
of tension in the world, to the restoration of confidence
and to the promotion of peaceful coexistence among
states.
The idea of convening a Conference of the Heads of
Governments is already deeply rooted in world public
opinion. The nations are justified in expecting that it
will take place as early as possible. Under the pressure
of world public opinion even the Western Powers have
expressed their concurrence in principle with the holding
of the Conference.
On the other hand, however, there have recently been
intensified attempts at belittling the significance of the
Conference and at delaying its convocation. As a result
of the assumption that the concern of the world public
opinion has already been sufficiently lulled, the adver-
saries of the Conference seek to cast in doubt its purpose
and opportuneness. In this connexion it is not possible
to disregard the position taken in respect of the Confer-
I
540
Department of State Bulletin
ence of the Heads of Governments by the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization Council at its recent session in
Copenhagen. In the closing communique of the session "
doubt is expressed whether at the present time the sum-
mit Conference is the best means for the lessening of
international tension. However, the development of
events in recent years has shown quite clearly that after
the consideration of these important questions of inter-
national policy in other world forums failed to produce
the expected results, a summit Conference, attended by
the Heads of Governments, appears to be the most ef-
fective means for a discussion which would undoubtedly
be instrumental in the relaxation of international tension.
The Government of the Czechoslovak Republic are of
the opinion that the summit Conference should discuss
the problems contained in the proposals submitted by
the Government of the U.S.S.R., which received full sup-
port in the Declaration of the Member States of the War-
saw Treaty of May 24, 1958, including such serious and
pressing problems, for the settlement of which there
exist today genuine prerequisites, as the cessation of
nuclear tests, the pledge of the Great Powers to renounce
the use of nuclear weapons, and the conclusion of a non-
aggression pact between the States Members of the North
Atlantic Treaty and the States Members of the Warsaw
Treaty. The broad masses of world public opinion have
accepted and greatly appreciate the proposal submitted
by the Polish People's Republic for the establishment
of an atom-free zone in Central Europe as an important
contribution to the lessening of international tension and
the elimination of the threat of an atomic war in Eu-
rope. The more regrettable is, therefore, the position
held by certain Western Powers which are rejecting this
proposal. The reasons given for this rejection cannot
weaken the conviction of the broadest masses of the
population of the European as well as non-European
countries that the proposal is beneficial to the cause of
peace and security.
None of these problems is being submitted for discus-
sion in the interest of one side alone. It is life itself
that has placed them before the nations of the world,
and their consideration and settlement would not harm
the interests of any country, but, to the contrary, would
help to improve the international situation, strengthen
security in Europe and eliminate mutual distrust.
The Government of the Czechoslovak Republic, as well
as the other States Members of the Warsaw Treaty, cate-
gorically reject the consideration of the provocative and
construed question of the so-called situation in the coun-
tries of Eastern Europe, for the inclusion of which in
the agenda of the summit Conference the ruling circles
of some NATO States are pressing. Similar proposals
constitute inadmissible interference in the internal af-
fairs of sovereign states, incompatible with international
law and the United Nations Charter.
Nor can the question of the unification of Germany,
which the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Council
at its last session sought to force onto the agenda of the
Conference, constitute an item suitable for consideration
by the Conference. This question can only be resolved
by the German people themselves, represented by the two
German States — the German Democratic Republic and
the German Federal Republic.
Neither the raising of such conditions as the discus-
sion at the Conference of the question of disarmament
on the basis of the proposals submitted by the Western
Powers on August 29, 1957° can, in the opinion of the
Czechoslovak Government, in any way be regarded as a
constructive approach to expediting its convocation.
These proposals have already been rejected as imprac-
ticable and inacceptable.
The requirement of a speedy convocation of the Con-
ference at the siunmit is fully met by the last Memo-
randum of the Government of the Soviet Union of May
5 10 of this year, which fully opens the prospects for an
expeditious termination of the preparatory work result-
ing in agreement and followed by an early convocation
of the Conference of the Heads of Governments.
The questions to be considered are of such gravity
that they impose the categorical demand to refrain from
further delays, to bring the negotiations through diplo-
matic channels to a speedy conclusion and to proceed to
the conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs followed
by that of the Heads of Governments.
Regarding the composition of the parties to the talks,
it is necessary to proceed from the real situation in such
a manner as to promote to the utmost the achievement
of positive results. This requirement is fully met by that
part of the Declaration where the States Members of the
Warsaw Treaty have expressed their consent with a
limited participation at the summit Conference of three
/four/ Countries Members of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization and three Countries Members of the War-
saw Treaty and have authorized the Soviet Union, the
Polish People's Republic and the Czechoslovak Republic
/the People's Republic of Roumania/ to attend the Con-
ference on behalf of the countries which are signatories
of the Warsaw Treaty.
The Government of the Czechoslovak Republic wishes
to seize this opportunity to stress once again its pre-
viously expressed readiness to contribute by all means at
its command to a speedy convocation of the summit Con-
ference and to the creation of the most favourable pre-
requisites for its successful result.
The Czechoslovak Government expects that also the
Governments which today have major resi>onsibility for
the convocation of the Conference at the summit will on
their part not fail to do everything in order to fulfill
the hopes that the nations have placed in the summit
Conference.
1 Ibid., May 26, 1958, p. 850.
9 Ibid., Sept. 16, 1957, p. 451.
" Ibid., July 7, 1958, p. 17.
October 6, J 958
54!
Principal Provisions of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1958
by Selma G. Kallis
For the lltli time since the enactment of the
original Trade Agreements Act in 1934, action was
taken during the 85th session of Congress to ex-
tend the President's authority to enter into trade
agreements with foreign countries for the recipro-
cal reduction of tariffs and other import restric-
tions. On August 20, 1958, the President signed
into law the Trade Agreements Extension Act of
1958, Public Law 85-686. Following is a sum-
mary of the principal provisions of the act.
Extension of Period
The 1958 act extends for 4 years, i. e., from
the close of June 30, 1958, through June 30, 1962,
the period during which the President is author-
ized to enter into trade agreements. This is the
longest period for which authority has been
granted in the history of the trade agreements
program. Previous periods have ranged from 1
to 3 years.
Authority To Decrease Rates of Duty
In trade agreements entered into during this 4-
year period the President is authorized to reduce
U.S. duties in stages by any one of three alter-
native methods as follows:
1. Reducing the rate existing on July 1, 1958,
by not more than 20 percent, provided that no
more than a 10 percent reduction can be made
effective in any one year. 1
• Mrs. Kallis, author of the above article,
is Acting Special Assistant in the Trade
Agreements Division.
2. Reducing the rate existing on July 1,
1958, by not more than 2 percentage points ad
valorem (or its ad valorem equivalent in the case
of a specific rate, or a combination of ad valorem
and specific rates). The reduction in any one
year under this alternative may not exceed 1 per-
centage point. On rates of duty below 10 percent
ad valorem or its equivalent, this alternative will
permit a larger reduction than the maximum de-
crease obtainable under (1) above. Thus if the
July 1, 1958, rate on an article was 5 percent ad
valorem, a reduction by 20 percent would yield
a rate of 4 percent ad valorem whereas a reduc-
tion by 2 percentage points would yield a rate of
3 percent ad valorem. Consistent with the pro-
visions of existing legislation, this alternative can
not be used to transfer an item from the dutiable
list to the free list. 1
3. Reducing to 50 percent ad valorem or its
equivalent a rate which is in excess of that level,
provided that not more than one-third of the
total reduction may become effective in any one
year. Similar authority was contained in the
1955 Extension Act. On rates in excess of 62 per-
cent, this alternative would permit a greater re-
duction than that obtainable under alternatives
(1) or (2).
1 With respect to alternatives (1) and (2), in the ex-
ceptional cases where a rate may have been increased
between July 1, 1958, and the date of a trade agreement
concluded under the authority of the 1958 act, the maxi-
mum reduction which may be put into effect in any one
year is one-third of the total reduction made under the
trade agreement, if such one-third Is greater than the
10 percent reduction or the 1 percentage point reduction
stipulated as the maximum under alternatives (1) and
(2) respectively.
542
Department of State Bulletin
In no case may reductions be made in more than
four stages, nor may separate stages be less than a
year apart, nor may the last stage be later than
3 years after the first stage. Authority to reduce
tariffs is not lost year by year if not put into
effect, as was the case under the 1955 act. The
full amount of the authority provided by any of
the three alternatives in the 1958 act may be used
on any article in a trade agreement entered into
at any time during the 4-year period ending June
30, 1962. The reduction may be put into effect
either during that period or thereafter, except
that no part of any decrease is permitted to come
into effect for the first time later than June 30,
1966.
Authority To Increase Rates of Duty
The President's authority to raise rates of duty,
which is of principal significance in escape-clause
cases, is amended for the purpose of minimizing
the need to resort to quotas. The amendments
are as follows :
1. The President is authorized to raise duties
as much as 50 percent over the rates which existed
on July 1, 1934. Previous legislation provided
authority to increase by 50 percent rates existing
on January 1, 1945. In the case of items on which
the rates of duty had been decreased in trade
agreements between these two dates, the change
in the base date will correspondingly increase the
extent to which rates can be raised.
2. Another amendment permits conversion of a
specific duty, e. g., a duty expressed in such terms
as cents per pound or per gallon, to the ad va-
lorem equivalent which the 1934 rate had in terms
of imports in 1934, when prices were generally
lower than now and the ad valorem equivalent
of a specific rate was correspondingly higher.
The authority to increase 1934 rates by 50 per-
cent could be applied to the ad valorem equiva-
lents calculated on the 1934 basis.
Both the authority to increase tariff rates and
to recalculate specific rates is permissive, not man-
datory.
Escape-Clause Provision
The escape-clause pro-vision, which was first
added to the trade agreements legislation in 1951,
is amended in several respects, as outlined below :
1. If the President disapproves the Tariff Com-
mission's recommendations in escape-clause cases
in whole or in part, the Congress may override
the President by approval within 60 days of a con-
current resolution passed by a two-thirds vote of
each House. Such a resolution would be given
privileged status in order to expedite congres-
sional consideration, and if the resolution were
adopted, prompt implementation of the Commis-
sion's recommendations would ensue. The pro-
vision does not eliminate Presidential discretion in
escape-clause cases since the President's decision
would stand unless the Congress approved a reso-
lution to override his decision.
2. The President is authorized in escape-clause
cases to impose a duty up to 50 percent ad valorem
on a duty-free item which is bound free in a trade
agreement. This is a departure from the previous
denial of authority to the President to transfer
items between the dutiable and free lists. The
new authority is permissive, not mandatory. Un-
der previous legislation the only remedy available
in the case of escape-clause action on a duty-free
item would have been the imposition of an import
quota. (See also the immediately preceding sec-
tion on authority to increase rates on dutiable
items. )
3. Escape-clause investigations and reports are
to be completed by the Tariff Commission in 6
months instead of the 9 months provided in pre-
vious legislation. This change will permit expe-
diting any relief to domestic industry which may
be found necessary.
4. The 1958 act specifically provides that organi-
zations or groups of employees are eligible to
apply for escape-clause investigations, thus mak-
ing clear that such bodies may apply even though
management is not a party to the application.
Peril-Point Provision
The so-called peril-point provision of the Trade
Agreements Extension Act of 1951 requires the
Tariff Commission to investigate and report to
the President with respect to each article under
consideration for possible modification of tariff
treatment in a trade agreement negotiation: (a)
the limit to which U.S. duties may be reduced
without causing or threatening serious injury to
the domestic industry producing like or competi-
tive articles, or (b) the minimum increases in U.S.
duties or additional import restrictions which may
be required to avoid serious injury. If the Presi-
Ocfober 6, 7 958
543
dent enters into a trade agreement in which reduc-
tions go below the limits found by the Tariff Com-
mission or which fails to include increases found
necessary by the Commission, he must within 30
days report to the Congress his reasons for the
action taken. The 1958 act makes the following
modifications in the peril-point provision :
1. The period of time provided for the Tariff
Commission's peril-point investigations and re-
ports is increased to 6 months from the 120 days
provided in previous legislation.
2. With respect to each article covered by a
peril-point investigation, the Tariff Commission
shall to the extent practicable and without
excluding other factors :
(a) ascertain the average invoice price, on a
country-of-origin basis, at which the foreign arti-
cle was sold for export to the United States, and
the average price at which the like or directly
competitive domestic articles were sold at whole-
sale in the principal U.S. markets during the last
calendar year preceding the investigation, and
(b) estimate the maximum increase in annual
imports which may occur without causing seri-
ous injury to the domestic industry producing like
or directly competitive articles. The Tariff Com-
mission is directed to ask the executive depart-
ments and agencies for information in their pos-
session concerning prices and pertinent economic
data in the foreign country which is the principal
supplier of each such article.
3. Whenever the Tariff Commission, during the
course of a peril-point investigation, finds with
respect to an article on which a previous tariff con-
cession has been made that an increase in duty or
additional import restriction is required to avoid
serious injury to the domestic industry producing
a like or competitive article, the Commission is di-
rected to start an escape-clause investigation im-
mediately, thus facilitating early settlement of the
issues in such cases.
National Security Provision
The national security provision, first introduced
in the 1954 extension act and substantially
amended in the 1955 act, is retained in the 1958
act with significant amendments as follows :
1. The duty on any article is not to be reduced
if the President finds that such reduction would
threaten to impair the national security. The
corresponding provision in previous legislation
barred any such reduction if the President found
it would threaten domestic production needed for
projected national defense requirements.
2. On request of any U. S. Government de-
partment or agency, on application by any inter-
ested party, or on his own motion, the Director of
the Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
(ODCM) is immediately to make an appropriate
investigation to determine the effects on the na-
tional security of imports of the article in ques-
tion. This section of the bill provides the follow-
ing with respect to possible action by the Presi-
dent :
... If, as a result of such investigation, the Director
is of the opinion that the said article is being imported
into the United States in such quantities or under such
circumstances as to threaten to impair the national se-
curity, he shall promptly so advise the President and,
unless the President determines that the article is not
being imported into the United States in such quantities
or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the
national security as set forth in this section, he shall
take such action, and for such time, as he deems neces-
sary to adjust the imports of such article and its deriva-
tives so that such imports will not so threaten to impair
the national security.
3. As guidance to the Director of ODCM and
the President in considering and determining
whether imports are threatening to impair the na-
tional security, the 1958 act sets forth certain fac-
tors in detail but provides that other relevant fac-
tors are. not to be excluded. The following is the
pertinent language of the act:
For the purposes of this section, the Director and the
President shall, in the light of the requirements of na-
tional security and without excluding other relevant fac-
tors, give consideration to domestic production needed for
projected national defense requirements, the capacity of
domestic industries to meet such requirements, existing
and anticipated availabilities of the human resources,
products, raw materials, and other supplies and services
essential to the national defense, the requirements of
growth of such industries and such supplies and services
including the investment, exploration, and development
necessary to assure such growth, and the importation of
goods in terms of their quantities, availabilities, charac-
ter, and use as those affect such industries and the ca-
pacity of the United States to meet national security re-
quirements. In the administration of this section, the
Director and the President shall further recognize the
close relation of the economic welfare of the Nation to our
national security, and shall take into consideration the
impact of foreign competition on the economic welfare of
544
Department of State Bulletin
Individual domestic industries; and any substantial un-
employment, decrease in revenues of government, loss of
skills or investment, or other serious effects resulting
from the displacement of any domestic products by exces-
sive Imports shall be considered, without excluding other
factors, in determining whether such weakening of our in-
ternal economy may impair the national security.
i. A report is to be issued on the outcome of
each case. The Director of ODCM is required to :
(a) publish procedural regulations to give effect
to his authority to make investigations under the
national security provision, and (b) in consulta-
tion with other Government agencies and with
the approval of the President, to submit, to the
Congress by February 1, 1959, a report on the ad-
ministration of the national security amendment.
5. The 195S act specifies that the changes in the
national security provision shall not require the
reopening of any actions taken or determinations
made under previous legislation.
Other Provisions
1. Under existing legislation the President is
required to submit to the Congress an annual re-
port on the operation of the trade agreements
program. The 1958 act directs the President to
include in such reports a statement on progress
made in obtaining the removal of foreign restric-
tions against U.S. exports, including restrictions
which discriminate against the United States, and
the measures available to secure their removal in
accordance with the objectives of the act.
2. The 1958 act declares it to be the sense of
the Congress that the President, during the course
of negotiating a foreign trade agreement under
the authority of the act, should secure information
and advice with respect thereto from represen-
tatives of American industry, agriculture, and
labor.
3. The Tariff Commission is expressly provided
with the power of subpena and related authority
to obtain information hi connection with its re-
sponsibilities under the trade agreements and
other legislation. This amendment will aid in
assuring that the Commission will have access to
any pertinent available information in escape-
clause and other investigations.
■4. The new legislation repeats standard lan-
guage, which the Congress has embodied in the
last several extension acts, providing that enact-
ment of the 1958 act shall not be construed as
either approval or disapproval of the executive
agreement known as the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade.
World Bank Grants Loan to India
for Railway Improvement
The World Bank announced on September 12
that it has approved a loan equivalent to $85
million to India to help meet the foreign-ex-
change costs of a program to improve and expand
the Indian railways, an important part of India's
Second Five- Year Plan.
The First Pennsylvania Banking and Trust
Company of Philadelphia will participate in the
loan, without the World Bank's guaranty, to the
extent of $500,000 representing parts of the first
five maturities which fall due between January
15, 1963, and January 15, 1965.
The bank's loan will help pay part of the cost
of rolling stock, locomotives, and other equipment
required for the expansion program and will meet
a large part of the payments already made or to
be made for such equipment during 1958 and the
first quarter of 1959.
The loan should be completely disbursed by the
end of March 1959. By that time, it is expected
that $15 million will have been disbursed from the
bank's recent $25 million loan for electric power
development in the Damodar Valley. As a result,
the equivalent of some $100 million, over and
above disbursements on earlier bank loans, will
be made available to India by the bank during the
remainder of India's current fiscal year. This
constitutes the bank's part in the arrangements
recently discussed by the bank with representa-
tives of the Governments of Canada, Germany,
Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United
States for covering India's additional foreign-
exchange requirements of $350 million during this
period.
The Indian railway system, the fourth largest
in the world, is owned by the Government and
managed and operated by the Railway Board, a
part of the Ministry of Railways. The railways
are by far the most important form of transport
in India and carry large volumes of long-haul
traffic that highways and river and coastal ship-
ping do not handle.
Ocfober 6, J 958
545
Improvement and expansion of the railways has
progressed satisfactorily in the Second Five- Year
Plan and the shortage of rail transport is now
less acute than it was 2 years ago. Adjustments
in the program are continually made to meet the
needs of traffic as they develop. Since July 1957,
when the bank lent India the equivalent of $90
million for the railways, the program has been
revised to provide for an increase in freight-car-
rying capacity. During the plan period, it is now
intended to increase freight capacity of the rail-
ways from 114 million tons annually to 168 mil-
lion tons, instead of the 162 million originally
planned. This will require the purchase of 11,000
additional freight cars over the 107,000 originally
intended. Plans to meet a 15 percent increase in
passenger traffic during the plan period remain
unchanged.
The approved expenditures on the railway pro-
gram under the Second Five- Year Plan were to
be 11,250 million rupees ($2,363 million equiv-
alent) of which some 4,250 million rupees
($893 million equivalent) would be required in
foreign currencies for the purchase of essential
goods, materials, and equipment which are either
not produced in India or of which the domestic
supply is insufficient.
The additional increase now planned in freight
capacity should be attained without adding sub-
stantially to the original estimates of total costs
and with an actual reduction in the foreign-ex-
change costs. This will be achieved by improved
operating efficiency and the postponement of cer-
tain less essential parts of the railway program.
The loan will be for a term of 20 years and will
bear interest of 5% percent including the 1 percent
commission which is allocated to the bank's special
reserve. Amortization will begin January 15,
1963. This will bring the total amount of loans
which the bank has made to India, net of cancel-
lations, to $507 million ; the net amount held by
the bank, after allowing for repayments and
amounts sold to third parties, is $450 million.
The loan was approved today by the bank's
executive directors and the loan documents are to
be signed on Tuesday, September 16, by Harishwar
Dayal, Minister and Charge d'Affaires of the Em-
bassy of India at Washington, on behalf of the
Government of India, and by Eugene R. Black,
President, on behalf of the World Bank.
THE CONGRESS
President Expresses Views
on Mutual Security Program
Folloiving is an exchange of letters between
President Eisenhower and members of the Sen-
ate Committee on Foreign Relations concerning
the mutual security program.
PRESIDENT EISENHOWER TO SENATOR GREEN
September 11, 1958
Dear Mr. Chairman : I appreciate your August
25 letter, co-signed by several of your colleagues,
and also the separate comments of Senators
Smith and Capehart. Certainly we agree fully
as to the already great and steadily growing im-
portance of our economic assistance programs.
For a considerable time I have urged their ex-
pansion and have been gratified by your Commit-
tee's support, but unfortunately the Congress as
a whole has sharply reduced the appropriations.
Additional emphasis on these programs is being
considered, and I judge from your letter that in
this effort I can continue to count on your Com-
mittee's support.
As for the military part of mutual security, I
am acutely conscious of its world-wide implica-
tions. Not only have requests for funds for the
military programs been reduced appreciably since
this Administration took office, but the percentage
of the total effort devoted to military and related
aid has been also substantially decreased. En-
largement of our economic programs next year
would of course further decrease the military
proportion.
Because both of these programs — the military
as well as the economic — serve our national in-
terests, an increasing of one at the expense of the
other could have very harmful effects. Without
prejudging the matter, I must say that the threat-
ening posture of the Sino-Soviet Bloc, the impor-
tance of our collective security relationships, and
the increasing cost of weapons will require a most
546
Department of State Bulletin
careful weighing of the security impact of fur-
ther reductions in military programs before they
can be seriously contemplated.
I have sent copies of your letter to Secretary
Dulles and Secretary McElroy. Please give your
colleagues my assurance that their views will have
thoughtful attention as next year's program is
readied for submission to Congress.
Sincerely,
Dwight D. Eisenhower
The Honorable Theodore Francis Green
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.
COMMITTEE MEMBERS TO THE PRESIDENT
August 25, 1958
The President,
The White House
Dear Mr. President: On August 23, the Mu-
tual Security Appropriations Bill for 1959 was
approved by the Congress. The undersigned
members of the Committee on Foreign Relations
voted in favor of this bill as they had previously
done with respect to the authorizing legislation.
The experience was not a new one for us.
Every member who has affixed his signature to
this letter has generally supported Mutual Secu-
rity legislation throughout the years of your
Administration as well as of the previous Ad-
ministration. We have been aware of the great
monetary cost to the people of the United States
which the policy of mutual security has involved.
We have measured that cost, however, against the
even greater cost of a spread of totalitarianism
and the ultimate cost of another war to the United
States. On balance, it has been clear to us that
the monetary cost of mutual security has been
warranted by the service which that policy has
heretofore performed in strengthening the resist-
ance of other nations to totalitarianism and
thereby reducing the danger of another great war.
In writing you concerning the Mutual Security
Program, we do so with a sense of non-partisan-
ship in matters which concern the vital interests
of the nation. This is why we have delayed this
letter until after the completion of the legislative
process on this program. We write now to in-
form you of our deep concern over the present
concept and administration of the program. We
do not presume to trespass on your authority as
President of the United States to administer the
law of the United States. We do believe, how-
ever, as individual members of the Senate with
some experience and understanding of the pro-
gram and a full appreciation of its importance,
that with respect to the less developed countries
there is a serious distortion in the present relative
importance which is attached to military and re-
lated aid on the one hand and technical assist-
ance and self-liquidating economic development
assistance on the other. For several years, we
have received testimony and otherwise obtained
information which tends to support this opinion.
Furthermore, we have seen of late many state-
ments in the press by members of your Adminis-
tration which suggest that the primary threat of
Soviet totalitarianism lies in the political and eco-
nomic realm. Yet the Mutual Security Program
which the Administration presented to the Con-
gress reflects little responsiveness to these ob-
servations.
Overemphasis on military assistance has tended
unavoidably to involve the United States in situa-
tions in which our aid may have contributed to the
maintenance in power of regimes which have
lacked broad support within the countries we have
assisted. It has helped to create abroad a mili-
taristic image of the United States which is a
distortion of our national character. It has dis-
tracted attention, energy and perhaps economic
aid, from more pressing problems. And finally,
we believe military assistance by its very nature
tends to create and then to perpetuate military
hierarchies which even in the most well-developed
countries may endanger the very values of indi-
vidual freedom which we seek to safeguard.
In support of these views, we refer to the unani-
mous report last year of the Special Committee
to Study the Foreign Aid Program, 1 in which
it was recommended that although "military aid
should be continued," "efforts consistent with na-
tional security should be made to reduce the rate
of expenditures". That same report drew at-
tention to three specific questions which the Com-
mittee felt required careful examination, namely :
* For the final report of the committee, see S. Rept.
300, 85th Cong., 1st sess.
Oc/ober 6, 7 958
547
"(1) The suitability of the level of military aid
and the types of arms being provided to less de-
veloped countries; (2) the possibility that com-
petition for arms aid among recipients is adding
unduly to the cost of the program; (3) the pos-
sibility that, in planning foreign aid programs,
insufficient consideration is given to the impact of
arms aid as a factor in generating increased
needs for supporting aid."
While we know you have had considerations of
this kind in mind in preparing annual presenta-
tions of the Mutual Security Program, we believe
that there may have been a tendency to believe
that Congress blindly supports military assist-
ance but looks with disfavor on economic assist-
ance. So far as the undersigned are concerned
that is not the case. Indeed, during considera-
tion this year of the Mutual Security legislation,
various of the undersigned gave serious consid-
eration, or urged, or voted for substantial reduc-
tions of the funds available for military assistance.
Such reductions either were not proposed or were
not adopted because of the possibility of serious
foreign policy repercussions unless reductions in
military assistance can be carefully planned and
phased into being over a period of time.
It seems to us of the greatest national impor-
tance that you give personal attention to this mat-
ter in the time which will elapse before the Mu-
tual Security legislation is again presented to the
Congress. We, urge most respectfully that you
study the Mutual Security Program in the light
of the views of members of your Administration,
of members of Congress and many others who
have stressed that it is in the political and eco-
nomic realm that the concepts of freedom are now
undergoing a universal trial. It may be that such
a study will lead you, Mr. President, as it has led
us to the conclusion that the principal and most
costly shortcoming in the Mutual Security Pro-
gram remains as it has been for some time — the
failure to emphasize military aid less and to stress
economic aid and technical assistance more. It
may be that such a study will reveal that the mili-
tary and non-military portions of the program
are drawn up independently to an undue extent
and then put together automatically in the same
package.
We are anxious to do what is necessary for the
welfare of the nation. So long as an aid program
serves the enlightened self-interest of the people
of the United States, we shall support it. We can
do so, however, only if it is reasonably clear that
it is administered in a fashion which does, in fact,
contribute to that end. Therefore, we express to
you our concern that we may be pursuing a pat-
tern of foreign aid drawn by force of habit rather
than one adjusted to current international
realities.
We write you at this time because we are aware
that budgets for the Mutual Security Program
are prepared many months in advance. If there
is to be an adjustment in this program in 1959,
then the most appropriate time to act is now. We
hope that before this program is again presented
to Congress you will have had opportunity to
re-appraise the relationship between the military
and economic assistance aspects of the Mutual
Security Program.
Yours respectfully,
Theodore Francis Green
j. w. fulbright
John J. Sparkman
Hubert H. Humphrey
Mike Mansfield
Wayne Morse
John F. Kennedy
William Langer
Enclosures
senator smith to senator fulbright
August 21, 1958
Dear Bill : I apologize for my delay in answering your
letter of August 13th.
On reflection, while I feel that your emphasis on eco-
nomic aid rather than military aid is a sound approach,
I would prefer not to join in a letter from the entire
Committee which would seem to imply that the opera-
tions of the Administration were open to criticism.
My own feeling is that while I would favor less mili-
tary aid, nevertheless we have been compelled to think
of the security of our country in light of the Soviet
threat. These security needs must be balanced with our
consideration of what might be called the wider range
of our activities in supporting a positive program for the
betterment of the other countries of the world.
My hope is that we can ultimately work out disarma-
ment movements and UN responsibilities so that by de-
grees the military side can be substantially reduced. As
rapidly as this can be accomplished we can move into the
constructive build-up side in order that there may be a
broad area of cooperation between the better-to-do na-
tions of the world, and the underdeveloped areas, in
548
Department of State Bulletin
terms of insuring the freedom, independence and self-
determination, and especially economic stability of the
latter.
This is doubtless along the same lines as your thinking,
but just as I am leaving the Senate I do not wish to
join in what might be construed to be a criticism of the
Administration's policies which I have been defending
vigorously since the mutual security concept was inaugu-
rated.
Should you and your colleagues decide to forward the
letter you have sent to us, I would be glad to have you
enclose this letter with it, indicating that I am in agree-
ment with your thoughts of moving more and more
towards the constructive, positive side and ultimately
reducing the defensive, negative side.
Always cordially yours,
H. Alexander Smith, U.S.S.
The Honorable J. W. Fulbbight
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.
senator capehart to senator fulbright
August 22, 1958
Dear Bill: I am sorry that I have delayed so long
in replying to your letter of August 13th with reference
to your proposal to forward a letter on the subject of
mutual security appropriations to President Eisenhower.
Bill, I would say frankly that I am not in a position
to join as a co-signer of the proposed letter which you en-
closed. My position on the matter of military and eco-
nomic aid is well known and I feel that it would be in-
appropriate for me to join as co-signer of a communica-
tion which might be interpreted to contain implications of
criticism to the Administration.
I am sure you know, because you have heard me say
so many, many times, that I favor the appropriation of
military aid funds directly to our own military to be ad-
ministered by our own military establishment. I likewise
have favored converting whatever economic aid program
is dictated by the circumstances of the moment into a
loan program.
I hope with you that the day will come when the
necessity for military aid is reduced or eliminated en-
tirely. I do not see that possibility at the moment in the
light of continuing Soviet threats.
While I am sure that you and I are in complete agree-
ment on the objectives of the mutual security program,
I do not feel that I can completely endorse the views
expressed in the proposed draft of your letter at this
time. Thus, if you and other members of the committee
do decide to send your letter to the President, I hope
you will feel that it is appropriate to include this letter
as an expression of my own views on the subject.
I very much appreciate your giving me the opportunity
to express my views with respect to this very, very im-
portant matter.
Regards.
Sincerely,
Homer E. Capehart
Honorable J. William Fulbright
Room 409
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.
Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy
85th Congress, 2d Session
Operation of Article VII, NATO Status of Forces Treaty.
Report of the Senate Committee on Armed Services
made by its Subcommittee on the Operation of Article
VII of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement to review
operation of article VII of the agreement between the
parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the
status of their forces covering period from December
1, 1956, through November 30, 1957. S. Rept. 2497,
August 23, 1958. 15 pp.
Mutual Security Act of 1959. Conference report to ac-
company H. R. 13192. H. Rept. 2704, August 23, 1958.
4 pp.
Designations
James R. Johnstone as Executive Director, Bureau of
Far Eastern Affairs, effective September 16.
Turner C. Cameron as Deputy Director, Office of
Western European Affairs, effective September 21.
Russell Fessenden as Deputy Director, Office of Euro-
pean Regional Affairs, effective September 21.
Robert H. McBride as Director, Office of Western
Euroi ican Affairs, effective September 21.
October 6, 1958
549
t
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings '
Adjourned During September 1958
ICAO Special Communications Preparatory Meeting for the ITU
Radio Conference.
19th International Exhibition of Cinematographic Art
19th International Exhibition of Feature Film
12th International Edinburgh Film Festival
International Union of Biochemistry: 3d General Assembly . . .
ICAO Development/Implementation Panel for the Meteorological
Operational Telecommunications Network for Europe.
2d U.N. International Conference on Peaceful Uses of Atomic
Energy.
U.N. Committee on South-West Africa
UNICEF Executive Board and Program Committee
U.N. ECAFE Working Party on Economic Development and
Planning: 4th Meeting.
International Statistical Institute: Special Session
6th International Congress of Tropical Medicine and Malaria . .
World Power Conference: International Executive Council . . .
World Power Conference: 12th Sectional Meeting
U.N. Exploratory Meeting on Copper
18th International Congress of Ophthalmology
FAO Governmental Experts on the Use of Designations, Definitions,
and Standards for Milk and Milk Products.
FAO Technical Meeting on the Costs and Earnings of Fishing
Enterprises.
ICAO Legal Committee: Subcommittee on Legal Status of Air-
craft.
U.N. Exploratory Meeting on Lead and Zinc
FAO Experts on National Dairy Policies
U.N. Trusteeship Council: 8th Special Session
International Commission for Criminal Police: 27th Session of the
General Assembly.
6th International Congress on Large Dams
IAEA Board of Governors: 8th Session
FAO International Chestnut Commission: 4th Session
11th World Poultry Congress
Informal Meeting of American Foreign Ministers
UNREF Executive Committee: 9th (Special) Session
Montreal Aug. 19-Sept. 9
Venice .
Venice .
Edinburgh
Vienna .
Paris . .
Geneva .
New York
New York
Bangkok
Brussels
Lisbon .
Montreal
Montreal
London
Brussels
Rome .
London
Montreal
London
Rome .
New York
London
New York
Vienna .
Yugoslavia
Mexico, D
Washington
Geneva . .
Aug. 24-Sept. 1
Aug. 24-Sept. 7
Aug. 24-Sept. 14
Sept. 1-6
Sept. 1-10
Sept. 1-13
Sept. 2-5
Sept. 2-11
Sept. 2-13
Sept. 3-8
Sept. 5-13
Sept. 6 and 10
Sept. 7-11
Sept. 8-10
Sept. 8-12
Sept. 8-13
Sept. 8-13
Sept. 9-20
Sept. 11-13
Sept. 15-19
Sept. 15-19
Sept. 15-20
Sept. 15-20
Sept. 16-20
Sept. 22-30
Sept. 21-28
Sept. 23-24
Sept. 25-26*
In Session as of September 30, 1958
U.N. General Assembly: 13th ^ession New York Sept.
San Juan Sept.
Geneva Sept.
Vienna Sept.
15th Pan American Sanitary Conference and 10th Meeting of the
Regional Committee of WHO for the Americas.
GATT Intersessional Committee
International Atomic Energy Agency: 2d General Conference
U.N. Sugar Conference Geneva.
WHO Regional Committee for the Western Pacific: 9th Session .
South Pacific Commission: 18th Session
ICAO Panel of Teletypewriter Specialists: 3d Meeting ....
Commonwealth Specialist Subcommittee of Service Psychologists
WMO Commission on Agricultural Meteorology: 2d Session
Sept.
16-
21-
22-
22-
22-
26-
2fi-
FAO/UNICEF Joint Policy Committee Rome
Manila Sept
Noumea, New Caledonia . . Sept,
Montreal Sept. 29
Melbourne Sept. 29
Warsaw Sept. 29
Sept. 29-
1 Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Sept. 18, 1958. Asterisks indicate tentative dates and places.
Following is a list of abbreviations: ANZUS, Australia, New Zealand, United States Treaty; ECAFE, Economic Com-
mission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council;
FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; ICAO, International Civil
Aviation Organization; ICEM, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration; ILO, International Labor Or-
ganization; PASO, Pan American Sanitary Organization; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization; UNICEF, United Nations Children's Fund; UNREF, United Nations Refugee Fund; WHO, World Health
Organization; WMO, World Meteorological Organization.
550
Department of State Bulletin
Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings — Continued
Scheduled October 1-December 31, 1958
International Symposium on U.S. Domestic Short Distance Navi- Washington Oct. 1-
gation System (VORTAC) and Its Relationship to the Interna- and
tional Air Navigation System. Indianapolis Oct. 3-
ANZUS: 6th Meeting Washington Oct. 1-
Internationnl Council of Scientific Unions: 8th General Assembly . Washington Oct. 2-
FAO International Rice Commission: 6th Session Tokyo Oct. 3-
International Union of Official Travel Organizations: 13th General Brussels Oct. 3-
Assembly.
Diplomatic Conference for Revision of Convention for the Protec- Lisbon Oct. 6-
tion of Industrial Property.
4th FAO Regional Conference for Asia and the Far East .... Tokyo Oct. 6-
International Monetary Fund, International Bank for Reconstruc- New Delhi Oct. 6-
tion and Development, and International Finance Corporation:
Annual Meetings of Boards of Governors.
PASO Executive Committee: 36th Meeting San Juan Oct. 6-
U.N. ECE Working Party on Electric Power Statistics Geneva Oct. 6-
Commonwealth Advisory Committee on Defense Sciences .... Canberra Oct. 7-
U.N. ECE Working Party on Rural Electrification Geneva Oct. 7-
FAO General Fisheries Council of the Mediterranean: 5th Meet- Rome Oct. 13-
ing.
Structural Division of American Society of Civil Engineers and In- New York Oct. 13-
ternational Association for Bridge and Structural Engineering:
Joint Meeting.
U.N. ECE Timber Committee: 16th Session Geneva Oct. 13-
GATT Contracting Parties: 13th Session Geneva Oct. 16-
9th U.N. ECOSOC Technical Assistance Conference New York Oct. 16-
FAO Near East Forestry Commission: 2d Session Iraq Oct. 18-
Consultative Committee for Cooperative Economic Development
in South and Southeast Asia ("Colombo Plan"): 10th Meeting.
Preliminary Working Group Seattle Oct. 20-
Officials Meeting Seattle Oct. 27-
Ministerial Meeting Seattle Nov. 10-
Intemational North Pacific Fisheries Commission: 6th Meeting . . Tokyo Oct. 20-
U. N. ECAFE Regional Cartographic Conference for Asia and the Tokyo Oct. 20-
Far East.
FAO Group on Coconut: 2d Session Manila Oct. 21-
ICAO Rules of the Air and Air Traffic Control/Search and Rescue Montreal Oct. 21-
Divisional Meeting.
U.N. ECAFE Industry and Natural Resources Committee: 8th Bangkok Oct. 21-
Session of Subcommittee on Iron and Steel.
FAO Council: 29th Session Rome Oct. 27-
U. N. ECE Committee on Development of Trade and East- West Geneva Oct. 27-
Trade Consultations.
UNESCO Executive Board: 52d Session Paris Oct. 27-
U. N. Preliminary Wheat Conference Geneva Oct. 28-
UNESCO Directors of National Cultural Relations: 2d Meeting . Paris Oct. 28-
South Pacific Commission: Special Conference on Tuberculosis . . Pago Pago Oct. 31-
International Sugar Council: 16th Session Geneva October
International S':gar Council: Executive Committee Geneva October
International S'gar Council: Statistical Committee Geneva October
International Wheat Council: 25th Session Geneva October
2d Pan American Congress of the Theater Habana October
6th Inter-American Congress of Radiology Lima Nov. 2-
ILO Governing Body: 140th Session (and Committees) Geneva Nov. 3-
FAO Latin American Forestry Commission: 6th Session Guatemala City Nov. 4-
ICEM Exec utive Committee: 11th Session Geneva Nov. 4-
U.N. ECAFE Inland Transport Committee: 4th Session of High- Bangkok Nov. 4-
way Subcommittee.
UNESCO General Conference: 10th Session Paris Nov. 4-
U.N. ECE Housing Committee: 17th Session and Working Parties . Geneva Nov. 0-
Technical Discissions on Prevention of Surprise Attack Geneva Nov. 10-*
U.N. Wheat Conference: Preparatory Committee London Nov. 10-
ICEM Council: 9th Session Geneva Nov. 12-
U.N. ECAFE Working Party on Customs Administration .... Bangkok Nov. 12-
FAO Latin American Regional Conference San Jos6 Nov. 17-
FAO/WHO Near East Regional Nutrition Meeting Cairo Nov. 18-
ICA0 Statistics Division: 3d Session Montreal Nov. 18-
Caribbean Commission: Conference on Revision of Agreement for Trinidad Nov. 24—
Establishment of the Commission.
Customs Cooperation Council: 13th Session Brussels Nov. 24-
ILO Asian Advisory Committee: 9th Session Geneva Nov. 24-
U.N. ECAFE Working Party on Railway Mechanical Engineers . . undetermined Nov. 24-
Ocfober 6, 7 958 551
Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings — Continued
Scheduled October 1-December 31, 1958 — Continued
IT.N. ECE Committee on Agricultural Problems: 10th Session . . .
International Fisheries Convention 1946, Permanent Commission:
7th Meeting.
U.N. ECAFE Working Party on Coordination of Transport . . .
U.N. ECOSOC Technical Assistance Committee
FAO Cocoa Study Group: Committee on Statistics
FAO Cocoa Study Group: Executive Committee
Inter-American Technical Meeting on Housing and Planning. . .
International North Pacific Fisheries Commission: Committee on
Biologv and Research.
ICAO Map Panel: 2d Meeting
FAO/WHO Technical Meeting on Food Additives
WMO Regional Association for North and Central America: 2d
Session.
U.N. ECAFE Symposium on Petroleum Resources Development.
FAO Indo-Pacific Fisheries Council: 8th Meeting
North Pacific Fur Seal Commission: 2d Meeting
ILO Technical Tripartite Committee on Timber Industry
U.N. ECAFE Conference of Asian Statisticians: 2d Session . . . .
U.N. ECE Steel Committee and Working Parties
7th Inter-American Travel Congress
FAO Regional Conference for Near East
Caribbean Commission: 27th Meeting
U.N. ECE Coal Trade Subcommittee (and related meetings) . . .
U.N. ECE Inland Transport Committee: 18th Session
U.N. Economic Commission for Africa: 1st Session
Geneva
Dublin .
Nov. 24-
Nov. 25-
Bangkok Nov. 25-
New York November
Rome November
Rome November
Lima November
Tokyo November
Montreal Dec. 1-
Rome Dec. 1—
Washington Dec. 1-
New Delhi Dec. 3-
Colombo Dec. 6-
Washington Dec. 8-
Geneva Dec. 8—
Bangkok Dec. 8-
Geneva Dec. 8-
Montevideo Dec. 9-
Damascus* Dec. 10-
Cayenne Dec. 15-
Geneva Dec. 15-
Geneva Dec. 15-
Addis Ababa Dec. 29-
Secretary Dulles Congratulates
U.S. Delegation to UNESCO
Following are remarks made by Secretary Dul-
les on September 12 at swearing-in ceremonies of
the U.S. delegation to the 10th session of the
General Conference of UNESCO.
I am delighted to be here at the swearing-in of
the United States delegation to the UNESCO
General Conference. 1 It is a distinguished delega-
tion, and it properly reflects the leadership which
the United States must provide to the world in the
intellectual field. It also reflects the importance
which the United States and its citizens attach to
the work of UNESCO in the fields of education,
science, and the arts.
I am particularly well acquainted with the
chairman and vice chairman of your delegation.
I have, for a number of years admired Max Eabb's
work as secretary to the Cabinet, and I know that
he is well qualified to lead a delegation such as
this. I am delighted at this evidence that his re-
cent return to private life has not meant that the
Government will totally lose his services. Johnnie
Hanes I have known perhaps even better, because
he was my special and trusted assistant for 4 years.
I am glad, too, that this ceremony could take
place so fittingly in the presence of the UNESCO
National Commission. 2 It is the function of the
National Commission to advise the Government
in the development of U.S. policies toward
UNESCO. The U.S. delegation to the General
Conference is the means whereby such policies are
carried out. I am doubly pleased, therefore, first,
that the delegation includes so many members of
the National Commission, including your chair-
man, Dr. [John R.] Richards; and, second, that
it has been possible to arrange this joint meeting
today between the entire National Commission and
the delegation.
Today's meeting marks two important innova-
tions. Never before has a UNESCO delegation
met together so long prior to the conference or
had the resulting opportunity to become a full
partner in the policy-making process of develop-
ing U.S. positions. Also, no previous delegation
has met with and received firsthand the advice of
1 For an announcement of the U.S. delegation, see
Bulletin of Sept. 8, 1958, p. 401.
2 The U.S. National Commission for UNESCO met at
Washington, D.C., Sept. 11-12.
552
Department of State Bulletin
the National Commission. I hope both of these
precedents will be continued in the future.
We in the Department of State appreciate
deeply the effective work of the National Commis-
sion. We know of the long study which you have
given to the UNESCO program that will be con-
sidered at the November conference. We are cer-
tain that the work of our delegation will benefit
immensely from your recommendations and your
mutual discussions today.
The things which UNESCO symbolizes have
always been important, but today their impor-
tance is growing — to the United States as well
as to the world.
When UNESCO was founded, all of us hoped
its work could be carried out in a world of
lessened international tensions and of growing
good will among nations. Instead, the hostility
that exists in the world today, the tensions that
continue to find expression, make it far more diffi-
cult to carry out successful programs of cultural
relations among nations. But the very existence
of these tensions and hostilities makes it more nec-
essary than ever to strengthen and use every means
to exchange ideas. It is clear that cultural con-
tacts alone will not be likely to bring peace to the
world, but it is equally true that political and eco-
nomic arrangements alone are not likely to bring a
peace which can secure the lasting support, of the
peoples of the world. True peace with justice
must rest upon a greater measure of intellectual
and moral understanding among all peoples. Your
work in the National Commission and the work
of our delegation are powerful forces increasing
that understanding.
I want to thank the members of this delegation
for the service they are performing. The United
States is tremendously fortunate in having citi-
zens willing to give their time and energy to
represent the United States in international meet-
ings. Very few people realize the long prepara-
tion required for these conferences, or the time
delegation members must be away from their own
business, or the pressure under which they work
during the sessions. We — and I — do appreciate
that, and your Government appreciates greatly
this contribution that you are making to our
representation in UNESCO and therefore to our
foreign policy and the welfare of the whole
United States.
U.S. Delegations to
International Conferences
Pan American Sanitary Conference and WHO
Regional Committee for the Americas
The Department of State announced on Sep-
tember 17 (press release 542) that, the 15th Pan
American Sanitary Conference and the 10th
meeting of the World Health Organization Ee-
gional Committee for the Americas will convene
at San Juan, P. R., September 21. The U.S.
delegation to this conference is as follows:
Delegates
Leroy E. Burney, M. D., chairman. Surgeon General, Pub-
lie Ilealth Service, Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare
Guillermo Arbona, M. D., Secretary of Health, Common-
wealth of Puerto Rico
H. van Zile Hyde, M. D., Special Assistant to the Sur-
geon General for International Affairs, Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare
Advisers
Roberto Francisco Azize, M. D., Director, Department of
Cardiology, San Juan Diagnostic Clinic, San Juan, P. R.
John B. Grant, M. D., Department of Preventive Medi-
cine and Public Health, School of Medicine, Uni»rer-
sity of Puerto Rico
Luis Guzman, M. D., President, Medical Association, San
Juan, P. R.
Harold Hinman, M. D., Dean, School of Medicine, Uni-
versity of Puerto Rico
Matthew R. Kinde, M. D., Kellogg Foundation, Battle
Creek, Mich.
Erie L. O'Neal, M. D., Commissioner of Health, Virgin
Islands
Charles G. Sommer, Office of International Administra-
tion, Department of State
Charles L. Williams, Jr., M. D., Deputy Chief, Public
Health Division, International Cooperation Adminis-
tration
Simon N. Wilson, Office of Inter-American Regional Po-
litical Affairs, Department of State
Secretary of Delegation
3. Harlan Southerland, Office of International Confer-
ences, Department of State
Members of the Staff
Louise Beane, Office of the Surgeon General, Public
Health Service, Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare
Betty L. Groves, Library Division, Department of State
Barbara Younghans, Employment Division, Department
of State
The Pan American Sanitary Conference is the
governing body of the Pan American Sanitary
October 6, 1958
553
Organization (PASO), the international cooi-di-
nating autliority for public health in the Amer-
icas, and serves as the Regional Committee for
the Americas of the World Health Organization.
Between quadrennial conferences the Directing
Council serves in the same capacity. The 14th
Conference was held at Santiago, Chile, October
8-22, 1954.
The 15th Conference will plan the activities of
the Pan American Sanitary Organization for the
next 4 years. It will consider the proposed pro-
grams and budgets of WHO for the Americas
and PASO for 19G0 and adopt the program and
budget for PASO for 1959, based upon the pro-
posals submitted by the director and the Execu-
tive Committee.
It will also elect the director of PASB (Pan
American Sanitary Bureau) for the next 4 years,
elect three members to the Executive Board, and
consider certain technical amendments to the con-
stitution. Dr. Fred C. Soper has been director
of the Bureau since 1947.
The principal technical programs to be dis-
cussed are status of malaria eradication in the
Americas, eradication of smallpox, work of the
Institution of Nutrition of Central America and
Panama (INCAP), and the status of Aedes
aegypti (yellow-fever eradication campaign).
Other highlights of the conference will be con-
sideration of reports of member states on public
health conditions and achievements during the
last 4 years, and technical discussions on the pre-
vention of accidents in childhood.
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Atomic Energy
Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Done
at New York October 26, 1956. Entered into force July
29, 1957. TIAS 3873.
Ratification deposited: Iran, September 16, 1958.
Finance
Articles of agreement of the International Monetary Fund.
Opened for signature at Washington December 27, 1945.
Entered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1501.
Signatures and acceptances: Spain, September 15, 1958;
Libya, September 17, 1958.
Articles of agreement of the International Bank for Re-
construction and Development. Opened for signature
at Washington December 27, 1945. Entered into force
December 27, 1945. TIAS 1502.
Signatures and acceptances: Spain, September 15, 1958;
Libya, September 17, 1958.
Protocol terminating obligations arising from the accord
of May 10, 1948 (TIAS 1773), regarding German as-
sets in Spain, and exchange of notes. Signed at Madrid
August 9, 1958. Enters into force on date of entry into
force of agreement between the Federal Republic of
Germany and Spain on certain consequences of the
Second World War, signed April 8, 1958.
Signatures : France, Spain, United Kingdom, and United
States.
Articles of agreement of the International Finance Cor-
poration. Done at Washington May 25, 1955. Entered
into force July 20, 1956. TIAS 3620.
Signature and acceptance: Ireland, September 11, 1958.
International Court of Justice
Statute of the International Court of Justice (59 Stat.
1055).
Declaration recognizing compulsory jurisdiction re-
newed: Turkey, August 7, 1958. Effective for a fur-
ther 5-year period from May 23, 1957.
Law of the Sea
Convention on the territorial sea and the contiguous zone.
Done at Geneva April 29, 1908. Enters into force on
the 30th day following the deposit of the 22d ratification
or accession. 1
Signatures: Argentina, Canada, China, Colombia (with
reservation), Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican
Republic, Ghana, Guatemala, Haiti, Iceland. Israel,
Nepal, Thailand, Uruguay, Yugoslavia, April 29, 1958 ;
Holy See, April 30, 1958; Panama, May 2, 1958;
Liberia, May 27, 1958; Iran (with reservation). May
28, 1958; United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland. September 9, 1958 ; United States,
September 15, 1958.
Convention on the high seas. Done at Geneva April 29,
1958. Enters into force on the 30th day following the
deposit of the 22d ratification or accession. 1
Signatures: Argentina, Canada, China, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ghana,
Guatemala, Haiti, Iceland, Israel, Nepal, Thailand,
Uruguay, Yugoslavia, April 29, 1958 ; Holy See, April
30, 1958; Panama, May 2, 1958; Indonesia, May 8,
1958; Switzerland, May 24, 1958; Liberia, May 27,
1958; Iran (with reservatisHs), May 28, 1958; Leb-
anon, May 29, 1958; United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, September 9, 1958 ;
United States, September 15, 1958.
Convention on fishing and conservation of living resources
of the high seas. Done at Geneva April 29, 1958. En-
ters into force on the 30th day following the deposit
of the 22d ratification or accession. 1
Signatures: Argentina, Canada, China, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ghana,
Haiti, Iceland, Israel, Nepal, Thailand, Uruguay,
Yugoslavia, April 29, 1958; Panama, May 2, 1958;
Indonesia, May 8, 1958 ; Liberia, May 27, 1958 ; Iran,
May 28, 1958 ; Lebanon, May 29, 1958 ; United King-
dom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Septem-
ber 9, 1958 ; United States, September 15, 1958.
Convention on the continental shelf. Done at Geneva
April 29, 1958. Enters into force the 30th day follow-
ing the deposit of the 22d ratification or accession. 1
1 Not in force.
554
Department of State Bulletin
Signatures: Argentina, Canada, China, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ghana,
Guatemala, Haiti, Iceland, Israel, Nepal, Thailand,
Uruguay, Yugoslavia, April 29, 1958; Panama, May
2, 195S; Liberia, May 27, 1958; Iran (with reserva-
tions), May 28, 1958; Lebanon, May 29, 1958; United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
September 9, 1958; United States, September 15, 1958.
Optional protocol of signature concerning the compulsory
settlement of disputes. Done at Geneva April 29, 1958.
Enters into force upon signature unless ratification is
required by the constitution of the signatory state. 2
Signatures: Canada, China, Colombia (with reserva-
tion), Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Re-
public, Ghana, Haiti, Israel (ad referendum), Nepal,
Uruguay, Yugoslavia (subject to ratification), April
29, 195S; Holy See, April 30, 195S; Panama, May 2,
195S; Indonesia, May 8, 1958; Switzerland (subject
to ratification), May 24, 1958; Liberia, May 27, 1958;
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ire-
land. September 9, 1958; United States, September
15, 1958.
Salvage
Convention for the unification of certain rules with re-
spect to assistance and salvage at sea. Signed at Brus-
sels September 23, 1910. Entered into force March 1,
1913. 37 Stat. 1658.
Adherence deposited: Dominican Republic, July 23,
1958.
Trade and Commerce
Protocol amending part I and articles XXIX and XXX
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done
at Geneva March 10, 1955. 1
Declaration deposited recognizing signature as fully
binding: Netherlands, August 26, 1958.
Protocol of organizational amendments to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva
March 10, 1955. 1
Declaration deposited recognizing signature as fully
binding: Netherlands, August 26, 195S.
War
Geneva convention relative to treatment of prisoners of
war ;
Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of
wounded and sick in armed forces in the field ;
Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of
wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of armed
forces at sea ;
Geneva convention relative to protection of civilian per-
sons in time of war.
Dated at Geneva August 12, 1949. Entered into force
October 21, 1950 ; for the United States February 2,
1956. TIAS 3364, 3362, 3363, and 3365, respectively.
Accession deposited: Ghana, August 2, 1958.
Prince September S and 9, 1958. Entered into force
September 9, 1958.
Israel
Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agree-
ments of April 29, 1955, as supplemented (TIAS 3228
and 3261), November 10, 1955, as amended (TIAS
3429, 3489, and 3497), September 11, 1956 (TIAS 3635),
and November 7, 1957, as supplemented (TIAS 3945
and 4063). Effected by exchange of notes at Washing-
ton August 28, 1958. Entered into force September 9,
1958.
Nicaragua
Agreement for the establishment of a Loran Transmitting
Station. Signed at Managua September 5, 1958. En-
tered into force September 5, 1958.
Yugoslavia
Agreement providing special economic assistance to Yugo-
slavia. Effected by exchange of notes at Belgrade
April 4 and 5, 1958. Entered into force April 5, 1958.
PUBLICATIONS
Recent Releases
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Gov-
ernment Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. Address
requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents,
except in the case of free publications, which may be
obtained from the Department of State.
Passport Visa Fees. TIAS 4053. 10 pp. 10<J.
Agreement between the United States of America and
New Zealand. Exchange of notes — Dated at Wellington
December 16, 1957, and May 2 and 5, 1958. Entered
into force on May 5, 1958. And amending agreement.
Exchange of notes — Dated at Wellington May 13, 1958.
Entered into force May 13, 1958.
Mutual Defense Assistance — Equipment, Materials, and
Services. TIAS 4055. 2 pp. 54.
Agreement between the United States of America and
Lebanon, amending agreement of June 3 and 6, 1957.
Exchange of notes — Signed at Beirut June 9 and 12, 1958.
Entered into force June 12, 1958; operative retroactively
June 6, 1957.
Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4056. 2 pp.
BILATERAL
Canada
Agreement providing for the establishment of a Canada-
1 nited States Committee on Joint Defense. Effected
by exchange of notes at Ottawa August 29 and Sep-
tember 2, 1958. Entered into force September 2, 1958.
Haiti
Agreement providing for duty-free entry into Haiti and
exemption from internal taxation of relief supplies and
* packages. Effected by exchange of notes at Port-au-
1 Not in force.
! Not in force for the United States.
Agreement between the United States of America and
Turkey, supplementing agreement of January 20, 1958 —
Signed at Ankara June 25, 1958. Entered into force June
25, 1958.
Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4057. 4 pp.
5<*.
Agreement between the United States of America and
Spain, supplementing agreement of January 27, 1958, as
supplemented — Signed at Madrid June 30, 1958. Entered
into force June 30, 1958.
Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4058. 7 pp.
UH.
Agreement between the United States of America and
Ocfober 6, J 958
555
India — Signed at New Delhi June 23, 1958, with related
letter. Entered into force June 23, 1958.
Atomic Energy — Cooperation for Civil Uses. TIAS 4059.
6 pp. 54.
Agreement between the United States of America and
Ireland — Signed at Washington March 16, 1956. Entered
into force July 9, 1958.
TIAS 4060. 4 pp.
Surplus Agricultural Commodities.
54.
Agreement, with exchange of letters, between the United
States of America and Yugoslavia — Signed at Belgrade
June 26, 1958. Entered into force June 26, 1958.
Mutual Defense Assistance — Equipment, Materials, and
Services. TIAS 4061. 5 pp. 54.
Agreement between the United States of America and
Bolivia. Exchange of notes — Signed at La Paz March 21
and April 22, 1958. Entered into force April 22, 1958.
Air Service — Lease of Equipment, Return of Certain
Items. TIAS 4062. 9 pp. 10#.
Agreement between the United States of America and the
Federal Republic of Germany, extending agreement of
August 2, 1955. Exchange of notes — Dated at Bonn/Bad
Godesberg and Bonn February 24 and May 24, 1958. En-
tered into force May 24, 1958 ; operative retroactively
August 2, 1957.
Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4063. 4
54.
pp.
Agreement between the United States of America and
Israel, supplementing agreement of November 7, 1957,
as amended. Exchange of notes — Signed at Washington
June 30, 1958. Entered into force June 30, 1958.
Surplus Agricultural Commodities.
54.
TIAS 4065. 3 pp.
Agreement between the United States of America and Ice-
land, supplementing agreement of May 3, 1958. Exchange
of notes — Signed at Reykjavik June 25 and 26, 1958.
Entered into force June 26, 1958.
TIAS 4066. 10 pp.
Surplus Agricultural Commodities.
104.
Agreement, with memorandum of understanding and ex-
change of notes, between the United States of America
and Viet-Nam — Signed at Saigon June 17, 1958. Entered
into force June 17, 1958.
Use of Veterans Memorial Hospital — Grants-in-Aid for
Medical Care and Treatment of Veterans. TIAS 4067.
7 pp. 100.
Agreement between the United States of America and the
Republic of the Philippines — Signed at Manila June 30,
1958. Entered into force July 1, 1958.
Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4068. 3 pp. 5<f.
Agreement between the United States of America and
Ceylon, amending agreement of June 18, 1958. Exchange
of notes — Signed at Washington June 30, 1958. Entered
into force June 30, 1958.
Cultural Relations. TIAS 4069. 5 pp. 54.
Agreement between the United States of America and
Afghanistan. Exchange of notes — Dated at Washington
June 26, 1958. Entered into force June 26, 1958.
Agreement between the United States of America and
Mexico, amending agreement of October 23, 1957. Ex-
change of notes — Dated at Mexico June 30, 1958. En-
tered into force June 30, 1958.
Air Transport Services. TIAS 4071. 4 pp. 54.
Agreement between the United States of America and
Denmark, amending agreement of December 16, 1944, as
amended. Exchange of notes — Signed at Washington
July 8, 1958. Entered into force July 8, 1958.
Air Transport Services. TIAS 4072. 3 pp. 5<f.
Agreement between the United States of America and
Norway, amending agreement of October 6, 1945, as
amended. Exchange of notes — Signed at Washington
July 8, 1958. Entered into force July 8, 1958.
Air Transport Services. TIAS 4073. 3 pp. 54.
Agreement between the United States of America and
Sweden, amending agreement of December 16, 1944, as
amended. Exchange of notes — Signed at Washington
July 8, 1958. Entered into force July 8, 1958.
Surplus Agricultural Commodities.
5<f.
TIAS 4074. 4 pp.
Agreement between the United States of America and
Brazil, amending agreement of December 31, 1956, as cor-
rected. Exchange of notes — Signed at Washington June
30, 1958. Entered into force June 30, 1958.
Passport Visas. TIAS 4076. 2 pp. 54.
Agreement between the United States of America and the
Union of South Africa, amending agreement of March 28
and April 3, 1956. Exchange of notes — Signed at Pre-
toria March 31, 1958. Entered into force April 1, 1958.
Surplus Agricultural Commodities.
54.
TIAS 4070. 3 pp.
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: September 15-21
Press releases may be obtained from the News
Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.
Releases issued prior to September 15 which
appear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 521
and 526 of September 9, 528 of September 11, 533
and 534 of September 12, and 535 of September 13.
No. Date Subject
Note to Czechoslovakia on summit
meeting.
Agreement with U.S.S.R. on exchange
of national exhibitions in 1959.
Symposium on air navigation.
Educational exchange (Egypt, Haiti,
Switzerland).
U.S. company to make surgical dress-
ings in India.
Delegation to 15th PASO conference
and 10th meeting of WHO Regional
Committee for the Americas (re-
write).
Dulles : U.N. General Assembly.
Dillon trip to 11 countries (rewrite).
Informal meeting of Foreign Ministers
of American Republics (rewrite).
*Not printed.
tHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin.
537
9/15
t538
9/15
539
*540
9/16
9/16
*541
9/17
542
9/17
543
544
t545
9/18
9/18
9/19
556
Department of State Bulletin
October 6, 1958
Ind
ex
Vol. XXXIX, No. 1006
American Republics. Pan American Sanitary
Conference and WHO Regional Committee for
the Americas (delegation) 553
Aviation. International Aviation Authorities To
Hold Symposium in U.S 535
China
Problems of Peace and Progress (Dulles) .... 525
U.S. Rejects Soviet Note on Far East Situation 530
Congress, The
Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign
Policy 549
President Expresses Views on Mutual Security Pro-
gram (Eisenhower, Green) 546
Czechoslovakia. U.S. and Czechoslovakia Ex-
change Views on Summit Conference (texts of
U.S. note and Czechoslovak memorandum) . . . 539
Department and Foreign Service. Designations
(Cameron, Fessenden, Johnstone, McBride) . . 549
Disarmament. Problems of Peace and Progress
(Dulles) 525
Economic Affairs
Mr. Dillon To Visit 11 Countries 532
Indian Finance Minister Visits United States . . . 535
Principal Provisions of the Trade Agreements Ex-
tension Act of 1958 (Kallis) 542
United States and Turkey Hold Economic Discus-
sions 533
World Bank Loan to India for Railway Improve-
ment 545
Germany. Problems of Peace and Progress
(Dulles) 525
Hungary. Problems of Peace and Progress
(Dulles) 525
India
Indian Finance Minister Visits United States . . 535
World Bank Loan to India for Railway Improve-
ment 545
International Law. International Order Under
Law (Rogers) 536
International Organizations and Conferences
Calendar of International Conferences and Meet-
ings 550
Pan American Sanitary Conference and WHO Re-
gional Committee for the Americas (delegation) . 553
Secretary Dulles Congratulates U.S. Delegation to
UNESCO 552
Japan. Japanese and U.S. Officials Conclude
Talks (text of joint statement) 532
Middle East. Problems of Peace and Progress
(Dulles) 525
Military Affairs. United States Seeks Informa-
tion on Missing Airmen (text of U.S. note) . . . 531
Mutual Security
Mr. Dillon To Visit 11 Countries 532
Indian Finance Minister Visits United States . . . 535
President Expresses Views on Mutual Security Pro-
gram (Eisenhower, Green) 546
Problems of Peace and Progress (Dulles) .... 525
United States and Turkey Hold Economic Discus-
sions (text of joint statement) 533
Presidential Documents
President Expresses Views on Mutual Security Pro-
gram 546
U.S. Rejects Soviet Note on Far East Situation . . 530
Publications. Recent Releases 555
Science. Problems of Peace and Progress
(Dulles) 525
Treaty Information. Current Actions 554
Turkey. United States and Turkey Hold Eco-
nomic Discussions (text of joint statement) . . 533
U.S.S.R.
U.S. Rejects Soviet Note on Far East Situation . . 530
United States Seeks Information on Missing Airmen
(text of U.S. note) 531
United Nations. Problems of Peace and Progress
(Dulles) 525
Name Index
Cameron, Turner C 549
Desai, Morarji R 535
Dillon, Douglas 532
Dulles, Secretary 525, 552
Eisenhower, President 530, 544, 546
Fessenden, Russell 549
Green, Theodore Francis 547
Johnstone, James R 549
Kallis, Selma G 542
McBride, Robert H 549
Polatkan, Hasan 533
Rogers, William P 536
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DISARMAMENT
The Intensified Effort, 1955-1958
This 65-page pamphlet discusses U.S. efforts over the last 3 years
to negotiate a sound disarmament agreement.
The narrative begins with a brief summary of U.S. disarmament
efforts during the decade of deadlock from 1945-55. This is followed
by an account of evolving U.S. disarmament policy during the past
3 years and of negotiations carried on within the U.N. Disarmament
Commission and its Subcommittee.
The pamphlet covers in detail the gradual development of U.S.
policy from the President's "open skies" proposal at Geneva to the
new approach presented at the 1957 London Disarmament Subcom-
mittee meetings and the U.N. General Assembly. It discusses the
long and intensive negotiations in London in 1957 and various
proposals for a first stage agreement. It ends with a brief overall
appraisal of accomplishments and prospects for the future.
Publication 6676
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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Vol. XXXIX, No. 1007 October 13, 1958
CHALLENGE TO PEACE IN THE FAR EAST • Address
by Secretary Dulles 561
NATO: INTERDEPENDENCE IN ACTION • Address by
Secretary Dulles 571
PRESIDENT LIMITS IMPORTS OF LEAD AND
ZINC • White House Announcement and Text of Proc-
lanuition , 579
FOREIGN RELATIONS ASPECTS OF LEAD AND ZINC
PROBLEM • by Assistant Secretary Mann 583
FOREIGN TRADE: WELFARE OR WARFARE • by
J. Graham Parsons 566
AMERICAN FOREIGN MINISTERS DISCUSS COM-
MON PROBLEMS • Announcement of Meeting and
Text of Communique 574,
GENERAL ASSEMBLY AGAIN REJECTS INDIAN
PROPOSAL TO CONSIDER QUESTION OF REPRE-
SENTATION OF CHINA • Statements by Ambassador
Henry Cabot Lodge 535
For index see inside back cover
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Vol. XXXIX, No. 1007 • Publication 6711
October 13, 1958
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington 25, D.C.
Pbice:
52 Issues, domestic $7.50, foreign $10.25
Single copy, 20 cents
The printing of this publication has been
approved by the Director of the Bureau of
the Budget (January 20, 1958).
Note: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and items contained herein may
be reprinted. Citation of the Department
OF State Bulletin as the source will be
appreciated.
The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the
Public Services Division, provides the
public and interested agencies of
the Government with information on
developments in the field of foreign
relations and on the work of the
Department of State and the Foreign
Service. The BULLETIN includes se-
lected press releases on foreign policy,
issued by the White House and the
Department, and statements and ad-
dresses made by the President and by
the Secretary of State and other
officers of the Department, as well as
special articles on various phases of
international affairs and the func-
tions of the Department. Informa-
tion is included concerning treaties
and international agreements to
which the United States is or may
become a party and treaties of gen-
eral international interest.
Publications of the Department,
United Nations documents, and legis-
lative material in the field of inter-
national relations are listed currently.
Challenge to Peace in the Far East
Address by Secretai'y Dulles x
This Far East-American conference has dealt
"with economic relations between the United States
and the countries of Asia. I shall talk about these
economic matters for a few minutes, but I shall
then speak of the various facets of the China
problem — where there is a threat of war which
could submerge all of our peaceful plans.
Trade
Trade between the United States and South
and East Asia has steadily grown. In 1957 its
value totaled nearly $5 billion. And we can expect
it to increase.
One important way in which our Government
has promoted this growth is through the reciprocal
trade agreements program. At the request of
the President the Congress this year extended this
program for a further period of 4 years. That
is the longest single extension that has been en-
acted during the 25-year history of the program.
Traders of other nations are thus assured of a con-
tinuity of United States trade policy which, on the
one hand, contains reasonable protective features
and, on the other hand, will promote trade. It
will thus serve the overall economic strength and
security both of the United States and of its free-
world friends.
Another governmental help to trade is the Ex-
port-Import Bank. The last Congress increased
its capital from $5 billion to $7 billion. It thus
has new resources to supplement, but not supplant,
the resources of private institutions.
Also the United States contributes to the Inter-
' Made before the Far East-America Council of Com-
neree and Industry, Inc., at New York, N. Y., on Sept.
!5 (press release 560).
national Monetary Fund, which helps trade be-
cause it helps to keep currencies on a stable basis.
Economic Development
In much of South and East Asia political free-
dom has recently come, bringing with it aspira-
tions for economic improvement. Peoples long
bogged down in the stagnation of poverty strive
for a better life. It is vital that the free world
should find ways to assist them. Otherwise the
materialistic approach of communism may be ir-
resistible.
The United States knows that it is possible to
have both freedom and economic development.
But we must help other free societies to demon-
strate that human freedom and economic welfare
can go hand in hand and that it is not necessary
to sacrifice human freedom in order to achieve ma-
terial advancement.
Last week I proposed to the General Assembly
of the United Nations that the members should, in
1959, make a special effort to develop long-term,
cooperative plans for assisting the processes of
economic growth in less developed areas. 2 The
United States feels that the time has come for the
nations to make an unusual and significant effort
to demonstrate both the will and the capacity to
help economic growth throughout the world.
Private initiative and private resources can and
should have a primary role in providing the capi-
tal development needed to meet these goals. But
abnormal risks are sometimes involved; so the
United States Government has a part to play.
Last year the Congress created the United
1 Bulletin of Oct. 6, 1958, p. 525.
Dcfober 73, J958
561
States Development Loan Fund and has provided
it with capitalization of $700 million. We hope
that this capital will shortly be increased, so that
the fund can make significant loans over a period
of years for development projects on liberal repay-
ment terms, including repayment in local cur-
rency. In this way the fund can play an impor-
tant role in cooperation with other lending bodies,
public and private.
An additional governmental measure is our
investment guaranty program. It provides in-
surance against the noncommercial risks of non-
convertibility of currency, expropriation, and war.
Nearly 40 nations have signed agreements under
this program, and over $200 million of insurance
contracts have been issued. Nations of Asia
which have not yet qualified for agreements may
wish to consider doing so.
The United States is the largest contributor to
the capital of the International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development, commonly called the
World Bank. This institution has already in-
vested over a billion dollars in Asia. Its initial
resources have now largely been committed, and
there may be need to increase its capital, as well
as the resources of the International Monetary
Fund. This will be dealt with within a few
days at New Delhi at the annual meeting of the
Governors of the bank and the fund.
In some areas of the world regional develop-
ment institutions are being planned.
However, in the cases of most of the Asian coun-
tries, there are well-established, successful, bilat-
eral relationships which are internationally co-
ordinated, notably through what is called the
Colombo Plan. This year the United States will
be the host to the ministerial meeting of the mem-
ber governments of this plan. We are happy to
have this opportunity to evidence once again our
warm support of its efforts.
The United States attaches the utmost impor-
tance to trade relations and economic development.
These serve the legitimate aspirations of people
everywhere for a better material life.
Unfortunately these aspirations are obstructed
by the ever-present danger of aggression. This
requires that the free world expend vast sums for
defense. For example, the United States defense
budget this year will be about $45 billion. This
is not a situation which we happily tolerate. We
would prefer that the resources of men every-
562
where could be devoted to exclusively creative
tasks rather than to sterile tasks of creating in-
struments of destruction. It is not beyond the
realm of hope that, if the free-world nations de-
vote themselves even more to creative tasks, their
example and its results could bring about, even
within the Sino-Soviet world, a greater use of
human effort for human betterment. That woidd
be a development to which the United States
would respond with joy and alacrity.
China Trade
I turn now to China.
This conference has, no doubt, noted the lack
of United States economic relations with Com-
munist China. Such relations have been barred
under our Trading With the Enemy Act since De-
cember 1950, when Communist China attacked
the United Nations forces in Korea. At that time
our Government said : 3
If the Chinese Communists choose to withdraw their
forces of aggression and act in conformity with United
Nations principles, this Government will be prepared
promptly to consider removing restrictions and restoring
normal trade relations.
However, the Chinese Communists still main-
tain forces of aggression in and about Korea.
They do not act in conformity with the United
Nations principles. They are threatening war
against us in the Formosa area. Therefore the
1950 restrictions on trade have not been lifted.
Some of our allies do, however, trade with
Communist China, and recently at their behest we
accepted some liberalization of the international
list of strategic goods not to be sold to Soviet
Russia or Communist China. The result has not
been an increase in China trade. Actually, China
trade is meager because Chinese Communist for
eign buying power is limited and is used largely
for war purposes. Tempting Communist trade
offers are largely political bait.
It seems clear that, even if trade were today
permitted between Communist China and th
United States, it would be of insignificant pr<
portions.
Moreover, developments in the Far East con-
firm the soundness of United States policy in not
helping to build up a war machine which, it is
now threatened, may be used against us.
' IMd., Dec. 25, 1950, p. 1004.
Department of State Bulletin
United States Recognition of Communist China
I turn now to consider the policy of the United
States toward what is called "recognizing" Com-
munist China.
Let me, first of all, make clear that we do not
pretend that the Chinese Communist regime does
not exist. We know, at heavy cost, that it does
exist. We do not refuse to deal with its repre-
sentatives whenever it seems that that might
serve a useful national purpose.
We negotiated the Korean armistice with
Chinese Communists. We took part with them in
the Geneva conference of 1954 which ended the
hostilities in Indochina. Since August 1955 we
have conducted negotiations at the ambassadorial
level with them, first at Geneva and now at
Warsaw.
But it is one thing to deal with the Chinese
Communist regime in relation to specific problems.
It is another thing to accord it general diplomatic
recognition. That would greatly increase its in-
fluence and prestige and correspondingly increase
its ability to do us harm.
There is no reasonable doubt that the basic for-
eign policy goals of the Chinese Communists are
not reconcilable with our own. We seek friendly
free-world governments in the Western Pacific
and Southeast Asia. The Chinese Communists
want to overthrow such governments, to domi-
nate the western area of the Pacific, and to make
Japan into a workshop for the Sino-Soviet Asian
world.
Mao Tse-tung, immediately following his 1919
military successes on the mainland of China and
a visit to Moscow, broadcast (February 1950) an
appeal to the peoples of Southeast Asia calling
upon them to rise up against their political lead-
ers, whom he termed "colonial puppets" and "lack-
eys" of the "imperialists." At the same time the
propaganda organs of the Chinese Communists
went into high gear against the United States
because we were a principal support, of the free
Asian governments. A typical example is a 1950
pamphlet of three sections. The first was entitled
"We Must Hate America Because She Is the
Chinese People's Implacable Enemy." The sec-
ond section was entitled "We Must Despise
America Because It Is a Corrupt, Imperialist
Nation, the World Center of Reaction and De-
cadency." The third section was entitled "We
Must Look Down Upon America Because She Is
a Paper Tiger and Entirely Vulnerable to
Defeat."
This attitude of the Chinese Communists has
continued consistently. Its expansionist policy
has been shown in Tibet, in Korea, in Indochina,
and now in the Formosa area.
The purpose of the present Chinese Communist
activities in the Formosa area has been put cate-
gorically and brutally by Mr. Khrushchev in his
letter of September 19 to President Eisenhower —
the letter which the President returned un-
answered. 4 Mr. Khrushchev said, "The American
naval fleet must be withdrawn from the Formosa
Straits and American soldiers must leave Formosa
and go home. Without this," Mr. Khrushchev said,
"there cannot be lasting peace in the Far East."
Were the United States now to extend general
diplomatic recognition to the Chinese Communist
regime, this would be of immense help to them in
carrying out their Asian policy.
Such recognition would, for example, gravely
jeopardize the authority of the Republic of China
on Formosa and its good relations with us. It
would, in other Asian countries, mean that the
influential Chinese communities would increas-
ingly take political guidance from the Communist
authorities and become a tool for the overthrowing
of now friendly governments.
It is suggested by some that the Chinese Com-
munists might alter their character and become
friendly to the United States if we would grant
them general diplomatic recognition. That is not
realism but extreme romanticism which flies in the
face of all actual experience.
We have given general diplomatic recognition
to several countries which are dominated by inter-
national communism. Never once has such recog-
nition served to alter the character or creed or
hostile purpose of the recognized government or
to deflect it from its expansionist policies.
In the face of this actual experience it would be
reckless to take action which would immensely in-
crease the capacity of the present Chinese Com-
munist regime to carry forward policies which are
not only hostile to the United States but highly
dangerous to our security.
China and the United Nations
I turn now to efforts that are made to bring the
Chinese Communists into the United Nations, ef-
4 Ibid., Oct. 6, 1958, p. 530.
October 73, 7958
563
forts which the present session of the General As-
sembly rebuffed. 6
The United States does not approach this matter
purely from the standpoint of United States na-
tional policies. We believe that in such a matter
the members of the United Nations have a duty
to apply the charter tests and not national tests.
The charter of the United Nations provides that
membership is open to "peace-loving states which
accept the obligations contained in the present
Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization,
are able and willing to carry out these obligations."
Also the charter provides that any member which
persistently violates the principles contained in the
present charter may be expelled.
The Chinese Communist regime has on no less
than five occasions since 1949 resorted to armed
force in an effort to expand its domain. Today
it stands formally condemned by the United Na-
tions as an armed aggressor. It has repeatedly and
viciously expressed its contempt for the United
Nations and its principles.
Some argue that the Communist Chinese regime
would be "reformed" if it were in the United
Nations. But the United Nations is not a reforma-
tory. There was debate at San Francisco as to
whether the United Nations should be a universal
institution or whether its membership should be
selective. The choice was in favor of a selectivity.
Let me read you an extract from the report of
Secretary of State Stettinius to President Truman
on the results of the San Francisco conference
which created the United Nations. 6 He said :
... It was pointed out by a number of delegations, and
particularly by the Delegation of the Soviet Union, that it
would be unfortunate to have a Member persistently vio-
lating the principles of the Charter while continuing to
remain a Member of the Organization. Such a Member
would be like a cancerous growth and ought not, it was
thought, to be associated in any way with the Organiza-
tion. In the end this view prevailed at the Con-
ference. . . .
Since then we have had some practical experi-
ence. Communist nations which became mem-
bers — and which cannot be expelled because of
the veto — have not in fact been reformed. They
have used force and violence as in Korea and
Hungary and have consistently rebuffed the
11 See p. 585.
"Report to the President on the Results of the San
Francisco Conference, June 26, 1945 (Department of State
publication 2349), p. 49.
efforts of the United Nations to put peace and
order upon a stable basis.
If the Chinese Communist regime were brought
into the United Nations, it would have shot its
way in.
It is sometimes argued that the Chinese Com-
munist regime does not have to meet the charter
tests because the Republic of China is already a
member and the so-called People's Republic of
China inherits the rights in this respect of the
Republic of China. That is an argument of
dubious validity. Irrespective of it, the fact is
that the membership of the United Nations has a
choice of whether or not to bring into its midst
and to give veto power on the Security Council to
a regime which has flagrantly defied the United
Nations; which has fought it; which has been
found to be an aggressor; and which far from
being "peace-loving" — the test for membership-
has persistently violated the principles contained
in the charter — which is the test for expulsion.
It would in the words of Secretary Stettinius be
"a cancerous growth and ought not to be associated
in any way with the Organization."
Taiwan (Formosa)
Let me in conclusion speak briefly about the
immediate situation in the Formosa Straits.
The Chinese Communists, starting last August
23, launched a major artillery attack against Que-
moy. They say, and the Soviet Union says, that
this is the beginning of an effort to take Formosa.
They probably hope that by capturing the offshore
islands of Quemoy and Matsu they will so destroy
the prestige and authority of the Republic of
China on Formosa that they can then quickly take
over Formosa by a subversive coup. But they
insist they will take it, if need be, by open force.
And the Soviet Union offers its help.
Now, of course, the offshore islands do not
constitute an ideal defensive position. The United
States has not been blind to that fact, nor have
we been unconcerned about it. But there are
other facts also to which we cannot be blind.
Let us recall that a last phase of the ground
fighting between Communists and Nationalists
was a Communist effort to take Quemoy. This
occurred in October 1949. Communist troops
were landed, but they were driven off by the
Nationalist forces in bitter battle. Ever since
then — now for 9 years — the National forces have
564
Department of State Bulletin
been in possession of Formosa, the Pescadores,
Quemoy, and Matsu.
Like the Korean armistice line, that situation in
the Formosa Straits reflects the actual military
position when the main fighting stopped. It is
this situation that the Chinese Communists are
now attempting to alter by the use of armed force.
The Republic of China has under its authority
relatively small amounts of territory. Among
these, the offshore islands, including Quemoy and
Matsu, have, for the Republic of China, a great
significance, comparable to the significance of
Berlin to the West.
Berlin is militarily indefensible. It is a small
island of freedom totally surrounded by Soviet
power. Nevertheless, the German Federal Repub-
lic and its allies, including the United States, have
risked war, and today stand committed to risk
war, rather than surrender Berlin.
That there is a close relationship between For-
mosa and the offshore islands is attested not
merely by the Republic of China, but it is asserted
by the Chinese Communists. When all factors,
moral and material, are taken into account, the
defense of one may not be divisible from the de-
fense of the other. So the United States is as-
sisting the Chinese Nationalists logistically in
their gallant and inspiring defense of these off-
shore positions. And President Eisenhower has
in relation to these islands made clear that United
States forces may be used more actively if the
Chinese Communists push further a military ef-
fort which they themselves proclaim has Formosa
as its goal.
The stakes involved are not just some square
miles of real estate. What is involved is a Com-
munist challenge to the basic principle of peace
that armed force should not be used for aggres-
sion. Upon the observance and enforcement of
that principle depends world order everywhere.
Once exceptions are begun to be made, that marks
the breakdown of the peaceful order sought to be
established by the principles of the United Na-
tions.
If the challenge is to world society in general, it
is particularly a challenge to the United States.
If we were to show indecision or weakness in the
face of this challenge, we would merely confirm
the rulers of the Sino-Soviet bloc, the leaders of
communism, in their hope that, by threatening
anywhere around them, they can compel submis-
sion or surrender.
If we must meet that challenge, it is better met
directly and at the beginning rather than after our
friends become disheartened and our enemies over-
confident and miscalculating.
Although the United States is not prepared to
retreat in the face of armed force, our position is
otherwise flexible. We have welcomed the will-
ingness of the Chinese Communists to resume am-
bassadorial talks at Warsaw. We stand ready,
in accord with our United Nations Charter obliga-
tion, to settle the dispute "by peaceful means in
such a manner that international peace and secu-
rity, and justice, are not endangered."
President Eisenhower and I have made clear
that in these Warsaw talks we will not be a party
to any arrangements which would prejudice the
rights of our trusted and loyal ally, the Republic
of China. But so far as we are concerned we would
find acceptable any arrangement which, on the one
hand, did not involve surrender to force or the
threat of force and, on the other hand, eliminated
from the situation features that could reasonably
be regarded as provocative or which, to use Presi-
dent Eisenhower's words, were a "thorn in the
side of peace."
So far, however, both the Chinese and Soviet
Communists publicly reject in advance any set-
tlement involving a cease-fire or which deals only
with the offshore islands. They demand Formosa
itself and the withdrawal of United States de-
fensive forces from the Western Pacific area.
Obviously any readjustment of free-world po-
sitions which would add strength and security is
desirable. But strength is not merely material.
It is a compound of many elements. In the face
of such threats as the Communists are now mak-
ing, and the extreme position they are now pub-
licly taking, it would be reckless to take action
which, so far as can be judged, would not lead
to peace but would dismay and dishearten our
free-world friends and allies in the area and en-
courage our enemies to be more bold and reckless.
We believe that the Soviet Union, if it wanted
to see a peaceful solution, could make that pos-
sible. That is why President Eisenhower in his
letter of September 12 7 to Chairman Khru-
shchev suggested that he should urge the Chinese
Communist leaders to turn to a policy of peaceful
settlement in the Formosa area. So far, however,
' For text, see ibid., Sept. 29, 195S, p. 498.
Ocfober 13, 7958
565
the situation is a study in contrasts. Let me
briefly portray it:
On the other hand, the United States has a col-
lective-defense treaty with the Republic of China.
Pursuant to this treaty the United States has
given substantial military assistance to the Re-
public of China. But it is agreed between us that
the use of force in the area "will be a matter of
joint agreement, subject to action of an emergency
character which is clearly an exercise of the in-
herent right of self-defense." 8 Pursuant to this
arrangement there has been no aggressive or of-
fensive use of force by the United States or by the
Republic of China against Communist China.
Now consider the other side. The Soviet Union
has a treaty of alliance with Communist China.
Pursuant to this treaty it has given vast amounts
of military aid to Communist China. But, in-
stead of assuring that this aid shall not be used
for aggressive purposes, the Soviet Union is aid-
ing and abetting the Chinese Communists in a use
of force against the Republic of China to con-
quer territory which the United States is by
treaty obligated to help to defend. The latest
Khrushchev letter, the letter rejected by President
Eisenhower, boasted that the Chinese Communists,
with Soviet support, would bring about the "ex-
pulsion" — that was Khrushchev's word — of the
United States from the entire Formosa area.
The world may judge, from this contrast, which
of our two nations serves the cause of peace and
where lies the responsibility for the danger of
war.
We refuse, however, to be discouraged. We
continue the challenge of a peaceful settlement, a
settlement which would meet every reasonable de-
mand of the situation. That is our rejoinder to
the Communist challenge of force. Let us hope
and pray and work that our peaceful challenge
will be accepted.
Foreign Trade: Welfare or Warfare
by J. Graham Parsons
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs 1
I welcome this opportunity to participate in the
distinguished forum provided by the Far East-
America Council of Commerce and Industry,
which has already done so much to promote the
mutual welfare of Asia and the United States. It
is an honor to meet with this outstanding group of
citizens and businessmen who are personally con-
tributing such a great deal to the realization of the
theme of this year's conference: "Asia-US. Eco-
nomic Relations, a Challenge of Mutual Under-
standing and Cooperative Action."
"Mutual Understanding" and "Cooperative Action"
"Mutual understanding" is a phrase which is
constantly on the lips both of men of good will and
8 For the text of the agreement, see ibid., Dee. 13, 1954,
p. 899 ; for an exchange of notes between Secretary Dulles
and the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs on Dec. 10,
1954, see ibid., Jan. 24, 1955, p. 152.
1 Remarks made before the Far East-America Council
of Commerce and Industry, Inc., at New York, N. Y., on
Sept. 25 (press release 559).
those of dark purpose. Our view of what it means
is that both parties make an objective effort to put
themselves in the other's place when they scru-
tinize their counterparts' aspirations and motives.
Thus, for example, in examining Japanese aspira-
tions to contribute to the economic development
of Southeast Asia, and in responding to their
overtures to enlist United States support and
sympathy with those objectives, we seek, in the
spirit of mutual understanding, to devise ways in
which Japan as well as the United States and the
other free nations can most effectively support
the common purposes of the free world. In con-
trast, the Sino-Soviet bloc's interpretation of such
mutual understanding is that it represents "a con-
spiracy of American- Japanese monopoly capital-
ism to reimpose colonialism" on the area.
The theme of this conference also stresses "co-
operative action." Cooperative action is the
basis of the United States approach to the prob-
lems of the Far East as in the rest of the world.
566
Department of State Bulletin
The United States seeks to achieve its purposes
by encouraging cooperation on the part of those
with a stake in the creation of a free and bountiful
society in the Far East. I have deliberately
stressed the word "encouraging" in order to make
two points: first, the United States cannot, and
would not if it could, impose cooperation, and sec-
ond, the difficulties of promoting cooperation in an
area of such diverse cultures, societies, and econo-
mies, still not recovered from its tragic wartime
experiences and exposed to the relentless pressures
of Communist China, are enormous. Their solu-
tion will indeed require the all-out efforts of men
of good will such as those assembled here.
What do the objectives of mutual understanding
and cooperative action in the economic relations
of Asia and the United States require today ? I
would say that they require a common apprecia-
tion of the present situation in the Far East and
a common program of action based on that ap-
preciation. In the United States view the Far
Eastern situation, even apart from the Chinese
Communist resort to military force in the Taiwan
Strait, has for some time been dominated by one
fact : the emergence of a dynamic, aggressive re-
gime, restrained by no moral law, by no economic
considerations, and little respect for world opinion.
There was a time when Communist China, though
not concealing its hostility toward the United
States, operated behind a mask of benevolence to-
ward the countries of the Far East. More re-
cently, however, its trading tactics have once again
unmasked it as the unregenerate disciple of Lenin
and Stalin.
Chinese Communist Economic Offensive
It is peculiarly fitting that we should discuss
such a development in this afternoon's panel, since
it is the Japanese who thus far have been the
principal targets of the Chinese Communist of-
fensive. This campaign has been in progress for
several years, but until recently it has not pri-
marily been aimed at the Japanese and it has been
pursued mainly in the form of cut-price trade,
which by those who wished to interpret it in the
best light could be labeled peaceful penetration —
or even a rather backhanded variety of economic
aid. It may not be generally recognized what re-
markable gains the Chinese Communists have
scored in their cut-price trade offensive. Unre-
strained by any political necessity to devote re-
sources to the improvement of living standards in
their own country, the Communists in China, as the
Soviet Union in the 1920's, have had no compunc-
tion in resorting to hunger exports in order to
militarize their economy and to pervert their trade
for political ends. The trade offensive, in which
food exports have been a prominent item, has gone
forward despite widespread shortages and hunger
on the mainland. Not all of the figures are yet
available, but estimates of the total trade of Com-
munist China with South and Southeast Asia now
range about one-half billion dollars per year. In
Indonesia, a traditional market for Japanese and
Indian cotton textiles, Chinese Communist exports
grew from 8.4 million square yards in 1954 to 100
million in 1957.
In Hong Kong the Communist Chinese have in-
creased their share of the grey cotton-goods mar-
ket from percent in 1953 to 84 percent in 1957
and their share of the window-glass market from
percent to 47 percent. Hong Kong cement and
textile mills have shut down because of increased
Chinese Communist exports to Hong Kong, and
the markets of Burma, Malaya, Thailand, Cam-
bodia, Singapore, and Ceylon are all suffering
from the Chinese Communist offensive.
Apart from foodstuffs, textiles, cement, and
window glass, the Chinese Communists have also
made great strides in many other specific fields.
Lest we assume that the effort to win control has
been centered on just a handful of products, let
me enumerate a few other markets in which the
Chinese Communists offer strong competition:
building materials, such as building tiles; hard-
ware, such as hammers, nails, padlocks, pliers,
and wrenches; iron and steel products, such as
bars, shapes, and wire; and manufactured goods,
such as enamelware, pottery, fountain pens,
thermos bottles, flashlights, aluminum and steel
pots, alarm clocks, electric fans, radios, tape re-
corders, small three-speed phonographs, toys, sew-
ing machines, wrist watches, bicycles, typewriters,
adding machines, small electric motors, combs,
hair brushes, medicines, chemicals, asphalt, bake-
lite, glucose, gelatin, and paper and paper board.
Although the Japanese have been the chief, they
are not the only exporters suffering from this Chi-
nese Communist offensive. Indian exports of tex-
tiles into the Federation of Malaya and Singapore
shrank from 18.6 million square yards in the first
calendar quarter of 1957 to 6.4 million square
Ocfober 13, 7958
567
yards in the first 3 months of 1958. Indian textile
exports are also under great pressure from Com-
munist Chinese exports in Thailand, Burma, and
Indonesia.
The real significance for this panel of the Chi-
nese Communist trade offensive, however, is not
in the gains which they have made but in the ob-
jectives of their campaign and the methods by
which their successes have been achieved. For-
eign trade normally increases the welfare of those
who participate in it. It is for this reason that
the United States Government has for so long
actively promoted, through its trade agreements
program and the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, a continual increase in world trade
levels. Trade, however, is not per se good; in-
creased trade does not guarantee increased wel-
fare. It can be used as an instrument of warfare,
and that is how the Chinese Communists have
been using it.
I have spoken of hunger exports. I could speak
of dumping, which the Chinese Communists have
extensively engaged in, apparently pursuant to a
consistent policy of undercutting the lowest com-
petitor by 10 percent — or more, if necessary. I
could speak of the monopolistic exploitations of
which the Chinese state-trading corporations are
guilty. I could speak of any number of trading
practices which sacrifice welfare to political ob-
jectives. I shall, however, confine my remarks to
the clearest example, of the way in which the Chi-
nese Communists utilize trade for warfare rather
than welfare.
This has been the campaign of all-out economic
warfare launched by the Chinese Government
against the Government of Japan in April 1958,
when the Japanese refused to accept, a Chinese
Communist ultimatum that the Japanese pay an
exorbitant political price in order to preserve
trade relations with Communist China.
This episode is worth studying as a case study
in Chinese Communist tactics. I hope that my
friend, Ambassador Asakai, will forgive me for
dwelling on it for a moment. Many Japanese
honestly believe that trade with Communist China
is possible on a welfare basis. Trying to exploit
the lively desire of these Japanese to resume their
prewar trade with the China mainland, the Chi-
nese Communists had for some time been seeking
to bring the Japanese Government to recognize
their regime and to break off relations with the
Republic of China — which, by the way, has been
a more valuable trade partner to Japan than Com-
munist China. The Chinese Communists sent a
stream of "trade delegations" to Japan which
invariably held out hopes of a great deal of
trade — subject to concessions in the political field.
At first it was urged that, if only the so-called
"China differential," which maintained a volun-
tary system of free-world multilateral controls on
strategic trade with Communist China higher
than that on the rest of the Soviet bloc, were
eliminated, trade would expand. The "China dif-
ferential" was abolished in July 1957, and trade
dropped from $67.3 million in 1956 to $60.5
million in 1957.
Then after protracted negotiations between
representatives of private Japanese trade associa-
tions and the Communist Chinese trade authori-
ties, a fourth private trade agreement was signed
on March 5, 1958, in Peiping. The agreement
provided for total trade amounting to nearly $200
million during the 1-year period. The Japanese
negotiated this agreement in good faith, hoping
for a beneficial increase in trade. The Chinese,
for their part, seemed interested above all in a
memorandum accompanying the agreement which
specified that both parties should urge their re-
spective governments to facilitate the execution
of the agreement and to grant certain privileges,
including the "right" to fly their respective na-
tional flags, to members of the respective trade
missions. Naturally Japan, which strongly
desires to increase trade with all countries, was
opposed to the exploitation of trade for the
achievement of political objectives. The Japanese
therefore agreed to "extend support and coopera-
tion" to the trade associations that would execute
the agreement but noted that Japan did not recog-
nize the Chinese Communist Government. It
therefore refused to recognize "as a right, the
hoisting of the so-called national flag of Commu-
nist China over the private trade missions."
When the Chinese Communists realized that
they had failed to back the Japanese Government
into diplomatic recognition through a so-called
"private" trade agreement, they in effect declared
economic war on Japan.
On April 13, just before the Japanese elections,
the Chinese Communists denounced the Kishi
government, accused it of sabotaging the trade
agreement, withdrew its trade offers, and can-
568
Department of State Bulletin
celed a 5-year $280 million barter agreement in
force between Communist China and the private
Japanese steel industry. Japanese fishing boats
were seized off the China coast. Pending trade
fairs were canceled. Cultural relations were
broken off. The repatriation of Japanese na-
tionals, long held hostages on the China mainland,
was stopped. In a short time all trade ground to
a halt. Even with trade nonexistent, however, the
Chinese Reds continued to exploit trade as a
weapon. Following the elections they continued
their vicious attacks, accusing Japan, a stanch
and independent member of the free-world com-
munity, of subservience to United States inter-
ests and stigmatizing it as hostile to the Chinese
nation and indifferent to the rich prospects of
trade with Communist China.
Blatant as was this use of trade as a political
weapon, the Chinese Communists went further
in economic warfare against Japan. They ap-
plied pressure, as they have done before, to the
overseas Chinese merchant communities, which
occupy positions of economic importance in many
Far Eastern countries, demanding a boycott of
all Japanese goods. At the same time, Chinese-
mainland goods were dumped at prices ranging
from 10 to 20 percent below competing Japanese
products, in an effort to eliminate Japanese goods
from these important markets so as to bring pres-
sure on the Japanese Government. From every
part of South Asia evidence is accumulating that
Communist Chinese prices are fixed without re-
gard to cost, human or material, to undersell the
products of free countries.
Ladies and gentlemen, this is foreign trade used
not to promote welfare but to wage warfare.
Implications of Chinese Communists' Trade Warfare
"What are the implications of such trade war-
fare for this group ?
As I said earlier, we must agree first on our
analysis of the problem and second on a common
approach to the problem. On the analytical side
can we not agree, despite widespread temptations
to hope the contrary, that the record clearly
shows that the attitude of Communist China, as
of all Communist states, toward foreign trade, is
that:
(1) Commercial considerations are subordinate
to political goals;
(2) The less a Communist state depends on
trade with the free world, the better off it is; and
that
(3) Trade with the non-Communist world is
simply another form of warfare.
Under these circumstances we must recognize
that the free nations as a whole have an immense
stake in meeting the problem of the expansion of
Chinese Communist trade, with its political im-
plications and its demonstrated practice of using
trade as a weapon of warfare in Southeast Asia.
This can be brought about by both negative and
positive measures. On the negative side, the free
world still maintains a system of voluntary con-
trols over the exportation to the Sino-Soviet bloc
of strategic goods. This should be preserved and
strengthened in its effectiveness, lest we con-
tribute to the strength of those who are avowedly
hostile to us and our friends. There is also an
important task of public enlightenment to be ac-
complished in every country. The Chinese Com-
munists risk little and often gain much by their
dumping in countries with relatively little domes-
tic industry. Consumers receive goods at lower
prices, and producer interests suffer little. None-
theless it is extremely dangerous for government
to rely on Communist countries for a regular sup-
ply of important goods or consumers to acquire a
taste for the products of Communist nations,
since they may, like the Japanese, suddenly see
their source of supply cut off or maintained only
at the cost of important political concessions. In
self-defense certain governments are alreacty con-
sidering the imposition of quantitative restric-
tions and antidumping duties on Chinese Com-
munist goods.
Trade Policy for the Free World
These measures, important as they are, how-
ever, are negative and defensive in nature, and the
free world requires equally effective and more
imaginative positive policy.
It should be an important purpose of a group
such as this, with its immense resources of corpo-
rate know-how and personal acquaintance with
Asian economic problems, to suggest ways in
which the challenge and thrust of Chinese Com-
munist pressure in the area can be successfully re-
pelled. In the struggle for Asia, the free world is
October 73, 7958
569
at a certain disadvantage: It cannot formulate a
master design and require the obedience of its con-
stituent parts in accomplishing the plan. The
free world must rely on the ingenuity and dyna-
mism of business and government, international
and national action. Each must consider what it
is best equipped to do.
The list of possibilities is long and ranges from
the most pedestrian to the most visionary. Sim-
ply for its value in stimulating discussion, and
without either endorsement or rejection, we might
mention, under economic countermeasures, such
things as joint undertakings to favor free-world
over Communist suppliers, cooperative private ef-
forts to supply critically needed consumer or cap-
ital items at prices and on terms competitive with
Communist suppliers, and the encouragement of
the adoption by governments of penalties on un-
fair trade competition. In the field of economic
development, steps might include free-world
cooperation in supplying private credit, joint gov-
ernment efforts to coordinate national economic
planning and bilateral economic development
plans, multilateral economic development plan-
ning and training programs, and the encourage-
ment of long-range production plans or purchas-
ing contracts for raw materials in order to avoid
sharp fluctuations in export incomes in the area.
The Japanese, for their part, have strongly
favored the establishment of a regional economic
development fund, similar either to that proposed
for Latin America or the Near East. The United
States, on the other hand, in the absence of any
expressed desire on the part of the other nations
of this area, has not favored such a fund, which
would not in any case add financial resources to
the area, but it has encouraged applications to al-
ready existing multilateral lending institutions
such as the IBRD and the IMF. It has also
sought to assure no worthy development project
would be permitted to fail for lack of funds to
finance it.
Additionally, the United States has told the na-
tions of the Far East, including Japan, that they
may seek the assistance of the Export-Import
Bank and the DLF as sources of additional fi-
nancing in promoting economic development in
the Far East. We have also agreed to consider in
what ways our bilateral aid programs may be
coordinated with the various economic programs,
including those of the Japanese, in the Far East.
570
Finally, we have indicated that we sympathize
with the Japanese in their unsought role of in-
tended victim of Chinese Communist economic
warfare and that we shall assist them in any way
compatible with controlling statutes and policies
to resist the Chinese Communist campaign to eject
them from their traditional markets.
Ladies and gentlemen, what we require to
achieve mutual understanding and cooperative ac-
tion in Asia is what joint action in the face of
diverse background, traditions, and immediate in-
terests has always required : an appreciation of the
true nature of the problem and the recognition
that only in cooperative action is there security.
The meaning of the Chinese Communists' trade
offensive should by this time be clear to all : How-
ever much they speak of welfare, their methods
are those of warfare — trade warfare — whose pur-
pose is to pave the way for the only export com-
modity in which they are really interested, namely,
communism. A constant recognition of this fact
will assist us not only to design measures for deal-
ing with their methods; it will remind us that
Communist tactics whether they be in the field of
trade, of propaganda, of infiltration and subver-
sion, or an actual resort to force, as in the Taiwan
Strait, have only one end in view, namely, the ex-
tinction of human liberties and Communist
domination of the world.
NATO Foreign Ministers
To Meet at Washington
Press release 558 dated September 24
The U.S. Government has invited the North
Atlantic Council to hold the spring meeting of
NATO Foreign Ministers at Washington, D. C,
from April 2 to 4, 1959. The Council has ac-
cepted the invitation.
This will be the regular spring meeting of the
Foreign Ministers of the NATO countries.
The regular business meeting of the NATO
Foreign Ministers will be concluded on April 4
by appropriate ceremonies in commemoration of
the 10th anniversary of the signing of the North
Atlantic Treaty. It will be recalled that the
North Atlantic Treaty was signed by the 12 origi-
nal signatories at Washington on April 4, 1949.
Department of State Bulletin
NATO: Interdependence in Action
Address by Secretary Dulles '
The strength of NATO lies in the understand-
ing, and in the faith, of the peoples who make
up the member states. Such understanding and
faith do not come about automatically. They
depend upon knowledge. And assemblies such
as this contribute indispensably to that knowledge
and help to keep the Atlantic Community a living
reality.
Independence and Interdependence
What is NATO \ NATO is basically an exer-
cise in interdependence. It is coming more and
more to be realized that independence, which each
of our nations rightly cherishes, can only be pre-
served by the practice of interdependence. The
early history of our own nation can perhaps guide
us even today. Our nation was founded by men of
faith who were seeking not just to achieve security
for themselves but to conduct a great experiment
in human liberty, the impact of which would be
felt throughout the world. But the 13 original
States could not have performed this mission, or
even survived in independence, had they rejected
interdependence as between themselves.
The precise federal formula they adopted is, of
course, not applicable to the group of 15 nations
which make up NATO. But it is imperative that
they find some way to apply the truth that, under
present world conditions, free nations cannot en-
joy the glories of prosperous independence if they
neglect interdependence. It is self-evident that no
single nation can be truly independent and the
master of its own destiny if it stands alone against
the massive menace of 900 million people and
their military and economic resources, solidified
1 Made before the Atlantic Treaty Association at Boston,
Mass., on Sept. 27 (press release 566).
by international communism into a monolithic,
aggressive force dedicated to world domination.
Regional Collective Security
The United Nations was, of course, designed as
an effort to achieve worldwide order and security.
But we are compelled to recognize that fulfill-
ment of that goal has been seriously obstructed by
the policies and conduct of the Soviet Union.
Each NATO member of the United Nations
strives to play a positive role in the functioning
of that organization. But in the face of the de-
fiance of the Soviet-bloc states it has been necessary
to supplement the United Nations by other secu-
rity measures. Such measures take the form prin-
cipally of regional collective-defense associations
such as NATO. These are specifically authorized
by the United Nations Charter and supplement,
but do not derogate from, the authority of the
United Nations. These regional associations, each
in accordance with the genius of its group, ai*e in-
dispensable to enable the members adequately to
help one another.
Military Interdependence
The interdependence of our nations is most evi-
dent in the military field. It would be a grievous
burden for all, and impossible for some, to find
the funds required to maintain alone the military
strength to deter or repel armed aggression. So
we have, within NATO, established machinery
to share the tasks of defense. Land, sea, and air
commands of NATO are effectively organized and
well equipped — although not perhaps as fully
equipped as purely military considerations would
suggest.
Ocfober 13, 1958
571
As the engines of war grow ever more compli-
cated, they grow ever more expensive and the con-
sequences of their use ever more horrible to con-
template. "We do not devote our energies and our
resources so wholly to the proliferation of such
weapons that we undermine the economies which
the weapons are designed to defend. NATO has,
however, acquired what George Washington called
"a respectable military posture." NATO military
power is such as to command the respect of any
potential aggressor.
It has not always been easy to sustain this pos-
ture, and there are inadequacies. But in the last
analysis recognition of our essential interdepend-
ence has guided NATO well.
Economic Interdependence
An essential complement to military defense is
economic cooperation. Article 2 of the North
Atlantic Treaty commits the parties to encourage
economic collaboration between them.
Today, despite some specific economic troubles
there is a good overall situation on both sides of
the Atlantic. Western Europe has fully recovered
from war's devastation and there is confident ex-
pectation of long-term growth. In 1938 the com-
bined gross national product for the European
NATO countries was $85 billion. In 1957 the
comparable figure was $228 billion. While some
of this increase is due to price changes, real growth
has been tremendous.
The hopeful economic situation is attributable
in no small part to NATO's protective shield. Be-
hind it our peoples are able to pursue their peace-
ful endeavors.
In addition to general cooperation there have
developed in Europe special organs of economic
cooperation supplementing the general coopera-
tion of all the members. For example, there is
the Organization for European Economic Co-
operation (OEEC) and the European Payments
Union (EPU). These include some European
countries which are not members of NATO. Then
there is the community of six, represented by the
Coal and Steel Community, EURATOM, and the
Common Market.
Such special economic efforts, while they do not
precisely coincide with NATO, can fairly be con-
sidered, in their present form, to reflect the ad-
monition of the NATO treaty that there should be
economic cooperation.
Consolidating the Peace
As we have improved the quality of the shield
and the sword that preserve the peace, and as we
have, behind that shield, strengthened our econo-
mies, we have also worked more closely together
in harmonizing our foreign policies. In the last
few years the place of political consultations in
the North Atlantic Council has become ever more
prominent. It is now something unique in history.
We have a high-level Council of Permanent
Representatives. This is in virtually continuous
session. It regularly considers and helps to co-
ordinate allied policies which deal with matters of
direct concern to the organization, notably politi-
cal and military relations with the Soviet Union.
The United States and others directly involved
use the Council as the means of exchanging viows
with other members with respect to such matters
as a possible summit meeting and preparations
therefor, the reunification of Germany, the suspen-
sion of nuclear tests, the establishment of zones for
inspection against surprise attack, and disarma-
ment matters in general.
NATO consultations are, however, not limited
to matters which directly affect the treaty area.
We have begun the practice of talking over situ-
ations anywhere which might have worldwide re-
percussions. For example, the United States and
the United Kingdom discussed in the Council the
situation which led them to send troops to Lebanon
and to Jordan. The United States has similarly
discussed its policies in relation to Formosa and
the offshore islands.
Such presentations are not designed to enlarge
the treaty area which the members are bound to
defend. They result from recognition of the fact
that misunderstandings anywhere impair coopera-
tion in the treaty area. Also we know that hos-
tilities anywhere could spread and quickly affect
the treaty area. Therefore there is a legitimate
desire on the part of all the members to be in-
formed about such situations and to have an op-
portunity to express their views. Also those who
have to take serious responsibilities in other areas
welcome the viewpoint of others and the oppor-
tunity to promote understanding and unity.
A new development, which reflects this concept
of the indivisibility of peace, is the contact being
established between the Secretary General of
NATO and other regional organizations such as
the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, the
572
Department of State Bulletin
Baghdad Pact, and the Organization of American
States. This liaison is still in an early develop-
ment stage. It is, however, a beginning from
which good results can be expected.
Preserving Unity
Despite accomplishments of which we can
be proud and which justify our continuing faith,
it remains the fact that the unity of NATO is at
times disturbed and its future placed in jeopardy.
There are sometimes sharp differences within our
membership. That unhappily is the case now in
relation to Cyprus.
None of the differences which have shaken
NATO result from any weakening on the part of
the members in their determination to maintain
their independence and freedom as against the
menace of Soviet communism. But the fact is
that communism gains whenever there are differ-
ences. Also communism, recognizing such possi-
bilities of gain, always attempts to create and
exacerbate differences.
Recognizing this dangerous fact, the NATO
Council approved, in December 1956, procedures
for the peaceful settlement of intermember dis-
putes. The members were invited to submit dis-
putes between them to good-offices procedures
within the NATO framework, and the Secretary
General was empowered to offer his good offices
informally at any time to the parties in dispute.
Our present Secretary General, the able and dis-
tinguished Paul-Henri Spaak, has taken a promi-
nent role in efforts to develop the NATO practices
in this respect. It is wholly consistent with inde-
pendence and interdependence, and vital to the
survival of NATO, that procedures be found to as-
sure that NATO will not fall apart because of
internal differences.
The Far East
I will now say a few words about the situation
in the Far East because it could affect NATO.
The basic principle applicable there which is chal-
lenged by the Chinese Communists is that interna-
tional disputes should be settled by peaceful means
in such a manner that international peace and se-
curity and justice are not endangered. That lan-
guage derives from article 1 of the United Nations
Charter and constitutes article 1 of the North At-
lantic Treaty. In Formosa and the Formosa
Straits the Chinese Communists, with Soviet back-
ing, seek by force to enlarge the area of their
control and threaten to "expel" the United States
from Formosa, which is covered by a collective-
security treaty. The United States seeks a solu-
tion by peaceful means. If that principle of
peaceful settlement is abandoned in the Far East,
it is undermined everywhere.
Our NATO partners have a natural concern
that the United States should not become so in-
volved in Asia that its contribution to NATO
strength would be impaired. We do not expect
that to happen.
But something else needs also to be borne in
mind. The strength of NATO and the immunity
of the NATO area from aggression depend very
largely upon what the Soviet leaders consider
to be the will of the United States. Is the United
States in fact willing to defend territory other
than its own, in support of collective security?
Mr. Khrushchev in his rejected letter of Septem-
ber 19 to President Eisenhower demanded cate-
gorically that the United States should — as he put
it — "go home." He said that, if we did not with-
draw the forces committed to collective defense
with the Republic of China, they would be
forcibly expelled.
If the United States should give in to that arro-
gant demand in Asia, the consequences would be
felt in Western Europe.
The Soviet rulers have been seeking intensively
to undermine the concept of collective security.
They claim that the collective-security arrange-
ments such as NATO are "aggressive groupings."
They violently condemn what they call "foreign
bases" and the presence of troops upon foreign
soil. They now demand that our Navy should
be confined to its home waters.
All of this is designed to destroy the basic prin-
ciples upon which NATO is founded.
It is quite true that that effort at destruction
is now concentrated at a point geographically on
the other side of the world. The Communists as-
tutely picked a point where the Communists judge
retreat was most likely. But nonetheless the prin-
ciples at stake there are the principles upon which
NATO rests. If the principles are not valid and
not sustained in Asia, it cannot be confidently as-
sumed that they are valid and will be sustained in
Europe.
I am happy to feel that the governments of
NATO understand the position we are taking.
October 73, J958
573
They devoutly hope, as does the United States,
that there will be a peaceful settlement — but not
a surrender of the principles upon which rests
all world order.
Of course, the United States has not asked for
and does not expect NATO military support in
the Formosa area. That would be far beyond any
commitment of the North Atlantic Treaty.
develop solidarity and thus serve itself and the
world.
NATO serves that indispensable purpose. Thus
it deserves the understanding and support of all
who would preserve and carry forward the great
traditions of which they are the heirs.
Conclusion
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization rep-
resents a significant experiment which, we are
confident, is proving its worth. In the United
States it used to be accepted doctrine that alliances
which left each member sovereign were valid only
for a period of war and that in times of peace
they inevitably broke apart. That theory is, we
believe, being disproved in the case of NATO.
That is because NATO is now much more than a
military alliance. It began with primary em-
phasis upon the military aspect, and that is still
important. But out of the relationship is de-
veloping something more, which is proving of
great value.
The possibilities inherent in this relationship
are not yet by any means fully developed. It is
only within the last 2 or 3 years that there has
been a serious effort to give NATO much more
than the characteristics of a military alliance.
What has already been achieved in that short time
shows the vast possibilities that lie ahead.
Western civilization has made an immense con-
tribution to the welfare of the whole world. It
has been a dynamic force which, on the whole,
has reflected an enlightened view of the nature
of man and of his God-given right to enjoy life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. It has
brought to much of the world a knowledge, a
political freedom, and an economic opportunity
which it had never enjoyed before.
But the mission of the West is not completed.
The Atlantic Community has a possibility of fur-
ther greatly enriching the lives of its own peoples
and of others. However, this can never be done
unless the West overcomes its great weakness,
which has been its disunity. Out of this disimity
came wars which have taken the life blood of its
finest youth and weakened its economies. A major
task of postwar statesmanship has been and is to
find ways whereby the West can maintain and
American Foreign Ministers
Discuss Common Problems
ANNOUNCEMENT OF MEETING
The Department of State announced on Septem-
ber 19 (press release 545) that an informal meet-
ing of the Foreign Ministers of the American
Republics will be held at Washington September
23 and 24. The meeting, which is being held at
the invitation of the Secretary of State, will be of
a private and informal character for the purpose
of exchanging views on current matters of com-
mon interest. There will be no formal agenda.
The names of the Foreign Ministers who will
attend the meetings are as follows:
Argentina
Carlos A. Florit, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship
Bolivia
Victor Andrade, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship
Brazil
Francisco Nagrao de Lima, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Chile
Alberto Sepulveda Contreras, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Colombia
Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala, Minister of Foreign Relations
Costa Rica
Alfredo Vargas Fernandez, Minister of Foreign Affairs
and Worship
Cuba
Gonzalo Guell y Morales de los Rios, Prime Minister and
Minister of State
Dominican Republic
Porfirio Herrera Baez, Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs
Ecuador
Carlos Tobar Zaldumbide, Minister of Foreign Affairs
El Salvador
Alfredo Ortiz Mancia, Minister of Foreign Affairs
574
Department of State Bulletin
Guatemala
Jesus Victor Unda Murillo, Minister of Foreign Relations
Haiti
Louis Mars, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and
Worship
Honduras
Andres Alvarado Puerto, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Mexico
Luis Padilla Nervo, Minister of Foreign Relations
Nicaragua
Alejandro Montiel Arguello. Minister of Foreign Affairs
Panama
Miguel J. Moreno, Jr.. Minister of Foreign Relations
Paraguay
Haul Sapena Pastor. Minister of Foreign Relations
Peru
Haul Porras Barrenechea, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Uruguay
i (scar Se > Ellauri, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Venezuela
Rene de Sola, Minister of Foreign Affairs
The Foreign Ministers will arrive on Septem-
ber 22 from New York, where they are attending
the 13th session of the U.N. General Assembly.
Their program will include, in addition to the
scheduled meetings, a luncheon given in their
honor by President Eisenhower at the White
House, a dinner at which Secretary Dulles will be
their host, and a luncheon given by the chairman
and members of the Council of the Organization
of American States.
TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE'
The Foreign Ministers of the 21 American Re-
publics met informally in Washington on Sep-
tember 23 and 24. at the invitation of the Secre-
tary of State of the United States, and discussed
important current questions of common interest.
In three sessions, the Foreign Ministers exchanged
views regarding inter-American relations and
problems, particularly those of an economic na-
ture, and also reviewed the international scene.
The Ministers recognize that in the history of
the world, the solidarity of the American States
has been of great importance, and that at the pres-
ent time it acquires special significance. They
' Approved on Sept. 24. 1958.
Ocfober 73, 1958
483364—58 3
reaffirm that solidarity, which is founded on the
principles of the ('barter of the Organization
[of American States]. The present period of
evolutionary change in the political, economic and
social structure of society calls for a renewed dedi-
cation to the inter-American ideals of independ-
ence, political liberty, and economic and cultural
progress, and for a reaffirmation of the faith of the
American nations in their capacity to proceed
dynamically toward the realization of those high
ideals.
The Ministers are confident that their exchange
of views and informal conversations will have
fruitful results. They agree to recommend that
their governments instruct their representatives
on the Council of the Organization of American
States to consider the desirability of holding more
frequently similar informal meetings of Foreign
Ministers and other high-ranking government
representatives.
The Ministers are of the opinion that, in keep-
ing with the aspirations and needs of the peoples
of America expressed on numerous occasions, ac-
tion to promote the greatest possible economic
development of the continent must be intensified.
They are certain that a harmonious and carefully
planned joint effort to that end will contribute
enormously to strengthening the solidarity of
the hemisphere and to the well-being of all
Americans.
The Foreign Ministers are deeply gratified at
the affirmation made by President Eisenhower,
that the Government, of the United States is pre-
pared to lend its full cooperation in achieving con-
crete results in the common effort to promote the
economic development of the American countries,
for it considers that peace, prosperity and se-
curity are in the end, indivisible.
They furthermore consider that this is the
proper time to review and strengthen inter-
American cooperation in the economic field, as has
been suggested by President Kubitschek 2 and in
the proposals of various American Governments.
The Ministers recommend that, during the com-
in<r period before the Eleventh Inter-American
Conference, special attention be given to working
out additional measures of economic cooperation
taking as the point of departure the six topics
proposed by the Government of Brazil in its
2 For an exchange of correspondence between President
Eisenhower and President Juscelino Kubitschek of
Brazil, see I'.iuetin of June 30, 1958, p. 1090.
575
memorandum of August 9, 1958 concerning the
plan known as "Operation Pan America", any
other specific topics that the other governments of
the Republics of the hemisphere may wish to sub-
mit in connection with the general topic under
consideration, namely, the promotion of economic
development, and the following topic proposed by
the Foreign Minister of Argentina :
Preparation and immediate execution of a broad
hemispheric program to train experts for eco-
nomic development, chiefly in the fields of engi-
neering, agronomy, industrial engineering,
economics, public administration, and bvisiness
administration.
For this purpose and to facilitate other informal
talks, the Ministers are of the opinion that the
Council of the Organization of American States
should set up a Special Commission of the Council
on which the governments of the 21 American
Republics would be represented. As the Com-
mission reaches conclusions regarding measures
that might be taken, it should submit its reports
to the Council of the Organization. Then the
necessary action may be taken to have those pro-
posals or measures carried out through the organs
of the Organization, or directly by the govern-
ments, as may be appropriate.
Also, the Ministers are of the opinion that
practical measures may be taken now in connec-
tion with certain specific proposals. These are:
1. The establishment of an inter-American
economic development institution in which all the
American countries would participate. For this
purpose the Inter- American Economic and Social
Council should convene as soon as possible a
specialized committee of government representa-
tives, as recommended in Resolution XVIII of the
Buenos Aires Economic Conference. It is recom-
mended that this committee meet in continuous
session until it completes draft articles of the
agreement for the proposed institution, which will
be signed at a later date.
2. Intensification of efforts to establish regional
markets in Latin America. It would be well for
the governments directly concerned and the inter-
national organizations directly interested, chiefly
the Organization of American States, the Eco-
nomic Commission for Latin America, and the
Organization of Central American States, to
expedite their studies and concrete measures di-
576
rected toward the establishment of regional
markets in Central and South America. The
Ministers suggest that a report on this important
project be submitted to the members of the OAS
not later than the Eleventh Inter- American Con-
ference. In this connection the Ministers note
that the United States Government has made
known that it is prepared to assist financially in
the establishment of solvent industries, through
appropriate agencies, under suitable conditions,
with a view to promoting enjoyment of the bene-
fits of regional markets through public and pri-
vate investment.
The Ministers again express their constant
concern about the problems of markets for basic
products. They are in agreement that the eco-
nomic structure of the majority of the American
Republics requires that solutions to these problems
be sought urgently, for which purpose consulta-
tions should be carried out between the interested
members of the Organization of American States,
on bilateral and multilateral bases, as well as with
the producer and consumer countries of other
geographic areas.
In concluding this communique, the Ministers
expressed that there prevailed at this meeting an
atmosphere of frankness, sincerity, and under-
standing which contributed greatly to the estab-
lishment of a feeling of confidence that the im-
portant tasks being started at this time will be
completed successfully.
ICA Allocates Aid for Civilians
on Chinese Offshore Islands
Press release 562 dated September 26
The International Cooperation Administration
has authorized its mission at Taipei to use local
currency, equivalent to $180,000, for civilian relief
on the offshore islands in the Taiwan Straits, in-
cluding Quemoy and Matsu. Quemoy has been
subjected to intensive artillery bombardment by
the Chinese Communists since August 23, 1958.
The action was taken at the request of the Minis-
try of Interior of the Republic of China. The
relief work will be handled by the Free China
Relief Association in cooperation with Taiwan
officials and the Chinese- American Joint Commis-
sion on Rural Reconstruction, the organization
Department of State Bulletin
directing U.S. technical and economic aid to the
Republic of China.
Much of the money will be used to assist in-
habitants of the islands to strengthen their air
raid shelters, provide temporary housing for per-
sons whose homes have been destroyed by Com-
munist shelling, and for medical supplies, includ-
ing first-aid kits. This unprovoked shelling has
been characterized by a Chinese general officer as
a "shameful act of wanton cruelty." Over 250
civilians have been killed or wounded by Com-
munist shellfire in the 1-month period. About
1,900 civilian houses have been totally destroyed
and 1,800 partially destroyed in the same period.
Some funds may be used to build up an emer-
gency stockpile of civilian foodstuffs, including
rice, flour, and cooking oil, although the Chinese
director of agricultural extension and 4-H Club
work on Quemoy has reported that the people at
present do not need to worry seriously about food
supplies.
Visit of Prime Minister
of Cambodia
Press release 565 dated September 27
Prince Norodom Sihanouk, Prime Minister of
Cambodia and head of the Cambodian delegation
to the United Nations General Assembly, will ar-
rive at Washington September 28 for an unofficial
visit.
After a luncheon at the White House on Sep-
tember ,30 with President Eisenhower, Prince
Sihanouk will meet with Secretary Dulles. In the
evening the Prince will be host at a dinner in
honor of the Secretary. During the week Prince
Sihanouk will talk with officials of the Depart-
ment of State and other Government agencies.
He also will lay a wreath at the Tomb of the Un-
known Soldier. On October 3 Nong Kimny, Am-
bassador of Cambodia, will be host at a reception
in honor of the Prince.
The Royal Court ballet will perform at Prince
Sihanouk's dinner in honor of the Secretary and
at the Cambodian Ambassador's reception. The
ballet includes a son and a daughter of Prince
Sihanouk.
On conclusion of his Washington visit Prince
Sihanouk will return to New York to resume his
responsibilities as head of the Cambodian delega-
tion at the United Nations General Assembly.
United States and Soviet Union
To Exchange National Exhibits
DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT
The State Department announced on September
15 (press release 538) an agreement with the
Soviet Government for an exchange of national
exhibitions in the summer of 1959.
This exchange is in accordance with section
XIII of the U.S.-U.S.S.E. exchange agreement
of January 27, 1958, 1 negotiated by Ambassadors
W. S. B. Lacy and Georgi Zaroubin, wherein it
was agreed in principle that exhibits are an effec-
tive means of developing mutual understanding
between the peoples of the United States and the
Soviet Union.
The American exhibit, which will be staged in
Gorki Park, Moscow, will be the first major one
ever held in the Soviet Union under U.S. Govern-
ment auspices. The Soviets will hold their exhibit
in the New York Coliseum. Both exhibits will
open in early summer.
Several agencies of the U.S. Government will
assist in organizing the Gorki Park exhibit, and
the U.S. Information Agency has been designated
to coordinate it. It is expected that American
private industry will participate.
The agreement, which was signed for the Soviet
Embassy by Vladimir S. Alkhimov, Commercial
Counselor, and for the Department of State by
Frederick T. Merrill, Director of East-West Con-
tacts, provides that each exhibit will be devoted
on a reciprocal basis to the demonstration by each
country of its development in science, technology,
and culture. The details remain to be worked out.
TEXT OF AGREEMENT
Referring to Section XIII (1) of the U.S.-U.S.S.R.
Agreement, signed January 27, 1958, on exchanges in
the field of culture, technology, and education and to the
Aide-Mernoire dated July 7, 1958, from the Embassy of
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Depart-
1 For text, see Bulletin of Feb. 17, 1958, p. 243.
October 13, 7958
577
inent of State of the United States of America, the Em-
bassy of the U.S.S.R. and the Department of State
hereby agree to the exchange on a reciprocal basis of
exhibits devoted to the demonstration of the development
of science, technology, and culture, in accordance with
the above-mentioned Agreement. It has been agreed that
the American exhibit in Moscow and the Soviet exhibit
in New York be held in the summer of 1959, further de-
tails to be decided upon at the working level between
appropriate organizations and representatives of the two
parties concerned, which would be authorized to organize
the above-mentioned exhibits.
Frederick T. Merrill,
Department of State of the
United, States of America
V. Alkhimov
Embassy of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Washington, September 10, 1958
EX. No. 79
Soviet Oceanographic Vessel
To Call at U.S. Ports
Press release 549- dated September 22
The Department of State on September 22 in-
formed the Soviet Embassy that the U.S. Govern-
ment would permit the Soviet oceanographic sur-
vey vessel Yityaz to call at San Francisco in No-
vember and Honolulu in December 1958 for the
purpose of replenishing- its stores of fresh .water,
fuel, and food products and to allow scientific per-
sonnel and officers and men of the ship's crew to
go ashore. The Yityaz is engaged in scientific
investigations in the North and South Pacific
Oceans which are a part of the program of the
International Geophysical Year. It is assumed
that the data collected will be made available to
scientists of the other nations participating in
the IGY.
West Germany's Decision To Limit
Coal Imports Discussed
Press release 554 dated September 23
Under Secretary of State Herter and Acting
Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs W. T. M.
Beale on September 23 received a committee of
the U.S. Coal Exporters Association in connection
with the recently announced decision of the West
German Government to restrict coal imports into
the Federal Republic. During the meeting the
export association committee was informed of the
representations made to the Federal German
Government.
Discussions are taking place at Bonn between
representatives of the American Embassy and the
German Federal Republic concerning the German
action announced September 2, 1958, to limit the
conclusion of new coal import contracts. From
these discussions it is understood that this action
was taken as a temporary measure on the ground
that a further increase of imports would threaten
the German coal mining industry with widespread
unemployment in view of (a) already existing im-
port contracts involving about 40 million tons of
American coal and (b) the very large coal stocks
on hand at the mines and in the possession of Ger-
man consumers, particularly industrial consumers.
Representatives of the Federal Government
pointed out that there was no intention of inter-
fering with already existing coal import contracts.
The importation of American coal may, therefore,
continue. German authorities are at present gath-
ering further detailed data in order to obtain as
complete a picture as possible of the total volume
of coal involved in contracts already concluded.
On the basis of these discussions with the Ger-
man authorities, it is expected that the limitations
on German coal imports will be eliminated as soon
as the coal stocks are brought down to manage-
able levels.
U.S. officials have emphasized that the German
action in placing coal imports under quantitative
restrictions could be seriously prejudicial to the
U.S. coal industry and that the question of the
consistency of this action with the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade is now under study.
The German Government has sent a statement
concerning its action to the GATT Secretariat for
circulation to all contracting parties.
In the meantime, discussions between U.S. and
German authorities are continuing at Bonn with
a view to obtaining the removal of these tempo-
rary restrictions on contracts for U.S. coal exports
to Germany after the reduction of the coal
stockpiles.
The U.S. Coal Exporters Association committee
was made up of the following members :
S. P. Hutchinson, General Coal Company, Philadelphia,
Pa.
578
Department of State Bulletin
D. T. Buckley, Castner, Curran & Bullitt, Inc., New York,
NY.
J. W. Haley, Jewell Ridge Coal Corporation, Washington,
D.C.
P. F. Masse, C. H. Sprague & Son Company, Inc., New
V.. rlc, X.Y.
J. S. Routh, Routh Coal Export Corporation, New York,
N.Y.
President Limits Imports
of Lead and Zinc
White House (Newport, R. I.) press release dated September 22
WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT
The President on September 22 agreed with the
unanimous finding of the U.S. Tariff Commission
that escape-clause relief is warranted in the case
of lead and zinc. To provide an appropriate and
immediate remedy, the President issued a procla-
mation limiting imports by an annual quota equiv-
alent in amount to 80 percent of average annual
commercial imports during the 5-year period
1953-57. The quota is allocated among exporting
countries and subdivided by calendar quarters
and by tariff-scheduled classifications.
In identical letters to the chairmen of the Senate
Finance and House Ways and Means Committees,
the President recognized that "the imposition of
quotas is an unusual step, but it is better suited
than a tariff increase to the unique circumstances
of the case and more likely to lead to enduring
solutions beneficial to the entire lead and zinc
industry." He agreed with the Tariff Commis-
sion with respect to the distressed condition of
domestic producers and pointed out that the pro-
claimed import limitation, which represented an
equitable approach to a worldwide problem,
should be of real benefit to the lead and zinc in-
dustry. As our economy moves upward, he
pointed out, that benefit should increase.
The President's letter also emphasized the im-
portance to friendly countries of their exports to
us, the worldwide nature of the present condition
of lead and zinc overproduction, and the need for
sharing the burdens of this problem. The United
States has been discussing this problem with other
countries, and the President is hopeful that mu-
tually acceptable solutions can be found.
Meanwhile, the proclamation provides immedi-
ate relief for this problem which the President
has several times set before the Congress. In 1957
the administration presented a long-range min-
erals program, but it was not enacted. During the
past legislative session, the administration pro-
posed a domestic minerals stabilization plan which
would have assisted not only the lead and zinc in-
dustry but also domestic producers of copper,
acid-grade fluorspar, and tungsten. In suspend-
ing action on the Tariff Commission report last
June, the President stressed the problems and
urgent needs of domestic minerals producers. 1
The letter noted that the Congress did not enact
that plan for promoting a healthy and vigorous
mining industry.
The proclamation of September 22 was issued
pursuant to section 7 of the Trade Agreements Ex-
tension Act of 1951, as amended. That provision
authorizes import restrictions to remedy serious
injury or the threat of serious injury as determined
by the U.S. Tariff Commission. The Commission
reported its unanimous finding of injury on April
24, 1958. 2 The report contained alternative reme-
dial recommendations. Three Commissioners pro-
posed a restoration of the tariff rates provided in
the Tariff Act of 1930. The remaining three Com-
missioners favored a larger tariff increase to-
gether with quantitative limitations.
LETTER TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES »
September 22, 1958
Dear Mr. Chairman : In my letter to you of
June. 19, 1958, 1 stated that I was suspending con-
sideration of the recommendations of the United
States Tariff Commission in Escape-Clause In-
vestigation No. 65 on lead and zinc. I pointed
out that a final decision would be appropriate after
the Congress had completed its consideration of
the proposed Minerals Stabilization Plan. The
Congress did not, as you know, enact this Plan.
After full consultation with the Trade Policy
Committee and other interested agencies of the
1 Bulletin of July 14, 1958, p. 69.
2 Copies of the Commission's report may be obtained
from the U.S. Tariff Commission, Washington 25, D.C.
'Addressed to Harry Flood Byrd, chairman of the
Senate Committee on Finance, and Wilbur D. Mills, chair-
man of the House Ways and Means Committee.
October 73, 1958
579
Executive Branch, I have decided to accept the
unanimous findings of the Tariff Commission re-
specting injury. There is no doubt that the do-
mestic producers are in genuine distress. They
have substantially curtailed their production, and
large commercial stocks have accumulated within
this country. At the same time, the prices of both
lead and zinc have declined and, despite decreased
demand, import levels have remained high.
In seeking a solution which will afford adequate
relief to the domestic industry, I am also conscious
of the importance to the economies of friendly
countries of exports of lead and zinc to the United
States. There is no doubt that in the long term
the United States will continue to be an important
market for lead and zinc producers abroad. With
these considerations in mind, and with the aim of
finding a way to share with exporting countries
the burdens caused by the present condition of
world over-production, representatives of this
Government have recently participated in discus-
sions of this problem with other nations. I am
hopeful that, with the good will and cooperation
of all major exporting and importing countries,
mutually acceptable solutions can be found.
Meanwhile, the condition of the domestic
producers admits of no further delay in taking
remedial measures. After a careful examination
of the Commission's report, including its alterna-
tive proposals for meeting the problem, I have
decided to establish a quota limiting imports to
eighty percent of average annual commercial im-
ports during the five years 1953-57, as set forth
in the attached copy of my Proclamation of today.
This quota is allocated by countries and represents
an equitable approach to a difficult problem affect-
ing many sources of supply.
I recognize that the imposition of quotas is an
unusual step, but it is better suited than a tariff
increase to the unique circumstances of the case
and more likely to lead to enduring solutions
beneficial to the entire lead and zinc industry.
These limitations represent a twenty percent re-
duction from the level of average annual imports
during the last five years. This action should be
of real benefit to the lead and zinc industry, and
that benefit should increase as our economy moves
upward.
Sincerely,
Dwight D. Eisenhower
PROCLAMATION 3257 *
Modification op Trade Agreement Concessions and
Imposition of Quotas on Unmanufactured Lead and
Zinc
1. Whereas, pursuant to the authority vested in him by
the Constitution and the statutes, including section 350
of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (19 U. S. 0. 1351),
the President, on October 30, 1947, entered into a trade
agreement with foreign countries, which consists of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the related
Protocol of Provisional Application thereof, together with
the Final Act Adopted at the Conclusion of the Second
Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Na-
tions Conference on Trade and Employment (61 Stat.
(Parts 5 and 6) A 7, A 11, and A 2051), and, by Procla-
mation No. 2761 A of December 16, 1947 (61 Stat. (Part
2) 1103), proclaimed such modifications of existing duties
and other import restrictions of the United States and such
continuance of existing customs or excise treatment of
articles imported into the United States as were then
found to be required or appropriate to carry out that
agreement on and after January 1, 1948 ;
2. Whereas, pursuant to the said authority, the Presi-
dent, on April 21, 1951, entered into a trade agreement
consisting of the Torquay Protocol to the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade, including the annexes thereto
(3 UST (Part 1) 588), and, by Proclamation No. 2929 of
June 2, 1951 (3 CFR, 1951 Supp., p. 27), proclaimed such
modification of existing duties and other import restric-
tions of the United States and such continuance of exist-
ing customs or excise treatment of articles imported into
the United States as were then found to be required or
appropriate to carry out that agreement on and after
June 6, 1951, which proclamation has been supplemented
by several notifications of the President to the Secretary
of the Treasury, including a notification dated June 2,
1951 (3 CFR, 1951 Supp., p. 530) ;
3. Whereas the second item 394 in Part I of Schedule
XX annexed to the agreement referred to in the first recital
of this proclamation (61 Stat. (Part 5) A 1219) reads as
follows :
Tariff
act of
1930,
para-
graph
Description of products
Rate of duty
394
Old and worn-out zinc, fit only to be remanu-
factured, zinc dross, and zinc skimmings.
54 cent per pound.
4. Whereas item 391, the first item 392, item 393, and
item 394 in Part I of Schedule XX annexed to the trade
agreement referred to in the second recital of this proc-
lamation (3 UST (Part I) 1167), read, respectively, as
follows :
' 23 Fed. Reg. 7475.
580
Department of State Bulletin
TarilT
act of
1930,
Description of products
Rate of duty
para-
graph
391
Lead-bearing ores, flue dust, and mattes of a]]
% cent per pound
kinds.
on lead content.
392
Lead bullion or base bullion, lead In pigs and
1 H o cents per pound
b US, tead dross, reclaimed lead, scrap lead,
on lead content.
antimonial lead, antimonial scrap lead,
type metal. Babbitt metal, solder, all alloys
or combinations of lead not specially pro-
vided for.
393
Zinc-bearing ores of all kinds, except pyrites
0.6 cent per pound
containing not over 3% of zinc.
on zinc content.
394
Zinc in blocks, pigs, or slabs, and zinc dust...
0.7 cent per pound.
5. Whereas, in accordance with Articles II and XI of
the said General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the
United States customs treatment reflecting the conces-
sions granted in the said trade agreements with respect
to the articles described in the items reproduced in the
third and fourth recitals of this proclamation has been
the application of the respective rates of duty specified
in such items, without quantitative limitation ;
6. Whereas the United States Tariff Commission has
submitted to me a report of its Investigation No. 65 under
section 7 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951,
as amended (19 U.S.C. 1364), as a result of which the
Co mm ission has found that the articles described in the
said items (except Babbitt metal, solder, and zinc dust)
are, as a result in part of the customs treatment specified
iu the fifth recital of this proclamation, being imported
into the United States in such increased quantities, both
actual and relative, as to cause serious injury to the do-
mestic industries producing like or directly competitive
products ;
7. Whereas I find that the modifications of the con-
cessions granted in the said agreements with respect to
such articles to permit the application to such articles of
the customs treatment hereinafter proclaimed is neces-
sary to remedy the serious injury to the domestic indus-
tries producing like or directly competitive products ;
8. Whereas the said section 350 of the Tariff Act of
1930, as amended, authorizes the President to proclaim
such modifications of existing duties and such additional
import restrictions as are required or appropriate to carry
out any foreign trade agreement that the President has;
entered into under the said section 350 ; and
9. Whereas, upon modification of the said concessions
as hereinafter proclaimed, it will be appropriate, to carry
out t::e General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, to apply
to the said articles the customs treatment hereinafter
proclaimed :
Xow, therefore, I, Dwioht D. Eisenhower, President
of the United States of America, acting under the author-
ity vested in me by section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930,
as amended, and by section 7 (c) of the Trade Agree-
ments Extension Act of 1951, as amended, and in accord-
ance with the provisions of Article XIX of the said
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, do proclaim as
follows :
(a) Item 391, the first item 392, item 393, and item 394,
referred to in the fourth recital of this proclamation, shall
each be modified, effective October 1, 1958, so as to read,
respectively, as follows :
392
Lead-bearing ores, flue dust, and mattes of
all kinds.
Whenever, in any three-month period be-
ginning October 1 in 1958, and January 1,
April 1, July 1, and October 1 in any sub-
sequent year —
(1) the dutiable lead content (as shown on
the entry in accordance with the applicable
customs regulations) of lead-bearing ores, flue
dust, and mattes the product of a country
specified below, entered, or withdrawn from
warehouse, for consumption, and
(2) the dutiable lead content (as shown on
the warehouse withdrawal for consumption
In accordance with the applicable customs
regulations) of lead-bearing ores, flue dust, or
mattes the product of such country, with
respect to which duty was collected under
section 312 of the Tariff Act of 1930 upon with-
drawal for consumption from customs bonded
warehouse of "metal producible" within the
meaning of the said section 312,
are determined by the Secretary of the Treas-
ury of the United States to have reached the
aggregate quantity specified below for such
country, no lead-bearing ores, flue dust, or
mattes the product of such country may be
entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for
consumption during the remainder of such
period; and no article may be withdrawn for
consumption from any customs bonded ware-
house during the remainder of such period if
by reason of such withdrawal duty would be-
come collectible under section 312 of the Tariff
Act of 1930 in cancellation of a bond charge
covering any lead-bearing ore, flue dust, or
matte the product of such country:
Short
tons
Peru 8,080
Union of South Africa 7, 440
Canada 6. 720
Australia 5,040
Bolivia 2,520
All other foreign countries (total) . 3, 280
The foregoing quantitative restrictions
shall not apply to any ore, flue dust, or matte
the lead content of which Is not subject to
duty or which contains less than two per
centum of lead (whether or not the lead con-
tent thereof Is subject to duty); to any article
imported by or for the account of the Govern-
ment of the United States; or to any imported
article which is under contract for delivery in
the United States for the account of a corpora-
tion wholly owned by the Government of the
United States.
Lead bullion or base bullion, lead In pigs and
bars, lead dross, reclaimed lead, scrap lead,
antimonial lead, antimonial scrap lead,
type metal, Babbitt metal, solder, all alloys
or combinations of lead not specially pro-
vided for.
Yt cent per pound
on lead content.
lMe cents per
pound on lead
content.
Ocfober 13, 7958
581
Whenever, in any three-month period be-
ginning October 1 in 1958, and January 1,
April 1, July 1, and October 1 in any subse-
quent year, the dutiable lead content (as
shown on the entry in accordance with the
applicable customs regulations) of the articles
described above in this item (except Babbitt
metal and solder) the product of a country
specified below, entered, or withdrawn from
warehouse, for consumption, is determined
by the Secretary of the Treasury of the United
States to have reached the aggregate quantity
specified below for such country, no such
articles the product of such country may be
entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for
consumption during the remainder of such
period:
Short
tons
Mexico 18,440
Australia 11,840
Canada 7,960
Yugoslavia 7,880
Peru 6,440
All other foreign countries (total) . 3, 010
The foregoing quantitative restrictions
shall not apply to any article described in
this item which is not subject to duty; to any
such article imported by or for the account of
the Government of the United States; or to
any imported article which is under contract
for delivery in the United States for the ac-
count of a corporation wholly owned by the
Government of the United States.
! »'■ : 1 . ! ; :
Zinc-bearing ores of all kinds, except pyrites
containing not over 3% of zinc.
Whenever, In any three-month period
beginning October 1 in 1958, and January 1,
April 1, July 1, and October 1 in any subse-
quent year
(1) the dutiable zinc content (as shown on
the entry in accordance with the applicable
customs regulations) of zinc-bearing ores the
product of a country specified below, entered,
or withdrawn from warehouse, for consump-
tion, and
(2) the dutiable zinc content (as shown on
the warehouse withdrawal for consumption
in accordance with the applicable customs
regulations) of zinc-bearing ores the product of
such country, with respect to which duty was
collected under section 312 of the Tariff. Act of
1930 upon withdrawal for consumption from
customs bonded warehouse of "metal pro-
ducible" within the meaning of the said
section 312,
are determined by the Secretary of the Treas-
ury of the United States to have reached the
aggregate quantity specified below for such
country, no zinc-bearing ores the product of
such country may be entered, or withdrawn
from warehouse, for consumption during the
remainder of such period; and no article may
be withdrawn for consumption from any
customs bonded warehouse during the re-
mainder of such period if by reason of such
withdrawal duty would become collectible
under section 312 of the Tarifl Act of 1930 in
cancellation of a bond charge covering any
zinc-bearing ore the product of such country:
O.fi cent per pound
on zinc content.
Short
tons
Mexico 35, 240
Canada 33,240
Peru 17,560
All other foreign countries (total) . 8, 920
The foregoing quantitative restrictions
shall not apply to any ore the zinc content of
which is not subject to duty or which con-
tains less than one per centum of zinc (wheth-
er or not the zinc content thereof is subject
to duty) ; to any article imported by or for the
account of the Government of the United
States; or to any imported article which is
under contract for delivery in the United
States for the account of a corporation wholly
owned by the Government of the United
States.
Zinc in blocks, pigs, or slabs, and zinc dust. .
Whenever, in any three-month period, be-
ginning October 1 in 1958, and January 1,
April 1, July 1, and October 1 in any subse-
quent year, the total aggregate quantity of
the articles described above in this item (ex-
cept zinc dust) and in the second item 394 in
Part I of Schedule XX annexed to the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade as au-
thenticated on October 30, 1947 (old and worn-
out zinc, fit only to be remanufactured, zinc
dross, and zinc skimmings), the product of a
country specified below, entered, or with-
drawn from warehouse, for consumption, is
determined by the Secretary of the Treasury
of the United States to have reached the aggre-
gatequantity specified below for such country,
no such articles the product of such country
may be entered, or withdrawn from ware-
house, for consumption during the remainder
of such period:
Short
tons
Canada 18,920
Belgium and Luxembourg (total) . 3,760
Mexico 3, 160
Belgium Congo 2, 720
Peru 1,880
Italy 1,800
All other foreign countries (total) . 3,040
The foregoing quantitative restrictions
shall not apply to any article described in this
item which is not subject to duty; to any such
article imported by or for the account of the
Government of the United States; or to any
imported article which is under contract for
delivery in the United States for the account
of a corporation wholly owned by the Gov-
ernment of the United States.
0.7 cent per pound.
(b) The articles described in the said items entered,
or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption on or
after October 1, 1958, and until the President otherwise
proclaims, shall be subject to the quantitative limitations
specified in the said items, as modified by paragraph (a)
above, except that no such quantitative limitation shall
be applied to any article described in item 392 or item
394 or in clause numbered (1) of item 391 or clause
numbered (1) of item 393 which was exported to the
United States prior to the date of this proclamation.
I
582
Department of State Bulletin
In witness wur.KKOF, I have hereunto set my hand and
caused the Seal of the United States of America to be
affixed.
Done at the City of Washington this twenty-second
day of September in the year of our Lord nine-
[seal] teen hundred and fifty-eight, and of the Inde-
pendence of the United States of America the one
hundred and eighty-third.
By the President :
John Foster Dulles
Secretary of State
Foreign Relations Aspects
of Lead and Zinc Problem
by Thomas C. Mann
Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs x
The lead and zinc industry throughout the free
world is faced with an immediate problem of a
serious imbalance between production and demand.
The principal causes of this imbalance are ob-
vious. The high level of demand and prices during
and after the Second "World War, and again in the
Korean conflict, stimulated production both in the
United States and elsewhere. United States Gov-
ernment acquisition for our strategic and supple-
mentary stockpiles helped to absorb the excess
production, and the completion of that program,
coinciding as it did with an economic recession, had
the combined effect of sharply reducing the total
volume of world demand.
Notwithstanding these factors, nearly all pro-
ducing countries, including the United States,
continued to produce at high levels throughout
most of 1957. By 1958 the dimensions of the
problem were clear to all with the inevitable signs
of imbalance — falling prices and the accumulation
of large inventories. Under these market pres-
sures, United States producers cut back produc-
tion by about 25 percent, but unfortunately the
level of imports remained at high levels and pro-
duction in some countries continued to expand.
1 Address made before the American Mining Congress
at San Francisco, Calif., on Sept. 23 (press release 551).
Economic Consequences to Domestic Industry
I do not need to describe to this gathering the
economic consequences to the domestic industry
of this imbalance between supply and demand.
They include unemployment, the shutting down
of some mines and the curtailment of production
to uneconomic levels in others, accumulation of
large commercial stocks, and falling prices. The
plight of the domestic industry in turn affected
not only those directly employed in the mines and
smelters but entire communities dependent on the
industry.
These trends were known to the United States
Tariff Commission when it made its unanimous
finding of injury. There was, moreover, the
broader national interest to be considered: En-
tirely apart from purely economic considerations,
healthy industry is important to our national
economy.
But there is another side to this coin. The im-
balance between supply and demand is not just a
United States problem. It is a world problem.
Difficulties resulting from industry dislocations
have occurred not only in the United States ; they
have occurred in other countries too. The lead
and zinc industry in some countries constitutes
an even more important segment of their total
economies than it does in ours. It is not an exag-
geration to say that for some, already beset with
serious problems of declines in price and demand
for other primary commodities, trade in lead and
zinc can be the decisive factor In their ability to
maintain viable economies.
Most of us now accept the fact that we live,
more than ever before, in an interdependent world
where social, political, and economic problems are
so interrelated as to be indivisible. We cannot,
without the direst consequences, insulate ourselves
against the distress of others. I hope that the
lessons of the early 1930's, when we learned that
trade barriers impeded rather than aided eco-
nomic recovery, will not be soon forgotten. We
learned then that the consequences of such a policy
were disastrous for industries, for the national
economy, and, as well, for free-world strength and
unity.
Search for Solution to Problem
It has been for these reasons of enlightened self-
interest that our Government has consistently
October 73, 7958
583
sought for solutions that will meet the needs of
the domestic industry with due regard for the
needs of other economies. You will recall that,
in 1954, when the Tariff Commission in an escape-
clause action found injury, the President decided
upon a stockpiling program which had the effect
of withdrawing excess inventories from the
market. In 1958, when the Tariff Commission
again found injury, the minerals stabilization plan
was proposed to our Congress as an alternative
to tariffs and quotas. When that plan was de-
feated by a narrow margin, the Department of
State promptly consulted with a number of coun-
tries interested in lead and zinc, both in bilateral
discussions and in the international meeting which
took place in London recently, in an effort to find
an effective formula which would be acceptable
to all.
These discussions did not result in unanimous
agreement on all issues. But they did reveal that
a majority recognized that the task of bringing
production and demand into some degree of order
and balance must be faced. This would take time
and would require difficult adjustments in many
countries. They also revealed a majority senti-
ment in favor of the creation of an international
study group to study the problem in all of its
aspects and to explore the possibility of finding
economically sound ways of dealing effectively
with the problem.
The London conference has requested all inter-
ested governments to state not later than October
15, 1958, whether they will participate in these
exploratory discussions. We intend to reply in
the affirmative. If these ex2iloratory discussions
should be held, as I hope they will be, I should hope
that the lead and zinc industry would welcome
the prospect of coordinated multilateral action to
at least diminish the severity of "boom" and "bust"
cycles which have been so common in past years
and of giving the world industry at least a measure
of enduring stability without sacrifice of the es-
sential needs of industries and economies at home
or abroad. We recognize that this road will not
be easy and that there are many difficulties to be
overcome. We hope that we may have your ad-
vice and help each step of the way. And we can
be encouraged in this task by prospects of an in-
creased demand for lead and zinc in the United
States market, by our knowledge that the United
States will be a growing market, and by the fact
that we will continue to be dependent on imports
to a substantial degree.
The long-term prospects, favorable as they are,
are not an answer to the present emergency. As
Secretary [of the Interior Fred A.] Seaton has
already informed you, the President, acting on the
findings of the Tariff Commission, has decided in
favor of a quota allocated by countries on a quar-
terly basis. There are a number of reasons why
quotas are more appropriate than tariffs in this
unique situation. First is the circumstance that
multilateral discussions are already under way in
search of a solution to the long-term problem of
chronic imbalance between production and de-
mand. Quotas, whether they be export or import,
are consistent with the suggestions for voluntary
export quotas made in the course of these discus-
sions and are a sign of our intention to seek multi-
lateral solutions. Second, quotas in this situation
will help, better than any available alternative, to
stabilize prices which will benefit not only do-
mestic producers but foreign producers as well.
Third, quotas avoid the necessity of the foreign
producer having to absorb the cost of increased
tariffs and thus will allow the foreign suppliers
a larger part of the proceeds of their sales in the
United States market. This is a factor of con-
siderable importance to exporting countries faced
with balance-of-payments difficulties. Fourth,
quotas assure all countries a definite market in the
United States during the emergency, based on
their average commercial exports to the United
States during the last 5 years. And, finally, it
has the aspect, allowing of course for a margin of
error in estimates of United States consumption
in the coming months, of encouraging equitable
distribution of the burden of readjustment.
Thus, the action we have taken aims to meet the
urgent needs of the domestic industry, on the one
hand, and, on the other, to share the burdens and
difficulties resulting from world industry imbal-
ances with our friends and allies in keeping with
United States traditions.
584
Department of State Bulletin
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
General Assembly Again Rejects Indian Proposal To Consider
Question of Representation of China
Follow/ ng are tioo statements made by Henry
Cabot Lodge, U.S. Representative to the United
Nations, (hiring debate on an Indian proposal to
in, !u,l, in tli, agenda of the 13th <•', nt ral Ass, m~
bly an item entitled "The Question of the Repre-
sentation of China, in the United Nations.''''
STATEMENT IN GENERAL COMMITTEE, SEP-
TEMBER 19
U.S. delegation press release 2995
Mr. President, although we have arguments of
an overwhelmingly persuasive character, I am
mindful of the admonition which you made to us at
the opening meeting that we should confine our-
selves to procedural arguments entirely here and
totally to avoid substance. Therefore, with great
respect, I shall not go into the substance of this
question here at this procedural meeting and also
why this year, of all years, is the year not to take
the type of action which the distinguished repre-
sentative of India proposes.
As in years past, the delegation of India has re-
quested the inclusion in our agenda of an item
entitled "The Question of the Representation of
China in the United Nations." We believe that
this request should be rejected. We have made
known our views before and will do so again at
the proper time, together with added reasons
which have come about because of recent develop-
ments. We believe that the General Assembly
should adopt a decision not to consider this matter
during its 13th regular session.
With these views in mind, the United States
proposes that the General Committee recommend
to the Assembly the adoption of the following
proposal : (Let me say before I read it that a copy
of this is being circulated to all members and it is
the same proposition as the one that has been
before us before.)
The General Assembly,
(1) Decides to reject the request of India for the in-
clusion in the agenda of its thirteenth regular session
of the item entitled: Question of the Representation
of China in the United Nations ; and
(2) Decides not to consider, at its thirteenth regular
session, any proposals to exclude the representatives
of the Government of the Republic of China or to seat
representatives of the Central People's Government of
the People's Republic of China.
Let me say, Mr. President, that there is very
ample precedent for this procedure. It was
established in this General Committee on several
occasions and was supported by the General As-
sembly in its 6th, in its 11th, and in its 12th ses-
sions. So we are not asking the General
Committee to do anything that it has not done
many times before. Part 1 of our resolution is a
decision on the question of inscription, namely,
to reject the request for inscription. Part 2 of
the resolution falls within the competence of the
General Committee to make recommendations to
the Assembly on the conduct of its business, and
in this form it is a proposal which has been
adopted by the General Assembly many times.
Mr. President, the distinguished representative
of India has referred to resolution 396 of the
5th session. I think it is fallacious to say that
this imposes the kind of mandate on us that he
contends that it does. There is no conflict, in
our opinion, between resolution 396 and what we
propose. Our resolution deals with the matter
here in the General Committee, and it also pro-
vides the basis for dealing with it in the General
Ocfofaer 73, 7958
585
Assembly. What we propose is completely con-
sistent with resolution 396. 1
Resolution 396 is a document that aims at get-
ting a decision. Moreover, resolution 396 does not
say that the issue has to be met at any particular
time. Certainly, it cannot be contended that this
resolution says that the issue cannot be postponed
or that the General Assembly has not got the
right or the power not to consider it. I am sure
that the representative of India would not con-
tend that the 5th General Assembly had the right
to bind all future Assemblies in their right to
say that they do not wish to consider a subject.
1 Resolution 396 of the 5th session reads as follows :
Recognition by the United Nations of the Representa-
tion op a Member State
The General Assembly,
Considering that difficulties may arise regarding the
representation of a Member State in the United Nations
and that there is a risk that conflicting decisions may be
reached by its various organs,
Considering that it is in the interest of the proper
functioning of the Organization that there should be uni-
formity in the procedure applicable whenever more than
one authority claims to be the government entitled to
represent a Member State in the United Nations, and
this question becomes the subject of controversy in the
United Nations,
Considering that, in virtue of its composition, the Gen-
eral Assembly is the organ of the United Nations in
which consideration can best be given to the views of all
Member States in matters affecting the functioning of
the Organization as a whole,
1. Recommends that, whenever more than one authority
claims to be the government entitled to represent a Mem-
ber State in the United Nations and this question becomes
the subject of controversy in the United Nations, the
question should be considered in the light of the Pur-
poses and Principles of the Charter and the circumstances
of each case ;
2. Recommends that, when any such question arises, it
should be considered by the General Assembly, or by the
Interim Committee if the General Assembly is not in
session ;
3. Recommends that the attitude adopted by the General
Assembly or its Interim Committee concerning any such
question should be taken into account in other organs of
the United Nations and in the specialized agencies;
4. Declares that the attitude adopted by the General
Assembly or its Interim Committee concerning any such
question shall not of itself affect the direct relations of
individual Member States with the State concerned ;
5. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit the
present resolution to the other organs of the United
Nations and to the specialized agencies for such action
as may be appropriate.
This question of resolution 396 was brought up
at the 11th General Assembly by the distin-
guished representative of India, and I spent last
night in reading his speech on the subject. So I
think I am familiar with it. And this was before
the General Committee and the General Assembly
last year and the General Assembly acted in full
knowledge of it. I hope, therefore, that the reso-
lution which we propose can be adopted. 2
STATEMENT IN PLENARY, SEPTEMBER 22
U.S. delegation preas release 3000
In the General Committee and now again in the
General Assembly the Soviet Union has seen fit to
engage in talk of a kind which is clearly subject
to a point of order. I did not raise the point of
order in the General Committee because I want to
be very slow to engage in parliamentary tactics
of any kind. I would have been well within my
rights here this afternoon to interrupt the repre-
sentative of the Soviet Union [Foreign Minister
Andrei Gromyko] because at least on 12 different
occasions he was clearly out of order. That is
not right and should not happen in this body.
But far more important than his being out of
order is the fact that his whole speech was noth-
ing but an attack on the United States. He did
not address himself to the China question. He
took advantage of this opportunity to make an
attack on the United States. Every member here
may well ask himself what his motive was and
what kind of a game he is playing here this
afternoon.
Now, I would like to cite specific illustrations
to back up what I say.
On page 2 of his speech he says, "It suffices to
point out the fact that the United States already
for 8 years has been occupying a part of Chinese
territory, the island of Taiwan and the Penghu
Islands, whose seizure was an act of direct aggres-
sion with regard to China."
We did not occupy that territory. We did not
seize it. That statement is totally wrong.
The next statement : "It is known also that the
United States Government does not approve of
the social order established by the Chinese people
in that country after the popular revolution did
2 The General Committee on Sept. 19 approved the U.S.
draft resolution by a vote of 12 to 7, with 2 abstentions.
586
Department of State Bulletin
away with the rule of foreign imperialists and
their henchmen."
That implies that we approve of foreign imperi-
alism. Of course, our -whole history is against all
forms of foreign imperialism.
It goes on to say: "Not to approve of the in-
ternal order in this or that country more often
than not means for the United States Government
with its policy 'from positions of strength' to
undertake attempts of direct interference in the
affairs of this country with the object of imposing
its will upon it and establishing in it such rule as
is to the liking of the ruling circles of the United
States."
Now, let us just analyze that. He objects to our
having a position of strength. All right for him
to have a position of strength, but we must have
a position of weakness. Now, what kind of a
consideration is that to bring into a debate on
Chinese representation ?
He speaks of "direct interference in the affairs
of countries," with "imposing our will." We
have never interfered. We have never sought to
impose our will. There is no country on the face
of this earth that has ever been enslaved by the
United States. It ill becomes the Soviet Union
with its record of slavery to make such charges
against us.
He speaks of the "ruling circles of the United
States." Here again he is confusing our situa-
tion with his. In this country the people rule.
There is not a little clique that have managed to
get xvp to the top of the slippery pole who are
giving orders to execute this brutality or that.
Now I come to the next one: "In Washington
such plans have not yet been laid aside also with
regard to the People's Republic of China although
it should be clear to everyone that these are but
illusory dreams of certain American politicians
whose appetites, it would seem, are greatly in
excess of their possibilities."
The inference that the men who have been duly
elected to govern this country are conducting the
policy of the United States in order to gratify
their appetites is an unworthy insinuation which
reflects no credit on the Foreign Minister of the
Soviet Union.
The next point: "The United States Govern-
ment must not regard so lightheartedly the prov-
ocations that it has initiated in the Far East seek-
ing to spread aggression against China, the region
of the offshore islands included."
The United States has initiated no provocat ions
in the Far East. We are not seeking to spread
aggression against China. We are seeking peace,
and every single statement that President Eisen-
hower has made — and you have all read them —
is proof of that fact.
On page 4 : "Extremely unsightly are today the.
efforts of a group of United States politicians to
close the eyes of the whole world to the existence
of China, to declare 'nonexistent' a great country
which at this very time has entered into a period
of might and prosperous development after the
victory of the popular revolution in China put
an end to the long period of disunity, constant
strife artificially instigated from outside, brutal
foreign exploitation and the ensuing backward-
ness and poverty of the people."
Well, Mr. President, it seems hardly necessary
to say that there are no United States politicians,
there are no Americans in official positions, who
are trying to close the eyes of the world to the
existence of China. We deplore the fact that this
group has taken possession of China, yes, in the
same way that we deplore the group that took
possession of Germany under the Hitler regime.
We can deplore that without being accused of
denying the existence of China. It is because we
value the existence of China that we hold to the
policy that we hold.
We are enemies of foreign exploitation and
backwardness and poverty, and we will match
our record against that of the Soviet Union in
trying to be helpful to people with no strings at-
tached to end that backwardness and end that
poverty.
The next point : "If the United Nations wishes
to deal with reality and not to live in the world
of illusions in whose grip the United States Gov-
ernment has found itself as a result of the failure
9 years ago of its imperialist policy with respect
to China," and so forth and so forth.
Mr. President, we have never had an imperialist
policy with respect to China. I suggest that Mr.
Gromyko read history and read about John Hay
and the Open Door policy of 50 years ago. He
will see to what extent our policy has always been
that of keeping China free from foreign domina-
tion.
The next point : "We are certainly aware of
the fact that the majority of countries espousing
the United States Government's position in the
question of China's representation in the United
Ocfober 73, 1958
587
Nations are doing this only for the reason that
they are under United States pressure."
Isn't that a polite, charming thing to say about
the members of this body who happen out of their
convictions to stand with us ? Isn't that a delicate,
gentlemanly way for one member of a body to
talk to his colleagues? Apparently nobody here
can have an honest agreement with us. If they
vote with us, it is because they are under United
States pressure. There again I say to him he is
confusing our position with his, because his Gov-
ernment operates by pressure, by putting
the screws on people, by intimidating people, by
threatening people. He thinks that is the way we
operate. Mr. President, we could not operate that
way — we do not know how to.
The same thing can be said about this : "The
United States abuses its position, imposing its will
on states which are dependent on it and which
are entangled with a net of military and other
treaties."
He cannot find one state on which we have
imposed our will. He knows very well that it
is on his side that the iron discipline exists. Our
side is voluntary, and he knows that as well as
I do.
Another quotation: "It is not difficult to con-
ceive that those countries which the United States
Government is dragging" — dragging in its wake,
if you please — "compelling them to follow its pol-
icy, feel it as a burden."
I have already commented on that type of ac-
cusation.
Then there is this one here : "Such an illustra-
tion is provided by the consideration at the UN".
General Assembly emergency session of the ques-
tion concerning the withdrawal of American
forces from Lebanon and of British forces from
Jordan and the decision adopted by it."
He cites that as a defeat for the United States.
Well, now, as a matter of fact, Mr. President, we
announced that we were delighted when the 10
Arab countries, under the distinguished leader-
ship of Foreign Minister Mahgoub of the Sudan,
had agreed upon this resolution, which was on all
fours with the resolution which Norway had
sponsored and which we were supporting. We
expressed our great pleasure. I did not call atten-
tion to it at the time because I am a kindly sort of
a man who does not go around looking for an ar-
588
gument, but, as he has brought this up, I will call
attention to the fact that the Soviet Union had to
withdraw its resolution, which called upon us to
withdraw from Lebanon. So they withdrew the
resolution for us to withdraw because they knew
they did not have the votes. So if anybody got a
defeat in that session, it was the Soviet Union.
I quote one more: "The responsibility for fur-
ther delay in solving this question will certainly
continue to rest with the United States Govern-
ment, which inspires and organizes sabotage
against the restoration of the legitimate rights of
China in the United Nations."
I need scarcely say we do not inspire nor do we
organize any sabotage.
Before I take my seat, Mr. President, let me
say that an accusation of the kind which Mr.
Gromyko has just made against the United States
ill becomes the spokesman of a government with
the brutal record of the Soviet Union. I just
heard last week from a very dependable source, a
man who just returned from Eastern Europe, that
the number of people currently escaping from
East Germany to West Germany has reached a
new high of 5,000 persons a week. Now, that is
the argument to end all arguments. That is the
most eloquent testimony to the humane character
of Soviet communism. Whenever they get a
chance to get away from it, they get away from
it.
No, Mr. President, the fact is that the Chinese
Communists are at this moment seeking, by force
of arms and in flagrant contravention of the
United Nations Charter, to conquer territory they
have never possessed. They have fired some
300,000 rounds of high explosive shells at the is-
land of Quemoy. That is in the neighborhood of
three rounds of high explosives for every man,
woman, and child on the island. This barrage
against Quemoy, which was started less than a
month ago, recalls the attempted invasion in Oc-
tober 1949 and the attack against Quemoy in
September 1954. In this latest barrage a thou-
sand civilians have already been killed.
We think that this is not only a further dis-
qualification to be added to the already long list,
insofar as the United Nations membership is con-
cerned; we also think it would justify the United
Nations in taking strong steps against that kind
of behavior. The Chinese Communists are rap-
Department of State Bulletin
idly shooting themselves — and shooting the
world — out of a chance to settle this question as
it should be settled.
I suggest to the representative of the Soviet
Union that, instead of vilifying us, he use what-
ever influence he may have with the group now
in power in Peking — and we can all of us imagine
how great or how small that influence is — to cease
their violent and their murderous activities. 3
U.S. Supports Inclusion
of Item on Hungary
Statement by Henry Cabot Lodge
U.S. Representative to the United Nations 1
The United States strongly supports the in-
scription of this item ["The situation in Hun-
gary"].
The report of the Special Committee on the
Problem of Hungary dated July 14, 1958, 2 re-
veals that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
and the authorities of the present regime in Hun-
gary continue to act in complete defiance — in com-
plete defiance, Mr. President — of the many
resolutions passed in the General Assembly by
overwhelming majorities of the members of the
United Nations. Let me specify :
Armed forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics remain in Hungary to deprive Hun-
gary, in violation of the charter of the United
Nations, of its liberty and political independence
and the Hungarian people of the exercise of their
fundamental human rights;
The present Hungarian regime, imposed forci-
bly on the Hungarian people by and maintained
solely through the pi*esence of Soviet armed
forces, continues its repressive measures against
the Hungarian people and deprives the Hungar-
ian people of the enjoyment of their fundamental
human rights and freedoms.
3 The General Assembly in plenary session on Sept. 23
adopted the resolution recommended by the General Com-
mittee by a vote of 44 to 28, with 9 abstentions.
1 Made in the General Committee on Sept. 17 (U.S. dele-
gation press release 2993) .
2 U.N. doc. A/3849.
The present Hungarian regime, in violation of
its pledged word, continues its policy of brutal
reprisals against leaders and participants in the
national uprising of 1956, including the practice
of secret arrests, trials, and executions so shock-
ingly revealed to the world in the tragic case of
former Premier Imre Nagy, General Pal Maleter,
and their companions. 3
I have just seen a United Press dispatch from
Vienna dated September 16, from which I shall
read.
Four more leaders of the abortive Hungarian revolu-
tion in 1956 have been convicted and sentenced to prison
terms ranging from 3 years to life, reliable sources said
here today.
They were identified as Gabor Tanczos, secretary of the
"Petoefi circle" of intellectuals and writers in Hungary ;
journalists Sandor Haraszti and Gyoergy Fazekas ; and
former secretary of the Budapest Communist Party Com-
mittee Joszef Surec.
The sources said Tanczos was sentenced to life, Faze-
kas to 11 years, Haraszti 8 years, and Surec 3 years.
The trials were understood to have been held in Buda-
pest last week.
Tanczos, Fazekas, and Haraszti were among the group
that sought and was granted political asylum in the
Yugoslav Legation in Budapest after Soviet troops
moved into the Hungarian capital and crushed the revo-
lution on November 4, 1956.
The Russians promised them safe conduct, but arrested
them as soon as they left the legation.
Mr. President, the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics and the present Hungarian regime have
willfully refused to recognize the competence of
the Special Committee on the Problem of Hun-
gary, which was established by resolution 1132
(XI) of the General Assembly 4 and that of the
General Assembly's Special Representative on
Hungary, Prince Wan Waithayakon, who was ap-
pointed by resolution 1133 (XI), and have re-
fused all cooperation with the Special Committee
and the Special Representative.
In these circumstances, the General Assembly
should consider additional measures designed to
secure the withdrawal of Soviet armed forces
from Hungary, bring an end to the present armed
repression, and alleviate the plight of the Hun-
garian people. 5
3 For background, see Bulletin of July 7, 1958, p. 7.
' For text, see ibid., Jan. 28, 1957, p. 140.
' "The situation in Hungary" became item 69 in the
agenda as adopted in plenary session.
October 13, J958
589
G.A. Agrees to Rewording of Item
on Peaceful Coexistence
Current U.N. Documents:
A Selected Bibliography 1
Statement oy Henry Cabot Lodge
U.S. Representative to the United Nations 1
The United States in the General Committee
moved to change the wording of this item so that,
instead of reading "Measures aimed at implemen-
tation and promotion of principles of peaceful
coexistence among States," it reads "Measures
aimed at implementation and promotion of peace-
ful and neighborly relations among States."
We made this motion because it reflects the title
of the resolution which was presented by India,
Yugoslavia, and Sweden last year, and that reso-
lution received unanimous support. We note that
the explanatory memorandum specifically refers
to this resolution and to the development of
friendly relations among nations as a primary
task of the United Nations.
Let me point out that the United Nations Char-
ter states in the preamble that one of the purposes
of the United Nations is for members "to pract ice
tolerance and live together in peace with one an-
other as good neighbors." The promotion of
peaceful and neighborly relations is therefore an
important concern of the General Assembly.
Mr. President, we should not stop at peaceful
coexistence. We should go further and live up to
the full spirit of the charter.
There is not only no shortcoming, to use the
phrase of the representative of Czechoslovakia, in
this language; it is actually more comprehensive.
We feel that this revised phrasing, so that it will
correspond with the action taken by the General
Assembly last year, will contribute to a serious
consideration of measures that might be recom-
mended to member states. We cannot coexist
peacefully, Mr. President, unless we behave peace-
fully and, I might add, justly. 2
1 Made during debate on the agenda in the plenary
session of the 13th General Assembly on Sept. 22 (U.S.
delegation press release 2997).
' "Measures aimed at implementation and promotion
of peaceful and neighborly relations among States" be-
came item 61 in the agenda as adopted in plenary session.
General Assembly
UNREP Executive Committee. Report on a Survey of
Difficult Cases Living Outside Official Camps in Aus-
tria, 1957-1958. A/AC.79/126, July 9, 1958. 59 pp.
mimeo. Note by the High Commissioner. A/AC.79/126/
Add. 1. July i6, 1958. 4 pp. mimeo.
Provisional Agenda of the Thirteenth Session of the Gen-
eral Assembly: Item proposed by Czechoslovakia.
Measures Aimed at Implementation and Promotion of
Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence Among States.
A/3847/ Add. 1. August 19, 1958. 3 pp. mimeo.
Constitutions, Electoral Laws and Other Legal Instru-
ments Relating to Political Rights of Women. Memo-
randum by the Secretary-General. A/38S9. August 20,
1958. 18 pp. mimeo.
Supplementary List of Items for the Agenda of the
Thirteenth Regular Session of the General Assembly.
A/3S94. August 25, 1958. 1 p. mimeo.
Effects of Atomic Radiation. Report of the Secretary-
General on the strengthening and widening of scientific
activities in the field of the effects of atomic radiation.
A/3S64/Add. 1. August 26, 1958. 3 pp. mimeo.
Supplementary List of Items for the Agenda of the
Thirteenth Regular Session of the General Assembly :
Item Proposed by Australia. The Situation in Hun-
gary. A/3875/Add. 1. August 26. 195s. 2 pp. mimeo.
United Nations Emergency Force. Report of the Secre-
tary-General. A/3899. August 27, 1958. 12 pp. mimeo.
Report of the United Nations Good Offices Committee on
South West Africa. Letter to the Secretary-General
from the Chairman of the United Nations Good Offices
Committee on South West Africa. A/3900. August 27,
195S.
:i pp. mimeo.
Report of the Conference of Experts To Study the Possi-
bility of Detecting Violations of a Possible Agreement
on the Suspension of Nuclear Tests. Note by the Secre-
tary-General. A/3S97. August 28, 1958. 39 pp. mimeo.
Request for the Inclusion of an Additional Item in the
Agenda of the Thirteenth Regular Session : Programme
for International Co-Operatiou in the Field of Outer
Space. Letter from the Permanent Representative of
the United States Addressed to the Secretary-General.
A/3902. September 2, 1958. 3 pp. mimeo.
Letter Dated 6 September 1958 From the Acting Perma-
nent Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics to the United Nations Addressed to the Secre-
tary-General. A/3904. September 9. 1958. 9 pp. mimeo.
Adoption of the Agenda and Allocation of Items to Com-
mittees. Memorandum by the Secretary-General.
A/BUR/148. September 11. 1958. 17 pp. mimeo.
Supplementary List of Items for the Agenda of the
Thirteenth Regular Session of the General Assembly:
Item Proposed by Greece. The Question of Cyprus.
A/3874/Add. 1. September 12, 1958. 5 pp. mimeo.
Economic Development of Under-Developed Countries.
Report and Recommendations of the Preparatory Com-
mittee for the Special Fund. A/3908. September 15,
1958. 33 pp. mimeo.
Request for the Inclusion of an Additional Item in the
Agenda of the Thirteenth Regular Session. The Dis-
continuance of Atomic and Hydrogen Weapons Tests.
Letter from the Chairman of the Delegation of the
1 Printed materials may be secured in the United States
from the International Documents Service, Columbia
University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y.
Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents)
may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the
United States.
590
Department of State Bulletin
Union of soviet Socialist Bepnblics Addressed to tbe
- retary-GeneraL A 3915. September 15, 1958. ;> pp.
mimeo.
Ass iciation of Non-Self-Governing Territories With the
European Economic Community. Report of the Secre-
tariat. A, 3916. September 17. 1958. 28 pp. mimeo.
Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories. Offers
of study ami Training Facilities Under Resolution 845
ii\i of 22 November 1954. Report of the Secretary-
General. A/3917. September 17. 1958. 11 pp. mimeo,
with tables.
Economic Development of Under-Developed Countries.
Replies received to an inquiry by the Secretary-General
regarding the extent of willingness of Governments
to contribute to the Special Fund. A 3910. September
is. 1958. 13 pp. mimeo.
Appointment of Members of the Disarmament Commis-
sion. Note by the Secretary-General. A 3913. Septem-
ber IS, 195S. 1 p. mimeo.
TREATY INFORMATION
Educational Exchange Agreement
With United Kingdom
Press release 548 dated September T2
In an exchange of notes at London on Septem-
ber 22 the United Stales and the United King-
dom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
agreed to extend the educational exchange pro-
gram carried out under the Fulbright Act for
another 5-year period. The brief ceremony took
place in the Foreign Office with Ambassador John
Hay Whitney representing the United States and
David Onnsby-Gore, British Minister of State
for Foreign Affairs, representing his country. It
was exactly 10 years ago that the original agree-
ment was concluded under which educational ex-
changes between the two countries were initiated.
This amendment authorizes the expenditure of
British currency equivalent to $5 million during
the next 5 years for exchanges of persons between
the United States and the United Kingdom and
colonial areas for purposes of study, teaching.
university lecturing, and conducting advanced re-
search. It is estimated that this amount v\ill
provide for nearly 3,000 exchanges. Approxi-
mately 0.000 persons have been exchanged follow-
ing the signing of the original agreement and
several amendments to extend the program.
The Fulbright Act. approved in 1946, author-
izes the use of certain foreign currencies owed to
or owned by the United States which are derived
from the sale of war-surplus property for educa-
tional exchanges between the United States and
other countries.
Surplus Agricultural Commodity
Agreement With India
Press release 563 dated September 26
An agreement to finance the sale to India of
$238.8 million worth of U.S. surplus agricultural
commodities under the Agricultural Trade De-
velopment and Assistance Act (P.L. 480) was
signed on September 20 at Washington, D.C. The
agreement was signed, in the presence of officials
from both Governments, by the Acting Secretary
of State. Christian Herter, and H. Dayal, Charge
d'All'aires of India, True D. Morse, Under Sec-
retary of Agriculture, represented the Depart-
ment of Agriculture.
This is the third agreement to be concluded be-
tween India and the United States under title I of
the agricultural surplus disposal authority. Pre-
vious agreements, totaling $425.4 million, were
concluded in August 1956 and June 1958.
The new agreement provides for financing the
sale for Indian rupees of wheat, corn, and grain
sorghums. The agreement also provides that the
Indian rupees accruing under the agreement will
be used for loans to the Indian Government for the
financing of economic development projects, some
grants, and for meeting U.S. expenditures in
India.
This agreement brings to a total of 8004.2 mil-
lion the U.S. surplus agricultural commodities
sold to India under title I of P.L. 4S0.
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Automotive Traffic
Convention concerning customs facilities for touring.
Done at New York, June 4. 1954. Entered into force
September 11. 1957. TIAS 3879.
Ratification deposited: Spain. Angus! 18, I! 58
Customs convention on temporary importation of private
road vehicles. Done at New York June 4. 1054. Entered
into force December 1.".. 1957. TIAS 3943.
Ratification deposited: Spain, August 18, 1958.
Ocfofaer 13, 1958
591
Finance
Articles of agreement of the International Finance Cor-
poration. Done at Washington May 25, 1955. Entered
into force July 20, 1956. TIAS 3620.
Signature and acceptance: Libya, September 18, 1958.
Warfare, Rules of
Convention respecting the laws and customs of war on
land, and annex. Signed at The Hague October 18, 1907.
Entered into force January 26, 1910. 36 Stat. 2277.
Ratification deposited: Dominican Republic, May 16,
1958.
DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE
State Department Reorganizes
Bureau of Inter- American Affairs
BILATERAL
Burma
Agreement providing currency of India, generated under
the agricultural commodities agreement of August 29,
1956, between the United States and India (TIAS 3661),
to Burma for the purchase of textiles in India. Effected
by exchange of notes at Rangoon August 25, 1958.
Entered into force August 25, 1958.
Japan
Agreement relating to Japanese contributions during
Japanese fiscal year 1958 under article XXV of the
administrative agreement of February 28, 1952 (TIAS
2492), for United States services and supplies in Japan.
Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo August 12, 1958.
Entered into force August 12, 1958.
Lebanon
Agreement providing for special assistance on a grant
basis to Lebanon for budgetary support Effected by
exchange of notes at Beirut September 2 and 3, 1958.
Entered into force September 3, 1958.
Mexico
Agreement amending the Memorandum of Understanding
of the provisional air transport agreement. Effected
by exchange of notes at Mexico February 24 and July
28, 1958. Entered into force July 28, 1958.
Thailand
Agreement further amending and extending the agreement
of July 1, 1950, as amended and extended (TIAS 2095,
2809, 3277, and 3740), for financing certain educational
exchange programs. Effected by exchange of notes at
Bangkok September 12, 1958. Entered into force Sep-
tember 12, 1958.
Turkey
Agreement regarding the ownership and use of local
currency repayments made by Turkey to the Develop-
ment Loan Fund. Effected by exchange of notes at
Ankara September 6, 1958. Entered into force Septem-
ber 6, 1958.
United Kingdom
Agreement relating to additional funds to be made avail-
able by the United Kingdom for the continued operation
of the United States Educational Commission in the
United Kingdom. Effected by exchange of notes at
London September 22, 1958. Entered into force Sep-
tember 22, 1958.
Yugoslavia
Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agree-
ments of Januarv 5, 1955, as amended (TIAS 3167, 3253,
and 3446), and January 19, 1956 (TIAS 3486). Effected
by exchange of notes at Belgrade September 10 and 11,
1958. Entered into force September 15, 1958.
The Department of State announced on Septem-
ber 23 (press release 552) that the Bureau of Inter-
American Affairs (AKA) had concluded a re-
organization of its operational structure under
plans drawn up in January of this year following
several months of detailed study and consulta-
tions. Instead of the previous two geographic
offices — Office of South American Affairs (OS A)
and Office of Middle American Affairs (MID) —
there are now four geographic offices responsible
for the conduct of U.S. foreign relations with
the 20 republics of Latin America. The creation
of two additional offices is designed to enable each
office director to concentrate to a greater extent
on his area and to effect closer coordination be-
tween Foreign Service posts and the Department
on significant political, economic, and consular
activities.
The new offices, their areas of responsibility,
and directors are as follows :
Office of East Coast Affairs (EST) — Argentina, Brazil,
Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela— Maurice M. Bern-
baum; Office of West Coast Affairs (WST)— Bolivia,
Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru — Ernest V. Siracusa ;
Office of Central American and Panamanian Affairs
(OAP) — Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Nicaragua, and Panama — C. Allan Stewart ; Office of
Caribbean and Mexican Affairs (CMA) — Cuba, Domini-
can Republic, Haiti, and Mexico — William A. Wieland.
No changes were made in the two offices respon-
sible for regional political affairs (RPA) and re-
gional economic affairs (REA) .
Designations
Edwin M. J. Kretzmann as Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Public Affairs, effective September 21. (For bio-
graphic details, see Department of State press release
556 dated September 24.)
John A. Calhoun as Director, Executive Secretariat,
effective September 29.
Lawrence Koegel as Deputy Executive Director, Bureau
of African Affairs, effective September 29.
Thomas W. McElhiney as Deputy Director, Executive
Secretariat, effective September 29.
592
Department of State Bulletin
October 13, 1958
Index
Vol. XXXIX, No. 1007
American Republics
American Foreign Ministers Discuss Common Prob-
lems i t*'Xt Of communique) 574
State Department Reorganizes Bureau of Inter-
American Affairs 592
Asia. Challenge to Peace in the Far East
(Dulles) 561
Cambodia. Visit of Prime Minister of Cambodia . 577
China
Challenge to Peace in the Far East (Dulles) . . . 561
General Assembly Again Rejects Indian Proposal
To Consider Question of Representation of
China (Lodge) 5S5
ICA Allocates Aid for Civilians on Chinese Off-
shore Islands 576
China, Communist. Foreign Trade: Welfare or
Warfare (Parsons) 566
Department and Foreign Service
Designations (Calhoun, Koegel, Kretzmann, Mc-
Elhiney) 592
State Department Reorganizes Bureau of Inter-
American Affairs 592
Economic Affairs
Challenge to Peace in the Far East (Dulles) . . . 561
Foreign Relations Aspects of Lead and Zinc Prob-
lem (Mann) 583
Foreign Trade : Welfare or Warfare (Parsons) . . 566
President Limits Imports of Lead and Zinc (texts
of letter and proclamation) 579
West Germany's Decision To Limit Coal Imports
Discussed 57S
Educational Exchange. Educational Exchange
Agreement With United Kingdom 591
Germany. West Germany's Decision To Limit Coal
Imports Discussed 578
Hungary. U.S. Supports Inclusion of Item on Hun-
gary (Lodge) 589
India. Surplus Agricultural Commodity Agree-
ment With India 591
International Information. United States and So-
viet Union To Exchange National Exhibits (text
of agreement) 577
Mutual Security
ICA Allocates Aid for Civilians on Chinese Off-
shore Islands 576
NATO : Interdependence in Action (Dulles) . . . 571
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NATO Foreign Ministers To Meet at Washington . 570
NATO: Interdependence in Action (Dulles) . . . 571
Presidential Documents. President Limits Im-
ports of Lead and Zinc 579
Science. Soviet Oceanographic Vessel To Call at
U.S. Ports 578
Treaty Information
Current Actions 591
Educational Exchange Agreement With United
Kingdom 591
Surplus Agricultural Commodity Agreement With
India 591
U.S.S.R.
Soviet Oceanographic Vessel To Call at U.S. Ports . 578
United States and Soviet Union To Exchange Na-
tional Exhibits (text of agreement) 577
United Kingdom. Educational Exchange Agree-
ment With United Kingdom 591
United Nations
Current U.N. Documents 590
General Assembly Again Rejects Indian Proposal
To Consider Question of Representation of
China (Lodge) 585
G. A. Agrees to Rewording of Item on Peaceful Co-
existence (Lodge) 590
U.S. Supports Inclusion of Item on Hungary
(Lodge) 589
Name Index
Calhoun, John A 592
Dulles, Secretary 561, 571
Eisenhower, President 579
Koegel, Lawrence 592
Kretzmann, Edwin M. J 592
Lodge, Henry Cabot 585,589,590
Mann, Thomas C 583
MeElhiuey, Thomas W 592
Parsons, J. Graham 566
Sihanouk, Norodom 577
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: September 22-28
Press releases may be obtained from the News
Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.
Releases issued prior to September 22 which ap-
pear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 538 of
September 15 and 545 of September 19.
Subject
IAEA delegation (rewrite).
New advanced course at Foreign Serv-
ice Institute.
U.S.-U.K. educational exchange agree-
ment.
Soviet oceanographic survey vessel to
call at San Francisco and Honolulu.
Record number of visitors visas.
Mann : "Foreign Relations Aspects of
Lead and Zinc Problem."
Reorganization of Bureau of Inter-
American Affairs.
Adams sworn in as IJC Commissioner.
Coal exporters meet with Under Secre-
tary Herter.
Case of plane crashed in U.S.S.R.
Kretzmann appointed Deputy Assist-
ant Secretary for Public Affairs
(biographic details).
Loan for development project in
Liberia.
April 1959 NATO meeting to be held at
Washington.
Parsons : "Foreign Trade : Welfare or
Warfare."
Dulles : Far East-America Council of
Commerce and Industry.
Auerbach : "The Administration of Im-
migration Laws by the Department
of State and the Foreign Service."
ICA aid to Chinese civilians on off-
shore islands.
U.S.-India agreement on surplus agri-
cultural commodities.
Thai parliamentary group visits U.S.
Visit of Prime Minister of Cambodia.
Dulles : Atlantic Treaty Association.
•Not printed.
tlleld for a later issue of the Bulletin.
No.
Date
f546
t547
9/22
9/22
548
9/22
549
9/22
f550
551
9/23
9/23
552
9/23
♦553
554
9/23
9/23
1555
*556
9/23
9/24
•557
9/24
558
9/24
559
9/25
560
9/25
t561
9/26
562
9/26
563
9/26
*564
56.-,
566
9/26
9/27
9/27
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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
73
■EPOSiTORY
Vol. XXXIX, No. 1008
October 20, 1958
PRESIDENT EXPLAINS PRINCIPLES GUIDING U.S.
POLICY IN TAIWAN AREA. • Exchange of Letters
Between President Eisenhower and Senator Theodore Francis
Green 605
SECRETARY DULLES' NEWS CONFERENCE OF
SEPTEMBER 30 597
NATO AND THE COMMUNIST CHALLENGE • by
Paul-Henri Spaak 607
FOUR POWERS EXCHANGE VIEWS ON THE GERMAN
PROBLEM
U.S. Aide Memoire to Federal Republic, September 30 . . . 613
German Aide Memoire, September 9 614
U.S. Note to U.S.S.R., September 30 615
Soviet Note, September 18 616
ADMINISTRATION OF THE IMMIGRATION LAWS BY
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND THE
FOREIGN SERVICE • by Frank L. Auerbaeh 621
AGENDA OF THE 13th REGULAR SESSION OF THE
U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY 630
For index see inside back cover
THE DEPARTME
Vol. XXXIX, No. 1008 • Publication 6715
October 20, 1958
Boston Public Library
Super n— * «•♦ «* nncomentt
OCT 2 9 1958
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington 25, D.C.
Price:
52 issues, domestic $8.50, foreign $12.25
Single copy, 25 cents
The printing of this publication has been
approved by the Director of the Bureau of
the Budget (January 20, 1958).
Note: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and items contained herein may
be reprinted. Citation of the Department
or State Bulletin as the source will bo
appreciated.
The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the
Public Services Division, provides the
public and interested agencies of
the Government with information on
developments in the field of foreign
relations and on the work of the
Department of State and the Foreign
Service. The BULLETIN includes se-
lected press releases on foreign policy,
issued by the White House and the
Department, and statements and ad-
dresses made by the President and f»y
the Secretary of Slate and other
officers of the Department, as well as
special articles on various phases of
international affairs and the func-
tions of the Department. Informa-
tion is included concerning treaties
and international agreements to
which the United States is or may
become a party and treaties of gen-
eral international interest.
Publications of the Department,
United Nations documents, and legis-
lative material in the field of inter-
national relations are listed currently.
Secretary Dulles' News Conference of September 30
Press release 574 dated September 30
Secretary Dulles: Before we have questions, I
would like to take a moment to call attention to
the speech which Paul-Henri Spaak made in Bos-
ton on Saturday night [September 27] at the meet-
ing there of a group supporting NATO [Boston
Atlantic Assembly]. It was a very important
speech which, unfortunately, was not released to
the press in time to get much attention in the
Sunday morning newspapers. But it really de-
serves consideration because it was a profound
and masterful speech.
There is one paragraph of it I would like to
read. 1
. . . we must assess the magnitude of the challenge
thrown out to us. It must be clearly understood that the
challenge is not that of the U.S.S.R. to the United States.
It is the challenge of the whole Communist world to the
Whole free world, and the countries of the free world
must accept the challenge collectively, in all fields and
everywhere. That is their only chance of winning.
Now if you have questions.
Quotas on Lead and Zinc
Q. Mr. Secretary, before you are bombarded
with questions on Quemoy, I am going to ask you
a relatively mild one. Up in Montreal the Com-
monwealth Trade and Economic Conference,
which was a rather sober affair, had a moment of
excitement when a stinging attack was made by
the Deputy Prime Minister of Australia, Mr. John
McEicen, against the imposition of quotas on lead
and zinc. Were you axoare of that, and what is
your reaction?
A. I am aware of the fact that there is very
considerable dissatisfaction in Australia and Peru
and other countries over the imposition of quotas
on lead and zinc. And the United States is at-
tempting to explain the situation and to alleviate
it. 2
There seems to be an impression that the United
States is trying to thrust upon foreign countries
the entire burden of the imbalance that exists
between current production and consumption of
lead and zinc. That is not the case. What we
are trying to do is to distribute that harden
equitably among the countries of the world.
There was an international conference held in
London to try to deal with that problem. It al-
most succeeded but failed because there were one
or two producing countries which had not gone
along with the international handling of the prob-
lem. So the United States acted unilaterally. It
acted along general lines, however, which seemed
to commend themselves to the majority of the
members of the international conference.
Now it is quite possible that this action may
have had in it some inequities. It had to be taken
rather promptly. But the basic fact is that the
United States is not trying to push onto the rest
of the world all of the burdens involved. This
quota system that we have adopted will still in-
volve the assumption of a very heavy burden in
terms of cutback of production upon the producers
in the United States.
State Department Mail on Offshore Islands
Q. Mr. Secretary, do you think that some sub-
ordinate in the State Department is trying to
sabotage your Formosa-Quemoy policy?
1 For complete text, see p. 007.
October 20, 1958
2 For text of President Eisenhower's proclamation im-
posing import quotas and for an address by Assistant
Secretary Thomas C. Mann on the foreign relations
aspects of lead and zinc, see Bulletin of Oct. 13, 1958,
p. 579 and p. 583.
597
A. That could be a matter of opinion. I would
say this : that I believe that the information given
out was ill-advised — not in what was given out but
what was not given out alongside of it.
You see, this isn't a normal situation. We are
having a very critical negotiation with the Chi-
nese Communists. They are pushing and probing
to find out whether we are weak or whether we are
strong. There is a great likelihood that the fact
that the State Department itself, without any
adequate explanation, gave out information indi-
cating that its policy was not supported by most
of the people who wrote in — that could have had,
and perhaps has had, a very serious effect upon
our negotiations and even a serious effect upon the
issue of war and peace.
I don't think that that aspect of the matter
was adequately taken into account. The fact is
that there is no intention of modifying our policy.
The letters that have come in are interesting and
useful but also difficult to evaluate. But, in my
opinion, in giving out a statement of that sort
there should have been an adequate evaluation
of it and, above all, an indication that that did
not imply that our policy was weakening.
You see, the Soviets, from the standpoint of
their system, could not conceive of the Soviet
Foreign Office giving out a statement of this kind
unless it was designed to foreshadow a change
of policy. And I think the great mistake was
that this was given out in a way which could be,
and probably was, misinterpreted by the Com-
munists as indicating a prospective change of
policy.
And I want to make clear for the benefit — not
of you gentlemen here, because I know you don't
misunderstand these things — (laughter) — but for
the benefit of our Communist associates (I don't
know whether we would call them "associates" or
not) — (laughter) — that this action was designed
to give out what I think was legitimate informa-
tion. But the fact that we did give it out did not
portend in any way a weakening of our policy in
this situation. I think that is very important.
Q. Mr. Secretary, speaking of policy, you have
said on many occasions in the past that, if the Chi-
nese Communists would renounce the use of force
in the Formosa area, it might have a very bene-
ficial effect on negotiations. Does it not logically
follow then that we ourselves have to make a simi-
lar declaration and say that we would not support
any armed operation by the Chiang Kai-sliek gov-
ernment against the Chinese mainland?
A. We obviously believe that, if there was a
renunciation of force, it should be a renunciation
on both sides. We could not expect a unilateral
renunciation of force. It should be on the basis
of and conditioned upon reciprocity.
Q. Mr. Secretary, in connection with these let-
ters a?id public support of your policy, how much
weight do you think in this situation the Govern-
ment should give to public opinion?
A. Well, I think public opinion is always im-
portant because obviously you cannot carry out
effectively a public policy without the support of
public opinion. The question is always present as
to whether the public opinion is sound or not.
Certainly you cannot allow your foreign policy to
be dictated by public opinion. I recall that polls
taken in the winter of '39-'40, I think it was,
showed that 95 percent of the American people
were strongly opposed to the United States getting
into the World War. We all know that public
opinion as indicated by polls and by letters can-
not be the basis of public policy.
And let me, gentlemen, say something about
these letters. Before I came down here, I asked
somebody to give me a handful of them, just
picked at hazard. I would challenge any expert
evaluator who works for Mr. Gallup or some of
these professionals to go through those letters and
decide just are they for or against. Evaluation
of these letters would be extremely difficult.
Most of the letters are letters written by people
who don't want to have a war, that say, "Let's
not get into a war." Well, I can assure you that
there is nobody that is less anxious to have a
war than President Eisenhower is. The question
of how to keep out of war is a much more com-
plicated question, and again that is a matter on
which President Eisenhower, I think, knows as
much as anybody as to how to get into wars and
perhaps how you get out of them. He has had a
very considerable experience in both aspects of
this matter.
There are other people who say, "Don't let's
have a war just on account of Quemoy and
Matsu." Well, we agree with that. We don't
intend to have a war just on account of Quemoy
and Matsu. If that was all there was to it, there
wouldn't be any problem. The problem is, how
598
Department of State Bulletin
do you prevent a retreat at the initial point of a
thrust from gathering a momentum which will
go on from there? That is the problem, and that
is an extremely difficult problem to evaluate. The
impact of that upon the governments and the
thinking of the peoples of Asia is a very, very
difficult problem to evaluate. I am quite sure
that none of the people that write these letters
would claim that they are experts in that phase
of the matter.
U.S. Views on Return of Nationalists to Mainland
Q. Mr. Secretary, in referring to the previous
question on the renunciation of force, is it the
position of this Government that the United
States expects or supports the idea that the Na-
tionalist Chinese Government is someday going
to return to the mainland either by force or some
other means?
A. "Well, that is a highly hypothetical matter.
I think it all depends upon what happens on the
mainland. I don't think that just by their own
steam they are going to get there. If you had
on the mainland a sort of unrest and revolt, like,
for example, what broke out in Hungary, then
the presence of a free China with considerable
power a few miles away could be a very impor-
tant element in the situation. I think that we
would all feel that, if there had been a free gov-
ernment of Hungary in existence within a few
miles of Hungary at the time when that revolt
took place, the situation might have developed
in a different way from what it did.
So I wouldn't want to exclude any possibility
of a situation developing on the mainland of
China, or on parts of the mainland of China,
which might not lead to reunification of some
sort between mainland China, or that part of
mainland China, and the free Government of
China, the Eepublic of China, now on Formosa.
I do not exclude it.
Q. Would that have to he entirely on the
s/ri ni/fh of the Government on Formosa, or is
there any American commitment, explicit or im-
plied, to aid in the kind of situation that you
have described?
A. Xo. There is no commitment of any kind
to aid in that. As I think you know, the only
commitment that there is in this connection is
the agreement involved in the exchange of letters
between the Chinese Foreign Minister and myself
which says that no force will be used from the
treaty areas except in agreement between us. 3
So neither of us is free to use force from the
areas of the treaty against the mainland except,
I think it says, in the case of emergency require-
ments of self-defense. But that exception would
not cover the kind of a situation that you are
speaking of.
Q. Mr. Secretary, if there were a rebellion or
revolt in China, would you expect its leaders to,
if they wanted to, turn over their mandate to
Chiang Kai-shek?
A. Well, I really don't think that is a question
that I can answer very well. It all — it depends
upon the nature of the revolution. I would think
that it would probably be primarily under local
auspices and local leadership. And while outside
cooperation and assistance might be sought, it
would be hypothetical and problematical as to
whether or not it would involve the going back of
Chiang as the head of the government. I don't
exclude that as a possibility. On the other hand,
the situation is so hypothetical at the present
time that it is almost unwise, I think, to try to
guess about it.
Negotiations With Communist China
Q. Mr. Secretary, what is the exact status of
our negotiations in Warsaw?
A. A meeting was held today. I have had no
word on what the outcome of the meeting was.
You know, I think, that the meetings are held
with the understanding on both sides that in-
formation will not be given out as to what trans-
pired at those meetings, and under those circum-
stances I can't give you information as to what
the exact status is.
Q. Mr. Secretary, would you be willing to meet
with Chou En-lai if such a meeting appeared to
offer any prospect of progress toward settlement
of the tensions in the Far East?
A. "Well, President Eisenhower has said that, as
far as he was concerned, there was nothing he
would not do, no place to which he would not go,
if he thought that it would really promote the
prospects of a just and durable peace. Certainly,
1 For test, see ibid., Jan. 24, 1055, p. 152.
October 20, 7 958
599
if that applies to him, it would equally apply to
me. On the other hand, we all, I think, realize
that, while there are sometimes some advantages
in raising the level, there are also disadvantages
in raising the level. It tends to bring matters into
a sharp focus and to a climax. So unless there
is reason in advance to believe that something
positive, constructive, will come out of such a
meeting, it would probably be a disadvantage to
have it.
The meetings at the ambassadorial level can go
on more or less indefinitely. The previous series
of meetings went on for 3 years and perhaps
served a useful purpose in helping to keep the
situation free of hostilities during that period.
These present talks that are now going on at War-
saw have been going on — I forget just how long —
between 2 and 3 weeks, I think. Any meeting at
a higher level, such as the foreign-ministers level,
would have to be a short meeting. The matter
would almost automatically come to a head, to a
climax. Therefore, unless there were reason to
think that something positive would come out of
it, it might do more harm than good, because it
would compel rapid and definitive decisions at
a time when perhaps a slower pace will better
serve the cause of peace.
Q. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned a few minutes
ago an exchange of letters between yourself and
Foreign Minister Yeh in December 1954- l n that
exchange it was agreed that military elements
tohich are the product of joint effort of the two
countries ivould not be removed from the treaty
area without mutual consent. Did we agree, as
President Chiang said yesterday, to the fortifica-
tion of the offshore islands and their buildup?
A. The United States did not feel that it was
sound to make the major commitment of force to
those areas that the Chinese Government wished
to make. In view, however, of the very strong
views of the Eepublic of China, we were acquies-
cent in that. We did not attempt to veto it. The
result is, I might say, one of acquiescence on the
part of the United States, not of approval. Nor
did we attempt to veto it after having used per-
suasion.
Q. Mr. Secretary, you spoke of the Warsaw
talks going on indefinitely, or the possibility of
their going on indefinitely. Does that mean you
do not foresee the crisis in the Far East would go
to the U.N. in any form at any time soon?
A. The talks could go on in Warsaw for a con-
siderable time. I did not use the word "indefi-
nitely" as implying "forever." But they could go
on for some little time. I think if they tended to
break down, or if the situation in the area became
more acute, and if the level of military activity was
substantially raised, that that might be an oc-
casion for bringing the situation to the United
Nations. Of course, as you recall, the view of the
Chinese Communists and, indeed, of the National-
ists, for that matter, is that this is essentially a
civil war and is not properly within the jurisdic-
tion of the United Nations. The Communists
took that same position as regards Korea in 1950
when they came temporarily to the United Nations
and then walked out. They took the same position
in early '55 when the Formosa matter was before
the Security Council. They take the same position
now. Nevertheless, if, as I say, the level of mili-
tary activity increased and the likelihood of a
general war increased with it, I believe that the
matter ought to be brought to the United Nations.
The United Nations is the agency which we have
agreed is the agency which should be called upon
in the event of a real threat to international peace.
I do not think that the situation should be allowed
to deteriorate without at least an effort in the
United Nations.
Q. Mr. Secretary, in that connection the Chinese
Communists are claiming that the United States
supply of sidewinder guided missiles to Nationalist
planes is an act of bad faith while the talks are
going on because it is increasing their military po-
tential. First, is it true that they do have the side-
winders, and, secondly, xvJiat is your view on that
concept?
A. It is true they have the sidewinders. The
sidewinders are nothing that was just injected
into the situation during the Warsaw talks. That
has been a part of the effort on the part of the
United States to train better, to equip better, the
Chinese Nationalist Air Force. If it happens to
coincide with the Warsaw talks that is purely ac-
cidental. If there had not been any Warsaw talks
this would have happened just the same.
Meeting of American Foreign Ministers
Q. Mr. Secretary, some months ago you claimed I
that the United States press was not giving an
adequate picture of the situatio-n in Lathi America.
600
Department of State Bulletin
/ think you said it emphasised the negative and did
not report adequately the positive developments in
the area. Last week there was a conference of
Foreign Ministers which the Latin Americans, at
least, considered as one of the most fruitful talks
in the last 10 years of inter-American relations. 4.
The Department's preparations in handling the
press and informing the press we all thought, I
think, were absolutely inadequate compared to
similar conferences of other areas, and, in fact,
people had to scurry all over town to get second-
and third-hand versions of what you told the con-
ference and of your point of view. I wonder how
you can reconcile this situation.
A. Well, I will tell you this — I know it won't be
popular for me to say it — but I would say one of
the reasons why this conference was such a suc-
cess was that it was understood at the beginning
that nobody was talking for the record. I am
quite sure that, if it had been the kind of a con-
ference where people made speeches that were
going to be publicized and so forth, we would not
have accomplished nearly what we did holding
the conference on an informal basis. I may say
that the Foreign Ministers were, I think, on the
whole amazed that there was so much that could
be actually accomplished, so much practical work
actually gotten under way, within a meeting
which lasted roughly for a day and a half. (The
second half day was a little long; it lasted until
five o'clock.) But we did accomplish a great deal,
and we could not possibly have gotten the accom-
plishments done that we did, I think, if we had
not said at the beginning, "This is going to be an
entirely informal meeting. It is going to be off
the record. People can say anything that is on
their minds, and there is not going to be any rec-
ord kept of what takes place." And there was no
record kept. You know that it is human nature
with all of us that, when there is a record kept,
when speeches are made which are going to be
published in the home papers, and so forth, we all
want to talk quite a bil more than we do when
we are talking where there is no record being
kept.
I believe that the meeting did achieve very ex-
traordinary results in the short span of time,
largely because it was operated on this quite in-
formal basis.
' For an announcement of the meeting and text of the
final communique, see ibid., Oct. 13, 1958, p. 574.
Q. So toould you think that that would make it
impossible to brief the press adequately before-
hand, that is, on a background basis? And I
dorCt think this was done.
A. Well, it would have been very difficult to
have briefed the press in advance about this meet-
ing because, frankly, when we went into it we
didn't know where we were going to come out.
I may say in all frankness that I went into this
meeting with very considerable trepidation. The
auguries were not entirely good. I knew we were
going to make this announcement about lead and
zinc the day before the meeting was held, and I
didn't know what the result of that would be.
Some people are critical of the fact that we made
that announcement just the day before. But I
felt that, as long as the decision had been taken
that we had to go in for quotas, it was more hon-
orable and straightforward to put it on the table
before the meeting took place rather than to keep
it up our sleeve — to have the meeting and then to
pull it immediately after the meeting. But I say
very frankly that I went into the meeting with
trepidation, with worriment as to what would
come out of the meeting. And what came out of
the meeting was nothing that could have been
foreseen. It gathered a momentum as it went
along largely because, as I say, people did speak
with perfect frankness. The Minister of Peru
didn't spare any words at all in what he said
about what he thought about our quotas. We
talked very frankly with each other, and there
was an atmosphere of real comradeship in that
meeting which was quite unusual (laughter) and
which, I think, was an eye opener to all of us.
But we couldn't have briefed all that in advance.
Q. Mr. Secretary, can we go back to the State
Departments mail a minute? I am not sure I
understand your attitude toward the information
which was put out. I think you said, in answer
to the question, that it was a matter of opinion
whether sabotage was involved, but I wasn't clear
whether you think that there was a deliberate at-
tempt, as has been charged by somebody, to under-
cut your policy.
A. Well, you know there is a legal maxim
which says that a person is presumed to intend
the natural consequences of his acts. Now if you
apply that maxim you can impute an intent. But
I think that is very largely a matter of opinion
October 20, 1958
601
which I don't think it is necessary or fruitful for
me to get into. The important thing was some-
thing else and that was made clear by the Vice
President's statement. He said this [sabotage]
aspect of it was relatively unimportant. What
was important was that the information should
have been given out in the way it was, unevaluated,
without being accompanied by any adequate ex-
planation of the reason why it was done and that
it did not imply any intent to weaken our policy.
Q. Mr. Secretary, do you really mean to leave
the impression that someone in the Department
was subversive? I mean do you really feel — /
mean is that your honest opinion? In other words,
if you had no specific evidence that that is true?
A. I don't think that anything I said indicated
that. I certainly did not intend to.
Q. That is what I wanted to know.
Question of Withdrawal of Nationalist Forces
Q. Mr. Secretary, inasmuch as you say you do
not think it was sound for the Nationalist Chinese
to have built up their forces on Quemoy and
Matsu, I would like to ask you if you now think
it would be sound to work out some arrangement
for the withdrawal of those forces from those two
islands?
A. It all depends upon the circumstances under
which they would be withdrawn. I think to with-
draw as a retreat under fire would not be a wise
step to take because of the probable impact of
that upon other peoples, other countries, and upon
the morale, indeed, on Formosa itself.
Q. Would you state, sir, the circumstances un-
der which you think a withdrawal could be
achieved?
A. If there were a cease-fire in the area which
seemed to be reasonably dependable, I think it
would be foolish to keep these large forces on
these islands. We thought that it was rather
foolish to put them there, and, as I say, if there
were a cease-fire it would be our judgment, mili-
tary judgment even, that it would not be wise or
prudent to keep them there.
Q. Mr. Secretary, you seem to emphasize the
need for a dependable cease-fire. Could you tell
us how you can get a dependable cease-fire with
the Communists, whose promises you don't like to
accept?
602
A. That is certainly a fair question and a dif-
ficult one to answer. I believe that promises of
the Communists are never dependable merely be-
cause they are promises. They are only depend-
able if there are unpleasant consequences in case
the Communists break their promises. And I be-
lieve that circumstances could be created where it
would be felt that the consequences of breaking
this promise would be so undesirable to the Com-
munists that we could assume that they would
probably live up to their promise, not because of
the sanctity of the given word — which they do
not believe in — but because of expediency.
Q. Mr. Secretary, would it be necessary for a
cease-fire to be written or unwritten? Could it
be a de facto cease-fire gained simply by the cessa-
tion of shooting without anything being written?
A. I think it could be de facto.
Q. Mr. Secretary, some Senators seem to believe
that the administration is extending the area of
the security treaty with the Republic of China,
and they are recalling that in February when you
went before the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee and said if you had any intention of ex-
tending the area you would return to the Senate.
Is this a proper construction, you think, that is be-
ing put upon our activity there?
A. No, I do not. The situation is that we do
not have any legal commitment to defend the off-
shore islands. We do not want to make any such
commitment. We do not have it today. What
we are acting under is the authority of the joint
resolution, 5 which is equally the law of the land,
which says that, if the President believes that the
defense of those offshore islands is necessary or
appropriate for the defense of the treaty area,
then he can use the forces of the United States
for that purpose. And that is the way it was un-
derstood, and that is the way we want it. I would
say today, if the United States believed that these
islands could be abandoned without its having any
adverse impact upon the potential defense of For-
mosa and the treaty area, we would not be think-
ing of using forces there. It's because there is
that relationship, under present conditions, con-
ditions primarily of the Communists' making, that
there is the tie-in there.
They say this is a push which is designed not
merely to push the Chinese Nationalists out of
' For text, see ibid., Feb. 7, 1955. p. 213.
Department of State Bulletin
Quemoy and Matsu but to push the United States
out of Formosa. And when you have the edge,
the front edge, of a wedge that is driving in, and
where they say they are not going to stop at the
first obstacle but to go on, then you have to decide
whether by allowing the wedge to gather momen-
tum and go on you are strengthening or weaken-
ing the defense of the area you are committed to
defend. That is the problem we have to think
about.
Q. Mr. Secretary, do you see any progress so
far in a little more than 2 weeks of negotiation
and crisis that now has gone on for more than a
month? Do you see any progress at all toward
a peaceful settlement either on an agreed basis or
onade facto basis?
A. I feel that there is a slight tendency toward
a stabilization of the situation, and I feel on the
whole that there is less likelihood of the hostilities
intensifying and enlarging than I thought was
the case a couple of weeks ago.
Q. Mr. Secretary, what do you have in mind
when you say you think the circumstances could
be created which would make breaking a cease-
fire commitment by the Communists unpleasant?
Were you talking about some joint allied commit-
ment for Formosa itself, or something else?
A. I am thinking of sanctions that might be
applied, perhaps by other nations in addition to
the United States. For example, possible trade
sanctions and the like.
Q. Have you made any effort with other nations
to work out something like that?
A. I would not think that what we have done
could be elevated to the role of what you might
call an effort. There have been very widespread
general discussions that have taken place between
me and the Foreign Ministers of 15 or 20 countries
about this whole situation. There are very few
ideas that have not been batted back and forth on
a tentative basis. I would not say that there has
been any real effort to organize such a program
because so far the premise of it does not seem to
be sufficiently likely as to make it worth while.
But we have a good many thoughts in our minds
about such possibilities.
Q. Mr. Secretary, you said that the renunciation
of force, if it occurs, should be reciprocal. Would
you consider that under this reciprocal agreement
would come renunciation by Chiang to intervene
in a Hungarian-type revolt, or would you say that
the reciprocal agreement to renounce force ceases
the minute there is a revolution in China?
A. Well, you see, in Hungary you had, at least
for a time, a government which sought assistance
from outside and which asked the Soviet Union
to withdraw. If there should be a recognized
government in China which called for help, I
would not consider that that involved an armed
intervention in China.
Q. Under Secretary Herter said in a speech
yesterday that the Quemoy and Matsu Islands are
"not defensible in the defense of Formosa''' and
that the Chinese Nationalists'' very devotion to
them is "almost pathological.''' Do you subscribe
to those views?
A. I didn't hear the first sentence that you read.
Are not defensible ?
Q. Are not defensible in the defense of Formosa.
It is phrased rather awkwardly, but it is a direct
quote.
Q. In the New York Times it says, "not strate-
gically defensible in the defense of Formosa?' 1
A. "Well, I don't like to comment on isolated
quotations from a speech. I'd rather see what the
full text said. I'm not familiar with it.
Q. Mr. Secretary, you said twice at the outset
this morning that the United States policy has
not changed. Yet during the course of the news
conference you have seemed to clarify at least
two major points that, so far as I know, have not
been publicly clarified by the Department before,
to wit: the reciprocal aspect of renunciation of
force and the fact that the United States con-
sidered it foolish to build up military force on
the islands and that under certain circumstances
they should be withdrawn. If these two points
are major and important, as they seem to be, why
haven't they been expressed publicly before?
A. Well, there is nothing really new in our atti-
tude on either of those propositions. I think, if
you will go back, for example, to study the record
of our prior talks with the Chinese Communists,
we have assumed that the renunciation of force
should be reciprocal if it occurs and that it would
be obviously quite impractical and quite wrong to
ask the Chinese Communists to abandon use of
force if they were being attacked by the Chinese
Ocfober 20, 1958
603
Nationalists. I might say that when we speak
about renunciation of force it has always been a
renunciation of force except for purposes of self-
defense. Perhaps I did not make that clear
before. So that if anybody is attacked, then the
renunciation of force would, of course, not apply.
Q. Mr. Secretary, is it fair to say that, while
United States policy has not changed as of now,
there is a possibility of some important changes,
provided there is some give on the Chinese Com-
munist side?
A. Yes, I would say so. Our policy in these re-
spects is flexible and adapted to the situation that
we have to meet. If the situation we have to meet
changes, our policies change with it.
Question of Taiwan Situation as "Civil War"
Q. Mr. Secretary, the Chinese Communists say
that to renounce force in what they considered an
internal affair is practically to renounce sover-
eignty and is tantamount, if one considered an
American example, to renouncing the right of the
United States Government to use, say, troops in
Little Rock to prevent disorder. Is there any toay
that you think you could put this renunciation
of force so that the Chinese Communists do not
feel they are thereby renouncing their claim on
Formosa?
A. Well, we have always made clear that re-
nunciation of force, except for self-defense, on
a reciprocal basis did not involve a renunciation
of claims. You have comparable situations, I
might say, all around the world. This is not a
unique situation. In Korea, Viet-Nam, India,
Pakistan, and Indonesia you might say that cer-
tain governments claim that a territory held by
others is rightfully theirs. They could claim that
to take it is purely a civil-war operation.
Now you have got to use, you might say, a rule
of reason in trying to decide whether, in fact, a
situation is a civil war or whether it involves a
threat to international peace. And the Com-
munists, as you know, made the argument in the
case of Korea that that was purely a civil war,
an effort by the north Koreans to reunite their
country, that they had a right to do it, and that
the United Nations and the United States were
aggressors when they came in there to stop this
effort of the Korean people to reunite their own
country. Similar positions could be made in the
case of other countries. You could say if the
Federal Republic of Germany tried to reunite
Germany that it was a civil operation. But none
of us treat it that way.
You have a very practical situation to take
into account, which is, will it, in fact, involve
world peace ? When you apply that test, I think
there is no possible doubt but what this effort to
take not just the offshore islands but Formosa
and the Penghu Islands (the Pescadores) that
that will involve world peace.
Here you have the Chinese Communists, with
a treaty alliance with the Soviet Union, making
these claims, and the Soviet Union saying they
are prepared to back them up to the hilt. Here
you have the Republic of China, which has a
treaty of collective self-defense with the United
States, which we are prepared to live up to. Now
when those two forces come to clash, nobody in
his senses could say, "This is purely a civil war
and doesn't affect international peace." It does.
And therefore it is properly a matter to be dealt
with from the standpoint of international peace
and the welfare of the world. You cannot treat
it purely as a civil-war matter. You can say,
"Well, the United States should stop helping the
Nationalists, and the Soviet Union should stop
helping Communist China," That is quite im-
practical. As far as we can tell, every plane,
every piece of artillery, and practically all the
ammunition that is being shot there today is of
Soviet origin.
Q. Mr. Secretary, Chiang Kai-shek yesterday
made statements about a cease-fire and the im-
portance of Quemoy and Matsu which xoould
seem to be quite different from some that you
have made here this morning. My question is:
Have you discussed your ideas about the cease-fire
and possible withdrawal of the bulk of the forces
from Quemoy and Matsu with the Nationalist
Chinese?
A. Yes. We keep in pretty close touch with
each other. We express our views. I wouldn't
want to imply that they accept our views. And
we don't accept their views in all respects, just
as they don't accept ours. But we have a friendly
exchange, and I think that, if it ever came down
to a point where it was important practically to
carry out these things, we would find a way to
agree. At least I hope so.
Q. Thank you, sir.
604
Department of State Bulletin
President Explains Principles
Guiding U.S. Policy in Taiwan Area
Following is an exchange of letters between
President Eisenhower and Senator Theodore
Francis Green, chairman of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, together with a statement
released by Senator Green on October 5.
PRESIDENT EISENHOWER TO SENATOR GREEN
White House press release dated October 4
October 2, 1958
Dear Senator Green : I acknowledge your let-
ter of September twenty-ninth with reference to
the situation in the Far East. I note that you
are concerned that the United States might be-
come involved in hostilities in defense of Quemoy
and Matsu; that it does not appear to you that
Quemoy is vital to the defense of Formosa or the
United States; that in such hostilities we would
be without allies, and, finally, that military in-
volvement in the defense of Quemoy would not
command that support of the American people
essential to successful military action.
Let me take up these points in order:
1. Neither you nor any other American need
feci that the United States will be involved in
military hostilities merely in defense of Quemoy
or Matsu. I am quite aware of the fact that the
Joint Resolution of Congress (January 29, 1955),
which authorized the President to employ the
armed forces of the United States in the Formosa
area, authorized the securing and protection of
such positions as Quemoy and Matsu only if the
President judges that to be required or appro-
priate in assuring the defense of Formosa and the
Pescadores. 1
I shall scrupulously observe that limitation
contained in the Congressional authority granted
me.
2. The Congressional Resolution had, of course,
not merely negative but positive implications. I
shall also observe these. I note that it does not
appear to you that Quemoy is vital to the defense
1 For background and text of resolution, see Bulletin
of Feb. 7, 1055, p. 211.
Ocrober 20, 1958
of Formosa or the United States. But the test
which the Congress established was whether or
not the defense of these positions was judged by
the President to be required or appropriate in
assuring the defense of Formosa. The Congres-
sional Resolution conferring that responsibility
on the President was adopted by almost unani-
mous vote of both Houses of the Congress. Since
then the people of the United States reelected me
to be that President. I shall, as President and
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of
the United States, exercise my lawful authority
and judgment in discharging the responsibility
thus laid upon me.
I welcome the opinions and counsel of others.
But in the last analysis such opinions cannot
legally replace my own.
The Chinese and Soviet Communist leaders as-
sert, and have reason to believe, that if they can
take Quemoy and Matsu by armed assault that
will open the way for them to take Formosa and
the Pescadores and, as they put it, "expel'' the
United States from the West Pacific and cause
its Fleet to leave international waters and "go
home."
I cannot dismiss these boastings as mere bluff.
Certainly there is always the possibility that it
may in certain contingencies, after taking ac-
count of all relevant facts, become necessary or
appropriate for the defense of Formosa and the
Pescadores also to take measures to secure and
protect the related positions of Quemoy and
Matsu.
I am striving to the best of my ability to avoid
hostilities; to achieve a cease-fire, and a reason-
able adjustment of the situation. You, I think,
know my deep dedication to peace. It is second
only to my dedication to the safety of the United
States and its honorable discharge of obligations
to its allies and to world order which have been
assumed by constitutional process. We must not
forget that the whole Formosa Straits situation
is intimately connected with the security of the
United States and the free world.
3. You say that in the event of hostilities we
would be without allies "in fact or in heart." Of
course, no nation other than the Republic of China
has a treaty alliance with us in relation to the
Formosa area. That is a well known fact — known
to the Congress when it adopted the Formosa
Joint Resolution and known to the Senate when
605
it approved of our Treaty of Mutual Security
with the Kepublic of China. But if you mean
that the United States action in standing firm
against armed Communist assault would not have
the approval of our allies, then I believe that you
are misinformed. Not only do I believe that our
friends and allies would support the United States
if hostilities should tragically, and against our
will, be forced upon us, I believe that most of them
would be appalled if the United States were spine-
lessly to retreat before the threat of Sino-Soviet
armed aggression.
4. Finally, you state that even if the United
States should become engaged in hostilities, there
would not be "that support of the American people
essential to successful military action."
"With respect to those islands, I have often
pointed out that the only way the United States
could become involved in hostilities would be be-
cause of its firm stand against Communist at-
tempts to gain their declared aims by force. 1
have also often said that firmness in supporting
principle makes war less, rather than more, likely
of occurrence.
I feel certain, beyond the shadow of a doubt,
that if the United States became engaged in hos-
tilities on account of the evil and aggressive
assaults of the forces of Communism, the Ameri-
can people would unite as one to assure the success
and triumph of our effort.
I deeply deplore the effect upon hostile forces of
a statement that if we became engaged in battle,
the United States would be defeated because of
disunity at home. If that were believed, it would
embolden our enemies and make almost inevitable
the conflict which, I am sure, we both seek to avoid
provided it can be avoided consistently with the
honor and security of our country.
Though in this letter I have explained the facts
and the principles that guide the government in
dealing with the critical Formosa Straits situa-
tion, I cannot close without saying that our whole
effort is now, and has always been, the preserva-
tion of a peace with honor and with justice. After
all, this is the basic aspiration of all Americans,
indeed of all peoples.
Inasmuch as there have been public reports on
the essence of your letter, I feel I should make this
reply public.
With great respect and best wishes,
Sincerely,
Dwight D. Eisenhower
606
STATEMENT BY SENATOR GREEN, OCTOBER 5
On receipt of the President's reply dated October 2,
1958, to my letter to him of last September 29, 1 am making
public my letter so that the opposing points of view may
be compared.
It is worth noting, however, that during the past week
both the President and Secretary Dulles have shown a
more realistic attitude than before toward the situation
in the Far East. This is encouraging and may be attribut-
able in part to various expressions of the kind to which
I have given voice.
There has been widespread public concern lest our posi-
tion in the Far East has been too aggressive and I wel-
come the President's letter which shows a more realistic
present approach to the problems in that area.
SENATOR GREEN TO PRESIDENT EISENHOWER
September 29, 1958
Deak Mb. President : There are many indications of a
real danger that the United States may become involved
in military hostilities in defense of Quemoy and Matsu.
These indications comprise newspaper reports from the
Far East, communications which I have received from
very many Americans, dispatches from friendly nations
throughout the world, as well as concern expressed pub-
licly by many prominent Americans well informed in the
field of foreign policy, and your own statements to the
American people.
Recently I have expressed my own views stating that
"it does not appear to me that Quemoy is vital to the
defense of either Formosa or the United States". I have
suggested that military action in the area should not be
ordered unless you, Mr. President, are sure beyond any
reasonable doubt that the security of Formosa itself is in
fact directly threatened. Subsequent to your address of
September ll, a I proposed that if there is danger of mili-
tary involvement in this area — a danger which you indi-
cated existed — Congress should be called immediately into
session.
The purpose of this letter, Mr. President, is to bring
to your attention my deep concern that the course of
events in the Far East may result in military involve-
ment at the wrong time, in the wrong place, and on issues
not of vital concern to our own security, and all this
without allies either in fact or in heart. Furthermore,
it is my impression, confirmed by the press and by my
own mail, that United States military involvement in
defense of Quemoy would not command that support of
the American people essential to successful military ac-
tion.
My decision to send this letter to you has involved a
great deal of soul-searching on my part. At one point,
I seriously contemplated calling the Committee on For-
eign Relations back to Washington so that it might meet
with cabinet members to learn fully the nature of our
possible involvement. That course was rejected for the
present because I felt such a public act might interfere
1 Ibid., Sept. 29, 1958, p. 481.
Department of State Bulletin
with the conduct of negotiations in which your represent-
atives are now engaged. I also contemplated the advisa-
bility of seeking in advance of this letter the consensus
of views of the members of the Committee so that our
joint views might be brought to your attention. But
that action was rejected because it would be time con-
suming and because of the possibility that such action
might be construed as a political maneuver.
It is not my intention to make this letter to you public
at this time. I am sending copies of it, however, to each
member of the Committee on Foreign Relations with the
thought that he may wish to provide you independently
with his views, particularly with reference to those I have
set forth in this letter. I am sending a copy also to Sen-
ator Lyndon Johnson.
With respect and deep concern, I remain
Sincerely yours,
Theodore Francis Green
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations
NATO and the Communist Challenge
by Paul-Henri Spaak
Secretary General, North Atlantic Treaty Organization-
NATO lacks many things for it to be a perfect
organization. What is chiefly lacking is the con-
fident backing of public opinion which, aware of
the importance of its role, is determined to give
NATO its active support.
It is because the main purpose of your Associa-
tions is to fill this gap that they are so important.
That is why I have made a point of being with
you today and why I am happy to be able to
share with you my cares and hopes.
I intend to be quite frank with you, to explain
tilings as I see them and to set out before you
what I believe to be the sum of nearly 10 years
of existence and accomplishment. However, as
time is short, I shall have to cut out the details
and confine myself to the basic outline, to the
main features of what we have done.
Atmosphere of 1949
In the first place, in order to get the picture
into perspective, we must try to recapture the
atmosphere of 1949, the year of the signing of
the Washington Treaty, the year which saw the
birth of the Atlantic Alliance.
The situation of the free world, and especially
of Europe, was far from brilliant at the time.
We had by no means recovered, financially and
economically, from the effects of the war. True,
the Marshall plan, which saved Western Europe
from poverty and communism — although this is
1 Address made before the Atlantic Treaty Association
at Boston, Mass., on Sept. 27.
now too often forgotten by so many ungrateful
people — had become a reality and, since the spring
of 1948, had even begun to operate ; but its results
were necessarily patchy, and many of the ruins
still had to be rebuilt.
The political event of the moment was the
Prague coup d'etat, the consummation of Soviet
policy. This policy, a combination of internal
subversion and external pressures, had enabled
the U.S.S.R. to add several thousands of square
miles to its territory in the space of a few years,
to bring under its jurisdiction, and against the
will of those concerned, several millions of human
beings, and to set up, in the Balkans and Eastern
Europe, minority governments completely sub-
servient to its wishes.
The Communist coup d'etat in Czechoslovakia
marked a turning point in the postwar foreign
policy of the Western World.
Until then, many well-meaning people in
Europe, and probably in the United States as well,
had hoped for a reasonable compromise between
the Communist world and the free world which
would preserve the alliance that had made the
victory over the Nazis and Fascists possible.
So as to be able to follow this course — no doubt
a wise one seen in the light of the prevailing cir-
cumstances in those days — the West had made
many concessions and proved its evident good will.
The historian of the future will perhaps add "and
displayed too much weakness."
Be that as it may, the Western World reacted
at last and did so in time to prevent the worst.
Ocfofaer 20, 1958
607
One year after the Prague coup d'etat the Wash-
ington Treaty was signed. Its main purpose was
to put a stop to the expansion of Soviet impe-
rialism and to achieve this purpose without having
to resort to war.
Although I have said this so many times be-
fore, I wish to repeat, if possible with added em-
phasis, that this purpose has been achieved 100
percent.
No one can believe that, if communism, after
its many spectacular successes between 1919 and
1948, has made no further progress for now 10
years, precisely since the day when the Western
powers joined forces, it is a mere coincidence. No,
the credit for this must be given to NATO. That
is why, whatever its defects and shortcomings —
and as we shall see, they exist — all free men should
be deeply grateful to the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization for having served the cause of free-
dom so well and for having so successfully de-
fended the independence of the democratic coun-
tries of Europe.
"In that case," you may say, "why continue
your talk ? Why attempt to add anything to such
a satisfactory balance sheet? Are you not well
satisfied to be the Secretary General of an organ-
ization that has fully achieved its main purpose?
What more can you want?"
I must now take the plunge and speak of my
worries and anxieties.
Reappraisal of NATO's Task
This is the moment to ask a vital question : Is
NATO, with its present composition, spirit, and
machinery, still the right answer to the threat
which communism represents for the free world?
Let me explain. In 1949, as I have already
said, the Communist threat was essentially Euro-
pean and military. In 1958 I see it as more par-
ticularly Asian and African and as more economic
and social than military.
I can put the idea differently: Is it sufficient,
at the present time, to construct a solid military
barrier along the Elbe, on the eastern frontier
of the free world, if the free world is to be out-
flanked politically, militarily, and economically in
the Middle East and Africa? In other words:
Has the time not come for a reappraisal of NATO
to adapt it to what is obviously the new plan of
campaign of the Communist offensive?
608
To my mind, when certain dates are lined up,
their special significance becomes apparent:
4th April 1949 : Signing of the Washington
Treaty establishing the Atlantic Alliance.
12th May 1949: End of the Berlin blockade.
October 1949 : End of the civil war in Greece,
marking the end of the Communist offensive in
Europe.
25th June 1950 : Invasion of south Korea. This
major event marks the preliminary stage of the
period in which we are still living today. There
is a displacement of the center of international
difficulties. It is no longer in Europe. The Far
East and the Middle East take first place in our
worries, soon to be followed by Africa.
Can we still afford, nowadays, to maintain atti-
tudes, however excellent, which are beginning to
be outdated ? We adopted them 10 years ago, and
this is a fast-moving world.
Very fortunately, the Washington Treaty and
the organization which issued from it have one
outstanding quality: a degree of flexibility that
provides for the possibility of almost endless
adaptations.
Look at what the North Atlantic Treaty Organ-
ization is today : not only the most powerful mili-
tary alliance known to history but also an inter-
national political council, the like of which has
never before been seen ; a secretary general, a com-
mander in chief, two routine ministerial meetings
every year, a council of 15 ambassadors in perma-
nent session in Paris, a military standing group
in Washington, a military command for Europe
with its numerous subdivisions, a naval command
for the Atlantic, another for the Channel. This
entire formidable organization has come into be-
ing as the result of the following five rather
loosely worded lines of article 9 of the treaty :
The Parties hereby establish a council, on which each
of them shall be represented, to consider matters con-
cerning the implementation of this Treaty. The council
shall be so organized as to be able to meet promptly
at any time. The council shall set up such subsidiary
bodies as may be necessary ; in particular it shall estab-
lish immediately a defense committee. . . .
This, I think, justifies my claim that the North
Atlantic Treaty is sufficiently flexible to adapt
itself to all conceivable contingencies and shows
that those who have to interpret or implement it
have sufficient imagination to find in its text all
Department of State Bulletin
they need in order to cope with even the most
recent eventualities.
Understanding the Communist Threat
I believe it to be essential, before we define our
new positions, to make sure that we thoroughly
understand the problem we have to solve, by
which I mean that we must correctly assess the
nature and magnitude of the Communist challenge
sent out to the free world and to its civilization.
I am astounded to see that in Europe, at all
events, there are still so many people who do not
understand the first thing about communism, its
reality, its hopes, and its ambitions. To a lot of
people the Communists are no more than political
extremists. What frightens and shocks a great
many of them are the economic changes and so-
cial reforms accomplished in the U.S.S.E. and
the satellite countries.
To my mind, this is quite the wrong attitude
to adopt. Personally, I do not shrink from any
social reform. On the contrary, I am convinced
that one of the peremptory requirements of our
times is the emergence of a form of society in
which the weak will be protected and will find
acceptable living conditions, in which all will
have equal opportunities and the "elite" will really
consist of the most intelligent, the most indus-
trious, and the most talented.
As for economic doctrines — the virtues of free
enterprise compared with those of a planned
economy — I must confess that, although I find
the controversy extremely interesting and useful
sometimes, I cannot bring myself to believe that
this is an issue worthy of violent passions and
that the world should divide, quarrel, and, worst
of all, go to war to insure the triumph of one or
other of these theories.
This, however, is not all. There is something
far more important, something far more funda-
mental.
Communism aspires to be a new form of civili-
zation. "What it wants to do is to bring the
world — or rather, to impose on it — a new concep-
tion of man, of his rights and duties, of his
relationship to other men, to society, and to the
state. This conception marks a very evident
backward movement away from what it has taken
such long and patient efforts to build up over
centuries of struggle and sacrifice.
While we, for our part, are doing our best — ■
though possibly not always with complete suc-
cess — to infuse a moral character into our private
lives and into our institutions as well as to follow
principles calculated to make a reality of "re-
spect of the individual," the core of Western
civilization — while we, for our part, are doing
our best to safeguard human freedom and to
shape society with that end in view, communism
proposes a formula the outstanding features of
which are the most extreme form of intolerance,
blind obedience, political dictatorship.
There lies the true cause of the opposition be-
tween the free world and communism. This is
the measure of the magnitude of the struggle and
of its vital significance for the future of mankind.
Communism, moreover, views its role as uni-
versal in scope. On the basis of a somewhat ele-
mentary theory of historical fatalism and a de-
pressing materialism, it reasons that its victory
is inevitable, that, to quote the proud, if rather
childish, boast of the Communists: "It is borne
forward by the current of history," that its tri-
umph is certain.
From these assertions, which I believe to be as
sincere as they are false, there are several con-
clusions to be drawn.
In the first place, there is little likelihood that
those who profess such doctrines will take the risk
of starting a world war which, whatever its final
outcome, would leave in its wake such an accumu-
lation of ruins as to retard for several dozens of
years the achievement of their hopes. W^e must
therefore not be unduly alarmed by their threats.
Our policy must, of course, never be aggressive or
unjust, but neither must it reflect any weakness
which would be regarded as an expression of fear.
Recent history has shown only too clearly that
the systematic appeasement of dictators leads to
the most harrowing experiences. Such a lesson
must not be lost. We must therefore pursue our
military effort, for, although it imposes a heavy,
costly burden on us, it is essential, not as a means
of intimidation but as a guaranty against threats
and blackmail.
But, above all, before we decide what action to
take, we must assess the magnitude of the chal-
lenge thrown out to us. It must be clearly under-
stood that the challenge is not that of the U.S.S.R.
to the United States. It is the challenge of the
whole Communist world to the whole free world,
and the countries of the free world must accept
October 20, J 958
609
the challenge collectively, in all fields and every-
where. That is their only chance of winning.
NATO's Changing Role
The concept of a military Atlantic Alliance re-
stricted to a specific geographical area, adequate
in 1949, is therefore no longer so in 1958. A com-
mon policy, probably of worldwide scope, must
be added to it. And this must be done at once.
Another thing which should be done as quickly
as possible is the organization of scientific co-
operation, and even economic and social action
should be harmonized. In a word, the Atlantic
Alliance should become the Atlantic Community.
Where do we stand today? What is the posi-
tion as regards these important projects?
Let us face it. We still have a long way to go.
What has been achieved with respect to economic
cooperation within NATO is definitely not
enough.
It is true, of course, that in Europe great
strides have been made with the assent and ef-
fective help of the United States and Canada,
and thanks to the Organization for European
Economic Cooperation, the European Payments
Union, the European Coal and Steel Community,
the Common Market, and EURATOM, and soon,
perhaps, to the Free Exchange Area. Although
these great strides have been made, I still do not
consider that they fully meet the requirements
though they augur well for the future. However,
within NATO, in the wider Atlantic framework,
article 2 of the treaty, in spite of all the declara-
tions to which it has given rise, is still practically
a dead letter.
I see yet another glimmer of hope: the start
made with scientific cooperation and some encour-
aging progress in the production in common of
the modern weapons.
The need and urgency of scientific cooperation
were the subject of a stirring announcement made
by President Eisenhower and Mr. Macmillan at
the end of last year. 2 Their bold appeal was not
made in vain. NATO now has a scientific adviser,
and the science committee, composed of very emi-
nent men, has held several sessions. A number of
modest schemes have been launched : summer semi-
nars, scholarships, and fellowships. This is all to
the good, and it is a promising start but is frankly
inadequate.
Carry your minds back to the humiliating
astonishment with which the West was struck
when the first sputnik soared into outer space.
Do you remember the despondency and even the
fear — in reality very unjustified — that gripped
certain people at that time ?
Neither the United States sputnik nor the ex-
ploits of the Nautilus must lead to the abandon-
ment of the pooling of our efforts which only a
few months ago was declared by our most respon-
sible thinkers to be a vital necessity.
Give us your support to prevent the initial
impetus from tailing off.
Political Cooperation
In the political field, I am pleased to say that
far better results have been obtained.
The Three Wise Men had told us: "For your
foreign policy, consult together." 3
I can give you an assurance that we have taken
this advice, that we have put it into practice, and
that consultation is now very comprehensive and
very thorough. The general public has no con-
ception of the progress NATO has made in this
respect during the last 12 months.
Take the preparation of the proposed summit
conference, for instance. I can tell you today
without disclosing any official secrets that,
throughout the past year, the United States Gov-
ernment did not send the Soviet Government a
single note on the proposed summit conference
without first submitting it to the NATO Perma-
nent Council.
The Government of the United States deserves
special mention in this connection — and it is a
point I wish to underline — because of all the
countries in our alliance it is the one which has
most consistently and most widely applied the
principle of prior consultation. It has not been
content with giving a fairly general indication of
its intention but has accepted to submit the actual
text of its notes to its allies for study and, if con-
sidered necessary, for criticism.
You will, I am sure, realize that this is an
innovation, even a revolution, in diplomatic prac-
tice. It is really extremely significant that the
most powerful nation in the world should accept
this form of consultation and adopt the new prac-
tice of inviting even the smallest of its allies to
3 Bulletin of Nov. 11, 1957, p. 739.
610
3 For text of the report of the Committee of Three on
Non-Military Co-operation in NATO, see ibid., Jan. 7,
1957, p. 18.
Department of State Bulletin
discuss with it on a footing of complete equality
matters of mutual interest, and that in the vast
majority of cases it should take account of sug-
gestions it receives. This is of cardinal impor-
tance if the alliance is to live and develop. If
successful, this practice may well be the beginning
of something very important and very new.
This is a gratifying prospect but would perhaps
not be an unmixed blessing.
Why is this? Because the practice of consulta-
tion as we know it has revealed to us its limitations.
When the Three Wise Men told us to "consult to-
gether," what they certainly meant was : "Consult
together so as to reach agreement."
It must be acknowledged that, although we
have followed the method advocated, we have not
always achieved the desired end.
Putting this experiment into practice has been
an exciting experience for me. It has convinced
me that the idea for which I have striven to gain
acceptance over the last 10 years is sound and
workable. It is this : International organizations
will not be really successful and produce all the
results which can legitimately be expected of them
until all their member countries, large and small,
accept some measure of supranational control.
It is not right that, because one nation is head-
strong, thinskinned, or obstinate, the combined
wisdom of the others should be set at nought.
True, I am well aware that this idea is probably
still in advance of the times. It does not fit in
with what governments and possibly their peoples
are prepared to accept. However, I do not despair
of its ultimate triumph and of its lasting benefit
to the security of the Western community. You
have only to measure the progress already achieved
in the fields of cooperation and mutual under-
standing, you have only to think of the many
things inconceivable only a few years ago and
which have now become realities, to realize that
there are no grounds for discouragement or
skepticism. Quite the contrary.
Ladies and gentlemen, have I succeeded in show-
ing you the number and magnitude of the questions
which face the Atlantic Alliance? I hope so.
I fully sympathize with those of you who, while
recognizing the importance of our organization,
see it as a strictly military one and take a greater
interest in the efforts made elsewhere. NATO,
however, must remain a powerful military ma-
chine, and it is our duty, and not always an easy
October 20, 1958
484031— BS 8
one, to explain why the effort needed for this must
be made.
But even today NATO is a great deal more than
this. It is the very center of the most significant
diplomatic innovation ever attempted and is not
only creating new methods but even a new spirit
where the relations of nations to each other are
concerned.
If the experiment in progress is crowned with
success, the West will present a very different ap-
pearance, for the individualism, the national sel-
fishness, perhaps wholly admirable in the past but
which are out of harmony with our own times, will
make way for new concepts: agreement, mutual
aid, cooperation, the common good.
If we can successfully accomplish this revolu-
tion by and for ourselves, we can without fear or
hesitation accept the great challenge which, under
the name of "peaceful coexistence," is, in fact, a
struggle between two civilizations.
First to safeguard, reaffirm, and consolidate —
and then make effective down to the last details and
the ultimate issues — the ethical principles of
Christianity and the political principles of the
great Western revolutions which, on both conti-
nents, have permitted the rise of democracy:
There is the task history has entrusted to the men
of today.
It is a mighty and magnificent task. The At-
lantic Alliance is the most useful and powerful
instrument for its accomplishment.
U. S. Officials in Europe
Hold Regional Conference
Press release 567 dated September 29
In keeping with the general Department of
State practice of holding regional conferences
periodically, ambassadors and other officers from
the U.S. missions at Copenhagen, Dublin, Hel-
sinki, London, Moscow, Oslo, Ottawa, Reykjavik,
and Stockholm will meet at London from October
6 to 8 with Loy W. Henderson, Deputy Under
Secretary of State, C. Burke Elbrick, Assistant
Secretary of State for European Affairs, and
other U.S. officials for a general exchange of
views on matters of current interest.
Among others who will attend are Robert H.
Thayer, Special Assistant to the Director of the
Bureau of Intelligence and Research; William
611
Clark, Assistant Director, U.S. Information
Agency; and Frederick E. Nolting, Jr., Deputy
U.S. Representative to the North Atlantic Council.
President Sends Congratulations
to General de Gaulle
White House press release dated September 30
The White House on September SO made pub-
lic the following message from the President to
Gen. Charles de Gaulle, President of the Council
of Ministers of the Republic of France.
September 29, 1958
Dear Mr. President: As an old friend of
France, I extend my personal congratulations to
you on the outcome of the referendum on the new-
French Constitution. To me the decisive result
recorded by yesterday's voting is not only an out-
standing success for yourself but also a most in-
spiring development for France. The outcome
is greatly encouraging to France's friends
throughout the world. For me it demonstrates
the determination of the French people to build
anew for the future.
Please accept, General, my heartfelt congratu-
lations and best personal wishes.
Sincerely,
Dwtght D. Eisenhower
ANZUS Council Meets
at Washington
Following is the text of an agreed announce-
ment released at the close of a meeting of the
ANZUS Council at Washington on October 1.
Press release 577 dated October 1
A meeting of the ANZUS Council was held at
Washington October 1, 1958. Australia was rep-
resented by The Right Honorable Richard G.
Casey, Minister for External Affairs; New Zea-
land was represented by The Right Honorable
Walter Nash, Prime Minister and Minister of
External Affairs ; and the United States was repre-
sented by The Honorable John Foster Dulles,
Secretary of State.
The Ministers reviewed events over the last
year which were of interest and concern to the
three countries. They agreed that militant and
subversive Communist expansionism remains the
greatest threat to the peaceful progress of the
free world. The Ministers expressed their satis-
faction with the opportunities presented by this
meeting to strengthen further their close relation-
ships in matters affecting the maintenance of in-
ternational peace and security.
The Council noted that the Southeast Asia
Treaty Organization, to which all three nations
adhere, continues to grow in its capacity to pro-
mote the security and well-being of the peoples
of the countries of Southeast Asia.
The members of the ANZUS Council have dis-
cussed the Chinese Communist attacks on the
Quemoy and Matsu islands and threats to seize
Taiwan. They agreed that the resort to force
and threat of force constitute a serious menace
to the peace of the area and is a matter in which
they are therefore deeply concerned.
The representatives of Australia and New Zea-
land, noting that the United States is now en-
gaged in bilateral negotiations with the Chinese
Communists in Warsaw in an effort to resolve
the crisis and arrive at an arrangement whereby
its recurrence might be avoided, affirmed their
resolution to support the bringing of these nego-
tiations to a peaceful conclusion. They joined
the United States in calling on the Chinese Com-
munists at once to discontinue their attacks on the
Quemoy and Matsu islands in the interests of the
peace of the area and as a first step to a peaceful
settlement.
They hold that, regardless of the merits of
claims and counter-claims, the use of aggressive
force is a violation of the basic principle on which
world order depends. Armed force should not
be used to achieve territorial ambitions.
The delegations also included, for Australia:
The Honorable Howard Beale, the Ambassador to
the United States ; Lieutenant General Sir Henry
Wells, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff;
Air Marshal Sir Frederick Scherger, Chief of Air
Force Staff; Mr. J. Plimsoll, Assistant Secretary,
Department of External Affairs. For New Zea-
land: Mr. G. D. L. White, Charge d'Affaires ad
interim, New Zealand Embassy; Major General
C. E. Weir, Chief of the General Staff; and Mr.
A. D. Mcintosh, Secretary of External Affairs.
For the United States : Mr. Walter S. Robertson,
612
Department of State Bulletin
Assistant Secretary of State; Mr. G. Frederick
Bernhardt, Counselor, Department of State;
Mr. John W. Irwin II, Deputy Assistant Secre-
tary of Defense; and Admiral Harry D. Felt,
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific.
Letters of Credence
Ethiopia
The newly appointed Ambassador of Ethiopia,
Zaude Gabre Heywot, presented his credentials
to President Eisenhower on September 30. For
texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the Presi-
dent's reply, see Department of State press release
570.
Republic of China
The newly appointed Ambassador of the Re-
public of China, George Kung-chao Yeh, present-
ed his credentials to President Eisenhower on
September 30. For texts of the Ambassador's
remarks and the President's reply, see Department
of State press release 571.
Visit the United States
of America Year, 1960
A PROCLAMATION 1
Whebeas travel is an important element in the develop-
ment of greater international understanding and thus
tends to promote international peace ; and
Whereas visitors from other lands have traditionally
found in the United States a friendly welcome from a
people whose primary concern is for peaceful accomplish-
ments in their economic, social, and cultural life ; and
Whereas the citizens of this Nation are desirous of
sharing with our world neighbors the pleasure and ad-
venture of visiting our country and of viewing its natural
beauties, its cities and villages, and its historic shrines ;
and
Whereas special preparations are being made by both
private and public agencies to encourage and facilitate
travel to and within the United States during the year
1960:
Now, therefore, I, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER,
President of the United States of America, do proclaim
the year 1960 as Visit the United States of America Year ;
and I request the appropriate officials of the Federal Gov-
ernment and of the several States, Territories, possessions,
and municipalities of the United States to cooperate in
the preparation for, and observance of, that year.
I also urge business, labor, agricultural, educational,
and civic groups, as well as the people of the United States
generally to observe 1960 as Visit the United States of
America Year with exhibits, ceremonies, and other ap-
propriate activities designed to forward the purpose of
promoting international understanding and world peace.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and
caused the Seal of the United States of America to be
affixed.
Done at the City of Washington this twenty-sixth day
of September in the year of our Lord nineteen
[seal] hundred and fifty-eight, and of the Independence
of the United States of America the one hundred
and eighty-third.
By the President :
John Foster Dulles,
Secretary of State.
Four Powers Exchange Views
on the German Problem
Following are two exchanges of correspondence
on the German problem,, one between the United
States and the Federal Republic of Germany and
the other between the United States and the Soviet
Union.
U.S. AIDE MEMOIRE TO FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
GERMANY, SEPTEMBER 30 '
Press release 572 dated September 30
The Embassy of the U.S.A. has been instructed
to inform the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs
as follows :
The Government of the United States refers to
the Aide Memoire of the Federal Government of
September 9, 1958, which draws attention to a
resolution passed by the German Federal Parlia-
ment and endorsed by the German Federal Coun-
cil. This resolution calls for the establishment
of a Four Power group composed of representa-
tives of the powers responsible for solution of the
German problem with a mandate to prepare joint
proposals for the solution of the German problem.
It also suggests that the group envisaged would
be set up either at a future international con-
ference of Heads of Government or independently
thereof.
1 No. 3258 ; 23 Fed. Reg. 7619.
October 20, 1958
1 Identical notes were delivered on Sept. 30 to the
Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the U.S., U.K.,
and French representatives at Bonn.
613
The Government of the United States notes that
the Government of the Federal Eepublic shares
the desire expressed in the resolution of the
German Legislature and that it hopes that this
group will study proposals concerning the re-
establishment of German unity and carry out the
preparatory work necessary for final negotiations
to be held at a later date.
The Government of the United States welcomes
the initiative of the Federal Government. As the
latter is aware, the German problem is an im-
portant element in the proposals put forward by
the Western Powers to the Soviet Government on
May 28 2 for an agenda for a meeting of Heads
of Government. The preparatory talks in Mos-
cow for such a meeting, mentioned in the Federal
Republic's Aide Memoire, have been in suspense
since the end of May because of the Soviet Govern-
ment's failure to reply to the Western proposal of
May 31 3 for overcoming the procedural difficulty
caused by the divergence in the Soviet and West-
ern sets of agenda proposals. Additional efforts
to obtain a response, made by the Western Powers
on July 1 4 and August 22, 6 have also so far been
to no avail.
The Western Powers continue to hold that a
summit meeting would be desirable if it would
provide opportunity for serious discussions of
major problems and if it would be an effective
means of reaching agreement on significant sub-
jects. The Government of the United States hopes
that the Soviet Government will now reply to the
Western proposal so that the preparatory talks
which would cover the important question of
Germany, may continue. At the same time, in
view of the crucial importance of the settlement
of the German problem to the relaxation of world
tensions, the Government of the United States is
also prepared to discuss the German problem in
a separate Four Power group to be set up in ac-
cordance with the desire of the Federal Govern-
ment expressed in its Aide Memoire of Septem-
ber 9.
The Government of the United States has con-
stantly sought to bring about the creation of a
' Bulletin of July 7, 1958, p. 12.
' Ibid., p. 16.
' For an exchange of correspondence between President
Eisenhower and Premier Khrushchev, see ibid., July 21,
1958, p. 95.
" For texts of U.S. and Soviet notes, see ibid., Sept. 22,
1958, p. 462.
freely-elected all-German Government which
would be truly representative of the German
people and which could conclude a peace treaty.
Until such a Government is created the continued
division of Germany maintains a situation in
which a segment of the German people is forced
to suffer the oppression of a regime imposed on it
from without.
For a long time, efforts to resolve German ques-
tions have been thwarted by the refusal of the
Soviet Government to agree to any plan which
would make reunification possible in a way which
would insure the freedom of the whole German
people. Once a freely-elected all-German Govern-
ment truly representative of the German people
has been created, it would be possible to proceed
with such a Government to the conclusion of a
peace treaty. The Government of the United
States is informing the Soviet Government of its
support of the initiative of the Federal Republic
and urging the Soviet Government to give it
favorable consideration.
GERMAN AIDE MEMOIRE, SEPTEMBER 9»
The German Federal Parliament (Bundestag) at its
meeting July 2, 1958, unanimously passed the following
resolution, which was endorsed by the German Federal
Council (Bundesrat) at its meeting July 18, 1958:
In order to promote the reestablishment of German
unity, the Federal Government is herewith directed to
request the four powers, France, the Union of Socialist
Soviet Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United
States, to set up, either at a future international con-
ference (summit conference) or independently thereof, a
four-power group (at least at the level of an ambassadors'
conference) with a mandate to prepare joint proposals for
the solution of the German problem.
The Federal Government shares the desire expressed in
the Bundestag resolution, that a group of the four powers
responsible for the solution of the German problem be set
up either at a future international conference (summit
conference) or independently thereof. It hopes that this
group will study proposals concerning the reestablishment
of German unity, and carry out the preparatory work nec-
essary for final negotiations to be held at a later date.
In compliance with the mandate given to it by the
Bundestag and the Bundesrat, and in view of the talks
in preparation for an international conference which have
been taking place in Moscow between representatives of
the four powers responsible for the reunification of
" Identical aide memoire were delivered on Sept. 9
to the U.S., U.K., French, and Soviet representatives at
Bonn.
614
Department of State Bulletin
Germany, the Federal Government begs to direct the
attention of the Government of the United States of Amer-
ica to the desire expressed in tie above resolution.
U.S. NOTE TO U.S.S.R., SEPTEMBER 30 '
Press release 573 dated September 30
The Embassy of the United States of America
presents its compliments to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics and on instruction of its Government
has the honor to state the following:
The United States Government wishes to refer
to the Soviet Government's note of September 18.
It regrets that the Soviet note ignores the pro-
posals made by the Government of the Federal
Republic of Germany, which were contained in an
Aide Memoire of September 9 addressed to the
Governments of France, the Soviet Union, the
United Kingdom and the United States. These
proposals, based on an unanimous resolution of
the German Federal Parliament which was en-
dorsed by the German Federal Council, also called
for the establishment of a Four Power group to
discuss the German problem. The United States
Government observes that instead, the Soviet note
is based on proposals made by the so-called "Gov-
ernment of the German Democratic Republic".
The United States Government fully shares the
view expressed in the Soviet Government's note
that "no one has the right to deprive the German
people for such a long time of the opportunity to
enjoy all the advantages of a state of peace".
It also notes with satisfaction the statement that
the Soviet Government is "in favor of a funda-
mental settlement of the German question". It
is well known to the Soviet Government that this
has long been the aim of the United States
Government. It is sufficient to recall the opening
words of the Berlin Declaration which was made
by the Governments of France, the Federal Re-
public of Germany, the United Kingdom and the
United States on July 29, 1957 : 8
Twelve years have elapsed since the end of the war
in Europe. The hopes of the peoples of the world for
the establishment of a basis for a just and lasting peace
have nevertheless not been fulfilled. One of the basic
reasons for the failure to reach a settlement is the
T Identical notes were delivered on Sept. 30 to the Soviet
Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the U.S., U.K., and French
Embassies.
8 Bulletin of Aug. 19. 19.">7. p. 304.
October 20, J 958
484031—58 4
iiintinued division of Germany, which is a grave in-
justice to the German people and a major source of
international tension in Europe.
The United States Government agrees that, as
stated in the Soviet note, 4t the conclusion of a
peace treaty with Germany would finally draw
the line below the last war", and that the German
people should themselves participate in the prep-
aration of such a treaty. An essential prerequi-
site for the negotiation of a peace treaty is, how-
ever, the creation of a Government which truly
reflects the will of the German people. Only a
Government created on such a basis could under-
take obligations which would inspire confidence
on the part of other countries and which would be
considered just and binding by the people of
Germany themselves. Moreover, German repre-
sentatives at any discussions about a peace treaty
which were held in advance of the reunification
of Germany would, as the Soviet Government
must be aware, have no power to commit a future
all-German Government to any of the conclusions
reached. For these reasons, the United States
Government considers that the first task in any
discussion of the German problem must be the
reunification of Germany and the formation of
an all-German Government by means of free
elections.
On the method by which such Government
should be formed, the United States Government
finds the proposals in the Soviet Government's
note both unrealistic and unsatisfactory. Accord-
ing to these proposals, the question of the reuni-
fication of Germany is to be left to a commission
composed of representatives of the Federal Re-
public and the Soviet Zone. The regime estab-
lished in the Soviet Zone of Germany does not
represent the will of the people of Eastern Ger-
many. It is rightly regarded by the people of all
parts of Germany as a regime imposed by ;>
foreign power and maintained in power by foreign
forces. Since his regime has no mandate from
the people it purports to speak for, it would vio-
late any genuine concern for the interests of the
German people to allow such a regime to partici-
pate in any discussions involving their future
Government.
In the Directive issued by the Four Heads of
Government at Geneva in 1955, 9 the Soviet Gov-
" Ibid., Aug. 1, 1955, p. 170.
615
eminent .recognized its responsibility for the re-
unification of Germany. The Directive provides
inter alia: "The Heads of Government, recogniz-
ing their common responsibility for the settlement
of the German question and the re-unification of
Germany, have agreed that the settlement of the
German question and the re-unification of Ger-
many by means of free elections shall be carried
out in conformity with the national interests of
the German people and the interests of European
security". The United States Government cannot
accept that the Soviet Government has the right
unilaterally to evade this responsibility or this
agreement. In accordance with its similar re-
sponsibility the United States Government, in
conjunction with the Governments of France and
the United Kingdom, has on many occasions put
forward proposals designed to achieve the restora-
tion of German unity. These Western proposals
recognize the right of the German people to de-
termine their own way of life in freedom, to de-
termine for themselves their own political,
economic and social system, and to provide for
their security with due regard to the legitimate
interests of other nations. They provide for the
exercise of this right through the holding of free
elections throughout Germany, the establishment
of an all-German Government, and the negotia-
tion with this Government of the terms of a peace
treaty.
The Government of the United States is ready
at any time to enter into discussions with the
Soviet Govermnent on the basis of these proposals,
or of any other proposals genuinely designed to
insure the reunification of Germany in freedom,
in any appropriate forum. It regards the solu-
tion of the German problem as essential if a last-
ing settlement in Europe is to be achieved. This
problem has been included as one of the subjects
which the Western Powers put forward on May
28 for examination at a conference of Heads of
Government. Although the Soviet Government
agreed that preparations for such a conference
should be made between representatives of the
Four Powers in Moscow, these preparations have
been in suspense since the end of May because of
the Soviet Government's failure to reply to the
Western proposals of May 31 for overcoming the
procedural difficulty caused by the divergence in
the Soviet and Western sets of agenda proposals.
The further Western communications of July 1
and August 22 have so far also remained un-
answered. Since the Soviet Government has in-
dicated in its note that it, too, attaches importance
to the solution of the German problem, the United
States Government hopes that the Soviet Govern-
ment will now reply to the Western proposal so
that the preparatory talks may continue.
In the interests of making progress on this sub-
ject, the Government of the United States is, how-
ever, prepared to discuss the German problem in
a separate Four Power group to be set up in ac-
cordance with the desire of the Federal Govern-
ment expressed in its Aide Memoire of September
9. The purpose of the group would be to discuss
proposals connected with the German problem and
to carry out the preparatory work necessary for
final negotiations to be held at a later date either
at a conference of Heads of Govermnent, if one
can be arranged, or otherwise.
The Govermnent of the United States hopes
that, in view of the importance of settling the
German problem, not only for the German people
but also as a contribution towards the relaxation
of tension in Europe, the Soviet Government will
agree to the procedure set out above.
A copy of the United States Government's re-
ply to the Federal Government's Aide Memoire of
September 9 is attached. The United States Gov-
ernment is also informing the Federal Govern-
ment of the terms of this note.
SOVIET NOTE, SEPTEMBER 18'°
Unofficial translation
The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics presents its compliments to the Government of
the United States of America and considers it necessary
to transmit the following for its information.
On 5 September of this year the Soviet Government
received the note of the Government of the German Dem-
ocratic Republic in which disquiet is expressed in con-
nection with the impermissibly delayed preparation of
a peace treaty with Germany. In the note a proposal
is advanced about the urgent creation of a commission
of representatives of the four great powers whose tasks
would be the carrying out of consultations about the
preparation of a peace treaty with Germany. As the
Government of the G.D.R. communicated, notes to the
same effect were addressed also to the Governments of
the United States of America, Great Britain and the
10 Identical notes were delivered on Sept. 18 to the
U.S., U.K., and French Embassies at Moscow.
616
Department of State Bulletin
French Republic. Moreover, the G.D.R. Government
made it known that it simultaneously proposed to the
Government of the F.R.G. to create a commission of rep-
resentatives of both German states which would examine
from a German point of Tiew all questions connected
with the preparation of a peace treaty with Germany.
According to the proposal of the G.D.R. Government,
this commission will occupy itself also with questions
relevant to the competence of the two German states,
connected with the creation of a united peace-loving
democratic Germany.
Taking into account that the question about preparing
a peace treaty is that part of the German problem for
the decision of which all states which participated in
the war, and in the first place the four great powers,
bear responsibility, the Soviet Government would like
to express to the Government of the U.S.A. its consid-
erations regarding the proposals advanced by the Gov-
ernment of the G.D.R. so that in the nearest future it
might be possible to undertake joint steps in the interest
of a peaceful settlement with Germany. The statement
of the G.D.R. Government points out how acutely the
German people feel that abnormal situation which al-
ready in the course of 13 years has been preserved in
Germany as result of the absence of a peace treaty with
this country. It is a new reminder to the great powers
on whom lies the main responsibility for a peaceful set-
tlement with Germany about the need at least to fulfill
their duty before the German people. The proposal of
the G.D.R. Government about the creation of a commis-
sion of representatives of the four powers and also of
a corresponding German commission for the preparation
of a peace treaty with Germany takes into account the
concrete conditions which have arisen up to the present
and opens the way for a practical solution of this long
since matured problem.
The Soviet Government being an advocate of the basic
solution of the German question has repeatedly come
out in the past with proposals, directed toward an ur-
gent conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany, which
unfortunately have not at that time met support on the
part of the Western powers. Recently it once more
advanced this question in connection with the prepara-
tion for the convocation of a summit meeting consider-
ing it necessary to examine this as one of the important
problems of the agenda of such a meeting.
The indisputable fact is evident to all that the ab-
sence of a peace treaty with Germany leaves open many
questions which profoundly disturb the whole German
people and affect important interests of the other Euro-
pean peoples who took part in the war with Germany,
including the interests of their security. No one has
the right in the course of such a long time to deprive
the German people of a possibility of enjoying all the
benefits of a peaceful situation, all the more since the
solution of analogous questions in connection with all
the countries drawn into the war on the side of Hitlerite
Germany has long since been a passed stage.
The conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany would
finally draw a line under the past war and its heavy
consequences for the European peoples and would un-
doubtedly have important significance for reducing ten-
sion and guaranteeing security in Europe. At the same
time it would permit the guarding from any outside
interference the internal development of Germany and
the restoring in full measure of its sovereignty and inde-
pendence. Germany would be placed in all relations in
a position of equality with other states and would receive
access to the U.N. The working out of the draft of a
peace treaty, which would define the political and eco-
nomic conditions of the development of Germany and its
military status, is dictated also by a real need to give
the German people clear perspectives for the development
of Germany in the future.
In supporting the initiative of the Government of the
German Democratic Republic, the Soviet Government
has also in mind that the preparatory work's concluding
a peace treaty with the participation of the Govern-
ments of both German states would facilitate a rap-
prochement between them and the unification of their
efforts for the purpose of restoring the state unity of
Germany.
The Soviet Government hereby informs the Govern-
ment of the U.S.A. that it has notified the G.D.R. Gov-
ernment about its agreement with its proposal to create
a commission of representatives of the four powers with
the aim of carrying out consultations about preparing
a peace treaty with Germany.
It also supports the idea of the creation of a commis-
sion of representatives of both German states and de-
clares its readiness to render any aid for the activity
of such a commission. The Soviet Government expects
that the Government of the United States of America,
in accordance with the obligations lying on it in connec-
tion with the peaceful settlement with Germany, also
will support the said proposals of the Government of
the G.D.R. and will adopt the necessary steps for their
realization. The Soviet Government would be grateful
to the Government of the U.S.A. for the receipt in a
short time of its considerations on the question touched
upon.
Notes of identical content have been addressed by the
Soviet Government also to the Governments of Great Brit-
ain and Prance.
U.S. Views on Recent Soviet Testing
of Nuclear Weapons
Following is the text of a Department an-
nouncement released to the press on September 30
{press release 575).
We have learned that two nuclear explosions
occurred today in the Soviet Union.
On March 31 the Soviet Union, having then
completed an intensive series of atomic weapons
tests, announced that it would discontinue further
testing but reserved the right to resume if the
United States and the United Kingdom should
Ocfober 20, 1958
617
continue testing. 1 It was known at the time that,
in accordance with normal planning, the United
States and the United Kingdom series of tests
would shortly begin.
It was suspected at that time that the Soviet
announcement was primarily a propaganda ex-
ercise and that there was no real intention to
suspend testing. This now seems to be confirmed
by the event.
Despite the foregoing the United States expects
that negotiations for safeguarded nuclear test sus-
pension will begin in Geneva on October 31 as
scheduled. 2 Unless the Soviet Union holds fur-
ther tests after negotiations have begun, the
United States remains prepared to withhold
further testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons
for a period of 1 year from the beginning of the
negotiations on October 31.
U.S. Confers With U.S.S.R.
on Case of Crashed Plane
U.S. NOTE OF SEPTEMBER 21
The Embassy of the United States of America
presents its compliments to the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics and has the honor to refer to the Min-
istry's note No. 57/OSA of September 19, 1958, 3
in reply to the Embassy's note No. 270 of Sep-
tember 13, 1958, 4 and to communicate the follow •
ing on instructions from its Government :
The Ministry's note fails to furnish any
information regarding eleven members of the crew
of the American C-130 transport aircraft which
crashed 55 kilometers northwest of Yerevan on
September 2, 1958. The clearly established fact
that this aircraft crashed in Soviet territory com-
pels the Government of the United States of
America again to request full information re-
garding the whereabouts and condition of the
eleven crew members unaccounted for.
1 Bulletin of Apr. 21, 1958, p. 646.
2 For an exchange of notes between the United States
and the Soviet Union, see Hid., Sept. 29, 1958, p. 503.
3 Not printed here.
* For text, see Bulletin of Oct. 6, 1958, p. 531.
The Embassy notes that the Soviet Government
is prepared to transfer to a representative of the
American authorities the remains of six members
of the crew of the crashed American airplane. In
requesting that this transfer take place as soon
as possible, the Embassy reiterates the importance
of establishing the identity of the victims of this
crash. It is, therefore, requested that there be
delivered the remains of these persons as found
and all material which will assist in establishing
their precise individual identification. Such ma-
terials should include military identification tags,
parachutes, personal effects, clothing and personal
flying equipment and all fragments thereof.
In requesting the full cooperation of the Soviet
Government in facilitating the identification of
the dead airmen, the Government of the United
States of America emphasizes the humanitarian
considerations which must be recognized in this
situation. Since September 2 the families of the
seventeen members of the crew of the missing air-
craft have received no information concerning the
individual fates of their close relatives. The
Ministry's notes of September 12 and September
19 made no attempt to relieve the anxiety of these
families by communicating information available
to the Soviet Government regarding the identity
of the six persons whose remains have been re-
covered.
The Government of the United States, there-
fore, hopes and expects that the transfer of these
remains and all materials which will facilitate
identification will be effected without delay and
requests that the Embassy promptly be notified
of the place and tune the transfer will take place.
DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT OF
SEPTEMBER 23
Press release 555 dated September 23
The Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs has in-
formed the American Embassy at Moscow that
the remains of six members of the crew of the
U.S. Air Force plane which crashed 55 kilometers
northwest of Yerevan, Armenian S.S.R., would
be turned over to American authorities at the
Turkish-Soviet border near Leninakan, Armenian
S.S.R., at 5 : 00 p. m. Moscow time on September
24, 1958.
The American Charge d'Affaires at Moscow has
informed the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs
618
Department of State Bulletin
that the U.S. air attache stationed at the Ameri-
can Embassy at Ankara, Turkey, would receive
the remains. The air attache planned to fly to
Erzerum, Turkey, on September 23 and to drive
from there to the border near Leninakan to re-
ceive the remains on September 24.°
Recent Austrian Legislation
on War Damage and Restitution
Press release 568 dated September 29
The Department of State has received informa-
tion about recent Austrian legislation with respect
to war damage and restitution which may be of
interest to American citizens and other residents
of the United States who were Nazi persecutees
or sustained damage to property in Austria dur-
ing World War II and the postwar occupation
period. This information is summarized below.
Restoration of Life Insurance Policies
The Austrian Parliament enacted a law con-
cerning the restoration of life insurance policies
which were confiscated in Austria by the German
Reich between 1938 and 1945. The law specifies
the amounts which will be payable to the bene-
ficiaries of the confiscated insurance policies.
Claims for the restoration of the policies should
be filed immediately with the insurance company
in Austria which issued the policy, referring to the
Regelung vom Deutschen Reiche eingezogener
Anspruche aus Lebensversicherungen. Claims
must be filed not later than June 30, 1959.
Restoration of Pensions
Arrangements have been made by the Austrian
authorities for the restoration of pension rights,
retroactive to May 1, 1950, of former employees
of the Austrian Social Insurance Institutes and
Austrian municipalities if the pension rights were
suspended in the course of Nazi persecution.
Persons entitled to the restoration of such pension
rights should file their claims with the Austrian
Social Insurance Institute or municipality where
they were formerly employed.
* Col. John S. Chalfant, U.S. air attache^ took delivery
of six coffins near Kars at 5 p. m. Moscow time Sept. 24.
Tax Exemption for Persecutees
A decree was issued by the Austrian Govern-
ment granting exemption from the Austrian occu-
pation cost tax on property to former Nazi per-
secutees if they were nationals of one of the
United Nations on July 27, 1955, when the Aus-
trian State Treaty entered into force. Claims for
exemption from this tax should be filed with the
finance office in Austria where the property is
located or the tax was paid.
Compensation for Confiscated Furniture and
Equipment
An Austrian war damage and persecution law
grants limited compensation to qualified persons
for ordinary household furniture and furnishings
and for the equipment necessary for the practice
of a profession, the following of a trade, and the
operation of a business enterprise, if such property
was lost or damaged as the result of war activities
or confiscated in the course of Nazi persecution.
Claimants whose income in 1955 exceeded the
amount specified in the law do not qualify for
compensation, and certain payments already made
out of Austrian Government funds are applied
against any compensation which might otherwise
become payable under the law. Claims under this
law must be filed not later than June 30, 1959,
with the Finanzlandesdirektion (district finance
office) in Austria for the district where the prop-
erty was located at the time of seizure or loss, mak-
ing reference to the Eriegs und Verfolgungs-
sachschaedengesetz. Claims must be filed on the
official forms prepared by the Austrian Govern-
ment, which will be obtainable at the Austrian
Embassy in Washington and the Austrian con-
sulates in New York, Chicago, Detroit, Portland,
San Francisco, Los Angeles, Dallas, Miami, At-
lanta, Memphis, and Cleveland after October 10,
1958. The forms will also contain information
concerning the laws.
Occupation Damage Law
Austrian legislation now makes provision for
compensation for certain property damage caused
by the occupation powers after September 11,
1945, providing the owners have not already re-
ceived compensation for such damage from the
Austrian Government or one of the former occu-
pation powers. Claims for compensation must
October 20, J 958
619
be filed not later than June 30, 1959, with the
Finanzlandesdirektion (district finance office) in
Austria for the district where the property was
located at the time of damage, making reference
to the Besatzungsschaedengesetz.
German Federal Restitution Law
Persons who sustained losses due to an unlawful
taking by certain German entities of tangible and
intangible identifiable property outside West Ger-
many, which property was subsequently sent into
West Germany or Berlin, are reminded that
claims for compensation for such property under
the German Federal Restitution Law must be filed
with the German authorities not later than
December 31, 1958. Claims for compensation
under the German Federal Restitution Law for
such property, which was confiscated in Austria
but can no longer be found, should be filed with
the German authorities even if a claim with re-
gard to the property has already been filed with
the Austrian authorities.
The Austrian authorities will cooperate in fur-
nishing available information to claimants about
any transfer to West Germany or Berlin of any
property confiscated in Austria during the Nazi
regime. The Finanzlandesdirektionen in Austria
will frequently be able to furnish a statement as
to whether property confiscated in Austria was
sent to West Germany or Berlin. Requests for
such information should be addressed directly to
the Finanzlandesdirektion (district finance office)
for the area where the property was located at
the time of the confiscation or to the bank or
other institution where the property was depos-
ited.
U.S. and Ghana Sign Agreement
on Investment Guaranty Program
Press release 581 dated October 2
The United States and Ghana have reached an
agreement to institute the investment guaranty
program of the International Cooperation Ad-
ministration in Ghana and thus encourage the in-
vestment of private American capital in the
economic and industrial development of the new
West African nation.
Ghana became the 38th country to enter into
the U.S. investment guaranty program when the
agreement was signed on September 30 at Accra
by Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah for Ghana
and Charge dAffaires Peter Rutter for the United
States.
Under the agreement the U.S. Government will
offer two types of guaranties to cover new invest-
ment of private American capital in business en-
terprises in Ghana. The first type is a guaranty
that investors will be able to convert Ghanaian
local currency receipts from new investments in
Ghana into U.S. dollars. The second type offers
insurance against losses which may result from
expropriation or confiscation.
The guaranties are available for new invest-
ments of cash, commodities, patents, or services
made by U.S. individuals or firms in countries
participating in the program. The investor pays
a small premium, usually one-half of one percent
for each type of insurance. In all countries,
guaranties totaling almost $300 million have been
issued since the program was authorized by the
Congress of the United States in 1948. There
are currently applications of several hundred mil-
lion dollars pending.
620
Department of State Bulletin
Administration of the Immigration Laws by the Department of State
and the Foreign Service
by Frank L. Auerbach
Assistant Director, Visa Office 1
An alien in the immigration process has usually
two, sometimes three or even four, procedural
contacts with the United States Government.
First, he applies abroad to an American consul
for a visa. If issued, the visa permits him to
apply at a port of entry to the Immigration and
Naturalization Service for admission to the
United States. Once admitted to the United
States he may become involved in deportation
proceedings before the Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service. If he desires to become a
citizen of the United States, he will petition a Fed-
eral or State court. Corresponding to the alien's
increasingly closer ties with the United States,
each of these steps is surrounded with additional
procedural safeguards for the alien. The four pro-
cedures develop from visa proceedings, subject
only to internal administrative scrutiny, to natu-
ralization proceedings in which the United States
becomes a party before the courts. I am to discuss
with you the first of these procedures, the consular
visa procedure.
The role played by the Secretary of State and
American consular officers in the issuance and re-
fusal of visas to aliens is one of the least under-
stood administrative functions carried out under
the provisions of our immigration laws. I am
grateful for the invitation to address this dis-
tinguished audience as it offers a welcome oppor-
tunity to explain these operations.
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952
requires, as did prior law, that aliens who apply
for admission to the United States be, with few
exceptions, in possession of a valid visa. The
1 Address made before the Committee on Immigration
and Nationality of the Federal Bar Association at Wash-
ington, D. C, on Sept. 26 (press release 561).
issuance of visas has been the responsibility of
American consular officers since 1917, when the
visa requirement was first established by joint
order of the Departments of State and Labor.
In determining whether an applicant is eligible
to receive a visa, American consular officers apply
the same criteria as do officers of the Immigration
and Naturalization Service at the time the alien
applies for admission at a port of entry. This
is required by the introductory language of sec-
tion 212 of the Immigration and Nationality Act,
which lists 31 classes of aliens who "shall be in-
eligible to receive visas and shall be excluded from
admission into the United States."
Responsibilities of Secretary of State
The basic responsibilities of the Secretary of
State and American consular officers in the ad-
ministration of the immigration laws are defined
in section 104 of the Immigration and Nationality
Act. This section charges the Secretary of State
with the administration and enforcement of the
provisions of the immigration laws relating to the
powers, duties, and functions of diplomatic and
consular officers of the United States, except those
conferred upon the consular officers relating to
the granting or refusal of visas. The same section
of law requires the Secretary of State to estab-
lish such regulations and issue such instructions
as he deems necessary for carrying out the pro-
visions of the immigration laws.
The statutory responsibility of consular officers
relating to the refusal of visas is dealt with in
section 221(g) of the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act. It prescribes that no visa shall be
issued to an alien if it appears to the consular
officer from statements in his application that the
alien is ineligible to receive a visa under the law,
October 20, 7958
621
if the alien's application fails to comply with the
provisions of law or regulations, or if the con-
sular officer has reason to believe or knows that
the alien is ineligible to receive a visa under the
law.
The fact that the law specifies that the respon-
sibility of the Secretary of State for the enforce-
ment of the immigration laws does not extend to
the powers, duties, and functions of consular of-
ficers relating to the granting or refusal of visas
has led to demands for amendatory action pro-
viding for the review of consular decisions by
formally established administrative review bodies
in the United States or by the courts. The
existing procedure has been referred to as a unique
vestige of administrative absolutism, and occa-
sionally consuls, in the performance of the visa
function, have been called "little Caesars" who
arbitrarily and whimsically issue or deny visas.
The Department of State is very mindful of
the fact that each of the nearly 850,000 visas issued
every year as well as each of those refused have a
direct bearing on our relations with foreign coun-
tries. There are few areas in which the action of
the United States Government affects so in-
timately so many foreign citizens as does the visa
function. It appears to be an outgrowth of this
recognition that the Congress has exempted con-
sular proceedings from formal administrative
and court review. The Administrative Procedure
Act exempts foreign affairs functions from its
adjudication procedures and from the require-
ment of notice of proposed rulemaking. The
courts have consistently held that the action of
a consular officer in refusing a visa is not review-
able judicially.
To provide formal administrative or judicial
review of consular decisions would seriously ham-
per the administration of the immigration laws
and would not be in the best interest of the con-
duct of our foreign relations. Frequently deci-
sions relating to the denial of a visa are based
on information obtained from confidential sources,
the disclosure of which would compromise our
sources of information and would sometimes ad-
versely affect our foreign relations. Obviously
this is the case in decisions relating to the security
of the United States. But by no means is the
validity of this observation limited to security
cases. For example, the immigration laws render
ineligible to receive a visa aliens who have been
illicit traffickers in narcotics, prostitutes, and
aliens who have been convicted of crimes involv-
ing moral turpitude. The fact that an alien is a
narcotic trafficker or a prostitute frequently is
established through confidential information. In
countries in which the conviction of an alien is
stricken from his court records as a result of a
pardon or good conduct over a period of time, an
action immaterial under our immigration laws,
the consular officer must rely occasionally on con-
fidential information to gain knowledge of such
a conviction. Formal administrative and judicial
review in these instances would leave the execu-
tive branch with the alternative of divulging a
confidential source of information or to issue a
visa to an alien who is ineligible to receive a visa.
The exemption of the visa process from the pro-
cedural provisions of the Administrative Proce-
dure Act and its nonreviewability by American
courts is, therefore, not a historical accident but
rather is necessitated by the unique conditions
under which it takes place.
Safeguards In Administration of Visa Function
What safeguards does the Secretary of State
provide in the face of this situation so as to attain
the highest administrative standards in the per-
formance of the visa function? Applicants for
the Foreign Service have to meet most exacting
requirements with respect to both their intellec-
tual and personal qualifications. After their
selection these officers undergo a rigorous train-
ing for their future duties. This training in-
cludes an intensive visa training course during
which the new officers are required to acquaint
themselves with the immigration laws, regula-
tions, and procedures. In addition, each officer
is required to take a comprehensive examination
on the completion of the visa training course.
The results of this examination are incorporated
in his personnel file. Before going to a visa post
these officers are briefed on their specific responsi-
bilities by senior officers of the Visa Office and
sometimes are assigned to the Visa Office for a
period of consultation.
Once in the field the consular officer assigned
to visa work has available to assist him in the
administration of the immigration laws and reg-
ulations elaborate interpretative note material,
precedent decisions, and visa instructions. Before
making decisions in certain types of visa cases
622
Department of State Bulletin
consular officers are required by published regu-
lations or internal instructions to obtain the De-
partment's views. If the officer is in doubt on any
aspect of a visa case, current instructions require
the submission of the case to the Department for
an advisory opinion to be rendered by the Visa
Office.
When an immigrant visa is refused, the appli-
cant is always informed of the specific provision
of law on which the refusal is based. Except
when the finding is based on confidential informa-
tion, the facts relating to the decision are also
stated. Published regulations require the con-
sular officer to prepare a memorandum of refusal,
which is retained in the consular file. Published
regulations also provide that the action of refus-
ing an immigrant visa must be reviewed by the
consular officer in charge of visa work at the post.
If he concurs in the refusal, he countersigns the
memorandum of refusal. If the reviewing officer
or the principal officer at the post does not concur
in the refusal, the case must be referred to the
Department for an advisory opinion.
One of the major functions of the Visa Office
of the Department of State, which is statutorily
established by the Immigration and Nationality
Act, is to render advisory opinions to consular
officers on substantive and procedural questions
which arise in connection with the visa function.
In rendering these advisory opinions the Visa Of-
fice is bound by decisions and rulings of the At-
torney General with respect to all questions of
law. It is also bound by controlling decisions of
the courts. It is guided by precedent-making de-
cisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals, and
it cooperates with the Immigration and Natural-
ization Service with a view to securing uniform
interpretations of the immigration law. For legal
questions of far-reaching importance it seeks the
advice of the Department's Legal Adviser. Prece-
dent-making opinions of the Visa Office are made
available to all consular posts in the form of an-
notations to the law and regulations.
Informal Review of Consular Decisions
These are the major internal procedures the
Department of State follows in assisting consular
officers with their responsibility for the issuance
and denial of visas. It remains to discuss how
the general public can seek an informal review
of a consular decision.
While a case is pending before a consular of-
ficer as well as after a visa has been denied, in
addition to the applicant, every person with a
legitimate interest, whether Member of Congress,
attorney, prospective employer, relative, or friend,
may directly approach a consular officer if he feels
that a case does not find or has not found prompt
or proper attention. In addition the Visa Office
will accept inquiries from these same sources in
all visa cases and will review the consular de-
cision if it is alleged that the denial of a visa was
in error or that the procedures followed were not
consistent with established standards. In such
cases the Department will request the consular
officer to submit a report on his action and, if
necessary, will require that the entire visa file be
submitted to the Department for review. Based
on this review the Department will render an ad-
visory opinion which will either concur in the con-
sul's action or will point out to him that in the
Department's opinion the decision was in error.
In some cases the Department might suggest that
additional evidence be examined or secured or
that the alien be interrogated more fully along
certain lines.
The critical question is, of course, what happens
if the Department disagrees with the consul's de-
cision to refuse a visa, in view of the provision of
the law that the responsibility of the Secretary
of State for the administration and enforcement
of the immigration laws does not extend to the
powers, duties, and functions conferred upon con-
sular officers relating to the granting or refusing
of visas? This provision is held to preclude the
Secretary of State from directing a specific con-
sular officer to grant or refuse a visa in a particu-
lar case. However, it appears consistent with the
Secretary's responsibility for the prescription of
regulations and the issuance of instructions which
to a considerable extent embody interpretations
of law that Congress intended the Department's
rulings on questions of law to be controlling on
consular officers. To the best of my knowledge
there has not been one case in which a consular
officer has disregarded the opinion of the Depart-
ment on a question of law.
When the evaluation of facts is at issue the
Department will give great weight to the consu-
lar officer's judgment who has the facts and the
applicant before him. However, should there be
a serious disagreement between the Department
and the consular officer in a particular case, it
Ocfober 20, 1958
623
could be assigned to another officer, thereby sub-
stituting the judgment of one consular officer for
that of another. Such action has become neces-
sary in only one case during the last 6 years.
The formulation of an advisory opinion in the
Department itself is subject to review on several
levels and may, as it sometimes is, be reviewed
on the highest level.
The Department is keenly aware of its responsi-
bility to assure an accurate, uniform, and fair
interpretation of our immigration laws and, there-
fore, in addition to the procedural steps already
discussed, has taken other steps to fulfill its obli-
gation. Precedent-making rulings on the inter-
pretation of the immigration laws are made
available by the Department in the form of Visa
Office bulletins to attorneys, voluntary social
agencies, carriers, and to any others who have
asked for this service. At consular conferences
held throughout the world representatives of the
Visa Office discuss problems of law to insure uni-
form application. New Foreign Service officers
during their training and in the field are impressed
with their responsibilities by senior officers of the
Department and the Foreign Service. In order to
increase their proficiency, staff members engaged
in visa work are encouraged to participate m a
visa training course by correspondence offered by
the Foreign Service Institute of the Department
in cooperation with the University of Wisconsin.
The administration of the immigration laws by
the Department of State and the Foreign Service
is guided by the recognition that, although the
law does not give the alien an enforceable right to
obtain a visa, the consular officer has no authority
to deny a visa, except for the reasons stated m the
law. A consular officer who would act in dis-
regard of this concept would not measure up to
the standards set for his satisfactory performance.
No procedure, whether judicial or administra-
tive, whether or not subject to the safeguards of
the Administrative Procedure Act, is foolproof
against errors in legal interpretations, m evaluat-
ing facts, or in the use of discretion. If we make
this general allowance which is applicable to all
human endeavor, I believe we can conclude that
existing visa procedures are responsive to the con-
duct of our foreign relations and by internal ad-
ministrative safeguards effectively protect the
interests of an alien who applies for a visa under
our immigration laws.
624
Record Number of Visitors Visas
Issued in 1958
Press release 550 dated September 23
The State Department announced on September
23 that a recordbreaking 612,824 visitors visas
were issued during the fiscal year ending June 30,
1958, to persons desiring to enter the United States
for business or pleasure or both.
In publishing annual statistics prepared by the
Visa Office on nonimmigrant and immigrant visas
issued by Foreign Service officers all over the
world, Roderic L. O'Connor, Administrator of the
Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, pointed
out that the number of visitors visas issued was 5
percent higher than during the previous year.
This increase, according to Mr. O'Connor, demon-
strates the continuing effectiveness of President
Eisenhower's leadership in seeking to promote the
interchange of friendly visits among the peoples
of the world and to facilitate international travel
as a means of insuring peace.
A total of 259,789 visas were also issued during
the 1958 fiscal year to aliens coming to reside per-
manently in the United States as both quota and
nonquota immigrants. More immigrant visas
were issued to persons of German nationality than
to those of any other nationality. Canadians
came next, followed by British nationals and Mex-
icans, in that order.
TMMIflBANT VISAS ISSUED BY DIPLOMATIC
IM AND CONSULAR OFFICES THROUGHOUT THE
WORLD
Fiscal Year 1958
Nationality
Afghanistan . . .
Albania
Andorra
Arabian Peninsula
Argentina ....
Asia Pacific Tri-
angle
Australia ....
Austria
Belgium ....
Belgian Congo.
Bhutan
Bolivia
Brazil
Bulgaria ....
Burma
Cambodia . . .
Annual
quota
100
100
100
100
100
100
1, 405
1,297
Immigrant visas
issued
Quota ' Nonquota
28
94
Total
30
102
100
100
100
100
94
66
1, 329
1,246
14
89
89
2,757
6
239
495
103
3
394
1,429
12
4
7
2,757
100
305
1,824
1,349
17
394
1,429
101
93
Department of State Bulletin
IMMIGRANT VISAS ISSUED BY DIPLOMATIC
AND CONSULAR OFFICES THROUGHOUT THE
WORLD— Continued
Fiscal Year 1958
Nationality
\nnu:il
quota
Immigrant visas
Total
Quota i
Nonquota
Cameroons .
100
100
Cameroun ....
2
30', 275
2
2
643
1,583
' 2, 912
735
11, 337
396
17
300
1, 205
1,264
84
753
28
4
107
1, 746
1
1
'8
3
' i
9, 699
3
1,259
2
8
241
176
14
37
32
9
36
3*
' 7'
789
3
120
1
123
' 4'
2
30, 275
2
Canal Zone ....
CeyloD
Chile
100
29
31
643
China
Chinese (Racial) . .
Colombia
too
105
88
50
1,671
50
2, 912
Costa Rica ....
735
Cuba
11, 337
Czechoslovakia. . .
Danzig
Denmark
Dominican Repub-
lic
2, 859
100
1, 175
2, 723
97
1, 144
3, 119
114
1,444
1, 205
Ecuador
1, 264
Egypt
El Salvador ....
100
94
178
753
Estonia
Finland
France
11.5
100
560
3, 009
99
70
546
2,832
8
1
2
3
60
20
6
3
25, 513
18
27, 831
36
15
93
83
4
79
77
96
14
98
5
1
6
35
1
20
100
40
19
76
4
97
9
19
1
127
74
653
4,578
9
French Equato-
rial Africa . .
2
French West
Africa ....
French Guiana
Guadaloupe . . .
2
3
68
Martinique . . .
23
New Caledonia
Oceania ....
6
5
Germany
Ghana
Great Britain and
Northern
Ireland ....
Aden
25, 814
100
05, 361
35, 212
21
29, 090
38
Antigua
23
334
Barbados ....
259
Basutoland . . .
4
Bermuda ....
93
Briti-h Guiana
British Honduras
British Virgin
114
128
23
Cyprus
134
Dominica ....
5
Falkland Islands
Fiji
1
6
Gibraltar ....
38
Gilbert and
Ellice Islands
Grenada ....
1
20
Hong Kong . . .
107
Jamaica ....
829
Kenva
22
Leeward Islands
190
5
Malta
220
Mauritius
9
Montserrat . . .
23
1
19
1
20
3
1
4
Northern
11
11
Nvasaland . . .
3
3
St. Christopher .
18
5
23
St. Helena . . .
2
2
St. Lucia ....
4
9
1
2
5
11
Seychelles . . .
4
4
14
14
Singapore ....
59
6
65
Somaliland Pro-
tectorate . . .
1
1
Southern
23
2
1
24
2
Trinidad and
Tobago ....
81
121
202
Windward
Islands ....
80
40
3
1, 729
120
St. Kitts ....
3
Greece
308
247
1,976
Guatemala ....
590
590
800
1,011
300
800
Honduras
1, 011
Hungary
805
819
1, 125
Iceland
100
100
58
158
India
100
78
123
201
Indonesia
100
86
38
124
100
68
59
127
100
66
49
115
Ireland
17, 750
10, 608
54
10, 002
Israel
100
75
158
233
Italy
5,645
5, 379
4, 012
9, 991
Japan
185
91
0, 425
6, 516
100
98
104
202
100
47
486
533
100
235
221
44
265
Lebanon
100
74
196
270
Liberia
100
23
2
25
100
100
11
111
Liechtenstein. . . .
100
8
8
Lithuania
384
361
66
427
Luxembourg. . . .
100
73
22
95
Malaya
•96
4
1
5
Mexico
26, 142
1
26, 142
100
14
15
Morocco
100
94
110
204
100
100
100
Nauru
Nepal
Netherlands ....
3, 136
2,904
465
3,369
Netherlands An-
tilles
90
53
15
9
105
62
New Guinea ....
100
100
New Zealand. . . .
89
99
188
Nicaragua
1, 337
1, 337
2, 364
2, 323
224
2,547
Pacific Islands . . .
100
100
12
112
100
74
23
97
100
76
25
101
Panama.
1,997
73
1, 997
Paraguay
73
Peru
896
1,815
896
100
34
1,849
Poland
6, 488
6,217
910
7, 127
438
407
1,063
1,470
Angola
1
1
Cape Verde Is-
lands
6
2
7S
4
84
Macau
6
Ruanda-Urundi . .
100
October 20, J 958
625
IMMIGRANT VISAS ISSUED BY DIPLOMATIC
AND CONSULAR OFFICES THROUGHOUT THE
WORLD— Continued
Fiscal Year 1958
Immigrant visas
Annual
issued
Nationality
quota
Total
Quota ■
Nonquota
289
241
178
419
Samoa
100
47
7
54
San Marino
100
98
1
99
Saudi Arabia. . . .
100
1
1
100
1
1
South West Africa .
100
12
12
Spain
250
196
829
1,025
100
52
1
53
2, 302
58
2,360
Switzerland
1,698
1,649
166
1,815
Syria
100
76
44
120
Tanganyika ....
100
11
11
Thailand
100
23
2
25
Togo
Trieste
100
100
98
38
136
100
100
12
112
225
182
252
434
Union of South
Africa
100
83
88
171
U. S. S. R
2,697
2, 578
126
2, 704
Uruguay
116
116
Venezuela
627
3
627
Viet-Nam
100
30
33
Yemen
100
67
1
68
Yugoslavia
933
862
708
1,570
Total ....
154, 953
105, 474
127, 113
232, 587
Nonquota Symbol
K visas issued
under the act of
September 11,
1957 (Public Law
85-316)
27, 202
27, 202
Grand total .
154, 315
259, 789
1 Figures represent actual quota visa issuances by con-
sular offices and do not include quota numbers used for
adjustments of status under section 245 of the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act, reductions of quotas by private
laws, and other provisions of law.
"Annual quota of 100 established pursuant to Procla-
mation 3206, Oct. 10, 1957 (Bulletin of Nov. 11, 1957,
p. 758). For fiscal year 1958 only, adjusted to 96 for
administrative purposes.
BREAKDOWN AND TOTAL OF VISAS ISSUED BY DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR OFFICES
THROUGHOUT THE WORLD
Fiscal Years 1946 through 1958
Immigrant
Fiscal year
Total
Nonimmigrant
Nonimmigrant
revalidations
Total
Grand total
Quota '
Nonquota
1946
37, 083
47, 327
84, 410
247, 672
5,306
252, 978
337, 388
1947
78, S73
66, 844
145, 717
313, 279
32
313,311
459, 028
1948
93, 222
72, 869
166, 091
309, 730
2, 164
311,894
477, 985
1949
» 133, 839
b 70, 096
203, 935
261, 071
7,487
268, 558
472, 493
1950
• 205, 365
■» 63, 541
268, 906
242, 784
11, 199
253, 983
522, 889
1951
• 170, 166
' 61, 137
231, 303
271, 706
23, 108
294, 814
526, 117
1952
* 180, 660
h 88, 286
268, 946
318. 872
21,017
339, 889
608, 835
1953
! 87, 211
94, 306
181,517
349, 388
11, 990
361,378
542, 895
1954
i 86, 356
k 122, 866
209, 222
399, 994
18, 197
418, 191
627, 413
1955
81, 027
' 163, 844
244, 871
420, 095
24, 943
445, 038
689, 909
1956
86, 449
m 245, 958
332, 407
425, 421
70, 666
496, 087
828, 494
1957
97, 684
"219,728
317, 412
501, 692
87, 495
589, 187
906, 599
1958
105, 474
° 154, 315
259, 789
530, 857
81, 967
612, 824
872, 613
1 Does not include 19 (c) cases, special acts of Congress, adjustments, sec. 245 and see. 4 cases.
a Includes 55,639 quota visas issued pursuant to the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, as amended.
b Includes 339 nonquota visas issued pursuant to the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, as amended.
Includes 131,901 quota visas issued pursuant to the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, as amended.
d Includes 261 nonquota visas issued pursuant to the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, as amended.
■ Includes 104,571 quota visas issued pursuant to the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, as amended.
' Includes 747 nonquota visas issued pursuant to the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, as amended.
8 Includes 106,497 quota visas issued pursuant to the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, as amended.
h Includes 3,037 nonquota visas issued pursuant to the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, as amended.
' Includes 459 (sheepherders) quota visas issued under Public Law 307 (82d Cong.) and 5,089 cases of aliens who en-
joyed a preference under sec. 3 (c) of the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, as amended.
> Includes 5,722 cases of aliens who enjoyed a preference under sec. 3 (c) of the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, as
amended.
k Includes 500 nonquota visas issued to orphans under Public Law 162 (83d Cong.) and 5,633 nonquota visas issued
pursuant to the Refugee Relief Act of 1953, as amended.
1 Includes 353 nonquota visas issued under Public Law 770 (sheepherders) 83d Cong., 2d sess., and 32,009 nonquota
visas issued pursuant to the Refugee Relief Act of 1953, as amended.
m Includes 32 nonquota visas issued under Public Law 770 (sheepherders) 83d Cong., 2d sess., and 84,151 visas issued
under the Refugee Relief Act of 1953, as amended.
"Includes 68,442 nonquota visas issued under the Refugee Relief Act of 1953, as amended.
° Includes 27,202 nonquota Symbol K visas issued pursuant to the act of Sept. 11, 1957 (Public Law 85-316).
626
Department of State Bulletin
Duty on Umbrella Frames
To Remain Unchanged
White House Announcement
White House press release dated September 30
The President on Septeml>er 30 decided that he
would not approve the increased tariff on imported
umbrella frames which the U.S. Tariff Commis-
sion had recommended in a three-to-two decision
under the escape clause. The facts of the case,
the President said, compelled him to conclude that
the present rate of duty should remain unchanged.
This conclusion was set forth in identical letters
to the chairmen of the Senate Finance Committee
and the House Ways and Means Committee. The
President's letter called attention to improvements
in the condition of the domestic industry. Im-
ports during 1957, he added, were 61 percent less
than imports of the previous year. The letter also
pointed out that employment and productivity
had improved, that inventories were reduced, and
that sales of domestically produced umbrella
frames had climbed.
On August 11, 1958, the Tariff Commission sub-
mitted the supplemental data that the President
requested on March 12, 1958, when he also wrote
the two congressional chairmen that, although
some clear conclusions could be draw T n from the
original report in this case, the domestic industry
should be given the opportunity to present further
information. 1 The Commission had reported on
January 1-1, 1958, the results of its investigation
under section 7 of the Trade Agreements Ex-
tension Act of 1951, as amended. Three members
of the Commission found that the domestic in-
dustry was experiencing serious injury ; two Com-
missioners reached the contrary conclusion that
escape-clause relief was not warranted in this case.
One member of the Commission did not partic-
ipate.
Letter to Chairmen of Congressional Committees 2
September 80, 1958
Dear Mr. Chairman: Under Section 7 of the
Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, as
1 For text of the President's letter of Mar. 12, see
Bulletin of Apr. 28, 1958, p. 696.
' Identical letters were sent to Senator Harry F. Byrd,
chairman of the Senate Committee on Finance, and Repre-
sentative Wilbur D. Mills, chairman of the House Com-
mittee on Ways and Means.
amended, the United States Tariff Commission
submitted to me its report on Escape Clause In-
vestigation No. G2 concerning umbrella frames.
Three members of the Commission found that the
domestic producers were experiencing serious in-
jury; two Commission members concluded that
escape clause relief was not warranted in this case.
One Commissioner did not participate.
My letter to you of March 12, 1958 set forth
the salient facts of the case and my conclusion
that although some clear interpretations could be
drawn from the report, the domestic producers
should be given the opportunity to present further
information. On August 11, 1958, the Tariff
Commission submitted the supplemental report
that I had requested. I have carefully considered
it together with the original report and have had
the advice of the Trade Policy Committee and
other departments and agencies of the Executive
Branch.
The supplemental report confirms the trends
suggested in the earlier report. The aggregate
financial experience of the domestic industry con-
tinues to reflect substantial variations among the
four firms of the industry. Nevertheless, the sup-
plemental report shows improvements in the in-
dustry's 1957 earnings over those of the previous
year.
The volume of imports, which dropped
markedly during the last two months of 1956, ap-
peal's to have stabilized at a much lower point
than the peak levels of 1956. Imports during
the first quarter of 1958 were below those of the
equivalent period last year, and total 1957 imports
were 61 percent less than imports during 1956.
While imports declined, both employment and
productivity improved in the domestic industry.
Inventories were reduced, and sales climbed.
Sales of domestically-produced umbrella frames
last year exceeded those of 1956 by 8.2 percent.
During the first three months of 1958, moreover,
domestic sales were up 11.3 percent from the
equivalent period of last year.
In view of the above considerations, the facts of
this case compel me to conclude that the present
rate of duty should remain unchanged.
Sincerely,
Dwiciit D. Eisenhower
Ocfober 20, 1958
627
President Defers Investigation
of Tariffs on Certain Imports
White House press release dated October 3
The President has concurred with the U.S.
Tariff Commission's recent findings that no formal
investigation should be instituted at this time to
determine whether the tariff should be reduced on
imports of linen toweling, watch movements, bi-
cycles, and dried figs. The President found, with
the Tariff Commission, that there is not sufficient
reason at this time to reopen the escape-clause ac-
tions of several previous years which resulted in
increases in the tariffs on these items. The Presi-
dent's decision means that the increased rates of
duty previously established as the result of escape-
clause actions will continue to apply without re-
duction or other modification.
The President's action was taken after con-
sultation with the Trade Policy Committee. The
Tariff Commission studies were made pursuant to
Executive Order 10401, which requires the peri-
odic review of affirmative actions taken under the
escape clause. The Commission's conclusions on
four such reviews were stated in the following re-
ports which it submitted to the President: (a)
first review of the 1956 tariff increase on linen
toweling, reported July 25, 1958; (b) second re-
view of the 1955 increase in bicycle tariffs, re-
ported August 18, 1958; (c) third review of the
1954 increase in duty on watch movements, re-
ported July 25, 1958; and (d) sixth review of the
1952 tariff increase on dried figs, reported August
28, 1958.
World Bank Loan to Peru
To Improve Port of Callao
The World Bank announced on September 17
that it had made a loan equivalent to $6,575,000
for the expansion and improvement of the port
of Callao, the main port of Peru. Better accom-
modation and service for ships calling at Callao
will improve Peru's competitive position in world
markets, particularly for its important minerals
exports, and should residt in increased foreign
trade earnings.
The Royal Bank of Canada, New York Agency,
and the Philadelphia National Bank are partici-
pating in the loan, without the World Bank's
guaranty, for a total amount of $395,000. This
represents the first three maturities, which fall due
between March 1, 1963, and March 1, 1964.
The loan was made to the Port of Callao Au-
thority, an autonomous agency which operates the
port, The Authority was established in 1952
shortly after the bank had made a loan of $2.5
million to the Government for the construction of
grain-discharging and storage facilities at Callao
and for the purchase of mechanical cargo-handling
equipment. Since its inception the Authority has
operated the port successfully, and the facilities
financed by the bank have contributed to a marked
improvement in the efficiency of the port.
The port of Callao serves the mining and agri-
cultural areas of the Central Sierra and Lima, the
capital and chief commercial and industrial center
of Peru. About 60 percent of the country's ex-
ports and imports pass through the port, and there
is a considerable volume of coastal traffic. In
terms of tonnage, the principal exports are min-
erals, refined metals, and general cargo such as
cotton, wool, hides, fishmeal, etc.; and the chief
imports are petroleum products, wheat, and gen-
eral cargo such as machinery, lumber, newsprint,
automobiles, etc. Between 1951 and 1956 traffic
rose from 2.4 million to 3.1 million tons annually,
and forecasts indicate an additional 25 percent in-
crease by 1963.
The expansion now being undertaken by the
Port Authority consists of the construction of a
new two-berth pier for the handling of petroleum
products, a new berth with mechanical equipment
for the loading of minerals, two new general-car-
go berths, three new storage sheds, improved ac-
commodations for passengers, the purchase of two
diesel tugs and a cutter suction dredge, new main-
tenance shops, and a gear store.
The new petroleum pier will permit tankers dis-
charging inflammable loads to berth away from
other ships and thus greatly reduce the risks of ex-
plosion and fire now involved with general-cargo
ships using the same pier as tankers. The new
installation for handling bulk minerals will be able
to move up to 14,000 tons of minerals daily, com-
pared with the present loading rate of between 500
and 850 tons. Ships calling at Callao for min-
erals will thus be able to leave much faster; this
will help keep down ocean freight rates to Peru.
The addition of two new general-cargo berths,
together with those released when the petroleum
628
Department of State Bulletin
and mineral berths are commissioned, will give
Callao a total of 12 general-cargo berths, which
will enable it to cope with the long-term growth
of general-cargo and refined-metals traffic. The
dredge will be used for work in connection with
the new piers ami to dredge and maintain the
harbor, which has been silting up during recent
years. When it is not in use at Callao the dredge
will be rented out for work at other ports. The
new transit sheds and warehouses will reduce
transfer costs between piers and sheds and pro-
vide long-term storage capacity now lacking.
The new maintenance shops, gear store, and tugs
will replace existing facilities which are inade-
quate and obsolete.
The Port Authority will retain the services of
consulting engineers to plan and supervise the
project and will award contracts for the work
to be undertaken on the basis of international bids.
The loan is for a term of 20 years and bears
interest at 5% percent per annum including the
1 percent commission which is allocated to the
bank's special reserve. Amortization will begin
March 1, 1963. The loan is guaranteed by the
Government of Peru.
After having been approved by the bank's ex-
ecutive directors, the loan documents were signed
by the Peruvian Ambassador at Washington,
Fernando Berckemeyer, on behalf of the Gov-
ernment of Peru, by both Jorge Chamot, Vice
President of the Board of Directors of the Port
Authority, and Carlos Gibson, Commercial Coun-
selor of the Peruvian Embassy at Washington, on
behalf of the Port of Callao Authority, and by
W. A. B. Iliff, Vice President, on behalf of the
World Bank.
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
Question of Troop Withdrawal
From the Middle East
Statement by Henry Cabot Lodge
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly J
Mr. [Andrei A.] Gromyko always has it in his
power to start an altercation here in the General
A--i-n]l>]y. whatever may be said aboui his abil
ity to finish an altercation or to influence mem-
bers in favor of his contention.
The latest strictures from the Moscow propa-
ganda factory against the United States which
he has just made are both violent and untrue.
We have made no aggression against Lebanon.
We were invited in, as the whole world knows.
\<>t only has there been no aggression; not one
shot has been fired by an American against the
Lebanese in the whole time that we have been
'Made in plenary session on Oct. 2 (U.S. delegation
press release 3007) in reply to Soviet Representative
Gromyko's charges against the United States for not hav-
ing withdrawn all its troops from Lebanon immedi-
ately.
there — by invitation of the Government of Leb-
anon.
We do not wish to delay implementation of the
resolution. 2 Our forces are not there for reasons
alien to the interests of the Near East — on the
contrary.
We are not — and I quote again his phrase — -
"practicing obstruction." In fact, the United
States has already pulled out three battalions of
marines — and those are the large-sized battalions.
We will scrupulously live up to the United Na-
tions resolution and are complying fully with it.
This resolution represents in every respect what
the United States favored, and it received the
overwhelming support of the members of the Gen-
eral Assembly. Our actions have not been uni-
versally condemned. In fact, the Soviet Union
withdrew its resolution which would have criti-
cized the United States for what it has done in
2 For text of the resolution on the Middle East adopted
at the third emergency special session of the General
Assembly on Aug. 21, see Bulletin of Sept. 15, 1958,
p. 411.
Ocfober 20, 7 958
629
Lebanon, which is some reflection on how much
they really believe what they are saying them-
selves.
We have not incited one Arab state against
another. We have no aim of creating provoca-
tion.
Our aim is a peaceful world. And if Soviet
communism did not keep the world stirred up
all the time, we would have a peaceful world.
Mr. President, Mr. Gromyko has not offered
one scintilla of proof of one single thing that
he has said. The speech was straight, unadul-
terated vilification. It is mere billingsgate. It
is abuse with a sinister, ulterior motive. Speeches
of this kind make a travesty of the United Na-
tions. They reveal all too clearly Mr. Gromyko's
contempt for the United Nations. It insults the
intelligence of the members. It casts grave doubts
on Mr. Gromyko's intentions. And I have al-
ready given the whole speech far more attention
than it deserves.
Agenda of the 13th Regular Session
of the U.N. General Assembly 1
U.N
1.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
. doc. A/3030 dated September 23
Opening of the session by the Chairman of the delega-
tion of New Zealand.
Minute of silent prayer or meditation.
Credentials of representatives to the thirteenth ses-
sion of the General Assembly :
(a) Appointment of the Credentials Committee;
(b) Report of the Credentials Committee.
Election of the President.
Constitution of the Main Committees and election of
officers.
Election of Vice-Presidents.
Notification by the Secretary-General under Article
12, paragraph 2, of the Charter.
Adoption of the agenda.
Opening of the general debate.
Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the
Organization.
Report of the Security Council.
Report of the Economic and Social Council.
Report of the Trusteeship Council.
Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Election of three non-permanent members of the Se-
curity Council.
Election of six members of the Economic and Social
Council.
Election of three members of the Trusteeship Council.
Appointment of the members of the Peace Observa-
tion Commission.
1 Adopted by the General Assembly at plenary sessions
on Sept. 22 and 23, 1958.
19. Appointment of members of the Disarmament
Commission.
20. Election of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees.
21. Question of amending the United Nations Charter, in
accordance with the procedure laid down in Article
10S of the Charter, to increase the number of non-
permanent members of the Security Council and the
number of votes required for decisions of the Council.
22. Question of amending the United Nations Charter, in
accordance with the procedure laid down in Article
108 of the Charter, to increase the membership of the
Economic and Social Council.
23. Question of amending the Statute of the International
Court of Justice, in accordance with the procedure
laid down in Article 108 of the Charter of the United
Nations and Article 69 of the Statute of the Court,
with respect to an increase in the number of judges
of the International Court of Justice.
24. The Korean question : report of the United Nations
Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of
Korea.
25. Effects of atomic radiation :
(a) Report of the United Nations Scientific Commit-
tee on the effects of Atomic Radiation ;
(b) Report of the Secretary-General on the strength-
ening and widening of scientific activities in this
field.
26. Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief
and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near
East.
27. United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency.
(a) Report of the Agent General of the Agency;
(b) Progress report of the Administrator for Resid-
ual Affairs of the Agency.
28. Economic development of under-developed countries,
(a) Establishment of the Special Fund: reports of
the Preparatory Committee for the Special Fund
and of the Economic and Social Council ;
(to) International tax problems: report of the Eco-
nomic and Social Council.
29. Programmes of technical assistance.
( a ) Report of the Economic and Social Council ;
(b) Confirmation of the allocation of funds under
the Expanded Programme of Technical Assist-
ance :
(c) Establishment of an international administrative
service.
30. Question of assistance to Libya.
31. Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees.
32. Draft International Covenants on Human Rights.
33. Recommendations concerning international respect
for the right of peoples and nations to self-
determination.
34. Advisory services in the field of human rights : re-
port of the Economic and Social Council.
35. Freedom of information : report of the Secretary-
General on consultations concerning the draft Con-
vention on Freedom of Information.
36. Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories
transmitted under Article 73 e of the Charter:
630
Department of State Bulletin
reports of the Secretary-General and of the Com-
mittee on Information from Non-Self-Governing
Territories.
(a) Information on social conditions;
(b) Information on other conditions;
(c) General questions relating to the transmission
and examination of information ; 46,
(d) Methods of reproducing summaries of informa-
tion concerning Non-Self-Goveruing Territories : 47.
report of the Secretary-General ;
(e) Report of the Secretary-General on developments
connected with the association of Non-Self- 48.
Governing Territories with the European Eco-
nomic Community ; 49.
(f) Offers of study and training facilities under
resolution S45 (IX) of 22 November 1954: report
of the Secretary-General. 50,
37. Question of the renewal of the Committee on Infor-
mation from Non-Self-Governing Territories : report
of the Committee on Information from Non-Self -Gov-
erning Territories. 51.
38. Election, if required, to fill vacancies in the member-
ship of the Committee on Information from Non-Self-
Governing Territories.
39. Question of South West Africa : 52.
(a) Report of the Good Offices Committee on South
West Africa ;
(b) Report of the Committee on South West Africa;
(c) Study of legal action to ensure the fulfilment of
the obligations assumed by the Mandatory Power
under the Mandate for South West Africa : re- 53.
sumed consideration of the special report of the
Committee on South West Africa ;
(d) Election of three members of the Committee on
South West Africa.
40. The future of Togoland under French administration :
report of the United Nations Commissioner for the
Supervision of the Elections and report of the Trus-
teeship Council thereon.
41. Question of the frontier between the Trust Territory
of Somaliland under Italian administration and
Ethiopia : reports of the Governments of Ethiopia
and of Italy.
42. Financial reports and accounts and reports of the
Board of Auditors :
(a) United Nations (for the financial year ended
31 December 1957) ;
(b) United Nations Children's Fund (for the finan-
cial year ended 31 December 19.57) ;
(c) United Nations Relief and Works Agency for
Palestine Refugees in the Near East (for the
financial period ended 31 December 1957) ;
(d) United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency
(for the financial year ended 30 June 1958) ;
(e) United Nations Refugee Fund (for the financial
year ended 31 December 1957).
43. Supplementary estimates for the financial year 1958.
44. Budget estimates for the financial year 1959.
45. Appointments to fill vacancies in the membership of
subsidiary bodies of the General Assembly.
(a) Advisory Committee on Administrative and 61.
Budgetary Questions ;
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
(b) Committee on Contributions;
(c) Board of Auditors ;
(d) Investments Committee: confirmation of the ap-
pointment made by the Secretary-General ;
(e) United Nations Administrative Tribunal ;
(f) United Nations Staff Pension Committee.
Report of the Negotiating Committee for Extra-Budg-
etary Funds.
Scale of assessments for the apportionment of the
expenses of the United Nations : report of the Commit-
tee on Contributions.
United Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund : annual re-
port of the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Board.
Audit reports relating to expenditure by specialized
agencies of technical assistance funds allocated from
the special account.
Administrative and budgetary co-ordination between
the United Nations and the specialized agencies : re-
port of the Advisory Committee on Administrative
and Budgetary Questions.
Control and limitation of documentation.
(a) Report of the Committee on the Control and
Limitation of Documentation ;
(b) Report of the Secretary -General.
Offer by the Government of Chile of land in Santiago
to be used as office site for the United Nations and
other international organizations : report of the Sec-
retary-General and observations thereon by the Ad-
visory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary
Questions.
Personnel questions :
(a) Geographical distribution of the staff of the Sec-
retariat of the United Nations : report of the Sec-
retary-General ;
(b) Proportion of fixed-term staff;
(c) Pensionable remuneration of the staff;
(d) Staff Regulations of the United Nations: report
of the Secretary-General.
United Nations International School and delegation
office facilities : reports of the Secretary-General.
Public information activities of the United Nations :
report of the Committee of Experts on United Na-
tions Public Information and comments and recom-
mendations thereon by the Secretary-General.
Report of the International Law Commission on the
work of its tenth session.
Question of arbitral procedure.
Question of initiating a study of the juridical regime
of historic waters, including historic bays.
Question of convening a second United Nations con-
ference on the law of the sea.
Question of the peaceful use of outer space :
(a) The banning of the use of cosmic space for mili-
tary purposes, the elimination of foreign military
bases on the territories of other countries and
international co-operation in the study of cosmic
space ;
(b) Programme for international co-operation in the
field of outer space.
Measures aimed at implementation and promotion of
peaceful and neighbourly relations among States.
October 20, 1958
631
62. Treatment of people of Indian origin in the Union of
South Africa :
(a) Report of the Government of India;
(b) Report of the Government of Pakistan.
63. Question of Algeria.
64. Question of disarmament.
65. United Nations Emergency Force:
(a) Cost estimates for the maintenance of the Force;
(b) Progress report on the Force;
(c) Summary study of the experience derived from
the establishment and operation of the Force.
66. Report of the Secretary-General on the Second United
Nations International Conference on the Peaceful
Uses of Atomic Energy.
67. Question of race conflict in South Africa resulting
from the policies of apartheid of the Government of
the Union of South Africa.
68. Question of Cyprus.
69. The situation in Hungary.
70. The discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapons
tests.
71. The organization of an international public health and
medical research year.
72. The reduction of the military budgets of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of
America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and France by 10-15 per cent and
the use of part of the savings so effected for assist-
ance to the under-developed countries.
World Bank Sets New Records
in Lending and Borrowing
The International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development reported on October 6 that in the
year ended June 30, 1958, it had set new records
in both its lending and its borrowing operations.
The 34 loans made during the year amounted to
the equivalent of $711 million, and the funds
raised by the bank through the sale of its bonds
and notes to other investors amounted to $650
million. At the same time, disbursements on the
bank's own loans, at $499 million, also exceeded
previous levels.
These facts are reported in the bank's 13th
annual report, which Bank President Eugene R.
Black presented on October 6 at New Delhi, India,
to the annual meeting of the bank's Board of
Governors. The growing number of economic de-
velopment projects that are ready and eligible
for financing by the bank, says the report, "indi-
cates that the rise in lending during the year may
have signaled the start of a new and higher level
of operations."
The bank continued to cover out of its own re-
sources all its operating expenses and continued
to show a surplus of earnings over expenditures.
Net income during the year amounted to $42
million, the highest figure yet recorded. The
bank's reserves reached a figure of $350 million.
Apart from its lending activities, the bank made
its good offices available to member countries in
negotiations looking toward the solution of im-
portant international issues. It assisted in the
settlement, signed on July 13 this year, of the
terms of the compensation to be paid by the United
Arab Republic for the nationalization of the Suez
Canal. W. A. B. Iliff, a vice president of the
bank, together with a team of experts, assisted
in the negotiations leading up to this settlement.
The bank agreed to act as fiscal agent for the com-
pensation payments to be made.
The bank also collaborated in the discussions
between India and Pakistan on the sharing of the
waters of the Indus Basin. As part of the con-
tinuing search for agreement on this subject, meet-
ings were held during the year at Washington,
Rome, and London, as well as in India and Paki-
stan. "The need for a definitive settlement," says
the annual report, "becomes more urgent as the
various clearance, irrigation and resettlement
schemes of the two Governments . . . get under
way."
Jointly with the Italian Government, the bank
undertook a study of a nuclear power station to
be constructed in southern Italy as part of the
Government's atomic energy program. Bids for
a station with a capacity of 130,000-150,000 kilo-
watts were opened to international competition,
and the bank organized an internationally re-
cruited panel of experts to make an analysis of
the tenders. Nine tenders were received and at
the end of the fiscal year were under review by
the international panel.
The Year's Lending
Loans were made for projects in 18 countries,
two of which — the Philippines and Nigeria — had
not previously benefited from bank loans.
Nearly half the year's lending was to strengthen
transportation services. Loans were made to im-
prove railways in Ecuador, India, Nigeria, Paki-
stan, Peru, Rhodesia, and South Africa. Other
lending was directed to road construction and
maintenance in the Belgian Congo, Ecuador, and
Honduras, the expansion of port services in India,
and the improvement of the Belgian canal system.
632
Department of State Bulletin
One of the year's largest loans, an amount of
$('.() million, was for the Yanhee Dam in Thailand.
This will add 140,000 kilowatts to generating
capacity serving the Bangkok area and help to
improve irrigation on 214 million acres of farm-
land. Other loans that will increase electric
power supplies were made in Austria, Brazil,
Ecuador, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Pakistan, and the
Philippines.
The year's loans will spur agricultural produc-
tion in several member countries. Investment
intended to bring higher farm yields was the
object of lending in Italy and Japan, as well as
in Thailand.
More than $100 million was lent during the
year for industry. The projects financed will
nearly double the steel capacity of the Tata Iron
and Steel Company in India and will expand pro-
duction at another privately owned steel enter-
prise in Asia, the Kawasaki Steel Corporation of
Japan. Two private coal-mining companies in
Chile received loans, while part of a loan made
in Italy will help private firms to develop potash
resources in Sicily and to promote industrial
growth elsewhere in the south of Italy. Other
bank lending helped newly established financing
agencies in Austria and Pakistan to assist private
industrial ventures.
Progress Under Earlier Loans
The report also refers to the progress made in
carrying out projects financed in earlier years.
It describes the damming of the Zambezi River in
the Kariba Gorge — the largest hydroelectric proj-
ect ever undertaken in Africa; the rapid industrial
growth of India's Damodar Valley; and the re-
construction of the Pacific Railroad along the
northwest coast of Mexico.
The bank's technical assistance activities during
the year included the maintenance of resident
representatives in Ecuador, Haiti, Honduras,
Panama, and Peru and the sending of a general
survey mission to Thailand. The Economic De-
velopment Institute, a staff college established by
the bank for senior development officials of less
developed member countries, carried out its third
6-month study course in Washington. The bank
continued to explore the role of specialized financ-
ing agencies set up to stimulate economic growth
and in May sponsored a conference of develop-
ment bank officials from 11 countries.
To make possible the expansion of its lending
activities, the bank borrowed larger sums from
the capital market than in any earlier year. Net
borrowing of $625 million raised the bank's
funded debt to $1,658 million. More than half
the new funds came from public issues of long-
term bonds in the United States; the year's three
issues totaled $375 million. The remaining $250
million was raised by private placements of short-
term U.S. dollar bonds with the Deutsche Bundes-
bank, central bank of the Federal Republic of
Germany. Pointing out that a worldwide market
exists for the bank's bonds, the report notes that
at the end of the fiscal year an estimated 47 per-
cent of the total outstanding debt was held by
investors outside the United States.
The bank continued to replenish its resources
by sales of parts of its loans. Banks and other
institutions agreed to participate in this way at
the time of signing of 22 of the year's 34 loans.
Approximately $4S million was thus raised.
Nearly as large a sum was raised through sales
of parts of loans already made.
Funds available for lending were also increased
by further releases made by member countries
from the 18 percent of their capital subscriptions
that is payable in their own currency and can only
be used with their permission. These releases
were equivalent to $149 million.
Reflecting the higher capital market rates,
upon which the charges on bank loans are based,
the interest payable by bank borrowers rose to 6
percent in October 1957. With the subsequent
easing in rates, the bank's charges were gradually
reduced, reaching 5% percent at the end of the
fiscal year.
Seven countries joined the bank in 1957-58 —
Ghana, Ireland, Malaya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia,
the Sudan, and Tunisia. This brought member-
ship to 67 and subscribed capital to $9,405 million
on June 30, 1958.
U.S. Delegations to
International Conferences
Second Regular Session of the IAEA
The Department of State announced on Sep-
tember 22 (press release 546) that President
Eisenhower on September 19 had appointed John
A. McCone, Chairman of the Atomic Energy
Commission, and Robert M. McKinney, the per-
Ocrober 20, J 958
633
manent U.S. Representative to the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as the U.S. Rep-
resentative and the Alternate U.S. Representa-
tive, respectively, to the second regular session of
the General Conference of the IAEA, which con-
venes at Vienna September 22.
Lewis L. Strauss, Special Assistant to the
President, will be a special observer at the meet-
ing, and Representative Carl T. Durham of the
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy will be act-
ing as a congressional adviser. AEC Commis-
sioners John F. Floberg and Harold S. Vance will
serve as special advisers to the delegation.
Other members of the U.S. delegation will
include :
Senior Advisers
W. Tapley Bennett, Jr.. American Embassy, Vienna, Aus-
tria
John A. Hall. Acting Assistant General Manager for In-
ternational Activities. Atomic Energy Commission
John H. Manley, U.S. Mission to the International Atomic
Energy Agency, Vienna, Austria
Harold C. Yedeler, U.S. Mission to the International
Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, Austria
Advisers
Kathleen Bell, Department of State
William I. Cargo, Department of State
Halvor O. Ekern, Department of State
Charter Heslop. Atomic Energy Commission
Myron B. Kratzer, Atomic Energy Commission
Clyde L. McClelland, U.S. Mission to the International
Atomic Energy Agency. Vienna. Austria
Alfred Puhan, Department of State
Edwin E. Spingarn, Atomic Energy Commission
Ernest L. Stanger, Department of State
John P. Trevithick. U.S. Mission to the International
Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, Austria
Luther J. Reid, Department of State
Richard E. Wright, Atomic Energy Commission
Special Assistant to the United States Representative
John L. McGruder, Atomic Energy Commission
Executive Officer
Richard S. Wheeler. U.S. Mission to the International
Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, Austria
Administrative Officer
Maurice J. Scanlon, Department of State
Staff Observers
Edward Bauser, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
George Brown. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
Byron LaPlante, Atomic Energy Commission
James T. Ramey, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
The inspiration for creating the Agency
stemmed from President Eisenhower's atoms-for-
peace address before the U.N. General Assembly
on December 8, 1953. The text of the present
statute was unanimously approved by an Sl-nation
conference at U.X. Headquarters on October 26,
1956. The Agency officially came into being on
July 29, 1957, after the necessary ratifications of
the statute had been deposited.
The Agency, a worldwide intergovernmental
organization under the aegis of the United Na-
tions, furthers the peaceful uses of atomic energy.
Its statute provides for an annual General Con-
ference and for a Board of Governors to carry out
the functions of the Agency. The Agency has 69
members, and its Board of Governors consists of
23 members.
The first General Conference of the Agency
was held at Vienna from October 1 to 23, 1957.
Among the decisions taken at the Conference was
the election of W. Sterling Cole, former Member
of the U.S. House of Representatives, as the
Agency's first Director General for a 4-year pe-
riod beginning December 1, 1957, and the selec-
tion of Vienna as the permanent headquarters
of the Agency.
The principal items which the second Confer-
ence will discuss include the report of the Board
of Governors on progress made during the year
1957-5S, the program and budget for 1959, pos-
sible participation of the Agency in the United
Nations Expanded Program of Technical As-
sistance, the election of five members to the Board
of Governors, and relations with specialized
agencies of the United Nations and intergovern-
mental organizations.
ITU Telegraph and Telephone Conference
The Department of State announced on Sep-
tember 29 (press release 569) the U.S. delegation
to the Administrative Telegraph and Telephone
Conference which is being convened at Geneva
by the International Telecommunication Union
on that date. The U.S. delegation is as follows:
Chairman
John C. Doerfer, Chairman, Federal Communications
Commission
Vice Chairmen
John J. Xordberg, Chief. Common Carrier Bureau. Fed-
eral Communications Commission
Marion H. Woodward. Chief, International Division,
Common Carrier Bureau, Federal Communications
Commission
634
Department of State Bulletin
Member*
Thomas J. Allen, European Communications Manager.
United Press International, New York. X. Y.
Richard T. Black, Telecommunications Division, Depart-
ment of State
Angus M. Dowling. American Telephone and Telegraph
r.... New Y rk. X. Y.
Ronald C. Egan, European Director of International
Communications. Western Union, London, England
Asher H. Ende. Chief. Rates and Revenue Requirements
Branch. International Division, Common Carrier Bu-
reau. Federal Communications Commission
Eugene B. English. Special Representative in Europe for
Western Union, Paris. France
Thomas S. Greenish. Vice President, Mackay Radio and
Telegraph Co.. Paris. France
Donald E. Hempstead, Traffic Engineer, RCA Communi-
cations, Inc.. New York, X. Y.
Alfred A. Hennings, Superintendent of Tariffs, Ameri-
can ("able and Radio Corp.. New York, X. Y.
John R. Lambert, Chief, Telegraph Division. Common
Carrier Bureau, Federal Communications Commission
Charles M. Mapes. Assistant Chief Engineer, American
Telephone and Telegraph Co.. New York. X. Y'.
Frank T. McGann, International Division, Common Car-
rier Bureau. Federal Communications Commission
Fred E. Meinholtz. Director of Communications, the Xew
York Timet, Xew York. X. Y.
Thomas D. Meola, Vice President and European Manager,
RCA Communications, Inc.. Rome. Italy
Edwin W. Peterson. Controller, RCA Communications,
Inc.. Xew York. X". Y.
Ernest E. Peterson, President. Peterson Cipher Code
Corp.. X'ew Y'ork. X". Y".
Maurine P. Rhodes, Telecommunications Division, De-
partment of State
Terrence L. Slater, International Division, Common Car-
rier Bureau, Federal Communications Commission
The purpose of the Conference is to revise the
international telegraph and telephone regulations.
A special plenary assembly of the International
Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee
(CCITT) was convened at Geneva September 22.
The recommendations of this meeting will serve
as guidelines in the work of the Administrative
Telegraph and Telephone Conference.
The main interest of the Uniced States is in
the telegraph regulations, to which the Govern-
ment became a party in 1950. These regulations
govern classes of telegraph traffic, rates, composi-
tion of traffic, word count, codes which may be
used, pick-up, transmission and delivery practices,
operating practices, and methods of establishing
and settling accounts among telegraph operating
agencies.
The conference is expected to last for about 8
weeks. The last conference was held at Paris.
May lS-August 5, 1949.
Diplomatic Conference for Revision of the Interna-
tional Convention forProtectionof Industrial Property
The Department of State announced on October
3 (press release 583) the following delegation to
the Diplomatic Conference for the Revision of the
International Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property, which will convene at Lisbon
October 6, 1958.
Delegate
Robert C. Watson. Commissioner of Patents, Department
of Commerce
Congressional Adviser
Alexander Wiley, United States Senate
Congressional Observer
Roland V. Libonati, House of Representatives
Advisers
Roger C. Dixon, chief, International Business Practices
Division. Department of State
Pasquale J. Federieo, Examiner-in-Chief, Patent Office,
Department of Commerce
Stephen P. Ladas. Xew York. X. Y.
Stanley D. Metzger. Assistant Legal Adviser for Economic
Affairs. Department of State
John Dashiell Myers. Marion, Pa.
Albert R. Teare. Cleveland, Ohio
Congressional Staff Observers
Carlile Bolton-Smith. Counsel for the Antitrust and
Monopoly Subcommittee, Senate Judiciary Committee
Cyril F. Brickfield, Counsel of the Judiciary Committee,
House of Representatives
Robert L. Wright. Counsel for the Subcommittee on
Patents. Trademarks and Copyrights, United States
Senate.
Observer
George F. Westerman. Lt. Col., USA Patent Adviser to
the Defense Adviser. U.S.R.O., Paris
This convention, to which the United States and
44 other countries adhere, was established in 1883.
It is the major intergovernmental instrument
assuring international protection of industrial
property rights, such as patents, utility models, in-
dustrial designs, trademarks, and commercial
names. It provides basically that each country
shall provide to foreign nationals the same protec-
tion with respect to industrial property rights that
it provides to its own nationals. It also contains
provisions assuring to inventors and trademark
owners sufficient time to file applications for
protection abroad after original home applications
have been made.
Conferences of revision are held periodically to
bring the convention up to date with technical and
October 20, 1953
635
commercial developments. The United States was
a party to the original convention and has ratified
the successive revisions of 1900, 1911, 1925, and
1934.
The conference will consider a number of pro-
posals which have been advanced for improving
the international protection of patents, trade-
marks, and related rights. It will also consider
the creation of a permanent intergovernmental
council to assist in carrying out the objectives of
the convention.
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Pacific Settlement of Disputes
Convention for the pacific settlement of international
disputes. Signed at The Hague October 18, 1907.
Entered into force January 26, 1910. 36 Stat. 2199.
Ratification deposited: Dominican Republic, July 9,
1958.
Postal Services
Universal postal convention with final protocol, annex,
regulations of execution, and provisions regarding air-
mail with final protocol. Done at Ottawa October 3,
1957.'
Ratifications deposited: Lebanon, July 23, 1958;
Canada, August 11, 1958; Denmark, August 13, 195S;
Norway, August 19, 1958.
Sugar
Protocol amending the international sugar agreement
(TIAS 3177), with annex. Done at Loudon December
1, 1956. Entered into force January 1, 1957 ; for the
United States September 25, 1957. TIAS 3937.
Ratification deposited: Mexico, September 25, 1957.
Acceptance deposited: Federal Republic of Germany,
July 24, 1958.
Trade and Commerce
Sixth protocol of supplementary concessions to the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva
May 23, 1956. Entered into force June 30, 1956. TIAS
3591.
Schedule of concessions entered into force: Austria,
September 1, 1958.
BILATERAL
Chile
Agreement amending the agreement of March 31, 1955
(TIAS 3235), for financing certain educational ex-
change programs. Effected by exchange of notes at
Santiago August IS and September 17, 1958. Entered
into force September 17, 1958.
India
Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of
1954, as amended (68 Stat. 455; 7 U. S. C. 1701-1709),
with memorandum of understanding and exchange
of notes. Signed at Washington September 26, 1958.
Entered into force September 26, 195S.
1 Not in force.
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: September 29 October 5
Press releases may be obtained from the News
Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.
Releases issued prior to September 29 which ap-
pear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 546 of
September 22, 550 and 555 of September 23, and
561 of September 26.
Subject
Regional conference of U.S. ambassa-
dors in London.
Austrian war damage and restitution
legislation.
Delegation to ITU conference (re-
write).
Ethiopia credentials (rewrite).
China credentials (rewrite).
Reply to German aide memoire of
Sept. 9.
Reply to Soviet note of Sept. IS.
Dulles : news conference.
Nuclear explosions in U.S.S.R.
Murphy : Catholic Lawyers' Guild.
ANZUS Council meeting.
Reply to Czech protest on border viola-
tions.
Educational exchange (U.S.S.R.).
Investment guaranty contracts for
tire-making plant in Iran.
Investment guaranty agreement with
Ghana.
Educational exchange (Venezuela).
Delegation to conference for revision
of convention for protection of in-
dustrial property (rewrite).
*Not printed.
tHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin.
No.
Date
567
9/29
568
9/29
569
9/29
570
571
572
9/30
9/30
9/30
573
574
575
t576
577
t578
9/30
9/30
9/30
10/1
10/1
10/2
•579
*5S0
10/2
10/2
5S1
10/2
*5S2
583
10/3
10/3
636
Department of State Bulletin
October 20. 1958
Ind
ex
Vol. XXXIX, No. 1008
American Republics. Secretary Dulles' News Con-
ference of September 30 597
Atomic Energy
Second Regular Session of tbe IAEA (delegation) . 033
U.S. Views on Recent Soviet Testing of Nuclear
Weapons 617
Australia. ANZUS Council Meets at Washington . 612
Austria. Recent Austrian Legislation on War
Damage and Restitution 619
China
ANZUS Council Meets at Washington 612
President Explains Principles Guiding U.S. Policy
in Taiwan Area (Eisenhower, Green) .... 605
Secretary Dulles' News Conference of September 30 597
China, Republic of. Letters of Credence (Yeh) . 613
Claims and Property. Recent Austrian Legislation
on War Damage and Restitution 619
Communism. NATO and the Communist Chal-
lenge (Spaak) 607
Congress, The. President Explains Principles
Guiding U. S. Policy in Taiwan Area (Eisen-
hower, Green) 605
Department and Foreign Service
Administration of the Immigration Laws by the
Department of State and the Foreign Service
(Anerbach) .... 621
Record Number of Visitors Visas Issued in 1958 . 624
Economic Affairs
ITU Telegraph and Telephone Conference (delega-
tion) 631
Diplomatic Conference for Revision of the Interna-
tional Convention for Protection of Industrial
Property (delegation) 635
Duty on Umbrella Frames To Remain Unchanged
(Eisenhower) 627
President Defers Investigation of Tariffs on Cer-
tain Imports 628
Secretary Dulles' News Conference of Septem-
ber 30 597
U.S. and Ghana Sign Agreement on Investment
Guaranty Program 620
World Bank Loan to Peru To Improve Port of
Callao 628
World Bank Sets New Records in Lending and
Borrowing 632
Ethiopia. Letters of Credence (Zaude Gabre Hey-
wot) 613
Europe. U.S. Officials in Europe Hold Regional
Conference 611
France. President Sends Congratulations to Gen-
eral de Gaulle 612
Germany. Four Powers Exchange Views on the
German Problem (tests of U.S. and German aide
memoire, U.S. and Soviet notes) 613
Ghana. U.S. and Ghana Sign Agreement on In-
vestment Guaranty Program 620
Immigration and Naturalization
Administration of the Immigration Laws by the
Department of State and the Foreign Service
(Anerbach) 621
Record Number of Visitors Visas Issued in 1958 . 624
International Organizations and Conferences
ITU Telegraph and Telephone Conference (delega-
tion) 634
Diplomatic Conference for Revision of the Interna-
tional Convention for Protection of Industrial
Property (delegation) 635
Second Regular Session of the IAEA (delegation) . 633
World Bank Sets New Records in Lending and
Borrowing 632
Lebanon. Question of Troop Withdrawal From
the Middle East (Lodge) 629
Military Affairs. U.S. Confers With U.S.S.R. on
Case of Crashed Plane 618
New Zealand. ANZUS Council Meets at Wash-
ington 612
NATO. NATO and the Communist Challenge
(Spaak) 607
Peru. World Bank Loan to Peru To Improve Port
of Callao 628
Presidential Documents
Duty on Umbrella Frames To Remain Unchanged . 627
President Explains Principles Guiding U.S. Policy
in Taiwan Area 605
President Sends Congratulations to General de
Gaulle 612
Visit the United States of America Year, 1960 . . 613
Treaty Information. Current Actions 636
U.S.S.R.
Four Powers Exchange Views on the German Prob-
lem (texts of U.S. and German aide memoire,
U.S. and Soviet notes) 613
U.S. Confers With U.S.S.R. on Case of Crashed
Plane 618
U.S. Views on Recent Soviet Testing of Nuclear
Weapons 617
United Nations
Agenda of the 13th Regular Session of the U.N.
General Assembly 630
Question of Troop Withdrawal From the Middle
East (Lodge) 629
Name Index
Auerbach, Frank L 621
Dulles, Secretary 597
Eisenhower, President 605, 612, 613, 627, 628
Green, Theodore Francis 605
Lodge, Henry Cabot 629
Spaak, Paul-Henri 607
Yeh, George Kung-chao 613
Zaude Gabre Hey wot 613
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The IAEA completed its first year of operation in July 1958. Its
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Publication 6654 75 cents
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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EPOSITORY
Vol. XXXIX, No. 1009
October 27, 1958
THE UNITED STATES AND AFRICA: CHALLENGE
AND OPPORTUNITY • by Assistant Secretary
Satterthtvaite 641
DATE SET FOR TECHNICAL TALKS ON PREVENT-
ING SURPRISE ATTACK • Exchange of Notes Between
U.S. and U.S.S.R 648
DEVELOPING UNrVERSAL RESPECT FOR THE RULE
OF LAW • Remarks by Deputy Under Secretary Murphy . 651
COMPONENTS OF INTER- AMERICAN UNDERSTAND-
ING • by Assistant Secretary Rubottom 654
U.N. COMMITTEE AGREES ON PROCEDURE FOR
DISARMAMENT ITEMS • Statements by Ambassador
Henry Cabot Lodge 666
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN FIELD OF
ATOMIC ENERGY • Remarks by John A. McCone . . 668
For index see inside back cover
Boston . . blic Library
Juperintor
it of Documents
NOV 17 1958
Vol. XXXIX, No. 1009 • Publication 6718
October 27, 1958
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington 25, D.C.
Peice:
62 Issues, domestic $8.50, foreign $12.25
Single copy, 25 cents
The printing of this publication has been
approved by the Director of tho Bureau of
the Budget (January 20, 1958).
Note: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and items contained herein may
be reprinted. Citation of the Department
of State Bulletin as the source will be
appreciated.
The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the
Public Services Division, provides the
pubHc and interested agencies of
the Government with infornuition on
developments in the field of foreign
relations and on the work of the
Department of State and the Foreign
Service. The BULLETIN includes se-
lected press releases on foreign policy,
issued by the White House and the
Department, and statements and ad-
dresses made by the President and by
the Secretary of State and other
officers of the Department, as well as
special articles on various phases of
international affairs and the func-
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which the United States is or may
become a party and treaties of gen-
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Publications of the Department,
United Nations documents, and legis-
lative material in the field of inter-
national relations are listed currently.
The United States and Africa: Challenge and Opportunity
by Joseph C. Satterthwaite
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs x
Since last May, when the American Assembly
held its seminar at Arden House, much has hap-
pened on the African scene. In fact the available
topics one might consider are too numerous to
consider adequately in a single talk. Consequently
I shall limit my discourse tonight to sketching the
current status of African nationalism, Africa's
struggle for economic development, and our poli-
cies relating to these two basic topics.
The Status of Nationalism in Africa Today
As has been said again and again, the urge to
create a national entity and to exercise the pre-
rogatives of self-government is clearly the major
political, social, and economic force at work in
most of Africa today. This great drive — this
dynamic force of nationalism — is weaving pro-
found changes in the pattern of African society
and is of direct and fundamental importance, first,
to Europe and, of course, to the United States, the
Americas, and Asia.
Political observers predict that within the next
few years nearly 75 percent of the 140 million
Africans still living in dependent territories will
be governing themselves. Yet this great sociopo-
litical drama is taking place largely without the
glare of publicity, for the spotlight of world at-
tention is focused on more spectacular develop-
ments in the Near and Far East.
African nationalism, like the continent itself, is
diverse. "We cannot therefore expect to find many
generalizations that will clearly interpret all the
national dramas unfolding on this great conti-
Address made before the Western Regional Assembly
(University of California at Los Angeles) at Lake Arrow-
bead, Calif., on Oct. 9 (press release 590 dated Oct. 8).
Ocfober 27, 7958
nent. Let us, then, survey some recent develop-
ments there and analyze their significance.
In northwest Africa, for example, dynamic na-
tionalism is expressing itself among the independ-
ent states in strenuous efforts to realize a fuller
sense of independence and complete sovereignty—
in a word, to consolidate the gains of the last few
years.
In the continent's oldest independent states,
Ethiopia and Liberia, the prevailing spirit today
can be described as that of awakening fervor, a
growing sense of belonging to a new Africa on the
move, and an increasing desire for national prog-
ress on all fronts— social, economic, and political.
In vast sub-Sahara Africa the trend is toward
regional cooperation in quest of a greater unity
of purpose in the nationalist movement, which,
however, has still not reached every territory in'
the region.
The first conference of independent African
states was held at Accra last April 15 to 22 on the
invitation of Prime Minister Nkrumah. This
conference made clear that a major objective of
the eight independent states of Africa participat-
ing is the rapid end of the continent's colonial
system and the strengthening of their own inde-
pendence.
Perhaps the most ambitious effort since World
War II to revitalize the pan-African movement
will be the All-African Peoples Conference,
which has been called by the Convention Peoples
Party of Ghana to convene in Accra from De-
cember 5 to 12 of this year. Its sponsors report
they are inviting all known African political par-
641
ties to attend. About 60 such parties and organ-
izations from countries and territories throughout
the continent are already associated with the proj-
ect, and the sponsors hope to have delegates from
100 organizations on hand by the time the con-
ference convenes.
The main purpose of this assemblage, in the
words of its hosts, is
... to formulate concrete plans and work out the
G-andhian tactics and strategy of the African non-violent
revolution in relation to colonialism and imperialism ;
racialism and discriminatory laws and practices ; tribal-
ism and religious separatism ; and the position of chief-
taincy under colonial rule and under a democratic
society.
The United States will not be alone in watch-
ing with great interest the outcome of this con-
ference.
It is clear that the majority of Africans today
are seeking political unity of purpose, energy, and
endeavor. The evolving European Community
and other European efforts to achieve unity are
in themselves examples for such endeavor. We
may ask, then, where are the militant forces of
nationalism leading Africa?
To answer this question, we need first to ex-
amine African objectives as stated by the conti-
nent's leaders themselves.
For example, Prime Minister Nkrumah of
Ghana wrote in an article entitled "African Pros-
pect" in the October issue of Foreign Affairs that,
despite the diversity of Africa and the diver-
gences, differences, and varying points of em-
phasis one finds in the continent, there are cur-
rently three traits common to all Africa. In his
own words these are :
1. Our desire to see Africa free and independent.
2. Our determination to pursue foreign policies based
upon non-alignment.
3. Our urgent need for economic development.
In short, responsible and articulate Africans
today seek equality, dignity, and justice for them-
selves and their fellow countrymen. They seek
to bridge as rapidly as possible the great gulf be-
tween conditions on their continent and in the
Western World. They are clearly determined to
eliminate old-fashioned colonialism and racial dis-
crimination from the African Continent. They
seek to play an important and expanding role in
world affairs — to project the new "African per-
sonality" on the world scene. As indicated by the
642
various all- African conferences to which I have
just referred, they seek to gain their objectives
by achieving a greater unity of purpose among
their diverse and disparate peoples.
What should the United States attitude toward
these African nationalist objectives be ?
Insofar as these objectives are progressive, just,
and constructive, insofar as the methods employed
to achieve the objectives are nonviolent and equi-
table, our attitude — in accordance with our na-
tional history, character, and tradition — should
obviously be one of sympathy and support.
Secretary Dulles in his personal message to
Prime Minister Nkrumah delivered at the opening
of the Accra conference of independent states last
April, 2 declared :
Through you, I wish to assure the African nations that
they can count on the sympathetic interest of the people
and Government of the United States. The United States
will continue to stand ready to support the constructive
efforts of the states of Africa to achieve a stable, pros-
perous community, conscious of its interdependence within
the family of nations and dedicated to the principles of
the United Nations Charter.
What should be our policy toward the diverse
dependent territories now emerging toward vary-
ing forms of self-government and aspiring for
independence ?
Having long recognized that traditional colo-
nialism is coming to an end, the United States
supports the principle of orderly transition to self-
government and eventual self-determination in
the interests of all parties and peoples involved.
The speed of this evolution, we believe, should be
determined by the capacity of the African popu-
lations concerned to assume and discharge the
responsibilities of self-government.
The United States supports European measures
designed to provide self-government and eventual
autonomy to dependent African territories. Inso-
far as we are able to do so, we also encourage
moderate African leaders who recognize the bene-
fit to their own people of evolutionary rather than
revolutionary progress. In this connection the
United States believes that all concerned should
consider seriously the dangerous pitfalls that con-
front a newly independent state today. Economic
viability, established and stable political, social,
and cultural institutions, trained cadres of civil i
servants, and at least a modicum of experienced
' Bulletin of May 12, 1958, p. 765.
Department of State Bulletin
technicians are generally regarded as essential to
a modern nation.
I should also like to point out that many Afri-
cans now look with gratitude and appreciation on
their associations with the European powers, and
we believe that the time may well come when most
Africans will do so. For it is these powers which
have brought Africa advanced administrative
techniques, modern economic-development meth-
ods, needed public-health and educational meas-
ures, and great capital investment and con-
struction.
The U.N. Trusteeship System
And speaking of constructive assistance in de-
velopment, let us turn now to a consideration of
one of the most important systems for political
advancement in operation on the African Conti-
nent, the United Nations trusteeship system, which
is designed to bring about "independence by or-
derly evolution."
This system is responsible for six trust
territories: French Togo, British and French
Cameroons, Ruanda-Urundi, Tanganyika, and
Somalia. A seventh territory — British Togo —
joined the newly independent state of Ghana in
March of 1957 in accordance with the will of the
Togo population expressed in a popular plebis-
cite supervised by the United Nations.
Provision is made under this system for periodic
visiting missions to the territories under trustee-
ship and also for hearing petitioners in person at
sessions of the Trusteeship Council and the United
Nations General Assembly.
A U.N. Trusteeship Council visiting mission
will leave later this month for the British and
French Cameroons, under the chairmanship of
Mr. Benjamin Gerig of the United States. Rep-
resentatives from Haiti, India, and New Zealand
complete the mission, which has been requested
to include in its report on the British Cameroons
its views on the methods of consultation which
should be adopted when the time comes for the
people to express their wishes concerning their fu-
ture. The mission will subsequently also examine
conditions in French Cameroun, where important
constitutional advances have been made in the
past 2 years.
We are encouraged by a recent statement from
French official sources to the effect that agreement
has been reached between the French and Togo
governments on plans which it is hoped will result
in independence for Togo within the framework
of the U.N. Charter. Progress is also being made
toward this same objective in negotiations between
the French and Cameroun governments, an agree-
ment having been drafted which now awaits ap-
proval of the two governments.
In accordance with the trusteeship agreement
entered into by Italy and the General Assembly
of the United Nations in 1950, the Trust Territory
of Somaliland under Italian administration is
scheduled to become the independent state of
Somalia in 1960. Elections will probably be held
early next year for a new legislative assembly
which will be authorized to prepare the constitu-
tion for the new state. Although Somalia is faced
with a large budgetary deficit and has a disputed
border with Ethiopia, there is no reason to doubt
that the orderly transition of this country to full
independence will unfold as expected. The
Trusteeship Council is concerned with exploring
the possibilities of providing the necessary eco-
nomic assistance when independence is achieved,
and the disputed border problem has been sub-
mitted to arbitration.
Tanganyika, a British East African trust terri-
tory, the largest and most populous of all African
trust territories, held its first national elections
in 5 of its 10 electoral districts last month. It
will hold elections in the remaining 5 districts next
spring to complete its new 67-member Legislative
Council. The Council is formed on the multi-
racial principle, with representatives from the
African, Indian, and European communities.
These elections have been held on the basis of a
common roll, with each voter voting for three
candidates — one each from the African, Asian,
and European communities.
Following completion of these elections next
year, the Constitutional Committee of the Tan-
ganyika Legislative Council will be established to
consider further constitutional steps to take, such
as a review of the parity system of equal com-
munal representation and of the possibility of in-
creasing African representation on the Council.
The Trusteeship Council at its 21st session this
spring expressed the hope that the Tanganyika
government would review its national electoral
qualifications with a view to introducing univer-
sal suffrage with the least possible delay.
October 27, 1958
643
A 1957 visiting mission to the Belgian Trust
Territory of Ruanda-Urundi reported that that
territory was making encouraging progress to-
ward the goals of the trusteeship system. Steps
are being taken to eliminate the remaining ves-
tiges of feudalistic society and to install institu-
tions more in keeping with the principles of mod-
ern democracy ; public opinion is making a greater
effort to express itself, and the ultimate develop-
ment of Ruanda-Urundi into a modern African
state can now be envisaged.
Reviewing the progress of trust areas toward
self-government or independence over the past 10
years, I believe we can fairly conclude that these
areas are not only keeping pace with the non-
trust territories emerging into independent states
in Africa but will develop toward fuller autonomy
at least as well-organized and experienced as those
areas which have not had the benefits of the
trusteeship system.
The United States is proud of the role it has
played in the trusteeship process and will con-
tinue, where appropriate, to assist those African
leaders who, during the trusteeship period, have
sought to bring their countries into independence
through the full exercise of democratic principles
and practices.
Before I turn to other aspects of African na-
tionalist development, I feel that I also should
mention the constructive work of a less publicized
and nonpermanent United Nations body that has
concerned itself with conditions in African de-
pendent areas — the Committee on Information
from Non-Self-Governing Territories. The
United Nations, of course, has no responsibility
for the supervision of dependent areas other than
trust territories. However, all governments hav-
ing dependent territories are obligated by the
charter of the United Nations to report regu-
larly to the United Nations on the economic, so-
cial, and educational conditions in these areas.
The 14-member Committee on Information from
Non-Self-Governing Territories, of which the
United States has been a member since its incep-
tion, was created by the United Nations to review
these reports and to make general recommenda-
tions on economic, social, and educational condi-
tions. These recommendations can be very useful
to governments which are engaged in promoting
the orderly social and political evolution of the
dependent territories under their jurisdiction.
Turning to developments in other parts of
Africa, our attention first logically focuses on the
recent constitutional referendum held in the 14
African territories of France (including Mada-
gascar) on September 28. This single, dramatic
action was one of the most significant and far-
reaching developments in the political evolution
of Africa this year and should result in a new
and mutually beneficial association between
France and French African territories.
As a result of this election, held on the basis of
universal suffrage for all over 21, the territory
of French Guinea, which voted in favor of its
independence, is taking steps to withdraw from
the French West African Federation. The 13
other African territories of France will presum-
ably be organized into the new French Community
within the next 6 months. Each territory will
apparently have full local autonomy. Matters
common to members of the Community, such as
defense, foreign relations, and currency, will be
handled by special federal institutions in which the
French Government will have the dominant voice.
The executive of the new Community will be
the President of the French Republic, assisted by
a government composed of the French and terri-
torial premiers and French ministers dealing with
matters of community interest. A senate and a
court of arbitration to settle disputes between
territories are also provided.
According to the constitution, those territories
which choose to join the Community may subse-
quently leave it and become independent. This
independence, however, is to be negotiated between
the territory and metropolitan France. It is
hoped that a continuing close and profitable re-
lationship will be maintained between France and
these areas.
Developments in British African territories are
equally encouraging. Forty-five delegates from
Nigeria are currently holding a constitutional con-
ference in London to determine the steps to be
taken to lead the giant West African Federation
of some 35 million people to independence in 1960.
The conferees are struggling to settle such prob-
lems as the question of creating new states within
the Federation, which now is divided into three
large regions, the problem of the allocation of
revenues between the regional and federal gov-
ernments, the control of police, and electoral laws.
In 1957, at another constitutional conference held
in London, the Eastern and Western Regions re-
644
Department of State Bulletin
([nested internal self-government and have since
achieved it. The Northern Region — the most
populous and predominantly Muslim — wants self-
government by March of 1959, and the southern
Cameroons, a British trust territory -which is rep-
resented in the federal Nigerian government, seeks
internal self-government by October 1959.
Next year federal elections will be held through-
out Nigeria, and the new House of Assembly will
be asked to approve a motion formally requesting
the British to grant independence to the Federa-
tion in 1960. Great Britain indicated last year
that it would receive such a resolution sympatheti-
cally and be prepared to fix the date for ending the
colonial rule which began about 100 years ago.
British Sierra Leone in west Africa and Uganda
in east Africa are also making important strides
toward autonomy and self-government. Kenya
has held elections to fill the larger representation
accorded Africans in the Legislative Council.
Pressure for still greater African participation
in the multiracial crown colony's government con-
tinues very strong, however.
The Search for a Just Racial Policy
The major political problem of east and central
Africa, of course, is that of working out equitable
policies to govern relations between the many
races living side by side there.
Prime Minister Sir Roy Welensky of the Fed-
eration of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, in an article
in the October edition of Western World pub-
lished in Paris on September 24, said :
It is my firm belief that the regime of friendship, of
cooperation between the races which we endeavor to
practice in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland,
does the most for the people of Africa.
The Federation, in effect, hopes to settle the race
problem through a policy of racial partnership.
On the other hand, in such regions as w T est Af-
rica, where white settlers are few or come almost
exclusively as missionaries, traders, teachers, ad-
ministrators, or technicians, racial problems have
been relatively minor.
One can conclude then that contact between
Africans and Europeans alone does not give rise
to serious race problems, but social and economic
competition between two permanently established
racial groups — such as in settler areas — does seem
to do so. The problem resolves essentially around
the African aspiration to approximate more
nearly the higher European living standard and
to increase his share of his country's great natural
resources and production.
Although we cannot ignore the many dangers
inherent in any failure to meet the problem of
harmonious relationships betw r een the several
races inhabiting Africa's dependent and inde-
pendent territories, we must recognize that at the
present time — in view of our own domestic prob-
lems^ — we must in humility avoid proposing spe-
cific solutions. We can and must, however, con-
tinue to stand steadfastly for the universal prin-
ciple of nondiscrimination and racial equality.
Insofar as we are able to solve this knotty prob-
lem of harmonious race relationships within our
own borders we will be in a better moral position
to exercise greater influence for moderate solu-
tions of racial problems in Africa and elsewhere
in the world.
Alien Pressures: Communism
In addition to the disturbing influence of racial
friction, the nationalist movement in Africa is
further harassed by the machinations of inter-
national communism, forever seeking to turn fluid
situations to advantage for the Communist bloc.
At the Cairo Afro- Asian Solidarity Conference
held last December and January, the Communists
notified the world that Africa was to be the next
arena of their anticolonial subversion.
In recent months the Communists have vigor-
ously continued their work of penetrating individ-
ual African labor organizations, youth groups,
and nationalist organizations. They continue
working overtime in Egypt and western Europe
to influence the thousands of African students
now studying there, bringing many either to bloc
countries or the Soviet Union on scholarships or
"guided" tours. They are devoting greatly in-
creased study and research to African subjects
and training more specialists in African affaire
both in the Soviet Union and its satellites. In the
last 2 years they have signed trade agreements
witli most of the independent African states.
They are pressing to exchange diplomatic repre-
sentatives with those independent states with
which they have not yet done so.
Although the current Soviet economic, cultural,
and diplomatic offensive has not shown important
results in Africa, no one can afford to be com-
placent. Persistent and ingenious Communists,
October 27, 1958
645
skilled in subversive and revolutionary tactics,
must be reckoned with. Success in meeting the
Communist challenge in Africa will directly de-
pend on success in helping Africans realize their
legitimate political and economic aspirations in
a progressive manner.
The Struggle for Economic Development
Africa's economic and social needs, closely re-
lated to her political and racial problems, are
numerous and pressing. Among them are the
need for more public and private capital for in-
vestment and development; for more technical,
executive, and organizational skills and abilities;
for more transportation and communication fa-
cilities; and for diversification of one-crop
economies.
Constituting a major challenge to our wisdom,
good will, and generosity, these economic prob-
lems require prompt remedial action. They are
so numerous that no one nation can possibly solve
them alone. Africa must have and deserves the
cooperative support of all nations of the free
world in this endeavor. Much is already being
done.
The United Nations is contributing in numer-
ous ways to assisting Africa's development. One-
sixth of all loans made by the International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development since 1951
have gone to African states and territories. Mr.
Eugene R. Black, bank president, estimates that
the International Bank's lending in Africa this
year will be approximately $100 million. He has
indicated, further, that he foresees a growing
amount of bank activity there. The United States,
it should be stressed, contributes at least 40 per-
cent of the funds of the bank. The Soviet Union,
it is equally important to note, is not even a
member.
The United Nations Technical Assistance Pro-
gram has been devoting more than $3 million an-
nually to African development and is expected to
expand this sum considerably in the years ahead.
This spring the Economic and Social Council
of the United Nations created a new Economic
Commission for Africa, which will establish its
headquarters in Addis Ababa. The first session
of this body will be held in December of this year.
The United States is not a member of the Com-
mission but will be represented by observers at
its opening session.
We believe this new United Nations organ will
be able to bring into focus Africa's many economic
problems as well as its opportunities. It will be
in a position to help the states of Africa find ef-
fective answers to their problems. It will also
provide a forum for a broad exchange of views
and ideas as well as for the more detailed con-
sideration of future plans and new techniques for
accelerating African economic development.
Side by side with economic development, of
course, must come social progress. Both the
United Nations and the countries of the free world
must contribute to Africa's social advancement,
for the advancement of African agriculture and
its progress in industrialization must take into ac-
count available human resources and the social
patterns within which economic development takes
place. This is particularly true since social pat-
terns in Africa range from primitive tribal or-
ganizations to highly developed urban societies.
In this connection we can note happily the
important contributions to African social as well
as economic development of the United Nations
technical agencies — the World Health Organiza-
tion (WHO), the Food and Agriculture Organi-
zation (FAO), the United Nations Children's
Fund (UNICEF), the International Labor
Organization (ILO) , and the United Nations Ed-
ucational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO) . The newly created Economic Com-
mission for Africa will also consider social ques-
tions insofar as they are related to economic
development.
United States and European private invest-
ments are of growing significance to African
economic development. Our investment in the
continent now totals about $624 million, one-half
of which is in the Union of South Africa.
European investment is many times that sum.
European governments are expending between
$600 and $700 million annually in African areas,
principally for economic assistance to their de-
pendent territories.
The United States reciprocal trade agreement
and mutual security programs, which have been
in effect for some years now, demonstrate clear
recognition of our interdependence and mutuality
of interest with other nations of the free world,
including the African nations. For the last 2
fiscal years, the mutual security program alone
has provided more than $70 million annually in
646
Department of State Bulletin
economic and technical assistance to Morocco,
Tunisia, Libya, Ethiopia, Somalia, Ghana, Li-
beria, and British African territories. Our 1959
fiscal year aid level will be greater than that of
last year.
The United States Export-Import Bank has
been providing African countries $10 to $15 mil-
lion annually in development loans. The new
Development Loan Fund is now beginning to an-
nounce approval of loans for African states. It is
hoped that the volume of these loans can be in-
creased, providing sufficient capital is made avail-
able by Congress.
In order to build sound and enduring economies
in African territories, investment and expanding
trade are necessary. Here private investment
must play its part. In this connection it is of
interest to note that the Stanford Eesearch Insti-
tute has just recently announced a program to
stimulate private overseas investment in Africa.
This new program, made possible by funds from
private industries and foundations, will compile
information on investment opportunities through-
out the continent.
In his address before the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly on September 18, 3 Secretary Dulles
outlined eight steps that the United States would
be prepared, subject to action by Congress as
appropriate, to take or support in the coming year
for worldwide economic-development purposes.
These steps, which bear repeating at this time
because of their applicability to African needs,
would include:
1. Pressing vigorously and effectively forward
with existing development financing programs;
2. Increasing efforts to emphasize the con-
structive role that private initiative can play in
economic development ;
3. Considering how the United States might
cooperate with regional development programs,
where desired by the countries of the region and
where the advantage of the regional over the
bilateral approach would be evident;
4. Considering the advisability of increasing the
capital of the International Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development and the quotas of the Inter-
national Monetary Fund;
5. Considering the feasibility of creating an
International Development Association, as an
' Ibid., Oct. 6. 1958, p. 525.
October 27, T958
affiliate of the International Bank, under condi-
tions likely to assure broad and effective support;
6. Supporting vigorously technical assistance
through our own programs, through the expanded
United Nations technical assistance programs, and
through a substantial initial contribution to the
new United Nations Special Projects Fund;
7. Eidisting the assistance of United States uni-
versities and scientific institutions, joining with
those of other cooperating countries to achieve
scientific and technological breakthroughs on prob-
lems of particular concern to less developed coun-
tries; and
8. Seeking funds from the Congress for health
programs.
It is anticipated that in the months ahead the
administration will set forth fuller details of these
programs.
Conclusions
I have spoken at some length on Africa's politi-
cal, economic, and social problems and develop-
ments and our relationship thereto. Let us
summarize our conclusions.
First, the United States must properly evaluate
the dynamic political forces currently at work in
Africa. Recognizing the vital interdependence of
Africa and Europe, we must also support con-
structive African political evolution and work for
mutual understanding of our own policies and sup-
port for our common ideals as set forth in the
United Nations Charter.
Africa is generally friendly to the West,
although independent African states have evinced
no apparent desire to formulate formal alliances.
Threatening this basic attitude of friendliness,
however, is the insidious international Communist
force, which would deny the area to the West and
ensnare it into the political and socioeconomic
slavery of communism. We of the West have no
time to lose. We must anticipate events, sympa-
thetically understand African aspirations, and
help to meet them.
Second, as it is clear that a basic African need is
for timely help in economic and social develop-
ment and the eradication of disease, ignorance,
and poverty, the United States must act promptly,
generously, and wisely with adequate economic
and technical assistance to this vast underdevel-
oped continent. To do so we must have the full
647
understanding and support of the American
people.
The opportunity to develop a sound base for
enduring friendly relations and mutual coopera-
tion with an emerging Africa is ours today. We
must make the most of this opportunity without
delay.
Date Set for Technical Talks
on Preventing Surprise Attack
Following is an exchange of notes between the
Governments of the United States and the
U.S.S.R. concerning a meeting of technical ex-
perts to study methods to lessen the danger of
surprise inilitai-y attach.
U.S. NOTE OF OCTOBER 10 '
Press release 600 dated October 10
The Embassy of the United States of America
presents its compliments to the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics and has the honor to refer to note 53/OSA
of September 15, 1958, regarding a meeting of
technical experts to study the practical aspects
of minimizing the possibility of surprise attack.
The Government of the United States believes
that the primary purpose of \h^ meeting should
be to examine the methods and objects of control
and to assess the results that might be obtained
from the adoption of those methods in lessening
the danger of surprise military attack. The study
should be undertaken with a view to the prepara-
tion of a technical report which could be recom-
mended for consideration by governments. The
report would be useful in the subsequent exami-
nation among governments at an appropriate
level of the problem of introducing measures
against surprise attack. As stated in its note of
July 31, 2 the United States considers that the dis-
cussions should take place without prejudice to
the respective positions of the two Governments
as to the delimitation of areas within which meas-
ures might be established, or as to the timing or
1 Delivered by the American Embassy to the Soviet
Foreign Office at Moscow on Oct. 10.
2 For text, see Bulletin of Aug. 18, 1958, p. 278.
648
interdependence of various aspects of disarma-
ment.
With this understanding, the Government of the
United States agrees to commencement of this
meeting at Geneva on November 10. The United
States hopes that substantial progress could be
made in a meeting of four to five weeks as sug-
gested by the Soviet Government.
With regard to the question of participation in
the proposed meeting, the United States believes
it would be appropriate to include experts from
countries other than the United States and the
U.S.S.R. in order to provide the broadest possible
base of technical experience under varying condi-
tions. After consultation with other nations the
United States proposes that, for the Western
countries, there will be experts from the United
States, the U.K., France, Canada, Italy and possi-
bly other countries. The names of the experts
who will participate will be communicated in due
course.
The comments in the United States note of July
31, with regard to the question of flights of United
States aircraft carrying nuclear weapons, with
which the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
takes issue in its note of September 15, were di-
rected to the charges made by the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics' representative in the Security
Council of the United Nations in April of this
year. 3 At that time, the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics' representative spoke of the "practice
of regular United States bomber flights armed
with atomic and hydrogen bombs which proceed
towards the borders of the Soviet Union upon the
giving of an alarm." The United States reaffirms
the statement contained in its note of July 31
"that the United States has never had the need to
launch nor has it in fact ever launched any atomic
bomber flights of this type."
SOVIET NOTE OF SEPTEMBER 15
Unofficial translation
Note No. 53/OSA
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR presents
its compliments to the Embassy of the USA, and referring
to note number 128 of July 31, 1958, has the honor to state
the following :
The Soviet Government notes the favorable attitude of
the Government of the USA towards the proposal set
1 For background, see ibid., May 12, 1958, p. 760.
Department of State Bulletin
forth in the message of the Chairman of the Council of
Ministers of the USSR, N. S. Khrushchev, to the President
of the USA, D. Eisenhower, of July 2, 1958' that in the
near future appropriate representatives, including repre-
sentatives of military agencies of both countries, desig-
nated by the Governments of the USSR, USA, and also,
possibly by the governments of some other states should
meet for the joint study of practical aspects of the prob-
lem of preventing surprise attack and should work out,
during the course of a definite period of time limit put in
advance, recommendations concerning measures for pre-
venting the possibility of a surprise attack.
In advancing the proposal concerning the conducting of
a meeting on the level of experts, the Soviet Government
proceeded from the fact that such a meeting would be
fruitful if its work is directed toward the working out of
practical recommendations concerning measures to pre-
vent surprise attack in combination with definite steps in
the field of disarmament. As the Government of the USA
is aware, in the message of the Chairman of the Council
of Ministers of the USSR of July 2 it is stated that the
Soviet Union proposes the reaching of agreement on es-
tablishment of control posts at railroad junctions, at large
ports and on principal automobile thoroughfares, in com-
bination with specific steps in disarmament, and also
concerning the carrying out of aerial photography in
areas having an important significance from the point of
view of the prevention of the danger of surprise attack.
Therefore the assertion of the Government of the US
that allegedly the Soviet Government agrees that these dis-
cussions should not predetermine the corresponding posi-
tions of both governments in connection with the time and
the interdependence of the different aspects of disarma-
ment has no foundation. Moreover, it is clear that the
experts will have to give serious attention also to such
technical questions as means and objects of control and
the results which might be secured by these measures.
As the Soviet Government has already stated an un-
derstanding on the measures of preventing surprise attack
is completely possible given conditions of fair considera-
tion of mutual interests and rejection of such actions as
would lead to a sharpening of the international situation
and the increasing of the danger of war. Of course, a
decision on the creation of mutual principles of a system
of preventing the possibility of surprise attack must be
adopted by the governments and not by the experts who
will only conduct preparatory work. However, the work-
ing out by the experts and practical recommendations on
concrete ways to prevent surprise attack undoubtedly will
necessitate fruitful examination of the question about
prevention of surprise attack at a meeting of heads of
governments.
In the note of the Embassy of the USA, the question is
again raised about the flights of military planes of the
USA in the region of the Arctic and about an Arctic zone
of inspection. The Government of the US in this note
gives categoric assurance that the US has never had the
need to carry out flights of military planes with hydrogen
and atomic bombs in the direction of the frontiers of the
Soviet Union. It is impossible, however, not to note that
statements of the Government of the US that allegedly
American atomic bombers are not carrying out flights in
the direction of the frontiers of the USSR look uncon-
vincing in the light of the statements of its representatives
in the U.N. Security Council and also the statement of
US Secretary of State Dulles at the press conference which
took place on 1 May." As is known, in this statement Mr.
Dulles directly announced that if the Soviet Union agrees
to the establishment of international inspection in the
Arctic, then the USA "would then feel it safe greatly to
reduee to a minimum these flights against which the
Soviet Union protests". Answering a question whether
the US will cease such flights in case of establishment of
inspection in the Arctic Mr. Dulles declared that this will
depend on what information the US receives as a result of
realization of inspection. These statements of Mr. Dulles
clearly confirm the flights of American planes loaded with
atomic and hydrogen bombs in the direction of the fron-
tiers of the Soviet Union. As for the question about an
Arctic zone of inspection which is broached in the note
of the Embassy of the USA the position of the Soviet
Union on this question was set forth earlier with ex-
haustive fullness.
In connection with the practical side of the convocation
of a meeting of experts the Soviet Government has no
objection to the time and place proposed by the US in
the note of 31 July for convocation of a meeting of ex-
perts. But if the Government of the USA is not ready
for this in the said time, on our part there is no objection
also that the meeting be called later as is proposed in
the note of the Embassy of the USA of 8 September."
Proceeding from this, the Soviet Government proposes
that a meeting of experts should begin in Geneva on 10
November having in mind that its work should be con-
cluded in the shortest possible time, for example in the
course of four to five weeks.
In the opinion of the Soviet Government it seems ex-
pedient that in the meeting of experts besides the USSR
and the USA other countries should also take part. More-
over, the Soviet Government considers it necessary to
proceed from the principle of equal representation of
countries which are members of the Atlantic Pact and
countries included in the organization of the Warsaw
Treaty. Taking this into account the Soviet Govern-
ment proposes that in a meeting of experts representatives
should take part from the USA, Great Britain, France,
Belgium, USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania.
It goes without saying, the U.N. organization will be
informed about the course of the experts' negotiations
through the U.N. Secretary-General.
The Soviet Government hopes that the Government of
the USA will carefully examine the considerations set
forth in the present note and give a positive reply to the
proposals advanced in it.
Moscow
September 15, 1958
' For text, see ibid., Aug. 18, 1958, p. 279.
Ocfober 27, 7958
'Ibid., May 19, 1958. p. 804.
1 For text, see ibid., Sept. 29, 1958, p. 504.
649
U.S. Views on Communist Cease-Fire
in Taiwan Straits Area
Statement by Acting Secretary Herter, October 6
Press release 585 dated October 6
The Department has noted a broadcast by the
Peiping Eadio of a statement attributed to the
Chinese Communist Minister of National De-
fense. This statement, though replete with famil-
iar Communist propaganda distortions regarding
U.S. policies, seems to move in the direction of
a cease-fire. It is therefore being carefully studied
by the U.S. Government in close consultation with
its ally, the Government of the Eepublic of China,
which of course is primarily concerned. What-
ever the Chinese Communist motivations, the
United States welcomes their declared intentions
to suspend bombardment of the offshore islands
for 1 week and hopes this foreshadows a perma-
nent cessation of their armed attack. Should this
prove to be the case, there would seem to be no
further necessity for the convoy of supply ship-
ments to the offshore island positions. This ques-
tion is being given careful consideration. It
should be pointed out that U.S. escorts for these
convoys in the offshore-island area have been
limited strictly to international waters. The De-
partment is glad to note the official statement
made today by the Ministry of National Defense
at Taipei that the Government of the Republic
of China would not break the cease-fire.
Statement by Secretary Dulles, October 7 >
The Chinese Communists, after having brutally
and incessantly bombarded Quemoy for over 6
weeks, now say they will be humanitarian and
peaceful for 1 week.
It is not easy to evaluate that statement, but at
least for the moment there is a cessation of the
bombing. This the United States has been vigor-
ously seeking, and also the development assures
worldwide condemnation of the Chinese Com-
munists if they again resume the fighting.
Department Statement, October 8
Press release 593 dated October 8
At the request of the Government of the Re-
public of China, the United States has engaged in
the escort of Chinese vessels resupplying Quemoy.
This escort activity was ordered to the extent
militarily necessary. No modification of this
order is needed.
The Chinese Communists' halt of attacks on the
offshore islands and on resupply operations to
these islands suspends the military necessity for
United States escort operations. If the Chinese
Communist attacks are resumed, then, under the
order, United States escort activity will be re-
sumed forthwith to the extent necessary.
There has been full consultation between the
Government of the United States and the Govern-
ment of the Republic of China as to this matter.
U.S. Announces Withdrawal
of Forces From Lebanon
Department Statement
Press release 589 dated October 8
The Government of the United States an-
nounces that by agreement with the Government
of the Republic of Lebanon it has now been de-
cided to complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from
Lebanon. It is expected that, barring unforeseen
developments, the forces will all be withdrawn
by the end of October.
The United States sent forces to Lebanon in re-
sponse to the urgent appeal of the then govern-
ment of that country for assistance in maintaining
Lebanese independence and integrity. 1 At the
same time the United States took steps in the
United Nations with a view to having it take
measures to preserve the independence and terri-
torial integrity of Lebanon and thus facilitate the
withdrawal of the U.S. forces. Subsequently the
U.N. General Assembly unanimously adopted a
resolution 2 developed by the Arab states and de-
signed to insure respect by states for the freedom,
independence, and integrity of other states and to
establish practical arrangements to uphold the
purposes and principles of the charter in relation
to Lebanon.
The steps which have been taken with respect
to the situation in Lebanon have led to a substan-
tial improvement in the international aspects of
1 Made at the Washington National Airport.
650
1 For background, see Bulletin of Aug. 4, 1958, p. 181.
' Ibid., Sept. 15, 1958, p. 409.
Department of State Bulletin
the Lebanese security situation. The current un-
rest appears to have essentially domestic origins.
In view of the progress made toward more stable
international conditions in the area, it has been
concluded that U.S. forces can now be totally with-
drawn from Lebanon. It is the confident hope of
the U.S. Government that the Kepublic of Leba-
non, its sovereignty and independence strength-
ened, will move forward in unity, peace, and
prosperity.
Military Survey Team
Sent to Jordan
Press release 605 dated October 11
A military survey team headed by Brig. Gen.
Richard A. Risden, U.S. Army, has been dis-
patched to Jordan at the request of the Jordanian
Government to make a study of the organization,
administration, and equipment of the Arab
Army of Jordan. The survey team is due to
arrive in Jordan on October 14.
Developing Universal Respect for the Rule of Law
by Deputy Under Secretary Murphy x
The thought of the probity and compassion,
the morality and charity of St. Ives, your patron
saint, led me, in traveling from Washington to
Boston this morning, into an intriguing specula-
tion as to the reactions which that saintly man
might have experienced were he involved in to-
day's international politics. What would he have
said, for example, after listening to a few sample
broadcasts in the daily output of Moscow and
Peiping ? What would he have thought of their
distortions, their bland disregard for elemental
honesty, their vicious purpose to destroy a form
of society which recognizes the Deity and to re-
place it with an atheistic materialism?
I am sure that, had he been asked, St. Ives
would have expressed confidence that, during the
700 years after his birth, the world would have
been wise enough to have developed a universal
respect for the rule of law. Perhaps he himself
was too wise to have attempted to prophesy.
What could be more repugnant to the rule of
law than military suppression by a foreign power
of the national aspiration of an entire people to
enjoy national independence? Yet in this 20th
century the Soviet Union, whose radio daily de-
scribes it as a peace-loving government, sent its
1 Remarks made before the Catholic Lawyers' Guild
of the Archdiocese of Boston at Boston, Mass., on Oct. 1
(press release S7T6). Mr. Murphy became on this occa-
sion the first recipient of the St. Ives Award, which the
Guild will present annually to a person of international
preeminence in some branch of the law.
armies across the Carpathian frontier in a brutal
suppression of the aspirations of the Hungarian
people to regain their independence, after many
years of occupation by Soviet forces and an im-
posed satellite government. Despite this classical
act of aggression which belies any pretense of
respect for the rule of law, the Soviet official posi-
tion continues to give lip service to the rule of
law by leveling synthetic charges of aggressive
acts and intent against our Government.
The Middle East Situation
For our part we believe that the charter of the
United Nations and the processes of that organ-
ization are powerful instruments of world law. I
know that you do not want to be burdened with
a lengthy expose of the Middle East situation. It
provides, however, an excellent example of the
respect which this country has for the ride of law.
As you know, during the critical situation which
developed in the Middle East this summer, Presi-
dent Eisenhower took the grave decision of send-
ing American troops to that country, at the ex-
press request of the duly constituted authorities
of Lebanon, to assist Lebanon to maintain its in-
dependence. This decision was taken in full con-
formity with the United Nations Charter, which
recognizes the inherent right of collective self-
defense. It was a step taken in the certain con-
viction that, if the West were to ignore the appeal
of this peaceful Middle East state, in grave dan-
Ocfober 27, 1958
651
ger of losing its independence, one small nation
after another could be destroyed in a fashion
which in the 1930's led inevitably to global con-
flict.
We were prompt to report our move to the Se-
curity Council of the United Nations, making
clear that the military measures would be termi-
nated "as soon as the Security Council has taken
the measures necessary to maintain international
peace and security." The Security Council, ham-
strung by Soviet veto (I believe its 85th veto in
that organization), was unable to take further
action. But we did not stop there, and in the
special session of the General Assembly our Presi-
dent presented his six-point plan for peace, 2 which
would provide a setting for political order respon-
sive to the will of the people of each nation, which
would avoid the dangers of a regional arms race
and would permit the peoples of the area to de-
vote their energies to the tasks of development
and human progress. As you know, much of the
President's program was reflected in the resolu-
tion sponsored by the Arab countries themselves
and unanimously adopted by the General Assem-
bly on August 21. 3
Thus significant agreement was reached on
three crucial points: (1) that states should respect
the freedom, independence, and integrity of other
states and avoid fomenting civil strife; (2) that
the United Nations should buttress this pledge of
noninterference in the Middle East; and (3) that
United Nations measures to insure the territorial
integrity and independence of these countries
would facilitate the early withdrawal of foreign
troops from the Lebanon and Jordan. Subse-
quently the distinguished Secretary-General of
the United Nations, Mr. Dag Hammarskjold, un-
dertook a useful mission to the Middle East, and
his initial report 4 has yesterday been submitted
to the United Nations General Assembly. In the
light of all these developments it has been possi-
ble to begin the withdrawal of U.S. forces from
Lebanon. 5 Thus it is clear that American respect
for the rule of law as represented in the legal
processes of the United Nations and our coopera-
tion with that organization, in the interests of
world peace and the rights of small nations, has
provided a classic demonstration which, I be-
lieve, were he here today, would be pleasing to
your patron saint. The contrast with the be-
havior of the Soviet Union has never been made
clearer.
Situation in the Far East
I would ask your indulgence to add a brief
comment regarding a situation in another world
area which is not without current interest. I
refer to the Far East.
Our Secretary of State in his able address in
September 1957 to the United Nations General
Assembly 6 said:
If there is any one thing that history demonstrates
is that it is impossible to preserve peace indefinitely un
less that peace is based upon justice and upon law.
411.
2 Bulletin of Sept. 1, 1958, p. 337.
3 For text, see iUd., Sept. 15, 1958, p.
'U.N. doc. A/3934/Rev. 1.
* For text of a Department statement, see p. 650.
652
»
Now what can we say of the progress of the
rule of law in the light of the Chinese Communist
attack? Certainly it is clear that the brutal as-
sault by the military forces of the Soviet Union
upon the freedom-loving people of Hungary has
now been followed by the equally outrageous re-
sort to naked force of Communist China. After a
period of relative and extended calm there began
on August 23 a violent and intense artillery attack
against the offshore islands of Formosa. A day
and night bombardment by literally hundreds of
heavy-caliber guns of Soviet origin has continued
for over a month now, largely concentrated on
Little and Big Quemoy Islands. Significantly this
bombardment has been accompanied by a barrage
of Peiping Kadio announcements that it is
Peiping's purpose to force the capitulation of the
Government of the Kepublic of China and to
drive out the military forces of the United States
from the entire Taiwan area. The announcements
have been couched in the hostile terms of threats
and have been repeated in the same tone by the
Soviet Union.
The offshore islands, the Quemoys and Matsu,
have never been in the possession of the Commu-
nist regime on the mainland. It might be well
for us to recall that a last phase of the ground
fighting between Communists and Nationalists in
China was a Communist effort to take Quemoy
in October of 1949. Communist troops were
landed but were driven off by Nationalist forces
in a bitter battle. Just as in the case of the Ko-
" Bulletin of Oct. 7, 1957, p. 555.
Department of Sfafe Bulletin
mm armistice lines, the situation in the Formosa
Strait reflects essentially the actual military posi-
tion when the main fighting stopped. It is this
situation the Chinese Communists are now at-
tempting to alter by force.
Obviously when a government has certain ter-
ritories under its authority it does not easily
abandon them. The fact that the islands are
close to the mainland is hardly an excuse to seize
them. When one regime attempts by force to
take additional territory which has long been un-
der the authority of another government, world
order is endangered, especially when the two con-
testing parties are allied, each, respectively, with
one of two major powers.
The Republic of China is determined to hold
these territories, and that determination stems
from many factors.
The United States has a collective-defense
treaty with the Republic of China. Pursuant to
that treaty our country has given substantial mil-
itary assistance to the Republic. But it is agreed
between us that the use of force by either of the
signatories "will be a matter of joint agreement,
subject to action of an emergency character which
is clearly an exercise of the inherent right of self-
defense." 7 There has been no aggressive or of-
fensive use of force by the United States or by
the Republic of China against Communist China.
We are convinced that it is in the interest
neither of the United States, nor of its allies in
Asia, nor of the free world to retreat in the face
of a blatant display of force or of threats such
as those recently expressed in the letter of Chair-
man Khrushchev to President. Eisenhower. That
letter was couched in terms so gross that it was
unacceptable, and it had to be returned. 8 We be-
lieve that to fall back under such circumstances
would merely encourage the leadership of the
Sino-Soviet bloc in the false belief that it is in
a position to threaten anywhere and to force con-
cessions under a threat of force. Thus a retreat
would not mark the end. It would simply mean
that the bloc would continue with greater arro-
' Ibid., Jan. 24, 1955, p. 152.
9 For background, see ibid., Oct. 6, 1958, p. 530.
gance and perhaps with more miscalculation its
utter disregard for international law and order,
thus increasing the danger of general war.
Therefore we find that it is in our own inter-
ests to assist the Republic of China in the defense
of its present position. Moreover, we believe —
and I think you as distinguished jurists particu-
larly will understand this — that there should be
active public opinion in the world at large which
would recognize the danger and assist in making
it possible to achieve a cease-fire in the area. It
is our purpose to create an atmosphere in which
features that could reasonably be regarded as pro-
vocative might be eliminated through peaceful
negotiation. We are, of course, pledged to take
no action which would prejudice the rights of our
valiant ally, the Government of the Republic of
China.
The American Ambassador in Warsaw [Jacob
I). Beam] is, as you know, engaged in negotia-
tions with the Chinese Communist representative,
Ambassador Wang Ping-nan. This is a practi-
cal attempt, using customary diplomatic means,
to arrive at a peaceful settlement. Our objec-
tive, first, is to obtain a cease-fire in the area.
There have been five meetings thus far, but we
do not despair of the possibility that, even if no
formalized agreement is achieved, there may be
developed a situation of de facto tranquillity
comparable to that which has existed for most of
the time during the past 9 years. Should these
discussions fail, there could be further recourse
if necessary to the forum of the United Nations.
In any event, it is the purpose of the United
States to pursue every opportunity of achieving
a peaceful solution of a situation which is both
grave and dangerous.
Letters of Credence
Finland
The newly appointed Ambassador of Finland,
Richard Rafael Seppala, presented his credentials
to President Eisenhower on October 8. For texts
of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's
reply, see Department of State press release 588.
October 27, J 958
653
Components of Inter-American Understanding
by Roy R. Rubottom, Jr.
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs 1
The governments and peoples of Latin America
and the United States have traditionally been the
best of friends. This friendship is not only de-
rived from our geographical relationship, the
broad identity of our aims and interests, and our
similar traditions but from understanding of each
other's history, culture, political philosophies,
aspirations, and problems. You may be certain
that our policies are based on further strengthen-
ing these ties.
Kecently much public attention has been
focused on United States policy toward Latin
America. I trust that just as much soul search-
ing has gone into the examination of the policies
of Latin America toward the United States.
Today's challenge in this friendly setting of
America is principally that of understanding one
another. In Latin America there are serious mis-
understandings and misconceptions with respect
to the United States and its attitudes toward
Latin America. In the United States there is an
equally serious lack of understanding with respect
to Latin America. Both of these problems can
best be treated with the helping remedy of truth.
Let me review briefly what the United States
has done to ascertain the facts about Latin
America's situation during the past year and a
half. Early in 1957 we realized all too well the
extent of the adverse economic factors which were
creating problems for our friends to the south.
There began a series of factfinding visits to the
area by high officials of this Government who
wanted to learn about the problems at first hand.
In August of 1957 the Buenos Aires Economic
Conference gave Secretary of the Treasury Ander-
son an opportunity to visit Argentina, with a brief
stopover in Brazil. Mr. C. Douglas Dillon, Under
Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, and Mr.
Samuel C. Waugh, President of the Export-
Import Bank, were also on the delegation to the
conference and visited other countries en route. 2
In May of this year Vice President Nixon made
his eventful visit to eight South American coun-
tries, including Argentina, where he represented
President Eisenhower at the inauguration of
President Frondizi. 3 This was followed by a trip
in July to Central America and Panama by Dr.
Milton S. Eisenhower, as personal representative
of the President. 4 He was accompanied by Mr.
Waugh, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury
Tom Coughran, and Mr. Dempster Mcintosh,
Director of the Development Loan Fund.
Most recently Secretary Dulles visited Brazil,
where bilateral and hemisphere matters of interest
to the two countries were discussed with Presi-
dent Kubitschek and other high Brazilian of-
ficials. 5 I accompanied the Secretary and was
also on the other trips mentioned above.
While such visits as these do not in themselves
provide the solutions to the problems between the
United States and Latin America, they certainly
1 Address made before the Pacific Coast Council on
Latin American Studies at Santa Barbara, Calif., on Oct.
10 (press release 595 dated Oct. 9).
s For statements by President Eisenhower and Mr. Dil-
lon and text of the Economic Declaration of Buenos Aires.
see Bulletin of Sept. 30, 1957, p. 539.
* For remarks made by President Eisenhower and Vice
President Nixon on Mr. Nixon's return to Washington, see
ibid., June 9, 1958, p. 950.
1 For a statement made by Dr. Eisenhower on his return,
see Hid., Aug. 25, 1958, p. 309.
For texts of two joint communiques issued on Aug. 6
at the close of Secretary Dulles' visit, together with re-
marks and an address by Secretary Dulles, see ibid., p.
301.
654
Department of State Bulletin
indicate our deep interest, in the area and are
mentioned here to provide the necessary back-
ground against which to appraise the recent steps
taken by the Governments of the United States
and the other American Republics to meet with
positive action the complex problems confronting
them.
The meeting in "Washington 2 weeks ago between
the Foreign Ministers of the American Re-
publics was but the most recent of a series of
significant developments. 6 That meeting crystal-
lized in dramatic fashion the desire for coopera-
tion and mutual understanding and the determi-
nation jointly to tackle the serious problems which
are of concern to us all. It set into motion spe-
cific consultative processes aimed at concrete prob-
lems of economic development and trade. As the
Foreign Ministers themselves announced at the
end of their meeting, "a harmonious and care-
fully planned joint effort . . . will contribute
enormously to strengthening the solidarity of the
hemisphere and to the well-being of all Ameri-
cans."
A few weeks before the Foreign Ministers meet-
ing — on August 12 — Under Secretary Dillon an-
nounced that the United States was prepared to
consider the establishment of an inter-American
regional development institution. 7 Studies look-
ing forward to this additional resource for eco-
nomic improvement in the hemisphere are now in
process. Their completion was given a new note
of urgency by the American Foreign Ministers.
Since last June the United States has been par-
ticipating in an international coffee study group
established to examine coffee trade problems and
recommend measures to be taken to meet them.
The extension by the United States Congress this
year of the reciprocal trade agreement authoriza-
tion and the increase of $2 billion in the lending
authority of the Export-Import Bank are addi-
tional measures which will benefit Latin America
economically. Congress also took notice of another
important front and voted an increase of $2 mil-
lion in the Latin American educational and cul-
tural exchange program.
The foregoing are illustrative of the positive
steps which are being taken to fulfill our pledge
that, as Latin America's problems increase, our
6 For a Department announcement of the meeting and
text of communique approved on Sept. 24, see ibid., Oct.
13, 1958, p. 574.
7 Ibid., Sept. 1, 1958, p. 347.
desire to cooperate in finding solutions increases
correspondingly. They presage new efforts to-
ward understanding and toward progress on the
part of all concerned and testify to the effective-
ness of good will, fact finding, and international
cooperation in coping with the demands of an
ever-changing world. Now let us examine certain
of Latin America's aspirations and the extent to
which we have been able to identify ourselves
with them.
Economic Development
Nowhere in the world is there a greater demand
for economic development than from the people
of Latin America. Their population is increasing
explosively, approximately 2.7 percent per year,
the fastest in the world. Housing and educational
facilities are inadequate. The countries want to
industrialize just as fast as possible. Everywhere
I traveled over the past 5 months — and I covered
more than 50 thousand miles in visiting nearly
every country in Latin America — I heard similar
expressions : "We must have loans for housing —
for irrigation facilities — for new factories — for
modern equipment — for highways and railroads,
indeed for airplanes too — for schools." The list
is long.
The United States is trying to help Latin
America to meet some of these goals. Loans to
Latin American countries by the United States
Export-Import Bank totaled $2.2 billion during
the 10-year period from 1948 to 1958. This repre-
sented more than 40 percent of the total of all
loans made by the bank during that time. The
United States stands ready to make additional
loans for sound projects. Yet it becomes obvious
that, no matter what our desires to be helpful, we
can only meet a small part of the tremendous
capital needs for development out of public funds.
It is for that reason that we are convinced that
the main reliance for the rapid economic develop-
ment of Latin America must necessarily be placed
on private enterprise — not just from the United
States and other foreign sources but also from
domestic private sources. Fortunately, in our
opinion, these private resources are not only avail-
able to fill a need which public resources simply
are unable to fill, but they also have proven them-
selves to be efficient and effective down through
the years.
In the past 12 years the book value of direct
private United States investment in Latin
Ocfober 27, 1958
4S4S39— 58 3
655
America has grown from $3 billion to almost $9
billion, this accounting for more than one-third of
our total private investment abroad. The rate of
flow has been about $600 million annually, al-
though the 1957 total reached $1.3 billion. This
flow can be speeded up, provided conditions are
established which attract private capital.
Obviously, capital is most attracted to those
places where budgets are balanced, currencies are
properly valued, credit is held to manageable
proportions, and production is encouraged — in
short, where inflation has been held in check.
But the contribution of private capital cannot
be measured in money resources alone. Along
with it come the results of research, technology,
know-how, new skills, and new products, as well
as expanded opportunity for the individual and
a higher standard of living for all.
As Secretary Dulles stated in his address to
the United Nations General Assembly on Sep-
tember 18 : 8
The United States will undertake increased efforts to
emphasize the constructive role that private initiative can
play in economic development. We hope that other na-
tions will also explore these important potentialities.
In this connection I would like to emphasize
that the United States recognizes each country's
right to develop its resources as it sees fit. By the
same token, and recognizing the limitations on
public funds available for lending, we do not
wish to be misunderstood when we state that,
based on our own experience, these limited public
funds can only supplement and strengthen the ef-
forts of private enterprise and are not available as
a substitute for, or to compete with, private enter-
prise.
The record does show, however, that the United
States has loaned funds to state-owned enter-
prises where private capital was not available.
Without taking the time to mention all such in-
stances, we have authorized credits in Brazil,
Bolivia, Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, and
Mexico for the purpose of helping to develop
public-owned steel plants, hydroelectric power
installations, transportation systems, port im-
provements, and other projects.
Basic Commodities
There is need for sober discussion on the im-
portant subject of basic commodities. Certainly
'ma., Oct. 6, 1958, p. 525.
656
one of the major objectives of Latin Americans
is to receive stable and remunerative prices for
their primary commodities. We share this as-
piration, and indeed it is in our interest to have
them achieve it. It is generally agreed that
prices of primary commodities are subject to wider
fluctuations than are those of manufactured goods
and that in times of recession these prices tend
to drop sooner and farther than prices of manu-
factured products. To those countries whose
economies rest on one or a very few export prod-
ucts this fact illustrates all too clearly their
vulnerability.
I wish to emphasize that it would be a basic
error to assume that the United States is indiffer-
ent to or complacent about this general problem.
Quite the contrary. We recognize the serious
difficulties confronting many of the Latin Ameri-
can countries by reason of wide fluctuation in
prices of basic commodities. We recognize that
it is a problem vital to Latin America. We recog-
nize, moreover, that it is a mutual problem, that
violent fluctuations in prices help nobody but
speculators, and that depressed prices of raw
materials result immediately in lowered capacity
of Latin America to import from the United
States. We are, in short, deeply concerned with
this whole matter.
The United States has no ready or simple an-
swer to the complex problem of terms of trade
and primary commodity prices. Solutions pro-
posed in the past have usually tended to center
almost entirely upon the commodity agreement as
the instrument to stabilize commodity prices and
the relationship with manufactured products.
Recently there has been a growing understanding
of the technical complexity of commodity prob-
lems and an interest in a more careful analysis of
these problems aimed at finding areas of agree-
ment and of feasible cooperative effort. The
United States is prepared to sit down and discuss
these problems. We are prepared to examine
pragmatically and on a case-by-case basis the ques-
tion of what measures might offer a solution to
commodity problems. This, as you know, is what
we are doing in the case of coffee. AVe likewise
participate in the Committee of Basic Products
established in the Inter- American Economic and
Social Council in compliance with a recommenda-
tion of the Buenos Aires conference. The com-
munique of the American Foreign Ministers re-
Department of State Bulletin
leased at the close of the informal meeting in
Washington last month expressed the concern of
the Ministers over this very problem. It urged
consultations between interested members of the
Organization of American States, on a bilateral
and multilateral basis as well as with producer and
consumer countries of other geographic areas.
Whatever solutions may appear to be indicated,
I think it must be realized that there will be
definite limits to what the United States itself
can do. Aid in these problems, whether it be
monetary-stabilization loans or economic coopera-
tion in some other form, cannot do more than
provide time for sound policies by the affected
countries themselves to become effective. Aid will
be useless if it supports policies which run counter
to the fundamental forces of the market.
Regional Markets
The United States has followed with keen in-
terest Latin American proposals for attaining
closer economic integration as a means to promote
economic development. It is fully aware of the
studies made and those in process in the Economic-
Commission for Latin America. Only a few
months ago the Central American countries
signed a multilateral trade treaty and an agree-
ment on industrial integration, both of which
are now pending ratification.
This country has looked with favor upon the
European undertaking toward economic integra-
tion through a customs union or a free-trade area
designed to eliminate duties and other trade re-
strictions on substantially all intraregional trade
and, at the same time, to maintain duties on trade
with countries outside the area at approximately
current levels. It is also recognized that, in spe-
cific cases, exceptions in the application of these
criteria may be necessary. Each such exception
must be judged on its individual merit, and agree-
ment therewith must depend largely on assessment
of the extent to which it. would contribute to the
establishment of a true common market, to the
promotion of competition, and to the bringing
about of increased trade with nonmember coun-
tries as well as within the area.
Economic circumstances in Latin America are,
of course, quite different from those in Western
Europe, but the United States believes that the
possible advantages of closer Latin American eco-
nomic integration justify the careful consideration
now being given to this problem. It further be-
lieves that the integration sought would best be
advanced by regional agreements based on the
criteria above outlined, and it continues to stand
ready to assist, as appropriate, in financing eco-
nomically sound industries established under
agreements conforming to these criteria. Avail-
ability of such financing would likewise, the U.S.
believes, encourage private capital investment in
those industries.
Dedication to Democracy
In thinking about how best to convey the spirit
of devotion with which the United States holds to
democratic principles, I decided to use the words
of President Eisenhower addressed to the new
Ambassador of Venezuela [Marcos Falcon-
Briceno] last August :
The United States believes firmly in the democratic
elective process and the choice by the people, through
free and fair elections, of democratic governments re-
sponsive to them. Authoritarianism and autocracy, of
whatever form, are incompatible with the ideals of our
great leaders of the past. Free institutions, respect for
individual rights, and the inherent dignity of man are
the heritage of our Western civilization.
The price of this devotion has been the lives of
hundreds of thousands of U.S. citizens, given not
that we alone could be free but that others too
could have the kind of life they want.
There are some important corollaries to this
statement by the President. One is that states,
irrespective of size or place, are juridically equal.
Another is that states do not intervene in the
affairs of others, perhaps the most widely cher-
ished of all American credos. Still another, ap-
proved in 1948 at the Bogota conference, stated
that continuity of diplomatic relations among the
American states was desirable and declared that
the maintenance of such relations does not involve
any judgment of the internal policies of another
government. These principles, I would like to
reiterate, were not merely pious hopes. They
were formally voted on and agreed to by all the
American Republics, the United States included,
and form a large part, of the foundation on which
inter-American solidarity and cooperation rest.
Xow the mere restatement of such principles as
these does not automatically result in democracy.
In the first place democracy can only be achieved
from within a country when a people want it —
October 27, 1958
657
certainly nobody can impose it against a people's
will. Then I think we should recognize that de-
mocracy may assume different forms in different
countries. No two methods of government, any
more than two individuals, can be exactly alike.
Thus we should not be surprised when the emerg-
ing patterns of government, indeed democratic
government, differ from country to country.
Finally, on this subject, democracy is not
achieved all at once. It is a continuing process
of growth and development. Its attainment is the
result of the unselfish efforts of countless indi-
viduals who together mold a country along the
lines they want. We can be encouraged by the
progress made in the past few years. Democratic
institutions throughout the Americas have been
notably strengthened.
Mutuality of Understanding
The theme of mutuality has been woven
throughout my remarks tonight. Certainly the
problems we face in the Americas are mutual,
but. there is also a need for us to understand each
other better. We err just as much when we mis-
understand as we do when we lack the knowledge
on which understanding is based.
No matter how much the United States wants
to assist Latin America, there are limits on its
field of action and its power of decision. Many
factors are joined in the determination of what
the United States can and cannot do in any given
instance. Our friends must not forget that we
are a democracy. Such factors as public opinion,
congressional attitudes, and legislation itself must
be weighed in the scales. We are quite human
and finite and have the same kind of internal prob-
lems as do other countries themselves.
When considering problems related to eco-
nomic development, especially the provision of
needed capital, no outside assistance, whether
from public or private sources, will be truly ef-
fective in achieving strong, self-reliant economies
in the absence of rational, sound economic policies
to go with it. In fact, primary responsibility for
remedial action to solve economic problems rests
with the affected countries themselves, and the
most the United States can do is to assist in pro-
viding some of the missing ingredients.
It should not be overlooked that the U.S. is also
a "deA r eloping'' country. Our citizens work and
658
live in a dynamic, not a static, society. Our needs
are never fully met. To provide for this nation
in motion is a costly undertaking, especially when
more than half our budget is for national and
free- world defense; yet our people have not
flinched when called upon for individual and na-
tional cooperation. I think President Eisenhower
voiced a national realization when he told the
American Foreign Ministers only 16 days ago that
peace, prosperity, and security are in the long
run indivisible.
Fortunately the awareness that these problems
are indeed mutual and that each country must
work energetically and harmoniously to resolve
them is more widespread than ever before. This
sense of joint effort is in fact now a dynamic prin-
ciple in the American family. Let me refer once
again to the remarkable meeting of the Foreign
Ministers which took place last month as a graphic
and dramatic example of this. The American
Republics have fortunately developed over the
years a unity of purpose, spirit, and accomplish-
ment truly unique in the world. Our present sense
of solidarity, of the necessity for truly construc-
tive cooperation, and the awareness of the world
context in which events are transpiring make it
possible to foresee very effective joint action rooted
in mutual respect and clear understanding of each
other's problems, difficulties, and limitations. We
acknowledge human frailty and the finiteness of
all human endeavor, but we have faith in the
common ideals that unite us. If we can continue
to work together with courage, imagination,
mutual respect, and understanding, then I sug-
gest that it would not be too naive to expect the
American family to demonstrate to the world an
effective means of meeting the age-old challenges
of poverty, disease, security, and peace with jus-
tice, without at the same time sacrificing our
cherished ideals of freedom and the dignity of
the individual.
General Pulaski's Memorial Day, 1958
A PROCLAMATION 1
Whereas during the war for American independence
brave men from across the seas left their homelands to
fight by our side for the cause of liberty ; and
Whereas one of the most valiant of these warriors was
Casimir Pulaski, a Polish count who, after distinguishing
1 No. 3260 ; 23 Fed. Reg. 7833.
Department of Sfafo Bulletin
himself in several encounters, died at the age of thirty-one
from a wound received while leading a cavalry attack
to relieve the city of Savannah ; and
Wiiereas October 11, 195S, is the one hundred and
seventy-ninth anniversary of the death of this youthful
foe of tyranny, whose ideals and selfless purpose set a
glorious example to all men who are willing to give their
strength for freedom ; and
Whereas it is fitting that we should mark this anni-
versary with ceremonies designed to honor this gallant
Pole, who attained the rank of Brigadier General in our
Continental Army :
Now, therefore, I, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER,
President of the United States of America, do hereby
designate Saturday, October 11, 195S, as General Pulaski's
Memorial Day; and I direct that the flag of the United
States be displayed on all Government buildings on that
day. I also invite our people to observe the day with
suitable manifestations of respect for the memory of
General Castmir Pulaski and for the cause which com-
manded his allegiance.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and
caused the Seal of the United States of America to be
affixed.
Done at the City of Washington this seventh day of
October in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred
[seal] and fifty-eight, and of the Independence of the
United States of America the one hundred and
eighty-third.
X_J (^LS-yL^tZ-JO-*^* A*K^^
By the President :
John Foster Dulles,
Secretary of State.
U.S. Sells Antipolio Vaccine
to Poland
Press release 601 dated October 10
A cargo of Salk antipolio vaccine, purchased
by the Polish Government, is scheduled to leave
Indianapolis on October 12 by a U.S. commercial
airplane bound for Warsaw. This shipment will
provide the first round of antipolio inoculations
for 3 million Polish children of preschool age in
selected areas of Poland where poliomyelitis has
been prevalent in recent years. A further ship-
ment to provide a second round of shots for these
children will be made from the United States
later in the year.
An earlier program to inoculate children with
Salk vaccine began in the flooded areas in Poland
last July when the American Junior Red Cross
airshipped to the Polish Red Cross nearly 11,000
doses of antipolio vaccine. This was followed by
a program to inoculate the most vulnerable groups
in the Polish population, undertaken by the
Polish Medical Aid Project in cooperation with
CARE, through contributions of vaccine from
pharmaceutical companies in the United States.
Enough Salk vaccine was contributed to provide
for 900,000 inoculations. The Polish Medical Aid
Project enabled the Polish health authorities to
institute at an early date an expanded program to
combat the incidence of infantile paralysis in
Poland.
The U.S. and Polish Governments have agreed
to allocate $1,200,000 for the purchase of Salk
vaccine from funds available under the credits for
Poland administered by the Export-Import Bank.
The shipment which left Indianapolis on October
12 was purchased from these funds. Agencies of
the U.S. and Polish Governments have cooperated
in arranging to expedite the shipment of Salk
vaccine so that the first round of inoculations can
be completed by the end of October 1958.
This vaccine was licensed for shipment by the
Department of Commerce under the Export Con-
trol Act.
U.S. Seeks Further Information
From U.S.S.R. on Crashed Plane
Press release 587 dated October 7
Department Announcement
On October 3, 1958, the American Ambassador
to the U.S.S.R., Llewellyn E. Thompson, delivered
to Acting Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs
Vasili Kuznetsov a note requesting further in-
formation on the USAF C-130 transport plane
which crashed on September 2, 1958, in Soviet
Armenia. 1 Mr. Kuznetsov said that he would
convey the contents of the note to the appropriate
Soviet authorities.
Text of U.S. Note
October 3, 1958
The Embassy of the United States of America
refers to the following notes which have been ex-
changed in connection with the crash of a United
1 For background and texts of U.S. notes, see Bulletin
of Sept. 29, 1958, p. 505 ; Oct. 6, 1958, p. 531 ; and Oct. 20,
1958, p. 618.
October 27, 1958
659
States C-130 transport aircraft on September 2,
1958 : the Ministry's notes Nos. 52/OSA, Septem-
ber 12, 1958, and 57/OSA, September 19, 1958;
and the Embassy's notes Nos. 252, September 6,
1958, 270, September 13, 1958, and 291, September
21, 1958.
On September 24, a representative of the United
States Government received at the Soviet- Turkish
frontier near Leninakan the remains of six air-
men, transferred in accordance with the under-
taking of the Soviet Government in the Ministry's
note of September 19, 1958.
Although the Soviet Government has not given
identification of the crashed and burned aircraft
found 55 kilometers northwest of Yerevan, the
United States Government considers that the
wreckage mentioned in the Ministry's note of
September 12 is that of the missing C-130 trans-
port plane. Investigations undertaken by the
Headquarters of the United States Air Forces in
Europe (USAFE) and by the appropriate Turk-
ish authorities establish that the C-130 aircraft
was intercepted at about 2 P. M. on September 2
by Soviet fighter aircraft in the area of the Turk-
ish-Soviet frontier west of the Aragats Mountain
(Gora Aragats). The investigations also disclose
that this C-130 aircraft was last seen flying on an
easterly course in the direction of the mountain
and that the Soviet aircraft were then in close
proximity to it. A few minutes after the aircraft
disappeared, an explosion occurred and a large
column of smoke was seen rising from behind hills
in Soviet territory in the direction of Aragats
Mountain. In view of the proximity of the Soviet
fighter planes to the C-130 aircraft, it must be as-
sumed that the pilots of the Soviet aircraft in-
volved in this interception had knowledge of the
circumstances surrounding the crash of this un-
armed American aircraft.
The Government of the United States, there-
fore, is still unable to understand the assertions by
the Soviet Government that it has no knowledge
of the circumstances surrounding the crash of
the American aircraft. Nor does the United
States Government understand why the Soviet
Government appears unable to furnish any in-
formation regarding the whereabouts and condi-
tion of 11 members of the crew of this aircraft who
are unaccounted for and still missing. The
United States Government is prepared to extend
whatever assistance the Soviet Government might
consider helpful in the search for these missing
airmen.
As stated in the Embassy's note of September
13, the United States Government categorically
rejects the Ministry's charge that this American
aircraft intentionally violated Soviet airspace.
This aircraft, based in Germany, was engaged in
a routine flight over eastern Turkey and had filed
in advance a standard instrument flight plan in
accordance with international regulations. The
commanding officer of the aircraft was under
strict, standing orders not to violate Soviet air-
space and the Government of the United States is
convinced that he did not knowingly commit such
a violation.
Under these circumstances, the Government of
the United States repeats its request that complete
information be furnished regarding the where-
abouts and condition of the eleven members of the
crew of the aircraft who are still missing; that a
comprehensive report describing all pertinent facts
surrounding the crash of this American aircraft
be furnished the Embassy by the Soviet Govern-
ment ; and that United States Air Force technical
experts be permitted to examine the plane wreck-
age at the crash site. The United States Govern-
ment reserves the right to full compensation for
the loss of life incurred and for the loss of this air-
craft and its equipment.
U.S. Replies to Czechoslovak
Protest on Border Violations
Following is a Department announcement and
the text of a U.S. note to the Czechoslovak Ministry
of Foreign Affairs (press release 578 dated October
#), together with the text of the Czechoslovak
note to the U.S. Embassy at Prague.
DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT
In a note delivered on September 25, 1958, to
the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs by
the American Embassy at Prague, the U.S. Gov-
ernment documents the innocent nature of recent
violations of the Czechoslovak frontier by Ameri-
can citizens and expresses the hope that the
Czechoslovak Government would "take steps to
permit the immediate departure from Czecho-
660
Department of State Bulletin
Slovakia" of Pfc. Andrew A. Bellrichard of Ne-
koosa, Wis., Pvt. Cole Youngert of Detroit, Mich.,
and Specialist Fourth Class John Kennedy of
Philadelphia, Pa. The U.S. note, which replies
to a Czechoslovak note of September 16, 1958, also
refers to the 2-week detention of M. Sgt. James
E. Cole of Connellsville, Pa., who has indicated
that he was forced into Czechoslovakia at gun-
point by Czechoslovak border guards, and to the
detention of John B. Hardcastle of Nashville,
Tenn., an American student. The U.S. note con-
cludes that the American Embassy expects that,
in all cases in which U.S. citizens are apprehended
within the borders of Czechoslovakia, U.S. repre-
sentatives will be granted immediate access to the
individuals detained, in accordance with interna-
tional comity and practice, and permitted to be
present at any trial which may be held.
U.S. NOTE OF SEPTEMBER 25
The Embassy of the United States presents its
compliments to the Czechoslovak Ministry of For-
eign Affairs and has the honor to refer to the
Ministry's protest of September 16, 1958 which
refers to the unauthorized crossings of the Czecho-
slovak border by citizens of the United States.
The Embassy acting under instructions would like
to review briefly the facts of the incidents which
are the subject of these protests.
Master Sergeant James E. Cole
Sergeant Cole disappeared on the morning of
June 10, 1958 while fishing with a relative on the
Dyje River near Hardegg on the Austro-Czecho-
slovak border. At the time of his disappearance,
he was on authorized military leave from his unit
in Germany and was visiting his wife's family in
Austria. The Czechoslovak Border Guards as-
sert that Sergeant Cole stepped onto an island in
the river and, by so doing, violated Czechoslovak
territory. Sergeant Cole has stated under oath
that he did not leave the Austrian side of the
river until forced to do so at gun point by Czecho-
slovak Border Guards. Sergeant Cole's state-
ments have been carefully investigated and have
been corroborated by all available evidence.
Even if the Czechoslovak Border Guard version
were correct, it is difficult for the United States
to understand how a transgression under such
circumstances could be branded as a "criminal
offense" and justify the three months' sentence im-
posed by the People's Court of Justice at Brno.
Sergeant Cole was incarcerated from June 10 to
June 24. Although he repeatedly requested ac-
cess to American officials, he was held incommuni-
cado throughout his entire period of detention.
The Government of the United States was how-
ever gratified that Sergeant Cole was not required
to complete the term of the sentence but was en-
abled to depart from Czechoslovakia on June 24,
1958.
John B. Hardcastle
American student John B. Hardcastle and two
youthful companions visited the Austro- Czecho-
slovak border early in the afternoon of August 9,
1958. Mr. Hardcastle expressed the desire to be
photographed while standing on the barrier across
the road leading into Czechoslovakia. While
doing so, he was arrested by two Czechoslovak
Border Guards armed with machine guns. Three
days of interrogation apparently convinced the
Czechoslovak authorities that Mr. Hardcastle was
not motivated by any evil intent and he was al-
lowed to return to Austrian territory on August
12, 1958. Once again, United States authorities
were not permitted access to an American citizen
jailed in Czechoslovakia, and the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs as late as August 12 maintained that
it had no knowledge of the incident.
Andrew A. Bellrichard
Private First Class Bellrichard disappeared
from his post on the German side of the German-
Czechoslovak border about noon on July 7, 1958
after having been found asleep on duty some hours
previously by a fellow soldier. Fearing that he
would be punished for his negligence, Private
Bellrichard, while apparently emotionally dis-
turbed as a result of this incident, crossed into
Czechoslovak territory, attracting attention to
himself by firing three random bursts from the
automatic weapon he was carrying. On August
15, 1958 he was sentenced by the District Court at
Pilsen to two years' imprisonment for illegal
border crossing. This severe sentence was upheld
by the Czechoslovak Supreme Court, and Private
Bellrichard has begun serving his term. Pro-
longed interrogation of this soldier by the Czecho-
slovak authorities must have established the facts
as they are stated above. Accordingly while the
Czechoslovak border may have been violated in a
Ocfober 27, 1958
661
technical sense, once again it appears perfectly
clear that this was not covert entry for inimical
purposes which could justify the punishment im-
posed.
Private Cole Youngert and Specialist John P.
Kennedy
Although these two American soldiers have been
in Czechoslovak custody since August 24, 1958
access to them has not been permitted, and there-
fore it has not been possible to determine the cir-
cumstances of their entry into Czechoslovakia.
It has been ascertained however that these
soldiers became intoxicated on the evening of Au-
gust 23 in Weiden, Germany and that they took
a taxicab from Weiden to the German Custom
House at Waidhaus near the Czechoslovak border.
The taxi driver has reported seeing these men dis-
appear in the direction of Czechoslovakia, but no
additional information is available to United
States authorities.
In spite of the best intentions and careful con-
trols, border violations are bound to occur. Al-
though the Government of the United States has
made every effort to prevent violations of Czech-
oslovak territory by American citizens and will
continue to do so, it is only realistic to recognize
that incidents such as those outlined above will
happen and should not be regarded as an affront
to the sovereignty of the country whose border
may have been violated in a technical sense. The
United States believes the Czechoslovak authori-
ties should bear in mind that the innocent nature
of the action in each individual case is proved by
the openness of each incident and the absence of
any evidence whatsoever that the individuals con-
cerned acted with any intent to damage Czech-
oslovak interests.
Incidents of this type may be handled in a
friendly and cooperative manner as is the usual
international practice or they may be magnified
into a major issue. The extreme sensitivity dis-
played by the Czechoslovak authorities in rela-
tion to these cases is regrettable. It is hoped that
after reconsideration the Government of Czech-
oslovakia will take steps to permit the immediate
departure from Czechoslovakia of the three sol-
diers still in custody. It is also hoped that the
Czechoslovak authorities will demonstrate a more
cooperative attitude in future so that technical
border violations of an obviously innocent char-
acter will not be made to interfere with the de-
velopment of better relations between Czecho-
slovakia and the United States. The Embassy
expects that in all cases when United States citi-
zens are apprehended within the borders of Czech-
oslovakia, United States representatives will, in
accordance with accepted international comity
and practice, be promptly notified, granted im-
mediate access to the individuals detained, and
permitted to be present at any trial which may
be held.
The Embassy of the United States of America
avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs the assurances of its
high consideration.
CZECHOSLOVAK NOTE OF SEPTEMBER 16
Unofficial translation
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compli-
ments to the Embassy of the United States of America
and with reference to the Embassy's notes No. 37 of
August 29, 1958 l and No. 42 of September 4, 1958, 1 has the
honor to advise that the number of unauthorized crossings
of the Czechoslovak border by United States citizens is
increasing constantly in spite of the repeated assurances
by the Embassy of the United States of America that
all necessary measures would be taken to prevent this
from happening.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs lodges the strongest
protest against these lately ever more numerous cross-
ings, among which belongs also the case of Andrew A.
Bellrichard, and expects that the American authorities
will immediately take measures to prevent the repetition
of similar incidents in the future.
As the Embassy was already advised by the note of
August 19, 1958, Private First Class Andrew A. Bell-
richard crossed the Czechoslovak border without per-
mission, with a firearm in his bands. For this unauthor-
ized crossing of the border, he was sentenced by the
District Court at Plzen to 2 years of deprivation of
liberty and an accessory punishment of expulsion from
the territory of Czechoslovakia. In view of an appeal
lodged by Andrew A. Bellrichard, his case was brought
before the Supreme Court in Praha, which upheld and
confirmed the sentence passed by the District Court,
so far as the punishment of deprivation of liberty and
the accessory penalty of expulsion are concerned.
As to the protest of the Embassy of the United States
of America that a representative of the Embassy was
barred from the appeals trial as an observer, the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs advises that the Czechoslovak authori-
ties permitted the Embassy of the United States of
America to pay a consular visit to Andrew A. Bellrichard,
prior to the date on which the sentence acquires legal
power. The public was not permitted to be present at
the appeals trial on the basis of Section 215 Paragraph
1 Not printed here.
662
Department of State Bulletin
1 of the Czechoslovak Penal Code for reasons of endanger-
ing State secrets/Reconstruction of the offense, proved
by photographs/ ; thus it was impossible for a representa-
tive of the Embassy to attend the appeals trial. The
Ministry would like further to advise that, according to
a communication of the competent Czechoslovak authori-
ties, the sentenced Bellrichard has already started to
serve his sentence of deprivation of liberty.
Another proof of the fact that no improvement has
been effected by the American authorities in the case of
frontier Incidents, is a fresh case of an unauthorized
crossing of the Czechoslovak border by Private Cole
Toungert and Specialist John Kennedy, mentioned in the
Embassy's note No. 42 of September 4, 1958, who, accord-
ing to a communication from the competent Czechoslovak
authorities, are within the territory of Czechoslovakia.
As soon as the Ministry is in possession of further informa-
tion relating to the investigation carried out in this
respect, it will not fail to inform the Embassy thereof.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs avails itself of this
opportunity to renew to the Embassy of the United States
of America the assurances of its high consideration.
Praha, September 16, 195S.
World Bank Makes Loan in Brazil
for Hydroelectric Project
The World Bank announced on October 3 that
it had made a loan equivalent to $73 million in
Brazil for the first stage of the largest hydroelec-
tric project ever undertaken in Latin America.
The completed project will bring an increase
equal to 50 percent of the power capacity now
available in central-southern Brazil, the area in
which four-fifths of Brazil's industry and much
of the agricultural activity is concentrated. The
loan is, with the exception of that made 2 years
ago for the Kariba Dam in Rhodesia, the largest
the bank has ever made for a single project.
This project is the first in which private compa-
nies have joined official Brazilian agencies to
carry out a large power development. Hitherto,
additions to generating capacity in Brazil have
been undertaken by private power companies to
meet their own requirements or by public bodies
set up to exploit particular reaches of the main
rivers. In this case the borrower is Central Ele-
trica de Furnas, S.A., a joint enterprise formed
1% years ago to construct, own, and operate the
new plant. The common stock of the company,
representing 50 percent of the equity capital, is
held by the Brazilian Government, by the State
of Sao Paulo, and by CEMIG (a corporation
owned by the State of Minas Gerais) ; all three
of these stockholders have already received bank
loans for power enterprises. The greater part
of the preferred stock is held by private compa-
nies — 51 percent by Sao Paulo Light Co., an
affiliate of the Brazilian Traction, Light and
Power Co. of Canada (already a bank borrower),
and 9 percent by Companhia Paulista de Forca e
Luz, an affiliate of the American and Foreign
Power Co.
The power station, to be built at Furnas Rapids
on the Rio Grande 200 miles north of Siio Paulo,
will ultimately have a capacity of 1,100,000 kilo-
watts, of which about 460,000 kilowatts will be
installed as the first stage. The earth- and rock-
fill dam will be nearly 400 feet high and will
create a reservoir 150 miles long, having sufficient
storage capacity to provide year-to-year regula-
tion of the flow to the power station. Three
other hydroelectric stations, one of them bank-
financed, are already in operation or under con-
struction on the Rio Grande. But the potential
of this river is so immense that, even after the
completion of Furnas, only about one-fifth of
the total will have been realized.
All the power generated at Furnas will be sold
in bulk to private and public suppliers in the
States of Minas Gerais and Sao Paulo. The de-
mand for power in the various parts of the area
to be served by the new power station is growing
at between 9 and 14 percent annually. By 1970
it is expected to have increased more than three-
fold.
The main industrial concentration in the area
to be served is around the city of Sao Paulo. In-
dustry is also rapidly expanding northward. The
manufacture of motorcars, trucks, and tractors,
chemical and metallurgical production, oil refin-
ing, and many other industries are already estab-
lished, and as new products are introduced the
need for power will continue to rise. Belo Hori-
zonte, capital of the State of Minas Gerais, is the
center of Brazil's iron, manganese, bauxite, and
other mineral production and has a large steel
mill. Nearly 60 percent of power sales in the
area is already accounted for by industrial and
commercial users.
Construction of access roads and service build-
ings at Furnas is well under way. The civil-works
contract has been allotted, after international
bidding, to a British firm in association with a
Brazilian contractor. A U.S. firm has been ap-
Oc/ober 27, J 958
663
pointed as consultant. Contracts for electrical
equipment are to be placed within the next 6
months, and the project is expected to be com-
pleted by the middle of 1963. Since the capacity
included in the first stage is likely to be needed
at once, it is planned that work on the second
stage will follow quickly and be completed by
1965.
The cost of the first stage is estimated at the
equivalent of approximately $210 million. The
bank's loan will cover the foreign-exchange ex-
penditure included in this total. The balance will
be met by share capital supplemented by loans
from the National Development Bank of Brazil
and the Federal Electrification Fund.
The loan is for a term of 25 years, with repay-
ment starting on April 1, 1964. The rate of in-
terest, including the 1 percent commission charged
on bank loans and added to its special reserve, is
5% percent. The loan is guaranteed by the Gov-
ernment of Brazil.
Exemption of Functions
Under Mutual Security Act
White House press release dated October 1
WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT
The President on October 1 issued an Execu-
tive order specifying laws from which functions
authorized by the Mutual Security Act of 1954,
as amended, shall be exempt.-
Under section 533 of the Mutual Security Act
of 1954, as amended, the President is authorized
to waive various restrictive provisions of law as
they relate to the mutual security program. The
waivers are made in furtherance of purposes de-
clared in the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as
amended. The laws which may be waived are
those regulating the making, performance, amend-
ment, or modification of contracts and the ex-
penditure of Government funds.
The order of October 1, which continues in
force a number of prior waivers, extends them
in two respects:
(1) With respect to contracts entered into
with foreign governments or agencies thereof for
the rendering of services to the United States or
to an agency thereof within the continental limits
of the United States, this order waives the statute
requiring that Government contracts include pro-
visions for the examination of the records of con-
tractors by the General Accounting Office (section
1 (h)). This waiver will be used principally in
connection with interpreter services obtained by
contract from foreign governments.
(2) The Government agencies concerned —
principally the International Cooperation Ad-
ministration — will be authorized to amend cer-
tain contracts with nonprofit institutions without
regard to the legal requirements of consideration
(section 3). This change will facilitate the cor-
rection of inequities arising under long-term con-
tracts with universities.
EXECUTIVE ORDER 10784 >
Specification of Laws From Which Functions Au-
thorized by the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as
Amended, Shall Be Exempt
By virtue of the authority vested in me by section 533
of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, 68 Stat. 860 (22
U. S. C. 1793), it is hereby determined that, to the extent
hereinafter indicated, the performance of functions au-
thorized by that act, as amended (including: the perform-
ance of functions authorized by section 544 thereof),
without regard to the laws specified in the lettered sub-
divisions of sections 1 and 2 of this order and without
regard to consideration as specified in section 3 of this
order will further the purposes of the Mutual Security
Act of 1954, as amended :
Section 1. With respect to functions authorized by the
Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended (22 U. S. C.
1750 et scq.), except those exercised by the Department
of Defense under authority of sections 521 and 524 of
that act (22 U. S. C. 1781, 1784) :
(a) The act of March 26, 1934, c. 90, 4S Stat. 500, as
amended (15 U. S. C. 616a).
(b) Section 3648 of the Revised Statutes, as amended,
60 Stat. S09 (31 U. S. C. 529).
(c) Section 305 of the Federal Property and Adminis-
trative Services Act of 1949, c. 288, 63 Stat. 396, as
amended (41 U. S. C. 255).
( d ) Section 3709 of the Revised Statutes, as amended
(41 U. S. C. 5).
(e) Section 3710 of the Revised Statutes (41 U. S. C.
S).
(f) Section 2 of Title III of the act of March 3, 1933,
c. 212, 47 Stat. 1520 (41 U. S. C. 10a).
(g) Section 3735 of the Revised Statutes (41 U. S. C.
13).
(h) Section 304 (c) of the Federal Property and Ad-
ministrative Services Act of 1949, as added by the act of
October 31, 1951, c. 652, 65 Stat. 700 (41 U. S. C. 254 (c) ),
but only with respect to contracts entered into with for-
eign governments or agencies thereof for the rendering of
'23 Fed. Reg. 7691.
664
Department of State Bulletin
services to the United States or an agency thereof within
the continental limits of the United States.
(i) Section 901 of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, c.
S5S, 49 Stat. 2015, as amended (-16 U. S. C. 1241 (a)).
Sec. 2. With respect to purchases authorized to be
made outside the continental limits of the United States
under the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended :
(a) Section 2276 (a) of title 10 of the United States
Code.
(b) Section 2313 (b) of title 10 of the United States
Code.
(c) Section 304 (e) of the Federal Property and Ad-
ministrative Services Act of 1949, as added by the act of
October 31, 1951, e. 652, 65 Stat. 700 (41 U. S. C. 254 (c) ).
(d) Section 1301 of the Second War Powers Act, 1942,
c. 199, 56 Stat. 185 (50 U. S. C. App. 643), as extended
by the provisions of the act of June 30, 1953, c. 169, 67
Stat 120.
Sec. 3. With respect to cost-type contracts heretofore
or hereafter made under authority of the Mutual Security
Act of 1954, as amended, with non-profit institutions
under which no fee is charged or paid, amendments and
modifications of such contracts may be made with or
without consideration and may be utilized to accomplish
the same things as any original contract could have ac-
complished, irrespective of the time or circumstances of
the making, or the form of the contract amended or modi-
fied, or of the amending or modifying contract, and irre-
spective of rights which may have accrued under the
contract or the amendments or modifications thereof.
This order supersedes Executive Order No. 10519 of
March 5, 1954 (3 CFR, 1954 Supp., p. 48) ,' entitled
"Specifications of Laws from Which Functions Author-
ized by Mutual Security Act of 1951, as Amended, Shall
Be Exempt"
A
(^KS-y C^tA^J C*-*U-l» Asv^s^
TnE White House,
October 1, 1958.
Japanese Trade Mission
Visits United States
Press release 603 dated October 10
The Japanese Trade Mission headed by Heitaro
Inagaki, president of the Japan Foreign Trade
Council, Inc., arrived at Washington October 9
for a 6-week tour of the United States, which
will take its members to Xew York, Providence,
Boston, Chicago, Atlanta, New Orleans, Dallas,
Los Angeles, Portland, San Francisco, and
Seattle.
' Bulletin of Mar. 29, 1954, p. 481.
Ocfober 27, J 958
The mission consists of 11 Japanese business-
men representing various branches of Japanese
industry and commerce and two Government offi-
cials representing the Ministries of Foreign Af-
fairs and of International Trade and Industry.
The leader of the mission, Mr. Inagaki, is a
former Minister of International Trade and In-
dustry.
The program of the mission's 6-day visit at
Washington, which opened with a call on the As-
sistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs,
Thomas C. Mann, on October 10, includes calls at
the Departments of Commerce, Interior, and
Agriculture, and the Export-Import Bank. As-
sistant Secretary Mann held a reception in honor
of the mission at the President's Guest House on
October 10.
A conference at the U.S. Chamber of Com-
merce, followed by a luncheon of the Japan-
America Society of Washington, will conclude
the program of the mission's visit to Washington
on October 15.
The Japanese Trade Mission has come to the
United States in response to an invitation issued
by the U.S. Trade Mission which visited Japan
last spring. The Japanese Trade Mission to the
United States has the same purpose as previous
U.S. Trade Missions to Japan, namely, to pro-
mote good will and trade between the two nations.
Ghana To Receive American Corn
To Combat Food Shortage
Press release 594 dated October 8
An agreement to supply $650,000 worth of yel-
low-dent corn to Ghana under the Agricultural
Trade Development and Assistance Act (P. L.
480) was signed on October 8 by the Govern-
ments of the United States and Ghana. The
agreement was signed for Ghana by R. M. Akwei,
second secretary of the Embassy of Ghana, at the
office of Stuart H. Van Dyke, regional director
of the Intel-national Cooperation Administration.
The agreement under title II of P. L. 480 will
permit the early shipment of the 5,000 tons of
corn to Ghana, where it will be used to combat
food shortages which have developed as a result
of extremely dry weather conditions in the areas
of South Mamprusi, Nanumba, Dagomba, and
Gonja, which have a population of about 400,000.
665
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
U. N. Committee Agrees on Procedure
for Disarmament Items
Statements oy Henry Cabot Lodge
U.S. Representative to the General Assemhly
STATEMENT OF OCTOBER 8 >
The United States is glad that the Soviet Union
considers that the disarmament question as a whole
should he considered first in this committee, al-
though we disagree with the Soviet proposal that
the item on the discontinuance of tests should be
put ahead of the other disarmament items. Let
me say that this is an unusual procedure; it is
distinctly out of the ordinary. The usual practice
is to take these items in the order in which they
have been introduced. In the total list of agenda
items for the 13th regular session of the General
Assembly the question of disarmament appears as
item 64; the question of the discontinuance of
atomic and hydrogen weapons tests is item 70 ; and
the question of the reduction of the military budg-
ets of the Soviet Union, the United States, the
United Kingdom, and France is item 72. And of
course this is reflected in document A/C.l/806, 2 in
which disarmament is item 4, the discontinuance
of tests item 7, and the reduction of military budg-
ets item 8. Naturally, the question of the dis-
continuance of tests is going to be discussed here.
The procedure which we propose, which is to dis-
cuss these items as a group, will permit the Soviet
representative to deal with the discontinuance of
tests first if he wishes to do so, and it will enable
any other member of the committee to discuss that
item first if he so desires. But we think that test-
ing is only one part of the many complex issues
involved in disarmament, and by no means the
most dangerous. Action on it alone would not
bring us closer to our goal of universal disarma-
ment under effective control.
J Made in Committee I (Political and Security) (U.S.
delegation press release 3010) .
' "Allocation of agenda items to the First Committee."
666
All that we are proposing is that we should pro-
ceed here in a way that would permit each one of
us to deal with the subject of disarmament in the
way which he believes would be the most con-
structive. We do not think that any one member
should seek to impose its way of discussing the
subject on other members. Let each member
choose for itself how it wants to discuss this ques-
tion and the three items that make up the total
disarmament problem.
I say in passing that, of course, I reject the
Soviet representative's insinuation that those who
do not agree with him are not interested in prompt
results on disarmament. That kind of talk is very
regrettable and certainly has no justification as far
as the United States is concerned, because Presi-
dent Eisenhower has made it abundantly clear how
anxious we are to obtain an agreement for the
suspension of tests.
We think that the First Committee not only
should take up disarmament as the first item of
business — that is, items 4, 7, and 8 of our agenda,
all of which relate directly to disarmament — but
that the committee should now decide to discuss
these three items as a group in such a way that they
can be discussed together, if a representative
wishes to do so ; or, if a representative wishes to
discuss them separately in any order which he may
desire, he can do so.
The procedure which we advocate follows past
practices. I have looked up the precedents and I
find that at the sixth session the First Committee
discussed simultaneously agenda item 1 — regula-
tion, limitation and reduction of all armed forces —
and item 2 — international control of atomic en-
ergy : report of the Committee of Twelve. I find
that at the ninth session the First Committee con-
sidered simultaneously agenda item 1 — regulation,
limitation and the balanced reduction of all
armed forces and armaments : report of the Dis-
armament Commission — and agenda item 2 — con-
clusion of an international convention on the re-
duction of armaments and the prohibition of
atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass de-
Department of State Bulletin
struction. Thus, this is our usual way of doing
things. Besides, it is a convenient way; it will
promote orderly discussion. The three items are
in themselves interrelated. Were we to consider
each individually, we would waste valuable time
by duplication of discussion.
Let me repeat: This does not prevent anyone
from speaking on each item if he wishes to, or
from covering all of them in a single statement if
he so desires. It does not in any way prejudge
what kind of action the committee may ultimately
take. We already have before us two proposals
on one item, and undoubtedly there will be others.
The procedure which we propose will not exclude
separate voting; there will be separate votes on
each proposal should the committee decide to pro-
ceed in that way.
If the procedure which we suggest is adopted,
each representative would be able to speak to any
aspect of a question and there would be no need
to change the order of the items that already ap-
pear on the agenda. We believe that the commit-
tee should not now decide on the order of the
remaining items of the agenda but should content
itself at this meeting with taking this decision on
the disarmament contemplation as a whole.
[In a further intervention Mr. Lodge said:]
I will be guided by the desires of the committee
as far as voting today or tomorrow is concerned.
I merely want to take one minute to say that
the United States is anxious to have progress in
this field. We see the possibility of progress in
the talks to begin on October 31 3 and on Novem-
ber 10. 4 We therefore think that this committee
should avoid three separate debates on disarma-
ment, which we contend is what the Soviet pro-
posal amounts to. We think that dealing with
the three items — that is, item 4, item 7, and item
8 — as part of one disarmament debate gives full
scope for full debate without delay, and we hope
that this will be the decision of the committee.
FIRST STATEMENT OF OCTOBER 9«
Let me first say that there is absolutely no foun-
dation for the statements which have been made
' For background, see Bulletin of Sept. 8, 1958, p. 378,
and Sept. 29, 1958, p. 503.
* For background, see p. 648.
'Made in Committee I (Political and Security) (U.S.
delegation press release 3011).
here today that the United States desires a new
item, or that the United States desires to reword
existing items, or that we are going to ask for a
meeting of the General Committee. I really think
I know what the United States proposal is and
that I am in a better position to describe it than
are those who have described it so erroneously.
The proposition of the United States, if
adopted, would mean that the agenda of the First
Committee will read as follows— I will read it out
with all the punctuation marks, so that members
can be perfectly clear as to what our proposal is :
1. Question of disarmament.
2. The discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapons
tests.
3. The reduction of the military budgets of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of
America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, and France by 10-15 percent and the
use of part of the savings so effected for assistance to
the under-developed countries.
That is how the agenda of the committee would
read if our proposal were adopted.
We think that these three items would be con-
sidered together. Each representative could deal
with them as he saw fit. He can discuss them
separately. He could take them up in any order
he wished. He could talk about all three in one
speech.
It is obvious that these three items are inter-
related. All of them deal with different aspects
of disarmament. We think that the most prac-
tical and most efficient way to deal with them is
in the way that I have proposed. It does not
prejudge in any way the committee's eventual
decision on the result of our discussions.
Now, as far as the question raised by the rep-
resentatives of Mexico and of Panama is con-
cerned — and I understand they did not make mo-
tions, they raised questions — we think this: that
the committee should decide at the time in what
order it wishes to take up specific resolutions.
Now, we could not decide today in what order
to take up resolutions if we wanted to because we
do not know what all the resolutions are. Two
resolutions are pending, but I know of one that
has not been introduced yet and will be intro-
duced. And I have heard rumors of several
others.
So it is, of course, an absolute practical im-
possibility for us to decide here this afternoon in
what order we are going to take up the resolutions
Ocfober 27, 7958
667
when we end our general debate. The only time
we can make that decision is after the general de-
bate is over, and then we can decide it in the light
of the debate — which we hope will lead to some
enlightenment — and in the light of the resolutions
which are before us at the time.
I do not think we can say now that when the
general debate is over we are going to limit our-
selves to resolutions which correspond exactly
with the limits of each agenda item. It seems to
me that, if a member wants to introduce a resolu-
tion which deals with subjects that are included
in various agenda items, he has got a right to do
it. That happens here all the time. To seek to
limit the discussion in that way would, we think,
be self-defeating.
We do not think that the question of tests
should be singled out and put first either today or
after the general debate is over. We say that be-
cause we think tests are part of the whole con-
templation and also because we do not think that
tests are by any means the most dangerous aspect
of this whole question. Furthermore, we do not
think that the decision to put tests first can be
accurately called a procedural motion.
It follows from what I have said, therefore, Mr.
President, that we would be agreeable to your
proposal No. 1 — your compromise proposal No.
1 — which would have a general debate on these
three items together and then leave for a later
stage the question of how we will deal with the
resolutions. We think that is a good compromise
and we would support that.
SECOND STATEMENT OF OCTOBER 9«
Certain remarks that have been made lead me
to ask the indulgence of the committee for just
one minute to say that the United States wants
to move ahead on this whole subject. We are
getting our hopes up about Geneva because it is
the first sign of progress on the cessation of tests.
In fact, it is the indispensable first step.
Let me tell the committee that we hope to intro-
duce a resolution with a number of other co-
sponsors very soon which will clearly show to all
the world the importance which we attach to this
first step.
We think that we here in this committee have
the opportunity to do something that bids fair to
get some real results on this matter of cessation
of nuclear tests, and that is the spirit which
animates us. 7
International Cooperation
in Field of Atomic Energy
by John A.M. cC one
Chairman, U. S. Atomic Energy Commission 1
Mr. President [Tjondronegoro Sudjarwo of
Indonesia], my delegation wishes to thank you for
assuming the tasks of presiding at this meeting
and to congratulate you on your skillful handling
of the problems that have arisen. I personally
feel that as you attend international conferences
of various kinds in the future you will find
yourself, because of your knowledge of procedure,
sitting in an elevated chair and, therefore, unable
to enjoy the flexibility and latitude of other dele-
gates.
It is a great honor to represent my country at
this General Conference and to participate in its
deliberations. We hope our work here will lead
to the adoption of policies which will enable the
Agency to progress more rapidly toward a realiza-
tion of the basic objective stated in its charter,
and that is: "to accelerate and enlarge the con-
tribution of atomic energy to peace, health, and
prosperity throughout the world."
What is said and done at this conference may
well determine the future of the Agency as a
significant force in the field of the peaceful appli-
cation of nuclear energy.
I deeply believe in this Agency — in its purpose,
its hopes, and in its expectations. More important
than my personal views, however, are those of my
Government.
States stands firm in its support and resolute in
I can assure this conference that the United
its conviction that the Agency offers to men of
good will throughout the world a response to the
"Made in Committee I (Political and Security) (U.S.
delegation press release 3012).
7 Committee I on Oct. 9 adopted the procedure advo-
cated by the United States by a vote of 50 to 9 (Soviet
bloc), with 19 abstentions.
1 Remarks made at the 2d General Conference of the
International Atomic Energy Agency at Vienna on Sept.
25. Mr. MeCone was chairman of the U.S. delegation.
668
Department of State Bulletin
challenge "to find the way by which the miracu-
lous inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated
to his death, but consecrated to his life."
The United States is prepared to exert all pos-
sible effort to maintain the Agency as the organi-
zation of primary importance in the field of inter-
national cooperation. This means that we will
botli initiate and we will support programs
designed to strengthen and to advance the Agency
as the preeminent international body in its field
of competence.
As time and experience progress, and consistent
with our existing obligations, the United States
will look to the Agency as the major institutional
channel through which international peaceful-use
programs of the United States will be carried for-
ward.
Basis for Cooperative Programs
The recently concluded United Nations Inter-
national Conference on the Peaceful Uses of
Atomic Energy demonstrated the importance of
international cooperation. The great wealth of
technological material on civilian applications of
the atom presented at Geneva provides a basis for
specific programs which this Agency is uniquely
qualified to undertake.
The United States welcomes and endorses the
statement by the Japanese delegate signifying
the intention of his Government to request this
Agency to administer the safeguards provided in
the agreement for cooperation between the
United States and Japan and to do this when the
Agency is prepared to undertake this service.
The vigor and imagination with which Japan is
developing a program for peaceful utilization of
atomic energy indicates the speed with which the
Agency must move in this area. This work must
be put in hand at once if the Agency is to assume
this function, which the Japanese Government
and the U.S. Government in consultation intend
to request. We therefore join wholeheartedly
witli the Japanese delegation in support of an
immediate approach to this task on the part of the
Secretariat.
We are convinced that in this new field there
are many important matters which must be dealt
with on an international basis. Such matters in-
clude the necessary development of universal
standards and regulations relating to protection
against hazards of radiation, the enactment of an
international convention to meet the problems of
third-party liability, and the careful utilization
of technical manpower. Only an international
organization such as this Agency can meet these
and other similar issues.
I would like to speak particularly to the ques-
tion of third-party liability. It has been referred
to by several of the speakers who addressed this
conference yesterday. It is my opinion and the
opinion of my delegation that these references are
an order to the Director General to immediately
institute necessary studies and proposals for ac-
tion.
It seems to me, Mr. President, and to my Gov-
ernment, that this conference must make a frank
and open appraisal of the problems before us.
We must unite in a constructive effort to resolve
them just as we united in September 1956 to forge
the Agency statute. 2
The Agency may not have met all hopes and
aspirations, but then no promising youth ever
does. The United States believes, however, that
the record to date, considered fairly and in proper
perspective, is indeed encouraging. The report
of the Board of Governors gives evidence of sub-
stantive accomplishment greater, perhaps, than
we had any right to expect. One needs only to
recall some of the highlights given by our Direc-
tor General, Mr. [W. Sterling] Cole, in his open-
ing statement at this conference.
He indicated the Agency's fellowship program
is now in operation. Procedures for the dissemi-
nation of information have been devised. Tech-
nical experts have been made available for
consultation, and field missions have been com-
pleted. A manual relating to protection against
hazards of radiation has been drafted. The in-
evitable difficulties of initial organization have
been met. We have before us for approval sev-
eral agreements with other international organi-
zations which provide for pooling many different
talents to promote the uses of nuclear energy.
In spite of this very substantial progress} how-
ever, we must recognize that there remain major
problems of organization and of substance which
the Agency must face. These must be overcome
if we are to achieve the objectives set forth in our
charter, and it is the responsibility of all here to
contribute to the solution of these problems.
1 For background on the establishment of the IAEA and
text of the statute, see Bulletin of Nov. 19, 1956, p. 813.
October 27, 7958
669
With respect to substantive matters, the United
States recognizes the collective responsibility that
it shares with other atomically advanced nations
to provide initiative and leadership in the devel-
opment of concrete proposals for long-term
Agency activity. We accept our share of this re-
sponsibility. We are prepared to submit certain
suggestions to that end and emphasize that others
must do likewise.
The United States does not consider this con-
ference of member states merely a forum. Nor is
this meeting limited only to a consideration of
immediate activities proposed by our Board of
Governors. This is a conference where the wide-
spread exchange of views can become the source
of fresh ideas from which the Board and the Di-
rector General can develop a full range of future
activities. I note that many of the speakers have
expressed similar ideas. These statements in
their composite will, in the opinion of my delega-
tion, serve as useful guidance to our Board and to
the Director General of our Agency.
At the outset, I wish to state that my Govern-
ment unequivocally supports the budget for next
year's operations as proposed to the conference
by the Board of Governors.
The United States attaches paramount impor-
tance to the funds recommended for Agency fel-
lowships and for grant-in-aid assistance. The
need for training in the nuclear field is universally
recognized; and it is obvious that trained men
require appropriate facilities with which to apply
and develop the knowledge they have acquired.
We also support the provision for a central lab-
oratory facility as we feel that the existence of
such a laboratory is necessary. There can be no
reasonable doubt in our opinion with respect to
the necessity for permanent laboratory facilities
placed at the Agency's exclusive responsibility
and disposal.
U.S. Makes Six Proposals
In addition to the program outlined in the
budget, my Government has given careful con-
sideration to other desirable Agency activities.
Accordingly, I should like to place before this
conference six proposals. In some cases these
involve new activities not incorporated in the
budget; in other cases we are suggesting in-
creased emphasis on activities already under way
or planned.
1. Radioisotopes. The Agency as a major en-
deavor should inaugurate a program of training,
research, and application in the field of radioiso-
topes. This program should have as its major
emphasis applications of radioisotopes in the
fields of medicine, biology, and agriculture.
The benefits of radioisotopes are available to
us today. We do not need to await the develop-
ment of more advanced or more efficient tech-
. niques although we confidently expect that such
advances will extend the already impressive cata-
log of uses of the radioisotope. Further, medical,
biological, and agricultural uses are immediately
applicable to many of the problems of the less
developed areas.
We emphasize particularly the contributions
that the radioisotope can make to alleviate the
crushing burden of hunger that is a primary prob-
lem in many parts of the world.
The Agency, through its fellowship plans, its
equipment grant arrangements, and with the aid
of its mobile radioisotope laboratories, can embark
on a coordinated program for establishing radio-
isotope training and research centers in many
member states. We urge that this area be pur-
sued energetically.
My Government is prepared to cooperate di-
rectly with this effort through joint sponsorship
with the Agency of specialized symposia, semi-
nars, and short training courses in specific fields
of isotope application. Our own training facili-
ties in our country, in our laboratories and our
research centers, remain open to students from
foreign lands as they have in the past.
2. Safety. We urge that the Agency intensify
efforts to develop international standards and reg-
ulations for the safe transportation, handling, and
use of radioactive materials and the disposal of
radioactive wastes. The Agency should also
press forward with safety codes relating to re-
actor operation, reactor siting, and the protection
of workers at atomic energy establishments.
Procedures for the accountability of material
and a convention covering third-party liability
are other important matters which should re-
ceive intense and early attention of the Interna-
tional Agency. Since common measuring de-
vices are essential, steps should be taken also to
establish the Agency as the central authority for
the standardization of isotopes and instrument
calibration.
670
Department of State Bulletin
3. Training. All of us recognize the absolute
need of training scientists from those nations
which are as yet but on the threshold of this new
era. In the deep conviction that the inherent
powers of the atom for good must be shared by
all nations of good will, my Government urges
most strongly that steps be taken beyond the
planned fellowship programs. The Agency
should be a central coordinating body for the
training of personnel in these areas.
•i. Research. We believe that there exists
throughout the world today a wealth of scientific
and technical competence which is not being
brought fully to bear on the development of the
peaceful uses of atomic energy. We believe that
the Agency can draw upon this unused talent to
the benefit of all.
Accordingly, we are prepared to explore with
the Agency the development of a program where-
by specific research projects can be assigned by
the United States Government to this Agency.
The Agency, in turn, could develop contracts
with existing research centers and universities
throughout the world to perform the specific proj-
ects assigned to them.
As examples, we have in mind areas of re-
search relating to ceramic fuel elements, to high-
temperature metallurgy, to the study of metabolic
processes of the human bod} 7 , and the methodology
of using radioisotopes in agriculture. In this way
we may bring within the program additional tal-
ents not now available. My Government will
bear all the contract costs involved, and, may I
emphasize, the results of projects undertaken
would be made available through the Agency to
all member states.
We are offering to bear the costs of these con-
tracts because we recognize that the Agency does
not include funds in this year's budget for this
purpose and because we believe f hese activities
should be undertaken promptly. We are hopeful
that, in due course, the results of this offer will
encourage other participating governments to fol-
low a similar course.
5. Nuclear Power. The Geneva conference —
and particularly the opening address of its Presi-
dent, M . [Francis] Perrin — did much to place
this subject in proper perspective.
There is no doubt but that nuclear power will
be a significant economic factor in the world — in
some countries sooner than in others. However,
we have come to that sophisticated stage in the
development when we now know that, before eco-
nomic nuclear power can become a widespread
reality, many financial, scientific, and engineering
problems must be solved. Of particular impor-
tance are problems of physics and metallurgy.
Today we have the technology to produce nu-
clear power. However, in many instances costs
are substantially greater than conventional power.
That, I might say, is the current condition. How-
ever, as we look down the road to the further de-
velopment of nuclear power and to the long-range
availability of other fuels, we can see that it is
crystal clear that nuclear power will have its
very important place in the industrial develop-
ment of this world.
We therefore urge that the member states not
be discouraged by the facts that control the im-
mediate future but look a little longer down the
road because it is our opinion that the long-range
problem cannot be solved by our country or by
any other country unless we come to grips with
the whole technology and do so in the immediate
future.
Even though there is some apparent higher cost
of nuclear power as compared to other sources
of power available at this time, this will not always
be the case. We have to take a longer-range view
than tomorrow, or a year from now, or even 5 years
from now, for we must plan this on a 50-year
basis.
The Agency should encourage the development
of atomic power with due consideration to the
special needs and conditions — particularly the
timing of projects — of undeveloped areas of the
world. Obviously, guidance is necessary in pro-
moting a concentration of effort, a pooling of tal-
ents and resources, and encouraging a cooperative
effort.
One important Agency function will be to assure
the distribution and use of fuel for power reactors
under conditions providing for their safe handling
and accountability. In this connection the sug-
gestion of the Director General for all shipments
of source materials to be registered with this
Agency should be carefully studied.
Research and development achievements are al-
ready impressive when viewed in the aggregate.
The Agency can render a valuable service to its
member states by making available to them, on a
continuing basis, the results of current research
October 27, 1958
671
and development programs and by undertaking
programs which form the basis for intelligent
future planning. The Geneva conference did much
to accomplish this. Further frequent meetings
and exchanges should be planned by this Agency.
My country therefore proposes the following as
an essential and immediate first step : the Agency
undertake an intensive and continuing study and
survey of existing reactor types, their costs, the
criteria for the introduction of them into new
areas, and means by which the Agency could ac-
celerate the availability of nuclear power within
reasonable economic dimensions.
We believe also that the Agency should be di-
rected by this conference to formulate, for
presentation at our next meeting, a coordinated
long-range program for Agency assistance in the
development and acquisition of nuclear-power
facilities by member states. Additional emphasis
might well be given to the development of smaller
power-reactor designs suited to areas of more
limited demand.
6. Information Exchange. The Agency should
continue to develop into a major center for the
acquisition, collection, and the distribution of
scientific information on the peaceful uses of
atomic energy. This will require the Agency to
tap existing extensive sources of technical infor-
mation. It should assemble and prepare these data
in readily accessible form and encourage member
states to avail themselves of this service. My
Government will continue to forward to the
Agency the immense volume of data being pro-
duced in our country.
We hope that the Agency will undertake the
sponsorship of scientific conferences and symposia
to make the most effective use of knowledge gained
at Geneva and available here and elsewhere, This
is an opportunity which the Agency should pur-
sue with vigor and imagination.
Futhermore, the United States considers the
future conferences of a type just concluded in
Geneva should be undertaken under the auspices
of this Agency.
More specifically, in the field of controlled
thermonuclear fusion the United States proposes
that the Agency undertake to serve as the medium
through which its members engaged in controlled
fusion research freely exchange technical infor-
mation. This is, of course, an extension of the
constructive cooperation which prevailed at the
meeting earlier this month in Geneva. I can as-
672
sure you of the full cooperation of my Govern-
ment.
Premise of U.S. Proposals
Mr. President, the program that my Govern-
ment is suggesting is based on two factors: the
sober recognition of the state of nuclear science
and technology as it exists today, and the knowl-
edge that the resources of this Agency are unfortu-
nately limited.
My Government believes that to propose major
program expenditures at this time would disrupt
orderly progress. We feel it would impede rather
than promote the attainment of the Agency's
statutory objectives. We believe that the sug-
gested program is soundly conceived and em-
braces projects of practical assistance to all of the
Agency members, large and small.
I sincerely believe, Mr. President, that, if dur-
ing the coming year the program outlined in the
budget is implemented as planned and if further
realistic projects such as those previously out-
lined are accepted, the International Atomic
Energy Agency will have made firm and signifi-
cant strides toward its goals.
President Eisenhower in his historic address be-
fore the United Nations in 1953 envisaged the In-
ternational Atomic Energy Agency as a symbol
which would "allow all peoples of all nations to
see that ... the great powers of the earth . . .
are interested in human aspirations first, rather
than in building up the armaments of war. '
To promote the attainment of this objective the
United States reaffirmed its offer of 5,000 kilo-
grams of uranium U-235 for use by this Agency.
Also we reaffirm that we will continue to match,
quantity by quantity, until July 1, I960, the offers
of all other member states. -We believe that it is
not unrealistic to hope that such steps, coupled
with appropriate progress in disarmament, will
bring closer the day when the International
Atomic Energy Agency will be the principal cus-
todian of the world's fissionable material.
The Agency is now only at the threshold of its
destiny. Before it lies the great challenge of
realizing to the fullest extent the benefits of the
atom. If we move forward wisely, the world will
be infinitely richer. The example we set of inter-
national cooperation toward this common end
might lead us in turn to the lasting peace all man-
kind seeks.
Department of Sfafe Bulletin
Robert McKinney Resigns
as U.S. Representative to IAEA
The President on October 3 accepted the resig-
nation of Robert McKinney as U.S. Representa-
tive to the International Atomic Energy Agency
effective October 4, following conclusion of the
second General Conference of the IAEA meeting
at Vienna.
Arnie J. Suomela Appointed
to Fisheries Commission
The "White House on October 9 announced the
appointment by the President of Arnie J. Suomela
to be a Commissioner of the U.S. Section of the
International North Pacific Fisheries Commis-
sion, vice Ross L. Leffler, resigned.
Current U.N. Documents:
A Selected Bibliography 1
Security Council
Letter Dated 15 August 1058 From the Permanent Repre-
sentative of India Addressed to the President of the
Security Council. S/4086. August 18, 1958. 2 pp.
mimeo.
Letter Dated 18 August 1958 From the Permanent Repre-
sentative of India Addressed to the President of the
Security Council. S/408S. August 19, 1958. 2 pp.
mimeo.
Report of the Conference of Experts To Study the Pos-
sibility of Detecting Violations of a Possible Agree-
ment on the Suspension of Nuclear Tests. Note by
the Secretary-General. S/4091. August 28, 1958. 3
pp. mimeo.
Letter Dated 27 August 1958 From the Acting Permanent
Representative of Pakistan Addressed to the President
of the Security Council. S, 4092. August 28, 1958. 8
pp. mimeo.
Economic and Social Council
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East. Com-
mittee on Industry and Natural Resources. Official
records, Kith session. 24 February-3 March 1958.
E CX.11/I&NR/8. June 4, 1958. 100 pp. mimeo.
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East. In-
land Transport Committee. Official records, 7th ses-
sion, 11-18 February 1958. E/CN.ll/TRANS/135. 77
pp. mimeo.
Annual Report of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees. E/3138. June 18, 1958. 100 pp. mimeo.
Report of the World Health Organization. Supplemen-
tary Report. E/3106/Add. 1. June 26, 1958. 16 pp.
mimeo.
TREATY INFORMATION
1 Printed materials may be secured in the United States
from the International Documents Service, Columbia
University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N.Y.
Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents)
may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the
United States.
Venezuela and United States
Sign Nuclear Power Agreement
The Atomic Energy Commission and the De-
partment of State (press release 591) announced
on October 8 that the Governments of Venezuela
and the United States had on that day signed a
comprehensive agreement for cooperation in the
peaceful uses of atomic energy for power and
research.
Signing the agreement for the United States
were Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-
American Affairs Roy R. Rubottom, Jr., and
John A. McCone, Chairman of the Atomic Energy
Commission, and for Venezuela Ambassador
Marcos Falcon-Briceno.
The new agreement will broaden the scope of ex-
change with Venezuela by providing for coopera-
tion on the development, design, construction, and
operation of both power and research reactors.
Under the terms of the agreement, which runs
for 20 years, the Atomic Energy Commission
will sell or lease fuel to Venezuela for use in
research reactors and sell fuel for use in power
reactors, providing a maximum of 800 kilograms
of contained uranium 235 up to 20 percent enrich-
ment. This fuel is allocated for use in a research
reactor now under construction near Caracas, a
materials-testing reactor, and three 15,000-kilo-
watt (electrical) boiling-water power reactors
planned for future construction in Venezuela. In
the case of the materials-testing reactor, the
United States is authorized to provide a maximum
of six kilograms of fuel at 90 percent enrichment
in U-235.
The agreement will become effective after pro-
cedural requirements on the part of both Govern-
ments have been satisfied. It will supersede a re-
search agreement for cooperation with Venezuela
which has been in effect since July 21, 1955. 1
1 Treaties and Other International Acts Series 3323.
October 27, 7958
673
U.S. and Japan Sign Protocol
to Atomic Energy Agreement
DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT
The Department of State and the U.S. Atomic
Energy Commission announced on October 9
(press release 598) that the Governments of Ja-
pan and the United States had on that day
signed a protocol amending the agreement for
cooperation between the two countries concerning
the peaceful uses of nuclear energy signed June
16, 1958. 1 The Assistant Secretary of State for
Far Eastern Affairs and the Chairman of the
Atomic Energy Commission signed the protocol
for the United States and the Ambassador of Ja-
pan signed for Japan.
Under the agreement for cooperation signed in
June, the United States will make available as
needed over a term of 10 years a net amount of
2,700 kilograms of uranium 235 to be contained in
fuel sold or leased to Japan for use in research,
experimental and demonstration power, and
power reactors.
The amendment increases by 250 grams the
quantity of plutonium which Japan may obtain
for use in connection with denned research proj-
ects. It is anticipated that the increased quantity
will be used principally to provide plutonium-
beryllium sources for subcritical assemblies which
are used for training and research in the field of
reactor physics.
This protocol provides for the transfer of high-
ly enriched uranium for use as fuel in research
and materials-testing reactors where use of such
material is technically and economically justified
and the core loading does not exceed 8 kilograms.
The protocol further provides that byproduct
special nuclear material produced in Japanese re-
actors fueled with U.S. materials, when it is pur-
chased by the United States under the purchase
option, as provided in article VII of the agree-
ment, will be used only for peaceful purposes.
This provision affirms U.S. policy concerning the
use of such material as announced by the Presi-
dent on November 17, 1956. 2
The agreement and the protocol will go into ef-
fect when the statutory and constitutional re-
quirements of the two nations have been fulfilled.
1 Bulletin of July 7, 1958, p. 40.
2 Ibid., Dec. 10, 1956, p. 926.
674
TEXT OF PROTOCOL
Protocol Amending the Agreement for Cooperation
Between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of Japan Concerning
Civil Uses of Atomic Energt
The Government of the United States of America and
the Government of Japan ;
Desiring to amend the Agreement for Cooperation be-
tween the Government of the United States of America
and the Government of Japan Concerning Civil Uses of
Atomic Energy, signed at Washington on June 16, 1958,
hereinafter referred to as the "Agreement for Coopera-
tion" ;
Have agreed as follows :
Article I
Article V paragraph A, of the Agreement for Coopera-
tion is amended by deleting the phrase "10 grams of
plutonium, and 10 grams of U-233" and substituting in
lieu thereof the phrase "10 grams of U-233, 250 grams of
plutonium in the form of fabricated foils and sources,
and 10 grams of plutonium in other forms".
Article II
Article VII, paragraph C, of the Agreement for Co-
operation is amended to read as follows :
"C. The United States Commission may, upon request
and in its discretion, make a portion of the foregoing
special nuclear material available as material enriched
up to ninety per cent (90%) for use in research and
materials testing reactors, each capable of operating
with a fuel load not to exceed eight (8) kilograms of con-
tained U-235 in uranium."
Article III
Article VII, paragraph F, of the Agreement for Co-
operation is amended by inserting the phrase "for use
for peaceful purposes only" immediately after the phrase
"a first option to purchase".
Article IV
This Protocol shall enter into force on the day on which
each Government shall receive from the other Govern-
ment written notification that it has complied with all
statutory and constitutional requirements for the entry
into force of such Protocol and shall remain in force for
the period of the Agreement for Cooperation.
In witness whereof, the undersigned, duly authorized,
have signed this Protocol.
Done at Washington, in duplicate, in the English and
Japanese languages, both texts being equally authentic,
this Ninth day of October, 1958.
For the Government of the United States of America :
Walter S. Robertson
John McCone
For the Government of Japan :
KOICHIRO ASAKAI
Ambassador of Japan
Department of State Bulletin
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Automotive Traffic
Convention on road traffic, with annexes. Done at Ge-
neva September 19, 1949. Entered into force March 26,
1962. TIAS2487.
Accession deposited: Malaya (excluding annexes 1 and
2), September 10, 1958.
International Court of Justice
Statute of the International Court of Justice (59 Stat.
1055).
Declaration recognizing compulsory jurisdiction depos-
ited: Japan, September 15, 1958. 1 Effective for 5 years
from September 15, 195S, and thereafter until termi-
nated by written notice.
Law of the Sea
Convention on the territorial sea and the contiguous zone ;
Convention on the high seas ;
Convention on fishing and conservation of living resources
of the high seas ;
Convention on the continental shelf.
Done at Geneva April 29, 195S. 2
Signature: Ireland, October 2, 1958.
Safety at Sea
Convention on safety of life at sea. Signed at London
June 10, T94S. Entered into force November 19, 1952.
TIAS 2495.
Acceptance deposited: Ghana, November 22, 1957.
Regulations for preventing collisions at sea. Done at
London June 10, 1948. Entered into force January 1,
1954. TIAS 2899.
Acceptance deposited: Ghana, July 10, 1958.
Shipping
International load line convention. Signed at London
July 5, 1930. Entered into force January 1, 1933. 47
Stat. 2228.
Accession deposited: Ghana, November 22, 1957.
BILATERAL
Federation of Malaya
Agreement relating to the sale of military equipment, ma-
terials, and services to the Federation of Malaya. Ef-
fected by exchange of notes at Washington June 30 and
July 9, 1958. Entered into force July 9, 1958.
Ghana
Agreement relating to investment guaranties under sec-
tion 413 (b) (4) of the Mutual Security Act of 1954,
as amended (68 Stat. 832, 847; 22 U. S. C. 1933). Ef-
fected by exchange of notes at Accra September 30, 1958.
Entered into force September 30, 1958.
Japan
Protocol amending research and power reactor agree-
ment concerning civil uses of atomic energy of June 16,
1958. 2 Signed at Washington October 9, 195S. Enters
into force on date on which each Government receives
from the other written notification that it has complied
with statutory and constitutional requirements.
Venezuela
Research and power reactor agreement concerning civil
uses of atomic energy, and superseding research reactor
agreement of July 21, 1955 (TIAS 3323). Signed at
Washington October S, 1958. Enters into force on date
on which each Government receives from the other writ-
ten notification that it has complied with statutory and
constitutional requirements.
DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE
1 With conditions.
* Not in force.
Secretary Dulles Inaugurates
Senior Officer Course at FSI
Press release 547 dated September 22
Secretary Dulles on September 22 officially in-
augurated a new advanced course for senior officers
of the Department of State at the Foreign Service
Institute.
The senior officer course represents a further
step by the Department to carry out recommenda-
tions for improving the training of career For-
eign Service officers made in 1954 by the Public
Committee on State Department Personnel,
chaired by Henry Wriston, then president of
Brown University. The House Committee on
Foreign Affairs earlier had recommended that the
Foreign Seiwice Institute "provide adequate in-
service training for Foreign Service Officers as
well as for other officers and employees of the
Service similar to that provided for Army and
Navy officers in the command schools, and the
Army and Navy War Colleges."
Inauguration of this course completes a cycle
of specialized training provided for officers be-
ginning at junior grade through midcareer on to
the policy-making level.
The senior officer course will be the most ad-
vanced program in the field of international rela-
tions and foreign policy offered by the Depart-
ment of State. Participation in the course tins
year is limited to 20 individuals comprising care-
fully selected senior officers of the Foreign Serv-
ice, with a small number of spaces for officers
of equivalent rank from those other agencies of
the Government particularly involved in different
aspects of U.S. foreign policy. The course will
continue through June 1959.
The purpose of the course is to prepare officers
for the highest positions of responsibility in
policy recommendation and execution, coordina-
Ocfober 27, 1958
675
tion, planning, and administration in the Depart-
ment, in diplomatic posts abroad, and in inter-
agency and international organizations.
Harold B. Hoskins, director of the Foreign
Service Institute, announced that the institute will
call upon outstanding representatives of U.S.
Government, industry, and labor as well as aca-
demic specialists to participate hi directing semi-
nar studies and discussions. Special library and
other facilities have been installed at the institute
to carry out the objectives of the senior officer
program. The course is under the supervision
of Willard F. Barber, a career Foreign Service
officer of class one.
The course will include study of the following
subjects: (1) the bases for American foreign
policy; (2) domestic influences on U.S. foreign
policy; (3) review of recent U.S. diplomacy; (4)
foreign policy objectives of allied and neutral
states and the Sino-Soviet bloc; (5) current for-
eign policy problems.
Recess Appointments
The President on October 10 appointed Lampton Berry
to be Ambassador to Ceylon, vice Maxwell H. Gluck, re-
signed. (For biographic details, see press release 602
dated October 10.)
Designations
Holland Welch as Special Assistant (Consular Affairs)
to the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration, effec-
tive October 5.
Recent Releases
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Gov-
ernment Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. Address
requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, ex-
cept in the case of free publications, ivhich may be ob-
tained from the Department of State.
Visa Work of the Department of State and the Foreign
Service. Pub. 6510. Department and Foreign Service
Series 69. 80 pp. $2.25.
This report is a resume of visa procedures under the im-
migration acts which have been passed by Congress, as
well as statistical tables of visas issued and quotas es-
tablished under the Immigration Act of 1924.
International Educational Exchange Program 1948-1958.
Pub. 6647. International Information and Cultural Series
58. 66 pp. Limited distribution.
19th semiannual report to Congress containing selected
highlights of exchange accomplishments during the last
10 years and a review of exchange activities from Janu-
ary to June 1957.
When You Go Abroad — Information for Bearers of Pass-
ports. Pub. 6065. Department and Foreign Service
Series 78. 109 pp. 35tf.
This pamphlet, which is an informative guide to Ameri-
can citizens traveling abroad, points out general rules,
regulations, and responsibilities of passport holders in
foreign countries.
Fact Sheet on the Mutual Security Program. Pub. 6673.
General Foreign Policy Series 129. 6 pp. Limited
distribution.
A folder explaining the need for a mutual security pro-
gram.
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: October 6-12
Press releases may be obtained from the News
Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.
Releases issued prior to October 6 which appear
in this issue
of the Bulletin are Nos. 547 of Sep-
tember 22, 576 of October 1, and 578 of October 2.
No.
Date
Snbject
t584
10/6
General War Sequel Law of German
Federal Republic.
585
10/6
Herter : Chinese Communist cease-
fire.
*586
10/7
Educational exchange (Italy).
587
10/7
Note to U.S.S.R. on crashed U.S.
plane.
588
10/8
Finland credentials (rewrite).
589
10/8
Withdrawal of U.S. forces from
Lebanon.
590
10/8
Satterthwaite : "The United States
and Africa : Challenge and Opportu-
nity."
591
10/8
Atomic energy agreement with Vene-
zuela.
*592
10/8
Educational exchange (U.S.).
593
10/8
Convoy activities in Taiwan area.
594
10/8
Agricultural surpluses to Ghana.
595
10/9
Rubottom : "Components of Inter-
American Understanding."
t596
10/9
Delegation to GATT (rewrite).
*597
10/9
Dulles: message on death of Pope.
598
10/9
Protocol amending atomic energy
agreement with Japan.
t599
10/9
U.S.-U.S.S.R. agreement on cinema-
tography.
600
10/10
Note to U.S.S.R. on surprise attack.
601
10/10
Salk vaccine to Poland.
♦602
10/10
Recess appointment of Berry as am-
bassador to Ceylon (biographic de-
tails).
603
10/10
Visit of Japanese trade mission.
*604
10/11
Educational exchange (Poland).
605
10/11
Military survey team to Jordan,
ed.
* Not prin
t Held for
a later issue of the Bulletin.
676
Department of State Bulletin
October 27, 1958
Africa. The United States and Africa : Challenge
ami Opportunity (Satterthwaite)
American Republics. Components of Inter-Ameri-
can Understanding (Rubottom)
Atomic Energy
International Cooperation in Field of Atomic En-
ergy (McCone)
Robert MeKinney Resigns as U.S. Representative
to IAEA
U.S. and Japan Sign Protocol to Atomic Energy
Agreement
Venezuela and United States Sign Nuclear Power
Agreement
Brazil. World Bank Makes Loan in Brazil for
Hydroelectric Project
Ceylon. Berry appointed ambassador
China
Developing Universal Respect for the Rule of
Law (Murphy)
U.S. Views on Communist Cease-Fire in Taiwan
Straits Area (Dulles, Herter)
Czechoslovakia. U.S. Replies to Czechoslovak Pro-
test on Border Violations (texts of U.S. and
Czechoslovak notes)
Department and Foreign Service
Designations (Welch)
Recess Appointments (Berry)
Secretary Dulles Inaugurates Senior Officer Course
at FSI
Disarmament
Date Set for Technical Talks on Preventing Sur-
prise Attack (texts of U.S. and Soviet notes) . .
U.N. Committee Agrees on Procedure for Disarma-
ment Items (Lodge)
Economic Affairs
Arnie J. Suomela Appointed to Fisheries Commis-
sion
Components of Inter-American Understanding (Ru-
bottom)
Japanese Trade Mission Visits United States . .
World Bank Makes Loan in Brazil for Hydroelec-
tric Project
Finland. Letters of Credence (Seppala) . . . .
Ghana. Ghana To Receive American Corn To Com-
bat Food Shortage
International Law. Developing Universal Respect
for the Rule of Law (Murphy)
International Organizations and Conferences
International Cooperation in Field of Atomic En-
ergy (McCone)
Robert MeKinney Resigns as U.S. Representative
to IAEA
Japan
Japanese Trade Mission Visits United States . .
U.S. and Japan Sign Protocol to Atomic Energy
Agreement
Jordan. Military Survey Team Sent to Jordan .
Index Vol. XXXIX, No. 1009
Lebanon. U.S. Announces Withdrawal of Forces
641 From Lebanon 650
Middle East. Developing Universal Respect for
654 the Rule of Law (Murphy) 651
Military Affairs
Military Survey Team Sent to Jordan 651
60S U.S. Announces Withdrawal of Forces From
Lebanon 650
673 U.S. Seeks Further Information From U.S.S.R on
Crashed Plane (text of U.S. note) 659
674 Mutual Security
Exemption of Functions Under Mutual Security Act
o'" 4 (text of Executive order) 664
Ghana To Receive American Corn To Combat Food
663 Shortage 6 65
676 Poland
General Pulaski's Memorial Day, 1958 (text of
proclamation) 658
U.S. Sells Antipolio Vaccine to Poland . . . . 659
Presidential Documents
650 Exemption of Functions Under Mutual Security
A<* 664
General Pulaski's Memorial Day, 1958 .... 658
660 Protection of Nationals. U.S. Replies to Czecho-
slovak Protest on Border Violations (texts of
U.S. and Czechoslovak notes) 660
676 Publications. Recent releases 676
Treaty Information
6«5 Current Actions 575
U.S. and Japan Sign Protocol to Atomic Energy
Agreement 674
648 Venezuela and United States Sign Nuclear Power
Agreement 673
666 U.S.S.R.
Date Set for Technical Talks on Preventing Sur-
prise Attack (texts of U.S. and Soviet notes) . . 648
673 U.S. Seeks Further Information From U.S.S R on
Crashed Plane (text of U.S. note) 659
654 United Nations
665 Current U.N. Documents 673
„ UN ' Committ ee Agrees on Procedure for Disarma-
bbd ment Items (Lodge) 666
653 Venezuela. Venezuela and United States Sign Nu-
clear Power Agreement 673
665 , J
Name Index
651 ^erry, Hampton 676
Dulles. Secretary 6 50, 675
Eisenhower, President 658 664
Herter, Christian A ' ' ' 650
668 Lodge, Henry Cabot 666
McCone, John A [ 668
673 MeKinney, Robert '.'.'., ' 673
Murphy, Robert ' ' 6 51
665 Rubottom, Roy R., Jr ....... \ '. 654
Satterthwaite, Joseph C • • • ^
674 Seppala, Richard Rafael . 653
Suomela, Arnie J . . . ' a 7 >>
651 Welch. Rolland .'.'.'.'...'. 676
U S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 195S
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OFFICIAL BUSINESS
YOU . . .
and the UNITED NATIONS
1958-59
Henry Cabot Lodge, United States Representative to the United
Nations, answers 24 questions frequently asked by citizens in this
newly revised pamphlet on the functions and accomplishments of the
U.N.
Among the questions :
"Can the United Nations do anything about disarmament?"
"How much does our membership in the United Nations cost?"
"What about outer space? Can the U.N. do anything to see that
nations use outer space for peace instead of war?"
"How would you sum up the value of the United Nations to the
United States?"
An introductory section outlines U.S. representation in the U.N.
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TbS'V I f}3
Vol. XXXIX, No. 1010
November 3, 1958
IAL
.Y RECORD
SECRETARY DULLES' NEWS CONFERENCE OF
OCTORER 14 681
ACADEMIC TRAINING FOR THE FOREIGN SERV-
ICE • Remarks by President Eisenhower and Deputy Under
Secretary Murphy ggg
REFLECTIONS ON U.S.-CANADIAN RELATIONS • by
Assistant Secretary Elbrick 694
UNITED NATIONS ESTABLISHES SPECIAL FUND •
Statements by Senator Mike Mansfield and Christopher H.
Phillips and Text of Resolution 702
For index see inside back cover
Boston Public Library
Superintendent of Documents
DEC 9 - 1958
DEPOSITORY
Vol. XXXIX, No. 1010 • Publication 6722
November 3, 1958
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Price:
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approved by the Director of the Bureau of
the Budget (January 19, 1958).
Note: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and items contained herein may
be reprinted. Citation of the Department
of State Bulletin as the source will be
appreciated.
The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the
Public Services Division, provides the
public and interested agencies of
the Government ivith information on
developments in the field of foreign
relations and on the work of the
Department of State and the Foreign
Service. The BULLETIN includes se-
lected press releases on foreign policy,
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Department, and statements and ad-
dresses made by the President and by
the Secretary of State and other
officers of the Department, as well as
special articles on various phases of
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tion is included concerning treaties
and international agreements to
which the United States is or may
become a party and treaties of gen-
eral international interest.
Publications of the Department,
United Nations documents, and legis-
lative material in the field of inter-
national relations are listed currently.
Secretary Dulles' News Conference of October 14
Press release 614 dated October 14
Secretary Dulles: I have a short statement.
Mimeographed copies will be available as you
leave. 1
The United States welcomes the Chinese Com-
munist decision of October 12 to continue to sus-
pend the shelling of Quemoy. We hope that this
suspension will in fact be for more than the 2
weeks mentioned. Short suspensions of armed at-
tack do not provide a solid foundation upon which
to stabilize the situation in the intei'est of peace.
The Peiping cease-fire order says that the Amer-
ican nation is a "great nation" and that its people
"do not want war. They welcome peace." That
is very true. So we shall strive for peace con-
sistently with the honorable performance of our
obligations to our allies and to world order.
It is, however, not easy to reconcile these basic
obligations of ours with the announced Chinese
Communist objectives. The Chinese Communists'
statement again makes it crystal clear that their
objective in the Far East goes far beyond the off-
shore islands and has as its primary, if not ex-
clusive, purpose to take over Taiwan (Formosa).
The offshore islands are treated as a matter of
indifference. Indeed, the statement says that the
suspension of shelling is "to enable our com-
patriots on Quemoy, both military and civilian, to
get sufficient supplies, including food and military
equipment, to strengthen their entrenchment."
The main theme constantly reiterated is that the
Americans must abandon Taiwan and their alli-
ance with the Republic of China made for the de-
fense of Taiwan and "go home."
The United States remains loyal to its treaty of
mutual security with the Republic of China. It
believes that this treaty is not just an intergovern-
The following six paragraphs were also released sep-
, arately as press release 613 dated Oct. 14.
November 3, 1958
mental arrangement but one that is responsive to
the aspirations of all Chinese who cherish freedom.
Now questions.
Question of Reduction of Garrisons
Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been a lot of inter-
est in the question whether the United States feels
that there is now a basis for reducing the garrisons
on Quemoy and Matsu, particularly Quemoy.
What is United States policy on that problem
now?
A. I would not say we had a United States
policy at all on the problem. It is primarily a
matter for the Republic of China to decide. I
have made no secret of the fact that over the past
the United States has been inclined to feel that
the troops there were excessive for the needs of the
situation, and that view we still hold. But the Re-
public of China holds its views, and, after all, it
is its territory that is primarily involved. The
statement I just made indicates that I really think
this question is somewhat exaggerated in its im-
portance. It is very strange, if it is as important
as some people think, that the Chinese Commu-
nists should have suspended the shelling in order,
as they say, to enable the people in Quemoy to get
more military equipment and to dig in and en-
trench themselves more firmly.
Q. Mr. Secretary, over the weekend Governor
[Thomas EJ] Dewey suggested that the question of
the offshore islands might be settled by the World
Court. Would you favor such an action?
A. I made clear in my speech recently in New
York, 2 and elsewhere, that the United States be-
lieves in invoking the provisions of the United Na-
tions Charter, which call for settlement by media-
1 Bulletin of Oct. 13, 1958, p. 561.
681
tion and judicial means, among others, of disputes
which might have international consequences.
We adhere to that view in relation to the Quemoy
situation. The Communists have never been will-
ing to submit any case to the World Court, and I
doubt whether that is a practical avenue of ap-
proach that offers much hope. Nevertheless, we
have extended that idea.
Q. Mr. Secretary, have you urged or do you in-
tend to urge Chiang Kai-shek to reduce the mili-
tary strength of forces on Quemoy f
A. We have no plans whatsoever for urging him
to do that, although no doubt there are discussions
that are going on over there probably at the pres-
ent time between Secretary [of Defense Neil H.]
McElroy and others as to the most useful disposi-
tion of the forces of the Republic of China. But
I would not want to give the impression that we
are pressing or plan to press the Eepublic of
China to do something against its own better
judgment. The important thing to bear in mind
here is, as this Chinese Communist statement
makes clear, what the Communists are working
for now is primarily to drive a wedge between the
Chinese on Taiwan and the United States. They
say that that is their political objective, that is now
the way they are going to try to get us out of the
area. We must be very careful not to play the
game of the Communists in this respect.
Q. Mr. Secretary, did you talk to Governor
Dewey about the World Court idea at any time?
A. No.
Q. Mr. Secretary, you said we Jwd extended that
idea with the idea of judicial settlement. You
mean formally extended it to the Communist
Chinese at Warsaw, for example?
A. I am sorry that, under the rules under which
that Warsaw conference is being held, I am pre-
cluded from giving any specific statements about
what we have done or said there ; but I think you
can draw certain inferences from what I have said.
Q. Mr. Secretary, in response to the question
about Governor Dewey's World Court suggestion,
the question was based on Formosa, and you re-
ferred in your answer to Quemoy. Is there any-
thing significant to tliat or does that apply to
Formosa? He was suggesting World Court de-
termination as to the status of Formosa.
A. I did not so understand it.
Q. I think I am wrong on that.
Q. Mr. Secretary, Mr. Dewey also said that he
thought that we would agree to the submission
to the World Court and the Chinese Nationalists
would too. Do you think the Chiang Kai-shek
government would agree to submitting it to the
World Court?
A. I have no idea at all.
Q. Mr. Secretary, this morning the wires out
of Formosa %oere saying that Chinese Nationalist
publications, presumably from official sources,
said, in fact, that Chiang Kai-shek was willing to
reduce his garrisons at Quemoy and Matsu pro-
vided tlie United States would guarantee their
protection with American military aid. Can you
comment on that? Is that in a state of negotia-
tions between Secretary McElroy and Chiang
Kai-shek?
A. I do not think that any political negotia-
tions are being conducted there by Secretary of
Defense McElroy. I am not aware of that fact,
and I think I would be aware of it if there were
such negotiations.
Q. That would be political?
A. Yes.
Q. Mr. Secretary, following that up, there
have been reports, however, t/iat the Secretary
might be looking for a formula whereby they re-
duce the amount of their troops on Quemoy and
Matsu in exchange for an increase in firepower.
Could you comment on that, please?
A. That would be entirely a military matter.
We are constantly in our own military establish-
ment striving to find ways whereby manpower can
be reduced and firepower increased. We have to
some extent found those ways. We have discussed
similar ways with our allies in Europe, and it
would not be surprising if they were being dis-
cussed with our allies in Asia. But I am not
aware of just what, if any, discussions of that sort
Q. Mr. Secretary, has there been any indica-
tion that the garrison on Quemoy is possibly mak-
ing any deal with the mainland?
A. We have no evidence at all to that effect,
682
Department of State Bulleth \
On the contrary, all the evidence that we have is
that the morale is very high and anti-Communist
feeling is running very strong.
Q. Mr. Secretary, to clear up that one point,
sir, generally a saving in manpower is effected
through the use of atomic weapons. Did you
mean in the discussions in the Far East that the
placement of iceapons with atomic capability is
being discussed?
A. No.
Foreign Policy and the Congressional Campaign
Q. Mr. Secretary, there is considerable discus-
sion these days as to whether it is wise or not to
| let foreign policy be injected into the present con-
gressional, campaign. Could you comment upon
this?
A. I do not think that it is wise that current
aspects of foreign policy should be injected in the
campaign. I think there are some basic problems
of foreign policy which can be discussed in terms
of underlying principles. But when you begin to
discuss what you might call current aspects, topi-
cal aspects, of foreign policy during the campaign,
I think that is highly undesirable.
I saw a statement that ex-President Truman
made on that subject this morning, and I want to
say I am in complete agreement with the point of
view he expressed. I also would like to take this
occasion to express my own appreciation of the
very strong statements which he has made, both
in support of the position we took in Lebanon and
in support of the position we have taken in rela-
tion to Quemoy and Matsu.
Q. Mr. Secretary, in that article this morning,
President Truman said there had been some
"speeches'''' of what he described as "narrow and
harmful partisanship" made, and he said he hoped
the administration would stop this. Are you
making any effort with the President or Vice
President, members of the Cabinet, or the Repub-
lican National Committee to keep these topical
references out of campaign speeches?
A. "Well, my general views about this subject
are well known. I myself have not taken part, as
I think you ladies and gentlemen know, in any
political aspects of the campaign. In the 1956
presidential election, I did not take part at all,
nor am I taking any part this year. There are
statements being made on both sides, and when a
statement is made on one side it is hardly practical
to prevent an answer being made from the other
side. I would hope that both sides woidd calm
down on this aspect of the debate.
Q. Have you discussed it xoith the President
or at a Cabinet meeting?
A. We have discussed the general topic, yes,
of trying to keep foreign policy out of partisan
debate. 3
Q. Mr. Secretary, is the thinning down of
Chiang's garrison on Quemoy the absolute limits
of our bargaining position?
A. Bargaining with whom ?
Q. With the Chinese Communists.
A. Well, I don't think that that has anything
to do with bargaining with the Chinese Commu-
nists. The Chinese Communists have said, "Bring
all the supplies, entrench your position all you
want to in Quemoy." There is nothing whatso-
ever to indicate that there is any bargaining posi-
tion in that whatsoever with the Chinese Commu-
nists. The question of the disposition of troops
is entirely a matter of what is the most effective,
efficient use of available forces. The question is
whether, given the number of forces that are
there, is it more effective to have them in their
present numbers on Quemoy and Matsu or to
have a greater number on Formosa, which would
have greater flexibility and greater range of action
under certain contingencies and they could go
back to Quemoy if the necessity came. It is a
military problem of the disposition of forces. I
have no evidence whatever to suggest that there
is in that any basis whatever for bargaining with
the Chinese Communists.
Q. Mr. Secretary, if the Chinese Nationalists
did not reduce their forces on these islands, hmv
will the situation in the Far East be different than
it was before the shooting started?
A. Well, it is different in the respect that the
Chinese Communists have learned through actual
experience that Quemoy is a hard nut to crack,
that they are up against strong will and resolu-
tion, and they may have decided to try other
See also p. 687.
November 3, 1958
683
means. Now I do not say that steps cannot be
taken to assure that these islands will not be a
source of provocation, as I said before, or that
they would not be "a thorn in the side of peace."
Actually very little, if anything, has been done
from these islands in recent months to make them
a thorn in the side of peace. They have not been
used to blockade the ports of Amoy or Fuchow.
They have not been staging commando raids from
them or trying to infiltrate agents from them. I
think the situation in that respect can be clarified,
but there is not a great deal to be done. We are
not in favor of turning over these islands to the
Chinese Communists. After all, there are 45,000
civilians (on Quemoy alone) who would have
been turned over and who don't want to be turned
over. We are not in the business of giving away
people, even if the Republic of China woidd agree.
We have to be very careful to handle this in a
way which, on the one hand, avoids anything
which can reasonably be regarded as provocative
of war or causes irritations, which would almost
inevitably provoke violent reactions, and, on the
other hand, avoids exhibiting a weakness which
would instill concern throughout the Far East as
to what our purposes were.
I think we can find a course which will be along
that route and that there is no reason to antici-
pate that there will be provocations from these
islands. But I do not think that there is much
in the way of a bargaining position with the
Communists in that respect, because, as I em-
phasize in all of our talks, whether at Warsaw
or elsewhere, in every statement that they have
made there has been nothing whatever to suggest
that you could strike a bargain with the Commu-
nists in terms of these islands. They are gunning
for something far bigger than that — they want to
drive the United States from the Western Pacific.
That is what has been made clear by the statement
made only a few days ago by the Chinese Foreign
Minister, reinforced by this statement of Sunday.
They are thinking in those terms. And I think
it is up to us, also, to think in those same terms
and not get our sights so minute, upon a little
thing, that we overlook the big thing which is at
stake in this situation.
Application of Treaty With Republic of China
Q. Mr. Secretary, is it correct that under the
mutual defense treaty with Chiang we have a veto
684
power over aggressive actions from Formosa and
the Pescadores? Does that also apply to the off-
shore islands which are not named in the treaty?
A. I think that it does. That's my recollection.
You say a "veto power"? It is agreed, I think,
that neither of us will use force for purposes other
than emergency action as against attack, except
through joint agreement. It is a reciprocal agree-
ment. It doesn't give us an exclusive veto power ;
it works both ways. 4
Q. Then could the U.S. give assurances that it
would not approve provocative or aggressive ac-
tions totoard the mainland from the offshore
islands under the treaty?
A. I think technically that we could, and, in-
deed, I think we have made it clear that we do
not intend to agree to provocative action of that
sort. Whether we could make an arrangement
that would be binding upon us in the future, I
don't know. I would somewhat doubt that. But
the existence of that arrangement does provide
assurance to all people who have confidence that
the United States does not favor aggression. I
think we have made it abundantly clear that we
do not favor aggression, and wherever we have an
opportunity to apply that principle against the
use of force for aggressive purposes, we do it.
We would use our rights and prerogatives in this
respect in that same sense.
Q. Mr. Secretary, just before the Red Chinese
cease-fire offer, I think you inade it pretty clear
that, if there were a cease-fire, certain good conse-
quences would flow. And now today you seem
to be saying that the thinning out of forces is not
part of the bargaining position here on either
side. And I wonder now, sir, if you coidd say
what the Red Chinese can expect in the way of
further developments now that a cease-fire has
been put forth.
A. Well, let me just beg of you this: We are
conducting a negotiation, a tough negotiation,
with the Chinese Communists, and you are asking
me here to expose to all of you and, in that way,
to the Chinese Communists, just what our bargain-
ing position is, just what we will do and what
we won't do. Now I am anxious to throw all the
' For background and text of the treaty, see Bulletin
of Dec. 13, 1954, p. 895.
Department of State Bulletin
light I reasonably can on the situation, but I just
can't destroy our whole bargaining position by
giving an advance preview of it to the Commu-
nists via this press conference.
New Chinese Communist Tactic
Q. Mr. Secretary, you have said that the new
Chinese Communist tactic could drive a wedge
between us and our Nationalist allies. Could you
amplify that a bit? In what way? I mean, is
it going to be a political attack, or is it under way,
or is it going to invoice more than the Chinese
Nationalists, or what?
A. The Communist statement says that they
must conduct efforts day by day, week by week,
gradually to educate the Chinese on Taiwan, in
particular, to the fact that the Americans are
really their enemies, and that the Chinese should
all be one happy family together, and that the
thing to do is to kick the Americans out, tell
them to go home. That is what they announce as
their program. I suppose they will carry it out
by propaganda, by subversive agents, and so forth.
They have been trying to do that in the past with,
I think, no significant success. But the statement,
at least if you take it at face value — as probably
you can't — would indicate that that is where they
are going to concentrate from now on.
Now, as I say, and as they say, this may be just
a trick. "We are dealing with very shifty people.
I am not certain how much reliance is to be placed
upon the Sunday statement. Maybe that is just
to get us thinking along other lines, and then
the}' may resume this armed attack again sud-
denly. They say, "It is up to us to decide when
we fight and when we stop fighting." So that
there is nothing very solid in their position that
we can depend upon. But they do say at least
that they intend to concentrate upon propaganda
and subversive efforts designed to woo the Chinese
so that they will get rid of the Americans.
Q. Mr. St cretary, if there is a de facto truce
in the Formosa area, do you expect there will be
probes in other parts of the Far East by the
Chinese Communists — in Indochina and Malaya
and other places? Have you any evidence of that?
A. I think that there is less likelihood of that
because of the fact that we did stand firm here
and that this particular probe, at least for the
moment, doesn't seem to pay off for the probers.
November 3, 1958
Q. Mr. Secretary, do you think perhaps your
remarks at your last news conference, with respect
to Chiang's prospects of getting back to the main-
land, might have induced the Communists to try
this wedge-driving process you now speak of?
A. I do not think so. There is nothing to indi-
cate that, certainly. I think that one has to be
careful not to make statements which will be mis-
interpreted in Taiwan, and it is very easy to have
that happen. But I do not think, in fact, that
that was a consequence of what I said.
Q. Mr. Secretary, I have a question on freedom
of the press, please. In the Worthy passport case
in the District Court, the pleadings argue that
freedom of the press is merely freedom to publish
and not freedom of access to news sources as by
foreign travel. Could you throw some light on
that and on what seems to be its discriminatory
application, since, while Worthy is refused the
passport for refusing to say that he won't go to
China with it, another American neivspaperman,
without having his passport withdrawn, is run-
ning a series in the Washington News on a visit
to Red China?
A. I am not very familiar with the Worthy
case. I do know that passports to go to mainland
China were issued to an appreciable number of
newspaper people about a year ago, I think, or
thereabouts. I think they originally ran out, and
I think their renewal has now been authorized.
So that there are representative newspaper people
who are authorized to go to China. I did not
know that any of them had received visas.
Q. Mr. Secretary, are you saying that the ap-
parently viidespread interpretation after your last
news conference 2 xoeeks ago that, if the cease-fire
changed, Chiang might be encouraged to get some
of his troops off Quemoy — that that interpreta-
tion was wrong?
A. No, I believe that, if there is a dependable
cease-fire there, quite a few things will happen
as a natural consequence of that. At the moment
it doesn't seem to be very dependable when it is
only done first for 1 week and then for 14 days.
But I believe that, if there were anything like a
dependable cease-fire in the area, there would
automatically, almost as a matter of cold logic,
come about quite considerable changes in the
situation.
685
Q. Mr. Secretary, on another subject, have you
considered going to Geneva at any stage in the
negotiations with the Soviet Union on the test ban
due to begin the end of the month?
A. Naturally, I have given thought to that
in view of the suggestion that was made by the
Soviet Union. And I would certainly go there if
I felt that my presence was necessary or helpful
to assure the success of that conference. At the
moment I do not see that that is likely to be the
case. But I keep an open mind on the subject.
There are very many aspects of it. Certainly the
initial aspects are, I think, highly complicated,
highly technical, where I am not versed at all. I
believe that the group we will have there, headed
by Ambassador Wadsworth, will be able to bring
to bear the knowledge that is required, and devote
to it the time that is required, to a better degree
than I could. But if a situation should arise
making it seem desirable for me to go there, I
would certainly be prepared to go.
Q. Mr. Secretary, you have spohen of a reason-
able, dependable cease-fire. Could you give us
your requirements for that and some idea of the
duration of the cease-fire before you would feel
that a reasonable cease-fire had come about?
A. I doubt whether I could usefully try to
answer that question. What is dependable, when
you are dealing with the Communists, is a very
difficult question indeed. It is made up of quite
a few components, not merely what they say, but
on what they do, and upon what other people do
as indicating that violations might carry with
them economic or political sanctions of a kind
which the Chinese Communists wouldn't like. It
is a complex business. But, as I say, if the total
of it all added up to something that we felt that
we could rely upon and that efforts would not be
used by the Communist side to take these islands
by force, then I think one can see that logically
certain consequences would flow from that.
Arab League
Q. Mr. Secretary, on another subject, there has
recently been made an attempt to revive some of
the functions of the League of Arab Nations, and
Tunisia and Morocco have joined it. Is this, in
your view, a welcomed development? Wliat use-
ful purposes could the Arab League fulfill on
this in your view?
686
A. In relation to Tunisia and Morocco?
Q. In relation to the area as a whole. The point
of my question is, is it your view that the Arab
League would be a useful instrument to facilitate
the peaceful change and otherwise serve the pur-
poses of peace in the area?
A. I think it could be, yes. We in general
favor, and indeed the charter of the United Na-
tions favors, the development of regional associa-
tions, and it calls for the solution of differences
by regional associations if that is practical. At
this last special emergency meeting of the Gen-
eral Assembly the unanimous vote was obtained
in the last analysis because the members of the
Arab League came together and agreed upon a
resolution which was acceptable to them all and
consequently was acceptable to the General
Assembly.
Now that illustrates, I think, that they do have
a potential of being constructive and helpful.
Whether they always will be or not is a question.
Q. Mr. Secretary, if the loss of Quemoy and
Matsu woxdd be so weakening and be so dis-
astrous to the free-world alliances, why do you
think it is that more of our allies do not see their
own interests in the Nationalist Chinese retention
of the islands?
A. I think that most of our allies, indeed, all
their governmental representatives, either foreign
ministers or ambassadors, that I have talked to—
and I have talked to quite a few— have been in
entire accord with the position which we have
taken there of strength and resoluteness and not
giving in. There have been some public state-
ments' of that sort made which, however, didn't
seem to make our press.
Q. Mr. Secretary, a few moments ago you spoke
on the desirability of having both the Republican
and Democratic leaders calm down on discussing
topical foreign policy issues, and you said it
would be all right to discuss what you considered
to be the general principles on both sides. What
would you think of a statement such as this: "The
Acheson-Truman foreign policy resulted in war
and the Eisenhower-Dulles policy resulted^ in
peace'''? Now this comes from a speech last night
by Vice President Nixon, and he explained that
he said this in answer to the statement put out
Department of Sfafe Bulletin
over the weekend by the Democrats. My question
is, does this statement fit within the limits that
you would hope both sides would observe?
A. Well, both statements might fit without the
limits which I hope both sides would observe.
[The Department of State on October 15 (press release
616) released the following statement by Secretary Dulles.
Statements which I made at yesterday's press confer-
ence have been interpreted in some quarters as implying
criticism of Vice President Nixon for having replied last
Monday to the foreign policy challenge issued on Sunday
by the Democratic Advisory Committee.
AetuaUy, my criticism applied to that Committee, al-
though I refrained from naming it. It had injected for-
eign policy into the political campaign in a manner that
required, indeed specifically called for, an answer.
In my press conference, I expressed the view that, in
the interest of the Nation, foreign policy should be kept
out of partisan politics. But I went on to say, "When a
statement is made on one side it is hardly practical to
prevent an answer being made from the other side." It
was the statement issued by the Democratic Advisory
Committee challenging Republicans to "defend" the ad-
ministration's foreign policy that evoked the answer from
the Vice President. In those circumstances I fully con-
curred in the need for that answer. I would, however,
have preferred it if the Democratic Advisory Committee
had not issued its highly partisan political challenge, so
that no reply would have been required.
The Vice President's statement made quite clear that
he, too, does not favor injecting foreign policy into politics
and that he only replied because, he said, "those in the
Democratic Party who insist on making foreign policy
an issue in this campaign have left us no choice." He
paid tribute, as did I, to the many Democrats who have
acted without partisanship in respect of foreign policy.
It is essential that this should continue, for if there is
partisan division in this field the results would be dis-
astrous for the Nation.]
Q. Mr. Secretary, did you have any word from
the Norwegians that influenced your statement in
(your press conference of last week on the thinning
down of forces in Quemoy and Matsu?
A. I have had talks with the representatives
at the United Nations of a large number of for-
eign countries, including the Foreign Minister of
» Norway, Mr. [Halvard] Lange, who is a man
whom I greatly respect and admire. From all of
them I have gotten comment or observations about
how they think the problem should be solved.
But I have not gotten from any source anything
to indicate that a deal could be made with the
Communists which was confined to the Quemoy
or Matsu situation.
Settling of Taiwan Dispute in U.N. or World Court
Q. Mr. Secretary, something you said about the
Court a while ago made me think that the United
States had suggested this as a possible forum, of
settlement on the Formosa problem and that Com-
munist China had not been interested in such a
procedure. I wondered, going beyond that,
whether you have thought of or might take some
action to take this whole matter now to the United
Nations or, unilaterally, to take it to the World
Court.
A. As the Chinese Communist statement of
Sunday made clear and, indeed, as they made
clear many times, they are absolutely opposed to
any consideration of this matter by the United
Nations. They took that position in relation to
the Korean war when they were there in 1950,
where they claimed it was just a civil war and that
the United Nations and the United States were
aggressors and they would only discuss this ag-
gression but not any aspects of the civil war.
They took the same position in 1955 when the
Taiwan Straits situation came up before the Se-
curity Council. And in the statement made on
Sunday they said that this was no business what-
soever of the United Nations, being purely a civil
war.
I am very dubious whether, in the light of that,
we could expect a positive solution of this prob-
lem through the United Nations. I have always
felt that, if there was in this situation a threat
of wai", we had a duty under the charter to bring
it to the United Nations which has that responsi-
bility. As the threat of war recedes, and I hope
that it has receded, there is perhaps less reason to
bring it to the United Nations, knowing as we do
know — not only from these official statements but
from unofficial activities of the Chinese Com-
munists — that they are doing everything possible
to prevent its being brought in any way before
the United Nations and would refuse to accept
any resolution by the United Nations on the sub-
ject except a resolution condemning the United
States and calling upon it to get out of Taiwan.
Under those circumstances I do not feel that this
present aspect of the matter can constructively
be brought to the United Nations.
Now, as far as the World Court is concerned,
there is no way the United States can unilaterally
November 3, 1958
687
bring it to the World Court. There would have
to be action by the United Nations in the Security
Council or the General Assembly, which would
require two-thirds vote. I'm very dubious
whether that would be obtained. There would
probably be veto action in the Security Council
by the Soviet Union, and probably, in view of
the Communists' attitude toward the World
Court, it would not be possible to get a two-thirds
vote in the General Assembly.
Q. Mr. Secretary, Senator Mike Mansfield
today suggested that, if the negotiations bogged
down in Warsaw, you meet with Chou En-lai.
Would you be willing to?
A. I answered that question at my last press
conference, 6 and I think that I'd like to stand on
that answer. If you don't recall it, I can —
Q. This is a fresh suggestion.
A. Well, I have no i - eason to alter the position
I expressed 2 weeks ago.
Q. Thank you, sir.
U.S. Dependents Authorized
To Return to Lebanon
Press release 627 dated October 18
The Department of State on October 18 au-
thorized dependents of U.S. officials stationed in
Lebanon to return to that country. All such
dependents were evacuated in June and July 1958.
The Department took this action as a result of
the improved conditions which have developed in
Lebanon in recent days.
U.S. Experts Named for Talks
on Preventing Surprise Attack
The Department of State announced on Octo-
ber 13 (press release 606) that William C. Foster,
vice president for public affaire and a director of
the Olin Mathieson Chemical Corporation;
George B. Kistiakowsky, professor of chemistry
at Harvard University and a member of the Pres-
ident's Science Advisory Committee; and Gen.
Otto P. Weyland, commander of the Tactical Air
Command at Langley Air Force Base, have been
asked and have agreed to serve as experts in the
forthcoming talks, beginning November 10, on the
technical aspects of minimizing the possibility of
surprise military attack. 1 For the Western coun-
tries there will also be experts from the United
Kingdom, France, Canada, Italy, and possibly
other countries.
Economic Officers in Europe
Hold Regional Meeting
Press release 611 dated October 14
A 3-day meeting of senior economic officers
from U.S. Foreign Service posts in 25 European
countries will be held at Berlin from October 20
to 22. The meeting will bring together the prin-
cipal officers engaged in economic work at each of
the Foreign Service posts involved.
Like similar meetings held in the past, this con-
ference will provide an opportunity for these offi-
cers to discuss current European and worldwide
economic developments and U.S. economic pro-
grams and policies among themselves and with
officials from Washington.
Officials from Washington participating in the
meeting will include : Douglas Dillon, Under Sec-
retary of State for Economic Affairs; Henry
Kearns, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for In-
ternational Affairs; Foy D. Kohler, Deputy As-
sistant Secretary of State for European Affairs;
and W. T. M. Beale, Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State for Economic Affairs.
Columbus Day, 1958
Remarks by President Eisenhower 2
It is an honor to join the Columbus Citizens
Committee in this traditional ceremony. As
dwellers in this mighty continent, whether in its
northern or in its southern half, we cannot fail
to honor the memory of Christopher Columbus
and acknowledge our debt to him.
Columbus opened the door to the New World,
to a new world of opportunity for the millions
who have followed the path he blazed. Coming
from every land and race and creed, our own fore-
fathers came together and built a nation.
' mil.. Oct. 20, 195S, p. 597.
688
1 For an exchange of notes between the U.S. and the
U.S.S.R., see Bulletin of Oct. 27, 1958, p. 648.
2 Made at a wreath-laying ceremony at Columbus Circle,
New York, N.Y., on Oct. 12 (White House press release).
Department of State Bulletin
Our people have made their own distinctive
contributions to mankind. We have forged a new
pattern of democracy. We established a new na-
tion, where men were and are free to live their
own lives.
Over the decades, blessed by a generous Provi-
dence, we have grown in strength and in tradi-
tion. We began to believe that we were set apart,
a new creation entirely. Surrounded on both
sides by two mighty oceans, we developed our
productive capacity and nourished in a world of
our own.
But in recent years we have witnessed a pro-
found change in the life and attitude of our peo-
ple. We know that we are no longer living in
a "new" world ; we are rather living in a part of
the whole world, and our fortunes are intimately
related to the fortunes of our neighbors over-
seas — on every continent.
Our wisest men have known this from the be-
ginning. We have always been part of the whole
fabric of human life.
As a part of the world's life — and especially
with those that, with us, respect human liberty
and dignity — we must, if we are to advance our
common fortunes, live as a family of equals. Co-
operation among us, whether it be in trade for
increased prosperity or in the task of protecting
our free institutions from aggression, is the com-
mon obligation of all. Unless each nation per-
forms this task to the extent of its capacity, then
none of us can long live in peace.
But, as long as we are faithful to these self-
evident truths, we can proudly say that we are a
new world. As long as our minds and hearts
are as wide open as the Atlantic Ocean and our
understanding as deep, we will continue to wel-
come new Christopher Columbuses to our shores
and with them push forward toward that goal of
all mankind, a just and permanent peace.
Academic Training for the Foreign Service
Following are remarks made by President
Eisenhower at ceremonies dedicating the Edmund
A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at George-
town University, Washington, D.C., on October
13 and remarks made by Deputy Under Secre-
tary of State Robert Murphy at a symposium on
foreign service on the same date.
REMARKS BY PRESIDENT EISENHOWER
White House press release dated October 13
As President, the highest executive official of
this Government, I want to thank the university
and the Society [of Jesus] and all of their sup-
porters for the work they are doing in educating
soldiers of peace. Certainly this is what we ex-
pect our diplomats to do — to be officers of the great
army that has as its first business the developing
and sustaining of a peace with justice and with
honor.
I am told, on figures that were of no later vin-
tage than April 10.")7, that 87 of your graduates
are actively working now in the Foreign Service.
Possibly there have been hundreds through these
40 years. That seemed to be the figure now ac-
tively working.
I woidd hope your number would increase. We
need people who will find, in the service of their
country and of peace, their great satisfaction.
We need people who will apply themselves to
understanding that the Avorld, as we saw symbol-
ized in the revolving globe at the entrance to the
hall, is a single entity. We need people who are
not too much concerned by the immediate consid-
erations of private gain, or the effect on our own
particular community of a wool importation, or
the bad effect that is caused at times by some in-
temperate, ill-tempered description of other peo-
ple in the world. We need people who see that
no part, no matter how important, can be greater
than the whole. In developing our country they
recognize that they must help to develop under-
standing and knowledge throughout the world;
they recognize peaceful intentions, and they are
determined to make those intentions reality.
So, to say that I am honored today by the uni-
versity — that I am complimented by its present-
November 3, 1958
689
ing to me its honorary doctorate — is a great
understatement. I assure you that the presence
here of these dedicated men and instructors and
students in this audience is an inspiration, a mem-
ory that I shall carry with me.
Thank you.
REMARKS BY DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY
MURPHY
Press release 608 dated October 13
The Secretary of State has asked me to convey
his cordial greetings to the Georgetown Univer-
sity School of Foreign Service and to the par-
ticipants in this symposium. It is a distinct priv-
ilege and inspiration to be associated today with
the dedication of the Edmund A. Walsh Memo-
rial Building in this great university.
I would like to discuss the subject "Academic
Training and Diplomacy" in terms of the emer-
gence of the new United States Foreign Service
which, as a result of the social, political, and
technological revolutions of our time, has had to
develop capacity in the last decade or two to per-
form an increasingly important, inclusive, and
difficult role. Of course what is true of our Amer-
ican organization applies in varying degrees, de-
pending on a number of factors, to other nations.
Our Service has had to assume a more important
role because failure of diplomacy to meet the chal-
lenge of the times could prove disastrous to our
civilization; a more inclusive role because diplo-
macy today enters into many fields other than the
traditional ones of the past; a more difficult role
because the extent of specific knowledge demanded
in each field is growing and with it simultane-
ously the need for a broad perspective and under-
standing of many fields.
The demands on the individual diplomat have
increased by virtue of the increases of the demands
upon the organization within which he works.
The United States State Department today, as an
organization, has responsibilities not only in the
conduct of traditional consular activities and in-
ternational relations in the political field but also
in diplomatic negotiation and in the policy as-
pects of such programs as economic aid, military
security, science, public information, cultural ac-
tivities, and many others.
Not only must our Foreign Service personnel
engage in programs of such diversity but they
must be equipped to understand the cultures and
values of many new and emergent countries and
areas of the world which were almost completely
beyond the ken of the United States diplomatic
service of yesteryear. Also today, and perhaps
first in importance, is the driving necessity of
understanding the nature, purpose, and methods
of the international Communist movement. No
Foreign Service officer, no matter where he may
be situated, can perform his job adequately with-
out such understanding. I am sure it would be
safe to say that Father Walsh, were he with us
today, could endorse that statement.
Broadening of the Foreign Service
The above factors roughly illustrate the scope
anil dimensions of our new Foreign Service. It is
the responsibility of our Government to organize
itself and to use its available human resources to
meet these new challenges. Since 1954 the State
Department has expanded and reorganized to this
purpose. Among the most important steps taken
has been the broadening of the Foreign Service
to bring in such functions as administration, in-
telligence and research, higher economics and
science, among others, under the diplomatic
umbrella.
Many positions located in Washington and
formerly filled by departmental civil servants
have been designated as Foreign Service officer
positions and will be staffed by officers subject to
Foreign Service regulations, including service
anywhere in the world. Many of the depart-
mental civil servants accepted the opportunity to
enter the Foreign Service, and the number of dip-
lomatic career positions was increased in this
process from about 1,300 to more than 4,000.
It is this group of officer positions of which we
are speaking today as being the Foreign Service
of the United States. Despite the obvious need
to respect economy, it would appear that there
will be inevitable growth as new responsibilities
are thrust upon us. There is, of course, constant
turnover as well. Most of the new blood to be
brought into the Service in the future will come
in at the entrance level (the class 8 Foreign Serv-
ice officer) and will be recruited from our colleges
and universities. To insure that young men and
women throughout the entire country in all types
of educational institutions will have access to the
Foreign Service, we have established liaison with
690
Department of State Bulletin
nearly 500 colleges and universities. We are in-
terested in the most highly qualified candidates,
many of whom will require training in many di-
versified fields not traditionally connected with
diplomacy. A tabulation of the educational
background of present Foreign Service officers
shows, in addition to the majority trained in the
social sciences, such specializations as accounting,
biological sciences, science, business administra-
tion, engineering, fine arts, journalism, and medi-
cine. The list is likely to become more rather
than less diversified in the future and with in-
creased stress on those with administrative skill
and training. Our colleges and universities can
and do help us to find able young people with di-
versified skills and interests.
Our written entrance examinations were re-
vised in 1955, shifting emphasis from detailed
knowledge in specific fields to a broader testing
of the candidate's understanding of the ideas and
concepts basic to the development of the United
States and other countries and on his ability to
write correctly and effectively and to interpret
tabular and quantitative data. The large ma-
jority of those who pass these written examina-
tions are college graduates. Many have advanced
degrees, although there is a small percentage who
succeed despite the fact they had only partial or
no college education. The subsequent oral ex-
amination evaluates the candidate's personality,
attitudes, behavior, and ability to think. The ex-
aminers are instructed to be skeptical of "parrot-
like answers" which may reflect a "cram" course,
dogmatic teaching, or rote memorization rather
than analytical ability. It is of interest to note
that more than 12,000 applications to the Foreign
Service were received in 1956 in contrast to 1,200
in 1954, reflecting interest on a countrywide basis
and at all economic levels.
The role of the universities and colleges as
training centers for this new and broader For-
eign Service has consequently been enlarged. In-
creasing emphasis among educators on dynamic
as opposed to static knowledge fits in well with
the new approach of the Foreign Service entrance
examinations. The humanizing of the humanities
and social sciences and the close application of
theory to the problems of reality is proving in-
creasingly valuable in the intellectual training
and equipment of Foreign Service officers. There
is one serious weakness, however, which the De-
partment and the colleges have shared, and that
is their failure to emphasize the study of foreign
languages.
While I note that Dr. [Leon] Dostert [director
of the Foreign Service School's Institute of Lan-
guages and Linguistics] is going to talk to us later
about "Language Communication in Diplomacy,"
I do feel it important that I emphasize that in the
new career Foreign Service knowledge of foreign
languages is indispensable. Each Foreign Serv-
ice officer is now required to have, or to gain, a
working knowledge of at least one modem- world
language. We hope in addition that he will have
or develop proficiency in the language of the coun-
try to which he is assigned.
Despite this increased emphasis on knowledge
of foreign languages, however, the Department
has been forced to change foreign language
from a required to an optional part of the en-
trance examination. Foreign-language examina-
tions proved such a difficult hurdle to candidates in
the past that the Department feared it would lose
otherwise potentially excellent officers. Indeed,
70 percent of the new officers who came in under the
new examination do not have a useful knowledge
of any modern foreign language. The Depart-
ment has undertaken to train them, adding a con-
siderable burden to its language-training pro-
gram, which also carries the responsibility of
teaching officers the more exotic or hard-to-learn
languages.
Training and Career Development
Of course, the Department of State obviously
does not expect that the academic institutions of
America can do the entire job of equipping our
young people for a Foreign Service career. The
needs of the Service and its changing emphasis
have required us to set up a Career Development
and Counseling Staff and to greatly expand the
Foreign Service Institute in order to effectively
develop and utilize our manpower. The Career
Development and Counseling Staff maintains a
continuing evaluation of the performance, abili-
ties, and potential of each officer as he progresses
from one assignment to another. It also is con-
stantly assessing both current and future person-
nel requirements of the Service, coordinating offi-
cer potential and Service needs. The Foreign
Service Institute provides training for junior,
midcareer, and senior officers, study in 31 Ian-
November 3, 1958
691
guages, and short lecture courses in special fields.
An academic year of advanced study at a uni-
versity, either in connection with an area special-
ization or in some academic discipline, such as
economics or political science, is also made avail-
able to officers who show marked potential.
The Department now has 2,600 officer positions
in 249 embassies, legations, and considates
scattered all over the world and nearly 1,400 more
in the United States. Our first job is to keep
these positions filled with the best qualified people
and to assure that there is enough reserve man-
power to fill positions which are vacated on an
emergency basis through incapacitation, illness,
or death, as well as to be able to meet unexpected
crises in almost any part of the globe. The De-
partment of State does not have a sufficiently
large manpower pool to meet both its operational
needs and its needed training responsibilities; so
training and career development often defer to
emergency requirements. We hope this situation
will improve, allowing more margin for training.
There is one last point I would like briefly to
make. The very nature of the Foreign Service
is such that an officer cannot expect to go through
his career serving always in the area and in the
capacity he would choose. The Department of
State, like so many other organizations in our
country, is large, compartmentalized, and com-
plex. The problems the individual faces in adapt-
ing himself to any organization without blunting
his initiative, enthusiasm, and imagination are
also very much a part of our Foreign Service.
Under present world conditions, when a great
number of problems have to be absorbed and co-
ordinated on their way from lower to higher
levels of authority, some form of pyramidal
hierarchy is inevitable, whether it be called a
system, an organization, a corporation, or a
bureaucracy. Yet forcefulness, intellectual cour-
age, judgment, and imagination have never been
needed more than they are today. Organization
is essential to order; individual enterprise is
essential to progress. No society can afford to
stress one at the expense of the other.
In our country the system has the responsi-
bility of keeping a maximum flexibility in order
to provide the individual with the greatest scope
possible for his development and maximum pro-
ductivity. The new Foreign Service is designed
and administered, we hope, to provide that flex-
ibility. It can achieve the union between order
and progress only if its officers, during the forma-
tive years they have spent in their institutions
of learning, achieve within themselves a happy
balance between individual drive and organiza-
tional discipline. In the molding of character
and personality, the development of a fine per-
ception which can avoid a destructive individu-
alism as well as an uninspired and routine con-
formity, the colleges and universities, just as this
great university of Georgetown, can make their
greatest contribution to the new career Foreign
Service.
47th Anniversary of Founding
of Republic of China
Following is an exchange of messages between
President Eisenhower and Chiang Kai-shek, Pres-
ident of the Republic of China.
Message From President Eisenhower
White House press release dated October 10
October 10, 1958
The people of the United States join me in send-
ing Your Excellency and the people of China their
sincerest felicitations on the forty-seventh anni-
versary of the founding of the Republic of China.
We gladly recall on this occasion the Treaty of
Mutual Defense between the Republic of China
and the United States. We pay tribute to the in-
domitable spirit of Free China which, tested so
often in recent years by invasion and war, has once
again been demonstrated in the face of Communist
attack. We recognize that the sacrifices of Free
China contribute to the survival of freedom every-
where. We extend our sympathy and friendship
to all the Chinese people, being deeply conscious
of the hardships and denials of freedom that so
many of them are enduring.
Dwight D. Eisenhower
Message From President Chiang Kai-shek
White House press release dated October 14
October 12, 1958
On behalf of the Chinese Government and peo-
ple I thank Your Excellency sincerely for the
cordial greetings and good wishes contained in
692
Department of State Bulletin
your kind message on our National Day. In com-
memorating this occasion amidst unprovoked
Communist attacks, we are also mindful of the
community of interests and unity of purpose be-
tween our two countries as symbolized by the
Mutual Defence Treaty. This solemn instrument
binds us more closely together in our common ef-
fort to safeguard peace and security in this pail
of the world.
I wish to express to Your Excellency the deep
appreciation of my Government and people for
the support rendered us by the United States Gov-
ernment to meet Communist aggression. I must
pay special tribute to the gallant officers and men
of United States Armed Forces who have been
sharing hardships with us and making invaluable
contributions to us, particularly in helping solve
problems of resupply to Kinmen Garrison and
civilian populace. The zest and courage they
have displayed in their endeavours deserve our
high admiration and commendation.
I feel sure that all Chinese people, including
those on the Mainland now under the yoke of
Communist tyranny, are encouraged by the deter-
mined effort our two countries are making for the
cause of freedom and democracy. I am confident
that our continuing solidarity and exertions will
bring about the ultimate attainment of our com-
mon goal.
Accept, Mr. President, my best wishes for your
good health and prosperity of your country.
Chiang Kai-shek
Korean Minister of Reconstruction
Visits United States
The Department of State announced on October
17 (press release 626) that the Minister of Re-
construction and Economic Coordinator of the
Republic of Korea, Song In-sang, would arrive
at "Washington on October 18 for a 2-week visit.
He is accompanied by the Economic Coordinator
of the United Nations Command, William E.
Warne; by Kim Tai-dong, Chief of the Require-
ments and Coordination Bureau of the Ministry
of Reconstruction: and by Lee Han-bin, Chief of
the Bureau of the Budget of the Ministry of
Finance of the Republic of Korea.
During his visit to Washington Minister Song
will confer with officials of the Department of
State, the Department of Defense, and the Inter-
national Cooperation Administration concerning
the execution of the mutual security program in
Korea.
Minister Song will call on the Acting Secretary
of State and the Director of the International
Cooperation Administration. He will also call
on Assistant Secretary of State for Economic
Affairs Thomas C. Mann and on Deputy Assist-
ant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs
J. Graham Parsons. Other meetings will be
scheduled as the program of Minister Song's visit
develops. He is expected to go to New York about
November 1 for several days and then return to
Washington for another week before his departure
for Korea.
Thai National Assemblymen
Visit United States
Press release 61S dated October 15
Secretary Dulles on October 15 welcomed 12
members of the National Assembly of Thailand
who are visiting the United States under the De-
partment's leader exchange program.
The 3-day Washington visit of the Assembly-
men included a meeting with President Eisen-
hower at the White House, conferences with
Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Af-
fairs Walter S. Robertson and Deputy Director
of the International Cooperation Administration
D. A. Fitzgerald, luncheon with representatives
of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
and a visit to the Capitol, a reception given by
Mr. Robertson at the President's Guest House, and
a dinner given by Thanat Kh.om.an, Ambassador
from Thailand.
On October 16 the Assemblymen leave for New
York City, where they will be honored at a lunch-
eon given by Columbia Univei'sity and another
on October 17 given by Prince Wan Waithayakon,
Foreign Minister of Thailand and head of Thai-
land's delegation at the United Nations.
Secretary Dulles, in outlining for the visitors
his views on the world situation, emphasized the
necessity for all free nations to cooperate in main-
taining their freedom in the face of the Commu-
nist threat. The goal of communism is not to
further the welfare of peoples but to exploit them
for the purpose of extending its sway throughout
the world, he stated. To combat this force the
November 3, 1958
693
free nations must have a resolute faith in free-
dom and a belief in the rights of individuals and
be willing to accept risks if necessary to withhold
the advance of communism. The Secretary told
the group of legislators that the United States con-
siders Thailand a nation deeply dedicated to free-
dom and rejoices in the friendship and alliance of
the two countries.
Reflections on U.S.-Canadian Relations
by G. Burke ETbrich
Assistant Secretary for European Affairs 1
I would like to convey to this distinguished au-
dience the regrets of the Secretary of State that
he is unable to be here in person this evening.
On his behalf, however, I want to express the
pleasure felt by the United States Government
at the opening of Canada House. It is an honor
for me to participate in the dedication of this
magnificent monument to Canadian- American re-
lations. The institutions and business concerns
housed here will, in their own way, be carrying
on international relations of considerable impor-
tance and, as such, will be pai'tners in the happy
chore of furthering United States-Canadian re-
lations. The Department of State wishes you
many years of fruitful and profitable tenancy.
A great deal has been said and written about
the unique relationship existing between Canada
and the United States. Some of these things, in
fact, have been said so often that they have be-
come somewhat trite. At the same time, we
should remember that many statements become
trite simply by the process of being true. The
relationship between Canada and the United
States is indeed unique, not only in our own era
but in the entire history of mankind. What other
two nations have ever maintained between them-
selves so large a volume of trade in peaceful
goods? What other two nations have lived to-
gether in peace for more than a hundred years
while sharing a 3,000-mile border unguarded by
armed forces ? What other two nations have ex-
perienced so striking a parallel in their historical,
political, economic, and cultural development?
1 Remarks made at the inaugural ceremonies for Can-
ada House at New York, N.Y., on Sept. 30.
The extraordinary relationship between Can-
ada and the United States is not always under-
stood in other parts of the world and is sometimes
confusing even to a part of our own populations.
In our early history, of course, many Americans
were anxious to force Canada into a union with
the United States, perhaps on the theory that we
would be doing Canada a big favor. But this
illusory ambition is now deeply buried in the
ashes of time. I am confident the Canadians
have long since forgiven us for trying to impose
American citizenship upon them, and I am even
more confident that the people of the United
States would like to forget the whole matter. I
might mention, in this connection, that those
Americans who proudly boast that our country
has never lost a war would do well to remember
that our invasion of Canada in 1813 was not
exactly a howling success.
Canada, a Major World Power
Another widely prevalent misconception about
the nature of Canadian-American ties is the ten-
dency to interpret this relationship as one be-
tween a "big power" and a "small power." This
notion has always seemed a bit odd to me. By
almost every meaningful standard of interna-
tional relations, Canada stands as a major world
power. It ranks third in area among the nations
of the world. It also ranks third in agricultural
production and more than 10 years ago reached
third position in its volume of international trade.
It has enormous physical resources and technical
skills. It is one of the principal contributors to
economic and teclmological development in other
parts of the world. It has a well-deserved repu-
694
Department of State Bulletin
tut ion for military prowess. Even the cynical
Joseph Stalin, who rated a nation's importance
solely in terms of the number of divisions it had
at its disposal, could hardly sneeze at the fact that
Canada mobilized more than 600,000 men during
the Second World War.
Actually, it is obvious that Canada ranks as a
truly great power by every known test except the
test of population. I feel sure that the Canadian
people are quite capable of dealing with this prob-
lem without any advice or assistance from the
outside.
When a professional diplomat such as myself
considers the relationship between the United
States and Canada, lie inevitably must exercise a
certain humility. He knows that this relation-
ship has not been primarily a product of diplo-
macy at the governmental level. Rather, it is his-
tory's most outstanding example of successful peo-
ple-to-people diplomacy. It is based upon a com-
munity of real interests — upon ties of blood and
intermarriage, upon trade and investment, upon
the joint development of resources, upon the shar-
ing of literature and communications, upon sim-
ilar cultural roots, and upon a common adherence
to the ideals of freedom and human dignity.
What our two countries have in common is some-
thing which no professional diplomat, however
good, could have created and which no profes-
sional diplomat, however maladroit, could ever
destroy.
Close Working Relationships
Before I go any further, however, let me say
that I do not want to overdo this humility theme.
Actually, the intricate relationships between our
two countries manage to keep the professional
diplomats in both Governments fairly busy. At
least this is true in my own Government. Our
ties with Canada regularly give rise to a large
volume of important and difficult problems. Some
of these problems involve complex questions of
commerce and investment, and others arise from
the highly coordinated defensive arrangements
developed and maintained between the two Gov-
ernments. Still others are connected with the
prominent roles which both our Governments
play in global political and economic affairs.
In dealing with this host of problems our two
Governments maintain a remarkably close and
active day-to-day working relationship. We
November 3, 7958
485615 — 58 3
have learned to work together at subordinate lev-
els of our respective ministries and agencies in the
same spirit that our Chiefs of State visit with each
other to confer on national policies and our Cab-
inets meet in joint discussion of trade and eco-
nomic affairs.
It would be foolish to pretend that this process
of working together involves an identity of view-
point. There are inevitable differences and dis-
agreements between independent governments.
Moreover, familiarity and proximity, in them-
selves, often breed irritations. Some of these ir-
ritations arise paradoxically enough in the field
of commercial relations, where we enjoy unusual
advantages as each other's principal trading part-
ners. Another source, of irritation is the vast ex-
change of information and opinion over our news-
stands and networks. Sometimes, in fact, Ca-
nadians are probably irritated by the impression
that their American neighbors are taking them
for granted.
As far as the great mass of Americans are con-
cerned, nothing could be further from the truth.
Far from taking Canadians for granted, we have
come to think of them as our best friends and
severest critics. In a world in which there is little
room left for national privacy, we. Americans can
be sure that we hold no secrets or mysteries for
Canadians. They probably know exactly what we
paid for Manhattan Island and rightly conclude
that we are making a tidy profit in selling them
a small corner of Fifth Avenue !
I am sure we all realize that the differences and
irritations I have mentioned are little more than
ripples in the vast ocean of common interests
which bind our two peoples. While Americans
and Canadians are naturally concerned about our
disagreements, w 7 e should remember that there are
others in the world who seem very unhappy be-
cause we do not manage to disagree often enough.
In recent months, for example, the Soviet Union
has been putting out quite a barrage of propa-
ganda designed to insinuate that those govern-
ments which cooperate closely with the United
States are really nothing more than American
satellites. The Soviet emphasis upon this propa-
ganda theme is a rather interesting development.
Its main purpose, of course, is fairly obvious.
Having failed to disrupt the basic unity of the
free world either by impassioned argument or by
tin-eats of military force, the Soviet rulers are now
695
attempting to embarrass free, governments by cast-
ing aspersions upon their sovereignty.
Even though we appropriately discount this
tactic of "diplomacy by insult," we must also be
aware of the possibility that the Soviet rulers may
have deluded themselves by their own propa-
ganda. Because of their own experience, they
may indeed be incapable of conceiving of any
relationship among nations other than a master-
slave relationship. They may actually be puzzled
by the fact that a large number of free nations
with similar interests and common ideals very
frequently reach identical conclusions about the
great political and moral issues confronting the
world.
In any event, the Canadian and American
peoples have no reason to apologize to anyone for
our community of interests and similarity of atti-
tudes. On the contrary, we can say without boast -
fulness that we have given the world an example
of constructive cooperation which many other
nations would do well to emulate. We have rea-
son to be proud of our special relationship and
to bend our future efforts toward making this
relationship more intimate and more rewarding.
This, of course, is one of the purposes of the
establishment we are dedicating today. I feel
the decision of our Canadian neighbors to erect
a handsome and permanent structure here is per-
haps the finest compliment they could pay to the
United States and the city of New York. "We
welcome to Fifth Avenue this symbol of Canadian
participation in American commercial life and
in the commerce of the world at large. We are
proud to have Canada House on United States
soil.
Mr. McClellan To Manage
U. S. Exhibit at Moscow
The White House announced on October 17
that, witli the approval of the President, Harold
Chadick McClellan, president of the Old Colony
Paint and Chemical Co., Los Angeles, Calif., and
former Assistant Secretary of Commerce for
International Affairs, will serve as general man-
ager of the U.S. Government exhibition to be held
at Gorki Park, Moscow, next summer.
The exhibition will be held in accordance with
an agreement, signed on September 10 between
the United States and the Soviet Union, 1 which
provides, reciprocally, for exhibits to be held at
Moscow and New York during the summer of
1959 "devoted to the demonstration of the de-
velopment of science, technology, and culture."
United States and U.S.S.R. Agree
on Films To Be Exchanged
Press release 599 dated October 9
DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT
In accordance with an agreement between the
United States of America and the U.S.S.R. in
cultural, technical, and educational fields, which
was signed at Washington on January 27, 1958, 2
meetings of representatives of the United States
of America and the U.S.S.E. for the implementa-
tion of contacts in the field of the cinema for
1958-59 provided for in section VII of the
Washington agreement, were held at Moscow in
September-October 1958.
Participants in the negotiations from the Soviet
side were: V. Surin, Vice Minister of Culture,
U.S.S.R., A. Davydov, director of Sovexportfilm,
A. Slavnov, head of the Foreign Relations De-
partment of the Ministry of Culture; and
E. Kachugin, assistant director of Sovexportfilm.
Participants from the American side were : Eric
Johnston, president, Motion Picture Export Asso-
ciation of America, Turner B. Shelton, director,
Motion Picture Service, United States Informa-
tion Agency; Ken Clark, vice president, Motion
Picture Export Association of America; and Hans
Tuch, attache, American Embassy, Moscow.
The negotiators have considered the questions
of the sale and purchase of feature films, the ex-
change of documentary films, the holding of film
weeks and film premieres in the United States of
America and the U.S.S.R., the exchange of film
delegations, and the joint production of feature,
popular science, and documentary films.
In the course of the negotiations the American
and Soviet sides have reached an agreement on
all the above questions.
1 For text of agreement, see Bulletin of Oct. 13, 1958,
p. 577.
2 For text, see Bulletin of Feb. 17, 1958, p. 243.
696
Department of State Bulletin
In accordance with item 8, section VII, of the
Washington agreement both sides have extended
until January 27, L960, the powers of the standing
committee designated in the agreement and have
agreed that the committee's next meeting will be
held at Washington during the first quarter
of 1959.
A memorandum has been drawn up by both
sides on the results of the negotiations and signed
in behalf of the American side by Messrs. John-
ston and Shelton, and in behalf of the Soviet side
by Messrs. Surin and Davydov.
MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT
Memorandum ox Soviet-American Negotiations on Mo-
tion* Pictures Held in Moscow During September-
October 19ns, Under the Cultural, Technical and
Educational Exchange Agreement Between the
U.S.S.R. and the United States op America, Signed
on January 27, 1958
In the course of the negotiations consideration has heen
given to the questions of the sale and purchase of feature
films, the exchange of documentary films, the holding of
a film week, in the Soviet Union and in the United States,
the premiere of the first film shown in each country under
this Agreement, the exchange of delegations of leading
motion picture personalities, and the joint production of
feature, popular science and documentary films during
1958 and 1959. The results of these considerations are
as follows :
Purchase of Feature Films
As the first step in this field agreement has been
reached whereby motion picture companies of the United
States will purchase 7 Soviet feature films, and Sovex-
portfilm will purchase 10 U.S. feature films. The follow-
ing 4 Soviet films have been selected : "The Cranes Are
Flying". "The Idiot", "The Captain's Daughter", and
"Swan Lake". The other 3 will be selected by U.S. com-
panies within thirty days from the date of the signing
of this Memorandum. The following 6 U.S. films have
been selected : "The Great Caruso", "Lili", "Roman Holi-
day", "Marty", "The Old Man and the Sea", "Oklahoma".
The other four will be selected by Sovexportfilm within
thirty days from the signing of this Memorandum.
The prices for each Soviet or American film shall be
$60,000 for each standard size film and $67,000 for each
widescreen film, including the cost of preprint material.
The payments shall be made in dollars.
It has been agreed that each side would release all
films of the other side in dubbed or subtitled versions.
The contents of the films must be preserved and any
changes must be agreed upon by the other side. The
release version must be agreed m>on prior to its distribu-
tion by a representative designated by the other side.
The American companies and Sovexportfilm will use
their best efforts to assure maximum commercial distri-
bution of the films purchased and to arrange for wide
publicity for these films. The films are for theatrical
showing only.
Sovexportfilm and American companies have the right
in the future to carry on negotiations for the purchase
and sale of films and to conclude agreements under the
provisions set forth in the Cultural, Technical and Educa-
tional Exchange Agreement between the U.S.S.R. and
the United States of America.
Any problem arising in connection with this provision
shall be referred to the Standing Committee.
Exchange of Documentary Films
Consideration has been given regarding the selection of
documentary films and it has been agreed that the fifteen
documentary films tentatively selected by the Soviet Em-
bassy in the United States would be sent to Moscow for
final approval by the Ministry of Culture, while the
fifteen Soviet documentary films tentatively selected by
the American Embassy in Moscow would be sent to the
United States for final approval by the United States
Information Agency.
The selection of films will be completed in an expedi-
tious manner in order that the broad distribution of docu-
mentary films would begin no later than January 31, 1959
in accordance with the provisions of Item 3 of Section VII
of the Cultural, Technical and Educational Exchange
Agreement between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., and de-
pending on the distribution situation in each country.
Film Weeks
Both sides have recognized the desirability of holding
on a mutual basis an American film week in the U.S.S.R.
and a Soviet film week in the U.S.A. To implement
this item in the Cultural Agreement and in order to bring
about the making of firm arrangements for such film
weeks, it has been agreed that an officer of the Soviet
Embassy in Washington would be designated to deal with
an official of the Government of the United States, and an
officer of the American Embassy in Moscow would be des-
ignated to deal with an official of the Soviet Union to take
proper steps to establish the necessary procedures. The
names of the officials to be designated under this Item
shall be exchanged no later than January 1, 1959.
The Standing Committee will act on concrete recom-
mendations, including dates for the holding of film weeks,
within the framework of the Cultural, Technical and Edu-
cational Exchange Agreement between the U.S.S.R. and the
U.S.A., made to it. by these representatives at its next meet-
ing to be held in Washington.
Film Premieres
It has been agreed that a premiere would be held in Mos-
cow of the first American film shown in the Soviet Union
under this Agreement, and that a premiere would be held
in Washington of the first Soviet film shown in the United
States under this Agreement and that two or three lead-
November 3, 1958
697
Ing motion picture personalities, preferably from the film
being shown, would be invited to attend the respective
premieres. Film organizations of each side shall pay
the travel expenses of its motion pictures personalities,
and the motion picture interests of each country shall
pay the expenses of film personalities during their at-
tendance at the respective premieres.
It has been agreed that film organizations of each side
would assume all the expenses connected with the prep-
aration and holding of each premiere.
Practical problems such as the date, the composition
of delegations to the premieres, etc., shall be resolved di-
rectly between Sovexportfilm and the American company
concerned with the premiere. The Standing Committee
will consider the question of the holding of subsequent
premieres at its next meeting to be held in Washington.
Exchange of Film Delegations
It has been agreed that delegations of up to ten leading
motion picture personalities, to be approved by both sides,
would be exchanged for the purpose of becoming acquaint-
ed with experiences in the production of motion pictures.
These delegations will include scenario writers and tech-
nical personnel. Their stay shall be for a period of up to
one month.
Appropriate organizations on each side shall pay the
travel expenses of its delegation and shall assume ex-
penses connected with the stay of the visiting delegation.
It was decided to schedule the visits during May-June
1959 and each side agreed to inform the other of the
composition of its delegation before April 1, 1959.
Joint Production
The matter of the joint production of feature, popular
science and documentary films was referred to the Stand-
ing Committee.
The Standing Committee decided that Soviet studios
and American motion picture producing organizations
may carry on negotiations and conclude agreements for
joint production of films in accordance with the provisions
of Section VII of the Cultural, Technical and Educational
Exchange Agreement between the U.S.S.R. and the United
States of America.
The Standing Committee
It has been agreed to extend until January 27, 1960
the powers of the Standing Committee appointed under
Item 8, Section VII, of the Cultural, Technical and Edu-
cational Exchange Agreement between the U.S.S.R. and
the United States of America. The Standing Committee
will meet next in Washington during the first quarter
of 1959.
Signed in Moscow on the ninth day of October, 1958.
Representatives of the United States of America.
Ebic Johnston
tctbneb b. shelton
Representatives of the U.S.S.R.
V. Surin
A. Davydov
698
Soviet Union Rejects Arbitration
of Navy Neptune Case by ICJ
Press release 610 dated October 13
It will be recalled that on August 22 the Legal
Adviser of the State Department filed an appli-
cation in the International Court of Justice as
agent for the United States * instituting proceed-
ings against the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-
lics on account of the destruction on September
4, 1954, of a Navy Neptune plane in the interna-
tional airspace over the Sea of Japan in the area
of Vladivostok. This was done because the
United States had exhausted all other diplomatic
remedies to obtain compensation from the Soviet
Government. In the incident an aircraft was
destroyed, one crew member was killed, and other
crew members injured.
The application appended copies of the diplo-
matic correspondence. These showed that there
existed between the United States and the Soviet
Union disputes of fact and of law with respect
to the case and emphasized that the Soviet Gov-
ernment, although qualified to do so, had not
submitted to the Court's jurisdiction. Among the
questions of fact were the circumstances under
which the shooting took place and whether the
shooting took place over the high seas. Among
the questions of law were the validity of the
Soviet Government's claim that it may, under
international law, unilaterally extend its terri-
torial limits in the international airspace in excess
of 3 nautical miles ; the application of international
obligations relating to the flight of military
aircraft claimed to be intruding and the inter-
ception and attack of such aircraft; the nature
of the rights of the United States to conduct
flights of military aircraft in the international
aii-space over the Sea of Japan; together with
other issues of law and fact which, if resolved in
favor of the United States, would prove breaches
of international obligation by the Soviet Govern-
ment; and the nature and extent of reparations to
be made by the Soviet Government for all these
breaches.
Now the U.S. Government has been informed
by the International Court of Justice that on Sep-
tember 26, 1958, the Soviet Charge d'Affaires in
The Hague sent a letter stating that "there are
1 Bulletin of Sept. 15, 1958, p. 420.
Department of State Bulletin
no questions which are of need to be considered
by the International Court."
Thus again the Soviet Government, while claim-
ing international legal justification for its wrong-
ful conduct, has refused to permit, the one tribunal
set. up by the nations of the world as the "princi-
pal judicial organ of the United Nations'' to ad-
judicate both disputes of fact and disputes of law
between governments to obtain jurisdiction over
the parties to such a case.
The U.S. Government, will continue to attempt
to exhaust the institutions of law and order to
settle disputes of fact and of law. It regrets that
thus far the record of the Soviet Union in this
regard has been negative.
U.S. Sends Salk Vaccine
to San Marino
Press release 607 dated October 13
The U.S. Government has sent a shipment of
2,600 cc. of Salk vaccine to the Republic of San
Marino. The tiny republic, faced with an increase
in polio cases in the area and a treasury left empty
by the previous Communist-controlled govern-
ment, appealed to the Department of State for as-
sistance so that all children up through 6 years of
age could be inoculated. The problem was called
to the attention of Eli Lilly & Co. by the Depart-
ment of State and the International Cooperation
Administration. The Lilly Company generously
responded with an offer to donate the vaccine and
immediately delivered the required amount to ICA
in Washington.
The U.S. Air Force and Army assumed the re-
sponsibility of speeding the donation to San
Marino. The Tactical Air Command placed the
shipment aboard one of its F-100S super sabrejet
aircraft making a normal high-flight mission.
The aircraft, piloted by Capt. W. A. Merrill, de-
parted Langley Field, was refueled in the air 500
miles east of Bermuda, and proceeded to Aviano
Air Base, Italy, via U.S. air bases in the Azores.
Morocco, and France. Weather permitting, a
U.S. Army helicopter from Southern European
Task Force Headquarters in Verona will fly the
vaccine from Aviano to San Marino. At San
Marino it will be received by U.S. consular offi-
cials who will deliver it to San Marino public-
health authorities.
General War Sequel Law
of German Federal Republic
Press release 584 dated October 6
The Finance Ministry of the Federal Republic
of Germany made an announcement on October
6 concerning the General War Sequel Law, which
was enacted on November 5, 1957, and came into
force on January 1, 1958. Claims under this law
must be filed before January 1, 1959, except that
the law provides for later dates for certain cate-
gories of cases.
The General War Sequel Law deals with claims
of foreign creditors against the former German
Reich (including the Reichsbahn, the Reichspost,
the Reichsautobahnen, and the former State of
Prussia) arising from capital investments ex-
pressed in reichsmarks and certain other reichs-
mark claims against these debtors. The law does
not deal with claims arising from racial, religious,
or political persecution or with claims arising out
of World War II.
Detailed information concerning this law and
concerning the filing of claims under it will be
found in an information sheet which is available
at the Securities Settlement Advisory Agency of
the Federal Republic of Germany, 30 Broad St.,
Suite 3601, New York 4, N. Y., or at the. German
Embassy in Washington, D.C., and at all German
consulates general and consulates in the United
States.
Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy
85th Congress, 2d Session
International Cooperation Administration Replies to
Criticisms of the Foreign Aid Program. March 14,
1958. 88 pp. [Committee Print.]
Export Program for Dairy Products. Hearing before a
subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Agriculture
and Forestry on S. 4013, a bill to provide an export pro-
gram for dairy products. July 14, 1958. 81 pp.
Passport Legislation. Hearings before the Senate Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations on S. 2770, S. 3998, S. 4110,
and S. 4137, bills relating to the issuance of passports.
July 16-28, 1958. 225 pp.
Diversion of Water From Lake Michigan. Hearings be-
fore a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Public
Works on H. R. 2 and S. 1123, bills to authorize the
State of Illinois and the Metropolitan Sanitary District
of Greater Chicago, under the direction of the -Secretary
of the Army to test, on a 3-year basis, the effect of
increasing the diversion of water from Lake Michigan
into the Illinois waterway. July 28-August 7, 1958.
407 pp.
November 3, 1958
699
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings '
Adjourned During October 1958
15th Pan American Sanitary Conference and 10th Meeting of San Juan Sept. 21-Oct. 6
the Regional Committee of WHO for the Americas.
International Atomic Energy Agency: 2d General Conference . Vienna Sept. 22-Oct. 4
U. N. Sugar Conference Geneva Sept. 22-Oct. 25
GATT Intersessional Committee Geneva Sept. 24-Oct.l
UNESCO Promotion of Peaceful Cooperation and International Prague Sept. 24-Oct. 1
Understanding Among Nations: 1st Meeting.
WHO Regional Committee for the Western Pacific: 9th Session Manila Sept. 26-Oct. 2
South Pacific Commission: 18th Session Noumea, New Caledonia . . . Sept. 26-Oct. 13
UNESCO Executive Board: 51st Session Brussels Sept. 29-Oct. 2
FAO/UNICEF Joint Policy Committee Rome Sept. 29-Oct. 2
U.N. ECE Inland Transport Committee: Working Party on Geneva Sept. 29-Oct. 3
Construction of Road Vehicles.
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea: 46th Copenhagen Sept. 29-Oct. 4
Annual Meeting.
Commonwealth Specialist Subcommittee of Service Psycholo- Melbourne Sept. 29-Oct. 8
gists.
WMO Commission on Agricultural Meteorologv : 2d Session . . Warsaw Sept. 29-Oct. 17
ICAO Panel of Teletypewriter Specialists: 3d Meeting .... Montreal Sept. 29-Oct. 27
ANZUS Council: 6th Meeting Washington Oct. 1 (1 day)
International Symposium on U. S. Domestic Short Distance Washington Oct. 1-2
Navigation System (VORTAC) and Its Relationship to the and
Air Navigation System. Indianapolis Oct. 2-4
International Council of Scientific Unions: 8th General As- Washington Oct. 2-6
sembly.
PASO Executive Committee: 36th Meeting San Juan Oct. 3 (1 day)
FAO International Rice Commission: 6th Session Tokyo Oct. 3-4
International Union of Official Travel Organizations: 13th Gen- Brussels Oct. 3-11
eral Assembly.
IAEA Board of Governors: 9th Session Vienna Oct. 6-7
U. N. ECE Working Party on Electric Power Statistics Geneva Oct. 6-8
U. N. ECE Working Party on Rural Electrification Geneva Oct. 6-9
International Monetary Fund, International Bank for Recon- New Delhi Oct. 6-10
struction and Development, International Finance Corpora-
tion : Annual Meetings of Boards of Governors.
4th FAO Regional Conference for Asia and the Far East .... Tokyo Oct. 6-16
Diplomatic Conference for Revision of the Convention for the Lisbon Oct. 6-31
Protection of Industrial Property.
Commonwealth Advisory Committee on Defense Sciences . . . Canberra Oct. 7-28
Caribbean Commission: Special Meeting Washington Oct. 8-9
Special Five-Power Meeting on North Atlantic Cable System . . London Oct. 9-16
U. N. ECOSOC/ILO Consultation New York Oct. 13-15
U. N. ECE Timber Committee: 16th Session Geneva Oct. 13-17
Structural Division of American Society of Civil Engineers and New York Oct. 13-17
International Association for Bridge and Structural Engi-
neering: Joint Meeting.
FAO General Fisheries Council of the Mediterranean: 5th Rome Oct. 13-18
Meeting.
GATT Intersessional Committee Geneva Oct. 15 (1 day)
9th U. N.ECOSOC Technical Assistance Conference New York Oct. 16 (1 day)
U. N. ECE Committee on Development of Trade and East-West Geneva Oct. 16-24
Trade Consultations: Working Party on Arbitration.
'Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Oct. 15, 1958. Asterisks indicate tentative dates and places.
Following is a list of abbreviations: ANZUS, Australia, New Zealand, United States Treaty; ECAFE, Economic Com-
mission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECLA, Economic Commission for Latin
America; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade; IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization;
ICEM, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO. Inter-
governmental Maritime Consultative Organization; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; NATO, North Atlantic
Treaty Organization; PASO, Pan American Sanitary Organization; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; "UNICEF, United Nations Children's Fund; WHO, World Health
Organization; WMO, World Meteorological Organization.
700 Department of State Bulletin
FAO Group on Coconut and Coconut Products: 2d Session . . . Manila Oct. 20-29
I N I CAFE Industry and Natural Resources Committee: Bangkok Oct. 21-28
8th Session of Subcommittee on Iron and Steel.
FAO Cocoa Study Group: 3d Meeting of Committee on Statistics. Rome Oct. 23-24
UNESCO Directors of National Cultural Relations: 2d Meeting . Paris Oct. 28-31
In Session as of October 31, 1958
U. N, General Assembly: 13th Session New York Sept. 16-
[TTJ International Administrative Telephone and Telegraph Geneva Sept. 29-
Conference.
GATT Contracting Parties: 13th Session Geneva Oct. 16-
Consultative Committee for Cooperative Economic Development
in Smith and Southeast Asia ("Colombo Plan"): 10th Meeting.
Preliminary Working Group Seattle Oct. 20-
Officials' Meeting Seattle Oct. 27-
Ministerial Meeting Seattle Nov. 10-
International North Pacific Fisheries Commission: 6th Meeting. Tokyo Oct. 20-
ILO Experts on Teachers' Problems Geneva Oct. 20-
U. N. ECAFE Regional Cartographic Conference for Asia and Tokyo Oct. 20-
the Far East.
ICAO Rules of the Air and Air Traffic Control/Search and Rescue Montreal Oct. 21-
Divisional Meeting.
FAO Council: 29th Session Rome Oct. 27-
FAO Near East Forestry Commission: 2d Session Cairo Oct. 27-
ILO Experts on the International Classification of Radiographs Geneva Oct. 27-
of Pneumoconioses.
UNESCO Executive Board: 52d Session Paris Oct. 27-
U. N. ECE Committee on Development of Trade and East- West Geneva Oct. 27-
Trade Consultations.
U. N. Wheat Conference: Preliminary Meeting Geneva Oct. 28-
South Pacific Commission: Special Conference on Tuberculosis. Pago Pago, American Samoa . Oct. 31-
Negotiations on Political Aspects of Suspension of Nuclear Tests . Geneva Oct. 31-
Scheduled November 1, 1958, Through January 31, 1959
6th Inter-American Congress of Radiology Lima Nov. 2—
ILO Governing Body and Committees: 140th Session Geneva Nov. 3-
FAO Latin American Forestry Commission: 6th Session. . . . Antigua Nov. 4-
[CEM Executive Committee: 11th Session Geneva Nov. 4-
U.N. E( 'AFE Inland Transport Committee: 4th Session of High- Bangkok Nov. 4-
N\av Subcommittee.
UNESCO General Conference: 10th Session Paris Nov. 4-
U.N. ECE Housing Committee: 17th Session and Working Geneva Nov. 6-
Parties.
2d Inter-American Technical Meeting on Housing and Planning . Lima Nov. 10*
Technical Discussions on Prevention of Surprise Attack .... Geneva Nov. 10-
U.N. Wheat Conference: Preparatory Committee London Nov. 10-
ICEM Council: 9th Session ..." Geneva Nov. 12-
7th International Congress of Leprology Tokyo Nov. 12-
t'.N. Advisory Committee on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy . New York Nov. 12-
U.N. ECAFE Committee on Trade: Working Party on Customs Bangkok Nov. 12-
Administration.
FAO Latin American Regional Conference San Jos6, Costa Rica Nov. 17-
K \<> Statistics Division: 3d Session Montreal Nov. 18-
FAO/WHO Regional Nutrition Meeting (Near East) Cairo Nov. 18-
International Child Welfare Study Conference Tokyo Nov. 23-
Conference on Revision of Agreement for Establishment of the Trinidad Nov. 24-
Caribbean Commission.
ims Cooperation Council: 13th Session Brussels Nov. 24-
l". N. ECE Committee on Agricultural Problems: 10th Session . Geneva Nov. 24-
U. N. ECAFE Working Party of Railway Mechanical Engineers . undetermined Nov. 24-
International Fisheries Convention 1946, Permanent Commis- Dublin Nov. 25-
sion: 7th Meeting.
U. N. ECAFE Working Party on Coordination of Transport . . Bangkok Nov. 25-
ICAO Special North Atlantic Fixed Services: 2d Meeting . . . Paris November
U. N. ECOSOC Technical Assistance Committee New York November
International North Pacific Fisheries Commission: Committee Tokyo November
on Biology and Research.
FAO WII Technical Meeting on Food Additives Rome Dec. 1-
ICAO Map Panel: 2d Meeting Montreal Dec. 1-
U. N. ECAFE Committee on Industry and Natural Resources: New Delhi Dec. 3-
Symposium on Petrol iim Development.
FAO Indo-Pacific Fisheries Council: 8th Meeting Colombo Dec. 6-
U. N. ECAFE Conference of Asian Statisticians: 2d Session . . Bangkok Dec. 8-
North Pacific Fur Seal Commission: 2d Meeting Washington Dec. 8-
November 3, 1958 701
Calendar off International Conferences and Meetings — Continued
Scheduled November 1, 1958, Through January 31, 1959 — Continued
ILO Technical Tripartite Committee on Timber Industry . . .
U. N. ECE Steel Committee and Working Parties
7th Inter-American Travel Congress
FAO Regional Conference for Near East
Caribbean Commission: 27th Meeting ,
U. N. ECE Coal Trade Subcommittee (and related meetings) .
U. N. ECE Inland Transport Committee: 18th Session . . . .
NATO Council: Ministerial Session
U. N. Economic Commission for Africa: 1st Session
Inter-American Child Institute: Directing Council
U.N. ECOSOC: 26th Session (resumed)
UNESCO Executive Board: 53d Session
U.N. ECAFE Committee on Trade: Intraregional Trade Pro-
motion Talks.
ICAO Southeast Asia-Limited Middle East Regional Air Naviga-
tion Meeting.
IMCO Assembly: 1st Session
IMCO Council: 1st Session
5th Pan American Consultation on Geography
ICAO Meeting of Panel on Vertical Separation of Aircraft . . .
4th Pan American Consultation on History
Inter-American Council of Jurists: 4th Meeting
WHO Standing Committee on Administration and Finance . . .
U.N. Wheat Conference: Negotiating Conference
WHO Executive Board: 23d Session
(J.N. ECLA Committee on Trade
Geneva Dec. 8-
Geneva Dec. 8-
Montevideo Dec. 9-
Damascus* Dec. 10-
Cayenne Dec. 15*
Geneva
Geneva
Paris ....
Addis Ababa
Montevideo .
New York . .
Paris .
Dec. 15-
Dec. 15-
Dec. 16-
Dec. 29-
December*
December
December
Bangkok Jan. 5-
Rome
Jan. 6-
London Jan. 6-
London Jan. 6-
Quito Jan. 7-
Montreal Jan. 12*
Cuenca, Ecuador Jan. 19-
Santiago Jan. 19-
Geneva Jan. 20-
New York or Rome Jan. 26*
Geneva January
Mexico, D.F January
United Nations Establishes Special Fund
Following is a series of statements on the estab-
lishment of the Special Fund made in the 13th
session of the V.N. General Assembly by Senator
Mike Mansfield and Christopher H. Phillips,
U.S. representatives, together with the text of the
resolution adopted in plenary session on October
H
STATEMENT BY SENATOR MANSFIELD, SEP-
TEMBER 30'
It was my privilege to represent the United
States in the Second Committee of the Sixth Gen-
eral Assembly. At that time a new experiment
in international cooperation — the United Nations
Expanded Program of Technical Assistance — was
barely a year old. The International Bank had
concentrated its energies mainly on the recon-
struction of war-devastated areas and was only
then in the process of shifting its activities more
and more to the underdeveloped countries. The
problems of economic development were, increas-
ingly, commanding the attention of the members
'Made in Committee II (Economic and Financial)
(U.S. delegation press release 3004).
of the United Nations. With growing recogni-
tion of these problems as they affected underde-
veloped countries, the General Assembly was
deeply concerned with ways and means of stimu-
lating the international flow of public and private
investment capital.
During the years since the Sixth General As-
sembly, as a member of the United States Senate,
I have been in a position to continue to follow
events in this field of economic development. I
have been able to see for myself, in visits to many
of your countries, the efforts being made, the suc-
cesses achieved, and, I might say, some of the fail-
ures as well. May I add that I have also been
able to understand some of the complex difficulties
which remain to be surmounted.
There are many dark spots in the picture of
economic development around the world. The
great bulk of the job still remains to be done. But
there are also encouraging aspects. You know
them. You have seen them in the widespread de-
termination of underdeveloped countries to rid
themselves of institutions and practices which no
longer respond to the needs of their peoples. You
have witnessed them in the willingness of many
countries to assist others to achieve more rapid
702
Department of State Bulletin
economic and social progress. You have sensed
them in the development of institutions which
provide the framework for international cooper-
ation of a scope and variety little dreamed of only
a few years ago. You have experienced them in
the continuous search in which many of you have
participated personally — the search for effective
ways and means to help achieve our common goal
of economic progress.
Report of Preparatory Committee
The report of the Preparatory Committee on
the Special Fund, 2 which is now before this com-
mittee, is one result of this search.
Teclinology — that common treasury of tools
and tecliniques — has been called man's primary
economic resource. Without it, other resources
continue to stagnate. "With it, other resources
may take on new dimensions of usefulness. Few
questions are more urgent today than the question
of how modern teclinology can be most quickly ap-
plied in underdeveloped countries. How can its
benefits be spread to all the world's people?
At the last General Assembly my Government
was convinced that the United Nations had a sig-
nificant opportunity to assist in answering this
question by making available technical aid of a
kind not possible under the Expanded Program
of Technical Assistance. To this end the United
States delegation proposed and the General As-
sembly voted unanimously for the establisliment
of the Special Fund. 3
The United States had the honor to serve on
the Preparatory Committee, and the United
States representative on that committee concurred
in the report which is now before us. My delega-
tion is happy, therefore, to join in cosponsoring
the draft resolution* which, as recommended by
the Economic and Social Council, incorporates
the proposals of the Preparatory Committee.
That we concurred in the report of the Pre-
paratory Committee does not mean that we were
completely satisfied with the report in all respects.
We had hoped, for example, that the Preparatory
Committee would recommend that governments
provide some minimum of convertibility in their
contributions to the Special Fund. It was not
possible to agree on this point. In view of the de-
sirability of affording the fund maximum flexi-
1 U.N. doc. A/3908 and Corr. 1.
* Bulletin of Jan. 13, 1958, p. 57.
4 U.N. doc. A/C.2/L.363.
November 3, 1958
bility and efficiency in its operations, we urge now
that contributing governments make every effort
to have their contributions readily usable by the
fund for approved programs.
Another point, the question of the governing
body to exercise control of the Special Fund, was
one of the most difficult problems considered by
the Preparatory Committee. As many of you
know, the United States was convinced that the
most efficient organization would be to have a
single governing body responsible for both the
Special Fund and the Expanded Program. In
the interest of harmony, however, we agreed to
the compromise arrangements contained in the
committee's report.
We are acutely aware of the fact — a fact al-
ready emphasized by previous speakers — that the
committee's recommendations represent the end
product of weeks of careful negotiation and the
accommodation of different views. My delega-
tion, for one, can testify to the painstaking effort
which was required to produce the structure
which finally obtained the unanimous support of
the committee. The difficulty was especially great
because, as many of you are aware, the member-
ship of the Preparatory Committee was very care-
fully selected so as to assure full consideration of
the whole range of views represented in the
United Nations.
In the light of these considerations my delega-
tion hopes that all members of this committee will
be prepared to accept the recommendations which
have been submitted to us. "We are convinced that
to attempt now to recast the work of the com-
mittee in any significant way would reopen ques-
tions which might well cause the greatest
difficulty.
Purpose of Special Fund
It is true, as has been so often emphasized, that
the process of economic development requires not
only such ingredients as domestic effort and tech-
nical assistance but also a crucial margin of for-
eign capital. It is also true that the Special
Fund cannot do the job envisaged for a capital
development fund. Does that mean, however,
that it can make no contribution ? Is it not a fact
that a significant momentum of development
cannot be obtained without knowledge of basic re-
sources, without the technical skills to put them
to use, and without trained personnel to work in
703
agriculture, industry, and administration? Is it
not a fact that the Special Fund is designed pre-
cisely to assist countries in dealing with these
basic requirements of economic growth? I urge,
therefore, that we grasp this opportunity to make
a new and important contribution to the economic
development of the less developed countries.
The United States representative emphasized
in this committee last year and the General As-
sembly recognized in resolution 1219 5 that the
Special Fund, by creating conditions in under-
developed areas that will make investment either
feasible or more effective, will facilitate new in-
vestment of all types. In this way it will help to
meet urgent requirements for capital in all under-
developed countries.
The establishment of the Special Fund repre-
sents an important extension of the activities of
the United Nations in the field of economic de-
velopment. Success or failure in this effort will
do much to determine the directions in which the
United Nations may move in the same field in the
future. This success or failure will be governed
in large part by two factors: One is the extent
to which projects into which the Special Fund is
projected are well planned and integrated into
national development programs. The other is the
extent to which member states give the Special
Fund their financial support.
With some exceptions, my Government has
been disappointed by the responses thus far made
to the Secretary-General's request that govern-
ments indicate the extent of their support of the
Special Fund. My delegation hopes that final
action by this General Assembly on the nature
and structure of the Special Fund will make
it possible for all member states, developed and
underdeveloped, to give the fund their full
financial support at the forthcoming pledging
conference.
U.S. Contribution
My Government stands ready to help translate,
this project into the kind of concrete action which
we believe will pay important dividends in the
development of underdeveloped countries. As
some of you may be aware, the Congress lias pro-
vided for a combined U.S. contribution to both
the Special Fund and the Expanded Program of
Technical Assistance of $38 million — subject only
to the percentage limitation prescribed by law.
Those of you who participated in the discussions
on the establishment of the Special Fund during
the 12th session will recall that at that time our
legislation required a reduction in the United
States share of contributions to the Expanded
Program from 38 percent in 1959 to 33% percent
thereafter. You will also recall that Congressman
Judd, who represented the United States in this
committee, stated that he was prepared to go be-
fore the Congress to urge that the percentage
of the United States contribution be stabilized at
40 percent, at least for several years. I, as a
Democrat, can attest to the effectiveness of the
efforts which Mr. Judd, as a Republican, put
forth in the Congress of the United States in this
connection. The Congress agreed to a 40 percent
contribution to the Special Fund and the Ex-
panded Program for the coming year. May I
say out of the experience of many years of serv-
ice in the Congress of the United States that that
body may be counted upon to act generously in
international matters if the ends for which it is
called upon to act are clearly constructive and
if other nations do their part.
Mr. Chairman, it has been said that the choice
before us today is whether the world will pro-
duce for the needs of families or for the needs of
armies. The world of tomorrow can be a world
of peace, of growth, and of a progressive reduction
of crushing and degrading poverty wherever it
may exist. Working together through the United
Nations, we have an opportunity to bring that
kind of world into being. The Special Fund can
be a milestone pointing in the direction of that
kind of world. The United States delegation is
prepared to join with others in erecting this mile-
stone now.
STATEMENT BY MR. PHILLIPS, OCTOBER 6 s
The most striking feature of the debate we have
had on the Special Fund is not the small area of
disagreement but rather the large area of agree-
ment. Even the Soviet Union and Czechoslo-
vakia, which last December were very critical of
resolution 1219, have now come to look upon the
Special Fund as a genuine step forward in pro-
5 For text, see Bulletin of Jan. 13, 1958, p. 71.
704
"Made in Committee II (U.S. delegation press release
.3008).
Department of State Bulletin
viding assistance to the economic development of
underdeveloped countries. This is encouraging.
I recall that the Soviet Union at one time de-
nounced the Expanded Program of Technical As-
sist ance as a "cloak for imperialism" but 3 years
later decided to participate in the Expanded Pro-
gram. Mr. [G. P.] Arkadev's statement last week
raises the hope that the Soviet Union this time
may be somewhat quicker to recognize the value
of a new program important to the development
of underdeveloped countries — and to contribute
resources to the program.
The Soviet representative also referred to a pro-
posal by his Foreign Minister that the major pow-
ers reduce armaments by 10 to 15 percent and
devote the savings therefrom to assistance for the
economic development of the underdeveloped
countries. Let us hope that this statement too
will foreshadow a more generous attitude by the
Soviet Government in contributing toward United
Nations programs than has so far been the case.
"What is frankly needed is less talk and invective
and more action in the form of material support.
The Soviet Union currently contributes about one-
fifteenth of the sum provided to the Expanded
Program of Technical Assistance by the United
States, although it boasts of military forces second
to none and is constantly telling us of its amazing
economic progress.
The idea of devoting savings from a reduction
in armament expenditures for economic develop-
ment is a very good one to which my country has
subscribed for many years. You will recall that
President Eisenhower in 1953 7 declared his readi-
ness to recommend to Congress that part of the
savings achieved through an agreement on inter-
nationally controlled disarmament should be de-
voted to a multilateral fund for economic assist-
ance to underdeveloped countries. We have been
striving for many years for such a disarmament
agreement. We will continue to strive for it with
every means at our command. In the meantime,
however, we have not waited for disarmament be-
fore giving increased assistance to the less de-
veloped countries. As I mentioned earlier, the
United States has been contributing from 14 to 15
times as much as the Soviet Union to the United
Xations Expanded Program of Technical Assist-
ance. Moreover, a very large part of the funds
for the loans of over $700 million in the past fiscal
year by the International Bank — most of which
went to underdeveloped countries — came from
United States sources.
In bilateral programs United Nations document
E/3131 shows that during 1957 United States
Government loans and grants to the less developed
countries amounted to almost $iy 2 billion. New
United States private investments in these areas
were of about the same magnitude. Thus, the
United States provided almost $3 billion in one
form or another to help finance the economic de-
velopment of the underdeveloped countries.
As for the immediate future, the United States
Congress this spring authorized additional capital
amounting to $2 billion for the Export-Import
Bank to be used in providing loans to foreign
countries and an additional $400 million for the
Development Loan Fund for "soft" loans. In
New Delhi this month my Government will pro-
pose substantial increases in the capital of the In-
ternational Bank and in the quotas of the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund. It will also explore in-
formally whether there is international support
for the establishment of an International Develoj)-
ment Association affiliated with the International
Bank which would extend the same kind of as-
sistance to the less developed countries which the
advocates of a United Nations capital fund have
long had in mind. I underscore the importance
of this proposal. Its feasibility will largely de-
pend on the willingness of members to contribute
financial support. This, Mr. Chairman, repre-
sents action, not just words, in the field of economic
assistance to the less developed countries.
Question of Election of Governing Council
We have before us two draft resolutions. 8 As
several of our cosponsors have indicated, the only
essential difference between them is on the ques-
tion of whether the Economic and Social Council
nr the General Assembly should elect the Govern-
ing Council. The distinguished representative of
Iraq has noted that there are five Council mem-
bers cosponsoring L. 362 and eight cosponsoring
L. 363 ; this happens to represent 30 percent of the
number of cosponsors in each case. Both resolu-
tions have many sponsors from the less developed
countries. Moreover, as some of our cosponsors
7 Bulletin of Apr. 27, 1953, p. 599.
November 3, 7958
8 U.N. does. A/C. 2/L. 362, with 17 sponsors, and L.
303. with 27 sponsors, including the United States.
705
have indicated, a large number of sponsors of each
resolution have long supported SUNFED. My
delegation assumes that representatives — whether
from India or Japan, the United Arab Republic
or Argentina — have the will and the competence
to protect the interests of their own governments
and to cooperate in advancing the work of the
United Nations.
We have given the most careful consideration
to this question over the past 9 months, while pre-
paring for the discussions of the Special Fund
in the Preparatory Committee, the Economic and
Social Council, and here at the General Assembly.
The burden of proof for bypassing the Economic
and Social Council in the election of the Gov-
erning Council would seem to us to lie with those
who propose a departure from established prac-
tice. Yet we have heard no convincing argument
for refusing to the Economic and Social Council
its normal responsibility for electing the member-
ship of United Nations bodies active in the eco-
nomic and social field.
True to form, the Soviet representative has im-
plied that there is some sinister motive behind the
United States position — and, incidentally, the
position of 26 cosponsors and many other delega-
tions — on this basic matter of principle. It is an
old trick in debate to question the motives of your
opponent if you have no strong arguments against
his position. The Soviet representative has im-
plied that ECOSOC does not accurately reflect the
United Nations membership and that therefore it
should not be entrusted with the responsibility of
electing the Governing Council. If he believes
this, he will soon have an opportunity in this com-
mittee to support an appropriate increase in the
membership of ECOSOC. The proposal to do so
was endorsed by the ECOSOC at its 26th session.
The vote was 16 for and 2 against. The negative
votes were cast by the Soviet Union and Poland.
Those of us who support the Preparatory Com-
mittee's recommendation on election of the Gov-
erning Council by ECOSOC do so because we sin-
cerely believe that both a principle and a precedent
are involved. As far as the composition of the
Governing Council is concerned, we believe it will
not differ markedly whether the election is held
by ECOSOC or by the General Assembly.
Furthermore, the fact that six members of the
Council must be elected annually affords ample
opportunity for eventual participation by a large
number of countries.
The overwhelming weight of principle and
precedent favor election by ECOSOC. Let us
look first at the United Nations Charter. Under
articles 1 and 61-72, the Economic and Social
Council is the United Nations body which has
direct responsibility for United Nations activities
". . . to achieve international cooperation in solv-
ing international problems of an economic, social,
cultural, or humanitarian character."
In particular, article 63 makes the Council re-
sponsible for coordinating the activities of the
specialized agencies in economic, social, cultural,
educational, health, and related fields. It is there-
fore entirely natural that in the case of all existing
U.N. bodies in these fields election of members is
by the Economic and Social Council. This ap-
plies to the Technical Assistance Committee, the
Executive Board of the United Nations Children's
Fund, the Executive Committee of the High Com-
missioner for Refugees, the Commission on Hu-
man Rights, the Commission on International
Commodity Trade, and many others.
We agree with those who say that the Special
Fund will be a very important program; we
thought so when we proposed it last year and we
still do. But would anyone argue that the pro-
tection of human rights, the welfare of children,
social progress, and the Expanded Program of
Technical Assistance are not important? The
United Nations has given the Economic and So-
cial Council full confidence in being directly re-
sponsible for these programs and in electing the
governing bodies. This history and precedent
was undoubtedly what the distinguished repre-
sentative of Mexico had in mind when he said:
It appears regrettably that there is being created a sort
of antagonism between the Assembly and the Council, the
organ to which have been entrusted — and should continue i
to be entrusted — functions of great importance in matters
which are precisely of its competence. If the Assembly
entrusts to the Council the delicate task of supervising
the activities of the Special Fund, how can it not show
the same confidence with regard to the election of mem-
bers of its Governing Council?
May I add that, if the Economic and Social Coun-
cil were not worthy of confidence, it woidd be a
serious reflection on the General Assembly, which,
after all, elects the Council.
The distinguished representative of the Nether-
lands, in a cogent statement on this point, care-
fully outlined the reasons why the Preparatory
Committee recommended that the Economic and
706
Department of Stafe Bulletin
Social Council should elect the members of the
Special Fund Governing Council. He said as
follows:
At the present time there is no body operating within
the United Nations in the economic and social framework
of which the members are not elected by the Economic
and Social Council. To deviate from the accepted princi-
ple that the Economic and Social Council will elect the
members of bodies in the economic field might create in
certain countries the impression that political motives
had contributed to the decision to have the General As-
sembly perform this election. Such a belief could, even
though it would probably be erroneous, in itself be detri-
mental to the widest possible support, especially financial
support, to the Special Fund. On the other hand elec-
tion by the Economic and Social Council would fit into a
well established pattern.
The Netherlands representative made it very clear
that this position on this matter of principle has
nothing to do with the future of SUNFED. He
emphasized that his delegation as well as many
others cosponsoring resolution L. 363 continue to
be firm supporters of SUNFED.
Making the Special Fund Successful
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I should like to
say a few words about section III of resolution
1219. My delegation cooperated in drafting that
section and has supported it fully. We continue
to support it fully. Our only stipulation is that it
be read to mean exactly what it says. It reads,
Decides that as and when the resources prospectively
available are considered by the General Assembly to be
sufficient to enter into the field of capital development,
principally the development of the economic and social
infrastructure of the less developed countries, the General
Assembly shall review the scope and future activities of
the Fund and take such action as it may deem appro-
priate.
Please note that the paragraph does not "bury"
the idea of a U.N. capital development fund.
Neither does it provide that the Special Fund
shall become such a fund. It provides that, as
and when resources prospectively available are
considered by the General Assembly to be suffi-
cient to enter into the field of capital development,
the Assembly shall take such action as it may
deem appropriate. Some delegations have ex-
pressed the hope that such action will be the estab-
lishment of SUNFED. I would assume this
might mean a substantial reorganization of the
machinery proposed for the Special Fund. It
might also take the form of encouraging the estab-
lishment of an international development associa-
tion affiliated with the International Bank. In
any event, we shall know better when the time
comes what the appropriate action of the General
Assembly will be.
My Government fully agrees that there should
be a review at that time, and we attach no im-
portance to the word "possible" appearing in para-
graph I of the Preparatory Committee recommen-
dation. In the meantime let us dedicate ourselves
to making the Special Fund a successful venture
fully supported by all members. Let us not so
concentrate our thoughts on the future as to miss
the constructive possibilities of the present. The
Special Fund will not solve all problems of devel-
opment, but it will, if properly supported and ad-
ministered, make a highly significant contribution.
My Government pledges its full support for the
speedy establishment of this new and important
addition to United Nations activities on behalf of
the economic development of the less developed
countries.
STATEMENT BY MR. PHILLIPS, OCTOBER 13 »
As you know, section III of resolution 1219 was
a very carefully balanced compromise between
those who looked upon the Special Fund as a step
toward a U.N. capital development f imd and those
who regarded it as a concrete step f orward in its
own right, leaving for future consideration the
question of establishing a capital development
fund. This compromise took a long time to work
out and was accepted unanimously by Commit-
tee II.
On the basis of resolution 1219, including sec-
tion III, my Government has been cooperating for
almost a year with other governments in working
out the terms of reference for the Special Fund.
Now, as this fund is about to be born, we have had
introduced at the very last moment — Friday, to be
exact — an addition to section III which, in the
view of my Government, upsets the carefully bal-
anced compromise of last year. It is unfortunate
that this new and very delicate element was intro-
duced just at this moment. Having gone very far
indeed in accepting and reaffirming the carefully
'Made in Committee II (U.S. delegation press release
3018).
November 3, 1958
707
United States Pledges $38 Million
to ETAP and Special Fund
Statement by Senator Mansfield 1
The United States has been interested in the
technical assistance activities of the United Na-
tions and the specialized agencies since their be-
ginnings. We regard the establishment of the
Special Fund, which was ratified by this Assembly
on Tuesday, as a step forward toward meeting the
needs of newly developing countries which cannot
now be met by the Expanded Program of Technical
Assistance.
While these programs are specifically designed
to meet the needs of less developed countries, in
actuality they serve to benefit all countries through
the interchange of peoples and ideas.
The United States Government is prepared to
do its share in supporting these programs. We
are hopeful that other governments will find them-
selves in a similar position and will be able not
only to provide adequate funds for the Expanded
Technical Assistance Program but also to make
generous contributions to the Special Fund.
For calendar year 1958 the United States pledged
the amount of $15.5 million to the Expanded Tech-
nical Assistance Program subject to the limitation
that the United States share would not exceed 45
percent of the total contributions to the central
fund. The United States now pledges the amount
of $38 million to the Expanded Technical Assist-
ance Program and the Special Fund for the calen-
dar year 1959. This is subject to the limitation
that the United States contribution will not exceed
40 percent of the total amount contributed to the
two funds. The specific amounts to be made avail-
able to each fund will be announced at a later date
after pledges from other governments are known.
We hope that this pledge, together with those
of the other governments represented here, will
enable the Expanded Technical Assistance Pro-
gram to continue to develop and will permit the
Special Fund to make an auspicious start in the
important task which has been set for it.
1 Made on Oct. 16 before the Pledging Conference
on the Expanded Technical Assistance Program and
the Special Fund (U.S./U.N. press release 3025).
balanced formula in section III of resolution 1210,
my Government is unable at this time to accept
any alteration in that balance. If the proposed
amendment is pressed to a vote, the United States
delegation will have to vote against it. More-
over, should the amendment be adopted, my dele-
gation will be unable to accept the resolution as
a whole. It woidd in this case be necessary to
refer the resolution to my Government for fur-
ther review.
Most of you know how wholeheartedly my Gov-
ernment has been engaged in working with other
governments to establish a Special Fund. You
must know, therefore, how much we would regret
any move that would jeopardize this program. I
would, therefore, appeal to those who are support-
ing the amendment not to press it to a vote.
I know that some of you here attach impor-
tance to the idea of the proposed amendment. I
fully respect your views and would certainly have
no objection to having this same issue placed be-
fore the committee at a future date. I hope that
others will have the same regard for the very
strong feelings of the United States Government
on this issue. With my faith in the usual good
sense of this committee, I cannot believe that it
will permit itself to be stampeded into a hasty act
which might jeopardize the fullest possible co-
operation by member governments in this pro-
gram. The Special Fund is ready. As I sug-
gested last week, let us not so concentrate our
thoughts on the future as to miss the construc-
tive opportunities of the present. Let us rather
dedicate ourselves to making the Special Fund
a successful venture fully supported by all
members. 10
STATEMENT BY SENATOR MANSFIELD, OCTO-
BER 14"
Mr. President, the resolution on which we are
about to vote represents many weeks of effort by
many delegations. Very difficult questions were
involved in defining the nature and structure of
the Special Fund. However, the spirit of under-
standing and conciliation displayed has now made
it possible to translate an idea into action.
During consideration of this matter in commit-
tee, many interpretations were made concerning
the nature and significance of the Special Fund
in the general context of efforts by the United
10 On Oct. 13 Committee II, by a vote of 73 to 0, with
1 abstention, approved a draft resolution (U.N. doc.
A/C.2/L.364, as amended) which consisted of the text
common to the revised draft resolutions contained in A/C
.2/L.362/Rev. 1 and A/C.2/L.363/Rev. 1.
"Made in plenary session (U.S. delegation press re-
lease 3021).
708
Department of State Bulletin
Nations to assist the economic development of the
less developed countries. So far as the United
States is concerned, let me say at the outset that
its views remain those expressed by the United
States representative to the General Assembly on
December 14, 1D57. 12
Despite differences of view on this and other
matters, however, the United States is persuaded
that the establishment of the Special Fund will
make the beginning of a new and important phase
in the war which the United Nations has under-
taken to wage against poverty, hunger, and dis-
ease wherever these may be found.
My delegation is satisfied that the Special Fund
gives real promise of making a contribution to the
progress of the less developed countries. As I
emphasized previously in a statement in commit-
tee, no significant momentum of development can
be attained without knowledge of basic resources,
without the skills to put them to use, and without
trained personnel to work in agriculture, indus-
try, administration, and health. It is at these
key points that the Special Fund can assist in
bringing the world's knowledge and experience to
bear on the problems of economic development.
The support which this resolution received in
committee indicates the hope which nations place
in the Special Fund. The fund is not, however, a
self -operative or magical formula. If it is to ful-
fill its promise, all nations must make the effort —
financial and otherwise — which will translate a
paper resolution into an effective device of inter-
national cooperation. The first test of the will
to make this effort shall come in just 2 days. At
that time member states will be called upon to
indicate the extent of their financial support for
the fund. As has already been announced, the
United States stands ready to make a combined
contribution to both the Special Fund and the Ex-
panded Program of Technical Assistance of $38
million, provided adequate contributions are
forthcoming from other member nations. I can
only express the hope that others will see the po-
tential benefits of this fund to the world as we
see them and that they will dig down deeply in
support of it. With mutual effort and determi-
nation, we can make the Special Fund an effective
instrument for the greater well-being of all
peoples.
My delegation is happy to vote for this resolu-
tion as is. It is with deep regret that we cannot
subscribe to the amendment offered by the distin-
guished delegate from India. 13
RESOLUTION ESTABLISHING SPECIAL FUND M
The General Assembly,
In conformity with the determination of the United
Nations, as expressed in its Charter, to promote social
progress and better standards of life in larger freedom
and, for these ends, to employ international machinery
for the promotion of the economic and social advance-
ment of all peoples,
Conscious of the particular needs of the less developed
countries for international aid in achieving accelerated
development of their economic and social infrastructure,
Recalling its resolution 1219 (XII) of 14 December 1957,
Further recalling previous resolutions on the establish-
ment of an international fund for economic development
within the framework of the United Nations,
Noting the recommendations contained in Economic
and Social Council resolution 692 (XXVI) of 31 July 1958,
Part A
1. Commends the Preparatory Committee on its work;
2. Establishes a Special Fund in accordance with the
provisions set forth in part B below :
Part B
I. Guiding principles and criteria
1. Pursuant to the provisions of General Assembly
resolution 1219 (XII) and pending a review by the As-
sembly of the scope and future activities of the Special
Fund, as envisaged in section III of that resolution, the
Special Fund shall :
(a) Be a separate fund ;
(&) Provide systematic and sustained assistance in
fields essential to the integrated technical, economic and
social development of the less developed countries ;
(c) In view of the resources prospectively available at
this time, which are not likely to exceed $100 million
annually, direct its operations towards enlarging the
scope of the United Nations programmes of technical
assistance so as to include special projects in certain
basic fields as outlined hereunder.
The Special Fund is thus envisaged as a constructive ad-
vance in United Nations assistance to the less developed
countries which should be of immediate significance in
accelerating their economic development by, inter alia,
"Bulletin- of Jan. 13, 1958, p. 69.
November 3, 1958
1J In plenary session on Oct. 14 the representative of
India reintroduced, as an amendment to paragraph 13
of the draft resolution, the proposal that the states mem-
bers of the Governing Council be elected by the General
Assembly instead of by the Economic and Social Council.
The Indian proposal was rejected by a vote of 30 to 45,
with '.', abstentions.
"U.N. doe. A/Res/1240 (XIII) (A/C.2/L.364, as
amended) ; adopted in plenary session Oct. 14 by a vote
of 77 to 0, with 1 abstention.
709
facilitating new capital investments of all types by creat-
ing conditions which would make such investments either
feasible or more effective.
2. In establishing programmes, the Managing Director
and the Governing Council of the Special Fund shall be
guided by the following principles and criteria :
(a) The Special Fund shall concentrate, as far as
practicable, on relatively large projects and avoid allo-
cation of its resources over a great number of small
projects ;
(6) Due consideration shall be given to the urgency
of the needs of the requesting countries ;
(c) Projects shall be undertaken which will lead to
early results and have the widest possible impact in
advancing the economic, social or technical development
of the country or countries concerned, in particular by
facilitating new capital investment ;
(d) Due consideration shall be given to a wide geo-
graphical distribution in allocations over a period of
years ;
(e) Due consideration shall be given to technical or-
ganizational and financial problems likely to be encoun-
tered in executing a proposed project ;
(f) Due consideration shall be given to the
arrangements made for the integration of projects into
national development programmes and for effective co-
ordination of the project with other multilateral and bi-
lateral programmes ;
(<7) In accordance with the principles of the Charter
of the United Nations, the assistance furnished by the
Special Fund shall not be a means of foreign economic
and political interference in the internal affairs of the
country or countries concerned and shall not be accom-
panied by any conditions of a political nature ;
(h) Projects shall be devised in such a way as to
facilitate transfer, as soon as practicable, of the respon-
sibilities of the Special Fund to assisted countries or to
organizations designated by them.
3. Projects may be for one country or a group of
countries or a region.
4. Projects may be approved for the period of time
needed for their execution, even if more than one year.
II. Basic fields of assistance and types of project
5. The Special Fund shall assist projects in the fields
of resources, including the assessment and development
of manpower, industry, including handicrafts and cot-
tage industries, agriculture, transport and communica-
tions, building and housing, health, education, statistics
and public administration.
6. In view of the resources prospectively available at
the time of the initial period of the Special Fund's
operations, projects to be assisted by the Special Fund
might be in one or a combination of the following forms :
surveys ; research and training ; demonstration, inclwl-
ing pilot projects. These may be implemented by the
provision of staff, experts, equipment, supplies and serv-
ices, as well as the establishment of institutes, demon-
stration centres, plants or works, and other appropriate
means, including fellowships, in so far as they are inte-
gral parts of a specific project financed by the Special
Fund, in such proportions as are judged necessary by
the Managing Director for each project, taking into ac-
count the type of assistance requested by Governments.
III. Participation in the Special Fund
7. Participation in the Special Fund shall be open to
any States Members of the United Nations, or members
of the specialized agencies or of the International Atomic
Energy Agency.
IV. Organization and management
8. There are established as organs of the Special Fund :
a Governing Council, a Managing Director and his staff,
and a consultative board. The Special Fund shall be an
organ of the United Nations administered under the
authority of the Economic and Social Council and of the
General Assembly, which will exercise in respect of the
Special Fund their powers under the Charter.
9. The Economic and Social Council shall be respon-
sible for the formulation of the general rules and prin-
ciples which will govern the administration and
operations of the Special Fund ; the review of the opera-
tions of the Special Fund on the basis of the annual
reports to be submitted by the Governing Council ; and
the consideration of the Expanded Programme of Techni-
cal Assistance and of the Special Fund in relation to
each other.
10. The Economic and Social Council shall transmit
the report of the Governing Council, together with its
own comments, to the General Assembly. The Assembly
will review the progress and operations of the Special
Fund as a separate subject of its agenda and make any
appropriate recommendations.
Governing Council
11. The immediate inter-governmental control of the
policies and operations of the Special Fund shall be ex-
ercised by a Governing Council which will consist of
representatives of eighteen States.
12. The Governing Council shall provide general policy
guidance on the administration and operations of the
Special Fund. It shall have final authority for the ap-
proval of the projects and programmes recommended by
the Managing Director. It shall review the administra-
tion and the execution of the Special Fund's approved
projects, and shall submit reports and recommendations
to the Economic and Social Council, including such
recommendations as the Governing Council may deem ap-
propriate in the light of the relevant provisions of Gen-
eral Assembly resolution 1219 (XII).
13. The States members of the Governing Council shall
be elected by the Economic and Social Council from
among Members of the United Nations or members of
the specialized agencies or of the International Atomic
Energy Agency.
14. There shall be equal representation on the Gov-
erning Council of economically more developed countries,
having due regard to their contributions to the Special
Fund, on the one hand, and of less developed countries,
on the other hand, taking into account the need for
equitable geographical distribution among the latter
members.
15. States members of the Governing Council shall be
710
Department of State Bulletin
elected for a term of three years, provided, however, that
of the members elected at the first election, the terms of
six members shall expire at the end of one year and the
terms of six other members at the end of two years.
Retiring members shall be eligible for re-election.
16. Decisions of the Governing Council on important
questions shall be made by a two-thirds majority of the
members present and voting. These questions shall in-
clude questions of policy, the approval of projects and the
allocation of funds. Decisions of the Governing Council
on other questions shall be made by a majority of the
members present and voting.
IT. The Governing Council shall adopt its own rules of
procedure, including the method of selecting its officers.
18. The Governing Council shall normally meet twice a
year and on such occasions as may be necessary, in con-
formity with its rules of procedure.
19. The Managing Director of the Special Fund shall
participate without vote in the deliberations of the Gov-
erning Council.
20. The Governing Council shall make appropriate ar-
rangements in its rules of procedure for the representa-
tion of the specialized agencies, the International Atomic
Energy Agency and the Executive Chairman of the Tech-
nical Assistance Board. To this end, it shall take due
account of the practice followed by the Economic and
Social Council.
Managing Director
21. The Special Fund shall be administered by a Man-
aging Director under the policy guidance of the Govern-
ing Council. The Managing Director shall have the over-
all responsibility for the operations of the Fund, with sole
authority to recommend to the Governing Council projects
submitted by Governments.
22. After having consulted the Governing Council, the
Secretary-General will appoint the Managing Director,
subject to confirmation by the General Assembly.
23. The Managing Director shall be appointed for a
term of four years, or for a shorter period. He shall be
eligible for reappointment.
24. Appropriate arrangements shall be made for the
participation of the Managing Director in the Technical
Assistance Board.
25. The Managing Director shall establish and main-
tain close and continuing working relationships with the
specialized agencies concerned with those fields of activity
in which the Special Fund will operate, and with the In-
ternational Atomic Energy Agency. He may also estab-
lish appropriate contacts with other organizations which
may be concerned with the activities of the Fund.
Consultative Board
26. A Consultative Board shall be established to advise
the Managing Director. The function of the Board shall
be to assist the Managing Director with advice in the ex-
amination and appraisal of project requests and proposed
programmes of the Special Fund. The Board -shall be
composed of the Secretary-General of the United Nations,
the Executive Chairman of the Technical Assistance
Board and the President of the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development or their designated rep-
resentatives.
27. The Managing Director shall make, as appropriate,
arrangements for representatives of the specialized agen-
cies and of the International Atomic Energy Agency to
be invited to the deliberations of the Consultative Board
when projects falling mainly within their fields of activity
are considered.
Staff
28. The Managing Director shall be assisted by a small
group of officials to be selected by, or in consultation with
him, on the basis of their special competence.
29. For other services, the Managing Director shall
rely as far as possible on the existing facilities of the
United Nations, the specialized agencies, the International
Atomic Energy Agency, and the Technical Assistance
Board. These facilities should be made available to the
Special Fund without charge except when clearly iden-
tifiable additional expenses are involved. The Managing
Director may also, as required, engage expert consultants.
30. To facilitate the field co-ordination between the
Special Fund and the Expanded Programme of Technical
Assistance in the countries seeking assistance, the Man-
aging Director shall enter into an agreement with the
Executive Chairman of the Technical Assistance Board
concerning the role of the resident representatives in the
work of the Fund.
V. Procedures
Sources and formulation of requests
31. Projects shall be undertaken only at the request of
a Government or group of Governments eligible to partici-
pate in the Special Fund.
32. Governments shall present their requests for assist-
ance in a form indicated by the Managing Director. Re-
quests shall include all possible information on the in-
tended use and benefits expected to be derived from the
Special Fund's assistance, evidence of a technical nature
regarding the projects for which assistance is requested,
data bearing upon the economic appraisal of such proj-
ects, and statements concerning the part of costs which
the Government itself would be ready to assume. The
Special Fund, the Expanded Programme of Technical As-
sistance, the United Nations, the specialized agencies and
the International Atomic Energy Agency should be ready
to assist and advise Governments at their request, in the
preparation of their applications for assistance.
33. The Special Fund shall utilize only the oflSeial
channel designated by each Government for the submis-
sion of requests.
Evaluation and approval of requests
34. The Managing Director shall be responsible for the
evaluation of project requests. In this evaluation, he will
normally be expected to rely upon the assistance of exist-
ing services within the Expanded Programme of Techni-
cal Assistance, the United Nations, the specialized agen-
cies and the International Atomic Energy Agency. He
shall also be authorized to contract the services of other
agencies, private firms or individual experts for this pur-
pose, in case the services of the United Nations, the spe-
November 3, 1958
711
cialized agencies or the International Atomic Energy
Agency are wholly or partly unavailable or inadequate.
35. On the basis of the evaluation of project requests,
the Managing Director shall periodically develop pro-
grammes for submission to the Governing Council. In
developing his recommendations to the Governing Coun-
cil, he shall consult the Consultative Board.
36. The Managing Director shall, at the request of the
Government or Governments which have submitted such
projects, submit to the Governing Council for its consider-
ation a report on project requests which he has been un-
able to include in his programme.
37. The Governing Council shall examine the pro-
grammes and projects submitted by the Managing Di-
rector. Each project shall be accompanied by :
(a) An evaluation of the benefits expected to be de-
rived by the requesting country or countries ;
(b) A summary of its technical evaluation;
(c) A proposed budget showing the financial implica-
tions of the project in their entirety, including a state-
ment on the costs which would be borne by the recipient
Governments ;
(d) A draft agreement with the requesting Government
or Governments ;
(e) When appropriate, a draft agreement with the
agent or agents responsible for execution of the project.
38. The Governing Council shall take a final decision
on the projects and programmes recommended by the
Managing Director and authorize him to conclude the
appropriate agreements.
Execution of projects
39. Projects shall be executed, whenever possible, by
the United Nations, by the specialized agencies con-
cerned, or by the International Atomic Energy Agency,
it being understood that the Managing Director shall
also be authorized to contract for the services of other
agencies, private firms or individual experts in the cases
mentioned in paragraph 34 above.
40. Arrangements for the execution of projects shall
be subject to the approval of the requesting Government
or Governments, and shall be specified in an agreement
with these Governments. Such arrangements shall con-
tain provisions regarding the cost, including any local
costs, which the requesting Government will assume and
those facilities and services it will provide.
41. Where requests for assistance fall within the
sphere of two or more organizations, arrangements shall
be made for joint execution by the organizations con-
cerned and for proper co-ordination.
42. The Managing Director shall make appropriate ar-
rangements to follow the execution of projects.
43. The Managing Director shall report to the Govern-
ing Council on the status of projects and the financial
position of the projects and programmes.
44. The Managing Director and the Governing Council
shall take appropriate measures to ensure an objective
evaluation of the results of projects and programmes.
VI. Finances
45. The financial resources of the Special Fund shall
be derived from voluntary contributions by Governments
of States Members of the United Nations, or members of
the specialized agencies or of the International Atomic
Energy Agency. The Fund is also authorized to receive
donations from non-governmental sources. It is recom-
mended that contributions by Governments should be
paid as early in each year as possible. Furthermore,
while contributions will normally be on an annual basis,
it is recommended, in view of the expected longer term of
many of the Fund's projects, that contributions be
pledged or indicated, whenever possible, for a number of
years.
46. The Secretary-General is requested to convene
annually a pledging conference at which Governments
would announce their contributions to the Expanded
Programme of Technical Assistance and to the Special
Fund respectively. If a Government pledges an initial
lump sum, it should, within a reasonably short period,
indicate the division of its contribution between the two
programmes.
47. Contributions shall be made by Governments in cur-
rency readily usable by the Special Fund consistent with
the need for efficiency and economy of the Fund's
operations, or shall be transferable to the greatest possi-
ble extent into currency readily usable by the Fund. To
this end, Governments are urged to make available as
large a percentage as they may find possible of their
contributions in such currency or currencies as the Man-
aging Director may indicate are required for the execu-
tion of the Fund's programme. The Managing Director
should, consistent with the criteria set forth respecting
the nature and utilization of contributions, endeavour to
make the fullest possible use of available currencies.
48. The Managing Director shall, at the end of the
first year of the operations of the Special Fund and sub-
sequently as he deems necessary, report to the Govern-
ing Council for its consideration on the extent to which
restrictions which may have been maintained on con-
tributions have affected the flexibility, efficiency and
economy of the Fund's operations. The Governing Coun-
cil shall also consider what action may be necessary with
respect to currency found not readily usable in order to
facilitate the Fund's operations. Any action in this re-
spect shall be subject to review by the Economic and
Social Council and the General Assembly.
49. Contributions shall be made without limitation as
to use by a specific agency or in a specific recipient coun-
try or for a specific project.
50. To the end that the multilateral character of the
Special Fund shall be strictly respected, no contributing
country should receive special treatment with respect to
its contribution nor should negotiations for the use of
currencies take place between contributing and receiving
countries.
51. Since programmes shall be developed on a project
basis, there should be no a priori allocation of funds on
a country basis or among basic fields of assistance.
52. Recipient Governments shall be expected to finance
part of the costs of projects, at least that part payable
in local currency. This general rule may, however, be
waived in the case of countries deemed financially un-
able to make even a local currency payment.
53. The Special Fund shall be governed by financial
712
Department of State Bulletin
regulations consistent with the financial regulations and
policies of the United Nations. The financial regula-
tions for the Fund shall be drafted by the Secretary-Gen-
eral lit' the 1'nited Nations, in consultation with the
Managing Director, for approval by the Governing Coun-
cil, after review by the Advisory Committee for Admin-
istrative and Budgetary Questions. In the preparation
of these regulations, account shall be taken of the special
requirements of the Fund's operations ; in particular,
appropriate provision shall be made to permit the ap-
proval of projects of more than one year's duration and
for an exchange of currencies between the Fund and
the Special Account for the Expanded Programme of
Technical Assistance. Provision should also exist under
which the Managing Director is authorized in consulta-
tion with the Governing Council to establish appropriate
financial rules and procedures.
54. The administrative budget prepared by the Manag-
ing Director with the assistance of the Secretary-Gen-
eral of the United Nations shall be submitted for ap-
proval to the Governing Council with the comments, if
any, of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and
Budgetary Questions. It shall be submitted to the Gen-
eral Assembly at the same time as the annual report of
the Governing Council with the comments of the Ad-
visory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary
Questions.
55. The Special Fund shall be authorized to build up
gradually a reserve fund by earmarking a specific per-
centage of the total contributions of each year up to an
amount to be determined by the Governing Council on
recommendation of the Managing Director.
56. The Governing Council shall be authorized to con-
sider allocating part of the resources of the Special
Fund for assistance on a refundable basis at the re-
quest of Governments for projects within the terms of
reference of the Fund.
Part C
Reaffirms the conditions set forth in section III of Gen-
eral Assembly resolution 1219 (XII), under which the
Assembly shall review the scope and future activities of
the Special Fund and take such action as it may deem
appropriate.
Mr. Dillon Named Representative
to OAS Special Committee
Press release 612 dated October 14
Douglas Dillon, Under Secretary of State for
Economic Affairs, has been named representative
of the United States on the Special Committee of
the Council of the Organization of American
States that has been established to consider addi-
tional measures of inter-American economic
cooperation.
The Special Committee was established by the
Council of the Organization of American States
pursuant to a recommendation of the 21 Foreign
Ministers of the American Republics at the close
of their 2-day informal meeting at Washington
September 23 to 24. 1 The Council has fixed
November 17 as the date for the first meeting of
the Special Committee.
Named as alternates to Under Secretary Dillon
are Assistant Secretary of State for Inter- Ameri-
can Affairs Roy R. Rubottom, Jr., Assistant Sec-
retary of State for Economic Affairs Thomas C.
Mann, and Assistant Secretary of the Treasury
Tom B. Coughran.
U.S. Delegations to
International Conferences
13th Session of Contracting Parties to GATT
The Department of State announced on Oc-
tober 9 (press release 596) that two U.S. Senators
and four prominent citizens will serve as advisers
to the U.S. delegation to the 13th session of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) at Geneva.
Senator Prescott Bush, a member of the Senate
Banking and Currency Committee and the Senate
Armed Services Committee, and Senator George
A. Smathers, a member of the Senate Finance
Committee and the Senate Interstate and Foreign
Commerce Committee, will be congressional ad-
visers to the delegation. The four nongovern-
mental advisers will be Mrs. Enid H. Robinson,
Stanley H. Ruttenberg, Richard Wagner, and
George H. Wilson.
The Department announced on October 15
(press release 615) that Under Secretary of State
Douglas Dillon and Assistant Secretary of Com-
merce Henry Kearns will attend the 13th session
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), which opens at Geneva on October 16
and will participate in the proceedings during the
O] lening days of the session. The chairman of the
U.S. delegation to the 13th session will be W. T.
M. Beale, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for Economic A Hairs.
The United States played a leading role in nego-
tiating the GATT in 1947 and since that date has
made it the cornerstone of its commercial policy.
1 For an announcement of the meeting and test of the
communique, see Bulletin of Oct. 13, 1958, p. 574.
November 3, 1958
713
The rules of the GATT are designed to reduce
governmental interference with the flow of trade
and with the exercise of private business initiative.
It has become the basic instrument, governing com-
mercial relations between the United States and
the principal trading nations of the free world.
All together the 37 Contracting Parties to the
GATT account for more than 80 percent of inter-
national trade.
The session will be confronted with trade mat-
ters of long-range importance and continuing con-
cern as well as with a number of immediate prob-
lems that have arisen during the past year and
that should be settled during the 4 to 6 weeks
that the session is expected to last. Cabinet min-
isters from a number of GATT countries will
attend the. opening days of the session.
One feature of the 13th session will be the pres-
entation of a report on long-term trends in inter-
national trade prepared by a panel of four inter-
nationally recognized economists headed by Prof.
Gottfried Haberler of Harvard University. The
panel's report was released to the public on Oc-
tober 12, under the title of Trends in International
Trade. Among the matters dealt with in the re-
port are trade problems of underdeveloped coun-
tries, price fluctuations of primary products, and
agricultural protection.
A matter of immediate importance to the Con-
tracting Parties is the question of the continued
maintenance of import restrictions by the German
Federal Republic. The GATT permits a country
to place quotas on imports so long as such controls
are required to safeguard its foreign-exchange re-
serves. The International Monetary Fund de-
termined last year that, as a concomitant of Ger-
many's economic revival, the Federal Republic
was no longer experiencing balance-of-payments
difficulties. Last spring the Intersessional Com-
mittee of the GATT reviewed this matter and
urged Germany to bring its policies into con-
formity with the GATT.
At the intersessional meeting last spring the six
signatories to the Koine treaty establishing the
European Economic Community agreed to consult
with those countries that were concerned over the
possible effects of the treaty on their trade. It is
hoped that these consultations will begin within
the GATT framework while the 13th session is
still in progress.
The agenda of the session also provides for con-
sultations with countries that are still imposing
import restrictions to safeguard their balance of
payments. Originally proposed by the United
States, these consultations are intended to explore
the need for and the techniques of applying
quantitative restrictions. It is one of several
methods whereby the U.S. Government seeks to
reduce discrimination against American exports
and to promote greater freedom of commerce.
Other matters to come before the Contracting
Parties include annual reports under certain de-
cisions taken in previous years, customs adminis-
tration matters, comments on trends and develop-
ments in trade in primary commodities, and an
exchange of views on the related issue of disposal
of agricultural surpluses.
The U.S. delegation to the GATT is as follows :
Ministerial Representatives
Douglas Dillon, Under Secretary of State for Economic
Affairs
Henry Kearns, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for In-
ternational Affairs
Chairman
W. T. M. Beale, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for Economic Affairs
Vice Chairmen
Marshall M. Smith, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Com-
merce for International Affairs
Albert E. Pappano, Chief, Commercial Policy and
Treaties Division, Office of International Trade, De-
partment of State
Senatorial Advisers
Prescott Bush
George A. Smathers
Public Members
Airs. Enid H. Robinson, Hampton, Iowa
Richard Wagner, Champlin Oil and Refining Co.
George H. Wilson, American Farm Bureau Federation
Stanley Ruttenberg, AFL-CIO
Advisers
Myron Black, Officer-in-Charge, Economic Organization
Affairs, Office of European Regional Affairs, Depart-
ment of State
Emerson Brown, Commercial Policy and Treaties Divi-
sion, Office of International Trade, Department of State
Carl Corse, U.S. Mission to the European Communities,
Department of State
John Czyzak, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of
State
A. Richard DeFelice, Deputy Assistant Administrator,
Agricultural Trade Policy and Analysis Division, For-
eign Agricultural Service, Department of Agriculture
Ethel Dietrich, Director of the Trade Division, U.S. Mis-
sion to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Inter-
national Cooperation Administration
714
Department of State Bulletin
Morris J. Fields, Chief of the Commercial Policy and
United Nations Division, ( ifliee of International Fi-
nance, Treasury Department
Earle Fox, Trade Policy Division, Foreign Agricultural
Service, Department of Agriculture
Mortimer Goldstein, Assistant Chief, International Fi-
nance Division, Office of International Financial and
Development Affairs, Department of State
G. Edward Galbreath, Executive Office of the President
Leonard R. Linsenmayer, Associate Director, Office of
International Labor Affairs, Department of Labor
Richard L. Mattheisen, Assistant to the Director, Office
of Economic Affairs, Bureau of Foreign Commerce,
Department of Commerce
Virginia H. McClung, Office of International Resources.
Department of State
Margaret Potter, U.S. Resident Delegation, Geneva, De-
partment of State
John J. Schalet, Deputy Assistant General Counsel for
International Affairs, Department of Commerce
Harry Shooshan, International Activities Assistant,
Technical Review Staff, Department of the Interior
Clarence Siegel, Deputy Director, European Division,
Office of Economic Affairs, Bureau of Foreign Com-
merce, Department of Commerce
TREATY INFORMATION
Educational Exchange Agreement
Signed With Spain
Presa release 621 dated October 16
Spain and the United States on October 16
signed an agreement putting into operation a new
program of educational exchanges authorized by
the Fulbright Act. The signing took place at
Madrid with Fernando Maria Castiella, Minister
of Foreign Affairs, representing the Spanish Gov-
ernment and John Lodge, Ambassador of the
United States, representing the U.S. Government.
The agreement provides for the expenditure,
over a 3-year period, of Spanish currency equiva-
lent to $000,000, received from the sale of surplus
agricultural products in Spain, to finance ex-
changes of persons between the two countries to
study, conduct advanced research, teach, or to en-
gage in other educational activities. The purpose
of this program will be to further mutual under-
standing between the peoples of Spain and the
United States through a wider exchange of knowl-
edge and professional skills. Exchanges of per-
sons under the Fulbright Act are carried out as
a regular part of the international educational ex-
change program of the Department of State.
Under the terms of the agreement a binational
commission, to be known as the Commission for
Educational Exchange Between the United States
and Spain, will be established in Madrid to facil-
itate the administration of the program. The
Commission's board of directors will consist of
10 members with equal representation as to Span-
ish and U.S. citizens, in addition to the U.S. Am-
bassador, who will serve as honorary chairman.
All recipients of awards under the program au-
thorized by the Fulbright Act are selected by
the Board of Foreign Scholarships, whose mem-
bers are appointed by the President of the United
States. The Board maintains a secretariat in
the Department of State.
With the signing of this agreement Spain be-
comes the 40th country to participate in the edu-
cational exchange program authorized by the Ful-
bright Act. Approximately 33,000 exchanges
have taken place since the legislation was enacted
a little over 10 years ago. Educational exchanges
heretofore have been carried out with Spain under
the Smith-Mundt Act, the United States Infor-
mation and Educational Exchange Act of 1948.
The agreement will considerably augment the
present number of exchanges with that country.
Following appointment of the members of the
Commission in Madrid and the formulation of
a program of operations, information about spe-
cific opportunities available will be released.
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Austria
State treaty for the reestablishment of an independent
and democratic Austria. Signed at Vienna May 15,
1955. Entered into force July 27, 1955. TIAS 3298.
Accession deposited: Brazil, September 15, 1958.
BILATERAL
Australia
Agreement for exchange of postal parcels between tne
United States and the Territory of Papua and the Trust
Territory of New Guinea. Signed at Canberra May 22
and at Washington June 20, 1958. Entered into force
October 1, 1958.
November 3, 1958
715
DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE
with special reference to areas of substantial labor sur-
plus. Such study shall include specific recommendations
for such legislative and administrative action as may be
necessary to expand the role of private enterprise in ad-
vancing the foreign policy objectives of the United States.
Ralph I. Straus To Assist
With Mutual Security Study
Press release 628 dated October 18
Department Announcement
The Department of State announced on Octo-
ber 18 the appointment of Ralph I. Straus as a
consultant to Douglas Dillon, Under Secretary
for Economic Affairs, to assist in preparing a
study of ways and mean to expand the role of
private enterprise in advancing the foreign pol-
icy objectives of the United States, and related
matters. This study is called for by section 413
(c) of the Mutual Security Act, as amended,
which requests that specific recommendations for
legislative and administrative action be submitted
to the next session of Congress.
The study will be conducted under the direc-
tion of Mr. Dillon, in collaboration with the
Department of Commerce as well as the Interna-
tional Cooperation Administration and other
interested agencies. Individuals and private or-
ganizations concerned with international trade,
foreign investment, and business operations
abroad will be consulted, as well as others in-
terested in the conduct of the mutual security
program.
Mr. Straus is a member of the board of R. H.
Macy and Co., Inc., and has had several assign-
ments with the International Cooperation Ad-
ministration and its predecessor agencies.
Section 413 (c) of Mutual Security Act of 1954, as
Amended '
Under the direction of the President, the Departments
of State and Commerce and such other agencies of the
Government as the President shall deem appropriate, in
cooperation to the fullest extent practicable with pri-
vate enterprise concerned with international trade, for-
eign investment, and business operations in foreign coun-
tries, shall conduct a study of the ways and means in
which the role of the private sector of the national econ-
omy can be more effectively utilized and protected in
carrying out the purposes of this Act, so as to promote
the foreign policy of the United States, to stabilize and
to expand its economy and to prevent adverse effects,
Designations
Parker T. Hart as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near
Eastern and South Asian Affairs, effective October 19.
Appointments
Robert Lawrence Berenson as director of the U.S.
Operations Mission, Yugoslavia, effective October 16.
(For biographic details, see Department of State press
release 620 dated October 16. )
Section 205 (j) (2) of Mutual Security Act of 1958.
716
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: October 13-19
Press releases may be obtained from the News
Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.
Releases issued prior to October 13 which appear
in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 584 of October
6 and 596 and 599 of October 9.
Subject
U.S. representatives named to sur-
prise-attack talks (rewrite).
Salk vaccine to San Marino.
Murphy : "Academic Training and
Career Diplomacy."
Muller appointed ICA representative
to Somalia (biographic details).
Navy Neptune case.
Meeting of U.S. senior economic
officers in Europe.
Dillon named U.S. representative on
OAS Special Committee.
Suspension of shelling of Quemoy
(combined with No. 614).
Dulles : news conference.
13th GATT session delegation
(rewrite).
Dulles : congressional political cam-
paign (combined with No. 614).
Investment guaranties.
Thai parliamentary group visits U.S.
Supplementary income-tax protocol
with U.K.
Berenson named ICA director in
Yugoslavia (biographic details).
Educational exchange agreement with
Spain.
Educational exchange (Netherlands).
Dillon : "Problems Affecting Interna-
tional Trade."
Educational exchange (Guatemala).
Educational exchange (India, Latin
America ) .
Korean Minister of Reconstruction
visits U.S.
U.S. dependents allowed to return to
Lebanon.
Straus appointed consultant to Under
Secretary Dillon.
* Not printed.
t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.
No.
Date
606
10/13
607
608
10/13
10/13
*609
10/13
610
611
10/13
10/14
612
10/14
613
10/14
614
615
10/14
10/15
616
10/15
*617
618
t619
10/15
10/15
10/16
*620
10/16
621
10/16
*622
t623
10/17
10/17
*624
*625
10/17
10/17
626
10/17
627
10/18
628
10/18
Department of Stafe Bulletin
November 3, 1958
American Republics. Mr. Dillon Named Represent-
ative to OSA Special Committee
Canada. Reflections on U.S.-Canadian Relations
(Elbrick)
China, Republic of
47th Anniversary of Founding of Republic of China
(Eisenhower, Chiang Kai-shek)
Secretary Dulles' News Conference of October 14 .
Claims and Property. General War Sequel Law of
German Federal Republic
Congress, The. Congressional Documents Relating
to Foreign Policy
Department and Foreign Service
Academic Training for the Foreign Service (Eisen-
hower, Murphy)
Appointments (Berenson)
Designations (Hart)
Economic Officers in Europe Hold Regional Meet-
ing
Ralph I. Straus To Assist With Mutual Security
Study
Disarmament. U.S. Experts Named for Talks on
Preventing Surprise Attack
Economic Affairs
Economic Officers in Europe Hold Regional Meet-
ing
General War Sequel Law of German Federal Re-
public
Mr. Dillon Named Representative to OAS Special
Committee
13th Session of Contracting Parties to GATT (dele-
gation)
United Nations Establishes Special Fund (Mans-
field, Phillips, text of resolution)
Educational Exchange
Educational Exchange Agreement Signed With
Spain
Thai National Assemblymen Visit United States . .
Europe. Economic Officers in Europe Hold Re-
gional Meeting
Germany. General War Sequel Law of German
Federal Republic
Health, Education, and Welfare. U.S. Sends Salk
Vaccine to San Marino
International Information
Mr. Mci lellan To Manage U.S. Exhibit at Moscow .
United States and U.S.S.R. Agree on Films To Be
Exchanged (text of memorandum of agreement) .
International Law. Soviet Union Rejects Arbitra-
tion of Navy Neptune Case by ICJ
International Organizations and Conferences
Calendar of International Conferences and Meet-
ings
13th Session of Contracting Parties to GATT (dele-
gation)
Index Vol. XXXIX, No. 1010
Korea. Korean Minister of Reconstruction Visits
713 United States 693
Lebanon. U.S. Dependents Authorized To Return
094 to Lebanon 088
Middle East. Secretary Dulles' News Conference
of October 14 681
692 Mutual Security
Berenson appointed chief, USOM, Yugoslavia . . 716
Korean Minister of Reconstruction Visits United
699 States 693
Ralph I. Straus To Assist With Mutual Security
699 Study 710
U.S. Sends Salk Vaccine to San Marino 699
Presidential Documents
6S9 Academic Training for the Foreign Service .... 6S9
J 16 Columbus Day, 1958 688
47th Anniversary of Founding of Republic of China . 692
688 San Marino. U.S. Sends Salk Vaccine to San
Marino 699
716 Spain. Educational Exchange Agreement Signed
With Spain 715
688 Thailand. Thai National Assemblymen Visit
United States 693
Treaty Information
688 Current Treaty Actions 715
Educational Exchange Agreement Signed With
699 Spain 715
United States and U.S.S.R. Agree on Films To Be
Exchanged (text of memorandum of agreement) . 696
713 U.S.S.R.
Mr. McClellan To Manage U.S. Exhibit at Moscow . 696
702 Soviet Union Rejects Arbitration of Navy Neptune
Case by ICJ 698
United States and U.S.S.R. Agree on Films To Be
715 Exchanged (text of memorandum of agreement) . 696
693 United Nations. United Nations Establishes Spe-
cial Fund (Mansfield, Phillips, text of resolu-
688 tion) 702
Yugoslavia. Berenson appointed chief, USOM . . 716
099
Name Index
699 Berenson, Robert Lawrence 710
Chiang Kai-shek 692
696 Dillon, Douglas 713
Dulles, Secretary 681
696 Eisenhower, President 688, 689, 692
Elbrick, C. Burke 694
698 Hart, Parker T 716
Mansfield, Mike 702
McClellan, Harold Chadick 696
700 Murphy, Robert 689
Phillips, Christopher H 702
713 Straus, Ralph I 716
U S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1958
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OFFICIAL BUSINESS
YOU . . .
and the UNITED NATIONS
1958-59
Henry Cabot Lodge, United States Representative to the United
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newly revised pamphlet on the functions and accomplishments of the
U.N.
Among the questions :
"Can the United Nations do anything about disarmament?"
"How much does our membership in the United Nations cost?"
"What about outer space? Can the U.N. do anything to see that
nations use outer space for peace instead of war?"
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HE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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Vol. XXXIX, No. 1011
November 10. 1958
E
ILL
iEKLY RECORD
STATES
N POLICY
UNITED STATES AND REPUBLIC OF CHINA RE-
AFFIRM SOLIDARITY • Joint Communique and State-
ment by Secretary Dulles 721
SECRETARY DULLES DISCUSSES U.S. FOREIGN
POLICY FOR BRITISH TELEVISION BROAD-
CAST • Transcript of Interview With William D. Clark . . 733
THE BASES OF PEACE • Remarks by Deputy Under
Secretary Murphy 74Q
THE UNITED NATIONS AND NATIONAL SECURITY •
by William I. Cargo 725
PROBLEMS AFFECTING INTERNATIONAL TRADE •
Statement by Under Secretary Dillon 742
U.N. COMMITTEE OPENS DEBATE ON DISARMA-
MENT • Statements by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge
and James W. Barco 747
For index see inside back cover
JE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Vol. XXXIX, No. 1011 • Publication 6724
November 10, 1958
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington 25, D.O.
Price:
62 Issues, domestic $8.50, foreign $12.25
Single copy, 25 cents
The printing of this publication has been
approved by the Director of the Bureau of
the Budget (January 20, 1958).
Note: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and items contained herein may
be reprinted. Citation of the Department
of State Bulletin as the source will be
appreciated.
The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the
Public Services Division, provides the
public and interested agencies of
the Government with information on
developments in the field of foreign
relations and on the work of the
Department of State and the Foreign
Service. The BULLETIN includes se-
lected press releases on foreign policy,
issued by the White House and the
Department, and statements and ad-
dresses made by the President and by
the Secretary of State and other
officers of the Department, as well as
special articles on various phases of
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Publications of the Department,
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United States and Republic of China Reaffirm Solidarity
JOINT COMMUNIQUE
Press release 634 dated October 23
The following is the full text of the communi-
que issued at the conclusion of the meetings be-
tween President Chiang Kai-shek and Secretary
of State John Foster Dulles, Taipei, October 23,
1958.
Consultations have been taking place over the
past three days between the Government of the
United States and the Government of the Re-
public of China pursuant to Article IV of the
Mutual Defense. Treaty. 1 These consultations
had been invited by President Chiang Kai-shek.
The following are among those who took part in
the consultations :
For the Republic of China :
President Chiang Kai-shek
Vice President-Premier Chen Cheng
Secretary General to the President Chang Chun
Minister of Foreign Affairs Huang Shao-ku
Ambassador to the United States George K. C. Yeh
For the United States of America :
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles
Assistant Secretary of State Walter S. Robertson
Ambassador to the Republic of China Everett F. Drum-
right
The consultations had been arranged to be held
during the two weeks when the Chinese Commu-
nists had declared they would cease fire upon
Quemoy. It had been hoped that, under these
circumstances, primary consideration could have
been given to measures which would have con-
tributed to stabilizing an actual situation of non-
militancy. However, on the eve of the consulta-
tions, the Chinese Communists, in violation of
their declaration, resumed artillery fire against
the Quemoys. It was recognized that under the
present conditions the defense of the Quemoys,
1 For text, see Bulletin of Dee. 13. 1954, p. 809.
November JO, 1958
together with the Matsus, is closely related to the
defense of Taiwan and Penghu.
The two Governments recalled that their Mu-
tual Defense Treaty had had the purpose of man-
ifesting their unity "so that no potential aggres-
sor could be under the illusion that either of them
stands alone in the West Pacific Area." The con-
sultations provided a fresh occasion for demon-
strating that unity.
The two Governments reaffirmed their solidar-
ity in the face of the new Chinese Communist
aggression now manifesting itself in the bom-
bardment of the Quemoys. This aggression and
the accompanying Chinese Communist propa-
ganda have not divided them, as the Communists
have hoped. On the contrary, it has drawn them
closer together. They believe that by unitedly
opposing aggression they serve not only them-
selves but the cause of peace. As President Eis-
enhower said on September ll, 2 the position of
opposing aggression by force is the only position
consistent with the peace of the world.
The two Governments took note of the fact that
the Chinese Communists, with the backing of the
Soviet Union, avowedly seek to conquer Taiwan,
to eliminate Free China and to expel the United
States from the Western Pacific generally, com-
pelling the United States to abandon its collec-
tive security arrangements with free countries of
that area. This policy cannot possibly succeed.
It is hoped and believed that the Communists,
faced by the proven unity, resolution and strength
of the Governments of the United States and the
Republic of China, will not put their policy to
the test of general war and that they will abandon
the military steps which they have already taken
to initiate their futile and dangerous policy.
In addition to dealing with the current mili-
tary situation, the two Governments considered
1 Ibid., Sept. 29, 1958, p. 481.
721
Chinese Communist Resumption
of Firing in Taiwan Straits Area
Statement by Secretary Dulles 1
I am informed that the Chinese Communists have
resumed sporadic firing in the Taiwan (Formosa)
Straits area. I am nevertheless continuing my trip
to Taipei. I had embarked on what I believed and
hoped was a mission of peace. I shall persist in
that purpose.
One week ago the Chinese Communists announced
that they would suspend their attacks for at least
2 weeks more. It seemed to President Chiang Kai-
shek and President Eisenhower that under those
circumstances it would be useful for me to go to
Taiwan for consultations. It is obvious that if the
Communists resume their fighting to achieve their
political goals our consultations cannot have the
same scope and character that would have been
possible if there were a cease-fire. Nevertheless, I
believe that consultations can usefully be held.
It is a tragedy that the Chinese Communists have
again displayed their warlike disposition. All who
love peace must hope that the present resumption
of fighting will be of short duration and that the
world may be spared the grave consequences of
Communist persistence in aggression.
1 Made at Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska, on
Oct. 20 (press release 629) .
the broad and long-range aspects of their rela-
tionship.
The United States, its Government and its peo-
ple, have an abiding faith in the Chinese people
and profound respect for the great contribution
which they have made and will continue to make
to a civilization that respects and honors the in-
dividual and his family life. The United States
recognizes that the Republic of China is the au-
thentic spokesman for Free China and of the
hopes and aspirations entertained by the great
mass of the Chinese people.
The Government of the Republic of China de-
clared its purpose to be a worthy representative
of the Chinese people and to strive to preserve
those qualities and characteristics which have en-
abled the Chinese to contribute so much of benefit
to humanity.
The two Governments reaffirmed their dedica-
tion to the principles of the Charter of the United
Nations. They recalled that the treaty under
which they are acting is defensive in character.
The Government of the Republic of China con-
siders that the restoration of freedom to its peo-
ple on the mainland is its sacred mission. It be-
lieves that the foundation of this mission resides
in the minds and the hearts of the Chinese people
and that the principal means of successfully
achieving its mission is the implementation of
Dr. Sim Yat-sen's three people's principles (na-
tionalism, democracy and social well-being) and
not the use of force.
The consultations which took place permitted a
thorough study and reexamination of the pressing
problems of mutual concern. As such they have
proved to be of great value to both Governments.
It is believed that such consultations should con-
tinue to be held at appropriate intervals.
STATEMENT BY SECRETARY DULLES
White House press release dated October 24
I returned last night from 3 days in Taipei,
Formosa. There we held consultations with the
Government of the Republic of China pursuant
to our Treaty of Mutual Defense. These con-
sultations had been planned to occur during the
period when the Chinese Communists had said
they would not carry out their bombardments
from the mainland. However, while we were en
route to Formosa, the Chinese Communists re-
sumed firing on Quemoy in violation of their cease-
fire pledge.
It is possible that the firing is more for psycho-
logical than for military purposes. Apparently
the Communists desire to throw roadblocks in the
way of stabilized tranquillity. Last night the
Chinese Communist official press agency boasted
that "the United States has met with defeat in her
original plot to use the Chinese temporary suspen-
sion of shelling Quemoy to promote a permanent
cease-fire," The Communists seem to believe that
they can best achieve domination of the western
Pacific if they perpetuate confusion and uncer-
tainty and if they alternatively give hopes for
peace and fears of war. They accompany their
erratic action with intensive propaganda to the ef-
fect that, if the people of Asia would unite to ex-
pel the United States from the western Pacific,
then all would be well.
We return confident that the Chinese Com-
munists will not gain their ends either through
their military efforts or their propaganda guile.
Free China is resolute — its Government, its armed
722
Department of State Bulletin
forces, and its people. All of the free countries of
the Far East increasingly realize that Chinese
communism is a mortal danger. They are heart-
ened by the manifest power of the United States
and our stand against retreat in the face of armed
aggression.
The will of the free peoples of Asia to resist
Chinese communism intrusions is, I judge, more
solid than ever before.
While at Taipei I was again made aware, at
first hand, that the dominant spirit within the
Republic of China is not mere military defense
but rather that of peacefully bringing freedom to
all China. The Government realizes its responsi-
bilities as the authentic custodian and defender of
those honored cultural and spiritual values long
identified with China. It believes that its mis-
sion is to bring about the restoration of freedom
to the people on the mainland and to do so, not
by the use of force but by conduct and example
which will sustain the minds and hearts of the
mainland Chinese so that they are unconquerable.
I return convinced that the Government of Free
China is prudent, resolute, and dedicated to the
peaceful achievement of its high mission as spokes-
man for the aspirations and traditions of China.
The American nation can be thankful that there
exists a Free China animated by these sentiments.
It resists those forces whose central purpose is
world rule and, to that end, the encirclement and
ultimate defeat of the United States.
Negotiations for the Suspension
of Nuclear Weapons Tests
Following are the texts of a statement by Presi-
dent Eisenhower and an exchange of notes be-
tween the United States and the Soviet Union on
negotiations for the suspension of nuclear weapons
tests, together vrith a list of the members of the
U.S. delegation.
STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT EISENHOWER
White House pre6S release dated October 2u
On August 22, 1958, the United States declared
its willingness, in order to facilitate negotiations
for the suspension of nuclear weapons tests and
establishment of an international control system,
to withhold testing of atomic and hydrogen weap-
ons for a period of 1 year from the beginning of
these negotiations on October 31. The sole con-
dition for this voluntary 1-year suspension is that
the Soviet Union should not itself conduct tests
during this period.
The United Kingdom has similarly declared its
willingness to suspend tests. It thus lies with
the Soviet Union to decide whether on October
31st all countries which have tested nuclear weap-
ons will have voluntarily suspended testing.
The United States regrets that the Soviet Union
has not accepted the offer of the United States
and the United Kingdom, although we still hope
that it will do so.
U.S. NOTE OF OCTOBER 20'
The Embassy of the United States of America
presents its compliments to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics and has the honor to refer to note 58/
OSA of October 1, 1958, regarding arrangements
for the meeting on suspension of nuclear tests and
establishment of an international control system
scheduled to begin in Geneva among the U.S.,
U.K., and U.S.S.R. on October 31. 2
The United States takes note of the Soviet
statement that the aim of the conference would be
the conclusion of an agreement to cease tests of
atomic and hydrogen weapons by all states forever,
and the establishment of appropriate control over
the implementation of such an agreement. It is
the sincere hope of the United States that the
conference will make sufficient progress to justify
the expectation that the final termination of all
nuclear weapons test explosions may in due course
be achieved. The United States has always
accepted as a most desirable objective the final
termination of nuclear weapons test explosions.
However, the United States feels it necessary to
refer once again to the terms of the statement of
the President of the United States of August 22,
1958. 3 In this statement, President Eisenhower
declared that the United States would be prepared
1 Delivered on Oct. 20 by the U.S. Embassy at Moscow
to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs (press release
630).
2 For a previous exchange of notes, see Bulletin of
Sept. 29, 1958, p. 503.
* lhid., Sept. 8, 1958, p. 378.
November 10, 1958
723
to refrain from nuclear weapons tests for further
successive periods of one year after the initial
suspension of one year, provided that the Soviet
Union would do the same, that the agreed in-
spection system is installed and working effec-
tively, and that satisfactory progress is being
made in reacliing agreement on and implementing
major and substantive arms control measures. If
sufficient progress can be made at the Geneva con-
ference which is to open on the 31st of October
and if subsequently these objectives are effec-
tively achieved without undue delays, the world
could then be confident that nuclear weapons test-
ing would never be resumed by the parties to the
agreement.
The United States considers that an agreement
for the suspension of nuclear weapons testing
under international control should be worked out
as rapidly as possible. In view of the complexities
of detecting and verifying violations of an agree-
ment on suspension of nuclear tests which are
revealed in the report of the Geneva Conference
of Experts, 4 careful and detailed negotiations will
be required for an agreement of such importance,
however, and the United States considers that this
work should be initiated on October 31 at the
diplomatic level. If, as the discussions at the
diplomatic level proceed, the presence of Foreign
Ministers seems necessary and desirable, the Sec-
retary of State would be prepared to attend.
SOVIET NOTE OF OCTOBER 1
Unofficial translation
No. 58/0 SA
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR presents
its compliments to the Embassy of the United States of
America and in connection with Embassy note No. 262
of 10 September has the honor upon instructions of the
Soviet Government to state the following.
Account is taken of the positive reply of the Govern-
ment of the United States concerning the proposal of
the Government of the Soviet Union that negotiations
on the cessation of tests of nuclear weapons, by all
powers having such weapons at their disposal, should
be conducted in Geneva. Thus the question about the
date of the start of the talks, 31 October this year, and
the place of their conduct can be considered agreed upon.
As for the task of the coming meeting, the Soviet
Government deems it necessary to confirm its position
set forth in the Ministry's note of 30 August, 6 and spe-
cifically that the aim of such a meeting is the conclusion
' For text, see ibid., Sept. 22, 1958, p. 453.
5 For text, see ibid., Sept. 29, 1958, p. 503.
724
of an agreement on the cessation forever of tests of
atomic and hydrogen weapons by states with the estab-
lishment of appropriate control for the fulfillment of such
an agreement.
At present when it has been confirmed by the Geneva
meeting of experts that any testing of atomic and hy-
drogen weapons cannot remain unnoticed, there should
not be any obstacles in order that the powers possessing
nuclear weapons should conclude an agreement on the
immediate cessation of tests of all types of atomic and
hydrogen weapons everlastingly.
Taking into account that the immediate and universal
cessation of tests of nuclear weapons is an urgent prob-
lem, involving the vital interests of all mankind, the So-
viet Government hopes that the participants of the meet-
ing will apply all efforts in order in the briefest period
possible to reach and sign the appropriate agreement.
Having this in mind, the Soviet Government proposes
that the meeting should be called on the level of Minis-
ters of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, USA, and
Great Britain.
The Soviet Government expresses the hope that the
Government of the USA will attentively study these pro-
posals of the Soviet Government and give a positive
answer to them.
MEMBERS OF U.S. DELEGATION
Press release 643 dated October 25
The State Department on October 25 announced
the members of the U.S. delegation to the confer-
ence on suspension of nuclear tests, to be held at
Geneva beginning October 31, 1958 :
U.S. Representative
James J. Wadsworth, Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary, U.S. Representative on Disarmament
Deputy U.S. Representative
Robert F. Bacher, member, President's Science Advisory
Committee
Senior Advisers
Charles C. Stelle, Department of State
Alfonzo P. Fox, Lt. Gen., USA (retired), Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
George M. Kavanaugh, Atomic Energy Commission
Congressional Advisers
Albert Gore, United States Senate
(Hubert H. Humphrey, United States Senate, alternate)
Bourke B. Hickenlooper, United States Senate
Advisers
Vincent Baker, Department of State
Robert G. Baraz, Department of State
Stephen Benedict, U.S. Information Agency
Hans A. Bethe, member, President's Science Advisory
Committee
Darcy Brent, Department of State
Harold Brown, Atomic Energy Commission
Department of State Bulletin
Charles E. Collett, Col., USAF, Departmeut of Defense
Spurgeon M. Keeuy, Jr., Office of the Special Assistant to
the President for Science and Technology
Richard Latter, Rand Corporation
Doyle L. Northrup, Department of Defense
David H. Popper, American Consulate General, Geneva
Luther Reid, Department of State
Malcolm Toon, Department of State
Paul Toussaint, Department of State
Henry S. Villard, American Consul General, Geneva
John N. Washburn, Department of State
Secretary of Delegation
Virgil L. Moore, American Consulate General, Geneva.
The United Nations and National Security
by William I. Cargo
Director, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs 1
The problem of our national security in the
world of today is of direct personal concern to
every American. It is a potent truism that war
with modern weapons would weigh heavily on
civilian populations. Our citizens throughout the
country, particularly in urban areas, would face
the threat of destruction of life and property. In
broader terms the question of our national se-
curity is the question of our right and ability to
develop American life and institutions for the
well-being of present and future generations.
It is most appropriate also to relate Ameri-
can security to the role of the United Nations.
The United Nations is now well into its second
decade. At this same point in history the Ameri-
can people face a threat to their security greater
than ever before. We may well inquire, there-
fore: What is the role of the United Nations in
promoting the peace and security of the world
and, accordingly, our own security ?
In dealing with this question, I propose first
to comment on the nature of the security posi-
tion in which the United States now finds itself.
Against this background I will then discuss the
role of the United Nations in relation to our na-
tional security.
American Security in a Changing World
The security position of the United States has
been sharply affected by developments since
World War II. There was a long period in our
1 Address made before the Rochester Citizens Com-
mittee for United Nations Day at Rochester, N. Y., on
Oct. 24.
history when this country, flanked by two great
oceans, was nearly invulnerable. This, unhap-
pily, is no longer the case. What has brought
about this tremendous change ?
First of all, there is the enormous destructive
power of modern weapons. Notwithstanding all
of the publicity about nuclear and thermonuclear
explosions there is a real lag in our thinking
about them. Perhaps we tend to think in terms
of World War II. Perhaps the human mind re-
coils at the terrible destructiveness of these new
weapons. Yet these weapons of tremendous power
exist; they are possessed not only by the United
States and the United Kingdom but also by the
Soviet Union ; and other countries are striving to
develop them. These facts are of major impor-
tance in appraising the present security position
of the United States.
Another factor of first magnitude in our
changed strategic position is the reduction of the
built-in safety factor which the United States
has historically enjoyed. Our classical strategic
position is that we have been geographically iso-
lated from those who might threaten our security.
We have been endowed with an abundance of nat-
ural and human resources which could, in good
time, be converted to military strength. Should a
threat to our security emerge, as in the case of the
growth of ambitious military power in Europe
or military action against our bases in the Pacific,
we could rely upon our basic position of strength
to permit us months and even years to develop
the military power to turn back the threat to our
security. Our national security could thus be
based on the presumption that the permissible re-
November 70, J 958
725
action time between threat and response could be
relatively long.
This pattern has been radically changed by
modern technology. High-speed military aircraft
can already span the oceans or the polar wastes
in a matter of hours. Faster aircraft are con-
stantly being developed. And as we progress into
the missile era we must reckon with the fact that
weapons of massive destructive power could ap-
proach our great cities at thousands of miles per
hour and arrive within minutes of the time
launched. Thus our permissible reaction time
may now need to be measured in hours or in
minutes rather than in months or years. The era
of our history when we could build up our mili-
tary strength after a threat to our survival had
been launched is gone, probably forever. And
gone with it are concepts of security which are no
longer adequate to meet our requirements in this
changed world.
The Soviet Challenge
In considering our current security position we
should recall that there was a time when many
tended to cite our large population, our seem-
ingly ample resources, our scientific and tech-
nological skills, and our enormous industrial
capacity as the answer to all existing or prospec-
tive problems. While no one would deny that our
strength is great and the capacities of our coun-
try and its people enormous, I think we now see
these things in somewhat more realistic perspec-
tive. We recognize that, populous as this coun-
try is, we represent only about one-twentieth of
the population of the world. The Soviet and
Chinese Communists control nearly one-third.
We recognize that our resources, great as they are,
are not unlimited. We are by no means self-
sufficient. We know, in fact, that we import
substantial quantities of some 50 commodities of
fundamental economic and strategic importance.
We also realize that we do not have a monopoly
on scientific achievement or technical know-how.
We have not failed, for example, to realize the
contribution of scientists from friendly European
countries to the development of the nuclear sci-
ences and the first atomic weapons. We have had
impressed upon us by visible signs in the night
skies the achievements of Soviet scientists.
These developments which I have noted affect-
ing the United States security position in the
world are largely a reflection of scientific and
technological developments. These have made a
deep imprint upon our traditional strategic posi-
tion and have greatly compounded our security
problem. These developments would be in them-
selves highly significant. But we have also had,
following World War II, a concentration of
power in two main centers. To appreciate the
problem fully in its present magnitude, we must
assess the Soviet challenge to our security.
The Soviet Union, as the leader of world com-
munism, is a country whose rulers are dedicated
to the proposition that communism will inevitably
be adopted throughout the world. They are dedi-
cated to the achievement of this objective, however
long it may take and irrespective of possible
tactical deviations. Khrushchev has made this
clear in his frank connnent : "We will bury you."
Now this objective of Soviet communism, in-
compatible as it is with American security in-
terests, would not necessarily be in itself a matter
of serious proportions. The seriousness of the
Soviet threat to United States security arises
precisely because this objective of world domina-
tion is held by those who also control a political,
industrial, and military system of great and in-
creasing power.
What is the basis of this enhanced power posi-
tion of the Soviet Union ?
First of all, there is the rapid growth of Soviet
economic capacity. The Soviet Union in its four
decades of existence, and at incredible cost in
human terms, has developed an industrial base
second only to that of the United States. The
Soviet gross national product is increasing by
more than 5 percent per year — a rapid rate, in-
deed — and is expected to reach nearly $350 billion
by 1965. During the past decade the Soviet out-
put of electrical power and oil has nearly quad-
rupled. Soviet steel production has shown a simi-
lar rate of growth. There are many other graphic
illustrations of the rapidly expanding Soviet
economy. And the Soviet Union has just this
week announced that its new 7-year plan will
call for the achievement by 1965 of production
goals for steel, electric power, coal, and oil origi-
nally set for 1972.
We are sharply aware also of the increased So-
viet scientific and technical capacity. The Soviet
Union has developed its capabilities in the atomic
field and devised nuclear and thermonuclear
726
Department of State Bulletin
weapons at a rate which many people in the West
did not consider possible. The advanced state of
Soviet technical capabilities has also been appar-
ent in their development of long-range ballistic
missiles and in the launching of earth satellites.
The very term "sputnik" has entered the inter-
national vocabulary, an achievement no doubt rel-
ished by Soviet propagandists.
Closely related to the growing scientific and
technical capacity of the Soviet Union is the role
of Soviet education. The Soviet Union syste-
matically molds its educational system and regi-
ments its students to serve the objectives of the
Soviet Communist Party and the state. Heavy
emphasis is placed on scientific training and its
practical application in industrial engineering and
technology. The vigor with which the Soviet
educational program has been pursued should be
carefully noted in this country. In 1914 only some
10.7(10 "specialists" graduated from secondary
and higher special educational institutions in
Russia. In 1955 such graduates totaled 1,634,000.
The Soviet educational system is also designed
to iit the pattern of Soviet world objectives in its
emphasis on languages. Every high school stu-
dent in the Soviet Union must study a foreign
language for 6 years. If he goes on to university
work, he must learn one of the languages of Asia
or Africa, a significant point in itself. Some 8,000
American students are studying Russian; 10 mil-
lion Soviet students are studying English.
Here then is Soviet education : It is geared in a
massive way to the development of the industrial
and military power of the Soviet Union and to the
world objectives of Soviet leaders.
Soviet scientific, technological, and industrial
achievements have been directed toward the build-
ing of a powerful military machine. Since the
end of World War II the Soviet Union has re-
equipped massive ground forces, built fleets of
modern jet aircraft and submarines, and devel-
oped stockpiles of nuclear weapons and missiles.
This direct translation by the Soviet Union of
scientific and industrial potential into military
power is a salient factor in the world security
situation.
Implications for United States Security
In this brief way I have sought to indicate what
seem to me to be certain of the principal features
of America's security position in the world to-
United Nations Day, 1958
Statement by Henry Cabot Lodr/e
U.S. Representative to the United Nations
U.S. /U.N. press release 3027
As the United Nations reaches its 13th birthday
it is proper for us to reflect on what the United
Nations means to the United States.
Americans want a foreign policy which does two
things — promotes world peace and upholds our na-
tional interests and ideals.
The United Nations is a place where we pursue
that foreign policy. In it we work together with
like-minded nations, not only to solve disputes but
also promote positive things like the atoms-for-
peace program, worldwide malaria control, and bet-
ter living standards for people all over the world.
We seek by persuasion and diplomacy to increase
the number of our friends and decrease the number
of our opponents.
The United Nations also serves as a great loud-
speaker which can expose Communist fallacies and
mobilize world public opinion against aggressors.
It is the most effective single engine in the world
for the influencing of world opinion.
The world today is a dangerous place. The
United Nations is not going to take us to heaven.
But it has already done much — in Korea, the Mid-
dle East, and elsewhere — to prevent wars, punish
aggressors, and make the world a more decent place
in which to live.
It is up to the member nations, including partic-
ularly the United States, to make the United Na-
tions work. On this anniversary, therefore, we
should remember how much an effective U.N. adds
to the peace and safety of the American people.
day. Modern technological developments and the
growth of an aggressive power system under the
control of the Soviet Union pose for us serious
challenges which we can ignore only at our peril.
There are, in my view, some rather clear im-
plications in the situation which I have outlined.
I would summarize these as follows :
1. The thought of war, with the colossal destruc-
tiveness which it might now bring — far exceeding
anything else in human experience — is repugnant
to most Americans. But security for this country
cannot be found in recoiling from grim facts. We
cannot allow the Soviet rulers the freedom to take
the world at their leisure.
2. We cannot — and do not — rest our security
on the potential military strength residing in our
great industrial capacity and our reservoir of
scientific achievement and technical skills. The
November 10, 1958
727
United States and its free- world allies must have
adequate military forces ready at all times. This
concept of "force in being" is, for example, the
basis of the formation of our Strategic Air Com-
mand. It is fundamental also to the organization
and purposes of that great defensive alliance of
free nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion. The concept of adequate "force in being" is,
in short, the essential basis of the ability of the
free world to deter those who might contemplate
aggression.
3. We must recognize, as indeed I think we all
do, the long-term character of the Soviet challenge
to the security of the free world. We are not deal-
ing with some transient political system that
might be changed or obliterated by a "palace revo-
lution." We must therefore place our reliance not
in the presumed or hoped-for weakness of others
but in our own strength, deeply rooted in the
physical power and moral fiber of our people and
properly adjusted to meet the challenges of our
age.
4. "Go-it-alone-ism" is not a feasible policy for
the United States. Despite our considerable re-
sources it is clear that our national defense re-
quires the maintenance of strong collective-se-
curity arrangements with other free nations. We
depend upon our friends and allies for vital raw
materials, for manpower and equipment to oppose
Communist aggression, for access to bases and
facilities essential to our capacity to deter aggres-
sion, and for significant contributions in science
and technology. Free Europe contains the world's
largest industrial complex outside the United
States. With this European industrial establish-
ment, the free world has a substantial preponder-
ance of productive capacity over the Communist
world. Were this great industrial plant of free
Europe to fall into Communist hands, the produc-
tive capacity of the Soviet Union would be more
than doubled. The serious implications of such
an eventuality for American security are self-evi-
dent. For comparable reasons we need our other
friends and allies of the free world in the quest
for mutual security just as they need us.
5. Security is indivisible. It is indivisible in a
geographic sense. An act of aggression cannot be
ignored simply because it may seem to be far
away. A threat to the independence and integrity
of a state is no less serious because the intended
victim may be small. The teaching of history in
this matter is precise. Freedom everywhere has
paid the price when free men have stood aside and
watched aggression triumph in areas which they
conceived to be not of direct concern to them.
Security is also indivisible in the sense that the
battle for security in the world today must be
fought on many fronts. It must be fought in
political, psychological, economic, and social areas
even more continuously than in purely military
terms. The era of the A-bomb and the H-bomb is
likewise the era of indirect aggression, of sub-
versive efforts to destroy independent states. We
have become well acquainted with the technique of
so-called "volunteers" who somehow turn up in
areas of tension. The battle for security today is
also a struggle for the minds of men — and for
their stomachs as well. Our own security is thus
increasingly bound up with political, economic,
and social conditions in allied and friendly coun-
tries and with the advancement of dependent
peoples toward self-government or independence.
We must therefore see American security today in
broad perspective. It is notable that the United
Nations operates on a similar broad basis.
Meeting the Challenge
In the light of this developing world situation,
our Government and the American people have
engaged in a broad program of action.
• The United States has built up its own defense
establishment to insure against the dangers of
surprise attack. The Strategic Air Command,
maintained in a high state of readiness, provides
the backbone of our strong deterrent against ag-
gression. Our recent achievements with nuclear
submarines are further evidence of the constant
labor of science, industry, and government to in-
sure the primacy of our modern weapons systems.
• We have pursued vigorously the mutual se-
curity program designed to assist friendly nations
and allies in building up their economic strength
and to maintain forces essential for their own de-
fense and the defense of the free world.
• Through collective-security arrangements
such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
and the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization, we
have developed regional collective-security sys-
tems welding the free world together and stand-
ing as barriers to possible aggression.
• We have developed a program of counter-
ing Soviet propaganda, making it possible for
728
Department of State Bulletin
others to hear the truth about this country and
world problems. I refer to the programs of the
United States Information Agency, particularly
the broadcasts of the Voice of America. Am-
bassador Henry Cabot Lodge, the United States
Representative to the United Nations, challenged
the Soviet Union to permit the peoples under its
control to hear without obstruction the broadcasts
of the full proceedings of the recent emergency
special session of the United Nations General
Assembly on the Near East. The Soviet Union
sought to jam these broadcasts, once again illus-
trating their extreme sensitivity to efforts to pro-
vide the truth to people behind the Iron Curtain.
• We have strongly supported the United Na-
tions as a force for international peace and se-
curity and in its program to advance human well-
being. This is a key element in the conduct of
our foreign policy.
The Role of the United Nations
I have dealt with the challenges of world
change to our national security and the measures
we have taken to meet them. I would now like
to turn to the question with which we began,
namely, what can the United Nations do to pro-
mote international peace and security and accord-
ingly that of the United States?
The overall answer to this question is, I think,
clear : A strong and effective United Nations con-
tributes to international peace, security, and sta-
bility, and consequently it also enhances the secu-
rity and strength of the United States. To the
extent that the United Nations is successful in its
efforts to stop or prevent aggression and to find
peaceful adjustments in disputes which might
otherwise lead to war, the interests of the United
States and United States security are advanced.
To the extent that the United Nations contributes
to economic and social well-being, it contributes
to stability and expands the area of security
around us. In my judgment the record shows that
the United Nations has been both responsive to
American interests and a force for peace in the
world.
The United Nations and Collective Security
Now let us look at some of the specifics. First
of all, the United Nations as an instrument of
collective security :
It would be a mistake to seek to assess the U.N.
in purely military terms. We should recall here,
however, the role played by the United Nations in
repelling Communist aggression in Korea. Forces
from some 17 countries gathered under the U.N.
symbol and, for the first time in history, an inter-
national organization took successful action to
counter affjjression. The circumstances surround-
ing the U.N. role on the Korean question were,
however, somewhat unusual. For example, the
Security Council was able to act effectively be-
cause the Soviet Union was absent and therefore
did not interpose the veto.
We must realistically recognize the basic dif-
ferences of view which exist between the Soviet
Union and the United States sharply limit the
ability of the U.N. to carry out the collective-
security role envisaged in the U.N. Charter. In
this situation the United States places its primary
reliance for collective security on regional ar-
rangements such as the North Atlantic Treaty Or-
ganization. These regional defense arrangements
are within the framework of the charter and sup-
port its broad objectives of maintaining interna-
tional peace and security.
I would add this : The United Nations has the
necessary flexibility to facilitate the establishment
of a broader collective-security system whenever
the fundamental attitudes and policies of govern-
ments will make this possible of achievement.
Disarmament
No question dealt with by the United Nations
is of greater potential significance to our national
security than the question of disarmament. The
destructive power of modern weapons and the
development of newer and more effective means
of launching surprise attacks make it clear that
our security would be enhanced if we could achieve
a limitation and reduction of armaments and
armed forces under effective safeguards and con-
trols that would insure that the agreed terms
would be observed by all sides.
The crux of the disarmament problem seems to
me to be whether agreement can be reached on the
necessary controls and safeguards. Concretely,
this means that there should be sufficient interna-
tional control and inspection to insure that all dis-
armament measures agreed upon will in fact be
faithfully carried out by all the governments con-
cerned. A disarmament agreement cannot be a
mere paper agreement. In clear terms : we must
November 10, 1958
729
be assured that it will be carried out by the Soviet
Union. Otherwise, our security would be dimin-
ished rather than enhanced.
Now it is precisely this question of safeguards
and controls which the Soviet Union is likely to
find the most difficult. The Soviets, with their
emphasis on secrecy, will be clearly reluctant to
open their territory to the required international
inspection.
Some encouraging developments in the disarma-
ment picture have taken place, however, in recent
months. A conference of experts in Geneva, in-
cluding both American and Soviet personnel,
reached agreement on the technical requirements
for a workable system to detect and identify nu-
clear explosions. 2 Further discussions are sched-
uled to begin in Geneva on October 31 to seek
agreement on the suspension of nuclear weapons
tests and the actual establishment of a control
system for monitoring a suspension. 3 We will
discover in this conference whether the Soviet
Union is actually prepared to agree to establish
the required inspection system and to provide the
necessary facilities for it to function effectively
within the Soviet Union.
Beginning on November 10 a conference of
experts, also including both American and Soviet
personnel, will convene in Geneva to explore the
practical aspects of guarding against surprise
attack. 4
The United Nations has had, and will continue
to have, an important role to play in the search
for meaningful disarmament. The United Na-
tions has provided an opportunity for all members
to contribute their ideas on disarmament. It has
facilitated actual negotiations by establishing
bodies such as the Disarmament Subcommittee,
through which extensive negotiations were car-
ried out in London between the Soviet Union and
Western states. The United Nations, by resolu-
tions it has adopted, has recognized the im-
portance of balanced measures of disarmament
under appropriate safeguards. The United Na-
tions might well provide the framework within
which a control and inspection system might be
established under the provisions of any disarma-
ment agreement with the Soviet Union.
2 For background and text of the final report, see
Bulletin of Sept. 22, 1958, p. 452.
3 See p. 723.
4 Bulletin of Oct. 27, 1958, p. 648.
Disarmament is being discussed at this very time
in the General Assembly of the United Nations. 5
It is our hope that the Assembly by its discussions
will assist in maintaining the forward momentum
we have gained in the disarmament field.
Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy
In addition to seeking appropriate agreed con-
trols for nuclear weapons in disarmament nego-
tiations, the United States has taken the lead in
promoting international cooperation in the peace-
ful uses of atomic energy. In 1953 President
Eisenhower, in his "Atoms for Peace" speech,
called for the establishment of an international
agency for this purpose. The International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has now been
established with headquarters in Vienna. Among
its tasks, it will promote the application of radio-
isotopes to agriculture, medicine, and industry;
facilitate the exchange and training of experts
and technicians in the nuclear sciences ; serve as a
channel for exchange of information resulting
from research ; and undertake studies and surveys
to encourage the development of atomic power.
The Agency is also designed to assist in estab-
lishing safeguards to prevent the diversion of
fissionable materials to weapons purposes. It is
in the interest of our own security to encourage
the IAEA in this task so that we may be assured
that exports of fissionable materials for peaceful
purposes do not breed military dangers.
Outer Space
Although little is known about the nature of
outer space, recent developments have made it
clear that the potential uses of this new frontier
for peaceful or destructive purposes are enormous.
The United States has proposed technical dis-
cussions with the Soviet Union to see whether a
system of control can be established that will in-
sure that outer space will be used only for peace-
ful purposes. 6 Although the Soviet response has
not yet been favorable, we hope that the Geneva
talks on nuclear weapons testing and the projected
technical discussions on surprise attack will lead
to similar discussions on outer space.
The United States supports international co-
operation in the peaceful uses of outer space. The
5 See p. 747.
8 Bulletin of Sept. 16, 1957, p. 451.
730
Department of State Bulletin
United States has proposed that the present Gen-
eral Assembly of the United Nations establish an
Ad Hoc Committee on the peaceful uses of outer
space to survey the problem and consider what
the U.N. might appropriately do in this field. A
program of international cooperation in the peace-
ful uses of outer space was undertaken during the
International Geophysical Year imder the Inter-
national Council of Scientific Unions. This co-
operative endeavor of scientists, including scien-
tists of the Soviet Union, is to be continued. We
hope this will set a constructive precedent for the
future.
Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes
One of the major purposes of the United Na-
tions is to bring about by peaceful means the ad-
justment or settlement of international disputes
which might lead to a breach of the peace. It is
clearly of the highest importance to settle dif-
ferences between members of the world commu-
nity before they become accentuated, possibly re-
sulting in armed conflict. This is not to suggest
that disputes which reach the United Nations are
likely to be small. In many cases they are serious
indeed.
The record of the United Nations as a force for
averting war by settling differences through
peaceful means is an outstanding one. It is well
to recall some of the major achievements of the
U.N. over the 13 years of its life thus far. By its
actions the United Nations:
• Focused world opinion on the Soviet refusal
to withdraw its forces from Iran and played a
major role in the withdrawal of these troops in
1946.
• Helped bring an end to Communist inter-
vention in Greece, which was threatening the in-
tegrity and independence of that state.
• Assisted in halting the fighting in Palestine
and in implementing the Armistice Agreements
between Israel and the neighboring Arab states.
• Brought about a truce between India and
Pakistan in the Kashmir dispute and offered a
forum in which this question could be discussed
with a view to peaceful adjustment.
• Brought about a settlement of the future
status of the former Italian colonies, a difficult
question resulting from "World War II.
• Avoided a major war in the Suez crisis by
bringing the pressure of world opinion to bear for
a quick end to hostilities.
• Supervised the clearance of the Suez Canal
and assisted in reopening it to the commerce of
the world.
• Established a United Nations Observation
Group in Lebanon in view of the external threats
to the independence of that country.
• Worked out, through the Secretary-General,
arrangements to assist in preserving the independ-
ence and integrity of Jordan.
This incomplete list graphically illustrates the
breadth of United Nations activities to preserve
the peace.
The United Nations has in fact developed as
the greatest single center the world has known
for harmonizing the actions of nations. Quite
apart from the formal agenda of United Nations
meetings, we can never know the scope of the in-
formal conversations which take place in the cor-
ridors and lounges of the United Nations. I have
never walked through the Delegates Lounge of
the United Nations when the General Assembly
is in session without being sharply aware of this
great gathering of leader's from all over the world
and the many opportunities this affords for useful
discussions of mutual problems. At the current
session of the General Assembly, for example,
some 65 foreign ministers and prime ministers
have been in attendance.
The Secretary-General of the United Nations,
Mr. Hammarskjold, by his quiet and effective ef-
forts has come to play a major role in the peaceful
settlement activities of the United Nations. He
is increasingly called on by the General Assembly
and the Security Council to undertake tasks of
composing differences between members. In his
position as Secretary-General he commands the
respect of the entire membership of the United
Nations. The efforts of the Secretary-General and
his associates, particularly Dr. Kalph Bunche,
have been notably effective in the troubled area of
the Near East.
In its efforts to preserve the peace and to pre-
vent small incidents from becoming major ones,
the United Nations has developed a flexible tech-
nique of employing military personnel in obser-
vation or patrol work. Many of these groups are
now widely known by their initials : UNEF, the
United Nations Emergency Force in the Suez
area; UNTSO, the United Nations Truce Super-
November JO, 1958
731
vision Organization in the Palestine area; and
UNOGIL, the United Nations Observation Group
in Lebanon. Beyond the value of the'ir specific
duties, it has become apparent that the interests
of peace are well served by the symbol which
such groups provide of a "United Nations pres-
ence 1 ' in a troubled area. This in itself is testi-
mony to the stature which the United Nations has
achieved not only here but in distant places
throughout the world.
The experience of UNEF and the other groups
I have referred to has been found to be so useful
that there is wide opinion in the United Nations
that steps should be taken looking toward some
kind of a standby United Nations force. The
U.N. Secretariat, for example, might develop
plans for calling into being and supporting such
a force in implementation of a United Nations
decision to employ it. The United States sup-
ports such a concept. The General Assembly at
its current session will consider this question.
Economic and Social Progress
The United Nations is broadly engaged in pro-
moting economic and social advancement and the
betterment of conditions of life of peoples
throughout the world. Through the United Na-
tions General Assembly, the Economic and Social
Council, and the specialized agencies, the United
Nations is making steady progress in combating
disease, poverty, ignorance, and hunger. This
work is done quietly ; it does not usually result in
newspaper headlines.
The United Nations has economic commissions
for Latin America, the Far East, and Europe and
a newly created Economic Commission for Africa.
There are funds for technical assistance to under-
developed areas and a new Special Projects Fund
is now being created by the General Assembly. 7
There are programs for refugees and emergency
funds for children. There are broad programs
for health, programs for education and training,
and scholarship activities of many kinds.
Here are three specific examples of the work
of the United Nations in this important area, im-
portant not only in terms of human values but
also in terms of world peace and U.S. security :
1. The World Health Organization is engaged
in a campaign, with every prospect of success, to
' Ibid., Nov. 3, 1958, p. 702.
eliminate malaria from the face of the earth —
malaria which strikes 200 million persons an-
nually, of whom 2 million die and countless others
are permanently afflicted.
2. The Food and Agriculture Organization has
taught the Indonesian techniques of growing ed-
ible fish in rice paddies to farmers elsewhere in
Southeast Asia, and even in the Caribbean. This
has resulted in greatly supplementing existing
food supplies and in providing a better diet by
adding new and valuable sources of protein.
3. The United Nations Children's Fund now
helps more than 50 million children and mothers
each year to better health. For many millions of
these, it has granted life in place of death.
I need not dwell upon the obvious relationship
of the economic and social activities of the United
Nations to our own security interests. People who
are imbued with the sense of hope, the eagerness
for tomorrow, which economic and social well-
being can give, do not respond to the propaganda
appeals of Soviet communism. When the United
Nations helps people increase their food supplies,
reduce sickness, learn productive crafts and trades,
it is taking constructive actions for peace — and we
should lend it our continued support in such
actions.
Conclusion
In order to safeguard our national security in
the world of today, we must be acutely conscious
of the difficulties we face and we must work as
individuals and as a people to meet them. We
must continue to build our strength on the national
level. We must continue to work with allied and
friendly countries in establishing the conditions
for mutual and collective security. And we must
continue to give strong support to the United
Nations. This I am sure we will do. As Presi-
dent Eisenhower has said in his United Nations
Day proclamation :
. . . firm support of the United Nations has always
been a fundamental element of our foreign policy.
The United States has a vital and direct concern
in the success of the United Nations. The efforts
of the United Nations to avert or repel aggression,
to settle disputes among nations by peaceful means,
to promote economic and social advancement and
otherwise to eliminate the causes of international
friction are consistent with United States objec-
tives and promote our security interests.
732
Department of Sfofo Bulletin
The I 'nil eel Nations is not a substitute for Amer-
ican policy. As we face the world's problems, we
cannot step back and leave them to the United
Nations. Tbe United Nations is strong when its
members give it strength. As we look to the fu-
ture, wo must be prepared to work through the
United Nations with vigor, imagination, and
leadership. We should thus move forward with
the United Nations in its continual quest for peace
and justice in the world.
Secretary Duiles Discusses U.S. Foreign Policy for British Television Broadcast
Following is the transcript of an interview re-
corded at Washington on October 17 between Sec-
r< tary Dulles and William D. Clark and broadcast
on October 23 over the Independent Television
Network of the United Kingdom.
Press release 635 dated October 23
Mr. Clark: Mr. Secretary, I am extremely grate-
ful to you for finding time to come and answer the
sort of questions that are bubbling up in Britain.
As you know, there has been a good deal of criti-
cism of American policy and perhaps some mis-
understanding. I wonder if you would care to
reply to what is probably the commonest form of
their criticism, which is that America is missing
opportunities for improving peace or the chances
of peace by your being too rigid?
Secretary Dulles: I am delighted, Mr. Clark, to
have the opportunity to talk with you and through
you to our friends in Britain about these aspects
of our foreign policy. On this question of rigid-
ity, I do believe that there are certain basic prin-
ciples in which we believe and to which we must
hold steadfastly. We are up against a creed which
believes almost fanatically in a different concept
of the nature of the world, the kind of a civiliza-
tion we should have, and above all the nature of
man and the part man plays in it. It should be
just a mechanistic particle to be dealt with by gov-
ernment in the interests of material welfare.
We have a totally different concept, always have
had; and this struggle of man for freedom has
been going on over the centuries, and we cannot
conduct it successfully unless we believe in it and
are steadfast and strong for it. Now, in those
basic things I admit to being rigid, to standing
firm and standing solid.
Now, as to the mechanics with which you carry
tilings out, your day-to-day tactics, I do not think
the charge of rigidity can be made against me.
Indeed, over here oftentimes I am accused not of
being rigid and consistent but of being incon-
sistent. So I think when it comes down to the
details, the tactics, there is room for flexibility. I
try to show it. But on the basic principles I do
believe in standing strong and steadfast, and I
think without that we will never survive the as-
sault to which our civilization is being subjected.
Nature of Struggle With Communism
Q. Do you then see the struggle with commu-
nism as primarily a moral or primarily a power
political struggle?
A. Primarily a moral struggle. Because, if it
was only power politics and did not involve a basic
threat to the whole moral values of our civiliza-
tion, we wouldn't treat it as a worldwide struggle.
The question of which regime exercises power here
and there is of itself unimportant in many parts
of the world, as far as we are concerned. It is
only because that power is becoming a challenge
to the basic moral principles of our Judeo-Chris-
tian civilization, and indeed the civilization which
is based upon other great religions— it is only be-
cause of that that it becomes a worldwide struggle
and a struggle where we must all stand together.
As Mr. Spaak said the other day, speaking here
in Boston, 1 we must come to recognize that the
struggle is a struggle against our civilization be-
ing conducted all over the world, and unless the
free nations meet it everywhere we will be de-
feated.
Q. Then do you foresee in the reasonably near
future any possibility that there toill be some sort
1 Bulletin of Oct. 20, 1958, p. G07.
November 10, 7958
733
of a possibility of peaceful coexistence perhaps
reached through the disarmament talks?
A. Well, I think that it's possible perhaps to
improve the armament situation. That is one
of these, what I call, tactical situations where
there is no reason why there should not be flexi-
bility To my mind, the most important aspect
there is the possibility of developing these areas
where there is protection against surprise attack
It's when people live under the menace of almost
instant annihilation that they become nervous,
somewhat jittery, where they concentrate them-
selves upon building up defensive weapons, deter-
rent weapons. Here today we go to meetings ol
the National Security Council, as I went this
week, and are told that we probably will not get
more than 15 minutes' warning before practically
our entire country will be obliterated.
Now, when you face that kind of a threat, you
have to build up counterthreats, deterrents, and
so the thing goes on mounting, mounting, mount-
ing And I do not see the likelihood of a formula
for a disarmament which can work unless you
strike at the heart, the root of the trouble, which
is the fear of massive surprise attack. And 1
place the greatest hope upon the possibility of
developing zones of strategic importance m crit-
ical parts of the world where you could develop
areas where the likelihood of surprise attack would
be substantially diminished. We tried to do that,
you know, in the Arctic zone, and the Soviets com-
plained about flights in the Arctic area, but we
said, "Let's set up a zone so neither of us will be
afraid" Everybody thought that would be a
wonderful idea, except the Soviet Union, and
they vetoed it when it came to the Security Coun-
cil 2 But I still have hope. And you know we
are planning to have talks with the Soviets about
that subject I hope in November. 3
Q. Then the thing that one wonders is what will
be the end of all this. When one has got per-
haps some slight lessening of tension as the result
of a disarmament agreement of any sort, what do
you look forward to then— a period of negotia-
tions? Or do you think that communism will
wither away?
A. Well, I am not sure that communism as a
social and economic structure will wither away. I
8 IMd., May 19, 1958, p. 816.
» Ibid., Oct. 27, 1958, p. 648.
734
do see an evolution away from what I call inter-
national communism, that is the kind of com-
munism which tries to spread its creed all over
the world, which believes that you cannot have
world order, world peace, unless it controls every-
thing and brings about a state of conformity with
its principles everywhere. Now that is a form of
warfare which can only be ended, in my opinion,
by a change away from that policy. I don't see
how we can ever capitulate to that. And it is
not willing to compromise. It believes, just as
strongly as we believe in our faith, that their
system is the answer but it can't work until it is
worldwide.
Now that will evolve, in my opinion, gradually
to a system which puts more emphasis upon na-
tional welfare, the welfare of the peoples. There
is no dispute at all between the United States and
the peoples of Russia. If only the Government of
Russia was interested in looking out for the wel-
fare of Russia, the people of Russia, we would
have a state of nontension right away. The trou-
ble is these areas, the Sino-Soviet area, the Rus-
sians and the Chinese Communists, are not work-
ing for the benefit of their own people. They are
working to spread throughout the world a creed
which is irreconcilable with our own.
You take China. Here you have got people
where millions of them are starving, and what
does that government do? It ships food out m
order to get a political conquest somewhere else.
At my staff meeting yesterday I was told that
they are sending 70 technicians and $20 million,
approximately, to Yemen. Why are they doing
that * Not because there isn't need for these tech-
nicians, for this money, in China, but because they
think that is an opportunity to get a political con-
quest in Yemen. And you cannot, as I see it have
peace with that kind of a society. But I do be-
lieve that there will be an evolution of this com-
munism, so more and more it will come to concen-
trate upon the welfare of its own people and will
give up this fantastic dream of world conquest.
Q. Is there anything we can do to hasten that
day, in which there will be an increase?
A Yes, there is, certainly. And the thing that
we can do is to make it apparent that it can't
succeed. You may recall in the speech that
Khrushchev made where he denounced the evils
of Stalinism and the "cult of personality" and all
the cruelties of that police state.
Department of State Bulletin
Q. Yes, I know.
A. And in it he said lie was asked, "Well, why
didn't you do something about it earlier?" He
said, "We couldn't do anything about it earlier
because it was gaining such victories." Now, as
long as it gains victories, it's not going to change,
knowing it contributes to its going on more and
gaining successes. If we stand stout and resolute
and oppose it everywhere, whenever we can, and
it doesn't gain successes, then it will almost auto-
mat ically change and be more of a domestic phe-
nomenon and less of an international phenomenon.
U.S. Policy of Nonrecognition of Communist China
Q. You have just mentioned China, and re-
cently the danger of war seems to have been more
from China than it has been in Europe. There
is a lot of criticism in Britain of America 's China
policy and, I think, very little understanding of
it. There are two main criticisms. Pll put the
first one to you and ask you to say something. It
is this: that we feel, many of us — not necessarily
the government — that the policy of nonrecogni-
tion of the government in Peking is both unreal-
istic and has involved you, so to speak, in taking
sides in what is virtually a dead civil war. Would
you say something on that?
A. The question of recognition involves to some
extent a play on words. There is no doubt we
recognize Communist China as a fact, as we deal
with Communist China. Indeed, I suspect that the
United States has had more continuous serious
dealings with Communist China than any other
free-world country over the last 10 years. We
have dealt with it in Korea in terms of the Ko-
rean armistice. We, with you and France and
others, dealt with it at Geneva at the Indochina
armistice. We have had talks at the diplomatic
level, first at Geneva and now in Warsaw, over the
last 4 years with the Chinese Communists. It's a
fact and we deal with it as a fact, and whenever
it is advantageous to the world or for peace to do
business with it, we don't hesitate to do business
with it.
Then there is another form of recognition which
means diplomatic recognition. That carries with
it very great advantages to the recognized state.
It turns over assets throughout all the world to its
control. It puts it in a position of prestige as re-
gards the Chinese overseas populations which look
November JO, 7958
486276 — 58 3
very largely to it for guidance. In many coun-
tries of the world if they recognize the Chinese
Communists they would turn over an asset in
terms of those overseas Chinese which would prob-
ably result in the subversion and overthrow of
the Government.
Now we don't see any particular reason why
we should give this great advantage to a regime
which announces its bitter hostility to us and to
all the principles upon which we stand. That isn't
a policy of blindness. That is a policy of realism.
As I say, we recognize it exists. We negotiate
with it. We deal with it, wherever that will serve
a useful purpose. But we do not give it all the
surplus advantages which would flow from gen-
eral diplomatic recognition, because those added
advantages would merely be used against us and
against all the things we believe in. So we think
the practical policy of realism is to do that.
Now let me remind you that this policy of so-
called nonrecognition is equally applied by the
rest of us. You can take East Germany. There
is a so-called People's Republic of East Germany.
It's a fact, but neither your government nor ours
recognizes it. Why? Because we believe it is
politically disadvantageous and harmful to our
interests to do it. So the guide in these things
isn't something doctrinaire, that you have to give
recognition of a diplomatic character to a regime
which is hostile to you and where it involves great
disadvantages to do it. You have a choice about
that. But, on the other hand, we do not accept
the blind policy of pretending that it doesn't ex-
ist. It does exist. We know it exists. It has
killed and wounded about a hundred thousand
Americans; so obviously it exists.
Q. I think the other part of the criticism which
stems from this, though, is that, as a result of non-
recognition and as a result of recognition of an
alternative regime in Formosa, you became in-
volved, not just immediately but over the years,
in hostilities which are very dangerous to world
peace and aren't getting us anywhere. I won-
der if you could say something about the positive
aspects of American policy, where it is getting us
toward China?
A. Well, we have not, in fact, become involved
in hostilities, except where the Chinese Commu-
nists intervened in Korea and fought us and the
United Nations and you and others who had
forces in the Republic of Korea. There we
735
fought, and we fought together, against the Chi-
nese People's Kepublic and its Ked forces. Other-
wise we have not engaged in hostilities toward it.
We have supported the Government of China
which was the recognized Government of China
which we all recognized before 1945, which we
have continued to recognize, despite the partial
results of the revolution.
But, you see, this question of its being a civil
war is exactly the same as the situation in Korea,
where it was claimed that that was a civil war.
And the Russians and the Chinese Communists
and the north Koreans took the position there
that we were intervening in a civil war, that this
was just an effort of the Koreans to unite them-
selves. The same thing in the case of Viet-Nam.
But we don't believe that, in the case of civil wars
of this sort, force ought to be used by either side
at a point where it involves great international
complications.
The Federal Bepublic of Germany has agreed
not to use force to unite Germany. And we re-
joice that it has taken that decision. The Re-
public of China on Formosa has agreed with us
not to use force to go back to the mainland or
against the mainland in any way except in joint
agreement with us. The only threat comes from
the Chinese Communists. They have attacked
and may attack again.
Now then, the question comes, if they attack
what do you do? Do you fall back, or do you
retreat? We believe that the whole position of
the free world in the western Pacific, running
from Japan, Korea, Okinawa, Formosa, the Phil-
ippines, down to Viet-Nam, Australia, and New
Zealand, depends upon maintaining a strong line
against the thrusts of the Chinese Communists
against that insular and peninsular position of
the free world, which is held with difficulty. It's
a thin line. It's not a continuous line such as you
have in western Europe. And it can only be
held, in our opinion, if we stand firm.
We are not going to attack or tolerate attacks
against the Chinese Communists, but when they
attack then I think we have to stand firm. If we
don't I think that there will be a breach in the
line, and the effect of that will be felt all along
and that whole position of the free world in the
western Pacific will be lost. We will be driven
back home, and indeed that is the avowed goal
of the Sino-Soviet policy. They say that. "Go
736
back home. You belong in your own side of the
Pacific and get away from the western Pacific."
Q. We tend to look at Asia not as the Pacific
but from the Indian Ocean, up from India, from
our traditional history. What part do you see
is going to he played in Western policy in Asia
by the great neutralist power of India in Asia?
What part do you think the United States can
play in helping India?
A. Well, I think we can play a very consider-
able part, and indeed we are. We have given a
tremendous assistance to India. And India is
neutralist in only one sense of the word. India
is neutralist in the sense that it has not joined up
in any of the collective-security organizations. I
think they may be wrong, but I think on the whole
the free nations are more apt to stay free if they
unite in collective security. But each country can
make that decision for itself. We don't quarrel
with the Indian decision. India is not neutral in j
the sense that it is indifferent to the threat of com-
munism. It is fighting it, fighting it vigorously,
hard, and is attempting to demonstrate for its own
people that a free way of life can improve human
welfare. And in that struggle, that competition
with communism, we are all for it, and we believe
it is extremely important that it should succeed.
U.S. Economic Aid Programs
Q. Do you think that economic aid programs of
the United States are really as important as the
military alliances?
A. You know, that is one of the great troubles
that we have in dealing with you gentlemen of
the news media. Whenever we make a speech, you
may have in it 90 percent about economic develop-
ment, improvement, and so forth, and 10 percent
about some military business. The thing that
makes the headlines, that makes the news, is the
10 percent about the military. That always seems
to attract more attention, be more newsworthy;
and I have made speech after speech about the
nonmilitary aspect of our foreign policy, and it
never makes a headline or even a subheadline.
But if you talk about the military business and
retaliatory power and deterrent power and so
forth, that is a screaming headline right away.
So oftentimes your own views get distorted, your
policies get distorted, because the human interest
Department of State Bulletin
■J
attaches more to the military than the nonmilitary.
I attach, myself, more importance to the nonmili-
tary than to the military.
Q. And do you think — incidentally, I have just
been in hidia and come back from there — do you
think that the -programs that you are doing, and
that we are taking some part in too, are beginning
to have an effect, that, on the whole, xoe are stabi-
lizing free Asia?
A. I think so. I think that this Indian second
5-year program is going to be carried through.
It has had very great, help from various free-world
countries, most of all from the United States ; con-
siderable help from you and from others. And I
believe that it will succeed, and, as I have said be-
fore, I think it is extremely important that it
should succeed. Because while I attach the great-
est importance to the maintenance of the spiritual
values — the moral values of the free world, in
terms of the right of individuals to think as they
wish, to believe as they wish, to get information,
and so forth — one cannot realistically expect that
human values will be preserved in an atmosphere
of squalor and misery. And there is a dynamic
spirit — in recent years, with the development and
spread of political independence, there has along-
side of that developed a feeling on the part of the
people that that political independence must bring
them better economic and social conditions. And
I think it is vitally important that there should be
a response to that. I think, if there is no response
to that, then the democratic institutions of these
newborn countries will fade away and they will be
replaced by some form of Communist or State
Socialist scheme, which will, in fact, destroy hu-
man liberties in an effort in that way to achieve
greater economic welfare. We have got to prove
that the two things will go hand in hand: human
freedom and human rights, and economic welfare.
Q. What about the Middle East? Recently the
President announced a plan for economic develop-
in > nt with American help in that area. Do you
think that is going to do anything to produce sta-
bility and some protection for our interests in the
Middli East?
A. I hope so very much. Of course, as the
President said when he addressed the extraordi-
nary United Nations General Assembly on the
subject, 4 the desire for it has got to be manifested
* Ibid., Sept. 1, 1958, p. 337.
by the Arab peoples themselves. They are ex-
tremely sensitive, as all peoples are who have
been in the past subjected to colonial rule and who
now feel that they have gotten their independence.
And they are suspicious, and they do not want to
be subjected to the risk of political domination
again under the guise of economic assistance. So
that the plan must originate really with them.
Now what we have made clear, and I think
others have made clear, is that if there is such a
desire they will find a ready response. Mr. Ham-
marskjold, the Secretary-General of the United
Nations, has been working on that general idea,
and certainly there is desperate need for a greater
economic welfare there. The misery, the squalor,
the disease there are terrible. One can't visit those
countries without being impressed by it. And I
would hope very much that the Arab countries
would see that their own legitimate national as-
pirations can be combined with a joint economic
program which would stabilize the area and im-
prove the welfare of their people.
Middle East Oil — Mutuality of Interests
Q. Do you think that will also do something to
protect our interests, particularly our interests in
oil in that area, or would one realize — that is of
importance after all?
A. I think it will, but — if you will permit me to
take exception when you say "our" interests in
oil — the interests there are mutual. It is just as
important and vital to the peoples of those areas
to have a market for their oil as that we should be
able to buy the oil. As a matter of fact, the oil
is obtainable — not quite as readily or as cheaply,
but it is obtainable elsewhere in the world. And
the important thing to recognize, I think, when
we talk about this matter is that we are providing
a market which provides the resources which can
tremendously help the welfare of those countries.
And there is a growing development there of plans
to use oil royalties and so forth for economic wel-
fare, and that is not just a development of some-
thing that is of interest to the West. It is of in-
terest to the West, of course, but it is equally im-
portant to have a market. A pool of oil is about
the most worthless thing there is in the world un-
less you have the machinery for marketing it. And
we provide that, and that is a joint enterprise
between the West and the Arab countries.
November 10, 1958
737
Q. You mentioned a moment ago the ex-colonial
peoples and their feelings. I think one of the
things that has divided Britain and America since
1776 has been America's great suspicion of British
imperialism. Do you think the country now,
America now, recognizes how much British co-
lonialism is a thing of the past and the British
Commonwealth is a thing of the future?
A. I think so. Naturally our history books
still carry the memories of the distant past. But
I think that there is by and large in this country
a tremendous admiration for the way in which —
our own country being an exception — there has
been a peaceful evolution of the countries of the
British Empire, what used to be the British
Empire, to independence; now the British Com-
monwealth. And, although it is under no writ-
ten constitution, one of the great facts of the
world and one of the brilliant feats, I think, of
statesmanship, is to have brought about that
peaceful evolution so that now, whereas you had
an empire with a single rule in London, you have
a commonwealth of free countries all voluntarily
participating and each under a government of its
own choosing.
Q. Mr. Secretary, I wonder if I could ask you
one at least rather more personal question, which
is this: You have been Secretary of State now for
6 pretty gruelling years, and you seem to be doing
very well and very healthy on it. Tell me, what
is it that keeps you going? Is it faith, hope, or do
you somehoio enjoy all the pressures and the
power that go with this great post?
A. You know, I don't think anybody is a very
good analyst of himself, and I have never psy-
choanalyzed myself; so I don't really know the
answer to this. But I can say this, Mr. Clark:
These are times of tremendous importance. Any-
body who has a tradition, as exists in my family,
of public service in the international field cannot
but feel the challenge of these times. And when
you have a President, such as President Eisen-
hower, whom I consider a very great President,
one who himself knows a great deal about
international affairs, problems of war and peace—
if he says, "I think you are the fellow to carry
this job at this time," I think one cannot but take
satisfaction and do one's best to justify the faith
that President Eisenhower puts in you. And I
think it is that perhaps more than anything else
that keeps me going.
Role of English-Speaking Countries
Q. Then a last question arising really out of
that. You say these are really very stirring times;
we would all agree. What sort of a world — tak-
ing a pioneer's -eye view of the whole world —
what sort of a world do you see emerging in the
next quarter century or so? And, incidentally,
what part do you think the English-speaking peo-
ples, Britain and America, are going to play in
that?
A. I think that we are developing into a world
where there must be far greater interdependence
between all nations, and "interdependence" is a
phrase which was particularly emphasized when
your very great Prime Minister, Harold Macmil-
lan, was here talking with President Eisenhower
a year or so ago, 5 and it is a key word —
interdependence.
You cannot preserve independence nowadays
without interdependence. Now who are the peo-
ple who should set the first example in interde-
pendence ? Shouldn't it be our peoples who derive
from the same traditions, speak the same lan-
guage, have the same religion, have the same
common-law principles, and so forth ? If we can't
do it, who can you expect to do it? And I look
upon the extremely close cooperation which now
exists happily between our countries as setting
an example of interdependence. It is not any-
thing which is exclusive to us. It is not an at-
tempt on our part to set ourselves up over the
rest of the world. It is setting an example which
needs to be set and carried out so that all of us
are cooperating more and more. But we, with
certain common heritage, have certainly an ex-
ample to set, and I think we are setting that
example.
Q. Today, do you think that the English-
speaking — that Britain and America are really
cooperating well again?
A. I think I can say without fear of challenge
that never since this nation became independent
has there been the close cooperation that exists at
the present time. And indeed I doubt whether
history shows ever that two countries have been
'Ibid., Nov. 11, 1957, p. 739.
738
Department of State Bulletin
cooperating as closely as we are cooperating at
the present time. And let me emphasize again
tlia( is not an effort to set up a family of two over
the rest of the world. It is setting an example
of the kind of thing which we are prepared to do
and want to do with other countries, but, because
of certain elements in common, we perhaps can
set the stage, for doing this thing. But we want
to have it — I know your country and our country
want to develop this theme of interdependence
everywhere. But surely we are setting a good
example ourselves.
Q. That is a very hopeful note to end on. And
thank you very much indeed, Mr. Dulles, for giv-
ing us your views in this way.
A. Well, I am delighted to have had this
opportunity.
Q. Thank you.
Second Anniversary
of Hungarian Revolt
Department Statement
Press release C38 dated October 23
Two years ago, on October 23, the people
of Hungary rose in spontaneous revolt
against a Soviet-imposed Communist regime
which for many years had suppressed their lib-
erties and subverted their national independence.
Their courageous struggle to free themselves from
Soviet domination and to institute a government
of their own choosing evoked worldwide sympa-
thy. Tragically, this national effort to achieve
freedom did not succeed because of the ruthless
intervention of the armed forces of the Soviet
Union.
Since the suppression of the revolt, the present
Hungarian regime has carried out systematic re-
prisals against those who led or participated in
the uprising. Many reports of secret trials, im-
prisonment, and executions have reached the. out-
side world. Their authenticity was shockingly
attested in June of this year in the executions of
former Premier Imre Nagy, General Pal Maleter,
and two of their companions. 1
The United Nations has repeatedly called upon
the Soviet and Hungarian Governments to comply
with the terms of the resolutions on Hungary
which were adopted in the General Assembly by
overwhelming majorities. The Soviet and Hun-
garian Governments have willfully refused, how-
ever, to act in accordance with these resolutions.
They have also refused to cooperate in any way
with the United Nations Special Committee on
the Problem of Hungary and with the United
Nations Special Representative on the Hungarian
Problem. These actions of the Soviet and Hun-
garian Governments in defiance of the United
Nations, no less than their repressive actions
within Hungary itself, have occasioned deep con-
cern in the United States and elsewhere through-
out the world. They cannot and will not be
ignored.
On this second anniversary of the Hungarian
revolt, the people and Government of the United
States recall with profound respect the valiant
struggle of the Hungarian nation. The sacrifices
which the Hungarian people have made in the
cause of their own freedom are indeed an inspir-
ing contribution to the cause of freedom for all
mankind.
U.S. Replies to Soviet Note
on Balloons
Press release 636 dated October 23
On October 22, the American Embassy at Mos-
cow delivered the following note to the Soviet
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The United States Government acknowledges
the receipt of the note of the Soviet Government
of October 13 1 concerning aerial balloons of
American manufacture which the Soviet Govern-
ment states recently landed in the Soviet Union.
The position of the United States Government
regarding this matter has been set forth in a note
delivered by the American Embassy at Moscow
to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Sep-
tember 5, 1958. 2 In that note the United States
Government pointed out that the balloons referred
to by the Soviet Government might have been
among those unrecovered by the Cambridge Re-
search Center of the United States Air Force,
1 For a Department statement of June 17, 1958, see
Bulletin of July 7, 1958, p. 7.
1 Not printed.
" For text, see Bulletin of Sept. 29, 1958, p. 504.
November TO, 1958
739
which had launched from the West Coast of the
United States a number of high-altitude weather
research balloons in connection with a program de-
signed to gather meteorological information on the
earth's atmosphere. If this proved to be the case,
the Soviet Government was requested to return
the scientific recording instruments attached to the
balloons in order that the data collected might
be evaluated and made available for use through-
out the world scientific community. With this
objective in mind and if these instruments are in
fact among those unrecovered by the Cambridge
Research Center, the United States Government
renews its request that the Soviet Government re-
turn this equipment through the American Em-
bassy at Moscow.
U.S. Sends Radio and Television
Specialists to U.S.S.R.
Press release 637 dated October 23
The Department of State announced on Octo-
ber 23 that a delegation of American radio and
television specialists would arrive in the Soviet
Union that week in furtherance of section II (5)
of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. agreement on exchanges. 1
This section states :
Both parties will provide for an exchange of delegations
of specialists in 1958 to study the production of radio and
television programs, the techniques of sound recording,
the equipment of radio and television studios, and the
manufacture of films, recording tape, tape recorders, and
records.
The members of the delegation are :
Ralph N. Harmon, vice president of engineering, Westing-
house Broadcasting Co., Inc.
Jerry Danzig, vice president in charge of radio network
programs, National Broadcasting Co., Inc.
Ralph Conn, president, Screen Gems, Inc.
Mike Wallace, American Broadcasting Co.
Burton Paulu, director of radio and television broadcast-
ing, General Extension Division, University of Minne-
sota
In reciprocity a Soviet delegation is expected
to visit the United States in November.
The Bases of Peace
hy Deputy Under Secretary Murphy 1
When we speak of peace we must always re-
member that peace is subject to more than one def-
inition. Peace with the Communists can always
be had if we are prepared to surrender. When-
ever a condition of apparent peacefulness is
pursued too narrowly or bought at the price of un-
wise concessions, real peace eludes us. Meaning-
ful and lasting peace can only come as the end
result of persistence and determination to main-
tain our ideals and strength with understanding
and compassion.
Genuine peace obviously must rest upon a
foundation of economic health and the political
stability which flows from it. That applies to
others as well as to ourselves.
There is often a lack of appreciation of the
close relationship that exists between international
trade, economic development, and the question of
war or peace. We at times identify the causes of
the Second World War, for example, with the
personalities of certain political leaders— the
Hitlers, the Mussolinis. We would do well to
think also of the unhappy and tragic economic and
social conditions of the twenties, which brought
these leaders into power. We might bear in mind
that any serious interruption of world trade and
economic development, or frustrated hopes for
better living standards, could again bring des-
perate men to power in one world area or another
and thus evoke the threat of disturbance and war.
In a world where war is unthinkable as a means
of settlement of disputes, an alternative must be
devised. As our able Secretary of State John
Foster Dulles has many times pointed out, the
only substitute for the rule of war for the settle-
ment of disputes is a rule of law.
International law has developed in several im-
portant ways in the past two decades. Yesterday
we celebrated throughout the Nation the 13th
anniversary of the coming into force of the United
Nations Charter. This charter established certain
basic principles of international law, notably in
'For text of agreement on exchanges in the cultural,
technical, and educational fields, see Bulletin of Feb. 17,
1958, p. 243.
740
1 Remarks made at the Peace Award luncheon of the
Catholic Association for International Peace at Washing-
ton, D.C., on Oct. 25 (press release 641 dated Oct. 24). Mr.
Murphy was on this occasion the recipient of the associa-
tion's annual Peace Award.
Department of Sfofe Bulletin
article 2, which deals with sovereign equality, the
settlement of international disputes by peaceful
means, and the renunciation of the threat or use
of force. These principles have been usefully ap-
plied, and thereby strengthened, in the settlement
of an increasing number of disputes which in
former times might have generated hostilities. It
is a hopeful trend.
There has also been a healthy growth of the
multilateral treaties. These prescribe rules of
conduct in such matters as the treatment of aliens
and international trade and constitute interna-
tional law.
Another powerful force, perhaps the most
powerful, is world opinion, sometimes expressed
in gatherings of the United Nations General As-
sembly, at other times through diplomatic chan-
nels or in the press. World public opinion,
wherever it enjoys freedom of the press, has come
to play a role comparable to "common law" in the
earlier days of our history. This force operates
as a vital factor in the settlement of disputes and
as a deterrent to the use of force. The assiduous
attention to world opinion paid by the dictators
of the Kremlin, even though cynical, bears testi-
mony to the power it exercises.
Despite recent progress there is still more left
to be done than has been done in developing inter-
national law to a point of full effectiveness as an
instrument of guarding peace. That is where this
association can be and is a most valuable instru-
ment in promoting the rule of law in international
relations.
Whatever our economic and legal achievements
in behalf of peace, in the world as we know it
we must unfortunately expect periodic crises.
There will, no doubt, be attempts by ambitious
and hostile elements to gain their ends by unlaw-
ful means. Each time this happens there are
flashes of danger to the peace of the world. Then
we usually witness agitation to make concessions,
to "adjust" our foreign policy, to yield a point or
two, to give away territory. If we do, it is then
urged, we will regain control of leadership, this
aggressor — the tiger — will be assuaged, tranquil-
lity will be restored. Thus it was at the time of
the Berlin blockade, of Korea, and in the Middle
East, and most recently in the Formosa Strait.
But, if we have learned anything as the result of
experience in dealing with international commu-
nism since World War II, it is that our conces-
sions are invariably considered a sign of weakness
and stimulate a demand for more. It is our des-
tiny to live in an era of struggle with an interna-
tional movement intent on the creation of a new
social order which would involve the destruction
of the ideals of a Christian society. Until that
movement is spent, we must be prepared for
periodic crises in a series of probings and testing
by the leadership of that movement. These prob-
ings and testing seek to ascertain points of weak-
ness and disunity in the free world to promote the
expansion of international communism. The
tiger is never assuaged. He does understand and
respect positions of strength.
For resisting and deterring aggression, and for
containing violent outbreaks in the present world
situation, there is no substitute for our strength,
moral and physical, to stand firm.
At the start of the crisis in Taiwan Strait there
were those who declared that our firm stand risked
war. It is true that the stand we took involved
risk, as will almost any course of action taken at
a difficult time. But in our judgment a firm stand
at that time and place involved the least risk, in
the long run, to peace with freedom and honor in
the world.
Essential to a sound foreign policy is our aware-
ness that there is no riskless road to peace.
In guarding peace one further instrument al-
ways plays its quiet but essential part: That is
diplomacy. In this connection it is to be re-
membered that His Holiness Pius XII was a high-
ly skilled diplomat as well as a churchman.
I have spent most of my adult years in the
United States Foreign Service; so it is perhaps
natural that I should be a partisan of diplomacy
as a force in world affairs. It would be difficult to
overestimate the importance of the contribution
diplomacy can make to strengthening the safe-
guards of peace and lessening the chance of war.
In the shorter run diplomacy plays a necessary
part in moderating or deflecting the perils of a
crisis until time and better reason can open up
alternatives. In the longer run the skills of
diplomacy are essential for putting into effect the
decisions of the statesman, thereby diverting the
energies of men increasingly toward peaceful
enterprises. Diplomacy has been justly called the
first line of our defense.
November 10, J 958
741
It is my conviction that peace cannot be an end
in itself, will never be won by itself. World peace
is the result of economic health and political
stability; of a rule of law gradually coming to
supplant the rule of war; of the strength, physi-
cal and spiritual, to hold steady in the face of
crisis and to stand firm in resistance to aggressive
force; of skilled and tireless diplomacy.
With you I pray that our nation may continue
successfully to follow these four paths to peace
and good will among men.
Problems Affecting International Trade
by Under Secretary Dillon *
It is a great pleasure to me to have this oppor-
tunity to participate, for the first time, in an an-
nual meeting of the Contracting Parties to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The
general agreement has steadily gained in strength
and influence year by year, so that the meetings
of the Contracting Parties have now become the
major world forum for the discussion of trade
policies on a broad international basis and for
the settlement of international trade disputes.
I think it is of considerable importance to the con-
tinuing vitality of the GATT institution that
those of us who carry substantial responsibilities
at home in the field of trade policy should meet
from time to time, even if for only a few days, to
become acquainted with one another, to exchange
views, and to clarify the positions of our govern-
ments on important issues of concern to GATT.
U.S. Domestic Economy and International Trade
In my remarks today I would like first of all to
say a few words about the state of our domestic
economy. Then I will turn to some of the specific
problems with which our various delegations will
be concerned in the weeks ahead.
Since the 12th session held a year ago, the
United States has gone through a business reces-
sion and is now well on the road to complete re-
covery. Our business contraction has had two
major characteristics :
First, it has been short. The decline lasted only
8 months from the peak of economic activity,
1 Address made before the 13th -ession of the Contract-
ing Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade at the ministerial level, at Geneva on Oct. 16 (press
release 623 dated Oct. 17).
which was reached in the third quarter of 1957, to
the bottom, which was reached early in the second
quarter of 1958. Since then our rate of recovery
has been extraordinarily rapid. Present indica-
tions are that the whole of the drop will have
been recovered by the end of the year, when our
economy will begin once again to record new all-
time highs.
Second, the recession has been relatively mild.
The maximum drop in gross national production
was only 4 percent. The maximum drop in per-
sonal income was only 2 percent.
The economy of the United States has shown
remarkable strength and resiliency since the end
of the war. While the expansion of our economy
has been interrupted three times in the postwar
period, in each case the halt was mild and brief.
Powerful long-term forces for economic growth
have dominated and continue to dominate the
American economy. In addition,' governmental
measures — both automatic, built-in stabilizers and
specific actions designed to meet the particular
problems of each of the downturns — have played
an important role in keeping these readjustments
limited in time and extent. In short, the record of
the economy of the United States since the war
indicates that economic growth with reasonable
stability can be achieved in a free society.
Of course, the chief anxiety of the rest of the
world is that an American recession will ad-
versely affect the international trade and mone-
tary reserves of other countries. The interna-
tional transactions of the United States during
the 1957-58 recession have been characterized by
a high level of American imports and a marked
decline in American exports. These develop-
ments have been largely responsible for the recent
742
Department of Siate Bulletin
substantial improvement in the foreign-exchange
position of the rest of the world as a whole. Also,
I think that it is true, as mentioned by Mr. Per
Jacobbson, the Managing Director of the Inter-
national Monetary Fund, at the recent meeting in
New Delhi, that "the brunt of the reduced de-
mand in the United States has, over a large field,
so far fallen on the marginal domestic producers."
Looking back over developments in our foreign
trade in recent years, I am led to make certain
observations about the vulnerability of the rest of
the world to economic fluctuations in the United
States :
1. When consumer expenditures in the United
States have been well maintained, as has been the
case in each of our postwar recessions, our de-
mand has remained strong for many types of im-
ports, notably food and manufactures. This was
particularly true in 1957-58, when our imports of
manufactures actually increased.
2. Our demand for imports of industrial mate-
rials may be more adversely affected. The de-
cline in the value of United States imports of in-
dustrial materials in 1957-58, however, was in
large part a function of the drop in price. The
reduction in the volume of these imports was
quite mild.
3. United States Government transactions —
foreign assistance and other Government expendi-
tures abroad — have come to be a sizable part of
our total outpayments to foreign countries.
They are not directly responsive to changes in do-
mestic business activity.
4. Our exports, on the other hand, seem to
have become more sensitive to cyclical fluctua-
tions abroad. After responding vigorously at
times of peak foreign demand, as in early 1957,
they have fallen off sharply when some slackening
of foreign demand has appeared. There is no
doubt that, because of the postwar growth and
modernization of the productive capacity of other
countries. United States exports face stronger
competition in world markets today than they did
a few years ago.
These various factors taken together clearly in-
dicate that the effects of an American recession
on the balance of payments of the United States,
and hence on foreign countries, have been less
than it was earlier thought they would be. The
conclusions to be drawn from (his are clear. It
is that government need not continue to be so ap-
prehensive about periodic business movements in
the American economy. In particular, the fear of
a so-called dollar shortage should no longer be
allowed to impede our common effort to move for-
ward toward a fully liberalized multilateral trad-
ing system.
There are, however, other problems affecting
international trade and payments. It is true, for
example, that the less developed countries have
encountered difficulties in their foreign trade and
payments. This has been in large part the result
of declining prices for primary products, a trend
which began prior to the beginning of the reces-
sion in the United States and which, in the case
of a number of commodities, was due to an im-
balance between world supply and demand for
basic products. A contributing cause in the case
of some countries has been a continuing level of
internal demand larger than could be justified by
the total resources, domestic and foreign, at their
disposal.
A new danger, which so far has principally af-
fected the economies of the less developed coun-
tries, has been the recent dumping activities in
a few key items by the Soviet Union and Commu-
nist China. The dumping of tin by the Soviet
Union has served to disrupt the economy of Bo-
livia and to deal severe blows to the hopes of the
peoples of Malaya and Indonesia for an improve-
ment in their economic well-being. The dumping
of textile products by Communist China is severe-
ly affecting the traditional export markets of
India and Japan. It is thus making far more
difficult the achievement on schedule of the sec-
ond 5-year plan of India and hampering the
economic growth of Japan.
As long as the Soviet Union and Communist
China persist in these destructive trade practices
the hope for a better life for millions of people
in the less developed countries of the world will
become even more difficult of realization.
I would like now to turn to some of the specific
problems on our agenda.
Primary Commodities and Agricultural Protec-
tionism
A few weeks ago we received the preliminary
draft of the report 2 of our panel of experts on
trends in international trade, with special em-
1 Doc. MGT/80/58.
November 10, 7958
743
phasis on primary commodities and agricultural
protectionism. This is, of course, a difficult as
well as a controversial field, and it is not to be ex-
pected that governments will find all of the policy
conclusions of the experts to their liking. Never-
theless, I think we can all agree that the report
provides us with an excellent analysis on which
to base our further examination of these prob-
lems and that the distinguished economists who
prepared it — Professor [Gottfried] Haberler,
Professor [James] Meade, Professor [Jan] Tin-
bergen, and Dr. [Koberto de Oliveira] Campos —
deserve our warmest thanks.
This report will obviously require careful and
thorough study. However, from a preliminary
reading, there are two observations which I wish
to make at this time.
First, we are impressed by the sections of the
report dealing with the impact of internal taxes
levied by certain industrialized countries, which
severely limit the consumption of primary prod-
ucts such as coffee and tea, the market for which
is of importance to the economic development of
many countries in Latin America, Africa, and
Asia. While recognizing the problems involved
for certain countries in lifting the basis of their
taxation, we hope that this portion of the report
will receive serious attention with a resulting in-
crease in the markets for these basic commodities.
Second, we welcome the emphasis in the report
on the fact that the maintenance of a healthy in-
ternational economic system is of much greater
significance for the well-being of primary pro-
ducers than are efforts to regulate production,
prices, and trade in particular commodities.
However, we find ourselves unable to concur with
certain conclusions in the report relating to com-
modity stabilization schemes. Whereas the report
appears to endorse the notion of the simultaneous
negotiation of international stabilization schemes
for a substantial number of commodities, we our-
selves believe that commodity problems can best
be approached on a case-by-case basis, taking ac-
count of the particular problem to be solved and
the special circumstances surrounding production
and trade for the commodity concerned. We note
that the countries of the Commonwealth ex-
pressed much the same view as ours in the com-
munique which they issued at the close of the re-
cent Commonwealth Trade and Economic Confer-
ence at Montreal.
The United States is now prepared to join in
discussion of commodity problems on a case-by-
case basis. We are already doing so with respect
to coffee, and lead and zinc. Coffee, of course, is
a commodity which we do not produce in the
United States but which we heavily consume.
Yet we have recognized the serious difficulties
with which coffee producers in Latin America
and Africa have been confronted and have been
willing to sit down with them to try to work out
a means of ameliorating these problems. In the
case of lead and zinc, producers in the United
States have been seriously injured by the world-
wide decline in prices accompanied by extremely
heavy increases in imports. This has forced a re-
duction in our domestic output of about 25 per-
cent. In this situation we sought a multilateral
solution by agreement between exporting and im-
porting countries. When we found that there
was no early prospect of dealing mnltilaterally
with the problem, we were compelled to apply im-
port restrictions on these products. 3 We continue,
however, to hope that it will be possible in the
near future to reach multilateral understanding
which will be acceptable to all.
My colleague from the U.K. this morning sug-
gested that our recent actions on lead and zinc
might well be discussed at this session. If the
other Contracting Parties so desire we are, of
course, prepared to join in such a discussion.
However, I should like to point out that this sub-
ject is already being discussed by the countries
directly concerned. The meeting of lead and zinc
producing and consuming countries held in Lon-
don early in September looked toward a further
meeting of technical experts this fall for the pur-
pose of seeking agreement on a multilateral pro-
gram for these two commodities. The United
States, as I have said, is prepared to take an active
part in this endeavor. Until we know the results
of these efforts, I seriously doubt the wisdom of
initiating discussions on the same subject here in
Geneva.
As regards the suggestion of my British col-
league that there be a broad discussion of agri-
cultural policies, the United States always stands
ready to discuss its policies and is prepared to
join in such a discussion if the other Contracting
Parties so desire. Of course, the detailed pro-
* For background, see Bulletin of Oct. 13, 1958, p. 579
and p. 583.
744
Department of State Bulletin
cedural arrangements for such a discussion would
necessarily be subject to further consideration by
our various delegations.
The report of the panel of experts also speaks
well, although with certain reservations, of the
technique of achieving commodity price stabiliza-
tion through the use of buffer stocks. The theory
appears to be that by this means governments may
be able to even out price fluctuations without re-
sort to direct controls over production and trade.
"While recognizing the theoretical attraction of
this approach, it is our view that international
buffer-stock schemes do not offer a hopeful method
of solving commodity problems. As the body of
the report itself implies, the successful manage-
ment of any buffer stock presumes an exceptional
accuracy of human judgment and demands a fore-
knowledge of future economic events which we do
not in fact possess. Because of these factors, it is
our view that buffer-stock schemes are all too
likely to break down completely or to lead to an
aggravated form of the very restrictions on pro-
duction and trade which they were originally de-
signed to prevent.
GATT'S Relations With EEC
At their last annual session the Contracting
Parties began to consider their future relation-
ships with the European Economic Community.
It was recognized then that the objectives of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and
those of the Treaty of Rome were basically in
harmony, that together they aimed at the eco-
nomic integration of countries in Western Europe
within the framework of a liberal trading philos-
ophy embracing the whole of the free world. The
Contracting Parties recognized, too, that much
thought would have to be given to the develop-
ment of day-to-day working relationships with
the Community of Six, so that the broad objec-
tives of these two great international instruments
would in fact be translated into practical achieve-
ments. My Government believes that this work
has been well begun and should be continued on
the present basis.
One of the most important aspects of the future
relationship between the Common Market and the
general agreement relates to the level of the Com-
mon Market tariff to be applied to imports into
the Common Market from the territories of the
other Contracting Parties. As a result of the ap-
proval by the United States Congress of the Re-
ciprocal Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1958,
my Government is now prepared to participate in
tariff negotiations with the members of the Euro-
pean Economic Commimity and with other coun-
tries, to the end that mutually beneficial tariff
concessions may be agreed upon. The trade
agreements extension approved by our Congress —
for a period of 4 years from July 1, 1958 — is the
longest in the history of our trade agreements
legislation. Also, the extent of the basic author-
ity granted to our President to reduce tariff rates
makes it desirable that the Contracting Parties
prepare for negotiations looking toward their
completion prior to the expiration of our negotiat-
ing authority on July 1, 1962.
We also hope that, either during these negotia-
tions or separately, the Community of Six will
find it possible to reduce the Common Market
tariffs on a number of tropical products which,
under the Treaty of Rome, would be imported
free of duty from the overseas territories of the
Common Market while being subject to duty when
imported from many of the less developed coun-
tries which are Contracting Parties to the general
agreement.
There has been considerable concern in some
quarters regarding the agricultural policies to be
followed by the European Economic Community.
For ourselves we believe that a guiding principle
in the establishment of these policies should be
the principle embodied in the general agreement;
that is, that the trade of other Contracting Par-
ties should not be faced with higher or more re-
strictive barriers to agricultural trade because of
the formation of the Community. We are confi-
dent that this is the intention of the Community
of Six. It is of course appropriate that the action
of the Six in the agricultural field should come
within the purview of the general agreement in
the same way as other commercial regulations ap-
plied by the European Economic Community.
Dollar Liberalization
Finally I would like to say a word about dollar
liberalization. The international payments situa-
tion of the countries of the free world has, by
and large, continued to improve. Yet, in our
judgment, the removal of balance-of -payments re-
strictions has not adequately kept pace with this
improvement. On the one hand, we certainly
November 10, 1958
745
welcome the effective steps taken during the past
year by the United Kingdom and Australia to
remove or relax their remaining balance-of-pay-
ments restrictions. On the other hand, we regret
that certain countries in a position to make
greater progress in removing restrictions have
failed so far to do so. In particular we hope that
Germany and Austria will now agree to adequate
measures of liberalization.
In the case of Germany this should in our view
result in the elimination of the remaining restric-
tions on imports of industrial items and, with re-
spect to agricultural items, either the elimination
of restrictions or the negotiation of an agreed
waiver of the applicable provisions of the gen-
eral agreement.
We recognize that the substance of a waiver is
naturally subject to negotiation and agreement
between the Federal Republic and the other Con-
tracting Parties, but we see no reason why a
waiver should not be negotiated at this time so as
to regularize the position of the Federal Repub-
lic in the same manner as other countries, includ-
ing the United States, have regularized their
position. We do not feel that the negotiation of
a waiver should await a possible renegotiation of
the GATT provisions on agriculture. Such a re-
negotiation would inevitably involve complex and
difficult negotiations which might well take a
number of years. The negotiation of a waiver
would be a much simpler matter and could be ac-
complished at this session. We think this should
be done so as to avoid the necessity for action un-
der article XXIII.
In the case of Austria, her improved financial
position is such that we see no reason why dollar
discrimination on nonagricultural goods should
not be substantially eliminated or why a further
substantial step should not be taken in the reduc-
tion of discrimination on agricultural products.
We recognize, of course, that the sudden re-
moval of balance-of-payments restrictions main-
tained for a long time may create real hardships
for domestic producers. Yet the answer to this
problem is not the indefinite continuance of such
restrictions contrary to the applicable provisions
of the general agreement. If a country considers
that it cannot promptly remove balance-of-pay-
ments restrictions which are no longer needed for
financial reasons, then we think that the appropri-
ate course is for such a country to agree with the
Contracting Parties on the terms of a mutually
acceptable waiver from the provisions of the gen-
eral agreement.
In his excellent address to us this morning, our
distinguished chairman [L. K. Jha] has made sev-
eral suggestions as to how we might further
strengthen the general agreement and better or-
ganize the work of the Contracting Parties. In
particular, we wish to support the plan which he
has outlined, whereby the Contracting Parties
would meet in several sessions throughout the year,
thus enabling them to handle their ordinary busi-
ness with greater dispatch and to eliminate the
present system of a single annual session which
necessarily requires many weeks to complete. We
also agree with the chairman that one of the most
practicable means of overcoming some of GATT's
administrative problems would be to create
stronger permanent delegations of the Contracting
Parties in Geneva so that urgent problems could
be effectively discussed without the need for a
formal session. The United States would be pre-
pared to strengthen its permanent delegation for
this purpose.
In closing, Mr. Chairman, I wish to thank you
on behalf of my Government for the wise guidance
and outstanding qualities of leadership which you
have brought to the deliberations of the Con-
tracting Parties during the past year. I also want
to pay tribute once again to our executive secre-
tary, Mr. Wyndham White, who with his excellent
and hard-working staff has so greatly helped to
build the general agreement into the truly effective
international economic institution which it is
today.
746
Department of State Bulletin
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
U.N. Committee Opens Debate on Disarmament
Following is a series of statements made in
Committee I {Political and Security) by Henry
Cabot Lodge and James W. Barco, U.S.
Representatives to the General Assembly.
FIRST STATEMENT BY MR. LODGE, OCTOBER 10
U.S. delegation press release 3013
We turn once again to the subject of disarma-
ment, a subject in which the deep tensions afflict-
ing the world are all too clearly reflected. It is
a subject "piled high with difficulty," but so im-
portant for humanity that we must not become
discouraged.
In this past year of disarmament talks the
world had its share of difficulty — perhaps more
than its share. There has also been progress. The
scientists who met at Geneva have proved the
worth of technical talks in one field of widespread
concern — the means of detecting nuclear explo-
sions. This is significant. There is also ground
for hope that technical talks will open the way for
forward steps to lessen the possibility of surprise
attack. Indeed, this approach has wider implica-
tions for the whole field of disarmament.
Secretary-General Hammarskjold took a com-
mendable initiative in proposing this item for our
agenda this year. In his memorandum 1 he says,
and we fully agree, "The attainment of balanced,
worldwide disarmament through the United Na-
tions must remain a primary objective of the or-
ganization." His is a most useful memorandum.
I shall refer to it more than once in this
statement.
The United States has always recognized the
fundamental responsibility of the United Nations
in the held of disarmament. We have cooperated
wholeheartedly in every effort of this organiza-
tion to solve the disarmament dilemma. We are
glad to give to this committee, and to the General
Assembly, an accounting of our efforts in the past
year.
To put our present work in perspective, let me
recall briefly, and without any recrimination,
some of the events of the past year. A year ago,
in the 12th General Assembly, our debates on dis-
armament began under a cloud. All the hopes of
agreement built up during months of careful di-
plomacy in the London Subcommittee talks had
suddenly been disappointed.
The General Assembly responded wisely to that
rather frustrating situation. It endorsed a rea-
sonable set of principles for a disarmament agree-
ment. It also enlarged the Disarmament Com-
mission to its present composition of 25 members,
in the well-justified expectation that this would
meet the Soviet view. 2
However, Mr. Chairman, it must be set down
as a fact that up to this moment the Disarmament
Commission and its Subcommittee have been pre-
vented by the Soviet Union from any further
useful efforts.
Much as we regretted the Soviet attitude, we
refused to be deterred. The most important thing
was to keep working on the job which the United
Nations had given us, even if this meant doing
our work outside the formal structure of the
United Nations.
Question of Nuclear Weapons Tests
We concentrated first on the problem of sus-
pending nuclear weapons tests — the first point in
the program endorsed by the General Assembly
a year ago. One big difficulty here has always
been how to make sure that a pledge to refrain
from testing was not being violated in secret. On
April 28 President Eisenhower proposed to
Premier Khrushchev that technical discussions be
'U.N*. doc. A/3936.
November 10, 1958
'Bulletin of Dec. 16, 1957, p. 961.
747
held to see whether scientists from both sides
could work out a practical way to detect nuclear
explosions. 3
These talks actually began in Geneva on July
1. Scientific experts from both sides met at the
European Office of the United Nations, with a
representative of the Secretary-General present
at all the meetings. Three of the most eminent
scientists of the United States attended the meet-
ings : Dr. James B. Fisk, Dr. Eobert F. Bacher,
and the late Dr. Ernest O. Lawrence. The other
participants were of similar standing in their
countries. We are glad to say that the discussions
from start to finish remained almost completely
scientific and nonpolitical.
After 7 weeks the talks resulted in an agreed
report. The means of detecting violations of a
possible test suspension are set forth in the report
which was submitted to the United Nations by
United States and Soviet representatives and
which has been circulated as document A/3897
[dated September 30]. 4
Mr. Chairman, when this technical agreement
was reached on August 21 we lost no time in tak-
ing the next forward step. The following day
President Eisenhower proposed prompt negotia-
tions for an actual agreement "for the suspension
of nuclear weapons tests and the actual establish-
ment of an international control system on the
basis of the experts' report." 5 We are gratified
that the United States, the United Kingdom, and
the Soviet Union have now agreed on the proposed
negotiations, which are scheduled to begin in
Geneva on October 31.
Making his proposal President Eisenhower an-
nounced that the United States was willing, "un-
less testing is resumed by the Soviet Union, to
withhold further testing on its part of atomic and
hydrogen weapons for a period of one year from
the beginning of the negotiations." We regret
that Mr. Gromyko in his press conference the
other day threw doubt upon his Government's
willingness to stop tests. We hope that what Mr.
Gromyko said does not mean that he is looking
"For text of President Eisenhower's letter, see ibid.,
May 19, 1958, p. 811.
4 For a statement by Dr. Fisk and tests of a com-
munique and the final report (without annexes), see ibid.,
Sept. 22, 195S, p. 452.
' Ibid., Sept. 8, 1958, p. 378.
748
for a way to justify continued unrestricted test-
ing by the Soviet Union now that some progress
has been made toward agreement. We hope that
his Government is not trying to evade acceptance
of the offer the United States made. This offer
was made to facilitate these negotiations, and it
would be regrettable indeed if the Soviet Union
took steps which had the opposite effect.
When the United States made that offer, Mr.
Chairman, the Soviet Union had not carried out
any nuclear tests since March — about 5 months.
In recent weeks they have resumed testing. The
question may therefore be asked whether the
United States offer still holds. I am authorized
to assure the United Nations on behalf of the
United States Government that, as President
Eisenhower announced, we will withhold further
testing for 1 year from the date the negotiations
begin — unless, of course, the Soviet Union con-
ducts further tests beyond that date.
The question of nuclear testing has been the
subject of many proposals. We are especially
glad that progress has been possible this year on
this particular aspect of the complex armaments
question. We are measurably closer than we were
a year ago to an actual long-range suspension of
nuclear tests. The reason for this is that both
sides recognized the need for control. The scien-
tists have shown that a technique for detection is
possible. Thus the vital element has been sup-
plied without which confidence is impossible and
without which any agreement in this field must
end in disillusionment : the element of inspection
and control.
It remains to be seen whether this technical
agreement can be translated into political reality.
We will go into the Geneva talks determined to
achieve an agreement.
It is apparent to everyone in this room that
United States policy on the question of tests has
evolved considerably in the last year. Perhaps I
may be forgiven for saying that it is a good thing
when government policies do evolve and are not
frozen for all time. And I should add that one of
the big factors in our evolution has been the
opinions expressed here in the United Nations.
We are a country which respects the United Na-
tions and which heeds its expressions of opinion—
and which takes account of minorities views ex-
pressed here.
Department of State Bulletin
Guarding Against Surprise Attack
The method of technical talks among experts
gives promise of progress in a second field —
guarding against surprise attack. Since 1955,
when President Eisenhower made his open-skies
proposal, the United States has sought persistently
to curb the danger of surprise attack by air and
ground inspection.
Since last spring the United States has been
discussing this matter with the Soviet Govern-
ment. We now have good reason to expect that
a meeting of experts, to explore the practical
aspects of safeguarding against surprise attack,
will begin in Geneva on November 10. 6 "We will
do our best to see that these technical discussions
are as successful as those on nuclear testing. "We
hope that these talks, too, will be followed by
negotiations which will in turn lead to measures
to minimize the dangers of surprise attack. And
if that is done, a great step will have been taken
toward the mutual confidence we all seek and away
from the fear of global war.
Mr. Chairman, the momentum created by these
developments must not be lost. The Secretary-
General, in his memorandum of September 30 on
disarmament, has stated very well the hopeful
prospects before us. After referring to the con-
ference of experts on detecting nuclear explosions,
he says :
... a technical approach to such subjects as leave
room for study of a non-political nature, similar to that
employed in the Geneva talks, would seem to provide
possibilities for further progress in disarmament. I
believe that all such possibilities should be fully explored.
Steps in this direction, as the work of the Scientific
Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation and the
Second International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of
Atomic Energy has demonstrated, might also lead to a
steady and progressive exchange of information concern-
ing military technologies and armaments. The lack of
confidence between States in this respect hitherto has been
one of the major causes of fear, suspicion and interna-
tional tension. The General Assembly might wish to
consider the value of endorsing the principle of openness
of information in the armaments and allied fields as one
which could contribute significantly to reduce interna-
tional tension and promote progress toward disarm-
ament.
We agree with those observations. The United
States believes in the principle of openness. We
" For background, see ibid., Oct. 27, 1958, p. 648 : for an
announcement of the U.S. delegation, see ibid., Nov. 3,
1958, p. 688.
agree with Mr. Hammarskjold that it has partic-
ular significance in the disarmament field. We
are encouraged by its success in the fields which
he has mentioned. We would like to apply it in
the future in new technical discussions on several
different fronts in the disarmament field.
A New Approach to Disarmament
Now, encouraging and important as these de-
velopments which I have described are, it is only
prudent to recognize that, as isolated steps, they
do not deal witli the heart of the problem of dis-
armament. But these developments illustrate the
fruitfulness of the new approach we have taken —
an approach which means that we should stop
arguing about generalities and get down to prac-
tical and specific discussions on how various dis-
armament measures, which we all agree desirable,
can actually be applied and enforced. We need
no longer argue theory. Let us jointly explore the
facts. It has been shown that such discussions —
technical discussions — can be undertaken without
prejudice to the basic position of the various
governments concerned. We should, therefore,
make the most of these discussions.
I should like now to set down some of the signif-
icant questions to which this new approach might
ultimately be applied.
1. Conventional Arms and Armed Forces. This
remains a vitally important part of disarmament.
We have through the years confronted such ques-
tions as conventional armaments and the size of
standing armies. All of those concerned have
agreed that any significant disarmament agree-
ment must meet the issue of controlled limitations
on armaments and armed forces and the con-
sequent reductions in military expenditures.
There is agreement on figures for levels of armed
forces. There is, of course, dispute about the ex-
tent to which these reductions could be put into
effect without regard to the settlement of certain
political issues which cause states to regard armed
forces as necessary for their security. But there
is no agreement on the measures which would be
required to insure the faithful carrying out of any
reductions on which agreement might be obtained.
Surely an exploration of the technical aspects of
controlling conventional armaments and armed
forces would be worth while. If nothing else, it
would bring us closer to agreement on what it
November 10, 1958
749
would be feasible to do to lessen the threat of
large armies and great stocks of modern weapons.
This alone would constitute substantial progress
in a field now devoid of it.
2. Nuclear Weapons. Both sides have likewise
agreed that the objective of a disarmament agree-
ment would be to deal realistically with the nu-
clear threat. The United States, United King-
dom, Canada, and France have proposed that early
steps be taken to insure the cessation of manu-
facture of fissionable materials for weapons pur-
poses and the beginning of transfer to peaceful
uses of the fissionable materials presently tied up
in stocks of nuclear weapons. The U.S.S.R. has
spoken of the "cessation of manufacture" of these
weapons but has tied this action to the complete
prohibition and liquidation of weapons stockpiles.
This is a measure which, however desirable, we
believe is uncontrollable. Here is another prob-
lem where, by technical discussions, again with-
out prejudice to the basic position of either side,
we might be able to find out just what it would
be humanly possible to do and what kind of con-
trol system could be devised to insure the carry-
ing out of these measures.
3. Outer Space. A year ago in this committee
the United States asked that a beginning be made
on control of the disarmament aspect of outer
space. 7 We proposed that the Soviet Union join
us in studying the terms of an inspection system
which would assure that outer space would not be
used for military purposes. Outer-space missiles
armed with nuclear warheads are now a reality.
With particular emphasis, therefore, the United
States reaffirms this proposal and its willingness
to take part in technical discussions in this field.
Studies of the measures I have mentioned would
only be a first, though indispensable, step. What
counts is actually putting them into effect. In all
these regards the United States is willing to move
ahead on any measures which offer reasonable
prospects for agreement. But if such negotiations
are to hold promise we believe they should be
based on a solid technical groundwork which sets
forth the facts on what is feasible and controllable.
Mr. Chairman, these brief remarks have summed
up what the United States regards as the most
hopeful and worthwhile events of the past year
in the disarmament field. We have sketched out
what we think are the most promising possibili-
7 Ibid., Oct. 28, 1957, p. 667.
750
ties for immediate progress. We have by no
means mentioned all the major events of the year,
some of which have been bitterly disappointing.
In a field so demanding and so difficult as this
we must try not to "look back in anger." We
must look forward to those points of light which
show us the way out of the forest.
The United States believes that the most light
at this stage can be shed by the scientific and tech-
nical approach, because in that way we can lay a
sound basis for actual disarmament measures, in
that way we can talk the same language, and in
that way we can avoid the distressing recrimina-
tions of past years. We believe that the construc-
tive thing for the General Assembly to do at this
point is to encourage the forthcoming talks.
This is a time for self-restraint. It is a time
when the General Assembly can act most construc-
tively not by raising for further discussions var-
ious issues well known to us from past debates
but by lending its support to the delicate and
promising work which is already in hand or
about to begin in Geneva.
Many good possibilities lie. beyond that work.
The important thing is that the next step should
succeed.
Valuable Principles for Negotiations
From our 12 years' experience in disarmament
negotiations a number of valuable principles have
emerged.
1. Any measures undertaken must be capable of
verification and control. We have learned through
the past lessons of history that any agreement
based on good faith and promises alone leads to
an increase rather than a lessening of tensions.
Confidence created by confirmation is the only sure
foundation for progress toward effective arms
limitation and control.
2. Drastic reduction of our armaments and
armed forces can be realistically expected when
the existing political situation has improved. We
continue to believe that the partial approach
adopted by the Assembly in 1955 is the proper
one. We believe that high armaments levels are
the product of international tensions and also that
they tend to increase these tensions. Accordingly
we believe that limited conventional arms reduc-
tions along with other measures can be taken
now — without awaiting political settlements.
Such reductions would lead to a lessening of ten-
Department of State Bulletin
sions. This would facilitate political agreements
and would, in turn, allow states to accept with
confidence more drastic cuts.
3. The relationship between conventional and
nuclear armaments dictates the need for arms
limitations in both fields to proceed concurrently.
The United States believes that disarmament must
be balanced to assure each state that its security
is not impaired. We coidd not accept nor do we
expect others to accept unbalanced measures of
disarmament which call for abandonment of a
nuclear deterrent while allowing conventional
arms and manpower in unlimited quantities. If
they are to be controlled, the measures for so
doing should proceed in a manner which does not
offer one side a military advantage over the other.
4. A complete and permanent cessation of nu-
clear weapons testing can come with progress to-
ward lessening the nuclear threat; reducing the
high level of nonnuclear arms; and minimizing
the danger of surprise attack. In other words, if
the United States is to give up its ability to im-
prove its defensive weapons, then there must be
corresponding limitations on the ability of other
states to increase their weapons stocks and to
maintain large armed forces.
President Eisenhower in his statement of Au-
gust 22, to which I have already referred, an-
nouncing the United States test suspension, said :
As the United States has frequently made clear, the
suspension of testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons
is not, in itself, a measure of disarmament or a limitation
of armament. An agreement in this respect is significant
if it leads to other and more substantial agreements re-
lating to limitation and reduction of fissionable material
for weapons and to other essential phases of disarmament.
It is in this hope that the United States makes this pro-
posal.
We sincerely hope that an agreement on the
cessation of nuclear weapons tests will be reached
at the coming negotiations. It is our hope that
this will eventually lead to a permanent test sus-
pension. Let me add that the United States has
stated its willingness to negotiate a cessation of
nuclear weapons tests in the interests of encour-
aging the Soviet Union to make a comparable
move forward.
The present situation, wherein states have a
capability for mutual destruction, is fraught witli
danger for all the world. We must not allow this
dangerous state of affairs to go on. Unilateral or
unbalanced disarmament, or disarmament based
on good faith alone, would but add to the danger
of war. For those who cherish peace and justice
and do not harbor aggressive purposes, other ways
must be found. We offer a practical, positive be-
ginning. Let us not miss this opportunity. Let us
turn the corner toward a relaxation of the present
tension and danger. The survival of civilization
is at stake.
There exists today some real momentum toward
progress in the disarmament effort, with all that
this implies for humanity. We ask the Assembly
to help us maintain that momentum. Thus we
can hope to move toward the day when the na-
tions can lay down their burden of armaments and
their still heavier burden of fear.
SECOND STATEMENT BY MR. LODGE, OCTO-
BER 10
U.S. delegation press release 3014
I merely want to take a moment, under the right
of reply.
Mr. Zorin s has given you words about the
United States position. I would like to give you
some facts.
The United States position on suspension of nu-
clear weapons tests is not conditional on the exist-
ence of an entire disarmament plan. W T e will
suspend for 1 year without controls, unless the
Soviet Union continues testing during that period.
And we are ready to extend our suspension indefi-
nitely as long as each year we know that the in-
spection system is working and we are making
reasonable progress on other aspects of disarma-
ment.
Then, Mr. Chairman, we are in favor of compre-
hensive disarmament. It is the fact that the
Soviet Union has always prevented agreement on
this which has impelled us to go ahead on test
suspension as something which may be possible
to attain. But we shall continue to work for com-
prehensive disarmament.
In one breath Mr. Zorin criticizes us for not be-
ing in favor of a comprehensive plan, and in the
next breath he criticizes us for not being in favor
of going ahead on an individual basis. No matter
what we do we are wrong, according to Mr. Zorin.
November 10, 1958
8 Valerian A. Zorin, Soviet representative to the Gen-
eral Assembly.
751
Our policy has evolved, as anyone who could
remember last year knows. He would have you
believe that it has not evolved.
Mr. Chairman, future historians may be able to
explain why the Soviet Union in this year of 1958
thought it worth while to make these flagrant and
obvious distortions of United States policy, even
including the imputing to us of unworthy motives,
in this committee which contains many of the most
sophisticated and the most experienced men in the
world in the field of diplomacy and of world poli-
tics. Surely he cannot hope to delude the mem-
bers of this committee. Maybe his hope is that
bits and pieces of these distortions will find their
way into the press of the world and will influence
the public. But here too he underestimates the
public and its knowledge of what the truth
really is.
STATEMENT BY MR. LODGE, OCTOBER 13
U.S. delegation press release 3017
I have asked to speak again in order to explain
the draft resolution sponsored by Argentina,
Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark,
Ecuador, Iran, Italy, Laos, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Thailand, United
Kingdom, and United States, which has been cir-
culated as document A/C.1/L.205. This resolu-
tion outlines policies and procedures which would
make a concrete contribution to disarmament. It
deals with test suspension, surprise attack, further
initiatives, and the relationship of the United
Nations to them.
Let me comment briefly on these matters in the
order that they appear in the operative para-
graphs.
1. Test Suspension. There is a widespread de-
sire among all members of the United Nations —
a desire fully shared by the United States — for
an early agreement on the suspension of nuclear
weapons tests under effective international control.
Paragraph 1 of the resolution stresses the impor-
tance which the General Assembly attaches to the
success of the October 31 conference between the
U.S.S.R., the United States, and the United King-
dom. It urges the parties to "make every effort
to reach early agreement." This is strong lan-
guage. Such action by the General Assembly
should encourage the participants to do everything
in their power to make the conference a success.
Paragraph 2 urges the parties involved not to
undertake further testing of nuclear weapons
while the negotiations are going on. The United
States and the United Kingdom have already vol-
unteered to stop nuclear weapons tests for 1 year
beginning October 31, provided the Soviet Union
does not conduct tests during that period. We
hope the Soviet Union will stop its tests. The
cosponsors considered that a halt on tests during
the negotiations will facilitate a lasting agree-
ment. As I said Friday [October 10], we are
ready to extend our suspension indefinitely as
long as each year we know that an agreed inspec-
tion system is working and that we are making
reasonable progress on other aspects of disarma-
ment.
2. Surprise Attack. Another important issue
which has concerned us all has been the increas-
ing danger of surprise attack in an era when the
warning time has been reduced to minutes. Presi-
dent Eisenhower's open-skies proposal of 1955
and the recent United States efforts in the Secu-
rity Council to achieve agreement on an Arctic
inspection zone 9 exemplify this concern. It has
also been reflected in the disarmament proposals
of the Soviet Union.
We hope there will be a serious effort to reach
understanding in the November 10 Geneva meet-
ing on the technical aspects of measures against
the possibility of surprise attack. If these talks
are successfully concluded and an agreement is
subsequently reached, its practical benefits would
be of great value. Among other things it would
increase the confidence among states which is in-
dispensable for rapid progress on disarmament.
Reflecting these considerations, paragraph 3 calls
attention to the urgency of reaching the widest
possible measure of agreement in the prospective
technical talks on measures against surprise
attack.
3. Objectives. Paragraph 4 reflects the deter-
mination of the sponsors that the technical ap-
proach, as well as other approaches, should be
pursued vigorously toward achieving the ultimate
goal of a comprehensive disarmament agreement.
It has become apparent that technical studies can
be an effective means to this end. The General
Assembly should build on the recent success of
the Geneva technical talks on nuclear testing.
The resolution therefore encourages an exten-
9 Bulletin of May 19, 1958, p. 816.
752
Department of State Bulletin
sion of this approach to other aspects of the dis-
armament problem with a view toward finally
achieving the longstanding goal of the United
Nations — a balanced and effectively controlled
worldwide system of disarmament.
4. Role of the United Natiotis. The United
Nations has a vital responsibility in the field of
disarmament. The last section of the resolution
slates explicitly how the conferences and the
United Nations can assist each other.
Paragraph 5 invites the forthcoming confer-
ences to avail themselves of the assistance and
services of the Secretary-General. We are pleased
that both sides in these conferences have, in fact,
already been working with the Secretary-General
to this end.
Paragraph 5 also calls for the United Nations
to be kept informed about the forthcoming con-
ferences. This is obviously important.
Paragraph 6 reflects the significant role that
the Secretary-General can play. He is invited,
in consultation with the governments concerned,
not only to give such advice as may seem appro-
priate to facilitate the current developments but
also with respect to any further initiatives on
disarmament.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, paragraph 7 assures
that the deliberations of the General Assembly
and the proposals made here should be taken into
account by the states and experts involved in the
forthcoming conferences.
The United States hopes that the General As-
sembly will unanimously endorse the principles
outlined in this resolution. They are positive,
forward-looking measures consistent with the ob-
ligations of this body and with the overwhelming
aspirations of mankind.
STATEMENT BY MR. LODGE, OCTOBER 15
U.S. delegation press release 3023
Let me advert briefly to the statement by the
representative of the Soviet Union yesterday that
the Soviet Union had accepted the system of con-
trol proposed by the conference of experts on
nuclear tests while the United States and the
United Kingdom had not.
I am glad to state here and now in the clearest
possible language that the United States has ac-
cepted and does accept the report of the experts,
including the control system therein contained.
Let that be understood.
Let me also remind the committee that Presi-
dent Eisenhower welcomed what he called the
"successful conclusion" of the talks on the very
day after they ended. He proposed that the So-
viet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United
States meet to reach agreement on the suspension
of tests "on the basis" of that report, and the
Soviet Union accepted this.
The United States has also stated that the find-
ings of the experts at Geneva should form the
basis for the actual establishment of an interna-
tional control system for any agreed suspension
of nuclear weapons testing. The experts made
recommendations, and everyone understood that
the next step was for governmental representa-
tives to act on these recommendations. We are
convinced that putting into effect the recommenda-
tions of the experts will make the conference a
success.
Now, Mr. Chairman, why the Soviet Union tries
to obscure these facts or appears to engage in a
quibble about them is a mystery to me. I there-
fore repeat categorically, so that there is no con-
fusion, that the United States accepts the report
of the experts, including the control system con-
tained therein.
Now, Mr. Chairman, having said this, I think we
should remove the implication which Mr. Zorin
sought to read into what either his or our "ac-
ceptance" means.
The report contains a set of scientific facts
arrived at by some of the world's best experts after
mature deliberation. They are scientific facts,
and we accept them. The controls recommended
are those which would be needed to police a dis-
continuance of tests. They can, if the nations
will it, be translated into practical arrangements
at the forthcoming political conference.
The Geneva report says that most tests can be
detected by inspection machinery including 170
to 180 inspection posts, by aerial observations, and
by on-the-spot investigations. To this the Soviet
Union has agreed.
But the Soviet Union has not yet agreed on the
nature of the supervisory body, the composition
of the inspection teams, the location of control
posts, the immunities and privileges of inspecting
personnel, and the like. These were not discussed
in Geneva. As mutually agreed, they did not fall
November 70, 1958
753
within the provisions of the technical conference.
They had to be left for political negotiations.
The "acceptance" of a control system by the So-
viet Union at this stage means no more than So-
viet recognition that the technical conclusions are
correct. The task remains to put living flesh onto
these bones.
In short, the Soviet Union has not yet agreed to
the actual establishment of effective controls.
The Soviet Union can destroy all the progress
made this summer by refusing at the forthcoming
talks to give the inspection machinery proper
facilities to function in the Soviet Union. We
hope they will not, but the world should be aware
that they will have ample opportunity to do so.
So much, Mr. Chairman, for the report of the
experts.
Then Mr. Zorin alleged that our position on the
suspension of nuclear weapons tests has not
evolved since the 1957 London disarmament meet-
ing. Such a statement on his part in the face
of our offer to suspend tests for 1 year reflects a
complete unwillingness to recognize a gesture of
compromise.
Then, too, the representative of the Soviet
Union also said that the question of a suspension
of nuclear weajjons tests was simply one of halt-
ing the tests. According to him, you just stop,
pure and simple.
Now, Mr. Chairman, that is not the question.
The question is whether we achieve a discontinu-
ance of tests under controls so that the discon-
tinuance is real and whether this agreement will
lead to further progress on the disarmament prob-
lem. When the Soviet representative takes the
line that he has taken, he invariably opens himself
up to this kind of question : Is the Soviet Union
against real controls? One is bound to ask one-
self that question. Does the Soviet Union wish
to evade test suspension once it has agreed to it?
Is the Soviet Union reluctant to reach agreement
on armsdimitation problems? Does the Soviet
Union object to substantial progress being made in
disarmament ? These, I submit very candidly, are
the types of questions to which Mr. Zorin's re-
marks naturally give rise.
I note that the Soviet resolution 10 does not men-
tion controls at all. It is, as well, devoid of any
reference to real disarmament.
Now, Mr. Chairman, there is a road to a per-
10 U.N. doc. A/C. 1/L. 203.
754
manent cessation of testing. It is through agree-
ment, not through pronouncements. If the Soviet
Union wants to continue its propaganda slogan
"stop the tests" — period, full stop — it can do so.
If it shares the desires of others to achieve a real
and effective cessation, it can go to Geneva and ne-
gotiate with candor and in good faith.
We offer a workable, quick plan to halt nuclear
tests. Mr. Zorin appears to spurn it. I hope I
misunderstand him, but I warn him now that, if he
persists in vetoing inspection schemes and in turn-
ing down offers to suspend tests, the world will be
able to draw only the most unfortunate conclusions
about the Soviet Union's true intentions.
The United States will go to the Geneva ne-
gotiations on nuclear testing with the determina-
tion to reach an equitable and lasting agreement.
We want to make this conference, as well as the
technical talks on surprise attack, a success. We
hope that in spite of their disquieting attitude
here in this committee the Soviet Union will do
the same.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to remind
the committee once again that in accordance with
our frequently restated announcements the United
States and the United Kingdom will discontinue
tests on October 31, the end of this month, pro-
vided the Soviet Union does the same.
The Soviet Union has been totally and monu-
mentally silent on this point.
Will the Soviet Union stop ?
We would like to have a clear answer to that.
STATEMENT BY MR. BARCO, OCTOBER 17
U.S. delegation press release 3028
The representative of the Soviet Union made a
number of assertions which are so far from the
truth that I feel compelled to reply to him.
The Soviet representative stated that what the
United States has in mind is a temporary sus-
pension only and only for 1 year. He asks the
question, "Why do not the sponsors of the 17-
power resolution set cessation as a goal?" And
he answers the question by saying, "Because they
do not think in these terms; they do not think of
cessation as a goal, but only in terms of a suspen-
sion for 1 year, and not for a definitive solution."
Then he makes the totally outrageous suggestion
that the United States wants to suspend only for
1 year to give time to prepare for another series
of tests.
Department of State Bulletin
Mr. Chairman, these assertions are just totally
wrong. They are totally upside down. I do not
know what one can say here to convince Mr.
Zorin.
The representative of the United States has
made very clear what the goal is, as far as we
are concerned. He has made very clear that we
are working for an agreement that can lead to the
cessation of tests. But none of this seems to af-
fect the attitude of the Soviet representative.
We have said that we will discontinue for 1
year our tests beginning October 31 if the
U.S.S.R. also does so. Mr. Lodge asked Mr.
Zorin the question, "Is the U.S.S.R. going to do
the same?'' And we have not had an answer to
that question. I would like to have an answer to
that question.
[In a further intervention Mr. Barco said :]
Mr. Chairman, I would like to remind the rep-
resentative of the Soviet Union that the repre-
sentative of the United States has also asked him
the question whether he disagrees that there
should be further progress on disarmament. I
think this is a matter which requires some clarifi-
cation from him.
I would like to say one more thing about the
use of these words of "cessation" and "suspen-
sion"' and "discontinuance"' and so forth. We are
not dealing here with slogans, however much the
representative of the Soviet Union would like us
to. We are dealing with serious problems of how
to achieve disarmament and all the things that
go with it. And these slogans which he likes to
foist upon us are not going to achieve that.
Current U.N. Documents:
A Selected Bibliography 1
Security Council
Fourth Report of the United Nations Observation Group
in Lebanon. Submitted through the Secretary-Gen-
eral in pursuance of the resolution of the Security
Council of 11 June 1958 (S/4023). S/4100. Septem-
ber 29, 1958. 21 pp.. map. mimeo.
1 1'rinted materials may be secured in the United States
from the International Documents Service, Columbia
University Press, 296(1 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y.
Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents)
may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the
United States.
General Assembly
Supplementary Estimates for the Financial Year 1958.
Report of the Secretary-General. A/3922. September
22, 1958. 36 pp. mimeo.
Association of Non-Self-Governing Territories With the
European Economic Community. Report of the Sec-
retary-General. A/3916/Rev. 1. September 24, 195a
28 pp. mimeo.
UNREF Executive Committee. Report on the First Ses-
sion of the Working Party on Future International
Assistance to Refugees, 21-27 August 1958.
A/AC.79/130. September 25, 1958. 12 pp. mimeo.
Question of Disarmament. Memorandum by the Secre-
tary-General. A/3936. September 30, 1958. 4 pp.
mimeo.
Report of the Negotiating Committee for Extra-Budgetary
Funds. A/3944. October 9, 1958. 16 pp. mimeo.
United Nations Emergency Force : Summary Study of
the Experience Derived From the Establishment and
Operation of the Force. Report of the Secretary-
General. A/3943. October 9, 1958. 81 pp. mimeo.
Economic Development of Under-Developed Countries:
Establishment of the Special Fund. Report of the
Secretary-General. A/3947. October 13, 1958. 20 pp.
mimeo.
U.S. Views on the U.N. Budget for 1959
Statement by Senator Bourke B. Ilickenlooper
I '>'. Representative to the General Assembly 1
Once again this year we are indebted to the
Secretary-General and to the chairman of the
Advisory Committee for their general statements
on the budget of the organization for 1959. These
statements, I am certain, have been helpful to all
members of this committee in our approach to the
budgetary problems which face us for the coming
year.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to comment briefly
on the present level of the budget and the increase
forecast by the Secretary-General for the 1959
budget. We all consider that the budget level is
high, but frankly, Mr. Chairman, we do not be-
lieve that it is too high when we view the responsi-
bilities which governments have placed upon the
organization in recent years. By the same token,
while we are concerned at the size of the increase
for 1959 forecast by the Secretary-General, we
cannot say that the increase is excessive in view
of the activities which we expect the organization
to carry on in the coming year. Having said
this, Mr. Chairman, I must caution that the pres-
ent budget level and the rate of increase has be-
come such that the Secretary-General, the
Advisory Committee, and the Fifth Committee
1 Made in Committee V (Administrative and Budgetary)
on Oct. 14 (U.S. delegation press release 3020).
November 10, 1958
755
must exercise the greatest care to assure that no
unwise or unnecessary expenditures are incurred.
Recommendations of Secretary-General
and Advisory Committee
Before discussing any of the specific problems
involved, I would like to indicate the general ap-
proach of the United States delegation to a con-
sideration of the estimates. First of all, we have
full confidence in the Secretary-General and the
Controller, and we consider that any budget esti-
mates which they present to us have been most
carefully prepared with a view to the greatest
possible economy consistent with the efficient op-
eration of the organization. However, the Gen-
eral Assembly has created the mechanism of the
Advisory Committee — a committee of administra-
tive and financial experts — to examine in detail
the estimates prepared by the Secretary-General
and to bring a competent and objective judgment
to bear upon those estimates. As we all know,
that committee spends many months in examining
the estimates and it provides us with its recom-
mendations with respect to them. It is obvious
that the Fifth Committee cannot repeat the de-
tailed examination carried out by the Advisory
Committee, and it would seem equally obvious
that we should not spend our time in a detailed
discussion of all budget sections when we have on
our agenda so many matters of principle requir-
ing decisions. However, we do believe we should
make a careful examination of the items as to
which there is a difference between the request of
the Secretary-General and the recommendation
of the Advisory Committee. 2
It follows, Mr. Chairman, that it is the view of
the United States delegation that this committee
should give most serious consideration to the
recommendations of the Advisory Committee and
should support those recommendations except in
those instances of disagreement where the Secre-
tary-General can make a clear and compelling case
of his original estimates. It is our position that a
recommendation of the Advisory Committee for a
modification of the original estimates does not
constitute an attack upon the judgment or admin-
istrative approach of the Secretary-General but
2 For the budget estimates of the Secretary-General for
1959, see U.N. doc. A/3825 ; for the report of the Advisory
Committee and recommendations on revised estimates, see
U.N. docs. A/3860, 3923, 3924, and 3933.
756
rather represents an objective judgment and ap-
praisal of the situation which results in a con-
clusion different from that of the Secretary-
General. We believe that the Secretary-General
should, and no doubt does, give serious considera-
tion to the recommendations of the Advisory
Committee which differ from his own and that
he should accept them unless he believes he can
clearly and persuasively demonstrate that the
recommendations of the Advisory Committee are
not in the best interests of the organization.
The administrator proposing a budget and the
policy-determining body may well view the same
problem from different angles and may therefore
reach different conclusions.
Applying these principles to the budget esti-
mates and to the report of the Advisory Com-
mittee which are before us, we are prepared, in
general, to support the recommendations of the
Advisory Committee. I have used the phrase "in
general," Mr. Chairman, because we retain an
open mind and are prepared to hear any case
which the Secretary-General may wish to put be-
fore us.
We listened carefully to the statement made by
the Secretary-General on October 9 3 in which he
asked for a restoration of $170,000 of the amount
which the Advisory Committee has recommended
be cut from his budget request. I must say, Mr.
Chairman, that only with respect to the restora-
tion of an amount of $27,800 in Section 11 [Gen-
eral Expenses] do we presently agree, but we still
reserve our final position on this section. I
might say at this point that, if it is decided that
a restoration is warranted in section 11, we ex-
pect that every possible effort will be made to
avoid supplementary estimates with respect to this
section next year. We do not believe that a rise
in prices or increased cost for utilities should
automatically become a basis for supplementary
estimates, and we would expect that every effort
would be made to find economies which would
compensate for these factors.
Salaries and Wages
With respect to Section 6 [Salaries and Wages],
my delegation does not feel that a case has been
made for rejecting the recommendations of the
Advisory Committee. While we appreciate the
1 For text, see U.N. doc. A/C.5/748.
Department of Stale Bulletin
willingness of the Secretary-General not to con-
test the major portion of the recommended cut
and not to insist upon the addition of professional
posts, we are not prepared to agree to the estab-
lishment of 21 General Service posts. We realize,
of course, that a strong argument can be made for
the necessity of many of these posts as essential
requirements for existing regional commissions;
nevertheless we believe that we must look at the
picture of regional commissions and economic ac-
tivities as a whole.
In view of the fact that a new regional economic
commission is being established for Africa, with
a consequent substantial increase in expenditures,
my delegation believes we should go more slowly
with respect to the other commissions for the
time being. In other words, we are quite pre-
pared to accept a growth of expenditure with re-
spect to the regional economic commissions as a
whole, but we believe that the pace of this growth
must be maintained within the financial capa-
bilities of the organization.
Travel
With respect to Section 8 [Travel], we again
are not persuaded that the Advisory Committee's
recommendation should be rejected. I might recall
at this point, Mr. Chairman, that last year we
supported the Secretary-General's request for res-
toration of a cut proposed in the estimates for
travel on official business. This year, however,
we believe that the situation is somewhat different
and we believe that the cut proposed by the Ad-
visory Committee will not make impossible any
travel which is really necessary. In this connec-
tion we have noted the recent statement of the
Controller that an attempt is being made to reach
agreement with the specialized agencies on a modi-
fication of certain of the regulations presently in
force with respect to travel. We hope that any
agreement which is reached will make it possiblo
to achieve additional economies.
As regards Section 10 [Office of the High Com-
missioner for Refugees], the U.S. delegation is, of
course, prepared to withhold any judgment until
we have heard the views of the High Commissioner
himself.
The last item of reduction which is contested by
the Secretary-General relates to the proposed ap-
propriation of $2,000 for the payment of
honoraria to the president and members of the
Administrative Tribunal. We regret that this
proposal has been made by the Secretary-General
in view of the decision arrived at by this com-
mittee 2 years ago on the matter of paying hono-
raria. We are not aware of any change in circum-
stance during the past 2 years. Accordingly, it is
our present feeling that we should not change our
earlier decision in this matter.
I would like to refer, Mr. Chairman, to several
other matters which were mentioned by the Secre-
tary-General and by the chairman of the Advisory
Committee in their statements to us. First of all,
my delegation believes that an increase in the level
of the Working Capital Fund is fully justified.
We would be prepared to support an increase to
the level of $30 million. However, if the majority
of this committee believes that such an increase
would impose too great a burden, we would be
prepared to concur in the Advisory Committee's
recommendation to increase the level to $25 mil-
lion spread over 2 or 3 years.
One of the most important and helpful portions
of this year's Advisory Committee report is the
section covering the special study made of the
Offices of the Controller and of Personnel. We
consider that such special studies of particular
areas of the Secretariat are highly useful, and
we look forward to similar efforts in the future.
The study made this year impels us to conclude
that, the level of performance of the two offices
studied is high, and accordingly we wish to com-
pliment the responsible Secretariat officials in
those offices.
However, Mr. Chairman, we are surprised at an
omission from the Advisory Committee's report
on its special study of the Controller's office. Last
year the United States delegation placed great
emphasis on the establishment in that office of a
small management staff which would have as one
of it9 principal functions the making of periodic
surveys of overseas establishments. We under-
stood that the Controller intended to create such
a unit, and yet we find no specific mention of it in
the Advisory Committee's report. Accordingly,
we hope to hear the comment of the Controller
and of the chairman of the Advisory Committee
on this matter. At this time I will limit myself
to saying that we consider the establishment of
this management staff so important that we would
November 10, J 958
757
be prepared to see the addition, if necessary, of
several new posts in the Controller's office for this
purpose.
Control of Administrative and Financial Services
It is with some hesitation, Mr. Chairman, that
I now mention a point of some delicacy. This is
the matter, mentioned in paragraphs 256-258 and
paragraph 295 of the Advisory Committee's re-
port, on the question of the overall direction of
the administrative and financial services of the
organization. We listened very carefully to the
Secretary-General's statement on this point, and
we realize that it was with all sincerity that he
assured us that the present arrangements are fully
satisfactory. He stated that his personal exper-
ience did not lead him to share the views of the
Advisory Committee. Mr. Chairman, our ex-
perience in observing the functioning of the or-
ganization from the outside — as opposed to the
Secretary-General's observation of the function-
ing from within — leads us respectfully to differ
with his conclusion.
The Secretary-General states that he does not
see the slightest justification for proposing a new
post in the organization, a position with special
senior status and relationship to the Secretary-
General, which would combine overall control of
the administrative and financial services.
We are all well aware of the Secretary-General's
outstanding capabilities for harmonizing conflict-
ing views in the political sphere. We are also
well aware of his superior ability in dealing with
the numerous complex problems of operating as
widespread and varied an organization as the
Secretariat. However, we believe that the com-
bination of these two roles creates a burden greater
than any one man — even one with the ability and
devotion of the Secretary-General — should be
called upon to carry. We feel that we should not
impose such a burden on him and that likewise he
should not be required to impose it on himself.
We, therefore, continue to believe that the center-
ing of staff work on the administrative and finan-
cial services of the organization in a special senior
post would be in the best interest of the organi-
zation.
We, of course, realize, Mr. Chairman, that this
is a matter which is in the hands of the Secretary-
General to decide. Nevertheless, it is our duty
as a member of the organization to point to this
problem as one which should be solved.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, we would like to assure
the Secretary- General that, in considering his
budget estimates for 1959, we are fully aware of
the tremendous responsibilities which events and
decisions of various organs have placed upon him
and the Secretariat as a whole. We are also fully
aware of the very high level of performance which
has been obtained in dealing with these responsi-
bilities. We realize that the budget estimates
represent the judgment of the Secretary-General
as to the financial support which he believes will
be required in carrying out his responsibilities. I
am sure that he will understand that, wherever we
may disagree with him concerning particular ex-
penditures, it is only because we believe that we
too have a responsibility to the organization which
we must fulfill.
Human Rights and the Covenants
Statement by Mrs. Osioald B. Lord
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly '
We have, in the past., stated our position on the
[human rights] covenants and the reasons for our
intention not to sign or ratify the covenants. We
have felt that the covenants are not the means best
suited to facilitate the promotion and preserva-
tion of human rights throughout the world. We
do want to reiterate, however, that the United
States Government wishes to encourage the pro-
motion of human rights and individual freedoms
everywhere, both at home and abroad. We in the
United States have a profound interest in human
rights and fundamental freedoms, as outlined in
our own Bill of Eights. It has been the firm pol-
icy of our Government to support all efforts made
to improve the lot of human beings the world
over. Progress has been slow and often disheart-
ening, but we are confident of ultimately achiev-
ing our goal.
The U.S. Government has firmly supported the
principles of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, which the General Assembly proclaimed
10 years ago. We support the efforts the United
Nations has taken and will take to bring about the
fulfillment of these principles in every part of the
world. I am sure that we share with everyone
'Made in Committee III (Social, Humanitarian and
Cultural) on Oct. 10 (U.S. delegation press release 3015).
758
Department of State Bulletin
here genuine devotion bo the cause of human
rights throughout the world. We differ only as
to method, feeling that more can be accomplished
through persuasion and example rather than
through what we deem to be the coercion inherent
in the treaty approach.
This year we are joining with other nations of
the world to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We are
planning to organize programs in all our schools
and churches and other institutions throughout
America and, in this connection, to establish close
liaison with nongovernmental organizations.
I hope, Madam Chairman, that we may have the
opportunity, either at the special plenary or at
some other time, to hear from other delegations
as to their detailed plans for the observance in
their own countries of this 10th anniversary of
the Universal Declaration of Human Eights.
In closing may I say that it is our intention to
consult with other delegations, to offer sugges-
tions, and to participate in drafting the language
of the draft covenants so as to produce the best
possible formulation. We hope, Madam Chair-
man, that we can be constructive and helpful.
TREATY INFORMATION
Supplementary Income-Tax Protocol
With U.K. Enters Into Force
Press release 619 dated October 16
On October 15, 1958, the supplementary in-
come-tax protocol of August 19, 1957, between
the United States and the United Kingdom was
brought into force by the exchange of instru-
ments of ratification at London.
The supplementary protocol amends the con-
vention of April 16, 1945, for the avoidance of
double taxation and the prevention of fiscal eva-
sion with respect to taxes on income, as modified
by supplementary protocols of June 6, 1946, and
May 25, 1954. 1
The new supplementary protocol contains three
articles. Article I amends article VIII of the
1945 convention relating to exemption from tax-
1 Treaties and Other International Acts Series 1540
and 3165.
ation, on certain conditions, of royalties and other
amounts paid as consideration for the use of, or
for the privilege of using, copyrights, patents, de-
signs, secret processes and formulas, trade marks,
and other like property. Article II amends arti-
cle XIII of the 1945 convention relating to credits
against the tax paid to one country for tax paid
to the other country. The combined effect of
those amendments is to eliminate double taxation
with respect to royalty payments received from a
U.K. licensee by a U.S. licensor having a perma-
nent establishment in the United Kingdom.
Article III provides for ratification and the ex-
change of instruments of ratification and speci-
fies the dates on and after which the provisions
shall be effective with respect to U.S. and British
taxes. In the case of U.S. taxes the protocol is
effective for taxable years beginning on or after
January 1, 1956. In the case of U.K. taxes the
protocol is effective (a) as respects income tax
and surtax for any year of assessment beginning
on or after April 6, 1956, and (b) as respects
profits tax for any chargeable accounting period
beginning on or after April 1, 1956, and for the
unexpired portion of any chargeable accounting
period current 
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