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Full text of "Department of State bulletin"

rE" 



JV9* 935 3. Ir30 



"3i 




> 1962 



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Participation of the United States Government 

in 

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES 

July 1, 1959-June 30, 1960 



This volume is designed to serve as a reference guide to the 
official participation of the U.S. Government in multilateral inter- 
national conferences and meetings of international organizations 
during the period July 1, 1959-June 30, 1960. The United States 
participated officially in 352 international conferences and 
meetings during the 12-month period covered. 

In addition to a complete list, the volume presents detailed data 
on many of the conferences, including the composition of the 
U.S. delegation, principal officers, participation by other countries 
and organizations, and brief statements of the actions taken. 



Publication 7043 



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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 



XkTO^ic. 



E 
FICIAL 

:ekly record 



Reca 

^^^ 5 1962 
B' P. L. 




AprU 2, 1962 



U.S. OUTLINES INITIAL PROPOSALS OF PROGRAM 
FOR GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMA- 
MENT • Statement by Secretary Rusk 531 

FOREIGN ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE 
PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 1963 • Message 

of the President to the Congress 550 

FULFILLING THE PLEDGES OF THE ALLIANCE FOR 

PROGRESS • Remarks by President Kennedy .... 539 

THE CHALLENGE OF AFRICA TO THE YOUTH OF 

AMERICA • by Assistant Secretary Williams 544 

U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY REJECTS CUBAN 
CHARGES AGAINST UNITED STATES • State- 

ments by Adlai E. Stevenson and Francis T. P. Plimpton . . 553 



IITED STATES 
REIGN POLICY 



For index see inside back cover 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 




Vol. XLVI, No. 1188 • Publication 7358 
April 2, 1962 



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0» State Bi'LLETIN as the si«iree will bo 
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Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Public Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public 
and interested agencies of the 
Government tvith information on 
developments in the field of foreign 
relations and on the work of the 
Department of State and the Foreign 
Service. The BULLETIN includes se- 
lected press releases on foreign policy, 
issued by the tFhite House and t/if 
Department, and statements and ad- 
dresses made by the President and by 
the Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Department, as well as 
special articles on various phases of 
interruitional affairs and the func- 
tions of the Department. Informa- 
tion is included concerning treaties 
and international agreements to 
which the United States is or may 
become a party and treaties of gen- 
eral international interest. 

Publications of tlie Department, 
United Nations documents, and legis- 
lative material in the field of inter- 
national relations are listed currently. 



U.S. Outlines Initial Proposals of Program 
for General and Complete Disarmament 



STATEMENT BY SECRETARY RUSK i 

I am happy to have the opportunity to meet in 
this hall with the foreign ministers and principal 
delegates of the coimtries participating in tliis 
conference. I bring you greetmgs from the Presi- 
dent of the United States and the most sincere 
good wishes of the American people for the suc- 
cess of our work. I should like to open my re- 
marks by reading a letter ^ which the President 
has sent to me : 

As you and your colleagues from every quarter of the 
globe enter upon the work of the Geneva Disarmament 
Conference, it may seem unnecessary to state again that 
the hopes and indeed the very prospects of mankind are 
involved in the undertaking in which you are engaged. 
And yet the fact that the immediate and practical sig- 
nificance of the task that has brought you together has 
come to be so fully realized by the peoples of the world 
is one of the crucial developments of our time. For men 
now know that amassing of destructive power does not 
beget security ; they know that polemics do not bring 
peace. Men's minds, men's hearts, and men's spiritual 
aspirations alike demand no less than a reversal of the 
course of recent history — a replacement of ever-growing 
stockpiles of destruction by ever-growing opportunities 
for human achievement. It is your task as representative 
of the United States to join with your colleagues in a 
supreme effort toward that end. 

This task, the foremost item on the agenda of humanity, 
is not a quick or easy one. It must be aijproached both 
boldly and responsibly. It is a task whose magnitude and 
urgency justifies our bringing to bear upon it the highest 
resources of creative statesmanship the international com- 
munity has to offer, for It is the future of the community 
of mankind that is involved. We must pledge ourselves 
at the outset to an unceasing effort to continue until the 
job is done. We must not be discouraged by initial dis- 
agreements nor weakened in our resolve by the tensions 
that surround us and add difficulties to our task. For 



' Made at the second plenary meeting of the confer- 
ence of the IS-nation Disarmament Committee at Geneva 
on Mar. 15 (press release 172 (revised) dated Mar. 17). 

' Also released as a White House press release dated 
Mar. 14. 



verifiable disarmament arrangements are not a fair 
weather phenomenon. A sea wall is not needed when the 
seas are calm. Sound disarmament agreements, deeply 
rooted in mankind's mutual interest in survival, must 
serve as a bulwark against the tidal waves of war and 
its destructiveness. Let no one, then, say that we can- 
not arrive at such agreements in troubled times, for it 
is then their need is greatest. 

My earnest hope is that no effort will be spared to de- 
fine areas of agreement on all of the three important 
levels to which Prime Minister Macmillan and' I referred 
in our joint letter of February 7 to Premier Khrushchev.^ 
Building upon the principles already agreed, I hope that 
you will quickly be able to report agreement on an out- 
line defining the overall shape of a program for general 
and complete disarmament in a peaceful world. I have 
submitted such an outline on behalf of the U.S. to the 
U.N. General Assembly last September.' But an outline 
is not enough. Ton should seek as well, as areas of agree- 
ment emerge, a definition in siiccific terms of measures 
set forth in the outline. The objective should be to define 
in treaty terms the widest area of agreement that can 
be implemented at the earliest x>ossible time while still 
continuing your maximum efforts to achieve agreement 
on those other aspects which present more difficulty. As 
a third specific objective you should seek to isolate and 
identify initial measures of disarmament which could, 
if put into effect without delay, materially improve inter- 
national security and the prospects for further disarma- 
ment progress. In this category you should seek as a 
matter of highest priority agreement on a safeguarded 
nuclear test ban. At this juncture in history no single 
measure in the field of disarmament would be more pro- 
ductive of concrete benefit in the alleviation of tensions 
and the enhancement of prospects for greater progress. 

Please conve.v, on my behalf and on behalf of the people 
of the United States to the representatives of the nations 
assembled, our deep and abiding support of the delibera- 
tions on which you are about to embark. I pledge anew 
my personal and continuing interest in this work. 

All of US will agree, I am sure, that this confer- 
ence faces one of the most perplexing and urgent 
tasks on the agenda of man. In this endeavor we 
welcome our association with delegates from coim- 



' For text, see Bulletin of Mar. 5, 1962, p. 355. 
* For text, see ibid., Oct. 16, 1961, p. 650. 



April 2, J 962 



531 



tries which have not previously been intimately 
involved with earlier negotiations on disarma- 
ment. The dreary history of such negotiations 
shows that we need their help and fresh points of 
view. The presence of these delegations reminds 
us, too, that arms races are not the exclusive con- 
cern of the great powers. Countries situated in 
every region of the world are confronted with 
their own conflicts and tensions, and some are en- 
gaged in amis competition. 

Disarmament a Worldwide Responsibility 

We are not here dealing solely with a single 
struggle in which a few large states are engaged, 
with the rest of the world as spectators. Every 
state has a contribution to make in establishing 
the conditions for general disarmament in its own 
way. Every state has a responsibility to strive 
for a reduction of tension, and of armaments, in 
its own neighborhood. 

This means that each of us will bear personal 
responsibility for what we do here. Every speech 
and every act must move us toward our common 
objective. At the same time, every one of us brings 
to the search for disarmament a separate fund of 
experience relevant to our problem. The United 
States, for example, has established a major new 
agency of government to mobilize its skills and 
resources to seek out and study every useful ap- 
proach to anns reduction. 

^Vliat is needed is immediate reduction and 
eventual elimination of all the national armaments 
and armed forces required for making war. \Vliat 
is required most urgently is to stop the nuclear 
arms race. All of us recognize that this moment 
is critical. We are here because we share the con- 
viction that the arms race is dangerous and that 
every tool of statecraft must be used to end it. As 
the President stated on March 2,° the United 
States is convinced that, "in the long run, the only 
real security in this age of nuclear peril rests not 
in armaments but in disarmament." 

Modern weapons have a quality new to history. 
A single thermonuclear weapon today can carry 
(he explosive power of all the weapons of the last 
war. In the last war they M-ere delivered at 300 
miles per hour; today they travel at almost 300 
miles per minute. Economic cost slryrockets 
through sophistication of design and b}^ acceler- 
ating rates of obsolescence. 

' Ihid., Mar. 19, 1962, p. 443. 
532 



Our objective, therefore, is clear enough. We 
must eliminate the instruments of destruction. 
We must prevent the outbreak of war by accident 
or by design. We must create the conditions for 
a secui-e and peaceful world. In so doing we can 
turn the momentum of science exclusively to peace- 
ful purposes and we can lift the burden of the 
arms race and thus increase our capacity to raise 
living standards everj-where. 

A group of experts meeting at the United Na- 
tions has just issued an impressive report * on the 
economic and social consequences of disarmament 
which should stimulate us in our work. The ex- 
perts, drawn from covmtries with the most divei-se 
jDolitical systems, were unanimously of the opinion 
that the problems of transition connected with dis- 
armament could be solved to the benefit of all 
countries and that disarmament would lead to the 
improvement of world economic and social condi- 
tions. They characterized the achievement of gen- 
eral and complete disannament as an luiqualified 
blessing to all mankind. 

This is the spirit in which we in the United 
States would deal with the economic readjustments 
required if we should achieve broad and deep cuts 
in the level of armaments. The United States is 
a nation with vast unfinished business. Disarma- 
ment would permit lis to get on with the job of 
building a better America and, through expanded 
economic development activities, of building a bet- 
ter world. The great promise of man's capacity 
should not be frustrated by his inability to deal 
with war and implements of war. Man is an in- 
ventive being; surely we can turn our hands and 
minds at long last to the task of the political in- 
vention we need to repeal the law of the jungle. 

Laying Basis for Disarmament 

IIow can we move toward such disarmament? 

The American people bear arms through neces- 
sity, not. by choice. Emerging from World War 
II in a imiquely powerful militai-y position, the 
United Stat as demobilized its armed strength and 
made pei-sistent efforts to place under international 
control the use of atomic energ\', then an Ameri- 
can monopoly. The fact that the story of the post- 
war period has forced increased defense efforts 
upon us is a most grievous disappointment. Tins 
disappointment teaches us that reduction of ten- 
sions must go hand in hand with real pi-ogress in 



" U.N. doc. E/3.")93 and Corr. 1. 



Department of Slate Bulletin 



(lisaiinament. We must, I belie\e, simultaneously 
work at both. 

On the one hand, it is idle to expect that we can 
move very far down the road toward disarmament 
if those who claim to want it do not seek, as well, 
to relax tensions and create conditions of trust. 
Confidence cannot be built on a footing of threats, 
polemics, and disturbed relations. On the other 
hand, by reducing and finally eliminating means 
of military intimidation we might render our 
political crises less acutely dangerous and provide 
greater scope for tlieir settlement by peaceful 
me<ans. 

I would be less than candid if I did not point out 
the harmful effect which deliberately stimulated 
crises can have on our work here. In the joint 
statement of agreed principles for disannament 
negotiations published on September 20, 1961,^ the 
United States and the Sonnet Union affirmed that, 
"to facilitate the attainment of general and com- 
plete disarmament in a peaceful world it is im- 
portant that all States abide by existing interna- 
tional agreements, refrain from any actions wliich 
might aggravate international tensions, and that 
they seek settlement of all disputes by peaceful 
means." Yet we are confronted by crises which 
inevitably cast, their shadows into this meeting 
room. 

The same can be said for the failure of our ef- 
forts, so hopefully begmi, to conclude an effective 
agreement for ending nuclear weapon tests. There 
is an obvious lesson to be drawn from these con- 
siderations. The lesson is that general and com- 
plete disarmament must be accompanied by the 
establishment of reliable procedures for the peace- 
ful settlement of disputes and effective arrange- 
ments for the maintenance of peace in accordance 
with the principles of the United Nations Charter. 
For the rule and spirit of law must prevail if the 
world is to be disarmed. 

As we make progress in this conference, we shall 
have to lay increasing stress on this point. A dis- 
armed world must be a law-abiding world in which 
a United Nations peace force can cope with inter- 
national breaches of the peace. In the words of the 
joint statement : "Progress in disarmament should 
be accompanied bj' measures to strengthen institu- 
tions for maintaining peace and the settlement of 
international disputes by peaceful means." 

Fortunately thei-e is one sign which can give us 



For text, see Bulletin of Oct. 9, 1961, p. 589. 



hope that this conference will in good time lay 
the foundation stones for a world witiiout war. 
For the first time a disannament conference is 
beginning its activities within an agreed frame- 
work — the joint statement of agi-eed principles — 
which all our governments have welcomed along 
with every other member of the United Nations. 
The United States considers the joint statement us 
its point of departure. Our objective is to build 
on that foundation and to give practical applica- 
tion to the principles. 

The United States program for general and 
complete disarmament in a peaceful world, intro- 
duced in the United Nations on September 25, 
1961, was presented to give life to the agi-eed prin- 
ciples. It is comprehensive in its scope and in its 
description of the subjects suitable for action in 
the first and subsequent stages of the disarmament 
process. It is framed so as to avoid impairment 
of the security of any state. It aims at balanced 
and verified disarmament in successive stages. It 
is not immutable, liowever. It is designed to serve 
as a basis for negotiation. 

This conference also has before it another plan, 
presented by the Soviet Union. A comparison of 
the two plans will show some areas of agreement. 
We believe it is the task of the conference to search 
for broader areas of accord leading to specific 
steps which all can take with confidence. 

At this meeting the United States wishes to put 
forward some suggestions and proposals regarding 
the course of our futui-e activity, first as to ob- 
jective and procedure, then as to a program of 
work for the conference. 

We believe that the ultimate objective should be 
the working out in detail of a treaty or treaties 
putting into effect an agreed program for general 
and complete disarmament in a j^eaceful world. 
To bring this about we propose that all of our 
delegations agree to continue our efforts at this 
conference without interruptions, other than those 
we all agree to be desirable or necessary for our 
task, until a total program for general and com- 
plete disarmament has been achieved. 

As for procedures we propose that we find means 
of achieving maximum informality and flexibility. 
We do not believe that the best way to make prog- 
ress is to concentrate our time and efforts in pro- 
tracted or sterile debate. Accordingly the United 
States will propose that, as soon as ample oppor- 
tunity has been allowed for opening statements, 
the schedule of plenary meetings be reduced so that 



April 2, 1962 



533 



issues and problems can be explored in informal 
meetings and in subcommittees more likely to pro- 
duce agreement. 

U.S. Proposals for Work of Conference 

Let me turn now to proposals regarding the 
work for the conference. 

The first proposal is that the conference work 
out and agree on an outline progi'am of general 
and complete disarmament which can be included 
in the report due to the United Nations Disarma- 
ment Commission by June 1. The United States 
believes that, to fulfill this first objective, the ini- 
tial aim of the conference should be to consolidate 
and expand the areas of agreement and to recon- 
cile the differences between the United States and 
Soviet disarmament plans. This should result in 
working out a single program of general and com- 
plete disarmament which all could support. This 
agreed program might well take the form of a joint 
declaration which could be presented to the United 
Nations by all the states represented here. Such 
a program could be a framework for the treaty 
or treaties which would put the agreed total pro- 
gram into effect. 

But of course our aims must be more ambitious 
than this. We should begin at once to fill in the 
outline of the total program. Wlierever possible 
we should seek specific commitments that could be 
put into effect without delay. This need not await 
agreement on the outline as a whole. Nor should 
it impede the development of an overall program. 
Wherever the common interest permits we can 
and should put into effect defined, specific steps 
as quickly as possible. 

As a first step toward filling in the details of 
such a program the United States makes the fol- 
lowing proposals : 

One: We propose that a cut of 30 percent in 
nuclear delivery vehicles and major conventional 
armaments be included in the first stage of the 
disarmament program. We propose that stra- 
tegic delivery vehicles be reduced not only in niun- 
bers but also in destructive capability. We esti- 
mate that, given faithful cooperation, this reduc- 
tion might be carried out in 3 years. Similar re- 
ductions can, we believe, bo achieved in each of the 
later stages. It is recognized, however, that, in 
the words of the agreed pi'inciples, "All measures 
of general and comi^lete disarmament should be 
balanced so that at no stage of the implementation 



of the treaty could any State or group of States 
gain militai-y advantage and that security is en- 
sured equally for all." But agreement on such a 
reduction and the measures to carry it out would 
be a significant step forward. It would reverse 
the upward spiral of the arms race, replacing in- 
creases with decreases, and men could begin to 
gain freedom from the fear of mass destruction 
from such weapons. 

Two : The United States has proposed that early 
in the first stage further production of any fission- 
able material for nuclear weapons use be stopped. 
We propose now that thereafter the United States 
and the U.S.S.R. each agree to transfer in the first 
stage 50,000 kilograms of weapons grade U-235 to 
nonweapons purposes. Such a move would cut at 
the heart of nuclear weapons production. The 
initial transfers should be followed by additional 
transfers in the subsequent stages of the disarma- 
ment program. Resources now devoted to military 
programs coidd then be employed for purposes of 
peace. 

Three : The United States proposes that the dis- 
armament program also include early action on 
specific worldwide measures which will reduce the 
risk of war by accident, miscalculation, failure of 
communications, or surprise attack. These are 
measures which can be worked out rapidly. They 
are bound to increase confidence. They will reduce 
the likelihood of war. 

We will be prepared to present concrete pro- 
posals for action in the following areas : 

A. Advance notification of military movements, 
such as major transfers of forces, exercises and 
maneuvers, flights of aircraft, as well as firing of 
missiles. 

B. Establishment of observation posts at major 
ports, railway centers, motor highways, river 
crossings, and airbases to report on concentrations 
and movements of military forces. 

C. Establislimont of aerial inspection areas and 
the use of mobile inspection teams to improve pro- 
tection against surprise attack. 

D. Establishment of an International Commis- 
sion on Pleasures To Eoduco the Risk of War, 
charged with the task of examining objectively 
the teclinical problems involved. 

Four : The United States proposes that the par- 
ticipants in this conference undertake an urgent 
search for mutually acceptable methods of guaran- 



534 



Department of Stale Bulletin 



teeing the fulfillment of obligations for arms re- 
duction. We shall look with sympathy on any 
approach which shows promise of leading to prog- 
ress without sacrificing safety. 

We must not be diverted from this search by 
shopworn efforts to equate verification with espio- 
nage. Such an abortive attempt misses the vital 
point in verification procedures. No government, 
large or small, could be expected to enter into dis- 
armament arrangements under which their peoples 
might become victims of the perfidy of others. 

In other affairs, accounting and auditing sys- 
tems are customarily installed so that the question 
of confidence need not arise. Confidence grows 
out of knowledge; suspicion and fear are rooted 
in ignorance. This has been true since the begin- 
ning of time. 

Let me make this point clear : The United States 
does not ask for inspection for inspection's sake. 
Inspection is for no purpose other than assurance 
that commitments are fulfilled. The United 
States will do what is necessary to assure others 
that it has fulfilled its commitments; we would 
find it difficult to understand why others camiot 
do the same. We will settle for any reasonable 
arrangement which gives assurances cominensu- 
rate with the risks. We do not ask a degree of 
inspection out of line with the amount and kind 
of disarmament actually undertaken. Our aim is 
prudent precaution, in the interest of the security 
of us all, and nothing else. 

We are prepared jointly to explore various 
means through which this could be done. It 
might be possible in certain instances to use sam- 
pling teclmiques in which verification could take 
place in some predetermined fashion, perhaps in 
specific geographic areas, thus subjecting any 
violator of a disarmament agreement to a restrain- 
ing risk of exposure, without maintaining con- 
stant sui'veillance everywhere. This is, I repeat, 
one example of ways in which recent progress in 
verification techniques can be adapted to the needs 
of participating states. We would hope that this 
conference would make a thorough study of every 
practicable method of effective verification. 

The four proposals I have just described are 
new and realistic examples of the specific measures 
which we contemplated in the first stage of the 
United States plan of September 25. We can 
recall that that plan had other specific proposals : 



That the Soviet Union and the United States 
reduce their force levels by many hundreds of 
thousands of men, to a total of 2,100,000 for each. 

That steps be taken to prevent states owning 
nuclear weapons from relinquishing control of 
such weapons to any nation not owning them. 

That weapons capable of producing mass de- 
struction should not be placed in orbit or stationed 
in outer space. 

Call for Early Action on Testing 

Finally, we call for early action on a matter 
that should yield priority to none — the cessation 
of nuclear weapons tests. Here we stand at a 
turning point. If a treaty cannot be signed, and 
signed quickly, to do away with nuclear weapon 
testing with appropriate arrangements for detec- 
tion and verification, there will be further tests 
and the spiral of competition will continue up- 
ward. But if we can reach such an agreement, 
this development can be stopped, and stopped for- 
ever. This is why the United States and the 
United Kingdom have invited the Soviet Union 
to resmne negotiations to ban all nuclear weapons 
tests under effective international controls. We 
shall press this matter here at Geneva and make 
every reasonable effort to conclude an agreement 
which can bring an end to testing. 

I had expected that a number of representatives 
might express here their regrets that the Soviet 
Union and the United States had resumed nuclear 
testing. But I had supposed that there was one 
delegation — that of the Soviet Union — which 
could not have found it possible to criticize the 
United States for doing so. The representative 
of the Soviet Union has spoken of the possible 
effect of United States weapons testing on this 
conference. The statement of agreed principles 
and this conference were born amid the echoing 
roars of more than 40 Soviet nuclear explosions. 
A 50-megaton bomb does not make the noise of 
a cooing dove. 

Despite the Soviet tests of last autumn, nuclear 
weapons testing can stoi^ — now and forever. 

The Soviet Union has spoken of its readiness to 
accept inspection of disarmament, though not of 
armament. We hope that it will agree that the 
total, permanent elimination of nuclear testing is 
disarmament and will accept effective interna- 
tional control within its own formula. 



April 2, 1962 



535 



Achieving Consensus on First Steps 

I have presented tlie United States proposals for 
early disarmament action in this conferenoe. We 
shall have further suggestions, and so, I am sure, 
will others. The conference will need to single out 
those points it regards as most susceptible of use- 
ful treatment, or most pressing in terms of the 
common danger, and to take them up at once. 

We believe that, as soon as agreement is reached 
on the specific measures to be included in the first 
stage, we can develop the specific steps for the sec- 
ond and third stages. In these stages further re- 
ductions of armaments will move hand in hand 
with the strengthening of international institu- 
tions for the maintenance of peace. 

Our plan of work must achieve what this con- 
ference is charged to do in the joint statement of 
agreed principles. Let us define the overall shape 
of the program. Let us develop in more detail the 
component parts which must bo fitted together 
within the program. Let us do as much as we can 
as fast as we can. 

Let us, then, apply ourselves to the task of this 
conference soberly, systematically, and realisti- 
cally. Let the need for disarmament provide the 
momentum for our work. Let us follow every 
promising path which might lead to progress. 
Let us with all deliberate speed reach a consensus 
on what can be done first and on what should be 
undertaken on a continuing basis. 

And let us not permit this conference, like its 
predecessors, to become frozen in deadlock at the 
start of its deliberations. Surely it need not do 
so. The obstacles to disarmament agreements — the 
forces tending to divide us ii\to rival aggregations 
of power — might at long last begin to yield to the 
overriding and shared interest in survival which 
alone can unite us for peace. 

PRINCIPAL ADVISERS TO U.S. DELEGATION 

The Department of State announced on March 
9 (press release 15G) that Secretary Rusk would 
leave Washington March 10 for the meeting of 
the 18-nation Disarmament Connnittee, whicli will 
convene at Geneva March 14. 

Principal advisers to the delegation are : ^ 

Cli.'Uies E. Bolilcn, Siiociul xVssislaut to the Secretary 
Aitlmr II. Dean, Ambassador 



William C. Foster, Director, Arms Control and Disarma- 
ment Agency 

Foy D. Kohler, Assistant Secretary of State for Euro- 
pean Affairs 

Robert Manning, Assistant Secretary of State-designate 
for Public Affairs 

Charles C. Stelle, United States Mission, Geneva 

Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador of the United States 
to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 



U.S. Presents Proposals to U.S.S.R. 
for Cooperation in Space Exploration 

Following is the t^xt of a letter from. President 
Kennedy to Nikita S. Khrushchev, Chairman of 
the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. 

White House press release dated March 17 

March 7, 1962 

Dear Mr. Chairman : On February twenty- 
second last I wrote you that I was instructing ap- 
propriate officers of this Government to prepare 
concrete proposals for immediate projects of com- 
mon action in the exploration of space.^ I now 
present such proposals to you. 

The exploration of space is a broad and varied 
activity and the possibilities for cooperation are 
many. In suggesting the possible first steps which 
are set out below, I do not intend to limit our 
mutual consideration of desirable cooperative ac- 
tivities. On the contrary, I will welcome your 
concrete suggestions along these or other lines. 

1. Perhaps we could render no greater service 
to mankind through our space programs than by 
the joint establishment of an early operational 
weather satellite system. Such a system would be 
designed to provide global weather data for 
prompt use by an^' nation. To initiate this service, 
I propose that the LTnited States and the Soviet 
Union each launch a satellite to photograph cloud 
cover and provide other agreed meteorological 
services for all nations. The two satellites would 
be placed in near-polar orbits in planes approxi- 
mately perpendicidarto each other, thus providing 
regular coverage of all areas. This immensely 
valuable data would then be disseminated tlirough 
normal international meteorological channels and 
would make a significant contribution to the re- 



' For a list of the other members of the U.S. delegation, 
see Department of State press release 15G dated JIar. S). 



' For an i-xchange of messages between President 
Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev, see Bulletin of Mar. 
12, 10t)2, p. 411. (President Kennedy's letter dated Feb. 
21 was delivered at Moscow on Feb. 22.) 



536 



Department of State Bulletin 



search and service jirograms now under study by 
the World Meteorolooical Organization in re- 
sponse to Eesohition 1721 (XVI) adopted by the 
United Nations General Assembly on December 
20, 19G1.= 

2. It would be of great interest to those re- 
sponsible for the conduct of our respective space 
programs if they could obtain operational track- 
ing services from each other's territories. Ac- 
cordingly, I propose that each of our countries 
establish and operate a radio tracking station to 
provide tracking services to the other, utilizing 
equipment which we would each provide to the 
other. Thus, the United States would provide the 
technical equipment for a tracking station to be 
established in the Soviet Union and to be operated 
by Soviet technicians. The United States would in 
turn establish and operate a radio tracking station 
utilizing Soviet equipment. Each country would 
train the other's technicians in the operation of 
its equipment, would utilize the station located on 
its territoi-y to provide tracking services to the 
other, and would afford such access as may be 
necessary to accommodate modifications and main- 
tenance of equipment from time to time. 

3. In the field of the earth sciences, the precise 
character of the earth's magnetic field is central 
to many scientific problems. I propose therefore 
that we cooperate in mapping the earth's magnetic 
field in space by utilizing two satellites, one in a 
near-earth orbit and the second in a more distant 
orbit. The United States would launch one of 
these satellites while the Soviet Union would 
launch the other. The data would be exchanged 
throughout the world scientific community, and 
opportunities for correlation of supporting data 
obtained on the ground would be arranged. 

i. In the field of experimental communications 
by satellite, the United States has already under- 
taken arrangements to test and demonstrate the 
feasibility of intercontinental transmissions. A 
nmuber of countries are constructing equipment 
suitable for participation in such testing. I would 
welcome the Soviet Union's joining in this co- 
operative etfort which will be a step toward meet- 
ing the objective, contained in United Nations 
General Assembly Resolution 1721 (XVI), that 
communications by means of satellites should be 
available to the nations of the world as soon as 
practicable on a global and non-discriminatory 



= For text, see ibid.. Jan. 29, 1962, p. 185. 
April 2, 1962 



basis. I note also that Secretary Rusk has 
broached the subject of cooperation in this field 
with Minister Gromyko and that Mr. Gromyko has 
expressed some interest. Our technical repre- 
sentatives might now discuss specific possibilities 
in this field. 

5. Given our common interest in manned space 
flights and in insuring man's ability to survive 
in space and return safely, I propose that we pool 
our efforts and exchange our knowledge in the 
field of space medicine, where future research can 
be pursued in cooperation with scientists from 
various countries. 

Beyond these specific projects we are prepared 
now to discuss broader cooperation in the still 
more challenging projects which must be under- 
taken in the exploration of outer s^Dace. The tasks 
are so challenging, the costs so great, and the risks 
to the brave men who engage in space exploration 
so grave, that we must in all good conscience try 
every possibility of sharing these tasks and costs 
and of minimizing these risks. Leaders of the 
United States space program have developed de- 
tailed plans for an orderly sequence of manned and 
unmanned flights for exploration of space and the 
planets. Out of discussion of these plans, and of 
your own, for undertaking the tasks of this dec- 
ade would undoubtedly emerge possibilities for 
substantive scientific and technical cooperation in 
manned and unmanned space investigations. 
Some possibilities are not yet precisely identifi- 
able, but should become clear as the space pi'o- 
grams of our two countries proceed. In the case 
of others it may be possible to start planning to- 
gether now. For example, we might cooperate in 
unmanned exploration of the lunar surface, or we 
might commence now the mutual definition of 
steps to be taken in sequence for an exhaustive sci- 
entific investigation of the planets Mars or Venus, 
including consideration of the possible utility of 
manned flight in such programs. When a proper 
sequence for experiments has been detennined, we 
might share responsibility for the necessary proj- 
ects. All data would be made freely available. 

I believe it is both appropriate and desirable 
that we take full cognizance of the scientific and 
other contributions which other states the world 
over might be able to make in such programs. As 
agreements are reached between us on any parts 
of these or similar programs, I propose that we 
report them to the United Nations Committee on 
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. The Commit- 



537 



tee offers a variety of additional opportunities for 
joint cooperative efforts within the framework of 
its mandate as set forth in General Assembly Res- 
olutions 1472 (XIV) and 1721 (XVI). 

I am designating technical representatives who 
will be prepared to meet and discuss with your 
representatives our ideas and yours in a spirit of 
l^ractical cooperation. In order to accomplish this 
at an early date, I suggest that the representatives 
of our two countries who will be coming to New 
York to take part in the United Nations Outer 
Space Committee meet privately to discuss the 
proposals set forth in this letter. 
Sincerelj', 

John ICennedt 

His Excellency 
NiKiTA S. Khrushchev, 

Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Moscow. 



U.S. and Chile Reach Agreement 
on Financing of Development Plan 

Press release 155 dated March 9 

Following is the text of a joint communique 
issued hy representatives of the Governments of 
the United States and Chile at Santiago on 
March 8. 

The representatives of the Government of Chile 
and of the Government of the United States have 
today concluded an intensive series of discussions 
of the economic relations between Chile and the 
United States. In these conversations both Gov- 
ernments reaffirmed their determination to cooper- 
ate in increasing the welfare of the people of the 
Americas under the Alliance for Progress. As 
a result of these discussions, agreements have 
been reached which both Governments believe will 
begin a new era in the economic and social devel- 
opment of Chile — an era in which (he people of 
Chile can look forward to increasing economic 
welfai'e within the framework of social justice 
and human freedom. 

Fron^ this date forward, the United States and 
Chile are joined together in a common effort of 
unparalleled magnitude and nobility of purpose 
to answer the basic aspirations of tlie Chilean peo- 



ple for a better life for themselves and their 
children. Through this program, the traditional 
freedom of the Chilean people will rest on an 
ever-widening base of economic progress and 
social justice. 

Discussions were held concerning the financing 
of Chile's long-term, ten-year plan of economic 
development — a plan designed to bring about an 
unprecedented increase in the welfare of the 
Chilean people during the decade of the sixties. 

The United States agreed to help provide the 
external resources needed for this plan along with 
other industrialized coimtries, international insti- 
tutions, and private investment. The United 
States commitment alone could amount to as 
much as $35 million over the first five years of 
the plan to finance projects in the public sector. 

The long-range development plan has been 
submitted by the Government of Chile to the OAS 
[Organization of American States] panel of ex- 
perts for study, and its future implementation 
will take place under their recommendations, and 
subject, of course, to the approval of the neces- 
sary funds by the governments of the participat- 
ing countries, including the Congress of the 
United States. 

The effort, of assistance by the United States 
durmg 1962 will be in the amount of up to $12 
million, of which $8 million will be made available 
for specific approval of projects designed to have 
an early effect in improving the welfare of the 
Chilean people. In addition, up to $4 million in 
basic and essential foodstuffs will be made avail- 
able, the specific amount to be determined by 
Chile's ability to absorb these foodstuffs and after 
consultation with other friendly governments. 

Both the United States and Chile reaffirmed 
their dedication to the principles of the Alliance 
for Progress as well as their determination to 
carry out the commitments which they made in the 
Charter of Punta del Este. 

The representatives of the United States ex- 
pressed, on behalf of their Government, the deep 
personal concern of President Kennedy for the 
welfare of the people of Chile and his continued 
intention to work with the countries of I^atin 
America until the last vestige of poverty and 
hunger and ignorance has been eliminated from 
this Ilemisphei'e. 



538 



Department of State Bulletin 



Fulfilling the Pledges of the Alliance for Progress 



Remarks l)y President Kennedy ^ 



One year ago today I proposed that the people 
of this hemisphere join in an Allanza -para el 
Progreso ^ — a continent- wide cooperative effort to 
satisfy the basic needs of the American people 
for homes, work, and land, for health and schools, 
for political liberty and the dignity of the spirit. 
Our mission, I said, was "to complete the revolu- 
tion of the Americas, to build a hemisphere wliere 
all men can hope for a suitable standard of living 
and all can live out their lives in dignity and in 
freedom." 

I then requested a meeting of the Inter- Ameri- 
can Economic and Social Council to consider the 
proposal. And 7 months ago, at Punta del Este, 
that Council met and adopted the charter ^ which 
established the Alianza fara el Progreso and de- 
clared that : 

We, the American Republics, hereby proclaim our deci- 
sion to unite in a common effort to bring our people ac- 
celerated economic progress and broader social justice 
within the frameworic of personal dignity and political 
liberty. 

Together the free nations of the hemispliere 
pledged their resources and their energies to the 
Alliance for Progress. Together they pledged to 
accelerate economic and social development and 
to make tlie basic reforms necessary to insure that 
all would participate in fruits of this develop- 
ment. Together they pledged to modernize tax 
structures and land tenure, to wipe out illiteracy 
and ignorance, to promote health and provide 
decent housing, to solve tlie problems of commod- 
ity stabilization, to maintain sound fiscal and 



' Made at a White House reception for Latin American 
diplomats on Mar. 13 (White House press release). 

" Bulletin of Apr. 3, 1961, p. 471. 

' For background and text of the charter, see ihiiU, Sept. 
11, 1961, p. 4.j9. 



monetary policies, to secure the contributions of 
private enterprise to development, and to speed 
the economic integration of Latin America. And 
together they established the basic institutional 
framework for this immense, decade-long effort. 

This historic charter marks a new step forward 
in the relations between the American Republics. 
It is a reaffirmation of the continued vitality of 
our inter-American system, a renewed proof of 
our capacity to meet the challenges and perils of 
our time, as our predecessors met the challenge 
of their day. 

In the late 18th and early 19th century we 
struggled to throw off the bonds of colonial rule, 
to achieve political independence, and to establish 
the principle that never again would the Old 
World be allowed to impose its will on the nations 
of the New. By the early 19th century these goals 
had been achieved. 

In the early 20th centuiy we worked to bring 
recognition of the fimdamental equality of the 
American nations and to strengthen tlio machinery 
of regional cooperation which could assure that 
continued equality within a framework of mutual 
respect. Under the leadership of Franklin Roose- 
velt and the good-neighbor policy that goal was 
achieved a generation ago. 

Today we seek to move beyond these accom- 
plishments of the past, to establish the principle 
that all the people of this hemisphere are entitled 
to a decent way of life, and to transform that prin- 
ciple into the reality of economic advance and 
social justice on which political equality is based. 

This is the most demanding goal of all. For we 
seek not merely the welfare and equality of na- 
tions but the welfare and equality of the people of 
these nations. In so doing we are fulfilling the 
ancient dreams of Wasliington and Jefferson, of 
Bolivar and Marti and San Martin. And I be- 



April 2, 1962 



539 



lieve that the first 7 montlis of the alliance have 
strengthened our confidence that this goal is 
witliin our grasp. 

Accomplishments of the First 7 Months 

Perhaps our most impressive accomplisliment 
has been the dramatic shift in thinking and atti- 
tudes which has occurred in our hemispliere in 
these 7 months. The Charter of Punta del Este 
posed the challenge of development in a manner 
that could not be ignored. It redefined tlie historic 
relationshii>s between the American nations in 
terms of the fundamental needs and hopes of the 
20th centui-y. It set forth the conditions and atti- 
tudes on wliich development depends. It initiated 
the process of education, without wliich develop- 
ment is impossible. It laid down a new principle 
of our relationship — the prmciple of collective re- 
sponsibility for the welfare of the people of the 
Americas. 

Already elections are being fought in terms of 
the Alliance for Progress. Already governments 
are pledging themselves to carry out the provisions 
of the Charter of Punta del Este. Already people 
throughout the hemisphere — m schools and in 
trade unions, in chambers of commerce and in 
military establishments, in government and on the 
farms — have accepted the goals of the charter as 
their own personal and political commitments. 
For tlie first time in the history of inter- American 
relations our energies are concentrated on the cen- 
tral task of democratic development. 

This dramatic change in thought is essential to 
the realization of our goals. For only by placing 
the task of development in the arena of daily 
thought and action can we hope to summon the 
unity of will and courage which that task de- 
mands. Tliis first accomplisliment is essential to 
all the othei-s. 

Our second achievement has been the establish- 
ment of the mstitutional framework within which 
our decade of development will take place. "\Ye 
honor here today the OAS [Organization of 
American States] panel of experts — a new ad- 
venture in inter-American cooperation — drawn 
from all pai-ts of the continent, charged with the 
high responsibility of evaluating long-range de- 
velopment plans, reviewing the progress of those 
plans, and helping to obtain tlie financing neces- 
sary to caiTy them out. This group has already 
begim its work. And here today I reaffirm my 



Government's commitment to look to this panel for 
advice and guidance in the conduct of our joint 
effort. 

In addition, the OAS, the Economic Commis- 
sion for Latin America, and the Inter-American 
Bank have offered planning assistance to Latin 
American nations. The OAS has begun a series 
of studies in critical development fields, and a new 
ECLA planning institute is being established to 
train the young men who will lead the future de- 
velopment of their countries. And we have com- 
pletely reorganized our own assistance program, 
with central responsibility now placed in the hands 
of a single coordinator. 

Thus, within 7 months, we have built the es- 
sential structure of institutions, thought, and pol- 
icy on which our long-term effort will rest. But we 
have not waited for this structure to be completed 
in order to begin our work. 

Last year I said that my counti-y would commit 
$1 billion to the first year of that alliance. That 
pledge has now been fulfilled. The Alliance for 
Progress has already meant better food for the 
children of Puno in Peru, new schools for the 
people of Colombia, new homes for campesinos in 
Venezuela. And in the year to come millions more 
will take new hope from the Alliance for Progress 
as it touches their daily life. 

In the vital field of commodity stabilization I 
pledged the efforts of my countrj- to end the fre- 
quent, violent price changes which damage the 
economies of many of the Latin American coun- 
tries. Immediately aft^'r that pledge was made, 
we began work on the task of formulating stabili- 
zation agreements. In December 1961 a new coffee 
agreement, drafted by a committee under United 
States chairmanship, was completed.^ Today that 
agreement is in pi'ocess of negotiation. I can think 
of no single measure which can make a greater 
contribution to the cause of development than ef- 
fective stabilization of the price of coffee. In ad- 
dition the Ignited States has participated in the 
drafting of a cocoa agreement, and we have hold 
discussion about the terms of possible accession to 
the tin agreement. 

'Wo have also been working with our European 
allies in a determined effort to insure that Latin 
American products will have equal access to the 
European Common Market. Much of the eco- 
nomic future of this hemisphere depends upon 



'For biiekKrouiul, see iliit!.. .Tnii. 12!), 1!>(!2, p. ITS. 



540 



Department of State Bulletin 



ready availability of the markets of tiie Atlantic 
community, and Me will continue tliese efforts to 
keep these markets open in the months to come. 

The countries of Latin America have also been 
working to fulfill the commitments of the Cliarter 
of Pimta del Este. The report of the Inter- 
American Bank contains an impressive list of 
measures being taken in each of the IS countries, 
measures ranging from the mobilization of do- 
mestic resources to new education and housing 
programs, measures within the context of the Act 
of Bogota and the Alliance for Progress charter. 

Nearly all the governments of the hemisphere 
have begun to organize national development pro- 
grams, and in some cases completed plans have 
been presented for review. Tax- and land-reform 
laws are on the books, and the national legislature 
of nearly every country is considering new meas- 
ures in these critical fields. New programs of de- 
velopment, of housing, and agriculture and power 
are already under way. 

Goals To Be Met in the Years Ahead 

These are all heartening accomplishments — the 
fruits of the first 7 months of work in a program 
which is designed to span a decade. But all who 
Icnow the magnitude and urgency of the problems 
realize that we have just begun, that we must act 
much more rapidly and on a much larger scale if 
we are to meet our development goals in the yeai^s 
to come. 

I pledge my own nation to such an intensified 
effort. Aiid I am confident that, having emerged 
from the shaping period of our alliance, all the 
nations of this hemisphere will also accelerate 
their work. 

For we all know that, no matter what contribu- 
tion tlie United States may make, the ultimate 
responsibility for success lies with the developing 
nation itself. For only you can mobilize the re- 
sources, make the reforms, set tlie goals, and pro- 
vide the energies which will transform our 
external assistance into an effective contribution to 
the progress of our continent. Only you can cre- 
ate the economic confidence whicli will encourage 
the free flow of capital, both domestic and for- 
eign — the capital which, under conditions of re- 
sponsible investment and together with public 
funds, will produce permanent economic advance. 
Only you can eliminate the evils of destructive 
inflation, chronic trade imbalances, and wide- 



spread unemployment. Witliout determined ef- 
forts on your part to establisli these conditions 
for reform and development, no amount of outside 
help can do the job. 

I know the difficulties of such a task. Our own 
history shows how fierce the resistance can be to 
changes whicli later generations regard as part of 
the framework of life. And the course of ra- 
tional social change is even more hazardous for 
those progi-essive governments who often face 
entrenched privilege of the right and subversive 
conspiracies on the left. 

For too long my country, the wealthiest nation 
on a poor continent, failed to carry out its full 
responsibilities to its sister Republics. We have 
now accepted that responsibility. In the same way 
those who possess wealth and power in poor na- 
tions must accept their own responsibilities. 
They must lead the fight for those basic reforms 
which alone can preserve the fabric of their own 
societies. Those who make peaceful revolution 
impossible will make violent revolution inevitable. 

These social reforms are at the heart of the Al- 
liance for Progress. They are the precondition 
to economic modernization. And they are the 
instrument by which we assure to the poor and 
hungry, to the worker and the campesino, his full 
participation in the benefits of our development 
and in the human dignity which is the purpose of 
free societies. At the same time we sympathize 
with the difficulties of remaking deeply rooted and 
traditional social stractures. We ask that sub- 
stantial and steady progress toward reform ac- 
company the effort to develop the economies of 
the American nations. 

"We Have No Doubt About the Outcome" 

A year ago I also expressed our special friend- 
ship to the people of Cuba and the Dominican Ee- 
public and the hope that they would soon rejoin 
the society of free men, uniting with us in our 
common effort. Today I am glad to welcome 
among us the representatives of a free Dominican 
Republic and to reaffirm the hope that, in the not 
too distant future, our society of free nations will 
once again be complete. 

For we must not forget tliat our Alliance for 
Progress is more than a doctrine of development — 
a blueprint for economic advance. Rather it is an 
expression of the noblest goals of our civilization. 
It says that want and despair need not be the lot 



April 2, 1962 



541 



of man. It says that no society is free until all 
its people have an equal opportunity to sliare the 
fruits of their own land and their own labor. 
And it says that material progress is meaningless 
without individual freedom and political liberty. 
It is a doctrine of the freedom of man in the most 
spacious sense of that freedom. 

Nearly a century ago Jose Hernandez, the Ar- 
gentine poet, wrote, 

America has a great destiny to achieve in the fate of 
mankind. . . . One day . . . the American Alliance will 
undoubtedly be achieved, and the American Alliance will 
bring world peace. . . . America must be the cradle of the 
great principles which are to bring a complete change in 
the political and social organization of other nations. 

We have made a good start on our journey ; but 
we still have far to go. The conquest of poverty 
is as difficult as the conquest of outer space. And 
we can expect moments of frustration and disap- 
pointment in the years to come. But we have no 
doubt about the outcome. For all history shows 
that the effort to win progress with freedom repre- 
sents the most determined and steadfast aspira- 
tion of man. 

We are joined together in this alliance as na- 
tions united by a common history and common 
values. And I look forward to the day when the 
people of Latin America will take their place be- 
side the United States and Western Europe as 
citizens of industrialized and growing and in- 
creasingly abundant societies. The United States, 
Europe, and Latin America — almost a billion 
people — a bulwark of freedom and the values of 
Western civilization, invulnerable to the forces of 
despotism, lighting the path to liberty for all the 
peoples of the world — this is our vision, and, with 
faith and courage, we will realize that vision in 
our own time. 



U.S., Mexico Agree To Use Scientists 
To Study Salinity Problem 

Folloioing is a statement released at Washing- 
ton on March 16. A similar statement was re- 
leased at Mexico., D.F.., on tlie same date. 

White House press release dated March 18 

The Presidents of the United States and Mexico 
are agreed that it is urgent to find a mutually 
satisfactory solution to the salinity problem.' 



To this end, the Presidents of both countries, 
through their respective Foreign Offices, have 
given instructions to their representatives in the 
International Boundary and Water Commission 
to recommend within 45 days the measures wliich 
should be taken. 

In order to carry out these instructions in the 
most effective way the Commissioners are to avail 
themselves of qualified water and soil scientists. 

The objective of the two Governments is, with- 
out prejudice to the legal rights of either country, 
to agree upon and actually put into operation 
remedial measures within the shortest possible 
period of time. 



Pan American Day 

and Pan American Week, 1962 

A PROCLAMATION' 

Whereas April 14, 1962, will be the seventy-second an- 
niversary of the establishment by the American Republics 
of our inter-American system, now known as the Organ- 
ization of American States ; and 

Whereas the people and the Government of the United 
States are allied with their good neighbors, the other free 
Republics of this Hemisphere, in their resolution to remain 
free and their obligation to defend the foundations of 
freedom ; and 

Whereas the free peoples of this Hemisphere have like- 
wise joined in an Alliance for Progress with the objective 
of homes, work and land, health and schools for all cit- 
izens, so that freedom may be assured an environment in 
which it can develop and stay strong ; and 

Whereas the United States of America throughout these 
seventy-two years has supported staunchly those ideals 
of cooperation for the common good and solidarity for the 
common safeguard, both basic to our inter-American sys- 
tem, through which, in the words of the late President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, the peoples of the Americas have 
developed a faith in freedom and its fulfillment arising 
"from a common hope and a common design given us by 
our fathers in differing form but with a simple aim : free- 
dom and security of the individual, which has become 
the foundation of our peace" : 

Now, THEREFORE, I, .ToHN F. KENNEDY, President of the 
United States of America, do hereby proclaim Saturday, 
April 14, 1962, as Pan American Day, and the period from 
April 8 through April 14, 1962, as Pan American Week ; 
and I call upon the Governors of the fifty States of the 
Union, the Governor of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 
and the Governors of all other areas under the United 
States flag to issue similar proclamations. 

I also urge all United States citizens and intereste<l 
organizations to participate in commemorating Pan 



' For background, see Bulletin of Jan. 22, 1962, p. 144. 



542 



' No. 3452 ; 27 Fed. Reg. 2027. 

Department of State Bulletin 




American Day and Pan American Weeli in view of the 
importance of inter-American friendship to our own na- 
tional welfare and that of the neighbor Republics, and 
in testimony to the circumstances of culture, geograi>hy, 
and history which have allied our destinies as defenders 
of liberty within law. 

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and 
caused the Seal of the United States of America to be 
affixed. 
Done at the City of Washington this 26th day of Feb- 
ruary in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred 
[seal] and sixty-two, and of the Independence of the 
United States of America the one hundred and 
eighty-sixth. 



By the President : 
Dean Rdsk, 
Secretary of State. 



Report on Foot and IVaouth Disease 
Transmitted to Argentina 

The Wliite House announced on March 4 that 
President Kennedy had on tliat day transmitted 
the report of his Scientific Mission on Foot and 
Mouth Disease to President Arturo Frondizi of 
the Kepublic of Argentina.^ 

Formation of the mission was first announced 
December 14, 1961.^ It came as the result of a re- 
quest to President Kennedy by President Frondizi 
during his visit to the United States in September 
1961.^ The group, headed by J. George Harrar, 
president, Rockefeller Foundation, visited the Re- 
public of Argentina during January of this year. 
Dr. Harrar made a preliminary report to Presi- 
dent Kennedy on February 1. 

In addition to Dr. Harrar, other members of 
this mission were : Samuel A. Goldblith, Depart- 
ment of Nutrition, Food Science and Teclinology, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Stewart 
H. Madin, professor of microbiology, University 
of California, Oakland; Willard O. Nelson, De- 
partment of Dairy Science, University of Illinois ; 
George Poppensiek, dean. Veterinary College, 
Cornell University; Richard E. Shope, Rocke- 
feller Institute, New York, N.Y. ; C. K. "VViesman, 
Food Research Division, Armour and Company, 



' For text of report, see White House press release 
dated Mar. 3. 
' Bulletin of Jan. 8, 1962, p. 67. 
" Ibid., Oct. 30, 1961, p. 719. 



Chicago, 111. ; and James B. Hartgering, Office of 
the Special Assistant for Science and Technology. 
The National Academy of Sciences conducted a 
series of meetings beginning March 5 to work out 
the technical details of a research program. 



President Ahmadou Ahidjo 
of Cameroon Visits U.S. 

President Ahmadou Ahidjo of the Federal Re- 
public of Cameroon visited the United States 
March 13-18} Following is the text of a joint 
comrrmnique issued at Washington.^ D.C., on 
March 1]^ at the close of discussions held hy Presi- 
dent Kennedy and President Ahidjo on March 13 
and H. 

White House press release dated March 14 

President Ahmadou Ahidjo, who is making a 
five-day visit to the United States as the guest of 
President Kennedy, will conclude a two-day stay 
in Washington tomorrow and continue his visit in 
New York. 

Although President Ahidjo has been in this 
coimtry before, this is his first voyage to America 
since his country became independent and since he 
became its first Qiief of State. The visit has given 
the two Presidents an opportunity to become per- 
sonally acquainted. They have held frank and 
cordial discussions covering a wide range of 
topics of mutual interest to their countries. Tliese 
included a number of world problems, in particu- 
lar the means of accelerating the decolonization of 
Africa, and also of other parts of the world, and 
the consolidation of the independence of young 
nations. President Kennedy congratulated Presi- 
dent Ahidjo for his successful efforts in the pro- 
gressive development of his coimtry, both in 
combating internal subversion and in achieving 
the reimification of the two parts of Cameroon. 

The two Presidents noted with satisfaction the 
efforts recently undertaken to create African 
imity. In tliis connection President AJiidjo ex- 
pressed his satisfaction over the role played by the 
United States in the framework of United Nations 
action in the Congo in order to hasten the re- 
establislunent of the peace and unity of that coun- 
try. The United Nations remains, in the view of 
both Presidents, the best means whereby nations 



' For an announcement of the visit, see Bulletin of 
Mar. 12, 1902, p. 418. 



April 2, 1962 



543 



can discuss issues openly, and the best instrument 
for finding solutions to problems that menace the 
peace of the world. 

In the field of cooperation the Presidents noted 
that in addition to a continuing program of eco- 
nomic aid and technical assistance to the Cameroon 
the United States is also preparing to make a loan 
to help finance the extension of the trans- 
Cameroonian railroad. 

The two Presidents agreed to take steps to en- 
courage commerce and investment between their 



two countries and noted that a United States 
Trade Mission is tentatively scheduled to visit 
Cameroon in Maj^ 1962. 

President Ahidjo and President Kennedy agreed 
that the exchange of views made possible by this 
visit have reaffinned that their two countries have 
many common goals and ideals. They expressed 
the conviction that the visit has served to 
strengthen and improve the friendly relations be- 
tween the United States and the Federal Republic 
of Cameroon. 



The Challenge of Africa to the Youth of America 



iy G. Mennen Williams 

Assistant Secretary for African Affairs ^ 



It is a genuine pleasure to join you at this im- 
portant seminar. The fact that this program was 
initiated and carried out by students is especially 
heartening and, to me, is another strong indication 
of the increasingly mature ideas of American 
youth. 

These ai"e good days to be young. In this coun- 
try we are governed by an administration com- 
l)Osed of 20th-century men — men youthful in age, 
in ideas, and in outlook but not lacking in wisdom 
or experience. President Kennedy emphatically 
made this point clear in his memorable inaugural 
address - when lie said : 

. . . the torch has been passed to a new generation of 
Americans — born in this century, tempered by war, dis- 
ciplined by a hnrd and bitter peace, proud of our ancient 
heritage — and unwilling to witness or permit the slow 
undoing of those human rights to which this Nation has 
always been connuittert, and to which we are committed 
today at home and around the world. 

In our colleges and universities there are con- 
stant reminders that youth is meeting its respon- 
sibilities on America's campuses more fully than 



'Address made licfore (ho "Africa Speaks" symposium 
at Franklin and ilarshall College, Lancaster, Pa., on .AI;ir. 
10 (press release K^H dated Mar. !)). 

-For text, see IUiu.etin of Feb. 0, 1!H)1, p. 175. 



at any time in the past. The intense concern of 
today's young men and women with national and 
international affairs has been noted with great 
interest and satisfaction in Washington. 

In Africa, as well, youth is a dominant factor. 
Although many parts of this ancient continent 
trace their civilizations into antiquity, modern 
Africa is basically young in statehood and in 
leadership. It is an old continent embarked on a 
new chapter in history. 

You who have this salutary interest in Africa 
are more fortunate than many of your ancestors 
in past centuries. Many generations of men and 
women have lived their lives through with no sense 
of history, with no awareness that the events of 
their times would have a profound effect on coimt- 
less generations to come. Today's J'outh, however, 
knows it is part of a mighty tide of history. Your 
generation knows its effort or lack of effort will 
largely determine the content of many pages in 
tomorrow's history books. 

This is especially true for you who demonst rate 
an interest in Africa. To you falls the splendid 
opportunity to join our African friends and their 
young states on a historj'making journey through 
the remainder of this century. This is an exciting 
challenge for American youth. 

Let me touch briefly on the scope of this chal- 



544 



Department of State Bulletin 



lengo and then discuss some of the opportunities 
you have for meeting this cliallenge wliile you are 
still students. 

Size of African Continent 

First, there is the question of size, of the vastness 
of the continent of Africa. It is difficult for many 
people to grasp the reality of Africa's hugeness. 
Into this continent — the world's second largest 
landmass — could be dropped the 50 United States, 
plus India, plus mainland China, plus all of 
Europe except the Soviet Union. To go from 
north to south or from east to west in Africa you 
would have to make a journey equivalent to a 
round trip from here to San Francisco. 

In this vast area live approximately 230 million 
people of diverse racial origin in 52 political enti- 
ties. They speak almost 1,000 languages or dia- 
lects, and their cultures range from stone-age to 
very modern. Of this total only 214 percent are 
of European stock. Africa's 29 independent coun- 
tries range widely in population — from 35 million 
in Nigeria to about I/2 million in Gabon. The 
continent's people are about 16 percent Christian, 
40 percent Moslem, and 44 percent pagan or 
animist. 

Vastly wealthy in mineral resources, Africa 
accounts for most of the world's production of 
mdustrial diamonds, three-fourths of its cobalt, 
half of its gold, one-fourth of its copper, and one- 
fifth of its uranium and manganese. The conti- 
nent has many other important minerals, and new 
discoveries of significant oil reserves in the Sa- 
hara promise additional wealth. It is rich in 
hydroelectric potential, with 40 percent of the 
world's total, but less than 1 percent is developed 
today. 

Agricultural exports also play a major role in 
Africa's economy. The continent accounts for 76 
percent of world trade in peanuts, 71 percent in 
cocoa, 67 percent in wine, and 60 percent in palm 
products and sisal. 

African diversity can be more readily under- 
stood if we view the continent as five major geo- 
graphical units. 

First there is the predominantly Arab-Berber 
North Africa, bounded by the Mediterranean and 
the Sahara's vast sea of sand. 

Then there is the Horn of Africa — the liigli 
Etliiopian plateau and the hot coastal lands of 
Eritrea and Somalia. 

April 2, 1962 

632904—62 3 



Third there is savanna Africa, the series of sand 
and grassland states running along the bottom of 
the Sahara, where indigenous kingdoms floui'ished 
in the Middle Ages. This broad belt includes such 
fabled cities as Timbuktu, which was an important 
university center in the 16th centui^y. 

Fourth there is rain-forest Africa, which 
stretches from just below Dakar in Senegal to a 
little below the mouth of the Congo. 

Finally there is mountain Africa. This is the 
chain of mountains, high plateaus, and fertile val- 
leys starting with the so-called Wliite Highlands 
in northern Kenya and running south through 
Tanganyika, the Rhodesias, the higlier parts of 
the Portuguese territories, and on to Capetown. 

African Aspirations 

One thing that unites all five of these regions 
is the list of desires shai-ed by all Africans. These 
aspirations are much the same as those of free 
men everywhere. 

First and foremost in most African minds is 
the desire to win and hold freedom and independ- 
ence from colonial rule. In recent years this goal 
has been achieved in a rapid and unprecedented 
fashion. In 1950 only 4 countries in Africa could 
be coimted as independent: Egypt in the north, 
Ethiopia in the east, Liberia in the west, and the 
Union of South Africa. In the ensuing 12 years, 
25 more countries have won their freedom, and 
others are on their way. 

The relatively peaceful emergence of so many 
new nations in so short a span of time is a remark- 
ably significant event for the world community — 
and it is eloquent testimony to man's desire to 
guide his own destiny in a free society. I think 
it is also important to note that this transition has 
been acliieved, with important exceptions, through 
intelligent cooperation between the new states and 
the former colonial powers that controlled them. 

A second African aspiration is to acliieve a better 
standard of living, a goal with wliich we are in 
complete accord. The annual income in tropical 
Africa is only $89 per person. Taking the conti- 
nent as a whole, this figure rises to only $132. To 
see this in proper perspective it should be pointed 
out that annual income in the Near East is $171 
and in Latin America it is $253, and both of tliese 
areas are among the lesser developed parts of the 
world. Compared with annual incomes of $790 
in Europe and $2,500 in the United States, Africa's 



545 



low level of income is set, in even sharper contrast. 

Quite naturally Africans want a better standard 
of living and intend to achieve one. To do this, 
however, they mu.st solve the problem of obtaining 
capital rapidly in large amounts. They must also 
face the problem of obtaining technical know-how, 
which in most African nations is in very shoit 
supply. And they must develop a climate that 
will stimulate private investment, a very necessary 
commodity if they are to raise their living 
standards. 

Another major desii'e of Africans is to improve 
education in this vast area where 90 percent of the 
people are illiterate. Last year I visited 35 coun- 
tries in Africa, both independent states and areas 
still associated with European powers. I talked 
with men and women of all ages and of all social 
levels, and I wtis deeply impressed with the burn- 
ing desire of the African people for education. 
Education is inextricably linked with all the chal- 
lenges of African development. 

Enlarged educational opportunities have been 
given a very high priority by African leadei-s. 
They realize, as do we, that if the rising expecta- 
tions of the people for a better life with more op- 
portunities for individual advancement are to be 
met, Africa must have infinitely more educational 
facilities — more primary, secondary, and voca- 
tional schools, more teachers colleger and technical 
institutes, more African univei'sities. 

Improved health is a fourth major aspiration in 
Africa. African leaders recognize that the inci- 
dence of disease and the degree of malnutrition 
constitute major roadblocks on Africa's road to 
progress. Better housing, improved sanitation, 
widespread instruction in personal hygiene, and 
l)otable water are important needs to improve 
liealth in Africa. 

There is deep concern on the part of African 
health oiiicials about disease and the need for ex- 
panded and improved health services. The size 
of the problem is far too large for their own 
limited facilities to handle, however. 

In addition to the four African aspirations al- 
ready mentioned, another — and indeed the most 
important of all — is the great desire of Africans 
for equal dignity with the rest of mankind. They 
have achieved sovereignty, and they insist right- 
fully on being treated as sovereign nations. They 
can ask for nothing less. Achievement of their 
other iispirations means little unless they are ac- 



corded the human dignity given to other free and 
independent peoples. 

This is an especially acute problem for us in the 
United States, where we have not yet achieved full 
racial equality. Our failures and our faults in 
this area often lead us into serious difficulties in 
our I'elations with Africans and their desire for 
dignity and equality. 

It is not enough for us to be concerned solely 
with the rights of foreign officials, however. We 
must be clear and vigorous in our belief that our 
own citizens are assured of treatment equal to that 
won for foreign visitors. The challenge, then, is 
to find lasting ways of erasing all barriers of race 
in America. 

U.S. Policy Toward Africa 

In tlie light of the aspirations of the people of 
Africa you might well ask what we are doing about 
(hem and how we support them. 

What is our policy toward Africa? Are we 
backing our words with deeds ? I think the record 
will show that we are. 

Our foreign policy is deeply imbedded in a 
series of historic beliefs that we hold dearly. Of 
these beliefs, self-detemiination is one of the most 
important. In fact the veiy basis of world order 
is a universal recognition of tlie rights of people 
to determine the kind of government under which 
they want to live. 

This country seeks to evaluate its policies to- 
ward Africa on the basis of these principles, judg- 
ing each individual case and problem on its merits. 
We have no pat formulas to apply in Africa, nor 
do we seek to impose any particular blueprint of 
our own. Instead we shall stand by our beliefs 
and try to use our influence wisely with those men 
of good will, of all races and creeds, in whose hands 
I lie future of Africa rests. 

This has been best expressed in President Ken- 
nedy's second state of the Union message,^ when 
he said: 

. . . our basic goal remains the same : a peaceful world 
coiiiniuiiily of free aud independent states, free to choose 
their own future aud their own sjstoni so Ions as it does 
not threaten the freedom of others. 

Some may choose forms and ways we would not choose 
for ourselves, but It is not for us that they are choosing. 
We can welcome diversity — the Communists cannot. For 
we offer a world of choice — tliey offer the world of coer- 
cion. And the way of the past shows dearly thai freedom, 
not coercion, is the wave of the future. 



" For text, see ibiil., Jan. 29, 19C2, p. 159. 



546 



Department of State Bulletin 



In ciirrying out our basic goals old programs 
liavo been strengtlipned and new progi'anis started. 
I think our deeds fully back up our words in this 
vital area. Let me list some of these deeds briefly. 

Our support of freedom for African nations has 
been clearly demonstrated by our program in the 
United Nations. 

The United States supports improved standards 
of living in Africa. In 1961 our aid totaled about 
$215 million. This is a start, but it is not enough 
when we consider that the French and British are 
still supplying nearly $700 million worth of aid to 
Africa. 

We favor increased private investment in 
Afi-ica. 

We encourage student exchange. Approxi- 
mately 3,000 Africans are studying in the United 
States this year, ranging from advanced graduate 
students through undergraduates who are just 
learning English. Again, however, our Western 
allies are showing us the way, largely because of 
their long and extensive association with African 
territories. There are some 12,000 Africans study- 
ing in the United Kingdom and another sizable 
group studying in France. 

Our new Agency for International Development 
is emphasizing long-term development loans, 
stressing economic instead of military aid, and 
developing individual plans to meet the individual 
needs of African nations. 

The newly expanded Food-for-Peace Pi'ogram 
includes lunches for children, wages for economic 
development, relief for disaster victims, and a bet- 
ter diet for millions. 

The newly conceived Peace Corps is supplying 
trained and dedicated men and women to help in 
the building of better societies and gives a glimpse 
of American idealism as well. Today 107 Peace 
Corps volunteers are at work in Nigeria, 51 in 
Ghana, 37 in Sierra Leone, and 35 in Tanganyika, 
adding up to a creditable total of 2'30 already 
trained and at work in the field. There is much 
more that will be done, however. The large 
volmne of requests from the African nations has 
created unlimited possibilities both in numbers of 
volunteei-s and types of Peace Corps activity. 
Community development, agricultural extension, 
English language instruction, vocational educa- 
tion, adult education, and primary and university 
education are but a few of the areas of concentra- 
tion for future planned programs. 



Problems Remaining in the Congo 

It is obvious that all our policies regarding 
Africa have not met and, in the nature of things, 
cannot always meet with speedy results, however. 
Here I have in mind, for example, our experience 
in the Congo. Although much remains to be done 
there, we believe that our policy of support for the 
U.N. Operation, parliamentary govormnent, and 
the territorial integrity of the country has none- 
theless led to substantial progress over the past 15 
months. We continue to support the peacekeeping 
and nationbuilding operation of the U.N. in the 
Congo. 

Just a year ago the Congo was badly split into 
pro-Western and pro-Communist camps. The 
Communist bloc and a few other countries had 
recognized the Stanleyville regime of Antoine Gi- 
zenga as the country's legal government, and Moise 
Tshombe had created further disunity with his 
secessionist movement in Katanga. 

This was a highly charged situation that could 
have been further aggravated if Katanga's at- 
tempt at secession had been supported by the West. 
Instead, the United Nations prevented the Com- 
munist bloc from supplying direct aid to Stanley- 
ville, discouraged conflict between warring par- 
ties, and brought about a peaceful solution to the 
crisis through a meeting of Parliament at Lovan- 
ium University. From this meeting, anti-Commu- 
nist Cyrille Adoula emerged as Prime Minister 
of a moderate coalition government. Despite the 
best efforts of the Leopoldville group, the United 
Nations, and the West, Mr. Tshombe's supporters 
failed to participate and thereby passed up an 
opportimity to strengthen the anti-Communist 
forces and join in assuring a stable, independent, 
and rmited Congo. Even without Mr. Tshombe's 
cooperation, however. Prime Minister Adoula has 
brought the rebellion of Mr. Gizenga to an end — 
and with it a major opportunity for Soviet pene- 
tration in central Africa. 

The issue today remains the reintegration of Ka- 
tanga into the central government. A little more 
than 2 months ago, at Kitona, Mr. Tshombe agreed 
to take such a step. We welcome the recent an- 
nouncement that Prime Minister Adoula and Mr. 
Tshombe will meet in Leopoldville next week. It 
is most important that at this meeting both Con- 
golese leaders pursue promptly the statesmanlike 
work begun at Kitona for the peaceful reintegra- 
tion of the Katanga. 



April 2, ?962 



547 



Peaceful solutions to problems remaining in the 
Congo are not easy and obviously camiot be ac- 
complished overnight. The road ahead will be 
a rough one and will require all the concerted ef- 
fort we can muster, but we are convinced that it 
can be traveled — in fact, must be traveled — suc- 
cessfully if we are to bring this tragic chapter in 
African history to a satisfactory end. 

These, then, are the forces at work in Africa 
and a brief summary of what the United States is 
trying to do to help Africans achieve their legiti- 
mate aspirations in peace and freedom. 

Opportunities for American Students 

Now, what can American youth do to help in 
this enormous task? In view of your enterprise 
in organizing this symposiiun, I suspect this par- 
ticular audience may have a good many ideas of 
its own on how to further this country's African 
policies. 

You can, however, inform yourselves on foreign 
policy issues and as good citizens help formulate 
and support apjiropriate programs. 

There are also a few thoughts I would like to 
suggest to you in the field of education, which is 
one of the principal building blocks of our foreign 
policy in Africa at the present time. 

Wliat, for example, should comprise the ele- 
ments of good human relations with African stu- 
dents attending our colleges and universities? 
Here we have a group of 3,000 students leaving 
their homes and friends and crossing a vast ocean 
to study among strangers. I think American stu- 
dents have a wonderful opportunity to further our 
foreign policy objectives by strengthening their 
bonds with the African students in their midst. 
Today's young Americans are in an excellent posi- 
tion to foster a wide range of improved human 
and intergroup relations among students and 
scholars from both continents. 

Within that framewoi-k American students 
might look into the question of hospitality in its 
broadest sense, something beyond routine coffee- 
and-doughnut entertainment. There is the whole 
area of helping African students adjust easily to 
American campuses — housing adjustments, ad- 
justments to campus social life, classroom adjust- 
ments, adjustments to our kind of examinations. 
This is a broad field with many opportunities for 
American students. 

There is also the area of financial support. 



What kinds of things can African students do to 
help themselves financially ? Some of them come 
to this country inadequately prepared to maintain 
themselves throughout college. They run into 
difficulties because they have nothing more to 
sustain them than a burning ambition to get an 
education in the United States and return to 
render services to their countries. 

Can students organize work opportunities for 
the more deserving African students who are the 
victims of a background of poverty ? Your organ- 
ized eiforts could help them find suitable siunmer 
employment or much-needed part-time work to 
carry them through the school year. There is also 
the question of tutorial assistance, which they 
might need urgently and yet be unable to afi^ord. 

Study and discussion groups would also be val- 
uable to both American and African students. A 
mutual exchange of ideas and information could 
lead both parties to rich and rewarding college ex- 
periences. It would be very valuable, too, to open 
such meetings to residents of campus communities 
and broaden the range of contacts. 

Another possibility would be for college groups 
to sponsor study tours in African countries. Such 
toure could be organized as sununer activities and 
could be conducted by African students who are 
knowledgeable in the life of their societies. This 
would be a formidable imdertaking for students 
to carry out alone, I realize. Perhaps canapus 
communities could be interested in "adopting" 
African cities of similar size and interests. I am 
sure the Department of State would be willing to 
discuss the working out of the many details in- 
volved in such a program. In this connection you 
might want to cooperate with the progi-ams spon- 
sored by the Experiment in International Living, 
which last summer and fall assisted in shipboard 
orientation and provided 1-month sojourns with 
American families for 221 African students. 

It is a vei-y worthwhile endeavor to bring Afri- 
can students into average American homes to show 
them American life as it is really lived. Too often 
they draw their image of the American family 
from motion pictures or television and sometimes 
fail to recognize the strong bonds of affection and 
respect that really characterize the American 
family. 

Tlie Operation Crossroads type of activity offers 
a splendid opportunity for American students to 
make a contribution to better international under- 
standing. Working with African students, Amer- 



548 



Department of State Bulletin 



icaus could select and ship significant study and 
reading materials to African countries to give 
them a better understanding of some of tlie great 
writings of Western civilization. 

Then there is Government work itself to con- 
sider between college years or when students fuiish 
tlieir formal education. The opportmiities to serve 
tiiis country in the Peace Corps are unique in our 
history, and the young men and women who go 
into this vital occupation can make important con- 
tributions to the future welfare of the United 
States. 

There are also summer opportunities in the Gov- 
ernment, where students can get a firsthand under- 
standing of many of the intricate problems we 
must deal with on a day-to-day basis. This would 
be invaluable training to take back to the campus 
in the fall, and it certainly would suggest new 
ways in which American students can support our 
national goals. 

These are only a few thoughts on how American 
students can participate in the exciting business of 
international relations on a student-to-student 
basis. But they are all activities suitable for 
young adults, and their successful accomplishment 
could have a vei"y favorable impact on our overall 
African policies. 

The young Africans with whom American stu- 
dents work and live today will be among the 
leadei-s of Africa tomorrow. Their impressions 
of America and the lasting friendships they make 
while they ai-e in this coimtry could be decisive 
factors in the success or failure of our foreign 
policy over the next several decades. Their i-ecep- 
tion here might even make the difference between 
war and peace in the years ahead. 

I am happy, therefore, to see the healthy interest 
in Africa here today. You have made an excellent 
beginning in building new bridges of friendship 
across the broad Atlantic. I hope you will con- 
tinue this fine work throughout your lives. 



Foreign Policy Briefings for Visitors 
to Wasliington Begin at Department 

Press release 161 dated March 12 

The Department of State is initiating on March 
12 regularly scheduled foreign policy briefings for 
visitors to Washington in response to interest ex- 



pressed by Membeis of Congress in behalf of their 
constituents. These briefings will be held each 
Monday, Wednesday, and Friday at 9 :30 a.m. in 
the East Auditorium of the Department. The 
briefings will include a discussion of the making of 
foreign policy, the organization and functions of 
the Department of State and Foreign Service, and 
current foreign policy developments. 



President Discusses Trade Matters 
With Australian Deputy Premier 



John McEicen, Australian Deputy Prime Min- 
ister and Minister for Trade, was in Washington 
March 9-11}. and talked with President Kennedy, 
Acting Secretary of State Ball, Secretary of the 
Treasury Douglas Dillon, and Under Secretary of 
Agriculture Charles S. Murphy. Following is the 
text of a joint statement released at the close of his 
meeting with the President on March llf.. 

White House press release dated March 14 

The President today conferred with the Aus- 
tralian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for 
Trade, the Right Honorable Jolin McEwen. 

Mr. McEwen, who was accompanied by the Aus- 
tralian Ambassador to the United States, Sir 
Howard Beale, reviewed with the President the 
importance to Australia of a number of current 
developments in the international trade and com- 
modity policy fields, including developments re- 
lating to the European Economic Community, and 
the considerable degree of common interest of the 
United States and Australia on these questions. 

The President and the Deputy Prime Minister 
agreed that an economically strong and develop- 
ing Australia is essential to the best interests of 
both coujitries in the Southwest. Pacific and ex- 
pressed mutual confidence in the continuing close 
identity of view which each countiy shares on 
matters of common concern. 

Mr. McEwen is on his way to Europe, where he 
will meet representatives of the British Govern- 
ment and a number of European Governments for 
discussions on the subject of Britain's proposed 
enti-y into the European Common Market. 



Apr// 2, 1962 



549 



THE CONGRESS 



Foreign Economic and Military Assistance Program 
for Fiscal Year 1963 



MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT TO THE CONGRESS < 



To the Congress of the United States : 

Last year this Nation dedicated itself to a 
"decade of development," designed to help the new 
and developing states of the world grow in politi- 
cal independence, economic welfare, and social 
justice. 

Last September, in support of this effort, the 
Congress enacted fundamental changes in our pro- 
gram of foreign assistance.^ 

Last November the executive branch drastically 
reorganized and restaffed this program in accord- 
ance with the congressional mandate.^ 

Today the "decade" is only 4 months old. It 
would surely be premature to make any claims of 
dramatic results. Our new aid program, ad- 
dressed to the specific needs of individual coun- 
tries for long-term development, presupposes basic 
changes, careful planning, and gradual achieve- 
ment. Yet these few months have shown signifi- 
cant movement in new directions. The turnaround 
has begim. 

Our new aid policy aims at strengthening the 
political and economic independence of developing 
countries — which means strengthening their ca- 
pacity both to master the inherent stress of rapid 
change and to repel Conmiunist efforts to exploit 
such stress from within or without. In the frame- 
work of this broad policy, economic, social, and 
military development take their proper place. In 
Washington our aid operations have been largely 
unified under the direction of the Administrator 
of the Agency for International Development. 
Recipient countries are improving their planning 
mechanisms, devising country development plans, 
and beginning extensive programs of self-lielp and 



self-reform. In addition to long-range programs 
developed with India, Nigeria, and others we have, 
under the new authority granted by the Congress, 
entered into a new type of long-term commitment 
with two nations — Pakistan and Tanganyika — 
after the most painstaking review of their jDroposed 
development plans, and others will follow. In 
addition to placing emphasis on the improvement 
of internal security forces, we are giving increased 
attention to the contribution wliich local militaiy 
forces can make through civic action programs to 
economic and social development. 

In financing these programs, we are relying 
more heavily than before on loans repayable in 
dollars. Other institutions are joming with us 
in this effort — not only private institutions but 
also the United Nations, the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development, the Organi- 
zation of American States and the Inter- Ameri- 
can Development Bank. We have urged other 
industrialized countries to devote a larger share 
of their resources to the provision of capital to the 
less developed nations. Some have done so — and 
we are hopeful that the rest will also recognize 
their stake in the success and stability of the 
emerging economies. We are continuing, in view 
of our balance-of-payments situation, to empha- 
size procurement within the LTnited States for 
most goods required by the program. And we ai'c 
working toward strengthening the foreign ex- 
change position of the emerging coimtries by en- 
couraging the development of new trade patterns. 
The proposed new Trade Expansion Act is a most 
important tool in facilitating this trend.* 

Arucli more, of coui-se, could be said. But hav- 
ing set forth last year in a series of messages and 



' H. Doc. 362, 87th Cong., 2fl se.ss. ; transmitted on 
Mnr. 13. 

■ Public Law 87-19.5. 

' Bulletin of Nov. 27, 1961, p. 900. 



* For text of the Pre.'sident's message to the Congress 
proiiosing new foreign trade legislation, see ibid., Feb. 
12, 1962, p. 231. 



550 



Department of Sfafe Bulletin 



addresses on foreign aid tlie fjjoals we seek and the 
tools we need, it is not necessary to repeat to tlie 
Congress this year our Nation's basic interest in 
the development and freedom of olher nations — 
or to review all of the initiatives launched under 
last year's programs. The Congress is familiar 
with these arguments and programs, as well as its 
own role and contribution in enacting long-term 
financing authority. Thus the foreign aid legis- 
lation submitted this year does not requii'e recon- 
sideration of these questions. It is instead limited 
primarily to the new authorizations required an- 
nually under the terms of last year's law. The 
only major change proposed is the establishment 
of a separate long-term alliance for progress fund. 
The total amounts requested were included in the 
Federal budget previously submitted for fiscal 
1963 and the authorizing legislation enacted last 
year, and have in fact been reduced in some in- 
stances. They cannot, I believe, be further re- 
duced if the partnership on which we are now em- 
barked — a joint endeavor with each developing 
nation and with each aid-giving nation — is to dem- 
onstrate the advances in human well-being which 
flow from economic development joined with po- 
litical liberty. For we should know by now that 
where weakness and dependence are not trans- 
formed into strength and self-reliance, we can 
expect only chaos, and then tyranny to follow. 

II 

Because development lending and militaiy as- 
sistance appropriations for fiscal year 1963 were 
authorized in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 
no new authorizations for these two programs ai'e 
needed. I am proposing new authorization and 
appropriation of $335 million for development 
grants; $481.5 million for supporting assistance; 
$148.9 million for contributions to international 
organizations; $100 million for investment guar- 
antees; $400 million for the contingency fund; 
and $60 million for administrative costs and other 
programs. I am also proposing appropriations 
for 1963 of $2,753 million, including the $1,250 
million already authorized for development lend- 
ing, and $1,500 million ($200 million below that 
authorized) for military assistance. The total ap- 
propriation request for the foreign economic and 
military assistance program for fiscal year 1963 is 
$4,878 million. 

These recommendations are based upon a care- 
ful examination of the most urgent needs of each 



country and area. Each of these forms of a.ssist- 
ance, in these amounts, is essential to the achieve- 
ment of our overall foreign assistance objectives. 
The total is less than the estimates in the budget 
because of a reduction in my request for support- 
ing assistance. 

One item in particular deserves attention. The 
past year has amply demonstrated that rapid and 
unpredictable changes in the world situation of 
direct interest to our security cannot be foreseen or 
predicted accurately at the time Congress acts 
upon the appropriations. I therefore urge the 
Congress to recognize this need for flexibility to 
meet contingencies and emergencies and to approve 
the full authorization and appropriation requested 
of $400 million. 

Ill 

The Charter of Piuita del Este which last Au- 
gust established the alliance for progress is the 
framewoi-k of goals and conditions for what has 
been called "a peaceful revolution on a hemi- 
spheric scale." ^ 

That revolution had begun before the charter 
was drawn. It will continue after its goals are 
reached. If its goals are not achieved, the revolu- 
tion will continue but its methods and results will 
be tragically different. Histoi-y has removed for 
governments the margin of safety between the 
peaceful revolution and the violent revolution. 
The luxury of a leisurely interval is no longer 
available. 

These were the facts recognized at Pmita del 
Este. These were the facts that dictated the terms 
of the charter. And these are the facts which re- 
quire our participation in this massive cooperative 
effort. 

To give this program the special recognition 
and additional resources which it requires, I there- 
fore propose an authorization of $3 billion for the 
alliance for progress for the next 4 years. Of the 
$3 billion, an authorization and appropriation of 
$600 million is being requested for 1963, with up 
to $100 million to be used for grants and the bal- 
ance of $500 million or more for development 
loans. This authorization will be separate from 
and supplementary to the $6 billion already au- 
thorized for loans for development for 1963 
through 1966, which will remain available for use 
throughout the world. 



° For background and text of the charter, see ihid., 
Sept. 11, 1961, p. 4.59. 



April 2, 1962 



5S1 



During the year beginning last March over $1 
billion has been committed in Latin America by 
the United States in support of the alliance, ful- 
filling the pledge we made at the first Punta del 
Este meeting, and launching in a veiy real way 
for this hemisphere a dramatic decade of develop- 
ment. But even with this impressive support, the 
destiny of the alliance lies largely in the hands of 
the countries themselves. For even large amounts 
of external aid can do no more than provide the 
margin which enables each country through its 
own determination and action to achieve lasting 
success. 

The United States recognizes that it takes 
time — to develop careful programs for national 
development and the administrative capacity 
necessary to carry out such a progi-am — to go 
beyond the enactment of land reform measures 
and actually transfer tlie land and make the most 
productive use of it — to pass new tax laws and 
then achieve their acceptance and enforcement. It 
is heartening, therefore, that the changes called 
for by the alliance for progress have been the 
central issue in several Latin American elec- 
tions — demonstrating that its effects will be deep 
and real. Under the Oi'ganization of American 
States, nine outstanding economists and develop- 
ment advisers have begun to assist countries in 
critically reviewing their plans. Three Latin 
American countries have already completed and 
submitted for review their plans for the more 
effective mobilization of their resources toward 
national development. The others are creating 
and strengthening their mechanisms for develop- 
ment planning. A number of Latin American 
countries have already taken significant stejas to- 
ward land or tax reform; and throughout the 
region there is a new ferment of activity, centered 
on improvements in education, in rural develop- 
ment, in public administration, and on other essen- 
tial institutional measures required to give a sound 
basis for economic growth. 

But more important still is the changed atti- 
tudes of peoples and governments already notice- 
able in Latin America. The alliance has fired 
the imagination and kindled the hopes of millions 
of our good neighbors. Their drive toward mod- 
ernization is gaining momentum as it imleashcs 
the energies of these millions; and the United 
States is becoming increasingly identified in the 



minds of the people with the goal they move to- 
ward: a better life with freedom. Our hand — 
extended in help — is being accepted without loss 
of dignity. 

But the alliance is barely underway. It is a task 
for a decade, not for a year. It requires further 
changes in outlook and policy by all American 
states. New institutions will need to be formed. 
New plans — if they are to be serious — will have 
to assume a life other than on paper. 

One of the brightest pages of the world's history 
has been the series of programs this Nation has 
devised, established, and implemented following 
the Second World "War to help free peoples achieve 
economic development and the control of their 
own destinies. These programs, which have been 
solidly based on bipartisan support, are the proud 
manifestations of our deep-seated love and pur- 
suit of freedom for individuals and for nations. 

I realize that there are among us those who are 
weary of sustaining this continual effort to help 
other nations. But I would ask them to look at 
a map and recognize that many of those whom 
we help live on the "front lines" of the long twi- 
light struggle for freedom — that others are new 
nations posed between order and chaos — and the 
rest are older nations now undergoing a turbident 
transition of new expectations. Our efforts to help 
them help themselves, to demonstrate and to 
strengthen the vitality of free institutions, are 
small in cost compared to our military outlays for 
the defense of freedom. Yet all of our armies 
and atoms combined will be of little avail if these 
nations fall, unable to meet the needs of their own 
people, and unable to stave off within their borders 
the rise of forces that threaten our security. This 
program — and the passage of this bill — are vital 
to the interests of tlie United States. 

"Wo are, I am confident, e<]ual to our respon- 
sibilities in tliis area — responsibilities as compel- 
ling as any our Nation has known. Today, we are 
still in the first months of a decade's sustained 
effort. But I can report that our efforts are under- 
way; tlicy are moving in the right direction; they 
are gaining momentum daily; and they have al- 
ready begun to realize a small part of their great 
potential. The turnaround has indeed begun. 



John F. Kennedy 



The WiurE House, 
March 13, 1962. 



552 



Department of Stale Bulletin 



INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES 



U.N. General Assembly Rejects Cuban Charges 
Against United States 



Following are statements made hy Adlai E. 
Stevenson and Francis T. P. PUmjJton, U.S. 
Representatives to the U.N. General Assernily. 



STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR STEVENSON' 

As we approach at last the end of this pro- 
longed and unnecessary debate, I should like to 
try to place the Cuban charge against my country 
in its proper perspective. Up to now the 16th 
General Assembly has compiled a creditable 
record. We have dealt reasonably and responsi- 
bly, I believe, with the prior items on our agenda, 
and I think this is because the prior items were 
worthy of responsible discussion and of responsi- 
ble action. Now, however, this Assembly, at its 
very end, has been forced to deal for 10 precious 
days with cold-war propaganda charges that are 
botli irresponsible, misupported, and wholly false. 

This item has been placed on our agenda by 
Cuba not as an emergency, as its language sug- 
gests, but last August. And now, 6 months after 
this supposedly urgent item was inscribed, the 
members of this committee have been obliged to 
listen to repetitive and interminable harangues 
which have produced all of the abusive, the false, 
and the tired phrases in the Communist lexicon — 
but nothing resembling proof of the charges. 

We have even been told that the American 
worker owes his automobile, his house, his dish- 
washer, ancl his refrigerator to the Eussian revolu- 
tion. Well, I suppose, Mr. Chairman, that we 
Americans should be thankful that our Communist 
friends have taken such good care of us first while 
neglecting themselves ! 

But we are not thankful for this intolerable 
imposition on the patience of this committee nor 



for this gross misuse of the machinery of the 
United Nations, which is not only a waste of the 
General Assembly's time but also an invitation to 
the detractors of the United Nations to heap fresh 
ridicule on our organization. 

Our charter, Mr. Chairman, speaks of this place 
as a "center for harmonizing the actions of na- 
tions." Could anything be more disharmonizing 
than the mibridled vituperation to which we have 
been subjected by the Castro delegation and its 
Communist colleagues? That charges of aggi-es- 
sion and intervention — unsupported by evidence 
and squarely denied— can be dredged up, after 
lying dormant for 6 months, and be solenmly 
paraded for 10 days before the representatives of 
104 nations cannot enhance the reputation of this 
organization for seriousness or efhciency. And 
what a pity that at a time when there are some 
signs of sincere efforts to diminish the tensions 
between my country and the Soviet Union, the 
latter should have ordered its satellites to unleash 
such an unprincipled, unjustified, unsupported 
attack on the United States! 

Now, what is tlie reason for this outburst of 
cold-war violence after this item has been pending 
for 6 months'? 

Clearly it is an attempt to drown in a torrent of 
words the unanimous — and I say unanimous — con- 
clusion of the American Republics that it is the 
Communist offensive, of which Cuba is a part, 
which is trying to intervene in tlie domestic affairs 
of the American Republics and to destroy their 
free democratic institutions.^ It is an attempt to 
obscure the unanimous — and again I say unani- 
mous — decision reached at Punta del Este by all 
of the American Republics that the Castro regime 



' Made in Committee I (Political and Security) on Feb. 
14 (U.S. delegation press release 3925). 



^ For statements made by Secretary Ruslc at the Eighth 
Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs 
of the American Republics and texts of resolutions, see 
Bulletin of Feb. 19, 1962, p. 270. 



April 2, 1962 



553 



is incompatible with tlie principles and the objec- 
tives of the inter- American system. 

What precisely were these two unanimous deci- 
sions that they want to obscure and hide ? 

OAS Decision on Communist Offensive in America 

The first decision is found in Resolution I, en- 
titled "Communist Offensive in America," con- 
tained in document S/5075, the Punta del Este 
Final Act, and I should like to read you para- 
graphs 1, 2, and 3 of that unanimous resolution : 

1. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of tlie American 
Kepublics, convened in their Eighth Meeting of Consulta- 
tion, declare that the continental unity and the democratic 
institutions of the hemisphere are now in danger. 

The Ministers have been able to verify that the sub- 
versive offensive of communist Governments, their agents 
and the organizations which they control, has increased in 
intensity. The purpose of this offensive is the destruction 
of democratic institutions and the establishment of 
totalitarian dictatorships at the service of extra- 
continental powers. The outstanding facts in this intensi- 
fied offensive are the declarations set forth in ofiicial 
documents of the directing bodies of the international 
communist movement, that one of its principal objectives 
is the establishment of communist regimes in the under- 
developed countries and in Latin America ; and the 
existence of a Marxist-Leninist government in Cuba which 
is publicly aligned with the doctrine and foreign policy of 
the communist powers. 

2. In order to achieve their subversive purposes and 
hide their true intentions, the communist governments and 
their agents exploit the legitimate needs of the less- 
favored sectors of the population and the just national 
aspirations of the various peoples. With the pretext of 
defending popular interests, freedom is suppressed, demo- 
cratic institutions are destroyed, human rights are 
violated and the individual is subjected to materialistic 
ways of life imposed by tlie dictatorship of a single party. 
Under the slogan of "anti-iniiJerialism" they try to estab- 
lish an oppressive, aggressive imperialism, which sub- 
ordinates the subjugated nations to the militaristic and 
aggressive interests of extra-continental powers. By 
maliciously utilizing the very principles of the Inter- 
American system, they attempt to undermine democratic 
institutions and to strengthen and protect political 
penetration and aggression. The subversive methods of 
communist governments and their agents constitute one 
of the most subtle and dangerous forms of intervention in 
the internal affairs of other countries. 

3. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs alert the peoples of 
the hemisphere to the intensification of the subversive 
offensive of communist governments, their agents, and 
the organizations that they control and to the tactics and 
methods that they employ and also warn them of the 
dangers this situation represents to representative democ- 
racy, to respect for human rights, and to the self-determi- 
nation of peoples. 



The principles of communism are incompatible with the 
priniii)les of the Inter-American system. 

Castro's Ttireat to Western Hemisphere Security 

These, gentlemen, are the words of the foreign 
ministers of all of the American Republics — ex- 
cept for Cuba. These words were based on a mass 
of evidence accumulated over the years by the Or- 
ganization of American States and by the member 
states themselves, and in particular on a report of 
the Inter- American Peace Committee, which was 
dated January 14, 1962. 

The facts are clear that the Castro regime, with 
the assistance of local Communist parties, is em- 
ploying a wide variety of techniques and practices 
to overthrow the free democratic institutions of 
Latin America. It is bringing hundreds of Latin 
American students, labor leaders, intellectuals, 
and dissident political leaders to Cuba for indoc- 
trination and for training to be sent back to their 
countries for the double purpose of agitating in 
favor of the Castro regime and undermining their 
own governments. It is fostering the establish- 
ment in other Latin American countries of so- 
called "Committees of Solidarity with the Cuban 
Revolution" for the same dual purpose. Cuban 
diplomatic personnel encourage and finance agita- 
tion and subversion by dissident elements seeking 
to overthrow established government by force. 

The Cuban regime is flooding the hemi.spliere 
with profDaganda and with printed material. The 
recent inauguration of a powerful shortwave radio 
station in Cuba now enables the regime to broad- 
cast its propaganda to every corner of the hemi- 
sphere, and these broadcasts have not hesitated to 
call for the violent overthrow of established gov- 
ernments. Such appeals have been directed to 
Peru, Brazil, Guatemala, and, most recently, the 
Dominican Republic. On January 22, 19G2, Radio 
Habana beamed a broadcast to the Dominican Re- 
public calling on the people to "overthrow the 
Coinicil of State" — the very democratic council 
which is now expressing the will of the Dominican 
people to be free of the last remnants of the Tru- 
jillo dictatorship. 

The military training of I^atin Americans in 
Cuba by the Castro regime, and the wide distribu- 
tion throughout the hemisphere of the treatise on 
guerrilla warfare by "Che" Guevara, Castro's 
chief lieutenant, are clear evidence that the Ctistro 
regime is bent on guerrilla operations as another 



554 



Department of Stale Bulletin 



important device for gaining its objectives. The 
large amounts of arms wliich Castro boasts of 
having obtained from the Communist military 
bloc place him in a position to support such opera- 
tions, and, in fact, we have seen him aiding or 
supporting armed invasions in other Caribbean 
countries, notably Panama and the Dominican 
Eepublic. If vce are to believe Castro's threats 
made prior to and during the Punta del Este con- 
ference, there will almost certainly be further 
Cuban-inspired guerrilla operations against its 
Latin American neighbors. 

Now, what this means, Mr. Chairman, is that 
Cuba today represents a bridgehead of Sino-Soviet 
imperialism in the Western Hemisphere and a base 
for Communist aggression, intervention, agitation, 
and subversion against the American Republics. 
It is small wonder that the American Republics 
unanimously recognize that this situation is a 
serious threat to their security and the ability of 
their peoples to choose freely their own form of 
government and to pursue freely their goals of 
economic well-being and of social justice. It is 
small wonder that they unanimously adopted the 
resolution I have just quoted in part and small 
wonder that the Communists are throwing up a 
smokescreen in an attempt to conceal that 
mianimity. 

Cuban Regime IncompatibleiWith American System 

Xow, what was the second unanimous decision 
that they want to conceal ? 

It is found in the first two operative paragraphs 
of Resolution VI of the Punta del Este Final Act, 
entitled "Exclusion of the Present Government of 
Cuba From Participation in the Inter- American 
System." 

I read as follows from that resolution : 

1. Tliat adherence by any member of the Organization 
of American States to Marxism-Leninism is incompatible 
with the inter-American system and the alignment of 
such a government with the communist bloc breaks the 
unity and solidarity of the hemisphere. 

2. That the present Government of Cuba, which has 
officially identified itself as a Marxist-Leninist govern- 
ment, is incompatible with the principles and objectives of 
the inter- American system. 

Those paragraphs, Mr. Chairman, were agreed 
to by the unanimous vote of the 20 American 
Republics, with Cuba alone dissenting. "We have 



then a unanimous decision that the Cuban regime 
has made itself incompatible with the inter- Ameri- 
can system. 

There were two further operative paragraphs, 
which I quote : 

That this incompatibility excludes the present Govern- 
ment of Cuba from participation in the inter-American 
system. 

That the Council of the Organization of American States 
and the other organs and organizations of the inter- 
American system adopt without delay tlie measures neces- 
sary to carry out this resolution. 

As to these two paragraphs, 14 comitries — that 
is to say, two-thirds of the membership — voted in 
favor, 1 against — Cuba — and 6 abstained — Argen- 
tina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Bolivia, and Ecuador. 
Their abstention, as has been made clear, in no way 
affects the decision that the Castro regime is in- 
compatible with the American system of demo- 
cratic freedom but merely evidenced doubts as to 
the legal procedures involved in the exclusion 
caused by the incompatibility. 

Unsupported Claims of U.S. Aggressive Plans 

Now, so much for the Punta del Este decisions 
that Castro is trying to hide by the unsupported 
claun that the United States is now planning 
aggression against Cuba. Wliat supposed items of 
evidence has the Cuban representative produced 
to substantiate that wild claim ? Only two. 

First, he says that on October 9, 19G1, "the 
revolutionary government denounced the military 
bases, both within and without the United States, 
listing those in which the American Government 
trained mercenaries in order to use them against 
our coimtry." This ex parte declaration by the 
revolutionary government of Cuba is followed by 
a list of most of the noted Florida winter resorts, 
such as West Palm Beach, Fort Lauderdale, 
Hollywood, St. Petersburg, and so forth. 

I have no doubt that the Castro government did 
"denounce" these localities, for certainly denuncia- 
tion is a daily pastime in Habana these days. But 
denunciation is not proof, and they have not pro- 
duced a shred of evidence that the United States 
Government is training anyone anywhere to attack 
Cuba. And I in turn denoimce any such absurd 
denunciations. 

Secondly, the Castro representative quoted from 
the New York Times of December 23, 1961, where 



April 2, J 962 



555 



one Luis Manuel Martinez, presiunably a Cuban, 
is said to have stated that "nearly 400 exile fighters 
have left Guatemala in the last six weeks for the 
United States for eventual duty as guerrillas in 
Cuba." It may very well be tliat a Cuban patriot 
may have made such a statement, but I repeat that 
the United States is not training any Cuban exile 
fighters anywhei'e to attack Cuba. 

Now, these two items, Castro's own assertion and 
the Martinez quotation, are the only — literally 
only — supposed evidence advanced for the charge 
that the United States is now planning aggi-ession 
against Cuba. 

And here I want to repeat that all of the charges 
that the Castro regime has made against the 
United States in this room were made at Punta del 
Este — every one — and that the American Repub- 
lics, who of all people know the facts as to what 
goes on in this hemisphere, brushed these charges 
aside, just as they should be brushed aside here in 
this committee. 

Now that the Castro representative has brouglit 
up the New York Times of December 23, 1961, I 
would like to call the committee's attention to 
another item in that same issue which the Cuban 
representative did not see fit to quote. That item 
is a report from Ilabana quoting Castro as having 
said on the previous day, December 22, that he 
was a "Marxist-Leninist" during his mountain 
guerrilla warfare days and that he had hidden the 
fact "because otherwise he would not have been 
able to press his revolution to a successful conclu- 
sion." He is quoted as going on to say tliat while 
in the mountains if he had said, "We are Marxist- 
Leninists," "it is possible that we would never have 
been able to descend to the lowlands. ... So we 
called it something else." Those are the words of 
Mr. Castro. 

Mr. Castro, blatantly and cynically, admits and 
boasts that he deliberately deceived the Cuban 
people. 

I now come to the attempt by the representative 
of the Soviet Union to turn this debate into a 
propaganda quiz program. 

Most of the so-called "questions" which he lias 
asked related to events last April which were 
thoroughly discussed and dealt with at that time by 
this committee and by the General Assembly.' But 
he purports to be very distressed that I have not 



° For l)iukp;ioiiiul and texts of resolutions, see ihid.. May 
S, 1001 , 11. 0G7. 



answered his questions. It is not my practice, 
as I hoije you have noticed, to intervene every few 
minutes but rather to await my turn. But I do 
not want the representative of the Soviet Union to 
suffer any longer. 

So as to his other declarations, let me say, no, 
the United States is not training anyone for an 
invasion of Cuba at the "bases" mentioned by the 
Cuban representative. Neither the Soviet rep- 
resentative nor the Cuban representative nor any- 
one else has brought forth the slightest evidence 
to the contrary. And Castro's "denunciation" of 
sucli innocent winter resorts as West Palm Beach, 
Sarasota, and so forth, is proof of nothing but a 
very vivid and unscrupulous imagination. 

Tlie next question: Yes, Cubans may enlist in 
the Armed Forces of the United States, and so may 
any permanent resident of the United States. Our 
latest count, as of 2 weeks ago, showed that the 
nvimber of Cubans in the three armed services of 
this counti-y amounted to a grand total of 88. 

No Support for Cuba at Punta del Este 

The next question : No, all the decisions at the 
Punta del Este conference were not ummimous. 
Tills was not a meeting of the Warsaw military 
pact. This was a meeting of free and independent 
sovereign states, proudly insistent on the demo- 
cratic rights of freedom of speech and freedom 
of decision. 

So that the record is completely clear to all of 
the members, I want to state the votes on the nine 
resolutions which are set forth in the Final Act 
of the Punta del P]ste conference (document 
S/5075). 

Resolution I, entitled "Communist Offensive in 
America," which I liave already read in part, was 
adopted by the vote of 20 for and 1 against, Cuba 
being the 1. 

Resolution II, setting up a special consultative 
committee on security against the subversive ac- 
tion of international communism, was adopted by 
the vote of 19 to 1 — Cuba — with Bolivia abstahi- 
ing. 

Resolution III, reiterating the principles of non- 
intervention and self-determination, was adopted 
by the vote of 20 to 1, the 1 being Cuba. I call 
attention to the fact that Cuba voted against this 
resolution and, in particular, voted against para- 
graph 2 of tliat resolution, whicli urged that 
American governments organize themselves on 



556 



Deparfment of Slate Bulletin 



the basis of free elections that express, without re- 
striction, tlie will of the people. 

Resolution IV, for the holding of free elections, 
was also adopted by the vote of 20 to 1. I again 
call attention to the fact that Cuba is against the 
holding of free elections. 

Resolution V, endorsing the Alliance for Prog- 
ress, was adopted by the vote of 20 to 1. Once 
again, as in the case of the Marshall plan, the 
Communists are against the idea of economic and 
social progress with freedom. 

As to Resolution VI, relating to the self-exclu- 
sion of Cuba from the American system, as I have 
said, paragraphs 1 and 2 were adopted by the vote 
of 20 to 1, and 3 and 4 were adopted by the vote 
of 14 to 1, with G abstentions. 

Resolution VII, excluding Cuba from the Inter- 
American Defense Board, was adopted by the vote 
of 20 to 1. 

Resolution \r[II, relating to the suspension of 
arms traffic with Cuba and charging the Organiza- 
tion of American States Council to study the de- 
sirability of suspending trade in other items, was 
adopted by the vote of 16 to 1, with 4 abstentions. 

Resolution IX, relating to strengthening the 
statute of tlie Inter- Ajnerican Commission on Hu- 
man Rights, was adopted by the vote of 19 to 1, 
with 1 abstention. 

In short, Mr. Chairman, Cuba received no sup- 
port on anything. No one voted with Cuba on 
anything. Cuba joined the others in voting for 
only one paragraph of one resolution, and there 
was not a single negative vote, other than Cuba's, 
on any resolution or any paragraph of any resolu- 
tion. In other words, the newest associate of the 
Conmiunist bloc stood alone in the self-imposed 
isolation which its interventions and disregard of 
human rights have brought upon itself. 

Now, these are the facts about Punta del Este, 
and they show that what is before this committee 
is not some bilateral issue between the Castro gov- 
ernment and the Govei'nment of the United States 
but a broad multilateral problem involving a self- 
declared Communist regime's aggi-essive hostility 
against all of the free nations of the Latin Ameri- 
can world. It is not a bilateral problem; it is a 
hemispheric problem. 

My final answer to the representative of the 
Soviet Union is yes, the United States does believe 
in the principle of nonintervention in the affairs of 
other countries and we strongly recommend this 



principle to tlie Cuban regime, especially with ref- 
erence to its neighbors in this hemisphere. 

And while we are on the subject of noninterven- 
tion, I would strongly reconnnend to the Soviet 
Union that our memories are not so short that we 
have forgotten some events of recent years which 
are still on our agenda. 

I have heard during the past fortnight repeated 
contemptuous ref ei-ences to the Cuban patriots who 
have escaped from the oppression of the Castro 
dictatorship and the names of a few industrialists 
and land owners. But I have not heard mention 
of no less than 150,000 Cubans who have fled from 
tyranny to liberty — of 150,000 workers, peasants, 
shopkeepers, professional people, artisans, profes- 
sors, and judges — many of them former comrades 
of Castro — who fled when it became clear to them 
that he had deceived them and betrayed their 
revolution. They are the fortunate ones who have 
escaped the knock on the door in the night and 
drmnhead justice and the firing squads that have 
slaughtered so many of Castro's countrymen. 

I read you a short list of Castro's own comrades 
who now know what he represents and have es- 
caped to freedom: Castro's firet Prime Minister, 
the first Provisional President of his revolutionary 
government, his Chief Justice, nearly two-thirds 
of the 19 members of his first Cabinet, his revolu- 
tionary commander of Camagiiey Province, his 
appointees as presidents of the National Bank 
and the National Development Bank, the chief of 
liis Air Force, his personal pilot, the General Sec- 
retary of the Cuban Trade Union Federation, the 
editor of the anti-Batista magazine Bohemia, the 
author of Castro's revolutionary exhortation "his- 
tory will absolve me," and countless other editors, 
radio commentators, and public figures. 

These are some of the millions who have fled 
Communist tyranny in search of freedom. We 
have heard some dissertations on the Marxist- 
Leninist ideology from a procession of Communist 
speakers during this debate. I certainly will not 
take up the committee's time to more than say that 
millions of voices will answer them — the voices 
not only of 150,000 Cubans but of 200,000 Hun- 
garians, of 55,000 Tibetans, of 1,100,000 Chinese, 
of 2,500,000 East Germans, and many more who 
have risked their lives to escape from that ideology 
and that form of government to the free world. 
And the final confession of ideological bankruptcy 
is that it takes a wall through the heart of Berlin 



April 2, 7962 



557 



not to keep the enemies out but to keep their own 
people in. 

It has been suggested over and over that in some 
way the American Republics are interfering with 
Cuba's right of self-determination, the right of 
its people to choose their own government. This 
is not true. The American Eepublics believe in 
and practice self-determination. It is the Castro 
regime itself that has deprived the Cuban people 
of that right. 

The Organization of American States' Charter 
states in article 5 : "The solidarity of the Ameri- 
can States and the high aims which are sought 
through it require the political organization of 
those States on the basis of the effective exercise 
of representative democracy." Through the Or- 
ganization of American States, the American 
Republics in recent weeks have helped the people 
of the Dominican Republic to regain the right of 
democratic self-determination, with the happy 
result that the voice of the ancient Dominican peo- 
ple, long stilled by dictatorship, is now heard 
again. 

The voice of the Cuban people has also been 
stilled by dictatorship, a dictatorship conceived in 
deceit and deception and now maintained by force. 
The voice we now hear is not the voice of the 
Cuban people but the voice of a master. His 
plaintive plea for the right of self-determination 
is in fact a cynical demand that he — and his 
foreign masters — do the self-determining and be 
left alone to shamelessly crush the will of the 
Cuban people and further the objectives of Com- 
munist imperialism throughout the hemisphere. 

How can Castro, who first deceived his people 
and who now refuses to let them speak for them- 
selves, speak for them as to the form of govern- 
ment they desire? How can a man who has 
betrayed his country and delivered it to an inter- 
national conspiracy speak for a people to whom 
he denies the fundamental right of self-determi- 
nation ? 

What Castro Promised 

In Castro's first political statement from the 
Sierra Maestra in July 1957 I will tell you what 
he promised. He promised general elections at 
the end of 1 year. He promised an "absolute 
guarantee" of freedom of information, of freedom 
of press and all civil and political rights in accord- 
ance with Cuba's 1940 Constitution. In an article 



in February 1958 he wrote that he was fighting for 
a "genuine representative government," "thor- 
oughly honest" general elections within 12 months, 
"full and untrammeled" freedom of public infor- 
mation and public media, and the reestablishment 
of all the personal and political rights set forth 
in Cuba's 1940 Constitution. And the greatest 
irony of all — in that article he denies the charge 
of "plotting to replace military dictatorship with 
revolutionary dictatorship." 

These were the promises that Castro made to 
the Cuban people. It is small wonder that those 
people welcomed the man who made them. Re- 
joicing in their release from the thralldom of 
Batista's military dictatorship, they looked for- 
ward eagerly to the freedom that Castro had 
promised. And what has he given them? He 
has given them the very dictatorship which he 
solemnly assured them he would not. He has 
given them a dictatorship under which free ex- 
pression and free elections no longer exist. He has 
given them a government-controlled press. He 
has confiscated their property. He has terrorized 
their religion and suppressed all civil and political 
liberty. And to cap the climax, at Punta del Este 
he has voted against even the principle of free 
elections ! 

It must be clear to all that the present rulers of 
Cuba have engaged in a classic example of Com- 
munist subversion from within — indirect aggres- 
sion. They sought to gain power over Cuba not 
to free Cubans but to enslave them, not to serve 
Cuban interests but the interests of that worldwide 
imperialism which wanted Cuba as a bridgehead 
for its ambitions in the rest of Latin America. 

The free peoples of Latin America will not 
permit this, and that is the meaning of Punta del 
Este. 

The free nations have sought by every means 
since the end of the Second World War to defend 
their freedom. This organization has dealt with 
many of these battles of wliat has come to be 
known as the cold war and of which Cuba and 
the debate here today is only the latest example. 
I had hoped when I came here a year ago that the 
United Nations could be used, and I so stated, as 
an arena not to fight the cold war but to pursue 
peace. And wo had hoped in the Americas, as do 
others in other continents, to keep the intrusion 
of the cold war from our shores. But one of our 
American states has been subverted and is now 
being used as a vehicle for pressing tlie cold war 



558 



Department of State Bulletin 



against us and our American friends. We have 
not brouglit the cold war into this committee ; it 
is the Castro regime and its masters that have done 
so. 

As the Secretary of State of the United States 
said at the Punta del Este meeting : 

The cold war would have been unknown to us had 
the Soviet Union determined, at the end of World War 
II, to live In peace with other nations In accordance with 
its commitments under the Charter of the United Nations. 
The cold war would end tomorrow If those who control 
the Communist movement would cease their aggressive 
acts, in all their many forms. Nothing would be more 
gratifying to the citizens of my country than to have 
the Soviet Union bring about the revolution of peace by 
a simple deei.'iion to leave the rest of the world alone. 

But the cold war is not a contest between the Soviet 
Union and the United States which the United States is 
pursuing for national ends. It is a struggle in the long 
story of freedom between those who would destroy it and 
those who are determined to preserve it. If every nation 
were genuinely independent, and left alone to work out 
its relations with its neighbors by common agreement, 
the tensions between Washington and Moscow would 
vanish overnight. 

The Alliance for Progress 

Latin America is a continent in ferment. Its 
peoples voice a growing demand for social and 
economic changes that will bring to every man, 
woman, and child tlie technological benefits of 
our age. Its peoples want better education, 
better housing, better health, their own land, and 
economic and personal security. Its peoples are 
restless with hopes and aspirations. 

To satisfy these hopes, to make these aspirations 
a living reality, we in the "Western Hemisphere 
have embarked on a positive program of un- 
paralleled magnitude in scope and effort — the 
Alliance for Progress.'' We of the American 
Eepublics have set forth our goals of social ad- 
vancement throughout the coming decade. We 
have pledged our joint resources. We are insisting 
on tax reform and land reform and industrial de- 
velopment. We have stated our convictions tliat 
investment in liimian resources — in the brains and 
skills of our peoples — should receive top priority. 
The United States is ready to contribute over a bil- 
lion dollars a year to tliis great humanitarian 
undertaking and to do its full part in helping to 
re-create a new world for the peoples of Latin 
America. 

Tliis is tlie project whicli the Castro regime and 



its Communist masters are trying to subvert and 
sabotage. It is for this that the Communist bloc 
in the closing days of our session have taxed our 
patience, abused our procedures, and unleashed all 
of their tired invectives and scattered groundless 
charges to arrest tlie forward march of tlie Ameri- 
can Republics to a better life and democratic 
freedom. 

I hope, Mr. Chairman, that this committee will 
resoundingly defeat any resolution that equates 
unsupported charges and the decisions of the 
American states to defend themselves from sub- 
version and to work together for that better life 
in full conformity with tlie principles of the 
charter. 



STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR PLIMPTON' 

I would like to point out, by way of an intro- 
ductory remark, that the title of this item has not 
been changed. It will be remembered that the 
title reads: "Complaint by Cuba of threats to 
international peace and security arising from new 
plans of aggression and acts of intervention being 
executed by the Government of the United States 
of America against the Revolutionary Govern- 
ment of Cuba." 

The sponsor of the draft resolution now seems 
to be trying, by document A/L.385/Eev.l, to create 
the impression that the title of the item has been 
changed, obviously because the deliberately biased 
form of the title of the item clearly reveals its 
cold-war propaganda purpose. However, Mr. 
President, the title of the item has not been 
changed. The document itself refers three times 
to item 78 — in the upper left-hand corner, in the 
heading, and in the first preambular paragraph. 
And item 78 still reads just the way it always has. 
The so-called "technical error" referred to in re- 
vision 1 is itself nothing but another parliamentary 
maneuver to obscure the fact that the draft resolu- 
tion is still a draft resolution against the back- 
ground and in the context of the completely 
unproved Cuban charges, as set forth in the cold- 
war title of the item. 

Mr. President, the Cuban charges of interven- 
tion and plans of aggression have been with us 
now for 6 months. My delegation voted long ago, 
last September, in favor of inscribing this item on 



' See p. 539. 



■"Made in plenary on Feb. 20 (U.S. delegation press 
release 3928). 



April 2, 1962 



559 



our agenda because of our commitment to the prin- 
ciple that any complaint, no matter how ground- 
less, should receive a liearing in our organization. 
The First Committee dealt with the Czechoslovak- 
Rumanian draft resolution. [U.N. doc. A/C.l/ 
L. 309] .« 

It is instructive to review briefly the fate of 
this Communist cold-war effort. Not one dele- 
gate outside of the 11 Communist representatives 
supported the unfounded accusation of United 
States interference in Cuban aifairs. A clear ma- 
jority of the First Committee also rebuffed the 
apparently harmless reference to peaceful settle- 
ment of international disputes because they rec- 
ognized that in the context of the Cuban charges 
such an affirmation of a general principle would 
dignify and give substance to charges that are in 
fact crude, defamatory, and false. The First Com- 
mittee also witnessed a striking demonstration of 
vigor and solidarity among the nations that make 
up our Organization of American States. We 
voted as one in defense of our common cause, and it 
is this fact more than any words I can say that 
testifies to the worthlessness of the Cuban charges. 

Mr. President, over this weekend we were 
greeted by a new exercise in parliamentary leger- 
demain. This will, I am confident, be equally re- 
pudiated by this Assembly. Having failed to ob- 
tain any support for the baseless charges leveled 
against the United States in the First Committee 
and having failed to enlist the backing of a single 
one of the 93 non-Communist members of this 
body for its complaint of United States interfer- 
ence, the Communist bloc now is trying to bring 
in through the back door what was thrown out at 
the front door. That well-known authority on 
Caribbean affairs, that longtime friend and next- 
door neighbor of Cuba, the Republic of Outer 
Mongolia, has now appeared from central Asia 



"The operative paragraphs of draft resolution A/C.l/ 
L.309 were rejected by Committee I on Feb. 15, and the 
chairman therefore declared, pursuant to rule 130 of the 
rules of procedure, that the draft resolution as a whole 
was rejected. Operative paragraph 1, which appealed 
to the U.S. Govornmont "to put an end to the interference 
in the internal affairs of the Rep\iblic of Cuba and to all 
the actions directed against the territorial integrity and 
political Independence of Cuba," was rejected by a vote 
of 11 to 50, with 39 abstentions. Operative pnragrajjh 2, 
which called upon the Governments of Cuba and the United 
States "to settle tlieir differences by peaceful means, 
through negotiations, without recour.se to use of force," 
was rejected by a vote of 30 to 40, with 15 abstentions. 



and placed before us a resolution [U.N. doc. A/L. 
385/Rev. 1] which purports to innocently reaffirm 
the principle of equal rights and self-determina- 
tion of peoples and of noninterference in the in- 
ternal affairs of any state. In voting on this 
parliamentary maneuver, the United States will 
take the following course: 

First, we will vote for the preambular reference 
to the report of the First Committee. We welcome 
that report as demonstrating the fact that, after 
a fair hearing and thorough airing of the Cuban 
complaint, it was overwhelmingly rejected. We 
find it proper for the General Assembly to take 
note of this report. 

Second, on the operative paragi-aph, which is 
substantially a repetition of the second preambular 
paragraph of the Czechoslovak-Rumanian resolu- 
tion introduced in the First Committee, we shall 
again abstain. The obvious maneuver of Mon- 
golia on behalf of the Communist bloc is to force 
other members of the Assembly into the apparent 
dilemma of either voting against self-determina- 
tion or to pass a resolution with an unintended 
effect. There is no reason to fall for this trick. 
The United States, of course, subscribes to these 
principles. The United States reaffirms principles 
which were first set forth in our Declaration of 
Indeijendence and in our Constitution, as well as 
in the conventions and agreements of the inter- 
American system and the United Nations Charter. 
In a separata vote on the operative paragraph, 
we will, therefore, not vote but will abstain in the 
light of the context of this paragraph under the 
unproved Cuban allegations which are still in the 
title of the item. 

We shall, however, vote against the resolution as 
a whole, and we hope that the Assembly will do 
likewise. There is no reason to dignify the un- 
proved charges presented by the Communist bloc 
by enveloping them in noble and historic principles 
of the charter. A vote against the resolution as a 
whole will properly repudiate this transparent 
parliamentary numeuvei". 

If such principles are to be reaffirmed, Mr. Presi- 
dent, they should be pi'oclaimed in the context of 
calling on the Cuban regime to stop intervening in 
the affairs of other American states. They should 
call on this regime to grant the Cuban people the 
right to choose freely tlicir own form of govern- 
ment, to give tliem the right of self-determination. 
Those principles should voice the appeal of the free 



560 



Department of Sfafe Bulletin 



peoples of the vrorld for restoration to the Cuban 
people of those equal rifjlifs spelled out so clearly 
in the Declaration of Human Kights, the United 
Nations Charter, and tlie Charter of the Organi- 
zation of American States. 

Mr. President, when this item was inscribed last 
August, we recognized the competence of the Gen- 
eral Assembly to concern itself with such grave 
charges. We welcomed the airuig of those charges, 
the discussion of those charges. We were gratified 
by the display of hemispheric unity and the sup- 
port of other members who repudiated those 
charges. We were gratified that not one of the 93 
non-Connnunist members of this body voted with 
the Communist bloc to validate those charges. We 
trust, Mr. President, that this Assembly will act 
with the same sense of responsibility and will not 
be trapped by a transparent maneuver, such as the 
one we now have before us, and will vote against 
this draft resolution as a whole.'' 



U.S. Exchanges Tariff Concessions 
With GATT Contracting Parties 

White House press release dated March 7 

The White House on March 7 announced the 
conclusion at Geneva of tariff negotiations with 
the European Economic Communitj^, with the 
United Kingdom, and with 24 other countries. 

Summary 

These negotiations, the largest and most com- 
plex in the 28-year history of the Trade Agree- 
ments Act, produced results of great importance 
to the United States. The commercial importance 
of the negotiations was matched by their political 
significance, since they constituted the first test of 
whether the United States and the European Eco- 
nomic Community — the so-called European Com- 
mon Market — would be able to find a mutual basis 
for the long-run development of economic rela- 
tions critical to both areas. 

The European Conunon Market, created in 1957 
by France, Germany, Italy, and the Low Coun- 
tries [Belgium, Xetherlands, Luxembourg] in the 
Treaty of Rome, establishes a giant economic com- 
munity in Western Europe. It encompasses a 



' On Feb. 20 draft resolution A/L.385/Rev.l was re- 
jected by the General Assembly by a vote of .37 to 45, with 
18 abstentions. 



market whose imports are greater than those of 
the United States itself, with a growth rate well 
in excess of the current United States growth rate. 
In accordance with their treaty, the six member 
countries of the European Community are rapidly 
eliminating tariffs within the Connnunity and are 
establishing a common external tariff for the Com- 
munity which will apply generally to the products 
of outside countries including the United States. 
At the same time the six member countries are 
merging their separate national programs for the 
protection of domestic agriculture into an inte- 
grated Community-wide program known as the 
common agricultural policy. When this policy 
comes fully into effect, there will be a single Com- 
mmiity-wide support price for each of a nmnber 
of major agricultural commodities. 

In the face of these developments the United 
States objectives in the negotiations were twofold : 
(1) to secure reductions in the common external 
tariff which would expand trade between the 
European Economic Community and the United 
States and (2) to insure that the common agri- 
cultural policy took account of the interests of 
United States agricultural exporters. These ob- 
jectives were sought in the framework of the long- 
run United States policy of maintaining and ex- 
panding trading relations among free-world 
nations. 

These results were achieved. In general the 
European Economic Community agreed to an ex- 
change of concessions involving a phased 20-per- 
cent reduction in most of the industrial items 
making up its common external tariff. The Com- 
munity's freedom to negotiate on certain agricul- 
tural items was hampered by the fact that its 
common agricultural policy was still in process 
of development. Nevertheless it agreed to various 
arrangements — including a number of important 
tariff cuts— which will insure for the present that 
most agricultural exports of the United States 
will be able to maintain their position in tlie Com- 
mimity's markets. 

The United States, operating under the severely 
circumscribed authority of the present Trade 
Agreements Act, was unable to offer concessions 
of equal value to the Europeans. This was true 
even though the President went below the peril- 
point rates recommended by the Tariff Commis- 
sion on a number of items. In spite of the inability 
of the United States to offer equivalent conces- 
sions, the Community agreed to close the negotia- 



April 2, 1962 



561 



tions on the basis of the concessions finally offered 
by the United States. 

An appended table summarizes the trade value 
of concessions exchanged with the EEC and other 
countries in terms of the amount of trade during 
1960 in the items covered. In the exchange of 
new tariff concessions in the form of reductions or 
bindings at fixed levels, the United States received 
concessions on a trade volume of approximately 
$1.6 billion in return for adjustments and commit- 
ments, to take effect in most cases on two steps 1 
year apart, on United States tariffs covering com- 
modities with a trade volume of $1.2 billion. 

In other negotiations for compensatory tariff 
adjustments, where contracting members of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
had altered or withdrawn previous concessions, the 
United States received concessions on a trade 
volume estimated at $2.7 billion to replace conces- 
sions withdrawn or modified in the amount of $1.6 
billion. The central feature of this phase of the 
Geneva negotiations was the replacement of tariff 
concessions granted by the EEC member states 
before they formed the Common Market with con- 
cessions to be incorporated in a new common ex- 
ternal tariff. The EEC adjustments thus made in 
the Common Market tariff affect trade valued at 
$2.5 billion. 

Compensatory tariff concessions on the part of 
the United States were limited, covering trade 
valued at $30 million. 

The new tariff reductions obtained from the 
EEC include items of major importance to United 
States export trade to the Common Market area. 
Most of these concessions were reductions of 20 
percent. Tliere were, however, a number of re- 
ductions of more than 20 percent, the most im- 
portant of these being reductions of 24 and 26 
percent, respectively, in the common tariff on 
automobiles and parts; in dollar terms this reduc- 
tion will average to about $12G per automobile 
exported to the European market. Other cate- 
gories of i)articular importance to the United 
States were chemicals and phai-maceuticals, in- 
dustrial and electrical machinei-y, textiles, canned 
and preserved fruits, and fats and oils. 

Principal concessions granted by the United 
States included automobiles, certain classes of ma- 
chinery and electrical apparatus, certain types of 
steel products, and some classes of glassware. The 
United States automobile concession, which ac- 



counted for a substantial part of the total amount 
of trade affected by the United States concessions, 
averages approximately $21.50 per automobile im- 
ported into the United States market. 

For various technical reasons it is impossible to 
make exact comparisons of the general tariff levels 
of different countries. Nevertheless it appears 
that, as a result of the negotiations just concluded 
at Geneva, the general tariff level of the European 
Economic Community is roughly comparable to 
that of the United States. In some items the 
United States level exceeds that of the Commu- 
nity; in other items the opposite is the case. The 
major difference in the two tariff structures is that 
the EEC has fewer prohibitively high tariffs than 
the United States as well as fewer extremely low 
tariffs. 

The similarity in general levels provides an 
opportunity for even more effective tariff nego- 
tiation in the future. However, if the United 
States is to exploit this opportunity, it must be 
equipped with new statutory powers, since the 
President has now exhausted his powers to grant 
tariff concessions under existing law.^ 

In its negotiations for new concessions at Ge- 
neva the United States dealt not only with the 
EEC but also with Austria, Cambodia, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, Haiti, India, Israel, Japan, 
New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United 
Kingdom. 

Negotiations for compensatory concessions, in 
addition to those with the EEC, were held with 
Australia, Brazil, Canada, Ceylon, Finland, Haiti, 
Indonesia, Japan, the Netherlands Antilles, Paki- 
stan, Peru, the Eepublic of South Africa, Sweden, 
and Turkey. 

While negotiations by the United States with 
all the named countries except Spain have been 
completed, final agreements have not been con- 
cluded with some countries, which have either not 
completed their negotiations with otlier countries 
or have not yet completed the necessary domestic 
procedures. Wlicn all negotiations have been 
concluded, additional benefits will accrue to the 
United States from the concessions exchanged be- 
tween otlier countries. 



' For ti'xt of rrosiilont Kennedy's message to Congress 
on triulo, see lUn.i.iciiN of Feb. 12, 1902, p. 231 ; for a 
summary of the proposed legislation, see ibid., Feb. 26, 
1002, p. 343. 



562 



Deparfment of State Bulletin 



Further Details 

The tariff conference, which opened in Geneva 
in September 1900,- was convened by the Con- 
tracting Parties to the General Agi-eement on 
Tarilfs and Trade at United States initiative. 
The Geneva conference was open to all contracting 
parties to the GATT, 35 of which participated in 
the negotiations. Geneva was thus the scene of a 
major multilateral negotiation for the lowering of 
free-world ti-ade barriers. 

Nevertheless, attention was largely centered on 
the European Economic Community and its com- 
mon external tariff. "While customs unions are 
not a new thing in the world community, no cus- 
toms union before the Common Market had so 
much significance for world trade and, indeed, 
for the shaping of future political and economic 
forces in the world. 

The outlook on the whole was for a broadly 
liberal Common Market approach to international 
economic affairs. Even before the conference 
opened, there was outstanding an offer on the part 
of the European Economic Community to reduce 
by 20 percent most of its tariff rates on industrial 
products, conditional on the grant of reciprocal 
concessions by other countries. The United 
States was a principal supplier of most of the 
items affected. 

Despite the generally propitious atmosphere in 
which the negotiations were begun, it was by no 
means certain that any useful agreement could 
be reached. United States negotiators came to 
the Geneva conference empowered with the limited 
authorities contained in the Trade Agreements 
Extension Act of 1958. Under the law the maxi- 
mum tariff reduction they could offer was generally 
fixed at 20 percent. The negotiating list which 
they were authorized to use had been established 
after a rigorous screening by the interagency 
Trade Agi-eements Committee and after very sub- 
stantial further eliminations as a result of the 
Tariff Commission's peril-point findings under 
section 3(a) of the Trade Agreements Act. De- 
spite the fact that the United States had a very 
large export trade at stake and despite the major 
political opportunity offered by the negotiations, 
it was apparent when the United States negotiat- 
ing instructions were originally drawn that the 



^ For a statement made at the opening meeting by 
Clarence B. Randall, Special Assistant to President Eisen- 
hower, see ibiiL, Sept. 19, 1960, p. 453. 



United States would be unable on this basis to 
meet the EEC request for adequate reciprocity. 

The negotiations with the EEC were of un- 
rivaled complexity. They fell into two pliases. 
The purpose of the first phase was to meet the 
requirement of GATT, article XXIV :6, provid- 
ing for new tariff concessions by a customs union 
to replace those which had been granted previously 
by the member states. In preparing for this nego- 
tiation the American negotiators examined each 
item in the European common external tariff and 
compared the prospective incidence of the new 
rates with the previous national rates. 'Wlierever 
the new rate seemed on the whole to have a dif- 
ferent protective incidence than the old national 
rates, this difference had to be taken into account 
as a debit or credit in the subsequent negotiations. 
For agricultural products, however, special diffi- 
culties arose. Since the EEC nations were in 
process of developing the common agricultural 
policy called for in the Rome Treaty, they were 
restricted in their ability to negotiate on some of 
the tariff rates for agricultural products. 

The outcome of this phase of the EEC negotia- 
tion brought direct commitments to the United 
States on common external tariff rates covering 
exports totaling $2.5 billion in 1960, compared 
with a total of $1.4 billion of trade that had been 
covered by concessions which the Common IMarket 
member nations had previously granted to the 
United States. 

In the second phase of the negotiations, the so- 
called reciprocal round, the EEC confirmed the 
offer which had been provisionally put forward 
in May 1960. Specifically the Community offered 
a reduction of 20 percent on industrial tariff rates, 
subject to a few exceptions. The linear reduction 
offer did not apply to agricultural commodities, 
but in the course of the negotiations reductions on 
certain agricultural products were made. 

As the negotiations proceeded it became clear 
that the United States bargaining position was 
inadequate to take advantage of the EEC offer. 
A deadlock ensued and a collapse of the negotia- 
tions was threatened, with all the adverse conse- 
quences that this portended for American eco- 
nomic interests and Western political cooperation. 

The Tariff Commission's peril-point findings 
were, therefore, carefully reexamined, and a num- 
ber of additional items were found in which it 
appeared possible to offer tariff reductions. 



April 2, 1962 



563 



These were items in -wliich (lie procedures and 
stnndards stipulalod in tlie Trade Agreements Act 
had compelled tlie Commission to make unduly 
restrictive jud<>-ments or to make judcrments un- 
supported by relevant evidence. In many in- 
stances tariff reductions of even a few percentage 
points had been precluded. In some instances 
peril points had l)een set on items where imports 
represented only a minor fraction of domestic 
production. In others peril points had been 
found at existing duty levels for specialty com- 
modities which were produced abroad for a nar- 
row and highly specialized market in the United 
States and which were not competitive with 
domestic production. In still other cases a single 
peril point had been set for basket categories of 
many items, even tliough the situation as between 
items in the category appeared to differ markedly. 
It was in cases of the foregoing character that it 
was decided that tariff reductions could be made. 
A number of such items, covering $76 million 
of United States imports, were selected to provide 
a new bargaining offer. This action broke the 
deadlock in the negotiations. 

Appended are the messages from the President 
to the Congress 3 which give full details on the 
action taken with respect to the peril -pointed 
items in question. 

Agricultural commodities exported by the 
United States were included in botli the reciprocal 
and the compensatoi-y j^hases of the Geneva nego- 
tiations with the Common Market. These nego- 
tiations involved special difficulties. ]n-imarily 
because the EEC was concurrently develojnng its 
common agricultural policy. These difficulties 
were an additional cause for the prolonged period 
of the negotiations. 

In the understandings that were ultimately 
reached, the EEC made commitments on products 
accounting for approximately $800 million of the 
United Slates agricultural exports to the Com- 
mon Market in 19G0. Tliese conunitments cover 
such major items as cotton, soybeans, tallow, hides 
and skins, and certain fruit and vegetable prod- 
ucts. On cotton and soybeans, duty-free bindings 
replace tariffs in some of the member countries. 
The United States also obtained a reduction in 
the common external tariff on tobacco. Eor this 
item and vegetable oils, which together accounted 
for exports in 1960 of about $125 million, the EEC 



' Not iirintcd here. 



has entered into understandings with us envisag- 
ing negotiations for the further reductions in the 
common external tariffs. 

Witli respect to another group of products, 
principally grains and certain livestock products, 
which will be protected by variable levies instead 
of fixed tariffs, the United States sought to obtain 
adequate assurances of access to the EEC market. 
Because of the many problems which were still un- 
settled among the EEC coimtries themselves, it 
was not possible to work out during the Geneva 
negotiations definitive arrangements for access. 
Therefore, agreement was reached by the two 
sides to reconsider the matter of trade access in 
the near future. This represented a fundamental 
change in the position of the EEC, which early in 
the negotiations announced its intention to with- 
draw existing concessions on these products with- 
out providing for future negotiations on access. 

Specifically the EEC agreed to certain interim 
arrangements for wheat, corn, grain sorglium, 
poultry, and rice. United States exports of these 
commodities to the Common Market in 1960 were 
valued at about $214 million. For corn, grain 
sorghum, ordinary wlieat, rice, and poultry, the 
EEC has agreed to negotiate further on these items 
with respect to trade access arrangements and to 
maintain existing national import systems on as 
favorable a basis as at present until a common 
policy is put into operation. 

In the case of quality wheat the EEC agreed 
to negotiate further on the trade access arrange- 
ments after the initiation of the common agricul- 
tural policy. Before this new system is put into 
operation, member countries will continue to apply 
existing national import systems on as favorable 
a basis as at present. Further, the EEC agreed 
that when the common policy on wheat is put into 
operation, and throughout the period covered by 
these negotiations, it will take corrective measures 
for any decline in I"''nited States exports of quality 
wheat resulting from the application of the com- 
mon policy. 

Since tlie common agricultural policy will take 
effect over a period of years beginning on July 1, 
1962, in general it should not have adverse effects 
on the level of XTnited States exports during the 
coming year. The maintenance or expansion of 
United States exports will depend upon future 
negotiations carried out under the authority of 
the jiroposed trade agreements legislation. 

The negotiations for the reciprocal reduction of 



564 



Department of Sfafe Bulletin 



tariffs involved 18 countries in addition to tlio 
Common Market. Of these, tlie most important 
were with the United Kingdom. 

The United States received from the United 
Kingdom direct concessions on about 320 tariff 
items with a trade coverage of $197.5 million. 
Included were automobiles and parts, aircraft and 
parts, machine tools, certain chemicals, Kraft 
board and paper, synthetic rubber, and dried 
beans. Most of the duty reductions followed the 
20-percent pattern set by the EEC. 

In return the United States gave concessions, 
also mostly at the 20-percent level, on 185 items 
with a trade volume of $185 million. Among these 
items were machinery and vehicles, principally 
aircraft and parts, books and printed matter, flax, 
hemp, and ramie textile manufactures, certain 
food products, and Scotch whisky. The negotia- 
tions with the United Kingdom involved depar- 
tures from Tariff Commission peril-point findings 
on items representing a trade volume of $7 million. 

Negotiations for new concessions with 17 other 
countries, some of which have not yet been formal- 
ized in final agreements, have resulted in addi- 
tional concessions to the United States of about 
$575 million in return for concessions totaling 
about $450 million. These totals will be further 
augmented when the conclusion of all negotia- 
tions still in progress between other countries 
permits the calculation of indirect benefits that 
will accrue to the United States. 

Agreements were also negotiated with 14 coun- 
tries for compensatory concessions to replace other 
concessions which had been modified or with- 
drawn. The concessions to the United States that 
were modified or withdrawn by other countries 
involved trade of approximately $220 million. 
Compensatory concessions granted to the United 
States by these countries covered about $200 mil- 
lion of trade. 

For its part the United States withdrew or 
modified concessions with a trade coverage of $85 
million and offered compensatory concessions on 
$30 million of trade to seven countries, namely, 
Benelux, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Ger- 
many, Italy, Japan, Sweden, and the United King- 
dom. These compensatory concessions were se- 
lected from the same list of items on which the 
United States delegation had been authorized by 
the interdepartmental trade agreements organiza- 
tion to make offers in the negotiations for new 
concessions. These items were therefore not avail- 



able to the United States delegation for bargain- 
ing for additional new concessions. 

In the table which follows there is summarized 
the trade coverage of the concessions exchanged 
by the United States with other countries during 
the Geneva conference. 

Recapitulation op Trade Coverage of Concessions 
Exchanged 

(Direct concessions: Estimates based on 1960 trade) 

1. Reciprocal negotiations for new concessions 

Trade value of concessions 
Obtained by U.S. Granted by U.S. 

Witli EEC $1, 000 million .$79.5 million 

Witli other countries .$575 million $430 million 

2. Article XXIV :0 compensatory negotiations ivith the 

EEC 

Trade value of concessions 

Previous concessions by mem- 
ber states, to be replaced 
by EEC concessions $1, 400 million 

Concessions granted by EEC $2, 500 million 

3. Other compensatory negotiations 

Trade value of concessions 
Concessions withdrawn or 

modified by other countries $220 million 

Compensatory concessions to 

the U.S. $200 million 

Concessions witlulrawTi or 

modified by the U.S. $85 million 

Compensatory concessions by 

the U.S. $.30 million 

Further details concerning the agreements con- 
cluded at Geneva are contained in a publication 
entitled General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: 
Analysis of United States Negotiations, which has 
been issued in two volumes. Volume I (Depart- 
ment of State publication 7349, price $1.25) de- 
scribes the agreements with the EEC and the 
reciprocal agreements for new concessions. Vol- 
ume II (Department of State publication 7350, 
price 35 cents) describes the compensatory negoti- 
ations. These publications may be purchased 
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Gov- 
ernment Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. 



DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE 



Designations 

Richard D. Kearney as Deputy Legal Adviser, effective 
March 18. (For biographic details, see Department of 
State press release 157 dated JIarch 9.) 



April 2, 1962 



565 



Appointments 

J. Murray Luck as science attach^ at Bern, Switzer- 
land, effective March 19. (For biographic details, see 
Department of State press release 173 dated Alareh 15.) 



TREATY INFORMATION 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 



Atomic Energy 

Amendment to article VI.A.3 of the Statute of the Inter- 
national Atomic Energy Agency (TIAS 3873). Done 
at Vienna October 4, 1961.^ 
Ratification advised by the Senate: March 13, 1962. 

Automotive Traffic 

Convention concerning customs facilities for touring. 
Done at New Yorlj June 4, 19.j4. Entered into force 
September 11, 1957. TIAS 3879. 
Extension to: British Guiana, February 5, 1962. 

Customs convention on temporary importation of private 
road vehicles. Done at New York June 4, 19.54. En- 
tered into force December 15, 1957. TIAS 3943. 
Extension to: British Guiana, February 5, 1962. 

Fisheries 

Declaration of understanding regarding the international 
convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries of 
February 8, 1949 (TIAS 2089). Done at Washington 
April 24, 1961.' 

Ratified by the President of the United States: Febru- 
ary 9, 1962. 
Acceptatice deposited: United States, February 9, 1962. 

Narcotics 

Convention relating to the suppression of the abuse of 
opium and other drugs. Signed at The Hague Janu- 
ary 23, 1912. Entered into force December 31, 1914; 
for the United States February 11, 1915. 38 Stat. 1912. 
Assumed applicable ohliyations and responsibilities of 
the United Kingdom : Nigeria, June 20, 1901. 

Telecommunications 

International telecommunication convention with six an- 
nexes. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered 
into force January 1, 1960; for the United States 
October 23, 1901. TIAS 4892. 
Accession deposited: Mali, February 26, 1962. 

Trade and Commerce 

Aehnowlcdf/ed applicable rights and obligations of the 
United Kingdom: Tanganyika, January 18, 1962, with 
respect to tlic following : 

Annecy protocol of terms of accession to the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Annecy 



' Not in force. 
566 



October 10, 1049. Entered into force for the United 

States October 10, 1949. TIAS 2100. 
Fourth protocol of rectifications to the General Agreement 

on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva April 3, 1950. 

Entered into force September 24. 19.52. TIAS 2747. 
Fifth protocol of rectifications to the General Agreement 

on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Torquay December 16, 

1950. Entered into force June 30, 1953. TIAS 2764. 
Torquay protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and 

Trade and schedules of tariff concessions annexed 

thereto. Done at Torquay April 21, 1951. Entered into 

force June 6, 1951. TIAS 2420. 
First protocol of rectifications and modifications to texts 

of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and 

Trade. Done at Geneva October 27, 1951. Entered into 

force October 21, 19.53. TIAS 2885. 
Second protocol of rectifications aud modifications to texts 

of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and 

Trade. Done at Geneva November 8, 1952. Entered 

into force February 2. 19.59. TIAS 4250. 
Third protocol of rectifications and modifications to texts 

of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and 

Trade. Done at Geneva October 24, 1953. Entered 

into force February 2, 1959. TIAS 4197. 

War 

Geneva convention relative to treatment of prisoners of 

war; 
Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of 

wounded and sick in armed forces in the field ; 
Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of 
wounded, sick, and shipwrecked members of armed 
forces at sea ; 
Geneva convention relative to protection of civilian per- 
sons in time of war. 

Dated at Geneva August 12, 1949. Entered into force 
October 21, 19,50; for the United States February 2, 
1956. TIAS 3364, 3362, 3363, and 3365, respectively. 
Notifications received that they consider themselves 
bound: Dahome.v, January 9, 1062 ; Ivory Coast, De- 
cember 30, 1961 ; Togo, January 11, 1962. 

Weather 

Resolution by the Third Congress of the World Meteoro- 
logical Organization amending article 10(a)(2) of the 
convention of the World Meteorological Organization 
signed October 11, 1947 (TIAS 2052). Adopted at 
Geneva April 1-28. 1959.' 
Approval advised by the Senate: March 13, 1962. 



BILATERAL 

Chile 

Agreement further amending the agreement of March 
31, 105.5, as amended (TIAS 3235 and 4112), for fi- 
nancing certain educational programs. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Santiago November 17, I'.Mll, aud 
February 8, 1962. Entered into force February 8, 1962. 

Korea 

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the 
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 
10.54, as amended (08 Stat. 4.55; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), 
with exchange of notes. Signed at Seoul March 2. 1002. 
Entered into force March 2, 1062. 

Panama 

Agreement relating to investment guaranties against in- 
convertibility and losses due to expropriation aud war 
autborizetl by section 413(b)(4) of the Mutual Se- 
curity Act of 19.54, as amended (08 Stat. 847 ; 22 l.'.S.C. 
1033). Effected by exchange of notes at Washington 
January 23, 1961. 
Entered into force: March 8, 1962. 



Department of Sfafe Bulletin 



April 2, 1962 I n d 

Africa. The Challenge of Africa to the Youth of 

Ainerii-ii (Williams) ^'-^ 

Agriculture. Report on Foot and Mouth Disease 

Transmitted to Argentina 543 

American Republics 

FuiniUng the fledges of the Alliance for Progress 

( Kennedy ) 539 

Pan American Day and Pan American Week, 1962 

(text of proclamation) 542 

Argentina. Report on Foot and Mouth Disease 

Transmitted to Argentina 543 

Australia. President Discusses Trade Matters 
Willi Australian Deputy Premier (text of joint 
statement) 549 

Cameroon. President Ahmadou Ahidjo of Came- 

roim Visits U.S. (text of joint communique) . . 543 

Chile. U.S. and Chile Reach Agreement on Financ- 
ing of Development Plan (text of joint com- 
munique) 538 

Congres.s, The. Foreign Economic and Military As- 
sistance Program for Fiscal Year 19G3 (Ken- 
nedy) 550 

Cuba. U.N. General Assembly Rejects Cuban 
Charges Against United States (Plimpton, 
Stevenson) 553 

Department and Foreign Service 

Appointments (Luck) 566 

Designations (Kearney) 565 

Disarmament. U.S. Outlines Initial Proposals of 
Program for General and Complete Disarmament 
(Rusk, principal advisers to delegation) . . . 531 

Economic Affairs 

President Discu.sses Trade Matters With Australian 

Deputy Premier (text of joint statement) . . . 549 

U.S. Exchanges Tariff Concessions With GATT Con- 
tracting Parties 561 

Educational and Cultural Affairs. The Challenge 

of Africa to the Youth of America (Williams) . 544 

Foreign Aid 

Foreign Economic and Military Assistance Program 

for Fiscal Year 1963 (Kennedy) 550 

Fulfilling the Pledges of the Alliance for Progress 

(Kennedy) 539 

U.S. and Chile Reach Agreement on Financing of 

Development Plan (text of joint communique) . 538 

International Organizations and Conferences 

U.S. Exchanges Tariff Concessions With GATT Con- 
tracting Parties 561 

U.S. Outlines Initial Proposals of Program for Gen- 
eral and Complete Disarmament (Rusk, principal 
advisers to delegation) 531 

Mexico. U.S., Mexico Agree To Use Scientists To 

Study Salinity Problem 542 

Military Affairs. Foreign Economic and Military 
Assistance Program for Fiscal Year 1963 
(Kennedy) 5.50 

Presidential Documents 

Foreign Economic and Military Assistance Program 

for Fiscal Year 19C3 550 

Fulfilling the Pledges of the Alliance for Progress . 539 
Pan American Day and Pan American Week, 1962 . 542 
President Ahmadou Ahidjo of Cameroon Visits 

U.S 543 

President Discusses Trade Matters With Aus- 
tralian Deputy Premier 549 

U.S. Presents Proposals to U.S.S.R. for Coopera- 
tion in Space Exploration 536 



ex 



Vol. XLVI, No. 1188 



Public Affairs. Foreign Policy Briefings for Visi- 
tors to Washington Begin at Department . . . 549 

Science 

Luck appointed science attach^, Bern 566 

Report on Foot and Mouth Disease Transudtted to 

Argentina 543 

U.S. Presents Proposals to U.S.S.R. for Coopera- 
tion in Space Exploration (Kennedy) .... 536 

Switzerland. Luck appointed science attach6 . . 566 

Treaty Information. Current Actions 566 

U.S.S.R. U.S. Presents Proposals to U.S.S.R. for 

Cooperation in Space Exploration (Kennedy) . . 536 

United Nations. U.N. General Assembly Rejects 
Cuban Charges Against United States (Plimpton, 

Stevenson) 553 

Name Index 

Ahidjo, Ahmadou 543 

Kearney, Richard D 565 

Kennedy, President 536,539,542,543,549,550 

Luck, J. Murray 566 

McEwen, John 549 

Plimpton, Francis T. P 559 

Rusk, Secretary 531 

Stevenson, Adlai E 553 

Williams, G. Mennen 544 



Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: March 12 18 

Press releases may be obtained from the Ofl5ce of 
News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C. 

Releases appearing in this issue of the Bulletin 
which were issued prior to March 12 are Nos. 155, 
156, and 158 of March 9. 

No. Date Subject 

tl60 3/12 Cleveland: "The Practical Side of 

Peacekeeping." 
161 3/12 Foreign policy briefings for public. 
*162 3/12 U.S. participation in international con- 
ferences. 
*163 3/12 Salute to new nations of Africa. 
tl64 3/13 Ball : House Committee on Ways and 

Means. 
*165 3/13 Program for visit of President of 

Cameroon. 
*166 3/14 Ambassador Williams : meeting of U.S. 

citizens at San Salvador. 
tl67 3/14 Trezise: Fresno Chamber of Com- 
merce, Fresno, Calif. 
tl68 3/14 White nominated to GAS Special Con- 
sultative Committee on Security (re- 
write). 
Ball : reply to U.N. Secretary-General 
on dissemination of nuclear weapons. 
Rostow : "American Strategy on the 

World Scene." 
Trezise: "U.S. International Trade 

Policies." 
Rusk : statement before 18-nation Dis- 
armament Committee. 
Luck appointed science attach^ at Bern 
(biographic details). 
*174 3/16 Program for visit of President of Togo. 
*175 3/16 Cultural exchange (Europe, Middle 
East). 



tl69 


3/14 


tl70 


3/15 


tl71 


3/15 


172 


3/17 


*173 


3/15 



*Not printed. 

tHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin. 



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Participation of the United States Government 

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INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES 

July 1, 1959-June 30, 1960 



Tliis volume is designed to serve as a reference guide to the 
official participation of the U.S. Government in multilateral inter- 
national conferences and meetings of international organizations 
during the period July 1, 1959-June 30, 19G0. The United States 
participated officially in 352 international conferences and 
meetings during the 12-month period covered. 

In addition to a complete list, the voliunc presents detailed data 
on many of the conferences, including the composition of the 
U.S. delegation, principal officers, participation by other countries 
and organizations, and brief statements of the actions taken. 



Publication 7043 



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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 




Vol. XLVI, No. 1189 



April 9, 1962 



MCIAL 

EKLY RECORD 



U.S. URGES SOVIET UNION TO JOIN IN ENDING 

NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS • Statement by Secre- 
tary Rusk 571 

MAJOR ASPECTS OF THE TRADE EXPANSION ACT 

• Statement by Acting Secretary Ball 597 

MEETING THE SOVIET ECONOMIC CHALLENGE • 

by Acting Assistant Secretary Trezise 592 

THE UNITED NATIONS DECADE OF DEVELOPMENT 

An Adventure in Human Development • fay Ambassador 

Stevenson 577 

The Practical Side of Peacekeeping • by Assistant Secretary 

Cleveland ooS 

Extending Law Into Outer Space • by Deputy Assistant Sec- 
retary Gardner 5oO 



ITED STATES 
^EIGN POLICY 



For index see inside back cover 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 




Vol. XLVI, No. 1189 • Publication 7360 
April 9, 1962 






For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington 26. D.O. 

Price: 

62 Issues, domestic $8.60, torelcn $12.26 

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Use of funds tor prlntlnB of this iiubllca- 
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of the Budget (January 19, 1901). 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and Items contained heroin may 
be reprinted. Citation of the Dei'Ahtment 
or State Bulletin as the source will he 
appreciated. The Bulletin Is Indexed lu the 
Readers' Oulde to Periodical Literature. 



The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Public Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public 
and interested agencies of the 
Government with information on 
developments in the field of foreign 
relations and on the work of the 
Department of State and the Foreign 
Service. The BULLETJy includes se- 
lected press releases on foreign policy, 
issued by the White House and the 
Department, and statements and ad- 
dresses made by the President and by 
t/ie Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Department, as tcell as 
specuil articles on various phases of 
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tion is included concerning treaties 
and international agreements to 
which the United States is or may 
become a party and treaties of gen- 
eral international interest. 

Publications of the Departnwnt, 
United Nations documents, and legis- 
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national relations arc listed currently. 



U.S. Urges Soviet Union To Join in Ending 
Nuclear Weapon Tests 



Statement ty Secretary Rusk ^ 



I have asked for the floor this morning to com- 
ment on the interim report to which the chairman 
has just alluded. I do so because of the expressed 
wishes of a considerable nimiber of foreign minis- 
ters to turn their attention urgently to this prob- 
lem of the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests 
before the foreign ministers begin to return to 
their respective capitals. 

Let me say that the United States deeply regrets, 
in the words of the brief interim report, that it 
is not possible to report progress toward a treaty 
for the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests, 
because the United States regards and will con- 
tinue to regard a safeguarded end to nuclear test- 
ing as a major objective of its foreign policy. It 
also regards this as a major problem for considera- 
tion by this conference. 

The reason is obvious. The moratorium which 
for almost 3 years has halted nuclear weapon tests 
was wrecked by the sudden resumption of testing 
by the Soviet Union last September.^ The Presi- 
dent of the United States has amiounced that the 
United States wiU resume testing in the atmos- 
phere late in April, if by that time a safeguarded 
test ban treaty has not been signed. The reasons 
for tlais decision were set forth in his speech of 
March 2,^ which we are asking be circulated as a 
document of this conference. The time is short, 
and this conference will understandably wish to 



' Made before the 18-nation Disarmament Committee at 
Geneva on Mar. 23 (press release 186 dated Mar. 24). 
For text of a statement made by Secretary Rusk before 
the Committee on Mar. 15, see Bulletin of Apr. 2, 1962, 
p. .531. 

' For background, see ihid., Sept. IS, 1961, p. 475. 

' Ibid., Mar. 19, 1962, p. 443. 



be sure that every possible effort is made to pre- 
vent a further intensification of the race to pro- 
duce more and more deadly weapons of mass 
destruction. 

I have asked for the floor this morning to com- 
ment on the interim report which the conference 
subcommittee on nuclear weapons testing has 
made to the conference. Unfortunately that in- 
terim report indicates that no progress has been 
made toward the conclusion of an effective treaty 
to prohibit nuclear weapon tests. The Soviet 
Union appears to be adamantly opposed to any 
international system of detection and verification 
which could disclose clandestine testing and thus 
serve to place an obstacle in the way of a potential 
violator of a test ban treaty. 

We hope we have not yet heard the last word 
of the Soviet Union on this matter, though I must 
confess that we see little ground for optimism at 
the moment. 

Because of the United States Government's 
great desire to put an end to all tests of nuclear 
weapons, we are willing to sign a safeguarded 
treaty, with effective international controls, even 
though the Soviet Union conducted over 40 tests 
last fall. However, we are willing to ignore these 
tests only if, in return, we can be assured that test- 
ing will actually be halted. We will not again 
make our security subject to an unenforcible and 
uncontrolled moratorium, whether this be in the 
form of a verbal pledge or a pseudotreaty such 
as the U.S.S.R. proposed on November 28, 1961.* 

"Wliat we need above all in this field is confidence 
and not fear, a basis for trust and not for sus- 



* For background, see Hid., Jan. 8, 1962, p. 63. 



April 9, 7962 



571 



picion. To get this is the major purpose of our 
insistence on efTective international arrangements 
to insure tliat nuclear weapon tests, once outlawed, 
do not, in fact, ever occur again. 

You will remember that the atmosphere for 
agreements on disarmament questions was not too 
favorable in 1958, especially after the collapse of 
lengthy negotiations in London during much of 
1957. 

Accordingly, in the searcli for a more promising 
approach to the issue of a nuclear test ban, the 
United States, the United Kingdom, and the 
Soviet Union decided to tiy to resolve the tech- 
nical questions first before proceeding to a consid- 
eration of political questions. This path led to a 
conference in Geneva in July and August 1958 
among the scientists of eight countries, i.e. of the 
three then existing nuclear powers plus France, 
Canada, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Eumania. 

On August 21, 1958, these experts imanimously 
agreed on the details of a control system which 
would be teclmically adequate to monitor a treaty 
ending all tests of nuclear weapons.^ Before 
September 1, 1958, the recommendations of the 
scientists had been accepted in toto by the Govern- 
ments of the United States, the United Kingdom, 
and the Soviet Union. Essentially these same 
technical provisions form the basis of the draft test 
ban treaty presented by the United States and 
United Kingdom on April 18, 1961.^ 

Technical Aspects of Controlling Test Ban 

I believe it would be helpful to review some of 
the technical aspects of controlling a test ban. 

The words "detection" and "identification" are 
the key to an understanding of the technical as- 
pects of verification. A great many methods have 
been devised by scientists to record the innumera- 
ble happenings of a geopliysical nature which take 
place around us. Earthquakes are registered by 
seismographs; hydroacoustic apparatus records 
sounds in the oceans. 

I liave mentioned these two particular types of 
instruments because they, along with various other 
devices, also happen to be capable of registering 
signals which are emitted by nuclear detonations. 



" For background and text of report, see ihid., Sept. 22, 
la'-jS, p. 452. 
• For text, see ibid., June 5, 1961, p. 870. 



"Wliat we call detection is merely the capturing of 
these diverse signals. 

Detection, however, is only half of the story ; in 
fact, it is rather less than half. The primary con- 
cern is to Icnow exactly what has been recorded 
or detected. For example, the signal received on a 
seismograph from an underground nuclear explo- 
sion looks like the signals received on a seismo- 
graph from many types of earthquakes. Signals 
which may come from a small nuclear detonation 
in the atmosphere may be difficult to detect. In 
each case the overwhelming difficulty confronting 
any control system monitoring a nuclear test ban 
is how to differentiate among the various record- 
ings or detected signals, how to tell which is a 
natural phenomenon and which is a nuclear 
explosion. 

This was exactly the issue that faced the scien- 
tists in Geneva in mid-1958. It is the very same 
issue that faces us on control today. The answer 
of the scientists was tliat, where doubt existed, the 
only way to clear up the mystery was to utilize 
some form of on-site inspection. This is still the 
only answer available to us. 

In regard to underground tests, except for quite 
large ones like the Soviet blast of February 2, 
1962, the technical situation is unchallenged by 
anybody and was even readily admitted by the 
Soviet Govei'nment on November 28 last when it 
put forward its new test ban scheme based on 
existing monitoring systems. For these under- 
ground events which are detected but which can- 
not be identified by expert interpretation of the 
seismic recording, the only way to determine what 
has happened is to send an investigating team to 
the spot. The events could be earthquakes or 
secret nuclear tests. And there could be some 
hundreds of such events per year in the United 
States and the Soviet Union. 

There is no scientific method not involving in- 
spection that can identify positively a seismic 
event as a nuclear explosion. If our Soviet col- 
leagues have reason to believe otherwise, they 
should come forward with their new scientific 
evidence. 

This technical situation provides a further im- 
portant reason for including the Soviet Union in 
the woi-ldwide control-post network. The spacing 
between the control posts in the Soviet Union 
should be exactly the same as it is in the rest of 
the world. In order to have the best chance to 



572 



Department of State Bulletin 



eliminate a seismic event from suspicion without 
conducting an inspection, that is, by means of the 
interpretation of the seismic recording itself by 
exi:)erts, it is essential to have readings from con- 
trol posts on a global basis, including those within 
the United States and the U.S.S.R. Without in- 
struments in the U.S.S.R. — one-sixth of the land- 
mass of the globe — many more seismic events in 
that country become suspicious. 

In connection with atmospheric tests, the con- 
clusive means for identifying the true nature of 
a detected event is to acquire a sample of the air 
near that event. If the event was manmade tliis 
will show up during a chemical analysis of the 
air sample. For medium and large atmospheric 
nuclear detonations, the radioactive debris will 
become part of air masses that are certain to move 
beyond the boundaries of the country concerned. 
This method is not reliable, however, for small 
atmospheric tests. 

In recognition of this the 1958 scientists rec- 
ommended the installation of air-sampling equip- 
ment at every control post. Even then they 
anticipated that in certain instances some question 
of identification would still remain, and for this 
they proposed the use of special aircraft flights 
conducted over the territory of a specific country 
to capture air samj^les. Natui'ally, to the extent 
that control posts within a country did not exist 
where radioactive air sampling could take place, 
there would be just that much greater need of 
special air-sampling flights. 

Although American scientists have for the past 
several years been actively seeking new methods of 
detection and, even more, of identification of pos- 
sible nuclear explosions, and although there are 
some promising avenues of investigation which 
may be proven in the next few years, the fact is 
that very little has been discovered up to date to 
justify any significant modification of the conclu- 
sions and recommendations of the Geneva scien- 
tists of 1958. Soviet scientists essentially agreed 
with this at our last joint meeting with them on 
a test ban during May 1960 in Geneva. There- 
fore, when we contemplate the cessation of nuclear 
weapon tests by international agreement, we must 
still look to international control arrangements 
similar to those proposed in 1958 to give the world 
security against violations. But the faster we 
have tried to move toward the Soviets in these 
matters, the faster they seem to move away from 
their earlier positions. 



Tlie draft treaty which the United States and 
the United Kingdom proposed in April 1961 re- 
flected the recommendations of the 1958 experts. 
It also incorporated into its terms a large number 
of political and organizational arrangements for 
the test ban control organization on which the 
three powers had already come to agreement at the 
test ban conference or which went far toward 
meeting previous Soviet demands. Eastern and 
Western nations were to have equal numbere of 
seats on the Control Commission, which also had 
places for nonalined nations, and there were de- 
tailed provisions for an equitable division by na- 
tionality of the international statf, as the U.S.S.R. 
had sought. The fact that many of the adminis- 
trative and organizational provisions for the fu- 
ture International Disarmament Organization, as 
set forth in the Soviet document tabled here on 
March 15, are similar to the provisions of the 
Anglo-American draft test ban treaty of last year 
demonstrates that the Soviet Union can have no 
serious objection to large portions of our proposal. 

No Basis for Fear of Espionage 

Indeed, when all is said and done, the funda- 
mental Soviet complaint about the test ban con- 
trol system to which it seemed to agree in 1958, 
1959, and 1960, and which its own scientists had 
helped to devise, is that it would facilitate West- 
ern espionage against the Soviet Union. But the 
facts are otherwise. The proposed system would 
not have any potential for any espionage which 
would be meaningful in terms of present-day 
military requirements. 

The truth is that under the United States- 
United Kingdom draft treaty control posts in the 
U.S.S.R. would be immobile units with fixed 
boundaries. No site could be chosen for a control 
post in the U.S.S.R. without the specific consent 
of the Soviet Government. No foreign personnel 
on the staff of any control post would have any 
official need to leave the boundaries of the post 
(except when entering and leaving Soviet terri- 
tory), and it would be up to the Soviet authori- 
ties to decide whether such personnel should be 
permitted to leave the post. Within the post one- 
third of the technical staff and all of the auxiliary 
staff would be Soviet nationals, nominated by the 
Soviet Government. In these circumstances surely 
nothing taking place at the post could remain 
unknown to the Soviet Government. 



April 9, 7962 



573 



The situation concerning on-site inspection 
teams would be equally devoid of espionage possi- 
bilities. The area to be inspected would be prede- 
termined on the basis of seismographic recordings. 
There would be no random selection of the geo- 
graphic site. To get to the site of the inspection 
the teams would have to use transport furnished 
by the Soviet Government. They could only carry 
specified equipment related to their immediate job. 
Although there would not be any Soviet national 
members of the inspection team, half of the team 
would be nationals of nonalined countries and the 
Soviet Government would be invited to assign as 
many Soviet observers as it wished to verify the 
activities of the inspection team. 

I should also sti-ess that the size of the inspec- 
table area would, in any event, be limited to the 
territory within a radius of about 8 or, in some 
cases, 13 kilometers from the point, the so-called 
probable epicenter, where the unidentified seismic 
event was presumed to have taken place. Tliis 
radius would involve an inspectable area of 200 or, 
in some cases, 500 square kilometers. The Soviet 
Union has territory of over 21 million square kilo- 
meters. Therefore it can readily be seen that, even 
if there were 20 inspections per year in the 
U.S.S.R. and even if each of these inspections 
operated within a 500-square-kilometer area, less 
than one-twentieth of 1 percent of Soviet territory, 
i.e. less than one part in 2,000, could ever be sub- 
ject to inspection in any one year. 

Finally, no espionage would be feasible on the 
occasional special air-sampling flights which 
might take place over Soviet territory. The plane 
and its crew would be Soviet, and Soviet Govern- 
ment observers could be on board. The only 
foreigners would be two staff technicians from the 
control organization who would manage the equip- 
ment taking the air samples and who would 
insure that the plane actually flew along the route 
previously prescribed. 

I have recounted these matters in some detail 
because it is easy to make generalized charges over 
and over again about the dangers of espionage in 
a test ban control system. 

It takes careful explanation to show why such 
charges are completely gi'oundless, even though 
it stands to reason that the U.S.S.R., which was 
just as sensitive about espionage in 1958 as in 1961, 
would never have accepted such a control system in 
principle in 1958 if it had then believed that the 



system could have had the slightest real espionage 
danger for the Soviet Union. 

It should be clear now that the explanation for 
Soviet behavior on the issue of a test ban must 
be sought elsewhere. There is no rational basis 
for Soviet concern about misuse of the control 
system for espionage purposes. There is no scien- 
tific basis for the Soviet desire to abandon the 
still indispensable control system which was rec- 
ommended by the scientists in 1958 and approved 
by the governments of the then-existing nuclear 
powers. There is no political basis for any of us 
to believe that a test ban is any less urgent now 
than it was in 1958 or that the benefits which it 
would bring in improving the international cli- 
mate would be any less. 

U.S.S.R. Urged To Review Position 

My Government, therefore, is at a loss to under- 
stand the Soviet position unless it be that the 
U.S.S.R. has decided that it is still overwhelm- 
ingly important for it to be free to continue its 
nuclear weapon tests. This was what the Sovnet 
Government said last September, when it referred 
to the tense international situation as a justifica- 
tion for its test resmnption, and it may be that 
the U.S.S.R. feels a military need for another test 
series. If this is the case, then it is true that the 
easiest way for the Soviet Union to remain im- 
hampered by a test ban treaty is to offer one which 
contains no provisions whatsoever for effective 
control and which the United States and United 
Kingdom could accept only at grave risk to their 
national security and to that of the free world. 

I cannot urge the Soviet Government too 
strongly to review its position and to return to the 
previously agreed basis of negotiation, namely, the 
experts' recommendation of 1958. We ask the 
Soviet Union to cease its attempts to have the 
international community distort sound verification 
procedures to accommodate one state which is 
obsessed by a passion for secrecy. We call upon 
the Soviet Union to enter into genuine negotia- 
tions in the three-nation subcommittee set up by 
this Committee to consider the test ban problem. 

There is today an interim report of this sub- 
committee. But, unfoi'tunately, there are no 
grounds for encouragement. I sliould like to com- 
ment briefly on the events of the past few weeks 
which have led us to this point. 



574 



Department of Sfafe Bulletin 



Recent U.S. Proposals To Achieve Test Ban 

The President of the United States on March 
2 stated in referring to our conference here that : 

. . . we shall, in association witli the United Kingdom, 
present once again our proposals for a separate compre- 
hensive treaty — with appropriate arrangements for detec- 
tion and verification — to halt permanently the testing of 
all nuclear weapons, in every environment : in the air, 
in outer space, under ground, or under water. New mod- 
ifications will also be offered in the light of new experi- 
ence. 

In fulfillment of this pledge the United States 
presented to the Soviet Union, first in an informal 
meeting on March 15 and this week in the sub- 
committee, new proposals of the kind indicated. 
We have indicated clearly in both formal and in- 
formal discussions that the United States is pre- 
pared to grant a point to which the Soviet Union 
has apparently attached great importance, namely, 
to drop the 4.75-degree threshold and to make the 
treaty from the outset complete in its coverage — • 
banning from the beginning all tests in the at- 
mosphere, outer space, undergi-oimd, and in the 
oceans. We will do this without increasing the 
number of inspections or the number of control 
posts in the Soviet Union. We would seek, by 
conunon agreement, to allocate the quota of inspec- 
tions in such a way that most would be conducted 
in a few areas of high seismicity and only a few 
would be allowable in a large region in the heart 
of the Soviet Union, where there are normally 
few seismic noises which would require inves- 
tigation. 

These moves have been made possible by in- 
creased experience and increased scientific knowl- 
edge. But our experience has also shown the need 
for provisions for safeguarding other states 
against the consequences of preparations for test- 
ing. Tliis would consist, in large part, of periodic 
declarations on the parts of heads of state that 
there will be no preparations for testing, and 
agreed rights to inspect a certain number of times 
per year equal numbers of declared sites on each 
side. 

Experience has also shown the need for provi- 
sions to shorten the time spent before the begin- 
ning of the inspection process. This would pri- 
marily be a question of the way the Preparatory 
Commission functioned and agreement to cooper- 
ate in speeding up, by all possible means, the 
establislunent of detection facilities, including 
temporary control posts. 

April 9, 1962 



The United States has made clear that it still 
stands by its original treaty proposal of April 18, 
1961, plus the amendments proposed in 1961, and 
will sign that treaty. It has also made clear that 
it is willing to negotiate along the lines I have 
described to update the treaty if the Soviet Union 
prefers. 

The response of the Soviet Union thus far has 
not given us any hope. The Soviet delegation has 
told us that the U.S.S.E. will not accept a treaty 
with or without the amendments we propose. We 
are still confronted with the unmistakable re- 
versal of the Soviet position which took place a 
few months ago after the Soviet Union had for 
4 years asserted its willingness to accept a con- 
trolled test ban agreement and after 17 articles 
and 2 important treaty annexes had been negoti- 
ated. The roadblock to a cessation of tests is this 
reversal of the Soviet attitude. The U.S.S.R. was 
prepared to accept controls before the recent test 
series. Now, after 40 or more tests, it is not ready 
to do so. It is difficult for us to understand the 
reason. 

The problem cannot really be espionage. For 
over 2 years in the test ban conference, as I have 
outlined in detail, we negotiated arrangements 
which would insure that the modest amount of 
control and inspection contemplated could not be 
misused for espionage purposes. 

The problem also cannot be that the verification 
system is overly burdensome. As I have said, the 
system which we worked out was directly based 
on the estimate of the minimum technical require- 
ments which was the product of an agreed analysis 
by Soviet and Western scientists. The technical 
basis for this system has never yet been challenged 
on scientific grounds by the Soviet Union. 

The U.S.S.R. now seems to be telling us that 
under existing circumstances the idea of interna- 
tional verification is wholly unacceptable in any 
form whatsoever. It seems to be telling us that 
verification is not even necessary — that it is an in- 
sult to request it, even though this is a measure of 
disarmament. Unnecessaiy? Merely necessary 
to end nuclear testing. It seems to be telling us 
that there can be no impartial investigation, even 
when there has been a signal recorded from within 
the Soviet Union and when it is impossible, with- 
out such an investigation, to ascertain whether the 
cause of the signal was a phenomenon of nature 
or a manmade nuclear explosion. 

575 



We recognize that there are risks in any dis- 
armament measure because no control system can 
give 100 percent certainty. But a study of our 
draft treaty with our proposed modifications will 
indicate that the United States and United King- 
dom have been willing to accept a very considera- 
ble degree of risk. However, we cannot move to a 
treaty which is based on no adequate controls at 
all but solely on pure faith. We do not ask the 
Soviet Union to trust the word of other nations, 
and other nations cannot be asked to trust the 
Soviet Union's word on matters of such far-reach- 
ing significance. 

In President Kennedy's words of March 2, "We 
know enough now about broken negotiations, 
secret preparations, and the advantages gained 
from a long test series never to offer again an 
uninspected moratorium." The same could 
equally be said about an unverified treaty obliga- 
tion such as the U.S.S.R. is now proposing. We 
do not intend to be caught again as we were in the 
autumn of 1961, and there is no reason why we 
should have to be caught again by a unilateral 
Soviet decision to resume nuclear weapon tests. 
This is a risk to national and international security 
which the United States cannot and will not take. 
A test ban, or any disarmament measure, will be 
acceptable to us only when it is accompanied by 
adequate measures of verification. 

International Verification Essential 

In summary the essential element on which we 
must insist is that there be an objective interna- 
tional system for assuring tliat the ban against 
testing is being complied with. This means that 
there must be an international system for distin- 
guishing between natural and artificial events. 
The April 18 treaty provided for such a system. 
Last week the U.S. and U.K. made some modifica- 
tions of the proposed treaty in a way calculated 
to meet Soviet objections. These proposed modi- 
fications were rejected almost immediately by the 
Soviets on the grounds that international verifica- 
tion was not nccessai-y. This refusal to accept 
any form of verification strikes very hard at our 
efforts to guarantee the world against resumption 
of nuclear tests. The key element in the U.S. 
position is that there must be effective interna- 
tional verification of the obligations imdertaken 
in any sucli treaty. 

Let there be no misunderstanding in tiiis Com- 



mittee. A nuclear test ban agreement can be 
signed in short order. There are no hidden diffi- 
culties; there are no mysterious obstacles in the 
way. No time-consuming negotiations need be re- 
quired. The groundwork has all been laid. Only 
one element is missing : Soviet willmgness to con- 
clude an agreement. 

The United States will consider any proposal 
which offers effective international verification, 
but the United States cannot settle for anything 
less. 

We urge the Soviet Union to reconsider its 
attitude and join in putting an end to nuclear 
weapon testing — a total end, a permanent end. 



Foreign Policy Briefing Conference 
To Be Held at Toledo, Ohio 

Press release 184 dated March 23 

Tlie Department of State, with the cooperation 
of the Blade and the Toledo Council on World 
Affairs, will hold its next regional foreign policj' 
briefing conference at Toledo, Ohio, on April 24 
and 25. Representatives of the press, radio and 
television, nongovermnental organizations con- 
cerned with foreign policy, and community leaders 
from the States of Michigan and Ohio are being 
invited to participate. 

This will be the seventh of the series of regional 
conferences which began in July 1961 at San 
Francisco and Denver. The purpose of these re- 
gional meetings is to provide opportunity for 
discussion of international affairs between those 
who inform the public on issues and the senior 
officers of the executive branch who have respon- 
sibility for dealing with them. 

Among those officers of the Government partici- 
pating in the conference will be Charles E. Boh- 
len. Special Assistant to the Secretary of State; 
Chester Bowles, the President's Special Represent- 
ative and Adviser on African, Asian, and Latin 
American Affairs; Harlan Cleveland, Assistant 
Secretary of State for International Organization 
Affairs; Robert J. Manning, Assistant Secretai-y 
of State-designate for Public Affairs; George C. 
]\rcG1ioe, Under Secretary of State for Political 
Affairs; J. Robert Schaetzel, Special Assistant to 
the Under Secretary of Stute; aiul Thomas C. 
Sorensen, Dejuity Director (Policy and Plans), 
U.S. Information Agency. 



576 



Deparfmeni of Sfafe Bulletin 



The United Nations Decade of Development 



12TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
CALLED BY THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE UNITED NATIONS 



Following are addresses made hefore the 12th 
annual Conference of National Organizations at 
Washington, D.C., on March 13 iy Adlai E. Ste- 
venson, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, 
and on March 12 by Harlan Cleveland, Assistant 
Secretary of State for International Organization 
Affairs, and Richard N. Gardner, Dejnity Assist- 
ant Secretary for International Organization 
Affairs. 

ADDRESS BY AMBASSADOR STEVENSON 

D.S./U.N. press release 3937 dated March 12 

An Adventure in Human Development 

"Wlaat a fine and liopeful note this conference 
has struck in taking as its theme "A United Na- 
tions Decade of Development" ! You hardly need 
me to tell you in these 30 minutes what you have 
been telling each other so well for the past 2 days — 
that the United Nations today, after a year of 
trial and testing, is feeling a new surge of hope. 

All the concrete embodiments of that hope which 
your speakers have laid before you — all tlie plans 
and possibilities in the fields of disarmament, of 
economic and social growth, of the growth of a 
world community of peace and law — all these must 
face the hard tests of diplomatic and political 
reality. We cannot tell which will succumb and 
which will prosper. But to the spirit that under- 
lies them all — the spirit of daring and of faith 
in the community of man — to that invincible spirit 
I say "Amen !" And mine, I know, is but one in a 
great chorus of "Amens" from all across this 
nation. 

A year ago, when I had only recently taken up 
my duties at the United Nations, I could scarcely 



have spoken to you in this vein. We faced trials 
and dark prospects at the U.N. whose outcome no 
man dared to predict, least of all myself. Indeed, 
in the staggering loss of Dag Hammarskjold we 
were to face a trial severer than any we had 
guessed. 

But today we can see that the United Nations has 
overcome the worst of that trial, and in doing so 
the great majority of its members have shown a 
serene solidarity and a deep sense of common 
purpose. Whatever perils may lie hidden in the 
future, this dangerous voyage at least has been 
passed in safety. Surely this is reason enough to 
be thankful and confident in the future! 

For these thoughts there is a happy parallel in 
the mood of our own nation. Never have Ameri- 
cans shown more confidence and eagerness. I be- 
lieve that mood was not so much created as it was 
revealed by the astonishing drama that began at 
Cape Canaveral 3 weeks ago. And because that 
drama and that revelation seem to me to have a 
great significance, I am going to ask you to con- 
sider it with me. 

Significance of Colonel Glenn's Space Flight 

Since that memorable morning the Nation has 
had its eyes on a quiet, unassuming marine — 
who also happens to be the fii-st American to ride 
in outer space and see four sunsets in a single 
day. Colonel Glenn and his exploit have too 
many different meanings for us and for our na- 
tional life for tumultuous rejoicings and ticker- 
tape parades to be the sum of our response. He 
has jolted us into a new awareness of confidence 
and hope. 

I believe profoundly that confidence and hope 
are the natural, historical expression of our great 



ApnV 9, J 962 



577 



President Greets American Association for the United Nations 

Message From President Kennedy 

White House press release dated March 13 

Mabch 12, 1962 

The Twelfth Annual Conference of National Organizations called by the American Association for the 
United Nations comes as a propitious reminder of the range and depth of this country's support of the 
United Nations. 

Both by its promise and by its actions, the U.N. has Justified that support over the years. 

The Sixteenth Session of the General Assembly ended last month with a matchless record of solid 
accomplishments. 

It rejected emphatically a powerful attack against the integrity of the Secretariat and went on to a 
series of positive steps which are admirably srmimarized in the theme of your conference, "The U.N. Decade 
of Development." 

In the course of its work the Sixteenth General Assembly adopted a set of guiding principles and agreed 
to the new approach to general and complete disarmament which will get under way in Geneva on Wednesday 
[March 14]. It extended the Charter of the United Nations to outer space and established a new Committee 
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space which begins Its work next week. It adopted a resolution calling for 
an expanded and intensified program for economic and social progress in the less developed world in the 
decade ahead. 

We can be proud of our Initiatives and of the U.N. response in those three critical areas of disarmament, 
outer space, and rapid modernization of the emerging nations. If real progress can be made in these three 
areas, the present decade can be the most exciting and rewarding time in history. 

To sustain its present initiative as a force for peace and human progress the U.N., of course, must regain 
a sound and orderly financial position. The three-point financial plan approved by the General Assembly is 
the only proposal put forth at the U.N. or elsewhere which will meet the requirements and is the only one 
which has the approval of the General Assembly. The U.N. bond issue,^ which is the key part of the financing 
plan, has become the symbol and substance of support of the United Nations by its members. 

Last week Finland and Norway purchased the first of the U.N. bonds. A dozen more nations will follow 
shortly. The world is now watching to see whether the United States will continue to play its full part in 
helping the United Nations to make this a decade in which the world moves dramatically toward the peaceful 
and progressive world foreseen in the Charter. 

I look forward to meeting with your leaders at the White House tomorrow, and I welcome the evidence 
offered by your organizations that bipartisan support for the U.N. in its present financial crisis is stronger 
than ever. Please accept my best wishes for a most productive conference. 



John F. Kennedy 



Mr. Herman W. Steinkraus, President, 
American Association for the United Nations, 
12th Anntial Conference of National Organizations, 
c/o Statler Hotel, 
Washington, D.C. 



' For background, see Bulletin of Feb. 26, 1962, p. 311. 



nation's stance in world affairs. The belief that a 
new kind of society — without privilege and op- 
pression—could be built on earth inspired the 
Founding Fathers. Since their day all our great- 
est leaders have expressed in some way their con- 
fidence that something special and something new 
could be achieved in and by America — a society 
without slavery, a society without poverty and 
insecurity, a society which might play its part 
in leading the nations to a world without war, a 
wealthy and bountiful community able to extend 



to all mankind its own principle of "the general 
welfare." 

These have been great dreams, and they have 
fostered great initiatives. Yet we have not always 
lived by our best dreams. Some of us, on the con- 
trarj', have talked as if mankind were at the 
mercy of the drift of history, powerless to influence 
his fate, moving like a sleepwalker to .^omc apoc- 
alyptic atomic doom — a mood as far removed from 
the earlier youth and optimism of our Republic as 
is St. Paul from Jeremiah. 



578 



Department of Sfafe Bulletin 



Some of us — alas ! among the most vocal — have 
yielded to still another nightmare, one in which 
we are always doing badly, while our adversaries 
march from one triumph to the next. From this 
bad dream come the cries of extreme rightists 
about an ever-encroaching Communist conspiracy 
wliich, if we were to believe them, has not made 
a single error in 40 years. 

This picture excludes a whole universe of facts : 
the fact of unrest in Eastern Europe, the fact of 
waning Communist belief in Western Europe, the 
fact of ideological differences between Moscow 
and Peiping. It excludes a whole series of recent 
Soviet setbacks in the Congo and elsewhere in 
Africa — and at the United Nations. It excludes 
the failure of Soviet state capitalism to compete 
in the production of consumer goods or to work 
at all in agriculture. 

I suggest that, in lashing out at a vast, over- 
whelming, irresistible Communist "takeover," 
the rightists are not only overselling communism. 
Worse, they are underselling America — and un- 
derselling as well the stubborn will to be free 
which is communism's worst obstacle in every 
continent. 

Let us, therefore, be grateful for that image 
of Friendship 7, carrying round the earth one 
of the most buoyant and manly personalities and 
one of the clearest, most light-of-day minds ever 
"orbited" into the national consciousness. For it 
has already begun to replace some of the images 
of unreasoning fear to which we have been treated 
recently. Let it correct, too, the more widespread 
miasma of doubt about the ability of Americans 
in particular, and men in general, to master the 
incredible forces of nature which human intelli- 
gence has imlocked in our time. 

To me there is something superbly symbolic in 
the fact that an astronaut, sent up as assistant 
to a series of computers, found that he worked 
more accurately and more intelligently than they. 
Inside the capsule man is still in charge. Let 
that be called Glenn's Law ! 

Let us now, with new courage and zest, apply 
Glenn's Law to this little capsule of the world, 
spinning through space. Let us do so in the con- 
sciousness that America is a great and inventive 
society, that its occasional tendency to torpor is an 
essentially uncharacteristic response to the enor- 
mous challenges of the contemporary universe. 

Communism, like outer space, may be hostile. 
But it can be lived with and controlled by the same 



patience, skill, hard work, and generous resources 
that went into Project Mercury. Moreover, like 
space, it can also bo seen as a creative challenge. 
Would we not have slumbered under the weight of 
our gimmicks and gadgetry if the cold challenge 
of outdoing and outthinking the Conamunist order 
had not stiffened our backs and our minds? 

So, we may conclude, this competitive nation 
can still compete and even relish the competition. 
Moreover, I believe Colonel Glenn's space journey 
points to the kind of victory for which we hope to 
strive. 

A New Fellowship for Peace 

I am sure you have heard talk and criticism re- 
cently of the Government pursuing a "no win" 
policy. Now I am not sure that I altogether un- 
derstand what the critics have in mind. Do they 
mean that the administration is unready to launch 
a nuclear war to speed the liberation of countries 
under Communist rule? Or do they mean the 
United States should send Marines to take over 
Cuba — and throw away the confidence of most of 
Latin America? I do not know. The critics do 
not spell out what they want, and so we do not 
know whether they accept the basic facts of our 
age — that in a nuclear war there would be not only 
"no win" but no winners. 

From these anxious years our people have been 
slowly learning a new truth, and it is this : Democ- 
racy has no need of enemies or of hatred, and the 
victories it cherishes most are the victories of 
peace in which no one suffers defeat and no one 
nourishes dreams of vengeance in a future war. 

Our orbital flight is such a victory. In it all 
men are winners. It has elicited from Mr. 
Khrushchev the immediate suggestion that Amer- 
ica and Russia should cooperate closely in the fur- 
ther exploration of outer space.^ As you know, the 
United States has been trying for years to promote 
an international approach by which these vast new 
oceans of space would not have to witness the tribal 
conflicts of earthbound creatures or be sullied by 
engines of war. Now with our orbital flight we 
have more chips on the bargaining table with 
which to pursue those imiversal goals. 

Next Monday [March 19] the Outer Space Com- 
mittee of the United Nations will meet at last. 
The 2-year Soviet boycott is over. The Commit- 



' For background, see Bulletin of Mar. 12, 1962, p. 411, 
and Apr. 2, 1962, p. 536. 



^pt\\ 9, 7962 



579 



tee will be gjuided by a unanimous resolution of the 
General Assembly ^ approving the vitally impor- 
tant principle that outer space and the bodies in it 
are not subject to national appropriation and are 
subject to international law, including, specifically, 
the United Nations Charter. The same resolution 
also endorsed worldwide collaboration in the use 
of outer space for the advancement of weather 
forecasting and even weather control, and for 
worldwide radio and television communications by 
satellite. 

Before we succumb to pessimism about the 
chances of any agreement on these measures, let 
us remember that, 2 years ago, a year of scientific 
cooperation on geophysical problems between all 
the nations of the world led to a treaty of neutral- 
ization and national self-restraint in Antarctica.' 
This treaty was a substantial effort to bring all 
the nations into war-reducing activities. Now it 
provides a model for the broader attempt to free 
outer space from the burdens and horrors of the 
arms race. 

When we face the dark wall of Soviet hostility 
and irrationality, we are a little like scientists 
faced with the infinitely complex problems of 
penetrating the lethal secrets of radiation or prob- 
ing the layer upon layer of mystery that surround 
both stars and atoms. At times these scientists 
must despair. At times they must wonder whether 
the small toeholds they have in cosmic research 
will ever lead on to wider vistas and broader 
paths. Small wonder that we, being faced with 
Mr. Khrushcliev's threats and blandishments and 
his retreat from an agreement on atomic testing, 
find Soviet policy even more mysterious and hos- 
tile than the hazards of space ! 

IIow inventive and resourceful they are, those 
engineers who put John Glenn, Alan Shepard, and 
Virgil Grissom into space. If a valve doesn't func- 
tion, they invent another. If one device disap- 
points them, they design a new one. The search 
for solutions and the certainty that there are solu- 
tions continue unrelentingly. 

In just such a way wo must react to the still more 
complex task of creating a viable human order. 
Frustrated in one place, we must try another way 

'For a statpinpnt by Ambassador Sleveiison in Commit- 
tee I on Doc. 4, lOlil, anil test of tlie resolution, see ibid., 
Jan. 2!), ]!K)2, p. ISO. 

" For baclcground and text of treaty, see ibid., Dec. 21, 
1059, p. Oil. 



round. If agreements "leak," new and better ones 
must be sought. If we bog down in our efforts to 
organize joint space research, all the more reason 
for trying harder. If the issue of inspection and 
control proves the toughest nut to crack in dis- 
armament negotiations, let us work all the harder 
on that. 

But we are hard to discourage. Even though the 
Russians reject once again all offers of a reasonable 
test ban treaty at Geneva, and thus compel us to 
resume testing, we are not on that account giving 
up the search for a breakthrough in arms controh 
In fact we must give to our research in this science 
of survival the same ingenuity — and the same scale 
of resources — that go into our defense and space 
research. For remarkable feats of imagination 
will be needed before we can adequately penetrate 
tlie thicket of technical, diplomatic, and i:)sycho- 
logical mysteries in which the arms race and the 
cold war have their being. 

We do not know the whole truth about our ad- 
versaries — any more than we know everything 
about the Van Allen radiation belts. We know 
both can be chingerous and treacherous. But we 
don't stop seeking a way through. I^et our ap- 
proaches to Russia be made with the same ultimate 
confidence, with the same rejection of fatalism, 
with the same readiness for work, for disappoint- 
ment if need be, and for renewed effort. 

To me one of the primary advantages of such 
partial "breakthroughs'' as a joint geophysical 
3'ear or a joint program in outer space is that they 
give us the chance to begin to attempt the only 
final solution to our profound differences with 
Russia — the solution that lies in some kind of in- 
terpenetration and meeting of minds. If we can 
create communities of men — astronauts, scientists, 
doctors, geologists, artists, musicians — who have 
shared tasks of common discovery, we can at least 
hope that their discoveries will include some of the 
truth about themselves and each other. A Glenn 
or a Gagarin, working together in some hazardous 
yet exhilarating space project, could scarcely 
emerge from this experience with all the veils still 
drawn down. And if tlie Soviet closed society 
ojwned enough so tiiat in both societies there came 
to be men and women wlio understand in depth the 
hopes and fears of their opposite numbers, we 
should have opened many windows to the light and 
set many candles burning in the gloom of 
ignorance. 



580 



Department of State Bulletin 



"How beautiful is our earth !" exclaimed Major 
[Yuri] Gafjarin as he came down from space. And 
you remember when Colonel Glenn, looking at the 
same view shouted: "Man, that view is tremen- 
dous !" I tiiink tliose two men have more in com- 
mon tlian either has with the ideologists of 
conquest. 

Do not tliink this is simply Pollyanna talk. 
Wars start in the blind, angry hearts of men. But 
it is hard to hate those who toil and hope and 
discover beside you in a common human venture. 
The Glenns of our world could be new men in a 
quite new sense — the new men who, having seen 
our little i)lanot in a wholly new perspective, will 
be ready to accept as a profound sj^iritual insight 
the unity of mankind. 

When I had the good fortune to conduct the 
astronauts and their families around the United 
Nations and to witness the thunderous, sponta- 
neous welcome that roared from room to room 
among all the nations, I had a sense that men such 
as these belong to a new fellowship which could 
one day be a great strand in the web of peace. 
And I believe they felt the same. Colonel Glenn 
said, if j'ou recall : 

As space science and space technology grow . . . and 
become iiicire ambitious, we shall be relying more and 
more on international teamwork . . . we have an infinite 
amount to learn both from nature and from each other. 
We devoutly hope that we will be able to learn together 
and work together in peace. 

These are the words of our "new men" — not a 
narrow arrogance but a generous vision of the 
great human family. Let no obstacles, however 
forbidding, ever blind us to that vision. 

Strategy of Development 

This same spirit must animate us in other 
realms. I am deeply convinced that the tran- 
quillity of the human family in the next three or 
four decades depends upon bridging the great 
and growing gap between the wealthy, industrial- 
ized, developed Northern Plemisphere and the un- 
derdeveloped, poverty-ridden south. 

After a decade of fairly sustained effort, we are 
beginning to learn that to move out of the cramped, 
ignorant, pretechnological conditions of a static 
tribal or feudal society is fully as difficult as 
breaking the bounds of space. All the forces of 
tradition, all the gravity of ancient habits hold the 
nations back. Each national "capsule," small or 



large, has to find its own idiosyncratic way into 
orbit, and a lot of them are still on the ground. 

The process of modernizing nations involves an 
exceptionally complicated and difficult set of in- 
terlocking actions, decisions, and discoveries. 
There will therefore be delays and disappoint- 
ments. Some projects, like some rockets, will ex- 
plode in midair. Some will take paths that were 
not in the plans. Yet failure is often the prelude 
to success. 

In the matter of international assistance we can 
say without doubt that we know more than we did. 
Our techniques are wiser, our sense of what we 
have to do more sure. Some underdeveloped 
areas — one thinks of parts of India and parts of 
west Africa- — are beginning to show unmistakable 
signs of momentum. This is no time to write the 
program off as a costly failure. We are learning 
by doing, and results are already beginning to 
show. 

To you who have observed the U.N. for many 
years let me say also that the peculiar merits of 
multilateral aid programs under U.N. auspices are 
being recognized more widely than ever. This is 
especially true in the new nations of Africa. I am 
told that the delegates to the recent meetings of 
the U.N. Economic Commission for Africa, in 
Addis Ababa, were unanimous and emphatic in 
their desire to see the U.N. become a major partner 
in their development program. 

None of this can be done quickly. Changing 
an economy means in fact changing a whole gener- 
ation of men. I doubt if that can be done in less 
than two decades. So I would say : Look on the 
fateful program of modernizing what the French 
call the "third world" — the world of the poor and 
dispossessed — as you look on the program for 
probing the planets. Expect failures. Rejoice 
in successes. Never doubt the job can be done. 
Indeed it must be done if misery is not to turn 
to despair, and despair to wars, and war to ruin 
for us all. 

So vital is this strategy of development to our 
country's future security that I never stop being 
amazed at the way in which this nation — which 
cheerfully pays $50 billion a year for arms and 
may pay billions to reach the moon — can begrudge 
the two billions a year that go to economic develop- 
ment abroad — a program which in human terms 
must be judged one of the world's greatest ad- 
ventures. Yet we still hear the argument that we 



April 9, 1962 



581 



cannot afford more, that our national resources 
can't stand it. Yet we are growing richer all the 
time. 

No, the real basis for hesitation about economic 
aid is not scarce resources but scarce imagination. 
There are some citizens whom the prospect of end- 
ing the age-old tyrannies of hunger and disease 
does not stir as does the glamour of space travel 
or the fear of military defeat. Their dreams — and 
their nightmares — tend to be those of the rich and 
the satisfied and the possessors ! 

Yet liow dangerous those dreams are! For 
the rich are a small minority in this world, and 
their ultimate security can only be found by mak- 
ing common cause with the far different hopes and 
dreams of the many poor. Only thus can we hope 
to prevent the despair which communism exploits 
and which so imperils our own security. To forget 
this truth is to be wrong — fatally wrong — about 
our national strategy. 

But it is also wrong at a much profoimder 
level : wrong to leave children to starve who could 
eat with our help, wrong to let youngsters die 
when medical skill can save them, wrong to leave 
men and women without shelter, wrong to accept 
for others, in the midst of our own abmidance, the 
iron pains of degrading want. 

These are moral decisions. We are not bound to 
such evils by necessity or by scarcity. Our modern 
technology of abundance gives us the freedom 
to act — if we so decide. There are no restraints 
now except the restraints of a blind eye and an 
imfeeling heart. 

I think we should rejoice as we have been given 
the extra dimension of freedom, for I profoundly 
believe that at bottom there is liere in America 
a good and generous and moral people. Yet 
some of the elements in our way of life — as in 
all the burgeoning affluent societies of the West — 
tend to make us allergic to self-denial, to altruism, 
and to difficult endeavor. All around us are voices 
which rouse the clamor of desires and claims wiiich 
can stifle our imaginations and douse our sense 
of pity. 

The more we concentrate on our own needs, the 
less we can measure the needs of othei-s and tiie 
more the gap will grow between tlie overfed, over- 
dressed, overindulged, overdeveloped peoples of 
the Atlantic world and the starving millions be- 
yond the magic pale. 



" Great Deeds Demand Great Preparation" 

I would like to end where I began — with the 
image of Colonel Glemi, astronaut, citizen, dedi- 
cated man. I believe that his courage and humil- 
ity and high good humor are the qualities we 
really admire. In a slack age we can still be moved 
by the prospect of discipline and dedication. And 
in an age in which so many people seem to be con- 
demned to wander lost in their own psychological 
undergrowth, we can still recognize and acclaim 
a simplicity of doing and being and giving from 
which great enterprises spring. 

We cannot enter with emotion and sympathy 
into the vast drama of "haves" and "have nots" 
imless some image of discipline, I would say even 
of a certain asceticism, releases us from the pres- 
sures of smash and grab, of "me first," of "you've 
never had it so good." Some sudden new light 
on the ways in which human beings can live is 
needed to release us from the obsessions of our 
"getting and spending," our immense preoccupa- 
tion with "what there is in it for me," and of what 
in short-term thrills or benefits I can extract from 
this day for my very own. 

Perhaps there is salvation in the new image of 
the immense patience and discipline and stripping 
down of desires and wants that are necessary in 
the life of those who are fit enough and tough 
enough to venture out into the new dimension of 
outer space. Here we can perhaps glimpse some 
reflection of the kind of discipline and restraint 
which we all need in some measure if our genera- 
tion is to achieve great tasks, not only in the upper 
air but here and now in this bewildered and floun- 
dering world. 

The sense that something more is required of us 
than a happy acquiescence in our affluence is, I 
believe, more widespread than we know. The 
thousands of yoimg people who volunteer for the 
rigors and discomforts of tlie Peace Corps, the 
uncomplaining reservists, the growing body of 
students with a passionate concern for world peace 
or for the end of racial discrimination, the unsung 
citizens all over this continent whose love and 
service and neighborly good will are the hidden 
motive forces of our Republic — all these people 
will see reflected in the discipline and dedication 
of Colonel Glenn and his comrades the proof that 
great deeds demand great preparation and that 
no country can hope to master the challenge of 



582 



Deparfment of Slafe Bulletin 



our day without a comparable readiness to cut 
away the trivialities and achieve the freedom 
which comes from being no longer "passion's 
slave." 

To tliis kind of greatness we are all called, for 
even daily life cannot be lived with grace and 
dignity without some sense of others' needs and of 
the claims they may make on our sympathy and 
good will. How much more must the great public 
life of a whole nation be informed with discipline 
and vision if its generosity is to shine forth and 
its courage to lie beyond all shadow of doubt ! 

I do not believe that in the last decade our Re- 
public has always equaled the brilliant image of 
youth and energy and regeneration which was once 
projected to the world when, as a commimity dedi- 
cated to a proposition and an ideal, it stirred to 
life two centuries ago in these United States. Nor 
do I believe we can fulfill our role in liistory with- 
out a recovery of the original dream. 

Therefore I pray that, like our young astro- 
nauts, we soar to the stars in mind as well as body 
and recover that sense of our vocation and dedica- 
tion without which this people, founded and cre- 
ated in a great vision, will not finally endure. 

ADDRESS BY MR. CLEVELAND 

Press release 160 dated March 12 

The Practical Side of Peacekeeping 

We are meeting, it seems, to discuss a vision : 
a disarmed world under law. It is the subject 
of much oratory and many books. A few states- 
men have added their endorsement to those of 
poets and professors. But I think it is fair to 
say that until very recently most practical politi- 
cians haven't bothered very much about disarma- 
ment. As practitioners of the possible, they knew 
that disarmament, like congressional reapportion- 
ment or a wholly new farm policy, was simply 
not going to happen. 

Yet suddenly, in the past few months, some of 
the world's toughest and most practical politicians 
have turned their close attention to the dismantling 
of national warmaking capabilities and the build- 
ing up of an international peacekeeping force. 
Their attention has been captured by a temporary 
and dramatic conjuncture of events : 

First, the great-power confrontation that began 
in Iran 16 years ago has just about exhausted all 



room for further territorial maneuver. From 
Berlin to Korea and Viet-Nam, this stalemate is 
symbolized by temporary frontiers hardened by 
the armed forces of the great powers. 

Second, the Soviet Union faces agonizing de- 
cisions in its foreign policy. Weakened by agri- 
cultural troubles at home, the men in the Kremlin 
face increasing restiveness all through the bloc, 
the gradual decay of East Germany, and the overt 
breakaway of the Chinese Communists. The com- 
bination of pressures from the Chinese, from 
Stalinist elements in Russia, from the success of 
the Common Market and the prospect of Atlantic 
partnership, from Soviet failure in the Congo and 
growing U.S. determination in Viet-Nam, must be 
raising new questions in the Kremlin about the 
viability of their traditional policies. 

Third, in U.S.-Soviet relations there is not much 
time to prevent 

— another indefinite succession of appallingly 
complex and costly stages in the nuclear arms 
race — from missiles to antimissiles to more missiles 
to more antimissiles; 

— the spreading of nuclear weapons to other 
countries — and the multiplying of the number of 
fingers on the nuclear trigger; 

— a runaway competition for leadership in outer 
space. 

Fourth, there is a general sense of political flux, 
made possible by military stalemate — and made 
precarious by the teclinological instability of that 
same stalemate. 

Ways and Means in the Search for Peace 

And so we gather here in Washington tliis morn- 
ing just as the curtain goes up on a month of 
vigorous diplomacy, with the possibility of a sum- 
mit meeting hanging in the air. 

The Secretary of State is meeting in Geneva 
with the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union 
and Great Britain to discuss the great issues which 
divide the Communist and non-Communist worlds. 

On Wednesday [March 14], also in Geneva, the 
18-nation Disarmament Committee opens its meet- 
ing — with 17 members present^ — to begin talks 
about "general and complete disarmament," in- 
cluding the creation of new and improved institu- 



' France declined to participate in the meeting. 



April 9, J 962 



583 



tions to keep the peace and provide for peaceful 
change under accepted rules of conduct.' 

A week from today [March 19] the U.N. Com- 
mittee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space will con- 
vene in New York to talk about the rule of law 
in outer space — and its peaceful and cooperative 
exploration. These discussions open with the 
kiiowledge that President Kennedy and Chairman 
Khrushchev have just exchanged letters on coop- 
eration in outer space and that the President has 
made specific suggestions to the Soviet leader for 
international cooperation on certain space projects 
of dramatic potential. U.S. policy is clear — to 
secure the benefits of space science to all mankind. 

Pursuant to that policy, agreed now with others, 
the World Meteorological Organization is work- 
ing on a worldwide weather reporting and fore- 
casting service, taking advantage of weather- 
watching earth satellites. The International 
Telecommunication Union is preparing to work on 
communications satellites. 

Meanwhile the International Coiirt of Justice 
is about to hear arguments on its advisory opinion 
about financing the peacekeepmg operations of the 
United Nations.* 

At dozens of places in dozens of ways, in 51 in- 
ternational organizations and more than 400 inter- 
governmental conferences this year, larger and 
smaller groups of nations are working away at the 
intricate process of knitting together the fabric of 
international life and working out the rules for 
conducting more and more of the world's business 
under agi'eed codes of conduct. 

Some of us are wont to say that our political 
and social institutions lag dangerously behind the 
brilliant advances of the material sciences — and 
with good reason. We are fond of noting that 
doctrine inherited from decades past is all too 
likely to be obsolete in the 1960's. AVe raise with 
alarm the question of wliether conventional wis- 
dom which had led nations to a long series of dis- 
astrous wars is safe in an age in which, as President 
Eisenhower used to say, "there is no alternative to 
peace." 

The alarm is well founded. But something 
quite startling — and potentially hopefvil — lias 
happened in the recent past. Time was wlien the 
subject of peace was reserved to poets and propa- 



gandists, to ministers and mothers, to college stu- 
dents and other dreamers, and to occasional bursts 
of high-fiown rhetoric shortly before national 
elections. 

Peacekeeping, of course, has always been en- 
dowed with unassailable moral, ethical, religious, 
and semantic values — which have normally failed 
to stop men and nations from fighting each other. 
But somehow tlie subject of peace and peacekeep- 
ing has never been considered quite practical, 
especially by men who pride themselves on being 
practical. 

But in recent months, while the astronauts have 
been preparing for the most visionary project in 
histoiy, man's oldest adventure, the search for 
peace, has been quite suddenly brought down to 
earth. It has moved from the realm of dream and 
I'hetoric to tlie realm of ways and means. In the 
process peace and peacekeeping has become the 
major business of the U.S. Government. There 
are no stars in the eyes of Federal bureaucracy. 
We know that it takes two to make peace, just as 
it takes two to make a fight. But on our side at 
least, we are settling down to it in a practical way. 

Working Toward a Disarmed World 

It started last September, when a most prag- 
matic President of the United States addressed 
the 16th General Assembly of the United Na- 
tions.' He called for a U.N. Decade of Develop- 
ment, a concentrated program of peaceful change 
in the economic and social field, which the Gen- 
eral Assembly later adopted. 

He also called for the extension of the rule of 
law to outer space and offered to cooperate with 
the Soviet Union and other nations in the explora- 
tion and development of space. This, too, found 
response in a General xVssembly resolution and in 
tlie formation of the new Committee on Peaceful 
Uses of Outer Space, which meets in New York on 
the lOtli of Marcli. 

Finally the President outlined a comprehensive 
plan for general and complete disarmament.* 
Meanwliile, in bilateral negotiations, the U.S. and 
the Soviet Union agreed on the principles to guide 
disarmament discussions " and on tlie IS-nation 
forum now about to convene in Geneva. 



" For a statement by Secretary Rusk, see p. 571. 
" For biu-kgrouiul, see Bullewn of Feb. 26, 1962, p. 311, 
and Mar. 12, 1902, p. 430. 



' Ibid.. Oct. 16, 19(;], p. C.l!). 
" For text, see ibid., p. ()">(). 
° For text, see ibid., Oct. 0, 1901, p. 58.0. 



584 



Department of State Bulletin 



Shortly after the President addressed the Gen- 
eral Assembly, the Congress approved his proposal 
to establish a full-time, major U.S. Goverimient 
agency to concern itself exclusively with the prob- 
lem of arms control and disarmament.— the first 
such agency in the liistory of any government. It 
is now engaged in an extensive program of serious 
research on the practical technical problems of 
working our way toward a disarmed world under 
law. 

It would be foolish, of course, to predict the out- 
come of the Geneva meeting of the new Disarma- 
ment Committee or the outer space group in New 
York. Significant progress at the technical level 
may be very difficult without a prior political 
agreement having been reached between the great 
powers. 

Yet in his television address to the Nation on 
March 2," tlie President laid the doctrinal basis 
for progress on disarmament when he said that 
". . . in the long run, the only real security in 
this age of nuclear peril rests not in armament but 
in disarmament" — and when he later added, "Our 
foremost aim is the control of force, not the pursuit 
of force. . . ." If the Soviet Union were seri- 
ously to adopt a parallel doctrine, the first disar- 
mament steps would become at once a matter of 
very practical politics. 

But, as President Kennedy said," "To destroy 
arms ... is not enough. "We must create even 
as we destroy — creating worldwide law and law 
enforcement as we outlaw worldwide war and 
weapons." 

This critical point was further developed by 
Ambassador Stevenson when he opened the dis- 
armament debate in the General Assembly last 
fall.^^ He said then that a disarmed world will 
not be a placid world : 

Conflicting ideologies would still be with us. 

Political struggles would still take place. 

Social systems would still be subject to disruptive pres- 
sures from within and without. 

Economic strength would still be a factor in, and an 
instrument of, national foreign policies. 

And the world would still be the scene of peaceful trans- 
formations — for it cannot and should not remain static. 

. . . Disarmament alone will not purify the human race 
of the last vestige of greed, ambition, and brutality, of 



"^ Ibid., Mar. 19, 19G2. p. 44.3. 

" Ibid., Oct. 16, 1961, p. 619. 

" For a statement made by Ambassador Stevenson on 
Nov. 15 in Committee I and test of a resolution on dis- 
armament, see ibid., Dec. 18, 1961, p. 1023. 

April 9, 1962 

633698—62 3 



false pride and the love of imwer. Nor will it cleanse 
every last national leader of the least impulse to inter- 
national lawlessness. No sane and honest man can pre- 
tend to foresee such a paradise on earth — even an crirtb 
without arms. 

That is why, in the United States plan for dis- 
armament, international peacekeeping was treated 
as the handmaiden of arms control and disanna- 
ment. The preamble of our plan contains the fol- 
lowing key sentence : 

As States relinquish their arms, the United Nations 
shall be progressively strengthened in order to improve 
its capacity to assure international security and the peace- 
ful settlement of differences as well as to facilitate the 
development of international co-operatiou in common 
tasks for the benefit of mankind. 

It's not exciting prose, but there is nothing un- 
exciting about the idea. 

What an International Peace Force Could Do 

The world has little practical experience witli 
the dismantling of the national capacity to make 
war. But on the other side of the disarmament 
equation — the building of an international peace 
force — there is some useful experience on which 
to draw. 

We can focus, not on the theoretical kind of 
peace force which the f ramers of the U.N. Charter 
seemed to have in mind, but on the actual peace 
tasks which the international community has un- 
dertaken since the charter was adopted. 

You will recall that the original idea in 1945, 
when the U.N. Charter was signed, was that the 
United Nations should have a standing force pro- 
vided by the great powers to deal with breaches 
or threatened breaches of the peace. But we have 
found from experience that each crisis requiring 
peacekeeping forces arises in a different form and 
therefore requires a different kind of foi'ce. 

In actual experience the United Nations has 
engaged in eight peacekeeping operations — in In- 
donesia, Greece, Palestine, Kashmir, Korea, the 
Middle East, Lebanon, and the Congo. Each time 
the mission was different. Each time the number 
and type and training and nationality of the 
forces were somewhat different — and the supply 
and logistical problems were different too. 

In most cases the standing force envisaged by 
the framers of the charter would have been the 
wrong kind of force to deal with the actual situa- 
tions the U.N. has had to tackle. The political 
composition would have been wrong, or the mix 

585 



of weapons systems would have been inappro- 
priate. 

One lesson is clear from the scattered experience 
to date : We cannot run the risk of throwing to- 
gether scratch teams with no training at a mo- 
ment's notice — emergency forces which are, as the 
President described them in his U.N. speech, 
"hastily assembled, uncertainly supplied, and 
inadequately financed." So entirely new ideas of 
identifying, training, commanding, transporting, 
and supplying special units for special jobs will 
have to be worked out against future emergencies. 

From the modern world's own experience, then, 
we can begin to learn what an international peace 
force could usefully do : 

It could send observers to potential areas of 
conflict ; 

It could watch over tlie carrying out of inter- 
national agreements ; 

It could administer particular areas or special 
functions which have been given an international 
character by the decision of those competent to 
make the decision ; 

It could be interposed between combatants to 
enforce a cease-fire — inside a turbulent country 
(as in the Congo) or between turbulent countries 
(as in the Middle East) ; 

At a later stage a larger international peace 
force with some experience behind it might be able 
to cope with actual hostilities between well-armed 
secondary powers. 

Only in the final and faraway stage of general 
and complete disarmament could an international 
force interpose itself in a conflict between great 
powers. But by making it more difficult for brush 
fires to break out, and by reducing the temptation 
for big powers to intervene when brush fires do 
break out, even a small, highly mobile polic« force 
could render more imlikely the escalation of little 
wars into big ones. 

The practical questions that arise are many and 
quite fascinating to think about: 

Wliat should be the political makeup of tlie 
force and its color composition ? 

To what extent should it consist of a jjermanent 
cadre of regular forces, and to what extent should 
the U.N. depend on a rapid callup system of na- 
tional forces tentatively earmarked for interna- 
tional duty in an emergency? 

Wliat weapons should it have, and what admix- 
ture of air, sea, and ground forces ? Should it have 
bombers or only lighters, surface vessels or sub- 



marines? And what about tactical nuclear 
weapons ? 

By what military law should the troops be dis- 
ciplined? 'What advance training should the 
officers have together? How can a peace force 
liave an adequate intelligence arm ? 'Wliat should 
it do about its own public relations? 

How should an international peace force be 
financed? The rapid increase in the U.N.'s 
budget for peacekeeping operations has already 
produced one major financial crisis at the United 
Nations. The U.S. Senate may decide this week 
whether the President should have the resources 
he has asked for to do our part — our necessanly 
leading part — to meet that crisis. But the amounts 
of money involved in the Middle East and the 
Congo are, of course, small compared to the soit 
of international peacekeeping force that would 
be required in stages II and III of the U.S. dis- 
armament plan. Where will the money come from 
to support them ? 

And finally, the most inclusive and most difficult 
political question: How should the international 
force be conmianded and controlled? How can 
the views of great powers, which under a disarma- 
ment agreement would be progressively giving up 
their reliance on national forces and contributing 
disproportionately to international forces, be given 
appropriate weight in the command and control 
system for an international force, without doing 
violence to what the charter calls "the equal 
rights ... of nations large and small"? 

These are the questions bej'ond the questions at 
Geneva. On a small scale they are inherent even 
in the U.N.'s present peacekeeping role. But be- 
fore most of them have to be answered outside of 
books — for real — we have to learn whether the 
Government of the U. S. S. R. agrees with the 
President of the Ignited States that "Our foremost 
aim is the control of force, not the pursuit of 
force. . . ." 



ADDRESS BY MR. GARDNER 

rri>ss release 159 dnteii March 10 

Extending Law Into Outer Space 

I want to talk to you today about what may 
appear to some to be an esoteric subject^ — the rule 
of law and outer space. 

Let me make it clear that I do not pretend to 
the title of "space lawyer." A space lawyer is 



586 



Department of State Bulletin 



someone you go to if you are ever sued by a 
Martian. I am talking about a diiTerent kind of 
law. A former colleague of mine once described 
law as "eunomics" — the science of good arrange- 
ments. This is what I propose to discuss today — 
good arrangements for international cooperation 
in the peaceful uses of outer space. 

The subject could scarcely be more timely. Next 
week will be the first meeting of the United 
Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space. The United States, the Soviet Union, and 
26 other countries are participating. There is no 
doubt that the Committee will get off its launching 
pad. The real question is whether it will achieve 
a useful orbit. 

Experience has taught ns to appreciate the dif- 
ficulties as well as the possibilities inherent in co- 
operative space activities. The dawn of the space 
age fostered unrealistic notions of how technology 
might heal the breaches of the cold war. Outer 
space, however, cannot be regarded as a realm di- 
vorced from the political realities of life on earth. 
As one of our leading space experts likes to say, 
"Space is a place, not a topic." The things nations 
do in space are largely extensions of their earth- 
bound activities ; they will inevitably reflect mil- 
itai-y, political, economic, and scientific interests. 
Early difficulties in developing a U.N. program of 
outer space cooperation provide convincing evi- 
dence of this fact. 

Yet recent events justify a mood of cautious op- 
timism. In his letter to President Kennedy of 
February 21 congratulating the United States on 
the successful orbiting of Lieutenant Colonel John 
H. Glenn, Premier Khrushchev noted sig- 
nificantly : 

If our countries pooled tbeir efforts — scientific, tech- 
nical and material — to master the universe, this would 
be very beneficial for the advance of science and would be 
joyfully acclaimed by all peoples who would like to see 
scientific achievements benefit man and not be used for 
"cold war" purposes and the arms race. 

The next day the President replied : 

I am instructing the appropriate oflScers of this Govern- 
ment to prepare new and concrete proposals for immediate 
projects of common action, and I hope that at a very early 
date our representatives may meet to discuss our ideas 
and yours in a spirit of practical cooperation. 

The significance of this exchange is enhanced 
by the basis for cooperation which has been laid 
in recent months. The United States, of course, 
has called for cooperation with the Soviet Union 



in outer space on many occasions. This offer was 
eloquently restated by President Kennedy in his 
first state of the Union message on January .30, 
1961." Further impetus was given to the idea 
when, on September 25, the President laid before 
the United Nations a four-point program of space 
cooperation under United Nations auspices. The 
program called for a regime of law and order in 
outer space, the registration of satellites and space 
probes with the United Nations, a worldwide pro- 
gram of weather research and weather forecasting, 
and international cooperation in the establishment 
of a global system of communications satellites. 
A resolution embodying the President's program, 
cosponsored by the United States and several 
friendly states, was placed before the United Na- 
tions on December 4. The Soviet Union, after 
some apparent hesitation, decided to cosponsor 
the resolution — with only a few minor amend- 
ments. Moreover, it cooperated in the solution of 
the procedural difficulties which had hitherto pre- 
vented the Outer Space Committee from begin- 
ning its work. 

What happened to produce this modest advance 
in U.N. space cooperation? How substantial a 
cooperative venture does it portend? 

To answer these questions we must take a closer 
look at the program which was recently approved 
by the General Assembly. 

Framework for International Cooperation 

The first part of the program looks toward a 
regime of law and order in outer space on the basis 
of two fundamental principles: 

1. International law, including the United Na- 
tions Charter, applies to outer space and celestial 
bodies. 

2. Outer space and celestial bodies are free for 
exploration and use by all states in conformity 
with international law and are not subject to na- 
tional appropriation. 

The General Assembly did not seek, quite riglitly 
in the judgment of the United States, to go beyond 
these two principles and to define just where air- 
space leaves off and outer space begins. It has 
been the general view, not challenged by any na- 
tion, that satellites so far placed in orbit have been 
operating in outer space. But the drawing of a 
precise boundary must await further experience 
and a consensus among nations. 



"Il)id., Feb. 13, 1961, p. 207. 



April 9, 1962 



587 



U.S. Supplies Information to U.N. 
on Its Space Launchings 

U.S. /U.N. press release 3933 dated March 5 

FoUouing is the text of a letter from Ambassador 
Adlai E. Stevenson, U.S. Representative to the 
United Natio7is, to V Thant, Acting Secretary-Gen- 
eral of the United Nations. 

JlABCH 5, 1962 

Dear Mb. Secretary General : In accordance 
with Section B.l. of General Assembly Resolution 
1721 (XVI)' I enclose registration data " concerning 
objects launched into sustained orbit or beyond by 
the United States. This reix)rt presents a chrono- 
logical census of seventy-two United States space 
vehicles and associated objects in sustained orbit or 
space transit as of February ir>, 1962. The United 
States plans to submit reports on a bi-weekly basis 
to keep this information up-to-date. 

These periodic reports are submitted for the in- 
formation of the United Nations and to enable you 
to maintain a public registry of orbiting objects 
in accordance with Section B.2. of Resolution 1721 
(XVI). The establishment of such a registry 
marks another step forward in the direction of open 
and orderly conduct of outer space activities. Outer 
space is the province of all mankind and the United 
States believes that the benefits of the exploration 
and use of outer space should accrue to all. We 
therefore particularly welcome the establishment 
of this registry in the United Nations and are 
pleased to supply this information to open it. 

As you are aware, the United States is also sup- 
plying information on launching vehicles and space 
craft of special interest to the Committee on Space 
Research of the International Council of Scientific 
Unions as well as directly to states which are par- 
ticipating with the United States in specific coop- 
erative space activities. We hope of course that 
comparable information will be made available by 
others in accordance with Resolution 1721 (XVI), 
as the value of the registry will depend largely on 
the cooperation of all concerned. 
Sincerely yours, 

Adlai E. Stevenson 



' For text, see Bulletin of Jan. 29, 1962, p. 185. 
' U.N. doc. A/AC. 105/INP. 1. 



The U.N. program takes international law and 
the U.N. Charter as the standard for space activi- 
ties. Mankind would thus be free to use space on 
the same basis as it uses the high seas — free of any 
restraint except those on illegal activity such as 
aggression and exclusive use. This formula is 
designed to promote the maximum exploitation of 
space technology in tiie service of human needs. 



It is designed to prevent space and celestial bodies 
from becoming the objects of competing national 
claims. 

Within this general framework the Outer Space 
Committee, through its technical and legal sub- 
committees, will now seek to develop further 
standards for the conduct of space activities which 
will serve the interest of all nations — standards 
covering such matters as liability for injury caused 
by space vehicles and the return of space vehicles 
and personnel. 

Registration of Objects in Orbit 

A second aspect of the new U.N. program is the 
registration of objects lavmched into orbit or be- 
yond. Under the resolution information on these 
objects is to be furnished promptly to the Outer 
Space Committee through the Secretary-General 
for the vise of all members of the United Nations. 

To fulfill its obligations imder this part of the 
U.N. resolution, the United States has submitted 
a comprehensive inventory of all U.S. satellites in 
sustained orbit and will keep this initial i-egistra- 
tion up to date by the periodic filing of new 
information. 

The establishment of a complete registry of 
space vehicles marks a modest but important step 
toward openness in the conduct of space activity. 
It will benefit all nations, large and small, inter- 
ested in identifying space vehicles. It might make 
a modest contribution to the eventual establish- 
ment of a sj'stem of prelaunch inspection as part 
of a comprehensive disarmament agreement. 

Weather Research and Prediction 

The third part of the new space program looks 
toward a worldwide program of weather research 
and weather prediction. 

Tlie space age has brought a revolutionary 
advance in meteorologA'. Orbiting weather satel- 
lites, supplementing other advances in meteoro- 
logical technology, such as sounding rockets, 
radar, and electronic computers, make it possible 
now for the first time to keep the entire atmos- 
phere of the earth under constant observation. 

The United Nations program calls upon the 
World Meteorological Organization (AVMO), in 
collaboration with UNESCO (United Nations Ed- 
ucational. Scientific and Cultural Organization) 
and the scientific communitj', to develop two kinds 



588 



DeparfmenI of Stale Bullelin 



of proposal;^. Tlie first is for an international re- 
search program to yield information essential for 
improved weather prediction and perhaps even- 
tually weather control. The second is for an inter- 
national weather service program — a global net- 
work of regional weather stations to receive, 
process, and transmit meteorological information 
from orbiting weather satellites as well as eai'th- 
based instruments. 

The United States has offered to make the 
weather data received from U.S. satellites avail- 
able for this international program. Indeed we 
are already making available to other comitries 
the information received from our Tiros satellites 
and are developing methods to permit direct trans- 
mission of satellite cloud photography to any part 
of the world. 

The worldwide program of weather forecasting 
and weather research could lead to the saving of 
billions of dollars in the United States alone. It 
holds special promise for countries in the tropics 
and the Southern Hemisphere, where vast areas 
cannot be covered by present techniques. 

More accurate prediction of storms, floods, rain- 
fall, and drought will bring major savings in life 
and property. Significant increases in farm pro- 
duction will be made possible as the nature and 
timing of crop planting are adjusted to take ac- 
count of future weather patterns. Increased 
knowledge of the atmosphere may lead to new 
solutions to air pollution above our cities. Even- 
tually it may help us break up dangerous storms 
and achieve some control over climate and rainfall. 

The cost of the worldwide weather program is 
small compared to its potential benefits. The chal- 
lenge to the U.N. is to develop a program which 
will encourage the necessary cooperation among 
nations in research, in the training of weather ex- 
perts, in construction of weather stations, in the 
tracking of weather satellites, and in the exchange 
of weather information. 

Global System of Communication Satellites 

Tlie fourth part of the U.N. program of space 
cooperation looks toward the establishment of a 
global system of communication satellites. 

Space technology has opened up vast possibili- 
ties for international communications. Accord- 
ing to many current estimates, it should be techni- 
cally passible by the end of this decade to have in 

April 9, J 962 

63369S— 62 1 



operation a global system of telegraph, telephone, 
radio, and television communication. The cost of 
an initial system is estimated at upwards of $2,00 
million. Its benefits would be impressive. 

With the aid of satellites, telephone communica- 
tion between continents will become immeasurably 
easier. Communication satellites can offer 20 
times the number of telephone channels available 
in our existing undersea cables. If interconti- 
nental telephone communication increases suffi- 
ciently to fill this huge capacity, it may someday 
be possible to place a call to any place in the world 
for approximately the same charge as to another 
city in the United States. 

Intercontinental radio and television open even 
more dramatic prospects. According to David 
Sarnofl', chairman of the board of the Radio Cor- 
poration of America, there are now some 100 mil- 
lion television receivers in use in 75 countries of 
the world. By the end of this decade, when a 
communication satellite network could be operat- 
ing, there will be some 200 million receivers. Pro- 
grams will have a potential audience of nearly 1 
billion people. 

This fundamental breakthrough in communica- 
tion could affect the lives of people everywhere. 
It could forge new bonds of mutual knowledge 
and understanding between nations. It could offer 
a powerful tool to improve literacy and education 
in developing nations. It would enable leaders of 
nations to talk face to face on a convenient and 
reliable basis. 

Some time in the future lies the prospect of 
direct broadcast radio and television. When this 
day comes, it may be possible to beam programs 
from communications satellites directly into 
l)eople"s homes. 

The satellite system likely to be in use within 
this decade, however, will be for point-to-point 
relay between central installations in different 
countries. This means that the benefits of space 
communications can be made available to all peo- 
ples only tJiroiigh political as well as technical 
cooperation. 

Rationale of U.N. Program 

The United Nations program represents a mod- 
est step toward worldwide cooperation on these 
problems. It starts from a principle now unani- 
mously endorsed in the U.N. resolution — that 
satellite communication should be available to the 



589 



nations of the world as soon as practicable on a 
global and nondiscriminatory basis. This is a 
valuable recognition that, in principle, efforts 
should be made to develop a single commercial 
system for all nations of the world rather than 
competing systems between contending political 
blocs. 

A second principle underlying the program is 
that the United Nations should be able to use com- 
munications satellites both in communicating with 
its representatives around the world and in broad- 
casting programs of information and education. 
Within the next year or two the United States will 
be able to offer its satellites, on an experimental 
basis, for live TV transmission across the North 
Atlantic of brief broadcasts from the United 
Nations. 

A third principle is the importance of technical 
assistance and economic aid to develop the internal 
communication systems of the less developed coun- 
tries. A country with an inadequate telephone and 
radio system and no television at all cannot partic- 
ipate fully in a global network of communications. 

Beyond these principles there is general agree- 
ment on the important role in space communica- 
tions that should be played by the United Nations 
and its interested specialized agencies. The In- 
ternational Telecommunication Union has already 
laid tentative plans to call a special conference in 
1963 to make allocations of radio frequency bands 
for outer space activities. It is now proposed to 
broaden the scope of this conference to include 
consideration of other aspects of space communi- 
cation in which international cooperation will be 
required. 

Meanwhile the ITU, like the WMO in the 
weather field, is charged with the responsibility of 
framing more specific proposals for consideration 
by the Outer Space Connnittee, the Economic and 
Social Council, and the General Assembly. 

T^Hiile the ITU study is under way, the United 
States is developing the foundation for a program 
of international cooperation. On February 7 the 
President submitted to the Congress S. 2814, a bill 
to establisli a communications satellite corporation, 
which would be llio instrument for U.S. participa- 
tion in a global satellite system.^* 



" For text of President Kennedy's message transmitting 
the proposed legislation to Congress, see White House press 
relea.se dated Feb. 7. 



We do not, of course, envisage that other coun- 
tries will satisfy their interest in satellite com- 
munications by means of purchase of shares in the 
proposed U.S. satellite corporation. Existing U.S. 
law prohibits more than 20 percent foreign owner- 
ship in any U.S. communications corporation and 
will apply in this case. In order to obtain global 
participation it appears desirable that there sub- 
sequently be negotiated and established an inter- 
national arrangement which would provide for 
broad ownership and participation on a worldwide 
basis. With our present knowledge of the active 
interest of foreign countries in establishing com- 
munications via satellite and their natural desire 
to operate their own ground stations as well as 
participate in the ownership of a global system, the 
establishment of a truly international satellite 
arrangement would appear to be necessary. 

The international nature of a satellite com- 
munications system is dictated by a number of 
commonsense considerations. The satellites will be 
primarily useful for communicating with other 
countries, and we thus must agree with those 
sovereign countries on the arrangements for talk- 
ing with them. Much of the traffic will be between 
other countries not involving the United States 
at all. In view of the importance of communica- 
tions to all states, many other countries will wish 
to have a voice in the operation and management 
of the system. For our part we should welcome 
this interest in cooperation and participation by 
other countries both as a sharing of the burden 
of establishing and maintaining the system and as 
a venture in international cooperation which will 
have value in itself. 

Practical Value of Program to All Nations 

This review of the details of the program of 
space cooperation sponsored by the United States 
in the United Nations suggests some tentative 
answers to the questions asked earlier. It sug- 
gests that the program was endorsed by all U.N. 
members because it promised practical benefits 
to many nations — so nuich so as to be innnune from 
effective partisan attack. It suggests that the pro- 
gram will achieve results so far as the specific 
proposals of cooperation commend themselves on 
a basis of national self-interest. 

A program of space cooperation under U.N. 
auspices serves the national interest of the United 
States and other countries for three main reasons: 



590 



Deparftnent of State Bulletin 



In the first place it provides a way, despite 
political differences, to exploit tlie oiiormous pos- 
sibilities which the space age opens for all man- 
kind. The need for cooperation across political 
lines is supported by solid practical considerations. 
It is in the interest of all countries, whatever their 
ideologj', tliat space and celestial bodies should not 
be the subject of competing national claims, that 
a comprehensive public registry of orbiting ve- 
hicles be maintained, that worldwide weather serv- 
ices be developed, and that communications among 
nations be improved. 

To be sure, the deep political divergencies of 
our time have placed an upper limit on the extent 
of cooperation. But it is noteworthy, for example, 
that the Soviet Union, after years of resisting rules 
for frequency allocations and usage for radio com- 
mmiication, finally accepted the frequency alloca- 
tions of the ITU for its own broadcasts in order 
to avoid interference and other difficulties in the 
operation of its radio circuits. Hopefully the na- 
tional interest of the Soviet Union will encourage 
it to cooperate from tlie outset in space communica- 
tions. 

Beyond these practical considerations the unique 
impact of outer space on the mind of man can be 
used to widen and deepen international coopera- 
tion. There is a widespread feeling that somehow 
man must venture beyond the globe in a spirit of 
cooperation rather than conflict, that activities in 
space should serve the interest of mankind as a 
whole. Our challenge is to use the drama attend- 
ant upon space technology to open doors of co- 
operation that might otherwise be locked. 

In the second place the U.N. program has value 
quite apart from encouraging valuable cooperation 
with the Communist bloc. The assistance of many 
nations is needed if our national space program 
is to be successfully carried on. In weather and 
communications, for example, the technology of 
the United States can yield dividends to ourselves 
and others only if many nations join in allocating 
radio frequencies, in tracking and communicating 
with space vehicles, and in placing necessary 
ground installations on their territories. The 
United Nations can do much to facilitate coopera- 
tion on a free-world basis even if universal par- 
ticipation is not achieved. A good start has al- 
ready been made in such cooperation through 
the activities of the National Aeronautics and 



Space Administration, which has cooperative ven- 
tures with some 40 countries involving tracking 
stations, exchanges of personnel, and joint space 
experiments. 

In the third place the program of space co- 
operation has deep significance for the U.N. itself. 
The United Nations and specialized agencies such 
as the ITU, WMO, and UNESCO will have new 
resjjonsibilities for registering space vehicles, 
studying problems of space cooperation, and as- 
sisting in the development of worldwide weather 
and communications services. Such activities can- 
not fail to strengthen the United Nations as a force 
for peace by binding its members to it through ties 
of common interest. This is particularly true for 
some of the developing countries which stand to 
derive some of the greatest benefits. 

All of these considerations lay behind these con- 
cluding words of Adlai Stevenson when he pre- 
sented the outer space program to the last 
General Assembly : 

"There is a right and a wrong way to get on with 
the business of space exploration. In our judg- 
ment the wrong way is to allow the march of 
science to become a runaway race into the un- 
known. The right way is to make it an ordered, 
peaceful, cooperative, and constructive forward 
march under the aegis of the United Nations."' 



General White Nominated for Special 
OAS Committee on Security 

The Department of State announced on March 
14 (press release 168) that the United States has 
nominated former Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. 
Thomas D. "WHiite for membei-ship on the new- 
Special Consultative Committee on Security of the 
Organization of American States. 

Eesolution II of the recent meeting of foreign 
ministers at Punta del Este, Uruguay,' called for 
the establislunent of this committee of experts on 
security against the subversive action of interna- 
tional communism. The committee is to submit 
an uiitial general report with recommendations to 
the Coimcil of the Organization of American 
States not later than May 1, 1962, and also to sub- 
mit reports to member governments that may re- 
quest such assistance. 



'■ For text, see Bulletin of Feb. 19, 1962, p. 279. 



April 9, 1962 



591 



Meeting the Soviet Economic Ciiallenge 



hy Philip H. Trezise 

Acting Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs ^ 



Today is the Ides of March, a date suggestive 
of fate and doom. I will take for my text an 
appropriately somber quotation: "American cap- 
italism has passed its zenith and is going down." 
The author of this statement is the Chairman of 
the Conmiunist Party of the Soviet Union, Mr. 
Khrushchev. He has also been quoted, on another 
occasion, as saying, "Whether you like it or not, 
history is on our side. We will bury you !" 

Soviet abilities in tlie mortuary field are per- 
haps subject to some discount. After all, they 
have had to bury Stalin twice. And to judge 
from the discussions taking place within the Com- 
munist bloc, Stalinism itself is far from a dead 
and buried issue. 

However, when Khrushchev speaks of the de- 
cline of capitalism, he is taking the role of his- 
torian and prophet. He is offering the predic- 
tion — and no doubt his firmly held belief — about 
the future. At the same time he is issuing a chal- 
lenge. We must examine the challenge soberly 
and carefully. If we take it seriously, as we 
should, he is defining one of the terms of an his- 
toric contest betAveen systems of government and 
ways of life. 

Factors Motivating Soviet Claims 

Wlien Khrushchev predicts the doom of capital- 
ism, he is of course echoing a traditional point in 
Marxian dogma. Marx taught that capitalism is 
doomed, that it must inevitably be supplanted by 
a new system, namely, the Communist society. 



' Ad(Jres.s made before the Chamber of Conimerco of 
Fresno, Calif., on Mar. 1.% (press release 107 dated .Mar. 
14). 



Then, too, the Soviets have long been concerned 
with building a strong economy for military rea- 
sons. Lenin in 1919, when the Soviet Union was 
in the throes of civil war, said, "We must either 
perish or overtake the advanced countries and 
surpass them also economical!}'." And Stalin in 
1931 took the same tack : "We are fifty or a hun- 
dred years behind the advanced countries. We 
must make good this distance in ten years." 

It seems likely, nevertheless, that Khrushchev 
has more than doctrine and tradition in mind. 
There are shrewd and practical considerations of 
foreign and domestic policy which could motivate 
him to lay down the challenge of an economic 
competition with the West. 

In the international arena power or prospective 
power continues to be a key factor. Governments 
make their calculations and decisions in part on 
the basis of the strength or the prospective 
strength of the major nations. If the Soviet 
Union can convince other countries that its eco- 
nomic growth will exceed that of the United 
States, this will register on political choices and 
decisions around the world. A few years ago the 
government of a nation friendly to us prepared 
an ofiicial report containing the amazing predic- 
tion that by 1980 the Soviet would have caught 
up with and greatly outstripped the United States 
in total production. We were able to disabuse tliat 
government of this remarkable belief. Hut you 
may be sure that foreign offices and ]ioiiiical lead- 
ers in many coinitries will continue to reflect most 
seriously about the power relations likely to exist 
between the United States aiul tlie Soviet l^nion 
5, 10, and 20 years lience and how this will bear 
ujion the role of their nations in world afl'airs. 



592 



Departmenf of State Bulletin 



So Mr. Khrushchev no doubt has in mind the 
impact on third countries of his assurance that tlie 
Soviet Union will overtake the United States in 
the economic field. 

There is probably another motive and one that 
strikes closer to home. This has to do with the 
impact of relative living standards on the political 
situation within the Soviet bloc. The theme of 
Soviet victory in an economic race began to domi- 
nate Khrushchev's speeches beginning in 1957, a 
period of crisis within the Soviet sphere. The 
Hungarians had rebelled, and the Poles had shown 
great restiveness. There was obviously grave dis- 
satisfaction within the Soviet Union itself. The 
living conditions of the Soviet people had risen 
from the low levels of the 1940's, but the pace of 
improvement had been vei-y slow. There was 
enough knowledge about higher li%ang standards 
in the West — knowledge gained from the Western 
press and from Western broadcasts — so that So- 
viet citizens were led to ask how it was that they, 
with an allegedly superior economic system, lived 
so much less well than the workers in the decadent 
capitalist countries. 

Khrushchev was ready to concede that affluence 
equals influence. He said at the time, "We will 
insure the production of consumers' goods at a 
higher rate. It will be soon. We shall see. Not 
very much time will pass. We will jump the ob- 
stacle of the highest capitalist comitry, which is 
the United States. Then, my dear people, what 
will you have to say ? We will see who eats the 
most and who has the most clothes." In other 
words, one more giant effort and the Soviet Union 
would be the most powerful and also the most 
affluent nation. 

U.S. and Soviet Rates of Growth 

It would seem, then, that Khrushchev speaks 
not only out of Marxist conviction but out of di- 
rect political compulsions. He is anxious to in- 
fluence other countries in their policies, and he is 
desirous of impressing his own people and the 
people of the Soviet bloc with the superior promise 
of the Communist system. Even so, his challenge 
is in some respects a vei-y bold one. The Soviet 
bloc, including Communist China, at this time pro- 
duces far less than the free world. Using the 
rather rough estimates that are available, the Com- 
mimist countries' total output in 1960 was roughly 
$400 billion as against the free world's total of 



$1,000-$!, 100 billion. This is a tremendous mar- 
gin to overcome. 

It may be more reasonable to make the compari- 
son on a narrower base, the Soviet Union versus 
the United States. Still, the task before the So- 
viet Union would be a huge one. Our total pro- 
duction in 1961 was valued at $521 billion, while 
the Soviet Union was producing only about $240 
billion. To reduce this margin significantly the 
Soviet Union would have to expand very much 
more rapidly than the United States. In fact, 
to believe that the Soviet Union will overtake and 
surpass the United States or the West, one must 
also believe that Western capitalism will be af- 
flicted with a kind of stagnation. 

Such a belief would imply that the dynamic ele- 
ments in Western economic life are few and are 
declining. The notion would be that our system 
is about to run out of steam whereas communism 
retains tremendous vitality. The implications of 
this, as you see, go far beyond mere economic ques- 
tions and to the very heart of our differing politi- 
cal and social systems. If the evidences for Mr. 
Khrushchev's proposition were found to be strong, 
then we would indeed have reason for despair. 

"Wliat are the facts? And what do we see in 
the world scene to justify or to contradict Mr. 
Khrushchev's point of view ? 

First we must recognize in all candor that the 
Soviet Union has shown a capability for quite 
high rates of overall economic growth. The 
motor force beliind this has been a high rate of 
forced savings and of forced investment in the 
industrial sectors where the Soviet Government 
chose to concentrate its efforts. If we take 1953 
as the fii-st more or less normal year after the 
period of postwar reconstruction and rehabilita- 
tion, the Soviet Union seems to have had an annual 
rate of growth of 6 to 61/^ percent, which is quite 
respectable as these things go. This is not to say 
that the Soviet economy was rmi efficiently, for in 
fact Soviet methods of organization and manage- 
ment create innmnerable forms of waste. Nor, 
obviously, does it suggest that the Soviet people 
received benefits commensurate with the rate of 
growth. In fact living standards rose very 
slowly. Even so basic a commodity as food still 
is in short supply in Soviet cities. 

Tlie sacrifices imposed on the Soviet citizens to 
achieve high rates of growth become the more no- 
table, however, when it is remembered that many 



April 9, J 962 



593 



other countries expanded more rapidly than the 
Soviet Union without the need for the grim bra- 
tality of the Soviet system. Japan, with its very 
limited land area and with scarce natural re- 
sources, had a growth rate of more than 7 percent 
during tlie 1953 to 1960 period. Japanese living 
standards during these years sliowed a spectacular 
improvement. West Germany had a rate of 
growth of more than 7 percent while Italy, which 
once was considered to have a hopelessly stagnant 
economy, grew at about 6 percent or roughly the 
same rate as the Soviet Union. In Latin America, 
Venezuela, Brazil, and Mexico all showed rates of 
growth as high as or higher than the Soviets. In 
none of these cases did the government indulge in 
forcible measures to expand the economy. For the 
most part they depended on the efforts of private 
citizens impelled by a desire for higher incomes 
and better standards of life, that is, the motiva- 
tions of the private enterprise system. 

For the United States, it is true, the 1950's were 
years of relatively slower progress. We seemed to 
be resting a bit after the extremely rapid expan- 
sion during the 1940's. We did not, of course, have 
any postwar reconstruction task at home to give 
special stimulus to our economy, and we had sev- 
eral brief but retarding recessions. Nevertheless, 
in a period that was very far from typical of the 
potential performance of our economy, the United 
States increased total output by an average of 2i/^ 
percent per year. In absolute terms we were pro- 
ducing in 1960 $80 billion more real goods and 
services than we were in 1953. In 1961 the coun- 
try's total production rose by 3.6 percent, and this 
year it is expected to grow by 9 or 10 percent. If 
we have not been doing quite as well as we would 
have liked, we have certainly not been stagnating. 

For the future it seems that our economy could 
probably, without any miusual stimulus, average a 
rate of expansion of 41/2 percent or so. The Soviet 
Union in 1961 seems to have fallen below that level, 
down to about 4 percent, primarily because of in- 
creases in the military budget and because of mis- 
takes in planning and management on the part of 
the cumbersome Soviet bureaucratic system. We 
should count, to be on the cautious side, on the 
Soviets' doing somewhat better than that in most 
yeare in the future. A 6-percent average annual 
rate of growth might be the likely one for some 
years to come. If we do not do hotter than 41/2 
percent on the average— and this should be a fairly 



comfortable rate — the Soviet Union is not going to 
narrow the margin between us by very much dur- 
ing the next decade. At these rates the U.S.S.R. 
in 1970 would be producing about 48 percent as 
much as we are, as against 44 percent today. 

Comparison of Various Sectors of Economies 

These overall rates of growth are interesting and 
pertinent, and we should not ignore them. They 
give a measure of the broad performance of an 
economy in terms of total amount of goods and 
sei-vices that it generates. They tell us very little, 
on the other hand, about the performance in the 
various sectors of the economy or about the 
changes in standards of living that have come 
about. It is useful, therefore, to make some other 
comparisons. 

One is in the agricultural field. Here the com- 
])arison between the United States and the Soviet 
Union, or other Communist nations, is so unfavor- 
able to the Communist system that one wonders 
why Khrushchev from time to time even refers to 
the possibility of catching up with us. We have 
roughly 8 percent of our labor force engaged in 
farming; the Soviet Union has close to 50 percent. 
Just a few days ago Khrushchev observed that the 
entire economy is in danger of being wrecked be- 
cause of a lagging agriculture. There are admit- 
tedly shortages of meat and milk in the U.S.S.R. 
We have on the whole the most varied and at the 
same time the least expensive diet in the world. 

These enormous differentials cannot be at- 
tributed to differences of natural endowments 
alone. There seems to be no technical reason why 
Soviet agriculture should necessarily be so grossly 
less productive than our own. The difference 
seems to go straight back to social systems. Ours is 
a farm economy built around private ownership 
and the incentives of the private system. Soviet 
agriculture, for its part, is a state system in which 
the individual is given little reason to use his tal- 
ents to the full and in which the state, as a matter 
of policy, systematically withholds from agricul- 
ture the equipment and working capital that 
would make it more efficient. The travel of Soviet 
leaders about the countryside offering advice about 
what needs to be done is certainlj' no substitute for 
a decision to give the individual Russian farmer 
an opportunity and an incentive to work his land 
fully and efficiently. 

It might be said that the comparison between 



594 



Deparfment of State Bulletin 



the United States and the Soviet Union is not an 
entirely fair one, that our agricultural technology 
is realh' a special case, and that the performance 
of the Soviet farm economy might better be com- 
pared with that in less advanced countries than 
the United States. This is not what Khrushchev 
asks, of course, but it can be observed in any event 
that in Japan, which is a country of extremely 
small farms, where modern technology has to be 
applied in a very special way, there has been a suc- 
cession of bumper rice crops to the point where 
the country is just about self-sufficient in its basic 
foodstuff. This was accomplished, mind you, 
under far less favorable natural conditions than 
exist in the Communist states. The accomplish- 
ment must be attributed to the way in which the 
individual small farmer was willing and able to 
adapt modem methods to his tiny plot. Else- 
where Ln the world, in "Western Europe, farm out- 
put is booming. Aniong the industrial countries, 
at least, the economics of agricultural scarcity 
are confined almost entirely to the Soviet Union. 
Elsewhere we have achieved or are m sight of 
achieving what the Communist Utopia promises 
at some distant future date, that is, an economy 
of abundance and, with us, an economy of abun- 
dance that is sometimes embarrassing. 

At the far end of the scale is Communist China. 
There the authorities tried an experiment in rapid 
and total communization which startled and 
alarmed even the U.S.S.R. The results, for those 
of us who believe in the importance of the indi- 
vidual, have been highly instructive. So far as 
can be determined, the experiment in rural com- 
munism in China was a total and unmitigated 
disaster for the Communists. In a coimtry 
with 80 percent of the popidation engaged in 
farming, there is widespread hunger and even, 
we may suppose, many pockets of starvation. The 
Chinese Communists are using their scarce re- 
serves of foreign currencies to buy wheat from the 
capitalist farming nations. The retreat from im- 
mediate communism on the farms has been a rout. 

If we look at the amenities that contribute to 
the comfort or pleasure of life in the Western 
countries, we find them to a large extent absent 
in the Communist bloc. Most important is the 
shockingly low standard of housing that still pre- 
vails in the U.S.S.R. The floor space nowadays 
available to Soviet city folks is at best 66 square 
feet per person; may I mention that the Federal 



prisons in this country supply their inmates a 
minimnvi of 60 square feet. Shopping in the 
U.S.S.R. is most burdensome because of perennial 
shortages and a complete absence of the service 
concept in a bureaucratic retail trade setup. Need 
I add that most of the consumer durables and 
consumer services that in this country are taken 
for granted are but a dream to the Soviet citizen. 
Take automobiles. The private automobile, 
which has made us so mobile a people, is a rare 
phenomenon in the Soviet bloc. Among all of the 
220 million Soviet people, there are 640,000 auto- 
mobiles, as compared with the 61 million cars that 
cover our highways. A great many of the service 
industries that we take for granted, such as dry 
cleaning, are all but unknown in the U.S.S.R. 

In fact Soviet development has been concen- 
trated narrowly on industrial power and par- 
ticularly on heavy industry. There is no doubt 
about Soviet advances there. Machinery and 
equipment is in many cases the equal of advanced 
equipment in the West. Soviet achievements in 
space testify to a high degree of engineering as 
well as scientific skill. We should not make the 
mistake of discounting this. But we should be 
equally careful not to make the mistake of over- 
estimating the dynamics of a society which has 
focused its efforts so narrowly on a few selected 
fields. 

Looking to the Future 

Wliat of the future? Will the Western private 
enterprise system be able to maintain and even to 
increase its margin over the Soviet bloc? And 
will it be able to provide the capital assistance 
and access to markets that will make it possible 
for the nonindustrial countries in Asia and Africa 
and Latin America to make progress under free 
societies ? 

The answer, needless to say, lies with ourselves 
and with our friends. We obviously have the 
resources and the capabilities if we use them with 
any degree of wisdom. There are very encourag- 
ing indications that we are likely to do so. It is 
entirely possible that the free nations are on the 
verge of a new burst of economic creativeness. In 
Western Europe the appearance of a Common 
Market among great industrial states pi'omises to 
bring about an economic unit very much like the 
United States. It will probably have more people 
than the United States. They are highly skilled 



April 9, ?962 



595 



and thorouglily acquainted with the processes of 
modern industry and science and technology. As 
they tear down the national barriers that separate 
their economies, they will become part of a great 
economic unit, much like that in the United States. 
This is likely to give enormous impetus to busi- 
ness activity, for the possibilities of producing for 
a market of more than 200 million people obvi- 
ously will call for development and oi-ganization 
of new kinds of industrial and business enterprise. 

The dynamic of the Common Market could also 
transfer itself to the United States. The Euro- 
pean nations, joined together, are likely to undergo 
the kind of development in living standards that 
we have had. When looked at in terms of owner- 
ship of automobiles, refrigerators, washing ma- 
chines, and other durable goods. Western Europe 
is where we were in 1935, or even earlier. There 
is going to be a vast potential in Europe for ex- 
port goods. We can, if we are alert to the oppor- 
tunity, get for our own economy the stimulus of 
a rapidly developing new market in Western 
Eurojie. 

The ripples of European expansion need not 
stop with the United States. Rapid growth in 
Western Europe could have its etfects all over the 
free world, in Japan, in Canada, in Australia and 
New Zealand, and in the less developed countries 
of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The way is 
opening, it seems, to a strong push forward in 
the free-world economy. 

For this to happen, however, we shall have to 
make certain that obstacles and barriers are not 
allowed to hinder it unnecessarily. We need to 
make every etl'ort to be sure that the European 
development is an open one, that the expanding 
market of Western Europe is not artificially lim- 
ited to European producer.s, that the prospect for 
free-world expansion not be choked of!" by the 
creation of separate trading blocs. 

The thrust of President Kennedy's trade pro- 
posals before the Congress - is to give this country 
the means to leadership in bringing the free-world 
economy forward. The President is asking for 



the essential bargainmg means to work with the 
Common Market. We can hope, if the President 
is gi\'en the authorities he asks, to assure that the 
Common Market will be outward-looking in its 
economic policies and that the net effect in the 
free world of this great change on the European 
Continent will be to bring a spurt of additional 
economic activity in the free world as a whole. 

Choosing the Right Alternatives 

Nobody, not even Mr. Khrushchev, can see 
clearly into the future. As we look ahead, we 
must depend for our forecasts on forces and fac- 
tors we have observed in the past. 

These considerations would tell us that Mr. 
Khrushchev's economic challenge is not necessarily 
an idle or foolish one. The Soviet system, withm 
its limitations, clearly is capable of generating 
large amounts of economic power. If we were to 
be complacent enough and shortsighted enough, 
the performance of the Communist system might 
bring it within much closer range of our own, at 
least in terms of raw power. 

At the same time we know something about the 
potential of our own system and of the possibili- 
ties and even probabilities for it. If we do tol- 
erably well, we can stay fairly comfortably ahead 
of the Soviet Union. The prospects are, however, 
that we will have the opportunity to do a good 
deal better than tolei-ably well. In that event we 
and our friends might even run away with the 
game. Wliat happens is going to depend very 
largely on alternatives that are easily open to us. 
The problem is to choose the right ones. 



DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE 



'For text of the I'resldent's me.ssage to Congress, see 
Bulletin of Feb. 12, ll)G2, p. 231; for a summary of the 
new trade legislation, see ibid., Feb. 26, 10C2, p. 343. 



Confirmations 

Tlie Senate on March 16 confirmed W. Michael Bln- 
raenthal to 1h' Ihe representative of the United States 
on the Commission on International Commodity Trade 
of the Ecouomie and Social Council of the United Nations. 



596 



Department of Stale Bulletin 



THE CONGRESS 



Major Aspects of the Trade Expansion Act 



Statement hy Acting Secretary Ball ' 



The proposed Trade Expansion Act of 1962 is 
designed to provide the President with tlie requi- 
site tools to advance and protect major United 
States interests in a world tliat has radically 
changed since the reciprocal trade agreements 
program was first conceived by Cordell Hull 
almost 30 years ago. 

■\Anien the first Trade Agreements Act was 
passed in 1934, the United States was in the depths 
of the great depression. Since that time we ex- 
perienced the agony of the Second "World "War, 
which not only drastically altered the power bal- 
ance in the world but set in train forces of change 
and revolution that are still vigorously at work. 

The United States was the only major industrial 
nation that did not feel the direct effects of war's 
devastations on its own soil. In fact, during the 
course of the war, our economy enormously ex- 
panded. Our national income, measured in con- 
stant dollars, rose nearly 50 percent between 1939 
and 1946. 

Almost everywhere else the story was different. 
By "V-E Day many of Europe's factories were 
heaps of bricks and mortar. Japan's economy was 
a shambles. Even agriculture over a great part 
of the world had suffered from shortages of ferti- 
lizers and the disruption of the agricultural labor 
force. 

"\^niile nations of the world were rebuilding, the 
United States sensed as the major supplier of ma- 
terials and equipment. Through the Marshall 

' Made before the House Ways and Means Committee 
in support of H.R. 9900 on Mar. 13 (press release 164). 
For test of the President's message to Congress proposing 
new trade legislation, see Bulletin of Feb. 12, 1962, 
p. 231 ; for a brief summary of the bill, see iMd., Feb. 26, 
1962, p. 343. 



plan we made it possible for the "Western European 
countries to acquire the goods and services they 
needed but which they could not earn the dollars 
to buy. 

During that time we had no difficulty disposing 
of our export surpluses. Aided by Marshall plan 
dollars many American industries enjoyed an ex- 
port trade two or three times as large as they had 
ever enjoyed before the war. In fact the volume 
of United States exports to Europe was over 40 
percent higher in the years of the Marshall plan 
than it had been in previous years. 

"With little need for an overseas sales effort, our 
industry felt no compulsion to design goods ex- 
pressly for foreign markets. To a very large 
extent any surplus capacity that had been built 
during the war could be used to produce goods for 
sale overseas. 

Except for the raw materials needed by our 
own industry, our imports during this period were 
severely limited. Since other industrial nations 
of the world could not produce enough even to 
satisfy their own needs, they had few industrial 
goods to send to the American market. Accord- 
ingly our industry during this period lived under 
highly artificial conditions. It could sell its sur- 
plus production of practically any article in for- 
eign mai'kets as fast as the article could be 
produced. It did not have to face the discipline of 
foreign competition in the domestic market. 

Policy for a Changing World 

Those days of effortless exports are gone for- 
ever. Since the end of the war the world has 
undergone several cataclysmic changes. 

First, the old colonial systems, anchored to 



April 9, 1962 



597 



mother countries in Western Europe, have largely 
disintegrated. In place of colonial possessions 
spread over six continents, nearly 50 new coun- 
tries have been created and still more are in the 
process of creation. Many of these new covmtries 
have been bom weak, sometimes prematurely ; but 
all share a desire to maintain their independence 
and to develop higher living standards for their 
peoplas. 

Second, the colonial powers — the great states of 
Western Europe — have rebuilt their economies 
and have attained new heights of production. Far 
from being weakened by the loss of their colonial 
possessions, they have turned their energies toward 
a common endeavor of creating a vigorous and 
united Europe — a Europe that promises to be- 
come a great new trading area prospectively as 
strong and productive as the United States. 

Third, the international Communist conspiracy 
has tightened its hold on two great nations, the 
Soviet Union and Red China. This has given it 
not only the command of great potential economic 
resources but the mastery of the most advanced 
teclmology. Between the Iron Curtain that 
stretches from the Brandenburg Gate to the Yel- 
low Sea are a billion people — roughly one-third 
of the world's population. 

In this changed and changing world, faced with 
a constant menace from the Communist bloc, we 
have no option but to pursue lines of policy di- 
rected at two major objectives. 

In the first place we must consolidate the 
strength of the great industrial powers of the free 
world. In this effort we must see to it that trade 
serves as a cement to bind our political systems 
more closely together rather than as a source of 
discord between us. The relatively free flow of 
trade among the advanced nations, unimpeded by 
artificial obstructions, will compel the use of our 
resources in the most productive manner. 

In the second place United States policy must 
aim for a higher level of commercial trade with 
the less developed nations under conditions that 
permit those nations to begin to earn the foreign 
exchange that is essential if they are to develop 
economic strength. This is the only way they can 
ever attain an adequate rate of economic growth 
without the continued need for external economic 
assistance. 

Taken together, the forging of closer economic 
ties between Europe and the United States and a 



combined U.S. -European effort to provide larger 
markets for the products of the developing coun- 
tries of the world can be the free world's most 
telling response to the Communist economic 
challenge. 

The enactment of the Trade Expansion Act of 
1962 should give the President the ability to pur- 
sue these lines of policy effectively. 

EEC and America's Federal Experience 

The European Common Market, which is one 
of the main undertakings provided by the Treaty 
of Rome, can be best understood in terms of our 
own constitutional experience. In Philadelphia 
in 1789 our Foimding Fathers made a choice that 
Europe did not make imtil 1957. They elected 
to reverse the trend toward compartmentalized 
Statewide markets in favor of a single market 
embracing all of the then 13 States on the eastern 
seaboard of this great continent. Under the Ar- 
ticles of Confederation, as you know, the States had 
interposed trade restrictions among themselves. 
The Commonwealth of Virginia, for example, 
exacted the same tariff on shipments of goods from 
other States that it did on goods from overseas. 
If a farmer hauled a load of cord wood from Con- 
necticut into New York, or a barge of cabbages 
across the Hudson from New Jersey, he was 
stopped at the border and required to pay duty. 
In drafting our Constitution the Founding 
Fathers changed all this. They deprived the 
States of the right to "lay any Imposts or Duties 
on Imports or Exports." 

The result is that we now have in America a 
great common market embracing 50 States, among 
which trade flows freely. Surrounding that com- 
mon market is a common external tariff. This is 
substantially the pattern of the European Eco- 
nomic Community. Within a few years — in no 
event later than the end of the present decade — 
the European Community will consist of a com- 
mon market comprised of its member states. Trade 
will flow freely among these states while the Com- 
munity as a whole will be surrounded by a 
common external tariff. 

As I mentioned a moment ago there are pres- 
ently six member states in the Conunon Market. 
The United Kingdom, however, applied for mem- 
bership last August. Since then Denmark and 
Ireland have made similar applications. 

It would not be appropriate for mo to attempt 



598 



Deporfmenf of State Bulletin 



to predict this morning the outcome of the current 
negotiations between the United Kingdom and 
the member states of the Community. But if 
those negotiations do lead to the accession of the 
United Kingdom to the Treaty of Rome, the Com- 
mon Market will embrace a population of about 
one-quarter of a billion people with a gross na- 
tional product, on the basis of 1961 figures, exceed- 
ing $340 billion. And it will be an expanding 
market; the creation of internal free trade within 
the area of the Community is unleashing strong 
dynamic forces that are giving a new energy both 
to industi-y and agriculture. As a result the mem- 
ber nations today are experiencing a rate of 
growth more than twice that of the current growth 
rate of the United States. 

EEC's Significance for United States 

The creation of this new market will have a 
great significance for America. 

For one thing it will afford market opportuni- 
ties for American exporters of a kind unparalleled 
in our experience as a trading nation. By helping 
the nations of Europe to regain health and vigor 
through the Marshall plan we made it possible 
for them to become our best customers. Even 
before the European Community was created our 
exports to Europe were expanding as European 
incomes rose. 

With the emergence of the Common Market, 
however, the opportunities in Europe will expand 
and change in character. American producers 
will find in Europe something that they have 
hitherto known only in the United States — a great 
mass market for their products. The rapid 
growth already demonstrated by this market is 
generating ever larger demands for American 
goods. This flow of goods across the Atlantic 
can, and no doubt will, grow ever greater as the 
trade-expanding effects of these increasing de- 
mands are realized — particularly if we take the 
necessary measures to reduce impediments to that 
flow by bringing about a reduction of Europe's 
common external tariff. 

But the coming into being of the Common Mar- 
ket will also have other effects on trade — so-called 
trade-diverting effects. The extent to which these 
trade-diverting effects may prove adverse to 
American interests will depend upon whether or 
not President Kennedy is equipped with the 
powers that will enable hun, by negotiating 



trade arrangements with the Common Market, to 
reduce the level of the common external tariff'. 

A great deal has been said about the disad- 
vantage to United States producers that will re- 
sult from tlie Common Market, but the precise 
measure of that disadvantage is not always imder- 
stood. As the European Common INIarket becomes 
fully effective, a manufacturer in Detroit selling 
to a customer in Diisseldorf will be at this disad- 
vantage as against a manufacturer in Milan : He 
will have to sell his goods over a common external 
tariff while the manufacturer in Milan will not. 
But, of course, advantages and disadvantages are 
reciprocal. A manufacturer in Diisseldorf sell- 
ing to a Texas customer will be at a similar dis- 
advantage as against the manufacturer in Detroit ; 
he will have to sell his goods over the barrier of 
our own common external tariff, while the pro- 
ducer in Detroit will not. 

The existence of this situation poses a simple 
question : Should the United States and the Euro- 
pean Community agree together to reduce the 
level of this mutual disadvantage in the markets 
of each other by reducing the level of their com- 
mon external tariffs, for the benefit not only of 
one another but of the whole free world? 

Political and Economic Considerations 

The answer to this question has two aspects — 
one political and one economic. Let us consider 
each in turn. 

In approaching the political question we should 
be quite clear in our minds as to the nature of 
the European Economic Community. It is, of 
course, a trading entity, but it is far more than 
that. In signing the Treaty of Rome in 1957, 
which created the Community, the present six 
member nations — France, Italy, Germany, and the 
three Benelux countries [Belgium, Netherlands, 
and Luxembourg] — performed a solemn act of 
large political implications. The main driving 
force behind the creation of the Community was 
the desire to lay the groundwork for a united 
Europe. To many of its proponents the Treaty 
of Rome marked the beginning of a process that 
may lead ultimately to the creation of something 
resembling a United States of Europe. 

The signatory nations to the treaty took far- 
reaching commitments. They agreed not only 
to create a Common Market but also to undertake 
a wide spectrum of common action covering all 



April 9, J 962 



S99 



aspects of economic integration — including the 
concerting of monetary and fiscal policy, the har- 
monization of social security systems, the devel- 
opment of a common antitrust law, common pro- 
visions for the regulation of transport, the free 
movement not only of goods but of labor, capital, 
and services, and so on. 

Equally as important, the treaty provided for 
the creation of a set of institutions comprising 
an executive in the form of a Commission and 
Council of Ministers, a parliamentary body in the 
form of an Assembly, and a court — the Court of 
Justice of the Community — that by its decisions 
is building up a body of European jurisprudence. 
I emphasize these aspects of the Rome Treatj 
because there is a tendency to focus on its impact 
on commercial policy — whicli is merely one of the 
aspects of the European Community — to the ex- 
clusion of the other broad provisions of the treaty. 

If we think of the European Community in this 
way we can begin to comprehend its larger polit- 
ical implications. If the negotiations for British 
accession to the Community succeed we shall have 
on either side of the Atlantic two enormous enti- 
ties. On our side a federation of States tied to- 
gether by developed institutions and a century 
and a half of common experience to form a nation 
that is the leading world power; on the other, a 
community of states, trading as a single market 
and seeking among themselves to perfect the com- 
mon policies and institutional arrangements that 
can lead toward increasing economic and political 
integration. 

Between them these two entities will account for 
90 percent of the free world's trade in industrial 
goods and almost as much of the free world's pro- 
duction of such goods. Between them they will 
represent the world's key currencies; they will 
provide the world's principal markets for raw ma- 
terials; and they will constitute the world's prin- 
cipal source of capital needed to assist the less 
developed countries to move toward independence 
and decent living standards. 

Great as each of these entities may be, they will 
bo deejily interdependent. The experience of the 
great depression bi'ought home to Euro]io and 
America the fact tliat not only prosperity but 
hardsliip is indivisible. Tied together by inter- 
related markets, commanding a common technol- 
ogy, reacting to similar wants and aspirations, 
these two great trading entities on either side of 



the Atlantic will, of necessity, constitute the hard 
core of strength with which the free world must 
defend its freedom. 

The degree of interdependence between the great 
economies flanking the Atlantic has been demon- 
strated repeatedly in recent years. Imbalances 
within the trade or payments arrangements 
among the major economically advanced nations 
can create serious problems. Our own troubling 
and persistent balance-of-payments deficit is in a 
very real sense the mirror image of surpluses in 
the accounts of certain of our European friends. 
To minimize these imbalances a high degree of 
coordination of domestic economic policies is re- 
quired — coordination that is already being under- 
taken through the OECD [Organization for Eco- 
nomic Cooperation and Development], which 
came into being last September. We are also seek- 
ing through the Development Assistance Commit- 
tee of the OECD to coordinate national programs 
of aid to less developed countries. 

The extent of the interdependence of the United 
States and Europe goes further still. Effective 
plans for the stabilization of the market of a man- 
ufactured product such as textiles or the market 
of some raw material such as coffee are impossible 
without the cooperation of both of these two major 
trading areas. Indeed any major economic pro- 
gram involving the world's markets demands the 
close cooperation of Europe and the United States. 
As a result the United States finds itself engaged 
in consulting with its European partners al- 
most continuously on a widening area of economic 
problems. 

The growing strength and cohesion of the Eu- 
ropean Economic Community arc laying the foun- 
dation for a much more efl'ective Atlantic part- 
nership. We have long felt the need for a Europe 
strong and miited that could serve as an equal 
partner committed to the same basic values and 
objectives as all America. We can foresee that 
possibility for the first time as the European 
Community begins to spoak with a single voice 
not only on problems of commercial policy but on 
an increasing number of economic subjects. 

Yet it may be asked, granting that a nu)re efToc- 
tive Atlantic partnership can contribute to the 
increased strength and cohesion of the free world, 
how will it affect the trading interests of the 
United States? There are several answers. 

For many reasons the European Common Mar- 



600 



Deparfmenf of State Bulletin 



ket, as it is developing, will provide an unparal- 
leled opportunity for the sale of our products. 
Our tratle with the nations of an expanded Com- 
munity is today very much in our favor. Our ex- 
ports of all products to that area are 50 percent 
higher tlian our imports. Most Europeans are 
only just hef^inning to enjoy many of the consumer 
goods tliat Americans have known for years — 
automobiles, electric refrigerators, air condition- 
ing. Using automobile ownership as an index, one 
may say that the European market is about at the 
level of consumer demand which existed in the 
United States in the late twenties — and think of 
the expansion that has taken place in our markets 
since that day ! 

A great mass of Europeans are just beginning 
to expand their horizons, to catch the vision of the 
more ample life. Their demands are increasing 
explosively. Europe is undergoing a revolution 
of rising expectations quite as profound as that 
which is sweeping the less developed countries — 
but of course on a higher plane. 

Opportunities for Expanding U.S. Trade 

Not only does the European market offer an 
almost, unlimited potential for growth, but it is 
the kind of market best suited for American pro- 
duction. European industrialists have been ac- 
customed to selling their products in small, 
narrow, national markets. They have built their 
industrial plants with that in mind. We alone 
in the free world have fully developed the tech- 
niques of mass production, for we alone have had 
a great mass market open to us. If American in- 
dustry has the will and energy, and if access to 
the Common Market can be assured to it through 
the tools provided by the Trade Expansion Act, 
it should find in Europe new trading opportuni- 
ties of a kind not dreamed of a few years ago. 

Of course the development of the European 
market for American products will not be easy. 
It will make heavy demands on our imagination 
and ingenuity. It will require a considerable ef- 
fort of merchandising of a kind few American 
firms have ever attempted in Europe, because in 
the past the potential of limited national markets 
has never seemed to justify the trouble. It will 
require us to do much more than merely ship 
abroad the surplus of the goods we produce for 
Americans. It will mean much greater attention 



to the tailoring of products designed expressly for 
European tastes or European conditions. 

This need is already being recognized. For ex- 
ample, last week a leading business publication re- 
viewed the plans of one of America's automobile 
manufacturers to produce a univereal car for sale 
anywhere in the world. At least GO percent of the 
overseas demand, the article noted, was for a very 
small car designed for buyers who were moving up 
the scale from bicycles and motor scooters. An 
official of the automobile firm was quoted as say- 
ing: "Ninety-three percent of vehicles made in 
the United States are not suitable for overseas 
consumption." 

So change is in the wind. There is no reason 
why American industry should not continue to 
display the vitality and creativeness that have 
stamped its performance in the past. Industrial 
research in the United States continues at a level 
many times higher than that of Europe. Each 
year American industry creates new products and 
processes responding to the high living standards 
of our people and creating the improved produc- 
tion techniques that will push those living stand- 
ards higher still. 

Our machinery industries, generating a contmu- 
ous stream of new inventions for export to the 
world, are the acknowledged leadere of mass pro- 
duction systems. Our synthetic chemicals prod- 
ucts continue to provide most of the major ad- 
vances in the world's new synthetic products-so 
much so that half or more of the sales of some of 
our leading producei-s consist of items that did not 
exist 10 years ago. We are a creative nation, and 
there is every reason to suppose that we shall re- 
main so. If we can turn this creative genius to 
use in this new and promising mass market of 
Europe, the gains for the American economy can 
be prodigious. 

Need for Prompt Enactment of Trade Program 

But if American producers are to have a fair 
chance at the great trading opportunities provided 
by this new mass market we cannot afford to delay. 
We must be able to assure them of axicess to that 
market as soon as possible. 

There are several reasons why prompt action is 
imperative. 

First, the enactment of the Trade Expansion 
Act at tliis session can have a major effect on de- 



April 9, 1962 



601 



velopments within the Common Market itself. 
There are as many shades of opinion in Europe 
as in the United States. Within the European 
Community there are strong pressures for the 
adoption of a liberal commercial policy and for 
an outward-looking posture toward the world. 
But there are also pressures for keeping the com- 
mon external tariff high and for protecting agri- 
culture excessively. 

By enacting the Trade Expansion Act we will 
make a strong declaration not only of our inten- 
tion but our ability to work toward a world of ex- 
panding trade. We will strengthen those forces in 
Europe that are seeking to liberalize the Common 
Market's trading policies. 

Prompt action is particularly important in view 
of the pending negotiations for the accession of 
the United Kingdom to the Common Market. 
That negotiation is complex. It affects trading 
arrangements not merely with the British Com- 
monwealth, which is spread over six continents 
around the world, but also with the other Euro- 
pean nations that have been imited with Great 
Britain in a Free Trade Association. 

There are various formulae that can be devised 
for the solution of these intricate problems. Some 
would be advantageous to United States trading 
interests, others severely disadvantageous. Since 
the President first announced his intention to sub- 
mit the Trade Expansion Act to the Congress some 
of the nations participating in the negotiations 
have already seen in the Trade Expansion Act the 
instrumentality whereby many of the problems in- 
volved in the current negotiations can be rendered 
easier of solution — and in a manner that will avoid 
discrimination against, or disadvantage to, not 
only the United States but also other nonmember 
trading nations, including our friends in Latin 
America. 

There is a second important reason why the 
prompt enactment of the Trade Expansion Act is 
necessary. There has never been a time in recent 
history when the trading needs of Europe and the 
United States have been more complementary. 
Today Europe needs our imports and we need to 
provide tlie goods it can use. For today Europe's 
economy is strained to its limits; capital is scarce; 
executive manpower is lacking; overemployment 
exists in many areas. America, on the other hand, 
has idle facilities and pockets of unemployment. 
It would be an act of economic statesmanship if, 
by agreement between ourselves and the Common 



Market, we could promptly find a basis for achiev- 
ing a greater flow of goods to Europe. 

"While such an arrangement must, of course, be 
reciprocal in form, Europe is unlikely for a num- 
ber of years to have large export surpluses avail- 
able for sale in America or the capital essential to 
make a major advance in the American market. 

Both sides of the Atlantic will profit, therefore, 
from an early indication that the President will 
be in position to negotiate for reductions in the 
tariff barriers on transatlantic trade. This can 
go far to assure that the solutions arrived at in the 
course of the current negotiations for the expan- 
sion of the Common Market will not be unduly 
burdensome for the trading interests either of 
America or of third countries. It should enable 
the process of reducing the common external tariff 
on major American export products to be phased 
more closely with the reduction in the internal 
tariffs of the Common Market and thus minimize 
the disadvantage to American producers. It 
should make it possible for American industry to 
gain early access to this new and burgeoning mar- 
ket and to establish its brand names and distribu- 
tion channels while the competitive situation is 
still fluid. 

Comparison of U.S. and EEC Tariff Scliedules 

I have pointed out earlier in this statement that 
the economies of the United States and of the 
member nations of the Common Market have 
many similarities. Europe, however, has not 
reached the same high degree of industrial devel- 
opment as we have, in part because it has not 
hitherto had the benefit of all the economies of a 
great mass market. But there is one additional 
respect in which these two economies resemble one 
another; they both are enjoying roughly the same 
levels of protection from outside competition. 

While it is difficult to make precise comparisons, 
I should like to draw upon the results of a recent 
preliminary and unpublished Tariff Commission 
study. This study shows that if the common ex- 
ternal tariff of the European Community, as mod- 
ified by the recent negotiations in Geneva, were 
applied to the actual flow of trade in 1060, the 
average levels of duty in the EEC for industrial 
products would have been 5.7 percent. The com- 
parable figure for the United States would have 
averaged 7.1 percent. I am advised that the Tariff 
Commission will shortly be reducing this study 



602 



Department of State Bulletin 



to final form and that it can be made available to 
the committee at that time. 

Another study, completed before the recent 
Geneva negotiations, shows that the median of all 
tariff rates is the same for the Common Market 
and the United States — 13 percent. 

While the average tariff burdens on industrial 
imports are roughly similar and the median rates 
are the same, the structure of tariffs in the two 
trading areas is very different. United States 
tariff rates range from the very low to the very 
high. "We admit nearly 1,000 of the 5,000 items 
on our tarilf schedule on a duty-free basis. At the 
same time there are about 900 items on which we 
levy a duty of 30 percent or more. Products cov- 
ered by such high rates are largely excluded from 
the American market, while the duty-free items, 
to a considerable extent, are products not produced 
in the United States. 

The common external tariff of the European 
Community has a quite different structure because 
it was developed by averaging the rates that 
existed before 1957 in France, Germany, Italy, 
and the Benelux customs union. As a result of 
this a\eraging process practically all of the high 
tariff rates that existed in the individual coim- 
tries have been greatly reduced. Wliereas over 
one-sixth of the rates in the United States tariff 
are above 30 percent, less than one-fiftieth of 
Europe's rates run over 30 pei'cent. There are 
thus few rates in the European Common Market 
as protective as many rates in our own tariff sched- 
ule ; at the same time there are fewer items on the 
free list. 

These facts are significant for two reasons. In 
the first place they show that in any new trade 
negotiation the United States and the European 
Common Market would be starting at substan- 
tially the same levels of protection. It should be 
possible to phase down the levels of protection at 
roughly the same pace. 

But these studies also demonstrate that, con- 
trary to the prevailing mythology, our trade nego- 
tiators have effectively defended United States 
interests. There is a tendency in discussing these 
matters to cite rates that are markedly higher in 
Europe than in the United States — such as the 
current rate on automobiles, which under the com- 
mon external tariff of the Common Market is 221^ 
percent while under the United States tariff is 
only 61^ percent — and assume from this that 
America has been unduly generous in past nego- 

April 9, 7962 



tiations and that our negotiators have persistently 
gotten the worst of it. 

This attitude is in part, perhaps, the reflection 
of a long-held view that when our diplomats go 
abroad they are too naive and high principled to 
protect their country's interests. Such a view does 
more credit to our modesty than our judgment. 
Speaking for the Department of State, which has 
the major responsibility for the actual negotia- 
tion of trade agreements, I can assure this com- 
mittee quite categorically that this view is held 
nowhere outside of the United States. The offi- 
cials of our Government who over the years have 
participated in trade agreements negotiations 
have served their country well. If this were not 
so, we could expect to find the tariff rates of 
Europe today well above those of the United 
States. 

It is true, of course, that during the period of 
the dollar shortage the limiting factor on our ex- 
ports to Europe was Europe's ability to earn the 
currency to pay for what it imported. European 
nations were thus forced to resort to quantitative 
limitations in the form of quotas in order to save 
dollar exchange. But by 1958 the Western World 
had achieved general convertibility, and today 
there are practically no quotas on industrial prod- 
ucts in any of the major Western European 
markets. 

In the past our representatives in tariff nego- 
tiations have faced serious technical difficulties. 
They have spoken for a United States market of 
enormous size, while the representatives of other 
countries could speak only for relatively small 
national markets. As a consequence, in order to 
obtain adequate reciprocal concessions for the con- 
cessions we made with respect to the United States 
market, our negotiators were forced to bargain 
with many countries at the same time. 

With the advent of the European Common 
Market— and particularly if that market is ex- 
panded—future negotiations will depend to a 
large extent on the bargain that can be struck 
between our representatives speaking for our own 
large market and their European counterparts 
speaking for a market of almost comparable size. 
This in Itself should facilitate the achievement of 
agreements. 

Expansion of U.S. Agricultural Exports 

This statement so far has concerned itself with 
the problem of negotiating trade agreements pri- 

603 



marily with respect to industrial products. But 
we have an interest fully as great in preserving 
and expanding the access for American agricul- 
tural products into the European Common Market. 
Our commercial agricultural exports to the na- 
tions that would comprise an expanded European 
Common Market are presently running at the rate 
of about $1,600,000,000 annually, which repre- 
sents almost half of our total commercial exports 
of United States agricultural products. 

In January of this year, after protracted nego- 
tiations among the members, the European Com- 
munity agreed on the principles of a common ag- 
ricultural policy. In a year or two, in accordance 
with the new policy, tlie members of the Com- 
munity will begin moving toward a common in- 
ternal price in their agricultural commodities. By 
1970 the Common Market will have achieved free 
trade in such products among the member nations. 
As the member nations move toward a common 
internal price they will also begin to protect that 
price structure against lower cost agricultural im- 
ports by a system of so-called variable levies. The 
levy for each commodity will be fixed at the 
amount necessary to bring the price of the im- 
ported product up to the common internal price. 

Thus far these internal prices have not been 
established. It is a matter of the greatest inter- 
est to United States agriculture that they not be 
established at unduly high levels. A high internal 
price level, as we well know, will tend to encourage 
uneconomic production, wliich over the years could 
displace the products of more efficient producers — 
including United States farmers. 

I shall not attempt to develop this problem here 
this morning since Secretary Freeman [Orville 
L. Freeman, Secretary of Agriculture] can speak 
about it with much more authority and wisdom. 
But it should be emphasized that the Trade Expan- 
sion Act was designed expressly to provide bar- 
gaining powers that would enable the United 
States to maintain the position of United States 
farm products in the enormou.sly important West- 
em European market. 

Expanding Markets of Less Developed Nations 

I have spoken so far almost entirely of the appli- 
cation of the Trade Expansion Act to our com- 
merce with the European Economic Community. 
Secretary Hodges [Lutlier II. Hodges, Secretary 



of Commerce] yesterday described in some detail 
how the act will function in negotiations with 
other nations around the world. 

As this committee Imows, H.R. 9900 would pro- 
vide the President with the authority to reduce 
tariffs on any product up to 50 percent in con- 
nection with our tariff negotiations with any 
country. At the same time the bill reaffirms the 
principles of nondiscrimination and most-favored- 
nation treatment. Accordingly the benefits of our 
negotiations with the European Community would 
be available to other nations. To the extent that 
such nations receive substantial incidental bene- 
fits we should expect to receive concessions from 
them. 

The United States has a special interest in ex- 
panding the export earnings of the developing 
areas of the world, not merely because it helps 
them toward the ultimate goal of self-sustaining 
growth but also because it affects the potential 
volume of our own exports. Our export inter- 
ests in Latin America and Asia are very large. 
Our commercial exports to these areas have now 
reached a figure of over $6 billion annually and 
promise to grow further still. 

The limit on these exports, of course, is repre- 
sented by the ability of the developing countries 
to earn foreign exchange. If Europe can be per- 
suaded to accept the products of Latin America 
without undue discrimination — and we hope to 
assist in bringing this about through our own 
negotiations with the European Economic Com- 
munity — this will mean more exports by tlie Latin 
American countries. And, of couree, any increase 
in the export opportunities of these countries will 
increase their ability to buy our products. Our 
political and security interests and our trading 
interests are, therefore, the same ; both are served 
by expanding the market opportunities for the 
developing nations. The Trade Expansion Act 
should contribute to those opportunities. 

Strengthening the Atlantic Partnership 

In the course of tliis statement I have attempted 
to bring to this conunittee the views of the Depart- 
ment of State with regard to certain major as- 
pects of the proposed Trade Expansion Act of 
19G2. Wo regard this legislation as of major im- 
portance. Not only sliould it prove an effective 
tool for advancing and protecting the interests of 
United States trade — and tlnis of providing new 



604 



Deparfment of Sfaie Bulletin 



business opportunities and job opportunities for 
Americans— but it should also constitute a neces- 
sary instrument for strengthening the bonds be- 
tween the two sides of the Atlantic. 

In a world threatened by an aggressive and un- 
friendly power, as is the free world today, we 
cannot neglect either of these objectives. Not 
only must we seize every opportunity to increase 
our own strength by the development of new mar- 
kets for our products, but we must seek through 
the expansion of our trading relations to bind 
together the nations that are the core of our 



strength for defending the values to which we are 
committed. 

I think that President Kennedy stated the case 
for the trade expansion bill with great eloquence 
when he said at the conclusion of his message : 

"At rare moments in the life of this nation an 
opportunity comes along to fashion out of the 
confusion of current events a clear and bold ac- 
tion to show the world what it is we stand for. 
Such an opportunity is before us now. This bill, 
by enabling us to strike a bargain with the Com- 
mon Market, will 'strike a blow' for freedom." 



INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES 



Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings' 



Scheduled April Through June 1962 

FAO Committee of Government Experts on the Uses of Designa- 
tions, Definitions, and Standards for Milk Products. 

ICEM Executive Committee: 19th Session 

U.N. ECE Consultation of Experts on Energy in Europe .... 

UNESCO Conference on Education in Asia 

ILO African Advisory Committee: 2d Session . . . ._ 

Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission: 4th Meetmg . . . 

U N. Economic and Social Council: 33d Session ...... . ■ 

ITU CCIR Study Group I (Transmitters) and Study Group 111 
(Fixed Service Systems). 

IDB Board of Governors: 3d Meeting ,o " ' ' 

GATT Working Party on European Economic Community/Greece . 

3d International Cinema Festival 

ILO Committee on Statistics of Hours of Work 

ILO/WHO Committee on Occupational Health: 4th Session . . . 

ICEM Council: 16th Session i, '"'■'' ' 

Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission: 4th Symposmm on 
Peaceful Application of Nuclear Energy. 

U.N. Committee on Question of Defining Aggression 

U.N. ECE Working Group on Family Budget Inquiries 

NATO Medical Committee „ ■ .• , W ,; ' 

U.N. EGA Community Development Workshop on Social WeUare 
and Family and Child Welfare. . 

IAEA Symposium on Reactor Hazards Evaluation Techniques . . 

FAO Desert Locust Control Committee: 7th Session ...... 

F.\0 Poplar Commission: 17th Session of Executive Committee . . 



Rome Apr. 2- 

Geneva Apr. 2- 

Geneva Apr. 2- 

Tokyo Apr. 2- 

Tananarive ^^P""- ^ 

M6xico, D.F Apr. 3- 

New York Apr. 3- 

Geneva Apr. 4- 

Buenos Aires Apr. 5- 

Geneva Apr. 5- 

Cartagena, Colombia .... Apr. b 

Geneva '^P'"- n 

Geneva Apr. 9- 

Geneva ■^P''• o 

Mdxico, D.F Apr. 9- 

New York Apr. 9- 

Gcneva ^P""' ?n 

Paris *P'- ?~ 

Abidjan Apr. 11- 

Vienna Apr. 16- 

Addis Ababa f P'" ,\^ 

Ankara Apr. 10^ 



^ Prepared in the Office of International Conferene^. far 18, 19G| Asterisks^.ndK^ e^te^^^^^^^ 

ins is a list of abbreviations: ANZUS, Australia-New Zealand-United States^^^^^^ 1 

des radio communications; CCITT, Comity consultatif ^"/"nat.onal t^legi^aphi^ue et^ ^^^. ^^^^ ^^^^ 

Treaty Organization ; ECA, Economic Commission for Africa ; ECAFE, '^^°^°?^}^^':;'"'"":'pj.f. p^od and Agriculture 
East; ECE. Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Cou^^^^^^ 

Organization; GATT. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; ^AEA Internationa^ Atonn^ ^ ^^^^_ 

International Civil Aviation Organization; ICEM I°tergovernniental Comnuttee fo^^^^^^^^ Consulta- 

American Development Bank; ILO, International Labor OrgamzaUon , IMCO Inter^^^^^^ Organization; OECD. 

tive Organization; ITU, International Teleconimunication Union ; NATO, Nor^hM ^^^^^^^ p^^^ 

WJIO, World Meteorological Organization. 



April 9, 1962 



605 



Calendar off international Conferences and Meetings — Continued 

Scheduled April Through June 1962 — Continued 

SEATO Military Advisers Committee Paris Apr. 19-* 

U.N. Committee on Information From Non-Self-Governing Terri- New York Apr. 23- 

tories: 13th Session. 

U.N. ECAFE Regional Seminar on Development of Groundwater Bangkok Apr. 24-* 

Resources. 

U.N. Economic Commission for Europe: 17th Session Geneva Apr. 24— 

GATT Special Group on Tropical Products Geneva Apr. 25- 

ITU CCIR Study Group VII (Standard Frequencies and Time Geneva Apr. 25- 

Signals). 

ITU CCIR Study Group V (Propagation, Including the Effects of Geneva Apr. 25- 

Earth and Troposphere). 

U.N. ECA Workshop on Urbanization Addis Ababa Apr. 25- 

U.N. ECOSOC Commission on International Commodity Trade Rome Apr. 25- 

and FAG Committee on Commodity Problems (joint session). 

CENTO Military Committee London Apr. 26- 

SEATO Council of Ministers: 8th Meeting Paris Apr. 26- 

PAHO Executive Committee: 46th Meeting (undetermined) Apr. 29- 

IMCO Council: Extraordinary Session London Apr. 30 (1 day) 

CENTO Ministerial Council: 10th Meeting London Apr. 30- 

IMCO Interagency Meeting for Coordination of Safety at Sea and London Apr. 30- 

Air. 

GATT Committee III on Expansion of International Trade . . . Geneva Apr. 30- 

U.N. ECOSOC Commission on International Commodity Trade: Rome Apr. 30- 

Special Working Party. 

U.N. ECOSOC Social Commission: 14th Session New York Apr. 30- 

FAO Council: 38th Session New York April 

PAHO Ministers of Health Washington April 

PAHO Permanent Executive Committee Mexico, D.F April 

OECD Economic Policy Committee Paris April 

NATO Food and Agriculture Planning Committee Paris April 

NATO Science Committee Paris April 

U.N. ECAFE Conference on Asian Population Bangkok April 

U.N. ECOSOC Statistical Commission: 12th Session New York April 

OECD Committee for Scientific and Technical Personnel .... Paris April or May 

OECD Maritime Committee Paris April or May 

2d U.N. ECAFE Symposium on the Development of Petroleum Re- Tehran May 2- 

sources of Asia and the Far East. 

UNESCO Executive Board: 61st Session Paris May 2- 

NATO Ministerial Council Athens May 3- 

ITU Administrative Council: 17th Session Geneva May 5- 

ANZUS Council: 8th Meeting Canberra May 7- 

lAEA Symposium on Radiation Damage in Solids and Reactor Ma- Venice May 7- 

terials. 

15th International Film Festival Cannes May 7- 

ILO Chemical Industries Committee: 6th Session Geneva May 7- 

IMCO Maritime Safety Committee: Subcommittee on Code of Sig- London May 7- 

nals. 

NATO Planning Board for Ocean Shipping: 14th Meeting . . . . Washington May 7- 

International Seed Testing Association: 13th Congress Lisbon ^lay 7- 

ITU CCIR Study Group II (Receivers) Geneva May 7- 

ITU CCIR Study Group VI (Ionospheric Propagation) Geneva May 7- 

GATT Committee on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions Geneva May7- 

15th World Health Assembly Geneva May 8- 

8th International Hydrographic Conference Monte Carlo May 8- 

NATO Civil Defense Committee Paris May 8- 

U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Human Rights: Seminar on Status Tokyo May 8- 

of Women in Family Law. 

U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Narcotic Drugs: Committee on Geneva Mav 8- 

Illicit Traffic. 

International Cotton Advisory Committee: Committee on Extra- Washington May 9- 

Long Staple Cotton and Study Group on Prospective Trends in 

Cotton. 

International Cotton Advisory Committee: 21st Plenary Meeting. Washington May 14- 

FAO Committee on Commodity Problems: 35th Session Rome May 14- 

Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Law: 11th Session (resumed). Brussels May 14- 

Executive Conunittee of the Program of the U.N. High Commis- Geneva May 14- 

sioner for Refugees: 7th Session. 

U.N. ECOSOC Commission on International Commodity Trade: Rome May 14- 

10th Session. 

U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Narcotic Drugs: 17th Session. . . Geneva May 14- 

World Food Forum Washington May 15- 

8th Inter-American Travel Congress Rio tie Janeiro May 15- 

19th International Conferonco on Large Electric Systems .... Paris May 16- 

Inter-Arncricnn Tropical Tuna Commission: Annual Meeting. . . Quito May 10- 

ICAO Airworthiness Committee: 5th Session Montreal May 21- 

606 Department of State Bulletin 



GATT Council of Representatives Geneva May 21- 

U.N. Special Fund: 8th Session of Governing Council New York May 21- 

FAO Study Group on Cocoa: 5th Session (undetermined) May 22- 

NATO Manpower Committee Paris May 22- 

NATO Civil Aviation Planning Committee Paris May 25- 

ICAO Meteorological Operational Telecommunication Network Paris May 28- 

Europe (MOTNE) Panel. 

OECD Committee for Scientific Research Paris May 28- 

WHO Executive Board: 30th Session Geneva May 28- 

ILO Governing Body: 152d Session (and its committees) Geneva May 28- 

IMCO Maritime Safety Committee: Subcommittee on Subdivi- London May 28- 

sion and Stability. 

International Rubber Study Group: 16th Meeting Washington May 28- 

W MO Executive Committee: 14th Session Geneva May 29- 

U.N. Trusteeship Council: 29th Session New York May 31- 

PAIGH Directing Council: 6th Meeting Mexico, D.F June 1- 

International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries: Moscow. June 4- 

12th Meeting. 

U.N. General Assembly: 16th Session (resumed) New York June 4- 

U.N. Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Ques- Geneva June 4- 

tions. 

U.N. ECE Housing Committee: 23d Session Geneva June 4- 

UNICEF Program Committee and Executive Board New York June 4- 

PIANC Permanent International Commission: Annual Meeting . . Brussels June 5- 

International Labor Conference: 46th Session Geneva June 6- 



Rome. 



June 11- 



Bad Kreuznach, Germany . 



June 12- 
June 12- 

June 13- 



Berlin June 22- 

Geneva June 25- 

Paris June 25- 



9th International Electronic, Nuclear, and Motion Picture Exposi- 
tion. 

IAEA Board of Governors Vienna 

UNESCO Intergovernmental Meeting on Discrimination in Edu- Paris . 

cation. 
ITU CCIR Study Group X (Broadcasting), Study Group XI (Tele- 
vision), and Study Group XII (Tropical Broadcasting). 

12th International Film Festival 

U.N. ECOSOC Technical Assistance Committee 

UNESCO Intergovernmental Meeting of Experts Specializing in 
Technical Education. 

ICAO Visual Aids Panel: 2d Meeting Montreal June 28- 

NATO Planning Board for Inland Surface Transport Paris June 28- 

OECD Ministerial Meeting Paris June * 

7th FAO Regional Conference for Latin America Brazil June 

FAO Group on Grains: 7th Session Rome June 

IMCO Subcommittee on Tonnage Measurement London June 

NATO Science Committee Paris June 

South Pacific Commission: 12th Meeting of Research Council . . Noumea June 

GATT Working Partv on Tariff Reduction Geneva June 

ITU CCITT Study Group XII (Telephone Transmission Perform- Geneva June 

ance). 

ITU CCITT Study Group XI (Telephone Switching) Geneva June 

U.N. ECE Consultation of Experts on Energy in Europe .... Geneva June 



United States Delegations 
to International Conferences 

UNESCO Meeting of African Education Ministers 

The Department of State announced on 
March 22 (press release 181) that J. Wayne 
Fredericks, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Afri- 
can Aifairs, would lead the U.S. observer delega- 
tion at a meeting of education ministers of Africa 
at UNESCO House in Paris March 26-30. 

Invited to the conference are the ministers of 
education of the 34 African countries that partici- 
pated in a conference at Addis Ababa last May,^ 



' Bulletin of Jmie 12, 1961, p. 936. 



as well as other observer delegations from Bel- 
gium, France, the United Kingdom, and the four 
North African states of Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, 
and the United Arab Republic. 
Other members of the American delegation are : 

Arthur A. Bardos, U.S. Information Service, American 

Embassy, Paris 
Ras O. Johnson, chief. Education Division, Bureau for 

Africa and Europe, Agency for International 

Development 
John H. Morrow, U.S. Representative for UNESCO, 

American Embassy, Paris 
C. Kenneth Snyder, Plans and Development Staff, Bureau 

of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of 

State 
Harris Wofford, Jr., Special Assistant to the President 



April 9, J 962 



607 



The meeting in Paris will be concerned with 
implementing, including financing, an overall 
plan for the development of education in Africa 
adopted at the Addis Ababa conference convened 
by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization and the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Africa. The partici- 
pating African states drew up two plans. A long- 
range plan calls for extending free universal pri- 
mary education by 1980. A 5-year plan would 
boost primary school enrollment in Africa from 
the present figure of 40 percent of the scliool-age 
population to over 51 percent by 1966 and second- 
ary school enrollment from 3 to 9 percent. The 
cost of the short-range plan was estimated at 
$4,150,000,000, of which $2,840,000,000 would be 
provided by the African states and the rest from 
outside sources. 

Specifically, the Paris meeting will review na- 
tional plans for educational development in the 
general context of the economic and social devel- 
opment of each country and study current educa- 
tional budgeting in each country in relation to 
objectives set at the Addis Ababa conference. 



U.S. Replies to U.N. Query 

on Transfer of Nuclear Weapons 

Folloxoing is the text of a letter from Acting 
Secretary of State Ball to U Thanf, Acting Sec- 
retary-General of the United Nations. 

Press release 169 dated March 14 

March 13, 1962 
Excellency : I have the honor to acknowledge 
the receipt of your note of January 2 in which, 
pursuant to General Assembly Eesolution 1664 
(XVI), you request the views of my Government 
"as to the conditions under which countries not 
possessing nuclear weapons might be willing to 
enter into specific undertakings to refrain from 
manufacturing or otherwise acquiring such 
weapons and to refuse to receive in the future 
nuclear weapons on their territories on behalf of 
any other coiuitry." 

Tlio United States attaches great importance 
to this matter and desires that an early solution be 
achieved to tliis as well as other imi^ortant aspects 
of disarmament. Its views on the manner in 
which the problem of proliferation of nuclear 

608 



weapons must be solved have been set forth by the 
Eepresentative of the United States to the United 
Nations during the General Assembly debates on 
this problem. Nevertheless, I welcome this addi- 
tional opportunity to reiterate these views. 

With regard to the position of the United 
States, the question of dissemination of nuclear 
weapons appears to fall logically into two cate- 
gories: (1) the manufacture or acquisition of 
ownership of nuclear weapons, and (2) the de- 
ployment of nuclear weapons. With respect to 
the manufacture or ownership of nuclear weapons, 
the concern of my Government to prevent the 
proliferation of such weapons has been made clear 
by its actions. Both United States legislation 
and policy severely limit United States transfer 
of weapons information to other countries; United 
States policy opposes the development of national 
nuclear weapons capability by any additional 
nation. United States legislation precludes trans- 
fer of ownership or control of such weapons to 
other states. This legislation has been a keystone 
in nuclear weapons policy of the United States. 

The concern of my Government with the prob- 
lem of proliferation of nuclear weapons is also 
i-eflected in the far-reaching disarmament pro- 
posal which it put forward on September 25, 
1961,^ in the Sixteenth General Assembly. That 
proposal in its Stage I provides, inter alia, that 
"States owning nuclear weapons shall not re- 
linquish control of such weapons to any nation 
not owning them and shall not transmit to any 
nation information or material necessary for their 
manufacture."' It further provides that "States 
not owning nuclear weapons shall not manufac- 
ture such weapons, attempt to obtain control of 
such weapons belonging to other States, or seek 
or receive information or materials necessary' for 
their manufacture." In the Sixteenth Genei'al 
Assembly, the Government of Ireland proposed a 
resolution (1665 XVI), the substance of which 
was in consonance with the similar proposals con- 
tained in the United States proposal of Sep- 
tember 25. Consequently, the ITiiitcd Slates gave 
its full support to that constructive ell'ort to deal 
with the problem and joined other delegations in 
passing this resolution by a unanimous vote. 

On the second aspect of General Assembly 
Resolution 1664 (XVI), i.e., location of luiclear 
weapons, for reasons that are well understood the 



' For text, see Bulletin of Oct 16, 1961, p. 650. 

Department of State Bulletin 



defense system of the United States and of its 
allies includes both conventional and nuclear 
weapons, wliich exist to support the right of in- 
dividual and collective self-defense, a right recog- 
nized by the Charter of the United Nations. Both 
the United States and its allies have chosen these 
arrangements recognizing that nuclear weapons 
are a necessary deterrent to a potential aggressor 
who is armed with such weapons and openly 
threatens the free world. 

It is the firm belief of the United States that 
the only sure way to remove nuclear weapons, 
wherever located, from national defense establish- 
ments is through realization of a program of gen- 
eral and complete disarmament under eilective 
international control. Although this country can- 
not speak for other states, it is the opinion of the 
United States that, in the present world situation, 
nations would be willing to accept those specific 
undertakings which would involve giving up vital 
elements of their security arrangements only after 
they can be sure their security is adequately guar- 
anteed by effective disarmament and peacekeeping 
measures. 

This problem was carefully considered by my 
Government in drafting the broad disarmament 
proposals it advanced on September 25. My Gov- 
ernment considers it appropriate that the 
Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, en- 
dorsed by the General Assembly in its Resolution 
1722 (XVI), take under consideration the ques- 
tions raised by General Assembly Resolution 1664. 
The resolution put forward by the Government of 
Sweden was adopted by the General Assembly 
prior to the formation of the Eighteen-Nation 
Disarmament Committee. Consonant with its 
views that all of the problems specified in General 
Assembly Resolution 1664 (XVI) can only be 
finally resolved in the context of general and com- 
plete disarmament with adequate control, the 
United States Government believes that these mat- 
ters are appropriate for the Disarmament Com- 
mittee to consider. That Committee is charged 
with negotiating a balanced disarmament agi-ee- 
ment in keeping with the unanimous recommenda- 
tion of the General Assembly that such negotia- 
tions be based on the Joint Statement of Agreed 
Principles for Disarmament Negotiations of 20 
September 1961 (Document A/4879 ).= 



'' For text, see ibid., Oct. 9, 1961, p. 5S9 ; for a statement 
made b.v Secretary Rusk before the Disarmament Com- 
mittee on JIar. 1.5, see ibid., Apr. 2, 1962, p. .531. 



May I assure you of the continued cooperation 
of the United States Government in those areas of 
endeavor which will lessen the threat to mankind 
of nuclear destruction. It is fervently hoped that 
real progress can soon be made toward the attain- 
ment of peace in a disai-med world. 

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my high- 
est consideration. 

George W. Ball 
Acting Secretary of State 

His Excellency 

U Thant 

Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations 



Current U.N. Documents: 
A Selected Bibliography 

Mimeographed or processed documents (xuch as those 
listed below) may he consulted at depository libraries in 
the United States. U.N. printed publicatiovs may be pur- 
chased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, 
United Natioiu Plaza, N.Y. 

General Assembly 

Progress and operations of the Special Fund. A/5011. 
December 6, 1961. 9 pp. 

Supplementary estimates for the financial year 1961. 
A/4870/Add. 1. December 8, 1961. 10 pp. 

Cost estimates and financing for the United Nations 
Operations In the Congo. A/5019. December 8, 1961. 
4 pp. 

Report of the Negotiating Committee for Extra-Budg- 
etary Funds. A/5031. December 13, 1961. 17 pp. 

Letter dated January 10, 1962. from the Permanent Rep- 
resentative of Portugal addressed to the President of 
the General Assembly submitting a document comment- 
ing on the report of the Sub-Uommittee on Angola. 
A/50S2. January 17, 1962. 27 pp. 

Economic and Social Council 

Papers prepared for the fourth session of the Economic 
Commission for Africa, Addis Ababa, February-March 
1962. E/CN.14/137, November 9, 1961, 4 pp.; E/CN. 
14/122, November 14, 1961, 3 pp. ; E/CN.14/166, Novem- 
ber 15, 1961, 16 pp. 

Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Pro- 
tection of Minorities of the Commission on Human 
Rights. Study of discrimination in the matter of po- 
litical rights. E/CN.4/Sub.2/213. November 9, 1961. 
134 pp. 

Report of the Secretary-Oeneral on programs of technical 
assistance financed by the regular budget. E/TAC/112. 
Novemljer 9, 1961. 91 pp. 

Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Pro- 
tection of Minorities of the Commission on Human 
Rights. Protection of minorities. E/CN.4/Sub.2/214. 
November 16, 1961. ,56 pp. 

Commission on Human Rights. Periodic reports on hu- 
man rights. E/CN.4/S10/Add. 2. December 6, 1961. 
70 pp. 

Report of the Technical Assistance Committee on pro- 
grams of technical cooperation. E/3563. December 20, 
1961. 24 pp. 



April 9, 1962 



609 



TREATY INFORMATION 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 



Togo 

Agreement relating to investment guaranties. Signed at 
Washington March 20, 1962. Entered into force March 
20, 1962. 

Turkey 

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agree- 
ment of July 29, 1961, as amended (TIAS 4819, 4874, 
4926, and 4937). Effected by exchange of notes at 
Ankara March 14, 1962. Entered into force March 14, 
1962. 



Atomic Energy 

Amendment to article VI.A.3 of the Statute of the Inter- 
national Atomic Energy Agency (TIAS 3873). Done 
at Vienna October 4, 1961.' 

Acceptances deposited: France, March 14, 1962; Ghana, 
March 15, 1962. 

Automotive Traffic 

Convention on road traffic, with annexes. Done at 

Geneva September 19, 1949. Entered into force 

March 26, 1952. TIAS 2487. 

Accession deposited: Guatemala (with reservation), 
January 10, 1962. 
Protocol providing for accession to the convention on road 

traffic by occupied countries or territories. Done at 

Geneva September 19, 1949. TIAS 2487. 

Accession deposited: Guatemala, January 10, 1962. 

Bills of Lading 

International convention for unification of certain rules 
relating to bills of lading, and protocol of signature. 
Ckjncluded at Brussels August 25, 1924. Entered Into 
force June 2, 1931 ; for the United States December 29, 
1937. 51 Stat. 233. 

Accession deposited: Ireland (with reservations). 
January 30, 1962. 



BILATERAL 

Afghanistan 

Agreement extending the technical cooperation program 
agreement of June 30, 1953, as extended (TIAS 2856 
and 4670). Effected by exchange of notes at Kabul 
December 30, 1961, and February 27, 1962. Entered 
into force February 27, 1962. 

Colombia 

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agree- 
ment of October 6, 1959 (TIAS 4337). Effected by ex- 
change of notes at Washington September 6 and 8, 
1961. Entered into force September 8, 1961. 

Cyprus 

Memorandum of understanding regarding the grant to 
Cyprus of agricultural commodities for an expanded 
school lunch program. Signed at Nicosia March 2, 
1902. Entered into force March 2, 1962. 

Switzerland 

Agreement modifying section A of Schedule I of reciprocal 
trade agreement of January 9, 1936, as modified (49 
Stat. 3917 ; TIAS 4379) . Effected by exchange of notes 
at Geneva January 18, 1962. Entered into force January 
18, 1962. 



PUBLICATIONS 



' Not in force. 



Department Publishes Foreign Relations 
Volumes on China and Far East 

China, 1943 

Press release 148 dated March 7, for release March 20 

The Department of State released on March 20 Foreign 
Relations of the United States, 1943, China. Aside from 
the special volume on the conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 
this is the first of the Foreign Relations volumes to be 
issued for the year 1943. Other volumes for that year are 
in process of preparation. 

Copies of Foreign Relations of the United States, 194S, 
China (vi, 908 pp.) may be purchased from the Superin- 
tendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington 25, D.C., for $4 each. 

Far East, 1941 

Press release 178 dated March 20, for release March 27 

The Department of State released on March 27 Foreign 

Relations of the United States, 19il, roluinc V, The Far 
East. This volume is one of a series of seven regular 
Foreign Relations volumes for the year 1941. The first 
four volumes of this series have previously been pub- 
lished. The remaining two volumes, dealing with rela- 
tions with the American Republics, are in process of 
preparation. 

Volume IV for 1941 also relates to the Far East and a 
con.siderable amount of diplomatic corresimndence for 
1941 on the Far East is contained in Foreign Relations of 
the United States, Japan, 19S1-19.',1, Volumes I and II, 
published in 1943. 

Copies of Foreign Relations of the United States, lO^l, 
Volume V, The Far East (v, 938 pp.) may be purchased 
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C., for ,$4 each. 



610 



Department of $fafe Bulletin 



April 9, 1962 



Ind 



ex 



Vol. XLVI, No. 1189 



Africa. UNESCO Meeting of African Education 

Ministers (delegation) 607 

American Republics. General White Nominated 
for Special OAS Committee on Security .... 591 

Asia. Foreign Relations volume, Far East, 1941 . 610 

Atomic Energy 

The United Nations Decade of Development (Cleve- 
land, Gardner, Stevenson) 577 

U.S. Replies to U.N. Query on Transfer of Nuclear 
Weapons (Ball) 608 

U.S. Urges Soviet Union To Join In Ending Nuclear 
Weapon Tests (Rusk) 571 

China. Foreign Relations volume, China, 1943 . . 610 

Congress, The. Major Aspects of the Trade Expan- 
sion Act (Ball) 597 

Department and Foreign Service. Confirmations 

(Blumenthal) 596 

Disarmament 

The United Nations Decade of Development (Cleve- 
land, Gardner, Stevenson) 577 

U.S. Replies to U.N. Query on Transfer of Nuclear 

Weapons (Ball) 608 

U.S. Urges Soviet Union To Join in Ending Nuclear 

Weapon Tests (Rusk) 571 

Economic Affairs 

Major Aspects of the Trade Expansion Act (Ball) . 597 
Meeting the Soviet Economic Challenge (Trezise) . 592 

Educational and Cultural Affairs. UNESCO Meet- 
ing of African Education Ministers (delegation) . 607 

Europe. Major Aspects of the Trade Expansion 
Act (Ball) 597 

International Organizations and Conferences 

Calendar of International Conferences and Meet- 
ings 605 

General White Nominated for Special OAS Commit- 
tee on Security 591 

UNESCO Meeting of African Education Ministers 

(delegation) 607 

U.S. Urges Soviet Union To Join in Ending Nuclear 
Weapon Tests (Rusk) 571 

Presidential Documents. President Greets Ameri- 
can Association for the United Nations .... 578 

Public Affairs. Foreign Policy Briefing Conference 

To Be Held at Toledo, Ohio 576 

Publications. Department Publishes Foreign Rela- 
tions Volumes on China and Far East .... 610 

Science 

The United Nations Decade of Development (Cleve- 
land, Gardner, Stevenson) 577 

U.S. Supplies Information to U.N. on Its Space 
Launchings (Stevenson) 588 

Treaty Information. Current Actions 610 

U.S.S.R. 

Meeting the Soviet Economic Challenge (Trezise) . 592 
The United Nations Decade of Development (Cleve- 
land, Gardner, Stevenson) 577 



U.S. Urges Soviet Union To Join in Ending Nuclear 

Weapon Tests (Rusk) 571 

United Nations 

Blumenthal confirmed as U.S. representative on 
ECOSOC Commission on International Commod- 
ity Trade 596 

Current U.N. Documents 609 

President Greets American Association for the 

United Nations (Kennedy) 578 

The United Nations Decade of Development (Cleve- 
land, Gardner. Stevenson) 577 

U.S. Replies to U.N. Query on Transfer of Nuclear 
Weapons (Ball) 608 

U.S. Supplies Information to U.N. on Its Space 
Laimchinga (Stevenson) 588 

Name Index 

Ball, George W 597,608 

Blumenthal, W. Michael 596 

Cleveland, Harlan 583 

Gardner, Richard N 586 

Kennedy, President 578 

Rusk, Secretary 571 

Stevenson, Adlai E 577, 588 

Trezise, Philip H 592 

White, Thomas D 591 



Check List of Department of State 


Press Releases: March 19-25 


Press releases may be obtained from the Ofllce of 


News 


, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C. 


Releases 


ippearing in this issue of the Bulletin 


which were 


issued prior to March 19 are Nos. 148 


of March 7 


; 15!) of March 10; 160 of March 12: 


164 of March 13 ; and 167, 168, and 169 of March 14. | 


No. 


Date 


Subject 


•176 


3/19 


U.S. participation in international 
conferences. 


tl77 


3/19 


Williams : National Farmers Union. 


178 


3/20 


Foreign Relations volume on Par East. 


*179 


3/20 


Visit of President of Brazil. 


*180 


3/22 


Williams : "Intergroup Relations in In- 
ternational and National Affairs." 


181 


3/22 


Delegatton to UNESCO meeting of 
African education ministers (re- 
write.) 


•182 


3/21 


Gardner: "The New Foreign Trade 
Proposals." 


tl83 


3/23 


Bowles : "A Balance Sheet on Asia." 


1^ 


3/23 


Regional foreign policy briefing con- 
ference, Toledo. 


tl85 


3/23 


Delegation to WJIO Commission for 
Synoptic Meteorology (rewrite). 


186 


3/24 


Rusk : Geneva disarmament confer- 
ence. 

a ted. 


• Not pri 


t Held foi 


a later issue of the Bulletin. 




the 



United States 
Government Printing Office 

DIVISION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS 

Washington 25, D.C. 



PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE TO AVOID 

PAYMENT OF POSTAGE, fSOO 

(QPO) 



OFFICIAL BUSINESS 



FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE 
UNITED STATES 

Diplomatic Papers 
1943, CHINA 



Department 

of 

State 

m 


The Department of State recently released a. volume of documents 
on relations of the United States with China for the year lOiS. This 
is a continuation of a volume covering the year 194:2, issued in 1956. 
The volume is concerned primarily with diplomatic activities within 
the responsibility of the Department of State. 

The contents include a wide range of subject matter. Topics dealt 
with concern China's military position and participation in the war 
with Japan, American military assistance to China, political condi- 
tions there as affected by Soviet and Chinese Communist policies, 
financial relations and lend-lease aid, efforts to open up a new supply 
route to China from outside, cultural relations, repeal of Chinese 
exclusion laws by the United States, interest of the United States in 
Chinese postwar planning, and numerous other subjects. The volume 
contains 893 pages, exclusive of preface and index. 

Publication 6459 Price: $4.00 


Order Form 

'o: Supt. of Documents 
Govt. Printing Office 


Please send me copies of Foreign Relations of the United States, 

Diplomatic Papers, 1913, China. 

Name: ._ 


Washington 25, D.C. 


Street Address: 


Enclosed find: 


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{cash, check, or money 
order payable to 
Supt. of Docs.) 





FHE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 



T^^^d^ 



ICIAL 

EKLY RECORD 



ITED STATES 
lEIGN POLICY 




Vol. XLVI, No. 1190 



April 16, 1962 



THE ROLE OF THE UNIVERSITY IN THE BUILDING 
OF A FLEXIBLE WORLD ORDER • Addresshy 

President Kennedy 615 

U.S. PROPOSES PATTERNS FOR FUTURE WORK OF 
DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE • Statement by 

Secretary Rusk 618 

THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE REAL WORLD • by 

Acting Secretary Ball "Oii 

AMERICAN STRATEGY ON THE WORLD SCENE • by 

Walt W. Rostow 625 

THE ROLE OF AGRICULTURE IN THE DEVELOP- 
MENT OF AFRICA • by Assistant Secretary Williams . . 639 

U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICIES • by Acting 

Assistant Secretary Trezise 64o 

For index see inside back cover 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Qovernment Printing Office 

Washington 25, D.C. 

Peice: 

62 Issues, domestic $8.60, foreign $12.26 

Single copy, 25 cents 

Use of funds for printing of this publlcji- 
tlon approved by the Director of the Bureau 
of the Budget (January 19, 1961). 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may 
be rei)rlnted. Citation of the Dkpaetment 
o» State Bulletin as the source will be 
appreciated. The Bulletin Is liide.ied In the 
Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



Vol. XLVI.'No. 1190 • Publication 7363 
April 16, 1962 



The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by tlie 
Office of Public Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public 
and interested agencies of the 
Government with information on 
developments in the field of foreign 
relations and on the work of the 
Department of State and tlie Foreign 
Service. The BULLETIN includes se- 
lected press releases on foreign policy, 
issued by the White House and the 
Department, and statements and ad- 
dresses made by the President and by 
the Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Department, as well as 
special articles on i^arious plutses of 
international affairs and the func- 
tions of the Department. Informa- 
tion is incluiled concerning treaties 
and interntitional agreements to 
which the United States is or nuiy 
become a party and treaties of gen- 
eral international interest. 

Publications of the Department, 
United Nations documents, and legis- 
lative nuiterial in tlie fwUl of inter- 
national relations are listed currently. 



The Role of the University in the Building 
of a Flexible World Order 



Address hy President Kennedy^ 



I am delighted to be here on this occasion for 
though it is the 94th anniversary of the charter, 
in a sense this is the liundredth, for this university 
and so many other imiversities across our country 
owe their birth to the most extraordinary piece of 
legislation -n-hich this countiy has ever adopted 
and that is the Morrill Act, signed by President 
Abraham Lincoln in the darkest and most un- 
certain days of the Civil War, which set before 
the country the opportunity to build the great 
land-grant colleges, of which this is so distin- 
guished a part. Six years later this imiversity 
obtained its charter. 

In its first gi'aduating class it included a future 
Governor of California, a future Congressman, a 
judge, a distinguished State assemblyman, a 
clergyman, a lawyer, a doctor— all in a graduating 
class of 12 graduates ! 

This college, therefore, from its earliest be- 
ginnings, has recognized, and its graduates have 
recognizetl, that the purpose of education is not 
merely to advance the economic self-interest of its 
graduates. The people of California, as much if 
not more than the people of any other State, have 
supported their colleges and their universities and 
their schools because they recognize how important 
it is to the maintenance of a free society that its 
citizens be well educated. 

"Every man," said Professor Woodrow Wilson, 
"sent out from a university should be a man of 
his nation as well as a man of his time." 

And Prince Bismarck was even more specific. 



^ Made at the Charter Day exercises at the University 
of California, Berkeley, Calif., on Mar. 23 (White House 
press release; as-delivered text). 



One-third, he said, of the students of German uni- 
versities broke down from overwork, another tliird 
broke down from dissipation, and the other third 
ruled Germany. 

I do not know which third of students are here 
today, but I am confident that I am talking to the 
future leaders of this State and comitry, who 
recognize their responsibilities to the public 
interest. 

Today you carry on that tradition. Our distin- 
guished and courageous Secretary of Defense, our 
distinguished Secretary of State, the Chairman 
of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Director 
of the CIA, and others, all are graduates of this 
miiversity. It is a disturbing factor to me, and 
it may be to some of you, that the New Frontier 
owes as much to Berkeley as it does to Harvard 
University ! 

This has been a week of momentous events 
around the world. The long and painful struggle 
in Algeria, which comes to an end. Both nuclear 
powers and neutrals labored at Geneva for a solu- 
tion to the problem of a spiraling arms race and 
also to the problems that so vex our relations with 
the Soviet Union. The Congress opened hearings 
on a trade bill which is far more than a trade bill 
but an opportunity to build a stronger and closer 
Atlantic community. And my wife had her first 
and last ride on an elephant. 

Prospect for U.S.-U.S.S.R. Cooperation in Space 

But history may well remember this as a week 
for an act of lesser immediate impact, and that is 
the decision by the United States and the Soviet 
Union to seek concrete agreements on the joint 



April 16, 1962 



615 



exploration of space.^ Experience has taught us 
that an agreement to negotiate does not always 
mean a negotiated agreement. But should such a 
joint effort be realized, its significance could well 
be tremendous for us all. In terms of space 
science, our combined knowledge and efforts can 
benefit the people of all the nations : joint weather 
satellites to provide more ample warnings against 
the destructive storms, joint communications sys- 
tems to draw the world more closely together, and 
cooperation in space medicine research and space 
tracking operations to speed the day when man 
will go to the moon and beyond. 

But the scientific gains from such a joint effort 
would offer, I believe, less realized return than the 
gains for world peace. For a cooperative Soviet- 
American effort in space science and exploration 
would emphasize the interests that must unite us 
rather than those that always divide us. It offers 
us an area in which the stale and sterile dogmas 
of the cold war could be literally left a quarter of 
a million miles behind. And it would remind us 
on both sides that knowledge, not hate, is the pass- 
key to the future, that knowledge transcends 
national antagonisms, that it speaks a universal 
language, that it is the possession, not of a single 
class or of a single nation or a single ideology, 
but of all mankind. 

I need hardly emphasize the happy pursuit of 
knowledge in this place. Your faculty includes 
more Nobel laureates than any other faculty in 
the world — more in this one community than our 
principal advei-sary has received since the awards 
began in 1901. And we take pride in that only 
from a national point of view because it indicates, 
as the Chancellor pointed out, the great intellec- 
tual benefits of a free society. This University of 
California will continue to grow as an intellectual 
center because your presidents and your chancel- 
lors and your professors have rigorously defended 
that unhampered freedom of discussion and in- 
quiry which is the soul of the intellectual enter- 
prise and the heart of the free university. 

We may be proud as a nation of our record in 
scientific achievement, but at the same time we 
must be impressed by the interdependence of all 
knowledge. I am certain that eveiy scholar and 
scientist here today would agree that his own work 
has benefited immeasurably from the work of the 
men and women in other countries. The prospect 



' For background, see Buixetin of Apr. 2, 1962, p. 536. 
616 



of a partnership with Soviet scientists in the ex- 
ploration of space opens up exciting prospects of 
collaboration in other areas of learning. And 
cooperation in the pursuit of knowledge can hope- 
fully lead to cooperation in the pursuit of peace. 

The Revolution of National Independence 

Yet the pursuit of knowledge itself implies a 
world where men are free to follow out the logic 
of their own ideas. It implies a world where na- 
tions are free to solve their own problems and to 
realize their own ideals. It implies, in short, a 
world where collaboration emerges from the vol- 
untary decisions of nations strong in their own 
independence and their own self-respect. It im- 
plies, I believe, the kind of world which is emerg- 
ing before our eyes — the world produced by the 
revolution of national independence which is to- 
day, and has been since 1945, sweeping across the 
face of the world. 

I sometimes think that we are too much im- 
pressed by the clamor of daily events. The news- 
paper headlines and the television screens give us 
a short view. They so flood us with the stop-press 
details of daily stories that we lose sight of one of 
the great movements of history. Yet it is the pro- 
found tendencies of history, and not the passing 
excitements, that wiU shape our future. 

The short view gives us the impression as a na- 
tion of being shoved and harried, everywhere on 
the defense. But this impression is surely an op- 
tical illusion. From the perspective of Moscow 
the world today may seem even more trouble- 
some, more intractable, more frustrating than it 
does to us. The leaders of the Communist world 
are confronted not only by acute internal prob- 
lems in each Communist country — the failure of 
agricvdture, the rising discontent of the youth and 
the intellectuals, the demands of technical and 
managerial groups for status and security. They 
are confronted in addition by profound divisions 
within the Communist world itself, divisions 
which have already shattered the image of com- 
munism as a universal system guaranteed to abol- 
ish all social and international conflicts — the most 
valuable asset the Communists had for many 
years. 

Wisdom requires the long view. And the long 
view shows us that the revolution of national in- 
dependence is a fundamental fact of our era. This 
revolution will not be stopped. As new nations 

Deparfmenf of State Bulletin 



emerge from the oblivion of centuries, their first 
aspiration is to aflinn their national identity. 
Their deepest hope is for a world where, within a 
framework of international cooperation, every 
country can solve its own problems according to 
its own traditions and ideals. 

It is in the interests of the pursuit of knowl- 
edge, and it is in our own national interest, that 
this revolution of national independence succeed. 
For the Communists rest everything on the idea 
of a monolithic world — a world where all knowl- 
edge has a single pattern, all societies move toward 
a single model, all problems and roads have a sin- 
gle solution and a single destination. The pursuit 
of knowledge, on the other hand, rests everything 
on the opposite idea — on the idea of a world based 
on diversity, self-determination, and freedom. 
And that is the kind of world to which we Ameri- 
cans, as a nation, are committed by the principles 
upon which the great Kepublic was foimded. 

As men conduct the pursuit of knowledge, they 
create a world which freely imites national di- 
versity and international partnership. This 
emerging world is incompatible with the Com- 
munist world order. It will irresistibly burst the 
bonds of the Commimist organization and the 
Communist ideolog}'. And diversity and inde- 
pendence, far from being opposed to the Ameri- 
can conception of world order, represent the very 
essence of our view of the future of the world. 

The Vision of a Free and Diverse World 

There used to be so much talk a few years ago 
about the inevitable triumph of communism. We 
hear such talk much less now. No one who ex- 
amines the modem world can doubt that the great 
currents of history are carrying the world away 
from the monolithic idea toward the pluralist 
idea — away from communism and toward national 
independence and f i-eedom. No one can doubt that 
the wave of the future is not the conquest of the 
world by a single dogmatic creed but the libera- 
tion of the diverse energies of free nations and 
free men. No one can doubt that cooperation in 
the pursuit of knowledge must lead to freedom of 
the mind and freedom of the soul. 

Beyond the drumfire of daily crisis, therefore, 
there is arising the outlines of a robust and vital 
world community, founded on nations secure in 
their own independence and united by allegiance 
to world peace. It would be foolish to say that this 



world will be won tomorrow, or the day after. 
The processes of history are fitful and uncertain 
and aggravating. There will be frustrations and 
setbacks. There will be times of anxiety and 
gloom. The specter of thermonuclear war will 
continue to hang over mankind ; and we must heed 
the advice of Oliver Wendell Holmes of "freedom 
leaning on her spear" until all nations are wise 
enough to disarm safely and effectively. 

Yet we can have that new confidence today in 
the direction in which history is moving. Nothing 
is more stirring than the recognition of great pub- 
lic purpose. Every great age is marked by innova- 
tion and daring, by the ability to meet 
unprecedented problems with intelligent solutions. 
In a time of turbulence and change it is more true 
than ever that knowledge is power, for only by true 
understanding and steadfast judgment are we able 
to master the challenge of history. 

If this is so, we must strive to acquire knowledge 
and to apply it with wisdom. We must reject 
oversimplified theories of international life — the 
theory that American power is unlimited or that 
the American mission is to remake the world in 
the American image. We must seize the vision of 
a free and diverse world — and shape our policies 
to speed progress toward a more flexible world 
order. 

This is the unifying spirit of our policies in the 
world today. The purpose of our aid programs 
must be to help developing countries move forward 
as rapidly as possible on the road to genuine na- 
tional independence. Our military policies must 
assist nations to protect the processes of demo- 
cratic reform and development against disruption 
and intervention. Our diplomatic policies must 
strengthen our relations with the whole world, 
with our several alliances, and with the United 
Nations. 

As we press forward on ever^' front to realize the 
flexible world order, the role of the university 
becomes ever more important, both as a reservoir 
of ideas and as a repository of the long view of the 
shore dimly seen. 

"Knowledge is the great sun of the firmament," 
said Senator Daniel Webster. "Life and power 
are scattered with all its beams." 

In its light we must think and act not only for 
the moment but for our time. I am reminded of 
the story of the great French ^Marshal Lyautey, 
who once asked his gardener to plant a tree. The 



April 16, 1962 



617 



gardener objected that the tree was slow-growing 
and would not reach maturity for a liundred years. 
The Marshal replied, "In that case, there is no 
time to lose; plant it this afternoon." 



Today a world of knowledge — a world of co- 
operation — a just and lasting peace — may be years 
away. But we have no time to lose. Let us plant 
our trees this afternoon. 



U.S. Proposes Patterns for Future Work of Disarmament Conference 



Statement hy Secretary Rusk ^ 



I appreciate the indulgence of my colleagues 
for some additional remarks on the subject of gen- 
eral and complete disarmament. Now that we are 
coming to the end of the second week of our dis- 
cussion, we believe that it is appropriate at this 
point to take some stock as to where we stand and 
where we should go next and to try to get a clear 
picture of the pattern of our future work in order 
that we might move with purpose and not merely 
drift. 

A number of foreign ministers have departed 
and others will be leaving this week as I myself 
expect to this afternoon, but I shall be ready to 
come back at any time that my return would ad- 
vance our work here and I am sure that my col- 
leagues aroimd the table would be ready to do the 
same. 

The foreign ministers of the nations represented 
here came to Geneva, I would suggest, for three 
broad purposes : 

First, to do what they could to prepare the at- 
mosphere for the discussions. 

The second was to establish an agreed program 
of work. 

And the third purpose was to present authorita- 
tively, and to exchange views on, the basic posi- 
tions and approaches of their governments. 

These objectives have been achieved with vary- 
ing amounts of success; we could liave wished for 
more, but we could easily have had less. 

The political atmosphere which has surrounded 
the opening of tlie talks in this room has been on 



' Marie before the IS-nation Disarmament Committee 
at Geneva on Mar. 27 (press release 194, revised). 



the whole good; the discussions have revealed a 
seriousness of purpose and a generally construc- 
tive tone. I do not mean, of couree, that no differ- 
ences have been expressed. We do not believe that 
we would perform any service to the world or to 
our work if we attempted to conceal difficulties 
and issues for the sake of a false appearance of 
hannony. However, we have been encouraged by 
the minimmn of recrimination and vituperation. 
We hope that this approach will be maintained, 
for progress in these matters depends upon our 
keeping dispassionate negotiation from being sub- 
merged in torrents of invective from any side. 

The conference on Friday [March 23] adopted 
a plan of work proposed by the cochainnen. 
This is an important step forward, although wo 
believe that, since there is much yet to be resolved, 
there will necessarily be further discussions on 
this matter as the days unfold. I will have ad- 
ditional views on l)chalf of the United States to 
present this morning. 

In fulfilling our third purpose each of us has 
set forth in broad tonns the basic attitudes of our 
respective governments on the subject matter of 
this conference. Each foreign minister has put 
forward ideas and suggestions worthy of the most 
serious scrutiny. These provide a framework for 
moving into more detailed discussions of the prob- 
lems the conference met to resolve. 

In my lirst statement at this conference,- I 
referred to thelTnited Slates prograjn for general 
and complete disarmament in a peaceful woi'ld 

" For a statement liy Secretary Uiislc on Mar. l."), see 
Bulletin of Apr. 2, 1902, p. 531. 



618 



Deparfmenf of Sfafe Bulletin 



and made several new specific proposals for con- 
sideration within that program. Today I sliould 
like to comment on the overall approach repre- 
sented by the United States plan.^ For this plan 
is not simply a collection of isolated and mirelated 
measures. It represents a carefully coordinated 
approach to the goal defined in the statement of 
principles * agreed last September. Now, for the 
first time since the President's presentation of 
the jjlan, we are met in a forum charged with the 
negotiation of binding agreements. 

It would, I think, be useful to recall President 
Kennedy's statement of the purposes and objec- 
tives of the plan we have put before you. On 
September 25, before the United Nations General 
Assembly, ho said : ^ 

It would create machinery to keep the peace as it 
destroys the machines of war. It would proceed through 
balanced and safeguarded stages designed to give no 
state a military advantage over another. It would place 
the final responsibility for verification and control where 
it belongs — not with the big powers alone, not with one's 
adversary or one's self, but in an international organi- 
zation within the framework of the United Nations. It 
would assure that indispensable condition of disarma- 
ment— true inspection — and apply it in stages proportion- 
ate to the stage of disarmament. It would cover delivery 
systems as well as weapons. It would ultimately halt 
their production as well as their testing, their transfer 
as well as their possession. 

Main Policy Objectives of U.S. Plan 

To meet the problems of a world in imeasy 
peace, in the midst of an arms race and seriously 
divided in ideological aspirations, there are sev- 
eral main areas of disarmament which deserve the 
primary attention of the conference. They are 
areas common to both the United States and 
Soviet programs for general and complete dis- 
armament. In light of these common areas I 
should like to trac« the main threads of policy 
objectives that i-un through and give unity to the 
fabric of the United States plan. 

One of these is a series of related measures 
directed toward the containment and reduction of 
the nucle-ar threat. 

The program we lay before you for considera- 
tion is a program of action which begins now and 
which converges from many fronts to contain, to 
reduce, and to eliminate this threat. 



' For text, see ibid., Oct. 16, 1961, p. 650. 
' For text, see ibid., Oct. 9, 1961, p. 589. 
= [bid., Oct. 16. 1961, p. 619. 



In my statement on March 23 ^ I emphasized 
one important step of this kind which, this very 
month, lies within our gi'asp. It is a sound agree- 
ment to end all nuclear weapons tests. 

On March 15 I stressed two additional steps, 
which also could be put into effect without delay, 
to get to the roots of the problem of the nuclear 
threat. One is a cutoff of production of fissionable 
materials for use in weapons. The other, to begin 
at the same time, is the transfer of 50,000 kilo- 
grams of weapons-grade fissionable materials to 
nonweapons purposes. 

Let me digress a moment here to answer a ques- 
tion put to us by a number of delegations : How 
much is 50 metric tons of U-2.35? Lord Home 
has ali"eady given one indication : Its value is con- 
siderably more than $500 million. It could, if 
combined with other ingredients, produce war- 
heads with tens of thousands of megatons of ex- 
plosive power. 

The United States also proposes that any fis- 
sionable materials transferred between countries 
for peaceful uses of nuclear energy shall be subject 
to appropriate safeguards to be developed in 
agreement with the International Atomic Energy 
Agency. 

Finally, the United States would prohibit the 
relinquishment of the control of nuclear weapons 
and information and material necessary for their 
manufacture to any nation not owning such 
weapons. 

These measures would contain and reduce the 
nuclear threat. This is very important, but it is 
not in itself enough. We must, as rapidly as scien- 
tific knowledge can point the way for us, seek to 
eliminate nuclear weapons stockpiles. Let us be- 
gin now to mobilize the best scientific resources 
our respective nations can command to concentrate 
upon this task. 

All these tilings should be done within the first 
stage of the disarmament program. 

In the second stage we propose that stocks of 
nuclear weapons shall be progressively reduced 
to the minimum levels which can be agreed upon 
as a result of the findings of the Nuclear Experts 
Commission; the resulting excess of fissionable 
material should be transferred to peaceful pur- 
poses. 

There is another area where action cannot be 



" Ibid., Apr. 9, 1962, p. 571. 



April 76, 7962 



619 



long postponed. Space is our newest ocean of 
discovery. 

Let us build upon the areas of peaceful coopera- 
tion in space which are now being developed in 
the United Nations and elsewhere as an outgrowth 
of the recent exchange of letters between President 
Kennedy and Premier Klirushchev.'' Let us ex- 
tend these areas to the field of disarmament. 

We have proposed that the placing into orbit 
or stationing in outer space of weapons capable 
of producing mass destruction be prohibited. We 
proposed tliat states shall give advance notifica- 
tion to participating states and to the Interna- 
tional Disarmament Organization of launchings 
of space vehicles and missiles, together with the 
track of the vehicle. In one sense these measures 
represent another facet of the containment of the 
nuclear threat. 

Let us begin, and continue until the job is done, 
in a third area to reduce and eliminate strategic 
nuclear delivery vehicles, other forms of arma- 
ments, and armed forces. Let us move boldly and 
across the board so that no nation can charge im- 
balance in the process. 

I have already put forward, a week ago Thurs- 
day [March 15], the United States proposal for a 
30-percent reduction in the first stage of nuclear 
delivery veliicles and of major conventional arma- 
ments. I have said that comparable reductions 
should be made in the subsequent stages. This 
proposal, in the United States plan, is accom- 
panied by related measures to deal simultaneously 
in all stages with the other major elements of 
military power, including reductions in force 
levels of states and restrictions and limitations on 
production and testing of major armaments as 
well as limitations on production and testing of 
weapons designed to counter strategic delivery 
vehicles. The United States also proposes the 
mobilization of scientific talent to find ways to 
reduce and eliminate chemical and biological 
weapons. 

A fourth area also requires action. The United 
States plan calls for worldwide measures to reduce 
the risk of war by accident, miscalculation, and 
surprise attack. Last week I put forward four 
specific proposals in tliis field, involving advance 
notification of military movements, establishment 



' For texts, see iVid., Mar. 12, 19C2, p. 411, and Apr. 2, 
1962, p. 53C. 



of observation posts, establishment of aerial in- 
spection areas and mobile inspection teams, and 
establishment of an International Commission on 
Measures To Reduce the Risk of War. 

Such steps are admittedly no substitute for dis- 
armament, but, until disarmament is fiilly 
achieved, they can make an important difference. 

U.S. Position on Verification 

The L'nited States basic position with respect 
to verification is known to you. 

Secrecy and disarmament are fimdamentally in- 
compatible. But it is also that the measures 
agreed to must be subject only to that verification 
which is necessary in order to determine whether 
the agreed measures are in fact being carried out. 
This is the only manner in which disarmament 
can proceed with the certainty that no state will 
obtain military advantage by violation or evasion 
of its commitments during the disarmament 
process. 

A major problem of past general disarmament 
negotiations has been the lack of opportimity to 
explore the key question of verification thoroughly, 
objectively, and constructively. This conference 
provides such an opportunity. The United States 
is willing to consider seriously any proposed veri- 
fication system in the light of the degree of assur- 
ance of compliance that it would provide and in 
the light of the significance of possible violations. 
The United States recognizes that considerably 
less than total access to a nation's territory may 
suffice. 

For example, it is possible, we believe, to design 
an adequate verification system based on the con- 
cept that, although all parts of the territory of a 
state should be subject to the risk of inspection 
from the outset, the extent of the territory actually 
inspected in any step or stage would bear a close 
relationship to the amount of disarmament and 
to the criticality of the particular disarmament 
measures. 

The United States believes, as I suggested on 
March l.*!, that this concept could be implemented 
by a system of zonal inspection which would he 
generally applicable to measures eliminating, 
limiting, or reducing armaments and forces. A 
system of zonal inspection would limit the extent 
of territory actually inspe-cted during the early 
phases of disarmament; it would require far fewer 
inspectors than would be required to verify imple- 



620 



Department of Slate Bulletin 



mentation of disarmament simultaneously in all 
parts of a nation from the outset. 

At the same time it could have complementary 
provisions providing for full verification of arms 
destroyed and full verification of limitations on 
declared facilities such as test sites, missile launch- 
ers, factories, and military laboratories. As dis- 
armament proceeded there would be increasing 
assurance, as more and more zones come under 
inspection, that no undeclared armaments or forces 
were retained and that no clandestine activities 
were being pui'sued. Such a zonal approach, we 
feel, would meet the Soviet requirement that full 
inspection be related to full disarmament and our 
view that inspection develop progressively with 
disarmament. 

The United States is prepared now both to make 
suggestions as to the details of such a plan and 
to explore the possibility of designing a zonal veri- 
fication system which would be applicable to an 
agreed program of disarmament. 

Organizational Arrangements Needed 

Organizational arrangements must be worked 
out to put disarmament and verification measures 
into effect. 

Isolated initial measures might be undertaken 
without such arrangements. We believe, how- 
ever, that any comprehensive agreement embrac- 
ing a number of important arms reductions will 
require supervision by an International Disarma- 
ment Organization. The joint statement of 
agreed principles envisages such an organization ; 
so do the plans of the So\aet Union and the 
United States. At an early stage this conference 
will have to determine the shape and the duties of 
this organization, as well as its place within the 
structure of the United Nations. 

There is a still larger task that confronts us as 
we put a disarmament program mto effect — a task 
neither less intricate nor less difficult than the at- 
tainment of general and complete disarmament 
itself. This is the creation of the kind of world 
in which national and international security will 
be maintained by means other than national armed 
forces. 

For if we are to destroy the armed forces which 
protect us today, we must be able to look to other 
methods of protecting one's safety against an- 
other's internal security forces, subversive activ- 
ities, or surprise rearmament. 



So disarmament must be accompanied by the 
strengthening of institutions for maintaining 
peace and settling international disputes by peace- 
ful means. I do not think there is any dissent 
from this proposition, though there may, of course, 
be important differences as to methods. The es- 
sential point is that progress must be made in this 
area to insure that lack of international security 
does not become a brake impeding implementation 
of the latter stages of disarmament. 

Before I move on to the plan of work which 
the United States proposes for this conference, I 
should like to address some questions which have 
been raised about the United States plan for gen- 
eral and complete disarmament. 

The fii-st is why the United States is willing to 
reduce nuclear delivery vehicles by "only" — and 
I put "only" in quotation marks — 30 percent, 
whereas the Soviet proposal is to reduce them by 
100 percent in the first stage. 

The fact is that the United States and the 
U.S.S.R. are agreed that we should achieve general 
and complete disarmament. The first part of 
paragraph No. 1 of the joint statement of agreed 
principles so states. The objective, therefore, is to 
reduce national armaments to nothing — to zero 
percent. This is in the Soviet plan; it is in the 
United States plan. 

There is no significant difference between the 
Soviet Union and the United States, then, as to the 
amount of disarmament sought. 

Both the United States and the Soviet Union, 
in getting to that condition of general and com- 
plete disarmament — from the present levels to 
zei-o — must pass by the 90-percent, the 70-percent, 
the 50-percent, and so on, levels of retained arms, 
whatever our arrangement. So here, too, there 
can be no significant difference between the United 
States and the U.S.S.R. 

The fundamental problems are two: 

Tlie first is : how to disarm in such a way that 
at no time in the process will the security of any 
nation be impaired. The solution of tliis first 
problem, of course, requires that the sequence of 
reductions — of kinds of arms and of their sites — 
be such as not to create a critical imbalance. 

The second problem is : how to keep the develop- 
ment of U.N. dispute-settling and peacekeeping 
institutions abreast of disarmament. 

The problem of maintaining military balance as 
we move to general and complete disarmament 



April 16, 1962 



621 



was raised by the distinguished Foreign Minister 
of Ethiopia last Wednesday. Mr. [Ketema] 
Yif ru stated that he would like to have an explana- 
tion as to how the United States proposal to reduce 
nuclear delivery vehicles and major conventional 
armaments by 30 percent "fit with point 5 of the 
agreed principles." Point 5, of course, states that 

All measures of general and complete disarmament 
should be balanced so that at no stage of the implementa- 
tion of the treaty could any State or group of States gain 
military advantage and that security is ensured equally 
for all. 

The United States proposal is based on the con- 
viction that there is a tolerable balance today and 
that across-the-board, carefully implemented, 
progressively larger percentage reductions serve 
disarmament most while disturbing balance least. 

The thought behind the approach is that reduc- 
tions in this manner will in fact leave nations with 
compositions of armaments — that is, ai-maments 
mix — which are organically sound and which they 
and their neighbors imderstand and to which they 
are accustomed. 

The difference, as the percentages of cuts go 
higher and higher, is only that the overall levels 
of arms will go lower and lower. The across-the- 
board, carefully implemented, percentage-cut ap- 
proach avoids the shock of removing, by major 
surgery, a disproportionate part of any one com- 
ponent of an intricately integrated military mix 
upon which a nation has come to rely in protecting 
its security. 

The United States believes that we have taken 
important steps toward evolving a realistic plan 
of work for this conference. With the innovation 
of informal meetings supplementing plenary ses- 
sions we have taken a very significant step away 
from the tradition of past disarmament confer- 
ences. We have agreed that the plenary meetings 
will pursue the primary objective of elaborating 
agreement on general and complete disarmament. 
With the establishment of a three-nation subcom- 
mittee on nuclear testing, we have implicitly rec- 
ognized the utility of subcommittees, on which 
my delegation believes we will increasingly come 
to rely. 

U.S. Proposes Specific Program of Work 

The United States makes the following pro- 
posals regarding our specific program of work for 
the following weeks: 



In the plenary conference we believe that we 
should identify the major substantive areas of a 
disarmament program and begin, as quickly as 
possible, to determine how these will be dealt with 
in an overall agreement on general and complete 
disarmament. We should, as we have agreed, con- 
sider the Soviet approach in each of these areas, 
as set forth in their draft proposal of March 15th. 
Simultaneously we would consider the approach 
in each of these areas as set forth in the United 
States program of September 25, 1961, which will, 
in the near future, be resubmitted in more detailed 
and elaborated form. 

Our objective should be to reach a common un- 
derstanding of how all of these aspects can be 
fitted into a master agreement for general and 
complete disarmament, drawing upon the best of 
all the proposals presented by these two programs 
submitted and by those which come from other 
quarters. 

The United States suggests that we take up the 
following broad areas in whatever order would 
be deemed most useful by the conference as a 
whole : 

First, measures for the reduction and elimina- 
tion of nuclear weapons and other weapons of 
mass destruction, as indicated in paragraph 3(b) 
of the joint statement of agreed principles of Sep- 
tember 20, 1961. 

Second, measures for the elimination of all 
means of delivery of weapons of mass destruc- 
tion, including orbiting vehicles, and for the 
reduction and elimination of all armed forces, 
conventional armaments, military expenditures, 
military training, and military establishments, as 
indicated in paragraphs 3 (a), (c), (d), and (e) of 
the agreed principles. 

Third, measures for the creation of an Inter- 
national Disarmament Organization within the 
framework of the U.N. and for ell'ective verifica- 
tion of the disarmament program, as indicated in 
paragrupli 6 of the agreed principles. 

And fourth, measures to strengthen institutions 
for the maintenance of peace and the settlement 
of international disputes by peaceful means, in- 
cluding the establishment of a U.K. peace force, 
as indicated in paragraplis 1(b), 2, and 7 of the 
agi'eed principles. 

In all of tlicso areas we should consider the 
sequence and balance of measures within stages 
and the time limits for each measure and stage, 



622 



Department of State Bulletin 



as indicated in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the agreed 
principles. 

The United States believes that as these broad 
discussions are continued in the plenaiy, with the 
objective of acliieving an agreed approacli in all 
of these areas, it will be desirable for the plenary 
to set up working and reporting subcommittees 
to deal with more detailed matters of a technical 
or treaty-drafting nature. 

For example, we believe that it would be de- 
sirable, in the near future, to set up subcommittees 
of the plenai-y to study the technical problems in- 
volved in the elimination of chemical and bacterio- 
logical weapons and to work out the control 
problems involved. Similarly, a subcommittee 
should be established to examine the problem of 
securing the controlled reduction and elimination 
of nuclear weapons. We believe that it will be de- 
sirable to establish a subcommittee to work out 
agreed categories for the elimination of the nu- 
clear delivery vehicles and conventional arma- 
ments and the measures of control which will be 
necessary to police their elimination. And the 
United States believes that it will prove useful, 
in due course, to establish a subcommittee to ex- 
amine the potentialities of the zonal and random 
sampling approach to inspection that we have 
proposed. 

This is not an exhaustive list, and we are sure 
that other members will have suggestions for 
similar working groups as we proceed in our 
discussion. 

Suggested Agenda for Committee of the Whole 

We have now also agreed to establish a Com- 
mittee of the Whole to deal with problems that 
might be pursued separately from an overall 
agreement. There will be many suggestions for 
items to be placed on the agenda of this commit- 
tee. Although the subcommittee on nuclear test- 
ing was established before we had agreed to set 
up the Committee of the Whole, we believe this 
subcommittee should most logically operate within 
the framework of the Committee of the Whole. 
I believe all members here have agreed that the 
objective of a nuclear test ban treaty should be 
pursued as one separate from the overall objective 
of general and complete disarmament. 

The United States proposes two further items 
for the agenda of the Committee of the Whole: 
First, we propose that this committee consider as 



a matter of urgency an agreement for the cessa- 
tion of the production of fissionable material for 
use in weapons. While this measure would ob- 
viously be a necessary part of a program for gen- 
eral and complete disarmament, as provided in 
both the Soviet and the United States plans, we 
believe also that this measure should not be de- 
layed. We feel that it can be put into effect 
separately and as a matter of the highest priority. 

The United States will also wish, in the Com- 
mittee of the Whole, to reach agreement on meas- 
ures for the reduction of the possibility of war 
by surprise attack, miscalculation, or failure of 
communications. We will specifically propose 
that the Committee of the Whole, perhaps in a 
subcommittee, explore, on an urgent basis, the four 
measures which I proposed in my opening state- 
ment of March 15 and to which I referred earlier 
today. 

The United States makes the above proposals in 
the hope that they will lead to a useful exchange 
of views and to agreement on precisely how we 
will proceed in our work here. The organiza- 
tional arrangements which we have already agreed 
upon, and which we hope will be elaborated in the 
days ahead, provide a good basis for advancing 
our work. 

Let me emphasize that, as we look upon our 
program of work, the conference must and should 
examine every proposal made by every delegation 
which is relevant to the work of the disarmament 
conference. We are in no sense in our suggestions 
trying to oppose any suggestion from any quarter 
on any point. 

In conclusion I would like to repeat the commit- 
ment of the United States to the goal of general 
and complete disarmament in a peaceful world. 
The United States has established a major new 
agency to develop our proposals to reach that goal. 
The United States is willing to negotiate as con- 
structively and as patiently as is necessary to 
reach agreement. 

A great service would be performed by this 
conference if it took steps this spring : 

To reverse the upward spiral of destructive 
capability which, if imchecked, could by 1966 be 
double what it is today ; 

To reverse the trend toward diffusion of nu- 
clear capability to new nations; 

To produce agreement on measures to reduce 
the risk of war by accident, miscalculation, or sur- 



April 16, T962 



623 



prise attack ; for the longer we permit tlie risk of 
nuclear war to hang over our heads, the more 
important it is that the risk be made as small as 
possible. 

The cochairmen have recommended a plan of 
work. This has now been adopted by the con- 
ference. I have made some proposals about how 
we might proceed under the plan. 

Let us now get to work and make a good begin- 
ning. We need not be discouraged if we en- 
counter difficulties in our early deliberations, be- 
cause we are talking about nothing less than the 
transformation of the history of man. But it is 
important to begin — and with actual, physical dis- 
armament. A good beginning will hasten us on 
our way to the full disarmament we seek in a 
world at peace. 



President Repeats U.S. Desire 
for Effective Test Ban Treaty 

Statement iy President Kennedy 

White House press release dated March 29 

I stated on March 2 ^ the United States 
earnestly desires a test ban treaty with effective 
controls. The essential element upon which the 
United States has insisted, however, is that there 
be an objective international system for insuring 
that the ban against testing is being complied with. 
This means that there should be an international 
organization for operating seismic stations and 
for verifying that seismic events have been de- 
tected, located, and are appropriate for inspection. 
Most important of all, the organization should 
have the power to conduct a limited number of 
on-site inspections to verify whether a seismic 
event was an earthquake or an explosion. With- 
out these inspections there can be no confidence 
in any system of detection, because it will not tell 
us wlicther an underground event is a nuclear ex- 
plosion or an earthquake. 

On this subject one must distinguish carefully 
between detection and identification. We can de- 
tect and locate sigiiificant underground events by 
seismic means, but of course the same seismic 
means detect many shallow earthquakes. Tlie 
problem is to identify a particular detected event 
as an explosion or as an earthquake. Seismic 



means alone simply will not do the job. This 
matter has been reviewed again and again by the 
best technical minds of the United States and 
Great Britain, and the answer is always the same. 
And no serious technical evidence to the contrary 
has been produced by any other country. A few 
of the larger earthquakes can be identified as 
such, and very large underground tests outside of 
seismic areas can be identified with a high meas- 
ure of probability ; this was the case with the So- 
viet test on Febiiiai-y 2d. But the seismic records 
from the large majority of the events are such 
that they could be from either earthquakes or ex- 
plosions. In otlier words they cannot be identified. 

The only way we know to perform this identifi- 
cation is to have a scientific team go to the site 
of the event and examine it. By studying the 
rocks and the radioactivity and by drilling holes 
one can find out with satisfactory certainty 
whether it was an explosion. This is the on-sit© 
inspection wliich we insist is the only way to verify 
the character of an imderground event. 

Now the Soviet Government objects to our April 
1961 draft treaty on the test ban ^ quite simply 
because it provides for international inspection in 
Soviet territory. It objects specifically to having 
any control posts for test detection in their terri- 
tory. This is a sharp and inexplicable regression 
from the Soviet position of even a year ago. In 
addition the Soviets object to any on-site inspec- 
tions whatsoever. 

In earlier years the So\Tiet Government, at all 
levels, clearly accepted both the idea of control 
posts and the basic principle of on-site inspection. 
Now it is claimed that such control posts and in- 
spections are useful only for purposes of espionage. 

As Mr. Rusk pointed out in Geneva last Friday,' 
such fears of espionage from the proposed sj'stem 
of control and inspection are wholly unjustified. 
Members of fixed control posts would be under 
Soviet supervision at all times and could go no- 
where at all without Soviet appro\-al. ]\Iembers 
of inspection teams would be mider constant 
Soviet observation and would be limited to the 
execution of technical tasks in an area which, at 
the very most, would never exceed more than one 
part in 2,000 of Soviet territory in any year — and 
most of this work would be done in the earthquake 
areas of tlie U.S.S.R., far from centers of militaiy 



' Bulletin of Mar. 19, 19C2, p. 443. 
624 



' For text, see ihid.. June .'). lOGl. p. S70. 
'lUa., Apr. 0, 19G2, p. .571. 



Department of State Bulletin 



or industrial activity. Finally, occasional air- 
sampling teams would fly in Soviet planes under 
fully controlled conditions. I submit that no one 
interested in espionage would go at it by the means 
of control and inspection worked out in this treaty 
after years of effort involving Soviet scientists as 
well as our own. 

Nevertheless the Soviet Government is now ab- 
solutely opposed not only to this particular system 
of inspection, carefully supervised and narrowly 
limited as it is, but to any inspection at all. This 
position has been made very clear both publicly 
and privately — most plainly by Mr. Gromyko on 
the United Nations radio on March 27. 

We laiow of no way to verify underground 
nuclear explosions without inspections, and we 
cannot at this time enter into a treaty without the 
ability and right of international verification. 
Hence we seem to be at a real impasse. Never- 
theless, I want to repeat with emphasis our desire 
for an effective treaty and our readiness to con- 
clude such a treaty at the earliest possible time. 



U.S. and U.S.S.R. Discuss German 
Problem and Related Questions 

Following is the text of a joint statement re- 
leased at Geneva on March 27 at tlie close of talks 
between Secretary Rusk and Soviet Foreign Min- 
ister Andrei A. Gromyko. 

In connection with their presence in Geneva to 
attend the opening sessions of the Eighteen Nation 
Committee on Disarmament, the Foreign Minis- 
ters of the U.S.S.R. and the United States have 
had a series of meetings devoted to a discussion of 
the German problem and related questions. Their 
conversations have been both useful and frank, 
and some progress has been made in clarifying 
points of agreement and points of difference. 
They have agreed to resume contact in an appro- 
priate way after reporting to their respective 
Governments and after consultation with their 
Allies. 



American Strategy on the World Scene 



ly Walt W. Rostow ^ 



The title of my talk tonight is one of my own 
choosing: "American Strategy on the World 
Scene." I chose this title because there is a wide- 
spread feeling in the country that we do not have 
a strategy. That view derives mainly, I think, 
from the fact that in the predominating news 
which comes to us from day to day — in the news- 
papers, over television and radio — is the news of 
crises : Berlin and the Congo, Laos and Viet-Nam, 
and all the others. These crises are very much 
part of the reality we face, and I shall begin by 
talking about them. 

But our strategy goes beyond the crises that are 



' Address made before the Purdue Conference on Inter- 
national Affairs at Purdue University, Lafayette, Ind., on 
Mar. 15 (press release 170). Mr. Rostow is Counselor and 
Chairman of the Policy Planning Council, Department 
of State. 



forced upon us. We have a clear and constructive 
strategy. It was outlined briefly by the President 
in his last state of the Union message,^ and by 
Secretary Eusk in his recent talks to the American 
Historical Association ^ and at Davidson College.* 
This strategy goes forward in quiet ways, in large 
as well as small movements ; but these do not make 
exciting news. Nor is this forward movement 
always easy to measure. My main purpose in com- 
ing here is, therefore, to try to explain what it is 
that we are trying to achieve on the world scene 
as a nation, positively and constructively, and 
what our prospects appear to be. 
But first a word about crises. 



' Bulletin of Jan. 29, 1962, p. 159. 
"/6i(f., Jan. 15, 1962, p. 83. 
*IXiid., Mar. 19, 1962, p. 448. 



AprW 16, 1962 



625 



Wlien this administration came to responsibility 
some 14 montlis ago we confronted situations of 
acute crisis in Southeast Asia, in tlie Congo, in 
Cuba, as well as the threat which has overhung 
Berlin since 1958 — Mr. Khrushchev's threat that 
he would make a separate German treaty which, 
in his view, would extinguish Western rights in 
West Berlin. These were by no means the first 
crises of the postwar years. Such crises have been 
the lot of all who have borne responsibility in 
Washington since 1945. 

Wliy is it that we appear to be living in a sea 
of troubles? 'V\niat is it that determines the 
chronic recurrence of crises in our environment? 

Leaving aside the direct intrusions of Commu- 
nist military power in the postwar years — sym- 
bolized, for example, by the blockade of Berlin in 
1948-49, the invasion of South Korea in 1950, and 
the periodic attacks on the offshore islands — post- 
war crises have been of three kinds, usually in some 
sort of combination : international crises arising 
from internal struggles for power, reflecting the 
inevitable political and social strains of moderni- 
zation going forward in the underdeveloped areas ; 
colonial or postcolonial conflicts involving Euro- 
pean nations on the one hand and the nations and 
territories of the southern continents on the other ; 
and the Communist efforts systematically to ex- 
ploit the opportunities offered by these two in- 
herent types of trouble. Think back and you will, 
I think, agree. Indochina, Suez, Iraq, Cuba, Al- 
geria, the Congo, Bizerte, Goa, West New Guinea, 
the Dominican Republic — they were all com- 
pounded of some combination of these three ele- 
ments, and they all arose in what we call the 
underdeveloped areas. 

In Stalin's time the main thrust of Communist 
policy was fairly direct and military, but in the 
last decade the Communists have worked system- 
atically to make the most of the inevitable turbu- 
lence of the modernization process on the one hand 
and of the north-south conflicts on the other — 
(using that shorthand gcogi'aphical designation 
to represent the approximate fact that the indus- 
trial revolution came first to the noi'thern portions 
of the vvoi'id and is only now gathering strength 
to the south). 

For example, in order to maximize the chance 
that Indonesia would go to war in order to acquire 
the Dutch-held territory of West New Guinea, the 
Communist bloc has advanced credits of $800 mil- 
lion to Djakarta, just as, starting in 1955, they 



granted substantial anns credits in the Middle 
East to disrupt this area and to aline themselves 
and the local Communist parties with issues that 
had strong national appeal. 

Communist activity is global, and it is not, of 
course, confined to arms deals. There is almost 
literally no nation in Asia, the Middle East, 
Africa, and Latin America in which the Com- 
munists are not investing significant resources in 
order to organize individuals and groups for the 
purpose of overthrowing the existing governments 
and supplanting them with Communist regimes; 
and they look quite openly to what they call wars 
of national liberation — that is, to systematic sub- 
version building up to urban insurrection or guer- 
rilla warfare— as a way of bringing communism 
to the underdeveloped areas. Khrushchev has 
stated that he regai'ds it as legitimate for Com- 
munist regimes to support such insurrection, wluch 
we can see in full cry in South Viet-Nam — a guer- 
rilla war instigated, supplied, and guided from 
outside the country. In a speech of December 2 
last year Castro spoke of guerrilla warfare as the 
match to be thrown into the haystack and noted 
that many Latin American countries were ready 
for such treatment. 

It is not difficult to see why the Conununists 
look on the underdeveloped areas as an arena of 
opportunity. The process of modernization in- 
volves radical change not merely in the economy 
of underdeveloped nations but in their social 
structure and political life. We live, quite liter- 
ally, in a revolutionary time. We must expect 
over the next decade recurrent turbulence in these 
ai'eas; we must expect systematic efforts by the 
Communists to exploit this turbulence; we must 
expect from time to time that crises will occur, 
and a great deal of skill, courage, and insight will 
be required to handle them in ways which do not 
damage — and, if possible, promote — the interests 
of the free world. 

Shaping Today's Forces to Our Purposes 

But our strategy is not built on a merely defen- 
sive reaction to these turbulent situations and the 
Communist effort to exploit them. We are, I 
think, learning better how to anticipate crises, and 
we are working with our friends in the free world 
to head off or to deal with Communist efforts to 
ex])loit them. But we are doing more than that, 
and we intend to do more. We are working to a 



626 



Department of Sfafe Bulletin 



positive strategy which takes into account the 
forces at work in our environment and seeks to 
shape them constructively to our own purposes 
and interests — as a nation and as members of a 
community committed to the principles of national 
independence and human freedom. 

What are these fundamental forces which we 
confront and which we must shape? 

The revolution in military teclinology, yielding 
an uncontrolled competitive arms race and, at 
present, an imbalance of the offensive over the 
defensive in the field of nuclear weapons. 

The revolution of modernization in Latin Amer- 
ica, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, including 
the modernization going forward in undei'devel- 
oped areas under Coirmiunist control. 

The revival of economic momentum and politi- 
cal strength in Western Europe and Japan. 

The revolution in science and teclmology, no- 
tably in international communications. 

The political revolution, marked simultaneously 
by proliferation of ardent new nations and an in- 
tensified interdependence which requires the in- 
dividual nation-state to cooperate increasingly 
with others in order to provide for its security and 
economic welfare. 

Taken together, these forces decree a world set- 
ting where power and influence are being progres- 
sively diffused within, as well as without, the 
Communist bloc, where strong inhibitions exist 
against all-out use of military force, where the in- 
teraction of societies and sovereign nations be- 
comes progressively more intimate. 

In tlie light of this view of what we confront in 
the world around us, our strategy' has five dimen- 
sions. 

Strengthening Bonds Among Industrialized Nations 

First, we are strengthening the bonds of associa- 
tion among the more industrialized nations, which 
lie mainly in the northern portion of the free 
world: Western Europe, Canada, and Japan. 

Western Europe and Japan have been caught up 
in a remarkable phase of postwar recovery and 
economic growth. During that period they were 
protected by American military strength and sup- 
ported in many ways by American economic re- 
sources. Although they must still rely on the 
deterrent power of American nuclear resources, 
they are evidently entering a phase where they 
wish to play a larger role on the world scene and 



have the resources to do so. We are in the midst 
of an exciting and complicated process of working 
out new terms of partnership with Western 
Europe in every dimension. 

NATO is being rethought and Europe's role 
within it being redefined in the light of Soviet pos- 
session of nuclear weapons and missiles and Mos- 
cow's recurrent threat that Western Europe is 
"hostage"' to its missiles. 

New patterns of trade are being worked out 
within Europe, between Europe and the U.S., be- 
tween the whole Atlantic community and the rest 
of the world. 

Our policies with respect to economic growth 
and currency reserves are being discussed and 
alined in the Organization for Economic Coopera- 
tion and Development, and we are moving into a 
new partnership in the business of aid to the un- 
derdeveloped areas. 

Although Japan stands in a somewhat different 
relation to us than does Europe with respect to 
militai-y affairs, in each of the other dimensions of 
alliance policy — trade, reserves, and aid — it is 
moving into a role of partnerehip with the indus- 
trialized north. And bilaterally we have moved 
closer to Japan in the past year, with the visit of 
Prime Minister Ikeda,'^ the Tokyo meeting of cab- 
inet ministers from the two countries,® and the 
recent visit to Japan of the Attorney General. 

The constructive steps that mark this process of 
tightening the north and of mobilizing its strength 
and resources for worldwide tasks do not usually 
make headlines unless — as is inevitable — there are 
phases of disagreement along the way ; but it is a 
rapidly developing piece of history which will give 
to the cause of freedom a new strength, a new bone 
structure. The trade legislation which the admin- 
istration has recently presented to Congress ^ is 
both a symbol of what we are trying to create and 
a crucial element in its architecture. 

Modernization in Underdeveloped Nations 

The second dimension of our strategy concerns 
our posture toward the revolution of moderniza- 
tion going forward in Latin America, Africa, 
Asia, and the Middle East. 



■ For background, see ihid., July 10, 1961, p. 57. 

'For background, see ihid., Nov. 27, 1061, p. 890. 

' For text of President Kennedy's message on trade, 
see ibid., Feb. 12, 1962, p. 231 ; for a summary of the bill 
(H.R. 9900), see ibid., Feb. 26, 1962, p. 343. 



April 16, J 962 



627 



What we sometimes call underdeveloped na- 
tions represent a -wide spectrum with different 
problems marking each stage along the road to 
self-sustained growth. Some of these nations are 
well along that road; others are just beginning. 
And in the end each nation, like each individual, 
is in an important sense unique. "Wliat is common 
throughout these regions is that men and women 
are determined to bring to bear what modem 
science and technology can afford in order to ele- 
vate the standards of life of their peoples and to 
provide a firm basis for positions of national dig- 
nity and independence on the world scene. 

The United States is firmly committed to sup- 
port this effort. We look forward to the emer- 
gence of strong, assertive nations which, out of 
their own traditions and aspirations, create their 
own forms of modem society. We take it as our 
duty- — and our interest — to help maintain the in- 
tegrity and the independence of this vast modern- 
ization process insofar as our resources and our 
ability to influence the course of events permit. 

Last year the executive branch and the Con- 
gress collaborated to launch a new program of 
aid which would grant aid increasingly on the 
basis of each nation's effort to mobilize its own 
resources. This approach to the development 
problem, which looks to the creation of long-term 
national development programs, is just beginning 
to take hold. We are in the midst of a complex 
turnaround affecting both our own policy and that 
of many other nations. 

National development plans cannot be made 
effective by writing them down in government 
offices; they require effective administration and 
the mobilization of millions of men and women. 
New roads and dams, schools and factories re- 
quire feasibility studies and blueprints if they are 
to be built — not merely listing in hopeful govern- 
ment documents. This turnaround process will, 
therefore, take time, but from one end of the 
underdeveloped regions to the other it is actively 
under way. 

More than that, it is now clear that the United 
States is positively alined with those men and 
women who do not merely talk about economic 
development and the modernization of their so- 
cieties but who really mean it and are prepared to 
dedicate their lives to its achievement. It is no 
accident that President Kennedy spoke last year 



of a "decade of development." ^ We are up against 
a longer and tougher job than the Marshall plan. 
But we have already begun to create a new basis 
of partnership, not merely between ourselves and 
the underdeveloped areas but between the whole 
industrialized northern part of the free world and 
its less developed regions. 

Our objective is to see emerge a new relation of 
cooperation among self-respecting sovereign na- 
tions to supplant the old colonial ties which are 
gone or fast disappearing from the world scene. 
"VVliile the headlines are filled with the residual 
colonial problems — and they are very real — of 
Rhodesia, of Angola, of West New Guinea, quiet 
but real progress has been made in fashioning new 
links between the more developed and the less 
developed areas. 

Building New North-South Tie 

The building of this new north-south tie is the 
third major dimension of our strategy on the 
world scene. It goes forward in the Alliance for 
Progress,' in our relations with the new African 
nations, in the meetings of the Development As- 
sistance Committee of the OECD in Paris, in the 
consortium arrangements of the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, in 
the transformed relations of the British Common- 
wealth and the French Community, in the enlarg- 
ing contribution of Germany, Japan, and other 
nations to economic development. And above all, 
it goes forward in the minds of citizens in both 
the north and the south who are gradually com- 
ing to perceive that, however painful the mem- 
ories of the colonial past may be, major and 
abiding areas of common interest are emerging 
between nations at different stages of the growth 
process which are authentically committed to the 
goals of national independence and human free- 
dom. 

Creating a Stable Military Environment 

The fourth dimension of our strategy is mili- 
tary. There is much for us to build within the 
free world, but we must protect what we are build- 
ing or there will be no freedom. 



' For an address by President Kennedy before the U.N. 
General Assembly on Sept. 25, 1961, see ihid., Oct. 16, 1961, 
p. 619. 

•For background, see ibid., Apr. 2, 1962, p. 539. 



628 



Deparfmenf of Sfafe Bulletin 



A persistent characteristic of Communist strat- 
eo'v has been its searching attention to specific 
ga'ps— regional and technical— in the defenses of 
Tlie free world. It has been, thus far, an evident 
purpose of Communist strategy to avoid a direct 
confrontation not only with U.S. main strength 
but with positions of relative strength within the 
free world. 

Soviet policy appears to be based on sustained 
and sophisticated study of particular areas of vul- 
nerability (e.g. northern Azerbaijan, Greece, Ber- 
lin, Indochina, South Korea) and particular types 
of vulnerability (e.g. the geographical position of 
Berlin, the shortage of local defenses against 
guerrilla warfare in Laos and South Viet-Nam). 
We cannot rule out that in the future the Com- 
munists will be prepared to assault directly the 
IT.S. or other positions of evident strength within 
the free community. Tlierefore it is a first charge 
on U.S. military policy to make such direct as- 
sault grossly unattractive and unprofitable. But 
a major lesson of postwar history is that U.S. and 
Allied policy must achieve, to the maximum de- 
gree possible, a closing off of areas of vulnerability 
if we wish to minimize the number and effective- 
ness of Communist probes. It is this lesson which 
requires that the United States and its allies de- 
velop a full spectrum of military strength, under 
sensitive and flexible control, capable of covering 
all regions of the free world, if we are to create 
a stable military environment and minimize the 
op])ortunity for Communist intrusions. 

It is toward this objective that we have been 
working over the past year. We have been build- 
ing American military forces over the whole range 
from virtually unattackable Polaris submarines to 
the training of our own men and the soldiers of 
our allies to deter or to defeat guerrilla warfare. 
We wish to make it clear to those who might 
attack that a nuclear assault on ourselves or our 
allies would bring in return nuclear disaster. We 
wish to make it clear that we would use all the 
force at our disposal if we or our allies were at- 
tacked massively by other means; but we require 
also the kinds of force which would permit us to 
deter or deal with limited Communist attack with- 
out having to choose between nuclear war and 
surrender. 

Over the past year, and at present, our ability 
to cope with force and the threat of force is being 
tested in Berlin and in Southeast Asia. We do not 



intend to surrender at either point or at any other 
point along the frontiers of freedom. 

At the same time we recognize that the arms 
race is an unsatisfactory way to provide national 
security in a nuclear age. We are prepared to 
take either limited or radical evenhanded meas- 
ures to reduce the risks of war and the burden of 
armaments, so long as we are confident that these 
measures can be verified and controlled by effec- 
tive measures of inspection. This is the burden 
of our position at the current Geneva disarmament 
conference.'" 

Our approach to problems of ai-ms control and 
disarmament is not in terms of propaganda : It is 
a soberly weighed aspect of national security pol- 
icy. We are in deadly earnest. But no amount of 
U.S. staff work or seriousness of intent can substi- 
tute for the essential missing ingi-edient: a Soviet 
willingness to acknowledge and to act on the sim- 
ple fact that an end to the arms race requires a 
progressive opening of societies to mutual 
inspection. 

Test of Strength With Communist World 

The fifth element in our strategy concerns our 
posture toward the nations now under Communist 
rule. We have made it clear that we do not intend 
to initiate nuclear war to destroy the Communist 
world. The question then arises : Are we content 
merely to fend off Communist intrusion, military 
and subversive? Wliat are our hopes and our 
prospects with respect to the Communist world? 
Are we reconciled to a planet that shall, at best, 
be forever split ? 

We are engaged in an historic test of strength — 
not merely of military strength but of our capac- 
ity to understand and to deal with the forces at 
work in the world about us. The ultimate ques- 
tion at issue is whether this small planet is to be 
organized on the principles of the Communist 
bloc or on the principles of volimtary cooperation 
among independent nation-states dedicated to 
human freedom. If we succeed in defending the 
present frontiers of freedom, the outcome of that 
test of strength will be determmed by slow-moving 
forces of history. It will be determined by 
whether the elements in the world envii'onment, 
which I listed earlier, are more successfully 



" For a statement by Secretary Rusk at Geneva on Mar. 
27, see p. 618. 



April 16, J 962 

634433—62 3 



629 



gripped and organized by ourselves and our 
friends than by the Communists. 

The question then becomes : How is history mov- 
ing? Are these underlying forces now working 
for us or against us ? 

I would put it to you strongly that they are 
working our way if we have the wit to work with 
them. 

First, in the naore industrialized north we have 
seen in the postwar years a remarkable demonstra- 
tion which has had a more profound effect on 
Communist thought than is generally understood. 
Until very recently the Communists believed that 
the United States was something of a special case. 
We were viewed as the fortunate democratic is- 
land-continent with much land and a few people, 
permitted to enjoy — at least for a time — a special, 
favored destiny. They looked to Europe and 
Japan as more vulnerable regions subject to Com- 
munist takeover in the fairly near future. 

AVliat has been demonstrated in the past decade 
is that advanced democratic societies have learned 
to avoid protracted phases of severe luiemploy- 
ment and that the American pattern of develop- 
ment—our standard of living and the provision of 
high standards of consumption to the mass of the 
people — is the general pattern. The trend toward 
the Americanization of standards of living in 
Western Europe and Japan, and the vitality of 
democratic capitalism in the past decade, is a 
major setback to the Communst image of history, 
to their ideology, and to their working plans. 

Partly because of this setback they have looked 
with increasing hope and enterprise to the under- 
developed areas. There they thought the 
Communist metliods of organization and the Com- 
munist example in China, North Viet-Nam, and 
elsewhere — as a means of moving an underdevel- 
oped country forward rapidly toward modern 
status — would draw others to the bloc. Tliey 
turned to a strategy of outflanking and isolating 
the United States, Europe, and Japan by winning 
over the underdeveloped areas — by ideological 
attraction as well as by subversion, aid, and 
diplomacy. 

The returns are not yet in, but a sober and cau- 
tious assessment, :is of 1962, shows this: Wliere 
the Communists have had power in underdevel- 
oped areas — in China, North Korea, North Viet- 
Nam, and now in Cuba — they have done an unim- 
pressive job technically, quite aside from the 



inhumanity of a police state. The most striking 
fact about tlie mood in Asia, when I went out there 
with General [Maxwell D.] Taylor last fall, was 
the loss by the Communists of their power to at- 
tract by example in either North Viet-Nam or in 
China. Tlie Communist states are drab and hun- 
gry. In particular the Chinese Communists have 
demonstrated that the most powerful control ma- 
chine ever mounted in an underdeveloped country 
is incapable of forcing men to grow enougli food, 
and their agricultural crisis has compounded into 
a general crisis of industrial production and 
foreign exchange. 

Meanwhile India and certain other underdevel- 
oped nations have begun to demonstrate that real 
momentum and steady progress can be obtained in 
an underdeveloped area by mobilizing the energies 
and loyalties of the people by consent and normal 
human incentives. 

It appears to be a teclinical fact that the most 
powerful system of control is an inadequate sub- 
stitute for the incentives and commitment of the 
individual citizen, once he can be engaged. De- 
velopment is a process which requires that millions 
of human beings and many organized groups as- 
sume responsibility for moving tilings forward on 
their narrow part of the front. There are simply 
not enough Commiuiist cadres or secret policemen 
available to substitute for the energy and commit- 
ment of men and women who understand what 
needs to be done and why it is their interest to 
do it. 

The demonstration in the underdeveloped areas 
is not yet as definitive a victory for freedom as 
that in the northern half of the free world. One 
of the gi-eat tasks of this decade is to complete this 
demonstration. But the lesson of our experience 
thus far is that we sliould be confident that, in go- 
ing forward with economic development by the 
methods of pragmatic planning and individual 
consent which are natural to us, we are on the right 
track technically us well as morally and that the 
Communist image of the problems of moderniza- 
tion — and Communist techniques for handling 
them in the underdeveloped areas — are just as 
arcliaic as their notions of how one sliould or- 
ganize an advanced industrial society. 

There is yet another force worlving our way, and 
that is tlie intent of people and governments in the 
underdeveloped areas to maintain their independ- 



630 



Department of State Bulletin 



ence. We in the United States can live comfort- 
ably in a pluralistic world of independent nations, 
each fashioning its own modern personality, be- 
cause our life at home is based on the principle 
of cooperation among dignified and responsible 
equals; but the Communists are driven by their 
methods for organizing domestic power to violate 
equally the integrity of individuals and nations. 
The drive of the people and governmeaits in the 
underdeveloped areas to maintain their independ- 
ence is a most powerful force. We can honestly 
aline our policy with this force. In the end the 
Communists cannot; and this is one fundamental 
reason why the Communist offensive in the under- 
developed areas will fail. 

Dispute Between Moscow and Peiping 

Finally, tlie Communist bloc itself is now in the 
midst ofa slow-moving but great historical crisis. 
This crisis takes the form of the deep dispute 
between Moscow and Peiping, a dispute which has 
engaged in one way or another Communist parties 
throughout the world. Wliat lies behind this dis- 
pute, among other factors, is the rise of national- 
ism as a living and growing force within the 
Communist bloc. It is a force within Russia itself, 
and it is a growing force as well in other regions 
where Communist regimes are in power. Despite 
the interest of Communists in maintaining their 
cohesion against the West, the slow fragmentation 
of the Communist bloc and the diffusion of power 
within it goes forward. 

We expect no quick or cheap benefits from this 
process. In the short run it may present problems 
to us, as when the Russians and the Chinese com- 
pete to exert their influence over the Communist 
Party in Hanoi by backing its efforts in Laos and 
in South Viet-Nam. But fundamentally the as- 
sertion of nationalism and national interests with- 
in the Communist bloc should tend to produce a 
more livable world. The diffusion of power, we 
know, is the basis for human liberty within soci- 
eties, and on the world scene it is the basis for 
independent nations. 

For example, we have every reason to believe 
that the limited assistance we have given Yugo- 
slavia and Poland over the years and our willing- 
ness to maintain wide human contacts with their 
citizens have been sound longrun investments in 
the principle of national independence and human 
freedom. 

April 16, 1962 



We should, therefore, be prepared, as these na- 
tional interests exert themselves, to find limited 
areas of overlapping interest with Communist re- 
gimes and to work toward a world which increas- 
ingly approximates the kind of world we 
envisaged when the United Nations was set up. 
Our^'strategy is, then, quite simple. We are 
working from day to day to bind up in closer 
partnership the industrialized nations of the 
north, to work with our friends in the north to 
create a new partnership between the more devel- 
oped and less developed nations. Recognizing and 
welcoming the new strength to be found in West- 
ern Europe and Japan, recognizing and wel- 
coming the impulse of the southern nations to 
modernize, we see a path ahead which would 
reconcile the great interests involved and gradu- 
ally build a community of free nations. 

We intend to defend this community of free na- 
tions and to do so in ways which will minimize the 
possibility that a nuclear war will come about, and 
we intend, with all the poise and insight we can 
muster, to draw the nations now under Communist 
regimes toward the free-world community by both 
ruling out the expansion of communism and by ex- 
ploiting specific areas of overlapping interest 
which we believe will increasingly emerge as the 
strength, unity, and effectiveness of the free com- 
munity is demonstrated. As Secretary Rusk re- 
cently said : " ". . . we should be aware that the 
concepts of independent nationhood, of national 
mterest, and of national culture are day to day as- 
serting themselves strongly" within the Commu- 
nist bloc. We have every reason to be confident 
that the wave of the future lies with the funda- 
mental principles on which our own society is 
based and which are rooted also in the United Na- 
tions Cliarter. 

It is in this spirit— in terms of these objectives 
and this intent— that we do our work from day to 
day in Washington. We kTiow that over the next 
decade there will be frustrations and setbacks. We 
know that we shall have to deal with difficult crises 
as well as press forward with our work of con- 
struction. But, as we go about our business, we 
are in good heart, and we shall not be deflected. 
We believe that time is on the side of the things 
this nation stands for if we use time well, and we 
intend to do so. 



' Bulletin of Jan. 15, 1962, p. 83. 



631 



The United Nations and the Real World 



iy Acting Secretary Ball^ 



Statesmen, Journalists, pundits, and politicians 
are fond of reminding us that these are times of 
rapid change and vast transformation in human 
affairs. It is well that they do, for the pace and 
pervasiveness of scientific, political, and social 
change have given a special character to the post- 
war world. 

Yet it is not enough to recognize, as a general 
proposition, that change is taking place. We must 
define the direction of that change if we are to 
adjust our attitudes and policies to the shifting 
requirements of the times. For as the world 
changes, our conventional wisdom is called into 
question, inherited doctrine becomes obsolete, and 
human institutions perforce take on new forms 
and new functions. It requires all the perception 
and imagination we can muster — and then some — 
if we are to know even imprecisely what we are 
doing or where we are going. 

This morning I want to talk with you about 
what we are doing and where we are going with 
one of the most ambitious and misunderstood of 
our postwar institutions — the United Nations. 

I refer to the United Nations as misunderstood 
because the current discussion of the effectiveness 
and utility of that institution displays a wide area 
of difference as to its purposes and objectives. If 
one would loolc back to San Francisco in 1945 
when the charter was being drafted and then look 
at the world today, the reason for this misunder- 
standing becomes apparent. The assumption — 
or at least the hope — that inspired the drafters 
of that noble document was that the great powere, 



* Address made at a foreiRii policy briefing conference 
for the press and l)roadcastinK industry at the Department 
on Mar. 20 ( press release 191 ) . 



allied in World War II, would be able to live in 
relative harmony and together police the postwar 
world. They could settle whatever differences 
arose among them within the forum of the Se- 
curity Council. 

As we know all too well, the effort to fashion 
one world with one treaty hardly lasted through 
the first General Assembly. The Soviet Union 
joined the United Nations in name only. Over 
the next 4 years the Iron Curtain slammed down 
to form a cage aroimd one-third of the world's 
population, living on a great landmass that 
stretches from the Brandenburg Gate to the Yel- 
low Sea. 

The United Nations was thus frustrated in its 
original objective of serving as a forum for rec- 
onciling differences among the great powers. 
This has not, however, destroyed its usefulness — 
indeed its indispensability. 

Instead the United Nations has found its post- 
war destiny in quite different and enormously ef- 
fective endeavors. 

That is why I thought it might be useful, in 
the few moments we have together this morning, 
to describe the major role tliat the United Nations 
has in fact played in this turbulent postwar decade 
and a half and to suggest how the United Na- 
tions fits into flic whole of American diplomacy. 

Transformation in World Power Relationships 

The brief moment of time — less than a genera- 
tion — since the end of World War II has seen 
the world transformed. If one-third of the world 
population has been encircled by tlie Iron Cur- 
tain, in this brief period another one-third has 
made the eventful passage from colonial status 



632 



Department of Sfcrfe Bulletin 



to some form of national independence. Almost 
50 new states have come into being; a dozen more 
are actively in the making. 

Such a revolutionary movement on a worldwide 
scale has no precedent. The great changes of the 
past have taken place only over centuries; the sud- 
den denouement of the 20th-century anticolonial 
revolution has been compressed in a mere 15 years. 
The breakup of the European empires meant 
the collapse of a longstanding system of world 
order. It meant the sudden rupture of old ties, 
the sudden emergence of new states, the sudden 
liberation of a billion people from colonial de- 
pendence. The world has never known a compa- 
rable political convulsion— so abruptly begun, so 
quickly concluded. 

Even under the best of circumstances one could 
well have expected this to be a period of violent 
conflict, chaos, and vast bloodletting. But the 
collapse of the European empires did not take 
place in the best of circumstances — almost in the 
worst. For it took place in a world polarized be- 
tween the great powers of East and West, where 
the Sino-Soviet bloc had everything to gain by 
the vigorous promotion of chaos. 

The Communists tried hard to exploit the tur- 
moil implicit in rapid change. They sought to 
capture and divert the nationalist revolutions into 
Communist channels. They did their best to turn 
political instability into political collapse, to rub 
salt into the wounds of racial antagonisms, to fan 
jealousies between the poor and the rich, to ex- 
ploit the inexperience of the new governments, to 
capitalize on economic misery, and to heighten 
tensions between new states and their neighbors 
wherever they existed. 

In retrospect, of course, it seems extraordinary 
that, since the Red Chinese takeover in 1949, the 
Iron Curtain countries have failed in almost all 
their efforts to convert nationalist revolutions into 
Communist revolutions. In spite of the extension 
of the Commimist conspiracy through highly or- 
ganized local party organizations, in spite of the 
disruptive force of violent change, in spite of the 
political inexperience of the leaders of the new 
coimtries and the natural antagonisms between 
the new countries and their former colonial over- 
lords, the greatest political upheaval of all time 
has still taken place — witlun a fantastically short 
timespan — with amazing smoothness and good 
will and with a surprising lack of bloodshed. 

April 16, 1962 



In this great process of change the interests of 
the great powers were at all times deeply involved. 
Lurking in the background of political changes all 
over the world was the disturbing question of rela- 
tive big-power advantage. Because of this the 
world has lived in constant danger that a jungle 
war in Southeast Asia or a tribal conflict in the 
heart of Africa could become the occasion for a 
great-power confrontation — and that what began 
as a brush fire could be fanned into a nuclear 
holocaust. Yet this has not happened. Except in 
Korea, the direct confrontation of great-power 
troops has been averted. 

This, it seems to me, suggests quite clearly one 
of the major roles of the United Nations. Unable 
to bring the great powers together, it has played 
a decisive role in keeping them apart. And all 
the while it has served as overseer of the rast and 
for the most part nationalist transformations 
which have been taking place all over the world. 
In appraising the success of the United Nations, 
in appraising its usefulness to the United States, 
I think it is this standard of judgment that we 
should employ : How effectively has it facilitated 
the peaceful revision of the relations between the 
billion colonial peoples largely in the Southern 
Hemisphere and the billion economically advanced 
peoples in the Northern Hemisphere— in the face 
of constant efforts of subversion and interference 
from the Communist powers that control the bil- 
lion people behind the Iron Curtain ? 

End of the Colonial Era 

One of the most frequently heard complaints 
against the United Nations is that it has precipi- 
tated change at too rapid a pace. By providing 
each emergent new state a voice equal to that of a 
great power, it is said, the United Nations has 
given an excessive impetus to the breakup of 
colonialism. As the new nations have gained in 
numbers and thus in votes in the General Assem- 
bly of the U.N., they have mounted pressures 
that have forced the colonial powers to move be- 
yond the speed limits set by prudence. As a result, 
independence has been conferred upon peoples 
miprepared for the complex tasks of nation- 
building. 

Evidence can be marshaled to support this 
thesis. Examples can be cited of nations born 
prematurely, nations lacking the educated elite 
to operate the difficult business of government, 

633 



nations illogically conceived, with national bound- 
aries that have little rational meaning either in 
etlmic or economic terms. 

But on the other side there are powerful argu- 
ments for maintaining the momentum of change. 
When the world is faced with a convulsion so 
profound as the ending of colonialism, it is well 
to get the process over just as quickly as it can 
be done peacefully. A great political and social 
revolution of this kind cannot be achieved with- 
out major adjustments, and in a world where half 
of the dependent peoples have achieved independ- 
ence the lot of the other half must become increas- 
ingly irksome. Under such circumstances a long 
deferment of their own independence is likely to 
produce frustrations and bitterness that will im- 
pede and complicate their ultimate accommoda- 
tion to the environment of free nations. 

It must be recognized, of course, that the colo- 
nial era is not yet finally completed ; there is still 
substantial unfinished business to be done. In the 
areas of Africa where many Europeans have made 
their homes, there remains the task of reconciling 
the rights of white minorities with the rights and 
aspirations of African majorities. The trouble- 
some problem remains, moreover, of how to deal 
with the bits and pieces of former colonial sys- 
tems — fragments that are themselves so small as 
not to fit neatly into the pattern of new nation 
states. There are altogether about 50 fragments 
of this kind. We oureelves are the administering 
power for several groups of Pacific islands under 
a United Nations trusteeship. We are seeking to 
devise appropriate long-term arrangements for 
these areas that will permit the maximum of op- 
portunity for the peoples involved. 

Yet if the colonial era is not concluded it is well 
on the way toward being so. The vast bulk of the 
population formerly under colonial rule has now 
achieved self-government. Certainly for the ma- 
jor powers of the West, colonialism is largely a 
matter of history. With good hick the cease-fire 
in Algeria can mark another finished page. 

By and large the major European powers, which 
are our natural partners in most of our activities, 
have either seen the transfonnation of their former 
colonial possessions into sovereign states or are in 
the process of doing so. 

This has created difficult problems for them, but, 
for the most part, these problems have been met 
and solved more easily than had been anticipated. 
In spite of fears that the loss of colonies might 



enfeeble the colonial powers, this has not proved 
to be true. In fact one can say without being 
fanciful that, just as the shattering of their colo- 
nial systems — like the fission of the atom — has un- 
leashed fierce energies, the former colonial powers 
— the great powers of Western Europe — are them- 
selves generating vast forces, not through fissions 
but through the fusion of their economies in the 
European Common Market. In ceasing to think 
of themselves as the centers of individual colonial 
systems they have found a common destiny as 
Europeans. In undertaking the business of build- 
ing a united Europe they have already developed 
a new prosperity, a new purpose, and the begin- 
nings of a new relationship with the new nations 
carved out of their old empires. 

We ourselves have a direct interest in the com- 
pletion of the decolonization process for, as colo- 
nialism becomes a dead issue between the peoples 
of the less developed countries and the major pow- 
ers of Western Europe, the free world as a whole 
should become increasingly cohesive. President 
Kennedy has described the 1960's as a "decade of 
development." ^ Certainly the major powers of 
the West must devote themselves intensively over 
the next few years to assisting the newly emerging 
countries toward a level of political and economic 
independence that will enable them to play a con- 
structive role in the family of nations. 

In this endeavor it is essential that the major 
AVestern Powers be able to work closely together, 
just as they work closely together in resisting 
threatened aggression from the Communist bloc. 
In the past, however, the existence of colonialism 
has often proved an impediment to common ac- 
tions or policies among the Western Powers. With 
its passing we should be able to look forward to a 
further and freer development of the Atlantic 
partnership, which is, after all, the hard core of 
free- world strength. 

Converting Nationalism Into Nationhood 

For most of tlio colonial peoples the end of the 
colonial ordeal marks the start of a new process, 
the convei-sion of nationalism into nationhood. 
Sovereignty is sometimes a heady wine. It en- 
courages exuberant voices and sometimes irrele- 
vant argument. But perliaps this is a function 



" For an aUdrt'ss by the Presidont before the U.N. Geu- 
eral Assembly on Sept. 25, 1961, see Bulletin of Oct. 16, 
1901, p. C19. 



634 



Department of Stale Bulletin 



of growing up — a normal aspect of the transfor- 
mation from dependent status to independence. 
Let us remember that we were ourselves a young, 
brash, and rather cocky nation at the end of the 
18th century. 

Wo should not, therefore, be put oil' by the fact 
that representatives of the new nations are some- 
times given to irrelevant talk. Neither we nor 
they sliould permit it to obscure tlie relevant busi- 
ness that every new state has to tackle as it entei-s 
the age of engineering and economics. 

In fact, instead of being irked by the occasional 
exuberance of some of the representatives of newer 
nations in the General Assembly, we should be 
eternally grateful to the U.N. that the complex 
business of transforming almost 50 new states 
from dependence to sovereignty has, for the most 
part, been accompanied by speeches rather than 
by shooting. This is, I think, one of the striking 
achievements of our time. 

In trying to understand the actions of the new 
nations we should realize that in their eyes the 
U.N. has a very special meaning. The immediate 
and natural ambition of every new nation is to 
establish its national identity. Membership in the 
United Nations has served this purpose; it has 
become the badge of independence, the credentials 
of sovereignty, the symbol of nationhood, and the 
passport to the 20th century. "Wlien the delega- 
tion of a new nation takes its place in the grand 
hall of the General Assembly, that nation has 
arrived; it can look the world in the eye and 
speak its piece. And even if that piece may be 
discordant to our ears the fact that it can be 
spoken has helped to stabilize the postwar world. 
Yet the U.N. is more than a place for letting off 
steam ; it is also a school of political responsibility. 
While some of its members may represent closed 
societies, it is itself an open society. The General 
Assembly is staged for all the world to see, and 
performing upon that stage sometimes— though 
not always — helps turn demagogs into statesmen. 
How else can one explain the fact that at the last 
General Assembly the most "anticolonial" mem- 
bers of the United Nations decisively rejected a 
Soviet resolution calling for independence of all 
remaining dependent areas by 1962 ? They spon- 
sored instead moderate and sensible resolutions 
for which we and most of our European friends 
could vote without reservation. 

April 16, J 962 



The growing sense of responsibility in the new 
nations is only partly the result of finding them- 
selves on stage before a critical world. It is also 
the result of a growing conviction that the business 
of economic and social development in their own 
countries is tough and demanding. They find 
the problems of food and health, education and 
technology, enterprise and administration will not 
yield to repetitive slogans carried over from the 
fight for independence. And they discover, too, 
the need to develop a new relationship with ths 
Europeans and with the North Americans. 

The framework of the United Nations provides 
a basis for such a new relationship — a political 
system in which the less developed nations can 
have a full sense of participation, which makes 
possible a family of technical organizations whose 
international staffs can help conceive and carry 
out the development plans every people now ex- 
pects its government to pursue with vigor. 

Two Aspects of U.N.'s Peacekeeping Role 

In one aspect, then, the United Nations is an 
instrument through which the industrial societies 
and the less developed nations can be brought to- 
gether. In another aspect, as I have earlier sug- 
gested, one of the principal achievements of the 
United Nations had been to keep the great powere 
apart. It has accomplished this by bringing about 
the settlement of conflicts through conciliation and 
debate and by interposing itself as the agency to 
keep the peace in areas where chaos might other- 
wise attract great-power intei-vention. 

The U.N. was scarcely organized before it was 
involved in the difficult and dangerous business of 
peacekeeping— in Iran, Greece, Indonesia, Kash- 
mir. Since then it has played a part in stopping 
aggression, threatened aggression, or civil war in 
Palestine, Korea, at Suez, in the Lebanon and the 
Congo. In all of these conflicts the great powers 
had interests. In the absence of the U.N. they 
would in all likelihood have intervened to defend 
those interests. Intervention by both sides could 
have led to a dangerous confrontation. 

The most recent, and perhaps most spectacular, 
of the trouble spots in which the U.N. has acted 
to prevent great-power confrontation is, of course, 
the Congo. Here the U.N., with full United 
States support, interposed itself in the heart of 
Africa in the nick of time. The Soviet Union was 
already moving in, and we could never have stood 

635 



by while they set up shop in the heart of Africa. 
The intervention of the U.N., difficult though it 
may have seemed at the time, prevented the chaos 
that could well have turned the Congo into another 
Korea. Today, by patience and effort, it is help- 
ing to bring about the conditions under which an 
integrated Congo republic can work its way 
toward stability and peace. 

I would suggest, therefore, that, in thinking 
about the Congo and about other areas where the 
United Nations is brought in to keep the peace, 
we should ask ourselves this question: From the 
point of view of our national security, would it 
have been better to send in the American Marines 
or to act with others to send in the United Na- 
tions in the name of the world commmiity? 

Obviously the U.N. cannot keep the peace with- 
out expense. Today it has over 20,000 men in the 
field, patrolling the truce lines in the Middle East 
and keeping the lid on in the Congo. Manifestly 
this is the work of something more than a League 
of Nations — more than a debating society grafted 
on a pious commitment to unattainable goals. It 
is the work of an executive agency of considerable 
capacity and skill, capable of performing prag- 
matic tasks — such as mobilizing, transporting, 
commanding, and supplying substantial forces in 
the field when an emergency arises. 

U.N. an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy 

Much of the discussion about the United Na- 
tions has not been concerned so much with what it 
does as how its activities fit in with the larger 
purposes of our own foreign policy. To those of 
us in tlie Department of State who have responsi- 
bility for the formulation and administration of 
that policy tlie relationsliip is clear enough. The 
United Nations is an instrument of United States 
foreign policy just as it is an instrument of the 
foreign policy of every other member state. In 
addition the U.N. provides us with a mechanism 
by which we can seek to persuade other member 
states not only that they should agree with us on 
our foreign policy but that they should express 
that agreement by actively supporting resolutions 
that accord with our own national objectives. 

Because our policies have tended to be right and 
have thus appealed to the interests of other na- 
tions and because Ambassador Stevenson and his 
staff have displayed exceptional leadership, wo 
have been remarkably successful in obtaining 



international approval of our own national 
policies. 

This is illustrated clearly by the record of the 
last General Assembly — the 16th. You will re- 
call that this Assembly convened last September 
in an atmospliere of somber crisis — the secession 
of Katanga Province in the Congo, the death of 
Dag Hammarskjold on a mission of conciliation, 
the Soviet Union's revival of its infamous troika 
proposal for a three-headed Secretary-General, 
and the prospect of imminent bankruptcy. 

Such was the stat« of affairs when President 
Kennedy addressed the General Assembly in 
September. He made a ringing affirmation of 
U.S. support and confidence in the future of the 
United Nations — and backed it up with three 
major initiatives. 

The President laid before the membership a 
comprehensive U.S. plan for general and complete 
disarmament,' made realistic by its insistence on 
a simultaneous improvement of international 
peacekeeping machinery. This put the U.N. in 
business again on this vital if frustrating sub- 
ject — and seized the initiative for the United 
States on the issue of peace. 

President Kennedy also called for an active 
program of U.N. activity on the peaceful uses of 
outer space. The General Assembly acted on this 
American proposal in a resolution that extended 
the Charter of the United Nations to outer space 
and set up the Committee on Peaceful Uses of 
Outer Space, which began its work last week in 
an atmosphere unusual for the absence of cold- 
war policies. 

Finally the President called for a U.N. Decade 
of Development to speed economic and social 
growth in the less developed world. This was ap- 
proved unanimously; a general goal of a 50-per- 
cent expansion in national incomes was adopted 
for the next decade; and a wide range of specific 
programs and projects is in the course of prep- 
aration. 

Thus did the U.N. General Assembly respond to 
American leadership and react to American ini- 
tiatives that are both in our own interest and in 
the interest of a great majority of the members. 
Meanwhile the Assembly resolutely preserved 
the integrity of the Secretariat against Soviet at- 
tack ; rejected the Soviet effort to replace National- 
ist China with Commmiist China; drew up an 



* For text, see ibid., p. 650. 



636 



Department of State Bulletin 



emergency plan to restore financial order to its 
affairs; and dealt in a generally responsible man- 
ner with the emotional subject of colonialism. 

Functions of Regional Institutions 

But if the United Nations is an instniment of 
United States policy it is only one of many instru- 
ments available to us. It is one of the tasks of 
the Secretary of State and his staff, when con- 
fronted with a particular problem, to select and 
utilize that instrument most appropriate for the 
purpose. 

It is therefore important to be clear not only 
about what the United Nations does but what it 
does not do — what it is not, as well as what it is. 
Clarity on this score helps resolve the contradic- 
tion some people seem to find in American foreign 
policy, a contradiction between our reliance on the 
institutions of the Atlantic community and our 
participation in the United Nations. 

No such contradiction in fact exists. The found- 
ers of the United Nations recognized the necessity 
for regional institutions and explicitly provided 
for them in the charter. Indeed the charter calls 
upon members to seek settlement of disputes with- 
in the framework of regional institutions before 
they are brought to the U.N. at all. 

In practice we use the various institutions to 
which we belong for quite different purposes. Tlie 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is, 
of course, the backbone of our military defense of 
the free world against the Commimist bloc. 
Through our own massive forces and through 
NATO we maintain the armed strength that is the 
principal deterrent to Communist aggression. 
But just as the U.N.'s capabilities are limited, so 
are NATO's. Quite clearly NATO could not have 
intervened in the Congo to restore order when 
Belgium withdrew. Only a world organization 
could do so without arousing anticolonialist 
emotions. 

It is true that the United Nations cannot, by 
itself, maintain the peace between the major 
powers. It is equally true that NATO was not 
qualified to supervise the peaceful change from 
colonialism to independence. Their roles are quite 
different and distinct. Each is essential, and 
therefore we support each for different reasons. 

The same observation can be made with regard 
to the OECD — the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development — which came into 

April 16, 7962 



being last September. Through this organization 
we are developing means for close cooperation in 
economic matters with the major industrialized 
powers on either side of the Atlantic. This kind 
of cooperation cannot be achieved within the 
larger framework of the United Nations. But 
the building of workable international relation- 
ships with the smaller, poorer countries requires 
arrangements in which the weaker nations can par- 
ticipate, with dignity, as full-fledged members — 
which is the secret of success of the "World Bank, 
the U.N. Special Fund, and other worldwide insti- 
tutions for technical aid and development lending. 
I could, of course, go on to mention other re- 
gional arrangements in which we participate. 
The Organization of American States, for ex- 
ample, gives institutional form to the American 
system. And the Alliance for Progress provides 
for a massive cooperative effort between the 
United States and Latin America. 

In view of the need for different instruments to 
serve the diverse purposes of our foreign policy, I 
find the suggestion quite curious that, by seelring 
to use NATO or the OECD as a means of coopera- 
tion with our European friends, we are somehow 
turning our back on the U.N. I find equally 
curious the belief that in seeking to work within 
the United Nations we are betraying our friend- 
ship with our Atlantic partners. 

Nothing could be further from the truth. The 
fact of the matter is that, in 41 key votes in the 
last General Assembly, the United States and a 
majority of the NATO members voted together 
41 times. Members of NATO do not, of course, 
vote as a bloc at the United Nations; only Com- 
munist members vote consistently as a bloc. But 
if loyalty to a majority of our NATO allies within 
the United Nations is a test, the United States has 
proved the most loyal of all— and this record was 
made in an Assembly in which there were 14 major 
votes on so-called colonial issues. 

I cannot understand the contention that the 
United States must make a choice between the U.N. 
and NATO, that we are compelled for some 
strange reason to put all our eggs in one basket. 
It seems to me a curious concept that in world 
affairs we can do only one thing at a time — that 
if we stand finn in one place we cannot move 
ahead in another, that if we are in favor of quiet 
diplomacy we must be against parliamentary 
diplomacy in the General Assembly, that if we 

637 



are for a strong concert of free nations we must 
be against a strong world community, that if re- 
gional organizations are realistic world organiza- 
tions are necessarily unrealistic. 

It seems to me that the present maturity of our 
foreign policy lies precisely in our ability to stand 
firm against threats of aggression while simul- 
taneously taking constructive initiatives to build 
a woi'ld free of the threat of aggression — build- 
ing up the regional organizations of the Atlantic 
and Western Hemisphere communities while 
simultaneously supporting the world community 
represented by the United Nations — practicing at 
the same time bilateral diplomacy, regional di- 
plomacy, and global diplomacy through the United 
Nations. 



U.S. Mission to the U.N. And the combination of 
American ideas and initiatives, backed by Ameri- 
can power and carried into action by American 
diplomacy, enables the United States to carry more 
weight in the United Nations than any other 
member. 

Because it does things we want to see done and 
makes possible some relations with other countries J 
we want to see established — and because it oper- i 
ates, in the words of the charter, as "a center for 
harmonizing the actions of nations" — the United 
Nations serves the national interests of the United 
States. It will, we believe, continue to do so as 
long as the United States is its leading member 
and exercises day by day, the year round, the 
function of leadei-ship. 



U.N. Serves National Interests 

In this world of interlocking partnerships the 
quality of our country-by-country diplomacy has 
to be supplemented with a diplomacy of regional 
organizations, and both must be complemented by 
our effective participation in the parliamentary 
diplomacy of the United Nations. 

The U.N.'s New York headquarters has become, 
for the newer and smaller nations, the diplomatic 
capital of the world. Some of the smaller nations 
can hardly afford to be represented in more than 
a few capitals, but they are always represented 
at the United Nations. Thus if an African na- 
tion has business with Japan or India or Brazil, 
it is more than likely these days to tell its mission 
in New York to talk to the Japanese or Indian or 
Brazilian delegation to the U.N. And in the U.N. 
building itself there were 2,21Y meetings this past 
year in the ceaseless process of building relation- 
ships among 104 countries whose independence is 
declared but whose interdependence is essential. 

This is why the United States Mission to the 
United Nations bears such a heavy burden and 
why its quality is so critical to the national in- 
terest. This is why there is a "U.N. angle" to so 
many different parts of American foreign policy. 
This is why President Kennedy readied out for a 
man of Cabinet stature and world renown to head 
the United States Mission at the United Nations. 

The center of decision and the source of instruc- 
tions is Washington — on U.N. affairs as on all 
other parts of our foreign policy. These instruc- 
tions give considerable weight, as they should, to 
the facts and reconunendations received from the 



President of Republic of Togo 
Visits United States 

Sylvanus Olymfio, President of the Republic 
of Togo, visited the United States March 19-30. 
After 2 days at Washington as a Presidential 
guest March 20-22, President Olympio contintied 
his visit at New York City, making two other 
hrief trips, one to Ni-agara Falls and otic to the 
Virgin Islands. Following is the text of a joint 
communique between President Kenrwdy and 
President Olympio released on March 21 at the 
close of their talks. 

White House press release dated March 21 

The President of the Republic of Togo, His 
Excellency Sylvanus Olympio, who is making a 
five-day visit to the United States as a Presidential 
guest of President Kennedy, will conclude a two- 
day stay in Washington tomorrow and continue 
his visit in New York. This visit has afforded an 
opportunity for the two Presidents to establish a 
personal acquaintance and discuss fully matters of 
common concern, including problems of global 
interest afTooting world peace and human welfare. 

The two Chiefs of State agreed that the forma- 
tion of the Organization of African States at the 
recent liagos Conference was a constructive step 
toward building African unify tlirougli political 
consultation and practical cooperation in the vari- 
ous technical and economic fields. President 
Olympio pointed out that such a regional organi- 
zation should be based on the same principles as 



638 



Department of State Bulletin 



those of the United Nations, including the prin- 
ciple of non-intervention in the internal affairs of 
member states. 

President Olympio expressed his deep satis- 
faction for the unwavering support which the 
United States has given to the United Nations, 
particularly since the newly independent states 
consider that Organization a guarantee of their 
independence. 

The two Presidents reviewed the friendly and 
mutually beneficial relations already established 
between the two countries. President Kennedy 



noted the determined efforts toward economic and 
social development being carried forward by the 
Republic of Togo and stated the desire of the 
United States to continue development assistance 
to Togo. President Kennedy also expressed satis- 
faction that the United States could make avail- 
able surplus commodities to alleviate the severe 
famine conditions in northern Togo, and President 
Olympio thanked him for this help. In addition 
the two Presidents discussed the role which the 
"Food for Peace" program could play in stimu- 
lating economic and social development in Togo. 



The Role of Agriculture in the Development orAfrica 



iy G. Mennen Williams 

Assistant Secretary for African Affairs ^ 



It was a real pleasure to get an invitation from 
Jim Patton to attend this distinguished gathering, 
and I am happy to be here among my many friends 
in the National Farmers Union. You have 
coupled with your strong interest in the prosperity 
of the family-sized farm a strong interest in na- 
tional and world affairs. During the past quarter- 
century, world affairs have become increasingly 
a major concern for all Americans. Tliis is clearly 
true in terms of Africa, where the surge toward 
freedom and independence has pushed that con- 
tinent to the front of the world stage in a single 
decade. 

Prior to 1951, only four countries — Egypt, 
Ethiopia, Liberia, and the Union of South 
Africa — could be listed as independent countries. 
Since that time, 25 new nations have emerged on 
the African Continent — 17 of them coming in 1960 
alone. And there will be many others to follow — 
this year and in the years ahead. 

"Without subjecting you to a burdensome niunber 
of statistics, I would like to mention a few facts 
and figures that will give you some perspective 
of the scope of the challenge we face in Africa. 



' Address made before the National Farmers Union at 
Denver, Colo., on Mar. 19 (press release 177). 



Take size, for example. The continent of Africa 
is an extremely huge landmass, but many Ameri- 
cans still are not aware how large and complex 
the area really is. Traveling here, I was reminded 
that a trip across broadest Africa is almost twice 
the distance from Washington to San Francisco. 
Looking out of the window of the plane carrying 
me into Stapleton Airport, I could see mile after 
mile of the Colorado plateau and the magnificent 
Rockies towering over Denver. More than 100,000 
square miles in size, Colorado is our eighth largest 
State. Yet you could fit 100 Colorados into the 
African Continent and still have a million square 
miles of land unused. 

Although large in size, Africa is by no means 
heavily populated. Its 230 million people place 
it below Asia, Europe, and North America in total 
population. Its 29 independent countries range 
widely in niunbers of people — from 35-40 million 
in Nigeria to about i/4 million in Gabon. 

Transportation and communication facilities in 
Africa are largely undeveloped, and this massive 
continent contains a wide variety of peoples and 
cultures little related to one another. Nearly 
1,000 languages or dialects are used in different 
parts of the continent. 



Apri] 16, 1962 



639 



The economic bases of the widely scattered 
African lands also are quite different from region 
to region, but the two principal supports of all 
African economies are mining and agi'iculture. 
These two activities make important contributions 
to the well-being of the rest of the world as well. 
In minerals, Africa supplies most of the diamonds 
used throughout the world and large amounts of 
gold, copper, cobalt, uranium, and manganese, to 
name a few. It also exports major quantities of 
such agricultural commodities as peanuts, cocoa, 
coffee, wine, palm products, and sisal. 

Geographical Divisions of Africa 

Africa is just as diverse geographically as it is 
culturally and economically. Essentially, how- 
ever, six major regions comprise the continent, and 
these arbitrary divisions are useful in helping us 
recognize some of the reasons for the many dif- 
ferences in Africa. 

Bordered by the Mediterranean, the Sahara, the 
Atlantic, and the Bed Sea is North Africa, settled 
principally by Arabs and Berbers. 

Jutting out into the Arabian Sea is the Horn of 
Africa, which includes the high Ethiopian plateau 
and the hot coastal lands of Somalia and those 
bordering the Red Sea. 

Savanna Africa is a third major geographical 
division. This consists of a broad belt of sand 
and grassland states just south of the Sahara ex- 
tending from Sudan to the Atlantic Ocean. 

On the west coast, running in an arc from Dakar 
in Senegal to northern Angola is rain-forest 
Africa, the most heavily populated region of the 
continent outside of Egypt. 

Starting in northern Kenya in East Africa and 
rimning on both sides of a line to Cape Town in 
South Africa is mountain Africa, the area of 
greatest concentration of minority white settle- 
ments. 

The sixth distinct geographic region is the 
Malagasy Republic, the island of Madagascar in 
the Indian Ocean, which is settled by people of 
mixed stock. Malagasy gives us another good ex- 
ample of the hugeness of the African area. If this 
island were set along our eastern seaboard, it 
would extend from Cape Cod to northern Florida. 
Yet many of us think of the Malagasy Republic as 
a fairly small island off the African coast. 

What is it, then, that binds these many different 
regions, cultures, and peoples together? The best 



answer to that question is found in the major 
aspirations of Africans everywliere throughout 
the continent. These broad desires — independ- 
ence, dignity, and improved standards of living — 
are subscribed to by people from one end of the 
continent to the other. 

Major Aspirations of African Peoples 

Heading this list is the African peoples' desire 
to gain freedom and independence from colonial 
rule. In recent years this desire has led to the 
birth of more than two dozen new nations. Most 
of these nations came to independence peacefully. 
However, while we may look with wonder on 
the transition of 25 nations to freedom in so short 
a space of time, the Africans tend to see about an 
equal number of nations not yet free. 

A second Africa-wide aspiration is the achieve- 
ment of individual dignity and self-expression 
equal to that of the rest of mankind. This is an 
extremely important concern for dark-skinned 
people in a world where color bars are being 
lowered too slowly for their likmg. 

We in America should be especially concerned 
with tills particular African goal. The signifi- 
cance of racial discrimination in our country is as 
keenly felt among African leaders as it is among 
Americans. The more sophisticated Africans are 
aware that many Americans are making serious 
and strenuous efforts to assure all of our citizens 
the rights entitled them by our Constitution. Yet 
it is clear in our dealings with African nations that 
our slowness in providing equal rights for all our 
people continues to make us suspect in their eyes. 

Improved standards of living comprise the tliird 
major aspiration of the emerging nations of 
Africa. There are vast differences in economic 
levels in Africa, but all of its countries are anxious 
to raise their standards of living as quiclcly as pos- 
sible. This is not surprising, for in tropical 
Africa the per capita annual income is $89 ($132 
for the continent as a whole), whereas in the 
nearest other area, the Middle East, it is $171, and 
in the United States it is $2,500. 

Africa's leadere are men in a hurrj'. Tlieir 
people have been patient throughout decades of 
colonial rule. Now that they have joined the 
world of free choice, however, the people insist on 
immediate economic improvement. 

The people of Africa want to develop and mod- 



640 



Department of State Bulletin 



ernize their countries, not only to obtain the ma- 
terial and cultural advantages that come with 
mature economies but also to maintain their free- 
dom in national and international affairs. They 
want to obtain large amoimts of capital and tech- 
nical know-how rapidly. They want to improve 
educational facilities for themselves and for gen- 
erations to come. They want better health, better 
sanitation, better housing, better nutrition. 

Our agricultural abundance is playing an in- 
creasingly important role in our foreign assistance 
programs in Africa. Food is our most valuable 
material resource, and its use in our Food for 
Peace Program gives American farmers a direct 
and important stake in American foreign policy. 

Many African countries are participating in 
this undertaking, and in such countries as Mo- 
rocco, Libya, and Tunisia Food for Peace pro- 
grams of considerable magnitude are under way. 
In these countries not only surplus sales but gifts 
for flood and famine relief and school lunches are 
part of the overall effort. Of particular interest 
in Morocco and Tunisia are programs where agri- 
cultural commodities are used directly as partial 
payment to workers engaged in national public 
works projects. This form of development as- 
sistance permits the Governments to embark on 
large-scale projects and at the same time combat 
the problems of unemployment and under- 
employment. 

The people and governments who get these sur- 
plus agricultural commodities often express their 
appreciation at shipside ceremonies. In fact. 
President [Habib] Bourguiba of Tunisia last year 
said that the generous assistance of this country 
prevented famine in Tunisia. We are happy to 
be able to help our friends in Africa in these cir- 
cumstances, but we also want to help them improve 
their own agricultural methods. 

With some 90 percent of the population of 
Africa engaged in agriculture, and with the pro- 
ductive capacity of much of the continent im- 
paired by malnutrition, the people of Africa ob- 
viously want to improve their crops and their 
livestock. Figures supplied by the U.N. Food 
and Agriculture Organization show that Africa 
has more arable land and pastureland than either 
the United States or the Soviet Union. Yet Africa 
produces only one-twentieth of the world's agri- 
cultural commodities while the United States ac- 
counts for almost one-sixth. 



Although agriculture is the major source ot 
income and emplo3Tnent for most Africans, pres- 
ent conditions keep productivity levels per worker 
very low. With improved agricultural tech- 
niques designed specifically for African condi- 
tions, however, there is good reason to believe 
that the large arable areas of Africa can be put 
to fuller use and raise African living standards 
and economies considerably. There is little won- 
der that very heavy emphasis is placed on im- 
proving this sector of the economy rapidly. 

Patterns of Agricultural Production 

Patterns of agriculture in Africa today place 
ancient, traditional methods of farming for sub- 
sistence crops in sharp contrast with the latest 
modern agricultural techniques designed to pro- 
duce large cash crops for export. This is the 
result of decades of colonial rule under which 
each unit of Africa was developed as a part of 
an overall colonial economy and not as a viable 
economic unit in itself. This is an enormous 
handicap to many of the new governments of 
Africa today. 

For the multiplicity of stages of agriculture in 
Africa, there are three general patterns of pro- 
duction. 

First there are those producers who employ 
primitive implements and essentially produce sub- 
sistence crops to feed the local farm communities. 
The traditional agricultural methods used by these 
farmers have been handed down from generation 
to generation over centuries. In some coimtries 
there are areas that never knew the plow until the 
last several decades, and in many areas farmers 
still use mattocks instead of animal-drawn plows. 

In North Africa the principal crops grown for 
consumption are winter cereals — wheat and bar- 
ley — as well as olives for olive oil. At the other 
end of the continent, in South Africa, crop em- 
phasis is on siunmer cereals, such as maize and 
kafir corn. In between these areas, in tropical 
Africa, the major staple crops are cereals, starchy 
foods, oil-bearing fruits, groundnuts, and rice. 
Coffee, cocoa, and cotton are the three main cash 
crops in tropical Africa, and these are grown by 
small peasant producers principally for export. 

A second group of producers is making vigorous 
efforts to convert their operations from traditional 
to modem agricultm-al methods. The size of these 



April 16, 7962 



641 



fanning operations varies greatly, and they are 
generally efforts which combine subsistence farm- 
ing -with cash crops. Many of these producei"S 
employ hired labor because of the size of their 
plantings. 

The third category consists of large-scale plan- 
tations and farms using very modern agricultural 
methods. These production methods are princi- 
pally found in the more temperate regions of 
Africa — in the north, in the south, and in the 
eastern highlands. Production in these areas is 
on a massive scale for the export market, and, in 
many cases, production per manpower and unit 
of land is as great or greater than that of the 
United States or the Soviet Union. These meth- 
ods of farming initially were introduced by Euro- 
pean settlers, but they are being adopted today by 
African governments in their efforts to develop 
sound economies. 

An important question for American farmers is 
whether the African farmer, with improved agri- 
cultural methods, is going to be competitive with 
the American farmer. Tliis is a very complex 
question, but with a few exceptions our agricul- 
tural products and those of most of Africa, par- 
ticularly tropical Africa, are complementary 
instead of competitive. All indications show that 
for many years to come we are going to get from 
Africa substantial quantities of their tropical 
crops, such as cocoa, coffee, and sisal, and that we 
will export to Africa substantial quantities of our 
crops. For example, there is the strong likelihood 
that Africans will increase their consumption of 
wheat, which is one major item that tropical 
Africa has been getting from us in recent years. 
Another important U.S. ex{iort to tropical Africa 
is dairy products, which are in great demand be- 
cause the tsetse fly prohibits livestock production 
througliout a large area of central Africa. 

Another factor to consider is population. As 
improvements in public health, sanitation, and 
medical facilities occur in Africa, there is good 
reason to believe that a major increase in Africa's 
population will take place over the next two dec- 
ades. This rapid growth in Africa will create 
strong pressures for increased food requirements, 
and the products of improved agricultural tech- 
niques will be urgently needed in the African coun- 
tries themselves. As African economies grow 
there will also be an increase in monetary income. 
This factor, together with an expanding popula- 



tion, will absorb whatever improved food produc- 
tion takes place in the years immediately ahead. 
On balance, then, it seems quite likely that the 
complementary aspects of American and African 
agi'iculture will characterize relations between the 
two systems for some time to come. 

Progress of Cooperative Movement 

The cooperative aspects of African agriculture 
impressed me gi-eatly on my visits to the African 
Continent last year, and I think the progress of 
the cooperative movement in Africa may be of 
some interest to you. The cooperative approach 
to agricultural production and marketing is espe- 
cially important in underdeveloped areas, where 
the individual is practically without capital 
resources. 

Progress in developing co-ops in Africa has 
been slow and gradual but generally sound. There 
is still much to be done before such organizations 
achieve the same relative importance in Africa 
that they have in the United Kingdom and West- 
ern Europe, where the African movement gets its 
inspiration. Needed most to further develop the 
cooperative movement in Africa are time and 
money to develop teclmical skills and good organi- 
zations. 

There is, however, great awareness in Africa of 
the important role that co-ops can play in national 
development, and most governments are encourag- 
ing and supporting them, often with credit facili- 
ties or credit guarantees. Their efforts are aided 
by the fact that cooperation and communal effort 
are basic characteristics of traditional African 
society, and present-day co-ops are in a sense a 
modern extension and adaptation of ancient ways 
of life. Most African cooperatives are production 
and mai'keting organizations, based on major agri- 
cultural export crops. Some of the largest and 
most successful cooperatives are concentrated in 
East Africa and North Africa, but there are 
other important cooperative activities elsewhere 
throughout tlie continent. 

The cooperative movement in Africa was ini- 
tiated principally by white settler groups, who 
account for most of the commercial export crop 
cooperatives today. Current growth in co-ops, 
however, is largely due to the efforts of indigenous 
Africans. As they take over more and more re- 
sponsibilities for their economies, they have turned 



642 



Department of Slate Bulletin 



increasingly to cooperative methods to handle 
their agricultural jDroduction and marketing. 

In Uganda, in East Africa, the cooperative 
movement is primarily concerned with marketing 
and processing cotton and coffee, which form the 
basis of its export trade. At the end of 1960 
Uganda had 1,640 registered cooperative societies 
with a membership of more than 210,000, and 29 
estate cotTee factories were owned and operated 
on a co-op basis by associations of African growers. 
Uganda also has cooperatives concerned with 
groundnuts, tobacco, milk, cattle, and fish. 

Tanganyikan African cooperatives now market 
virtually all African-grown mild coffee, a high 
proportion of hard coffee, and at least half of the 
total production of cotton. A number of financial- 
ly successful Tanganyikan marketing coopera- 
tives have invested in cotton-ginning plants as 
well as in social projects — including the establish- 
ment of Moshi College in that northeastern Tan- 
ganyikan city near Mt. Kilimanjaro. Between 
1948 and the end of 1959, registered co-op societies 
in Tanganyika grew from 62 with 52,000 to 617 
with 325,000 members. 

In Kenya, too, most agricultural commodities 
are handled by cooperatives, which numbered 576 
in 1959. In this country the African Cooperative 
Union of Kilimanjaro has a long history of de- 
veloping coffee production by Africans and serves 
as a model for other indigenous African co-ops. 

In Noi"th Africa cooperatives play an important 
role in the Timisian economy, and the Govern- 
ment of Tunisia contemplates an even larger role 
for them in the future. In Morocco the first co-ops 
were established about 1920. Again here, the 
Government looks to further cooperative efforts to 
help modernize traditional agriculture in the 
rural areas. In the Sudan there are 600 coopera- 
tive societies, of which more than one- fourth are 
agricultural, and the Government has established 
a Department of Cooperation to help the co-op 
movement gi-ow throughout the counti-y. 

In recent years the United States has played 
a modest but significant role in developing co-ops 
in Africa, but many other countries also have made 
major contributions to the growth of the coopera- 
tive movement there. The United Kingdom 
really gave impetus to the movement in Africa 
following World War II, when it became official 
Government policy to foster the growth of co-ops 
throughout British Africa. Israel is another 
country that has given strong support to coopera- 



tive development. Israelis have played a large 
part in assisting the growth of co-ops in West 
Africa in particular. 

U.S. Assistance in Development of Cooperatives 

The U.S. Government today is actively en- 
couraging the development of cooperatives in 
Africa. Our assistance in this field is being 
stepped up at the present time, and the Agency 
for International Development only recently estab- 
lished an office to help its regional bureaus with 
cooperative matters. 

I am very pleased that the National Farmers 
Union has decided to join with the U.S. Govern- 
ment in advancing our interest in the cooperative 
movement in Africa. As our good friend from 
Minnesota, Senator Hubert Humphrey, said re- 
cently, "Today's efforts for international progress 
are not limited to governmental action. ... As 
a free society, the United States offers its skills 
and help to others through the efforts of individ- 
ual citizens and private groups. I believe we 
should pause frequently to encourage nongovern- 
mental programs for international progress and 
understanding. . . ." 

The contract you are now developing with the 
Agency for Intei-national Development to provide 
training and demonstrations for African coopera- 
tive leaders and employees in two countries — one 
in East Africa and the other in West Africa — is a 
worthy endeavor on your part. This is a highly 
desirable type of activity for American nongovern- 
mental organizations, and I am very pleased that 
you are taking this initiative in a very important 
area of American interest. 

Another important contribution of nongovern- 
mental organizations to African agriculture is the 
agricultural teaching being done in Africa by 
American land-grant colleges. Michigan State 
University has such a program in Nigeria, and 
Oklahoma Stat« University has one in Ethiopia. 
We also have four preliminary work contracts in 
this field — two in Nigeria and one each in Tangan- 
yika and Tunisia — and other countries have in- 
dicated interest in such programs for the next 
fiscal year. 

Our governmental agricultural program in 
Africa, of course, is also of major importance in 
helping African countries boost their economies. 
In fiscal year 1962, which ends on June 30, our 
agricultural program for 24 African countries 



April 16, J 962 



643 



covers 105 projects at a cost of approximately $25 
million, plus the equivalent of $20 million in U.S.- 
owned local currencies. These projects call for 
280 U.S. technicians to provide training and 
demonstrations in the 24 countries. In addition 
nearly 600 participants from those coimtries are to 
be trained outside Africa, with more than two- 
thirds of them scheduled to come to the United 
States. 

Agricultural aid is only one segment of a new, 
integrated economic assistance program by which 
the U.S. Government is seeking to help the African 
nations help themselves. We also have strong 
interests in the development of such important 
matters as water programs for irrigation and 
power. Africa is rich in hydroelectric potential, 
having 40 percent of the world's total, but less 
than 1 percent is developed today. Our interest 
and support of the Volta River project in Ghana - 
has been widely reported, but we also are studying 
the Nile Basin in Ethiopia and have other studies 
under way in Sudan, Tunisia, Libya, and Somalia. 

Our overall assistance program in Africa 
strongly reflects our sincere interest in Africa's 
social and economic progress, as well as in its 
political and economic independence. We support 
the three major aspirations of Africans — freedom, 
dignity, and improved standards of living — be- 
cause these are goals that have made our own 
country strong. These are aspirations that point 
the way to a strong and stable Africa, and stability 
and strength in turn can lead to the kind of peace- 
ful world in which we want our children to live. 

Man cannot live by bread alone, however, as 
you well know. Universal human values of the 
spirit transcend the material aspects of life. Our 
real challenge in Africa is whether we can respond 
to the newly emerging countries of that continent 
in a spirit of true brotherhood and friendship. In 
meeting this challenge, we dare not fail. I thank 
all of you for your splendid support of our efforts 
in this tremendously important task. 



Letters of Credence 

Central African Republic 

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Central 
African Republic, Jean-Pierre Kombet, presented 
his credentials to President Kennedy on March 30. 



' For background, see Bulletin of Jan. 1, 1962, p. 30. 
644 



For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the 
President's reply, see Department of State press 
release 206 dated March 30. 

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics, Anatoliy Fedorovich 
Dobrynin, presented his credentials to President 
Kennedy on March 30. For texts of tlie i\jnbas- 
sador's remarks and the President's reply, see De- 
partment of State press release 207 dated 
March 30. 



President Sends Congratulations 
to Governor General of Ceylon 

Following is the text of a message sent hy Presi- 
dent Kennedy on March 21 to William Gopallaioa, 
Governor General of Ceylon. 

White House press release dated March 21 

I congratulate you on your appointment as Gov- 
ernor General of Ceylon. It is my sincere wish 
and that of the people of the United States that 
you enjoy every success. Your ambassadorship in 
Washington did much to reinforce the traditional 
bonds of friendship between our two countries. 
May that friendship be strengthened still further 
in the future. Please accept my warm personal 
greetings and best wishes. 



Sino-Soviet Bloc Military Aid to Cuba 
Summarized by Department 

Press release 195 dated March 27 

The folloiving s^immary on Sino-Soviet bloc 
military aid to Cuba is issued in response to nu- 
merous requests for up-to-date information on this 
subject. 

For about a year and a half the Sino-Soviet 
bloc has supplied Cuba with large-scale military 
assistance. Bloc military deliveries— primarily 
from the U.S.S.R. and Czechoslovakia — have in- 
cluded a wide assortment of land armaments 
ranging from small arms tlirough heavy tanks. 
Bloc airci'aft supplied to Cuba include MIG jet 
figliters, helicoptei-s, transports, and trainers. 
Extensive military training has been pi'ovided 

Department of Stale Bulletin 



both in the bloc and in Cuba. Communist mili- 
tary aid has turned the Cuban military establish- 
ment into one of the most formidable in Latin 
America, and it has introduced a militaiy cajja- 
bility hitherto not present in any of the Latin 
American countries of the Caribbean area. How- 
ever, there is no evidence that the Soviet Union 
has supplied Cuba with missiles or that missile 
bases are under constiiiction in Cuba. 

The Soviet Union at first moved cautiously in 
responding to Cuban requests for military assist- 
ance. Once imder way, however, the Cuban 
buildup proceeded swiftly. Bloc support has 
aided the Castro regime in consolidating its con- 
trol over the Cuban people. For the past several 
months the bloc's military aid program in Cuba 
has been concerned primarily with training, as- 
similating new equipment, and remolding the 
Cuban military establislmient along bloc organi- 
zational lines. 

Background 

Preliminary attempts to procure Soviet bloc 
arms were initiated by the Cuban government as 
early as 1959, but no firm military aid pacts were 
concluded until the summer of 1960. During 1959 
and early 1960, Cuban purchasing missions trav- 
eled frequently to the bloc to investigate new 
sources of supply. Discussions reportedly covered 
a whole range of equipment from small arms to 
modern jet aircraft. Mikoyan's [Anastas I. Miko- 
yan, First Deputy Chairman of the U.S.S.R.] 
visit to Cuba in February 1960 signaled the be- 
ginning of a massive bloc trade and aid program 
wliich gained momentum throughout 1960 as U.S.- 
Cuban relations deteriorated. 

Military negotiations with the U.S.S.E. and 
Czechoslovakia in 1960 were followed up by a 
well-publicized trip to Prague and Moscow by 
Raul Castro, which probably was the occasion for 
the conclusion of secret arms deals. By August, 
Czech small arms were being issued by some Cuban 
militia units, and in the autiunn the first major 
shipments of Communist arms began arriving in 
Cuba. 

Scope of Bloc Military Aid 

From the autumn of 1960 until the late summer 
of 1961, bloc arms deliveries were made regularly 
to Cuban ports. No financial information on the 



bloc's arms deals with Cuba has been disclosed, but 
it is estimated that on the order of $100 million 
worth of equipment and teclinical services has been 
provided. Moreover, several hundred Cuban mili- 
tary personnel have received training, including 
pilot training, in the bloc. 

On January 5, 1962, during a military parade 
celebrating the third anniversary of takeover by 
the present regime, Cuba unveiled an array of 
militaiy hardware indicative of deliveries up to 
that time. Units equipped with medium and 
heavy tanks, assault guns, truck-mounted rocket 
launchers, artillery, antiaircraft weapons, and 
mortars, as well as rifles and machineguns, were 
featured prominently. A fly-by of MIG jet 
fighters, including some high-performance MIG- 
19's, was one of the highlights of the air display. 

In the latter part of 1961 tlie focus of the bloc's 
military aid to Cuba was on assimilation of new 
equipment, intensive training, and completion of 
the reorganization of Cuba's military establish- 
ment. Recently, however, military shipments to 
Cuba have resumed and for the first time have 
included small naval vessels. 

The capabilities of the Cuban ground forces 
have increased steadily since the introduction of 
bloc equipment and training in tlie autumn of 
1960. The ground forces are estimated to num- 
ber some 300,000. All units are equipped with 
bloc small arms, and many have heavier equip- 
ment as well. Bloc aid is strongly reflected in 
Cuba's ground forces organization, which resem- 
bles that of the East European satellites. Soviet 
bloc arms aid has given the Cuban ground forces 
an armored, artillery, antiaircraft,, and antitank 
capability largely lacking in the past and un- 
known to other Latin American countries of the 
Caribbean area. Thousands of modern bloc small 
arms have been delivered. Soviet bloc instructors 
have been used extensively for training purposes, 
and they serve as full-time advisers to some 
individual units. 

Following the takeover by the present regime, 
the capabilities of the Cuban air force declined 
sharply as a result of purges and defections of key 
personnel. One of the major goals of the new 
regime, however, was to acquire combat jet air- 
craft, and most of the Cuban military trainees 
who went to the bloc in the summer of 1960 were 
air cadets. Their training has been one of the 



April 76, 7962 



645 



most important tasks of the bloc's military air 
program. Cuban pilots liave now returned to 
Cuba, where they are continuing instruction on 
MIG jet fighters which arrived last summer. The 
bloc has also supplied helicopters, piston-engine 
trainers, and small single-engine transports. 
About a dozen ILi-14 twin-engine transports were 
delivered this autumn for the Cuban civil airline. 
No Soviet bombers are known to have been 
delivered to Cuba. 

During the first year and a half of the bloc's 
military aid program, the Cuban navy did not 
receive any significant assistance. Since the first 



of the year, however, a number of Soviet patrol I 
vessels and motor torpedo boats Iiave been 
supplied. 

Bloc Arms and Militaky Equipment SuppLiBaj to Cuba 



Type of equipment 


Estimated quantitu 


MIG jet fighters 


60-75 


Medium and heavy tanks 


1.50-250 


Assault guns 


50-100 


Field artillery 


500-1000 


Antiaircraft artillery 


500-1000 


Mortars 


500 


Small arms 


200,000 


Patrol vessels 


Some 


Motor torpedo boats 


Some 



U.S. International Trade Policies 



hy Philip H. I'rezise 

Acting Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs ^ 



In 1928 merchandise exports of the United 
States were about $5.2 billion. That was a year 
of world prosperity, as measured at the time. It 
was also before the massive obstacles to inter- 
national trade and payments that were raised in 
the next decade. 

In 1932 our merchandise exports were valued 
at $1.7 billion, down 67 percent from 1928. It 
was the low year of the great depression. And 
it was a time of widespread restrictions on world 
trade, including the very high American tariff 
levels established in the Smoot-Hawley tariff bill 
of 1930. 

This comparison suggests the two main factors 
that normally bear on the vohmie of world com- 
merce. One relates to levels of income around 
the world. Tlie other is the presence, or rela- 
tive absence, of serious and general impediments 
to world trade, especially in the high-income 
countries. 

These are not really sejiarablo forces, of course. 
Undue barriers to world trade have the effect of 



' Address made before the California Agribusiness Con- 
gress for World Trade at Fresno, Calif., on Mar. 10 (press 
release 171 dated Mar. 15). 



holding down world business activity and income. 
Removal of such barriers tends to push up in- 
come as well as trade. 

Over the past 10 years, in any event, both forces 
have been favorable, on the whole, to an expansion 
of international trade. There has been a steady 
growth in economic activity, particularly in the 
industrial countries of North xVmerica, Western 
Europe, and Japan. Total production in the free 
world increased between 1950 and 1960 by more 
than 40 percent. 

At the same time, the major trading nations 
have been cutting away at the great mass of trade 
restrictions — tariffs, quotas, and exchange con- 
trol — which were inherited from the depression 
and which were made even more binding in many 
cases during the earlj' postwar years. The rules of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 
which is the international code of rules for the 
conduct of trade among the participating nations, 
have been very useful guidelines and benchmarks 
in tliis dovoloi)nicnt. So have the articles gov- 
erning the international payments system as 
agreed to by the members of tlie International 
Monetary Fund. "We have come a considerable 
way toward reaching the basic aims of tlie GATT 



646 



Department of Stafe Bulletin 



and the Fund in freeing up trade and payments. 
The effect on world trade of developments dur- 
ing the 1950's was salutary. Free-woi'ld trade in 
1960 was about 80 percent more than it had been 
a decade earlier. 

U.S. Position in World Trade 

The position of the United States in this world 
trading system is a central one. "We account for 
an estimated 15 percent of total free-world im- 
ports and exports.^ In 1961 our nonmilitary ex- 
ports were about $20 billion and our imports about 
$14.5 billion. Although international trade makes 
up a smaller proportion of our national output 
than in many other countries, the absolute volume 
of our purchases and sales from and to the rest 
of the world makes our actions and decisions 
crucial to the course of world commerce. 

The ramifications of our choices in the trade 
field can be very wide, for the political health of 
a great many free-world countries is directly re- 
lated to the ups and downs of international trade. 
We could easily undo our efforts to strengthen the 
political and defense structure of the free world if 
we were to take the wrong directions in our trade 
policies. I mention this only in passing, however, 
for our economic interests alone argue strongly 
for an American policy of leadership in expand- 
ing world trade. 

"We have consistently been a large net exporter 
of goods to the world. In the early postwar years, 
of course, it was easy to export, since the Amer- 
ican economy came out of the war undamaged and 
in a state of high productive efficiency. Rut our 
overall export strength has not declined, despite 
the remarkable industrial recovery and growth 
in "Western Europe and Japan. Last year we ran 
a surplus of about $5.4 billion of exports over im- 
ports. In 19G0 we did roughly the same. After 
making a discount for those exports financed by 
the Government, our suqilus in 1960 and 1961 was 
still a whopping $3 billion. 

Through the 1950's exports increased faster 
than imports and faster than total national out- 
put. The proposition that we have priced our- 
selves out of world markets fuids no support in 
these figures. On the contrary, wherever our ag- 
riculture and industry, taken as a whole, have a 
fair chance to compete in foreign markets, we can 
export. 



" In 1960 it was 1.5.7 percent. 
AptW 76, 7962 



This is probably not news to Califomians. 
Your State in 1960 ranked third in the Union as 
an exporter of manufactured goods, with a total 
value of $1.3 billion. The estimate is that Cali- 
fornian agricultural exports were worth another 
$500 million and that 12 percent of your farm 
workers were producing for the export trade. 
"Wages and costs in California have not lagged 
behind the rest of the covmtry, as I understand it, 
but California's ability to export its products has 
not visibly diminished. 

The fact is that we can with some confidence as- 
sume that an increase in the volume of total world 
trade will be accompanied by a larger American 
export surplus. "We need a larger surplus to help 
our balance of payments, where we have a chronic 
deficit, and we need it to increase employment and 
business activity at home. Our interest, in short, 
is to use our position of leadership in the world 
to reduce barriers to trade wherever and whenever 
possible. 

The European Common Market gives special 
point and urgency to American decision-making 
in the trade field. 

"Wlien the major European currencies were 
made convertible for current transactions in early 
1958, with a resultant lifting of many quantitative 
restrictions on imports, our trade with "Western 
Europe skyrocketed. Between 1958 and 1960 our 
exports to 17 "Western European countries rose by 
38 percent — which, incidentally, was twice as fast 
as the rate of increase achieved by other exporting 
nations and which suggests something, perhaps, 
about our competitiveness. In nonagricultural 
goods taken alone, where the range of freer access 
to the European market was greatest, our exports 
went up by 44 percent in 1959 over 1958 and by 
58 percent in 1960 over 1959. 

Up until now we have been competing in "West- 
ern Europe on the same terms as everyone else. 
The market in France for our machinery exports 
has been no more restricted than for German or 
British machinery exports. Now, however, the 
Common Market has begun to apply its tariffs 
differentially and is moving steadily along toward 
dismantling the tariffs that are operative among 
its members. By the end of the decade, and j^rob- 
ably sooner, there will be no tariffs on industrial 
products within the Common Market but there 
will be a tarilf, of indeterminate height, against 
the rest of the world. At that point, unless we 



647 



do sometliing soon about it, we may find ourselves 
competing not on equal terms but on distinctly un- 
equal terms as against producers within the Com- 
mon Market. 

I will not go further into the subject of the 
Common Market, since it is to be covered fully in 
a few moments, except to say what is perfectly 
plain — that its development will surely add a new 
dimension to the world trading scene. 

Proposed Trade Expansion Act 

These, then, are among the considerations in the 
background of planning American trade policies 
for the years immediately ahead. We need to 
build on our export surplus. And the appearance 
on the world trading scene of a thriving, expand- 
ing economic imit that may shortly include most 
of the industrial power of Western Europe pre- 
sents a major challenge and opportunity for our 
trade. 

The old Keciprocal Trade Agreements Act, 
which Cordell Hull fathered in 1934, expires in 
June. This act, and the policies it represented, 
have served our national interests well. Without 
it as the basis for the exercise of American lead- 
ership in international trade, the world by now 
imdoubtedly would have become organized into a 
series of tight little mutually exclusive trading 
blocs. The volume of international trade would 
be much smaller than it is, and prospects for 
forward progress in trade would be dim indeed. 

Over the years, however, the Trade Agreements 
Act accimiulated numerous barnacles and disa- 
bilities. A mere renewal of the law in its present 
form would not provide the elements essential to a 
vigorous American initiative in world trade. We 
have just concluded in Geneva a prolonged and 
difficult negotiation under the expiring act.^ Ev- 
erybody who was involved agrees that we cannot 
hope to cope with the trade problems of the 
future under the limitations that we were subject 
to at Geneva. 

The President has asked the Congress for basi- 
cally new legislation in the proposed Ti-nde Ex- 
pansion Act of 1962.* His proposal would greatly 
expand our ability to negotiate tariff adjustments, 
particularly with the European Common Market. 



° l<'or l)!U'kf;rouiul. see Bulletin of Apr. 2, 1002, p. 561. 

* For text of the rresidont's lucssaKe to Congress, see 
ibid., Feb. 12, 1002, p. 2:^1 ; for a suininary of the hill 
(II.R. 9900) , see ibid., Feb. 20, l'.M>2, p. 343. 



It would allow us to depart from item-by -item 
bargaining over hvmdreds of small portions of 
trade and to go to across-the-board negotiations 
on categories of goods whenever that procedure 
promised to be advantageous to us. It would in- 
clude modernized safeguard provisions to deal 
with problems of adjustment to imports. 

Under the proposed law the President would be 
authorized to negotiate with any of our trading 
partners for tariff reductions of up to 50 percent. 
A special section of the law would empower him 
to bargain with the Common Market for the re- 
duction, or elimination, of tariffs on categories of 
goods of which the United States and the Common 
Market are dominant suppliers to the world. He 
could negotiate with the Common Market for the 
reduction or elimination of tariffs on a common 
list of agricultural commodities, without the dom- 
inant-supplier limitation. He would be allowed 
to reduce or give up our nuisance tariffs, that is, 
those amounting to 5 percent or less ad valorem. 
And he would be able to reduce or eliminate tar- 
iff's on certain tropical forestry and agricultural 
products on condition that the Common Market 
take similar action. Our tariff cuts under the 
main authorities of the bill would be staged over 
a 5-year period. All reductions by ourselves 
would be extended to all other free-world coun- 
tries on the basis of the most-favored-nation 
principle. Similarly, other countries in GATT 
would, under the rules of that agreement, extend 
their reductions to other GATT countries. 

The new law would provide authority to nego- 
tiate. It would not require negotiations on any 
particular article or articles. In fact the bill ex- 
plicitly provides for reserving items from tariff 
bargaining. It would continue the procedure of 
referring proposed negotiating lists to the Tariff 
Commission for advice on the probable economic 
effects of tariff reductions, but it prescribes new 
criteria to guide the Commission. It retains the 
national security clause of the old act, permitting 
the President to take any action to adjust imports 
that might impair national security. 

There is a new approach to the import adjust- 
ment problem in the form of provisions for assist- 
ance to companies or workers whose interests are 
found to be harmed by import competition as a 
result of tariff reductions. Companies would be 
able to get financial assistance, tax relief, and tech- 
nical assistance. Workers would be eligible for 



648 



Department of State Bulletin 



extended unemployment insurance, retraining, 
and relocation expense payments. 

Tariff relief of the familiar escape-clause kind 
would still be available for industries adversely 
affected by imports, when adjustment assistance 
proved to be inadequate or mappropriate. The 
bill labels this as "extraordinary" relief in recog- 
nition of the fact that withdrawals of tariff con- 
cessions are not to be undertaken liglitly in a 
world in which we ourselves want international 
conmiitments to mean what they say. 

Relation to Political Factors 

That, in summary, is the shape of our proposed 
new trade program and policy. It carries over the 
experience gained in 26 years of experience with 
the Trade Agreements Act. It also strikes out 
along new lines in order to deal with the problems 
of the 1060's. 

Hearings on the bill have just begun before the 
"Ways and Means Committee of the House.^ It 
would be premature and inappropriate to predict 
how the Congress will deal with the President's 
proposal. The prospect, in any case, is that there 
will be a great debate in the Congress and through- 
out the country and that tliis will serve to clarify 
the issues and to inform our people about the 
stake our country has in world trade. 

If the Congress provides the President with 
new negotiating authority, the probability is that 
we would begin preparations for a tariff confer- 
ence under GATT auspices possibly to begin 
sometime in 1963. The aim would be to convene 
all the nations committed to the GATT in a large- 
scale multilateral negotiation to bring down trade 
barriers throughout the free world. 

There are a great many reasons why we should 
take the lead and the initiative in this. I have 
touched on some of the key economic points. It 
is evident also that our political relationships with 
Western Europe and our position in the less de- 
veloped and uncommitted areas of Asia, Africa, 
and Latin America will be affected by our action 
or lack of action on trade matters. This could 
be the opportunity to knit the free- world economy 
and thereby its policy more closely together for 
mutual benefit. If we were to succeed, the fiirther 
consequences for the historic confrontation be- 
tween our system of government and politics and 



the Soviet system would be far-reaching and fa- 
vorable. These issues are not modest or narrow 
ones. Trade policy this year is in the center ring. 
It well deserves the attention that groups like 
yours are giving it. 



President Makes Decisions 
in Four Import Duty Cases 

The Wliite House announced on March 19 the 
President's decisions in four cases involving recom- 
mendations of the Tariff Commission. In two 
instances, concerning imports of woven carpets 
and sheet glass, the President accepted the Com- 
mission recommendations and signed proclama- 
tions increasing applicable duties, effective after 
the close of business April 18.^ In two cases, 
affecting imports of ceramic tile and baseball 
gloves and mitts, the President decided that the 
evidence presented did not clearly sustain conclu- 
sions that serious injury had resulted from import 
competition. 

The effect of the President's decisions will be: 

(a) To increase the duty on Wilton and velvet 
(or tapestry) carpet imports from 21 percent to 
40 percent ad valorem ; 

(b) To increase duties on imports of cylinder, 
crown, and sheet glass to amounts ranging from 
1.3 cents to 3.5 cents per pound depending on size 
and thickness; 

(c) To hold the existing duty level on imports 
of ceramic mosaic tile ; and 

(d) To retain the present 15-percent ad valorem 
duty on baseball gloves and mitts. 

In all four cases the President has asked the 
Tariff Commission to provide data supplementing 
its original reports. 

The President's decisions were reported in let- 
ters ^ transmitted on March 19 to the chairmen of 
the Committee on Finance of the Senate and the 
Committee on Ways and Means of the House of 
Representatives. 

The Tariff Commission conclusion — and the 
President's concurring judgment — that imports of 



° For a statement made by Under Secretary Ball on 
Mar. 13, see ibid., Apr. 9, 1962, p. 597. 



^ For texts of Proclamations 3454 and 3455, see 27 Fed. 
Reg. 27S9 and 2791. On Mar. 27 the President issued 
Proclamation 3458 delaying the effective date of these 
proclamations until June 17 ; for text, see 27 Fed. Reg. 
3101. 

" For test, see White House press release dated Mar. 19. 



April 16, 7962 



649 



Wilton and velvet (or tapestry) carpets were in- 
juring the domestic industry producing like prod- 
ucts was based on the record of general decline in 
production since 1955, in a period when imports 
increased significantly. Industiy earnings and 
worker man-hours also declined in the same 
period. 

Acceptance of the Tariff Commission recommen- 
dation for relief to the domestic sheet-glass indus- 
try was based on evidence that importers enjoy 
a price advantage that has occasioned a significant 
rise in imports since 1955, while U.S. production 
has dropped. Domestic industry profits have 
trended downward, and losses were registered in 
1960. Worker man-hours have also declined, with 
further adverse effect on communities in areas 
burdened with labor surpluses. 

The President did not increase the duty on 
imports of ceramic mosaic tile because it did not 
appear that the industry had sustained serious 
injury. Although imports have increased sub- 
stantially since 1955, domestic production has not 
declined. The level of employment in domestic 
plants has also remained constant. 

In the baseball-glove and -mitt case the Tariff 
Commission did not conclude that the domestic in- 
dustry had been injured but rather that a threat 
of injury exists. In the President's judgment this 
finding, viewed in the light of the data presented, 
did not justify the duty increase requested by 
the domestic industi-y, which, despite very large 
increases in imports in recent years, has main- 
tained relatively stable levels of employment and 
of total annual sales. 

An additional consideration in both the ceramic- 
tile and baseball -glove cases was the fact that 
Japanese manufacturers, who are the principal 
competitors from abroad, have established volun- 
tary quotas on exports to the United States of 
these products. 



Scientists Named for Joint Study 
of U.S.-Mexico Salinity Problem 

Department Announcement 

Press release 193 dated March 20 

The Presidents of the IJnlled States and Mexico 
announced on March IG^ that the International 



' Bulletin of Apr. 2, 1962, p. 542. 
650 



Boundary and Water Commission would appoint 
a team of highly qualified United States and Mexi- 
can water and soil scientists and engineers to make 
an objective analysis of the lower Colorado River 
salinity problem. The recommendation of this 
team would be an essential part of the urgent 
study of the problem now being carried out by the 
Commission. 

After consultation with the President's Special 
Assistant for Science and Technology, Jerome B. 
Wiesner, and on the recommendation of the De- 
partment of the Interior, the United States Com- 
missioner on the International Boundary and 
Water Commission has appointed the following 
scientists as advisers to him to participate in the 
joint study with Mexico: 

Charles A. Bower, Director, United States Salinity Lab- 
oratory, Agricultural Research Service, Department of 
Agriculture, Riverside, Calif. 

Russell H. Brown, Chief, Research Section, Ground Water 
Branch, Division of Water Resources, United States 
Geological Surve.v, Department of the Interior 

John Harshbarger, Professor of Geology, University of 
Arizona 

Arthur F. Pillsbury, Professor of Irrigation and Irriga- 
tion Engineering, University of California at Los 
Angeles 

Stephen Reynolds, State Engineer of New Mexico 

These scientists will meet at Yuma, Ariz., on 
March 27 with the United States Commissioner, 
the Officer in Charge of Mexican Affairs of the 
Department of State, and members of the Com- 
missioner's staff to obtain background information 
on the salinity problem. The Mexican scientists 
who are to work with the United States scientists 
on the joint study are scheduled to meet with the 
Mexican Commissioner on March 28 at Ciudad 
Juarez, Mexico, for similar purposes. The Mexi- 
can and United States scientists will meet together 
on March ?>0 to commence their study. They will 
be assisted bj' Roger Revelle, Science Adviser to 
the Secretary of the Interior. 

The Presidents, in their announcement of March 
10, stated that the objective of the two Govern- 
ments was, without prejudice to the legal riglits of 
either country, to agree upon and ]iut into opera- 
tion remedial measures M-itliin the shortest i)ossil)le 
l^eriod of time. The Department of State believes 
that the scientists of the two countries who will 
convene on Marcli ."^O can cont ribute immeasurably 
to the realization of this objective. 

Deporfmenf of Sfafe Bu/fefin 



INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES 



Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings' 

Adjourned During March 1962 

United Nations Wheat Conference Geneva Jan. 31-Mar. 10 

U.N. Economic Commission for Africa: 4th Session Addis Ababa Feb. 19- Mar. 3 

GATT Contracting Parties: Council of Representatives Geneva Feb. 22-28 

ILO Governing Body: 151st Session (and its committees) .... Geneva Feb. 26- Mar. 9 

IAE.\ Board of Governors Vienna Feb. 27-Mar. 5 

OECD Industries Committee Paris Mar. 1-3 

lA-ECOSOC: 1st Meeting of National Directors of Immigration San Salvador Mar. 1-9 

Customs and Tourism of Central America, Mexico, and tlie 

United States. 

Caribbean Organization: Meeting of Representatives of Member Georgetown, British Guiana. . Mar. 5-8 

Governments. 

Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences: 7th Meeting of San Jose Mar. 5-9 

Technical .'Vdvisory Council. 

GATT Working Party on Apphcation of GATT to International Geneva Mar. 5-9 

Trade in Television Programs. 

U.N. ECOSOC Committee for Industrial Development: 2d Session . New York Mar. 5-16 

ICAO Panel on Origin and Destination Statistics: 4th Session . . Montreal Mar. 5-17 

UNESCO/ECLA/OAS/ILO/FAO Conference on Education and Santiago Mar. 5-19 

Economic and Social Development in Latin America. 

U.N. Scientific Committee on Effects of Atomic Radiation: 11th New York Mar. 5-23 

Session. 

U.N. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East: 18th Tokyo Mar. 6-19 

Session. 

Intern.ational Lead and Zinc Study Group: Special Working Group . Geneva Mar. 8-16 

International Lead and Zinc Study Group: Statistical Committee. Geneva Mar. 12-13 

OECD Oil Committee Paris Mar. 12-14 

CENTO Liaison Committee Rawalpindi Mar. 12-15 

GATT Panel of E.xperts on Consular Formalities Geneva Mar. 12-16 

U.N. ECE Working Party on Construction of Vehicles Geneva Mar. 12-16 

ITU CCIR Study Group'lV (Space Systems) Washington Mar. 12-23 

ITU CCIR Study Group VIII (International Monitoring) .... Washington Mar. 12-23 

ICAO Air Traffic Control Panel Montreal Mar. 12-24 

Caribbean Organization Council: 2d Meeting Georgetown, British Guiana . Mar. 13-16 

OECD Agriculture Committee Paris Mar. 14-15 

WMO Regional Association I (Africa): 3d Session Addis Ababa Mar. 14-31 

NATO Petroleum Planning Committee Paris Mar. 15-16 

International Lead and Zinc Study Group: 5th Session Geneva Mar. 15-21 

International Seminar in Clinical and Public Health Lahore Mar. 17-20 

OECD Fisheries Committee Paris Mar. 19-20 

International Sugar Council: 11th Session London Mar. 19-20 

U.N. ECE Coal Committee (and working parties) Geneva Mar. 19-23 

U.N. Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space New York Mar. 19-29 

UNESCO Intergovernmental Advisory Committee on the Extension Santiago Mar. 20-23 

of Primary Education in Latin America: 4th Meeting. 

U.N. ECE Steel Committee: 27th Session (and working parties) . Geneva Mar. 20-27 

U.N. ECLA Committee of the Whole: Extraordinary Meeting . . Santiago Mar. 21 (1 day) 

OECD Development Assistance Committee Paris Mar. 21-22 

CENTO Civil Defense Experts Rawalpindi Mar. 21-24 

UNESCO Conference of Ministers of Education of Africa .... Paris Mar. 26-30 

OECD Nonferrous Metals Committee Paris Mar. 27-28 

FAO European Commission for the Control of Foot-and-Mouth Rome Mar. 27-29 

Disease: 9th Session. 



1 Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Mar. 30, 1962. Following is a list of abbreviations: CCIR, 
Comit6 consultatif international des radio communications; CENTO, Central Treaty Organization; ECE, Economic 
Commission for Europe; ECL.\, Economic Commission for Latin America; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; 
FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IAEA, International Atomic 
Energy Agency; lA-ECOSOC, Inter-American Economic and Social Council; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organi- 
zation; ICEM, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, 
Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; NATO, North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization; OAS, Organization of American States; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organiza- 
tion; WMO, World Meteorological Organization. 

April 16, 1962 651 



Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings — Continued 



Adjourned During March 1962 — Continued 

OECD Committee on Restrictive Business Practices: Advisory Paris. 

Committee. 
OECD Committee on Restrictive Business Practices: Bureau . . 
International Union for the Protection of Industrial Property: 

Permanent Bureau of the Consultative Committee. 
ICE M Subcommittee on Budget and Finance: 5th Session. . . . Geneva. 



Mar. 27-28 



Paris Mar. 29-30 

Geneva Mar. 29-31 



Mar. 29-31 



U.N. ECE Meeting on Effective Demand for Housing Geneva Mar. 29-31 



In Session as of March 31, 1962 

Conference on Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests (not Geneva Oct. 31, 1958 

meeting). 

5th Round of GATT Tarifif Negotiations 

International Conference for the Settlement of the Laotian Ques- 
tion. 

United Nations General Assembly: 16th Session (recessed February 
23). 

OAS Group of Experts on Compensatory Financing Washington Jan. 5- 



Geneva Sept. 1, 1960- 

Geneva May 16, 1961- 

New York Sept. 19, 1961- 



Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee Geneva . 

U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Human Rights: 18th Session ..." 
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Status of Women: 16th Session . . 
ICAO Subcommittee on the Legal Status of Aircraft: 4th Meeting . 
IMCO International Conference on the Prevention of Pollution of 

the Sea by Oil. 
WMO Commission for Synoptic Meteorology: 3d Session .... 



New York 
New York 
Montreal . 
London. . 



Mar. 14- 
Mar. 19- 
Mar. 19- 
Mar. 26- 
Mar. 26- 



Washington Mar. 26- 



lAEA Director General 
Visits Washington 

The Department of State announced on March 
28 (press release 199) that Sigvard Ekliind of 
Sweden, Director General of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), would arrive 
at Washington on March 28. 

Dr. Eklund will be received b_y President Ken- 
nedy at the "White House on March 30. He will 
be guest of honor at luncheons given by Secretary 
Rusk on March 29 and by the Joint Committee on 
Atomic Energy on March 30, and at a reception 
by the Chairman of the Atomic Eneray Commis- 
sion, Glerni Seaborg, and the Under Secretary of 
State, George McGhee, on March 30. He will 
also be received by the Ambassador of Sweden. 

He will meet Avith officers in the Department 
of State and the Atomic Energy Commission to 
discuss questions of mutual interest to the Agency 
and the United Stales. During his stay in "Wash- 
ington, he will sign on behalf of the IAEA an 
agreement between the United States and the 
Agency under which the Agency's safeguards sj's- 
tem would bo applied to four United States 
nuclear reactors. 

Dr. Eklund will leave for Slcxico City on 
April 2 to attend the opening sessions of the 
Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission 



meeting and will later visit the Argonne National 
Laboratory near Chicago and atomic energy facili- 
ties at Oak Kidge, Tenn. 



TREATY INFORMATION 



U.S. and U.S.S.R. Sign Agreement 
on Exchanges for 1962-63 

STATEMENT BY CHARLES E. BOHLEN> 

It is a pleasure to sign the new U.S. -U.S.S.R. 
agreement on exclianges in the scientific, technical, 
educational, cultural, and other fields for the years 
1962 and 19G3. This agreement moves forward 
the important program of American-Soviet ex- 
changes which was inaugurated by the first agree- 
ment, signed in January 1958,= and continued, for 
an additional 2-year period, in November 1959.^ 



' Made nt the signing ceremony at W.ishinKton on Mar. 
8 (pre.ss release 152). Mr. Bohlen is Special Assistant to 
the Secretary of State. 

' For te.xt, see Bulletin of Feb. 17, 1958, p. 343. 

' For text, see tftid., Dec. 28, 1959, p. 951. 



652 



Department of State Bulletin 



Negotiations leading to the present agreement 
took place in Washington from January 31st 
imtil today. Wo feel that this agreement, based 
on the principle of reciprocity and mutual ad- 
vantages in all fields, has laid the basis for bal- 
anced increased exchanges during the next 2 years. 
The length of the negotiations in themselves re- 
veals the complexity of the problems considered, 
as well as differences between the two countries on 
the methods of carrying out the various exchanges. 
The negotiations were serious and businesslike, 
and we feel that it is a matter of mutual congrat- 
ulations that they have come to a successful con- 
clusion. Compromises were found to bridge the 
differences of approaches, and we consider that 
the present agreement represents a satisfactory 
coordination of these differences. We also believe 
that the present agreement represents a measure 
of progress over the last U.S.-Soviet exchange 
agreem.ent, and we look forward, in subsequent 
agreements, to a continuance of this progress. 

Negotiations held at the same time led to agree- 
ments between the National Academy of Sciences 
and the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., as 
well as between the American Council of Learned 
Societies and the Academy of Sciences of the 
U.S.S.R., providing for the further broadening 
of contacts between American and Soviet sci- 
entists and scholars in 1962-1963. 

It should be noted that the agreement between 
the National Academy of Sciences and the Soviet 
Academy has been initialed by the respective ne- 
gotiators and is subject to the approval of the 
governing bodies of both academies. 

The President and the Secretary of State have 
supported the usefulness of a mutually advan- 
tageous exchanges program with the Soviet Union. 
We look forward to another 2 years of useful ex- 
changes with the Soviet Union. All of us hope 
that the increased program of exchanges, includ- 
ing a broader flow of communication, will 
contribute to a better mutual understanding of 
outstanding problems and to a lessening of inter- 
national tension. 

TEXT OF JOINT COMMUNIQUE* 

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics have signed today, March 8, 1962, 
an Agreement on Exchanges In the Scientific, Technical, 
Educational, Cultural and other Fields for 19G2-19C3. 



'Released on Mar. 8 (press release 151) ; press release 
151 also included the text of the agreement. 



During the course of the negotiations which led to the 
Agreement, the fulfillment of the previous agreement for 
exchanges in 1960-1961, signed in Moscow on November 
21, 1959, was reviewed and was recognized to be mu- 
tually beneficial and useful. 

The Agreement was signed by Ambassador Charles E. 
Bohlen, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, for 
the United States, and by S. K. Romanovsky, Deputy 
Chairman of the State Committee of the Council of Min- 
isters of the U.S.S.R. for Cultural Relations with For- 
eign Countries, for the Union of Soviet Socialist Re- 
publics. The Agreement entered into force upon signature 
with effect from January 1, 1962 and is the third in a 
series of two-year exchanges agreements between the two 
countries. The first of these was signed in Washington 
on January 27, 1958. 

The Agreement provides for exchanges in the fields of 
science, technology, construction, trade, agriculture, pub- 
lic health and medical science, performing arts, publica- 
tions, exhibitions, motion pictures, radio and television, 
culture and the professions, and athletics. The Parties 
also agreed to encourage visits of members of Congress 
of the United States and deputies of the Supreme Soviet 
of the U.S.S.R., as well as visits of other governmental 
and social groups, and tourism. 

At the same time. Agreements were negotiated between 
the National Academy of Sciences of the United States 
and the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., as well as 
between the American Council of Learned Societies and 
the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., providing for 
the further broadening of contacts between American and 
Soviet scientists and scholars in 1962-1963. In the field 
of peaceful uses of atomic energy, it is contemplated that 
specific proposals for exchanges will be developed between 
the United States Atomic Energy Commission and the 
State Committee of the Council of Ministers of the 
U.S.S.R. for the Utilization of Atomic Energy. 

At the signing the representatives of both sides ex- 
pressed the hope that the further development of ex- 
changes and contacts between the United States and the 
Soviet Union will contribute to the betterment of mutual 
understanding and to the broadening of cooperation be- 
tween the people of the two countries. 



Current Actions 

MULTILATERAL 



Automotive Traffic 

Convention on road traffic, with annexes. Done at Geneva 
September 19, 1&19. Entered into force March 26, 1952. 
TIAS 2487. 

Ratification deposited: India (with a declaration), 
March 9, 1962. 

Aviation 

Convention on international civil aviation. Done at 
Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force April 4, 
1947. TIAS 1.591. 
Adherence deposited: Upper Volta, March 21, 1962. 

International air services transit agreement. Done at 
Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force for the 
United States February 8, 1W5. 59 Stat. 1693. 



AprW 16, 7962 



653 



Notification that it considers itself bound: Niger, March 
14, 1962. 
Protocol relating to amendment of article 50(a) of the 

Convention on International Civil Aviation to increase 

membership of the Council from 21 to 27. Approved 

by the ICAO Assembly at Montreal June 21, 1961. 

Enters into force upon deposit of the 56th instrument 

of ratification. 

Ratifications deposited: Australia, January 19, 1962; 
Belgium, February 15, 1902; Cameroon, November 14, 
1961 ; Canada, October 17, 1901 : Dominican Republic, 
October 24, 1901; Finland, September 18, 1961; 
Guinea, August 21, 1901 ; India, December 18, 1961 ; 
Indonesia, July 28, 1961 ; Israel, February 12, 1962 ; 
Ivory Coast, November 14, 1901 ; Jordan, July 27, 
1961 ; Korea, February 10, 1962 ; Malaya, October 3, 
1961 ; Mali, July 12, 1961 ; Nicaragua, November 17, 
1961 ; Niger, September 14, 1961 ; Norway, October 
10, 1961; South Africa, February 13, 1002; Sweden, 
December 28, 1961 ; Thailand, January 17, 1962 ; 
Tunisia, December 27, 1061 ; United Arab Republic, 
February 27, 1902 ; United Kingdom, January 4, 1962 ; 
United States, March 23, 1062 ; Venezuela, February 
6, 1062. 

Finance 

Articles of agreement of the International Finance Cor- 
poration. Done at Washington May 25, 1955. Entered 
into force July 20, 1956. TIAS 3620. 
Signature and acceptance: Liberia, March 28, 1962. 

Articles of agreement of the International Monetary 
Fund. Opened for signature at Washington December 
27, 1045. Entered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 
1501. 
Signature and acceptance: Liberia, March 28, 1962. 

Articles of agreement of the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development. Opened for signa- 
ture at Washington December 27, 1945. Entered into 
force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1502. 
Signature and acceptance: Liberia, March 28, 1962. 

Articles of agreement of the International Development 
Association. Done at Washington January 20, 1960. 
Entered into force September 24, 1960. TIAS 4007. 
Signature and acceptance: Liberia, March 28, 1902. 
Acceptance deposited: Greece, January 9, 1962. 

Oil Pollution 

International convention for the prevention of pollution 
of the sea by oil, with annexes. Done at London May 
12, 1954. Entered into force for the United States 
December 8, 1961. 
Acceptance deposited: Iceland, February 23, 1962. 

Slavery 

Slavery convention signed at Geneva September 25, 1926, 
as amended (TIAS 3532). Entered into force March 
9, 1927; for the United States March 21, 1929. 46 
Stat. 2183. 

Notification received that it considers itself hound: 
Cameroon, March 7, 1902. 

Sugar 

International sugar agreement, 1958. Done at London 
December 1, 1058. Entered into force January 1, 1050; 
for the United States October 0, 1959. TIAS 4389. 
Ratification deposited: Italy, February 16, 1902. 



BILATERAL 

Brazil 

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agree- 
ment of December 31, 1956, as corrected and amended 
(TIAS 3725, 3804, 4074, 4144, 4183, 4239, 4311, 4039, 



4644, and 4775). Effected by exchange of notes at Rio 
de Janeiro February 26, 1902. Entered into force 
February 26, 1902. 

Iceland 

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the 
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 
1954, as amended (68 Stat. 4.55; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), 
with memorandum of understanding. Signed at Reyk- 
javik March 10, 1962. Entered into force March 16, 
1962. 



Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: March 26-April 1 

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of 
News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C. 

Releases appearing in this issue of the Bulletin 
which were issued prior to March 26 are Nos. 151 
and 152 of March 8 ; 170 and 171 of March 15 ; and 
177 of March 19. 

No. Date Subject 

*187 3/26 U.S. participation in international con- 
ferences. 

tl88 3/26 McGhee: '"Strategy of American For- 
eign Policy." 

*189 3/26 Rusk : interview on BBC. 

tl90 3/26 McGhee: "Mineral Resources and the 
World of the 1960's." 
191 3/26 Ball : "The U.N. and the Real World." 

tl92 3/20 Cleveland : WMO Commission for Syn- 
optic Meteorology. 

193 3/26 Science advisers appointed to U.S. 

Commissioner, U.S. -Mexico Bound- 
ary and Water Commission. 

194 3/27 Rusk : Geneva disarmament conference 
(revised). 

Sino-Soviet bloc military aid to Cuba. 

Ball : interview on "Prospects of Man- 
kind." 

Post of Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
Atlantic .Affairs established. 

Conference on educational development 
in Latin America. 

IAEA Director General to visit Wash- 
ington (rewrite). 

I'rogram for visit of President of 
Brazil. 

Delegation to meeting of Asian minis- 
ters of education. 

13th Foreign Service Staff review 
panels. 

Williams : "Change and Challenge in 
Africa." 

Cultural exchange (Japan). 

Butterworlli. Dowling. and .Mrs. Willis 
sworn in as career ambassadors (bi- 
ographic details). 

206 3/30 Central ^Vfricau Republic credentials 

( rewrite ) . 

207 3/30 U.S.S.K. credentials (rewrite). 

t208 3/30 U.S. agrees to international inspection 
of four atouiic reactors. 

•209 3/30 Cleveland : postage stamp commemo- 
rating malaria eradication campaign. 

•Not printed. 

tHeld for a later issue of the Buluetin. 



195 
•196 


3/27 
3/27 


tl97 


3/28 


*198 


3/28 


199 


3/28 


•200 


3/28 


t201 


3/29 


•202 


3/29 


1203 


3/29 


•204 
•205 


3/30 
3/30 



654 



Department of State Bulletin 



April 16, 1962 I n 

Africa. The Role of Agriculture In the Develop- 
ment of Africa (Williams) 639 

Agriculture. The Role of Agriculture in the De- 
velopment of Africa (Williams) 639 

Atomic Energy 

IAEA Director General Visits Wasliington . . . 652 

President Repeats U.S. Desire for Effective Test 

Ban Treaty (Kennedy) • . . . . 624 

Central African Republic. Letters of Credence 

(Kombet) &14 

Ceylon. Pi-esident Sends Congratulations to Gov- 
ernor General of Ceylon (Kennedy) . . • . . 644 

Communism. American Strategy on the World 

Scene (Rostow) 625 

Cuba. Sino-Soviet Bloc Military Aid to Cuba Sum- 
marized by Department 644 

Disarmament. U.S. Proposes Patterns for Future 

Work of Disarmament Conference (Rusk) . . 618 

Economic Affairs 

American Strategy on the World Scene (Rostow) . 625 
President Makes Decisions in Four Imjwrt Duty 

Cases 649 

U.S. International Trade Policies (Trezise) . . . 646 

Educational and Cultural Affairs 

The Role of the University in the Building of a 

Flexible World Order (Kennedy) 615 

U.S. and U.S.S.R. Sign Agreement on Exchanges 
for 1962-63 652 

Foreign Aid. American Strategy on the World 

Scene (Rostow) 625 

Germany. U.S. and U.S.S.R. Discuss German Prob- 
lem and Related Questions (text of joint state- 
ment) 625 

International Information. U.S. and U.S.S.R. Sign 
Agreement on Exchanges for 1962-63 .... 652 

International Organizations and Conferences 
Calendar of International Conferences and Meet- 
ings 651 

IAEA Director General Visits Washington . . . 652 



ex Vol. XLVI, No. 1190 

U.S. Proposes Patterns for Future Work of Dis- 
armament Conference (Rusk) 618 

Mexico. Scieutists Named for Joint Study of U.S.- 
Mexico Salinity Problem gso 

Military Affairs. Sino-Soviet Bloc Military Aid to 

Cuba Summarized by Department 644 

Presidential Documents 

President of Republic of Togo Visits United States . 638 

President Repeats U.S. Desire for Effective Test 

Ban Treaty 624 

President Sends Congratulations to Governor Gen- 
eral of Ceylon (544. 

The Role of the University in the Building of a 

Flexible World Order 615 

Togo. President of Republic of Togo Visits United 

States (text of joint communique) 638 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 653 

U.S. and U.S.S.R. Sign Agreement on Exchanges 
for 1962-63 652 

U.S.S.R. 

Letters of Credence (Dobrynin) 644 

Sino-Soviet Bloc Military Aid to Cuba Summarized 
by Department 644 

U.S. and U.S.S.R. Discuss German Problem and Re- 
lated Questions (text of joint statement) . . . 625 

U.S. and U.S.S.R. Sign Agreement on Exchanges 
for 1962-63 652 

U.S. Proposes Patterns for Future Work of Dis- 
armament Conference (Rusk) 618 

United Nations. The United Nations and the Real 
World (Ball) 632 

Name Index 

Ball, George W 632 

Bohlen, Charles E [ 652 

Dobrynin, AnatoUy Fedorovich (544 

Kennedy, President 615,624,638,644 

Kombet, Jean-Pierre 644 

Olympio, Sylvanus 638 

Rostow, Walt W .' . 625 

Rusk, Secretary 618 

Trezise, Philip H 646 

Williams, G. Mennen 639 



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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE 
UNITED STATES 

Diplomatic Papers 
1943, CHINA 



Department 

of 

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The Department of State recently released a volume of documents 
on relations of the United States with China for the year 1943. Tliis 
is a continuation of a volume covering the year 1942, issued in 1956. 
The volume is concerned primarily with diplomatic activities within 
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The contents include a wide range of subject matter. Topics dealt 
with concern CMna's military position and participation in the war 
with Japan, American military assistance to China, political condi- 
tions there as affected by Soviet and Chinese Communist policies, 
financial relations and lend-lease aid, efforts to open up a new supply 
route to Cliina from outside, cultural relations, repeal of Cliinese 
exclusion laws by the United States, interest of th& United States in 
Chinese postwar planning, and numerous otlier subjects. The volume 
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«S»' 





%io-^ 



E 
FICIAL 

:ekly record 



Boston Public Library 
Superintendent of Documents 
Vol. XLVI, No. 1191 April 23, 1962 

MAY 8 1962 

THE FOREIGN AID PlR^S^M'^'k FISCAL YEAR 

1963 • Statement by Secretary Rusk 659 

STRATEGY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY • by 

Under Secretary McGhee 678 

A BALANCE SHEET ON ASIA • by Chester Bowles ... 674 

U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL REJECTS CUBAN CALL 
FOR OPINION OF WORLD COURT ON OAS 

ACTION • Statements by Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson 

and Text of Draft Resolution 684 

THE DEVELOPING ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP • by 

Under Secretary Ball 666 



IITED STATES 
REIGN POLICY 



For index see inside back cover 



THE DEPARTIVIENT OF STATE 




Vol. XLVI, No. 1191 • Publication 7365 
April 23, 1962 



'^O^iai'j 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington 28, D.O. 

Pkice: 

62 issues, domestic $8.C0, (orelRn $12.26 

Single copy, 25 cents 

Use of funds for printing of this publica- 
tion approved by the Director of the Bureau 
of the Budget (January 10, 1861). 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and Items contained heroin may 
be reprinted. Citation of the Department 
or State Bulletin os the source will be 
appreciated. The Bulletin Is indexed In the 
Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Public Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public 
and interested agencies of the 
Government tcith information on 
developments in tlie field of foreign 
relations and on tlie work of the 
Department of State and tlie Foreign 
Service. The BULLETIN includes se- 
lected press releases on foreign policy, 
issued by the White House and the 
Department, and statements and ad- 
dresses made by the President and by 
the Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Department, as well as 
special articles on various phases of 
international affairs antl tlie func- 
tions of the Department. Informa- 
tion is included concerning treaties 
and international agreements to 
tvhich the United States is or may 
become a party and treaties of gen- 
eral internatiotuil interest. 

Publications of the Department, 
United Nations documents, and legis- 
lative material in the field of inter- 
national relations are listed cxirrently. 



The Foreign Aid Program for Fiscal Year 1963 



Statement by Secretary Rtisk ^ 



I appreciate the opportunity to meet again witli 
tlie committee to discuss the f oreigii aid prograna — 
tlie President's proposals for the Foreign Assist- 
ance Act of 1962.^ 

I am deeply aware, as I am sure you must be, 
that from the provisions of interim aid preceding 
the Marshall plan this is the 15th year in which 
you have held hearings similar to this on proposals 
for foreign assistance. I recognize also that you 
have heard Secretaries Marshall, Acheson, Dulles, 
and Herter speak to some of the underlying 
themes of our foreign aid responsibilities. 

Some members of this committee have actively 
participated in these problems from the very be- 
ginning. You have helped bring into being and 
supported the Marshall plan, point 4, the Mutual 
Defense Assistance Program, the Development 
Loan Fund, and the other elements of this major 
bipartisan effort. 

It would seem almost imnecessary for me to urge 
upon this committee the vital importance of the 
foreign aid program to the security and welfare 
of our nation. You are fully aware, as I am, of 
great accomplisliments of the program over the 
years and, as well, of some of its weaknesses, short- 
comings, and disappointments. The committee's 
comments in your report ^ last year on the new 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 stated the case 
for the aid program with a clarity and directness 
I would gladly adopt. You said then : 

The committee believes, no less than the President, that 
the United States must plan for and contribute generously 



^ Made before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
on Apr. 5 (press release 226) . 

^ For text of President Kennedy's message to Congress 
on tlie Foreign Economic and Military Assistance Pro- 
gram for Fiscal Tear 1963, see Buixetin of Apr. 2, 1962, 
p. rpfK). 

' S. Kept. 612, 87th Cong., 1st sess. 



toward a decade of development. Foreign aid is both 
an unavoidable responsibility and a central instrument 
of our foreign policy. It is dictated by the hard logic of 
the cold war and by a moral responsibility resulting from 
poverty, hunger, disease, ignorance, feudalism, strife, 
revolution, chronic instability, and life without hope. 

Basic Propositions for Our Aid 

Our present problem, therefore, is not to justify 
the fundamental need for our foreign aid program 
but to determine and act upon the principles which 
will contribute most effectively to its success. 

There are undoubtedly many significant factors 
whicli must be considered from time to time, but 
I believe we may miderscore six basic propositions 
as our major guides : 

1. The fundamental and indispensable require- 
ment for the development of a nation is the de- 
termination of its own government and people to 
m,ove forward. Our aid, no matter what its 
amoimt, cannot materially help those who will not 
help themselves. No country can make solid 
progress except by its own efforts, inspired by its 
own leadership and supported by the dedication 
of its own people. 

Tlie aid we can supply will be only a small por- 
tion of the total national effort needed. Our aid, 
for example, to the nations joining in the Alliance 
for Progreas is less than 2 percent of the total of 
their gross national products. Obviously, there- 
fore, what is done by these nations with their own 
resources is crucial. These efforts must in all 
cases include mobilization of national resources, 
economic, fuiancial, and hiunan. With national 
variations, they must include the willingness to 
imdertake reforms important to progress — re- 
forms in taxation, in land holdings, in housing, and 
the broadening and improvement of educational 
opportunities. "We must constantly bear in mind 



KptW 23, 1962 



659 



that our goal is not just economic development. 
It is equally and concurrently to increase social 
justice wliich will secure the benefits of progress 
to those masses who have so long suffered from 
poverty, ignorance, and disease — and from the 
most cruel condition of all, hopelessness. 

2. Our resources should he devoted to fostering 
long-range economic and social growth. "We can- 
not prudently invest major resources on a crisis- 
to-crisis basis. Political stability cannot be as- 
sured unless there is steady progress toward long- 
tenn goals. We are inevitably and properly 
limited in the money and the skilled manpower 
we can invest in the progress of the less developed 
countries. We have no funds to spend on those 
projects which, however useful in themselves, do 
not significantly help advance the cause of na- 
tional growth. We must continually press coun- 
tries receiving our assistance to improve their 
planning and to use their resources in the most 
effective way. Our aid must be tailored counti-y 
by country to concentrate on those programs and 
projects which will have the maximum effect on 
development. 

3. The education and training of the people of 
the nations vie are aiding is vital to their economic 
and social growth. Progress will not come from 
our aid dollars or materials but from the use 
which people can make of them. People are the 
dynamos which generate the power of develop- 
ment. They provide the minds, the will, and the 
skills by which progress is made. It is essential 
that they have not only the wiU but the compe- 
tence for the task. 

Education in all its branches is fundamental. 
We have seen in our own counti-y that our econom- 
ic progress has paralleled our educational devel- 
opment. We could not wait to become rich before 
we built our educational system. We created it, 
and our skilled people created our wealth. This 
year we are particularly aware of this relationship 
because we are celebrating the 100th anniversary 
of our unique system of land-grant colleges. Ed- 
ucation of leaders, training of administrators and 
of technicians of all kinds must be centi-al to the 
development programs of many of the new na- 
tions. The emphasis of our grant assistance in 
Africa and Latin America, especially, is and prop- 
erly should bo in this most basic field of liuman 
and social development. 

4. The progress of the newly developing na- 
tions should have the aid of all the industrialized 



nations of the free world. Those which we aided 
in tlie past are now thriving. It is appropriate 
and practical that they should increase their con- 
tributions. 

5. Developing nations themselves have an op- 
portunity to help each other. They may do so by 
opening tlieir educational institutions to others 
less well situated. They may share the lessons 
learned in the process of development. They may 
extend direct assistance within their capabilities. 
This is already occurring, and we can be encour- 
aged by the response to this opportimity. 

6. Our aid program should he administered as 
efficiently as possihle. The administering agency 
should be organized to fulfill the requirements of 
the program and should be staffed by the most able 
personnel who can be persuaded to undertake this 
complex and important public duty. 

Progress in This Year of Transition 

If these should be our guiding principles, how 
have we applied them ? 

It is too early to make a full report. The new 
authorizing legislation became effective about 7 
months ago, and the Agency for International De- 
velopment came into being only 5 months ago. 
Yet I can report that significant progress has been 
made. 

Administration: The needed administrative re- 
organization is imder way. Mr. Fowler Hamilton, 
the new Administrator of tlie Agency for Inter- 
national Development, has reshaped the Agency 
on a regional basis capable of carrying out the 
new emphasis on well-planned country programs. 
He has enlisted the services of an able group to 
direct these regional programs and to administer 
the supporting functional staffs which will provide 
expert advice with respect to material resources, 
educational and social development, and develop- 
ment financing and private enterprise. Qualified 
employees of the old ICA [International Coopera- 
tion Administration] and the Development Loan 
Fund are now being integrated into the new AID 
organization, and a major senrch is under way in 
and out of Government for additional talented 
people to carry out tlie demanding and complex 
tasks of tlie progi-am in Washington and the field. 

Self -Help: I am encouraged by the growing 
evidences of tlio detorniination of the less devel- 
oped nations to act vigorously for (heir own prog- 
ress and by the multiplying examples of basic re- 



660 



Department of State Bulletin 



forms and otlior measures of self-help. Many of 
these liave, of course, been in preparation for sev- 
eral years. Others are of more recent origin. The 
Charter of Punta del Este* contains a forward- 
looking agreement on goals to be achieved by the 
Latin iVmerican nations in a framework of co- 
operation. The goals they agreed on include a 
minimum rate of economic growth of 2.5 percent 
per capita, a more equitable distribution of na- 
tional income, economic diversification, the elimi- 
nation of adult illiteracy by 1970 and the provi- 
sion of at least 6 years of schooling for each child, 
the substantial improvement of health conditions, 
the increase of low-cost housing, and progress 
toward economic integration. 

It is true these are goals and not yet facts, but 
the agreement is in itself a substantial accomplish- 
ment and the determination back of it justifies the 
hope of substantial progress toward fulfillment. 
This hope is sustained by the series of reform 
measures which have been undertaken by Latin 
American nations since the Act of Bogota '* less 
than 2 years ago. 

Planning: We can be encouraged also by the 
progress which has been made in long-term plan- 
ning in this year of transition. In Latin America 
many countries have made conscientious efforts 
to improve their planning processes. Several 
xVfi'ican coimtries — Tunisia and Xigeria are good 
examples — are developing realistic plans. India 
and Pakistan, of course, have well-developed 
]>lans, and others show promise. We must recog- 
nize, however, that many others face serious ob- 
stacles to adequate planning. For many the 
needed administrative experience is lacking. For 
some even the basic statistical information is not 
yet available. Where decisions must be made by 
democratic processes — processes which are among 
our basic objectives — these decisions may involve 
the same kind of debate, timing, and resolution 
of difficulties with which we ourselves are familiar. 

Long-range commitments are a spur to long- 
range planning, and such commitments have now 
been made with India, Pakistan, Nigeria, and Tan- 
ganyika. The authority granted by the Congress 
has already provided encouragement to other 
countries to take tlie difficult steps necessary for 
development. We anticipate making conunit- 
ments under the long-range authority in the near 

* For text, see Btnj.ETrN of Sept. 11, 1961, p. 463. 
' For text, see Hid., Oct. 3, 1960, p. 537. 



future with a few other nations where meaningful 
plans are now being formulated. 

Human Resources: Our increased emphasis on 
the development of human resources is finding 
ready response in Africa and Latin America. Sev- 
eral nations have strongly recognized its basic im- 
portance to progress and have urged our assist- 
ance to educational and health programs they 
have worked out. 

Aid From Other Nations: During the past year 
we have increased our efforts to coordinate and 
increase the flow of assistance from our allies to 
the less developed coimtries. Our NATO allies, 
together with Japan, are now providing in the 
neighborhood of $2.3 billion per year to less devel- 
oped countries. A number of these other free- 
world coimtries are contributing to foreign 
assistance a portion of their gross national product 
comparable to that contributed by the United 
States. Unfortunately, however, much of the 
assistance from these countries is in the form of 
short-term loans with relatively high interest 
rates. Several nations have substantially liberal- 
ized their loan terms in the past year, but further 
improvement is needed. Significantly, the LTnited 
Kingdom, Germany, France, Belgium, Canada, 
and Japan have established new aid and lending 
agencies, evidencing their sense of responsibility 
in this area. 

Several types of multilateral organizations and 
groups have been formed to encourage closer co- 
operation and coordination of effort among the 
nations supplying capital and technical assistance 
to the developing areas. Consortia organized by 
the World Bank are supporting the development 
plans of countries such as India and Pakistan. 
The Development Assistance Committee of OECD 
[Organization for Economic Cooperation and De- 
velopment] is undertaking a coordinating role 
wit.li regard to technical and capital assistance to 
countries where its members have substantial 
interests. 

The Use of Fiscal Year 1962 Funds 

Mr. Hamilton and his colleagues will discuss 
with you in detail the uses to which the funds 
available for the first year under the new legis- 
lation are being put. I should like to stress, how- 
ever, their indispensable value in supporting 
foreign policy positions the United States has 



April 23, 1962 



661 



taken in recent months. In the Far East, for ex- 
ample, these funds have made possible the buildup 
of militai-y and economic strength with which the 
free people of Viet-Nam are combatinoj the forces 
intent on destroying their nation. In South Asia 
these funds are contributing to the continued re- 
markable progress India and Pakistan are mak- 
ing with their well-developed programs. These 
funds are making possible the peacekeeping ac- 
tivities of the United Nations in the Middle East 
and in the Congo — activities which have turned 
aside what might otherwise have been the grave 
danger of involvement of major powers. 

In Africa also these funds through loans and 
grants are providing for fimdamental develop- 
ment of himnan and economic resources quite 
literally crucial to tlie building of whole nations. 
And in Latin America the availability of aid funds 
made it possible for us to support a free govern- 
ment in the Dominican Republic. In Latin 
America also I have already refen-ed to the 
Charter of Punta del Este based in substantial 
measure on the assurance of aid from the United 
States and designed to bring about the peaceful 
evolution of a continent under conditions of free 
institutions. 

In short, around the world, on five continents, 
our aid is fulfilling a major and indispensable role 
in support of the interests of our country and the 
preservation and strengthening of freedom. 

The Program for Fiscal Year 1963 

The request before you is essentially for the 
authorization of funds for fiscal year 1963. It 
rests on the premise that the authorizing legis- 
lation enacted last year is sound. It asks for only 
one major change and a few minor ones. It does 
not provide at all for authorization for military 
assistance or development lending funds, since 
authorizations enacted for those categories last 
year extend through fiscal year 1963. 

Military Assi.Hfance : I Iniow, however, that you 
have a deep intei'est in military assistance, and I 
should like to report to you on the program for 
whicli $1.5 billion of funds are being asked in 
appropriations. 

Militai-y assistance remains an important part 
of the total U.S. defense effort. It is also the 
principal means by which there is sustained the 
worldwide collective security systems of which we 
are a part. You may recall that the Chairman 



of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said to you last year 
that no amount of money spent on our own forces 
could give the United States a comparable asset 
of trained, well-equipped forces, familiar with the 
terrain and in suitable position for immediate 
resistance to local aggression. 

Secretary [of Defense Robert S.] McXamara, 
General [Lyman L.] Lemnitzer, and others will 
discuss the program with you in detail. Without 
the confidence engendered in tlie people of nation 
after nation by the presence of their own forces, 
to which we have contributed both training and 
arms, it would have long since become impossible 
to maintain the existing structure of free and in- 
dependent nations. 

Our military strategy today calls for a neces- 
sary flexibility. We do not wisli to allow our- 
selves to become frozen in our choices so that we 
are limited either to submission to aggression 
against a free-world neighbor or compelled to re- 
sort to forces of unlimited and uncontrollable 
destruction. The availability of trained and 
equipped forces of Allied nations at the points 
where aggression may come and prepared to de- 
fend their own homelands is increasingly im- 
portant to this vital flexibility of response. 

The appropriation requested for fiscal year 
1963 is $1.5 billion. It is $385 million less than 
was asked for last year and $200 million less than 
was authorized for fiscal year 1963. It is intended 
to continue the program of providing only that 
equipment and training which is needed to fill the 
gap between what the aided counti-y can do for 
itself and what must be done to enable it to pro- 
tect itself from internal subversion and external 
aggression. It is important also to tlie mainte- 
nance of a climate of stability and confidence fa- 
vorable to economic and social progress. 

One other positive benefit will come from our 
expenditures for military aid. We are placing 
emphasis on civic action projects in underdevel- 
oped countries. Wherever possible, country forces 
receiving military assistance are encouraged to 
participate in developing public works programs 
such as roadbuilding, sanitation, and communi- 
cations. American aid in this area is particu- 
larly productive because it not only advances the 
progress of the nation as a whole but also brings 
home to its people tlie fruits of United States 
friendship and concern for their general welfare. 

Development Lending: Funds needed for de- 
velopment lending in the coming year were also 



662 



Department of Stale Bulletin 



authorized last year. Dollar repayable develop- 
ment loans now constitute the major instrument of 
our foreign economic assistance program. In the 
current year they will make possible commitments 
of approximately $1,100 million for fundamental 
development purposes. Already loans have been 
approved for major transportation facilities, local 
credit institutions, public utilities, a cement plant, 
and capital goods for development in 18 countries. 

For fiscal year 1963 over half of the funds re- 
quested will be for development lending. The 
present authorization for fiscal year 1963 is $1,500 
million. The President has requested an appro- 
priation of $1,250 million. (Additional fimds are 
asked for the Alliance for Progress, which I shall 
discuss in a moment.) These new loan funds will 
be concentrated in countries which have somid and 
well-administered long-term development pro- 
grams or the capability to cari-y forward individ- 
ual projects which will contribute to national 
gi'owth. 

Funds at least in the magnitude requested are 
needed and can be eft'ectively used during the 
coming year. 

1963 Legislative Proposals 

Alliance for Progress: The only significant leg- 
islative change sought this year is the enactment 
of a new title VI providing for the Alliance for 
Progress and authorizing its long-term support 
by the United States. The alliance is unique 
among our regional programs in that it is based 
upon a mutual declaration of principles and goals 
and a procedure for review of country programs 
by a regional panel. These concepts were agreed 
upon by the United States and the Latin Amer- 
ican Republics at Bogota and Punta del Este. In 
addition, the authority and funds for our aid in 
support of the alliance derives in part from legis- 
lation separate from the basic Foreign Assistance 
Act. The alliance criteria and authorization 
should now be consolidated within the AID pro- 
gram both to simplify administration and to reit- 
erate our adherence to these exacting standards 
and high goals. 

The alliance also diifers from our other pro- 
grams because we are dealing not with new coun- 
tries but with Republics almost as old as our own. 
The struggle for orderly change of the entire 
social and economic structures of Latin America 
faces stubborn resistance from entrenched priv- 



ilege and vitriolic opposition from a radical left 
for whom change means only violent revolution. 
We cannot expect the necessary changes to occur 
under conditions of orderly growth and long-term 
reform unless there is reasonable assurance that 
the critical increment of United States financial 
support necessary to success will be forthcoming 
over the long pull. We therefore strongly urge 
that Congress record its long-term support by 
authorizing $3 billion for the next 4 years of the 
alliance. Such authorization will bolster pro- 
gressive forces and provide a sounder basis for 
the kind of long-range planning required if the 
objectives of the alliance are to be realized. It 
will provide for the alliance the same period of 
assurance of United States support as is provided 
for aid to other areas. 

Authorization of Fimds for FY 1963: The total 
appropriation which the President is requesting 
for fiscal year 1963 is $4,878 million— slightly 
more than Congress appropriated last year for 
AID and the alliance. The new authority wliich 
is requested from this committee for appropria- 
tions this year totals $2,125 million. 

Within this total we are requesting an initial 
appropriation for the Alliance for Progi-ess of 
$600 million in loan and grant funds for next year 
as part of the $3 billion long-term authorization 
extending through fiscal year 1966. 

Development Grants: The legislation before 
you asks $335 million authorization for develop- 
ment grant activities in fiscal year 1963 in areas 
other than Latm Anaerica. These f mids are among 
the most crucially needed in the entire bill. Ad- 
vances in education and technical training, im- 
provements in health conditions, the development 
of able public administratore, and the creation of 
effective governmental institutions are essential to 
progress in most of the developing nations. 

Supporting A ssistance : In our effort to concen- 
trate economic aid on development we camiot over- 
look the fact that supporting assistance will still 
be needed for a number of countries — primarily 
those on the peripheiy of the Sino-Soviet bloc 
which are subjected to direct and massive Com- 
munist pressures and must of necessity maintain 
anned forces greater than their economies can 
support unaided. We are asking for the autliori- 
zation of $481.5 million for this purpose — 20 per- 
cent less than was requested last year. Most of 
this will go to three Far Eastern coimtries which 
are particularly threatened. 



April 23, 1962 



663 



As we reported to you last year, it is our purpose 
to supplant supporting aid with development loans 
as soon as it becomes feasible for any particular 
countiy. It is important to recognize that we are 
proposing supporting assistance for next year for 
18 countries fewer than those receiving such as- 
sistance this year. Although this judgment may 
require modification in light of events, we hope 
that this trend will be continued. In some cases the 
need for supporting assistance may persist for a 
considerable period. 

International Organizati<ms : As in past years 
we are requesting fimds for voluntai-y contribu- 
tions to multilateral programs conducted mider the 
United Nations: These include the Expanded 
Technical Assistance Program and tlie Special 
Fmid, UNICEF [United Nations Children's 
Fund] , the Palestme Refugee Program, the U.N. 
Congo Economic Program, and others. This cate- 
gory also includes our contribution to the Indus 
Basin Trust Fund administered by the World 
Bank and to other international programs. The 
sum requested for these purposes is $148.9 million. 

Investment Guaranties and Savings: We are 
well aware that private investment can make a 
most valuable contribution to progress in the less 
developed countries. But the investor in such a 
country may face special risks which he will not 
imdertake without some form of protection. The 
investment guaranty program authorized by the 
AID legislation has been an effective incentive to 
such investment. We anticipate that in the next 
year requests by American businessmen for guar- 
anties will exceed the funds available. We there- 
fore are asking for additional investment guaranty 
authorizations. 

Contingency Fund: Each of these requests for 
funds represents our best estimate of the minimiun 
necessary to maintain the momentum of our eco- 
nomic and military programs. But I would like 
particularly to emphasize the importance of the 
President's contingency fund. Kecent events have 
given us no basis for supposing that our responsi- 
bilities can be significantly reduced. The only 
assured ])redictioii we can make is that the unpre- 
dictable will occur. We must be ready to move 
quickly to anticipate or meet new situations. The 
unprogramed reserve against tlio unexpected is, 
therefore, one of the most imi)ortant elements in 
the foreign assistance program. Tlie $400 million 
requested is not too great a sum to have available 
for emergency needs. 



Conclusion 

Our 5 months' experience under the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961 lias demonstrated that the 
legislative framework of our foreign aid program 
is sound. The task of transforming the social and 
economic structures of less developed countries 
around the world will involve their energies for 
years to come; our own effort, relatively modest 
though it be, will require persistence and an as- 
surance of continuing interest. The stakes are the 
security of the free world today and the shape 
of the world of tomorrow. 



U.S. Comments on Developments 
at Geneva Disarmament Conference 

Press release 220 dated April 3 

Follow'nig is a Department statement on certain 
matters of frocedure and substance which have de- 
veloped at the 18-nation disarmament conference 
at Geneva. 

Discussions concerning general and complete 
disarmament are continuing at the plenary meet- 
ings of the conference.^ Preliminary discussions 
are focusing on the objectives and principles of 
general and complete disarmament. What is 
needed soon is an exploration of essential substan- 
tive problems requiring agreement before the pre- 
cise language of a comprehensive program on 
general and complete disarmament can be de- 
veloped. The United States believes that such a 
concentration of efl'ort would quickly take the con- 
ference to the heart of the issues which must be 
resolved and hopes that substantive debate may 
soon begin. 

A Committee of the Wliole has been established 
by the conference to consider those partial dis- 
armament measures wliich the various delegations 
might wish to submit. The United States at- 
taches great importance to the work of the Com- 
mittee. The ITnited States has given clear 
evidence of its support for those measures which 
would increase confidence among the nations, fa- 
cilitate the disarmament process, and reduce the 
risks of war inherent in the present international 



' For statements made by Secretary Rusk before the 
18-nation Disarmament Committee at Geneva, see Buiy 
LETiN of Apr. 2, 1962, p. 531 ; Apr. 9, 1902, p. 571 ; and 
Apr. IG, 19C2, p. 618. 



664 



Department of State Bulletin 



situation. Agreement on an agenda has now been 
reached, with priority being given to pi'oposals on 
the cessation of war propaganda. Other matters 
such as a cutoff of fissionable material production 
for use in weapons and reduction of the possibility 
of war by surprise attack, miscalculation, or fail- 
ure of communication have also been put forward 
for consideration by this Committee. 

In connection with the agenda of this Commit- 
tee, discussions have developed as to the attitude 
of the United States toward the proposals of the 
Polish Government which contemplate the estab- 
lishment of nuclear free zones in Central Europe. 
While it is recognized that the proposals of the 
Polish Government, usually identified as the "Ra- 
packi plan," - have been advanced from a desire 
to contribute to the maintenance of peace, careful 
study of these suggestions lias led the United 
States to the conclusion that they would not help 
to resolve present difficulties. 

The United States, on the other hand, has pro- 
posed equitable measures to this end. These in- 
clude arrangements for advance notification of 
military movements, such as transfers of large 
military units or the firing of missiles, the estab- 
lishment of observation posts at important points 
within a country, the use of aerial and mobile 
inspection t«ams to improve protection against 
surprise attack, and the establishment of a com- 
mission to examine the technical problems in- 
volved in measures which could reduce the risks 
of war. Moreover, these measures proposed by 
the United States could be put into effect immedi- 
ately without resulting in one-sided political and 
military advantages. 

The principal objections of the United States to 
the Rapacki plan, which purports to be a confi- 
dence-building measure, have been, and remain : 
(1) that the measures envisaged do not address 
themselves to the nuclear weapons located in the 
Soviet Union, the use of which against Western 
Europe has been repeatedly threatened by Soviet 
spokesmen; (2) that the plan would therefore re- 
sult in a serious military imbalance; (3) that con- 
sequently, while creating an illusion of progress, 
it would in reality endanger the peace of the world 
rather than contribute to maintaining it. The 
dangers t-o peace resulting from such an imbalance 
under present conditions have been clearly and 



' For background, see ibid., May 19, 1958, p. 821. 
April 23, J 962 



repeatedly demonstrated by events witliin memory 
of all. 

The United States will continue its efforts to 
focus the attention of the Committee of the Wliole 
on the proposals it has brought forward — at the 
same time, it is prepared to give prompt and seri- 
ous attention to the proposals and suggestions ad- 
vanced by other conference members which could 
offer some hope of early agreement on concrete 
measures and which would, in turn, facilitate 
progress toward the overall objectives of the 
conference. 

One initial measure where agreement would do 
much to set the work of the conference on the 
road to success is a nuclear test ban treaty. On 
this subject, unfortunately, there has been no prog- 
ress at Geneva because the Soviet Union has re- 
fused to accept even the concept of international 
inspection to monitor a test ban. The Soviet 
Union takes this position in opposition to general 
scientific opinion and contrary to views held by 
the Soviet Government itself since 1957. Never- 
theless, the United States has not abandoned the 
hope that the Soviet Government will recognize 
tliat it is acting in defiance of the will of people 
everywhere and will return to its earlier position 
that international verification is necessary for a 
nuclear test ban agreement. 



President Macapagal of Philippines 
To Visit United States 

White House press release dated March 30 

President Diosdado Macapagal of the Republic 
of the Philippines has accepted President Ken- 
nedy's invitation to visit the United States from 
June 19 through 28, 1962. President Macapagal 
met the President when, as Vice President of the 
Philippines, he visited the United States in Octo- 
ber 1960. President Macapagal was elected to the 
Presidency of the Republic of the Philippines in 
November 1961 and was inaugurated on December 
30, 1961. 

This visit is in testimony to the special relation- 
ship which exists between the United States and 
the Pliilippines and the longstanding friendship 
of the people of the two countries. It will provide 
a welcome occasion for the American people to 
learn more about the new leadership of an im- 
portant democratic partner. 



665 



The Developing Atlantic Partnership 



hy Under SecreUinj Ball ^ 



A little over a month ago the Attorney General 
of the United States, Mr. Robert Kennedy, speak- 
ing in this same hall, suggested some of the 
elements essential to an effective Atlantic partner- 
ship, lie addressed you then as Germans, but — 
just as I am doing this evening — he spoke to you 
also as citizens of the neve Europe that you and 
your neighbors are building with such inspiring 
vigor. 

Tonight I shall attempt to carry the Attorney 
General's suggestions a little farther. I sliall tiy 
to bring you something of the flavor of the dis- 
cussion that is taking place in the United States 
and to indicate the general directions of the poli- 
cies we are shaping. 

End of American Isolationism 

The United States approaches Europe from a 
background of history with which you are gen- 
erally familiar. We were originally a group of 
colonies that broke away to form a Federal state. 
During the formative years of our existence as a 
nation, we concentrated on establisliing our na- 
tional integrity and turned our backs on our 
colonial past. Preoccupied with the problem of 
building a nation and conquering a vast frontier, 
we followed the advice of our first President, 
George Washington, to avoid entangling alli- 
ances with the great nations of Europe. 

Our policy of keeping aloof from European 
problems was intensified by the influence of those 
emigrants from P^urope who came to settle our 
farms and cities during the 19th century. Most 
of those emigrants, including the stalwart men 
and women who left Germany after tlie failure of 



'Address nindp before Ihe Gorman Society for Foreign 
Affairs at Bonn, Germany, on Apr. 2 (press release 214). 

666 



the 1848 revolution, had fled Europe for religious, 
economic, or political reasons. They sublimated 
their disenchantment with Europe by iminei-sing 
themselves in the formidable work of building a 
new nation on tlie soil of tlie New World. They 
contributed to the American distrust of the Con- 
tinent they had left behind them — distrust which 
persisted well into the 20th centuiy. 

But times and events have clianged all this. 
You and we — on the opposite shores of the Atlan- 
tic — liave learned to work closely and effectively 
together. Arid tonight I need hardly insist that 
American isolationism is a dead issue. It has dis- 
appeared forever. 

If one likes to mark historic changes by signifi- 
cant dates, one can say tliat American isolationism 
finally died on August 24, 1040 — the day the 
United States Senate ratified the North Atlantic 
partnership. By that solemn compact America 
and Europe guaranteed tlie survival not only of 
freedom but of free men. When today President 
Kennedy tells the jjcople of America that he 
would regard an attack on Berlin as an attack on 
Wasliington or Chicago, he is giving explicit 
recognition to the central principle of our alli- 
ance — that the destinies of Western Europe and 
North America are irrevocably intertwined and 
tliat their defense is indivisible. 

This principle is not limited to the views we 
constantly express in the councils of the alliance: 
All i)lans and efforts to improve the defensive 
posture of NATO are based upon it. It is the 
foundation of security on whicli our Atlantic 
partnership rests. 

I can say with confidence that our joint mili- 
tary posture has never been stronger, yet I would 
bo less than candid if I wore to express complete 
satisfaction. 

Department of State Builetin 



Today, as President Kennedy has made clear, 
there is a real and urgent need to give a new 
priority to the conventional elements of our com- 
mon defense. NATO needs a wide spectrum of 
capabilities if it is to respond to widely varying 
types of attack with appropriate force. The nu- 
clear deterrent will be fully credible only if rein- 
forced by a substantial nonnuclear capability that 
will give us flexibility in dealing with aggression. 

The United States has substantially increased 
its conventional forces, including the number of 
its combat divisions. Our Navy and Marine 
Corps, as well as our antiguerrilla forces, have been 
strengthened and expanded. We have added air- 
and sea-lift capabilities. We are spending billions 
of additional dollare on these added programs. 
Some of our European partners have also recog- 
nized the need for expanded conventional force. 
As a result there has been a substantial improve- 
ment in our combined nonnuclear strength during 
the past year. But this, while gratifying, is still 
not enough. We need to do more if the deterrent 
to every kind of aggression is to remain effective 
in the face of growing power in the East. Nu- 
clear strength, of course, remains basic to our com- 
mon and indivisible defense of Western Europe 
and North America. The United States has pro- 
vided for substantial acceleration and strengthen- 
ing of the Polaris and Minuteman programs, 
giving the alliance added nuclear capabilities 
under vaiTing conditions. 

We recognize that defense plans cannot be 
static: They must respond to changing conditions 
of power and resources. There is need, therefore, 
for constant and serious consideration of future 
arrangements if our nuclear forces are to be truly 
expressive of the ideas of the Atlantic partner- 
ship. We wish to respond constructively to the 
desire of our allies for an increasing role in nu- 
clear deterrence. 

We strongly favor the multilateral approach 
suggested by President Kennedy in his speech at 
Ottawa last May.= As the President stated then, 
we are willing to join our allies in serious con- 
sideration of the possibility of a sea-based NATO 
MEBM [medium-range ballistic missile] force 
under truly multilateral ownership and control. 
He also offered to commit five Polaris sub- 
marines — or even more in appropriate circimi- 
stances — to NATO. We feel that a constructive 



= Bulletin of June 5, 1961, p. 839. 
April 23, 7962 



solution to this problem of NATO's future nuclear 
role is both important and possible. We remain 
prepared to work with our allies to that end. We 
believe that such a multilateral solution is greatly 
to be preferred to any proliferation of national 
nuclear capabilities. 

U.S. Support of European Integration 

If our common efforts toward an effective com- 
bined military force are defensive in character, our 
efforts toward cooperation in the area of eco- 
nomics have a more positive aim. They are based 
upon the amply demonstrated fact that in the 
modern world the major industrial economies are 
increasingly interdependent. In a world of swift 
transport and instantaneous communications, 
where every man is every other man's close neigh- 
bor, no nation can affoi'd to be an economic island. 
As the volume of goods and services that we ex- 
change grows higher every year, so does the need 
for us to develop more effective ways of working 
together. 

It is for this reason, among many others, that 
the United States has, from the beginning, given 
active support to the development of an integrated 
Europe. We have regarded a imited Europe as a 
condition to the development of an effective Atlan- 
tic partnership. 

Let me emphasize at this point that the pace of 
evolution of the Atlantic partnership in the eco- 
nomic area has depended upon an essential 
phasing. It has been necessary for Europe to 
move toward substantial internal cohesion in order 
to complete the fomidation upon which the strac- 
ture of an Atlantic partnership can be erected. 

Through the whole of the postwar period we 
Americans have taken no comfort from the dis- 
parity between our own resources and those of 
any other nation of the free world. We have been 
proud that the United States is a world leader, but 
we have sometimes found it less than satisfactory 
to be a world leader isolated by the possession of 
an overwhelming proportion of the total wealth, 
power, and resources. To our minds — and I am 
sure to your minds as well — a strong partnership 
must almost by definition mean a collaboration of 
equals. 'Wlien one partner possesses over 50 per- 
cent of the resources of so great an enterprise and 
the balance is distributed among 16 or 17 others, 
the relationship is unlikely to work with full ef- 
fectiveness. And so long as Europe remained 

667 



fragmented, so long as it consisted merely of 
nations small by modern standards, the potentials 
for true partnership were always limited. 

But a Europe united and strong can be an equal 
partner in the achievement of our common en- 
deavors — an equal partner committed to the same 
basic objectives as we ourselves. For, after all, 
you and we alike believe in the preservation and 
extension of freedom and in the values that dis- 
tinguish free men from slaves. 

Reality of Our Common Objectives 

I cannot overstate the enthusiasm with which 
Americans have welcomed the burgeoning strength 
and cohesion of Europe. But why is it that one 
sometimes hears in Europe — almost never in 
America — timid voices ominously complaining 
that a united Europe might become a neutralist 
"third force"? 

Let me say emphatically that we Americans 
have no fear that the new Europe will be neutralist 
any more than we fear that America will return 
to isolationism. The neutralism of which we 
heard a fair amount a decade ago was an expres- 
sion of weakness, not strength. It sprang from a 
belief that Europe could no longer play a signifi- 
cant role in the power contest between the United 
States and the Communist bloc. Persuaded that 
they could not influence the outcome by taking 
sides, its advocates assumed a role of Olympian 
detachment from the battle, measuring out equal 
amounts of criticism for each side. As the nations 
of Western Europe have grown more vmited, the 
voices of neutralism that produced such a fright- 
ful cacophony 10 years ago have been largely 
stilled. 

But there are a few who still profess fear of a 
strong, united Europe for yet a different reason. 
They see the specter not of a neutralist third force 
but of a third force and an America following 
increasingly divergent paths. A powerful Con- 
tinental entity, they argue, could be tempted to 
try a new kind of balance-of-power politics, to 
play the East against the West, to sell its weight 
and authority to the highest bidder to serve its 
own pai-ocliial and selfish objectives. 

Such a prediction, I am persuaded, misconceives 
the nature of the forces at work on both sides of 
the Atlantic. It overlooks the vital ity and sol idity 
of our common heritage. It ignores the reality of 
our common objectives. It ignores the direction 
in which Euroi)e is already moving. It rejects, in 



fact, the very interdependence of the members of 
the NATO alliance on which our national security 
is now based. 

To my mind both you and we have everything 
to gain by the construction of a strong and united 
Europe. Europe united will almost certainly dis- 
play a deeper and stronger feeling of responsibility 
for the defense of Western values than will the 
individual nation-states in a Europe weak and 
fragmented. Unity builds strength. The experi- 
ence and awareness of strength engender not only 
the ability but the will to influence events. And 
for Europeans, as for Americans, the will to in- 
fluence events is merely another way of expressing 
a sense of responsibility. 

We Americans are thoroughly convinced, there- 
fore, that the farther Europe proceeds down the 
road toward unity the more Europe can be ex- 
pected to play an affirmative and responsible role 
in our common concerns. In expressing this belief 
we recognize, of course, that the Atlantic partner- 
ship can never be one-sided and that we ourselves 
must fulfill the obligations of a good partner. 

Implications of European Economic Community 

United States support for European integi'ation 
and for the European Economic Community has 
deep roots. It springs from a recollection of our 
own Federal experience and from a desire to end 
the sanguinary rivalry that once divided the great 
states of Western Europe. 

But Americans have recognized that the com- 
mercial manifestation of the Community — the 
Common Market — implies a substantial degree of 
discrimination against American trade. Of neces- 
sity it will require adjustments for the industry, 
agriculture, and labor of the United States and of 
nonmember third countries. 

Yet this has never deflected us from the larger 
objectives of our policy. In spite of the problems 
for America implicit in the development of the 
Common Market, we have given consistent and 
active support to the growth of the European 
Community. 

In providing this support we have acted on two 
convictions: first, that the Community would be 
conducted as an outward-looking society, liberal 
in its trading and economic policies, and second, 
tliat it would be increasingly prepared to bear 
responsibilities around the world as its strength 
and unity develop. 



668 



Department of State Bulletin 



Purposes of Proposed Trade Legislation 

Our faith in the liberal intentions of tlie Euro- 
pean Community has been given concrete expres- 
sion in the trade legislation that President Ken- 
nedy has recently submitted to the United States 
Congress.' Since there has been some misunder- 
standing in Europe with regard to the nature and 
purposes of these proposals, I should like to com- 
ment on them briefly. 

By the proposed legislation the President is 
seeking authority to negotiate new trade arrange- 
ments, primarily with the Community but also 
with other trading nations. Under the American 
constitutional process such authority must be 
granted by the Congress. The Executive can ne- 
gotiate reductions in tariffs only to the extent that 
the Congress delegates this power to him. 

The powers sought by the President are tailored 
to the kinds of problems that we now both have in 
common. The trading world is radically chang- 
ing. The prospect of the United Kingdom's 
membership in the Common Market would mean, 
in a very sliort period of time, that 90 percent of 
the industrial production and 90 percent of the 
trade in industrial goods in the free world would 
be concentrated in two great common markets — - 
the United States and an enlarged EEC. 

In negotiating with each other these two com- 
mon markets would be dealing for the first time on 
a basis of near equality. In terms of population, 
trade, and the general state of the industrial arts 
and productive techniques, the United States and 
the EEC are not far apart. Our respective ex- 
ternal tariffs will be at roughly the same average 
level; for certain goods the tariff of the Commun- 
ity will be fixed at rates exceeding those of the 
United States tariff; for other goods the reverse 
will be true. By negotiating with each other we 
should be able to increase access to each other's 
markets on a basis that would be mutually 
advantageous. 

At the same time, because of our combined 
predominance in world trade, the United States 
and an enlarged EEC would bear a special re- 
sponsibility toward third countries. Strength and 
power involve, for those who possess it, a special 
set of obligations. By negotiating with each other 
within the framework of the GATT [General 



° For text of the President's message to Congress, see 
iUd., Feb. 12, 1962, p. 231 ; for a summary of the draft 
legislation, see ibid., Feb. 26, 1962, p. 343. 



Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] and substan- 
tially reducing tariffs on a most-favored-nation 
basis, these two great common markets could 
diminish to manageable and tolerable proportions 
the difficulties and apprehensions of all countries 
of the free world. This assumes, of course, that 
third countries would also play their part by pro- 
viding reciprocal concessions. 

Integrity of Common Market Not Affected 

In the proposed legislation the President has 
requested the bargaining authority that would en- 
able him to negotiate for a substantial increase 
in the free exchange of goods across the Atlantic. 
In asking the Congress to grant him that author- 
ity the President is not seeking to dictate the 
ground rules under which a negotiation must be 
conducted. Those rules are a matter for mutual 
agreement among the negotiating parties. 

The principal authority sought by the President 
is the power to negotiate reductions in American 
tariffs by as much as 50 percent. 

Tlie proposed legislation would also provide a 
special authority permitting the President, in ne- 
gotiations with the EEC, to offer concessions in 
the United States tariff to the extent of 100 per- 
cent. By the nature of its technical limitations 
this special authority could be effectively employed 
only if the United Kingdom becomes a member 
of the European Economic Community. 

In seeking this special authority the President 
has not sought in any way to prejudice the negoti- 
ations now under way between the EEC and the 
United Kingdom. He has wished merely to pro- 
vide himself with the power to bargain with an 
expanded EEC in the event those negotiations are 
successfully concluded. Under this special au- 
thority the President could, with respect to a 
limited range of goods — those goods that are pre- 
dominantly supplied by the United States or the 
expanded EEC — reduce tariffs by as much as 100 
percent in return for reciprocal concessions. 

The President's request for this special author- 
ity has created some critical comment in Europe. 
It has been suggested, for example, that such an 
American initiative might have the effect of erod- 
ing away the common external tariff that has both 
defined and given integrity to the European Eco- 
nomic Community. 

This concern is not well founded. The fact that 
certain goods might, in the course of a trade nego- 



April 23, 1962 



669 



tiation, be put on the free list by the EEC would 
not mean the elimination across the board of the 
common external tariff. Each of us already has 
a number of industrial products on our free lists. 
The United States presently imposes no duties on 
typewriters, newsprint, fertilizer, or a nimiber of 
machinery items. The common external tariff of 
the EEC will be at zero for synthetic rubber, some 
pulp or paper products, and certain types of ships 
and boats, and jewelry; it has been suspended on 
aircraft. 

Is there any reason why such free lists should 
not be expanded? Moreover, I question the as- 
sumption that the integrity of the European Com- 
mon Market is dependent, to the extent suggested, 
on the maintenance of substantial levels of exter- 
nal protection. The implications of their reduc- 
tion depend again on phasing. Wliile the common 
external tariff wall may initially have been its 
defining element, the Community has already 
achieved integrity through other far-reaching 
means. It has a well-developed set of common 
institutions, and its cohesion will, at least in the 
final analysis, depend on the continued extension 
of common action over an increasingly wide range 
of policies. 

Consultation on Economic Policies 

If it be wrong to maintain that the President's 
trade proposals are somehow a threat to the in- 
tegrity of the Common Market, another European 
reaction has seemed to us exaggerated. This is the 
suggestion that a substantial reduction of tariffs 
on both sides of the Atlantic can be safely acliicved 
only if the two parties will commit themselves to 
common economic policies. In effect, these critics 
seem to be saying that freer trade is impossible 
imless the United States joins with the EEC in 
committing itself to a discipline similar to that 
imposed by the Rome Treaty. 

In my view this greatly overstates the problem. 
In requesting new trade legislation the President 
is not proposing a customs union or a free trade 
area with the Common Market. Nor is he pro- 
posing an exclusive trading arrangement of any 
kind with the EEC; whatever agi-eements are 
made must bo on a most- favored-nation basis. 
He is proposing rather that the United States, in 
agreement with the EEC, should move toward the 
liberalization of trade under conditions in which 
all countries would share in the benefits of com- 



parative advantage. The fact that American wage 
rates are substantially higher than those in 
Europe, for example, does not necessarily price 
our exports out of your market any more than 
your lower productivity or higher energy costs 
price your goods out of ours. 

Nevertheless we recognize that, if transatlantic 
commerce is to expand with requisite freedom, the 
United States and tlie European Community must 
move together toward a progressively greater co- 
ordination of economic policies. For that reason, 
we have welcomed the suggestions of our European 
friends for more vigorous common action. 

In fact it was because my Government recog- 
nized the hard facts of interdependence among 
the major industrialized powers that it proposed 
the creation of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development. With the coming 
into being of that organization last September — 
and in fact, in the months preceding that event — 
the Atlantic community has acquired an instru- 
ment of incalculable value for the orderly and 
accelerated growth of our economies. And we 
have only begun to exploit tlie potential for 
economic consultation and cooperation available 
through OECD's various committees. 

We are prepared to go as far as any other 
member of the OECD in concerting our economic 
policies and in developing and amplifying tech- 
niques for consultation and coordination. We are 
prepared to consult on any aspect of American 
economic policy, including tlie broad fields of mon- 
etary, fiscal, and trade policy. We are also pre- 
pared to discuss the hannonization of agricultural 
policies, particularly those policies that would 
facilitate the access of efficient farm production to 
world markets and the constructive and imagina- 
tive use of world farm surpluses to serve the vital 
interests of the free world — especially in the devel- 
oping nations. And we recognize that, to be ef- 
fective, consultation must include consideration of 
national policies in the formative state — that is, 
before tlioy have been hardened by official decision. 

In approaching the harmonization of our eco- 
nomic policies we are, of course, committed to the 
development and preservation of competition and 
the avoidance of restrictive arrangements. 

Tlie adoption of anticartel rules and procedures 
by the European Economic Coinniunity luis seemed 
to us, by setting a course parallel to our own, to 
enhance the possibilities of cooperation. As a 
nation with a long antimonopoly tradition and 



670 



Department of State Bulletin 



with a continiiine; allegiance to the market mech- 
anism as an economic regulator, we welcome this 
step. For in undertaking to extend the depth and 
broaden the area of cooperation, we must, in loy- 
alty to our own traditions, reject any idea of trans- 
atlantic cartelization — and for that matter seek to 
avoid arrangements that might interfere with the 
free movement of capital or with the freedom of 
choice of entrepreneurs' investment decisions. 

Perspective on Recent U.S. Tariff Actions 

The course of liberal trade is not always smooth. 
Within the past fortnight the President of the 
United States felt compelled to approve recom- 
mendations to raise import duties on certain kinds 
of carpets and on flat glass.'' These recommenda- 
tions were based on findings of the Tariff Com- 
mission, made following public hearings open to 
all interested parties. This action has excited 
comment in Europe, and questions have been raised 
about its longrun implications for United States 
trade policy. Let me tell you precisely what 
those implications are. 

At the present moment, and until a new law is 
enacted, the President's powers to change United 
States tariffs are based upon the existing Trade 
Agreements Act. The philosophy and approach 
of that act are clear : "Wlien an American industry 
is suffering from serious injury that can be attrib- 
uted to imports, the law provides for the restora- 
tion of import, restrictions. Under that law the 
President raised the tariffs on carpets and glass. 

This was the only form of relief which the Pres- 
ident could provide under existing law. That 
will no longer be the case if Congress enacts the 
proposed Trade Expansion Act. That act pro- 
vides a different approach to the problems of ad- 
justment created by imports. Eeflecting the 
experience of the EEC itself, the act proposes to 
rely upon domestic adjustments as the first re- 
sponse to such i^roblems. Industries finding difH- 
culties in adjusting to lower tariffs will be given 
various types of financial and tax aid to enable 
them to shift to new lines of production ; workers 
will be helped through retraining and by other 
means. Import restrictions may be resorted to 
only as an exceptional procedure and then only 
for a limited period. 

But even apart from the proposed change in 



* For background, see il)id., Apr. 16, 1962, p. 649. 



U.S. escape-clause policy, the recent tariff actions 
assume smaller dimensions if put in proper per- 
spective. In all the years in which escape clauses 
have been the prescribed mechanism the President 
has found it necessary to apply such clauses only 
to 17 cases. This has been a creditable record. 
Few other countries of the world have exercised 
such restraint; in fact some of the nations — al- 
though not all — that have expressed the strongest 
views with respect to the President's recent action 
have on past occasions seen fit to restore protec- 
tion to many domestic industries. Some have 
done this by availing themselves of procedures un- 
der article XXVIII of the GATT, raising hun- 
dreds of their tariff rates in the process. Others 
have occasionally applied quotas in violation of 
the agreement. Such actions have frequently 
caused severe hardships, especially in other parts 
of the free world, such as Japan. 

But the unportant question for us is not what 
restrictions have been applied in the past: It is 
what policies we are to pursue in the future. The 
proposed trade legislation now before the United 
States Congi-ess embodies the principle that trade 
adjustments, rather than trade restrictions, should 
be the preferred approach to import competition. 
I am confident that in the end this principle will 
be widely adopted in the trading relations between 
nations. 

Equal Sliaring of Burdens Necessary 

Tlie United States has taken it for granted tliat 
the European Economic Community will be out- 
ward-looking, that it will resist the temptation to 
create a trading bloc isolated from the rest of the 
free world. We have assumed also that, with the 
developing strength and unity of Europe, the 
member nations of the European Community will 
feel a growing sense of I'esponsibility for the se- 
curity and well-being of the rest of the free world. 

As the nation with the preponderance of re- 
sources, the United States, since the end of World 
AVar II, has provided an economic defensive 
sliield behind which Europe has been able to de- 
velop. It has provided also a continuing flow of 
capital to the less developed nations of the world 
to assist them to attain rising standards of living 
so essential for stability and independence. 

All of this has not been accomplished without 
exertion and strain. Today our troublesome bal- 
ance-of-payments deficit is proving a dramatic 



April 23, 1962 



671 



measure of the burden the United States is carry- 
ing. The causes of this deficit are unique in his- 
tory. It does not result from the failure of the 
United States to compete in woi'ld markets; our 
annual commercial balance continues to be in sur- 
plus in the amount of several billion dollars. It 
results purely and simply from tlie fact that we 
are carrying an extraordinary burden of effort for 
the defense of the free world and for assistance to 
the less developed nations. 

The United States is not faltering in its com- 
mitments. It will continue to carry its full share 
of the financial and technical weight of the se- 
curity shield for the free world. 

The United States Government has faced its 
balance-of-payments problems with restraint. It 
has rejected proposals for redressing the balance 
either by restrictive measures or by reducing our 
commitments around the world. 

At the same time I need hardly emphasize that 
this persistent deficit is a matter of continuing con- 
cern to my Government. We are not wholly per- 
suaded that Europe, growing continually stronger 
and more unified, has yet fully assumed that share 
of the burden that its growing strength warrants. 

The task before us may be divided into two 
parts. I have already discussed the urgent need 
for a still greater militai-y effort to increase the 
credibility of our deterrent. It hardly needs say- 
ing that the disproportionate share of the com- 
mon defense borne by the United States is one of 
the principal strains upon our payments situation. 
Within the last year, for example, the maintenance 
of our military forces in Europe has resulted in a 
net drain on the United States balance of payments 
in the amount of $1,600 million. 

The second part of the task is the responsibility 
that we in the industrialized nations of the At- 
lantic community owe to that half of the free 
world's population that has not yet achieved a de- 
cent standard of living. This is the responsibility 
to provide tlio flow of financial resources neces- 
sary for those hundreds of millions of human be- 
ings to attain adequate — and eventually self-sus- 
taining — economic development, to respond to the 
imperatives of the "revolution of rising expecta- 
tions." 

Permit me at this point to congratulate the Ger- 
man Government and the German people on the 
deepening awareness they have shown of the mag- 
nitude of this problem. We in the United States 
are confident that, with your growing strength, 



you will continually increase your exertions and 
improve the quality of aid, expanding the volume 
of assistance and shaping the terms on which it 
is provided so as to minimize the burden on the 
balance of payments of the recipient countries. 

One of the problems before us is to coordinate 
and expand our assistance programs. We have 
created an admirable instrument for this purpose 
in the Development Assistance Committee of the 
OECD. If we use this vehicle with vigor and 
determination, we should be able to convert it into 
an institution of notable value to our common 
effort. Work is well under way inside that Com- 
mittee toward the creation of teams for specific 
countries and areas to assist in the coordination, 
expansion, and application of aid in such countries 
and areas. Each team will be composed of repre- 
sentatives of two or more industrialized countries, 
together, when appropriate, with existing inter- 
national financial institutions. They will of 
course work with the consent of, and in close 
cooperation with, the recipient nations. 

Creating a Healthy World Trade Environment 

But direct assistance can perform only part of 
the task. Sooner or later the less developed coun- 
tries must themselves achieve the means to expand 
and sustain economic growth above and beyond 
immediate injections of outside public aid. In 
the long run they can accomplish this only by cre- 
ating an environment congenial to private invest- 
ment and by selling their products to the world 
at reasonably stable prices. 

In the years just ahead the nature of the eco- 
nomic ties between the advanced countries and 
the emerging areas of Asia, Latin America, and 
Africa will undergo a considerable evolution. Two 
patterns are possible: one in which the less de- 
veloped countries attain inci-easing access to the 
markets of all the advanced nations of the world 
as a basis on which to speed their growth, and an- 
other in which the preferential trading habits of 
the old colonial systems are perpetuated in new 
forms. 

The second course leads to a dead end. It tends 
to distort patterns of trade, encourage artificial 
and inefficient production, limit the scope of eco- 
nomic diversification, and perpetuate discrimina- 
tion against other developing countries. More 
than tliat, tlie countries within preferential sys- 
tems — even though tliey may find their special 



672 



Department of State Bulletin 



privileges attractive at the moment — are likely to 
grow restive with any arrangement that, over the 
long term, impedes their freedom of choice. 

If the United States and the EEC together agree 
to open their markets to the primary products of 
less developed countries on a basis of nondiscrimi- 
nation, they can set the direction for an evolu- 
tion:ii"y process, a process that will in the long run 
create a healthy world trading environment in 
which the less developed coimtries can develop 
their production for world markets. Obviously 
this cannot be achieved overnight. The shift to 
nondiscriminatory trade with the less developed 
nations will require transitional arrangements — 
compensatory mechanisms that will ease the ad- 
justment to nondiscriminatory trade for nations 
now dependent upon preferences and assistance in 
the achievement of sound long-term development 
plans. It will require also that the economically 
advanced countries work closely together in order 
to assure that the critical problem of price fluc- 
tuation for primary commodities is squarely faced 
through adequate global arrangements. 

To such efforts the United States is prepared to 
contribute its share. 

Through this course, in the long run, you and 
we should be able to achieve a world environment 
in which the economically advanced countries 
share their responsibilities for assisting the less 
developed in the areas both of aid and trade, recog- 
nizing full well that these are common problems 
of such magnitude that it will require all of the 
resources, skills, and imagination we can muster 
if we are to create stability and strength in the 
free world. 

Decade of Development 

Finally I would like to recall that President 
Kennedy has called for the sixties to be the "dec- 
ade of development" ' — the decade in which the 
economically advanced countries, guided by high 
purpose and sensitive to the sweep of history, play 



a role worthy of their traditions and their 
strength. 

The Atlantic partnership has the means to real- 
ize this goal. We are making progress. We 
must, and we will, increase our effort. And in 
doing so, in sharing the fruits of our own pros- 
perity, we can make this an era that historians 
will note, not for the alarms and bitterness of the 
cold war but as the moment when mankind at last 
foimd the path to freedom from want and fear. 



Post of Deputy Assistant Secretary 
for Atlantic Affairs Established 

Press release 197 dated March 28 

The Department of State announced on March 28 the 
creation of a new post of Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
State for Atlantic Affairs under the jurisdiction of the 
Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs. J. 
Robert Schaetzel, now Special Assistant to the Under 
Secretary of State, will be appointed to this post 

During the past few years the Atlantic nations have 
been moving forward on a broad front to consolidate their 
unity and to create new and closer relationships among 
themselves. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) has continued to grow and develop as the princi- 
pal safeguard for the security of the North Atlantic area. 
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop- 
ment Convention ' came Into force last September, linking 
the countries of Western Europe and North America in 
a new organization to promote growth and prosperity not 
only in the Atlantic area but in the less developed na- 
tions of the free world. The success of the European 
Common Market and its prospective enlargement to in- 
clude other European members creates an opportunity 
for closer partnership between the United States and 
Europe in many fields of common activity, in the Interests 
of the North Atlantic nations and the free world as a 
whole. 

The Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Atlantic 
Affairs will have primary responsibility in the Depart- 
ment for following these developments and working out 
policies to promote the further progress of the Atlantic 
partnership. The Deputy Assistant Secretary will have 
authority over two new offices, one responsible for NATO 
problems and the other for OECD and European integra- 
tion problems. These oflices will be headed by Kussell 
Fessenden and Stanley M. Cleveland. 



° For an address by President Kennedy before the U.N. 
General Assembly on Sept. 25, 1961, see ibid., Oct. 16, 1961, 
p. 619. 



^ For background and text, see BinxETiN of Jan. 2, 
1961, p. 8. 



April 23, 7962 

635258 — 62 3 



673 



A Balance Sheet on Asia 



hy Chester Bowles 



Lenin has been quoted as summing up the Com- 
munist strategy for world conquest in one memo- 
rable sentence: "The road to Paris lies through 
Calcutta and Peking." Scholars assert that Lenin 
never made such a statement. I would reply that 
he should have — and would have, with the assist- 
ance of better speechwriters. For I know of no 
sentence that describes more cogently the tlirust 
of Soviet strategy. 

I have just returned from a 6-week trip ^ during 
which I visited many Asian countries which are 
special objects of Soviet or Chinese attention. My 
assignment from the President was to take a sober 
look at United States relations with these coun- 
tries and to try to assess for him where we stand. 
My journey took me into northeast Africa and 
from one end of Asia to the other — from Ethiopia, 
the Sudan, Egypt, and Iran to Pakistan, Afghan- 
istan, and India, then to Thailand, Cambodia, 
the Philippines, and Japan. 

After visits to these 11 countries I feel on bal- 
ance more assured about the direction and conduct 
of United States foreign policy than at any time 
in the past 10 years. 

This may be explained in part by the differing 
perspective from which we view the world here 
on the other side of the oceans. In Washington 
our desks are loaded with reports of crises and 
new catastrophes, of conflict and confvision. This 
is the stuff of daily news. It is also the stuff of 
daily diplomacy. The quieter and less immedi- 
ately newsworthy events which — haltingly but, I 
believe, with increasing force — may be contribut- 
ing to the development of a more rational world 



' Address made before the National Press Club at AVash- 
inpton, n.C, on Mar. 2.3 (press release 18,3). Mr. Bowles 
is the President's Special Uepresentative and Adviser on 
African, Asian, and Latin American Affairs. 

" For an announcement of Mr. Bowles' trip see Buixetin 
of Feb. 12, 19G2, p. 251. 



are likely to be put aside for weekend reading 
which often does not take place. 

I realize that my reckless suggestion that the 
world is not necessarily coming to an end may be 
interpreted by some as an assurance that all is 
well and that the Communists are about to throw 
in the sponge. I hasten, therefore, to knock on 
wood in the hope that at least I may be spared the 
fate of a friend who published a book called 
Permanent American Prosperity, Its Causes and 
Efects on the very day before the stock market 
collapsed in 1929. 

In a mood of nervous optimism I shall now dis- 
cuss three or four specific situations which I en- 
countered on my trip that may be of particular 
interest and significance and then offer some gen- 
eral impressions of our overall position. 

Visit to Egypt 

Let us first consider Egypt, where I met for 4 
crowded days with President Nasser and some of 
his top economic and political advisers. 

Although I went to Cairo with no expectation 
of achieving miracles of good will, I believe my 
visit helped to eliminate certain misunderetand- 
ings. I came away with some hope that we may 
be entering into a period of calmer, more realistic 
and rational rclationship.s. 

Wo must expect that Egypt will remain a revo- 
lutionary country laboring under the psychologi- 
cal load of past conflicts and frustrations in its 
encounters with the West. Moreover, our rela- 
tions with Egypt will continue to be conditioned 
by our deeply held conviction that Israel's inde- 
pendence and integrity must be preserved. 

Yet there are a number of questions on which 
we see eye to eye. For example, Egypt's leaders 
have come to realize that communism offers no 
solution to Egypt's manifold ]irol)loms. They also 



674 



liepat\meni of State Bulletin 



appear determined to provide a greater measure 
of social justice and economic opportunity for 
Egypt's people. 

If the leaders of the Egyptian Government come 
to see that their role in history will be determined 
not by what tliey say over the radio to the people 
of other Middle Eastern nations but rather by 
what they actually do about the aching poverty 
and miseiy that oppress the people of Egypt, there 
will be opportunities for constructive, peaceful co- 
operation between the American and Egyptian 
Governments. 

In this event tensions may gradually be eased 
throughout the Middle East and energies may in- 
creasingly be diverted from angry conflict to con- 
structive development. 

Developments in South Asia 

In South Asia it is easy to become preoccupied 
by such urgent questions as the dispute over Kash- 
mir or the closing of the Pak-Afghan border. 
However, if our policies are to make sense over 
the longer run, it is important that we not over- 
look some of the less immediately newsworthy 
developments. 

On the positive side, India and Pakistan are 
making extraordinary strides in economic plan- 
ning and development and in extending local 
democracy to the villages. We have placed heavy 
bets on each of these nations, and we were right 
in doing so. India, for instance, has a population 
larger than that of Latin America and Africa 
combined. Her continuing economic and polit- 
ical progress will contribute decisively to world 
stability; her failure would be catastrophic. 

In Iran, with the Shah's support and encourage- 
ment, the government headed by Prime Minister 
[Ali] Amini is pressing reform programs which 
Iran has so long desperately needed in the agi-i- 
cultural, administrative, and economic fields. 

On the negative side of the South Asian ledger, 
however, we find some worrisome developments. 
Afghanistan is one example. 

For several generations this fiercely independent 
nation has successfully maintained its position as 
a buffer state between Russia, the Middle East, 
and South Asia. Today, however, it is being sub- 
jected to Soviet pressures which are novel, well- 
financed, and potentially effective. 

No visible attempt is being made by Soviet rep- 
resentatives to introduce Communist ideology as 



such. Indeed, Afghanistan i*ight now is said to 
have fewer indigenous Communists than any na- 
tion in Asia. Nor is there any effort to stir up 
antagonism against the royal family or the 
Government. 

The Soviets have set out simply and directly 
to persuade both the rulers and the ruled that 
Soviet dams, roads, agricultural methods, and 
technical skills are best adapted to Afghanistan's 
needs and that bountiful Soviet capital and skills 
are theirs for the asking with the usual assurance 
of "no political strings." 

Soviet military advisers are busily training the 
Afghan Army and supplying it with modem 
Soviet equipment. At the same time, some 2,200 
Soviet development technicians are hard at work 
on several dozen projects. For instance, Soviet 
roadbuilders, speaking excellent Farsi, work 
shoulder to shoulder with Afghan labor crews. 
Soviet farm technicians are moving into the 
Afghan countryside to assist in opening addi- 
tional agricultural lands. 

Through these massive assistance efforts and the 
increased flow of trade from across the Oxus, the 
Afghan economy is being increasingly tied to that 
of the Soviet Union. 

No one who knows the present Afghan leaders 
and the courageous Afghan people will seriously 
doubt their deep personal commitment to freedom. 
Generation after generation of Afghans have 
fought, and fought successfully, to protect their 
country against the incursions of the Russians 
from the north and of the British from their old 
imperial base in India. However, this generation 
of Afghans has been persuaded by the sheer mag- 
nitude of their problems that they can somehow 
use massive Soviet aid to modernize their archaic 
land and still remain masters in their own house. 

We should fervently wish them well. At the 
same time we must face the hard fact that 
Afghanistan's continuing role as an independent, 
neutral, buffer state in a critical area is likely to 
depend in large measure on the economic assist- 
ance, political sophistication, and moral support 
of the United States Government. 

Encouraging Events in Cambodia 

In Southeast Asia the all-too-familiar conflicts 
in Laos and Viet-Nam claim a lion's share of the 
headlines and present us with military challenges 
of the most difficult and dangerous sort. Yet 



April 23, T962 



675 



tliere are other less dramatic developments in 
Southeast Asia which are not generally under- 
stood, and some of them, at least, are encouraging. 

In Cambodia, for instance, it is heartening to 
see the powerfid popular support which the Cam- 
bodian Government enjoys throughout the King- 
dom. Widespread ownership of land has helped 
to insulate the Cambodian peasantry against Com- 
munist infiltration or subversion, and there is a 
remarkably close bond between the army and the 
people. 

This latter point is of particular significance. 

Seven years ago the army was disliked and dis- 
trasted by the average Cambodian. Now it is 
welcomed eagerly as it moves into the rural areas 
to clear forests, resettle families on improved 
lands, build roads and schools, dig wells, and even 
teach literacy classes. 

However, Cambodian "nonalinement" in the in- 
ternational field should not lead us to assiune any 
lack of understanding of the threat of Communist 
subversion. Wlien the Geneva agreements ' ended 
the Indochinese war in 1954, large Viet Minh 
forces were active throughout more than half of 
Cambodia. All of these Communist guerrillas 
were eliminated without outside help. 

Cambodia can teach us and the governments of 
many developing new nations some valuable les- 
sons in the handling of subversion — if we are 
ready to listen. 

U.S. Performance Steadily Improving 

Now I shall briefly offer some general impres- 
sions of what I believe to be our own steadily 
improving performance in this part of the world. 

Everywhere I went I saw evidence, sometimes 
marginal, sometimes totally persuasive, that we 
are beginning to look beyond the crises which we 
face to the forces which are creating those crises. 
Moreover, I believe we are beginning to deal with 
these forces with a tough-minded but sensitive 
realism that is new in the conduct of American 
foreign affairs. 

This realism was strikingly evident at last 
week's Regional Operations Conference at Baguio 
in the Philippines.'' This meeting was the sixth 



' For texts, see American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: 
Basic Documents, vol. I, Department of State publication 
6440, p. 750. 

* For an announcement of the conference, see Bttlletin 
of Mar. 2G, 1902, p. 511. 



in a series of such meetings that have now covered 
all our missions in Africa, Latin America, the 
Middle East, South Asia, and East Asia. It was 
attended by U.S. ambassadors and their principal 
associates from 15 Asian posts, plus key officials 
from Waslmigton representing various Govern- 
ment agencies that deal with foreign affairs. 
These Regional Operations Conferences have had 
thi'ee main objectives : 

1. To confirm beyond question the overall au- 
thority and responsibility of our ambassadors; 

2. To improve the coordination and administra- 
tion abroad of the many instruments of United 
States foreign policy ; and 

3. To review the policies of the present admin- 
istration in depth, not only on a regional basis but 
in all parts of the world. 

As tools of improved management and com- 
mimication, all of these meetings have demon- 
strated their usefulness. At Baguio there was a 
particularly frank attempt to reach a balanced as- 
sessment of past mistakes and successes in Asia 
and our present overall position there. 

In regard to Communist China it was agreed 
that the time has come for more solid thought and 
fewer slogans. Although some may still hope that 
the so-called "China problem" will conveniently 
disappear, thoughtful observers agree that this is 
not in the cards. Consequently there was general 
agreement at Baguio that our approach to Com- 
munist China must look beyond the narrow ques- 
tion of recognition — on which our policies are 
clear — to consider some of the pressures now being 
generated within mainland China, pressures whose 
significance is undeniable but whose results remain 
obscure. 

At present, Peiping-Moscow relations appear to 
be steadily worsening. At the same time mainland 
China is facing an acute food shortage that stems 
not merely from bad weather and mismanagement 
but more fundamentally from a shortage of arable 
land, inadequate fertilizer production, and a popu- 
lation increase of 16 million people annually. 

The political implications are both explosive 
and unjiredictable. 

Will (he Peii)ing government adopt a more ag- 
gressive course in Southeast Asia? Or will it 
gradually move toward a more moderate ap- 
proach? Are we fully prepared for either con- 
tingency ? 



676 



Department of State Bulletin 



These and many other equally hard questions 
occupied the center of our discussions. Although 
no final answers were reached, frank discussion is 
a first essential step. 

In Asia I also saw evidence of a new apprecia- 
tion of the relevance of the American revolution- 
ary tradition to world affairs — not simply as an 
anticolonial force but in its broad economic, social, 
and political implications. I had sensed a similar 
appreciation in earlier trips to Africa and Latin 
America. 

In this context we are beginning to develop a 
more positive idea of what American foreign pol- 
icy is striving to achieve. In today's world it is 
not enough to be against communism; people 
everywhere want to know what we stand for. 

With increasing effectiveness we are beginning 
to tell them. 

Total Diplomacy 

A new generation is now serving our Govern- 
ment which does not look back — as many of the 
older generation do — to a so-called "normal life" 
of quiet isolation. On the contrary, they see in 
bur new global commitments an exciting new 
frontier of human opportunity. 

We are also coming to realize that foreign op- 
erations in today's world call for a total diplomacy 
that reflects all of the dynamic phases of our own 
American society — from our industrial capacity 
and military defense to our educational system and 
our dedication to the rights of the human in- 
dividual. 

American ambassadors can no longer be content 
with wining and dining, reporting, analyzing, and 
cautiously predicting. They must act as adminis- 
trators and coordinators, responsible for the effec- 
tive operation of all U.S. Government activities 
in the countries of their assignment. 

Growing out of these factors is a new under- 
standing in every nation and in every corner of 
every nation of the overriding importance of 
people — what they think, what they fear, what 
they seek. No longer can a wealthy minority in 
a developing country depend on docile peasant 
soldiers to defend its privileges. 

Not even the best equipped, American-trained 
troops can successfully defend their own country 
unless their fellow citizens feel that they have 
something meaningful of their own for which they 
are prepared to give their lives. This is a decisive 



new factor in world affairs and therefore a basic 
new element of power. 

In this respect we are now beginning to encour- 
age the developing nations to create military forces 
capable of effective defense against Communist 
guerrillas ; in the tradition of our own U.S. Army 
Engineers, such forces are also trained in the 
building of roads, dams, bridges, and schools. 
This helps create a working partnership between 
soldiers and citizens. 

We have also become aware of the need for 
flexible, mobile, American military power capable 
of dealing vigorously with the kind of local wars 
which we may be called upon to fight in support 
of independent goverimients. 

In our aid programs, through painful experi- 
ence, we have learned that we cannot impose our 
own system on others, that we cannot effectively 
use our aid to buy friends, and that it is unpro- 
ductive to use economic assistance simply to outbid 
the Communists. We have become aware that 
the true purpose of our assistance is to help devel- 
oping nations exercise their own freedom of 
choice, to decide within their own religions and 
cultures and within the framework of their own 
history what kind of societies will best serve their 
own people. 

We have always Icnown that orderly political 
growth requires material progress. But now we 
are coming to see that the manner in which the 
growth is achieved may be decisive. To what 
extent, for instance, have the people as a whole 
participated in the process of development? To 
what extent has it given them an increasing sense 
of individual justice and dignity ? 

Steady improvement is now clearly evident in 
the effectiveness of our information program and 
in the ways we use our agricultural plenty through 
Food for Peace. And everywhere I heard praise 
for the operations of our new Peace Corps — a new 
and promising concept in people-to-people re- 
lations. 

As a result I believe that most Asians are gradu- 
ally beginning to trust us, to sense that the United 
States is not simply another rich nation out to 
exploit the less fortunate, and to see that the weary 
old colonial issue is no longer in fact relevant. 

As they consider the contradictions of Marxism 
and the internal difficulties and divisions facing 
the Soviet Union and mainland China, Asians are 
also beginning to understand the sterility of the 
Communist doctrine itself. They are even begin- 



AprU 23, 1962 



677 



ning to appreciate the importance of the United 
States military shield, without which there would 
be little opportunity to build the independent 
Asian societies on which they have set their hearts. 
On the basis of these generally hopeful impres- 
sions, I therefore return to Washington with a 
greater sense of confidence than when I left — and 
yet still keenly aware that a naked act of aggres- 
sion or a tragic miscalculation could blow us all 
sky high by sunset. 



The situation in Asia has its mixture of the re- 
assuring and the grim. Yet I believe that the wave 
of the future belongs to free men of many races 
and creeds, working together in a massive effort 
to create some kind of rational world partnership. 

Moreover, I believe that the faint outlines of 
such a partnership are already beginning to show 
themselves and that in the 1960"s — barring a nu- 
clear accident — they may become increasingly 
clear for all to see. 



Strategy of American Foreign Policy 



hy George C. McGhee 

Under Secretary for Political Affairs ^ 



For nearly 15 years the Department of State 
has received — almost every week — a certain num- 
ber of letters that ask us, in effect, why we don't 
"do something about the Communist menace." 
They suggest that we are "too soft" on communism 
and that we must "win the cold war." 

During this same period we have also received 
almost as many letters that seem to suggest that 
the Department isn't doing enough to preserve 
international peace. Sometim&s they say that we 
should "learn to trust other nations," "iron out our 
misunderstandings with Russia," "stop the arms 
race," and eliminate the terrifying threat of nu- 
clear hostilities. 

I believe the people who wrote these letters — as 
well as millions of other Americans — are really 
asking serious and reasonable questions. They 
want to understand the "grand strategy" of Amer- 
ican foreign policy — what our nation is trying to 
do in the world, why we are trying to do it, and 
how we are going about it. And I believe they are 
entitled to an answer. 

This grand strategy isn't really mysterious, but 
it is almost unbelievably complex. It is complex 
because the world is a big place, because we must 



' Address made before the San Francisco Area World 
Trade ABsociatlon, World Trade Club, San Francisco, 
Calif., on Mar. 27 (press release 188 dated Mar. 2C). 



have not one but many diflferent purposes, and be- 
cause we must use many and specialized tools to 
accomplish these purposes. As a result no man 
alive sees the whole picture nor can tell you the 
whole story. My purpose today is to put together 
for you certain parts of the picture that I consider 
vitally important to our survival as free men and 
women in a free and prosperous nation. 

The strategy of American foreign policy today 
is designed to pursue realistically the totality of 
American interests, as these interests have been 
expressed by the American people both directly 
and through their elected representatives. 

The key to the success of our international 
strategy — like all strategy — is the development 
and use of strength. We must not, however, be 
misled by oversimplification of the problem into 
placing our reliance upon any single element of 
strength. Our nation cannot be protected — nor 
our ultimate objectives promoted — by military 
strength alone, nor by economic strength alone, 
nor by moral strength alone. 

The struggle known as the cold war calls for tlie 
effective utilization of all our resources. We can- 
not confine ourselves to one or even a limited range 
of tools or techniques. We must have the strength 
that comes from a mighty military establislunent, 
from a prosperous and dynamic economy, from an 
evolving science and teclinology, from a free and 



678 



Department of State Bulletin 



orderly scx-ietj', from intellectual and spiritual 
growth, and from unity of purpose and action- 
all at the same time. 

Strenfrth, like charity, must begin at home. To- 
day the United States is in almost every sense a 
healthy and powerful nation. However, wo 
learned many years ago that we could not attain 
our national objectives, nor even assure our sur- 
vival, solely through our own strength. Our 
country has only about 6 percent of the world's 
territory and population. We are blessed by an 
abundance of natural resources, but these are not 
adequate to make us militarily or economically 
self-sufficient. 

We have an advanced science and technology, 
but we depend heavily upon the science and tech- 
nology of other friendly nations. It is well for 
Americans to remember that the first atomic bomb 
was produced by combining the knowledge and 
skills of scientists from many nations. 

Even if we could ignore our moral and humani- 
tarian interests in the freedom and well-being of 
other nations, we could not ignore the fact that 
their health and strength are essential to our own 
freedom and well-being. The United States could 
not surv'ive indefinitely as an island fortress in a 
hostile world. For these reasons, as well as others, 
we have cast aside the concept of isolationism. 
There still lingers, however, some of the myth- 
ology of that era to obscure our perception of in- 
ternational issues. 

Survey of World Objectives 

To survey our objectives in the world, we wish, 
as a minimum, for all other nations that are free 
of Sino-Soriet domination to retain their inde- 
pendence. This is true even of nations that have 
political and economic systems markedly different 
from our own — nations that have even expressed 
hostility toward our values and our policies — • 
nations that have little or nothing to contribute at 
the present time to the cause of peace and free- 
dom. Where such a nation's policies and actions 
are uncooperative, of coui-se, our own ability to 
cooperate and assist is limited. 

Nevertheless we recognize the great importance 
of the fact that any nation, so long as it retains 
true independence, retains at the same time a free- 
dom of choice as to its future— a freedom which 
is lost once it has been subjected to Sino-Soviet 
control. It also retains the opportimity for change 



and growth. Moreover, .so long as it remains in- 
dependent, its human and material resources can- 
not be used to augment the power of the Sino- 
So\'iet empire. 

As a maximmn we wish other nations to achieve 
sufficient national and personal freedom, together 
with sufficient strength and sense of common pur- 
pose, that will enable them to make a positive con- 
tribution to our common interests and objectives. 
Obviously there are many intermediate stages be- 
tween our minimum and maximmn goals. At the 
end of World War II there was virtually no free 
nation that could make a significant contribution 
to our most important interests. Our closest and 
strongest friends had been strained or ravaged 
by war and could add little or nothing to our ovm 
political, military, or economic strength. They 
seemed to be liabilities rather than assets. 

Fortunately our nation had the foresight to 
recognize that liabilities could be converted into 
assets and the imagination and courage to imder- 
take this task. We do not fear the strength of 
other free nations, nor do we feel obliged to keep 
them divided. On the contrary, we have worked 
to increase their strength and to encourage their 
efforts at unity. 

In Japan our military occupation did not milk 
the Japanese economy but rather sought to lay 
a foundation for a free and prosperous Japanese 
society. In Western Europe we undertook and 
supported a bold series of measures to build 
strength and unity — the Greek-Turkish aid pro- 
gram, the Marshall plan, the OEEC [Organiza- 
tion for European Economic Cooperation], the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and various 
policies aimed at achieving maximum integration 
among the European nations themselves. We 
made a very substantial investment in Western 
European strength and imity, and this investment 
has paid handsome dividends. 

The nations of Western Europe have, with our 
help, maintained and extended their political and 
social freedom. They have recovered from the 
ravages of war and have achieved imprecedented 
levels of economic prosperity, based essentially 
upon competitive private enterprise. Their large 
colonial empires have almost entirely dis- 
appeared; about 800 million people formerly 
under Western European rule have attained 
statehood. 

However, the virtual elimination of colonialism 
has not diminished Western Europe's overall 



April 23, 1962 



679 



strength and influence; first, because "Western 
Europe still retains close political, economic, and 
cultural ties with many of these new countries; 
and second, because Western Europe has been per- 
mitted to turn its vast energies from the burdens 
of colonialism to its own evolution and develop- 
ment. Meanwhile several of the Western Euro- 
pean nations have developed substantial military 
as well as economic capabilities. 

The nations of the Atlantic community, includ- 
ing the United States, Canada, and the free na- 
tions of Western Europe, now possess about 90 
percent of the free world's industrial and techno- 
logical capacity. They possess virtually all of the 
free world's modern military power. They have 
numerous ties with the nations of Asia, Africa, 
and Latin America. In brief, the Atlantic com- 
munity is the hard core of the strength and vmity 
of the free world as a whole. 

It is important to remember that the "Atlantic 
community" is not a formal organization but is 
rather a concept, a series of institutions and a 
steadily evolving process of cooperation. Fifteen 
nations of the Atlantic community have joined 
together in NATO, a defensive military alliance 
and an instrument of political cooperation. 
Twenty Atlantic nations have also joined together 
in the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development, through which the member 
governments are seeking to coordinate many of 
their economic and fiscal policies and to provide 
more ample and effective assistance to the lesser 
developed regions of the world. 

United States and the Common Market 

Meanwhile we have witnessed and encouraged 
another development of tremendous significance. 
For centuries European statesmen have sought to 
eliminate the frictions and rivalries that have dis- 
sipated Europe's strength and have produced two 
disastrous world wars. Some have dreamed of a 
United States of Europe. Thus far attempts at 
uniting Westei-n Europe by conquest, by political 
federation, and by military integration have 
proved unsuccessful. However, six Western Eu- 
ropean nations have made an unprecedented 
breakthrougli in the field of economic integration. 
Beginning in 1950 with the European Coal and 
Steel Community, these nations have moved for- 
ward to establish a European Atomic Energy 
Community and are now in the process of per- 



fecting a European p]conomic Commiuiity, better 
known as the European Common Market. 

The members of this Common Market have 
pledged themselves to remove by gradual stages 
all artificial barriers to trade and the movement 
of their citizens across national boundaries, with 
the objective of achieving by 1970 an economic 
relationship comparable to that which exists 
among the 50 States of our own country. While 
the ultimate goals of the European Common 
Market have not yet been realized, the process of 
economic integration, in the opinion of most Eu- 
ropean statesmen, has already passed the point of 
no return. Moreover, this process has gone far 
enough to demonstrate conclusively the political 
and economic value of unity. By reducing tariffs 
and other barriers of trade — thus simultaneously 
providing wider markets and the powerful stimu- 
lus of competition — industry, commerce, and agri- 
culture have gained new vitality. 

The sick national economies that we used to 
hear about a few years ago have become healthy 
and vigorous economies. Profits, wages, and liv- 
ing standards have risen. Western Europe is 
competing more effectively in world markets. 
Unemployed workers in certain countries are find- 
ing good jobs in other countries. Finally, the na- 
tions of the Common Market have attained an 
annual rate of economic growth that is approxi- 
mately twice the recent growth rate of the United 
States. 

For the first time in history the United States is 
confronted by an economic entity roughly equiv- 
alent in size and capacity to itself. The Common 
Market is already larger than the United States 
market in terms of population and is potentially 
larger in purchasing power. Last year the United 
Kingdom applied for full membership in the Com- 
mon Market, and other Western European nations 
may follow. These applications for membership 
will involve delicate negotiations, and the outcome 
cannot bo predicted at this time. However, the 
Common Market has already altered world trading 
patterns and has developed (ho capacity to play a 
dynamic role of leadership on the political stage. 
Its maximum potentialities are very great. 

President Kennedy and his advisers are keenly 
awaro of the immense significance and potentiality 
of the expanding Common Market, both in terms 
of our domestic prosperity and in terms of our 
general foreign policy. The members of tlie ex- 
panded Common Market, for example, accoimt for 



680 



Department of State Bulletin 



a major portion of American export trade — al- 
togetlier $0 billion a year — and much of our import 
trade. Existing tariff legislation does not, how- 
ever, give the President sufficient authority to bar- 
gain effectively with the European Common 
Market nor to cope with radically changing trad- 
ing patterns in other parts of the world. There- 
fore the President has asked the Congress for 
new legislation to enlarge and broaden his bar- 
gaining authority and to provide more flexible 
and selective protection for American workers, 
farmers, and businessmen.^ 

I do not want to enter into a detailed discussion 
of the domestic economic advantages of the pro- 
posed trade legislation. There is overwhelming 
evidence that it will be beneficial to the American 
people without inflicting significant injuiy upon 
any segment of the economy. This is not a ques- 
tion of making a sacrifice in order to help our 
European friends but of our whole future as a 
world trading nation. 

We have every reason to anticipate that the 
adoption of this legislation, followed by an effec- 
tive negotiation with the European Common 
Market and other countries, will add to our do- 
mestic prosperity, increase employment, provide 
new opportunities to industrial and agricultural 
producers, help to check inflation, and in the long 
run contribute substantially to the dynamism of 
our whole economic system. 

However, the implications of the President's 
trade proposals go far beyond their domestic eco- 
nomic benefits. These proposals, in fact, represent 
the most important single example of the positive 
elements of our international strategy. They are 
designed to serve as an essential foundation stone 
for a world community of free, prosperous, and 
peaceful nations. 

As I have already pointed out, the expanding 
European Common Market will be a true equal of 
the United States in many important respects. 
This fact is extremely important. Despite the 
close relationships that already exist — institutional 
and otherwise — between North America and West- 
em Europe, there has always been a missing in- 
gredient. While several members of NATO and 
the OECD may properly be described as major 
powers, none has approached the United States 
in terms of wealth, production and consumption, 

^ For text of the President's message to Congress, see 
Buu-ETiN of Feb. 12, 1962, p. 231 ; for a summary of the 
bill (H.R. 9900), see ibid., Feb. 26, 1962, p. 343. 



science and technology, military strength, inter- 
national commitments, etc. Both the United 
States and the other members of the Atlantic 
community have been discomfited by the fact that 
there has been no equality, either in capacities or 
responsibilities. 

If we can negotiate a mutually beneficial trade 
agreement with the Common Market on a broad 
category of goods, permitting expanded and inti- 
mate trading between us, we shall have taken the 
first and perhaps decisive step toward converting 
a relatively loose association of unequals into a 
tightly knit partnership of equals. 

By the same step we shall have increased the 
economic and technological dynamism of both 
partners. We shall have cemented and consoli- 
dated existing institutional relationships which 
might be imperiled if the two great common mar- 
kets of Western Europe and North America should 
make the tragic mistake of becoming economic 
rivals. In brief the adoption of the President's 
trade proposals and their effective implementation 
can vastly increase the strength — and simultane- 
ously tighten the unity — of Western Europe and 
North America by creating a new Atlantic 
partnership. 

Strength and Unity of Free World 

In view of my earlier remarks the direct and 
immediate value of such a partnership should be 
obvious. It can contribute to the security, pros- 
perity, and freedom of both the United States and 
the European Economic Community. But its im- 
plications go much further. A strong and united 
Atlantic partnership can also contribute to the 
strength and unity of the free world as a whole. 

All Amei'icans know that the United States has 
interests and obligations involving many nations 
and regions outside the European Economic Com- 
munity. These include those Western European 
states which cannot or do not choose to join the 
Common Market. They include our northern 
neighbor and partner — Canada — as well as other 
members of the British Commonwealth. They 
include our old and intimate friends and allies in 
the Organization of American States. They in- 
clude Japan, which has become a major center of 
freedom and economic vitality in the Far East, 
and other friends and allies in the Western Pacific. 
Finally, they include the newly emerging and 
lesser developed countries of the world, primarily 
in Asia and Africa. 



April 23, 1962 



681 



The present and prospective members of the 
European Common Market also have worldwide 
interests and responsibilities. The unity provided 
by the Common Market system, enhanced further 
by an economic partnership with the United 
States, will vastly increase the capacity of both 
parties to pursue these interests and meet these 
responsibilities. Neither the United States nor 
any other Atlantic nation wishes to be a member 
of an exclusive "rich man's club." Our ultimate 
purpose is to attain the kind of world community 
contemplated by the United Nations Charter. 
The profound significance of the Atlantic partner- 
ship lies in the fact that the consolidation and 
expansion of its own strength and unity can help 
to impart strength and unity to the remainder of 
the free world. 

To be more specific, we should understand the 
fact that the President's trade proposals provide 
for the maintenance of the most-favored-nation 
principle. This means that the benefits of any 
trading agi-eement reached with the European 
Common Market will be available automatically 
to all other free nations that have made or are 
willing to make comparable trading concessions. 
The Atlantic partnership, therefore, will not be 
an instrmnent of discrimination in trade with 
other areas but instead will be a means of reducing 
and eliminating such discrimination. 

Expanded trade, in turn, will benefit these 
other areas in many ways. In the lesser developed 
I'egions, for example, expanded trade will stimu- 
late investment, provide more stable export mar- 
kets and sources of supply, and thereby permit 
these countries to earn foreign exchange to sup- 
plement that now being received in the form of 
loans and grants. Eventually, of course, these 
earnings are expected to substitute for loans and 
grants as the lesser developed countries advance 
toward the ultimate goal of self-sustaining eco- 
nomic growth. 

Expanded trade will also provide cement for 
the entire community of free nations. In the long 
run the unity we sock cannot be assured by force, 
diplomacy, psychological strategy, or oven inti- 
mate cultural and personal contacts. It must rest 
upon a real identity of interests, and there is prob- 
ably no single common interest that draws coun- 
tries so closely together as a mutually beneficial 
trading relationship. 

We expect expanded trade to be reflected in 
a growth of commerce with the Far East, whicli 



is of particular interest — and rightly 90 — to the 
people of your city and State. Japan, already one 
of our best customers, will, imder conditions of 
freer trade, enhance its growth and hence its de- 
mand for United States imports. The less devel- 
oped countries of the Far East will at the same 
time be moving toward self-sustaining growth and 
higher levels of economic activity and trade with 
this country. 

Increase in trade with the Far East, both in 
imports and exports, will, of course, have a direct 
and major impact on California, its industries, 
its workers, and its farmers. The shipping indus- 
try would benefit directly and importantly from 
the new trade program proposed by the President. 
The port of San Francisco handles about half of 
all California's exports and imports — 2,000,000 
and 3,000,000 tons, respectively, a year. Ex- 
panded trade, particularly with the Far East, 
would give it a tremendous boost. 

Your State's expoils total about $1.8 billion a 
year, second only to New York's. More than one- 
fourth of this total represents exports of agricul- 
tural commodities, another fourth transportation 
equipment, mainly aircraft. Canned foods, petro- 
leum products, construction equipment, and elec- 
trical machinery account for most of the remain- 
der. Some 500 California firms each have annual 
exports totaling more than $25,000, nearly half 
of which use the port of San Francisco. Together 
they employ nearly a half million persons. Food 
and manufactured products shipped from the San 
Francisco Bay area go all over the world — to 
France, "West Germany, the Netherlands, Eng- 
land, Japan, Mexico, Brazil, Colombia, and else- 
where in Latin America. 

Reduced tarilTs on imports and the vast ex- 
pansion of the Nation's export markets envisaged 
by the new trade program would help the San 
Francisco area — indeed, the entire State of Cali- 
fornia — as much as any area of the Nation. 

A Policy of Dynamic Growth 

The Atlantic partnership will increa.se the ca- 
pacity of its members to protect and assist the 
lesser developed regions. Strength begets strength 
:in(l attracts strength. A strong and united At- 
lantic partnership will be able to make available 
to the lesser developed nations more money and 
resources — more technical advice and assistance — 
than ever before, and will also be able to insure 
that all this aid is u.sed more efTectively. A 



682 



Department of Slate Bulletin 



stronger Atlantic partnership will also be able 
to establish a more secure world in which these 
countries will be better protected against aggres- 
sion. 

Its strength should have an impact on the nu- 
mei'ous and persistent crises in various parts of 
the world — Berlin, the Congo, Viet-Nam, Laos, 
etc. Neither we nor our allies can ignore areas of 
weakness nor areas under attack — actual or threat- 
ened — however far these areas may be from the 
centers of our own strength and interests. As 
Secretary Rusk has said, if we ignore the periph- 
ery, the periphery may become the center. 

But let us not, either, focus exclusively upon the 
crisis areas — upon weakness and danger — and 
thereby make the even more serious error of ig- 
noring the center itself : the hard core of Atlantic 
nations which supply most of the aid resources and 
military strength of the free world. We must be 
as quick to seize opportunities in strengthening 
the center as to respond to challenges on the 
periphery. 

The basic strategy of American foreign policy 
is thus not a policy of static defense. It is a 
strategy of dynamic growth. Our task is to use 
all the means available to us to increase the 
strength and unity of other free nations and 
peoples and thus to extend the frontiers of freedom 
itself. 

But the purpose of this strength and unity is 
not just to be able to fight and win a nuclear war, 
nor just to fight a more effective cold war — unless 
the Sino-Soviet bloc chooses to continue this waste- 
ful struggle. Rather our purpose is to offer the 
rulers and peoples of the Communist world power- 
ful incentives to abandon the cold war and to sub- 
stitute genuine peace and cooperation for the 
vague and mysterious "coexistence" they have 
offered. 

We must never close the door to cooperation 
with any nation. "Wliile we cannot be so optimis- 
tic as to assume that the Communist system is 
on the brink of collapse, neither should we be so 
pessimistic as to ignore the possibility of change — 
gradual or sudden — in the structure of the Com- 
munist system or the objectives of its rulers. It 
is our duty to be suspicious and distrustful so long 
as we have evidence to justify distrust, but it is 
also our duty to offer incentives for cooperation 
and to be prepared for all possibilities — the ])ossi- 
bilities of good and evil alike. We must keep our 
hopes high and our powder dry. 

April 23, 1962 



In other words our strategy is to attain and ex- 
tend a combination of strength and unity that will, 
in tlie first instance, render the United States, the 
Atlantic community, and all other free nations 
unassailable, and at the same time make freedom 
and cooperation attractive. Strength is a magnet 
as well as a fortress. In the long run our stick is 
the same as our carrot. 



J. F. Friedkin Named to U.S.-Mexican 
Boundary and Water Commission 

The Department of State announced on April 2 
(press release 217) that Joseph F. Friedkin had 
taken his oath of office on that day as U.S. Com- 
missioner on the International Boundary and 
Water Commission, United States and Mexico. 
He succeeds Col. L. H. Hewitt (U.S. Army, re- 
tired). The new Commissioner, a career employee, 
has been with the U.S. Section of the Commission 
continuously since April 2, 1934, except for mili- 
tai-y service. He became Principal Engineer 
(Supervising) in 1952. 

The International Boundary and Water Com- 
mission, United States and Mexico, consists of a 
U.S. and a Mexican Commissioner, and the treaty 
of 1944 with Mexico stipulates that each must be 
an engineer. Functioning under the policy direc- 
tion of the Department of State and the Mexican 
Ministry of Foreign Relations, the Commission is 
charged by numerous treaties and laws with the 
conduct of an international program for the solu- 
tion of engineering problems along the 1,935-mile 
boundary with Mexico. 

Among its activities the Commission is presently 
entering the construction phase of a second great 
international dam on the Rio Grande. The first, 
Falcon Dam, was completed in 1953 and has al- 
ready more than paid for itself in flood control. 
The Congress authorized the U.S. Section in June 
1960 to proceed with the still-larger structure to be 
known as Amistad Dam. The Commission also 
administers the deliveiy of Colorado River water 
to Mexico under the 1944 treaty and is engaged 
in an intensive study to remedy a salinity problem 
that has arisen with Mexico.^ The Commission is 
in charge of flood control on the lower Rio Grande. 



' For background, see Bulletin of Apr. 16, 1962, p. 650. 

683 



INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES 



U.N. Security Council Rejects Cuban Call for Opinion 
of World Court on OAS Action 



Following are statements made hy Adlai E. 
Stevenson^ U.S. Representative in the Security 
Council, on March 15 and 23, and the text of a 
Cuban draft resolution. 



STATEMENT OF MARCH 15 

U.S. /U.N. press release 3940 

This is the third time this year that United Na- 
tions organs have met in response to a Cuban 
complaint. They are all essentially alike — attacks 
on the United States or the Organization of 
American States. But this time something has 
been added: The objective of the Communists is 
very clear; it is to extend the Soviet veto to all 
regional organizations by way of the Security 
Council. 

Wlien the Cuban government sought to bring its 
last charge before the Security Council a couple 
of weeks ago, just after almost 2 weeks of exami- 
nation of the same charge in the General Assem- 
bly, my Government opposed further discussion 
of the complaint.^ But this time we have not op- 
posed placing the item on our agenda, not, as I 
say, because it differs in its political content but 
because we believe this Council should dispas- 
sionately examine any request that an opinion be 
sought of the International Court of Justice. 

The representative of Cuba [Mario Garcia 
Inchaustegui] regrettably has not approaclied his 
own request for a judicial opinion in a judicial 
manner. Eather, by the tone and substance of 
his speech it is clear that he is again pursuing a 
dispute which his goveniment has created between 

^ On Feb. 27 the Security Council met to con.si(lor a Cu- 
ban complaint asainst the United States (S/r)OSO) and 
decided, by a vole of 4 to 0, witli 7 abstentions (U.S.), 
not to include the item in its asendn ; for U.S. statements 
in the General Assembly on Feb. 14 and 20, see Bulletin 
of Apr. 2, 1962, p. 553. 



it, on the one hand, and all the Kepublics of the 
hemisphere on the other. 

This time the attack is against the Organiza- 
tion of American States. But it is clearly aimed 
at all regional organizations. It is an attempt to 
subject the activities of all regional organizations 
to the Soviet veto in the Security Council. 

Let there be no mistake about the objective of 
this complaint. The Cuban letter is camouflaged 
witli legalisms, but the issue it raises is 100-per- 
cent political. That issue is whether a regional 
organization, one which has cooperated fully with 
the United Nations, has the right to manage its 
own affairs and defend itself against a foreign 
dominated government or whether the Soviet Un- 
ion is to be allowed to paralyze that organization's 
activities through Soviet exercise of its veto power 
in this Council. 

We believe that everyone who recognizes the 
great contributions to the progress of the world 
which regional organizations have made and can 
make, whether it be the Organization of American 
States, the Arab League, or some future regional 
associations of African or Asian states, will join 
in rejecting this threat to the independence and 
vitality of such regional organizations and this 
elfort of tlie Soviet Union to extend its veto over 
their activities. 

This is not the first time the Communist bloc 
has tried to extend the veto to advance its cam- 
paign for world domination. Soviet vetoes in the 
Security Council so impaired its functions and 
effectiveness over the years that it became neces- 
sary to adopt the "Uniting for Peace" resolution ^ 
so that the General Assembly, at least, can act 
with decisiveness and dispatch. Even in the As- 
sembly and its committees we have seen efforts to 
spread the Soviet veto through the concept of 
unanimity. And it was only last fall that we 

" For text, see ihiiL, Nov. 20, 1050, p. S2.3. 



634 



Department of Sfofe Bulletin 



faced a Communist move, stimulated by tlie ef- 
fectiveness of the Secretariat, to impose a troika 
on the office of the Secretary-General, which would 
have subjected the entire Secretariat to the Soviet 
veto. That move was decisively rejected. And 
this new effort to extend the veto to regional or- 
ganizations should be just as decisively rejected. 

"What is it that the Cuban letter^ before us is 
asking the Security Council to do? The letter 
contends that the resolutions ^ adopted by the Or- 
ganization of American States at Pimta del Este 
constitute "aggression against the sovereignty of 
our country and a serious threat to international 
peace and security," that they require the authori- 
zation of the Security Council, under article 53 of 
the charter, on the ground that they constitute 
"enforcement action" within the language of that 
article, and that without such approval they vio- 
late the Charter of the United Nations. 

So that we may not forget what the real issue 
at Punta del Este was and so that we may deter- 
mine whether its decisions did or did not consti- 
tute aggression, violate the charter, or require Se- 
curity Council approval as "enforcement action," 
I must ask your indulgence while I deal with each 
of the Punta del Este resolutions. They are all 
set forth in full in the Final Act of Punta del 
Este, document S/5075, which is before the Se- 
curity Council. 

Communist Offensive in America 

The first resolution relates to the offensive by 
the Communist bloc against the American Re- 
publics. I shall read from paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 
of that resolution, which was adopted by the unan- 
imous vote of all the American Republics (except 
Cuba) : 

1. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American 
Republics . . . declare that the continental unity and the 
democratic institutions of the hemisphere are now In 
danger. 

The Mini.sters have been able to verify that the sub- 
versive offensive of communist governments, their agents 
and the organizations which they control, has increased 
in intensity. The purpose of this offensive is the destruc- 
tion of democratic institutions and the establishment of 
totalitarian dictatorships at the service of extracontinen- 
tal powers. The outstanding facts in this intensified of- 
fensive are the declarations set forth in ofiicial documents 
of the directing bodies of the international communist 



" U.N. doc. S/5086. 

* For background and tests of resolutions, see Bdxletin 
of Feb. 19, 1962, p. 270. 



movement, that one of its principal objectives is the 
establishment of communist regimes in the underdeveloped 
countries and in Latin America; and the existence of 
a Marxist-Leninist government in Cuba which is publicly 
aligned with the doctrine and foreign policy of the com- 
munist powers. 

2. In order to achieve their subversive purposes and 
hide their true intentions, the communist governments 
and their agents exploit the legitimate needs of the less- 
favored sectors of the population and the just national 
aspirations of the various peoples. With the pretext of 
defending popular interests, freedom is suppressed, demo- 
cratic institutions are destroyed, human rights are vio- 
lated and the individual is subjected to materialistic 
wa.vs of life imposed by the dictatorship of a single party. 
Under the slogan "anti-imperialism" they try to establish 
an oppressive. aggres.sive, imperialism, which subordi- 
nates the subjugated nations to the militaristic and ag- 
gressive interests of estracontinental powers. By ma^ 
liciously utilizing the very principles of the Inter-American 
system, they attempt to undermine democratic institu- 
tions and to strengthen and protect political penetration 
and aggression. The .subversive methods of communist 
governments and their agents constitute one of the most 
subtle and dangerous forms of intervention in the internal 
affairs of other countries. 

3. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs alert the peoples 
of the hemisphere to the intensification of the subversive 
offensive of communist governments, their agents, and the 
organizations that they control and to the tactics and 
methods that they employ and also warn them of the 
dangers this situation represents to representative de- 
mocracy, to respect for human rights, and to the self- 
determination of peoples. 

And then the Ministers conclude with a declara- 
tion that : 

The principles of communism are incompatible with 
the principles of the Inter-American system. 

Here, then, is a resolution in which the members 
of the OAS have unanimously alerted the West- 
ern Hemisphere to the dangers of Communist 
aggression in the form of subversion. This reso- 
lution is a statement of policy by the OAS and a 
statement of its great concern about the Commu- 
nist threat to our security. It was to deal with 
just such problems that the OAS was established. 

Does such a resolution constitute aggression or 
contravene the United Nations Charter or require 
Security Council authorization ? Of course it does 
not, and it would be pointless to ask the Interna- 
tional Court of Justice whether it does. 

Establishment of Committee on Security 

The second resolution, adopted 19 to 1 (Cuba), 
with one abstention ( Bolivia) , requested the Coun- 
cil of the Organization of American States to 



April 23, J 962 



685 



maintain vigilance for the purpose of warning 
against acts of aggression, subversion, and other 
dangers to peace and security resulting from the 
continued intervention of Sino-Soviet powers in 
the Western Hemisphere. 

The resolution directed the Council to establish 
a special consultative committee of experts on se- 
curity matters to advise member states tliat may 
request assistance. The resolution also urged 
member states to take steps considered by them 
appropriate for their individual or collective self- 
defense and to cooperate to strengthen their capac- 
ity to counteract threats or acts of aggression, 
subversion, or other dangers to peace and security 
resulting from the continued intervention in the 
Western Hemisphere of Sino-Soviet powers. 

Does such a resolution constitute aggression or 
contravene the United Nations Cliarter or require 
Security Council authorization? Of course it 
does not, and it would be pointless to ask the 
International Court of Justice whether it does. 
Clearly the resolution is an exercise of the inherent 
riglit of nations to prepare for their own self- 
defense, whether individually or collectively. 
And so to prepare was elementai-y prudence in the 
face of the extracontinental Communist threat. 

Resolutions Calling for Free Elections 

The tliird resolution reiterated the foreign min- 
isters' adherence to the principles of self-deter- 
mination and nonintervention and, in a second 
paragraph, urged the governments of the member 
states to organize themselves on the basis of free 
elections that express, without restriction, the will 
of the people. 

The Cuban regime voted against— I repeat, 
against— free elections and voted against — I re- 
peat, against — the resolution itself. Every other 
American Republic voted for that paragraph and 
for the resolution. 

Does such a resolution, calling for free elections 
to express the people's will, contravene the United 
Nations Charter or require Security Council au- 
thorization ? Of course it does not, and it would 
be pointless to ask the International Court of 
.fusticc whether it does. The real problem in the 
Caribbean is disclosed by the fact that tlie Cuban 
regime felt compelled to vote against such a basic 
right, a basic riglit enshrined in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. 

The fourth resolution recommended that gov- 



ernments whose structure or acts are incompatible 
with the effective exercise of representative de- 
mocracy should hold free elections in order to 
guarantee the restoration of a legal order based 
on the authority of the law and respect for the 
rights of the individual. The Cuban regime also 
voted against that resolution, again denying the 
principle of free elections. Eveiy other American 
Republic voted for free elections and for the 
resolution. 

Does such a recommendation constitute aggres- 
sion or contravene the United Nations Charter or 
require Security Coimcil authorization? Of 
course it does not, and there is no reason to ask 
the International Court of Justice whether it 
does. 

Alliance for Progress Resolution 

The fifth resolution, also unanimously adopted 
(except for Cuba) , declared in part : 

1. That the preservation and strengthening of free and 
democratic institutions in the American republics require 
. . . the prompt, accelerated execution of an unprece- 
dented effort to promote their economic and social devel- 
opment for which effort the public and private, domestic 
and foreign financial resources necessary to those objec- 
tives are to be made available, economic and social re- 
forms are to be established, and every nec-essary internal 
effort is to be made in accordance with the provisions of 
the Charter of Punta del Este. 

2. That it is essential to promote energetically and 
vigorously the basic industries of the Latin American 
countries, to liberalize trade in raw materials by the 
elimination of undue restrictions, to seek to avoid violent 
fluctuations in their prices, to encourage the moderniza- 
tion and expansion of services in order ... to increase 
national wealth and to nialie such increased wealth avail- 
able to persons of all economic and social groui>s, and to 
satisfy quiclily, among other aspirations, the needs for 
worli, housing, land, health, and education. 

Does such a resolution — and it is interesting to 
note that this resolution has been thorouglily 
deprecated by Cuba — constitute aggression or con- 
travene the United Nations Charter or require Se- 
curity Council authorization? Of course it does 
not, and it would be pointless to ask the Interna- 
tional Court of Justice whether it does. 

Self-Exclusion of Cuba From American System 

The sixth resolution is entitled "Exclusion of 
the Present Government of Cuba From Participa- 
tion in the Inter-American System." This reso- 
lution is one of those most critical of tlie present 



I 



686 



Department of Stale Bulletin 



government of Cuba, and for this reason it has 
provoked strong Cuban reaction. But this does 
not make the resolution "aggression" or make it 
subject to Security Council approval. 

The resolution refers to the report of the Inter- 
American Peace Committee, which stated : 

3. As regards the intense subversive activity in which 
the countries of the Sino-Soviet bloc are engaged in 
America and the activities of the Cuban Government that 
are pointed out in this report, it is evident that they 
would constitute acts that, within the system for the 
"ix)litical defense" of the hemisphere, have been classed 
as acts of "political aggression" or "aggression of a non- 
military character." Such acts represent attacks upon 
Inter-American peace and security as well as on the sov- 
ereignty and political independence of the American 
states, and therefore a serious violation of fundamental 
principles of the inter-American system, as has been re- 
peatedly and explicitly declared at previous Inter- 
American Conferences and Meetings of Consultation. 

Based on these facts, among others, the resolution 
declared : 

That, as a consequence of repeated acts, the present 
government of Cuba has voluntarily placed itself outside 
the inter-American system. 

The resolution goes on with two operative para- 
graphs, reading as follows : 

1. That adherence by any member of the Organization 
of American States to Marxism-Leninism is incompatible 
with the inter- American system and the alignment of such 
a government with the communist bloc breaks the unity 
and solidarity of the hemisphere. 

2. That the present government of Cuba, which has of- 
ficially identified itself as a Marxist-Leninist government, 
is incompatible with the principles and objectives of the 
inter-American system. 

These two paragraphs were adopted by the 
unanimous vote of the 20 American Kepublics, 
with Cuba alone dissenting. Do these two opera- 
tive paragraphs, expressing the convictions of the 
OAS membership, constitute aggression or contra- 
vene the United Nations Charter or require Se- 
curity Council authorization ? Of course not, and 
it would be pointless to ask the International Court 
of Justice whether they do. They are statements 
of the unanimous views (except, of course, for 
Cuba) of the members of a regional organiza- 
tion — not only fully within its rights but specifi- 
cally within the purposes for which the organiza- 
tion was established. 

There were two further operative paragraphs 
in the resolution : 

3. That this incompatibility excludes the present Gov- 



ernment of Cuba from participation in the inter-American 
system. 

4. That the Coimeil of the Organization of American 
States and the other organs and organizations of the 
inter-American system adopt without delay the measures 
necessary to carry out this resolution. 

As to these two paragraphs, 14 countries, namely 
two-thirds of the membereliip, voted in favor, 1 
(Cuba) against, and 6 abstained. Their absten- 
tions in no way affected the unanimous decision, 
in which all except Cuba joined, that the Castro 
regime and its Communist aggressions are incom- 
patible with the American system of democratic 
freedom. 

Cuba and the U.S.S.R. claim that these para- 
graphs constitute "aggression" and that tliey re- 
quire Security Coimcil approval. Let us look at 
these two contentions. First, do the paragraphs 
constitute aggression against Cuba? The answer 
to that is obvious. To claim such a resolution is 
aggression is to distort the meaning of words be- 
yond all reason. The fact is that it was a de- 
fensive reaction to the Cuban regime's subversive 
activities against the free institutions of the Amer- 
ican Republics. Those aggressive activities were 
the cause of the resolution and are the source of 
present tensions. 

Cuba's Violations of OAS Charter 

Let me review the facts brought out at the 
Pimta del Este conference. It was there clearly 
shown that the Castro regime, with the assistance 
of local Co:nmunist parties, is employing a wide 
variety of techniques and practices to overthrow 
the free democratic institutions of Latin Amer- 
ica. It is bringing hundreds of Latin American 
students, labor leaders, intellectuals, and dissident 
political leaders to Cuba for indoctrination and 
for training, to be sent back to their countries for 
the double purpose of agitating in favor of the 
Castro regime and undermining their own gov- 
ernments. It is fostering the establishment in 
other Latin American countries of so-called "com- 
mittees of solidarity'' with the Cuban revolution 
for the same dual purpose. Cuban diplomatic 
personnel encourage and finance agitation and 
subversion by dissident elements seeking to over- 
throw established government by force. 

The Cuban regime is flooding the hemisphere 
with propaganda and with printed material. The 
recent inauguration of a powerful short-wave 
radio station in Cuba now enables the regime to 



April 23, 1962 



687 



broadcast its propaganda to every corner of the 
hemisphere, and tliese broadcasts have not hesi- 
tated to call for the violent overthrow of estab- 
lished governments. Such appeals have been di- 
rected to Peru, Brazil, Guatemala, and, most 
recently, the Dominican Eepublic. On January 
22, 1962, Radio Habana beamed a broadcast to the 
Dominican Republic calling on the people to "over- 
throw the Council of State"— the very democratic 
Council which is now expressing the will of the 
Dominican people to be free of the last remnants 
of the Trujillo dictatorship. 

The military training of Latin Americans in 
Cuba by the Castro regime and the wide distri- 
bution throughout the hemisphere of the treatise 
on guerrilla warfare by "Che" Guevara, Castro's 
chief lieutenant, are clear evidence that the Castro 
regime will use guerrilla operations as another 
important device for gaining its objectives. The 
large amounts of arms which Castro boasts of 
having obtained from the Communist military 
bloc place him in a position to support such oper- 
ations, and, in fact, we have seen him aiding or 
supporting armed invasions in other Caribbean 
countries, notably Panama and the Dominican Re- 
public. If we are to believe Castro's threats made 
prior to and during the Punta del Este confer- 
ence, there will almost certainly be further 
Cuban-inspired guerrilla operations against its 
Latin American neighbors. 

OAS Calls Cuba Bridgehead of Communism 

What the OAS decided — unanimously — is that 
Cuba today represents a bridgehead of Sino-Soviet 
imperialism in the Western Hemisphere and a 
base for Communist aggression, intervention, agi- 
tation, and subversion against the American Re- 
publics. It is small wonder that the American 
Republics unanimously recognized that this situa- 
tion is a serious threat to their security and the 
ability of their peoples to choose freely their own 
form of government and to pursue freely their 
goals of economic well-being and of social justice. 

In the face of these facts it is absurd to contend 
that the Punta del Este resolution excluding the 
present Cuban regime from the OAS constitutes 
aggression against Cuba when it is the Cuban 
regime's own aggression against the OAS which 
lias caused that exclusion. What the Cuban 
regime has done is to create a condition which 
makes OAS action necessary and then appear be- 
fore this Council to complain of the action made 



necessary by the very condition they themselves 
created. Clearly a regional organization can de- 
termine for itself the conditions of membership. 
If it could not so decide, it would clearly be in- 
capable of its o\\'n defense and therefore have no 
reason for existence. 

Equally clearly such self-exclusion, caused by 
Cuba's aggressive acts against members of the 
OAS, is not "enforcement action" by the OAS 
within the meaning of article 53 of the United 
Nations Charter. Security Council "authoriza- 
tion" cannot be required for regional action — in 
this case exclusion from participation in a re- 
gional organization — as to matters which the 
Council itself cannot possibly act on and which 
are solely within the competence of the organiza- 
tion itself. 

The Organization of American States is. in the 
language of article 52, paragraph 1, of the United 
Nations Charter, a regional agency for the mainte- 
nance of international peace and security. Surely 
the Organization of American States, like any 
other regional agency, is and, as an agency for the 
exercise of the right of collective self-defense, 
must be entitled to determine who should partic- 
ipate in its proceedings without being subject to 
a Soviet veto or any other veto in the Security 
Council. The Council cannot pretend to deter- 
mine what states should and should not partici- 
pate in such a regional agency like the Organiza- 
tion of American States and the Arab League. 

It should be noted that the Cuban government's 
yself-exclusion from the Organization of American 
States was not based on its "social system," as 
Cuba alleges. It was based on that government's 
violations of the OAS Charter, to which Cuba 
had solemnly subscribed. In violation of that 
charter the present Cuban government has con- 
ducted aggressive and subversive activities against, 
its fellow American Republics, and in violation of 
that charter it has suppressed the fundamental 
rights of the individual. 

Surely it is not a violation of the United Na- 
tions Charter to suspend a government for the 
very aggressive activities which the United Na- 
tions Charter is designed to prevent, and surely 
it is not a violation of the United Nations Cliarter 
to suspend a government for suj^prcssing the hu- 
man rights and fundamental freedoms which the 
TTiiited Nations Charter is designed to uphold. 
Nor did the f ramers of tlie United Nations Cliarter 
intend it to protect a government from the con- 



688 



Department of State Bulletin 



sequences of such aggressive activities and such 
violations of liuman rights and fundamental free- 
doms. Tlie OAS is clearly entitled to suspend the 
participation of a government which deliberately 
violates one of the basic principles of membership 
in tlie organization. 

Cuban Reasoning Erroneous 

The reasoning by which the Cuban representa- 
tive has sought to justify his contention that the 
suspension — or, as he put it, expulsion — of the 
Cuban government from the OAS was unlawful 
was this : 

Since the OAS Charter, an international treaty, 
contains no clause expressly authorizing suspen- 
sion or expulsion, such a right of suspension or 
expulsion cannot be implied. He claimed that 
treaties must be interpreted restrictively and that 
the principle of restrictive interpretation of 
treaties in this case prohibited implying a right of 
suspension. 

The Cuban representative is wrong for three 
reasons : 

First, it is for the Organization of American 
States to interpret its own charter. The required 
two-thirds of the membership of the Organization 
of American States has interpreted its charter to 
justify suspension. 

Second, treaties, including the OAS Charter, 
are to be interpreted effectively and not restric- 
tively. It is the cardinal rule of the interpretation 
of treaties that they must be interpreted so as to 
give effect to their essential purposes. Since the 
present Cuban government is doing its best to 
frustrate tlie essential purposes of the OAS 
Charter, effective interpretation of that treaty re- 
quires the exclusion of the Cuban government. 

Third, it is obvious that no regional body can 
be forced to accept or maintain the presence of a 
government which the members of that regional 
body determine to be violating the very terms of 
the charter of that body. In this case all of the 
members of the OAS except Cuba determined that 
the Cuban government is violating the OAS 
Charter, to which Cuba had solemnly subscribed. 
The independence and effectiveness of regional 
agencies would be destroyed by a rule that re- 
quired regional organizations to continue in their 
midst governments that oppose themselves to the 
organizations' principles and violate their 
charters. 



Further Actions at Punta del Este 

To return to the Punta del Este resolutions, the 
next resolution — the seventh — was also iniani- 
mously adopted (except for Cuba). It excluded 
the present Cuban regime from the Inter- Ameri- 
can Defense Board until it should be determined by 
the Council of the Organization of American 
States that membership of the government of 
Cuba is not prejudicial to the work of the Board 
or to the security of the Western Hemisphere. 

Does such a resolution constitute aggression or 
contravene the United Nations Charter or require 
Security Council authorization ? Of course it does 
not, and it would be pointless to ask the Interna- 
tional Court of Justice whether it does. 

The Inter-American Defense Board consists of 
military and naval experts whose function is to 
study and recommend measures for the defense of 
the Western Hemisphere. Surely the American 
Republics are entitled, without subjecting them- 
selves to a Soviet veto, to exclude from such study 
a government which is hostile to the very purposes 
of the Board and which is an acknowledged mem- 
ber of the Conmaunist bloc constituting the very 
threat the American Republics are attempting to 
defend themselves against. 

The eighth resolution, adopted by the vote of 16 
to 1 (Cuba), with 4 abstentions (Chile, Mexico, 
Ecuador, and Brazil), recited the statement by 
the report of the Inter- American Peace Commit- 
tee that the intense subversive activity of the Sino- 
Soviet bloc and the Cuban government in America 
constitutes "a serious violation of fundamental 
principles of the inter- American system," and re- 
solved as follows: 

1. To suspend immediately trade with Cuba in arms 
and implements of war of every kind. 

2. To charge the Council of the Organization of Amer- 
ican States, in accordance with the circumstances and 
with due consideration for the constitutional or legal lim- 
itations of each and every one of the member states, with 
studying the feasibility and desirability of extending the 
suspension of trade to other items, with special attention 
to items of strategic importance. 

3. To authorize the Council of the Organization of 
American States to discontinue, by an affirmative vote of 
two-thirds of its members, the measure or measures 
adopted pursuant to the preceding paragraphs, at such 
time as the Government of Cuba demonstrates its com- 
patibility with the purposes and principles of the 
system. 

Does such a resolution constitute aggression or 



April 23, J 962 



689 



contravene the United Nations Charter or require 
Security Council authorization as an enforcement 
action? Of course it does not, and it would be 
pointless to ask the International Court of Justice 
Avhether it does. In the first place, suspension of 
trade in arms is the very reverse of aggression 
and in this instance is a measure of self-defense 
against aggression. Nor is such suspension an 
"enforcement action" within the meaning of arti- 
cle 53 of the charter. It is a step that any state 
can properly and legally take, individually or col- 
lectively, without authorization from anyone. 

As regards extending the trade suspension to 
other items, the resolution instructs the Organi- 
zation of American States Council to study the 
feasibility and desirability of such an extension, 
with due consideration for the constitutional or 
legal limitations of the member states. Obviously 
no "enforcement action" was involved. 

I now come to the ninth and final resolution, 
adopted by a vote of 19 to 1 (Cuba), with 1 ab- 
stention. This resolution recommended that the 
Statute of the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Eights be revised to broaden and 
strengthen the Commission's attributes and facul- 
ties and permit it effectively to further respect 
for these rights in the Western Hemisphere coun- 
tries. 

Does such a resolution constitute aggression or 
contravene the United Nations Charter or require 
Security Council authorization ? Of course it does 
not, and it would be pointless to ask the Inter- 
national Court of Justice whether it does. 

From this survey of all the Punta del Este reso- 
lutions, three conclusions emerge: First, the only 
aggression involved is the documented aggressive 
activities of the Cuban Communist regime, which 
the countries of Latin America found unani- 
mously at Punta del Este to be directed against 
the free democratic institutions of the American 
Republics; second, nothing remotely resembling 
a violation of the United Nations Charter is in- 
volved; and third, nothing is involved which 
would justify the Council in invoking article 53 
of the United Nations Charter. The responsibil- 
ities of the OAS were satisfied when it reported 
under article 54. 

There is accordingly no question which merits 
submission to the International Court of Justice 
for an advisory opinion. 



Council's Decision in Dominican Case 

Furthermore the issue is one which the Security 
Council has already considered thoroughly and as 
to which it has reached a clear-cut decision. I 
refer, of course, to the discussion in the Council in 
September 1960 ^ as to whether the Council con- 
sidered its authorization to be required, under 
article 53 of the charter, for the action that had 
then been taken by the OAS with respect to the 
Dominican Republic.'* At that time also a Com- 
munist country (the Soviet Union) tried to have 
decisions of the Organization of American States 
subjected to Soviet veto. 

In that case the Organization of American 
States had applied against the Dominican Repub- 
lic measures more far-reaching than those in the 
case now before us. There the members of the 
OAS had severed diplomatic relations with the 
Dominican Republic and had instituted a partial 
interruption of economic relations. 

In that case the Soviet Union, as does the Cas- 
tro regime here, contended that the Organization 
of American States resolutions constituted "en- 
forcement action" under article 53 of the charter 
which had to be authorized by the Security Coun- 
cil and introduced a resolution to that effect. An 
extensive debate took place during which the Se- 
curity Council's authority and responsibilities 
with respect to article 53 were thoroughly dis- 
cussed. The Soviet resolution received no support, 
and the Soviet representative ultimately would not 
even put it to a vote. 

Instead, nine members of the Council supported 
a resolution, sponsored by Argentina, Ecuador, 
and the United States, the purpose of wliich was 
explicitly to limit Security Council action to "not- 
ing," not authorizing or approving or disapprov- 
ing, the OAS action which had been reported to 
the Security Council in accordance, solely, with 
article 54. 

We have, then, a square decision by this Coun- 
cil, after thorough debate, as to the extent of the 
Council's authority under article 53. That deci- 
sion was that measures even more far-reacliing 
than those now before us do not involve "enforce- 
ment action" within tlio meaning of article 53 and 
thei'cforo do not require Security Council author- 
ization. It is even clearer that the milder Punta 



' Ibiil., Oct. 3, I960, p. .'>42. 
" Ibid., Sept. 5, 1960, p. Sri.^. 



690 



Department of Slate Bulletin 



del Este resolutions now before us involve no such 
"enforcement action" and require no Security 
Council authorization. 

I cannot help but refer, in this connection, to 
the blatantly cynical statement by the permanent 
representative of the Soviet Union at the meet- 
ing of the First Committee held on February 27, 
1962, when he said, referring to the interpretation 
of article 53 in the Dominican Republic case (pro- 
visional record, document S/PV.991, page 22) : 

In the first place, in 1960 the question involved action 
against the Dominican Republic. To us there is a differ- 
ence. The Dominican Republic is one matter; Cuba 
another ; Chile another. 

The Soviet Union's political orientation is thus 
against the Dominican Republic in one case and 
in favor of Cuba in another, and it is that political 
orientation which is what determines its interpre- 
tation of the charter. 

We do not believe that the other members of 
this Council look upon the interpretation of the 
charter in a spirit of any such blatant cynicism. 
The Soviet Union's attempt in the Dominican Re- 
public case to have the Security Council authorize 
action of which the Soviets approved was recog- 
nized at the time as a prelude to a later effort 
to employ its veto against the OAS and in defense 
of its base of operations in the Western Hemi- 
sphere — Cuba. 

That effort is precisely what the Coimcil is 
now faced with. 

Insubstantiality of Cuban Demands 

Viewed in the context of the resolutions adopted 
at Punta del Este and the square precedent of the 
Dominican case, the seven questions which the 
Cuban representative advances should be dis- 
missed for lack of substantiality, quite apart from 
the fact that Cuba comes into court, in the com- 
mon law phrase, with unclean hands. 

Moreover, the insubstantiality of the questions 
demonstrates that there is even less reason for the 
Council to consider the Cuban demand that pro- 
visional measures be adopted, under article 40, to 
suspend the implementation of the resolutions of 
Punta del Este. 

The United States Government has repeatedly 
made clear that it favors increased recourse to the 
International Court of Justice. But it does not 
favor use of the Court for cold-war political pur- 



poses foreign to the charter and the Court's stat- 
ute. It is significant, in this connection, that the 
Soviet representative, whose Government is con- 
sistently hostile to the use of the Court for the 
settlement of genuine legal disputes Ijctween states 
and has deprecated the Court's advisory jurisdic- 
tion, should so enthusiastically favor submission 
to the Court of the rhetorical and self-serving 
questions which have been conjured up by the 
Cuban representative. 

It will not do to say that if even one countiy, 
Cuba, believes that an issue concerning this Coun- 
cil's authority is debatable, then that issue might 
well be referred to the Court for an advisory opin- 
ion. Here the very issue of this Council's author- 
ity over OAS decisions has already been decided 
by this Council under circumstances in which 
regional action was more far-reaching than in this 
case. 

There is, therefore, no reason why we should 
reopen that decision. There is even less reason 
why we should again give any consideration to 
the substance of Communist charges of OAS ag- 
gression against Cuba or to the Cuban regime's 
effort to prevent the OAS from reacting to the 
situation which the regime itself created. 

Mr. President and members of the Council, 
what we have here is no legal disjiute. Wliat we 
have is a cold-war political attack by the Soviet 
Union, through the Cuban Communist regime, on 
the Organization of American States. 

Wliat is more, what we have here is an attempt 
to shackle the OAS with the Soviet Union's Se- 
curity Council veto. If that attemj)t were to be 
successful, it would mean the impotence not only 
of the OAS but of all other regional organizations, 
through subjection to the untender mercies of the 
veto. 

We do not believe that the members of this 
Council or, indeed, the members of the General 
Assembly wish to have any regional organization 
fettered by any such subservience. 

STATEMENT OF MARCH 23 

U.S./U.N. press release 3948 

Before we proceed to the vote I should like to 
summarize hurriedly the argiunents of the com- 
plainants wliich we have heard on this item from 
the representatives of Cuba and the Soviet Union 
for an entire week. 



April 23, 1962 



691 



What we have heard is literally daily repetition 
of the identical assertions that were made here on 
the first day and which have been answered by 
almost every other member here present over and 
over again. But each day the representatives of 
Cuba and the Soviet Union disregard what has 
been said the day before and begin anew to sol- 
emnly repeat the same charges. This procedure 
could go on for years. It is what we call in Eng- 
lish the dialog of the deaf; in Spanish, I believe, 
it is el dismirso entre sordos; and I have no doubt 
that there is more than one Russian equivalent 
for endlessly repeating the same thing like a stuck 
phonograph and refusing to hear the answers. 

I submit that it is long past time to bring this 
rhetorical endurance contest to an end, for we have 
heard nothing new since the fii-st day, and before 
we conclude this undistinguished episode in the 
history of this Council I will, as I say, hurriedly 
review only those few arguments wliich relate to 
the letter filed by Cuba. 

The Cuban and Soviet representatives have as- 
serted over and over, with characteristic deafness 
for the facts, that Cuba was excluded from the 
Organization of American States because of its 
social system. The fact is, of course, that Cuba 
was not excluded because of its social system; it 
was excluded because of its violations of the 
Cliarter of the Organization of American States, 
as all the American Republics represented here 
have testified. And as the resolution of Punta del 
Este makes explicitly clear, the fact is that, in 
violation of the Charter of the Organization of 
American States and in pursuit of aims contrary 
to the principles of the American system, the pres- 
ent Cuban government has conducted aggressive 
and subversive activities against other American 
Republics and has suppressed the fundamental 
rights of the individual in Cuba. It was on the 
basis of these violations that the members of the 
Organization of American States at Punta del 
Este decided that Cuba's government — not Cuba 
but its present government — was no longer com- 
patible with the inter- American system. 

Secondly, these same delegations have reiterated 
tliat tlie OAS had no right to exclude Cuba from 
its membership because of these violations of the 
OAS Cliarter. On its face this is absurd. It is 
tlie inherent right of any regional organization to 
determine which countries shall participate and 
which shall not. Yet from what the Soviet rep- 



resentative has been saying this principle applies 
only in those instances whicli fit Soviet political 
motives. Stripped of polemics, what he would 
have us believe is that the Latin American coun- 
tries cannot decide for themselvas with whom they 
wish to associate in tlieir regional organization, 
and such a proposition hardly merits serious 
discussion. 

Integrity of Regional Organizations 

Thirdly, the Soviet Union has attempted to sep- 
arate the Organization of American States from 
other regional organizations, present or future. 
Council members have already drawn attention 
to this distortion in their statements. Tlie prob- 
lem we face here today — that is, the problem of 
extending the Soviet veto over decisions of re- 
gional organizations — is not in any sense limited j 
to the Organization of American States. It ap- \ 
plies equally to any regional organization. The 
Soviet position, in sliort, is an assault on the whole 
system of regional organizations, and if it is suc- 
cessful it would nullify a fundamental provision 
of the Cliarter of the United Nations. 

Two days ago the Council heard the penetrating 
analysis and defense of the regional organization 
system by the representative of Ireland. He said 
that regional organizations as such have long 
since proved their usefulness and daily were grow- 
ing in importance and in vigor. He expected that 
before too long there might be a regional organiza- 
tion in Africa. And this was not surprising. 
Mr. [Frederick H.] Poland intimated, since with 
a growing United Nations it must be anticipated 
that much of the worlv within a region would have 
to be undertaken by the region itself, this would 
perforce lead to the establisliment of an increasing 
number of regional organizations in the days 
ahead. The Council, Mr. Poland said, should 
therefore be careful to avoid reaching any con- 
clusions which might appear to undervalue or to 
challenge the principle of regional organizations. 

We submit that it is this vei-y independence and 
this very integrity of a regional organization 
wliich the Soviet Union is continually trying to 
destroy by subjugating the decisions of regional 
organizations to the Security Council and, there- 
fore, Soviet approval. The list of I'hetorical ques- 
tions contained in the Cuban draft resolution 
(S/5095) would seem to prove this conclusively. 



692 



Department of State Bulletin 



No "Enforcement Action" Involved 

Finally, the Soviet representative has accused 
us of trying to force acceptance of our interpreta- 
tion of the words "enforcement action" in article 
53 upon the members of this Council. This is sim- 
ply not true. We are not trying to force anything, 
nor are we attempting to define these words in a 
way which the Security Coimcil has not already 
accepted. We have cited repeatedly here the Do- 
minican case. It was referred to by the repre- 
sentative of Ghana, who cited statements by 
Coimcil members to support his feeling that the 
issue may not have been clearly met at that time. 
The fact is, however, that the Council did decide 
in the Dominican case that no enforcement action 
was involved. 

The whole purpose of the Soviet Union in 
bringing the case before the Council was to insist 
that Security Council approval under article 53 
was required. The entire debate revolved around 
whether the resolution of the Organization of 
American States in the Dominican case did or did 
not constitute enforcement action under the terms 
of article 53. If it was enforcement action, the 
Security Council was required — not authorized, 
but required — to give its approval or disapproval 
under article 53. The fact that it refused to act 
under article 53 is conclusive. The Soviet con- 
tention had so little support that the Soviet Union 
declined even to put its draft resolution to the 
vote at that time. A counterresolution presented 
by Argentina, Ecuador, and the United States, 
which explicitly did not come under article 53, 
was adopted by the Council. It may not have de- 
fined what enforcement action under article 53 
was, but it most definitely did decide that action 
of the sort embraced in the Dominican case was 
not subject to article 53. 

For these reasons, we hope that the Council will 
dispose of the draft resolution before us by rejec- 
tion, and in so doing the Council will again be 
making an important contribution toward the 
preservation and the integrity and the independ- 
ence of regional organizations of the United 
Nations. 

I am very happy to waive translation Ln order 
to save time and, I hope, the patience of members. 

[In a later Intervention Ambassador Stevenson said :] 

I understand that both the representatives of 
the Soviet Union and of Cuba, who have sponsored 



this resolution, now propose to withdraw it. I 
must object most emphatically to any attempt to 
avoid a vote on this resolution as a whole. 

The rule is very clear. Rule 35 says that a 
motion or draft resolution can at any time be 
withdrawn so long as no vote has been taken with 
respect to it. A vote has been taken with respect 
to it. Therefore the resolution can no longer be 
withdrawn, and I move that it be put to a vote, 
as a whole, forthwith.'' 



TEXT OF DRAFT RESOLUTION s 

The Security Council, 

In accordance with Article 0C(1) of the Charter, 
Decides to request the International Court of Justice 
to give an advisory opinion on the following questions : 

1. Is the Organization of American States, under the 
terms of its Charter, a regional agency within the mean- 
ing of Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter and 
do its activities have to be compatible with the Purposes 
and Principles of the United Nations? 

2. Under the United Nations Charter, does the Organi- 
zation of American States have the right as a regional 
agency to take the enforcement action provided in Article 
53 of the United Nations Charter without the authoriza- 
tion of the Security Council? 

3. Can the expression "enforcement action" in Article 53 
of the United Nations Charter be considered to include 
the measures provided for in Article 41 of the United 
Nations Charter? Is the list of these measures in Article 
41 exhaustive? 

4. Does the Charter of the Organization of American 
States provide for any procedure for expelling a State 
member of the Organization, in particular because of its 
social system? 

5. Can the provisions of the Charter of the Organiza- 
tion of American States and the Inter-American Treaty 
of Reciprocal Assistance be considered to take precedence 
over the obligations of Member States under the United 
Nations Charter? 

6. Is one of the main principles of the United Nations 
Charter that membership in the United Nations is open to 



'A ruling by the President of the Council concerning 
the application of rule 35 of the rules of procedure was 
upheld on Mar. 23 by a vote of 7 (Chile, China, France, 
Ireland, U.K., U.S., Venezuela) to 2 (Rumania, U.S.S.R.), 
with 2 abstentions (Ghana, U.A.R.). 

°U.N. doc. S/5095. On Mar. 23 the Security Council 
voted first on operative paragraph 3, which it rejected 
by a vote of 4 (Ghana, Rumania, U.S.S.R., U.A.R.) to 7 
(Chile, China, France, Ireland, U.K., U.S., Venezuela). 
The remainder of the draft resolution was then put to the 
vote and rejected by 2 votes in favor (Rumania, U.S.S.R.), 
7 against, with 1 abstention (U.A.R.) ; Ghana did not 
participate. 



April 23, 1962 



693 



states which meet the requirements of Article 4 of the 
Charter, irrespective of their system? 

7. In the light of the replies to the foregoing questions 
are, or are not, the resolutions adopted at Punta del Este 
at the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of American Minis- 
ters of Foreign Affairs relating to the expulsion of a 
State member of the regional agency because of its social 
system and the taking of other enforcement action against 
it, without the authorization of the Security Council, 
consistent with the provisions of the United Nations 
Charter, the Charter of the Organization of American 
States and the Treaty of Rio? 

Also decides to request the International Court of Jus- 
tice to give priority to the consideration of this matter. 



International Cooperation 
in Synoptic Meteorology 

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT 

The Department of State announced on 
March 23 (press release 185) that more than 100 
weathermen from all over the world would gather 
at the Department of State on March 26 for the 
third session of the Commission for Synoptic 
Meteorology of the World Meteorological Organ- 
ization (WMO). 

Technical experts from more than 100 nations 
are expected to attend the 2G-day session, where 
weather observations, codes, communications, and 
methods of forecasting will be considered. The 
Commission will have before it reports from its 
various working groups on code problems, obser- 
vational networks, telecommunications, pressure 
reduction methods, and the use of data received 
from weather satellites. 

The international exchange of weather infor- 
mation fostered by the WMO and its technical 
commissions makes it possible to prei)are weather 
maps covering an entire hemisphere twice each 
day. The basic ingredients for these maps are 
the individual observations taken at weather sta- 
tions throughout the entire world. 

Edward M. Vernon, Chief of the Weather Bu- 
reau's Forecast and Synoptic Reports Division, 
will head the U.S. delegation at tlie session and 
will be assisted by the following six experts in the 
field of synoptic meteorology : 

Delegates 

Santoro R. Rarbagallo, Woathcr Bureau, Dciiarlincnt of 
Commerce 



Charles G. Reeves, Weather Bureau, Department of 

Commerce 
Leonard W. Snellman, Air Weather Service, Department 

of the Air Force 

Advisers 

W. R. Franklin, Captain, USN, Navy Weather Service, 

Department of the Navy 
W. C. Huyler, Air Weather Service, Department of the 

Air Force 
George G. Sink, Federal Aviation Agency 

REMARKS BY HARLAN CLEVELAND > 

Mr. President, distinguished delegates to the 
third session of the Commission for Synoptic Me- 
teorology of the World Meteorological Organiza- 
tion: The long name of this meeting puts me in 
mind of that speaker at a high school graduation 
ceremony who chose to use the letters in the name 
of his college — Yale — as an acrostic. He spoke 
for 15 minutes on "Youth," for 20 minutes on 
"Ambition," for 25 minutes on "Loyalty." Just 
as he was ready to start on "Energy" a loud stage 
whisper floated across the hall: "Thank God he 
didn't go to the Massachusetts Institute of Tech- 
nology !" My remarks will be brief — or should I 
say synoptic? 

It is a great pleasure to welcome you to Wash- 
ington and to this meeting. Although it is well 
known that the first meeting of your organization 
was held here in Washington in 1953, it is not so 
well known that the first international conference 
in which the United States officially participated 
was the meteorological conference of 1853 in 
Brussels. 

There was a maritime conference to devise a 
uniform system of meteorological obsei-vations at 
sea. In 14 sessions the conference succeeded in 
achieving the objectives for which it had been con- 
vened. The members agreed on recommendations 
concerning instruments to be used in making me- 
teorological observations. They adopted a form 
for an abstract log and directions for its use in 
recording weather data. They suggested that a 
set of standard instruments be used by each gov- 
ernment and that instructions in their use be ex- 
changed with every other government to promote 



' Made at the opening meeting of the third session of 
the Commission for Synoi)tic Moteoroh>g>- of the World 
Meteorological Organization at Washington, D.C., on 
M.Tr. 26 (press release 1!)2). Mr. Cleveland is Assistant 
Secretary of State for luternationnl Organization Affairs. 



694 



Department of State Bulletin 



accuracy in comparing the recorded weather data. 

Does it sound familiar? 

Representatives of 10 nations attended the Brus- 
sels meeting in 1853 : Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Great Britain, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 
Russia, Sweden, and the United States. I am 
glad these same nations — and many more — are 
represented here today. The fact that men of dif- 
ferent backgrounds and nationalities have been 
woi'king together successfully for more than 100 
years is not just an example of sentimental fact; 
it is also a very practical demonstration of a basic 
reason for international cooperation: a real and 
recognized need on the part of many nations, a 
need which cannot be met except through such 
cooperation. 

In the area of weather prediction and control we 
see an outstanding example of how the self- 
interests of many sovereign nations join together 
in one large mutual interest. Such mutual interest 
led to mutual action 100 years ago and to mutual 
benefits ever since. And these mutualities are the 
only lasting basis for partnerships of any kind— 
whether among men, organized groups, or nations. 

It is encouraging to me that cooperation is pos- 
sible — in your case actual — among nations whose 
structure of government and economies seem to be 
so different. Differences do not have to mean con- 
flicts, nor do they have to mean insidious compari- 
sons of "good" and "evil" — of "better" or "worse." 
Among men of reason, differences of opinion and 
belief can exist in peace. If the differences need 
to be resolved, such resolution is on the basis of 
facts — greater knowledge and deeper understand- 
ing. President Kennedy said last week,^ ". . . 
knowledge, not hate, is the passkey to the fu- 
ture. . . ." He added, "As men conduct the pui-suit 
of knowledge, they create a world which freely 
unites national diversity and international 
partnership." 

Maybe these prospects come as less of a surprise 
to you who have devoted your lives to science. It 
often seems easier for men to work together to 
understand, to live with, and to control the forces 
of their external environment than to put the same 
amount of time and energy into study and under- 
standing of the mysterious forces inside their 
minds and hearts and souls. 

Still, international cooperation in many areas is 



- Bulletin of Apr. 16, 1962, p. 615. 



an actual and continuing fact. In the field of 
meteorology it has progi-essed in one century from 
sea to land, to air, and now to outer space. And 
from observation, collection, and analysis of data 
to hemispheric predictions and even efforts at 
weather modification and control. 

Despite the existence of weather reporting satel- 
lites, and the prospect of more as the result of 
greater cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer 
space, there remain great gaps in the data from 
which you work. The difficulties of making con- 
tinuous observations in remote areas of the earth's 
surface have resulted in incomplete coverage. 

Today, however, two separate developments may 
help solve this problem : first, the development of 
an unmanned weather station powered by nuclear 
wastes ; second, the development of communication 
satellites. 

The United States has developed such an un- 
manned weather station. It is powered by a de- 
rivative of strontium 90 — strontium 90 with its 
fangs removed. With the cooperation of the Gov- 
ernment of Canada this station has been installed 
on an island in the Arctic and is sending in reports. 

Such unmanned weather stations, collecting 
raw data from many areas not presently covered, 
could make a major difference in weather predic- 
tion. Signals could be bounced off communica- 
tion satellites. 

Thus through a scientific marriage of conven- 
ience great progress can be expected, peaceful 
progress for the benefit of all mankind. 

We have come a long way since that first con- 
ference in Brussels. No one can predict — not even 
such gifted predictors as yourselves — how far we 
have to go. Only one thing is certain : The prog- 
ress in science must be matched by progress in 
building international institutions. There is no 
shelter from the social fallout of science. 



United States Delegations 
to International Conferences 

UNESCO Conference on Education in Asia 

The Department of State announced on 
March 29 (press release 201) that a five-man 
American observer delegation will attend a meet- 
ing of ministers of education of Asian countries at 
Tokyo April 2-11 under the auspices of the United 



April 23, 1962 



695 



Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) and the U.N. Economic 
Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE). 
The American delegates are : 

Charles B. Fahs, chairman, U.S. Information Service, 

Tokyo 
Robert H. B. Wade, vice chairman, Special As.sistant, 

Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs, Department 

of State 
James H. Faulhaber, Office of Financial Support, Agency 

for International Development 
Joseph B. Jarvis, Special Assistant to the Commissioner 

of Education, Department of Health, Education, and 

Welfare 
William A. Wolfifer, OflBce of Technical Support, Agency 

for International Development 

The Tolvyo meeting will examine overall educa- 
tion planning in Asia and review country-by- 
country progress made to implement the so-called 
Karachi Plan. This plan, adopted in 1960 by 17 
Asian member states of UNESCO, called on their 
governments to attain free and compulsory pri- 
mary education by 1980. UNESCO endorsed the 
plan at its 11th General Conference in 1960. 



Current U.N. Documents: 
A Selected Bibliography 

Mimeographed or processed documents {such as those 
listed beloic) may be consulted at depository libraries in 
the United States. U.N. printed publications may be 
purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, 
United Nations Plaza, N.Y. 

Security Council 

Reports of the officer-in-charge of the U.N. Operation in 
the Congo. S/.5053, January 9, 1962, 5 pp.; Add. 1, 
January 20, 1962, 19 pp. ; Add. 2, January 23, 1962, 4 
pp.; Add. 3, January 29, 1962, 10 pp.; Add. 4, Jan- 
uary 30, 1962, 2 pp. ; Add. 5 and Corr. 1, January 30, 
1962, 3 pp. ; Add. 6 and Corr. 1, February 3, 1962, 4 pp. ; 
Add. 7, February 12, 1962, 3 pp. ; Add. 8, Fel)ruary 19, 
1962, 14 pp. ; Add. 9 and Corr. 1, March 9, 1962, 9 pp. 

Letter dated January 9, 1962, from the Portuguese repre- 
sentative addressed to the President of the Security 
Council concerning border-violation charges by Senegal. 
S/5055. January 10, 1962. 2 pp. 

General Assembly 

Letter dated J:uiuary 27, 1962, from the Portuguese repre- 
sentative addres.sed to the President of the General 
Assembly concerning the situation in Angola. A/uOS". 
January 27, 1962. 14 pp. 

Information from non-self-governing territories (sum- 
maries of information transmitted under article 73e of 
the U.N. Charter) : African and adjacent territories, 
A/r.078, January 31, 1962, 196 pp.; A/5078/Add. 1, 
March 2(», 1962, 42 pp. Asian territories, A/r)079, 
February 8, 1962, 132 pp.; A/.W79/Add. 1, March 22, 
1962, 5 pp. 



TREATY INFORMATION 



Accession of Cambodia, Israel, 
and Portugal to GATT 

Press release 229 dated April 6 

Protocols for the accession of Cambodia, Israel, 
and Portugal to the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) were opened for signature 
on April 6, 1962. Tariff negotiations required 
imder GATT accession procedures were carried 
out by each of the three Governments during the 
1960-61 GATT tariff conference at Geneva. 
Their accession will bring the total number of 
GATT contracting parties to 43. 

The accessions of Israel and Portugal become 
effective 30 days after tlieir respective acceptances. 
Cambodia's accession may also come into effect 
on the same basis, or at a later date, depending 
upon the Contracting Parties' approval of a de- 
cision on Cambodian accession now before them 
for balloting. Decisions agreeing to the accession 
of Israel and Portugal were taken by the Contract- 
ing Parties on December 8, 1961. 

Special provisions in the Portuguese protocol 
of accession recognize the present regime of pref- 
erential customs regulations for Portuguese cus- 
toms territories as an arrangement leading toward 
the formation of a free-trade area to be attained 
no later than 1974. Accordingly the protocol does 
not require that the existing preferences be elimi- 
nated. 

Israel had provisionally acceded to the GATT 
at the time it began tariff negotiations for acces- 
sion, while Portugal and Cambodia have partici- 
pated in the work of the GATT since June 4, 1900, 
and November 17, 1958, respectively. 

U.S. Agrees to International 
Inspection of Four Atomic Reactors 

Tlie Department of State announced on March 
30 (]iress release 208) the signing of an agree- 
ment ' on tliat date between the United States and 



'For text, .see Department of State press release 208 
dated Mar. 30. 



696 



Department of State Bulletin 



the International Atomic Energy Agency under 
wliich the effectiveness of a system of safeguards 
against the misuse of atomic reactors designed for 
research and development purposes will be put to 
the test. 

The agreement allows access by IAEA inspec- 
tors to four U.S. atomic reactors whose design and 
operation are compatible with safeguard proce- 
dures agreed upon by the International Agency. 
These safeguards, which provide for reports and 
inspections, have been developed by the IAEA 
to assure that nuclear assistance made available 
through the Agency is not used to further any 
military purpose. 

The agreement will test the workability of such 
safeguards and will provide a field laboratory in 
which the methods and tecluiiques of inspection 
can be tested. 

Sigvard Eklund, Director General of the IAEA, 
signed the agreement on behalf of the Agency. 
Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary of State for 
International Organization Affairs, signed for the 
United States. The signing ceremony took place 
at the Department of State. 

The following four reactors have been placed 
under the agreement for a period of 1 to 2 years: 
the Brookhaven Graphite Research Reactor, 
Brookhaven National Laboratoiy, Upton, N.Y. ; 
the Medical Research Reactor, Brookhaven Na- 
tional Laboratory ; the Experimental Boiling Wa- 
ter Reactor, Argonne National Laboratory, Le- 
mont. 111.; and the Piqua Organic Cooled and 
Moderated Power Reactor, Piqua, Ohio. 

The agreement enters into effect on June 1, 1962. 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Health 

Constitution of the World Health Organization, as 
amended. Opened for signature at New Yorlc July 22, 
1946. Entered into force April 7, 1948 ; for the United 
States June 21, 1948. TIAS 1808 and 4643. 
Acceptance deposited: Tanganyika, March 1.5, 1962. 

Rice 

Amended constitution of the International Rice Commis- 
sion, and rules of procedure, as amended. Approved 
l)y the seventh session of the Food and Agriculture Con- 
ference. Rome. December 10, 19r).3. Entered into force 
December 10, 1953. TIAS 3016 and 4110. 
Acceptances deposited: Nigeria, November 13, 1961; 
Venezuela, November 27, 1961. 



Shipping 

Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consulta- 
tive Organization. Signed at Geneva March 6, 1948. 
Entered into force March 17, 1958. TIAS 4044. 
Acceptance deposited: Nigeria, March 15, 1962. 

Weather 

Convention of the World Meteorological Organization. 
Done at AVashington October 11, 1947. Entered into 
force March 23, 1950. TIAS 2052. 
Accession deposited: Sierra Leone, March 30, 1962. 



BILATERAL 



Bolivia 

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agree- 
ment of February 12, 1962. Effected by exchange of 
notes at La Paz March 27, 1962. Entered into force 
March 27, 1962. 

Dominican Republic 

Military assistance agreement. Signed at Santo Domingo 
March 8, 1962. Enters into force upon receipt by the 
United States of notification of ratification in con- 
formity with the constitutional procedures of the Do- 
minican Republic. 

El Salvador 

General agreement for economic, technical, and related 
assistance. Signed at San Salvador December 19, 1961. 
Entered, into force: January 16, 1962. 
Agreement relating to grants for the training of Salva- 
doran citizens in various economic, social, and tech- 
nical fields. Effected by exchange of notes at San Sal- 
vador April 18, 1951. TIAS 2251. 

Terminated: January 16, 1962 (superseded by agree- 
ment of December 19, 1961, supra ) . 
Agreement relating to assurances required by the Mutual 
Security Act of 1951. Effected by exchange of notes 
at San Salvador December 11, 1951, and January 7, 
1952. TIAS 2631. 

Terminated: January 16, 1962 (superseded by agree- 
ment of December 19, 1961, supra ) . 
General agreement for technical cooperation. Signed at 
San Salvador April 4, 1952. TIAS 2527. 
Terminated: January 16. 1962 (superseded by agree- 
ment of December 19, 1961, supra). 

Greece 

Amendment to the agreement of August 4, 1955, for co- 
operation concerning civil uses of atomic energy, as 
amended (TIAS 3310 and 4837). Signed at Washing- 
ton April 3, 1962. Enters into force on the date on 
which each Government shall have received from the 
other written notification that it has complied with all 
statutory and constitutional requirements. 

International Atomic Energy Agency 

Agreement for the application of agency safeguards to 
four U.S. reactor facilities, with annexes. Signed at 
Washington March 30, 1962. Enters into force June 
1, 1962. 

Japan 

Understanding relating to export of typewriter-ribbon 
cloth from Japan to the United States. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Toljyo March 23, 1962. Entered 
into force March 23, 1962. 

Liberia 

Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace Corps 
program in Liberia. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Monrovia March 5 and 8, 1962. Entered into force 
March 8, 1962. 



April 23, 7962 



697 



Panama 

General agreement for technical and economic coopera- 
tion. Signed at Panamd December H, 1961. 
Entered into force: March 5, 1962. 

General agreement for technical cooperation, as amended. 
Signed at Panama December 30, 1950. Entered into 
force December 30, 1950. TIAS 2167 aiid 2644. 
Terminated: March 5, 1962 (superseded by agreement of 
December 11, 1961, supra). 

Peru 

Agricultural commodities agreement under title IV of the 
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 
1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 73 Stat. 610; 7 U.S.C. 
1731-1736), with exchange of notes. Signetl at Lima 
March 20, 1962. Entered into force March 20, 1962. 

United Arab Republic 

Agreement amending the rate of exchange ai)plieable to 
deiwsits under the agricultural commodities agreement 
of September 2, 1961 (TIAS 4844). Effected by ex- 
change of notes at Cairo March 28, 1962. Entered into 
force March 28, 1962. 



DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE 



Confirmations 

The Senate on March 29 confirmed the following 
nominations : 

Walter L. Lingle, Jr., to be a Deputy Administrator of 
the Agency for International Development. 

Robert J. Manning to be an A.ssistant Secretary of 
State. (For biographic detjiils, see Department of State 
press release 242 dated April 11. ) 

John L. Salter to be Assistant Administrator for Con- 
gressional Liaison, Agency for International Development. 

Herbert J. Waters to be Assistant Administrator 
for Material Resources, Agency for International 
Development. 

The Senate on April 4 confirmed Robert P. Woodward 
to be Ambassador to Spain. (For biographic details, see 
White House press release dated March 27.) 



Appointments 

James L. Greenfield as Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
News, Bureau of Public Affairs, effective April 3. (For 
biographic details, see Department of State press release 
347 dated April 12.) 



Designations 

Sclma Freedinan as Public Affairs Adviser, Bureau of 
Economic Affairs, effective April 2. 



Roger W. Tubby as U.S. Representative to the European 
Office of the United Nations and Other International Or- 
ganizations at Geneva, effective April 2. (For biographic 
details, see Department of State press release 215 dated 
April 2.) 



Checi( List of Department of State 
Press Releases: April 2-8 

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of 
News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C. 

Releases appearing in this issue of the BtmETrN 
which were issued prior to April 2 are Nos. 183 and 
185 of March 23; 188 and 192 of March 26; 
197 of March 28; 201 of March 29; and 208 of 
March 30. 

Sabject 

Expansion of Foreign Service commer- 
cial program. 

Program for visit of President of Brazil 
(revised). 

Cieplinski : "Refugees Here and Around 
the World." 

U.S. participation in international con- 
ferences. 

Ball : "The Developing Atlantic Part- 
nership." 

Tubb.v sworn in as U.S. Representative 
to Euroi)ean office of U.N. and other 
international organizations at Geneva 
(biographic details). 

Air tallfs with Austria. 

Friedkin sworn in as U.S. Commissioner, 
U.S. -Mexican boundary and water 
commission (rewrite). 

Coppock : "U.S. Trade Policy and Free- 
World Leadership." 

Coppock : "The Cold War and U.S. 
Trade Policy." 

Developments at Geneva disarmament 
conference. 

Cultural exchange (India). 

Study of Pembina River resources with 
Canada. 

Members-designate of U.S. Advisory 
Commission on International Educa- 
tional and Cultural Affairs. 

Program for visit of Shah of Iran. 

MacArthur : "The New Europe — Its 
Challenge and Its Opportunities for 
the United States." 

Rusk : Foreign Assistance Act of 1962. 

Coppock : "The European Economic 
Community and U.S. Trade Policy." 

Iran cre<lentials (rewrite). 

Accession of Cambodia, Israel, and 
Portugal to GATT. 



No. 


Date 


1210 


4/2 


*211 


4/2 


t212 


4/2 


*213 


4/2 


214 


4/2 


*215 


4/2 


t216 

217 


4/2 
4/2 


»218 


4/3 


*219 


4/3 


220 


4/3 


*221 
1222 


4/4 
4/4 



♦223 4/5 



♦224 

1225 

226 

t227 

t228 
229 



4/5 
4/5 



4/5 
4/6 

4/6 
4/6 



* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 



698 



Department of Stale Bulletin 



April 23, 1962 



Index 



Vol. XLVI, No. 1191 



Asia 

A Balance Sheet on Asia (Bowles) C74 

UNESCO Conference on Education in Asia (dele- 
gation) 695 

Atomic Energy. U.S. Agrees to International In- 
spection of Four Atomic Reactors 696 

Cambodia. Accession of Cambodia, Israel, and 
Portugal to GATT 606 

Communism. A Balance Sheet on Asia (Bowles) . 674 

Congress, The. The Foreign Aid Program for Fis- 
cal Year 1963 (Rusk) 659 

Cuba. U.N. Security Council Rejects Call for Opin- 
ion of World Court on OAS Action (Stevenson, 
text of draft resolution) 684 

Department and Foreign Service 

Appointments (Greenfield) 698 

Confirmations (Lingle, Manning, Salter, Waters, 

Woodward) 698 

Designations (Freedman, Tubby) 698 

Post of Deputy Assistant Secretary for Atlantic 

Affairs Established 673 

Disarmament. U.S. Comments on Developments 

at Geneva Disarmament Conference 664 

Economic Affairs 

Accession of Cambodia, Israel, and Portugal to 

GATT 696 

The Developing Atlantic Partnership (Ball) . . 666 
Miss Freedman designated Public Affairs Adviser . 698 
Strategy of American Foreign Policy (McGhee). . 678 
Educational and Cultural Affairs. UNESCO Con- 
ference on Education in Asia (delegation) . . 695 
Europe 

The Developing Atlantic Partnership (Ball) . . (566 
Post of Deputy Assistant Secretary for Atlantic 

Affairs Established 673 

Foreign Aid 

Confirmations, AID (Lingle as Deputy Adminis- 
trator; Salter, Waters as Assistant Administra- 
tors) 698 

The Foreign Aid Program for Fiscal Year 1963 

(Rusk) 6.59 

International Organizations and Conferences 

Accession of Cambodia, Israel, and Portugal to 

GATT 696 

International Cooperation in Synoptic Meteorology 

(Cleveland, delegation) 694 

Tubby designated U.S. Representative to European 

Office of U.N 698 



UNESCO Conference on Education in Asia (dele- 
gation) C95 

U.S. Agrees to International Insi)ection of Four 
Atomic Reactors C96 

U.S. Comments on Developments at Geneva Dis- 
armament Conference 664 

Israel. Accession of Cambodia, Israel, and Portu- 
gal to GATT 696 

Mexico. J. F. Friedkin Named to U.S.-Mexican 

Boundary and Water Commission 683 

Middle East. A Balance Sheet on Asia (Bowles). . 674 

Philippines. President Macapagal of Philippines 

To Visit United States 665 

Portugal. Accession of Cambodia, Israel, and Por- 
tugal to GATT 696 

Public Affairs. Manning confirmed as Assistant 
Secretary; Greenfield appointed Deputy Assist- 
ant Secretary for News 698 

Science. International Cooperation in Synoptic 
Meteorology (Cleveland, delegation) 694 

Spain. Woodward confirmed as Ambassador . . 698 

Treaty Information 

Accession of Cambodia, Israel, and Portugal to 

GATT 696 

Current Actions 697 

U.S. Agrees to International Inspection of Four 
Atomic Reactors 696 

United Nations 

Current U.N. Documents 696 

U.N. Security Council Rejects Cuban Call for Opin- 
ion of World Court on OAS Action (Stevenson, 
text of draft resolution) 684 

Name Index 

Ball, George W 666 

Bowles, Chester 674 

Cleveland, Harlan 694 

Freedman, Selma 698 

Friedkin, Joseph F 683 

Greenfield, James L 698 

Lingle, Walter L., Jr 698 

Manning, Robert J 698 

McGhee, George C 678 

Rusk, Secretary 659 

Salter, John L 698 

Stevenson, Adlal E 684 

Tubby, Roger W 698 

Waters, Herbert J 698 

Woodward, Robert F 698 



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OFFICIAL BUSINESS 



U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE UN 

REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT TO THE 
CONGRESS FOR THE YEAR 1960 

A factual account of the U.S. Government's participation in the 
work of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies during the 
year 1960 is contained in this fifteenth annual report by the President 
to the Congress. 

The Appendixes to the volume contain U.N. charts, tables, and in- 
formation on the various organizations and availability of publica- 
tions and documents. 



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THE BATTLE ACT IN NEW TIMES 

MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE 
CONTROL ACT OF 1951 

Fifteenth Report to Congress 

This 54-page booklet contains the annual revisions of the Interna- 
tional Lists adjusted to new technological and military developments 
in the Sino-Soviet bloc and the free world. It also includes a brief 
evaluation of the Battle Act under current conditions. 

The Appendixes include (1) the text of the Act of 1951, (2) text 
of the Battle Act Amendment, (3) the Battle Act Lists, (4) trade 
controls of free- world countries, (5) Presidential determinations made 
July 1960-June 19G1, and (6) statistical tables. 

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Vol. XLVI, No. 1192 



AprU 30, 1962 



MCIAL 

EKLY RECORD 

ITED STATES 
REIGN POLICY 



PAN AMERICAN DAY, 1962 • Address hy Secretary Rii»h . . 703 

THE NEW EUROPE— ITS CHALLENGE AND ITS 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE UNITED STATES • 

by Ambassador Douglas MacArthur II 709 

MINERAL RESOURCES AND THE WORLD OF THE 

1960's • fay Under Secretary McGhee 723 

CHANGE AND CHALLENGE IN AFRICA • fay Assistant 

Secretary Williams 719 

REFUGEES HERE AND AROUND THE WORLD • by 

Michel Cieplinski 730 

SECURITY COUNCIL CALLS UPON ISRAEL AND 
SYRIA TO OBSERVE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT • 

Statement by Charles W. Yost and Text of Resolution , , . 735 



For in<lex see inside back cover 



THE DEPARTMENT 



TATE 




Vol. XLVI, No. 1192 • Publication 7367 
April 30, 1962 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Qovemment PrtntlnB OUlce 

Washington 26, D.O. 

Price: 

62 Issues, domestic $8.60, foreign $12.25 

Single copy, 26 cents 

Use of funds for printing of this publica- 
tion apijroved by the Director of the Bureau 
of the Budget (January 16, 1961). 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrlghtod and Items contained herein may 
be nsprlntcd. Citation of the Uepaktment 
o» State Btn.LETiN as the sourco will be 
appreciated. The Bulletin Is Indexed In the 
Eeadera' Quide to Periodical Literature. 



The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a tceekly publication issued by the 
Office of Public Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public 
and interested agencies of the 
Government with information on 
developn\ents in the field of foreign 
relations and on the work of the 
Department of State and the Foreign 
Service. Tlie BULLETIN includes se- 
lected press releases on foreign policy, 
issued by tfie White House and the 
Department, and statements and ad- 
dresses made by the President and by 
the Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Department, as well as 
special articles on various phases of 
international affairs and the func- 
tions of tlie Department. Informa- 
tion is included concerning treaties 
and international agreements to 
tchich the United States is or may 
become a party and treaties of gen- 
eral international interest. 

Publications of the Department, 
United Nations documents, and legis- 
lative material in the field of inter- 
na tional relations are listed currently. 



Pan American Day, 1962 



Address by Secretary Rusk '■ 



I am grateful to you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Secre- 
taiy Greneral, and members of the Comicil, for 
your invitation to address this special meeting in 
observance of Pan American Day [April 14]. It 
affords me tlie happy occasion of bexioming another 
among my country's Secretaries of Stata who have 
met with the members of this venerable body which 
has long been deeply and productively concerned 
with furthering international cooperation among 
the sovereign states of this hemisphere. 

We meet after two historic meetings held since 
we last celebrated Pan American Day, both <at 
Punta del Este.^ One committed us to a sustained 
cooperative effort in economic and social progress; 
the other committed us to defend together the hu- 
mane, democratic traditions in wliich our societies 
are rootetl. Looking back at those meetings and 
the enterprises they laimched, I am sure that we 
have strengthened the possibilities of progress in 
freedom in tliis hemisphere. Furthermore, we 
have demonstrated that the Organization of 
American States has the vitality to survive, to 
grow, and to help shape the histoi-y of this hemi- 
sphere and its peoples. 

We are bound together now — as always — not 
merely by geography but by a shared vision of the 
destiny of men and societies. In the preamble to 
the Charter of Punta del Este,' our Governments 
have given that vision a new expression and have 
defined their responsibility for giving it a special 
vitality in this decade. They accepted the task of 
demonstrating that "the creative powers of free 



' Made before the Council of the Organization of Ameri- 
can States at the Pan American Union, Washington, D.C., 
on Apr. 13 (press release 250). 

" For background, see Bulletin of Sept. 11, 1961, p. 459, 
and Feb. 19, 1962, p. 270. 

3 For text, see ihid., Sept. 11, 1961, p. 463. 



men hold the key to their progress and to the prog- 
ress of future generations." 

We are allied in a vast, imaginative, but highly 
practical enterprise. We have pledged our ma- 
terial resources, and our resources of heart and 
mind, to transform this hemisphere economically 
and socially, through the awakened cooperation of 
free peoples. We have begun our inunense mider- 
taking in full awareness that this transformation 
will, in many areas, bring about complex social 
and political as well as economic change. We face 
these changes resolutely and with confidence for a 
simple reason : They are necessary to effect the 
will of our peoples, who demand and require that 
the fruits of modem science and teclmology yield 
for themselves and their children a better life. 
One of my illustrious predecessors, the first Secre- 
taiy of State, Thomas Jefferson, defender of the 
rights of man, declared: "Laws and institutions 
must go hand in hand with the progress of the 
human mind." The human mind has opened up 
vast possibilities for improved welfare, and it has 
fractured the isolation of our societies one from the 
other. Our laws, institutions, and societies must 
reflect these facts and the impulses they have 
released. 

The Alliance for Progress 

Exactly 1 year and 1 month ago today the Presi- 
dent of the United States presented to the ambas- 
sadorial corps of the American Republics the 
project of an Alliance for Progi'ess.^ He crystal- 
lized on that occasion the response of the United 
States to the growing demand and initiative of 
the Governments and peoples of the hemisphere 
that we mount a collective attack on poverty, stag- 



'Ibid.. Apr. 3, 1901. p. 471. 



April 30, 1962 



703 



nation, and social injustice. He called on the 
American i>eoples to prove to the entire world that 
man's as yet unsatisfied aspiration for economic 
progress and social justice can best be achieved by 
free men working within a framework of demo- 
cratic institutions. He affirmed for his Govern- 
ment — as the Charter of Punta del Este was to 
reaffirm a few months later for us all — that public 
and private investment, domestic and foreign in- 
vestment, must interact and work together 
throughout the Americas. 

This common effort, both within our societies 
and among them, is required to attain the simple, 
basic goals the hemisphere has set itself : work and 
bread; better homes; better education and health 
for all our citizens. These goals are achievable by 
equally basic means: by regular increase of per 
capita income, more equitably distributed; by a 
systematic mobilization of the material and human 
resources at our disposal ; by tax and land reforms 
where they are needed ; by a consensus in our so- 
cieties, reaching into all their groupings, that tliis 
hemisphere shall create and sustain an environ- 
ment of growth. 

Maintaining Institutions of Free Men 

These objectives are not confined to this hemi- 
sphere. The Alliance for Progress is our own ex- 
pression of a determination which is sweeping 
through every continent. The cliallenge here, as 
elsewhere, is to achieve tliese objectives while 
maintaining and developing tlie institutions of 
free men. 

The challenge is not abstract. Throughout our 
hemisphere the Communists and tliose drawn to 
their doctrines will tell us that the social changes 
required for the growth and modernization of 
societies and the organization required to mol>ilize 
the necessary resources can only be achieved by a 
totalitarian dictatorship and the techniques of 
the police state. Where men have succumbed to 
this perspective — and found the conspiracies 
which have installed such dictatorships — the re- 
sults liave been not merely the humiliation and 
degradation of a police state, but hunger and 
inefficiency. But then it is too late to return to 
the ways of freedom. 

We are therefore challenged by the need to 
demonstrate urgently that free men can carry 
forward the great transformation to whicli we 
are committed ; and we are challenged equally by 



the need to frustrate the techniques by which 
Communists seek power in societies disrupted by 
the process of modernization. 

There will be those who are reluctant to take 
the steps and demand the sacrifices necessary to 
make good the Alliance for Progress within their 
societies. There will be those who will insist that 
only violent revolution can achieve its objectives. 

In the center, however, are the vast majority of 
our citizens. They know that in fact this hemi- 
sphere has seen already many constructive 
changes. They know — and it is the deepest part 
of our common tradition — that the goals we 
achieve will depend on the means we use. They 
know that progress and freedom are compatible 
and are prepared to stake their lives on that prop- 
osition. They know that in carrying forward 
with the Alliance for Progress they are working 
in continuity with a tradition of evolutionary and 
humane change more than a century old. 

I am confident that over this decade we shall 
in our hemisphere see the triumpli of this great 
majority of the center, neither fearful of the fu- 
ture nor tempted by illusory efficiency of totalitar- 
ian methods. 

Tradition of Cooperation 

The working agenda ahead of us is long. 
Serious national development programs cannot be 
produced overnight; projects require studies of 
feasibility and blueprints, and these take time and 
technical skill. But we are moving. We are be- 
ginning to give life to the ideas of Latin American 
statesmen and economists who, over the past 
decade, have been preparing the way for the Al- 
liance for Progress and preparing a generation of 
young men and women technically capable of 
canning it forward. Out of this ferment will 
come not merely development plans and projects 
but a coming together of the Latin American na- 
tions themselves, through regional markets, im- 
proved communications, and the common day-to- 
day efforts that flow from the commitment to build 
on a grand scale in this hemisphere and to protect 
wliat we are building. The principle of coopenx- 
f ion is, in itself, an old tradition in the hemisphere. 

From the inception of the idea of inter-Ameri- 
can cooperation my Government has maintained 
faith in its potential for good, in all the phases 
through which it lias passed. President John 
Quincy Adams, early in the past century, ac- 



704 



Department of State Bulletin 



claimed Bolivar's "great design" of hemisphere 
alliance. In December 1880 President Benjamin 
Harrison said in his message to Congress: 

It is a matter of high significance, and no less of con- 
gratulations, that the first year of the second century of 
our constitutional existence finds, as honored guests 
witliin our borders, the representatives of all the inde- 
pendent states of North and South America met together 
in earnest conference touching the best methods of 
perpetuating and expanding the relations of mutual in- 
terest and friendliness existing among them. . . . 

And, President Harrison's message continued, 
while much was expected from that first conference 
in mutually beneficial commercial cooperation, 

. . . the crowning benefit will be found in the better 
securities which may be devised for the maintenance of 
peace among all American nations, and the settlement of 
all contentions by methods that a Christian civilization 
can approve. 

Unity of Thought and Purpose 

Twenty-nine years ago yesterday, on April 12, 
1933, President Franklin D. Roosevelt reminded 
this august Council's predecessors that celebration 
of Pan American Day here in the House of the 
Americas, dedicated as it is to international good 
will and cooperation, "exemplifies a unity of 
thought and purpose among the peoples of this 
hemisphere." "It is," he said, ''a manifestation 
of the common ideal of mutual helpfulness, sym- 
pathetic imderstanding, and spiritual solidarity." 
Those three elements of our present alliance — 
helpfulness, understanding, solidarity — have been 
manifested repeatedly during the intervening 
years. They are attested not only by resolutions 
of Inter- American Conferences and of this Coun- 
cil but by the innumerable cooperative acts 
through which these resolutions have been made 
effective. 

As our alliance moves forward, let us not forget 
Jose Martl's reminder to governors and the gov- 
erned. In words that have operational meaning 
in evei-y quarter of the globe, free or enslaved, he 
said: 

By being men, we are endowed with the principle of 
freedom ; by being intelligent, we incur the obligation of 
making that principle a reality. 

At Punta del Este in Januaiy of this year we 
heard a most moving and significant statement, 
rooted in the same moral tradition. It was made 
by the Foreign Minister of the Dominican Ee- 
public, Jose Antonio Bonilla Atiles. He said: 



Freedom itself is not democracy. Democracy is not an 
end in itself. But it is the best means to attain the ob- 
jective of a people's well-being and happiness ; and so 
long as there are poverty, ignorance, and social injustice, 
there can be no happiness and well-being. 

This is the challenge we face and the mjunction 
that should guide us as we move forward together. 



United States and Brazil Reaffirm 
Existing Close Relations 

Jodo Goulart, President of the Refublic of the 
United States of Brazil, visited the United States 
April 3-8. Following in the text of a joint com- 
munique issued by President Kennedy and Presi- 
dent Goulart on Apnl If. at the close of the Wash- 
ington portion of Mr. Goularfs visit. 

White Uouse pie.ss release dated April 4 

The meetings of the President of the United 
States of Brazil and the President of the United 
States of America during the past two days have 
been marked by a spirit of frankness, cordiality, 
and mutual understanding. During their talks 
the two Presidents examined relations between 
their two countries with respect to topics of world- 
wide and hemispheric, as well as bilateral, con- 
cern. On the conclusion of these extremely fruit- 
ful talks, they agreed to publish the following 
joint commimique : 

They reaffirm that the traditional friendship be- 
tweeii Brazil and the United States has grown 
through the years as a consequence of the faith- 
fulness of the Brazilian and the American peoples, 
to common ideals of representative democracy and 
social progress, to mutual respect between the two 
nations, and to their determination that both Gov- 
ernments work together in the cause of peace and 
freedom. 

The two Presidents declared that political 
democracy, national independence and self-deter- 
mination, and the liberty of the individual are the 
political principles which shape the national poli- 
cies of Brazil and the United States. Both coun- 
tries are joined in a world-wide effort to bring 
about the economic progress and social justice 
which are the only secure foundations for human 
freedom. 

The Presidents discussed the participation of 
their comitries in the Geneva disarmament talks 



April 30, J 962 



705 



and agreed to continue to work to reduce world 
tensions through negotiations insuring progressive 
disarmament under effective international control. 
Resources freed as a result of such disarmament 
should be used for peaceful purposes which will 
benefit peoples everywhere. 

The two Presidents reaffirmed the dedication of 
their countries to the Inter- American system and 
to the values of human dignity, liberty, and prog- 
ress on which that system is based. They ex- 
pressed their intention to strengthen the Inter- 
American machinery for regional cooperation, and 
to work together to protect this hemisphere against 
all forms of aggression. They also expressed 
their concern that political crises in American 
nations be resolved through peaceful adherence to 
constitutional government, the rule of law, and 
consent of the people expressed through the demo- 
cratic processes. 

The Presidents reaffirmed their adherence to the 
principles of the Charter of Punta del Est« ' and 
their intention to carry forward the commitments 
which they assumed under that Charter. They 
agreed on the need for rapid execution of the steps 
necessary to make the Alliance for Progress effec- 
tive — national programming to concentrate re- 
sources on high priority objectives of economic and 
social progress; institutional reforms, including 
reform of the agrarian structure, tax reform, and 
other changes required to assure a broad distribu- 
tion of the fruits of development among all sec- 
tors of the community ; and international financial 
and technical assistance to accelerate the accom- 
plishment of national development programs. 

The Presidents stressed the important role 
which trade unions operating imder democratic 
principles should play in advancing the goals of 
the Alliance for Progress. 

President Goulart stated the intention of the 
Government of Brazil to sti'engthen the machinery 
for national programming, selection of priorities 
and preparation of projects. President Kennedy 
indicated the readiness of the United States Gov- 
ernment to assign representatives to work closely 
with such Brazilian agencies to minimize delays 
in project selection and the provision of external 
support. 

Tlie Presidents noted with satisfaction the ef- 
fective cooperation of the two Governments in 
working out an agreement for large-scale United 



' For text, see Bulletin of Sept. 11, 1901, p. 463. 
706 



States support of the Brazilian Government's pro- 
gram for development of the Northeast of Brazil. 
They expressed the hope that this program would 
provide a fruitful response at an early date to the 
aspirations of the hard-pressed people of that 
area for a better life. 

The President of Brazil stated the intention of 
his Government to maintain conditions of security 
whicli will permit private capital to perform its 
vital role in Brazilian economic development. 
The President of Brazil stated tliat in arrange- 
ments with the companies for the transfer of pub- 
lic utility enterprises to Brazilian ownership the 
principle of fair compensation with reinvestment 
in other sectors important to Brazilian economic 
development would be maintained. President 
Kennedy expressed great interest in this approach. 

The two Presidents discussed the efforts which 
the Government of Brazil has undertaken for a 
program of financial recovery, aiming at holding 
down the cost of living and assuring a rapid rate 
of economic growth and social development in a 
context of a balanced economy. The Government 
of Brazil has already taken significant action 
under this program. The Presidents agreed that 
these efforts, effectively carried through, will mark 
an important forward step under the Alliance for 
Progress. The Presidents welcomed the under- 
standing recently reached between the Brazilian 
Finance Minister and the U.S. Secretary of the 
Treasury, under which the United States is pro- 
viding support for the program which has been 
presented by the Government of Brazil. 

In order to promote the expansion of Latin 
American markets and to encourage the most effi- 
cient use of available resources, the two Presidents 
indicated their support for the Latin American 
free trade area and their intention to speed its 
development and strengthening. 

The two Presidents discussed the major aspects 
of the problem of raw materials and primary 
products. They decided to give full support to 
the completion of a world-wide agreement on 
coffee, which is now in process of negotiation. 
They will jointly support representation to the 
European economic community looking toward 
the elimination of excessive excise taxes which 
limit the sales of such products and customs dis- 
crimination which reduces the ready access to 
European markets for the basic products of Latin 
American origin. 

Department of State Bulletin 



In conclusion, the two Presidents agreed that 
their exchange of views had confirmed the close 
relations between their two governments and na- 
tions. President Kennedy reaffirmed his coun- 
try's commitment to assist the Government of 
Brazil in its elForts to achieve its people's aspira- 
tions for economic progress and social justice. 
The two Presidents restated their conviction that 
the destiny of the hemisphere lay in the collabora- 
tion of nations united in faith in individual lib- 
erty, free institutions and human dignity. 



Letters of Credence 

Iran 

The newly appointed Ambassador of Iran, 
Hosein Qods-Nakliai, presented his credentials to 
President Kcimedy on April 6. For the texts of 
the Ambassador's remarks and the President's re- 
ply, see Department of State press release 228 
dated April 6. 



U.S. and U.K. State Position 
on Nuclear Testing 

Joint Statement 

White House press release dated April 10 

Discussions among ourselves and the Soviet 
Union about a treaty to ban nuclear tests have 
been going on in Geneva for nearly a month.^ Tlie 
Soviet representatives have rejected international 
inspection or verification inside the Soviet Union 
to determine the nature of unexplained seismic 
events which might be nuclear tests. 

This is a point of cardinal importance to the 
United States and the United Kingdom.^ From 
the very beginning of the negotiations on a nuclear 
Test Ban Treaty, they have made it clear that an 
essential element of such a treaty is an objective 
international system for assuring tliat a ban on 
nuclear tests is being observed by all parties. The 
need for sucli a system was clearly recognized in 



' For a statement by Secretary Rusk before the 18-natioii 
Disarmament Committee on Mar. 23, see Bulletin of 
Apr. 9, 1962, p. 571. 

' For a statement by President Kennedy on Mar. 29, 
see ihid., Apr. 16, 1962, p. 624. 



the report ^ of the scientific experts which was the 
foundation of the Geneva negotiations. For nearly 
three years this need was accepted by the Soviet 
delegation at Geneva. There was disagreement 
about details, but the principle of objective inter- 
national verification was accepted. It was em- 
bodied in the Treaty tabled by the United States 
and the United Kingdom on April 18, 1961,* 
which provides for such a system. Since the cur- 
rent disarmament meetings began in Geneva, the 
United States and the United Kingdom have made 
further efforts to meet Soviet objections to the 
April 18 treaty. These efforts have met with no 
success as is clearly shown by the recent statements 
of the Foreign IVIinister of the Soviet Union 
[Andrei A. Gromyko] and of their representative 
in Geneva, Mr. [Valerian A.] Zorin, who have 
repeatedly rejected the very concept of interna- 
tional verification. There has been no progress on 
this point in Geneva; the Soviet Union has re- 
fused to change its position. 

The ground given seems to be that existing na- 
tional detection systems can give adequate protec- 
tion against clandestine tests. In the present state 
of scientific instrumentation, there are a great 
many cases in which we cannot distinguish be- 
tween natural and artificial seismic disturbances — 
as opposed to recording the fact of a disturbance 
and locating its probable epicenter. A treaty 
therefore cannot be made effective unless adequate 
verification is included in it. For otherwise there 
would be no alternative, if an instrument reported 
an miexplained seismic occurrence on eitlier side, 
between accepting the possibility of an evasion of 
the Treaty or its immediate denunciation. The 
opportunity for adequate verification is of the very 
essence of mutual confidence. 

This principle has so far been rejected by the 
Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, and there 
is no indication that he lias not spoken with the 
full approval of his Government. We continue 
to hope that the Soviet Government may recon- 
sider the position and express their readiness to 
accept the principle of international verification. 
If they will do this, there is still tune to reach 
agreement. But if there is no change in the pres- 
ent Soviet position, the Governments of the United 
States and the United Kingdom must conclude 
that their effoi-ts to obtain a workable treaty to 



^ For background and text of report, see ibid., Sept. 22, 
19.')8, p. 452. 
' For text, see ibid., June 5, 1961, p. S70. 



April 30, J 962 



707 



ban nuclear tests are not now successful, and the 
test series scheduled for the latter part of this 



month ^ will have to go forward. 



testing, would only give rise to a false sense of 
security and provide yet another opportunity for 
the Soviet Union to prepare in secret for its own 
nuclear testing. 



U.S. Comments on Soviet Statement 
Calling for Nuclear Test Moratorium 

Department Statement 

Press release 245 dated April 12 

The statement today [April 12] by the Soviet 
Union that a new uninspected moratorium on nu- 
clear tests should be undertaken for as long as the 
18-nation disarmament conference remains in ses- 
sion is another unfortunate effort to substitute 
paper pledges for guaranteed agreements. The 
United States hopes that this statement is not the 
final answer of the Soviet Government to the joint 
U.S.-U.K. message of April 10 ^ on nuclear testing, 
which clearly states the position of the two Gov- 
ernments toward this vital issue. 

Tlie United States is deeply sensitive to the ap- 
prehensions which have been expressed by the 
eight new nations at the Geneva conf ei-ence regard- 
ing nuclear testing. But it does not believe that 
a solution to tliis vital issue can result from paper 
pledges. Rather, it is essential that the conference 
direct its energies to reaching an agreement on 
adequate verification arrangements which will re- 
sult in a safeguarded agreement. This is where 
an answer to the world's desire for an end to all 
nuclear testing will be found. 

This latest Soviet proposal must be judged in 
the light of the actions of the Soviet Government 
last fall during the course of the test ban con- 
ference. Even as these discussions were continu- 
ing, the Soviet Union resumed tests,^ thus ending 
the unpoliced moratorium which it now proposes 
to reinstate. 

The United States does not intend to place its 
security and the security of its allies at the mercy 
of Soviet on-again-off-again tactics. We are ready 
to conclude an effective test ban agreement now. 
But we cannot be led into another paper pledge 
which, far from guaranteeing a halt to nuclear 



"For an atUlress to the Nation by Tresiilent Kennedy 
on Mar. 2, see ihid.. Mar. 10, 19G2, p. 443. 
' See p. 707. 
' For backgrotnid, see Bulletin of Nov. 20, lOGl, p. 844. 



President Commends General Clay 
on Mission to Berlin 

Statement by President Kennedy 

White House press release dated April 12 

General [Lucius D.] Clay and I have had a 
thorough discussion of the situation in Berlin and 
of his own role in it. General Clay has served for 
several montlis beyond the duration of tliis assign- 
ment as originally expected. He has served with 
great effectiveness in helping to sustain the close 
partnership and mutual miderstanding of the 
people of West Berlin with the United States in 
a time of grave danger. 

Wlule there is still no settlement of the differ- 
ences among the great powers over Germany and 
Berlin and while the defense of the freedom of 
West Berlin remains a matter of the highest con- 
cern to the United States, General Clay has re- 
ported to me that the morale and economy of the 
city are such that liis full-time presence as my 
personal representative is no longer required. 
This is particularly true as Allied planning and 
coordination have advanced rapidly in the last 
several months. 

While personal considerations would not lead 
General Clay to ask to be relieved in time of 
emergency, he should not be called upon to stay 
indefinitely when his immediate mission is over. 
With regard to his work in Berlin, General Clay's 
contributions to the situation there are too well 
known to require comment other than to say that 
I am glad that he will remain in service on call as 
my adviser on matters relating to Berlin. In this 
capacity ho will be returning to the city at frequent 
intervals in future months, and in case of emer- 
gency he is only 8 hours away from the city. He 
will go back to Berlin Simday [April 15], where 
he will remain for a few weelvs. 

General Clay luis made a great contribution in 
the last autumn and winter, and it is good that this 
contribution will continue as he comes home from 
full-time service. 



708 



Department of Stale Bulletin 



The New Europe— Its Challenge and its Opportunities for the United States 



ly Douglas MacArthur II 
Ambassador to Belgium ^ 



It is not only a great privilege, but it is also a 
pleasure to participate in tlie annual convention 
of the Young Presidents. It is a privilege be- 
cause the Young Presidents are Imown not only 
in the United States but in many other countries of 
the world which they have visited over the years 
as a vigorous, progressive, and forward-looking 
group of young business leaders— leadere who are 
making a veiy substantial contribution to the 
mainstream of industrial and economic thought 
and action, which will help not only our own 
coimtiy but the free world meet the great chal- 
lenge it faces. It is a pleasure to be here l^ecause 
it gives me the opportunity to see again old friends 
from your distinguished group with whom I had 
the good fortune to meet and discuss common prob- 
lems in Tokj'o in 1958 during your Far Eastern 
seminar and in Brussels last November during 
your European seminar. 

In inviting me to meet and talk with you today 
it was suggested that I first discuss the background 
of the United States support for the truly revolu- 
tionary movement toward European unity that is 
in progress and then turn to the great opportuni- 
ties as well as the great challenge we will face as 
a result of the Common Market and other Euro- 
pean institutions. This subject seems most ap- 
propriate since you represent businesses and 
industries whose future depends not just on Amer- 
ican domestic commercial transactions and policies 
but to a very considerable extent on international 
trade and particularly on the kind of interna- 
tional trade policy that your Government is en- 
abled to follow with respect to the European 

' Address made before the Young Presidents' Organiza- 
tion, Inc., at Phoenix, Ariz., on Apr. 9 (press release 225 
dated Apr. 5). 

April 30, 1962 



Common Market and other foreign outlets for our 
products. And of course the kind of foreign trade 
policy we adopt will have a major impact on the 
entire world economic and political picture, par- 
ticularly insofar as the future of free nations is 
concerned. 

However, before discussing trade policy, I will 
fii-st review briefly certain aspects of the European 
picture which make clear why both Democratic 
and Republican administrations in the United 
States have in the postwar period given full and 
wholehearted support to the concept of European 
economic and political integration. This, I think, 
is important, for it holds the answer to questions 
that are sometimes asked, such as: "In giving 
Marshall plan aid to Europe and in otherwise 
supporting European moves toward unification 
did we not just build up a competitive industrial 
base that will put iVmerican industry out of 
business ?" 

Postwar Hostility of Soviet Leadership 

To explain fully the backgromid of our support 
of European integration, I will first go back to 
1945. When the cruel chapter of World War II 
ended, Americans hoped and prayed that a new 
era of genuine international cooperation and co- 
existence would be ushered in. And in particular 
it was hoped that the Soviet Union, responsive to 
the many billions of dollars of lend-lease assistance 
extended to it by the United States and the thou- 
sands of Allied lives that were sacrificed io get 
such help to Russia to enable it to survive Nazi 
Germany's assault, would modify its traditional 
policy of tiying to undermine and destroy all gov- 
ernments and systems that it did not dominate. 
In other words, we hoped that Communist Russia, 

709 



although having a substantially different political 
system from that of the United States and other 
democratic countries, would be willing to live and 
let live. 

For our part, and despite the basic difference in 
political philosophy, we were not only willing but 
eager to live together and cooperate with the 
Soviets in a world where force, the threat of force, 
and subversion would be replaced by the rule of 
law and the settlement of international differences 
by peaceful means. Knowing full well the terri- 
ble power of the atom, we wanted to avoid another 
world conflagration that could well be fatal to 
humanity. 

Alas, this bright dream of the future was never 
realized. Soon after the war ended the Soviet 
leadership clearly indicated it did not intend to 
tolerate the existence of systems of government 
other than its own. Indeed on Febi-uary 6, 1946, 
in an important speech, Stalin openly blamed the 
Western Powers for the war and said that the con- 
tinued existence of "capitalism" meant the basic 
causes of war were still present. Thus, despite the 
massive assistance extended by the West to Soviet 
Russia during the war, Stalin and the leaders of 
the Kremlin refused to modify that basic tenet of 
Soviet Communist doctrine which is responsible 
for today's cold war and the great tension and 
threat to world peace. The fundamental tenet of 
which I speak is the implacable and unremitting 
hostility of Soviet leadership past and present to 
any other government or system that it does not 
control or dominate, and its active efforts through 
force, the threat of force, and subversion to impose 
its system on other peoples. 

Let me emphasize that, contrary to what some 
people say, this is not just a question of conflict 
between "communism" and "capitalism," or "so- 
cialism" and "free entei-prise," as the recent 22d 
Congress of the Soviet Communist Party so clearly 
demonstrated. At that congress the Soviet leader- 
ship stated its complete hostility toward the Com- 
munist Albanian government because the latter 
was not fully subservient to Moscow's control. 
Similarly, you will recall that in 1948, when Com- 
munist Yugoslavia refused to submit to Moscow's 
direction, the Soviet Union did its best to under- 
mine and destroy the Yugoslav Government. I 
mention these events only to emphasize that the 
cold war and related problems that free peoples 
fao^ today do not stem from mere differences of 



political or economic systems but from Moscow's 
determination to dominate the world and its un- 
remitting and relentless efforts to impose its con- 
trol on all governments and systems. 

And so it became clear shortly after World War 
II that the United States and other free societies 
were faced with a threat of great magnitude. I 
used the expression "great magnitude" advisedly, 
because one of the major results of World War II, 
indeed one of the great phenomena of this century, 
is the cataclysmic change in the overall ratio of 
military strength and power in the world — the 
disappearance of the traditional military strength 
of Germany and Japan, which had for centuries 
helped contain Russian expansionism; the reduc- 
tion in the great military strength, land and sea, 
of France and Britain respectively; and the 
emergence of the tremendous power of the Soviet 
Union, with its expanded empire stretching from 
the Pacific right into the heart of Western Europe. 

Rehabilitation of Europe's Potential 

As we assessed the threat to the survival of our 
own coimtry and other free nations, it soon became 
apparent that the United States would by itself be 
unable to meet successfully the challenge of Soviet 
exjiansionism. The imperative and crying need 
was for greater free-world strength which, joined 
with our own power, would be adequate to meet 
the challenge. 

Wliei-e were we to find such additional muscle ? 
One area of great potential strength came im- 
mediately to mind. This was the Western Euro- 
pean complex, from which America sprang. I 
used the phrase "potential strength'' advisedly, 
because we recognized that over the past century 
Western Europe had possessed greater assets in 
terms of population, industiy, and scientific skills 
and knowledge than either the United States or 
Russia. However, this great Western Europe po- 
tential had never been realized because of the 
senseless bloodlettings and internecine struggles 
in Western Europe — political, economic, and mili- 
tary — which over the past 100 years have succes- 
sively gutted that vitally impoi-tant area and 
sapped its strength and vigor. 

Furthermore, as a result of devastation of tlie 
war, Europe's industrial plant had been largely 
destroyed. It was clear that without economic 
assistance and rehabilihilion there would not be 
economic, social, or political stabilil y and Europe 



710 



Department of State Bulletin 



might even fall to the fonnidable offensive that 
the Communists unleashed against it soon after the 
end of the war. 

However, if Europe's great potential — eco- 
nomic, industrial, and human — could be rehabili- 
tated and if our European friends would work to- 
gether in cooperation with each other and with 
us and other like-minded people, then indeed 
Western Europe's great potential could be realized 
and the balance of free-world-Communist-world 
military power could be more than redressed. 

And so in tlie late 1940's we extended Marshall 
plan aid to help restore Europe's shattered econ- 
omy and thus provide a basis for .social and po- 
litical stability — the basis for a strong Europe 
tliat could help share the burden of free-world 
security. 

And at the same time, because we recognized 
tliat without close intra-European cooperation the 
rehabilitation of Europe's shattered indu.stries 
might simply reproduce the tragic past, we gave 
encouragement to those European leaders who 
were working for European integration within 
the framework of a broader Atlantic conununity 
in order to develop Europe's strength and also to 
provide a framework for close political, economic, 
and military cooperation between Western Europe 
and North America. 

Importance of European Integration 

But there were other historical and compelling 
reasons for our support of European integration 
far transcending the present East-West confron- 
tation. European integration was not in our view 
just a cold- war instrument but was a genuine ne- 
cessity for us and for the future of Western na- 
tions irrespective of the state of relations with the 
Soviet bloc. Why? Because twice within the 
span of a single generation the jealousies and ri- 
valries of Europe had led to explosions and world 
wars which had eventually involved us at the cost 
of hundreds of thousands of young American 
lives and tens of billions of dollars of our 
resources. 

One of the principal obstacles to a prosperous 
and peaceful Europe had been the traditional 
animosity and hostility between France and Ger- 
many that three times within the lifespan of liv- 
ing men and women had torn Europe apart and 
drained it so terribly of its strength and vitality. 
In what framework could this ancient enmity be 



transformed into a cooperative arrangement where 
the great assets and qualities of both the French 
and German people would work together to 
strengthen the fabric of peace in Europe? Given 
the larger population and the traditional vigor of 
Germany, France was understandably reluctant 
to enter alone into a partnership with Germany 
in which the latter might gain dominant control. 
A few European leaders of great vision believed 
that a lasting French-German rapprochement and 
partnership was only feasible within some broader 
and stronger framework, the framework of an 
integrated Europe. Thus the vigor and resources 
of Germany would be joined in equal partnership 
with the assets and energies of other Western 
European countries so that Germany, with its 
superior numbers and great industrial capability, 
would not by itself have the dominant voice. 

And related to this aspect of the problem there 
is still another reason why an integrated Europe 
was important to Europe and to us. This was 
the desirability of Germany's being woven solidly 
into a fabric of Western European "collectivity" 
so that the great and traditional energy, vitality, 
and vigor of the German people would not once 
again be channeled into the narrow and destruc- 
tive stream of xenophobic nationalism but could 
find adequate and constructive scope and expres- 
sion in an integrated and more prosperous Europe, 
to which Germany could make its own unique and 
indispensable contribution. 

Let me make clear that we did not try to impose 
European integration on any nation or people. 
But for all the above reasons the enlightened self- 
interest of the United States and the American 
people seemed to dictate our encouragement of the 
views of those European leaders who were work- 
ing so actively for an economically and politically 
integrated Europe. 

Need for Liberal Trade Policies 

However, while recognizing the advantages of 
a strong and integrated Europe, we also recognized 
that it held both political and economic risks for 
us unless certain fundamental principles were ob- 
ser\'ed — principles wliich we understood our West- 
ern European friends fully shared. 

One of the basic assumptions on which we gave 
our support to European political integration was 
that the politically integrated Europe which 
would emerge would not be a political "third 



April 30, 7962 



711 



force" that would adopt a policy of political op- 
portunism and blackmail and try to play the 
United States off against the Communist bloc. 
What we had in mind was the emergence of a 
Europe, united and strong, that could serve as an 
equal partner with the United States in the 
achievement of our common aims and endeavors. 
Our assumption in this respect has thus far been 
more than justified. Although the jjrocess of polit- 
ical integration is still proceeding, we have seen 
ever-growing bonds and ties developing not only 
between the nations of Western Europe but also 
between this new Europe and ourselves. 

A vitally important premise on which we gave 
support to European economic integration was 
that the trade policies of a European Common 
Market would be liberal and outward-looking and 
that such a Common Market would not, while 
lowering its internal tariffs, at the same time erect 
around itself high tariff walls that would exclude 
products of the United States and other third 
countries that had traditionally had important 
outlets in Europe. This of course was of over- 
riding importance, not only for our own economy 
but for free-world strength and unity. For ob- 
viously a narrow protectionist policy on the part 
of a unified Europe or the United States would 
invite retaliation from the other side and do not 
only irreparable damage Ui the economies of each 
but also strike a mortal blow at the solidarity, 
strength, and cohesion of the Western World. 
Creation of a high, outside tariff wall would also 
tend to preclude an increase in the total volume 
of trade which should otherwise result from for- 
mation of a customs union and which should in 
the long run offset the immediate disadvantages to 
third countries inherent in the removal of the 
barriers between the members of the customs union. 

And of course we made clear in our talks with 
European leaders that liberal trade policies of a 
Common Market must apply not just to industrial 
commodities but agricultural products as well. 
For the stability of our economy and our ability 
to deal successfully with our difficult balance-of- 
payments problem depends not only on outlets for 
industrial products but also on the maintenance 
of our market for agricultural products in 
Europe — our greatest single market for such com- 
modities. And since the Common Market is of 
such gi-eat importance to us I would like to say 
just a few words about it. 



European Common Market 

Following World War II, imder the genius and 
drive of such great Europeans as Jean Monnet, 
[Konrad] Adenauer, [Alcide] de Gasperi, Kobert 
Schuman, and Paul-Henri Spaak, the movement 
toward European unity slowly took form and 
steadily progressed until 5 years ago a revolu- 
tionary development occurred that has galvanized 
and transformed the situation — a development 
which holds for us not only great challenge but 
also great opportunities. I refer to the signing 
of the Treaty of Eome in 1957 and the subsequent 
formation of the Common Market for which it 
provided.- 

"VVlien the Common Market came into being in 
1958, there were some who believed it would not 
amount to very much and others who preferred at 
that time to remain outside its framework for 
imderstandable reasons. Britain, the Scandi- 
navian and other European countries were in the 
latter category. 

But those who did not believe in the Common 
Market have been proved dramatically wrong. 
For since the Common Market got under way, the 
level of industrial activities of its members has 
advanced at the very high rate of some 7 percent 
per year, whereas the progress in other European 
countries, such as Britain and the Scandinavian 
countries, has been only about half as great. 

During the period 1957-1960 the gross national 
pi'oduct of the Common Market countries in- 
creased by more than 45 percent, while the gross 
national product of the United States increased by 
only about 18 percent. This dramatic increase 
in the level of economic activity of the members 
has been accompanied by a very substantial in- 
crease in trade and commercial activities both with 
other countries and especially between the mem- 
bers. 

Total foreign trade of the Common Market 
with all countries increased from about $43 billion 
in 1956, just before formation of the Common 
Market, to just under $G0 billion in 1960, a whop- 
ping 39 percent. Trade between the six members 
of the Common Market increased during that 
same period from $12.7 billion to $20.3 billion, 
an incredible 60 percent. Although both of these 



'The six members of the European Common Market 
are Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and 
the Netjierlands. 



712 



Deparfment of Sfafe Bulletin 



increases are important, the latter is particularly 
sigcnilicant, as it reflects the development of closer 
trading ties among tlie six Common Mai-ket coun- 
tries as trading barriers are lowered between them. 
That development is one which I shall refer to 
again a bit later. 

It is a fact that the Common Market has suc- 
ceeded dramatically and with a rapidity which 
has astounded even its most ardent supporters. 
The result has been that Greece has stated its 
desire ultimately to join and is already an associ- 
ated member, while Britam, Denmark, and Ire- 
land have asked to join and Norway is also 
contemplating doing so. 

'WHiat are the challenges as well as tlie oppor- 
tunities that this situation presents for us? 

The Challenge to the United States 

Tlie challenge can, I believe, best be evaluated 
by a few facts relating to population, industry, 
and trade of the six Common Market countries 
and the other European nations that desii-e to 
join it. 

(a) The Common Market nations today have 
a population of 170 million and, should the pres- 
ent negotiations with Britain and the subsequent 
negotiations with Denmark, Ireland, and Norway 
be successful, it will have a population of about 
250 million, as contrasted with our population 
of 185 million. In terms of population it will 
represent a smgle market substantially larger than 
either the United States or the Soviet Union. 

(b) Furthermore, in the Common Market real 
wages and purchasing power are steadily rising. 
During the period 1953-1960 consumption ex- 
penditures per person increased by 30 pei-cent in 
the Common Market countries while in the United 
States such expenditures increased by only 13.5 
percent. It is of course true that those countries 
started from a lower base than we and their stand- 
ards of living are still lower than ours. However, 
in view of its dynamics, it is clear that wages, 
standards of living, and consumption expendi- 
tures are now rising at an even more rapid rate 
and will continue to grow toward those of the 
United States. In fact, should Britain and the 
other three nations join the Conunon Market, it 
will become the world's greatest single market. 

(c) The Common Market has great industrial 
strength that should increase. In 1960 steel pro- 
duction of the Common IMarket was almost that 



of the United States and well ahead of the Soviet 
Union. Its coal production was exceeded only by 
that of the United States and of the Soviet Union. 
Its productivity is increasing at a rate of almost 
twice that of the United States, and in automobiles, 
transport equipment, machmery, chemicals, steel 
products, and a host of other manufactures it is 
giving us hard competition in world markets. 

(d) It will have an unrivaled pool of scientific 
and teclmological skills and Icnowledge to apply 
to industrial advances. 

(e) And it will comprise the greatest single in- 
ternational trading bloc in the world. In 1960 the 
six Common Market covmtries, without Britain 
and the other three countries I mentioned, had im- 
ports of $29.6 billion and exports of $29.7 billion 
for an overall trade total of just mider $60 billion. 
In comparison our own imports amoimted to about 
$15 billion and our exports to $20 billion for a total 
of about $35 billion. 

It is crj'stal clear that, if our own American 
economy is not to stagnate and become depressed, 
we must have maximum access to this great new 
market for both our industrial and our agricul- 
tural products. Today we sell to the six Common 
Market countries, Britain, and the other countries 
wliich now contemplate joming it approximately 
$314 billion of our industrial products. We also 
sell to them just under $2 billion of American 
agricultural products, for Western Europe is by 
far our gi-eatest agricultural market. 

I mention agricultural products because, while 
there is general understanding of the importance 
of markets for our industrial products, there is 
sometimes less underetanding about the vital 
necessity of preserving our great West European 
market for agricultural products if our balance- 
of-payments situation is not to suffer, witli serious 
effects on our economy. 

To sum up, our annual industrial and agricul- 
tural exports to Western Europe are just under 
$6 billion, about 30 percent of our total exports. 
And, as contrasted with the postwar years when 
Europe was so heavily dependent on us, we are 
now more dependent than ever on our European 
market. For if our industrial and agi-icultural 
exports to Europe were substantially reduced, we 
would be faced with a major balance-of -payments 
crisis; many of our industries which depend on 
foreign trade would be threatened ; our ability to 
deal successfully with our vei-y difficult agricul- 



April 30, 1962 



713 



tural surplus problem would be endangered ; and 
we would in fact face the prospect of a most 
serious economic crisis. 

Opportunities for American Export Trade 

Although the challenge of the Common Market 
is great, the opportunities are equally great. It is 
a market where American products, both indus- 
trial and agricultural, are well and vei-y favorably 
known. Indeed today our exports to the Common 
Market are 50 percent greater than our imports 
from it ; it is a market wliere real wages, and hence 
consumption, are rising rapidly; it is a market 
with a rapidly expanding population. It is in fact 
rapidly becoming the world's greatest single 
market, and it thus holds great opportunities for 
us. 

Problems for U.S. Government and Industry 

One of the most important problems we face to- 
day is how to maintain and expand our access to 
this new and great European market on which our 
own economy and the prosperity and well-being 
of the American people so largely depend. 

It seems to me that the answer to this question 
has two basic aspects : 

First, there is the problem of reducing to the 
maximimi extent possible the official customs bar- 
riers and other protective devices which the Com- 
mon Market and other nations may apply against 
imports of American products. This part of the 
problem must be dealt with by your Government 
rather than by American business and industry. 
However, your Government can only do so success- 
fully if it is given the necessary t<x)ls. 

The second aspect relates to the ability of United 
States products to compete successfully in world 
markets. And here, I think, American business 
and industry have an indispensable contribution 
wluch they alone can make. 

Protecting U.S. Trade Position 

I^^t me deal fii-st witli the problem of liow we 
are to prevent tariff barriers and other protective 
devices from walling American products out of 
the European Common Market and other foreign 
markets. The only way we can protect our posi- 
tion against such governmental devices is to under- 
take negotiations at the governmental level with 
the Common Market or other countries involved. 



And let me emphasize most emphatically that 
in these negotiations we do not hold all the cards. 
Too many Americans today do not realize that our 
own relative strength and position in the world 
have vastly changed since the immediate postwar 
period, when Europe and much of the rest of the 
world was prostrate or in distress and we were 
pretty well able to call the time in trade and eco- 
nomic matters without fear of being successfully 
challenged. The unbalanced postwar situation 
where we alone in the free world liad any real 
economic strength and power is gone for good. 
Today in Europe we have a strong and equal 
partner, a partner with great and increasing eco- 
nomic and industrial strength and vigor. 

If we are to safeguard our own vital interests — 
industrial and agricultural — we will have to en- 
gage in give-and-take tariff negotiations with tliis 
new Europe. The President will need all the 
authority and flexibility he has requested in his 
foreign ti'ade legislation^ to meet the challenge 
we face. 

Let me also state my own conviction that with 
such authority we will be able to negotiate ar- 
rangements which will be best designed to protect 
not only American industry but also labor and 
agriculture. Without that authority your Gov- 
ernment's hands will be tied; we will be imable 
to negotiate successfully on tariffs, and the re- 
sults will be tragic for our economy and the well- 
being of the American people. 

Need for Broad Authority To Negotiate 

Some people may have a question as to the 
horse-trading skill of the American negotiators. 
I have complete confidence in their toughness of 
mind and ability to hold their own in any future 
negotiations, just as they recently did in the diffi- 
cult negotiation in GATT [General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade] under our present trade agree- 
ments legislation.* 

These last GATT negotiations, where for the 
fii-st time wo could bargain with the Common 
Market as a single negot iator, were the most com- 
plex and, I must add, the most long-di-awn-out of 



' For text of Presidont Kennedy's trade messaee to Con- 
gress, see Bulletin of Feb. 12, 1962, p. 231 ; for a sum- 
mary of the proposed legislation, see ibid., Feb. 26, 1962, 
p. .343. 

* For a summary of tariff negotiations concluded at 
Geneva on Mar. 7, see ihid., .\pr. 2, liH!2, p. r>61. 



714 



Department of State Bulletin 



the major negotiating sessions in tlie history of 
GATT. But the result was satisfactory for our 
interests. We granted concessions on goods im- 
ported into the United States worth about $2.9 
billion ; in return we received concessions on about 
$4.3 billion worth of exports, all based on 1960 
figures. As the most-favored-nation principle 
applies to those negotiations, we can safely say 
that there should be ultimate and appreciable 
benefits not only to us but to all the trading part- 
ners of GATT from the results. 

However, while the existing Trade Agreements 
Act under which we conducted the recent GATT 
negotiations has served a very useful puqiose for 
many years, it is today as outmoded as the faithful 
old bC-3 aircraft. We must have new and up-to- 
date authorization if we are to negotiate success- 
fully. 

Trade among tlie six members of the Common 
Market has already increased by 60 percent since 
the Common Market entered into force and the 
trade barriers between its members began to be 
lowered. In order to maintain our European 
markets while members of the present or an ex- 
panded Common IMarket are elimmating the in- 
ternal trade barriers between themselves, we must 
be able to negotiate down the Common Market's 
external tariff barriers. 

The importance of such negotiations for us is 
emphasized by the fact that, if the British and 
other prospective applicants join the Common 
ilarket, that organization and the United States 
will together have almost 90 percent of total free- 
world industrial production. In such circum- 
stances and to protect our own interests, it will no 
longer be feasible to negotiate tariff reductions 
item by it«m. Instead there must be broad au- 
thority for across-the-board tariff cuts, carefully 
negotiated on a reciprocal basis which insures 
benefits not only for the two negotiating parties 
but also for our other free- world friends, who will 
benefit by reason of the most-favored-nation 
principle. 

President's Trade Proposals 

I shoxdd like to emphasize that President Ken- 
nedy's trade program is one that serves both our 
national as well as our vital overall international 
interests. The program seeks to preserve the in- 
terests of the United States in a worldwide trad- 
ing context, not just with regard to Europe and 

April 30, 1962 



the Atlantic community. Our aim is that the 
benefits of lower American and European tariffs 
will also benefit other non-Connnunist countries 
in other parts of the world, establishing a pattern 
of economic relations that will unify rather than 
divide the free world. 

It is indeed possible that some of our businesses 
or entei-prises will encounter difficulties because of 
reductions of tariffs and other trading barriers. 
However, our country has grown great by our 
spirit of progress through competition, and I have 
seen no evidence that American management and 
labor cannot face up to this challenge. Further- 
more, there are safeguards in tlie President's pro- 
gram to cope with temporary hardships and of 
course our nation as a whole stands to benefit in- 
finitely more from expanded exports than from a 
restrictive policy that eventually would only lead 
to disaster. 

Now there are some sincere people who think 
tliat the answer to the great challenge we face in 
the field of international trade lies in protection- 
ism rather than broad authority to negotiate 
liberal trade arrangements on a give-and-take 
basis. I would only reply by saying that if the 
United States insists on a policy of trade protec- 
tionism and import restrictions, we will face re- 
taliation from our friends. And such retaliation 
will be applied not only against American indus- 
trial commodities and products but against Ameri- 
can agriculture as well. What retaliation against 
American industrial products would mean to busi- 
ness and labor needs no elaboration. The effect on 
agriculture would be equally disastrous. 

Today we have heavy agricultural surpluses 
that we have great difficulty in disposing of and 
which represent a heavy burden on our budget. 
But even with the surpluses that are stockpiled 
here in America or used so effectively in some of 
our foreign economic aid programs to promote 
economic and political stability and progress, we 
do sell in foreign markets approximately $5 bil- 
lion worth of agricultural commodities a year. 
If we lost a very substantial part of our market 
for agricultural products, the greatest single part 
of which lies in Europe, I need not tell you of the 
problems that would be created for our balance of 
payments, our farmers, and our overall economy. 
And one of our problems is that some of the 
xVmerican agricultural products in heaviest surplus 
are also in heavy surplus in other countries. Can- 

715 



ada, Australia, and the Argentine have large sur- 
pluses of grain. India, Pakistan, Egypt, and 
other countries have surpluses of cotton. The 
Netherlands, Denmark, and otliers have surpluses 
of dairy products. And so it goes. If we insist 
on imposing high tariffs and restrictions on in- 
dustrial imports from our friends, we must be 
realistic enough to expect that our friends would 
feel obliged to turn elsewhere for many of the 
agricultural commodities they now obtain from us. 

Of course in any discussion of foreign trade the 
question of Japan always arises. All the factors 
I have just mentioned apply with particular force 
to our trading relations with Japan. Because 
there is a very close connection between Japan's 
external trade and the coimtry's domestic well- 
being, and because the United States occupies a 
very important place in that external trade. United 
States actions in the trade field often have direct 
economic and political repercussions in Japan. It 
is clear, therefore, that in our own interests and 
those of the free world we should act in a way 
which will minimize friction and foster an expan- 
sion of trade between the two nations — an expan- 
sion in both directions. 

We need not think of our purchases from Japan 
as mere acts of political necessity, however. Ja- 
pan is an ever-growing market for American 
goods. Last year Japan was our second best for- 
eign customer, and our exports to Japan exceeded 
our imports by some $700 million or by almost 70 
percent. 

Nor do we need to think of our purchases from 
Japan as the imavoidable means of sustaining our 
exports, though it is axiomatic that if we are to sell 
to Japan we must buy from Japan. Imports are 
part of a desirable process wherein we get from 
the highly productive and increasingly inventive 
industrial economy of Japan a great many useful 
things which make our lives more comfortable and 
our economy stronger. Imports can displace do- 
mestic production temporarily and locally, but 
they can also lead tlirough a chain of actions to 
the expansion of domestic industry and to the 
creation of new jobs. 

The President's new trade proposals are realistic 
in dealing with the problem of import competi- 
tion. They recognize that there must be an effec- 
tive method of dealing with this problem if there 
is to be real progress in reducing barriers to im- 
ports. To meet the problem the President is pro- 



posing a program of assistance to workers, firms, 
or industries which have enjoyed protection from 
imports and which may suffer dislocation after 
that protection has been reduced. These provi- 
sions in the bill recognize that the community as 
a whole has an obligation to assist those who may 
be adversely affected by actions taken on behalf 
of the whole community. 

U.S. Industry Must "Root, Hog, or Die" 

Now let me return to the second aspect of our 
foreign trade problem — the ability of American 
goods to compete in world markets. This is an 
area where much of the problem lies not with your 
Government but with you, the American business 
community. 

I will say to you very frankly, as I said to your 
Far Eastern and European seminar groups when 
I met with them in Tokyo and Brussels, that I do 
not think American business and industry m recent 
years have always made tlie contribution to our 
foreign trade that they are capable of making. 
Wliile, obviously, if we are to compete successfully 
there cannot be endless wage-price spirals which 
result in pricing our products out of world mar- 
kets, and while it also seems clear that wage in- 
creases should generally be absorbed through 
increased productivity rather than higher prices, 
the problem of America's ability to earn its living 
through exports is very substantially influenced 
by the vigor and imagination with which Ameri- 
can business approaches the problem of selling 
American products abroad. After all, our coun- 
try developed and came to greatness through for- 
eign trade. Our Yankee forebears went to the 
four corners of the earth in their clipper ships 
trading and selling American products. If I may 
frankly say so, we seem to have lost some of the 
vigor and drive of our Yankee ancestors in de- 
veloping and holdhig foreign markets. 

The reasons are perhaps imderstandable. From 
the period roughly from 1940 until 1953 American 
industry enjoyed what amounted to almost total 
and absolute protection. What do I mean by 
this? I mean that, following the outbreak of 
war in 1939, the two great traditional areas of 
traditional industrial competition — Western Eu- 
rope and Japan — were no longer in the picture 
as serious competitors. Circumstances of the war 
prevented their industrial and agricultural prod- 



716 



Department of State Bulletin 



ucts from competing with us, not only in the 
United States but also in most third countries. 

And after the war the destruction of industry 
had been so great and privations so heavy that for 
many years, as the industrial strength of Japan 
and Western Europe was gradually rebuilt, their 
industrial output went largely into the home mar- 
kets to mi the needs caused by the destruction 
and privations of the war. The result was that 
not mitil about 1953 or 1954 did we begin to feel 
any real competition from Western Europe or 
Japan. 

However, as the basic and immediate needs of 
the peoples of Western Europe and Japan and the 
surrounding areas were met, we began once again 
to face stiff competition in our own domestic mar- 
ket. And, faced with such competition, there was 
often a tendency to call for protection rather than 
trying to meet the competition by appropriate m- 
dustrlal and business techniques and methods. 

At the same time competition in third markets 
was increasing. For 4 years I served as American 
Ambassador to Japan, and for 3 years preceding 
that period I traveled every year extensively 
through the nations of free Asia. And as I trav- 
eled in Asia I was struck by the fact that wher- 
ever I went I found business and trade teams 
from Britain, from Germany, from France, from 
Italy, from the Benelux countries, actively study- 
ing and estimating the potential market and mak- 
ing effective plans to penetrate it. These foreign 
business teams often spent weeks in a smgle small 
Asian country estunating the needs and costs of 
entering the market. They studied such questions 
as advertising methods, language and translations, 
servicing of their product, local representation, 
and so forth. For them it was a question of "root, 
hog, or die" to obtain that market. 

And m some of these same countries I occa- 
sionally saw American businessmen who were 
looking into the market. They had talks with 
local leaders and were entertained by them. But 
the general attitude of some seemed to be that 
their product was so outstanding it sold itself. 
Therefore, if the coimtry wanted their product or 
business, the market would come to them and they 
would not have to go after it aggressively with a 
selling campaign. In other cases, I recall, they 
felt the market might not be large enough to jus- 
tify any great effort. And so the business went 
to European competitors. The tragedy was that 

April 30, 7962 

636026—62 3 



it was quite clear that in a good many instances 
we had products which were competitive and 
would sell, even though sometimes priced a bit 
higher, but which were not selling because the 
effort and salesmanship had not been put into 
the endeavor. 

Gentlemen, if we are to gain or even hold the 
foreign markets we have today, we will have to 
do much more. As time passes our European 
friends are working more closely together to ex- 
pand their research and technical improvements 
of their products. At the same time they are 
beginning to lower their prices as a result of in- 
creased production resulting from the expanding 
Common Market. We are in fact going to find 
the competition in the future much tougher than 
in the past. And yet I am sure the genius and 
ability of American industry can meet competi- 
tion it will face in Europe and other countries. 
But to sell we will have to get out and "root, hog, 
or die." We can do it, but it wUl require research, 
teclinical improvements, and of course salesman- 
ship. 

This is something that the Government cannot 
do for you. We can negotiate — successfully, I 
believe— to keep tariff walls and restrictions 
against the import of American products gener- 
ally within reasonable and manageable propor- 
tions. But we cannot develop or sell the products 
for you. This is a job that American business 
will have to do if our American free and competi- 
tive enterprise system is to make the grade. 

In conclusion let me say that as we face the 
future I am not pessunistic. On the contrary I 
am optunistic because we not only clearly have 
the capability of successfully meeting the chal- 
lenge that the new Europe poses to us in the field 
of "trade but we can actually benefit from the 
opportunities that this great and expanding mar- 
ket holds for us. Furthermore, in successfully 
and constructively meeting the challenge of the 
new Europe we will be contributing to the pros- 
perity, strength, and unity of the whole free- world 
economic system, thus helpmg to assure the ulti- 
mate victory of the free world over Soviet totali- 
tarianism on the battlefield of peaceful competi- 
tion. 

The problem is not one of capability but of will. 
Do we have the will to get out and "root" for 
foreign markets? Is there the will to give the 
President and the administration the tools to 

717 



work with? I believe the answer to both these 
questions is yes. 

However, let me reiterate my conviction that 
the decision we take with respect to the President's 
foreign trade program will have a direct and 
major bearing on the future of free-world unity 
and strength. There are two courses open to us. 
One is a policy of protectionism and restriction 
that will divide and destroy free-world unity and 
strength and sap our own vitality and power. 
The other course is to maintain our liberal trade 
policy and adopt those measures that will make 
it effective so that trade can become the great 
unifying force and source of strength for the 
United States and the free world. 



U.S. and Austria Suspend Air Talks, 
To Resume in Near Future 

Department Announcement of April 2 

Press release 216 dated April 2 

Delegations of the Governments of the United 
States and Austria met on April 2 at the Depart- 
ment of State to initiate consultations regarding 
operations under the Interim Air Transport 
Agreement of October 8, 1947.^ The Government 
of Austria requested the consultations for the pur- 
pose of bringing up to date the terms and condi- 
tions of the interim agreement and giving it 
permanent effect. 

The U.S. delegation is chaired by Philip H. 
Trezise, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for 
Economic Affairs. Alan S. Boyd, Chairman of 
the Civil Aeronautics Board, and other officers of 
the Department of State, the Civil Aeronautics 
Board, and the Department of Commerce will 
participate. A representative of the Air Trans- 
port Association of America is attending as 
observer. 

The chairman of the Austi-ian delegation is 
Hermann Gohn, Head of the Finance and Traffic 
Division of the Federal Ministry for Foreign Af- 
fairs. He is assisted by Otto Jettmar, Head of the 
Civil Aviation Department of the Federal Minis- 
try of Communications and Electric Power Devel- 
opment, and by other officials of the Civil Aviation 



Department and the Austrian Embassy in Wash- 
ington. An official of Austrian Airlines is attend- 
ing as observer. 

Department Announcement of April 9 

Press release 230 dated April 9 

Delegations of the Government of the United 
States and the Austrian Federal Government held 
negotiations from April 2 to April 7, 1962, in 
Washington for the purpose of renegotiating the 
U.S.-Austrian Interim Air Transport Agreement 
of October 8, 1947. Considerable progress was 
made in establishing the terms of a new agreement. 
Negotiations were suspended on April 7 by mutual 
agreement between the two delegations with the 
expectation that they will be resumed in the near 
future. 



Claims on Austrian Persecutee Fund 
Must Be Filed by August 31, 1962 

Press release 235 dated April 10 

The Department of State again calls attention 
to the Austrian fund for settlement of persecutee 
property losses (Fonds zur Abgeltung von 
Vermoegensverlusten politisch Verfolgter) and 
points out that the time for filing claims against 
this fund will expire on August 31, 1962.^ Claims 
may be filed by persons who were subject to racial, 
religious, or political persecution in Austria from 
March 13, 1938, to May 8, 1945, their spouses, 
children (grandchildren are eligible to receive the 
share of deceased children), or parent (s), in the 
order given. Awards will be made from the fund, 
which amounts to $6,000,000, to cover bank ac- 
counts, securities, mortgages, or moneys which 
were the subject of forced transfers or which were 
confiscated by Nazi authorities, as well as pay- 
ments of the discriminatory taxes known as 
"Eeichsfluchtsteuer" and "Suehneleistung der 
Jiiden (JUVA)." 

Reports from Vienna indicate tliat only 1,300 
claim applications have been received to date from 
the United States. Further, even if the present 
claims are paid in full, the fund will be left with 
over $1.5 million unexpended. 



' Treaties and Other International Acts Series 1659. 



^ For background, see Bulletin of May 8, lOGl, p. 691, 
and Oct. 2, 1961, p. 553. 



718 



Department of State Bulletin 



Applications should be addressed to the Fonds 
zur Abgeltung von Vermoegensverlusten politisch 
Verfolgter, Taborstrasse 2-6, Vienna II. Forms 
may be obtained from the above address or from 
the Austrian Embassy, 2343 Massachusetts Ave., 
Washington, D.C., or at the nearest Austrian con- 



sulate. Austrian consulates are located in New 
York, New Orleans, Chicago, Detroit, Portland 
(Oreg.), San Francisco, Los Angeles, Dallas, 
IVIiami, Atlanta, Cleveland, Boston, and Seattle, 
and inquiries for further information should be 
directed to Austrian representatives. 



Change and Challenge in Africa 



hy G. Mennen Williams 

Assistant Secretary for African Affairs * 



Tempora mutantur, et nos mutamur in illis. 

It is so exciting to be with an audience where 
Latin is still good coin of the realm that I cannot 
resist the opportunity to make a bow to the lamp 
of learning that burns brightly at Boston College 
and, indeed, throughout the entire academic com- 
munity of Greater Boston. 

This quotation is more than a gesture, however. 
The Reverend William Harrison's statement of 
1577, "Times change, and we change with them," 
actually states quite well my theme for this meet- 
ing. Change is the principal factor charac- 
terizing the Afi-ican scene today, and the effects 
of change in Africa have had an enormous impact 
on the development of U.S. interests in Afi-ica, its 
lands and its people. 

Although XJ.S. relations with Africa date back 
nearly two centuries, it is only in recent years that 
our interests have attained their present broad 
scope and complexity. 

Historically, our first political contacts with the 
continent came shortly after our independence, 
when the predators of the Barbaiy Coast plun- 
dered the ships of the infant United States. This 
led to our signing in 1786 a treaty of friendship, 
commerce and navigation with Morocco, and our 
first official tie with Africa was formed. 

More than 100 years ago we participated in the 
founding of the Republic of Liberia on Africa's 



' Address made before the Boston College Law School 
Forum at Brighton, Mass., on Mar. 29 (press release 203). 



west coast. This free state remained the only in- 
dependent nation in tropical Africa until the past 
decade. Today Liberia shares the continent with 
28 other free countries with whom we have diplo- 
matic relations, and others are in the process of 
being born. 

For a century and a half American missionary 
groups have had strong ties with Africa. The 
various home offices, boards, and orders in this 
country today have more than 6,500 missionaries 
at work throughout the continent. On my visits 
to various African countries I have had a chance 
to meet with many missionary groups and observe 
their splendid efforts to assist the peoples of 
Africa. 

Trade also has been a significant American in- 
terest in Africa down through the years, and our 
trading relationships date back to the days when 
Yankee clipper ships moored in Boston Harbor. 

Our interests in Africa broadened as we moved 
into the modern world, and the strategic position 
of Africa grew more important during World War 
II and the postwar years. Africa lies on the flank 
of our oldest allies in Europe. As part of our 
worldwide security effort, the United States main- 
tains important naval and air bases in Africa 
under bilateral agreements. We maintain track- 
ing stations in Nigeria, Zanzibar, and South 
Africa, which are vital to our NASA [National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration] space re- 
search program. Africa also proved to be an 



April 30, 1962 



719 



important strategic factor when the Suez Canal 
was blocked in 1956 and oil for the free world was 
shipped around the Cape of Good Hope. 

The Wind of Change in Africa 

The Africa our fathers knew or we knew before 
World War II is a far cry from the Africa of 
today. As Prime Minister Macmillan remarked : 
"The wind of change is blowing through [Africa], 
and whether we like it or not, this growth of na- 
tional consciousness is a political fact. We must 
all accept it as a fact, and our national policies 
must take accoimt of it." 

With important exceptions the former colonial 
powers have felt this "wind of change" sweep 
across Africa and responded. As a result, 25 of 
Africa's 29 sovereign countries have gained their 
independence in the last 11 years — 18 of them 
within the past 2 years alone. This is the result 
of the African's first great aspiration — a burning 
desire for freedom and independence. 

The remarkable aspect of this substantial 
change in the face of Africa has been the peaceful 
manner in which the shift in power was accom- 
plished. Peaceful evolution has been the key to 
modern Africa's development, despite the difficul- 
ties in Algeria and the Congo. 

With the promise of independence for Algeria, 
French and Algerian leaders are forming an in- 
terim executive to handle transitional steps on the 
road to complete self-determination, and it seems 
likely that the remaining disorder in that country 
will be halted by French and Algerian authorities 
together. 

Although much remains to be done in the 
Congo, we believe that our policy of support for 
the U.N. Operation, parliamentary government, 
and the territorial integrity of the country has 
led to substantial progress over the past 18 months. 
In 1960 President Eisenhower committed the 
United States to the support of a United Nations 
solution to that nation's troubles, and we continue 
to support the peacekeeping and nationbuilding 
operation of the U.N. in the Congo. 

Just a year ago the Congo was badly split. The 
Communist bloc and a few other countries had 
recognized the Stanleyville regime of Antoine 
Gizenga as the country's government, rather than 
the legal national government lieaded by Presi- 
dent [Joseph] Kasavubu at Lcopoldville, which 
was recognized by most other nations. And Moise 



Tshombe had created further disunity with his 
secessionist movement in Katanga. 

This was a highly charged situation that could 
have been further aggravated. Instead, the 
United Nations prevented the Communist bloc 
from supplying direct aid to Stanleyville, dis- 
couraged conflict between warring parties, and 
brought about a peaceful solution to the crisis 
through a meeting of Parliament at Lovanivmi 
University. From this meeting, anti-Communist 
Cyrille Adoula emerged as Prime Minister of a 
moderate coalition government. Despite the best 
efforts of the Leopoldville group, the United Na- 
tions, and the West, Katanga Provincial President 
Tshombe's supporters failed to participate in this 
government and thereby passed up an opportunity 
to strengthen the moderate forces of true Congo- 
lese nationalism and join in assuring a stable, in- 
dependent, and united Congo. Even without Mr. 
Tshombe's cooperation, however, Prime Minister 
Adoula has brought the illegal regime of Mr. 
Gizenga to an end — and with it a major oppor- 
tunity for Soviet penetration in central Africa. 

The issue today remains the reintegi-ation of 
Katanga into the Congo. A little more than 3 
months ago, at Kitona, Mr. Tshombe agreed to 
take such a step. We welcome the current talks 
between Prime Minister Adoula and Provincial 
President Tshombe in Leopoldville. It is most 
important that both Congolese leaders pursue 
promptly the statesmanlike work begim at Kitona 
for the peacefvil reintegration of the Katanga, 
which will direct once again the Congo's resources 
and talents to the urgent and constructive task of 
nationbuilding. 

Incidentally, I'm sure all of you saw yesterday's 
New York Times. It is most regrettable that 
American partisans of Mr. Tshombe, I believe 
unwanted by him, should choose this particular 
moment to renew publication of a distorted ac- 
count of last year's events in Elisabethville — 
events reported in full by the United Nations last 
January 20 without any attempt being made to 
gloss over their tragic meaning. 

U.S. Policy Toward "Dependent" Africa 

Elsewhere on the continent where freedom and 
independence do not exist, the "wind of change" 
still blows strongly. This is a realitj' that every- 
one recognizes, and we do no service to anyone by 
failing to take note of its presence. 



720 



[iepat\met\i of State Bulletin 



Our policy for those parts of Africa which are 
still dependent has two principal aspects. First, 
the "continuing tide of self-determination, which 
runs so strong, has our sympathy and our sup- 
port," as the President told the United Nations 
last September.- Second, we consider some delib- 
erate and expeditious preparation for self-govern- 
ment essential to African advancement and to 
avoid tensions that could peril the remarkable 
progress that has characterized political evolu- 
tion in Africa thus far. 

It is in the still-dependent areas of Africa where 
the white man has developed minority settlements 
that the next acts in the exciting drama of emer- 
gent Africa are to be played out. 

Equal dignity, both personal and national, with 
the rest of mankind is a second aspiration for 
change endorsed by all Africans. As sovereign 
people and countries they insist — and rightly so — 
that they be accorded equal treatment with all 
other nations of the world. This is an extremely 
important concern for dark-skinned people in a 
world where color bars are being lowered too 
slowly for their liking. It demands a change the 
whole world must make. 

In the United States, where full racial equality 
for all Americans has not yet been attained, we 
have a particular concern with this African as- 
piration. Our discriminatory practices have a 
tremendous impact on Africa's new leaders and 
place the United States under an important handi- 
cap in dealing with African countries. 

Harmony in African affairs is not the only — 
nor indeed the primary — reason for concern with 
our racial situation, however. Our denial of 
human dignity and equal rights for all Americans 
is a blight on the fulfillment of the American 
dream. We owe it to ourselves to remove this 
backward system from our country for our own 
sake and not simply for the sake of our foreign 
relations. A major challenge of our time is to 
find lasting ways to erase all barriers of race, creed, 
and color in America. 

Concerning the third African aspiration for 
change — improved standards of living — we stand 
ready to help where we are asked and can make 
a contribution to forward progress. We are will- 
ing to assist not only because, as the President 
said, "If a free society cannot help the many who 



are poor, it cannot save the few who are rich," ' 
but because it is right. Americans have always 
been good neighbors. This springs from the 
Christian and democratic tradition of our frontier 
days and is consonant with our historic devotion 
to freedom everywhere. There can be no freedom 
in misery, and there is no security for us if a large 
area of the world is downtrodden or insecure. 

Not only is the peace of the world indivisible 
but the poverty and degradation of people any- 
where represents a constant challenge to our basic 
moral principles. We cannot say with Cain that 
we are not our brother's keeper — especially when 
that brother's needs are self-evident and he is 
offered help from false friends who are our own 
mortal enemies. 



Cooperative Approach to Africa's Development 

In this economic and technical area it is to the 
interest of the United States and of the African 
countries involved that the countries of Europe 
continue and expand their programs of assistance. 
Individual African countries, understandably, are 
anxious to relieve themselves of exclusive dej^end- 
ence on any one country when it can — or can seem 
to — limit their independence. Wliile there was a 
time when the former colonial powers wished to 
retain an exclusive or predominant assistance 
position, today, for the most part, they are happy 
to share this responsibility. 

There is strong evidence that fruitful coopera- 
tion and a continuing partnersliip between most 
of the new African governments and the former 
colonial powers will be an important factor in 
Africa's future. At the present time, in fact, 
European countries are well ahead of the United 
States in providing economic and teclmical assist- 
ance to African nations. 

During the next fiscal year the United States 
proposes to make substantial increases in its eco- 
nomic aid to Africa, but it will still fall below the 
level of that provided by Europe. We are asking 
the Congress to allot between $350 and $430 mil- 
lion in economic aid to Africa in fiscal year 1963, 
depending on the projects that are worked out and 
on its ability to use aid effectively. This com- 
pares with approximately $250 million for the 



'■ Bulletin of Oct. 16, 1961, p. 619. 
April 30, 1962 



' Ihkl., Feb. G, 1901, p. 17.5. 



7ai 



current fiscal year and an actual $204 million in 
fiscal year 1961, exclusive of substantial amounts 
of surplus agricultural conamodities and develop- 
ment loans from the Export-Import Bank. 

It should be emphasized also that Africans are 
pouring tremendous amounts of energy and work 
into the economic and social development of their 
countries. They are making great .sacrifices to 
meet their needs, and a steady stream of progress 
can clearly be seen throughout Africa. 

In some instances the African nations are turn- 
ing to regional or other cooperative approaches to 
meet their needs. Many of the present political 
boundaries were drawn arbitrarily years ago and 
do not reflect today's necessity for imdertaking 
economically or socially viable projects of supra- 
national scope. Africa's leaders recognize that 
economic survival in some instances may require 
cooperative or regional forms especially designed 
for African conditions, and a broad range of such 
groupings is being explored. 

One example of a number of such approaches to 
regional cooperation is the African and Malagasy 
Union, the U.A.M., composed of 12 French- 
speaking African nations. The U.A.M. has been 
meeting this week at Bangui in the Central Afri- 
can Republic to explore common approaches to 
economic, transport, and communication problems, 
among other matters. The group already has 
formed a Supreme Council of Defense, an Organ- 
ization for Economic Cooperation, and a Postal 
and Telegraphic Union. The U.A.M. is a strong 
supporter of the proposed charter for a broader 
association of African coimtries which was re- 
cently adopted at the Lagos conference. 

Without evaluating the U.A.M. or any of the 
other germinating groupings in Africa, we believe 
the recognition of the need for cooperation is sal- 
utary. We are in favor of associations of African 
states when such associations help to develop po- 
litical stability and economic viability. 

The wliole question of regional groupings in 
Africa is very complex, however, and contains 
far-reaching political implications. While it is 
quite probable that such groupings will develop 
as a part of Africa's growtli, the tiltimate shape of 
such groups may take a long time to discern and, 
in the end, should be determined solely by the 
needs of the peoples of the various countries. 

This summary of U.S. interests in Africa illus- 
trates the eztent to which tlie adage tliat "Times 



change, and we change with them" applies to the 
rapid evolution of our relations with Africa in 
recent years. This swift transition has shattered 
some of our older concepts about Africa. The 
American people have discovered, not surpris- 
ingly, that the peoples of Africa are warm human 
beings with generally the same goals, the same 
ambitions, and the same dreams as those of all 
mankind. 

We have adapted ourselves to the new ideas and 
responsibilities that change in Africa has brouglit. 
We have had to do this throughout the world in 
the years since World War II, as we have become 
conscious of the efforts of colonial peoples to 
achieve self-determination. 

In these postwar years the leadership of the 
free world has shifted onto our shoulders because 
of our material strength and because of our dem- 
ocratic and Christian heritage. With this leader- 
ship has come an appreciation for the indivisible 
nature of world peace — for the direct links be- 
tween conditions of peace in the remotest corner 
of the globe and conditions of peace for us and 
our children. Today no area of the world will 
long be stable and peaceful unless it enjoys free- 
dom, unless it enjoys equal dignity, and unless it 
enjoys an opportunity to live a more abundant life. 



Assistant Secretary Williams 
Visits 10 African Countries 

The Department of State announced on April 
10 (press release 237) that the Assistant Secretary 
for African Affairs, G. Mennen Williams, would 
leave Washington April 13 for Conakry, Guinea, 
first stop in an official visit to 10 African countries. 
He will be accompanied by Mrs. Williams, Lisle C. 
Carter, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Health, 
Education, and Welfare, Department of State 
aides, and representatives of other Government 
departments. 

Charged by President Kennedy with conveyuig 
personally America's good wishes and interests to 
the leaders and people of Africa, Mr. Williams 
during 1961 visited 23 sovereign nations and 12 
dependent territories in north, central, and south- 
east Africa. During the forthcoming 1-montli 
trip he will attend Independence Day cei"emonies 
April 27 in the Republic of Togo as guest of Pres- 
ident [Sylvanus] Olympio and oflicially open new 
U.S. cultural centers in the Republic of Dahomey 



722 



Department of State Bulletin 



and the Central African Republic. He will also 
visit Sierra Leone, Cameroon, Congo (Leopold- 
ville), Eiianda-Urundi, Kenya, and Upper Volta. 
In each of tlie 10 countries Assistant Seci'elary 



Williams will discuss aspects of the United States 
African policy with government and political 
leaders. He will also consult with members of 
U.S. embassies and consulates. 



Mineral Resources and the World of the 1960's 



hy George G. McGhee 

Under Secretary for Political Affairs ^ 



Through your efforts exploration for petroleum 
and other minerals has developed from its origins 
as sometliing of an art to its riglitful place among 
the more rigorous of the applied sciences. The 
constant improvement in the standards of the cur- 
ricula offered in these sciences in our universities 
has been greatly facilitated by the work of these 
organizations, as well as the quality of the 
young men who have been entering into these 
professions. 

The period since the war has, moreover, seen 
an enlargement of the sphere of activity of Ameri- 
can exploration, and the men who conduct it, into 
the far reaches of the globe. It is a matter of 
commonplace for one of your group to be just 
returning from or departing for service in some 
far-off country which a few years ago you would 
have found it difficult to locate on a map. This 
has resulted in a broadened scope and increased 
efl'ectiveness of your sciences, in adapting to and 
learning from the particular circumstances of 
petroleum and mineral occurrences in other 
countries, and from your contacts with your 
fellow scientists from the other advanced nations 
of the world. 

It is because of tliis truly global outlook which 
members of your profession must of necessity have 
today that I, coming to you from my position in 
your Department of State, have chosen to talk 



' Address made before the American Association of 
Petroleum Geologists and the Society of Economic Paleon- 
tologists and Mineralogists at San Francisco, Calif., on 
Mar. 27 (press release 190 dated Mar. 26). 



to you on the subject of "Mineral Resources and 
the World of the 1960's." 

The exploration profession, perhaps mora than 
most others, has gone through various vicissitudes 
in the last several decades. Most of you will re- 
member, as do I, the painful adjustment necessi- 
tated by the great depression, when many of our 
number could not find employment and the pros- 
pect for the future seemed very grim indeed. 

There was an abundant supply of the oil and 
mineral resources which we had prepared ourselves 
to seek. Our economy was too weak to provide 
the demand required to stimulate further dis- 
coveries. The national product of our country, 
the same country with a little less population, was 
vastly less than it is today. Our petroleum and 
mineral industry, usually with an ominous over- 
hang of surpluses, has often been one of "bust" 
rather than "boom." 

Economic Growth 

Today there are still surpluses, but the world 
outlook is quite different. The world of the sixties 
is intent on economic growth. Never before has 
so large a part of the world population been con- 
vinced that a substantial, rapid increase in the 
output of useful goods and services is not only at- 
tainable — but quickly attainable. It is obvious 
that the importance of this trend, for you and your 
profession, is very great. 

The United Nations' proclamation of the sixties 
as a "decade of development" reflected an emphasis 
that already existed throughout the world. 



AprW 30, 7962 



723 



Through this proclamation the United Nations 
was seeking to dramatize and institutionalize the 
development efforts which peoples and govern- 
ments everywhere are making. 

Economic growth has become more than an idea 
or an individual aim. It has become almost a re- 
ligion. It is being made explicit in national goals 
and in plans for organized cooperation between 
nations. The philosophy of resignation, subsist- 
ence living, and acceptance of the status quo has 
been relegated to the past. There are bound to be 
some sacrifices, some steps backward as well as 
forward, but the commitment to progress is un- 
qualified and imiversal. 

Moreover, the fact of growing population is be- 
coming increasingly recognized in setting goals 
for economic growth. Objectives are being set in 
per capita terms: more production, consumption, 
and trade ; more investment, more advanced tech- 
nology, and greater efficiency in production and 
distribution. 

This is true of the developed, as well as the less 
developed, nations. The first Ministerial Council 
of the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development, which includes most of the in- 
dustrial nations of the world, called for an increase 
in real gross national product of 50 percent for the 
20 member countries, taken together, during i\\Q 
decade from 1960 to 1970.= This growth would 
add to the Atlantic community the economic 
equivalent of a new country of the present size and 
wealth of the United States — and with a corre- 
sponding demand for fuels and industrial raw ma- 
terials. 

The OECD countries also see the relationship of 
economic expansion to strategic power, and thus 
to their own prospects for achieving not only eco- 
nomic progress but greater national security. This 
is of particular importance from the standpoint 
of the future effectiveness of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization, of which most are members. 

Ferment for progress is not by any means con- 
fined, however, to the North Atlantic community. 
Large development plans and efforts are being 
mounted in other parts of the free world. The 
Alliance for Progress, here in our hemisphere, is 
such an effort — one to which the United States 
attaches outstanding importance. The American 
Kepublics, except for Cuba, are cooperating to ac- 



complish a substantial and sustained growth of per 
capita income.^ 

They have recognized that, in order to reach the 
objectives of the Alliance for Progress within a 
reasonable time, the rate of economic growth in 
every country of Latin America should be not less 
than 2.5 percent per capita per year. Each par- 
ticipating country is urged to determine its own 
growth target in the light of its stage of social 
and economic evolution, resource endowment, and 
ability to mobilize its national efforts for develop- 
ment. 

Ambitious development plans are also being 
launched in Asia and Africa. India, for example, 
is now in the second year of a 5-year plan which 
sets a target of a 5-percent annual rise in national 
income. Pakistan is planning a 24-percent in- 
crease in gross national product during the 5-year 
period which began in 1960. This would permit 
a 2.5-percent increase annually in per capita in- 
come. Nigeria is officially launching a national 
development plan on April 1st of this year which 
calls for an annual increase of 4 to 4.5 percent in 
gross national product, or about 2.5 percent per 
capita. 

Increased Raw Materials Requirements 

These worldwide plans and prospects for in- 
creased production and consumption will mean to 
the members of your organizations vastly increased 
requirements for fuels and industrial raw ma- 
terials. Indeed production cannot move forward 
without such a corresponding increase in its raw- 
material underpinnings. 

World demand for minerals and metals, which 
more than doubled in the 1950's over what it had 
been in the 1930's, is likely to double again by the 
1970's. A recent study of Europe's needs indi- 
cates, for example, that by 1970 consumption of 
aluminum and copper may be double the 1955 
rate ; zinc may increase by about 50 pei'ccnt, lead 
by about 25 percent, and tin bj' about 15 percent. 

World consumption in the 1960's of the princi- 
pal nonferrous metals in the aggregate is expected 
to be 45 to 50 percent greater than even the high 
rate of consumption during the 1950's. World 
consumption of aluminum, for example, should 
continue its stronger than average growth with 
consumption at 5,750,000 metric tons annually, by 



' Bulletin of Dec. 18, lOCl, p. 1014. 
724 



" For background, see ibid., Sept. 11, lOCl, p. 459. 

Department of Slate Bulletin 



comparison with 2,860,000 in the 1950's, 1,260,000 
in the 1940's, and only 390,000 nietric tons an- 
nually during the 1930's. 

Demand for petroleum products will also grow 
as industrial development and transportation 
growth take giant strides. Free-world petroleum 
consumption is expected to increase by about 50 
percent during the decade of the sixties, rising 
from about 19 to 28 million barrels daily. This 
represents an annual average rate of growth of 
4.5 percent, compared with the post-World War 
II average rise of 7 percent annually; however, 
the absolute amomit is much greater. In Western 
Europe the use of petroleum will continue to show 
one of the most rapid rates of increase of any 
region — about 6 to 7 percent yearly. 

This results from the increasing importance pe- 
troleum is assuming in Western Europe as a source 
of energy. Consumption of some 4 million bar- 
rels daily in 1960 represented about 35 percent of 
the total energy supply. During the next 10 yeare 
the region's rate of increase in petroleum use will 
be more than double that for total energy. As a 
result the 7 to 8 million barrels likely to be con- 
sumed there each day in 1970 will supply nearly 
45 percent of all energy, a proportion similar to 
that in the United States today. 

To make really substantial economic gains, most 
of the less developed comitries must first place their 
agricultural production on a sounder basis. In- 
creased agricidtural activity will have an impor- 
tant impact on requirements for such minerals as 
phosphates, potash, and nitrate of soda. 

These countries will also need increased supplies 
of raw materials, including, of course, minerals, 
for their expanding industries. They will need 
abundant and low-cost energy for heat, transpor- 
tation, and electric power. Countries with the 
highest levels of economic development use 20 to 
40 times as much energy per capita as the least 
developed. Consequently requirements for petro- 
leum products in the less developed countries will 
increase at a greater rate than requirements gen- 
erally. 

The important thing about this development is 
that, rather than remaining concentrated in a few 
favored countries as in the past, it will literally be 
taking place all over the world. 

In the face of growing demands the current 
oversupply of certain mmerals could change to 
shortage. Reserves, both of petroleum and ores, 



will seem less and less adequate as demand in- 
creases. The petroleum and metals industries will 
demand a larger backlog of raw materials to as- 
sure full utilization of their increasingly large in- 
vestment. 

Present abundance can be traced back to fore- 
sight — to the exploration and development in the 
forties and fifties. Exploration and investment 
have not, however, continued at the previous high 
rate. Moreover, a very considerable lead time is 
required for resource development to meet the 
needs of the seventies — longer in the case of some 
other minerals than for petroleum. This will call 
for an uptrend in exploratory and developmental 
activity during the sixties. 

Capital investment necessary to expand mineral 
and metal production to meet anticipated world 
requirements will thus be large. United States 
direct private investment abroad in mining and 
smelting increased from a book value of about $1.1 
billion in 1950 to nearly $2.4 billion at the end of 
1957 and to nearly $3 billion at the end of 1959. 
Future demands for capital will be at increasingly 
higher rates and will be available only if the fuels 
and minerals industries can show adequate re- 
serves on the ground — as well as profits. Explora- 
tion is required to block out these reserves. 

Estimates of the prospective new investment in 
petroleum vary, but all authorities agree that these 
sums will be huge. As free-world consumption of 
oil increases from 72 billion barrels during the 
fifties to about 125 billion barrels in the sixties, 
capital expenditures of the petroleum industry are 
likely to increase by more than 50 percent, from 
about $90 billion in the fifties to $140 billion in 
the sixties. Capital expenditures which amounted 
to about $10.5 billion in 1960 will probably be 
$15-16 billion in 1970. 

Notwithstanding the capacity which is shut in 
at present, we see exploration and development 
proceeding actively in all continents. Each 
comitry has its own reasons for wishing to 
strengthen its productive capacity and its future 
prospects for oil. 

In light of the continuing cold war, require- 
ments of security, as well as growth, dictate that 
we develop, and maintain the availability of, a 
wide variety of resource materials. Availability 
from domestic or nearby reserves that will be 
secure in event of war assumes greater importance 
which, in the case of oil, has been recognized by 



April 30, 7962 



725 



our Government. This means that domestic ex- 
ploration must continue at a high rate. Security 
also demands, both for us and others, access to 
alternative sources of supplies — in event one is 
cut off. This necessitates duplication in availa- 
bility, hence increased exploration and develop- 
ment. 

Needs for the most basic resources, i.e. water 
and land, common industrial minerals, and energy 
sources, are likely to be relatively predictable. 
But we must anticipate that the most favored ma- 
terials for specific purposes will be constantly 
changing. It is impossible to see in any detail for 
more than a few years ahead the precise types and 
amounts of all the various raw materials that will 
be required for military or peaceful uses. Ma- 
terials that now have little commercial use may 
be in great demand. 

Many groups are pursuing serious and useful 
research in anticipation of future shortages of 
particular minerals. Even if we run out of some 
materials, we can in most cases resort to ores of 
lesser concentration than those now being 
exploited or to substitutes. The liistory of the 
copper industry, for example, has been one of 
exploitation of ores of progressively decreasing 
concentration without great increase in cost. Oil 
can be produced from shale, or tar sands, at costs 
which ultimately may not greatly exceed that for 
crude oil. 

Even if shortages do occur, products which 
users now know could generally continue to be 
supplied, perhaps at a somewhat higher cost. 
Technology has, more often than not, been able 
to provide economies that keep pace with material 
shortages. In serious cases the products them- 
selves could be redesigned or other means could 
be devised to satisfy our needs. 

Dr. Guy Suits of the General Electric Labora- 
tories made a statement which has impressed 
others and which I think we can well note again : 

Growth [in science and technology] has been so rapid 
that 90% of all the scientists who ever lived must be 
alive today. Science and technological change had al- 
most no impact on the outcome of World War I, while it 
was a major factor in World War II. . . . Lord Keynes 
didn't recognize technological innovation as a factor In 
the economy 20 years ago, yet today it assumes major 
proportions. 

Technological change has been a determining 
factor in the forties and the fifties. We would be 



foolish to suppose that it will be a smaller force | 
in the sixties and beyond. The demand for raw 
materials will be powerfully shaped by this force. 

The Challenge 

The incredible growth in demand for raw ma- 
terials during the sixties wiU pose a threefold 
challenge. 

First, it will pose a challenge to your profes- 
sion. It will demand of you the best effort of 
which you are capable. 

The geographical distribution of fuels and min- 
erals bears no relationsliip to national boimdaries. , 
Geologists will have to search out and produce | 
needed increased materials wherever they are. To 
do this they will have increasingly to go out into 
the world, since the emphasis is shifting from the 
United States to other countries as sources of raw 
materials. 

You will have to work more intimately with in- 
dustrial and commercial managers, investors, and 
government officials in seeking to promote in- 
creased private and public interest in raw-material 
development. 

This is the more true since many of the less de- 
veloped comitries will want to press ahead with 
resource surveys even before the general need for 
their expanded raw-material production is estab- 
lished. The United Nations Special Fund M-as set 
up especially to finance such surveys as one of its 
principal activities ; so these countries will be able 
to afford the surveys. This will pose new demands 
on yom* profession. 

Many of these countries will want to do their 
own exploration for raw materials and minerals; 
that is, they will want tliis exploration done on be- 
half of either their nationals or their government. 
Geologists must thus be willing to work with and 
for private groups and governments in these coun- 
tries, as well as for the international organizations 
which serve them. A precedent is already at hand 
in the activities of our own private corporations 
in the ex|:)loration and development field, many of 
which have entered into satisfactory contractual 
relations with the governments of emerging coun- 
tries. And indeed many of our geologists have 
already followed suit. 

The Soviet Union is, moreover, forcing our hand 
hi many of these countries. It is sending out geol- 
ogists in significant numbers to help the less de- 



726 



Department of State BuHetin 



veloped coimtries explore and exploit their 
mineral i-csources. India is a case in point, where 
Russian exploration has resulted in an important 
oil discovery. We cannot afford to lag behind. 
We must outmatch Communist efforts in making 
our exploration skills available. 

This means surpassing the Soviets not only in 
quantity but in quality. The Soviets have shown 
great skill in exploring for oil and other minerals. 
Their ability to tuni out good geologists is an im- 
portant asset in their efforts to extend their power 
and influence into less developed countries. Our 
ability to turn out better geologists will be an even 
more important asset. We must develop and en- 
hance it. Our imiversities must keep pace with the 
growing demand for geologists and with the new 
teclmiques being introduced into the profession. 
We must find and induce the best available young 
men to enter the profession, whose greatest oppor- 
tunities to be of service lie ahead. 

The need for enhanced skills is the greater in 
view of the changing dimensions of the problem 
which we face. The general trend in oil explora- 
tion, as you well know, is from large to small — 
from shallow to deep — from simple to complex oc- 
currences. The original oil fields were relatively 
easy to discover ; the fields of the future will only 
be found through application of the most advanced 
techniques and the liighest degree of professional 
skill and ingenuity. Tliis is true of other minerals 
as well. 

Second, our business leadership will be chal- 
lenged. 

It will be necessary for our companies to raise 
larger sums for investment and to be able to or- 
ganize their efforts on a larger scale. No nation is 
self-sufficient in its mineral resources. The ar- 
rsjigements by which the industrialized countries 
have in the past assured themselves of adequate 
and relatively cheap supplies of minerals and other 
materials will be subject to new pressures as a 
consequence of political and social changes which 
have occurred since the Second World War. 

New arrangements have already had to be de- 
vised to meet some of these changed situations, 
and it is probable that other changes will be re- 
quired. Terms of agreements with other govern- 
ments covering development of natural resources 
will, in many cases, differ from traditional pat- 
terns. Private operations will be scrutinized more 



closely from the standpoint of harmony with pub- 
lic interest and policy. 

And, finally, there is a challenge to our political 
leadership, wliich must meet the new political 
problems posed by tliis coming era of increased 
production. 

Development of an increasing scale calls increas- 
ingly for closer consultation and mutual considera- 
tion among the governments whicli are concerned 
with access to foreign markets or foreign sources. 
All countries will want to assure themselves of an 
equitable share in the fruits of the abundance that 
we foresee. 

A special problem in this connection is posed by 
excessive instability in prices for the mineral and 
agricultural commodities wliich bulk so large in 
the foreign exchange earnings and tax revenues 
of many less developed coimtries. To assure con- 
tinued access to the raw materials produced in 
other coimtries we must assure them greater price 
stability, in ways which will be reasonably con- 
sistent with the broader objectives of our economic 
policy. 

We must also carry forward trade policies wliich 
will give less developed raw-material producing 
countries needed access to the markets of the de- 
veloped countries. And we must carry forward 
aid policies which make available the capital these 
developing countries need to expand their produc- 
tion and raise their living standards. In short, we 
must seek to develop a new pattern of relations 
between the developed nations of the north and the 
less developed countries of the south which will 
be mutually beneficial and welcome to both sets of 
countries and which will replace the outworn pat- 
terns of colonialism. 

We must also develop closer relations with the 
other developed nations in order to concert their 
and our policies effectively to this end. One of the 
major reasons we are trying to create an even 
closer economic partnership between the United 
States and Europe is to assure that these developed 
countries make an increasingly effective contribu- 
tion, through aid and trade policies, to the growth 
of less developed areas. 

Enactment of the Trade Expansion Act, which 
has been recommended by the President to the 
Congress,* would help us to fulfill this purpose. 



* For text of the President's message to Congress, see 
ibid., Feb. 12, 1962, p. 231 ; for a summary of the draft 
legislation, see ibid., Feb. 26, 1962, p. 343. 



Apr/7 30, 1962 



727 



This act provides our Government authority to 
bargain for decreases in tariffs not only with the 
developing European Common Market but also 
with the nations from which we and Europe must 
obtain many of our raw materials. 

It would, through removing obstacles to trade, 
help us to create higher levels of trade and pros- 
perity from which less developed — as well as de- 
veloped — countries could not fail to draw benefit. 
As the President has said,^ we seek through this act 
"to enlarge the prosperity of free men everywhere, 
to build in partnership a new trading community 
in which all free nations may gain from the pro- 
ductive energy of free competitive effort." 

Conclusion 

I believe that we Americans will meet the chal- 
lenge of the sixties — all of us : geologists, business 
leaders, and political leadere. We will be able to 
do this if we can learn to work together to over- 
come the problems and exploit the opportunities 
posed by this era of abundance. 

If we can do this we will be able to find the 
necessai-y mineral resources to make the aiTange- 
ments and the outlays required for their efficient 
production and to insure that they are used and 
distributed in a way which makes a maximum 
contribution not only to our economy and security 
but to the economic health of the free world. 

In this exciting task your profession will play 
a special role — in many ways a basic role. Our 
country's greatness owes much to the past labors 
of the geologist. In the future your efforts will 
assist not only the continuing growth of our coun- 
try but also more rapid progress toward our ulti- 
mate goal : a world community of nations which 
can cooperate ever more closely in achieving 
needed progress while maintaining the independ- 
ence and strengthening the freedom which this 
progress serves. 



U.S., Canada To Study Development 
of Pembina River Resources 

Press release 222 dated April 4 

The Department of State announced on April 
4 that the Governments of the United States and 
Canada have requested the International Joint 



Commission, United States and Canada, to investi- I 
gate and report on what measures could be taken to 
develop the water resources of the Pembina River 
in the State of North Dakota and the Province of 
Manitoba. 

The International Joint Commission was estab- 
lished pursuant to the terms of the Boundary Wa- 
ters Treaty of 1909 in order to facilitate the set- 
tlement of questions of mutual interest to the 
United States and Canada in the general field of 
boundary waters and related matters. 

Tliis new reference has been made by the Gov- 
ernments in the light of the conclusion of the Com- 
mission that detailed feasibility studies concerning j 
possible development of the Pembina River basin ' 
should be imdertaken. The Commission has been 
requested by the Governments to determine what 
plan or plans of cooperative development of the 
water resources of the Pembina River basin would 
be practicable, economically feasible, and to the 
mutual advantage of both countries. The Com- 
mission is asked to bear in mind the requirements 
of domestic water supply and sanitation, control of 
floods, irrigation, and any other beneficial uses of 
these waters. The Governments have further 
asked the Commission, in the event that it finds a 
plan or plans meeting these criteria, to make rec- 
ommendations concerning the choice and imple- 
mentation of such plan or plans. 



United States and Canada Withdraw 
Study on Niagara Falls 

Press release 233 dated April 9 

The Department of State announced on AprU 9 
that the Governments of the United States and 
Canada have amended the Niagara Reference 
which was made to the International Joint Com- 
mission on May 5, 1961.' 

At the request of the Power Authority of the 
State of New York and the Hydro-Electric Power 
Commission of Ontario in a joint brief submitted 
on March 15, 1961, the Governments of the United 
States and Canada in the joint reference of May 5, 
1961, included a request for the International 
Joint Commission to report whether, without 



" Ibid., Jan. 29, 19G2, p. 159. 
728 



' For background and text of the reference, see Buixk- 
TiN of July 3, 1961, 11. 43. 

Department of Slate Bulletin 



detriment to the scenic beauty of Niagara Falls, 
the flows over the falls could be less than those 
now specified in the Niagara Treaty of 1950. 

The Govermnent of the United States was re- 
cently informed that the Power Authority of the 
State of New York was withdrawing its request 
for a study of this matter. The Canadian Govern- 
ment received a similar request from the Provin- 
cial Secretary of the Province of Ontario on be- 
half of the Ilydro-Electric Power Commission of 
Ontario. 

The Governments of the United States and 
Canada have, in view of these parallel requests, 
agreed to amend the Niagara Reference of 1961 
by deleting the request of Governments for a study 
of this matter. 



President Salutes Role of IJC 
in U.S.-Canadian Relations 

Statement hy President Kennedy ^ 

Fifty years ago today the International Joint 
Commission, a body provided for by the Interna- 
tional Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, held its 
first semiannual meeting. This institution, which 
was created with the objective of resolving ami- 
cably disputes and problems confronting the two 
nations with regard to the lakes and rivers com- 
mon to both of them, has had a distinguished rec- 
ord. It has set a standard for later organizations 
created by Canada and the United States for the 
resolution of problems and for the development 
of conunon policies. The International Joint 
Commission has worked on a very large number 
of problems and projects dealing with water re- 
sources. The Commission's studies and recom- 
mendations have served as a basis for important 
agreements which have brought great profit to 
both the United States and Canada. 

These quiet but important efforts deserve recog- 
nition, as do the present Chairman of the United 
States Section of the International Joint Commis- 
sion, the Honorable Teno Roncalio, and his Com- 



missioners, and the distinguished Chairman of the 
Canadian Section, General Andrew G. L. Mc- 
Naughton, and his colleagues. It is certainly the 
hope of everyone that the International Joint 
Commission will, in the next half century, con- 
tinue its record of outstanding achievement. 



President Kennedy Greets Philippines 
on Bataan Day 

Following is the text of a message from Presi- 
dent Kennedy to Diosdado Macapagal, President 
of the Republic of the Philippines. 

White House press release dated April 9 

April 9, 1962 
Dear Mr. President : On this day, we and mil- 
lions of our fellow citizens will recall the sacrifices 
of the heroes who were so sorely tested just twenty 
years ago on Bataan and Corregidor. Although 
physically defeated, their devotion to our common 
democratic principles added new meaning to those 
ideals and made possible the ultimate triumph of 
freedom and democracy in a vast area of the world. 
Our peoples are again united in spirit and in 
arms in a similar struggle against a new and much 
more subtle form of imperialism which would 
enslave us. Let no one overlook the lesson of 
Bataan that the strength of our common heritage 
of courage and devotion will prevail to bring free 
choice and justice to mankind. 

I look forward with pleasure to the opportunity 
the people of the United States soon will have to 
express personally to you ^ and to the people of 
the Philippines their gratification and pride in 
the enduring partnership which carried us through 
the dark days of two decades ago to our present 
mutual pursuit of peaceful economic and social 
progress. 

Sincerely yours, 

John F. Elennedt 



' Made on Apr. 2 in observance of the 50th anniversary 
of the inaugural meeting of the U.S.-Canada Interna- 
tional Joint Commission (White House press release). 



' The White House announced on Mar. 30 that Presi- 
dent Macapagal will visit the United States June 19-28 ; 
for test of the announcement, see Bulletin of Apr. 23, 
1962, p. 665. 



April 30, 1962 



7129 



Refugees Here and Around the World 



hy Michel Gieflinski 

Acting Administrator^ Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs ^ 



It is a distinct honor and pleasure for me to par- 
ticipate in this conference devoted to considera- 
tion of the i^roblems of immigration and refugees. 
Because of the scope of the topic assigned to me, 
I shall be able to give you little more than the 
highlights of each of the problems. 

Let me take a few minutes to describe some of 
the responsibilities of the Department of State 
and consular officers abroad in the administration 
of our immigration laws. As you Iniow, all immi- 
grants who want to come to the United States must 
be in possession of visas. These visas are issued 
by American consular officers stationed in foreign 
countries after they determine that an applicant 
qualifies for a visa under existing law and that 
a quota number is available to him if he is sul)ject 
to quota restrictions. 

The Department has been making great efforts 
to select carefully those officers who deal with visa 
applicants and to train them so that these officers 
not only understand the law but also the problems 
each alien may have who applies for a visa. Sonie 
500,000 visas are issued each year. As yon also 
know, once an immigrant arrives at a port of entry 
he is doublechecked by officers of the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service — an arm of tlie De- 
partment of Justice. An infinitesimal niiinber of 
aliens holding visas are excluded at ports of entry 
(less than 100 of some 1,500,000 aliens asking for 
admission, many of them repeatei-s). Tiiis is the 
best illustration that our officers do a comj-ietent 
job in screening visa applicants. 

During the past few years our efforts have been 
concentrated on eliminating redtape in the issuing 



' Address mnde before the Indiana Iinmifrrntion Con- 
forcnff .'It Indianapolis, Ind., on Apr. 3 (press release 
212 dated Apr. 2). 



of visas. Without sacrifice to the enforcement of 
our laws, we have streamlined and simplified ap- 
plication forms and visa procedures. 

The groups represented here, of course, are in- 
terested in modernizing our immigration laws. 
It must be recognized that changes in the immigra- 
tion laws traditionally have not taken place over- 
night but by a gradual development. Many of the 
changes which have taken place since the enact- 
ment of the Immigration and Nationality Act in 
1952 were suggested originally by the Department I 
of State. The elimination of fingerprinting of 
visitors and the elimination of the question for- 
merly put to every applicant for an immigrant or 
visitor visa as to his race and ethnic classification 
are two of the more important changes in this 
category. 

Of course the Department's interest in changes 
in our immigration laws is prompted by its con- 
cern with our foreign relations. As you know, 
existing law accords nonquota status to most, but 
not all, countries in the Western Hemispliere. 
Foreign policy considerations prompted the De- 
partment to emphasize the importance of placing 
all independent countries within the Western 
Hemisphere on equal footing by according them 
nonquota status. 

Those of you who are interested in some of the 
Department's views on immigration legislation 
may want to read the letter the Department ad- 
dressed to Senator [Kennetli B.] Keating on Sep- 
tember 12, 1961, which was printed in the Congres- 
sional Record on the same date. The points raised 
in this letter by no means cover the entire range 
of the Department's concern with various pro- 
visions of the immigration laws, but it is the De- 
partment's policy to make its views Icnown only to 



730 



Department of Slate Bulletin 



ICongress, in rej^ly to requests for comments on 
landing legislation or in formal presentations, 
when occasion arises. 

A bill - of great interest to the Department, in- 
troduced by Congressman [Francis E.] Walter 
and passed by the House, is now before the Senate. 
This bill among other things would provide for 
an important reorganization of the Bureau of Se- 
curity and Consular Affairs which, if accom- 
plished, in my opinion would go far in improving 
its efficiency. It would authorize continuation of 
the Department's refugee and migration programs 
as well as the Department of Plealth, Education, 
and Welfare Cuban refugee activities. In addi- 
tion it would extend indefinitely the provision of 
P.L. 86-648 to permit continued admission of a 
limited number of refugees under the parole 
process. 

Other migration and refugee legislative pro- 
posals have been introduced into both the Senate 
and the House. You are doubtless familiar with 
many of them, particularly the measures intro- 
duced by Senators [Philip A.] Hart, [Claiborne] 
Pell, and [Thomas J.] Dodd. 

Aid to European Refugees 

In view of the limits of time it would be im- 
possible for me to give you a detailed inventory 
of all the refugee problems existing in the world 
today. For the same reason I could not outline 
all of the public and private efforts being expended 
in behalf of these refugees. At best I can identify 
for you here today only the most pressing of these 
problems and make a brief comment as to the 
various programs being conducted in their behalf. 

On a global basis there are those who have used 
a figure of 12.5 million refugees. This figure lacks 
validity in that it fails to include some recent 
gi-oups, particularly the newly developing refugees 
in Africa, while it includes large groups of earlier 
refugees whom I believe are now firmly integrated 
into the areas to which they have been resettled. 
Actually the world refugee problem today, in 
terms of refugees who have not yet been reestab- 
lished on a satisfactory basis, is in the neighbor- 
hood of 3.5 million persons. 

The refugee groups best known to most of you 
are the anti-Communist refugees and escapees in 
Europe. Of this group the Hungarians made the 



= H.R. 11079. 



most dramatic impression on the free world. I am 
happy to tell you that by dint of the conscientious 
and generous help of the U.S. Government and 
other governments of the free world, aided by the 
dedicated voluntary agencies and private citizens 
of this and other countries, the problem of the 
older refugees in Europe is well on its way to solu- 
tion. Through the efforts of the U.N. High Com- 
missioner for Refugees, assisted by the almost 
global response to the World Eefugee Year em- 
phasis, there remain only 9,000 refugees in official 
refugee camps in Europe. The UNHCR has plans 
and funds to resettle or provide permanent solu- 
tions for all of these persons who have lived so 
long in drab and sordid camps. 

There still remain in Europe approximately 
50,000 out-of-camp refugees, most of whom require 
varying degrees of assistance in becoming reestab- 
lished. The generous world response to these 
refugees coupled with the greatly improved eco- 
nomic situation in most of the European countries 
has resulted in a virtual miracle by solving most 
of the vast refugee problems in Europe, including 
the 200.000 Hungarians who escaped to freedom. 

The Federal Republic of Germany has achieved 
unbelievable success in absorbing well over 13% 
million expellees, displaced persons, refugees, and 
escapees. In the West German economy refugees 
have become an asset rather than a liability. I 
hasten to add, however, that the refugee problem 
in Germany as well as elsewhere in Europe is not 
static. East Zone refugees still find ways of es- 
caping to West Germany in spite of the diabolic 
wall erected in Berlin and the increased control 
measures resorted to by the puppet East German 
regime calling itself a sovereign government. 
Escapees from the Soviet Union, Poland, Czecho- 
slovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Al- 
bania still manage to penetrate the tight border 
controls established by the Communists to make 
sure that their oppressed peoples remain in their 
self-proclaimed "workers' paradise." Large num- 
bers of Yugoslavs continue to arrive in Italy, 
Austria, Greece, and other European countries. 

The flow of escapees and refugees will continue 
so long as the Communists pursue their attempts 
to deny individual freedom and to subject all men 
to a common mold of belief or endeavor. I must 
call your attention at this point to the fact that not 
only are the Communists responsible for the con- 
ditions which create refugees, but they continue to 



April 30, 1962 



731 



engage in a costly and widespread program of 
propaganda and intrigue among the emigree 
groups in an effort to discredit the humanitarian 
motives of the free West. 

The United States will continue to assist these 
new arrivals tlirough its United States Escapee 
Program (USEP). It is of interest to note that 
the escapee program has just celebrated its 10th 
anniversary. During the 10 years of its existence 
USEP has assisted a total of 926,000 escapees 
from Communist and Communist-dominated 
countries. They have been given food, clothing, 
medical and dental care, language and vocational 
training, counseling, and many other benefits. Of 
this almost 1 million persons, one-third, or 330,000, 
have been helped to become mtegrated into the 
countries granting them initial asylum and an- 
other 157,000 have been successfully resettled in 
some 48 countries. Through its generous support 
of the Intergovernmental Committee for Euro- 
pean Migration (ICEM) and the UNHCE, the 
United States will continue its help to these recent 
escapees and to the residual group of older refu- 
gees still in need of our help. 

Refugees From Communist China and Cuba 

Another group of anti-Communist refugees to 
which the United States has made significant con- 
tributions botli public and private are the more 
than a million refugees from Eed China presently 
in Hong Kong. In spite of the magnificent job 
which the Hong Kong Colonial Government is 
doing for these refugees, who make up one-third 
of the Colony's population, there still is need for 
additional aid from international sources. The 
needs to be met encompass housing, medical and 
clinical services, education, and in many instances 
food and clothing. In addition to a liberal World 
Refugee Year contribution for construction of a 
refugee center, schools, and clinics, the United 
States provides annually approximately $1 million 
in cash and surplus foods estimated at $5 million 
for these refugees. 

External resettlement of these refugees is not 
the solution except for a relatively few who will 
find migration opportunities. The answer lies in 
their being assimilated into the economy of Hong 
Kong. This process will continue to be required 
for those already there and more importantly for 
the estimated 50,000 arriving each year. 



Another 50,000 Chinese refugees present a seri- 
ous problem to the authorities in Macau. Assist- 
ance to this group is limited and consists primarily 
of U.S. help. 

A relatively small but highly significant prob- 
lem is that of the White Russian refugees arriving 
in Hong Kong from Red China. Over 20,000 of 
these refugees, who are fleeing communism for the 
second time, have already been resettled by ICEM 
and the UNHCR, and some 0,000 still in Cliina are 
expected to come out over the next several years. 
The United States has contributed substantially 
to this resettlement program and will continue to 
do so until the problem is finally resolved. 

The 60,000 Tibetans who have escaped the Com- 
munist Chinese takeover of their country and are 
now in India and Nepal represent one of the most 
pitifiil groups of refugees anywhere in the world. 
Limited private aid has gone into both India and 
Nepal. The United States has made available 
both surplus food and cash to meet as many of the 
needs as possible. United States fimds are being 
used to augment private funds in helping to re- 
locate Tibetan young people and children in 
Europe, particularly in Switzerland, where a Swiss 
organization is doing a splendid job in attempting 
to extend vocational training and imderstanding • 
of Western culture to develop these young Tibet- ' 
ans into future leaders. 

Most of you are aware at least to some degree 
of the more than 100,000 Cuban refugees who have 
fled to this country to escape the oppression and 
totalitarian measures forced upon them and their 
peace-loving relatives by Castro and his Com- 
munist henchmen. The United States has now 
become a country of first asylum and finds itself 
confronted with the same problems and expenses 
of helping a large number of refugees which have 
been faced by other countries abroad. 

Voluntary agencies and citizens' groups are 
helping tlie Department of Health, Education, 
and Welfare to cope with this stupendous prob- 
lem. The primary difficulty lies in reducing the 
burden on the State of Florida, Dade County, and 
the City of Miami, where the bulk of these proud 
and able people are congested. Their numbers, if ! 
distributed over the country, would present prac- 
ticall}^ no problem from a housing, employment, 
or welfare standpoint, but localized as they are in 
Florida and in New York City these refugees are 
creating serious social, economic, and political 



732 



Deparfment of Sfa/e Bullefin 



problems the solution to which requires immediate 
and careful resettlement throughout the country. 
Each conununity must become as generous as it 
was in accepting Hungarians by providing for its 
share of these close friends and violently anti- 
Conmiunist neighbors. 

Victims of Political Stalemates 

The victims of political stalemate, more than a 
million Palestine refugees continue to present a 
pathetic picture in the several Middle East coun- 
tries. The solution to their problem presents some 
of the most politically sensitive issues facing the 
United Nations. Until these issues can be resolved 
the problem will remain acute and the present re- 
lief program of the United Nations Eelief and 
Works Agency (UNRWA) must continue. The 
United States supports this Agency to approxi- 
mately 70 percent of its annual $35 million budget. 

The Director of UNRWA has recently launched 
an appeal for funds to increase and intensify the 
vocational training facilities for the young people 
of this pathetic gi'oup. Since the limited pro- 
grams of this type have had excellent results, it 
is hoped that the approximately 3,000 young men 
now being helped to secure jobs and independence 
can be increased materially. 

Within recent weeks the future of the more than 
300,000 Algerian refugees in Tunisia and Morocco 
seems more hopeful. These refugees, consisting 
mainly of women, children, and elderly men, were 
forced from the war areas in Algeria. They have 
been cared for by the combined efforts of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
and the League of Red Cross Societies. The United 
States has been a primary supporter of these ac- 
tivities both in cash and in large supplies of sur- 
plus foods. 

A cease-fire in Algeria will not in itself end the 
problems of these refugees, for as they return to 
their war-damaged farms and desert villages, they 
will be forced to share with more than 2 million 
other Algerians presently displaced within Algeria 
the problems of rehabilitation and of reconstruc- 
tion of their personal economies. I can assure you 
that your Government and other governments 
sympathetic to the plight of these people will do 
the utmost to help these victims of political up- 
heaval achieve as rapidly as possible a return to 
normal livine. 



It is not necessary for me to go into any details 
with reference to the millions of Hindu refugees 
in India and Moslem refugees in Pakistan who 
were created by the partition of India in 1947 and 
subsequent events. The overwhelming bulk of 
these refugees have now been successfully inte- 
grated in their countries of present residence, and 
the authorities in these countries are actively pur- 
suing similar solution for the relatively small 
residual numbers. I can also mention that the 
more than 850,000 North Vietnamese moved from 
the presently Communist-controlled areas in North 
Viet-Nam have been so successfully integrated 
into South Viet-Nam that they no longer con- 
stitute a problem. Similar success can be reported 
for the North Korean refugees in South Korea. 

Scattered elsewhere throughout the world but 
particularly in Southeast Asia are pockets of refu- 
gees, mostly Chinese who are in varying degrees 
of need but also including 50,000 anti-Communist 
Laotian refugees in Laos who have been displaced 
from their tribal homes by Communist guerrilla 
activity and for whom the United States is pro- 
viding emergency assistance. 

In Africa the historic march toward independ- 
ence of states which for generations have been 
colonial possessions has more often than not been 
accompanied by strife and political upheaval, 
creating new refugee problems of serious pro- 
portions. More than 150,000 refugees fled from 
Angola to the Republic of the Congo, while within 
the Congo over 300,000 Baluba refugees have re- 
quired relief assistance in the provinces of Ka- 
tanga and Kasai. Elsewhere tens of thousands of 
other refugee tribesmen present similar prob- 
lems—in Togo, Ruanda-Urundi, Uganda, and 
Tanganyika. In all of these the U.S. Government, 
operating as much as possible through the United 
Nations, the League of Red Cross Societies, and 
the UNHCR, has poured in surplus food items and 
assisted with cash contributions where required. 

Need for Continuing Refugee Aid 

You may ask, why nmst the United States feel 
it necessary to support refugee programs to the 
extent it does? Or you may want an answer to 
the question of how long will new refugee prob- 
lems continue to emerge. Is there any hope that 
the day will come when there will be no refugee 



April 30, 1962 



733 



problems to challenge the conscience and command 
the attention of civilized mankind ? 

The answer to the latter is simpler. As long as 
modifications in political entities are made and 
geographic boundaries are changed, each bringing 
with it inevitable changes in leadership and fol- 
lowers, there will be those who are forced or choose 
to flee to escape political persecution or economic 
oppression. As long as tliere are totalitarian re- 
gimes whether Communist or any other form of 
despotism there will be refugees and escapees in 
need of a helping hand. I have mentioned the 
great achievements made in reducing the stagger- 
ing numbers of displaced persons, refugees, and 
escapees. I have called your attention to the fact 
that the refugee problem is not static. Therefore, 
my answer must be that until mankind finds the 
formula to live in complete peace and harmony 
one with another, and when the dignity of man is 
given due and proper recognition, then and then 
only will the problems of refugees vanish. 

The interest of the United States Government 
and the interest of the American people in refu- 
gees is as natural as the American way of life. I 
believe President Kennedy gave the best answer 
to this question in his letter last July to the Con- 
gress in explanation of his requested refugee and 
migration legislation : ' 

The United States, consistent with the traditional 
humanitarian regard of the American people for the in- 
dividual and for his right to a life of dignity and self- 
fulfillment, should continue to express in a practical way 
its concern and friendship for individuals in free-world 
countries abroad who are uprooted and unsettled as the 
result of political conditions or military action. 

The successful re-establlshment of refugees, who for 
political, racial, religious or other reasons are unable or 
unwilling to return to their country of origin or of 
nationality under conditions of freedom, dignity, and self- 
respect, is importantly related to free-world political 
objectives. These objectives are : (a) continuation of the 
provision of asylum and friendly assistance to the op- 
pressed and persecuted; (b) the extension of hope and 
encouragement to the victims of communism and other 
forms of despotism, and the promotion of faith among 
the captive populations in the purposes and processes of 
freedom and democracy; (c) the exemplification by free 
citizens of free countries, through actions and sacrifices, 
of the fundamental humanitarianisra which constitutes 
the basic dllTeretice between free and captive societies. 

Some refugee problems are of such order of magnitude 
that they comprise an undue liurden upon the economies 
of the countries harboring the refugees in the first iu- 



" For text, see Bulletin of Aug. 7, 1!)t;i . p. 2.".". 
734 



stance, requiring international assistance to relieve such 
countries of these burdens. 

It is for these reasons that the United States 
since the end of World War II has admitted more 
than 800,000 refugees, escapees, and displaced per- 
sons. During that same period the United States 
has expended over $1.5 billion in direct appropria- 
tions for refugee programs in addition to other 
assistance provided indirectly through our foreign 
aid programs in behalf of countries affording 
asylum to refugees. 

These then are the highlights of the problems 
of refugees here and around the world. 



Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

87th Congress, 1st Session 

Cuban Refugee Problems. Hearings before the Sub- 
committee To Investigate Problems Connected With 
Refugees and Escapees of the Senate .Judiciary Com- 
mittee. December 6-13, 19C1. 304 pp. 

Center for Cultural and Technical Interchange Between 
East and West (East- West Center). Hearings before 
the Subcommittee on State Department Organization 
and Foreign Operations of the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee. December 13-January 8, 1!X)2. 364 pp. 

Report of the Fifth Meeting of the Canada-United States 
Interparliamentary Group, June S-9, 1961. Reiwrt sub- 
mitted by Cornelius E. Gallagher, chairman of the 
House delegation. H. Rept. 1207. February 5, 1962. 
7 pp. 

87th Congress, 2d Session 

Impact of Imports and Exports on Employment (Agri- 
cultural Products, Chemicals, Oil, Machinery. Motion 
Pictures, Transportation, and Other Industries). Hear- 
ings before the Subcommittee on the Impact of Imports 
and Exports on American Employment. Part 8. 
November 27, 1961-January 5, 1962. 1055 pp. 

Latin American and Ilnitefl States Policies. Report of 
Senator Mike Mansfield on a study mission to Latin 
America. January 13. 1962. 85 pp. [Committee print] 

Mexican Farm Labor Program. Hearing before the Sub- 
committee on Equipment, Supplies, and Manpower of 
the House Agriculture Committee. January 19, 1962. 
46 pp. 

Report on Audit of the Export-ImiKirt Bank of Washing- 
ton for Fiscal Year 1!K>1. II. Doc. 308. January 23, 
19(i2. 42 pp. 

Economic Policies and Programs in South .\merica. Re- 
port submitted by the Sulicoinmittee on Inter-American 
Economic Relationships to the Joint Economic Commit- 
tee. January 24, 1962. 123 i)p. 

.Tanuary 1962 I5conoinic Report of the President. Hear- 
ings before the Joint Economic Committee. January 
2.>-February 8, 1962. 845 pp. 

Review of the .Vdministration of the Trading With the 
Enemy Act. Reiiort to accompany S. Res. 268. S. Rept 
1161. January ;n. 1962. 3 jip. 

Consular Affairs and StM'urit.v Administration in the 
Department of St.'ite. Hearings before Subcommittee 
No. 1 of the House Judiciary Committee on H.R. 9904, a 
bill to amend swtion 104 of the Immigraticm and Na- 
tionality Act, and for other purposes. January 31- 
February 2, 1962. 48 i)p. 

Deparfment of Sfate Bulletin 



INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES 



Security Council Calls Upon Israel and Syria 
To Observe Armistice Agreement 



Following are a statement made in the U.N. Se- 
curity Council on April 6 iy Charles W. Yost, 
Deputy U.S. Representative in the Security Coun- 
cil, and the text of a resolution adopted by the 
Council on April 9. 

STATEMENT BY MR. YOST 

U.S. /U.N. press release 3971 

I wish to speak briefly now to explain the draft 
resolution ^ wliicli has been introduced by the dele- 
gations of the United Kingdom and the United 
States and which was referred to yesterday [April 
5] by Ambassador Dean." 

I believe the preamble is self-explanatorj', and I 
therefore propose to discuss only the operative 
paragraplis. 

The first operative paragraph deplores the hos- 
tile exchanges between Syria and Israel which 
started on March 8 and calls upon them to comply 
with their obligations under article 2, paragrapli 
4, of the charter by refraining from the tlireat as 
well as the use of force. 

This paragraph deplores the exchanges without 
assessing blame because the United Nations Truce 
Supervision Organization was unable to determine 
who initiated the firing on any of the occasions 
prior to the attack of 16 March. Tliis is in large 
part due to the fact that the parties, and partic- 
ularly Israel, have placed obstacles in the way of 
effective circulation and observation by the United 
Xations organization. It does, however, appear 
from the report ^ that, wliatever initial firing there 
may have been with small weapons and whoever 
started it, the level of the engagement was raised 



'U.N. doc. S/5110 and Corr. 1. 

^ Arthur H. De.in. U.S. Representative to the 18-nation 
disarmament conference at Geneva. 
°U.N. doe. S/.'JKG. 



by Syria starting on March 8 to that of artillery 
fire, apparently of 80 mm. guns. It aLso appears 
from the report, that artillery and mortars were 
used by both parties on subsequent occasions. 
Whatever the origin of tlie events, therefore, it is 
obvious that artillery weapons were placed in the 
Defensive Area in violation of tlie Armistice 
Agreement and that they were used against Israeli- 
controlled territory on March 8 and subsequently. 
The prospect of escalation of minor incidents when 
artilleiy is employed is only too obvious. This 
sort, of military action cannot be condoned when 
United Nations machinery is available. 

At the same time we note that Israel also ap- 
parently employed 20 mm. weapons in these en- 
gagements, at least in those after March 8. Both 
the presence and the use of such a weapon in the 
Defensive Area is also in violation of the Armistice 
Agi-eement. 

Israel and Syria Reminded of Cliarter Obligations 

In addition to deploring these hostile engage- 
ments and the use of such weapons, the paragraph 
also reminds the governments concerned of tlieir 
obligations under article 2, paragraph 4, of the 
charter. Both parties have on this occasion used 
force contrary to that article. In addition there 
were provocative statements by each party which, 
at the very least, were not calculated to assure the 
other of its peaceful intentions. We appeal to both 
Governments to make every effort to restore peace 
and security in the area and to utilize the utmost 
caution in their pronoimcements and statements. 

Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the resolution concern 
the Israeli assault of the night of March 16-17 — 
an assault the nature and origin of whicli are not 
contested. According to tlie announcement of the 
Israeli Defense Force itself, Israel on that night 
assaulted Syrian positions north of Nuqeib. Tliis 



April 30, 1962 



735 



was clearly a reverse to a policy of armed and 
large-scale retaliation repeatedly condemned by 
the Comicil in 1955 and 1956. Inasmuch as there 
is an impartial and long-established alternative to 
such action, through the machinery of the United 
Nations, there can be no justification for a policy 
of retaliation. The Security Council has con- 
sistently condemned such attacks even when prior 
but less serious violations by the other party have 
been confinned by the Chief of Staff. 

In the light of this situation, paragraph 3 de- 
termines that the Israeli attack on March 16-17 
constituted a flagrant violation of the Security 
Coimcil resolution of 19 Januaiy 1956,* which con- 
demned Israeli retaliatory action of this sort. This 
attack was of the same order as previous attacks 
and has been so dealt with in the resolution we 
have submitted. 

The fact that the attack of March 16 was a 
large-scale operation is apparent not only from 
the annoimcement made of it by the Israeli mili- 
tary sources themselves but also from the number 
of men involved and the number of lives and 
armored vehicles lost. There is no indication that 
the ground attack carried into Syria proper, but 
Israeli planes apparently bombed Syrian territory 
and the Israeli Defense Force announcement gave 
no indication that the operation was intended to 
be restricted to the Demilitarized Zone. This ac- 
tion was a most serious breach of the Armistice 
Agreement and a flagrant violation of paragraph 
2 of the resolution of January 19, 1956, in which 
the Council condemned retaliatory raids. 

Israel should be called on scrupulously to re- 
frain from such actions in the future. The Coun- 
cil's position on that point must be absolutely 
clear if the peace of the area is to be preserved. 

This expresses the attitude we believe the Coun- 
cil should take both toward the events between 
March 8 and 16 and the events of that night. It 
is important that (he parties understand the firm 
view of the Security Council that it is incumbent 
upon them both to abide scrupulously by the pro- 
visions of tlie Armistice Agreement and that the 
United Nations denounces and is prepared to take 
measures appropriate to the situation both against 
small-scale harassment and against the serious 
dangers involved in retaliation. 



Need To Strengthen UNTSO Machinery 

We could perhaps be accused — if there were no 
alternative — of adopting an attitude of unreality 
in opposing retaliatory military action in the light 
of the inherent right of self-defense enjoyed by 
sovereign nations. However, there is an alterna- 
tive and an alternative which nowhere in the 
world is more readily available than on the borders 
between Israel and its Arab neighbors. This al- 
ternative is the peacekeeping machinery of the 
United Nations. This machinery has not been 
employed sufficiently and thoroughly enough in 
the present and in past instances. Not only has 
the United Nations machinery in the area been 
hampered in obtaining the facilities and freedom 
of operation which would have made both detec- 
tion and deterrence of the events between March 8 
and 16 more effective, but the retaliatory action 
of March 16 was taken entirely without prior re- 
course either to the Mixed Armistice machinery 
or the Security Council — the political bodies 
charged with responsibility for the peace. The 
capabilities of this machinery and equally the 
political intention to use it need to be improved 
to prevent such situations in the future. 

The rest of the resolution therefore deals with 
what should be done in order to strengthen this 
machinery. In particular we would urge Israel, 
which feels it was provoked in the present situa- 
tion, to extend its full cooperation to the United 
Nations Truce Supervision Organization and to 
the United Nations military observers so tliat they 
may in the future readily detect and report to the 
world on the origin of incidents and, even more 
hopefully, by their presence deter them from 
starting in the first instance. We would urge 
Israel in the most stringent terms to resort to the 
Mixed Armistice Commission and to the Security 
Council in accordance with its obligations under 
the charter instead of resorting to the use of force. 

In connection with the improvement of United 
Nations capabilities in the area, I would like to 
commend General von Horn " and his able col- 
leagues on their excellent performance of duties 
on belialf of the United Nations under unusually 
difficult circumstances. The Chief of Stall's pres- 
ence during our deliberations has been of consid- 
erable assistance to the Council in its consideration 



* For text, see Bulletin of Jan. 30, 1950, p. 183. 
736 



• Gen. Carl Cnrlssou von Horn, Chief of Staff, U.N. Truce 
Supervision Organization. 

Departmenf of State Bulletin 



of the complex factors involved. General voii 
Horn and his entire staff deserve the gratitude 
and the unstinting support of the members of the 
United Nations, most of all that of Israel and its 
Arab neighbors. 

As was revealed in General von Horn's report, 
and more precisely spelled out in his responses to 
the questions put to him by members of the Coim- 
cil, the observation facilities available to the 
United Nations Truce Supervision Organization 
in the Tiberias region are insufficient to insure the 
proper exercise of the Truce Supervision Organi- 
zation's tranquilizing role. The new observation 
post at El Koursi will help considerably in this 
regard. It is the sincere hope of my Government 
that the Israeli and Syrian authorities will coop- 
erate wholeheartedly with the Chief of Staff in 
the working out of the further arrangements he 
has recommended. Certainly it is necessai-y that 
the Truce Supervision Organization observers be 
permitted to move fi'eely and rapidly anywhere in 
the Defensive Area, and we endorse the mobile 
observation arrangements which he has proposed 
believing that they can be particularly valuable. 

The United Nations Truce Supervision Organ- 
ization's machinery was sorely tested by events of 
mid-March. The Chief of Staff has informed us 
of gaps in his organization revealed by these 
sudden demands. Tlie United States urges that 
deficiencies noted by General von Horn be made 
up at once and that the parties move quickly to 
comply with his requests for greater cooperation. 

In the light of such factors the resolution en- 
dorses the measure recommended by the Chief of 
Staff both in his first report and his supplementary 
report to the Security Council. It calls on the 
Israeli and Syrian authorities to assist him in 
their implementation. Any additional measures 
which the parties may recommend and which the 
Chief of Staff thinks would be useful would of 
course also be welcome. 

The resolution also calls for strict observance 
of the provisions of the Armistice Agreement con- 
cerning the Demilitarized Zone and the Defensive 
Area. For many years there have been violations 
of these provisions, some major and some minor. 
An explicit adherence to the agreement by both 
sides would remove the danger of conflicts in the 
area, and we urge both Syria and Israel to coop- 
erate in eliminating any violations. 

Finally, we have included a paragraph with a 



general call upon both parties to cooperate fully 
with the Chief of Staff in his responsibilities and 
which urges that all necessary steps Ixi taken for 
reactivating the Mixed Armistice Commission and 
for making full use of the Mixed Armistice ma- 
chinery. Particularly we believe that Israel 
should return to the Mixed Armistice Commission, 
in which it has not participated since 1951, and 
that it should make full use of its procedures when- 
ever it feels provocations have occurred. 

If the parties cooperate fully with the United 
Nations instrumentalities in the area and with the 
Security Council, we are confident that peaceful 
conditions can be maintained, that the number of 
minor incidents can be severely reduced, and that 
any incidents which start can be detected and 
brought to an end promptly without resort to 
force. This is the sure path to peaceful conditions, 
and we urge both parties to follow it scrupulously 
and consistently. 



TEXT OF RESOLUTION < 

Tlic Security Council, 

Recalling its resolutions of 15 July 1948 and 18 May 
1051, 

Having considered the report of the Chief of Staff of 
the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization on the 
military activities in the Lake Tiberias area and in the 
Demilitarized Zone, 

Having heard the statements of the representatives of 
the Syrian Arab Republic and Israel, 

Being deeply concerned over developments in the area 
which have taken place in violation of the Charter and 
of the Armistice Agreement, 

Recalling in particular the pi-ovisions of Article 2, para- 
grai)h 4 of the Charter, and Article 1 of the Syrian-Israeli 
General Armistice Agreement, 

Noting with gatisfaction that a cease-fire has been 
achieved, 

1. Deplores the hostile exchanges between the Syrian 
Arab Republic and Israel starting on 8 March 1962 and 
calls upon the two Governments concerned to comply 
with their obligations under Article 2, paragraph 4 of the 
Charter by refraining from the threat as well as the use 
of force ; 

2. Rcafflrms the Security Council resolution of 19 
.Tanuary 1956 which condemned Israeli military action in 
breach of the General Armistice Agreement, whether or 
not undertaken by way of retaliation ; 

3. Determines that the Israeli attack of 16-17 March 



' U.N. doc. S/5111 ( S/5110 and Corr. 1 ) ; adopted by 
the Security Council on Apr. 9 by a vote of 10-0, with 1 
abstention (France). 



April 30, 1962 



737 



1962 constitutes a flagrant violation of that resolution 
and calls upon Israel scrupulously to refrain from such 
action in the future; 

4. Endorses the measures recommended by the Chief of 
Staff for the strengthening of the Truce Supervision 
Organization in its tasks of maintaining and restoring 
the peace and of detecting and deterring future incidents, 
and calls upon the Israeli and Syrian authorities to assist 
the Chief of Staff in their early implementation; 

5. Calls upon both parties to abide scrupulously by the 
cease-fire arranged by the Chief of Staff on 17 March 
1962; 

6. Calls for strict observance of article 5 of the General 
Armistice Agreement which provides for the exclusion of 
armed forces from the Demilitarized Zone and Aimex 4 
of that Agreement which sets limits on forces in the 
Defensive Area, and calls upon the Governments of Israel 
and the Syrian Arab Republic to co-operate with the 
Chief of Staff in eliminating any violations thereof; 

7. Calls upon the Governments of Israel and of the 
Syrian Arab Republic to co-operate with the Chief of 
Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization in carrying 
out his resjionsibilities under the General Armistice 
Agreement and the pertinent resolutions of the Security 
Council and urges that all steps necessary for reactivat- 
ing the Mixed Armistice Commission and for making full 
use of the Mixed Armistice machinery be promptly taken ; 

8. Requests the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision 
Organization to report as appropriate concerning the 
situation. 



Current U. N. Documents: 
A Selected Bibliography 



Mimeographed or processed documents (stich as those 
listed helmc) may be consulted at depository libraries 
in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be 
purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, 
United Nations Plaza, N.Y. 



Security Council 

Letter dated January 11, 1962, from the Pakistani repre- 
sentative to the President of the Security Council con- 
cerning Kashmir. S/.'JOSS. January 12, 1902. 2 pp. 

Letter dated January 16, 1962, from the Indian repre- 
sentative addressed to the President of the Security 
Council concerning Kashmir. S/5060. January 16, 
1962. 2 pp. 

Letter dated January 18, 1962, from the Notherland repre- 
sentative addressed to the Acting Secretary-General 
concerning New Guinea. S/5062. January 18, 1962. 
3 pp. 

Communications concerning the situation in the Congo. 
S/.5064, January 25, 1962, 2 pp. ; H/r>(H]r>, January 27, 
1962, 4 pp.; S/.'jOO.VAdd. 1, January 29, 1',l(;2, 1 p.; 
S/.5066, January 29, 1962, 1 p.; S/5072, January 31, 
1962, 1 p.; S/.'-)078, February 10, 1962, pp. 

Letter dated January 29, 19G2, from the Pakistani repre- 
sentative addressed to the President of the Security 
Council concerning Kashmir. S/5068. January 29, 
1962. 5 pp. 

Letter dated January 31, 19i;2, from the Secretary-General 
of the Organization of American States adilressed to 
the Acting Secretary-General transmitting the Final 



Act of the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers 
of Foreign Affairs, which deals with Communist inter- 
vention in the Western Hemisphere. S/5075. Febru- 
ary 3, 1962. 24 pp. 

Letter dated March 2, 1962, from the Cuban representative 
addressed to the Security Council concerning action 
taken at the OAS Eighth Meeting of Consultation. 
S/5083. March 2, 1962. 4 pp. 

Communications concerning the Lake Tiberias incident 
between Israel and Syria. S/5084, March 2, 1962, 2 pp. ; 
S/5098, March 21, 1962, 2 pp. ; S/5100, March 22, 1962, 
2 pp. ; S/5102, March 26, 1962, 13 pp. ; S/5102/Add. 1, 
March 27, 1962, 1 p. 



General Assembly 

Capital development needs of the less developed coun- 
tries. A/AC.102/5. February 8, 1962. 74 pp. 

Letter dated February 27, 1902, from the Soviet represen- 
tative addressed to the Acting Secretary-General trans- 
mitting text of Premier Khrushchev's message of 
February 21, 1962, to President Kennedy. A/5096. 
February 27, 1962. 11 pp. 

Note verbale dated February 27, 1962, from the U.K. 
representative addressed to the Secretary-General con- 
cerning the future of the Trust Territory of the 
Cameroons under U.K. administration. A/5097. 
March 2, 1962. 6 pp. 

Letter dated March 6, 1962, from the Acting Secretary- 
General addressed to the Chairman of the Committee 
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, transmitting a 
communication dated March 5, 1962, from the U.S. 
representative concerning data on U.S. satellite launch- 
ings. A/AC.105/INF. 1. March 7, 1962. 5 pp. 

Letter datefl March 8, 1962, from the U.S. representative 
addressed to the Acting Secretary-General transmitting 
various documents concerning the IS-nation disarma- 
ment conference at Geneva. A/5099. March 9, 1962. 
8 pp. 

Letter dated March 9, 1962, from the Soviet deputy rep- 
resentative addressed to the Acting Secretary-General 
transmitting text of Premier Khrushchev's message of 
March 3, 1962, to President Kennedy concerning the 18- 
nation disarmament conference. A/5101. March 9, 
1962. 8 pp. 

Letter dated March 10, 1962, from the Soviet deputy 
representative addressed to the Acting Secretary- 
General concerning a nuclear weapons test ban treaty. 
A/5102. March 12, 1962. 3 pp. 

Letter dated March 10, 1962, from the Soviet deputy 
representative addressed to the Acting Secretary- 
General concerning Resolution 1664 (XVI). A/5103. 
March 12, 1962. 5 pp. 

Letter dated March 9, 1962, from the U.K. deputy repre- 
sentative addressed to tie Secretary-General trans- 
mitting texts of messages of Prime Minister Macmillan 
concerning the 18-nation disarmament conference. 
A/51()4. March 12, 1962. 7 pp. 

Note verbale dated March 13, 1962. from the Czechoslovak 
representative addres.sed to the .Vcting Secretary- 
General concerning Resolution 1604 (XVI). A/5106. 
March 22. 1962. 4 pp. 

Letter dated March ICi, 1902, from the Rumanian repre- 
.sontative addressed to the Secretary-General concern- 
ing Resolution 1664 (XVI). A/5107. March 22, 1962. 
4 pp. 



Economic and Social Council 

Commission on the Status of Women. Inheritance lawa 

as thoy affect the status of women. E/CN.6/391. 

January 4, liM">2. 59 pp. 
Commission on the Status of Women. Age of retirement 

and right to i)ension. E/CN.6/394. January 4, 1962. 

132 pp. 



738 



Department of State Bulletin 



TREATY INFORMATION 



in availing themselves of the facilities and services 
of the International Atomic Energy Agency. 

The agreement will become effective after statu- 
tory and constitutional requirements have been 
fulfilled by both Governments. 



Atomic Energy Agreement 
Signed With Colombia 

Press release 231 dated April 9 

Representatives of the Governments of Colom- 
bia and the United States on April 9 signed an 
agreement for cooperation in the peaceful uses of 
atomic energj'. The agreement was signed by Am- 
bassador Carlos Sanz de Santamaria of Colombia. 
Assistant Secretary of State Edwin M. Martin 
signed for the United States. The signing cere- 
mony was held at the Department of State. 

Under the proposed agreement the Governments 
of Colombia and the United States will cooperate 
in a nuclear project to be carried out at Bogota, 
Colombia. This will include the exchange of in- 
formation on the design, construction, and opera- 
tion of nuclear research reactors and their use as 
research, training, development, and engineering 
devices, and in medical therapy. American in- 
dustry would be authorized by the agreement to 
supply appropriate nuclear equipment and related 
services to the Colombian Government or to au- 
thorized individuals or organizations under its 
jurisdiction. 

The proposed agreement also provides that the 
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission may sell or lease 
to the Colombian Government uranium enriched 
up to 20 percent in the isotope U-235 for use in 
research reactors, materials testing reactors, and 
reactor experiments, each capable of operating 
with a fuel load up to 10 kilograms of the isotope 
U-235 contained in such uranium ; or uranium en- 
riched up to 90 percent in the isotope U-235 to 
operate with a fuel load up to 8 kilograms. 
Colombia also will assume responsibility for assur- 
ing that material obtained from the United States 
will be used only for peaceful purposes. The 
agreement further provides for the exchange of 
information in health and safety matters related 
to research reactors and in the use of radioisotopes 
in physical and biological research, medical ther- 
apy, agriculture, and industry. 

Both countries also affirm their common interest 



Estate-Tax Convention With Canada 
Enters Into Force 

Press release 234 dated April 9 

According to information received from the 
American Embassy at Ottawa, the convention be- 
tween the United States of America and Canada 
for the avoidance of double taxation and the pre- 
vention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on 
the estates of deceased persons, signed at Wash- 
ington on February 17, 1961,^ was brought into 
force by the exchange of instruments of ratifica- 
tion at Ottawa on April 9, 1962. 

This estate-tax convention is fundamentally 
similar to, and has the same basic objectives as, 
estate-tax conventions which have entered into 
force between the United States and 12 countries, 
including the convention of June 8, 1944, with 
Canada ^ as modified by a convention of June 12, 
1950.^ Such conventions are designed to eliminate 
double taxation in connection with the settlement 
in one country of estates in which nationals of the 
other country have interests. 

The new convention with Canada takes the 
place of the 1944 convention as modified. The 
1944 convention provided that, for Canada, the 
taxes referred to therein were the taxes imposed 
under the Dominion Succession Duty Act. That 
convention, as modified, was rendered inoperative 
by the repeal of the Dominion Succession Duty 
Act and the enactment of the Canadian Estate 
Tax Act effective January 1, 1959. It is provided 
in the new convention that, upon its entry into 
force, the 1944 and 1950 conventions shall be 
deemed to have terminated as to estates of dece- 
dents dying on or after January 1, 1959, and that 
the new convention shall be deemed to have come 
into effect as to estates of decedents dying on or 
after that date. 

So far as the United States is concerned, the 



' Bulletin of Mar. 6, inci, p. 351. 

■ .-)9 Stat. 915. 

' Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2348. 



April 30, J 962 



739 



convention applies only with respect to United 
States (that is, Federal) estate taxes. It does not 
apply to the imposition of taxes by the several 
States, the District of Columbia, or territories or 
possessions of the United States. 

By its terms the convention will be in effect for 
a period of 5 years from January 1, 1959, and will 
continue in effect thereafter until 6 months after 
the date of a notice of termination given by either 
of the two Governments. 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 



Patents 

Agreement for the mutual safegruarding of secrecy of in- 
vention relating to defense and for which applications 
for patents have been made. Done at Paris September 
21. lOGO. Entered into force January 12, 1961. TIAS 
4672. 
Approval deposited: Turkey, February 20, 1962. 

Safety at Sea 

International convention for the safety of life at sea, 

1960. Done at London June 17, I960.' 

Signatures: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, 
Bulgaria (with a declaration), Cameroon, Canada, 
China, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Finland, 
France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Hun- 
gary (with a declaration), Iceland, India, Ireland, 
Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Kuwait, Liberia, Nether- 
lands, New Zealand, Norway. Pakistan, Panama, 
Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Sweden, Smtzerland, 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (with a reserva- 
tion), United Arab Republic, United Kingdom, United 
States, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, June 17, I960.' 

Acceptances deposited: France, October 16, 1961; Haiti, 
March 17, 1961 ; Norway, August 23, 1961 ; Viet-Nam, 
January 8, 1962. 

Ratification advised ty the Senate: April 12, 1962. 



Agriculture 

Constitution of the Food and Agriculture Organization of 
the United Nations, as amended. Signed at Quebec 
October 16, 1945. Entered into force October 16, 1945. 
TIAS 1554 and 4803. 
Acceptance deposited: Tanganyika, February 8, 1962. 

Fisheries 

Amendment to paragraph 1 (b) of the annex to the inter- 
national convention for the high seas fisheries of the 
North Pacific Ocean of May 9, 1952, as amended (TIAS 
278(! and 4493). Adopted at Tokyo Novemt>er 11, 1961, 
at the eighth meeting of the International North Pacific 
Fisheries Commission. Entered into force April 2. 1962. 
Approvals deposited: Canada, March 14, 1962: Japan, 
March 26, 1962; United States, April 2, 1962. 

Health 

Amendments to articles 24 and 25 of the World Health 
Organization Constitution of July 22, 1946 (TIAS 1808). 
Adopted by the 12th World Health Assembly, Geneva, 
May 28, 1959. Entered into force October 25, 1960. 
TIAS 4643. 
Acceptance deposited: Ttirkey, January 10, 1962. 

Narcotic Drugs 

Convention relating to the suppression of the abuse of 
opium and other drugs. Signe<l at The Hague January 
23, 1912. Entered Into force February 11, 1915. 38 Stat. 
1912. 

Notification received that it considers itself bound: 
Sierra Leone, March 13, l',X!2. 

Convention for limiting the manufacture and regulating 
the distributiim of narcotic drugs, as amended (61 Stat. 
2230; 62 Stat. 1790). Done at Geneva July 13, 1931. 
Entere<l into force July 9, 1933. 48 Stat. 1543. 
Notification received that it considers itself bound: 
Sierra Leone, March 1.3, 1962. 

Protocol bringing under international control drugs out- 
side the scope of the convention limiting the manufac- 
ture and regulating the distribution of narcotic drugs 
concluded at Geneva July 13, 1931 (48 Stat. 1543), as 
amended (61 Stat. 22.30; 62 Stat. 1796). Done at Paris 
November 19, 1948. Entere<l into force December 1, 
1949; for the United States, September 11, 1950. TIAS 
2.308. 

Notification received tliat it considers itself bound: 
Sierra Leone, March 13, 1962. 



BILATERAL 



Brazil 

Agreement on cooperation for the promotion of economic 
and social development in the Brazilian Northeast, and 
exchange of notes. Signed at Washington April 13 
1962. Entered into force April 13, 1962. 

Canada 

Convention for avoidance of double taxation and pre 
vention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on estates 
of deceased persons. Signed at Washington Februarj 
17, 1961. 

Ratifications exchanged: April 9, 1962. 
Entered into force: April 9, 1962. Applicable to estate 
of persons dying on or after January 1, 1959. 
Convention for avoidance of double taxation and preven 
tion of fiscal evasion in the case of estate taxes anc 
succession duties. Signed at Ottawa June 8, 1944 
Entered into force February 6, 194.5. 59 Stat. 915. 
Terminated: January 1, 1959, by entry into force of con- 
vention signed February 17, 1961, supra, insofar as 
application to estates of decedents dying on or after 
January 1, 1959, is concerned ; continues in effect 
with respect to estates of decedents dying prior to 
that date. 
Convention modifying and supplementing convention for 
avoid.uice of double taxation and prevention of fiscal 
evasion in the case of estate taxes and succession duties 
of June 8, 1944 (59 Stat. 915). Signed at Ottawa June 
12. 19.50. Entered into force November 21, 1951. TIAS 
2.348. 

Terminated: January 1. 19.59, by entry into force of 
convention signed February 17, 1961, supra, insofar 
as application to estates of decedents dying on or 
after January 1, 1959, is concerned; continues in 
effect with re.si)ect to estates of decedents dying prior 
to that date. 
Agreement further extending the agreement of January 
10 and 17, 1957 (TIAS 3732), relating to the use of the 



' Not in force. 

" All signed subject to acceptance, approval, or ratifi- 
cation. 



740 



Department of Staie Bulletin 



Haines cutoff road for winter maintenance of a section 
of the Ilaines-Fairbanlis pipeline. Effeited by exchange 
of notes at Ottawa December 22. 1961, and January 26, 
19C2. Entered into force January 20, 1902. 

Colombia 

Agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic 
energy. Signed at Wasliington April 9. 1902. Enters 
into force on the date on which each Oovernment re- 
ceives from the other written notitication that it has 
complied with all statutory anil constitutional require- 
ments for entry into force. 

Israel 

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agree- 
ment of November 6. 19.")8. as supplemented and 
amended (TIAS 4126, 418S. 4818, and 4906). Effected 
by exchange of notes at Washington April 6 and 11, 
1902. Entered into force April 11, 1902. 

Paraguay 

Reciprocal trade agreement. Signed at Asuncii'in Sep- 
tember 12, Itne. Entered into force .\pril 9, 15M7. 
TIAS 1601. 

Notice of intention to irrminate (livcn hi/ I'nraguay: 

April 2, 1902. (In accordance with provisions of 

article XVII, para. 2, agreement will be terminated 

October 2, 1962.) 

Agreement temporarily bringing up to date .scliedule I 

of the reciprocal trade agreement of September 12, 

1946, supra. Effected by exchange of notes at Asunei6n 

April 2, 1962. Entered into force April 2, 1962. 



DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE 



State and Commerce Agree To Expand 
Foreign Service Commercial Program 

Press release 210 dated April 2 

An agreement designed to fulfill President Ken- 
nedy's export expansion program by improving 
the Government's international trade services to 
the American business community has been con- 
cluded by the Department of Commerce and the 
Department of State. 

The interdepartmental agreement, signed by 
Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Secretary 
of Commerce Luther II. Hodges, jirovides a 
stepped-up commercial program within the For- 
eign Service. It identifies the overseas commer- 
cial attaclie as a career specialist within the For- 
eign Service; it provides for recruiting of addi- 
tional specialists from the Commerce Department 
and the business world and gives the Commerce 
Department greater participation in the recruit- 
ment, training, assignment, and promotion of 
commercial officers. 



The commercial officers in the Foreign Service, 
as members of the statTs of U.S. embassies and 
consulates abroad, represent a princii)al means for 
overseas trade promotional support to the U.S. 
business community. The services they perform 
for businessmen and the trade opportunities and 
foreign market information they develop can play 
a major role in the successful increase of Amer- 
ican business activity abroad and in the expansion 
of our exports. 

The objectives of the agreement are set forth in 
these terms: 

The President has directed the Executive Agencies to 
place maximum emphasis on enlarging the foreign com- 
merce of the United States in seeking to maintain an 
over-all balance in our international payments. . . . 
To provide effective leadership, the Department of 
Commerce is assuming primary responsibility and direc- 
tion for foreign trade promotion activities at home and 
abroad. . . . The Departments of State and Commerce 
agree that the President's directive can best be carried out 
abroad by a single overseas service. To fulfill their re- 
spective respc)nsibilities, the two Departments undertake 
to establLsli new arrangements for the purpose of provid- 
ing optimum commercial service.s within the framework of 
a unified Foreign Service. 

The agreement provides an opportunity for For- 
eign Service officers to elect commercial work as a 
career specialty and permits advancement within 
this specialty to the highest levels in the Foreign 
Service. Personnel will be augmented by an en- 
larged number of appointments from the Depart- 
ment of Commerce and the business community, 
who, together with the Foreign Service career 
commercial specialists, will provide the expertise 
needed to assist American business in meeting the 
increasing competition for world markets. 

To attract economic and commercial talent the 
two Departments will e.stablish joint recruitment 
teams to visit educational institutions giving grad- 
uate and tmdergraduate degrees in business ad- 
ministration or foreign trade, and the Department 
of State will make special provision in its written 
Foreign Service examinations for candidates with 
background and interest in commercial activities. 

A Department of Commercial Ailairs will be 
established in the Foreign Service Institute of the 
Department of State, chaired by a mutually ac- 
ceptable nominee of the Department of Commerce. 
The chairman will develop a commercial training 
program and supervise its imjjlementation and 
operation. 

The Department of Commerce will normally 



April 30, 1962 



741 



initiate instructions for commercial specialists to 
carry out their operational and reporting duties 
and responsibilities. Current instructions will be 
modified to provide for increased emphasis on the 
promotion of trade, investment, and travel. Com- 
mercial specialists will be encouraged to travel 
more widely in their respective districts in order 
to develop market information which will be 
speedily communicated to businessmen in the 
United States. 

The two Departments consider that the agree- 
ment accommodates the responsibilities of both 
Departments and provides the means for the 
closest possible cooperation in this imjwrtant area 
of overseas activity. 



PUBLICATIONS 



Recent Releases 

Fw sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Gov- 
ernment Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. Address 
requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, ex- 
cept in the case of free publications, which may be 
obtained from the Department of State. 

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4790. 4 pp. 

Agreement with the United Arab Republic, amending the 
agreement of August 1, 1960, as amended. Exchange of 
notes — Signed at Cairo June 24, 1961. Entered into force 
June 24, 1961. 



Economic Assistance. TIAS 4791. 3 pp. 5^. 
Agreement with Ecuador. Exchange of notes — Signed at 
Quito June 7 and 17, 1961. ~ 
1961. 



Entered into force June 17, 



Technical Cooperation. TIAS 4792. 4 pp. 5<i. 
Agreement with Cyprus — Signed at Nicosia, June 29, 1961. 
Entered into force June 29, 1961. 

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4793. 3 pp. 

Agreement with Greece, amending the agreement of No- 
vember 7, 1960. Exchange of notes — Signed at Athens 
June 22, 1961. Entered into force June 22, 1961. 

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4794. 4 pp. 

Agreement witli Palvistan. amending certain agreements, 
as amended. Exchange of notes — Signed at Karachi June 
29, 19G1. Entered into force June 29, 1961. 

Military Mission to Costa Rica. TIAS 4795. 3 pp. 5<f. 

Agreement with Costa Rica, amending the agreement of 
December 10, 194.5, as amended and extended. Exchange 

742 



of notes — Dated at San Jos6 February 25 and May 13, 
1959. Entered into force May 13, 1959. 

War Damage Claims. TIAS 4796. 4 pp. 5<t. 
Agreement with Italy, supplementing the understanding 
of March 29, 1957. Exchange of notes — Signed at Rome 
July 12, 1960. Entered into force June 15, 1961. 

Second Agreement Regarding Certain Matters Arising 
From the Validation of German Dollar Bonds. TIAS 
4798. 12 pp. 10(!. 

Agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany — 
Signed at Bonn August 16, 1960. Entered into force June 
30, 1961. 



Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: April 9-15 

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of 
News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C. 

Releases appearing in this issue of the Bulletin 
which were Issued prior to April 9 are Nos. 190 of 
March 26; 203 of March 29; 210, 212 and 216 of 
April 2 ; 222 of April 4 : 225 of April 5 ; and 228 of 
April 6. 

No. Date Subject 

230 4/9 Air talks with Austria suspended. 

231 4/9 Atomic energy agreement with Colombia. 
*232 4/9 U.S. participation in international con- 
ferences. 

233 4/9 Withdrawal of study on Niagara Falls. 

234 4/9 Estate-tax convention with Canada. 

235 4/10 Austrian persecutee claims. 

t236 4/12 Trezise : "Trade Policy for the 1960's." 
237 4/10 Assistant Secretary Williams' trip to 
Africa (rewrite). 

♦238 4/10 Cleveland; "The Winning of the Non- 
war." 

*239 4/11 Cultural exchange (Brazil). 

•240 4/11 Biography of Under Secretary Ball. 

*241 4/11 Williams : "American Foreign Policy and 
the Emerging Nations of .\frica." 

♦242 4/11 Manning sworn in as Assistant Secretary 
for Public Affairs (biographic details). 

•243 4/11 Sisco: "The U.N. and U.S. National In- 
terests." 

t244 4/12 Bowles ; American Jewish Congress. 
245 4/12 Soviet statement on nuclear test morato- 
rium. 

•246 4/12 Amendments to program for visit of Shah 
of Iran. 

•247 4/12 Greentield appointed Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for News (biographic de- 
tails). 

•248 4/12 Gardner : "The U.S. and the U.N. : A Re- 
appraisiil of the National Interest." 

t249 4/13 Cleveland : "View From the Diplomatic 
Tightrope." 
2.50 4/13 Rusk : Pan American Day. 

•251 4/13 Brodie: "Commodity Problems and Stabi- 
lization Programs in Latin America." 

•252 4/13 Harriman : .\merican Academy of Polit- 
ical and Social Science (excerpts). 

t253 4/13 Williams: "Aids and Obstacles to Polit- 
ical Stability in Slid-Africa." 

•2.54 4/14 Harriman ; interview on "Operation in 
the Capital." 



•Not printed. 

tlleld for a later issue of the Bulletin. 



Department of State Bulletin 



J 



April 30, 1962 



Ind 



e X 



Vol. XLVI, No. 1192 



Africa 

Assistant Secretary Williams Visits 10 African 

Countries 722 

Change and Challenge in Africa (Williams) . . . 719 
American Republics. Pan American Day, 1962 

(Rusk) 703 

Atomic Energy 

Atomic Energy Agreement Signed With Colombia . 739 

U.S. and U.K. State Position on Nuclear Testing 

(joint statement) 707 

U.S. Comments on Soviet Statement Calling for Nu- 
clear Test Moratorium 708 

Austria 

Claims on Austrian Persecutee Fimd Must Be Filed 

by August 31, 1962 718 

U.S. and Austria Susi)end Air Talks, To Resume in 

Near Future 718 

Aviation. U.S. and Austria Suspend Air Talks, To 

Resume in Near Future 718 

Brazil. United States and Brazil Reaffirm Existing 

Close Relations (Goulart, Kennedy) 705 

Canada 

Estate-Tax Convention With Canada Enters Into 

Force 739 

President Salutes Role of IJC in U.S.-Canadian 

Relations 729 

United States and Canada Withdraw Study on 

Niagara Falls 728 

U.S., Canada To Study Development of Pembina 

River Resources 728 

Claims. Claims on Austrian Persecutee Fimd Must 

Be Filed by August 31, 1962 718 

Colombia. Atomic Energy Agreement Signed With 

Colombia 739 

Congress, The. Congressional Documents Relating 
to Foreign Policy 734 

Department and Foreign Service. State and Com- 
merce Agree To Expand Foreign Service Com- 
mercial Program 741 

Economic Affairs 

Estate- Tax Convention With Canada Enters Into 

Force 739 

Mineral Resources and the World of the 1960's 

(McGhee) 723 

The New Europe — Its ChaUenge and Its Opportuni- 
ties for the United States (MacArthur) .... 709 

State and Commerce Agree To Expand Foreign 
Service Commercial Program 741 

Europe. The New Europe — Its Challenge and Its 
Opportunities for the United States (Mac- 
Arthur) 709 



Germany. I'resident Commends General Clay on 

Mission to Berlin 708 

Iran. Letters of Credence (Qods-Nakhai) .... 707 
Israel. Security Council Calls Upon Israel and 
Syria To Observe Armistice Agreement ( Yost and 
text of resolution) 735 

Philippines. President Kennedy Greets Philippines 
on Bataan Day 729 

Presidential Documents 

President Commends General Clay on Mission to 

Berlin 708 

President Kennedy Greets Philippines on Bataan 
Day 729 

President Salutes Role of IJC in U.S.-Canadian 

Relations 709 

United States and Brazil Reaffirm Existing Close 
Relations 705 

Publications. Recent Releases 742 

Refugees. Refugees Here and Around the World 

(CiepUnski) 730 

Syria. Security Council Calls Upon Israel and 
Syria To Observe Armistice Agreement (Tost 
and text of resolution) 735 

Treaty Information 

Atomic Energy Agreement Signed With Colombia . 739 

Current Actions 749 

Estate-Tax Convention With Canada Enters Into 

Force 739 

U.S. and Austria Suspend Air Talks, To Resume in 
Near Future jig 

U.S.S.R. U.S. Comments on Soviet Statement Call- 
ing for Nuclear Test Moratorium 708 

United Kingdom. U.S. and U.K. State Position on 
Nuclear Testing (joint statement) 707 

United Nations 

Current U.N. Documents 733 

Security Council Calls Upon Israel and Syria To 
Observe Armistice Agreement (Yost and text of 
resolution) 735 

'Same Index 

CiepUnski, Michel 730 

Goulart, Joao 705 

Kennedy, President 705,708,729 

MacArthur, Douglas II 709 

McGhee, George C 723 

Qods-Nakhai, Hosein 707 

Rusk, Secretary 703 

Williams, G. Mennen 719 

Yost, Charles W 735 



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The Appendixes include (1) the text of the Act of 1051, (2) text 
of the Battle Act Amenchnent, (3) the Battle Act Lists, (4) trade 
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Vol. XLVI, No. 1193 



May 7, 1962 



IE 

FICIAL 

lEKLY RECORD 



UNITED STATES PRESENTS OUTLINE OF A TREATY 
ON GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMA- 
MENT • Statement by President Kennedy and Text of 
Outline 747 

ATTORNEY GENERAL EXPLAINS U.S. GOALS 
TO PEOPLE OF JAPAN, INDONESIA, AND 

GERMANY • Excerpts From Addresses 761 

A LOOK AT THE MIDDLE EAST TODAY • 

by Chester Bowles 765 

TRADE POLICY FOR THE 1960's • by Acting Assistant 

Secretary Trezise 774 

THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY AND 
UNITED STATES TRADE POLICY • by 

Joseph D. Coppock • 770 



IITED STATES 
REIGN POLICY 




For index see inside back cover 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 




Vol. XLVI, No. 1193 • Publication 7371 
May 7, 1962 



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Readers' Oulde to Periodical Literature. 



The Department of State BULLETiy, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Public Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public 
and interested agencies of the 
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the Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Department, as well as 
special articles on various pliases of 
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and international agreements to 
which the United States is or may 
become a party and treaties of gen- 
eral international interest. 

Publications of the Department, 
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United States Presents Outline of a Treaty 
on General and Complete Disarmament 



STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT KENNEDY ' 

The United States has today [April 18] tabled 
at Geneva an outline of every bt^sic provision of a 
treaty on general and complete disarmament in a 
peaceful world. It jirovides a blueprint of our 
position on general and complete disarmament as 
well as elaboration of the nature, sequence, and 
timing of specific disarmament measures. 

This outline of a treaty represents the most 
comprehensive and specific series of proposals the 
United States or any other country has ever made 
on disarmament. In addition to stating the ob- 
jectives and principles which should govern agree- 
ments for disannament, the document calls for the 
grouping of individual measures in three balanced 
and safeguarded stages. We are hopeful through 
the give-and-take of the conference table this plan 
will have a const nictive influence upon the negoti- 
ations now in progress. 

I want to stress that with this plan the United 
States is making a major effort to achieve a break- 
through on disarmament negotiations. We be- 
lieve that the nations represented at Geneva have a 
heavy responsibility to lay the foundations for a 
genuinely secure and peaceful world starting 
through a reduction in arms. 



TEXT OF OUTLINE 2 

Outline of Basic PBO\^SIONS of a Tkeatt on General 
AND Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World 

In order to assist in the preparation of a treaty on 
general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world, 



' Read by the President at his press conference on 
Apr. IS. 

^ Submitted to the 18-nation Committee on Disarmament 
at Geneva by tie U.S. delegation on Apr. 18. 



the United States submits the following outline of basic 
provisions of such a treaty. 

A. Objectives 

1. To ensure that (a) disarmament is general and com- 
plete and war is no longer an instrument for settling inter- 
national problems, and (b) general and complete 
disarmament is accompanied by the establishment of re- 
liable procedures for the settlement of disputes and by 
effective arrangements for the maintenance of i)eace in 
accordance with the principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations. 

2. Taking into account paragraphs 3 and 4 below, to 
provide, with respect to the military establishment of 
every nation, for: 

(a) Disbanding of armed forces, dismantling of military 
establishments, including bases, cessation of the produc- 
tion of armaments as well as their liquidation or con- 
version to peaceful uses ; 

(b) Elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, 
biological, and other weapons of mass destruction and 
cessation of the production of such weapons ; 

(c) Elimination of all means of delivery of weapons of 
mass destruction ; 

(d) Abolition of the organizations and institutions de- 
signed to organize the military efforts of states, cessation 
of military training, and closing of aU military training 
institutions ; 

(e) Discontinuance of military expenditures. 

3. To ensure that, at the completion of the program for 
general and complete disarmament, states would have at 
their disiwsal only those non-nuclear armaments, forces, 
facilities and establishments as are agreed to be necessary 
to maintain internal order and protect the personal se- 
curity of citizens. 

4. To ensure that during and after implementation of 
general and complete disarmament, states also would sup- 
port and provide agreed manpower for a United Nations 
Peace Force to be equipped with agreed types of arma- 
ments necessary to en.sure that the United Nations can 
effectively deter or suppress any threat or use of arms. 

5. To establish and provide for the effective operation 
of an International Disarmament Organization within the 



May 7, J 962 



747 



framework of the United Nations for the purpose of en- 
suring that all obligations under the disarmament program 
would be honored and observed during and after imple- 
mentation of general and complete disarmament ; and to 
this end to ensure that the International Disarmament 
Organization and its inspectors would have imrestricted 
access without veto to all places as necessary for the 
purpose of effective verification. 

B. Principles 

The guiding principles during the achievement of these 
objectives are: 

1. Disarmament would be implemented until it is com- 
pleted by stages to be carried out within specified time 
limits. 

2. Disarmament would be balanced so that at no stage 
of the implementation of the treaty could any state or 
group of states gain military advantage, and so that se- 
curity would be ensured equally for all. 

3. Compliance with all disarmament obligations would 
be effectively verified during and after their entry into 
force. Verification arrangements would be instituted 
progressively as necessary to ensure throughout the dis- 
armament process that agreed levels of armaments and 
armed forces were not exceeded. 

4. As national armaments are reduced, the United Na- 
tions would be progressively strengthened in order to 
improve its capacity to ensure international security and 
the peaceful settlement of differences as well as to facili- 
tate the development of international cooperation in com- 
mon tasks for the benefit of mankind. 

5. Transition from one stage of disarmament to the 
next would take place uix)n decision that all measures in 
the preceding stage had been implemented and verified 
and that any additional arrangements required for meas- 
ures in the next stage were ready to operate. 

Introduction 

The Treaty would contain three stages designed to 
achieve a permanent state of general and complete dis- 
armament in a peaceful world. The Treaty would enter 
into force upon the signature and ratification of the 
United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics and such other states as might be agreed. 
Stage II would begin when all militarily significant states 
had become Parties to the Treaty and other transition 
requirements had been satisfied. Stage III would begin 
when all states possessing armed forces and armaments 
had become Parties to the Treaty and other transition 
requirements had been .satisfied. Disarmament, verifica- 
tion, and measures for keeping the peace would proceed 
progressively and proportionately beginning with the entry 
into force of the Treaty. 

Stage I 

Stage I would begin upon the entry into force of the 
Treaty and would be completed within three years from 
that date. 

During Stage I the Parties to the Treaty would under- 
take: 

1. To reduce their armaments and armed forces and to 



carry out other agreed measures in the manner outlined 
below ; 

2. To establish the International Disarmament Organi- 
zation upon the entry into force of the Treaty in order 
to ensure the verification in the agreed manner of the 
obligations undertaken ; and 

3. To strengthen arrangements for keeping the peace 
through the measures outlined below. 

A. Armaments 

1. Reduction of Armaments 

a. Specified Parties to the Treaty, as a first stage 
toward general and complete disarmament in a peaceful 
world, would reduce by thirty percent the armaments in 
each category listed in subparagraph b below. Except 
as adjustments for production would be permitted in 
Stage I in accordance with paragraph 3 below, each type 
of armament in the categories listed in subparagraph b 
would be reduced by thirty percent of the inventory ex- 
isting at an agreed date. 

b. All types of armaments within agreed categories 
would be subject to reduction in Stage I (the following 
list of categories, and of types within categories, is 
illustrative) : 

(1) Armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of 
40,000 kilograms or gi'eater ; missiles having a range of 
.5,000 kilometers or greater, together with their related 
fixed launching pads ; and submarine-la imehed missiles 
and air-to-surfaee missiles having a range of 300 kilome- 
ters or greater. 

(Within this category, the United States, for example, 
would declare as types of armaments: the B-52 aircraft; 
Atlas missiles together with their related fixed launching 
pads ; Titan missiles together with their related fixed 
launching pads ; Polaris missiles ; Hound Dog missiles ; 
and each new type of armament, such as Minuteman 
missiles, which came within the category description, 
together with, where applicable, their related fixed 
launching pads. The declared inventory of t.vpes within 
the category by other Parties to the Treaty would be 
similarly detailed). 

(2) Armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of 
between 15,000 kilograms and 40,000 kilograms and those 
missiles not included in category (1) having a range be- 
tween 300 kilometers and 5,000 kilometers, together with 
any relatetl fixed launching pads. (The Parties would 
declare their armaments by types within the category). 

(3) Armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of 
between 2,500 and 15,000 kilograms. (The Parties would 
declare their armaments by types within the category). 

(4) Surface-to-surface (including submarine-launched 
missiles) and air-to-surface aerodynamic and ballistic 
missiles and free rockets having a range of between 10 
kilometers and 300 kilometers, together with any related 
fixed launching pads. (The Parties would declare their 
armaments by types within the category) . 

(5) Anti-missile missile systems, together with related 
fixed launching jiads. (The Parties would declare their 
armaments by types within the category). 

(6) Surface-to-air missiles other than anti-mis.sile 
missile systems, together with any related fixed launching 



748 



Department of Stale Bulletin 



pads. (The Parties would declare their armaments by 
types within the category). 

(7) Tanks. (The Parties would declare their arma- 
ments by types within the category). 

(8) Armored cars and armored personnel carriers. 
(The Parties would declare their armaments by t.yi)es 
within the category). 

(9) All artillery, and mortars and rocket launchers 
having a caliber of 1(X) mm. or greater. (The Parties 
would declare their armaments by types within the cate- 
gory). 

(10) Combatant ships with standard displacement of 
400 tons or greater of the following classes : Aircraft 
carriers, battleships, cruisers, destroyer types and sub- 
marines. (The Parties would declare their armaments 
by types within the category). 

2. Method of Reduction 

a. Those Parties to the Treaty which were subject to 
the reduction of armaments would submit to the Interna- 
tional Disarmament Organization an appropriate declarar 
tion respecting inventories of their armaments existing at 
the agreed date. 

b. The reduction would be accomplished in three steps, 
each consisting of one year. One-third of the reduction 
to be made during Stage I would be carried out during 
each step. 

c. During the first part of each step, one-third of the 
armaments to be eliminated during Stage I would be 
placed in depots under supervision of the International 
Disarmament Organization. During the second part of 
each step, the deposited armaments would be destroyed 
or, where appropriate, converted to peaceful uses. The 
number and location of such deiwts and arrangements 
respecting their establishment and operation would be set 
forth in an annex to the Treaty. 

d. In accordance with arrangements which would be 
set forth in a Treaty annex on verification, the Interna- 
tional Disarmament Organization would verify the fore- 
going reduction and would provide assurance that retained 
armaments did not exceed agreed levels. 

3. Limitation on Production of Armaments and on Re- 
lated Activities 

a. Production of all armaments listed in subparagraph 
b of paragraph 1 above would be limited to agreed allow- 
ances during Stage I and, by the beginning of Stage II, 
would be halted except for production within agreed 
limits of parts for maintenance of the agreed retained 
armaments. 

b. The allowances would permit limited production in 
each of the categories of armaments listed in subpara- 
graph b of paragraph 1 above. In all Instances during 
the process of eliminating production of armaments: 

(1) any armament produced within a category would 
be compensated for by an additional armament destroyed 
within that category to the end that the ten percent 
reduction in numbers in each category in each step, and 
the resulting thirty percent reduction in Stage I, would 
be achieved ; and furthermore 

(2) in the case of armed combat aircraft having an 
empty weight of 15,0(X) kilograms or greater and of mi.s- 
siles having a range of 300 kilometers or greater, the 



destructive capability of any such armaments pro<lueed 
within a category would be compensated for by the 
destruction of sufficient armaments within that category 
to the end that the ten percent reduction in destructive 
capability as well as numbers in each of these categories 
in each step, and the resulting thirty percent reduction 
in Stage I, would be achieved. 

c. Should a Party to the Treaty elect to reduce its 
production in any category at a more rapid rate than re- 
quired by the allowances provided in subparagraph b 
above, that Party would be entitled to retain existing 
armaments to the extent of the unused portion of its 
production allowance. In any such instance, any arma- 
ment so retained would be compensated for in the manner 
set forth in subparagraph b(l) and, where applicable, 
b(2) above to the end that the ten percent reduction in 
numbers and, where applicable, destructive capability in 
each category in each step, and the resulting thirty 
percent reduction in Stage I, would be achieved. 

d. The flight testing of missiles would be limited to 
agreed annual quotas. 

e. In accordance with arrangements which would be 
set forth in the annex on verification, the International 
Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing 
measures at declared locations and would provide assur- 
ance that activities subject to the foregoing measures 
were not conducted at undeclared locations. 

4. Additional Measures 

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to examine 
unresolved questions relating to means of accomplishing 
in Stages II and III the reduction and eventual elimina- 
tion of production and stockpiles of chemical and bio- 
logical weapons of mass destruction. In light of this 
examination, the Parties to the Treaty would agree to 
arrangements concerning chemical and biological weapons 
of mass destruction. 

B. Armed Forces 

1. Reduction of Armed Forces 

Force levels for the United States of America and the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would be reduced 
to 2.1 million each and for other specified Parties to tie 
Treaty to agreed levels not exceeding 2.1 million each. 
All other Parties to the Treaty would, with agreed excep- 
tions, reduce their force levels to 100,000 or one percent 
of their population, whichever were higher, provided that 
in no case would the force levels of such other Parties 
to the Treaty exceed levels in existence upon the entry 
into force of the Treaty. 

2. Armed Forces Subject to Reduction 

Agreed force levels would Include all full-time, uni- 
formed personnel maintained by national governments in 
the following categories : 

a. Career personnel of active armed forces and other 
personnel serving in the active armed forces on fixed 
engagements or contracts. 

b. Conscripts performing their required period of full- 
time active duty as fixed by national law. 

c. Personnel of militarily organized security forces 



May 7, J 962 



749 



and of other forces or organizations equipped and or- 
ganized to perform a military mission. 

3. Method of Reduction of Armed Forces 

The reduction of force levels would be carried out in 
the following manner : 

a. Those Parties to the Treaty which were subject to 
the foregoing reductions would suljmit to the Internar 
tional Disarmament Organization a declaration stating 
their force levels at the agreed date. 

b. Force level reductions would be accomplished in 
three steps, each having a duration of one year. During 
each step force levels would be reduced by one-third of 
the difference between force levels existing at the agreed 
date and the levels to be reached at tiie end of Stage I. 

c. In accordance with arrangements that would be set 
forth in the annex on verification, the International Dis- 
armament Organization would verify the reduction of 
force levels and provide assurance that retained forces 
did not exceed agreed levels. 

4. Additional Measures 

The Parties to the Treaty which were subject to the 
foregoing reductions would agree upon appropriate ar- 
rangements, including procedures for consultation, in 
order to ensure that civilian employment by military 
establishments would be in accordance with the objec- 
tives of the obligations respecting force levels. 

C. Nuclear Weapons 

1. Production of Fissionable Materials for Nuclear 
Weapons 

a. The Parties to the Treaty would halt the production 
of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons. 

b. This measure would be carried out in the following 
manner : 

(1) The Parties to the Treaty would submit to the 
International Disarmament Organization a declaration 
listing by name, location and production capacity every 
facility under their jurisdiction capable of producing 
and processing fissionable materials at the agreed date. 

(2) Production of fissionalile materials for purposes 
other than use in nuclear weapons would be limited to 
agreed levels. The Parties to the Treaty would submit 
to the International Disarmament Organization periodic 
declarations stating the amounts and types of fissionable 
materials which were still being produced at each 
facility. 

(3) In accordance with arrangements which would 
be set forth in the annex on verification, the International 
Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing 
measures at declared facilities and would provide assur- 
ance that activities subject to the foregoing limitations 
were not conducted at undeclared facilities. 

2. Transfer of Fi.ssional)Ie Material to Purposes Other 
Than Use in Nuclear Weapons 

a. Upon the cessation of production of fissionable ma- 
terials for use in nuclear weapons, the United States of 
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Ucpublics 
would each transfer to purposes other than use in nu- 



clear weapons an agreed (luantity of weapons-grade U- 
235 from past production. The purposes for which such 
materials would be used would be determined by the state 
to which the material belonged, provided that such ma- 
terials were not used in nuclear weapons. 

b. To ensure that the transferred materials were not 
used in nuclear weapons, such materials would be placed 
under safeguards and inspection by the International 
Disarmament Organization either in stockpiles or at the 
facilities in which they would be utilized for purposes 
other than use in nuclear weapons. Arrangements for 
such safeguards and inspection would be set forth in the 
annex on verification. 

3. Transfer of Fissionable Materials Between States for 
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy 

a. Any transfer of fissionable materials between states 
would be for purposes other than for use in nuclear weap- 
ons and would be subject to a system of safeguards to 
ensure that such materials were not used in nuclear 
weapons. 

b. The system of safeguards to be applied for this pur- 
po.se would be developed in agreememt with the Interna- 
tional Atomic Energy Agency and would be set forth 
in an annex to the Treaty. 

4. Non-Transfer of Nuclear Weapons 

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to seek to pre- 
vent the creation of further national nuclear forces. To 
this end the Parties would agree that : 

a. Any Party to the Treaty which had manufactured, 
or which at any time manufactures, a nuclear weapon 
would : 

(1) Not transfer control over any nuclear weapons to 
a state which had not manufactured a nuclear weapon 
before an agreed date ; 

(2) Not a.ssist any such state in manufacturing any 
nuclear weapons. 

b. Any Party to the Treaty which had not manufac- 
tured a nuclear weapon before the agreed date would : 

(1) Not acquire, or attempt to acquire, control over 
any nuclear weapons ; 

(2) Not manufacture, or attempt to manufacture, any 
nuclear weaixms. 

5. Nuclear Weapons Test Explosions 

a. If an agreement prohibiting nuclear weapons test 
explosions and providing for effective international con- 
trol had come into force prior to the entry into force of 
the Treaty, such agreement would become an annex to the 
Treaty, and all the Parties to the Treaty would be bound 
by the obligations specified in the agreement. 

1>. If, however, no such agreement had come into force 
prior to the entry into force of the Treaty, all nuclear 
weapons test explosions would be prohibitwl, and the 
procedures for effective international control would be 
sot forth in an annex to the Treaty. 

6. Additional Measures 

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to examine re- 
maining unresolved questions relating to the means of 
accomplishing in Stages II and III the reduction and 



750 



Deparfment of State Bulletin 



eventual eliiiiination of iiuck>ar weapons stockpiles. In 
the light of this examination, the I'arties to the Treaty 
would agree to arrangements couceruing nuclear weapons 
stocljpiles. 

I). Outer Space 

1. Prohibition of Weapons of Mass Destruction in Orliit 
The Parties to the Treaty would agree not to place in 

orbit weapons capable of producing mass destruction. 

2. Peaceful Cooperation in Space 

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support in- 
creased international cooiwration in jieaceful uses of outer 
space in the United Nations or through other appropriate 
arrangements. 

3. Notification and Pre-launch Inspection 

With re.spect to the launching of space vehicles and 
missiles : 

a. Those Parties to the Treaty which conducted launch- 
ings of space vehicles or missiles would provide advance 
notification of such launchings to other Parties to the 
Treaty and to the International Disarmament Organiza- 
tion together with the track of the space vehicle or mis- 
sile. Such advance notification would be provided on a 
timely basis to permit pre-launch inspection of the space 
vehicle or missile to be launched. 

b. In accordance with arrangements which would be 
set forth in the annex on verification, the International 
Disarmament Organization would conduct pre-launch in- 
spection of space vehicles and missiles and would establish 
and operate any arrangements necessary for detecting 
unreported launchings. 

4. Limitations on Production and on Related Activities 

The production, stockpiling and testing of boosters for 
space vehicles would be subject to agreed limitations. 
Such activities would be monitored by the International 
Disarmament Organization in accordance with arrange- 
ments which would be set forth in the annex on verifica- 
tion. 

E. Military Expenditures 

1. Report on Expenditures 

The Parties to the Treaty would submit to the Inter- 
national Disarmament Organization at the end of each 
step of each stage a report on their military expenditures. 
Such reports would include an itemization of military ex- 
penditures. 

2. Verifiable Reduction of Expenditures 

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to examine ques- 
tions related to the verifiable reduction of military ex- 
penditures. In the light of this examination, the Parties 
to the Treaty would consider appropriate arrangements 
respecting military expenditures. 

F. RcdKCtion of the Risk of War 

In order to promote confidence and reduce the risk of 
war, the Parties to the Treaty would agree to the follow- 
ing measures: 



1. Advance Notification of Military Movements and Ma- 
neuvers 

Specified Partie.s to the Treaty would give advance 
notification of major military movements and maneuvers 
to other Parties to the Treaty and to the International 
Disarmament Organization. Specific arrangements re- 
lating to this commitment, including the scale of move- 
ments and maneuvers to be reported and the information 
to be transmitted, would be agreed, 

2. Observation Posts 

Specified Parties to the Treaty would permit observa- 
tion posts to be established at agreed locations, including 
major ports, railway centers, motor highways, river 
crossings, and air bases to report on concentrations and 
movements of military forces. The number of such posts 
could be progressively expanded in each successive step 
of Stage I. Specific arrangements relating to such ob- 
servation posts, including the location and stafling of 
posts, the method of receiving and reporting information, 
and the .schedule for installation of posts would be agreed. 

3. Additional Observation Arrangements 

The Parties to the Treaty would establish such addi- 
tional observation arrangements as might be agreed. Such 
arrangements could be extended in an agreed manner 
during each step of Stage I. 

4. Exchange of Military Missions 

Specified Parties to the Treaty would undertake the 
exchange of military missions between states or groups 
of states in order to improve communications and under- 
standing between them. Specific arrangements respect- 
ing such exchanges would be agreed. 

5. Communications Between Heads of Government 

Specified Parties to the Treaty would agree to the 
establishment of rapid and reliable communications among 
their heads of government and with the Secretary General 
of the United Nations. Specific arrangements in this re- 
gard would be subject to agreement among the Parties 
concerned and between such Parties and the Secretary 
General. 

6. International Commission on Reduction of the Risk 
of War 

The Parties to the Treaty would establish an Inter- 
national Commission on Reduction of the Risk of War as 
a subsidiary body of the International Disarmament 
Organization to examine and make recommendations re- 
garding further measures that might be undertaken dur- 
ing Stage I or sub.sequent .stages of disarmament to re- 
duce the risk of war by accident, miscalculation, failure of 
communications, or surprise attack. Specific arrange- 
ments for such measures as might be agreed to by all or 
some of the Parties to the Treaty would be subject to 
agreement among the Parties concerned. 

G. The International Disarmament Organization 

1. Establishment of the International Disarmament 
Organization 

The International Disarmament Organization would be 



fAay 7, J 962 



751 



established uiwn the entry into force of the Treaty and 
would function within the framework of the United Na- 
tions and in accordance with the terms and conditions of 
the Treaty. 

2. Cooperation of the Parties to the Treaty 

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to cooperate 
promptly and fully with the International Disarmament 
Organization and to assist the International Disarmament 
Organization in the performance of its functions and in 
the execution of the decisions made by it in accordance 
with the provisions of the Treaty. 

3. Verification Functions of the International Disarma- 
ment Organization 

The International Disarmament Organization would 
verify disarmament measures in accordance with the 
following principles which would be implemented through 
specific arrangements set forth in the amiex on verifica- 
tion : 

a. Measures providing for reduction of armaments 
would be verified by the International Disarmament Or- 
ganization at agreed depots and would include verifica- 
tion of the destruction of armaments and, where appro- 
priate, verification of the conversion of armaments to 
peaceful uses. Measures providing for reduction of armed 
forces would be verified by the International Disarmament 
Organization either at the agreed depots or other agreed 
locations. 

b. Measures halting or limiting production, testing, and 
other specified activities would be verified by the Inter- 
national Disarmament Organization. Parties to the 
Treaty would declare the nature and location of all pro- 
duction and testing facilities and other specified activities. 
The International Disarmament Organization would have 
access to relevant facilities and activities wherever lo- 
cated in the territory of such Parties. 

c. Assurance that agreed levels of armaments and 
armed forces were not exeeede<l and that activities limited 
or prohibited by the Treaty were not being conducted 
clandestinely would be provided by the International 
Disarmament Organization through agreed arrangements 
which would have the effect of providing that the extent 
of inspection during any step or stage would be related 
to the amount of disarmament being inidertaken and to 
the degree of risk to the Parties to the Treaty of iwssible 
violations. This might be accomplishetl, for exami>le, by 
an arrangement embodying such features as the following : 

(1) All parts of the territory of those Parties to the 
Treaty to which this form of verification was applicable 
would be subject to selection for insi>ection from the be- 
ginning of Stage I as provided below. 

(2) Parties to the Treaty would divide their territory 
into an agreed number of appropriate zones and at the 
licginning of each step of disarmament would submit to 
the Iiiternati(mal Disarmament Organization a declara- 
tion stating the total level of armaments, forces, and 
specified types of activities subject to verification within 
each zone. The exact location of armaments and forces 
within a zone would not be revealed prior to its selection 
for insi)ection. 

(3) An agreed number of these zones would be progres- 
sively inspected by the International Disarmament Or- 



ganization during Stage I according to an agreed time 
schedule. The zones to be inspected would be selected 
by procedures which would ensure their selection by 
Parties to the Treaty other than the Party whose territory 
was to be inspected or any Party associated with it. 
Upon selection of each zone, the Party to the Treaty 
whose territory was to be inspected would declare the 
exact location of armaments, forces and other agreed 
activities within the selected zone. During the verifica- 
tion process, arrangements would be made to provide as- 
surance against undeclared movements of the objects of 
verification to or from the zone or zones being inspected. 
Both aerial and mobile ground inspection would be em- 
ployed within the zone being inspected. In so far as 
agreed measures being verified were concerned, access 
within the zone would be free and unimpeded, and veri- 
fication would be carried out with the full cooperation 
of the state being inspected. 

(4) Once a zone had l)een insi^ected it would remain 
open for further inspection while verification was being 
extended to additional zones. 

(5) By the end of Stage III, when all disarmament 
measures had been completed, inspection would have lieen 
extended to all parts of the territory of Parties to the 
Treaty. 

4. Composition of the International Disarmament 
Organization 

a. The International Di.sarmament Organization would 
have : 

(1) A General Conference of all the Parties to the 
Treaty ; 

(2) A Control Council consisting of representatives of 
all the major signatory powers as permanent members and 
certain other Parties to the Treaty on a rotating basis ; 
and 

(3) An Administrator who would administer the Inter- 
national Disarmament Organization under the direction 
of the Control Council and who would have the authority, 
staff, and finances adequate to ensure effective and im- 
partial implementation of the functions of the Interna- 
tional Disarmament Organization. 

b. The General Conference and the Control Council 
would have power to establish such subsidiary bodies, in- 
cluding expert study groups, as either of them might deem 
necessary. 

5. Functions of the General Conference 

The General Conference would have the following func- 
tions, among others which might be agreed : 

a. Electing non-permanent members to the Control 
Council ; 

b. Approving certain accessi(ms to the Treaty ; 

e. ApiKiinting the Adniinislrator upon recommendation 
of the Control Coiuicil ; 

d. Approving agreements between the International Dis- 
armament Organization and the United Nations and other 
international organizations : 

e. Approving the budget of Ihe Inloriialiunal Disarma- 
ment Organization ; 

f. Reciuesting and receiving rejiorts from the Control 



752 



Deparfmenf of State Bulletin 



Council and deciding upon matters referred to it by the 
Control Council ; 

g. Ai>i)roving reports to be submitted to bodies of the 
United Nations ; 

h. l^roposing matters for consideration by the Control 
Council ; 

i. Requesting the International Court of Justice to give 
advisory opinions on legal questions concerning the inter- 
pretation or application of the Treaty, subject to a general 
authorization of this power by the General Assembly of 
the United Nations ; 

j. Approving amendments to the Treaty for possible 
ratification by the Parties to the Treaty ; 

k. Considering matters of mutual interest pertaining to 
the Treaty or disarmament in general. 

6. Functions of the Control Council 

The Control Council would have the following functions, 
among others which might be agreed : 

a. Recommending appointment of the Administrator ; 

b. Adopting rules for implementing the terms of the 
Treaty ; 

c. Establishing procedures and standards for the instal- 
lation and operation of the verification arrangements, and 
maintaining supervision over such arrangements and the 
Administrator; 

d. Establishing procedures for making available to the 
Parties to the Treaty data produced by verification ar- 
rangements : 

e. Considering reports of the Administrator on the 
progress of disarmament measures and of their verifica- 
tion, and on the installation and operation of the verifica- 
tion arrangements ; 

f. Recommending to the Conference approval of the 
budget of the International Disarmament Organization ; 

g. Requesting the International Court of Justice to give 
advisory opinions on legal questions concerning the inter- 
pretation or application of the Treaty, subject to a gen- 
eral authorization of this power by the General Assembly 
of the United Nations ; 

h. Recommending to the Conference approval of certain 
accessions to the Treaty ; 

i. Considering matters of mutual interest pertaining to 
the Treaty or to disarmament in general. 

7. Functions of the Administrator 

The Administrator would have the foUovying functions, 
among others which might be agreed : 

a. Administering the installation and operation of the 
verification arrangements, and serving as Chief Executive 
Otficer of the International Disarmament Organization ; 

b. Making available to the Parties to the Treaty data 
produced by the verification arrangements ; 

c. Preparing the budget of the International Disarma- 
ment Organization ; 

d. Making reports to the Control Council on the progress 
of disarmament measures and of their verification, and on 
the installation and operation of the verification arrange- 
ments. 

8. Privileges and Immunities 

The privileges and immunities which the Parties to the 



Treaty would grant to the International Disarmament 
Organization and its staff and to the representatives of 
the Parties to the International Disarmament Organiza- 
tion, and the legal capacity which the International Dis- 
armament Organization should enjoy in the territory of 
each of the Parties to the Treaty would be specified in 
an annex to the Treaty. 

9. Relations with the United Nations and Other Inter- 
national Organizations 

a. The International Disarmament Organization, being 
established within the framework of the United Nations, 
would conduct its activities in accordance with the pur- 
poses and principles of the United Nations. It would 
maintain close working arrangements with the United 
Nations, and the Administrator of the International Dis- 
armament Organization would consult with the Secretary 
General of the United Nations on matters of mutual 
interest. 

b. The Control Council of the International Disar- 
mament Organization would transmit to the United Na- 
tions annual and other reports on the activities of the 
International Disarmament Organization. 

c. Principal organs of the United Nations could make 
recommendations to the International Disarmament Or- 
ganization, which would consider them and report to the 
United Nations on action taken. 

Note: The above outline does not cover all the possible 
details or aspects of relationships between the 
International Disarmament Organization and the 
United Nations. 

H. Measures To Strengthen Arrangements for Keeping the 
Peaee 

1. Obligations Concerning the Threat or Use of Force 
The Parties to the Treaty would undertake obligations 

to refrain, in their international relations, from the threat 
or use of force of any type — including nuclear, conven- 
tional, chemical or biological means of warfare — contrary 
to the purposes and principles of the United Nations 
Charter. 

2. Rules of International Conduct 

a. The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support a 
study by a subsidiary body of the International Dis- 
armament Organization of the codification and progi-es- 
sive development of rules of international conduct related 
to disarmament. 

b. The Parties to the Treaty would refrain from in- 
direct aggression and subversion. The subsidiary body 
provided for in subparagraph a would also study methods 
of assuring states against indirect aggression or subver- 
sion. 

3. Peaceful Settlement of Disputes 

a. The Parties to the Treaty would utilize all appro- 
priate processes for the peaceful settlement of all disputes 
which might arise between them and any other state, 
whether or not a Party to the Treaty, including negotia- 
tion, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial 
settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, 
submission to the Security Council or the General As- 



May 7, J 962 



753 



sembly of the United Xations, or other peaceful means 
of their choice. 

b. The Parties to the Treaty would agree that disputes 
concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaty 
which were not settled by negotiation or by the Inter- 
national Disarmament Organization would be subject to 
referral by any party to the dispute to the International 
Court of Justice, unless the parties concerned agreed on 
another mode of settlement. 

c. The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support a 
study under the General Assembly of the United Nations 
of measures which should be undertaken to make existing 
arrangements for the peaceful settlement of international 
disputes, whether legal or political in nature, more effec- 
tive; and to institute new procedures and arrangements 
where needed. 

4. Maintenance of International Peace and Security 

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support 
measures strengthening the structure, authority, and 
operation of the United Nations so as to improve its 
capability to maintain international peace and security. 

5. United Nations Peace Force 

The Parties to the Treaty would undertake to develop 
arrangements during Stage I for the establishment in 
Stage II of a United Nations Peace Force. To this end, 
the Parties to the Treaty would agree on the following 
measures within the United Nations : 

a. Examination of the experience of the United Nations 
leading to a further strengthening of United Nations 
forces for keeping the peace ; 

b. Examination of the feasibility of concluding promptly 
the agreements envisaged in Article 43 of the United 
Nations Charter ; 

c. Conclusion of an agreement for the establishment 
of a United Nations Peace Force in Stage II, including 
definitions of its purpose, mission, composition and 
strength, disposition, command and control, training, logis- 
tical support, financing, equipment and armaments. 

6. United Nations Peace Observation Corps 

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to supixjrt the 
establishment within the United Nations of a Peace Ob- 
servation Corps, staffed with a standing cadre of observers 
who could be despatched i)romptly to investigate any 
situation which might constitute a threat to or a breach 
of the peace. Elements of the Peace Observation Corps 
could also be stationed as appropriate in selected areas 
throughout the world. 

I. Transition 

1. Transition from Stage I to Stage II would take place 
at the end of Stage I, upon a determination that the 
following circumstances existed : 

a. All undertakings to be carried out in Stage I had 
been carried out ; 

b. All preparations required for Stage II had been 
made ; and 

c. All militarily significant states had become Parties 
to the Treaty. 



2. During the last three months of Stage I, the Con- 
trol Council would review the situation respecting these 
circumstances with a view to determining whether these 
circumstances existed at the end of Stage I. 

3. If, at the end of Stage I, one or more permanent 
members of the Control Council should declare that the 
foregoing circumstances did not exist, the agreed period 
of Stage I would, uix)n the request of such permanent 
member or members, be extended by a period or periods 
totalling no more than three months for the purpose of 
bringing about the foregoing circumstances. 

4. If, upon the expiration of such period or periods, one 
or more of the permanent members of the Control Council 
should declare that the foregoing circumstances still did 
not exist, the question would be ijlaced before a special 
session of the Security Council ; transition to Stage II 
would take place upon a determination by the Security 
Council that the foregoing circumstances did in fact exist. 

Stage II 

Stage II would begin upon the transition from Stage I 
and would be completed within three years from that date. 

During Stage II, the Parties to the Treaty would under- 
take: 

1. To continue all obligations undertaken during Stage 
I; 

2. To reduce further the armaments and armed forces 
reduced during Stage I and to carry out additional 
measures of disarmament in the manner outlined below ; 

3. To ensure that the International Disarmament Organ- 
ization would have the capacity to verify in the agreed 
manner the obligations undertaken during Stage II ; and 

4. To strengthen further the arrangements for keeping 
the peace through the establishment of a United Nations 
Peace Force and through the additional measures outlined 
below. 

A. Aimumcnts 

1. Reduction of Armaments 

a. Those Parties to the Treaty which had during Stage 

I reduced their armaments in agreed categories by thirty 
percent would during Stage II further reduce each type 
of aruKunents in the categories listed in Section A, sub- 
paragraph l.b of Stage I by fifty percent of the inventory 
existing at the end of Stage I. 

b. Those Parties to the Treaty which had not been 
subject to measures for the reduction of armaments dur- 
ing Stage I would submit to the International Disarma- 
ment Organization an appropriate declaration respecting 
the inventories iiy tyjies, within the categories listed in 
Stage I, of their armaments existing at the beginning of 
Stage II. Such Parties to the Treaty would during Stage 

II reduce the inventory of each type of such armaments 
by sixty-five percent in order that such Parties would 
accomplish the same total i)ercentage of reduction by the 
end of Stage II as would be accomplished by those 
Parties to the Treaty which had reduced their annunients 
by thirty percent in Stage I. 

2. Additional Armaments Subject to Reduction 

a. The Parties to the Treaty would submit to the Inter- 



754 



Department of State Bulletin 



national Disarmament Organization a declaration respect- 
ing tlieir inventories existing at the beginning of Stage 
II of the additional types of armaments in the categories 
listed in subjiaragraph b below, and would during Stage II 
reduce the inventory of each type of such armaments by 
fifty i)ercent. 

b. All types of armaments within further agreed cate- 
gories would be suliject to reduction in Stage II (the fol- 
lowing list of categories is illustrative) : 

(1) Armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of 
up to 2,500 kilograms (declarations by types). 

(2) Specified types of unarmed military aircraft (dec- 
larations by types). 

(3) Missiles and free rockets having a range of less 
than lOkilometers (declarations by types). 

(4) Mortars and rocket launchers having a caliber of 
less than 100 mm. (declarations by types). 

(5) Specified types of unarmored personnel carriers 
and transport vehicles (declarations by types). 

(6) Combatant ships with standard displacement of 
400 tons or greater which had not been included among 
the armaments listed in Stage I, and combatant ships 
with standard displacement of less than 400 toiLs (declara- 
tions by types). 

(7) Specified types of non-combatant naval vessels 
( declarations by types) . 

(8) Specified types of small arms (declarations by 
types). 

c. Specified categories of ammunition for armaments 
listed in Stage I, Section A, subparagraph l.b and in sub- 
paragraph b above would be reduced to levels consistent 
with the levels of armaments agreed for the end of Stage 
II. 

3. Method of Reduction 

The foregoing measures would be carried out and would 
be verified by the International Disarmament Organiza- 
tion in a manner corresponding to that provided for in 
Stage I, Section A, paragraph 2. 

4. Limitation on Production of Armaments and on Related 
Activities 

a. The Parties to the Treaty would halt the production 
of armaments in the specified categories except for pro- 
duction, within agreed limits, of parts required for main- 
tenance of the agreed retained armaments. 

b. The production of ammunition in specified categories 
would be reduced to agreed levels consistent with the 
levels of armaments agreed for the end of Stage II. 

c. The Parties to the Treaty would halt development 
and testing of new types of armaments. The flight testing 
of existing types of missiles would be limited to agreed 
annual quotas. 

d. In accordance with arrangements which would be set 
forth in the annex on verification, the International Dis- 
armament Organization would verify the foregoing meas- 
ures at declared locations and would provide assurance 
that activities subject to the foregoing measures were not 
conducted at undeclared locations. 

5. Additional Measures 

a. In the light of their examination during Stage I of 



the means of accomplishing the reduction and eventual 
elimination of production and stockpiles of chemical and 
biological weapons of mass destruction, the Parties to the 
Treaty would undertake the following measures respect- 
ing such weapons : 

(1) The cessation of all production and field testing of 
chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction. 

(2) The reduction, by agreed categories, of stockpiles 
of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction 
to levels fifty percent below those existing at the beginning 
of Stage II. 

(3) The dismantling or conversion to peaceful uses of 
all facilities engaged in the production or field testing of 
chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction. 

b. The foregoing measures would be carried out in an 
agreed sequence and through arrangements which would 
be set forth in an annex to the Treaty. 

c. In accordance with arrangements which would be 
set forth in the annex on verification the International 
Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing 
measures and would provide assurance that retained 
levels of chemical and biological weapons did not exceed 
agreed levels and that activities subject to the foregoing 
limitations were not conducted at undeclared locations. 

B. Armed Forces 

1. Reduction of Armed Forces 

a. Those Parties to the Treaty which had been subject 
to measures providing for reduction of force levels during 
Stage I would further reduce their force levels on the 
following basis : 

(1) Force levels of the United States of America and 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would he reduced 
to levels fifty percent below the levels agreed for the end 
of Stage I. 

(2) Force levels of other Parties to the Treaty which 
had been subject to measures providing for the reduction 
of force levels during Stage I would be further reduced, 
on the basis of an agreed percentage, below the levels 
agreed for the end of Stage I to levels which would not 
in any case exceed the agreed level for the United States 
of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at 
the end of Stage II. 

b. Those Parties to the Treaty which had not been 
subject to measures providing for the reduction of armed 
forces during Stage I would reduce their force levels to 
agreed levels consistent with those to be reached by other 
Parties which had reduced their force levels during Stage 
I as well as Stage II. In no case would such agreed 
levels exceed the agreed level for the United States of 
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at 
the end of Stage II. 

c. Agreed levels of armed forces would include all 
personnel in the categories set forth in Section B, para- 
graph 2 of Stage I. 

2. Method of Reduction 

The further reduction of force levels would be carried 
out and would be verified by the International Disarma- 
ment Organization in a manner corresponding to that 



May 7, J 962 



755 



provided for in Section B, paragraph 3 of Stage I. 

3. Additional Measures 

Agreed limitations consistent with retained force levels 
would be placed on compulsory military training, and on 
refresher training for reserve forces of the Parties to the 
Treaty. 

C. NiicJcar Weapons 

1. Reduction of Nuclear Weapons 

In the light of their examination during Stage I of the 
means of accomplishing the reduction and eventual elimi- 
nation of nuclear weapons stockpiles, the Parties to the 
Treaty would undertake to reduce in the following man- 
ner remaining nuclear weapons and fissionable materials 
for use in nuclear weapons : 

a. The Parties to the Treaty would submit to the Inter- 
national Disarmament Organization a declaration stating 
the amounts, types and nature of utilization of all their 
fissionable materials. 

b. The Parties to the Treaty would reduce the amounts 
and types of fissionable materials declared for use in 
nuclear weapons to minimum levels on the basis of agreed 
percentages. The foregoing reduction would be accom- 
plished through the transfer of such materials to purjwses 
other than use in nuclear weapons. The purposes for 
which such materials would be use<l would be determined 
l)y the state to which the materials belonged, provided 
that .such materials were not used in nuclear weapons. 

c. The Parties to the Treaty would destroy the non- 
nuclear components and assemblies of nuclear weapons 
from which fissionable materials had been removed to 
effect the foregoing reduction of fissionable materials for 
use in nuclear weapons. 

d. Production or refabrication of nuclear weapons from 
any remaining fissionable materials would be subject to 
agreed limitations. 

e. The foregoing measures would be canned out in an 
agreed sequence and through arrangements which would 
be set forth in an annex to the Treaty. 

f. In accordance with arrangements that would be set 
forth in the verification annex to the Treaty, the Inter- 
national Disarmament Organization would verify the fore- 
going measures at declared locations and would provide 
assurance that activities subject to the foregoing limita- 
tions were not conducted at undeclared locations. 

2. Registration of Nuclear Weapons for Verification 
Purposes 

To facilitate verification during Stage III that no nu- 
clear weapons remained at the dispo.sal of the Parties to 
the Treaty, those Parties to the Treaty which possessed 
nuclear weapons would, during the last six months of 
Stage II, register and serialize their remaining nuclear 
weapons and would register remaining fission.ible mate- 
rials for use in such weapons. Such registration and 
serialization would l)e carried out with the International 
Disarmament Organization in accordance with procedures 
which would be set forth in the annex on verification. 

D. Military liases and Facilities 

1. Reduction of Military Bases and Facilities 



The Parties to the Treaty would dismantle or convert 
to ijeaeeful uses agreed military bases and facilities, 
wherever they might be located. 

2. Method of Reduction 

a. The list of military bases and facilities subject to the 
foregoing measures and the sequence and arrangements 
for dismantling or converting them to peaceful uses would 
be set forth in an annex to the Treaty. 

b. In accordance with arrangements which would be 
set forth in the annex on verification, the International 
Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing 
measures. 

E. Reduction of the Risk of War 

In the light of the examination by the International 
Commission on Reduction of the Risk of War during 
Stage I the Parties to the Treaty would undertake such 
additional arrangements as appeared desirable to promote 
confidence and reduce the risk of war. The Parties to 
the Treaty would also consider extending and improving 
the measures undertaken in Stage I for this purpose. 
The Commission would remain in existence to examine 
extensions, improvements or additional measures which 
might be undertaken during and after Stage II. 

F. The International Disarmament Organization 

The International Disarmament Organization would 
be strengthened in the manner necessary to ensure its 
capacity to verify the measures undertaken in Stage II 
through an extension of the arrangements based upon the 
principles set forth in Section G, paragraph 3 of Stage I. 

G. Measures to Strengthen Arrangements for Keeping 
the Peace 

1 . Peaceful Settlement of Disputes 

a. In light of the study of peaceful settlement of dis- 
putes conducted during Stage I, the Parties to the Treaty 
would agree to such additional steps and arrangements 
as were necessary to assure the just and peaceful settle- 
ment of international disputes, whether legal or political 
in nature. 

b. The Parties to the Treaty would undertake to accept 
without reservation, pursuant to Article 36, paragraph 1 
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the 
compuLsory jurisdiction of that Court to decide interna- 
tional legal disputes. 

2. Rules of International Conduct 

a. The Parties to the Treaty would continue their 
support of the study by the subsidiary body of the Inter- 
national Disarmament Organization initiated in Stage I 
to study the codification and progressive development of 
rules of international conduct related to disarmament. 
The Parties to the Treaty would agree to the establish- 
ment of procedures wlierehy rules rccommende<l by the 
subsidiary body and approved by the Control Council 
would be circulated to all Parties to the Treaty and 
would become effective three months thereafter unless a 
majority of the Parties to the Treaty signified their dis- 
approval, and whereby the Parties to the Treaty would 
be bound by rules which had become effwtive in this way 
unless, within a period of one year from the effective date. 



756 



Department of State Bulletin 



they formally notified the International Disarmament 
Organization that they did not consider themselves so 
bound. Using sueh procedures, the Parties to the Treaty 
would adopt such rules of international conduct related to 
disarmament as might be necessary to begin Stage III. 

b. In the light of the study of indirect aggression and 
subversion conducted in Stage I, the Parties to the Treaty 
vcould agree to arrangements necessary to assure states 
against indirect aggression and subversion. 

3. United Nations Peace Force 

The United Nations Peace Force to be established as 
the result of the agreement reached during Stage I would 
come into being within the first year of Stage II and 
would be progressively strengthened during Stage II. 

4. United Nations Peace Observation Cori>s 

The Parties to the Treaty would conclude arrangements 
for the expansion of the activities of the United Nations 
Peace Observation Corps. 

5. National Legislation 

Those Parties to the Treaty which had not already 
done so would, in accordance with their constitutional 
processes, enact national legislation in supiwrt of the 
Treaty imposing legal obligations on individuals and 
organizations under their jurisdiction and providing ap- 
propriate penalties for noncompliance. 

H. Transition 

1. Transition from Stage II to Stage III would take 
place at the end of Stage II, upon a determination that 
the following circumstances existed : 

a. All undertakings to be carried out in Stage II had 
been carried out; 

b. All preparations required for Stage III had been 
made ; and 

c. AU states possessing armed forces and armaments 
had become Parties to the Treaty. 

2. During the last three months of Stage II, the Control 
Council would review the situation respecting these 
circumstances with a view to determining at the end of 
Stage II whether they existed. 

3. If, at the end of Stage II, one or more permanent 
members of the Control Council should declare that the 
foregoing circumstances did not exist, the agreed period 
of Stage II would, upon the request of such permanent 
member or members, be extended by a i)eriod or periods 
totalling no more than three months for the purpose of 
bringing about the foregoing circumstances. 

4. If, upon the expiration of such period or periods, one 
or more of the permanent members of the Control Council 
should declare that the foregoing circumstances still did 
not exist, the question would be placed before a special 
session of the Security Council ; transition to Stage III 
would take place upon a determination by the Security 
Council that the foregoing circumstances did in fact exist. 

Stage III 

Stage III would begin upon the transition from Stage II 
and would be completed within an agreed period of time 
as promptly as possible. 



During Stage III, the Parties to the Treaty would 
undertake : 

1. To continue all obligations undertaken during Stages 
I and II ; 

2. To complete the process of general and complete 
disarmament in the manner outlined below ; 

3. To ensure that the International Disarmament Or- 
ganization would have the capacity to verify in the 
agreed manner the obligations undertaken during Stage 
III and of continuing verification subse<iuent to the com- 
pletion of Stage III ; and 

4. To strengthen further the arrangements for keeping 
the peace during and following the achievement of general 
and complete disarmament through the additional meas- 
ures outlined below. 

A. Armaments 

1. Reduction of Armaments 

Subject to agreed requirements for non-nuclear arma- 
ments of agreed types for national forces required to 
maintain internal order and protect the personal security 
of citizens, the Parties to the Treaty would eliminate all 
armaments remaining at their disposal at the end of 
Stage II. 

2. Method of Reduction 

a. The foregoing measure would be carried out in an 
agreed sequence and through arrangements that would 
be set forth in an annex to the Treaty. 

b. In accordance with arrangements that would be 
set forth in the annex on verification, the International 
Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing 
measures and would provide assurance that retained 
armaments were of the agreed types and did not exceed 
agreed levels. 

3. Limitations on Production of Armaments and on 
Related Activities 

a. Subject to agreed arrangements in support of na- 
tional forces required to maintain internal order and 
protect the personal security of citizens and subject to 
agreed arrangements in support of the Unite<l Nations 
Peace Force, the Parties to the Treaty would halt all 
applied research, development, production, and testing 
of armaments and would cause to be dismantled or con- 
verted to peaceful uses all facilities for such purposes. 

b. The foregoing measures would be carried out in an 
agreed sequence and through arrangements which would 
be .set forth in an annex to the Treaty. 

c. In accordance with arrangements which would be 
set forth in the annex on verification, the International 
Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing 
measures at declared locations and would provide assur- 
ance that activities subject to the foregoing measures 
were not conducted at undeclared locations. 

B. Armed Forces 

1. Reduction of Armed Forces 

To the end that upon completion of Stage III they 
would have at their disposal only those forces and or- 
ganizational arrangements necessary for agreed forces 



May 7, J 962 



757 



to maintain internal order and protect tlie personal se- 
curity of citizens and that they would be capable of 
providing agreed manpower for the United Nations 
Peace Force, the Parties to the Treaty would complete 
the reduction of their force levels, disband systems of 
reserve forces, cause to be disbanded organizational ar- 
rangements comprising and supporting their national 
military establishment, and terminate the employment of 
civilian personnel associated with the foregoing. 

2. Method of Reduction 

a. The foregoing measures would be carried out in an 
agreed sequence through arrangements which would be 
set forth in an annex to the Treaty. 

b. In accordance with arrangements which would be 
set forth in the annex on verification, the International 
Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing 
measures and would provide assurance that the only 
forces and organizational arrangements retained or sub- 
sequently established were those necessary for agreed 
forces required to maintain internal order and to pro- 
tect the personal security of citizens and those for pro- 
viding agreed manpower for the United Nations Peace 
Force. 

3. Other Limitationa 

The Parties to the Treaty would halt all military con- 
scription and would undertalje to annul legislation con- 
cerning national military establishments or military 
service inconsistent with the foregoing measures. 

C. Nuclear Weapons 

1. Reduction of Nuclear Weapons 

In light of the steps taken in Stages I and II to halt 
the production of fissionable material for use in nuclear 
weapons and to reduce nuclear weapons stockpiles, the 
Parties to the Treaty would eliminate all nuclear weapons 
remaining at their di.sposal, would cause to be dismantled 
or converted to peaceful use all facilities for production 
of such weapons, and would transfer all materials re- 
maining at their disposal for use in such weapons to 
purposes other than use in such weapons. 

2. Method of Reduction 

a. The foregoing measures would be carried out in an 
agreed secjuence and through arrangements which would 
be set forth in an annex to the Treaty. 

b. In accordance with arrangements which would be 
set forth in the annex on verification, the International 
Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing 
measures and would i)rovide assurance that no nuclear 
weapons or materials for use in such weapons remained 
at the di.sposal of the Parties to the Treaty and that no 
such weapons or materials were i)roduced at imdeclared 
facilities. 

D. Military Bases and Facilities 

1. Reduction of Military Bases and Facilities 

The Parties to the Treaty would dismantle or convert 
to peaceful uses the military bases and facilities remain- 
ing at their disposal, wherever they might be located. In 



758 



an agreed sequence except for such agreed bases or facili- 
ties within the territory of the Parties to the Treaty for 
agreed forces required to maintain internal order and 
protect the personal security of citizens. 

2. Method of Reduction 

a. The list of military bases and facilities subject to 
the foregoing measure and the .sequence and arrange- 
ments for dismantling or converting them to peaceful 
uses during Stage III would be set forth in an annex to 
the Treaty. 

b. In accordance with arrangements which would be 
set forth in the annex on verification, the International 
Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing 
measure at declared locations and provide assurance 
that there were no undeclared military bases and facili- 
ties. 

E. Research and Development of Military Significance 

1. Reporting Requirement 

The Parties to the Treaty would undertake the fol- 
lowing measures respecting research and development of 
military significance subsequent to Stage III : 

a. The Parties to the Treaty would report to the In- 
ternational Disarmament Organization any basic scien- 
tific discovery and any technological invention having 
potential military significance. 

b. The Control Council would establish such expert 
study groups as might be required to examine the poten- 
tial military significance of such discoveries and inven- 
tions and, if necessary, to recommend appropriate 
measures for their control. In the light of such exjiert 
study, the Parties to the Treaty would, where necessary, 
establish agreed arrangements providing for verification 
by the International Disarmament Organization that such 
discoveries and inventions were not utilized for military 
purposes. Such arrangements would become an annex 
to the Treaty. 

c. The Parties to the Treaty would agree to appropriate 
arrangements for protection of the ownership rights of all 
discoveries and inventions reported to the International 
Disarmament Organization in accordance with subpara- 
graph a above. 

2. International Cooperation 

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support full 
international cooi)eration in all fields of scientific re- 
search and development, and to engage in free exchange 
of scientific and technical information and free inter- 
change of views among scientific and technical personnel. 

F. Reduction of the Risk of War 

1. Improved Measures 

In the light of the Stage II examination by the In- 
ternational Commission on Ucduction of the Risk of War, 
the Parties to the Treaty would undertake such exten- 
sions and improvements of existing arrangements and 
such additional arrangements as appeared desirable to 
pnimotc confidence and reduce the risk of war. Tlie 
Coiiniiissiou would rcniuin in existence to examine ex- 

Department of Sfafe BuHetin 



tensions, improvements or iidditional measures which 
might be taken during and after Stage III. 

2. Application of Measures to (Continuing Forces 

The Parties to the Treaty would apply to national 
forces required to maintain internal order and protect 
the personal security of citizens those apiilicable meas- 
ures concerning the reduction of the risk of war that had 
been applied to national armed forces in Stages I and II. 

G. The Internatioital Disarmament Organization 

The International Disarmament Organization would be 
strengthened in the manner necessary to ensure its ca- 
pacity (1) to verify the measures undertaken in Stage 
III through an extension of arrangements based upon 
the i.rineiples set forth in Section G, paragraph 3 of 
Stage I so that by the end of Stage III, when all dis- 
armament measures had been completed, inspection 
would have been extended to all parts of the territory of 
Parties to the Treaty; and (2) to provide continuing 
verification of disarmament after the completion of Stage 

H. Measures to Strengthen Arrangements for Keeping 
the Peace 

1. Peaceful Change and Settlement of Disputes 

The Parties to the Treaty would undertake such addi- 
tional steps and arrangements as were necessary to pro- 
vide a basis for peaceful change in a disarmed world and 
to continue the just and peaceful settlement of all inter- 
national disputes, whether legal or political in nature. 

2. Rules of International Conduct 

The Parties to the Treaty would continue the codifica- 
tion and progressive development of rules of international 
conduct related to disarmament in the manner provided 
in Stage II and by any other agreed procedure. 

3. United Nations Peace Force 

The Parties to the Treaty would progressively 
strengthen the United Nations Peace Force established 
In Stage II until it had sufficient armed forces and arma- 
ments so that no state could challenge it. 

I. Completion of Stage III 

1. At the end of the time period agreed for Stage III, 
the Control Council would review the situation with a 
view to determining whether all imdertakings to be 
carried out in Stage III had been carried out. 

2. In the event that one or more of the permanent 
members of the Control Council should declare that such 
undertakings had not been carried out, the agreed period 
of Stage III would, upon the request of such permanent 
member or members, be extended for a period or periods 
totalling no more than three months for the purpose of 
completing any uncompleted undertakings. If, upon the 
expiration of such period or periods, one or more of the 
permanent members of the Control Council should declare 
that such undertakings still had not been carried out, 
the question would be placed before a special session of 

May 7, 7962 



the Security Council, which would dotenuiue whether 
Stage III had been completed. 

3. After the completion of Stage III, the obligations un- 
dertaken in Stages I, II and III would continue. 

Genebal Provisions Applicable to All Stages 

1. Subsequent Modifications or Amendments of the Treaty 
The Parties to the Treaty would agree to specific pro- 
cedures for con.sidering amendments or modifications of 
the Treaty which were believed desirable by any Party 
to the Treaty in the light of experience in the eariy period 
of implementation of the Treaty. Such procedures would 
include provi-sion for a conference on revision of the 
Treaty after a specified period of time. 

2. Interim Agreement 

The Parties to the Treaty would undertake such specific 
arrangements, including the establishment of a Prepara- 
tory Commission, as were necessary between the signing 
and entry into force of the Treaty to ensure the initiation 
"f Stage I immediately upon the entry into force of the 
Treat.v, and to provide an interim forum for the exchange 
of views and information on topics relating to the Treaty 
and to the achievement of a permanent state of general 
and complete disarmament in a peaceful world. 

3. Parties to the Treaty, Ratification, Accession, and Entry 
into Force of the Treaty 

a. The Treaty would be open to signature and ratifica- 
tion, or accession, by all members of the United Nations 
or Its specialized agencies. 

b. Any other state which desired to become a Party to 
the Treaty could accede to the Treaty with the approval 
of the Conference on recommendation of the Control 
Council. 

0. The Treaty would come into force when it had been 

ratified by state.s, including the United 

States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
and an agreed number of the following states • 



(1. In order to assure the achievement of the funda- 
mental purpose of a permanent state of general and com- 
plete disarmament in a peaceful worid, the Treaty would 
specify that the accession of certain militarily significant 
states would be essential for the continued effectiveness 
of the Treaty or for the coming into force of particular 
measures or stages. 

e. The Parties to the Treaty would undertake to exert 
every effort to Induce other states or authorities to accede 
to the Treaty. 

f. The Treaty would be subject to ratification or accept- 
ance in accordance with constitutional processes. 

g. A Depository Government would be agreed upon 
which would have all of the duties normally Incumbent 
upon a Depository. Alternatively, the United Nations 
would be the Depository. 

4. Finance 

a. In order to meet the financial obligations of the 
International Disarmament Organization, the Parties to 
the Treaty would bear the International Disarmament 



759 



Organization's expenses as provided in the budget ap- 
proved by the General Conference and in accordance with 
a scale of apportionment approved by the General 
Conference. 

b. The General Conference would exercise borrowing 
powers on behalf of the International Disarmament 
Organization. 

5. Authentic Texts 

The text of the Treaty would consist of equally au- 
thentic versions in English, French, Rassian, Chinese and 
Spanish. 



President Kennedy and Shah of Iran 
Discuss Matters of Mutual Interest 

His Majesty Molimnmad Reza Shah Pahlavi, 
Shahanshah of Iran, accompanied hy the Emfress 
Farah, made a state visit to the United States 
April 10-18. Following is the text of a joint com- 
onunique issued hy President Kennedy and His 
Imperial Majesty on April 13 at the conclusion 
of the Washington portion of his visit. 

White House press release dated April 13 

The President and His Imperial Majesty liave 
had a cordial and useful exchange of views during 
the past three days. The visit afforded an oppor- 
tunity for the President and the Shah to become 
acquainted personally and to discuss matters of 
mutual interest to their countries. 

Their talks included a review of political and 
military situations in the world; a discussion of 
the progress which Iran is making in economic 
and social advancement; a review of defense ar- 
rangements in which the two countries are as- 
sociated; and aspects of United States economic 
and military aid programs in Iran. 

Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of 
Defense Robert S. McNamara and Iranian 
Foreign Minister Abbas Aram also participated 
in the talks. 

His Imperial Majesty described the form and 
goals of the Third Iranian Economic Development 
l^lan, which is scheduled to start later this year. 
The President and His Imperial Majesty agreed 
on the necessity for further acceleration of eco- 
nomic development in Iran, and on the need for 
continued external assistance to Iran to enable 
that country to pursue the goals of its economic 
development plans. 

They discussed and were in complete agreement 



on the subject of tlie nature of the threat to the 
Middle East and to all free peoples. They re- 
affirmed the provisions of the bilateral agreement 
of 1959 ^ concerning the maintenance of the in- 
dependence and territorial integrity of Iran, and 
agreed on the necessity of collective security ar- 
rangements to achieve this end. They also agreed 
on the necessity of achieving a high level of in- 
ternal economic development and social welfare 
in order to continue the internal stability neces- 
sary to resist external threats. 

The friendly and extensive exchange of views 
between the President and His Imperial Majesty 
lias been consonant with the close relationship 
between the two countries and has strengtliened 
the bonds of friendship between them in their 
quest for common objectives of peace and well- 
being. 

In taking leave of the President, His Imperial 
Majesty expressed his thanks for the friendly re- 
ception accorded him in the United States. Both 
the President and His Imperial Majesty were grat- 
ified by their fruitful discussions and by the spirit 
of cooperative understanding which marked those 
discussions. 



Assistant Secretary Cleveland 
Visits Europe and Congo 

Press release L'tV2 dated April 21 

Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary for In- 
ternational Organization Affairs, will leave the 
United States on April 24 for a 10-day trip to 
Europe and the Congo. 

Mr. Cleveland will confer with U.S. and inter- 
national organization officials on future budget 
and program planning and the coordination of 
national and internationally administered pro- 
grams. The discussions will include financial and 
administrative arrangements under which U.S. 
contributions to the U.N. are employed in the 
Congo and elsewhere. 

The Bureau of International Organization 
Affairs, which handles U.N. affairs in the Depart- 
ment, is also responsible for the budgeting and 
management of U.S. financial contributions to 
international organizations. 



'For background and text, see Bulletin of Mar. 23, 
1959, p. 416. 



760 



Department of State Bulletin 



Attorney General Explains U.S. Goals to People 
of Japan, Indonesia, and Germany 



Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy^ & visit to 
Japan, Indonesia, and Europe in February was 
reported widely in the United States and through- 
out the world. The lively, spontaneous exchanges 
between the Attorney Gerieral and those who 
heard him and the statements of officials in high 
position are well known. 

The reportage, Tievertheless, did not convey 
inuch of the substance of the speeches he had pre- 
pared. These speeches were received with great 
interest, even by his hecklers. 

It should be remembered that in many cases, 
particularly in Indonesia and Japan, young intel- 
lectuals luere heanng for the first time a inember 
of the United States Cabinet. 

Excerpts from the Attorney GeiveraVa talks 
follow. 



UNIVERSITY OF GADJA MADA, 
JOGJAKARTA, INDONESIA 

February 15, 1962 

Let me tell you something of modern-day 
America and what we stand for. 

Freedom possesses many meanings. It speaks 
not merely in terms of political and religious 
liberty but also in terms of economic and social 
progress. Over the years the concept has been 
an expanding one. 

In the United States today freedom speaks out 
for expanding industrialization, increases in pro- 
ductivity, the better distribution of the rewards 
of labor, a decent return on investment. 

It speaks in terms of laws to prevent monopoly 
by business, corruption by labor leaders, to prevent 
stock and bond frauds in investments, to grant a 
$1.25 an hour minimum wage for workers. 

The last few decades in America have seen tlie 
rise of unemployment comi>ensation, social secu- 
rity, pension funds to aid the elderly, medical 
assistance, and a variety of other benefits that 

May 7, 1962 

636919 — 62 3 



make impossible the concept of an economic so- 
ciety, such as we were threatened with in the last 
century by the imcontrolled rise of industrialism, 
in which the rich got richer and the poor got 
poorer. 

Our society then, still loyal today to its orig- 
inal revolutionary concept of the importance of 
the individual, sees its goals in the United States 
in service to mankind in ways never imagined 
years ago. It reaches out to protect us in our 
old age; it provides our youth with an ever better 
education; it bans child labor and starvation 
wages; it protects our savings in the banks; and 
more and more it reaches out to newer and greater 
frontiers that will provide spiritually and eco- 
nomically a richer life. 

This is not the society condemned some one 
hundred years ago as an era of brutal capitalism 
based on laissez faire. This is not the society 
whose evils Marx thought were beyond tlie cure 
of democracy. It is not an economy that tolerates 
long hours, low wages, child labor, and the bitter 
hatred between capital and labor that was the 
core of Marx's Manifesto — a Manifesto that even 
the Communists now recognize as being economi- 
cally inaccurate and historically unsound. Indeed, 
this democratic society boasts of its abolition of 
these evils and cries out against ideologies of gov- 
ernment that demand the supisression of freedom 
of worship, freedom of speech, and call for the 
complete domination and subservience of the in- 
dividual to the needs of the state as determined by 
a select few. 

NIHON UNIVERSITY, TOKYO, JAPAN 

February 6, 1962 

The overriding development of the second half 
of the 20th centui-y is tlie awakening of peoples 
in Asia and Africa and Latin America — peoples 
stirring from centuries of stagnation, suppression, 



761 



and dependency. Now they are seeking through 
national independence the kind of economic and 
social development which both your country and 
mine have experienced. These are young nations, 
trying desperately in the quest for political and 
social progress to make up for lost centuries. . . . 

We have no intention of trying to remake the 
world in our image, but we have no intention either 
of permitting any other state to remake the world 
in its image. . . . The institutions we have de- 
vised to achieve our aims may be inappropriate 
in another culture or another historic setting. 
The creation of the necessary political and eco- 
nomic machinery to achieve these aims must be 
performed by tlie people themselves. 

We do not condemn others for their dilferences 
in economic and political structures. We under- 
stand that newer nations have not had time, even 
if they so wished, to build institutions relying pri- 
marily on private enterprise as we have done. 
Our privately owned railroads, our airlines, our 
commmiications systems, our mdustries, were not 
created overnight. These enterprises developed as 
a result of private initiative at a time when life 
was far simpler than it is now. We thus had time 
to permit their slow growth and time to permit the 
intertwining of many small units into the great 
systems that the modern age requires, and, under 
government regulation, time to permit the con- 
tmuation of private control. In many of the 
newer nations, government appears to be the only 
mechanism capable of performing these feats 
within a reasonable length of time. This we can 
understand and appreciate. It neither offends us, 
nor can we deem it hostile. 

UNIVERSITY OF INDONESIA, DJAKARTA 

February 14, 1962 

It is from our own laiowledge of difliculties we 
have faced, as well as from our dedication to the 
ideal of independence, that we have sought to aid 
new nations with technical and financial assistance 
dunng their crucial early years. Our aim is that 
they survive, develop, and remain proud and 
independent. 

No period of the world's history lias seen the 
birth in such a short space of time of so many new 
nations as these postwar years. 

With more nations, there is bound to bo an in- 
crease in the forces that, out of jealousies and 
ambitions, could disturb the peace of the world. 



The prolific growth of many nations in the place 
of a few makes it impossible today for there to 
be anything resembling the 19th-century Pax 
Britannica. 



FREE UNIVERSITY OF BERLIN 

February 22, 1962 

Our position with regard to Berlin is well 
known — but, to remove all doubt, let me re- 
affirm its essential elements today. 

We have stood in the past- — and we will 
stand in the future — for the full freedom of 
the inhabitants of West Berlin and for the con- 
tinuation of West Berlin's ties with the Federal 
Republic and the world beyond. 

We have stood in the past — and we will stand 
in the future — for the presence of allied forces 
in West Berlin, as long as they are necessary and 
as long as you so desire. We will not allow this 
presence to be diluted or replaced. 

We have stood in the past— and we will stand in 
the future — for uncontrolled access to and from 
Berlin. We will permit no interference with this 
access, as we have recently demonstrated with 
regard to the air corridors. 

We have stood in the past — and we will stand 
in the future — for an active, viable West Berlin. 
Berlm will not merely exist. It will grow and 
prosper. 

We stand behind all these positions with the 
full strength of American power. . . . 

Herr Ulbricht himself has confessed that it was 
to stop the flight of people — to lock up his workers 
in the workers' paradise — that the wall was built. 
For the first time in the history of mankind, a 
political system lias had to construct a ban-ier to 
keep its people in — and the whole world recog- 
nizes the desperate meaning of this act. 

They wall their people in. 

We set our people free. 

Robert Frost, who read from his poetry at the 
inauguration of our President, once wrote these 
lines: 

Before I built a wall I'd ask to know 
What I was walling in or walling out, 
And to whom I was like to give offence. 
Something there is that doesn't love a wall, 
That wants it down. . . . 

What wants this wall down is the whole free 
spirit of man. . . . 
And while today Berlin is divided, as Germany 



762 



Department of State Bulletin 



is divided, by the decision of the Communists, you 
know and I know that in the end all Berlin and 
all Germany are one. My country shares with 
you the peaceful but persistent purpose that Ger- 
mans shall one day find themselves reunited. This 
is the true path toward lower tensions and to less- 
ened dangers. We shall continue to hope that as 
policies of repression fail, and as fears of "re- 
venge" prove unfounded, the Soviet Government, 
in its own true interest, will come to share this 
purpose and to cooperate in its realization. . . . 

One vestige of injustice in my country has been 
the treatment of fellow citizens of another color. 
For a hundred years, despite our claims of equal- 
ity, we had, as you know, a wall of our own — a 
wall of segregation erected against Negroes. That 
wall is coming down through the orderly process 
of enforcing the laws and securing compliance 
with court decisions, an area of government where 
my own responsibilities, as Attorney General, are 
heavy. 

The battle against discrimination in interstate 
transportation has been won ; the conquest of seg- 
regation in the public schools is making new 
progress each school year. Throughout the Na- 
tion, the consci