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Participation of the United States Government
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INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES
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^^^ 5 1962
B' P. L.
AprU 2, 1962
U.S. OUTLINES INITIAL PROPOSALS OF PROGRAM
FOR GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMA-
MENT • Statement by Secretary Rusk 531
FOREIGN ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE
PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 1963 • Message
of the President to the Congress 550
FULFILLING THE PLEDGES OF THE ALLIANCE FOR
PROGRESS • Remarks by President Kennedy .... 539
THE CHALLENGE OF AFRICA TO THE YOUTH OF
AMERICA • by Assistant Secretary Williams 544
U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY REJECTS CUBAN
CHARGES AGAINST UNITED STATES • State-
ments by Adlai E. Stevenson and Francis T. P. Plimpton . . 553
IITED STATES
REIGN POLICY
For index see inside back cover
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Vol. XLVI, No. 1188 • Publication 7358
April 2, 1962
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U.S. Outlines Initial Proposals of Program
for General and Complete Disarmament
STATEMENT BY SECRETARY RUSK i
I am happy to have the opportunity to meet in
this hall with the foreign ministers and principal
delegates of the coimtries participating in tliis
conference. I bring you greetmgs from the Presi-
dent of the United States and the most sincere
good wishes of the American people for the suc-
cess of our work. I should like to open my re-
marks by reading a letter ^ which the President
has sent to me :
As you and your colleagues from every quarter of the
globe enter upon the work of the Geneva Disarmament
Conference, it may seem unnecessary to state again that
the hopes and indeed the very prospects of mankind are
involved in the undertaking in which you are engaged.
And yet the fact that the immediate and practical sig-
nificance of the task that has brought you together has
come to be so fully realized by the peoples of the world
is one of the crucial developments of our time. For men
now know that amassing of destructive power does not
beget security ; they know that polemics do not bring
peace. Men's minds, men's hearts, and men's spiritual
aspirations alike demand no less than a reversal of the
course of recent history — a replacement of ever-growing
stockpiles of destruction by ever-growing opportunities
for human achievement. It is your task as representative
of the United States to join with your colleagues in a
supreme effort toward that end.
This task, the foremost item on the agenda of humanity,
is not a quick or easy one. It must be aijproached both
boldly and responsibly. It is a task whose magnitude and
urgency justifies our bringing to bear upon it the highest
resources of creative statesmanship the international com-
munity has to offer, for It is the future of the community
of mankind that is involved. We must pledge ourselves
at the outset to an unceasing effort to continue until the
job is done. We must not be discouraged by initial dis-
agreements nor weakened in our resolve by the tensions
that surround us and add difficulties to our task. For
' Made at the second plenary meeting of the confer-
ence of the IS-nation Disarmament Committee at Geneva
on Mar. 15 (press release 172 (revised) dated Mar. 17).
' Also released as a White House press release dated
Mar. 14.
verifiable disarmament arrangements are not a fair
weather phenomenon. A sea wall is not needed when the
seas are calm. Sound disarmament agreements, deeply
rooted in mankind's mutual interest in survival, must
serve as a bulwark against the tidal waves of war and
its destructiveness. Let no one, then, say that we can-
not arrive at such agreements in troubled times, for it
is then their need is greatest.
My earnest hope is that no effort will be spared to de-
fine areas of agreement on all of the three important
levels to which Prime Minister Macmillan and' I referred
in our joint letter of February 7 to Premier Khrushchev.^
Building upon the principles already agreed, I hope that
you will quickly be able to report agreement on an out-
line defining the overall shape of a program for general
and complete disarmament in a peaceful world. I have
submitted such an outline on behalf of the U.S. to the
U.N. General Assembly last September.' But an outline
is not enough. Ton should seek as well, as areas of agree-
ment emerge, a definition in siiccific terms of measures
set forth in the outline. The objective should be to define
in treaty terms the widest area of agreement that can
be implemented at the earliest x>ossible time while still
continuing your maximum efforts to achieve agreement
on those other aspects which present more difficulty. As
a third specific objective you should seek to isolate and
identify initial measures of disarmament which could,
if put into effect without delay, materially improve inter-
national security and the prospects for further disarma-
ment progress. In this category you should seek as a
matter of highest priority agreement on a safeguarded
nuclear test ban. At this juncture in history no single
measure in the field of disarmament would be more pro-
ductive of concrete benefit in the alleviation of tensions
and the enhancement of prospects for greater progress.
Please conve.v, on my behalf and on behalf of the people
of the United States to the representatives of the nations
assembled, our deep and abiding support of the delibera-
tions on which you are about to embark. I pledge anew
my personal and continuing interest in this work.
All of US will agree, I am sure, that this confer-
ence faces one of the most perplexing and urgent
tasks on the agenda of man. In this endeavor we
welcome our association with delegates from coim-
' For text, see Bulletin of Mar. 5, 1962, p. 355.
* For text, see ibid., Oct. 16, 1961, p. 650.
April 2, J 962
531
tries which have not previously been intimately
involved with earlier negotiations on disarma-
ment. The dreary history of such negotiations
shows that we need their help and fresh points of
view. The presence of these delegations reminds
us, too, that arms races are not the exclusive con-
cern of the great powers. Countries situated in
every region of the world are confronted with
their own conflicts and tensions, and some are en-
gaged in amis competition.
Disarmament a Worldwide Responsibility
We are not here dealing solely with a single
struggle in which a few large states are engaged,
with the rest of the world as spectators. Every
state has a contribution to make in establishing
the conditions for general disarmament in its own
way. Every state has a responsibility to strive
for a reduction of tension, and of armaments, in
its own neighborhood.
This means that each of us will bear personal
responsibility for what we do here. Every speech
and every act must move us toward our common
objective. At the same time, every one of us brings
to the search for disarmament a separate fund of
experience relevant to our problem. The United
States, for example, has established a major new
agency of government to mobilize its skills and
resources to seek out and study every useful ap-
proach to anns reduction.
^Vliat is needed is immediate reduction and
eventual elimination of all the national armaments
and armed forces required for making war. \Vliat
is required most urgently is to stop the nuclear
arms race. All of us recognize that this moment
is critical. We are here because we share the con-
viction that the arms race is dangerous and that
every tool of statecraft must be used to end it. As
the President stated on March 2,° the United
States is convinced that, "in the long run, the only
real security in this age of nuclear peril rests not
in armaments but in disarmament."
Modern weapons have a quality new to history.
A single thermonuclear weapon today can carry
(he explosive power of all the weapons of the last
war. In the last war they M-ere delivered at 300
miles per hour; today they travel at almost 300
miles per minute. Economic cost slryrockets
through sophistication of design and b}^ acceler-
ating rates of obsolescence.
' Ihid., Mar. 19, 1962, p. 443.
532
Our objective, therefore, is clear enough. We
must eliminate the instruments of destruction.
We must prevent the outbreak of war by accident
or by design. We must create the conditions for
a secui-e and peaceful world. In so doing we can
turn the momentum of science exclusively to peace-
ful purposes and we can lift the burden of the
arms race and thus increase our capacity to raise
living standards everj-where.
A group of experts meeting at the United Na-
tions has just issued an impressive report * on the
economic and social consequences of disarmament
which should stimulate us in our work. The ex-
perts, drawn from covmtries with the most divei-se
jDolitical systems, were unanimously of the opinion
that the problems of transition connected with dis-
armament could be solved to the benefit of all
countries and that disarmament would lead to the
improvement of world economic and social condi-
tions. They characterized the achievement of gen-
eral and complete disannament as an luiqualified
blessing to all mankind.
This is the spirit in which we in the United
States would deal with the economic readjustments
required if we should achieve broad and deep cuts
in the level of armaments. The United States is
a nation with vast unfinished business. Disarma-
ment would permit lis to get on with the job of
building a better America and, through expanded
economic development activities, of building a bet-
ter world. The great promise of man's capacity
should not be frustrated by his inability to deal
with war and implements of war. Man is an in-
ventive being; surely we can turn our hands and
minds at long last to the task of the political in-
vention we need to repeal the law of the jungle.
Laying Basis for Disarmament
IIow can we move toward such disarmament?
The American people bear arms through neces-
sity, not. by choice. Emerging from World War
II in a imiquely powerful militai-y position, the
United Stat as demobilized its armed strength and
made pei-sistent efforts to place under international
control the use of atomic energ\', then an Ameri-
can monopoly. The fact that the story of the post-
war period has forced increased defense efforts
upon us is a most grievous disappointment. Tins
disappointment teaches us that reduction of ten-
sions must go hand in hand with real pi-ogress in
" U.N. doc. E/3.")93 and Corr. 1.
Department of Slate Bulletin
(lisaiinament. We must, I belie\e, simultaneously
work at both.
On the one hand, it is idle to expect that we can
move very far down the road toward disarmament
if those who claim to want it do not seek, as well,
to relax tensions and create conditions of trust.
Confidence cannot be built on a footing of threats,
polemics, and disturbed relations. On the other
hand, by reducing and finally eliminating means
of military intimidation we might render our
political crises less acutely dangerous and provide
greater scope for tlieir settlement by peaceful
me<ans.
I would be less than candid if I did not point out
the harmful effect which deliberately stimulated
crises can have on our work here. In the joint
statement of agreed principles for disannament
negotiations published on September 20, 1961,^ the
United States and the Sonnet Union affirmed that,
"to facilitate the attainment of general and com-
plete disarmament in a peaceful world it is im-
portant that all States abide by existing interna-
tional agreements, refrain from any actions wliich
might aggravate international tensions, and that
they seek settlement of all disputes by peaceful
means." Yet we are confronted by crises which
inevitably cast, their shadows into this meeting
room.
The same can be said for the failure of our ef-
forts, so hopefully begmi, to conclude an effective
agreement for ending nuclear weapon tests. There
is an obvious lesson to be drawn from these con-
siderations. The lesson is that general and com-
plete disarmament must be accompanied by the
establishment of reliable procedures for the peace-
ful settlement of disputes and effective arrange-
ments for the maintenance of peace in accordance
with the principles of the United Nations Charter.
For the rule and spirit of law must prevail if the
world is to be disarmed.
As we make progress in this conference, we shall
have to lay increasing stress on this point. A dis-
armed world must be a law-abiding world in which
a United Nations peace force can cope with inter-
national breaches of the peace. In the words of the
joint statement : "Progress in disarmament should
be accompanied bj' measures to strengthen institu-
tions for maintaining peace and the settlement of
international disputes by peaceful means."
Fortunately thei-e is one sign which can give us
For text, see Bulletin of Oct. 9, 1961, p. 589.
hope that this conference will in good time lay
the foundation stones for a world witiiout war.
For the first time a disannament conference is
beginning its activities within an agreed frame-
work — the joint statement of agi-eed principles —
which all our governments have welcomed along
with every other member of the United Nations.
The United States considers the joint statement us
its point of departure. Our objective is to build
on that foundation and to give practical applica-
tion to the principles.
The United States program for general and
complete disarmament in a peaceful world, intro-
duced in the United Nations on September 25,
1961, was presented to give life to the agi-eed prin-
ciples. It is comprehensive in its scope and in its
description of the subjects suitable for action in
the first and subsequent stages of the disarmament
process. It is framed so as to avoid impairment
of the security of any state. It aims at balanced
and verified disarmament in successive stages. It
is not immutable, liowever. It is designed to serve
as a basis for negotiation.
This conference also has before it another plan,
presented by the Soviet Union. A comparison of
the two plans will show some areas of agreement.
We believe it is the task of the conference to search
for broader areas of accord leading to specific
steps which all can take with confidence.
At this meeting the United States wishes to put
forward some suggestions and proposals regarding
the course of our futui-e activity, first as to ob-
jective and procedure, then as to a program of
work for the conference.
We believe that the ultimate objective should be
the working out in detail of a treaty or treaties
putting into effect an agreed program for general
and complete disarmament in a j^eaceful world.
To bring this about we propose that all of our
delegations agree to continue our efforts at this
conference without interruptions, other than those
we all agree to be desirable or necessary for our
task, until a total program for general and com-
plete disarmament has been achieved.
As for procedures we propose that we find means
of achieving maximum informality and flexibility.
We do not believe that the best way to make prog-
ress is to concentrate our time and efforts in pro-
tracted or sterile debate. Accordingly the United
States will propose that, as soon as ample oppor-
tunity has been allowed for opening statements,
the schedule of plenary meetings be reduced so that
April 2, 1962
533
issues and problems can be explored in informal
meetings and in subcommittees more likely to pro-
duce agreement.
U.S. Proposals for Work of Conference
Let me turn now to proposals regarding the
work for the conference.
The first proposal is that the conference work
out and agree on an outline progi'am of general
and complete disarmament which can be included
in the report due to the United Nations Disarma-
ment Commission by June 1. The United States
believes that, to fulfill this first objective, the ini-
tial aim of the conference should be to consolidate
and expand the areas of agreement and to recon-
cile the differences between the United States and
Soviet disarmament plans. This should result in
working out a single program of general and com-
plete disarmament which all could support. This
agreed program might well take the form of a joint
declaration which could be presented to the United
Nations by all the states represented here. Such
a program could be a framework for the treaty
or treaties which would put the agreed total pro-
gram into effect.
But of course our aims must be more ambitious
than this. We should begin at once to fill in the
outline of the total program. Wlierever possible
we should seek specific commitments that could be
put into effect without delay. This need not await
agreement on the outline as a whole. Nor should
it impede the development of an overall program.
Wherever the common interest permits we can
and should put into effect defined, specific steps
as quickly as possible.
As a first step toward filling in the details of
such a program the United States makes the fol-
lowing proposals :
One: We propose that a cut of 30 percent in
nuclear delivery vehicles and major conventional
armaments be included in the first stage of the
disarmament program. We propose that stra-
tegic delivery vehicles be reduced not only in niun-
bers but also in destructive capability. We esti-
mate that, given faithful cooperation, this reduc-
tion might be carried out in 3 years. Similar re-
ductions can, we believe, bo achieved in each of the
later stages. It is recognized, however, that, in
the words of the agreed pi'inciples, "All measures
of general and comi^lete disarmament should be
balanced so that at no stage of the implementation
of the treaty could any State or group of States
gain militai-y advantage and that security is en-
sured equally for all." But agreement on such a
reduction and the measures to carry it out would
be a significant step forward. It would reverse
the upward spiral of the arms race, replacing in-
creases with decreases, and men could begin to
gain freedom from the fear of mass destruction
from such weapons.
Two : The United States has proposed that early
in the first stage further production of any fission-
able material for nuclear weapons use be stopped.
We propose now that thereafter the United States
and the U.S.S.R. each agree to transfer in the first
stage 50,000 kilograms of weapons grade U-235 to
nonweapons purposes. Such a move would cut at
the heart of nuclear weapons production. The
initial transfers should be followed by additional
transfers in the subsequent stages of the disarma-
ment program. Resources now devoted to military
programs coidd then be employed for purposes of
peace.
Three : The United States proposes that the dis-
armament program also include early action on
specific worldwide measures which will reduce the
risk of war by accident, miscalculation, failure of
communications, or surprise attack. These are
measures which can be worked out rapidly. They
are bound to increase confidence. They will reduce
the likelihood of war.
We will be prepared to present concrete pro-
posals for action in the following areas :
A. Advance notification of military movements,
such as major transfers of forces, exercises and
maneuvers, flights of aircraft, as well as firing of
missiles.
B. Establishment of observation posts at major
ports, railway centers, motor highways, river
crossings, and airbases to report on concentrations
and movements of military forces.
C. Establislimont of aerial inspection areas and
the use of mobile inspection teams to improve pro-
tection against surprise attack.
D. Establishment of an International Commis-
sion on Pleasures To Eoduco the Risk of War,
charged with the task of examining objectively
the teclinical problems involved.
Four : The United States proposes that the par-
ticipants in this conference undertake an urgent
search for mutually acceptable methods of guaran-
534
Department of Stale Bulletin
teeing the fulfillment of obligations for arms re-
duction. We shall look with sympathy on any
approach which shows promise of leading to prog-
ress without sacrificing safety.
We must not be diverted from this search by
shopworn efforts to equate verification with espio-
nage. Such an abortive attempt misses the vital
point in verification procedures. No government,
large or small, could be expected to enter into dis-
armament arrangements under which their peoples
might become victims of the perfidy of others.
In other affairs, accounting and auditing sys-
tems are customarily installed so that the question
of confidence need not arise. Confidence grows
out of knowledge; suspicion and fear are rooted
in ignorance. This has been true since the begin-
ning of time.
Let me make this point clear : The United States
does not ask for inspection for inspection's sake.
Inspection is for no purpose other than assurance
that commitments are fulfilled. The United
States will do what is necessary to assure others
that it has fulfilled its commitments; we would
find it difficult to understand why others camiot
do the same. We will settle for any reasonable
arrangement which gives assurances cominensu-
rate with the risks. We do not ask a degree of
inspection out of line with the amount and kind
of disarmament actually undertaken. Our aim is
prudent precaution, in the interest of the security
of us all, and nothing else.
We are prepared jointly to explore various
means through which this could be done. It
might be possible in certain instances to use sam-
pling teclmiques in which verification could take
place in some predetermined fashion, perhaps in
specific geographic areas, thus subjecting any
violator of a disarmament agreement to a restrain-
ing risk of exposure, without maintaining con-
stant sui'veillance everywhere. This is, I repeat,
one example of ways in which recent progress in
verification techniques can be adapted to the needs
of participating states. We would hope that this
conference would make a thorough study of every
practicable method of effective verification.
The four proposals I have just described are
new and realistic examples of the specific measures
which we contemplated in the first stage of the
United States plan of September 25. We can
recall that that plan had other specific proposals :
That the Soviet Union and the United States
reduce their force levels by many hundreds of
thousands of men, to a total of 2,100,000 for each.
That steps be taken to prevent states owning
nuclear weapons from relinquishing control of
such weapons to any nation not owning them.
That weapons capable of producing mass de-
struction should not be placed in orbit or stationed
in outer space.
Call for Early Action on Testing
Finally, we call for early action on a matter
that should yield priority to none — the cessation
of nuclear weapons tests. Here we stand at a
turning point. If a treaty cannot be signed, and
signed quickly, to do away with nuclear weapon
testing with appropriate arrangements for detec-
tion and verification, there will be further tests
and the spiral of competition will continue up-
ward. But if we can reach such an agreement,
this development can be stopped, and stopped for-
ever. This is why the United States and the
United Kingdom have invited the Soviet Union
to resmne negotiations to ban all nuclear weapons
tests under effective international controls. We
shall press this matter here at Geneva and make
every reasonable effort to conclude an agreement
which can bring an end to testing.
I had expected that a number of representatives
might express here their regrets that the Soviet
Union and the United States had resumed nuclear
testing. But I had supposed that there was one
delegation — that of the Soviet Union — which
could not have found it possible to criticize the
United States for doing so. The representative
of the Soviet Union has spoken of the possible
effect of United States weapons testing on this
conference. The statement of agreed principles
and this conference were born amid the echoing
roars of more than 40 Soviet nuclear explosions.
A 50-megaton bomb does not make the noise of
a cooing dove.
Despite the Soviet tests of last autumn, nuclear
weapons testing can stoi^ — now and forever.
The Soviet Union has spoken of its readiness to
accept inspection of disarmament, though not of
armament. We hope that it will agree that the
total, permanent elimination of nuclear testing is
disarmament and will accept effective interna-
tional control within its own formula.
April 2, 1962
535
Achieving Consensus on First Steps
I have presented tlie United States proposals for
early disarmament action in this conferenoe. We
shall have further suggestions, and so, I am sure,
will others. The conference will need to single out
those points it regards as most susceptible of use-
ful treatment, or most pressing in terms of the
common danger, and to take them up at once.
We believe that, as soon as agreement is reached
on the specific measures to be included in the first
stage, we can develop the specific steps for the sec-
ond and third stages. In these stages further re-
ductions of armaments will move hand in hand
with the strengthening of international institu-
tions for the maintenance of peace.
Our plan of work must achieve what this con-
ference is charged to do in the joint statement of
agreed principles. Let us define the overall shape
of the program. Let us develop in more detail the
component parts which must bo fitted together
within the program. Let us do as much as we can
as fast as we can.
Let us, then, apply ourselves to the task of this
conference soberly, systematically, and realisti-
cally. Let the need for disarmament provide the
momentum for our work. Let us follow every
promising path which might lead to progress.
Let us with all deliberate speed reach a consensus
on what can be done first and on what should be
undertaken on a continuing basis.
And let us not permit this conference, like its
predecessors, to become frozen in deadlock at the
start of its deliberations. Surely it need not do
so. The obstacles to disarmament agreements — the
forces tending to divide us ii\to rival aggregations
of power — might at long last begin to yield to the
overriding and shared interest in survival which
alone can unite us for peace.
PRINCIPAL ADVISERS TO U.S. DELEGATION
The Department of State announced on March
9 (press release 15G) that Secretary Rusk would
leave Washington March 10 for the meeting of
the 18-nation Disarmament Connnittee, whicli will
convene at Geneva March 14.
Principal advisers to the delegation are : ^
Cli.'Uies E. Bolilcn, Siiociul xVssislaut to the Secretary
Aitlmr II. Dean, Ambassador
William C. Foster, Director, Arms Control and Disarma-
ment Agency
Foy D. Kohler, Assistant Secretary of State for Euro-
pean Affairs
Robert Manning, Assistant Secretary of State-designate
for Public Affairs
Charles C. Stelle, United States Mission, Geneva
Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador of the United States
to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
U.S. Presents Proposals to U.S.S.R.
for Cooperation in Space Exploration
Following is the t^xt of a letter from. President
Kennedy to Nikita S. Khrushchev, Chairman of
the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R.
White House press release dated March 17
March 7, 1962
Dear Mr. Chairman : On February twenty-
second last I wrote you that I was instructing ap-
propriate officers of this Government to prepare
concrete proposals for immediate projects of com-
mon action in the exploration of space.^ I now
present such proposals to you.
The exploration of space is a broad and varied
activity and the possibilities for cooperation are
many. In suggesting the possible first steps which
are set out below, I do not intend to limit our
mutual consideration of desirable cooperative ac-
tivities. On the contrary, I will welcome your
concrete suggestions along these or other lines.
1. Perhaps we could render no greater service
to mankind through our space programs than by
the joint establishment of an early operational
weather satellite system. Such a system would be
designed to provide global weather data for
prompt use by an^' nation. To initiate this service,
I propose that the LTnited States and the Soviet
Union each launch a satellite to photograph cloud
cover and provide other agreed meteorological
services for all nations. The two satellites would
be placed in near-polar orbits in planes approxi-
mately perpendicidarto each other, thus providing
regular coverage of all areas. This immensely
valuable data would then be disseminated tlirough
normal international meteorological channels and
would make a significant contribution to the re-
' For a list of the other members of the U.S. delegation,
see Department of State press release 15G dated JIar. S).
' For an i-xchange of messages between President
Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev, see Bulletin of Mar.
12, 10t)2, p. 411. (President Kennedy's letter dated Feb.
21 was delivered at Moscow on Feb. 22.)
536
Department of State Bulletin
search and service jirograms now under study by
the World Meteorolooical Organization in re-
sponse to Eesohition 1721 (XVI) adopted by the
United Nations General Assembly on December
20, 19G1.=
2. It would be of great interest to those re-
sponsible for the conduct of our respective space
programs if they could obtain operational track-
ing services from each other's territories. Ac-
cordingly, I propose that each of our countries
establish and operate a radio tracking station to
provide tracking services to the other, utilizing
equipment which we would each provide to the
other. Thus, the United States would provide the
technical equipment for a tracking station to be
established in the Soviet Union and to be operated
by Soviet technicians. The United States would in
turn establish and operate a radio tracking station
utilizing Soviet equipment. Each country would
train the other's technicians in the operation of
its equipment, would utilize the station located on
its territoi-y to provide tracking services to the
other, and would afford such access as may be
necessary to accommodate modifications and main-
tenance of equipment from time to time.
3. In the field of the earth sciences, the precise
character of the earth's magnetic field is central
to many scientific problems. I propose therefore
that we cooperate in mapping the earth's magnetic
field in space by utilizing two satellites, one in a
near-earth orbit and the second in a more distant
orbit. The United States would launch one of
these satellites while the Soviet Union would
launch the other. The data would be exchanged
throughout the world scientific community, and
opportunities for correlation of supporting data
obtained on the ground would be arranged.
i. In the field of experimental communications
by satellite, the United States has already under-
taken arrangements to test and demonstrate the
feasibility of intercontinental transmissions. A
nmuber of countries are constructing equipment
suitable for participation in such testing. I would
welcome the Soviet Union's joining in this co-
operative etfort which will be a step toward meet-
ing the objective, contained in United Nations
General Assembly Resolution 1721 (XVI), that
communications by means of satellites should be
available to the nations of the world as soon as
practicable on a global and non-discriminatory
= For text, see ibid.. Jan. 29, 1962, p. 185.
April 2, 1962
basis. I note also that Secretary Rusk has
broached the subject of cooperation in this field
with Minister Gromyko and that Mr. Gromyko has
expressed some interest. Our technical repre-
sentatives might now discuss specific possibilities
in this field.
5. Given our common interest in manned space
flights and in insuring man's ability to survive
in space and return safely, I propose that we pool
our efforts and exchange our knowledge in the
field of space medicine, where future research can
be pursued in cooperation with scientists from
various countries.
Beyond these specific projects we are prepared
now to discuss broader cooperation in the still
more challenging projects which must be under-
taken in the exploration of outer s^Dace. The tasks
are so challenging, the costs so great, and the risks
to the brave men who engage in space exploration
so grave, that we must in all good conscience try
every possibility of sharing these tasks and costs
and of minimizing these risks. Leaders of the
United States space program have developed de-
tailed plans for an orderly sequence of manned and
unmanned flights for exploration of space and the
planets. Out of discussion of these plans, and of
your own, for undertaking the tasks of this dec-
ade would undoubtedly emerge possibilities for
substantive scientific and technical cooperation in
manned and unmanned space investigations.
Some possibilities are not yet precisely identifi-
able, but should become clear as the space pi'o-
grams of our two countries proceed. In the case
of others it may be possible to start planning to-
gether now. For example, we might cooperate in
unmanned exploration of the lunar surface, or we
might commence now the mutual definition of
steps to be taken in sequence for an exhaustive sci-
entific investigation of the planets Mars or Venus,
including consideration of the possible utility of
manned flight in such programs. When a proper
sequence for experiments has been detennined, we
might share responsibility for the necessary proj-
ects. All data would be made freely available.
I believe it is both appropriate and desirable
that we take full cognizance of the scientific and
other contributions which other states the world
over might be able to make in such programs. As
agreements are reached between us on any parts
of these or similar programs, I propose that we
report them to the United Nations Committee on
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. The Commit-
537
tee offers a variety of additional opportunities for
joint cooperative efforts within the framework of
its mandate as set forth in General Assembly Res-
olutions 1472 (XIV) and 1721 (XVI).
I am designating technical representatives who
will be prepared to meet and discuss with your
representatives our ideas and yours in a spirit of
l^ractical cooperation. In order to accomplish this
at an early date, I suggest that the representatives
of our two countries who will be coming to New
York to take part in the United Nations Outer
Space Committee meet privately to discuss the
proposals set forth in this letter.
Sincerelj',
John ICennedt
His Excellency
NiKiTA S. Khrushchev,
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Moscow.
U.S. and Chile Reach Agreement
on Financing of Development Plan
Press release 155 dated March 9
Following is the text of a joint communique
issued hy representatives of the Governments of
the United States and Chile at Santiago on
March 8.
The representatives of the Government of Chile
and of the Government of the United States have
today concluded an intensive series of discussions
of the economic relations between Chile and the
United States. In these conversations both Gov-
ernments reaffirmed their determination to cooper-
ate in increasing the welfare of the people of the
Americas under the Alliance for Progress. As
a result of these discussions, agreements have
been reached which both Governments believe will
begin a new era in the economic and social devel-
opment of Chile — an era in which (he people of
Chile can look forward to increasing economic
welfai'e within the framework of social justice
and human freedom.
Fron^ this date forward, the United States and
Chile are joined together in a common effort of
unparalleled magnitude and nobility of purpose
to answer the basic aspirations of tlie Chilean peo-
ple for a better life for themselves and their
children. Through this program, the traditional
freedom of the Chilean people will rest on an
ever-widening base of economic progress and
social justice.
Discussions were held concerning the financing
of Chile's long-term, ten-year plan of economic
development — a plan designed to bring about an
unprecedented increase in the welfare of the
Chilean people during the decade of the sixties.
The United States agreed to help provide the
external resources needed for this plan along with
other industrialized coimtries, international insti-
tutions, and private investment. The United
States commitment alone could amount to as
much as $35 million over the first five years of
the plan to finance projects in the public sector.
The long-range development plan has been
submitted by the Government of Chile to the OAS
[Organization of American States] panel of ex-
perts for study, and its future implementation
will take place under their recommendations, and
subject, of course, to the approval of the neces-
sary funds by the governments of the participat-
ing countries, including the Congress of the
United States.
The effort, of assistance by the United States
durmg 1962 will be in the amount of up to $12
million, of which $8 million will be made available
for specific approval of projects designed to have
an early effect in improving the welfare of the
Chilean people. In addition, up to $4 million in
basic and essential foodstuffs will be made avail-
able, the specific amount to be determined by
Chile's ability to absorb these foodstuffs and after
consultation with other friendly governments.
Both the United States and Chile reaffirmed
their dedication to the principles of the Alliance
for Progress as well as their determination to
carry out the commitments which they made in the
Charter of Punta del Este.
The representatives of the United States ex-
pressed, on behalf of their Government, the deep
personal concern of President Kennedy for the
welfare of the people of Chile and his continued
intention to work with the countries of I^atin
America until the last vestige of poverty and
hunger and ignorance has been eliminated from
this Ilemisphei'e.
538
Department of State Bulletin
Fulfilling the Pledges of the Alliance for Progress
Remarks l)y President Kennedy ^
One year ago today I proposed that the people
of this hemisphere join in an Allanza -para el
Progreso ^ — a continent- wide cooperative effort to
satisfy the basic needs of the American people
for homes, work, and land, for health and schools,
for political liberty and the dignity of the spirit.
Our mission, I said, was "to complete the revolu-
tion of the Americas, to build a hemisphere wliere
all men can hope for a suitable standard of living
and all can live out their lives in dignity and in
freedom."
I then requested a meeting of the Inter- Ameri-
can Economic and Social Council to consider the
proposal. And 7 months ago, at Punta del Este,
that Council met and adopted the charter ^ which
established the Alianza fara el Progreso and de-
clared that :
We, the American Republics, hereby proclaim our deci-
sion to unite in a common effort to bring our people ac-
celerated economic progress and broader social justice
within the frameworic of personal dignity and political
liberty.
Together the free nations of the hemispliere
pledged their resources and their energies to the
Alliance for Progress. Together they pledged to
accelerate economic and social development and
to make tlie basic reforms necessary to insure that
all would participate in fruits of this develop-
ment. Together they pledged to modernize tax
structures and land tenure, to wipe out illiteracy
and ignorance, to promote health and provide
decent housing, to solve tlie problems of commod-
ity stabilization, to maintain sound fiscal and
' Made at a White House reception for Latin American
diplomats on Mar. 13 (White House press release).
" Bulletin of Apr. 3, 1961, p. 471.
' For background and text of the charter, see ihiiU, Sept.
11, 1961, p. 4.j9.
monetary policies, to secure the contributions of
private enterprise to development, and to speed
the economic integration of Latin America. And
together they established the basic institutional
framework for this immense, decade-long effort.
This historic charter marks a new step forward
in the relations between the American Republics.
It is a reaffirmation of the continued vitality of
our inter-American system, a renewed proof of
our capacity to meet the challenges and perils of
our time, as our predecessors met the challenge
of their day.
In the late 18th and early 19th century we
struggled to throw off the bonds of colonial rule,
to achieve political independence, and to establish
the principle that never again would the Old
World be allowed to impose its will on the nations
of the New. By the early 19th century these goals
had been achieved.
In the early 20th centuiy we worked to bring
recognition of the fimdamental equality of the
American nations and to strengthen tlio machinery
of regional cooperation which could assure that
continued equality within a framework of mutual
respect. Under the leadership of Franklin Roose-
velt and the good-neighbor policy that goal was
achieved a generation ago.
Today we seek to move beyond these accom-
plishments of the past, to establish the principle
that all the people of this hemisphere are entitled
to a decent way of life, and to transform that prin-
ciple into the reality of economic advance and
social justice on which political equality is based.
This is the most demanding goal of all. For we
seek not merely the welfare and equality of na-
tions but the welfare and equality of the people of
these nations. In so doing we are fulfilling the
ancient dreams of Wasliington and Jefferson, of
Bolivar and Marti and San Martin. And I be-
April 2, 1962
539
lieve that the first 7 montlis of the alliance have
strengthened our confidence that this goal is
witliin our grasp.
Accomplishments of the First 7 Months
Perhaps our most impressive accomplisliment
has been the dramatic shift in thinking and atti-
tudes which has occurred in our hemispliere in
these 7 months. The Charter of Punta del Este
posed the challenge of development in a manner
that could not be ignored. It redefined tlie historic
relationshii>s between the American nations in
terms of the fundamental needs and hopes of the
20th centui-y. It set forth the conditions and atti-
tudes on wliich development depends. It initiated
the process of education, without wliich develop-
ment is impossible. It laid down a new principle
of our relationship — the prmciple of collective re-
sponsibility for the welfare of the people of the
Americas.
Already elections are being fought in terms of
the Alliance for Progress. Already governments
are pledging themselves to carry out the provisions
of the Charter of Punta del Este. Already people
throughout the hemisphere — m schools and in
trade unions, in chambers of commerce and in
military establishments, in government and on the
farms — have accepted the goals of the charter as
their own personal and political commitments.
For tlie first time in the history of inter- American
relations our energies are concentrated on the cen-
tral task of democratic development.
This dramatic change in thought is essential to
the realization of our goals. For only by placing
the task of development in the arena of daily
thought and action can we hope to summon the
unity of will and courage which that task de-
mands. Tliis first accomplisliment is essential to
all the othei-s.
Our second achievement has been the establish-
ment of the mstitutional framework within which
our decade of development will take place. "\Ye
honor here today the OAS [Organization of
American States] panel of experts — a new ad-
venture in inter-American cooperation — drawn
from all pai-ts of the continent, charged with the
high responsibility of evaluating long-range de-
velopment plans, reviewing the progress of those
plans, and helping to obtain tlie financing neces-
sary to caiTy them out. This group has already
begim its work. And here today I reaffirm my
Government's commitment to look to this panel for
advice and guidance in the conduct of our joint
effort.
In addition, the OAS, the Economic Commis-
sion for Latin America, and the Inter-American
Bank have offered planning assistance to Latin
American nations. The OAS has begun a series
of studies in critical development fields, and a new
ECLA planning institute is being established to
train the young men who will lead the future de-
velopment of their countries. And we have com-
pletely reorganized our own assistance program,
with central responsibility now placed in the hands
of a single coordinator.
Thus, within 7 months, we have built the es-
sential structure of institutions, thought, and pol-
icy on which our long-term effort will rest. But we
have not waited for this structure to be completed
in order to begin our work.
Last year I said that my counti-y would commit
$1 billion to the first year of that alliance. That
pledge has now been fulfilled. The Alliance for
Progress has already meant better food for the
children of Puno in Peru, new schools for the
people of Colombia, new homes for campesinos in
Venezuela. And in the year to come millions more
will take new hope from the Alliance for Progress
as it touches their daily life.
In the vital field of commodity stabilization I
pledged the efforts of my countrj- to end the fre-
quent, violent price changes which damage the
economies of many of the Latin American coun-
tries. Immediately aft^'r that pledge was made,
we began work on the task of formulating stabili-
zation agreements. In December 1961 a new coffee
agreement, drafted by a committee under United
States chairmanship, was completed.^ Today that
agreement is in pi'ocess of negotiation. I can think
of no single measure which can make a greater
contribution to the cause of development than ef-
fective stabilization of the price of coffee. In ad-
dition the Ignited States has participated in the
drafting of a cocoa agreement, and we have hold
discussion about the terms of possible accession to
the tin agreement.
'Wo have also been working with our European
allies in a determined effort to insure that Latin
American products will have equal access to the
European Common Market. Much of the eco-
nomic future of this hemisphere depends upon
'For biiekKrouiul, see iliit!.. .Tnii. 12!), 1!>(!2, p. ITS.
540
Department of State Bulletin
ready availability of the markets of tiie Atlantic
community, and Me will continue tliese efforts to
keep these markets open in the months to come.
The countries of Latin America have also been
working to fulfill the commitments of the Cliarter
of Pimta del Este. The report of the Inter-
American Bank contains an impressive list of
measures being taken in each of the IS countries,
measures ranging from the mobilization of do-
mestic resources to new education and housing
programs, measures within the context of the Act
of Bogota and the Alliance for Progress charter.
Nearly all the governments of the hemisphere
have begun to organize national development pro-
grams, and in some cases completed plans have
been presented for review. Tax- and land-reform
laws are on the books, and the national legislature
of nearly every country is considering new meas-
ures in these critical fields. New programs of de-
velopment, of housing, and agriculture and power
are already under way.
Goals To Be Met in the Years Ahead
These are all heartening accomplishments — the
fruits of the first 7 months of work in a program
which is designed to span a decade. But all who
Icnow the magnitude and urgency of the problems
realize that we have just begun, that we must act
much more rapidly and on a much larger scale if
we are to meet our development goals in the yeai^s
to come.
I pledge my own nation to such an intensified
effort. Aiid I am confident that, having emerged
from the shaping period of our alliance, all the
nations of this hemisphere will also accelerate
their work.
For we all know that, no matter what contribu-
tion tlie United States may make, the ultimate
responsibility for success lies with the developing
nation itself. For only you can mobilize the re-
sources, make the reforms, set tlie goals, and pro-
vide the energies which will transform our
external assistance into an effective contribution to
the progress of our continent. Only you can cre-
ate the economic confidence whicli will encourage
the free flow of capital, both domestic and for-
eign — the capital which, under conditions of re-
sponsible investment and together with public
funds, will produce permanent economic advance.
Only you can eliminate the evils of destructive
inflation, chronic trade imbalances, and wide-
spread unemployment. Witliout determined ef-
forts on your part to establisli these conditions
for reform and development, no amount of outside
help can do the job.
I know the difficulties of such a task. Our own
history shows how fierce the resistance can be to
changes whicli later generations regard as part of
the framework of life. And the course of ra-
tional social change is even more hazardous for
those progi-essive governments who often face
entrenched privilege of the right and subversive
conspiracies on the left.
For too long my country, the wealthiest nation
on a poor continent, failed to carry out its full
responsibilities to its sister Republics. We have
now accepted that responsibility. In the same way
those who possess wealth and power in poor na-
tions must accept their own responsibilities.
They must lead the fight for those basic reforms
which alone can preserve the fabric of their own
societies. Those who make peaceful revolution
impossible will make violent revolution inevitable.
These social reforms are at the heart of the Al-
liance for Progress. They are the precondition
to economic modernization. And they are the
instrument by which we assure to the poor and
hungry, to the worker and the campesino, his full
participation in the benefits of our development
and in the human dignity which is the purpose of
free societies. At the same time we sympathize
with the difficulties of remaking deeply rooted and
traditional social stractures. We ask that sub-
stantial and steady progress toward reform ac-
company the effort to develop the economies of
the American nations.
"We Have No Doubt About the Outcome"
A year ago I also expressed our special friend-
ship to the people of Cuba and the Dominican Ee-
public and the hope that they would soon rejoin
the society of free men, uniting with us in our
common effort. Today I am glad to welcome
among us the representatives of a free Dominican
Republic and to reaffirm the hope that, in the not
too distant future, our society of free nations will
once again be complete.
For we must not forget tliat our Alliance for
Progress is more than a doctrine of development —
a blueprint for economic advance. Rather it is an
expression of the noblest goals of our civilization.
It says that want and despair need not be the lot
April 2, 1962
541
of man. It says that no society is free until all
its people have an equal opportunity to sliare the
fruits of their own land and their own labor.
And it says that material progress is meaningless
without individual freedom and political liberty.
It is a doctrine of the freedom of man in the most
spacious sense of that freedom.
Nearly a century ago Jose Hernandez, the Ar-
gentine poet, wrote,
America has a great destiny to achieve in the fate of
mankind. . . . One day . . . the American Alliance will
undoubtedly be achieved, and the American Alliance will
bring world peace. . . . America must be the cradle of the
great principles which are to bring a complete change in
the political and social organization of other nations.
We have made a good start on our journey ; but
we still have far to go. The conquest of poverty
is as difficult as the conquest of outer space. And
we can expect moments of frustration and disap-
pointment in the years to come. But we have no
doubt about the outcome. For all history shows
that the effort to win progress with freedom repre-
sents the most determined and steadfast aspira-
tion of man.
We are joined together in this alliance as na-
tions united by a common history and common
values. And I look forward to the day when the
people of Latin America will take their place be-
side the United States and Western Europe as
citizens of industrialized and growing and in-
creasingly abundant societies. The United States,
Europe, and Latin America — almost a billion
people — a bulwark of freedom and the values of
Western civilization, invulnerable to the forces of
despotism, lighting the path to liberty for all the
peoples of the world — this is our vision, and, with
faith and courage, we will realize that vision in
our own time.
U.S., Mexico Agree To Use Scientists
To Study Salinity Problem
Folloioing is a statement released at Washing-
ton on March 16. A similar statement was re-
leased at Mexico., D.F.., on tlie same date.
White House press release dated March 18
The Presidents of the United States and Mexico
are agreed that it is urgent to find a mutually
satisfactory solution to the salinity problem.'
To this end, the Presidents of both countries,
through their respective Foreign Offices, have
given instructions to their representatives in the
International Boundary and Water Commission
to recommend within 45 days the measures wliich
should be taken.
In order to carry out these instructions in the
most effective way the Commissioners are to avail
themselves of qualified water and soil scientists.
The objective of the two Governments is, with-
out prejudice to the legal rights of either country,
to agree upon and actually put into operation
remedial measures within the shortest possible
period of time.
Pan American Day
and Pan American Week, 1962
A PROCLAMATION'
Whereas April 14, 1962, will be the seventy-second an-
niversary of the establishment by the American Republics
of our inter-American system, now known as the Organ-
ization of American States ; and
Whereas the people and the Government of the United
States are allied with their good neighbors, the other free
Republics of this Hemisphere, in their resolution to remain
free and their obligation to defend the foundations of
freedom ; and
Whereas the free peoples of this Hemisphere have like-
wise joined in an Alliance for Progress with the objective
of homes, work and land, health and schools for all cit-
izens, so that freedom may be assured an environment in
which it can develop and stay strong ; and
Whereas the United States of America throughout these
seventy-two years has supported staunchly those ideals
of cooperation for the common good and solidarity for the
common safeguard, both basic to our inter-American sys-
tem, through which, in the words of the late President
Franklin D. Roosevelt, the peoples of the Americas have
developed a faith in freedom and its fulfillment arising
"from a common hope and a common design given us by
our fathers in differing form but with a simple aim : free-
dom and security of the individual, which has become
the foundation of our peace" :
Now, THEREFORE, I, .ToHN F. KENNEDY, President of the
United States of America, do hereby proclaim Saturday,
April 14, 1962, as Pan American Day, and the period from
April 8 through April 14, 1962, as Pan American Week ;
and I call upon the Governors of the fifty States of the
Union, the Governor of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,
and the Governors of all other areas under the United
States flag to issue similar proclamations.
I also urge all United States citizens and intereste<l
organizations to participate in commemorating Pan
' For background, see Bulletin of Jan. 22, 1962, p. 144.
542
' No. 3452 ; 27 Fed. Reg. 2027.
Department of State Bulletin
American Day and Pan American Weeli in view of the
importance of inter-American friendship to our own na-
tional welfare and that of the neighbor Republics, and
in testimony to the circumstances of culture, geograi>hy,
and history which have allied our destinies as defenders
of liberty within law.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and
caused the Seal of the United States of America to be
affixed.
Done at the City of Washington this 26th day of Feb-
ruary in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred
[seal] and sixty-two, and of the Independence of the
United States of America the one hundred and
eighty-sixth.
By the President :
Dean Rdsk,
Secretary of State.
Report on Foot and IVaouth Disease
Transmitted to Argentina
The Wliite House announced on March 4 that
President Kennedy had on tliat day transmitted
the report of his Scientific Mission on Foot and
Mouth Disease to President Arturo Frondizi of
the Kepublic of Argentina.^
Formation of the mission was first announced
December 14, 1961.^ It came as the result of a re-
quest to President Kennedy by President Frondizi
during his visit to the United States in September
1961.^ The group, headed by J. George Harrar,
president, Rockefeller Foundation, visited the Re-
public of Argentina during January of this year.
Dr. Harrar made a preliminary report to Presi-
dent Kennedy on February 1.
In addition to Dr. Harrar, other members of
this mission were : Samuel A. Goldblith, Depart-
ment of Nutrition, Food Science and Teclinology,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Stewart
H. Madin, professor of microbiology, University
of California, Oakland; Willard O. Nelson, De-
partment of Dairy Science, University of Illinois ;
George Poppensiek, dean. Veterinary College,
Cornell University; Richard E. Shope, Rocke-
feller Institute, New York, N.Y. ; C. K. "VViesman,
Food Research Division, Armour and Company,
' For text of report, see White House press release
dated Mar. 3.
' Bulletin of Jan. 8, 1962, p. 67.
" Ibid., Oct. 30, 1961, p. 719.
Chicago, 111. ; and James B. Hartgering, Office of
the Special Assistant for Science and Technology.
The National Academy of Sciences conducted a
series of meetings beginning March 5 to work out
the technical details of a research program.
President Ahmadou Ahidjo
of Cameroon Visits U.S.
President Ahmadou Ahidjo of the Federal Re-
public of Cameroon visited the United States
March 13-18} Following is the text of a joint
comrrmnique issued at Washington.^ D.C., on
March 1]^ at the close of discussions held hy Presi-
dent Kennedy and President Ahidjo on March 13
and H.
White House press release dated March 14
President Ahmadou Ahidjo, who is making a
five-day visit to the United States as the guest of
President Kennedy, will conclude a two-day stay
in Washington tomorrow and continue his visit in
New York.
Although President Ahidjo has been in this
coimtry before, this is his first voyage to America
since his country became independent and since he
became its first Qiief of State. The visit has given
the two Presidents an opportunity to become per-
sonally acquainted. They have held frank and
cordial discussions covering a wide range of
topics of mutual interest to their countries. Tliese
included a number of world problems, in particu-
lar the means of accelerating the decolonization of
Africa, and also of other parts of the world, and
the consolidation of the independence of young
nations. President Kennedy congratulated Presi-
dent Ahidjo for his successful efforts in the pro-
gressive development of his coimtry, both in
combating internal subversion and in achieving
the reimification of the two parts of Cameroon.
The two Presidents noted with satisfaction the
efforts recently undertaken to create African
imity. In tliis connection President AJiidjo ex-
pressed his satisfaction over the role played by the
United States in the framework of United Nations
action in the Congo in order to hasten the re-
establislunent of the peace and unity of that coun-
try. The United Nations remains, in the view of
both Presidents, the best means whereby nations
' For an announcement of the visit, see Bulletin of
Mar. 12, 1902, p. 418.
April 2, 1962
543
can discuss issues openly, and the best instrument
for finding solutions to problems that menace the
peace of the world.
In the field of cooperation the Presidents noted
that in addition to a continuing program of eco-
nomic aid and technical assistance to the Cameroon
the United States is also preparing to make a loan
to help finance the extension of the trans-
Cameroonian railroad.
The two Presidents agreed to take steps to en-
courage commerce and investment between their
two countries and noted that a United States
Trade Mission is tentatively scheduled to visit
Cameroon in Maj^ 1962.
President Ahidjo and President Kennedy agreed
that the exchange of views made possible by this
visit have reaffinned that their two countries have
many common goals and ideals. They expressed
the conviction that the visit has served to
strengthen and improve the friendly relations be-
tween the United States and the Federal Republic
of Cameroon.
The Challenge of Africa to the Youth of America
iy G. Mennen Williams
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs ^
It is a genuine pleasure to join you at this im-
portant seminar. The fact that this program was
initiated and carried out by students is especially
heartening and, to me, is another strong indication
of the increasingly mature ideas of American
youth.
These ai"e good days to be young. In this coun-
try we are governed by an administration com-
l)Osed of 20th-century men — men youthful in age,
in ideas, and in outlook but not lacking in wisdom
or experience. President Kennedy emphatically
made this point clear in his memorable inaugural
address - when lie said :
. . . the torch has been passed to a new generation of
Americans — born in this century, tempered by war, dis-
ciplined by a hnrd and bitter peace, proud of our ancient
heritage — and unwilling to witness or permit the slow
undoing of those human rights to which this Nation has
always been connuittert, and to which we are committed
today at home and around the world.
In our colleges and universities there are con-
stant reminders that youth is meeting its respon-
sibilities on America's campuses more fully than
'Address made licfore (ho "Africa Speaks" symposium
at Franklin and ilarshall College, Lancaster, Pa., on .AI;ir.
10 (press release K^H dated Mar. !)).
-For text, see IUiu.etin of Feb. 0, 1!H)1, p. 175.
at any time in the past. The intense concern of
today's young men and women with national and
international affairs has been noted with great
interest and satisfaction in Washington.
In Africa, as well, youth is a dominant factor.
Although many parts of this ancient continent
trace their civilizations into antiquity, modern
Africa is basically young in statehood and in
leadership. It is an old continent embarked on a
new chapter in history.
You who have this salutary interest in Africa
are more fortunate than many of your ancestors
in past centuries. Many generations of men and
women have lived their lives through with no sense
of history, with no awareness that the events of
their times would have a profound effect on coimt-
less generations to come. Today's J'outh, however,
knows it is part of a mighty tide of history. Your
generation knows its effort or lack of effort will
largely determine the content of many pages in
tomorrow's history books.
This is especially true for you who demonst rate
an interest in Africa. To you falls the splendid
opportunity to join our African friends and their
young states on a historj'making journey through
the remainder of this century. This is an exciting
challenge for American youth.
Let me touch briefly on the scope of this chal-
544
Department of State Bulletin
lengo and then discuss some of the opportunities
you have for meeting this cliallenge wliile you are
still students.
Size of African Continent
First, there is the question of size, of the vastness
of the continent of Africa. It is difficult for many
people to grasp the reality of Africa's hugeness.
Into this continent — the world's second largest
landmass — could be dropped the 50 United States,
plus India, plus mainland China, plus all of
Europe except the Soviet Union. To go from
north to south or from east to west in Africa you
would have to make a journey equivalent to a
round trip from here to San Francisco.
In this vast area live approximately 230 million
people of diverse racial origin in 52 political enti-
ties. They speak almost 1,000 languages or dia-
lects, and their cultures range from stone-age to
very modern. Of this total only 214 percent are
of European stock. Africa's 29 independent coun-
tries range widely in population — from 35 million
in Nigeria to about I/2 million in Gabon. The
continent's people are about 16 percent Christian,
40 percent Moslem, and 44 percent pagan or
animist.
Vastly wealthy in mineral resources, Africa
accounts for most of the world's production of
mdustrial diamonds, three-fourths of its cobalt,
half of its gold, one-fourth of its copper, and one-
fifth of its uranium and manganese. The conti-
nent has many other important minerals, and new
discoveries of significant oil reserves in the Sa-
hara promise additional wealth. It is rich in
hydroelectric potential, with 40 percent of the
world's total, but less than 1 percent is developed
today.
Agricultural exports also play a major role in
Africa's economy. The continent accounts for 76
percent of world trade in peanuts, 71 percent in
cocoa, 67 percent in wine, and 60 percent in palm
products and sisal.
African diversity can be more readily under-
stood if we view the continent as five major geo-
graphical units.
First there is the predominantly Arab-Berber
North Africa, bounded by the Mediterranean and
the Sahara's vast sea of sand.
Then there is the Horn of Africa — the liigli
Etliiopian plateau and the hot coastal lands of
Eritrea and Somalia.
April 2, 1962
632904—62 3
Third there is savanna Africa, the series of sand
and grassland states running along the bottom of
the Sahara, where indigenous kingdoms floui'ished
in the Middle Ages. This broad belt includes such
fabled cities as Timbuktu, which was an important
university center in the 16th centui^y.
Fourth there is rain-forest Africa, which
stretches from just below Dakar in Senegal to a
little below the mouth of the Congo.
Finally there is mountain Africa. This is the
chain of mountains, high plateaus, and fertile val-
leys starting with the so-called Wliite Highlands
in northern Kenya and running south through
Tanganyika, the Rhodesias, the higlier parts of
the Portuguese territories, and on to Capetown.
African Aspirations
One thing that unites all five of these regions
is the list of desires shai-ed by all Africans. These
aspirations are much the same as those of free
men everywhere.
First and foremost in most African minds is
the desire to win and hold freedom and independ-
ence from colonial rule. In recent years this goal
has been achieved in a rapid and unprecedented
fashion. In 1950 only 4 countries in Africa could
be coimted as independent: Egypt in the north,
Ethiopia in the east, Liberia in the west, and the
Union of South Africa. In the ensuing 12 years,
25 more countries have won their freedom, and
others are on their way.
The relatively peaceful emergence of so many
new nations in so short a span of time is a remark-
ably significant event for the world community —
and it is eloquent testimony to man's desire to
guide his own destiny in a free society. I think
it is also important to note that this transition has
been acliieved, with important exceptions, through
intelligent cooperation between the new states and
the former colonial powers that controlled them.
A second African aspiration is to acliieve a better
standard of living, a goal with wliich we are in
complete accord. The annual income in tropical
Africa is only $89 per person. Taking the conti-
nent as a whole, this figure rises to only $132. To
see this in proper perspective it should be pointed
out that annual income in the Near East is $171
and in Latin America it is $253, and both of tliese
areas are among the lesser developed parts of the
world. Compared with annual incomes of $790
in Europe and $2,500 in the United States, Africa's
545
low level of income is set, in even sharper contrast.
Quite naturally Africans want a better standard
of living and intend to achieve one. To do this,
however, they mu.st solve the problem of obtaining
capital rapidly in large amounts. They must also
face the problem of obtaining technical know-how,
which in most African nations is in very shoit
supply. And they must develop a climate that
will stimulate private investment, a very necessary
commodity if they are to raise their living
standards.
Another major desii'e of Africans is to improve
education in this vast area where 90 percent of the
people are illiterate. Last year I visited 35 coun-
tries in Africa, both independent states and areas
still associated with European powers. I talked
with men and women of all ages and of all social
levels, and I wtis deeply impressed with the burn-
ing desire of the African people for education.
Education is inextricably linked with all the chal-
lenges of African development.
Enlarged educational opportunities have been
given a very high priority by African leadei-s.
They realize, as do we, that if the rising expecta-
tions of the people for a better life with more op-
portunities for individual advancement are to be
met, Africa must have infinitely more educational
facilities — more primary, secondary, and voca-
tional schools, more teachers colleger and technical
institutes, more African univei'sities.
Improved health is a fourth major aspiration in
Africa. African leaders recognize that the inci-
dence of disease and the degree of malnutrition
constitute major roadblocks on Africa's road to
progress. Better housing, improved sanitation,
widespread instruction in personal hygiene, and
l)otable water are important needs to improve
liealth in Africa.
There is deep concern on the part of African
health oiiicials about disease and the need for ex-
panded and improved health services. The size
of the problem is far too large for their own
limited facilities to handle, however.
In addition to the four African aspirations al-
ready mentioned, another — and indeed the most
important of all — is the great desire of Africans
for equal dignity with the rest of mankind. They
have achieved sovereignty, and they insist right-
fully on being treated as sovereign nations. They
can ask for nothing less. Achievement of their
other iispirations means little unless they are ac-
corded the human dignity given to other free and
independent peoples.
This is an especially acute problem for us in the
United States, where we have not yet achieved full
racial equality. Our failures and our faults in
this area often lead us into serious difficulties in
our I'elations with Africans and their desire for
dignity and equality.
It is not enough for us to be concerned solely
with the rights of foreign officials, however. We
must be clear and vigorous in our belief that our
own citizens are assured of treatment equal to that
won for foreign visitors. The challenge, then, is
to find lasting ways of erasing all barriers of race
in America.
U.S. Policy Toward Africa
In tlie light of the aspirations of the people of
Africa you might well ask what we are doing about
(hem and how we support them.
What is our policy toward Africa? Are we
backing our words with deeds ? I think the record
will show that we are.
Our foreign policy is deeply imbedded in a
series of historic beliefs that we hold dearly. Of
these beliefs, self-detemiination is one of the most
important. In fact the veiy basis of world order
is a universal recognition of tlie rights of people
to determine the kind of government under which
they want to live.
This country seeks to evaluate its policies to-
ward Africa on the basis of these principles, judg-
ing each individual case and problem on its merits.
We have no pat formulas to apply in Africa, nor
do we seek to impose any particular blueprint of
our own. Instead we shall stand by our beliefs
and try to use our influence wisely with those men
of good will, of all races and creeds, in whose hands
I lie future of Africa rests.
This has been best expressed in President Ken-
nedy's second state of the Union message,^ when
he said:
. . . our basic goal remains the same : a peaceful world
coiiiniuiiily of free aud independent states, free to choose
their own future aud their own sjstoni so Ions as it does
not threaten the freedom of others.
Some may choose forms and ways we would not choose
for ourselves, but It is not for us that they are choosing.
We can welcome diversity — the Communists cannot. For
we offer a world of choice — tliey offer the world of coer-
cion. And the way of the past shows dearly thai freedom,
not coercion, is the wave of the future.
" For text, see ibiil., Jan. 29, 19C2, p. 159.
546
Department of State Bulletin
In ciirrying out our basic goals old programs
liavo been strengtlipned and new progi'anis started.
I think our deeds fully back up our words in this
vital area. Let me list some of these deeds briefly.
Our support of freedom for African nations has
been clearly demonstrated by our program in the
United Nations.
The United States supports improved standards
of living in Africa. In 1961 our aid totaled about
$215 million. This is a start, but it is not enough
when we consider that the French and British are
still supplying nearly $700 million worth of aid to
Africa.
We favor increased private investment in
Afi-ica.
We encourage student exchange. Approxi-
mately 3,000 Africans are studying in the United
States this year, ranging from advanced graduate
students through undergraduates who are just
learning English. Again, however, our Western
allies are showing us the way, largely because of
their long and extensive association with African
territories. There are some 12,000 Africans study-
ing in the United Kingdom and another sizable
group studying in France.
Our new Agency for International Development
is emphasizing long-term development loans,
stressing economic instead of military aid, and
developing individual plans to meet the individual
needs of African nations.
The newly expanded Food-for-Peace Pi'ogram
includes lunches for children, wages for economic
development, relief for disaster victims, and a bet-
ter diet for millions.
The newly conceived Peace Corps is supplying
trained and dedicated men and women to help in
the building of better societies and gives a glimpse
of American idealism as well. Today 107 Peace
Corps volunteers are at work in Nigeria, 51 in
Ghana, 37 in Sierra Leone, and 35 in Tanganyika,
adding up to a creditable total of 2'30 already
trained and at work in the field. There is much
more that will be done, however. The large
volmne of requests from the African nations has
created unlimited possibilities both in numbers of
volunteei-s and types of Peace Corps activity.
Community development, agricultural extension,
English language instruction, vocational educa-
tion, adult education, and primary and university
education are but a few of the areas of concentra-
tion for future planned programs.
Problems Remaining in the Congo
It is obvious that all our policies regarding
Africa have not met and, in the nature of things,
cannot always meet with speedy results, however.
Here I have in mind, for example, our experience
in the Congo. Although much remains to be done
there, we believe that our policy of support for the
U.N. Operation, parliamentary govormnent, and
the territorial integrity of the country has none-
theless led to substantial progress over the past 15
months. We continue to support the peacekeeping
and nationbuilding operation of the U.N. in the
Congo.
Just a year ago the Congo was badly split into
pro-Western and pro-Communist camps. The
Communist bloc and a few other countries had
recognized the Stanleyville regime of Antoine Gi-
zenga as the country's legal government, and Moise
Tshombe had created further disunity with his
secessionist movement in Katanga.
This was a highly charged situation that could
have been further aggravated if Katanga's at-
tempt at secession had been supported by the West.
Instead, the United Nations prevented the Com-
munist bloc from supplying direct aid to Stanley-
ville, discouraged conflict between warring par-
ties, and brought about a peaceful solution to the
crisis through a meeting of Parliament at Lovan-
ium University. From this meeting, anti-Commu-
nist Cyrille Adoula emerged as Prime Minister
of a moderate coalition government. Despite the
best efforts of the Leopoldville group, the United
Nations, and the West, Mr. Tshombe's supporters
failed to participate and thereby passed up an
opportimity to strengthen the anti-Communist
forces and join in assuring a stable, independent,
and rmited Congo. Even without Mr. Tshombe's
cooperation, however. Prime Minister Adoula has
brought the rebellion of Mr. Gizenga to an end —
and with it a major opportunity for Soviet pene-
tration in central Africa.
The issue today remains the reintegration of Ka-
tanga into the central government. A little more
than 2 months ago, at Kitona, Mr. Tshombe agreed
to take such a step. We welcome the recent an-
nouncement that Prime Minister Adoula and Mr.
Tshombe will meet in Leopoldville next week. It
is most important that at this meeting both Con-
golese leaders pursue promptly the statesmanlike
work begun at Kitona for the peaceful reintegra-
tion of the Katanga.
April 2, ?962
547
Peaceful solutions to problems remaining in the
Congo are not easy and obviously camiot be ac-
complished overnight. The road ahead will be
a rough one and will require all the concerted ef-
fort we can muster, but we are convinced that it
can be traveled — in fact, must be traveled — suc-
cessfully if we are to bring this tragic chapter in
African history to a satisfactory end.
These, then, are the forces at work in Africa
and a brief summary of what the United States is
trying to do to help Africans achieve their legiti-
mate aspirations in peace and freedom.
Opportunities for American Students
Now, what can American youth do to help in
this enormous task? In view of your enterprise
in organizing this symposiiun, I suspect this par-
ticular audience may have a good many ideas of
its own on how to further this country's African
policies.
You can, however, inform yourselves on foreign
policy issues and as good citizens help formulate
and support apjiropriate programs.
There are also a few thoughts I would like to
suggest to you in the field of education, which is
one of the principal building blocks of our foreign
policy in Africa at the present time.
Wliat, for example, should comprise the ele-
ments of good human relations with African stu-
dents attending our colleges and universities?
Here we have a group of 3,000 students leaving
their homes and friends and crossing a vast ocean
to study among strangers. I think American stu-
dents have a wonderful opportunity to further our
foreign policy objectives by strengthening their
bonds with the African students in their midst.
Today's young Americans are in an excellent posi-
tion to foster a wide range of improved human
and intergroup relations among students and
scholars from both continents.
Within that framewoi-k American students
might look into the question of hospitality in its
broadest sense, something beyond routine coffee-
and-doughnut entertainment. There is the whole
area of helping African students adjust easily to
American campuses — housing adjustments, ad-
justments to campus social life, classroom adjust-
ments, adjustments to our kind of examinations.
This is a broad field with many opportunities for
American students.
There is also the area of financial support.
What kinds of things can African students do to
help themselves financially ? Some of them come
to this country inadequately prepared to maintain
themselves throughout college. They run into
difficulties because they have nothing more to
sustain them than a burning ambition to get an
education in the United States and return to
render services to their countries.
Can students organize work opportunities for
the more deserving African students who are the
victims of a background of poverty ? Your organ-
ized eiforts could help them find suitable siunmer
employment or much-needed part-time work to
carry them through the school year. There is also
the question of tutorial assistance, which they
might need urgently and yet be unable to afi^ord.
Study and discussion groups would also be val-
uable to both American and African students. A
mutual exchange of ideas and information could
lead both parties to rich and rewarding college ex-
periences. It would be very valuable, too, to open
such meetings to residents of campus communities
and broaden the range of contacts.
Another possibility would be for college groups
to sponsor study tours in African countries. Such
toure could be organized as sununer activities and
could be conducted by African students who are
knowledgeable in the life of their societies. This
would be a formidable imdertaking for students
to carry out alone, I realize. Perhaps canapus
communities could be interested in "adopting"
African cities of similar size and interests. I am
sure the Department of State would be willing to
discuss the working out of the many details in-
volved in such a program. In this connection you
might want to cooperate with the progi-ams spon-
sored by the Experiment in International Living,
which last summer and fall assisted in shipboard
orientation and provided 1-month sojourns with
American families for 221 African students.
It is a vei-y worthwhile endeavor to bring Afri-
can students into average American homes to show
them American life as it is really lived. Too often
they draw their image of the American family
from motion pictures or television and sometimes
fail to recognize the strong bonds of affection and
respect that really characterize the American
family.
Tlie Operation Crossroads type of activity offers
a splendid opportunity for American students to
make a contribution to better international under-
standing. Working with African students, Amer-
548
Department of State Bulletin
icaus could select and ship significant study and
reading materials to African countries to give
them a better understanding of some of tlie great
writings of Western civilization.
Then there is Government work itself to con-
sider between college years or when students fuiish
tlieir formal education. The opportmiities to serve
tiiis country in the Peace Corps are unique in our
history, and the young men and women who go
into this vital occupation can make important con-
tributions to the future welfare of the United
States.
There are also summer opportunities in the Gov-
ernment, where students can get a firsthand under-
standing of many of the intricate problems we
must deal with on a day-to-day basis. This would
be invaluable training to take back to the campus
in the fall, and it certainly would suggest new
ways in which American students can support our
national goals.
These are only a few thoughts on how American
students can participate in the exciting business of
international relations on a student-to-student
basis. But they are all activities suitable for
young adults, and their successful accomplishment
could have a vei"y favorable impact on our overall
African policies.
The young Africans with whom American stu-
dents work and live today will be among the
leadei-s of Africa tomorrow. Their impressions
of America and the lasting friendships they make
while they ai-e in this coimtry could be decisive
factors in the success or failure of our foreign
policy over the next several decades. Their i-ecep-
tion here might even make the difference between
war and peace in the years ahead.
I am happy, therefore, to see the healthy interest
in Africa here today. You have made an excellent
beginning in building new bridges of friendship
across the broad Atlantic. I hope you will con-
tinue this fine work throughout your lives.
Foreign Policy Briefings for Visitors
to Wasliington Begin at Department
Press release 161 dated March 12
The Department of State is initiating on March
12 regularly scheduled foreign policy briefings for
visitors to Washington in response to interest ex-
pressed by Membeis of Congress in behalf of their
constituents. These briefings will be held each
Monday, Wednesday, and Friday at 9 :30 a.m. in
the East Auditorium of the Department. The
briefings will include a discussion of the making of
foreign policy, the organization and functions of
the Department of State and Foreign Service, and
current foreign policy developments.
President Discusses Trade Matters
With Australian Deputy Premier
John McEicen, Australian Deputy Prime Min-
ister and Minister for Trade, was in Washington
March 9-11}. and talked with President Kennedy,
Acting Secretary of State Ball, Secretary of the
Treasury Douglas Dillon, and Under Secretary of
Agriculture Charles S. Murphy. Following is the
text of a joint statement released at the close of his
meeting with the President on March llf..
White House press release dated March 14
The President today conferred with the Aus-
tralian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for
Trade, the Right Honorable Jolin McEwen.
Mr. McEwen, who was accompanied by the Aus-
tralian Ambassador to the United States, Sir
Howard Beale, reviewed with the President the
importance to Australia of a number of current
developments in the international trade and com-
modity policy fields, including developments re-
lating to the European Economic Community, and
the considerable degree of common interest of the
United States and Australia on these questions.
The President and the Deputy Prime Minister
agreed that an economically strong and develop-
ing Australia is essential to the best interests of
both coujitries in the Southwest. Pacific and ex-
pressed mutual confidence in the continuing close
identity of view which each countiy shares on
matters of common concern.
Mr. McEwen is on his way to Europe, where he
will meet representatives of the British Govern-
ment and a number of European Governments for
discussions on the subject of Britain's proposed
enti-y into the European Common Market.
Apr// 2, 1962
549
THE CONGRESS
Foreign Economic and Military Assistance Program
for Fiscal Year 1963
MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT TO THE CONGRESS <
To the Congress of the United States :
Last year this Nation dedicated itself to a
"decade of development," designed to help the new
and developing states of the world grow in politi-
cal independence, economic welfare, and social
justice.
Last September, in support of this effort, the
Congress enacted fundamental changes in our pro-
gram of foreign assistance.^
Last November the executive branch drastically
reorganized and restaffed this program in accord-
ance with the congressional mandate.^
Today the "decade" is only 4 months old. It
would surely be premature to make any claims of
dramatic results. Our new aid program, ad-
dressed to the specific needs of individual coun-
tries for long-term development, presupposes basic
changes, careful planning, and gradual achieve-
ment. Yet these few months have shown signifi-
cant movement in new directions. The turnaround
has begim.
Our new aid policy aims at strengthening the
political and economic independence of developing
countries — which means strengthening their ca-
pacity both to master the inherent stress of rapid
change and to repel Conmiunist efforts to exploit
such stress from within or without. In the frame-
work of this broad policy, economic, social, and
military development take their proper place. In
Washington our aid operations have been largely
unified under the direction of the Administrator
of the Agency for International Development.
Recipient countries are improving their planning
mechanisms, devising country development plans,
and beginning extensive programs of self-lielp and
self-reform. In addition to long-range programs
developed with India, Nigeria, and others we have,
under the new authority granted by the Congress,
entered into a new type of long-term commitment
with two nations — Pakistan and Tanganyika —
after the most painstaking review of their jDroposed
development plans, and others will follow. In
addition to placing emphasis on the improvement
of internal security forces, we are giving increased
attention to the contribution wliich local militaiy
forces can make through civic action programs to
economic and social development.
In financing these programs, we are relying
more heavily than before on loans repayable in
dollars. Other institutions are joming with us
in this effort — not only private institutions but
also the United Nations, the International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development, the Organi-
zation of American States and the Inter- Ameri-
can Development Bank. We have urged other
industrialized countries to devote a larger share
of their resources to the provision of capital to the
less developed nations. Some have done so — and
we are hopeful that the rest will also recognize
their stake in the success and stability of the
emerging economies. We are continuing, in view
of our balance-of-payments situation, to empha-
size procurement within the LTnited States for
most goods required by the program. And we ai'c
working toward strengthening the foreign ex-
change position of the emerging coimtries by en-
couraging the development of new trade patterns.
The proposed new Trade Expansion Act is a most
important tool in facilitating this trend.*
Arucli more, of coui-se, could be said. But hav-
ing set forth last year in a series of messages and
' H. Doc. 362, 87th Cong., 2fl se.ss. ; transmitted on
Mnr. 13.
■ Public Law 87-19.5.
' Bulletin of Nov. 27, 1961, p. 900.
* For text of the Pre.'sident's message to the Congress
proiiosing new foreign trade legislation, see ibid., Feb.
12, 1962, p. 231.
550
Department of Sfafe Bulletin
addresses on foreign aid tlie fjjoals we seek and the
tools we need, it is not necessary to repeat to tlie
Congress this year our Nation's basic interest in
the development and freedom of olher nations —
or to review all of the initiatives launched under
last year's programs. The Congress is familiar
with these arguments and programs, as well as its
own role and contribution in enacting long-term
financing authority. Thus the foreign aid legis-
lation submitted this year does not requii'e recon-
sideration of these questions. It is instead limited
primarily to the new authorizations required an-
nually under the terms of last year's law. The
only major change proposed is the establishment
of a separate long-term alliance for progress fund.
The total amounts requested were included in the
Federal budget previously submitted for fiscal
1963 and the authorizing legislation enacted last
year, and have in fact been reduced in some in-
stances. They cannot, I believe, be further re-
duced if the partnership on which we are now em-
barked — a joint endeavor with each developing
nation and with each aid-giving nation — is to dem-
onstrate the advances in human well-being which
flow from economic development joined with po-
litical liberty. For we should know by now that
where weakness and dependence are not trans-
formed into strength and self-reliance, we can
expect only chaos, and then tyranny to follow.
II
Because development lending and militaiy as-
sistance appropriations for fiscal year 1963 were
authorized in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,
no new authorizations for these two programs ai'e
needed. I am proposing new authorization and
appropriation of $335 million for development
grants; $481.5 million for supporting assistance;
$148.9 million for contributions to international
organizations; $100 million for investment guar-
antees; $400 million for the contingency fund;
and $60 million for administrative costs and other
programs. I am also proposing appropriations
for 1963 of $2,753 million, including the $1,250
million already authorized for development lend-
ing, and $1,500 million ($200 million below that
authorized) for military assistance. The total ap-
propriation request for the foreign economic and
military assistance program for fiscal year 1963 is
$4,878 million.
These recommendations are based upon a care-
ful examination of the most urgent needs of each
country and area. Each of these forms of a.ssist-
ance, in these amounts, is essential to the achieve-
ment of our overall foreign assistance objectives.
The total is less than the estimates in the budget
because of a reduction in my request for support-
ing assistance.
One item in particular deserves attention. The
past year has amply demonstrated that rapid and
unpredictable changes in the world situation of
direct interest to our security cannot be foreseen or
predicted accurately at the time Congress acts
upon the appropriations. I therefore urge the
Congress to recognize this need for flexibility to
meet contingencies and emergencies and to approve
the full authorization and appropriation requested
of $400 million.
Ill
The Charter of Piuita del Este which last Au-
gust established the alliance for progress is the
framewoi-k of goals and conditions for what has
been called "a peaceful revolution on a hemi-
spheric scale." ^
That revolution had begun before the charter
was drawn. It will continue after its goals are
reached. If its goals are not achieved, the revolu-
tion will continue but its methods and results will
be tragically different. Histoi-y has removed for
governments the margin of safety between the
peaceful revolution and the violent revolution.
The luxury of a leisurely interval is no longer
available.
These were the facts recognized at Pmita del
Este. These were the facts that dictated the terms
of the charter. And these are the facts which re-
quire our participation in this massive cooperative
effort.
To give this program the special recognition
and additional resources which it requires, I there-
fore propose an authorization of $3 billion for the
alliance for progress for the next 4 years. Of the
$3 billion, an authorization and appropriation of
$600 million is being requested for 1963, with up
to $100 million to be used for grants and the bal-
ance of $500 million or more for development
loans. This authorization will be separate from
and supplementary to the $6 billion already au-
thorized for loans for development for 1963
through 1966, which will remain available for use
throughout the world.
° For background and text of the charter, see ihid.,
Sept. 11, 1961, p. 4.59.
April 2, 1962
5S1
During the year beginning last March over $1
billion has been committed in Latin America by
the United States in support of the alliance, ful-
filling the pledge we made at the first Punta del
Este meeting, and launching in a veiy real way
for this hemisphere a dramatic decade of develop-
ment. But even with this impressive support, the
destiny of the alliance lies largely in the hands of
the countries themselves. For even large amounts
of external aid can do no more than provide the
margin which enables each country through its
own determination and action to achieve lasting
success.
The United States recognizes that it takes
time — to develop careful programs for national
development and the administrative capacity
necessary to carry out such a progi-am — to go
beyond the enactment of land reform measures
and actually transfer tlie land and make the most
productive use of it — to pass new tax laws and
then achieve their acceptance and enforcement. It
is heartening, therefore, that the changes called
for by the alliance for progress have been the
central issue in several Latin American elec-
tions — demonstrating that its effects will be deep
and real. Under the Oi'ganization of American
States, nine outstanding economists and develop-
ment advisers have begun to assist countries in
critically reviewing their plans. Three Latin
American countries have already completed and
submitted for review their plans for the more
effective mobilization of their resources toward
national development. The others are creating
and strengthening their mechanisms for develop-
ment planning. A number of Latin American
countries have already taken significant stejas to-
ward land or tax reform; and throughout the
region there is a new ferment of activity, centered
on improvements in education, in rural develop-
ment, in public administration, and on other essen-
tial institutional measures required to give a sound
basis for economic growth.
But more important still is the changed atti-
tudes of peoples and governments already notice-
able in Latin America. The alliance has fired
the imagination and kindled the hopes of millions
of our good neighbors. Their drive toward mod-
ernization is gaining momentum as it imleashcs
the energies of these millions; and the United
States is becoming increasingly identified in the
minds of the people with the goal they move to-
ward: a better life with freedom. Our hand —
extended in help — is being accepted without loss
of dignity.
But the alliance is barely underway. It is a task
for a decade, not for a year. It requires further
changes in outlook and policy by all American
states. New institutions will need to be formed.
New plans — if they are to be serious — will have
to assume a life other than on paper.
One of the brightest pages of the world's history
has been the series of programs this Nation has
devised, established, and implemented following
the Second World "War to help free peoples achieve
economic development and the control of their
own destinies. These programs, which have been
solidly based on bipartisan support, are the proud
manifestations of our deep-seated love and pur-
suit of freedom for individuals and for nations.
I realize that there are among us those who are
weary of sustaining this continual effort to help
other nations. But I would ask them to look at
a map and recognize that many of those whom
we help live on the "front lines" of the long twi-
light struggle for freedom — that others are new
nations posed between order and chaos — and the
rest are older nations now undergoing a turbident
transition of new expectations. Our efforts to help
them help themselves, to demonstrate and to
strengthen the vitality of free institutions, are
small in cost compared to our military outlays for
the defense of freedom. Yet all of our armies
and atoms combined will be of little avail if these
nations fall, unable to meet the needs of their own
people, and unable to stave off within their borders
the rise of forces that threaten our security. This
program — and the passage of this bill — are vital
to the interests of tlie United States.
"Wo are, I am confident, e<]ual to our respon-
sibilities in tliis area — responsibilities as compel-
ling as any our Nation has known. Today, we are
still in the first months of a decade's sustained
effort. But I can report that our efforts are under-
way; tlicy are moving in the right direction; they
are gaining momentum daily; and they have al-
ready begun to realize a small part of their great
potential. The turnaround has indeed begun.
John F. Kennedy
The WiurE House,
March 13, 1962.
552
Department of Stale Bulletin
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
U.N. General Assembly Rejects Cuban Charges
Against United States
Following are statements made hy Adlai E.
Stevenson and Francis T. P. PUmjJton, U.S.
Representatives to the U.N. General Assernily.
STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR STEVENSON'
As we approach at last the end of this pro-
longed and unnecessary debate, I should like to
try to place the Cuban charge against my country
in its proper perspective. Up to now the 16th
General Assembly has compiled a creditable
record. We have dealt reasonably and responsi-
bly, I believe, with the prior items on our agenda,
and I think this is because the prior items were
worthy of responsible discussion and of responsi-
ble action. Now, however, this Assembly, at its
very end, has been forced to deal for 10 precious
days with cold-war propaganda charges that are
botli irresponsible, misupported, and wholly false.
This item has been placed on our agenda by
Cuba not as an emergency, as its language sug-
gests, but last August. And now, 6 months after
this supposedly urgent item was inscribed, the
members of this committee have been obliged to
listen to repetitive and interminable harangues
which have produced all of the abusive, the false,
and the tired phrases in the Communist lexicon —
but nothing resembling proof of the charges.
We have even been told that the American
worker owes his automobile, his house, his dish-
washer, ancl his refrigerator to the Eussian revolu-
tion. Well, I suppose, Mr. Chairman, that we
Americans should be thankful that our Communist
friends have taken such good care of us first while
neglecting themselves !
But we are not thankful for this intolerable
imposition on the patience of this committee nor
for this gross misuse of the machinery of the
United Nations, which is not only a waste of the
General Assembly's time but also an invitation to
the detractors of the United Nations to heap fresh
ridicule on our organization.
Our charter, Mr. Chairman, speaks of this place
as a "center for harmonizing the actions of na-
tions." Could anything be more disharmonizing
than the mibridled vituperation to which we have
been subjected by the Castro delegation and its
Communist colleagues? That charges of aggi-es-
sion and intervention — unsupported by evidence
and squarely denied— can be dredged up, after
lying dormant for 6 months, and be solenmly
paraded for 10 days before the representatives of
104 nations cannot enhance the reputation of this
organization for seriousness or efhciency. And
what a pity that at a time when there are some
signs of sincere efforts to diminish the tensions
between my country and the Soviet Union, the
latter should have ordered its satellites to unleash
such an unprincipled, unjustified, unsupported
attack on the United States!
Now, what is tlie reason for this outburst of
cold-war violence after this item has been pending
for 6 months'?
Clearly it is an attempt to drown in a torrent of
words the unanimous — and I say unanimous — con-
clusion of the American Republics that it is the
Communist offensive, of which Cuba is a part,
which is trying to intervene in tlie domestic affairs
of the American Republics and to destroy their
free democratic institutions.^ It is an attempt to
obscure the unanimous — and again I say unani-
mous — decision reached at Punta del Este by all
of the American Republics that the Castro regime
' Made in Committee I (Political and Security) on Feb.
14 (U.S. delegation press release 3925).
^ For statements made by Secretary Ruslc at the Eighth
Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs
of the American Republics and texts of resolutions, see
Bulletin of Feb. 19, 1962, p. 270.
April 2, 1962
553
is incompatible with tlie principles and the objec-
tives of the inter- American system.
What precisely were these two unanimous deci-
sions that they want to obscure and hide ?
OAS Decision on Communist Offensive in America
The first decision is found in Resolution I, en-
titled "Communist Offensive in America," con-
tained in document S/5075, the Punta del Este
Final Act, and I should like to read you para-
graphs 1, 2, and 3 of that unanimous resolution :
1. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of tlie American
Kepublics, convened in their Eighth Meeting of Consulta-
tion, declare that the continental unity and the democratic
institutions of the hemisphere are now in danger.
The Ministers have been able to verify that the sub-
versive offensive of communist Governments, their agents
and the organizations which they control, has increased in
intensity. The purpose of this offensive is the destruction
of democratic institutions and the establishment of
totalitarian dictatorships at the service of extra-
continental powers. The outstanding facts in this intensi-
fied offensive are the declarations set forth in ofiicial
documents of the directing bodies of the international
communist movement, that one of its principal objectives
is the establishment of communist regimes in the under-
developed countries and in Latin America ; and the
existence of a Marxist-Leninist government in Cuba which
is publicly aligned with the doctrine and foreign policy of
the communist powers.
2. In order to achieve their subversive purposes and
hide their true intentions, the communist governments and
their agents exploit the legitimate needs of the less-
favored sectors of the population and the just national
aspirations of the various peoples. With the pretext of
defending popular interests, freedom is suppressed, demo-
cratic institutions are destroyed, human rights are
violated and the individual is subjected to materialistic
ways of life imposed by tlie dictatorship of a single party.
Under the slogan of "anti-iniiJerialism" they try to estab-
lish an oppressive, aggressive imperialism, which sub-
ordinates the subjugated nations to the militaristic and
aggressive interests of extra-continental powers. By
maliciously utilizing the very principles of the Inter-
American system, they attempt to undermine democratic
institutions and to strengthen and protect political
penetration and aggression. The subversive methods of
communist governments and their agents constitute one
of the most subtle and dangerous forms of intervention in
the internal affairs of other countries.
3. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs alert the peoples of
the hemisphere to the intensification of the subversive
offensive of communist governments, their agents, and
the organizations that they control and to the tactics and
methods that they employ and also warn them of the
dangers this situation represents to representative democ-
racy, to respect for human rights, and to the self-determi-
nation of peoples.
The principles of communism are incompatible with the
priniii)les of the Inter-American system.
Castro's Ttireat to Western Hemisphere Security
These, gentlemen, are the words of the foreign
ministers of all of the American Republics — ex-
cept for Cuba. These words were based on a mass
of evidence accumulated over the years by the Or-
ganization of American States and by the member
states themselves, and in particular on a report of
the Inter- American Peace Committee, which was
dated January 14, 1962.
The facts are clear that the Castro regime, with
the assistance of local Communist parties, is em-
ploying a wide variety of techniques and practices
to overthrow the free democratic institutions of
Latin America. It is bringing hundreds of Latin
American students, labor leaders, intellectuals,
and dissident political leaders to Cuba for indoc-
trination and for training to be sent back to their
countries for the double purpose of agitating in
favor of the Castro regime and undermining their
own governments. It is fostering the establish-
ment in other Latin American countries of so-
called "Committees of Solidarity with the Cuban
Revolution" for the same dual purpose. Cuban
diplomatic personnel encourage and finance agita-
tion and subversion by dissident elements seeking
to overthrow established government by force.
The Cuban regime is flooding the hemi.spliere
with profDaganda and with printed material. The
recent inauguration of a powerful shortwave radio
station in Cuba now enables the regime to broad-
cast its propaganda to every corner of the hemi-
sphere, and these broadcasts have not hesitated to
call for the violent overthrow of established gov-
ernments. Such appeals have been directed to
Peru, Brazil, Guatemala, and, most recently, the
Dominican Republic. On January 22, 19G2, Radio
Habana beamed a broadcast to the Dominican Re-
public calling on the people to "overthrow the
Coinicil of State" — the very democratic council
which is now expressing the will of the Dominican
people to be free of the last remnants of the Tru-
jillo dictatorship.
The military training of I^atin Americans in
Cuba by the Castro regime, and the wide distribu-
tion throughout the hemisphere of the treatise on
guerrilla warfare by "Che" Guevara, Castro's
chief lieutenant, are clear evidence that the Ctistro
regime is bent on guerrilla operations as another
554
Department of Stale Bulletin
important device for gaining its objectives. The
large amounts of arms wliich Castro boasts of
having obtained from the Communist military
bloc place him in a position to support such opera-
tions, and, in fact, we have seen him aiding or
supporting armed invasions in other Caribbean
countries, notably Panama and the Dominican
Eepublic. If vce are to believe Castro's threats
made prior to and during the Punta del Este con-
ference, there will almost certainly be further
Cuban-inspired guerrilla operations against its
Latin American neighbors.
Now, what this means, Mr. Chairman, is that
Cuba today represents a bridgehead of Sino-Soviet
imperialism in the Western Hemisphere and a base
for Communist aggression, intervention, agitation,
and subversion against the American Republics.
It is small wonder that the American Republics
unanimously recognize that this situation is a
serious threat to their security and the ability of
their peoples to choose freely their own form of
government and to pursue freely their goals of
economic well-being and of social justice. It is
small wonder that they unanimously adopted the
resolution I have just quoted in part and small
wonder that the Communists are throwing up a
smokescreen in an attempt to conceal that
mianimity.
Cuban Regime IncompatibleiWith American System
Xow, what was the second unanimous decision
that they want to conceal ?
It is found in the first two operative paragraphs
of Resolution VI of the Punta del Este Final Act,
entitled "Exclusion of the Present Government of
Cuba From Participation in the Inter- American
System."
I read as follows from that resolution :
1. Tliat adherence by any member of the Organization
of American States to Marxism-Leninism is incompatible
with the inter-American system and the alignment of
such a government with the communist bloc breaks the
unity and solidarity of the hemisphere.
2. That the present Government of Cuba, which has
officially identified itself as a Marxist-Leninist govern-
ment, is incompatible with the principles and objectives of
the inter- American system.
Those paragraphs, Mr. Chairman, were agreed
to by the unanimous vote of the 20 American
Republics, with Cuba alone dissenting. "We have
then a unanimous decision that the Cuban regime
has made itself incompatible with the inter- Ameri-
can system.
There were two further operative paragraphs,
which I quote :
That this incompatibility excludes the present Govern-
ment of Cuba from participation in the inter-American
system.
That the Council of the Organization of American States
and the other organs and organizations of the inter-
American system adopt without delay tlie measures neces-
sary to carry out this resolution.
As to these two paragraphs, 14 comitries — that
is to say, two-thirds of the membership — voted in
favor, 1 against — Cuba — and 6 abstained — Argen-
tina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Bolivia, and Ecuador.
Their abstention, as has been made clear, in no way
affects the decision that the Castro regime is in-
compatible with the American system of demo-
cratic freedom but merely evidenced doubts as to
the legal procedures involved in the exclusion
caused by the incompatibility.
Unsupported Claims of U.S. Aggressive Plans
Now, so much for the Punta del Este decisions
that Castro is trying to hide by the unsupported
claun that the United States is now planning
aggression against Cuba. Wliat supposed items of
evidence has the Cuban representative produced
to substantiate that wild claim ? Only two.
First, he says that on October 9, 19G1, "the
revolutionary government denounced the military
bases, both within and without the United States,
listing those in which the American Government
trained mercenaries in order to use them against
our coimtry." This ex parte declaration by the
revolutionary government of Cuba is followed by
a list of most of the noted Florida winter resorts,
such as West Palm Beach, Fort Lauderdale,
Hollywood, St. Petersburg, and so forth.
I have no doubt that the Castro government did
"denounce" these localities, for certainly denuncia-
tion is a daily pastime in Habana these days. But
denunciation is not proof, and they have not pro-
duced a shred of evidence that the United States
Government is training anyone anywhere to attack
Cuba. And I in turn denoimce any such absurd
denunciations.
Secondly, the Castro representative quoted from
the New York Times of December 23, 1961, where
April 2, J 962
555
one Luis Manuel Martinez, presiunably a Cuban,
is said to have stated that "nearly 400 exile fighters
have left Guatemala in the last six weeks for the
United States for eventual duty as guerrillas in
Cuba." It may very well be tliat a Cuban patriot
may have made such a statement, but I repeat that
the United States is not training any Cuban exile
fighters anywhei'e to attack Cuba.
Now, these two items, Castro's own assertion and
the Martinez quotation, are the only — literally
only — supposed evidence advanced for the charge
that the United States is now planning aggi-ession
against Cuba.
And here I want to repeat that all of the charges
that the Castro regime has made against the
United States in this room were made at Punta del
Este — every one — and that the American Repub-
lics, who of all people know the facts as to what
goes on in this hemisphere, brushed these charges
aside, just as they should be brushed aside here in
this committee.
Now that the Castro representative has brouglit
up the New York Times of December 23, 1961, I
would like to call the committee's attention to
another item in that same issue which the Cuban
representative did not see fit to quote. That item
is a report from Ilabana quoting Castro as having
said on the previous day, December 22, that he
was a "Marxist-Leninist" during his mountain
guerrilla warfare days and that he had hidden the
fact "because otherwise he would not have been
able to press his revolution to a successful conclu-
sion." He is quoted as going on to say tliat while
in the mountains if he had said, "We are Marxist-
Leninists," "it is possible that we would never have
been able to descend to the lowlands. ... So we
called it something else." Those are the words of
Mr. Castro.
Mr. Castro, blatantly and cynically, admits and
boasts that he deliberately deceived the Cuban
people.
I now come to the attempt by the representative
of the Soviet Union to turn this debate into a
propaganda quiz program.
Most of the so-called "questions" which he lias
asked related to events last April which were
thoroughly discussed and dealt with at that time by
this committee and by the General Assembly.' But
he purports to be very distressed that I have not
° For l)iukp;ioiiiul and texts of resolutions, see ihid.. May
S, 1001 , 11. 0G7.
answered his questions. It is not my practice,
as I hoije you have noticed, to intervene every few
minutes but rather to await my turn. But I do
not want the representative of the Soviet Union to
suffer any longer.
So as to his other declarations, let me say, no,
the United States is not training anyone for an
invasion of Cuba at the "bases" mentioned by the
Cuban representative. Neither the Soviet rep-
resentative nor the Cuban representative nor any-
one else has brought forth the slightest evidence
to the contrary. And Castro's "denunciation" of
sucli innocent winter resorts as West Palm Beach,
Sarasota, and so forth, is proof of nothing but a
very vivid and unscrupulous imagination.
Tlie next question: Yes, Cubans may enlist in
the Armed Forces of the United States, and so may
any permanent resident of the United States. Our
latest count, as of 2 weeks ago, showed that the
nvimber of Cubans in the three armed services of
this counti-y amounted to a grand total of 88.
No Support for Cuba at Punta del Este
The next question : No, all the decisions at the
Punta del Este conference were not ummimous.
Tills was not a meeting of the Warsaw military
pact. This was a meeting of free and independent
sovereign states, proudly insistent on the demo-
cratic rights of freedom of speech and freedom
of decision.
So that the record is completely clear to all of
the members, I want to state the votes on the nine
resolutions which are set forth in the Final Act
of the Punta del P]ste conference (document
S/5075).
Resolution I, entitled "Communist Offensive in
America," which I liave already read in part, was
adopted by the vote of 20 for and 1 against, Cuba
being the 1.
Resolution II, setting up a special consultative
committee on security against the subversive ac-
tion of international communism, was adopted by
the vote of 19 to 1 — Cuba — with Bolivia abstahi-
ing.
Resolution III, reiterating the principles of non-
intervention and self-determination, was adopted
by the vote of 20 to 1, the 1 being Cuba. I call
attention to the fact that Cuba voted against this
resolution and, in particular, voted against para-
graph 2 of tliat resolution, whicli urged that
American governments organize themselves on
556
Deparfment of Slate Bulletin
the basis of free elections that express, without re-
striction, tlie will of the people.
Resolution IV, for the holding of free elections,
was also adopted by the vote of 20 to 1. I again
call attention to the fact that Cuba is against the
holding of free elections.
Resolution V, endorsing the Alliance for Prog-
ress, was adopted by the vote of 20 to 1. Once
again, as in the case of the Marshall plan, the
Communists are against the idea of economic and
social progress with freedom.
As to Resolution VI, relating to the self-exclu-
sion of Cuba from the American system, as I have
said, paragraphs 1 and 2 were adopted by the vote
of 20 to 1, and 3 and 4 were adopted by the vote
of 14 to 1, with G abstentions.
Resolution VII, excluding Cuba from the Inter-
American Defense Board, was adopted by the vote
of 20 to 1.
Resolution \r[II, relating to the suspension of
arms traffic with Cuba and charging the Organiza-
tion of American States Council to study the de-
sirability of suspending trade in other items, was
adopted by the vote of 16 to 1, with 4 abstentions.
Resolution IX, relating to strengthening the
statute of tlie Inter- Ajnerican Commission on Hu-
man Rights, was adopted by the vote of 19 to 1,
with 1 abstention.
In short, Mr. Chairman, Cuba received no sup-
port on anything. No one voted with Cuba on
anything. Cuba joined the others in voting for
only one paragraph of one resolution, and there
was not a single negative vote, other than Cuba's,
on any resolution or any paragraph of any resolu-
tion. In other words, the newest associate of the
Conmiunist bloc stood alone in the self-imposed
isolation which its interventions and disregard of
human rights have brought upon itself.
Now, these are the facts about Punta del Este,
and they show that what is before this committee
is not some bilateral issue between the Castro gov-
ernment and the Govei'nment of the United States
but a broad multilateral problem involving a self-
declared Communist regime's aggi-essive hostility
against all of the free nations of the Latin Ameri-
can world. It is not a bilateral problem; it is a
hemispheric problem.
My final answer to the representative of the
Soviet Union is yes, the United States does believe
in the principle of nonintervention in the affairs of
other countries and we strongly recommend this
principle to tlie Cuban regime, especially with ref-
erence to its neighbors in this hemisphere.
And while we are on the subject of noninterven-
tion, I would strongly reconnnend to the Soviet
Union that our memories are not so short that we
have forgotten some events of recent years which
are still on our agenda.
I have heard during the past fortnight repeated
contemptuous ref ei-ences to the Cuban patriots who
have escaped from the oppression of the Castro
dictatorship and the names of a few industrialists
and land owners. But I have not heard mention
of no less than 150,000 Cubans who have fled from
tyranny to liberty — of 150,000 workers, peasants,
shopkeepers, professional people, artisans, profes-
sors, and judges — many of them former comrades
of Castro — who fled when it became clear to them
that he had deceived them and betrayed their
revolution. They are the fortunate ones who have
escaped the knock on the door in the night and
drmnhead justice and the firing squads that have
slaughtered so many of Castro's countrymen.
I read you a short list of Castro's own comrades
who now know what he represents and have es-
caped to freedom: Castro's firet Prime Minister,
the first Provisional President of his revolutionary
government, his Chief Justice, nearly two-thirds
of the 19 members of his first Cabinet, his revolu-
tionary commander of Camagiiey Province, his
appointees as presidents of the National Bank
and the National Development Bank, the chief of
liis Air Force, his personal pilot, the General Sec-
retary of the Cuban Trade Union Federation, the
editor of the anti-Batista magazine Bohemia, the
author of Castro's revolutionary exhortation "his-
tory will absolve me," and countless other editors,
radio commentators, and public figures.
These are some of the millions who have fled
Communist tyranny in search of freedom. We
have heard some dissertations on the Marxist-
Leninist ideology from a procession of Communist
speakers during this debate. I certainly will not
take up the committee's time to more than say that
millions of voices will answer them — the voices
not only of 150,000 Cubans but of 200,000 Hun-
garians, of 55,000 Tibetans, of 1,100,000 Chinese,
of 2,500,000 East Germans, and many more who
have risked their lives to escape from that ideology
and that form of government to the free world.
And the final confession of ideological bankruptcy
is that it takes a wall through the heart of Berlin
April 2, 7962
557
not to keep the enemies out but to keep their own
people in.
It has been suggested over and over that in some
way the American Republics are interfering with
Cuba's right of self-determination, the right of
its people to choose their own government. This
is not true. The American Eepublics believe in
and practice self-determination. It is the Castro
regime itself that has deprived the Cuban people
of that right.
The Organization of American States' Charter
states in article 5 : "The solidarity of the Ameri-
can States and the high aims which are sought
through it require the political organization of
those States on the basis of the effective exercise
of representative democracy." Through the Or-
ganization of American States, the American
Republics in recent weeks have helped the people
of the Dominican Republic to regain the right of
democratic self-determination, with the happy
result that the voice of the ancient Dominican peo-
ple, long stilled by dictatorship, is now heard
again.
The voice of the Cuban people has also been
stilled by dictatorship, a dictatorship conceived in
deceit and deception and now maintained by force.
The voice we now hear is not the voice of the
Cuban people but the voice of a master. His
plaintive plea for the right of self-determination
is in fact a cynical demand that he — and his
foreign masters — do the self-determining and be
left alone to shamelessly crush the will of the
Cuban people and further the objectives of Com-
munist imperialism throughout the hemisphere.
How can Castro, who first deceived his people
and who now refuses to let them speak for them-
selves, speak for them as to the form of govern-
ment they desire? How can a man who has
betrayed his country and delivered it to an inter-
national conspiracy speak for a people to whom
he denies the fundamental right of self-determi-
nation ?
What Castro Promised
In Castro's first political statement from the
Sierra Maestra in July 1957 I will tell you what
he promised. He promised general elections at
the end of 1 year. He promised an "absolute
guarantee" of freedom of information, of freedom
of press and all civil and political rights in accord-
ance with Cuba's 1940 Constitution. In an article
in February 1958 he wrote that he was fighting for
a "genuine representative government," "thor-
oughly honest" general elections within 12 months,
"full and untrammeled" freedom of public infor-
mation and public media, and the reestablishment
of all the personal and political rights set forth
in Cuba's 1940 Constitution. And the greatest
irony of all — in that article he denies the charge
of "plotting to replace military dictatorship with
revolutionary dictatorship."
These were the promises that Castro made to
the Cuban people. It is small wonder that those
people welcomed the man who made them. Re-
joicing in their release from the thralldom of
Batista's military dictatorship, they looked for-
ward eagerly to the freedom that Castro had
promised. And what has he given them? He
has given them the very dictatorship which he
solemnly assured them he would not. He has
given them a dictatorship under which free ex-
pression and free elections no longer exist. He has
given them a government-controlled press. He
has confiscated their property. He has terrorized
their religion and suppressed all civil and political
liberty. And to cap the climax, at Punta del Este
he has voted against even the principle of free
elections !
It must be clear to all that the present rulers of
Cuba have engaged in a classic example of Com-
munist subversion from within — indirect aggres-
sion. They sought to gain power over Cuba not
to free Cubans but to enslave them, not to serve
Cuban interests but the interests of that worldwide
imperialism which wanted Cuba as a bridgehead
for its ambitions in the rest of Latin America.
The free peoples of Latin America will not
permit this, and that is the meaning of Punta del
Este.
The free nations have sought by every means
since the end of the Second World War to defend
their freedom. This organization has dealt with
many of these battles of wliat has come to be
known as the cold war and of which Cuba and
the debate here today is only the latest example.
I had hoped when I came here a year ago that the
United Nations could be used, and I so stated, as
an arena not to fight the cold war but to pursue
peace. And wo had hoped in the Americas, as do
others in other continents, to keep the intrusion
of the cold war from our shores. But one of our
American states has been subverted and is now
being used as a vehicle for pressing tlie cold war
558
Department of State Bulletin
against us and our American friends. We have
not brouglit the cold war into this committee ; it
is the Castro regime and its masters that have done
so.
As the Secretary of State of the United States
said at the Punta del Este meeting :
The cold war would have been unknown to us had
the Soviet Union determined, at the end of World War
II, to live In peace with other nations In accordance with
its commitments under the Charter of the United Nations.
The cold war would end tomorrow If those who control
the Communist movement would cease their aggressive
acts, in all their many forms. Nothing would be more
gratifying to the citizens of my country than to have
the Soviet Union bring about the revolution of peace by
a simple deei.'iion to leave the rest of the world alone.
But the cold war is not a contest between the Soviet
Union and the United States which the United States is
pursuing for national ends. It is a struggle in the long
story of freedom between those who would destroy it and
those who are determined to preserve it. If every nation
were genuinely independent, and left alone to work out
its relations with its neighbors by common agreement,
the tensions between Washington and Moscow would
vanish overnight.
The Alliance for Progress
Latin America is a continent in ferment. Its
peoples voice a growing demand for social and
economic changes that will bring to every man,
woman, and child tlie technological benefits of
our age. Its peoples want better education,
better housing, better health, their own land, and
economic and personal security. Its peoples are
restless with hopes and aspirations.
To satisfy these hopes, to make these aspirations
a living reality, we in the "Western Hemisphere
have embarked on a positive program of un-
paralleled magnitude in scope and effort — the
Alliance for Progress.'' We of the American
Eepublics have set forth our goals of social ad-
vancement throughout the coming decade. We
have pledged our joint resources. We are insisting
on tax reform and land reform and industrial de-
velopment. We have stated our convictions tliat
investment in liimian resources — in the brains and
skills of our peoples — should receive top priority.
The United States is ready to contribute over a bil-
lion dollars a year to tliis great humanitarian
undertaking and to do its full part in helping to
re-create a new world for the peoples of Latin
America.
Tliis is tlie project whicli the Castro regime and
its Communist masters are trying to subvert and
sabotage. It is for this that the Communist bloc
in the closing days of our session have taxed our
patience, abused our procedures, and unleashed all
of their tired invectives and scattered groundless
charges to arrest tlie forward march of tlie Ameri-
can Republics to a better life and democratic
freedom.
I hope, Mr. Chairman, that this committee will
resoundingly defeat any resolution that equates
unsupported charges and the decisions of the
American states to defend themselves from sub-
version and to work together for that better life
in full conformity with tlie principles of the
charter.
STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR PLIMPTON'
I would like to point out, by way of an intro-
ductory remark, that the title of this item has not
been changed. It will be remembered that the
title reads: "Complaint by Cuba of threats to
international peace and security arising from new
plans of aggression and acts of intervention being
executed by the Government of the United States
of America against the Revolutionary Govern-
ment of Cuba."
The sponsor of the draft resolution now seems
to be trying, by document A/L.385/Eev.l, to create
the impression that the title of the item has been
changed, obviously because the deliberately biased
form of the title of the item clearly reveals its
cold-war propaganda purpose. However, Mr.
President, the title of the item has not been
changed. The document itself refers three times
to item 78 — in the upper left-hand corner, in the
heading, and in the first preambular paragraph.
And item 78 still reads just the way it always has.
The so-called "technical error" referred to in re-
vision 1 is itself nothing but another parliamentary
maneuver to obscure the fact that the draft resolu-
tion is still a draft resolution against the back-
ground and in the context of the completely
unproved Cuban charges, as set forth in the cold-
war title of the item.
Mr. President, the Cuban charges of interven-
tion and plans of aggression have been with us
now for 6 months. My delegation voted long ago,
last September, in favor of inscribing this item on
' See p. 539.
■"Made in plenary on Feb. 20 (U.S. delegation press
release 3928).
April 2, 1962
559
our agenda because of our commitment to the prin-
ciple that any complaint, no matter how ground-
less, should receive a liearing in our organization.
The First Committee dealt with the Czechoslovak-
Rumanian draft resolution. [U.N. doc. A/C.l/
L. 309] .«
It is instructive to review briefly the fate of
this Communist cold-war effort. Not one dele-
gate outside of the 11 Communist representatives
supported the unfounded accusation of United
States interference in Cuban aifairs. A clear ma-
jority of the First Committee also rebuffed the
apparently harmless reference to peaceful settle-
ment of international disputes because they rec-
ognized that in the context of the Cuban charges
such an affirmation of a general principle would
dignify and give substance to charges that are in
fact crude, defamatory, and false. The First Com-
mittee also witnessed a striking demonstration of
vigor and solidarity among the nations that make
up our Organization of American States. We
voted as one in defense of our common cause, and it
is this fact more than any words I can say that
testifies to the worthlessness of the Cuban charges.
Mr. President, over this weekend we were
greeted by a new exercise in parliamentary leger-
demain. This will, I am confident, be equally re-
pudiated by this Assembly. Having failed to ob-
tain any support for the baseless charges leveled
against the United States in the First Committee
and having failed to enlist the backing of a single
one of the 93 non-Communist members of this
body for its complaint of United States interfer-
ence, the Communist bloc now is trying to bring
in through the back door what was thrown out at
the front door. That well-known authority on
Caribbean affairs, that longtime friend and next-
door neighbor of Cuba, the Republic of Outer
Mongolia, has now appeared from central Asia
"The operative paragraphs of draft resolution A/C.l/
L.309 were rejected by Committee I on Feb. 15, and the
chairman therefore declared, pursuant to rule 130 of the
rules of procedure, that the draft resolution as a whole
was rejected. Operative paragraph 1, which appealed
to the U.S. Govornmont "to put an end to the interference
in the internal affairs of the Rep\iblic of Cuba and to all
the actions directed against the territorial integrity and
political Independence of Cuba," was rejected by a vote
of 11 to 50, with 39 abstentions. Operative pnragrajjh 2,
which called upon the Governments of Cuba and the United
States "to settle tlieir differences by peaceful means,
through negotiations, without recour.se to use of force,"
was rejected by a vote of 30 to 40, with 15 abstentions.
and placed before us a resolution [U.N. doc. A/L.
385/Rev. 1] which purports to innocently reaffirm
the principle of equal rights and self-determina-
tion of peoples and of noninterference in the in-
ternal affairs of any state. In voting on this
parliamentary maneuver, the United States will
take the following course:
First, we will vote for the preambular reference
to the report of the First Committee. We welcome
that report as demonstrating the fact that, after
a fair hearing and thorough airing of the Cuban
complaint, it was overwhelmingly rejected. We
find it proper for the General Assembly to take
note of this report.
Second, on the operative paragi-aph, which is
substantially a repetition of the second preambular
paragraph of the Czechoslovak-Rumanian resolu-
tion introduced in the First Committee, we shall
again abstain. The obvious maneuver of Mon-
golia on behalf of the Communist bloc is to force
other members of the Assembly into the apparent
dilemma of either voting against self-determina-
tion or to pass a resolution with an unintended
effect. There is no reason to fall for this trick.
The United States, of course, subscribes to these
principles. The United States reaffirms principles
which were first set forth in our Declaration of
Indeijendence and in our Constitution, as well as
in the conventions and agreements of the inter-
American system and the United Nations Charter.
In a separata vote on the operative paragraph,
we will, therefore, not vote but will abstain in the
light of the context of this paragraph under the
unproved Cuban allegations which are still in the
title of the item.
We shall, however, vote against the resolution as
a whole, and we hope that the Assembly will do
likewise. There is no reason to dignify the un-
proved charges presented by the Communist bloc
by enveloping them in noble and historic principles
of the charter. A vote against the resolution as a
whole will properly repudiate this transparent
parliamentary numeuvei".
If such principles are to be reaffirmed, Mr. Presi-
dent, they should be pi'oclaimed in the context of
calling on the Cuban regime to stop intervening in
the affairs of other American states. They should
call on this regime to grant the Cuban people the
right to choose freely tlicir own form of govern-
ment, to give tliem the right of self-determination.
Those principles should voice the appeal of the free
560
Department of Sfafe Bulletin
peoples of the vrorld for restoration to the Cuban
people of those equal rifjlifs spelled out so clearly
in the Declaration of Human Kights, the United
Nations Charter, and tlie Charter of the Organi-
zation of American States.
Mr. President, when this item was inscribed last
August, we recognized the competence of the Gen-
eral Assembly to concern itself with such grave
charges. We welcomed the airuig of those charges,
the discussion of those charges. We were gratified
by the display of hemispheric unity and the sup-
port of other members who repudiated those
charges. We were gratified that not one of the 93
non-Connnunist members of this body voted with
the Communist bloc to validate those charges. We
trust, Mr. President, that this Assembly will act
with the same sense of responsibility and will not
be trapped by a transparent maneuver, such as the
one we now have before us, and will vote against
this draft resolution as a whole.''
U.S. Exchanges Tariff Concessions
With GATT Contracting Parties
White House press release dated March 7
The White House on March 7 announced the
conclusion at Geneva of tariff negotiations with
the European Economic Communitj^, with the
United Kingdom, and with 24 other countries.
Summary
These negotiations, the largest and most com-
plex in the 28-year history of the Trade Agree-
ments Act, produced results of great importance
to the United States. The commercial importance
of the negotiations was matched by their political
significance, since they constituted the first test of
whether the United States and the European Eco-
nomic Community — the so-called European Com-
mon Market — would be able to find a mutual basis
for the long-run development of economic rela-
tions critical to both areas.
The European Conunon Market, created in 1957
by France, Germany, Italy, and the Low Coun-
tries [Belgium, Xetherlands, Luxembourg] in the
Treaty of Rome, establishes a giant economic com-
munity in Western Europe. It encompasses a
' On Feb. 20 draft resolution A/L.385/Rev.l was re-
jected by the General Assembly by a vote of .37 to 45, with
18 abstentions.
market whose imports are greater than those of
the United States itself, with a growth rate well
in excess of the current United States growth rate.
In accordance with their treaty, the six member
countries of the European Community are rapidly
eliminating tariffs within the Connnunity and are
establishing a common external tariff for the Com-
munity which will apply generally to the products
of outside countries including the United States.
At the same time the six member countries are
merging their separate national programs for the
protection of domestic agriculture into an inte-
grated Community-wide program known as the
common agricultural policy. When this policy
comes fully into effect, there will be a single Com-
mmiity-wide support price for each of a nmnber
of major agricultural commodities.
In the face of these developments the United
States objectives in the negotiations were twofold :
(1) to secure reductions in the common external
tariff which would expand trade between the
European Economic Community and the United
States and (2) to insure that the common agri-
cultural policy took account of the interests of
United States agricultural exporters. These ob-
jectives were sought in the framework of the long-
run United States policy of maintaining and ex-
panding trading relations among free-world
nations.
These results were achieved. In general the
European Economic Community agreed to an ex-
change of concessions involving a phased 20-per-
cent reduction in most of the industrial items
making up its common external tariff. The Com-
munity's freedom to negotiate on certain agricul-
tural items was hampered by the fact that its
common agricultural policy was still in process
of development. Nevertheless it agreed to various
arrangements — including a number of important
tariff cuts— which will insure for the present that
most agricultural exports of the United States
will be able to maintain their position in tlie Com-
mimity's markets.
The United States, operating under the severely
circumscribed authority of the present Trade
Agreements Act, was unable to offer concessions
of equal value to the Europeans. This was true
even though the President went below the peril-
point rates recommended by the Tariff Commis-
sion on a number of items. In spite of the inability
of the United States to offer equivalent conces-
sions, the Community agreed to close the negotia-
April 2, 1962
561
tions on the basis of the concessions finally offered
by the United States.
An appended table summarizes the trade value
of concessions exchanged with the EEC and other
countries in terms of the amount of trade during
1960 in the items covered. In the exchange of
new tariff concessions in the form of reductions or
bindings at fixed levels, the United States received
concessions on a trade volume of approximately
$1.6 billion in return for adjustments and commit-
ments, to take effect in most cases on two steps 1
year apart, on United States tariffs covering com-
modities with a trade volume of $1.2 billion.
In other negotiations for compensatory tariff
adjustments, where contracting members of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
had altered or withdrawn previous concessions, the
United States received concessions on a trade
volume estimated at $2.7 billion to replace conces-
sions withdrawn or modified in the amount of $1.6
billion. The central feature of this phase of the
Geneva negotiations was the replacement of tariff
concessions granted by the EEC member states
before they formed the Common Market with con-
cessions to be incorporated in a new common ex-
ternal tariff. The EEC adjustments thus made in
the Common Market tariff affect trade valued at
$2.5 billion.
Compensatory tariff concessions on the part of
the United States were limited, covering trade
valued at $30 million.
The new tariff reductions obtained from the
EEC include items of major importance to United
States export trade to the Common Market area.
Most of these concessions were reductions of 20
percent. Tliere were, however, a number of re-
ductions of more than 20 percent, the most im-
portant of these being reductions of 24 and 26
percent, respectively, in the common tariff on
automobiles and parts; in dollar terms this reduc-
tion will average to about $12G per automobile
exported to the European market. Other cate-
gories of i)articular importance to the United
States were chemicals and phai-maceuticals, in-
dustrial and electrical machinei-y, textiles, canned
and preserved fruits, and fats and oils.
Principal concessions granted by the United
States included automobiles, certain classes of ma-
chinery and electrical apparatus, certain types of
steel products, and some classes of glassware. The
United States automobile concession, which ac-
counted for a substantial part of the total amount
of trade affected by the United States concessions,
averages approximately $21.50 per automobile im-
ported into the United States market.
For various technical reasons it is impossible to
make exact comparisons of the general tariff levels
of different countries. Nevertheless it appears
that, as a result of the negotiations just concluded
at Geneva, the general tariff level of the European
Economic Community is roughly comparable to
that of the United States. In some items the
United States level exceeds that of the Commu-
nity; in other items the opposite is the case. The
major difference in the two tariff structures is that
the EEC has fewer prohibitively high tariffs than
the United States as well as fewer extremely low
tariffs.
The similarity in general levels provides an
opportunity for even more effective tariff nego-
tiation in the future. However, if the United
States is to exploit this opportunity, it must be
equipped with new statutory powers, since the
President has now exhausted his powers to grant
tariff concessions under existing law.^
In its negotiations for new concessions at Ge-
neva the United States dealt not only with the
EEC but also with Austria, Cambodia, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, Haiti, India, Israel, Japan,
New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United
Kingdom.
Negotiations for compensatory concessions, in
addition to those with the EEC, were held with
Australia, Brazil, Canada, Ceylon, Finland, Haiti,
Indonesia, Japan, the Netherlands Antilles, Paki-
stan, Peru, the Eepublic of South Africa, Sweden,
and Turkey.
While negotiations by the United States with
all the named countries except Spain have been
completed, final agreements have not been con-
cluded with some countries, which have either not
completed their negotiations with otlier countries
or have not yet completed the necessary domestic
procedures. Wlicn all negotiations have been
concluded, additional benefits will accrue to the
United States from the concessions exchanged be-
tween otlier countries.
' For ti'xt of rrosiilont Kennedy's message to Congress
on triulo, see lUn.i.iciiN of Feb. 12, 1902, p. 231 ; for a
summary of the proposed legislation, see ibid., Feb. 26,
1002, p. 343.
562
Deparfment of State Bulletin
Further Details
The tariff conference, which opened in Geneva
in September 1900,- was convened by the Con-
tracting Parties to the General Agi-eement on
Tarilfs and Trade at United States initiative.
The Geneva conference was open to all contracting
parties to the GATT, 35 of which participated in
the negotiations. Geneva was thus the scene of a
major multilateral negotiation for the lowering of
free-world ti-ade barriers.
Nevertheless, attention was largely centered on
the European Economic Community and its com-
mon external tariff. "While customs unions are
not a new thing in the world community, no cus-
toms union before the Common Market had so
much significance for world trade and, indeed,
for the shaping of future political and economic
forces in the world.
The outlook on the whole was for a broadly
liberal Common Market approach to international
economic affairs. Even before the conference
opened, there was outstanding an offer on the part
of the European Economic Community to reduce
by 20 percent most of its tariff rates on industrial
products, conditional on the grant of reciprocal
concessions by other countries. The United
States was a principal supplier of most of the
items affected.
Despite the generally propitious atmosphere in
which the negotiations were begun, it was by no
means certain that any useful agreement could
be reached. United States negotiators came to
the Geneva conference empowered with the limited
authorities contained in the Trade Agreements
Extension Act of 1958. Under the law the maxi-
mum tariff reduction they could offer was generally
fixed at 20 percent. The negotiating list which
they were authorized to use had been established
after a rigorous screening by the interagency
Trade Agi-eements Committee and after very sub-
stantial further eliminations as a result of the
Tariff Commission's peril-point findings under
section 3(a) of the Trade Agreements Act. De-
spite the fact that the United States had a very
large export trade at stake and despite the major
political opportunity offered by the negotiations,
it was apparent when the United States negotiat-
ing instructions were originally drawn that the
^ For a statement made at the opening meeting by
Clarence B. Randall, Special Assistant to President Eisen-
hower, see ibiiL, Sept. 19, 1960, p. 453.
United States would be unable on this basis to
meet the EEC request for adequate reciprocity.
The negotiations with the EEC were of un-
rivaled complexity. They fell into two pliases.
The purpose of the first phase was to meet the
requirement of GATT, article XXIV :6, provid-
ing for new tariff concessions by a customs union
to replace those which had been granted previously
by the member states. In preparing for this nego-
tiation the American negotiators examined each
item in the European common external tariff and
compared the prospective incidence of the new
rates with the previous national rates. 'Wlierever
the new rate seemed on the whole to have a dif-
ferent protective incidence than the old national
rates, this difference had to be taken into account
as a debit or credit in the subsequent negotiations.
For agricultural products, however, special diffi-
culties arose. Since the EEC nations were in
process of developing the common agricultural
policy called for in the Rome Treaty, they were
restricted in their ability to negotiate on some of
the tariff rates for agricultural products.
The outcome of this phase of the EEC negotia-
tion brought direct commitments to the United
States on common external tariff rates covering
exports totaling $2.5 billion in 1960, compared
with a total of $1.4 billion of trade that had been
covered by concessions which the Common IMarket
member nations had previously granted to the
United States.
In the second phase of the negotiations, the so-
called reciprocal round, the EEC confirmed the
offer which had been provisionally put forward
in May 1960. Specifically the Community offered
a reduction of 20 percent on industrial tariff rates,
subject to a few exceptions. The linear reduction
offer did not apply to agricultural commodities,
but in the course of the negotiations reductions on
certain agricultural products were made.
As the negotiations proceeded it became clear
that the United States bargaining position was
inadequate to take advantage of the EEC offer.
A deadlock ensued and a collapse of the negotia-
tions was threatened, with all the adverse conse-
quences that this portended for American eco-
nomic interests and Western political cooperation.
The Tariff Commission's peril-point findings
were, therefore, carefully reexamined, and a num-
ber of additional items were found in which it
appeared possible to offer tariff reductions.
April 2, 1962
563
These were items in -wliich (lie procedures and
stnndards stipulalod in tlie Trade Agreements Act
had compelled tlie Commission to make unduly
restrictive jud<>-ments or to make judcrments un-
supported by relevant evidence. In many in-
stances tariff reductions of even a few percentage
points had been precluded. In some instances
peril points had l)een set on items where imports
represented only a minor fraction of domestic
production. In others peril points had been
found at existing duty levels for specialty com-
modities which were produced abroad for a nar-
row and highly specialized market in the United
States and which were not competitive with
domestic production. In still other cases a single
peril point had been set for basket categories of
many items, even tliough the situation as between
items in the category appeared to differ markedly.
It was in cases of the foregoing character that it
was decided that tariff reductions could be made.
A number of such items, covering $76 million
of United States imports, were selected to provide
a new bargaining offer. This action broke the
deadlock in the negotiations.
Appended are the messages from the President
to the Congress 3 which give full details on the
action taken with respect to the peril -pointed
items in question.
Agricultural commodities exported by the
United States were included in botli the reciprocal
and the compensatoi-y j^hases of the Geneva nego-
tiations with the Common Market. These nego-
tiations involved special difficulties. ]n-imarily
because the EEC was concurrently develojnng its
common agricultural policy. These difficulties
were an additional cause for the prolonged period
of the negotiations.
In the understandings that were ultimately
reached, the EEC made commitments on products
accounting for approximately $800 million of the
United Slates agricultural exports to the Com-
mon Market in 19G0. Tliese conunitments cover
such major items as cotton, soybeans, tallow, hides
and skins, and certain fruit and vegetable prod-
ucts. On cotton and soybeans, duty-free bindings
replace tariffs in some of the member countries.
The United States also obtained a reduction in
the common external tariff on tobacco. Eor this
item and vegetable oils, which together accounted
for exports in 1960 of about $125 million, the EEC
' Not iirintcd here.
has entered into understandings with us envisag-
ing negotiations for the further reductions in the
common external tariffs.
Witli respect to another group of products,
principally grains and certain livestock products,
which will be protected by variable levies instead
of fixed tariffs, the United States sought to obtain
adequate assurances of access to the EEC market.
Because of the many problems which were still un-
settled among the EEC coimtries themselves, it
was not possible to work out during the Geneva
negotiations definitive arrangements for access.
Therefore, agreement was reached by the two
sides to reconsider the matter of trade access in
the near future. This represented a fundamental
change in the position of the EEC, which early in
the negotiations announced its intention to with-
draw existing concessions on these products with-
out providing for future negotiations on access.
Specifically the EEC agreed to certain interim
arrangements for wheat, corn, grain sorglium,
poultry, and rice. United States exports of these
commodities to the Common Market in 1960 were
valued at about $214 million. For corn, grain
sorghum, ordinary wlieat, rice, and poultry, the
EEC has agreed to negotiate further on these items
with respect to trade access arrangements and to
maintain existing national import systems on as
favorable a basis as at present until a common
policy is put into operation.
In the case of quality wheat the EEC agreed
to negotiate further on the trade access arrange-
ments after the initiation of the common agricul-
tural policy. Before this new system is put into
operation, member countries will continue to apply
existing national import systems on as favorable
a basis as at present. Further, the EEC agreed
that when the common policy on wheat is put into
operation, and throughout the period covered by
these negotiations, it will take corrective measures
for any decline in I"''nited States exports of quality
wheat resulting from the application of the com-
mon policy.
Since tlie common agricultural policy will take
effect over a period of years beginning on July 1,
1962, in general it should not have adverse effects
on the level of XTnited States exports during the
coming year. The maintenance or expansion of
United States exports will depend upon future
negotiations carried out under the authority of
the jiroposed trade agreements legislation.
The negotiations for the reciprocal reduction of
564
Department of Sfafe Bulletin
tariffs involved 18 countries in addition to tlio
Common Market. Of these, tlie most important
were with the United Kingdom.
The United States received from the United
Kingdom direct concessions on about 320 tariff
items with a trade coverage of $197.5 million.
Included were automobiles and parts, aircraft and
parts, machine tools, certain chemicals, Kraft
board and paper, synthetic rubber, and dried
beans. Most of the duty reductions followed the
20-percent pattern set by the EEC.
In return the United States gave concessions,
also mostly at the 20-percent level, on 185 items
with a trade volume of $185 million. Among these
items were machinery and vehicles, principally
aircraft and parts, books and printed matter, flax,
hemp, and ramie textile manufactures, certain
food products, and Scotch whisky. The negotia-
tions with the United Kingdom involved depar-
tures from Tariff Commission peril-point findings
on items representing a trade volume of $7 million.
Negotiations for new concessions with 17 other
countries, some of which have not yet been formal-
ized in final agreements, have resulted in addi-
tional concessions to the United States of about
$575 million in return for concessions totaling
about $450 million. These totals will be further
augmented when the conclusion of all negotia-
tions still in progress between other countries
permits the calculation of indirect benefits that
will accrue to the United States.
Agreements were also negotiated with 14 coun-
tries for compensatory concessions to replace other
concessions which had been modified or with-
drawn. The concessions to the United States that
were modified or withdrawn by other countries
involved trade of approximately $220 million.
Compensatory concessions granted to the United
States by these countries covered about $200 mil-
lion of trade.
For its part the United States withdrew or
modified concessions with a trade coverage of $85
million and offered compensatory concessions on
$30 million of trade to seven countries, namely,
Benelux, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, Italy, Japan, Sweden, and the United King-
dom. These compensatory concessions were se-
lected from the same list of items on which the
United States delegation had been authorized by
the interdepartmental trade agreements organiza-
tion to make offers in the negotiations for new
concessions. These items were therefore not avail-
able to the United States delegation for bargain-
ing for additional new concessions.
In the table which follows there is summarized
the trade coverage of the concessions exchanged
by the United States with other countries during
the Geneva conference.
Recapitulation op Trade Coverage of Concessions
Exchanged
(Direct concessions: Estimates based on 1960 trade)
1. Reciprocal negotiations for new concessions
Trade value of concessions
Obtained by U.S. Granted by U.S.
Witli EEC $1, 000 million .$79.5 million
Witli other countries .$575 million $430 million
2. Article XXIV :0 compensatory negotiations ivith the
EEC
Trade value of concessions
Previous concessions by mem-
ber states, to be replaced
by EEC concessions $1, 400 million
Concessions granted by EEC $2, 500 million
3. Other compensatory negotiations
Trade value of concessions
Concessions withdrawn or
modified by other countries $220 million
Compensatory concessions to
the U.S. $200 million
Concessions witlulrawTi or
modified by the U.S. $85 million
Compensatory concessions by
the U.S. $.30 million
Further details concerning the agreements con-
cluded at Geneva are contained in a publication
entitled General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade:
Analysis of United States Negotiations, which has
been issued in two volumes. Volume I (Depart-
ment of State publication 7349, price $1.25) de-
scribes the agreements with the EEC and the
reciprocal agreements for new concessions. Vol-
ume II (Department of State publication 7350,
price 35 cents) describes the compensatory negoti-
ations. These publications may be purchased
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Gov-
ernment Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C.
DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE
Designations
Richard D. Kearney as Deputy Legal Adviser, effective
March 18. (For biographic details, see Department of
State press release 157 dated JIarch 9.)
April 2, 1962
565
Appointments
J. Murray Luck as science attach^ at Bern, Switzer-
land, effective March 19. (For biographic details, see
Department of State press release 173 dated Alareh 15.)
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Atomic Energy
Amendment to article VI.A.3 of the Statute of the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency (TIAS 3873). Done
at Vienna October 4, 1961.^
Ratification advised by the Senate: March 13, 1962.
Automotive Traffic
Convention concerning customs facilities for touring.
Done at New Yorlj June 4, 19.j4. Entered into force
September 11, 1957. TIAS 3879.
Extension to: British Guiana, February 5, 1962.
Customs convention on temporary importation of private
road vehicles. Done at New York June 4, 19.54. En-
tered into force December 15, 1957. TIAS 3943.
Extension to: British Guiana, February 5, 1962.
Fisheries
Declaration of understanding regarding the international
convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries of
February 8, 1949 (TIAS 2089). Done at Washington
April 24, 1961.'
Ratified by the President of the United States: Febru-
ary 9, 1962.
Acceptatice deposited: United States, February 9, 1962.
Narcotics
Convention relating to the suppression of the abuse of
opium and other drugs. Signed at The Hague Janu-
ary 23, 1912. Entered into force December 31, 1914;
for the United States February 11, 1915. 38 Stat. 1912.
Assumed applicable ohliyations and responsibilities of
the United Kingdom : Nigeria, June 20, 1901.
Telecommunications
International telecommunication convention with six an-
nexes. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered
into force January 1, 1960; for the United States
October 23, 1901. TIAS 4892.
Accession deposited: Mali, February 26, 1962.
Trade and Commerce
Aehnowlcdf/ed applicable rights and obligations of the
United Kingdom: Tanganyika, January 18, 1962, with
respect to tlic following :
Annecy protocol of terms of accession to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Annecy
' Not in force.
566
October 10, 1049. Entered into force for the United
States October 10, 1949. TIAS 2100.
Fourth protocol of rectifications to the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva April 3, 1950.
Entered into force September 24. 19.52. TIAS 2747.
Fifth protocol of rectifications to the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Torquay December 16,
1950. Entered into force June 30, 1953. TIAS 2764.
Torquay protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade and schedules of tariff concessions annexed
thereto. Done at Torquay April 21, 1951. Entered into
force June 6, 1951. TIAS 2420.
First protocol of rectifications and modifications to texts
of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade. Done at Geneva October 27, 1951. Entered into
force October 21, 19.53. TIAS 2885.
Second protocol of rectifications aud modifications to texts
of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade. Done at Geneva November 8, 1952. Entered
into force February 2. 19.59. TIAS 4250.
Third protocol of rectifications and modifications to texts
of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade. Done at Geneva October 24, 1953. Entered
into force February 2, 1959. TIAS 4197.
War
Geneva convention relative to treatment of prisoners of
war;
Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of
wounded and sick in armed forces in the field ;
Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of
wounded, sick, and shipwrecked members of armed
forces at sea ;
Geneva convention relative to protection of civilian per-
sons in time of war.
Dated at Geneva August 12, 1949. Entered into force
October 21, 19,50; for the United States February 2,
1956. TIAS 3364, 3362, 3363, and 3365, respectively.
Notifications received that they consider themselves
bound: Dahome.v, January 9, 1062 ; Ivory Coast, De-
cember 30, 1961 ; Togo, January 11, 1962.
Weather
Resolution by the Third Congress of the World Meteoro-
logical Organization amending article 10(a)(2) of the
convention of the World Meteorological Organization
signed October 11, 1947 (TIAS 2052). Adopted at
Geneva April 1-28. 1959.'
Approval advised by the Senate: March 13, 1962.
BILATERAL
Chile
Agreement further amending the agreement of March
31, 105.5, as amended (TIAS 3235 and 4112), for fi-
nancing certain educational programs. Effected by
exchange of notes at Santiago November 17, I'.Mll, aud
February 8, 1962. Entered into force February 8, 1962.
Korea
Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of
10.54, as amended (08 Stat. 4.55; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709),
with exchange of notes. Signed at Seoul March 2. 1002.
Entered into force March 2, 1062.
Panama
Agreement relating to investment guaranties against in-
convertibility and losses due to expropriation aud war
autborizetl by section 413(b)(4) of the Mutual Se-
curity Act of 19.54, as amended (08 Stat. 847 ; 22 l.'.S.C.
1033). Effected by exchange of notes at Washington
January 23, 1961.
Entered into force: March 8, 1962.
Department of Sfafe Bulletin
April 2, 1962 I n d
Africa. The Challenge of Africa to the Youth of
Ainerii-ii (Williams) ^'-^
Agriculture. Report on Foot and Mouth Disease
Transmitted to Argentina 543
American Republics
FuiniUng the fledges of the Alliance for Progress
( Kennedy ) 539
Pan American Day and Pan American Week, 1962
(text of proclamation) 542
Argentina. Report on Foot and Mouth Disease
Transmitted to Argentina 543
Australia. President Discusses Trade Matters
Willi Australian Deputy Premier (text of joint
statement) 549
Cameroon. President Ahmadou Ahidjo of Came-
roim Visits U.S. (text of joint communique) . . 543
Chile. U.S. and Chile Reach Agreement on Financ-
ing of Development Plan (text of joint com-
munique) 538
Congres.s, The. Foreign Economic and Military As-
sistance Program for Fiscal Year 19G3 (Ken-
nedy) 550
Cuba. U.N. General Assembly Rejects Cuban
Charges Against United States (Plimpton,
Stevenson) 553
Department and Foreign Service
Appointments (Luck) 566
Designations (Kearney) 565
Disarmament. U.S. Outlines Initial Proposals of
Program for General and Complete Disarmament
(Rusk, principal advisers to delegation) . . . 531
Economic Affairs
President Discu.sses Trade Matters With Australian
Deputy Premier (text of joint statement) . . . 549
U.S. Exchanges Tariff Concessions With GATT Con-
tracting Parties 561
Educational and Cultural Affairs. The Challenge
of Africa to the Youth of America (Williams) . 544
Foreign Aid
Foreign Economic and Military Assistance Program
for Fiscal Year 1963 (Kennedy) 550
Fulfilling the Pledges of the Alliance for Progress
(Kennedy) 539
U.S. and Chile Reach Agreement on Financing of
Development Plan (text of joint communique) . 538
International Organizations and Conferences
U.S. Exchanges Tariff Concessions With GATT Con-
tracting Parties 561
U.S. Outlines Initial Proposals of Program for Gen-
eral and Complete Disarmament (Rusk, principal
advisers to delegation) 531
Mexico. U.S., Mexico Agree To Use Scientists To
Study Salinity Problem 542
Military Affairs. Foreign Economic and Military
Assistance Program for Fiscal Year 1963
(Kennedy) 5.50
Presidential Documents
Foreign Economic and Military Assistance Program
for Fiscal Year 19C3 550
Fulfilling the Pledges of the Alliance for Progress . 539
Pan American Day and Pan American Week, 1962 . 542
President Ahmadou Ahidjo of Cameroon Visits
U.S 543
President Discusses Trade Matters With Aus-
tralian Deputy Premier 549
U.S. Presents Proposals to U.S.S.R. for Coopera-
tion in Space Exploration 536
ex
Vol. XLVI, No. 1188
Public Affairs. Foreign Policy Briefings for Visi-
tors to Washington Begin at Department . . . 549
Science
Luck appointed science attach^, Bern 566
Report on Foot and Mouth Disease Transudtted to
Argentina 543
U.S. Presents Proposals to U.S.S.R. for Coopera-
tion in Space Exploration (Kennedy) .... 536
Switzerland. Luck appointed science attach6 . . 566
Treaty Information. Current Actions 566
U.S.S.R. U.S. Presents Proposals to U.S.S.R. for
Cooperation in Space Exploration (Kennedy) . . 536
United Nations. U.N. General Assembly Rejects
Cuban Charges Against United States (Plimpton,
Stevenson) 553
Name Index
Ahidjo, Ahmadou 543
Kearney, Richard D 565
Kennedy, President 536,539,542,543,549,550
Luck, J. Murray 566
McEwen, John 549
Plimpton, Francis T. P 559
Rusk, Secretary 531
Stevenson, Adlai E 553
Williams, G. Mennen 544
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: March 12 18
Press releases may be obtained from the Ofl5ce of
News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.
Releases appearing in this issue of the Bulletin
which were issued prior to March 12 are Nos. 155,
156, and 158 of March 9.
No. Date Subject
tl60 3/12 Cleveland: "The Practical Side of
Peacekeeping."
161 3/12 Foreign policy briefings for public.
*162 3/12 U.S. participation in international con-
ferences.
*163 3/12 Salute to new nations of Africa.
tl64 3/13 Ball : House Committee on Ways and
Means.
*165 3/13 Program for visit of President of
Cameroon.
*166 3/14 Ambassador Williams : meeting of U.S.
citizens at San Salvador.
tl67 3/14 Trezise: Fresno Chamber of Com-
merce, Fresno, Calif.
tl68 3/14 White nominated to GAS Special Con-
sultative Committee on Security (re-
write).
Ball : reply to U.N. Secretary-General
on dissemination of nuclear weapons.
Rostow : "American Strategy on the
World Scene."
Trezise: "U.S. International Trade
Policies."
Rusk : statement before 18-nation Dis-
armament Committee.
Luck appointed science attach^ at Bern
(biographic details).
*174 3/16 Program for visit of President of Togo.
*175 3/16 Cultural exchange (Europe, Middle
East).
tl69
3/14
tl70
3/15
tl71
3/15
172
3/17
*173
3/15
*Not printed.
tHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin.
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Participation of the United States Government
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INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES
July 1, 1959-June 30, 1960
Tliis volume is designed to serve as a reference guide to the
official participation of the U.S. Government in multilateral inter-
national conferences and meetings of international organizations
during the period July 1, 1959-June 30, 19G0. The United States
participated officially in 352 international conferences and
meetings during the 12-month period covered.
In addition to a complete list, the voliunc presents detailed data
on many of the conferences, including the composition of the
U.S. delegation, principal officers, participation by other countries
and organizations, and brief statements of the actions taken.
Publication 7043
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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Vol. XLVI, No. 1189
April 9, 1962
MCIAL
EKLY RECORD
U.S. URGES SOVIET UNION TO JOIN IN ENDING
NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS • Statement by Secre-
tary Rusk 571
MAJOR ASPECTS OF THE TRADE EXPANSION ACT
• Statement by Acting Secretary Ball 597
MEETING THE SOVIET ECONOMIC CHALLENGE •
by Acting Assistant Secretary Trezise 592
THE UNITED NATIONS DECADE OF DEVELOPMENT
An Adventure in Human Development • fay Ambassador
Stevenson 577
The Practical Side of Peacekeeping • by Assistant Secretary
Cleveland ooS
Extending Law Into Outer Space • by Deputy Assistant Sec-
retary Gardner 5oO
ITED STATES
^EIGN POLICY
For index see inside back cover
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Vol. XLVI, No. 1189 • Publication 7360
April 9, 1962
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington 26. D.O.
Price:
62 Issues, domestic $8.60, torelcn $12.26
Single copy, 26 cents
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tlon approved by the Director of tlio Bureau
of the Budget (January 19, 1901).
Note: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and Items contained heroin may
be reprinted. Citation of the Dei'Ahtment
or State Bulletin as the source will he
appreciated. The Bulletin Is Indexed lu the
Readers' Oulde to Periodical Literature.
The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the
Office of Public Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public
and interested agencies of the
Government with information on
developments in the field of foreign
relations and on the work of the
Department of State and the Foreign
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lected press releases on foreign policy,
issued by the White House and the
Department, and statements and ad-
dresses made by the President and by
t/ie Secretary of State and other
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specuil articles on various phases of
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which the United States is or may
become a party and treaties of gen-
eral international interest.
Publications of the Departnwnt,
United Nations documents, and legis-
lative material in the field of inter-
national relations arc listed currently.
U.S. Urges Soviet Union To Join in Ending
Nuclear Weapon Tests
Statement ty Secretary Rusk ^
I have asked for the floor this morning to com-
ment on the interim report to which the chairman
has just alluded. I do so because of the expressed
wishes of a considerable nimiber of foreign minis-
ters to turn their attention urgently to this prob-
lem of the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests
before the foreign ministers begin to return to
their respective capitals.
Let me say that the United States deeply regrets,
in the words of the brief interim report, that it
is not possible to report progress toward a treaty
for the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests,
because the United States regards and will con-
tinue to regard a safeguarded end to nuclear test-
ing as a major objective of its foreign policy. It
also regards this as a major problem for considera-
tion by this conference.
The reason is obvious. The moratorium which
for almost 3 years has halted nuclear weapon tests
was wrecked by the sudden resumption of testing
by the Soviet Union last September.^ The Presi-
dent of the United States has amiounced that the
United States wiU resume testing in the atmos-
phere late in April, if by that time a safeguarded
test ban treaty has not been signed. The reasons
for tlais decision were set forth in his speech of
March 2,^ which we are asking be circulated as a
document of this conference. The time is short,
and this conference will understandably wish to
' Made before the 18-nation Disarmament Committee at
Geneva on Mar. 23 (press release 186 dated Mar. 24).
For text of a statement made by Secretary Rusk before
the Committee on Mar. 15, see Bulletin of Apr. 2, 1962,
p. .531.
' For background, see ihid., Sept. IS, 1961, p. 475.
' Ibid., Mar. 19, 1962, p. 443.
be sure that every possible effort is made to pre-
vent a further intensification of the race to pro-
duce more and more deadly weapons of mass
destruction.
I have asked for the floor this morning to com-
ment on the interim report which the conference
subcommittee on nuclear weapons testing has
made to the conference. Unfortunately that in-
terim report indicates that no progress has been
made toward the conclusion of an effective treaty
to prohibit nuclear weapon tests. The Soviet
Union appears to be adamantly opposed to any
international system of detection and verification
which could disclose clandestine testing and thus
serve to place an obstacle in the way of a potential
violator of a test ban treaty.
We hope we have not yet heard the last word
of the Soviet Union on this matter, though I must
confess that we see little ground for optimism at
the moment.
Because of the United States Government's
great desire to put an end to all tests of nuclear
weapons, we are willing to sign a safeguarded
treaty, with effective international controls, even
though the Soviet Union conducted over 40 tests
last fall. However, we are willing to ignore these
tests only if, in return, we can be assured that test-
ing will actually be halted. We will not again
make our security subject to an unenforcible and
uncontrolled moratorium, whether this be in the
form of a verbal pledge or a pseudotreaty such
as the U.S.S.R. proposed on November 28, 1961.*
"Wliat we need above all in this field is confidence
and not fear, a basis for trust and not for sus-
* For background, see Hid., Jan. 8, 1962, p. 63.
April 9, 7962
571
picion. To get this is the major purpose of our
insistence on efTective international arrangements
to insure tliat nuclear weapon tests, once outlawed,
do not, in fact, ever occur again.
You will remember that the atmosphere for
agreements on disarmament questions was not too
favorable in 1958, especially after the collapse of
lengthy negotiations in London during much of
1957.
Accordingly, in the searcli for a more promising
approach to the issue of a nuclear test ban, the
United States, the United Kingdom, and the
Soviet Union decided to tiy to resolve the tech-
nical questions first before proceeding to a consid-
eration of political questions. This path led to a
conference in Geneva in July and August 1958
among the scientists of eight countries, i.e. of the
three then existing nuclear powers plus France,
Canada, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Eumania.
On August 21, 1958, these experts imanimously
agreed on the details of a control system which
would be teclmically adequate to monitor a treaty
ending all tests of nuclear weapons.^ Before
September 1, 1958, the recommendations of the
scientists had been accepted in toto by the Govern-
ments of the United States, the United Kingdom,
and the Soviet Union. Essentially these same
technical provisions form the basis of the draft test
ban treaty presented by the United States and
United Kingdom on April 18, 1961.^
Technical Aspects of Controlling Test Ban
I believe it would be helpful to review some of
the technical aspects of controlling a test ban.
The words "detection" and "identification" are
the key to an understanding of the technical as-
pects of verification. A great many methods have
been devised by scientists to record the innumera-
ble happenings of a geopliysical nature which take
place around us. Earthquakes are registered by
seismographs; hydroacoustic apparatus records
sounds in the oceans.
I liave mentioned these two particular types of
instruments because they, along with various other
devices, also happen to be capable of registering
signals which are emitted by nuclear detonations.
" For background and text of report, see ihid., Sept. 22,
la'-jS, p. 452.
• For text, see ibid., June 5, 1961, p. 870.
"Wliat we call detection is merely the capturing of
these diverse signals.
Detection, however, is only half of the story ; in
fact, it is rather less than half. The primary con-
cern is to Icnow exactly what has been recorded
or detected. For example, the signal received on a
seismograph from an underground nuclear explo-
sion looks like the signals received on a seismo-
graph from many types of earthquakes. Signals
which may come from a small nuclear detonation
in the atmosphere may be difficult to detect. In
each case the overwhelming difficulty confronting
any control system monitoring a nuclear test ban
is how to differentiate among the various record-
ings or detected signals, how to tell which is a
natural phenomenon and which is a nuclear
explosion.
This was exactly the issue that faced the scien-
tists in Geneva in mid-1958. It is the very same
issue that faces us on control today. The answer
of the scientists was tliat, where doubt existed, the
only way to clear up the mystery was to utilize
some form of on-site inspection. This is still the
only answer available to us.
In regard to underground tests, except for quite
large ones like the Soviet blast of February 2,
1962, the technical situation is unchallenged by
anybody and was even readily admitted by the
Soviet Govei'nment on November 28 last when it
put forward its new test ban scheme based on
existing monitoring systems. For these under-
ground events which are detected but which can-
not be identified by expert interpretation of the
seismic recording, the only way to determine what
has happened is to send an investigating team to
the spot. The events could be earthquakes or
secret nuclear tests. And there could be some
hundreds of such events per year in the United
States and the Soviet Union.
There is no scientific method not involving in-
spection that can identify positively a seismic
event as a nuclear explosion. If our Soviet col-
leagues have reason to believe otherwise, they
should come forward with their new scientific
evidence.
This technical situation provides a further im-
portant reason for including the Soviet Union in
the woi-ldwide control-post network. The spacing
between the control posts in the Soviet Union
should be exactly the same as it is in the rest of
the world. In order to have the best chance to
572
Department of State Bulletin
eliminate a seismic event from suspicion without
conducting an inspection, that is, by means of the
interpretation of the seismic recording itself by
exi:)erts, it is essential to have readings from con-
trol posts on a global basis, including those within
the United States and the U.S.S.R. Without in-
struments in the U.S.S.R. — one-sixth of the land-
mass of the globe — many more seismic events in
that country become suspicious.
In connection with atmospheric tests, the con-
clusive means for identifying the true nature of
a detected event is to acquire a sample of the air
near that event. If the event was manmade tliis
will show up during a chemical analysis of the
air sample. For medium and large atmospheric
nuclear detonations, the radioactive debris will
become part of air masses that are certain to move
beyond the boundaries of the country concerned.
This method is not reliable, however, for small
atmospheric tests.
In recognition of this the 1958 scientists rec-
ommended the installation of air-sampling equip-
ment at every control post. Even then they
anticipated that in certain instances some question
of identification would still remain, and for this
they proposed the use of special aircraft flights
conducted over the territory of a specific country
to capture air samj^les. Natui'ally, to the extent
that control posts within a country did not exist
where radioactive air sampling could take place,
there would be just that much greater need of
special air-sampling flights.
Although American scientists have for the past
several years been actively seeking new methods of
detection and, even more, of identification of pos-
sible nuclear explosions, and although there are
some promising avenues of investigation which
may be proven in the next few years, the fact is
that very little has been discovered up to date to
justify any significant modification of the conclu-
sions and recommendations of the Geneva scien-
tists of 1958. Soviet scientists essentially agreed
with this at our last joint meeting with them on
a test ban during May 1960 in Geneva. There-
fore, when we contemplate the cessation of nuclear
weapon tests by international agreement, we must
still look to international control arrangements
similar to those proposed in 1958 to give the world
security against violations. But the faster we
have tried to move toward the Soviets in these
matters, the faster they seem to move away from
their earlier positions.
Tlie draft treaty which the United States and
the United Kingdom proposed in April 1961 re-
flected the recommendations of the 1958 experts.
It also incorporated into its terms a large number
of political and organizational arrangements for
the test ban control organization on which the
three powers had already come to agreement at the
test ban conference or which went far toward
meeting previous Soviet demands. Eastern and
Western nations were to have equal numbere of
seats on the Control Commission, which also had
places for nonalined nations, and there were de-
tailed provisions for an equitable division by na-
tionality of the international statf, as the U.S.S.R.
had sought. The fact that many of the adminis-
trative and organizational provisions for the fu-
ture International Disarmament Organization, as
set forth in the Soviet document tabled here on
March 15, are similar to the provisions of the
Anglo-American draft test ban treaty of last year
demonstrates that the Soviet Union can have no
serious objection to large portions of our proposal.
No Basis for Fear of Espionage
Indeed, when all is said and done, the funda-
mental Soviet complaint about the test ban con-
trol system to which it seemed to agree in 1958,
1959, and 1960, and which its own scientists had
helped to devise, is that it would facilitate West-
ern espionage against the Soviet Union. But the
facts are otherwise. The proposed system would
not have any potential for any espionage which
would be meaningful in terms of present-day
military requirements.
The truth is that under the United States-
United Kingdom draft treaty control posts in the
U.S.S.R. would be immobile units with fixed
boundaries. No site could be chosen for a control
post in the U.S.S.R. without the specific consent
of the Soviet Government. No foreign personnel
on the staff of any control post would have any
official need to leave the boundaries of the post
(except when entering and leaving Soviet terri-
tory), and it would be up to the Soviet authori-
ties to decide whether such personnel should be
permitted to leave the post. Within the post one-
third of the technical staff and all of the auxiliary
staff would be Soviet nationals, nominated by the
Soviet Government. In these circumstances surely
nothing taking place at the post could remain
unknown to the Soviet Government.
April 9, 7962
573
The situation concerning on-site inspection
teams would be equally devoid of espionage possi-
bilities. The area to be inspected would be prede-
termined on the basis of seismographic recordings.
There would be no random selection of the geo-
graphic site. To get to the site of the inspection
the teams would have to use transport furnished
by the Soviet Government. They could only carry
specified equipment related to their immediate job.
Although there would not be any Soviet national
members of the inspection team, half of the team
would be nationals of nonalined countries and the
Soviet Government would be invited to assign as
many Soviet observers as it wished to verify the
activities of the inspection team.
I should also sti-ess that the size of the inspec-
table area would, in any event, be limited to the
territory within a radius of about 8 or, in some
cases, 13 kilometers from the point, the so-called
probable epicenter, where the unidentified seismic
event was presumed to have taken place. Tliis
radius would involve an inspectable area of 200 or,
in some cases, 500 square kilometers. The Soviet
Union has territory of over 21 million square kilo-
meters. Therefore it can readily be seen that, even
if there were 20 inspections per year in the
U.S.S.R. and even if each of these inspections
operated within a 500-square-kilometer area, less
than one-twentieth of 1 percent of Soviet territory,
i.e. less than one part in 2,000, could ever be sub-
ject to inspection in any one year.
Finally, no espionage would be feasible on the
occasional special air-sampling flights which
might take place over Soviet territory. The plane
and its crew would be Soviet, and Soviet Govern-
ment observers could be on board. The only
foreigners would be two staff technicians from the
control organization who would manage the equip-
ment taking the air samples and who would
insure that the plane actually flew along the route
previously prescribed.
I have recounted these matters in some detail
because it is easy to make generalized charges over
and over again about the dangers of espionage in
a test ban control system.
It takes careful explanation to show why such
charges are completely gi'oundless, even though
it stands to reason that the U.S.S.R., which was
just as sensitive about espionage in 1958 as in 1961,
would never have accepted such a control system in
principle in 1958 if it had then believed that the
system could have had the slightest real espionage
danger for the Soviet Union.
It should be clear now that the explanation for
Soviet behavior on the issue of a test ban must
be sought elsewhere. There is no rational basis
for Soviet concern about misuse of the control
system for espionage purposes. There is no scien-
tific basis for the Soviet desire to abandon the
still indispensable control system which was rec-
ommended by the scientists in 1958 and approved
by the governments of the then-existing nuclear
powers. There is no political basis for any of us
to believe that a test ban is any less urgent now
than it was in 1958 or that the benefits which it
would bring in improving the international cli-
mate would be any less.
U.S.S.R. Urged To Review Position
My Government, therefore, is at a loss to under-
stand the Soviet position unless it be that the
U.S.S.R. has decided that it is still overwhelm-
ingly important for it to be free to continue its
nuclear weapon tests. This was what the Sovnet
Government said last September, when it referred
to the tense international situation as a justifica-
tion for its test resmnption, and it may be that
the U.S.S.R. feels a military need for another test
series. If this is the case, then it is true that the
easiest way for the Soviet Union to remain im-
hampered by a test ban treaty is to offer one which
contains no provisions whatsoever for effective
control and which the United States and United
Kingdom could accept only at grave risk to their
national security and to that of the free world.
I cannot urge the Soviet Government too
strongly to review its position and to return to the
previously agreed basis of negotiation, namely, the
experts' recommendation of 1958. We ask the
Soviet Union to cease its attempts to have the
international community distort sound verification
procedures to accommodate one state which is
obsessed by a passion for secrecy. We call upon
the Soviet Union to enter into genuine negotia-
tions in the three-nation subcommittee set up by
this Committee to consider the test ban problem.
There is today an interim report of this sub-
committee. But, unfoi'tunately, there are no
grounds for encouragement. I sliould like to com-
ment briefly on the events of the past few weeks
which have led us to this point.
574
Department of Sfafe Bulletin
Recent U.S. Proposals To Achieve Test Ban
The President of the United States on March
2 stated in referring to our conference here that :
. . . we shall, in association witli the United Kingdom,
present once again our proposals for a separate compre-
hensive treaty — with appropriate arrangements for detec-
tion and verification — to halt permanently the testing of
all nuclear weapons, in every environment : in the air,
in outer space, under ground, or under water. New mod-
ifications will also be offered in the light of new experi-
ence.
In fulfillment of this pledge the United States
presented to the Soviet Union, first in an informal
meeting on March 15 and this week in the sub-
committee, new proposals of the kind indicated.
We have indicated clearly in both formal and in-
formal discussions that the United States is pre-
pared to grant a point to which the Soviet Union
has apparently attached great importance, namely,
to drop the 4.75-degree threshold and to make the
treaty from the outset complete in its coverage — •
banning from the beginning all tests in the at-
mosphere, outer space, undergi-oimd, and in the
oceans. We will do this without increasing the
number of inspections or the number of control
posts in the Soviet Union. We would seek, by
conunon agreement, to allocate the quota of inspec-
tions in such a way that most would be conducted
in a few areas of high seismicity and only a few
would be allowable in a large region in the heart
of the Soviet Union, where there are normally
few seismic noises which would require inves-
tigation.
These moves have been made possible by in-
creased experience and increased scientific knowl-
edge. But our experience has also shown the need
for provisions for safeguarding other states
against the consequences of preparations for test-
ing. Tliis would consist, in large part, of periodic
declarations on the parts of heads of state that
there will be no preparations for testing, and
agreed rights to inspect a certain number of times
per year equal numbers of declared sites on each
side.
Experience has also shown the need for provi-
sions to shorten the time spent before the begin-
ning of the inspection process. This would pri-
marily be a question of the way the Preparatory
Commission functioned and agreement to cooper-
ate in speeding up, by all possible means, the
establislunent of detection facilities, including
temporary control posts.
April 9, 1962
The United States has made clear that it still
stands by its original treaty proposal of April 18,
1961, plus the amendments proposed in 1961, and
will sign that treaty. It has also made clear that
it is willing to negotiate along the lines I have
described to update the treaty if the Soviet Union
prefers.
The response of the Soviet Union thus far has
not given us any hope. The Soviet delegation has
told us that the U.S.S.E. will not accept a treaty
with or without the amendments we propose. We
are still confronted with the unmistakable re-
versal of the Soviet position which took place a
few months ago after the Soviet Union had for
4 years asserted its willingness to accept a con-
trolled test ban agreement and after 17 articles
and 2 important treaty annexes had been negoti-
ated. The roadblock to a cessation of tests is this
reversal of the Soviet attitude. The U.S.S.R. was
prepared to accept controls before the recent test
series. Now, after 40 or more tests, it is not ready
to do so. It is difficult for us to understand the
reason.
The problem cannot really be espionage. For
over 2 years in the test ban conference, as I have
outlined in detail, we negotiated arrangements
which would insure that the modest amount of
control and inspection contemplated could not be
misused for espionage purposes.
The problem also cannot be that the verification
system is overly burdensome. As I have said, the
system which we worked out was directly based
on the estimate of the minimum technical require-
ments which was the product of an agreed analysis
by Soviet and Western scientists. The technical
basis for this system has never yet been challenged
on scientific grounds by the Soviet Union.
The U.S.S.R. now seems to be telling us that
under existing circumstances the idea of interna-
tional verification is wholly unacceptable in any
form whatsoever. It seems to be telling us that
verification is not even necessary — that it is an in-
sult to request it, even though this is a measure of
disarmament. Unnecessaiy? Merely necessary
to end nuclear testing. It seems to be telling us
that there can be no impartial investigation, even
when there has been a signal recorded from within
the Soviet Union and when it is impossible, with-
out such an investigation, to ascertain whether the
cause of the signal was a phenomenon of nature
or a manmade nuclear explosion.
575
We recognize that there are risks in any dis-
armament measure because no control system can
give 100 percent certainty. But a study of our
draft treaty with our proposed modifications will
indicate that the United States and United King-
dom have been willing to accept a very considera-
ble degree of risk. However, we cannot move to a
treaty which is based on no adequate controls at
all but solely on pure faith. We do not ask the
Soviet Union to trust the word of other nations,
and other nations cannot be asked to trust the
Soviet Union's word on matters of such far-reach-
ing significance.
In President Kennedy's words of March 2, "We
know enough now about broken negotiations,
secret preparations, and the advantages gained
from a long test series never to offer again an
uninspected moratorium." The same could
equally be said about an unverified treaty obliga-
tion such as the U.S.S.R. is now proposing. We
do not intend to be caught again as we were in the
autumn of 1961, and there is no reason why we
should have to be caught again by a unilateral
Soviet decision to resume nuclear weapon tests.
This is a risk to national and international security
which the United States cannot and will not take.
A test ban, or any disarmament measure, will be
acceptable to us only when it is accompanied by
adequate measures of verification.
International Verification Essential
In summary the essential element on which we
must insist is that there be an objective interna-
tional system for assuring tliat the ban against
testing is being complied with. This means that
there must be an international system for distin-
guishing between natural and artificial events.
The April 18 treaty provided for such a system.
Last week the U.S. and U.K. made some modifica-
tions of the proposed treaty in a way calculated
to meet Soviet objections. These proposed modi-
fications were rejected almost immediately by the
Soviets on the grounds that international verifica-
tion was not nccessai-y. This refusal to accept
any form of verification strikes very hard at our
efforts to guarantee the world against resumption
of nuclear tests. The key element in the U.S.
position is that there must be effective interna-
tional verification of the obligations imdertaken
in any sucli treaty.
Let there be no misunderstanding in tiiis Com-
mittee. A nuclear test ban agreement can be
signed in short order. There are no hidden diffi-
culties; there are no mysterious obstacles in the
way. No time-consuming negotiations need be re-
quired. The groundwork has all been laid. Only
one element is missing : Soviet willmgness to con-
clude an agreement.
The United States will consider any proposal
which offers effective international verification,
but the United States cannot settle for anything
less.
We urge the Soviet Union to reconsider its
attitude and join in putting an end to nuclear
weapon testing — a total end, a permanent end.
Foreign Policy Briefing Conference
To Be Held at Toledo, Ohio
Press release 184 dated March 23
Tlie Department of State, with the cooperation
of the Blade and the Toledo Council on World
Affairs, will hold its next regional foreign policj'
briefing conference at Toledo, Ohio, on April 24
and 25. Representatives of the press, radio and
television, nongovermnental organizations con-
cerned with foreign policy, and community leaders
from the States of Michigan and Ohio are being
invited to participate.
This will be the seventh of the series of regional
conferences which began in July 1961 at San
Francisco and Denver. The purpose of these re-
gional meetings is to provide opportunity for
discussion of international affairs between those
who inform the public on issues and the senior
officers of the executive branch who have respon-
sibility for dealing with them.
Among those officers of the Government partici-
pating in the conference will be Charles E. Boh-
len. Special Assistant to the Secretary of State;
Chester Bowles, the President's Special Represent-
ative and Adviser on African, Asian, and Latin
American Affairs; Harlan Cleveland, Assistant
Secretary of State for International Organization
Affairs; Robert J. Manning, Assistant Secretai-y
of State-designate for Public Affairs; George C.
]\rcG1ioe, Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs; J. Robert Schaetzel, Special Assistant to
the Under Secretary of Stute; aiul Thomas C.
Sorensen, Dejuity Director (Policy and Plans),
U.S. Information Agency.
576
Deparfmeni of Sfafe Bulletin
The United Nations Decade of Development
12TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
CALLED BY THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE UNITED NATIONS
Following are addresses made hefore the 12th
annual Conference of National Organizations at
Washington, D.C., on March 13 iy Adlai E. Ste-
venson, U.S. Representative to the United Nations,
and on March 12 by Harlan Cleveland, Assistant
Secretary of State for International Organization
Affairs, and Richard N. Gardner, Dejnity Assist-
ant Secretary for International Organization
Affairs.
ADDRESS BY AMBASSADOR STEVENSON
D.S./U.N. press release 3937 dated March 12
An Adventure in Human Development
"Wlaat a fine and liopeful note this conference
has struck in taking as its theme "A United Na-
tions Decade of Development" ! You hardly need
me to tell you in these 30 minutes what you have
been telling each other so well for the past 2 days —
that the United Nations today, after a year of
trial and testing, is feeling a new surge of hope.
All the concrete embodiments of that hope which
your speakers have laid before you — all tlie plans
and possibilities in the fields of disarmament, of
economic and social growth, of the growth of a
world community of peace and law — all these must
face the hard tests of diplomatic and political
reality. We cannot tell which will succumb and
which will prosper. But to the spirit that under-
lies them all — the spirit of daring and of faith
in the community of man — to that invincible spirit
I say "Amen !" And mine, I know, is but one in a
great chorus of "Amens" from all across this
nation.
A year ago, when I had only recently taken up
my duties at the United Nations, I could scarcely
have spoken to you in this vein. We faced trials
and dark prospects at the U.N. whose outcome no
man dared to predict, least of all myself. Indeed,
in the staggering loss of Dag Hammarskjold we
were to face a trial severer than any we had
guessed.
But today we can see that the United Nations has
overcome the worst of that trial, and in doing so
the great majority of its members have shown a
serene solidarity and a deep sense of common
purpose. Whatever perils may lie hidden in the
future, this dangerous voyage at least has been
passed in safety. Surely this is reason enough to
be thankful and confident in the future!
For these thoughts there is a happy parallel in
the mood of our own nation. Never have Ameri-
cans shown more confidence and eagerness. I be-
lieve that mood was not so much created as it was
revealed by the astonishing drama that began at
Cape Canaveral 3 weeks ago. And because that
drama and that revelation seem to me to have a
great significance, I am going to ask you to con-
sider it with me.
Significance of Colonel Glenn's Space Flight
Since that memorable morning the Nation has
had its eyes on a quiet, unassuming marine —
who also happens to be the fii-st American to ride
in outer space and see four sunsets in a single
day. Colonel Glenn and his exploit have too
many different meanings for us and for our na-
tional life for tumultuous rejoicings and ticker-
tape parades to be the sum of our response. He
has jolted us into a new awareness of confidence
and hope.
I believe profoundly that confidence and hope
are the natural, historical expression of our great
ApnV 9, J 962
577
President Greets American Association for the United Nations
Message From President Kennedy
White House press release dated March 13
Mabch 12, 1962
The Twelfth Annual Conference of National Organizations called by the American Association for the
United Nations comes as a propitious reminder of the range and depth of this country's support of the
United Nations.
Both by its promise and by its actions, the U.N. has Justified that support over the years.
The Sixteenth Session of the General Assembly ended last month with a matchless record of solid
accomplishments.
It rejected emphatically a powerful attack against the integrity of the Secretariat and went on to a
series of positive steps which are admirably srmimarized in the theme of your conference, "The U.N. Decade
of Development."
In the course of its work the Sixteenth General Assembly adopted a set of guiding principles and agreed
to the new approach to general and complete disarmament which will get under way in Geneva on Wednesday
[March 14]. It extended the Charter of the United Nations to outer space and established a new Committee
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space which begins Its work next week. It adopted a resolution calling for
an expanded and intensified program for economic and social progress in the less developed world in the
decade ahead.
We can be proud of our Initiatives and of the U.N. response in those three critical areas of disarmament,
outer space, and rapid modernization of the emerging nations. If real progress can be made in these three
areas, the present decade can be the most exciting and rewarding time in history.
To sustain its present initiative as a force for peace and human progress the U.N., of course, must regain
a sound and orderly financial position. The three-point financial plan approved by the General Assembly is
the only proposal put forth at the U.N. or elsewhere which will meet the requirements and is the only one
which has the approval of the General Assembly. The U.N. bond issue,^ which is the key part of the financing
plan, has become the symbol and substance of support of the United Nations by its members.
Last week Finland and Norway purchased the first of the U.N. bonds. A dozen more nations will follow
shortly. The world is now watching to see whether the United States will continue to play its full part in
helping the United Nations to make this a decade in which the world moves dramatically toward the peaceful
and progressive world foreseen in the Charter.
I look forward to meeting with your leaders at the White House tomorrow, and I welcome the evidence
offered by your organizations that bipartisan support for the U.N. in its present financial crisis is stronger
than ever. Please accept my best wishes for a most productive conference.
John F. Kennedy
Mr. Herman W. Steinkraus, President,
American Association for the United Nations,
12th Anntial Conference of National Organizations,
c/o Statler Hotel,
Washington, D.C.
' For background, see Bulletin of Feb. 26, 1962, p. 311.
nation's stance in world affairs. The belief that a
new kind of society — without privilege and op-
pression—could be built on earth inspired the
Founding Fathers. Since their day all our great-
est leaders have expressed in some way their con-
fidence that something special and something new
could be achieved in and by America — a society
without slavery, a society without poverty and
insecurity, a society which might play its part
in leading the nations to a world without war, a
wealthy and bountiful community able to extend
to all mankind its own principle of "the general
welfare."
These have been great dreams, and they have
fostered great initiatives. Yet we have not always
lived by our best dreams. Some of us, on the con-
trarj', have talked as if mankind were at the
mercy of the drift of history, powerless to influence
his fate, moving like a sleepwalker to .^omc apoc-
alyptic atomic doom — a mood as far removed from
the earlier youth and optimism of our Republic as
is St. Paul from Jeremiah.
578
Department of Sfafe Bulletin
Some of us — alas ! among the most vocal — have
yielded to still another nightmare, one in which
we are always doing badly, while our adversaries
march from one triumph to the next. From this
bad dream come the cries of extreme rightists
about an ever-encroaching Communist conspiracy
wliich, if we were to believe them, has not made
a single error in 40 years.
This picture excludes a whole universe of facts :
the fact of unrest in Eastern Europe, the fact of
waning Communist belief in Western Europe, the
fact of ideological differences between Moscow
and Peiping. It excludes a whole series of recent
Soviet setbacks in the Congo and elsewhere in
Africa — and at the United Nations. It excludes
the failure of Soviet state capitalism to compete
in the production of consumer goods or to work
at all in agriculture.
I suggest that, in lashing out at a vast, over-
whelming, irresistible Communist "takeover,"
the rightists are not only overselling communism.
Worse, they are underselling America — and un-
derselling as well the stubborn will to be free
which is communism's worst obstacle in every
continent.
Let us, therefore, be grateful for that image
of Friendship 7, carrying round the earth one
of the most buoyant and manly personalities and
one of the clearest, most light-of-day minds ever
"orbited" into the national consciousness. For it
has already begun to replace some of the images
of unreasoning fear to which we have been treated
recently. Let it correct, too, the more widespread
miasma of doubt about the ability of Americans
in particular, and men in general, to master the
incredible forces of nature which human intelli-
gence has imlocked in our time.
To me there is something superbly symbolic in
the fact that an astronaut, sent up as assistant
to a series of computers, found that he worked
more accurately and more intelligently than they.
Inside the capsule man is still in charge. Let
that be called Glenn's Law !
Let us now, with new courage and zest, apply
Glenn's Law to this little capsule of the world,
spinning through space. Let us do so in the con-
sciousness that America is a great and inventive
society, that its occasional tendency to torpor is an
essentially uncharacteristic response to the enor-
mous challenges of the contemporary universe.
Communism, like outer space, may be hostile.
But it can be lived with and controlled by the same
patience, skill, hard work, and generous resources
that went into Project Mercury. Moreover, like
space, it can also bo seen as a creative challenge.
Would we not have slumbered under the weight of
our gimmicks and gadgetry if the cold challenge
of outdoing and outthinking the Conamunist order
had not stiffened our backs and our minds?
So, we may conclude, this competitive nation
can still compete and even relish the competition.
Moreover, I believe Colonel Glenn's space journey
points to the kind of victory for which we hope to
strive.
A New Fellowship for Peace
I am sure you have heard talk and criticism re-
cently of the Government pursuing a "no win"
policy. Now I am not sure that I altogether un-
derstand what the critics have in mind. Do they
mean that the administration is unready to launch
a nuclear war to speed the liberation of countries
under Communist rule? Or do they mean the
United States should send Marines to take over
Cuba — and throw away the confidence of most of
Latin America? I do not know. The critics do
not spell out what they want, and so we do not
know whether they accept the basic facts of our
age — that in a nuclear war there would be not only
"no win" but no winners.
From these anxious years our people have been
slowly learning a new truth, and it is this : Democ-
racy has no need of enemies or of hatred, and the
victories it cherishes most are the victories of
peace in which no one suffers defeat and no one
nourishes dreams of vengeance in a future war.
Our orbital flight is such a victory. In it all
men are winners. It has elicited from Mr.
Khrushchev the immediate suggestion that Amer-
ica and Russia should cooperate closely in the fur-
ther exploration of outer space.^ As you know, the
United States has been trying for years to promote
an international approach by which these vast new
oceans of space would not have to witness the tribal
conflicts of earthbound creatures or be sullied by
engines of war. Now with our orbital flight we
have more chips on the bargaining table with
which to pursue those imiversal goals.
Next Monday [March 19] the Outer Space Com-
mittee of the United Nations will meet at last.
The 2-year Soviet boycott is over. The Commit-
' For background, see Bulletin of Mar. 12, 1962, p. 411,
and Apr. 2, 1962, p. 536.
^pt\\ 9, 7962
579
tee will be gjuided by a unanimous resolution of the
General Assembly ^ approving the vitally impor-
tant principle that outer space and the bodies in it
are not subject to national appropriation and are
subject to international law, including, specifically,
the United Nations Charter. The same resolution
also endorsed worldwide collaboration in the use
of outer space for the advancement of weather
forecasting and even weather control, and for
worldwide radio and television communications by
satellite.
Before we succumb to pessimism about the
chances of any agreement on these measures, let
us remember that, 2 years ago, a year of scientific
cooperation on geophysical problems between all
the nations of the world led to a treaty of neutral-
ization and national self-restraint in Antarctica.'
This treaty was a substantial effort to bring all
the nations into war-reducing activities. Now it
provides a model for the broader attempt to free
outer space from the burdens and horrors of the
arms race.
When we face the dark wall of Soviet hostility
and irrationality, we are a little like scientists
faced with the infinitely complex problems of
penetrating the lethal secrets of radiation or prob-
ing the layer upon layer of mystery that surround
both stars and atoms. At times these scientists
must despair. At times they must wonder whether
the small toeholds they have in cosmic research
will ever lead on to wider vistas and broader
paths. Small wonder that we, being faced with
Mr. Khrushcliev's threats and blandishments and
his retreat from an agreement on atomic testing,
find Soviet policy even more mysterious and hos-
tile than the hazards of space !
IIow inventive and resourceful they are, those
engineers who put John Glenn, Alan Shepard, and
Virgil Grissom into space. If a valve doesn't func-
tion, they invent another. If one device disap-
points them, they design a new one. The search
for solutions and the certainty that there are solu-
tions continue unrelentingly.
In just such a way wo must react to the still more
complex task of creating a viable human order.
Frustrated in one place, we must try another way
'For a statpinpnt by Ambassador Sleveiison in Commit-
tee I on Doc. 4, lOlil, anil test of tlie resolution, see ibid.,
Jan. 2!), ]!K)2, p. ISO.
" For baclcground and text of treaty, see ibid., Dec. 21,
1059, p. Oil.
round. If agreements "leak," new and better ones
must be sought. If we bog down in our efforts to
organize joint space research, all the more reason
for trying harder. If the issue of inspection and
control proves the toughest nut to crack in dis-
armament negotiations, let us work all the harder
on that.
But we are hard to discourage. Even though the
Russians reject once again all offers of a reasonable
test ban treaty at Geneva, and thus compel us to
resume testing, we are not on that account giving
up the search for a breakthrough in arms controh
In fact we must give to our research in this science
of survival the same ingenuity — and the same scale
of resources — that go into our defense and space
research. For remarkable feats of imagination
will be needed before we can adequately penetrate
tlie thicket of technical, diplomatic, and i:)sycho-
logical mysteries in which the arms race and the
cold war have their being.
We do not know the whole truth about our ad-
versaries — any more than we know everything
about the Van Allen radiation belts. We know
both can be chingerous and treacherous. But we
don't stop seeking a way through. I^et our ap-
proaches to Russia be made with the same ultimate
confidence, with the same rejection of fatalism,
with the same readiness for work, for disappoint-
ment if need be, and for renewed effort.
To me one of the primary advantages of such
partial "breakthroughs'' as a joint geophysical
3'ear or a joint program in outer space is that they
give us the chance to begin to attempt the only
final solution to our profound differences with
Russia — the solution that lies in some kind of in-
terpenetration and meeting of minds. If we can
create communities of men — astronauts, scientists,
doctors, geologists, artists, musicians — who have
shared tasks of common discovery, we can at least
hope that their discoveries will include some of the
truth about themselves and each other. A Glenn
or a Gagarin, working together in some hazardous
yet exhilarating space project, could scarcely
emerge from this experience with all the veils still
drawn down. And if tlie Soviet closed society
ojwned enough so tiiat in both societies there came
to be men and women wlio understand in depth the
hopes and fears of their opposite numbers, we
should have opened many windows to the light and
set many candles burning in the gloom of
ignorance.
580
Department of State Bulletin
"How beautiful is our earth !" exclaimed Major
[Yuri] Gafjarin as he came down from space. And
you remember when Colonel Glenn, looking at the
same view shouted: "Man, that view is tremen-
dous !" I tiiink tliose two men have more in com-
mon tlian either has with the ideologists of
conquest.
Do not tliink this is simply Pollyanna talk.
Wars start in the blind, angry hearts of men. But
it is hard to hate those who toil and hope and
discover beside you in a common human venture.
The Glenns of our world could be new men in a
quite new sense — the new men who, having seen
our little i)lanot in a wholly new perspective, will
be ready to accept as a profound sj^iritual insight
the unity of mankind.
When I had the good fortune to conduct the
astronauts and their families around the United
Nations and to witness the thunderous, sponta-
neous welcome that roared from room to room
among all the nations, I had a sense that men such
as these belong to a new fellowship which could
one day be a great strand in the web of peace.
And I believe they felt the same. Colonel Glenn
said, if j'ou recall :
As space science and space technology grow . . . and
become iiicire ambitious, we shall be relying more and
more on international teamwork . . . we have an infinite
amount to learn both from nature and from each other.
We devoutly hope that we will be able to learn together
and work together in peace.
These are the words of our "new men" — not a
narrow arrogance but a generous vision of the
great human family. Let no obstacles, however
forbidding, ever blind us to that vision.
Strategy of Development
This same spirit must animate us in other
realms. I am deeply convinced that the tran-
quillity of the human family in the next three or
four decades depends upon bridging the great
and growing gap between the wealthy, industrial-
ized, developed Northern Plemisphere and the un-
derdeveloped, poverty-ridden south.
After a decade of fairly sustained effort, we are
beginning to learn that to move out of the cramped,
ignorant, pretechnological conditions of a static
tribal or feudal society is fully as difficult as
breaking the bounds of space. All the forces of
tradition, all the gravity of ancient habits hold the
nations back. Each national "capsule," small or
large, has to find its own idiosyncratic way into
orbit, and a lot of them are still on the ground.
The process of modernizing nations involves an
exceptionally complicated and difficult set of in-
terlocking actions, decisions, and discoveries.
There will therefore be delays and disappoint-
ments. Some projects, like some rockets, will ex-
plode in midair. Some will take paths that were
not in the plans. Yet failure is often the prelude
to success.
In the matter of international assistance we can
say without doubt that we know more than we did.
Our techniques are wiser, our sense of what we
have to do more sure. Some underdeveloped
areas — one thinks of parts of India and parts of
west Africa- — are beginning to show unmistakable
signs of momentum. This is no time to write the
program off as a costly failure. We are learning
by doing, and results are already beginning to
show.
To you who have observed the U.N. for many
years let me say also that the peculiar merits of
multilateral aid programs under U.N. auspices are
being recognized more widely than ever. This is
especially true in the new nations of Africa. I am
told that the delegates to the recent meetings of
the U.N. Economic Commission for Africa, in
Addis Ababa, were unanimous and emphatic in
their desire to see the U.N. become a major partner
in their development program.
None of this can be done quickly. Changing
an economy means in fact changing a whole gener-
ation of men. I doubt if that can be done in less
than two decades. So I would say : Look on the
fateful program of modernizing what the French
call the "third world" — the world of the poor and
dispossessed — as you look on the program for
probing the planets. Expect failures. Rejoice
in successes. Never doubt the job can be done.
Indeed it must be done if misery is not to turn
to despair, and despair to wars, and war to ruin
for us all.
So vital is this strategy of development to our
country's future security that I never stop being
amazed at the way in which this nation — which
cheerfully pays $50 billion a year for arms and
may pay billions to reach the moon — can begrudge
the two billions a year that go to economic develop-
ment abroad — a program which in human terms
must be judged one of the world's greatest ad-
ventures. Yet we still hear the argument that we
April 9, 1962
581
cannot afford more, that our national resources
can't stand it. Yet we are growing richer all the
time.
No, the real basis for hesitation about economic
aid is not scarce resources but scarce imagination.
There are some citizens whom the prospect of end-
ing the age-old tyrannies of hunger and disease
does not stir as does the glamour of space travel
or the fear of military defeat. Their dreams — and
their nightmares — tend to be those of the rich and
the satisfied and the possessors !
Yet liow dangerous those dreams are! For
the rich are a small minority in this world, and
their ultimate security can only be found by mak-
ing common cause with the far different hopes and
dreams of the many poor. Only thus can we hope
to prevent the despair which communism exploits
and which so imperils our own security. To forget
this truth is to be wrong — fatally wrong — about
our national strategy.
But it is also wrong at a much profoimder
level : wrong to leave children to starve who could
eat with our help, wrong to let youngsters die
when medical skill can save them, wrong to leave
men and women without shelter, wrong to accept
for others, in the midst of our own abmidance, the
iron pains of degrading want.
These are moral decisions. We are not bound to
such evils by necessity or by scarcity. Our modern
technology of abundance gives us the freedom
to act — if we so decide. There are no restraints
now except the restraints of a blind eye and an
imfeeling heart.
I think we should rejoice as we have been given
the extra dimension of freedom, for I profoundly
believe that at bottom there is liere in America
a good and generous and moral people. Yet
some of the elements in our way of life — as in
all the burgeoning affluent societies of the West —
tend to make us allergic to self-denial, to altruism,
and to difficult endeavor. All around us are voices
which rouse the clamor of desires and claims wiiich
can stifle our imaginations and douse our sense
of pity.
The more we concentrate on our own needs, the
less we can measure the needs of othei-s and tiie
more the gap will grow between tlie overfed, over-
dressed, overindulged, overdeveloped peoples of
the Atlantic world and the starving millions be-
yond the magic pale.
" Great Deeds Demand Great Preparation"
I would like to end where I began — with the
image of Colonel Glemi, astronaut, citizen, dedi-
cated man. I believe that his courage and humil-
ity and high good humor are the qualities we
really admire. In a slack age we can still be moved
by the prospect of discipline and dedication. And
in an age in which so many people seem to be con-
demned to wander lost in their own psychological
undergrowth, we can still recognize and acclaim
a simplicity of doing and being and giving from
which great enterprises spring.
We cannot enter with emotion and sympathy
into the vast drama of "haves" and "have nots"
imless some image of discipline, I would say even
of a certain asceticism, releases us from the pres-
sures of smash and grab, of "me first," of "you've
never had it so good." Some sudden new light
on the ways in which human beings can live is
needed to release us from the obsessions of our
"getting and spending," our immense preoccupa-
tion with "what there is in it for me," and of what
in short-term thrills or benefits I can extract from
this day for my very own.
Perhaps there is salvation in the new image of
the immense patience and discipline and stripping
down of desires and wants that are necessary in
the life of those who are fit enough and tough
enough to venture out into the new dimension of
outer space. Here we can perhaps glimpse some
reflection of the kind of discipline and restraint
which we all need in some measure if our genera-
tion is to achieve great tasks, not only in the upper
air but here and now in this bewildered and floun-
dering world.
The sense that something more is required of us
than a happy acquiescence in our affluence is, I
believe, more widespread than we know. The
thousands of yoimg people who volunteer for the
rigors and discomforts of tlie Peace Corps, the
uncomplaining reservists, the growing body of
students with a passionate concern for world peace
or for the end of racial discrimination, the unsung
citizens all over this continent whose love and
service and neighborly good will are the hidden
motive forces of our Republic — all these people
will see reflected in the discipline and dedication
of Colonel Glenn and his comrades the proof that
great deeds demand great preparation and that
no country can hope to master the challenge of
582
Deparfment of Slafe Bulletin
our day without a comparable readiness to cut
away the trivialities and achieve the freedom
which comes from being no longer "passion's
slave."
To tliis kind of greatness we are all called, for
even daily life cannot be lived with grace and
dignity without some sense of others' needs and of
the claims they may make on our sympathy and
good will. How much more must the great public
life of a whole nation be informed with discipline
and vision if its generosity is to shine forth and
its courage to lie beyond all shadow of doubt !
I do not believe that in the last decade our Re-
public has always equaled the brilliant image of
youth and energy and regeneration which was once
projected to the world when, as a commimity dedi-
cated to a proposition and an ideal, it stirred to
life two centuries ago in these United States. Nor
do I believe we can fulfill our role in liistory with-
out a recovery of the original dream.
Therefore I pray that, like our young astro-
nauts, we soar to the stars in mind as well as body
and recover that sense of our vocation and dedica-
tion without which this people, founded and cre-
ated in a great vision, will not finally endure.
ADDRESS BY MR. CLEVELAND
Press release 160 dated March 12
The Practical Side of Peacekeeping
We are meeting, it seems, to discuss a vision :
a disarmed world under law. It is the subject
of much oratory and many books. A few states-
men have added their endorsement to those of
poets and professors. But I think it is fair to
say that until very recently most practical politi-
cians haven't bothered very much about disarma-
ment. As practitioners of the possible, they knew
that disarmament, like congressional reapportion-
ment or a wholly new farm policy, was simply
not going to happen.
Yet suddenly, in the past few months, some of
the world's toughest and most practical politicians
have turned their close attention to the dismantling
of national warmaking capabilities and the build-
ing up of an international peacekeeping force.
Their attention has been captured by a temporary
and dramatic conjuncture of events :
First, the great-power confrontation that began
in Iran 16 years ago has just about exhausted all
room for further territorial maneuver. From
Berlin to Korea and Viet-Nam, this stalemate is
symbolized by temporary frontiers hardened by
the armed forces of the great powers.
Second, the Soviet Union faces agonizing de-
cisions in its foreign policy. Weakened by agri-
cultural troubles at home, the men in the Kremlin
face increasing restiveness all through the bloc,
the gradual decay of East Germany, and the overt
breakaway of the Chinese Communists. The com-
bination of pressures from the Chinese, from
Stalinist elements in Russia, from the success of
the Common Market and the prospect of Atlantic
partnership, from Soviet failure in the Congo and
growing U.S. determination in Viet-Nam, must be
raising new questions in the Kremlin about the
viability of their traditional policies.
Third, in U.S.-Soviet relations there is not much
time to prevent
— another indefinite succession of appallingly
complex and costly stages in the nuclear arms
race — from missiles to antimissiles to more missiles
to more antimissiles;
— the spreading of nuclear weapons to other
countries — and the multiplying of the number of
fingers on the nuclear trigger;
— a runaway competition for leadership in outer
space.
Fourth, there is a general sense of political flux,
made possible by military stalemate — and made
precarious by the teclinological instability of that
same stalemate.
Ways and Means in the Search for Peace
And so we gather here in Washington tliis morn-
ing just as the curtain goes up on a month of
vigorous diplomacy, with the possibility of a sum-
mit meeting hanging in the air.
The Secretary of State is meeting in Geneva
with the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union
and Great Britain to discuss the great issues which
divide the Communist and non-Communist worlds.
On Wednesday [March 14], also in Geneva, the
18-nation Disarmament Committee opens its meet-
ing — with 17 members present^ — to begin talks
about "general and complete disarmament," in-
cluding the creation of new and improved institu-
' France declined to participate in the meeting.
April 9, J 962
583
tions to keep the peace and provide for peaceful
change under accepted rules of conduct.'
A week from today [March 19] the U.N. Com-
mittee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space will con-
vene in New York to talk about the rule of law
in outer space — and its peaceful and cooperative
exploration. These discussions open with the
kiiowledge that President Kennedy and Chairman
Khrushchev have just exchanged letters on coop-
eration in outer space and that the President has
made specific suggestions to the Soviet leader for
international cooperation on certain space projects
of dramatic potential. U.S. policy is clear — to
secure the benefits of space science to all mankind.
Pursuant to that policy, agreed now with others,
the World Meteorological Organization is work-
ing on a worldwide weather reporting and fore-
casting service, taking advantage of weather-
watching earth satellites. The International
Telecommunication Union is preparing to work on
communications satellites.
Meanwhile the International Coiirt of Justice
is about to hear arguments on its advisory opinion
about financing the peacekeepmg operations of the
United Nations.*
At dozens of places in dozens of ways, in 51 in-
ternational organizations and more than 400 inter-
governmental conferences this year, larger and
smaller groups of nations are working away at the
intricate process of knitting together the fabric of
international life and working out the rules for
conducting more and more of the world's business
under agi'eed codes of conduct.
Some of us are wont to say that our political
and social institutions lag dangerously behind the
brilliant advances of the material sciences — and
with good reason. We are fond of noting that
doctrine inherited from decades past is all too
likely to be obsolete in the 1960's. AVe raise with
alarm the question of wliether conventional wis-
dom which had led nations to a long series of dis-
astrous wars is safe in an age in which, as President
Eisenhower used to say, "there is no alternative to
peace."
The alarm is well founded. But something
quite startling — and potentially hopefvil — lias
happened in the recent past. Time was wlien the
subject of peace was reserved to poets and propa-
gandists, to ministers and mothers, to college stu-
dents and other dreamers, and to occasional bursts
of high-fiown rhetoric shortly before national
elections.
Peacekeeping, of course, has always been en-
dowed with unassailable moral, ethical, religious,
and semantic values — which have normally failed
to stop men and nations from fighting each other.
But somehow tlie subject of peace and peacekeep-
ing has never been considered quite practical,
especially by men who pride themselves on being
practical.
But in recent months, while the astronauts have
been preparing for the most visionary project in
histoiy, man's oldest adventure, the search for
peace, has been quite suddenly brought down to
earth. It has moved from the realm of dream and
I'hetoric to tlie realm of ways and means. In the
process peace and peacekeeping has become the
major business of the U.S. Government. There
are no stars in the eyes of Federal bureaucracy.
We know that it takes two to make peace, just as
it takes two to make a fight. But on our side at
least, we are settling down to it in a practical way.
Working Toward a Disarmed World
It started last September, when a most prag-
matic President of the United States addressed
the 16th General Assembly of the United Na-
tions.' He called for a U.N. Decade of Develop-
ment, a concentrated program of peaceful change
in the economic and social field, which the Gen-
eral Assembly later adopted.
He also called for the extension of the rule of
law to outer space and offered to cooperate with
the Soviet Union and other nations in the explora-
tion and development of space. This, too, found
response in a General xVssembly resolution and in
tlie formation of the new Committee on Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space, which meets in New York on
the lOtli of Marcli.
Finally the President outlined a comprehensive
plan for general and complete disarmament.*
Meanwliile, in bilateral negotiations, the U.S. and
the Soviet Union agreed on the principles to guide
disarmament discussions " and on tlie IS-nation
forum now about to convene in Geneva.
" For a statement by Secretary Rusk, see p. 571.
" For biu-kgrouiul, see Bullewn of Feb. 26, 1962, p. 311,
and Mar. 12, 1902, p. 430.
' Ibid.. Oct. 16, 19(;], p. C.l!).
" For text, see ibid., p. ()">().
° For text, see ibid., Oct. 0, 1901, p. 58.0.
584
Department of State Bulletin
Shortly after the President addressed the Gen-
eral Assembly, the Congress approved his proposal
to establish a full-time, major U.S. Goverimient
agency to concern itself exclusively with the prob-
lem of arms control and disarmament.— the first
such agency in the liistory of any government. It
is now engaged in an extensive program of serious
research on the practical technical problems of
working our way toward a disarmed world under
law.
It would be foolish, of course, to predict the out-
come of the Geneva meeting of the new Disarma-
ment Committee or the outer space group in New
York. Significant progress at the technical level
may be very difficult without a prior political
agreement having been reached between the great
powers.
Yet in his television address to the Nation on
March 2," tlie President laid the doctrinal basis
for progress on disarmament when he said that
". . . in the long run, the only real security in
this age of nuclear peril rests not in armament but
in disarmament" — and when he later added, "Our
foremost aim is the control of force, not the pursuit
of force. . . ." If the Soviet Union were seri-
ously to adopt a parallel doctrine, the first disar-
mament steps would become at once a matter of
very practical politics.
But, as President Kennedy said," "To destroy
arms ... is not enough. "We must create even
as we destroy — creating worldwide law and law
enforcement as we outlaw worldwide war and
weapons."
This critical point was further developed by
Ambassador Stevenson when he opened the dis-
armament debate in the General Assembly last
fall.^^ He said then that a disarmed world will
not be a placid world :
Conflicting ideologies would still be with us.
Political struggles would still take place.
Social systems would still be subject to disruptive pres-
sures from within and without.
Economic strength would still be a factor in, and an
instrument of, national foreign policies.
And the world would still be the scene of peaceful trans-
formations — for it cannot and should not remain static.
. . . Disarmament alone will not purify the human race
of the last vestige of greed, ambition, and brutality, of
"^ Ibid., Mar. 19, 19G2. p. 44.3.
" Ibid., Oct. 16, 1961, p. 619.
" For a statement made by Ambassador Stevenson on
Nov. 15 in Committee I and test of a resolution on dis-
armament, see ibid., Dec. 18, 1961, p. 1023.
April 9, 1962
633698—62 3
false pride and the love of imwer. Nor will it cleanse
every last national leader of the least impulse to inter-
national lawlessness. No sane and honest man can pre-
tend to foresee such a paradise on earth — even an crirtb
without arms.
That is why, in the United States plan for dis-
armament, international peacekeeping was treated
as the handmaiden of arms control and disanna-
ment. The preamble of our plan contains the fol-
lowing key sentence :
As States relinquish their arms, the United Nations
shall be progressively strengthened in order to improve
its capacity to assure international security and the peace-
ful settlement of differences as well as to facilitate the
development of international co-operatiou in common
tasks for the benefit of mankind.
It's not exciting prose, but there is nothing un-
exciting about the idea.
What an International Peace Force Could Do
The world has little practical experience witli
the dismantling of the national capacity to make
war. But on the other side of the disarmament
equation — the building of an international peace
force — there is some useful experience on which
to draw.
We can focus, not on the theoretical kind of
peace force which the f ramers of the U.N. Charter
seemed to have in mind, but on the actual peace
tasks which the international community has un-
dertaken since the charter was adopted.
You will recall that the original idea in 1945,
when the U.N. Charter was signed, was that the
United Nations should have a standing force pro-
vided by the great powers to deal with breaches
or threatened breaches of the peace. But we have
found from experience that each crisis requiring
peacekeeping forces arises in a different form and
therefore requires a different kind of foi'ce.
In actual experience the United Nations has
engaged in eight peacekeeping operations — in In-
donesia, Greece, Palestine, Kashmir, Korea, the
Middle East, Lebanon, and the Congo. Each time
the mission was different. Each time the number
and type and training and nationality of the
forces were somewhat different — and the supply
and logistical problems were different too.
In most cases the standing force envisaged by
the framers of the charter would have been the
wrong kind of force to deal with the actual situa-
tions the U.N. has had to tackle. The political
composition would have been wrong, or the mix
585
of weapons systems would have been inappro-
priate.
One lesson is clear from the scattered experience
to date : We cannot run the risk of throwing to-
gether scratch teams with no training at a mo-
ment's notice — emergency forces which are, as the
President described them in his U.N. speech,
"hastily assembled, uncertainly supplied, and
inadequately financed." So entirely new ideas of
identifying, training, commanding, transporting,
and supplying special units for special jobs will
have to be worked out against future emergencies.
From the modern world's own experience, then,
we can begin to learn what an international peace
force could usefully do :
It could send observers to potential areas of
conflict ;
It could watch over tlie carrying out of inter-
national agreements ;
It could administer particular areas or special
functions which have been given an international
character by the decision of those competent to
make the decision ;
It could be interposed between combatants to
enforce a cease-fire — inside a turbulent country
(as in the Congo) or between turbulent countries
(as in the Middle East) ;
At a later stage a larger international peace
force with some experience behind it might be able
to cope with actual hostilities between well-armed
secondary powers.
Only in the final and faraway stage of general
and complete disarmament could an international
force interpose itself in a conflict between great
powers. But by making it more difficult for brush
fires to break out, and by reducing the temptation
for big powers to intervene when brush fires do
break out, even a small, highly mobile polic« force
could render more imlikely the escalation of little
wars into big ones.
The practical questions that arise are many and
quite fascinating to think about:
Wliat should be the political makeup of tlie
force and its color composition ?
To what extent should it consist of a jjermanent
cadre of regular forces, and to what extent should
the U.N. depend on a rapid callup system of na-
tional forces tentatively earmarked for interna-
tional duty in an emergency?
Wliat weapons should it have, and what admix-
ture of air, sea, and ground forces ? Should it have
bombers or only lighters, surface vessels or sub-
marines? And what about tactical nuclear
weapons ?
By what military law should the troops be dis-
ciplined? 'What advance training should the
officers have together? How can a peace force
liave an adequate intelligence arm ? 'Wliat should
it do about its own public relations?
How should an international peace force be
financed? The rapid increase in the U.N.'s
budget for peacekeeping operations has already
produced one major financial crisis at the United
Nations. The U.S. Senate may decide this week
whether the President should have the resources
he has asked for to do our part — our necessanly
leading part — to meet that crisis. But the amounts
of money involved in the Middle East and the
Congo are, of course, small compared to the soit
of international peacekeeping force that would
be required in stages II and III of the U.S. dis-
armament plan. Where will the money come from
to support them ?
And finally, the most inclusive and most difficult
political question: How should the international
force be conmianded and controlled? How can
the views of great powers, which under a disarma-
ment agreement would be progressively giving up
their reliance on national forces and contributing
disproportionately to international forces, be given
appropriate weight in the command and control
system for an international force, without doing
violence to what the charter calls "the equal
rights ... of nations large and small"?
These are the questions bej'ond the questions at
Geneva. On a small scale they are inherent even
in the U.N.'s present peacekeeping role. But be-
fore most of them have to be answered outside of
books — for real — we have to learn whether the
Government of the U. S. S. R. agrees with the
President of the Ignited States that "Our foremost
aim is the control of force, not the pursuit of
force. . . ."
ADDRESS BY MR. GARDNER
rri>ss release 159 dnteii March 10
Extending Law Into Outer Space
I want to talk to you today about what may
appear to some to be an esoteric subject^ — the rule
of law and outer space.
Let me make it clear that I do not pretend to
the title of "space lawyer." A space lawyer is
586
Department of State Bulletin
someone you go to if you are ever sued by a
Martian. I am talking about a diiTerent kind of
law. A former colleague of mine once described
law as "eunomics" — the science of good arrange-
ments. This is what I propose to discuss today —
good arrangements for international cooperation
in the peaceful uses of outer space.
The subject could scarcely be more timely. Next
week will be the first meeting of the United
Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space. The United States, the Soviet Union, and
26 other countries are participating. There is no
doubt that the Committee will get off its launching
pad. The real question is whether it will achieve
a useful orbit.
Experience has taught ns to appreciate the dif-
ficulties as well as the possibilities inherent in co-
operative space activities. The dawn of the space
age fostered unrealistic notions of how technology
might heal the breaches of the cold war. Outer
space, however, cannot be regarded as a realm di-
vorced from the political realities of life on earth.
As one of our leading space experts likes to say,
"Space is a place, not a topic." The things nations
do in space are largely extensions of their earth-
bound activities ; they will inevitably reflect mil-
itai-y, political, economic, and scientific interests.
Early difficulties in developing a U.N. program of
outer space cooperation provide convincing evi-
dence of this fact.
Yet recent events justify a mood of cautious op-
timism. In his letter to President Kennedy of
February 21 congratulating the United States on
the successful orbiting of Lieutenant Colonel John
H. Glenn, Premier Khrushchev noted sig-
nificantly :
If our countries pooled tbeir efforts — scientific, tech-
nical and material — to master the universe, this would
be very beneficial for the advance of science and would be
joyfully acclaimed by all peoples who would like to see
scientific achievements benefit man and not be used for
"cold war" purposes and the arms race.
The next day the President replied :
I am instructing the appropriate oflScers of this Govern-
ment to prepare new and concrete proposals for immediate
projects of common action, and I hope that at a very early
date our representatives may meet to discuss our ideas
and yours in a spirit of practical cooperation.
The significance of this exchange is enhanced
by the basis for cooperation which has been laid
in recent months. The United States, of course,
has called for cooperation with the Soviet Union
in outer space on many occasions. This offer was
eloquently restated by President Kennedy in his
first state of the Union message on January .30,
1961." Further impetus was given to the idea
when, on September 25, the President laid before
the United Nations a four-point program of space
cooperation under United Nations auspices. The
program called for a regime of law and order in
outer space, the registration of satellites and space
probes with the United Nations, a worldwide pro-
gram of weather research and weather forecasting,
and international cooperation in the establishment
of a global system of communications satellites.
A resolution embodying the President's program,
cosponsored by the United States and several
friendly states, was placed before the United Na-
tions on December 4. The Soviet Union, after
some apparent hesitation, decided to cosponsor
the resolution — with only a few minor amend-
ments. Moreover, it cooperated in the solution of
the procedural difficulties which had hitherto pre-
vented the Outer Space Committee from begin-
ning its work.
What happened to produce this modest advance
in U.N. space cooperation? How substantial a
cooperative venture does it portend?
To answer these questions we must take a closer
look at the program which was recently approved
by the General Assembly.
Framework for International Cooperation
The first part of the program looks toward a
regime of law and order in outer space on the basis
of two fundamental principles:
1. International law, including the United Na-
tions Charter, applies to outer space and celestial
bodies.
2. Outer space and celestial bodies are free for
exploration and use by all states in conformity
with international law and are not subject to na-
tional appropriation.
The General Assembly did not seek, quite riglitly
in the judgment of the United States, to go beyond
these two principles and to define just where air-
space leaves off and outer space begins. It has
been the general view, not challenged by any na-
tion, that satellites so far placed in orbit have been
operating in outer space. But the drawing of a
precise boundary must await further experience
and a consensus among nations.
"Il)id., Feb. 13, 1961, p. 207.
April 9, 1962
587
U.S. Supplies Information to U.N.
on Its Space Launchings
U.S. /U.N. press release 3933 dated March 5
FoUouing is the text of a letter from Ambassador
Adlai E. Stevenson, U.S. Representative to the
United Natio7is, to V Thant, Acting Secretary-Gen-
eral of the United Nations.
JlABCH 5, 1962
Dear Mb. Secretary General : In accordance
with Section B.l. of General Assembly Resolution
1721 (XVI)' I enclose registration data " concerning
objects launched into sustained orbit or beyond by
the United States. This reix)rt presents a chrono-
logical census of seventy-two United States space
vehicles and associated objects in sustained orbit or
space transit as of February ir>, 1962. The United
States plans to submit reports on a bi-weekly basis
to keep this information up-to-date.
These periodic reports are submitted for the in-
formation of the United Nations and to enable you
to maintain a public registry of orbiting objects
in accordance with Section B.2. of Resolution 1721
(XVI). The establishment of such a registry
marks another step forward in the direction of open
and orderly conduct of outer space activities. Outer
space is the province of all mankind and the United
States believes that the benefits of the exploration
and use of outer space should accrue to all. We
therefore particularly welcome the establishment
of this registry in the United Nations and are
pleased to supply this information to open it.
As you are aware, the United States is also sup-
plying information on launching vehicles and space
craft of special interest to the Committee on Space
Research of the International Council of Scientific
Unions as well as directly to states which are par-
ticipating with the United States in specific coop-
erative space activities. We hope of course that
comparable information will be made available by
others in accordance with Resolution 1721 (XVI),
as the value of the registry will depend largely on
the cooperation of all concerned.
Sincerely yours,
Adlai E. Stevenson
' For text, see Bulletin of Jan. 29, 1962, p. 185.
' U.N. doc. A/AC. 105/INP. 1.
The U.N. program takes international law and
the U.N. Charter as the standard for space activi-
ties. Mankind would thus be free to use space on
the same basis as it uses the high seas — free of any
restraint except those on illegal activity such as
aggression and exclusive use. This formula is
designed to promote the maximum exploitation of
space technology in tiie service of human needs.
It is designed to prevent space and celestial bodies
from becoming the objects of competing national
claims.
Within this general framework the Outer Space
Committee, through its technical and legal sub-
committees, will now seek to develop further
standards for the conduct of space activities which
will serve the interest of all nations — standards
covering such matters as liability for injury caused
by space vehicles and the return of space vehicles
and personnel.
Registration of Objects in Orbit
A second aspect of the new U.N. program is the
registration of objects lavmched into orbit or be-
yond. Under the resolution information on these
objects is to be furnished promptly to the Outer
Space Committee through the Secretary-General
for the vise of all members of the United Nations.
To fulfill its obligations imder this part of the
U.N. resolution, the United States has submitted
a comprehensive inventory of all U.S. satellites in
sustained orbit and will keep this initial i-egistra-
tion up to date by the periodic filing of new
information.
The establishment of a complete registry of
space vehicles marks a modest but important step
toward openness in the conduct of space activity.
It will benefit all nations, large and small, inter-
ested in identifying space vehicles. It might make
a modest contribution to the eventual establish-
ment of a sj'stem of prelaunch inspection as part
of a comprehensive disarmament agreement.
Weather Research and Prediction
The third part of the new space program looks
toward a worldwide program of weather research
and weather prediction.
Tlie space age has brought a revolutionary
advance in meteorologA'. Orbiting weather satel-
lites, supplementing other advances in meteoro-
logical technology, such as sounding rockets,
radar, and electronic computers, make it possible
now for the first time to keep the entire atmos-
phere of the earth under constant observation.
The United Nations program calls upon the
World Meteorological Organization (AVMO), in
collaboration with UNESCO (United Nations Ed-
ucational. Scientific and Cultural Organization)
and the scientific communitj', to develop two kinds
588
DeparfmenI of Stale Bullelin
of proposal;^. Tlie first is for an international re-
search program to yield information essential for
improved weather prediction and perhaps even-
tually weather control. The second is for an inter-
national weather service program — a global net-
work of regional weather stations to receive,
process, and transmit meteorological information
from orbiting weather satellites as well as eai'th-
based instruments.
The United States has offered to make the
weather data received from U.S. satellites avail-
able for this international program. Indeed we
are already making available to other comitries
the information received from our Tiros satellites
and are developing methods to permit direct trans-
mission of satellite cloud photography to any part
of the world.
The worldwide program of weather forecasting
and weather research could lead to the saving of
billions of dollars in the United States alone. It
holds special promise for countries in the tropics
and the Southern Hemisphere, where vast areas
cannot be covered by present techniques.
More accurate prediction of storms, floods, rain-
fall, and drought will bring major savings in life
and property. Significant increases in farm pro-
duction will be made possible as the nature and
timing of crop planting are adjusted to take ac-
count of future weather patterns. Increased
knowledge of the atmosphere may lead to new
solutions to air pollution above our cities. Even-
tually it may help us break up dangerous storms
and achieve some control over climate and rainfall.
The cost of the worldwide weather program is
small compared to its potential benefits. The chal-
lenge to the U.N. is to develop a program which
will encourage the necessary cooperation among
nations in research, in the training of weather ex-
perts, in construction of weather stations, in the
tracking of weather satellites, and in the exchange
of weather information.
Global System of Communication Satellites
Tlie fourth part of the U.N. program of space
cooperation looks toward the establishment of a
global system of communication satellites.
Space technology has opened up vast possibili-
ties for international communications. Accord-
ing to many current estimates, it should be techni-
cally passible by the end of this decade to have in
April 9, J 962
63369S— 62 1
operation a global system of telegraph, telephone,
radio, and television communication. The cost of
an initial system is estimated at upwards of $2,00
million. Its benefits would be impressive.
With the aid of satellites, telephone communica-
tion between continents will become immeasurably
easier. Communication satellites can offer 20
times the number of telephone channels available
in our existing undersea cables. If interconti-
nental telephone communication increases suffi-
ciently to fill this huge capacity, it may someday
be possible to place a call to any place in the world
for approximately the same charge as to another
city in the United States.
Intercontinental radio and television open even
more dramatic prospects. According to David
Sarnofl', chairman of the board of the Radio Cor-
poration of America, there are now some 100 mil-
lion television receivers in use in 75 countries of
the world. By the end of this decade, when a
communication satellite network could be operat-
ing, there will be some 200 million receivers. Pro-
grams will have a potential audience of nearly 1
billion people.
This fundamental breakthrough in communica-
tion could affect the lives of people everywhere.
It could forge new bonds of mutual knowledge
and understanding between nations. It could offer
a powerful tool to improve literacy and education
in developing nations. It would enable leaders of
nations to talk face to face on a convenient and
reliable basis.
Some time in the future lies the prospect of
direct broadcast radio and television. When this
day comes, it may be possible to beam programs
from communications satellites directly into
l)eople"s homes.
The satellite system likely to be in use within
this decade, however, will be for point-to-point
relay between central installations in different
countries. This means that the benefits of space
communications can be made available to all peo-
ples only tJiroiigh political as well as technical
cooperation.
Rationale of U.N. Program
The United Nations program represents a mod-
est step toward worldwide cooperation on these
problems. It starts from a principle now unani-
mously endorsed in the U.N. resolution — that
satellite communication should be available to the
589
nations of the world as soon as practicable on a
global and nondiscriminatory basis. This is a
valuable recognition that, in principle, efforts
should be made to develop a single commercial
system for all nations of the world rather than
competing systems between contending political
blocs.
A second principle underlying the program is
that the United Nations should be able to use com-
munications satellites both in communicating with
its representatives around the world and in broad-
casting programs of information and education.
Within the next year or two the United States will
be able to offer its satellites, on an experimental
basis, for live TV transmission across the North
Atlantic of brief broadcasts from the United
Nations.
A third principle is the importance of technical
assistance and economic aid to develop the internal
communication systems of the less developed coun-
tries. A country with an inadequate telephone and
radio system and no television at all cannot partic-
ipate fully in a global network of communications.
Beyond these principles there is general agree-
ment on the important role in space communica-
tions that should be played by the United Nations
and its interested specialized agencies. The In-
ternational Telecommunication Union has already
laid tentative plans to call a special conference in
1963 to make allocations of radio frequency bands
for outer space activities. It is now proposed to
broaden the scope of this conference to include
consideration of other aspects of space communi-
cation in which international cooperation will be
required.
Meanwhile the ITU, like the WMO in the
weather field, is charged with the responsibility of
framing more specific proposals for consideration
by the Outer Space Connnittee, the Economic and
Social Council, and the General Assembly.
T^Hiile the ITU study is under way, the United
States is developing the foundation for a program
of international cooperation. On February 7 the
President submitted to the Congress S. 2814, a bill
to establisli a communications satellite corporation,
which would be llio instrument for U.S. participa-
tion in a global satellite system.^*
" For text of President Kennedy's message transmitting
the proposed legislation to Congress, see White House press
relea.se dated Feb. 7.
We do not, of course, envisage that other coun-
tries will satisfy their interest in satellite com-
munications by means of purchase of shares in the
proposed U.S. satellite corporation. Existing U.S.
law prohibits more than 20 percent foreign owner-
ship in any U.S. communications corporation and
will apply in this case. In order to obtain global
participation it appears desirable that there sub-
sequently be negotiated and established an inter-
national arrangement which would provide for
broad ownership and participation on a worldwide
basis. With our present knowledge of the active
interest of foreign countries in establishing com-
munications via satellite and their natural desire
to operate their own ground stations as well as
participate in the ownership of a global system, the
establishment of a truly international satellite
arrangement would appear to be necessary.
The international nature of a satellite com-
munications system is dictated by a number of
commonsense considerations. The satellites will be
primarily useful for communicating with other
countries, and we thus must agree with those
sovereign countries on the arrangements for talk-
ing with them. Much of the traffic will be between
other countries not involving the United States
at all. In view of the importance of communica-
tions to all states, many other countries will wish
to have a voice in the operation and management
of the system. For our part we should welcome
this interest in cooperation and participation by
other countries both as a sharing of the burden
of establishing and maintaining the system and as
a venture in international cooperation which will
have value in itself.
Practical Value of Program to All Nations
This review of the details of the program of
space cooperation sponsored by the United States
in the United Nations suggests some tentative
answers to the questions asked earlier. It sug-
gests that the program was endorsed by all U.N.
members because it promised practical benefits
to many nations — so nuich so as to be innnune from
effective partisan attack. It suggests that the pro-
gram will achieve results so far as the specific
proposals of cooperation commend themselves on
a basis of national self-interest.
A program of space cooperation under U.N.
auspices serves the national interest of the United
States and other countries for three main reasons:
590
Deparftnent of State Bulletin
In the first place it provides a way, despite
political differences, to exploit tlie oiiormous pos-
sibilities which the space age opens for all man-
kind. The need for cooperation across political
lines is supported by solid practical considerations.
It is in the interest of all countries, whatever their
ideologj', tliat space and celestial bodies should not
be the subject of competing national claims, that
a comprehensive public registry of orbiting ve-
hicles be maintained, that worldwide weather serv-
ices be developed, and that communications among
nations be improved.
To be sure, the deep political divergencies of
our time have placed an upper limit on the extent
of cooperation. But it is noteworthy, for example,
that the Soviet Union, after years of resisting rules
for frequency allocations and usage for radio com-
mmiication, finally accepted the frequency alloca-
tions of the ITU for its own broadcasts in order
to avoid interference and other difficulties in the
operation of its radio circuits. Hopefully the na-
tional interest of the Soviet Union will encourage
it to cooperate from tlie outset in space communica-
tions.
Beyond these practical considerations the unique
impact of outer space on the mind of man can be
used to widen and deepen international coopera-
tion. There is a widespread feeling that somehow
man must venture beyond the globe in a spirit of
cooperation rather than conflict, that activities in
space should serve the interest of mankind as a
whole. Our challenge is to use the drama attend-
ant upon space technology to open doors of co-
operation that might otherwise be locked.
In the second place the U.N. program has value
quite apart from encouraging valuable cooperation
with the Communist bloc. The assistance of many
nations is needed if our national space program
is to be successfully carried on. In weather and
communications, for example, the technology of
the United States can yield dividends to ourselves
and others only if many nations join in allocating
radio frequencies, in tracking and communicating
with space vehicles, and in placing necessary
ground installations on their territories. The
United Nations can do much to facilitate coopera-
tion on a free-world basis even if universal par-
ticipation is not achieved. A good start has al-
ready been made in such cooperation through
the activities of the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration, which has cooperative ven-
tures with some 40 countries involving tracking
stations, exchanges of personnel, and joint space
experiments.
In the third place the program of space co-
operation has deep significance for the U.N. itself.
The United Nations and specialized agencies such
as the ITU, WMO, and UNESCO will have new
resjjonsibilities for registering space vehicles,
studying problems of space cooperation, and as-
sisting in the development of worldwide weather
and communications services. Such activities can-
not fail to strengthen the United Nations as a force
for peace by binding its members to it through ties
of common interest. This is particularly true for
some of the developing countries which stand to
derive some of the greatest benefits.
All of these considerations lay behind these con-
cluding words of Adlai Stevenson when he pre-
sented the outer space program to the last
General Assembly :
"There is a right and a wrong way to get on with
the business of space exploration. In our judg-
ment the wrong way is to allow the march of
science to become a runaway race into the un-
known. The right way is to make it an ordered,
peaceful, cooperative, and constructive forward
march under the aegis of the United Nations."'
General White Nominated for Special
OAS Committee on Security
The Department of State announced on March
14 (press release 168) that the United States has
nominated former Air Force Chief of Staff Gen.
Thomas D. "WHiite for membei-ship on the new-
Special Consultative Committee on Security of the
Organization of American States.
Eesolution II of the recent meeting of foreign
ministers at Punta del Este, Uruguay,' called for
the establislunent of this committee of experts on
security against the subversive action of interna-
tional communism. The committee is to submit
an uiitial general report with recommendations to
the Coimcil of the Organization of American
States not later than May 1, 1962, and also to sub-
mit reports to member governments that may re-
quest such assistance.
'■ For text, see Bulletin of Feb. 19, 1962, p. 279.
April 9, 1962
591
Meeting the Soviet Economic Ciiallenge
hy Philip H. Trezise
Acting Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs ^
Today is the Ides of March, a date suggestive
of fate and doom. I will take for my text an
appropriately somber quotation: "American cap-
italism has passed its zenith and is going down."
The author of this statement is the Chairman of
the Conmiunist Party of the Soviet Union, Mr.
Khrushchev. He has also been quoted, on another
occasion, as saying, "Whether you like it or not,
history is on our side. We will bury you !"
Soviet abilities in tlie mortuary field are per-
haps subject to some discount. After all, they
have had to bury Stalin twice. And to judge
from the discussions taking place within the Com-
munist bloc, Stalinism itself is far from a dead
and buried issue.
However, when Khrushchev speaks of the de-
cline of capitalism, he is taking the role of his-
torian and prophet. He is offering the predic-
tion — and no doubt his firmly held belief — about
the future. At the same time he is issuing a chal-
lenge. We must examine the challenge soberly
and carefully. If we take it seriously, as we
should, he is defining one of the terms of an his-
toric contest betAveen systems of government and
ways of life.
Factors Motivating Soviet Claims
Wlien Khrushchev predicts the doom of capital-
ism, he is of course echoing a traditional point in
Marxian dogma. Marx taught that capitalism is
doomed, that it must inevitably be supplanted by
a new system, namely, the Communist society.
' Ad(Jres.s made before the Chamber of Conimerco of
Fresno, Calif., on Mar. 1.% (press release 107 dated .Mar.
14).
Then, too, the Soviets have long been concerned
with building a strong economy for military rea-
sons. Lenin in 1919, when the Soviet Union was
in the throes of civil war, said, "We must either
perish or overtake the advanced countries and
surpass them also economical!}'." And Stalin in
1931 took the same tack : "We are fifty or a hun-
dred years behind the advanced countries. We
must make good this distance in ten years."
It seems likely, nevertheless, that Khrushchev
has more than doctrine and tradition in mind.
There are shrewd and practical considerations of
foreign and domestic policy which could motivate
him to lay down the challenge of an economic
competition with the West.
In the international arena power or prospective
power continues to be a key factor. Governments
make their calculations and decisions in part on
the basis of the strength or the prospective
strength of the major nations. If the Soviet
Union can convince other countries that its eco-
nomic growth will exceed that of the United
States, this will register on political choices and
decisions around the world. A few years ago the
government of a nation friendly to us prepared
an ofiicial report containing the amazing predic-
tion that by 1980 the Soviet would have caught
up with and greatly outstripped the United States
in total production. We were able to disabuse tliat
government of this remarkable belief. Hut you
may be sure that foreign offices and ]ioiiiical lead-
ers in many coinitries will continue to reflect most
seriously about the power relations likely to exist
between the United States aiul tlie Soviet l^nion
5, 10, and 20 years lience and how this will bear
ujion the role of their nations in world afl'airs.
592
Departmenf of State Bulletin
So Mr. Khrushchev no doubt has in mind the
impact on third countries of his assurance that tlie
Soviet Union will overtake the United States in
the economic field.
There is probably another motive and one that
strikes closer to home. This has to do with the
impact of relative living standards on the political
situation within the Soviet bloc. The theme of
Soviet victory in an economic race began to domi-
nate Khrushchev's speeches beginning in 1957, a
period of crisis within the Soviet sphere. The
Hungarians had rebelled, and the Poles had shown
great restiveness. There was obviously grave dis-
satisfaction within the Soviet Union itself. The
living conditions of the Soviet people had risen
from the low levels of the 1940's, but the pace of
improvement had been vei-y slow. There was
enough knowledge about higher li%ang standards
in the West — knowledge gained from the Western
press and from Western broadcasts — so that So-
viet citizens were led to ask how it was that they,
with an allegedly superior economic system, lived
so much less well than the workers in the decadent
capitalist countries.
Khrushchev was ready to concede that affluence
equals influence. He said at the time, "We will
insure the production of consumers' goods at a
higher rate. It will be soon. We shall see. Not
very much time will pass. We will jump the ob-
stacle of the highest capitalist comitry, which is
the United States. Then, my dear people, what
will you have to say ? We will see who eats the
most and who has the most clothes." In other
words, one more giant effort and the Soviet Union
would be the most powerful and also the most
affluent nation.
U.S. and Soviet Rates of Growth
It would seem, then, that Khrushchev speaks
not only out of Marxist conviction but out of di-
rect political compulsions. He is anxious to in-
fluence other countries in their policies, and he is
desirous of impressing his own people and the
people of the Soviet bloc with the superior promise
of the Communist system. Even so, his challenge
is in some respects a vei-y bold one. The Soviet
bloc, including Communist China, at this time pro-
duces far less than the free world. Using the
rather rough estimates that are available, the Com-
mimist countries' total output in 1960 was roughly
$400 billion as against the free world's total of
$1,000-$!, 100 billion. This is a tremendous mar-
gin to overcome.
It may be more reasonable to make the compari-
son on a narrower base, the Soviet Union versus
the United States. Still, the task before the So-
viet Union would be a huge one. Our total pro-
duction in 1961 was valued at $521 billion, while
the Soviet Union was producing only about $240
billion. To reduce this margin significantly the
Soviet Union would have to expand very much
more rapidly than the United States. In fact,
to believe that the Soviet Union will overtake and
surpass the United States or the West, one must
also believe that Western capitalism will be af-
flicted with a kind of stagnation.
Such a belief would imply that the dynamic ele-
ments in Western economic life are few and are
declining. The notion would be that our system
is about to run out of steam whereas communism
retains tremendous vitality. The implications of
this, as you see, go far beyond mere economic ques-
tions and to the very heart of our differing politi-
cal and social systems. If the evidences for Mr.
Khrushchev's proposition were found to be strong,
then we would indeed have reason for despair.
"Wliat are the facts? And what do we see in
the world scene to justify or to contradict Mr.
Khrushchev's point of view ?
First we must recognize in all candor that the
Soviet Union has shown a capability for quite
high rates of overall economic growth. The
motor force beliind this has been a high rate of
forced savings and of forced investment in the
industrial sectors where the Soviet Government
chose to concentrate its efforts. If we take 1953
as the fii-st more or less normal year after the
period of postwar reconstruction and rehabilita-
tion, the Soviet Union seems to have had an annual
rate of growth of 6 to 61/^ percent, which is quite
respectable as these things go. This is not to say
that the Soviet economy was rmi efficiently, for in
fact Soviet methods of organization and manage-
ment create innmnerable forms of waste. Nor,
obviously, does it suggest that the Soviet people
received benefits commensurate with the rate of
growth. In fact living standards rose very
slowly. Even so basic a commodity as food still
is in short supply in Soviet cities.
Tlie sacrifices imposed on the Soviet citizens to
achieve high rates of growth become the more no-
table, however, when it is remembered that many
April 9, J 962
593
other countries expanded more rapidly than the
Soviet Union without the need for the grim bra-
tality of the Soviet system. Japan, with its very
limited land area and with scarce natural re-
sources, had a growth rate of more than 7 percent
during tlie 1953 to 1960 period. Japanese living
standards during these years sliowed a spectacular
improvement. West Germany had a rate of
growth of more than 7 percent while Italy, which
once was considered to have a hopelessly stagnant
economy, grew at about 6 percent or roughly the
same rate as the Soviet Union. In Latin America,
Venezuela, Brazil, and Mexico all showed rates of
growth as high as or higher than the Soviets. In
none of these cases did the government indulge in
forcible measures to expand the economy. For the
most part they depended on the efforts of private
citizens impelled by a desire for higher incomes
and better standards of life, that is, the motiva-
tions of the private enterprise system.
For the United States, it is true, the 1950's were
years of relatively slower progress. We seemed to
be resting a bit after the extremely rapid expan-
sion during the 1940's. We did not, of course, have
any postwar reconstruction task at home to give
special stimulus to our economy, and we had sev-
eral brief but retarding recessions. Nevertheless,
in a period that was very far from typical of the
potential performance of our economy, the United
States increased total output by an average of 2i/^
percent per year. In absolute terms we were pro-
ducing in 1960 $80 billion more real goods and
services than we were in 1953. In 1961 the coun-
try's total production rose by 3.6 percent, and this
year it is expected to grow by 9 or 10 percent. If
we have not been doing quite as well as we would
have liked, we have certainly not been stagnating.
For the future it seems that our economy could
probably, without any miusual stimulus, average a
rate of expansion of 41/2 percent or so. The Soviet
Union in 1961 seems to have fallen below that level,
down to about 4 percent, primarily because of in-
creases in the military budget and because of mis-
takes in planning and management on the part of
the cumbersome Soviet bureaucratic system. We
should count, to be on the cautious side, on the
Soviets' doing somewhat better than that in most
yeare in the future. A 6-percent average annual
rate of growth might be the likely one for some
years to come. If we do not do hotter than 41/2
percent on the average— and this should be a fairly
comfortable rate — the Soviet Union is not going to
narrow the margin between us by very much dur-
ing the next decade. At these rates the U.S.S.R.
in 1970 would be producing about 48 percent as
much as we are, as against 44 percent today.
Comparison of Various Sectors of Economies
These overall rates of growth are interesting and
pertinent, and we should not ignore them. They
give a measure of the broad performance of an
economy in terms of total amount of goods and
sei-vices that it generates. They tell us very little,
on the other hand, about the performance in the
various sectors of the economy or about the
changes in standards of living that have come
about. It is useful, therefore, to make some other
comparisons.
One is in the agricultural field. Here the com-
])arison between the United States and the Soviet
Union, or other Communist nations, is so unfavor-
able to the Communist system that one wonders
why Khrushchev from time to time even refers to
the possibility of catching up with us. We have
roughly 8 percent of our labor force engaged in
farming; the Soviet Union has close to 50 percent.
Just a few days ago Khrushchev observed that the
entire economy is in danger of being wrecked be-
cause of a lagging agriculture. There are admit-
tedly shortages of meat and milk in the U.S.S.R.
We have on the whole the most varied and at the
same time the least expensive diet in the world.
These enormous differentials cannot be at-
tributed to differences of natural endowments
alone. There seems to be no technical reason why
Soviet agriculture should necessarily be so grossly
less productive than our own. The difference
seems to go straight back to social systems. Ours is
a farm economy built around private ownership
and the incentives of the private system. Soviet
agriculture, for its part, is a state system in which
the individual is given little reason to use his tal-
ents to the full and in which the state, as a matter
of policy, systematically withholds from agricul-
ture the equipment and working capital that
would make it more efficient. The travel of Soviet
leaders about the countryside offering advice about
what needs to be done is certainlj' no substitute for
a decision to give the individual Russian farmer
an opportunity and an incentive to work his land
fully and efficiently.
It might be said that the comparison between
594
Deparfment of State Bulletin
the United States and the Soviet Union is not an
entirely fair one, that our agricultural technology
is realh' a special case, and that the performance
of the Soviet farm economy might better be com-
pared with that in less advanced countries than
the United States. This is not what Khrushchev
asks, of course, but it can be observed in any event
that in Japan, which is a country of extremely
small farms, where modern technology has to be
applied in a very special way, there has been a suc-
cession of bumper rice crops to the point where
the country is just about self-sufficient in its basic
foodstuff. This was accomplished, mind you,
under far less favorable natural conditions than
exist in the Communist states. The accomplish-
ment must be attributed to the way in which the
individual small farmer was willing and able to
adapt modem methods to his tiny plot. Else-
where Ln the world, in "Western Europe, farm out-
put is booming. Aniong the industrial countries,
at least, the economics of agricultural scarcity
are confined almost entirely to the Soviet Union.
Elsewhere we have achieved or are m sight of
achieving what the Communist Utopia promises
at some distant future date, that is, an economy
of abundance and, with us, an economy of abun-
dance that is sometimes embarrassing.
At the far end of the scale is Communist China.
There the authorities tried an experiment in rapid
and total communization which startled and
alarmed even the U.S.S.R. The results, for those
of us who believe in the importance of the indi-
vidual, have been highly instructive. So far as
can be determined, the experiment in rural com-
munism in China was a total and unmitigated
disaster for the Communists. In a coimtry
with 80 percent of the popidation engaged in
farming, there is widespread hunger and even,
we may suppose, many pockets of starvation. The
Chinese Communists are using their scarce re-
serves of foreign currencies to buy wheat from the
capitalist farming nations. The retreat from im-
mediate communism on the farms has been a rout.
If we look at the amenities that contribute to
the comfort or pleasure of life in the Western
countries, we find them to a large extent absent
in the Communist bloc. Most important is the
shockingly low standard of housing that still pre-
vails in the U.S.S.R. The floor space nowadays
available to Soviet city folks is at best 66 square
feet per person; may I mention that the Federal
prisons in this country supply their inmates a
minimnvi of 60 square feet. Shopping in the
U.S.S.R. is most burdensome because of perennial
shortages and a complete absence of the service
concept in a bureaucratic retail trade setup. Need
I add that most of the consumer durables and
consumer services that in this country are taken
for granted are but a dream to the Soviet citizen.
Take automobiles. The private automobile,
which has made us so mobile a people, is a rare
phenomenon in the Soviet bloc. Among all of the
220 million Soviet people, there are 640,000 auto-
mobiles, as compared with the 61 million cars that
cover our highways. A great many of the service
industries that we take for granted, such as dry
cleaning, are all but unknown in the U.S.S.R.
In fact Soviet development has been concen-
trated narrowly on industrial power and par-
ticularly on heavy industry. There is no doubt
about Soviet advances there. Machinery and
equipment is in many cases the equal of advanced
equipment in the West. Soviet achievements in
space testify to a high degree of engineering as
well as scientific skill. We should not make the
mistake of discounting this. But we should be
equally careful not to make the mistake of over-
estimating the dynamics of a society which has
focused its efforts so narrowly on a few selected
fields.
Looking to the Future
Wliat of the future? Will the Western private
enterprise system be able to maintain and even to
increase its margin over the Soviet bloc? And
will it be able to provide the capital assistance
and access to markets that will make it possible
for the nonindustrial countries in Asia and Africa
and Latin America to make progress under free
societies ?
The answer, needless to say, lies with ourselves
and with our friends. We obviously have the
resources and the capabilities if we use them with
any degree of wisdom. There are very encourag-
ing indications that we are likely to do so. It is
entirely possible that the free nations are on the
verge of a new burst of economic creativeness. In
Western Europe the appearance of a Common
Market among great industrial states pi'omises to
bring about an economic unit very much like the
United States. It will probably have more people
than the United States. They are highly skilled
April 9, ?962
595
and thorouglily acquainted with the processes of
modern industry and science and technology. As
they tear down the national barriers that separate
their economies, they will become part of a great
economic unit, much like that in the United States.
This is likely to give enormous impetus to busi-
ness activity, for the possibilities of producing for
a market of more than 200 million people obvi-
ously will call for development and oi-ganization
of new kinds of industrial and business enterprise.
The dynamic of the Common Market could also
transfer itself to the United States. The Euro-
pean nations, joined together, are likely to undergo
the kind of development in living standards that
we have had. When looked at in terms of owner-
ship of automobiles, refrigerators, washing ma-
chines, and other durable goods. Western Europe
is where we were in 1935, or even earlier. There
is going to be a vast potential in Europe for ex-
port goods. We can, if we are alert to the oppor-
tunity, get for our own economy the stimulus of
a rapidly developing new market in Western
Eurojie.
The ripples of European expansion need not
stop with the United States. Rapid growth in
Western Europe could have its etfects all over the
free world, in Japan, in Canada, in Australia and
New Zealand, and in the less developed countries
of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The way is
opening, it seems, to a strong push forward in
the free-world economy.
For this to happen, however, we shall have to
make certain that obstacles and barriers are not
allowed to hinder it unnecessarily. We need to
make every etl'ort to be sure that the European
development is an open one, that the expanding
market of Western Europe is not artificially lim-
ited to European producer.s, that the prospect for
free-world expansion not be choked of!" by the
creation of separate trading blocs.
The thrust of President Kennedy's trade pro-
posals before the Congress - is to give this country
the means to leadership in bringing the free-world
economy forward. The President is asking for
the essential bargainmg means to work with the
Common Market. We can hope, if the President
is gi\'en the authorities he asks, to assure that the
Common Market will be outward-looking in its
economic policies and that the net effect in the
free world of this great change on the European
Continent will be to bring a spurt of additional
economic activity in the free world as a whole.
Choosing the Right Alternatives
Nobody, not even Mr. Khrushchev, can see
clearly into the future. As we look ahead, we
must depend for our forecasts on forces and fac-
tors we have observed in the past.
These considerations would tell us that Mr.
Khrushchev's economic challenge is not necessarily
an idle or foolish one. The Soviet system, withm
its limitations, clearly is capable of generating
large amounts of economic power. If we were to
be complacent enough and shortsighted enough,
the performance of the Communist system might
bring it within much closer range of our own, at
least in terms of raw power.
At the same time we know something about the
potential of our own system and of the possibili-
ties and even probabilities for it. If we do tol-
erably well, we can stay fairly comfortably ahead
of the Soviet Union. The prospects are, however,
that we will have the opportunity to do a good
deal better than tolei-ably well. In that event we
and our friends might even run away with the
game. Wliat happens is going to depend very
largely on alternatives that are easily open to us.
The problem is to choose the right ones.
DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE
'For text of the I'resldent's me.ssage to Congress, see
Bulletin of Feb. 12, ll)G2, p. 231; for a summary of the
new trade legislation, see ibid., Feb. 26, 10C2, p. 343.
Confirmations
Tlie Senate on March 16 confirmed W. Michael Bln-
raenthal to 1h' Ihe representative of the United States
on the Commission on International Commodity Trade
of the Ecouomie and Social Council of the United Nations.
596
Department of Stale Bulletin
THE CONGRESS
Major Aspects of the Trade Expansion Act
Statement hy Acting Secretary Ball '
The proposed Trade Expansion Act of 1962 is
designed to provide the President with tlie requi-
site tools to advance and protect major United
States interests in a world tliat has radically
changed since the reciprocal trade agreements
program was first conceived by Cordell Hull
almost 30 years ago.
■\Anien the first Trade Agreements Act was
passed in 1934, the United States was in the depths
of the great depression. Since that time we ex-
perienced the agony of the Second "World "War,
which not only drastically altered the power bal-
ance in the world but set in train forces of change
and revolution that are still vigorously at work.
The United States was the only major industrial
nation that did not feel the direct effects of war's
devastations on its own soil. In fact, during the
course of the war, our economy enormously ex-
panded. Our national income, measured in con-
stant dollars, rose nearly 50 percent between 1939
and 1946.
Almost everywhere else the story was different.
By "V-E Day many of Europe's factories were
heaps of bricks and mortar. Japan's economy was
a shambles. Even agriculture over a great part
of the world had suffered from shortages of ferti-
lizers and the disruption of the agricultural labor
force.
"\^niile nations of the world were rebuilding, the
United States sensed as the major supplier of ma-
terials and equipment. Through the Marshall
' Made before the House Ways and Means Committee
in support of H.R. 9900 on Mar. 13 (press release 164).
For test of the President's message to Congress proposing
new trade legislation, see Bulletin of Feb. 12, 1962,
p. 231 ; for a brief summary of the bill, see iMd., Feb. 26,
1962, p. 343.
plan we made it possible for the "Western European
countries to acquire the goods and services they
needed but which they could not earn the dollars
to buy.
During that time we had no difficulty disposing
of our export surpluses. Aided by Marshall plan
dollars many American industries enjoyed an ex-
port trade two or three times as large as they had
ever enjoyed before the war. In fact the volume
of United States exports to Europe was over 40
percent higher in the years of the Marshall plan
than it had been in previous years.
"With little need for an overseas sales effort, our
industry felt no compulsion to design goods ex-
pressly for foreign markets. To a very large
extent any surplus capacity that had been built
during the war could be used to produce goods for
sale overseas.
Except for the raw materials needed by our
own industry, our imports during this period were
severely limited. Since other industrial nations
of the world could not produce enough even to
satisfy their own needs, they had few industrial
goods to send to the American market. Accord-
ingly our industry during this period lived under
highly artificial conditions. It could sell its sur-
plus production of practically any article in for-
eign mai'kets as fast as the article could be
produced. It did not have to face the discipline of
foreign competition in the domestic market.
Policy for a Changing World
Those days of effortless exports are gone for-
ever. Since the end of the war the world has
undergone several cataclysmic changes.
First, the old colonial systems, anchored to
April 9, 1962
597
mother countries in Western Europe, have largely
disintegrated. In place of colonial possessions
spread over six continents, nearly 50 new coun-
tries have been created and still more are in the
process of creation. Many of these new covmtries
have been bom weak, sometimes prematurely ; but
all share a desire to maintain their independence
and to develop higher living standards for their
peoplas.
Second, the colonial powers — the great states of
Western Europe — have rebuilt their economies
and have attained new heights of production. Far
from being weakened by the loss of their colonial
possessions, they have turned their energies toward
a common endeavor of creating a vigorous and
united Europe — a Europe that promises to be-
come a great new trading area prospectively as
strong and productive as the United States.
Third, the international Communist conspiracy
has tightened its hold on two great nations, the
Soviet Union and Red China. This has given it
not only the command of great potential economic
resources but the mastery of the most advanced
teclmology. Between the Iron Curtain that
stretches from the Brandenburg Gate to the Yel-
low Sea are a billion people — roughly one-third
of the world's population.
In this changed and changing world, faced with
a constant menace from the Communist bloc, we
have no option but to pursue lines of policy di-
rected at two major objectives.
In the first place we must consolidate the
strength of the great industrial powers of the free
world. In this effort we must see to it that trade
serves as a cement to bind our political systems
more closely together rather than as a source of
discord between us. The relatively free flow of
trade among the advanced nations, unimpeded by
artificial obstructions, will compel the use of our
resources in the most productive manner.
In the second place United States policy must
aim for a higher level of commercial trade with
the less developed nations under conditions that
permit those nations to begin to earn the foreign
exchange that is essential if they are to develop
economic strength. This is the only way they can
ever attain an adequate rate of economic growth
without the continued need for external economic
assistance.
Taken together, the forging of closer economic
ties between Europe and the United States and a
combined U.S. -European effort to provide larger
markets for the products of the developing coun-
tries of the world can be the free world's most
telling response to the Communist economic
challenge.
The enactment of the Trade Expansion Act of
1962 should give the President the ability to pur-
sue these lines of policy effectively.
EEC and America's Federal Experience
The European Common Market, which is one
of the main undertakings provided by the Treaty
of Rome, can be best understood in terms of our
own constitutional experience. In Philadelphia
in 1789 our Foimding Fathers made a choice that
Europe did not make imtil 1957. They elected
to reverse the trend toward compartmentalized
Statewide markets in favor of a single market
embracing all of the then 13 States on the eastern
seaboard of this great continent. Under the Ar-
ticles of Confederation, as you know, the States had
interposed trade restrictions among themselves.
The Commonwealth of Virginia, for example,
exacted the same tariff on shipments of goods from
other States that it did on goods from overseas.
If a farmer hauled a load of cord wood from Con-
necticut into New York, or a barge of cabbages
across the Hudson from New Jersey, he was
stopped at the border and required to pay duty.
In drafting our Constitution the Founding
Fathers changed all this. They deprived the
States of the right to "lay any Imposts or Duties
on Imports or Exports."
The result is that we now have in America a
great common market embracing 50 States, among
which trade flows freely. Surrounding that com-
mon market is a common external tariff. This is
substantially the pattern of the European Eco-
nomic Community. Within a few years — in no
event later than the end of the present decade —
the European Community will consist of a com-
mon market comprised of its member states. Trade
will flow freely among these states while the Com-
munity as a whole will be surrounded by a
common external tariff.
As I mentioned a moment ago there are pres-
ently six member states in the Conunon Market.
The United Kingdom, however, applied for mem-
bership last August. Since then Denmark and
Ireland have made similar applications.
It would not be appropriate for mo to attempt
598
Deporfmenf of State Bulletin
to predict this morning the outcome of the current
negotiations between the United Kingdom and
the member states of the Community. But if
those negotiations do lead to the accession of the
United Kingdom to the Treaty of Rome, the Com-
mon Market will embrace a population of about
one-quarter of a billion people with a gross na-
tional product, on the basis of 1961 figures, exceed-
ing $340 billion. And it will be an expanding
market; the creation of internal free trade within
the area of the Community is unleashing strong
dynamic forces that are giving a new energy both
to industi-y and agriculture. As a result the mem-
ber nations today are experiencing a rate of
growth more than twice that of the current growth
rate of the United States.
EEC's Significance for United States
The creation of this new market will have a
great significance for America.
For one thing it will afford market opportuni-
ties for American exporters of a kind unparalleled
in our experience as a trading nation. By helping
the nations of Europe to regain health and vigor
through the Marshall plan we made it possible
for them to become our best customers. Even
before the European Community was created our
exports to Europe were expanding as European
incomes rose.
With the emergence of the Common Market,
however, the opportunities in Europe will expand
and change in character. American producers
will find in Europe something that they have
hitherto known only in the United States — a great
mass market for their products. The rapid
growth already demonstrated by this market is
generating ever larger demands for American
goods. This flow of goods across the Atlantic
can, and no doubt will, grow ever greater as the
trade-expanding effects of these increasing de-
mands are realized — particularly if we take the
necessary measures to reduce impediments to that
flow by bringing about a reduction of Europe's
common external tariff.
But the coming into being of the Common Mar-
ket will also have other effects on trade — so-called
trade-diverting effects. The extent to which these
trade-diverting effects may prove adverse to
American interests will depend upon whether or
not President Kennedy is equipped with the
powers that will enable hun, by negotiating
trade arrangements with the Common Market, to
reduce the level of the common external tariff'.
A great deal has been said about the disad-
vantage to United States producers that will re-
sult from tlie Common Market, but the precise
measure of that disadvantage is not always imder-
stood. As the European Common INIarket becomes
fully effective, a manufacturer in Detroit selling
to a customer in Diisseldorf will be at this disad-
vantage as against a manufacturer in Milan : He
will have to sell his goods over a common external
tariff while the manufacturer in Milan will not.
But, of course, advantages and disadvantages are
reciprocal. A manufacturer in Diisseldorf sell-
ing to a Texas customer will be at a similar dis-
advantage as against the manufacturer in Detroit ;
he will have to sell his goods over the barrier of
our own common external tariff, while the pro-
ducer in Detroit will not.
The existence of this situation poses a simple
question : Should the United States and the Euro-
pean Community agree together to reduce the
level of this mutual disadvantage in the markets
of each other by reducing the level of their com-
mon external tariffs, for the benefit not only of
one another but of the whole free world?
Political and Economic Considerations
The answer to this question has two aspects —
one political and one economic. Let us consider
each in turn.
In approaching the political question we should
be quite clear in our minds as to the nature of
the European Economic Community. It is, of
course, a trading entity, but it is far more than
that. In signing the Treaty of Rome in 1957,
which created the Community, the present six
member nations — France, Italy, Germany, and the
three Benelux countries [Belgium, Netherlands,
and Luxembourg] — performed a solemn act of
large political implications. The main driving
force behind the creation of the Community was
the desire to lay the groundwork for a united
Europe. To many of its proponents the Treaty
of Rome marked the beginning of a process that
may lead ultimately to the creation of something
resembling a United States of Europe.
The signatory nations to the treaty took far-
reaching commitments. They agreed not only
to create a Common Market but also to undertake
a wide spectrum of common action covering all
April 9, J 962
S99
aspects of economic integration — including the
concerting of monetary and fiscal policy, the har-
monization of social security systems, the devel-
opment of a common antitrust law, common pro-
visions for the regulation of transport, the free
movement not only of goods but of labor, capital,
and services, and so on.
Equally as important, the treaty provided for
the creation of a set of institutions comprising
an executive in the form of a Commission and
Council of Ministers, a parliamentary body in the
form of an Assembly, and a court — the Court of
Justice of the Community — that by its decisions
is building up a body of European jurisprudence.
I emphasize these aspects of the Rome Treatj
because there is a tendency to focus on its impact
on commercial policy — whicli is merely one of the
aspects of the European Community — to the ex-
clusion of the other broad provisions of the treaty.
If we think of the European Community in this
way we can begin to comprehend its larger polit-
ical implications. If the negotiations for British
accession to the Community succeed we shall have
on either side of the Atlantic two enormous enti-
ties. On our side a federation of States tied to-
gether by developed institutions and a century
and a half of common experience to form a nation
that is the leading world power; on the other, a
community of states, trading as a single market
and seeking among themselves to perfect the com-
mon policies and institutional arrangements that
can lead toward increasing economic and political
integration.
Between them these two entities will account for
90 percent of the free world's trade in industrial
goods and almost as much of the free world's pro-
duction of such goods. Between them they will
represent the world's key currencies; they will
provide the world's principal markets for raw ma-
terials; and they will constitute the world's prin-
cipal source of capital needed to assist the less
developed countries to move toward independence
and decent living standards.
Great as each of these entities may be, they will
bo deejily interdependent. The experience of the
great depression bi'ought home to Euro]io and
America the fact tliat not only prosperity but
hardsliip is indivisible. Tied together by inter-
related markets, commanding a common technol-
ogy, reacting to similar wants and aspirations,
these two great trading entities on either side of
the Atlantic will, of necessity, constitute the hard
core of strength with which the free world must
defend its freedom.
The degree of interdependence between the great
economies flanking the Atlantic has been demon-
strated repeatedly in recent years. Imbalances
within the trade or payments arrangements
among the major economically advanced nations
can create serious problems. Our own troubling
and persistent balance-of-payments deficit is in a
very real sense the mirror image of surpluses in
the accounts of certain of our European friends.
To minimize these imbalances a high degree of
coordination of domestic economic policies is re-
quired — coordination that is already being under-
taken through the OECD [Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development], which
came into being last September. We are also seek-
ing through the Development Assistance Commit-
tee of the OECD to coordinate national programs
of aid to less developed countries.
The extent of the interdependence of the United
States and Europe goes further still. Effective
plans for the stabilization of the market of a man-
ufactured product such as textiles or the market
of some raw material such as coffee are impossible
without the cooperation of both of these two major
trading areas. Indeed any major economic pro-
gram involving the world's markets demands the
close cooperation of Europe and the United States.
As a result the United States finds itself engaged
in consulting with its European partners al-
most continuously on a widening area of economic
problems.
The growing strength and cohesion of the Eu-
ropean Economic Community arc laying the foun-
dation for a much more efl'ective Atlantic part-
nership. We have long felt the need for a Europe
strong and miited that could serve as an equal
partner committed to the same basic values and
objectives as all America. We can foresee that
possibility for the first time as the European
Community begins to spoak with a single voice
not only on problems of commercial policy but on
an increasing number of economic subjects.
Yet it may be asked, granting that a nu)re efToc-
tive Atlantic partnership can contribute to the
increased strength and cohesion of the free world,
how will it affect the trading interests of the
United States? There are several answers.
For many reasons the European Common Mar-
600
Deparfmenf of State Bulletin
ket, as it is developing, will provide an unparal-
leled opportunity for the sale of our products.
Our tratle with the nations of an expanded Com-
munity is today very much in our favor. Our ex-
ports of all products to that area are 50 percent
higher tlian our imports. Most Europeans are
only just hef^inning to enjoy many of the consumer
goods tliat Americans have known for years —
automobiles, electric refrigerators, air condition-
ing. Using automobile ownership as an index, one
may say that the European market is about at the
level of consumer demand which existed in the
United States in the late twenties — and think of
the expansion that has taken place in our markets
since that day !
A great mass of Europeans are just beginning
to expand their horizons, to catch the vision of the
more ample life. Their demands are increasing
explosively. Europe is undergoing a revolution
of rising expectations quite as profound as that
which is sweeping the less developed countries —
but of course on a higher plane.
Opportunities for Expanding U.S. Trade
Not only does the European market offer an
almost, unlimited potential for growth, but it is
the kind of market best suited for American pro-
duction. European industrialists have been ac-
customed to selling their products in small,
narrow, national markets. They have built their
industrial plants with that in mind. We alone
in the free world have fully developed the tech-
niques of mass production, for we alone have had
a great mass market open to us. If American in-
dustry has the will and energy, and if access to
the Common Market can be assured to it through
the tools provided by the Trade Expansion Act,
it should find in Europe new trading opportuni-
ties of a kind not dreamed of a few years ago.
Of course the development of the European
market for American products will not be easy.
It will make heavy demands on our imagination
and ingenuity. It will require a considerable ef-
fort of merchandising of a kind few American
firms have ever attempted in Europe, because in
the past the potential of limited national markets
has never seemed to justify the trouble. It will
require us to do much more than merely ship
abroad the surplus of the goods we produce for
Americans. It will mean much greater attention
to the tailoring of products designed expressly for
European tastes or European conditions.
This need is already being recognized. For ex-
ample, last week a leading business publication re-
viewed the plans of one of America's automobile
manufacturers to produce a univereal car for sale
anywhere in the world. At least GO percent of the
overseas demand, the article noted, was for a very
small car designed for buyers who were moving up
the scale from bicycles and motor scooters. An
official of the automobile firm was quoted as say-
ing: "Ninety-three percent of vehicles made in
the United States are not suitable for overseas
consumption."
So change is in the wind. There is no reason
why American industry should not continue to
display the vitality and creativeness that have
stamped its performance in the past. Industrial
research in the United States continues at a level
many times higher than that of Europe. Each
year American industry creates new products and
processes responding to the high living standards
of our people and creating the improved produc-
tion techniques that will push those living stand-
ards higher still.
Our machinery industries, generating a contmu-
ous stream of new inventions for export to the
world, are the acknowledged leadere of mass pro-
duction systems. Our synthetic chemicals prod-
ucts continue to provide most of the major ad-
vances in the world's new synthetic products-so
much so that half or more of the sales of some of
our leading producei-s consist of items that did not
exist 10 years ago. We are a creative nation, and
there is every reason to suppose that we shall re-
main so. If we can turn this creative genius to
use in this new and promising mass market of
Europe, the gains for the American economy can
be prodigious.
Need for Prompt Enactment of Trade Program
But if American producers are to have a fair
chance at the great trading opportunities provided
by this new mass market we cannot afford to delay.
We must be able to assure them of axicess to that
market as soon as possible.
There are several reasons why prompt action is
imperative.
First, the enactment of the Trade Expansion
Act at tliis session can have a major effect on de-
April 9, 1962
601
velopments within the Common Market itself.
There are as many shades of opinion in Europe
as in the United States. Within the European
Community there are strong pressures for the
adoption of a liberal commercial policy and for
an outward-looking posture toward the world.
But there are also pressures for keeping the com-
mon external tariff high and for protecting agri-
culture excessively.
By enacting the Trade Expansion Act we will
make a strong declaration not only of our inten-
tion but our ability to work toward a world of ex-
panding trade. We will strengthen those forces in
Europe that are seeking to liberalize the Common
Market's trading policies.
Prompt action is particularly important in view
of the pending negotiations for the accession of
the United Kingdom to the Common Market.
That negotiation is complex. It affects trading
arrangements not merely with the British Com-
monwealth, which is spread over six continents
around the world, but also with the other Euro-
pean nations that have been imited with Great
Britain in a Free Trade Association.
There are various formulae that can be devised
for the solution of these intricate problems. Some
would be advantageous to United States trading
interests, others severely disadvantageous. Since
the President first announced his intention to sub-
mit the Trade Expansion Act to the Congress some
of the nations participating in the negotiations
have already seen in the Trade Expansion Act the
instrumentality whereby many of the problems in-
volved in the current negotiations can be rendered
easier of solution — and in a manner that will avoid
discrimination against, or disadvantage to, not
only the United States but also other nonmember
trading nations, including our friends in Latin
America.
There is a second important reason why the
prompt enactment of the Trade Expansion Act is
necessary. There has never been a time in recent
history when the trading needs of Europe and the
United States have been more complementary.
Today Europe needs our imports and we need to
provide tlie goods it can use. For today Europe's
economy is strained to its limits; capital is scarce;
executive manpower is lacking; overemployment
exists in many areas. America, on the other hand,
has idle facilities and pockets of unemployment.
It would be an act of economic statesmanship if,
by agreement between ourselves and the Common
Market, we could promptly find a basis for achiev-
ing a greater flow of goods to Europe.
"While such an arrangement must, of course, be
reciprocal in form, Europe is unlikely for a num-
ber of years to have large export surpluses avail-
able for sale in America or the capital essential to
make a major advance in the American market.
Both sides of the Atlantic will profit, therefore,
from an early indication that the President will
be in position to negotiate for reductions in the
tariff barriers on transatlantic trade. This can
go far to assure that the solutions arrived at in the
course of the current negotiations for the expan-
sion of the Common Market will not be unduly
burdensome for the trading interests either of
America or of third countries. It should enable
the process of reducing the common external tariff
on major American export products to be phased
more closely with the reduction in the internal
tariffs of the Common Market and thus minimize
the disadvantage to American producers. It
should make it possible for American industry to
gain early access to this new and burgeoning mar-
ket and to establish its brand names and distribu-
tion channels while the competitive situation is
still fluid.
Comparison of U.S. and EEC Tariff Scliedules
I have pointed out earlier in this statement that
the economies of the United States and of the
member nations of the Common Market have
many similarities. Europe, however, has not
reached the same high degree of industrial devel-
opment as we have, in part because it has not
hitherto had the benefit of all the economies of a
great mass market. But there is one additional
respect in which these two economies resemble one
another; they both are enjoying roughly the same
levels of protection from outside competition.
While it is difficult to make precise comparisons,
I should like to draw upon the results of a recent
preliminary and unpublished Tariff Commission
study. This study shows that if the common ex-
ternal tariff of the European Community, as mod-
ified by the recent negotiations in Geneva, were
applied to the actual flow of trade in 1060, the
average levels of duty in the EEC for industrial
products would have been 5.7 percent. The com-
parable figure for the United States would have
averaged 7.1 percent. I am advised that the Tariff
Commission will shortly be reducing this study
602
Department of State Bulletin
to final form and that it can be made available to
the committee at that time.
Another study, completed before the recent
Geneva negotiations, shows that the median of all
tariff rates is the same for the Common Market
and the United States — 13 percent.
While the average tariff burdens on industrial
imports are roughly similar and the median rates
are the same, the structure of tariffs in the two
trading areas is very different. United States
tariff rates range from the very low to the very
high. "We admit nearly 1,000 of the 5,000 items
on our tarilf schedule on a duty-free basis. At the
same time there are about 900 items on which we
levy a duty of 30 percent or more. Products cov-
ered by such high rates are largely excluded from
the American market, while the duty-free items,
to a considerable extent, are products not produced
in the United States.
The common external tariff of the European
Community has a quite different structure because
it was developed by averaging the rates that
existed before 1957 in France, Germany, Italy,
and the Benelux customs union. As a result of
this a\eraging process practically all of the high
tariff rates that existed in the individual coim-
tries have been greatly reduced. Wliereas over
one-sixth of the rates in the United States tariff
are above 30 percent, less than one-fiftieth of
Europe's rates run over 30 pei'cent. There are
thus few rates in the European Common Market
as protective as many rates in our own tariff sched-
ule ; at the same time there are fewer items on the
free list.
These facts are significant for two reasons. In
the first place they show that in any new trade
negotiation the United States and the European
Common Market would be starting at substan-
tially the same levels of protection. It should be
possible to phase down the levels of protection at
roughly the same pace.
But these studies also demonstrate that, con-
trary to the prevailing mythology, our trade nego-
tiators have effectively defended United States
interests. There is a tendency in discussing these
matters to cite rates that are markedly higher in
Europe than in the United States — such as the
current rate on automobiles, which under the com-
mon external tariff of the Common Market is 221^
percent while under the United States tariff is
only 61^ percent — and assume from this that
America has been unduly generous in past nego-
April 9, 7962
tiations and that our negotiators have persistently
gotten the worst of it.
This attitude is in part, perhaps, the reflection
of a long-held view that when our diplomats go
abroad they are too naive and high principled to
protect their country's interests. Such a view does
more credit to our modesty than our judgment.
Speaking for the Department of State, which has
the major responsibility for the actual negotia-
tion of trade agreements, I can assure this com-
mittee quite categorically that this view is held
nowhere outside of the United States. The offi-
cials of our Government who over the years have
participated in trade agreements negotiations
have served their country well. If this were not
so, we could expect to find the tariff rates of
Europe today well above those of the United
States.
It is true, of course, that during the period of
the dollar shortage the limiting factor on our ex-
ports to Europe was Europe's ability to earn the
currency to pay for what it imported. European
nations were thus forced to resort to quantitative
limitations in the form of quotas in order to save
dollar exchange. But by 1958 the Western World
had achieved general convertibility, and today
there are practically no quotas on industrial prod-
ucts in any of the major Western European
markets.
In the past our representatives in tariff nego-
tiations have faced serious technical difficulties.
They have spoken for a United States market of
enormous size, while the representatives of other
countries could speak only for relatively small
national markets. As a consequence, in order to
obtain adequate reciprocal concessions for the con-
cessions we made with respect to the United States
market, our negotiators were forced to bargain
with many countries at the same time.
With the advent of the European Common
Market— and particularly if that market is ex-
panded—future negotiations will depend to a
large extent on the bargain that can be struck
between our representatives speaking for our own
large market and their European counterparts
speaking for a market of almost comparable size.
This in Itself should facilitate the achievement of
agreements.
Expansion of U.S. Agricultural Exports
This statement so far has concerned itself with
the problem of negotiating trade agreements pri-
603
marily with respect to industrial products. But
we have an interest fully as great in preserving
and expanding the access for American agricul-
tural products into the European Common Market.
Our commercial agricultural exports to the na-
tions that would comprise an expanded European
Common Market are presently running at the rate
of about $1,600,000,000 annually, which repre-
sents almost half of our total commercial exports
of United States agricultural products.
In January of this year, after protracted nego-
tiations among the members, the European Com-
munity agreed on the principles of a common ag-
ricultural policy. In a year or two, in accordance
with the new policy, tlie members of the Com-
munity will begin moving toward a common in-
ternal price in their agricultural commodities. By
1970 the Common Market will have achieved free
trade in such products among the member nations.
As the member nations move toward a common
internal price they will also begin to protect that
price structure against lower cost agricultural im-
ports by a system of so-called variable levies. The
levy for each commodity will be fixed at the
amount necessary to bring the price of the im-
ported product up to the common internal price.
Thus far these internal prices have not been
established. It is a matter of the greatest inter-
est to United States agriculture that they not be
established at unduly high levels. A high internal
price level, as we well know, will tend to encourage
uneconomic production, wliich over the years could
displace the products of more efficient producers —
including United States farmers.
I shall not attempt to develop this problem here
this morning since Secretary Freeman [Orville
L. Freeman, Secretary of Agriculture] can speak
about it with much more authority and wisdom.
But it should be emphasized that the Trade Expan-
sion Act was designed expressly to provide bar-
gaining powers that would enable the United
States to maintain the position of United States
farm products in the enormou.sly important West-
em European market.
Expanding Markets of Less Developed Nations
I have spoken so far almost entirely of the appli-
cation of the Trade Expansion Act to our com-
merce with the European Economic Community.
Secretary Hodges [Lutlier II. Hodges, Secretary
of Commerce] yesterday described in some detail
how the act will function in negotiations with
other nations around the world.
As this committee Imows, H.R. 9900 would pro-
vide the President with the authority to reduce
tariffs on any product up to 50 percent in con-
nection with our tariff negotiations with any
country. At the same time the bill reaffirms the
principles of nondiscrimination and most-favored-
nation treatment. Accordingly the benefits of our
negotiations with the European Community would
be available to other nations. To the extent that
such nations receive substantial incidental bene-
fits we should expect to receive concessions from
them.
The United States has a special interest in ex-
panding the export earnings of the developing
areas of the world, not merely because it helps
them toward the ultimate goal of self-sustaining
growth but also because it affects the potential
volume of our own exports. Our export inter-
ests in Latin America and Asia are very large.
Our commercial exports to these areas have now
reached a figure of over $6 billion annually and
promise to grow further still.
The limit on these exports, of course, is repre-
sented by the ability of the developing countries
to earn foreign exchange. If Europe can be per-
suaded to accept the products of Latin America
without undue discrimination — and we hope to
assist in bringing this about through our own
negotiations with the European Economic Com-
munity — this will mean more exports by tlie Latin
American countries. And, of couree, any increase
in the export opportunities of these countries will
increase their ability to buy our products. Our
political and security interests and our trading
interests are, therefore, the same ; both are served
by expanding the market opportunities for the
developing nations. The Trade Expansion Act
should contribute to those opportunities.
Strengthening the Atlantic Partnership
In the course of tliis statement I have attempted
to bring to this conunittee the views of the Depart-
ment of State with regard to certain major as-
pects of the proposed Trade Expansion Act of
19G2. Wo regard this legislation as of major im-
portance. Not only sliould it prove an effective
tool for advancing and protecting the interests of
United States trade — and tlnis of providing new
604
Deparfment of Sfaie Bulletin
business opportunities and job opportunities for
Americans— but it should also constitute a neces-
sary instrument for strengthening the bonds be-
tween the two sides of the Atlantic.
In a world threatened by an aggressive and un-
friendly power, as is the free world today, we
cannot neglect either of these objectives. Not
only must we seize every opportunity to increase
our own strength by the development of new mar-
kets for our products, but we must seek through
the expansion of our trading relations to bind
together the nations that are the core of our
strength for defending the values to which we are
committed.
I think that President Kennedy stated the case
for the trade expansion bill with great eloquence
when he said at the conclusion of his message :
"At rare moments in the life of this nation an
opportunity comes along to fashion out of the
confusion of current events a clear and bold ac-
tion to show the world what it is we stand for.
Such an opportunity is before us now. This bill,
by enabling us to strike a bargain with the Com-
mon Market, will 'strike a blow' for freedom."
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings'
Scheduled April Through June 1962
FAO Committee of Government Experts on the Uses of Designa-
tions, Definitions, and Standards for Milk Products.
ICEM Executive Committee: 19th Session
U.N. ECE Consultation of Experts on Energy in Europe ....
UNESCO Conference on Education in Asia
ILO African Advisory Committee: 2d Session . . . ._
Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission: 4th Meetmg . . .
U N. Economic and Social Council: 33d Session ...... . ■
ITU CCIR Study Group I (Transmitters) and Study Group 111
(Fixed Service Systems).
IDB Board of Governors: 3d Meeting ,o " ' '
GATT Working Party on European Economic Community/Greece .
3d International Cinema Festival
ILO Committee on Statistics of Hours of Work
ILO/WHO Committee on Occupational Health: 4th Session . . .
ICEM Council: 16th Session i, '"'■'' '
Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission: 4th Symposmm on
Peaceful Application of Nuclear Energy.
U.N. Committee on Question of Defining Aggression
U.N. ECE Working Group on Family Budget Inquiries
NATO Medical Committee „ ■ .• , W ,; '
U.N. EGA Community Development Workshop on Social WeUare
and Family and Child Welfare. .
IAEA Symposium on Reactor Hazards Evaluation Techniques . .
FAO Desert Locust Control Committee: 7th Session ......
F.\0 Poplar Commission: 17th Session of Executive Committee . .
Rome Apr. 2-
Geneva Apr. 2-
Geneva Apr. 2-
Tokyo Apr. 2-
Tananarive ^^P""- ^
M6xico, D.F Apr. 3-
New York Apr. 3-
Geneva Apr. 4-
Buenos Aires Apr. 5-
Geneva Apr. 5-
Cartagena, Colombia .... Apr. b
Geneva '^P'"- n
Geneva Apr. 9-
Geneva ■^P''• o
Mdxico, D.F Apr. 9-
New York Apr. 9-
Gcneva ^P""' ?n
Paris *P'- ?~
Abidjan Apr. 11-
Vienna Apr. 16-
Addis Ababa f P'" ,\^
Ankara Apr. 10^
^ Prepared in the Office of International Conferene^. far 18, 19G| Asterisks^.ndK^ e^te^^^^^^^
ins is a list of abbreviations: ANZUS, Australia-New Zealand-United States^^^^^^ 1
des radio communications; CCITT, Comity consultatif ^"/"nat.onal t^legi^aphi^ue et^ ^^^. ^^^^ ^^^^
Treaty Organization ; ECA, Economic Commission for Africa ; ECAFE, '^^°^°?^}^^':;'"'"":'pj.f. p^od and Agriculture
East; ECE. Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Cou^^^^^^
Organization; GATT. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; ^AEA Internationa^ Atonn^ ^ ^^^^_
International Civil Aviation Organization; ICEM I°tergovernniental Comnuttee fo^^^^^^^^ Consulta-
American Development Bank; ILO, International Labor OrgamzaUon , IMCO Inter^^^^^^ Organization; OECD.
tive Organization; ITU, International Teleconimunication Union ; NATO, Nor^hM ^^^^^^^ p^^^
WJIO, World Meteorological Organization.
April 9, 1962
605
Calendar off international Conferences and Meetings — Continued
Scheduled April Through June 1962 — Continued
SEATO Military Advisers Committee Paris Apr. 19-*
U.N. Committee on Information From Non-Self-Governing Terri- New York Apr. 23-
tories: 13th Session.
U.N. ECAFE Regional Seminar on Development of Groundwater Bangkok Apr. 24-*
Resources.
U.N. Economic Commission for Europe: 17th Session Geneva Apr. 24—
GATT Special Group on Tropical Products Geneva Apr. 25-
ITU CCIR Study Group VII (Standard Frequencies and Time Geneva Apr. 25-
Signals).
ITU CCIR Study Group V (Propagation, Including the Effects of Geneva Apr. 25-
Earth and Troposphere).
U.N. ECA Workshop on Urbanization Addis Ababa Apr. 25-
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on International Commodity Trade Rome Apr. 25-
and FAG Committee on Commodity Problems (joint session).
CENTO Military Committee London Apr. 26-
SEATO Council of Ministers: 8th Meeting Paris Apr. 26-
PAHO Executive Committee: 46th Meeting (undetermined) Apr. 29-
IMCO Council: Extraordinary Session London Apr. 30 (1 day)
CENTO Ministerial Council: 10th Meeting London Apr. 30-
IMCO Interagency Meeting for Coordination of Safety at Sea and London Apr. 30-
Air.
GATT Committee III on Expansion of International Trade . . . Geneva Apr. 30-
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on International Commodity Trade: Rome Apr. 30-
Special Working Party.
U.N. ECOSOC Social Commission: 14th Session New York Apr. 30-
FAO Council: 38th Session New York April
PAHO Ministers of Health Washington April
PAHO Permanent Executive Committee Mexico, D.F April
OECD Economic Policy Committee Paris April
NATO Food and Agriculture Planning Committee Paris April
NATO Science Committee Paris April
U.N. ECAFE Conference on Asian Population Bangkok April
U.N. ECOSOC Statistical Commission: 12th Session New York April
OECD Committee for Scientific and Technical Personnel .... Paris April or May
OECD Maritime Committee Paris April or May
2d U.N. ECAFE Symposium on the Development of Petroleum Re- Tehran May 2-
sources of Asia and the Far East.
UNESCO Executive Board: 61st Session Paris May 2-
NATO Ministerial Council Athens May 3-
ITU Administrative Council: 17th Session Geneva May 5-
ANZUS Council: 8th Meeting Canberra May 7-
lAEA Symposium on Radiation Damage in Solids and Reactor Ma- Venice May 7-
terials.
15th International Film Festival Cannes May 7-
ILO Chemical Industries Committee: 6th Session Geneva May 7-
IMCO Maritime Safety Committee: Subcommittee on Code of Sig- London May 7-
nals.
NATO Planning Board for Ocean Shipping: 14th Meeting . . . . Washington May 7-
International Seed Testing Association: 13th Congress Lisbon ^lay 7-
ITU CCIR Study Group II (Receivers) Geneva May 7-
ITU CCIR Study Group VI (Ionospheric Propagation) Geneva May 7-
GATT Committee on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions Geneva May7-
15th World Health Assembly Geneva May 8-
8th International Hydrographic Conference Monte Carlo May 8-
NATO Civil Defense Committee Paris May 8-
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Human Rights: Seminar on Status Tokyo May 8-
of Women in Family Law.
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Narcotic Drugs: Committee on Geneva Mav 8-
Illicit Traffic.
International Cotton Advisory Committee: Committee on Extra- Washington May 9-
Long Staple Cotton and Study Group on Prospective Trends in
Cotton.
International Cotton Advisory Committee: 21st Plenary Meeting. Washington May 14-
FAO Committee on Commodity Problems: 35th Session Rome May 14-
Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Law: 11th Session (resumed). Brussels May 14-
Executive Conunittee of the Program of the U.N. High Commis- Geneva May 14-
sioner for Refugees: 7th Session.
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on International Commodity Trade: Rome May 14-
10th Session.
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Narcotic Drugs: 17th Session. . . Geneva May 14-
World Food Forum Washington May 15-
8th Inter-American Travel Congress Rio tie Janeiro May 15-
19th International Conferonco on Large Electric Systems .... Paris May 16-
Inter-Arncricnn Tropical Tuna Commission: Annual Meeting. . . Quito May 10-
ICAO Airworthiness Committee: 5th Session Montreal May 21-
606 Department of State Bulletin
GATT Council of Representatives Geneva May 21-
U.N. Special Fund: 8th Session of Governing Council New York May 21-
FAO Study Group on Cocoa: 5th Session (undetermined) May 22-
NATO Manpower Committee Paris May 22-
NATO Civil Aviation Planning Committee Paris May 25-
ICAO Meteorological Operational Telecommunication Network Paris May 28-
Europe (MOTNE) Panel.
OECD Committee for Scientific Research Paris May 28-
WHO Executive Board: 30th Session Geneva May 28-
ILO Governing Body: 152d Session (and its committees) Geneva May 28-
IMCO Maritime Safety Committee: Subcommittee on Subdivi- London May 28-
sion and Stability.
International Rubber Study Group: 16th Meeting Washington May 28-
W MO Executive Committee: 14th Session Geneva May 29-
U.N. Trusteeship Council: 29th Session New York May 31-
PAIGH Directing Council: 6th Meeting Mexico, D.F June 1-
International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries: Moscow. June 4-
12th Meeting.
U.N. General Assembly: 16th Session (resumed) New York June 4-
U.N. Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Ques- Geneva June 4-
tions.
U.N. ECE Housing Committee: 23d Session Geneva June 4-
UNICEF Program Committee and Executive Board New York June 4-
PIANC Permanent International Commission: Annual Meeting . . Brussels June 5-
International Labor Conference: 46th Session Geneva June 6-
Rome.
June 11-
Bad Kreuznach, Germany .
June 12-
June 12-
June 13-
Berlin June 22-
Geneva June 25-
Paris June 25-
9th International Electronic, Nuclear, and Motion Picture Exposi-
tion.
IAEA Board of Governors Vienna
UNESCO Intergovernmental Meeting on Discrimination in Edu- Paris .
cation.
ITU CCIR Study Group X (Broadcasting), Study Group XI (Tele-
vision), and Study Group XII (Tropical Broadcasting).
12th International Film Festival
U.N. ECOSOC Technical Assistance Committee
UNESCO Intergovernmental Meeting of Experts Specializing in
Technical Education.
ICAO Visual Aids Panel: 2d Meeting Montreal June 28-
NATO Planning Board for Inland Surface Transport Paris June 28-
OECD Ministerial Meeting Paris June *
7th FAO Regional Conference for Latin America Brazil June
FAO Group on Grains: 7th Session Rome June
IMCO Subcommittee on Tonnage Measurement London June
NATO Science Committee Paris June
South Pacific Commission: 12th Meeting of Research Council . . Noumea June
GATT Working Partv on Tariff Reduction Geneva June
ITU CCITT Study Group XII (Telephone Transmission Perform- Geneva June
ance).
ITU CCITT Study Group XI (Telephone Switching) Geneva June
U.N. ECE Consultation of Experts on Energy in Europe .... Geneva June
United States Delegations
to International Conferences
UNESCO Meeting of African Education Ministers
The Department of State announced on
March 22 (press release 181) that J. Wayne
Fredericks, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Afri-
can Aifairs, would lead the U.S. observer delega-
tion at a meeting of education ministers of Africa
at UNESCO House in Paris March 26-30.
Invited to the conference are the ministers of
education of the 34 African countries that partici-
pated in a conference at Addis Ababa last May,^
' Bulletin of Jmie 12, 1961, p. 936.
as well as other observer delegations from Bel-
gium, France, the United Kingdom, and the four
North African states of Libya, Morocco, Tunisia,
and the United Arab Republic.
Other members of the American delegation are :
Arthur A. Bardos, U.S. Information Service, American
Embassy, Paris
Ras O. Johnson, chief. Education Division, Bureau for
Africa and Europe, Agency for International
Development
John H. Morrow, U.S. Representative for UNESCO,
American Embassy, Paris
C. Kenneth Snyder, Plans and Development Staff, Bureau
of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of
State
Harris Wofford, Jr., Special Assistant to the President
April 9, J 962
607
The meeting in Paris will be concerned with
implementing, including financing, an overall
plan for the development of education in Africa
adopted at the Addis Ababa conference convened
by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization and the United Nations
Economic Commission for Africa. The partici-
pating African states drew up two plans. A long-
range plan calls for extending free universal pri-
mary education by 1980. A 5-year plan would
boost primary school enrollment in Africa from
the present figure of 40 percent of the scliool-age
population to over 51 percent by 1966 and second-
ary school enrollment from 3 to 9 percent. The
cost of the short-range plan was estimated at
$4,150,000,000, of which $2,840,000,000 would be
provided by the African states and the rest from
outside sources.
Specifically, the Paris meeting will review na-
tional plans for educational development in the
general context of the economic and social devel-
opment of each country and study current educa-
tional budgeting in each country in relation to
objectives set at the Addis Ababa conference.
U.S. Replies to U.N. Query
on Transfer of Nuclear Weapons
Folloxoing is the text of a letter from Acting
Secretary of State Ball to U Thanf, Acting Sec-
retary-General of the United Nations.
Press release 169 dated March 14
March 13, 1962
Excellency : I have the honor to acknowledge
the receipt of your note of January 2 in which,
pursuant to General Assembly Eesolution 1664
(XVI), you request the views of my Government
"as to the conditions under which countries not
possessing nuclear weapons might be willing to
enter into specific undertakings to refrain from
manufacturing or otherwise acquiring such
weapons and to refuse to receive in the future
nuclear weapons on their territories on behalf of
any other coiuitry."
Tlio United States attaches great importance
to this matter and desires that an early solution be
achieved to tliis as well as other imi^ortant aspects
of disarmament. Its views on the manner in
which the problem of proliferation of nuclear
608
weapons must be solved have been set forth by the
Eepresentative of the United States to the United
Nations during the General Assembly debates on
this problem. Nevertheless, I welcome this addi-
tional opportunity to reiterate these views.
With regard to the position of the United
States, the question of dissemination of nuclear
weapons appears to fall logically into two cate-
gories: (1) the manufacture or acquisition of
ownership of nuclear weapons, and (2) the de-
ployment of nuclear weapons. With respect to
the manufacture or ownership of nuclear weapons,
the concern of my Government to prevent the
proliferation of such weapons has been made clear
by its actions. Both United States legislation
and policy severely limit United States transfer
of weapons information to other countries; United
States policy opposes the development of national
nuclear weapons capability by any additional
nation. United States legislation precludes trans-
fer of ownership or control of such weapons to
other states. This legislation has been a keystone
in nuclear weapons policy of the United States.
The concern of my Government with the prob-
lem of proliferation of nuclear weapons is also
i-eflected in the far-reaching disarmament pro-
posal which it put forward on September 25,
1961,^ in the Sixteenth General Assembly. That
proposal in its Stage I provides, inter alia, that
"States owning nuclear weapons shall not re-
linquish control of such weapons to any nation
not owning them and shall not transmit to any
nation information or material necessary for their
manufacture."' It further provides that "States
not owning nuclear weapons shall not manufac-
ture such weapons, attempt to obtain control of
such weapons belonging to other States, or seek
or receive information or materials necessary' for
their manufacture." In the Sixteenth Genei'al
Assembly, the Government of Ireland proposed a
resolution (1665 XVI), the substance of which
was in consonance with the similar proposals con-
tained in the United States proposal of Sep-
tember 25. Consequently, the ITiiitcd Slates gave
its full support to that constructive ell'ort to deal
with the problem and joined other delegations in
passing this resolution by a unanimous vote.
On the second aspect of General Assembly
Resolution 1664 (XVI), i.e., location of luiclear
weapons, for reasons that are well understood the
' For text, see Bulletin of Oct 16, 1961, p. 650.
Department of State Bulletin
defense system of the United States and of its
allies includes both conventional and nuclear
weapons, wliich exist to support the right of in-
dividual and collective self-defense, a right recog-
nized by the Charter of the United Nations. Both
the United States and its allies have chosen these
arrangements recognizing that nuclear weapons
are a necessary deterrent to a potential aggressor
who is armed with such weapons and openly
threatens the free world.
It is the firm belief of the United States that
the only sure way to remove nuclear weapons,
wherever located, from national defense establish-
ments is through realization of a program of gen-
eral and complete disarmament under eilective
international control. Although this country can-
not speak for other states, it is the opinion of the
United States that, in the present world situation,
nations would be willing to accept those specific
undertakings which would involve giving up vital
elements of their security arrangements only after
they can be sure their security is adequately guar-
anteed by effective disarmament and peacekeeping
measures.
This problem was carefully considered by my
Government in drafting the broad disarmament
proposals it advanced on September 25. My Gov-
ernment considers it appropriate that the
Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, en-
dorsed by the General Assembly in its Resolution
1722 (XVI), take under consideration the ques-
tions raised by General Assembly Resolution 1664.
The resolution put forward by the Government of
Sweden was adopted by the General Assembly
prior to the formation of the Eighteen-Nation
Disarmament Committee. Consonant with its
views that all of the problems specified in General
Assembly Resolution 1664 (XVI) can only be
finally resolved in the context of general and com-
plete disarmament with adequate control, the
United States Government believes that these mat-
ters are appropriate for the Disarmament Com-
mittee to consider. That Committee is charged
with negotiating a balanced disarmament agi-ee-
ment in keeping with the unanimous recommenda-
tion of the General Assembly that such negotia-
tions be based on the Joint Statement of Agreed
Principles for Disarmament Negotiations of 20
September 1961 (Document A/4879 ).=
'' For text, see ibid., Oct. 9, 1961, p. 5S9 ; for a statement
made b.v Secretary Rusk before the Disarmament Com-
mittee on JIar. 1.5, see ibid., Apr. 2, 1962, p. .531.
May I assure you of the continued cooperation
of the United States Government in those areas of
endeavor which will lessen the threat to mankind
of nuclear destruction. It is fervently hoped that
real progress can soon be made toward the attain-
ment of peace in a disai-med world.
Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my high-
est consideration.
George W. Ball
Acting Secretary of State
His Excellency
U Thant
Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations
Current U.N. Documents:
A Selected Bibliography
Mimeographed or processed documents (xuch as those
listed below) may he consulted at depository libraries in
the United States. U.N. printed publicatiovs may be pur-
chased from the Sales Section of the United Nations,
United Natioiu Plaza, N.Y.
General Assembly
Progress and operations of the Special Fund. A/5011.
December 6, 1961. 9 pp.
Supplementary estimates for the financial year 1961.
A/4870/Add. 1. December 8, 1961. 10 pp.
Cost estimates and financing for the United Nations
Operations In the Congo. A/5019. December 8, 1961.
4 pp.
Report of the Negotiating Committee for Extra-Budg-
etary Funds. A/5031. December 13, 1961. 17 pp.
Letter dated January 10, 1962. from the Permanent Rep-
resentative of Portugal addressed to the President of
the General Assembly submitting a document comment-
ing on the report of the Sub-Uommittee on Angola.
A/50S2. January 17, 1962. 27 pp.
Economic and Social Council
Papers prepared for the fourth session of the Economic
Commission for Africa, Addis Ababa, February-March
1962. E/CN.14/137, November 9, 1961, 4 pp.; E/CN.
14/122, November 14, 1961, 3 pp. ; E/CN.14/166, Novem-
ber 15, 1961, 16 pp.
Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Pro-
tection of Minorities of the Commission on Human
Rights. Study of discrimination in the matter of po-
litical rights. E/CN.4/Sub.2/213. November 9, 1961.
134 pp.
Report of the Secretary-Oeneral on programs of technical
assistance financed by the regular budget. E/TAC/112.
Novemljer 9, 1961. 91 pp.
Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Pro-
tection of Minorities of the Commission on Human
Rights. Protection of minorities. E/CN.4/Sub.2/214.
November 16, 1961. ,56 pp.
Commission on Human Rights. Periodic reports on hu-
man rights. E/CN.4/S10/Add. 2. December 6, 1961.
70 pp.
Report of the Technical Assistance Committee on pro-
grams of technical cooperation. E/3563. December 20,
1961. 24 pp.
April 9, 1962
609
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Togo
Agreement relating to investment guaranties. Signed at
Washington March 20, 1962. Entered into force March
20, 1962.
Turkey
Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agree-
ment of July 29, 1961, as amended (TIAS 4819, 4874,
4926, and 4937). Effected by exchange of notes at
Ankara March 14, 1962. Entered into force March 14,
1962.
Atomic Energy
Amendment to article VI.A.3 of the Statute of the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency (TIAS 3873). Done
at Vienna October 4, 1961.'
Acceptances deposited: France, March 14, 1962; Ghana,
March 15, 1962.
Automotive Traffic
Convention on road traffic, with annexes. Done at
Geneva September 19, 1949. Entered into force
March 26, 1952. TIAS 2487.
Accession deposited: Guatemala (with reservation),
January 10, 1962.
Protocol providing for accession to the convention on road
traffic by occupied countries or territories. Done at
Geneva September 19, 1949. TIAS 2487.
Accession deposited: Guatemala, January 10, 1962.
Bills of Lading
International convention for unification of certain rules
relating to bills of lading, and protocol of signature.
Ckjncluded at Brussels August 25, 1924. Entered Into
force June 2, 1931 ; for the United States December 29,
1937. 51 Stat. 233.
Accession deposited: Ireland (with reservations).
January 30, 1962.
BILATERAL
Afghanistan
Agreement extending the technical cooperation program
agreement of June 30, 1953, as extended (TIAS 2856
and 4670). Effected by exchange of notes at Kabul
December 30, 1961, and February 27, 1962. Entered
into force February 27, 1962.
Colombia
Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agree-
ment of October 6, 1959 (TIAS 4337). Effected by ex-
change of notes at Washington September 6 and 8,
1961. Entered into force September 8, 1961.
Cyprus
Memorandum of understanding regarding the grant to
Cyprus of agricultural commodities for an expanded
school lunch program. Signed at Nicosia March 2,
1902. Entered into force March 2, 1962.
Switzerland
Agreement modifying section A of Schedule I of reciprocal
trade agreement of January 9, 1936, as modified (49
Stat. 3917 ; TIAS 4379) . Effected by exchange of notes
at Geneva January 18, 1962. Entered into force January
18, 1962.
PUBLICATIONS
' Not in force.
Department Publishes Foreign Relations
Volumes on China and Far East
China, 1943
Press release 148 dated March 7, for release March 20
The Department of State released on March 20 Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1943, China. Aside from
the special volume on the conferences at Cairo and Tehran,
this is the first of the Foreign Relations volumes to be
issued for the year 1943. Other volumes for that year are
in process of preparation.
Copies of Foreign Relations of the United States, 194S,
China (vi, 908 pp.) may be purchased from the Superin-
tendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington 25, D.C., for $4 each.
Far East, 1941
Press release 178 dated March 20, for release March 27
The Department of State released on March 27 Foreign
Relations of the United States, 19il, roluinc V, The Far
East. This volume is one of a series of seven regular
Foreign Relations volumes for the year 1941. The first
four volumes of this series have previously been pub-
lished. The remaining two volumes, dealing with rela-
tions with the American Republics, are in process of
preparation.
Volume IV for 1941 also relates to the Far East and a
con.siderable amount of diplomatic corresimndence for
1941 on the Far East is contained in Foreign Relations of
the United States, Japan, 19S1-19.',1, Volumes I and II,
published in 1943.
Copies of Foreign Relations of the United States, lO^l,
Volume V, The Far East (v, 938 pp.) may be purchased
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C., for ,$4 each.
610
Department of $fafe Bulletin
April 9, 1962
Ind
ex
Vol. XLVI, No. 1189
Africa. UNESCO Meeting of African Education
Ministers (delegation) 607
American Republics. General White Nominated
for Special OAS Committee on Security .... 591
Asia. Foreign Relations volume, Far East, 1941 . 610
Atomic Energy
The United Nations Decade of Development (Cleve-
land, Gardner, Stevenson) 577
U.S. Replies to U.N. Query on Transfer of Nuclear
Weapons (Ball) 608
U.S. Urges Soviet Union To Join In Ending Nuclear
Weapon Tests (Rusk) 571
China. Foreign Relations volume, China, 1943 . . 610
Congress, The. Major Aspects of the Trade Expan-
sion Act (Ball) 597
Department and Foreign Service. Confirmations
(Blumenthal) 596
Disarmament
The United Nations Decade of Development (Cleve-
land, Gardner, Stevenson) 577
U.S. Replies to U.N. Query on Transfer of Nuclear
Weapons (Ball) 608
U.S. Urges Soviet Union To Join in Ending Nuclear
Weapon Tests (Rusk) 571
Economic Affairs
Major Aspects of the Trade Expansion Act (Ball) . 597
Meeting the Soviet Economic Challenge (Trezise) . 592
Educational and Cultural Affairs. UNESCO Meet-
ing of African Education Ministers (delegation) . 607
Europe. Major Aspects of the Trade Expansion
Act (Ball) 597
International Organizations and Conferences
Calendar of International Conferences and Meet-
ings 605
General White Nominated for Special OAS Commit-
tee on Security 591
UNESCO Meeting of African Education Ministers
(delegation) 607
U.S. Urges Soviet Union To Join in Ending Nuclear
Weapon Tests (Rusk) 571
Presidential Documents. President Greets Ameri-
can Association for the United Nations .... 578
Public Affairs. Foreign Policy Briefing Conference
To Be Held at Toledo, Ohio 576
Publications. Department Publishes Foreign Rela-
tions Volumes on China and Far East .... 610
Science
The United Nations Decade of Development (Cleve-
land, Gardner, Stevenson) 577
U.S. Supplies Information to U.N. on Its Space
Launchings (Stevenson) 588
Treaty Information. Current Actions 610
U.S.S.R.
Meeting the Soviet Economic Challenge (Trezise) . 592
The United Nations Decade of Development (Cleve-
land, Gardner, Stevenson) 577
U.S. Urges Soviet Union To Join in Ending Nuclear
Weapon Tests (Rusk) 571
United Nations
Blumenthal confirmed as U.S. representative on
ECOSOC Commission on International Commod-
ity Trade 596
Current U.N. Documents 609
President Greets American Association for the
United Nations (Kennedy) 578
The United Nations Decade of Development (Cleve-
land, Gardner. Stevenson) 577
U.S. Replies to U.N. Query on Transfer of Nuclear
Weapons (Ball) 608
U.S. Supplies Information to U.N. on Its Space
Laimchinga (Stevenson) 588
Name Index
Ball, George W 597,608
Blumenthal, W. Michael 596
Cleveland, Harlan 583
Gardner, Richard N 586
Kennedy, President 578
Rusk, Secretary 571
Stevenson, Adlai E 577, 588
Trezise, Philip H 592
White, Thomas D 591
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: March 19-25
Press releases may be obtained from the Ofllce of
News
, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.
Releases
ippearing in this issue of the Bulletin
which were
issued prior to March 19 are Nos. 148
of March 7
; 15!) of March 10; 160 of March 12:
164 of March 13 ; and 167, 168, and 169 of March 14. |
No.
Date
Subject
•176
3/19
U.S. participation in international
conferences.
tl77
3/19
Williams : National Farmers Union.
178
3/20
Foreign Relations volume on Par East.
*179
3/20
Visit of President of Brazil.
*180
3/22
Williams : "Intergroup Relations in In-
ternational and National Affairs."
181
3/22
Delegatton to UNESCO meeting of
African education ministers (re-
write.)
•182
3/21
Gardner: "The New Foreign Trade
Proposals."
tl83
3/23
Bowles : "A Balance Sheet on Asia."
1^
3/23
Regional foreign policy briefing con-
ference, Toledo.
tl85
3/23
Delegation to WJIO Commission for
Synoptic Meteorology (rewrite).
186
3/24
Rusk : Geneva disarmament confer-
ence.
a ted.
• Not pri
t Held foi
a later issue of the Bulletin.
the
United States
Government Printing Office
DIVISION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS
Washington 25, D.C.
PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE TO AVOID
PAYMENT OF POSTAGE, fSOO
(QPO)
OFFICIAL BUSINESS
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES
Diplomatic Papers
1943, CHINA
Department
of
State
m
The Department of State recently released a. volume of documents
on relations of the United States with China for the year lOiS. This
is a continuation of a volume covering the year 194:2, issued in 1956.
The volume is concerned primarily with diplomatic activities within
the responsibility of the Department of State.
The contents include a wide range of subject matter. Topics dealt
with concern China's military position and participation in the war
with Japan, American military assistance to China, political condi-
tions there as affected by Soviet and Chinese Communist policies,
financial relations and lend-lease aid, efforts to open up a new supply
route to China from outside, cultural relations, repeal of Chinese
exclusion laws by the United States, interest of the United States in
Chinese postwar planning, and numerous other subjects. The volume
contains 893 pages, exclusive of preface and index.
Publication 6459 Price: $4.00
Order Form
'o: Supt. of Documents
Govt. Printing Office
Please send me copies of Foreign Relations of the United States,
Diplomatic Papers, 1913, China.
Name: ._
Washington 25, D.C.
Street Address:
Enclosed find:
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FHE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
T^^^d^
ICIAL
EKLY RECORD
ITED STATES
lEIGN POLICY
Vol. XLVI, No. 1190
April 16, 1962
THE ROLE OF THE UNIVERSITY IN THE BUILDING
OF A FLEXIBLE WORLD ORDER • Addresshy
President Kennedy 615
U.S. PROPOSES PATTERNS FOR FUTURE WORK OF
DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE • Statement by
Secretary Rusk 618
THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE REAL WORLD • by
Acting Secretary Ball "Oii
AMERICAN STRATEGY ON THE WORLD SCENE • by
Walt W. Rostow 625
THE ROLE OF AGRICULTURE IN THE DEVELOP-
MENT OF AFRICA • by Assistant Secretary Williams . . 639
U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICIES • by Acting
Assistant Secretary Trezise 64o
For index see inside back cover
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Qovernment Printing Office
Washington 25, D.C.
Peice:
62 Issues, domestic $8.60, foreign $12.26
Single copy, 25 cents
Use of funds for printing of this publlcji-
tlon approved by the Director of the Bureau
of the Budget (January 19, 1961).
Note: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and items contained herein may
be rei)rlnted. Citation of the Dkpaetment
o» State Bulletin as the source will be
appreciated. The Bulletin Is liide.ied In the
Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.
Vol. XLVI.'No. 1190 • Publication 7363
April 16, 1962
The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by tlie
Office of Public Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public
and interested agencies of the
Government with information on
developments in the field of foreign
relations and on the work of the
Department of State and tlie Foreign
Service. The BULLETIN includes se-
lected press releases on foreign policy,
issued by the White House and the
Department, and statements and ad-
dresses made by the President and by
the Secretary of State and other
officers of the Department, as well as
special articles on i^arious plutses of
international affairs and the func-
tions of the Department. Informa-
tion is incluiled concerning treaties
and interntitional agreements to
which the United States is or nuiy
become a party and treaties of gen-
eral international interest.
Publications of the Department,
United Nations documents, and legis-
lative nuiterial in tlie fwUl of inter-
national relations are listed currently.
The Role of the University in the Building
of a Flexible World Order
Address hy President Kennedy^
I am delighted to be here on this occasion for
though it is the 94th anniversary of the charter,
in a sense this is the liundredth, for this university
and so many other imiversities across our country
owe their birth to the most extraordinary piece of
legislation -n-hich this countiy has ever adopted
and that is the Morrill Act, signed by President
Abraham Lincoln in the darkest and most un-
certain days of the Civil War, which set before
the country the opportunity to build the great
land-grant colleges, of which this is so distin-
guished a part. Six years later this imiversity
obtained its charter.
In its first gi'aduating class it included a future
Governor of California, a future Congressman, a
judge, a distinguished State assemblyman, a
clergyman, a lawyer, a doctor— all in a graduating
class of 12 graduates !
This college, therefore, from its earliest be-
ginnings, has recognized, and its graduates have
recognizetl, that the purpose of education is not
merely to advance the economic self-interest of its
graduates. The people of California, as much if
not more than the people of any other State, have
supported their colleges and their universities and
their schools because they recognize how important
it is to the maintenance of a free society that its
citizens be well educated.
"Every man," said Professor Woodrow Wilson,
"sent out from a university should be a man of
his nation as well as a man of his time."
And Prince Bismarck was even more specific.
^ Made at the Charter Day exercises at the University
of California, Berkeley, Calif., on Mar. 23 (White House
press release; as-delivered text).
One-third, he said, of the students of German uni-
versities broke down from overwork, another tliird
broke down from dissipation, and the other third
ruled Germany.
I do not know which third of students are here
today, but I am confident that I am talking to the
future leaders of this State and comitry, who
recognize their responsibilities to the public
interest.
Today you carry on that tradition. Our distin-
guished and courageous Secretary of Defense, our
distinguished Secretary of State, the Chairman
of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Director
of the CIA, and others, all are graduates of this
miiversity. It is a disturbing factor to me, and
it may be to some of you, that the New Frontier
owes as much to Berkeley as it does to Harvard
University !
This has been a week of momentous events
around the world. The long and painful struggle
in Algeria, which comes to an end. Both nuclear
powers and neutrals labored at Geneva for a solu-
tion to the problem of a spiraling arms race and
also to the problems that so vex our relations with
the Soviet Union. The Congress opened hearings
on a trade bill which is far more than a trade bill
but an opportunity to build a stronger and closer
Atlantic community. And my wife had her first
and last ride on an elephant.
Prospect for U.S.-U.S.S.R. Cooperation in Space
But history may well remember this as a week
for an act of lesser immediate impact, and that is
the decision by the United States and the Soviet
Union to seek concrete agreements on the joint
April 16, 1962
615
exploration of space.^ Experience has taught us
that an agreement to negotiate does not always
mean a negotiated agreement. But should such a
joint effort be realized, its significance could well
be tremendous for us all. In terms of space
science, our combined knowledge and efforts can
benefit the people of all the nations : joint weather
satellites to provide more ample warnings against
the destructive storms, joint communications sys-
tems to draw the world more closely together, and
cooperation in space medicine research and space
tracking operations to speed the day when man
will go to the moon and beyond.
But the scientific gains from such a joint effort
would offer, I believe, less realized return than the
gains for world peace. For a cooperative Soviet-
American effort in space science and exploration
would emphasize the interests that must unite us
rather than those that always divide us. It offers
us an area in which the stale and sterile dogmas
of the cold war could be literally left a quarter of
a million miles behind. And it would remind us
on both sides that knowledge, not hate, is the pass-
key to the future, that knowledge transcends
national antagonisms, that it speaks a universal
language, that it is the possession, not of a single
class or of a single nation or a single ideology,
but of all mankind.
I need hardly emphasize the happy pursuit of
knowledge in this place. Your faculty includes
more Nobel laureates than any other faculty in
the world — more in this one community than our
principal advei-sary has received since the awards
began in 1901. And we take pride in that only
from a national point of view because it indicates,
as the Chancellor pointed out, the great intellec-
tual benefits of a free society. This University of
California will continue to grow as an intellectual
center because your presidents and your chancel-
lors and your professors have rigorously defended
that unhampered freedom of discussion and in-
quiry which is the soul of the intellectual enter-
prise and the heart of the free university.
We may be proud as a nation of our record in
scientific achievement, but at the same time we
must be impressed by the interdependence of all
knowledge. I am certain that eveiy scholar and
scientist here today would agree that his own work
has benefited immeasurably from the work of the
men and women in other countries. The prospect
' For background, see Buixetin of Apr. 2, 1962, p. 536.
616
of a partnership with Soviet scientists in the ex-
ploration of space opens up exciting prospects of
collaboration in other areas of learning. And
cooperation in the pursuit of knowledge can hope-
fully lead to cooperation in the pursuit of peace.
The Revolution of National Independence
Yet the pursuit of knowledge itself implies a
world where men are free to follow out the logic
of their own ideas. It implies a world where na-
tions are free to solve their own problems and to
realize their own ideals. It implies, in short, a
world where collaboration emerges from the vol-
untary decisions of nations strong in their own
independence and their own self-respect. It im-
plies, I believe, the kind of world which is emerg-
ing before our eyes — the world produced by the
revolution of national independence which is to-
day, and has been since 1945, sweeping across the
face of the world.
I sometimes think that we are too much im-
pressed by the clamor of daily events. The news-
paper headlines and the television screens give us
a short view. They so flood us with the stop-press
details of daily stories that we lose sight of one of
the great movements of history. Yet it is the pro-
found tendencies of history, and not the passing
excitements, that wiU shape our future.
The short view gives us the impression as a na-
tion of being shoved and harried, everywhere on
the defense. But this impression is surely an op-
tical illusion. From the perspective of Moscow
the world today may seem even more trouble-
some, more intractable, more frustrating than it
does to us. The leaders of the Communist world
are confronted not only by acute internal prob-
lems in each Communist country — the failure of
agricvdture, the rising discontent of the youth and
the intellectuals, the demands of technical and
managerial groups for status and security. They
are confronted in addition by profound divisions
within the Communist world itself, divisions
which have already shattered the image of com-
munism as a universal system guaranteed to abol-
ish all social and international conflicts — the most
valuable asset the Communists had for many
years.
Wisdom requires the long view. And the long
view shows us that the revolution of national in-
dependence is a fundamental fact of our era. This
revolution will not be stopped. As new nations
Deparfmenf of State Bulletin
emerge from the oblivion of centuries, their first
aspiration is to aflinn their national identity.
Their deepest hope is for a world where, within a
framework of international cooperation, every
country can solve its own problems according to
its own traditions and ideals.
It is in the interests of the pursuit of knowl-
edge, and it is in our own national interest, that
this revolution of national independence succeed.
For the Communists rest everything on the idea
of a monolithic world — a world where all knowl-
edge has a single pattern, all societies move toward
a single model, all problems and roads have a sin-
gle solution and a single destination. The pursuit
of knowledge, on the other hand, rests everything
on the opposite idea — on the idea of a world based
on diversity, self-determination, and freedom.
And that is the kind of world to which we Ameri-
cans, as a nation, are committed by the principles
upon which the great Kepublic was foimded.
As men conduct the pursuit of knowledge, they
create a world which freely imites national di-
versity and international partnership. This
emerging world is incompatible with the Com-
munist world order. It will irresistibly burst the
bonds of the Commimist organization and the
Communist ideolog}'. And diversity and inde-
pendence, far from being opposed to the Ameri-
can conception of world order, represent the very
essence of our view of the future of the world.
The Vision of a Free and Diverse World
There used to be so much talk a few years ago
about the inevitable triumph of communism. We
hear such talk much less now. No one who ex-
amines the modem world can doubt that the great
currents of history are carrying the world away
from the monolithic idea toward the pluralist
idea — away from communism and toward national
independence and f i-eedom. No one can doubt that
the wave of the future is not the conquest of the
world by a single dogmatic creed but the libera-
tion of the diverse energies of free nations and
free men. No one can doubt that cooperation in
the pursuit of knowledge must lead to freedom of
the mind and freedom of the soul.
Beyond the drumfire of daily crisis, therefore,
there is arising the outlines of a robust and vital
world community, founded on nations secure in
their own independence and united by allegiance
to world peace. It would be foolish to say that this
world will be won tomorrow, or the day after.
The processes of history are fitful and uncertain
and aggravating. There will be frustrations and
setbacks. There will be times of anxiety and
gloom. The specter of thermonuclear war will
continue to hang over mankind ; and we must heed
the advice of Oliver Wendell Holmes of "freedom
leaning on her spear" until all nations are wise
enough to disarm safely and effectively.
Yet we can have that new confidence today in
the direction in which history is moving. Nothing
is more stirring than the recognition of great pub-
lic purpose. Every great age is marked by innova-
tion and daring, by the ability to meet
unprecedented problems with intelligent solutions.
In a time of turbulence and change it is more true
than ever that knowledge is power, for only by true
understanding and steadfast judgment are we able
to master the challenge of history.
If this is so, we must strive to acquire knowledge
and to apply it with wisdom. We must reject
oversimplified theories of international life — the
theory that American power is unlimited or that
the American mission is to remake the world in
the American image. We must seize the vision of
a free and diverse world — and shape our policies
to speed progress toward a more flexible world
order.
This is the unifying spirit of our policies in the
world today. The purpose of our aid programs
must be to help developing countries move forward
as rapidly as possible on the road to genuine na-
tional independence. Our military policies must
assist nations to protect the processes of demo-
cratic reform and development against disruption
and intervention. Our diplomatic policies must
strengthen our relations with the whole world,
with our several alliances, and with the United
Nations.
As we press forward on ever^' front to realize the
flexible world order, the role of the university
becomes ever more important, both as a reservoir
of ideas and as a repository of the long view of the
shore dimly seen.
"Knowledge is the great sun of the firmament,"
said Senator Daniel Webster. "Life and power
are scattered with all its beams."
In its light we must think and act not only for
the moment but for our time. I am reminded of
the story of the great French ^Marshal Lyautey,
who once asked his gardener to plant a tree. The
April 16, 1962
617
gardener objected that the tree was slow-growing
and would not reach maturity for a liundred years.
The Marshal replied, "In that case, there is no
time to lose; plant it this afternoon."
Today a world of knowledge — a world of co-
operation — a just and lasting peace — may be years
away. But we have no time to lose. Let us plant
our trees this afternoon.
U.S. Proposes Patterns for Future Work of Disarmament Conference
Statement hy Secretary Rusk ^
I appreciate the indulgence of my colleagues
for some additional remarks on the subject of gen-
eral and complete disarmament. Now that we are
coming to the end of the second week of our dis-
cussion, we believe that it is appropriate at this
point to take some stock as to where we stand and
where we should go next and to try to get a clear
picture of the pattern of our future work in order
that we might move with purpose and not merely
drift.
A number of foreign ministers have departed
and others will be leaving this week as I myself
expect to this afternoon, but I shall be ready to
come back at any time that my return would ad-
vance our work here and I am sure that my col-
leagues aroimd the table would be ready to do the
same.
The foreign ministers of the nations represented
here came to Geneva, I would suggest, for three
broad purposes :
First, to do what they could to prepare the at-
mosphere for the discussions.
The second was to establish an agreed program
of work.
And the third purpose was to present authorita-
tively, and to exchange views on, the basic posi-
tions and approaches of their governments.
These objectives have been achieved with vary-
ing amounts of success; we could liave wished for
more, but we could easily have had less.
The political atmosphere which has surrounded
the opening of tlie talks in this room has been on
' Marie before the IS-nation Disarmament Committee
at Geneva on Mar. 27 (press release 194, revised).
the whole good; the discussions have revealed a
seriousness of purpose and a generally construc-
tive tone. I do not mean, of couree, that no differ-
ences have been expressed. We do not believe that
we would perform any service to the world or to
our work if we attempted to conceal difficulties
and issues for the sake of a false appearance of
hannony. However, we have been encouraged by
the minimmn of recrimination and vituperation.
We hope that this approach will be maintained,
for progress in these matters depends upon our
keeping dispassionate negotiation from being sub-
merged in torrents of invective from any side.
The conference on Friday [March 23] adopted
a plan of work proposed by the cochainnen.
This is an important step forward, although wo
believe that, since there is much yet to be resolved,
there will necessarily be further discussions on
this matter as the days unfold. I will have ad-
ditional views on l)chalf of the United States to
present this morning.
In fulfilling our third purpose each of us has
set forth in broad tonns the basic attitudes of our
respective governments on the subject matter of
this conference. Each foreign minister has put
forward ideas and suggestions worthy of the most
serious scrutiny. These provide a framework for
moving into more detailed discussions of the prob-
lems the conference met to resolve.
In my lirst statement at this conference,- I
referred to thelTnited Slates prograjn for general
and complete disarmament in a peaceful woi'ld
" For a statement liy Secretary Uiislc on Mar. l."), see
Bulletin of Apr. 2, 1902, p. 531.
618
Deparfmenf of Sfafe Bulletin
and made several new specific proposals for con-
sideration within that program. Today I sliould
like to comment on the overall approach repre-
sented by the United States plan.^ For this plan
is not simply a collection of isolated and mirelated
measures. It represents a carefully coordinated
approach to the goal defined in the statement of
principles * agreed last September. Now, for the
first time since the President's presentation of
the jjlan, we are met in a forum charged with the
negotiation of binding agreements.
It would, I think, be useful to recall President
Kennedy's statement of the purposes and objec-
tives of the plan we have put before you. On
September 25, before the United Nations General
Assembly, ho said : ^
It would create machinery to keep the peace as it
destroys the machines of war. It would proceed through
balanced and safeguarded stages designed to give no
state a military advantage over another. It would place
the final responsibility for verification and control where
it belongs — not with the big powers alone, not with one's
adversary or one's self, but in an international organi-
zation within the framework of the United Nations. It
would assure that indispensable condition of disarma-
ment— true inspection — and apply it in stages proportion-
ate to the stage of disarmament. It would cover delivery
systems as well as weapons. It would ultimately halt
their production as well as their testing, their transfer
as well as their possession.
Main Policy Objectives of U.S. Plan
To meet the problems of a world in imeasy
peace, in the midst of an arms race and seriously
divided in ideological aspirations, there are sev-
eral main areas of disarmament which deserve the
primary attention of the conference. They are
areas common to both the United States and
Soviet programs for general and complete dis-
armament. In light of these common areas I
should like to trac« the main threads of policy
objectives that i-un through and give unity to the
fabric of the United States plan.
One of these is a series of related measures
directed toward the containment and reduction of
the nucle-ar threat.
The program we lay before you for considera-
tion is a program of action which begins now and
which converges from many fronts to contain, to
reduce, and to eliminate this threat.
' For text, see ibid., Oct. 16, 1961, p. 650.
' For text, see ibid., Oct. 9, 1961, p. 589.
= [bid., Oct. 16. 1961, p. 619.
In my statement on March 23 ^ I emphasized
one important step of this kind which, this very
month, lies within our gi'asp. It is a sound agree-
ment to end all nuclear weapons tests.
On March 15 I stressed two additional steps,
which also could be put into effect without delay,
to get to the roots of the problem of the nuclear
threat. One is a cutoff of production of fissionable
materials for use in weapons. The other, to begin
at the same time, is the transfer of 50,000 kilo-
grams of weapons-grade fissionable materials to
nonweapons purposes.
Let me digress a moment here to answer a ques-
tion put to us by a number of delegations : How
much is 50 metric tons of U-2.35? Lord Home
has ali"eady given one indication : Its value is con-
siderably more than $500 million. It could, if
combined with other ingredients, produce war-
heads with tens of thousands of megatons of ex-
plosive power.
The United States also proposes that any fis-
sionable materials transferred between countries
for peaceful uses of nuclear energy shall be subject
to appropriate safeguards to be developed in
agreement with the International Atomic Energy
Agency.
Finally, the United States would prohibit the
relinquishment of the control of nuclear weapons
and information and material necessary for their
manufacture to any nation not owning such
weapons.
These measures would contain and reduce the
nuclear threat. This is very important, but it is
not in itself enough. We must, as rapidly as scien-
tific knowledge can point the way for us, seek to
eliminate nuclear weapons stockpiles. Let us be-
gin now to mobilize the best scientific resources
our respective nations can command to concentrate
upon this task.
All these tilings should be done within the first
stage of the disarmament program.
In the second stage we propose that stocks of
nuclear weapons shall be progressively reduced
to the minimum levels which can be agreed upon
as a result of the findings of the Nuclear Experts
Commission; the resulting excess of fissionable
material should be transferred to peaceful pur-
poses.
There is another area where action cannot be
" Ibid., Apr. 9, 1962, p. 571.
April 76, 7962
619
long postponed. Space is our newest ocean of
discovery.
Let us build upon the areas of peaceful coopera-
tion in space which are now being developed in
the United Nations and elsewhere as an outgrowth
of the recent exchange of letters between President
Kennedy and Premier Klirushchev.'' Let us ex-
tend these areas to the field of disarmament.
We have proposed that the placing into orbit
or stationing in outer space of weapons capable
of producing mass destruction be prohibited. We
proposed tliat states shall give advance notifica-
tion to participating states and to the Interna-
tional Disarmament Organization of launchings
of space vehicles and missiles, together with the
track of the vehicle. In one sense these measures
represent another facet of the containment of the
nuclear threat.
Let us begin, and continue until the job is done,
in a third area to reduce and eliminate strategic
nuclear delivery vehicles, other forms of arma-
ments, and armed forces. Let us move boldly and
across the board so that no nation can charge im-
balance in the process.
I have already put forward, a week ago Thurs-
day [March 15], the United States proposal for a
30-percent reduction in the first stage of nuclear
delivery veliicles and of major conventional arma-
ments. I have said that comparable reductions
should be made in the subsequent stages. This
proposal, in the United States plan, is accom-
panied by related measures to deal simultaneously
in all stages with the other major elements of
military power, including reductions in force
levels of states and restrictions and limitations on
production and testing of major armaments as
well as limitations on production and testing of
weapons designed to counter strategic delivery
vehicles. The United States also proposes the
mobilization of scientific talent to find ways to
reduce and eliminate chemical and biological
weapons.
A fourth area also requires action. The United
States plan calls for worldwide measures to reduce
the risk of war by accident, miscalculation, and
surprise attack. Last week I put forward four
specific proposals in tliis field, involving advance
notification of military movements, establishment
' For texts, see iVid., Mar. 12, 19C2, p. 411, and Apr. 2,
1962, p. 53C.
of observation posts, establishment of aerial in-
spection areas and mobile inspection teams, and
establishment of an International Commission on
Measures To Reduce the Risk of War.
Such steps are admittedly no substitute for dis-
armament, but, until disarmament is fiilly
achieved, they can make an important difference.
U.S. Position on Verification
The L'nited States basic position with respect
to verification is known to you.
Secrecy and disarmament are fimdamentally in-
compatible. But it is also that the measures
agreed to must be subject only to that verification
which is necessary in order to determine whether
the agreed measures are in fact being carried out.
This is the only manner in which disarmament
can proceed with the certainty that no state will
obtain military advantage by violation or evasion
of its commitments during the disarmament
process.
A major problem of past general disarmament
negotiations has been the lack of opportimity to
explore the key question of verification thoroughly,
objectively, and constructively. This conference
provides such an opportunity. The United States
is willing to consider seriously any proposed veri-
fication system in the light of the degree of assur-
ance of compliance that it would provide and in
the light of the significance of possible violations.
The United States recognizes that considerably
less than total access to a nation's territory may
suffice.
For example, it is possible, we believe, to design
an adequate verification system based on the con-
cept that, although all parts of the territory of a
state should be subject to the risk of inspection
from the outset, the extent of the territory actually
inspected in any step or stage would bear a close
relationship to the amount of disarmament and
to the criticality of the particular disarmament
measures.
The United States believes, as I suggested on
March l.*!, that this concept could be implemented
by a system of zonal inspection which would he
generally applicable to measures eliminating,
limiting, or reducing armaments and forces. A
system of zonal inspection would limit the extent
of territory actually inspe-cted during the early
phases of disarmament; it would require far fewer
inspectors than would be required to verify imple-
620
Department of Slate Bulletin
mentation of disarmament simultaneously in all
parts of a nation from the outset.
At the same time it could have complementary
provisions providing for full verification of arms
destroyed and full verification of limitations on
declared facilities such as test sites, missile launch-
ers, factories, and military laboratories. As dis-
armament proceeded there would be increasing
assurance, as more and more zones come under
inspection, that no undeclared armaments or forces
were retained and that no clandestine activities
were being pui'sued. Such a zonal approach, we
feel, would meet the Soviet requirement that full
inspection be related to full disarmament and our
view that inspection develop progressively with
disarmament.
The United States is prepared now both to make
suggestions as to the details of such a plan and
to explore the possibility of designing a zonal veri-
fication system which would be applicable to an
agreed program of disarmament.
Organizational Arrangements Needed
Organizational arrangements must be worked
out to put disarmament and verification measures
into effect.
Isolated initial measures might be undertaken
without such arrangements. We believe, how-
ever, that any comprehensive agreement embrac-
ing a number of important arms reductions will
require supervision by an International Disarma-
ment Organization. The joint statement of
agreed principles envisages such an organization ;
so do the plans of the So\aet Union and the
United States. At an early stage this conference
will have to determine the shape and the duties of
this organization, as well as its place within the
structure of the United Nations.
There is a still larger task that confronts us as
we put a disarmament program mto effect — a task
neither less intricate nor less difficult than the at-
tainment of general and complete disarmament
itself. This is the creation of the kind of world
in which national and international security will
be maintained by means other than national armed
forces.
For if we are to destroy the armed forces which
protect us today, we must be able to look to other
methods of protecting one's safety against an-
other's internal security forces, subversive activ-
ities, or surprise rearmament.
So disarmament must be accompanied by the
strengthening of institutions for maintaining
peace and settling international disputes by peace-
ful means. I do not think there is any dissent
from this proposition, though there may, of course,
be important differences as to methods. The es-
sential point is that progress must be made in this
area to insure that lack of international security
does not become a brake impeding implementation
of the latter stages of disarmament.
Before I move on to the plan of work which
the United States proposes for this conference, I
should like to address some questions which have
been raised about the United States plan for gen-
eral and complete disarmament.
The fii-st is why the United States is willing to
reduce nuclear delivery vehicles by "only" — and
I put "only" in quotation marks — 30 percent,
whereas the Soviet proposal is to reduce them by
100 percent in the first stage.
The fact is that the United States and the
U.S.S.R. are agreed that we should achieve general
and complete disarmament. The first part of
paragraph No. 1 of the joint statement of agreed
principles so states. The objective, therefore, is to
reduce national armaments to nothing — to zero
percent. This is in the Soviet plan; it is in the
United States plan.
There is no significant difference between the
Soviet Union and the United States, then, as to the
amount of disarmament sought.
Both the United States and the Soviet Union,
in getting to that condition of general and com-
plete disarmament — from the present levels to
zei-o — must pass by the 90-percent, the 70-percent,
the 50-percent, and so on, levels of retained arms,
whatever our arrangement. So here, too, there
can be no significant difference between the United
States and the U.S.S.R.
The fundamental problems are two:
Tlie first is : how to disarm in such a way that
at no time in the process will the security of any
nation be impaired. The solution of tliis first
problem, of course, requires that the sequence of
reductions — of kinds of arms and of their sites —
be such as not to create a critical imbalance.
The second problem is : how to keep the develop-
ment of U.N. dispute-settling and peacekeeping
institutions abreast of disarmament.
The problem of maintaining military balance as
we move to general and complete disarmament
April 16, 1962
621
was raised by the distinguished Foreign Minister
of Ethiopia last Wednesday. Mr. [Ketema]
Yif ru stated that he would like to have an explana-
tion as to how the United States proposal to reduce
nuclear delivery vehicles and major conventional
armaments by 30 percent "fit with point 5 of the
agreed principles." Point 5, of course, states that
All measures of general and complete disarmament
should be balanced so that at no stage of the implementa-
tion of the treaty could any State or group of States gain
military advantage and that security is ensured equally
for all.
The United States proposal is based on the con-
viction that there is a tolerable balance today and
that across-the-board, carefully implemented,
progressively larger percentage reductions serve
disarmament most while disturbing balance least.
The thought behind the approach is that reduc-
tions in this manner will in fact leave nations with
compositions of armaments — that is, ai-maments
mix — which are organically sound and which they
and their neighbors imderstand and to which they
are accustomed.
The difference, as the percentages of cuts go
higher and higher, is only that the overall levels
of arms will go lower and lower. The across-the-
board, carefully implemented, percentage-cut ap-
proach avoids the shock of removing, by major
surgery, a disproportionate part of any one com-
ponent of an intricately integrated military mix
upon which a nation has come to rely in protecting
its security.
The United States believes that we have taken
important steps toward evolving a realistic plan
of work for this conference. With the innovation
of informal meetings supplementing plenary ses-
sions we have taken a very significant step away
from the tradition of past disarmament confer-
ences. We have agreed that the plenary meetings
will pursue the primary objective of elaborating
agreement on general and complete disarmament.
With the establishment of a three-nation subcom-
mittee on nuclear testing, we have implicitly rec-
ognized the utility of subcommittees, on which
my delegation believes we will increasingly come
to rely.
U.S. Proposes Specific Program of Work
The United States makes the following pro-
posals regarding our specific program of work for
the following weeks:
In the plenary conference we believe that we
should identify the major substantive areas of a
disarmament program and begin, as quickly as
possible, to determine how these will be dealt with
in an overall agreement on general and complete
disarmament. We should, as we have agreed, con-
sider the Soviet approach in each of these areas,
as set forth in their draft proposal of March 15th.
Simultaneously we would consider the approach
in each of these areas as set forth in the United
States program of September 25, 1961, which will,
in the near future, be resubmitted in more detailed
and elaborated form.
Our objective should be to reach a common un-
derstanding of how all of these aspects can be
fitted into a master agreement for general and
complete disarmament, drawing upon the best of
all the proposals presented by these two programs
submitted and by those which come from other
quarters.
The United States suggests that we take up the
following broad areas in whatever order would
be deemed most useful by the conference as a
whole :
First, measures for the reduction and elimina-
tion of nuclear weapons and other weapons of
mass destruction, as indicated in paragraph 3(b)
of the joint statement of agreed principles of Sep-
tember 20, 1961.
Second, measures for the elimination of all
means of delivery of weapons of mass destruc-
tion, including orbiting vehicles, and for the
reduction and elimination of all armed forces,
conventional armaments, military expenditures,
military training, and military establishments, as
indicated in paragraphs 3 (a), (c), (d), and (e) of
the agreed principles.
Third, measures for the creation of an Inter-
national Disarmament Organization within the
framework of the U.N. and for ell'ective verifica-
tion of the disarmament program, as indicated in
paragrupli 6 of the agreed principles.
And fourth, measures to strengthen institutions
for the maintenance of peace and the settlement
of international disputes by peaceful means, in-
cluding the establishment of a U.K. peace force,
as indicated in paragraplis 1(b), 2, and 7 of the
agi'eed principles.
In all of tlicso areas we should consider the
sequence and balance of measures within stages
and the time limits for each measure and stage,
622
Department of State Bulletin
as indicated in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the agreed
principles.
The United States believes that as these broad
discussions are continued in the plenaiy, with the
objective of acliieving an agreed approacli in all
of these areas, it will be desirable for the plenary
to set up working and reporting subcommittees
to deal with more detailed matters of a technical
or treaty-drafting nature.
For example, we believe that it would be de-
sirable, in the near future, to set up subcommittees
of the plenai-y to study the technical problems in-
volved in the elimination of chemical and bacterio-
logical weapons and to work out the control
problems involved. Similarly, a subcommittee
should be established to examine the problem of
securing the controlled reduction and elimination
of nuclear weapons. We believe that it will be de-
sirable to establish a subcommittee to work out
agreed categories for the elimination of the nu-
clear delivery vehicles and conventional arma-
ments and the measures of control which will be
necessary to police their elimination. And the
United States believes that it will prove useful,
in due course, to establish a subcommittee to ex-
amine the potentialities of the zonal and random
sampling approach to inspection that we have
proposed.
This is not an exhaustive list, and we are sure
that other members will have suggestions for
similar working groups as we proceed in our
discussion.
Suggested Agenda for Committee of the Whole
We have now also agreed to establish a Com-
mittee of the Whole to deal with problems that
might be pursued separately from an overall
agreement. There will be many suggestions for
items to be placed on the agenda of this commit-
tee. Although the subcommittee on nuclear test-
ing was established before we had agreed to set
up the Committee of the Whole, we believe this
subcommittee should most logically operate within
the framework of the Committee of the Whole.
I believe all members here have agreed that the
objective of a nuclear test ban treaty should be
pursued as one separate from the overall objective
of general and complete disarmament.
The United States proposes two further items
for the agenda of the Committee of the Whole:
First, we propose that this committee consider as
a matter of urgency an agreement for the cessa-
tion of the production of fissionable material for
use in weapons. While this measure would ob-
viously be a necessary part of a program for gen-
eral and complete disarmament, as provided in
both the Soviet and the United States plans, we
believe also that this measure should not be de-
layed. We feel that it can be put into effect
separately and as a matter of the highest priority.
The United States will also wish, in the Com-
mittee of the Whole, to reach agreement on meas-
ures for the reduction of the possibility of war
by surprise attack, miscalculation, or failure of
communications. We will specifically propose
that the Committee of the Whole, perhaps in a
subcommittee, explore, on an urgent basis, the four
measures which I proposed in my opening state-
ment of March 15 and to which I referred earlier
today.
The United States makes the above proposals in
the hope that they will lead to a useful exchange
of views and to agreement on precisely how we
will proceed in our work here. The organiza-
tional arrangements which we have already agreed
upon, and which we hope will be elaborated in the
days ahead, provide a good basis for advancing
our work.
Let me emphasize that, as we look upon our
program of work, the conference must and should
examine every proposal made by every delegation
which is relevant to the work of the disarmament
conference. We are in no sense in our suggestions
trying to oppose any suggestion from any quarter
on any point.
In conclusion I would like to repeat the commit-
ment of the United States to the goal of general
and complete disarmament in a peaceful world.
The United States has established a major new
agency to develop our proposals to reach that goal.
The United States is willing to negotiate as con-
structively and as patiently as is necessary to
reach agreement.
A great service would be performed by this
conference if it took steps this spring :
To reverse the upward spiral of destructive
capability which, if imchecked, could by 1966 be
double what it is today ;
To reverse the trend toward diffusion of nu-
clear capability to new nations;
To produce agreement on measures to reduce
the risk of war by accident, miscalculation, or sur-
April 16, T962
623
prise attack ; for the longer we permit tlie risk of
nuclear war to hang over our heads, the more
important it is that the risk be made as small as
possible.
The cochairmen have recommended a plan of
work. This has now been adopted by the con-
ference. I have made some proposals about how
we might proceed under the plan.
Let us now get to work and make a good begin-
ning. We need not be discouraged if we en-
counter difficulties in our early deliberations, be-
cause we are talking about nothing less than the
transformation of the history of man. But it is
important to begin — and with actual, physical dis-
armament. A good beginning will hasten us on
our way to the full disarmament we seek in a
world at peace.
President Repeats U.S. Desire
for Effective Test Ban Treaty
Statement iy President Kennedy
White House press release dated March 29
I stated on March 2 ^ the United States
earnestly desires a test ban treaty with effective
controls. The essential element upon which the
United States has insisted, however, is that there
be an objective international system for insuring
that the ban against testing is being complied with.
This means that there should be an international
organization for operating seismic stations and
for verifying that seismic events have been de-
tected, located, and are appropriate for inspection.
Most important of all, the organization should
have the power to conduct a limited number of
on-site inspections to verify whether a seismic
event was an earthquake or an explosion. With-
out these inspections there can be no confidence
in any system of detection, because it will not tell
us wlicther an underground event is a nuclear ex-
plosion or an earthquake.
On this subject one must distinguish carefully
between detection and identification. We can de-
tect and locate sigiiificant underground events by
seismic means, but of course the same seismic
means detect many shallow earthquakes. Tlie
problem is to identify a particular detected event
as an explosion or as an earthquake. Seismic
means alone simply will not do the job. This
matter has been reviewed again and again by the
best technical minds of the United States and
Great Britain, and the answer is always the same.
And no serious technical evidence to the contrary
has been produced by any other country. A few
of the larger earthquakes can be identified as
such, and very large underground tests outside of
seismic areas can be identified with a high meas-
ure of probability ; this was the case with the So-
viet test on Febiiiai-y 2d. But the seismic records
from the large majority of the events are such
that they could be from either earthquakes or ex-
plosions. In otlier words they cannot be identified.
The only way we know to perform this identifi-
cation is to have a scientific team go to the site
of the event and examine it. By studying the
rocks and the radioactivity and by drilling holes
one can find out with satisfactory certainty
whether it was an explosion. This is the on-sit©
inspection wliich we insist is the only way to verify
the character of an imderground event.
Now the Soviet Government objects to our April
1961 draft treaty on the test ban ^ quite simply
because it provides for international inspection in
Soviet territory. It objects specifically to having
any control posts for test detection in their terri-
tory. This is a sharp and inexplicable regression
from the Soviet position of even a year ago. In
addition the Soviets object to any on-site inspec-
tions whatsoever.
In earlier years the So\Tiet Government, at all
levels, clearly accepted both the idea of control
posts and the basic principle of on-site inspection.
Now it is claimed that such control posts and in-
spections are useful only for purposes of espionage.
As Mr. Rusk pointed out in Geneva last Friday,'
such fears of espionage from the proposed sj'stem
of control and inspection are wholly unjustified.
Members of fixed control posts would be under
Soviet supervision at all times and could go no-
where at all without Soviet appro\-al. ]\Iembers
of inspection teams would be mider constant
Soviet observation and would be limited to the
execution of technical tasks in an area which, at
the very most, would never exceed more than one
part in 2,000 of Soviet territory in any year — and
most of this work would be done in the earthquake
areas of tlie U.S.S.R., far from centers of militaiy
' Bulletin of Mar. 19, 19C2, p. 443.
624
' For text, see ihid.. June .'). lOGl. p. S70.
'lUa., Apr. 0, 19G2, p. .571.
Department of State Bulletin
or industrial activity. Finally, occasional air-
sampling teams would fly in Soviet planes under
fully controlled conditions. I submit that no one
interested in espionage would go at it by the means
of control and inspection worked out in this treaty
after years of effort involving Soviet scientists as
well as our own.
Nevertheless the Soviet Government is now ab-
solutely opposed not only to this particular system
of inspection, carefully supervised and narrowly
limited as it is, but to any inspection at all. This
position has been made very clear both publicly
and privately — most plainly by Mr. Gromyko on
the United Nations radio on March 27.
We laiow of no way to verify underground
nuclear explosions without inspections, and we
cannot at this time enter into a treaty without the
ability and right of international verification.
Hence we seem to be at a real impasse. Never-
theless, I want to repeat with emphasis our desire
for an effective treaty and our readiness to con-
clude such a treaty at the earliest possible time.
U.S. and U.S.S.R. Discuss German
Problem and Related Questions
Following is the text of a joint statement re-
leased at Geneva on March 27 at tlie close of talks
between Secretary Rusk and Soviet Foreign Min-
ister Andrei A. Gromyko.
In connection with their presence in Geneva to
attend the opening sessions of the Eighteen Nation
Committee on Disarmament, the Foreign Minis-
ters of the U.S.S.R. and the United States have
had a series of meetings devoted to a discussion of
the German problem and related questions. Their
conversations have been both useful and frank,
and some progress has been made in clarifying
points of agreement and points of difference.
They have agreed to resume contact in an appro-
priate way after reporting to their respective
Governments and after consultation with their
Allies.
American Strategy on the World Scene
ly Walt W. Rostow ^
The title of my talk tonight is one of my own
choosing: "American Strategy on the World
Scene." I chose this title because there is a wide-
spread feeling in the country that we do not have
a strategy. That view derives mainly, I think,
from the fact that in the predominating news
which comes to us from day to day — in the news-
papers, over television and radio — is the news of
crises : Berlin and the Congo, Laos and Viet-Nam,
and all the others. These crises are very much
part of the reality we face, and I shall begin by
talking about them.
But our strategy goes beyond the crises that are
' Address made before the Purdue Conference on Inter-
national Affairs at Purdue University, Lafayette, Ind., on
Mar. 15 (press release 170). Mr. Rostow is Counselor and
Chairman of the Policy Planning Council, Department
of State.
forced upon us. We have a clear and constructive
strategy. It was outlined briefly by the President
in his last state of the Union message,^ and by
Secretary Eusk in his recent talks to the American
Historical Association ^ and at Davidson College.*
This strategy goes forward in quiet ways, in large
as well as small movements ; but these do not make
exciting news. Nor is this forward movement
always easy to measure. My main purpose in com-
ing here is, therefore, to try to explain what it is
that we are trying to achieve on the world scene
as a nation, positively and constructively, and
what our prospects appear to be.
But first a word about crises.
' Bulletin of Jan. 29, 1962, p. 159.
"/6i(f., Jan. 15, 1962, p. 83.
*IXiid., Mar. 19, 1962, p. 448.
AprW 16, 1962
625
Wlien this administration came to responsibility
some 14 montlis ago we confronted situations of
acute crisis in Southeast Asia, in tlie Congo, in
Cuba, as well as the threat which has overhung
Berlin since 1958 — Mr. Khrushchev's threat that
he would make a separate German treaty which,
in his view, would extinguish Western rights in
West Berlin. These were by no means the first
crises of the postwar years. Such crises have been
the lot of all who have borne responsibility in
Washington since 1945.
Wliy is it that we appear to be living in a sea
of troubles? 'V\niat is it that determines the
chronic recurrence of crises in our environment?
Leaving aside the direct intrusions of Commu-
nist military power in the postwar years — sym-
bolized, for example, by the blockade of Berlin in
1948-49, the invasion of South Korea in 1950, and
the periodic attacks on the offshore islands — post-
war crises have been of three kinds, usually in some
sort of combination : international crises arising
from internal struggles for power, reflecting the
inevitable political and social strains of moderni-
zation going forward in the underdeveloped areas ;
colonial or postcolonial conflicts involving Euro-
pean nations on the one hand and the nations and
territories of the southern continents on the other ;
and the Communist efforts systematically to ex-
ploit the opportunities offered by these two in-
herent types of trouble. Think back and you will,
I think, agree. Indochina, Suez, Iraq, Cuba, Al-
geria, the Congo, Bizerte, Goa, West New Guinea,
the Dominican Republic — they were all com-
pounded of some combination of these three ele-
ments, and they all arose in what we call the
underdeveloped areas.
In Stalin's time the main thrust of Communist
policy was fairly direct and military, but in the
last decade the Communists have worked system-
atically to make the most of the inevitable turbu-
lence of the modernization process on the one hand
and of the north-south conflicts on the other —
(using that shorthand gcogi'aphical designation
to represent the approximate fact that the indus-
trial revolution came first to the noi'thern portions
of the vvoi'id and is only now gathering strength
to the south).
For example, in order to maximize the chance
that Indonesia would go to war in order to acquire
the Dutch-held territory of West New Guinea, the
Communist bloc has advanced credits of $800 mil-
lion to Djakarta, just as, starting in 1955, they
granted substantial anns credits in the Middle
East to disrupt this area and to aline themselves
and the local Communist parties with issues that
had strong national appeal.
Communist activity is global, and it is not, of
course, confined to arms deals. There is almost
literally no nation in Asia, the Middle East,
Africa, and Latin America in which the Com-
munists are not investing significant resources in
order to organize individuals and groups for the
purpose of overthrowing the existing governments
and supplanting them with Communist regimes;
and they look quite openly to what they call wars
of national liberation — that is, to systematic sub-
version building up to urban insurrection or guer-
rilla warfare— as a way of bringing communism
to the underdeveloped areas. Khrushchev has
stated that he regai'ds it as legitimate for Com-
munist regimes to support such insurrection, wluch
we can see in full cry in South Viet-Nam — a guer-
rilla war instigated, supplied, and guided from
outside the country. In a speech of December 2
last year Castro spoke of guerrilla warfare as the
match to be thrown into the haystack and noted
that many Latin American countries were ready
for such treatment.
It is not difficult to see why the Conununists
look on the underdeveloped areas as an arena of
opportunity. The process of modernization in-
volves radical change not merely in the economy
of underdeveloped nations but in their social
structure and political life. We live, quite liter-
ally, in a revolutionary time. We must expect
over the next decade recurrent turbulence in these
ai'eas; we must expect systematic efforts by the
Communists to exploit this turbulence; we must
expect from time to time that crises will occur,
and a great deal of skill, courage, and insight will
be required to handle them in ways which do not
damage — and, if possible, promote — the interests
of the free world.
Shaping Today's Forces to Our Purposes
But our strategy is not built on a merely defen-
sive reaction to these turbulent situations and the
Communist effort to exploit them. We are, I
think, learning better how to anticipate crises, and
we are working with our friends in the free world
to head off or to deal with Communist efforts to
ex])loit them. But we are doing more than that,
and we intend to do more. We are working to a
626
Department of Sfafe Bulletin
positive strategy which takes into account the
forces at work in our environment and seeks to
shape them constructively to our own purposes
and interests — as a nation and as members of a
community committed to the principles of national
independence and human freedom.
What are these fundamental forces which we
confront and which we must shape?
The revolution in military teclinology, yielding
an uncontrolled competitive arms race and, at
present, an imbalance of the offensive over the
defensive in the field of nuclear weapons.
The revolution of modernization in Latin Amer-
ica, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, including
the modernization going forward in undei'devel-
oped areas under Coirmiunist control.
The revival of economic momentum and politi-
cal strength in Western Europe and Japan.
The revolution in science and teclmology, no-
tably in international communications.
The political revolution, marked simultaneously
by proliferation of ardent new nations and an in-
tensified interdependence which requires the in-
dividual nation-state to cooperate increasingly
with others in order to provide for its security and
economic welfare.
Taken together, these forces decree a world set-
ting where power and influence are being progres-
sively diffused within, as well as without, the
Communist bloc, where strong inhibitions exist
against all-out use of military force, where the in-
teraction of societies and sovereign nations be-
comes progressively more intimate.
In tlie light of this view of what we confront in
the world around us, our strategy' has five dimen-
sions.
Strengthening Bonds Among Industrialized Nations
First, we are strengthening the bonds of associa-
tion among the more industrialized nations, which
lie mainly in the northern portion of the free
world: Western Europe, Canada, and Japan.
Western Europe and Japan have been caught up
in a remarkable phase of postwar recovery and
economic growth. During that period they were
protected by American military strength and sup-
ported in many ways by American economic re-
sources. Although they must still rely on the
deterrent power of American nuclear resources,
they are evidently entering a phase where they
wish to play a larger role on the world scene and
have the resources to do so. We are in the midst
of an exciting and complicated process of working
out new terms of partnership with Western
Europe in every dimension.
NATO is being rethought and Europe's role
within it being redefined in the light of Soviet pos-
session of nuclear weapons and missiles and Mos-
cow's recurrent threat that Western Europe is
"hostage"' to its missiles.
New patterns of trade are being worked out
within Europe, between Europe and the U.S., be-
tween the whole Atlantic community and the rest
of the world.
Our policies with respect to economic growth
and currency reserves are being discussed and
alined in the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development, and we are moving into a
new partnership in the business of aid to the un-
derdeveloped areas.
Although Japan stands in a somewhat different
relation to us than does Europe with respect to
militai-y affairs, in each of the other dimensions of
alliance policy — trade, reserves, and aid — it is
moving into a role of partnerehip with the indus-
trialized north. And bilaterally we have moved
closer to Japan in the past year, with the visit of
Prime Minister Ikeda,'^ the Tokyo meeting of cab-
inet ministers from the two countries,® and the
recent visit to Japan of the Attorney General.
The constructive steps that mark this process of
tightening the north and of mobilizing its strength
and resources for worldwide tasks do not usually
make headlines unless — as is inevitable — there are
phases of disagreement along the way ; but it is a
rapidly developing piece of history which will give
to the cause of freedom a new strength, a new bone
structure. The trade legislation which the admin-
istration has recently presented to Congress ^ is
both a symbol of what we are trying to create and
a crucial element in its architecture.
Modernization in Underdeveloped Nations
The second dimension of our strategy concerns
our posture toward the revolution of moderniza-
tion going forward in Latin America, Africa,
Asia, and the Middle East.
■ For background, see ihid., July 10, 1961, p. 57.
'For background, see ihid., Nov. 27, 1061, p. 890.
' For text of President Kennedy's message on trade,
see ibid., Feb. 12, 1962, p. 231 ; for a summary of the bill
(H.R. 9900), see ibid., Feb. 26, 1962, p. 343.
April 16, J 962
627
What we sometimes call underdeveloped na-
tions represent a -wide spectrum with different
problems marking each stage along the road to
self-sustained growth. Some of these nations are
well along that road; others are just beginning.
And in the end each nation, like each individual,
is in an important sense unique. "Wliat is common
throughout these regions is that men and women
are determined to bring to bear what modem
science and technology can afford in order to ele-
vate the standards of life of their peoples and to
provide a firm basis for positions of national dig-
nity and independence on the world scene.
The United States is firmly committed to sup-
port this effort. We look forward to the emer-
gence of strong, assertive nations which, out of
their own traditions and aspirations, create their
own forms of modem society. We take it as our
duty- — and our interest — to help maintain the in-
tegrity and the independence of this vast modern-
ization process insofar as our resources and our
ability to influence the course of events permit.
Last year the executive branch and the Con-
gress collaborated to launch a new program of
aid which would grant aid increasingly on the
basis of each nation's effort to mobilize its own
resources. This approach to the development
problem, which looks to the creation of long-term
national development programs, is just beginning
to take hold. We are in the midst of a complex
turnaround affecting both our own policy and that
of many other nations.
National development plans cannot be made
effective by writing them down in government
offices; they require effective administration and
the mobilization of millions of men and women.
New roads and dams, schools and factories re-
quire feasibility studies and blueprints if they are
to be built — not merely listing in hopeful govern-
ment documents. This turnaround process will,
therefore, take time, but from one end of the
underdeveloped regions to the other it is actively
under way.
More than that, it is now clear that the United
States is positively alined with those men and
women who do not merely talk about economic
development and the modernization of their so-
cieties but who really mean it and are prepared to
dedicate their lives to its achievement. It is no
accident that President Kennedy spoke last year
of a "decade of development." ^ We are up against
a longer and tougher job than the Marshall plan.
But we have already begun to create a new basis
of partnership, not merely between ourselves and
the underdeveloped areas but between the whole
industrialized northern part of the free world and
its less developed regions.
Our objective is to see emerge a new relation of
cooperation among self-respecting sovereign na-
tions to supplant the old colonial ties which are
gone or fast disappearing from the world scene.
"VVliile the headlines are filled with the residual
colonial problems — and they are very real — of
Rhodesia, of Angola, of West New Guinea, quiet
but real progress has been made in fashioning new
links between the more developed and the less
developed areas.
Building New North-South Tie
The building of this new north-south tie is the
third major dimension of our strategy on the
world scene. It goes forward in the Alliance for
Progress,' in our relations with the new African
nations, in the meetings of the Development As-
sistance Committee of the OECD in Paris, in the
consortium arrangements of the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, in
the transformed relations of the British Common-
wealth and the French Community, in the enlarg-
ing contribution of Germany, Japan, and other
nations to economic development. And above all,
it goes forward in the minds of citizens in both
the north and the south who are gradually com-
ing to perceive that, however painful the mem-
ories of the colonial past may be, major and
abiding areas of common interest are emerging
between nations at different stages of the growth
process which are authentically committed to the
goals of national independence and human free-
dom.
Creating a Stable Military Environment
The fourth dimension of our strategy is mili-
tary. There is much for us to build within the
free world, but we must protect what we are build-
ing or there will be no freedom.
' For an address by President Kennedy before the U.N.
General Assembly on Sept. 25, 1961, see ihid., Oct. 16, 1961,
p. 619.
•For background, see ibid., Apr. 2, 1962, p. 539.
628
Deparfmenf of Sfafe Bulletin
A persistent characteristic of Communist strat-
eo'v has been its searching attention to specific
ga'ps— regional and technical— in the defenses of
Tlie free world. It has been, thus far, an evident
purpose of Communist strategy to avoid a direct
confrontation not only with U.S. main strength
but with positions of relative strength within the
free world.
Soviet policy appears to be based on sustained
and sophisticated study of particular areas of vul-
nerability (e.g. northern Azerbaijan, Greece, Ber-
lin, Indochina, South Korea) and particular types
of vulnerability (e.g. the geographical position of
Berlin, the shortage of local defenses against
guerrilla warfare in Laos and South Viet-Nam).
We cannot rule out that in the future the Com-
munists will be prepared to assault directly the
IT.S. or other positions of evident strength within
the free community. Tlierefore it is a first charge
on U.S. military policy to make such direct as-
sault grossly unattractive and unprofitable. But
a major lesson of postwar history is that U.S. and
Allied policy must achieve, to the maximum de-
gree possible, a closing off of areas of vulnerability
if we wish to minimize the number and effective-
ness of Communist probes. It is this lesson which
requires that the United States and its allies de-
velop a full spectrum of military strength, under
sensitive and flexible control, capable of covering
all regions of the free world, if we are to create
a stable military environment and minimize the
op])ortunity for Communist intrusions.
It is toward this objective that we have been
working over the past year. We have been build-
ing American military forces over the whole range
from virtually unattackable Polaris submarines to
the training of our own men and the soldiers of
our allies to deter or to defeat guerrilla warfare.
We wish to make it clear to those who might
attack that a nuclear assault on ourselves or our
allies would bring in return nuclear disaster. We
wish to make it clear that we would use all the
force at our disposal if we or our allies were at-
tacked massively by other means; but we require
also the kinds of force which would permit us to
deter or deal with limited Communist attack with-
out having to choose between nuclear war and
surrender.
Over the past year, and at present, our ability
to cope with force and the threat of force is being
tested in Berlin and in Southeast Asia. We do not
intend to surrender at either point or at any other
point along the frontiers of freedom.
At the same time we recognize that the arms
race is an unsatisfactory way to provide national
security in a nuclear age. We are prepared to
take either limited or radical evenhanded meas-
ures to reduce the risks of war and the burden of
armaments, so long as we are confident that these
measures can be verified and controlled by effec-
tive measures of inspection. This is the burden
of our position at the current Geneva disarmament
conference.'"
Our approach to problems of ai-ms control and
disarmament is not in terms of propaganda : It is
a soberly weighed aspect of national security pol-
icy. We are in deadly earnest. But no amount of
U.S. staff work or seriousness of intent can substi-
tute for the essential missing ingi-edient: a Soviet
willingness to acknowledge and to act on the sim-
ple fact that an end to the arms race requires a
progressive opening of societies to mutual
inspection.
Test of Strength With Communist World
The fifth element in our strategy concerns our
posture toward the nations now under Communist
rule. We have made it clear that we do not intend
to initiate nuclear war to destroy the Communist
world. The question then arises : Are we content
merely to fend off Communist intrusion, military
and subversive? Wliat are our hopes and our
prospects with respect to the Communist world?
Are we reconciled to a planet that shall, at best,
be forever split ?
We are engaged in an historic test of strength —
not merely of military strength but of our capac-
ity to understand and to deal with the forces at
work in the world about us. The ultimate ques-
tion at issue is whether this small planet is to be
organized on the principles of the Communist
bloc or on the principles of volimtary cooperation
among independent nation-states dedicated to
human freedom. If we succeed in defending the
present frontiers of freedom, the outcome of that
test of strength will be determmed by slow-moving
forces of history. It will be determined by
whether the elements in the world envii'onment,
which I listed earlier, are more successfully
" For a statement by Secretary Rusk at Geneva on Mar.
27, see p. 618.
April 16, J 962
634433—62 3
629
gripped and organized by ourselves and our
friends than by the Communists.
The question then becomes : How is history mov-
ing? Are these underlying forces now working
for us or against us ?
I would put it to you strongly that they are
working our way if we have the wit to work with
them.
First, in the naore industrialized north we have
seen in the postwar years a remarkable demonstra-
tion which has had a more profound effect on
Communist thought than is generally understood.
Until very recently the Communists believed that
the United States was something of a special case.
We were viewed as the fortunate democratic is-
land-continent with much land and a few people,
permitted to enjoy — at least for a time — a special,
favored destiny. They looked to Europe and
Japan as more vulnerable regions subject to Com-
munist takeover in the fairly near future.
AVliat has been demonstrated in the past decade
is that advanced democratic societies have learned
to avoid protracted phases of severe luiemploy-
ment and that the American pattern of develop-
ment—our standard of living and the provision of
high standards of consumption to the mass of the
people — is the general pattern. The trend toward
the Americanization of standards of living in
Western Europe and Japan, and the vitality of
democratic capitalism in the past decade, is a
major setback to the Communst image of history,
to their ideology, and to their working plans.
Partly because of this setback they have looked
with increasing hope and enterprise to the under-
developed areas. There they thought the
Communist metliods of organization and the Com-
munist example in China, North Viet-Nam, and
elsewhere — as a means of moving an underdevel-
oped country forward rapidly toward modern
status — would draw others to the bloc. Tliey
turned to a strategy of outflanking and isolating
the United States, Europe, and Japan by winning
over the underdeveloped areas — by ideological
attraction as well as by subversion, aid, and
diplomacy.
The returns are not yet in, but a sober and cau-
tious assessment, :is of 1962, shows this: Wliere
the Communists have had power in underdevel-
oped areas — in China, North Korea, North Viet-
Nam, and now in Cuba — they have done an unim-
pressive job technically, quite aside from the
inhumanity of a police state. The most striking
fact about tlie mood in Asia, when I went out there
with General [Maxwell D.] Taylor last fall, was
the loss by the Communists of their power to at-
tract by example in either North Viet-Nam or in
China. Tlie Communist states are drab and hun-
gry. In particular the Chinese Communists have
demonstrated that the most powerful control ma-
chine ever mounted in an underdeveloped country
is incapable of forcing men to grow enougli food,
and their agricultural crisis has compounded into
a general crisis of industrial production and
foreign exchange.
Meanwhile India and certain other underdevel-
oped nations have begun to demonstrate that real
momentum and steady progress can be obtained in
an underdeveloped area by mobilizing the energies
and loyalties of the people by consent and normal
human incentives.
It appears to be a teclinical fact that the most
powerful system of control is an inadequate sub-
stitute for the incentives and commitment of the
individual citizen, once he can be engaged. De-
velopment is a process which requires that millions
of human beings and many organized groups as-
sume responsibility for moving tilings forward on
their narrow part of the front. There are simply
not enough Commiuiist cadres or secret policemen
available to substitute for the energy and commit-
ment of men and women who understand what
needs to be done and why it is their interest to
do it.
The demonstration in the underdeveloped areas
is not yet as definitive a victory for freedom as
that in the northern half of the free world. One
of the gi-eat tasks of this decade is to complete this
demonstration. But the lesson of our experience
thus far is that we sliould be confident that, in go-
ing forward with economic development by the
methods of pragmatic planning and individual
consent which are natural to us, we are on the right
track technically us well as morally and that the
Communist image of the problems of moderniza-
tion — and Communist techniques for handling
them in the underdeveloped areas — are just as
arcliaic as their notions of how one sliould or-
ganize an advanced industrial society.
There is yet another force worlving our way, and
that is tlie intent of people and governments in the
underdeveloped areas to maintain their independ-
630
Department of State Bulletin
ence. We in the United States can live comfort-
ably in a pluralistic world of independent nations,
each fashioning its own modern personality, be-
cause our life at home is based on the principle
of cooperation among dignified and responsible
equals; but the Communists are driven by their
methods for organizing domestic power to violate
equally the integrity of individuals and nations.
The drive of the people and governmeaits in the
underdeveloped areas to maintain their independ-
ence is a most powerful force. We can honestly
aline our policy with this force. In the end the
Communists cannot; and this is one fundamental
reason why the Communist offensive in the under-
developed areas will fail.
Dispute Between Moscow and Peiping
Finally, tlie Communist bloc itself is now in the
midst ofa slow-moving but great historical crisis.
This crisis takes the form of the deep dispute
between Moscow and Peiping, a dispute which has
engaged in one way or another Communist parties
throughout the world. Wliat lies behind this dis-
pute, among other factors, is the rise of national-
ism as a living and growing force within the
Communist bloc. It is a force within Russia itself,
and it is a growing force as well in other regions
where Communist regimes are in power. Despite
the interest of Communists in maintaining their
cohesion against the West, the slow fragmentation
of the Communist bloc and the diffusion of power
within it goes forward.
We expect no quick or cheap benefits from this
process. In the short run it may present problems
to us, as when the Russians and the Chinese com-
pete to exert their influence over the Communist
Party in Hanoi by backing its efforts in Laos and
in South Viet-Nam. But fundamentally the as-
sertion of nationalism and national interests with-
in the Communist bloc should tend to produce a
more livable world. The diffusion of power, we
know, is the basis for human liberty within soci-
eties, and on the world scene it is the basis for
independent nations.
For example, we have every reason to believe
that the limited assistance we have given Yugo-
slavia and Poland over the years and our willing-
ness to maintain wide human contacts with their
citizens have been sound longrun investments in
the principle of national independence and human
freedom.
April 16, 1962
We should, therefore, be prepared, as these na-
tional interests exert themselves, to find limited
areas of overlapping interest with Communist re-
gimes and to work toward a world which increas-
ingly approximates the kind of world we
envisaged when the United Nations was set up.
Our^'strategy is, then, quite simple. We are
working from day to day to bind up in closer
partnership the industrialized nations of the
north, to work with our friends in the north to
create a new partnership between the more devel-
oped and less developed nations. Recognizing and
welcoming the new strength to be found in West-
ern Europe and Japan, recognizing and wel-
coming the impulse of the southern nations to
modernize, we see a path ahead which would
reconcile the great interests involved and gradu-
ally build a community of free nations.
We intend to defend this community of free na-
tions and to do so in ways which will minimize the
possibility that a nuclear war will come about, and
we intend, with all the poise and insight we can
muster, to draw the nations now under Communist
regimes toward the free-world community by both
ruling out the expansion of communism and by ex-
ploiting specific areas of overlapping interest
which we believe will increasingly emerge as the
strength, unity, and effectiveness of the free com-
munity is demonstrated. As Secretary Rusk re-
cently said : " ". . . we should be aware that the
concepts of independent nationhood, of national
mterest, and of national culture are day to day as-
serting themselves strongly" within the Commu-
nist bloc. We have every reason to be confident
that the wave of the future lies with the funda-
mental principles on which our own society is
based and which are rooted also in the United Na-
tions Cliarter.
It is in this spirit— in terms of these objectives
and this intent— that we do our work from day to
day in Washington. We kTiow that over the next
decade there will be frustrations and setbacks. We
know that we shall have to deal with difficult crises
as well as press forward with our work of con-
struction. But, as we go about our business, we
are in good heart, and we shall not be deflected.
We believe that time is on the side of the things
this nation stands for if we use time well, and we
intend to do so.
' Bulletin of Jan. 15, 1962, p. 83.
631
The United Nations and the Real World
iy Acting Secretary Ball^
Statesmen, Journalists, pundits, and politicians
are fond of reminding us that these are times of
rapid change and vast transformation in human
affairs. It is well that they do, for the pace and
pervasiveness of scientific, political, and social
change have given a special character to the post-
war world.
Yet it is not enough to recognize, as a general
proposition, that change is taking place. We must
define the direction of that change if we are to
adjust our attitudes and policies to the shifting
requirements of the times. For as the world
changes, our conventional wisdom is called into
question, inherited doctrine becomes obsolete, and
human institutions perforce take on new forms
and new functions. It requires all the perception
and imagination we can muster — and then some —
if we are to know even imprecisely what we are
doing or where we are going.
This morning I want to talk with you about
what we are doing and where we are going with
one of the most ambitious and misunderstood of
our postwar institutions — the United Nations.
I refer to the United Nations as misunderstood
because the current discussion of the effectiveness
and utility of that institution displays a wide area
of difference as to its purposes and objectives. If
one would loolc back to San Francisco in 1945
when the charter was being drafted and then look
at the world today, the reason for this misunder-
standing becomes apparent. The assumption —
or at least the hope — that inspired the drafters
of that noble document was that the great powere,
* Address made at a foreiRii policy briefing conference
for the press and l)roadcastinK industry at the Department
on Mar. 20 ( press release 191 ) .
allied in World War II, would be able to live in
relative harmony and together police the postwar
world. They could settle whatever differences
arose among them within the forum of the Se-
curity Council.
As we know all too well, the effort to fashion
one world with one treaty hardly lasted through
the first General Assembly. The Soviet Union
joined the United Nations in name only. Over
the next 4 years the Iron Curtain slammed down
to form a cage aroimd one-third of the world's
population, living on a great landmass that
stretches from the Brandenburg Gate to the Yel-
low Sea.
The United Nations was thus frustrated in its
original objective of serving as a forum for rec-
onciling differences among the great powers.
This has not, however, destroyed its usefulness —
indeed its indispensability.
Instead the United Nations has found its post-
war destiny in quite different and enormously ef-
fective endeavors.
That is why I thought it might be useful, in
the few moments we have together this morning,
to describe the major role tliat the United Nations
has in fact played in this turbulent postwar decade
and a half and to suggest how the United Na-
tions fits into flic whole of American diplomacy.
Transformation in World Power Relationships
The brief moment of time — less than a genera-
tion — since the end of World War II has seen
the world transformed. If one-third of the world
population has been encircled by tlie Iron Cur-
tain, in this brief period another one-third has
made the eventful passage from colonial status
632
Department of Sfcrfe Bulletin
to some form of national independence. Almost
50 new states have come into being; a dozen more
are actively in the making.
Such a revolutionary movement on a worldwide
scale has no precedent. The great changes of the
past have taken place only over centuries; the sud-
den denouement of the 20th-century anticolonial
revolution has been compressed in a mere 15 years.
The breakup of the European empires meant
the collapse of a longstanding system of world
order. It meant the sudden rupture of old ties,
the sudden emergence of new states, the sudden
liberation of a billion people from colonial de-
pendence. The world has never known a compa-
rable political convulsion— so abruptly begun, so
quickly concluded.
Even under the best of circumstances one could
well have expected this to be a period of violent
conflict, chaos, and vast bloodletting. But the
collapse of the European empires did not take
place in the best of circumstances — almost in the
worst. For it took place in a world polarized be-
tween the great powers of East and West, where
the Sino-Soviet bloc had everything to gain by
the vigorous promotion of chaos.
The Communists tried hard to exploit the tur-
moil implicit in rapid change. They sought to
capture and divert the nationalist revolutions into
Communist channels. They did their best to turn
political instability into political collapse, to rub
salt into the wounds of racial antagonisms, to fan
jealousies between the poor and the rich, to ex-
ploit the inexperience of the new governments, to
capitalize on economic misery, and to heighten
tensions between new states and their neighbors
wherever they existed.
In retrospect, of course, it seems extraordinary
that, since the Red Chinese takeover in 1949, the
Iron Curtain countries have failed in almost all
their efforts to convert nationalist revolutions into
Communist revolutions. In spite of the extension
of the Commimist conspiracy through highly or-
ganized local party organizations, in spite of the
disruptive force of violent change, in spite of the
political inexperience of the leaders of the new
coimtries and the natural antagonisms between
the new countries and their former colonial over-
lords, the greatest political upheaval of all time
has still taken place — witlun a fantastically short
timespan — with amazing smoothness and good
will and with a surprising lack of bloodshed.
April 16, 1962
In this great process of change the interests of
the great powers were at all times deeply involved.
Lurking in the background of political changes all
over the world was the disturbing question of rela-
tive big-power advantage. Because of this the
world has lived in constant danger that a jungle
war in Southeast Asia or a tribal conflict in the
heart of Africa could become the occasion for a
great-power confrontation — and that what began
as a brush fire could be fanned into a nuclear
holocaust. Yet this has not happened. Except in
Korea, the direct confrontation of great-power
troops has been averted.
This, it seems to me, suggests quite clearly one
of the major roles of the United Nations. Unable
to bring the great powers together, it has played
a decisive role in keeping them apart. And all
the while it has served as overseer of the rast and
for the most part nationalist transformations
which have been taking place all over the world.
In appraising the success of the United Nations,
in appraising its usefulness to the United States,
I think it is this standard of judgment that we
should employ : How effectively has it facilitated
the peaceful revision of the relations between the
billion colonial peoples largely in the Southern
Hemisphere and the billion economically advanced
peoples in the Northern Hemisphere— in the face
of constant efforts of subversion and interference
from the Communist powers that control the bil-
lion people behind the Iron Curtain ?
End of the Colonial Era
One of the most frequently heard complaints
against the United Nations is that it has precipi-
tated change at too rapid a pace. By providing
each emergent new state a voice equal to that of a
great power, it is said, the United Nations has
given an excessive impetus to the breakup of
colonialism. As the new nations have gained in
numbers and thus in votes in the General Assem-
bly of the U.N., they have mounted pressures
that have forced the colonial powers to move be-
yond the speed limits set by prudence. As a result,
independence has been conferred upon peoples
miprepared for the complex tasks of nation-
building.
Evidence can be marshaled to support this
thesis. Examples can be cited of nations born
prematurely, nations lacking the educated elite
to operate the difficult business of government,
633
nations illogically conceived, with national bound-
aries that have little rational meaning either in
etlmic or economic terms.
But on the other side there are powerful argu-
ments for maintaining the momentum of change.
When the world is faced with a convulsion so
profound as the ending of colonialism, it is well
to get the process over just as quickly as it can
be done peacefully. A great political and social
revolution of this kind cannot be achieved with-
out major adjustments, and in a world where half
of the dependent peoples have achieved independ-
ence the lot of the other half must become increas-
ingly irksome. Under such circumstances a long
deferment of their own independence is likely to
produce frustrations and bitterness that will im-
pede and complicate their ultimate accommoda-
tion to the environment of free nations.
It must be recognized, of course, that the colo-
nial era is not yet finally completed ; there is still
substantial unfinished business to be done. In the
areas of Africa where many Europeans have made
their homes, there remains the task of reconciling
the rights of white minorities with the rights and
aspirations of African majorities. The trouble-
some problem remains, moreover, of how to deal
with the bits and pieces of former colonial sys-
tems — fragments that are themselves so small as
not to fit neatly into the pattern of new nation
states. There are altogether about 50 fragments
of this kind. We oureelves are the administering
power for several groups of Pacific islands under
a United Nations trusteeship. We are seeking to
devise appropriate long-term arrangements for
these areas that will permit the maximum of op-
portunity for the peoples involved.
Yet if the colonial era is not concluded it is well
on the way toward being so. The vast bulk of the
population formerly under colonial rule has now
achieved self-government. Certainly for the ma-
jor powers of the West, colonialism is largely a
matter of history. With good hick the cease-fire
in Algeria can mark another finished page.
By and large the major European powers, which
are our natural partners in most of our activities,
have either seen the transfonnation of their former
colonial possessions into sovereign states or are in
the process of doing so.
This has created difficult problems for them, but,
for the most part, these problems have been met
and solved more easily than had been anticipated.
In spite of fears that the loss of colonies might
enfeeble the colonial powers, this has not proved
to be true. In fact one can say without being
fanciful that, just as the shattering of their colo-
nial systems — like the fission of the atom — has un-
leashed fierce energies, the former colonial powers
— the great powers of Western Europe — are them-
selves generating vast forces, not through fissions
but through the fusion of their economies in the
European Common Market. In ceasing to think
of themselves as the centers of individual colonial
systems they have found a common destiny as
Europeans. In undertaking the business of build-
ing a united Europe they have already developed
a new prosperity, a new purpose, and the begin-
nings of a new relationship with the new nations
carved out of their old empires.
We ourselves have a direct interest in the com-
pletion of the decolonization process for, as colo-
nialism becomes a dead issue between the peoples
of the less developed countries and the major pow-
ers of Western Europe, the free world as a whole
should become increasingly cohesive. President
Kennedy has described the 1960's as a "decade of
development." ^ Certainly the major powers of
the West must devote themselves intensively over
the next few years to assisting the newly emerging
countries toward a level of political and economic
independence that will enable them to play a con-
structive role in the family of nations.
In this endeavor it is essential that the major
AVestern Powers be able to work closely together,
just as they work closely together in resisting
threatened aggression from the Communist bloc.
In the past, however, the existence of colonialism
has often proved an impediment to common ac-
tions or policies among the Western Powers. With
its passing we should be able to look forward to a
further and freer development of the Atlantic
partnership, which is, after all, the hard core of
free- world strength.
Converting Nationalism Into Nationhood
For most of tlio colonial peoples the end of the
colonial ordeal marks the start of a new process,
the convei-sion of nationalism into nationhood.
Sovereignty is sometimes a heady wine. It en-
courages exuberant voices and sometimes irrele-
vant argument. But perliaps this is a function
" For an aUdrt'ss by the Presidont before the U.N. Geu-
eral Assembly on Sept. 25, 1961, see Bulletin of Oct. 16,
1901, p. C19.
634
Department of Stale Bulletin
of growing up — a normal aspect of the transfor-
mation from dependent status to independence.
Let us remember that we were ourselves a young,
brash, and rather cocky nation at the end of the
18th century.
Wo should not, therefore, be put oil' by the fact
that representatives of the new nations are some-
times given to irrelevant talk. Neither we nor
they sliould permit it to obscure tlie relevant busi-
ness that every new state has to tackle as it entei-s
the age of engineering and economics.
In fact, instead of being irked by the occasional
exuberance of some of the representatives of newer
nations in the General Assembly, we should be
eternally grateful to the U.N. that the complex
business of transforming almost 50 new states
from dependence to sovereignty has, for the most
part, been accompanied by speeches rather than
by shooting. This is, I think, one of the striking
achievements of our time.
In trying to understand the actions of the new
nations we should realize that in their eyes the
U.N. has a very special meaning. The immediate
and natural ambition of every new nation is to
establish its national identity. Membership in the
United Nations has served this purpose; it has
become the badge of independence, the credentials
of sovereignty, the symbol of nationhood, and the
passport to the 20th century. "Wlien the delega-
tion of a new nation takes its place in the grand
hall of the General Assembly, that nation has
arrived; it can look the world in the eye and
speak its piece. And even if that piece may be
discordant to our ears the fact that it can be
spoken has helped to stabilize the postwar world.
Yet the U.N. is more than a place for letting off
steam ; it is also a school of political responsibility.
While some of its members may represent closed
societies, it is itself an open society. The General
Assembly is staged for all the world to see, and
performing upon that stage sometimes— though
not always — helps turn demagogs into statesmen.
How else can one explain the fact that at the last
General Assembly the most "anticolonial" mem-
bers of the United Nations decisively rejected a
Soviet resolution calling for independence of all
remaining dependent areas by 1962 ? They spon-
sored instead moderate and sensible resolutions
for which we and most of our European friends
could vote without reservation.
April 16, J 962
The growing sense of responsibility in the new
nations is only partly the result of finding them-
selves on stage before a critical world. It is also
the result of a growing conviction that the business
of economic and social development in their own
countries is tough and demanding. They find
the problems of food and health, education and
technology, enterprise and administration will not
yield to repetitive slogans carried over from the
fight for independence. And they discover, too,
the need to develop a new relationship with ths
Europeans and with the North Americans.
The framework of the United Nations provides
a basis for such a new relationship — a political
system in which the less developed nations can
have a full sense of participation, which makes
possible a family of technical organizations whose
international staffs can help conceive and carry
out the development plans every people now ex-
pects its government to pursue with vigor.
Two Aspects of U.N.'s Peacekeeping Role
In one aspect, then, the United Nations is an
instrument through which the industrial societies
and the less developed nations can be brought to-
gether. In another aspect, as I have earlier sug-
gested, one of the principal achievements of the
United Nations had been to keep the great powere
apart. It has accomplished this by bringing about
the settlement of conflicts through conciliation and
debate and by interposing itself as the agency to
keep the peace in areas where chaos might other-
wise attract great-power intei-vention.
The U.N. was scarcely organized before it was
involved in the difficult and dangerous business of
peacekeeping— in Iran, Greece, Indonesia, Kash-
mir. Since then it has played a part in stopping
aggression, threatened aggression, or civil war in
Palestine, Korea, at Suez, in the Lebanon and the
Congo. In all of these conflicts the great powers
had interests. In the absence of the U.N. they
would in all likelihood have intervened to defend
those interests. Intervention by both sides could
have led to a dangerous confrontation.
The most recent, and perhaps most spectacular,
of the trouble spots in which the U.N. has acted
to prevent great-power confrontation is, of course,
the Congo. Here the U.N., with full United
States support, interposed itself in the heart of
Africa in the nick of time. The Soviet Union was
already moving in, and we could never have stood
635
by while they set up shop in the heart of Africa.
The intervention of the U.N., difficult though it
may have seemed at the time, prevented the chaos
that could well have turned the Congo into another
Korea. Today, by patience and effort, it is help-
ing to bring about the conditions under which an
integrated Congo republic can work its way
toward stability and peace.
I would suggest, therefore, that, in thinking
about the Congo and about other areas where the
United Nations is brought in to keep the peace,
we should ask ourselves this question: From the
point of view of our national security, would it
have been better to send in the American Marines
or to act with others to send in the United Na-
tions in the name of the world commmiity?
Obviously the U.N. cannot keep the peace with-
out expense. Today it has over 20,000 men in the
field, patrolling the truce lines in the Middle East
and keeping the lid on in the Congo. Manifestly
this is the work of something more than a League
of Nations — more than a debating society grafted
on a pious commitment to unattainable goals. It
is the work of an executive agency of considerable
capacity and skill, capable of performing prag-
matic tasks — such as mobilizing, transporting,
commanding, and supplying substantial forces in
the field when an emergency arises.
U.N. an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy
Much of the discussion about the United Na-
tions has not been concerned so much with what it
does as how its activities fit in with the larger
purposes of our own foreign policy. To those of
us in tlie Department of State who have responsi-
bility for the formulation and administration of
that policy tlie relationsliip is clear enough. The
United Nations is an instrument of United States
foreign policy just as it is an instrument of the
foreign policy of every other member state. In
addition the U.N. provides us with a mechanism
by which we can seek to persuade other member
states not only that they should agree with us on
our foreign policy but that they should express
that agreement by actively supporting resolutions
that accord with our own national objectives.
Because our policies have tended to be right and
have thus appealed to the interests of other na-
tions and because Ambassador Stevenson and his
staff have displayed exceptional leadership, wo
have been remarkably successful in obtaining
international approval of our own national
policies.
This is illustrated clearly by the record of the
last General Assembly — the 16th. You will re-
call that this Assembly convened last September
in an atmospliere of somber crisis — the secession
of Katanga Province in the Congo, the death of
Dag Hammarskjold on a mission of conciliation,
the Soviet Union's revival of its infamous troika
proposal for a three-headed Secretary-General,
and the prospect of imminent bankruptcy.
Such was the stat« of affairs when President
Kennedy addressed the General Assembly in
September. He made a ringing affirmation of
U.S. support and confidence in the future of the
United Nations — and backed it up with three
major initiatives.
The President laid before the membership a
comprehensive U.S. plan for general and complete
disarmament,' made realistic by its insistence on
a simultaneous improvement of international
peacekeeping machinery. This put the U.N. in
business again on this vital if frustrating sub-
ject — and seized the initiative for the United
States on the issue of peace.
President Kennedy also called for an active
program of U.N. activity on the peaceful uses of
outer space. The General Assembly acted on this
American proposal in a resolution that extended
the Charter of the United Nations to outer space
and set up the Committee on Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space, which began its work last week in
an atmosphere unusual for the absence of cold-
war policies.
Finally the President called for a U.N. Decade
of Development to speed economic and social
growth in the less developed world. This was ap-
proved unanimously; a general goal of a 50-per-
cent expansion in national incomes was adopted
for the next decade; and a wide range of specific
programs and projects is in the course of prep-
aration.
Thus did the U.N. General Assembly respond to
American leadership and react to American ini-
tiatives that are both in our own interest and in
the interest of a great majority of the members.
Meanwhile the Assembly resolutely preserved
the integrity of the Secretariat against Soviet at-
tack ; rejected the Soviet effort to replace National-
ist China with Commmiist China; drew up an
* For text, see ibid., p. 650.
636
Department of State Bulletin
emergency plan to restore financial order to its
affairs; and dealt in a generally responsible man-
ner with the emotional subject of colonialism.
Functions of Regional Institutions
But if the United Nations is an instniment of
United States policy it is only one of many instru-
ments available to us. It is one of the tasks of
the Secretary of State and his staff, when con-
fronted with a particular problem, to select and
utilize that instrument most appropriate for the
purpose.
It is therefore important to be clear not only
about what the United Nations does but what it
does not do — what it is not, as well as what it is.
Clarity on this score helps resolve the contradic-
tion some people seem to find in American foreign
policy, a contradiction between our reliance on the
institutions of the Atlantic community and our
participation in the United Nations.
No such contradiction in fact exists. The found-
ers of the United Nations recognized the necessity
for regional institutions and explicitly provided
for them in the charter. Indeed the charter calls
upon members to seek settlement of disputes with-
in the framework of regional institutions before
they are brought to the U.N. at all.
In practice we use the various institutions to
which we belong for quite different purposes. Tlie
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is,
of course, the backbone of our military defense of
the free world against the Commimist bloc.
Through our own massive forces and through
NATO we maintain the armed strength that is the
principal deterrent to Communist aggression.
But just as the U.N.'s capabilities are limited, so
are NATO's. Quite clearly NATO could not have
intervened in the Congo to restore order when
Belgium withdrew. Only a world organization
could do so without arousing anticolonialist
emotions.
It is true that the United Nations cannot, by
itself, maintain the peace between the major
powers. It is equally true that NATO was not
qualified to supervise the peaceful change from
colonialism to independence. Their roles are quite
different and distinct. Each is essential, and
therefore we support each for different reasons.
The same observation can be made with regard
to the OECD — the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development — which came into
April 16, 7962
being last September. Through this organization
we are developing means for close cooperation in
economic matters with the major industrialized
powers on either side of the Atlantic. This kind
of cooperation cannot be achieved within the
larger framework of the United Nations. But
the building of workable international relation-
ships with the smaller, poorer countries requires
arrangements in which the weaker nations can par-
ticipate, with dignity, as full-fledged members —
which is the secret of success of the "World Bank,
the U.N. Special Fund, and other worldwide insti-
tutions for technical aid and development lending.
I could, of course, go on to mention other re-
gional arrangements in which we participate.
The Organization of American States, for ex-
ample, gives institutional form to the American
system. And the Alliance for Progress provides
for a massive cooperative effort between the
United States and Latin America.
In view of the need for different instruments to
serve the diverse purposes of our foreign policy, I
find the suggestion quite curious that, by seelring
to use NATO or the OECD as a means of coopera-
tion with our European friends, we are somehow
turning our back on the U.N. I find equally
curious the belief that in seeking to work within
the United Nations we are betraying our friend-
ship with our Atlantic partners.
Nothing could be further from the truth. The
fact of the matter is that, in 41 key votes in the
last General Assembly, the United States and a
majority of the NATO members voted together
41 times. Members of NATO do not, of course,
vote as a bloc at the United Nations; only Com-
munist members vote consistently as a bloc. But
if loyalty to a majority of our NATO allies within
the United Nations is a test, the United States has
proved the most loyal of all— and this record was
made in an Assembly in which there were 14 major
votes on so-called colonial issues.
I cannot understand the contention that the
United States must make a choice between the U.N.
and NATO, that we are compelled for some
strange reason to put all our eggs in one basket.
It seems to me a curious concept that in world
affairs we can do only one thing at a time — that
if we stand finn in one place we cannot move
ahead in another, that if we are in favor of quiet
diplomacy we must be against parliamentary
diplomacy in the General Assembly, that if we
637
are for a strong concert of free nations we must
be against a strong world community, that if re-
gional organizations are realistic world organiza-
tions are necessarily unrealistic.
It seems to me that the present maturity of our
foreign policy lies precisely in our ability to stand
firm against threats of aggression while simul-
taneously taking constructive initiatives to build
a woi'ld free of the threat of aggression — build-
ing up the regional organizations of the Atlantic
and Western Hemisphere communities while
simultaneously supporting the world community
represented by the United Nations — practicing at
the same time bilateral diplomacy, regional di-
plomacy, and global diplomacy through the United
Nations.
U.S. Mission to the U.N. And the combination of
American ideas and initiatives, backed by Ameri-
can power and carried into action by American
diplomacy, enables the United States to carry more
weight in the United Nations than any other
member.
Because it does things we want to see done and
makes possible some relations with other countries J
we want to see established — and because it oper- i
ates, in the words of the charter, as "a center for
harmonizing the actions of nations" — the United
Nations serves the national interests of the United
States. It will, we believe, continue to do so as
long as the United States is its leading member
and exercises day by day, the year round, the
function of leadei-ship.
U.N. Serves National Interests
In this world of interlocking partnerships the
quality of our country-by-country diplomacy has
to be supplemented with a diplomacy of regional
organizations, and both must be complemented by
our effective participation in the parliamentary
diplomacy of the United Nations.
The U.N.'s New York headquarters has become,
for the newer and smaller nations, the diplomatic
capital of the world. Some of the smaller nations
can hardly afford to be represented in more than
a few capitals, but they are always represented
at the United Nations. Thus if an African na-
tion has business with Japan or India or Brazil,
it is more than likely these days to tell its mission
in New York to talk to the Japanese or Indian or
Brazilian delegation to the U.N. And in the U.N.
building itself there were 2,21Y meetings this past
year in the ceaseless process of building relation-
ships among 104 countries whose independence is
declared but whose interdependence is essential.
This is why the United States Mission to the
United Nations bears such a heavy burden and
why its quality is so critical to the national in-
terest. This is why there is a "U.N. angle" to so
many different parts of American foreign policy.
This is why President Kennedy readied out for a
man of Cabinet stature and world renown to head
the United States Mission at the United Nations.
The center of decision and the source of instruc-
tions is Washington — on U.N. affairs as on all
other parts of our foreign policy. These instruc-
tions give considerable weight, as they should, to
the facts and reconunendations received from the
President of Republic of Togo
Visits United States
Sylvanus Olymfio, President of the Republic
of Togo, visited the United States March 19-30.
After 2 days at Washington as a Presidential
guest March 20-22, President Olympio contintied
his visit at New York City, making two other
hrief trips, one to Ni-agara Falls and otic to the
Virgin Islands. Following is the text of a joint
communique between President Kenrwdy and
President Olympio released on March 21 at the
close of their talks.
White House press release dated March 21
The President of the Republic of Togo, His
Excellency Sylvanus Olympio, who is making a
five-day visit to the United States as a Presidential
guest of President Kennedy, will conclude a two-
day stay in Washington tomorrow and continue
his visit in New York. This visit has afforded an
opportunity for the two Presidents to establish a
personal acquaintance and discuss fully matters of
common concern, including problems of global
interest afTooting world peace and human welfare.
The two Chiefs of State agreed that the forma-
tion of the Organization of African States at the
recent liagos Conference was a constructive step
toward building African unify tlirougli political
consultation and practical cooperation in the vari-
ous technical and economic fields. President
Olympio pointed out that such a regional organi-
zation should be based on the same principles as
638
Department of State Bulletin
those of the United Nations, including the prin-
ciple of non-intervention in the internal affairs of
member states.
President Olympio expressed his deep satis-
faction for the unwavering support which the
United States has given to the United Nations,
particularly since the newly independent states
consider that Organization a guarantee of their
independence.
The two Presidents reviewed the friendly and
mutually beneficial relations already established
between the two countries. President Kennedy
noted the determined efforts toward economic and
social development being carried forward by the
Republic of Togo and stated the desire of the
United States to continue development assistance
to Togo. President Kennedy also expressed satis-
faction that the United States could make avail-
able surplus commodities to alleviate the severe
famine conditions in northern Togo, and President
Olympio thanked him for this help. In addition
the two Presidents discussed the role which the
"Food for Peace" program could play in stimu-
lating economic and social development in Togo.
The Role of Agriculture in the Development orAfrica
iy G. Mennen Williams
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs ^
It was a real pleasure to get an invitation from
Jim Patton to attend this distinguished gathering,
and I am happy to be here among my many friends
in the National Farmers Union. You have
coupled with your strong interest in the prosperity
of the family-sized farm a strong interest in na-
tional and world affairs. During the past quarter-
century, world affairs have become increasingly
a major concern for all Americans. Tliis is clearly
true in terms of Africa, where the surge toward
freedom and independence has pushed that con-
tinent to the front of the world stage in a single
decade.
Prior to 1951, only four countries — Egypt,
Ethiopia, Liberia, and the Union of South
Africa — could be listed as independent countries.
Since that time, 25 new nations have emerged on
the African Continent — 17 of them coming in 1960
alone. And there will be many others to follow —
this year and in the years ahead.
"Without subjecting you to a burdensome niunber
of statistics, I would like to mention a few facts
and figures that will give you some perspective
of the scope of the challenge we face in Africa.
' Address made before the National Farmers Union at
Denver, Colo., on Mar. 19 (press release 177).
Take size, for example. The continent of Africa
is an extremely huge landmass, but many Ameri-
cans still are not aware how large and complex
the area really is. Traveling here, I was reminded
that a trip across broadest Africa is almost twice
the distance from Washington to San Francisco.
Looking out of the window of the plane carrying
me into Stapleton Airport, I could see mile after
mile of the Colorado plateau and the magnificent
Rockies towering over Denver. More than 100,000
square miles in size, Colorado is our eighth largest
State. Yet you could fit 100 Colorados into the
African Continent and still have a million square
miles of land unused.
Although large in size, Africa is by no means
heavily populated. Its 230 million people place
it below Asia, Europe, and North America in total
population. Its 29 independent countries range
widely in niunbers of people — from 35-40 million
in Nigeria to about i/4 million in Gabon.
Transportation and communication facilities in
Africa are largely undeveloped, and this massive
continent contains a wide variety of peoples and
cultures little related to one another. Nearly
1,000 languages or dialects are used in different
parts of the continent.
Apri] 16, 1962
639
The economic bases of the widely scattered
African lands also are quite different from region
to region, but the two principal supports of all
African economies are mining and agi'iculture.
These two activities make important contributions
to the well-being of the rest of the world as well.
In minerals, Africa supplies most of the diamonds
used throughout the world and large amounts of
gold, copper, cobalt, uranium, and manganese, to
name a few. It also exports major quantities of
such agricultural commodities as peanuts, cocoa,
coffee, wine, palm products, and sisal.
Geographical Divisions of Africa
Africa is just as diverse geographically as it is
culturally and economically. Essentially, how-
ever, six major regions comprise the continent, and
these arbitrary divisions are useful in helping us
recognize some of the reasons for the many dif-
ferences in Africa.
Bordered by the Mediterranean, the Sahara, the
Atlantic, and the Bed Sea is North Africa, settled
principally by Arabs and Berbers.
Jutting out into the Arabian Sea is the Horn of
Africa, which includes the high Ethiopian plateau
and the hot coastal lands of Somalia and those
bordering the Red Sea.
Savanna Africa is a third major geographical
division. This consists of a broad belt of sand
and grassland states just south of the Sahara ex-
tending from Sudan to the Atlantic Ocean.
On the west coast, running in an arc from Dakar
in Senegal to northern Angola is rain-forest
Africa, the most heavily populated region of the
continent outside of Egypt.
Starting in northern Kenya in East Africa and
rimning on both sides of a line to Cape Town in
South Africa is mountain Africa, the area of
greatest concentration of minority white settle-
ments.
The sixth distinct geographic region is the
Malagasy Republic, the island of Madagascar in
the Indian Ocean, which is settled by people of
mixed stock. Malagasy gives us another good ex-
ample of the hugeness of the African area. If this
island were set along our eastern seaboard, it
would extend from Cape Cod to northern Florida.
Yet many of us think of the Malagasy Republic as
a fairly small island off the African coast.
What is it, then, that binds these many different
regions, cultures, and peoples together? The best
answer to that question is found in the major
aspirations of Africans everywliere throughout
the continent. These broad desires — independ-
ence, dignity, and improved standards of living —
are subscribed to by people from one end of the
continent to the other.
Major Aspirations of African Peoples
Heading this list is the African peoples' desire
to gain freedom and independence from colonial
rule. In recent years this desire has led to the
birth of more than two dozen new nations. Most
of these nations came to independence peacefully.
However, while we may look with wonder on
the transition of 25 nations to freedom in so short
a space of time, the Africans tend to see about an
equal number of nations not yet free.
A second Africa-wide aspiration is the achieve-
ment of individual dignity and self-expression
equal to that of the rest of mankind. This is an
extremely important concern for dark-skinned
people in a world where color bars are being
lowered too slowly for their likmg.
We in America should be especially concerned
with tills particular African goal. The signifi-
cance of racial discrimination in our country is as
keenly felt among African leaders as it is among
Americans. The more sophisticated Africans are
aware that many Americans are making serious
and strenuous efforts to assure all of our citizens
the rights entitled them by our Constitution. Yet
it is clear in our dealings with African nations that
our slowness in providing equal rights for all our
people continues to make us suspect in their eyes.
Improved standards of living comprise the tliird
major aspiration of the emerging nations of
Africa. There are vast differences in economic
levels in Africa, but all of its countries are anxious
to raise their standards of living as quiclcly as pos-
sible. This is not surprising, for in tropical
Africa the per capita annual income is $89 ($132
for the continent as a whole), whereas in the
nearest other area, the Middle East, it is $171, and
in the United States it is $2,500.
Africa's leadere are men in a hurrj'. Tlieir
people have been patient throughout decades of
colonial rule. Now that they have joined the
world of free choice, however, the people insist on
immediate economic improvement.
The people of Africa want to develop and mod-
640
Department of State Bulletin
ernize their countries, not only to obtain the ma-
terial and cultural advantages that come with
mature economies but also to maintain their free-
dom in national and international affairs. They
want to obtain large amoimts of capital and tech-
nical know-how rapidly. They want to improve
educational facilities for themselves and for gen-
erations to come. They want better health, better
sanitation, better housing, better nutrition.
Our agricultural abundance is playing an in-
creasingly important role in our foreign assistance
programs in Africa. Food is our most valuable
material resource, and its use in our Food for
Peace Program gives American farmers a direct
and important stake in American foreign policy.
Many African countries are participating in
this undertaking, and in such countries as Mo-
rocco, Libya, and Tunisia Food for Peace pro-
grams of considerable magnitude are under way.
In these countries not only surplus sales but gifts
for flood and famine relief and school lunches are
part of the overall effort. Of particular interest
in Morocco and Tunisia are programs where agri-
cultural commodities are used directly as partial
payment to workers engaged in national public
works projects. This form of development as-
sistance permits the Governments to embark on
large-scale projects and at the same time combat
the problems of unemployment and under-
employment.
The people and governments who get these sur-
plus agricultural commodities often express their
appreciation at shipside ceremonies. In fact.
President [Habib] Bourguiba of Tunisia last year
said that the generous assistance of this country
prevented famine in Tunisia. We are happy to
be able to help our friends in Africa in these cir-
cumstances, but we also want to help them improve
their own agricultural methods.
With some 90 percent of the population of
Africa engaged in agriculture, and with the pro-
ductive capacity of much of the continent im-
paired by malnutrition, the people of Africa ob-
viously want to improve their crops and their
livestock. Figures supplied by the U.N. Food
and Agriculture Organization show that Africa
has more arable land and pastureland than either
the United States or the Soviet Union. Yet Africa
produces only one-twentieth of the world's agri-
cultural commodities while the United States ac-
counts for almost one-sixth.
Although agriculture is the major source ot
income and emplo3Tnent for most Africans, pres-
ent conditions keep productivity levels per worker
very low. With improved agricultural tech-
niques designed specifically for African condi-
tions, however, there is good reason to believe
that the large arable areas of Africa can be put
to fuller use and raise African living standards
and economies considerably. There is little won-
der that very heavy emphasis is placed on im-
proving this sector of the economy rapidly.
Patterns of Agricultural Production
Patterns of agriculture in Africa today place
ancient, traditional methods of farming for sub-
sistence crops in sharp contrast with the latest
modern agricultural techniques designed to pro-
duce large cash crops for export. This is the
result of decades of colonial rule under which
each unit of Africa was developed as a part of
an overall colonial economy and not as a viable
economic unit in itself. This is an enormous
handicap to many of the new governments of
Africa today.
For the multiplicity of stages of agriculture in
Africa, there are three general patterns of pro-
duction.
First there are those producers who employ
primitive implements and essentially produce sub-
sistence crops to feed the local farm communities.
The traditional agricultural methods used by these
farmers have been handed down from generation
to generation over centuries. In some coimtries
there are areas that never knew the plow until the
last several decades, and in many areas farmers
still use mattocks instead of animal-drawn plows.
In North Africa the principal crops grown for
consumption are winter cereals — wheat and bar-
ley — as well as olives for olive oil. At the other
end of the continent, in South Africa, crop em-
phasis is on siunmer cereals, such as maize and
kafir corn. In between these areas, in tropical
Africa, the major staple crops are cereals, starchy
foods, oil-bearing fruits, groundnuts, and rice.
Coffee, cocoa, and cotton are the three main cash
crops in tropical Africa, and these are grown by
small peasant producers principally for export.
A second group of producers is making vigorous
efforts to convert their operations from traditional
to modem agricultm-al methods. The size of these
April 16, 7962
641
fanning operations varies greatly, and they are
generally efforts which combine subsistence farm-
ing -with cash crops. Many of these producei"S
employ hired labor because of the size of their
plantings.
The third category consists of large-scale plan-
tations and farms using very modern agricultural
methods. These production methods are princi-
pally found in the more temperate regions of
Africa — in the north, in the south, and in the
eastern highlands. Production in these areas is
on a massive scale for the export market, and, in
many cases, production per manpower and unit
of land is as great or greater than that of the
United States or the Soviet Union. These meth-
ods of farming initially were introduced by Euro-
pean settlers, but they are being adopted today by
African governments in their efforts to develop
sound economies.
An important question for American farmers is
whether the African farmer, with improved agri-
cultural methods, is going to be competitive with
the American farmer. Tliis is a very complex
question, but with a few exceptions our agricul-
tural products and those of most of Africa, par-
ticularly tropical Africa, are complementary
instead of competitive. All indications show that
for many years to come we are going to get from
Africa substantial quantities of their tropical
crops, such as cocoa, coffee, and sisal, and that we
will export to Africa substantial quantities of our
crops. For example, there is the strong likelihood
that Africans will increase their consumption of
wheat, which is one major item that tropical
Africa has been getting from us in recent years.
Another important U.S. ex{iort to tropical Africa
is dairy products, which are in great demand be-
cause the tsetse fly prohibits livestock production
througliout a large area of central Africa.
Another factor to consider is population. As
improvements in public health, sanitation, and
medical facilities occur in Africa, there is good
reason to believe that a major increase in Africa's
population will take place over the next two dec-
ades. This rapid growth in Africa will create
strong pressures for increased food requirements,
and the products of improved agricultural tech-
niques will be urgently needed in the African coun-
tries themselves. As African economies grow
there will also be an increase in monetary income.
This factor, together with an expanding popula-
tion, will absorb whatever improved food produc-
tion takes place in the years immediately ahead.
On balance, then, it seems quite likely that the
complementary aspects of American and African
agi'iculture will characterize relations between the
two systems for some time to come.
Progress of Cooperative Movement
The cooperative aspects of African agriculture
impressed me gi-eatly on my visits to the African
Continent last year, and I think the progress of
the cooperative movement in Africa may be of
some interest to you. The cooperative approach
to agricultural production and marketing is espe-
cially important in underdeveloped areas, where
the individual is practically without capital
resources.
Progress in developing co-ops in Africa has
been slow and gradual but generally sound. There
is still much to be done before such organizations
achieve the same relative importance in Africa
that they have in the United Kingdom and West-
ern Europe, where the African movement gets its
inspiration. Needed most to further develop the
cooperative movement in Africa are time and
money to develop teclmical skills and good organi-
zations.
There is, however, great awareness in Africa of
the important role that co-ops can play in national
development, and most governments are encourag-
ing and supporting them, often with credit facili-
ties or credit guarantees. Their efforts are aided
by the fact that cooperation and communal effort
are basic characteristics of traditional African
society, and present-day co-ops are in a sense a
modern extension and adaptation of ancient ways
of life. Most African cooperatives are production
and mai'keting organizations, based on major agri-
cultural export crops. Some of the largest and
most successful cooperatives are concentrated in
East Africa and North Africa, but there are
other important cooperative activities elsewhere
throughout tlie continent.
The cooperative movement in Africa was ini-
tiated principally by white settler groups, who
account for most of the commercial export crop
cooperatives today. Current growth in co-ops,
however, is largely due to the efforts of indigenous
Africans. As they take over more and more re-
sponsibilities for their economies, they have turned
642
Department of Slate Bulletin
increasingly to cooperative methods to handle
their agricultural jDroduction and marketing.
In Uganda, in East Africa, the cooperative
movement is primarily concerned with marketing
and processing cotton and coffee, which form the
basis of its export trade. At the end of 1960
Uganda had 1,640 registered cooperative societies
with a membership of more than 210,000, and 29
estate cotTee factories were owned and operated
on a co-op basis by associations of African growers.
Uganda also has cooperatives concerned with
groundnuts, tobacco, milk, cattle, and fish.
Tanganyikan African cooperatives now market
virtually all African-grown mild coffee, a high
proportion of hard coffee, and at least half of the
total production of cotton. A number of financial-
ly successful Tanganyikan marketing coopera-
tives have invested in cotton-ginning plants as
well as in social projects — including the establish-
ment of Moshi College in that northeastern Tan-
ganyikan city near Mt. Kilimanjaro. Between
1948 and the end of 1959, registered co-op societies
in Tanganyika grew from 62 with 52,000 to 617
with 325,000 members.
In Kenya, too, most agricultural commodities
are handled by cooperatives, which numbered 576
in 1959. In this country the African Cooperative
Union of Kilimanjaro has a long history of de-
veloping coffee production by Africans and serves
as a model for other indigenous African co-ops.
In Noi"th Africa cooperatives play an important
role in the Timisian economy, and the Govern-
ment of Tunisia contemplates an even larger role
for them in the future. In Morocco the first co-ops
were established about 1920. Again here, the
Government looks to further cooperative efforts to
help modernize traditional agriculture in the
rural areas. In the Sudan there are 600 coopera-
tive societies, of which more than one- fourth are
agricultural, and the Government has established
a Department of Cooperation to help the co-op
movement gi-ow throughout the counti-y.
In recent years the United States has played
a modest but significant role in developing co-ops
in Africa, but many other countries also have made
major contributions to the growth of the coopera-
tive movement there. The United Kingdom
really gave impetus to the movement in Africa
following World War II, when it became official
Government policy to foster the growth of co-ops
throughout British Africa. Israel is another
country that has given strong support to coopera-
tive development. Israelis have played a large
part in assisting the growth of co-ops in West
Africa in particular.
U.S. Assistance in Development of Cooperatives
The U.S. Government today is actively en-
couraging the development of cooperatives in
Africa. Our assistance in this field is being
stepped up at the present time, and the Agency
for International Development only recently estab-
lished an office to help its regional bureaus with
cooperative matters.
I am very pleased that the National Farmers
Union has decided to join with the U.S. Govern-
ment in advancing our interest in the cooperative
movement in Africa. As our good friend from
Minnesota, Senator Hubert Humphrey, said re-
cently, "Today's efforts for international progress
are not limited to governmental action. ... As
a free society, the United States offers its skills
and help to others through the efforts of individ-
ual citizens and private groups. I believe we
should pause frequently to encourage nongovern-
mental programs for international progress and
understanding. . . ."
The contract you are now developing with the
Agency for Intei-national Development to provide
training and demonstrations for African coopera-
tive leaders and employees in two countries — one
in East Africa and the other in West Africa — is a
worthy endeavor on your part. This is a highly
desirable type of activity for American nongovern-
mental organizations, and I am very pleased that
you are taking this initiative in a very important
area of American interest.
Another important contribution of nongovern-
mental organizations to African agriculture is the
agricultural teaching being done in Africa by
American land-grant colleges. Michigan State
University has such a program in Nigeria, and
Oklahoma Stat« University has one in Ethiopia.
We also have four preliminary work contracts in
this field — two in Nigeria and one each in Tangan-
yika and Tunisia — and other countries have in-
dicated interest in such programs for the next
fiscal year.
Our governmental agricultural program in
Africa, of course, is also of major importance in
helping African countries boost their economies.
In fiscal year 1962, which ends on June 30, our
agricultural program for 24 African countries
April 16, J 962
643
covers 105 projects at a cost of approximately $25
million, plus the equivalent of $20 million in U.S.-
owned local currencies. These projects call for
280 U.S. technicians to provide training and
demonstrations in the 24 countries. In addition
nearly 600 participants from those coimtries are to
be trained outside Africa, with more than two-
thirds of them scheduled to come to the United
States.
Agricultural aid is only one segment of a new,
integrated economic assistance program by which
the U.S. Government is seeking to help the African
nations help themselves. We also have strong
interests in the development of such important
matters as water programs for irrigation and
power. Africa is rich in hydroelectric potential,
having 40 percent of the world's total, but less
than 1 percent is developed today. Our interest
and support of the Volta River project in Ghana -
has been widely reported, but we also are studying
the Nile Basin in Ethiopia and have other studies
under way in Sudan, Tunisia, Libya, and Somalia.
Our overall assistance program in Africa
strongly reflects our sincere interest in Africa's
social and economic progress, as well as in its
political and economic independence. We support
the three major aspirations of Africans — freedom,
dignity, and improved standards of living — be-
cause these are goals that have made our own
country strong. These are aspirations that point
the way to a strong and stable Africa, and stability
and strength in turn can lead to the kind of peace-
ful world in which we want our children to live.
Man cannot live by bread alone, however, as
you well know. Universal human values of the
spirit transcend the material aspects of life. Our
real challenge in Africa is whether we can respond
to the newly emerging countries of that continent
in a spirit of true brotherhood and friendship. In
meeting this challenge, we dare not fail. I thank
all of you for your splendid support of our efforts
in this tremendously important task.
Letters of Credence
Central African Republic
The newly appointed Ambassador of the Central
African Republic, Jean-Pierre Kombet, presented
his credentials to President Kennedy on March 30.
' For background, see Bulletin of Jan. 1, 1962, p. 30.
644
For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the
President's reply, see Department of State press
release 206 dated March 30.
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
The newly appointed Ambassador of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics, Anatoliy Fedorovich
Dobrynin, presented his credentials to President
Kennedy on March 30. For texts of tlie i\jnbas-
sador's remarks and the President's reply, see De-
partment of State press release 207 dated
March 30.
President Sends Congratulations
to Governor General of Ceylon
Following is the text of a message sent hy Presi-
dent Kennedy on March 21 to William Gopallaioa,
Governor General of Ceylon.
White House press release dated March 21
I congratulate you on your appointment as Gov-
ernor General of Ceylon. It is my sincere wish
and that of the people of the United States that
you enjoy every success. Your ambassadorship in
Washington did much to reinforce the traditional
bonds of friendship between our two countries.
May that friendship be strengthened still further
in the future. Please accept my warm personal
greetings and best wishes.
Sino-Soviet Bloc Military Aid to Cuba
Summarized by Department
Press release 195 dated March 27
The folloiving s^immary on Sino-Soviet bloc
military aid to Cuba is issued in response to nu-
merous requests for up-to-date information on this
subject.
For about a year and a half the Sino-Soviet
bloc has supplied Cuba with large-scale military
assistance. Bloc military deliveries— primarily
from the U.S.S.R. and Czechoslovakia — have in-
cluded a wide assortment of land armaments
ranging from small arms tlirough heavy tanks.
Bloc airci'aft supplied to Cuba include MIG jet
figliters, helicoptei-s, transports, and trainers.
Extensive military training has been pi'ovided
Department of Stale Bulletin
both in the bloc and in Cuba. Communist mili-
tary aid has turned the Cuban military establish-
ment into one of the most formidable in Latin
America, and it has introduced a militaiy cajja-
bility hitherto not present in any of the Latin
American countries of the Caribbean area. How-
ever, there is no evidence that the Soviet Union
has supplied Cuba with missiles or that missile
bases are under constiiiction in Cuba.
The Soviet Union at first moved cautiously in
responding to Cuban requests for military assist-
ance. Once imder way, however, the Cuban
buildup proceeded swiftly. Bloc support has
aided the Castro regime in consolidating its con-
trol over the Cuban people. For the past several
months the bloc's military aid program in Cuba
has been concerned primarily with training, as-
similating new equipment, and remolding the
Cuban military establislmient along bloc organi-
zational lines.
Background
Preliminary attempts to procure Soviet bloc
arms were initiated by the Cuban government as
early as 1959, but no firm military aid pacts were
concluded until the summer of 1960. During 1959
and early 1960, Cuban purchasing missions trav-
eled frequently to the bloc to investigate new
sources of supply. Discussions reportedly covered
a whole range of equipment from small arms to
modern jet aircraft. Mikoyan's [Anastas I. Miko-
yan, First Deputy Chairman of the U.S.S.R.]
visit to Cuba in February 1960 signaled the be-
ginning of a massive bloc trade and aid program
wliich gained momentum throughout 1960 as U.S.-
Cuban relations deteriorated.
Military negotiations with the U.S.S.E. and
Czechoslovakia in 1960 were followed up by a
well-publicized trip to Prague and Moscow by
Raul Castro, which probably was the occasion for
the conclusion of secret arms deals. By August,
Czech small arms were being issued by some Cuban
militia units, and in the autiunn the first major
shipments of Communist arms began arriving in
Cuba.
Scope of Bloc Military Aid
From the autumn of 1960 until the late summer
of 1961, bloc arms deliveries were made regularly
to Cuban ports. No financial information on the
bloc's arms deals with Cuba has been disclosed, but
it is estimated that on the order of $100 million
worth of equipment and teclinical services has been
provided. Moreover, several hundred Cuban mili-
tary personnel have received training, including
pilot training, in the bloc.
On January 5, 1962, during a military parade
celebrating the third anniversary of takeover by
the present regime, Cuba unveiled an array of
militaiy hardware indicative of deliveries up to
that time. Units equipped with medium and
heavy tanks, assault guns, truck-mounted rocket
launchers, artillery, antiaircraft weapons, and
mortars, as well as rifles and machineguns, were
featured prominently. A fly-by of MIG jet
fighters, including some high-performance MIG-
19's, was one of the highlights of the air display.
In the latter part of 1961 tlie focus of the bloc's
military aid to Cuba was on assimilation of new
equipment, intensive training, and completion of
the reorganization of Cuba's military establish-
ment. Recently, however, military shipments to
Cuba have resumed and for the first time have
included small naval vessels.
The capabilities of the Cuban ground forces
have increased steadily since the introduction of
bloc equipment and training in tlie autumn of
1960. The ground forces are estimated to num-
ber some 300,000. All units are equipped with
bloc small arms, and many have heavier equip-
ment as well. Bloc aid is strongly reflected in
Cuba's ground forces organization, which resem-
bles that of the East European satellites. Soviet
bloc arms aid has given the Cuban ground forces
an armored, artillery, antiaircraft,, and antitank
capability largely lacking in the past and un-
known to other Latin American countries of the
Caribbean area. Thousands of modern bloc small
arms have been delivered. Soviet bloc instructors
have been used extensively for training purposes,
and they serve as full-time advisers to some
individual units.
Following the takeover by the present regime,
the capabilities of the Cuban air force declined
sharply as a result of purges and defections of key
personnel. One of the major goals of the new
regime, however, was to acquire combat jet air-
craft, and most of the Cuban military trainees
who went to the bloc in the summer of 1960 were
air cadets. Their training has been one of the
April 76, 7962
645
most important tasks of the bloc's military air
program. Cuban pilots liave now returned to
Cuba, where they are continuing instruction on
MIG jet fighters which arrived last summer. The
bloc has also supplied helicopters, piston-engine
trainers, and small single-engine transports.
About a dozen ILi-14 twin-engine transports were
delivered this autumn for the Cuban civil airline.
No Soviet bombers are known to have been
delivered to Cuba.
During the first year and a half of the bloc's
military aid program, the Cuban navy did not
receive any significant assistance. Since the first
of the year, however, a number of Soviet patrol I
vessels and motor torpedo boats Iiave been
supplied.
Bloc Arms and Militaky Equipment SuppLiBaj to Cuba
Type of equipment
Estimated quantitu
MIG jet fighters
60-75
Medium and heavy tanks
1.50-250
Assault guns
50-100
Field artillery
500-1000
Antiaircraft artillery
500-1000
Mortars
500
Small arms
200,000
Patrol vessels
Some
Motor torpedo boats
Some
U.S. International Trade Policies
hy Philip H. I'rezise
Acting Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs ^
In 1928 merchandise exports of the United
States were about $5.2 billion. That was a year
of world prosperity, as measured at the time. It
was also before the massive obstacles to inter-
national trade and payments that were raised in
the next decade.
In 1932 our merchandise exports were valued
at $1.7 billion, down 67 percent from 1928. It
was the low year of the great depression. And
it was a time of widespread restrictions on world
trade, including the very high American tariff
levels established in the Smoot-Hawley tariff bill
of 1930.
This comparison suggests the two main factors
that normally bear on the vohmie of world com-
merce. One relates to levels of income around
the world. Tlie other is the presence, or rela-
tive absence, of serious and general impediments
to world trade, especially in the high-income
countries.
These are not really sejiarablo forces, of course.
Undue barriers to world trade have the effect of
' Address made before the California Agribusiness Con-
gress for World Trade at Fresno, Calif., on Mar. 10 (press
release 171 dated Mar. 15).
holding down world business activity and income.
Removal of such barriers tends to push up in-
come as well as trade.
Over the past 10 years, in any event, both forces
have been favorable, on the whole, to an expansion
of international trade. There has been a steady
growth in economic activity, particularly in the
industrial countries of North xVmerica, Western
Europe, and Japan. Total production in the free
world increased between 1950 and 1960 by more
than 40 percent.
At the same time, the major trading nations
have been cutting away at the great mass of trade
restrictions — tariffs, quotas, and exchange con-
trol — which were inherited from the depression
and which were made even more binding in many
cases during the earlj' postwar years. The rules of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
which is the international code of rules for the
conduct of trade among the participating nations,
have been very useful guidelines and benchmarks
in tliis dovoloi)nicnt. So have the articles gov-
erning the international payments system as
agreed to by the members of tlie International
Monetary Fund. "We have come a considerable
way toward reaching the basic aims of tlie GATT
646
Department of Stafe Bulletin
and the Fund in freeing up trade and payments.
The effect on world trade of developments dur-
ing the 1950's was salutary. Free-woi'ld trade in
1960 was about 80 percent more than it had been
a decade earlier.
U.S. Position in World Trade
The position of the United States in this world
trading system is a central one. "We account for
an estimated 15 percent of total free-world im-
ports and exports.^ In 1961 our nonmilitary ex-
ports were about $20 billion and our imports about
$14.5 billion. Although international trade makes
up a smaller proportion of our national output
than in many other countries, the absolute volume
of our purchases and sales from and to the rest
of the world makes our actions and decisions
crucial to the course of world commerce.
The ramifications of our choices in the trade
field can be very wide, for the political health of
a great many free-world countries is directly re-
lated to the ups and downs of international trade.
We could easily undo our efforts to strengthen the
political and defense structure of the free world if
we were to take the wrong directions in our trade
policies. I mention this only in passing, however,
for our economic interests alone argue strongly
for an American policy of leadership in expand-
ing world trade.
"We have consistently been a large net exporter
of goods to the world. In the early postwar years,
of course, it was easy to export, since the Amer-
ican economy came out of the war undamaged and
in a state of high productive efficiency. Rut our
overall export strength has not declined, despite
the remarkable industrial recovery and growth
in "Western Europe and Japan. Last year we ran
a surplus of about $5.4 billion of exports over im-
ports. In 19G0 we did roughly the same. After
making a discount for those exports financed by
the Government, our suqilus in 1960 and 1961 was
still a whopping $3 billion.
Through the 1950's exports increased faster
than imports and faster than total national out-
put. The proposition that we have priced our-
selves out of world markets fuids no support in
these figures. On the contrary, wherever our ag-
riculture and industry, taken as a whole, have a
fair chance to compete in foreign markets, we can
export.
" In 1960 it was 1.5.7 percent.
AptW 76, 7962
This is probably not news to Califomians.
Your State in 1960 ranked third in the Union as
an exporter of manufactured goods, with a total
value of $1.3 billion. The estimate is that Cali-
fornian agricultural exports were worth another
$500 million and that 12 percent of your farm
workers were producing for the export trade.
"Wages and costs in California have not lagged
behind the rest of the covmtry, as I understand it,
but California's ability to export its products has
not visibly diminished.
The fact is that we can with some confidence as-
sume that an increase in the volume of total world
trade will be accompanied by a larger American
export surplus. "We need a larger surplus to help
our balance of payments, where we have a chronic
deficit, and we need it to increase employment and
business activity at home. Our interest, in short,
is to use our position of leadership in the world
to reduce barriers to trade wherever and whenever
possible.
The European Common Market gives special
point and urgency to American decision-making
in the trade field.
"Wlien the major European currencies were
made convertible for current transactions in early
1958, with a resultant lifting of many quantitative
restrictions on imports, our trade with "Western
Europe skyrocketed. Between 1958 and 1960 our
exports to 17 "Western European countries rose by
38 percent — which, incidentally, was twice as fast
as the rate of increase achieved by other exporting
nations and which suggests something, perhaps,
about our competitiveness. In nonagricultural
goods taken alone, where the range of freer access
to the European market was greatest, our exports
went up by 44 percent in 1959 over 1958 and by
58 percent in 1960 over 1959.
Up until now we have been competing in "West-
ern Europe on the same terms as everyone else.
The market in France for our machinery exports
has been no more restricted than for German or
British machinery exports. Now, however, the
Common Market has begun to apply its tariffs
differentially and is moving steadily along toward
dismantling the tariffs that are operative among
its members. By the end of the decade, and j^rob-
ably sooner, there will be no tariffs on industrial
products within the Common Market but there
will be a tarilf, of indeterminate height, against
the rest of the world. At that point, unless we
647
do sometliing soon about it, we may find ourselves
competing not on equal terms but on distinctly un-
equal terms as against producers within the Com-
mon Market.
I will not go further into the subject of the
Common Market, since it is to be covered fully in
a few moments, except to say what is perfectly
plain — that its development will surely add a new
dimension to the world trading scene.
Proposed Trade Expansion Act
These, then, are among the considerations in the
background of planning American trade policies
for the years immediately ahead. We need to
build on our export surplus. And the appearance
on the world trading scene of a thriving, expand-
ing economic imit that may shortly include most
of the industrial power of Western Europe pre-
sents a major challenge and opportunity for our
trade.
The old Keciprocal Trade Agreements Act,
which Cordell Hull fathered in 1934, expires in
June. This act, and the policies it represented,
have served our national interests well. Without
it as the basis for the exercise of American lead-
ership in international trade, the world by now
imdoubtedly would have become organized into a
series of tight little mutually exclusive trading
blocs. The volume of international trade would
be much smaller than it is, and prospects for
forward progress in trade would be dim indeed.
Over the years, however, the Trade Agreements
Act accimiulated numerous barnacles and disa-
bilities. A mere renewal of the law in its present
form would not provide the elements essential to a
vigorous American initiative in world trade. We
have just concluded in Geneva a prolonged and
difficult negotiation under the expiring act.^ Ev-
erybody who was involved agrees that we cannot
hope to cope with the trade problems of the
future under the limitations that we were subject
to at Geneva.
The President has asked the Congress for basi-
cally new legislation in the proposed Ti-nde Ex-
pansion Act of 1962.* His proposal would greatly
expand our ability to negotiate tariff adjustments,
particularly with the European Common Market.
° l<'or l)!U'kf;rouiul. see Bulletin of Apr. 2, 1002, p. 561.
* For text of the rresidont's lucssaKe to Congress, see
ibid., Feb. 12, 1002, p. 2:^1 ; for a suininary of the hill
(II.R. 9900) , see ibid., Feb. 20, l'.M>2, p. 343.
It would allow us to depart from item-by -item
bargaining over hvmdreds of small portions of
trade and to go to across-the-board negotiations
on categories of goods whenever that procedure
promised to be advantageous to us. It would in-
clude modernized safeguard provisions to deal
with problems of adjustment to imports.
Under the proposed law the President would be
authorized to negotiate with any of our trading
partners for tariff reductions of up to 50 percent.
A special section of the law would empower him
to bargain with the Common Market for the re-
duction, or elimination, of tariffs on categories of
goods of which the United States and the Common
Market are dominant suppliers to the world. He
could negotiate with the Common Market for the
reduction or elimination of tariffs on a common
list of agricultural commodities, without the dom-
inant-supplier limitation. He would be allowed
to reduce or give up our nuisance tariffs, that is,
those amounting to 5 percent or less ad valorem.
And he would be able to reduce or eliminate tar-
iff's on certain tropical forestry and agricultural
products on condition that the Common Market
take similar action. Our tariff cuts under the
main authorities of the bill would be staged over
a 5-year period. All reductions by ourselves
would be extended to all other free-world coun-
tries on the basis of the most-favored-nation
principle. Similarly, other countries in GATT
would, under the rules of that agreement, extend
their reductions to other GATT countries.
The new law would provide authority to nego-
tiate. It would not require negotiations on any
particular article or articles. In fact the bill ex-
plicitly provides for reserving items from tariff
bargaining. It would continue the procedure of
referring proposed negotiating lists to the Tariff
Commission for advice on the probable economic
effects of tariff reductions, but it prescribes new
criteria to guide the Commission. It retains the
national security clause of the old act, permitting
the President to take any action to adjust imports
that might impair national security.
There is a new approach to the import adjust-
ment problem in the form of provisions for assist-
ance to companies or workers whose interests are
found to be harmed by import competition as a
result of tariff reductions. Companies would be
able to get financial assistance, tax relief, and tech-
nical assistance. Workers would be eligible for
648
Department of State Bulletin
extended unemployment insurance, retraining,
and relocation expense payments.
Tariff relief of the familiar escape-clause kind
would still be available for industries adversely
affected by imports, when adjustment assistance
proved to be inadequate or mappropriate. The
bill labels this as "extraordinary" relief in recog-
nition of the fact that withdrawals of tariff con-
cessions are not to be undertaken liglitly in a
world in which we ourselves want international
conmiitments to mean what they say.
Relation to Political Factors
That, in summary, is the shape of our proposed
new trade program and policy. It carries over the
experience gained in 26 years of experience with
the Trade Agreements Act. It also strikes out
along new lines in order to deal with the problems
of the 1060's.
Hearings on the bill have just begun before the
"Ways and Means Committee of the House.^ It
would be premature and inappropriate to predict
how the Congress will deal with the President's
proposal. The prospect, in any case, is that there
will be a great debate in the Congress and through-
out the country and that tliis will serve to clarify
the issues and to inform our people about the
stake our country has in world trade.
If the Congress provides the President with
new negotiating authority, the probability is that
we would begin preparations for a tariff confer-
ence under GATT auspices possibly to begin
sometime in 1963. The aim would be to convene
all the nations committed to the GATT in a large-
scale multilateral negotiation to bring down trade
barriers throughout the free world.
There are a great many reasons why we should
take the lead and the initiative in this. I have
touched on some of the key economic points. It
is evident also that our political relationships with
Western Europe and our position in the less de-
veloped and uncommitted areas of Asia, Africa,
and Latin America will be affected by our action
or lack of action on trade matters. This could
be the opportunity to knit the free- world economy
and thereby its policy more closely together for
mutual benefit. If we were to succeed, the fiirther
consequences for the historic confrontation be-
tween our system of government and politics and
the Soviet system would be far-reaching and fa-
vorable. These issues are not modest or narrow
ones. Trade policy this year is in the center ring.
It well deserves the attention that groups like
yours are giving it.
President Makes Decisions
in Four Import Duty Cases
The Wliite House announced on March 19 the
President's decisions in four cases involving recom-
mendations of the Tariff Commission. In two
instances, concerning imports of woven carpets
and sheet glass, the President accepted the Com-
mission recommendations and signed proclama-
tions increasing applicable duties, effective after
the close of business April 18.^ In two cases,
affecting imports of ceramic tile and baseball
gloves and mitts, the President decided that the
evidence presented did not clearly sustain conclu-
sions that serious injury had resulted from import
competition.
The effect of the President's decisions will be:
(a) To increase the duty on Wilton and velvet
(or tapestry) carpet imports from 21 percent to
40 percent ad valorem ;
(b) To increase duties on imports of cylinder,
crown, and sheet glass to amounts ranging from
1.3 cents to 3.5 cents per pound depending on size
and thickness;
(c) To hold the existing duty level on imports
of ceramic mosaic tile ; and
(d) To retain the present 15-percent ad valorem
duty on baseball gloves and mitts.
In all four cases the President has asked the
Tariff Commission to provide data supplementing
its original reports.
The President's decisions were reported in let-
ters ^ transmitted on March 19 to the chairmen of
the Committee on Finance of the Senate and the
Committee on Ways and Means of the House of
Representatives.
The Tariff Commission conclusion — and the
President's concurring judgment — that imports of
° For a statement made by Under Secretary Ball on
Mar. 13, see ibid., Apr. 9, 1962, p. 597.
^ For texts of Proclamations 3454 and 3455, see 27 Fed.
Reg. 27S9 and 2791. On Mar. 27 the President issued
Proclamation 3458 delaying the effective date of these
proclamations until June 17 ; for text, see 27 Fed. Reg.
3101.
" For test, see White House press release dated Mar. 19.
April 16, 7962
649
Wilton and velvet (or tapestry) carpets were in-
juring the domestic industry producing like prod-
ucts was based on the record of general decline in
production since 1955, in a period when imports
increased significantly. Industiy earnings and
worker man-hours also declined in the same
period.
Acceptance of the Tariff Commission recommen-
dation for relief to the domestic sheet-glass indus-
try was based on evidence that importers enjoy
a price advantage that has occasioned a significant
rise in imports since 1955, while U.S. production
has dropped. Domestic industry profits have
trended downward, and losses were registered in
1960. Worker man-hours have also declined, with
further adverse effect on communities in areas
burdened with labor surpluses.
The President did not increase the duty on
imports of ceramic mosaic tile because it did not
appear that the industry had sustained serious
injury. Although imports have increased sub-
stantially since 1955, domestic production has not
declined. The level of employment in domestic
plants has also remained constant.
In the baseball-glove and -mitt case the Tariff
Commission did not conclude that the domestic in-
dustry had been injured but rather that a threat
of injury exists. In the President's judgment this
finding, viewed in the light of the data presented,
did not justify the duty increase requested by
the domestic industi-y, which, despite very large
increases in imports in recent years, has main-
tained relatively stable levels of employment and
of total annual sales.
An additional consideration in both the ceramic-
tile and baseball -glove cases was the fact that
Japanese manufacturers, who are the principal
competitors from abroad, have established volun-
tary quotas on exports to the United States of
these products.
Scientists Named for Joint Study
of U.S.-Mexico Salinity Problem
Department Announcement
Press release 193 dated March 20
The Presidents of the IJnlled States and Mexico
announced on March IG^ that the International
' Bulletin of Apr. 2, 1962, p. 542.
650
Boundary and Water Commission would appoint
a team of highly qualified United States and Mexi-
can water and soil scientists and engineers to make
an objective analysis of the lower Colorado River
salinity problem. The recommendation of this
team would be an essential part of the urgent
study of the problem now being carried out by the
Commission.
After consultation with the President's Special
Assistant for Science and Technology, Jerome B.
Wiesner, and on the recommendation of the De-
partment of the Interior, the United States Com-
missioner on the International Boundary and
Water Commission has appointed the following
scientists as advisers to him to participate in the
joint study with Mexico:
Charles A. Bower, Director, United States Salinity Lab-
oratory, Agricultural Research Service, Department of
Agriculture, Riverside, Calif.
Russell H. Brown, Chief, Research Section, Ground Water
Branch, Division of Water Resources, United States
Geological Surve.v, Department of the Interior
John Harshbarger, Professor of Geology, University of
Arizona
Arthur F. Pillsbury, Professor of Irrigation and Irriga-
tion Engineering, University of California at Los
Angeles
Stephen Reynolds, State Engineer of New Mexico
These scientists will meet at Yuma, Ariz., on
March 27 with the United States Commissioner,
the Officer in Charge of Mexican Affairs of the
Department of State, and members of the Com-
missioner's staff to obtain background information
on the salinity problem. The Mexican scientists
who are to work with the United States scientists
on the joint study are scheduled to meet with the
Mexican Commissioner on March 28 at Ciudad
Juarez, Mexico, for similar purposes. The Mexi-
can and United States scientists will meet together
on March ?>0 to commence their study. They will
be assisted bj' Roger Revelle, Science Adviser to
the Secretary of the Interior.
The Presidents, in their announcement of March
10, stated that the objective of the two Govern-
ments was, without prejudice to the legal riglits of
either country, to agree upon and ]iut into opera-
tion remedial measures M-itliin the shortest i)ossil)le
l^eriod of time. The Department of State believes
that the scientists of the two countries who will
convene on Marcli ."^O can cont ribute immeasurably
to the realization of this objective.
Deporfmenf of Sfafe Bu/fefin
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings'
Adjourned During March 1962
United Nations Wheat Conference Geneva Jan. 31-Mar. 10
U.N. Economic Commission for Africa: 4th Session Addis Ababa Feb. 19- Mar. 3
GATT Contracting Parties: Council of Representatives Geneva Feb. 22-28
ILO Governing Body: 151st Session (and its committees) .... Geneva Feb. 26- Mar. 9
IAE.\ Board of Governors Vienna Feb. 27-Mar. 5
OECD Industries Committee Paris Mar. 1-3
lA-ECOSOC: 1st Meeting of National Directors of Immigration San Salvador Mar. 1-9
Customs and Tourism of Central America, Mexico, and tlie
United States.
Caribbean Organization: Meeting of Representatives of Member Georgetown, British Guiana. . Mar. 5-8
Governments.
Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences: 7th Meeting of San Jose Mar. 5-9
Technical .'Vdvisory Council.
GATT Working Party on Apphcation of GATT to International Geneva Mar. 5-9
Trade in Television Programs.
U.N. ECOSOC Committee for Industrial Development: 2d Session . New York Mar. 5-16
ICAO Panel on Origin and Destination Statistics: 4th Session . . Montreal Mar. 5-17
UNESCO/ECLA/OAS/ILO/FAO Conference on Education and Santiago Mar. 5-19
Economic and Social Development in Latin America.
U.N. Scientific Committee on Effects of Atomic Radiation: 11th New York Mar. 5-23
Session.
U.N. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East: 18th Tokyo Mar. 6-19
Session.
Intern.ational Lead and Zinc Study Group: Special Working Group . Geneva Mar. 8-16
International Lead and Zinc Study Group: Statistical Committee. Geneva Mar. 12-13
OECD Oil Committee Paris Mar. 12-14
CENTO Liaison Committee Rawalpindi Mar. 12-15
GATT Panel of E.xperts on Consular Formalities Geneva Mar. 12-16
U.N. ECE Working Party on Construction of Vehicles Geneva Mar. 12-16
ITU CCIR Study Group'lV (Space Systems) Washington Mar. 12-23
ITU CCIR Study Group VIII (International Monitoring) .... Washington Mar. 12-23
ICAO Air Traffic Control Panel Montreal Mar. 12-24
Caribbean Organization Council: 2d Meeting Georgetown, British Guiana . Mar. 13-16
OECD Agriculture Committee Paris Mar. 14-15
WMO Regional Association I (Africa): 3d Session Addis Ababa Mar. 14-31
NATO Petroleum Planning Committee Paris Mar. 15-16
International Lead and Zinc Study Group: 5th Session Geneva Mar. 15-21
International Seminar in Clinical and Public Health Lahore Mar. 17-20
OECD Fisheries Committee Paris Mar. 19-20
International Sugar Council: 11th Session London Mar. 19-20
U.N. ECE Coal Committee (and working parties) Geneva Mar. 19-23
U.N. Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space New York Mar. 19-29
UNESCO Intergovernmental Advisory Committee on the Extension Santiago Mar. 20-23
of Primary Education in Latin America: 4th Meeting.
U.N. ECE Steel Committee: 27th Session (and working parties) . Geneva Mar. 20-27
U.N. ECLA Committee of the Whole: Extraordinary Meeting . . Santiago Mar. 21 (1 day)
OECD Development Assistance Committee Paris Mar. 21-22
CENTO Civil Defense Experts Rawalpindi Mar. 21-24
UNESCO Conference of Ministers of Education of Africa .... Paris Mar. 26-30
OECD Nonferrous Metals Committee Paris Mar. 27-28
FAO European Commission for the Control of Foot-and-Mouth Rome Mar. 27-29
Disease: 9th Session.
1 Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Mar. 30, 1962. Following is a list of abbreviations: CCIR,
Comit6 consultatif international des radio communications; CENTO, Central Treaty Organization; ECE, Economic
Commission for Europe; ECL.\, Economic Commission for Latin America; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council;
FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IAEA, International Atomic
Energy Agency; lA-ECOSOC, Inter-American Economic and Social Council; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organi-
zation; ICEM, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO,
Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; NATO, North
Atlantic Treaty Organization; OAS, Organization of American States; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organiza-
tion; WMO, World Meteorological Organization.
April 16, 1962 651
Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings — Continued
Adjourned During March 1962 — Continued
OECD Committee on Restrictive Business Practices: Advisory Paris.
Committee.
OECD Committee on Restrictive Business Practices: Bureau . .
International Union for the Protection of Industrial Property:
Permanent Bureau of the Consultative Committee.
ICE M Subcommittee on Budget and Finance: 5th Session. . . . Geneva.
Mar. 27-28
Paris Mar. 29-30
Geneva Mar. 29-31
Mar. 29-31
U.N. ECE Meeting on Effective Demand for Housing Geneva Mar. 29-31
In Session as of March 31, 1962
Conference on Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests (not Geneva Oct. 31, 1958
meeting).
5th Round of GATT Tarifif Negotiations
International Conference for the Settlement of the Laotian Ques-
tion.
United Nations General Assembly: 16th Session (recessed February
23).
OAS Group of Experts on Compensatory Financing Washington Jan. 5-
Geneva Sept. 1, 1960-
Geneva May 16, 1961-
New York Sept. 19, 1961-
Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee Geneva .
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Human Rights: 18th Session ..."
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Status of Women: 16th Session . .
ICAO Subcommittee on the Legal Status of Aircraft: 4th Meeting .
IMCO International Conference on the Prevention of Pollution of
the Sea by Oil.
WMO Commission for Synoptic Meteorology: 3d Session ....
New York
New York
Montreal .
London. .
Mar. 14-
Mar. 19-
Mar. 19-
Mar. 26-
Mar. 26-
Washington Mar. 26-
lAEA Director General
Visits Washington
The Department of State announced on March
28 (press release 199) that Sigvard Ekliind of
Sweden, Director General of the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), would arrive
at Washington on March 28.
Dr. Eklund will be received b_y President Ken-
nedy at the "White House on March 30. He will
be guest of honor at luncheons given by Secretary
Rusk on March 29 and by the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy on March 30, and at a reception
by the Chairman of the Atomic Eneray Commis-
sion, Glerni Seaborg, and the Under Secretary of
State, George McGhee, on March 30. He will
also be received by the Ambassador of Sweden.
He will meet Avith officers in the Department
of State and the Atomic Energy Commission to
discuss questions of mutual interest to the Agency
and the United Stales. During his stay in "Wash-
ington, he will sign on behalf of the IAEA an
agreement between the United States and the
Agency under which the Agency's safeguards sj's-
tem would bo applied to four United States
nuclear reactors.
Dr. Eklund will leave for Slcxico City on
April 2 to attend the opening sessions of the
Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission
meeting and will later visit the Argonne National
Laboratory near Chicago and atomic energy facili-
ties at Oak Kidge, Tenn.
TREATY INFORMATION
U.S. and U.S.S.R. Sign Agreement
on Exchanges for 1962-63
STATEMENT BY CHARLES E. BOHLEN>
It is a pleasure to sign the new U.S. -U.S.S.R.
agreement on exclianges in the scientific, technical,
educational, cultural, and other fields for the years
1962 and 19G3. This agreement moves forward
the important program of American-Soviet ex-
changes which was inaugurated by the first agree-
ment, signed in January 1958,= and continued, for
an additional 2-year period, in November 1959.^
' Made nt the signing ceremony at W.ishinKton on Mar.
8 (pre.ss release 152). Mr. Bohlen is Special Assistant to
the Secretary of State.
' For te.xt, see Bulletin of Feb. 17, 1958, p. 343.
' For text, see tftid., Dec. 28, 1959, p. 951.
652
Department of State Bulletin
Negotiations leading to the present agreement
took place in Washington from January 31st
imtil today. Wo feel that this agreement, based
on the principle of reciprocity and mutual ad-
vantages in all fields, has laid the basis for bal-
anced increased exchanges during the next 2 years.
The length of the negotiations in themselves re-
veals the complexity of the problems considered,
as well as differences between the two countries on
the methods of carrying out the various exchanges.
The negotiations were serious and businesslike,
and we feel that it is a matter of mutual congrat-
ulations that they have come to a successful con-
clusion. Compromises were found to bridge the
differences of approaches, and we consider that
the present agreement represents a satisfactory
coordination of these differences. We also believe
that the present agreement represents a measure
of progress over the last U.S.-Soviet exchange
agreem.ent, and we look forward, in subsequent
agreements, to a continuance of this progress.
Negotiations held at the same time led to agree-
ments between the National Academy of Sciences
and the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., as
well as between the American Council of Learned
Societies and the Academy of Sciences of the
U.S.S.R., providing for the further broadening
of contacts between American and Soviet sci-
entists and scholars in 1962-1963.
It should be noted that the agreement between
the National Academy of Sciences and the Soviet
Academy has been initialed by the respective ne-
gotiators and is subject to the approval of the
governing bodies of both academies.
The President and the Secretary of State have
supported the usefulness of a mutually advan-
tageous exchanges program with the Soviet Union.
We look forward to another 2 years of useful ex-
changes with the Soviet Union. All of us hope
that the increased program of exchanges, includ-
ing a broader flow of communication, will
contribute to a better mutual understanding of
outstanding problems and to a lessening of inter-
national tension.
TEXT OF JOINT COMMUNIQUE*
The United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics have signed today, March 8, 1962,
an Agreement on Exchanges In the Scientific, Technical,
Educational, Cultural and other Fields for 19G2-19C3.
'Released on Mar. 8 (press release 151) ; press release
151 also included the text of the agreement.
During the course of the negotiations which led to the
Agreement, the fulfillment of the previous agreement for
exchanges in 1960-1961, signed in Moscow on November
21, 1959, was reviewed and was recognized to be mu-
tually beneficial and useful.
The Agreement was signed by Ambassador Charles E.
Bohlen, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, for
the United States, and by S. K. Romanovsky, Deputy
Chairman of the State Committee of the Council of Min-
isters of the U.S.S.R. for Cultural Relations with For-
eign Countries, for the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics. The Agreement entered into force upon signature
with effect from January 1, 1962 and is the third in a
series of two-year exchanges agreements between the two
countries. The first of these was signed in Washington
on January 27, 1958.
The Agreement provides for exchanges in the fields of
science, technology, construction, trade, agriculture, pub-
lic health and medical science, performing arts, publica-
tions, exhibitions, motion pictures, radio and television,
culture and the professions, and athletics. The Parties
also agreed to encourage visits of members of Congress
of the United States and deputies of the Supreme Soviet
of the U.S.S.R., as well as visits of other governmental
and social groups, and tourism.
At the same time. Agreements were negotiated between
the National Academy of Sciences of the United States
and the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., as well as
between the American Council of Learned Societies and
the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., providing for
the further broadening of contacts between American and
Soviet scientists and scholars in 1962-1963. In the field
of peaceful uses of atomic energy, it is contemplated that
specific proposals for exchanges will be developed between
the United States Atomic Energy Commission and the
State Committee of the Council of Ministers of the
U.S.S.R. for the Utilization of Atomic Energy.
At the signing the representatives of both sides ex-
pressed the hope that the further development of ex-
changes and contacts between the United States and the
Soviet Union will contribute to the betterment of mutual
understanding and to the broadening of cooperation be-
tween the people of the two countries.
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Automotive Traffic
Convention on road traffic, with annexes. Done at Geneva
September 19, 1&19. Entered into force March 26, 1952.
TIAS 2487.
Ratification deposited: India (with a declaration),
March 9, 1962.
Aviation
Convention on international civil aviation. Done at
Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force April 4,
1947. TIAS 1.591.
Adherence deposited: Upper Volta, March 21, 1962.
International air services transit agreement. Done at
Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force for the
United States February 8, 1W5. 59 Stat. 1693.
AprW 16, 7962
653
Notification that it considers itself bound: Niger, March
14, 1962.
Protocol relating to amendment of article 50(a) of the
Convention on International Civil Aviation to increase
membership of the Council from 21 to 27. Approved
by the ICAO Assembly at Montreal June 21, 1961.
Enters into force upon deposit of the 56th instrument
of ratification.
Ratifications deposited: Australia, January 19, 1962;
Belgium, February 15, 1902; Cameroon, November 14,
1961 ; Canada, October 17, 1901 : Dominican Republic,
October 24, 1901; Finland, September 18, 1961;
Guinea, August 21, 1901 ; India, December 18, 1961 ;
Indonesia, July 28, 1961 ; Israel, February 12, 1962 ;
Ivory Coast, November 14, 1901 ; Jordan, July 27,
1961 ; Korea, February 10, 1962 ; Malaya, October 3,
1961 ; Mali, July 12, 1961 ; Nicaragua, November 17,
1961 ; Niger, September 14, 1961 ; Norway, October
10, 1961; South Africa, February 13, 1002; Sweden,
December 28, 1961 ; Thailand, January 17, 1962 ;
Tunisia, December 27, 1061 ; United Arab Republic,
February 27, 1902 ; United Kingdom, January 4, 1962 ;
United States, March 23, 1062 ; Venezuela, February
6, 1062.
Finance
Articles of agreement of the International Finance Cor-
poration. Done at Washington May 25, 1955. Entered
into force July 20, 1956. TIAS 3620.
Signature and acceptance: Liberia, March 28, 1962.
Articles of agreement of the International Monetary
Fund. Opened for signature at Washington December
27, 1045. Entered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS
1501.
Signature and acceptance: Liberia, March 28, 1962.
Articles of agreement of the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development. Opened for signa-
ture at Washington December 27, 1945. Entered into
force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1502.
Signature and acceptance: Liberia, March 28, 1962.
Articles of agreement of the International Development
Association. Done at Washington January 20, 1960.
Entered into force September 24, 1960. TIAS 4007.
Signature and acceptance: Liberia, March 28, 1902.
Acceptance deposited: Greece, January 9, 1962.
Oil Pollution
International convention for the prevention of pollution
of the sea by oil, with annexes. Done at London May
12, 1954. Entered into force for the United States
December 8, 1961.
Acceptance deposited: Iceland, February 23, 1962.
Slavery
Slavery convention signed at Geneva September 25, 1926,
as amended (TIAS 3532). Entered into force March
9, 1927; for the United States March 21, 1929. 46
Stat. 2183.
Notification received that it considers itself hound:
Cameroon, March 7, 1902.
Sugar
International sugar agreement, 1958. Done at London
December 1, 1058. Entered into force January 1, 1050;
for the United States October 0, 1959. TIAS 4389.
Ratification deposited: Italy, February 16, 1902.
BILATERAL
Brazil
Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agree-
ment of December 31, 1956, as corrected and amended
(TIAS 3725, 3804, 4074, 4144, 4183, 4239, 4311, 4039,
4644, and 4775). Effected by exchange of notes at Rio
de Janeiro February 26, 1902. Entered into force
February 26, 1902.
Iceland
Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of
1954, as amended (68 Stat. 4.55; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709),
with memorandum of understanding. Signed at Reyk-
javik March 10, 1962. Entered into force March 16,
1962.
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: March 26-April 1
Press releases may be obtained from the Office of
News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.
Releases appearing in this issue of the Bulletin
which were issued prior to March 26 are Nos. 151
and 152 of March 8 ; 170 and 171 of March 15 ; and
177 of March 19.
No. Date Subject
*187 3/26 U.S. participation in international con-
ferences.
tl88 3/26 McGhee: '"Strategy of American For-
eign Policy."
*189 3/26 Rusk : interview on BBC.
tl90 3/26 McGhee: "Mineral Resources and the
World of the 1960's."
191 3/26 Ball : "The U.N. and the Real World."
tl92 3/20 Cleveland : WMO Commission for Syn-
optic Meteorology.
193 3/26 Science advisers appointed to U.S.
Commissioner, U.S. -Mexico Bound-
ary and Water Commission.
194 3/27 Rusk : Geneva disarmament conference
(revised).
Sino-Soviet bloc military aid to Cuba.
Ball : interview on "Prospects of Man-
kind."
Post of Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Atlantic .Affairs established.
Conference on educational development
in Latin America.
IAEA Director General to visit Wash-
ington (rewrite).
I'rogram for visit of President of
Brazil.
Delegation to meeting of Asian minis-
ters of education.
13th Foreign Service Staff review
panels.
Williams : "Change and Challenge in
Africa."
Cultural exchange (Japan).
Butterworlli. Dowling. and .Mrs. Willis
sworn in as career ambassadors (bi-
ographic details).
206 3/30 Central ^Vfricau Republic credentials
( rewrite ) .
207 3/30 U.S.S.K. credentials (rewrite).
t208 3/30 U.S. agrees to international inspection
of four atouiic reactors.
•209 3/30 Cleveland : postage stamp commemo-
rating malaria eradication campaign.
•Not printed.
tHeld for a later issue of the Buluetin.
195
•196
3/27
3/27
tl97
3/28
*198
3/28
199
3/28
•200
3/28
t201
3/29
•202
3/29
1203
3/29
•204
•205
3/30
3/30
654
Department of State Bulletin
April 16, 1962 I n
Africa. The Role of Agriculture In the Develop-
ment of Africa (Williams) 639
Agriculture. The Role of Agriculture in the De-
velopment of Africa (Williams) 639
Atomic Energy
IAEA Director General Visits Wasliington . . . 652
President Repeats U.S. Desire for Effective Test
Ban Treaty (Kennedy) • . . . . 624
Central African Republic. Letters of Credence
(Kombet) &14
Ceylon. Pi-esident Sends Congratulations to Gov-
ernor General of Ceylon (Kennedy) . . • . . 644
Communism. American Strategy on the World
Scene (Rostow) 625
Cuba. Sino-Soviet Bloc Military Aid to Cuba Sum-
marized by Department 644
Disarmament. U.S. Proposes Patterns for Future
Work of Disarmament Conference (Rusk) . . 618
Economic Affairs
American Strategy on the World Scene (Rostow) . 625
President Makes Decisions in Four Imjwrt Duty
Cases 649
U.S. International Trade Policies (Trezise) . . . 646
Educational and Cultural Affairs
The Role of the University in the Building of a
Flexible World Order (Kennedy) 615
U.S. and U.S.S.R. Sign Agreement on Exchanges
for 1962-63 652
Foreign Aid. American Strategy on the World
Scene (Rostow) 625
Germany. U.S. and U.S.S.R. Discuss German Prob-
lem and Related Questions (text of joint state-
ment) 625
International Information. U.S. and U.S.S.R. Sign
Agreement on Exchanges for 1962-63 .... 652
International Organizations and Conferences
Calendar of International Conferences and Meet-
ings 651
IAEA Director General Visits Washington . . . 652
ex Vol. XLVI, No. 1190
U.S. Proposes Patterns for Future Work of Dis-
armament Conference (Rusk) 618
Mexico. Scieutists Named for Joint Study of U.S.-
Mexico Salinity Problem gso
Military Affairs. Sino-Soviet Bloc Military Aid to
Cuba Summarized by Department 644
Presidential Documents
President of Republic of Togo Visits United States . 638
President Repeats U.S. Desire for Effective Test
Ban Treaty 624
President Sends Congratulations to Governor Gen-
eral of Ceylon (544.
The Role of the University in the Building of a
Flexible World Order 615
Togo. President of Republic of Togo Visits United
States (text of joint communique) 638
Treaty Information
Current Actions 653
U.S. and U.S.S.R. Sign Agreement on Exchanges
for 1962-63 652
U.S.S.R.
Letters of Credence (Dobrynin) 644
Sino-Soviet Bloc Military Aid to Cuba Summarized
by Department 644
U.S. and U.S.S.R. Discuss German Problem and Re-
lated Questions (text of joint statement) . . . 625
U.S. and U.S.S.R. Sign Agreement on Exchanges
for 1962-63 652
U.S. Proposes Patterns for Future Work of Dis-
armament Conference (Rusk) 618
United Nations. The United Nations and the Real
World (Ball) 632
Name Index
Ball, George W 632
Bohlen, Charles E [ 652
Dobrynin, AnatoUy Fedorovich (544
Kennedy, President 615,624,638,644
Kombet, Jean-Pierre 644
Olympio, Sylvanus 638
Rostow, Walt W .' . 625
Rusk, Secretary 618
Trezise, Philip H 646
Williams, G. Mennen 639
U.S GOVERNMEHl PRINTING OFFICE. 1962
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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES
Diplomatic Papers
1943, CHINA
Department
of
State
The Department of State recently released a volume of documents
on relations of the United States with China for the year 1943. Tliis
is a continuation of a volume covering the year 1942, issued in 1956.
The volume is concerned primarily with diplomatic activities within
the responsibility of the Department of State.
The contents include a wide range of subject matter. Topics dealt
with concern CMna's military position and participation in the war
with Japan, American military assistance to China, political condi-
tions there as affected by Soviet and Chinese Communist policies,
financial relations and lend-lease aid, efforts to open up a new supply
route to Cliina from outside, cultural relations, repeal of Cliinese
exclusion laws by the United States, interest of th& United States in
Chinese postwar planning, and numerous otlier subjects. The volume
contains 893 pages, exclusive of preface and index.
Publication 6459 Price: $4.00
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Please send me copies of Foreign Relations of the United States,
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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
«S»'
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FICIAL
:ekly record
Boston Public Library
Superintendent of Documents
Vol. XLVI, No. 1191 April 23, 1962
MAY 8 1962
THE FOREIGN AID PlR^S^M'^'k FISCAL YEAR
1963 • Statement by Secretary Rusk 659
STRATEGY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY • by
Under Secretary McGhee 678
A BALANCE SHEET ON ASIA • by Chester Bowles ... 674
U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL REJECTS CUBAN CALL
FOR OPINION OF WORLD COURT ON OAS
ACTION • Statements by Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson
and Text of Draft Resolution 684
THE DEVELOPING ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP • by
Under Secretary Ball 666
IITED STATES
REIGN POLICY
For index see inside back cover
THE DEPARTIVIENT OF STATE
Vol. XLVI, No. 1191 • Publication 7365
April 23, 1962
'^O^iai'j
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington 28, D.O.
Pkice:
62 issues, domestic $8.C0, (orelRn $12.26
Single copy, 25 cents
Use of funds for printing of this publica-
tion approved by the Director of the Bureau
of the Budget (January 10, 1861).
Note: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and Items contained heroin may
be reprinted. Citation of the Department
or State Bulletin os the source will be
appreciated. The Bulletin Is indexed In the
Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.
The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the
Office of Public Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public
and interested agencies of the
Government tcith information on
developments in tlie field of foreign
relations and on tlie work of the
Department of State and tlie Foreign
Service. The BULLETIN includes se-
lected press releases on foreign policy,
issued by the White House and the
Department, and statements and ad-
dresses made by the President and by
the Secretary of State and other
officers of the Department, as well as
special articles on various phases of
international affairs antl tlie func-
tions of the Department. Informa-
tion is included concerning treaties
and international agreements to
tvhich the United States is or may
become a party and treaties of gen-
eral internatiotuil interest.
Publications of the Department,
United Nations documents, and legis-
lative material in the field of inter-
national relations are listed cxirrently.
The Foreign Aid Program for Fiscal Year 1963
Statement by Secretary Rtisk ^
I appreciate the opportunity to meet again witli
tlie committee to discuss the f oreigii aid prograna —
tlie President's proposals for the Foreign Assist-
ance Act of 1962.^
I am deeply aware, as I am sure you must be,
that from the provisions of interim aid preceding
the Marshall plan this is the 15th year in which
you have held hearings similar to this on proposals
for foreign assistance. I recognize also that you
have heard Secretaries Marshall, Acheson, Dulles,
and Herter speak to some of the underlying
themes of our foreign aid responsibilities.
Some members of this committee have actively
participated in these problems from the very be-
ginning. You have helped bring into being and
supported the Marshall plan, point 4, the Mutual
Defense Assistance Program, the Development
Loan Fund, and the other elements of this major
bipartisan effort.
It would seem almost imnecessary for me to urge
upon this committee the vital importance of the
foreign aid program to the security and welfare
of our nation. You are fully aware, as I am, of
great accomplisliments of the program over the
years and, as well, of some of its weaknesses, short-
comings, and disappointments. The committee's
comments in your report ^ last year on the new
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 stated the case
for the aid program with a clarity and directness
I would gladly adopt. You said then :
The committee believes, no less than the President, that
the United States must plan for and contribute generously
^ Made before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
on Apr. 5 (press release 226) .
^ For text of President Kennedy's message to Congress
on tlie Foreign Economic and Military Assistance Pro-
gram for Fiscal Tear 1963, see Buixetin of Apr. 2, 1962,
p. rpfK).
' S. Kept. 612, 87th Cong., 1st sess.
toward a decade of development. Foreign aid is both
an unavoidable responsibility and a central instrument
of our foreign policy. It is dictated by the hard logic of
the cold war and by a moral responsibility resulting from
poverty, hunger, disease, ignorance, feudalism, strife,
revolution, chronic instability, and life without hope.
Basic Propositions for Our Aid
Our present problem, therefore, is not to justify
the fundamental need for our foreign aid program
but to determine and act upon the principles which
will contribute most effectively to its success.
There are undoubtedly many significant factors
whicli must be considered from time to time, but
I believe we may miderscore six basic propositions
as our major guides :
1. The fundamental and indispensable require-
ment for the development of a nation is the de-
termination of its own government and people to
m,ove forward. Our aid, no matter what its
amoimt, cannot materially help those who will not
help themselves. No country can make solid
progress except by its own efforts, inspired by its
own leadership and supported by the dedication
of its own people.
Tlie aid we can supply will be only a small por-
tion of the total national effort needed. Our aid,
for example, to the nations joining in the Alliance
for Progreas is less than 2 percent of the total of
their gross national products. Obviously, there-
fore, what is done by these nations with their own
resources is crucial. These efforts must in all
cases include mobilization of national resources,
economic, fuiancial, and hiunan. With national
variations, they must include the willingness to
imdertake reforms important to progress — re-
forms in taxation, in land holdings, in housing, and
the broadening and improvement of educational
opportunities. "We must constantly bear in mind
KptW 23, 1962
659
that our goal is not just economic development.
It is equally and concurrently to increase social
justice wliich will secure the benefits of progress
to those masses who have so long suffered from
poverty, ignorance, and disease — and from the
most cruel condition of all, hopelessness.
2. Our resources should he devoted to fostering
long-range economic and social growth. "We can-
not prudently invest major resources on a crisis-
to-crisis basis. Political stability cannot be as-
sured unless there is steady progress toward long-
tenn goals. We are inevitably and properly
limited in the money and the skilled manpower
we can invest in the progress of the less developed
countries. We have no funds to spend on those
projects which, however useful in themselves, do
not significantly help advance the cause of na-
tional growth. We must continually press coun-
tries receiving our assistance to improve their
planning and to use their resources in the most
effective way. Our aid must be tailored counti-y
by country to concentrate on those programs and
projects which will have the maximum effect on
development.
3. The education and training of the people of
the nations vie are aiding is vital to their economic
and social growth. Progress will not come from
our aid dollars or materials but from the use
which people can make of them. People are the
dynamos which generate the power of develop-
ment. They provide the minds, the will, and the
skills by which progress is made. It is essential
that they have not only the wiU but the compe-
tence for the task.
Education in all its branches is fundamental.
We have seen in our own counti-y that our econom-
ic progress has paralleled our educational devel-
opment. We could not wait to become rich before
we built our educational system. We created it,
and our skilled people created our wealth. This
year we are particularly aware of this relationship
because we are celebrating the 100th anniversary
of our unique system of land-grant colleges. Ed-
ucation of leaders, training of administrators and
of technicians of all kinds must be centi-al to the
development programs of many of the new na-
tions. The emphasis of our grant assistance in
Africa and Latin America, especially, is and prop-
erly should bo in this most basic field of liuman
and social development.
4. The progress of the newly developing na-
tions should have the aid of all the industrialized
nations of the free world. Those which we aided
in tlie past are now thriving. It is appropriate
and practical that they should increase their con-
tributions.
5. Developing nations themselves have an op-
portunity to help each other. They may do so by
opening tlieir educational institutions to others
less well situated. They may share the lessons
learned in the process of development. They may
extend direct assistance within their capabilities.
This is already occurring, and we can be encour-
aged by the response to this opportimity.
6. Our aid program should he administered as
efficiently as possihle. The administering agency
should be organized to fulfill the requirements of
the program and should be staffed by the most able
personnel who can be persuaded to undertake this
complex and important public duty.
Progress in This Year of Transition
If these should be our guiding principles, how
have we applied them ?
It is too early to make a full report. The new
authorizing legislation became effective about 7
months ago, and the Agency for International De-
velopment came into being only 5 months ago.
Yet I can report that significant progress has been
made.
Administration: The needed administrative re-
organization is imder way. Mr. Fowler Hamilton,
the new Administrator of tlie Agency for Inter-
national Development, has reshaped the Agency
on a regional basis capable of carrying out the
new emphasis on well-planned country programs.
He has enlisted the services of an able group to
direct these regional programs and to administer
the supporting functional staffs which will provide
expert advice with respect to material resources,
educational and social development, and develop-
ment financing and private enterprise. Qualified
employees of the old ICA [International Coopera-
tion Administration] and the Development Loan
Fund are now being integrated into the new AID
organization, and a major senrch is under way in
and out of Government for additional talented
people to carry out tlie demanding and complex
tasks of tlie progi-am in Washington and the field.
Self -Help: I am encouraged by the growing
evidences of tlio detorniination of the less devel-
oped nations to act vigorously for (heir own prog-
ress and by the multiplying examples of basic re-
660
Department of State Bulletin
forms and otlior measures of self-help. Many of
these liave, of course, been in preparation for sev-
eral years. Others are of more recent origin. The
Charter of Punta del Este* contains a forward-
looking agreement on goals to be achieved by the
Latin iVmerican nations in a framework of co-
operation. The goals they agreed on include a
minimum rate of economic growth of 2.5 percent
per capita, a more equitable distribution of na-
tional income, economic diversification, the elimi-
nation of adult illiteracy by 1970 and the provi-
sion of at least 6 years of schooling for each child,
the substantial improvement of health conditions,
the increase of low-cost housing, and progress
toward economic integration.
It is true these are goals and not yet facts, but
the agreement is in itself a substantial accomplish-
ment and the determination back of it justifies the
hope of substantial progress toward fulfillment.
This hope is sustained by the series of reform
measures which have been undertaken by Latin
American nations since the Act of Bogota '* less
than 2 years ago.
Planning: We can be encouraged also by the
progress which has been made in long-term plan-
ning in this year of transition. In Latin America
many countries have made conscientious efforts
to improve their planning processes. Several
xVfi'ican coimtries — Tunisia and Xigeria are good
examples — are developing realistic plans. India
and Pakistan, of course, have well-developed
]>lans, and others show promise. We must recog-
nize, however, that many others face serious ob-
stacles to adequate planning. For many the
needed administrative experience is lacking. For
some even the basic statistical information is not
yet available. Where decisions must be made by
democratic processes — processes which are among
our basic objectives — these decisions may involve
the same kind of debate, timing, and resolution
of difficulties with which we ourselves are familiar.
Long-range commitments are a spur to long-
range planning, and such commitments have now
been made with India, Pakistan, Nigeria, and Tan-
ganyika. The authority granted by the Congress
has already provided encouragement to other
countries to take tlie difficult steps necessary for
development. We anticipate making conunit-
ments under the long-range authority in the near
* For text, see Btnj.ETrN of Sept. 11, 1961, p. 463.
' For text, see Hid., Oct. 3, 1960, p. 537.
future with a few other nations where meaningful
plans are now being formulated.
Human Resources: Our increased emphasis on
the development of human resources is finding
ready response in Africa and Latin America. Sev-
eral nations have strongly recognized its basic im-
portance to progress and have urged our assist-
ance to educational and health programs they
have worked out.
Aid From Other Nations: During the past year
we have increased our efforts to coordinate and
increase the flow of assistance from our allies to
the less developed coimtries. Our NATO allies,
together with Japan, are now providing in the
neighborhood of $2.3 billion per year to less devel-
oped countries. A number of these other free-
world coimtries are contributing to foreign
assistance a portion of their gross national product
comparable to that contributed by the United
States. Unfortunately, however, much of the
assistance from these countries is in the form of
short-term loans with relatively high interest
rates. Several nations have substantially liberal-
ized their loan terms in the past year, but further
improvement is needed. Significantly, the LTnited
Kingdom, Germany, France, Belgium, Canada,
and Japan have established new aid and lending
agencies, evidencing their sense of responsibility
in this area.
Several types of multilateral organizations and
groups have been formed to encourage closer co-
operation and coordination of effort among the
nations supplying capital and technical assistance
to the developing areas. Consortia organized by
the World Bank are supporting the development
plans of countries such as India and Pakistan.
The Development Assistance Committee of OECD
[Organization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment] is undertaking a coordinating role
wit.li regard to technical and capital assistance to
countries where its members have substantial
interests.
The Use of Fiscal Year 1962 Funds
Mr. Hamilton and his colleagues will discuss
with you in detail the uses to which the funds
available for the first year under the new legis-
lation are being put. I should like to stress, how-
ever, their indispensable value in supporting
foreign policy positions the United States has
April 23, 1962
661
taken in recent months. In the Far East, for ex-
ample, these funds have made possible the buildup
of militai-y and economic strength with which the
free people of Viet-Nam are combatinoj the forces
intent on destroying their nation. In South Asia
these funds are contributing to the continued re-
markable progress India and Pakistan are mak-
ing with their well-developed programs. These
funds are making possible the peacekeeping ac-
tivities of the United Nations in the Middle East
and in the Congo — activities which have turned
aside what might otherwise have been the grave
danger of involvement of major powers.
In Africa also these funds through loans and
grants are providing for fimdamental develop-
ment of himnan and economic resources quite
literally crucial to tlie building of whole nations.
And in Latin America the availability of aid funds
made it possible for us to support a free govern-
ment in the Dominican Republic. In Latin
America also I have already refen-ed to the
Charter of Punta del Este based in substantial
measure on the assurance of aid from the United
States and designed to bring about the peaceful
evolution of a continent under conditions of free
institutions.
In short, around the world, on five continents,
our aid is fulfilling a major and indispensable role
in support of the interests of our country and the
preservation and strengthening of freedom.
The Program for Fiscal Year 1963
The request before you is essentially for the
authorization of funds for fiscal year 1963. It
rests on the premise that the authorizing legis-
lation enacted last year is sound. It asks for only
one major change and a few minor ones. It does
not provide at all for authorization for military
assistance or development lending funds, since
authorizations enacted for those categories last
year extend through fiscal year 1963.
Military Assi.Hfance : I Iniow, however, that you
have a deep intei'est in military assistance, and I
should like to report to you on the program for
whicli $1.5 billion of funds are being asked in
appropriations.
Militai-y assistance remains an important part
of the total U.S. defense effort. It is also the
principal means by which there is sustained the
worldwide collective security systems of which we
are a part. You may recall that the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said to you last year
that no amount of money spent on our own forces
could give the United States a comparable asset
of trained, well-equipped forces, familiar with the
terrain and in suitable position for immediate
resistance to local aggression.
Secretary [of Defense Robert S.] McXamara,
General [Lyman L.] Lemnitzer, and others will
discuss the program with you in detail. Without
the confidence engendered in tlie people of nation
after nation by the presence of their own forces,
to which we have contributed both training and
arms, it would have long since become impossible
to maintain the existing structure of free and in-
dependent nations.
Our military strategy today calls for a neces-
sary flexibility. We do not wisli to allow our-
selves to become frozen in our choices so that we
are limited either to submission to aggression
against a free-world neighbor or compelled to re-
sort to forces of unlimited and uncontrollable
destruction. The availability of trained and
equipped forces of Allied nations at the points
where aggression may come and prepared to de-
fend their own homelands is increasingly im-
portant to this vital flexibility of response.
The appropriation requested for fiscal year
1963 is $1.5 billion. It is $385 million less than
was asked for last year and $200 million less than
was authorized for fiscal year 1963. It is intended
to continue the program of providing only that
equipment and training which is needed to fill the
gap between what the aided counti-y can do for
itself and what must be done to enable it to pro-
tect itself from internal subversion and external
aggression. It is important also to tlie mainte-
nance of a climate of stability and confidence fa-
vorable to economic and social progress.
One other positive benefit will come from our
expenditures for military aid. We are placing
emphasis on civic action projects in underdevel-
oped countries. Wherever possible, country forces
receiving military assistance are encouraged to
participate in developing public works programs
such as roadbuilding, sanitation, and communi-
cations. American aid in this area is particu-
larly productive because it not only advances the
progress of the nation as a whole but also brings
home to its people tlie fruits of United States
friendship and concern for their general welfare.
Development Lending: Funds needed for de-
velopment lending in the coming year were also
662
Department of Stale Bulletin
authorized last year. Dollar repayable develop-
ment loans now constitute the major instrument of
our foreign economic assistance program. In the
current year they will make possible commitments
of approximately $1,100 million for fundamental
development purposes. Already loans have been
approved for major transportation facilities, local
credit institutions, public utilities, a cement plant,
and capital goods for development in 18 countries.
For fiscal year 1963 over half of the funds re-
quested will be for development lending. The
present authorization for fiscal year 1963 is $1,500
million. The President has requested an appro-
priation of $1,250 million. (Additional fimds are
asked for the Alliance for Progress, which I shall
discuss in a moment.) These new loan funds will
be concentrated in countries which have somid and
well-administered long-term development pro-
grams or the capability to cari-y forward individ-
ual projects which will contribute to national
gi'owth.
Funds at least in the magnitude requested are
needed and can be eft'ectively used during the
coming year.
1963 Legislative Proposals
Alliance for Progress: The only significant leg-
islative change sought this year is the enactment
of a new title VI providing for the Alliance for
Progress and authorizing its long-term support
by the United States. The alliance is unique
among our regional programs in that it is based
upon a mutual declaration of principles and goals
and a procedure for review of country programs
by a regional panel. These concepts were agreed
upon by the United States and the Latin Amer-
ican Republics at Bogota and Punta del Este. In
addition, the authority and funds for our aid in
support of the alliance derives in part from legis-
lation separate from the basic Foreign Assistance
Act. The alliance criteria and authorization
should now be consolidated within the AID pro-
gram both to simplify administration and to reit-
erate our adherence to these exacting standards
and high goals.
The alliance also diifers from our other pro-
grams because we are dealing not with new coun-
tries but with Republics almost as old as our own.
The struggle for orderly change of the entire
social and economic structures of Latin America
faces stubborn resistance from entrenched priv-
ilege and vitriolic opposition from a radical left
for whom change means only violent revolution.
We cannot expect the necessary changes to occur
under conditions of orderly growth and long-term
reform unless there is reasonable assurance that
the critical increment of United States financial
support necessary to success will be forthcoming
over the long pull. We therefore strongly urge
that Congress record its long-term support by
authorizing $3 billion for the next 4 years of the
alliance. Such authorization will bolster pro-
gressive forces and provide a sounder basis for
the kind of long-range planning required if the
objectives of the alliance are to be realized. It
will provide for the alliance the same period of
assurance of United States support as is provided
for aid to other areas.
Authorization of Fimds for FY 1963: The total
appropriation which the President is requesting
for fiscal year 1963 is $4,878 million— slightly
more than Congress appropriated last year for
AID and the alliance. The new authority wliich
is requested from this committee for appropria-
tions this year totals $2,125 million.
Within this total we are requesting an initial
appropriation for the Alliance for Progi-ess of
$600 million in loan and grant funds for next year
as part of the $3 billion long-term authorization
extending through fiscal year 1966.
Development Grants: The legislation before
you asks $335 million authorization for develop-
ment grant activities in fiscal year 1963 in areas
other than Latm Anaerica. These f mids are among
the most crucially needed in the entire bill. Ad-
vances in education and technical training, im-
provements in health conditions, the development
of able public administratore, and the creation of
effective governmental institutions are essential to
progress in most of the developing nations.
Supporting A ssistance : In our effort to concen-
trate economic aid on development we camiot over-
look the fact that supporting assistance will still
be needed for a number of countries — primarily
those on the peripheiy of the Sino-Soviet bloc
which are subjected to direct and massive Com-
munist pressures and must of necessity maintain
anned forces greater than their economies can
support unaided. We are asking for the autliori-
zation of $481.5 million for this purpose — 20 per-
cent less than was requested last year. Most of
this will go to three Far Eastern coimtries which
are particularly threatened.
April 23, 1962
663
As we reported to you last year, it is our purpose
to supplant supporting aid with development loans
as soon as it becomes feasible for any particular
countiy. It is important to recognize that we are
proposing supporting assistance for next year for
18 countries fewer than those receiving such as-
sistance this year. Although this judgment may
require modification in light of events, we hope
that this trend will be continued. In some cases the
need for supporting assistance may persist for a
considerable period.
International Organizati<ms : As in past years
we are requesting fimds for voluntai-y contribu-
tions to multilateral programs conducted mider the
United Nations: These include the Expanded
Technical Assistance Program and tlie Special
Fmid, UNICEF [United Nations Children's
Fund] , the Palestme Refugee Program, the U.N.
Congo Economic Program, and others. This cate-
gory also includes our contribution to the Indus
Basin Trust Fund administered by the World
Bank and to other international programs. The
sum requested for these purposes is $148.9 million.
Investment Guaranties and Savings: We are
well aware that private investment can make a
most valuable contribution to progress in the less
developed countries. But the investor in such a
country may face special risks which he will not
imdertake without some form of protection. The
investment guaranty program authorized by the
AID legislation has been an effective incentive to
such investment. We anticipate that in the next
year requests by American businessmen for guar-
anties will exceed the funds available. We there-
fore are asking for additional investment guaranty
authorizations.
Contingency Fund: Each of these requests for
funds represents our best estimate of the minimiun
necessary to maintain the momentum of our eco-
nomic and military programs. But I would like
particularly to emphasize the importance of the
President's contingency fund. Kecent events have
given us no basis for supposing that our responsi-
bilities can be significantly reduced. The only
assured ])redictioii we can make is that the unpre-
dictable will occur. We must be ready to move
quickly to anticipate or meet new situations. The
unprogramed reserve against tlio unexpected is,
therefore, one of the most imi)ortant elements in
the foreign assistance program. Tlie $400 million
requested is not too great a sum to have available
for emergency needs.
Conclusion
Our 5 months' experience under the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 lias demonstrated that the
legislative framework of our foreign aid program
is sound. The task of transforming the social and
economic structures of less developed countries
around the world will involve their energies for
years to come; our own effort, relatively modest
though it be, will require persistence and an as-
surance of continuing interest. The stakes are the
security of the free world today and the shape
of the world of tomorrow.
U.S. Comments on Developments
at Geneva Disarmament Conference
Press release 220 dated April 3
Follow'nig is a Department statement on certain
matters of frocedure and substance which have de-
veloped at the 18-nation disarmament conference
at Geneva.
Discussions concerning general and complete
disarmament are continuing at the plenary meet-
ings of the conference.^ Preliminary discussions
are focusing on the objectives and principles of
general and complete disarmament. What is
needed soon is an exploration of essential substan-
tive problems requiring agreement before the pre-
cise language of a comprehensive program on
general and complete disarmament can be de-
veloped. The United States believes that such a
concentration of efl'ort would quickly take the con-
ference to the heart of the issues which must be
resolved and hopes that substantive debate may
soon begin.
A Committee of the Wliole has been established
by the conference to consider those partial dis-
armament measures wliich the various delegations
might wish to submit. The United States at-
taches great importance to the work of the Com-
mittee. The ITnited States has given clear
evidence of its support for those measures which
would increase confidence among the nations, fa-
cilitate the disarmament process, and reduce the
risks of war inherent in the present international
' For statements made by Secretary Rusk before the
18-nation Disarmament Committee at Geneva, see Buiy
LETiN of Apr. 2, 1962, p. 531 ; Apr. 9, 1902, p. 571 ; and
Apr. IG, 19C2, p. 618.
664
Department of State Bulletin
situation. Agreement on an agenda has now been
reached, with priority being given to pi'oposals on
the cessation of war propaganda. Other matters
such as a cutoff of fissionable material production
for use in weapons and reduction of the possibility
of war by surprise attack, miscalculation, or fail-
ure of communication have also been put forward
for consideration by this Committee.
In connection with the agenda of this Commit-
tee, discussions have developed as to the attitude
of the United States toward the proposals of the
Polish Government which contemplate the estab-
lishment of nuclear free zones in Central Europe.
While it is recognized that the proposals of the
Polish Government, usually identified as the "Ra-
packi plan," - have been advanced from a desire
to contribute to the maintenance of peace, careful
study of these suggestions lias led the United
States to the conclusion that they would not help
to resolve present difficulties.
The United States, on the other hand, has pro-
posed equitable measures to this end. These in-
clude arrangements for advance notification of
military movements, such as transfers of large
military units or the firing of missiles, the estab-
lishment of observation posts at important points
within a country, the use of aerial and mobile
inspection t«ams to improve protection against
surprise attack, and the establishment of a com-
mission to examine the technical problems in-
volved in measures which could reduce the risks
of war. Moreover, these measures proposed by
the United States could be put into effect immedi-
ately without resulting in one-sided political and
military advantages.
The principal objections of the United States to
the Rapacki plan, which purports to be a confi-
dence-building measure, have been, and remain :
(1) that the measures envisaged do not address
themselves to the nuclear weapons located in the
Soviet Union, the use of which against Western
Europe has been repeatedly threatened by Soviet
spokesmen; (2) that the plan would therefore re-
sult in a serious military imbalance; (3) that con-
sequently, while creating an illusion of progress,
it would in reality endanger the peace of the world
rather than contribute to maintaining it. The
dangers t-o peace resulting from such an imbalance
under present conditions have been clearly and
' For background, see ibid., May 19, 1958, p. 821.
April 23, J 962
repeatedly demonstrated by events witliin memory
of all.
The United States will continue its efforts to
focus the attention of the Committee of the Wliole
on the proposals it has brought forward — at the
same time, it is prepared to give prompt and seri-
ous attention to the proposals and suggestions ad-
vanced by other conference members which could
offer some hope of early agreement on concrete
measures and which would, in turn, facilitate
progress toward the overall objectives of the
conference.
One initial measure where agreement would do
much to set the work of the conference on the
road to success is a nuclear test ban treaty. On
this subject, unfortunately, there has been no prog-
ress at Geneva because the Soviet Union has re-
fused to accept even the concept of international
inspection to monitor a test ban. The Soviet
Union takes this position in opposition to general
scientific opinion and contrary to views held by
the Soviet Government itself since 1957. Never-
theless, the United States has not abandoned the
hope that the Soviet Government will recognize
tliat it is acting in defiance of the will of people
everywhere and will return to its earlier position
that international verification is necessary for a
nuclear test ban agreement.
President Macapagal of Philippines
To Visit United States
White House press release dated March 30
President Diosdado Macapagal of the Republic
of the Philippines has accepted President Ken-
nedy's invitation to visit the United States from
June 19 through 28, 1962. President Macapagal
met the President when, as Vice President of the
Philippines, he visited the United States in Octo-
ber 1960. President Macapagal was elected to the
Presidency of the Republic of the Philippines in
November 1961 and was inaugurated on December
30, 1961.
This visit is in testimony to the special relation-
ship which exists between the United States and
the Pliilippines and the longstanding friendship
of the people of the two countries. It will provide
a welcome occasion for the American people to
learn more about the new leadership of an im-
portant democratic partner.
665
The Developing Atlantic Partnership
hy Under SecreUinj Ball ^
A little over a month ago the Attorney General
of the United States, Mr. Robert Kennedy, speak-
ing in this same hall, suggested some of the
elements essential to an effective Atlantic partner-
ship, lie addressed you then as Germans, but —
just as I am doing this evening — he spoke to you
also as citizens of the neve Europe that you and
your neighbors are building with such inspiring
vigor.
Tonight I shall attempt to carry the Attorney
General's suggestions a little farther. I sliall tiy
to bring you something of the flavor of the dis-
cussion that is taking place in the United States
and to indicate the general directions of the poli-
cies we are shaping.
End of American Isolationism
The United States approaches Europe from a
background of history with which you are gen-
erally familiar. We were originally a group of
colonies that broke away to form a Federal state.
During the formative years of our existence as a
nation, we concentrated on establisliing our na-
tional integrity and turned our backs on our
colonial past. Preoccupied with the problem of
building a nation and conquering a vast frontier,
we followed the advice of our first President,
George Washington, to avoid entangling alli-
ances with the great nations of Europe.
Our policy of keeping aloof from European
problems was intensified by the influence of those
emigrants from P^urope who came to settle our
farms and cities during the 19th century. Most
of those emigrants, including the stalwart men
and women who left Germany after tlie failure of
'Address nindp before Ihe Gorman Society for Foreign
Affairs at Bonn, Germany, on Apr. 2 (press release 214).
666
the 1848 revolution, had fled Europe for religious,
economic, or political reasons. They sublimated
their disenchantment with Europe by iminei-sing
themselves in the formidable work of building a
new nation on tlie soil of tlie New World. They
contributed to the American distrust of the Con-
tinent they had left behind them — distrust which
persisted well into the 20th centuiy.
But times and events have clianged all this.
You and we — on the opposite shores of the Atlan-
tic — liave learned to work closely and effectively
together. Arid tonight I need hardly insist that
American isolationism is a dead issue. It has dis-
appeared forever.
If one likes to mark historic changes by signifi-
cant dates, one can say tliat American isolationism
finally died on August 24, 1040 — the day the
United States Senate ratified the North Atlantic
partnership. By that solemn compact America
and Europe guaranteed tlie survival not only of
freedom but of free men. When today President
Kennedy tells the jjcople of America that he
would regard an attack on Berlin as an attack on
Wasliington or Chicago, he is giving explicit
recognition to the central principle of our alli-
ance — that the destinies of Western Europe and
North America are irrevocably intertwined and
tliat their defense is indivisible.
This principle is not limited to the views we
constantly express in the councils of the alliance:
All i)lans and efforts to improve the defensive
posture of NATO are based upon it. It is the
foundation of security on whicli our Atlantic
partnership rests.
I can say with confidence that our joint mili-
tary posture has never been stronger, yet I would
bo less than candid if I wore to express complete
satisfaction.
Department of State Builetin
Today, as President Kennedy has made clear,
there is a real and urgent need to give a new
priority to the conventional elements of our com-
mon defense. NATO needs a wide spectrum of
capabilities if it is to respond to widely varying
types of attack with appropriate force. The nu-
clear deterrent will be fully credible only if rein-
forced by a substantial nonnuclear capability that
will give us flexibility in dealing with aggression.
The United States has substantially increased
its conventional forces, including the number of
its combat divisions. Our Navy and Marine
Corps, as well as our antiguerrilla forces, have been
strengthened and expanded. We have added air-
and sea-lift capabilities. We are spending billions
of additional dollare on these added programs.
Some of our European partners have also recog-
nized the need for expanded conventional force.
As a result there has been a substantial improve-
ment in our combined nonnuclear strength during
the past year. But this, while gratifying, is still
not enough. We need to do more if the deterrent
to every kind of aggression is to remain effective
in the face of growing power in the East. Nu-
clear strength, of course, remains basic to our com-
mon and indivisible defense of Western Europe
and North America. The United States has pro-
vided for substantial acceleration and strengthen-
ing of the Polaris and Minuteman programs,
giving the alliance added nuclear capabilities
under vaiTing conditions.
We recognize that defense plans cannot be
static: They must respond to changing conditions
of power and resources. There is need, therefore,
for constant and serious consideration of future
arrangements if our nuclear forces are to be truly
expressive of the ideas of the Atlantic partner-
ship. We wish to respond constructively to the
desire of our allies for an increasing role in nu-
clear deterrence.
We strongly favor the multilateral approach
suggested by President Kennedy in his speech at
Ottawa last May.= As the President stated then,
we are willing to join our allies in serious con-
sideration of the possibility of a sea-based NATO
MEBM [medium-range ballistic missile] force
under truly multilateral ownership and control.
He also offered to commit five Polaris sub-
marines — or even more in appropriate circimi-
stances — to NATO. We feel that a constructive
= Bulletin of June 5, 1961, p. 839.
April 23, 7962
solution to this problem of NATO's future nuclear
role is both important and possible. We remain
prepared to work with our allies to that end. We
believe that such a multilateral solution is greatly
to be preferred to any proliferation of national
nuclear capabilities.
U.S. Support of European Integration
If our common efforts toward an effective com-
bined military force are defensive in character, our
efforts toward cooperation in the area of eco-
nomics have a more positive aim. They are based
upon the amply demonstrated fact that in the
modern world the major industrial economies are
increasingly interdependent. In a world of swift
transport and instantaneous communications,
where every man is every other man's close neigh-
bor, no nation can affoi'd to be an economic island.
As the volume of goods and services that we ex-
change grows higher every year, so does the need
for us to develop more effective ways of working
together.
It is for this reason, among many others, that
the United States has, from the beginning, given
active support to the development of an integrated
Europe. We have regarded a imited Europe as a
condition to the development of an effective Atlan-
tic partnership.
Let me emphasize at this point that the pace of
evolution of the Atlantic partnership in the eco-
nomic area has depended upon an essential
phasing. It has been necessary for Europe to
move toward substantial internal cohesion in order
to complete the fomidation upon which the strac-
ture of an Atlantic partnership can be erected.
Through the whole of the postwar period we
Americans have taken no comfort from the dis-
parity between our own resources and those of
any other nation of the free world. We have been
proud that the United States is a world leader, but
we have sometimes found it less than satisfactory
to be a world leader isolated by the possession of
an overwhelming proportion of the total wealth,
power, and resources. To our minds — and I am
sure to your minds as well — a strong partnership
must almost by definition mean a collaboration of
equals. 'Wlien one partner possesses over 50 per-
cent of the resources of so great an enterprise and
the balance is distributed among 16 or 17 others,
the relationship is unlikely to work with full ef-
fectiveness. And so long as Europe remained
667
fragmented, so long as it consisted merely of
nations small by modern standards, the potentials
for true partnership were always limited.
But a Europe united and strong can be an equal
partner in the achievement of our common en-
deavors — an equal partner committed to the same
basic objectives as we ourselves. For, after all,
you and we alike believe in the preservation and
extension of freedom and in the values that dis-
tinguish free men from slaves.
Reality of Our Common Objectives
I cannot overstate the enthusiasm with which
Americans have welcomed the burgeoning strength
and cohesion of Europe. But why is it that one
sometimes hears in Europe — almost never in
America — timid voices ominously complaining
that a united Europe might become a neutralist
"third force"?
Let me say emphatically that we Americans
have no fear that the new Europe will be neutralist
any more than we fear that America will return
to isolationism. The neutralism of which we
heard a fair amount a decade ago was an expres-
sion of weakness, not strength. It sprang from a
belief that Europe could no longer play a signifi-
cant role in the power contest between the United
States and the Communist bloc. Persuaded that
they could not influence the outcome by taking
sides, its advocates assumed a role of Olympian
detachment from the battle, measuring out equal
amounts of criticism for each side. As the nations
of Western Europe have grown more vmited, the
voices of neutralism that produced such a fright-
ful cacophony 10 years ago have been largely
stilled.
But there are a few who still profess fear of a
strong, united Europe for yet a different reason.
They see the specter not of a neutralist third force
but of a third force and an America following
increasingly divergent paths. A powerful Con-
tinental entity, they argue, could be tempted to
try a new kind of balance-of-power politics, to
play the East against the West, to sell its weight
and authority to the highest bidder to serve its
own pai-ocliial and selfish objectives.
Such a prediction, I am persuaded, misconceives
the nature of the forces at work on both sides of
the Atlantic. It overlooks the vital ity and sol idity
of our common heritage. It ignores the reality of
our common objectives. It ignores the direction
in which Euroi)e is already moving. It rejects, in
fact, the very interdependence of the members of
the NATO alliance on which our national security
is now based.
To my mind both you and we have everything
to gain by the construction of a strong and united
Europe. Europe united will almost certainly dis-
play a deeper and stronger feeling of responsibility
for the defense of Western values than will the
individual nation-states in a Europe weak and
fragmented. Unity builds strength. The experi-
ence and awareness of strength engender not only
the ability but the will to influence events. And
for Europeans, as for Americans, the will to in-
fluence events is merely another way of expressing
a sense of responsibility.
We Americans are thoroughly convinced, there-
fore, that the farther Europe proceeds down the
road toward unity the more Europe can be ex-
pected to play an affirmative and responsible role
in our common concerns. In expressing this belief
we recognize, of course, that the Atlantic partner-
ship can never be one-sided and that we ourselves
must fulfill the obligations of a good partner.
Implications of European Economic Community
United States support for European integi'ation
and for the European Economic Community has
deep roots. It springs from a recollection of our
own Federal experience and from a desire to end
the sanguinary rivalry that once divided the great
states of Western Europe.
But Americans have recognized that the com-
mercial manifestation of the Community — the
Common Market — implies a substantial degree of
discrimination against American trade. Of neces-
sity it will require adjustments for the industry,
agriculture, and labor of the United States and of
nonmember third countries.
Yet this has never deflected us from the larger
objectives of our policy. In spite of the problems
for America implicit in the development of the
Common Market, we have given consistent and
active support to the growth of the European
Community.
In providing this support we have acted on two
convictions: first, that the Community would be
conducted as an outward-looking society, liberal
in its trading and economic policies, and second,
tliat it would be increasingly prepared to bear
responsibilities around the world as its strength
and unity develop.
668
Department of State Bulletin
Purposes of Proposed Trade Legislation
Our faith in the liberal intentions of tlie Euro-
pean Community has been given concrete expres-
sion in the trade legislation that President Ken-
nedy has recently submitted to the United States
Congress.' Since there has been some misunder-
standing in Europe with regard to the nature and
purposes of these proposals, I should like to com-
ment on them briefly.
By the proposed legislation the President is
seeking authority to negotiate new trade arrange-
ments, primarily with the Community but also
with other trading nations. Under the American
constitutional process such authority must be
granted by the Congress. The Executive can ne-
gotiate reductions in tariffs only to the extent that
the Congress delegates this power to him.
The powers sought by the President are tailored
to the kinds of problems that we now both have in
common. The trading world is radically chang-
ing. The prospect of the United Kingdom's
membership in the Common Market would mean,
in a very sliort period of time, that 90 percent of
the industrial production and 90 percent of the
trade in industrial goods in the free world would
be concentrated in two great common markets — -
the United States and an enlarged EEC.
In negotiating with each other these two com-
mon markets would be dealing for the first time on
a basis of near equality. In terms of population,
trade, and the general state of the industrial arts
and productive techniques, the United States and
the EEC are not far apart. Our respective ex-
ternal tariffs will be at roughly the same average
level; for certain goods the tariff of the Commun-
ity will be fixed at rates exceeding those of the
United States tariff; for other goods the reverse
will be true. By negotiating with each other we
should be able to increase access to each other's
markets on a basis that would be mutually
advantageous.
At the same time, because of our combined
predominance in world trade, the United States
and an enlarged EEC would bear a special re-
sponsibility toward third countries. Strength and
power involve, for those who possess it, a special
set of obligations. By negotiating with each other
within the framework of the GATT [General
° For text of the President's message to Congress, see
iUd., Feb. 12, 1962, p. 231 ; for a summary of the draft
legislation, see ibid., Feb. 26, 1962, p. 343.
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] and substan-
tially reducing tariffs on a most-favored-nation
basis, these two great common markets could
diminish to manageable and tolerable proportions
the difficulties and apprehensions of all countries
of the free world. This assumes, of course, that
third countries would also play their part by pro-
viding reciprocal concessions.
Integrity of Common Market Not Affected
In the proposed legislation the President has
requested the bargaining authority that would en-
able him to negotiate for a substantial increase
in the free exchange of goods across the Atlantic.
In asking the Congress to grant him that author-
ity the President is not seeking to dictate the
ground rules under which a negotiation must be
conducted. Those rules are a matter for mutual
agreement among the negotiating parties.
The principal authority sought by the President
is the power to negotiate reductions in American
tariffs by as much as 50 percent.
Tlie proposed legislation would also provide a
special authority permitting the President, in ne-
gotiations with the EEC, to offer concessions in
the United States tariff to the extent of 100 per-
cent. By the nature of its technical limitations
this special authority could be effectively employed
only if the United Kingdom becomes a member
of the European Economic Community.
In seeking this special authority the President
has not sought in any way to prejudice the negoti-
ations now under way between the EEC and the
United Kingdom. He has wished merely to pro-
vide himself with the power to bargain with an
expanded EEC in the event those negotiations are
successfully concluded. Under this special au-
thority the President could, with respect to a
limited range of goods — those goods that are pre-
dominantly supplied by the United States or the
expanded EEC — reduce tariffs by as much as 100
percent in return for reciprocal concessions.
The President's request for this special author-
ity has created some critical comment in Europe.
It has been suggested, for example, that such an
American initiative might have the effect of erod-
ing away the common external tariff that has both
defined and given integrity to the European Eco-
nomic Community.
This concern is not well founded. The fact that
certain goods might, in the course of a trade nego-
April 23, 1962
669
tiation, be put on the free list by the EEC would
not mean the elimination across the board of the
common external tariff. Each of us already has
a number of industrial products on our free lists.
The United States presently imposes no duties on
typewriters, newsprint, fertilizer, or a nimiber of
machinery items. The common external tariff of
the EEC will be at zero for synthetic rubber, some
pulp or paper products, and certain types of ships
and boats, and jewelry; it has been suspended on
aircraft.
Is there any reason why such free lists should
not be expanded? Moreover, I question the as-
sumption that the integrity of the European Com-
mon Market is dependent, to the extent suggested,
on the maintenance of substantial levels of exter-
nal protection. The implications of their reduc-
tion depend again on phasing. Wliile the common
external tariff wall may initially have been its
defining element, the Community has already
achieved integrity through other far-reaching
means. It has a well-developed set of common
institutions, and its cohesion will, at least in the
final analysis, depend on the continued extension
of common action over an increasingly wide range
of policies.
Consultation on Economic Policies
If it be wrong to maintain that the President's
trade proposals are somehow a threat to the in-
tegrity of the Common Market, another European
reaction has seemed to us exaggerated. This is the
suggestion that a substantial reduction of tariffs
on both sides of the Atlantic can be safely acliicved
only if the two parties will commit themselves to
common economic policies. In effect, these critics
seem to be saying that freer trade is impossible
imless the United States joins with the EEC in
committing itself to a discipline similar to that
imposed by the Rome Treaty.
In my view this greatly overstates the problem.
In requesting new trade legislation the President
is not proposing a customs union or a free trade
area with the Common Market. Nor is he pro-
posing an exclusive trading arrangement of any
kind with the EEC; whatever agi-eements are
made must bo on a most- favored-nation basis.
He is proposing rather that the United States, in
agreement with the EEC, should move toward the
liberalization of trade under conditions in which
all countries would share in the benefits of com-
parative advantage. The fact that American wage
rates are substantially higher than those in
Europe, for example, does not necessarily price
our exports out of your market any more than
your lower productivity or higher energy costs
price your goods out of ours.
Nevertheless we recognize that, if transatlantic
commerce is to expand with requisite freedom, the
United States and tlie European Community must
move together toward a progressively greater co-
ordination of economic policies. For that reason,
we have welcomed the suggestions of our European
friends for more vigorous common action.
In fact it was because my Government recog-
nized the hard facts of interdependence among
the major industrialized powers that it proposed
the creation of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development. With the coming
into being of that organization last September —
and in fact, in the months preceding that event —
the Atlantic community has acquired an instru-
ment of incalculable value for the orderly and
accelerated growth of our economies. And we
have only begun to exploit tlie potential for
economic consultation and cooperation available
through OECD's various committees.
We are prepared to go as far as any other
member of the OECD in concerting our economic
policies and in developing and amplifying tech-
niques for consultation and coordination. We are
prepared to consult on any aspect of American
economic policy, including tlie broad fields of mon-
etary, fiscal, and trade policy. We are also pre-
pared to discuss the hannonization of agricultural
policies, particularly those policies that would
facilitate the access of efficient farm production to
world markets and the constructive and imagina-
tive use of world farm surpluses to serve the vital
interests of the free world — especially in the devel-
oping nations. And we recognize that, to be ef-
fective, consultation must include consideration of
national policies in the formative state — that is,
before tlioy have been hardened by official decision.
In approaching the harmonization of our eco-
nomic policies we are, of course, committed to the
development and preservation of competition and
the avoidance of restrictive arrangements.
Tlie adoption of anticartel rules and procedures
by the European Economic Coinniunity luis seemed
to us, by setting a course parallel to our own, to
enhance the possibilities of cooperation. As a
nation with a long antimonopoly tradition and
670
Department of State Bulletin
with a continiiine; allegiance to the market mech-
anism as an economic regulator, we welcome this
step. For in undertaking to extend the depth and
broaden the area of cooperation, we must, in loy-
alty to our own traditions, reject any idea of trans-
atlantic cartelization — and for that matter seek to
avoid arrangements that might interfere with the
free movement of capital or with the freedom of
choice of entrepreneurs' investment decisions.
Perspective on Recent U.S. Tariff Actions
The course of liberal trade is not always smooth.
Within the past fortnight the President of the
United States felt compelled to approve recom-
mendations to raise import duties on certain kinds
of carpets and on flat glass.'' These recommenda-
tions were based on findings of the Tariff Com-
mission, made following public hearings open to
all interested parties. This action has excited
comment in Europe, and questions have been raised
about its longrun implications for United States
trade policy. Let me tell you precisely what
those implications are.
At the present moment, and until a new law is
enacted, the President's powers to change United
States tariffs are based upon the existing Trade
Agreements Act. The philosophy and approach
of that act are clear : "Wlien an American industry
is suffering from serious injury that can be attrib-
uted to imports, the law provides for the restora-
tion of import, restrictions. Under that law the
President raised the tariffs on carpets and glass.
This was the only form of relief which the Pres-
ident could provide under existing law. That
will no longer be the case if Congress enacts the
proposed Trade Expansion Act. That act pro-
vides a different approach to the problems of ad-
justment created by imports. Eeflecting the
experience of the EEC itself, the act proposes to
rely upon domestic adjustments as the first re-
sponse to such i^roblems. Industries finding difH-
culties in adjusting to lower tariffs will be given
various types of financial and tax aid to enable
them to shift to new lines of production ; workers
will be helped through retraining and by other
means. Import restrictions may be resorted to
only as an exceptional procedure and then only
for a limited period.
But even apart from the proposed change in
* For background, see il)id., Apr. 16, 1962, p. 649.
U.S. escape-clause policy, the recent tariff actions
assume smaller dimensions if put in proper per-
spective. In all the years in which escape clauses
have been the prescribed mechanism the President
has found it necessary to apply such clauses only
to 17 cases. This has been a creditable record.
Few other countries of the world have exercised
such restraint; in fact some of the nations — al-
though not all — that have expressed the strongest
views with respect to the President's recent action
have on past occasions seen fit to restore protec-
tion to many domestic industries. Some have
done this by availing themselves of procedures un-
der article XXVIII of the GATT, raising hun-
dreds of their tariff rates in the process. Others
have occasionally applied quotas in violation of
the agreement. Such actions have frequently
caused severe hardships, especially in other parts
of the free world, such as Japan.
But the unportant question for us is not what
restrictions have been applied in the past: It is
what policies we are to pursue in the future. The
proposed trade legislation now before the United
States Congi-ess embodies the principle that trade
adjustments, rather than trade restrictions, should
be the preferred approach to import competition.
I am confident that in the end this principle will
be widely adopted in the trading relations between
nations.
Equal Sliaring of Burdens Necessary
Tlie United States has taken it for granted tliat
the European Economic Community will be out-
ward-looking, that it will resist the temptation to
create a trading bloc isolated from the rest of the
free world. We have assumed also that, with the
developing strength and unity of Europe, the
member nations of the European Community will
feel a growing sense of I'esponsibility for the se-
curity and well-being of the rest of the free world.
As the nation with the preponderance of re-
sources, the United States, since the end of World
AVar II, has provided an economic defensive
sliield behind which Europe has been able to de-
velop. It has provided also a continuing flow of
capital to the less developed nations of the world
to assist them to attain rising standards of living
so essential for stability and independence.
All of this has not been accomplished without
exertion and strain. Today our troublesome bal-
ance-of-payments deficit is proving a dramatic
April 23, 1962
671
measure of the burden the United States is carry-
ing. The causes of this deficit are unique in his-
tory. It does not result from the failure of the
United States to compete in woi'ld markets; our
annual commercial balance continues to be in sur-
plus in the amount of several billion dollars. It
results purely and simply from tlie fact that we
are carrying an extraordinary burden of effort for
the defense of the free world and for assistance to
the less developed nations.
The United States is not faltering in its com-
mitments. It will continue to carry its full share
of the financial and technical weight of the se-
curity shield for the free world.
The United States Government has faced its
balance-of-payments problems with restraint. It
has rejected proposals for redressing the balance
either by restrictive measures or by reducing our
commitments around the world.
At the same time I need hardly emphasize that
this persistent deficit is a matter of continuing con-
cern to my Government. We are not wholly per-
suaded that Europe, growing continually stronger
and more unified, has yet fully assumed that share
of the burden that its growing strength warrants.
The task before us may be divided into two
parts. I have already discussed the urgent need
for a still greater militai-y effort to increase the
credibility of our deterrent. It hardly needs say-
ing that the disproportionate share of the com-
mon defense borne by the United States is one of
the principal strains upon our payments situation.
Within the last year, for example, the maintenance
of our military forces in Europe has resulted in a
net drain on the United States balance of payments
in the amount of $1,600 million.
The second part of the task is the responsibility
that we in the industrialized nations of the At-
lantic community owe to that half of the free
world's population that has not yet achieved a de-
cent standard of living. This is the responsibility
to provide tlio flow of financial resources neces-
sary for those hundreds of millions of human be-
ings to attain adequate — and eventually self-sus-
taining — economic development, to respond to the
imperatives of the "revolution of rising expecta-
tions."
Permit me at this point to congratulate the Ger-
man Government and the German people on the
deepening awareness they have shown of the mag-
nitude of this problem. We in the United States
are confident that, with your growing strength,
you will continually increase your exertions and
improve the quality of aid, expanding the volume
of assistance and shaping the terms on which it
is provided so as to minimize the burden on the
balance of payments of the recipient countries.
One of the problems before us is to coordinate
and expand our assistance programs. We have
created an admirable instrument for this purpose
in the Development Assistance Committee of the
OECD. If we use this vehicle with vigor and
determination, we should be able to convert it into
an institution of notable value to our common
effort. Work is well under way inside that Com-
mittee toward the creation of teams for specific
countries and areas to assist in the coordination,
expansion, and application of aid in such countries
and areas. Each team will be composed of repre-
sentatives of two or more industrialized countries,
together, when appropriate, with existing inter-
national financial institutions. They will of
course work with the consent of, and in close
cooperation with, the recipient nations.
Creating a Healthy World Trade Environment
But direct assistance can perform only part of
the task. Sooner or later the less developed coun-
tries must themselves achieve the means to expand
and sustain economic growth above and beyond
immediate injections of outside public aid. In
the long run they can accomplish this only by cre-
ating an environment congenial to private invest-
ment and by selling their products to the world
at reasonably stable prices.
In the years just ahead the nature of the eco-
nomic ties between the advanced countries and
the emerging areas of Asia, Latin America, and
Africa will undergo a considerable evolution. Two
patterns are possible: one in which the less de-
veloped countries attain inci-easing access to the
markets of all the advanced nations of the world
as a basis on which to speed their growth, and an-
other in which the preferential trading habits of
the old colonial systems are perpetuated in new
forms.
The second course leads to a dead end. It tends
to distort patterns of trade, encourage artificial
and inefficient production, limit the scope of eco-
nomic diversification, and perpetuate discrimina-
tion against other developing countries. More
than tliat, tlie countries within preferential sys-
tems — even though tliey may find their special
672
Department of State Bulletin
privileges attractive at the moment — are likely to
grow restive with any arrangement that, over the
long term, impedes their freedom of choice.
If the United States and the EEC together agree
to open their markets to the primary products of
less developed countries on a basis of nondiscrimi-
nation, they can set the direction for an evolu-
tion:ii"y process, a process that will in the long run
create a healthy world trading environment in
which the less developed coimtries can develop
their production for world markets. Obviously
this cannot be achieved overnight. The shift to
nondiscriminatory trade with the less developed
nations will require transitional arrangements —
compensatory mechanisms that will ease the ad-
justment to nondiscriminatory trade for nations
now dependent upon preferences and assistance in
the achievement of sound long-term development
plans. It will require also that the economically
advanced countries work closely together in order
to assure that the critical problem of price fluc-
tuation for primary commodities is squarely faced
through adequate global arrangements.
To such efforts the United States is prepared to
contribute its share.
Through this course, in the long run, you and
we should be able to achieve a world environment
in which the economically advanced countries
share their responsibilities for assisting the less
developed in the areas both of aid and trade, recog-
nizing full well that these are common problems
of such magnitude that it will require all of the
resources, skills, and imagination we can muster
if we are to create stability and strength in the
free world.
Decade of Development
Finally I would like to recall that President
Kennedy has called for the sixties to be the "dec-
ade of development" ' — the decade in which the
economically advanced countries, guided by high
purpose and sensitive to the sweep of history, play
a role worthy of their traditions and their
strength.
The Atlantic partnership has the means to real-
ize this goal. We are making progress. We
must, and we will, increase our effort. And in
doing so, in sharing the fruits of our own pros-
perity, we can make this an era that historians
will note, not for the alarms and bitterness of the
cold war but as the moment when mankind at last
foimd the path to freedom from want and fear.
Post of Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Atlantic Affairs Established
Press release 197 dated March 28
The Department of State announced on March 28 the
creation of a new post of Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for Atlantic Affairs under the jurisdiction of the
Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs. J.
Robert Schaetzel, now Special Assistant to the Under
Secretary of State, will be appointed to this post
During the past few years the Atlantic nations have
been moving forward on a broad front to consolidate their
unity and to create new and closer relationships among
themselves. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) has continued to grow and develop as the princi-
pal safeguard for the security of the North Atlantic area.
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment Convention ' came Into force last September, linking
the countries of Western Europe and North America in
a new organization to promote growth and prosperity not
only in the Atlantic area but in the less developed na-
tions of the free world. The success of the European
Common Market and its prospective enlargement to in-
clude other European members creates an opportunity
for closer partnership between the United States and
Europe in many fields of common activity, in the Interests
of the North Atlantic nations and the free world as a
whole.
The Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Atlantic
Affairs will have primary responsibility in the Depart-
ment for following these developments and working out
policies to promote the further progress of the Atlantic
partnership. The Deputy Assistant Secretary will have
authority over two new offices, one responsible for NATO
problems and the other for OECD and European integra-
tion problems. These oflices will be headed by Kussell
Fessenden and Stanley M. Cleveland.
° For an address by President Kennedy before the U.N.
General Assembly on Sept. 25, 1961, see ibid., Oct. 16, 1961,
p. 619.
^ For background and text, see BinxETiN of Jan. 2,
1961, p. 8.
April 23, 7962
635258 — 62 3
673
A Balance Sheet on Asia
hy Chester Bowles
Lenin has been quoted as summing up the Com-
munist strategy for world conquest in one memo-
rable sentence: "The road to Paris lies through
Calcutta and Peking." Scholars assert that Lenin
never made such a statement. I would reply that
he should have — and would have, with the assist-
ance of better speechwriters. For I know of no
sentence that describes more cogently the tlirust
of Soviet strategy.
I have just returned from a 6-week trip ^ during
which I visited many Asian countries which are
special objects of Soviet or Chinese attention. My
assignment from the President was to take a sober
look at United States relations with these coun-
tries and to try to assess for him where we stand.
My journey took me into northeast Africa and
from one end of Asia to the other — from Ethiopia,
the Sudan, Egypt, and Iran to Pakistan, Afghan-
istan, and India, then to Thailand, Cambodia,
the Philippines, and Japan.
After visits to these 11 countries I feel on bal-
ance more assured about the direction and conduct
of United States foreign policy than at any time
in the past 10 years.
This may be explained in part by the differing
perspective from which we view the world here
on the other side of the oceans. In Washington
our desks are loaded with reports of crises and
new catastrophes, of conflict and confvision. This
is the stuff of daily news. It is also the stuff of
daily diplomacy. The quieter and less immedi-
ately newsworthy events which — haltingly but, I
believe, with increasing force — may be contribut-
ing to the development of a more rational world
' Address made before the National Press Club at AVash-
inpton, n.C, on Mar. 2.3 (press release 18,3). Mr. Bowles
is the President's Special Uepresentative and Adviser on
African, Asian, and Latin American Affairs.
" For an announcement of Mr. Bowles' trip see Buixetin
of Feb. 12, 19G2, p. 251.
are likely to be put aside for weekend reading
which often does not take place.
I realize that my reckless suggestion that the
world is not necessarily coming to an end may be
interpreted by some as an assurance that all is
well and that the Communists are about to throw
in the sponge. I hasten, therefore, to knock on
wood in the hope that at least I may be spared the
fate of a friend who published a book called
Permanent American Prosperity, Its Causes and
Efects on the very day before the stock market
collapsed in 1929.
In a mood of nervous optimism I shall now dis-
cuss three or four specific situations which I en-
countered on my trip that may be of particular
interest and significance and then offer some gen-
eral impressions of our overall position.
Visit to Egypt
Let us first consider Egypt, where I met for 4
crowded days with President Nasser and some of
his top economic and political advisers.
Although I went to Cairo with no expectation
of achieving miracles of good will, I believe my
visit helped to eliminate certain misunderetand-
ings. I came away with some hope that we may
be entering into a period of calmer, more realistic
and rational rclationship.s.
Wo must expect that Egypt will remain a revo-
lutionary country laboring under the psychologi-
cal load of past conflicts and frustrations in its
encounters with the West. Moreover, our rela-
tions with Egypt will continue to be conditioned
by our deeply held conviction that Israel's inde-
pendence and integrity must be preserved.
Yet there are a number of questions on which
we see eye to eye. For example, Egypt's leaders
have come to realize that communism offers no
solution to Egypt's manifold ]irol)loms. They also
674
liepat\meni of State Bulletin
appear determined to provide a greater measure
of social justice and economic opportunity for
Egypt's people.
If the leaders of the Egyptian Government come
to see that their role in history will be determined
not by what tliey say over the radio to the people
of other Middle Eastern nations but rather by
what they actually do about the aching poverty
and miseiy that oppress the people of Egypt, there
will be opportunities for constructive, peaceful co-
operation between the American and Egyptian
Governments.
In this event tensions may gradually be eased
throughout the Middle East and energies may in-
creasingly be diverted from angry conflict to con-
structive development.
Developments in South Asia
In South Asia it is easy to become preoccupied
by such urgent questions as the dispute over Kash-
mir or the closing of the Pak-Afghan border.
However, if our policies are to make sense over
the longer run, it is important that we not over-
look some of the less immediately newsworthy
developments.
On the positive side, India and Pakistan are
making extraordinary strides in economic plan-
ning and development and in extending local
democracy to the villages. We have placed heavy
bets on each of these nations, and we were right
in doing so. India, for instance, has a population
larger than that of Latin America and Africa
combined. Her continuing economic and polit-
ical progress will contribute decisively to world
stability; her failure would be catastrophic.
In Iran, with the Shah's support and encourage-
ment, the government headed by Prime Minister
[Ali] Amini is pressing reform programs which
Iran has so long desperately needed in the agi-i-
cultural, administrative, and economic fields.
On the negative side of the South Asian ledger,
however, we find some worrisome developments.
Afghanistan is one example.
For several generations this fiercely independent
nation has successfully maintained its position as
a buffer state between Russia, the Middle East,
and South Asia. Today, however, it is being sub-
jected to Soviet pressures which are novel, well-
financed, and potentially effective.
No visible attempt is being made by Soviet rep-
resentatives to introduce Communist ideology as
such. Indeed, Afghanistan i*ight now is said to
have fewer indigenous Communists than any na-
tion in Asia. Nor is there any effort to stir up
antagonism against the royal family or the
Government.
The Soviets have set out simply and directly
to persuade both the rulers and the ruled that
Soviet dams, roads, agricultural methods, and
technical skills are best adapted to Afghanistan's
needs and that bountiful Soviet capital and skills
are theirs for the asking with the usual assurance
of "no political strings."
Soviet military advisers are busily training the
Afghan Army and supplying it with modem
Soviet equipment. At the same time, some 2,200
Soviet development technicians are hard at work
on several dozen projects. For instance, Soviet
roadbuilders, speaking excellent Farsi, work
shoulder to shoulder with Afghan labor crews.
Soviet farm technicians are moving into the
Afghan countryside to assist in opening addi-
tional agricultural lands.
Through these massive assistance efforts and the
increased flow of trade from across the Oxus, the
Afghan economy is being increasingly tied to that
of the Soviet Union.
No one who knows the present Afghan leaders
and the courageous Afghan people will seriously
doubt their deep personal commitment to freedom.
Generation after generation of Afghans have
fought, and fought successfully, to protect their
country against the incursions of the Russians
from the north and of the British from their old
imperial base in India. However, this generation
of Afghans has been persuaded by the sheer mag-
nitude of their problems that they can somehow
use massive Soviet aid to modernize their archaic
land and still remain masters in their own house.
We should fervently wish them well. At the
same time we must face the hard fact that
Afghanistan's continuing role as an independent,
neutral, buffer state in a critical area is likely to
depend in large measure on the economic assist-
ance, political sophistication, and moral support
of the United States Government.
Encouraging Events in Cambodia
In Southeast Asia the all-too-familiar conflicts
in Laos and Viet-Nam claim a lion's share of the
headlines and present us with military challenges
of the most difficult and dangerous sort. Yet
April 23, T962
675
tliere are other less dramatic developments in
Southeast Asia which are not generally under-
stood, and some of them, at least, are encouraging.
In Cambodia, for instance, it is heartening to
see the powerfid popular support which the Cam-
bodian Government enjoys throughout the King-
dom. Widespread ownership of land has helped
to insulate the Cambodian peasantry against Com-
munist infiltration or subversion, and there is a
remarkably close bond between the army and the
people.
This latter point is of particular significance.
Seven years ago the army was disliked and dis-
trasted by the average Cambodian. Now it is
welcomed eagerly as it moves into the rural areas
to clear forests, resettle families on improved
lands, build roads and schools, dig wells, and even
teach literacy classes.
However, Cambodian "nonalinement" in the in-
ternational field should not lead us to assiune any
lack of understanding of the threat of Communist
subversion. Wlien the Geneva agreements ' ended
the Indochinese war in 1954, large Viet Minh
forces were active throughout more than half of
Cambodia. All of these Communist guerrillas
were eliminated without outside help.
Cambodia can teach us and the governments of
many developing new nations some valuable les-
sons in the handling of subversion — if we are
ready to listen.
U.S. Performance Steadily Improving
Now I shall briefly offer some general impres-
sions of what I believe to be our own steadily
improving performance in this part of the world.
Everywhere I went I saw evidence, sometimes
marginal, sometimes totally persuasive, that we
are beginning to look beyond the crises which we
face to the forces which are creating those crises.
Moreover, I believe we are beginning to deal with
these forces with a tough-minded but sensitive
realism that is new in the conduct of American
foreign affairs.
This realism was strikingly evident at last
week's Regional Operations Conference at Baguio
in the Philippines.'' This meeting was the sixth
' For texts, see American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955:
Basic Documents, vol. I, Department of State publication
6440, p. 750.
* For an announcement of the conference, see Bttlletin
of Mar. 2G, 1902, p. 511.
in a series of such meetings that have now covered
all our missions in Africa, Latin America, the
Middle East, South Asia, and East Asia. It was
attended by U.S. ambassadors and their principal
associates from 15 Asian posts, plus key officials
from Waslmigton representing various Govern-
ment agencies that deal with foreign affairs.
These Regional Operations Conferences have had
thi'ee main objectives :
1. To confirm beyond question the overall au-
thority and responsibility of our ambassadors;
2. To improve the coordination and administra-
tion abroad of the many instruments of United
States foreign policy ; and
3. To review the policies of the present admin-
istration in depth, not only on a regional basis but
in all parts of the world.
As tools of improved management and com-
mimication, all of these meetings have demon-
strated their usefulness. At Baguio there was a
particularly frank attempt to reach a balanced as-
sessment of past mistakes and successes in Asia
and our present overall position there.
In regard to Communist China it was agreed
that the time has come for more solid thought and
fewer slogans. Although some may still hope that
the so-called "China problem" will conveniently
disappear, thoughtful observers agree that this is
not in the cards. Consequently there was general
agreement at Baguio that our approach to Com-
munist China must look beyond the narrow ques-
tion of recognition — on which our policies are
clear — to consider some of the pressures now being
generated within mainland China, pressures whose
significance is undeniable but whose results remain
obscure.
At present, Peiping-Moscow relations appear to
be steadily worsening. At the same time mainland
China is facing an acute food shortage that stems
not merely from bad weather and mismanagement
but more fundamentally from a shortage of arable
land, inadequate fertilizer production, and a popu-
lation increase of 16 million people annually.
The political implications are both explosive
and unjiredictable.
Will (he Peii)ing government adopt a more ag-
gressive course in Southeast Asia? Or will it
gradually move toward a more moderate ap-
proach? Are we fully prepared for either con-
tingency ?
676
Department of State Bulletin
These and many other equally hard questions
occupied the center of our discussions. Although
no final answers were reached, frank discussion is
a first essential step.
In Asia I also saw evidence of a new apprecia-
tion of the relevance of the American revolution-
ary tradition to world affairs — not simply as an
anticolonial force but in its broad economic, social,
and political implications. I had sensed a similar
appreciation in earlier trips to Africa and Latin
America.
In this context we are beginning to develop a
more positive idea of what American foreign pol-
icy is striving to achieve. In today's world it is
not enough to be against communism; people
everywhere want to know what we stand for.
With increasing effectiveness we are beginning
to tell them.
Total Diplomacy
A new generation is now serving our Govern-
ment which does not look back — as many of the
older generation do — to a so-called "normal life"
of quiet isolation. On the contrary, they see in
bur new global commitments an exciting new
frontier of human opportunity.
We are also coming to realize that foreign op-
erations in today's world call for a total diplomacy
that reflects all of the dynamic phases of our own
American society — from our industrial capacity
and military defense to our educational system and
our dedication to the rights of the human in-
dividual.
American ambassadors can no longer be content
with wining and dining, reporting, analyzing, and
cautiously predicting. They must act as adminis-
trators and coordinators, responsible for the effec-
tive operation of all U.S. Government activities
in the countries of their assignment.
Growing out of these factors is a new under-
standing in every nation and in every corner of
every nation of the overriding importance of
people — what they think, what they fear, what
they seek. No longer can a wealthy minority in
a developing country depend on docile peasant
soldiers to defend its privileges.
Not even the best equipped, American-trained
troops can successfully defend their own country
unless their fellow citizens feel that they have
something meaningful of their own for which they
are prepared to give their lives. This is a decisive
new factor in world affairs and therefore a basic
new element of power.
In this respect we are now beginning to encour-
age the developing nations to create military forces
capable of effective defense against Communist
guerrillas ; in the tradition of our own U.S. Army
Engineers, such forces are also trained in the
building of roads, dams, bridges, and schools.
This helps create a working partnership between
soldiers and citizens.
We have also become aware of the need for
flexible, mobile, American military power capable
of dealing vigorously with the kind of local wars
which we may be called upon to fight in support
of independent goverimients.
In our aid programs, through painful experi-
ence, we have learned that we cannot impose our
own system on others, that we cannot effectively
use our aid to buy friends, and that it is unpro-
ductive to use economic assistance simply to outbid
the Communists. We have become aware that
the true purpose of our assistance is to help devel-
oping nations exercise their own freedom of
choice, to decide within their own religions and
cultures and within the framework of their own
history what kind of societies will best serve their
own people.
We have always Icnown that orderly political
growth requires material progress. But now we
are coming to see that the manner in which the
growth is achieved may be decisive. To what
extent, for instance, have the people as a whole
participated in the process of development? To
what extent has it given them an increasing sense
of individual justice and dignity ?
Steady improvement is now clearly evident in
the effectiveness of our information program and
in the ways we use our agricultural plenty through
Food for Peace. And everywhere I heard praise
for the operations of our new Peace Corps — a new
and promising concept in people-to-people re-
lations.
As a result I believe that most Asians are gradu-
ally beginning to trust us, to sense that the United
States is not simply another rich nation out to
exploit the less fortunate, and to see that the weary
old colonial issue is no longer in fact relevant.
As they consider the contradictions of Marxism
and the internal difficulties and divisions facing
the Soviet Union and mainland China, Asians are
also beginning to understand the sterility of the
Communist doctrine itself. They are even begin-
AprU 23, 1962
677
ning to appreciate the importance of the United
States military shield, without which there would
be little opportunity to build the independent
Asian societies on which they have set their hearts.
On the basis of these generally hopeful impres-
sions, I therefore return to Washington with a
greater sense of confidence than when I left — and
yet still keenly aware that a naked act of aggres-
sion or a tragic miscalculation could blow us all
sky high by sunset.
The situation in Asia has its mixture of the re-
assuring and the grim. Yet I believe that the wave
of the future belongs to free men of many races
and creeds, working together in a massive effort
to create some kind of rational world partnership.
Moreover, I believe that the faint outlines of
such a partnership are already beginning to show
themselves and that in the 1960"s — barring a nu-
clear accident — they may become increasingly
clear for all to see.
Strategy of American Foreign Policy
hy George C. McGhee
Under Secretary for Political Affairs ^
For nearly 15 years the Department of State
has received — almost every week — a certain num-
ber of letters that ask us, in effect, why we don't
"do something about the Communist menace."
They suggest that we are "too soft" on communism
and that we must "win the cold war."
During this same period we have also received
almost as many letters that seem to suggest that
the Department isn't doing enough to preserve
international peace. Sometim&s they say that we
should "learn to trust other nations," "iron out our
misunderstandings with Russia," "stop the arms
race," and eliminate the terrifying threat of nu-
clear hostilities.
I believe the people who wrote these letters — as
well as millions of other Americans — are really
asking serious and reasonable questions. They
want to understand the "grand strategy" of Amer-
ican foreign policy — what our nation is trying to
do in the world, why we are trying to do it, and
how we are going about it. And I believe they are
entitled to an answer.
This grand strategy isn't really mysterious, but
it is almost unbelievably complex. It is complex
because the world is a big place, because we must
' Address made before the San Francisco Area World
Trade ABsociatlon, World Trade Club, San Francisco,
Calif., on Mar. 27 (press release 188 dated Mar. 2C).
have not one but many diflferent purposes, and be-
cause we must use many and specialized tools to
accomplish these purposes. As a result no man
alive sees the whole picture nor can tell you the
whole story. My purpose today is to put together
for you certain parts of the picture that I consider
vitally important to our survival as free men and
women in a free and prosperous nation.
The strategy of American foreign policy today
is designed to pursue realistically the totality of
American interests, as these interests have been
expressed by the American people both directly
and through their elected representatives.
The key to the success of our international
strategy — like all strategy — is the development
and use of strength. We must not, however, be
misled by oversimplification of the problem into
placing our reliance upon any single element of
strength. Our nation cannot be protected — nor
our ultimate objectives promoted — by military
strength alone, nor by economic strength alone,
nor by moral strength alone.
The struggle known as the cold war calls for tlie
effective utilization of all our resources. We can-
not confine ourselves to one or even a limited range
of tools or techniques. We must have the strength
that comes from a mighty military establislunent,
from a prosperous and dynamic economy, from an
evolving science and teclinology, from a free and
678
Department of State Bulletin
orderly scx-ietj', from intellectual and spiritual
growth, and from unity of purpose and action-
all at the same time.
Strenfrth, like charity, must begin at home. To-
day the United States is in almost every sense a
healthy and powerful nation. However, wo
learned many years ago that we could not attain
our national objectives, nor even assure our sur-
vival, solely through our own strength. Our
country has only about 6 percent of the world's
territory and population. We are blessed by an
abundance of natural resources, but these are not
adequate to make us militarily or economically
self-sufficient.
We have an advanced science and technology,
but we depend heavily upon the science and tech-
nology of other friendly nations. It is well for
Americans to remember that the first atomic bomb
was produced by combining the knowledge and
skills of scientists from many nations.
Even if we could ignore our moral and humani-
tarian interests in the freedom and well-being of
other nations, we could not ignore the fact that
their health and strength are essential to our own
freedom and well-being. The United States could
not surv'ive indefinitely as an island fortress in a
hostile world. For these reasons, as well as others,
we have cast aside the concept of isolationism.
There still lingers, however, some of the myth-
ology of that era to obscure our perception of in-
ternational issues.
Survey of World Objectives
To survey our objectives in the world, we wish,
as a minimum, for all other nations that are free
of Sino-Soriet domination to retain their inde-
pendence. This is true even of nations that have
political and economic systems markedly different
from our own — nations that have even expressed
hostility toward our values and our policies — •
nations that have little or nothing to contribute at
the present time to the cause of peace and free-
dom. Where such a nation's policies and actions
are uncooperative, of coui-se, our own ability to
cooperate and assist is limited.
Nevertheless we recognize the great importance
of the fact that any nation, so long as it retains
true independence, retains at the same time a free-
dom of choice as to its future— a freedom which
is lost once it has been subjected to Sino-Soviet
control. It also retains the opportimity for change
and growth. Moreover, .so long as it remains in-
dependent, its human and material resources can-
not be used to augment the power of the Sino-
So\'iet empire.
As a maximmn we wish other nations to achieve
sufficient national and personal freedom, together
with sufficient strength and sense of common pur-
pose, that will enable them to make a positive con-
tribution to our common interests and objectives.
Obviously there are many intermediate stages be-
tween our minimum and maximmn goals. At the
end of World War II there was virtually no free
nation that could make a significant contribution
to our most important interests. Our closest and
strongest friends had been strained or ravaged
by war and could add little or nothing to our ovm
political, military, or economic strength. They
seemed to be liabilities rather than assets.
Fortunately our nation had the foresight to
recognize that liabilities could be converted into
assets and the imagination and courage to imder-
take this task. We do not fear the strength of
other free nations, nor do we feel obliged to keep
them divided. On the contrary, we have worked
to increase their strength and to encourage their
efforts at unity.
In Japan our military occupation did not milk
the Japanese economy but rather sought to lay
a foundation for a free and prosperous Japanese
society. In Western Europe we undertook and
supported a bold series of measures to build
strength and unity — the Greek-Turkish aid pro-
gram, the Marshall plan, the OEEC [Organiza-
tion for European Economic Cooperation], the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and various
policies aimed at achieving maximum integration
among the European nations themselves. We
made a very substantial investment in Western
European strength and imity, and this investment
has paid handsome dividends.
The nations of Western Europe have, with our
help, maintained and extended their political and
social freedom. They have recovered from the
ravages of war and have achieved imprecedented
levels of economic prosperity, based essentially
upon competitive private enterprise. Their large
colonial empires have almost entirely dis-
appeared; about 800 million people formerly
under Western European rule have attained
statehood.
However, the virtual elimination of colonialism
has not diminished Western Europe's overall
April 23, 1962
679
strength and influence; first, because "Western
Europe still retains close political, economic, and
cultural ties with many of these new countries;
and second, because Western Europe has been per-
mitted to turn its vast energies from the burdens
of colonialism to its own evolution and develop-
ment. Meanwhile several of the Western Euro-
pean nations have developed substantial military
as well as economic capabilities.
The nations of the Atlantic community, includ-
ing the United States, Canada, and the free na-
tions of Western Europe, now possess about 90
percent of the free world's industrial and techno-
logical capacity. They possess virtually all of the
free world's modern military power. They have
numerous ties with the nations of Asia, Africa,
and Latin America. In brief, the Atlantic com-
munity is the hard core of the strength and vmity
of the free world as a whole.
It is important to remember that the "Atlantic
community" is not a formal organization but is
rather a concept, a series of institutions and a
steadily evolving process of cooperation. Fifteen
nations of the Atlantic community have joined
together in NATO, a defensive military alliance
and an instrument of political cooperation.
Twenty Atlantic nations have also joined together
in the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development, through which the member
governments are seeking to coordinate many of
their economic and fiscal policies and to provide
more ample and effective assistance to the lesser
developed regions of the world.
United States and the Common Market
Meanwhile we have witnessed and encouraged
another development of tremendous significance.
For centuries European statesmen have sought to
eliminate the frictions and rivalries that have dis-
sipated Europe's strength and have produced two
disastrous world wars. Some have dreamed of a
United States of Europe. Thus far attempts at
uniting Westei-n Europe by conquest, by political
federation, and by military integration have
proved unsuccessful. However, six Western Eu-
ropean nations have made an unprecedented
breakthrougli in the field of economic integration.
Beginning in 1950 with the European Coal and
Steel Community, these nations have moved for-
ward to establish a European Atomic Energy
Community and are now in the process of per-
fecting a European p]conomic Commiuiity, better
known as the European Common Market.
The members of this Common Market have
pledged themselves to remove by gradual stages
all artificial barriers to trade and the movement
of their citizens across national boundaries, with
the objective of achieving by 1970 an economic
relationship comparable to that which exists
among the 50 States of our own country. While
the ultimate goals of the European Common
Market have not yet been realized, the process of
economic integration, in the opinion of most Eu-
ropean statesmen, has already passed the point of
no return. Moreover, this process has gone far
enough to demonstrate conclusively the political
and economic value of unity. By reducing tariffs
and other barriers of trade — thus simultaneously
providing wider markets and the powerful stimu-
lus of competition — industry, commerce, and agri-
culture have gained new vitality.
The sick national economies that we used to
hear about a few years ago have become healthy
and vigorous economies. Profits, wages, and liv-
ing standards have risen. Western Europe is
competing more effectively in world markets.
Unemployed workers in certain countries are find-
ing good jobs in other countries. Finally, the na-
tions of the Common Market have attained an
annual rate of economic growth that is approxi-
mately twice the recent growth rate of the United
States.
For the first time in history the United States is
confronted by an economic entity roughly equiv-
alent in size and capacity to itself. The Common
Market is already larger than the United States
market in terms of population and is potentially
larger in purchasing power. Last year the United
Kingdom applied for full membership in the Com-
mon Market, and other Western European nations
may follow. These applications for membership
will involve delicate negotiations, and the outcome
cannot bo predicted at this time. However, the
Common Market has already altered world trading
patterns and has developed (ho capacity to play a
dynamic role of leadership on the political stage.
Its maximum potentialities are very great.
President Kennedy and his advisers are keenly
awaro of the immense significance and potentiality
of the expanding Common Market, both in terms
of our domestic prosperity and in terms of our
general foreign policy. The members of tlie ex-
panded Common Market, for example, accoimt for
680
Department of State Bulletin
a major portion of American export trade — al-
togetlier $0 billion a year — and much of our import
trade. Existing tariff legislation does not, how-
ever, give the President sufficient authority to bar-
gain effectively with the European Common
Market nor to cope with radically changing trad-
ing patterns in other parts of the world. There-
fore the President has asked the Congress for
new legislation to enlarge and broaden his bar-
gaining authority and to provide more flexible
and selective protection for American workers,
farmers, and businessmen.^
I do not want to enter into a detailed discussion
of the domestic economic advantages of the pro-
posed trade legislation. There is overwhelming
evidence that it will be beneficial to the American
people without inflicting significant injuiy upon
any segment of the economy. This is not a ques-
tion of making a sacrifice in order to help our
European friends but of our whole future as a
world trading nation.
We have every reason to anticipate that the
adoption of this legislation, followed by an effec-
tive negotiation with the European Common
Market and other countries, will add to our do-
mestic prosperity, increase employment, provide
new opportunities to industrial and agricultural
producers, help to check inflation, and in the long
run contribute substantially to the dynamism of
our whole economic system.
However, the implications of the President's
trade proposals go far beyond their domestic eco-
nomic benefits. These proposals, in fact, represent
the most important single example of the positive
elements of our international strategy. They are
designed to serve as an essential foundation stone
for a world community of free, prosperous, and
peaceful nations.
As I have already pointed out, the expanding
European Common Market will be a true equal of
the United States in many important respects.
This fact is extremely important. Despite the
close relationships that already exist — institutional
and otherwise — between North America and West-
em Europe, there has always been a missing in-
gredient. While several members of NATO and
the OECD may properly be described as major
powers, none has approached the United States
in terms of wealth, production and consumption,
^ For text of the President's message to Congress, see
Buu-ETiN of Feb. 12, 1962, p. 231 ; for a summary of the
bill (H.R. 9900), see ibid., Feb. 26, 1962, p. 343.
science and technology, military strength, inter-
national commitments, etc. Both the United
States and the other members of the Atlantic
community have been discomfited by the fact that
there has been no equality, either in capacities or
responsibilities.
If we can negotiate a mutually beneficial trade
agreement with the Common Market on a broad
category of goods, permitting expanded and inti-
mate trading between us, we shall have taken the
first and perhaps decisive step toward converting
a relatively loose association of unequals into a
tightly knit partnership of equals.
By the same step we shall have increased the
economic and technological dynamism of both
partners. We shall have cemented and consoli-
dated existing institutional relationships which
might be imperiled if the two great common mar-
kets of Western Europe and North America should
make the tragic mistake of becoming economic
rivals. In brief the adoption of the President's
trade proposals and their effective implementation
can vastly increase the strength — and simultane-
ously tighten the unity — of Western Europe and
North America by creating a new Atlantic
partnership.
Strength and Unity of Free World
In view of my earlier remarks the direct and
immediate value of such a partnership should be
obvious. It can contribute to the security, pros-
perity, and freedom of both the United States and
the European Economic Community. But its im-
plications go much further. A strong and united
Atlantic partnership can also contribute to the
strength and unity of the free world as a whole.
All Amei'icans know that the United States has
interests and obligations involving many nations
and regions outside the European Economic Com-
munity. These include those Western European
states which cannot or do not choose to join the
Common Market. They include our northern
neighbor and partner — Canada — as well as other
members of the British Commonwealth. They
include our old and intimate friends and allies in
the Organization of American States. They in-
clude Japan, which has become a major center of
freedom and economic vitality in the Far East,
and other friends and allies in the Western Pacific.
Finally, they include the newly emerging and
lesser developed countries of the world, primarily
in Asia and Africa.
April 23, 1962
681
The present and prospective members of the
European Common Market also have worldwide
interests and responsibilities. The unity provided
by the Common Market system, enhanced further
by an economic partnership with the United
States, will vastly increase the capacity of both
parties to pursue these interests and meet these
responsibilities. Neither the United States nor
any other Atlantic nation wishes to be a member
of an exclusive "rich man's club." Our ultimate
purpose is to attain the kind of world community
contemplated by the United Nations Charter.
The profound significance of the Atlantic partner-
ship lies in the fact that the consolidation and
expansion of its own strength and unity can help
to impart strength and unity to the remainder of
the free world.
To be more specific, we should understand the
fact that the President's trade proposals provide
for the maintenance of the most-favored-nation
principle. This means that the benefits of any
trading agi-eement reached with the European
Common Market will be available automatically
to all other free nations that have made or are
willing to make comparable trading concessions.
The Atlantic partnership, therefore, will not be
an instrmnent of discrimination in trade with
other areas but instead will be a means of reducing
and eliminating such discrimination.
Expanded trade, in turn, will benefit these
other areas in many ways. In the lesser developed
I'egions, for example, expanded trade will stimu-
late investment, provide more stable export mar-
kets and sources of supply, and thereby permit
these countries to earn foreign exchange to sup-
plement that now being received in the form of
loans and grants. Eventually, of course, these
earnings are expected to substitute for loans and
grants as the lesser developed countries advance
toward the ultimate goal of self-sustaining eco-
nomic growth.
Expanded trade will also provide cement for
the entire community of free nations. In the long
run the unity we sock cannot be assured by force,
diplomacy, psychological strategy, or oven inti-
mate cultural and personal contacts. It must rest
upon a real identity of interests, and there is prob-
ably no single common interest that draws coun-
tries so closely together as a mutually beneficial
trading relationship.
We expect expanded trade to be reflected in
a growth of commerce with the Far East, whicli
is of particular interest — and rightly 90 — to the
people of your city and State. Japan, already one
of our best customers, will, imder conditions of
freer trade, enhance its growth and hence its de-
mand for United States imports. The less devel-
oped countries of the Far East will at the same
time be moving toward self-sustaining growth and
higher levels of economic activity and trade with
this country.
Increase in trade with the Far East, both in
imports and exports, will, of course, have a direct
and major impact on California, its industries,
its workers, and its farmers. The shipping indus-
try would benefit directly and importantly from
the new trade program proposed by the President.
The port of San Francisco handles about half of
all California's exports and imports — 2,000,000
and 3,000,000 tons, respectively, a year. Ex-
panded trade, particularly with the Far East,
would give it a tremendous boost.
Your State's expoils total about $1.8 billion a
year, second only to New York's. More than one-
fourth of this total represents exports of agricul-
tural commodities, another fourth transportation
equipment, mainly aircraft. Canned foods, petro-
leum products, construction equipment, and elec-
trical machinery account for most of the remain-
der. Some 500 California firms each have annual
exports totaling more than $25,000, nearly half
of which use the port of San Francisco. Together
they employ nearly a half million persons. Food
and manufactured products shipped from the San
Francisco Bay area go all over the world — to
France, "West Germany, the Netherlands, Eng-
land, Japan, Mexico, Brazil, Colombia, and else-
where in Latin America.
Reduced tarilTs on imports and the vast ex-
pansion of the Nation's export markets envisaged
by the new trade program would help the San
Francisco area — indeed, the entire State of Cali-
fornia — as much as any area of the Nation.
A Policy of Dynamic Growth
The Atlantic partnership will increa.se the ca-
pacity of its members to protect and assist the
lesser developed regions. Strength begets strength
:in(l attracts strength. A strong and united At-
lantic partnership will be able to make available
to the lesser developed nations more money and
resources — more technical advice and assistance —
than ever before, and will also be able to insure
that all this aid is u.sed more efTectively. A
682
Department of Slate Bulletin
stronger Atlantic partnership will also be able
to establish a more secure world in which these
countries will be better protected against aggres-
sion.
Its strength should have an impact on the nu-
mei'ous and persistent crises in various parts of
the world — Berlin, the Congo, Viet-Nam, Laos,
etc. Neither we nor our allies can ignore areas of
weakness nor areas under attack — actual or threat-
ened — however far these areas may be from the
centers of our own strength and interests. As
Secretary Rusk has said, if we ignore the periph-
ery, the periphery may become the center.
But let us not, either, focus exclusively upon the
crisis areas — upon weakness and danger — and
thereby make the even more serious error of ig-
noring the center itself : the hard core of Atlantic
nations which supply most of the aid resources and
military strength of the free world. We must be
as quick to seize opportunities in strengthening
the center as to respond to challenges on the
periphery.
The basic strategy of American foreign policy
is thus not a policy of static defense. It is a
strategy of dynamic growth. Our task is to use
all the means available to us to increase the
strength and unity of other free nations and
peoples and thus to extend the frontiers of freedom
itself.
But the purpose of this strength and unity is
not just to be able to fight and win a nuclear war,
nor just to fight a more effective cold war — unless
the Sino-Soviet bloc chooses to continue this waste-
ful struggle. Rather our purpose is to offer the
rulers and peoples of the Communist world power-
ful incentives to abandon the cold war and to sub-
stitute genuine peace and cooperation for the
vague and mysterious "coexistence" they have
offered.
We must never close the door to cooperation
with any nation. "Wliile we cannot be so optimis-
tic as to assume that the Communist system is
on the brink of collapse, neither should we be so
pessimistic as to ignore the possibility of change —
gradual or sudden — in the structure of the Com-
munist system or the objectives of its rulers. It
is our duty to be suspicious and distrustful so long
as we have evidence to justify distrust, but it is
also our duty to offer incentives for cooperation
and to be prepared for all possibilities — the ])ossi-
bilities of good and evil alike. We must keep our
hopes high and our powder dry.
April 23, 1962
In other words our strategy is to attain and ex-
tend a combination of strength and unity that will,
in tlie first instance, render the United States, the
Atlantic community, and all other free nations
unassailable, and at the same time make freedom
and cooperation attractive. Strength is a magnet
as well as a fortress. In the long run our stick is
the same as our carrot.
J. F. Friedkin Named to U.S.-Mexican
Boundary and Water Commission
The Department of State announced on April 2
(press release 217) that Joseph F. Friedkin had
taken his oath of office on that day as U.S. Com-
missioner on the International Boundary and
Water Commission, United States and Mexico.
He succeeds Col. L. H. Hewitt (U.S. Army, re-
tired). The new Commissioner, a career employee,
has been with the U.S. Section of the Commission
continuously since April 2, 1934, except for mili-
tai-y service. He became Principal Engineer
(Supervising) in 1952.
The International Boundary and Water Com-
mission, United States and Mexico, consists of a
U.S. and a Mexican Commissioner, and the treaty
of 1944 with Mexico stipulates that each must be
an engineer. Functioning under the policy direc-
tion of the Department of State and the Mexican
Ministry of Foreign Relations, the Commission is
charged by numerous treaties and laws with the
conduct of an international program for the solu-
tion of engineering problems along the 1,935-mile
boundary with Mexico.
Among its activities the Commission is presently
entering the construction phase of a second great
international dam on the Rio Grande. The first,
Falcon Dam, was completed in 1953 and has al-
ready more than paid for itself in flood control.
The Congress authorized the U.S. Section in June
1960 to proceed with the still-larger structure to be
known as Amistad Dam. The Commission also
administers the deliveiy of Colorado River water
to Mexico under the 1944 treaty and is engaged
in an intensive study to remedy a salinity problem
that has arisen with Mexico.^ The Commission is
in charge of flood control on the lower Rio Grande.
' For background, see Bulletin of Apr. 16, 1962, p. 650.
683
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
U.N. Security Council Rejects Cuban Call for Opinion
of World Court on OAS Action
Following are statements made hy Adlai E.
Stevenson^ U.S. Representative in the Security
Council, on March 15 and 23, and the text of a
Cuban draft resolution.
STATEMENT OF MARCH 15
U.S. /U.N. press release 3940
This is the third time this year that United Na-
tions organs have met in response to a Cuban
complaint. They are all essentially alike — attacks
on the United States or the Organization of
American States. But this time something has
been added: The objective of the Communists is
very clear; it is to extend the Soviet veto to all
regional organizations by way of the Security
Council.
Wlien the Cuban government sought to bring its
last charge before the Security Council a couple
of weeks ago, just after almost 2 weeks of exami-
nation of the same charge in the General Assem-
bly, my Government opposed further discussion
of the complaint.^ But this time we have not op-
posed placing the item on our agenda, not, as I
say, because it differs in its political content but
because we believe this Council should dispas-
sionately examine any request that an opinion be
sought of the International Court of Justice.
The representative of Cuba [Mario Garcia
Inchaustegui] regrettably has not approaclied his
own request for a judicial opinion in a judicial
manner. Eather, by the tone and substance of
his speech it is clear that he is again pursuing a
dispute which his goveniment has created between
^ On Feb. 27 the Security Council met to con.si(lor a Cu-
ban complaint asainst the United States (S/r)OSO) and
decided, by a vole of 4 to 0, witli 7 abstentions (U.S.),
not to include the item in its asendn ; for U.S. statements
in the General Assembly on Feb. 14 and 20, see Bulletin
of Apr. 2, 1962, p. 553.
it, on the one hand, and all the Kepublics of the
hemisphere on the other.
This time the attack is against the Organiza-
tion of American States. But it is clearly aimed
at all regional organizations. It is an attempt to
subject the activities of all regional organizations
to the Soviet veto in the Security Council.
Let there be no mistake about the objective of
this complaint. The Cuban letter is camouflaged
witli legalisms, but the issue it raises is 100-per-
cent political. That issue is whether a regional
organization, one which has cooperated fully with
the United Nations, has the right to manage its
own affairs and defend itself against a foreign
dominated government or whether the Soviet Un-
ion is to be allowed to paralyze that organization's
activities through Soviet exercise of its veto power
in this Council.
We believe that everyone who recognizes the
great contributions to the progress of the world
which regional organizations have made and can
make, whether it be the Organization of American
States, the Arab League, or some future regional
associations of African or Asian states, will join
in rejecting this threat to the independence and
vitality of such regional organizations and this
elfort of tlie Soviet Union to extend its veto over
their activities.
This is not the first time the Communist bloc
has tried to extend the veto to advance its cam-
paign for world domination. Soviet vetoes in the
Security Council so impaired its functions and
effectiveness over the years that it became neces-
sary to adopt the "Uniting for Peace" resolution ^
so that the General Assembly, at least, can act
with decisiveness and dispatch. Even in the As-
sembly and its committees we have seen efforts to
spread the Soviet veto through the concept of
unanimity. And it was only last fall that we
" For text, see ihiiL, Nov. 20, 1050, p. S2.3.
634
Department of Sfofe Bulletin
faced a Communist move, stimulated by tlie ef-
fectiveness of the Secretariat, to impose a troika
on the office of the Secretary-General, which would
have subjected the entire Secretariat to the Soviet
veto. That move was decisively rejected. And
this new effort to extend the veto to regional or-
ganizations should be just as decisively rejected.
"What is it that the Cuban letter^ before us is
asking the Security Council to do? The letter
contends that the resolutions ^ adopted by the Or-
ganization of American States at Pimta del Este
constitute "aggression against the sovereignty of
our country and a serious threat to international
peace and security," that they require the authori-
zation of the Security Council, under article 53 of
the charter, on the ground that they constitute
"enforcement action" within the language of that
article, and that without such approval they vio-
late the Charter of the United Nations.
So that we may not forget what the real issue
at Punta del Este was and so that we may deter-
mine whether its decisions did or did not consti-
tute aggression, violate the charter, or require Se-
curity Council approval as "enforcement action,"
I must ask your indulgence while I deal with each
of the Punta del Este resolutions. They are all
set forth in full in the Final Act of Punta del
Este, document S/5075, which is before the Se-
curity Council.
Communist Offensive in America
The first resolution relates to the offensive by
the Communist bloc against the American Re-
publics. I shall read from paragraphs 1, 2, and 3
of that resolution, which was adopted by the unan-
imous vote of all the American Republics (except
Cuba) :
1. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American
Republics . . . declare that the continental unity and the
democratic institutions of the hemisphere are now In
danger.
The Mini.sters have been able to verify that the sub-
versive offensive of communist governments, their agents
and the organizations which they control, has increased
in intensity. The purpose of this offensive is the destruc-
tion of democratic institutions and the establishment of
totalitarian dictatorships at the service of extracontinen-
tal powers. The outstanding facts in this intensified of-
fensive are the declarations set forth in ofiicial documents
of the directing bodies of the international communist
" U.N. doc. S/5086.
* For background and tests of resolutions, see Bdxletin
of Feb. 19, 1962, p. 270.
movement, that one of its principal objectives is the
establishment of communist regimes in the underdeveloped
countries and in Latin America; and the existence of
a Marxist-Leninist government in Cuba which is publicly
aligned with the doctrine and foreign policy of the com-
munist powers.
2. In order to achieve their subversive purposes and
hide their true intentions, the communist governments
and their agents exploit the legitimate needs of the less-
favored sectors of the population and the just national
aspirations of the various peoples. With the pretext of
defending popular interests, freedom is suppressed, demo-
cratic institutions are destroyed, human rights are vio-
lated and the individual is subjected to materialistic
wa.vs of life imposed by the dictatorship of a single party.
Under the slogan "anti-imperialism" they try to establish
an oppressive. aggres.sive, imperialism, which subordi-
nates the subjugated nations to the militaristic and ag-
gressive interests of estracontinental powers. By ma^
liciously utilizing the very principles of the Inter-American
system, they attempt to undermine democratic institu-
tions and to strengthen and protect political penetration
and aggression. The .subversive methods of communist
governments and their agents constitute one of the most
subtle and dangerous forms of intervention in the internal
affairs of other countries.
3. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs alert the peoples
of the hemisphere to the intensification of the subversive
offensive of communist governments, their agents, and the
organizations that they control and to the tactics and
methods that they employ and also warn them of the
dangers this situation represents to representative de-
mocracy, to respect for human rights, and to the self-
determination of peoples.
And then the Ministers conclude with a declara-
tion that :
The principles of communism are incompatible with
the principles of the Inter-American system.
Here, then, is a resolution in which the members
of the OAS have unanimously alerted the West-
ern Hemisphere to the dangers of Communist
aggression in the form of subversion. This reso-
lution is a statement of policy by the OAS and a
statement of its great concern about the Commu-
nist threat to our security. It was to deal with
just such problems that the OAS was established.
Does such a resolution constitute aggression or
contravene the United Nations Charter or require
Security Council authorization ? Of course it does
not, and it would be pointless to ask the Interna-
tional Court of Justice whether it does.
Establishment of Committee on Security
The second resolution, adopted 19 to 1 (Cuba),
with one abstention ( Bolivia) , requested the Coun-
cil of the Organization of American States to
April 23, J 962
685
maintain vigilance for the purpose of warning
against acts of aggression, subversion, and other
dangers to peace and security resulting from the
continued intervention of Sino-Soviet powers in
the Western Hemisphere.
The resolution directed the Council to establish
a special consultative committee of experts on se-
curity matters to advise member states tliat may
request assistance. The resolution also urged
member states to take steps considered by them
appropriate for their individual or collective self-
defense and to cooperate to strengthen their capac-
ity to counteract threats or acts of aggression,
subversion, or other dangers to peace and security
resulting from the continued intervention in the
Western Hemisphere of Sino-Soviet powers.
Does such a resolution constitute aggression or
contravene the United Nations Cliarter or require
Security Council authorization? Of course it
does not, and it would be pointless to ask the
International Court of Justice whether it does.
Clearly the resolution is an exercise of the inherent
riglit of nations to prepare for their own self-
defense, whether individually or collectively.
And so to prepare was elementai-y prudence in the
face of the extracontinental Communist threat.
Resolutions Calling for Free Elections
The tliird resolution reiterated the foreign min-
isters' adherence to the principles of self-deter-
mination and nonintervention and, in a second
paragraph, urged the governments of the member
states to organize themselves on the basis of free
elections that express, without restriction, the will
of the people.
The Cuban regime voted against— I repeat,
against— free elections and voted against — I re-
peat, against — the resolution itself. Every other
American Republic voted for that paragraph and
for the resolution.
Does such a resolution, calling for free elections
to express the people's will, contravene the United
Nations Charter or require Security Council au-
thorization ? Of course it does not, and it would
be pointless to ask the International Court of
.fusticc whether it does. The real problem in the
Caribbean is disclosed by the fact that tlie Cuban
regime felt compelled to vote against such a basic
right, a basic riglit enshrined in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.
The fourth resolution recommended that gov-
ernments whose structure or acts are incompatible
with the effective exercise of representative de-
mocracy should hold free elections in order to
guarantee the restoration of a legal order based
on the authority of the law and respect for the
rights of the individual. The Cuban regime also
voted against that resolution, again denying the
principle of free elections. Eveiy other American
Republic voted for free elections and for the
resolution.
Does such a recommendation constitute aggres-
sion or contravene the United Nations Charter or
require Security Coimcil authorization? Of
course it does not, and there is no reason to ask
the International Court of Justice whether it
does.
Alliance for Progress Resolution
The fifth resolution, also unanimously adopted
(except for Cuba) , declared in part :
1. That the preservation and strengthening of free and
democratic institutions in the American republics require
. . . the prompt, accelerated execution of an unprece-
dented effort to promote their economic and social devel-
opment for which effort the public and private, domestic
and foreign financial resources necessary to those objec-
tives are to be made available, economic and social re-
forms are to be established, and every nec-essary internal
effort is to be made in accordance with the provisions of
the Charter of Punta del Este.
2. That it is essential to promote energetically and
vigorously the basic industries of the Latin American
countries, to liberalize trade in raw materials by the
elimination of undue restrictions, to seek to avoid violent
fluctuations in their prices, to encourage the moderniza-
tion and expansion of services in order ... to increase
national wealth and to nialie such increased wealth avail-
able to persons of all economic and social groui>s, and to
satisfy quiclily, among other aspirations, the needs for
worli, housing, land, health, and education.
Does such a resolution — and it is interesting to
note that this resolution has been thorouglily
deprecated by Cuba — constitute aggression or con-
travene the United Nations Charter or require Se-
curity Council authorization? Of course it does
not, and it would be pointless to ask the Interna-
tional Court of Justice whether it does.
Self-Exclusion of Cuba From American System
The sixth resolution is entitled "Exclusion of
the Present Government of Cuba From Participa-
tion in the Inter-American System." This reso-
lution is one of those most critical of tlie present
I
686
Department of Stale Bulletin
government of Cuba, and for this reason it has
provoked strong Cuban reaction. But this does
not make the resolution "aggression" or make it
subject to Security Council approval.
The resolution refers to the report of the Inter-
American Peace Committee, which stated :
3. As regards the intense subversive activity in which
the countries of the Sino-Soviet bloc are engaged in
America and the activities of the Cuban Government that
are pointed out in this report, it is evident that they
would constitute acts that, within the system for the
"ix)litical defense" of the hemisphere, have been classed
as acts of "political aggression" or "aggression of a non-
military character." Such acts represent attacks upon
Inter-American peace and security as well as on the sov-
ereignty and political independence of the American
states, and therefore a serious violation of fundamental
principles of the inter-American system, as has been re-
peatedly and explicitly declared at previous Inter-
American Conferences and Meetings of Consultation.
Based on these facts, among others, the resolution
declared :
That, as a consequence of repeated acts, the present
government of Cuba has voluntarily placed itself outside
the inter-American system.
The resolution goes on with two operative para-
graphs, reading as follows :
1. That adherence by any member of the Organization
of American States to Marxism-Leninism is incompatible
with the inter- American system and the alignment of such
a government with the communist bloc breaks the unity
and solidarity of the hemisphere.
2. That the present government of Cuba, which has of-
ficially identified itself as a Marxist-Leninist government,
is incompatible with the principles and objectives of the
inter-American system.
These two paragraphs were adopted by the
unanimous vote of the 20 American Kepublics,
with Cuba alone dissenting. Do these two opera-
tive paragraphs, expressing the convictions of the
OAS membership, constitute aggression or contra-
vene the United Nations Charter or require Se-
curity Council authorization ? Of course not, and
it would be pointless to ask the International Court
of Justice whether they do. They are statements
of the unanimous views (except, of course, for
Cuba) of the members of a regional organiza-
tion — not only fully within its rights but specifi-
cally within the purposes for which the organiza-
tion was established.
There were two further operative paragraphs
in the resolution :
3. That this incompatibility excludes the present Gov-
ernment of Cuba from participation in the inter-American
system.
4. That the Coimeil of the Organization of American
States and the other organs and organizations of the
inter-American system adopt without delay the measures
necessary to carry out this resolution.
As to these two paragraphs, 14 countries, namely
two-thirds of the membereliip, voted in favor, 1
(Cuba) against, and 6 abstained. Their absten-
tions in no way affected the unanimous decision,
in which all except Cuba joined, that the Castro
regime and its Communist aggressions are incom-
patible with the American system of democratic
freedom.
Cuba and the U.S.S.R. claim that these para-
graphs constitute "aggression" and that tliey re-
quire Security Coimcil approval. Let us look at
these two contentions. First, do the paragraphs
constitute aggression against Cuba? The answer
to that is obvious. To claim such a resolution is
aggression is to distort the meaning of words be-
yond all reason. The fact is that it was a de-
fensive reaction to the Cuban regime's subversive
activities against the free institutions of the Amer-
ican Republics. Those aggressive activities were
the cause of the resolution and are the source of
present tensions.
Cuba's Violations of OAS Charter
Let me review the facts brought out at the
Pimta del Este conference. It was there clearly
shown that the Castro regime, with the assistance
of local Co:nmunist parties, is employing a wide
variety of techniques and practices to overthrow
the free democratic institutions of Latin Amer-
ica. It is bringing hundreds of Latin American
students, labor leaders, intellectuals, and dissident
political leaders to Cuba for indoctrination and
for training, to be sent back to their countries for
the double purpose of agitating in favor of the
Castro regime and undermining their own gov-
ernments. It is fostering the establishment in
other Latin American countries of so-called "com-
mittees of solidarity'' with the Cuban revolution
for the same dual purpose. Cuban diplomatic
personnel encourage and finance agitation and
subversion by dissident elements seeking to over-
throw established government by force.
The Cuban regime is flooding the hemisphere
with propaganda and with printed material. The
recent inauguration of a powerful short-wave
radio station in Cuba now enables the regime to
April 23, 1962
687
broadcast its propaganda to every corner of the
hemisphere, and tliese broadcasts have not hesi-
tated to call for the violent overthrow of estab-
lished governments. Such appeals have been di-
rected to Peru, Brazil, Guatemala, and, most
recently, the Dominican Eepublic. On January
22, 1962, Radio Habana beamed a broadcast to the
Dominican Republic calling on the people to "over-
throw the Council of State"— the very democratic
Council which is now expressing the will of the
Dominican people to be free of the last remnants
of the Trujillo dictatorship.
The military training of Latin Americans in
Cuba by the Castro regime and the wide distri-
bution throughout the hemisphere of the treatise
on guerrilla warfare by "Che" Guevara, Castro's
chief lieutenant, are clear evidence that the Castro
regime will use guerrilla operations as another
important device for gaining its objectives. The
large amounts of arms which Castro boasts of
having obtained from the Communist military
bloc place him in a position to support such oper-
ations, and, in fact, we have seen him aiding or
supporting armed invasions in other Caribbean
countries, notably Panama and the Dominican Re-
public. If we are to believe Castro's threats made
prior to and during the Punta del Este confer-
ence, there will almost certainly be further
Cuban-inspired guerrilla operations against its
Latin American neighbors.
OAS Calls Cuba Bridgehead of Communism
What the OAS decided — unanimously — is that
Cuba today represents a bridgehead of Sino-Soviet
imperialism in the Western Hemisphere and a
base for Communist aggression, intervention, agi-
tation, and subversion against the American Re-
publics. It is small wonder that the American
Republics unanimously recognized that this situa-
tion is a serious threat to their security and the
ability of their peoples to choose freely their own
form of government and to pursue freely their
goals of economic well-being and of social justice.
In the face of these facts it is absurd to contend
that the Punta del Este resolution excluding the
present Cuban regime from the OAS constitutes
aggression against Cuba when it is the Cuban
regime's own aggression against the OAS which
lias caused that exclusion. What the Cuban
regime has done is to create a condition which
makes OAS action necessary and then appear be-
fore this Council to complain of the action made
necessary by the very condition they themselves
created. Clearly a regional organization can de-
termine for itself the conditions of membership.
If it could not so decide, it would clearly be in-
capable of its o\\'n defense and therefore have no
reason for existence.
Equally clearly such self-exclusion, caused by
Cuba's aggressive acts against members of the
OAS, is not "enforcement action" by the OAS
within the meaning of article 53 of the United
Nations Charter. Security Council "authoriza-
tion" cannot be required for regional action — in
this case exclusion from participation in a re-
gional organization — as to matters which the
Council itself cannot possibly act on and which
are solely within the competence of the organiza-
tion itself.
The Organization of American States is. in the
language of article 52, paragraph 1, of the United
Nations Charter, a regional agency for the mainte-
nance of international peace and security. Surely
the Organization of American States, like any
other regional agency, is and, as an agency for the
exercise of the right of collective self-defense,
must be entitled to determine who should partic-
ipate in its proceedings without being subject to
a Soviet veto or any other veto in the Security
Council. The Council cannot pretend to deter-
mine what states should and should not partici-
pate in such a regional agency like the Organiza-
tion of American States and the Arab League.
It should be noted that the Cuban government's
yself-exclusion from the Organization of American
States was not based on its "social system," as
Cuba alleges. It was based on that government's
violations of the OAS Charter, to which Cuba
had solemnly subscribed. In violation of that
charter the present Cuban government has con-
ducted aggressive and subversive activities against,
its fellow American Republics, and in violation of
that charter it has suppressed the fundamental
rights of the individual.
Surely it is not a violation of the United Na-
tions Charter to suspend a government for the
very aggressive activities which the United Na-
tions Charter is designed to prevent, and surely
it is not a violation of the United Nations Cliarter
to suspend a government for suj^prcssing the hu-
man rights and fundamental freedoms which the
TTiiited Nations Charter is designed to uphold.
Nor did the f ramers of tlie United Nations Cliarter
intend it to protect a government from the con-
688
Department of State Bulletin
sequences of such aggressive activities and such
violations of liuman rights and fundamental free-
doms. Tlie OAS is clearly entitled to suspend the
participation of a government which deliberately
violates one of the basic principles of membership
in tlie organization.
Cuban Reasoning Erroneous
The reasoning by which the Cuban representa-
tive has sought to justify his contention that the
suspension — or, as he put it, expulsion — of the
Cuban government from the OAS was unlawful
was this :
Since the OAS Charter, an international treaty,
contains no clause expressly authorizing suspen-
sion or expulsion, such a right of suspension or
expulsion cannot be implied. He claimed that
treaties must be interpreted restrictively and that
the principle of restrictive interpretation of
treaties in this case prohibited implying a right of
suspension.
The Cuban representative is wrong for three
reasons :
First, it is for the Organization of American
States to interpret its own charter. The required
two-thirds of the membership of the Organization
of American States has interpreted its charter to
justify suspension.
Second, treaties, including the OAS Charter,
are to be interpreted effectively and not restric-
tively. It is the cardinal rule of the interpretation
of treaties that they must be interpreted so as to
give effect to their essential purposes. Since the
present Cuban government is doing its best to
frustrate tlie essential purposes of the OAS
Charter, effective interpretation of that treaty re-
quires the exclusion of the Cuban government.
Third, it is obvious that no regional body can
be forced to accept or maintain the presence of a
government which the members of that regional
body determine to be violating the very terms of
the charter of that body. In this case all of the
members of the OAS except Cuba determined that
the Cuban government is violating the OAS
Charter, to which Cuba had solemnly subscribed.
The independence and effectiveness of regional
agencies would be destroyed by a rule that re-
quired regional organizations to continue in their
midst governments that oppose themselves to the
organizations' principles and violate their
charters.
Further Actions at Punta del Este
To return to the Punta del Este resolutions, the
next resolution — the seventh — was also iniani-
mously adopted (except for Cuba). It excluded
the present Cuban regime from the Inter- Ameri-
can Defense Board until it should be determined by
the Council of the Organization of American
States that membership of the government of
Cuba is not prejudicial to the work of the Board
or to the security of the Western Hemisphere.
Does such a resolution constitute aggression or
contravene the United Nations Charter or require
Security Council authorization ? Of course it does
not, and it would be pointless to ask the Interna-
tional Court of Justice whether it does.
The Inter-American Defense Board consists of
military and naval experts whose function is to
study and recommend measures for the defense of
the Western Hemisphere. Surely the American
Republics are entitled, without subjecting them-
selves to a Soviet veto, to exclude from such study
a government which is hostile to the very purposes
of the Board and which is an acknowledged mem-
ber of the Conmaunist bloc constituting the very
threat the American Republics are attempting to
defend themselves against.
The eighth resolution, adopted by the vote of 16
to 1 (Cuba), with 4 abstentions (Chile, Mexico,
Ecuador, and Brazil), recited the statement by
the report of the Inter- American Peace Commit-
tee that the intense subversive activity of the Sino-
Soviet bloc and the Cuban government in America
constitutes "a serious violation of fundamental
principles of the inter- American system," and re-
solved as follows:
1. To suspend immediately trade with Cuba in arms
and implements of war of every kind.
2. To charge the Council of the Organization of Amer-
ican States, in accordance with the circumstances and
with due consideration for the constitutional or legal lim-
itations of each and every one of the member states, with
studying the feasibility and desirability of extending the
suspension of trade to other items, with special attention
to items of strategic importance.
3. To authorize the Council of the Organization of
American States to discontinue, by an affirmative vote of
two-thirds of its members, the measure or measures
adopted pursuant to the preceding paragraphs, at such
time as the Government of Cuba demonstrates its com-
patibility with the purposes and principles of the
system.
Does such a resolution constitute aggression or
April 23, J 962
689
contravene the United Nations Charter or require
Security Council authorization as an enforcement
action? Of course it does not, and it would be
pointless to ask the International Court of Justice
Avhether it does. In the first place, suspension of
trade in arms is the very reverse of aggression
and in this instance is a measure of self-defense
against aggression. Nor is such suspension an
"enforcement action" within the meaning of arti-
cle 53 of the charter. It is a step that any state
can properly and legally take, individually or col-
lectively, without authorization from anyone.
As regards extending the trade suspension to
other items, the resolution instructs the Organi-
zation of American States Council to study the
feasibility and desirability of such an extension,
with due consideration for the constitutional or
legal limitations of the member states. Obviously
no "enforcement action" was involved.
I now come to the ninth and final resolution,
adopted by a vote of 19 to 1 (Cuba), with 1 ab-
stention. This resolution recommended that the
Statute of the Inter-American Commission on
Human Eights be revised to broaden and
strengthen the Commission's attributes and facul-
ties and permit it effectively to further respect
for these rights in the Western Hemisphere coun-
tries.
Does such a resolution constitute aggression or
contravene the United Nations Charter or require
Security Council authorization ? Of course it does
not, and it would be pointless to ask the Inter-
national Court of Justice whether it does.
From this survey of all the Punta del Este reso-
lutions, three conclusions emerge: First, the only
aggression involved is the documented aggressive
activities of the Cuban Communist regime, which
the countries of Latin America found unani-
mously at Punta del Este to be directed against
the free democratic institutions of the American
Republics; second, nothing remotely resembling
a violation of the United Nations Charter is in-
volved; and third, nothing is involved which
would justify the Council in invoking article 53
of the United Nations Charter. The responsibil-
ities of the OAS were satisfied when it reported
under article 54.
There is accordingly no question which merits
submission to the International Court of Justice
for an advisory opinion.
Council's Decision in Dominican Case
Furthermore the issue is one which the Security
Council has already considered thoroughly and as
to which it has reached a clear-cut decision. I
refer, of course, to the discussion in the Council in
September 1960 ^ as to whether the Council con-
sidered its authorization to be required, under
article 53 of the charter, for the action that had
then been taken by the OAS with respect to the
Dominican Republic.'* At that time also a Com-
munist country (the Soviet Union) tried to have
decisions of the Organization of American States
subjected to Soviet veto.
In that case the Organization of American
States had applied against the Dominican Repub-
lic measures more far-reaching than those in the
case now before us. There the members of the
OAS had severed diplomatic relations with the
Dominican Republic and had instituted a partial
interruption of economic relations.
In that case the Soviet Union, as does the Cas-
tro regime here, contended that the Organization
of American States resolutions constituted "en-
forcement action" under article 53 of the charter
which had to be authorized by the Security Coun-
cil and introduced a resolution to that effect. An
extensive debate took place during which the Se-
curity Council's authority and responsibilities
with respect to article 53 were thoroughly dis-
cussed. The Soviet resolution received no support,
and the Soviet representative ultimately would not
even put it to a vote.
Instead, nine members of the Council supported
a resolution, sponsored by Argentina, Ecuador,
and the United States, the purpose of wliich was
explicitly to limit Security Council action to "not-
ing," not authorizing or approving or disapprov-
ing, the OAS action which had been reported to
the Security Council in accordance, solely, with
article 54.
We have, then, a square decision by this Coun-
cil, after thorough debate, as to the extent of the
Council's authority under article 53. That deci-
sion was that measures even more far-reacliing
than those now before us do not involve "enforce-
ment action" within tlio meaning of article 53 and
thei'cforo do not require Security Council author-
ization. It is even clearer that the milder Punta
' Ibiil., Oct. 3, I960, p. .'>42.
" Ibid., Sept. 5, 1960, p. Sri.^.
690
Department of Slate Bulletin
del Este resolutions now before us involve no such
"enforcement action" and require no Security
Council authorization.
I cannot help but refer, in this connection, to
the blatantly cynical statement by the permanent
representative of the Soviet Union at the meet-
ing of the First Committee held on February 27,
1962, when he said, referring to the interpretation
of article 53 in the Dominican Republic case (pro-
visional record, document S/PV.991, page 22) :
In the first place, in 1960 the question involved action
against the Dominican Republic. To us there is a differ-
ence. The Dominican Republic is one matter; Cuba
another ; Chile another.
The Soviet Union's political orientation is thus
against the Dominican Republic in one case and
in favor of Cuba in another, and it is that political
orientation which is what determines its interpre-
tation of the charter.
We do not believe that the other members of
this Council look upon the interpretation of the
charter in a spirit of any such blatant cynicism.
The Soviet Union's attempt in the Dominican Re-
public case to have the Security Council authorize
action of which the Soviets approved was recog-
nized at the time as a prelude to a later effort
to employ its veto against the OAS and in defense
of its base of operations in the Western Hemi-
sphere — Cuba.
That effort is precisely what the Coimcil is
now faced with.
Insubstantiality of Cuban Demands
Viewed in the context of the resolutions adopted
at Punta del Este and the square precedent of the
Dominican case, the seven questions which the
Cuban representative advances should be dis-
missed for lack of substantiality, quite apart from
the fact that Cuba comes into court, in the com-
mon law phrase, with unclean hands.
Moreover, the insubstantiality of the questions
demonstrates that there is even less reason for the
Council to consider the Cuban demand that pro-
visional measures be adopted, under article 40, to
suspend the implementation of the resolutions of
Punta del Este.
The United States Government has repeatedly
made clear that it favors increased recourse to the
International Court of Justice. But it does not
favor use of the Court for cold-war political pur-
poses foreign to the charter and the Court's stat-
ute. It is significant, in this connection, that the
Soviet representative, whose Government is con-
sistently hostile to the use of the Court for the
settlement of genuine legal disputes Ijctween states
and has deprecated the Court's advisory jurisdic-
tion, should so enthusiastically favor submission
to the Court of the rhetorical and self-serving
questions which have been conjured up by the
Cuban representative.
It will not do to say that if even one countiy,
Cuba, believes that an issue concerning this Coun-
cil's authority is debatable, then that issue might
well be referred to the Court for an advisory opin-
ion. Here the very issue of this Council's author-
ity over OAS decisions has already been decided
by this Council under circumstances in which
regional action was more far-reaching than in this
case.
There is, therefore, no reason why we should
reopen that decision. There is even less reason
why we should again give any consideration to
the substance of Communist charges of OAS ag-
gression against Cuba or to the Cuban regime's
effort to prevent the OAS from reacting to the
situation which the regime itself created.
Mr. President and members of the Council,
what we have here is no legal disjiute. Wliat we
have is a cold-war political attack by the Soviet
Union, through the Cuban Communist regime, on
the Organization of American States.
Wliat is more, what we have here is an attempt
to shackle the OAS with the Soviet Union's Se-
curity Council veto. If that attemj)t were to be
successful, it would mean the impotence not only
of the OAS but of all other regional organizations,
through subjection to the untender mercies of the
veto.
We do not believe that the members of this
Council or, indeed, the members of the General
Assembly wish to have any regional organization
fettered by any such subservience.
STATEMENT OF MARCH 23
U.S./U.N. press release 3948
Before we proceed to the vote I should like to
summarize hurriedly the argiunents of the com-
plainants wliich we have heard on this item from
the representatives of Cuba and the Soviet Union
for an entire week.
April 23, 1962
691
What we have heard is literally daily repetition
of the identical assertions that were made here on
the first day and which have been answered by
almost every other member here present over and
over again. But each day the representatives of
Cuba and the Soviet Union disregard what has
been said the day before and begin anew to sol-
emnly repeat the same charges. This procedure
could go on for years. It is what we call in Eng-
lish the dialog of the deaf; in Spanish, I believe,
it is el dismirso entre sordos; and I have no doubt
that there is more than one Russian equivalent
for endlessly repeating the same thing like a stuck
phonograph and refusing to hear the answers.
I submit that it is long past time to bring this
rhetorical endurance contest to an end, for we have
heard nothing new since the fii-st day, and before
we conclude this undistinguished episode in the
history of this Council I will, as I say, hurriedly
review only those few arguments wliich relate to
the letter filed by Cuba.
The Cuban and Soviet representatives have as-
serted over and over, with characteristic deafness
for the facts, that Cuba was excluded from the
Organization of American States because of its
social system. The fact is, of course, that Cuba
was not excluded because of its social system; it
was excluded because of its violations of the
Cliarter of the Organization of American States,
as all the American Republics represented here
have testified. And as the resolution of Punta del
Este makes explicitly clear, the fact is that, in
violation of the Charter of the Organization of
American States and in pursuit of aims contrary
to the principles of the American system, the pres-
ent Cuban government has conducted aggressive
and subversive activities against other American
Republics and has suppressed the fundamental
rights of the individual in Cuba. It was on the
basis of these violations that the members of the
Organization of American States at Punta del
Este decided that Cuba's government — not Cuba
but its present government — was no longer com-
patible with the inter- American system.
Secondly, these same delegations have reiterated
tliat tlie OAS had no right to exclude Cuba from
its membership because of these violations of the
OAS Cliarter. On its face this is absurd. It is
tlie inherent right of any regional organization to
determine which countries shall participate and
which shall not. Yet from what the Soviet rep-
resentative has been saying this principle applies
only in those instances whicli fit Soviet political
motives. Stripped of polemics, what he would
have us believe is that the Latin American coun-
tries cannot decide for themselvas with whom they
wish to associate in tlieir regional organization,
and such a proposition hardly merits serious
discussion.
Integrity of Regional Organizations
Thirdly, the Soviet Union has attempted to sep-
arate the Organization of American States from
other regional organizations, present or future.
Council members have already drawn attention
to this distortion in their statements. Tlie prob-
lem we face here today — that is, the problem of
extending the Soviet veto over decisions of re-
gional organizations — is not in any sense limited j
to the Organization of American States. It ap- \
plies equally to any regional organization. The
Soviet position, in sliort, is an assault on the whole
system of regional organizations, and if it is suc-
cessful it would nullify a fundamental provision
of the Cliarter of the United Nations.
Two days ago the Council heard the penetrating
analysis and defense of the regional organization
system by the representative of Ireland. He said
that regional organizations as such have long
since proved their usefulness and daily were grow-
ing in importance and in vigor. He expected that
before too long there might be a regional organiza-
tion in Africa. And this was not surprising.
Mr. [Frederick H.] Poland intimated, since with
a growing United Nations it must be anticipated
that much of the worlv within a region would have
to be undertaken by the region itself, this would
perforce lead to the establisliment of an increasing
number of regional organizations in the days
ahead. The Council, Mr. Poland said, should
therefore be careful to avoid reaching any con-
clusions which might appear to undervalue or to
challenge the principle of regional organizations.
We submit that it is this vei-y independence and
this very integrity of a regional organization
wliich the Soviet Union is continually trying to
destroy by subjugating the decisions of regional
organizations to the Security Council and, there-
fore, Soviet approval. The list of I'hetorical ques-
tions contained in the Cuban draft resolution
(S/5095) would seem to prove this conclusively.
692
Department of State Bulletin
No "Enforcement Action" Involved
Finally, the Soviet representative has accused
us of trying to force acceptance of our interpreta-
tion of the words "enforcement action" in article
53 upon the members of this Council. This is sim-
ply not true. We are not trying to force anything,
nor are we attempting to define these words in a
way which the Security Coimcil has not already
accepted. We have cited repeatedly here the Do-
minican case. It was referred to by the repre-
sentative of Ghana, who cited statements by
Coimcil members to support his feeling that the
issue may not have been clearly met at that time.
The fact is, however, that the Council did decide
in the Dominican case that no enforcement action
was involved.
The whole purpose of the Soviet Union in
bringing the case before the Council was to insist
that Security Council approval under article 53
was required. The entire debate revolved around
whether the resolution of the Organization of
American States in the Dominican case did or did
not constitute enforcement action under the terms
of article 53. If it was enforcement action, the
Security Council was required — not authorized,
but required — to give its approval or disapproval
under article 53. The fact that it refused to act
under article 53 is conclusive. The Soviet con-
tention had so little support that the Soviet Union
declined even to put its draft resolution to the
vote at that time. A counterresolution presented
by Argentina, Ecuador, and the United States,
which explicitly did not come under article 53,
was adopted by the Council. It may not have de-
fined what enforcement action under article 53
was, but it most definitely did decide that action
of the sort embraced in the Dominican case was
not subject to article 53.
For these reasons, we hope that the Council will
dispose of the draft resolution before us by rejec-
tion, and in so doing the Council will again be
making an important contribution toward the
preservation and the integrity and the independ-
ence of regional organizations of the United
Nations.
I am very happy to waive translation Ln order
to save time and, I hope, the patience of members.
[In a later Intervention Ambassador Stevenson said :]
I understand that both the representatives of
the Soviet Union and of Cuba, who have sponsored
this resolution, now propose to withdraw it. I
must object most emphatically to any attempt to
avoid a vote on this resolution as a whole.
The rule is very clear. Rule 35 says that a
motion or draft resolution can at any time be
withdrawn so long as no vote has been taken with
respect to it. A vote has been taken with respect
to it. Therefore the resolution can no longer be
withdrawn, and I move that it be put to a vote,
as a whole, forthwith.''
TEXT OF DRAFT RESOLUTION s
The Security Council,
In accordance with Article 0C(1) of the Charter,
Decides to request the International Court of Justice
to give an advisory opinion on the following questions :
1. Is the Organization of American States, under the
terms of its Charter, a regional agency within the mean-
ing of Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter and
do its activities have to be compatible with the Purposes
and Principles of the United Nations?
2. Under the United Nations Charter, does the Organi-
zation of American States have the right as a regional
agency to take the enforcement action provided in Article
53 of the United Nations Charter without the authoriza-
tion of the Security Council?
3. Can the expression "enforcement action" in Article 53
of the United Nations Charter be considered to include
the measures provided for in Article 41 of the United
Nations Charter? Is the list of these measures in Article
41 exhaustive?
4. Does the Charter of the Organization of American
States provide for any procedure for expelling a State
member of the Organization, in particular because of its
social system?
5. Can the provisions of the Charter of the Organiza-
tion of American States and the Inter-American Treaty
of Reciprocal Assistance be considered to take precedence
over the obligations of Member States under the United
Nations Charter?
6. Is one of the main principles of the United Nations
Charter that membership in the United Nations is open to
'A ruling by the President of the Council concerning
the application of rule 35 of the rules of procedure was
upheld on Mar. 23 by a vote of 7 (Chile, China, France,
Ireland, U.K., U.S., Venezuela) to 2 (Rumania, U.S.S.R.),
with 2 abstentions (Ghana, U.A.R.).
°U.N. doc. S/5095. On Mar. 23 the Security Council
voted first on operative paragraph 3, which it rejected
by a vote of 4 (Ghana, Rumania, U.S.S.R., U.A.R.) to 7
(Chile, China, France, Ireland, U.K., U.S., Venezuela).
The remainder of the draft resolution was then put to the
vote and rejected by 2 votes in favor (Rumania, U.S.S.R.),
7 against, with 1 abstention (U.A.R.) ; Ghana did not
participate.
April 23, 1962
693
states which meet the requirements of Article 4 of the
Charter, irrespective of their system?
7. In the light of the replies to the foregoing questions
are, or are not, the resolutions adopted at Punta del Este
at the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of American Minis-
ters of Foreign Affairs relating to the expulsion of a
State member of the regional agency because of its social
system and the taking of other enforcement action against
it, without the authorization of the Security Council,
consistent with the provisions of the United Nations
Charter, the Charter of the Organization of American
States and the Treaty of Rio?
Also decides to request the International Court of Jus-
tice to give priority to the consideration of this matter.
International Cooperation
in Synoptic Meteorology
DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT
The Department of State announced on
March 23 (press release 185) that more than 100
weathermen from all over the world would gather
at the Department of State on March 26 for the
third session of the Commission for Synoptic
Meteorology of the World Meteorological Organ-
ization (WMO).
Technical experts from more than 100 nations
are expected to attend the 2G-day session, where
weather observations, codes, communications, and
methods of forecasting will be considered. The
Commission will have before it reports from its
various working groups on code problems, obser-
vational networks, telecommunications, pressure
reduction methods, and the use of data received
from weather satellites.
The international exchange of weather infor-
mation fostered by the WMO and its technical
commissions makes it possible to prei)are weather
maps covering an entire hemisphere twice each
day. The basic ingredients for these maps are
the individual observations taken at weather sta-
tions throughout the entire world.
Edward M. Vernon, Chief of the Weather Bu-
reau's Forecast and Synoptic Reports Division,
will head the U.S. delegation at tlie session and
will be assisted by the following six experts in the
field of synoptic meteorology :
Delegates
Santoro R. Rarbagallo, Woathcr Bureau, Dciiarlincnt of
Commerce
Charles G. Reeves, Weather Bureau, Department of
Commerce
Leonard W. Snellman, Air Weather Service, Department
of the Air Force
Advisers
W. R. Franklin, Captain, USN, Navy Weather Service,
Department of the Navy
W. C. Huyler, Air Weather Service, Department of the
Air Force
George G. Sink, Federal Aviation Agency
REMARKS BY HARLAN CLEVELAND >
Mr. President, distinguished delegates to the
third session of the Commission for Synoptic Me-
teorology of the World Meteorological Organiza-
tion: The long name of this meeting puts me in
mind of that speaker at a high school graduation
ceremony who chose to use the letters in the name
of his college — Yale — as an acrostic. He spoke
for 15 minutes on "Youth," for 20 minutes on
"Ambition," for 25 minutes on "Loyalty." Just
as he was ready to start on "Energy" a loud stage
whisper floated across the hall: "Thank God he
didn't go to the Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology !" My remarks will be brief — or should I
say synoptic?
It is a great pleasure to welcome you to Wash-
ington and to this meeting. Although it is well
known that the first meeting of your organization
was held here in Washington in 1953, it is not so
well known that the first international conference
in which the United States officially participated
was the meteorological conference of 1853 in
Brussels.
There was a maritime conference to devise a
uniform system of meteorological obsei-vations at
sea. In 14 sessions the conference succeeded in
achieving the objectives for which it had been con-
vened. The members agreed on recommendations
concerning instruments to be used in making me-
teorological observations. They adopted a form
for an abstract log and directions for its use in
recording weather data. They suggested that a
set of standard instruments be used by each gov-
ernment and that instructions in their use be ex-
changed with every other government to promote
' Made at the opening meeting of the third session of
the Commission for Synoi)tic Moteoroh>g>- of the World
Meteorological Organization at Washington, D.C., on
M.Tr. 26 (press release 1!)2). Mr. Cleveland is Assistant
Secretary of State for luternationnl Organization Affairs.
694
Department of State Bulletin
accuracy in comparing the recorded weather data.
Does it sound familiar?
Representatives of 10 nations attended the Brus-
sels meeting in 1853 : Belgium, Denmark, France,
Great Britain, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
Russia, Sweden, and the United States. I am
glad these same nations — and many more — are
represented here today. The fact that men of dif-
ferent backgrounds and nationalities have been
woi'king together successfully for more than 100
years is not just an example of sentimental fact;
it is also a very practical demonstration of a basic
reason for international cooperation: a real and
recognized need on the part of many nations, a
need which cannot be met except through such
cooperation.
In the area of weather prediction and control we
see an outstanding example of how the self-
interests of many sovereign nations join together
in one large mutual interest. Such mutual interest
led to mutual action 100 years ago and to mutual
benefits ever since. And these mutualities are the
only lasting basis for partnerships of any kind—
whether among men, organized groups, or nations.
It is encouraging to me that cooperation is pos-
sible — in your case actual — among nations whose
structure of government and economies seem to be
so different. Differences do not have to mean con-
flicts, nor do they have to mean insidious compari-
sons of "good" and "evil" — of "better" or "worse."
Among men of reason, differences of opinion and
belief can exist in peace. If the differences need
to be resolved, such resolution is on the basis of
facts — greater knowledge and deeper understand-
ing. President Kennedy said last week,^ ". . .
knowledge, not hate, is the passkey to the fu-
ture. . . ." He added, "As men conduct the pui-suit
of knowledge, they create a world which freely
unites national diversity and international
partnership."
Maybe these prospects come as less of a surprise
to you who have devoted your lives to science. It
often seems easier for men to work together to
understand, to live with, and to control the forces
of their external environment than to put the same
amount of time and energy into study and under-
standing of the mysterious forces inside their
minds and hearts and souls.
Still, international cooperation in many areas is
- Bulletin of Apr. 16, 1962, p. 615.
an actual and continuing fact. In the field of
meteorology it has progi-essed in one century from
sea to land, to air, and now to outer space. And
from observation, collection, and analysis of data
to hemispheric predictions and even efforts at
weather modification and control.
Despite the existence of weather reporting satel-
lites, and the prospect of more as the result of
greater cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer
space, there remain great gaps in the data from
which you work. The difficulties of making con-
tinuous observations in remote areas of the earth's
surface have resulted in incomplete coverage.
Today, however, two separate developments may
help solve this problem : first, the development of
an unmanned weather station powered by nuclear
wastes ; second, the development of communication
satellites.
The United States has developed such an un-
manned weather station. It is powered by a de-
rivative of strontium 90 — strontium 90 with its
fangs removed. With the cooperation of the Gov-
ernment of Canada this station has been installed
on an island in the Arctic and is sending in reports.
Such unmanned weather stations, collecting
raw data from many areas not presently covered,
could make a major difference in weather predic-
tion. Signals could be bounced off communica-
tion satellites.
Thus through a scientific marriage of conven-
ience great progress can be expected, peaceful
progress for the benefit of all mankind.
We have come a long way since that first con-
ference in Brussels. No one can predict — not even
such gifted predictors as yourselves — how far we
have to go. Only one thing is certain : The prog-
ress in science must be matched by progress in
building international institutions. There is no
shelter from the social fallout of science.
United States Delegations
to International Conferences
UNESCO Conference on Education in Asia
The Department of State announced on
March 29 (press release 201) that a five-man
American observer delegation will attend a meet-
ing of ministers of education of Asian countries at
Tokyo April 2-11 under the auspices of the United
April 23, 1962
695
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO) and the U.N. Economic
Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE).
The American delegates are :
Charles B. Fahs, chairman, U.S. Information Service,
Tokyo
Robert H. B. Wade, vice chairman, Special As.sistant,
Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs, Department
of State
James H. Faulhaber, Office of Financial Support, Agency
for International Development
Joseph B. Jarvis, Special Assistant to the Commissioner
of Education, Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare
William A. Wolfifer, OflBce of Technical Support, Agency
for International Development
The Tolvyo meeting will examine overall educa-
tion planning in Asia and review country-by-
country progress made to implement the so-called
Karachi Plan. This plan, adopted in 1960 by 17
Asian member states of UNESCO, called on their
governments to attain free and compulsory pri-
mary education by 1980. UNESCO endorsed the
plan at its 11th General Conference in 1960.
Current U.N. Documents:
A Selected Bibliography
Mimeographed or processed documents {such as those
listed beloic) may be consulted at depository libraries in
the United States. U.N. printed publications may be
purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations,
United Nations Plaza, N.Y.
Security Council
Reports of the officer-in-charge of the U.N. Operation in
the Congo. S/.5053, January 9, 1962, 5 pp.; Add. 1,
January 20, 1962, 19 pp. ; Add. 2, January 23, 1962, 4
pp.; Add. 3, January 29, 1962, 10 pp.; Add. 4, Jan-
uary 30, 1962, 2 pp. ; Add. 5 and Corr. 1, January 30,
1962, 3 pp. ; Add. 6 and Corr. 1, February 3, 1962, 4 pp. ;
Add. 7, February 12, 1962, 3 pp. ; Add. 8, Fel)ruary 19,
1962, 14 pp. ; Add. 9 and Corr. 1, March 9, 1962, 9 pp.
Letter dated January 9, 1962, from the Portuguese repre-
sentative addressed to the President of the Security
Council concerning border-violation charges by Senegal.
S/5055. January 10, 1962. 2 pp.
General Assembly
Letter dated J:uiuary 27, 1962, from the Portuguese repre-
sentative addres.sed to the President of the General
Assembly concerning the situation in Angola. A/uOS".
January 27, 1962. 14 pp.
Information from non-self-governing territories (sum-
maries of information transmitted under article 73e of
the U.N. Charter) : African and adjacent territories,
A/r.078, January 31, 1962, 196 pp.; A/5078/Add. 1,
March 2(», 1962, 42 pp. Asian territories, A/r)079,
February 8, 1962, 132 pp.; A/.W79/Add. 1, March 22,
1962, 5 pp.
TREATY INFORMATION
Accession of Cambodia, Israel,
and Portugal to GATT
Press release 229 dated April 6
Protocols for the accession of Cambodia, Israel,
and Portugal to the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) were opened for signature
on April 6, 1962. Tariff negotiations required
imder GATT accession procedures were carried
out by each of the three Governments during the
1960-61 GATT tariff conference at Geneva.
Their accession will bring the total number of
GATT contracting parties to 43.
The accessions of Israel and Portugal become
effective 30 days after tlieir respective acceptances.
Cambodia's accession may also come into effect
on the same basis, or at a later date, depending
upon the Contracting Parties' approval of a de-
cision on Cambodian accession now before them
for balloting. Decisions agreeing to the accession
of Israel and Portugal were taken by the Contract-
ing Parties on December 8, 1961.
Special provisions in the Portuguese protocol
of accession recognize the present regime of pref-
erential customs regulations for Portuguese cus-
toms territories as an arrangement leading toward
the formation of a free-trade area to be attained
no later than 1974. Accordingly the protocol does
not require that the existing preferences be elimi-
nated.
Israel had provisionally acceded to the GATT
at the time it began tariff negotiations for acces-
sion, while Portugal and Cambodia have partici-
pated in the work of the GATT since June 4, 1900,
and November 17, 1958, respectively.
U.S. Agrees to International
Inspection of Four Atomic Reactors
Tlie Department of State announced on March
30 (]iress release 208) the signing of an agree-
ment ' on tliat date between the United States and
'For text, .see Department of State press release 208
dated Mar. 30.
696
Department of State Bulletin
the International Atomic Energy Agency under
wliich the effectiveness of a system of safeguards
against the misuse of atomic reactors designed for
research and development purposes will be put to
the test.
The agreement allows access by IAEA inspec-
tors to four U.S. atomic reactors whose design and
operation are compatible with safeguard proce-
dures agreed upon by the International Agency.
These safeguards, which provide for reports and
inspections, have been developed by the IAEA
to assure that nuclear assistance made available
through the Agency is not used to further any
military purpose.
The agreement will test the workability of such
safeguards and will provide a field laboratory in
which the methods and tecluiiques of inspection
can be tested.
Sigvard Eklund, Director General of the IAEA,
signed the agreement on behalf of the Agency.
Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary of State for
International Organization Affairs, signed for the
United States. The signing ceremony took place
at the Department of State.
The following four reactors have been placed
under the agreement for a period of 1 to 2 years:
the Brookhaven Graphite Research Reactor,
Brookhaven National Laboratoiy, Upton, N.Y. ;
the Medical Research Reactor, Brookhaven Na-
tional Laboratory ; the Experimental Boiling Wa-
ter Reactor, Argonne National Laboratory, Le-
mont. 111.; and the Piqua Organic Cooled and
Moderated Power Reactor, Piqua, Ohio.
The agreement enters into effect on June 1, 1962.
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Health
Constitution of the World Health Organization, as
amended. Opened for signature at New Yorlc July 22,
1946. Entered into force April 7, 1948 ; for the United
States June 21, 1948. TIAS 1808 and 4643.
Acceptance deposited: Tanganyika, March 1.5, 1962.
Rice
Amended constitution of the International Rice Commis-
sion, and rules of procedure, as amended. Approved
l)y the seventh session of the Food and Agriculture Con-
ference. Rome. December 10, 19r).3. Entered into force
December 10, 1953. TIAS 3016 and 4110.
Acceptances deposited: Nigeria, November 13, 1961;
Venezuela, November 27, 1961.
Shipping
Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consulta-
tive Organization. Signed at Geneva March 6, 1948.
Entered into force March 17, 1958. TIAS 4044.
Acceptance deposited: Nigeria, March 15, 1962.
Weather
Convention of the World Meteorological Organization.
Done at AVashington October 11, 1947. Entered into
force March 23, 1950. TIAS 2052.
Accession deposited: Sierra Leone, March 30, 1962.
BILATERAL
Bolivia
Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agree-
ment of February 12, 1962. Effected by exchange of
notes at La Paz March 27, 1962. Entered into force
March 27, 1962.
Dominican Republic
Military assistance agreement. Signed at Santo Domingo
March 8, 1962. Enters into force upon receipt by the
United States of notification of ratification in con-
formity with the constitutional procedures of the Do-
minican Republic.
El Salvador
General agreement for economic, technical, and related
assistance. Signed at San Salvador December 19, 1961.
Entered, into force: January 16, 1962.
Agreement relating to grants for the training of Salva-
doran citizens in various economic, social, and tech-
nical fields. Effected by exchange of notes at San Sal-
vador April 18, 1951. TIAS 2251.
Terminated: January 16, 1962 (superseded by agree-
ment of December 19, 1961, supra ) .
Agreement relating to assurances required by the Mutual
Security Act of 1951. Effected by exchange of notes
at San Salvador December 11, 1951, and January 7,
1952. TIAS 2631.
Terminated: January 16, 1962 (superseded by agree-
ment of December 19, 1961, supra ) .
General agreement for technical cooperation. Signed at
San Salvador April 4, 1952. TIAS 2527.
Terminated: January 16. 1962 (superseded by agree-
ment of December 19, 1961, supra).
Greece
Amendment to the agreement of August 4, 1955, for co-
operation concerning civil uses of atomic energy, as
amended (TIAS 3310 and 4837). Signed at Washing-
ton April 3, 1962. Enters into force on the date on
which each Government shall have received from the
other written notification that it has complied with all
statutory and constitutional requirements.
International Atomic Energy Agency
Agreement for the application of agency safeguards to
four U.S. reactor facilities, with annexes. Signed at
Washington March 30, 1962. Enters into force June
1, 1962.
Japan
Understanding relating to export of typewriter-ribbon
cloth from Japan to the United States. Effected by
exchange of notes at Toljyo March 23, 1962. Entered
into force March 23, 1962.
Liberia
Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace Corps
program in Liberia. Effected by exchange of notes at
Monrovia March 5 and 8, 1962. Entered into force
March 8, 1962.
April 23, 7962
697
Panama
General agreement for technical and economic coopera-
tion. Signed at Panamd December H, 1961.
Entered into force: March 5, 1962.
General agreement for technical cooperation, as amended.
Signed at Panama December 30, 1950. Entered into
force December 30, 1950. TIAS 2167 aiid 2644.
Terminated: March 5, 1962 (superseded by agreement of
December 11, 1961, supra).
Peru
Agricultural commodities agreement under title IV of the
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of
1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 73 Stat. 610; 7 U.S.C.
1731-1736), with exchange of notes. Signetl at Lima
March 20, 1962. Entered into force March 20, 1962.
United Arab Republic
Agreement amending the rate of exchange ai)plieable to
deiwsits under the agricultural commodities agreement
of September 2, 1961 (TIAS 4844). Effected by ex-
change of notes at Cairo March 28, 1962. Entered into
force March 28, 1962.
DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE
Confirmations
The Senate on March 29 confirmed the following
nominations :
Walter L. Lingle, Jr., to be a Deputy Administrator of
the Agency for International Development.
Robert J. Manning to be an A.ssistant Secretary of
State. (For biographic detjiils, see Department of State
press release 242 dated April 11. )
John L. Salter to be Assistant Administrator for Con-
gressional Liaison, Agency for International Development.
Herbert J. Waters to be Assistant Administrator
for Material Resources, Agency for International
Development.
The Senate on April 4 confirmed Robert P. Woodward
to be Ambassador to Spain. (For biographic details, see
White House press release dated March 27.)
Appointments
James L. Greenfield as Deputy Assistant Secretary for
News, Bureau of Public Affairs, effective April 3. (For
biographic details, see Department of State press release
347 dated April 12.)
Designations
Sclma Freedinan as Public Affairs Adviser, Bureau of
Economic Affairs, effective April 2.
Roger W. Tubby as U.S. Representative to the European
Office of the United Nations and Other International Or-
ganizations at Geneva, effective April 2. (For biographic
details, see Department of State press release 215 dated
April 2.)
Checi( List of Department of State
Press Releases: April 2-8
Press releases may be obtained from the Office of
News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.
Releases appearing in this issue of the BtmETrN
which were issued prior to April 2 are Nos. 183 and
185 of March 23; 188 and 192 of March 26;
197 of March 28; 201 of March 29; and 208 of
March 30.
Sabject
Expansion of Foreign Service commer-
cial program.
Program for visit of President of Brazil
(revised).
Cieplinski : "Refugees Here and Around
the World."
U.S. participation in international con-
ferences.
Ball : "The Developing Atlantic Part-
nership."
Tubb.v sworn in as U.S. Representative
to Euroi)ean office of U.N. and other
international organizations at Geneva
(biographic details).
Air tallfs with Austria.
Friedkin sworn in as U.S. Commissioner,
U.S. -Mexican boundary and water
commission (rewrite).
Coppock : "U.S. Trade Policy and Free-
World Leadership."
Coppock : "The Cold War and U.S.
Trade Policy."
Developments at Geneva disarmament
conference.
Cultural exchange (India).
Study of Pembina River resources with
Canada.
Members-designate of U.S. Advisory
Commission on International Educa-
tional and Cultural Affairs.
Program for visit of Shah of Iran.
MacArthur : "The New Europe — Its
Challenge and Its Opportunities for
the United States."
Rusk : Foreign Assistance Act of 1962.
Coppock : "The European Economic
Community and U.S. Trade Policy."
Iran cre<lentials (rewrite).
Accession of Cambodia, Israel, and
Portugal to GATT.
No.
Date
1210
4/2
*211
4/2
t212
4/2
*213
4/2
214
4/2
*215
4/2
t216
217
4/2
4/2
»218
4/3
*219
4/3
220
4/3
*221
1222
4/4
4/4
♦223 4/5
♦224
1225
226
t227
t228
229
4/5
4/5
4/5
4/6
4/6
4/6
* Not printed.
t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.
698
Department of Stale Bulletin
April 23, 1962
Index
Vol. XLVI, No. 1191
Asia
A Balance Sheet on Asia (Bowles) C74
UNESCO Conference on Education in Asia (dele-
gation) 695
Atomic Energy. U.S. Agrees to International In-
spection of Four Atomic Reactors 696
Cambodia. Accession of Cambodia, Israel, and
Portugal to GATT 606
Communism. A Balance Sheet on Asia (Bowles) . 674
Congress, The. The Foreign Aid Program for Fis-
cal Year 1963 (Rusk) 659
Cuba. U.N. Security Council Rejects Call for Opin-
ion of World Court on OAS Action (Stevenson,
text of draft resolution) 684
Department and Foreign Service
Appointments (Greenfield) 698
Confirmations (Lingle, Manning, Salter, Waters,
Woodward) 698
Designations (Freedman, Tubby) 698
Post of Deputy Assistant Secretary for Atlantic
Affairs Established 673
Disarmament. U.S. Comments on Developments
at Geneva Disarmament Conference 664
Economic Affairs
Accession of Cambodia, Israel, and Portugal to
GATT 696
The Developing Atlantic Partnership (Ball) . . 666
Miss Freedman designated Public Affairs Adviser . 698
Strategy of American Foreign Policy (McGhee). . 678
Educational and Cultural Affairs. UNESCO Con-
ference on Education in Asia (delegation) . . 695
Europe
The Developing Atlantic Partnership (Ball) . . (566
Post of Deputy Assistant Secretary for Atlantic
Affairs Established 673
Foreign Aid
Confirmations, AID (Lingle as Deputy Adminis-
trator; Salter, Waters as Assistant Administra-
tors) 698
The Foreign Aid Program for Fiscal Year 1963
(Rusk) 6.59
International Organizations and Conferences
Accession of Cambodia, Israel, and Portugal to
GATT 696
International Cooperation in Synoptic Meteorology
(Cleveland, delegation) 694
Tubby designated U.S. Representative to European
Office of U.N 698
UNESCO Conference on Education in Asia (dele-
gation) C95
U.S. Agrees to International Insi)ection of Four
Atomic Reactors C96
U.S. Comments on Developments at Geneva Dis-
armament Conference 664
Israel. Accession of Cambodia, Israel, and Portu-
gal to GATT 696
Mexico. J. F. Friedkin Named to U.S.-Mexican
Boundary and Water Commission 683
Middle East. A Balance Sheet on Asia (Bowles). . 674
Philippines. President Macapagal of Philippines
To Visit United States 665
Portugal. Accession of Cambodia, Israel, and Por-
tugal to GATT 696
Public Affairs. Manning confirmed as Assistant
Secretary; Greenfield appointed Deputy Assist-
ant Secretary for News 698
Science. International Cooperation in Synoptic
Meteorology (Cleveland, delegation) 694
Spain. Woodward confirmed as Ambassador . . 698
Treaty Information
Accession of Cambodia, Israel, and Portugal to
GATT 696
Current Actions 697
U.S. Agrees to International Inspection of Four
Atomic Reactors 696
United Nations
Current U.N. Documents 696
U.N. Security Council Rejects Cuban Call for Opin-
ion of World Court on OAS Action (Stevenson,
text of draft resolution) 684
Name Index
Ball, George W 666
Bowles, Chester 674
Cleveland, Harlan 694
Freedman, Selma 698
Friedkin, Joseph F 683
Greenfield, James L 698
Lingle, Walter L., Jr 698
Manning, Robert J 698
McGhee, George C 678
Rusk, Secretary 659
Salter, John L 698
Stevenson, Adlal E 684
Tubby, Roger W 698
Waters, Herbert J 698
Woodward, Robert F 698
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U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE UN
REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT TO THE
CONGRESS FOR THE YEAR 1960
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work of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies during the
year 1960 is contained in this fifteenth annual report by the President
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The Appendixes to the volume contain U.N. charts, tables, and in-
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in the Sino-Soviet bloc and the free world. It also includes a brief
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The Appendixes include (1) the text of the Act of 1951, (2) text
of the Battle Act Amendment, (3) the Battle Act Lists, (4) trade
controls of free- world countries, (5) Presidential determinations made
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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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^
Vol. XLVI, No. 1192
AprU 30, 1962
MCIAL
EKLY RECORD
ITED STATES
REIGN POLICY
PAN AMERICAN DAY, 1962 • Address hy Secretary Rii»h . . 703
THE NEW EUROPE— ITS CHALLENGE AND ITS
OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE UNITED STATES •
by Ambassador Douglas MacArthur II 709
MINERAL RESOURCES AND THE WORLD OF THE
1960's • fay Under Secretary McGhee 723
CHANGE AND CHALLENGE IN AFRICA • fay Assistant
Secretary Williams 719
REFUGEES HERE AND AROUND THE WORLD • by
Michel Cieplinski 730
SECURITY COUNCIL CALLS UPON ISRAEL AND
SYRIA TO OBSERVE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT •
Statement by Charles W. Yost and Text of Resolution , , . 735
For in<lex see inside back cover
THE DEPARTMENT
TATE
Vol. XLVI, No. 1192 • Publication 7367
April 30, 1962
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Qovemment PrtntlnB OUlce
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Note: Contents of this publication are not
copyrlghtod and Items contained herein may
be nsprlntcd. Citation of the Uepaktment
o» State Btn.LETiN as the sourco will be
appreciated. The Bulletin Is Indexed In the
Eeadera' Quide to Periodical Literature.
The Department of State BULLETIN,
a tceekly publication issued by the
Office of Public Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public
and interested agencies of the
Government with information on
developn\ents in the field of foreign
relations and on the work of the
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lected press releases on foreign policy,
issued by tfie White House and the
Department, and statements and ad-
dresses made by the President and by
the Secretary of State and other
officers of the Department, as well as
special articles on various phases of
international affairs and the func-
tions of tlie Department. Informa-
tion is included concerning treaties
and international agreements to
tchich the United States is or may
become a party and treaties of gen-
eral international interest.
Publications of the Department,
United Nations documents, and legis-
lative material in the field of inter-
na tional relations are listed currently.
Pan American Day, 1962
Address by Secretary Rusk '■
I am grateful to you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Secre-
taiy Greneral, and members of the Comicil, for
your invitation to address this special meeting in
observance of Pan American Day [April 14]. It
affords me tlie happy occasion of bexioming another
among my country's Secretaries of Stata who have
met with the members of this venerable body which
has long been deeply and productively concerned
with furthering international cooperation among
the sovereign states of this hemisphere.
We meet after two historic meetings held since
we last celebrated Pan American Day, both <at
Punta del Este.^ One committed us to a sustained
cooperative effort in economic and social progress;
the other committed us to defend together the hu-
mane, democratic traditions in wliich our societies
are rootetl. Looking back at those meetings and
the enterprises they laimched, I am sure that we
have strengthened the possibilities of progress in
freedom in tliis hemisphere. Furthermore, we
have demonstrated that the Organization of
American States has the vitality to survive, to
grow, and to help shape the histoi-y of this hemi-
sphere and its peoples.
We are bound together now — as always — not
merely by geography but by a shared vision of the
destiny of men and societies. In the preamble to
the Charter of Punta del Este,' our Governments
have given that vision a new expression and have
defined their responsibility for giving it a special
vitality in this decade. They accepted the task of
demonstrating that "the creative powers of free
' Made before the Council of the Organization of Ameri-
can States at the Pan American Union, Washington, D.C.,
on Apr. 13 (press release 250).
" For background, see Bulletin of Sept. 11, 1961, p. 459,
and Feb. 19, 1962, p. 270.
3 For text, see ihid., Sept. 11, 1961, p. 463.
men hold the key to their progress and to the prog-
ress of future generations."
We are allied in a vast, imaginative, but highly
practical enterprise. We have pledged our ma-
terial resources, and our resources of heart and
mind, to transform this hemisphere economically
and socially, through the awakened cooperation of
free peoples. We have begun our inunense mider-
taking in full awareness that this transformation
will, in many areas, bring about complex social
and political as well as economic change. We face
these changes resolutely and with confidence for a
simple reason : They are necessary to effect the
will of our peoples, who demand and require that
the fruits of modem science and teclmology yield
for themselves and their children a better life.
One of my illustrious predecessors, the first Secre-
taiy of State, Thomas Jefferson, defender of the
rights of man, declared: "Laws and institutions
must go hand in hand with the progress of the
human mind." The human mind has opened up
vast possibilities for improved welfare, and it has
fractured the isolation of our societies one from the
other. Our laws, institutions, and societies must
reflect these facts and the impulses they have
released.
The Alliance for Progress
Exactly 1 year and 1 month ago today the Presi-
dent of the United States presented to the ambas-
sadorial corps of the American Republics the
project of an Alliance for Progi'ess.^ He crystal-
lized on that occasion the response of the United
States to the growing demand and initiative of
the Governments and peoples of the hemisphere
that we mount a collective attack on poverty, stag-
'Ibid.. Apr. 3, 1901. p. 471.
April 30, 1962
703
nation, and social injustice. He called on the
American i>eoples to prove to the entire world that
man's as yet unsatisfied aspiration for economic
progress and social justice can best be achieved by
free men working within a framework of demo-
cratic institutions. He affirmed for his Govern-
ment — as the Charter of Punta del Este was to
reaffirm a few months later for us all — that public
and private investment, domestic and foreign in-
vestment, must interact and work together
throughout the Americas.
This common effort, both within our societies
and among them, is required to attain the simple,
basic goals the hemisphere has set itself : work and
bread; better homes; better education and health
for all our citizens. These goals are achievable by
equally basic means: by regular increase of per
capita income, more equitably distributed; by a
systematic mobilization of the material and human
resources at our disposal ; by tax and land reforms
where they are needed ; by a consensus in our so-
cieties, reaching into all their groupings, that tliis
hemisphere shall create and sustain an environ-
ment of growth.
Maintaining Institutions of Free Men
These objectives are not confined to this hemi-
sphere. The Alliance for Progress is our own ex-
pression of a determination which is sweeping
through every continent. The cliallenge here, as
elsewhere, is to achieve tliese objectives while
maintaining and developing tlie institutions of
free men.
The challenge is not abstract. Throughout our
hemisphere the Communists and tliose drawn to
their doctrines will tell us that the social changes
required for the growth and modernization of
societies and the organization required to mol>ilize
the necessary resources can only be achieved by a
totalitarian dictatorship and the techniques of
the police state. Where men have succumbed to
this perspective — and found the conspiracies
which have installed such dictatorships — the re-
sults liave been not merely the humiliation and
degradation of a police state, but hunger and
inefficiency. But then it is too late to return to
the ways of freedom.
We are therefore challenged by the need to
demonstrate urgently that free men can carry
forward the great transformation to whicli we
are committed ; and we are challenged equally by
the need to frustrate the techniques by which
Communists seek power in societies disrupted by
the process of modernization.
There will be those who are reluctant to take
the steps and demand the sacrifices necessary to
make good the Alliance for Progress within their
societies. There will be those who will insist that
only violent revolution can achieve its objectives.
In the center, however, are the vast majority of
our citizens. They know that in fact this hemi-
sphere has seen already many constructive
changes. They know — and it is the deepest part
of our common tradition — that the goals we
achieve will depend on the means we use. They
know that progress and freedom are compatible
and are prepared to stake their lives on that prop-
osition. They know that in carrying forward
with the Alliance for Progress they are working
in continuity with a tradition of evolutionary and
humane change more than a century old.
I am confident that over this decade we shall
in our hemisphere see the triumpli of this great
majority of the center, neither fearful of the fu-
ture nor tempted by illusory efficiency of totalitar-
ian methods.
Tradition of Cooperation
The working agenda ahead of us is long.
Serious national development programs cannot be
produced overnight; projects require studies of
feasibility and blueprints, and these take time and
technical skill. But we are moving. We are be-
ginning to give life to the ideas of Latin American
statesmen and economists who, over the past
decade, have been preparing the way for the Al-
liance for Progress and preparing a generation of
young men and women technically capable of
canning it forward. Out of this ferment will
come not merely development plans and projects
but a coming together of the Latin American na-
tions themselves, through regional markets, im-
proved communications, and the common day-to-
day efforts that flow from the commitment to build
on a grand scale in this hemisphere and to protect
wliat we are building. The principle of coopenx-
f ion is, in itself, an old tradition in the hemisphere.
From the inception of the idea of inter-Ameri-
can cooperation my Government has maintained
faith in its potential for good, in all the phases
through which it lias passed. President John
Quincy Adams, early in the past century, ac-
704
Department of State Bulletin
claimed Bolivar's "great design" of hemisphere
alliance. In December 1880 President Benjamin
Harrison said in his message to Congress:
It is a matter of high significance, and no less of con-
gratulations, that the first year of the second century of
our constitutional existence finds, as honored guests
witliin our borders, the representatives of all the inde-
pendent states of North and South America met together
in earnest conference touching the best methods of
perpetuating and expanding the relations of mutual in-
terest and friendliness existing among them. . . .
And, President Harrison's message continued,
while much was expected from that first conference
in mutually beneficial commercial cooperation,
. . . the crowning benefit will be found in the better
securities which may be devised for the maintenance of
peace among all American nations, and the settlement of
all contentions by methods that a Christian civilization
can approve.
Unity of Thought and Purpose
Twenty-nine years ago yesterday, on April 12,
1933, President Franklin D. Roosevelt reminded
this august Council's predecessors that celebration
of Pan American Day here in the House of the
Americas, dedicated as it is to international good
will and cooperation, "exemplifies a unity of
thought and purpose among the peoples of this
hemisphere." "It is," he said, ''a manifestation
of the common ideal of mutual helpfulness, sym-
pathetic imderstanding, and spiritual solidarity."
Those three elements of our present alliance —
helpfulness, understanding, solidarity — have been
manifested repeatedly during the intervening
years. They are attested not only by resolutions
of Inter- American Conferences and of this Coun-
cil but by the innumerable cooperative acts
through which these resolutions have been made
effective.
As our alliance moves forward, let us not forget
Jose Martl's reminder to governors and the gov-
erned. In words that have operational meaning
in evei-y quarter of the globe, free or enslaved, he
said:
By being men, we are endowed with the principle of
freedom ; by being intelligent, we incur the obligation of
making that principle a reality.
At Punta del Este in Januaiy of this year we
heard a most moving and significant statement,
rooted in the same moral tradition. It was made
by the Foreign Minister of the Dominican Ee-
public, Jose Antonio Bonilla Atiles. He said:
Freedom itself is not democracy. Democracy is not an
end in itself. But it is the best means to attain the ob-
jective of a people's well-being and happiness ; and so
long as there are poverty, ignorance, and social injustice,
there can be no happiness and well-being.
This is the challenge we face and the mjunction
that should guide us as we move forward together.
United States and Brazil Reaffirm
Existing Close Relations
Jodo Goulart, President of the Refublic of the
United States of Brazil, visited the United States
April 3-8. Following in the text of a joint com-
munique issued by President Kennedy and Presi-
dent Goulart on Apnl If. at the close of the Wash-
ington portion of Mr. Goularfs visit.
White Uouse pie.ss release dated April 4
The meetings of the President of the United
States of Brazil and the President of the United
States of America during the past two days have
been marked by a spirit of frankness, cordiality,
and mutual understanding. During their talks
the two Presidents examined relations between
their two countries with respect to topics of world-
wide and hemispheric, as well as bilateral, con-
cern. On the conclusion of these extremely fruit-
ful talks, they agreed to publish the following
joint commimique :
They reaffirm that the traditional friendship be-
tweeii Brazil and the United States has grown
through the years as a consequence of the faith-
fulness of the Brazilian and the American peoples,
to common ideals of representative democracy and
social progress, to mutual respect between the two
nations, and to their determination that both Gov-
ernments work together in the cause of peace and
freedom.
The two Presidents declared that political
democracy, national independence and self-deter-
mination, and the liberty of the individual are the
political principles which shape the national poli-
cies of Brazil and the United States. Both coun-
tries are joined in a world-wide effort to bring
about the economic progress and social justice
which are the only secure foundations for human
freedom.
The Presidents discussed the participation of
their comitries in the Geneva disarmament talks
April 30, J 962
705
and agreed to continue to work to reduce world
tensions through negotiations insuring progressive
disarmament under effective international control.
Resources freed as a result of such disarmament
should be used for peaceful purposes which will
benefit peoples everywhere.
The two Presidents reaffirmed the dedication of
their countries to the Inter- American system and
to the values of human dignity, liberty, and prog-
ress on which that system is based. They ex-
pressed their intention to strengthen the Inter-
American machinery for regional cooperation, and
to work together to protect this hemisphere against
all forms of aggression. They also expressed
their concern that political crises in American
nations be resolved through peaceful adherence to
constitutional government, the rule of law, and
consent of the people expressed through the demo-
cratic processes.
The Presidents reaffirmed their adherence to the
principles of the Charter of Punta del Est« ' and
their intention to carry forward the commitments
which they assumed under that Charter. They
agreed on the need for rapid execution of the steps
necessary to make the Alliance for Progress effec-
tive — national programming to concentrate re-
sources on high priority objectives of economic and
social progress; institutional reforms, including
reform of the agrarian structure, tax reform, and
other changes required to assure a broad distribu-
tion of the fruits of development among all sec-
tors of the community ; and international financial
and technical assistance to accelerate the accom-
plishment of national development programs.
The Presidents stressed the important role
which trade unions operating imder democratic
principles should play in advancing the goals of
the Alliance for Progress.
President Goulart stated the intention of the
Government of Brazil to sti'engthen the machinery
for national programming, selection of priorities
and preparation of projects. President Kennedy
indicated the readiness of the United States Gov-
ernment to assign representatives to work closely
with such Brazilian agencies to minimize delays
in project selection and the provision of external
support.
Tlie Presidents noted with satisfaction the ef-
fective cooperation of the two Governments in
working out an agreement for large-scale United
' For text, see Bulletin of Sept. 11, 1901, p. 463.
706
States support of the Brazilian Government's pro-
gram for development of the Northeast of Brazil.
They expressed the hope that this program would
provide a fruitful response at an early date to the
aspirations of the hard-pressed people of that
area for a better life.
The President of Brazil stated the intention of
his Government to maintain conditions of security
whicli will permit private capital to perform its
vital role in Brazilian economic development.
The President of Brazil stated tliat in arrange-
ments with the companies for the transfer of pub-
lic utility enterprises to Brazilian ownership the
principle of fair compensation with reinvestment
in other sectors important to Brazilian economic
development would be maintained. President
Kennedy expressed great interest in this approach.
The two Presidents discussed the efforts which
the Government of Brazil has undertaken for a
program of financial recovery, aiming at holding
down the cost of living and assuring a rapid rate
of economic growth and social development in a
context of a balanced economy. The Government
of Brazil has already taken significant action
under this program. The Presidents agreed that
these efforts, effectively carried through, will mark
an important forward step under the Alliance for
Progress. The Presidents welcomed the under-
standing recently reached between the Brazilian
Finance Minister and the U.S. Secretary of the
Treasury, under which the United States is pro-
viding support for the program which has been
presented by the Government of Brazil.
In order to promote the expansion of Latin
American markets and to encourage the most effi-
cient use of available resources, the two Presidents
indicated their support for the Latin American
free trade area and their intention to speed its
development and strengthening.
The two Presidents discussed the major aspects
of the problem of raw materials and primary
products. They decided to give full support to
the completion of a world-wide agreement on
coffee, which is now in process of negotiation.
They will jointly support representation to the
European economic community looking toward
the elimination of excessive excise taxes which
limit the sales of such products and customs dis-
crimination which reduces the ready access to
European markets for the basic products of Latin
American origin.
Department of State Bulletin
In conclusion, the two Presidents agreed that
their exchange of views had confirmed the close
relations between their two governments and na-
tions. President Kennedy reaffirmed his coun-
try's commitment to assist the Government of
Brazil in its elForts to achieve its people's aspira-
tions for economic progress and social justice.
The two Presidents restated their conviction that
the destiny of the hemisphere lay in the collabora-
tion of nations united in faith in individual lib-
erty, free institutions and human dignity.
Letters of Credence
Iran
The newly appointed Ambassador of Iran,
Hosein Qods-Nakliai, presented his credentials to
President Kcimedy on April 6. For the texts of
the Ambassador's remarks and the President's re-
ply, see Department of State press release 228
dated April 6.
U.S. and U.K. State Position
on Nuclear Testing
Joint Statement
White House press release dated April 10
Discussions among ourselves and the Soviet
Union about a treaty to ban nuclear tests have
been going on in Geneva for nearly a month.^ Tlie
Soviet representatives have rejected international
inspection or verification inside the Soviet Union
to determine the nature of unexplained seismic
events which might be nuclear tests.
This is a point of cardinal importance to the
United States and the United Kingdom.^ From
the very beginning of the negotiations on a nuclear
Test Ban Treaty, they have made it clear that an
essential element of such a treaty is an objective
international system for assuring tliat a ban on
nuclear tests is being observed by all parties. The
need for sucli a system was clearly recognized in
' For a statement by Secretary Rusk before the 18-natioii
Disarmament Committee on Mar. 23, see Bulletin of
Apr. 9, 1962, p. 571.
' For a statement by President Kennedy on Mar. 29,
see ihid., Apr. 16, 1962, p. 624.
the report ^ of the scientific experts which was the
foundation of the Geneva negotiations. For nearly
three years this need was accepted by the Soviet
delegation at Geneva. There was disagreement
about details, but the principle of objective inter-
national verification was accepted. It was em-
bodied in the Treaty tabled by the United States
and the United Kingdom on April 18, 1961,*
which provides for such a system. Since the cur-
rent disarmament meetings began in Geneva, the
United States and the United Kingdom have made
further efforts to meet Soviet objections to the
April 18 treaty. These efforts have met with no
success as is clearly shown by the recent statements
of the Foreign IVIinister of the Soviet Union
[Andrei A. Gromyko] and of their representative
in Geneva, Mr. [Valerian A.] Zorin, who have
repeatedly rejected the very concept of interna-
tional verification. There has been no progress on
this point in Geneva; the Soviet Union has re-
fused to change its position.
The ground given seems to be that existing na-
tional detection systems can give adequate protec-
tion against clandestine tests. In the present state
of scientific instrumentation, there are a great
many cases in which we cannot distinguish be-
tween natural and artificial seismic disturbances —
as opposed to recording the fact of a disturbance
and locating its probable epicenter. A treaty
therefore cannot be made effective unless adequate
verification is included in it. For otherwise there
would be no alternative, if an instrument reported
an miexplained seismic occurrence on eitlier side,
between accepting the possibility of an evasion of
the Treaty or its immediate denunciation. The
opportunity for adequate verification is of the very
essence of mutual confidence.
This principle has so far been rejected by the
Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, and there
is no indication that he lias not spoken with the
full approval of his Government. We continue
to hope that the Soviet Government may recon-
sider the position and express their readiness to
accept the principle of international verification.
If they will do this, there is still tune to reach
agreement. But if there is no change in the pres-
ent Soviet position, the Governments of the United
States and the United Kingdom must conclude
that their effoi-ts to obtain a workable treaty to
^ For background and text of report, see ibid., Sept. 22,
19.')8, p. 452.
' For text, see ibid., June 5, 1961, p. S70.
April 30, J 962
707
ban nuclear tests are not now successful, and the
test series scheduled for the latter part of this
month ^ will have to go forward.
testing, would only give rise to a false sense of
security and provide yet another opportunity for
the Soviet Union to prepare in secret for its own
nuclear testing.
U.S. Comments on Soviet Statement
Calling for Nuclear Test Moratorium
Department Statement
Press release 245 dated April 12
The statement today [April 12] by the Soviet
Union that a new uninspected moratorium on nu-
clear tests should be undertaken for as long as the
18-nation disarmament conference remains in ses-
sion is another unfortunate effort to substitute
paper pledges for guaranteed agreements. The
United States hopes that this statement is not the
final answer of the Soviet Government to the joint
U.S.-U.K. message of April 10 ^ on nuclear testing,
which clearly states the position of the two Gov-
ernments toward this vital issue.
Tlie United States is deeply sensitive to the ap-
prehensions which have been expressed by the
eight new nations at the Geneva conf ei-ence regard-
ing nuclear testing. But it does not believe that
a solution to tliis vital issue can result from paper
pledges. Rather, it is essential that the conference
direct its energies to reaching an agreement on
adequate verification arrangements which will re-
sult in a safeguarded agreement. This is where
an answer to the world's desire for an end to all
nuclear testing will be found.
This latest Soviet proposal must be judged in
the light of the actions of the Soviet Government
last fall during the course of the test ban con-
ference. Even as these discussions were continu-
ing, the Soviet Union resumed tests,^ thus ending
the unpoliced moratorium which it now proposes
to reinstate.
The United States does not intend to place its
security and the security of its allies at the mercy
of Soviet on-again-off-again tactics. We are ready
to conclude an effective test ban agreement now.
But we cannot be led into another paper pledge
which, far from guaranteeing a halt to nuclear
"For an atUlress to the Nation by Tresiilent Kennedy
on Mar. 2, see ihid.. Mar. 10, 19G2, p. 443.
' See p. 707.
' For backgrotnid, see Bulletin of Nov. 20, lOGl, p. 844.
President Commends General Clay
on Mission to Berlin
Statement by President Kennedy
White House press release dated April 12
General [Lucius D.] Clay and I have had a
thorough discussion of the situation in Berlin and
of his own role in it. General Clay has served for
several montlis beyond the duration of tliis assign-
ment as originally expected. He has served with
great effectiveness in helping to sustain the close
partnership and mutual miderstanding of the
people of West Berlin with the United States in
a time of grave danger.
Wlule there is still no settlement of the differ-
ences among the great powers over Germany and
Berlin and while the defense of the freedom of
West Berlin remains a matter of the highest con-
cern to the United States, General Clay has re-
ported to me that the morale and economy of the
city are such that liis full-time presence as my
personal representative is no longer required.
This is particularly true as Allied planning and
coordination have advanced rapidly in the last
several months.
While personal considerations would not lead
General Clay to ask to be relieved in time of
emergency, he should not be called upon to stay
indefinitely when his immediate mission is over.
With regard to his work in Berlin, General Clay's
contributions to the situation there are too well
known to require comment other than to say that
I am glad that he will remain in service on call as
my adviser on matters relating to Berlin. In this
capacity ho will be returning to the city at frequent
intervals in future months, and in case of emer-
gency he is only 8 hours away from the city. He
will go back to Berlin Simday [April 15], where
he will remain for a few weelvs.
General Clay luis made a great contribution in
the last autumn and winter, and it is good that this
contribution will continue as he comes home from
full-time service.
708
Department of Stale Bulletin
The New Europe— Its Challenge and its Opportunities for the United States
ly Douglas MacArthur II
Ambassador to Belgium ^
It is not only a great privilege, but it is also a
pleasure to participate in tlie annual convention
of the Young Presidents. It is a privilege be-
cause the Young Presidents are Imown not only
in the United States but in many other countries of
the world which they have visited over the years
as a vigorous, progressive, and forward-looking
group of young business leaders— leadere who are
making a veiy substantial contribution to the
mainstream of industrial and economic thought
and action, which will help not only our own
coimtiy but the free world meet the great chal-
lenge it faces. It is a pleasure to be here l^ecause
it gives me the opportunity to see again old friends
from your distinguished group with whom I had
the good fortune to meet and discuss common prob-
lems in Tokj'o in 1958 during your Far Eastern
seminar and in Brussels last November during
your European seminar.
In inviting me to meet and talk with you today
it was suggested that I first discuss the background
of the United States support for the truly revolu-
tionary movement toward European unity that is
in progress and then turn to the great opportuni-
ties as well as the great challenge we will face as
a result of the Common Market and other Euro-
pean institutions. This subject seems most ap-
propriate since you represent businesses and
industries whose future depends not just on Amer-
ican domestic commercial transactions and policies
but to a very considerable extent on international
trade and particularly on the kind of interna-
tional trade policy that your Government is en-
abled to follow with respect to the European
' Address made before the Young Presidents' Organiza-
tion, Inc., at Phoenix, Ariz., on Apr. 9 (press release 225
dated Apr. 5).
April 30, 1962
Common Market and other foreign outlets for our
products. And of course the kind of foreign trade
policy we adopt will have a major impact on the
entire world economic and political picture, par-
ticularly insofar as the future of free nations is
concerned.
However, before discussing trade policy, I will
fii-st review briefly certain aspects of the European
picture which make clear why both Democratic
and Republican administrations in the United
States have in the postwar period given full and
wholehearted support to the concept of European
economic and political integration. This, I think,
is important, for it holds the answer to questions
that are sometimes asked, such as: "In giving
Marshall plan aid to Europe and in otherwise
supporting European moves toward unification
did we not just build up a competitive industrial
base that will put iVmerican industry out of
business ?"
Postwar Hostility of Soviet Leadership
To explain fully the backgromid of our support
of European integration, I will first go back to
1945. When the cruel chapter of World War II
ended, Americans hoped and prayed that a new
era of genuine international cooperation and co-
existence would be ushered in. And in particular
it was hoped that the Soviet Union, responsive to
the many billions of dollars of lend-lease assistance
extended to it by the United States and the thou-
sands of Allied lives that were sacrificed io get
such help to Russia to enable it to survive Nazi
Germany's assault, would modify its traditional
policy of tiying to undermine and destroy all gov-
ernments and systems that it did not dominate.
In other words, we hoped that Communist Russia,
709
although having a substantially different political
system from that of the United States and other
democratic countries, would be willing to live and
let live.
For our part, and despite the basic difference in
political philosophy, we were not only willing but
eager to live together and cooperate with the
Soviets in a world where force, the threat of force,
and subversion would be replaced by the rule of
law and the settlement of international differences
by peaceful means. Knowing full well the terri-
ble power of the atom, we wanted to avoid another
world conflagration that could well be fatal to
humanity.
Alas, this bright dream of the future was never
realized. Soon after the war ended the Soviet
leadership clearly indicated it did not intend to
tolerate the existence of systems of government
other than its own. Indeed on Febi-uary 6, 1946,
in an important speech, Stalin openly blamed the
Western Powers for the war and said that the con-
tinued existence of "capitalism" meant the basic
causes of war were still present. Thus, despite the
massive assistance extended by the West to Soviet
Russia during the war, Stalin and the leaders of
the Kremlin refused to modify that basic tenet of
Soviet Communist doctrine which is responsible
for today's cold war and the great tension and
threat to world peace. The fundamental tenet of
which I speak is the implacable and unremitting
hostility of Soviet leadership past and present to
any other government or system that it does not
control or dominate, and its active efforts through
force, the threat of force, and subversion to impose
its system on other peoples.
Let me emphasize that, contrary to what some
people say, this is not just a question of conflict
between "communism" and "capitalism," or "so-
cialism" and "free entei-prise," as the recent 22d
Congress of the Soviet Communist Party so clearly
demonstrated. At that congress the Soviet leader-
ship stated its complete hostility toward the Com-
munist Albanian government because the latter
was not fully subservient to Moscow's control.
Similarly, you will recall that in 1948, when Com-
munist Yugoslavia refused to submit to Moscow's
direction, the Soviet Union did its best to under-
mine and destroy the Yugoslav Government. I
mention these events only to emphasize that the
cold war and related problems that free peoples
fao^ today do not stem from mere differences of
political or economic systems but from Moscow's
determination to dominate the world and its un-
remitting and relentless efforts to impose its con-
trol on all governments and systems.
And so it became clear shortly after World War
II that the United States and other free societies
were faced with a threat of great magnitude. I
used the expression "great magnitude" advisedly,
because one of the major results of World War II,
indeed one of the great phenomena of this century,
is the cataclysmic change in the overall ratio of
military strength and power in the world — the
disappearance of the traditional military strength
of Germany and Japan, which had for centuries
helped contain Russian expansionism; the reduc-
tion in the great military strength, land and sea,
of France and Britain respectively; and the
emergence of the tremendous power of the Soviet
Union, with its expanded empire stretching from
the Pacific right into the heart of Western Europe.
Rehabilitation of Europe's Potential
As we assessed the threat to the survival of our
own coimtry and other free nations, it soon became
apparent that the United States would by itself be
unable to meet successfully the challenge of Soviet
exjiansionism. The imperative and crying need
was for greater free-world strength which, joined
with our own power, would be adequate to meet
the challenge.
Wliei-e were we to find such additional muscle ?
One area of great potential strength came im-
mediately to mind. This was the Western Euro-
pean complex, from which America sprang. I
used the phrase "potential strength'' advisedly,
because we recognized that over the past century
Western Europe had possessed greater assets in
terms of population, industiy, and scientific skills
and knowledge than either the United States or
Russia. However, this great Western Europe po-
tential had never been realized because of the
senseless bloodlettings and internecine struggles
in Western Europe — political, economic, and mili-
tary — which over the past 100 years have succes-
sively gutted that vitally impoi-tant area and
sapped its strength and vigor.
Furthermore, as a result of devastation of tlie
war, Europe's industrial plant had been largely
destroyed. It was clear that without economic
assistance and rehabilihilion there would not be
economic, social, or political stabilil y and Europe
710
Department of State Bulletin
might even fall to the fonnidable offensive that
the Communists unleashed against it soon after the
end of the war.
However, if Europe's great potential — eco-
nomic, industrial, and human — could be rehabili-
tated and if our European friends would work to-
gether in cooperation with each other and with
us and other like-minded people, then indeed
Western Europe's great potential could be realized
and the balance of free-world-Communist-world
military power could be more than redressed.
And so in tlie late 1940's we extended Marshall
plan aid to help restore Europe's shattered econ-
omy and thus provide a basis for .social and po-
litical stability — the basis for a strong Europe
tliat could help share the burden of free-world
security.
And at the same time, because we recognized
tliat without close intra-European cooperation the
rehabilitation of Europe's shattered indu.stries
might simply reproduce the tragic past, we gave
encouragement to those European leaders who
were working for European integration within
the framework of a broader Atlantic conununity
in order to develop Europe's strength and also to
provide a framework for close political, economic,
and military cooperation between Western Europe
and North America.
Importance of European Integration
But there were other historical and compelling
reasons for our support of European integration
far transcending the present East-West confron-
tation. European integration was not in our view
just a cold- war instrument but was a genuine ne-
cessity for us and for the future of Western na-
tions irrespective of the state of relations with the
Soviet bloc. Why? Because twice within the
span of a single generation the jealousies and ri-
valries of Europe had led to explosions and world
wars which had eventually involved us at the cost
of hundreds of thousands of young American
lives and tens of billions of dollars of our
resources.
One of the principal obstacles to a prosperous
and peaceful Europe had been the traditional
animosity and hostility between France and Ger-
many that three times within the lifespan of liv-
ing men and women had torn Europe apart and
drained it so terribly of its strength and vitality.
In what framework could this ancient enmity be
transformed into a cooperative arrangement where
the great assets and qualities of both the French
and German people would work together to
strengthen the fabric of peace in Europe? Given
the larger population and the traditional vigor of
Germany, France was understandably reluctant
to enter alone into a partnership with Germany
in which the latter might gain dominant control.
A few European leaders of great vision believed
that a lasting French-German rapprochement and
partnership was only feasible within some broader
and stronger framework, the framework of an
integrated Europe. Thus the vigor and resources
of Germany would be joined in equal partnership
with the assets and energies of other Western
European countries so that Germany, with its
superior numbers and great industrial capability,
would not by itself have the dominant voice.
And related to this aspect of the problem there
is still another reason why an integrated Europe
was important to Europe and to us. This was
the desirability of Germany's being woven solidly
into a fabric of Western European "collectivity"
so that the great and traditional energy, vitality,
and vigor of the German people would not once
again be channeled into the narrow and destruc-
tive stream of xenophobic nationalism but could
find adequate and constructive scope and expres-
sion in an integrated and more prosperous Europe,
to which Germany could make its own unique and
indispensable contribution.
Let me make clear that we did not try to impose
European integration on any nation or people.
But for all the above reasons the enlightened self-
interest of the United States and the American
people seemed to dictate our encouragement of the
views of those European leaders who were work-
ing so actively for an economically and politically
integrated Europe.
Need for Liberal Trade Policies
However, while recognizing the advantages of
a strong and integrated Europe, we also recognized
that it held both political and economic risks for
us unless certain fundamental principles were ob-
ser\'ed — principles wliich we understood our West-
ern European friends fully shared.
One of the basic assumptions on which we gave
our support to European political integration was
that the politically integrated Europe which
would emerge would not be a political "third
April 30, 7962
711
force" that would adopt a policy of political op-
portunism and blackmail and try to play the
United States off against the Communist bloc.
What we had in mind was the emergence of a
Europe, united and strong, that could serve as an
equal partner with the United States in the
achievement of our common aims and endeavors.
Our assumption in this respect has thus far been
more than justified. Although the jjrocess of polit-
ical integration is still proceeding, we have seen
ever-growing bonds and ties developing not only
between the nations of Western Europe but also
between this new Europe and ourselves.
A vitally important premise on which we gave
support to European economic integration was
that the trade policies of a European Common
Market would be liberal and outward-looking and
that such a Common Market would not, while
lowering its internal tariffs, at the same time erect
around itself high tariff walls that would exclude
products of the United States and other third
countries that had traditionally had important
outlets in Europe. This of course was of over-
riding importance, not only for our own economy
but for free-world strength and unity. For ob-
viously a narrow protectionist policy on the part
of a unified Europe or the United States would
invite retaliation from the other side and do not
only irreparable damage Ui the economies of each
but also strike a mortal blow at the solidarity,
strength, and cohesion of the Western World.
Creation of a high, outside tariff wall would also
tend to preclude an increase in the total volume
of trade which should otherwise result from for-
mation of a customs union and which should in
the long run offset the immediate disadvantages to
third countries inherent in the removal of the
barriers between the members of the customs union.
And of course we made clear in our talks with
European leaders that liberal trade policies of a
Common Market must apply not just to industrial
commodities but agricultural products as well.
For the stability of our economy and our ability
to deal successfully with our difficult balance-of-
payments problem depends not only on outlets for
industrial products but also on the maintenance
of our market for agricultural products in
Europe — our greatest single market for such com-
modities. And since the Common Market is of
such gi-eat importance to us I would like to say
just a few words about it.
European Common Market
Following World War II, imder the genius and
drive of such great Europeans as Jean Monnet,
[Konrad] Adenauer, [Alcide] de Gasperi, Kobert
Schuman, and Paul-Henri Spaak, the movement
toward European unity slowly took form and
steadily progressed until 5 years ago a revolu-
tionary development occurred that has galvanized
and transformed the situation — a development
which holds for us not only great challenge but
also great opportunities. I refer to the signing
of the Treaty of Eome in 1957 and the subsequent
formation of the Common Market for which it
provided.-
"VVlien the Common Market came into being in
1958, there were some who believed it would not
amount to very much and others who preferred at
that time to remain outside its framework for
imderstandable reasons. Britain, the Scandi-
navian and other European countries were in the
latter category.
But those who did not believe in the Common
Market have been proved dramatically wrong.
For since the Common Market got under way, the
level of industrial activities of its members has
advanced at the very high rate of some 7 percent
per year, whereas the progress in other European
countries, such as Britain and the Scandinavian
countries, has been only about half as great.
During the period 1957-1960 the gross national
pi'oduct of the Common Market countries in-
creased by more than 45 percent, while the gross
national product of the United States increased by
only about 18 percent. This dramatic increase
in the level of economic activity of the members
has been accompanied by a very substantial in-
crease in trade and commercial activities both with
other countries and especially between the mem-
bers.
Total foreign trade of the Common Market
with all countries increased from about $43 billion
in 1956, just before formation of the Common
Market, to just under $G0 billion in 1960, a whop-
ping 39 percent. Trade between the six members
of the Common Market increased during that
same period from $12.7 billion to $20.3 billion,
an incredible 60 percent. Although both of these
'The six members of the European Common Market
are Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and
the Netjierlands.
712
Deparfment of Sfafe Bulletin
increases are important, the latter is particularly
sigcnilicant, as it reflects the development of closer
trading ties among tlie six Common Mai-ket coun-
tries as trading barriers are lowered between them.
That development is one which I shall refer to
again a bit later.
It is a fact that the Common Market has suc-
ceeded dramatically and with a rapidity which
has astounded even its most ardent supporters.
The result has been that Greece has stated its
desire ultimately to join and is already an associ-
ated member, while Britam, Denmark, and Ire-
land have asked to join and Norway is also
contemplating doing so.
'WHiat are the challenges as well as tlie oppor-
tunities that this situation presents for us?
The Challenge to the United States
Tlie challenge can, I believe, best be evaluated
by a few facts relating to population, industry,
and trade of the six Common Market countries
and the other European nations that desii-e to
join it.
(a) The Common Market nations today have
a population of 170 million and, should the pres-
ent negotiations with Britain and the subsequent
negotiations with Denmark, Ireland, and Norway
be successful, it will have a population of about
250 million, as contrasted with our population
of 185 million. In terms of population it will
represent a smgle market substantially larger than
either the United States or the Soviet Union.
(b) Furthermore, in the Common Market real
wages and purchasing power are steadily rising.
During the period 1953-1960 consumption ex-
penditures per person increased by 30 pei-cent in
the Common Market countries while in the United
States such expenditures increased by only 13.5
percent. It is of course true that those countries
started from a lower base than we and their stand-
ards of living are still lower than ours. However,
in view of its dynamics, it is clear that wages,
standards of living, and consumption expendi-
tures are now rising at an even more rapid rate
and will continue to grow toward those of the
United States. In fact, should Britain and the
other three nations join the Conunon Market, it
will become the world's greatest single market.
(c) The Common Market has great industrial
strength that should increase. In 1960 steel pro-
duction of the Common IMarket was almost that
of the United States and well ahead of the Soviet
Union. Its coal production was exceeded only by
that of the United States and of the Soviet Union.
Its productivity is increasing at a rate of almost
twice that of the United States, and in automobiles,
transport equipment, machmery, chemicals, steel
products, and a host of other manufactures it is
giving us hard competition in world markets.
(d) It will have an unrivaled pool of scientific
and teclmological skills and Icnowledge to apply
to industrial advances.
(e) And it will comprise the greatest single in-
ternational trading bloc in the world. In 1960 the
six Common Market covmtries, without Britain
and the other three countries I mentioned, had im-
ports of $29.6 billion and exports of $29.7 billion
for an overall trade total of just mider $60 billion.
In comparison our own imports amoimted to about
$15 billion and our exports to $20 billion for a total
of about $35 billion.
It is crj'stal clear that, if our own American
economy is not to stagnate and become depressed,
we must have maximum access to this great new
market for both our industrial and our agricul-
tural products. Today we sell to the six Common
Market countries, Britain, and the other countries
wliich now contemplate joming it approximately
$314 billion of our industrial products. We also
sell to them just under $2 billion of American
agricultural products, for Western Europe is by
far our gi-eatest agricultural market.
I mention agricultural products because, while
there is general understanding of the importance
of markets for our industrial products, there is
sometimes less underetanding about the vital
necessity of preserving our great West European
market for agricultural products if our balance-
of-payments situation is not to suffer, witli serious
effects on our economy.
To sum up, our annual industrial and agricul-
tural exports to Western Europe are just under
$6 billion, about 30 percent of our total exports.
And, as contrasted with the postwar years when
Europe was so heavily dependent on us, we are
now more dependent than ever on our European
market. For if our industrial and agi-icultural
exports to Europe were substantially reduced, we
would be faced with a major balance-of -payments
crisis; many of our industries which depend on
foreign trade would be threatened ; our ability to
deal successfully with our vei-y difficult agricul-
April 30, 1962
713
tural surplus problem would be endangered ; and
we would in fact face the prospect of a most
serious economic crisis.
Opportunities for American Export Trade
Although the challenge of the Common Market
is great, the opportunities are equally great. It is
a market where American products, both indus-
trial and agricultural, are well and vei-y favorably
known. Indeed today our exports to the Common
Market are 50 percent greater than our imports
from it ; it is a market wliere real wages, and hence
consumption, are rising rapidly; it is a market
with a rapidly expanding population. It is in fact
rapidly becoming the world's greatest single
market, and it thus holds great opportunities for
us.
Problems for U.S. Government and Industry
One of the most important problems we face to-
day is how to maintain and expand our access to
this new and great European market on which our
own economy and the prosperity and well-being
of the American people so largely depend.
It seems to me that the answer to this question
has two basic aspects :
First, there is the problem of reducing to the
maximimi extent possible the official customs bar-
riers and other protective devices which the Com-
mon Market and other nations may apply against
imports of American products. This part of the
problem must be dealt with by your Government
rather than by American business and industry.
However, your Government can only do so success-
fully if it is given the necessary t<x)ls.
The second aspect relates to the ability of United
States products to compete successfully in world
markets. And here, I think, American business
and industry have an indispensable contribution
wluch they alone can make.
Protecting U.S. Trade Position
I^^t me deal fii-st witli the problem of liow we
are to prevent tariff barriers and other protective
devices from walling American products out of
the European Common Market and other foreign
markets. The only way we can protect our posi-
tion against such governmental devices is to under-
take negotiations at the governmental level with
the Common Market or other countries involved.
And let me emphasize most emphatically that
in these negotiations we do not hold all the cards.
Too many Americans today do not realize that our
own relative strength and position in the world
have vastly changed since the immediate postwar
period, when Europe and much of the rest of the
world was prostrate or in distress and we were
pretty well able to call the time in trade and eco-
nomic matters without fear of being successfully
challenged. The unbalanced postwar situation
where we alone in the free world liad any real
economic strength and power is gone for good.
Today in Europe we have a strong and equal
partner, a partner with great and increasing eco-
nomic and industrial strength and vigor.
If we are to safeguard our own vital interests —
industrial and agricultural — we will have to en-
gage in give-and-take tariff negotiations with tliis
new Europe. The President will need all the
authority and flexibility he has requested in his
foreign ti'ade legislation^ to meet the challenge
we face.
Let me also state my own conviction that with
such authority we will be able to negotiate ar-
rangements which will be best designed to protect
not only American industry but also labor and
agriculture. Without that authority your Gov-
ernment's hands will be tied; we will be imable
to negotiate successfully on tariffs, and the re-
sults will be tragic for our economy and the well-
being of the American people.
Need for Broad Authority To Negotiate
Some people may have a question as to the
horse-trading skill of the American negotiators.
I have complete confidence in their toughness of
mind and ability to hold their own in any future
negotiations, just as they recently did in the diffi-
cult negotiation in GATT [General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade] under our present trade agree-
ments legislation.*
These last GATT negotiations, where for the
fii-st time wo could bargain with the Common
Market as a single negot iator, were the most com-
plex and, I must add, the most long-di-awn-out of
' For text of Presidont Kennedy's trade messaee to Con-
gress, see Bulletin of Feb. 12, 1962, p. 231 ; for a sum-
mary of the proposed legislation, see ibid., Feb. 26, 1962,
p. .343.
* For a summary of tariff negotiations concluded at
Geneva on Mar. 7, see ihid., .\pr. 2, liH!2, p. r>61.
714
Department of State Bulletin
the major negotiating sessions in tlie history of
GATT. But the result was satisfactory for our
interests. We granted concessions on goods im-
ported into the United States worth about $2.9
billion ; in return we received concessions on about
$4.3 billion worth of exports, all based on 1960
figures. As the most-favored-nation principle
applies to those negotiations, we can safely say
that there should be ultimate and appreciable
benefits not only to us but to all the trading part-
ners of GATT from the results.
However, while the existing Trade Agreements
Act under which we conducted the recent GATT
negotiations has served a very useful puqiose for
many years, it is today as outmoded as the faithful
old bC-3 aircraft. We must have new and up-to-
date authorization if we are to negotiate success-
fully.
Trade among tlie six members of the Common
Market has already increased by 60 percent since
the Common Market entered into force and the
trade barriers between its members began to be
lowered. In order to maintain our European
markets while members of the present or an ex-
panded Common IMarket are elimmating the in-
ternal trade barriers between themselves, we must
be able to negotiate down the Common Market's
external tariff barriers.
The importance of such negotiations for us is
emphasized by the fact that, if the British and
other prospective applicants join the Common
ilarket, that organization and the United States
will together have almost 90 percent of total free-
world industrial production. In such circum-
stances and to protect our own interests, it will no
longer be feasible to negotiate tariff reductions
item by it«m. Instead there must be broad au-
thority for across-the-board tariff cuts, carefully
negotiated on a reciprocal basis which insures
benefits not only for the two negotiating parties
but also for our other free- world friends, who will
benefit by reason of the most-favored-nation
principle.
President's Trade Proposals
I shoxdd like to emphasize that President Ken-
nedy's trade program is one that serves both our
national as well as our vital overall international
interests. The program seeks to preserve the in-
terests of the United States in a worldwide trad-
ing context, not just with regard to Europe and
April 30, 1962
the Atlantic community. Our aim is that the
benefits of lower American and European tariffs
will also benefit other non-Connnunist countries
in other parts of the world, establishing a pattern
of economic relations that will unify rather than
divide the free world.
It is indeed possible that some of our businesses
or entei-prises will encounter difficulties because of
reductions of tariffs and other trading barriers.
However, our country has grown great by our
spirit of progress through competition, and I have
seen no evidence that American management and
labor cannot face up to this challenge. Further-
more, there are safeguards in tlie President's pro-
gram to cope with temporary hardships and of
course our nation as a whole stands to benefit in-
finitely more from expanded exports than from a
restrictive policy that eventually would only lead
to disaster.
Now there are some sincere people who think
tliat the answer to the great challenge we face in
the field of international trade lies in protection-
ism rather than broad authority to negotiate
liberal trade arrangements on a give-and-take
basis. I would only reply by saying that if the
United States insists on a policy of trade protec-
tionism and import restrictions, we will face re-
taliation from our friends. And such retaliation
will be applied not only against American indus-
trial commodities and products but against Ameri-
can agriculture as well. What retaliation against
American industrial products would mean to busi-
ness and labor needs no elaboration. The effect on
agriculture would be equally disastrous.
Today we have heavy agricultural surpluses
that we have great difficulty in disposing of and
which represent a heavy burden on our budget.
But even with the surpluses that are stockpiled
here in America or used so effectively in some of
our foreign economic aid programs to promote
economic and political stability and progress, we
do sell in foreign markets approximately $5 bil-
lion worth of agricultural commodities a year.
If we lost a very substantial part of our market
for agricultural products, the greatest single part
of which lies in Europe, I need not tell you of the
problems that would be created for our balance of
payments, our farmers, and our overall economy.
And one of our problems is that some of the
xVmerican agricultural products in heaviest surplus
are also in heavy surplus in other countries. Can-
715
ada, Australia, and the Argentine have large sur-
pluses of grain. India, Pakistan, Egypt, and
other countries have surpluses of cotton. The
Netherlands, Denmark, and otliers have surpluses
of dairy products. And so it goes. If we insist
on imposing high tariffs and restrictions on in-
dustrial imports from our friends, we must be
realistic enough to expect that our friends would
feel obliged to turn elsewhere for many of the
agricultural commodities they now obtain from us.
Of course in any discussion of foreign trade the
question of Japan always arises. All the factors
I have just mentioned apply with particular force
to our trading relations with Japan. Because
there is a very close connection between Japan's
external trade and the coimtry's domestic well-
being, and because the United States occupies a
very important place in that external trade. United
States actions in the trade field often have direct
economic and political repercussions in Japan. It
is clear, therefore, that in our own interests and
those of the free world we should act in a way
which will minimize friction and foster an expan-
sion of trade between the two nations — an expan-
sion in both directions.
We need not think of our purchases from Japan
as mere acts of political necessity, however. Ja-
pan is an ever-growing market for American
goods. Last year Japan was our second best for-
eign customer, and our exports to Japan exceeded
our imports by some $700 million or by almost 70
percent.
Nor do we need to think of our purchases from
Japan as the imavoidable means of sustaining our
exports, though it is axiomatic that if we are to sell
to Japan we must buy from Japan. Imports are
part of a desirable process wherein we get from
the highly productive and increasingly inventive
industrial economy of Japan a great many useful
things which make our lives more comfortable and
our economy stronger. Imports can displace do-
mestic production temporarily and locally, but
they can also lead tlirough a chain of actions to
the expansion of domestic industry and to the
creation of new jobs.
The President's new trade proposals are realistic
in dealing with the problem of import competi-
tion. They recognize that there must be an effec-
tive method of dealing with this problem if there
is to be real progress in reducing barriers to im-
ports. To meet the problem the President is pro-
posing a program of assistance to workers, firms,
or industries which have enjoyed protection from
imports and which may suffer dislocation after
that protection has been reduced. These provi-
sions in the bill recognize that the community as
a whole has an obligation to assist those who may
be adversely affected by actions taken on behalf
of the whole community.
U.S. Industry Must "Root, Hog, or Die"
Now let me return to the second aspect of our
foreign trade problem — the ability of American
goods to compete in world markets. This is an
area where much of the problem lies not with your
Government but with you, the American business
community.
I will say to you very frankly, as I said to your
Far Eastern and European seminar groups when
I met with them in Tokyo and Brussels, that I do
not think American business and industry m recent
years have always made tlie contribution to our
foreign trade that they are capable of making.
Wliile, obviously, if we are to compete successfully
there cannot be endless wage-price spirals which
result in pricing our products out of world mar-
kets, and while it also seems clear that wage in-
creases should generally be absorbed through
increased productivity rather than higher prices,
the problem of America's ability to earn its living
through exports is very substantially influenced
by the vigor and imagination with which Ameri-
can business approaches the problem of selling
American products abroad. After all, our coun-
try developed and came to greatness through for-
eign trade. Our Yankee forebears went to the
four corners of the earth in their clipper ships
trading and selling American products. If I may
frankly say so, we seem to have lost some of the
vigor and drive of our Yankee ancestors in de-
veloping and holdhig foreign markets.
The reasons are perhaps imderstandable. From
the period roughly from 1940 until 1953 American
industry enjoyed what amounted to almost total
and absolute protection. What do I mean by
this? I mean that, following the outbreak of
war in 1939, the two great traditional areas of
traditional industrial competition — Western Eu-
rope and Japan — were no longer in the picture
as serious competitors. Circumstances of the war
prevented their industrial and agricultural prod-
716
Department of State Bulletin
ucts from competing with us, not only in the
United States but also in most third countries.
And after the war the destruction of industry
had been so great and privations so heavy that for
many years, as the industrial strength of Japan
and Western Europe was gradually rebuilt, their
industrial output went largely into the home mar-
kets to mi the needs caused by the destruction
and privations of the war. The result was that
not mitil about 1953 or 1954 did we begin to feel
any real competition from Western Europe or
Japan.
However, as the basic and immediate needs of
the peoples of Western Europe and Japan and the
surrounding areas were met, we began once again
to face stiff competition in our own domestic mar-
ket. And, faced with such competition, there was
often a tendency to call for protection rather than
trying to meet the competition by appropriate m-
dustrlal and business techniques and methods.
At the same time competition in third markets
was increasing. For 4 years I served as American
Ambassador to Japan, and for 3 years preceding
that period I traveled every year extensively
through the nations of free Asia. And as I trav-
eled in Asia I was struck by the fact that wher-
ever I went I found business and trade teams
from Britain, from Germany, from France, from
Italy, from the Benelux countries, actively study-
ing and estimating the potential market and mak-
ing effective plans to penetrate it. These foreign
business teams often spent weeks in a smgle small
Asian country estunating the needs and costs of
entering the market. They studied such questions
as advertising methods, language and translations,
servicing of their product, local representation,
and so forth. For them it was a question of "root,
hog, or die" to obtain that market.
And m some of these same countries I occa-
sionally saw American businessmen who were
looking into the market. They had talks with
local leaders and were entertained by them. But
the general attitude of some seemed to be that
their product was so outstanding it sold itself.
Therefore, if the coimtry wanted their product or
business, the market would come to them and they
would not have to go after it aggressively with a
selling campaign. In other cases, I recall, they
felt the market might not be large enough to jus-
tify any great effort. And so the business went
to European competitors. The tragedy was that
April 30, 7962
636026—62 3
it was quite clear that in a good many instances
we had products which were competitive and
would sell, even though sometimes priced a bit
higher, but which were not selling because the
effort and salesmanship had not been put into
the endeavor.
Gentlemen, if we are to gain or even hold the
foreign markets we have today, we will have to
do much more. As time passes our European
friends are working more closely together to ex-
pand their research and technical improvements
of their products. At the same time they are
beginning to lower their prices as a result of in-
creased production resulting from the expanding
Common Market. We are in fact going to find
the competition in the future much tougher than
in the past. And yet I am sure the genius and
ability of American industry can meet competi-
tion it will face in Europe and other countries.
But to sell we will have to get out and "root, hog,
or die." We can do it, but it wUl require research,
teclinical improvements, and of course salesman-
ship.
This is something that the Government cannot
do for you. We can negotiate — successfully, I
believe— to keep tariff walls and restrictions
against the import of American products gener-
ally within reasonable and manageable propor-
tions. But we cannot develop or sell the products
for you. This is a job that American business
will have to do if our American free and competi-
tive enterprise system is to make the grade.
In conclusion let me say that as we face the
future I am not pessunistic. On the contrary I
am optunistic because we not only clearly have
the capability of successfully meeting the chal-
lenge that the new Europe poses to us in the field
of "trade but we can actually benefit from the
opportunities that this great and expanding mar-
ket holds for us. Furthermore, in successfully
and constructively meeting the challenge of the
new Europe we will be contributing to the pros-
perity, strength, and unity of the whole free- world
economic system, thus helpmg to assure the ulti-
mate victory of the free world over Soviet totali-
tarianism on the battlefield of peaceful competi-
tion.
The problem is not one of capability but of will.
Do we have the will to get out and "root" for
foreign markets? Is there the will to give the
President and the administration the tools to
717
work with? I believe the answer to both these
questions is yes.
However, let me reiterate my conviction that
the decision we take with respect to the President's
foreign trade program will have a direct and
major bearing on the future of free-world unity
and strength. There are two courses open to us.
One is a policy of protectionism and restriction
that will divide and destroy free-world unity and
strength and sap our own vitality and power.
The other course is to maintain our liberal trade
policy and adopt those measures that will make
it effective so that trade can become the great
unifying force and source of strength for the
United States and the free world.
U.S. and Austria Suspend Air Talks,
To Resume in Near Future
Department Announcement of April 2
Press release 216 dated April 2
Delegations of the Governments of the United
States and Austria met on April 2 at the Depart-
ment of State to initiate consultations regarding
operations under the Interim Air Transport
Agreement of October 8, 1947.^ The Government
of Austria requested the consultations for the pur-
pose of bringing up to date the terms and condi-
tions of the interim agreement and giving it
permanent effect.
The U.S. delegation is chaired by Philip H.
Trezise, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for
Economic Affairs. Alan S. Boyd, Chairman of
the Civil Aeronautics Board, and other officers of
the Department of State, the Civil Aeronautics
Board, and the Department of Commerce will
participate. A representative of the Air Trans-
port Association of America is attending as
observer.
The chairman of the Austi-ian delegation is
Hermann Gohn, Head of the Finance and Traffic
Division of the Federal Ministry for Foreign Af-
fairs. He is assisted by Otto Jettmar, Head of the
Civil Aviation Department of the Federal Minis-
try of Communications and Electric Power Devel-
opment, and by other officials of the Civil Aviation
Department and the Austrian Embassy in Wash-
ington. An official of Austrian Airlines is attend-
ing as observer.
Department Announcement of April 9
Press release 230 dated April 9
Delegations of the Government of the United
States and the Austrian Federal Government held
negotiations from April 2 to April 7, 1962, in
Washington for the purpose of renegotiating the
U.S.-Austrian Interim Air Transport Agreement
of October 8, 1947. Considerable progress was
made in establishing the terms of a new agreement.
Negotiations were suspended on April 7 by mutual
agreement between the two delegations with the
expectation that they will be resumed in the near
future.
Claims on Austrian Persecutee Fund
Must Be Filed by August 31, 1962
Press release 235 dated April 10
The Department of State again calls attention
to the Austrian fund for settlement of persecutee
property losses (Fonds zur Abgeltung von
Vermoegensverlusten politisch Verfolgter) and
points out that the time for filing claims against
this fund will expire on August 31, 1962.^ Claims
may be filed by persons who were subject to racial,
religious, or political persecution in Austria from
March 13, 1938, to May 8, 1945, their spouses,
children (grandchildren are eligible to receive the
share of deceased children), or parent (s), in the
order given. Awards will be made from the fund,
which amounts to $6,000,000, to cover bank ac-
counts, securities, mortgages, or moneys which
were the subject of forced transfers or which were
confiscated by Nazi authorities, as well as pay-
ments of the discriminatory taxes known as
"Eeichsfluchtsteuer" and "Suehneleistung der
Jiiden (JUVA)."
Reports from Vienna indicate tliat only 1,300
claim applications have been received to date from
the United States. Further, even if the present
claims are paid in full, the fund will be left with
over $1.5 million unexpended.
' Treaties and Other International Acts Series 1659.
^ For background, see Bulletin of May 8, lOGl, p. 691,
and Oct. 2, 1961, p. 553.
718
Department of State Bulletin
Applications should be addressed to the Fonds
zur Abgeltung von Vermoegensverlusten politisch
Verfolgter, Taborstrasse 2-6, Vienna II. Forms
may be obtained from the above address or from
the Austrian Embassy, 2343 Massachusetts Ave.,
Washington, D.C., or at the nearest Austrian con-
sulate. Austrian consulates are located in New
York, New Orleans, Chicago, Detroit, Portland
(Oreg.), San Francisco, Los Angeles, Dallas,
IVIiami, Atlanta, Cleveland, Boston, and Seattle,
and inquiries for further information should be
directed to Austrian representatives.
Change and Challenge in Africa
hy G. Mennen Williams
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs *
Tempora mutantur, et nos mutamur in illis.
It is so exciting to be with an audience where
Latin is still good coin of the realm that I cannot
resist the opportunity to make a bow to the lamp
of learning that burns brightly at Boston College
and, indeed, throughout the entire academic com-
munity of Greater Boston.
This quotation is more than a gesture, however.
The Reverend William Harrison's statement of
1577, "Times change, and we change with them,"
actually states quite well my theme for this meet-
ing. Change is the principal factor charac-
terizing the Afi-ican scene today, and the effects
of change in Africa have had an enormous impact
on the development of U.S. interests in Afi-ica, its
lands and its people.
Although XJ.S. relations with Africa date back
nearly two centuries, it is only in recent years that
our interests have attained their present broad
scope and complexity.
Historically, our first political contacts with the
continent came shortly after our independence,
when the predators of the Barbaiy Coast plun-
dered the ships of the infant United States. This
led to our signing in 1786 a treaty of friendship,
commerce and navigation with Morocco, and our
first official tie with Africa was formed.
More than 100 years ago we participated in the
founding of the Republic of Liberia on Africa's
' Address made before the Boston College Law School
Forum at Brighton, Mass., on Mar. 29 (press release 203).
west coast. This free state remained the only in-
dependent nation in tropical Africa until the past
decade. Today Liberia shares the continent with
28 other free countries with whom we have diplo-
matic relations, and others are in the process of
being born.
For a century and a half American missionary
groups have had strong ties with Africa. The
various home offices, boards, and orders in this
country today have more than 6,500 missionaries
at work throughout the continent. On my visits
to various African countries I have had a chance
to meet with many missionary groups and observe
their splendid efforts to assist the peoples of
Africa.
Trade also has been a significant American in-
terest in Africa down through the years, and our
trading relationships date back to the days when
Yankee clipper ships moored in Boston Harbor.
Our interests in Africa broadened as we moved
into the modern world, and the strategic position
of Africa grew more important during World War
II and the postwar years. Africa lies on the flank
of our oldest allies in Europe. As part of our
worldwide security effort, the United States main-
tains important naval and air bases in Africa
under bilateral agreements. We maintain track-
ing stations in Nigeria, Zanzibar, and South
Africa, which are vital to our NASA [National
Aeronautics and Space Administration] space re-
search program. Africa also proved to be an
April 30, 1962
719
important strategic factor when the Suez Canal
was blocked in 1956 and oil for the free world was
shipped around the Cape of Good Hope.
The Wind of Change in Africa
The Africa our fathers knew or we knew before
World War II is a far cry from the Africa of
today. As Prime Minister Macmillan remarked :
"The wind of change is blowing through [Africa],
and whether we like it or not, this growth of na-
tional consciousness is a political fact. We must
all accept it as a fact, and our national policies
must take accoimt of it."
With important exceptions the former colonial
powers have felt this "wind of change" sweep
across Africa and responded. As a result, 25 of
Africa's 29 sovereign countries have gained their
independence in the last 11 years — 18 of them
within the past 2 years alone. This is the result
of the African's first great aspiration — a burning
desire for freedom and independence.
The remarkable aspect of this substantial
change in the face of Africa has been the peaceful
manner in which the shift in power was accom-
plished. Peaceful evolution has been the key to
modern Africa's development, despite the difficul-
ties in Algeria and the Congo.
With the promise of independence for Algeria,
French and Algerian leaders are forming an in-
terim executive to handle transitional steps on the
road to complete self-determination, and it seems
likely that the remaining disorder in that country
will be halted by French and Algerian authorities
together.
Although much remains to be done in the
Congo, we believe that our policy of support for
the U.N. Operation, parliamentary government,
and the territorial integrity of the country has
led to substantial progress over the past 18 months.
In 1960 President Eisenhower committed the
United States to the support of a United Nations
solution to that nation's troubles, and we continue
to support the peacekeeping and nationbuilding
operation of the U.N. in the Congo.
Just a year ago the Congo was badly split. The
Communist bloc and a few other countries had
recognized the Stanleyville regime of Antoine
Gizenga as the country's government, rather than
the legal national government lieaded by Presi-
dent [Joseph] Kasavubu at Lcopoldville, which
was recognized by most other nations. And Moise
Tshombe had created further disunity with his
secessionist movement in Katanga.
This was a highly charged situation that could
have been further aggravated. Instead, the
United Nations prevented the Communist bloc
from supplying direct aid to Stanleyville, dis-
couraged conflict between warring parties, and
brought about a peaceful solution to the crisis
through a meeting of Parliament at Lovanivmi
University. From this meeting, anti-Communist
Cyrille Adoula emerged as Prime Minister of a
moderate coalition government. Despite the best
efforts of the Leopoldville group, the United Na-
tions, and the West, Katanga Provincial President
Tshombe's supporters failed to participate in this
government and thereby passed up an opportunity
to strengthen the moderate forces of true Congo-
lese nationalism and join in assuring a stable, in-
dependent, and united Congo. Even without Mr.
Tshombe's cooperation, however, Prime Minister
Adoula has brought the illegal regime of Mr.
Gizenga to an end — and with it a major oppor-
tunity for Soviet penetration in central Africa.
The issue today remains the reintegi-ation of
Katanga into the Congo. A little more than 3
months ago, at Kitona, Mr. Tshombe agreed to
take such a step. We welcome the current talks
between Prime Minister Adoula and Provincial
President Tshombe in Leopoldville. It is most
important that both Congolese leaders pursue
promptly the statesmanlike work begim at Kitona
for the peacefvil reintegration of the Katanga,
which will direct once again the Congo's resources
and talents to the urgent and constructive task of
nationbuilding.
Incidentally, I'm sure all of you saw yesterday's
New York Times. It is most regrettable that
American partisans of Mr. Tshombe, I believe
unwanted by him, should choose this particular
moment to renew publication of a distorted ac-
count of last year's events in Elisabethville —
events reported in full by the United Nations last
January 20 without any attempt being made to
gloss over their tragic meaning.
U.S. Policy Toward "Dependent" Africa
Elsewhere on the continent where freedom and
independence do not exist, the "wind of change"
still blows strongly. This is a realitj' that every-
one recognizes, and we do no service to anyone by
failing to take note of its presence.
720
[iepat\met\i of State Bulletin
Our policy for those parts of Africa which are
still dependent has two principal aspects. First,
the "continuing tide of self-determination, which
runs so strong, has our sympathy and our sup-
port," as the President told the United Nations
last September.- Second, we consider some delib-
erate and expeditious preparation for self-govern-
ment essential to African advancement and to
avoid tensions that could peril the remarkable
progress that has characterized political evolu-
tion in Africa thus far.
It is in the still-dependent areas of Africa where
the white man has developed minority settlements
that the next acts in the exciting drama of emer-
gent Africa are to be played out.
Equal dignity, both personal and national, with
the rest of mankind is a second aspiration for
change endorsed by all Africans. As sovereign
people and countries they insist — and rightly so —
that they be accorded equal treatment with all
other nations of the world. This is an extremely
important concern for dark-skinned people in a
world where color bars are being lowered too
slowly for their liking. It demands a change the
whole world must make.
In the United States, where full racial equality
for all Americans has not yet been attained, we
have a particular concern with this African as-
piration. Our discriminatory practices have a
tremendous impact on Africa's new leaders and
place the United States under an important handi-
cap in dealing with African countries.
Harmony in African affairs is not the only —
nor indeed the primary — reason for concern with
our racial situation, however. Our denial of
human dignity and equal rights for all Americans
is a blight on the fulfillment of the American
dream. We owe it to ourselves to remove this
backward system from our country for our own
sake and not simply for the sake of our foreign
relations. A major challenge of our time is to
find lasting ways to erase all barriers of race, creed,
and color in America.
Concerning the third African aspiration for
change — improved standards of living — we stand
ready to help where we are asked and can make
a contribution to forward progress. We are will-
ing to assist not only because, as the President
said, "If a free society cannot help the many who
are poor, it cannot save the few who are rich," '
but because it is right. Americans have always
been good neighbors. This springs from the
Christian and democratic tradition of our frontier
days and is consonant with our historic devotion
to freedom everywhere. There can be no freedom
in misery, and there is no security for us if a large
area of the world is downtrodden or insecure.
Not only is the peace of the world indivisible
but the poverty and degradation of people any-
where represents a constant challenge to our basic
moral principles. We cannot say with Cain that
we are not our brother's keeper — especially when
that brother's needs are self-evident and he is
offered help from false friends who are our own
mortal enemies.
Cooperative Approach to Africa's Development
In this economic and technical area it is to the
interest of the United States and of the African
countries involved that the countries of Europe
continue and expand their programs of assistance.
Individual African countries, understandably, are
anxious to relieve themselves of exclusive dej^end-
ence on any one country when it can — or can seem
to — limit their independence. Wliile there was a
time when the former colonial powers wished to
retain an exclusive or predominant assistance
position, today, for the most part, they are happy
to share this responsibility.
There is strong evidence that fruitful coopera-
tion and a continuing partnersliip between most
of the new African governments and the former
colonial powers will be an important factor in
Africa's future. At the present time, in fact,
European countries are well ahead of the United
States in providing economic and teclmical assist-
ance to African nations.
During the next fiscal year the United States
proposes to make substantial increases in its eco-
nomic aid to Africa, but it will still fall below the
level of that provided by Europe. We are asking
the Congress to allot between $350 and $430 mil-
lion in economic aid to Africa in fiscal year 1963,
depending on the projects that are worked out and
on its ability to use aid effectively. This com-
pares with approximately $250 million for the
'■ Bulletin of Oct. 16, 1961, p. 619.
April 30, 1962
' Ihkl., Feb. G, 1901, p. 17.5.
7ai
current fiscal year and an actual $204 million in
fiscal year 1961, exclusive of substantial amounts
of surplus agricultural conamodities and develop-
ment loans from the Export-Import Bank.
It should be emphasized also that Africans are
pouring tremendous amounts of energy and work
into the economic and social development of their
countries. They are making great .sacrifices to
meet their needs, and a steady stream of progress
can clearly be seen throughout Africa.
In some instances the African nations are turn-
ing to regional or other cooperative approaches to
meet their needs. Many of the present political
boundaries were drawn arbitrarily years ago and
do not reflect today's necessity for imdertaking
economically or socially viable projects of supra-
national scope. Africa's leaders recognize that
economic survival in some instances may require
cooperative or regional forms especially designed
for African conditions, and a broad range of such
groupings is being explored.
One example of a number of such approaches to
regional cooperation is the African and Malagasy
Union, the U.A.M., composed of 12 French-
speaking African nations. The U.A.M. has been
meeting this week at Bangui in the Central Afri-
can Republic to explore common approaches to
economic, transport, and communication problems,
among other matters. The group already has
formed a Supreme Council of Defense, an Organ-
ization for Economic Cooperation, and a Postal
and Telegraphic Union. The U.A.M. is a strong
supporter of the proposed charter for a broader
association of African coimtries which was re-
cently adopted at the Lagos conference.
Without evaluating the U.A.M. or any of the
other germinating groupings in Africa, we believe
the recognition of the need for cooperation is sal-
utary. We are in favor of associations of African
states when such associations help to develop po-
litical stability and economic viability.
The wliole question of regional groupings in
Africa is very complex, however, and contains
far-reaching political implications. While it is
quite probable that such groupings will develop
as a part of Africa's growtli, the tiltimate shape of
such groups may take a long time to discern and,
in the end, should be determined solely by the
needs of the peoples of the various countries.
This summary of U.S. interests in Africa illus-
trates the eztent to which tlie adage tliat "Times
change, and we change with them" applies to the
rapid evolution of our relations with Africa in
recent years. This swift transition has shattered
some of our older concepts about Africa. The
American people have discovered, not surpris-
ingly, that the peoples of Africa are warm human
beings with generally the same goals, the same
ambitions, and the same dreams as those of all
mankind.
We have adapted ourselves to the new ideas and
responsibilities that change in Africa has brouglit.
We have had to do this throughout the world in
the years since World War II, as we have become
conscious of the efforts of colonial peoples to
achieve self-determination.
In these postwar years the leadership of the
free world has shifted onto our shoulders because
of our material strength and because of our dem-
ocratic and Christian heritage. With this leader-
ship has come an appreciation for the indivisible
nature of world peace — for the direct links be-
tween conditions of peace in the remotest corner
of the globe and conditions of peace for us and
our children. Today no area of the world will
long be stable and peaceful unless it enjoys free-
dom, unless it enjoys equal dignity, and unless it
enjoys an opportunity to live a more abundant life.
Assistant Secretary Williams
Visits 10 African Countries
The Department of State announced on April
10 (press release 237) that the Assistant Secretary
for African Affairs, G. Mennen Williams, would
leave Washington April 13 for Conakry, Guinea,
first stop in an official visit to 10 African countries.
He will be accompanied by Mrs. Williams, Lisle C.
Carter, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare, Department of State
aides, and representatives of other Government
departments.
Charged by President Kennedy with conveyuig
personally America's good wishes and interests to
the leaders and people of Africa, Mr. Williams
during 1961 visited 23 sovereign nations and 12
dependent territories in north, central, and south-
east Africa. During the forthcoming 1-montli
trip he will attend Independence Day cei"emonies
April 27 in the Republic of Togo as guest of Pres-
ident [Sylvanus] Olympio and oflicially open new
U.S. cultural centers in the Republic of Dahomey
722
Department of State Bulletin
and the Central African Republic. He will also
visit Sierra Leone, Cameroon, Congo (Leopold-
ville), Eiianda-Urundi, Kenya, and Upper Volta.
In each of tlie 10 countries Assistant Seci'elary
Williams will discuss aspects of the United States
African policy with government and political
leaders. He will also consult with members of
U.S. embassies and consulates.
Mineral Resources and the World of the 1960's
hy George G. McGhee
Under Secretary for Political Affairs ^
Through your efforts exploration for petroleum
and other minerals has developed from its origins
as sometliing of an art to its riglitful place among
the more rigorous of the applied sciences. The
constant improvement in the standards of the cur-
ricula offered in these sciences in our universities
has been greatly facilitated by the work of these
organizations, as well as the quality of the
young men who have been entering into these
professions.
The period since the war has, moreover, seen
an enlargement of the sphere of activity of Ameri-
can exploration, and the men who conduct it, into
the far reaches of the globe. It is a matter of
commonplace for one of your group to be just
returning from or departing for service in some
far-off country which a few years ago you would
have found it difficult to locate on a map. This
has resulted in a broadened scope and increased
efl'ectiveness of your sciences, in adapting to and
learning from the particular circumstances of
petroleum and mineral occurrences in other
countries, and from your contacts with your
fellow scientists from the other advanced nations
of the world.
It is because of tliis truly global outlook which
members of your profession must of necessity have
today that I, coming to you from my position in
your Department of State, have chosen to talk
' Address made before the American Association of
Petroleum Geologists and the Society of Economic Paleon-
tologists and Mineralogists at San Francisco, Calif., on
Mar. 27 (press release 190 dated Mar. 26).
to you on the subject of "Mineral Resources and
the World of the 1960's."
The exploration profession, perhaps mora than
most others, has gone through various vicissitudes
in the last several decades. Most of you will re-
member, as do I, the painful adjustment necessi-
tated by the great depression, when many of our
number could not find employment and the pros-
pect for the future seemed very grim indeed.
There was an abundant supply of the oil and
mineral resources which we had prepared ourselves
to seek. Our economy was too weak to provide
the demand required to stimulate further dis-
coveries. The national product of our country,
the same country with a little less population, was
vastly less than it is today. Our petroleum and
mineral industry, usually with an ominous over-
hang of surpluses, has often been one of "bust"
rather than "boom."
Economic Growth
Today there are still surpluses, but the world
outlook is quite different. The world of the sixties
is intent on economic growth. Never before has
so large a part of the world population been con-
vinced that a substantial, rapid increase in the
output of useful goods and services is not only at-
tainable — but quickly attainable. It is obvious
that the importance of this trend, for you and your
profession, is very great.
The United Nations' proclamation of the sixties
as a "decade of development" reflected an emphasis
that already existed throughout the world.
AprW 30, 7962
723
Through this proclamation the United Nations
was seeking to dramatize and institutionalize the
development efforts which peoples and govern-
ments everywhere are making.
Economic growth has become more than an idea
or an individual aim. It has become almost a re-
ligion. It is being made explicit in national goals
and in plans for organized cooperation between
nations. The philosophy of resignation, subsist-
ence living, and acceptance of the status quo has
been relegated to the past. There are bound to be
some sacrifices, some steps backward as well as
forward, but the commitment to progress is un-
qualified and imiversal.
Moreover, the fact of growing population is be-
coming increasingly recognized in setting goals
for economic growth. Objectives are being set in
per capita terms: more production, consumption,
and trade ; more investment, more advanced tech-
nology, and greater efficiency in production and
distribution.
This is true of the developed, as well as the less
developed, nations. The first Ministerial Council
of the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development, which includes most of the in-
dustrial nations of the world, called for an increase
in real gross national product of 50 percent for the
20 member countries, taken together, during i\\Q
decade from 1960 to 1970.= This growth would
add to the Atlantic community the economic
equivalent of a new country of the present size and
wealth of the United States — and with a corre-
sponding demand for fuels and industrial raw ma-
terials.
The OECD countries also see the relationship of
economic expansion to strategic power, and thus
to their own prospects for achieving not only eco-
nomic progress but greater national security. This
is of particular importance from the standpoint
of the future effectiveness of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization, of which most are members.
Ferment for progress is not by any means con-
fined, however, to the North Atlantic community.
Large development plans and efforts are being
mounted in other parts of the free world. The
Alliance for Progress, here in our hemisphere, is
such an effort — one to which the United States
attaches outstanding importance. The American
Kepublics, except for Cuba, are cooperating to ac-
complish a substantial and sustained growth of per
capita income.^
They have recognized that, in order to reach the
objectives of the Alliance for Progress within a
reasonable time, the rate of economic growth in
every country of Latin America should be not less
than 2.5 percent per capita per year. Each par-
ticipating country is urged to determine its own
growth target in the light of its stage of social
and economic evolution, resource endowment, and
ability to mobilize its national efforts for develop-
ment.
Ambitious development plans are also being
launched in Asia and Africa. India, for example,
is now in the second year of a 5-year plan which
sets a target of a 5-percent annual rise in national
income. Pakistan is planning a 24-percent in-
crease in gross national product during the 5-year
period which began in 1960. This would permit
a 2.5-percent increase annually in per capita in-
come. Nigeria is officially launching a national
development plan on April 1st of this year which
calls for an annual increase of 4 to 4.5 percent in
gross national product, or about 2.5 percent per
capita.
Increased Raw Materials Requirements
These worldwide plans and prospects for in-
creased production and consumption will mean to
the members of your organizations vastly increased
requirements for fuels and industrial raw ma-
terials. Indeed production cannot move forward
without such a corresponding increase in its raw-
material underpinnings.
World demand for minerals and metals, which
more than doubled in the 1950's over what it had
been in the 1930's, is likely to double again by the
1970's. A recent study of Europe's needs indi-
cates, for example, that by 1970 consumption of
aluminum and copper may be double the 1955
rate ; zinc may increase by about 50 pei'ccnt, lead
by about 25 percent, and tin bj' about 15 percent.
World consumption in the 1960's of the princi-
pal nonferrous metals in the aggregate is expected
to be 45 to 50 percent greater than even the high
rate of consumption during the 1950's. World
consumption of aluminum, for example, should
continue its stronger than average growth with
consumption at 5,750,000 metric tons annually, by
' Bulletin of Dec. 18, lOCl, p. 1014.
724
" For background, see ibid., Sept. 11, lOCl, p. 459.
Department of Slate Bulletin
comparison with 2,860,000 in the 1950's, 1,260,000
in the 1940's, and only 390,000 nietric tons an-
nually during the 1930's.
Demand for petroleum products will also grow
as industrial development and transportation
growth take giant strides. Free-world petroleum
consumption is expected to increase by about 50
percent during the decade of the sixties, rising
from about 19 to 28 million barrels daily. This
represents an annual average rate of growth of
4.5 percent, compared with the post-World War
II average rise of 7 percent annually; however,
the absolute amomit is much greater. In Western
Europe the use of petroleum will continue to show
one of the most rapid rates of increase of any
region — about 6 to 7 percent yearly.
This results from the increasing importance pe-
troleum is assuming in Western Europe as a source
of energy. Consumption of some 4 million bar-
rels daily in 1960 represented about 35 percent of
the total energy supply. During the next 10 yeare
the region's rate of increase in petroleum use will
be more than double that for total energy. As a
result the 7 to 8 million barrels likely to be con-
sumed there each day in 1970 will supply nearly
45 percent of all energy, a proportion similar to
that in the United States today.
To make really substantial economic gains, most
of the less developed comitries must first place their
agricultural production on a sounder basis. In-
creased agricidtural activity will have an impor-
tant impact on requirements for such minerals as
phosphates, potash, and nitrate of soda.
These countries will also need increased supplies
of raw materials, including, of course, minerals,
for their expanding industries. They will need
abundant and low-cost energy for heat, transpor-
tation, and electric power. Countries with the
highest levels of economic development use 20 to
40 times as much energy per capita as the least
developed. Consequently requirements for petro-
leum products in the less developed countries will
increase at a greater rate than requirements gen-
erally.
The important thing about this development is
that, rather than remaining concentrated in a few
favored countries as in the past, it will literally be
taking place all over the world.
In the face of growing demands the current
oversupply of certain mmerals could change to
shortage. Reserves, both of petroleum and ores,
will seem less and less adequate as demand in-
creases. The petroleum and metals industries will
demand a larger backlog of raw materials to as-
sure full utilization of their increasingly large in-
vestment.
Present abundance can be traced back to fore-
sight — to the exploration and development in the
forties and fifties. Exploration and investment
have not, however, continued at the previous high
rate. Moreover, a very considerable lead time is
required for resource development to meet the
needs of the seventies — longer in the case of some
other minerals than for petroleum. This will call
for an uptrend in exploratory and developmental
activity during the sixties.
Capital investment necessary to expand mineral
and metal production to meet anticipated world
requirements will thus be large. United States
direct private investment abroad in mining and
smelting increased from a book value of about $1.1
billion in 1950 to nearly $2.4 billion at the end of
1957 and to nearly $3 billion at the end of 1959.
Future demands for capital will be at increasingly
higher rates and will be available only if the fuels
and minerals industries can show adequate re-
serves on the ground — as well as profits. Explora-
tion is required to block out these reserves.
Estimates of the prospective new investment in
petroleum vary, but all authorities agree that these
sums will be huge. As free-world consumption of
oil increases from 72 billion barrels during the
fifties to about 125 billion barrels in the sixties,
capital expenditures of the petroleum industry are
likely to increase by more than 50 percent, from
about $90 billion in the fifties to $140 billion in
the sixties. Capital expenditures which amounted
to about $10.5 billion in 1960 will probably be
$15-16 billion in 1970.
Notwithstanding the capacity which is shut in
at present, we see exploration and development
proceeding actively in all continents. Each
comitry has its own reasons for wishing to
strengthen its productive capacity and its future
prospects for oil.
In light of the continuing cold war, require-
ments of security, as well as growth, dictate that
we develop, and maintain the availability of, a
wide variety of resource materials. Availability
from domestic or nearby reserves that will be
secure in event of war assumes greater importance
which, in the case of oil, has been recognized by
April 30, 7962
725
our Government. This means that domestic ex-
ploration must continue at a high rate. Security
also demands, both for us and others, access to
alternative sources of supplies — in event one is
cut off. This necessitates duplication in availa-
bility, hence increased exploration and develop-
ment.
Needs for the most basic resources, i.e. water
and land, common industrial minerals, and energy
sources, are likely to be relatively predictable.
But we must anticipate that the most favored ma-
terials for specific purposes will be constantly
changing. It is impossible to see in any detail for
more than a few years ahead the precise types and
amounts of all the various raw materials that will
be required for military or peaceful uses. Ma-
terials that now have little commercial use may
be in great demand.
Many groups are pursuing serious and useful
research in anticipation of future shortages of
particular minerals. Even if we run out of some
materials, we can in most cases resort to ores of
lesser concentration than those now being
exploited or to substitutes. The liistory of the
copper industry, for example, has been one of
exploitation of ores of progressively decreasing
concentration without great increase in cost. Oil
can be produced from shale, or tar sands, at costs
which ultimately may not greatly exceed that for
crude oil.
Even if shortages do occur, products which
users now know could generally continue to be
supplied, perhaps at a somewhat higher cost.
Technology has, more often than not, been able
to provide economies that keep pace with material
shortages. In serious cases the products them-
selves could be redesigned or other means could
be devised to satisfy our needs.
Dr. Guy Suits of the General Electric Labora-
tories made a statement which has impressed
others and which I think we can well note again :
Growth [in science and technology] has been so rapid
that 90% of all the scientists who ever lived must be
alive today. Science and technological change had al-
most no impact on the outcome of World War I, while it
was a major factor in World War II. . . . Lord Keynes
didn't recognize technological innovation as a factor In
the economy 20 years ago, yet today it assumes major
proportions.
Technological change has been a determining
factor in the forties and the fifties. We would be
foolish to suppose that it will be a smaller force |
in the sixties and beyond. The demand for raw
materials will be powerfully shaped by this force.
The Challenge
The incredible growth in demand for raw ma-
terials during the sixties wiU pose a threefold
challenge.
First, it will pose a challenge to your profes-
sion. It will demand of you the best effort of
which you are capable.
The geographical distribution of fuels and min-
erals bears no relationsliip to national boimdaries. ,
Geologists will have to search out and produce |
needed increased materials wherever they are. To
do this they will have increasingly to go out into
the world, since the emphasis is shifting from the
United States to other countries as sources of raw
materials.
You will have to work more intimately with in-
dustrial and commercial managers, investors, and
government officials in seeking to promote in-
creased private and public interest in raw-material
development.
This is the more true since many of the less de-
veloped comitries will want to press ahead with
resource surveys even before the general need for
their expanded raw-material production is estab-
lished. The United Nations Special Fund M-as set
up especially to finance such surveys as one of its
principal activities ; so these countries will be able
to afford the surveys. This will pose new demands
on yom* profession.
Many of these countries will want to do their
own exploration for raw materials and minerals;
that is, they will want tliis exploration done on be-
half of either their nationals or their government.
Geologists must thus be willing to work with and
for private groups and governments in these coun-
tries, as well as for the international organizations
which serve them. A precedent is already at hand
in the activities of our own private corporations
in the ex|:)loration and development field, many of
which have entered into satisfactory contractual
relations with the governments of emerging coun-
tries. And indeed many of our geologists have
already followed suit.
The Soviet Union is, moreover, forcing our hand
hi many of these countries. It is sending out geol-
ogists in significant numbers to help the less de-
726
Department of State BuHetin
veloped coimtries explore and exploit their
mineral i-csources. India is a case in point, where
Russian exploration has resulted in an important
oil discovery. We cannot afford to lag behind.
We must outmatch Communist efforts in making
our exploration skills available.
This means surpassing the Soviets not only in
quantity but in quality. The Soviets have shown
great skill in exploring for oil and other minerals.
Their ability to tuni out good geologists is an im-
portant asset in their efforts to extend their power
and influence into less developed countries. Our
ability to turn out better geologists will be an even
more important asset. We must develop and en-
hance it. Our imiversities must keep pace with the
growing demand for geologists and with the new
teclmiques being introduced into the profession.
We must find and induce the best available young
men to enter the profession, whose greatest oppor-
tunities to be of service lie ahead.
The need for enhanced skills is the greater in
view of the changing dimensions of the problem
which we face. The general trend in oil explora-
tion, as you well know, is from large to small —
from shallow to deep — from simple to complex oc-
currences. The original oil fields were relatively
easy to discover ; the fields of the future will only
be found through application of the most advanced
techniques and the liighest degree of professional
skill and ingenuity. Tliis is true of other minerals
as well.
Second, our business leadership will be chal-
lenged.
It will be necessary for our companies to raise
larger sums for investment and to be able to or-
ganize their efforts on a larger scale. No nation is
self-sufficient in its mineral resources. The ar-
rsjigements by which the industrialized countries
have in the past assured themselves of adequate
and relatively cheap supplies of minerals and other
materials will be subject to new pressures as a
consequence of political and social changes which
have occurred since the Second World War.
New arrangements have already had to be de-
vised to meet some of these changed situations,
and it is probable that other changes will be re-
quired. Terms of agreements with other govern-
ments covering development of natural resources
will, in many cases, differ from traditional pat-
terns. Private operations will be scrutinized more
closely from the standpoint of harmony with pub-
lic interest and policy.
And, finally, there is a challenge to our political
leadership, wliich must meet the new political
problems posed by tliis coming era of increased
production.
Development of an increasing scale calls increas-
ingly for closer consultation and mutual considera-
tion among the governments whicli are concerned
with access to foreign markets or foreign sources.
All countries will want to assure themselves of an
equitable share in the fruits of the abundance that
we foresee.
A special problem in this connection is posed by
excessive instability in prices for the mineral and
agricultural commodities wliich bulk so large in
the foreign exchange earnings and tax revenues
of many less developed coimtries. To assure con-
tinued access to the raw materials produced in
other coimtries we must assure them greater price
stability, in ways which will be reasonably con-
sistent with the broader objectives of our economic
policy.
We must also carry forward trade policies wliich
will give less developed raw-material producing
countries needed access to the markets of the de-
veloped countries. And we must carry forward
aid policies which make available the capital these
developing countries need to expand their produc-
tion and raise their living standards. In short, we
must seek to develop a new pattern of relations
between the developed nations of the north and the
less developed countries of the south which will
be mutually beneficial and welcome to both sets of
countries and which will replace the outworn pat-
terns of colonialism.
We must also develop closer relations with the
other developed nations in order to concert their
and our policies effectively to this end. One of the
major reasons we are trying to create an even
closer economic partnership between the United
States and Europe is to assure that these developed
countries make an increasingly effective contribu-
tion, through aid and trade policies, to the growth
of less developed areas.
Enactment of the Trade Expansion Act, which
has been recommended by the President to the
Congress,* would help us to fulfill this purpose.
* For text of the President's message to Congress, see
ibid., Feb. 12, 1962, p. 231 ; for a summary of the draft
legislation, see ibid., Feb. 26, 1962, p. 343.
Apr/7 30, 1962
727
This act provides our Government authority to
bargain for decreases in tariffs not only with the
developing European Common Market but also
with the nations from which we and Europe must
obtain many of our raw materials.
It would, through removing obstacles to trade,
help us to create higher levels of trade and pros-
perity from which less developed — as well as de-
veloped — countries could not fail to draw benefit.
As the President has said,^ we seek through this act
"to enlarge the prosperity of free men everywhere,
to build in partnership a new trading community
in which all free nations may gain from the pro-
ductive energy of free competitive effort."
Conclusion
I believe that we Americans will meet the chal-
lenge of the sixties — all of us : geologists, business
leaders, and political leadere. We will be able to
do this if we can learn to work together to over-
come the problems and exploit the opportunities
posed by this era of abundance.
If we can do this we will be able to find the
necessai-y mineral resources to make the aiTange-
ments and the outlays required for their efficient
production and to insure that they are used and
distributed in a way which makes a maximum
contribution not only to our economy and security
but to the economic health of the free world.
In this exciting task your profession will play
a special role — in many ways a basic role. Our
country's greatness owes much to the past labors
of the geologist. In the future your efforts will
assist not only the continuing growth of our coun-
try but also more rapid progress toward our ulti-
mate goal : a world community of nations which
can cooperate ever more closely in achieving
needed progress while maintaining the independ-
ence and strengthening the freedom which this
progress serves.
U.S., Canada To Study Development
of Pembina River Resources
Press release 222 dated April 4
The Department of State announced on April
4 that the Governments of the United States and
Canada have requested the International Joint
Commission, United States and Canada, to investi- I
gate and report on what measures could be taken to
develop the water resources of the Pembina River
in the State of North Dakota and the Province of
Manitoba.
The International Joint Commission was estab-
lished pursuant to the terms of the Boundary Wa-
ters Treaty of 1909 in order to facilitate the set-
tlement of questions of mutual interest to the
United States and Canada in the general field of
boundary waters and related matters.
Tliis new reference has been made by the Gov-
ernments in the light of the conclusion of the Com-
mission that detailed feasibility studies concerning j
possible development of the Pembina River basin '
should be imdertaken. The Commission has been
requested by the Governments to determine what
plan or plans of cooperative development of the
water resources of the Pembina River basin would
be practicable, economically feasible, and to the
mutual advantage of both countries. The Com-
mission is asked to bear in mind the requirements
of domestic water supply and sanitation, control of
floods, irrigation, and any other beneficial uses of
these waters. The Governments have further
asked the Commission, in the event that it finds a
plan or plans meeting these criteria, to make rec-
ommendations concerning the choice and imple-
mentation of such plan or plans.
United States and Canada Withdraw
Study on Niagara Falls
Press release 233 dated April 9
The Department of State announced on AprU 9
that the Governments of the United States and
Canada have amended the Niagara Reference
which was made to the International Joint Com-
mission on May 5, 1961.'
At the request of the Power Authority of the
State of New York and the Hydro-Electric Power
Commission of Ontario in a joint brief submitted
on March 15, 1961, the Governments of the United
States and Canada in the joint reference of May 5,
1961, included a request for the International
Joint Commission to report whether, without
" Ibid., Jan. 29, 19G2, p. 159.
728
' For background and text of the reference, see Buixk-
TiN of July 3, 1961, 11. 43.
Department of Slate Bulletin
detriment to the scenic beauty of Niagara Falls,
the flows over the falls could be less than those
now specified in the Niagara Treaty of 1950.
The Govermnent of the United States was re-
cently informed that the Power Authority of the
State of New York was withdrawing its request
for a study of this matter. The Canadian Govern-
ment received a similar request from the Provin-
cial Secretary of the Province of Ontario on be-
half of the Ilydro-Electric Power Commission of
Ontario.
The Governments of the United States and
Canada have, in view of these parallel requests,
agreed to amend the Niagara Reference of 1961
by deleting the request of Governments for a study
of this matter.
President Salutes Role of IJC
in U.S.-Canadian Relations
Statement hy President Kennedy ^
Fifty years ago today the International Joint
Commission, a body provided for by the Interna-
tional Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, held its
first semiannual meeting. This institution, which
was created with the objective of resolving ami-
cably disputes and problems confronting the two
nations with regard to the lakes and rivers com-
mon to both of them, has had a distinguished rec-
ord. It has set a standard for later organizations
created by Canada and the United States for the
resolution of problems and for the development
of conunon policies. The International Joint
Commission has worked on a very large number
of problems and projects dealing with water re-
sources. The Commission's studies and recom-
mendations have served as a basis for important
agreements which have brought great profit to
both the United States and Canada.
These quiet but important efforts deserve recog-
nition, as do the present Chairman of the United
States Section of the International Joint Commis-
sion, the Honorable Teno Roncalio, and his Com-
missioners, and the distinguished Chairman of the
Canadian Section, General Andrew G. L. Mc-
Naughton, and his colleagues. It is certainly the
hope of everyone that the International Joint
Commission will, in the next half century, con-
tinue its record of outstanding achievement.
President Kennedy Greets Philippines
on Bataan Day
Following is the text of a message from Presi-
dent Kennedy to Diosdado Macapagal, President
of the Republic of the Philippines.
White House press release dated April 9
April 9, 1962
Dear Mr. President : On this day, we and mil-
lions of our fellow citizens will recall the sacrifices
of the heroes who were so sorely tested just twenty
years ago on Bataan and Corregidor. Although
physically defeated, their devotion to our common
democratic principles added new meaning to those
ideals and made possible the ultimate triumph of
freedom and democracy in a vast area of the world.
Our peoples are again united in spirit and in
arms in a similar struggle against a new and much
more subtle form of imperialism which would
enslave us. Let no one overlook the lesson of
Bataan that the strength of our common heritage
of courage and devotion will prevail to bring free
choice and justice to mankind.
I look forward with pleasure to the opportunity
the people of the United States soon will have to
express personally to you ^ and to the people of
the Philippines their gratification and pride in
the enduring partnership which carried us through
the dark days of two decades ago to our present
mutual pursuit of peaceful economic and social
progress.
Sincerely yours,
John F. Elennedt
' Made on Apr. 2 in observance of the 50th anniversary
of the inaugural meeting of the U.S.-Canada Interna-
tional Joint Commission (White House press release).
' The White House announced on Mar. 30 that Presi-
dent Macapagal will visit the United States June 19-28 ;
for test of the announcement, see Bulletin of Apr. 23,
1962, p. 665.
April 30, 1962
7129
Refugees Here and Around the World
hy Michel Gieflinski
Acting Administrator^ Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs ^
It is a distinct honor and pleasure for me to par-
ticipate in this conference devoted to considera-
tion of the i^roblems of immigration and refugees.
Because of the scope of the topic assigned to me,
I shall be able to give you little more than the
highlights of each of the problems.
Let me take a few minutes to describe some of
the responsibilities of the Department of State
and consular officers abroad in the administration
of our immigration laws. As you Iniow, all immi-
grants who want to come to the United States must
be in possession of visas. These visas are issued
by American consular officers stationed in foreign
countries after they determine that an applicant
qualifies for a visa under existing law and that
a quota number is available to him if he is sul)ject
to quota restrictions.
The Department has been making great efforts
to select carefully those officers who deal with visa
applicants and to train them so that these officers
not only understand the law but also the problems
each alien may have who applies for a visa. Sonie
500,000 visas are issued each year. As yon also
know, once an immigrant arrives at a port of entry
he is doublechecked by officers of the Immigration
and Naturalization Service — an arm of tlie De-
partment of Justice. An infinitesimal niiinber of
aliens holding visas are excluded at ports of entry
(less than 100 of some 1,500,000 aliens asking for
admission, many of them repeatei-s). Tiiis is the
best illustration that our officers do a comj-ietent
job in screening visa applicants.
During the past few years our efforts have been
concentrated on eliminating redtape in the issuing
' Address mnde before the Indiana Iinmifrrntion Con-
forcnff .'It Indianapolis, Ind., on Apr. 3 (press release
212 dated Apr. 2).
of visas. Without sacrifice to the enforcement of
our laws, we have streamlined and simplified ap-
plication forms and visa procedures.
The groups represented here, of course, are in-
terested in modernizing our immigration laws.
It must be recognized that changes in the immigra-
tion laws traditionally have not taken place over-
night but by a gradual development. Many of the
changes which have taken place since the enact-
ment of the Immigration and Nationality Act in
1952 were suggested originally by the Department I
of State. The elimination of fingerprinting of
visitors and the elimination of the question for-
merly put to every applicant for an immigrant or
visitor visa as to his race and ethnic classification
are two of the more important changes in this
category.
Of course the Department's interest in changes
in our immigration laws is prompted by its con-
cern with our foreign relations. As you know,
existing law accords nonquota status to most, but
not all, countries in the Western Hemispliere.
Foreign policy considerations prompted the De-
partment to emphasize the importance of placing
all independent countries within the Western
Hemisphere on equal footing by according them
nonquota status.
Those of you who are interested in some of the
Department's views on immigration legislation
may want to read the letter the Department ad-
dressed to Senator [Kennetli B.] Keating on Sep-
tember 12, 1961, which was printed in the Congres-
sional Record on the same date. The points raised
in this letter by no means cover the entire range
of the Department's concern with various pro-
visions of the immigration laws, but it is the De-
partment's policy to make its views Icnown only to
730
Department of Slate Bulletin
ICongress, in rej^ly to requests for comments on
landing legislation or in formal presentations,
when occasion arises.
A bill - of great interest to the Department, in-
troduced by Congressman [Francis E.] Walter
and passed by the House, is now before the Senate.
This bill among other things would provide for
an important reorganization of the Bureau of Se-
curity and Consular Affairs which, if accom-
plished, in my opinion would go far in improving
its efficiency. It would authorize continuation of
the Department's refugee and migration programs
as well as the Department of Plealth, Education,
and Welfare Cuban refugee activities. In addi-
tion it would extend indefinitely the provision of
P.L. 86-648 to permit continued admission of a
limited number of refugees under the parole
process.
Other migration and refugee legislative pro-
posals have been introduced into both the Senate
and the House. You are doubtless familiar with
many of them, particularly the measures intro-
duced by Senators [Philip A.] Hart, [Claiborne]
Pell, and [Thomas J.] Dodd.
Aid to European Refugees
In view of the limits of time it would be im-
possible for me to give you a detailed inventory
of all the refugee problems existing in the world
today. For the same reason I could not outline
all of the public and private efforts being expended
in behalf of these refugees. At best I can identify
for you here today only the most pressing of these
problems and make a brief comment as to the
various programs being conducted in their behalf.
On a global basis there are those who have used
a figure of 12.5 million refugees. This figure lacks
validity in that it fails to include some recent
gi-oups, particularly the newly developing refugees
in Africa, while it includes large groups of earlier
refugees whom I believe are now firmly integrated
into the areas to which they have been resettled.
Actually the world refugee problem today, in
terms of refugees who have not yet been reestab-
lished on a satisfactory basis, is in the neighbor-
hood of 3.5 million persons.
The refugee groups best known to most of you
are the anti-Communist refugees and escapees in
Europe. Of this group the Hungarians made the
= H.R. 11079.
most dramatic impression on the free world. I am
happy to tell you that by dint of the conscientious
and generous help of the U.S. Government and
other governments of the free world, aided by the
dedicated voluntary agencies and private citizens
of this and other countries, the problem of the
older refugees in Europe is well on its way to solu-
tion. Through the efforts of the U.N. High Com-
missioner for Refugees, assisted by the almost
global response to the World Eefugee Year em-
phasis, there remain only 9,000 refugees in official
refugee camps in Europe. The UNHCR has plans
and funds to resettle or provide permanent solu-
tions for all of these persons who have lived so
long in drab and sordid camps.
There still remain in Europe approximately
50,000 out-of-camp refugees, most of whom require
varying degrees of assistance in becoming reestab-
lished. The generous world response to these
refugees coupled with the greatly improved eco-
nomic situation in most of the European countries
has resulted in a virtual miracle by solving most
of the vast refugee problems in Europe, including
the 200.000 Hungarians who escaped to freedom.
The Federal Republic of Germany has achieved
unbelievable success in absorbing well over 13%
million expellees, displaced persons, refugees, and
escapees. In the West German economy refugees
have become an asset rather than a liability. I
hasten to add, however, that the refugee problem
in Germany as well as elsewhere in Europe is not
static. East Zone refugees still find ways of es-
caping to West Germany in spite of the diabolic
wall erected in Berlin and the increased control
measures resorted to by the puppet East German
regime calling itself a sovereign government.
Escapees from the Soviet Union, Poland, Czecho-
slovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Al-
bania still manage to penetrate the tight border
controls established by the Communists to make
sure that their oppressed peoples remain in their
self-proclaimed "workers' paradise." Large num-
bers of Yugoslavs continue to arrive in Italy,
Austria, Greece, and other European countries.
The flow of escapees and refugees will continue
so long as the Communists pursue their attempts
to deny individual freedom and to subject all men
to a common mold of belief or endeavor. I must
call your attention at this point to the fact that not
only are the Communists responsible for the con-
ditions which create refugees, but they continue to
April 30, 1962
731
engage in a costly and widespread program of
propaganda and intrigue among the emigree
groups in an effort to discredit the humanitarian
motives of the free West.
The United States will continue to assist these
new arrivals tlirough its United States Escapee
Program (USEP). It is of interest to note that
the escapee program has just celebrated its 10th
anniversary. During the 10 years of its existence
USEP has assisted a total of 926,000 escapees
from Communist and Communist-dominated
countries. They have been given food, clothing,
medical and dental care, language and vocational
training, counseling, and many other benefits. Of
this almost 1 million persons, one-third, or 330,000,
have been helped to become mtegrated into the
countries granting them initial asylum and an-
other 157,000 have been successfully resettled in
some 48 countries. Through its generous support
of the Intergovernmental Committee for Euro-
pean Migration (ICEM) and the UNHCE, the
United States will continue its help to these recent
escapees and to the residual group of older refu-
gees still in need of our help.
Refugees From Communist China and Cuba
Another group of anti-Communist refugees to
which the United States has made significant con-
tributions botli public and private are the more
than a million refugees from Eed China presently
in Hong Kong. In spite of the magnificent job
which the Hong Kong Colonial Government is
doing for these refugees, who make up one-third
of the Colony's population, there still is need for
additional aid from international sources. The
needs to be met encompass housing, medical and
clinical services, education, and in many instances
food and clothing. In addition to a liberal World
Refugee Year contribution for construction of a
refugee center, schools, and clinics, the United
States provides annually approximately $1 million
in cash and surplus foods estimated at $5 million
for these refugees.
External resettlement of these refugees is not
the solution except for a relatively few who will
find migration opportunities. The answer lies in
their being assimilated into the economy of Hong
Kong. This process will continue to be required
for those already there and more importantly for
the estimated 50,000 arriving each year.
Another 50,000 Chinese refugees present a seri-
ous problem to the authorities in Macau. Assist-
ance to this group is limited and consists primarily
of U.S. help.
A relatively small but highly significant prob-
lem is that of the White Russian refugees arriving
in Hong Kong from Red China. Over 20,000 of
these refugees, who are fleeing communism for the
second time, have already been resettled by ICEM
and the UNHCR, and some 0,000 still in Cliina are
expected to come out over the next several years.
The United States has contributed substantially
to this resettlement program and will continue to
do so until the problem is finally resolved.
The 60,000 Tibetans who have escaped the Com-
munist Chinese takeover of their country and are
now in India and Nepal represent one of the most
pitifiil groups of refugees anywhere in the world.
Limited private aid has gone into both India and
Nepal. The United States has made available
both surplus food and cash to meet as many of the
needs as possible. United States fimds are being
used to augment private funds in helping to re-
locate Tibetan young people and children in
Europe, particularly in Switzerland, where a Swiss
organization is doing a splendid job in attempting
to extend vocational training and imderstanding •
of Western culture to develop these young Tibet- '
ans into future leaders.
Most of you are aware at least to some degree
of the more than 100,000 Cuban refugees who have
fled to this country to escape the oppression and
totalitarian measures forced upon them and their
peace-loving relatives by Castro and his Com-
munist henchmen. The United States has now
become a country of first asylum and finds itself
confronted with the same problems and expenses
of helping a large number of refugees which have
been faced by other countries abroad.
Voluntary agencies and citizens' groups are
helping tlie Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare to cope with this stupendous prob-
lem. The primary difficulty lies in reducing the
burden on the State of Florida, Dade County, and
the City of Miami, where the bulk of these proud
and able people are congested. Their numbers, if !
distributed over the country, would present prac-
ticall}^ no problem from a housing, employment,
or welfare standpoint, but localized as they are in
Florida and in New York City these refugees are
creating serious social, economic, and political
732
Deparfment of Sfa/e Bullefin
problems the solution to which requires immediate
and careful resettlement throughout the country.
Each conununity must become as generous as it
was in accepting Hungarians by providing for its
share of these close friends and violently anti-
Conmiunist neighbors.
Victims of Political Stalemates
The victims of political stalemate, more than a
million Palestine refugees continue to present a
pathetic picture in the several Middle East coun-
tries. The solution to their problem presents some
of the most politically sensitive issues facing the
United Nations. Until these issues can be resolved
the problem will remain acute and the present re-
lief program of the United Nations Eelief and
Works Agency (UNRWA) must continue. The
United States supports this Agency to approxi-
mately 70 percent of its annual $35 million budget.
The Director of UNRWA has recently launched
an appeal for funds to increase and intensify the
vocational training facilities for the young people
of this pathetic gi'oup. Since the limited pro-
grams of this type have had excellent results, it
is hoped that the approximately 3,000 young men
now being helped to secure jobs and independence
can be increased materially.
Within recent weeks the future of the more than
300,000 Algerian refugees in Tunisia and Morocco
seems more hopeful. These refugees, consisting
mainly of women, children, and elderly men, were
forced from the war areas in Algeria. They have
been cared for by the combined efforts of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
and the League of Red Cross Societies. The United
States has been a primary supporter of these ac-
tivities both in cash and in large supplies of sur-
plus foods.
A cease-fire in Algeria will not in itself end the
problems of these refugees, for as they return to
their war-damaged farms and desert villages, they
will be forced to share with more than 2 million
other Algerians presently displaced within Algeria
the problems of rehabilitation and of reconstruc-
tion of their personal economies. I can assure you
that your Government and other governments
sympathetic to the plight of these people will do
the utmost to help these victims of political up-
heaval achieve as rapidly as possible a return to
normal livine.
It is not necessary for me to go into any details
with reference to the millions of Hindu refugees
in India and Moslem refugees in Pakistan who
were created by the partition of India in 1947 and
subsequent events. The overwhelming bulk of
these refugees have now been successfully inte-
grated in their countries of present residence, and
the authorities in these countries are actively pur-
suing similar solution for the relatively small
residual numbers. I can also mention that the
more than 850,000 North Vietnamese moved from
the presently Communist-controlled areas in North
Viet-Nam have been so successfully integrated
into South Viet-Nam that they no longer con-
stitute a problem. Similar success can be reported
for the North Korean refugees in South Korea.
Scattered elsewhere throughout the world but
particularly in Southeast Asia are pockets of refu-
gees, mostly Chinese who are in varying degrees
of need but also including 50,000 anti-Communist
Laotian refugees in Laos who have been displaced
from their tribal homes by Communist guerrilla
activity and for whom the United States is pro-
viding emergency assistance.
In Africa the historic march toward independ-
ence of states which for generations have been
colonial possessions has more often than not been
accompanied by strife and political upheaval,
creating new refugee problems of serious pro-
portions. More than 150,000 refugees fled from
Angola to the Republic of the Congo, while within
the Congo over 300,000 Baluba refugees have re-
quired relief assistance in the provinces of Ka-
tanga and Kasai. Elsewhere tens of thousands of
other refugee tribesmen present similar prob-
lems—in Togo, Ruanda-Urundi, Uganda, and
Tanganyika. In all of these the U.S. Government,
operating as much as possible through the United
Nations, the League of Red Cross Societies, and
the UNHCR, has poured in surplus food items and
assisted with cash contributions where required.
Need for Continuing Refugee Aid
You may ask, why nmst the United States feel
it necessary to support refugee programs to the
extent it does? Or you may want an answer to
the question of how long will new refugee prob-
lems continue to emerge. Is there any hope that
the day will come when there will be no refugee
April 30, 1962
733
problems to challenge the conscience and command
the attention of civilized mankind ?
The answer to the latter is simpler. As long as
modifications in political entities are made and
geographic boundaries are changed, each bringing
with it inevitable changes in leadership and fol-
lowers, there will be those who are forced or choose
to flee to escape political persecution or economic
oppression. As long as tliere are totalitarian re-
gimes whether Communist or any other form of
despotism there will be refugees and escapees in
need of a helping hand. I have mentioned the
great achievements made in reducing the stagger-
ing numbers of displaced persons, refugees, and
escapees. I have called your attention to the fact
that the refugee problem is not static. Therefore,
my answer must be that until mankind finds the
formula to live in complete peace and harmony
one with another, and when the dignity of man is
given due and proper recognition, then and then
only will the problems of refugees vanish.
The interest of the United States Government
and the interest of the American people in refu-
gees is as natural as the American way of life. I
believe President Kennedy gave the best answer
to this question in his letter last July to the Con-
gress in explanation of his requested refugee and
migration legislation : '
The United States, consistent with the traditional
humanitarian regard of the American people for the in-
dividual and for his right to a life of dignity and self-
fulfillment, should continue to express in a practical way
its concern and friendship for individuals in free-world
countries abroad who are uprooted and unsettled as the
result of political conditions or military action.
The successful re-establlshment of refugees, who for
political, racial, religious or other reasons are unable or
unwilling to return to their country of origin or of
nationality under conditions of freedom, dignity, and self-
respect, is importantly related to free-world political
objectives. These objectives are : (a) continuation of the
provision of asylum and friendly assistance to the op-
pressed and persecuted; (b) the extension of hope and
encouragement to the victims of communism and other
forms of despotism, and the promotion of faith among
the captive populations in the purposes and processes of
freedom and democracy; (c) the exemplification by free
citizens of free countries, through actions and sacrifices,
of the fundamental humanitarianisra which constitutes
the basic dllTeretice between free and captive societies.
Some refugee problems are of such order of magnitude
that they comprise an undue liurden upon the economies
of the countries harboring the refugees in the first iu-
" For text, see Bulletin of Aug. 7, 1!)t;i . p. 2.".".
734
stance, requiring international assistance to relieve such
countries of these burdens.
It is for these reasons that the United States
since the end of World War II has admitted more
than 800,000 refugees, escapees, and displaced per-
sons. During that same period the United States
has expended over $1.5 billion in direct appropria-
tions for refugee programs in addition to other
assistance provided indirectly through our foreign
aid programs in behalf of countries affording
asylum to refugees.
These then are the highlights of the problems
of refugees here and around the world.
Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy
87th Congress, 1st Session
Cuban Refugee Problems. Hearings before the Sub-
committee To Investigate Problems Connected With
Refugees and Escapees of the Senate .Judiciary Com-
mittee. December 6-13, 19C1. 304 pp.
Center for Cultural and Technical Interchange Between
East and West (East- West Center). Hearings before
the Subcommittee on State Department Organization
and Foreign Operations of the House Foreign Affairs
Committee. December 13-January 8, 1!X)2. 364 pp.
Report of the Fifth Meeting of the Canada-United States
Interparliamentary Group, June S-9, 1961. Reiwrt sub-
mitted by Cornelius E. Gallagher, chairman of the
House delegation. H. Rept. 1207. February 5, 1962.
7 pp.
87th Congress, 2d Session
Impact of Imports and Exports on Employment (Agri-
cultural Products, Chemicals, Oil, Machinery. Motion
Pictures, Transportation, and Other Industries). Hear-
ings before the Subcommittee on the Impact of Imports
and Exports on American Employment. Part 8.
November 27, 1961-January 5, 1962. 1055 pp.
Latin American and Ilnitefl States Policies. Report of
Senator Mike Mansfield on a study mission to Latin
America. January 13. 1962. 85 pp. [Committee print]
Mexican Farm Labor Program. Hearing before the Sub-
committee on Equipment, Supplies, and Manpower of
the House Agriculture Committee. January 19, 1962.
46 pp.
Report on Audit of the Export-ImiKirt Bank of Washing-
ton for Fiscal Year 1!K>1. II. Doc. 308. January 23,
19(i2. 42 pp.
Economic Policies and Programs in South .\merica. Re-
port submitted by the Sulicoinmittee on Inter-American
Economic Relationships to the Joint Economic Commit-
tee. January 24, 1962. 123 i)p.
.Tanuary 1962 I5conoinic Report of the President. Hear-
ings before the Joint Economic Committee. January
2.>-February 8, 1962. 845 pp.
Review of the .Vdministration of the Trading With the
Enemy Act. Reiiort to accompany S. Res. 268. S. Rept
1161. January ;n. 1962. 3 jip.
Consular Affairs and StM'urit.v Administration in the
Department of St.'ite. Hearings before Subcommittee
No. 1 of the House Judiciary Committee on H.R. 9904, a
bill to amend swtion 104 of the Immigraticm and Na-
tionality Act, and for other purposes. January 31-
February 2, 1962. 48 i)p.
Deparfment of Sfate Bulletin
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
Security Council Calls Upon Israel and Syria
To Observe Armistice Agreement
Following are a statement made in the U.N. Se-
curity Council on April 6 iy Charles W. Yost,
Deputy U.S. Representative in the Security Coun-
cil, and the text of a resolution adopted by the
Council on April 9.
STATEMENT BY MR. YOST
U.S. /U.N. press release 3971
I wish to speak briefly now to explain the draft
resolution ^ wliicli has been introduced by the dele-
gations of the United Kingdom and the United
States and which was referred to yesterday [April
5] by Ambassador Dean."
I believe the preamble is self-explanatorj', and I
therefore propose to discuss only the operative
paragraplis.
The first operative paragraph deplores the hos-
tile exchanges between Syria and Israel which
started on March 8 and calls upon them to comply
with their obligations under article 2, paragrapli
4, of the charter by refraining from the tlireat as
well as the use of force.
This paragraph deplores the exchanges without
assessing blame because the United Nations Truce
Supervision Organization was unable to determine
who initiated the firing on any of the occasions
prior to the attack of 16 March. Tliis is in large
part due to the fact that the parties, and partic-
ularly Israel, have placed obstacles in the way of
effective circulation and observation by the United
Xations organization. It does, however, appear
from the report ^ that, wliatever initial firing there
may have been with small weapons and whoever
started it, the level of the engagement was raised
'U.N. doc. S/5110 and Corr. 1.
^ Arthur H. De.in. U.S. Representative to the 18-nation
disarmament conference at Geneva.
°U.N. doe. S/.'JKG.
by Syria starting on March 8 to that of artillery
fire, apparently of 80 mm. guns. It aLso appears
from the report, that artillery and mortars were
used by both parties on subsequent occasions.
Whatever the origin of tlie events, therefore, it is
obvious that artillery weapons were placed in the
Defensive Area in violation of tlie Armistice
Agreement and that they were used against Israeli-
controlled territory on March 8 and subsequently.
The prospect of escalation of minor incidents when
artilleiy is employed is only too obvious. This
sort, of military action cannot be condoned when
United Nations machinery is available.
At the same time we note that Israel also ap-
parently employed 20 mm. weapons in these en-
gagements, at least in those after March 8. Both
the presence and the use of such a weapon in the
Defensive Area is also in violation of the Armistice
Agi-eement.
Israel and Syria Reminded of Cliarter Obligations
In addition to deploring these hostile engage-
ments and the use of such weapons, the paragraph
also reminds the governments concerned of tlieir
obligations under article 2, paragraph 4, of the
charter. Both parties have on this occasion used
force contrary to that article. In addition there
were provocative statements by each party which,
at the very least, were not calculated to assure the
other of its peaceful intentions. We appeal to both
Governments to make every effort to restore peace
and security in the area and to utilize the utmost
caution in their pronoimcements and statements.
Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the resolution concern
the Israeli assault of the night of March 16-17 —
an assault the nature and origin of whicli are not
contested. According to tlie announcement of the
Israeli Defense Force itself, Israel on that night
assaulted Syrian positions north of Nuqeib. Tliis
April 30, 1962
735
was clearly a reverse to a policy of armed and
large-scale retaliation repeatedly condemned by
the Comicil in 1955 and 1956. Inasmuch as there
is an impartial and long-established alternative to
such action, through the machinery of the United
Nations, there can be no justification for a policy
of retaliation. The Security Council has con-
sistently condemned such attacks even when prior
but less serious violations by the other party have
been confinned by the Chief of Staff.
In the light of this situation, paragraph 3 de-
termines that the Israeli attack on March 16-17
constituted a flagrant violation of the Security
Coimcil resolution of 19 Januaiy 1956,* which con-
demned Israeli retaliatory action of this sort. This
attack was of the same order as previous attacks
and has been so dealt with in the resolution we
have submitted.
The fact that the attack of March 16 was a
large-scale operation is apparent not only from
the annoimcement made of it by the Israeli mili-
tary sources themselves but also from the number
of men involved and the number of lives and
armored vehicles lost. There is no indication that
the ground attack carried into Syria proper, but
Israeli planes apparently bombed Syrian territory
and the Israeli Defense Force announcement gave
no indication that the operation was intended to
be restricted to the Demilitarized Zone. This ac-
tion was a most serious breach of the Armistice
Agreement and a flagrant violation of paragraph
2 of the resolution of January 19, 1956, in which
the Council condemned retaliatory raids.
Israel should be called on scrupulously to re-
frain from such actions in the future. The Coun-
cil's position on that point must be absolutely
clear if the peace of the area is to be preserved.
This expresses the attitude we believe the Coun-
cil should take both toward the events between
March 8 and 16 and the events of that night. It
is important that (he parties understand the firm
view of the Security Council that it is incumbent
upon them both to abide scrupulously by the pro-
visions of tlie Armistice Agreement and that the
United Nations denounces and is prepared to take
measures appropriate to the situation both against
small-scale harassment and against the serious
dangers involved in retaliation.
Need To Strengthen UNTSO Machinery
We could perhaps be accused — if there were no
alternative — of adopting an attitude of unreality
in opposing retaliatory military action in the light
of the inherent right of self-defense enjoyed by
sovereign nations. However, there is an alterna-
tive and an alternative which nowhere in the
world is more readily available than on the borders
between Israel and its Arab neighbors. This al-
ternative is the peacekeeping machinery of the
United Nations. This machinery has not been
employed sufficiently and thoroughly enough in
the present and in past instances. Not only has
the United Nations machinery in the area been
hampered in obtaining the facilities and freedom
of operation which would have made both detec-
tion and deterrence of the events between March 8
and 16 more effective, but the retaliatory action
of March 16 was taken entirely without prior re-
course either to the Mixed Armistice machinery
or the Security Council — the political bodies
charged with responsibility for the peace. The
capabilities of this machinery and equally the
political intention to use it need to be improved
to prevent such situations in the future.
The rest of the resolution therefore deals with
what should be done in order to strengthen this
machinery. In particular we would urge Israel,
which feels it was provoked in the present situa-
tion, to extend its full cooperation to the United
Nations Truce Supervision Organization and to
the United Nations military observers so tliat they
may in the future readily detect and report to the
world on the origin of incidents and, even more
hopefully, by their presence deter them from
starting in the first instance. We would urge
Israel in the most stringent terms to resort to the
Mixed Armistice Commission and to the Security
Council in accordance with its obligations under
the charter instead of resorting to the use of force.
In connection with the improvement of United
Nations capabilities in the area, I would like to
commend General von Horn " and his able col-
leagues on their excellent performance of duties
on belialf of the United Nations under unusually
difficult circumstances. The Chief of Stall's pres-
ence during our deliberations has been of consid-
erable assistance to the Council in its consideration
* For text, see Bulletin of Jan. 30, 1950, p. 183.
736
• Gen. Carl Cnrlssou von Horn, Chief of Staff, U.N. Truce
Supervision Organization.
Departmenf of State Bulletin
of the complex factors involved. General voii
Horn and his entire staff deserve the gratitude
and the unstinting support of the members of the
United Nations, most of all that of Israel and its
Arab neighbors.
As was revealed in General von Horn's report,
and more precisely spelled out in his responses to
the questions put to him by members of the Coim-
cil, the observation facilities available to the
United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
in the Tiberias region are insufficient to insure the
proper exercise of the Truce Supervision Organi-
zation's tranquilizing role. The new observation
post at El Koursi will help considerably in this
regard. It is the sincere hope of my Government
that the Israeli and Syrian authorities will coop-
erate wholeheartedly with the Chief of Staff in
the working out of the further arrangements he
has recommended. Certainly it is necessai-y that
the Truce Supervision Organization observers be
permitted to move fi'eely and rapidly anywhere in
the Defensive Area, and we endorse the mobile
observation arrangements which he has proposed
believing that they can be particularly valuable.
The United Nations Truce Supervision Organ-
ization's machinery was sorely tested by events of
mid-March. The Chief of Staff has informed us
of gaps in his organization revealed by these
sudden demands. Tlie United States urges that
deficiencies noted by General von Horn be made
up at once and that the parties move quickly to
comply with his requests for greater cooperation.
In the light of such factors the resolution en-
dorses the measure recommended by the Chief of
Staff both in his first report and his supplementary
report to the Security Council. It calls on the
Israeli and Syrian authorities to assist him in
their implementation. Any additional measures
which the parties may recommend and which the
Chief of Staff thinks would be useful would of
course also be welcome.
The resolution also calls for strict observance
of the provisions of the Armistice Agreement con-
cerning the Demilitarized Zone and the Defensive
Area. For many years there have been violations
of these provisions, some major and some minor.
An explicit adherence to the agreement by both
sides would remove the danger of conflicts in the
area, and we urge both Syria and Israel to coop-
erate in eliminating any violations.
Finally, we have included a paragraph with a
general call upon both parties to cooperate fully
with the Chief of Staff in his responsibilities and
which urges that all necessary steps Ixi taken for
reactivating the Mixed Armistice Commission and
for making full use of the Mixed Armistice ma-
chinery. Particularly we believe that Israel
should return to the Mixed Armistice Commission,
in which it has not participated since 1951, and
that it should make full use of its procedures when-
ever it feels provocations have occurred.
If the parties cooperate fully with the United
Nations instrumentalities in the area and with the
Security Council, we are confident that peaceful
conditions can be maintained, that the number of
minor incidents can be severely reduced, and that
any incidents which start can be detected and
brought to an end promptly without resort to
force. This is the sure path to peaceful conditions,
and we urge both parties to follow it scrupulously
and consistently.
TEXT OF RESOLUTION <
Tlic Security Council,
Recalling its resolutions of 15 July 1948 and 18 May
1051,
Having considered the report of the Chief of Staff of
the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization on the
military activities in the Lake Tiberias area and in the
Demilitarized Zone,
Having heard the statements of the representatives of
the Syrian Arab Republic and Israel,
Being deeply concerned over developments in the area
which have taken place in violation of the Charter and
of the Armistice Agreement,
Recalling in particular the pi-ovisions of Article 2, para-
grai)h 4 of the Charter, and Article 1 of the Syrian-Israeli
General Armistice Agreement,
Noting with gatisfaction that a cease-fire has been
achieved,
1. Deplores the hostile exchanges between the Syrian
Arab Republic and Israel starting on 8 March 1962 and
calls upon the two Governments concerned to comply
with their obligations under Article 2, paragraph 4 of the
Charter by refraining from the threat as well as the use
of force ;
2. Rcafflrms the Security Council resolution of 19
.Tanuary 1956 which condemned Israeli military action in
breach of the General Armistice Agreement, whether or
not undertaken by way of retaliation ;
3. Determines that the Israeli attack of 16-17 March
' U.N. doc. S/5111 ( S/5110 and Corr. 1 ) ; adopted by
the Security Council on Apr. 9 by a vote of 10-0, with 1
abstention (France).
April 30, 1962
737
1962 constitutes a flagrant violation of that resolution
and calls upon Israel scrupulously to refrain from such
action in the future;
4. Endorses the measures recommended by the Chief of
Staff for the strengthening of the Truce Supervision
Organization in its tasks of maintaining and restoring
the peace and of detecting and deterring future incidents,
and calls upon the Israeli and Syrian authorities to assist
the Chief of Staff in their early implementation;
5. Calls upon both parties to abide scrupulously by the
cease-fire arranged by the Chief of Staff on 17 March
1962;
6. Calls for strict observance of article 5 of the General
Armistice Agreement which provides for the exclusion of
armed forces from the Demilitarized Zone and Aimex 4
of that Agreement which sets limits on forces in the
Defensive Area, and calls upon the Governments of Israel
and the Syrian Arab Republic to co-operate with the
Chief of Staff in eliminating any violations thereof;
7. Calls upon the Governments of Israel and of the
Syrian Arab Republic to co-operate with the Chief of
Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization in carrying
out his resjionsibilities under the General Armistice
Agreement and the pertinent resolutions of the Security
Council and urges that all steps necessary for reactivat-
ing the Mixed Armistice Commission and for making full
use of the Mixed Armistice machinery be promptly taken ;
8. Requests the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision
Organization to report as appropriate concerning the
situation.
Current U. N. Documents:
A Selected Bibliography
Mimeographed or processed documents (stich as those
listed helmc) may be consulted at depository libraries
in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be
purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations,
United Nations Plaza, N.Y.
Security Council
Letter dated January 11, 1962, from the Pakistani repre-
sentative to the President of the Security Council con-
cerning Kashmir. S/.'JOSS. January 12, 1902. 2 pp.
Letter dated January 16, 1962, from the Indian repre-
sentative addressed to the President of the Security
Council concerning Kashmir. S/5060. January 16,
1962. 2 pp.
Letter dated January 18, 1962, from the Notherland repre-
sentative addressed to the Acting Secretary-General
concerning New Guinea. S/5062. January 18, 1962.
3 pp.
Communications concerning the situation in the Congo.
S/.5064, January 25, 1962, 2 pp. ; H/r>(H]r>, January 27,
1962, 4 pp.; S/.'jOO.VAdd. 1, January 29, 1',l(;2, 1 p.;
S/.5066, January 29, 1962, 1 p.; S/5072, January 31,
1962, 1 p.; S/.'-)078, February 10, 1962, pp.
Letter dated January 29, 19G2, from the Pakistani repre-
sentative addressed to the President of the Security
Council concerning Kashmir. S/5068. January 29,
1962. 5 pp.
Letter dated January 31, 19i;2, from the Secretary-General
of the Organization of American States adilressed to
the Acting Secretary-General transmitting the Final
Act of the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers
of Foreign Affairs, which deals with Communist inter-
vention in the Western Hemisphere. S/5075. Febru-
ary 3, 1962. 24 pp.
Letter dated March 2, 1962, from the Cuban representative
addressed to the Security Council concerning action
taken at the OAS Eighth Meeting of Consultation.
S/5083. March 2, 1962. 4 pp.
Communications concerning the Lake Tiberias incident
between Israel and Syria. S/5084, March 2, 1962, 2 pp. ;
S/5098, March 21, 1962, 2 pp. ; S/5100, March 22, 1962,
2 pp. ; S/5102, March 26, 1962, 13 pp. ; S/5102/Add. 1,
March 27, 1962, 1 p.
General Assembly
Capital development needs of the less developed coun-
tries. A/AC.102/5. February 8, 1962. 74 pp.
Letter dated February 27, 1902, from the Soviet represen-
tative addressed to the Acting Secretary-General trans-
mitting text of Premier Khrushchev's message of
February 21, 1962, to President Kennedy. A/5096.
February 27, 1962. 11 pp.
Note verbale dated February 27, 1962, from the U.K.
representative addressed to the Secretary-General con-
cerning the future of the Trust Territory of the
Cameroons under U.K. administration. A/5097.
March 2, 1962. 6 pp.
Letter dated March 6, 1962, from the Acting Secretary-
General addressed to the Chairman of the Committee
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, transmitting a
communication dated March 5, 1962, from the U.S.
representative concerning data on U.S. satellite launch-
ings. A/AC.105/INF. 1. March 7, 1962. 5 pp.
Letter datefl March 8, 1962, from the U.S. representative
addressed to the Acting Secretary-General transmitting
various documents concerning the IS-nation disarma-
ment conference at Geneva. A/5099. March 9, 1962.
8 pp.
Letter dated March 9, 1962, from the Soviet deputy rep-
resentative addressed to the Acting Secretary-General
transmitting text of Premier Khrushchev's message of
March 3, 1962, to President Kennedy concerning the 18-
nation disarmament conference. A/5101. March 9,
1962. 8 pp.
Letter dated March 10, 1962, from the Soviet deputy
representative addressed to the Acting Secretary-
General concerning a nuclear weapons test ban treaty.
A/5102. March 12, 1962. 3 pp.
Letter dated March 10, 1962, from the Soviet deputy
representative addressed to the Acting Secretary-
General concerning Resolution 1664 (XVI). A/5103.
March 12, 1962. 5 pp.
Letter dated March 9, 1962, from the U.K. deputy repre-
sentative addressed to tie Secretary-General trans-
mitting texts of messages of Prime Minister Macmillan
concerning the 18-nation disarmament conference.
A/51()4. March 12, 1962. 7 pp.
Note verbale dated March 13, 1962. from the Czechoslovak
representative addres.sed to the .Vcting Secretary-
General concerning Resolution 1604 (XVI). A/5106.
March 22. 1962. 4 pp.
Letter dated March ICi, 1902, from the Rumanian repre-
.sontative addressed to the Secretary-General concern-
ing Resolution 1664 (XVI). A/5107. March 22, 1962.
4 pp.
Economic and Social Council
Commission on the Status of Women. Inheritance lawa
as thoy affect the status of women. E/CN.6/391.
January 4, liM">2. 59 pp.
Commission on the Status of Women. Age of retirement
and right to i)ension. E/CN.6/394. January 4, 1962.
132 pp.
738
Department of State Bulletin
TREATY INFORMATION
in availing themselves of the facilities and services
of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
The agreement will become effective after statu-
tory and constitutional requirements have been
fulfilled by both Governments.
Atomic Energy Agreement
Signed With Colombia
Press release 231 dated April 9
Representatives of the Governments of Colom-
bia and the United States on April 9 signed an
agreement for cooperation in the peaceful uses of
atomic energj'. The agreement was signed by Am-
bassador Carlos Sanz de Santamaria of Colombia.
Assistant Secretary of State Edwin M. Martin
signed for the United States. The signing cere-
mony was held at the Department of State.
Under the proposed agreement the Governments
of Colombia and the United States will cooperate
in a nuclear project to be carried out at Bogota,
Colombia. This will include the exchange of in-
formation on the design, construction, and opera-
tion of nuclear research reactors and their use as
research, training, development, and engineering
devices, and in medical therapy. American in-
dustry would be authorized by the agreement to
supply appropriate nuclear equipment and related
services to the Colombian Government or to au-
thorized individuals or organizations under its
jurisdiction.
The proposed agreement also provides that the
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission may sell or lease
to the Colombian Government uranium enriched
up to 20 percent in the isotope U-235 for use in
research reactors, materials testing reactors, and
reactor experiments, each capable of operating
with a fuel load up to 10 kilograms of the isotope
U-235 contained in such uranium ; or uranium en-
riched up to 90 percent in the isotope U-235 to
operate with a fuel load up to 8 kilograms.
Colombia also will assume responsibility for assur-
ing that material obtained from the United States
will be used only for peaceful purposes. The
agreement further provides for the exchange of
information in health and safety matters related
to research reactors and in the use of radioisotopes
in physical and biological research, medical ther-
apy, agriculture, and industry.
Both countries also affirm their common interest
Estate-Tax Convention With Canada
Enters Into Force
Press release 234 dated April 9
According to information received from the
American Embassy at Ottawa, the convention be-
tween the United States of America and Canada
for the avoidance of double taxation and the pre-
vention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on
the estates of deceased persons, signed at Wash-
ington on February 17, 1961,^ was brought into
force by the exchange of instruments of ratifica-
tion at Ottawa on April 9, 1962.
This estate-tax convention is fundamentally
similar to, and has the same basic objectives as,
estate-tax conventions which have entered into
force between the United States and 12 countries,
including the convention of June 8, 1944, with
Canada ^ as modified by a convention of June 12,
1950.^ Such conventions are designed to eliminate
double taxation in connection with the settlement
in one country of estates in which nationals of the
other country have interests.
The new convention with Canada takes the
place of the 1944 convention as modified. The
1944 convention provided that, for Canada, the
taxes referred to therein were the taxes imposed
under the Dominion Succession Duty Act. That
convention, as modified, was rendered inoperative
by the repeal of the Dominion Succession Duty
Act and the enactment of the Canadian Estate
Tax Act effective January 1, 1959. It is provided
in the new convention that, upon its entry into
force, the 1944 and 1950 conventions shall be
deemed to have terminated as to estates of dece-
dents dying on or after January 1, 1959, and that
the new convention shall be deemed to have come
into effect as to estates of decedents dying on or
after that date.
So far as the United States is concerned, the
' Bulletin of Mar. 6, inci, p. 351.
■ .-)9 Stat. 915.
' Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2348.
April 30, J 962
739
convention applies only with respect to United
States (that is, Federal) estate taxes. It does not
apply to the imposition of taxes by the several
States, the District of Columbia, or territories or
possessions of the United States.
By its terms the convention will be in effect for
a period of 5 years from January 1, 1959, and will
continue in effect thereafter until 6 months after
the date of a notice of termination given by either
of the two Governments.
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Patents
Agreement for the mutual safegruarding of secrecy of in-
vention relating to defense and for which applications
for patents have been made. Done at Paris September
21. lOGO. Entered into force January 12, 1961. TIAS
4672.
Approval deposited: Turkey, February 20, 1962.
Safety at Sea
International convention for the safety of life at sea,
1960. Done at London June 17, I960.'
Signatures: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil,
Bulgaria (with a declaration), Cameroon, Canada,
China, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Finland,
France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Hun-
gary (with a declaration), Iceland, India, Ireland,
Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Kuwait, Liberia, Nether-
lands, New Zealand, Norway. Pakistan, Panama,
Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Sweden, Smtzerland,
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (with a reserva-
tion), United Arab Republic, United Kingdom, United
States, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, June 17, I960.'
Acceptances deposited: France, October 16, 1961; Haiti,
March 17, 1961 ; Norway, August 23, 1961 ; Viet-Nam,
January 8, 1962.
Ratification advised ty the Senate: April 12, 1962.
Agriculture
Constitution of the Food and Agriculture Organization of
the United Nations, as amended. Signed at Quebec
October 16, 1945. Entered into force October 16, 1945.
TIAS 1554 and 4803.
Acceptance deposited: Tanganyika, February 8, 1962.
Fisheries
Amendment to paragraph 1 (b) of the annex to the inter-
national convention for the high seas fisheries of the
North Pacific Ocean of May 9, 1952, as amended (TIAS
278(! and 4493). Adopted at Tokyo Novemt>er 11, 1961,
at the eighth meeting of the International North Pacific
Fisheries Commission. Entered into force April 2. 1962.
Approvals deposited: Canada, March 14, 1962: Japan,
March 26, 1962; United States, April 2, 1962.
Health
Amendments to articles 24 and 25 of the World Health
Organization Constitution of July 22, 1946 (TIAS 1808).
Adopted by the 12th World Health Assembly, Geneva,
May 28, 1959. Entered into force October 25, 1960.
TIAS 4643.
Acceptance deposited: Ttirkey, January 10, 1962.
Narcotic Drugs
Convention relating to the suppression of the abuse of
opium and other drugs. Signe<l at The Hague January
23, 1912. Entered Into force February 11, 1915. 38 Stat.
1912.
Notification received that it considers itself bound:
Sierra Leone, March 13, l',X!2.
Convention for limiting the manufacture and regulating
the distributiim of narcotic drugs, as amended (61 Stat.
2230; 62 Stat. 1790). Done at Geneva July 13, 1931.
Entere<l into force July 9, 1933. 48 Stat. 1543.
Notification received that it considers itself bound:
Sierra Leone, March 1.3, 1962.
Protocol bringing under international control drugs out-
side the scope of the convention limiting the manufac-
ture and regulating the distribution of narcotic drugs
concluded at Geneva July 13, 1931 (48 Stat. 1543), as
amended (61 Stat. 22.30; 62 Stat. 1796). Done at Paris
November 19, 1948. Entere<l into force December 1,
1949; for the United States, September 11, 1950. TIAS
2.308.
Notification received tliat it considers itself bound:
Sierra Leone, March 13, 1962.
BILATERAL
Brazil
Agreement on cooperation for the promotion of economic
and social development in the Brazilian Northeast, and
exchange of notes. Signed at Washington April 13
1962. Entered into force April 13, 1962.
Canada
Convention for avoidance of double taxation and pre
vention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on estates
of deceased persons. Signed at Washington Februarj
17, 1961.
Ratifications exchanged: April 9, 1962.
Entered into force: April 9, 1962. Applicable to estate
of persons dying on or after January 1, 1959.
Convention for avoidance of double taxation and preven
tion of fiscal evasion in the case of estate taxes anc
succession duties. Signed at Ottawa June 8, 1944
Entered into force February 6, 194.5. 59 Stat. 915.
Terminated: January 1, 1959, by entry into force of con-
vention signed February 17, 1961, supra, insofar as
application to estates of decedents dying on or after
January 1, 1959, is concerned ; continues in effect
with respect to estates of decedents dying prior to
that date.
Convention modifying and supplementing convention for
avoid.uice of double taxation and prevention of fiscal
evasion in the case of estate taxes and succession duties
of June 8, 1944 (59 Stat. 915). Signed at Ottawa June
12. 19.50. Entered into force November 21, 1951. TIAS
2.348.
Terminated: January 1. 19.59, by entry into force of
convention signed February 17, 1961, supra, insofar
as application to estates of decedents dying on or
after January 1, 1959, is concerned; continues in
effect with re.si)ect to estates of decedents dying prior
to that date.
Agreement further extending the agreement of January
10 and 17, 1957 (TIAS 3732), relating to the use of the
' Not in force.
" All signed subject to acceptance, approval, or ratifi-
cation.
740
Department of Staie Bulletin
Haines cutoff road for winter maintenance of a section
of the Ilaines-Fairbanlis pipeline. Effeited by exchange
of notes at Ottawa December 22. 1961, and January 26,
19C2. Entered into force January 20, 1902.
Colombia
Agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic
energy. Signed at Wasliington April 9. 1902. Enters
into force on the date on which each Oovernment re-
ceives from the other written notitication that it has
complied with all statutory anil constitutional require-
ments for entry into force.
Israel
Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agree-
ment of November 6. 19.")8. as supplemented and
amended (TIAS 4126, 418S. 4818, and 4906). Effected
by exchange of notes at Washington April 6 and 11,
1902. Entered into force April 11, 1902.
Paraguay
Reciprocal trade agreement. Signed at Asuncii'in Sep-
tember 12, Itne. Entered into force .\pril 9, 15M7.
TIAS 1601.
Notice of intention to irrminate (livcn hi/ I'nraguay:
April 2, 1902. (In accordance with provisions of
article XVII, para. 2, agreement will be terminated
October 2, 1962.)
Agreement temporarily bringing up to date .scliedule I
of the reciprocal trade agreement of September 12,
1946, supra. Effected by exchange of notes at Asunei6n
April 2, 1962. Entered into force April 2, 1962.
DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE
State and Commerce Agree To Expand
Foreign Service Commercial Program
Press release 210 dated April 2
An agreement designed to fulfill President Ken-
nedy's export expansion program by improving
the Government's international trade services to
the American business community has been con-
cluded by the Department of Commerce and the
Department of State.
The interdepartmental agreement, signed by
Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Secretary
of Commerce Luther II. Hodges, jirovides a
stepped-up commercial program within the For-
eign Service. It identifies the overseas commer-
cial attaclie as a career specialist within the For-
eign Service; it provides for recruiting of addi-
tional specialists from the Commerce Department
and the business world and gives the Commerce
Department greater participation in the recruit-
ment, training, assignment, and promotion of
commercial officers.
The commercial officers in the Foreign Service,
as members of the statTs of U.S. embassies and
consulates abroad, represent a princii)al means for
overseas trade promotional support to the U.S.
business community. The services they perform
for businessmen and the trade opportunities and
foreign market information they develop can play
a major role in the successful increase of Amer-
ican business activity abroad and in the expansion
of our exports.
The objectives of the agreement are set forth in
these terms:
The President has directed the Executive Agencies to
place maximum emphasis on enlarging the foreign com-
merce of the United States in seeking to maintain an
over-all balance in our international payments. . . .
To provide effective leadership, the Department of
Commerce is assuming primary responsibility and direc-
tion for foreign trade promotion activities at home and
abroad. . . . The Departments of State and Commerce
agree that the President's directive can best be carried out
abroad by a single overseas service. To fulfill their re-
spective respc)nsibilities, the two Departments undertake
to establLsli new arrangements for the purpose of provid-
ing optimum commercial service.s within the framework of
a unified Foreign Service.
The agreement provides an opportunity for For-
eign Service officers to elect commercial work as a
career specialty and permits advancement within
this specialty to the highest levels in the Foreign
Service. Personnel will be augmented by an en-
larged number of appointments from the Depart-
ment of Commerce and the business community,
who, together with the Foreign Service career
commercial specialists, will provide the expertise
needed to assist American business in meeting the
increasing competition for world markets.
To attract economic and commercial talent the
two Departments will e.stablish joint recruitment
teams to visit educational institutions giving grad-
uate and tmdergraduate degrees in business ad-
ministration or foreign trade, and the Department
of State will make special provision in its written
Foreign Service examinations for candidates with
background and interest in commercial activities.
A Department of Commercial Ailairs will be
established in the Foreign Service Institute of the
Department of State, chaired by a mutually ac-
ceptable nominee of the Department of Commerce.
The chairman will develop a commercial training
program and supervise its imjjlementation and
operation.
The Department of Commerce will normally
April 30, 1962
741
initiate instructions for commercial specialists to
carry out their operational and reporting duties
and responsibilities. Current instructions will be
modified to provide for increased emphasis on the
promotion of trade, investment, and travel. Com-
mercial specialists will be encouraged to travel
more widely in their respective districts in order
to develop market information which will be
speedily communicated to businessmen in the
United States.
The two Departments consider that the agree-
ment accommodates the responsibilities of both
Departments and provides the means for the
closest possible cooperation in this imjwrtant area
of overseas activity.
PUBLICATIONS
Recent Releases
Fw sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Gov-
ernment Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. Address
requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, ex-
cept in the case of free publications, which may be
obtained from the Department of State.
Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4790. 4 pp.
Agreement with the United Arab Republic, amending the
agreement of August 1, 1960, as amended. Exchange of
notes — Signed at Cairo June 24, 1961. Entered into force
June 24, 1961.
Economic Assistance. TIAS 4791. 3 pp. 5^.
Agreement with Ecuador. Exchange of notes — Signed at
Quito June 7 and 17, 1961. ~
1961.
Entered into force June 17,
Technical Cooperation. TIAS 4792. 4 pp. 5<i.
Agreement with Cyprus — Signed at Nicosia, June 29, 1961.
Entered into force June 29, 1961.
Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4793. 3 pp.
Agreement with Greece, amending the agreement of No-
vember 7, 1960. Exchange of notes — Signed at Athens
June 22, 1961. Entered into force June 22, 1961.
Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4794. 4 pp.
Agreement witli Palvistan. amending certain agreements,
as amended. Exchange of notes — Signed at Karachi June
29, 19G1. Entered into force June 29, 1961.
Military Mission to Costa Rica. TIAS 4795. 3 pp. 5<f.
Agreement with Costa Rica, amending the agreement of
December 10, 194.5, as amended and extended. Exchange
742
of notes — Dated at San Jos6 February 25 and May 13,
1959. Entered into force May 13, 1959.
War Damage Claims. TIAS 4796. 4 pp. 5<t.
Agreement with Italy, supplementing the understanding
of March 29, 1957. Exchange of notes — Signed at Rome
July 12, 1960. Entered into force June 15, 1961.
Second Agreement Regarding Certain Matters Arising
From the Validation of German Dollar Bonds. TIAS
4798. 12 pp. 10(!.
Agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany —
Signed at Bonn August 16, 1960. Entered into force June
30, 1961.
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: April 9-15
Press releases may be obtained from the Office of
News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.
Releases appearing in this issue of the Bulletin
which were Issued prior to April 9 are Nos. 190 of
March 26; 203 of March 29; 210, 212 and 216 of
April 2 ; 222 of April 4 : 225 of April 5 ; and 228 of
April 6.
No. Date Subject
230 4/9 Air talks with Austria suspended.
231 4/9 Atomic energy agreement with Colombia.
*232 4/9 U.S. participation in international con-
ferences.
233 4/9 Withdrawal of study on Niagara Falls.
234 4/9 Estate-tax convention with Canada.
235 4/10 Austrian persecutee claims.
t236 4/12 Trezise : "Trade Policy for the 1960's."
237 4/10 Assistant Secretary Williams' trip to
Africa (rewrite).
♦238 4/10 Cleveland; "The Winning of the Non-
war."
*239 4/11 Cultural exchange (Brazil).
•240 4/11 Biography of Under Secretary Ball.
*241 4/11 Williams : "American Foreign Policy and
the Emerging Nations of .\frica."
♦242 4/11 Manning sworn in as Assistant Secretary
for Public Affairs (biographic details).
•243 4/11 Sisco: "The U.N. and U.S. National In-
terests."
t244 4/12 Bowles ; American Jewish Congress.
245 4/12 Soviet statement on nuclear test morato-
rium.
•246 4/12 Amendments to program for visit of Shah
of Iran.
•247 4/12 Greentield appointed Deputy Assistant
Secretary for News (biographic de-
tails).
•248 4/12 Gardner : "The U.S. and the U.N. : A Re-
appraisiil of the National Interest."
t249 4/13 Cleveland : "View From the Diplomatic
Tightrope."
2.50 4/13 Rusk : Pan American Day.
•251 4/13 Brodie: "Commodity Problems and Stabi-
lization Programs in Latin America."
•252 4/13 Harriman : .\merican Academy of Polit-
ical and Social Science (excerpts).
t253 4/13 Williams: "Aids and Obstacles to Polit-
ical Stability in Slid-Africa."
•2.54 4/14 Harriman ; interview on "Operation in
the Capital."
•Not printed.
tlleld for a later issue of the Bulletin.
Department of State Bulletin
J
April 30, 1962
Ind
e X
Vol. XLVI, No. 1192
Africa
Assistant Secretary Williams Visits 10 African
Countries 722
Change and Challenge in Africa (Williams) . . . 719
American Republics. Pan American Day, 1962
(Rusk) 703
Atomic Energy
Atomic Energy Agreement Signed With Colombia . 739
U.S. and U.K. State Position on Nuclear Testing
(joint statement) 707
U.S. Comments on Soviet Statement Calling for Nu-
clear Test Moratorium 708
Austria
Claims on Austrian Persecutee Fimd Must Be Filed
by August 31, 1962 718
U.S. and Austria Susi)end Air Talks, To Resume in
Near Future 718
Aviation. U.S. and Austria Suspend Air Talks, To
Resume in Near Future 718
Brazil. United States and Brazil Reaffirm Existing
Close Relations (Goulart, Kennedy) 705
Canada
Estate-Tax Convention With Canada Enters Into
Force 739
President Salutes Role of IJC in U.S.-Canadian
Relations 729
United States and Canada Withdraw Study on
Niagara Falls 728
U.S., Canada To Study Development of Pembina
River Resources 728
Claims. Claims on Austrian Persecutee Fimd Must
Be Filed by August 31, 1962 718
Colombia. Atomic Energy Agreement Signed With
Colombia 739
Congress, The. Congressional Documents Relating
to Foreign Policy 734
Department and Foreign Service. State and Com-
merce Agree To Expand Foreign Service Com-
mercial Program 741
Economic Affairs
Estate- Tax Convention With Canada Enters Into
Force 739
Mineral Resources and the World of the 1960's
(McGhee) 723
The New Europe — Its ChaUenge and Its Opportuni-
ties for the United States (MacArthur) .... 709
State and Commerce Agree To Expand Foreign
Service Commercial Program 741
Europe. The New Europe — Its Challenge and Its
Opportunities for the United States (Mac-
Arthur) 709
Germany. I'resident Commends General Clay on
Mission to Berlin 708
Iran. Letters of Credence (Qods-Nakhai) .... 707
Israel. Security Council Calls Upon Israel and
Syria To Observe Armistice Agreement ( Yost and
text of resolution) 735
Philippines. President Kennedy Greets Philippines
on Bataan Day 729
Presidential Documents
President Commends General Clay on Mission to
Berlin 708
President Kennedy Greets Philippines on Bataan
Day 729
President Salutes Role of IJC in U.S.-Canadian
Relations 709
United States and Brazil Reaffirm Existing Close
Relations 705
Publications. Recent Releases 742
Refugees. Refugees Here and Around the World
(CiepUnski) 730
Syria. Security Council Calls Upon Israel and
Syria To Observe Armistice Agreement (Tost
and text of resolution) 735
Treaty Information
Atomic Energy Agreement Signed With Colombia . 739
Current Actions 749
Estate-Tax Convention With Canada Enters Into
Force 739
U.S. and Austria Suspend Air Talks, To Resume in
Near Future jig
U.S.S.R. U.S. Comments on Soviet Statement Call-
ing for Nuclear Test Moratorium 708
United Kingdom. U.S. and U.K. State Position on
Nuclear Testing (joint statement) 707
United Nations
Current U.N. Documents 733
Security Council Calls Upon Israel and Syria To
Observe Armistice Agreement (Yost and text of
resolution) 735
'Same Index
CiepUnski, Michel 730
Goulart, Joao 705
Kennedy, President 705,708,729
MacArthur, Douglas II 709
McGhee, George C 723
Qods-Nakhai, Hosein 707
Rusk, Secretary 703
Williams, G. Mennen 719
Yost, Charles W 735
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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
yitC^j!<^
Vol. XLVI, No. 1193
May 7, 1962
IE
FICIAL
lEKLY RECORD
UNITED STATES PRESENTS OUTLINE OF A TREATY
ON GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMA-
MENT • Statement by President Kennedy and Text of
Outline 747
ATTORNEY GENERAL EXPLAINS U.S. GOALS
TO PEOPLE OF JAPAN, INDONESIA, AND
GERMANY • Excerpts From Addresses 761
A LOOK AT THE MIDDLE EAST TODAY •
by Chester Bowles 765
TRADE POLICY FOR THE 1960's • by Acting Assistant
Secretary Trezise 774
THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY AND
UNITED STATES TRADE POLICY • by
Joseph D. Coppock • 770
IITED STATES
REIGN POLICY
For index see inside back cover
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Vol. XLVI, No. 1193 • Publication 7371
May 7, 1962
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United States Presents Outline of a Treaty
on General and Complete Disarmament
STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT KENNEDY '
The United States has today [April 18] tabled
at Geneva an outline of every bt^sic provision of a
treaty on general and complete disarmament in a
peaceful world. It jirovides a blueprint of our
position on general and complete disarmament as
well as elaboration of the nature, sequence, and
timing of specific disarmament measures.
This outline of a treaty represents the most
comprehensive and specific series of proposals the
United States or any other country has ever made
on disarmament. In addition to stating the ob-
jectives and principles which should govern agree-
ments for disannament, the document calls for the
grouping of individual measures in three balanced
and safeguarded stages. We are hopeful through
the give-and-take of the conference table this plan
will have a const nictive influence upon the negoti-
ations now in progress.
I want to stress that with this plan the United
States is making a major effort to achieve a break-
through on disarmament negotiations. We be-
lieve that the nations represented at Geneva have a
heavy responsibility to lay the foundations for a
genuinely secure and peaceful world starting
through a reduction in arms.
TEXT OF OUTLINE 2
Outline of Basic PBO\^SIONS of a Tkeatt on General
AND Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World
In order to assist in the preparation of a treaty on
general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world,
' Read by the President at his press conference on
Apr. IS.
^ Submitted to the 18-nation Committee on Disarmament
at Geneva by tie U.S. delegation on Apr. 18.
the United States submits the following outline of basic
provisions of such a treaty.
A. Objectives
1. To ensure that (a) disarmament is general and com-
plete and war is no longer an instrument for settling inter-
national problems, and (b) general and complete
disarmament is accompanied by the establishment of re-
liable procedures for the settlement of disputes and by
effective arrangements for the maintenance of i)eace in
accordance with the principles of the Charter of the
United Nations.
2. Taking into account paragraphs 3 and 4 below, to
provide, with respect to the military establishment of
every nation, for:
(a) Disbanding of armed forces, dismantling of military
establishments, including bases, cessation of the produc-
tion of armaments as well as their liquidation or con-
version to peaceful uses ;
(b) Elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear, chemical,
biological, and other weapons of mass destruction and
cessation of the production of such weapons ;
(c) Elimination of all means of delivery of weapons of
mass destruction ;
(d) Abolition of the organizations and institutions de-
signed to organize the military efforts of states, cessation
of military training, and closing of aU military training
institutions ;
(e) Discontinuance of military expenditures.
3. To ensure that, at the completion of the program for
general and complete disarmament, states would have at
their disiwsal only those non-nuclear armaments, forces,
facilities and establishments as are agreed to be necessary
to maintain internal order and protect the personal se-
curity of citizens.
4. To ensure that during and after implementation of
general and complete disarmament, states also would sup-
port and provide agreed manpower for a United Nations
Peace Force to be equipped with agreed types of arma-
ments necessary to en.sure that the United Nations can
effectively deter or suppress any threat or use of arms.
5. To establish and provide for the effective operation
of an International Disarmament Organization within the
May 7, J 962
747
framework of the United Nations for the purpose of en-
suring that all obligations under the disarmament program
would be honored and observed during and after imple-
mentation of general and complete disarmament ; and to
this end to ensure that the International Disarmament
Organization and its inspectors would have imrestricted
access without veto to all places as necessary for the
purpose of effective verification.
B. Principles
The guiding principles during the achievement of these
objectives are:
1. Disarmament would be implemented until it is com-
pleted by stages to be carried out within specified time
limits.
2. Disarmament would be balanced so that at no stage
of the implementation of the treaty could any state or
group of states gain military advantage, and so that se-
curity would be ensured equally for all.
3. Compliance with all disarmament obligations would
be effectively verified during and after their entry into
force. Verification arrangements would be instituted
progressively as necessary to ensure throughout the dis-
armament process that agreed levels of armaments and
armed forces were not exceeded.
4. As national armaments are reduced, the United Na-
tions would be progressively strengthened in order to
improve its capacity to ensure international security and
the peaceful settlement of differences as well as to facili-
tate the development of international cooperation in com-
mon tasks for the benefit of mankind.
5. Transition from one stage of disarmament to the
next would take place uix)n decision that all measures in
the preceding stage had been implemented and verified
and that any additional arrangements required for meas-
ures in the next stage were ready to operate.
Introduction
The Treaty would contain three stages designed to
achieve a permanent state of general and complete dis-
armament in a peaceful world. The Treaty would enter
into force upon the signature and ratification of the
United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics and such other states as might be agreed.
Stage II would begin when all militarily significant states
had become Parties to the Treaty and other transition
requirements had been satisfied. Stage III would begin
when all states possessing armed forces and armaments
had become Parties to the Treaty and other transition
requirements had been .satisfied. Disarmament, verifica-
tion, and measures for keeping the peace would proceed
progressively and proportionately beginning with the entry
into force of the Treaty.
Stage I
Stage I would begin upon the entry into force of the
Treaty and would be completed within three years from
that date.
During Stage I the Parties to the Treaty would under-
take:
1. To reduce their armaments and armed forces and to
carry out other agreed measures in the manner outlined
below ;
2. To establish the International Disarmament Organi-
zation upon the entry into force of the Treaty in order
to ensure the verification in the agreed manner of the
obligations undertaken ; and
3. To strengthen arrangements for keeping the peace
through the measures outlined below.
A. Armaments
1. Reduction of Armaments
a. Specified Parties to the Treaty, as a first stage
toward general and complete disarmament in a peaceful
world, would reduce by thirty percent the armaments in
each category listed in subparagraph b below. Except
as adjustments for production would be permitted in
Stage I in accordance with paragraph 3 below, each type
of armament in the categories listed in subparagraph b
would be reduced by thirty percent of the inventory ex-
isting at an agreed date.
b. All types of armaments within agreed categories
would be subject to reduction in Stage I (the following
list of categories, and of types within categories, is
illustrative) :
(1) Armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of
40,000 kilograms or gi'eater ; missiles having a range of
.5,000 kilometers or greater, together with their related
fixed launching pads ; and submarine-la imehed missiles
and air-to-surfaee missiles having a range of 300 kilome-
ters or greater.
(Within this category, the United States, for example,
would declare as types of armaments: the B-52 aircraft;
Atlas missiles together with their related fixed launching
pads ; Titan missiles together with their related fixed
launching pads ; Polaris missiles ; Hound Dog missiles ;
and each new type of armament, such as Minuteman
missiles, which came within the category description,
together with, where applicable, their related fixed
launching pads. The declared inventory of t.vpes within
the category by other Parties to the Treaty would be
similarly detailed).
(2) Armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of
between 15,000 kilograms and 40,000 kilograms and those
missiles not included in category (1) having a range be-
tween 300 kilometers and 5,000 kilometers, together with
any relatetl fixed launching pads. (The Parties would
declare their armaments by types within the category).
(3) Armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of
between 2,500 and 15,000 kilograms. (The Parties would
declare their armaments by types within the category).
(4) Surface-to-surface (including submarine-launched
missiles) and air-to-surface aerodynamic and ballistic
missiles and free rockets having a range of between 10
kilometers and 300 kilometers, together with any related
fixed launching pads. (The Parties would declare their
armaments by types within the category) .
(5) Anti-missile missile systems, together with related
fixed launching jiads. (The Parties would declare their
armaments by types within the category).
(6) Surface-to-air missiles other than anti-mis.sile
missile systems, together with any related fixed launching
748
Department of Stale Bulletin
pads. (The Parties would declare their armaments by
types within the category).
(7) Tanks. (The Parties would declare their arma-
ments by types within the category).
(8) Armored cars and armored personnel carriers.
(The Parties would declare their armaments by t.yi)es
within the category).
(9) All artillery, and mortars and rocket launchers
having a caliber of 1(X) mm. or greater. (The Parties
would declare their armaments by types within the cate-
gory).
(10) Combatant ships with standard displacement of
400 tons or greater of the following classes : Aircraft
carriers, battleships, cruisers, destroyer types and sub-
marines. (The Parties would declare their armaments
by types within the category).
2. Method of Reduction
a. Those Parties to the Treaty which were subject to
the reduction of armaments would submit to the Interna-
tional Disarmament Organization an appropriate declarar
tion respecting inventories of their armaments existing at
the agreed date.
b. The reduction would be accomplished in three steps,
each consisting of one year. One-third of the reduction
to be made during Stage I would be carried out during
each step.
c. During the first part of each step, one-third of the
armaments to be eliminated during Stage I would be
placed in depots under supervision of the International
Disarmament Organization. During the second part of
each step, the deposited armaments would be destroyed
or, where appropriate, converted to peaceful uses. The
number and location of such deiwts and arrangements
respecting their establishment and operation would be set
forth in an annex to the Treaty.
d. In accordance with arrangements which would be
set forth in a Treaty annex on verification, the Interna-
tional Disarmament Organization would verify the fore-
going reduction and would provide assurance that retained
armaments did not exceed agreed levels.
3. Limitation on Production of Armaments and on Re-
lated Activities
a. Production of all armaments listed in subparagraph
b of paragraph 1 above would be limited to agreed allow-
ances during Stage I and, by the beginning of Stage II,
would be halted except for production within agreed
limits of parts for maintenance of the agreed retained
armaments.
b. The allowances would permit limited production in
each of the categories of armaments listed in subpara-
graph b of paragraph 1 above. In all Instances during
the process of eliminating production of armaments:
(1) any armament produced within a category would
be compensated for by an additional armament destroyed
within that category to the end that the ten percent
reduction in numbers in each category in each step, and
the resulting thirty percent reduction in Stage I, would
be achieved ; and furthermore
(2) in the case of armed combat aircraft having an
empty weight of 15,0(X) kilograms or greater and of mi.s-
siles having a range of 300 kilometers or greater, the
destructive capability of any such armaments pro<lueed
within a category would be compensated for by the
destruction of sufficient armaments within that category
to the end that the ten percent reduction in destructive
capability as well as numbers in each of these categories
in each step, and the resulting thirty percent reduction
in Stage I, would be achieved.
c. Should a Party to the Treaty elect to reduce its
production in any category at a more rapid rate than re-
quired by the allowances provided in subparagraph b
above, that Party would be entitled to retain existing
armaments to the extent of the unused portion of its
production allowance. In any such instance, any arma-
ment so retained would be compensated for in the manner
set forth in subparagraph b(l) and, where applicable,
b(2) above to the end that the ten percent reduction in
numbers and, where applicable, destructive capability in
each category in each step, and the resulting thirty
percent reduction in Stage I, would be achieved.
d. The flight testing of missiles would be limited to
agreed annual quotas.
e. In accordance with arrangements which would be
set forth in the annex on verification, the International
Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing
measures at declared locations and would provide assur-
ance that activities subject to the foregoing measures
were not conducted at undeclared locations.
4. Additional Measures
The Parties to the Treaty would agree to examine
unresolved questions relating to means of accomplishing
in Stages II and III the reduction and eventual elimina-
tion of production and stockpiles of chemical and bio-
logical weapons of mass destruction. In light of this
examination, the Parties to the Treaty would agree to
arrangements concerning chemical and biological weapons
of mass destruction.
B. Armed Forces
1. Reduction of Armed Forces
Force levels for the United States of America and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would be reduced
to 2.1 million each and for other specified Parties to tie
Treaty to agreed levels not exceeding 2.1 million each.
All other Parties to the Treaty would, with agreed excep-
tions, reduce their force levels to 100,000 or one percent
of their population, whichever were higher, provided that
in no case would the force levels of such other Parties
to the Treaty exceed levels in existence upon the entry
into force of the Treaty.
2. Armed Forces Subject to Reduction
Agreed force levels would Include all full-time, uni-
formed personnel maintained by national governments in
the following categories :
a. Career personnel of active armed forces and other
personnel serving in the active armed forces on fixed
engagements or contracts.
b. Conscripts performing their required period of full-
time active duty as fixed by national law.
c. Personnel of militarily organized security forces
May 7, J 962
749
and of other forces or organizations equipped and or-
ganized to perform a military mission.
3. Method of Reduction of Armed Forces
The reduction of force levels would be carried out in
the following manner :
a. Those Parties to the Treaty which were subject to
the foregoing reductions would suljmit to the Internar
tional Disarmament Organization a declaration stating
their force levels at the agreed date.
b. Force level reductions would be accomplished in
three steps, each having a duration of one year. During
each step force levels would be reduced by one-third of
the difference between force levels existing at the agreed
date and the levels to be reached at tiie end of Stage I.
c. In accordance with arrangements that would be set
forth in the annex on verification, the International Dis-
armament Organization would verify the reduction of
force levels and provide assurance that retained forces
did not exceed agreed levels.
4. Additional Measures
The Parties to the Treaty which were subject to the
foregoing reductions would agree upon appropriate ar-
rangements, including procedures for consultation, in
order to ensure that civilian employment by military
establishments would be in accordance with the objec-
tives of the obligations respecting force levels.
C. Nuclear Weapons
1. Production of Fissionable Materials for Nuclear
Weapons
a. The Parties to the Treaty would halt the production
of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons.
b. This measure would be carried out in the following
manner :
(1) The Parties to the Treaty would submit to the
International Disarmament Organization a declaration
listing by name, location and production capacity every
facility under their jurisdiction capable of producing
and processing fissionable materials at the agreed date.
(2) Production of fissionalile materials for purposes
other than use in nuclear weapons would be limited to
agreed levels. The Parties to the Treaty would submit
to the International Disarmament Organization periodic
declarations stating the amounts and types of fissionable
materials which were still being produced at each
facility.
(3) In accordance with arrangements which would
be set forth in the annex on verification, the International
Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing
measures at declared facilities and would provide assur-
ance that activities subject to the foregoing limitations
were not conducted at undeclared facilities.
2. Transfer of Fi.ssional)Ie Material to Purposes Other
Than Use in Nuclear Weapons
a. Upon the cessation of production of fissionable ma-
terials for use in nuclear weapons, the United States of
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Ucpublics
would each transfer to purposes other than use in nu-
clear weapons an agreed (luantity of weapons-grade U-
235 from past production. The purposes for which such
materials would be used would be determined by the state
to which the material belonged, provided that such ma-
terials were not used in nuclear weapons.
b. To ensure that the transferred materials were not
used in nuclear weapons, such materials would be placed
under safeguards and inspection by the International
Disarmament Organization either in stockpiles or at the
facilities in which they would be utilized for purposes
other than use in nuclear weapons. Arrangements for
such safeguards and inspection would be set forth in the
annex on verification.
3. Transfer of Fissionable Materials Between States for
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy
a. Any transfer of fissionable materials between states
would be for purposes other than for use in nuclear weap-
ons and would be subject to a system of safeguards to
ensure that such materials were not used in nuclear
weapons.
b. The system of safeguards to be applied for this pur-
po.se would be developed in agreememt with the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency and would be set forth
in an annex to the Treaty.
4. Non-Transfer of Nuclear Weapons
The Parties to the Treaty would agree to seek to pre-
vent the creation of further national nuclear forces. To
this end the Parties would agree that :
a. Any Party to the Treaty which had manufactured,
or which at any time manufactures, a nuclear weapon
would :
(1) Not transfer control over any nuclear weapons to
a state which had not manufactured a nuclear weapon
before an agreed date ;
(2) Not a.ssist any such state in manufacturing any
nuclear weapons.
b. Any Party to the Treaty which had not manufac-
tured a nuclear weapon before the agreed date would :
(1) Not acquire, or attempt to acquire, control over
any nuclear weapons ;
(2) Not manufacture, or attempt to manufacture, any
nuclear weaixms.
5. Nuclear Weapons Test Explosions
a. If an agreement prohibiting nuclear weapons test
explosions and providing for effective international con-
trol had come into force prior to the entry into force of
the Treaty, such agreement would become an annex to the
Treaty, and all the Parties to the Treaty would be bound
by the obligations specified in the agreement.
1>. If, however, no such agreement had come into force
prior to the entry into force of the Treaty, all nuclear
weapons test explosions would be prohibitwl, and the
procedures for effective international control would be
sot forth in an annex to the Treaty.
6. Additional Measures
The Parties to the Treaty would agree to examine re-
maining unresolved questions relating to the means of
accomplishing in Stages II and III the reduction and
750
Deparfment of State Bulletin
eventual eliiiiination of iiuck>ar weapons stockpiles. In
the light of this examination, the I'arties to the Treaty
would agree to arrangements couceruing nuclear weapons
stocljpiles.
I). Outer Space
1. Prohibition of Weapons of Mass Destruction in Orliit
The Parties to the Treaty would agree not to place in
orbit weapons capable of producing mass destruction.
2. Peaceful Cooperation in Space
The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support in-
creased international cooiwration in jieaceful uses of outer
space in the United Nations or through other appropriate
arrangements.
3. Notification and Pre-launch Inspection
With re.spect to the launching of space vehicles and
missiles :
a. Those Parties to the Treaty which conducted launch-
ings of space vehicles or missiles would provide advance
notification of such launchings to other Parties to the
Treaty and to the International Disarmament Organiza-
tion together with the track of the space vehicle or mis-
sile. Such advance notification would be provided on a
timely basis to permit pre-launch inspection of the space
vehicle or missile to be launched.
b. In accordance with arrangements which would be
set forth in the annex on verification, the International
Disarmament Organization would conduct pre-launch in-
spection of space vehicles and missiles and would establish
and operate any arrangements necessary for detecting
unreported launchings.
4. Limitations on Production and on Related Activities
The production, stockpiling and testing of boosters for
space vehicles would be subject to agreed limitations.
Such activities would be monitored by the International
Disarmament Organization in accordance with arrange-
ments which would be set forth in the annex on verifica-
tion.
E. Military Expenditures
1. Report on Expenditures
The Parties to the Treaty would submit to the Inter-
national Disarmament Organization at the end of each
step of each stage a report on their military expenditures.
Such reports would include an itemization of military ex-
penditures.
2. Verifiable Reduction of Expenditures
The Parties to the Treaty would agree to examine ques-
tions related to the verifiable reduction of military ex-
penditures. In the light of this examination, the Parties
to the Treaty would consider appropriate arrangements
respecting military expenditures.
F. RcdKCtion of the Risk of War
In order to promote confidence and reduce the risk of
war, the Parties to the Treaty would agree to the follow-
ing measures:
1. Advance Notification of Military Movements and Ma-
neuvers
Specified Partie.s to the Treaty would give advance
notification of major military movements and maneuvers
to other Parties to the Treaty and to the International
Disarmament Organization. Specific arrangements re-
lating to this commitment, including the scale of move-
ments and maneuvers to be reported and the information
to be transmitted, would be agreed,
2. Observation Posts
Specified Parties to the Treaty would permit observa-
tion posts to be established at agreed locations, including
major ports, railway centers, motor highways, river
crossings, and air bases to report on concentrations and
movements of military forces. The number of such posts
could be progressively expanded in each successive step
of Stage I. Specific arrangements relating to such ob-
servation posts, including the location and stafling of
posts, the method of receiving and reporting information,
and the .schedule for installation of posts would be agreed.
3. Additional Observation Arrangements
The Parties to the Treaty would establish such addi-
tional observation arrangements as might be agreed. Such
arrangements could be extended in an agreed manner
during each step of Stage I.
4. Exchange of Military Missions
Specified Parties to the Treaty would undertake the
exchange of military missions between states or groups
of states in order to improve communications and under-
standing between them. Specific arrangements respect-
ing such exchanges would be agreed.
5. Communications Between Heads of Government
Specified Parties to the Treaty would agree to the
establishment of rapid and reliable communications among
their heads of government and with the Secretary General
of the United Nations. Specific arrangements in this re-
gard would be subject to agreement among the Parties
concerned and between such Parties and the Secretary
General.
6. International Commission on Reduction of the Risk
of War
The Parties to the Treaty would establish an Inter-
national Commission on Reduction of the Risk of War as
a subsidiary body of the International Disarmament
Organization to examine and make recommendations re-
garding further measures that might be undertaken dur-
ing Stage I or sub.sequent .stages of disarmament to re-
duce the risk of war by accident, miscalculation, failure of
communications, or surprise attack. Specific arrange-
ments for such measures as might be agreed to by all or
some of the Parties to the Treaty would be subject to
agreement among the Parties concerned.
G. The International Disarmament Organization
1. Establishment of the International Disarmament
Organization
The International Disarmament Organization would be
fAay 7, J 962
751
established uiwn the entry into force of the Treaty and
would function within the framework of the United Na-
tions and in accordance with the terms and conditions of
the Treaty.
2. Cooperation of the Parties to the Treaty
The Parties to the Treaty would agree to cooperate
promptly and fully with the International Disarmament
Organization and to assist the International Disarmament
Organization in the performance of its functions and in
the execution of the decisions made by it in accordance
with the provisions of the Treaty.
3. Verification Functions of the International Disarma-
ment Organization
The International Disarmament Organization would
verify disarmament measures in accordance with the
following principles which would be implemented through
specific arrangements set forth in the amiex on verifica-
tion :
a. Measures providing for reduction of armaments
would be verified by the International Disarmament Or-
ganization at agreed depots and would include verifica-
tion of the destruction of armaments and, where appro-
priate, verification of the conversion of armaments to
peaceful uses. Measures providing for reduction of armed
forces would be verified by the International Disarmament
Organization either at the agreed depots or other agreed
locations.
b. Measures halting or limiting production, testing, and
other specified activities would be verified by the Inter-
national Disarmament Organization. Parties to the
Treaty would declare the nature and location of all pro-
duction and testing facilities and other specified activities.
The International Disarmament Organization would have
access to relevant facilities and activities wherever lo-
cated in the territory of such Parties.
c. Assurance that agreed levels of armaments and
armed forces were not exeeede<l and that activities limited
or prohibited by the Treaty were not being conducted
clandestinely would be provided by the International
Disarmament Organization through agreed arrangements
which would have the effect of providing that the extent
of inspection during any step or stage would be related
to the amount of disarmament being inidertaken and to
the degree of risk to the Parties to the Treaty of iwssible
violations. This might be accomplishetl, for exami>le, by
an arrangement embodying such features as the following :
(1) All parts of the territory of those Parties to the
Treaty to which this form of verification was applicable
would be subject to selection for insi>ection from the be-
ginning of Stage I as provided below.
(2) Parties to the Treaty would divide their territory
into an agreed number of appropriate zones and at the
licginning of each step of disarmament would submit to
the Iiiternati(mal Disarmament Organization a declara-
tion stating the total level of armaments, forces, and
specified types of activities subject to verification within
each zone. The exact location of armaments and forces
within a zone would not be revealed prior to its selection
for insi)ection.
(3) An agreed number of these zones would be progres-
sively inspected by the International Disarmament Or-
ganization during Stage I according to an agreed time
schedule. The zones to be inspected would be selected
by procedures which would ensure their selection by
Parties to the Treaty other than the Party whose territory
was to be inspected or any Party associated with it.
Upon selection of each zone, the Party to the Treaty
whose territory was to be inspected would declare the
exact location of armaments, forces and other agreed
activities within the selected zone. During the verifica-
tion process, arrangements would be made to provide as-
surance against undeclared movements of the objects of
verification to or from the zone or zones being inspected.
Both aerial and mobile ground inspection would be em-
ployed within the zone being inspected. In so far as
agreed measures being verified were concerned, access
within the zone would be free and unimpeded, and veri-
fication would be carried out with the full cooperation
of the state being inspected.
(4) Once a zone had l)een insi^ected it would remain
open for further inspection while verification was being
extended to additional zones.
(5) By the end of Stage III, when all disarmament
measures had been completed, inspection would have lieen
extended to all parts of the territory of Parties to the
Treaty.
4. Composition of the International Disarmament
Organization
a. The International Di.sarmament Organization would
have :
(1) A General Conference of all the Parties to the
Treaty ;
(2) A Control Council consisting of representatives of
all the major signatory powers as permanent members and
certain other Parties to the Treaty on a rotating basis ;
and
(3) An Administrator who would administer the Inter-
national Disarmament Organization under the direction
of the Control Council and who would have the authority,
staff, and finances adequate to ensure effective and im-
partial implementation of the functions of the Interna-
tional Disarmament Organization.
b. The General Conference and the Control Council
would have power to establish such subsidiary bodies, in-
cluding expert study groups, as either of them might deem
necessary.
5. Functions of the General Conference
The General Conference would have the following func-
tions, among others which might be agreed :
a. Electing non-permanent members to the Control
Council ;
b. Approving certain accessi(ms to the Treaty ;
e. ApiKiinting the Adniinislrator upon recommendation
of the Control Coiuicil ;
d. Approving agreements between the International Dis-
armament Organization and the United Nations and other
international organizations :
e. Approving the budget of Ihe Inloriialiunal Disarma-
ment Organization ;
f. Reciuesting and receiving rejiorts from the Control
752
Deparfmenf of State Bulletin
Council and deciding upon matters referred to it by the
Control Council ;
g. Ai>i)roving reports to be submitted to bodies of the
United Nations ;
h. l^roposing matters for consideration by the Control
Council ;
i. Requesting the International Court of Justice to give
advisory opinions on legal questions concerning the inter-
pretation or application of the Treaty, subject to a general
authorization of this power by the General Assembly of
the United Nations ;
j. Approving amendments to the Treaty for possible
ratification by the Parties to the Treaty ;
k. Considering matters of mutual interest pertaining to
the Treaty or disarmament in general.
6. Functions of the Control Council
The Control Council would have the following functions,
among others which might be agreed :
a. Recommending appointment of the Administrator ;
b. Adopting rules for implementing the terms of the
Treaty ;
c. Establishing procedures and standards for the instal-
lation and operation of the verification arrangements, and
maintaining supervision over such arrangements and the
Administrator;
d. Establishing procedures for making available to the
Parties to the Treaty data produced by verification ar-
rangements :
e. Considering reports of the Administrator on the
progress of disarmament measures and of their verifica-
tion, and on the installation and operation of the verifica-
tion arrangements ;
f. Recommending to the Conference approval of the
budget of the International Disarmament Organization ;
g. Requesting the International Court of Justice to give
advisory opinions on legal questions concerning the inter-
pretation or application of the Treaty, subject to a gen-
eral authorization of this power by the General Assembly
of the United Nations ;
h. Recommending to the Conference approval of certain
accessions to the Treaty ;
i. Considering matters of mutual interest pertaining to
the Treaty or to disarmament in general.
7. Functions of the Administrator
The Administrator would have the foUovying functions,
among others which might be agreed :
a. Administering the installation and operation of the
verification arrangements, and serving as Chief Executive
Otficer of the International Disarmament Organization ;
b. Making available to the Parties to the Treaty data
produced by the verification arrangements ;
c. Preparing the budget of the International Disarma-
ment Organization ;
d. Making reports to the Control Council on the progress
of disarmament measures and of their verification, and on
the installation and operation of the verification arrange-
ments.
8. Privileges and Immunities
The privileges and immunities which the Parties to the
Treaty would grant to the International Disarmament
Organization and its staff and to the representatives of
the Parties to the International Disarmament Organiza-
tion, and the legal capacity which the International Dis-
armament Organization should enjoy in the territory of
each of the Parties to the Treaty would be specified in
an annex to the Treaty.
9. Relations with the United Nations and Other Inter-
national Organizations
a. The International Disarmament Organization, being
established within the framework of the United Nations,
would conduct its activities in accordance with the pur-
poses and principles of the United Nations. It would
maintain close working arrangements with the United
Nations, and the Administrator of the International Dis-
armament Organization would consult with the Secretary
General of the United Nations on matters of mutual
interest.
b. The Control Council of the International Disar-
mament Organization would transmit to the United Na-
tions annual and other reports on the activities of the
International Disarmament Organization.
c. Principal organs of the United Nations could make
recommendations to the International Disarmament Or-
ganization, which would consider them and report to the
United Nations on action taken.
Note: The above outline does not cover all the possible
details or aspects of relationships between the
International Disarmament Organization and the
United Nations.
H. Measures To Strengthen Arrangements for Keeping the
Peaee
1. Obligations Concerning the Threat or Use of Force
The Parties to the Treaty would undertake obligations
to refrain, in their international relations, from the threat
or use of force of any type — including nuclear, conven-
tional, chemical or biological means of warfare — contrary
to the purposes and principles of the United Nations
Charter.
2. Rules of International Conduct
a. The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support a
study by a subsidiary body of the International Dis-
armament Organization of the codification and progi-es-
sive development of rules of international conduct related
to disarmament.
b. The Parties to the Treaty would refrain from in-
direct aggression and subversion. The subsidiary body
provided for in subparagraph a would also study methods
of assuring states against indirect aggression or subver-
sion.
3. Peaceful Settlement of Disputes
a. The Parties to the Treaty would utilize all appro-
priate processes for the peaceful settlement of all disputes
which might arise between them and any other state,
whether or not a Party to the Treaty, including negotia-
tion, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial
settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements,
submission to the Security Council or the General As-
May 7, J 962
753
sembly of the United Xations, or other peaceful means
of their choice.
b. The Parties to the Treaty would agree that disputes
concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaty
which were not settled by negotiation or by the Inter-
national Disarmament Organization would be subject to
referral by any party to the dispute to the International
Court of Justice, unless the parties concerned agreed on
another mode of settlement.
c. The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support a
study under the General Assembly of the United Nations
of measures which should be undertaken to make existing
arrangements for the peaceful settlement of international
disputes, whether legal or political in nature, more effec-
tive; and to institute new procedures and arrangements
where needed.
4. Maintenance of International Peace and Security
The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support
measures strengthening the structure, authority, and
operation of the United Nations so as to improve its
capability to maintain international peace and security.
5. United Nations Peace Force
The Parties to the Treaty would undertake to develop
arrangements during Stage I for the establishment in
Stage II of a United Nations Peace Force. To this end,
the Parties to the Treaty would agree on the following
measures within the United Nations :
a. Examination of the experience of the United Nations
leading to a further strengthening of United Nations
forces for keeping the peace ;
b. Examination of the feasibility of concluding promptly
the agreements envisaged in Article 43 of the United
Nations Charter ;
c. Conclusion of an agreement for the establishment
of a United Nations Peace Force in Stage II, including
definitions of its purpose, mission, composition and
strength, disposition, command and control, training, logis-
tical support, financing, equipment and armaments.
6. United Nations Peace Observation Corps
The Parties to the Treaty would agree to supixjrt the
establishment within the United Nations of a Peace Ob-
servation Corps, staffed with a standing cadre of observers
who could be despatched i)romptly to investigate any
situation which might constitute a threat to or a breach
of the peace. Elements of the Peace Observation Corps
could also be stationed as appropriate in selected areas
throughout the world.
I. Transition
1. Transition from Stage I to Stage II would take place
at the end of Stage I, upon a determination that the
following circumstances existed :
a. All undertakings to be carried out in Stage I had
been carried out ;
b. All preparations required for Stage II had been
made ; and
c. All militarily significant states had become Parties
to the Treaty.
2. During the last three months of Stage I, the Con-
trol Council would review the situation respecting these
circumstances with a view to determining whether these
circumstances existed at the end of Stage I.
3. If, at the end of Stage I, one or more permanent
members of the Control Council should declare that the
foregoing circumstances did not exist, the agreed period
of Stage I would, uix)n the request of such permanent
member or members, be extended by a period or periods
totalling no more than three months for the purpose of
bringing about the foregoing circumstances.
4. If, upon the expiration of such period or periods, one
or more of the permanent members of the Control Council
should declare that the foregoing circumstances still did
not exist, the question would be ijlaced before a special
session of the Security Council ; transition to Stage II
would take place upon a determination by the Security
Council that the foregoing circumstances did in fact exist.
Stage II
Stage II would begin upon the transition from Stage I
and would be completed within three years from that date.
During Stage II, the Parties to the Treaty would under-
take:
1. To continue all obligations undertaken during Stage
I;
2. To reduce further the armaments and armed forces
reduced during Stage I and to carry out additional
measures of disarmament in the manner outlined below ;
3. To ensure that the International Disarmament Organ-
ization would have the capacity to verify in the agreed
manner the obligations undertaken during Stage II ; and
4. To strengthen further the arrangements for keeping
the peace through the establishment of a United Nations
Peace Force and through the additional measures outlined
below.
A. Aimumcnts
1. Reduction of Armaments
a. Those Parties to the Treaty which had during Stage
I reduced their armaments in agreed categories by thirty
percent would during Stage II further reduce each type
of aruKunents in the categories listed in Section A, sub-
paragraph l.b of Stage I by fifty percent of the inventory
existing at the end of Stage I.
b. Those Parties to the Treaty which had not been
subject to measures for the reduction of armaments dur-
ing Stage I would submit to the International Disarma-
ment Organization an appropriate declaration respecting
the inventories iiy tyjies, within the categories listed in
Stage I, of their armaments existing at the beginning of
Stage II. Such Parties to the Treaty would during Stage
II reduce the inventory of each type of such armaments
by sixty-five percent in order that such Parties would
accomplish the same total i)ercentage of reduction by the
end of Stage II as would be accomplished by those
Parties to the Treaty which had reduced their annunients
by thirty percent in Stage I.
2. Additional Armaments Subject to Reduction
a. The Parties to the Treaty would submit to the Inter-
754
Department of State Bulletin
national Disarmament Organization a declaration respect-
ing tlieir inventories existing at the beginning of Stage
II of the additional types of armaments in the categories
listed in subjiaragraph b below, and would during Stage II
reduce the inventory of each type of such armaments by
fifty i)ercent.
b. All types of armaments within further agreed cate-
gories would be suliject to reduction in Stage II (the fol-
lowing list of categories is illustrative) :
(1) Armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of
up to 2,500 kilograms (declarations by types).
(2) Specified types of unarmed military aircraft (dec-
larations by types).
(3) Missiles and free rockets having a range of less
than lOkilometers (declarations by types).
(4) Mortars and rocket launchers having a caliber of
less than 100 mm. (declarations by types).
(5) Specified types of unarmored personnel carriers
and transport vehicles (declarations by types).
(6) Combatant ships with standard displacement of
400 tons or greater which had not been included among
the armaments listed in Stage I, and combatant ships
with standard displacement of less than 400 toiLs (declara-
tions by types).
(7) Specified types of non-combatant naval vessels
( declarations by types) .
(8) Specified types of small arms (declarations by
types).
c. Specified categories of ammunition for armaments
listed in Stage I, Section A, subparagraph l.b and in sub-
paragraph b above would be reduced to levels consistent
with the levels of armaments agreed for the end of Stage
II.
3. Method of Reduction
The foregoing measures would be carried out and would
be verified by the International Disarmament Organiza-
tion in a manner corresponding to that provided for in
Stage I, Section A, paragraph 2.
4. Limitation on Production of Armaments and on Related
Activities
a. The Parties to the Treaty would halt the production
of armaments in the specified categories except for pro-
duction, within agreed limits, of parts required for main-
tenance of the agreed retained armaments.
b. The production of ammunition in specified categories
would be reduced to agreed levels consistent with the
levels of armaments agreed for the end of Stage II.
c. The Parties to the Treaty would halt development
and testing of new types of armaments. The flight testing
of existing types of missiles would be limited to agreed
annual quotas.
d. In accordance with arrangements which would be set
forth in the annex on verification, the International Dis-
armament Organization would verify the foregoing meas-
ures at declared locations and would provide assurance
that activities subject to the foregoing measures were not
conducted at undeclared locations.
5. Additional Measures
a. In the light of their examination during Stage I of
the means of accomplishing the reduction and eventual
elimination of production and stockpiles of chemical and
biological weapons of mass destruction, the Parties to the
Treaty would undertake the following measures respect-
ing such weapons :
(1) The cessation of all production and field testing of
chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction.
(2) The reduction, by agreed categories, of stockpiles
of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction
to levels fifty percent below those existing at the beginning
of Stage II.
(3) The dismantling or conversion to peaceful uses of
all facilities engaged in the production or field testing of
chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction.
b. The foregoing measures would be carried out in an
agreed sequence and through arrangements which would
be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.
c. In accordance with arrangements which would be
set forth in the annex on verification the International
Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing
measures and would provide assurance that retained
levels of chemical and biological weapons did not exceed
agreed levels and that activities subject to the foregoing
limitations were not conducted at undeclared locations.
B. Armed Forces
1. Reduction of Armed Forces
a. Those Parties to the Treaty which had been subject
to measures providing for reduction of force levels during
Stage I would further reduce their force levels on the
following basis :
(1) Force levels of the United States of America and
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would he reduced
to levels fifty percent below the levels agreed for the end
of Stage I.
(2) Force levels of other Parties to the Treaty which
had been subject to measures providing for the reduction
of force levels during Stage I would be further reduced,
on the basis of an agreed percentage, below the levels
agreed for the end of Stage I to levels which would not
in any case exceed the agreed level for the United States
of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at
the end of Stage II.
b. Those Parties to the Treaty which had not been
subject to measures providing for the reduction of armed
forces during Stage I would reduce their force levels to
agreed levels consistent with those to be reached by other
Parties which had reduced their force levels during Stage
I as well as Stage II. In no case would such agreed
levels exceed the agreed level for the United States of
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at
the end of Stage II.
c. Agreed levels of armed forces would include all
personnel in the categories set forth in Section B, para-
graph 2 of Stage I.
2. Method of Reduction
The further reduction of force levels would be carried
out and would be verified by the International Disarma-
ment Organization in a manner corresponding to that
May 7, J 962
755
provided for in Section B, paragraph 3 of Stage I.
3. Additional Measures
Agreed limitations consistent with retained force levels
would be placed on compulsory military training, and on
refresher training for reserve forces of the Parties to the
Treaty.
C. NiicJcar Weapons
1. Reduction of Nuclear Weapons
In the light of their examination during Stage I of the
means of accomplishing the reduction and eventual elimi-
nation of nuclear weapons stockpiles, the Parties to the
Treaty would undertake to reduce in the following man-
ner remaining nuclear weapons and fissionable materials
for use in nuclear weapons :
a. The Parties to the Treaty would submit to the Inter-
national Disarmament Organization a declaration stating
the amounts, types and nature of utilization of all their
fissionable materials.
b. The Parties to the Treaty would reduce the amounts
and types of fissionable materials declared for use in
nuclear weapons to minimum levels on the basis of agreed
percentages. The foregoing reduction would be accom-
plished through the transfer of such materials to purjwses
other than use in nuclear weapons. The purposes for
which such materials would be use<l would be determined
l)y the state to which the materials belonged, provided
that .such materials were not used in nuclear weapons.
c. The Parties to the Treaty would destroy the non-
nuclear components and assemblies of nuclear weapons
from which fissionable materials had been removed to
effect the foregoing reduction of fissionable materials for
use in nuclear weapons.
d. Production or refabrication of nuclear weapons from
any remaining fissionable materials would be subject to
agreed limitations.
e. The foregoing measures would be canned out in an
agreed sequence and through arrangements which would
be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.
f. In accordance with arrangements that would be set
forth in the verification annex to the Treaty, the Inter-
national Disarmament Organization would verify the fore-
going measures at declared locations and would provide
assurance that activities subject to the foregoing limita-
tions were not conducted at undeclared locations.
2. Registration of Nuclear Weapons for Verification
Purposes
To facilitate verification during Stage III that no nu-
clear weapons remained at the dispo.sal of the Parties to
the Treaty, those Parties to the Treaty which possessed
nuclear weapons would, during the last six months of
Stage II, register and serialize their remaining nuclear
weapons and would register remaining fission.ible mate-
rials for use in such weapons. Such registration and
serialization would l)e carried out with the International
Disarmament Organization in accordance with procedures
which would be set forth in the annex on verification.
D. Military liases and Facilities
1. Reduction of Military Bases and Facilities
The Parties to the Treaty would dismantle or convert
to ijeaeeful uses agreed military bases and facilities,
wherever they might be located.
2. Method of Reduction
a. The list of military bases and facilities subject to the
foregoing measures and the sequence and arrangements
for dismantling or converting them to peaceful uses would
be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.
b. In accordance with arrangements which would be
set forth in the annex on verification, the International
Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing
measures.
E. Reduction of the Risk of War
In the light of the examination by the International
Commission on Reduction of the Risk of War during
Stage I the Parties to the Treaty would undertake such
additional arrangements as appeared desirable to promote
confidence and reduce the risk of war. The Parties to
the Treaty would also consider extending and improving
the measures undertaken in Stage I for this purpose.
The Commission would remain in existence to examine
extensions, improvements or additional measures which
might be undertaken during and after Stage II.
F. The International Disarmament Organization
The International Disarmament Organization would
be strengthened in the manner necessary to ensure its
capacity to verify the measures undertaken in Stage II
through an extension of the arrangements based upon the
principles set forth in Section G, paragraph 3 of Stage I.
G. Measures to Strengthen Arrangements for Keeping
the Peace
1 . Peaceful Settlement of Disputes
a. In light of the study of peaceful settlement of dis-
putes conducted during Stage I, the Parties to the Treaty
would agree to such additional steps and arrangements
as were necessary to assure the just and peaceful settle-
ment of international disputes, whether legal or political
in nature.
b. The Parties to the Treaty would undertake to accept
without reservation, pursuant to Article 36, paragraph 1
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the
compuLsory jurisdiction of that Court to decide interna-
tional legal disputes.
2. Rules of International Conduct
a. The Parties to the Treaty would continue their
support of the study by the subsidiary body of the Inter-
national Disarmament Organization initiated in Stage I
to study the codification and progressive development of
rules of international conduct related to disarmament.
The Parties to the Treaty would agree to the establish-
ment of procedures wlierehy rules rccommende<l by the
subsidiary body and approved by the Control Council
would be circulated to all Parties to the Treaty and
would become effective three months thereafter unless a
majority of the Parties to the Treaty signified their dis-
approval, and whereby the Parties to the Treaty would
be bound by rules which had become effwtive in this way
unless, within a period of one year from the effective date.
756
Department of State Bulletin
they formally notified the International Disarmament
Organization that they did not consider themselves so
bound. Using sueh procedures, the Parties to the Treaty
would adopt such rules of international conduct related to
disarmament as might be necessary to begin Stage III.
b. In the light of the study of indirect aggression and
subversion conducted in Stage I, the Parties to the Treaty
vcould agree to arrangements necessary to assure states
against indirect aggression and subversion.
3. United Nations Peace Force
The United Nations Peace Force to be established as
the result of the agreement reached during Stage I would
come into being within the first year of Stage II and
would be progressively strengthened during Stage II.
4. United Nations Peace Observation Cori>s
The Parties to the Treaty would conclude arrangements
for the expansion of the activities of the United Nations
Peace Observation Corps.
5. National Legislation
Those Parties to the Treaty which had not already
done so would, in accordance with their constitutional
processes, enact national legislation in supiwrt of the
Treaty imposing legal obligations on individuals and
organizations under their jurisdiction and providing ap-
propriate penalties for noncompliance.
H. Transition
1. Transition from Stage II to Stage III would take
place at the end of Stage II, upon a determination that
the following circumstances existed :
a. All undertakings to be carried out in Stage II had
been carried out;
b. All preparations required for Stage III had been
made ; and
c. AU states possessing armed forces and armaments
had become Parties to the Treaty.
2. During the last three months of Stage II, the Control
Council would review the situation respecting these
circumstances with a view to determining at the end of
Stage II whether they existed.
3. If, at the end of Stage II, one or more permanent
members of the Control Council should declare that the
foregoing circumstances did not exist, the agreed period
of Stage II would, upon the request of such permanent
member or members, be extended by a i)eriod or periods
totalling no more than three months for the purpose of
bringing about the foregoing circumstances.
4. If, upon the expiration of such period or periods, one
or more of the permanent members of the Control Council
should declare that the foregoing circumstances still did
not exist, the question would be placed before a special
session of the Security Council ; transition to Stage III
would take place upon a determination by the Security
Council that the foregoing circumstances did in fact exist.
Stage III
Stage III would begin upon the transition from Stage II
and would be completed within an agreed period of time
as promptly as possible.
During Stage III, the Parties to the Treaty would
undertake :
1. To continue all obligations undertaken during Stages
I and II ;
2. To complete the process of general and complete
disarmament in the manner outlined below ;
3. To ensure that the International Disarmament Or-
ganization would have the capacity to verify in the
agreed manner the obligations undertaken during Stage
III and of continuing verification subse<iuent to the com-
pletion of Stage III ; and
4. To strengthen further the arrangements for keeping
the peace during and following the achievement of general
and complete disarmament through the additional meas-
ures outlined below.
A. Armaments
1. Reduction of Armaments
Subject to agreed requirements for non-nuclear arma-
ments of agreed types for national forces required to
maintain internal order and protect the personal security
of citizens, the Parties to the Treaty would eliminate all
armaments remaining at their disposal at the end of
Stage II.
2. Method of Reduction
a. The foregoing measure would be carried out in an
agreed sequence and through arrangements that would
be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.
b. In accordance with arrangements that would be
set forth in the annex on verification, the International
Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing
measures and would provide assurance that retained
armaments were of the agreed types and did not exceed
agreed levels.
3. Limitations on Production of Armaments and on
Related Activities
a. Subject to agreed arrangements in support of na-
tional forces required to maintain internal order and
protect the personal security of citizens and subject to
agreed arrangements in support of the Unite<l Nations
Peace Force, the Parties to the Treaty would halt all
applied research, development, production, and testing
of armaments and would cause to be dismantled or con-
verted to peaceful uses all facilities for such purposes.
b. The foregoing measures would be carried out in an
agreed sequence and through arrangements which would
be .set forth in an annex to the Treaty.
c. In accordance with arrangements which would be
set forth in the annex on verification, the International
Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing
measures at declared locations and would provide assur-
ance that activities subject to the foregoing measures
were not conducted at undeclared locations.
B. Armed Forces
1. Reduction of Armed Forces
To the end that upon completion of Stage III they
would have at their disposal only those forces and or-
ganizational arrangements necessary for agreed forces
May 7, J 962
757
to maintain internal order and protect tlie personal se-
curity of citizens and that they would be capable of
providing agreed manpower for the United Nations
Peace Force, the Parties to the Treaty would complete
the reduction of their force levels, disband systems of
reserve forces, cause to be disbanded organizational ar-
rangements comprising and supporting their national
military establishment, and terminate the employment of
civilian personnel associated with the foregoing.
2. Method of Reduction
a. The foregoing measures would be carried out in an
agreed sequence through arrangements which would be
set forth in an annex to the Treaty.
b. In accordance with arrangements which would be
set forth in the annex on verification, the International
Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing
measures and would provide assurance that the only
forces and organizational arrangements retained or sub-
sequently established were those necessary for agreed
forces required to maintain internal order and to pro-
tect the personal security of citizens and those for pro-
viding agreed manpower for the United Nations Peace
Force.
3. Other Limitationa
The Parties to the Treaty would halt all military con-
scription and would undertalje to annul legislation con-
cerning national military establishments or military
service inconsistent with the foregoing measures.
C. Nuclear Weapons
1. Reduction of Nuclear Weapons
In light of the steps taken in Stages I and II to halt
the production of fissionable material for use in nuclear
weapons and to reduce nuclear weapons stockpiles, the
Parties to the Treaty would eliminate all nuclear weapons
remaining at their di.sposal, would cause to be dismantled
or converted to peaceful use all facilities for production
of such weapons, and would transfer all materials re-
maining at their disposal for use in such weapons to
purposes other than use in such weapons.
2. Method of Reduction
a. The foregoing measures would be carried out in an
agreed secjuence and through arrangements which would
be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.
b. In accordance with arrangements which would be
set forth in the annex on verification, the International
Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing
measures and would i)rovide assurance that no nuclear
weapons or materials for use in such weapons remained
at the di.sposal of the Parties to the Treaty and that no
such weapons or materials were i)roduced at imdeclared
facilities.
D. Military Bases and Facilities
1. Reduction of Military Bases and Facilities
The Parties to the Treaty would dismantle or convert
to peaceful uses the military bases and facilities remain-
ing at their disposal, wherever they might be located. In
758
an agreed sequence except for such agreed bases or facili-
ties within the territory of the Parties to the Treaty for
agreed forces required to maintain internal order and
protect the personal security of citizens.
2. Method of Reduction
a. The list of military bases and facilities subject to
the foregoing measure and the .sequence and arrange-
ments for dismantling or converting them to peaceful
uses during Stage III would be set forth in an annex to
the Treaty.
b. In accordance with arrangements which would be
set forth in the annex on verification, the International
Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing
measure at declared locations and provide assurance
that there were no undeclared military bases and facili-
ties.
E. Research and Development of Military Significance
1. Reporting Requirement
The Parties to the Treaty would undertake the fol-
lowing measures respecting research and development of
military significance subsequent to Stage III :
a. The Parties to the Treaty would report to the In-
ternational Disarmament Organization any basic scien-
tific discovery and any technological invention having
potential military significance.
b. The Control Council would establish such expert
study groups as might be required to examine the poten-
tial military significance of such discoveries and inven-
tions and, if necessary, to recommend appropriate
measures for their control. In the light of such exjiert
study, the Parties to the Treaty would, where necessary,
establish agreed arrangements providing for verification
by the International Disarmament Organization that such
discoveries and inventions were not utilized for military
purposes. Such arrangements would become an annex
to the Treaty.
c. The Parties to the Treaty would agree to appropriate
arrangements for protection of the ownership rights of all
discoveries and inventions reported to the International
Disarmament Organization in accordance with subpara-
graph a above.
2. International Cooperation
The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support full
international cooi)eration in all fields of scientific re-
search and development, and to engage in free exchange
of scientific and technical information and free inter-
change of views among scientific and technical personnel.
F. Reduction of the Risk of War
1. Improved Measures
In the light of the Stage II examination by the In-
ternational Commission on Ucduction of the Risk of War,
the Parties to the Treaty would undertake such exten-
sions and improvements of existing arrangements and
such additional arrangements as appeared desirable to
pnimotc confidence and reduce the risk of war. Tlie
Coiiniiissiou would rcniuin in existence to examine ex-
Department of Sfafe BuHetin
tensions, improvements or iidditional measures which
might be taken during and after Stage III.
2. Application of Measures to (Continuing Forces
The Parties to the Treaty would apply to national
forces required to maintain internal order and protect
the personal security of citizens those apiilicable meas-
ures concerning the reduction of the risk of war that had
been applied to national armed forces in Stages I and II.
G. The Internatioital Disarmament Organization
The International Disarmament Organization would be
strengthened in the manner necessary to ensure its ca-
pacity (1) to verify the measures undertaken in Stage
III through an extension of arrangements based upon
the i.rineiples set forth in Section G, paragraph 3 of
Stage I so that by the end of Stage III, when all dis-
armament measures had been completed, inspection
would have been extended to all parts of the territory of
Parties to the Treaty; and (2) to provide continuing
verification of disarmament after the completion of Stage
H. Measures to Strengthen Arrangements for Keeping
the Peace
1. Peaceful Change and Settlement of Disputes
The Parties to the Treaty would undertake such addi-
tional steps and arrangements as were necessary to pro-
vide a basis for peaceful change in a disarmed world and
to continue the just and peaceful settlement of all inter-
national disputes, whether legal or political in nature.
2. Rules of International Conduct
The Parties to the Treaty would continue the codifica-
tion and progressive development of rules of international
conduct related to disarmament in the manner provided
in Stage II and by any other agreed procedure.
3. United Nations Peace Force
The Parties to the Treaty would progressively
strengthen the United Nations Peace Force established
In Stage II until it had sufficient armed forces and arma-
ments so that no state could challenge it.
I. Completion of Stage III
1. At the end of the time period agreed for Stage III,
the Control Council would review the situation with a
view to determining whether all imdertakings to be
carried out in Stage III had been carried out.
2. In the event that one or more of the permanent
members of the Control Council should declare that such
undertakings had not been carried out, the agreed period
of Stage III would, upon the request of such permanent
member or members, be extended for a period or periods
totalling no more than three months for the purpose of
completing any uncompleted undertakings. If, upon the
expiration of such period or periods, one or more of the
permanent members of the Control Council should declare
that such undertakings still had not been carried out,
the question would be placed before a special session of
May 7, 7962
the Security Council, which would dotenuiue whether
Stage III had been completed.
3. After the completion of Stage III, the obligations un-
dertaken in Stages I, II and III would continue.
Genebal Provisions Applicable to All Stages
1. Subsequent Modifications or Amendments of the Treaty
The Parties to the Treaty would agree to specific pro-
cedures for con.sidering amendments or modifications of
the Treaty which were believed desirable by any Party
to the Treaty in the light of experience in the eariy period
of implementation of the Treaty. Such procedures would
include provi-sion for a conference on revision of the
Treaty after a specified period of time.
2. Interim Agreement
The Parties to the Treaty would undertake such specific
arrangements, including the establishment of a Prepara-
tory Commission, as were necessary between the signing
and entry into force of the Treaty to ensure the initiation
"f Stage I immediately upon the entry into force of the
Treat.v, and to provide an interim forum for the exchange
of views and information on topics relating to the Treaty
and to the achievement of a permanent state of general
and complete disarmament in a peaceful world.
3. Parties to the Treaty, Ratification, Accession, and Entry
into Force of the Treaty
a. The Treaty would be open to signature and ratifica-
tion, or accession, by all members of the United Nations
or Its specialized agencies.
b. Any other state which desired to become a Party to
the Treaty could accede to the Treaty with the approval
of the Conference on recommendation of the Control
Council.
0. The Treaty would come into force when it had been
ratified by state.s, including the United
States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
and an agreed number of the following states •
(1. In order to assure the achievement of the funda-
mental purpose of a permanent state of general and com-
plete disarmament in a peaceful worid, the Treaty would
specify that the accession of certain militarily significant
states would be essential for the continued effectiveness
of the Treaty or for the coming into force of particular
measures or stages.
e. The Parties to the Treaty would undertake to exert
every effort to Induce other states or authorities to accede
to the Treaty.
f. The Treaty would be subject to ratification or accept-
ance in accordance with constitutional processes.
g. A Depository Government would be agreed upon
which would have all of the duties normally Incumbent
upon a Depository. Alternatively, the United Nations
would be the Depository.
4. Finance
a. In order to meet the financial obligations of the
International Disarmament Organization, the Parties to
the Treaty would bear the International Disarmament
759
Organization's expenses as provided in the budget ap-
proved by the General Conference and in accordance with
a scale of apportionment approved by the General
Conference.
b. The General Conference would exercise borrowing
powers on behalf of the International Disarmament
Organization.
5. Authentic Texts
The text of the Treaty would consist of equally au-
thentic versions in English, French, Rassian, Chinese and
Spanish.
President Kennedy and Shah of Iran
Discuss Matters of Mutual Interest
His Majesty Molimnmad Reza Shah Pahlavi,
Shahanshah of Iran, accompanied hy the Emfress
Farah, made a state visit to the United States
April 10-18. Following is the text of a joint com-
onunique issued hy President Kennedy and His
Imperial Majesty on April 13 at the conclusion
of the Washington portion of his visit.
White House press release dated April 13
The President and His Imperial Majesty liave
had a cordial and useful exchange of views during
the past three days. The visit afforded an oppor-
tunity for the President and the Shah to become
acquainted personally and to discuss matters of
mutual interest to their countries.
Their talks included a review of political and
military situations in the world; a discussion of
the progress which Iran is making in economic
and social advancement; a review of defense ar-
rangements in which the two countries are as-
sociated; and aspects of United States economic
and military aid programs in Iran.
Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of
Defense Robert S. McNamara and Iranian
Foreign Minister Abbas Aram also participated
in the talks.
His Imperial Majesty described the form and
goals of the Third Iranian Economic Development
l^lan, which is scheduled to start later this year.
The President and His Imperial Majesty agreed
on the necessity for further acceleration of eco-
nomic development in Iran, and on the need for
continued external assistance to Iran to enable
that country to pursue the goals of its economic
development plans.
They discussed and were in complete agreement
on the subject of tlie nature of the threat to the
Middle East and to all free peoples. They re-
affirmed the provisions of the bilateral agreement
of 1959 ^ concerning the maintenance of the in-
dependence and territorial integrity of Iran, and
agreed on the necessity of collective security ar-
rangements to achieve this end. They also agreed
on the necessity of achieving a high level of in-
ternal economic development and social welfare
in order to continue the internal stability neces-
sary to resist external threats.
The friendly and extensive exchange of views
between the President and His Imperial Majesty
lias been consonant with the close relationship
between the two countries and has strengtliened
the bonds of friendship between them in their
quest for common objectives of peace and well-
being.
In taking leave of the President, His Imperial
Majesty expressed his thanks for the friendly re-
ception accorded him in the United States. Both
the President and His Imperial Majesty were grat-
ified by their fruitful discussions and by the spirit
of cooperative understanding which marked those
discussions.
Assistant Secretary Cleveland
Visits Europe and Congo
Press release L'tV2 dated April 21
Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary for In-
ternational Organization Affairs, will leave the
United States on April 24 for a 10-day trip to
Europe and the Congo.
Mr. Cleveland will confer with U.S. and inter-
national organization officials on future budget
and program planning and the coordination of
national and internationally administered pro-
grams. The discussions will include financial and
administrative arrangements under which U.S.
contributions to the U.N. are employed in the
Congo and elsewhere.
The Bureau of International Organization
Affairs, which handles U.N. affairs in the Depart-
ment, is also responsible for the budgeting and
management of U.S. financial contributions to
international organizations.
'For background and text, see Bulletin of Mar. 23,
1959, p. 416.
760
Department of State Bulletin
Attorney General Explains U.S. Goals to People
of Japan, Indonesia, and Germany
Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy^ & visit to
Japan, Indonesia, and Europe in February was
reported widely in the United States and through-
out the world. The lively, spontaneous exchanges
between the Attorney Gerieral and those who
heard him and the statements of officials in high
position are well known.
The reportage, Tievertheless, did not convey
inuch of the substance of the speeches he had pre-
pared. These speeches were received with great
interest, even by his hecklers.
It should be remembered that in many cases,
particularly in Indonesia and Japan, young intel-
lectuals luere heanng for the first time a inember
of the United States Cabinet.
Excerpts from the Attorney GeiveraVa talks
follow.
UNIVERSITY OF GADJA MADA,
JOGJAKARTA, INDONESIA
February 15, 1962
Let me tell you something of modern-day
America and what we stand for.
Freedom possesses many meanings. It speaks
not merely in terms of political and religious
liberty but also in terms of economic and social
progress. Over the years the concept has been
an expanding one.
In the United States today freedom speaks out
for expanding industrialization, increases in pro-
ductivity, the better distribution of the rewards
of labor, a decent return on investment.
It speaks in terms of laws to prevent monopoly
by business, corruption by labor leaders, to prevent
stock and bond frauds in investments, to grant a
$1.25 an hour minimum wage for workers.
The last few decades in America have seen tlie
rise of unemployment comi>ensation, social secu-
rity, pension funds to aid the elderly, medical
assistance, and a variety of other benefits that
May 7, 1962
636919 — 62 3
make impossible the concept of an economic so-
ciety, such as we were threatened with in the last
century by the imcontrolled rise of industrialism,
in which the rich got richer and the poor got
poorer.
Our society then, still loyal today to its orig-
inal revolutionary concept of the importance of
the individual, sees its goals in the United States
in service to mankind in ways never imagined
years ago. It reaches out to protect us in our
old age; it provides our youth with an ever better
education; it bans child labor and starvation
wages; it protects our savings in the banks; and
more and more it reaches out to newer and greater
frontiers that will provide spiritually and eco-
nomically a richer life.
This is not the society condemned some one
hundred years ago as an era of brutal capitalism
based on laissez faire. This is not the society
whose evils Marx thought were beyond tlie cure
of democracy. It is not an economy that tolerates
long hours, low wages, child labor, and the bitter
hatred between capital and labor that was the
core of Marx's Manifesto — a Manifesto that even
the Communists now recognize as being economi-
cally inaccurate and historically unsound. Indeed,
this democratic society boasts of its abolition of
these evils and cries out against ideologies of gov-
ernment that demand the supisression of freedom
of worship, freedom of speech, and call for the
complete domination and subservience of the in-
dividual to the needs of the state as determined by
a select few.
NIHON UNIVERSITY, TOKYO, JAPAN
February 6, 1962
The overriding development of the second half
of the 20th centui-y is tlie awakening of peoples
in Asia and Africa and Latin America — peoples
stirring from centuries of stagnation, suppression,
761
and dependency. Now they are seeking through
national independence the kind of economic and
social development which both your country and
mine have experienced. These are young nations,
trying desperately in the quest for political and
social progress to make up for lost centuries. . . .
We have no intention of trying to remake the
world in our image, but we have no intention either
of permitting any other state to remake the world
in its image. . . . The institutions we have de-
vised to achieve our aims may be inappropriate
in another culture or another historic setting.
The creation of the necessary political and eco-
nomic machinery to achieve these aims must be
performed by tlie people themselves.
We do not condemn others for their dilferences
in economic and political structures. We under-
stand that newer nations have not had time, even
if they so wished, to build institutions relying pri-
marily on private enterprise as we have done.
Our privately owned railroads, our airlines, our
commmiications systems, our mdustries, were not
created overnight. These enterprises developed as
a result of private initiative at a time when life
was far simpler than it is now. We thus had time
to permit their slow growth and time to permit the
intertwining of many small units into the great
systems that the modern age requires, and, under
government regulation, time to permit the con-
tmuation of private control. In many of the
newer nations, government appears to be the only
mechanism capable of performing these feats
within a reasonable length of time. This we can
understand and appreciate. It neither offends us,
nor can we deem it hostile.
UNIVERSITY OF INDONESIA, DJAKARTA
February 14, 1962
It is from our own laiowledge of difliculties we
have faced, as well as from our dedication to the
ideal of independence, that we have sought to aid
new nations with technical and financial assistance
dunng their crucial early years. Our aim is that
they survive, develop, and re 
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