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Participation of the United States Government

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INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES

July 1, 1959-June 30, 1960

This volume is designed to serve as a reference guide to the
official participation of the U.S. Government in multilateral inter-
national conferences and meetings of international organizations
during the period July 1, 1959-June 30, 1960. The United States
participated officially in 352 international conferences and
meetings during the 12-month period covered.

In addition to a complete list, the volume presents detailed data
on many of the conferences, including the composition of the
U.S. delegation, principal officers, participation by other countries
and organizations, and brief statements of the actions taken.

Publication 7043

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^^^ 5 1962
B' P. L.

AprU 2, 1962

U.S. OUTLINES INITIAL PROPOSALS OF PROGRAM
FOR GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMA-
MENT • Statement by Secretary Rusk 531

FOREIGN ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE
PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 1963 • Message

of the President to the Congress 550

FULFILLING THE PLEDGES OF THE ALLIANCE FOR

PROGRESS • Remarks by President Kennedy .... 539

THE CHALLENGE OF AFRICA TO THE YOUTH OF

AMERICA • by Assistant Secretary Williams 544

U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY REJECTS CUBAN
CHARGES AGAINST UNITED STATES • State-

ments by Adlai E. Stevenson and Francis T. P. Plimpton . . 553

IITED STATES
REIGN POLICY

For index see inside back cover

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Vol. XLVI, No. 1188 • Publication 7358
April 2, 1962

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U.S. Outlines Initial Proposals of Program
for General and Complete Disarmament

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY RUSK i

I am happy to have the opportunity to meet in
this hall with the foreign ministers and principal
delegates of the coimtries participating in tliis
conference. I bring you greetmgs from the Presi-
dent of the United States and the most sincere
good wishes of the American people for the suc-
cess of our work. I should like to open my re-
marks by reading a letter ^ which the President
has sent to me :

As you and your colleagues from every quarter of the
globe enter upon the work of the Geneva Disarmament
Conference, it may seem unnecessary to state again that
the hopes and indeed the very prospects of mankind are
involved in the undertaking in which you are engaged.
And yet the fact that the immediate and practical sig-
nificance of the task that has brought you together has
come to be so fully realized by the peoples of the world
is one of the crucial developments of our time. For men
now know that amassing of destructive power does not
beget security ; they know that polemics do not bring
peace. Men's minds, men's hearts, and men's spiritual
aspirations alike demand no less than a reversal of the
course of recent history — a replacement of ever-growing
stockpiles of destruction by ever-growing opportunities
for human achievement. It is your task as representative
of the United States to join with your colleagues in a
supreme effort toward that end.

This task, the foremost item on the agenda of humanity,
is not a quick or easy one. It must be aijproached both
boldly and responsibly. It is a task whose magnitude and
urgency justifies our bringing to bear upon it the highest
resources of creative statesmanship the international com-
munity has to offer, for It is the future of the community
of mankind that is involved. We must pledge ourselves
at the outset to an unceasing effort to continue until the
job is done. We must not be discouraged by initial dis-
agreements nor weakened in our resolve by the tensions
that surround us and add difficulties to our task. For

' Made at the second plenary meeting of the confer-
ence of the IS-nation Disarmament Committee at Geneva
on Mar. 15 (press release 172 (revised) dated Mar. 17).

' Also released as a White House press release dated
Mar. 14.

verifiable disarmament arrangements are not a fair
weather phenomenon. A sea wall is not needed when the
seas are calm. Sound disarmament agreements, deeply
rooted in mankind's mutual interest in survival, must
serve as a bulwark against the tidal waves of war and
its destructiveness. Let no one, then, say that we can-
not arrive at such agreements in troubled times, for it
is then their need is greatest.

My earnest hope is that no effort will be spared to de-
fine areas of agreement on all of the three important
levels to which Prime Minister Macmillan and' I referred
in our joint letter of February 7 to Premier Khrushchev.^
Building upon the principles already agreed, I hope that
you will quickly be able to report agreement on an out-
line defining the overall shape of a program for general
and complete disarmament in a peaceful world. I have
submitted such an outline on behalf of the U.S. to the
U.N. General Assembly last September.' But an outline
is not enough. Ton should seek as well, as areas of agree-
ment emerge, a definition in siiccific terms of measures
set forth in the outline. The objective should be to define
in treaty terms the widest area of agreement that can
be implemented at the earliest x>ossible time while still
continuing your maximum efforts to achieve agreement
on those other aspects which present more difficulty. As
a third specific objective you should seek to isolate and
identify initial measures of disarmament which could,
if put into effect without delay, materially improve inter-
national security and the prospects for further disarma-
ment progress. In this category you should seek as a
matter of highest priority agreement on a safeguarded
nuclear test ban. At this juncture in history no single
measure in the field of disarmament would be more pro-
ductive of concrete benefit in the alleviation of tensions
and the enhancement of prospects for greater progress.

Please conve.v, on my behalf and on behalf of the people
of the United States to the representatives of the nations
assembled, our deep and abiding support of the delibera-
tions on which you are about to embark. I pledge anew
my personal and continuing interest in this work.

All of US will agree, I am sure, that this confer-
ence faces one of the most perplexing and urgent
tasks on the agenda of man. In this endeavor we
welcome our association with delegates from coim-

' For text, see Bulletin of Mar. 5, 1962, p. 355.
* For text, see ibid., Oct. 16, 1961, p. 650.

April 2, J 962

531

tries which have not previously been intimately
involved with earlier negotiations on disarma-
ment. The dreary history of such negotiations
shows that we need their help and fresh points of
view. The presence of these delegations reminds
us, too, that arms races are not the exclusive con-
cern of the great powers. Countries situated in
every region of the world are confronted with
their own conflicts and tensions, and some are en-
gaged in amis competition.

Disarmament a Worldwide Responsibility

We are not here dealing solely with a single
struggle in which a few large states are engaged,
with the rest of the world as spectators. Every
state has a contribution to make in establishing
the conditions for general disarmament in its own
way. Every state has a responsibility to strive
for a reduction of tension, and of armaments, in
its own neighborhood.

This means that each of us will bear personal
responsibility for what we do here. Every speech
and every act must move us toward our common
objective. At the same time, every one of us brings
to the search for disarmament a separate fund of
experience relevant to our problem. The United
States, for example, has established a major new
agency of government to mobilize its skills and
resources to seek out and study every useful ap-
proach to anns reduction.

^Vliat is needed is immediate reduction and
eventual elimination of all the national armaments
and armed forces required for making war. \Vliat
is required most urgently is to stop the nuclear
arms race. All of us recognize that this moment
is critical. We are here because we share the con-
viction that the arms race is dangerous and that
every tool of statecraft must be used to end it. As
the President stated on March 2,° the United
States is convinced that, "in the long run, the only
real security in this age of nuclear peril rests not
in armaments but in disarmament."

Modern weapons have a quality new to history.
A single thermonuclear weapon today can carry
(he explosive power of all the weapons of the last
war. In the last war they M-ere delivered at 300
miles per hour; today they travel at almost 300
miles per minute. Economic cost slryrockets
through sophistication of design and b}^ acceler-
ating rates of obsolescence.

' Ihid., Mar. 19, 1962, p. 443.
532

Our objective, therefore, is clear enough. We
must eliminate the instruments of destruction.
We must prevent the outbreak of war by accident
or by design. We must create the conditions for
a secui-e and peaceful world. In so doing we can
turn the momentum of science exclusively to peace-
ful purposes and we can lift the burden of the
arms race and thus increase our capacity to raise
living standards everj-where.

A group of experts meeting at the United Na-
tions has just issued an impressive report * on the
economic and social consequences of disarmament
which should stimulate us in our work. The ex-
perts, drawn from covmtries with the most divei-se
jDolitical systems, were unanimously of the opinion
that the problems of transition connected with dis-
armament could be solved to the benefit of all
countries and that disarmament would lead to the
improvement of world economic and social condi-
tions. They characterized the achievement of gen-
eral and complete disannament as an luiqualified
blessing to all mankind.

This is the spirit in which we in the United
States would deal with the economic readjustments
required if we should achieve broad and deep cuts
in the level of armaments. The United States is
a nation with vast unfinished business. Disarma-
ment would permit lis to get on with the job of
building a better America and, through expanded
economic development activities, of building a bet-
ter world. The great promise of man's capacity
should not be frustrated by his inability to deal
with war and implements of war. Man is an in-
ventive being; surely we can turn our hands and
minds at long last to the task of the political in-
vention we need to repeal the law of the jungle.

Laying Basis for Disarmament

IIow can we move toward such disarmament?

The American people bear arms through neces-
sity, not. by choice. Emerging from World War
II in a imiquely powerful militai-y position, the
United Stat as demobilized its armed strength and
made pei-sistent efforts to place under international
control the use of atomic energ\', then an Ameri-
can monopoly. The fact that the story of the post-
war period has forced increased defense efforts
upon us is a most grievous disappointment. Tins
disappointment teaches us that reduction of ten-
sions must go hand in hand with real pi-ogress in

" U.N. doc. E/3.")93 and Corr. 1.

Department of Slate Bulletin

(lisaiinament. We must, I belie\e, simultaneously
work at both.

On the one hand, it is idle to expect that we can
move very far down the road toward disarmament
if those who claim to want it do not seek, as well,
to relax tensions and create conditions of trust.
Confidence cannot be built on a footing of threats,
polemics, and disturbed relations. On the other
hand, by reducing and finally eliminating means
of military intimidation we might render our
political crises less acutely dangerous and provide
greater scope for tlieir settlement by peaceful
me<ans.

I would be less than candid if I did not point out
the harmful effect which deliberately stimulated
crises can have on our work here. In the joint
statement of agreed principles for disannament
negotiations published on September 20, 1961,^ the
United States and the Sonnet Union affirmed that,
"to facilitate the attainment of general and com-
plete disarmament in a peaceful world it is im-
portant that all States abide by existing interna-
tional agreements, refrain from any actions wliich
might aggravate international tensions, and that
they seek settlement of all disputes by peaceful
means." Yet we are confronted by crises which
inevitably cast, their shadows into this meeting
room.

The same can be said for the failure of our ef-
forts, so hopefully begmi, to conclude an effective
agreement for ending nuclear weapon tests. There
is an obvious lesson to be drawn from these con-
siderations. The lesson is that general and com-
plete disarmament must be accompanied by the
establishment of reliable procedures for the peace-
ful settlement of disputes and effective arrange-
ments for the maintenance of peace in accordance
with the principles of the United Nations Charter.
For the rule and spirit of law must prevail if the
world is to be disarmed.

As we make progress in this conference, we shall
have to lay increasing stress on this point. A dis-
armed world must be a law-abiding world in which
a United Nations peace force can cope with inter-
national breaches of the peace. In the words of the
joint statement : "Progress in disarmament should
be accompanied bj' measures to strengthen institu-
tions for maintaining peace and the settlement of
international disputes by peaceful means."

Fortunately thei-e is one sign which can give us

For text, see Bulletin of Oct. 9, 1961, p. 589.

hope that this conference will in good time lay
the foundation stones for a world witiiout war.
For the first time a disannament conference is
beginning its activities within an agreed frame-
work— the joint statement of agi-eed principles —
which all our governments have welcomed along
with every other member of the United Nations.
The United States considers the joint statement us
its point of departure. Our objective is to build
on that foundation and to give practical applica-
tion to the principles.

The United States program for general and
complete disarmament in a peaceful world, intro-
duced in the United Nations on September 25,
1961, was presented to give life to the agi-eed prin-
ciples. It is comprehensive in its scope and in its
description of the subjects suitable for action in
the first and subsequent stages of the disarmament
process. It is framed so as to avoid impairment
of the security of any state. It aims at balanced
and verified disarmament in successive stages. It
is not immutable, liowever. It is designed to serve
as a basis for negotiation.

This conference also has before it another plan,
presented by the Soviet Union. A comparison of
the two plans will show some areas of agreement.
We believe it is the task of the conference to search
for broader areas of accord leading to specific
steps which all can take with confidence.

At this meeting the United States wishes to put
forward some suggestions and proposals regarding
the course of our futui-e activity, first as to ob-
jective and procedure, then as to a program of
work for the conference.

We believe that the ultimate objective should be
the working out in detail of a treaty or treaties
putting into effect an agreed program for general
and complete disarmament in a j^eaceful world.
To bring this about we propose that all of our
delegations agree to continue our efforts at this
conference without interruptions, other than those
we all agree to be desirable or necessary for our
task, until a total program for general and com-
plete disarmament has been achieved.

As for procedures we propose that we find means
of achieving maximum informality and flexibility.
We do not believe that the best way to make prog-
ress is to concentrate our time and efforts in pro-
tracted or sterile debate. Accordingly the United
States will propose that, as soon as ample oppor-
tunity has been allowed for opening statements,
the schedule of plenary meetings be reduced so that

April 2, 1962

533

issues and problems can be explored in informal
meetings and in subcommittees more likely to pro-
duce agreement.

U.S. Proposals for Work of Conference

Let me turn now to proposals regarding the
work for the conference.

The first proposal is that the conference work
out and agree on an outline progi'am of general
and complete disarmament which can be included
in the report due to the United Nations Disarma-
ment Commission by June 1. The United States
believes that, to fulfill this first objective, the ini-
tial aim of the conference should be to consolidate
and expand the areas of agreement and to recon-
cile the differences between the United States and
Soviet disarmament plans. This should result in
working out a single program of general and com-
plete disarmament which all could support. This
agreed program might well take the form of a joint
declaration which could be presented to the United
Nations by all the states represented here. Such
a program could be a framework for the treaty
or treaties which would put the agreed total pro-
gram into effect.

But of course our aims must be more ambitious
than this. We should begin at once to fill in the
outline of the total program. Wlierever possible
we should seek specific commitments that could be
put into effect without delay. This need not await
agreement on the outline as a whole. Nor should
it impede the development of an overall program.
Wherever the common interest permits we can
and should put into effect defined, specific steps
as quickly as possible.

As a first step toward filling in the details of
such a program the United States makes the fol-
lowing proposals :

One: We propose that a cut of 30 percent in
nuclear delivery vehicles and major conventional
armaments be included in the first stage of the
disarmament program. We propose that stra-
tegic delivery vehicles be reduced not only in niun-
bers but also in destructive capability. We esti-
mate that, given faithful cooperation, this reduc-
tion might be carried out in 3 years. Similar re-
ductions can, we believe, bo achieved in each of the
later stages. It is recognized, however, that, in
the words of the agreed pi'inciples, "All measures
of general and comi^lete disarmament should be
balanced so that at no stage of the implementation

of the treaty could any State or group of States
gain militai-y advantage and that security is en-
sured equally for all." But agreement on such a
reduction and the measures to carry it out would
be a significant step forward. It would reverse
the upward spiral of the arms race, replacing in-
creases with decreases, and men could begin to
gain freedom from the fear of mass destruction
from such weapons.

Two : The United States has proposed that early
in the first stage further production of any fission-
able material for nuclear weapons use be stopped.
We propose now that thereafter the United States
and the U.S.S.R. each agree to transfer in the first
stage 50,000 kilograms of weapons grade U-235 to
nonweapons purposes. Such a move would cut at
the heart of nuclear weapons production. The
initial transfers should be followed by additional
transfers in the subsequent stages of the disarma-
ment program. Resources now devoted to military
programs coidd then be employed for purposes of
peace.

Three : The United States proposes that the dis-
armament program also include early action on
specific worldwide measures which will reduce the
risk of war by accident, miscalculation, failure of
communications, or surprise attack. These are
measures which can be worked out rapidly. They
are bound to increase confidence. They will reduce
the likelihood of war.

We will be prepared to present concrete pro-
posals for action in the following areas :

A. Advance notification of military movements,
such as major transfers of forces, exercises and
maneuvers, flights of aircraft, as well as firing of
missiles.

B. Establishment of observation posts at major
ports, railway centers, motor highways, river
crossings, and airbases to report on concentrations
and movements of military forces.

C. Establislimont of aerial inspection areas and
the use of mobile inspection teams to improve pro-
tection against surprise attack.

D. Establishment of an International Commis-
sion on Pleasures To Eoduco the Risk of War,
charged with the task of examining objectively
the teclinical problems involved.

Four : The United States proposes that the par-
ticipants in this conference undertake an urgent
search for mutually acceptable methods of guaran-

534

Department of Stale Bulletin

teeing the fulfillment of obligations for arms re-
duction. We shall look with sympathy on any
approach which shows promise of leading to prog-
ress without sacrificing safety.

We must not be diverted from this search by
shopworn efforts to equate verification with espio-
nage. Such an abortive attempt misses the vital
point in verification procedures. No government,
large or small, could be expected to enter into dis-
armament arrangements under which their peoples
might become victims of the perfidy of others.

In other affairs, accounting and auditing sys-
tems are customarily installed so that the question
of confidence need not arise. Confidence grows
out of knowledge; suspicion and fear are rooted
in ignorance. This has been true since the begin-
ning of time.

Let me make this point clear : The United States
does not ask for inspection for inspection's sake.
Inspection is for no purpose other than assurance
that commitments are fulfilled. The United
States will do what is necessary to assure others
that it has fulfilled its commitments; we would
find it difficult to understand why others camiot
do the same. We will settle for any reasonable
arrangement which gives assurances cominensu-
rate with the risks. We do not ask a degree of
inspection out of line with the amount and kind
of disarmament actually undertaken. Our aim is
prudent precaution, in the interest of the security
of us all, and nothing else.

We are prepared jointly to explore various
means through which this could be done. It
might be possible in certain instances to use sam-
pling teclmiques in which verification could take
place in some predetermined fashion, perhaps in
specific geographic areas, thus subjecting any
violator of a disarmament agreement to a restrain-
ing risk of exposure, without maintaining con-
stant sui'veillance everywhere. This is, I repeat,
one example of ways in which recent progress in
verification techniques can be adapted to the needs
of participating states. We would hope that this
conference would make a thorough study of every
practicable method of effective verification.

The four proposals I have just described are
new and realistic examples of the specific measures
which we contemplated in the first stage of the
United States plan of September 25. We can
recall that that plan had other specific proposals :

That the Soviet Union and the United States
reduce their force levels by many hundreds of
thousands of men, to a total of 2,100,000 for each.

That steps be taken to prevent states owning
nuclear weapons from relinquishing control of
such weapons to any nation not owning them.

That weapons capable of producing mass de-
struction should not be placed in orbit or stationed
in outer space.

Call for Early Action on Testing

Finally, we call for early action on a matter
that should yield priority to none — the cessation
of nuclear weapons tests. Here we stand at a
turning point. If a treaty cannot be signed, and
signed quickly, to do away with nuclear weapon
testing with appropriate arrangements for detec-
tion and verification, there will be further tests
and the spiral of competition will continue up-
ward. But if we can reach such an agreement,
this development can be stopped, and stopped for-
ever. This is why the United States and the
United Kingdom have invited the Soviet Union
to resmne negotiations to ban all nuclear weapons
tests under effective international controls. We
shall press this matter here at Geneva and make
every reasonable effort to conclude an agreement
which can bring an end to testing.

I had expected that a number of representatives
might express here their regrets that the Soviet
Union and the United States had resumed nuclear
testing. But I had supposed that there was one
delegation — that of the Soviet Union — which
could not have found it possible to criticize the
United States for doing so. The representative
of the Soviet Union has spoken of the possible
effect of United States weapons testing on this
conference. The statement of agreed principles
and this conference were born amid the echoing
roars of more than 40 Soviet nuclear explosions.
A 50-megaton bomb does not make the noise of
a cooing dove.

Despite the Soviet tests of last autumn, nuclear
weapons testing can stoi^ — now and forever.

The Soviet Union has spoken of its readiness to
accept inspection of disarmament, though not of
armament. We hope that it will agree that the
total, permanent elimination of nuclear testing is
disarmament and will accept effective interna-
tional control within its own formula.

April 2, 1962

535

Achieving Consensus on First Steps

I have presented tlie United States proposals for
early disarmament action in this conferenoe. We
shall have further suggestions, and so, I am sure,
will others. The conference will need to single out
those points it regards as most susceptible of use-
ful treatment, or most pressing in terms of the
common danger, and to take them up at once.

We believe that, as soon as agreement is reached
on the specific measures to be included in the first
stage, we can develop the specific steps for the sec-
ond and third stages. In these stages further re-
ductions of armaments will move hand in hand
with the strengthening of international institu-
tions for the maintenance of peace.

Our plan of work must achieve what this con-
ference is charged to do in the joint statement of
agreed principles. Let us define the overall shape
of the program. Let us develop in more detail the
component parts which must bo fitted together
within the program. Let us do as much as we can
as fast as we can.

Let us, then, apply ourselves to the task of this
conference soberly, systematically, and realisti-
cally. Let the need for disarmament provide the
momentum for our work. Let us follow every
promising path which might lead to progress.
Let us with all deliberate speed reach a consensus
on what can be done first and on what should be
undertaken on a continuing basis.

And let us not permit this conference, like its
predecessors, to become frozen in deadlock at the
start of its deliberations. Surely it need not do
so. The obstacles to disarmament agreements — the
forces tending to divide us ii\to rival aggregations
of power — might at long last begin to yield to the
overriding and shared interest in survival which
alone can unite us for peace.

PRINCIPAL ADVISERS TO U.S. DELEGATION

The Department of State announced on March
9 (press release 15G) that Secretary Rusk would
leave Washington March 10 for the meeting of
the 18-nation Disarmament Connnittee, whicli will
convene at Geneva March 14.

Principal advisers to the delegation are : ^

Cli.'Uies E. Bolilcn, Siiociul xVssislaut to the Secretary
Aitlmr II. Dean, Ambassador

William C. Foster, Director, Arms Control and Disarma-
ment Agency

Foy D. Kohler, Assistant Secretary of State for Euro-
pean Affairs

Robert Manning, Assistant Secretary of State-designate
for Public Affairs

Charles C. Stelle, United States Mission, Geneva

Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador of the United States
to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

U.S. Presents Proposals to U.S.S.R.
for Cooperation in Space Exploration

Following is the t^xt of a letter from. President
Kennedy to Nikita S. Khrushchev, Chairman of
the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R.

White House press release dated March 17

March 7, 1962

Dear Mr. Chairman : On February twenty-
second last I wrote you that I was instructing ap-
propriate officers of this Government to prepare
concrete proposals for immediate projects of com-
mon action in the exploration of space.^ I now
present such proposals to you.

The exploration of space is a broad and varied
activity and the possibilities for cooperation are
many. In suggesting the possible first steps which
are set out below, I do not intend to limit our
mutual consideration of desirable cooperative ac-
tivities. On the contrary, I will welcome your
concrete suggestions along these or other lines.

1. Perhaps we could render no greater service
to mankind through our space programs than by
the joint establishment of an early operational
weather satellite system. Such a system would be
designed to provide global weather data for
prompt use by an^' nation. To initiate this service,
I propose that the LTnited States and the Soviet
Union each launch a satellite to photograph cloud
cover and provide other agreed meteorological
services for all nations. The two satellites would
be placed in near-polar orbits in planes approxi-
mately perpendicidarto each other, thus providing
regular coverage of all areas. This immensely
valuable data would then be disseminated tlirough
normal international meteorological channels and
would make a significant contribution to the re-

' For a list of the other members of the U.S. delegation,
see Department of State press release 15G dated JIar. S).

' For an i-xchange of messages between President
Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev, see Bulletin of Mar.
12, 10t)2, p. 411. (President Kennedy's letter dated Feb.
21 was delivered at Moscow on Feb. 22.)

536

Department of State Bulletin

search and service jirograms now under study by
the World Meteorolooical Organization in re-
sponse to Eesohition 1721 (XVI) adopted by the
United Nations General Assembly on December
20, 19G1.=

2. It would be of great interest to those re-
sponsible for the conduct of our respective space
programs if they could obtain operational track-
ing services from each other's territories. Ac-
cordingly, I propose that each of our countries
establish and operate a radio tracking station to
provide tracking services to the other, utilizing
equipment which we would each provide to the
other. Thus, the United States would provide the
technical equipment for a tracking station to be
established in the Soviet Union and to be operated
by Soviet technicians. The United States would in
turn establish and operate a radio tracking station
utilizing Soviet equipment. Each country would
train the other's technicians in the operation of
its equipment, would utilize the station located on
its territoi-y to provide tracking services to the
other, and would afford such access as may be
necessary to accommodate modifications and main-
tenance of equipment from time to time.

3. In the field of the earth sciences, the precise
character of the earth's magnetic field is central
to many scientific problems. I propose therefore
that we cooperate in mapping the earth's magnetic
field in space by utilizing two satellites, one in a
near-earth orbit and the second in a more distant
orbit. The United States would launch one of
these satellites while the Soviet Union would
launch the other. The data would be exchanged
throughout the world scientific community, and
opportunities for correlation of supporting data
obtained on the ground would be arranged.

i. In the field of experimental communications
by satellite, the United States has already under-
taken arrangements to test and demonstrate the
feasibility of intercontinental transmissions. A
nmuber of countries are constructing equipment
suitable for participation in such testing. I would
welcome the Soviet Union's joining in this co-
operative etfort which will be a step toward meet-
ing the objective, contained in United Nations
General Assembly Resolution 1721 (XVI), that
communications by means of satellites should be
available to the nations of the world as soon as
practicable on a global and non-discriminatory

= For text, see ibid.. Jan. 29, 1962, p. 185.
April 2, 1962

basis. I note also that Secretary Rusk has
broached the subject of cooperation in this field
with Minister Gromyko and that Mr. Gromyko has
expressed some interest. Our technical repre-
sentatives might now discuss specific possibilities
in this field.

5. Given our common interest in manned space
flights and in insuring man's ability to survive
in space and return safely, I propose that we pool
our efforts and exchange our knowledge in the
field of space medicine, where future research can
be pursued in cooperation with scientists from
various countries.

Beyond these specific projects we are prepared
now to discuss broader cooperation in the still
more challenging projects which must be under-
taken in the exploration of outer s^Dace. The tasks
are so challenging, the costs so great, and the risks
to the brave men who engage in space exploration
so grave, that we must in all good conscience try
every possibility of sharing these tasks and costs
and of minimizing these risks. Leaders of the
United States space program have developed de-
tailed plans for an orderly sequence of manned and
unmanned flights for exploration of space and the
planets. Out of discussion of these plans, and of
your own, for undertaking the tasks of this dec-
ade would undoubtedly emerge possibilities for
substantive scientific and technical cooperation in
manned and unmanned space investigations.
Some possibilities are not yet precisely identifi-
able, but should become clear as the space pi'o-
grams of our two countries proceed. In the case
of others it may be possible to start planning to-
gether now. For example, we might cooperate in
unmanned exploration of the lunar surface, or we
might commence now the mutual definition of
steps to be taken in sequence for an exhaustive sci-
entific investigation of the planets Mars or Venus,
including consideration of the possible utility of
manned flight in such programs. When a proper
sequence for experiments has been detennined, we
might share responsibility for the necessary proj-
ects. All data would be made freely available.

I believe it is both appropriate and desirable
that we take full cognizance of the scientific and
other contributions which other states the world
over might be able to make in such programs. As
agreements are reached between us on any parts
of these or similar programs, I propose that we
report them to the United Nations Committee on
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. The Commit-

537

tee offers a variety of additional opportunities for
joint cooperative efforts within the framework of
its mandate as set forth in General Assembly Res-
olutions 1472 (XIV) and 1721 (XVI).

I am designating technical representatives who
will be prepared to meet and discuss with your
representatives our ideas and yours in a spirit of
l^ractical cooperation. In order to accomplish this
at an early date, I suggest that the representatives
of our two countries who will be coming to New
York to take part in the United Nations Outer
Space Committee meet privately to discuss the
proposals set forth in this letter.
Sincerelj',

John ICennedt

His Excellency
NiKiTA S. Khrushchev,

Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Moscow.

U.S. and Chile Reach Agreement
on Financing of Development Plan

Press release 155 dated March 9

Following is the text of a joint communique
issued hy representatives of the Governments of
the United States and Chile at Santiago on
March 8.

The representatives of the Government of Chile
and of the Government of the United States have
today concluded an intensive series of discussions
of the economic relations between Chile and the
United States. In these conversations both Gov-
ernments reaffirmed their determination to cooper-
ate in increasing the welfare of the people of the
Americas under the Alliance for Progress. As
a result of these discussions, agreements have
been reached which both Governments believe will
begin a new era in the economic and social devel-
opment of Chile — an era in which (he people of
Chile can look forward to increasing economic
welfai'e within the framework of social justice
and human freedom.

Fron^ this date forward, the United States and
Chile are joined together in a common effort of
unparalleled magnitude and nobility of purpose
to answer the basic aspirations of tlie Chilean peo-

ple for a better life for themselves and their
children. Through this program, the traditional
freedom of the Chilean people will rest on an
ever-widening base of economic progress and
social justice.

Discussions were held concerning the financing
of Chile's long-term, ten-year plan of economic
development — a plan designed to bring about an
unprecedented increase in the welfare of the
Chilean people during the decade of the sixties.

The United States agreed to help provide the
external resources needed for this plan along with
other industrialized coimtries, international insti-
tutions, and private investment. The United
States commitment alone could amount to as
much as $35 million over the first five years of
the plan to finance projects in the public sector.

The long-range development plan has been
submitted by the Government of Chile to the OAS
[Organization of American States] panel of ex-
perts for study, and its future implementation
will take place under their recommendations, and
subject, of course, to the approval of the neces-
sary funds by the governments of the participat-
ing countries, including the Congress of the
United States.

The effort, of assistance by the United States
durmg 1962 will be in the amount of up to $12
million, of which $8 million will be made available
for specific approval of projects designed to have
an early effect in improving the welfare of the
Chilean people. In addition, up to $4 million in
basic and essential foodstuffs will be made avail-
able, the specific amount to be determined by
Chile's ability to absorb these foodstuffs and after
consultation with other friendly governments.

Both the United States and Chile reaffirmed
their dedication to the principles of the Alliance
for Progress as well as their determination to
carry out the commitments which they made in the
Charter of Punta del Este.

The representatives of the United States ex-
pressed, on behalf of their Government, the deep
personal concern of President Kennedy for the
welfare of the people of Chile and his continued
intention to work with the countries of I^atin
America until the last vestige of poverty and
hunger and ignorance has been eliminated from
this Ilemisphei'e.

538

Department of State Bulletin

Fulfilling the Pledges of the Alliance for Progress

Remarks l)y President Kennedy ^

One year ago today I proposed that the people
of this hemisphere join in an Allanza -para el
Progreso ^ — a continent- wide cooperative effort to
satisfy the basic needs of the American people
for homes, work, and land, for health and schools,
for political liberty and the dignity of the spirit.
Our mission, I said, was "to complete the revolu-
tion of the Americas, to build a hemisphere wliere
all men can hope for a suitable standard of living
and all can live out their lives in dignity and in
freedom."

I then requested a meeting of the Inter- Ameri-
can Economic and Social Council to consider the
proposal. And 7 months ago, at Punta del Este,
that Council met and adopted the charter ^ which
established the Alianza fara el Progreso and de-
clared that :

We, the American Republics, hereby proclaim our deci-
sion to unite in a common effort to bring our people ac-
celerated economic progress and broader social justice
within the frameworic of personal dignity and political
liberty.

Together the free nations of the hemispliere
pledged their resources and their energies to the
Alliance for Progress. Together they pledged to
accelerate economic and social development and
to make tlie basic reforms necessary to insure that
all would participate in fruits of this develop-
ment. Together they pledged to modernize tax
structures and land tenure, to wipe out illiteracy
and ignorance, to promote health and provide
decent housing, to solve tlie problems of commod-
ity stabilization, to maintain sound fiscal and

' Made at a White House reception for Latin American
diplomats on Mar. 13 (White House press release).

" Bulletin of Apr. 3, 1961, p. 471.

' For background and text of the charter, see ihiiU, Sept.
11, 1961, p. 4.j9.

monetary policies, to secure the contributions of
private enterprise to development, and to speed
the economic integration of Latin America. And
together they established the basic institutional
framework for this immense, decade-long effort.

This historic charter marks a new step forward
in the relations between the American Republics.
It is a reaffirmation of the continued vitality of
our inter-American system, a renewed proof of
our capacity to meet the challenges and perils of
our time, as our predecessors met the challenge
of their day.

In the late 18th and early 19th century we
struggled to throw off the bonds of colonial rule,
to achieve political independence, and to establish
the principle that never again would the Old
World be allowed to impose its will on the nations
of the New. By the early 19th century these goals
had been achieved.

In the early 20th centuiy we worked to bring
recognition of the fimdamental equality of the
American nations and to strengthen tlio machinery
of regional cooperation which could assure that
continued equality within a framework of mutual
respect. Under the leadership of Franklin Roose-
velt and the good-neighbor policy that goal was
achieved a generation ago.

Today we seek to move beyond these accom-
plishments of the past, to establish the principle
that all the people of this hemisphere are entitled
to a decent way of life, and to transform that prin-
ciple into the reality of economic advance and
social justice on which political equality is based.

This is the most demanding goal of all. For we
seek not merely the welfare and equality of na-
tions but the welfare and equality of the people of
these nations. In so doing we are fulfilling the
ancient dreams of Wasliington and Jefferson, of
Bolivar and Marti and San Martin. And I be-

April 2, 1962

539

lieve that the first 7 montlis of the alliance have
strengthened our confidence that this goal is
witliin our grasp.

Accomplishments of the First 7 Months

Perhaps our most impressive accomplisliment
has been the dramatic shift in thinking and atti-
tudes which has occurred in our hemispliere in
these 7 months. The Charter of Punta del Este
posed the challenge of development in a manner
that could not be ignored. It redefined tlie historic
relationshii>s between the American nations in
terms of the fundamental needs and hopes of the
20th centui-y. It set forth the conditions and atti-
tudes on wliich development depends. It initiated
the process of education, without wliich develop-
ment is impossible. It laid down a new principle
of our relationship — the prmciple of collective re-
sponsibility for the welfare of the people of the
Americas.

Already elections are being fought in terms of
the Alliance for Progress. Already governments
are pledging themselves to carry out the provisions
of the Charter of Punta del Este. Already people
throughout the hemisphere — m schools and in
trade unions, in chambers of commerce and in
military establishments, in government and on the
farms — have accepted the goals of the charter as
their own personal and political commitments.
For tlie first time in the history of inter- American
relations our energies are concentrated on the cen-
tral task of democratic development.

This dramatic change in thought is essential to
the realization of our goals. For only by placing
the task of development in the arena of daily
thought and action can we hope to summon the
unity of will and courage which that task de-
mands. Tliis first accomplisliment is essential to
all the othei-s.

Our second achievement has been the establish-
ment of the mstitutional framework within which
our decade of development will take place. "\Ye
honor here today the OAS [Organization of
American States] panel of experts — a new ad-
venture in inter-American cooperation — drawn
from all pai-ts of the continent, charged with the
high responsibility of evaluating long-range de-
velopment plans, reviewing the progress of those
plans, and helping to obtain tlie financing neces-
sary to caiTy them out. This group has already
begim its work. And here today I reaffirm my

Government's commitment to look to this panel for
advice and guidance in the conduct of our joint
effort.

In addition, the OAS, the Economic Commis-
sion for Latin America, and the Inter-American
Bank have offered planning assistance to Latin
American nations. The OAS has begun a series
of studies in critical development fields, and a new
ECLA planning institute is being established to
train the young men who will lead the future de-
velopment of their countries. And we have com-
pletely reorganized our own assistance program,
with central responsibility now placed in the hands
of a single coordinator.

Thus, within 7 months, we have built the es-
sential structure of institutions, thought, and pol-
icy on which our long-term effort will rest. But we
have not waited for this structure to be completed
in order to begin our work.

Last year I said that my counti-y would commit
$1 billion to the first year of that alliance. That
pledge has now been fulfilled. The Alliance for
Progress has already meant better food for the
children of Puno in Peru, new schools for the
people of Colombia, new homes for campesinos in
Venezuela. And in the year to come millions more
will take new hope from the Alliance for Progress
as it touches their daily life.

In the vital field of commodity stabilization I
pledged the efforts of my countrj- to end the fre-
quent, violent price changes which damage the
economies of many of the Latin American coun-
tries. Immediately aft^'r that pledge was made,
we began work on the task of formulating stabili-
zation agreements. In December 1961 a new coffee
agreement, drafted by a committee under United
States chairmanship, was completed.^ Today that
agreement is in pi'ocess of negotiation. I can think
of no single measure which can make a greater
contribution to the cause of development than ef-
fective stabilization of the price of coffee. In ad-
dition the Ignited States has participated in the
drafting of a cocoa agreement, and we have hold
discussion about the terms of possible accession to
the tin agreement.

'Wo have also been working with our European
allies in a determined effort to insure that Latin
American products will have equal access to the
European Common Market. Much of the eco-
nomic future of this hemisphere depends upon

'For biiekKrouiul, see iliit!.. .Tnii. 12!), 1!>(!2, p. ITS.

540

Department of State Bulletin

ready availability of the markets of tiie Atlantic
community, and Me will continue tliese efforts to
keep these markets open in the months to come.

The countries of Latin America have also been
working to fulfill the commitments of the Cliarter
of Pimta del Este. The report of the Inter-
American Bank contains an impressive list of
measures being taken in each of the IS countries,
measures ranging from the mobilization of do-
mestic resources to new education and housing
programs, measures within the context of the Act
of Bogota and the Alliance for Progress charter.

Nearly all the governments of the hemisphere
have begun to organize national development pro-
grams, and in some cases completed plans have
been presented for review. Tax- and land-reform
laws are on the books, and the national legislature
of nearly every country is considering new meas-
ures in these critical fields. New programs of de-
velopment, of housing, and agriculture and power
are already under way.

Goals To Be Met in the Years Ahead

These are all heartening accomplishments — the
fruits of the first 7 months of work in a program
which is designed to span a decade. But all who
Icnow the magnitude and urgency of the problems
realize that we have just begun, that we must act
much more rapidly and on a much larger scale if
we are to meet our development goals in the yeai^s
to come.

I pledge my own nation to such an intensified
effort. Aiid I am confident that, having emerged
from the shaping period of our alliance, all the
nations of this hemisphere will also accelerate
their work.

For we all know that, no matter what contribu-
tion tlie United States may make, the ultimate
responsibility for success lies with the developing
nation itself. For only you can mobilize the re-
sources, make the reforms, set tlie goals, and pro-
vide the energies which will transform our
external assistance into an effective contribution to
the progress of our continent. Only you can cre-
ate the economic confidence whicli will encourage
the free flow of capital, both domestic and for-
eign— the capital which, under conditions of re-
sponsible investment and together with public
funds, will produce permanent economic advance.
Only you can eliminate the evils of destructive
inflation, chronic trade imbalances, and wide-

spread unemployment. Witliout determined ef-
forts on your part to establisli these conditions
for reform and development, no amount of outside
help can do the job.

I know the difficulties of such a task. Our own
history shows how fierce the resistance can be to
changes whicli later generations regard as part of
the framework of life. And the course of ra-
tional social change is even more hazardous for
those progi-essive governments who often face
entrenched privilege of the right and subversive
conspiracies on the left.

For too long my country, the wealthiest nation
on a poor continent, failed to carry out its full
responsibilities to its sister Republics. We have
now accepted that responsibility. In the same way
those who possess wealth and power in poor na-
tions must accept their own responsibilities.
They must lead the fight for those basic reforms
which alone can preserve the fabric of their own
societies. Those who make peaceful revolution
impossible will make violent revolution inevitable.

These social reforms are at the heart of the Al-
liance for Progress. They are the precondition
to economic modernization. And they are the
instrument by which we assure to the poor and
hungry, to the worker and the campesino, his full
participation in the benefits of our development
and in the human dignity which is the purpose of
free societies. At the same time we sympathize
with the difficulties of remaking deeply rooted and
traditional social stractures. We ask that sub-
stantial and steady progress toward reform ac-
company the effort to develop the economies of
the American nations.

"We Have No Doubt About the Outcome"

A year ago I also expressed our special friend-
ship to the people of Cuba and the Dominican Ee-
public and the hope that they would soon rejoin
the society of free men, uniting with us in our
common effort. Today I am glad to welcome
among us the representatives of a free Dominican
Republic and to reaffirm the hope that, in the not
too distant future, our society of free nations will
once again be complete.

For we must not forget tliat our Alliance for
Progress is more than a doctrine of development —
a blueprint for economic advance. Rather it is an
expression of the noblest goals of our civilization.
It says that want and despair need not be the lot

April 2, 1962

541

of man. It says that no society is free until all
its people have an equal opportunity to sliare the
fruits of their own land and their own labor.
And it says that material progress is meaningless
without individual freedom and political liberty.
It is a doctrine of the freedom of man in the most
spacious sense of that freedom.

Nearly a century ago Jose Hernandez, the Ar-
gentine poet, wrote,

America has a great destiny to achieve in the fate of
mankind. . . . One day . . . the American Alliance will
undoubtedly be achieved, and the American Alliance will
bring world peace. . . . America must be the cradle of the
great principles which are to bring a complete change in
the political and social organization of other nations.

We have made a good start on our journey ; but
we still have far to go. The conquest of poverty
is as difficult as the conquest of outer space. And
we can expect moments of frustration and disap-
pointment in the years to come. But we have no
doubt about the outcome. For all history shows
that the effort to win progress with freedom repre-
sents the most determined and steadfast aspira-
tion of man.

We are joined together in this alliance as na-
tions united by a common history and common
values. And I look forward to the day when the
people of Latin America will take their place be-
side the United States and Western Europe as
citizens of industrialized and growing and in-
creasingly abundant societies. The United States,
Europe, and Latin America — almost a billion
people — a bulwark of freedom and the values of
Western civilization, invulnerable to the forces of
despotism, lighting the path to liberty for all the
peoples of the world — this is our vision, and, with
faith and courage, we will realize that vision in
our own time.

U.S., Mexico Agree To Use Scientists
To Study Salinity Problem

Folloioing is a statement released at Washing-
ton on March 16. A similar statement was re-
leased at Mexico., D.F.., on tlie same date.

White House press release dated March 18

The Presidents of the United States and Mexico
are agreed that it is urgent to find a mutually
satisfactory solution to the salinity problem.'

To this end, the Presidents of both countries,
through their respective Foreign Offices, have
given instructions to their representatives in the
International Boundary and Water Commission
to recommend within 45 days the measures wliich
should be taken.

In order to carry out these instructions in the
most effective way the Commissioners are to avail
themselves of qualified water and soil scientists.

The objective of the two Governments is, with-
out prejudice to the legal rights of either country,
to agree upon and actually put into operation
remedial measures within the shortest possible
period of time.

Pan American Day

and Pan American Week, 1962

A PROCLAMATION'

Whereas April 14, 1962, will be the seventy-second an-
niversary of the establishment by the American Republics
of our inter-American system, now known as the Organ-
ization of American States ; and

Whereas the people and the Government of the United
States are allied with their good neighbors, the other free
Republics of this Hemisphere, in their resolution to remain
free and their obligation to defend the foundations of
freedom ; and

Whereas the free peoples of this Hemisphere have like-
wise joined in an Alliance for Progress with the objective
of homes, work and land, health and schools for all cit-
izens, so that freedom may be assured an environment in
which it can develop and stay strong ; and

Whereas the United States of America throughout these
seventy-two years has supported staunchly those ideals
of cooperation for the common good and solidarity for the
common safeguard, both basic to our inter-American sys-
tem, through which, in the words of the late President
Franklin D. Roosevelt, the peoples of the Americas have
developed a faith in freedom and its fulfillment arising
"from a common hope and a common design given us by
our fathers in differing form but with a simple aim : free-
dom and security of the individual, which has become
the foundation of our peace" :

Now, THEREFORE, I, .ToHN F. KENNEDY, President of the
United States of America, do hereby proclaim Saturday,
April 14, 1962, as Pan American Day, and the period from
April 8 through April 14, 1962, as Pan American Week ;
and I call upon the Governors of the fifty States of the
Union, the Governor of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,
and the Governors of all other areas under the United
States flag to issue similar proclamations.

I also urge all United States citizens and intereste<l
organizations to participate in commemorating Pan

' For background, see Bulletin of Jan. 22, 1962, p. 144.

542

' No. 3452 ; 27 Fed. Reg. 2027.

Department of State Bulletin

American Day and Pan American Weeli in view of the
importance of inter-American friendship to our own na-
tional welfare and that of the neighbor Republics, and
in testimony to the circumstances of culture, geograi>hy,
and history which have allied our destinies as defenders
of liberty within law.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and
caused the Seal of the United States of America to be
affixed.
Done at the City of Washington this 26th day of Feb-
ruary in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred
[seal] and sixty-two, and of the Independence of the
United States of America the one hundred and
eighty-sixth.

By the President :
Dean Rdsk,
Secretary of State.

Report on Foot and IVaouth Disease
Transmitted to Argentina

The Wliite House announced on March 4 that
President Kennedy had on tliat day transmitted
the report of his Scientific Mission on Foot and
Mouth Disease to President Arturo Frondizi of
the Kepublic of Argentina.^

Formation of the mission was first announced
December 14, 1961.^ It came as the result of a re-
quest to President Kennedy by President Frondizi
during his visit to the United States in September
1961.^ The group, headed by J. George Harrar,
president, Rockefeller Foundation, visited the Re-
public of Argentina during January of this year.
Dr. Harrar made a preliminary report to Presi-
dent Kennedy on February 1.

In addition to Dr. Harrar, other members of
this mission were : Samuel A. Goldblith, Depart-
ment of Nutrition, Food Science and Teclinology,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Stewart
H. Madin, professor of microbiology, University
of California, Oakland; Willard O. Nelson, De-
partment of Dairy Science, University of Illinois ;
George Poppensiek, dean. Veterinary College,
Cornell University; Richard E. Shope, Rocke-
feller Institute, New York, N.Y. ; C. K. "VViesman,
Food Research Division, Armour and Company,

' For text of report, see White House press release
dated Mar. 3.
' Bulletin of Jan. 8, 1962, p. 67.
" Ibid., Oct. 30, 1961, p. 719.

Chicago, 111. ; and James B. Hartgering, Office of
the Special Assistant for Science and Technology.
The National Academy of Sciences conducted a
series of meetings beginning March 5 to work out
the technical details of a research program.

President Ahmadou Ahidjo
of Cameroon Visits U.S.

President Ahmadou Ahidjo of the Federal Re-
public of Cameroon visited the United States
March 13-18} Following is the text of a joint
comrrmnique issued at Washington.^ D.C., on
March 1]^ at the close of discussions held hy Presi-
dent Kennedy and President Ahidjo on March 13
and H.

White House press release dated March 14

President Ahmadou Ahidjo, who is making a
five-day visit to the United States as the guest of
President Kennedy, will conclude a two-day stay
in Washington tomorrow and continue his visit in
New York.

Although President Ahidjo has been in this
coimtry before, this is his first voyage to America
since his country became independent and since he
became its first Qiief of State. The visit has given
the two Presidents an opportunity to become per-
sonally acquainted. They have held frank and
cordial discussions covering a wide range of
topics of mutual interest to their countries. Tliese
included a number of world problems, in particu-
lar the means of accelerating the decolonization of
Africa, and also of other parts of the world, and
the consolidation of the independence of young
nations. President Kennedy congratulated Presi-
dent Ahidjo for his successful efforts in the pro-
gressive development of his coimtry, both in
combating internal subversion and in achieving
the reimification of the two parts of Cameroon.

The two Presidents noted with satisfaction the
efforts recently undertaken to create African
imity. In tliis connection President AJiidjo ex-
pressed his satisfaction over the role played by the
United States in the framework of United Nations
action in the Congo in order to hasten the re-
establislunent of the peace and unity of that coun-
try. The United Nations remains, in the view of
both Presidents, the best means whereby nations

' For an announcement of the visit, see Bulletin of
Mar. 12, 1902, p. 418.

April 2, 1962

543

can discuss issues openly, and the best instrument
for finding solutions to problems that menace the
peace of the world.

In the field of cooperation the Presidents noted
that in addition to a continuing program of eco-
nomic aid and technical assistance to the Cameroon
the United States is also preparing to make a loan
to help finance the extension of the trans-
Cameroonian railroad.

The two Presidents agreed to take steps to en-
courage commerce and investment between their

two countries and noted that a United States
Trade Mission is tentatively scheduled to visit
Cameroon in Maj^ 1962.

President Ahidjo and President Kennedy agreed
that the exchange of views made possible by this
visit have reaffinned that their two countries have
many common goals and ideals. They expressed
the conviction that the visit has served to
strengthen and improve the friendly relations be-
tween the United States and the Federal Republic
of Cameroon.

The Challenge of Africa to the Youth of America

iy G. Mennen Williams

Assistant Secretary for African Affairs ^

It is a genuine pleasure to join you at this im-
portant seminar. The fact that this program was
initiated and carried out by students is especially
heartening and, to me, is another strong indication
of the increasingly mature ideas of American
youth.

These ai"e good days to be young. In this coun-
try we are governed by an administration com-
l)Osed of 20th-century men — men youthful in age,
in ideas, and in outlook but not lacking in wisdom
or experience. President Kennedy emphatically
made this point clear in his memorable inaugural
address - when lie said :

. . . the torch has been passed to a new generation of
Americans — born in this century, tempered by war, dis-
ciplined by a hnrd and bitter peace, proud of our ancient
heritage — and unwilling to witness or permit the slow
undoing of those human rights to which this Nation has
always been connuittert, and to which we are committed
today at home and around the world.

In our colleges and universities there are con-
stant reminders that youth is meeting its respon-
sibilities on America's campuses more fully than

'Address made licfore (ho "Africa Speaks" symposium
at Franklin and ilarshall College, Lancaster, Pa., on .AI;ir.
10 (press release K^H dated Mar. !)).

-For text, see IUiu.etin of Feb. 0, 1!H)1, p. 175.

at any time in the past. The intense concern of
today's young men and women with national and
international affairs has been noted with great
interest and satisfaction in Washington.

In Africa, as well, youth is a dominant factor.
Although many parts of this ancient continent
trace their civilizations into antiquity, modern
Africa is basically young in statehood and in
leadership. It is an old continent embarked on a
new chapter in history.

You who have this salutary interest in Africa
are more fortunate than many of your ancestors
in past centuries. Many generations of men and
women have lived their lives through with no sense
of history, with no awareness that the events of
their times would have a profound effect on coimt-
less generations to come. Today's J'outh, however,
knows it is part of a mighty tide of history. Your
generation knows its effort or lack of effort will
largely determine the content of many pages in
tomorrow's history books.

This is especially true for you who demonst rate
an interest in Africa. To you falls the splendid
opportunity to join our African friends and their
young states on a historj'making journey through
the remainder of this century. This is an exciting
challenge for American youth.

Let me touch briefly on the scope of this chal-

544

Department of State Bulletin

lengo and then discuss some of the opportunities
you have for meeting this cliallenge wliile you are
still students.

Size of African Continent

First, there is the question of size, of the vastness
of the continent of Africa. It is difficult for many
people to grasp the reality of Africa's hugeness.
Into this continent — the world's second largest
landmass — could be dropped the 50 United States,
plus India, plus mainland China, plus all of
Europe except the Soviet Union. To go from
north to south or from east to west in Africa you
would have to make a journey equivalent to a
round trip from here to San Francisco.

In this vast area live approximately 230 million
people of diverse racial origin in 52 political enti-
ties. They speak almost 1,000 languages or dia-
lects, and their cultures range from stone-age to
very modern. Of this total only 214 percent are
of European stock. Africa's 29 independent coun-
tries range widely in population — from 35 million
in Nigeria to about I/2 million in Gabon. The
continent's people are about 16 percent Christian,
40 percent Moslem, and 44 percent pagan or
animist.

Vastly wealthy in mineral resources, Africa
accounts for most of the world's production of
mdustrial diamonds, three-fourths of its cobalt,
half of its gold, one-fourth of its copper, and one-
fifth of its uranium and manganese. The conti-
nent has many other important minerals, and new
discoveries of significant oil reserves in the Sa-
hara promise additional wealth. It is rich in
hydroelectric potential, with 40 percent of the
world's total, but less than 1 percent is developed
today.

Agricultural exports also play a major role in
Africa's economy. The continent accounts for 76
percent of world trade in peanuts, 71 percent in
cocoa, 67 percent in wine, and 60 percent in palm
products and sisal.

African diversity can be more readily under-
stood if we view the continent as five major geo-
graphical units.

First there is the predominantly Arab-Berber
North Africa, bounded by the Mediterranean and
the Sahara's vast sea of sand.

Then there is the Horn of Africa — the liigli
Etliiopian plateau and the hot coastal lands of
Eritrea and Somalia.

April 2, 1962

632904—62 3

Third there is savanna Africa, the series of sand
and grassland states running along the bottom of
the Sahara, where indigenous kingdoms floui'ished
in the Middle Ages. This broad belt includes such
fabled cities as Timbuktu, which was an important
university center in the 16th centui^y.

Fourth there is rain-forest Africa, which
stretches from just below Dakar in Senegal to a
little below the mouth of the Congo.

Finally there is mountain Africa. This is the
chain of mountains, high plateaus, and fertile val-
leys starting with the so-called Wliite Highlands
in northern Kenya and running south through
Tanganyika, the Rhodesias, the higlier parts of
the Portuguese territories, and on to Capetown.

African Aspirations

One thing that unites all five of these regions
is the list of desires shai-ed by all Africans. These
aspirations are much the same as those of free
men everywhere.

First and foremost in most African minds is
the desire to win and hold freedom and independ-
ence from colonial rule. In recent years this goal
has been achieved in a rapid and unprecedented
fashion. In 1950 only 4 countries in Africa could
be coimted as independent: Egypt in the north,
Ethiopia in the east, Liberia in the west, and the
Union of South Africa. In the ensuing 12 years,
25 more countries have won their freedom, and
others are on their way.

The relatively peaceful emergence of so many
new nations in so short a span of time is a remark-
ably significant event for the world community —
and it is eloquent testimony to man's desire to
guide his own destiny in a free society. I think
it is also important to note that this transition has
been acliieved, with important exceptions, through
intelligent cooperation between the new states and
the former colonial powers that controlled them.

A second African aspiration is to acliieve a better
standard of living, a goal with wliich we are in
complete accord. The annual income in tropical
Africa is only $89 per person. Taking the conti-
nent as a whole, this figure rises to only $132. To
see this in proper perspective it should be pointed
out that annual income in the Near East is $171
and in Latin America it is $253, and both of tliese
areas are among the lesser developed parts of the
world. Compared with annual incomes of $790
in Europe and $2,500 in the United States, Africa's

545

low level of income is set, in even sharper contrast.

Quite naturally Africans want a better standard
of living and intend to achieve one. To do this,
however, they mu.st solve the problem of obtaining
capital rapidly in large amounts. They must also
face the problem of obtaining technical know-how,
which in most African nations is in very shoit
supply. And they must develop a climate that
will stimulate private investment, a very necessary
commodity if they are to raise their living
standards.

Another major desii'e of Africans is to improve
education in this vast area where 90 percent of the
people are illiterate. Last year I visited 35 coun-
tries in Africa, both independent states and areas
still associated with European powers. I talked
with men and women of all ages and of all social
levels, and I wtis deeply impressed with the burn-
ing desire of the African people for education.
Education is inextricably linked with all the chal-
lenges of African development.

Enlarged educational opportunities have been
given a very high priority by African leadei-s.
They realize, as do we, that if the rising expecta-
tions of the people for a better life with more op-
portunities for individual advancement are to be
met, Africa must have infinitely more educational
facilities — more primary, secondary, and voca-
tional schools, more teachers colleger and technical
institutes, more African univei'sities.

Improved health is a fourth major aspiration in
Africa. African leaders recognize that the inci-
dence of disease and the degree of malnutrition
constitute major roadblocks on Africa's road to
progress. Better housing, improved sanitation,
widespread instruction in personal hygiene, and
l)otable water are important needs to improve
liealth in Africa.

There is deep concern on the part of African
health oiiicials about disease and the need for ex-
panded and improved health services. The size
of the problem is far too large for their own
limited facilities to handle, however.

In addition to the four African aspirations al-
ready mentioned, another — and indeed the most
important of all — is the great desire of Africans
for equal dignity with the rest of mankind. They
have achieved sovereignty, and they insist right-
fully on being treated as sovereign nations. They
can ask for nothing less. Achievement of their
other iispirations means little unless they are ac-

corded the human dignity given to other free and
independent peoples.

This is an especially acute problem for us in the
United States, where we have not yet achieved full
racial equality. Our failures and our faults in
this area often lead us into serious difficulties in
our I'elations with Africans and their desire for
dignity and equality.

It is not enough for us to be concerned solely
with the rights of foreign officials, however. We
must be clear and vigorous in our belief that our
own citizens are assured of treatment equal to that
won for foreign visitors. The challenge, then, is
to find lasting ways of erasing all barriers of race
in America.

U.S. Policy Toward Africa

In tlie light of the aspirations of the people of
Africa you might well ask what we are doing about
(hem and how we support them.

What is our policy toward Africa? Are we
backing our words with deeds ? I think the record
will show that we are.

Our foreign policy is deeply imbedded in a
series of historic beliefs that we hold dearly. Of
these beliefs, self-detemiination is one of the most
important. In fact the veiy basis of world order
is a universal recognition of tlie rights of people
to determine the kind of government under which
they want to live.

This country seeks to evaluate its policies to-
ward Africa on the basis of these principles, judg-
ing each individual case and problem on its merits.
We have no pat formulas to apply in Africa, nor
do we seek to impose any particular blueprint of
our own. Instead we shall stand by our beliefs
and try to use our influence wisely with those men
of good will, of all races and creeds, in whose hands
I lie future of Africa rests.

This has been best expressed in President Ken-
nedy's second state of the Union message,^ when
he said:

. . . our basic goal remains the same : a peaceful world
coiiiniuiiily of free aud independent states, free to choose
their own future aud their own sjstoni so Ions as it does
not threaten the freedom of others.

Some may choose forms and ways we would not choose
for ourselves, but It is not for us that they are choosing.
We can welcome diversity — the Communists cannot. For
we offer a world of choice — tliey offer the world of coer-
cion. And the way of the past shows dearly thai freedom,
not coercion, is the wave of the future.

" For text, see ibiil., Jan. 29, 19C2, p. 159.

546

Department of State Bulletin

In ciirrying out our basic goals old programs
liavo been strengtlipned and new progi'anis started.
I think our deeds fully back up our words in this
vital area. Let me list some of these deeds briefly.

Our support of freedom for African nations has
been clearly demonstrated by our program in the
United Nations.

The United States supports improved standards
of living in Africa. In 1961 our aid totaled about
$215 million. This is a start, but it is not enough
when we consider that the French and British are
still supplying nearly $700 million worth of aid to
Africa.

We favor increased private investment in
Afi-ica.

We encourage student exchange. Approxi-
mately 3,000 Africans are studying in the United
States this year, ranging from advanced graduate
students through undergraduates who are just
learning English. Again, however, our Western
allies are showing us the way, largely because of
their long and extensive association with African
territories. There are some 12,000 Africans study-
ing in the United Kingdom and another sizable
group studying in France.

Our new Agency for International Development
is emphasizing long-term development loans,
stressing economic instead of military aid, and
developing individual plans to meet the individual
needs of African nations.

The newly expanded Food-for-Peace Pi'ogram
includes lunches for children, wages for economic
development, relief for disaster victims, and a bet-
ter diet for millions.

The newly conceived Peace Corps is supplying
trained and dedicated men and women to help in
the building of better societies and gives a glimpse
of American idealism as well. Today 107 Peace
Corps volunteers are at work in Nigeria, 51 in
Ghana, 37 in Sierra Leone, and 35 in Tanganyika,
adding up to a creditable total of 2'30 already
trained and at work in the field. There is much
more that will be done, however. The large
volmne of requests from the African nations has
created unlimited possibilities both in numbers of
volunteei-s and types of Peace Corps activity.
Community development, agricultural extension,
English language instruction, vocational educa-
tion, adult education, and primary and university
education are but a few of the areas of concentra-
tion for future planned programs.

Problems Remaining in the Congo

It is obvious that all our policies regarding
Africa have not met and, in the nature of things,
cannot always meet with speedy results, however.
Here I have in mind, for example, our experience
in the Congo. Although much remains to be done
there, we believe that our policy of support for the
U.N. Operation, parliamentary govormnent, and
the territorial integrity of the country has none-
theless led to substantial progress over the past 15
months. We continue to support the peacekeeping
and nationbuilding operation of the U.N. in the
Congo.

Just a year ago the Congo was badly split into
pro-Western and pro-Communist camps. The
Communist bloc and a few other countries had
recognized the Stanleyville regime of Antoine Gi-
zenga as the country's legal government, and Moise
Tshombe had created further disunity with his
secessionist movement in Katanga.

This was a highly charged situation that could
have been further aggravated if Katanga's at-
tempt at secession had been supported by the West.
Instead, the United Nations prevented the Com-
munist bloc from supplying direct aid to Stanley-
ville, discouraged conflict between warring par-
ties, and brought about a peaceful solution to the
crisis through a meeting of Parliament at Lovan-
ium University. From this meeting, anti-Commu-
nist Cyrille Adoula emerged as Prime Minister
of a moderate coalition government. Despite the
best efforts of the Leopoldville group, the United
Nations, and the West, Mr. Tshombe's supporters
failed to participate and thereby passed up an
opportimity to strengthen the anti-Communist
forces and join in assuring a stable, independent,
and rmited Congo. Even without Mr. Tshombe's
cooperation, however. Prime Minister Adoula has
brought the rebellion of Mr. Gizenga to an end —
and with it a major opportunity for Soviet pene-
tration in central Africa.

The issue today remains the reintegration of Ka-
tanga into the central government. A little more
than 2 months ago, at Kitona, Mr. Tshombe agreed
to take such a step. We welcome the recent an-
nouncement that Prime Minister Adoula and Mr.
Tshombe will meet in Leopoldville next week. It
is most important that at this meeting both Con-
golese leaders pursue promptly the statesmanlike
work begun at Kitona for the peaceful reintegra-
tion of the Katanga.

April 2, ?962

547

Peaceful solutions to problems remaining in the
Congo are not easy and obviously camiot be ac-
complished overnight. The road ahead will be
a rough one and will require all the concerted ef-
fort we can muster, but we are convinced that it
can be traveled — in fact, must be traveled — suc-
cessfully if we are to bring this tragic chapter in
African history to a satisfactory end.

These, then, are the forces at work in Africa
and a brief summary of what the United States is
trying to do to help Africans achieve their legiti-
mate aspirations in peace and freedom.

Opportunities for American Students

Now, what can American youth do to help in
this enormous task? In view of your enterprise
in organizing this symposiiun, I suspect this par-
ticular audience may have a good many ideas of
its own on how to further this country's African
policies.

You can, however, inform yourselves on foreign
policy issues and as good citizens help formulate
and support apjiropriate programs.

There are also a few thoughts I would like to
suggest to you in the field of education, which is
one of the principal building blocks of our foreign
policy in Africa at the present time.

Wliat, for example, should comprise the ele-
ments of good human relations with African stu-
dents attending our colleges and universities?
Here we have a group of 3,000 students leaving
their homes and friends and crossing a vast ocean
to study among strangers. I think American stu-
dents have a wonderful opportunity to further our
foreign policy objectives by strengthening their
bonds with the African students in their midst.
Today's young Americans are in an excellent posi-
tion to foster a wide range of improved human
and intergroup relations among students and
scholars from both continents.

Within that framewoi-k American students
might look into the question of hospitality in its
broadest sense, something beyond routine coffee-
and-doughnut entertainment. There is the whole
area of helping African students adjust easily to
American campuses — housing adjustments, ad-
justments to campus social life, classroom adjust-
ments, adjustments to our kind of examinations.
This is a broad field with many opportunities for
American students.

There is also the area of financial support.

What kinds of things can African students do to
help themselves financially ? Some of them come
to this country inadequately prepared to maintain
themselves throughout college. They run into
difficulties because they have nothing more to
sustain them than a burning ambition to get an
education in the United States and return to
render services to their countries.

Can students organize work opportunities for
the more deserving African students who are the
victims of a background of poverty ? Your organ-
ized eiforts could help them find suitable siunmer
employment or much-needed part-time work to
carry them through the school year. There is also
the question of tutorial assistance, which they
might need urgently and yet be unable to afi^ord.

Study and discussion groups would also be val-
uable to both American and African students. A
mutual exchange of ideas and information could
lead both parties to rich and rewarding college ex-
periences. It would be very valuable, too, to open
such meetings to residents of campus communities
and broaden the range of contacts.

Another possibility would be for college groups
to sponsor study tours in African countries. Such
toure could be organized as sununer activities and
could be conducted by African students who are
knowledgeable in the life of their societies. This
would be a formidable imdertaking for students
to carry out alone, I realize. Perhaps canapus
communities could be interested in "adopting"
African cities of similar size and interests. I am
sure the Department of State would be willing to
discuss the working out of the many details in-
volved in such a program. In this connection you
might want to cooperate with the progi-ams spon-
sored by the Experiment in International Living,
which last summer and fall assisted in shipboard
orientation and provided 1-month sojourns with
American families for 221 African students.

It is a vei-y worthwhile endeavor to bring Afri-
can students into average American homes to show
them American life as it is really lived. Too often
they draw their image of the American family
from motion pictures or television and sometimes
fail to recognize the strong bonds of affection and
respect that really characterize the American
family.

Tlie Operation Crossroads type of activity offers
a splendid opportunity for American students to
make a contribution to better international under-
standing. Working with African students, Amer-

548

Department of State Bulletin

icaus could select and ship significant study and
reading materials to African countries to give
them a better understanding of some of tlie great
writings of Western civilization.

Then there is Government work itself to con-
sider between college years or when students fuiish
tlieir formal education. The opportmiities to serve
tiiis country in the Peace Corps are unique in our
history, and the young men and women who go
into this vital occupation can make important con-
tributions to the future welfare of the United
States.

There are also summer opportunities in the Gov-
ernment, where students can get a firsthand under-
standing of many of the intricate problems we
must deal with on a day-to-day basis. This would
be invaluable training to take back to the campus
in the fall, and it certainly would suggest new
ways in which American students can support our
national goals.

These are only a few thoughts on how American
students can participate in the exciting business of
international relations on a student-to-student
basis. But they are all activities suitable for
young adults, and their successful accomplishment
could have a vei"y favorable impact on our overall
African policies.

The young Africans with whom American stu-
dents work and live today will be among the
leadei-s of Africa tomorrow. Their impressions
of America and the lasting friendships they make
while they ai-e in this coimtry could be decisive
factors in the success or failure of our foreign
policy over the next several decades. Their i-ecep-
tion here might even make the difference between
war and peace in the years ahead.

I am happy, therefore, to see the healthy interest
in Africa here today. You have made an excellent
beginning in building new bridges of friendship
across the broad Atlantic. I hope you will con-
tinue this fine work throughout your lives.

Foreign Policy Briefings for Visitors
to Wasliington Begin at Department

Press release 161 dated March 12

The Department of State is initiating on March
12 regularly scheduled foreign policy briefings for
visitors to Washington in response to interest ex-

pressed by Membeis of Congress in behalf of their
constituents. These briefings will be held each
Monday, Wednesday, and Friday at 9 :30 a.m. in
the East Auditorium of the Department. The
briefings will include a discussion of the making of
foreign policy, the organization and functions of
the Department of State and Foreign Service, and
current foreign policy developments.

President Discusses Trade Matters
With Australian Deputy Premier

John McEicen, Australian Deputy Prime Min-
ister and Minister for Trade, was in Washington
March 9-11}. and talked with President Kennedy,
Acting Secretary of State Ball, Secretary of the
Treasury Douglas Dillon, and Under Secretary of
Agriculture Charles S. Murphy. Following is the
text of a joint statement released at the close of his
meeting with the President on March llf..

White House press release dated March 14

The President today conferred with the Aus-
tralian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for
Trade, the Right Honorable Jolin McEwen.

Mr. McEwen, who was accompanied by the Aus-
tralian Ambassador to the United States, Sir
Howard Beale, reviewed with the President the
importance to Australia of a number of current
developments in the international trade and com-
modity policy fields, including developments re-
lating to the European Economic Community, and
the considerable degree of common interest of the
United States and Australia on these questions.

The President and the Deputy Prime Minister
agreed that an economically strong and develop-
ing Australia is essential to the best interests of
both coujitries in the Southwest. Pacific and ex-
pressed mutual confidence in the continuing close
identity of view which each countiy shares on
matters of common concern.

Mr. McEwen is on his way to Europe, where he
will meet representatives of the British Govern-
ment and a number of European Governments for
discussions on the subject of Britain's proposed
enti-y into the European Common Market.

Apr// 2, 1962

549

THE CONGRESS

Foreign Economic and Military Assistance Program
for Fiscal Year 1963

MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT TO THE CONGRESS <

To the Congress of the United States :

Last year this Nation dedicated itself to a
"decade of development," designed to help the new
and developing states of the world grow in politi-
cal independence, economic welfare, and social
justice.

Last September, in support of this effort, the
Congress enacted fundamental changes in our pro-
gram of foreign assistance.^

Last November the executive branch drastically
reorganized and restaffed this program in accord-
ance with the congressional mandate.^

Today the "decade" is only 4 months old. It
would surely be premature to make any claims of
dramatic results. Our new aid program, ad-
dressed to the specific needs of individual coun-
tries for long-term development, presupposes basic
changes, careful planning, and gradual achieve-
ment. Yet these few months have shown signifi-
cant movement in new directions. The turnaround
has begim.

Our new aid policy aims at strengthening the
political and economic independence of developing
countries — which means strengthening their ca-
pacity both to master the inherent stress of rapid
change and to repel Conmiunist efforts to exploit
such stress from within or without. In the frame-
work of this broad policy, economic, social, and
military development take their proper place. In
Washington our aid operations have been largely
unified under the direction of the Administrator
of the Agency for International Development.
Recipient countries are improving their planning
mechanisms, devising country development plans,
and beginning extensive programs of self-lielp and

self-reform. In addition to long-range programs
developed with India, Nigeria, and others we have,
under the new authority granted by the Congress,
entered into a new type of long-term commitment
with two nations — Pakistan and Tanganyika —
after the most painstaking review of their jDroposed
development plans, and others will follow. In
addition to placing emphasis on the improvement
of internal security forces, we are giving increased
attention to the contribution wliich local militaiy
forces can make through civic action programs to
economic and social development.

In financing these programs, we are relying
more heavily than before on loans repayable in
dollars. Other institutions are joming with us
in this effort — not only private institutions but
also the United Nations, the International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development, the Organi-
zation of American States and the Inter- Ameri-
can Development Bank. We have urged other
industrialized countries to devote a larger share
of their resources to the provision of capital to the
less developed nations. Some have done so — and
we are hopeful that the rest will also recognize
their stake in the success and stability of the
emerging economies. We are continuing, in view
of our balance-of-payments situation, to empha-
size procurement within the LTnited States for
most goods required by the program. And we ai'c
working toward strengthening the foreign ex-
change position of the emerging coimtries by en-
couraging the development of new trade patterns.
The proposed new Trade Expansion Act is a most
important tool in facilitating this trend.*

Arucli more, of coui-se, could be said. But hav-
ing set forth last year in a series of messages and

' H. Doc. 362, 87th Cong., 2fl se.ss. ; transmitted on
Mnr. 13.

■ Public Law 87-19.5.

' Bulletin of Nov. 27, 1961, p. 900.

* For text of the Pre.'sident's message to the Congress
proiiosing new foreign trade legislation, see ibid., Feb.
12, 1962, p. 231.

550

Department of Sfafe Bulletin

addresses on foreign aid tlie fjjoals we seek and the
tools we need, it is not necessary to repeat to tlie
Congress this year our Nation's basic interest in
the development and freedom of olher nations —
or to review all of the initiatives launched under
last year's programs. The Congress is familiar
with these arguments and programs, as well as its
own role and contribution in enacting long-term
financing authority. Thus the foreign aid legis-
lation submitted this year does not requii'e recon-
sideration of these questions. It is instead limited
primarily to the new authorizations required an-
nually under the terms of last year's law. The
only major change proposed is the establishment
of a separate long-term alliance for progress fund.
The total amounts requested were included in the
Federal budget previously submitted for fiscal
1963 and the authorizing legislation enacted last
year, and have in fact been reduced in some in-
stances. They cannot, I believe, be further re-
duced if the partnership on which we are now em-
barked— a joint endeavor with each developing
nation and with each aid-giving nation — is to dem-
onstrate the advances in human well-being which
flow from economic development joined with po-
litical liberty. For we should know by now that
where weakness and dependence are not trans-
formed into strength and self-reliance, we can
expect only chaos, and then tyranny to follow.

II

Because development lending and militaiy as-
sistance appropriations for fiscal year 1963 were
authorized in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,
no new authorizations for these two programs ai'e
needed. I am proposing new authorization and
appropriation of $335 million for development
grants; $481.5 million for supporting assistance;
$148.9 million for contributions to international
organizations; $100 million for investment guar-
antees; $400 million for the contingency fund;
and $60 million for administrative costs and other
programs. I am also proposing appropriations
for 1963 of $2,753 million, including the $1,250
million already authorized for development lend-
ing, and $1,500 million ($200 million below that
authorized) for military assistance. The total ap-
propriation request for the foreign economic and
military assistance program for fiscal year 1963 is
$4,878 million.

These recommendations are based upon a care-
ful examination of the most urgent needs of each

country and area. Each of these forms of a.ssist-
ance, in these amounts, is essential to the achieve-
ment of our overall foreign assistance objectives.
The total is less than the estimates in the budget
because of a reduction in my request for support-
ing assistance.

One item in particular deserves attention. The
past year has amply demonstrated that rapid and
unpredictable changes in the world situation of
direct interest to our security cannot be foreseen or
predicted accurately at the time Congress acts
upon the appropriations. I therefore urge the
Congress to recognize this need for flexibility to
meet contingencies and emergencies and to approve
the full authorization and appropriation requested
of $400 million.

Ill

The Charter of Piuita del Este which last Au-
gust established the alliance for progress is the
framewoi-k of goals and conditions for what has
been called "a peaceful revolution on a hemi-
spheric scale." ^

That revolution had begun before the charter
was drawn. It will continue after its goals are
reached. If its goals are not achieved, the revolu-
tion will continue but its methods and results will
be tragically different. Histoi-y has removed for
governments the margin of safety between the
peaceful revolution and the violent revolution.
The luxury of a leisurely interval is no longer
available.

These were the facts recognized at Pmita del
Este. These were the facts that dictated the terms
of the charter. And these are the facts which re-
quire our participation in this massive cooperative
effort.

To give this program the special recognition
and additional resources which it requires, I there-
fore propose an authorization of $3 billion for the
alliance for progress for the next 4 years. Of the
$3 billion, an authorization and appropriation of
$600 million is being requested for 1963, with up
to $100 million to be used for grants and the bal-
ance of $500 million or more for development
loans. This authorization will be separate from
and supplementary to the $6 billion already au-
thorized for loans for development for 1963
through 1966, which will remain available for use
throughout the world.

° For background and text of the charter, see ihid.,
Sept. 11, 1961, p. 4.59.

April 2, 1962

5S1

During the year beginning last March over $1
billion has been committed in Latin America by
the United States in support of the alliance, ful-
filling the pledge we made at the first Punta del
Este meeting, and launching in a veiy real way
for this hemisphere a dramatic decade of develop-
ment. But even with this impressive support, the
destiny of the alliance lies largely in the hands of
the countries themselves. For even large amounts
of external aid can do no more than provide the
margin which enables each country through its
own determination and action to achieve lasting
success.

The United States recognizes that it takes
time — to develop careful programs for national
development and the administrative capacity
necessary to carry out such a progi-am — to go
beyond the enactment of land reform measures
and actually transfer tlie land and make the most
productive use of it — to pass new tax laws and
then achieve their acceptance and enforcement. It
is heartening, therefore, that the changes called
for by the alliance for progress have been the
central issue in several Latin American elec-
tions— demonstrating that its effects will be deep
and real. Under the Oi'ganization of American
States, nine outstanding economists and develop-
ment advisers have begun to assist countries in
critically reviewing their plans. Three Latin
American countries have already completed and
submitted for review their plans for the more
effective mobilization of their resources toward
national development. The others are creating
and strengthening their mechanisms for develop-
ment planning. A number of Latin American
countries have already taken significant stejas to-
ward land or tax reform; and throughout the
region there is a new ferment of activity, centered
on improvements in education, in rural develop-
ment, in public administration, and on other essen-
tial institutional measures required to give a sound
basis for economic growth.

But more important still is the changed atti-
tudes of peoples and governments already notice-
able in Latin America. The alliance has fired
the imagination and kindled the hopes of millions
of our good neighbors. Their drive toward mod-
ernization is gaining momentum as it imleashcs
the energies of these millions; and the United
States is becoming increasingly identified in the

minds of the people with the goal they move to-
ward: a better life with freedom. Our hand —
extended in help — is being accepted without loss
of dignity.

But the alliance is barely underway. It is a task
for a decade, not for a year. It requires further
changes in outlook and policy by all American
states. New institutions will need to be formed.
New plans — if they are to be serious — will have
to assume a life other than on paper.

One of the brightest pages of the world's history
has been the series of programs this Nation has
devised, established, and implemented following
the Second World "War to help free peoples achieve
economic development and the control of their
own destinies. These programs, which have been
solidly based on bipartisan support, are the proud
manifestations of our deep-seated love and pur-
suit of freedom for individuals and for nations.

I realize that there are among us those who are
weary of sustaining this continual effort to help
other nations. But I would ask them to look at
a map and recognize that many of those whom
we help live on the "front lines" of the long twi-
light struggle for freedom — that others are new
nations posed between order and chaos — and the
rest are older nations now undergoing a turbident
transition of new expectations. Our efforts to help
them help themselves, to demonstrate and to
strengthen the vitality of free institutions, are
small in cost compared to our military outlays for
the defense of freedom. Yet all of our armies
and atoms combined will be of little avail if these
nations fall, unable to meet the needs of their own
people, and unable to stave off within their borders
the rise of forces that threaten our security. This
program — and the passage of this bill — are vital
to the interests of tlie United States.

"Wo are, I am confident, e<]ual to our respon-
sibilities in tliis area — responsibilities as compel-
ling as any our Nation has known. Today, we are
still in the first months of a decade's sustained
effort. But I can report that our efforts are under-
way; tlicy are moving in the right direction; they
are gaining momentum daily; and they have al-
ready begun to realize a small part of their great
potential. The turnaround has indeed begun.

John F. Kennedy

The WiurE House,
March 13, 1962.

552

Department of Stale Bulletin

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

U.N. General Assembly Rejects Cuban Charges
Against United States

Following are statements made hy Adlai E.
Stevenson and Francis T. P. PUmjJton, U.S.
Representatives to the U.N. General Assernily.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR STEVENSON'

As we approach at last the end of this pro-
longed and unnecessary debate, I should like to
try to place the Cuban charge against my country
in its proper perspective. Up to now the 16th
General Assembly has compiled a creditable
record. We have dealt reasonably and responsi-
bly, I believe, with the prior items on our agenda,
and I think this is because the prior items were
worthy of responsible discussion and of responsi-
ble action. Now, however, this Assembly, at its
very end, has been forced to deal for 10 precious
days with cold-war propaganda charges that are
botli irresponsible, misupported, and wholly false.

This item has been placed on our agenda by
Cuba not as an emergency, as its language sug-
gests, but last August. And now, 6 months after
this supposedly urgent item was inscribed, the
members of this committee have been obliged to
listen to repetitive and interminable harangues
which have produced all of the abusive, the false,
and the tired phrases in the Communist lexicon —
but nothing resembling proof of the charges.

We have even been told that the American
worker owes his automobile, his house, his dish-
washer, ancl his refrigerator to the Eussian revolu-
tion. Well, I suppose, Mr. Chairman, that we
Americans should be thankful that our Communist
friends have taken such good care of us first while
neglecting themselves !

But we are not thankful for this intolerable
imposition on the patience of this committee nor

for this gross misuse of the machinery of the
United Nations, which is not only a waste of the
General Assembly's time but also an invitation to
the detractors of the United Nations to heap fresh
ridicule on our organization.

Our charter, Mr. Chairman, speaks of this place
as a "center for harmonizing the actions of na-
tions." Could anything be more disharmonizing
than the mibridled vituperation to which we have
been subjected by the Castro delegation and its
Communist colleagues? That charges of aggi-es-
sion and intervention — unsupported by evidence
and squarely denied— can be dredged up, after
lying dormant for 6 months, and be solenmly
paraded for 10 days before the representatives of
104 nations cannot enhance the reputation of this
organization for seriousness or efhciency. And
what a pity that at a time when there are some
signs of sincere efforts to diminish the tensions
between my country and the Soviet Union, the
latter should have ordered its satellites to unleash
such an unprincipled, unjustified, unsupported
attack on the United States!

Now, what is tlie reason for this outburst of
cold-war violence after this item has been pending
for 6 months'?

Clearly it is an attempt to drown in a torrent of
words the unanimous — and I say unanimous — con-
clusion of the American Republics that it is the
Communist offensive, of which Cuba is a part,
which is trying to intervene in tlie domestic affairs
of the American Republics and to destroy their
free democratic institutions.^ It is an attempt to
obscure the unanimous — and again I say unani-
mous— decision reached at Punta del Este by all
of the American Republics that the Castro regime

' Made in Committee I (Political and Security) on Feb.
14 (U.S. delegation press release 3925).

^ For statements made by Secretary Ruslc at the Eighth
Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs
of the American Republics and texts of resolutions, see
Bulletin of Feb. 19, 1962, p. 270.

April 2, 1962

553

is incompatible with tlie principles and the objec-
tives of the inter- American system.

What precisely were these two unanimous deci-
sions that they want to obscure and hide ?

OAS Decision on Communist Offensive in America

The first decision is found in Resolution I, en-
titled "Communist Offensive in America," con-
tained in document S/5075, the Punta del Este
Final Act, and I should like to read you para-
graphs 1, 2, and 3 of that unanimous resolution :

1. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of tlie American
Kepublics, convened in their Eighth Meeting of Consulta-
tion, declare that the continental unity and the democratic
institutions of the hemisphere are now in danger.

The Ministers have been able to verify that the sub-
versive offensive of communist Governments, their agents
and the organizations which they control, has increased in
intensity. The purpose of this offensive is the destruction
of democratic institutions and the establishment of
totalitarian dictatorships at the service of extra-
continental powers. The outstanding facts in this intensi-
fied offensive are the declarations set forth in ofiicial
documents of the directing bodies of the international
communist movement, that one of its principal objectives
is the establishment of communist regimes in the under-
developed countries and in Latin America ; and the
existence of a Marxist-Leninist government in Cuba which
is publicly aligned with the doctrine and foreign policy of
the communist powers.

2. In order to achieve their subversive purposes and
hide their true intentions, the communist governments and
their agents exploit the legitimate needs of the less-
favored sectors of the population and the just national
aspirations of the various peoples. With the pretext of
defending popular interests, freedom is suppressed, demo-
cratic institutions are destroyed, human rights are
violated and the individual is subjected to materialistic
ways of life imposed by tlie dictatorship of a single party.
Under the slogan of "anti-iniiJerialism" they try to estab-
lish an oppressive, aggressive imperialism, which sub-
ordinates the subjugated nations to the militaristic and
aggressive interests of extra-continental powers. By
maliciously utilizing the very principles of the Inter-
American system, they attempt to undermine democratic
institutions and to strengthen and protect political
penetration and aggression. The subversive methods of
communist governments and their agents constitute one
of the most subtle and dangerous forms of intervention in
the internal affairs of other countries.

3. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs alert the peoples of
the hemisphere to the intensification of the subversive
offensive of communist governments, their agents, and
the organizations that they control and to the tactics and
methods that they employ and also warn them of the
dangers this situation represents to representative democ-
racy, to respect for human rights, and to the self-determi-
nation of peoples.

The principles of communism are incompatible with the
priniii)les of the Inter-American system.

Castro's Ttireat to Western Hemisphere Security

These, gentlemen, are the words of the foreign
ministers of all of the American Republics — ex-
cept for Cuba. These words were based on a mass
of evidence accumulated over the years by the Or-
ganization of American States and by the member
states themselves, and in particular on a report of
the Inter- American Peace Committee, which was
dated January 14, 1962.

The facts are clear that the Castro regime, with
the assistance of local Communist parties, is em-
ploying a wide variety of techniques and practices
to overthrow the free democratic institutions of
Latin America. It is bringing hundreds of Latin
American students, labor leaders, intellectuals,
and dissident political leaders to Cuba for indoc-
trination and for training to be sent back to their
countries for the double purpose of agitating in
favor of the Castro regime and undermining their
own governments. It is fostering the establish-
ment in other Latin American countries of so-
called "Committees of Solidarity with the Cuban
Revolution" for the same dual purpose. Cuban
diplomatic personnel encourage and finance agita-
tion and subversion by dissident elements seeking
to overthrow established government by force.

The Cuban regime is flooding the hemi.spliere
with profDaganda and with printed material. The
recent inauguration of a powerful shortwave radio
station in Cuba now enables the regime to broad-
cast its propaganda to every corner of the hemi-
sphere, and these broadcasts have not hesitated to
call for the violent overthrow of established gov-
ernments. Such appeals have been directed to
Peru, Brazil, Guatemala, and, most recently, the
Dominican Republic. On January 22, 19G2, Radio
Habana beamed a broadcast to the Dominican Re-
public calling on the people to "overthrow the
Coinicil of State" — the very democratic council
which is now expressing the will of the Dominican
people to be free of the last remnants of the Tru-
jillo dictatorship.

The military training of I^atin Americans in
Cuba by the Castro regime, and the wide distribu-
tion throughout the hemisphere of the treatise on
guerrilla warfare by "Che" Guevara, Castro's
chief lieutenant, are clear evidence that the Ctistro
regime is bent on guerrilla operations as another

554

Department of Stale Bulletin

important device for gaining its objectives. The
large amounts of arms wliich Castro boasts of
having obtained from the Communist military
bloc place him in a position to support such opera-
tions, and, in fact, we have seen him aiding or
supporting armed invasions in other Caribbean
countries, notably Panama and the Dominican
Eepublic. If vce are to believe Castro's threats
made prior to and during the Punta del Este con-
ference, there will almost certainly be further
Cuban-inspired guerrilla operations against its
Latin American neighbors.

Now, what this means, Mr. Chairman, is that
Cuba today represents a bridgehead of Sino-Soviet
imperialism in the Western Hemisphere and a base
for Communist aggression, intervention, agitation,
and subversion against the American Republics.
It is small wonder that the American Republics
unanimously recognize that this situation is a
serious threat to their security and the ability of
their peoples to choose freely their own form of
government and to pursue freely their goals of
economic well-being and of social justice. It is
small wonder that they unanimously adopted the
resolution I have just quoted in part and small
wonder that the Communists are throwing up a
smokescreen in an attempt to conceal that
mianimity.

Cuban Regime IncompatibleiWith American System

Xow, what was the second unanimous decision
that they want to conceal ?

It is found in the first two operative paragraphs
of Resolution VI of the Punta del Este Final Act,
entitled "Exclusion of the Present Government of
Cuba From Participation in the Inter- American
System."

I read as follows from that resolution :

1. Tliat adherence by any member of the Organization
of American States to Marxism-Leninism is incompatible
with the inter-American system and the alignment of
such a government with the communist bloc breaks the
unity and solidarity of the hemisphere.

2. That the present Government of Cuba, which has
officially identified itself as a Marxist-Leninist govern-
ment, is incompatible with the principles and objectives of
the inter- American system.

Those paragraphs, Mr. Chairman, were agreed
to by the unanimous vote of the 20 American
Republics, with Cuba alone dissenting. "We have

then a unanimous decision that the Cuban regime
has made itself incompatible with the inter- Ameri-
can system.

There were two further operative paragraphs,
which I quote :

That this incompatibility excludes the present Govern-
ment of Cuba from participation in the inter-American
system.

That the Council of the Organization of American States
and the other organs and organizations of the inter-
American system adopt without delay tlie measures neces-
sary to carry out this resolution.

As to these two paragraphs, 14 comitries — that
is to say, two-thirds of the membership — voted in
favor, 1 against — Cuba — and 6 abstained — Argen-
tina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Bolivia, and Ecuador.
Their abstention, as has been made clear, in no way
affects the decision that the Castro regime is in-
compatible with the American system of demo-
cratic freedom but merely evidenced doubts as to
the legal procedures involved in the exclusion
caused by the incompatibility.

Unsupported Claims of U.S. Aggressive Plans

Now, so much for the Punta del Este decisions
that Castro is trying to hide by the unsupported
claun that the United States is now planning
aggression against Cuba. Wliat supposed items of
evidence has the Cuban representative produced
to substantiate that wild claim ? Only two.

First, he says that on October 9, 19G1, "the
revolutionary government denounced the military
bases, both within and without the United States,
listing those in which the American Government
trained mercenaries in order to use them against
our coimtry." This ex parte declaration by the
revolutionary government of Cuba is followed by
a list of most of the noted Florida winter resorts,
such as West Palm Beach, Fort Lauderdale,
Hollywood, St. Petersburg, and so forth.

I have no doubt that the Castro government did
"denounce" these localities, for certainly denuncia-
tion is a daily pastime in Habana these days. But
denunciation is not proof, and they have not pro-
duced a shred of evidence that the United States
Government is training anyone anywhere to attack
Cuba. And I in turn denoimce any such absurd
denunciations.

Secondly, the Castro representative quoted from
the New York Times of December 23, 1961, where

April 2, J 962

555

one Luis Manuel Martinez, presiunably a Cuban,
is said to have stated that "nearly 400 exile fighters
have left Guatemala in the last six weeks for the
United States for eventual duty as guerrillas in
Cuba." It may very well be tliat a Cuban patriot
may have made such a statement, but I repeat that
the United States is not training any Cuban exile
fighters anywhei'e to attack Cuba.

Now, these two items, Castro's own assertion and
the Martinez quotation, are the only — literally
only — supposed evidence advanced for the charge
that the United States is now planning aggi-ession
against Cuba.

And here I want to repeat that all of the charges
that the Castro regime has made against the
United States in this room were made at Punta del
Este — every one — and that the American Repub-
lics, who of all people know the facts as to what
goes on in this hemisphere, brushed these charges
aside, just as they should be brushed aside here in
this committee.

Now that the Castro representative has brouglit
up the New York Times of December 23, 1961, I
would like to call the committee's attention to
another item in that same issue which the Cuban
representative did not see fit to quote. That item
is a report from Ilabana quoting Castro as having
said on the previous day, December 22, that he
was a "Marxist-Leninist" during his mountain
guerrilla warfare days and that he had hidden the
fact "because otherwise he would not have been
able to press his revolution to a successful conclu-
sion." He is quoted as going on to say tliat while
in the mountains if he had said, "We are Marxist-
Leninists," "it is possible that we would never have
been able to descend to the lowlands. ... So we
called it something else." Those are the words of
Mr. Castro.

Mr. Castro, blatantly and cynically, admits and
boasts that he deliberately deceived the Cuban
people.

I now come to the attempt by the representative
of the Soviet Union to turn this debate into a
propaganda quiz program.

Most of the so-called "questions" which he lias
asked related to events last April which were
thoroughly discussed and dealt with at that time by
this committee and by the General Assembly.' But
he purports to be very distressed that I have not

° For l)iukp;ioiiiul and texts of resolutions, see ihid.. May
S, 1001 , 11. 0G7.

answered his questions. It is not my practice,
as I hoije you have noticed, to intervene every few
minutes but rather to await my turn. But I do
not want the representative of the Soviet Union to
suffer any longer.

So as to his other declarations, let me say, no,
the United States is not training anyone for an
invasion of Cuba at the "bases" mentioned by the
Cuban representative. Neither the Soviet rep-
resentative nor the Cuban representative nor any-
one else has brought forth the slightest evidence
to the contrary. And Castro's "denunciation" of
sucli innocent winter resorts as West Palm Beach,
Sarasota, and so forth, is proof of nothing but a
very vivid and unscrupulous imagination.

Tlie next question: Yes, Cubans may enlist in
the Armed Forces of the United States, and so may
any permanent resident of the United States. Our
latest count, as of 2 weeks ago, showed that the
nvimber of Cubans in the three armed services of
this counti-y amounted to a grand total of 88.

No Support for Cuba at Punta del Este

The next question : No, all the decisions at the
Punta del Este conference were not ummimous.
Tills was not a meeting of the Warsaw military
pact. This was a meeting of free and independent
sovereign states, proudly insistent on the demo-
cratic rights of freedom of speech and freedom
of decision.

So that the record is completely clear to all of
the members, I want to state the votes on the nine
resolutions which are set forth in the Final Act
of the Punta del P]ste conference (document
S/5075).

Resolution I, entitled "Communist Offensive in
America," which I liave already read in part, was
adopted by the vote of 20 for and 1 against, Cuba
being the 1.

Resolution II, setting up a special consultative
committee on security against the subversive ac-
tion of international communism, was adopted by
the vote of 19 to 1 — Cuba — with Bolivia abstahi-
ing.

Resolution III, reiterating the principles of non-
intervention and self-determination, was adopted
by the vote of 20 to 1, the 1 being Cuba. I call
attention to the fact that Cuba voted against this
resolution and, in particular, voted against para-
graph 2 of tliat resolution, whicli urged that
American governments organize themselves on

556

Deparfment of Slate Bulletin

the basis of free elections that express, without re-
striction, tlie will of the people.

Resolution IV, for the holding of free elections,
was also adopted by the vote of 20 to 1. I again
call attention to the fact that Cuba is against the
holding of free elections.

Resolution V, endorsing the Alliance for Prog-
ress, was adopted by the vote of 20 to 1. Once
again, as in the case of the Marshall plan, the
Communists are against the idea of economic and
social progress with freedom.

As to Resolution VI, relating to the self-exclu-
sion of Cuba from the American system, as I have
said, paragraphs 1 and 2 were adopted by the vote
of 20 to 1, and 3 and 4 were adopted by the vote
of 14 to 1, with G abstentions.

Resolution VII, excluding Cuba from the Inter-
American Defense Board, was adopted by the vote
of 20 to 1.

Resolution \r[II, relating to the suspension of
arms traffic with Cuba and charging the Organiza-
tion of American States Council to study the de-
sirability of suspending trade in other items, was
adopted by the vote of 16 to 1, with 4 abstentions.

Resolution IX, relating to strengthening the
statute of tlie Inter- Ajnerican Commission on Hu-
man Rights, was adopted by the vote of 19 to 1,
with 1 abstention.

In short, Mr. Chairman, Cuba received no sup-
port on anything. No one voted with Cuba on
anything. Cuba joined the others in voting for
only one paragraph of one resolution, and there
was not a single negative vote, other than Cuba's,
on any resolution or any paragraph of any resolu-
tion. In other words, the newest associate of the
Conmiunist bloc stood alone in the self-imposed
isolation which its interventions and disregard of
human rights have brought upon itself.

Now, these are the facts about Punta del Este,
and they show that what is before this committee
is not some bilateral issue between the Castro gov-
ernment and the Govei'nment of the United States
but a broad multilateral problem involving a self-
declared Communist regime's aggi-essive hostility
against all of the free nations of the Latin Ameri-
can world. It is not a bilateral problem; it is a
hemispheric problem.

My final answer to the representative of the
Soviet Union is yes, the United States does believe
in the principle of nonintervention in the affairs of
other countries and we strongly recommend this

principle to tlie Cuban regime, especially with ref-
erence to its neighbors in this hemisphere.

And while we are on the subject of noninterven-
tion, I would strongly reconnnend to the Soviet
Union that our memories are not so short that we
have forgotten some events of recent years which
are still on our agenda.

I have heard during the past fortnight repeated
contemptuous ref ei-ences to the Cuban patriots who
have escaped from the oppression of the Castro
dictatorship and the names of a few industrialists
and land owners. But I have not heard mention
of no less than 150,000 Cubans who have fled from
tyranny to liberty — of 150,000 workers, peasants,
shopkeepers, professional people, artisans, profes-
sors, and judges — many of them former comrades
of Castro — who fled when it became clear to them
that he had deceived them and betrayed their
revolution. They are the fortunate ones who have
escaped the knock on the door in the night and
drmnhead justice and the firing squads that have
slaughtered so many of Castro's countrymen.

I read you a short list of Castro's own comrades
who now know what he represents and have es-
caped to freedom: Castro's firet Prime Minister,
the first Provisional President of his revolutionary
government, his Chief Justice, nearly two-thirds
of the 19 members of his first Cabinet, his revolu-
tionary commander of Camagiiey Province, his
appointees as presidents of the National Bank
and the National Development Bank, the chief of
liis Air Force, his personal pilot, the General Sec-
retary of the Cuban Trade Union Federation, the
editor of the anti-Batista magazine Bohemia, the
author of Castro's revolutionary exhortation "his-
tory will absolve me," and countless other editors,
radio commentators, and public figures.

These are some of the millions who have fled
Communist tyranny in search of freedom. We
have heard some dissertations on the Marxist-
Leninist ideology from a procession of Communist
speakers during this debate. I certainly will not
take up the committee's time to more than say that
millions of voices will answer them — the voices
not only of 150,000 Cubans but of 200,000 Hun-
garians, of 55,000 Tibetans, of 1,100,000 Chinese,
of 2,500,000 East Germans, and many more who
have risked their lives to escape from that ideology
and that form of government to the free world.
And the final confession of ideological bankruptcy
is that it takes a wall through the heart of Berlin

April 2, 7962

557

not to keep the enemies out but to keep their own
people in.

It has been suggested over and over that in some
way the American Republics are interfering with
Cuba's right of self-determination, the right of
its people to choose their own government. This
is not true. The American Eepublics believe in
and practice self-determination. It is the Castro
regime itself that has deprived the Cuban people
of that right.

The Organization of American States' Charter
states in article 5 : "The solidarity of the Ameri-
can States and the high aims which are sought
through it require the political organization of
those States on the basis of the effective exercise
of representative democracy." Through the Or-
ganization of American States, the American
Republics in recent weeks have helped the people
of the Dominican Republic to regain the right of
democratic self-determination, with the happy
result that the voice of the ancient Dominican peo-
ple, long stilled by dictatorship, is now heard
again.

The voice of the Cuban people has also been
stilled by dictatorship, a dictatorship conceived in
deceit and deception and now maintained by force.
The voice we now hear is not the voice of the
Cuban people but the voice of a master. His
plaintive plea for the right of self-determination
is in fact a cynical demand that he — and his
foreign masters — do the self-determining and be
left alone to shamelessly crush the will of the
Cuban people and further the objectives of Com-
munist imperialism throughout the hemisphere.

How can Castro, who first deceived his people
and who now refuses to let them speak for them-
selves, speak for them as to the form of govern-
ment they desire? How can a man who has
betrayed his country and delivered it to an inter-
national conspiracy speak for a people to whom
he denies the fundamental right of self-determi-
nation ?

What Castro Promised

In Castro's first political statement from the
Sierra Maestra in July 1957 I will tell you what
he promised. He promised general elections at
the end of 1 year. He promised an "absolute
guarantee" of freedom of information, of freedom
of press and all civil and political rights in accord-
ance with Cuba's 1940 Constitution. In an article

in February 1958 he wrote that he was fighting for
a "genuine representative government," "thor-
oughly honest" general elections within 12 months,
"full and untrammeled" freedom of public infor-
mation and public media, and the reestablishment
of all the personal and political rights set forth
in Cuba's 1940 Constitution. And the greatest
irony of all — in that article he denies the charge
of "plotting to replace military dictatorship with
revolutionary dictatorship."

These were the promises that Castro made to
the Cuban people. It is small wonder that those
people welcomed the man who made them. Re-
joicing in their release from the thralldom of
Batista's military dictatorship, they looked for-
ward eagerly to the freedom that Castro had
promised. And what has he given them? He
has given them the very dictatorship which he
solemnly assured them he would not. He has
given them a dictatorship under which free ex-
pression and free elections no longer exist. He has
given them a government-controlled press. He
has confiscated their property. He has terrorized
their religion and suppressed all civil and political
liberty. And to cap the climax, at Punta del Este
he has voted against even the principle of free
elections !

It must be clear to all that the present rulers of
Cuba have engaged in a classic example of Com-
munist subversion from within — indirect aggres-
sion. They sought to gain power over Cuba not
to free Cubans but to enslave them, not to serve
Cuban interests but the interests of that worldwide
imperialism which wanted Cuba as a bridgehead
for its ambitions in the rest of Latin America.

The free peoples of Latin America will not
permit this, and that is the meaning of Punta del
Este.

The free nations have sought by every means
since the end of the Second World War to defend
their freedom. This organization has dealt with
many of these battles of wliat has come to be
known as the cold war and of which Cuba and
the debate here today is only the latest example.
I had hoped when I came here a year ago that the
United Nations could be used, and I so stated, as
an arena not to fight the cold war but to pursue
peace. And wo had hoped in the Americas, as do
others in other continents, to keep the intrusion
of the cold war from our shores. But one of our
American states has been subverted and is now
being used as a vehicle for pressing tlie cold war

558

Department of State Bulletin

against us and our American friends. We have
not brouglit the cold war into this committee ; it
is the Castro regime and its masters that have done
so.

As the Secretary of State of the United States
said at the Punta del Este meeting :

The cold war would have been unknown to us had
the Soviet Union determined, at the end of World War
II, to live In peace with other nations In accordance with
its commitments under the Charter of the United Nations.
The cold war would end tomorrow If those who control
the Communist movement would cease their aggressive
acts, in all their many forms. Nothing would be more
gratifying to the citizens of my country than to have
the Soviet Union bring about the revolution of peace by
a simple deei.'iion to leave the rest of the world alone.

But the cold war is not a contest between the Soviet
Union and the United States which the United States is
pursuing for national ends. It is a struggle in the long
story of freedom between those who would destroy it and
those who are determined to preserve it. If every nation
were genuinely independent, and left alone to work out
its relations with its neighbors by common agreement,
the tensions between Washington and Moscow would
vanish overnight.

The Alliance for Progress

Latin America is a continent in ferment. Its
peoples voice a growing demand for social and
economic changes that will bring to every man,
woman, and child tlie technological benefits of
our age. Its peoples want better education,
better housing, better health, their own land, and
economic and personal security. Its peoples are
restless with hopes and aspirations.

To satisfy these hopes, to make these aspirations
a living reality, we in the "Western Hemisphere
have embarked on a positive program of un-
paralleled magnitude in scope and effort — the
Alliance for Progress.'' We of the American
Eepublics have set forth our goals of social ad-
vancement throughout the coming decade. We
have pledged our joint resources. We are insisting
on tax reform and land reform and industrial de-
velopment. We have stated our convictions tliat
investment in liimian resources — in the brains and
skills of our peoples — should receive top priority.
The United States is ready to contribute over a bil-
lion dollars a year to tliis great humanitarian
undertaking and to do its full part in helping to
re-create a new world for the peoples of Latin
America.

Tliis is tlie project whicli the Castro regime and

its Communist masters are trying to subvert and
sabotage. It is for this that the Communist bloc
in the closing days of our session have taxed our
patience, abused our procedures, and unleashed all
of their tired invectives and scattered groundless
charges to arrest tlie forward march of tlie Ameri-
can Republics to a better life and democratic
freedom.

I hope, Mr. Chairman, that this committee will
resoundingly defeat any resolution that equates
unsupported charges and the decisions of the
American states to defend themselves from sub-
version and to work together for that better life
in full conformity with tlie principles of the
charter.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR PLIMPTON'

I would like to point out, by way of an intro-
ductory remark, that the title of this item has not
been changed. It will be remembered that the
title reads: "Complaint by Cuba of threats to
international peace and security arising from new
plans of aggression and acts of intervention being
executed by the Government of the United States
of America against the Revolutionary Govern-
ment of Cuba."

The sponsor of the draft resolution now seems
to be trying, by document A/L.385/Eev.l, to create
the impression that the title of the item has been
changed, obviously because the deliberately biased
form of the title of the item clearly reveals its
cold-war propaganda purpose. However, Mr.
President, the title of the item has not been
changed. The document itself refers three times
to item 78 — in the upper left-hand corner, in the
heading, and in the first preambular paragraph.
And item 78 still reads just the way it always has.
The so-called "technical error" referred to in re-
vision 1 is itself nothing but another parliamentary
maneuver to obscure the fact that the draft resolu-
tion is still a draft resolution against the back-
ground and in the context of the completely
unproved Cuban charges, as set forth in the cold-
war title of the item.

Mr. President, the Cuban charges of interven-
tion and plans of aggression have been with us
now for 6 months. My delegation voted long ago,
last September, in favor of inscribing this item on

' See p. 539.

■"Made in plenary on Feb. 20 (U.S. delegation press
release 3928).

April 2, 1962

559

our agenda because of our commitment to the prin-
ciple that any complaint, no matter how ground-
less, should receive a liearing in our organization.
The First Committee dealt with the Czechoslovak-
Rumanian draft resolution. [U.N. doc. A/C.l/
L. 309] .«

It is instructive to review briefly the fate of
this Communist cold-war effort. Not one dele-
gate outside of the 11 Communist representatives
supported the unfounded accusation of United
States interference in Cuban aifairs. A clear ma-
jority of the First Committee also rebuffed the
apparently harmless reference to peaceful settle-
ment of international disputes because they rec-
ognized that in the context of the Cuban charges
such an affirmation of a general principle would
dignify and give substance to charges that are in
fact crude, defamatory, and false. The First Com-
mittee also witnessed a striking demonstration of
vigor and solidarity among the nations that make
up our Organization of American States. We
voted as one in defense of our common cause, and it
is this fact more than any words I can say that
testifies to the worthlessness of the Cuban charges.

Mr. President, over this weekend we were
greeted by a new exercise in parliamentary leger-
demain. This will, I am confident, be equally re-
pudiated by this Assembly. Having failed to ob-
tain any support for the baseless charges leveled
against the United States in the First Committee
and having failed to enlist the backing of a single
one of the 93 non-Communist members of this
body for its complaint of United States interfer-
ence, the Communist bloc now is trying to bring
in through the back door what was thrown out at
the front door. That well-known authority on
Caribbean affairs, that longtime friend and next-
door neighbor of Cuba, the Republic of Outer
Mongolia, has now appeared from central Asia

"The operative paragraphs of draft resolution A/C.l/
L.309 were rejected by Committee I on Feb. 15, and the
chairman therefore declared, pursuant to rule 130 of the
rules of procedure, that the draft resolution as a whole
was rejected. Operative paragraph 1, which appealed
to the U.S. Govornmont "to put an end to the interference
in the internal affairs of the Rep\iblic of Cuba and to all
the actions directed against the territorial integrity and
political Independence of Cuba," was rejected by a vote
of 11 to 50, with 39 abstentions. Operative pnragrajjh 2,
which called upon the Governments of Cuba and the United
States "to settle tlieir differences by peaceful means,
through negotiations, without recour.se to use of force,"
was rejected by a vote of 30 to 40, with 15 abstentions.

and placed before us a resolution [U.N. doc. A/L.
385/Rev. 1] which purports to innocently reaffirm
the principle of equal rights and self-determina-
tion of peoples and of noninterference in the in-
ternal affairs of any state. In voting on this
parliamentary maneuver, the United States will
take the following course:

First, we will vote for the preambular reference
to the report of the First Committee. We welcome
that report as demonstrating the fact that, after
a fair hearing and thorough airing of the Cuban
complaint, it was overwhelmingly rejected. We
find it proper for the General Assembly to take
note of this report.

Second, on the operative paragi-aph, which is
substantially a repetition of the second preambular
paragraph of the Czechoslovak-Rumanian resolu-
tion introduced in the First Committee, we shall
again abstain. The obvious maneuver of Mon-
golia on behalf of the Communist bloc is to force
other members of the Assembly into the apparent
dilemma of either voting against self-determina-
tion or to pass a resolution with an unintended
effect. There is no reason to fall for this trick.
The United States, of course, subscribes to these
principles. The United States reaffirms principles
which were first set forth in our Declaration of
Indeijendence and in our Constitution, as well as
in the conventions and agreements of the inter-
American system and the United Nations Charter.
In a separata vote on the operative paragraph,
we will, therefore, not vote but will abstain in the
light of the context of this paragraph under the
unproved Cuban allegations which are still in the
title of the item.

We shall, however, vote against the resolution as
a whole, and we hope that the Assembly will do
likewise. There is no reason to dignify the un-
proved charges presented by the Communist bloc
by enveloping them in noble and historic principles
of the charter. A vote against the resolution as a
whole will properly repudiate this transparent
parliamentary numeuvei".

If such principles are to be reaffirmed, Mr. Presi-
dent, they should be pi'oclaimed in the context of
calling on the Cuban regime to stop intervening in
the affairs of other American states. They should
call on this regime to grant the Cuban people the
right to choose freely tlicir own form of govern-
ment, to give tliem the right of self-determination.
Those principles should voice the appeal of the free

560

Department of Sfafe Bulletin

peoples of the vrorld for restoration to the Cuban
people of those equal rifjlifs spelled out so clearly
in the Declaration of Human Kights, the United
Nations Charter, and tlie Charter of the Organi-
zation of American States.

Mr. President, when this item was inscribed last
August, we recognized the competence of the Gen-
eral Assembly to concern itself with such grave
charges. We welcomed the airuig of those charges,
the discussion of those charges. We were gratified
by the display of hemispheric unity and the sup-
port of other members who repudiated those
charges. We were gratified that not one of the 93
non-Connnunist members of this body voted with
the Communist bloc to validate those charges. We
trust, Mr. President, that this Assembly will act
with the same sense of responsibility and will not
be trapped by a transparent maneuver, such as the
one we now have before us, and will vote against
this draft resolution as a whole.''

U.S. Exchanges Tariff Concessions
With GATT Contracting Parties

White House press release dated March 7

The White House on March 7 announced the
conclusion at Geneva of tariff negotiations with
the European Economic Communitj^, with the
United Kingdom, and with 24 other countries.

Summary

These negotiations, the largest and most com-
plex in the 28-year history of the Trade Agree-
ments Act, produced results of great importance
to the United States. The commercial importance
of the negotiations was matched by their political
significance, since they constituted the first test of
whether the United States and the European Eco-
nomic Community — the so-called European Com-
mon Market — would be able to find a mutual basis
for the long-run development of economic rela-
tions critical to both areas.

The European Conunon Market, created in 1957
by France, Germany, Italy, and the Low Coun-
tries [Belgium, Xetherlands, Luxembourg] in the
Treaty of Rome, establishes a giant economic com-
munity in Western Europe. It encompasses a

' On Feb. 20 draft resolution A/L.385/Rev.l was re-
jected by the General Assembly by a vote of .37 to 45, with
18 abstentions.

market whose imports are greater than those of
the United States itself, with a growth rate well
in excess of the current United States growth rate.
In accordance with their treaty, the six member
countries of the European Community are rapidly
eliminating tariffs within the Connnunity and are
establishing a common external tariff for the Com-
munity which will apply generally to the products
of outside countries including the United States.
At the same time the six member countries are
merging their separate national programs for the
protection of domestic agriculture into an inte-
grated Community-wide program known as the
common agricultural policy. When this policy
comes fully into effect, there will be a single Com-
mmiity-wide support price for each of a nmnber
of major agricultural commodities.

In the face of these developments the United
States objectives in the negotiations were twofold :
(1) to secure reductions in the common external
tariff which would expand trade between the
European Economic Community and the United
States and (2) to insure that the common agri-
cultural policy took account of the interests of
United States agricultural exporters. These ob-
jectives were sought in the framework of the long-
run United States policy of maintaining and ex-
panding trading relations among free-world
nations.

These results were achieved. In general the
European Economic Community agreed to an ex-
change of concessions involving a phased 20-per-
cent reduction in most of the industrial items
making up its common external tariff. The Com-
munity's freedom to negotiate on certain agricul-
tural items was hampered by the fact that its
common agricultural policy was still in process
of development. Nevertheless it agreed to various
arrangements — including a number of important
tariff cuts— which will insure for the present that
most agricultural exports of the United States
will be able to maintain their position in tlie Com-
mimity's markets.

The United States, operating under the severely
circumscribed authority of the present Trade
Agreements Act, was unable to offer concessions
of equal value to the Europeans. This was true
even though the President went below the peril-
point rates recommended by the Tariff Commis-
sion on a number of items. In spite of the inability
of the United States to offer equivalent conces-
sions, the Community agreed to close the negotia-

April 2, 1962

561

tions on the basis of the concessions finally offered
by the United States.

An appended table summarizes the trade value
of concessions exchanged with the EEC and other
countries in terms of the amount of trade during
1960 in the items covered. In the exchange of
new tariff concessions in the form of reductions or
bindings at fixed levels, the United States received
concessions on a trade volume of approximately
$1.6 billion in return for adjustments and commit-
ments, to take effect in most cases on two steps 1
year apart, on United States tariffs covering com-
modities with a trade volume of $1.2 billion.

In other negotiations for compensatory tariff
adjustments, where contracting members of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
had altered or withdrawn previous concessions, the
United States received concessions on a trade
volume estimated at $2.7 billion to replace conces-
sions withdrawn or modified in the amount of $1.6
billion. The central feature of this phase of the
Geneva negotiations was the replacement of tariff
concessions granted by the EEC member states
before they formed the Common Market with con-
cessions to be incorporated in a new common ex-
ternal tariff. The EEC adjustments thus made in
the Common Market tariff affect trade valued at
$2.5 billion.

Compensatory tariff concessions on the part of
the United States were limited, covering trade
valued at $30 million.

The new tariff reductions obtained from the
EEC include items of major importance to United
States export trade to the Common Market area.
Most of these concessions were reductions of 20
percent. Tliere were, however, a number of re-
ductions of more than 20 percent, the most im-
portant of these being reductions of 24 and 26
percent, respectively, in the common tariff on
automobiles and parts; in dollar terms this reduc-
tion will average to about $12G per automobile
exported to the European market. Other cate-
gories of i)articular importance to the United
States were chemicals and phai-maceuticals, in-
dustrial and electrical machinei-y, textiles, canned
and preserved fruits, and fats and oils.

Principal concessions granted by the United
States included automobiles, certain classes of ma-
chinery and electrical apparatus, certain types of
steel products, and some classes of glassware. The
United States automobile concession, which ac-

counted for a substantial part of the total amount
of trade affected by the United States concessions,
averages approximately $21.50 per automobile im-
ported into the United States market.

For various technical reasons it is impossible to
make exact comparisons of the general tariff levels
of different countries. Nevertheless it appears
that, as a result of the negotiations just concluded
at Geneva, the general tariff level of the European
Economic Community is roughly comparable to
that of the United States. In some items the
United States level exceeds that of the Commu-
nity; in other items the opposite is the case. The
major difference in the two tariff structures is that
the EEC has fewer prohibitively high tariffs than
the United States as well as fewer extremely low
tariffs.

The similarity in general levels provides an
opportunity for even more effective tariff nego-
tiation in the future. However, if the United
States is to exploit this opportunity, it must be
equipped with new statutory powers, since the
President has now exhausted his powers to grant
tariff concessions under existing law.^

In its negotiations for new concessions at Ge-
neva the United States dealt not only with the
EEC but also with Austria, Cambodia, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, Haiti, India, Israel, Japan,
New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United
Kingdom.

Negotiations for compensatory concessions, in
addition to those with the EEC, were held with
Australia, Brazil, Canada, Ceylon, Finland, Haiti,
Indonesia, Japan, the Netherlands Antilles, Paki-
stan, Peru, the Eepublic of South Africa, Sweden,
and Turkey.

While negotiations by the United States with
all the named countries except Spain have been
completed, final agreements have not been con-
cluded with some countries, which have either not
completed their negotiations with otlier countries
or have not yet completed the necessary domestic
procedures. Wlicn all negotiations have been
concluded, additional benefits will accrue to the
United States from the concessions exchanged be-
tween otlier countries.

' For ti'xt of rrosiilont Kennedy's message to Congress
on triulo, see lUn.i.iciiN of Feb. 12, 1902, p. 231 ; for a
summary of the proposed legislation, see ibid., Feb. 26,
1002, p. 343.

562

Deparfment of State Bulletin

Further Details

The tariff conference, which opened in Geneva
in September 1900,- was convened by the Con-
tracting Parties to the General Agi-eement on
Tarilfs and Trade at United States initiative.
The Geneva conference was open to all contracting
parties to the GATT, 35 of which participated in
the negotiations. Geneva was thus the scene of a
major multilateral negotiation for the lowering of
free-world ti-ade barriers.

Nevertheless, attention was largely centered on
the European Economic Community and its com-
mon external tariff. "While customs unions are
not a new thing in the world community, no cus-
toms union before the Common Market had so
much significance for world trade and, indeed,
for the shaping of future political and economic
forces in the world.

The outlook on the whole was for a broadly
liberal Common Market approach to international
economic affairs. Even before the conference
opened, there was outstanding an offer on the part
of the European Economic Community to reduce
by 20 percent most of its tariff rates on industrial
products, conditional on the grant of reciprocal
concessions by other countries. The United
States was a principal supplier of most of the
items affected.

Despite the generally propitious atmosphere in
which the negotiations were begun, it was by no
means certain that any useful agreement could
be reached. United States negotiators came to
the Geneva conference empowered with the limited
authorities contained in the Trade Agreements
Extension Act of 1958. Under the law the maxi-
mum tariff reduction they could offer was generally
fixed at 20 percent. The negotiating list which
they were authorized to use had been established
after a rigorous screening by the interagency
Trade Agi-eements Committee and after very sub-
stantial further eliminations as a result of the
Tariff Commission's peril-point findings under
section 3(a) of the Trade Agreements Act. De-
spite the fact that the United States had a very
large export trade at stake and despite the major
political opportunity offered by the negotiations,
it was apparent when the United States negotiat-
ing instructions were originally drawn that the

^ For a statement made at the opening meeting by
Clarence B. Randall, Special Assistant to President Eisen-
hower, see ibiiL, Sept. 19, 1960, p. 453.

United States would be unable on this basis to
meet the EEC request for adequate reciprocity.

The negotiations with the EEC were of un-
rivaled complexity. They fell into two pliases.
The purpose of the first phase was to meet the
requirement of GATT, article XXIV :6, provid-
ing for new tariff concessions by a customs union
to replace those which had been granted previously
by the member states. In preparing for this nego-
tiation the American negotiators examined each
item in the European common external tariff and
compared the prospective incidence of the new
rates with the previous national rates. 'Wlierever
the new rate seemed on the whole to have a dif-
ferent protective incidence than the old national
rates, this difference had to be taken into account
as a debit or credit in the subsequent negotiations.
For agricultural products, however, special diffi-
culties arose. Since the EEC nations were in
process of developing the common agricultural
policy called for in the Rome Treaty, they were
restricted in their ability to negotiate on some of
the tariff rates for agricultural products.

The outcome of this phase of the EEC negotia-
tion brought direct commitments to the United
States on common external tariff rates covering
exports totaling $2.5 billion in 1960, compared
with a total of $1.4 billion of trade that had been
covered by concessions which the Common IMarket
member nations had previously granted to the
United States.

In the second phase of the negotiations, the so-
called reciprocal round, the EEC confirmed the
offer which had been provisionally put forward
in May 1960. Specifically the Community offered
a reduction of 20 percent on industrial tariff rates,
subject to a few exceptions. The linear reduction
offer did not apply to agricultural commodities,
but in the course of the negotiations reductions on
certain agricultural products were made.

As the negotiations proceeded it became clear
that the United States bargaining position was
inadequate to take advantage of the EEC offer.
A deadlock ensued and a collapse of the negotia-
tions was threatened, with all the adverse conse-
quences that this portended for American eco-
nomic interests and Western political cooperation.

The Tariff Commission's peril-point findings
were, therefore, carefully reexamined, and a num-
ber of additional items were found in which it
appeared possible to offer tariff reductions.

April 2, 1962

563

These were items in -wliich (lie procedures and
stnndards stipulalod in tlie Trade Agreements Act
had compelled tlie Commission to make unduly
restrictive jud<>-ments or to make judcrments un-
supported by relevant evidence. In many in-
stances tariff reductions of even a few percentage
points had been precluded. In some instances
peril points had l)een set on items where imports
represented only a minor fraction of domestic
production. In others peril points had been
found at existing duty levels for specialty com-
modities which were produced abroad for a nar-
row and highly specialized market in the United
States and which were not competitive with
domestic production. In still other cases a single
peril point had been set for basket categories of
many items, even tliough the situation as between
items in the category appeared to differ markedly.
It was in cases of the foregoing character that it
was decided that tariff reductions could be made.
A number of such items, covering $76 million
of United States imports, were selected to provide
a new bargaining offer. This action broke the
deadlock in the negotiations.

Appended are the messages from the President
to the Congress 3 which give full details on the
action taken with respect to the peril -pointed
items in question.

Agricultural commodities exported by the
United States were included in botli the reciprocal
and the compensatoi-y j^hases of the Geneva nego-
tiations with the Common Market. These nego-
tiations involved special difficulties. ]n-imarily
because the EEC was concurrently develojnng its
common agricultural policy. These difficulties
were an additional cause for the prolonged period
of the negotiations.

In the understandings that were ultimately
reached, the EEC made commitments on products
accounting for approximately $800 million of the
United Slates agricultural exports to the Com-
mon Market in 19G0. Tliese conunitments cover
such major items as cotton, soybeans, tallow, hides
and skins, and certain fruit and vegetable prod-
ucts. On cotton and soybeans, duty-free bindings
replace tariffs in some of the member countries.
The United States also obtained a reduction in
the common external tariff on tobacco. Eor this
item and vegetable oils, which together accounted
for exports in 1960 of about $125 million, the EEC

' Not iirintcd here.

has entered into understandings with us envisag-
ing negotiations for the further reductions in the
common external tariffs.

Witli respect to another group of products,
principally grains and certain livestock products,
which will be protected by variable levies instead
of fixed tariffs, the United States sought to obtain
adequate assurances of access to the EEC market.
Because of the many problems which were still un-
settled among the EEC coimtries themselves, it
was not possible to work out during the Geneva
negotiations definitive arrangements for access.
Therefore, agreement was reached by the two
sides to reconsider the matter of trade access in
the near future. This represented a fundamental
change in the position of the EEC, which early in
the negotiations announced its intention to with-
draw existing concessions on these products with-
out providing for future negotiations on access.

Specifically the EEC agreed to certain interim
arrangements for wheat, corn, grain sorglium,
poultry, and rice. United States exports of these
commodities to the Common Market in 1960 were
valued at about $214 million. For corn, grain
sorghum, ordinary wlieat, rice, and poultry, the
EEC has agreed to negotiate further on these items
with respect to trade access arrangements and to
maintain existing national import systems on as
favorable a basis as at present until a common
policy is put into operation.

In the case of quality wheat the EEC agreed
to negotiate further on the trade access arrange-
ments after the initiation of the common agricul-
tural policy. Before this new system is put into
operation, member countries will continue to apply
existing national import systems on as favorable
a basis as at present. Further, the EEC agreed
that when the common policy on wheat is put into
operation, and throughout the period covered by
these negotiations, it will take corrective measures
for any decline in I"''nited States exports of quality
wheat resulting from the application of the com-
mon policy.

Since tlie common agricultural policy will take
effect over a period of years beginning on July 1,
1962, in general it should not have adverse effects
on the level of XTnited States exports during the
coming year. The maintenance or expansion of
United States exports will depend upon future
negotiations carried out under the authority of
the jiroposed trade agreements legislation.

The negotiations for the reciprocal reduction of

564

Department of Sfafe Bulletin

tariffs involved 18 countries in addition to tlio
Common Market. Of these, tlie most important
were with the United Kingdom.

The United States received from the United
Kingdom direct concessions on about 320 tariff
items with a trade coverage of $197.5 million.
Included were automobiles and parts, aircraft and
parts, machine tools, certain chemicals, Kraft
board and paper, synthetic rubber, and dried
beans. Most of the duty reductions followed the
20-percent pattern set by the EEC.

In return the United States gave concessions,
also mostly at the 20-percent level, on 185 items
with a trade volume of $185 million. Among these
items were machinery and vehicles, principally
aircraft and parts, books and printed matter, flax,
hemp, and ramie textile manufactures, certain
food products, and Scotch whisky. The negotia-
tions with the United Kingdom involved depar-
tures from Tariff Commission peril-point findings
on items representing a trade volume of $7 million.

Negotiations for new concessions with 17 other
countries, some of which have not yet been formal-
ized in final agreements, have resulted in addi-
tional concessions to the United States of about
$575 million in return for concessions totaling
about $450 million. These totals will be further
augmented when the conclusion of all negotia-
tions still in progress between other countries
permits the calculation of indirect benefits that
will accrue to the United States.

Agreements were also negotiated with 14 coun-
tries for compensatory concessions to replace other
concessions which had been modified or with-
drawn. The concessions to the United States that
were modified or withdrawn by other countries
involved trade of approximately $220 million.
Compensatory concessions granted to the United
States by these countries covered about $200 mil-
lion of trade.

For its part the United States withdrew or
modified concessions with a trade coverage of $85
million and offered compensatory concessions on
$30 million of trade to seven countries, namely,
Benelux, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, Italy, Japan, Sweden, and the United King-
dom. These compensatory concessions were se-
lected from the same list of items on which the
United States delegation had been authorized by
the interdepartmental trade agreements organiza-
tion to make offers in the negotiations for new
concessions. These items were therefore not avail-

able to the United States delegation for bargain-
ing for additional new concessions.

In the table which follows there is summarized
the trade coverage of the concessions exchanged
by the United States with other countries during
the Geneva conference.

Recapitulation op Trade Coverage of Concessions
Exchanged

(Direct concessions: Estimates based on 1960 trade)

1. Reciprocal negotiations for new concessions

Trade value of concessions
Obtained by U.S. Granted by U.S.

Witli EEC $1, 000 million .$79.5 million

Witli other countries .$575 million $430 million

2. Article XXIV :0 compensatory negotiations ivith the

EEC

Trade value of concessions

Previous concessions by mem-
ber states, to be replaced
by EEC concessions $1, 400 million

Concessions granted by EEC $2, 500 million

3. Other compensatory negotiations

Trade value of concessions
Concessions withdrawn or

modified by other countries $220 million

Compensatory concessions to

the U.S. $200 million

Concessions witlulrawTi or

modified by the U.S. $85 million

Compensatory concessions by

the U.S. $.30 million

Further details concerning the agreements con-
cluded at Geneva are contained in a publication
entitled General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade:
Analysis of United States Negotiations, which has
been issued in two volumes. Volume I (Depart-
ment of State publication 7349, price $1.25) de-
scribes the agreements with the EEC and the
reciprocal agreements for new concessions. Vol-
ume II (Department of State publication 7350,
price 35 cents) describes the compensatory negoti-
ations. These publications may be purchased
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Gov-
ernment Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Designations

Richard D. Kearney as Deputy Legal Adviser, effective
March 18. (For biographic details, see Department of
State press release 157 dated JIarch 9.)

April 2, 1962

565

Appointments

J. Murray Luck as science attach^ at Bern, Switzer-
land, effective March 19. (For biographic details, see
Department of State press release 173 dated Alareh 15.)

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Amendment to article VI.A.3 of the Statute of the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency (TIAS 3873). Done
at Vienna October 4, 1961.^
Ratification advised by the Senate: March 13, 1962.

Automotive Traffic

Convention concerning customs facilities for touring.
Done at New Yorlj June 4, 19.j4. Entered into force
September 11, 1957. TIAS 3879.
Extension to: British Guiana, February 5, 1962.

Customs convention on temporary importation of private
road vehicles. Done at New York June 4, 19.54. En-
tered into force December 15, 1957. TIAS 3943.
Extension to: British Guiana, February 5, 1962.

Fisheries

Declaration of understanding regarding the international
convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries of
February 8, 1949 (TIAS 2089). Done at Washington
April 24, 1961.'

Ratified by the President of the United States: Febru-
ary 9, 1962.
Acceptatice deposited: United States, February 9, 1962.

Narcotics

Convention relating to the suppression of the abuse of
opium and other drugs. Signed at The Hague Janu-
ary 23, 1912. Entered into force December 31, 1914;
for the United States February 11, 1915. 38 Stat. 1912.
Assumed applicable ohliyations and responsibilities of
the United Kingdom : Nigeria, June 20, 1901.

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention with six an-
nexes. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered
into force January 1, 1960; for the United States
October 23, 1901. TIAS 4892.
Accession deposited: Mali, February 26, 1962.

Trade and Commerce

Aehnowlcdf/ed applicable rights and obligations of the
United Kingdom: Tanganyika, January 18, 1962, with
respect to tlic following :

Annecy protocol of terms of accession to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Annecy

' Not in force.
566

October 10, 1049. Entered into force for the United

States October 10, 1949. TIAS 2100.
Fourth protocol of rectifications to the General Agreement

on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva April 3, 1950.

Entered into force September 24. 19.52. TIAS 2747.
Fifth protocol of rectifications to the General Agreement

on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Torquay December 16,

1950. Entered into force June 30, 1953. TIAS 2764.
Torquay protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and

Trade and schedules of tariff concessions annexed

thereto. Done at Torquay April 21, 1951. Entered into

force June 6, 1951. TIAS 2420.
First protocol of rectifications and modifications to texts

of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and

Trade. Done at Geneva October 27, 1951. Entered into

force October 21, 19.53. TIAS 2885.
Second protocol of rectifications aud modifications to texts

of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and

Trade. Done at Geneva November 8, 1952. Entered

into force February 2. 19.59. TIAS 4250.
Third protocol of rectifications and modifications to texts

of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and

Trade. Done at Geneva October 24, 1953. Entered

into force February 2, 1959. TIAS 4197.

War

Geneva convention relative to treatment of prisoners of

war;
Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of

wounded and sick in armed forces in the field ;
Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of
wounded, sick, and shipwrecked members of armed
forces at sea ;
Geneva convention relative to protection of civilian per-
sons in time of war.

Dated at Geneva August 12, 1949. Entered into force
October 21, 19,50; for the United States February 2,
1956. TIAS 3364, 3362, 3363, and 3365, respectively.
Notifications received that they consider themselves
bound: Dahome.v, January 9, 1062 ; Ivory Coast, De-
cember 30, 1961 ; Togo, January 11, 1962.

Weather

Resolution by the Third Congress of the World Meteoro-
logical Organization amending article 10(a)(2) of the
convention of the World Meteorological Organization
signed October 11, 1947 (TIAS 2052). Adopted at
Geneva April 1-28. 1959.'
Approval advised by the Senate: March 13, 1962.

BILATERAL

Chile

Agreement further amending the agreement of March
31, 105.5, as amended (TIAS 3235 and 4112), for fi-
nancing certain educational programs. Effected by
exchange of notes at Santiago November 17, I'.Mll, aud
February 8, 1962. Entered into force February 8, 1962.

Korea

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of
10.54, as amended (08 Stat. 4.55; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709),
with exchange of notes. Signed at Seoul March 2. 1002.
Entered into force March 2, 1062.

Panama

Agreement relating to investment guaranties against in-
convertibility and losses due to expropriation aud war
autborizetl by section 413(b)(4) of the Mutual Se-
curity Act of 19.54, as amended (08 Stat. 847 ; 22 l.'.S.C.
1033). Effected by exchange of notes at Washington
January 23, 1961.
Entered into force: March 8, 1962.

Department of Sfafe Bulletin

April 2, 1962 I n d

Africa. The Challenge of Africa to the Youth of

Ainerii-ii (Williams) ^'-^

Agriculture. Report on Foot and Mouth Disease

Transmitted to Argentina 543

American Republics

FuiniUng the fledges of the Alliance for Progress

( Kennedy ) 539

Pan American Day and Pan American Week, 1962

(text of proclamation) 542

Argentina. Report on Foot and Mouth Disease

Transmitted to Argentina 543

Australia. President Discusses Trade Matters
Willi Australian Deputy Premier (text of joint
statement) 549

Cameroon. President Ahmadou Ahidjo of Came-

roim Visits U.S. (text of joint communique) . . 543

Chile. U.S. and Chile Reach Agreement on Financ-
ing of Development Plan (text of joint com-
munique) 538

Congres.s, The. Foreign Economic and Military As-
sistance Program for Fiscal Year 19G3 (Ken-
nedy) 550

Cuba. U.N. General Assembly Rejects Cuban
Charges Against United States (Plimpton,
Stevenson) 553

Department and Foreign Service

Appointments (Luck) 566

Designations (Kearney) 565

Disarmament. U.S. Outlines Initial Proposals of
Program for General and Complete Disarmament
(Rusk, principal advisers to delegation) . . . 531

Economic Affairs

President Discu.sses Trade Matters With Australian

Deputy Premier (text of joint statement) . . . 549

U.S. Exchanges Tariff Concessions With GATT Con-
tracting Parties 561

Educational and Cultural Affairs. The Challenge

of Africa to the Youth of America (Williams) . 544

Foreign Aid

Foreign Economic and Military Assistance Program

for Fiscal Year 1963 (Kennedy) 550

Fulfilling the Pledges of the Alliance for Progress

(Kennedy) 539

U.S. and Chile Reach Agreement on Financing of

Development Plan (text of joint communique) . 538

International Organizations and Conferences

U.S. Exchanges Tariff Concessions With GATT Con-
tracting Parties 561

U.S. Outlines Initial Proposals of Program for Gen-
eral and Complete Disarmament (Rusk, principal
advisers to delegation) 531

Mexico. U.S., Mexico Agree To Use Scientists To

Study Salinity Problem 542

Military Affairs. Foreign Economic and Military
Assistance Program for Fiscal Year 1963
(Kennedy) 5.50

Presidential Documents

Foreign Economic and Military Assistance Program

for Fiscal Year 19C3 550

Fulfilling the Pledges of the Alliance for Progress . 539
Pan American Day and Pan American Week, 1962 . 542
President Ahmadou Ahidjo of Cameroon Visits

U.S 543

President Discusses Trade Matters With Aus-
tralian Deputy Premier 549

U.S. Presents Proposals to U.S.S.R. for Coopera-
tion in Space Exploration 536

ex

Vol. XLVI, No. 1188

Public Affairs. Foreign Policy Briefings for Visi-
tors to Washington Begin at Department . . . 549

Science

Luck appointed science attach^, Bern 566

Report on Foot and Mouth Disease Transudtted to

Argentina 543

U.S. Presents Proposals to U.S.S.R. for Coopera-
tion in Space Exploration (Kennedy) .... 536

Switzerland. Luck appointed science attach6 . . 566

Treaty Information. Current Actions 566

U.S.S.R. U.S. Presents Proposals to U.S.S.R. for

Cooperation in Space Exploration (Kennedy) . . 536

United Nations. U.N. General Assembly Rejects
Cuban Charges Against United States (Plimpton,

Stevenson) 553

Name Index

Ahidjo, Ahmadou 543

Kearney, Richard D 565

Kennedy, President 536,539,542,543,549,550

Luck, J. Murray 566

McEwen, John 549

Plimpton, Francis T. P 559

Rusk, Secretary 531

Stevenson, Adlai E 553

Williams, G. Mennen 544

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: March 12 18

Press releases may be obtained from the Ofl5ce of
News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Releases appearing in this issue of the Bulletin
which were issued prior to March 12 are Nos. 155,
156, and 158 of March 9.

No. Date Subject

tl60 3/12 Cleveland: "The Practical Side of

Peacekeeping."
161 3/12 Foreign policy briefings for public.
*162 3/12 U.S. participation in international con-
ferences.
*163 3/12 Salute to new nations of Africa.
tl64 3/13 Ball : House Committee on Ways and

Means.
*165 3/13 Program for visit of President of

Cameroon.
*166 3/14 Ambassador Williams : meeting of U.S.

citizens at San Salvador.
tl67 3/14 Trezise: Fresno Chamber of Com-
merce, Fresno, Calif.
tl68 3/14 White nominated to GAS Special Con-
sultative Committee on Security (re-
write).
Ball : reply to U.N. Secretary-General
on dissemination of nuclear weapons.
Rostow : "American Strategy on the

World Scene."
Trezise: "U.S. International Trade

Policies."
Rusk : statement before 18-nation Dis-
armament Committee.
Luck appointed science attach^ at Bern
(biographic details).
*174 3/16 Program for visit of President of Togo.
*175 3/16 Cultural exchange (Europe, Middle
East).

tl69

3/14

tl70

3/15

tl71

3/15

172

3/17

*173

3/15

*Not printed.

tHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin.

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Participation of the United States Government

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INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES

July 1, 1959-June 30, 1960

Tliis volume is designed to serve as a reference guide to the
official participation of the U.S. Government in multilateral inter-
national conferences and meetings of international organizations
during the period July 1, 1959-June 30, 19G0. The United States
participated officially in 352 international conferences and
meetings during the 12-month period covered.

In addition to a complete list, the voliunc presents detailed data
on many of the conferences, including the composition of the
U.S. delegation, principal officers, participation by other countries
and organizations, and brief statements of the actions taken.

Publication 7043

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Vol. XLVI, No. 1189

April 9, 1962

MCIAL

EKLY RECORD

U.S. URGES SOVIET UNION TO JOIN IN ENDING

NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS • Statement by Secre-
tary Rusk 571

MAJOR ASPECTS OF THE TRADE EXPANSION ACT

• Statement by Acting Secretary Ball 597

MEETING THE SOVIET ECONOMIC CHALLENGE •

by Acting Assistant Secretary Trezise 592

THE UNITED NATIONS DECADE OF DEVELOPMENT

An Adventure in Human Development • fay Ambassador

Stevenson 577

The Practical Side of Peacekeeping • by Assistant Secretary

Cleveland ooS

Extending Law Into Outer Space • by Deputy Assistant Sec-
retary Gardner 5oO

ITED STATES
^EIGN POLICY

For index see inside back cover

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Vol. XLVI, No. 1189 • Publication 7360
April 9, 1962

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents

U.S. Government Printing Office

Washington 26. D.O.

Price:

62 Issues, domestic $8.60, torelcn $12.26

Single copy, 26 cents

Use of funds tor prlntlnB of this iiubllca-
tlon approved by the Director of tlio Bureau
of the Budget (January 19, 1901).

Note: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and Items contained heroin may
be reprinted. Citation of the Dei'Ahtment
or State Bulletin as the source will he
appreciated. The Bulletin Is Indexed lu the
Readers' Oulde to Periodical Literature.

The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the
Office of Public Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public
and interested agencies of the
Government with information on
developments in the field of foreign
relations and on the work of the
Department of State and the Foreign
Service. The BULLETJy includes se-
lected press releases on foreign policy,
issued by the White House and the
Department, and statements and ad-
dresses made by the President and by
t/ie Secretary of State and other
officers of the Department, as tcell as
specuil articles on various phases of
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tion is included concerning treaties
and international agreements to
which the United States is or may
become a party and treaties of gen-
eral international interest.

Publications of the Departnwnt,
United Nations documents, and legis-
lative material in the field of inter-
national relations arc listed currently.

U.S. Urges Soviet Union To Join in Ending
Nuclear Weapon Tests

Statement ty Secretary Rusk ^

I have asked for the floor this morning to com-
ment on the interim report to which the chairman
has just alluded. I do so because of the expressed
wishes of a considerable nimiber of foreign minis-
ters to turn their attention urgently to this prob-
lem of the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests
before the foreign ministers begin to return to
their respective capitals.

Let me say that the United States deeply regrets,
in the words of the brief interim report, that it
is not possible to report progress toward a treaty
for the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests,
because the United States regards and will con-
tinue to regard a safeguarded end to nuclear test-
ing as a major objective of its foreign policy. It
also regards this as a major problem for considera-
tion by this conference.

The reason is obvious. The moratorium which
for almost 3 years has halted nuclear weapon tests
was wrecked by the sudden resumption of testing
by the Soviet Union last September.^ The Presi-
dent of the United States has amiounced that the
United States wiU resume testing in the atmos-
phere late in April, if by that time a safeguarded
test ban treaty has not been signed. The reasons
for tlais decision were set forth in his speech of
March 2,^ which we are asking be circulated as a
document of this conference. The time is short,
and this conference will understandably wish to

' Made before the 18-nation Disarmament Committee at
Geneva on Mar. 23 (press release 186 dated Mar. 24).
For text of a statement made by Secretary Rusk before
the Committee on Mar. 15, see Bulletin of Apr. 2, 1962,
p. .531.

' For background, see ihid., Sept. IS, 1961, p. 475.

' Ibid., Mar. 19, 1962, p. 443.

be sure that every possible effort is made to pre-
vent a further intensification of the race to pro-
duce more and more deadly weapons of mass
destruction.

I have asked for the floor this morning to com-
ment on the interim report which the conference
subcommittee on nuclear weapons testing has
made to the conference. Unfortunately that in-
terim report indicates that no progress has been
made toward the conclusion of an effective treaty
to prohibit nuclear weapon tests. The Soviet
Union appears to be adamantly opposed to any
international system of detection and verification
which could disclose clandestine testing and thus
serve to place an obstacle in the way of a potential
violator of a test ban treaty.

We hope we have not yet heard the last word
of the Soviet Union on this matter, though I must
confess that we see little ground for optimism at
the moment.

Because of the United States Government's
great desire to put an end to all tests of nuclear
weapons, we are willing to sign a safeguarded
treaty, with effective international controls, even
though the Soviet Union conducted over 40 tests
last fall. However, we are willing to ignore these
tests only if, in return, we can be assured that test-
ing will actually be halted. We will not again
make our security subject to an unenforcible and
uncontrolled moratorium, whether this be in the
form of a verbal pledge or a pseudotreaty such
as the U.S.S.R. proposed on November 28, 1961.*

"Wliat we need above all in this field is confidence
and not fear, a basis for trust and not for sus-

* For background, see Hid., Jan. 8, 1962, p. 63.

April 9, 7962

571

picion. To get this is the major purpose of our
insistence on efTective international arrangements
to insure tliat nuclear weapon tests, once outlawed,
do not, in fact, ever occur again.

You will remember that the atmosphere for
agreements on disarmament questions was not too
favorable in 1958, especially after the collapse of
lengthy negotiations in London during much of
1957.

Accordingly, in the searcli for a more promising
approach to the issue of a nuclear test ban, the
United States, the United Kingdom, and the
Soviet Union decided to tiy to resolve the tech-
nical questions first before proceeding to a consid-
eration of political questions. This path led to a
conference in Geneva in July and August 1958
among the scientists of eight countries, i.e. of the
three then existing nuclear powers plus France,
Canada, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Eumania.

On August 21, 1958, these experts imanimously
agreed on the details of a control system which
would be teclmically adequate to monitor a treaty
ending all tests of nuclear weapons.^ Before
September 1, 1958, the recommendations of the
scientists had been accepted in toto by the Govern-
ments of the United States, the United Kingdom,
and the Soviet Union. Essentially these same
technical provisions form the basis of the draft test
ban treaty presented by the United States and
United Kingdom on April 18, 1961.^

Technical Aspects of Controlling Test Ban

I believe it would be helpful to review some of
the technical aspects of controlling a test ban.

The words "detection" and "identification" are
the key to an understanding of the technical as-
pects of verification. A great many methods have
been devised by scientists to record the innumera-
ble happenings of a geopliysical nature which take
place around us. Earthquakes are registered by
seismographs; hydroacoustic apparatus records
sounds in the oceans.

I liave mentioned these two particular types of
instruments because they, along with various other
devices, also happen to be capable of registering
signals which are emitted by nuclear detonations.

" For background and text of report, see ihid., Sept. 22,
la'-jS, p. 452.
• For text, see ibid., June 5, 1961, p. 870.

"Wliat we call detection is merely the capturing of
these diverse signals.

Detection, however, is only half of the story ; in
fact, it is rather less than half. The primary con-
cern is to Icnow exactly what has been recorded
or detected. For example, the signal received on a
seismograph from an underground nuclear explo-
sion looks like the signals received on a seismo-
graph from many types of earthquakes. Signals
which may come from a small nuclear detonation
in the atmosphere may be difficult to detect. In
each case the overwhelming difficulty confronting
any control system monitoring a nuclear test ban
is how to differentiate among the various record-
ings or detected signals, how to tell which is a
natural phenomenon and which is a nuclear
explosion.

This was exactly the issue that faced the scien-
tists in Geneva in mid-1958. It is the very same
issue that faces us on control today. The answer
of the scientists was tliat, where doubt existed, the
only way to clear up the mystery was to utilize
some form of on-site inspection. This is still the
only answer available to us.

In regard to underground tests, except for quite
large ones like the Soviet blast of February 2,
1962, the technical situation is unchallenged by
anybody and was even readily admitted by the
Soviet Govei'nment on November 28 last when it
put forward its new test ban scheme based on
existing monitoring systems. For these under-
ground events which are detected but which can-
not be identified by expert interpretation of the
seismic recording, the only way to determine what
has happened is to send an investigating team to
the spot. The events could be earthquakes or
secret nuclear tests. And there could be some
hundreds of such events per year in the United
States and the Soviet Union.

There is no scientific method not involving in-
spection that can identify positively a seismic
event as a nuclear explosion. If our Soviet col-
leagues have reason to believe otherwise, they
should come forward with their new scientific
evidence.

This technical situation provides a further im-
portant reason for including the Soviet Union in
the woi-ldwide control-post network. The spacing
between the control posts in the Soviet Union
should be exactly the same as it is in the rest of
the world. In order to have the best chance to

572

Department of State Bulletin

eliminate a seismic event from suspicion without
conducting an inspection, that is, by means of the
interpretation of the seismic recording itself by
exi:)erts, it is essential to have readings from con-
trol posts on a global basis, including those within
the United States and the U.S.S.R. Without in-
struments in the U.S.S.R. — one-sixth of the land-
mass of the globe — many more seismic events in
that country become suspicious.

In connection with atmospheric tests, the con-
clusive means for identifying the true nature of
a detected event is to acquire a sample of the air
near that event. If the event was manmade tliis
will show up during a chemical analysis of the
air sample. For medium and large atmospheric
nuclear detonations, the radioactive debris will
become part of air masses that are certain to move
beyond the boundaries of the country concerned.
This method is not reliable, however, for small
atmospheric tests.

In recognition of this the 1958 scientists rec-
ommended the installation of air-sampling equip-
ment at every control post. Even then they
anticipated that in certain instances some question
of identification would still remain, and for this
they proposed the use of special aircraft flights
conducted over the territory of a specific country
to capture air samj^les. Natui'ally, to the extent
that control posts within a country did not exist
where radioactive air sampling could take place,
there would be just that much greater need of
special air-sampling flights.

Although American scientists have for the past
several years been actively seeking new methods of
detection and, even more, of identification of pos-
sible nuclear explosions, and although there are
some promising avenues of investigation which
may be proven in the next few years, the fact is
that very little has been discovered up to date to
justify any significant modification of the conclu-
sions and recommendations of the Geneva scien-
tists of 1958. Soviet scientists essentially agreed
with this at our last joint meeting with them on
a test ban during May 1960 in Geneva. There-
fore, when we contemplate the cessation of nuclear
weapon tests by international agreement, we must
still look to international control arrangements
similar to those proposed in 1958 to give the world
security against violations. But the faster we
have tried to move toward the Soviets in these
matters, the faster they seem to move away from
their earlier positions.

Tlie draft treaty which the United States and
the United Kingdom proposed in April 1961 re-
flected the recommendations of the 1958 experts.
It also incorporated into its terms a large number
of political and organizational arrangements for
the test ban control organization on which the
three powers had already come to agreement at the
test ban conference or which went far toward
meeting previous Soviet demands. Eastern and
Western nations were to have equal numbere of
seats on the Control Commission, which also had
places for nonalined nations, and there were de-
tailed provisions for an equitable division by na-
tionality of the international statf, as the U.S.S.R.
had sought. The fact that many of the adminis-
trative and organizational provisions for the fu-
ture International Disarmament Organization, as
set forth in the Soviet document tabled here on
March 15, are similar to the provisions of the
Anglo-American draft test ban treaty of last year
demonstrates that the Soviet Union can have no
serious objection to large portions of our proposal.

No Basis for Fear of Espionage

Indeed, when all is said and done, the funda-
mental Soviet complaint about the test ban con-
trol system to which it seemed to agree in 1958,
1959, and 1960, and which its own scientists had
helped to devise, is that it would facilitate West-
ern espionage against the Soviet Union. But the
facts are otherwise. The proposed system would
not have any potential for any espionage which
would be meaningful in terms of present-day
military requirements.

The truth is that under the United States-
United Kingdom draft treaty control posts in the
U.S.S.R. would be immobile units with fixed
boundaries. No site could be chosen for a control
post in the U.S.S.R. without the specific consent
of the Soviet Government. No foreign personnel
on the staff of any control post would have any
official need to leave the boundaries of the post
(except when entering and leaving Soviet terri-
tory), and it would be up to the Soviet authori-
ties to decide whether such personnel should be
permitted to leave the post. Within the post one-
third of the technical staff and all of the auxiliary
staff would be Soviet nationals, nominated by the
Soviet Government. In these circumstances surely
nothing taking place at the post could remain
unknown to the Soviet Government.

April 9, 7962

573

The situation concerning on-site inspection
teams would be equally devoid of espionage possi-
bilities. The area to be inspected would be prede-
termined on the basis of seismographic recordings.
There would be no random selection of the geo-
graphic site. To get to the site of the inspection
the teams would have to use transport furnished
by the Soviet Government. They could only carry
specified equipment related to their immediate job.
Although there would not be any Soviet national
members of the inspection team, half of the team
would be nationals of nonalined countries and the
Soviet Government would be invited to assign as
many Soviet observers as it wished to verify the
activities of the inspection team.

I should also sti-ess that the size of the inspec-
table area would, in any event, be limited to the
territory within a radius of about 8 or, in some
cases, 13 kilometers from the point, the so-called
probable epicenter, where the unidentified seismic
event was presumed to have taken place. Tliis
radius would involve an inspectable area of 200 or,
in some cases, 500 square kilometers. The Soviet
Union has territory of over 21 million square kilo-
meters. Therefore it can readily be seen that, even
if there were 20 inspections per year in the
U.S.S.R. and even if each of these inspections
operated within a 500-square-kilometer area, less
than one-twentieth of 1 percent of Soviet territory,
i.e. less than one part in 2,000, could ever be sub-
ject to inspection in any one year.

Finally, no espionage would be feasible on the
occasional special air-sampling flights which
might take place over Soviet territory. The plane
and its crew would be Soviet, and Soviet Govern-
ment observers could be on board. The only
foreigners would be two staff technicians from the
control organization who would manage the equip-
ment taking the air samples and who would
insure that the plane actually flew along the route
previously prescribed.

I have recounted these matters in some detail
because it is easy to make generalized charges over
and over again about the dangers of espionage in
a test ban control system.

It takes careful explanation to show why such
charges are completely gi'oundless, even though
it stands to reason that the U.S.S.R., which was
just as sensitive about espionage in 1958 as in 1961,
would never have accepted such a control system in
principle in 1958 if it had then believed that the

system could have had the slightest real espionage
danger for the Soviet Union.

It should be clear now that the explanation for
Soviet behavior on the issue of a test ban must
be sought elsewhere. There is no rational basis
for Soviet concern about misuse of the control
system for espionage purposes. There is no scien-
tific basis for the Soviet desire to abandon the
still indispensable control system which was rec-
ommended by the scientists in 1958 and approved
by the governments of the then-existing nuclear
powers. There is no political basis for any of us
to believe that a test ban is any less urgent now
than it was in 1958 or that the benefits which it
would bring in improving the international cli-
mate would be any less.

U.S.S.R. Urged To Review Position

My Government, therefore, is at a loss to under-
stand the Soviet position unless it be that the
U.S.S.R. has decided that it is still overwhelm-
ingly important for it to be free to continue its
nuclear weapon tests. This was what the Sovnet
Government said last September, when it referred
to the tense international situation as a justifica-
tion for its test resmnption, and it may be that
the U.S.S.R. feels a military need for another test
series. If this is the case, then it is true that the
easiest way for the Soviet Union to remain im-
hampered by a test ban treaty is to offer one which
contains no provisions whatsoever for effective
control and which the United States and United
Kingdom could accept only at grave risk to their
national security and to that of the free world.

I cannot urge the Soviet Government too
strongly to review its position and to return to the
previously agreed basis of negotiation, namely, the
experts' recommendation of 1958. We ask the
Soviet Union to cease its attempts to have the
international community distort sound verification
procedures to accommodate one state which is
obsessed by a passion for secrecy. We call upon
the Soviet Union to enter into genuine negotia-
tions in the three-nation subcommittee set up by
this Committee to consider the test ban problem.

There is today an interim report of this sub-
committee. But, unfoi'tunately, there are no
grounds for encouragement. I sliould like to com-
ment briefly on the events of the past few weeks
which have led us to this point.

574

Department of Sfafe Bulletin

Recent U.S. Proposals To Achieve Test Ban

The President of the United States on March
2 stated in referring to our conference here that :

. . . we shall, in association witli the United Kingdom,
present once again our proposals for a separate compre-
hensive treaty — with appropriate arrangements for detec-
tion and verification — to halt permanently the testing of
all nuclear weapons, in every environment : in the air,
in outer space, under ground, or under water. New mod-
ifications will also be offered in the light of new experi-
ence.

In fulfillment of this pledge the United States
presented to the Soviet Union, first in an informal
meeting on March 15 and this week in the sub-
committee, new proposals of the kind indicated.
We have indicated clearly in both formal and in-
formal discussions that the United States is pre-
pared to grant a point to which the Soviet Union
has apparently attached great importance, namely,
to drop the 4.75-degree threshold and to make the
treaty from the outset complete in its coverage — •
banning from the beginning all tests in the at-
mosphere, outer space, undergi-oimd, and in the
oceans. We will do this without increasing the
number of inspections or the number of control
posts in the Soviet Union. We would seek, by
conunon agreement, to allocate the quota of inspec-
tions in such a way that most would be conducted
in a few areas of high seismicity and only a few
would be allowable in a large region in the heart
of the Soviet Union, where there are normally
few seismic noises which would require inves-
tigation.

These moves have been made possible by in-
creased experience and increased scientific knowl-
edge. But our experience has also shown the need
for provisions for safeguarding other states
against the consequences of preparations for test-
ing. Tliis would consist, in large part, of periodic
declarations on the parts of heads of state that
there will be no preparations for testing, and
agreed rights to inspect a certain number of times
per year equal numbers of declared sites on each
side.

Experience has also shown the need for provi-
sions to shorten the time spent before the begin-
ning of the inspection process. This would pri-
marily be a question of the way the Preparatory
Commission functioned and agreement to cooper-
ate in speeding up, by all possible means, the
establislunent of detection facilities, including
temporary control posts.

April 9, 1962

The United States has made clear that it still
stands by its original treaty proposal of April 18,
1961, plus the amendments proposed in 1961, and
will sign that treaty. It has also made clear that
it is willing to negotiate along the lines I have
described to update the treaty if the Soviet Union
prefers.

The response of the Soviet Union thus far has
not given us any hope. The Soviet delegation has
told us that the U.S.S.E. will not accept a treaty
with or without the amendments we propose. We
are still confronted with the unmistakable re-
versal of the Soviet position which took place a
few months ago after the Soviet Union had for
4 years asserted its willingness to accept a con-
trolled test ban agreement and after 17 articles
and 2 important treaty annexes had been negoti-
ated. The roadblock to a cessation of tests is this
reversal of the Soviet attitude. The U.S.S.R. was
prepared to accept controls before the recent test
series. Now, after 40 or more tests, it is not ready
to do so. It is difficult for us to understand the
reason.

The problem cannot really be espionage. For
over 2 years in the test ban conference, as I have
outlined in detail, we negotiated arrangements
which would insure that the modest amount of
control and inspection contemplated could not be
misused for espionage purposes.

The problem also cannot be that the verification
system is overly burdensome. As I have said, the
system which we worked out was directly based
on the estimate of the minimum technical require-
ments which was the product of an agreed analysis
by Soviet and Western scientists. The technical
basis for this system has never yet been challenged
on scientific grounds by the Soviet Union.

The U.S.S.R. now seems to be telling us that
under existing circumstances the idea of interna-
tional verification is wholly unacceptable in any
form whatsoever. It seems to be telling us that
verification is not even necessary — that it is an in-
sult to request it, even though this is a measure of
disarmament. Unnecessaiy? Merely necessary
to end nuclear testing. It seems to be telling us
that there can be no impartial investigation, even
when there has been a signal recorded from within
the Soviet Union and when it is impossible, with-
out such an investigation, to ascertain whether the
cause of the signal was a phenomenon of nature
or a manmade nuclear explosion.

575

We recognize that there are risks in any dis-
armament measure because no control system can
give 100 percent certainty. But a study of our
draft treaty with our proposed modifications will
indicate that the United States and United King-
dom have been willing to accept a very considera-
ble degree of risk. However, we cannot move to a
treaty which is based on no adequate controls at
all but solely on pure faith. We do not ask the
Soviet Union to trust the word of other nations,
and other nations cannot be asked to trust the
Soviet Union's word on matters of such far-reach-
ing significance.

In President Kennedy's words of March 2, "We
know enough now about broken negotiations,
secret preparations, and the advantages gained
from a long test series never to offer again an
uninspected moratorium." The same could
equally be said about an unverified treaty obliga-
tion such as the U.S.S.R. is now proposing. We
do not intend to be caught again as we were in the
autumn of 1961, and there is no reason why we
should have to be caught again by a unilateral
Soviet decision to resume nuclear weapon tests.
This is a risk to national and international security
which the United States cannot and will not take.
A test ban, or any disarmament measure, will be
acceptable to us only when it is accompanied by
adequate measures of verification.

International Verification Essential

In summary the essential element on which we
must insist is that there be an objective interna-
tional system for assuring tliat the ban against
testing is being complied with. This means that
there must be an international system for distin-
guishing between natural and artificial events.
The April 18 treaty provided for such a system.
Last week the U.S. and U.K. made some modifica-
tions of the proposed treaty in a way calculated
to meet Soviet objections. These proposed modi-
fications were rejected almost immediately by the
Soviets on the grounds that international verifica-
tion was not nccessai-y. This refusal to accept
any form of verification strikes very hard at our
efforts to guarantee the world against resumption
of nuclear tests. The key element in the U.S.
position is that there must be effective interna-
tional verification of the obligations imdertaken
in any sucli treaty.

Let there be no misunderstanding in tiiis Com-

mittee. A nuclear test ban agreement can be
signed in short order. There are no hidden diffi-
culties; there are no mysterious obstacles in the
way. No time-consuming negotiations need be re-
quired. The groundwork has all been laid. Only
one element is missing : Soviet willmgness to con-
clude an agreement.

The United States will consider any proposal
which offers effective international verification,
but the United States cannot settle for anything
less.

We urge the Soviet Union to reconsider its
attitude and join in putting an end to nuclear
weapon testing — a total end, a permanent end.

Foreign Policy Briefing Conference
To Be Held at Toledo, Ohio

Press release 184 dated March 23

Tlie Department of State, with the cooperation
of the Blade and the Toledo Council on World
Affairs, will hold its next regional foreign policj'
briefing conference at Toledo, Ohio, on April 24
and 25. Representatives of the press, radio and
television, nongovermnental organizations con-
cerned with foreign policy, and community leaders
from the States of Michigan and Ohio are being
invited to participate.

This will be the seventh of the series of regional
conferences which began in July 1961 at San
Francisco and Denver. The purpose of these re-
gional meetings is to provide opportunity for
discussion of international affairs between those
who inform the public on issues and the senior
officers of the executive branch who have respon-
sibility for dealing with them.

Among those officers of the Government partici-
pating in the conference will be Charles E. Boh-
len. Special Assistant to the Secretary of State;
Chester Bowles, the President's Special Represent-
ative and Adviser on African, Asian, and Latin
American Affairs; Harlan Cleveland, Assistant
Secretary of State for International Organization
Affairs; Robert J. Manning, Assistant Secretai-y
of State-designate for Public Affairs; George C.
]\rcG1ioe, Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs; J. Robert Schaetzel, Special Assistant to
the Under Secretary of Stute; aiul Thomas C.
Sorensen, Dejuity Director (Policy and Plans),
U.S. Information Agency.

576

Deparfmeni of Sfafe Bulletin

The United Nations Decade of Development

12TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
CALLED BY THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE UNITED NATIONS

Following are addresses made hefore the 12th
annual Conference of National Organizations at
Washington, D.C., on March 13 iy Adlai E. Ste-
venson, U.S. Representative to the United Nations,
and on March 12 by Harlan Cleveland, Assistant
Secretary of State for International Organization
Affairs, and Richard N. Gardner, Dejnity Assist-
ant Secretary for International Organization
Affairs.

ADDRESS BY AMBASSADOR STEVENSON

D.S./U.N. press release 3937 dated March 12

An Adventure in Human Development

"Wlaat a fine and liopeful note this conference
has struck in taking as its theme "A United Na-
tions Decade of Development" ! You hardly need
me to tell you in these 30 minutes what you have
been telling each other so well for the past 2 days —
that the United Nations today, after a year of
trial and testing, is feeling a new surge of hope.

All the concrete embodiments of that hope which
your speakers have laid before you — all tlie plans
and possibilities in the fields of disarmament, of
economic and social growth, of the growth of a
world community of peace and law — all these must
face the hard tests of diplomatic and political
reality. We cannot tell which will succumb and
which will prosper. But to the spirit that under-
lies them all — the spirit of daring and of faith
in the community of man — to that invincible spirit
I say "Amen !" And mine, I know, is but one in a
great chorus of "Amens" from all across this
nation.

A year ago, when I had only recently taken up
my duties at the United Nations, I could scarcely

have spoken to you in this vein. We faced trials
and dark prospects at the U.N. whose outcome no
man dared to predict, least of all myself. Indeed,
in the staggering loss of Dag Hammarskjold we
were to face a trial severer than any we had
guessed.

But today we can see that the United Nations has
overcome the worst of that trial, and in doing so
the great majority of its members have shown a
serene solidarity and a deep sense of common
purpose. Whatever perils may lie hidden in the
future, this dangerous voyage at least has been
passed in safety. Surely this is reason enough to
be thankful and confident in the future!

For these thoughts there is a happy parallel in
the mood of our own nation. Never have Ameri-
cans shown more confidence and eagerness. I be-
lieve that mood was not so much created as it was
revealed by the astonishing drama that began at
Cape Canaveral 3 weeks ago. And because that
drama and that revelation seem to me to have a
great significance, I am going to ask you to con-
sider it with me.

Significance of Colonel Glenn's Space Flight

Since that memorable morning the Nation has
had its eyes on a quiet, unassuming marine —
who also happens to be the fii-st American to ride
in outer space and see four sunsets in a single
day. Colonel Glenn and his exploit have too
many different meanings for us and for our na-
tional life for tumultuous rejoicings and ticker-
tape parades to be the sum of our response. He
has jolted us into a new awareness of confidence
and hope.

I believe profoundly that confidence and hope
are the natural, historical expression of our great

ApnV 9, J 962

577

President Greets American Association for the United Nations

Message From President Kennedy

White House press release dated March 13

Mabch 12, 1962

The Twelfth Annual Conference of National Organizations called by the American Association for the
United Nations comes as a propitious reminder of the range and depth of this country's support of the
United Nations.

Both by its promise and by its actions, the U.N. has Justified that support over the years.

The Sixteenth Session of the General Assembly ended last month with a matchless record of solid
accomplishments.

It rejected emphatically a powerful attack against the integrity of the Secretariat and went on to a
series of positive steps which are admirably srmimarized in the theme of your conference, "The U.N. Decade
of Development."

In the course of its work the Sixteenth General Assembly adopted a set of guiding principles and agreed
to the new approach to general and complete disarmament which will get under way in Geneva on Wednesday
[March 14]. It extended the Charter of the United Nations to outer space and established a new Committee
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space which begins Its work next week. It adopted a resolution calling for
an expanded and intensified program for economic and social progress in the less developed world in the
decade ahead.

We can be proud of our Initiatives and of the U.N. response in those three critical areas of disarmament,
outer space, and rapid modernization of the emerging nations. If real progress can be made in these three
areas, the present decade can be the most exciting and rewarding time in history.

To sustain its present initiative as a force for peace and human progress the U.N., of course, must regain
a sound and orderly financial position. The three-point financial plan approved by the General Assembly is
the only proposal put forth at the U.N. or elsewhere which will meet the requirements and is the only one
which has the approval of the General Assembly. The U.N. bond issue,^ which is the key part of the financing
plan, has become the symbol and substance of support of the United Nations by its members.

Last week Finland and Norway purchased the first of the U.N. bonds. A dozen more nations will follow
shortly. The world is now watching to see whether the United States will continue to play its full part in
helping the United Nations to make this a decade in which the world moves dramatically toward the peaceful
and progressive world foreseen in the Charter.

I look forward to meeting with your leaders at the White House tomorrow, and I welcome the evidence
offered by your organizations that bipartisan support for the U.N. in its present financial crisis is stronger
than ever. Please accept my best wishes for a most productive conference.

John F. Kennedy

Mr. Herman W. Steinkraus, President,
American Association for the United Nations,
12th Anntial Conference of National Organizations,
c/o Statler Hotel,
Washington, D.C.

' For background, see Bulletin of Feb. 26, 1962, p. 311.

nation's stance in world affairs. The belief that a
new kind of society — without privilege and op-
pression—could be built on earth inspired the
Founding Fathers. Since their day all our great-
est leaders have expressed in some way their con-
fidence that something special and something new
could be achieved in and by America — a society
without slavery, a society without poverty and
insecurity, a society which might play its part
in leading the nations to a world without war, a
wealthy and bountiful community able to extend

to all mankind its own principle of "the general
welfare."

These have been great dreams, and they have
fostered great initiatives. Yet we have not always
lived by our best dreams. Some of us, on the con-
trarj', have talked as if mankind were at the
mercy of the drift of history, powerless to influence
his fate, moving like a sleepwalker to .^omc apoc-
alyptic atomic doom — a mood as far removed from
the earlier youth and optimism of our Republic as
is St. Paul from Jeremiah.

578

Department of Sfafe Bulletin

Some of us — alas ! among the most vocal — have
yielded to still another nightmare, one in which
we are always doing badly, while our adversaries
march from one triumph to the next. From this
bad dream come the cries of extreme rightists
about an ever-encroaching Communist conspiracy
wliich, if we were to believe them, has not made
a single error in 40 years.

This picture excludes a whole universe of facts :
the fact of unrest in Eastern Europe, the fact of
waning Communist belief in Western Europe, the
fact of ideological differences between Moscow
and Peiping. It excludes a whole series of recent
Soviet setbacks in the Congo and elsewhere in
Africa — and at the United Nations. It excludes
the failure of Soviet state capitalism to compete
in the production of consumer goods or to work
at all in agriculture.

I suggest that, in lashing out at a vast, over-
whelming, irresistible Communist "takeover,"
the rightists are not only overselling communism.
Worse, they are underselling America — and un-
derselling as well the stubborn will to be free
which is communism's worst obstacle in every
continent.

Let us, therefore, be grateful for that image
of Friendship 7, carrying round the earth one
of the most buoyant and manly personalities and
one of the clearest, most light-of-day minds ever
"orbited" into the national consciousness. For it
has already begun to replace some of the images
of unreasoning fear to which we have been treated
recently. Let it correct, too, the more widespread
miasma of doubt about the ability of Americans
in particular, and men in general, to master the
incredible forces of nature which human intelli-
gence has imlocked in our time.

To me there is something superbly symbolic in
the fact that an astronaut, sent up as assistant
to a series of computers, found that he worked
more accurately and more intelligently than they.
Inside the capsule man is still in charge. Let
that be called Glenn's Law !

Let us now, with new courage and zest, apply
Glenn's Law to this little capsule of the world,
spinning through space. Let us do so in the con-
sciousness that America is a great and inventive
society, that its occasional tendency to torpor is an
essentially uncharacteristic response to the enor-
mous challenges of the contemporary universe.

Communism, like outer space, may be hostile.
But it can be lived with and controlled by the same

patience, skill, hard work, and generous resources
that went into Project Mercury. Moreover, like
space, it can also bo seen as a creative challenge.
Would we not have slumbered under the weight of
our gimmicks and gadgetry if the cold challenge
of outdoing and outthinking the Conamunist order
had not stiffened our backs and our minds?

So, we may conclude, this competitive nation
can still compete and even relish the competition.
Moreover, I believe Colonel Glenn's space journey
points to the kind of victory for which we hope to
strive.

A New Fellowship for Peace

I am sure you have heard talk and criticism re-
cently of the Government pursuing a "no win"
policy. Now I am not sure that I altogether un-
derstand what the critics have in mind. Do they
mean that the administration is unready to launch
a nuclear war to speed the liberation of countries
under Communist rule? Or do they mean the
United States should send Marines to take over
Cuba — and throw away the confidence of most of
Latin America? I do not know. The critics do
not spell out what they want, and so we do not
know whether they accept the basic facts of our
age — that in a nuclear war there would be not only
"no win" but no winners.

From these anxious years our people have been
slowly learning a new truth, and it is this : Democ-
racy has no need of enemies or of hatred, and the
victories it cherishes most are the victories of
peace in which no one suffers defeat and no one
nourishes dreams of vengeance in a future war.

Our orbital flight is such a victory. In it all
men are winners. It has elicited from Mr.
Khrushchev the immediate suggestion that Amer-
ica and Russia should cooperate closely in the fur-
ther exploration of outer space.^ As you know, the
United States has been trying for years to promote
an international approach by which these vast new
oceans of space would not have to witness the tribal
conflicts of earthbound creatures or be sullied by
engines of war. Now with our orbital flight we
have more chips on the bargaining table with
which to pursue those imiversal goals.

Next Monday [March 19] the Outer Space Com-
mittee of the United Nations will meet at last.
The 2-year Soviet boycott is over. The Commit-

' For background, see Bulletin of Mar. 12, 1962, p. 411,
and Apr. 2, 1962, p. 536.

^pt\\ 9, 7962

579

tee will be gjuided by a unanimous resolution of the
General Assembly ^ approving the vitally impor-
tant principle that outer space and the bodies in it
are not subject to national appropriation and are
subject to international law, including, specifically,
the United Nations Charter. The same resolution
also endorsed worldwide collaboration in the use
of outer space for the advancement of weather
forecasting and even weather control, and for
worldwide radio and television communications by
satellite.

Before we succumb to pessimism about the
chances of any agreement on these measures, let
us remember that, 2 years ago, a year of scientific
cooperation on geophysical problems between all
the nations of the world led to a treaty of neutral-
ization and national self-restraint in Antarctica.'
This treaty was a substantial effort to bring all
the nations into war-reducing activities. Now it
provides a model for the broader attempt to free
outer space from the burdens and horrors of the
arms race.

When we face the dark wall of Soviet hostility
and irrationality, we are a little like scientists
faced with the infinitely complex problems of
penetrating the lethal secrets of radiation or prob-
ing the layer upon layer of mystery that surround
both stars and atoms. At times these scientists
must despair. At times they must wonder whether
the small toeholds they have in cosmic research
will ever lead on to wider vistas and broader
paths. Small wonder that we, being faced with
Mr. Khrushcliev's threats and blandishments and
his retreat from an agreement on atomic testing,
find Soviet policy even more mysterious and hos-
tile than the hazards of space !

IIow inventive and resourceful they are, those
engineers who put John Glenn, Alan Shepard, and
Virgil Grissom into space. If a valve doesn't func-
tion, they invent another. If one device disap-
points them, they design a new one. The search
for solutions and the certainty that there are solu-
tions continue unrelentingly.

In just such a way wo must react to the still more
complex task of creating a viable human order.
Frustrated in one place, we must try another way

'For a statpinpnt by Ambassador Sleveiison in Commit-
tee I on Doc. 4, lOlil, anil test of tlie resolution, see ibid.,
Jan. 2!), ]!K)2, p. ISO.

" For baclcground and text of treaty, see ibid., Dec. 21,
1059, p. Oil.

round. If agreements "leak," new and better ones
must be sought. If we bog down in our efforts to
organize joint space research, all the more reason
for trying harder. If the issue of inspection and
control proves the toughest nut to crack in dis-
armament negotiations, let us work all the harder
on that.

But we are hard to discourage. Even though the
Russians reject once again all offers of a reasonable
test ban treaty at Geneva, and thus compel us to
resume testing, we are not on that account giving
up the search for a breakthrough in arms controh
In fact we must give to our research in this science
of survival the same ingenuity — and the same scale
of resources — that go into our defense and space
research. For remarkable feats of imagination
will be needed before we can adequately penetrate
tlie thicket of technical, diplomatic, and i:)sycho-
logical mysteries in which the arms race and the
cold war have their being.

We do not know the whole truth about our ad-
versaries— any more than we know everything
about the Van Allen radiation belts. We know
both can be chingerous and treacherous. But we
don't stop seeking a way through. I^et our ap-
proaches to Russia be made with the same ultimate
confidence, with the same rejection of fatalism,
with the same readiness for work, for disappoint-
ment if need be, and for renewed effort.

To me one of the primary advantages of such
partial "breakthroughs'' as a joint geophysical
3'ear or a joint program in outer space is that they
give us the chance to begin to attempt the only
final solution to our profound differences with
Russia — the solution that lies in some kind of in-
terpenetration and meeting of minds. If we can
create communities of men — astronauts, scientists,
doctors, geologists, artists, musicians — who have
shared tasks of common discovery, we can at least
hope that their discoveries will include some of the
truth about themselves and each other. A Glenn
or a Gagarin, working together in some hazardous
yet exhilarating space project, could scarcely
emerge from this experience with all the veils still
drawn down. And if tlie Soviet closed society
ojwned enough so tiiat in both societies there came
to be men and women wlio understand in depth the
hopes and fears of their opposite numbers, we
should have opened many windows to the light and
set many candles burning in the gloom of
ignorance.

580

Department of State Bulletin

"How beautiful is our earth !" exclaimed Major
[Yuri] Gafjarin as he came down from space. And
you remember when Colonel Glenn, looking at the
same view shouted: "Man, that view is tremen-
dous !" I tiiink tliose two men have more in com-
mon tlian either has with the ideologists of
conquest.

Do not tliink this is simply Pollyanna talk.
Wars start in the blind, angry hearts of men. But
it is hard to hate those who toil and hope and
discover beside you in a common human venture.
The Glenns of our world could be new men in a
quite new sense — the new men who, having seen
our little i)lanot in a wholly new perspective, will
be ready to accept as a profound sj^iritual insight
the unity of mankind.

When I had the good fortune to conduct the
astronauts and their families around the United
Nations and to witness the thunderous, sponta-
neous welcome that roared from room to room
among all the nations, I had a sense that men such
as these belong to a new fellowship which could
one day be a great strand in the web of peace.
And I believe they felt the same. Colonel Glenn
said, if j'ou recall :

As space science and space technology grow . . . and
become iiicire ambitious, we shall be relying more and
more on international teamwork . . . we have an infinite
amount to learn both from nature and from each other.
We devoutly hope that we will be able to learn together
and work together in peace.

These are the words of our "new men" — not a
narrow arrogance but a generous vision of the
great human family. Let no obstacles, however
forbidding, ever blind us to that vision.

Strategy of Development

This same spirit must animate us in other
realms. I am deeply convinced that the tran-
quillity of the human family in the next three or
four decades depends upon bridging the great
and growing gap between the wealthy, industrial-
ized, developed Northern Plemisphere and the un-
derdeveloped, poverty-ridden south.

After a decade of fairly sustained effort, we are
beginning to learn that to move out of the cramped,
ignorant, pretechnological conditions of a static
tribal or feudal society is fully as difficult as
breaking the bounds of space. All the forces of
tradition, all the gravity of ancient habits hold the
nations back. Each national "capsule," small or

large, has to find its own idiosyncratic way into
orbit, and a lot of them are still on the ground.

The process of modernizing nations involves an
exceptionally complicated and difficult set of in-
terlocking actions, decisions, and discoveries.
There will therefore be delays and disappoint-
ments. Some projects, like some rockets, will ex-
plode in midair. Some will take paths that were
not in the plans. Yet failure is often the prelude
to success.

In the matter of international assistance we can
say without doubt that we know more than we did.
Our techniques are wiser, our sense of what we
have to do more sure. Some underdeveloped
areas — one thinks of parts of India and parts of
west Africa- — are beginning to show unmistakable
signs of momentum. This is no time to write the
program off as a costly failure. We are learning
by doing, and results are already beginning to
show.

To you who have observed the U.N. for many
years let me say also that the peculiar merits of
multilateral aid programs under U.N. auspices are
being recognized more widely than ever. This is
especially true in the new nations of Africa. I am
told that the delegates to the recent meetings of
the U.N. Economic Commission for Africa, in
Addis Ababa, were unanimous and emphatic in
their desire to see the U.N. become a major partner
in their development program.

None of this can be done quickly. Changing
an economy means in fact changing a whole gener-
ation of men. I doubt if that can be done in less
than two decades. So I would say : Look on the
fateful program of modernizing what the French
call the "third world" — the world of the poor and
dispossessed — as you look on the program for
probing the planets. Expect failures. Rejoice
in successes. Never doubt the job can be done.
Indeed it must be done if misery is not to turn
to despair, and despair to wars, and war to ruin
for us all.

So vital is this strategy of development to our
country's future security that I never stop being
amazed at the way in which this nation — which
cheerfully pays $50 billion a year for arms and
may pay billions to reach the moon — can begrudge
the two billions a year that go to economic develop-
ment abroad — a program which in human terms
must be judged one of the world's greatest ad-
ventures. Yet we still hear the argument that we

April 9, 1962

581

cannot afford more, that our national resources
can't stand it. Yet we are growing richer all the
time.

No, the real basis for hesitation about economic
aid is not scarce resources but scarce imagination.
There are some citizens whom the prospect of end-
ing the age-old tyrannies of hunger and disease
does not stir as does the glamour of space travel
or the fear of military defeat. Their dreams — and
their nightmares — tend to be those of the rich and
the satisfied and the possessors !

Yet liow dangerous those dreams are! For
the rich are a small minority in this world, and
their ultimate security can only be found by mak-
ing common cause with the far different hopes and
dreams of the many poor. Only thus can we hope
to prevent the despair which communism exploits
and which so imperils our own security. To forget
this truth is to be wrong — fatally wrong — about
our national strategy.

But it is also wrong at a much profoimder
level : wrong to leave children to starve who could
eat with our help, wrong to let youngsters die
when medical skill can save them, wrong to leave
men and women without shelter, wrong to accept
for others, in the midst of our own abmidance, the
iron pains of degrading want.

These are moral decisions. We are not bound to
such evils by necessity or by scarcity. Our modern
technology of abundance gives us the freedom
to act — if we so decide. There are no restraints
now except the restraints of a blind eye and an
imfeeling heart.

I think we should rejoice as we have been given
the extra dimension of freedom, for I profoundly
believe that at bottom there is liere in America
a good and generous and moral people. Yet
some of the elements in our way of life — as in
all the burgeoning affluent societies of the West —
tend to make us allergic to self-denial, to altruism,
and to difficult endeavor. All around us are voices
which rouse the clamor of desires and claims wiiich
can stifle our imaginations and douse our sense
of pity.

The more we concentrate on our own needs, the
less we can measure the needs of othei-s and tiie
more the gap will grow between tlie overfed, over-
dressed, overindulged, overdeveloped peoples of
the Atlantic world and the starving millions be-
yond the magic pale.

" Great Deeds Demand Great Preparation"

I would like to end where I began — with the
image of Colonel Glemi, astronaut, citizen, dedi-
cated man. I believe that his courage and humil-
ity and high good humor are the qualities we
really admire. In a slack age we can still be moved
by the prospect of discipline and dedication. And
in an age in which so many people seem to be con-
demned to wander lost in their own psychological
undergrowth, we can still recognize and acclaim
a simplicity of doing and being and giving from
which great enterprises spring.

We cannot enter with emotion and sympathy
into the vast drama of "haves" and "have nots"
imless some image of discipline, I would say even
of a certain asceticism, releases us from the pres-
sures of smash and grab, of "me first," of "you've
never had it so good." Some sudden new light
on the ways in which human beings can live is
needed to release us from the obsessions of our
"getting and spending," our immense preoccupa-
tion with "what there is in it for me," and of what
in short-term thrills or benefits I can extract from
this day for my very own.

Perhaps there is salvation in the new image of
the immense patience and discipline and stripping
down of desires and wants that are necessary in
the life of those who are fit enough and tough
enough to venture out into the new dimension of
outer space. Here we can perhaps glimpse some
reflection of the kind of discipline and restraint
which we all need in some measure if our genera-
tion is to achieve great tasks, not only in the upper
air but here and now in this bewildered and floun-
dering world.

The sense that something more is required of us
than a happy acquiescence in our affluence is, I
believe, more widespread than we know. The
thousands of yoimg people who volunteer for the
rigors and discomforts of tlie Peace Corps, the
uncomplaining reservists, the growing body of
students with a passionate concern for world peace
or for the end of racial discrimination, the unsung
citizens all over this continent whose love and
service and neighborly good will are the hidden
motive forces of our Republic — all these people
will see reflected in the discipline and dedication
of Colonel Glenn and his comrades the proof that
great deeds demand great preparation and that
no country can hope to master the challenge of

582

Deparfment of Slafe Bulletin

our day without a comparable readiness to cut
away the trivialities and achieve the freedom
which comes from being no longer "passion's
slave."

To tliis kind of greatness we are all called, for
even daily life cannot be lived with grace and
dignity without some sense of others' needs and of
the claims they may make on our sympathy and
good will. How much more must the great public
life of a whole nation be informed with discipline
and vision if its generosity is to shine forth and
its courage to lie beyond all shadow of doubt !

I do not believe that in the last decade our Re-
public has always equaled the brilliant image of
youth and energy and regeneration which was once
projected to the world when, as a commimity dedi-
cated to a proposition and an ideal, it stirred to
life two centuries ago in these United States. Nor
do I believe we can fulfill our role in liistory with-
out a recovery of the original dream.

Therefore I pray that, like our young astro-
nauts, we soar to the stars in mind as well as body
and recover that sense of our vocation and dedica-
tion without which this people, founded and cre-
ated in a great vision, will not finally endure.

ADDRESS BY MR. CLEVELAND

Press release 160 dated March 12

The Practical Side of Peacekeeping

We are meeting, it seems, to discuss a vision :
a disarmed world under law. It is the subject
of much oratory and many books. A few states-
men have added their endorsement to those of
poets and professors. But I think it is fair to
say that until very recently most practical politi-
cians haven't bothered very much about disarma-
ment. As practitioners of the possible, they knew
that disarmament, like congressional reapportion-
ment or a wholly new farm policy, was simply
not going to happen.

Yet suddenly, in the past few months, some of
the world's toughest and most practical politicians
have turned their close attention to the dismantling
of national warmaking capabilities and the build-
ing up of an international peacekeeping force.
Their attention has been captured by a temporary
and dramatic conjuncture of events :

First, the great-power confrontation that began
in Iran 16 years ago has just about exhausted all

room for further territorial maneuver. From
Berlin to Korea and Viet-Nam, this stalemate is
symbolized by temporary frontiers hardened by
the armed forces of the great powers.

Second, the Soviet Union faces agonizing de-
cisions in its foreign policy. Weakened by agri-
cultural troubles at home, the men in the Kremlin
face increasing restiveness all through the bloc,
the gradual decay of East Germany, and the overt
breakaway of the Chinese Communists. The com-
bination of pressures from the Chinese, from
Stalinist elements in Russia, from the success of
the Common Market and the prospect of Atlantic
partnership, from Soviet failure in the Congo and
growing U.S. determination in Viet-Nam, must be
raising new questions in the Kremlin about the
viability of their traditional policies.

Third, in U.S.-Soviet relations there is not much
time to prevent

— another indefinite succession of appallingly
complex and costly stages in the nuclear arms
race — from missiles to antimissiles to more missiles
to more antimissiles;

— the spreading of nuclear weapons to other
countries — and the multiplying of the number of
fingers on the nuclear trigger;

— a runaway competition for leadership in outer
space.

Fourth, there is a general sense of political flux,
made possible by military stalemate — and made
precarious by the teclinological instability of that
same stalemate.

Ways and Means in the Search for Peace

And so we gather here in Washington tliis morn-
ing just as the curtain goes up on a month of
vigorous diplomacy, with the possibility of a sum-
mit meeting hanging in the air.

The Secretary of State is meeting in Geneva
with the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union
and Great Britain to discuss the great issues which
divide the Communist and non-Communist worlds.

On Wednesday [March 14], also in Geneva, the
18-nation Disarmament Committee opens its meet-
ing— with 17 members present^ — to begin talks
about "general and complete disarmament," in-
cluding the creation of new and improved institu-

' France declined to participate in the meeting.

April 9, J 962

583

tions to keep the peace and provide for peaceful
change under accepted rules of conduct.'

A week from today [March 19] the U.N. Com-
mittee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space will con-
vene in New York to talk about the rule of law
in outer space — and its peaceful and cooperative
exploration. These discussions open with the
kiiowledge that President Kennedy and Chairman
Khrushchev have just exchanged letters on coop-
eration in outer space and that the President has
made specific suggestions to the Soviet leader for
international cooperation on certain space projects
of dramatic potential. U.S. policy is clear — to
secure the benefits of space science to all mankind.

Pursuant to that policy, agreed now with others,
the World Meteorological Organization is work-
ing on a worldwide weather reporting and fore-
casting service, taking advantage of weather-
watching earth satellites. The International
Telecommunication Union is preparing to work on
communications satellites.

Meanwhile the International Coiirt of Justice
is about to hear arguments on its advisory opinion
about financing the peacekeepmg operations of the
United Nations.*

At dozens of places in dozens of ways, in 51 in-
ternational organizations and more than 400 inter-
governmental conferences this year, larger and
smaller groups of nations are working away at the
intricate process of knitting together the fabric of
international life and working out the rules for
conducting more and more of the world's business
under agi'eed codes of conduct.

Some of us are wont to say that our political
and social institutions lag dangerously behind the
brilliant advances of the material sciences — and
with good reason. We are fond of noting that
doctrine inherited from decades past is all too
likely to be obsolete in the 1960's. AVe raise with
alarm the question of wliether conventional wis-
dom which had led nations to a long series of dis-
astrous wars is safe in an age in which, as President
Eisenhower used to say, "there is no alternative to
peace."

The alarm is well founded. But something
quite startling — and potentially hopefvil — lias
happened in the recent past. Time was wlien the
subject of peace was reserved to poets and propa-

gandists, to ministers and mothers, to college stu-
dents and other dreamers, and to occasional bursts
of high-fiown rhetoric shortly before national
elections.

Peacekeeping, of course, has always been en-
dowed with unassailable moral, ethical, religious,
and semantic values — which have normally failed
to stop men and nations from fighting each other.
But somehow tlie subject of peace and peacekeep-
ing has never been considered quite practical,
especially by men who pride themselves on being
practical.

But in recent months, while the astronauts have
been preparing for the most visionary project in
histoiy, man's oldest adventure, the search for
peace, has been quite suddenly brought down to
earth. It has moved from the realm of dream and
I'hetoric to tlie realm of ways and means. In the
process peace and peacekeeping has become the
major business of the U.S. Government. There
are no stars in the eyes of Federal bureaucracy.
We know that it takes two to make peace, just as
it takes two to make a fight. But on our side at
least, we are settling down to it in a practical way.

Working Toward a Disarmed World

It started last September, when a most prag-
matic President of the United States addressed
the 16th General Assembly of the United Na-
tions.' He called for a U.N. Decade of Develop-
ment, a concentrated program of peaceful change
in the economic and social field, which the Gen-
eral Assembly later adopted.

He also called for the extension of the rule of
law to outer space and offered to cooperate with
the Soviet Union and other nations in the explora-
tion and development of space. This, too, found
response in a General xVssembly resolution and in
tlie formation of the new Committee on Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space, which meets in New York on
the lOtli of Marcli.

Finally the President outlined a comprehensive
plan for general and complete disarmament.*
Meanwliile, in bilateral negotiations, the U.S. and
the Soviet Union agreed on the principles to guide
disarmament discussions " and on tlie IS-nation
forum now about to convene in Geneva.

" For a statement by Secretary Rusk, see p. 571.
" For biu-kgrouiul, see Bullewn of Feb. 26, 1962, p. 311,
and Mar. 12, 1902, p. 430.

' Ibid.. Oct. 16, 19(;], p. C.l!).
" For text, see ibid., p. ()">().
° For text, see ibid., Oct. 0, 1901, p. 58.0.

584

Department of State Bulletin

Shortly after the President addressed the Gen-
eral Assembly, the Congress approved his proposal
to establish a full-time, major U.S. Goverimient
agency to concern itself exclusively with the prob-
lem of arms control and disarmament.— the first
such agency in the liistory of any government. It
is now engaged in an extensive program of serious
research on the practical technical problems of
working our way toward a disarmed world under
law.

It would be foolish, of course, to predict the out-
come of the Geneva meeting of the new Disarma-
ment Committee or the outer space group in New
York. Significant progress at the technical level
may be very difficult without a prior political
agreement having been reached between the great
powers.

Yet in his television address to the Nation on
March 2," tlie President laid the doctrinal basis
for progress on disarmament when he said that
". . . in the long run, the only real security in
this age of nuclear peril rests not in armament but
in disarmament" — and when he later added, "Our
foremost aim is the control of force, not the pursuit
of force. . . ." If the Soviet Union were seri-
ously to adopt a parallel doctrine, the first disar-
mament steps would become at once a matter of
very practical politics.

But, as President Kennedy said," "To destroy
arms ... is not enough. "We must create even
as we destroy — creating worldwide law and law
enforcement as we outlaw worldwide war and
weapons."

This critical point was further developed by
Ambassador Stevenson when he opened the dis-
armament debate in the General Assembly last
fall.^^ He said then that a disarmed world will
not be a placid world :

Conflicting ideologies would still be with us.

Political struggles would still take place.

Social systems would still be subject to disruptive pres-
sures from within and without.

Economic strength would still be a factor in, and an
instrument of, national foreign policies.

And the world would still be the scene of peaceful trans-
formations— for it cannot and should not remain static.

. . . Disarmament alone will not purify the human race
of the last vestige of greed, ambition, and brutality, of

"^ Ibid., Mar. 19, 19G2. p. 44.3.

" Ibid., Oct. 16, 1961, p. 619.

" For a statement made by Ambassador Stevenson on
Nov. 15 in Committee I and test of a resolution on dis-
armament, see ibid., Dec. 18, 1961, p. 1023.

April 9, 1962

633698—62 3

false pride and the love of imwer. Nor will it cleanse
every last national leader of the least impulse to inter-
national lawlessness. No sane and honest man can pre-
tend to foresee such a paradise on earth — even an crirtb
without arms.

That is why, in the United States plan for dis-
armament, international peacekeeping was treated
as the handmaiden of arms control and disanna-
ment. The preamble of our plan contains the fol-
lowing key sentence :

As States relinquish their arms, the United Nations
shall be progressively strengthened in order to improve
its capacity to assure international security and the peace-
ful settlement of differences as well as to facilitate the
development of international co-operatiou in common
tasks for the benefit of mankind.

It's not exciting prose, but there is nothing un-
exciting about the idea.

What an International Peace Force Could Do

The world has little practical experience witli
the dismantling of the national capacity to make
war. But on the other side of the disarmament
equation — the building of an international peace
force — there is some useful experience on which
to draw.

We can focus, not on the theoretical kind of
peace force which the f ramers of the U.N. Charter
seemed to have in mind, but on the actual peace
tasks which the international community has un-
dertaken since the charter was adopted.

You will recall that the original idea in 1945,
when the U.N. Charter was signed, was that the
United Nations should have a standing force pro-
vided by the great powers to deal with breaches
or threatened breaches of the peace. But we have
found from experience that each crisis requiring
peacekeeping forces arises in a different form and
therefore requires a different kind of foi'ce.

In actual experience the United Nations has
engaged in eight peacekeeping operations — in In-
donesia, Greece, Palestine, Kashmir, Korea, the
Middle East, Lebanon, and the Congo. Each time
the mission was different. Each time the number
and type and training and nationality of the
forces were somewhat different — and the supply
and logistical problems were different too.

In most cases the standing force envisaged by
the framers of the charter would have been the
wrong kind of force to deal with the actual situa-
tions the U.N. has had to tackle. The political
composition would have been wrong, or the mix

585

of weapons systems would have been inappro-
priate.

One lesson is clear from the scattered experience
to date : We cannot run the risk of throwing to-
gether scratch teams with no training at a mo-
ment's notice — emergency forces which are, as the
President described them in his U.N. speech,
"hastily assembled, uncertainly supplied, and
inadequately financed." So entirely new ideas of
identifying, training, commanding, transporting,
and supplying special units for special jobs will
have to be worked out against future emergencies.

From the modern world's own experience, then,
we can begin to learn what an international peace
force could usefully do :

It could send observers to potential areas of
conflict ;

It could watch over tlie carrying out of inter-
national agreements ;

It could administer particular areas or special
functions which have been given an international
character by the decision of those competent to
make the decision ;

It could be interposed between combatants to
enforce a cease-fire — inside a turbulent country
(as in the Congo) or between turbulent countries
(as in the Middle East) ;

At a later stage a larger international peace
force with some experience behind it might be able
to cope with actual hostilities between well-armed
secondary powers.

Only in the final and faraway stage of general
and complete disarmament could an international
force interpose itself in a conflict between great
powers. But by making it more difficult for brush
fires to break out, and by reducing the temptation
for big powers to intervene when brush fires do
break out, even a small, highly mobile polic« force
could render more imlikely the escalation of little
wars into big ones.

The practical questions that arise are many and
quite fascinating to think about:

Wliat should be the political makeup of tlie
force and its color composition ?

To what extent should it consist of a jjermanent
cadre of regular forces, and to what extent should
the U.N. depend on a rapid callup system of na-
tional forces tentatively earmarked for interna-
tional duty in an emergency?

Wliat weapons should it have, and what admix-
ture of air, sea, and ground forces ? Should it have
bombers or only lighters, surface vessels or sub-

marines? And what about tactical nuclear
weapons ?

By what military law should the troops be dis-
ciplined? 'What advance training should the
officers have together? How can a peace force
liave an adequate intelligence arm ? 'Wliat should
it do about its own public relations?

How should an international peace force be
financed? The rapid increase in the U.N.'s
budget for peacekeeping operations has already
produced one major financial crisis at the United
Nations. The U.S. Senate may decide this week
whether the President should have the resources
he has asked for to do our part — our necessanly
leading part — to meet that crisis. But the amounts
of money involved in the Middle East and the
Congo are, of course, small compared to the soit
of international peacekeeping force that would
be required in stages II and III of the U.S. dis-
armament plan. Where will the money come from
to support them ?

And finally, the most inclusive and most difficult
political question: How should the international
force be conmianded and controlled? How can
the views of great powers, which under a disarma-
ment agreement would be progressively giving up
their reliance on national forces and contributing
disproportionately to international forces, be given
appropriate weight in the command and control
system for an international force, without doing
violence to what the charter calls "the equal
rights ... of nations large and small"?

These are the questions bej'ond the questions at
Geneva. On a small scale they are inherent even
in the U.N.'s present peacekeeping role. But be-
fore most of them have to be answered outside of
books — for real — we have to learn whether the
Government of the U. S. S. R. agrees with the
President of the Ignited States that "Our foremost
aim is the control of force, not the pursuit of
force. . . ."

ADDRESS BY MR. GARDNER

rri>ss release 159 dnteii March 10

Extending Law Into Outer Space

I want to talk to you today about what may
appear to some to be an esoteric subject^ — the rule
of law and outer space.

Let me make it clear that I do not pretend to
the title of "space lawyer." A space lawyer is

586

Department of State Bulletin

someone you go to if you are ever sued by a
Martian. I am talking about a diiTerent kind of
law. A former colleague of mine once described
law as "eunomics" — the science of good arrange-
ments. This is what I propose to discuss today —
good arrangements for international cooperation
in the peaceful uses of outer space.

The subject could scarcely be more timely. Next
week will be the first meeting of the United
Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space. The United States, the Soviet Union, and
26 other countries are participating. There is no
doubt that the Committee will get off its launching
pad. The real question is whether it will achieve
a useful orbit.

Experience has taught ns to appreciate the dif-
ficulties as well as the possibilities inherent in co-
operative space activities. The dawn of the space
age fostered unrealistic notions of how technology
might heal the breaches of the cold war. Outer
space, however, cannot be regarded as a realm di-
vorced from the political realities of life on earth.
As one of our leading space experts likes to say,
"Space is a place, not a topic." The things nations
do in space are largely extensions of their earth-
bound activities ; they will inevitably reflect mil-
itai-y, political, economic, and scientific interests.
Early difficulties in developing a U.N. program of
outer space cooperation provide convincing evi-
dence of this fact.

Yet recent events justify a mood of cautious op-
timism. In his letter to President Kennedy of
February 21 congratulating the United States on
the successful orbiting of Lieutenant Colonel John
H. Glenn, Premier Khrushchev noted sig-
nificantly :

If our countries pooled tbeir efforts — scientific, tech-
nical and material — to master the universe, this would
be very beneficial for the advance of science and would be
joyfully acclaimed by all peoples who would like to see
scientific achievements benefit man and not be used for
"cold war" purposes and the arms race.

The next day the President replied :

I am instructing the appropriate oflScers of this Govern-
ment to prepare new and concrete proposals for immediate
projects of common action, and I hope that at a very early
date our representatives may meet to discuss our ideas
and yours in a spirit of practical cooperation.

The significance of this exchange is enhanced
by the basis for cooperation which has been laid
in recent months. The United States, of course,
has called for cooperation with the Soviet Union

in outer space on many occasions. This offer was
eloquently restated by President Kennedy in his
first state of the Union message on January .30,
1961." Further impetus was given to the idea
when, on September 25, the President laid before
the United Nations a four-point program of space
cooperation under United Nations auspices. The
program called for a regime of law and order in
outer space, the registration of satellites and space
probes with the United Nations, a worldwide pro-
gram of weather research and weather forecasting,
and international cooperation in the establishment
of a global system of communications satellites.
A resolution embodying the President's program,
cosponsored by the United States and several
friendly states, was placed before the United Na-
tions on December 4. The Soviet Union, after
some apparent hesitation, decided to cosponsor
the resolution — with only a few minor amend-
ments. Moreover, it cooperated in the solution of
the procedural difficulties which had hitherto pre-
vented the Outer Space Committee from begin-
ning its work.

What happened to produce this modest advance
in U.N. space cooperation? How substantial a
cooperative venture does it portend?

To answer these questions we must take a closer
look at the program which was recently approved
by the General Assembly.

Framework for International Cooperation

The first part of the program looks toward a
regime of law and order in outer space on the basis
of two fundamental principles:

1. International law, including the United Na-
tions Charter, applies to outer space and celestial
bodies.

2. Outer space and celestial bodies are free for
exploration and use by all states in conformity
with international law and are not subject to na-
tional appropriation.

The General Assembly did not seek, quite riglitly
in the judgment of the United States, to go beyond
these two principles and to define just where air-
space leaves off and outer space begins. It has
been the general view, not challenged by any na-
tion, that satellites so far placed in orbit have been
operating in outer space. But the drawing of a
precise boundary must await further experience
and a consensus among nations.

"Il)id., Feb. 13, 1961, p. 207.

April 9, 1962

587

U.S. Supplies Information to U.N.
on Its Space Launchings

U.S. /U.N. press release 3933 dated March 5

FoUouing is the text of a letter from Ambassador
Adlai E. Stevenson, U.S. Representative to the
United Natio7is, to V Thant, Acting Secretary-Gen-
eral of the United Nations.

JlABCH 5, 1962

Dear Mb. Secretary General : In accordance
with Section B.l. of General Assembly Resolution
1721 (XVI)' I enclose registration data " concerning
objects launched into sustained orbit or beyond by
the United States. This reix)rt presents a chrono-
logical census of seventy-two United States space
vehicles and associated objects in sustained orbit or
space transit as of February ir>, 1962. The United
States plans to submit reports on a bi-weekly basis
to keep this information up-to-date.

These periodic reports are submitted for the in-
formation of the United Nations and to enable you
to maintain a public registry of orbiting objects
in accordance with Section B.2. of Resolution 1721
(XVI). The establishment of such a registry
marks another step forward in the direction of open
and orderly conduct of outer space activities. Outer
space is the province of all mankind and the United
States believes that the benefits of the exploration
and use of outer space should accrue to all. We
therefore particularly welcome the establishment
of this registry in the United Nations and are
pleased to supply this information to open it.

As you are aware, the United States is also sup-
plying information on launching vehicles and space
craft of special interest to the Committee on Space
Research of the International Council of Scientific
Unions as well as directly to states which are par-
ticipating with the United States in specific coop-
erative space activities. We hope of course that
comparable information will be made available by
others in accordance with Resolution 1721 (XVI),
as the value of the registry will depend largely on
the cooperation of all concerned.
Sincerely yours,

Adlai E. Stevenson

' For text, see Bulletin of Jan. 29, 1962, p. 185.
' U.N. doc. A/AC. 105/INP. 1.

The U.N. program takes international law and
the U.N. Charter as the standard for space activi-
ties. Mankind would thus be free to use space on
the same basis as it uses the high seas — free of any
restraint except those on illegal activity such as
aggression and exclusive use. This formula is
designed to promote the maximum exploitation of
space technology in tiie service of human needs.

It is designed to prevent space and celestial bodies
from becoming the objects of competing national
claims.

Within this general framework the Outer Space
Committee, through its technical and legal sub-
committees, will now seek to develop further
standards for the conduct of space activities which
will serve the interest of all nations — standards
covering such matters as liability for injury caused
by space vehicles and the return of space vehicles
and personnel.

Registration of Objects in Orbit

A second aspect of the new U.N. program is the
registration of objects lavmched into orbit or be-
yond. Under the resolution information on these
objects is to be furnished promptly to the Outer
Space Committee through the Secretary-General
for the vise of all members of the United Nations.

To fulfill its obligations imder this part of the
U.N. resolution, the United States has submitted
a comprehensive inventory of all U.S. satellites in
sustained orbit and will keep this initial i-egistra-
tion up to date by the periodic filing of new
information.

The establishment of a complete registry of
space vehicles marks a modest but important step
toward openness in the conduct of space activity.
It will benefit all nations, large and small, inter-
ested in identifying space vehicles. It might make
a modest contribution to the eventual establish-
ment of a sj'stem of prelaunch inspection as part
of a comprehensive disarmament agreement.

Weather Research and Prediction

The third part of the new space program looks
toward a worldwide program of weather research
and weather prediction.

Tlie space age has brought a revolutionary
advance in meteorologA'. Orbiting weather satel-
lites, supplementing other advances in meteoro-
logical technology, such as sounding rockets,
radar, and electronic computers, make it possible
now for the first time to keep the entire atmos-
phere of the earth under constant observation.

The United Nations program calls upon the
World Meteorological Organization (AVMO), in
collaboration with UNESCO (United Nations Ed-
ucational. Scientific and Cultural Organization)
and the scientific communitj', to develop two kinds

588

DeparfmenI of Stale Bullelin

of proposal;^. Tlie first is for an international re-
search program to yield information essential for
improved weather prediction and perhaps even-
tually weather control. The second is for an inter-
national weather service program — a global net-
work of regional weather stations to receive,
process, and transmit meteorological information
from orbiting weather satellites as well as eai'th-
based instruments.

The United States has offered to make the
weather data received from U.S. satellites avail-
able for this international program. Indeed we
are already making available to other comitries
the information received from our Tiros satellites
and are developing methods to permit direct trans-
mission of satellite cloud photography to any part
of the world.

The worldwide program of weather forecasting
and weather research could lead to the saving of
billions of dollars in the United States alone. It
holds special promise for countries in the tropics
and the Southern Hemisphere, where vast areas
cannot be covered by present techniques.

More accurate prediction of storms, floods, rain-
fall, and drought will bring major savings in life
and property. Significant increases in farm pro-
duction will be made possible as the nature and
timing of crop planting are adjusted to take ac-
count of future weather patterns. Increased
knowledge of the atmosphere may lead to new
solutions to air pollution above our cities. Even-
tually it may help us break up dangerous storms
and achieve some control over climate and rainfall.

The cost of the worldwide weather program is
small compared to its potential benefits. The chal-
lenge to the U.N. is to develop a program which
will encourage the necessary cooperation among
nations in research, in the training of weather ex-
perts, in construction of weather stations, in the
tracking of weather satellites, and in the exchange
of weather information.

Global System of Communication Satellites

Tlie fourth part of the U.N. program of space
cooperation looks toward the establishment of a
global system of communication satellites.

Space technology has opened up vast possibili-
ties for international communications. Accord-
ing to many current estimates, it should be techni-
cally passible by the end of this decade to have in

April 9, J 962

63369S— 62 1

operation a global system of telegraph, telephone,
radio, and television communication. The cost of
an initial system is estimated at upwards of $2,00
million. Its benefits would be impressive.

With the aid of satellites, telephone communica-
tion between continents will become immeasurably
easier. Communication satellites can offer 20
times the number of telephone channels available
in our existing undersea cables. If interconti-
nental telephone communication increases suffi-
ciently to fill this huge capacity, it may someday
be possible to place a call to any place in the world
for approximately the same charge as to another
city in the United States.

Intercontinental radio and television open even
more dramatic prospects. According to David
Sarnofl', chairman of the board of the Radio Cor-
poration of America, there are now some 100 mil-
lion television receivers in use in 75 countries of
the world. By the end of this decade, when a
communication satellite network could be operat-
ing, there will be some 200 million receivers. Pro-
grams will have a potential audience of nearly 1
billion people.

This fundamental breakthrough in communica-
tion could affect the lives of people everywhere.
It could forge new bonds of mutual knowledge
and understanding between nations. It could offer
a powerful tool to improve literacy and education
in developing nations. It would enable leaders of
nations to talk face to face on a convenient and
reliable basis.

Some time in the future lies the prospect of
direct broadcast radio and television. When this
day comes, it may be possible to beam programs
from communications satellites directly into
l)eople"s homes.

The satellite system likely to be in use within
this decade, however, will be for point-to-point
relay between central installations in different
countries. This means that the benefits of space
communications can be made available to all peo-
ples only tJiroiigh political as well as technical
cooperation.

Rationale of U.N. Program

The United Nations program represents a mod-
est step toward worldwide cooperation on these
problems. It starts from a principle now unani-
mously endorsed in the U.N. resolution — that
satellite communication should be available to the

589

nations of the world as soon as practicable on a
global and nondiscriminatory basis. This is a
valuable recognition that, in principle, efforts
should be made to develop a single commercial
system for all nations of the world rather than
competing systems between contending political
blocs.

A second principle underlying the program is
that the United Nations should be able to use com-
munications satellites both in communicating with
its representatives around the world and in broad-
casting programs of information and education.
Within the next year or two the United States will
be able to offer its satellites, on an experimental
basis, for live TV transmission across the North
Atlantic of brief broadcasts from the United
Nations.

A third principle is the importance of technical
assistance and economic aid to develop the internal
communication systems of the less developed coun-
tries. A country with an inadequate telephone and
radio system and no television at all cannot partic-
ipate fully in a global network of communications.

Beyond these principles there is general agree-
ment on the important role in space communica-
tions that should be played by the United Nations
and its interested specialized agencies. The In-
ternational Telecommunication Union has already
laid tentative plans to call a special conference in
1963 to make allocations of radio frequency bands
for outer space activities. It is now proposed to
broaden the scope of this conference to include
consideration of other aspects of space communi-
cation in which international cooperation will be
required.

Meanwhile the ITU, like the WMO in the
weather field, is charged with the responsibility of
framing more specific proposals for consideration
by the Outer Space Connnittee, the Economic and
Social Council, and the General Assembly.

T^Hiile the ITU study is under way, the United
States is developing the foundation for a program
of international cooperation. On February 7 the
President submitted to the Congress S. 2814, a bill
to establisli a communications satellite corporation,
which would be llio instrument for U.S. participa-
tion in a global satellite system.^*

" For text of President Kennedy's message transmitting
the proposed legislation to Congress, see White House press
relea.se dated Feb. 7.

We do not, of course, envisage that other coun-
tries will satisfy their interest in satellite com-
munications by means of purchase of shares in the
proposed U.S. satellite corporation. Existing U.S.
law prohibits more than 20 percent foreign owner-
ship in any U.S. communications corporation and
will apply in this case. In order to obtain global
participation it appears desirable that there sub-
sequently be negotiated and established an inter-
national arrangement which would provide for
broad ownership and participation on a worldwide
basis. With our present knowledge of the active
interest of foreign countries in establishing com-
munications via satellite and their natural desire
to operate their own ground stations as well as
participate in the ownership of a global system, the
establishment of a truly international satellite
arrangement would appear to be necessary.

The international nature of a satellite com-
munications system is dictated by a number of
commonsense considerations. The satellites will be
primarily useful for communicating with other
countries, and we thus must agree with those
sovereign countries on the arrangements for talk-
ing with them. Much of the traffic will be between
other countries not involving the United States
at all. In view of the importance of communica-
tions to all states, many other countries will wish
to have a voice in the operation and management
of the system. For our part we should welcome
this interest in cooperation and participation by
other countries both as a sharing of the burden
of establishing and maintaining the system and as
a venture in international cooperation which will
have value in itself.

Practical Value of Program to All Nations

This review of the details of the program of
space cooperation sponsored by the United States
in the United Nations suggests some tentative
answers to the questions asked earlier. It sug-
gests that the program was endorsed by all U.N.
members because it promised practical benefits
to many nations — so nuich so as to be innnune from
effective partisan attack. It suggests that the pro-
gram will achieve results so far as the specific
proposals of cooperation commend themselves on
a basis of national self-interest.

A program of space cooperation under U.N.
auspices serves the national interest of the United
States and other countries for three main reasons:

590

Deparftnent of State Bulletin

In the first place it provides a way, despite
political differences, to exploit tlie oiiormous pos-
sibilities which the space age opens for all man-
kind. The need for cooperation across political
lines is supported by solid practical considerations.
It is in the interest of all countries, whatever their
ideologj', tliat space and celestial bodies should not
be the subject of competing national claims, that
a comprehensive public registry of orbiting ve-
hicles be maintained, that worldwide weather serv-
ices be developed, and that communications among
nations be improved.

To be sure, the deep political divergencies of
our time have placed an upper limit on the extent
of cooperation. But it is noteworthy, for example,
that the Soviet Union, after years of resisting rules
for frequency allocations and usage for radio com-
mmiication, finally accepted the frequency alloca-
tions of the ITU for its own broadcasts in order
to avoid interference and other difficulties in the
operation of its radio circuits. Hopefully the na-
tional interest of the Soviet Union will encourage
it to cooperate from tlie outset in space communica-
tions.

Beyond these practical considerations the unique
impact of outer space on the mind of man can be
used to widen and deepen international coopera-
tion. There is a widespread feeling that somehow
man must venture beyond the globe in a spirit of
cooperation rather than conflict, that activities in
space should serve the interest of mankind as a
whole. Our challenge is to use the drama attend-
ant upon space technology to open doors of co-
operation that might otherwise be locked.

In the second place the U.N. program has value
quite apart from encouraging valuable cooperation
with the Communist bloc. The assistance of many
nations is needed if our national space program
is to be successfully carried on. In weather and
communications, for example, the technology of
the United States can yield dividends to ourselves
and others only if many nations join in allocating
radio frequencies, in tracking and communicating
with space vehicles, and in placing necessary
ground installations on their territories. The
United Nations can do much to facilitate coopera-
tion on a free-world basis even if universal par-
ticipation is not achieved. A good start has al-
ready been made in such cooperation through
the activities of the National Aeronautics and

Space Administration, which has cooperative ven-
tures with some 40 countries involving tracking
stations, exchanges of personnel, and joint space
experiments.

In the third place the program of space co-
operation has deep significance for the U.N. itself.
The United Nations and specialized agencies such
as the ITU, WMO, and UNESCO will have new
resjjonsibilities for registering space vehicles,
studying problems of space cooperation, and as-
sisting in the development of worldwide weather
and communications services. Such activities can-
not fail to strengthen the United Nations as a force
for peace by binding its members to it through ties
of common interest. This is particularly true for
some of the developing countries which stand to
derive some of the greatest benefits.

All of these considerations lay behind these con-
cluding words of Adlai Stevenson when he pre-
sented the outer space program to the last
General Assembly :

"There is a right and a wrong way to get on with
the business of space exploration. In our judg-
ment the wrong way is to allow the march of
science to become a runaway race into the un-
known. The right way is to make it an ordered,
peaceful, cooperative, and constructive forward
march under the aegis of the United Nations."'

General White Nominated for Special
OAS Committee on Security

The Department of State announced on March
14 (press release 168) that the United States has
nominated former Air Force Chief of Staff Gen.
Thomas D. "WHiite for membei-ship on the new-
Special Consultative Committee on Security of the
Organization of American States.

Eesolution II of the recent meeting of foreign
ministers at Punta del Este, Uruguay,' called for
the establislunent of this committee of experts on
security against the subversive action of interna-
tional communism. The committee is to submit
an uiitial general report with recommendations to
the Coimcil of the Organization of American
States not later than May 1, 1962, and also to sub-
mit reports to member governments that may re-
quest such assistance.

'■ For text, see Bulletin of Feb. 19, 1962, p. 279.

April 9, 1962

591

Meeting the Soviet Economic Ciiallenge

hy Philip H. Trezise

Acting Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs ^

Today is the Ides of March, a date suggestive
of fate and doom. I will take for my text an
appropriately somber quotation: "American cap-
italism has passed its zenith and is going down."
The author of this statement is the Chairman of
the Conmiunist Party of the Soviet Union, Mr.
Khrushchev. He has also been quoted, on another
occasion, as saying, "Whether you like it or not,
history is on our side. We will bury you !"

Soviet abilities in tlie mortuary field are per-
haps subject to some discount. After all, they
have had to bury Stalin twice. And to judge
from the discussions taking place within the Com-
munist bloc, Stalinism itself is far from a dead
and buried issue.

However, when Khrushchev speaks of the de-
cline of capitalism, he is taking the role of his-
torian and prophet. He is offering the predic-
tion— and no doubt his firmly held belief — about
the future. At the same time he is issuing a chal-
lenge. We must examine the challenge soberly
and carefully. If we take it seriously, as we
should, he is defining one of the terms of an his-
toric contest betAveen systems of government and
ways of life.

Factors Motivating Soviet Claims

Wlien Khrushchev predicts the doom of capital-
ism, he is of course echoing a traditional point in
Marxian dogma. Marx taught that capitalism is
doomed, that it must inevitably be supplanted by
a new system, namely, the Communist society.

' Ad(Jres.s made before the Chamber of Conimerco of
Fresno, Calif., on Mar. 1.% (press release 107 dated .Mar.
14).

Then, too, the Soviets have long been concerned
with building a strong economy for military rea-
sons. Lenin in 1919, when the Soviet Union was
in the throes of civil war, said, "We must either
perish or overtake the advanced countries and
surpass them also economical!}'." And Stalin in
1931 took the same tack : "We are fifty or a hun-
dred years behind the advanced countries. We
must make good this distance in ten years."

It seems likely, nevertheless, that Khrushchev
has more than doctrine and tradition in mind.
There are shrewd and practical considerations of
foreign and domestic policy which could motivate
him to lay down the challenge of an economic
competition with the West.

In the international arena power or prospective
power continues to be a key factor. Governments
make their calculations and decisions in part on
the basis of the strength or the prospective
strength of the major nations. If the Soviet
Union can convince other countries that its eco-
nomic growth will exceed that of the United
States, this will register on political choices and
decisions around the world. A few years ago the
government of a nation friendly to us prepared
an ofiicial report containing the amazing predic-
tion that by 1980 the Soviet would have caught
up with and greatly outstripped the United States
in total production. We were able to disabuse tliat
government of this remarkable belief. Hut you
may be sure that foreign offices and ]ioiiiical lead-
ers in many coinitries will continue to reflect most
seriously about the power relations likely to exist
between the United States aiul tlie Soviet l^nion
5, 10, and 20 years lience and how this will bear
ujion the role of their nations in world afl'airs.

592

Departmenf of State Bulletin

So Mr. Khrushchev no doubt has in mind the
impact on third countries of his assurance that tlie
Soviet Union will overtake the United States in
the economic field.

There is probably another motive and one that
strikes closer to home. This has to do with the
impact of relative living standards on the political
situation within the Soviet bloc. The theme of
Soviet victory in an economic race began to domi-
nate Khrushchev's speeches beginning in 1957, a
period of crisis within the Soviet sphere. The
Hungarians had rebelled, and the Poles had shown
great restiveness. There was obviously grave dis-
satisfaction within the Soviet Union itself. The
living conditions of the Soviet people had risen
from the low levels of the 1940's, but the pace of
improvement had been vei-y slow. There was
enough knowledge about higher li%ang standards
in the West — knowledge gained from the Western
press and from Western broadcasts — so that So-
viet citizens were led to ask how it was that they,
with an allegedly superior economic system, lived
so much less well than the workers in the decadent
capitalist countries.

Khrushchev was ready to concede that affluence
equals influence. He said at the time, "We will
insure the production of consumers' goods at a
higher rate. It will be soon. We shall see. Not
very much time will pass. We will jump the ob-
stacle of the highest capitalist comitry, which is
the United States. Then, my dear people, what
will you have to say ? We will see who eats the
most and who has the most clothes." In other
words, one more giant effort and the Soviet Union
would be the most powerful and also the most
affluent nation.

U.S. and Soviet Rates of Growth

It would seem, then, that Khrushchev speaks
not only out of Marxist conviction but out of di-
rect political compulsions. He is anxious to in-
fluence other countries in their policies, and he is
desirous of impressing his own people and the
people of the Soviet bloc with the superior promise
of the Communist system. Even so, his challenge
is in some respects a vei-y bold one. The Soviet
bloc, including Communist China, at this time pro-
duces far less than the free world. Using the
rather rough estimates that are available, the Com-
mimist countries' total output in 1960 was roughly
$400 billion as against the free world's total of

$1,000-$!, 100 billion. This is a tremendous mar-
gin to overcome.

It may be more reasonable to make the compari-
son on a narrower base, the Soviet Union versus
the United States. Still, the task before the So-
viet Union would be a huge one. Our total pro-
duction in 1961 was valued at $521 billion, while
the Soviet Union was producing only about $240
billion. To reduce this margin significantly the
Soviet Union would have to expand very much
more rapidly than the United States. In fact,
to believe that the Soviet Union will overtake and
surpass the United States or the West, one must
also believe that Western capitalism will be af-
flicted with a kind of stagnation.

Such a belief would imply that the dynamic ele-
ments in Western economic life are few and are
declining. The notion would be that our system
is about to run out of steam whereas communism
retains tremendous vitality. The implications of
this, as you see, go far beyond mere economic ques-
tions and to the very heart of our differing politi-
cal and social systems. If the evidences for Mr.
Khrushchev's proposition were found to be strong,
then we would indeed have reason for despair.

"Wliat are the facts? And what do we see in
the world scene to justify or to contradict Mr.
Khrushchev's point of view ?

First we must recognize in all candor that the
Soviet Union has shown a capability for quite
high rates of overall economic growth. The
motor force beliind this has been a high rate of
forced savings and of forced investment in the
industrial sectors where the Soviet Government
chose to concentrate its efforts. If we take 1953
as the fii-st more or less normal year after the
period of postwar reconstruction and rehabilita-
tion, the Soviet Union seems to have had an annual
rate of growth of 6 to 61/^ percent, which is quite
respectable as these things go. This is not to say
that the Soviet economy was rmi efficiently, for in
fact Soviet methods of organization and manage-
ment create innmnerable forms of waste. Nor,
obviously, does it suggest that the Soviet people
received benefits commensurate with the rate of
growth. In fact living standards rose very
slowly. Even so basic a commodity as food still
is in short supply in Soviet cities.

Tlie sacrifices imposed on the Soviet citizens to
achieve high rates of growth become the more no-
table, however, when it is remembered that many

April 9, J 962

593

other countries expanded more rapidly than the
Soviet Union without the need for the grim bra-
tality of the Soviet system. Japan, with its very
limited land area and with scarce natural re-
sources, had a growth rate of more than 7 percent
during tlie 1953 to 1960 period. Japanese living
standards during these years sliowed a spectacular
improvement. West Germany had a rate of
growth of more than 7 percent while Italy, which
once was considered to have a hopelessly stagnant
economy, grew at about 6 percent or roughly the
same rate as the Soviet Union. In Latin America,
Venezuela, Brazil, and Mexico all showed rates of
growth as high as or higher than the Soviets. In
none of these cases did the government indulge in
forcible measures to expand the economy. For the
most part they depended on the efforts of private
citizens impelled by a desire for higher incomes
and better standards of life, that is, the motiva-
tions of the private enterprise system.

For the United States, it is true, the 1950's were
years of relatively slower progress. We seemed to
be resting a bit after the extremely rapid expan-
sion during the 1940's. We did not, of course, have
any postwar reconstruction task at home to give
special stimulus to our economy, and we had sev-
eral brief but retarding recessions. Nevertheless,
in a period that was very far from typical of the
potential performance of our economy, the United
States increased total output by an average of 2i/^
percent per year. In absolute terms we were pro-
ducing in 1960 $80 billion more real goods and
services than we were in 1953. In 1961 the coun-
try's total production rose by 3.6 percent, and this
year it is expected to grow by 9 or 10 percent. If
we have not been doing quite as well as we would
have liked, we have certainly not been stagnating.

For the future it seems that our economy could
probably, without any miusual stimulus, average a
rate of expansion of 41/2 percent or so. The Soviet
Union in 1961 seems to have fallen below that level,
down to about 4 percent, primarily because of in-
creases in the military budget and because of mis-
takes in planning and management on the part of
the cumbersome Soviet bureaucratic system. We
should count, to be on the cautious side, on the
Soviets' doing somewhat better than that in most
yeare in the future. A 6-percent average annual
rate of growth might be the likely one for some
years to come. If we do not do hotter than 41/2
percent on the average— and this should be a fairly

comfortable rate — the Soviet Union is not going to
narrow the margin between us by very much dur-
ing the next decade. At these rates the U.S.S.R.
in 1970 would be producing about 48 percent as
much as we are, as against 44 percent today.

Comparison of Various Sectors of Economies

These overall rates of growth are interesting and
pertinent, and we should not ignore them. They
give a measure of the broad performance of an
economy in terms of total amount of goods and
sei-vices that it generates. They tell us very little,
on the other hand, about the performance in the
various sectors of the economy or about the
changes in standards of living that have come
about. It is useful, therefore, to make some other
comparisons.

One is in the agricultural field. Here the com-
])arison between the United States and the Soviet
Union, or other Communist nations, is so unfavor-
able to the Communist system that one wonders
why Khrushchev from time to time even refers to
the possibility of catching up with us. We have
roughly 8 percent of our labor force engaged in
farming; the Soviet Union has close to 50 percent.
Just a few days ago Khrushchev observed that the
entire economy is in danger of being wrecked be-
cause of a lagging agriculture. There are admit-
tedly shortages of meat and milk in the U.S.S.R.
We have on the whole the most varied and at the
same time the least expensive diet in the world.

These enormous differentials cannot be at-
tributed to differences of natural endowments
alone. There seems to be no technical reason why
Soviet agriculture should necessarily be so grossly
less productive than our own. The difference
seems to go straight back to social systems. Ours is
a farm economy built around private ownership
and the incentives of the private system. Soviet
agriculture, for its part, is a state system in which
the individual is given little reason to use his tal-
ents to the full and in which the state, as a matter
of policy, systematically withholds from agricul-
ture the equipment and working capital that
would make it more efficient. The travel of Soviet
leaders about the countryside offering advice about
what needs to be done is certainlj' no substitute for
a decision to give the individual Russian farmer
an opportunity and an incentive to work his land
fully and efficiently.

It might be said that the comparison between

594

Deparfment of State Bulletin

the United States and the Soviet Union is not an
entirely fair one, that our agricultural technology
is realh' a special case, and that the performance
of the Soviet farm economy might better be com-
pared with that in less advanced countries than
the United States. This is not what Khrushchev
asks, of course, but it can be observed in any event
that in Japan, which is a country of extremely
small farms, where modern technology has to be
applied in a very special way, there has been a suc-
cession of bumper rice crops to the point where
the country is just about self-sufficient in its basic
foodstuff. This was accomplished, mind you,
under far less favorable natural conditions than
exist in the Communist states. The accomplish-
ment must be attributed to the way in which the
individual small farmer was willing and able to
adapt modem methods to his tiny plot. Else-
where Ln the world, in "Western Europe, farm out-
put is booming. Aniong the industrial countries,
at least, the economics of agricultural scarcity
are confined almost entirely to the Soviet Union.
Elsewhere we have achieved or are m sight of
achieving what the Communist Utopia promises
at some distant future date, that is, an economy
of abundance and, with us, an economy of abun-
dance that is sometimes embarrassing.

At the far end of the scale is Communist China.
There the authorities tried an experiment in rapid
and total communization which startled and
alarmed even the U.S.S.R. The results, for those
of us who believe in the importance of the indi-
vidual, have been highly instructive. So far as
can be determined, the experiment in rural com-
munism in China was a total and unmitigated
disaster for the Communists. In a coimtry
with 80 percent of the popidation engaged in
farming, there is widespread hunger and even,
we may suppose, many pockets of starvation. The
Chinese Communists are using their scarce re-
serves of foreign currencies to buy wheat from the
capitalist farming nations. The retreat from im-
mediate communism on the farms has been a rout.

If we look at the amenities that contribute to
the comfort or pleasure of life in the Western
countries, we find them to a large extent absent
in the Communist bloc. Most important is the
shockingly low standard of housing that still pre-
vails in the U.S.S.R. The floor space nowadays
available to Soviet city folks is at best 66 square
feet per person; may I mention that the Federal

prisons in this country supply their inmates a
minimnvi of 60 square feet. Shopping in the
U.S.S.R. is most burdensome because of perennial
shortages and a complete absence of the service
concept in a bureaucratic retail trade setup. Need
I add that most of the consumer durables and
consumer services that in this country are taken
for granted are but a dream to the Soviet citizen.
Take automobiles. The private automobile,
which has made us so mobile a people, is a rare
phenomenon in the Soviet bloc. Among all of the
220 million Soviet people, there are 640,000 auto-
mobiles, as compared with the 61 million cars that
cover our highways. A great many of the service
industries that we take for granted, such as dry
cleaning, are all but unknown in the U.S.S.R.

In fact Soviet development has been concen-
trated narrowly on industrial power and par-
ticularly on heavy industry. There is no doubt
about Soviet advances there. Machinery and
equipment is in many cases the equal of advanced
equipment in the West. Soviet achievements in
space testify to a high degree of engineering as
well as scientific skill. We should not make the
mistake of discounting this. But we should be
equally careful not to make the mistake of over-
estimating the dynamics of a society which has
focused its efforts so narrowly on a few selected
fields.

Looking to the Future

Wliat of the future? Will the Western private
enterprise system be able to maintain and even to
increase its margin over the Soviet bloc? And
will it be able to provide the capital assistance
and access to markets that will make it possible
for the nonindustrial countries in Asia and Africa
and Latin America to make progress under free
societies ?

The answer, needless to say, lies with ourselves
and with our friends. We obviously have the
resources and the capabilities if we use them with
any degree of wisdom. There are very encourag-
ing indications that we are likely to do so. It is
entirely possible that the free nations are on the
verge of a new burst of economic creativeness. In
Western Europe the appearance of a Common
Market among great industrial states pi'omises to
bring about an economic unit very much like the
United States. It will probably have more people
than the United States. They are highly skilled

April 9, ?962

595

and thorouglily acquainted with the processes of
modern industry and science and technology. As
they tear down the national barriers that separate
their economies, they will become part of a great
economic unit, much like that in the United States.
This is likely to give enormous impetus to busi-
ness activity, for the possibilities of producing for
a market of more than 200 million people obvi-
ously will call for development and oi-ganization
of new kinds of industrial and business enterprise.

The dynamic of the Common Market could also
transfer itself to the United States. The Euro-
pean nations, joined together, are likely to undergo
the kind of development in living standards that
we have had. When looked at in terms of owner-
ship of automobiles, refrigerators, washing ma-
chines, and other durable goods. Western Europe
is where we were in 1935, or even earlier. There
is going to be a vast potential in Europe for ex-
port goods. We can, if we are alert to the oppor-
tunity, get for our own economy the stimulus of
a rapidly developing new market in Western
Eurojie.

The ripples of European expansion need not
stop with the United States. Rapid growth in
Western Europe could have its etfects all over the
free world, in Japan, in Canada, in Australia and
New Zealand, and in the less developed countries
of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The way is
opening, it seems, to a strong push forward in
the free-world economy.

For this to happen, however, we shall have to
make certain that obstacles and barriers are not
allowed to hinder it unnecessarily. We need to
make every etl'ort to be sure that the European
development is an open one, that the expanding
market of Western Europe is not artificially lim-
ited to European producer.s, that the prospect for
free-world expansion not be choked of!" by the
creation of separate trading blocs.

The thrust of President Kennedy's trade pro-
posals before the Congress - is to give this country
the means to leadership in bringing the free-world
economy forward. The President is asking for

the essential bargainmg means to work with the
Common Market. We can hope, if the President
is gi\'en the authorities he asks, to assure that the
Common Market will be outward-looking in its
economic policies and that the net effect in the
free world of this great change on the European
Continent will be to bring a spurt of additional
economic activity in the free world as a whole.

Choosing the Right Alternatives

Nobody, not even Mr. Khrushchev, can see
clearly into the future. As we look ahead, we
must depend for our forecasts on forces and fac-
tors we have observed in the past.

These considerations would tell us that Mr.
Khrushchev's economic challenge is not necessarily
an idle or foolish one. The Soviet system, withm
its limitations, clearly is capable of generating
large amounts of economic power. If we were to
be complacent enough and shortsighted enough,
the performance of the Communist system might
bring it within much closer range of our own, at
least in terms of raw power.

At the same time we know something about the
potential of our own system and of the possibili-
ties and even probabilities for it. If we do tol-
erably well, we can stay fairly comfortably ahead
of the Soviet Union. The prospects are, however,
that we will have the opportunity to do a good
deal better than tolei-ably well. In that event we
and our friends might even run away with the
game. Wliat happens is going to depend very
largely on alternatives that are easily open to us.
The problem is to choose the right ones.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

'For text of the I'resldent's me.ssage to Congress, see
Bulletin of Feb. 12, ll)G2, p. 231; for a summary of the
new trade legislation, see ibid., Feb. 26, 10C2, p. 343.

Confirmations

Tlie Senate on March 16 confirmed W. Michael Bln-
raenthal to 1h' Ihe representative of the United States
on the Commission on International Commodity Trade
of the Ecouomie and Social Council of the United Nations.

596

Department of Stale Bulletin

THE CONGRESS

Major Aspects of the Trade Expansion Act

Statement hy Acting Secretary Ball '

The proposed Trade Expansion Act of 1962 is
designed to provide the President with tlie requi-
site tools to advance and protect major United
States interests in a world tliat has radically
changed since the reciprocal trade agreements
program was first conceived by Cordell Hull
almost 30 years ago.

■\Anien the first Trade Agreements Act was
passed in 1934, the United States was in the depths
of the great depression. Since that time we ex-
perienced the agony of the Second "World "War,
which not only drastically altered the power bal-
ance in the world but set in train forces of change
and revolution that are still vigorously at work.

The United States was the only major industrial
nation that did not feel the direct effects of war's
devastations on its own soil. In fact, during the
course of the war, our economy enormously ex-
panded. Our national income, measured in con-
stant dollars, rose nearly 50 percent between 1939
and 1946.

Almost everywhere else the story was different.
By "V-E Day many of Europe's factories were
heaps of bricks and mortar. Japan's economy was
a shambles. Even agriculture over a great part
of the world had suffered from shortages of ferti-
lizers and the disruption of the agricultural labor
force.

"\^niile nations of the world were rebuilding, the
United States sensed as the major supplier of ma-
terials and equipment. Through the Marshall

' Made before the House Ways and Means Committee
in support of H.R. 9900 on Mar. 13 (press release 164).
For test of the President's message to Congress proposing
new trade legislation, see Bulletin of Feb. 12, 1962,
p. 231 ; for a brief summary of the bill, see iMd., Feb. 26,
1962, p. 343.

plan we made it possible for the "Western European
countries to acquire the goods and services they
needed but which they could not earn the dollars
to buy.

During that time we had no difficulty disposing
of our export surpluses. Aided by Marshall plan
dollars many American industries enjoyed an ex-
port trade two or three times as large as they had
ever enjoyed before the war. In fact the volume
of United States exports to Europe was over 40
percent higher in the years of the Marshall plan
than it had been in previous years.

"With little need for an overseas sales effort, our
industry felt no compulsion to design goods ex-
pressly for foreign markets. To a very large
extent any surplus capacity that had been built
during the war could be used to produce goods for
sale overseas.

Except for the raw materials needed by our
own industry, our imports during this period were
severely limited. Since other industrial nations
of the world could not produce enough even to
satisfy their own needs, they had few industrial
goods to send to the American market. Accord-
ingly our industry during this period lived under
highly artificial conditions. It could sell its sur-
plus production of practically any article in for-
eign mai'kets as fast as the article could be
produced. It did not have to face the discipline of
foreign competition in the domestic market.

Policy for a Changing World

Those days of effortless exports are gone for-
ever. Since the end of the war the world has
undergone several cataclysmic changes.

First, the old colonial systems, anchored to

April 9, 1962

597

mother countries in Western Europe, have largely
disintegrated. In place of colonial possessions
spread over six continents, nearly 50 new coun-
tries have been created and still more are in the
process of creation. Many of these new covmtries
have been bom weak, sometimes prematurely ; but
all share a desire to maintain their independence
and to develop higher living standards for their
peoplas.

Second, the colonial powers — the great states of
Western Europe — have rebuilt their economies
and have attained new heights of production. Far
from being weakened by the loss of their colonial
possessions, they have turned their energies toward
a common endeavor of creating a vigorous and
united Europe — a Europe that promises to be-
come a great new trading area prospectively as
strong and productive as the United States.

Third, the international Communist conspiracy
has tightened its hold on two great nations, the
Soviet Union and Red China. This has given it
not only the command of great potential economic
resources but the mastery of the most advanced
teclmology. Between the Iron Curtain that
stretches from the Brandenburg Gate to the Yel-
low Sea are a billion people — roughly one-third
of the world's population.

In this changed and changing world, faced with
a constant menace from the Communist bloc, we
have no option but to pursue lines of policy di-
rected at two major objectives.

In the first place we must consolidate the
strength of the great industrial powers of the free
world. In this effort we must see to it that trade
serves as a cement to bind our political systems
more closely together rather than as a source of
discord between us. The relatively free flow of
trade among the advanced nations, unimpeded by
artificial obstructions, will compel the use of our
resources in the most productive manner.

In the second place United States policy must
aim for a higher level of commercial trade with
the less developed nations under conditions that
permit those nations to begin to earn the foreign
exchange that is essential if they are to develop
economic strength. This is the only way they can
ever attain an adequate rate of economic growth
without the continued need for external economic
assistance.

Taken together, the forging of closer economic
ties between Europe and the United States and a

combined U.S. -European effort to provide larger
markets for the products of the developing coun-
tries of the world can be the free world's most
telling response to the Communist economic
challenge.

The enactment of the Trade Expansion Act of
1962 should give the President the ability to pur-
sue these lines of policy effectively.

EEC and America's Federal Experience

The European Common Market, which is one
of the main undertakings provided by the Treaty
of Rome, can be best understood in terms of our
own constitutional experience. In Philadelphia
in 1789 our Foimding Fathers made a choice that
Europe did not make imtil 1957. They elected
to reverse the trend toward compartmentalized
Statewide markets in favor of a single market
embracing all of the then 13 States on the eastern
seaboard of this great continent. Under the Ar-
ticles of Confederation, as you know, the States had
interposed trade restrictions among themselves.
The Commonwealth of Virginia, for example,
exacted the same tariff on shipments of goods from
other States that it did on goods from overseas.
If a farmer hauled a load of cord wood from Con-
necticut into New York, or a barge of cabbages
across the Hudson from New Jersey, he was
stopped at the border and required to pay duty.
In drafting our Constitution the Founding
Fathers changed all this. They deprived the
States of the right to "lay any Imposts or Duties
on Imports or Exports."

The result is that we now have in America a
great common market embracing 50 States, among
which trade flows freely. Surrounding that com-
mon market is a common external tariff. This is
substantially the pattern of the European Eco-
nomic Community. Within a few years — in no
event later than the end of the present decade —
the European Community will consist of a com-
mon market comprised of its member states. Trade
will flow freely among these states while the Com-
munity as a whole will be surrounded by a
common external tariff.

As I mentioned a moment ago there are pres-
ently six member states in the Conunon Market.
The United Kingdom, however, applied for mem-
bership last August. Since then Denmark and
Ireland have made similar applications.

It would not be appropriate for mo to attempt

598

Deporfmenf of State Bulletin

to predict this morning the outcome of the current
negotiations between the United Kingdom and
the member states of the Community. But if
those negotiations do lead to the accession of the
United Kingdom to the Treaty of Rome, the Com-
mon Market will embrace a population of about
one-quarter of a billion people with a gross na-
tional product, on the basis of 1961 figures, exceed-
ing $340 billion. And it will be an expanding
market; the creation of internal free trade within
the area of the Community is unleashing strong
dynamic forces that are giving a new energy both
to industi-y and agriculture. As a result the mem-
ber nations today are experiencing a rate of
growth more than twice that of the current growth
rate of the United States.

EEC's Significance for United States

The creation of this new market will have a
great significance for America.

For one thing it will afford market opportuni-
ties for American exporters of a kind unparalleled
in our experience as a trading nation. By helping
the nations of Europe to regain health and vigor
through the Marshall plan we made it possible
for them to become our best customers. Even
before the European Community was created our
exports to Europe were expanding as European
incomes rose.

With the emergence of the Common Market,
however, the opportunities in Europe will expand
and change in character. American producers
will find in Europe something that they have
hitherto known only in the United States — a great
mass market for their products. The rapid
growth already demonstrated by this market is
generating ever larger demands for American
goods. This flow of goods across the Atlantic
can, and no doubt will, grow ever greater as the
trade-expanding effects of these increasing de-
mands are realized — particularly if we take the
necessary measures to reduce impediments to that
flow by bringing about a reduction of Europe's
common external tariff.

But the coming into being of the Common Mar-
ket will also have other effects on trade — so-called
trade-diverting effects. The extent to which these
trade-diverting effects may prove adverse to
American interests will depend upon whether or
not President Kennedy is equipped with the
powers that will enable hun, by negotiating

trade arrangements with the Common Market, to
reduce the level of the common external tariff'.

A great deal has been said about the disad-
vantage to United States producers that will re-
sult from tlie Common Market, but the precise
measure of that disadvantage is not always imder-
stood. As the European Common INIarket becomes
fully effective, a manufacturer in Detroit selling
to a customer in Diisseldorf will be at this disad-
vantage as against a manufacturer in Milan : He
will have to sell his goods over a common external
tariff while the manufacturer in Milan will not.
But, of course, advantages and disadvantages are
reciprocal. A manufacturer in Diisseldorf sell-
ing to a Texas customer will be at a similar dis-
advantage as against the manufacturer in Detroit ;
he will have to sell his goods over the barrier of
our own common external tariff, while the pro-
ducer in Detroit will not.

The existence of this situation poses a simple
question : Should the United States and the Euro-
pean Community agree together to reduce the
level of this mutual disadvantage in the markets
of each other by reducing the level of their com-
mon external tariffs, for the benefit not only of
one another but of the whole free world?

Political and Economic Considerations

The answer to this question has two aspects —
one political and one economic. Let us consider
each in turn.

In approaching the political question we should
be quite clear in our minds as to the nature of
the European Economic Community. It is, of
course, a trading entity, but it is far more than
that. In signing the Treaty of Rome in 1957,
which created the Community, the present six
member nations — France, Italy, Germany, and the
three Benelux countries [Belgium, Netherlands,
and Luxembourg] — performed a solemn act of
large political implications. The main driving
force behind the creation of the Community was
the desire to lay the groundwork for a united
Europe. To many of its proponents the Treaty
of Rome marked the beginning of a process that
may lead ultimately to the creation of something
resembling a United States of Europe.

The signatory nations to the treaty took far-
reaching commitments. They agreed not only
to create a Common Market but also to undertake
a wide spectrum of common action covering all

April 9, J 962

S99

aspects of economic integration — including the
concerting of monetary and fiscal policy, the har-
monization of social security systems, the devel-
opment of a common antitrust law, common pro-
visions for the regulation of transport, the free
movement not only of goods but of labor, capital,
and services, and so on.

Equally as important, the treaty provided for
the creation of a set of institutions comprising
an executive in the form of a Commission and
Council of Ministers, a parliamentary body in the
form of an Assembly, and a court — the Court of
Justice of the Community — that by its decisions
is building up a body of European jurisprudence.
I emphasize these aspects of the Rome Treatj
because there is a tendency to focus on its impact
on commercial policy — whicli is merely one of the
aspects of the European Community — to the ex-
clusion of the other broad provisions of the treaty.

If we think of the European Community in this
way we can begin to comprehend its larger polit-
ical implications. If the negotiations for British
accession to the Community succeed we shall have
on either side of the Atlantic two enormous enti-
ties. On our side a federation of States tied to-
gether by developed institutions and a century
and a half of common experience to form a nation
that is the leading world power; on the other, a
community of states, trading as a single market
and seeking among themselves to perfect the com-
mon policies and institutional arrangements that
can lead toward increasing economic and political
integration.

Between them these two entities will account for
90 percent of the free world's trade in industrial
goods and almost as much of the free world's pro-
duction of such goods. Between them they will
represent the world's key currencies; they will
provide the world's principal markets for raw ma-
terials; and they will constitute the world's prin-
cipal source of capital needed to assist the less
developed countries to move toward independence
and decent living standards.

Great as each of these entities may be, they will
bo deejily interdependent. The experience of the
great depression bi'ought home to Euro]io and
America the fact tliat not only prosperity but
hardsliip is indivisible. Tied together by inter-
related markets, commanding a common technol-
ogy, reacting to similar wants and aspirations,
these two great trading entities on either side of

the Atlantic will, of necessity, constitute the hard
core of strength with which the free world must
defend its freedom.

The degree of interdependence between the great
economies flanking the Atlantic has been demon-
strated repeatedly in recent years. Imbalances
within the trade or payments arrangements
among the major economically advanced nations
can create serious problems. Our own troubling
and persistent balance-of-payments deficit is in a
very real sense the mirror image of surpluses in
the accounts of certain of our European friends.
To minimize these imbalances a high degree of
coordination of domestic economic policies is re-
quired— coordination that is already being under-
taken through the OECD [Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development], which
came into being last September. We are also seek-
ing through the Development Assistance Commit-
tee of the OECD to coordinate national programs
of aid to less developed countries.

The extent of the interdependence of the United
States and Europe goes further still. Effective
plans for the stabilization of the market of a man-
ufactured product such as textiles or the market
of some raw material such as coffee are impossible
without the cooperation of both of these two major
trading areas. Indeed any major economic pro-
gram involving the world's markets demands the
close cooperation of Europe and the United States.
As a result the United States finds itself engaged
in consulting with its European partners al-
most continuously on a widening area of economic
problems.

The growing strength and cohesion of the Eu-
ropean Economic Community arc laying the foun-
dation for a much more efl'ective Atlantic part-
nership. We have long felt the need for a Europe
strong and miited that could serve as an equal
partner committed to the same basic values and
objectives as all America. We can foresee that
possibility for the first time as the European
Community begins to spoak with a single voice
not only on problems of commercial policy but on
an increasing number of economic subjects.

Yet it may be asked, granting that a nu)re efToc-
tive Atlantic partnership can contribute to the
increased strength and cohesion of the free world,
how will it affect the trading interests of the
United States? There are several answers.

For many reasons the European Common Mar-

600

Deparfmenf of State Bulletin

ket, as it is developing, will provide an unparal-
leled opportunity for the sale of our products.
Our tratle with the nations of an expanded Com-
munity is today very much in our favor. Our ex-
ports of all products to that area are 50 percent
higher tlian our imports. Most Europeans are
only just hef^inning to enjoy many of the consumer
goods tliat Americans have known for years —
automobiles, electric refrigerators, air condition-
ing. Using automobile ownership as an index, one
may say that the European market is about at the
level of consumer demand which existed in the
United States in the late twenties — and think of
the expansion that has taken place in our markets
since that day !

A great mass of Europeans are just beginning
to expand their horizons, to catch the vision of the
more ample life. Their demands are increasing
explosively. Europe is undergoing a revolution
of rising expectations quite as profound as that
which is sweeping the less developed countries —
but of course on a higher plane.

Opportunities for Expanding U.S. Trade

Not only does the European market offer an
almost, unlimited potential for growth, but it is
the kind of market best suited for American pro-
duction. European industrialists have been ac-
customed to selling their products in small,
narrow, national markets. They have built their
industrial plants with that in mind. We alone
in the free world have fully developed the tech-
niques of mass production, for we alone have had
a great mass market open to us. If American in-
dustry has the will and energy, and if access to
the Common Market can be assured to it through
the tools provided by the Trade Expansion Act,
it should find in Europe new trading opportuni-
ties of a kind not dreamed of a few years ago.

Of course the development of the European
market for American products will not be easy.
It will make heavy demands on our imagination
and ingenuity. It will require a considerable ef-
fort of merchandising of a kind few American
firms have ever attempted in Europe, because in
the past the potential of limited national markets
has never seemed to justify the trouble. It will
require us to do much more than merely ship
abroad the surplus of the goods we produce for
Americans. It will mean much greater attention

to the tailoring of products designed expressly for
European tastes or European conditions.

This need is already being recognized. For ex-
ample, last week a leading business publication re-
viewed the plans of one of America's automobile
manufacturers to produce a univereal car for sale
anywhere in the world. At least GO percent of the
overseas demand, the article noted, was for a very
small car designed for buyers who were moving up
the scale from bicycles and motor scooters. An
official of the automobile firm was quoted as say-
ing: "Ninety-three percent of vehicles made in
the United States are not suitable for overseas
consumption."

So change is in the wind. There is no reason
why American industry should not continue to
display the vitality and creativeness that have
stamped its performance in the past. Industrial
research in the United States continues at a level
many times higher than that of Europe. Each
year American industry creates new products and
processes responding to the high living standards
of our people and creating the improved produc-
tion techniques that will push those living stand-
ards higher still.

Our machinery industries, generating a contmu-
ous stream of new inventions for export to the
world, are the acknowledged leadere of mass pro-
duction systems. Our synthetic chemicals prod-
ucts continue to provide most of the major ad-
vances in the world's new synthetic products-so
much so that half or more of the sales of some of
our leading producei-s consist of items that did not
exist 10 years ago. We are a creative nation, and
there is every reason to suppose that we shall re-
main so. If we can turn this creative genius to
use in this new and promising mass market of
Europe, the gains for the American economy can
be prodigious.

Need for Prompt Enactment of Trade Program

But if American producers are to have a fair
chance at the great trading opportunities provided
by this new mass market we cannot afford to delay.
We must be able to assure them of axicess to that
market as soon as possible.

There are several reasons why prompt action is
imperative.

First, the enactment of the Trade Expansion
Act at tliis session can have a major effect on de-

April 9, 1962

601

velopments within the Common Market itself.
There are as many shades of opinion in Europe
as in the United States. Within the European
Community there are strong pressures for the
adoption of a liberal commercial policy and for
an outward-looking posture toward the world.
But there are also pressures for keeping the com-
mon external tariff high and for protecting agri-
culture excessively.

By enacting the Trade Expansion Act we will
make a strong declaration not only of our inten-
tion but our ability to work toward a world of ex-
panding trade. We will strengthen those forces in
Europe that are seeking to liberalize the Common
Market's trading policies.

Prompt action is particularly important in view
of the pending negotiations for the accession of
the United Kingdom to the Common Market.
That negotiation is complex. It affects trading
arrangements not merely with the British Com-
monwealth, which is spread over six continents
around the world, but also with the other Euro-
pean nations that have been imited with Great
Britain in a Free Trade Association.

There are various formulae that can be devised
for the solution of these intricate problems. Some
would be advantageous to United States trading
interests, others severely disadvantageous. Since
the President first announced his intention to sub-
mit the Trade Expansion Act to the Congress some
of the nations participating in the negotiations
have already seen in the Trade Expansion Act the
instrumentality whereby many of the problems in-
volved in the current negotiations can be rendered
easier of solution — and in a manner that will avoid
discrimination against, or disadvantage to, not
only the United States but also other nonmember
trading nations, including our friends in Latin
America.

There is a second important reason why the
prompt enactment of the Trade Expansion Act is
necessary. There has never been a time in recent
history when the trading needs of Europe and the
United States have been more complementary.
Today Europe needs our imports and we need to
provide tlie goods it can use. For today Europe's
economy is strained to its limits; capital is scarce;
executive manpower is lacking; overemployment
exists in many areas. America, on the other hand,
has idle facilities and pockets of unemployment.
It would be an act of economic statesmanship if,
by agreement between ourselves and the Common

Market, we could promptly find a basis for achiev-
ing a greater flow of goods to Europe.

"While such an arrangement must, of course, be
reciprocal in form, Europe is unlikely for a num-
ber of years to have large export surpluses avail-
able for sale in America or the capital essential to
make a major advance in the American market.

Both sides of the Atlantic will profit, therefore,
from an early indication that the President will
be in position to negotiate for reductions in the
tariff barriers on transatlantic trade. This can
go far to assure that the solutions arrived at in the
course of the current negotiations for the expan-
sion of the Common Market will not be unduly
burdensome for the trading interests either of
America or of third countries. It should enable
the process of reducing the common external tariff
on major American export products to be phased
more closely with the reduction in the internal
tariffs of the Common Market and thus minimize
the disadvantage to American producers. It
should make it possible for American industry to
gain early access to this new and burgeoning mar-
ket and to establish its brand names and distribu-
tion channels while the competitive situation is
still fluid.

Comparison of U.S. and EEC Tariff Scliedules

I have pointed out earlier in this statement that
the economies of the United States and of the
member nations of the Common Market have
many similarities. Europe, however, has not
reached the same high degree of industrial devel-
opment as we have, in part because it has not
hitherto had the benefit of all the economies of a
great mass market. But there is one additional
respect in which these two economies resemble one
another; they both are enjoying roughly the same
levels of protection from outside competition.

While it is difficult to make precise comparisons,
I should like to draw upon the results of a recent
preliminary and unpublished Tariff Commission
study. This study shows that if the common ex-
ternal tariff of the European Community, as mod-
ified by the recent negotiations in Geneva, were
applied to the actual flow of trade in 1060, the
average levels of duty in the EEC for industrial
products would have been 5.7 percent. The com-
parable figure for the United States would have
averaged 7.1 percent. I am advised that the Tariff
Commission will shortly be reducing this study

602

Department of State Bulletin

to final form and that it can be made available to
the committee at that time.

Another study, completed before the recent
Geneva negotiations, shows that the median of all
tariff rates is the same for the Common Market
and the United States — 13 percent.

While the average tariff burdens on industrial
imports are roughly similar and the median rates
are the same, the structure of tariffs in the two
trading areas is very different. United States
tariff rates range from the very low to the very
high. "We admit nearly 1,000 of the 5,000 items
on our tarilf schedule on a duty-free basis. At the
same time there are about 900 items on which we
levy a duty of 30 percent or more. Products cov-
ered by such high rates are largely excluded from
the American market, while the duty-free items,
to a considerable extent, are products not produced
in the United States.

The common external tariff of the European
Community has a quite different structure because
it was developed by averaging the rates that
existed before 1957 in France, Germany, Italy,
and the Benelux customs union. As a result of
this a\eraging process practically all of the high
tariff rates that existed in the individual coim-
tries have been greatly reduced. Wliereas over
one-sixth of the rates in the United States tariff
are above 30 percent, less than one-fiftieth of
Europe's rates run over 30 pei'cent. There are
thus few rates in the European Common Market
as protective as many rates in our own tariff sched-
ule ; at the same time there are fewer items on the
free list.

These facts are significant for two reasons. In
the first place they show that in any new trade
negotiation the United States and the European
Common Market would be starting at substan-
tially the same levels of protection. It should be
possible to phase down the levels of protection at
roughly the same pace.

But these studies also demonstrate that, con-
trary to the prevailing mythology, our trade nego-
tiators have effectively defended United States
interests. There is a tendency in discussing these
matters to cite rates that are markedly higher in
Europe than in the United States — such as the
current rate on automobiles, which under the com-
mon external tariff of the Common Market is 221^
percent while under the United States tariff is
only 61^ percent — and assume from this that
America has been unduly generous in past nego-

April 9, 7962

tiations and that our negotiators have persistently
gotten the worst of it.

This attitude is in part, perhaps, the reflection
of a long-held view that when our diplomats go
abroad they are too naive and high principled to
protect their country's interests. Such a view does
more credit to our modesty than our judgment.
Speaking for the Department of State, which has
the major responsibility for the actual negotia-
tion of trade agreements, I can assure this com-
mittee quite categorically that this view is held
nowhere outside of the United States. The offi-
cials of our Government who over the years have
participated in trade agreements negotiations
have served their country well. If this were not
so, we could expect to find the tariff rates of
Europe today well above those of the United
States.

It is true, of course, that during the period of
the dollar shortage the limiting factor on our ex-
ports to Europe was Europe's ability to earn the
currency to pay for what it imported. European
nations were thus forced to resort to quantitative
limitations in the form of quotas in order to save
dollar exchange. But by 1958 the Western World
had achieved general convertibility, and today
there are practically no quotas on industrial prod-
ucts in any of the major Western European
markets.

In the past our representatives in tariff nego-
tiations have faced serious technical difficulties.
They have spoken for a United States market of
enormous size, while the representatives of other
countries could speak only for relatively small
national markets. As a consequence, in order to
obtain adequate reciprocal concessions for the con-
cessions we made with respect to the United States
market, our negotiators were forced to bargain
with many countries at the same time.

With the advent of the European Common
Market— and particularly if that market is ex-
panded—future negotiations will depend to a
large extent on the bargain that can be struck
between our representatives speaking for our own
large market and their European counterparts
speaking for a market of almost comparable size.
This in Itself should facilitate the achievement of
agreements.

Expansion of U.S. Agricultural Exports

This statement so far has concerned itself with
the problem of negotiating trade agreements pri-

603

marily with respect to industrial products. But
we have an interest fully as great in preserving
and expanding the access for American agricul-
tural products into the European Common Market.
Our commercial agricultural exports to the na-
tions that would comprise an expanded European
Common Market are presently running at the rate
of about $1,600,000,000 annually, which repre-
sents almost half of our total commercial exports
of United States agricultural products.

In January of this year, after protracted nego-
tiations among the members, the European Com-
munity agreed on the principles of a common ag-
ricultural policy. In a year or two, in accordance
with the new policy, tlie members of the Com-
munity will begin moving toward a common in-
ternal price in their agricultural commodities. By
1970 the Common Market will have achieved free
trade in such products among the member nations.
As the member nations move toward a common
internal price they will also begin to protect that
price structure against lower cost agricultural im-
ports by a system of so-called variable levies. The
levy for each commodity will be fixed at the
amount necessary to bring the price of the im-
ported product up to the common internal price.

Thus far these internal prices have not been
established. It is a matter of the greatest inter-
est to United States agriculture that they not be
established at unduly high levels. A high internal
price level, as we well know, will tend to encourage
uneconomic production, wliich over the years could
displace the products of more efficient producers —
including United States farmers.

I shall not attempt to develop this problem here
this morning since Secretary Freeman [Orville
L. Freeman, Secretary of Agriculture] can speak
about it with much more authority and wisdom.
But it should be emphasized that the Trade Expan-
sion Act was designed expressly to provide bar-
gaining powers that would enable the United
States to maintain the position of United States
farm products in the enormou.sly important West-
em European market.

Expanding Markets of Less Developed Nations

I have spoken so far almost entirely of the appli-
cation of the Trade Expansion Act to our com-
merce with the European Economic Community.
Secretary Hodges [Lutlier II. Hodges, Secretary

of Commerce] yesterday described in some detail
how the act will function in negotiations with
other nations around the world.

As this committee Imows, H.R. 9900 would pro-
vide the President with the authority to reduce
tariffs on any product up to 50 percent in con-
nection with our tariff negotiations with any
country. At the same time the bill reaffirms the
principles of nondiscrimination and most-favored-
nation treatment. Accordingly the benefits of our
negotiations with the European Community would
be available to other nations. To the extent that
such nations receive substantial incidental bene-
fits we should expect to receive concessions from
them.

The United States has a special interest in ex-
panding the export earnings of the developing
areas of the world, not merely because it helps
them toward the ultimate goal of self-sustaining
growth but also because it affects the potential
volume of our own exports. Our export inter-
ests in Latin America and Asia are very large.
Our commercial exports to these areas have now
reached a figure of over $6 billion annually and
promise to grow further still.

The limit on these exports, of course, is repre-
sented by the ability of the developing countries
to earn foreign exchange. If Europe can be per-
suaded to accept the products of Latin America
without undue discrimination — and we hope to
assist in bringing this about through our own
negotiations with the European Economic Com-
munity— this will mean more exports by tlie Latin
American countries. And, of couree, any increase
in the export opportunities of these countries will
increase their ability to buy our products. Our
political and security interests and our trading
interests are, therefore, the same ; both are served
by expanding the market opportunities for the
developing nations. The Trade Expansion Act
should contribute to those opportunities.

Strengthening the Atlantic Partnership

In the course of tliis statement I have attempted
to bring to this conunittee the views of the Depart-
ment of State with regard to certain major as-
pects of the proposed Trade Expansion Act of
19G2. Wo regard this legislation as of major im-
portance. Not only sliould it prove an effective
tool for advancing and protecting the interests of
United States trade — and tlnis of providing new

604

Deparfment of Sfaie Bulletin

business opportunities and job opportunities for
Americans— but it should also constitute a neces-
sary instrument for strengthening the bonds be-
tween the two sides of the Atlantic.

In a world threatened by an aggressive and un-
friendly power, as is the free world today, we
cannot neglect either of these objectives. Not
only must we seize every opportunity to increase
our own strength by the development of new mar-
kets for our products, but we must seek through
the expansion of our trading relations to bind
together the nations that are the core of our

strength for defending the values to which we are
committed.

I think that President Kennedy stated the case
for the trade expansion bill with great eloquence
when he said at the conclusion of his message :

"At rare moments in the life of this nation an
opportunity comes along to fashion out of the
confusion of current events a clear and bold ac-
tion to show the world what it is we stand for.
Such an opportunity is before us now. This bill,
by enabling us to strike a bargain with the Com-
mon Market, will 'strike a blow' for freedom."

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings'

Scheduled April Through June 1962

FAO Committee of Government Experts on the Uses of Designa-
tions, Definitions, and Standards for Milk Products.

ICEM Executive Committee: 19th Session

U.N. ECE Consultation of Experts on Energy in Europe ....

UNESCO Conference on Education in Asia

ILO African Advisory Committee: 2d Session . . . ._

Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission: 4th Meetmg . . .

U N. Economic and Social Council: 33d Session ...... . ■

ITU CCIR Study Group I (Transmitters) and Study Group 111
(Fixed Service Systems).

IDB Board of Governors: 3d Meeting ,o " ' '

GATT Working Party on European Economic Community/Greece .

3d International Cinema Festival

ILO Committee on Statistics of Hours of Work

ILO/WHO Committee on Occupational Health: 4th Session . . .

ICEM Council: 16th Session i, '"'■'' '

Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission: 4th Symposmm on
Peaceful Application of Nuclear Energy.

U.N. Committee on Question of Defining Aggression

U.N. ECE Working Group on Family Budget Inquiries

NATO Medical Committee „ ■ .• , W ,; '

U.N. EGA Community Development Workshop on Social WeUare
and Family and Child Welfare. .

IAEA Symposium on Reactor Hazards Evaluation Techniques . .

FAO Desert Locust Control Committee: 7th Session ......

F.\0 Poplar Commission: 17th Session of Executive Committee . .

Rome Apr. 2-

Geneva Apr. 2-

Geneva Apr. 2-

Tokyo Apr. 2-

Tananarive ^^P""- ^

M6xico, D.F Apr. 3-

New York Apr. 3-

Geneva Apr. 4-

Buenos Aires Apr. 5-

Geneva Apr. 5-

Cartagena, Colombia .... Apr. b

Geneva '^P'"- n

Geneva Apr. 9-

Geneva ■^P''• o

Mdxico, D.F Apr. 9-

New York Apr. 9-

Gcneva ^P""' ?n

Paris *P'- ?~

Abidjan Apr. 11-

Vienna Apr. 16-

Addis Ababa f P'" ,\^

Ankara Apr. 10^

^ Prepared in the Office of International Conferene^. far 18, 19G| Asterisks^.ndK^ e^te^^^^^^^

ins is a list of abbreviations: ANZUS, Australia-New Zealand-United States^^^^^^ 1

des radio communications; CCITT, Comity consultatif ^"/"nat.onal t^legi^aphi^ue et^ ^^^. ^^^^ ^^^^

Treaty Organization ; ECA, Economic Commission for Africa ; ECAFE, '^^°^°?^}^^':;'"'"":'pj.f. p^od and Agriculture
East; ECE. Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Cou^^^^^^

Organization; GATT. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; ^AEA Internationa^ Atonn^ ^ ^^^^_

International Civil Aviation Organization; ICEM I°tergovernniental Comnuttee fo^^^^^^^^ Consulta-

American Development Bank; ILO, International Labor OrgamzaUon , IMCO Inter^^^^^^ Organization; OECD.

tive Organization; ITU, International Teleconimunication Union ; NATO, Nor^hM ^^^^^^^ p^^^

WJIO, World Meteorological Organization.

April 9, 1962

605

Calendar off international Conferences and Meetings — Continued

Scheduled April Through June 1962 — Continued

SEATO Military Advisers Committee Paris Apr. 19-*

U.N. Committee on Information From Non-Self-Governing Terri- New York Apr. 23-

tories: 13th Session.

U.N. ECAFE Regional Seminar on Development of Groundwater Bangkok Apr. 24-*

Resources.

U.N. Economic Commission for Europe: 17th Session Geneva Apr. 24—

GATT Special Group on Tropical Products Geneva Apr. 25-

ITU CCIR Study Group VII (Standard Frequencies and Time Geneva Apr. 25-

Signals).

ITU CCIR Study Group V (Propagation, Including the Effects of Geneva Apr. 25-

Earth and Troposphere).

U.N. ECA Workshop on Urbanization Addis Ababa Apr. 25-

U.N. ECOSOC Commission on International Commodity Trade Rome Apr. 25-

and FAG Committee on Commodity Problems (joint session).

CENTO Military Committee London Apr. 26-

SEATO Council of Ministers: 8th Meeting Paris Apr. 26-

PAHO Executive Committee: 46th Meeting (undetermined) Apr. 29-

IMCO Council: Extraordinary Session London Apr. 30 (1 day)

CENTO Ministerial Council: 10th Meeting London Apr. 30-

IMCO Interagency Meeting for Coordination of Safety at Sea and London Apr. 30-

Air.

GATT Committee III on Expansion of International Trade . . . Geneva Apr. 30-

U.N. ECOSOC Commission on International Commodity Trade: Rome Apr. 30-

Special Working Party.

U.N. ECOSOC Social Commission: 14th Session New York Apr. 30-

FAO Council: 38th Session New York April

PAHO Ministers of Health Washington April

PAHO Permanent Executive Committee Mexico, D.F April

OECD Economic Policy Committee Paris April

NATO Food and Agriculture Planning Committee Paris April

NATO Science Committee Paris April

U.N. ECAFE Conference on Asian Population Bangkok April

U.N. ECOSOC Statistical Commission: 12th Session New York April

OECD Committee for Scientific and Technical Personnel .... Paris April or May

OECD Maritime Committee Paris April or May

2d U.N. ECAFE Symposium on the Development of Petroleum Re- Tehran May 2-

sources of Asia and the Far East.

UNESCO Executive Board: 61st Session Paris May 2-

NATO Ministerial Council Athens May 3-

ITU Administrative Council: 17th Session Geneva May 5-

ANZUS Council: 8th Meeting Canberra May 7-

lAEA Symposium on Radiation Damage in Solids and Reactor Ma- Venice May 7-

terials.

15th International Film Festival Cannes May 7-

ILO Chemical Industries Committee: 6th Session Geneva May 7-

IMCO Maritime Safety Committee: Subcommittee on Code of Sig- London May 7-

nals.

NATO Planning Board for Ocean Shipping: 14th Meeting . . . . Washington May 7-

International Seed Testing Association: 13th Congress Lisbon ^lay 7-

ITU CCIR Study Group II (Receivers) Geneva May 7-

ITU CCIR Study Group VI (Ionospheric Propagation) Geneva May 7-

GATT Committee on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions Geneva May7-

15th World Health Assembly Geneva May 8-

8th International Hydrographic Conference Monte Carlo May 8-

NATO Civil Defense Committee Paris May 8-

U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Human Rights: Seminar on Status Tokyo May 8-

of Women in Family Law.

U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Narcotic Drugs: Committee on Geneva Mav 8-

Illicit Traffic.

International Cotton Advisory Committee: Committee on Extra- Washington May 9-

Long Staple Cotton and Study Group on Prospective Trends in

Cotton.

International Cotton Advisory Committee: 21st Plenary Meeting. Washington May 14-

FAO Committee on Commodity Problems: 35th Session Rome May 14-

Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Law: 11th Session (resumed). Brussels May 14-

Executive Conunittee of the Program of the U.N. High Commis- Geneva May 14-

sioner for Refugees: 7th Session.

U.N. ECOSOC Commission on International Commodity Trade: Rome May 14-

10th Session.

U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Narcotic Drugs: 17th Session. . . Geneva May 14-

World Food Forum Washington May 15-

8th Inter-American Travel Congress Rio tie Janeiro May 15-

19th International Conferonco on Large Electric Systems .... Paris May 16-

Inter-Arncricnn Tropical Tuna Commission: Annual Meeting. . . Quito May 10-

ICAO Airworthiness Committee: 5th Session Montreal May 21-

606 Department of State Bulletin

GATT Council of Representatives Geneva May 21-

U.N. Special Fund: 8th Session of Governing Council New York May 21-

FAO Study Group on Cocoa: 5th Session (undetermined) May 22-

NATO Manpower Committee Paris May 22-

NATO Civil Aviation Planning Committee Paris May 25-

ICAO Meteorological Operational Telecommunication Network Paris May 28-

Europe (MOTNE) Panel.

OECD Committee for Scientific Research Paris May 28-

WHO Executive Board: 30th Session Geneva May 28-

ILO Governing Body: 152d Session (and its committees) Geneva May 28-

IMCO Maritime Safety Committee: Subcommittee on Subdivi- London May 28-

sion and Stability.

International Rubber Study Group: 16th Meeting Washington May 28-

W MO Executive Committee: 14th Session Geneva May 29-

U.N. Trusteeship Council: 29th Session New York May 31-

PAIGH Directing Council: 6th Meeting Mexico, D.F June 1-

International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries: Moscow. June 4-

12th Meeting.

U.N. General Assembly: 16th Session (resumed) New York June 4-

U.N. Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Ques- Geneva June 4-

tions.

U.N. ECE Housing Committee: 23d Session Geneva June 4-

UNICEF Program Committee and Executive Board New York June 4-

PIANC Permanent International Commission: Annual Meeting . . Brussels June 5-

International Labor Conference: 46th Session Geneva June 6-

Rome.

June 11-

Bad Kreuznach, Germany .

June 12-
June 12-

June 13-

Berlin June 22-

Geneva June 25-

Paris June 25-

9th International Electronic, Nuclear, and Motion Picture Exposi-
tion.

IAEA Board of Governors Vienna

UNESCO Intergovernmental Meeting on Discrimination in Edu- Paris .

cation.
ITU CCIR Study Group X (Broadcasting), Study Group XI (Tele-
vision), and Study Group XII (Tropical Broadcasting).

12th International Film Festival

U.N. ECOSOC Technical Assistance Committee

UNESCO Intergovernmental Meeting of Experts Specializing in
Technical Education.

ICAO Visual Aids Panel: 2d Meeting Montreal June 28-

NATO Planning Board for Inland Surface Transport Paris June 28-

OECD Ministerial Meeting Paris June *

7th FAO Regional Conference for Latin America Brazil June

FAO Group on Grains: 7th Session Rome June

IMCO Subcommittee on Tonnage Measurement London June

NATO Science Committee Paris June

South Pacific Commission: 12th Meeting of Research Council . . Noumea June

GATT Working Partv on Tariff Reduction Geneva June

ITU CCITT Study Group XII (Telephone Transmission Perform- Geneva June

ance).

ITU CCITT Study Group XI (Telephone Switching) Geneva June

U.N. ECE Consultation of Experts on Energy in Europe .... Geneva June

United States Delegations
to International Conferences

UNESCO Meeting of African Education Ministers

The Department of State announced on
March 22 (press release 181) that J. Wayne
Fredericks, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Afri-
can Aifairs, would lead the U.S. observer delega-
tion at a meeting of education ministers of Africa
at UNESCO House in Paris March 26-30.

Invited to the conference are the ministers of
education of the 34 African countries that partici-
pated in a conference at Addis Ababa last May,^

' Bulletin of Jmie 12, 1961, p. 936.

as well as other observer delegations from Bel-
gium, France, the United Kingdom, and the four
North African states of Libya, Morocco, Tunisia,
and the United Arab Republic.
Other members of the American delegation are :

Arthur A. Bardos, U.S. Information Service, American

Embassy, Paris
Ras O. Johnson, chief. Education Division, Bureau for

Africa and Europe, Agency for International

Development
John H. Morrow, U.S. Representative for UNESCO,

American Embassy, Paris
C. Kenneth Snyder, Plans and Development Staff, Bureau

of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of

State
Harris Wofford, Jr., Special Assistant to the President

April 9, J 962

607

The meeting in Paris will be concerned with
implementing, including financing, an overall
plan for the development of education in Africa
adopted at the Addis Ababa conference convened
by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization and the United Nations
Economic Commission for Africa. The partici-
pating African states drew up two plans. A long-
range plan calls for extending free universal pri-
mary education by 1980. A 5-year plan would
boost primary school enrollment in Africa from
the present figure of 40 percent of the scliool-age
population to over 51 percent by 1966 and second-
ary school enrollment from 3 to 9 percent. The
cost of the short-range plan was estimated at
$4,150,000,000, of which $2,840,000,000 would be
provided by the African states and the rest from
outside sources.

Specifically, the Paris meeting will review na-
tional plans for educational development in the
general context of the economic and social devel-
opment of each country and study current educa-
tional budgeting in each country in relation to
objectives set at the Addis Ababa conference.

U.S. Replies to U.N. Query

on Transfer of Nuclear Weapons

Folloxoing is the text of a letter from Acting
Secretary of State Ball to U Thanf, Acting Sec-
retary-General of the United Nations.

Press release 169 dated March 14

March 13, 1962
Excellency : I have the honor to acknowledge
the receipt of your note of January 2 in which,
pursuant to General Assembly Eesolution 1664
(XVI), you request the views of my Government
"as to the conditions under which countries not
possessing nuclear weapons might be willing to
enter into specific undertakings to refrain from
manufacturing or otherwise acquiring such
weapons and to refuse to receive in the future
nuclear weapons on their territories on behalf of
any other coiuitry."

Tlio United States attaches great importance
to this matter and desires that an early solution be
achieved to tliis as well as other imi^ortant aspects
of disarmament. Its views on the manner in
which the problem of proliferation of nuclear

608

weapons must be solved have been set forth by the
Eepresentative of the United States to the United
Nations during the General Assembly debates on
this problem. Nevertheless, I welcome this addi-
tional opportunity to reiterate these views.

With regard to the position of the United
States, the question of dissemination of nuclear
weapons appears to fall logically into two cate-
gories: (1) the manufacture or acquisition of
ownership of nuclear weapons, and (2) the de-
ployment of nuclear weapons. With respect to
the manufacture or ownership of nuclear weapons,
the concern of my Government to prevent the
proliferation of such weapons has been made clear
by its actions. Both United States legislation
and policy severely limit United States transfer
of weapons information to other countries; United
States policy opposes the development of national
nuclear weapons capability by any additional
nation. United States legislation precludes trans-
fer of ownership or control of such weapons to
other states. This legislation has been a keystone
in nuclear weapons policy of the United States.

The concern of my Government with the prob-
lem of proliferation of nuclear weapons is also
i-eflected in the far-reaching disarmament pro-
posal which it put forward on September 25,
1961,^ in the Sixteenth General Assembly. That
proposal in its Stage I provides, inter alia, that
"States owning nuclear weapons shall not re-
linquish control of such weapons to any nation
not owning them and shall not transmit to any
nation information or material necessary for their
manufacture."' It further provides that "States
not owning nuclear weapons shall not manufac-
ture such weapons, attempt to obtain control of
such weapons belonging to other States, or seek
or receive information or materials necessary' for
their manufacture." In the Sixteenth Genei'al
Assembly, the Government of Ireland proposed a
resolution (1665 XVI), the substance of which
was in consonance with the similar proposals con-
tained in the United States proposal of Sep-
tember 25. Consequently, the ITiiitcd Slates gave
its full support to that constructive ell'ort to deal
with the problem and joined other delegations in
passing this resolution by a unanimous vote.

On the second aspect of General Assembly
Resolution 1664 (XVI), i.e., location of luiclear
weapons, for reasons that are well understood the

' For text, see Bulletin of Oct 16, 1961, p. 650.

Department of State Bulletin

defense system of the United States and of its
allies includes both conventional and nuclear
weapons, wliich exist to support the right of in-
dividual and collective self-defense, a right recog-
nized by the Charter of the United Nations. Both
the United States and its allies have chosen these
arrangements recognizing that nuclear weapons
are a necessary deterrent to a potential aggressor
who is armed with such weapons and openly
threatens the free world.

It is the firm belief of the United States that
the only sure way to remove nuclear weapons,
wherever located, from national defense establish-
ments is through realization of a program of gen-
eral and complete disarmament under eilective
international control. Although this country can-
not speak for other states, it is the opinion of the
United States that, in the present world situation,
nations would be willing to accept those specific
undertakings which would involve giving up vital
elements of their security arrangements only after
they can be sure their security is adequately guar-
anteed by effective disarmament and peacekeeping
measures.

This problem was carefully considered by my
Government in drafting the broad disarmament
proposals it advanced on September 25. My Gov-
ernment considers it appropriate that the
Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, en-
dorsed by the General Assembly in its Resolution
1722 (XVI), take under consideration the ques-
tions raised by General Assembly Resolution 1664.
The resolution put forward by the Government of
Sweden was adopted by the General Assembly
prior to the formation of the Eighteen-Nation
Disarmament Committee. Consonant with its
views that all of the problems specified in General
Assembly Resolution 1664 (XVI) can only be
finally resolved in the context of general and com-
plete disarmament with adequate control, the
United States Government believes that these mat-
ters are appropriate for the Disarmament Com-
mittee to consider. That Committee is charged
with negotiating a balanced disarmament agi-ee-
ment in keeping with the unanimous recommenda-
tion of the General Assembly that such negotia-
tions be based on the Joint Statement of Agreed
Principles for Disarmament Negotiations of 20
September 1961 (Document A/4879 ).=

'' For text, see ibid., Oct. 9, 1961, p. 5S9 ; for a statement
made b.v Secretary Rusk before the Disarmament Com-
mittee on JIar. 1.5, see ibid., Apr. 2, 1962, p. .531.

May I assure you of the continued cooperation
of the United States Government in those areas of
endeavor which will lessen the threat to mankind
of nuclear destruction. It is fervently hoped that
real progress can soon be made toward the attain-
ment of peace in a disai-med world.

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my high-
est consideration.

George W. Ball
Acting Secretary of State

His Excellency

U Thant

Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations

Current U.N. Documents:
A Selected Bibliography

Mimeographed or processed documents (xuch as those
listed below) may he consulted at depository libraries in
the United States. U.N. printed publicatiovs may be pur-
chased from the Sales Section of the United Nations,
United Natioiu Plaza, N.Y.

General Assembly

Progress and operations of the Special Fund. A/5011.
December 6, 1961. 9 pp.

Supplementary estimates for the financial year 1961.
A/4870/Add. 1. December 8, 1961. 10 pp.

Cost estimates and financing for the United Nations
Operations In the Congo. A/5019. December 8, 1961.
4 pp.

Report of the Negotiating Committee for Extra-Budg-
etary Funds. A/5031. December 13, 1961. 17 pp.

Letter dated January 10, 1962. from the Permanent Rep-
resentative of Portugal addressed to the President of
the General Assembly submitting a document comment-
ing on the report of the Sub-Uommittee on Angola.
A/50S2. January 17, 1962. 27 pp.

Economic and Social Council

Papers prepared for the fourth session of the Economic
Commission for Africa, Addis Ababa, February-March
1962. E/CN.14/137, November 9, 1961, 4 pp.; E/CN.
14/122, November 14, 1961, 3 pp. ; E/CN.14/166, Novem-
ber 15, 1961, 16 pp.

Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Pro-
tection of Minorities of the Commission on Human
Rights. Study of discrimination in the matter of po-
litical rights. E/CN.4/Sub.2/213. November 9, 1961.
134 pp.

Report of the Secretary-Oeneral on programs of technical
assistance financed by the regular budget. E/TAC/112.
Novemljer 9, 1961. 91 pp.

Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Pro-
tection of Minorities of the Commission on Human
Rights. Protection of minorities. E/CN.4/Sub.2/214.
November 16, 1961. ,56 pp.

Commission on Human Rights. Periodic reports on hu-
man rights. E/CN.4/S10/Add. 2. December 6, 1961.
70 pp.

Report of the Technical Assistance Committee on pro-
grams of technical cooperation. E/3563. December 20,
1961. 24 pp.

April 9, 1962

609

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Togo

Agreement relating to investment guaranties. Signed at
Washington March 20, 1962. Entered into force March
20, 1962.

Turkey

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agree-
ment of July 29, 1961, as amended (TIAS 4819, 4874,
4926, and 4937). Effected by exchange of notes at
Ankara March 14, 1962. Entered into force March 14,
1962.

Atomic Energy

Amendment to article VI.A.3 of the Statute of the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency (TIAS 3873). Done
at Vienna October 4, 1961.'

Acceptances deposited: France, March 14, 1962; Ghana,
March 15, 1962.

Automotive Traffic

Convention on road traffic, with annexes. Done at

Geneva September 19, 1949. Entered into force

March 26, 1952. TIAS 2487.

Accession deposited: Guatemala (with reservation),
January 10, 1962.
Protocol providing for accession to the convention on road

traffic by occupied countries or territories. Done at

Geneva September 19, 1949. TIAS 2487.

Accession deposited: Guatemala, January 10, 1962.

Bills of Lading

International convention for unification of certain rules
relating to bills of lading, and protocol of signature.
Ckjncluded at Brussels August 25, 1924. Entered Into
force June 2, 1931 ; for the United States December 29,
1937. 51 Stat. 233.

Accession deposited: Ireland (with reservations).
January 30, 1962.

BILATERAL

Afghanistan

Agreement extending the technical cooperation program
agreement of June 30, 1953, as extended (TIAS 2856
and 4670). Effected by exchange of notes at Kabul
December 30, 1961, and February 27, 1962. Entered
into force February 27, 1962.

Colombia

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agree-
ment of October 6, 1959 (TIAS 4337). Effected by ex-
change of notes at Washington September 6 and 8,
1961. Entered into force September 8, 1961.

Cyprus

Memorandum of understanding regarding the grant to
Cyprus of agricultural commodities for an expanded
school lunch program. Signed at Nicosia March 2,
1902. Entered into force March 2, 1962.

Switzerland

Agreement modifying section A of Schedule I of reciprocal
trade agreement of January 9, 1936, as modified (49
Stat. 3917 ; TIAS 4379) . Effected by exchange of notes
at Geneva January 18, 1962. Entered into force January
18, 1962.

PUBLICATIONS

' Not in force.

Department Publishes Foreign Relations
Volumes on China and Far East

China, 1943

Press release 148 dated March 7, for release March 20

The Department of State released on March 20 Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1943, China. Aside from
the special volume on the conferences at Cairo and Tehran,
this is the first of the Foreign Relations volumes to be
issued for the year 1943. Other volumes for that year are
in process of preparation.

Copies of Foreign Relations of the United States, 194S,
China (vi, 908 pp.) may be purchased from the Superin-
tendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington 25, D.C., for $4 each.

Far East, 1941

Press release 178 dated March 20, for release March 27

The Department of State released on March 27 Foreign

Relations of the United States, 19il, roluinc V, The Far
East. This volume is one of a series of seven regular
Foreign Relations volumes for the year 1941. The first
four volumes of this series have previously been pub-
lished. The remaining two volumes, dealing with rela-
tions with the American Republics, are in process of
preparation.

Volume IV for 1941 also relates to the Far East and a
con.siderable amount of diplomatic corresimndence for
1941 on the Far East is contained in Foreign Relations of
the United States, Japan, 19S1-19.',1, Volumes I and II,
published in 1943.

Copies of Foreign Relations of the United States, lO^l,
Volume V, The Far East (v, 938 pp.) may be purchased
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C., for ,$4 each.

610

Department of $fafe Bulletin

April 9, 1962

Ind

ex

Vol. XLVI, No. 1189

Africa. UNESCO Meeting of African Education

Ministers (delegation) 607

American Republics. General White Nominated
for Special OAS Committee on Security .... 591

Asia. Foreign Relations volume, Far East, 1941 . 610

Atomic Energy

The United Nations Decade of Development (Cleve-
land, Gardner, Stevenson) 577

U.S. Replies to U.N. Query on Transfer of Nuclear
Weapons (Ball) 608

U.S. Urges Soviet Union To Join In Ending Nuclear
Weapon Tests (Rusk) 571

China. Foreign Relations volume, China, 1943 . . 610

Congress, The. Major Aspects of the Trade Expan-
sion Act (Ball) 597

Department and Foreign Service. Confirmations

(Blumenthal) 596

Disarmament

The United Nations Decade of Development (Cleve-
land, Gardner, Stevenson) 577

U.S. Replies to U.N. Query on Transfer of Nuclear

Weapons (Ball) 608

U.S. Urges Soviet Union To Join in Ending Nuclear

Weapon Tests (Rusk) 571

Economic Affairs

Major Aspects of the Trade Expansion Act (Ball) . 597
Meeting the Soviet Economic Challenge (Trezise) . 592

Educational and Cultural Affairs. UNESCO Meet-
ing of African Education Ministers (delegation) . 607

Europe. Major Aspects of the Trade Expansion
Act (Ball) 597

International Organizations and Conferences

Calendar of International Conferences and Meet-
ings 605

General White Nominated for Special OAS Commit-
tee on Security 591

UNESCO Meeting of African Education Ministers

(delegation) 607

U.S. Urges Soviet Union To Join in Ending Nuclear
Weapon Tests (Rusk) 571

Presidential Documents. President Greets Ameri-
can Association for the United Nations .... 578

Public Affairs. Foreign Policy Briefing Conference

To Be Held at Toledo, Ohio 576

Publications. Department Publishes Foreign Rela-
tions Volumes on China and Far East .... 610

Science

The United Nations Decade of Development (Cleve-
land, Gardner, Stevenson) 577

U.S. Supplies Information to U.N. on Its Space
Launchings (Stevenson) 588

Treaty Information. Current Actions 610

U.S.S.R.

Meeting the Soviet Economic Challenge (Trezise) . 592
The United Nations Decade of Development (Cleve-
land, Gardner, Stevenson) 577

U.S. Urges Soviet Union To Join in Ending Nuclear

Weapon Tests (Rusk) 571

United Nations

Blumenthal confirmed as U.S. representative on
ECOSOC Commission on International Commod-
ity Trade 596

Current U.N. Documents 609

President Greets American Association for the

United Nations (Kennedy) 578

The United Nations Decade of Development (Cleve-
land, Gardner. Stevenson) 577

U.S. Replies to U.N. Query on Transfer of Nuclear
Weapons (Ball) 608

U.S. Supplies Information to U.N. on Its Space
Laimchinga (Stevenson) 588

Name Index

Ball, George W 597,608

Blumenthal, W. Michael 596

Cleveland, Harlan 583

Gardner, Richard N 586

Kennedy, President 578

Rusk, Secretary 571

Stevenson, Adlai E 577, 588

Trezise, Philip H 592

White, Thomas D 591

Check List of Department of State

Press Releases: March 19-25

Press releases may be obtained from the Ofllce of

News

, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Releases

ippearing in this issue of the Bulletin

which were

issued prior to March 19 are Nos. 148

of March 7

; 15!) of March 10; 160 of March 12:

164 of March 13 ; and 167, 168, and 169 of March 14. |

No.

Date

Subject

•176

3/19

U.S. participation in international
conferences.

tl77

3/19

Williams : National Farmers Union.

178

3/20

Foreign Relations volume on Par East.

*179

3/20

Visit of President of Brazil.

*180

3/22

Williams : "Intergroup Relations in In-
ternational and National Affairs."

181

3/22

Delegatton to UNESCO meeting of
African education ministers (re-
write.)

•182

3/21

Gardner: "The New Foreign Trade
Proposals."

tl83

3/23

Bowles : "A Balance Sheet on Asia."

1^

3/23

Regional foreign policy briefing con-
ference, Toledo.

tl85

3/23

Delegation to WJIO Commission for
Synoptic Meteorology (rewrite).

186

3/24

Rusk : Geneva disarmament confer-
ence.

a ted.

• Not pri

t Held foi

a later issue of the Bulletin.

the

United States
Government Printing Office

DIVISION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS

Washington 25, D.C.

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE TO AVOID

PAYMENT OF POSTAGE, fSOO

(QPO)

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES

Diplomatic Papers
1943, CHINA

Department

of

State

m

The Department of State recently released a. volume of documents
on relations of the United States with China for the year lOiS. This
is a continuation of a volume covering the year 194:2, issued in 1956.
The volume is concerned primarily with diplomatic activities within
the responsibility of the Department of State.

The contents include a wide range of subject matter. Topics dealt
with concern China's military position and participation in the war
with Japan, American military assistance to China, political condi-
tions there as affected by Soviet and Chinese Communist policies,
financial relations and lend-lease aid, efforts to open up a new supply
route to China from outside, cultural relations, repeal of Chinese
exclusion laws by the United States, interest of the United States in
Chinese postwar planning, and numerous other subjects. The volume
contains 893 pages, exclusive of preface and index.

Publication 6459 Price: $4.00

Order Form

'o: Supt. of Documents
Govt. Printing Office

Please send me copies of Foreign Relations of the United States,

Diplomatic Papers, 1913, China.

Name: ._

Washington 25, D.C.

Street Address:

Enclosed find:

City, Zone, and State:

$.

{cash, check, or money
order payable to
Supt. of Docs.)

FHE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

T^^^d^

ICIAL

EKLY RECORD

ITED STATES
lEIGN POLICY

Vol. XLVI, No. 1190

April 16, 1962

THE ROLE OF THE UNIVERSITY IN THE BUILDING
OF A FLEXIBLE WORLD ORDER • Addresshy

President Kennedy 615

U.S. PROPOSES PATTERNS FOR FUTURE WORK OF
DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE • Statement by

Secretary Rusk 618

THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE REAL WORLD • by

Acting Secretary Ball "Oii

AMERICAN STRATEGY ON THE WORLD SCENE • by

Walt W. Rostow 625

THE ROLE OF AGRICULTURE IN THE DEVELOP-
MENT OF AFRICA • by Assistant Secretary Williams . . 639

U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICIES • by Acting

Assistant Secretary Trezise 64o

For index see inside back cover

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents

U.S. Qovernment Printing Office

Washington 25, D.C.

Peice:

62 Issues, domestic $8.60, foreign $12.26

Single copy, 25 cents

Use of funds for printing of this publlcji-
tlon approved by the Director of the Bureau
of the Budget (January 19, 1961).

Note: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and items contained herein may
be rei)rlnted. Citation of the Dkpaetment
o» State Bulletin as the source will be
appreciated. The Bulletin Is liide.ied In the
Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

Vol. XLVI.'No. 1190 • Publication 7363
April 16, 1962

The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by tlie
Office of Public Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public
and interested agencies of the
Government with information on
developments in the field of foreign
relations and on the work of the
Department of State and tlie Foreign
Service. The BULLETIN includes se-
lected press releases on foreign policy,
issued by the White House and the
Department, and statements and ad-
dresses made by the President and by
the Secretary of State and other
officers of the Department, as well as
special articles on i^arious plutses of
international affairs and the func-
tions of the Department. Informa-
tion is incluiled concerning treaties
and interntitional agreements to
which the United States is or nuiy
become a party and treaties of gen-
eral international interest.

Publications of the Department,
United Nations documents, and legis-
lative nuiterial in tlie fwUl of inter-
national relations are listed currently.

The Role of the University in the Building
of a Flexible World Order

Address hy President Kennedy^

I am delighted to be here on this occasion for
though it is the 94th anniversary of the charter,
in a sense this is the liundredth, for this university
and so many other imiversities across our country
owe their birth to the most extraordinary piece of
legislation -n-hich this countiy has ever adopted
and that is the Morrill Act, signed by President
Abraham Lincoln in the darkest and most un-
certain days of the Civil War, which set before
the country the opportunity to build the great
land-grant colleges, of which this is so distin-
guished a part. Six years later this imiversity
obtained its charter.

In its first gi'aduating class it included a future
Governor of California, a future Congressman, a
judge, a distinguished State assemblyman, a
clergyman, a lawyer, a doctor— all in a graduating
class of 12 graduates !

This college, therefore, from its earliest be-
ginnings, has recognized, and its graduates have
recognizetl, that the purpose of education is not
merely to advance the economic self-interest of its
graduates. The people of California, as much if
not more than the people of any other State, have
supported their colleges and their universities and
their schools because they recognize how important
it is to the maintenance of a free society that its
citizens be well educated.

"Every man," said Professor Woodrow Wilson,
"sent out from a university should be a man of
his nation as well as a man of his time."

And Prince Bismarck was even more specific.

^ Made at the Charter Day exercises at the University
of California, Berkeley, Calif., on Mar. 23 (White House
press release; as-delivered text).

One-third, he said, of the students of German uni-
versities broke down from overwork, another tliird
broke down from dissipation, and the other third
ruled Germany.

I do not know which third of students are here
today, but I am confident that I am talking to the
future leaders of this State and comitry, who
recognize their responsibilities to the public
interest.

Today you carry on that tradition. Our distin-
guished and courageous Secretary of Defense, our
distinguished Secretary of State, the Chairman
of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Director
of the CIA, and others, all are graduates of this
miiversity. It is a disturbing factor to me, and
it may be to some of you, that the New Frontier
owes as much to Berkeley as it does to Harvard
University !

This has been a week of momentous events
around the world. The long and painful struggle
in Algeria, which comes to an end. Both nuclear
powers and neutrals labored at Geneva for a solu-
tion to the problem of a spiraling arms race and
also to the problems that so vex our relations with
the Soviet Union. The Congress opened hearings
on a trade bill which is far more than a trade bill
but an opportunity to build a stronger and closer
Atlantic community. And my wife had her first
and last ride on an elephant.

Prospect for U.S.-U.S.S.R. Cooperation in Space

But history may well remember this as a week
for an act of lesser immediate impact, and that is
the decision by the United States and the Soviet
Union to seek concrete agreements on the joint

April 16, 1962

615

exploration of space.^ Experience has taught us
that an agreement to negotiate does not always
mean a negotiated agreement. But should such a
joint effort be realized, its significance could well
be tremendous for us all. In terms of space
science, our combined knowledge and efforts can
benefit the people of all the nations : joint weather
satellites to provide more ample warnings against
the destructive storms, joint communications sys-
tems to draw the world more closely together, and
cooperation in space medicine research and space
tracking operations to speed the day when man
will go to the moon and beyond.

But the scientific gains from such a joint effort
would offer, I believe, less realized return than the
gains for world peace. For a cooperative Soviet-
American effort in space science and exploration
would emphasize the interests that must unite us
rather than those that always divide us. It offers
us an area in which the stale and sterile dogmas
of the cold war could be literally left a quarter of
a million miles behind. And it would remind us
on both sides that knowledge, not hate, is the pass-
key to the future, that knowledge transcends
national antagonisms, that it speaks a universal
language, that it is the possession, not of a single
class or of a single nation or a single ideology,
but of all mankind.

I need hardly emphasize the happy pursuit of
knowledge in this place. Your faculty includes
more Nobel laureates than any other faculty in
the world — more in this one community than our
principal advei-sary has received since the awards
began in 1901. And we take pride in that only
from a national point of view because it indicates,
as the Chancellor pointed out, the great intellec-
tual benefits of a free society. This University of
California will continue to grow as an intellectual
center because your presidents and your chancel-
lors and your professors have rigorously defended
that unhampered freedom of discussion and in-
quiry which is the soul of the intellectual enter-
prise and the heart of the free university.

We may be proud as a nation of our record in
scientific achievement, but at the same time we
must be impressed by the interdependence of all
knowledge. I am certain that eveiy scholar and
scientist here today would agree that his own work
has benefited immeasurably from the work of the
men and women in other countries. The prospect

' For background, see Buixetin of Apr. 2, 1962, p. 536.
616

of a partnership with Soviet scientists in the ex-
ploration of space opens up exciting prospects of
collaboration in other areas of learning. And
cooperation in the pursuit of knowledge can hope-
fully lead to cooperation in the pursuit of peace.

The Revolution of National Independence

Yet the pursuit of knowledge itself implies a
world where men are free to follow out the logic
of their own ideas. It implies a world where na-
tions are free to solve their own problems and to
realize their own ideals. It implies, in short, a
world where collaboration emerges from the vol-
untary decisions of nations strong in their own
independence and their own self-respect. It im-
plies, I believe, the kind of world which is emerg-
ing before our eyes — the world produced by the
revolution of national independence which is to-
day, and has been since 1945, sweeping across the
face of the world.

I sometimes think that we are too much im-
pressed by the clamor of daily events. The news-
paper headlines and the television screens give us
a short view. They so flood us with the stop-press
details of daily stories that we lose sight of one of
the great movements of history. Yet it is the pro-
found tendencies of history, and not the passing
excitements, that wiU shape our future.

The short view gives us the impression as a na-
tion of being shoved and harried, everywhere on
the defense. But this impression is surely an op-
tical illusion. From the perspective of Moscow
the world today may seem even more trouble-
some, more intractable, more frustrating than it
does to us. The leaders of the Communist world
are confronted not only by acute internal prob-
lems in each Communist country — the failure of
agricvdture, the rising discontent of the youth and
the intellectuals, the demands of technical and
managerial groups for status and security. They
are confronted in addition by profound divisions
within the Communist world itself, divisions
which have already shattered the image of com-
munism as a universal system guaranteed to abol-
ish all social and international conflicts — the most
valuable asset the Communists had for many
years.

Wisdom requires the long view. And the long
view shows us that the revolution of national in-
dependence is a fundamental fact of our era. This
revolution will not be stopped. As new nations

Deparfmenf of State Bulletin

emerge from the oblivion of centuries, their first
aspiration is to aflinn their national identity.
Their deepest hope is for a world where, within a
framework of international cooperation, every
country can solve its own problems according to
its own traditions and ideals.

It is in the interests of the pursuit of knowl-
edge, and it is in our own national interest, that
this revolution of national independence succeed.
For the Communists rest everything on the idea
of a monolithic world — a world where all knowl-
edge has a single pattern, all societies move toward
a single model, all problems and roads have a sin-
gle solution and a single destination. The pursuit
of knowledge, on the other hand, rests everything
on the opposite idea — on the idea of a world based
on diversity, self-determination, and freedom.
And that is the kind of world to which we Ameri-
cans, as a nation, are committed by the principles
upon which the great Kepublic was foimded.

As men conduct the pursuit of knowledge, they
create a world which freely imites national di-
versity and international partnership. This
emerging world is incompatible with the Com-
munist world order. It will irresistibly burst the
bonds of the Commimist organization and the
Communist ideolog}'. And diversity and inde-
pendence, far from being opposed to the Ameri-
can conception of world order, represent the very
essence of our view of the future of the world.

The Vision of a Free and Diverse World

There used to be so much talk a few years ago
about the inevitable triumph of communism. We
hear such talk much less now. No one who ex-
amines the modem world can doubt that the great
currents of history are carrying the world away
from the monolithic idea toward the pluralist
idea — away from communism and toward national
independence and f i-eedom. No one can doubt that
the wave of the future is not the conquest of the
world by a single dogmatic creed but the libera-
tion of the diverse energies of free nations and
free men. No one can doubt that cooperation in
the pursuit of knowledge must lead to freedom of
the mind and freedom of the soul.

Beyond the drumfire of daily crisis, therefore,
there is arising the outlines of a robust and vital
world community, founded on nations secure in
their own independence and united by allegiance
to world peace. It would be foolish to say that this

world will be won tomorrow, or the day after.
The processes of history are fitful and uncertain
and aggravating. There will be frustrations and
setbacks. There will be times of anxiety and
gloom. The specter of thermonuclear war will
continue to hang over mankind ; and we must heed
the advice of Oliver Wendell Holmes of "freedom
leaning on her spear" until all nations are wise
enough to disarm safely and effectively.

Yet we can have that new confidence today in
the direction in which history is moving. Nothing
is more stirring than the recognition of great pub-
lic purpose. Every great age is marked by innova-
tion and daring, by the ability to meet
unprecedented problems with intelligent solutions.
In a time of turbulence and change it is more true
than ever that knowledge is power, for only by true
understanding and steadfast judgment are we able
to master the challenge of history.

If this is so, we must strive to acquire knowledge
and to apply it with wisdom. We must reject
oversimplified theories of international life — the
theory that American power is unlimited or that
the American mission is to remake the world in
the American image. We must seize the vision of
a free and diverse world — and shape our policies
to speed progress toward a more flexible world
order.

This is the unifying spirit of our policies in the
world today. The purpose of our aid programs
must be to help developing countries move forward
as rapidly as possible on the road to genuine na-
tional independence. Our military policies must
assist nations to protect the processes of demo-
cratic reform and development against disruption
and intervention. Our diplomatic policies must
strengthen our relations with the whole world,
with our several alliances, and with the United
Nations.

As we press forward on ever^' front to realize the
flexible world order, the role of the university
becomes ever more important, both as a reservoir
of ideas and as a repository of the long view of the
shore dimly seen.

"Knowledge is the great sun of the firmament,"
said Senator Daniel Webster. "Life and power
are scattered with all its beams."

In its light we must think and act not only for
the moment but for our time. I am reminded of
the story of the great French ^Marshal Lyautey,
who once asked his gardener to plant a tree. The

April 16, 1962

617

gardener objected that the tree was slow-growing
and would not reach maturity for a liundred years.
The Marshal replied, "In that case, there is no
time to lose; plant it this afternoon."

Today a world of knowledge — a world of co-
operation— a just and lasting peace — may be years
away. But we have no time to lose. Let us plant
our trees this afternoon.

U.S. Proposes Patterns for Future Work of Disarmament Conference

Statement hy Secretary Rusk ^

I appreciate the indulgence of my colleagues
for some additional remarks on the subject of gen-
eral and complete disarmament. Now that we are
coming to the end of the second week of our dis-
cussion, we believe that it is appropriate at this
point to take some stock as to where we stand and
where we should go next and to try to get a clear
picture of the pattern of our future work in order
that we might move with purpose and not merely
drift.

A number of foreign ministers have departed
and others will be leaving this week as I myself
expect to this afternoon, but I shall be ready to
come back at any time that my return would ad-
vance our work here and I am sure that my col-
leagues aroimd the table would be ready to do the
same.

The foreign ministers of the nations represented
here came to Geneva, I would suggest, for three
broad purposes :

First, to do what they could to prepare the at-
mosphere for the discussions.

The second was to establish an agreed program
of work.

And the third purpose was to present authorita-
tively, and to exchange views on, the basic posi-
tions and approaches of their governments.

These objectives have been achieved with vary-
ing amounts of success; we could liave wished for
more, but we could easily have had less.

The political atmosphere which has surrounded
the opening of tlie talks in this room has been on

' Marie before the IS-nation Disarmament Committee
at Geneva on Mar. 27 (press release 194, revised).

the whole good; the discussions have revealed a
seriousness of purpose and a generally construc-
tive tone. I do not mean, of couree, that no differ-
ences have been expressed. We do not believe that
we would perform any service to the world or to
our work if we attempted to conceal difficulties
and issues for the sake of a false appearance of
hannony. However, we have been encouraged by
the minimmn of recrimination and vituperation.
We hope that this approach will be maintained,
for progress in these matters depends upon our
keeping dispassionate negotiation from being sub-
merged in torrents of invective from any side.

The conference on Friday [March 23] adopted
a plan of work proposed by the cochainnen.
This is an important step forward, although wo
believe that, since there is much yet to be resolved,
there will necessarily be further discussions on
this matter as the days unfold. I will have ad-
ditional views on l)chalf of the United States to
present this morning.

In fulfilling our third purpose each of us has
set forth in broad tonns the basic attitudes of our
respective governments on the subject matter of
this conference. Each foreign minister has put
forward ideas and suggestions worthy of the most
serious scrutiny. These provide a framework for
moving into more detailed discussions of the prob-
lems the conference met to resolve.

In my lirst statement at this conference,- I
referred to thelTnited Slates prograjn for general
and complete disarmament in a peaceful woi'ld

" For a statement liy Secretary Uiislc on Mar. l."), see
Bulletin of Apr. 2, 1902, p. 531.

618

Deparfmenf of Sfafe Bulletin

and made several new specific proposals for con-
sideration within that program. Today I sliould
like to comment on the overall approach repre-
sented by the United States plan.^ For this plan
is not simply a collection of isolated and mirelated
measures. It represents a carefully coordinated
approach to the goal defined in the statement of
principles * agreed last September. Now, for the
first time since the President's presentation of
the jjlan, we are met in a forum charged with the
negotiation of binding agreements.

It would, I think, be useful to recall President
Kennedy's statement of the purposes and objec-
tives of the plan we have put before you. On
September 25, before the United Nations General
Assembly, ho said : ^

It would create machinery to keep the peace as it
destroys the machines of war. It would proceed through
balanced and safeguarded stages designed to give no
state a military advantage over another. It would place
the final responsibility for verification and control where
it belongs — not with the big powers alone, not with one's
adversary or one's self, but in an international organi-
zation within the framework of the United Nations. It
would assure that indispensable condition of disarma-
ment—true inspection — and apply it in stages proportion-
ate to the stage of disarmament. It would cover delivery
systems as well as weapons. It would ultimately halt
their production as well as their testing, their transfer
as well as their possession.

Main Policy Objectives of U.S. Plan

To meet the problems of a world in imeasy
peace, in the midst of an arms race and seriously
divided in ideological aspirations, there are sev-
eral main areas of disarmament which deserve the
primary attention of the conference. They are
areas common to both the United States and
Soviet programs for general and complete dis-
armament. In light of these common areas I
should like to trac« the main threads of policy
objectives that i-un through and give unity to the
fabric of the United States plan.

One of these is a series of related measures
directed toward the containment and reduction of
the nucle-ar threat.

The program we lay before you for considera-
tion is a program of action which begins now and
which converges from many fronts to contain, to
reduce, and to eliminate this threat.

' For text, see ibid., Oct. 16, 1961, p. 650.
' For text, see ibid., Oct. 9, 1961, p. 589.
= [bid., Oct. 16. 1961, p. 619.

In my statement on March 23 ^ I emphasized
one important step of this kind which, this very
month, lies within our gi'asp. It is a sound agree-
ment to end all nuclear weapons tests.

On March 15 I stressed two additional steps,
which also could be put into effect without delay,
to get to the roots of the problem of the nuclear
threat. One is a cutoff of production of fissionable
materials for use in weapons. The other, to begin
at the same time, is the transfer of 50,000 kilo-
grams of weapons-grade fissionable materials to
nonweapons purposes.

Let me digress a moment here to answer a ques-
tion put to us by a number of delegations : How
much is 50 metric tons of U-2.35? Lord Home
has ali"eady given one indication : Its value is con-
siderably more than $500 million. It could, if
combined with other ingredients, produce war-
heads with tens of thousands of megatons of ex-
plosive power.

The United States also proposes that any fis-
sionable materials transferred between countries
for peaceful uses of nuclear energy shall be subject
to appropriate safeguards to be developed in
agreement with the International Atomic Energy
Agency.

Finally, the United States would prohibit the
relinquishment of the control of nuclear weapons
and information and material necessary for their
manufacture to any nation not owning such
weapons.

These measures would contain and reduce the
nuclear threat. This is very important, but it is
not in itself enough. We must, as rapidly as scien-
tific knowledge can point the way for us, seek to
eliminate nuclear weapons stockpiles. Let us be-
gin now to mobilize the best scientific resources
our respective nations can command to concentrate
upon this task.

All these tilings should be done within the first
stage of the disarmament program.

In the second stage we propose that stocks of
nuclear weapons shall be progressively reduced
to the minimum levels which can be agreed upon
as a result of the findings of the Nuclear Experts
Commission; the resulting excess of fissionable
material should be transferred to peaceful pur-
poses.

There is another area where action cannot be

" Ibid., Apr. 9, 1962, p. 571.

April 76, 7962

619

long postponed. Space is our newest ocean of
discovery.

Let us build upon the areas of peaceful coopera-
tion in space which are now being developed in
the United Nations and elsewhere as an outgrowth
of the recent exchange of letters between President
Kennedy and Premier Klirushchev.'' Let us ex-
tend these areas to the field of disarmament.

We have proposed that the placing into orbit
or stationing in outer space of weapons capable
of producing mass destruction be prohibited. We
proposed tliat states shall give advance notifica-
tion to participating states and to the Interna-
tional Disarmament Organization of launchings
of space vehicles and missiles, together with the
track of the vehicle. In one sense these measures
represent another facet of the containment of the
nuclear threat.

Let us begin, and continue until the job is done,
in a third area to reduce and eliminate strategic
nuclear delivery vehicles, other forms of arma-
ments, and armed forces. Let us move boldly and
across the board so that no nation can charge im-
balance in the process.

I have already put forward, a week ago Thurs-
day [March 15], the United States proposal for a
30-percent reduction in the first stage of nuclear
delivery veliicles and of major conventional arma-
ments. I have said that comparable reductions
should be made in the subsequent stages. This
proposal, in the United States plan, is accom-
panied by related measures to deal simultaneously
in all stages with the other major elements of
military power, including reductions in force
levels of states and restrictions and limitations on
production and testing of major armaments as
well as limitations on production and testing of
weapons designed to counter strategic delivery
vehicles. The United States also proposes the
mobilization of scientific talent to find ways to
reduce and eliminate chemical and biological
weapons.

A fourth area also requires action. The United
States plan calls for worldwide measures to reduce
the risk of war by accident, miscalculation, and
surprise attack. Last week I put forward four
specific proposals in tliis field, involving advance
notification of military movements, establishment

' For texts, see iVid., Mar. 12, 19C2, p. 411, and Apr. 2,
1962, p. 53C.

of observation posts, establishment of aerial in-
spection areas and mobile inspection teams, and
establishment of an International Commission on
Measures To Reduce the Risk of War.

Such steps are admittedly no substitute for dis-
armament, but, until disarmament is fiilly
achieved, they can make an important difference.

U.S. Position on Verification

The L'nited States basic position with respect
to verification is known to you.

Secrecy and disarmament are fimdamentally in-
compatible. But it is also that the measures
agreed to must be subject only to that verification
which is necessary in order to determine whether
the agreed measures are in fact being carried out.
This is the only manner in which disarmament
can proceed with the certainty that no state will
obtain military advantage by violation or evasion
of its commitments during the disarmament
process.

A major problem of past general disarmament
negotiations has been the lack of opportimity to
explore the key question of verification thoroughly,
objectively, and constructively. This conference
provides such an opportunity. The United States
is willing to consider seriously any proposed veri-
fication system in the light of the degree of assur-
ance of compliance that it would provide and in
the light of the significance of possible violations.
The United States recognizes that considerably
less than total access to a nation's territory may
suffice.

For example, it is possible, we believe, to design
an adequate verification system based on the con-
cept that, although all parts of the territory of a
state should be subject to the risk of inspection
from the outset, the extent of the territory actually
inspected in any step or stage would bear a close
relationship to the amount of disarmament and
to the criticality of the particular disarmament
measures.

The United States believes, as I suggested on
March l.*!, that this concept could be implemented
by a system of zonal inspection which would he
generally applicable to measures eliminating,
limiting, or reducing armaments and forces. A
system of zonal inspection would limit the extent
of territory actually inspe-cted during the early
phases of disarmament; it would require far fewer
inspectors than would be required to verify imple-

620

Department of Slate Bulletin

mentation of disarmament simultaneously in all
parts of a nation from the outset.

At the same time it could have complementary
provisions providing for full verification of arms
destroyed and full verification of limitations on
declared facilities such as test sites, missile launch-
ers, factories, and military laboratories. As dis-
armament proceeded there would be increasing
assurance, as more and more zones come under
inspection, that no undeclared armaments or forces
were retained and that no clandestine activities
were being pui'sued. Such a zonal approach, we
feel, would meet the Soviet requirement that full
inspection be related to full disarmament and our
view that inspection develop progressively with
disarmament.

The United States is prepared now both to make
suggestions as to the details of such a plan and
to explore the possibility of designing a zonal veri-
fication system which would be applicable to an
agreed program of disarmament.

Organizational Arrangements Needed

Organizational arrangements must be worked
out to put disarmament and verification measures
into effect.

Isolated initial measures might be undertaken
without such arrangements. We believe, how-
ever, that any comprehensive agreement embrac-
ing a number of important arms reductions will
require supervision by an International Disarma-
ment Organization. The joint statement of
agreed principles envisages such an organization ;
so do the plans of the So\aet Union and the
United States. At an early stage this conference
will have to determine the shape and the duties of
this organization, as well as its place within the
structure of the United Nations.

There is a still larger task that confronts us as
we put a disarmament program mto effect — a task
neither less intricate nor less difficult than the at-
tainment of general and complete disarmament
itself. This is the creation of the kind of world
in which national and international security will
be maintained by means other than national armed
forces.

For if we are to destroy the armed forces which
protect us today, we must be able to look to other
methods of protecting one's safety against an-
other's internal security forces, subversive activ-
ities, or surprise rearmament.

So disarmament must be accompanied by the
strengthening of institutions for maintaining
peace and settling international disputes by peace-
ful means. I do not think there is any dissent
from this proposition, though there may, of course,
be important differences as to methods. The es-
sential point is that progress must be made in this
area to insure that lack of international security
does not become a brake impeding implementation
of the latter stages of disarmament.

Before I move on to the plan of work which
the United States proposes for this conference, I
should like to address some questions which have
been raised about the United States plan for gen-
eral and complete disarmament.

The fii-st is why the United States is willing to
reduce nuclear delivery vehicles by "only" — and
I put "only" in quotation marks — 30 percent,
whereas the Soviet proposal is to reduce them by
100 percent in the first stage.

The fact is that the United States and the
U.S.S.R. are agreed that we should achieve general
and complete disarmament. The first part of
paragraph No. 1 of the joint statement of agreed
principles so states. The objective, therefore, is to
reduce national armaments to nothing — to zero
percent. This is in the Soviet plan; it is in the
United States plan.

There is no significant difference between the
Soviet Union and the United States, then, as to the
amount of disarmament sought.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union,
in getting to that condition of general and com-
plete disarmament — from the present levels to
zei-o — must pass by the 90-percent, the 70-percent,
the 50-percent, and so on, levels of retained arms,
whatever our arrangement. So here, too, there
can be no significant difference between the United
States and the U.S.S.R.

The fundamental problems are two:

Tlie first is : how to disarm in such a way that
at no time in the process will the security of any
nation be impaired. The solution of tliis first
problem, of course, requires that the sequence of
reductions — of kinds of arms and of their sites —
be such as not to create a critical imbalance.

The second problem is : how to keep the develop-
ment of U.N. dispute-settling and peacekeeping
institutions abreast of disarmament.

The problem of maintaining military balance as
we move to general and complete disarmament

April 16, 1962

621

was raised by the distinguished Foreign Minister
of Ethiopia last Wednesday. Mr. [Ketema]
Yif ru stated that he would like to have an explana-
tion as to how the United States proposal to reduce
nuclear delivery vehicles and major conventional
armaments by 30 percent "fit with point 5 of the
agreed principles." Point 5, of course, states that

All measures of general and complete disarmament
should be balanced so that at no stage of the implementa-
tion of the treaty could any State or group of States gain
military advantage and that security is ensured equally
for all.

The United States proposal is based on the con-
viction that there is a tolerable balance today and
that across-the-board, carefully implemented,
progressively larger percentage reductions serve
disarmament most while disturbing balance least.

The thought behind the approach is that reduc-
tions in this manner will in fact leave nations with
compositions of armaments — that is, ai-maments
mix — which are organically sound and which they
and their neighbors imderstand and to which they
are accustomed.

The difference, as the percentages of cuts go
higher and higher, is only that the overall levels
of arms will go lower and lower. The across-the-
board, carefully implemented, percentage-cut ap-
proach avoids the shock of removing, by major
surgery, a disproportionate part of any one com-
ponent of an intricately integrated military mix
upon which a nation has come to rely in protecting
its security.

The United States believes that we have taken
important steps toward evolving a realistic plan
of work for this conference. With the innovation
of informal meetings supplementing plenary ses-
sions we have taken a very significant step away
from the tradition of past disarmament confer-
ences. We have agreed that the plenary meetings
will pursue the primary objective of elaborating
agreement on general and complete disarmament.
With the establishment of a three-nation subcom-
mittee on nuclear testing, we have implicitly rec-
ognized the utility of subcommittees, on which
my delegation believes we will increasingly come
to rely.

U.S. Proposes Specific Program of Work

The United States makes the following pro-
posals regarding our specific program of work for
the following weeks:

In the plenary conference we believe that we
should identify the major substantive areas of a
disarmament program and begin, as quickly as
possible, to determine how these will be dealt with
in an overall agreement on general and complete
disarmament. We should, as we have agreed, con-
sider the Soviet approach in each of these areas,
as set forth in their draft proposal of March 15th.
Simultaneously we would consider the approach
in each of these areas as set forth in the United
States program of September 25, 1961, which will,
in the near future, be resubmitted in more detailed
and elaborated form.

Our objective should be to reach a common un-
derstanding of how all of these aspects can be
fitted into a master agreement for general and
complete disarmament, drawing upon the best of
all the proposals presented by these two programs
submitted and by those which come from other
quarters.

The United States suggests that we take up the
following broad areas in whatever order would
be deemed most useful by the conference as a
whole :

First, measures for the reduction and elimina-
tion of nuclear weapons and other weapons of
mass destruction, as indicated in paragraph 3(b)
of the joint statement of agreed principles of Sep-
tember 20, 1961.

Second, measures for the elimination of all
means of delivery of weapons of mass destruc-
tion, including orbiting vehicles, and for the
reduction and elimination of all armed forces,
conventional armaments, military expenditures,
military training, and military establishments, as
indicated in paragraphs 3 (a), (c), (d), and (e) of
the agreed principles.

Third, measures for the creation of an Inter-
national Disarmament Organization within the
framework of the U.N. and for ell'ective verifica-
tion of the disarmament program, as indicated in
paragrupli 6 of the agreed principles.

And fourth, measures to strengthen institutions
for the maintenance of peace and the settlement
of international disputes by peaceful means, in-
cluding the establishment of a U.K. peace force,
as indicated in paragraplis 1(b), 2, and 7 of the
agi'eed principles.

In all of tlicso areas we should consider the
sequence and balance of measures within stages
and the time limits for each measure and stage,

622

Department of State Bulletin

as indicated in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the agreed
principles.

The United States believes that as these broad
discussions are continued in the plenaiy, with the
objective of acliieving an agreed approacli in all
of these areas, it will be desirable for the plenary
to set up working and reporting subcommittees
to deal with more detailed matters of a technical
or treaty-drafting nature.

For example, we believe that it would be de-
sirable, in the near future, to set up subcommittees
of the plenai-y to study the technical problems in-
volved in the elimination of chemical and bacterio-
logical weapons and to work out the control
problems involved. Similarly, a subcommittee
should be established to examine the problem of
securing the controlled reduction and elimination
of nuclear weapons. We believe that it will be de-
sirable to establish a subcommittee to work out
agreed categories for the elimination of the nu-
clear delivery vehicles and conventional arma-
ments and the measures of control which will be
necessary to police their elimination. And the
United States believes that it will prove useful,
in due course, to establish a subcommittee to ex-
amine the potentialities of the zonal and random
sampling approach to inspection that we have
proposed.

This is not an exhaustive list, and we are sure
that other members will have suggestions for
similar working groups as we proceed in our
discussion.

Suggested Agenda for Committee of the Whole

We have now also agreed to establish a Com-
mittee of the Whole to deal with problems that
might be pursued separately from an overall
agreement. There will be many suggestions for
items to be placed on the agenda of this commit-
tee. Although the subcommittee on nuclear test-
ing was established before we had agreed to set
up the Committee of the Whole, we believe this
subcommittee should most logically operate within
the framework of the Committee of the Whole.
I believe all members here have agreed that the
objective of a nuclear test ban treaty should be
pursued as one separate from the overall objective
of general and complete disarmament.

The United States proposes two further items
for the agenda of the Committee of the Whole:
First, we propose that this committee consider as

a matter of urgency an agreement for the cessa-
tion of the production of fissionable material for
use in weapons. While this measure would ob-
viously be a necessary part of a program for gen-
eral and complete disarmament, as provided in
both the Soviet and the United States plans, we
believe also that this measure should not be de-
layed. We feel that it can be put into effect
separately and as a matter of the highest priority.

The United States will also wish, in the Com-
mittee of the Whole, to reach agreement on meas-
ures for the reduction of the possibility of war
by surprise attack, miscalculation, or failure of
communications. We will specifically propose
that the Committee of the Whole, perhaps in a
subcommittee, explore, on an urgent basis, the four
measures which I proposed in my opening state-
ment of March 15 and to which I referred earlier
today.

The United States makes the above proposals in
the hope that they will lead to a useful exchange
of views and to agreement on precisely how we
will proceed in our work here. The organiza-
tional arrangements which we have already agreed
upon, and which we hope will be elaborated in the
days ahead, provide a good basis for advancing
our work.

Let me emphasize that, as we look upon our
program of work, the conference must and should
examine every proposal made by every delegation
which is relevant to the work of the disarmament
conference. We are in no sense in our suggestions
trying to oppose any suggestion from any quarter
on any point.

In conclusion I would like to repeat the commit-
ment of the United States to the goal of general
and complete disarmament in a peaceful world.
The United States has established a major new
agency to develop our proposals to reach that goal.
The United States is willing to negotiate as con-
structively and as patiently as is necessary to
reach agreement.

A great service would be performed by this
conference if it took steps this spring :

To reverse the upward spiral of destructive
capability which, if imchecked, could by 1966 be
double what it is today ;

To reverse the trend toward diffusion of nu-
clear capability to new nations;

To produce agreement on measures to reduce
the risk of war by accident, miscalculation, or sur-

April 16, T962

623

prise attack ; for the longer we permit tlie risk of
nuclear war to hang over our heads, the more
important it is that the risk be made as small as
possible.

The cochairmen have recommended a plan of
work. This has now been adopted by the con-
ference. I have made some proposals about how
we might proceed under the plan.

Let us now get to work and make a good begin-
ning. We need not be discouraged if we en-
counter difficulties in our early deliberations, be-
cause we are talking about nothing less than the
transformation of the history of man. But it is
important to begin — and with actual, physical dis-
armament. A good beginning will hasten us on
our way to the full disarmament we seek in a
world at peace.

President Repeats U.S. Desire
for Effective Test Ban Treaty

Statement iy President Kennedy

White House press release dated March 29

I stated on March 2 ^ the United States
earnestly desires a test ban treaty with effective
controls. The essential element upon which the
United States has insisted, however, is that there
be an objective international system for insuring
that the ban against testing is being complied with.
This means that there should be an international
organization for operating seismic stations and
for verifying that seismic events have been de-
tected, located, and are appropriate for inspection.
Most important of all, the organization should
have the power to conduct a limited number of
on-site inspections to verify whether a seismic
event was an earthquake or an explosion. With-
out these inspections there can be no confidence
in any system of detection, because it will not tell
us wlicther an underground event is a nuclear ex-
plosion or an earthquake.

On this subject one must distinguish carefully
between detection and identification. We can de-
tect and locate sigiiificant underground events by
seismic means, but of course the same seismic
means detect many shallow earthquakes. Tlie
problem is to identify a particular detected event
as an explosion or as an earthquake. Seismic

means alone simply will not do the job. This
matter has been reviewed again and again by the
best technical minds of the United States and
Great Britain, and the answer is always the same.
And no serious technical evidence to the contrary
has been produced by any other country. A few
of the larger earthquakes can be identified as
such, and very large underground tests outside of
seismic areas can be identified with a high meas-
ure of probability ; this was the case with the So-
viet test on Febiiiai-y 2d. But the seismic records
from the large majority of the events are such
that they could be from either earthquakes or ex-
plosions. In otlier words they cannot be identified.

The only way we know to perform this identifi-
cation is to have a scientific team go to the site
of the event and examine it. By studying the
rocks and the radioactivity and by drilling holes
one can find out with satisfactory certainty
whether it was an explosion. This is the on-sit©
inspection wliich we insist is the only way to verify
the character of an imderground event.

Now the Soviet Government objects to our April
1961 draft treaty on the test ban ^ quite simply
because it provides for international inspection in
Soviet territory. It objects specifically to having
any control posts for test detection in their terri-
tory. This is a sharp and inexplicable regression
from the Soviet position of even a year ago. In
addition the Soviets object to any on-site inspec-
tions whatsoever.

In earlier years the So\Tiet Government, at all
levels, clearly accepted both the idea of control
posts and the basic principle of on-site inspection.
Now it is claimed that such control posts and in-
spections are useful only for purposes of espionage.

As Mr. Rusk pointed out in Geneva last Friday,'
such fears of espionage from the proposed sj'stem
of control and inspection are wholly unjustified.
Members of fixed control posts would be under
Soviet supervision at all times and could go no-
where at all without Soviet appro\-al. ]\Iembers
of inspection teams would be mider constant
Soviet observation and would be limited to the
execution of technical tasks in an area which, at
the very most, would never exceed more than one
part in 2,000 of Soviet territory in any year — and
most of this work would be done in the earthquake
areas of tlie U.S.S.R., far from centers of militaiy

' Bulletin of Mar. 19, 19C2, p. 443.
624

' For text, see ihid.. June .'). lOGl. p. S70.
'lUa., Apr. 0, 19G2, p. .571.

Department of State Bulletin

or industrial activity. Finally, occasional air-
sampling teams would fly in Soviet planes under
fully controlled conditions. I submit that no one
interested in espionage would go at it by the means
of control and inspection worked out in this treaty
after years of effort involving Soviet scientists as
well as our own.

Nevertheless the Soviet Government is now ab-
solutely opposed not only to this particular system
of inspection, carefully supervised and narrowly
limited as it is, but to any inspection at all. This
position has been made very clear both publicly
and privately — most plainly by Mr. Gromyko on
the United Nations radio on March 27.

We laiow of no way to verify underground
nuclear explosions without inspections, and we
cannot at this time enter into a treaty without the
ability and right of international verification.
Hence we seem to be at a real impasse. Never-
theless, I want to repeat with emphasis our desire
for an effective treaty and our readiness to con-
clude such a treaty at the earliest possible time.

U.S. and U.S.S.R. Discuss German
Problem and Related Questions

Following is the text of a joint statement re-
leased at Geneva on March 27 at tlie close of talks
between Secretary Rusk and Soviet Foreign Min-
ister Andrei A. Gromyko.

In connection with their presence in Geneva to
attend the opening sessions of the Eighteen Nation
Committee on Disarmament, the Foreign Minis-
ters of the U.S.S.R. and the United States have
had a series of meetings devoted to a discussion of
the German problem and related questions. Their
conversations have been both useful and frank,
and some progress has been made in clarifying
points of agreement and points of difference.
They have agreed to resume contact in an appro-
priate way after reporting to their respective
Governments and after consultation with their
Allies.

American Strategy on the World Scene

ly Walt W. Rostow ^

The title of my talk tonight is one of my own
choosing: "American Strategy on the World
Scene." I chose this title because there is a wide-
spread feeling in the country that we do not have
a strategy. That view derives mainly, I think,
from the fact that in the predominating news
which comes to us from day to day — in the news-
papers, over television and radio — is the news of
crises : Berlin and the Congo, Laos and Viet-Nam,
and all the others. These crises are very much
part of the reality we face, and I shall begin by
talking about them.

But our strategy goes beyond the crises that are

' Address made before the Purdue Conference on Inter-
national Affairs at Purdue University, Lafayette, Ind., on
Mar. 15 (press release 170). Mr. Rostow is Counselor and
Chairman of the Policy Planning Council, Department
of State.

forced upon us. We have a clear and constructive
strategy. It was outlined briefly by the President
in his last state of the Union message,^ and by
Secretary Eusk in his recent talks to the American
Historical Association ^ and at Davidson College.*
This strategy goes forward in quiet ways, in large
as well as small movements ; but these do not make
exciting news. Nor is this forward movement
always easy to measure. My main purpose in com-
ing here is, therefore, to try to explain what it is
that we are trying to achieve on the world scene
as a nation, positively and constructively, and
what our prospects appear to be.
But first a word about crises.

' Bulletin of Jan. 29, 1962, p. 159.
"/6i(f., Jan. 15, 1962, p. 83.
*IXiid., Mar. 19, 1962, p. 448.

AprW 16, 1962

625

Wlien this administration came to responsibility
some 14 montlis ago we confronted situations of
acute crisis in Southeast Asia, in tlie Congo, in
Cuba, as well as the threat which has overhung
Berlin since 1958 — Mr. Khrushchev's threat that
he would make a separate German treaty which,
in his view, would extinguish Western rights in
West Berlin. These were by no means the first
crises of the postwar years. Such crises have been
the lot of all who have borne responsibility in
Washington since 1945.

Wliy is it that we appear to be living in a sea
of troubles? 'V\niat is it that determines the
chronic recurrence of crises in our environment?

Leaving aside the direct intrusions of Commu-
nist military power in the postwar years — sym-
bolized, for example, by the blockade of Berlin in
1948-49, the invasion of South Korea in 1950, and
the periodic attacks on the offshore islands — post-
war crises have been of three kinds, usually in some
sort of combination : international crises arising
from internal struggles for power, reflecting the
inevitable political and social strains of moderni-
zation going forward in the underdeveloped areas ;
colonial or postcolonial conflicts involving Euro-
pean nations on the one hand and the nations and
territories of the southern continents on the other ;
and the Communist efforts systematically to ex-
ploit the opportunities offered by these two in-
herent types of trouble. Think back and you will,
I think, agree. Indochina, Suez, Iraq, Cuba, Al-
geria, the Congo, Bizerte, Goa, West New Guinea,
the Dominican Republic — they were all com-
pounded of some combination of these three ele-
ments, and they all arose in what we call the
underdeveloped areas.

In Stalin's time the main thrust of Communist
policy was fairly direct and military, but in the
last decade the Communists have worked system-
atically to make the most of the inevitable turbu-
lence of the modernization process on the one hand
and of the north-south conflicts on the other —
(using that shorthand gcogi'aphical designation
to represent the approximate fact that the indus-
trial revolution came first to the noi'thern portions
of the vvoi'id and is only now gathering strength
to the south).

For example, in order to maximize the chance
that Indonesia would go to war in order to acquire
the Dutch-held territory of West New Guinea, the
Communist bloc has advanced credits of $800 mil-
lion to Djakarta, just as, starting in 1955, they

granted substantial anns credits in the Middle
East to disrupt this area and to aline themselves
and the local Communist parties with issues that
had strong national appeal.

Communist activity is global, and it is not, of
course, confined to arms deals. There is almost
literally no nation in Asia, the Middle East,
Africa, and Latin America in which the Com-
munists are not investing significant resources in
order to organize individuals and groups for the
purpose of overthrowing the existing governments
and supplanting them with Communist regimes;
and they look quite openly to what they call wars
of national liberation — that is, to systematic sub-
version building up to urban insurrection or guer-
rilla warfare— as a way of bringing communism
to the underdeveloped areas. Khrushchev has
stated that he regai'ds it as legitimate for Com-
munist regimes to support such insurrection, wluch
we can see in full cry in South Viet-Nam — a guer-
rilla war instigated, supplied, and guided from
outside the country. In a speech of December 2
last year Castro spoke of guerrilla warfare as the
match to be thrown into the haystack and noted
that many Latin American countries were ready
for such treatment.

It is not difficult to see why the Conununists
look on the underdeveloped areas as an arena of
opportunity. The process of modernization in-
volves radical change not merely in the economy
of underdeveloped nations but in their social
structure and political life. We live, quite liter-
ally, in a revolutionary time. We must expect
over the next decade recurrent turbulence in these
ai'eas; we must expect systematic efforts by the
Communists to exploit this turbulence; we must
expect from time to time that crises will occur,
and a great deal of skill, courage, and insight will
be required to handle them in ways which do not
damage — and, if possible, promote — the interests
of the free world.

Shaping Today's Forces to Our Purposes

But our strategy is not built on a merely defen-
sive reaction to these turbulent situations and the
Communist effort to exploit them. We are, I
think, learning better how to anticipate crises, and
we are working with our friends in the free world
to head off or to deal with Communist efforts to
ex])loit them. But we are doing more than that,
and we intend to do more. We are working to a

626

Department of Sfafe Bulletin

positive strategy which takes into account the
forces at work in our environment and seeks to
shape them constructively to our own purposes
and interests — as a nation and as members of a
community committed to the principles of national
independence and human freedom.

What are these fundamental forces which we
confront and which we must shape?

The revolution in military teclinology, yielding
an uncontrolled competitive arms race and, at
present, an imbalance of the offensive over the
defensive in the field of nuclear weapons.

The revolution of modernization in Latin Amer-
ica, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, including
the modernization going forward in undei'devel-
oped areas under Coirmiunist control.

The revival of economic momentum and politi-
cal strength in Western Europe and Japan.

The revolution in science and teclmology, no-
tably in international communications.

The political revolution, marked simultaneously
by proliferation of ardent new nations and an in-
tensified interdependence which requires the in-
dividual nation-state to cooperate increasingly
with others in order to provide for its security and
economic welfare.

Taken together, these forces decree a world set-
ting where power and influence are being progres-
sively diffused within, as well as without, the
Communist bloc, where strong inhibitions exist
against all-out use of military force, where the in-
teraction of societies and sovereign nations be-
comes progressively more intimate.

In tlie light of this view of what we confront in
the world around us, our strategy' has five dimen-
sions.

Strengthening Bonds Among Industrialized Nations

First, we are strengthening the bonds of associa-
tion among the more industrialized nations, which
lie mainly in the northern portion of the free
world: Western Europe, Canada, and Japan.

Western Europe and Japan have been caught up
in a remarkable phase of postwar recovery and
economic growth. During that period they were
protected by American military strength and sup-
ported in many ways by American economic re-
sources. Although they must still rely on the
deterrent power of American nuclear resources,
they are evidently entering a phase where they
wish to play a larger role on the world scene and

have the resources to do so. We are in the midst
of an exciting and complicated process of working
out new terms of partnership with Western
Europe in every dimension.

NATO is being rethought and Europe's role
within it being redefined in the light of Soviet pos-
session of nuclear weapons and missiles and Mos-
cow's recurrent threat that Western Europe is
"hostage"' to its missiles.

New patterns of trade are being worked out
within Europe, between Europe and the U.S., be-
tween the whole Atlantic community and the rest
of the world.

Our policies with respect to economic growth
and currency reserves are being discussed and
alined in the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development, and we are moving into a
new partnership in the business of aid to the un-
derdeveloped areas.

Although Japan stands in a somewhat different
relation to us than does Europe with respect to
militai-y affairs, in each of the other dimensions of
alliance policy — trade, reserves, and aid — it is
moving into a role of partnerehip with the indus-
trialized north. And bilaterally we have moved
closer to Japan in the past year, with the visit of
Prime Minister Ikeda,'^ the Tokyo meeting of cab-
inet ministers from the two countries,® and the
recent visit to Japan of the Attorney General.

The constructive steps that mark this process of
tightening the north and of mobilizing its strength
and resources for worldwide tasks do not usually
make headlines unless — as is inevitable — there are
phases of disagreement along the way ; but it is a
rapidly developing piece of history which will give
to the cause of freedom a new strength, a new bone
structure. The trade legislation which the admin-
istration has recently presented to Congress ^ is
both a symbol of what we are trying to create and
a crucial element in its architecture.

Modernization in Underdeveloped Nations

The second dimension of our strategy concerns
our posture toward the revolution of moderniza-
tion going forward in Latin America, Africa,
Asia, and the Middle East.

■ For background, see ihid., July 10, 1961, p. 57.

'For background, see ihid., Nov. 27, 1061, p. 890.

' For text of President Kennedy's message on trade,
see ibid., Feb. 12, 1962, p. 231 ; for a summary of the bill
(H.R. 9900), see ibid., Feb. 26, 1962, p. 343.

April 16, J 962

627

What we sometimes call underdeveloped na-
tions represent a -wide spectrum with different
problems marking each stage along the road to
self-sustained growth. Some of these nations are
well along that road; others are just beginning.
And in the end each nation, like each individual,
is in an important sense unique. "Wliat is common
throughout these regions is that men and women
are determined to bring to bear what modem
science and technology can afford in order to ele-
vate the standards of life of their peoples and to
provide a firm basis for positions of national dig-
nity and independence on the world scene.

The United States is firmly committed to sup-
port this effort. We look forward to the emer-
gence of strong, assertive nations which, out of
their own traditions and aspirations, create their
own forms of modem society. We take it as our
duty- — and our interest — to help maintain the in-
tegrity and the independence of this vast modern-
ization process insofar as our resources and our
ability to influence the course of events permit.

Last year the executive branch and the Con-
gress collaborated to launch a new program of
aid which would grant aid increasingly on the
basis of each nation's effort to mobilize its own
resources. This approach to the development
problem, which looks to the creation of long-term
national development programs, is just beginning
to take hold. We are in the midst of a complex
turnaround affecting both our own policy and that
of many other nations.

National development plans cannot be made
effective by writing them down in government
offices; they require effective administration and
the mobilization of millions of men and women.
New roads and dams, schools and factories re-
quire feasibility studies and blueprints if they are
to be built — not merely listing in hopeful govern-
ment documents. This turnaround process will,
therefore, take time, but from one end of the
underdeveloped regions to the other it is actively
under way.

More than that, it is now clear that the United
States is positively alined with those men and
women who do not merely talk about economic
development and the modernization of their so-
cieties but who really mean it and are prepared to
dedicate their lives to its achievement. It is no
accident that President Kennedy spoke last year

of a "decade of development." ^ We are up against
a longer and tougher job than the Marshall plan.
But we have already begun to create a new basis
of partnership, not merely between ourselves and
the underdeveloped areas but between the whole
industrialized northern part of the free world and
its less developed regions.

Our objective is to see emerge a new relation of
cooperation among self-respecting sovereign na-
tions to supplant the old colonial ties which are
gone or fast disappearing from the world scene.
"VVliile the headlines are filled with the residual
colonial problems — and they are very real — of
Rhodesia, of Angola, of West New Guinea, quiet
but real progress has been made in fashioning new
links between the more developed and the less
developed areas.

Building New North-South Tie

The building of this new north-south tie is the
third major dimension of our strategy on the
world scene. It goes forward in the Alliance for
Progress,' in our relations with the new African
nations, in the meetings of the Development As-
sistance Committee of the OECD in Paris, in the
consortium arrangements of the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, in
the transformed relations of the British Common-
wealth and the French Community, in the enlarg-
ing contribution of Germany, Japan, and other
nations to economic development. And above all,
it goes forward in the minds of citizens in both
the north and the south who are gradually com-
ing to perceive that, however painful the mem-
ories of the colonial past may be, major and
abiding areas of common interest are emerging
between nations at different stages of the growth
process which are authentically committed to the
goals of national independence and human free-
dom.

Creating a Stable Military Environment

The fourth dimension of our strategy is mili-
tary. There is much for us to build within the
free world, but we must protect what we are build-
ing or there will be no freedom.

' For an address by President Kennedy before the U.N.
General Assembly on Sept. 25, 1961, see ihid., Oct. 16, 1961,
p. 619.

•For background, see ibid., Apr. 2, 1962, p. 539.

628

Deparfmenf of Sfafe Bulletin

A persistent characteristic of Communist strat-
eo'v has been its searching attention to specific
ga'ps— regional and technical— in the defenses of
Tlie free world. It has been, thus far, an evident
purpose of Communist strategy to avoid a direct
confrontation not only with U.S. main strength
but with positions of relative strength within the
free world.

Soviet policy appears to be based on sustained
and sophisticated study of particular areas of vul-
nerability (e.g. northern Azerbaijan, Greece, Ber-
lin, Indochina, South Korea) and particular types
of vulnerability (e.g. the geographical position of
Berlin, the shortage of local defenses against
guerrilla warfare in Laos and South Viet-Nam).
We cannot rule out that in the future the Com-
munists will be prepared to assault directly the
IT.S. or other positions of evident strength within
the free community. Tlierefore it is a first charge
on U.S. military policy to make such direct as-
sault grossly unattractive and unprofitable. But
a major lesson of postwar history is that U.S. and
Allied policy must achieve, to the maximum de-
gree possible, a closing off of areas of vulnerability
if we wish to minimize the number and effective-
ness of Communist probes. It is this lesson which
requires that the United States and its allies de-
velop a full spectrum of military strength, under
sensitive and flexible control, capable of covering
all regions of the free world, if we are to create
a stable military environment and minimize the
op])ortunity for Communist intrusions.

It is toward this objective that we have been
working over the past year. We have been build-
ing American military forces over the whole range
from virtually unattackable Polaris submarines to
the training of our own men and the soldiers of
our allies to deter or to defeat guerrilla warfare.
We wish to make it clear to those who might
attack that a nuclear assault on ourselves or our
allies would bring in return nuclear disaster. We
wish to make it clear that we would use all the
force at our disposal if we or our allies were at-
tacked massively by other means; but we require
also the kinds of force which would permit us to
deter or deal with limited Communist attack with-
out having to choose between nuclear war and
surrender.

Over the past year, and at present, our ability
to cope with force and the threat of force is being
tested in Berlin and in Southeast Asia. We do not

intend to surrender at either point or at any other
point along the frontiers of freedom.

At the same time we recognize that the arms
race is an unsatisfactory way to provide national
security in a nuclear age. We are prepared to
take either limited or radical evenhanded meas-
ures to reduce the risks of war and the burden of
armaments, so long as we are confident that these
measures can be verified and controlled by effec-
tive measures of inspection. This is the burden
of our position at the current Geneva disarmament
conference.'"

Our approach to problems of ai-ms control and
disarmament is not in terms of propaganda : It is
a soberly weighed aspect of national security pol-
icy. We are in deadly earnest. But no amount of
U.S. staff work or seriousness of intent can substi-
tute for the essential missing ingi-edient: a Soviet
willingness to acknowledge and to act on the sim-
ple fact that an end to the arms race requires a
progressive opening of societies to mutual
inspection.

Test of Strength With Communist World

The fifth element in our strategy concerns our
posture toward the nations now under Communist
rule. We have made it clear that we do not intend
to initiate nuclear war to destroy the Communist
world. The question then arises : Are we content
merely to fend off Communist intrusion, military
and subversive? Wliat are our hopes and our
prospects with respect to the Communist world?
Are we reconciled to a planet that shall, at best,
be forever split ?

We are engaged in an historic test of strength —
not merely of military strength but of our capac-
ity to understand and to deal with the forces at
work in the world about us. The ultimate ques-
tion at issue is whether this small planet is to be
organized on the principles of the Communist
bloc or on the principles of volimtary cooperation
among independent nation-states dedicated to
human freedom. If we succeed in defending the
present frontiers of freedom, the outcome of that
test of strength will be determmed by slow-moving
forces of history. It will be determined by
whether the elements in the world envii'onment,
which I listed earlier, are more successfully

" For a statement by Secretary Rusk at Geneva on Mar.
27, see p. 618.

April 16, J 962

634433—62 3

629

gripped and organized by ourselves and our
friends than by the Communists.

The question then becomes : How is history mov-
ing? Are these underlying forces now working
for us or against us ?

I would put it to you strongly that they are
working our way if we have the wit to work with
them.

First, in the naore industrialized north we have
seen in the postwar years a remarkable demonstra-
tion which has had a more profound effect on
Communist thought than is generally understood.
Until very recently the Communists believed that
the United States was something of a special case.
We were viewed as the fortunate democratic is-
land-continent with much land and a few people,
permitted to enjoy — at least for a time — a special,
favored destiny. They looked to Europe and
Japan as more vulnerable regions subject to Com-
munist takeover in the fairly near future.

AVliat has been demonstrated in the past decade
is that advanced democratic societies have learned
to avoid protracted phases of severe luiemploy-
ment and that the American pattern of develop-
ment—our standard of living and the provision of
high standards of consumption to the mass of the
people — is the general pattern. The trend toward
the Americanization of standards of living in
Western Europe and Japan, and the vitality of
democratic capitalism in the past decade, is a
major setback to the Communst image of history,
to their ideology, and to their working plans.

Partly because of this setback they have looked
with increasing hope and enterprise to the under-
developed areas. There they thought the
Communist metliods of organization and the Com-
munist example in China, North Viet-Nam, and
elsewhere — as a means of moving an underdevel-
oped country forward rapidly toward modern
status — would draw others to the bloc. Tliey
turned to a strategy of outflanking and isolating
the United States, Europe, and Japan by winning
over the underdeveloped areas — by ideological
attraction as well as by subversion, aid, and
diplomacy.

The returns are not yet in, but a sober and cau-
tious assessment, :is of 1962, shows this: Wliere
the Communists have had power in underdevel-
oped areas — in China, North Korea, North Viet-
Nam, and now in Cuba — they have done an unim-
pressive job technically, quite aside from the

inhumanity of a police state. The most striking
fact about tlie mood in Asia, when I went out there
with General [Maxwell D.] Taylor last fall, was
the loss by the Communists of their power to at-
tract by example in either North Viet-Nam or in
China. Tlie Communist states are drab and hun-
gry. In particular the Chinese Communists have
demonstrated that the most powerful control ma-
chine ever mounted in an underdeveloped country
is incapable of forcing men to grow enougli food,
and their agricultural crisis has compounded into
a general crisis of industrial production and
foreign exchange.

Meanwhile India and certain other underdevel-
oped nations have begun to demonstrate that real
momentum and steady progress can be obtained in
an underdeveloped area by mobilizing the energies
and loyalties of the people by consent and normal
human incentives.

It appears to be a teclinical fact that the most
powerful system of control is an inadequate sub-
stitute for the incentives and commitment of the
individual citizen, once he can be engaged. De-
velopment is a process which requires that millions
of human beings and many organized groups as-
sume responsibility for moving tilings forward on
their narrow part of the front. There are simply
not enough Commiuiist cadres or secret policemen
available to substitute for the energy and commit-
ment of men and women who understand what
needs to be done and why it is their interest to
do it.

The demonstration in the underdeveloped areas
is not yet as definitive a victory for freedom as
that in the northern half of the free world. One
of the gi-eat tasks of this decade is to complete this
demonstration. But the lesson of our experience
thus far is that we sliould be confident that, in go-
ing forward with economic development by the
methods of pragmatic planning and individual
consent which are natural to us, we are on the right
track technically us well as morally and that the
Communist image of the problems of moderniza-
tion— and Communist techniques for handling
them in the underdeveloped areas — are just as
arcliaic as their notions of how one sliould or-
ganize an advanced industrial society.

There is yet another force worlving our way, and
that is tlie intent of people and governments in the
underdeveloped areas to maintain their independ-

630

Department of State Bulletin

ence. We in the United States can live comfort-
ably in a pluralistic world of independent nations,
each fashioning its own modern personality, be-
cause our life at home is based on the principle
of cooperation among dignified and responsible
equals; but the Communists are driven by their
methods for organizing domestic power to violate
equally the integrity of individuals and nations.
The drive of the people and governmeaits in the
underdeveloped areas to maintain their independ-
ence is a most powerful force. We can honestly
aline our policy with this force. In the end the
Communists cannot; and this is one fundamental
reason why the Communist offensive in the under-
developed areas will fail.

Dispute Between Moscow and Peiping

Finally, tlie Communist bloc itself is now in the
midst ofa slow-moving but great historical crisis.
This crisis takes the form of the deep dispute
between Moscow and Peiping, a dispute which has
engaged in one way or another Communist parties
throughout the world. Wliat lies behind this dis-
pute, among other factors, is the rise of national-
ism as a living and growing force within the
Communist bloc. It is a force within Russia itself,
and it is a growing force as well in other regions
where Communist regimes are in power. Despite
the interest of Communists in maintaining their
cohesion against the West, the slow fragmentation
of the Communist bloc and the diffusion of power
within it goes forward.

We expect no quick or cheap benefits from this
process. In the short run it may present problems
to us, as when the Russians and the Chinese com-
pete to exert their influence over the Communist
Party in Hanoi by backing its efforts in Laos and
in South Viet-Nam. But fundamentally the as-
sertion of nationalism and national interests with-
in the Communist bloc should tend to produce a
more livable world. The diffusion of power, we
know, is the basis for human liberty within soci-
eties, and on the world scene it is the basis for
independent nations.

For example, we have every reason to believe
that the limited assistance we have given Yugo-
slavia and Poland over the years and our willing-
ness to maintain wide human contacts with their
citizens have been sound longrun investments in
the principle of national independence and human
freedom.

April 16, 1962

We should, therefore, be prepared, as these na-
tional interests exert themselves, to find limited
areas of overlapping interest with Communist re-
gimes and to work toward a world which increas-
ingly approximates the kind of world we
envisaged when the United Nations was set up.
Our^'strategy is, then, quite simple. We are
working from day to day to bind up in closer
partnership the industrialized nations of the
north, to work with our friends in the north to
create a new partnership between the more devel-
oped and less developed nations. Recognizing and
welcoming the new strength to be found in West-
ern Europe and Japan, recognizing and wel-
coming the impulse of the southern nations to
modernize, we see a path ahead which would
reconcile the great interests involved and gradu-
ally build a community of free nations.

We intend to defend this community of free na-
tions and to do so in ways which will minimize the
possibility that a nuclear war will come about, and
we intend, with all the poise and insight we can
muster, to draw the nations now under Communist
regimes toward the free-world community by both
ruling out the expansion of communism and by ex-
ploiting specific areas of overlapping interest
which we believe will increasingly emerge as the
strength, unity, and effectiveness of the free com-
munity is demonstrated. As Secretary Rusk re-
cently said : " ". . . we should be aware that the
concepts of independent nationhood, of national
mterest, and of national culture are day to day as-
serting themselves strongly" within the Commu-
nist bloc. We have every reason to be confident
that the wave of the future lies with the funda-
mental principles on which our own society is
based and which are rooted also in the United Na-
tions Cliarter.

It is in this spirit— in terms of these objectives
and this intent— that we do our work from day to
day in Washington. We kTiow that over the next
decade there will be frustrations and setbacks. We
know that we shall have to deal with difficult crises
as well as press forward with our work of con-
struction. But, as we go about our business, we
are in good heart, and we shall not be deflected.
We believe that time is on the side of the things
this nation stands for if we use time well, and we
intend to do so.

' Bulletin of Jan. 15, 1962, p. 83.

631

The United Nations and the Real World

iy Acting Secretary Ball^

Statesmen, Journalists, pundits, and politicians
are fond of reminding us that these are times of
rapid change and vast transformation in human
affairs. It is well that they do, for the pace and
pervasiveness of scientific, political, and social
change have given a special character to the post-
war world.

Yet it is not enough to recognize, as a general
proposition, that change is taking place. We must
define the direction of that change if we are to
adjust our attitudes and policies to the shifting
requirements of the times. For as the world
changes, our conventional wisdom is called into
question, inherited doctrine becomes obsolete, and
human institutions perforce take on new forms
and new functions. It requires all the perception
and imagination we can muster — and then some —
if we are to know even imprecisely what we are
doing or where we are going.

This morning I want to talk with you about
what we are doing and where we are going with
one of the most ambitious and misunderstood of
our postwar institutions — the United Nations.

I refer to the United Nations as misunderstood
because the current discussion of the effectiveness
and utility of that institution displays a wide area
of difference as to its purposes and objectives. If
one would loolc back to San Francisco in 1945
when the charter was being drafted and then look
at the world today, the reason for this misunder-
standing becomes apparent. The assumption —
or at least the hope — that inspired the drafters
of that noble document was that the great powere,

* Address made at a foreiRii policy briefing conference
for the press and l)roadcastinK industry at the Department
on Mar. 20 ( press release 191 ) .

allied in World War II, would be able to live in
relative harmony and together police the postwar
world. They could settle whatever differences
arose among them within the forum of the Se-
curity Council.

As we know all too well, the effort to fashion
one world with one treaty hardly lasted through
the first General Assembly. The Soviet Union
joined the United Nations in name only. Over
the next 4 years the Iron Curtain slammed down
to form a cage aroimd one-third of the world's
population, living on a great landmass that
stretches from the Brandenburg Gate to the Yel-
low Sea.

The United Nations was thus frustrated in its
original objective of serving as a forum for rec-
onciling differences among the great powers.
This has not, however, destroyed its usefulness —
indeed its indispensability.

Instead the United Nations has found its post-
war destiny in quite different and enormously ef-
fective endeavors.

That is why I thought it might be useful, in
the few moments we have together this morning,
to describe the major role tliat the United Nations
has in fact played in this turbulent postwar decade
and a half and to suggest how the United Na-
tions fits into flic whole of American diplomacy.

Transformation in World Power Relationships

The brief moment of time — less than a genera-
tion— since the end of World War II has seen
the world transformed. If one-third of the world
population has been encircled by tlie Iron Cur-
tain, in this brief period another one-third has
made the eventful passage from colonial status

632

Department of Sfcrfe Bulletin

to some form of national independence. Almost
50 new states have come into being; a dozen more
are actively in the making.

Such a revolutionary movement on a worldwide
scale has no precedent. The great changes of the
past have taken place only over centuries; the sud-
den denouement of the 20th-century anticolonial
revolution has been compressed in a mere 15 years.
The breakup of the European empires meant
the collapse of a longstanding system of world
order. It meant the sudden rupture of old ties,
the sudden emergence of new states, the sudden
liberation of a billion people from colonial de-
pendence. The world has never known a compa-
rable political convulsion— so abruptly begun, so
quickly concluded.

Even under the best of circumstances one could
well have expected this to be a period of violent
conflict, chaos, and vast bloodletting. But the
collapse of the European empires did not take
place in the best of circumstances — almost in the
worst. For it took place in a world polarized be-
tween the great powers of East and West, where
the Sino-Soviet bloc had everything to gain by
the vigorous promotion of chaos.

The Communists tried hard to exploit the tur-
moil implicit in rapid change. They sought to
capture and divert the nationalist revolutions into
Communist channels. They did their best to turn
political instability into political collapse, to rub
salt into the wounds of racial antagonisms, to fan
jealousies between the poor and the rich, to ex-
ploit the inexperience of the new governments, to
capitalize on economic misery, and to heighten
tensions between new states and their neighbors
wherever they existed.

In retrospect, of course, it seems extraordinary
that, since the Red Chinese takeover in 1949, the
Iron Curtain countries have failed in almost all
their efforts to convert nationalist revolutions into
Communist revolutions. In spite of the extension
of the Commimist conspiracy through highly or-
ganized local party organizations, in spite of the
disruptive force of violent change, in spite of the
political inexperience of the leaders of the new
coimtries and the natural antagonisms between
the new countries and their former colonial over-
lords, the greatest political upheaval of all time
has still taken place — witlun a fantastically short
timespan — with amazing smoothness and good
will and with a surprising lack of bloodshed.

April 16, 1962

In this great process of change the interests of
the great powers were at all times deeply involved.
Lurking in the background of political changes all
over the world was the disturbing question of rela-
tive big-power advantage. Because of this the
world has lived in constant danger that a jungle
war in Southeast Asia or a tribal conflict in the
heart of Africa could become the occasion for a
great-power confrontation — and that what began
as a brush fire could be fanned into a nuclear
holocaust. Yet this has not happened. Except in
Korea, the direct confrontation of great-power
troops has been averted.

This, it seems to me, suggests quite clearly one
of the major roles of the United Nations. Unable
to bring the great powers together, it has played
a decisive role in keeping them apart. And all
the while it has served as overseer of the rast and
for the most part nationalist transformations
which have been taking place all over the world.
In appraising the success of the United Nations,
in appraising its usefulness to the United States,
I think it is this standard of judgment that we
should employ : How effectively has it facilitated
the peaceful revision of the relations between the
billion colonial peoples largely in the Southern
Hemisphere and the billion economically advanced
peoples in the Northern Hemisphere— in the face
of constant efforts of subversion and interference
from the Communist powers that control the bil-
lion people behind the Iron Curtain ?

End of the Colonial Era

One of the most frequently heard complaints
against the United Nations is that it has precipi-
tated change at too rapid a pace. By providing
each emergent new state a voice equal to that of a
great power, it is said, the United Nations has
given an excessive impetus to the breakup of
colonialism. As the new nations have gained in
numbers and thus in votes in the General Assem-
bly of the U.N., they have mounted pressures
that have forced the colonial powers to move be-
yond the speed limits set by prudence. As a result,
independence has been conferred upon peoples
miprepared for the complex tasks of nation-
building.

Evidence can be marshaled to support this
thesis. Examples can be cited of nations born
prematurely, nations lacking the educated elite
to operate the difficult business of government,

633

nations illogically conceived, with national bound-
aries that have little rational meaning either in
etlmic or economic terms.

But on the other side there are powerful argu-
ments for maintaining the momentum of change.
When the world is faced with a convulsion so
profound as the ending of colonialism, it is well
to get the process over just as quickly as it can
be done peacefully. A great political and social
revolution of this kind cannot be achieved with-
out major adjustments, and in a world where half
of the dependent peoples have achieved independ-
ence the lot of the other half must become increas-
ingly irksome. Under such circumstances a long
deferment of their own independence is likely to
produce frustrations and bitterness that will im-
pede and complicate their ultimate accommoda-
tion to the environment of free nations.

It must be recognized, of course, that the colo-
nial era is not yet finally completed ; there is still
substantial unfinished business to be done. In the
areas of Africa where many Europeans have made
their homes, there remains the task of reconciling
the rights of white minorities with the rights and
aspirations of African majorities. The trouble-
some problem remains, moreover, of how to deal
with the bits and pieces of former colonial sys-
tems— fragments that are themselves so small as
not to fit neatly into the pattern of new nation
states. There are altogether about 50 fragments
of this kind. We oureelves are the administering
power for several groups of Pacific islands under
a United Nations trusteeship. We are seeking to
devise appropriate long-term arrangements for
these areas that will permit the maximum of op-
portunity for the peoples involved.

Yet if the colonial era is not concluded it is well
on the way toward being so. The vast bulk of the
population formerly under colonial rule has now
achieved self-government. Certainly for the ma-
jor powers of the West, colonialism is largely a
matter of history. With good hick the cease-fire
in Algeria can mark another finished page.

By and large the major European powers, which
are our natural partners in most of our activities,
have either seen the transfonnation of their former
colonial possessions into sovereign states or are in
the process of doing so.

This has created difficult problems for them, but,
for the most part, these problems have been met
and solved more easily than had been anticipated.
In spite of fears that the loss of colonies might

enfeeble the colonial powers, this has not proved
to be true. In fact one can say without being
fanciful that, just as the shattering of their colo-
nial systems — like the fission of the atom — has un-
leashed fierce energies, the former colonial powers
— the great powers of Western Europe — are them-
selves generating vast forces, not through fissions
but through the fusion of their economies in the
European Common Market. In ceasing to think
of themselves as the centers of individual colonial
systems they have found a common destiny as
Europeans. In undertaking the business of build-
ing a united Europe they have already developed
a new prosperity, a new purpose, and the begin-
nings of a new relationship with the new nations
carved out of their old empires.

We ourselves have a direct interest in the com-
pletion of the decolonization process for, as colo-
nialism becomes a dead issue between the peoples
of the less developed countries and the major pow-
ers of Western Europe, the free world as a whole
should become increasingly cohesive. President
Kennedy has described the 1960's as a "decade of
development." ^ Certainly the major powers of
the West must devote themselves intensively over
the next few years to assisting the newly emerging
countries toward a level of political and economic
independence that will enable them to play a con-
structive role in the family of nations.

In this endeavor it is essential that the major
AVestern Powers be able to work closely together,
just as they work closely together in resisting
threatened aggression from the Communist bloc.
In the past, however, the existence of colonialism
has often proved an impediment to common ac-
tions or policies among the Western Powers. With
its passing we should be able to look forward to a
further and freer development of the Atlantic
partnership, which is, after all, the hard core of
free- world strength.

Converting Nationalism Into Nationhood

For most of tlio colonial peoples the end of the
colonial ordeal marks the start of a new process,
the convei-sion of nationalism into nationhood.
Sovereignty is sometimes a heady wine. It en-
courages exuberant voices and sometimes irrele-
vant argument. But perliaps this is a function

" For an aUdrt'ss by the Presidont before the U.N. Geu-
eral Assembly on Sept. 25, 1961, see Bulletin of Oct. 16,
1901, p. C19.

634

Department of Stale Bulletin

of growing up — a normal aspect of the transfor-
mation from dependent status to independence.
Let us remember that we were ourselves a young,
brash, and rather cocky nation at the end of the
18th century.

Wo should not, therefore, be put oil' by the fact
that representatives of the new nations are some-
times given to irrelevant talk. Neither we nor
they sliould permit it to obscure tlie relevant busi-
ness that every new state has to tackle as it entei-s
the age of engineering and economics.

In fact, instead of being irked by the occasional
exuberance of some of the representatives of newer
nations in the General Assembly, we should be
eternally grateful to the U.N. that the complex
business of transforming almost 50 new states
from dependence to sovereignty has, for the most
part, been accompanied by speeches rather than
by shooting. This is, I think, one of the striking
achievements of our time.

In trying to understand the actions of the new
nations we should realize that in their eyes the
U.N. has a very special meaning. The immediate
and natural ambition of every new nation is to
establish its national identity. Membership in the
United Nations has served this purpose; it has
become the badge of independence, the credentials
of sovereignty, the symbol of nationhood, and the
passport to the 20th century. "Wlien the delega-
tion of a new nation takes its place in the grand
hall of the General Assembly, that nation has
arrived; it can look the world in the eye and
speak its piece. And even if that piece may be
discordant to our ears the fact that it can be
spoken has helped to stabilize the postwar world.
Yet the U.N. is more than a place for letting off
steam ; it is also a school of political responsibility.
While some of its members may represent closed
societies, it is itself an open society. The General
Assembly is staged for all the world to see, and
performing upon that stage sometimes— though
not always — helps turn demagogs into statesmen.
How else can one explain the fact that at the last
General Assembly the most "anticolonial" mem-
bers of the United Nations decisively rejected a
Soviet resolution calling for independence of all
remaining dependent areas by 1962 ? They spon-
sored instead moderate and sensible resolutions
for which we and most of our European friends
could vote without reservation.

April 16, J 962

The growing sense of responsibility in the new
nations is only partly the result of finding them-
selves on stage before a critical world. It is also
the result of a growing conviction that the business
of economic and social development in their own
countries is tough and demanding. They find
the problems of food and health, education and
technology, enterprise and administration will not
yield to repetitive slogans carried over from the
fight for independence. And they discover, too,
the need to develop a new relationship with ths
Europeans and with the North Americans.

The framework of the United Nations provides
a basis for such a new relationship — a political
system in which the less developed nations can
have a full sense of participation, which makes
possible a family of technical organizations whose
international staffs can help conceive and carry
out the development plans every people now ex-
pects its government to pursue with vigor.

Two Aspects of U.N.'s Peacekeeping Role

In one aspect, then, the United Nations is an
instrument through which the industrial societies
and the less developed nations can be brought to-
gether. In another aspect, as I have earlier sug-
gested, one of the principal achievements of the
United Nations had been to keep the great powere
apart. It has accomplished this by bringing about
the settlement of conflicts through conciliation and
debate and by interposing itself as the agency to
keep the peace in areas where chaos might other-
wise attract great-power intei-vention.

The U.N. was scarcely organized before it was
involved in the difficult and dangerous business of
peacekeeping— in Iran, Greece, Indonesia, Kash-
mir. Since then it has played a part in stopping
aggression, threatened aggression, or civil war in
Palestine, Korea, at Suez, in the Lebanon and the
Congo. In all of these conflicts the great powers
had interests. In the absence of the U.N. they
would in all likelihood have intervened to defend
those interests. Intervention by both sides could
have led to a dangerous confrontation.

The most recent, and perhaps most spectacular,
of the trouble spots in which the U.N. has acted
to prevent great-power confrontation is, of course,
the Congo. Here the U.N., with full United
States support, interposed itself in the heart of
Africa in the nick of time. The Soviet Union was
already moving in, and we could never have stood

635

by while they set up shop in the heart of Africa.
The intervention of the U.N., difficult though it
may have seemed at the time, prevented the chaos
that could well have turned the Congo into another
Korea. Today, by patience and effort, it is help-
ing to bring about the conditions under which an
integrated Congo republic can work its way
toward stability and peace.

I would suggest, therefore, that, in thinking
about the Congo and about other areas where the
United Nations is brought in to keep the peace,
we should ask ourselves this question: From the
point of view of our national security, would it
have been better to send in the American Marines
or to act with others to send in the United Na-
tions in the name of the world commmiity?

Obviously the U.N. cannot keep the peace with-
out expense. Today it has over 20,000 men in the
field, patrolling the truce lines in the Middle East
and keeping the lid on in the Congo. Manifestly
this is the work of something more than a League
of Nations — more than a debating society grafted
on a pious commitment to unattainable goals. It
is the work of an executive agency of considerable
capacity and skill, capable of performing prag-
matic tasks — such as mobilizing, transporting,
commanding, and supplying substantial forces in
the field when an emergency arises.

U.N. an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy

Much of the discussion about the United Na-
tions has not been concerned so much with what it
does as how its activities fit in with the larger
purposes of our own foreign policy. To those of
us in tlie Department of State who have responsi-
bility for the formulation and administration of
that policy tlie relationsliip is clear enough. The
United Nations is an instrument of United States
foreign policy just as it is an instrument of the
foreign policy of every other member state. In
addition the U.N. provides us with a mechanism
by which we can seek to persuade other member
states not only that they should agree with us on
our foreign policy but that they should express
that agreement by actively supporting resolutions
that accord with our own national objectives.

Because our policies have tended to be right and
have thus appealed to the interests of other na-
tions and because Ambassador Stevenson and his
staff have displayed exceptional leadership, wo
have been remarkably successful in obtaining

international approval of our own national
policies.

This is illustrated clearly by the record of the
last General Assembly — the 16th. You will re-
call that this Assembly convened last September
in an atmospliere of somber crisis — the secession
of Katanga Province in the Congo, the death of
Dag Hammarskjold on a mission of conciliation,
the Soviet Union's revival of its infamous troika
proposal for a three-headed Secretary-General,
and the prospect of imminent bankruptcy.

Such was the stat« of affairs when President
Kennedy addressed the General Assembly in
September. He made a ringing affirmation of
U.S. support and confidence in the future of the
United Nations — and backed it up with three
major initiatives.

The President laid before the membership a
comprehensive U.S. plan for general and complete
disarmament,' made realistic by its insistence on
a simultaneous improvement of international
peacekeeping machinery. This put the U.N. in
business again on this vital if frustrating sub-
ject— and seized the initiative for the United
States on the issue of peace.

President Kennedy also called for an active
program of U.N. activity on the peaceful uses of
outer space. The General Assembly acted on this
American proposal in a resolution that extended
the Charter of the United Nations to outer space
and set up the Committee on Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space, which began its work last week in
an atmosphere unusual for the absence of cold-
war policies.

Finally the President called for a U.N. Decade
of Development to speed economic and social
growth in the less developed world. This was ap-
proved unanimously; a general goal of a 50-per-
cent expansion in national incomes was adopted
for the next decade; and a wide range of specific
programs and projects is in the course of prep-
aration.

Thus did the U.N. General Assembly respond to
American leadership and react to American ini-
tiatives that are both in our own interest and in
the interest of a great majority of the members.
Meanwhile the Assembly resolutely preserved
the integrity of the Secretariat against Soviet at-
tack ; rejected the Soviet effort to replace National-
ist China with Commmiist China; drew up an

* For text, see ibid., p. 650.

636

Department of State Bulletin

emergency plan to restore financial order to its
affairs; and dealt in a generally responsible man-
ner with the emotional subject of colonialism.

Functions of Regional Institutions

But if the United Nations is an instniment of
United States policy it is only one of many instru-
ments available to us. It is one of the tasks of
the Secretary of State and his staff, when con-
fronted with a particular problem, to select and
utilize that instrument most appropriate for the
purpose.

It is therefore important to be clear not only
about what the United Nations does but what it
does not do — what it is not, as well as what it is.
Clarity on this score helps resolve the contradic-
tion some people seem to find in American foreign
policy, a contradiction between our reliance on the
institutions of the Atlantic community and our
participation in the United Nations.

No such contradiction in fact exists. The found-
ers of the United Nations recognized the necessity
for regional institutions and explicitly provided
for them in the charter. Indeed the charter calls
upon members to seek settlement of disputes with-
in the framework of regional institutions before
they are brought to the U.N. at all.

In practice we use the various institutions to
which we belong for quite different purposes. Tlie
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is,
of course, the backbone of our military defense of
the free world against the Commimist bloc.
Through our own massive forces and through
NATO we maintain the armed strength that is the
principal deterrent to Communist aggression.
But just as the U.N.'s capabilities are limited, so
are NATO's. Quite clearly NATO could not have
intervened in the Congo to restore order when
Belgium withdrew. Only a world organization
could do so without arousing anticolonialist
emotions.

It is true that the United Nations cannot, by
itself, maintain the peace between the major
powers. It is equally true that NATO was not
qualified to supervise the peaceful change from
colonialism to independence. Their roles are quite
different and distinct. Each is essential, and
therefore we support each for different reasons.

The same observation can be made with regard
to the OECD — the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development — which came into

April 16, 7962

being last September. Through this organization
we are developing means for close cooperation in
economic matters with the major industrialized
powers on either side of the Atlantic. This kind
of cooperation cannot be achieved within the
larger framework of the United Nations. But
the building of workable international relation-
ships with the smaller, poorer countries requires
arrangements in which the weaker nations can par-
ticipate, with dignity, as full-fledged members —
which is the secret of success of the "World Bank,
the U.N. Special Fund, and other worldwide insti-
tutions for technical aid and development lending.
I could, of course, go on to mention other re-
gional arrangements in which we participate.
The Organization of American States, for ex-
ample, gives institutional form to the American
system. And the Alliance for Progress provides
for a massive cooperative effort between the
United States and Latin America.

In view of the need for different instruments to
serve the diverse purposes of our foreign policy, I
find the suggestion quite curious that, by seelring
to use NATO or the OECD as a means of coopera-
tion with our European friends, we are somehow
turning our back on the U.N. I find equally
curious the belief that in seeking to work within
the United Nations we are betraying our friend-
ship with our Atlantic partners.

Nothing could be further from the truth. The
fact of the matter is that, in 41 key votes in the
last General Assembly, the United States and a
majority of the NATO members voted together
41 times. Members of NATO do not, of course,
vote as a bloc at the United Nations; only Com-
munist members vote consistently as a bloc. But
if loyalty to a majority of our NATO allies within
the United Nations is a test, the United States has
proved the most loyal of all— and this record was
made in an Assembly in which there were 14 major
votes on so-called colonial issues.

I cannot understand the contention that the
United States must make a choice between the U.N.
and NATO, that we are compelled for some
strange reason to put all our eggs in one basket.
It seems to me a curious concept that in world
affairs we can do only one thing at a time — that
if we stand finn in one place we cannot move
ahead in another, that if we are in favor of quiet
diplomacy we must be against parliamentary
diplomacy in the General Assembly, that if we

637

are for a strong concert of free nations we must
be against a strong world community, that if re-
gional organizations are realistic world organiza-
tions are necessarily unrealistic.

It seems to me that the present maturity of our
foreign policy lies precisely in our ability to stand
firm against threats of aggression while simul-
taneously taking constructive initiatives to build
a woi'ld free of the threat of aggression — build-
ing up the regional organizations of the Atlantic
and Western Hemisphere communities while
simultaneously supporting the world community
represented by the United Nations — practicing at
the same time bilateral diplomacy, regional di-
plomacy, and global diplomacy through the United
Nations.

U.S. Mission to the U.N. And the combination of
American ideas and initiatives, backed by Ameri-
can power and carried into action by American
diplomacy, enables the United States to carry more
weight in the United Nations than any other
member.

Because it does things we want to see done and
makes possible some relations with other countries J
we want to see established — and because it oper- i
ates, in the words of the charter, as "a center for
harmonizing the actions of nations" — the United
Nations serves the national interests of the United
States. It will, we believe, continue to do so as
long as the United States is its leading member
and exercises day by day, the year round, the
function of leadei-ship.

U.N. Serves National Interests

In this world of interlocking partnerships the
quality of our country-by-country diplomacy has
to be supplemented with a diplomacy of regional
organizations, and both must be complemented by
our effective participation in the parliamentary
diplomacy of the United Nations.

The U.N.'s New York headquarters has become,
for the newer and smaller nations, the diplomatic
capital of the world. Some of the smaller nations
can hardly afford to be represented in more than
a few capitals, but they are always represented
at the United Nations. Thus if an African na-
tion has business with Japan or India or Brazil,
it is more than likely these days to tell its mission
in New York to talk to the Japanese or Indian or
Brazilian delegation to the U.N. And in the U.N.
building itself there were 2,21Y meetings this past
year in the ceaseless process of building relation-
ships among 104 countries whose independence is
declared but whose interdependence is essential.

This is why the United States Mission to the
United Nations bears such a heavy burden and
why its quality is so critical to the national in-
terest. This is why there is a "U.N. angle" to so
many different parts of American foreign policy.
This is why President Kennedy readied out for a
man of Cabinet stature and world renown to head
the United States Mission at the United Nations.

The center of decision and the source of instruc-
tions is Washington — on U.N. affairs as on all
other parts of our foreign policy. These instruc-
tions give considerable weight, as they should, to
the facts and reconunendations received from the

President of Republic of Togo
Visits United States

Sylvanus Olymfio, President of the Republic
of Togo, visited the United States March 19-30.
After 2 days at Washington as a Presidential
guest March 20-22, President Olympio contintied
his visit at New York City, making two other
hrief trips, one to Ni-agara Falls and otic to the
Virgin Islands. Following is the text of a joint
communique between President Kenrwdy and
President Olympio released on March 21 at the
close of their talks.

White House press release dated March 21

The President of the Republic of Togo, His
Excellency Sylvanus Olympio, who is making a
five-day visit to the United States as a Presidential
guest of President Kennedy, will conclude a two-
day stay in Washington tomorrow and continue
his visit in New York. This visit has afforded an
opportunity for the two Presidents to establish a
personal acquaintance and discuss fully matters of
common concern, including problems of global
interest afTooting world peace and human welfare.

The two Chiefs of State agreed that the forma-
tion of the Organization of African States at the
recent liagos Conference was a constructive step
toward building African unify tlirougli political
consultation and practical cooperation in the vari-
ous technical and economic fields. President
Olympio pointed out that such a regional organi-
zation should be based on the same principles as

638

Department of State Bulletin

those of the United Nations, including the prin-
ciple of non-intervention in the internal affairs of
member states.

President Olympio expressed his deep satis-
faction for the unwavering support which the
United States has given to the United Nations,
particularly since the newly independent states
consider that Organization a guarantee of their
independence.

The two Presidents reviewed the friendly and
mutually beneficial relations already established
between the two countries. President Kennedy

noted the determined efforts toward economic and
social development being carried forward by the
Republic of Togo and stated the desire of the
United States to continue development assistance
to Togo. President Kennedy also expressed satis-
faction that the United States could make avail-
able surplus commodities to alleviate the severe
famine conditions in northern Togo, and President
Olympio thanked him for this help. In addition
the two Presidents discussed the role which the
"Food for Peace" program could play in stimu-
lating economic and social development in Togo.

The Role of Agriculture in the Development orAfrica

iy G. Mennen Williams

Assistant Secretary for African Affairs ^

It was a real pleasure to get an invitation from
Jim Patton to attend this distinguished gathering,
and I am happy to be here among my many friends
in the National Farmers Union. You have
coupled with your strong interest in the prosperity
of the family-sized farm a strong interest in na-
tional and world affairs. During the past quarter-
century, world affairs have become increasingly
a major concern for all Americans. Tliis is clearly
true in terms of Africa, where the surge toward
freedom and independence has pushed that con-
tinent to the front of the world stage in a single
decade.

Prior to 1951, only four countries — Egypt,
Ethiopia, Liberia, and the Union of South
Africa — could be listed as independent countries.
Since that time, 25 new nations have emerged on
the African Continent — 17 of them coming in 1960
alone. And there will be many others to follow —
this year and in the years ahead.

"Without subjecting you to a burdensome niunber
of statistics, I would like to mention a few facts
and figures that will give you some perspective
of the scope of the challenge we face in Africa.

' Address made before the National Farmers Union at
Denver, Colo., on Mar. 19 (press release 177).

Take size, for example. The continent of Africa
is an extremely huge landmass, but many Ameri-
cans still are not aware how large and complex
the area really is. Traveling here, I was reminded
that a trip across broadest Africa is almost twice
the distance from Washington to San Francisco.
Looking out of the window of the plane carrying
me into Stapleton Airport, I could see mile after
mile of the Colorado plateau and the magnificent
Rockies towering over Denver. More than 100,000
square miles in size, Colorado is our eighth largest
State. Yet you could fit 100 Colorados into the
African Continent and still have a million square
miles of land unused.

Although large in size, Africa is by no means
heavily populated. Its 230 million people place
it below Asia, Europe, and North America in total
population. Its 29 independent countries range
widely in niunbers of people — from 35-40 million
in Nigeria to about i/4 million in Gabon.

Transportation and communication facilities in
Africa are largely undeveloped, and this massive
continent contains a wide variety of peoples and
cultures little related to one another. Nearly
1,000 languages or dialects are used in different
parts of the continent.

Apri] 16, 1962

639

The economic bases of the widely scattered
African lands also are quite different from region
to region, but the two principal supports of all
African economies are mining and agi'iculture.
These two activities make important contributions
to the well-being of the rest of the world as well.
In minerals, Africa supplies most of the diamonds
used throughout the world and large amounts of
gold, copper, cobalt, uranium, and manganese, to
name a few. It also exports major quantities of
such agricultural commodities as peanuts, cocoa,
coffee, wine, palm products, and sisal.

Geographical Divisions of Africa

Africa is just as diverse geographically as it is
culturally and economically. Essentially, how-
ever, six major regions comprise the continent, and
these arbitrary divisions are useful in helping us
recognize some of the reasons for the many dif-
ferences in Africa.

Bordered by the Mediterranean, the Sahara, the
Atlantic, and the Bed Sea is North Africa, settled
principally by Arabs and Berbers.

Jutting out into the Arabian Sea is the Horn of
Africa, which includes the high Ethiopian plateau
and the hot coastal lands of Somalia and those
bordering the Red Sea.

Savanna Africa is a third major geographical
division. This consists of a broad belt of sand
and grassland states just south of the Sahara ex-
tending from Sudan to the Atlantic Ocean.

On the west coast, running in an arc from Dakar
in Senegal to northern Angola is rain-forest
Africa, the most heavily populated region of the
continent outside of Egypt.

Starting in northern Kenya in East Africa and
rimning on both sides of a line to Cape Town in
South Africa is mountain Africa, the area of
greatest concentration of minority white settle-
ments.

The sixth distinct geographic region is the
Malagasy Republic, the island of Madagascar in
the Indian Ocean, which is settled by people of
mixed stock. Malagasy gives us another good ex-
ample of the hugeness of the African area. If this
island were set along our eastern seaboard, it
would extend from Cape Cod to northern Florida.
Yet many of us think of the Malagasy Republic as
a fairly small island off the African coast.

What is it, then, that binds these many different
regions, cultures, and peoples together? The best

answer to that question is found in the major
aspirations of Africans everywliere throughout
the continent. These broad desires — independ-
ence, dignity, and improved standards of living —
are subscribed to by people from one end of the
continent to the other.

Major Aspirations of African Peoples

Heading this list is the African peoples' desire
to gain freedom and independence from colonial
rule. In recent years this desire has led to the
birth of more than two dozen new nations. Most
of these nations came to independence peacefully.
However, while we may look with wonder on
the transition of 25 nations to freedom in so short
a space of time, the Africans tend to see about an
equal number of nations not yet free.

A second Africa-wide aspiration is the achieve-
ment of individual dignity and self-expression
equal to that of the rest of mankind. This is an
extremely important concern for dark-skinned
people in a world where color bars are being
lowered too slowly for their likmg.

We in America should be especially concerned
with tills particular African goal. The signifi-
cance of racial discrimination in our country is as
keenly felt among African leaders as it is among
Americans. The more sophisticated Africans are
aware that many Americans are making serious
and strenuous efforts to assure all of our citizens
the rights entitled them by our Constitution. Yet
it is clear in our dealings with African nations that
our slowness in providing equal rights for all our
people continues to make us suspect in their eyes.

Improved standards of living comprise the tliird
major aspiration of the emerging nations of
Africa. There are vast differences in economic
levels in Africa, but all of its countries are anxious
to raise their standards of living as quiclcly as pos-
sible. This is not surprising, for in tropical
Africa the per capita annual income is $89 ($132
for the continent as a whole), whereas in the
nearest other area, the Middle East, it is $171, and
in the United States it is $2,500.

Africa's leadere are men in a hurrj'. Tlieir
people have been patient throughout decades of
colonial rule. Now that they have joined the
world of free choice, however, the people insist on
immediate economic improvement.

The people of Africa want to develop and mod-

640

Department of State Bulletin

ernize their countries, not only to obtain the ma-
terial and cultural advantages that come with
mature economies but also to maintain their free-
dom in national and international affairs. They
want to obtain large amoimts of capital and tech-
nical know-how rapidly. They want to improve
educational facilities for themselves and for gen-
erations to come. They want better health, better
sanitation, better housing, better nutrition.

Our agricultural abundance is playing an in-
creasingly important role in our foreign assistance
programs in Africa. Food is our most valuable
material resource, and its use in our Food for
Peace Program gives American farmers a direct
and important stake in American foreign policy.

Many African countries are participating in
this undertaking, and in such countries as Mo-
rocco, Libya, and Tunisia Food for Peace pro-
grams of considerable magnitude are under way.
In these countries not only surplus sales but gifts
for flood and famine relief and school lunches are
part of the overall effort. Of particular interest
in Morocco and Tunisia are programs where agri-
cultural commodities are used directly as partial
payment to workers engaged in national public
works projects. This form of development as-
sistance permits the Governments to embark on
large-scale projects and at the same time combat
the problems of unemployment and under-
employment.

The people and governments who get these sur-
plus agricultural commodities often express their
appreciation at shipside ceremonies. In fact.
President [Habib] Bourguiba of Tunisia last year
said that the generous assistance of this country
prevented famine in Tunisia. We are happy to
be able to help our friends in Africa in these cir-
cumstances, but we also want to help them improve
their own agricultural methods.

With some 90 percent of the population of
Africa engaged in agriculture, and with the pro-
ductive capacity of much of the continent im-
paired by malnutrition, the people of Africa ob-
viously want to improve their crops and their
livestock. Figures supplied by the U.N. Food
and Agriculture Organization show that Africa
has more arable land and pastureland than either
the United States or the Soviet Union. Yet Africa
produces only one-twentieth of the world's agri-
cultural commodities while the United States ac-
counts for almost one-sixth.

Although agriculture is the major source ot
income and emplo3Tnent for most Africans, pres-
ent conditions keep productivity levels per worker
very low. With improved agricultural tech-
niques designed specifically for African condi-
tions, however, there is good reason to believe
that the large arable areas of Africa can be put
to fuller use and raise African living standards
and economies considerably. There is little won-
der that very heavy emphasis is placed on im-
proving this sector of the economy rapidly.

Patterns of Agricultural Production

Patterns of agriculture in Africa today place
ancient, traditional methods of farming for sub-
sistence crops in sharp contrast with the latest
modern agricultural techniques designed to pro-
duce large cash crops for export. This is the
result of decades of colonial rule under which
each unit of Africa was developed as a part of
an overall colonial economy and not as a viable
economic unit in itself. This is an enormous
handicap to many of the new governments of
Africa today.

For the multiplicity of stages of agriculture in
Africa, there are three general patterns of pro-
duction.

First there are those producers who employ
primitive implements and essentially produce sub-
sistence crops to feed the local farm communities.
The traditional agricultural methods used by these
farmers have been handed down from generation
to generation over centuries. In some coimtries
there are areas that never knew the plow until the
last several decades, and in many areas farmers
still use mattocks instead of animal-drawn plows.

In North Africa the principal crops grown for
consumption are winter cereals — wheat and bar-
ley— as well as olives for olive oil. At the other
end of the continent, in South Africa, crop em-
phasis is on siunmer cereals, such as maize and
kafir corn. In between these areas, in tropical
Africa, the major staple crops are cereals, starchy
foods, oil-bearing fruits, groundnuts, and rice.
Coffee, cocoa, and cotton are the three main cash
crops in tropical Africa, and these are grown by
small peasant producers principally for export.

A second group of producers is making vigorous
efforts to convert their operations from traditional
to modem agricultm-al methods. The size of these

April 16, 7962

641

fanning operations varies greatly, and they are
generally efforts which combine subsistence farm-
ing -with cash crops. Many of these producei"S
employ hired labor because of the size of their
plantings.

The third category consists of large-scale plan-
tations and farms using very modern agricultural
methods. These production methods are princi-
pally found in the more temperate regions of
Africa — in the north, in the south, and in the
eastern highlands. Production in these areas is
on a massive scale for the export market, and, in
many cases, production per manpower and unit
of land is as great or greater than that of the
United States or the Soviet Union. These meth-
ods of farming initially were introduced by Euro-
pean settlers, but they are being adopted today by
African governments in their efforts to develop
sound economies.

An important question for American farmers is
whether the African farmer, with improved agri-
cultural methods, is going to be competitive with
the American farmer. Tliis is a very complex
question, but with a few exceptions our agricul-
tural products and those of most of Africa, par-
ticularly tropical Africa, are complementary
instead of competitive. All indications show that
for many years to come we are going to get from
Africa substantial quantities of their tropical
crops, such as cocoa, coffee, and sisal, and that we
will export to Africa substantial quantities of our
crops. For example, there is the strong likelihood
that Africans will increase their consumption of
wheat, which is one major item that tropical
Africa has been getting from us in recent years.
Another important U.S. ex{iort to tropical Africa
is dairy products, which are in great demand be-
cause the tsetse fly prohibits livestock production
througliout a large area of central Africa.

Another factor to consider is population. As
improvements in public health, sanitation, and
medical facilities occur in Africa, there is good
reason to believe that a major increase in Africa's
population will take place over the next two dec-
ades. This rapid growth in Africa will create
strong pressures for increased food requirements,
and the products of improved agricultural tech-
niques will be urgently needed in the African coun-
tries themselves. As African economies grow
there will also be an increase in monetary income.
This factor, together with an expanding popula-

tion, will absorb whatever improved food produc-
tion takes place in the years immediately ahead.
On balance, then, it seems quite likely that the
complementary aspects of American and African
agi'iculture will characterize relations between the
two systems for some time to come.

Progress of Cooperative Movement

The cooperative aspects of African agriculture
impressed me gi-eatly on my visits to the African
Continent last year, and I think the progress of
the cooperative movement in Africa may be of
some interest to you. The cooperative approach
to agricultural production and marketing is espe-
cially important in underdeveloped areas, where
the individual is practically without capital
resources.

Progress in developing co-ops in Africa has
been slow and gradual but generally sound. There
is still much to be done before such organizations
achieve the same relative importance in Africa
that they have in the United Kingdom and West-
ern Europe, where the African movement gets its
inspiration. Needed most to further develop the
cooperative movement in Africa are time and
money to develop teclmical skills and good organi-
zations.

There is, however, great awareness in Africa of
the important role that co-ops can play in national
development, and most governments are encourag-
ing and supporting them, often with credit facili-
ties or credit guarantees. Their efforts are aided
by the fact that cooperation and communal effort
are basic characteristics of traditional African
society, and present-day co-ops are in a sense a
modern extension and adaptation of ancient ways
of life. Most African cooperatives are production
and mai'keting organizations, based on major agri-
cultural export crops. Some of the largest and
most successful cooperatives are concentrated in
East Africa and North Africa, but there are
other important cooperative activities elsewhere
throughout tlie continent.

The cooperative movement in Africa was ini-
tiated principally by white settler groups, who
account for most of the commercial export crop
cooperatives today. Current growth in co-ops,
however, is largely due to the efforts of indigenous
Africans. As they take over more and more re-
sponsibilities for their economies, they have turned

642

Department of Slate Bulletin

increasingly to cooperative methods to handle
their agricultural jDroduction and marketing.

In Uganda, in East Africa, the cooperative
movement is primarily concerned with marketing
and processing cotton and coffee, which form the
basis of its export trade. At the end of 1960
Uganda had 1,640 registered cooperative societies
with a membership of more than 210,000, and 29
estate cotTee factories were owned and operated
on a co-op basis by associations of African growers.
Uganda also has cooperatives concerned with
groundnuts, tobacco, milk, cattle, and fish.

Tanganyikan African cooperatives now market
virtually all African-grown mild coffee, a high
proportion of hard coffee, and at least half of the
total production of cotton. A number of financial-
ly successful Tanganyikan marketing coopera-
tives have invested in cotton-ginning plants as
well as in social projects — including the establish-
ment of Moshi College in that northeastern Tan-
ganyikan city near Mt. Kilimanjaro. Between
1948 and the end of 1959, registered co-op societies
in Tanganyika grew from 62 with 52,000 to 617
with 325,000 members.

In Kenya, too, most agricultural commodities
are handled by cooperatives, which numbered 576
in 1959. In this country the African Cooperative
Union of Kilimanjaro has a long history of de-
veloping coffee production by Africans and serves
as a model for other indigenous African co-ops.

In Noi"th Africa cooperatives play an important
role in the Timisian economy, and the Govern-
ment of Tunisia contemplates an even larger role
for them in the future. In Morocco the first co-ops
were established about 1920. Again here, the
Government looks to further cooperative efforts to
help modernize traditional agriculture in the
rural areas. In the Sudan there are 600 coopera-
tive societies, of which more than one- fourth are
agricultural, and the Government has established
a Department of Cooperation to help the co-op
movement gi-ow throughout the counti-y.

In recent years the United States has played
a modest but significant role in developing co-ops
in Africa, but many other countries also have made
major contributions to the growth of the coopera-
tive movement there. The United Kingdom
really gave impetus to the movement in Africa
following World War II, when it became official
Government policy to foster the growth of co-ops
throughout British Africa. Israel is another
country that has given strong support to coopera-

tive development. Israelis have played a large
part in assisting the growth of co-ops in West
Africa in particular.

U.S. Assistance in Development of Cooperatives

The U.S. Government today is actively en-
couraging the development of cooperatives in
Africa. Our assistance in this field is being
stepped up at the present time, and the Agency
for International Development only recently estab-
lished an office to help its regional bureaus with
cooperative matters.

I am very pleased that the National Farmers
Union has decided to join with the U.S. Govern-
ment in advancing our interest in the cooperative
movement in Africa. As our good friend from
Minnesota, Senator Hubert Humphrey, said re-
cently, "Today's efforts for international progress
are not limited to governmental action. ... As
a free society, the United States offers its skills
and help to others through the efforts of individ-
ual citizens and private groups. I believe we
should pause frequently to encourage nongovern-
mental programs for international progress and
understanding. . . ."

The contract you are now developing with the
Agency for Intei-national Development to provide
training and demonstrations for African coopera-
tive leaders and employees in two countries — one
in East Africa and the other in West Africa — is a
worthy endeavor on your part. This is a highly
desirable type of activity for American nongovern-
mental organizations, and I am very pleased that
you are taking this initiative in a very important
area of American interest.

Another important contribution of nongovern-
mental organizations to African agriculture is the
agricultural teaching being done in Africa by
American land-grant colleges. Michigan State
University has such a program in Nigeria, and
Oklahoma Stat« University has one in Ethiopia.
We also have four preliminary work contracts in
this field — two in Nigeria and one each in Tangan-
yika and Tunisia — and other countries have in-
dicated interest in such programs for the next
fiscal year.

Our governmental agricultural program in
Africa, of course, is also of major importance in
helping African countries boost their economies.
In fiscal year 1962, which ends on June 30, our
agricultural program for 24 African countries

April 16, J 962

643

covers 105 projects at a cost of approximately $25
million, plus the equivalent of $20 million in U.S.-
owned local currencies. These projects call for
280 U.S. technicians to provide training and
demonstrations in the 24 countries. In addition
nearly 600 participants from those coimtries are to
be trained outside Africa, with more than two-
thirds of them scheduled to come to the United
States.

Agricultural aid is only one segment of a new,
integrated economic assistance program by which
the U.S. Government is seeking to help the African
nations help themselves. We also have strong
interests in the development of such important
matters as water programs for irrigation and
power. Africa is rich in hydroelectric potential,
having 40 percent of the world's total, but less
than 1 percent is developed today. Our interest
and support of the Volta River project in Ghana -
has been widely reported, but we also are studying
the Nile Basin in Ethiopia and have other studies
under way in Sudan, Tunisia, Libya, and Somalia.

Our overall assistance program in Africa
strongly reflects our sincere interest in Africa's
social and economic progress, as well as in its
political and economic independence. We support
the three major aspirations of Africans — freedom,
dignity, and improved standards of living — be-
cause these are goals that have made our own
country strong. These are aspirations that point
the way to a strong and stable Africa, and stability
and strength in turn can lead to the kind of peace-
ful world in which we want our children to live.

Man cannot live by bread alone, however, as
you well know. Universal human values of the
spirit transcend the material aspects of life. Our
real challenge in Africa is whether we can respond
to the newly emerging countries of that continent
in a spirit of true brotherhood and friendship. In
meeting this challenge, we dare not fail. I thank
all of you for your splendid support of our efforts
in this tremendously important task.

Letters of Credence

Central African Republic

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Central
African Republic, Jean-Pierre Kombet, presented
his credentials to President Kennedy on March 30.

' For background, see Bulletin of Jan. 1, 1962, p. 30.
644

For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the
President's reply, see Department of State press
release 206 dated March 30.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics, Anatoliy Fedorovich
Dobrynin, presented his credentials to President
Kennedy on March 30. For texts of tlie i\jnbas-
sador's remarks and the President's reply, see De-
partment of State press release 207 dated
March 30.

President Sends Congratulations
to Governor General of Ceylon

Following is the text of a message sent hy Presi-
dent Kennedy on March 21 to William Gopallaioa,
Governor General of Ceylon.

White House press release dated March 21

I congratulate you on your appointment as Gov-
ernor General of Ceylon. It is my sincere wish
and that of the people of the United States that
you enjoy every success. Your ambassadorship in
Washington did much to reinforce the traditional
bonds of friendship between our two countries.
May that friendship be strengthened still further
in the future. Please accept my warm personal
greetings and best wishes.

Sino-Soviet Bloc Military Aid to Cuba
Summarized by Department

Press release 195 dated March 27

The folloiving s^immary on Sino-Soviet bloc
military aid to Cuba is issued in response to nu-
merous requests for up-to-date information on this
subject.

For about a year and a half the Sino-Soviet
bloc has supplied Cuba with large-scale military
assistance. Bloc military deliveries— primarily
from the U.S.S.R. and Czechoslovakia — have in-
cluded a wide assortment of land armaments
ranging from small arms tlirough heavy tanks.
Bloc airci'aft supplied to Cuba include MIG jet
figliters, helicoptei-s, transports, and trainers.
Extensive military training has been pi'ovided

Department of Stale Bulletin

both in the bloc and in Cuba. Communist mili-
tary aid has turned the Cuban military establish-
ment into one of the most formidable in Latin
America, and it has introduced a militaiy cajja-
bility hitherto not present in any of the Latin
American countries of the Caribbean area. How-
ever, there is no evidence that the Soviet Union
has supplied Cuba with missiles or that missile
bases are under constiiiction in Cuba.

The Soviet Union at first moved cautiously in
responding to Cuban requests for military assist-
ance. Once imder way, however, the Cuban
buildup proceeded swiftly. Bloc support has
aided the Castro regime in consolidating its con-
trol over the Cuban people. For the past several
months the bloc's military aid program in Cuba
has been concerned primarily with training, as-
similating new equipment, and remolding the
Cuban military establislmient along bloc organi-
zational lines.

Background

Preliminary attempts to procure Soviet bloc
arms were initiated by the Cuban government as
early as 1959, but no firm military aid pacts were
concluded until the summer of 1960. During 1959
and early 1960, Cuban purchasing missions trav-
eled frequently to the bloc to investigate new
sources of supply. Discussions reportedly covered
a whole range of equipment from small arms to
modern jet aircraft. Mikoyan's [Anastas I. Miko-
yan, First Deputy Chairman of the U.S.S.R.]
visit to Cuba in February 1960 signaled the be-
ginning of a massive bloc trade and aid program
wliich gained momentum throughout 1960 as U.S.-
Cuban relations deteriorated.

Military negotiations with the U.S.S.E. and
Czechoslovakia in 1960 were followed up by a
well-publicized trip to Prague and Moscow by
Raul Castro, which probably was the occasion for
the conclusion of secret arms deals. By August,
Czech small arms were being issued by some Cuban
militia units, and in the autiunn the first major
shipments of Communist arms began arriving in
Cuba.

Scope of Bloc Military Aid

From the autumn of 1960 until the late summer
of 1961, bloc arms deliveries were made regularly
to Cuban ports. No financial information on the

bloc's arms deals with Cuba has been disclosed, but
it is estimated that on the order of $100 million
worth of equipment and teclinical services has been
provided. Moreover, several hundred Cuban mili-
tary personnel have received training, including
pilot training, in the bloc.

On January 5, 1962, during a military parade
celebrating the third anniversary of takeover by
the present regime, Cuba unveiled an array of
militaiy hardware indicative of deliveries up to
that time. Units equipped with medium and
heavy tanks, assault guns, truck-mounted rocket
launchers, artillery, antiaircraft weapons, and
mortars, as well as rifles and machineguns, were
featured prominently. A fly-by of MIG jet
fighters, including some high-performance MIG-
19's, was one of the highlights of the air display.

In the latter part of 1961 tlie focus of the bloc's
military aid to Cuba was on assimilation of new
equipment, intensive training, and completion of
the reorganization of Cuba's military establish-
ment. Recently, however, military shipments to
Cuba have resumed and for the first time have
included small naval vessels.

The capabilities of the Cuban ground forces
have increased steadily since the introduction of
bloc equipment and training in tlie autumn of
1960. The ground forces are estimated to num-
ber some 300,000. All units are equipped with
bloc small arms, and many have heavier equip-
ment as well. Bloc aid is strongly reflected in
Cuba's ground forces organization, which resem-
bles that of the East European satellites. Soviet
bloc arms aid has given the Cuban ground forces
an armored, artillery, antiaircraft,, and antitank
capability largely lacking in the past and un-
known to other Latin American countries of the
Caribbean area. Thousands of modern bloc small
arms have been delivered. Soviet bloc instructors
have been used extensively for training purposes,
and they serve as full-time advisers to some
individual units.

Following the takeover by the present regime,
the capabilities of the Cuban air force declined
sharply as a result of purges and defections of key
personnel. One of the major goals of the new
regime, however, was to acquire combat jet air-
craft, and most of the Cuban military trainees
who went to the bloc in the summer of 1960 were
air cadets. Their training has been one of the

April 76, 7962

645

most important tasks of the bloc's military air
program. Cuban pilots liave now returned to
Cuba, where they are continuing instruction on
MIG jet fighters which arrived last summer. The
bloc has also supplied helicopters, piston-engine
trainers, and small single-engine transports.
About a dozen ILi-14 twin-engine transports were
delivered this autumn for the Cuban civil airline.
No Soviet bombers are known to have been
delivered to Cuba.

During the first year and a half of the bloc's
military aid program, the Cuban navy did not
receive any significant assistance. Since the first

of the year, however, a number of Soviet patrol I
vessels and motor torpedo boats Iiave been
supplied.

Bloc Arms and Militaky Equipment SuppLiBaj to Cuba

Type of equipment

Estimated quantitu

MIG jet fighters

60-75

Medium and heavy tanks

1.50-250

Assault guns

50-100

Field artillery

500-1000

Antiaircraft artillery

500-1000

Mortars

500

Small arms

200,000

Patrol vessels

Some

Motor torpedo boats

Some

U.S. International Trade Policies

hy Philip H. I'rezise

Acting Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs ^

In 1928 merchandise exports of the United
States were about $5.2 billion. That was a year
of world prosperity, as measured at the time. It
was also before the massive obstacles to inter-
national trade and payments that were raised in
the next decade.

In 1932 our merchandise exports were valued
at $1.7 billion, down 67 percent from 1928. It
was the low year of the great depression. And
it was a time of widespread restrictions on world
trade, including the very high American tariff
levels established in the Smoot-Hawley tariff bill
of 1930.

This comparison suggests the two main factors
that normally bear on the vohmie of world com-
merce. One relates to levels of income around
the world. Tlie other is the presence, or rela-
tive absence, of serious and general impediments
to world trade, especially in the high-income
countries.

These are not really sejiarablo forces, of course.
Undue barriers to world trade have the effect of

' Address made before the California Agribusiness Con-
gress for World Trade at Fresno, Calif., on Mar. 10 (press
release 171 dated Mar. 15).

holding down world business activity and income.
Removal of such barriers tends to push up in-
come as well as trade.

Over the past 10 years, in any event, both forces
have been favorable, on the whole, to an expansion
of international trade. There has been a steady
growth in economic activity, particularly in the
industrial countries of North xVmerica, Western
Europe, and Japan. Total production in the free
world increased between 1950 and 1960 by more
than 40 percent.

At the same time, the major trading nations
have been cutting away at the great mass of trade
restrictions — tariffs, quotas, and exchange con-
trol— which were inherited from the depression
and which were made even more binding in many
cases during the earlj' postwar years. The rules of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
which is the international code of rules for the
conduct of trade among the participating nations,
have been very useful guidelines and benchmarks
in tliis dovoloi)nicnt. So have the articles gov-
erning the international payments system as
agreed to by the members of tlie International
Monetary Fund. "We have come a considerable
way toward reaching the basic aims of tlie GATT

646

Department of Stafe Bulletin

and the Fund in freeing up trade and payments.
The effect on world trade of developments dur-
ing the 1950's was salutary. Free-woi'ld trade in
1960 was about 80 percent more than it had been
a decade earlier.

U.S. Position in World Trade

The position of the United States in this world
trading system is a central one. "We account for
an estimated 15 percent of total free-world im-
ports and exports.^ In 1961 our nonmilitary ex-
ports were about $20 billion and our imports about
$14.5 billion. Although international trade makes
up a smaller proportion of our national output
than in many other countries, the absolute volume
of our purchases and sales from and to the rest
of the world makes our actions and decisions
crucial to the course of world commerce.

The ramifications of our choices in the trade
field can be very wide, for the political health of
a great many free-world countries is directly re-
lated to the ups and downs of international trade.
We could easily undo our efforts to strengthen the
political and defense structure of the free world if
we were to take the wrong directions in our trade
policies. I mention this only in passing, however,
for our economic interests alone argue strongly
for an American policy of leadership in expand-
ing world trade.

"We have consistently been a large net exporter
of goods to the world. In the early postwar years,
of course, it was easy to export, since the Amer-
ican economy came out of the war undamaged and
in a state of high productive efficiency. Rut our
overall export strength has not declined, despite
the remarkable industrial recovery and growth
in "Western Europe and Japan. Last year we ran
a surplus of about $5.4 billion of exports over im-
ports. In 19G0 we did roughly the same. After
making a discount for those exports financed by
the Government, our suqilus in 1960 and 1961 was
still a whopping $3 billion.

Through the 1950's exports increased faster
than imports and faster than total national out-
put. The proposition that we have priced our-
selves out of world markets fuids no support in
these figures. On the contrary, wherever our ag-
riculture and industry, taken as a whole, have a
fair chance to compete in foreign markets, we can
export.

" In 1960 it was 1.5.7 percent.
AptW 76, 7962

This is probably not news to Califomians.
Your State in 1960 ranked third in the Union as
an exporter of manufactured goods, with a total
value of $1.3 billion. The estimate is that Cali-
fornian agricultural exports were worth another
$500 million and that 12 percent of your farm
workers were producing for the export trade.
"Wages and costs in California have not lagged
behind the rest of the covmtry, as I understand it,
but California's ability to export its products has
not visibly diminished.

The fact is that we can with some confidence as-
sume that an increase in the volume of total world
trade will be accompanied by a larger American
export surplus. "We need a larger surplus to help
our balance of payments, where we have a chronic
deficit, and we need it to increase employment and
business activity at home. Our interest, in short,
is to use our position of leadership in the world
to reduce barriers to trade wherever and whenever
possible.

The European Common Market gives special
point and urgency to American decision-making
in the trade field.

"Wlien the major European currencies were
made convertible for current transactions in early
1958, with a resultant lifting of many quantitative
restrictions on imports, our trade with "Western
Europe skyrocketed. Between 1958 and 1960 our
exports to 17 "Western European countries rose by
38 percent — which, incidentally, was twice as fast
as the rate of increase achieved by other exporting
nations and which suggests something, perhaps,
about our competitiveness. In nonagricultural
goods taken alone, where the range of freer access
to the European market was greatest, our exports
went up by 44 percent in 1959 over 1958 and by
58 percent in 1960 over 1959.

Up until now we have been competing in "West-
ern Europe on the same terms as everyone else.
The market in France for our machinery exports
has been no more restricted than for German or
British machinery exports. Now, however, the
Common Market has begun to apply its tariffs
differentially and is moving steadily along toward
dismantling the tariffs that are operative among
its members. By the end of the decade, and j^rob-
ably sooner, there will be no tariffs on industrial
products within the Common Market but there
will be a tarilf, of indeterminate height, against
the rest of the world. At that point, unless we

647

do sometliing soon about it, we may find ourselves
competing not on equal terms but on distinctly un-
equal terms as against producers within the Com-
mon Market.

I will not go further into the subject of the
Common Market, since it is to be covered fully in
a few moments, except to say what is perfectly
plain — that its development will surely add a new
dimension to the world trading scene.

Proposed Trade Expansion Act

These, then, are among the considerations in the
background of planning American trade policies
for the years immediately ahead. We need to
build on our export surplus. And the appearance
on the world trading scene of a thriving, expand-
ing economic imit that may shortly include most
of the industrial power of Western Europe pre-
sents a major challenge and opportunity for our
trade.

The old Keciprocal Trade Agreements Act,
which Cordell Hull fathered in 1934, expires in
June. This act, and the policies it represented,
have served our national interests well. Without
it as the basis for the exercise of American lead-
ership in international trade, the world by now
imdoubtedly would have become organized into a
series of tight little mutually exclusive trading
blocs. The volume of international trade would
be much smaller than it is, and prospects for
forward progress in trade would be dim indeed.

Over the years, however, the Trade Agreements
Act accimiulated numerous barnacles and disa-
bilities. A mere renewal of the law in its present
form would not provide the elements essential to a
vigorous American initiative in world trade. We
have just concluded in Geneva a prolonged and
difficult negotiation under the expiring act.^ Ev-
erybody who was involved agrees that we cannot
hope to cope with the trade problems of the
future under the limitations that we were subject
to at Geneva.

The President has asked the Congress for basi-
cally new legislation in the proposed Ti-nde Ex-
pansion Act of 1962.* His proposal would greatly
expand our ability to negotiate tariff adjustments,
particularly with the European Common Market.

° l<'or l)!U'kf;rouiul. see Bulletin of Apr. 2, 1002, p. 561.

* For text of the rresidont's lucssaKe to Congress, see
ibid., Feb. 12, 1002, p. 2:^1 ; for a suininary of the hill
(II.R. 9900) , see ibid., Feb. 20, l'.M>2, p. 343.

It would allow us to depart from item-by -item
bargaining over hvmdreds of small portions of
trade and to go to across-the-board negotiations
on categories of goods whenever that procedure
promised to be advantageous to us. It would in-
clude modernized safeguard provisions to deal
with problems of adjustment to imports.

Under the proposed law the President would be
authorized to negotiate with any of our trading
partners for tariff reductions of up to 50 percent.
A special section of the law would empower him
to bargain with the Common Market for the re-
duction, or elimination, of tariffs on categories of
goods of which the United States and the Common
Market are dominant suppliers to the world. He
could negotiate with the Common Market for the
reduction or elimination of tariffs on a common
list of agricultural commodities, without the dom-
inant-supplier limitation. He would be allowed
to reduce or give up our nuisance tariffs, that is,
those amounting to 5 percent or less ad valorem.
And he would be able to reduce or eliminate tar-
iff's on certain tropical forestry and agricultural
products on condition that the Common Market
take similar action. Our tariff cuts under the
main authorities of the bill would be staged over
a 5-year period. All reductions by ourselves
would be extended to all other free-world coun-
tries on the basis of the most-favored-nation
principle. Similarly, other countries in GATT
would, under the rules of that agreement, extend
their reductions to other GATT countries.

The new law would provide authority to nego-
tiate. It would not require negotiations on any
particular article or articles. In fact the bill ex-
plicitly provides for reserving items from tariff
bargaining. It would continue the procedure of
referring proposed negotiating lists to the Tariff
Commission for advice on the probable economic
effects of tariff reductions, but it prescribes new
criteria to guide the Commission. It retains the
national security clause of the old act, permitting
the President to take any action to adjust imports
that might impair national security.

There is a new approach to the import adjust-
ment problem in the form of provisions for assist-
ance to companies or workers whose interests are
found to be harmed by import competition as a
result of tariff reductions. Companies would be
able to get financial assistance, tax relief, and tech-
nical assistance. Workers would be eligible for

648

Department of State Bulletin

extended unemployment insurance, retraining,
and relocation expense payments.

Tariff relief of the familiar escape-clause kind
would still be available for industries adversely
affected by imports, when adjustment assistance
proved to be inadequate or mappropriate. The
bill labels this as "extraordinary" relief in recog-
nition of the fact that withdrawals of tariff con-
cessions are not to be undertaken liglitly in a
world in which we ourselves want international
conmiitments to mean what they say.

Relation to Political Factors

That, in summary, is the shape of our proposed
new trade program and policy. It carries over the
experience gained in 26 years of experience with
the Trade Agreements Act. It also strikes out
along new lines in order to deal with the problems
of the 1060's.

Hearings on the bill have just begun before the
"Ways and Means Committee of the House.^ It
would be premature and inappropriate to predict
how the Congress will deal with the President's
proposal. The prospect, in any case, is that there
will be a great debate in the Congress and through-
out the country and that tliis will serve to clarify
the issues and to inform our people about the
stake our country has in world trade.

If the Congress provides the President with
new negotiating authority, the probability is that
we would begin preparations for a tariff confer-
ence under GATT auspices possibly to begin
sometime in 1963. The aim would be to convene
all the nations committed to the GATT in a large-
scale multilateral negotiation to bring down trade
barriers throughout the free world.

There are a great many reasons why we should
take the lead and the initiative in this. I have
touched on some of the key economic points. It
is evident also that our political relationships with
Western Europe and our position in the less de-
veloped and uncommitted areas of Asia, Africa,
and Latin America will be affected by our action
or lack of action on trade matters. This could
be the opportunity to knit the free- world economy
and thereby its policy more closely together for
mutual benefit. If we were to succeed, the fiirther
consequences for the historic confrontation be-
tween our system of government and politics and

the Soviet system would be far-reaching and fa-
vorable. These issues are not modest or narrow
ones. Trade policy this year is in the center ring.
It well deserves the attention that groups like
yours are giving it.

President Makes Decisions
in Four Import Duty Cases

The Wliite House announced on March 19 the
President's decisions in four cases involving recom-
mendations of the Tariff Commission. In two
instances, concerning imports of woven carpets
and sheet glass, the President accepted the Com-
mission recommendations and signed proclama-
tions increasing applicable duties, effective after
the close of business April 18.^ In two cases,
affecting imports of ceramic tile and baseball
gloves and mitts, the President decided that the
evidence presented did not clearly sustain conclu-
sions that serious injury had resulted from import
competition.

The effect of the President's decisions will be:

(a) To increase the duty on Wilton and velvet
(or tapestry) carpet imports from 21 percent to
40 percent ad valorem ;

(b) To increase duties on imports of cylinder,
crown, and sheet glass to amounts ranging from
1.3 cents to 3.5 cents per pound depending on size
and thickness;

(c) To hold the existing duty level on imports
of ceramic mosaic tile ; and

(d) To retain the present 15-percent ad valorem
duty on baseball gloves and mitts.

In all four cases the President has asked the
Tariff Commission to provide data supplementing
its original reports.

The President's decisions were reported in let-
ters ^ transmitted on March 19 to the chairmen of
the Committee on Finance of the Senate and the
Committee on Ways and Means of the House of
Representatives.

The Tariff Commission conclusion — and the
President's concurring judgment — that imports of

° For a statement made by Under Secretary Ball on
Mar. 13, see ibid., Apr. 9, 1962, p. 597.

^ For texts of Proclamations 3454 and 3455, see 27 Fed.
Reg. 27S9 and 2791. On Mar. 27 the President issued
Proclamation 3458 delaying the effective date of these
proclamations until June 17 ; for text, see 27 Fed. Reg.
3101.

" For test, see White House press release dated Mar. 19.

April 16, 7962

649

Wilton and velvet (or tapestry) carpets were in-
juring the domestic industry producing like prod-
ucts was based on the record of general decline in
production since 1955, in a period when imports
increased significantly. Industiy earnings and
worker man-hours also declined in the same
period.

Acceptance of the Tariff Commission recommen-
dation for relief to the domestic sheet-glass indus-
try was based on evidence that importers enjoy
a price advantage that has occasioned a significant
rise in imports since 1955, while U.S. production
has dropped. Domestic industry profits have
trended downward, and losses were registered in
1960. Worker man-hours have also declined, with
further adverse effect on communities in areas
burdened with labor surpluses.

The President did not increase the duty on
imports of ceramic mosaic tile because it did not
appear that the industry had sustained serious
injury. Although imports have increased sub-
stantially since 1955, domestic production has not
declined. The level of employment in domestic
plants has also remained constant.

In the baseball-glove and -mitt case the Tariff
Commission did not conclude that the domestic in-
dustry had been injured but rather that a threat
of injury exists. In the President's judgment this
finding, viewed in the light of the data presented,
did not justify the duty increase requested by
the domestic industi-y, which, despite very large
increases in imports in recent years, has main-
tained relatively stable levels of employment and
of total annual sales.

An additional consideration in both the ceramic-
tile and baseball -glove cases was the fact that
Japanese manufacturers, who are the principal
competitors from abroad, have established volun-
tary quotas on exports to the United States of
these products.

Scientists Named for Joint Study
of U.S.-Mexico Salinity Problem

Department Announcement

Press release 193 dated March 20

The Presidents of the IJnlled States and Mexico
announced on March IG^ that the International

' Bulletin of Apr. 2, 1962, p. 542.
650

Boundary and Water Commission would appoint
a team of highly qualified United States and Mexi-
can water and soil scientists and engineers to make
an objective analysis of the lower Colorado River
salinity problem. The recommendation of this
team would be an essential part of the urgent
study of the problem now being carried out by the
Commission.

After consultation with the President's Special
Assistant for Science and Technology, Jerome B.
Wiesner, and on the recommendation of the De-
partment of the Interior, the United States Com-
missioner on the International Boundary and
Water Commission has appointed the following
scientists as advisers to him to participate in the
joint study with Mexico:

Charles A. Bower, Director, United States Salinity Lab-
oratory, Agricultural Research Service, Department of
Agriculture, Riverside, Calif.

Russell H. Brown, Chief, Research Section, Ground Water
Branch, Division of Water Resources, United States
Geological Surve.v, Department of the Interior

John Harshbarger, Professor of Geology, University of
Arizona

Arthur F. Pillsbury, Professor of Irrigation and Irriga-
tion Engineering, University of California at Los
Angeles

Stephen Reynolds, State Engineer of New Mexico

These scientists will meet at Yuma, Ariz., on
March 27 with the United States Commissioner,
the Officer in Charge of Mexican Affairs of the
Department of State, and members of the Com-
missioner's staff to obtain background information
on the salinity problem. The Mexican scientists
who are to work with the United States scientists
on the joint study are scheduled to meet with the
Mexican Commissioner on March 28 at Ciudad
Juarez, Mexico, for similar purposes. The Mexi-
can and United States scientists will meet together
on March ?>0 to commence their study. They will
be assisted bj' Roger Revelle, Science Adviser to
the Secretary of the Interior.

The Presidents, in their announcement of March
10, stated that the objective of the two Govern-
ments was, without prejudice to the legal riglits of
either country, to agree upon and ]iut into opera-
tion remedial measures M-itliin the shortest i)ossil)le
l^eriod of time. The Department of State believes
that the scientists of the two countries who will
convene on Marcli ."^O can cont ribute immeasurably
to the realization of this objective.

Deporfmenf of Sfafe Bu/fefin

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings'

Adjourned During March 1962

United Nations Wheat Conference Geneva Jan. 31-Mar. 10

U.N. Economic Commission for Africa: 4th Session Addis Ababa Feb. 19- Mar. 3

GATT Contracting Parties: Council of Representatives Geneva Feb. 22-28

ILO Governing Body: 151st Session (and its committees) .... Geneva Feb. 26- Mar. 9

IAE.\ Board of Governors Vienna Feb. 27-Mar. 5

OECD Industries Committee Paris Mar. 1-3

lA-ECOSOC: 1st Meeting of National Directors of Immigration San Salvador Mar. 1-9

Customs and Tourism of Central America, Mexico, and tlie

United States.

Caribbean Organization: Meeting of Representatives of Member Georgetown, British Guiana. . Mar. 5-8

Governments.

Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences: 7th Meeting of San Jose Mar. 5-9

Technical .'Vdvisory Council.

GATT Working Party on Apphcation of GATT to International Geneva Mar. 5-9

Trade in Television Programs.

U.N. ECOSOC Committee for Industrial Development: 2d Session . New York Mar. 5-16

ICAO Panel on Origin and Destination Statistics: 4th Session . . Montreal Mar. 5-17

UNESCO/ECLA/OAS/ILO/FAO Conference on Education and Santiago Mar. 5-19

Economic and Social Development in Latin America.

U.N. Scientific Committee on Effects of Atomic Radiation: 11th New York Mar. 5-23

Session.

U.N. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East: 18th Tokyo Mar. 6-19

Session.

Intern.ational Lead and Zinc Study Group: Special Working Group . Geneva Mar. 8-16

International Lead and Zinc Study Group: Statistical Committee. Geneva Mar. 12-13

OECD Oil Committee Paris Mar. 12-14

CENTO Liaison Committee Rawalpindi Mar. 12-15

GATT Panel of E.xperts on Consular Formalities Geneva Mar. 12-16

U.N. ECE Working Party on Construction of Vehicles Geneva Mar. 12-16

ITU CCIR Study Group'lV (Space Systems) Washington Mar. 12-23

ITU CCIR Study Group VIII (International Monitoring) .... Washington Mar. 12-23

ICAO Air Traffic Control Panel Montreal Mar. 12-24

Caribbean Organization Council: 2d Meeting Georgetown, British Guiana . Mar. 13-16

OECD Agriculture Committee Paris Mar. 14-15

WMO Regional Association I (Africa): 3d Session Addis Ababa Mar. 14-31

NATO Petroleum Planning Committee Paris Mar. 15-16

International Lead and Zinc Study Group: 5th Session Geneva Mar. 15-21

International Seminar in Clinical and Public Health Lahore Mar. 17-20

OECD Fisheries Committee Paris Mar. 19-20

International Sugar Council: 11th Session London Mar. 19-20

U.N. ECE Coal Committee (and working parties) Geneva Mar. 19-23

U.N. Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space New York Mar. 19-29

UNESCO Intergovernmental Advisory Committee on the Extension Santiago Mar. 20-23

of Primary Education in Latin America: 4th Meeting.

U.N. ECE Steel Committee: 27th Session (and working parties) . Geneva Mar. 20-27

U.N. ECLA Committee of the Whole: Extraordinary Meeting . . Santiago Mar. 21 (1 day)

OECD Development Assistance Committee Paris Mar. 21-22

CENTO Civil Defense Experts Rawalpindi Mar. 21-24

UNESCO Conference of Ministers of Education of Africa .... Paris Mar. 26-30

OECD Nonferrous Metals Committee Paris Mar. 27-28

FAO European Commission for the Control of Foot-and-Mouth Rome Mar. 27-29

Disease: 9th Session.

1 Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Mar. 30, 1962. Following is a list of abbreviations: CCIR,
Comit6 consultatif international des radio communications; CENTO, Central Treaty Organization; ECE, Economic
Commission for Europe; ECL.\, Economic Commission for Latin America; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council;
FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IAEA, International Atomic
Energy Agency; lA-ECOSOC, Inter-American Economic and Social Council; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organi-
zation; ICEM, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO,
Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; NATO, North
Atlantic Treaty Organization; OAS, Organization of American States; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organiza-
tion; WMO, World Meteorological Organization.

April 16, 1962 651

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings — Continued

Adjourned During March 1962 — Continued

OECD Committee on Restrictive Business Practices: Advisory Paris.

Committee.
OECD Committee on Restrictive Business Practices: Bureau . .
International Union for the Protection of Industrial Property:

Permanent Bureau of the Consultative Committee.
ICE M Subcommittee on Budget and Finance: 5th Session. . . . Geneva.

Mar. 27-28

Paris Mar. 29-30

Geneva Mar. 29-31

Mar. 29-31

U.N. ECE Meeting on Effective Demand for Housing Geneva Mar. 29-31

In Session as of March 31, 1962

Conference on Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests (not Geneva Oct. 31, 1958

meeting).

5th Round of GATT Tarifif Negotiations

International Conference for the Settlement of the Laotian Ques-
tion.

United Nations General Assembly: 16th Session (recessed February
23).

OAS Group of Experts on Compensatory Financing Washington Jan. 5-

Geneva Sept. 1, 1960-

Geneva May 16, 1961-

New York Sept. 19, 1961-

Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee Geneva .

U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Human Rights: 18th Session ..."
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Status of Women: 16th Session . .
ICAO Subcommittee on the Legal Status of Aircraft: 4th Meeting .
IMCO International Conference on the Prevention of Pollution of

the Sea by Oil.
WMO Commission for Synoptic Meteorology: 3d Session ....

New York
New York
Montreal .
London. .

Mar. 14-
Mar. 19-
Mar. 19-
Mar. 26-
Mar. 26-

Washington Mar. 26-

lAEA Director General
Visits Washington

The Department of State announced on March
28 (press release 199) that Sigvard Ekliind of
Sweden, Director General of the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), would arrive
at Washington on March 28.

Dr. Eklund will be received b_y President Ken-
nedy at the "White House on March 30. He will
be guest of honor at luncheons given by Secretary
Rusk on March 29 and by the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy on March 30, and at a reception
by the Chairman of the Atomic Eneray Commis-
sion, Glerni Seaborg, and the Under Secretary of
State, George McGhee, on March 30. He will
also be received by the Ambassador of Sweden.

He will meet Avith officers in the Department
of State and the Atomic Energy Commission to
discuss questions of mutual interest to the Agency
and the United Stales. During his stay in "Wash-
ington, he will sign on behalf of the IAEA an
agreement between the United States and the
Agency under which the Agency's safeguards sj's-
tem would bo applied to four United States
nuclear reactors.

Dr. Eklund will leave for Slcxico City on
April 2 to attend the opening sessions of the
Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission

meeting and will later visit the Argonne National
Laboratory near Chicago and atomic energy facili-
ties at Oak Kidge, Tenn.

TREATY INFORMATION

U.S. and U.S.S.R. Sign Agreement
on Exchanges for 1962-63

STATEMENT BY CHARLES E. BOHLEN>

It is a pleasure to sign the new U.S. -U.S.S.R.
agreement on exclianges in the scientific, technical,
educational, cultural, and other fields for the years
1962 and 19G3. This agreement moves forward
the important program of American-Soviet ex-
changes which was inaugurated by the first agree-
ment, signed in January 1958,= and continued, for
an additional 2-year period, in November 1959.^

' Made nt the signing ceremony at W.ishinKton on Mar.
8 (pre.ss release 152). Mr. Bohlen is Special Assistant to
the Secretary of State.

' For te.xt, see Bulletin of Feb. 17, 1958, p. 343.

' For text, see tftid., Dec. 28, 1959, p. 951.

652

Department of State Bulletin

Negotiations leading to the present agreement
took place in Washington from January 31st
imtil today. Wo feel that this agreement, based
on the principle of reciprocity and mutual ad-
vantages in all fields, has laid the basis for bal-
anced increased exchanges during the next 2 years.
The length of the negotiations in themselves re-
veals the complexity of the problems considered,
as well as differences between the two countries on
the methods of carrying out the various exchanges.
The negotiations were serious and businesslike,
and we feel that it is a matter of mutual congrat-
ulations that they have come to a successful con-
clusion. Compromises were found to bridge the
differences of approaches, and we consider that
the present agreement represents a satisfactory
coordination of these differences. We also believe
that the present agreement represents a measure
of progress over the last U.S.-Soviet exchange
agreem.ent, and we look forward, in subsequent
agreements, to a continuance of this progress.

Negotiations held at the same time led to agree-
ments between the National Academy of Sciences
and the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., as
well as between the American Council of Learned
Societies and the Academy of Sciences of the
U.S.S.R., providing for the further broadening
of contacts between American and Soviet sci-
entists and scholars in 1962-1963.

It should be noted that the agreement between
the National Academy of Sciences and the Soviet
Academy has been initialed by the respective ne-
gotiators and is subject to the approval of the
governing bodies of both academies.

The President and the Secretary of State have
supported the usefulness of a mutually advan-
tageous exchanges program with the Soviet Union.
We look forward to another 2 years of useful ex-
changes with the Soviet Union. All of us hope
that the increased program of exchanges, includ-
ing a broader flow of communication, will
contribute to a better mutual understanding of
outstanding problems and to a lessening of inter-
national tension.

TEXT OF JOINT COMMUNIQUE*

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics have signed today, March 8, 1962,
an Agreement on Exchanges In the Scientific, Technical,
Educational, Cultural and other Fields for 19G2-19C3.

'Released on Mar. 8 (press release 151) ; press release
151 also included the text of the agreement.

During the course of the negotiations which led to the
Agreement, the fulfillment of the previous agreement for
exchanges in 1960-1961, signed in Moscow on November
21, 1959, was reviewed and was recognized to be mu-
tually beneficial and useful.

The Agreement was signed by Ambassador Charles E.
Bohlen, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, for
the United States, and by S. K. Romanovsky, Deputy
Chairman of the State Committee of the Council of Min-
isters of the U.S.S.R. for Cultural Relations with For-
eign Countries, for the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics. The Agreement entered into force upon signature
with effect from January 1, 1962 and is the third in a
series of two-year exchanges agreements between the two
countries. The first of these was signed in Washington
on January 27, 1958.

The Agreement provides for exchanges in the fields of
science, technology, construction, trade, agriculture, pub-
lic health and medical science, performing arts, publica-
tions, exhibitions, motion pictures, radio and television,
culture and the professions, and athletics. The Parties
also agreed to encourage visits of members of Congress
of the United States and deputies of the Supreme Soviet
of the U.S.S.R., as well as visits of other governmental
and social groups, and tourism.

At the same time. Agreements were negotiated between
the National Academy of Sciences of the United States
and the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., as well as
between the American Council of Learned Societies and
the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., providing for
the further broadening of contacts between American and
Soviet scientists and scholars in 1962-1963. In the field
of peaceful uses of atomic energy, it is contemplated that
specific proposals for exchanges will be developed between
the United States Atomic Energy Commission and the
State Committee of the Council of Ministers of the
U.S.S.R. for the Utilization of Atomic Energy.

At the signing the representatives of both sides ex-
pressed the hope that the further development of ex-
changes and contacts between the United States and the
Soviet Union will contribute to the betterment of mutual
understanding and to the broadening of cooperation be-
tween the people of the two countries.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Automotive Traffic

Convention on road traffic, with annexes. Done at Geneva
September 19, 1&19. Entered into force March 26, 1952.
TIAS 2487.

Ratification deposited: India (with a declaration),
March 9, 1962.

Aviation

Convention on international civil aviation. Done at
Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force April 4,
1947. TIAS 1.591.
Adherence deposited: Upper Volta, March 21, 1962.

International air services transit agreement. Done at
Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force for the
United States February 8, 1W5. 59 Stat. 1693.

AprW 16, 7962

653

Notification that it considers itself bound: Niger, March
14, 1962.
Protocol relating to amendment of article 50(a) of the

Convention on International Civil Aviation to increase

membership of the Council from 21 to 27. Approved

by the ICAO Assembly at Montreal June 21, 1961.

Enters into force upon deposit of the 56th instrument

of ratification.

Ratifications deposited: Australia, January 19, 1962;
Belgium, February 15, 1902; Cameroon, November 14,
1961 ; Canada, October 17, 1901 : Dominican Republic,
October 24, 1901; Finland, September 18, 1961;
Guinea, August 21, 1901 ; India, December 18, 1961 ;
Indonesia, July 28, 1961 ; Israel, February 12, 1962 ;
Ivory Coast, November 14, 1901 ; Jordan, July 27,
1961 ; Korea, February 10, 1962 ; Malaya, October 3,
1961 ; Mali, July 12, 1961 ; Nicaragua, November 17,
1961 ; Niger, September 14, 1961 ; Norway, October
10, 1961; South Africa, February 13, 1002; Sweden,
December 28, 1961 ; Thailand, January 17, 1962 ;
Tunisia, December 27, 1061 ; United Arab Republic,
February 27, 1902 ; United Kingdom, January 4, 1962 ;
United States, March 23, 1062 ; Venezuela, February
6, 1062.

Finance

Articles of agreement of the International Finance Cor-
poration. Done at Washington May 25, 1955. Entered
into force July 20, 1956. TIAS 3620.
Signature and acceptance: Liberia, March 28, 1962.

Articles of agreement of the International Monetary
Fund. Opened for signature at Washington December
27, 1045. Entered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS
1501.
Signature and acceptance: Liberia, March 28, 1962.

Articles of agreement of the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development. Opened for signa-
ture at Washington December 27, 1945. Entered into
force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1502.
Signature and acceptance: Liberia, March 28, 1962.

Articles of agreement of the International Development
Association. Done at Washington January 20, 1960.
Entered into force September 24, 1960. TIAS 4007.
Signature and acceptance: Liberia, March 28, 1902.
Acceptance deposited: Greece, January 9, 1962.

Oil Pollution

International convention for the prevention of pollution
of the sea by oil, with annexes. Done at London May
12, 1954. Entered into force for the United States
December 8, 1961.
Acceptance deposited: Iceland, February 23, 1962.

Slavery

Slavery convention signed at Geneva September 25, 1926,
as amended (TIAS 3532). Entered into force March
9, 1927; for the United States March 21, 1929. 46
Stat. 2183.

Notification received that it considers itself hound:
Cameroon, March 7, 1902.

Sugar

International sugar agreement, 1958. Done at London
December 1, 1058. Entered into force January 1, 1050;
for the United States October 0, 1959. TIAS 4389.
Ratification deposited: Italy, February 16, 1902.

BILATERAL

Brazil

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agree-
ment of December 31, 1956, as corrected and amended
(TIAS 3725, 3804, 4074, 4144, 4183, 4239, 4311, 4039,

4644, and 4775). Effected by exchange of notes at Rio
de Janeiro February 26, 1902. Entered into force
February 26, 1902.

Iceland

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of
1954, as amended (68 Stat. 4.55; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709),
with memorandum of understanding. Signed at Reyk-
javik March 10, 1962. Entered into force March 16,
1962.

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: March 26-April 1

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of
News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Releases appearing in this issue of the Bulletin
which were issued prior to March 26 are Nos. 151
and 152 of March 8 ; 170 and 171 of March 15 ; and
177 of March 19.

No. Date Subject

*187 3/26 U.S. participation in international con-
ferences.

tl88 3/26 McGhee: '"Strategy of American For-
eign Policy."

*189 3/26 Rusk : interview on BBC.

tl90 3/26 McGhee: "Mineral Resources and the
World of the 1960's."
191 3/26 Ball : "The U.N. and the Real World."

tl92 3/20 Cleveland : WMO Commission for Syn-
optic Meteorology.

193 3/26 Science advisers appointed to U.S.

Commissioner, U.S. -Mexico Bound-
ary and Water Commission.

194 3/27 Rusk : Geneva disarmament conference
(revised).

Sino-Soviet bloc military aid to Cuba.

Ball : interview on "Prospects of Man-
kind."

Post of Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Atlantic .Affairs established.

Conference on educational development
in Latin America.

IAEA Director General to visit Wash-
ington (rewrite).

I'rogram for visit of President of
Brazil.

Delegation to meeting of Asian minis-
ters of education.

13th Foreign Service Staff review
panels.

Williams : "Change and Challenge in
Africa."

Cultural exchange (Japan).

Butterworlli. Dowling. and .Mrs. Willis
sworn in as career ambassadors (bi-
ographic details).

206 3/30 Central ^Vfricau Republic credentials

( rewrite ) .

207 3/30 U.S.S.K. credentials (rewrite).

t208 3/30 U.S. agrees to international inspection
of four atouiic reactors.

•209 3/30 Cleveland : postage stamp commemo-
rating malaria eradication campaign.

•Not printed.

tHeld for a later issue of the Buluetin.

195
•196

3/27
3/27

tl97

3/28

*198

3/28

199

3/28

•200

3/28

t201

3/29

•202

3/29

1203

3/29

•204
•205

3/30
3/30

654

Department of State Bulletin

April 16, 1962 I n

Africa. The Role of Agriculture In the Develop-
ment of Africa (Williams) 639

Agriculture. The Role of Agriculture in the De-
velopment of Africa (Williams) 639

Atomic Energy

IAEA Director General Visits Wasliington . . . 652

President Repeats U.S. Desire for Effective Test

Ban Treaty (Kennedy) • . . . . 624

Central African Republic. Letters of Credence

(Kombet) &14

Ceylon. Pi-esident Sends Congratulations to Gov-
ernor General of Ceylon (Kennedy) . . • . . 644

Communism. American Strategy on the World

Scene (Rostow) 625

Cuba. Sino-Soviet Bloc Military Aid to Cuba Sum-
marized by Department 644

Disarmament. U.S. Proposes Patterns for Future

Work of Disarmament Conference (Rusk) . . 618

Economic Affairs

American Strategy on the World Scene (Rostow) . 625
President Makes Decisions in Four Imjwrt Duty

Cases 649

U.S. International Trade Policies (Trezise) . . . 646

Educational and Cultural Affairs

The Role of the University in the Building of a

Flexible World Order (Kennedy) 615

U.S. and U.S.S.R. Sign Agreement on Exchanges
for 1962-63 652

Foreign Aid. American Strategy on the World

Scene (Rostow) 625

Germany. U.S. and U.S.S.R. Discuss German Prob-
lem and Related Questions (text of joint state-
ment) 625

International Information. U.S. and U.S.S.R. Sign
Agreement on Exchanges for 1962-63 .... 652

International Organizations and Conferences
Calendar of International Conferences and Meet-
ings 651

IAEA Director General Visits Washington . . . 652

ex Vol. XLVI, No. 1190

U.S. Proposes Patterns for Future Work of Dis-
armament Conference (Rusk) 618

Mexico. Scieutists Named for Joint Study of U.S.-
Mexico Salinity Problem gso

Military Affairs. Sino-Soviet Bloc Military Aid to

Cuba Summarized by Department 644

Presidential Documents

President of Republic of Togo Visits United States . 638

President Repeats U.S. Desire for Effective Test

Ban Treaty 624

President Sends Congratulations to Governor Gen-
eral of Ceylon (544.

The Role of the University in the Building of a

Flexible World Order 615

Togo. President of Republic of Togo Visits United

States (text of joint communique) 638

Treaty Information

Current Actions 653

U.S. and U.S.S.R. Sign Agreement on Exchanges
for 1962-63 652

U.S.S.R.

Letters of Credence (Dobrynin) 644

Sino-Soviet Bloc Military Aid to Cuba Summarized
by Department 644

U.S. and U.S.S.R. Discuss German Problem and Re-
lated Questions (text of joint statement) . . . 625

U.S. and U.S.S.R. Sign Agreement on Exchanges
for 1962-63 652

U.S. Proposes Patterns for Future Work of Dis-
armament Conference (Rusk) 618

United Nations. The United Nations and the Real
World (Ball) 632

Name Index

Ball, George W 632

Bohlen, Charles E [ 652

Dobrynin, AnatoUy Fedorovich (544

Kennedy, President 615,624,638,644

Kombet, Jean-Pierre 644

Olympio, Sylvanus 638

Rostow, Walt W .' . 625

Rusk, Secretary 618

Trezise, Philip H 646

Williams, G. Mennen 639

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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES

Diplomatic Papers
1943, CHINA

Department

of

State

The Department of State recently released a volume of documents
on relations of the United States with China for the year 1943. Tliis
is a continuation of a volume covering the year 1942, issued in 1956.
The volume is concerned primarily with diplomatic activities within
the responsibility of the Department of State.

The contents include a wide range of subject matter. Topics dealt
with concern CMna's military position and participation in the war
with Japan, American military assistance to China, political condi-
tions there as affected by Soviet and Chinese Communist policies,
financial relations and lend-lease aid, efforts to open up a new supply
route to Cliina from outside, cultural relations, repeal of Cliinese
exclusion laws by the United States, interest of th& United States in
Chinese postwar planning, and numerous otlier subjects. The volume
contains 893 pages, exclusive of preface and index.

Publication 6459 Price: $4.00

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Please send me copies of Foreign Relations of the United States,

Diplomatic Papers, 1943, Cliina.

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

«S»'

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E
FICIAL

:ekly record

Boston Public Library
Superintendent of Documents
Vol. XLVI, No. 1191 April 23, 1962

MAY 8 1962

THE FOREIGN AID PlR^S^M'^'k FISCAL YEAR

1963 • Statement by Secretary Rusk 659

STRATEGY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY • by

Under Secretary McGhee 678

A BALANCE SHEET ON ASIA • by Chester Bowles ... 674

U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL REJECTS CUBAN CALL
FOR OPINION OF WORLD COURT ON OAS

ACTION • Statements by Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson

and Text of Draft Resolution 684

THE DEVELOPING ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP • by

Under Secretary Ball 666

IITED STATES
REIGN POLICY

For index see inside back cover

THE DEPARTIVIENT OF STATE

Vol. XLVI, No. 1191 • Publication 7365
April 23, 1962

'^O^iai'j

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents

U.S. Government Printing Office

Washington 28, D.O.

Pkice:

62 issues, domestic $8.C0, (orelRn $12.26

Single copy, 25 cents

Use of funds for printing of this publica-
tion approved by the Director of the Bureau
of the Budget (January 10, 1861).

Note: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and Items contained heroin may
be reprinted. Citation of the Department
or State Bulletin os the source will be
appreciated. The Bulletin Is indexed In the
Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the
Office of Public Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public
and interested agencies of the
Government tcith information on
developments in tlie field of foreign
relations and on tlie work of the
Department of State and tlie Foreign
Service. The BULLETIN includes se-
lected press releases on foreign policy,
issued by the White House and the
Department, and statements and ad-
dresses made by the President and by
the Secretary of State and other
officers of the Department, as well as
special articles on various phases of
international affairs antl tlie func-
tions of the Department. Informa-
tion is included concerning treaties
and international agreements to
tvhich the United States is or may
become a party and treaties of gen-
eral internatiotuil interest.

Publications of the Department,
United Nations documents, and legis-
lative material in the field of inter-
national relations are listed cxirrently.

The Foreign Aid Program for Fiscal Year 1963

Statement by Secretary Rtisk ^

I appreciate the opportunity to meet again witli
tlie committee to discuss the f oreigii aid prograna —
tlie President's proposals for the Foreign Assist-
ance Act of 1962.^

I am deeply aware, as I am sure you must be,
that from the provisions of interim aid preceding
the Marshall plan this is the 15th year in which
you have held hearings similar to this on proposals
for foreign assistance. I recognize also that you
have heard Secretaries Marshall, Acheson, Dulles,
and Herter speak to some of the underlying
themes of our foreign aid responsibilities.

Some members of this committee have actively
participated in these problems from the very be-
ginning. You have helped bring into being and
supported the Marshall plan, point 4, the Mutual
Defense Assistance Program, the Development
Loan Fund, and the other elements of this major
bipartisan effort.

It would seem almost imnecessary for me to urge
upon this committee the vital importance of the
foreign aid program to the security and welfare
of our nation. You are fully aware, as I am, of
great accomplisliments of the program over the
years and, as well, of some of its weaknesses, short-
comings, and disappointments. The committee's
comments in your report ^ last year on the new
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 stated the case
for the aid program with a clarity and directness
I would gladly adopt. You said then :

The committee believes, no less than the President, that
the United States must plan for and contribute generously

^ Made before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
on Apr. 5 (press release 226) .

^ For text of President Kennedy's message to Congress
on tlie Foreign Economic and Military Assistance Pro-
gram for Fiscal Tear 1963, see Buixetin of Apr. 2, 1962,
p. rpfK).

' S. Kept. 612, 87th Cong., 1st sess.

toward a decade of development. Foreign aid is both
an unavoidable responsibility and a central instrument
of our foreign policy. It is dictated by the hard logic of
the cold war and by a moral responsibility resulting from
poverty, hunger, disease, ignorance, feudalism, strife,
revolution, chronic instability, and life without hope.

Basic Propositions for Our Aid

Our present problem, therefore, is not to justify
the fundamental need for our foreign aid program
but to determine and act upon the principles which
will contribute most effectively to its success.

There are undoubtedly many significant factors
whicli must be considered from time to time, but
I believe we may miderscore six basic propositions
as our major guides :

1. The fundamental and indispensable require-
ment for the development of a nation is the de-
termination of its own government and people to
m,ove forward. Our aid, no matter what its
amoimt, cannot materially help those who will not
help themselves. No country can make solid
progress except by its own efforts, inspired by its
own leadership and supported by the dedication
of its own people.

Tlie aid we can supply will be only a small por-
tion of the total national effort needed. Our aid,
for example, to the nations joining in the Alliance
for Progreas is less than 2 percent of the total of
their gross national products. Obviously, there-
fore, what is done by these nations with their own
resources is crucial. These efforts must in all
cases include mobilization of national resources,
economic, fuiancial, and hiunan. With national
variations, they must include the willingness to
imdertake reforms important to progress — re-
forms in taxation, in land holdings, in housing, and
the broadening and improvement of educational
opportunities. "We must constantly bear in mind

KptW 23, 1962

659

that our goal is not just economic development.
It is equally and concurrently to increase social
justice wliich will secure the benefits of progress
to those masses who have so long suffered from
poverty, ignorance, and disease — and from the
most cruel condition of all, hopelessness.

2. Our resources should he devoted to fostering
long-range economic and social growth. "We can-
not prudently invest major resources on a crisis-
to-crisis basis. Political stability cannot be as-
sured unless there is steady progress toward long-
tenn goals. We are inevitably and properly
limited in the money and the skilled manpower
we can invest in the progress of the less developed
countries. We have no funds to spend on those
projects which, however useful in themselves, do
not significantly help advance the cause of na-
tional growth. We must continually press coun-
tries receiving our assistance to improve their
planning and to use their resources in the most
effective way. Our aid must be tailored counti-y
by country to concentrate on those programs and
projects which will have the maximum effect on
development.

3. The education and training of the people of
the nations vie are aiding is vital to their economic
and social growth. Progress will not come from
our aid dollars or materials but from the use
which people can make of them. People are the
dynamos which generate the power of develop-
ment. They provide the minds, the will, and the
skills by which progress is made. It is essential
that they have not only the wiU but the compe-
tence for the task.

Education in all its branches is fundamental.
We have seen in our own counti-y that our econom-
ic progress has paralleled our educational devel-
opment. We could not wait to become rich before
we built our educational system. We created it,
and our skilled people created our wealth. This
year we are particularly aware of this relationship
because we are celebrating the 100th anniversary
of our unique system of land-grant colleges. Ed-
ucation of leaders, training of administrators and
of technicians of all kinds must be centi-al to the
development programs of many of the new na-
tions. The emphasis of our grant assistance in
Africa and Latin America, especially, is and prop-
erly should bo in this most basic field of liuman
and social development.

4. The progress of the newly developing na-
tions should have the aid of all the industrialized

nations of the free world. Those which we aided
in tlie past are now thriving. It is appropriate
and practical that they should increase their con-
tributions.

5. Developing nations themselves have an op-
portunity to help each other. They may do so by
opening tlieir educational institutions to others
less well situated. They may share the lessons
learned in the process of development. They may
extend direct assistance within their capabilities.
This is already occurring, and we can be encour-
aged by the response to this opportimity.

6. Our aid program should he administered as
efficiently as possihle. The administering agency
should be organized to fulfill the requirements of
the program and should be staffed by the most able
personnel who can be persuaded to undertake this
complex and important public duty.

Progress in This Year of Transition

If these should be our guiding principles, how
have we applied them ?

It is too early to make a full report. The new
authorizing legislation became effective about 7
months ago, and the Agency for International De-
velopment came into being only 5 months ago.
Yet I can report that significant progress has been
made.

Administration: The needed administrative re-
organization is imder way. Mr. Fowler Hamilton,
the new Administrator of tlie Agency for Inter-
national Development, has reshaped the Agency
on a regional basis capable of carrying out the
new emphasis on well-planned country programs.
He has enlisted the services of an able group to
direct these regional programs and to administer
the supporting functional staffs which will provide
expert advice with respect to material resources,
educational and social development, and develop-
ment financing and private enterprise. Qualified
employees of the old ICA [International Coopera-
tion Administration] and the Development Loan
Fund are now being integrated into the new AID
organization, and a major senrch is under way in
and out of Government for additional talented
people to carry out tlie demanding and complex
tasks of tlie progi-am in Washington and the field.

Self -Help: I am encouraged by the growing
evidences of tlio detorniination of the less devel-
oped nations to act vigorously for (heir own prog-
ress and by the multiplying examples of basic re-

660

Department of State Bulletin

forms and otlior measures of self-help. Many of
these liave, of course, been in preparation for sev-
eral years. Others are of more recent origin. The
Charter of Punta del Este* contains a forward-
looking agreement on goals to be achieved by the
Latin iVmerican nations in a framework of co-
operation. The goals they agreed on include a
minimum rate of economic growth of 2.5 percent
per capita, a more equitable distribution of na-
tional income, economic diversification, the elimi-
nation of adult illiteracy by 1970 and the provi-
sion of at least 6 years of schooling for each child,
the substantial improvement of health conditions,
the increase of low-cost housing, and progress
toward economic integration.

It is true these are goals and not yet facts, but
the agreement is in itself a substantial accomplish-
ment and the determination back of it justifies the
hope of substantial progress toward fulfillment.
This hope is sustained by the series of reform
measures which have been undertaken by Latin
American nations since the Act of Bogota '* less
than 2 years ago.

Planning: We can be encouraged also by the
progress which has been made in long-term plan-
ning in this year of transition. In Latin America
many countries have made conscientious efforts
to improve their planning processes. Several
xVfi'ican coimtries — Tunisia and Xigeria are good
examples — are developing realistic plans. India
and Pakistan, of course, have well-developed
]>lans, and others show promise. We must recog-
nize, however, that many others face serious ob-
stacles to adequate planning. For many the
needed administrative experience is lacking. For
some even the basic statistical information is not
yet available. Where decisions must be made by
democratic processes — processes which are among
our basic objectives — these decisions may involve
the same kind of debate, timing, and resolution
of difficulties with which we ourselves are familiar.

Long-range commitments are a spur to long-
range planning, and such commitments have now
been made with India, Pakistan, Nigeria, and Tan-
ganyika. The authority granted by the Congress
has already provided encouragement to other
countries to take tlie difficult steps necessary for
development. We anticipate making conunit-
ments under the long-range authority in the near

* For text, see Btnj.ETrN of Sept. 11, 1961, p. 463.
' For text, see Hid., Oct. 3, 1960, p. 537.

future with a few other nations where meaningful
plans are now being formulated.

Human Resources: Our increased emphasis on
the development of human resources is finding
ready response in Africa and Latin America. Sev-
eral nations have strongly recognized its basic im-
portance to progress and have urged our assist-
ance to educational and health programs they
have worked out.

Aid From Other Nations: During the past year
we have increased our efforts to coordinate and
increase the flow of assistance from our allies to
the less developed coimtries. Our NATO allies,
together with Japan, are now providing in the
neighborhood of $2.3 billion per year to less devel-
oped countries. A number of these other free-
world coimtries are contributing to foreign
assistance a portion of their gross national product
comparable to that contributed by the United
States. Unfortunately, however, much of the
assistance from these countries is in the form of
short-term loans with relatively high interest
rates. Several nations have substantially liberal-
ized their loan terms in the past year, but further
improvement is needed. Significantly, the LTnited
Kingdom, Germany, France, Belgium, Canada,
and Japan have established new aid and lending
agencies, evidencing their sense of responsibility
in this area.

Several types of multilateral organizations and
groups have been formed to encourage closer co-
operation and coordination of effort among the
nations supplying capital and technical assistance
to the developing areas. Consortia organized by
the World Bank are supporting the development
plans of countries such as India and Pakistan.
The Development Assistance Committee of OECD
[Organization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment] is undertaking a coordinating role
wit.li regard to technical and capital assistance to
countries where its members have substantial
interests.

The Use of Fiscal Year 1962 Funds

Mr. Hamilton and his colleagues will discuss
with you in detail the uses to which the funds
available for the first year under the new legis-
lation are being put. I should like to stress, how-
ever, their indispensable value in supporting
foreign policy positions the United States has

April 23, 1962

661

taken in recent months. In the Far East, for ex-
ample, these funds have made possible the buildup
of militai-y and economic strength with which the
free people of Viet-Nam are combatinoj the forces
intent on destroying their nation. In South Asia
these funds are contributing to the continued re-
markable progress India and Pakistan are mak-
ing with their well-developed programs. These
funds are making possible the peacekeeping ac-
tivities of the United Nations in the Middle East
and in the Congo — activities which have turned
aside what might otherwise have been the grave
danger of involvement of major powers.

In Africa also these funds through loans and
grants are providing for fimdamental develop-
ment of himnan and economic resources quite
literally crucial to tlie building of whole nations.
And in Latin America the availability of aid funds
made it possible for us to support a free govern-
ment in the Dominican Republic. In Latin
America also I have already refen-ed to the
Charter of Punta del Este based in substantial
measure on the assurance of aid from the United
States and designed to bring about the peaceful
evolution of a continent under conditions of free
institutions.

In short, around the world, on five continents,
our aid is fulfilling a major and indispensable role
in support of the interests of our country and the
preservation and strengthening of freedom.

The Program for Fiscal Year 1963

The request before you is essentially for the
authorization of funds for fiscal year 1963. It
rests on the premise that the authorizing legis-
lation enacted last year is sound. It asks for only
one major change and a few minor ones. It does
not provide at all for authorization for military
assistance or development lending funds, since
authorizations enacted for those categories last
year extend through fiscal year 1963.

Military Assi.Hfance : I Iniow, however, that you
have a deep intei'est in military assistance, and I
should like to report to you on the program for
whicli $1.5 billion of funds are being asked in
appropriations.

Militai-y assistance remains an important part
of the total U.S. defense effort. It is also the
principal means by which there is sustained the
worldwide collective security systems of which we
are a part. You may recall that the Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said to you last year
that no amount of money spent on our own forces
could give the United States a comparable asset
of trained, well-equipped forces, familiar with the
terrain and in suitable position for immediate
resistance to local aggression.

Secretary [of Defense Robert S.] McXamara,
General [Lyman L.] Lemnitzer, and others will
discuss the program with you in detail. Without
the confidence engendered in tlie people of nation
after nation by the presence of their own forces,
to which we have contributed both training and
arms, it would have long since become impossible
to maintain the existing structure of free and in-
dependent nations.

Our military strategy today calls for a neces-
sary flexibility. We do not wisli to allow our-
selves to become frozen in our choices so that we
are limited either to submission to aggression
against a free-world neighbor or compelled to re-
sort to forces of unlimited and uncontrollable
destruction. The availability of trained and
equipped forces of Allied nations at the points
where aggression may come and prepared to de-
fend their own homelands is increasingly im-
portant to this vital flexibility of response.

The appropriation requested for fiscal year
1963 is $1.5 billion. It is $385 million less than
was asked for last year and $200 million less than
was authorized for fiscal year 1963. It is intended
to continue the program of providing only that
equipment and training which is needed to fill the
gap between what the aided counti-y can do for
itself and what must be done to enable it to pro-
tect itself from internal subversion and external
aggression. It is important also to tlie mainte-
nance of a climate of stability and confidence fa-
vorable to economic and social progress.

One other positive benefit will come from our
expenditures for military aid. We are placing
emphasis on civic action projects in underdevel-
oped countries. Wherever possible, country forces
receiving military assistance are encouraged to
participate in developing public works programs
such as roadbuilding, sanitation, and communi-
cations. American aid in this area is particu-
larly productive because it not only advances the
progress of the nation as a whole but also brings
home to its people tlie fruits of United States
friendship and concern for their general welfare.

Development Lending: Funds needed for de-
velopment lending in the coming year were also

662

Department of Stale Bulletin

authorized last year. Dollar repayable develop-
ment loans now constitute the major instrument of
our foreign economic assistance program. In the
current year they will make possible commitments
of approximately $1,100 million for fundamental
development purposes. Already loans have been
approved for major transportation facilities, local
credit institutions, public utilities, a cement plant,
and capital goods for development in 18 countries.

For fiscal year 1963 over half of the funds re-
quested will be for development lending. The
present authorization for fiscal year 1963 is $1,500
million. The President has requested an appro-
priation of $1,250 million. (Additional fimds are
asked for the Alliance for Progress, which I shall
discuss in a moment.) These new loan funds will
be concentrated in countries which have somid and
well-administered long-term development pro-
grams or the capability to cari-y forward individ-
ual projects which will contribute to national
gi'owth.

Funds at least in the magnitude requested are
needed and can be eft'ectively used during the
coming year.

1963 Legislative Proposals

Alliance for Progress: The only significant leg-
islative change sought this year is the enactment
of a new title VI providing for the Alliance for
Progress and authorizing its long-term support
by the United States. The alliance is unique
among our regional programs in that it is based
upon a mutual declaration of principles and goals
and a procedure for review of country programs
by a regional panel. These concepts were agreed
upon by the United States and the Latin Amer-
ican Republics at Bogota and Punta del Este. In
addition, the authority and funds for our aid in
support of the alliance derives in part from legis-
lation separate from the basic Foreign Assistance
Act. The alliance criteria and authorization
should now be consolidated within the AID pro-
gram both to simplify administration and to reit-
erate our adherence to these exacting standards
and high goals.

The alliance also diifers from our other pro-
grams because we are dealing not with new coun-
tries but with Republics almost as old as our own.
The struggle for orderly change of the entire
social and economic structures of Latin America
faces stubborn resistance from entrenched priv-

ilege and vitriolic opposition from a radical left
for whom change means only violent revolution.
We cannot expect the necessary changes to occur
under conditions of orderly growth and long-term
reform unless there is reasonable assurance that
the critical increment of United States financial
support necessary to success will be forthcoming
over the long pull. We therefore strongly urge
that Congress record its long-term support by
authorizing $3 billion for the next 4 years of the
alliance. Such authorization will bolster pro-
gressive forces and provide a sounder basis for
the kind of long-range planning required if the
objectives of the alliance are to be realized. It
will provide for the alliance the same period of
assurance of United States support as is provided
for aid to other areas.

Authorization of Fimds for FY 1963: The total
appropriation which the President is requesting
for fiscal year 1963 is $4,878 million— slightly
more than Congress appropriated last year for
AID and the alliance. The new authority wliich
is requested from this committee for appropria-
tions this year totals $2,125 million.

Within this total we are requesting an initial
appropriation for the Alliance for Progi-ess of
$600 million in loan and grant funds for next year
as part of the $3 billion long-term authorization
extending through fiscal year 1966.

Development Grants: The legislation before
you asks $335 million authorization for develop-
ment grant activities in fiscal year 1963 in areas
other than Latm Anaerica. These f mids are among
the most crucially needed in the entire bill. Ad-
vances in education and technical training, im-
provements in health conditions, the development
of able public administratore, and the creation of
effective governmental institutions are essential to
progress in most of the developing nations.

Supporting A ssistance : In our effort to concen-
trate economic aid on development we camiot over-
look the fact that supporting assistance will still
be needed for a number of countries — primarily
those on the peripheiy of the Sino-Soviet bloc
which are subjected to direct and massive Com-
munist pressures and must of necessity maintain
anned forces greater than their economies can
support unaided. We are asking for the autliori-
zation of $481.5 million for this purpose — 20 per-
cent less than was requested last year. Most of
this will go to three Far Eastern coimtries which
are particularly threatened.

April 23, 1962

663

As we reported to you last year, it is our purpose
to supplant supporting aid with development loans
as soon as it becomes feasible for any particular
countiy. It is important to recognize that we are
proposing supporting assistance for next year for
18 countries fewer than those receiving such as-
sistance this year. Although this judgment may
require modification in light of events, we hope
that this trend will be continued. In some cases the
need for supporting assistance may persist for a
considerable period.

International Organizati<ms : As in past years
we are requesting fimds for voluntai-y contribu-
tions to multilateral programs conducted mider the
United Nations: These include the Expanded
Technical Assistance Program and tlie Special
Fmid, UNICEF [United Nations Children's
Fund] , the Palestme Refugee Program, the U.N.
Congo Economic Program, and others. This cate-
gory also includes our contribution to the Indus
Basin Trust Fund administered by the World
Bank and to other international programs. The
sum requested for these purposes is $148.9 million.

Investment Guaranties and Savings: We are
well aware that private investment can make a
most valuable contribution to progress in the less
developed countries. But the investor in such a
country may face special risks which he will not
imdertake without some form of protection. The
investment guaranty program authorized by the
AID legislation has been an effective incentive to
such investment. We anticipate that in the next
year requests by American businessmen for guar-
anties will exceed the funds available. We there-
fore are asking for additional investment guaranty
authorizations.

Contingency Fund: Each of these requests for
funds represents our best estimate of the minimiun
necessary to maintain the momentum of our eco-
nomic and military programs. But I would like
particularly to emphasize the importance of the
President's contingency fund. Kecent events have
given us no basis for supposing that our responsi-
bilities can be significantly reduced. The only
assured ])redictioii we can make is that the unpre-
dictable will occur. We must be ready to move
quickly to anticipate or meet new situations. The
unprogramed reserve against tlio unexpected is,
therefore, one of the most imi)ortant elements in
the foreign assistance program. Tlie $400 million
requested is not too great a sum to have available
for emergency needs.

Conclusion

Our 5 months' experience under the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 lias demonstrated that the
legislative framework of our foreign aid program
is sound. The task of transforming the social and
economic structures of less developed countries
around the world will involve their energies for
years to come; our own effort, relatively modest
though it be, will require persistence and an as-
surance of continuing interest. The stakes are the
security of the free world today and the shape
of the world of tomorrow.

U.S. Comments on Developments
at Geneva Disarmament Conference

Press release 220 dated April 3

Follow'nig is a Department statement on certain
matters of frocedure and substance which have de-
veloped at the 18-nation disarmament conference
at Geneva.

Discussions concerning general and complete
disarmament are continuing at the plenary meet-
ings of the conference.^ Preliminary discussions
are focusing on the objectives and principles of
general and complete disarmament. What is
needed soon is an exploration of essential substan-
tive problems requiring agreement before the pre-
cise language of a comprehensive program on
general and complete disarmament can be de-
veloped. The United States believes that such a
concentration of efl'ort would quickly take the con-
ference to the heart of the issues which must be
resolved and hopes that substantive debate may
soon begin.

A Committee of the Wliole has been established
by the conference to consider those partial dis-
armament measures wliich the various delegations
might wish to submit. The United States at-
taches great importance to the work of the Com-
mittee. The ITnited States has given clear
evidence of its support for those measures which
would increase confidence among the nations, fa-
cilitate the disarmament process, and reduce the
risks of war inherent in the present international

' For statements made by Secretary Rusk before the
18-nation Disarmament Committee at Geneva, see Buiy
LETiN of Apr. 2, 1962, p. 531 ; Apr. 9, 1902, p. 571 ; and
Apr. IG, 19C2, p. 618.

664

Department of State Bulletin

situation. Agreement on an agenda has now been
reached, with priority being given to pi'oposals on
the cessation of war propaganda. Other matters
such as a cutoff of fissionable material production
for use in weapons and reduction of the possibility
of war by surprise attack, miscalculation, or fail-
ure of communication have also been put forward
for consideration by this Committee.

In connection with the agenda of this Commit-
tee, discussions have developed as to the attitude
of the United States toward the proposals of the
Polish Government which contemplate the estab-
lishment of nuclear free zones in Central Europe.
While it is recognized that the proposals of the
Polish Government, usually identified as the "Ra-
packi plan," - have been advanced from a desire
to contribute to the maintenance of peace, careful
study of these suggestions lias led the United
States to the conclusion that they would not help
to resolve present difficulties.

The United States, on the other hand, has pro-
posed equitable measures to this end. These in-
clude arrangements for advance notification of
military movements, such as transfers of large
military units or the firing of missiles, the estab-
lishment of observation posts at important points
within a country, the use of aerial and mobile
inspection t«ams to improve protection against
surprise attack, and the establishment of a com-
mission to examine the technical problems in-
volved in measures which could reduce the risks
of war. Moreover, these measures proposed by
the United States could be put into effect immedi-
ately without resulting in one-sided political and
military advantages.

The principal objections of the United States to
the Rapacki plan, which purports to be a confi-
dence-building measure, have been, and remain :
(1) that the measures envisaged do not address
themselves to the nuclear weapons located in the
Soviet Union, the use of which against Western
Europe has been repeatedly threatened by Soviet
spokesmen; (2) that the plan would therefore re-
sult in a serious military imbalance; (3) that con-
sequently, while creating an illusion of progress,
it would in reality endanger the peace of the world
rather than contribute to maintaining it. The
dangers t-o peace resulting from such an imbalance
under present conditions have been clearly and

' For background, see ibid., May 19, 1958, p. 821.
April 23, J 962

repeatedly demonstrated by events witliin memory
of all.

The United States will continue its efforts to
focus the attention of the Committee of the Wliole
on the proposals it has brought forward — at the
same time, it is prepared to give prompt and seri-
ous attention to the proposals and suggestions ad-
vanced by other conference members which could
offer some hope of early agreement on concrete
measures and which would, in turn, facilitate
progress toward the overall objectives of the
conference.

One initial measure where agreement would do
much to set the work of the conference on the
road to success is a nuclear test ban treaty. On
this subject, unfortunately, there has been no prog-
ress at Geneva because the Soviet Union has re-
fused to accept even the concept of international
inspection to monitor a test ban. The Soviet
Union takes this position in opposition to general
scientific opinion and contrary to views held by
the Soviet Government itself since 1957. Never-
theless, the United States has not abandoned the
hope that the Soviet Government will recognize
tliat it is acting in defiance of the will of people
everywhere and will return to its earlier position
that international verification is necessary for a
nuclear test ban agreement.

President Macapagal of Philippines
To Visit United States

White House press release dated March 30

President Diosdado Macapagal of the Republic
of the Philippines has accepted President Ken-
nedy's invitation to visit the United States from
June 19 through 28, 1962. President Macapagal
met the President when, as Vice President of the
Philippines, he visited the United States in Octo-
ber 1960. President Macapagal was elected to the
Presidency of the Republic of the Philippines in
November 1961 and was inaugurated on December
30, 1961.

This visit is in testimony to the special relation-
ship which exists between the United States and
the Pliilippines and the longstanding friendship
of the people of the two countries. It will provide
a welcome occasion for the American people to
learn more about the new leadership of an im-
portant democratic partner.

665

The Developing Atlantic Partnership

hy Under SecreUinj Ball ^

A little over a month ago the Attorney General
of the United States, Mr. Robert Kennedy, speak-
ing in this same hall, suggested some of the
elements essential to an effective Atlantic partner-
ship, lie addressed you then as Germans, but —
just as I am doing this evening — he spoke to you
also as citizens of the neve Europe that you and
your neighbors are building with such inspiring
vigor.

Tonight I shall attempt to carry the Attorney
General's suggestions a little farther. I sliall tiy
to bring you something of the flavor of the dis-
cussion that is taking place in the United States
and to indicate the general directions of the poli-
cies we are shaping.

End of American Isolationism

The United States approaches Europe from a
background of history with which you are gen-
erally familiar. We were originally a group of
colonies that broke away to form a Federal state.
During the formative years of our existence as a
nation, we concentrated on establisliing our na-
tional integrity and turned our backs on our
colonial past. Preoccupied with the problem of
building a nation and conquering a vast frontier,
we followed the advice of our first President,
George Washington, to avoid entangling alli-
ances with the great nations of Europe.

Our policy of keeping aloof from European
problems was intensified by the influence of those
emigrants from P^urope who came to settle our
farms and cities during the 19th century. Most
of those emigrants, including the stalwart men
and women who left Germany after tlie failure of

'Address nindp before Ihe Gorman Society for Foreign
Affairs at Bonn, Germany, on Apr. 2 (press release 214).

666

the 1848 revolution, had fled Europe for religious,
economic, or political reasons. They sublimated
their disenchantment with Europe by iminei-sing
themselves in the formidable work of building a
new nation on tlie soil of tlie New World. They
contributed to the American distrust of the Con-
tinent they had left behind them — distrust which
persisted well into the 20th centuiy.

But times and events have clianged all this.
You and we — on the opposite shores of the Atlan-
tic— liave learned to work closely and effectively
together. Arid tonight I need hardly insist that
American isolationism is a dead issue. It has dis-
appeared forever.

If one likes to mark historic changes by signifi-
cant dates, one can say tliat American isolationism
finally died on August 24, 1040 — the day the
United States Senate ratified the North Atlantic
partnership. By that solemn compact America
and Europe guaranteed tlie survival not only of
freedom but of free men. When today President
Kennedy tells the jjcople of America that he
would regard an attack on Berlin as an attack on
Wasliington or Chicago, he is giving explicit
recognition to the central principle of our alli-
ance— that the destinies of Western Europe and
North America are irrevocably intertwined and
tliat their defense is indivisible.

This principle is not limited to the views we
constantly express in the councils of the alliance:
All i)lans and efforts to improve the defensive
posture of NATO are based upon it. It is the
foundation of security on whicli our Atlantic
partnership rests.

I can say with confidence that our joint mili-
tary posture has never been stronger, yet I would
bo less than candid if I wore to express complete
satisfaction.

Department of State Builetin

Today, as President Kennedy has made clear,
there is a real and urgent need to give a new
priority to the conventional elements of our com-
mon defense. NATO needs a wide spectrum of
capabilities if it is to respond to widely varying
types of attack with appropriate force. The nu-
clear deterrent will be fully credible only if rein-
forced by a substantial nonnuclear capability that
will give us flexibility in dealing with aggression.

The United States has substantially increased
its conventional forces, including the number of
its combat divisions. Our Navy and Marine
Corps, as well as our antiguerrilla forces, have been
strengthened and expanded. We have added air-
and sea-lift capabilities. We are spending billions
of additional dollare on these added programs.
Some of our European partners have also recog-
nized the need for expanded conventional force.
As a result there has been a substantial improve-
ment in our combined nonnuclear strength during
the past year. But this, while gratifying, is still
not enough. We need to do more if the deterrent
to every kind of aggression is to remain effective
in the face of growing power in the East. Nu-
clear strength, of course, remains basic to our com-
mon and indivisible defense of Western Europe
and North America. The United States has pro-
vided for substantial acceleration and strengthen-
ing of the Polaris and Minuteman programs,
giving the alliance added nuclear capabilities
under vaiTing conditions.

We recognize that defense plans cannot be
static: They must respond to changing conditions
of power and resources. There is need, therefore,
for constant and serious consideration of future
arrangements if our nuclear forces are to be truly
expressive of the ideas of the Atlantic partner-
ship. We wish to respond constructively to the
desire of our allies for an increasing role in nu-
clear deterrence.

We strongly favor the multilateral approach
suggested by President Kennedy in his speech at
Ottawa last May.= As the President stated then,
we are willing to join our allies in serious con-
sideration of the possibility of a sea-based NATO
MEBM [medium-range ballistic missile] force
under truly multilateral ownership and control.
He also offered to commit five Polaris sub-
marines— or even more in appropriate circimi-
stances — to NATO. We feel that a constructive

= Bulletin of June 5, 1961, p. 839.
April 23, 7962

solution to this problem of NATO's future nuclear
role is both important and possible. We remain
prepared to work with our allies to that end. We
believe that such a multilateral solution is greatly
to be preferred to any proliferation of national
nuclear capabilities.

U.S. Support of European Integration

If our common efforts toward an effective com-
bined military force are defensive in character, our
efforts toward cooperation in the area of eco-
nomics have a more positive aim. They are based
upon the amply demonstrated fact that in the
modern world the major industrial economies are
increasingly interdependent. In a world of swift
transport and instantaneous communications,
where every man is every other man's close neigh-
bor, no nation can affoi'd to be an economic island.
As the volume of goods and services that we ex-
change grows higher every year, so does the need
for us to develop more effective ways of working
together.

It is for this reason, among many others, that
the United States has, from the beginning, given
active support to the development of an integrated
Europe. We have regarded a imited Europe as a
condition to the development of an effective Atlan-
tic partnership.

Let me emphasize at this point that the pace of
evolution of the Atlantic partnership in the eco-
nomic area has depended upon an essential
phasing. It has been necessary for Europe to
move toward substantial internal cohesion in order
to complete the fomidation upon which the strac-
ture of an Atlantic partnership can be erected.

Through the whole of the postwar period we
Americans have taken no comfort from the dis-
parity between our own resources and those of
any other nation of the free world. We have been
proud that the United States is a world leader, but
we have sometimes found it less than satisfactory
to be a world leader isolated by the possession of
an overwhelming proportion of the total wealth,
power, and resources. To our minds — and I am
sure to your minds as well — a strong partnership
must almost by definition mean a collaboration of
equals. 'Wlien one partner possesses over 50 per-
cent of the resources of so great an enterprise and
the balance is distributed among 16 or 17 others,
the relationship is unlikely to work with full ef-
fectiveness. And so long as Europe remained

667

fragmented, so long as it consisted merely of
nations small by modern standards, the potentials
for true partnership were always limited.

But a Europe united and strong can be an equal
partner in the achievement of our common en-
deavors— an equal partner committed to the same
basic objectives as we ourselves. For, after all,
you and we alike believe in the preservation and
extension of freedom and in the values that dis-
tinguish free men from slaves.

Reality of Our Common Objectives

I cannot overstate the enthusiasm with which
Americans have welcomed the burgeoning strength
and cohesion of Europe. But why is it that one
sometimes hears in Europe — almost never in
America — timid voices ominously complaining
that a united Europe might become a neutralist
"third force"?

Let me say emphatically that we Americans
have no fear that the new Europe will be neutralist
any more than we fear that America will return
to isolationism. The neutralism of which we
heard a fair amount a decade ago was an expres-
sion of weakness, not strength. It sprang from a
belief that Europe could no longer play a signifi-
cant role in the power contest between the United
States and the Communist bloc. Persuaded that
they could not influence the outcome by taking
sides, its advocates assumed a role of Olympian
detachment from the battle, measuring out equal
amounts of criticism for each side. As the nations
of Western Europe have grown more vmited, the
voices of neutralism that produced such a fright-
ful cacophony 10 years ago have been largely
stilled.

But there are a few who still profess fear of a
strong, united Europe for yet a different reason.
They see the specter not of a neutralist third force
but of a third force and an America following
increasingly divergent paths. A powerful Con-
tinental entity, they argue, could be tempted to
try a new kind of balance-of-power politics, to
play the East against the West, to sell its weight
and authority to the highest bidder to serve its
own pai-ocliial and selfish objectives.

Such a prediction, I am persuaded, misconceives
the nature of the forces at work on both sides of
the Atlantic. It overlooks the vital ity and sol idity
of our common heritage. It ignores the reality of
our common objectives. It ignores the direction
in which Euroi)e is already moving. It rejects, in

fact, the very interdependence of the members of
the NATO alliance on which our national security
is now based.

To my mind both you and we have everything
to gain by the construction of a strong and united
Europe. Europe united will almost certainly dis-
play a deeper and stronger feeling of responsibility
for the defense of Western values than will the
individual nation-states in a Europe weak and
fragmented. Unity builds strength. The experi-
ence and awareness of strength engender not only
the ability but the will to influence events. And
for Europeans, as for Americans, the will to in-
fluence events is merely another way of expressing
a sense of responsibility.

We Americans are thoroughly convinced, there-
fore, that the farther Europe proceeds down the
road toward unity the more Europe can be ex-
pected to play an affirmative and responsible role
in our common concerns. In expressing this belief
we recognize, of course, that the Atlantic partner-
ship can never be one-sided and that we ourselves
must fulfill the obligations of a good partner.

Implications of European Economic Community

United States support for European integi'ation
and for the European Economic Community has
deep roots. It springs from a recollection of our
own Federal experience and from a desire to end
the sanguinary rivalry that once divided the great
states of Western Europe.

But Americans have recognized that the com-
mercial manifestation of the Community — the
Common Market — implies a substantial degree of
discrimination against American trade. Of neces-
sity it will require adjustments for the industry,
agriculture, and labor of the United States and of
nonmember third countries.

Yet this has never deflected us from the larger
objectives of our policy. In spite of the problems
for America implicit in the development of the
Common Market, we have given consistent and
active support to the growth of the European
Community.

In providing this support we have acted on two
convictions: first, that the Community would be
conducted as an outward-looking society, liberal
in its trading and economic policies, and second,
tliat it would be increasingly prepared to bear
responsibilities around the world as its strength
and unity develop.

668

Department of State Bulletin

Purposes of Proposed Trade Legislation

Our faith in the liberal intentions of tlie Euro-
pean Community has been given concrete expres-
sion in the trade legislation that President Ken-
nedy has recently submitted to the United States
Congress.' Since there has been some misunder-
standing in Europe with regard to the nature and
purposes of these proposals, I should like to com-
ment on them briefly.

By the proposed legislation the President is
seeking authority to negotiate new trade arrange-
ments, primarily with the Community but also
with other trading nations. Under the American
constitutional process such authority must be
granted by the Congress. The Executive can ne-
gotiate reductions in tariffs only to the extent that
the Congress delegates this power to him.

The powers sought by the President are tailored
to the kinds of problems that we now both have in
common. The trading world is radically chang-
ing. The prospect of the United Kingdom's
membership in the Common Market would mean,
in a very sliort period of time, that 90 percent of
the industrial production and 90 percent of the
trade in industrial goods in the free world would
be concentrated in two great common markets — -
the United States and an enlarged EEC.

In negotiating with each other these two com-
mon markets would be dealing for the first time on
a basis of near equality. In terms of population,
trade, and the general state of the industrial arts
and productive techniques, the United States and
the EEC are not far apart. Our respective ex-
ternal tariffs will be at roughly the same average
level; for certain goods the tariff of the Commun-
ity will be fixed at rates exceeding those of the
United States tariff; for other goods the reverse
will be true. By negotiating with each other we
should be able to increase access to each other's
markets on a basis that would be mutually
advantageous.

At the same time, because of our combined
predominance in world trade, the United States
and an enlarged EEC would bear a special re-
sponsibility toward third countries. Strength and
power involve, for those who possess it, a special
set of obligations. By negotiating with each other
within the framework of the GATT [General

° For text of the President's message to Congress, see
iUd., Feb. 12, 1962, p. 231 ; for a summary of the draft
legislation, see ibid., Feb. 26, 1962, p. 343.

Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] and substan-
tially reducing tariffs on a most-favored-nation
basis, these two great common markets could
diminish to manageable and tolerable proportions
the difficulties and apprehensions of all countries
of the free world. This assumes, of course, that
third countries would also play their part by pro-
viding reciprocal concessions.

Integrity of Common Market Not Affected

In the proposed legislation the President has
requested the bargaining authority that would en-
able him to negotiate for a substantial increase
in the free exchange of goods across the Atlantic.
In asking the Congress to grant him that author-
ity the President is not seeking to dictate the
ground rules under which a negotiation must be
conducted. Those rules are a matter for mutual
agreement among the negotiating parties.

The principal authority sought by the President
is the power to negotiate reductions in American
tariffs by as much as 50 percent.

Tlie proposed legislation would also provide a
special authority permitting the President, in ne-
gotiations with the EEC, to offer concessions in
the United States tariff to the extent of 100 per-
cent. By the nature of its technical limitations
this special authority could be effectively employed
only if the United Kingdom becomes a member
of the European Economic Community.

In seeking this special authority the President
has not sought in any way to prejudice the negoti-
ations now under way between the EEC and the
United Kingdom. He has wished merely to pro-
vide himself with the power to bargain with an
expanded EEC in the event those negotiations are
successfully concluded. Under this special au-
thority the President could, with respect to a
limited range of goods — those goods that are pre-
dominantly supplied by the United States or the
expanded EEC — reduce tariffs by as much as 100
percent in return for reciprocal concessions.

The President's request for this special author-
ity has created some critical comment in Europe.
It has been suggested, for example, that such an
American initiative might have the effect of erod-
ing away the common external tariff that has both
defined and given integrity to the European Eco-
nomic Community.

This concern is not well founded. The fact that
certain goods might, in the course of a trade nego-

April 23, 1962

669

tiation, be put on the free list by the EEC would
not mean the elimination across the board of the
common external tariff. Each of us already has
a number of industrial products on our free lists.
The United States presently imposes no duties on
typewriters, newsprint, fertilizer, or a nimiber of
machinery items. The common external tariff of
the EEC will be at zero for synthetic rubber, some
pulp or paper products, and certain types of ships
and boats, and jewelry; it has been suspended on
aircraft.

Is there any reason why such free lists should
not be expanded? Moreover, I question the as-
sumption that the integrity of the European Com-
mon Market is dependent, to the extent suggested,
on the maintenance of substantial levels of exter-
nal protection. The implications of their reduc-
tion depend again on phasing. Wliile the common
external tariff wall may initially have been its
defining element, the Community has already
achieved integrity through other far-reaching
means. It has a well-developed set of common
institutions, and its cohesion will, at least in the
final analysis, depend on the continued extension
of common action over an increasingly wide range
of policies.

Consultation on Economic Policies

If it be wrong to maintain that the President's
trade proposals are somehow a threat to the in-
tegrity of the Common Market, another European
reaction has seemed to us exaggerated. This is the
suggestion that a substantial reduction of tariffs
on both sides of the Atlantic can be safely acliicved
only if the two parties will commit themselves to
common economic policies. In effect, these critics
seem to be saying that freer trade is impossible
imless the United States joins with the EEC in
committing itself to a discipline similar to that
imposed by the Rome Treaty.

In my view this greatly overstates the problem.
In requesting new trade legislation the President
is not proposing a customs union or a free trade
area with the Common Market. Nor is he pro-
posing an exclusive trading arrangement of any
kind with the EEC; whatever agi-eements are
made must bo on a most- favored-nation basis.
He is proposing rather that the United States, in
agreement with the EEC, should move toward the
liberalization of trade under conditions in which
all countries would share in the benefits of com-

parative advantage. The fact that American wage
rates are substantially higher than those in
Europe, for example, does not necessarily price
our exports out of your market any more than
your lower productivity or higher energy costs
price your goods out of ours.

Nevertheless we recognize that, if transatlantic
commerce is to expand with requisite freedom, the
United States and tlie European Community must
move together toward a progressively greater co-
ordination of economic policies. For that reason,
we have welcomed the suggestions of our European
friends for more vigorous common action.

In fact it was because my Government recog-
nized the hard facts of interdependence among
the major industrialized powers that it proposed
the creation of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development. With the coming
into being of that organization last September —
and in fact, in the months preceding that event —
the Atlantic community has acquired an instru-
ment of incalculable value for the orderly and
accelerated growth of our economies. And we
have only begun to exploit tlie potential for
economic consultation and cooperation available
through OECD's various committees.

We are prepared to go as far as any other
member of the OECD in concerting our economic
policies and in developing and amplifying tech-
niques for consultation and coordination. We are
prepared to consult on any aspect of American
economic policy, including tlie broad fields of mon-
etary, fiscal, and trade policy. We are also pre-
pared to discuss the hannonization of agricultural
policies, particularly those policies that would
facilitate the access of efficient farm production to
world markets and the constructive and imagina-
tive use of world farm surpluses to serve the vital
interests of the free world — especially in the devel-
oping nations. And we recognize that, to be ef-
fective, consultation must include consideration of
national policies in the formative state — that is,
before tlioy have been hardened by official decision.

In approaching the harmonization of our eco-
nomic policies we are, of course, committed to the
development and preservation of competition and
the avoidance of restrictive arrangements.

Tlie adoption of anticartel rules and procedures
by the European Economic Coinniunity luis seemed
to us, by setting a course parallel to our own, to
enhance the possibilities of cooperation. As a
nation with a long antimonopoly tradition and

670

Department of State Bulletin

with a continiiine; allegiance to the market mech-
anism as an economic regulator, we welcome this
step. For in undertaking to extend the depth and
broaden the area of cooperation, we must, in loy-
alty to our own traditions, reject any idea of trans-
atlantic cartelization — and for that matter seek to
avoid arrangements that might interfere with the
free movement of capital or with the freedom of
choice of entrepreneurs' investment decisions.

Perspective on Recent U.S. Tariff Actions

The course of liberal trade is not always smooth.
Within the past fortnight the President of the
United States felt compelled to approve recom-
mendations to raise import duties on certain kinds
of carpets and on flat glass.'' These recommenda-
tions were based on findings of the Tariff Com-
mission, made following public hearings open to
all interested parties. This action has excited
comment in Europe, and questions have been raised
about its longrun implications for United States
trade policy. Let me tell you precisely what
those implications are.

At the present moment, and until a new law is
enacted, the President's powers to change United
States tariffs are based upon the existing Trade
Agreements Act. The philosophy and approach
of that act are clear : "Wlien an American industry
is suffering from serious injury that can be attrib-
uted to imports, the law provides for the restora-
tion of import, restrictions. Under that law the
President raised the tariffs on carpets and glass.

This was the only form of relief which the Pres-
ident could provide under existing law. That
will no longer be the case if Congress enacts the
proposed Trade Expansion Act. That act pro-
vides a different approach to the problems of ad-
justment created by imports. Eeflecting the
experience of the EEC itself, the act proposes to
rely upon domestic adjustments as the first re-
sponse to such i^roblems. Industries finding difH-
culties in adjusting to lower tariffs will be given
various types of financial and tax aid to enable
them to shift to new lines of production ; workers
will be helped through retraining and by other
means. Import restrictions may be resorted to
only as an exceptional procedure and then only
for a limited period.

But even apart from the proposed change in

* For background, see il)id., Apr. 16, 1962, p. 649.

U.S. escape-clause policy, the recent tariff actions
assume smaller dimensions if put in proper per-
spective. In all the years in which escape clauses
have been the prescribed mechanism the President
has found it necessary to apply such clauses only
to 17 cases. This has been a creditable record.
Few other countries of the world have exercised
such restraint; in fact some of the nations — al-
though not all — that have expressed the strongest
views with respect to the President's recent action
have on past occasions seen fit to restore protec-
tion to many domestic industries. Some have
done this by availing themselves of procedures un-
der article XXVIII of the GATT, raising hun-
dreds of their tariff rates in the process. Others
have occasionally applied quotas in violation of
the agreement. Such actions have frequently
caused severe hardships, especially in other parts
of the free world, such as Japan.

But the unportant question for us is not what
restrictions have been applied in the past: It is
what policies we are to pursue in the future. The
proposed trade legislation now before the United
States Congi-ess embodies the principle that trade
adjustments, rather than trade restrictions, should
be the preferred approach to import competition.
I am confident that in the end this principle will
be widely adopted in the trading relations between
nations.

Equal Sliaring of Burdens Necessary

Tlie United States has taken it for granted tliat
the European Economic Community will be out-
ward-looking, that it will resist the temptation to
create a trading bloc isolated from the rest of the
free world. We have assumed also that, with the
developing strength and unity of Europe, the
member nations of the European Community will
feel a growing sense of I'esponsibility for the se-
curity and well-being of the rest of the free world.

As the nation with the preponderance of re-
sources, the United States, since the end of World
AVar II, has provided an economic defensive
sliield behind which Europe has been able to de-
velop. It has provided also a continuing flow of
capital to the less developed nations of the world
to assist them to attain rising standards of living
so essential for stability and independence.

All of this has not been accomplished without
exertion and strain. Today our troublesome bal-
ance-of-payments deficit is proving a dramatic

April 23, 1962

671

measure of the burden the United States is carry-
ing. The causes of this deficit are unique in his-
tory. It does not result from the failure of the
United States to compete in woi'ld markets; our
annual commercial balance continues to be in sur-
plus in the amount of several billion dollars. It
results purely and simply from tlie fact that we
are carrying an extraordinary burden of effort for
the defense of the free world and for assistance to
the less developed nations.

The United States is not faltering in its com-
mitments. It will continue to carry its full share
of the financial and technical weight of the se-
curity shield for the free world.

The United States Government has faced its
balance-of-payments problems with restraint. It
has rejected proposals for redressing the balance
either by restrictive measures or by reducing our
commitments around the world.

At the same time I need hardly emphasize that
this persistent deficit is a matter of continuing con-
cern to my Government. We are not wholly per-
suaded that Europe, growing continually stronger
and more unified, has yet fully assumed that share
of the burden that its growing strength warrants.

The task before us may be divided into two
parts. I have already discussed the urgent need
for a still greater militai-y effort to increase the
credibility of our deterrent. It hardly needs say-
ing that the disproportionate share of the com-
mon defense borne by the United States is one of
the principal strains upon our payments situation.
Within the last year, for example, the maintenance
of our military forces in Europe has resulted in a
net drain on the United States balance of payments
in the amount of $1,600 million.

The second part of the task is the responsibility
that we in the industrialized nations of the At-
lantic community owe to that half of the free
world's population that has not yet achieved a de-
cent standard of living. This is the responsibility
to provide tlio flow of financial resources neces-
sary for those hundreds of millions of human be-
ings to attain adequate — and eventually self-sus-
taining— economic development, to respond to the
imperatives of the "revolution of rising expecta-
tions."

Permit me at this point to congratulate the Ger-
man Government and the German people on the
deepening awareness they have shown of the mag-
nitude of this problem. We in the United States
are confident that, with your growing strength,

you will continually increase your exertions and
improve the quality of aid, expanding the volume
of assistance and shaping the terms on which it
is provided so as to minimize the burden on the
balance of payments of the recipient countries.

One of the problems before us is to coordinate
and expand our assistance programs. We have
created an admirable instrument for this purpose
in the Development Assistance Committee of the
OECD. If we use this vehicle with vigor and
determination, we should be able to convert it into
an institution of notable value to our common
effort. Work is well under way inside that Com-
mittee toward the creation of teams for specific
countries and areas to assist in the coordination,
expansion, and application of aid in such countries
and areas. Each team will be composed of repre-
sentatives of two or more industrialized countries,
together, when appropriate, with existing inter-
national financial institutions. They will of
course work with the consent of, and in close
cooperation with, the recipient nations.

Creating a Healthy World Trade Environment

But direct assistance can perform only part of
the task. Sooner or later the less developed coun-
tries must themselves achieve the means to expand
and sustain economic growth above and beyond
immediate injections of outside public aid. In
the long run they can accomplish this only by cre-
ating an environment congenial to private invest-
ment and by selling their products to the world
at reasonably stable prices.

In the years just ahead the nature of the eco-
nomic ties between the advanced countries and
the emerging areas of Asia, Latin America, and
Africa will undergo a considerable evolution. Two
patterns are possible: one in which the less de-
veloped countries attain inci-easing access to the
markets of all the advanced nations of the world
as a basis on which to speed their growth, and an-
other in which the preferential trading habits of
the old colonial systems are perpetuated in new
forms.

The second course leads to a dead end. It tends
to distort patterns of trade, encourage artificial
and inefficient production, limit the scope of eco-
nomic diversification, and perpetuate discrimina-
tion against other developing countries. More
than tliat, tlie countries within preferential sys-
tems— even though tliey may find their special

672

Department of State Bulletin

privileges attractive at the moment — are likely to
grow restive with any arrangement that, over the
long term, impedes their freedom of choice.

If the United States and the EEC together agree
to open their markets to the primary products of
less developed countries on a basis of nondiscrimi-
nation, they can set the direction for an evolu-
tion:ii"y process, a process that will in the long run
create a healthy world trading environment in
which the less developed coimtries can develop
their production for world markets. Obviously
this cannot be achieved overnight. The shift to
nondiscriminatory trade with the less developed
nations will require transitional arrangements —
compensatory mechanisms that will ease the ad-
justment to nondiscriminatory trade for nations
now dependent upon preferences and assistance in
the achievement of sound long-term development
plans. It will require also that the economically
advanced countries work closely together in order
to assure that the critical problem of price fluc-
tuation for primary commodities is squarely faced
through adequate global arrangements.

To such efforts the United States is prepared to
contribute its share.

Through this course, in the long run, you and
we should be able to achieve a world environment
in which the economically advanced countries
share their responsibilities for assisting the less
developed in the areas both of aid and trade, recog-
nizing full well that these are common problems
of such magnitude that it will require all of the
resources, skills, and imagination we can muster
if we are to create stability and strength in the
free world.

Decade of Development

Finally I would like to recall that President
Kennedy has called for the sixties to be the "dec-
ade of development" ' — the decade in which the
economically advanced countries, guided by high
purpose and sensitive to the sweep of history, play

a role worthy of their traditions and their
strength.

The Atlantic partnership has the means to real-
ize this goal. We are making progress. We
must, and we will, increase our effort. And in
doing so, in sharing the fruits of our own pros-
perity, we can make this an era that historians
will note, not for the alarms and bitterness of the
cold war but as the moment when mankind at last
foimd the path to freedom from want and fear.

Post of Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Atlantic Affairs Established

Press release 197 dated March 28

The Department of State announced on March 28 the
creation of a new post of Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for Atlantic Affairs under the jurisdiction of the
Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs. J.
Robert Schaetzel, now Special Assistant to the Under
Secretary of State, will be appointed to this post

During the past few years the Atlantic nations have
been moving forward on a broad front to consolidate their
unity and to create new and closer relationships among
themselves. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) has continued to grow and develop as the princi-
pal safeguard for the security of the North Atlantic area.
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment Convention ' came Into force last September, linking
the countries of Western Europe and North America in
a new organization to promote growth and prosperity not
only in the Atlantic area but in the less developed na-
tions of the free world. The success of the European
Common Market and its prospective enlargement to in-
clude other European members creates an opportunity
for closer partnership between the United States and
Europe in many fields of common activity, in the Interests
of the North Atlantic nations and the free world as a
whole.

The Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Atlantic
Affairs will have primary responsibility in the Depart-
ment for following these developments and working out
policies to promote the further progress of the Atlantic
partnership. The Deputy Assistant Secretary will have
authority over two new offices, one responsible for NATO
problems and the other for OECD and European integra-
tion problems. These oflices will be headed by Kussell
Fessenden and Stanley M. Cleveland.

° For an address by President Kennedy before the U.N.
General Assembly on Sept. 25, 1961, see ibid., Oct. 16, 1961,
p. 619.

^ For background and text, see BinxETiN of Jan. 2,
1961, p. 8.

April 23, 7962

635258 — 62 3

673

A Balance Sheet on Asia

hy Chester Bowles

Lenin has been quoted as summing up the Com-
munist strategy for world conquest in one memo-
rable sentence: "The road to Paris lies through
Calcutta and Peking." Scholars assert that Lenin
never made such a statement. I would reply that
he should have — and would have, with the assist-
ance of better speechwriters. For I know of no
sentence that describes more cogently the tlirust
of Soviet strategy.

I have just returned from a 6-week trip ^ during
which I visited many Asian countries which are
special objects of Soviet or Chinese attention. My
assignment from the President was to take a sober
look at United States relations with these coun-
tries and to try to assess for him where we stand.
My journey took me into northeast Africa and
from one end of Asia to the other — from Ethiopia,
the Sudan, Egypt, and Iran to Pakistan, Afghan-
istan, and India, then to Thailand, Cambodia,
the Philippines, and Japan.

After visits to these 11 countries I feel on bal-
ance more assured about the direction and conduct
of United States foreign policy than at any time
in the past 10 years.

This may be explained in part by the differing
perspective from which we view the world here
on the other side of the oceans. In Washington
our desks are loaded with reports of crises and
new catastrophes, of conflict and confvision. This
is the stuff of daily news. It is also the stuff of
daily diplomacy. The quieter and less immedi-
ately newsworthy events which — haltingly but, I
believe, with increasing force — may be contribut-
ing to the development of a more rational world

' Address made before the National Press Club at AVash-
inpton, n.C, on Mar. 2.3 (press release 18,3). Mr. Bowles
is the President's Special Uepresentative and Adviser on
African, Asian, and Latin American Affairs.

" For an announcement of Mr. Bowles' trip see Buixetin
of Feb. 12, 19G2, p. 251.

are likely to be put aside for weekend reading
which often does not take place.

I realize that my reckless suggestion that the
world is not necessarily coming to an end may be
interpreted by some as an assurance that all is
well and that the Communists are about to throw
in the sponge. I hasten, therefore, to knock on
wood in the hope that at least I may be spared the
fate of a friend who published a book called
Permanent American Prosperity, Its Causes and
Efects on the very day before the stock market
collapsed in 1929.

In a mood of nervous optimism I shall now dis-
cuss three or four specific situations which I en-
countered on my trip that may be of particular
interest and significance and then offer some gen-
eral impressions of our overall position.

Visit to Egypt

Let us first consider Egypt, where I met for 4
crowded days with President Nasser and some of
his top economic and political advisers.

Although I went to Cairo with no expectation
of achieving miracles of good will, I believe my
visit helped to eliminate certain misunderetand-
ings. I came away with some hope that we may
be entering into a period of calmer, more realistic
and rational rclationship.s.

Wo must expect that Egypt will remain a revo-
lutionary country laboring under the psychologi-
cal load of past conflicts and frustrations in its
encounters with the West. Moreover, our rela-
tions with Egypt will continue to be conditioned
by our deeply held conviction that Israel's inde-
pendence and integrity must be preserved.

Yet there are a number of questions on which
we see eye to eye. For example, Egypt's leaders
have come to realize that communism offers no
solution to Egypt's manifold ]irol)loms. They also

674

liepat\meni of State Bulletin

appear determined to provide a greater measure
of social justice and economic opportunity for
Egypt's people.

If the leaders of the Egyptian Government come
to see that their role in history will be determined
not by what tliey say over the radio to the people
of other Middle Eastern nations but rather by
what they actually do about the aching poverty
and miseiy that oppress the people of Egypt, there
will be opportunities for constructive, peaceful co-
operation between the American and Egyptian
Governments.

In this event tensions may gradually be eased
throughout the Middle East and energies may in-
creasingly be diverted from angry conflict to con-
structive development.

Developments in South Asia

In South Asia it is easy to become preoccupied
by such urgent questions as the dispute over Kash-
mir or the closing of the Pak-Afghan border.
However, if our policies are to make sense over
the longer run, it is important that we not over-
look some of the less immediately newsworthy
developments.

On the positive side, India and Pakistan are
making extraordinary strides in economic plan-
ning and development and in extending local
democracy to the villages. We have placed heavy
bets on each of these nations, and we were right
in doing so. India, for instance, has a population
larger than that of Latin America and Africa
combined. Her continuing economic and polit-
ical progress will contribute decisively to world
stability; her failure would be catastrophic.

In Iran, with the Shah's support and encourage-
ment, the government headed by Prime Minister
[Ali] Amini is pressing reform programs which
Iran has so long desperately needed in the agi-i-
cultural, administrative, and economic fields.

On the negative side of the South Asian ledger,
however, we find some worrisome developments.
Afghanistan is one example.

For several generations this fiercely independent
nation has successfully maintained its position as
a buffer state between Russia, the Middle East,
and South Asia. Today, however, it is being sub-
jected to Soviet pressures which are novel, well-
financed, and potentially effective.

No visible attempt is being made by Soviet rep-
resentatives to introduce Communist ideology as

such. Indeed, Afghanistan i*ight now is said to
have fewer indigenous Communists than any na-
tion in Asia. Nor is there any effort to stir up
antagonism against the royal family or the
Government.

The Soviets have set out simply and directly
to persuade both the rulers and the ruled that
Soviet dams, roads, agricultural methods, and
technical skills are best adapted to Afghanistan's
needs and that bountiful Soviet capital and skills
are theirs for the asking with the usual assurance
of "no political strings."

Soviet military advisers are busily training the
Afghan Army and supplying it with modem
Soviet equipment. At the same time, some 2,200
Soviet development technicians are hard at work
on several dozen projects. For instance, Soviet
roadbuilders, speaking excellent Farsi, work
shoulder to shoulder with Afghan labor crews.
Soviet farm technicians are moving into the
Afghan countryside to assist in opening addi-
tional agricultural lands.

Through these massive assistance efforts and the
increased flow of trade from across the Oxus, the
Afghan economy is being increasingly tied to that
of the Soviet Union.

No one who knows the present Afghan leaders
and the courageous Afghan people will seriously
doubt their deep personal commitment to freedom.
Generation after generation of Afghans have
fought, and fought successfully, to protect their
country against the incursions of the Russians
from the north and of the British from their old
imperial base in India. However, this generation
of Afghans has been persuaded by the sheer mag-
nitude of their problems that they can somehow
use massive Soviet aid to modernize their archaic
land and still remain masters in their own house.

We should fervently wish them well. At the
same time we must face the hard fact that
Afghanistan's continuing role as an independent,
neutral, buffer state in a critical area is likely to
depend in large measure on the economic assist-
ance, political sophistication, and moral support
of the United States Government.

Encouraging Events in Cambodia

In Southeast Asia the all-too-familiar conflicts
in Laos and Viet-Nam claim a lion's share of the
headlines and present us with military challenges
of the most difficult and dangerous sort. Yet

April 23, T962

675

tliere are other less dramatic developments in
Southeast Asia which are not generally under-
stood, and some of them, at least, are encouraging.

In Cambodia, for instance, it is heartening to
see the powerfid popular support which the Cam-
bodian Government enjoys throughout the King-
dom. Widespread ownership of land has helped
to insulate the Cambodian peasantry against Com-
munist infiltration or subversion, and there is a
remarkably close bond between the army and the
people.

This latter point is of particular significance.

Seven years ago the army was disliked and dis-
trasted by the average Cambodian. Now it is
welcomed eagerly as it moves into the rural areas
to clear forests, resettle families on improved
lands, build roads and schools, dig wells, and even
teach literacy classes.

However, Cambodian "nonalinement" in the in-
ternational field should not lead us to assiune any
lack of understanding of the threat of Communist
subversion. Wlien the Geneva agreements ' ended
the Indochinese war in 1954, large Viet Minh
forces were active throughout more than half of
Cambodia. All of these Communist guerrillas
were eliminated without outside help.

Cambodia can teach us and the governments of
many developing new nations some valuable les-
sons in the handling of subversion — if we are
ready to listen.

U.S. Performance Steadily Improving

Now I shall briefly offer some general impres-
sions of what I believe to be our own steadily
improving performance in this part of the world.

Everywhere I went I saw evidence, sometimes
marginal, sometimes totally persuasive, that we
are beginning to look beyond the crises which we
face to the forces which are creating those crises.
Moreover, I believe we are beginning to deal with
these forces with a tough-minded but sensitive
realism that is new in the conduct of American
foreign affairs.

This realism was strikingly evident at last
week's Regional Operations Conference at Baguio
in the Philippines.'' This meeting was the sixth

' For texts, see American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955:
Basic Documents, vol. I, Department of State publication
6440, p. 750.

* For an announcement of the conference, see Bttlletin
of Mar. 2G, 1902, p. 511.

in a series of such meetings that have now covered
all our missions in Africa, Latin America, the
Middle East, South Asia, and East Asia. It was
attended by U.S. ambassadors and their principal
associates from 15 Asian posts, plus key officials
from Waslmigton representing various Govern-
ment agencies that deal with foreign affairs.
These Regional Operations Conferences have had
thi'ee main objectives :

1. To confirm beyond question the overall au-
thority and responsibility of our ambassadors;

2. To improve the coordination and administra-
tion abroad of the many instruments of United
States foreign policy ; and

3. To review the policies of the present admin-
istration in depth, not only on a regional basis but
in all parts of the world.

As tools of improved management and com-
mimication, all of these meetings have demon-
strated their usefulness. At Baguio there was a
particularly frank attempt to reach a balanced as-
sessment of past mistakes and successes in Asia
and our present overall position there.

In regard to Communist China it was agreed
that the time has come for more solid thought and
fewer slogans. Although some may still hope that
the so-called "China problem" will conveniently
disappear, thoughtful observers agree that this is
not in the cards. Consequently there was general
agreement at Baguio that our approach to Com-
munist China must look beyond the narrow ques-
tion of recognition — on which our policies are
clear — to consider some of the pressures now being
generated within mainland China, pressures whose
significance is undeniable but whose results remain
obscure.

At present, Peiping-Moscow relations appear to
be steadily worsening. At the same time mainland
China is facing an acute food shortage that stems
not merely from bad weather and mismanagement
but more fundamentally from a shortage of arable
land, inadequate fertilizer production, and a popu-
lation increase of 16 million people annually.

The political implications are both explosive
and unjiredictable.

Will (he Peii)ing government adopt a more ag-
gressive course in Southeast Asia? Or will it
gradually move toward a more moderate ap-
proach? Are we fully prepared for either con-
tingency ?

676

Department of State Bulletin

These and many other equally hard questions
occupied the center of our discussions. Although
no final answers were reached, frank discussion is
a first essential step.

In Asia I also saw evidence of a new apprecia-
tion of the relevance of the American revolution-
ary tradition to world affairs — not simply as an
anticolonial force but in its broad economic, social,
and political implications. I had sensed a similar
appreciation in earlier trips to Africa and Latin
America.

In this context we are beginning to develop a
more positive idea of what American foreign pol-
icy is striving to achieve. In today's world it is
not enough to be against communism; people
everywhere want to know what we stand for.

With increasing effectiveness we are beginning
to tell them.

Total Diplomacy

A new generation is now serving our Govern-
ment which does not look back — as many of the
older generation do — to a so-called "normal life"
of quiet isolation. On the contrary, they see in
bur new global commitments an exciting new
frontier of human opportunity.

We are also coming to realize that foreign op-
erations in today's world call for a total diplomacy
that reflects all of the dynamic phases of our own
American society — from our industrial capacity
and military defense to our educational system and
our dedication to the rights of the human in-
dividual.

American ambassadors can no longer be content
with wining and dining, reporting, analyzing, and
cautiously predicting. They must act as adminis-
trators and coordinators, responsible for the effec-
tive operation of all U.S. Government activities
in the countries of their assignment.

Growing out of these factors is a new under-
standing in every nation and in every corner of
every nation of the overriding importance of
people — what they think, what they fear, what
they seek. No longer can a wealthy minority in
a developing country depend on docile peasant
soldiers to defend its privileges.

Not even the best equipped, American-trained
troops can successfully defend their own country
unless their fellow citizens feel that they have
something meaningful of their own for which they
are prepared to give their lives. This is a decisive

new factor in world affairs and therefore a basic
new element of power.

In this respect we are now beginning to encour-
age the developing nations to create military forces
capable of effective defense against Communist
guerrillas ; in the tradition of our own U.S. Army
Engineers, such forces are also trained in the
building of roads, dams, bridges, and schools.
This helps create a working partnership between
soldiers and citizens.

We have also become aware of the need for
flexible, mobile, American military power capable
of dealing vigorously with the kind of local wars
which we may be called upon to fight in support
of independent goverimients.

In our aid programs, through painful experi-
ence, we have learned that we cannot impose our
own system on others, that we cannot effectively
use our aid to buy friends, and that it is unpro-
ductive to use economic assistance simply to outbid
the Communists. We have become aware that
the true purpose of our assistance is to help devel-
oping nations exercise their own freedom of
choice, to decide within their own religions and
cultures and within the framework of their own
history what kind of societies will best serve their
own people.

We have always Icnown that orderly political
growth requires material progress. But now we
are coming to see that the manner in which the
growth is achieved may be decisive. To what
extent, for instance, have the people as a whole
participated in the process of development? To
what extent has it given them an increasing sense
of individual justice and dignity ?

Steady improvement is now clearly evident in
the effectiveness of our information program and
in the ways we use our agricultural plenty through
Food for Peace. And everywhere I heard praise
for the operations of our new Peace Corps — a new
and promising concept in people-to-people re-
lations.

As a result I believe that most Asians are gradu-
ally beginning to trust us, to sense that the United
States is not simply another rich nation out to
exploit the less fortunate, and to see that the weary
old colonial issue is no longer in fact relevant.

As they consider the contradictions of Marxism
and the internal difficulties and divisions facing
the Soviet Union and mainland China, Asians are
also beginning to understand the sterility of the
Communist doctrine itself. They are even begin-

AprU 23, 1962

677

ning to appreciate the importance of the United
States military shield, without which there would
be little opportunity to build the independent
Asian societies on which they have set their hearts.
On the basis of these generally hopeful impres-
sions, I therefore return to Washington with a
greater sense of confidence than when I left — and
yet still keenly aware that a naked act of aggres-
sion or a tragic miscalculation could blow us all
sky high by sunset.

The situation in Asia has its mixture of the re-
assuring and the grim. Yet I believe that the wave
of the future belongs to free men of many races
and creeds, working together in a massive effort
to create some kind of rational world partnership.

Moreover, I believe that the faint outlines of
such a partnership are already beginning to show
themselves and that in the 1960"s — barring a nu-
clear accident — they may become increasingly
clear for all to see.

Strategy of American Foreign Policy

hy George C. McGhee

Under Secretary for Political Affairs ^

For nearly 15 years the Department of State
has received — almost every week — a certain num-
ber of letters that ask us, in effect, why we don't
"do something about the Communist menace."
They suggest that we are "too soft" on communism
and that we must "win the cold war."

During this same period we have also received
almost as many letters that seem to suggest that
the Department isn't doing enough to preserve
international peace. Sometim&s they say that we
should "learn to trust other nations," "iron out our
misunderstandings with Russia," "stop the arms
race," and eliminate the terrifying threat of nu-
clear hostilities.

I believe the people who wrote these letters — as
well as millions of other Americans — are really
asking serious and reasonable questions. They
want to understand the "grand strategy" of Amer-
ican foreign policy — what our nation is trying to
do in the world, why we are trying to do it, and
how we are going about it. And I believe they are
entitled to an answer.

This grand strategy isn't really mysterious, but
it is almost unbelievably complex. It is complex
because the world is a big place, because we must

' Address made before the San Francisco Area World
Trade ABsociatlon, World Trade Club, San Francisco,
Calif., on Mar. 27 (press release 188 dated Mar. 2C).

have not one but many diflferent purposes, and be-
cause we must use many and specialized tools to
accomplish these purposes. As a result no man
alive sees the whole picture nor can tell you the
whole story. My purpose today is to put together
for you certain parts of the picture that I consider
vitally important to our survival as free men and
women in a free and prosperous nation.

The strategy of American foreign policy today
is designed to pursue realistically the totality of
American interests, as these interests have been
expressed by the American people both directly
and through their elected representatives.

The key to the success of our international
strategy — like all strategy — is the development
and use of strength. We must not, however, be
misled by oversimplification of the problem into
placing our reliance upon any single element of
strength. Our nation cannot be protected — nor
our ultimate objectives promoted — by military
strength alone, nor by economic strength alone,
nor by moral strength alone.

The struggle known as the cold war calls for tlie
effective utilization of all our resources. We can-
not confine ourselves to one or even a limited range
of tools or techniques. We must have the strength
that comes from a mighty military establislunent,
from a prosperous and dynamic economy, from an
evolving science and teclinology, from a free and

678

Department of State Bulletin

orderly scx-ietj', from intellectual and spiritual
growth, and from unity of purpose and action-
all at the same time.

Strenfrth, like charity, must begin at home. To-
day the United States is in almost every sense a
healthy and powerful nation. However, wo
learned many years ago that we could not attain
our national objectives, nor even assure our sur-
vival, solely through our own strength. Our
country has only about 6 percent of the world's
territory and population. We are blessed by an
abundance of natural resources, but these are not
adequate to make us militarily or economically
self-sufficient.

We have an advanced science and technology,
but we depend heavily upon the science and tech-
nology of other friendly nations. It is well for
Americans to remember that the first atomic bomb
was produced by combining the knowledge and
skills of scientists from many nations.

Even if we could ignore our moral and humani-
tarian interests in the freedom and well-being of
other nations, we could not ignore the fact that
their health and strength are essential to our own
freedom and well-being. The United States could
not surv'ive indefinitely as an island fortress in a
hostile world. For these reasons, as well as others,
we have cast aside the concept of isolationism.
There still lingers, however, some of the myth-
ology of that era to obscure our perception of in-
ternational issues.

Survey of World Objectives

To survey our objectives in the world, we wish,
as a minimum, for all other nations that are free
of Sino-Soriet domination to retain their inde-
pendence. This is true even of nations that have
political and economic systems markedly different
from our own — nations that have even expressed
hostility toward our values and our policies — •
nations that have little or nothing to contribute at
the present time to the cause of peace and free-
dom. Where such a nation's policies and actions
are uncooperative, of coui-se, our own ability to
cooperate and assist is limited.

Nevertheless we recognize the great importance
of the fact that any nation, so long as it retains
true independence, retains at the same time a free-
dom of choice as to its future— a freedom which
is lost once it has been subjected to Sino-Soviet
control. It also retains the opportimity for change

and growth. Moreover, .so long as it remains in-
dependent, its human and material resources can-
not be used to augment the power of the Sino-
So\'iet empire.

As a maximmn we wish other nations to achieve
sufficient national and personal freedom, together
with sufficient strength and sense of common pur-
pose, that will enable them to make a positive con-
tribution to our common interests and objectives.
Obviously there are many intermediate stages be-
tween our minimum and maximmn goals. At the
end of World War II there was virtually no free
nation that could make a significant contribution
to our most important interests. Our closest and
strongest friends had been strained or ravaged
by war and could add little or nothing to our ovm
political, military, or economic strength. They
seemed to be liabilities rather than assets.

Fortunately our nation had the foresight to
recognize that liabilities could be converted into
assets and the imagination and courage to imder-
take this task. We do not fear the strength of
other free nations, nor do we feel obliged to keep
them divided. On the contrary, we have worked
to increase their strength and to encourage their
efforts at unity.

In Japan our military occupation did not milk
the Japanese economy but rather sought to lay
a foundation for a free and prosperous Japanese
society. In Western Europe we undertook and
supported a bold series of measures to build
strength and unity — the Greek-Turkish aid pro-
gram, the Marshall plan, the OEEC [Organiza-
tion for European Economic Cooperation], the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and various
policies aimed at achieving maximum integration
among the European nations themselves. We
made a very substantial investment in Western
European strength and imity, and this investment
has paid handsome dividends.

The nations of Western Europe have, with our
help, maintained and extended their political and
social freedom. They have recovered from the
ravages of war and have achieved imprecedented
levels of economic prosperity, based essentially
upon competitive private enterprise. Their large
colonial empires have almost entirely dis-
appeared; about 800 million people formerly
under Western European rule have attained
statehood.

However, the virtual elimination of colonialism
has not diminished Western Europe's overall

April 23, 1962

679

strength and influence; first, because "Western
Europe still retains close political, economic, and
cultural ties with many of these new countries;
and second, because Western Europe has been per-
mitted to turn its vast energies from the burdens
of colonialism to its own evolution and develop-
ment. Meanwhile several of the Western Euro-
pean nations have developed substantial military
as well as economic capabilities.

The nations of the Atlantic community, includ-
ing the United States, Canada, and the free na-
tions of Western Europe, now possess about 90
percent of the free world's industrial and techno-
logical capacity. They possess virtually all of the
free world's modern military power. They have
numerous ties with the nations of Asia, Africa,
and Latin America. In brief, the Atlantic com-
munity is the hard core of the strength and vmity
of the free world as a whole.

It is important to remember that the "Atlantic
community" is not a formal organization but is
rather a concept, a series of institutions and a
steadily evolving process of cooperation. Fifteen
nations of the Atlantic community have joined
together in NATO, a defensive military alliance
and an instrument of political cooperation.
Twenty Atlantic nations have also joined together
in the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development, through which the member
governments are seeking to coordinate many of
their economic and fiscal policies and to provide
more ample and effective assistance to the lesser
developed regions of the world.

United States and the Common Market

Meanwhile we have witnessed and encouraged
another development of tremendous significance.
For centuries European statesmen have sought to
eliminate the frictions and rivalries that have dis-
sipated Europe's strength and have produced two
disastrous world wars. Some have dreamed of a
United States of Europe. Thus far attempts at
uniting Westei-n Europe by conquest, by political
federation, and by military integration have
proved unsuccessful. However, six Western Eu-
ropean nations have made an unprecedented
breakthrougli in the field of economic integration.
Beginning in 1950 with the European Coal and
Steel Community, these nations have moved for-
ward to establish a European Atomic Energy
Community and are now in the process of per-

fecting a European p]conomic Commiuiity, better
known as the European Common Market.

The members of this Common Market have
pledged themselves to remove by gradual stages
all artificial barriers to trade and the movement
of their citizens across national boundaries, with
the objective of achieving by 1970 an economic
relationship comparable to that which exists
among the 50 States of our own country. While
the ultimate goals of the European Common
Market have not yet been realized, the process of
economic integration, in the opinion of most Eu-
ropean statesmen, has already passed the point of
no return. Moreover, this process has gone far
enough to demonstrate conclusively the political
and economic value of unity. By reducing tariffs
and other barriers of trade — thus simultaneously
providing wider markets and the powerful stimu-
lus of competition — industry, commerce, and agri-
culture have gained new vitality.

The sick national economies that we used to
hear about a few years ago have become healthy
and vigorous economies. Profits, wages, and liv-
ing standards have risen. Western Europe is
competing more effectively in world markets.
Unemployed workers in certain countries are find-
ing good jobs in other countries. Finally, the na-
tions of the Common Market have attained an
annual rate of economic growth that is approxi-
mately twice the recent growth rate of the United
States.

For the first time in history the United States is
confronted by an economic entity roughly equiv-
alent in size and capacity to itself. The Common
Market is already larger than the United States
market in terms of population and is potentially
larger in purchasing power. Last year the United
Kingdom applied for full membership in the Com-
mon Market, and other Western European nations
may follow. These applications for membership
will involve delicate negotiations, and the outcome
cannot bo predicted at this time. However, the
Common Market has already altered world trading
patterns and has developed (ho capacity to play a
dynamic role of leadership on the political stage.
Its maximum potentialities are very great.

President Kennedy and his advisers are keenly
awaro of the immense significance and potentiality
of the expanding Common Market, both in terms
of our domestic prosperity and in terms of our
general foreign policy. The members of tlie ex-
panded Common Market, for example, accoimt for

680

Department of State Bulletin

a major portion of American export trade — al-
togetlier $0 billion a year — and much of our import
trade. Existing tariff legislation does not, how-
ever, give the President sufficient authority to bar-
gain effectively with the European Common
Market nor to cope with radically changing trad-
ing patterns in other parts of the world. There-
fore the President has asked the Congress for
new legislation to enlarge and broaden his bar-
gaining authority and to provide more flexible
and selective protection for American workers,
farmers, and businessmen.^

I do not want to enter into a detailed discussion
of the domestic economic advantages of the pro-
posed trade legislation. There is overwhelming
evidence that it will be beneficial to the American
people without inflicting significant injuiy upon
any segment of the economy. This is not a ques-
tion of making a sacrifice in order to help our
European friends but of our whole future as a
world trading nation.

We have every reason to anticipate that the
adoption of this legislation, followed by an effec-
tive negotiation with the European Common
Market and other countries, will add to our do-
mestic prosperity, increase employment, provide
new opportunities to industrial and agricultural
producers, help to check inflation, and in the long
run contribute substantially to the dynamism of
our whole economic system.

However, the implications of the President's
trade proposals go far beyond their domestic eco-
nomic benefits. These proposals, in fact, represent
the most important single example of the positive
elements of our international strategy. They are
designed to serve as an essential foundation stone
for a world community of free, prosperous, and
peaceful nations.

As I have already pointed out, the expanding
European Common Market will be a true equal of
the United States in many important respects.
This fact is extremely important. Despite the
close relationships that already exist — institutional
and otherwise — between North America and West-
em Europe, there has always been a missing in-
gredient. While several members of NATO and
the OECD may properly be described as major
powers, none has approached the United States
in terms of wealth, production and consumption,

^ For text of the President's message to Congress, see
Buu-ETiN of Feb. 12, 1962, p. 231 ; for a summary of the
bill (H.R. 9900), see ibid., Feb. 26, 1962, p. 343.

science and technology, military strength, inter-
national commitments, etc. Both the United
States and the other members of the Atlantic
community have been discomfited by the fact that
there has been no equality, either in capacities or
responsibilities.

If we can negotiate a mutually beneficial trade
agreement with the Common Market on a broad
category of goods, permitting expanded and inti-
mate trading between us, we shall have taken the
first and perhaps decisive step toward converting
a relatively loose association of unequals into a
tightly knit partnership of equals.

By the same step we shall have increased the
economic and technological dynamism of both
partners. We shall have cemented and consoli-
dated existing institutional relationships which
might be imperiled if the two great common mar-
kets of Western Europe and North America should
make the tragic mistake of becoming economic
rivals. In brief the adoption of the President's
trade proposals and their effective implementation
can vastly increase the strength — and simultane-
ously tighten the unity — of Western Europe and
North America by creating a new Atlantic
partnership.

Strength and Unity of Free World

In view of my earlier remarks the direct and
immediate value of such a partnership should be
obvious. It can contribute to the security, pros-
perity, and freedom of both the United States and
the European Economic Community. But its im-
plications go much further. A strong and united
Atlantic partnership can also contribute to the
strength and unity of the free world as a whole.

All Amei'icans know that the United States has
interests and obligations involving many nations
and regions outside the European Economic Com-
munity. These include those Western European
states which cannot or do not choose to join the
Common Market. They include our northern
neighbor and partner — Canada — as well as other
members of the British Commonwealth. They
include our old and intimate friends and allies in
the Organization of American States. They in-
clude Japan, which has become a major center of
freedom and economic vitality in the Far East,
and other friends and allies in the Western Pacific.
Finally, they include the newly emerging and
lesser developed countries of the world, primarily
in Asia and Africa.

April 23, 1962

681

The present and prospective members of the
European Common Market also have worldwide
interests and responsibilities. The unity provided
by the Common Market system, enhanced further
by an economic partnership with the United
States, will vastly increase the capacity of both
parties to pursue these interests and meet these
responsibilities. Neither the United States nor
any other Atlantic nation wishes to be a member
of an exclusive "rich man's club." Our ultimate
purpose is to attain the kind of world community
contemplated by the United Nations Charter.
The profound significance of the Atlantic partner-
ship lies in the fact that the consolidation and
expansion of its own strength and unity can help
to impart strength and unity to the remainder of
the free world.

To be more specific, we should understand the
fact that the President's trade proposals provide
for the maintenance of the most-favored-nation
principle. This means that the benefits of any
trading agi-eement reached with the European
Common Market will be available automatically
to all other free nations that have made or are
willing to make comparable trading concessions.
The Atlantic partnership, therefore, will not be
an instrmnent of discrimination in trade with
other areas but instead will be a means of reducing
and eliminating such discrimination.

Expanded trade, in turn, will benefit these
other areas in many ways. In the lesser developed
I'egions, for example, expanded trade will stimu-
late investment, provide more stable export mar-
kets and sources of supply, and thereby permit
these countries to earn foreign exchange to sup-
plement that now being received in the form of
loans and grants. Eventually, of course, these
earnings are expected to substitute for loans and
grants as the lesser developed countries advance
toward the ultimate goal of self-sustaining eco-
nomic growth.

Expanded trade will also provide cement for
the entire community of free nations. In the long
run the unity we sock cannot be assured by force,
diplomacy, psychological strategy, or oven inti-
mate cultural and personal contacts. It must rest
upon a real identity of interests, and there is prob-
ably no single common interest that draws coun-
tries so closely together as a mutually beneficial
trading relationship.

We expect expanded trade to be reflected in
a growth of commerce with the Far East, whicli

is of particular interest — and rightly 90 — to the
people of your city and State. Japan, already one
of our best customers, will, imder conditions of
freer trade, enhance its growth and hence its de-
mand for United States imports. The less devel-
oped countries of the Far East will at the same
time be moving toward self-sustaining growth and
higher levels of economic activity and trade with
this country.

Increase in trade with the Far East, both in
imports and exports, will, of course, have a direct
and major impact on California, its industries,
its workers, and its farmers. The shipping indus-
try would benefit directly and importantly from
the new trade program proposed by the President.
The port of San Francisco handles about half of
all California's exports and imports — 2,000,000
and 3,000,000 tons, respectively, a year. Ex-
panded trade, particularly with the Far East,
would give it a tremendous boost.

Your State's expoils total about $1.8 billion a
year, second only to New York's. More than one-
fourth of this total represents exports of agricul-
tural commodities, another fourth transportation
equipment, mainly aircraft. Canned foods, petro-
leum products, construction equipment, and elec-
trical machinery account for most of the remain-
der. Some 500 California firms each have annual
exports totaling more than $25,000, nearly half
of which use the port of San Francisco. Together
they employ nearly a half million persons. Food
and manufactured products shipped from the San
Francisco Bay area go all over the world — to
France, "West Germany, the Netherlands, Eng-
land, Japan, Mexico, Brazil, Colombia, and else-
where in Latin America.

Reduced tarilTs on imports and the vast ex-
pansion of the Nation's export markets envisaged
by the new trade program would help the San
Francisco area — indeed, the entire State of Cali-
fornia— as much as any area of the Nation.

A Policy of Dynamic Growth

The Atlantic partnership will increa.se the ca-
pacity of its members to protect and assist the
lesser developed regions. Strength begets strength
:in(l attracts strength. A strong and united At-
lantic partnership will be able to make available
to the lesser developed nations more money and
resources — more technical advice and assistance —
than ever before, and will also be able to insure
that all this aid is u.sed more efTectively. A

682

Department of Slate Bulletin

stronger Atlantic partnership will also be able
to establish a more secure world in which these
countries will be better protected against aggres-
sion.

Its strength should have an impact on the nu-
mei'ous and persistent crises in various parts of
the world — Berlin, the Congo, Viet-Nam, Laos,
etc. Neither we nor our allies can ignore areas of
weakness nor areas under attack — actual or threat-
ened— however far these areas may be from the
centers of our own strength and interests. As
Secretary Rusk has said, if we ignore the periph-
ery, the periphery may become the center.

But let us not, either, focus exclusively upon the
crisis areas — upon weakness and danger — and
thereby make the even more serious error of ig-
noring the center itself : the hard core of Atlantic
nations which supply most of the aid resources and
military strength of the free world. We must be
as quick to seize opportunities in strengthening
the center as to respond to challenges on the
periphery.

The basic strategy of American foreign policy
is thus not a policy of static defense. It is a
strategy of dynamic growth. Our task is to use
all the means available to us to increase the
strength and unity of other free nations and
peoples and thus to extend the frontiers of freedom
itself.

But the purpose of this strength and unity is
not just to be able to fight and win a nuclear war,
nor just to fight a more effective cold war — unless
the Sino-Soviet bloc chooses to continue this waste-
ful struggle. Rather our purpose is to offer the
rulers and peoples of the Communist world power-
ful incentives to abandon the cold war and to sub-
stitute genuine peace and cooperation for the
vague and mysterious "coexistence" they have
offered.

We must never close the door to cooperation
with any nation. "Wliile we cannot be so optimis-
tic as to assume that the Communist system is
on the brink of collapse, neither should we be so
pessimistic as to ignore the possibility of change —
gradual or sudden — in the structure of the Com-
munist system or the objectives of its rulers. It
is our duty to be suspicious and distrustful so long
as we have evidence to justify distrust, but it is
also our duty to offer incentives for cooperation
and to be prepared for all possibilities — the ])ossi-
bilities of good and evil alike. We must keep our
hopes high and our powder dry.

April 23, 1962

In other words our strategy is to attain and ex-
tend a combination of strength and unity that will,
in tlie first instance, render the United States, the
Atlantic community, and all other free nations
unassailable, and at the same time make freedom
and cooperation attractive. Strength is a magnet
as well as a fortress. In the long run our stick is
the same as our carrot.

J. F. Friedkin Named to U.S.-Mexican
Boundary and Water Commission

The Department of State announced on April 2
(press release 217) that Joseph F. Friedkin had
taken his oath of office on that day as U.S. Com-
missioner on the International Boundary and
Water Commission, United States and Mexico.
He succeeds Col. L. H. Hewitt (U.S. Army, re-
tired). The new Commissioner, a career employee,
has been with the U.S. Section of the Commission
continuously since April 2, 1934, except for mili-
tai-y service. He became Principal Engineer
(Supervising) in 1952.

The International Boundary and Water Com-
mission, United States and Mexico, consists of a
U.S. and a Mexican Commissioner, and the treaty
of 1944 with Mexico stipulates that each must be
an engineer. Functioning under the policy direc-
tion of the Department of State and the Mexican
Ministry of Foreign Relations, the Commission is
charged by numerous treaties and laws with the
conduct of an international program for the solu-
tion of engineering problems along the 1,935-mile
boundary with Mexico.

Among its activities the Commission is presently
entering the construction phase of a second great
international dam on the Rio Grande. The first,
Falcon Dam, was completed in 1953 and has al-
ready more than paid for itself in flood control.
The Congress authorized the U.S. Section in June
1960 to proceed with the still-larger structure to be
known as Amistad Dam. The Commission also
administers the deliveiy of Colorado River water
to Mexico under the 1944 treaty and is engaged
in an intensive study to remedy a salinity problem
that has arisen with Mexico.^ The Commission is
in charge of flood control on the lower Rio Grande.

' For background, see Bulletin of Apr. 16, 1962, p. 650.

683

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

U.N. Security Council Rejects Cuban Call for Opinion
of World Court on OAS Action

Following are statements made hy Adlai E.
Stevenson^ U.S. Representative in the Security
Council, on March 15 and 23, and the text of a
Cuban draft resolution.

STATEMENT OF MARCH 15

U.S. /U.N. press release 3940

This is the third time this year that United Na-
tions organs have met in response to a Cuban
complaint. They are all essentially alike — attacks
on the United States or the Organization of
American States. But this time something has
been added: The objective of the Communists is
very clear; it is to extend the Soviet veto to all
regional organizations by way of the Security
Council.

Wlien the Cuban government sought to bring its
last charge before the Security Council a couple
of weeks ago, just after almost 2 weeks of exami-
nation of the same charge in the General Assem-
bly, my Government opposed further discussion
of the complaint.^ But this time we have not op-
posed placing the item on our agenda, not, as I
say, because it differs in its political content but
because we believe this Council should dispas-
sionately examine any request that an opinion be
sought of the International Court of Justice.

The representative of Cuba [Mario Garcia
Inchaustegui] regrettably has not approaclied his
own request for a judicial opinion in a judicial
manner. Eather, by the tone and substance of
his speech it is clear that he is again pursuing a
dispute which his goveniment has created between

^ On Feb. 27 the Security Council met to con.si(lor a Cu-
ban complaint asainst the United States (S/r)OSO) and
decided, by a vole of 4 to 0, witli 7 abstentions (U.S.),
not to include the item in its asendn ; for U.S. statements
in the General Assembly on Feb. 14 and 20, see Bulletin
of Apr. 2, 1962, p. 553.

it, on the one hand, and all the Kepublics of the
hemisphere on the other.

This time the attack is against the Organiza-
tion of American States. But it is clearly aimed
at all regional organizations. It is an attempt to
subject the activities of all regional organizations
to the Soviet veto in the Security Council.

Let there be no mistake about the objective of
this complaint. The Cuban letter is camouflaged
witli legalisms, but the issue it raises is 100-per-
cent political. That issue is whether a regional
organization, one which has cooperated fully with
the United Nations, has the right to manage its
own affairs and defend itself against a foreign
dominated government or whether the Soviet Un-
ion is to be allowed to paralyze that organization's
activities through Soviet exercise of its veto power
in this Council.

We believe that everyone who recognizes the
great contributions to the progress of the world
which regional organizations have made and can
make, whether it be the Organization of American
States, the Arab League, or some future regional
associations of African or Asian states, will join
in rejecting this threat to the independence and
vitality of such regional organizations and this
elfort of tlie Soviet Union to extend its veto over
their activities.

This is not the first time the Communist bloc
has tried to extend the veto to advance its cam-
paign for world domination. Soviet vetoes in the
Security Council so impaired its functions and
effectiveness over the years that it became neces-
sary to adopt the "Uniting for Peace" resolution ^
so that the General Assembly, at least, can act
with decisiveness and dispatch. Even in the As-
sembly and its committees we have seen efforts to
spread the Soviet veto through the concept of
unanimity. And it was only last fall that we

" For text, see ihiiL, Nov. 20, 1050, p. S2.3.

634

Department of Sfofe Bulletin

faced a Communist move, stimulated by tlie ef-
fectiveness of the Secretariat, to impose a troika
on the office of the Secretary-General, which would
have subjected the entire Secretariat to the Soviet
veto. That move was decisively rejected. And
this new effort to extend the veto to regional or-
ganizations should be just as decisively rejected.

"What is it that the Cuban letter^ before us is
asking the Security Council to do? The letter
contends that the resolutions ^ adopted by the Or-
ganization of American States at Pimta del Este
constitute "aggression against the sovereignty of
our country and a serious threat to international
peace and security," that they require the authori-
zation of the Security Council, under article 53 of
the charter, on the ground that they constitute
"enforcement action" within the language of that
article, and that without such approval they vio-
late the Charter of the United Nations.

So that we may not forget what the real issue
at Punta del Este was and so that we may deter-
mine whether its decisions did or did not consti-
tute aggression, violate the charter, or require Se-
curity Council approval as "enforcement action,"
I must ask your indulgence while I deal with each
of the Punta del Este resolutions. They are all
set forth in full in the Final Act of Punta del
Este, document S/5075, which is before the Se-
curity Council.

Communist Offensive in America

The first resolution relates to the offensive by
the Communist bloc against the American Re-
publics. I shall read from paragraphs 1, 2, and 3
of that resolution, which was adopted by the unan-
imous vote of all the American Republics (except
Cuba) :

1. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American
Republics . . . declare that the continental unity and the
democratic institutions of the hemisphere are now In
danger.

The Mini.sters have been able to verify that the sub-
versive offensive of communist governments, their agents
and the organizations which they control, has increased
in intensity. The purpose of this offensive is the destruc-
tion of democratic institutions and the establishment of
totalitarian dictatorships at the service of extracontinen-
tal powers. The outstanding facts in this intensified of-
fensive are the declarations set forth in ofiicial documents
of the directing bodies of the international communist

" U.N. doc. S/5086.

* For background and tests of resolutions, see Bdxletin
of Feb. 19, 1962, p. 270.

movement, that one of its principal objectives is the
establishment of communist regimes in the underdeveloped
countries and in Latin America; and the existence of
a Marxist-Leninist government in Cuba which is publicly
aligned with the doctrine and foreign policy of the com-
munist powers.

2. In order to achieve their subversive purposes and
hide their true intentions, the communist governments
and their agents exploit the legitimate needs of the less-
favored sectors of the population and the just national
aspirations of the various peoples. With the pretext of
defending popular interests, freedom is suppressed, demo-
cratic institutions are destroyed, human rights are vio-
lated and the individual is subjected to materialistic
wa.vs of life imposed by the dictatorship of a single party.
Under the slogan "anti-imperialism" they try to establish
an oppressive. aggres.sive, imperialism, which subordi-
nates the subjugated nations to the militaristic and ag-
gressive interests of estracontinental powers. By ma^
liciously utilizing the very principles of the Inter-American
system, they attempt to undermine democratic institu-
tions and to strengthen and protect political penetration
and aggression. The .subversive methods of communist
governments and their agents constitute one of the most
subtle and dangerous forms of intervention in the internal
affairs of other countries.

3. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs alert the peoples
of the hemisphere to the intensification of the subversive
offensive of communist governments, their agents, and the
organizations that they control and to the tactics and
methods that they employ and also warn them of the
dangers this situation represents to representative de-
mocracy, to respect for human rights, and to the self-
determination of peoples.

And then the Ministers conclude with a declara-
tion that :

The principles of communism are incompatible with
the principles of the Inter-American system.

Here, then, is a resolution in which the members
of the OAS have unanimously alerted the West-
ern Hemisphere to the dangers of Communist
aggression in the form of subversion. This reso-
lution is a statement of policy by the OAS and a
statement of its great concern about the Commu-
nist threat to our security. It was to deal with
just such problems that the OAS was established.

Does such a resolution constitute aggression or
contravene the United Nations Charter or require
Security Council authorization ? Of course it does
not, and it would be pointless to ask the Interna-
tional Court of Justice whether it does.

Establishment of Committee on Security

The second resolution, adopted 19 to 1 (Cuba),
with one abstention ( Bolivia) , requested the Coun-
cil of the Organization of American States to

April 23, J 962

685

maintain vigilance for the purpose of warning
against acts of aggression, subversion, and other
dangers to peace and security resulting from the
continued intervention of Sino-Soviet powers in
the Western Hemisphere.

The resolution directed the Council to establish
a special consultative committee of experts on se-
curity matters to advise member states tliat may
request assistance. The resolution also urged
member states to take steps considered by them
appropriate for their individual or collective self-
defense and to cooperate to strengthen their capac-
ity to counteract threats or acts of aggression,
subversion, or other dangers to peace and security
resulting from the continued intervention in the
Western Hemisphere of Sino-Soviet powers.

Does such a resolution constitute aggression or
contravene the United Nations Cliarter or require
Security Council authorization? Of course it
does not, and it would be pointless to ask the
International Court of Justice whether it does.
Clearly the resolution is an exercise of the inherent
riglit of nations to prepare for their own self-
defense, whether individually or collectively.
And so to prepare was elementai-y prudence in the
face of the extracontinental Communist threat.

Resolutions Calling for Free Elections

The tliird resolution reiterated the foreign min-
isters' adherence to the principles of self-deter-
mination and nonintervention and, in a second
paragraph, urged the governments of the member
states to organize themselves on the basis of free
elections that express, without restriction, the will
of the people.

The Cuban regime voted against— I repeat,
against— free elections and voted against — I re-
peat, against — the resolution itself. Every other
American Republic voted for that paragraph and
for the resolution.

Does such a resolution, calling for free elections
to express the people's will, contravene the United
Nations Charter or require Security Council au-
thorization ? Of course it does not, and it would
be pointless to ask the International Court of
.fusticc whether it does. The real problem in the
Caribbean is disclosed by the fact that tlie Cuban
regime felt compelled to vote against such a basic
right, a basic riglit enshrined in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.

The fourth resolution recommended that gov-

ernments whose structure or acts are incompatible
with the effective exercise of representative de-
mocracy should hold free elections in order to
guarantee the restoration of a legal order based
on the authority of the law and respect for the
rights of the individual. The Cuban regime also
voted against that resolution, again denying the
principle of free elections. Eveiy other American
Republic voted for free elections and for the
resolution.

Does such a recommendation constitute aggres-
sion or contravene the United Nations Charter or
require Security Coimcil authorization? Of
course it does not, and there is no reason to ask
the International Court of Justice whether it
does.

Alliance for Progress Resolution

The fifth resolution, also unanimously adopted
(except for Cuba) , declared in part :

1. That the preservation and strengthening of free and
democratic institutions in the American republics require
. . . the prompt, accelerated execution of an unprece-
dented effort to promote their economic and social devel-
opment for which effort the public and private, domestic
and foreign financial resources necessary to those objec-
tives are to be made available, economic and social re-
forms are to be established, and every nec-essary internal
effort is to be made in accordance with the provisions of
the Charter of Punta del Este.

2. That it is essential to promote energetically and
vigorously the basic industries of the Latin American
countries, to liberalize trade in raw materials by the
elimination of undue restrictions, to seek to avoid violent
fluctuations in their prices, to encourage the moderniza-
tion and expansion of services in order ... to increase
national wealth and to nialie such increased wealth avail-
able to persons of all economic and social groui>s, and to
satisfy quiclily, among other aspirations, the needs for
worli, housing, land, health, and education.

Does such a resolution — and it is interesting to
note that this resolution has been thorouglily
deprecated by Cuba — constitute aggression or con-
travene the United Nations Charter or require Se-
curity Council authorization? Of course it does
not, and it would be pointless to ask the Interna-
tional Court of Justice whether it does.

Self-Exclusion of Cuba From American System

The sixth resolution is entitled "Exclusion of
the Present Government of Cuba From Participa-
tion in the Inter-American System." This reso-
lution is one of those most critical of tlie present

I

686

Department of Stale Bulletin

government of Cuba, and for this reason it has
provoked strong Cuban reaction. But this does
not make the resolution "aggression" or make it
subject to Security Council approval.

The resolution refers to the report of the Inter-
American Peace Committee, which stated :

3. As regards the intense subversive activity in which
the countries of the Sino-Soviet bloc are engaged in
America and the activities of the Cuban Government that
are pointed out in this report, it is evident that they
would constitute acts that, within the system for the
"ix)litical defense" of the hemisphere, have been classed
as acts of "political aggression" or "aggression of a non-
military character." Such acts represent attacks upon
Inter-American peace and security as well as on the sov-
ereignty and political independence of the American
states, and therefore a serious violation of fundamental
principles of the inter-American system, as has been re-
peatedly and explicitly declared at previous Inter-
American Conferences and Meetings of Consultation.

Based on these facts, among others, the resolution
declared :

That, as a consequence of repeated acts, the present
government of Cuba has voluntarily placed itself outside
the inter-American system.

The resolution goes on with two operative para-
graphs, reading as follows :

1. That adherence by any member of the Organization
of American States to Marxism-Leninism is incompatible
with the inter- American system and the alignment of such
a government with the communist bloc breaks the unity
and solidarity of the hemisphere.

2. That the present government of Cuba, which has of-
ficially identified itself as a Marxist-Leninist government,
is incompatible with the principles and objectives of the
inter-American system.

These two paragraphs were adopted by the
unanimous vote of the 20 American Kepublics,
with Cuba alone dissenting. Do these two opera-
tive paragraphs, expressing the convictions of the
OAS membership, constitute aggression or contra-
vene the United Nations Charter or require Se-
curity Council authorization ? Of course not, and
it would be pointless to ask the International Court
of Justice whether they do. They are statements
of the unanimous views (except, of course, for
Cuba) of the members of a regional organiza-
tion— not only fully within its rights but specifi-
cally within the purposes for which the organiza-
tion was established.

There were two further operative paragraphs
in the resolution :

3. That this incompatibility excludes the present Gov-

ernment of Cuba from participation in the inter-American
system.

4. That the Coimeil of the Organization of American
States and the other organs and organizations of the
inter-American system adopt without delay the measures
necessary to carry out this resolution.

As to these two paragraphs, 14 countries, namely
two-thirds of the membereliip, voted in favor, 1
(Cuba) against, and 6 abstained. Their absten-
tions in no way affected the unanimous decision,
in which all except Cuba joined, that the Castro
regime and its Communist aggressions are incom-
patible with the American system of democratic
freedom.

Cuba and the U.S.S.R. claim that these para-
graphs constitute "aggression" and that tliey re-
quire Security Coimcil approval. Let us look at
these two contentions. First, do the paragraphs
constitute aggression against Cuba? The answer
to that is obvious. To claim such a resolution is
aggression is to distort the meaning of words be-
yond all reason. The fact is that it was a de-
fensive reaction to the Cuban regime's subversive
activities against the free institutions of the Amer-
ican Republics. Those aggressive activities were
the cause of the resolution and are the source of
present tensions.

Cuba's Violations of OAS Charter

Let me review the facts brought out at the
Pimta del Este conference. It was there clearly
shown that the Castro regime, with the assistance
of local Co:nmunist parties, is employing a wide
variety of techniques and practices to overthrow
the free democratic institutions of Latin Amer-
ica. It is bringing hundreds of Latin American
students, labor leaders, intellectuals, and dissident
political leaders to Cuba for indoctrination and
for training, to be sent back to their countries for
the double purpose of agitating in favor of the
Castro regime and undermining their own gov-
ernments. It is fostering the establishment in
other Latin American countries of so-called "com-
mittees of solidarity'' with the Cuban revolution
for the same dual purpose. Cuban diplomatic
personnel encourage and finance agitation and
subversion by dissident elements seeking to over-
throw established government by force.

The Cuban regime is flooding the hemisphere
with propaganda and with printed material. The
recent inauguration of a powerful short-wave
radio station in Cuba now enables the regime to

April 23, 1962

687

broadcast its propaganda to every corner of the
hemisphere, and tliese broadcasts have not hesi-
tated to call for the violent overthrow of estab-
lished governments. Such appeals have been di-
rected to Peru, Brazil, Guatemala, and, most
recently, the Dominican Eepublic. On January
22, 1962, Radio Habana beamed a broadcast to the
Dominican Republic calling on the people to "over-
throw the Council of State"— the very democratic
Council which is now expressing the will of the
Dominican people to be free of the last remnants
of the Trujillo dictatorship.

The military training of Latin Americans in
Cuba by the Castro regime and the wide distri-
bution throughout the hemisphere of the treatise
on guerrilla warfare by "Che" Guevara, Castro's
chief lieutenant, are clear evidence that the Castro
regime will use guerrilla operations as another
important device for gaining its objectives. The
large amounts of arms which Castro boasts of
having obtained from the Communist military
bloc place him in a position to support such oper-
ations, and, in fact, we have seen him aiding or
supporting armed invasions in other Caribbean
countries, notably Panama and the Dominican Re-
public. If we are to believe Castro's threats made
prior to and during the Punta del Este confer-
ence, there will almost certainly be further
Cuban-inspired guerrilla operations against its
Latin American neighbors.

OAS Calls Cuba Bridgehead of Communism

What the OAS decided — unanimously — is that
Cuba today represents a bridgehead of Sino-Soviet
imperialism in the Western Hemisphere and a
base for Communist aggression, intervention, agi-
tation, and subversion against the American Re-
publics. It is small wonder that the American
Republics unanimously recognized that this situa-
tion is a serious threat to their security and the
ability of their peoples to choose freely their own
form of government and to pursue freely their
goals of economic well-being and of social justice.

In the face of these facts it is absurd to contend
that the Punta del Este resolution excluding the
present Cuban regime from the OAS constitutes
aggression against Cuba when it is the Cuban
regime's own aggression against the OAS which
lias caused that exclusion. What the Cuban
regime has done is to create a condition which
makes OAS action necessary and then appear be-
fore this Council to complain of the action made

necessary by the very condition they themselves
created. Clearly a regional organization can de-
termine for itself the conditions of membership.
If it could not so decide, it would clearly be in-
capable of its o\\'n defense and therefore have no
reason for existence.

Equally clearly such self-exclusion, caused by
Cuba's aggressive acts against members of the
OAS, is not "enforcement action" by the OAS
within the meaning of article 53 of the United
Nations Charter. Security Council "authoriza-
tion" cannot be required for regional action — in
this case exclusion from participation in a re-
gional organization — as to matters which the
Council itself cannot possibly act on and which
are solely within the competence of the organiza-
tion itself.

The Organization of American States is. in the
language of article 52, paragraph 1, of the United
Nations Charter, a regional agency for the mainte-
nance of international peace and security. Surely
the Organization of American States, like any
other regional agency, is and, as an agency for the
exercise of the right of collective self-defense,
must be entitled to determine who should partic-
ipate in its proceedings without being subject to
a Soviet veto or any other veto in the Security
Council. The Council cannot pretend to deter-
mine what states should and should not partici-
pate in such a regional agency like the Organiza-
tion of American States and the Arab League.

It should be noted that the Cuban government's
yself-exclusion from the Organization of American
States was not based on its "social system," as
Cuba alleges. It was based on that government's
violations of the OAS Charter, to which Cuba
had solemnly subscribed. In violation of that
charter the present Cuban government has con-
ducted aggressive and subversive activities against,
its fellow American Republics, and in violation of
that charter it has suppressed the fundamental
rights of the individual.

Surely it is not a violation of the United Na-
tions Charter to suspend a government for the
very aggressive activities which the United Na-
tions Charter is designed to prevent, and surely
it is not a violation of the United Nations Cliarter
to suspend a government for suj^prcssing the hu-
man rights and fundamental freedoms which the
TTiiited Nations Charter is designed to uphold.
Nor did the f ramers of tlie United Nations Cliarter
intend it to protect a government from the con-

688

Department of State Bulletin

sequences of such aggressive activities and such
violations of liuman rights and fundamental free-
doms. Tlie OAS is clearly entitled to suspend the
participation of a government which deliberately
violates one of the basic principles of membership
in tlie organization.

Cuban Reasoning Erroneous

The reasoning by which the Cuban representa-
tive has sought to justify his contention that the
suspension — or, as he put it, expulsion — of the
Cuban government from the OAS was unlawful
was this :

Since the OAS Charter, an international treaty,
contains no clause expressly authorizing suspen-
sion or expulsion, such a right of suspension or
expulsion cannot be implied. He claimed that
treaties must be interpreted restrictively and that
the principle of restrictive interpretation of
treaties in this case prohibited implying a right of
suspension.

The Cuban representative is wrong for three
reasons :

First, it is for the Organization of American
States to interpret its own charter. The required
two-thirds of the membership of the Organization
of American States has interpreted its charter to
justify suspension.

Second, treaties, including the OAS Charter,
are to be interpreted effectively and not restric-
tively. It is the cardinal rule of the interpretation
of treaties that they must be interpreted so as to
give effect to their essential purposes. Since the
present Cuban government is doing its best to
frustrate tlie essential purposes of the OAS
Charter, effective interpretation of that treaty re-
quires the exclusion of the Cuban government.

Third, it is obvious that no regional body can
be forced to accept or maintain the presence of a
government which the members of that regional
body determine to be violating the very terms of
the charter of that body. In this case all of the
members of the OAS except Cuba determined that
the Cuban government is violating the OAS
Charter, to which Cuba had solemnly subscribed.
The independence and effectiveness of regional
agencies would be destroyed by a rule that re-
quired regional organizations to continue in their
midst governments that oppose themselves to the
organizations' principles and violate their
charters.

Further Actions at Punta del Este

To return to the Punta del Este resolutions, the
next resolution — the seventh — was also iniani-
mously adopted (except for Cuba). It excluded
the present Cuban regime from the Inter- Ameri-
can Defense Board until it should be determined by
the Council of the Organization of American
States that membership of the government of
Cuba is not prejudicial to the work of the Board
or to the security of the Western Hemisphere.

Does such a resolution constitute aggression or
contravene the United Nations Charter or require
Security Council authorization ? Of course it does
not, and it would be pointless to ask the Interna-
tional Court of Justice whether it does.

The Inter-American Defense Board consists of
military and naval experts whose function is to
study and recommend measures for the defense of
the Western Hemisphere. Surely the American
Republics are entitled, without subjecting them-
selves to a Soviet veto, to exclude from such study
a government which is hostile to the very purposes
of the Board and which is an acknowledged mem-
ber of the Conmaunist bloc constituting the very
threat the American Republics are attempting to
defend themselves against.

The eighth resolution, adopted by the vote of 16
to 1 (Cuba), with 4 abstentions (Chile, Mexico,
Ecuador, and Brazil), recited the statement by
the report of the Inter- American Peace Commit-
tee that the intense subversive activity of the Sino-
Soviet bloc and the Cuban government in America
constitutes "a serious violation of fundamental
principles of the inter- American system," and re-
solved as follows:

1. To suspend immediately trade with Cuba in arms
and implements of war of every kind.

2. To charge the Council of the Organization of Amer-
ican States, in accordance with the circumstances and
with due consideration for the constitutional or legal lim-
itations of each and every one of the member states, with
studying the feasibility and desirability of extending the
suspension of trade to other items, with special attention
to items of strategic importance.

3. To authorize the Council of the Organization of
American States to discontinue, by an affirmative vote of
two-thirds of its members, the measure or measures
adopted pursuant to the preceding paragraphs, at such
time as the Government of Cuba demonstrates its com-
patibility with the purposes and principles of the
system.

Does such a resolution constitute aggression or

April 23, J 962

689

contravene the United Nations Charter or require
Security Council authorization as an enforcement
action? Of course it does not, and it would be
pointless to ask the International Court of Justice
Avhether it does. In the first place, suspension of
trade in arms is the very reverse of aggression
and in this instance is a measure of self-defense
against aggression. Nor is such suspension an
"enforcement action" within the meaning of arti-
cle 53 of the charter. It is a step that any state
can properly and legally take, individually or col-
lectively, without authorization from anyone.

As regards extending the trade suspension to
other items, the resolution instructs the Organi-
zation of American States Council to study the
feasibility and desirability of such an extension,
with due consideration for the constitutional or
legal limitations of the member states. Obviously
no "enforcement action" was involved.

I now come to the ninth and final resolution,
adopted by a vote of 19 to 1 (Cuba), with 1 ab-
stention. This resolution recommended that the
Statute of the Inter-American Commission on
Human Eights be revised to broaden and
strengthen the Commission's attributes and facul-
ties and permit it effectively to further respect
for these rights in the Western Hemisphere coun-
tries.

Does such a resolution constitute aggression or
contravene the United Nations Charter or require
Security Council authorization ? Of course it does
not, and it would be pointless to ask the Inter-
national Court of Justice whether it does.

From this survey of all the Punta del Este reso-
lutions, three conclusions emerge: First, the only
aggression involved is the documented aggressive
activities of the Cuban Communist regime, which
the countries of Latin America found unani-
mously at Punta del Este to be directed against
the free democratic institutions of the American
Republics; second, nothing remotely resembling
a violation of the United Nations Charter is in-
volved; and third, nothing is involved which
would justify the Council in invoking article 53
of the United Nations Charter. The responsibil-
ities of the OAS were satisfied when it reported
under article 54.

There is accordingly no question which merits
submission to the International Court of Justice
for an advisory opinion.

Council's Decision in Dominican Case

Furthermore the issue is one which the Security
Council has already considered thoroughly and as
to which it has reached a clear-cut decision. I
refer, of course, to the discussion in the Council in
September 1960 ^ as to whether the Council con-
sidered its authorization to be required, under
article 53 of the charter, for the action that had
then been taken by the OAS with respect to the
Dominican Republic.'* At that time also a Com-
munist country (the Soviet Union) tried to have
decisions of the Organization of American States
subjected to Soviet veto.

In that case the Organization of American
States had applied against the Dominican Repub-
lic measures more far-reaching than those in the
case now before us. There the members of the
OAS had severed diplomatic relations with the
Dominican Republic and had instituted a partial
interruption of economic relations.

In that case the Soviet Union, as does the Cas-
tro regime here, contended that the Organization
of American States resolutions constituted "en-
forcement action" under article 53 of the charter
which had to be authorized by the Security Coun-
cil and introduced a resolution to that effect. An
extensive debate took place during which the Se-
curity Council's authority and responsibilities
with respect to article 53 were thoroughly dis-
cussed. The Soviet resolution received no support,
and the Soviet representative ultimately would not
even put it to a vote.

Instead, nine members of the Council supported
a resolution, sponsored by Argentina, Ecuador,
and the United States, the purpose of wliich was
explicitly to limit Security Council action to "not-
ing," not authorizing or approving or disapprov-
ing, the OAS action which had been reported to
the Security Council in accordance, solely, with
article 54.

We have, then, a square decision by this Coun-
cil, after thorough debate, as to the extent of the
Council's authority under article 53. That deci-
sion was that measures even more far-reacliing
than those now before us do not involve "enforce-
ment action" within tlio meaning of article 53 and
thei'cforo do not require Security Council author-
ization. It is even clearer that the milder Punta

' Ibiil., Oct. 3, I960, p. .'>42.
" Ibid., Sept. 5, 1960, p. Sri.^.

690

Department of Slate Bulletin

del Este resolutions now before us involve no such
"enforcement action" and require no Security
Council authorization.

I cannot help but refer, in this connection, to
the blatantly cynical statement by the permanent
representative of the Soviet Union at the meet-
ing of the First Committee held on February 27,
1962, when he said, referring to the interpretation
of article 53 in the Dominican Republic case (pro-
visional record, document S/PV.991, page 22) :

In the first place, in 1960 the question involved action
against the Dominican Republic. To us there is a differ-
ence. The Dominican Republic is one matter; Cuba
another ; Chile another.

The Soviet Union's political orientation is thus
against the Dominican Republic in one case and
in favor of Cuba in another, and it is that political
orientation which is what determines its interpre-
tation of the charter.

We do not believe that the other members of
this Council look upon the interpretation of the
charter in a spirit of any such blatant cynicism.
The Soviet Union's attempt in the Dominican Re-
public case to have the Security Council authorize
action of which the Soviets approved was recog-
nized at the time as a prelude to a later effort
to employ its veto against the OAS and in defense
of its base of operations in the Western Hemi-
sphere— Cuba.

That effort is precisely what the Coimcil is
now faced with.

Insubstantiality of Cuban Demands

Viewed in the context of the resolutions adopted
at Punta del Este and the square precedent of the
Dominican case, the seven questions which the
Cuban representative advances should be dis-
missed for lack of substantiality, quite apart from
the fact that Cuba comes into court, in the com-
mon law phrase, with unclean hands.

Moreover, the insubstantiality of the questions
demonstrates that there is even less reason for the
Council to consider the Cuban demand that pro-
visional measures be adopted, under article 40, to
suspend the implementation of the resolutions of
Punta del Este.

The United States Government has repeatedly
made clear that it favors increased recourse to the
International Court of Justice. But it does not
favor use of the Court for cold-war political pur-

poses foreign to the charter and the Court's stat-
ute. It is significant, in this connection, that the
Soviet representative, whose Government is con-
sistently hostile to the use of the Court for the
settlement of genuine legal disputes Ijctween states
and has deprecated the Court's advisory jurisdic-
tion, should so enthusiastically favor submission
to the Court of the rhetorical and self-serving
questions which have been conjured up by the
Cuban representative.

It will not do to say that if even one countiy,
Cuba, believes that an issue concerning this Coun-
cil's authority is debatable, then that issue might
well be referred to the Court for an advisory opin-
ion. Here the very issue of this Council's author-
ity over OAS decisions has already been decided
by this Council under circumstances in which
regional action was more far-reaching than in this
case.

There is, therefore, no reason why we should
reopen that decision. There is even less reason
why we should again give any consideration to
the substance of Communist charges of OAS ag-
gression against Cuba or to the Cuban regime's
effort to prevent the OAS from reacting to the
situation which the regime itself created.

Mr. President and members of the Council,
what we have here is no legal disjiute. Wliat we
have is a cold-war political attack by the Soviet
Union, through the Cuban Communist regime, on
the Organization of American States.

Wliat is more, what we have here is an attempt
to shackle the OAS with the Soviet Union's Se-
curity Council veto. If that attemj)t were to be
successful, it would mean the impotence not only
of the OAS but of all other regional organizations,
through subjection to the untender mercies of the
veto.

We do not believe that the members of this
Council or, indeed, the members of the General
Assembly wish to have any regional organization
fettered by any such subservience.

STATEMENT OF MARCH 23

U.S./U.N. press release 3948

Before we proceed to the vote I should like to
summarize hurriedly the argiunents of the com-
plainants wliich we have heard on this item from
the representatives of Cuba and the Soviet Union
for an entire week.

April 23, 1962

691

What we have heard is literally daily repetition
of the identical assertions that were made here on
the first day and which have been answered by
almost every other member here present over and
over again. But each day the representatives of
Cuba and the Soviet Union disregard what has
been said the day before and begin anew to sol-
emnly repeat the same charges. This procedure
could go on for years. It is what we call in Eng-
lish the dialog of the deaf; in Spanish, I believe,
it is el dismirso entre sordos; and I have no doubt
that there is more than one Russian equivalent
for endlessly repeating the same thing like a stuck
phonograph and refusing to hear the answers.

I submit that it is long past time to bring this
rhetorical endurance contest to an end, for we have
heard nothing new since the fii-st day, and before
we conclude this undistinguished episode in the
history of this Council I will, as I say, hurriedly
review only those few arguments wliich relate to
the letter filed by Cuba.

The Cuban and Soviet representatives have as-
serted over and over, with characteristic deafness
for the facts, that Cuba was excluded from the
Organization of American States because of its
social system. The fact is, of course, that Cuba
was not excluded because of its social system; it
was excluded because of its violations of the
Cliarter of the Organization of American States,
as all the American Republics represented here
have testified. And as the resolution of Punta del
Este makes explicitly clear, the fact is that, in
violation of the Charter of the Organization of
American States and in pursuit of aims contrary
to the principles of the American system, the pres-
ent Cuban government has conducted aggressive
and subversive activities against other American
Republics and has suppressed the fundamental
rights of the individual in Cuba. It was on the
basis of these violations that the members of the
Organization of American States at Punta del
Este decided that Cuba's government — not Cuba
but its present government — was no longer com-
patible with the inter- American system.

Secondly, these same delegations have reiterated
tliat tlie OAS had no right to exclude Cuba from
its membership because of these violations of the
OAS Cliarter. On its face this is absurd. It is
tlie inherent right of any regional organization to
determine which countries shall participate and
which shall not. Yet from what the Soviet rep-

resentative has been saying this principle applies
only in those instances whicli fit Soviet political
motives. Stripped of polemics, what he would
have us believe is that the Latin American coun-
tries cannot decide for themselvas with whom they
wish to associate in tlieir regional organization,
and such a proposition hardly merits serious
discussion.

Integrity of Regional Organizations

Thirdly, the Soviet Union has attempted to sep-
arate the Organization of American States from
other regional organizations, present or future.
Council members have already drawn attention
to this distortion in their statements. Tlie prob-
lem we face here today — that is, the problem of
extending the Soviet veto over decisions of re-
gional organizations — is not in any sense limited j
to the Organization of American States. It ap- \
plies equally to any regional organization. The
Soviet position, in sliort, is an assault on the whole
system of regional organizations, and if it is suc-
cessful it would nullify a fundamental provision
of the Cliarter of the United Nations.

Two days ago the Council heard the penetrating
analysis and defense of the regional organization
system by the representative of Ireland. He said
that regional organizations as such have long
since proved their usefulness and daily were grow-
ing in importance and in vigor. He expected that
before too long there might be a regional organiza-
tion in Africa. And this was not surprising.
Mr. [Frederick H.] Poland intimated, since with
a growing United Nations it must be anticipated
that much of the worlv within a region would have
to be undertaken by the region itself, this would
perforce lead to the establisliment of an increasing
number of regional organizations in the days
ahead. The Council, Mr. Poland said, should
therefore be careful to avoid reaching any con-
clusions which might appear to undervalue or to
challenge the principle of regional organizations.

We submit that it is this vei-y independence and
this very integrity of a regional organization
wliich the Soviet Union is continually trying to
destroy by subjugating the decisions of regional
organizations to the Security Council and, there-
fore, Soviet approval. The list of I'hetorical ques-
tions contained in the Cuban draft resolution
(S/5095) would seem to prove this conclusively.

692

Department of State Bulletin

No "Enforcement Action" Involved

Finally, the Soviet representative has accused
us of trying to force acceptance of our interpreta-
tion of the words "enforcement action" in article
53 upon the members of this Council. This is sim-
ply not true. We are not trying to force anything,
nor are we attempting to define these words in a
way which the Security Coimcil has not already
accepted. We have cited repeatedly here the Do-
minican case. It was referred to by the repre-
sentative of Ghana, who cited statements by
Coimcil members to support his feeling that the
issue may not have been clearly met at that time.
The fact is, however, that the Council did decide
in the Dominican case that no enforcement action
was involved.

The whole purpose of the Soviet Union in
bringing the case before the Council was to insist
that Security Council approval under article 53
was required. The entire debate revolved around
whether the resolution of the Organization of
American States in the Dominican case did or did
not constitute enforcement action under the terms
of article 53. If it was enforcement action, the
Security Council was required — not authorized,
but required — to give its approval or disapproval
under article 53. The fact that it refused to act
under article 53 is conclusive. The Soviet con-
tention had so little support that the Soviet Union
declined even to put its draft resolution to the
vote at that time. A counterresolution presented
by Argentina, Ecuador, and the United States,
which explicitly did not come under article 53,
was adopted by the Council. It may not have de-
fined what enforcement action under article 53
was, but it most definitely did decide that action
of the sort embraced in the Dominican case was
not subject to article 53.

For these reasons, we hope that the Council will
dispose of the draft resolution before us by rejec-
tion, and in so doing the Council will again be
making an important contribution toward the
preservation and the integrity and the independ-
ence of regional organizations of the United
Nations.

I am very happy to waive translation Ln order
to save time and, I hope, the patience of members.

[In a later Intervention Ambassador Stevenson said :]

I understand that both the representatives of
the Soviet Union and of Cuba, who have sponsored

this resolution, now propose to withdraw it. I
must object most emphatically to any attempt to
avoid a vote on this resolution as a whole.

The rule is very clear. Rule 35 says that a
motion or draft resolution can at any time be
withdrawn so long as no vote has been taken with
respect to it. A vote has been taken with respect
to it. Therefore the resolution can no longer be
withdrawn, and I move that it be put to a vote,
as a whole, forthwith.''

TEXT OF DRAFT RESOLUTION s

The Security Council,

In accordance with Article 0C(1) of the Charter,
Decides to request the International Court of Justice
to give an advisory opinion on the following questions :

1. Is the Organization of American States, under the
terms of its Charter, a regional agency within the mean-
ing of Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter and
do its activities have to be compatible with the Purposes
and Principles of the United Nations?

2. Under the United Nations Charter, does the Organi-
zation of American States have the right as a regional
agency to take the enforcement action provided in Article
53 of the United Nations Charter without the authoriza-
tion of the Security Council?

3. Can the expression "enforcement action" in Article 53
of the United Nations Charter be considered to include
the measures provided for in Article 41 of the United
Nations Charter? Is the list of these measures in Article
41 exhaustive?

4. Does the Charter of the Organization of American
States provide for any procedure for expelling a State
member of the Organization, in particular because of its
social system?

5. Can the provisions of the Charter of the Organiza-
tion of American States and the Inter-American Treaty
of Reciprocal Assistance be considered to take precedence
over the obligations of Member States under the United
Nations Charter?

6. Is one of the main principles of the United Nations
Charter that membership in the United Nations is open to

'A ruling by the President of the Council concerning
the application of rule 35 of the rules of procedure was
upheld on Mar. 23 by a vote of 7 (Chile, China, France,
Ireland, U.K., U.S., Venezuela) to 2 (Rumania, U.S.S.R.),
with 2 abstentions (Ghana, U.A.R.).

°U.N. doc. S/5095. On Mar. 23 the Security Council
voted first on operative paragraph 3, which it rejected
by a vote of 4 (Ghana, Rumania, U.S.S.R., U.A.R.) to 7
(Chile, China, France, Ireland, U.K., U.S., Venezuela).
The remainder of the draft resolution was then put to the
vote and rejected by 2 votes in favor (Rumania, U.S.S.R.),
7 against, with 1 abstention (U.A.R.) ; Ghana did not
participate.

April 23, 1962

693

states which meet the requirements of Article 4 of the
Charter, irrespective of their system?

7. In the light of the replies to the foregoing questions
are, or are not, the resolutions adopted at Punta del Este
at the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of American Minis-
ters of Foreign Affairs relating to the expulsion of a
State member of the regional agency because of its social
system and the taking of other enforcement action against
it, without the authorization of the Security Council,
consistent with the provisions of the United Nations
Charter, the Charter of the Organization of American
States and the Treaty of Rio?

Also decides to request the International Court of Jus-
tice to give priority to the consideration of this matter.

International Cooperation
in Synoptic Meteorology

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

The Department of State announced on
March 23 (press release 185) that more than 100
weathermen from all over the world would gather
at the Department of State on March 26 for the
third session of the Commission for Synoptic
Meteorology of the World Meteorological Organ-
ization (WMO).

Technical experts from more than 100 nations
are expected to attend the 2G-day session, where
weather observations, codes, communications, and
methods of forecasting will be considered. The
Commission will have before it reports from its
various working groups on code problems, obser-
vational networks, telecommunications, pressure
reduction methods, and the use of data received
from weather satellites.

The international exchange of weather infor-
mation fostered by the WMO and its technical
commissions makes it possible to prei)are weather
maps covering an entire hemisphere twice each
day. The basic ingredients for these maps are
the individual observations taken at weather sta-
tions throughout the entire world.

Edward M. Vernon, Chief of the Weather Bu-
reau's Forecast and Synoptic Reports Division,
will head the U.S. delegation at tlie session and
will be assisted by the following six experts in the
field of synoptic meteorology :

Delegates

Santoro R. Rarbagallo, Woathcr Bureau, Dciiarlincnt of
Commerce

Charles G. Reeves, Weather Bureau, Department of

Commerce
Leonard W. Snellman, Air Weather Service, Department

of the Air Force

Advisers

W. R. Franklin, Captain, USN, Navy Weather Service,

Department of the Navy
W. C. Huyler, Air Weather Service, Department of the

Air Force
George G. Sink, Federal Aviation Agency

REMARKS BY HARLAN CLEVELAND >

Mr. President, distinguished delegates to the
third session of the Commission for Synoptic Me-
teorology of the World Meteorological Organiza-
tion: The long name of this meeting puts me in
mind of that speaker at a high school graduation
ceremony who chose to use the letters in the name
of his college — Yale — as an acrostic. He spoke
for 15 minutes on "Youth," for 20 minutes on
"Ambition," for 25 minutes on "Loyalty." Just
as he was ready to start on "Energy" a loud stage
whisper floated across the hall: "Thank God he
didn't go to the Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology !" My remarks will be brief — or should I
say synoptic?

It is a great pleasure to welcome you to Wash-
ington and to this meeting. Although it is well
known that the first meeting of your organization
was held here in Washington in 1953, it is not so
well known that the first international conference
in which the United States officially participated
was the meteorological conference of 1853 in
Brussels.

There was a maritime conference to devise a
uniform system of meteorological obsei-vations at
sea. In 14 sessions the conference succeeded in
achieving the objectives for which it had been con-
vened. The members agreed on recommendations
concerning instruments to be used in making me-
teorological observations. They adopted a form
for an abstract log and directions for its use in
recording weather data. They suggested that a
set of standard instruments be used by each gov-
ernment and that instructions in their use be ex-
changed with every other government to promote

' Made at the opening meeting of the third session of
the Commission for Synoi)tic Moteoroh>g>- of the World
Meteorological Organization at Washington, D.C., on
M.Tr. 26 (press release 1!)2). Mr. Cleveland is Assistant
Secretary of State for luternationnl Organization Affairs.

694

Department of State Bulletin

accuracy in comparing the recorded weather data.

Does it sound familiar?

Representatives of 10 nations attended the Brus-
sels meeting in 1853 : Belgium, Denmark, France,
Great Britain, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
Russia, Sweden, and the United States. I am
glad these same nations — and many more — are
represented here today. The fact that men of dif-
ferent backgrounds and nationalities have been
woi'king together successfully for more than 100
years is not just an example of sentimental fact;
it is also a very practical demonstration of a basic
reason for international cooperation: a real and
recognized need on the part of many nations, a
need which cannot be met except through such
cooperation.

In the area of weather prediction and control we
see an outstanding example of how the self-
interests of many sovereign nations join together
in one large mutual interest. Such mutual interest
led to mutual action 100 years ago and to mutual
benefits ever since. And these mutualities are the
only lasting basis for partnerships of any kind—
whether among men, organized groups, or nations.

It is encouraging to me that cooperation is pos-
sible— in your case actual — among nations whose
structure of government and economies seem to be
so different. Differences do not have to mean con-
flicts, nor do they have to mean insidious compari-
sons of "good" and "evil" — of "better" or "worse."
Among men of reason, differences of opinion and
belief can exist in peace. If the differences need
to be resolved, such resolution is on the basis of
facts — greater knowledge and deeper understand-
ing. President Kennedy said last week,^ ". . .
knowledge, not hate, is the passkey to the fu-
ture. . . ." He added, "As men conduct the pui-suit
of knowledge, they create a world which freely
unites national diversity and international
partnership."

Maybe these prospects come as less of a surprise
to you who have devoted your lives to science. It
often seems easier for men to work together to
understand, to live with, and to control the forces
of their external environment than to put the same
amount of time and energy into study and under-
standing of the mysterious forces inside their
minds and hearts and souls.

Still, international cooperation in many areas is

- Bulletin of Apr. 16, 1962, p. 615.

an actual and continuing fact. In the field of
meteorology it has progi-essed in one century from
sea to land, to air, and now to outer space. And
from observation, collection, and analysis of data
to hemispheric predictions and even efforts at
weather modification and control.

Despite the existence of weather reporting satel-
lites, and the prospect of more as the result of
greater cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer
space, there remain great gaps in the data from
which you work. The difficulties of making con-
tinuous observations in remote areas of the earth's
surface have resulted in incomplete coverage.

Today, however, two separate developments may
help solve this problem : first, the development of
an unmanned weather station powered by nuclear
wastes ; second, the development of communication
satellites.

The United States has developed such an un-
manned weather station. It is powered by a de-
rivative of strontium 90 — strontium 90 with its
fangs removed. With the cooperation of the Gov-
ernment of Canada this station has been installed
on an island in the Arctic and is sending in reports.

Such unmanned weather stations, collecting
raw data from many areas not presently covered,
could make a major difference in weather predic-
tion. Signals could be bounced off communica-
tion satellites.

Thus through a scientific marriage of conven-
ience great progress can be expected, peaceful
progress for the benefit of all mankind.

We have come a long way since that first con-
ference in Brussels. No one can predict — not even
such gifted predictors as yourselves — how far we
have to go. Only one thing is certain : The prog-
ress in science must be matched by progress in
building international institutions. There is no
shelter from the social fallout of science.

United States Delegations
to International Conferences

UNESCO Conference on Education in Asia

The Department of State announced on
March 29 (press release 201) that a five-man
American observer delegation will attend a meet-
ing of ministers of education of Asian countries at
Tokyo April 2-11 under the auspices of the United

April 23, 1962

695

Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO) and the U.N. Economic
Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE).
The American delegates are :

Charles B. Fahs, chairman, U.S. Information Service,

Tokyo
Robert H. B. Wade, vice chairman, Special As.sistant,

Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs, Department

of State
James H. Faulhaber, Office of Financial Support, Agency

for International Development
Joseph B. Jarvis, Special Assistant to the Commissioner

of Education, Department of Health, Education, and

Welfare
William A. Wolfifer, OflBce of Technical Support, Agency

for International Development

The Tolvyo meeting will examine overall educa-
tion planning in Asia and review country-by-
country progress made to implement the so-called
Karachi Plan. This plan, adopted in 1960 by 17
Asian member states of UNESCO, called on their
governments to attain free and compulsory pri-
mary education by 1980. UNESCO endorsed the
plan at its 11th General Conference in 1960.

Current U.N. Documents:
A Selected Bibliography

Mimeographed or processed documents {such as those
listed beloic) may be consulted at depository libraries in
the United States. U.N. printed publications may be
purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations,
United Nations Plaza, N.Y.

Security Council

Reports of the officer-in-charge of the U.N. Operation in
the Congo. S/.5053, January 9, 1962, 5 pp.; Add. 1,
January 20, 1962, 19 pp. ; Add. 2, January 23, 1962, 4
pp.; Add. 3, January 29, 1962, 10 pp.; Add. 4, Jan-
uary 30, 1962, 2 pp. ; Add. 5 and Corr. 1, January 30,
1962, 3 pp. ; Add. 6 and Corr. 1, February 3, 1962, 4 pp. ;
Add. 7, February 12, 1962, 3 pp. ; Add. 8, Fel)ruary 19,
1962, 14 pp. ; Add. 9 and Corr. 1, March 9, 1962, 9 pp.

Letter dated January 9, 1962, from the Portuguese repre-
sentative addressed to the President of the Security
Council concerning border-violation charges by Senegal.
S/5055. January 10, 1962. 2 pp.

General Assembly

Letter dated J:uiuary 27, 1962, from the Portuguese repre-
sentative addres.sed to the President of the General
Assembly concerning the situation in Angola. A/uOS".
January 27, 1962. 14 pp.

Information from non-self-governing territories (sum-
maries of information transmitted under article 73e of
the U.N. Charter) : African and adjacent territories,
A/r.078, January 31, 1962, 196 pp.; A/5078/Add. 1,
March 2(», 1962, 42 pp. Asian territories, A/r)079,
February 8, 1962, 132 pp.; A/.W79/Add. 1, March 22,
1962, 5 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

Accession of Cambodia, Israel,
and Portugal to GATT

Press release 229 dated April 6

Protocols for the accession of Cambodia, Israel,
and Portugal to the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) were opened for signature
on April 6, 1962. Tariff negotiations required
imder GATT accession procedures were carried
out by each of the three Governments during the
1960-61 GATT tariff conference at Geneva.
Their accession will bring the total number of
GATT contracting parties to 43.

The accessions of Israel and Portugal become
effective 30 days after tlieir respective acceptances.
Cambodia's accession may also come into effect
on the same basis, or at a later date, depending
upon the Contracting Parties' approval of a de-
cision on Cambodian accession now before them
for balloting. Decisions agreeing to the accession
of Israel and Portugal were taken by the Contract-
ing Parties on December 8, 1961.

Special provisions in the Portuguese protocol
of accession recognize the present regime of pref-
erential customs regulations for Portuguese cus-
toms territories as an arrangement leading toward
the formation of a free-trade area to be attained
no later than 1974. Accordingly the protocol does
not require that the existing preferences be elimi-
nated.

Israel had provisionally acceded to the GATT
at the time it began tariff negotiations for acces-
sion, while Portugal and Cambodia have partici-
pated in the work of the GATT since June 4, 1900,
and November 17, 1958, respectively.

U.S. Agrees to International
Inspection of Four Atomic Reactors

Tlie Department of State announced on March
30 (]iress release 208) the signing of an agree-
ment ' on tliat date between the United States and

'For text, .see Department of State press release 208
dated Mar. 30.

696

Department of State Bulletin

the International Atomic Energy Agency under
wliich the effectiveness of a system of safeguards
against the misuse of atomic reactors designed for
research and development purposes will be put to
the test.

The agreement allows access by IAEA inspec-
tors to four U.S. atomic reactors whose design and
operation are compatible with safeguard proce-
dures agreed upon by the International Agency.
These safeguards, which provide for reports and
inspections, have been developed by the IAEA
to assure that nuclear assistance made available
through the Agency is not used to further any
military purpose.

The agreement will test the workability of such
safeguards and will provide a field laboratory in
which the methods and tecluiiques of inspection
can be tested.

Sigvard Eklund, Director General of the IAEA,
signed the agreement on behalf of the Agency.
Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary of State for
International Organization Affairs, signed for the
United States. The signing ceremony took place
at the Department of State.

The following four reactors have been placed
under the agreement for a period of 1 to 2 years:
the Brookhaven Graphite Research Reactor,
Brookhaven National Laboratoiy, Upton, N.Y. ;
the Medical Research Reactor, Brookhaven Na-
tional Laboratory ; the Experimental Boiling Wa-
ter Reactor, Argonne National Laboratory, Le-
mont. 111.; and the Piqua Organic Cooled and
Moderated Power Reactor, Piqua, Ohio.

The agreement enters into effect on June 1, 1962.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Health

Constitution of the World Health Organization, as
amended. Opened for signature at New Yorlc July 22,
1946. Entered into force April 7, 1948 ; for the United
States June 21, 1948. TIAS 1808 and 4643.
Acceptance deposited: Tanganyika, March 1.5, 1962.

Rice

Amended constitution of the International Rice Commis-
sion, and rules of procedure, as amended. Approved
l)y the seventh session of the Food and Agriculture Con-
ference. Rome. December 10, 19r).3. Entered into force
December 10, 1953. TIAS 3016 and 4110.
Acceptances deposited: Nigeria, November 13, 1961;
Venezuela, November 27, 1961.

Shipping

Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consulta-
tive Organization. Signed at Geneva March 6, 1948.
Entered into force March 17, 1958. TIAS 4044.
Acceptance deposited: Nigeria, March 15, 1962.

Weather

Convention of the World Meteorological Organization.
Done at AVashington October 11, 1947. Entered into
force March 23, 1950. TIAS 2052.
Accession deposited: Sierra Leone, March 30, 1962.

BILATERAL

Bolivia

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agree-
ment of February 12, 1962. Effected by exchange of
notes at La Paz March 27, 1962. Entered into force
March 27, 1962.

Dominican Republic

Military assistance agreement. Signed at Santo Domingo
March 8, 1962. Enters into force upon receipt by the
United States of notification of ratification in con-
formity with the constitutional procedures of the Do-
minican Republic.

El Salvador

General agreement for economic, technical, and related
assistance. Signed at San Salvador December 19, 1961.
Entered, into force: January 16, 1962.
Agreement relating to grants for the training of Salva-
doran citizens in various economic, social, and tech-
nical fields. Effected by exchange of notes at San Sal-
vador April 18, 1951. TIAS 2251.

Terminated: January 16, 1962 (superseded by agree-
ment of December 19, 1961, supra ) .
Agreement relating to assurances required by the Mutual
Security Act of 1951. Effected by exchange of notes
at San Salvador December 11, 1951, and January 7,
1952. TIAS 2631.

Terminated: January 16, 1962 (superseded by agree-
ment of December 19, 1961, supra ) .
General agreement for technical cooperation. Signed at
San Salvador April 4, 1952. TIAS 2527.
Terminated: January 16. 1962 (superseded by agree-
ment of December 19, 1961, supra).

Greece

Amendment to the agreement of August 4, 1955, for co-
operation concerning civil uses of atomic energy, as
amended (TIAS 3310 and 4837). Signed at Washing-
ton April 3, 1962. Enters into force on the date on
which each Government shall have received from the
other written notification that it has complied with all
statutory and constitutional requirements.

International Atomic Energy Agency

Agreement for the application of agency safeguards to
four U.S. reactor facilities, with annexes. Signed at
Washington March 30, 1962. Enters into force June
1, 1962.

Japan

Understanding relating to export of typewriter-ribbon
cloth from Japan to the United States. Effected by
exchange of notes at Toljyo March 23, 1962. Entered
into force March 23, 1962.

Liberia

Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace Corps
program in Liberia. Effected by exchange of notes at
Monrovia March 5 and 8, 1962. Entered into force
March 8, 1962.

April 23, 7962

697

Panama

General agreement for technical and economic coopera-
tion. Signed at Panamd December H, 1961.
Entered into force: March 5, 1962.

General agreement for technical cooperation, as amended.
Signed at Panama December 30, 1950. Entered into
force December 30, 1950. TIAS 2167 aiid 2644.
Terminated: March 5, 1962 (superseded by agreement of
December 11, 1961, supra).

Peru

Agricultural commodities agreement under title IV of the
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of
1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 73 Stat. 610; 7 U.S.C.
1731-1736), with exchange of notes. Signetl at Lima
March 20, 1962. Entered into force March 20, 1962.

United Arab Republic

Agreement amending the rate of exchange ai)plieable to
deiwsits under the agricultural commodities agreement
of September 2, 1961 (TIAS 4844). Effected by ex-
change of notes at Cairo March 28, 1962. Entered into
force March 28, 1962.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Confirmations

The Senate on March 29 confirmed the following
nominations :

Walter L. Lingle, Jr., to be a Deputy Administrator of
the Agency for International Development.

Robert J. Manning to be an A.ssistant Secretary of
State. (For biographic detjiils, see Department of State
press release 242 dated April 11. )

John L. Salter to be Assistant Administrator for Con-
gressional Liaison, Agency for International Development.

Herbert J. Waters to be Assistant Administrator
for Material Resources, Agency for International
Development.

The Senate on April 4 confirmed Robert P. Woodward
to be Ambassador to Spain. (For biographic details, see
White House press release dated March 27.)

Appointments

James L. Greenfield as Deputy Assistant Secretary for
News, Bureau of Public Affairs, effective April 3. (For
biographic details, see Department of State press release
347 dated April 12.)

Designations

Sclma Freedinan as Public Affairs Adviser, Bureau of
Economic Affairs, effective April 2.

Roger W. Tubby as U.S. Representative to the European
Office of the United Nations and Other International Or-
ganizations at Geneva, effective April 2. (For biographic
details, see Department of State press release 215 dated
April 2.)

Checi( List of Department of State
Press Releases: April 2-8

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of
News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Releases appearing in this issue of the BtmETrN
which were issued prior to April 2 are Nos. 183 and
185 of March 23; 188 and 192 of March 26;
197 of March 28; 201 of March 29; and 208 of
March 30.

Sabject

Expansion of Foreign Service commer-
cial program.

Program for visit of President of Brazil
(revised).

Cieplinski : "Refugees Here and Around
the World."

U.S. participation in international con-
ferences.

Ball : "The Developing Atlantic Part-
nership."

Tubb.v sworn in as U.S. Representative
to Euroi)ean office of U.N. and other
international organizations at Geneva
(biographic details).

Air tallfs with Austria.

Friedkin sworn in as U.S. Commissioner,
U.S. -Mexican boundary and water
commission (rewrite).

Coppock : "U.S. Trade Policy and Free-
World Leadership."

Coppock : "The Cold War and U.S.
Trade Policy."

Developments at Geneva disarmament
conference.

Cultural exchange (India).

Study of Pembina River resources with
Canada.

Members-designate of U.S. Advisory
Commission on International Educa-
tional and Cultural Affairs.

Program for visit of Shah of Iran.

MacArthur : "The New Europe — Its
Challenge and Its Opportunities for
the United States."

Rusk : Foreign Assistance Act of 1962.

Coppock : "The European Economic
Community and U.S. Trade Policy."

Iran cre<lentials (rewrite).

Accession of Cambodia, Israel, and
Portugal to GATT.

No.

Date

1210

4/2

*211

4/2

t212

4/2

*213

4/2

214

4/2

*215

4/2

t216

217

4/2
4/2

»218

4/3

*219

4/3

220

4/3

*221
1222

4/4
4/4

♦223 4/5

♦224

1225

226

t227

t228
229

4/5
4/5

4/5
4/6

4/6
4/6

* Not printed.

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.

698

Department of Stale Bulletin

April 23, 1962

Index

Vol. XLVI, No. 1191

Asia

A Balance Sheet on Asia (Bowles) C74

UNESCO Conference on Education in Asia (dele-
gation) 695

Atomic Energy. U.S. Agrees to International In-
spection of Four Atomic Reactors 696

Cambodia. Accession of Cambodia, Israel, and
Portugal to GATT 606

Communism. A Balance Sheet on Asia (Bowles) . 674

Congress, The. The Foreign Aid Program for Fis-
cal Year 1963 (Rusk) 659

Cuba. U.N. Security Council Rejects Call for Opin-
ion of World Court on OAS Action (Stevenson,
text of draft resolution) 684

Department and Foreign Service

Appointments (Greenfield) 698

Confirmations (Lingle, Manning, Salter, Waters,

Woodward) 698

Designations (Freedman, Tubby) 698

Post of Deputy Assistant Secretary for Atlantic

Affairs Established 673

Disarmament. U.S. Comments on Developments

at Geneva Disarmament Conference 664

Economic Affairs

Accession of Cambodia, Israel, and Portugal to

GATT 696

The Developing Atlantic Partnership (Ball) . . 666
Miss Freedman designated Public Affairs Adviser . 698
Strategy of American Foreign Policy (McGhee). . 678
Educational and Cultural Affairs. UNESCO Con-
ference on Education in Asia (delegation) . . 695
Europe

The Developing Atlantic Partnership (Ball) . . (566
Post of Deputy Assistant Secretary for Atlantic

Affairs Established 673

Foreign Aid

Confirmations, AID (Lingle as Deputy Adminis-
trator; Salter, Waters as Assistant Administra-
tors) 698

The Foreign Aid Program for Fiscal Year 1963

(Rusk) 6.59

International Organizations and Conferences

Accession of Cambodia, Israel, and Portugal to

GATT 696

International Cooperation in Synoptic Meteorology

(Cleveland, delegation) 694

Tubby designated U.S. Representative to European

Office of U.N 698

UNESCO Conference on Education in Asia (dele-
gation) C95

U.S. Agrees to International Insi)ection of Four
Atomic Reactors C96

U.S. Comments on Developments at Geneva Dis-
armament Conference 664

Israel. Accession of Cambodia, Israel, and Portu-
gal to GATT 696

Mexico. J. F. Friedkin Named to U.S.-Mexican

Boundary and Water Commission 683

Middle East. A Balance Sheet on Asia (Bowles). . 674

Philippines. President Macapagal of Philippines

To Visit United States 665

Portugal. Accession of Cambodia, Israel, and Por-
tugal to GATT 696

Public Affairs. Manning confirmed as Assistant
Secretary; Greenfield appointed Deputy Assist-
ant Secretary for News 698

Science. International Cooperation in Synoptic
Meteorology (Cleveland, delegation) 694

Spain. Woodward confirmed as Ambassador . . 698

Treaty Information

Accession of Cambodia, Israel, and Portugal to

GATT 696

Current Actions 697

U.S. Agrees to International Inspection of Four
Atomic Reactors 696

United Nations

Current U.N. Documents 696

U.N. Security Council Rejects Cuban Call for Opin-
ion of World Court on OAS Action (Stevenson,
text of draft resolution) 684

Name Index

Ball, George W 666

Bowles, Chester 674

Cleveland, Harlan 694

Freedman, Selma 698

Friedkin, Joseph F 683

Greenfield, James L 698

Lingle, Walter L., Jr 698

Manning, Robert J 698

McGhee, George C 678

Rusk, Secretary 659

Salter, John L 698

Stevenson, Adlal E 684

Tubby, Roger W 698

Waters, Herbert J 698

Woodward, Robert F 698

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year 1960 is contained in this fifteenth annual report by the President
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The Appendixes include (1) the text of the Act of 1951, (2) text
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Vol. XLVI, No. 1192

AprU 30, 1962

MCIAL

EKLY RECORD

ITED STATES
REIGN POLICY

PAN AMERICAN DAY, 1962 • Address hy Secretary Rii»h . . 703

THE NEW EUROPE— ITS CHALLENGE AND ITS
OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE UNITED STATES •

by Ambassador Douglas MacArthur II 709

MINERAL RESOURCES AND THE WORLD OF THE

1960's • fay Under Secretary McGhee 723

CHANGE AND CHALLENGE IN AFRICA • fay Assistant

Secretary Williams 719

REFUGEES HERE AND AROUND THE WORLD • by

Michel Cieplinski 730

SECURITY COUNCIL CALLS UPON ISRAEL AND
SYRIA TO OBSERVE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT •

Statement by Charles W. Yost and Text of Resolution , , . 735

For in<lex see inside back cover

THE DEPARTMENT

TATE

Vol. XLVI, No. 1192 • Publication 7367
April 30, 1962

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents

U.S. Qovemment PrtntlnB OUlce

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Price:

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Use of funds for printing of this publica-
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Note: Contents of this publication are not
copyrlghtod and Items contained herein may
be nsprlntcd. Citation of the Uepaktment
o» State Btn.LETiN as the sourco will be
appreciated. The Bulletin Is Indexed In the
Eeadera' Quide to Periodical Literature.

The Department of State BULLETIN,
a tceekly publication issued by the
Office of Public Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public
and interested agencies of the
Government with information on
developn\ents in the field of foreign
relations and on the work of the
Department of State and the Foreign
Service. Tlie BULLETIN includes se-
lected press releases on foreign policy,
issued by tfie White House and the
Department, and statements and ad-
dresses made by the President and by
the Secretary of State and other
officers of the Department, as well as
special articles on various phases of
international affairs and the func-
tions of tlie Department. Informa-
tion is included concerning treaties
and international agreements to
tchich the United States is or may
become a party and treaties of gen-
eral international interest.

Publications of the Department,
United Nations documents, and legis-
lative material in the field of inter-
na tional relations are listed currently.

Pan American Day, 1962

Address by Secretary Rusk '■

I am grateful to you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Secre-
taiy Greneral, and members of the Comicil, for
your invitation to address this special meeting in
observance of Pan American Day [April 14]. It
affords me tlie happy occasion of bexioming another
among my country's Secretaries of Stata who have
met with the members of this venerable body which
has long been deeply and productively concerned
with furthering international cooperation among
the sovereign states of this hemisphere.

We meet after two historic meetings held since
we last celebrated Pan American Day, both <at
Punta del Este.^ One committed us to a sustained
cooperative effort in economic and social progress;
the other committed us to defend together the hu-
mane, democratic traditions in wliich our societies
are rootetl. Looking back at those meetings and
the enterprises they laimched, I am sure that we
have strengthened the possibilities of progress in
freedom in tliis hemisphere. Furthermore, we
have demonstrated that the Organization of
American States has the vitality to survive, to
grow, and to help shape the histoi-y of this hemi-
sphere and its peoples.

We are bound together now — as always — not
merely by geography but by a shared vision of the
destiny of men and societies. In the preamble to
the Charter of Punta del Este,' our Governments
have given that vision a new expression and have
defined their responsibility for giving it a special
vitality in this decade. They accepted the task of
demonstrating that "the creative powers of free

' Made before the Council of the Organization of Ameri-
can States at the Pan American Union, Washington, D.C.,
on Apr. 13 (press release 250).

" For background, see Bulletin of Sept. 11, 1961, p. 459,
and Feb. 19, 1962, p. 270.

3 For text, see ihid., Sept. 11, 1961, p. 463.

men hold the key to their progress and to the prog-
ress of future generations."

We are allied in a vast, imaginative, but highly
practical enterprise. We have pledged our ma-
terial resources, and our resources of heart and
mind, to transform this hemisphere economically
and socially, through the awakened cooperation of
free peoples. We have begun our inunense mider-
taking in full awareness that this transformation
will, in many areas, bring about complex social
and political as well as economic change. We face
these changes resolutely and with confidence for a
simple reason : They are necessary to effect the
will of our peoples, who demand and require that
the fruits of modem science and teclmology yield
for themselves and their children a better life.
One of my illustrious predecessors, the first Secre-
taiy of State, Thomas Jefferson, defender of the
rights of man, declared: "Laws and institutions
must go hand in hand with the progress of the
human mind." The human mind has opened up
vast possibilities for improved welfare, and it has
fractured the isolation of our societies one from the
other. Our laws, institutions, and societies must
reflect these facts and the impulses they have
released.

The Alliance for Progress

Exactly 1 year and 1 month ago today the Presi-
dent of the United States presented to the ambas-
sadorial corps of the American Republics the
project of an Alliance for Progi'ess.^ He crystal-
lized on that occasion the response of the United
States to the growing demand and initiative of
the Governments and peoples of the hemisphere
that we mount a collective attack on poverty, stag-

'Ibid.. Apr. 3, 1901. p. 471.

April 30, 1962

703

nation, and social injustice. He called on the
American i>eoples to prove to the entire world that
man's as yet unsatisfied aspiration for economic
progress and social justice can best be achieved by
free men working within a framework of demo-
cratic institutions. He affirmed for his Govern-
ment— as the Charter of Punta del Este was to
reaffirm a few months later for us all — that public
and private investment, domestic and foreign in-
vestment, must interact and work together
throughout the Americas.

This common effort, both within our societies
and among them, is required to attain the simple,
basic goals the hemisphere has set itself : work and
bread; better homes; better education and health
for all our citizens. These goals are achievable by
equally basic means: by regular increase of per
capita income, more equitably distributed; by a
systematic mobilization of the material and human
resources at our disposal ; by tax and land reforms
where they are needed ; by a consensus in our so-
cieties, reaching into all their groupings, that tliis
hemisphere shall create and sustain an environ-
ment of growth.

Maintaining Institutions of Free Men

These objectives are not confined to this hemi-
sphere. The Alliance for Progress is our own ex-
pression of a determination which is sweeping
through every continent. The cliallenge here, as
elsewhere, is to achieve tliese objectives while
maintaining and developing tlie institutions of
free men.

The challenge is not abstract. Throughout our
hemisphere the Communists and tliose drawn to
their doctrines will tell us that the social changes
required for the growth and modernization of
societies and the organization required to mol>ilize
the necessary resources can only be achieved by a
totalitarian dictatorship and the techniques of
the police state. Where men have succumbed to
this perspective — and found the conspiracies
which have installed such dictatorships — the re-
sults liave been not merely the humiliation and
degradation of a police state, but hunger and
inefficiency. But then it is too late to return to
the ways of freedom.

We are therefore challenged by the need to
demonstrate urgently that free men can carry
forward the great transformation to whicli we
are committed ; and we are challenged equally by

the need to frustrate the techniques by which
Communists seek power in societies disrupted by
the process of modernization.

There will be those who are reluctant to take
the steps and demand the sacrifices necessary to
make good the Alliance for Progress within their
societies. There will be those who will insist that
only violent revolution can achieve its objectives.

In the center, however, are the vast majority of
our citizens. They know that in fact this hemi-
sphere has seen already many constructive
changes. They know — and it is the deepest part
of our common tradition — that the goals we
achieve will depend on the means we use. They
know that progress and freedom are compatible
and are prepared to stake their lives on that prop-
osition. They know that in carrying forward
with the Alliance for Progress they are working
in continuity with a tradition of evolutionary and
humane change more than a century old.

I am confident that over this decade we shall
in our hemisphere see the triumpli of this great
majority of the center, neither fearful of the fu-
ture nor tempted by illusory efficiency of totalitar-
ian methods.

Tradition of Cooperation

The working agenda ahead of us is long.
Serious national development programs cannot be
produced overnight; projects require studies of
feasibility and blueprints, and these take time and
technical skill. But we are moving. We are be-
ginning to give life to the ideas of Latin American
statesmen and economists who, over the past
decade, have been preparing the way for the Al-
liance for Progress and preparing a generation of
young men and women technically capable of
canning it forward. Out of this ferment will
come not merely development plans and projects
but a coming together of the Latin American na-
tions themselves, through regional markets, im-
proved communications, and the common day-to-
day efforts that flow from the commitment to build
on a grand scale in this hemisphere and to protect
wliat we are building. The principle of coopenx-
f ion is, in itself, an old tradition in the hemisphere.

From the inception of the idea of inter-Ameri-
can cooperation my Government has maintained
faith in its potential for good, in all the phases
through which it lias passed. President John
Quincy Adams, early in the past century, ac-

704

Department of State Bulletin

claimed Bolivar's "great design" of hemisphere
alliance. In December 1880 President Benjamin
Harrison said in his message to Congress:

It is a matter of high significance, and no less of con-
gratulations, that the first year of the second century of
our constitutional existence finds, as honored guests
witliin our borders, the representatives of all the inde-
pendent states of North and South America met together
in earnest conference touching the best methods of
perpetuating and expanding the relations of mutual in-
terest and friendliness existing among them. . . .

And, President Harrison's message continued,
while much was expected from that first conference
in mutually beneficial commercial cooperation,

. . . the crowning benefit will be found in the better
securities which may be devised for the maintenance of
peace among all American nations, and the settlement of
all contentions by methods that a Christian civilization
can approve.

Unity of Thought and Purpose

Twenty-nine years ago yesterday, on April 12,
1933, President Franklin D. Roosevelt reminded
this august Council's predecessors that celebration
of Pan American Day here in the House of the
Americas, dedicated as it is to international good
will and cooperation, "exemplifies a unity of
thought and purpose among the peoples of this
hemisphere." "It is," he said, ''a manifestation
of the common ideal of mutual helpfulness, sym-
pathetic imderstanding, and spiritual solidarity."
Those three elements of our present alliance —
helpfulness, understanding, solidarity — have been
manifested repeatedly during the intervening
years. They are attested not only by resolutions
of Inter- American Conferences and of this Coun-
cil but by the innumerable cooperative acts
through which these resolutions have been made
effective.

As our alliance moves forward, let us not forget
Jose Martl's reminder to governors and the gov-
erned. In words that have operational meaning
in evei-y quarter of the globe, free or enslaved, he
said:

By being men, we are endowed with the principle of
freedom ; by being intelligent, we incur the obligation of
making that principle a reality.

At Punta del Este in Januaiy of this year we
heard a most moving and significant statement,
rooted in the same moral tradition. It was made
by the Foreign Minister of the Dominican Ee-
public, Jose Antonio Bonilla Atiles. He said:

Freedom itself is not democracy. Democracy is not an
end in itself. But it is the best means to attain the ob-
jective of a people's well-being and happiness ; and so
long as there are poverty, ignorance, and social injustice,
there can be no happiness and well-being.

This is the challenge we face and the mjunction
that should guide us as we move forward together.

United States and Brazil Reaffirm
Existing Close Relations

Jodo Goulart, President of the Refublic of the
United States of Brazil, visited the United States
April 3-8. Following in the text of a joint com-
munique issued by President Kennedy and Presi-
dent Goulart on Apnl If. at the close of the Wash-
ington portion of Mr. Goularfs visit.

White Uouse pie.ss release dated April 4

The meetings of the President of the United
States of Brazil and the President of the United
States of America during the past two days have
been marked by a spirit of frankness, cordiality,
and mutual understanding. During their talks
the two Presidents examined relations between
their two countries with respect to topics of world-
wide and hemispheric, as well as bilateral, con-
cern. On the conclusion of these extremely fruit-
ful talks, they agreed to publish the following
joint commimique :

They reaffirm that the traditional friendship be-
tweeii Brazil and the United States has grown
through the years as a consequence of the faith-
fulness of the Brazilian and the American peoples,
to common ideals of representative democracy and
social progress, to mutual respect between the two
nations, and to their determination that both Gov-
ernments work together in the cause of peace and
freedom.

The two Presidents declared that political
democracy, national independence and self-deter-
mination, and the liberty of the individual are the
political principles which shape the national poli-
cies of Brazil and the United States. Both coun-
tries are joined in a world-wide effort to bring
about the economic progress and social justice
which are the only secure foundations for human
freedom.

The Presidents discussed the participation of
their comitries in the Geneva disarmament talks

April 30, J 962

705

and agreed to continue to work to reduce world
tensions through negotiations insuring progressive
disarmament under effective international control.
Resources freed as a result of such disarmament
should be used for peaceful purposes which will
benefit peoples everywhere.

The two Presidents reaffirmed the dedication of
their countries to the Inter- American system and
to the values of human dignity, liberty, and prog-
ress on which that system is based. They ex-
pressed their intention to strengthen the Inter-
American machinery for regional cooperation, and
to work together to protect this hemisphere against
all forms of aggression. They also expressed
their concern that political crises in American
nations be resolved through peaceful adherence to
constitutional government, the rule of law, and
consent of the people expressed through the demo-
cratic processes.

The Presidents reaffirmed their adherence to the
principles of the Charter of Punta del Est« ' and
their intention to carry forward the commitments
which they assumed under that Charter. They
agreed on the need for rapid execution of the steps
necessary to make the Alliance for Progress effec-
tive— national programming to concentrate re-
sources on high priority objectives of economic and
social progress; institutional reforms, including
reform of the agrarian structure, tax reform, and
other changes required to assure a broad distribu-
tion of the fruits of development among all sec-
tors of the community ; and international financial
and technical assistance to accelerate the accom-
plishment of national development programs.

The Presidents stressed the important role
which trade unions operating imder democratic
principles should play in advancing the goals of
the Alliance for Progress.

President Goulart stated the intention of the
Government of Brazil to sti'engthen the machinery
for national programming, selection of priorities
and preparation of projects. President Kennedy
indicated the readiness of the United States Gov-
ernment to assign representatives to work closely
with such Brazilian agencies to minimize delays
in project selection and the provision of external
support.

Tlie Presidents noted with satisfaction the ef-
fective cooperation of the two Governments in
working out an agreement for large-scale United

' For text, see Bulletin of Sept. 11, 1901, p. 463.
706

States support of the Brazilian Government's pro-
gram for development of the Northeast of Brazil.
They expressed the hope that this program would
provide a fruitful response at an early date to the
aspirations of the hard-pressed people of that
area for a better life.

The President of Brazil stated the intention of
his Government to maintain conditions of security
whicli will permit private capital to perform its
vital role in Brazilian economic development.
The President of Brazil stated tliat in arrange-
ments with the companies for the transfer of pub-
lic utility enterprises to Brazilian ownership the
principle of fair compensation with reinvestment
in other sectors important to Brazilian economic
development would be maintained. President
Kennedy expressed great interest in this approach.

The two Presidents discussed the efforts which
the Government of Brazil has undertaken for a
program of financial recovery, aiming at holding
down the cost of living and assuring a rapid rate
of economic growth and social development in a
context of a balanced economy. The Government
of Brazil has already taken significant action
under this program. The Presidents agreed that
these efforts, effectively carried through, will mark
an important forward step under the Alliance for
Progress. The Presidents welcomed the under-
standing recently reached between the Brazilian
Finance Minister and the U.S. Secretary of the
Treasury, under which the United States is pro-
viding support for the program which has been
presented by the Government of Brazil.

In order to promote the expansion of Latin
American markets and to encourage the most effi-
cient use of available resources, the two Presidents
indicated their support for the Latin American
free trade area and their intention to speed its
development and strengthening.

The two Presidents discussed the major aspects
of the problem of raw materials and primary
products. They decided to give full support to
the completion of a world-wide agreement on
coffee, which is now in process of negotiation.
They will jointly support representation to the
European economic community looking toward
the elimination of excessive excise taxes which
limit the sales of such products and customs dis-
crimination which reduces the ready access to
European markets for the basic products of Latin
American origin.

Department of State Bulletin

In conclusion, the two Presidents agreed that
their exchange of views had confirmed the close
relations between their two governments and na-
tions. President Kennedy reaffirmed his coun-
try's commitment to assist the Government of
Brazil in its elForts to achieve its people's aspira-
tions for economic progress and social justice.
The two Presidents restated their conviction that
the destiny of the hemisphere lay in the collabora-
tion of nations united in faith in individual lib-
erty, free institutions and human dignity.

Letters of Credence

Iran

The newly appointed Ambassador of Iran,
Hosein Qods-Nakliai, presented his credentials to
President Kcimedy on April 6. For the texts of
the Ambassador's remarks and the President's re-
ply, see Department of State press release 228
dated April 6.

U.S. and U.K. State Position
on Nuclear Testing

Joint Statement

White House press release dated April 10

Discussions among ourselves and the Soviet
Union about a treaty to ban nuclear tests have
been going on in Geneva for nearly a month.^ Tlie
Soviet representatives have rejected international
inspection or verification inside the Soviet Union
to determine the nature of unexplained seismic
events which might be nuclear tests.

This is a point of cardinal importance to the
United States and the United Kingdom.^ From
the very beginning of the negotiations on a nuclear
Test Ban Treaty, they have made it clear that an
essential element of such a treaty is an objective
international system for assuring tliat a ban on
nuclear tests is being observed by all parties. The
need for sucli a system was clearly recognized in

' For a statement by Secretary Rusk before the 18-natioii
Disarmament Committee on Mar. 23, see Bulletin of
Apr. 9, 1962, p. 571.

' For a statement by President Kennedy on Mar. 29,
see ihid., Apr. 16, 1962, p. 624.

the report ^ of the scientific experts which was the
foundation of the Geneva negotiations. For nearly
three years this need was accepted by the Soviet
delegation at Geneva. There was disagreement
about details, but the principle of objective inter-
national verification was accepted. It was em-
bodied in the Treaty tabled by the United States
and the United Kingdom on April 18, 1961,*
which provides for such a system. Since the cur-
rent disarmament meetings began in Geneva, the
United States and the United Kingdom have made
further efforts to meet Soviet objections to the
April 18 treaty. These efforts have met with no
success as is clearly shown by the recent statements
of the Foreign IVIinister of the Soviet Union
[Andrei A. Gromyko] and of their representative
in Geneva, Mr. [Valerian A.] Zorin, who have
repeatedly rejected the very concept of interna-
tional verification. There has been no progress on
this point in Geneva; the Soviet Union has re-
fused to change its position.

The ground given seems to be that existing na-
tional detection systems can give adequate protec-
tion against clandestine tests. In the present state
of scientific instrumentation, there are a great
many cases in which we cannot distinguish be-
tween natural and artificial seismic disturbances —
as opposed to recording the fact of a disturbance
and locating its probable epicenter. A treaty
therefore cannot be made effective unless adequate
verification is included in it. For otherwise there
would be no alternative, if an instrument reported
an miexplained seismic occurrence on eitlier side,
between accepting the possibility of an evasion of
the Treaty or its immediate denunciation. The
opportunity for adequate verification is of the very
essence of mutual confidence.

This principle has so far been rejected by the
Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, and there
is no indication that he lias not spoken with the
full approval of his Government. We continue
to hope that the Soviet Government may recon-
sider the position and express their readiness to
accept the principle of international verification.
If they will do this, there is still tune to reach
agreement. But if there is no change in the pres-
ent Soviet position, the Governments of the United
States and the United Kingdom must conclude
that their effoi-ts to obtain a workable treaty to

^ For background and text of report, see ibid., Sept. 22,
19.')8, p. 452.
' For text, see ibid., June 5, 1961, p. S70.

April 30, J 962

707

ban nuclear tests are not now successful, and the
test series scheduled for the latter part of this

month ^ will have to go forward.

testing, would only give rise to a false sense of
security and provide yet another opportunity for
the Soviet Union to prepare in secret for its own
nuclear testing.

U.S. Comments on Soviet Statement
Calling for Nuclear Test Moratorium

Department Statement

Press release 245 dated April 12

The statement today [April 12] by the Soviet
Union that a new uninspected moratorium on nu-
clear tests should be undertaken for as long as the
18-nation disarmament conference remains in ses-
sion is another unfortunate effort to substitute
paper pledges for guaranteed agreements. The
United States hopes that this statement is not the
final answer of the Soviet Government to the joint
U.S.-U.K. message of April 10 ^ on nuclear testing,
which clearly states the position of the two Gov-
ernments toward this vital issue.

Tlie United States is deeply sensitive to the ap-
prehensions which have been expressed by the
eight new nations at the Geneva conf ei-ence regard-
ing nuclear testing. But it does not believe that
a solution to tliis vital issue can result from paper
pledges. Rather, it is essential that the conference
direct its energies to reaching an agreement on
adequate verification arrangements which will re-
sult in a safeguarded agreement. This is where
an answer to the world's desire for an end to all
nuclear testing will be found.

This latest Soviet proposal must be judged in
the light of the actions of the Soviet Government
last fall during the course of the test ban con-
ference. Even as these discussions were continu-
ing, the Soviet Union resumed tests,^ thus ending
the unpoliced moratorium which it now proposes
to reinstate.

The United States does not intend to place its
security and the security of its allies at the mercy
of Soviet on-again-off-again tactics. We are ready
to conclude an effective test ban agreement now.
But we cannot be led into another paper pledge
which, far from guaranteeing a halt to nuclear

"For an atUlress to the Nation by Tresiilent Kennedy
on Mar. 2, see ihid.. Mar. 10, 19G2, p. 443.
' See p. 707.
' For backgrotnid, see Bulletin of Nov. 20, lOGl, p. 844.

President Commends General Clay
on Mission to Berlin

Statement by President Kennedy

White House press release dated April 12

General [Lucius D.] Clay and I have had a
thorough discussion of the situation in Berlin and
of his own role in it. General Clay has served for
several montlis beyond the duration of tliis assign-
ment as originally expected. He has served with
great effectiveness in helping to sustain the close
partnership and mutual miderstanding of the
people of West Berlin with the United States in
a time of grave danger.

Wlule there is still no settlement of the differ-
ences among the great powers over Germany and
Berlin and while the defense of the freedom of
West Berlin remains a matter of the highest con-
cern to the United States, General Clay has re-
ported to me that the morale and economy of the
city are such that liis full-time presence as my
personal representative is no longer required.
This is particularly true as Allied planning and
coordination have advanced rapidly in the last
several months.

While personal considerations would not lead
General Clay to ask to be relieved in time of
emergency, he should not be called upon to stay
indefinitely when his immediate mission is over.
With regard to his work in Berlin, General Clay's
contributions to the situation there are too well
known to require comment other than to say that
I am glad that he will remain in service on call as
my adviser on matters relating to Berlin. In this
capacity ho will be returning to the city at frequent
intervals in future months, and in case of emer-
gency he is only 8 hours away from the city. He
will go back to Berlin Simday [April 15], where
he will remain for a few weelvs.

General Clay luis made a great contribution in
the last autumn and winter, and it is good that this
contribution will continue as he comes home from
full-time service.

708

Department of Stale Bulletin

The New Europe— Its Challenge and its Opportunities for the United States

ly Douglas MacArthur II
Ambassador to Belgium ^

It is not only a great privilege, but it is also a
pleasure to participate in tlie annual convention
of the Young Presidents. It is a privilege be-
cause the Young Presidents are Imown not only
in the United States but in many other countries of
the world which they have visited over the years
as a vigorous, progressive, and forward-looking
group of young business leaders— leadere who are
making a veiy substantial contribution to the
mainstream of industrial and economic thought
and action, which will help not only our own
coimtiy but the free world meet the great chal-
lenge it faces. It is a pleasure to be here l^ecause
it gives me the opportunity to see again old friends
from your distinguished group with whom I had
the good fortune to meet and discuss common prob-
lems in Tokj'o in 1958 during your Far Eastern
seminar and in Brussels last November during
your European seminar.

In inviting me to meet and talk with you today
it was suggested that I first discuss the background
of the United States support for the truly revolu-
tionary movement toward European unity that is
in progress and then turn to the great opportuni-
ties as well as the great challenge we will face as
a result of the Common Market and other Euro-
pean institutions. This subject seems most ap-
propriate since you represent businesses and
industries whose future depends not just on Amer-
ican domestic commercial transactions and policies
but to a very considerable extent on international
trade and particularly on the kind of interna-
tional trade policy that your Government is en-
abled to follow with respect to the European

' Address made before the Young Presidents' Organiza-
tion, Inc., at Phoenix, Ariz., on Apr. 9 (press release 225
dated Apr. 5).

April 30, 1962

Common Market and other foreign outlets for our
products. And of course the kind of foreign trade
policy we adopt will have a major impact on the
entire world economic and political picture, par-
ticularly insofar as the future of free nations is
concerned.

However, before discussing trade policy, I will
fii-st review briefly certain aspects of the European
picture which make clear why both Democratic
and Republican administrations in the United
States have in the postwar period given full and
wholehearted support to the concept of European
economic and political integration. This, I think,
is important, for it holds the answer to questions
that are sometimes asked, such as: "In giving
Marshall plan aid to Europe and in otherwise
supporting European moves toward unification
did we not just build up a competitive industrial
base that will put iVmerican industry out of
business ?"

Postwar Hostility of Soviet Leadership

To explain fully the backgromid of our support
of European integration, I will first go back to
1945. When the cruel chapter of World War II
ended, Americans hoped and prayed that a new
era of genuine international cooperation and co-
existence would be ushered in. And in particular
it was hoped that the Soviet Union, responsive to
the many billions of dollars of lend-lease assistance
extended to it by the United States and the thou-
sands of Allied lives that were sacrificed io get
such help to Russia to enable it to survive Nazi
Germany's assault, would modify its traditional
policy of tiying to undermine and destroy all gov-
ernments and systems that it did not dominate.
In other words, we hoped that Communist Russia,

709

although having a substantially different political
system from that of the United States and other
democratic countries, would be willing to live and
let live.

For our part, and despite the basic difference in
political philosophy, we were not only willing but
eager to live together and cooperate with the
Soviets in a world where force, the threat of force,
and subversion would be replaced by the rule of
law and the settlement of international differences
by peaceful means. Knowing full well the terri-
ble power of the atom, we wanted to avoid another
world conflagration that could well be fatal to
humanity.

Alas, this bright dream of the future was never
realized. Soon after the war ended the Soviet
leadership clearly indicated it did not intend to
tolerate the existence of systems of government
other than its own. Indeed on Febi-uary 6, 1946,
in an important speech, Stalin openly blamed the
Western Powers for the war and said that the con-
tinued existence of "capitalism" meant the basic
causes of war were still present. Thus, despite the
massive assistance extended by the West to Soviet
Russia during the war, Stalin and the leaders of
the Kremlin refused to modify that basic tenet of
Soviet Communist doctrine which is responsible
for today's cold war and the great tension and
threat to world peace. The fundamental tenet of
which I speak is the implacable and unremitting
hostility of Soviet leadership past and present to
any other government or system that it does not
control or dominate, and its active efforts through
force, the threat of force, and subversion to impose
its system on other peoples.

Let me emphasize that, contrary to what some
people say, this is not just a question of conflict
between "communism" and "capitalism," or "so-
cialism" and "free entei-prise," as the recent 22d
Congress of the Soviet Communist Party so clearly
demonstrated. At that congress the Soviet leader-
ship stated its complete hostility toward the Com-
munist Albanian government because the latter
was not fully subservient to Moscow's control.
Similarly, you will recall that in 1948, when Com-
munist Yugoslavia refused to submit to Moscow's
direction, the Soviet Union did its best to under-
mine and destroy the Yugoslav Government. I
mention these events only to emphasize that the
cold war and related problems that free peoples
fao^ today do not stem from mere differences of

political or economic systems but from Moscow's
determination to dominate the world and its un-
remitting and relentless efforts to impose its con-
trol on all governments and systems.

And so it became clear shortly after World War
II that the United States and other free societies
were faced with a threat of great magnitude. I
used the expression "great magnitude" advisedly,
because one of the major results of World War II,
indeed one of the great phenomena of this century,
is the cataclysmic change in the overall ratio of
military strength and power in the world — the
disappearance of the traditional military strength
of Germany and Japan, which had for centuries
helped contain Russian expansionism; the reduc-
tion in the great military strength, land and sea,
of France and Britain respectively; and the
emergence of the tremendous power of the Soviet
Union, with its expanded empire stretching from
the Pacific right into the heart of Western Europe.

Rehabilitation of Europe's Potential

As we assessed the threat to the survival of our
own coimtry and other free nations, it soon became
apparent that the United States would by itself be
unable to meet successfully the challenge of Soviet
exjiansionism. The imperative and crying need
was for greater free-world strength which, joined
with our own power, would be adequate to meet
the challenge.

Wliei-e were we to find such additional muscle ?
One area of great potential strength came im-
mediately to mind. This was the Western Euro-
pean complex, from which America sprang. I
used the phrase "potential strength'' advisedly,
because we recognized that over the past century
Western Europe had possessed greater assets in
terms of population, industiy, and scientific skills
and knowledge than either the United States or
Russia. However, this great Western Europe po-
tential had never been realized because of the
senseless bloodlettings and internecine struggles
in Western Europe — political, economic, and mili-
tary— which over the past 100 years have succes-
sively gutted that vitally impoi-tant area and
sapped its strength and vigor.

Furthermore, as a result of devastation of tlie
war, Europe's industrial plant had been largely
destroyed. It was clear that without economic
assistance and rehabilihilion there would not be
economic, social, or political stabilil y and Europe

710

Department of State Bulletin

might even fall to the fonnidable offensive that
the Communists unleashed against it soon after the
end of the war.

However, if Europe's great potential — eco-
nomic, industrial, and human — could be rehabili-
tated and if our European friends would work to-
gether in cooperation with each other and with
us and other like-minded people, then indeed
Western Europe's great potential could be realized
and the balance of free-world-Communist-world
military power could be more than redressed.

And so in tlie late 1940's we extended Marshall
plan aid to help restore Europe's shattered econ-
omy and thus provide a basis for .social and po-
litical stability — the basis for a strong Europe
tliat could help share the burden of free-world
security.

And at the same time, because we recognized
tliat without close intra-European cooperation the
rehabilitation of Europe's shattered indu.stries
might simply reproduce the tragic past, we gave
encouragement to those European leaders who
were working for European integration within
the framework of a broader Atlantic conununity
in order to develop Europe's strength and also to
provide a framework for close political, economic,
and military cooperation between Western Europe
and North America.

Importance of European Integration

But there were other historical and compelling
reasons for our support of European integration
far transcending the present East-West confron-
tation. European integration was not in our view
just a cold- war instrument but was a genuine ne-
cessity for us and for the future of Western na-
tions irrespective of the state of relations with the
Soviet bloc. Why? Because twice within the
span of a single generation the jealousies and ri-
valries of Europe had led to explosions and world
wars which had eventually involved us at the cost
of hundreds of thousands of young American
lives and tens of billions of dollars of our
resources.

One of the principal obstacles to a prosperous
and peaceful Europe had been the traditional
animosity and hostility between France and Ger-
many that three times within the lifespan of liv-
ing men and women had torn Europe apart and
drained it so terribly of its strength and vitality.
In what framework could this ancient enmity be

transformed into a cooperative arrangement where
the great assets and qualities of both the French
and German people would work together to
strengthen the fabric of peace in Europe? Given
the larger population and the traditional vigor of
Germany, France was understandably reluctant
to enter alone into a partnership with Germany
in which the latter might gain dominant control.
A few European leaders of great vision believed
that a lasting French-German rapprochement and
partnership was only feasible within some broader
and stronger framework, the framework of an
integrated Europe. Thus the vigor and resources
of Germany would be joined in equal partnership
with the assets and energies of other Western
European countries so that Germany, with its
superior numbers and great industrial capability,
would not by itself have the dominant voice.

And related to this aspect of the problem there
is still another reason why an integrated Europe
was important to Europe and to us. This was
the desirability of Germany's being woven solidly
into a fabric of Western European "collectivity"
so that the great and traditional energy, vitality,
and vigor of the German people would not once
again be channeled into the narrow and destruc-
tive stream of xenophobic nationalism but could
find adequate and constructive scope and expres-
sion in an integrated and more prosperous Europe,
to which Germany could make its own unique and
indispensable contribution.

Let me make clear that we did not try to impose
European integration on any nation or people.
But for all the above reasons the enlightened self-
interest of the United States and the American
people seemed to dictate our encouragement of the
views of those European leaders who were work-
ing so actively for an economically and politically
integrated Europe.

Need for Liberal Trade Policies

However, while recognizing the advantages of
a strong and integrated Europe, we also recognized
that it held both political and economic risks for
us unless certain fundamental principles were ob-
ser\'ed — principles wliich we understood our West-
ern European friends fully shared.

One of the basic assumptions on which we gave
our support to European political integration was
that the politically integrated Europe which
would emerge would not be a political "third

April 30, 7962

711

force" that would adopt a policy of political op-
portunism and blackmail and try to play the
United States off against the Communist bloc.
What we had in mind was the emergence of a
Europe, united and strong, that could serve as an
equal partner with the United States in the
achievement of our common aims and endeavors.
Our assumption in this respect has thus far been
more than justified. Although the jjrocess of polit-
ical integration is still proceeding, we have seen
ever-growing bonds and ties developing not only
between the nations of Western Europe but also
between this new Europe and ourselves.

A vitally important premise on which we gave
support to European economic integration was
that the trade policies of a European Common
Market would be liberal and outward-looking and
that such a Common Market would not, while
lowering its internal tariffs, at the same time erect
around itself high tariff walls that would exclude
products of the United States and other third
countries that had traditionally had important
outlets in Europe. This of course was of over-
riding importance, not only for our own economy
but for free-world strength and unity. For ob-
viously a narrow protectionist policy on the part
of a unified Europe or the United States would
invite retaliation from the other side and do not
only irreparable damage Ui the economies of each
but also strike a mortal blow at the solidarity,
strength, and cohesion of the Western World.
Creation of a high, outside tariff wall would also
tend to preclude an increase in the total volume
of trade which should otherwise result from for-
mation of a customs union and which should in
the long run offset the immediate disadvantages to
third countries inherent in the removal of the
barriers between the members of the customs union.

And of course we made clear in our talks with
European leaders that liberal trade policies of a
Common Market must apply not just to industrial
commodities but agricultural products as well.
For the stability of our economy and our ability
to deal successfully with our difficult balance-of-
payments problem depends not only on outlets for
industrial products but also on the maintenance
of our market for agricultural products in
Europe — our greatest single market for such com-
modities. And since the Common Market is of
such gi-eat importance to us I would like to say
just a few words about it.

European Common Market

Following World War II, imder the genius and
drive of such great Europeans as Jean Monnet,
[Konrad] Adenauer, [Alcide] de Gasperi, Kobert
Schuman, and Paul-Henri Spaak, the movement
toward European unity slowly took form and
steadily progressed until 5 years ago a revolu-
tionary development occurred that has galvanized
and transformed the situation — a development
which holds for us not only great challenge but
also great opportunities. I refer to the signing
of the Treaty of Eome in 1957 and the subsequent
formation of the Common Market for which it
provided.-

"VVlien the Common Market came into being in
1958, there were some who believed it would not
amount to very much and others who preferred at
that time to remain outside its framework for
imderstandable reasons. Britain, the Scandi-
navian and other European countries were in the
latter category.

But those who did not believe in the Common
Market have been proved dramatically wrong.
For since the Common Market got under way, the
level of industrial activities of its members has
advanced at the very high rate of some 7 percent
per year, whereas the progress in other European
countries, such as Britain and the Scandinavian
countries, has been only about half as great.

During the period 1957-1960 the gross national
pi'oduct of the Common Market countries in-
creased by more than 45 percent, while the gross
national product of the United States increased by
only about 18 percent. This dramatic increase
in the level of economic activity of the members
has been accompanied by a very substantial in-
crease in trade and commercial activities both with
other countries and especially between the mem-
bers.

Total foreign trade of the Common Market
with all countries increased from about $43 billion
in 1956, just before formation of the Common
Market, to just under $G0 billion in 1960, a whop-
ping 39 percent. Trade between the six members
of the Common Market increased during that
same period from $12.7 billion to $20.3 billion,
an incredible 60 percent. Although both of these

'The six members of the European Common Market
are Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and
the Netjierlands.

712

Deparfment of Sfafe Bulletin

increases are important, the latter is particularly
sigcnilicant, as it reflects the development of closer
trading ties among tlie six Common Mai-ket coun-
tries as trading barriers are lowered between them.
That development is one which I shall refer to
again a bit later.

It is a fact that the Common Market has suc-
ceeded dramatically and with a rapidity which
has astounded even its most ardent supporters.
The result has been that Greece has stated its
desire ultimately to join and is already an associ-
ated member, while Britam, Denmark, and Ire-
land have asked to join and Norway is also
contemplating doing so.

'WHiat are the challenges as well as tlie oppor-
tunities that this situation presents for us?

The Challenge to the United States

Tlie challenge can, I believe, best be evaluated
by a few facts relating to population, industry,
and trade of the six Common Market countries
and the other European nations that desii-e to
join it.

(a) The Common Market nations today have
a population of 170 million and, should the pres-
ent negotiations with Britain and the subsequent
negotiations with Denmark, Ireland, and Norway
be successful, it will have a population of about
250 million, as contrasted with our population
of 185 million. In terms of population it will
represent a smgle market substantially larger than
either the United States or the Soviet Union.

(b) Furthermore, in the Common Market real
wages and purchasing power are steadily rising.
During the period 1953-1960 consumption ex-
penditures per person increased by 30 pei-cent in
the Common Market countries while in the United
States such expenditures increased by only 13.5
percent. It is of course true that those countries
started from a lower base than we and their stand-
ards of living are still lower than ours. However,
in view of its dynamics, it is clear that wages,
standards of living, and consumption expendi-
tures are now rising at an even more rapid rate
and will continue to grow toward those of the
United States. In fact, should Britain and the
other three nations join the Conunon Market, it
will become the world's greatest single market.

(c) The Common Market has great industrial
strength that should increase. In 1960 steel pro-
duction of the Common IMarket was almost that

of the United States and well ahead of the Soviet
Union. Its coal production was exceeded only by
that of the United States and of the Soviet Union.
Its productivity is increasing at a rate of almost
twice that of the United States, and in automobiles,
transport equipment, machmery, chemicals, steel
products, and a host of other manufactures it is
giving us hard competition in world markets.

(d) It will have an unrivaled pool of scientific
and teclmological skills and Icnowledge to apply
to industrial advances.

(e) And it will comprise the greatest single in-
ternational trading bloc in the world. In 1960 the
six Common Market covmtries, without Britain
and the other three countries I mentioned, had im-
ports of $29.6 billion and exports of $29.7 billion
for an overall trade total of just mider $60 billion.
In comparison our own imports amoimted to about
$15 billion and our exports to $20 billion for a total
of about $35 billion.

It is crj'stal clear that, if our own American
economy is not to stagnate and become depressed,
we must have maximum access to this great new
market for both our industrial and our agricul-
tural products. Today we sell to the six Common
Market countries, Britain, and the other countries
wliich now contemplate joming it approximately
$314 billion of our industrial products. We also
sell to them just under $2 billion of American
agricultural products, for Western Europe is by
far our gi-eatest agricultural market.

I mention agricultural products because, while
there is general understanding of the importance
of markets for our industrial products, there is
sometimes less underetanding about the vital
necessity of preserving our great West European
market for agricultural products if our balance-
of-payments situation is not to suffer, witli serious
effects on our economy.

To sum up, our annual industrial and agricul-
tural exports to Western Europe are just under
$6 billion, about 30 percent of our total exports.
And, as contrasted with the postwar years when
Europe was so heavily dependent on us, we are
now more dependent than ever on our European
market. For if our industrial and agi-icultural
exports to Europe were substantially reduced, we
would be faced with a major balance-of -payments
crisis; many of our industries which depend on
foreign trade would be threatened ; our ability to
deal successfully with our vei-y difficult agricul-

April 30, 1962

713

tural surplus problem would be endangered ; and
we would in fact face the prospect of a most
serious economic crisis.

Opportunities for American Export Trade

Although the challenge of the Common Market
is great, the opportunities are equally great. It is
a market where American products, both indus-
trial and agricultural, are well and vei-y favorably
known. Indeed today our exports to the Common
Market are 50 percent greater than our imports
from it ; it is a market wliere real wages, and hence
consumption, are rising rapidly; it is a market
with a rapidly expanding population. It is in fact
rapidly becoming the world's greatest single
market, and it thus holds great opportunities for
us.

Problems for U.S. Government and Industry

One of the most important problems we face to-
day is how to maintain and expand our access to
this new and great European market on which our
own economy and the prosperity and well-being
of the American people so largely depend.

It seems to me that the answer to this question
has two basic aspects :

First, there is the problem of reducing to the
maximimi extent possible the official customs bar-
riers and other protective devices which the Com-
mon Market and other nations may apply against
imports of American products. This part of the
problem must be dealt with by your Government
rather than by American business and industry.
However, your Government can only do so success-
fully if it is given the necessary t<x)ls.

The second aspect relates to the ability of United
States products to compete successfully in world
markets. And here, I think, American business
and industry have an indispensable contribution
wluch they alone can make.

Protecting U.S. Trade Position

I^^t me deal fii-st witli the problem of liow we
are to prevent tariff barriers and other protective
devices from walling American products out of
the European Common Market and other foreign
markets. The only way we can protect our posi-
tion against such governmental devices is to under-
take negotiations at the governmental level with
the Common Market or other countries involved.

And let me emphasize most emphatically that
in these negotiations we do not hold all the cards.
Too many Americans today do not realize that our
own relative strength and position in the world
have vastly changed since the immediate postwar
period, when Europe and much of the rest of the
world was prostrate or in distress and we were
pretty well able to call the time in trade and eco-
nomic matters without fear of being successfully
challenged. The unbalanced postwar situation
where we alone in the free world liad any real
economic strength and power is gone for good.
Today in Europe we have a strong and equal
partner, a partner with great and increasing eco-
nomic and industrial strength and vigor.

If we are to safeguard our own vital interests —
industrial and agricultural — we will have to en-
gage in give-and-take tariff negotiations with tliis
new Europe. The President will need all the
authority and flexibility he has requested in his
foreign ti'ade legislation^ to meet the challenge
we face.

Let me also state my own conviction that with
such authority we will be able to negotiate ar-
rangements which will be best designed to protect
not only American industry but also labor and
agriculture. Without that authority your Gov-
ernment's hands will be tied; we will be imable
to negotiate successfully on tariffs, and the re-
sults will be tragic for our economy and the well-
being of the American people.

Need for Broad Authority To Negotiate

Some people may have a question as to the
horse-trading skill of the American negotiators.
I have complete confidence in their toughness of
mind and ability to hold their own in any future
negotiations, just as they recently did in the diffi-
cult negotiation in GATT [General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade] under our present trade agree-
ments legislation.*

These last GATT negotiations, where for the
fii-st time wo could bargain with the Common
Market as a single negot iator, were the most com-
plex and, I must add, the most long-di-awn-out of

' For text of Presidont Kennedy's trade messaee to Con-
gress, see Bulletin of Feb. 12, 1962, p. 231 ; for a sum-
mary of the proposed legislation, see ibid., Feb. 26, 1962,
p. .343.

* For a summary of tariff negotiations concluded at
Geneva on Mar. 7, see ihid., .\pr. 2, liH!2, p. r>61.

714

Department of State Bulletin

the major negotiating sessions in tlie history of
GATT. But the result was satisfactory for our
interests. We granted concessions on goods im-
ported into the United States worth about $2.9
billion ; in return we received concessions on about
$4.3 billion worth of exports, all based on 1960
figures. As the most-favored-nation principle
applies to those negotiations, we can safely say
that there should be ultimate and appreciable
benefits not only to us but to all the trading part-
ners of GATT from the results.

However, while the existing Trade Agreements
Act under which we conducted the recent GATT
negotiations has served a very useful puqiose for
many years, it is today as outmoded as the faithful
old bC-3 aircraft. We must have new and up-to-
date authorization if we are to negotiate success-
fully.

Trade among tlie six members of the Common
Market has already increased by 60 percent since
the Common Market entered into force and the
trade barriers between its members began to be
lowered. In order to maintain our European
markets while members of the present or an ex-
panded Common IMarket are elimmating the in-
ternal trade barriers between themselves, we must
be able to negotiate down the Common Market's
external tariff barriers.

The importance of such negotiations for us is
emphasized by the fact that, if the British and
other prospective applicants join the Common
ilarket, that organization and the United States
will together have almost 90 percent of total free-
world industrial production. In such circum-
stances and to protect our own interests, it will no
longer be feasible to negotiate tariff reductions
item by it«m. Instead there must be broad au-
thority for across-the-board tariff cuts, carefully
negotiated on a reciprocal basis which insures
benefits not only for the two negotiating parties
but also for our other free- world friends, who will
benefit by reason of the most-favored-nation
principle.

President's Trade Proposals

I shoxdd like to emphasize that President Ken-
nedy's trade program is one that serves both our
national as well as our vital overall international
interests. The program seeks to preserve the in-
terests of the United States in a worldwide trad-
ing context, not just with regard to Europe and

April 30, 1962

the Atlantic community. Our aim is that the
benefits of lower American and European tariffs
will also benefit other non-Connnunist countries
in other parts of the world, establishing a pattern
of economic relations that will unify rather than
divide the free world.

It is indeed possible that some of our businesses
or entei-prises will encounter difficulties because of
reductions of tariffs and other trading barriers.
However, our country has grown great by our
spirit of progress through competition, and I have
seen no evidence that American management and
labor cannot face up to this challenge. Further-
more, there are safeguards in tlie President's pro-
gram to cope with temporary hardships and of
course our nation as a whole stands to benefit in-
finitely more from expanded exports than from a
restrictive policy that eventually would only lead
to disaster.

Now there are some sincere people who think
tliat the answer to the great challenge we face in
the field of international trade lies in protection-
ism rather than broad authority to negotiate
liberal trade arrangements on a give-and-take
basis. I would only reply by saying that if the
United States insists on a policy of trade protec-
tionism and import restrictions, we will face re-
taliation from our friends. And such retaliation
will be applied not only against American indus-
trial commodities and products but against Ameri-
can agriculture as well. What retaliation against
American industrial products would mean to busi-
ness and labor needs no elaboration. The effect on
agriculture would be equally disastrous.

Today we have heavy agricultural surpluses
that we have great difficulty in disposing of and
which represent a heavy burden on our budget.
But even with the surpluses that are stockpiled
here in America or used so effectively in some of
our foreign economic aid programs to promote
economic and political stability and progress, we
do sell in foreign markets approximately $5 bil-
lion worth of agricultural commodities a year.
If we lost a very substantial part of our market
for agricultural products, the greatest single part
of which lies in Europe, I need not tell you of the
problems that would be created for our balance of
payments, our farmers, and our overall economy.
And one of our problems is that some of the
xVmerican agricultural products in heaviest surplus
are also in heavy surplus in other countries. Can-

715

ada, Australia, and the Argentine have large sur-
pluses of grain. India, Pakistan, Egypt, and
other countries have surpluses of cotton. The
Netherlands, Denmark, and otliers have surpluses
of dairy products. And so it goes. If we insist
on imposing high tariffs and restrictions on in-
dustrial imports from our friends, we must be
realistic enough to expect that our friends would
feel obliged to turn elsewhere for many of the
agricultural commodities they now obtain from us.

Of course in any discussion of foreign trade the
question of Japan always arises. All the factors
I have just mentioned apply with particular force
to our trading relations with Japan. Because
there is a very close connection between Japan's
external trade and the coimtry's domestic well-
being, and because the United States occupies a
very important place in that external trade. United
States actions in the trade field often have direct
economic and political repercussions in Japan. It
is clear, therefore, that in our own interests and
those of the free world we should act in a way
which will minimize friction and foster an expan-
sion of trade between the two nations — an expan-
sion in both directions.

We need not think of our purchases from Japan
as mere acts of political necessity, however. Ja-
pan is an ever-growing market for American
goods. Last year Japan was our second best for-
eign customer, and our exports to Japan exceeded
our imports by some $700 million or by almost 70
percent.

Nor do we need to think of our purchases from
Japan as the imavoidable means of sustaining our
exports, though it is axiomatic that if we are to sell
to Japan we must buy from Japan. Imports are
part of a desirable process wherein we get from
the highly productive and increasingly inventive
industrial economy of Japan a great many useful
things which make our lives more comfortable and
our economy stronger. Imports can displace do-
mestic production temporarily and locally, but
they can also lead tlirough a chain of actions to
the expansion of domestic industry and to the
creation of new jobs.

The President's new trade proposals are realistic
in dealing with the problem of import competi-
tion. They recognize that there must be an effec-
tive method of dealing with this problem if there
is to be real progress in reducing barriers to im-
ports. To meet the problem the President is pro-

posing a program of assistance to workers, firms,
or industries which have enjoyed protection from
imports and which may suffer dislocation after
that protection has been reduced. These provi-
sions in the bill recognize that the community as
a whole has an obligation to assist those who may
be adversely affected by actions taken on behalf
of the whole community.

U.S. Industry Must "Root, Hog, or Die"

Now let me return to the second aspect of our
foreign trade problem — the ability of American
goods to compete in world markets. This is an
area where much of the problem lies not with your
Government but with you, the American business
community.

I will say to you very frankly, as I said to your
Far Eastern and European seminar groups when
I met with them in Tokyo and Brussels, that I do
not think American business and industry m recent
years have always made tlie contribution to our
foreign trade that they are capable of making.
Wliile, obviously, if we are to compete successfully
there cannot be endless wage-price spirals which
result in pricing our products out of world mar-
kets, and while it also seems clear that wage in-
creases should generally be absorbed through
increased productivity rather than higher prices,
the problem of America's ability to earn its living
through exports is very substantially influenced
by the vigor and imagination with which Ameri-
can business approaches the problem of selling
American products abroad. After all, our coun-
try developed and came to greatness through for-
eign trade. Our Yankee forebears went to the
four corners of the earth in their clipper ships
trading and selling American products. If I may
frankly say so, we seem to have lost some of the
vigor and drive of our Yankee ancestors in de-
veloping and holdhig foreign markets.

The reasons are perhaps imderstandable. From
the period roughly from 1940 until 1953 American
industry enjoyed what amounted to almost total
and absolute protection. What do I mean by
this? I mean that, following the outbreak of
war in 1939, the two great traditional areas of
traditional industrial competition — Western Eu-
rope and Japan — were no longer in the picture
as serious competitors. Circumstances of the war
prevented their industrial and agricultural prod-

716

Department of State Bulletin

ucts from competing with us, not only in the
United States but also in most third countries.

And after the war the destruction of industry
had been so great and privations so heavy that for
many years, as the industrial strength of Japan
and Western Europe was gradually rebuilt, their
industrial output went largely into the home mar-
kets to mi the needs caused by the destruction
and privations of the war. The result was that
not mitil about 1953 or 1954 did we begin to feel
any real competition from Western Europe or
Japan.

However, as the basic and immediate needs of
the peoples of Western Europe and Japan and the
surrounding areas were met, we began once again
to face stiff competition in our own domestic mar-
ket. And, faced with such competition, there was
often a tendency to call for protection rather than
trying to meet the competition by appropriate m-
dustrlal and business techniques and methods.

At the same time competition in third markets
was increasing. For 4 years I served as American
Ambassador to Japan, and for 3 years preceding
that period I traveled every year extensively
through the nations of free Asia. And as I trav-
eled in Asia I was struck by the fact that wher-
ever I went I found business and trade teams
from Britain, from Germany, from France, from
Italy, from the Benelux countries, actively study-
ing and estimating the potential market and mak-
ing effective plans to penetrate it. These foreign
business teams often spent weeks in a smgle small
Asian country estunating the needs and costs of
entering the market. They studied such questions
as advertising methods, language and translations,
servicing of their product, local representation,
and so forth. For them it was a question of "root,
hog, or die" to obtain that market.

And m some of these same countries I occa-
sionally saw American businessmen who were
looking into the market. They had talks with
local leaders and were entertained by them. But
the general attitude of some seemed to be that
their product was so outstanding it sold itself.
Therefore, if the coimtry wanted their product or
business, the market would come to them and they
would not have to go after it aggressively with a
selling campaign. In other cases, I recall, they
felt the market might not be large enough to jus-
tify any great effort. And so the business went
to European competitors. The tragedy was that

April 30, 7962

636026—62 3

it was quite clear that in a good many instances
we had products which were competitive and
would sell, even though sometimes priced a bit
higher, but which were not selling because the
effort and salesmanship had not been put into
the endeavor.

Gentlemen, if we are to gain or even hold the
foreign markets we have today, we will have to
do much more. As time passes our European
friends are working more closely together to ex-
pand their research and technical improvements
of their products. At the same time they are
beginning to lower their prices as a result of in-
creased production resulting from the expanding
Common Market. We are in fact going to find
the competition in the future much tougher than
in the past. And yet I am sure the genius and
ability of American industry can meet competi-
tion it will face in Europe and other countries.
But to sell we will have to get out and "root, hog,
or die." We can do it, but it wUl require research,
teclinical improvements, and of course salesman-
ship.

This is something that the Government cannot
do for you. We can negotiate — successfully, I
believe— to keep tariff walls and restrictions
against the import of American products gener-
ally within reasonable and manageable propor-
tions. But we cannot develop or sell the products
for you. This is a job that American business
will have to do if our American free and competi-
tive enterprise system is to make the grade.

In conclusion let me say that as we face the
future I am not pessunistic. On the contrary I
am optunistic because we not only clearly have
the capability of successfully meeting the chal-
lenge that the new Europe poses to us in the field
of "trade but we can actually benefit from the
opportunities that this great and expanding mar-
ket holds for us. Furthermore, in successfully
and constructively meeting the challenge of the
new Europe we will be contributing to the pros-
perity, strength, and unity of the whole free- world
economic system, thus helpmg to assure the ulti-
mate victory of the free world over Soviet totali-
tarianism on the battlefield of peaceful competi-
tion.

The problem is not one of capability but of will.
Do we have the will to get out and "root" for
foreign markets? Is there the will to give the
President and the administration the tools to

717

work with? I believe the answer to both these
questions is yes.

However, let me reiterate my conviction that
the decision we take with respect to the President's
foreign trade program will have a direct and
major bearing on the future of free-world unity
and strength. There are two courses open to us.
One is a policy of protectionism and restriction
that will divide and destroy free-world unity and
strength and sap our own vitality and power.
The other course is to maintain our liberal trade
policy and adopt those measures that will make
it effective so that trade can become the great
unifying force and source of strength for the
United States and the free world.

U.S. and Austria Suspend Air Talks,
To Resume in Near Future

Department Announcement of April 2

Press release 216 dated April 2

Delegations of the Governments of the United
States and Austria met on April 2 at the Depart-
ment of State to initiate consultations regarding
operations under the Interim Air Transport
Agreement of October 8, 1947.^ The Government
of Austria requested the consultations for the pur-
pose of bringing up to date the terms and condi-
tions of the interim agreement and giving it
permanent effect.

The U.S. delegation is chaired by Philip H.
Trezise, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for
Economic Affairs. Alan S. Boyd, Chairman of
the Civil Aeronautics Board, and other officers of
the Department of State, the Civil Aeronautics
Board, and the Department of Commerce will
participate. A representative of the Air Trans-
port Association of America is attending as
observer.

The chairman of the Austi-ian delegation is
Hermann Gohn, Head of the Finance and Traffic
Division of the Federal Ministry for Foreign Af-
fairs. He is assisted by Otto Jettmar, Head of the
Civil Aviation Department of the Federal Minis-
try of Communications and Electric Power Devel-
opment, and by other officials of the Civil Aviation

Department and the Austrian Embassy in Wash-
ington. An official of Austrian Airlines is attend-
ing as observer.

Department Announcement of April 9

Press release 230 dated April 9

Delegations of the Government of the United
States and the Austrian Federal Government held
negotiations from April 2 to April 7, 1962, in
Washington for the purpose of renegotiating the
U.S.-Austrian Interim Air Transport Agreement
of October 8, 1947. Considerable progress was
made in establishing the terms of a new agreement.
Negotiations were suspended on April 7 by mutual
agreement between the two delegations with the
expectation that they will be resumed in the near
future.

Claims on Austrian Persecutee Fund
Must Be Filed by August 31, 1962

Press release 235 dated April 10

The Department of State again calls attention
to the Austrian fund for settlement of persecutee
property losses (Fonds zur Abgeltung von
Vermoegensverlusten politisch Verfolgter) and
points out that the time for filing claims against
this fund will expire on August 31, 1962.^ Claims
may be filed by persons who were subject to racial,
religious, or political persecution in Austria from
March 13, 1938, to May 8, 1945, their spouses,
children (grandchildren are eligible to receive the
share of deceased children), or parent (s), in the
order given. Awards will be made from the fund,
which amounts to $6,000,000, to cover bank ac-
counts, securities, mortgages, or moneys which
were the subject of forced transfers or which were
confiscated by Nazi authorities, as well as pay-
ments of the discriminatory taxes known as
"Eeichsfluchtsteuer" and "Suehneleistung der
Jiiden (JUVA)."

Reports from Vienna indicate tliat only 1,300
claim applications have been received to date from
the United States. Further, even if the present
claims are paid in full, the fund will be left with
over $1.5 million unexpended.

' Treaties and Other International Acts Series 1659.

^ For background, see Bulletin of May 8, lOGl, p. 691,
and Oct. 2, 1961, p. 553.

718

Department of State Bulletin

Applications should be addressed to the Fonds
zur Abgeltung von Vermoegensverlusten politisch
Verfolgter, Taborstrasse 2-6, Vienna II. Forms
may be obtained from the above address or from
the Austrian Embassy, 2343 Massachusetts Ave.,
Washington, D.C., or at the nearest Austrian con-

sulate. Austrian consulates are located in New
York, New Orleans, Chicago, Detroit, Portland
(Oreg.), San Francisco, Los Angeles, Dallas,
IVIiami, Atlanta, Cleveland, Boston, and Seattle,
and inquiries for further information should be
directed to Austrian representatives.

Change and Challenge in Africa

hy G. Mennen Williams

Assistant Secretary for African Affairs *

Tempora mutantur, et nos mutamur in illis.

It is so exciting to be with an audience where
Latin is still good coin of the realm that I cannot
resist the opportunity to make a bow to the lamp
of learning that burns brightly at Boston College
and, indeed, throughout the entire academic com-
munity of Greater Boston.

This quotation is more than a gesture, however.
The Reverend William Harrison's statement of
1577, "Times change, and we change with them,"
actually states quite well my theme for this meet-
ing. Change is the principal factor charac-
terizing the Afi-ican scene today, and the effects
of change in Africa have had an enormous impact
on the development of U.S. interests in Afi-ica, its
lands and its people.

Although XJ.S. relations with Africa date back
nearly two centuries, it is only in recent years that
our interests have attained their present broad
scope and complexity.

Historically, our first political contacts with the
continent came shortly after our independence,
when the predators of the Barbaiy Coast plun-
dered the ships of the infant United States. This
led to our signing in 1786 a treaty of friendship,
commerce and navigation with Morocco, and our
first official tie with Africa was formed.

More than 100 years ago we participated in the
founding of the Republic of Liberia on Africa's

' Address made before the Boston College Law School
Forum at Brighton, Mass., on Mar. 29 (press release 203).

west coast. This free state remained the only in-
dependent nation in tropical Africa until the past
decade. Today Liberia shares the continent with
28 other free countries with whom we have diplo-
matic relations, and others are in the process of
being born.

For a century and a half American missionary
groups have had strong ties with Africa. The
various home offices, boards, and orders in this
country today have more than 6,500 missionaries
at work throughout the continent. On my visits
to various African countries I have had a chance
to meet with many missionary groups and observe
their splendid efforts to assist the peoples of
Africa.

Trade also has been a significant American in-
terest in Africa down through the years, and our
trading relationships date back to the days when
Yankee clipper ships moored in Boston Harbor.

Our interests in Africa broadened as we moved
into the modern world, and the strategic position
of Africa grew more important during World War
II and the postwar years. Africa lies on the flank
of our oldest allies in Europe. As part of our
worldwide security effort, the United States main-
tains important naval and air bases in Africa
under bilateral agreements. We maintain track-
ing stations in Nigeria, Zanzibar, and South
Africa, which are vital to our NASA [National
Aeronautics and Space Administration] space re-
search program. Africa also proved to be an

April 30, 1962

719

important strategic factor when the Suez Canal
was blocked in 1956 and oil for the free world was
shipped around the Cape of Good Hope.

The Wind of Change in Africa

The Africa our fathers knew or we knew before
World War II is a far cry from the Africa of
today. As Prime Minister Macmillan remarked :
"The wind of change is blowing through [Africa],
and whether we like it or not, this growth of na-
tional consciousness is a political fact. We must
all accept it as a fact, and our national policies
must take accoimt of it."

With important exceptions the former colonial
powers have felt this "wind of change" sweep
across Africa and responded. As a result, 25 of
Africa's 29 sovereign countries have gained their
independence in the last 11 years — 18 of them
within the past 2 years alone. This is the result
of the African's first great aspiration — a burning
desire for freedom and independence.

The remarkable aspect of this substantial
change in the face of Africa has been the peaceful
manner in which the shift in power was accom-
plished. Peaceful evolution has been the key to
modern Africa's development, despite the difficul-
ties in Algeria and the Congo.

With the promise of independence for Algeria,
French and Algerian leaders are forming an in-
terim executive to handle transitional steps on the
road to complete self-determination, and it seems
likely that the remaining disorder in that country
will be halted by French and Algerian authorities
together.

Although much remains to be done in the
Congo, we believe that our policy of support for
the U.N. Operation, parliamentary government,
and the territorial integrity of the country has
led to substantial progress over the past 18 months.
In 1960 President Eisenhower committed the
United States to the support of a United Nations
solution to that nation's troubles, and we continue
to support the peacekeeping and nationbuilding
operation of the U.N. in the Congo.

Just a year ago the Congo was badly split. The
Communist bloc and a few other countries had
recognized the Stanleyville regime of Antoine
Gizenga as the country's government, rather than
the legal national government lieaded by Presi-
dent [Joseph] Kasavubu at Lcopoldville, which
was recognized by most other nations. And Moise

Tshombe had created further disunity with his
secessionist movement in Katanga.

This was a highly charged situation that could
have been further aggravated. Instead, the
United Nations prevented the Communist bloc
from supplying direct aid to Stanleyville, dis-
couraged conflict between warring parties, and
brought about a peaceful solution to the crisis
through a meeting of Parliament at Lovanivmi
University. From this meeting, anti-Communist
Cyrille Adoula emerged as Prime Minister of a
moderate coalition government. Despite the best
efforts of the Leopoldville group, the United Na-
tions, and the West, Katanga Provincial President
Tshombe's supporters failed to participate in this
government and thereby passed up an opportunity
to strengthen the moderate forces of true Congo-
lese nationalism and join in assuring a stable, in-
dependent, and united Congo. Even without Mr.
Tshombe's cooperation, however, Prime Minister
Adoula has brought the illegal regime of Mr.
Gizenga to an end — and with it a major oppor-
tunity for Soviet penetration in central Africa.

The issue today remains the reintegi-ation of
Katanga into the Congo. A little more than 3
months ago, at Kitona, Mr. Tshombe agreed to
take such a step. We welcome the current talks
between Prime Minister Adoula and Provincial
President Tshombe in Leopoldville. It is most
important that both Congolese leaders pursue
promptly the statesmanlike work begim at Kitona
for the peacefvil reintegration of the Katanga,
which will direct once again the Congo's resources
and talents to the urgent and constructive task of
nationbuilding.

Incidentally, I'm sure all of you saw yesterday's
New York Times. It is most regrettable that
American partisans of Mr. Tshombe, I believe
unwanted by him, should choose this particular
moment to renew publication of a distorted ac-
count of last year's events in Elisabethville —
events reported in full by the United Nations last
January 20 without any attempt being made to
gloss over their tragic meaning.

U.S. Policy Toward "Dependent" Africa

Elsewhere on the continent where freedom and
independence do not exist, the "wind of change"
still blows strongly. This is a realitj' that every-
one recognizes, and we do no service to anyone by
failing to take note of its presence.

720

[iepat\met\i of State Bulletin

Our policy for those parts of Africa which are
still dependent has two principal aspects. First,
the "continuing tide of self-determination, which
runs so strong, has our sympathy and our sup-
port," as the President told the United Nations
last September.- Second, we consider some delib-
erate and expeditious preparation for self-govern-
ment essential to African advancement and to
avoid tensions that could peril the remarkable
progress that has characterized political evolu-
tion in Africa thus far.

It is in the still-dependent areas of Africa where
the white man has developed minority settlements
that the next acts in the exciting drama of emer-
gent Africa are to be played out.

Equal dignity, both personal and national, with
the rest of mankind is a second aspiration for
change endorsed by all Africans. As sovereign
people and countries they insist — and rightly so —
that they be accorded equal treatment with all
other nations of the world. This is an extremely
important concern for dark-skinned people in a
world where color bars are being lowered too
slowly for their liking. It demands a change the
whole world must make.

In the United States, where full racial equality
for all Americans has not yet been attained, we
have a particular concern with this African as-
piration. Our discriminatory practices have a
tremendous impact on Africa's new leaders and
place the United States under an important handi-
cap in dealing with African countries.

Harmony in African affairs is not the only —
nor indeed the primary — reason for concern with
our racial situation, however. Our denial of
human dignity and equal rights for all Americans
is a blight on the fulfillment of the American
dream. We owe it to ourselves to remove this
backward system from our country for our own
sake and not simply for the sake of our foreign
relations. A major challenge of our time is to
find lasting ways to erase all barriers of race, creed,
and color in America.

Concerning the third African aspiration for
change — improved standards of living — we stand
ready to help where we are asked and can make
a contribution to forward progress. We are will-
ing to assist not only because, as the President
said, "If a free society cannot help the many who

are poor, it cannot save the few who are rich," '
but because it is right. Americans have always
been good neighbors. This springs from the
Christian and democratic tradition of our frontier
days and is consonant with our historic devotion
to freedom everywhere. There can be no freedom
in misery, and there is no security for us if a large
area of the world is downtrodden or insecure.

Not only is the peace of the world indivisible
but the poverty and degradation of people any-
where represents a constant challenge to our basic
moral principles. We cannot say with Cain that
we are not our brother's keeper — especially when
that brother's needs are self-evident and he is
offered help from false friends who are our own
mortal enemies.

Cooperative Approach to Africa's Development

In this economic and technical area it is to the
interest of the United States and of the African
countries involved that the countries of Europe
continue and expand their programs of assistance.
Individual African countries, understandably, are
anxious to relieve themselves of exclusive dej^end-
ence on any one country when it can — or can seem
to — limit their independence. Wliile there was a
time when the former colonial powers wished to
retain an exclusive or predominant assistance
position, today, for the most part, they are happy
to share this responsibility.

There is strong evidence that fruitful coopera-
tion and a continuing partnersliip between most
of the new African governments and the former
colonial powers will be an important factor in
Africa's future. At the present time, in fact,
European countries are well ahead of the United
States in providing economic and teclmical assist-
ance to African nations.

During the next fiscal year the United States
proposes to make substantial increases in its eco-
nomic aid to Africa, but it will still fall below the
level of that provided by Europe. We are asking
the Congress to allot between $350 and $430 mil-
lion in economic aid to Africa in fiscal year 1963,
depending on the projects that are worked out and
on its ability to use aid effectively. This com-
pares with approximately $250 million for the

'■ Bulletin of Oct. 16, 1961, p. 619.
April 30, 1962

' Ihkl., Feb. G, 1901, p. 17.5.

7ai

current fiscal year and an actual $204 million in
fiscal year 1961, exclusive of substantial amounts
of surplus agricultural conamodities and develop-
ment loans from the Export-Import Bank.

It should be emphasized also that Africans are
pouring tremendous amounts of energy and work
into the economic and social development of their
countries. They are making great .sacrifices to
meet their needs, and a steady stream of progress
can clearly be seen throughout Africa.

In some instances the African nations are turn-
ing to regional or other cooperative approaches to
meet their needs. Many of the present political
boundaries were drawn arbitrarily years ago and
do not reflect today's necessity for imdertaking
economically or socially viable projects of supra-
national scope. Africa's leaders recognize that
economic survival in some instances may require
cooperative or regional forms especially designed
for African conditions, and a broad range of such
groupings is being explored.

One example of a number of such approaches to
regional cooperation is the African and Malagasy
Union, the U.A.M., composed of 12 French-
speaking African nations. The U.A.M. has been
meeting this week at Bangui in the Central Afri-
can Republic to explore common approaches to
economic, transport, and communication problems,
among other matters. The group already has
formed a Supreme Council of Defense, an Organ-
ization for Economic Cooperation, and a Postal
and Telegraphic Union. The U.A.M. is a strong
supporter of the proposed charter for a broader
association of African coimtries which was re-
cently adopted at the Lagos conference.

Without evaluating the U.A.M. or any of the
other germinating groupings in Africa, we believe
the recognition of the need for cooperation is sal-
utary. We are in favor of associations of African
states when such associations help to develop po-
litical stability and economic viability.

The wliole question of regional groupings in
Africa is very complex, however, and contains
far-reaching political implications. While it is
quite probable that such groupings will develop
as a part of Africa's growtli, the tiltimate shape of
such groups may take a long time to discern and,
in the end, should be determined solely by the
needs of the peoples of the various countries.

This summary of U.S. interests in Africa illus-
trates the eztent to which tlie adage tliat "Times

change, and we change with them" applies to the
rapid evolution of our relations with Africa in
recent years. This swift transition has shattered
some of our older concepts about Africa. The
American people have discovered, not surpris-
ingly, that the peoples of Africa are warm human
beings with generally the same goals, the same
ambitions, and the same dreams as those of all
mankind.

We have adapted ourselves to the new ideas and
responsibilities that change in Africa has brouglit.
We have had to do this throughout the world in
the years since World War II, as we have become
conscious of the efforts of colonial peoples to
achieve self-determination.

In these postwar years the leadership of the
free world has shifted onto our shoulders because
of our material strength and because of our dem-
ocratic and Christian heritage. With this leader-
ship has come an appreciation for the indivisible
nature of world peace — for the direct links be-
tween conditions of peace in the remotest corner
of the globe and conditions of peace for us and
our children. Today no area of the world will
long be stable and peaceful unless it enjoys free-
dom, unless it enjoys equal dignity, and unless it
enjoys an opportunity to live a more abundant life.

Assistant Secretary Williams
Visits 10 African Countries

The Department of State announced on April
10 (press release 237) that the Assistant Secretary
for African Affairs, G. Mennen Williams, would
leave Washington April 13 for Conakry, Guinea,
first stop in an official visit to 10 African countries.
He will be accompanied by Mrs. Williams, Lisle C.
Carter, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare, Department of State
aides, and representatives of other Government
departments.

Charged by President Kennedy with conveyuig
personally America's good wishes and interests to
the leaders and people of Africa, Mr. Williams
during 1961 visited 23 sovereign nations and 12
dependent territories in north, central, and south-
east Africa. During the forthcoming 1-montli
trip he will attend Independence Day cei"emonies
April 27 in the Republic of Togo as guest of Pres-
ident [Sylvanus] Olympio and oflicially open new
U.S. cultural centers in the Republic of Dahomey

722

Department of State Bulletin

and the Central African Republic. He will also
visit Sierra Leone, Cameroon, Congo (Leopold-
ville), Eiianda-Urundi, Kenya, and Upper Volta.
In each of tlie 10 countries Assistant Seci'elary

Williams will discuss aspects of the United States
African policy with government and political
leaders. He will also consult with members of
U.S. embassies and consulates.

Mineral Resources and the World of the 1960's

hy George G. McGhee

Under Secretary for Political Affairs ^

Through your efforts exploration for petroleum
and other minerals has developed from its origins
as sometliing of an art to its riglitful place among
the more rigorous of the applied sciences. The
constant improvement in the standards of the cur-
ricula offered in these sciences in our universities
has been greatly facilitated by the work of these
organizations, as well as the quality of the
young men who have been entering into these
professions.

The period since the war has, moreover, seen
an enlargement of the sphere of activity of Ameri-
can exploration, and the men who conduct it, into
the far reaches of the globe. It is a matter of
commonplace for one of your group to be just
returning from or departing for service in some
far-off country which a few years ago you would
have found it difficult to locate on a map. This
has resulted in a broadened scope and increased
efl'ectiveness of your sciences, in adapting to and
learning from the particular circumstances of
petroleum and mineral occurrences in other
countries, and from your contacts with your
fellow scientists from the other advanced nations
of the world.

It is because of tliis truly global outlook which
members of your profession must of necessity have
today that I, coming to you from my position in
your Department of State, have chosen to talk

' Address made before the American Association of
Petroleum Geologists and the Society of Economic Paleon-
tologists and Mineralogists at San Francisco, Calif., on
Mar. 27 (press release 190 dated Mar. 26).

to you on the subject of "Mineral Resources and
the World of the 1960's."

The exploration profession, perhaps mora than
most others, has gone through various vicissitudes
in the last several decades. Most of you will re-
member, as do I, the painful adjustment necessi-
tated by the great depression, when many of our
number could not find employment and the pros-
pect for the future seemed very grim indeed.

There was an abundant supply of the oil and
mineral resources which we had prepared ourselves
to seek. Our economy was too weak to provide
the demand required to stimulate further dis-
coveries. The national product of our country,
the same country with a little less population, was
vastly less than it is today. Our petroleum and
mineral industry, usually with an ominous over-
hang of surpluses, has often been one of "bust"
rather than "boom."

Economic Growth

Today there are still surpluses, but the world
outlook is quite different. The world of the sixties
is intent on economic growth. Never before has
so large a part of the world population been con-
vinced that a substantial, rapid increase in the
output of useful goods and services is not only at-
tainable— but quickly attainable. It is obvious
that the importance of this trend, for you and your
profession, is very great.

The United Nations' proclamation of the sixties
as a "decade of development" reflected an emphasis
that already existed throughout the world.

AprW 30, 7962

723

Through this proclamation the United Nations
was seeking to dramatize and institutionalize the
development efforts which peoples and govern-
ments everywhere are making.

Economic growth has become more than an idea
or an individual aim. It has become almost a re-
ligion. It is being made explicit in national goals
and in plans for organized cooperation between
nations. The philosophy of resignation, subsist-
ence living, and acceptance of the status quo has
been relegated to the past. There are bound to be
some sacrifices, some steps backward as well as
forward, but the commitment to progress is un-
qualified and imiversal.

Moreover, the fact of growing population is be-
coming increasingly recognized in setting goals
for economic growth. Objectives are being set in
per capita terms: more production, consumption,
and trade ; more investment, more advanced tech-
nology, and greater efficiency in production and
distribution.

This is true of the developed, as well as the less
developed, nations. The first Ministerial Council
of the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development, which includes most of the in-
dustrial nations of the world, called for an increase
in real gross national product of 50 percent for the
20 member countries, taken together, during i\\Q
decade from 1960 to 1970.= This growth would
add to the Atlantic community the economic
equivalent of a new country of the present size and
wealth of the United States — and with a corre-
sponding demand for fuels and industrial raw ma-
terials.

The OECD countries also see the relationship of
economic expansion to strategic power, and thus
to their own prospects for achieving not only eco-
nomic progress but greater national security. This
is of particular importance from the standpoint
of the future effectiveness of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization, of which most are members.

Ferment for progress is not by any means con-
fined, however, to the North Atlantic community.
Large development plans and efforts are being
mounted in other parts of the free world. The
Alliance for Progress, here in our hemisphere, is
such an effort — one to which the United States
attaches outstanding importance. The American
Kepublics, except for Cuba, are cooperating to ac-

complish a substantial and sustained growth of per
capita income.^

They have recognized that, in order to reach the
objectives of the Alliance for Progress within a
reasonable time, the rate of economic growth in
every country of Latin America should be not less
than 2.5 percent per capita per year. Each par-
ticipating country is urged to determine its own
growth target in the light of its stage of social
and economic evolution, resource endowment, and
ability to mobilize its national efforts for develop-
ment.

Ambitious development plans are also being
launched in Asia and Africa. India, for example,
is now in the second year of a 5-year plan which
sets a target of a 5-percent annual rise in national
income. Pakistan is planning a 24-percent in-
crease in gross national product during the 5-year
period which began in 1960. This would permit
a 2.5-percent increase annually in per capita in-
come. Nigeria is officially launching a national
development plan on April 1st of this year which
calls for an annual increase of 4 to 4.5 percent in
gross national product, or about 2.5 percent per
capita.

Increased Raw Materials Requirements

These worldwide plans and prospects for in-
creased production and consumption will mean to
the members of your organizations vastly increased
requirements for fuels and industrial raw ma-
terials. Indeed production cannot move forward
without such a corresponding increase in its raw-
material underpinnings.

World demand for minerals and metals, which
more than doubled in the 1950's over what it had
been in the 1930's, is likely to double again by the
1970's. A recent study of Europe's needs indi-
cates, for example, that by 1970 consumption of
aluminum and copper may be double the 1955
rate ; zinc may increase by about 50 pei'ccnt, lead
by about 25 percent, and tin bj' about 15 percent.

World consumption in the 1960's of the princi-
pal nonferrous metals in the aggregate is expected
to be 45 to 50 percent greater than even the high
rate of consumption during the 1950's. World
consumption of aluminum, for example, should
continue its stronger than average growth with
consumption at 5,750,000 metric tons annually, by

' Bulletin of Dec. 18, lOCl, p. 1014.
724

" For background, see ibid., Sept. 11, lOCl, p. 459.

Department of Slate Bulletin

comparison with 2,860,000 in the 1950's, 1,260,000
in the 1940's, and only 390,000 nietric tons an-
nually during the 1930's.

Demand for petroleum products will also grow
as industrial development and transportation
growth take giant strides. Free-world petroleum
consumption is expected to increase by about 50
percent during the decade of the sixties, rising
from about 19 to 28 million barrels daily. This
represents an annual average rate of growth of
4.5 percent, compared with the post-World War
II average rise of 7 percent annually; however,
the absolute amomit is much greater. In Western
Europe the use of petroleum will continue to show
one of the most rapid rates of increase of any
region — about 6 to 7 percent yearly.

This results from the increasing importance pe-
troleum is assuming in Western Europe as a source
of energy. Consumption of some 4 million bar-
rels daily in 1960 represented about 35 percent of
the total energy supply. During the next 10 yeare
the region's rate of increase in petroleum use will
be more than double that for total energy. As a
result the 7 to 8 million barrels likely to be con-
sumed there each day in 1970 will supply nearly
45 percent of all energy, a proportion similar to
that in the United States today.

To make really substantial economic gains, most
of the less developed comitries must first place their
agricultural production on a sounder basis. In-
creased agricidtural activity will have an impor-
tant impact on requirements for such minerals as
phosphates, potash, and nitrate of soda.

These countries will also need increased supplies
of raw materials, including, of course, minerals,
for their expanding industries. They will need
abundant and low-cost energy for heat, transpor-
tation, and electric power. Countries with the
highest levels of economic development use 20 to
40 times as much energy per capita as the least
developed. Consequently requirements for petro-
leum products in the less developed countries will
increase at a greater rate than requirements gen-
erally.

The important thing about this development is
that, rather than remaining concentrated in a few
favored countries as in the past, it will literally be
taking place all over the world.

In the face of growing demands the current
oversupply of certain mmerals could change to
shortage. Reserves, both of petroleum and ores,

will seem less and less adequate as demand in-
creases. The petroleum and metals industries will
demand a larger backlog of raw materials to as-
sure full utilization of their increasingly large in-
vestment.

Present abundance can be traced back to fore-
sight— to the exploration and development in the
forties and fifties. Exploration and investment
have not, however, continued at the previous high
rate. Moreover, a very considerable lead time is
required for resource development to meet the
needs of the seventies — longer in the case of some
other minerals than for petroleum. This will call
for an uptrend in exploratory and developmental
activity during the sixties.

Capital investment necessary to expand mineral
and metal production to meet anticipated world
requirements will thus be large. United States
direct private investment abroad in mining and
smelting increased from a book value of about $1.1
billion in 1950 to nearly $2.4 billion at the end of
1957 and to nearly $3 billion at the end of 1959.
Future demands for capital will be at increasingly
higher rates and will be available only if the fuels
and minerals industries can show adequate re-
serves on the ground — as well as profits. Explora-
tion is required to block out these reserves.

Estimates of the prospective new investment in
petroleum vary, but all authorities agree that these
sums will be huge. As free-world consumption of
oil increases from 72 billion barrels during the
fifties to about 125 billion barrels in the sixties,
capital expenditures of the petroleum industry are
likely to increase by more than 50 percent, from
about $90 billion in the fifties to $140 billion in
the sixties. Capital expenditures which amounted
to about $10.5 billion in 1960 will probably be
$15-16 billion in 1970.

Notwithstanding the capacity which is shut in
at present, we see exploration and development
proceeding actively in all continents. Each
comitry has its own reasons for wishing to
strengthen its productive capacity and its future
prospects for oil.

In light of the continuing cold war, require-
ments of security, as well as growth, dictate that
we develop, and maintain the availability of, a
wide variety of resource materials. Availability
from domestic or nearby reserves that will be
secure in event of war assumes greater importance
which, in the case of oil, has been recognized by

April 30, 7962

725

our Government. This means that domestic ex-
ploration must continue at a high rate. Security
also demands, both for us and others, access to
alternative sources of supplies — in event one is
cut off. This necessitates duplication in availa-
bility, hence increased exploration and develop-
ment.

Needs for the most basic resources, i.e. water
and land, common industrial minerals, and energy
sources, are likely to be relatively predictable.
But we must anticipate that the most favored ma-
terials for specific purposes will be constantly
changing. It is impossible to see in any detail for
more than a few years ahead the precise types and
amounts of all the various raw materials that will
be required for military or peaceful uses. Ma-
terials that now have little commercial use may
be in great demand.

Many groups are pursuing serious and useful
research in anticipation of future shortages of
particular minerals. Even if we run out of some
materials, we can in most cases resort to ores of
lesser concentration than those now being
exploited or to substitutes. The liistory of the
copper industry, for example, has been one of
exploitation of ores of progressively decreasing
concentration without great increase in cost. Oil
can be produced from shale, or tar sands, at costs
which ultimately may not greatly exceed that for
crude oil.

Even if shortages do occur, products which
users now know could generally continue to be
supplied, perhaps at a somewhat higher cost.
Technology has, more often than not, been able
to provide economies that keep pace with material
shortages. In serious cases the products them-
selves could be redesigned or other means could
be devised to satisfy our needs.

Dr. Guy Suits of the General Electric Labora-
tories made a statement which has impressed
others and which I think we can well note again :

Growth [in science and technology] has been so rapid
that 90% of all the scientists who ever lived must be
alive today. Science and technological change had al-
most no impact on the outcome of World War I, while it
was a major factor in World War II. . . . Lord Keynes
didn't recognize technological innovation as a factor In
the economy 20 years ago, yet today it assumes major
proportions.

Technological change has been a determining
factor in the forties and the fifties. We would be

foolish to suppose that it will be a smaller force |
in the sixties and beyond. The demand for raw
materials will be powerfully shaped by this force.

The Challenge

The incredible growth in demand for raw ma-
terials during the sixties wiU pose a threefold
challenge.

First, it will pose a challenge to your profes-
sion. It will demand of you the best effort of
which you are capable.

The geographical distribution of fuels and min-
erals bears no relationsliip to national boimdaries. ,
Geologists will have to search out and produce |
needed increased materials wherever they are. To
do this they will have increasingly to go out into
the world, since the emphasis is shifting from the
United States to other countries as sources of raw
materials.

You will have to work more intimately with in-
dustrial and commercial managers, investors, and
government officials in seeking to promote in-
creased private and public interest in raw-material
development.

This is the more true since many of the less de-
veloped comitries will want to press ahead with
resource surveys even before the general need for
their expanded raw-material production is estab-
lished. The United Nations Special Fund M-as set
up especially to finance such surveys as one of its
principal activities ; so these countries will be able
to afford the surveys. This will pose new demands
on yom* profession.

Many of these countries will want to do their
own exploration for raw materials and minerals;
that is, they will want tliis exploration done on be-
half of either their nationals or their government.
Geologists must thus be willing to work with and
for private groups and governments in these coun-
tries, as well as for the international organizations
which serve them. A precedent is already at hand
in the activities of our own private corporations
in the ex|:)loration and development field, many of
which have entered into satisfactory contractual
relations with the governments of emerging coun-
tries. And indeed many of our geologists have
already followed suit.

The Soviet Union is, moreover, forcing our hand
hi many of these countries. It is sending out geol-
ogists in significant numbers to help the less de-

726

Department of State BuHetin

veloped coimtries explore and exploit their
mineral i-csources. India is a case in point, where
Russian exploration has resulted in an important
oil discovery. We cannot afford to lag behind.
We must outmatch Communist efforts in making
our exploration skills available.

This means surpassing the Soviets not only in
quantity but in quality. The Soviets have shown
great skill in exploring for oil and other minerals.
Their ability to tuni out good geologists is an im-
portant asset in their efforts to extend their power
and influence into less developed countries. Our
ability to turn out better geologists will be an even
more important asset. We must develop and en-
hance it. Our imiversities must keep pace with the
growing demand for geologists and with the new
teclmiques being introduced into the profession.
We must find and induce the best available young
men to enter the profession, whose greatest oppor-
tunities to be of service lie ahead.

The need for enhanced skills is the greater in
view of the changing dimensions of the problem
which we face. The general trend in oil explora-
tion, as you well know, is from large to small —
from shallow to deep — from simple to complex oc-
currences. The original oil fields were relatively
easy to discover ; the fields of the future will only
be found through application of the most advanced
techniques and the liighest degree of professional
skill and ingenuity. Tliis is true of other minerals
as well.

Second, our business leadership will be chal-
lenged.

It will be necessary for our companies to raise
larger sums for investment and to be able to or-
ganize their efforts on a larger scale. No nation is
self-sufficient in its mineral resources. The ar-
rsjigements by which the industrialized countries
have in the past assured themselves of adequate
and relatively cheap supplies of minerals and other
materials will be subject to new pressures as a
consequence of political and social changes which
have occurred since the Second World War.

New arrangements have already had to be de-
vised to meet some of these changed situations,
and it is probable that other changes will be re-
quired. Terms of agreements with other govern-
ments covering development of natural resources
will, in many cases, differ from traditional pat-
terns. Private operations will be scrutinized more

closely from the standpoint of harmony with pub-
lic interest and policy.

And, finally, there is a challenge to our political
leadership, wliich must meet the new political
problems posed by tliis coming era of increased
production.

Development of an increasing scale calls increas-
ingly for closer consultation and mutual considera-
tion among the governments whicli are concerned
with access to foreign markets or foreign sources.
All countries will want to assure themselves of an
equitable share in the fruits of the abundance that
we foresee.

A special problem in this connection is posed by
excessive instability in prices for the mineral and
agricultural commodities wliich bulk so large in
the foreign exchange earnings and tax revenues
of many less developed coimtries. To assure con-
tinued access to the raw materials produced in
other coimtries we must assure them greater price
stability, in ways which will be reasonably con-
sistent with the broader objectives of our economic
policy.

We must also carry forward trade policies wliich
will give less developed raw-material producing
countries needed access to the markets of the de-
veloped countries. And we must carry forward
aid policies which make available the capital these
developing countries need to expand their produc-
tion and raise their living standards. In short, we
must seek to develop a new pattern of relations
between the developed nations of the north and the
less developed countries of the south which will
be mutually beneficial and welcome to both sets of
countries and which will replace the outworn pat-
terns of colonialism.

We must also develop closer relations with the
other developed nations in order to concert their
and our policies effectively to this end. One of the
major reasons we are trying to create an even
closer economic partnership between the United
States and Europe is to assure that these developed
countries make an increasingly effective contribu-
tion, through aid and trade policies, to the growth
of less developed areas.

Enactment of the Trade Expansion Act, which
has been recommended by the President to the
Congress,* would help us to fulfill this purpose.

* For text of the President's message to Congress, see
ibid., Feb. 12, 1962, p. 231 ; for a summary of the draft
legislation, see ibid., Feb. 26, 1962, p. 343.

Apr/7 30, 1962

727

This act provides our Government authority to
bargain for decreases in tariffs not only with the
developing European Common Market but also
with the nations from which we and Europe must
obtain many of our raw materials.

It would, through removing obstacles to trade,
help us to create higher levels of trade and pros-
perity from which less developed — as well as de-
veloped— countries could not fail to draw benefit.
As the President has said,^ we seek through this act
"to enlarge the prosperity of free men everywhere,
to build in partnership a new trading community
in which all free nations may gain from the pro-
ductive energy of free competitive effort."

Conclusion

I believe that we Americans will meet the chal-
lenge of the sixties — all of us : geologists, business
leaders, and political leadere. We will be able to
do this if we can learn to work together to over-
come the problems and exploit the opportunities
posed by this era of abundance.

If we can do this we will be able to find the
necessai-y mineral resources to make the aiTange-
ments and the outlays required for their efficient
production and to insure that they are used and
distributed in a way which makes a maximum
contribution not only to our economy and security
but to the economic health of the free world.

In this exciting task your profession will play
a special role — in many ways a basic role. Our
country's greatness owes much to the past labors
of the geologist. In the future your efforts will
assist not only the continuing growth of our coun-
try but also more rapid progress toward our ulti-
mate goal : a world community of nations which
can cooperate ever more closely in achieving
needed progress while maintaining the independ-
ence and strengthening the freedom which this
progress serves.

U.S., Canada To Study Development
of Pembina River Resources

Press release 222 dated April 4

The Department of State announced on April
4 that the Governments of the United States and
Canada have requested the International Joint

Commission, United States and Canada, to investi- I
gate and report on what measures could be taken to
develop the water resources of the Pembina River
in the State of North Dakota and the Province of
Manitoba.

The International Joint Commission was estab-
lished pursuant to the terms of the Boundary Wa-
ters Treaty of 1909 in order to facilitate the set-
tlement of questions of mutual interest to the
United States and Canada in the general field of
boundary waters and related matters.

Tliis new reference has been made by the Gov-
ernments in the light of the conclusion of the Com-
mission that detailed feasibility studies concerning j
possible development of the Pembina River basin '
should be imdertaken. The Commission has been
requested by the Governments to determine what
plan or plans of cooperative development of the
water resources of the Pembina River basin would
be practicable, economically feasible, and to the
mutual advantage of both countries. The Com-
mission is asked to bear in mind the requirements
of domestic water supply and sanitation, control of
floods, irrigation, and any other beneficial uses of
these waters. The Governments have further
asked the Commission, in the event that it finds a
plan or plans meeting these criteria, to make rec-
ommendations concerning the choice and imple-
mentation of such plan or plans.

United States and Canada Withdraw
Study on Niagara Falls

Press release 233 dated April 9

The Department of State announced on AprU 9
that the Governments of the United States and
Canada have amended the Niagara Reference
which was made to the International Joint Com-
mission on May 5, 1961.'

At the request of the Power Authority of the
State of New York and the Hydro-Electric Power
Commission of Ontario in a joint brief submitted
on March 15, 1961, the Governments of the United
States and Canada in the joint reference of May 5,
1961, included a request for the International
Joint Commission to report whether, without

" Ibid., Jan. 29, 19G2, p. 159.
728

' For background and text of the reference, see Buixk-
TiN of July 3, 1961, 11. 43.

Department of Slate Bulletin

detriment to the scenic beauty of Niagara Falls,
the flows over the falls could be less than those
now specified in the Niagara Treaty of 1950.

The Govermnent of the United States was re-
cently informed that the Power Authority of the
State of New York was withdrawing its request
for a study of this matter. The Canadian Govern-
ment received a similar request from the Provin-
cial Secretary of the Province of Ontario on be-
half of the Ilydro-Electric Power Commission of
Ontario.

The Governments of the United States and
Canada have, in view of these parallel requests,
agreed to amend the Niagara Reference of 1961
by deleting the request of Governments for a study
of this matter.

President Salutes Role of IJC
in U.S.-Canadian Relations

Statement hy President Kennedy ^

Fifty years ago today the International Joint
Commission, a body provided for by the Interna-
tional Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, held its
first semiannual meeting. This institution, which
was created with the objective of resolving ami-
cably disputes and problems confronting the two
nations with regard to the lakes and rivers com-
mon to both of them, has had a distinguished rec-
ord. It has set a standard for later organizations
created by Canada and the United States for the
resolution of problems and for the development
of conunon policies. The International Joint
Commission has worked on a very large number
of problems and projects dealing with water re-
sources. The Commission's studies and recom-
mendations have served as a basis for important
agreements which have brought great profit to
both the United States and Canada.

These quiet but important efforts deserve recog-
nition, as do the present Chairman of the United
States Section of the International Joint Commis-
sion, the Honorable Teno Roncalio, and his Com-

missioners, and the distinguished Chairman of the
Canadian Section, General Andrew G. L. Mc-
Naughton, and his colleagues. It is certainly the
hope of everyone that the International Joint
Commission will, in the next half century, con-
tinue its record of outstanding achievement.

President Kennedy Greets Philippines
on Bataan Day

Following is the text of a message from Presi-
dent Kennedy to Diosdado Macapagal, President
of the Republic of the Philippines.

White House press release dated April 9

April 9, 1962
Dear Mr. President : On this day, we and mil-
lions of our fellow citizens will recall the sacrifices
of the heroes who were so sorely tested just twenty
years ago on Bataan and Corregidor. Although
physically defeated, their devotion to our common
democratic principles added new meaning to those
ideals and made possible the ultimate triumph of
freedom and democracy in a vast area of the world.
Our peoples are again united in spirit and in
arms in a similar struggle against a new and much
more subtle form of imperialism which would
enslave us. Let no one overlook the lesson of
Bataan that the strength of our common heritage
of courage and devotion will prevail to bring free
choice and justice to mankind.

I look forward with pleasure to the opportunity
the people of the United States soon will have to
express personally to you ^ and to the people of
the Philippines their gratification and pride in
the enduring partnership which carried us through
the dark days of two decades ago to our present
mutual pursuit of peaceful economic and social
progress.

Sincerely yours,

John F. Elennedt

' Made on Apr. 2 in observance of the 50th anniversary
of the inaugural meeting of the U.S.-Canada Interna-
tional Joint Commission (White House press release).

' The White House announced on Mar. 30 that Presi-
dent Macapagal will visit the United States June 19-28 ;
for test of the announcement, see Bulletin of Apr. 23,
1962, p. 665.

April 30, 1962

7129

Refugees Here and Around the World

hy Michel Gieflinski

Acting Administrator^ Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs ^

It is a distinct honor and pleasure for me to par-
ticipate in this conference devoted to considera-
tion of the i^roblems of immigration and refugees.
Because of the scope of the topic assigned to me,
I shall be able to give you little more than the
highlights of each of the problems.

Let me take a few minutes to describe some of
the responsibilities of the Department of State
and consular officers abroad in the administration
of our immigration laws. As you Iniow, all immi-
grants who want to come to the United States must
be in possession of visas. These visas are issued
by American consular officers stationed in foreign
countries after they determine that an applicant
qualifies for a visa under existing law and that
a quota number is available to him if he is sul)ject
to quota restrictions.

The Department has been making great efforts
to select carefully those officers who deal with visa
applicants and to train them so that these officers
not only understand the law but also the problems
each alien may have who applies for a visa. Sonie
500,000 visas are issued each year. As yon also
know, once an immigrant arrives at a port of entry
he is doublechecked by officers of the Immigration
and Naturalization Service — an arm of tlie De-
partment of Justice. An infinitesimal niiinber of
aliens holding visas are excluded at ports of entry
(less than 100 of some 1,500,000 aliens asking for
admission, many of them repeatei-s). Tiiis is the
best illustration that our officers do a comj-ietent
job in screening visa applicants.

During the past few years our efforts have been
concentrated on eliminating redtape in the issuing

' Address mnde before the Indiana Iinmifrrntion Con-
forcnff .'It Indianapolis, Ind., on Apr. 3 (press release
212 dated Apr. 2).

of visas. Without sacrifice to the enforcement of
our laws, we have streamlined and simplified ap-
plication forms and visa procedures.

The groups represented here, of course, are in-
terested in modernizing our immigration laws.
It must be recognized that changes in the immigra-
tion laws traditionally have not taken place over-
night but by a gradual development. Many of the
changes which have taken place since the enact-
ment of the Immigration and Nationality Act in
1952 were suggested originally by the Department I
of State. The elimination of fingerprinting of
visitors and the elimination of the question for-
merly put to every applicant for an immigrant or
visitor visa as to his race and ethnic classification
are two of the more important changes in this
category.

Of course the Department's interest in changes
in our immigration laws is prompted by its con-
cern with our foreign relations. As you know,
existing law accords nonquota status to most, but
not all, countries in the Western Hemispliere.
Foreign policy considerations prompted the De-
partment to emphasize the importance of placing
all independent countries within the Western
Hemisphere on equal footing by according them
nonquota status.

Those of you who are interested in some of the
Department's views on immigration legislation
may want to read the letter the Department ad-
dressed to Senator [Kennetli B.] Keating on Sep-
tember 12, 1961, which was printed in the Congres-
sional Record on the same date. The points raised
in this letter by no means cover the entire range
of the Department's concern with various pro-
visions of the immigration laws, but it is the De-
partment's policy to make its views Icnown only to

730

Department of Slate Bulletin

ICongress, in rej^ly to requests for comments on
landing legislation or in formal presentations,
when occasion arises.

A bill - of great interest to the Department, in-
troduced by Congressman [Francis E.] Walter
and passed by the House, is now before the Senate.
This bill among other things would provide for
an important reorganization of the Bureau of Se-
curity and Consular Affairs which, if accom-
plished, in my opinion would go far in improving
its efficiency. It would authorize continuation of
the Department's refugee and migration programs
as well as the Department of Plealth, Education,
and Welfare Cuban refugee activities. In addi-
tion it would extend indefinitely the provision of
P.L. 86-648 to permit continued admission of a
limited number of refugees under the parole
process.

Other migration and refugee legislative pro-
posals have been introduced into both the Senate
and the House. You are doubtless familiar with
many of them, particularly the measures intro-
duced by Senators [Philip A.] Hart, [Claiborne]
Pell, and [Thomas J.] Dodd.

Aid to European Refugees

In view of the limits of time it would be im-
possible for me to give you a detailed inventory
of all the refugee problems existing in the world
today. For the same reason I could not outline
all of the public and private efforts being expended
in behalf of these refugees. At best I can identify
for you here today only the most pressing of these
problems and make a brief comment as to the
various programs being conducted in their behalf.

On a global basis there are those who have used
a figure of 12.5 million refugees. This figure lacks
validity in that it fails to include some recent
gi-oups, particularly the newly developing refugees
in Africa, while it includes large groups of earlier
refugees whom I believe are now firmly integrated
into the areas to which they have been resettled.
Actually the world refugee problem today, in
terms of refugees who have not yet been reestab-
lished on a satisfactory basis, is in the neighbor-
hood of 3.5 million persons.

The refugee groups best known to most of you
are the anti-Communist refugees and escapees in
Europe. Of this group the Hungarians made the

= H.R. 11079.

most dramatic impression on the free world. I am
happy to tell you that by dint of the conscientious
and generous help of the U.S. Government and
other governments of the free world, aided by the
dedicated voluntary agencies and private citizens
of this and other countries, the problem of the
older refugees in Europe is well on its way to solu-
tion. Through the efforts of the U.N. High Com-
missioner for Refugees, assisted by the almost
global response to the World Eefugee Year em-
phasis, there remain only 9,000 refugees in official
refugee camps in Europe. The UNHCR has plans
and funds to resettle or provide permanent solu-
tions for all of these persons who have lived so
long in drab and sordid camps.

There still remain in Europe approximately
50,000 out-of-camp refugees, most of whom require
varying degrees of assistance in becoming reestab-
lished. The generous world response to these
refugees coupled with the greatly improved eco-
nomic situation in most of the European countries
has resulted in a virtual miracle by solving most
of the vast refugee problems in Europe, including
the 200.000 Hungarians who escaped to freedom.

The Federal Republic of Germany has achieved
unbelievable success in absorbing well over 13%
million expellees, displaced persons, refugees, and
escapees. In the West German economy refugees
have become an asset rather than a liability. I
hasten to add, however, that the refugee problem
in Germany as well as elsewhere in Europe is not
static. East Zone refugees still find ways of es-
caping to West Germany in spite of the diabolic
wall erected in Berlin and the increased control
measures resorted to by the puppet East German
regime calling itself a sovereign government.
Escapees from the Soviet Union, Poland, Czecho-
slovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Al-
bania still manage to penetrate the tight border
controls established by the Communists to make
sure that their oppressed peoples remain in their
self-proclaimed "workers' paradise." Large num-
bers of Yugoslavs continue to arrive in Italy,
Austria, Greece, and other European countries.

The flow of escapees and refugees will continue
so long as the Communists pursue their attempts
to deny individual freedom and to subject all men
to a common mold of belief or endeavor. I must
call your attention at this point to the fact that not
only are the Communists responsible for the con-
ditions which create refugees, but they continue to

April 30, 1962

731

engage in a costly and widespread program of
propaganda and intrigue among the emigree
groups in an effort to discredit the humanitarian
motives of the free West.

The United States will continue to assist these
new arrivals tlirough its United States Escapee
Program (USEP). It is of interest to note that
the escapee program has just celebrated its 10th
anniversary. During the 10 years of its existence
USEP has assisted a total of 926,000 escapees
from Communist and Communist-dominated
countries. They have been given food, clothing,
medical and dental care, language and vocational
training, counseling, and many other benefits. Of
this almost 1 million persons, one-third, or 330,000,
have been helped to become mtegrated into the
countries granting them initial asylum and an-
other 157,000 have been successfully resettled in
some 48 countries. Through its generous support
of the Intergovernmental Committee for Euro-
pean Migration (ICEM) and the UNHCE, the
United States will continue its help to these recent
escapees and to the residual group of older refu-
gees still in need of our help.

Refugees From Communist China and Cuba

Another group of anti-Communist refugees to
which the United States has made significant con-
tributions botli public and private are the more
than a million refugees from Eed China presently
in Hong Kong. In spite of the magnificent job
which the Hong Kong Colonial Government is
doing for these refugees, who make up one-third
of the Colony's population, there still is need for
additional aid from international sources. The
needs to be met encompass housing, medical and
clinical services, education, and in many instances
food and clothing. In addition to a liberal World
Refugee Year contribution for construction of a
refugee center, schools, and clinics, the United
States provides annually approximately $1 million
in cash and surplus foods estimated at $5 million
for these refugees.

External resettlement of these refugees is not
the solution except for a relatively few who will
find migration opportunities. The answer lies in
their being assimilated into the economy of Hong
Kong. This process will continue to be required
for those already there and more importantly for
the estimated 50,000 arriving each year.

Another 50,000 Chinese refugees present a seri-
ous problem to the authorities in Macau. Assist-
ance to this group is limited and consists primarily
of U.S. help.

A relatively small but highly significant prob-
lem is that of the White Russian refugees arriving
in Hong Kong from Red China. Over 20,000 of
these refugees, who are fleeing communism for the
second time, have already been resettled by ICEM
and the UNHCR, and some 0,000 still in Cliina are
expected to come out over the next several years.
The United States has contributed substantially
to this resettlement program and will continue to
do so until the problem is finally resolved.

The 60,000 Tibetans who have escaped the Com-
munist Chinese takeover of their country and are
now in India and Nepal represent one of the most
pitifiil groups of refugees anywhere in the world.
Limited private aid has gone into both India and
Nepal. The United States has made available
both surplus food and cash to meet as many of the
needs as possible. United States fimds are being
used to augment private funds in helping to re-
locate Tibetan young people and children in
Europe, particularly in Switzerland, where a Swiss
organization is doing a splendid job in attempting
to extend vocational training and imderstanding •
of Western culture to develop these young Tibet- '
ans into future leaders.

Most of you are aware at least to some degree
of the more than 100,000 Cuban refugees who have
fled to this country to escape the oppression and
totalitarian measures forced upon them and their
peace-loving relatives by Castro and his Com-
munist henchmen. The United States has now
become a country of first asylum and finds itself
confronted with the same problems and expenses
of helping a large number of refugees which have
been faced by other countries abroad.

Voluntary agencies and citizens' groups are
helping tlie Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare to cope with this stupendous prob-
lem. The primary difficulty lies in reducing the
burden on the State of Florida, Dade County, and
the City of Miami, where the bulk of these proud
and able people are congested. Their numbers, if !
distributed over the country, would present prac-
ticall}^ no problem from a housing, employment,
or welfare standpoint, but localized as they are in
Florida and in New York City these refugees are
creating serious social, economic, and political

732

Deparfment of Sfa/e Bullefin

problems the solution to which requires immediate
and careful resettlement throughout the country.
Each conununity must become as generous as it
was in accepting Hungarians by providing for its
share of these close friends and violently anti-
Conmiunist neighbors.

Victims of Political Stalemates

The victims of political stalemate, more than a
million Palestine refugees continue to present a
pathetic picture in the several Middle East coun-
tries. The solution to their problem presents some
of the most politically sensitive issues facing the
United Nations. Until these issues can be resolved
the problem will remain acute and the present re-
lief program of the United Nations Eelief and
Works Agency (UNRWA) must continue. The
United States supports this Agency to approxi-
mately 70 percent of its annual $35 million budget.

The Director of UNRWA has recently launched
an appeal for funds to increase and intensify the
vocational training facilities for the young people
of this pathetic gi'oup. Since the limited pro-
grams of this type have had excellent results, it
is hoped that the approximately 3,000 young men
now being helped to secure jobs and independence
can be increased materially.

Within recent weeks the future of the more than
300,000 Algerian refugees in Tunisia and Morocco
seems more hopeful. These refugees, consisting
mainly of women, children, and elderly men, were
forced from the war areas in Algeria. They have
been cared for by the combined efforts of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
and the League of Red Cross Societies. The United
States has been a primary supporter of these ac-
tivities both in cash and in large supplies of sur-
plus foods.

A cease-fire in Algeria will not in itself end the
problems of these refugees, for as they return to
their war-damaged farms and desert villages, they
will be forced to share with more than 2 million
other Algerians presently displaced within Algeria
the problems of rehabilitation and of reconstruc-
tion of their personal economies. I can assure you
that your Government and other governments
sympathetic to the plight of these people will do
the utmost to help these victims of political up-
heaval achieve as rapidly as possible a return to
normal livine.

It is not necessary for me to go into any details
with reference to the millions of Hindu refugees
in India and Moslem refugees in Pakistan who
were created by the partition of India in 1947 and
subsequent events. The overwhelming bulk of
these refugees have now been successfully inte-
grated in their countries of present residence, and
the authorities in these countries are actively pur-
suing similar solution for the relatively small
residual numbers. I can also mention that the
more than 850,000 North Vietnamese moved from
the presently Communist-controlled areas in North
Viet-Nam have been so successfully integrated
into South Viet-Nam that they no longer con-
stitute a problem. Similar success can be reported
for the North Korean refugees in South Korea.

Scattered elsewhere throughout the world but
particularly in Southeast Asia are pockets of refu-
gees, mostly Chinese who are in varying degrees
of need but also including 50,000 anti-Communist
Laotian refugees in Laos who have been displaced
from their tribal homes by Communist guerrilla
activity and for whom the United States is pro-
viding emergency assistance.

In Africa the historic march toward independ-
ence of states which for generations have been
colonial possessions has more often than not been
accompanied by strife and political upheaval,
creating new refugee problems of serious pro-
portions. More than 150,000 refugees fled from
Angola to the Republic of the Congo, while within
the Congo over 300,000 Baluba refugees have re-
quired relief assistance in the provinces of Ka-
tanga and Kasai. Elsewhere tens of thousands of
other refugee tribesmen present similar prob-
lems—in Togo, Ruanda-Urundi, Uganda, and
Tanganyika. In all of these the U.S. Government,
operating as much as possible through the United
Nations, the League of Red Cross Societies, and
the UNHCR, has poured in surplus food items and
assisted with cash contributions where required.

Need for Continuing Refugee Aid

You may ask, why nmst the United States feel
it necessary to support refugee programs to the
extent it does? Or you may want an answer to
the question of how long will new refugee prob-
lems continue to emerge. Is there any hope that
the day will come when there will be no refugee

April 30, 1962

733

problems to challenge the conscience and command
the attention of civilized mankind ?

The answer to the latter is simpler. As long as
modifications in political entities are made and
geographic boundaries are changed, each bringing
with it inevitable changes in leadership and fol-
lowers, there will be those who are forced or choose
to flee to escape political persecution or economic
oppression. As long as tliere are totalitarian re-
gimes whether Communist or any other form of
despotism there will be refugees and escapees in
need of a helping hand. I have mentioned the
great achievements made in reducing the stagger-
ing numbers of displaced persons, refugees, and
escapees. I have called your attention to the fact
that the refugee problem is not static. Therefore,
my answer must be that until mankind finds the
formula to live in complete peace and harmony
one with another, and when the dignity of man is
given due and proper recognition, then and then
only will the problems of refugees vanish.

The interest of the United States Government
and the interest of the American people in refu-
gees is as natural as the American way of life. I
believe President Kennedy gave the best answer
to this question in his letter last July to the Con-
gress in explanation of his requested refugee and
migration legislation : '

The United States, consistent with the traditional
humanitarian regard of the American people for the in-
dividual and for his right to a life of dignity and self-
fulfillment, should continue to express in a practical way
its concern and friendship for individuals in free-world
countries abroad who are uprooted and unsettled as the
result of political conditions or military action.

The successful re-establlshment of refugees, who for
political, racial, religious or other reasons are unable or
unwilling to return to their country of origin or of
nationality under conditions of freedom, dignity, and self-
respect, is importantly related to free-world political
objectives. These objectives are : (a) continuation of the
provision of asylum and friendly assistance to the op-
pressed and persecuted; (b) the extension of hope and
encouragement to the victims of communism and other
forms of despotism, and the promotion of faith among
the captive populations in the purposes and processes of
freedom and democracy; (c) the exemplification by free
citizens of free countries, through actions and sacrifices,
of the fundamental humanitarianisra which constitutes
the basic dllTeretice between free and captive societies.

Some refugee problems are of such order of magnitude
that they comprise an undue liurden upon the economies
of the countries harboring the refugees in the first iu-

" For text, see Bulletin of Aug. 7, 1!)t;i . p. 2.".".
734

stance, requiring international assistance to relieve such
countries of these burdens.

It is for these reasons that the United States
since the end of World War II has admitted more
than 800,000 refugees, escapees, and displaced per-
sons. During that same period the United States
has expended over $1.5 billion in direct appropria-
tions for refugee programs in addition to other
assistance provided indirectly through our foreign
aid programs in behalf of countries affording
asylum to refugees.

These then are the highlights of the problems
of refugees here and around the world.

Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy

87th Congress, 1st Session

Cuban Refugee Problems. Hearings before the Sub-
committee To Investigate Problems Connected With
Refugees and Escapees of the Senate .Judiciary Com-
mittee. December 6-13, 19C1. 304 pp.

Center for Cultural and Technical Interchange Between
East and West (East- West Center). Hearings before
the Subcommittee on State Department Organization
and Foreign Operations of the House Foreign Affairs
Committee. December 13-January 8, 1!X)2. 364 pp.

Report of the Fifth Meeting of the Canada-United States
Interparliamentary Group, June S-9, 1961. Reiwrt sub-
mitted by Cornelius E. Gallagher, chairman of the
House delegation. H. Rept. 1207. February 5, 1962.
7 pp.

87th Congress, 2d Session

Impact of Imports and Exports on Employment (Agri-
cultural Products, Chemicals, Oil, Machinery. Motion
Pictures, Transportation, and Other Industries). Hear-
ings before the Subcommittee on the Impact of Imports
and Exports on American Employment. Part 8.
November 27, 1961-January 5, 1962. 1055 pp.

Latin American and Ilnitefl States Policies. Report of
Senator Mike Mansfield on a study mission to Latin
America. January 13. 1962. 85 pp. [Committee print]

Mexican Farm Labor Program. Hearing before the Sub-
committee on Equipment, Supplies, and Manpower of
the House Agriculture Committee. January 19, 1962.
46 pp.

Report on Audit of the Export-ImiKirt Bank of Washing-
ton for Fiscal Year 1!K>1. II. Doc. 308. January 23,
19(i2. 42 pp.

Economic Policies and Programs in South .\merica. Re-
port submitted by the Sulicoinmittee on Inter-American
Economic Relationships to the Joint Economic Commit-
tee. January 24, 1962. 123 i)p.

.Tanuary 1962 I5conoinic Report of the President. Hear-
ings before the Joint Economic Committee. January
2.>-February 8, 1962. 845 pp.

Review of the .Vdministration of the Trading With the
Enemy Act. Reiiort to accompany S. Res. 268. S. Rept
1161. January ;n. 1962. 3 jip.

Consular Affairs and StM'urit.v Administration in the
Department of St.'ite. Hearings before Subcommittee
No. 1 of the House Judiciary Committee on H.R. 9904, a
bill to amend swtion 104 of the Immigraticm and Na-
tionality Act, and for other purposes. January 31-
February 2, 1962. 48 i)p.

Deparfment of Sfate Bulletin

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Security Council Calls Upon Israel and Syria
To Observe Armistice Agreement

Following are a statement made in the U.N. Se-
curity Council on April 6 iy Charles W. Yost,
Deputy U.S. Representative in the Security Coun-
cil, and the text of a resolution adopted by the
Council on April 9.

STATEMENT BY MR. YOST

U.S. /U.N. press release 3971

I wish to speak briefly now to explain the draft
resolution ^ wliicli has been introduced by the dele-
gations of the United Kingdom and the United
States and which was referred to yesterday [April
5] by Ambassador Dean."

I believe the preamble is self-explanatorj', and I
therefore propose to discuss only the operative
paragraplis.

The first operative paragraph deplores the hos-
tile exchanges between Syria and Israel which
started on March 8 and calls upon them to comply
with their obligations under article 2, paragrapli
4, of the charter by refraining from the tlireat as
well as the use of force.

This paragraph deplores the exchanges without
assessing blame because the United Nations Truce
Supervision Organization was unable to determine
who initiated the firing on any of the occasions
prior to the attack of 16 March. Tliis is in large
part due to the fact that the parties, and partic-
ularly Israel, have placed obstacles in the way of
effective circulation and observation by the United
Xations organization. It does, however, appear
from the report ^ that, wliatever initial firing there
may have been with small weapons and whoever
started it, the level of the engagement was raised

'U.N. doc. S/5110 and Corr. 1.

^ Arthur H. De.in. U.S. Representative to the 18-nation
disarmament conference at Geneva.
°U.N. doe. S/.'JKG.

by Syria starting on March 8 to that of artillery
fire, apparently of 80 mm. guns. It aLso appears
from the report, that artillery and mortars were
used by both parties on subsequent occasions.
Whatever the origin of tlie events, therefore, it is
obvious that artillery weapons were placed in the
Defensive Area in violation of tlie Armistice
Agreement and that they were used against Israeli-
controlled territory on March 8 and subsequently.
The prospect of escalation of minor incidents when
artilleiy is employed is only too obvious. This
sort, of military action cannot be condoned when
United Nations machinery is available.

At the same time we note that Israel also ap-
parently employed 20 mm. weapons in these en-
gagements, at least in those after March 8. Both
the presence and the use of such a weapon in the
Defensive Area is also in violation of the Armistice
Agi-eement.

Israel and Syria Reminded of Cliarter Obligations

In addition to deploring these hostile engage-
ments and the use of such weapons, the paragraph
also reminds the governments concerned of tlieir
obligations under article 2, paragraph 4, of the
charter. Both parties have on this occasion used
force contrary to that article. In addition there
were provocative statements by each party which,
at the very least, were not calculated to assure the
other of its peaceful intentions. We appeal to both
Governments to make every effort to restore peace
and security in the area and to utilize the utmost
caution in their pronoimcements and statements.

Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the resolution concern
the Israeli assault of the night of March 16-17 —
an assault the nature and origin of whicli are not
contested. According to tlie announcement of the
Israeli Defense Force itself, Israel on that night
assaulted Syrian positions north of Nuqeib. Tliis

April 30, 1962

735

was clearly a reverse to a policy of armed and
large-scale retaliation repeatedly condemned by
the Comicil in 1955 and 1956. Inasmuch as there
is an impartial and long-established alternative to
such action, through the machinery of the United
Nations, there can be no justification for a policy
of retaliation. The Security Council has con-
sistently condemned such attacks even when prior
but less serious violations by the other party have
been confinned by the Chief of Staff.

In the light of this situation, paragraph 3 de-
termines that the Israeli attack on March 16-17
constituted a flagrant violation of the Security
Coimcil resolution of 19 Januaiy 1956,* which con-
demned Israeli retaliatory action of this sort. This
attack was of the same order as previous attacks
and has been so dealt with in the resolution we
have submitted.

The fact that the attack of March 16 was a
large-scale operation is apparent not only from
the annoimcement made of it by the Israeli mili-
tary sources themselves but also from the number
of men involved and the number of lives and
armored vehicles lost. There is no indication that
the ground attack carried into Syria proper, but
Israeli planes apparently bombed Syrian territory
and the Israeli Defense Force announcement gave
no indication that the operation was intended to
be restricted to the Demilitarized Zone. This ac-
tion was a most serious breach of the Armistice
Agreement and a flagrant violation of paragraph
2 of the resolution of January 19, 1956, in which
the Council condemned retaliatory raids.

Israel should be called on scrupulously to re-
frain from such actions in the future. The Coun-
cil's position on that point must be absolutely
clear if the peace of the area is to be preserved.

This expresses the attitude we believe the Coun-
cil should take both toward the events between
March 8 and 16 and the events of that night. It
is important that (he parties understand the firm
view of the Security Council that it is incumbent
upon them both to abide scrupulously by the pro-
visions of tlie Armistice Agreement and that the
United Nations denounces and is prepared to take
measures appropriate to the situation both against
small-scale harassment and against the serious
dangers involved in retaliation.

Need To Strengthen UNTSO Machinery

We could perhaps be accused — if there were no
alternative — of adopting an attitude of unreality
in opposing retaliatory military action in the light
of the inherent right of self-defense enjoyed by
sovereign nations. However, there is an alterna-
tive and an alternative which nowhere in the
world is more readily available than on the borders
between Israel and its Arab neighbors. This al-
ternative is the peacekeeping machinery of the
United Nations. This machinery has not been
employed sufficiently and thoroughly enough in
the present and in past instances. Not only has
the United Nations machinery in the area been
hampered in obtaining the facilities and freedom
of operation which would have made both detec-
tion and deterrence of the events between March 8
and 16 more effective, but the retaliatory action
of March 16 was taken entirely without prior re-
course either to the Mixed Armistice machinery
or the Security Council — the political bodies
charged with responsibility for the peace. The
capabilities of this machinery and equally the
political intention to use it need to be improved
to prevent such situations in the future.

The rest of the resolution therefore deals with
what should be done in order to strengthen this
machinery. In particular we would urge Israel,
which feels it was provoked in the present situa-
tion, to extend its full cooperation to the United
Nations Truce Supervision Organization and to
the United Nations military observers so tliat they
may in the future readily detect and report to the
world on the origin of incidents and, even more
hopefully, by their presence deter them from
starting in the first instance. We would urge
Israel in the most stringent terms to resort to the
Mixed Armistice Commission and to the Security
Council in accordance with its obligations under
the charter instead of resorting to the use of force.

In connection with the improvement of United
Nations capabilities in the area, I would like to
commend General von Horn " and his able col-
leagues on their excellent performance of duties
on belialf of the United Nations under unusually
difficult circumstances. The Chief of Stall's pres-
ence during our deliberations has been of consid-
erable assistance to the Council in its consideration

* For text, see Bulletin of Jan. 30, 1950, p. 183.
736

• Gen. Carl Cnrlssou von Horn, Chief of Staff, U.N. Truce
Supervision Organization.

Departmenf of State Bulletin

of the complex factors involved. General voii
Horn and his entire staff deserve the gratitude
and the unstinting support of the members of the
United Nations, most of all that of Israel and its
Arab neighbors.

As was revealed in General von Horn's report,
and more precisely spelled out in his responses to
the questions put to him by members of the Coim-
cil, the observation facilities available to the
United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
in the Tiberias region are insufficient to insure the
proper exercise of the Truce Supervision Organi-
zation's tranquilizing role. The new observation
post at El Koursi will help considerably in this
regard. It is the sincere hope of my Government
that the Israeli and Syrian authorities will coop-
erate wholeheartedly with the Chief of Staff in
the working out of the further arrangements he
has recommended. Certainly it is necessai-y that
the Truce Supervision Organization observers be
permitted to move fi'eely and rapidly anywhere in
the Defensive Area, and we endorse the mobile
observation arrangements which he has proposed
believing that they can be particularly valuable.

The United Nations Truce Supervision Organ-
ization's machinery was sorely tested by events of
mid-March. The Chief of Staff has informed us
of gaps in his organization revealed by these
sudden demands. Tlie United States urges that
deficiencies noted by General von Horn be made
up at once and that the parties move quickly to
comply with his requests for greater cooperation.

In the light of such factors the resolution en-
dorses the measure recommended by the Chief of
Staff both in his first report and his supplementary
report to the Security Council. It calls on the
Israeli and Syrian authorities to assist him in
their implementation. Any additional measures
which the parties may recommend and which the
Chief of Staff thinks would be useful would of
course also be welcome.

The resolution also calls for strict observance
of the provisions of the Armistice Agreement con-
cerning the Demilitarized Zone and the Defensive
Area. For many years there have been violations
of these provisions, some major and some minor.
An explicit adherence to the agreement by both
sides would remove the danger of conflicts in the
area, and we urge both Syria and Israel to coop-
erate in eliminating any violations.

Finally, we have included a paragraph with a

general call upon both parties to cooperate fully
with the Chief of Staff in his responsibilities and
which urges that all necessary steps Ixi taken for
reactivating the Mixed Armistice Commission and
for making full use of the Mixed Armistice ma-
chinery. Particularly we believe that Israel
should return to the Mixed Armistice Commission,
in which it has not participated since 1951, and
that it should make full use of its procedures when-
ever it feels provocations have occurred.

If the parties cooperate fully with the United
Nations instrumentalities in the area and with the
Security Council, we are confident that peaceful
conditions can be maintained, that the number of
minor incidents can be severely reduced, and that
any incidents which start can be detected and
brought to an end promptly without resort to
force. This is the sure path to peaceful conditions,
and we urge both parties to follow it scrupulously
and consistently.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION <

Tlic Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions of 15 July 1948 and 18 May
1051,

Having considered the report of the Chief of Staff of
the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization on the
military activities in the Lake Tiberias area and in the
Demilitarized Zone,

Having heard the statements of the representatives of
the Syrian Arab Republic and Israel,

Being deeply concerned over developments in the area
which have taken place in violation of the Charter and
of the Armistice Agreement,

Recalling in particular the pi-ovisions of Article 2, para-
grai)h 4 of the Charter, and Article 1 of the Syrian-Israeli
General Armistice Agreement,

Noting with gatisfaction that a cease-fire has been
achieved,

1. Deplores the hostile exchanges between the Syrian
Arab Republic and Israel starting on 8 March 1962 and
calls upon the two Governments concerned to comply
with their obligations under Article 2, paragraph 4 of the
Charter by refraining from the threat as well as the use
of force ;

2. Rcafflrms the Security Council resolution of 19
.Tanuary 1956 which condemned Israeli military action in
breach of the General Armistice Agreement, whether or
not undertaken by way of retaliation ;

3. Determines that the Israeli attack of 16-17 March

' U.N. doc. S/5111 ( S/5110 and Corr. 1 ) ; adopted by
the Security Council on Apr. 9 by a vote of 10-0, with 1
abstention (France).

April 30, 1962

737

1962 constitutes a flagrant violation of that resolution
and calls upon Israel scrupulously to refrain from such
action in the future;

4. Endorses the measures recommended by the Chief of
Staff for the strengthening of the Truce Supervision
Organization in its tasks of maintaining and restoring
the peace and of detecting and deterring future incidents,
and calls upon the Israeli and Syrian authorities to assist
the Chief of Staff in their early implementation;

5. Calls upon both parties to abide scrupulously by the
cease-fire arranged by the Chief of Staff on 17 March
1962;

6. Calls for strict observance of article 5 of the General
Armistice Agreement which provides for the exclusion of
armed forces from the Demilitarized Zone and Aimex 4
of that Agreement which sets limits on forces in the
Defensive Area, and calls upon the Governments of Israel
and the Syrian Arab Republic to co-operate with the
Chief of Staff in eliminating any violations thereof;

7. Calls upon the Governments of Israel and of the
Syrian Arab Republic to co-operate with the Chief of
Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization in carrying
out his resjionsibilities under the General Armistice
Agreement and the pertinent resolutions of the Security
Council and urges that all steps necessary for reactivat-
ing the Mixed Armistice Commission and for making full
use of the Mixed Armistice machinery be promptly taken ;

8. Requests the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision
Organization to report as appropriate concerning the
situation.

Current U. N. Documents:
A Selected Bibliography

Mimeographed or processed documents (stich as those
listed helmc) may be consulted at depository libraries
in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be
purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations,
United Nations Plaza, N.Y.

Security Council

Letter dated January 11, 1962, from the Pakistani repre-
sentative to the President of the Security Council con-
cerning Kashmir. S/.'JOSS. January 12, 1902. 2 pp.

Letter dated January 16, 1962, from the Indian repre-
sentative addressed to the President of the Security
Council concerning Kashmir. S/5060. January 16,
1962. 2 pp.

Letter dated January 18, 1962, from the Notherland repre-
sentative addressed to the Acting Secretary-General
concerning New Guinea. S/5062. January 18, 1962.
3 pp.

Communications concerning the situation in the Congo.
S/.5064, January 25, 1962, 2 pp. ; H/r>(H]r>, January 27,
1962, 4 pp.; S/.'jOO.VAdd. 1, January 29, 1',l(;2, 1 p.;
S/.5066, January 29, 1962, 1 p.; S/5072, January 31,
1962, 1 p.; S/.'-)078, February 10, 1962, 0 pp.

Letter dated January 29, 19G2, from the Pakistani repre-
sentative addressed to the President of the Security
Council concerning Kashmir. S/5068. January 29,
1962. 5 pp.

Letter dated January 31, 19i;2, from the Secretary-General
of the Organization of American States adilressed to
the Acting Secretary-General transmitting the Final

Act of the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers
of Foreign Affairs, which deals with Communist inter-
vention in the Western Hemisphere. S/5075. Febru-
ary 3, 1962. 24 pp.

Letter dated March 2, 1962, from the Cuban representative
addressed to the Security Council concerning action
taken at the OAS Eighth Meeting of Consultation.
S/5083. March 2, 1962. 4 pp.

Communications concerning the Lake Tiberias incident
between Israel and Syria. S/5084, March 2, 1962, 2 pp. ;
S/5098, March 21, 1962, 2 pp. ; S/5100, March 22, 1962,
2 pp. ; S/5102, March 26, 1962, 13 pp. ; S/5102/Add. 1,
March 27, 1962, 1 p.

General Assembly

Capital development needs of the less developed coun-
tries. A/AC.102/5. February 8, 1962. 74 pp.

Letter dated February 27, 1902, from the Soviet represen-
tative addressed to the Acting Secretary-General trans-
mitting text of Premier Khrushchev's message of
February 21, 1962, to President Kennedy. A/5096.
February 27, 1962. 11 pp.

Note verbale dated February 27, 1962, from the U.K.
representative addressed to the Secretary-General con-
cerning the future of the Trust Territory of the
Cameroons under U.K. administration. A/5097.
March 2, 1962. 6 pp.

Letter dated March 6, 1962, from the Acting Secretary-
General addressed to the Chairman of the Committee
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, transmitting a
communication dated March 5, 1962, from the U.S.
representative concerning data on U.S. satellite launch-
ings. A/AC.105/INF. 1. March 7, 1962. 5 pp.

Letter datefl March 8, 1962, from the U.S. representative
addressed to the Acting Secretary-General transmitting
various documents concerning the IS-nation disarma-
ment conference at Geneva. A/5099. March 9, 1962.
8 pp.

Letter dated March 9, 1962, from the Soviet deputy rep-
resentative addressed to the Acting Secretary-General
transmitting text of Premier Khrushchev's message of
March 3, 1962, to President Kennedy concerning the 18-
nation disarmament conference. A/5101. March 9,
1962. 8 pp.

Letter dated March 10, 1962, from the Soviet deputy
representative addressed to the Acting Secretary-
General concerning a nuclear weapons test ban treaty.
A/5102. March 12, 1962. 3 pp.

Letter dated March 10, 1962, from the Soviet deputy
representative addressed to the Acting Secretary-
General concerning Resolution 1664 (XVI). A/5103.
March 12, 1962. 5 pp.

Letter dated March 9, 1962, from the U.K. deputy repre-
sentative addressed to tie Secretary-General trans-
mitting texts of messages of Prime Minister Macmillan
concerning the 18-nation disarmament conference.
A/51()4. March 12, 1962. 7 pp.

Note verbale dated March 13, 1962. from the Czechoslovak
representative addres.sed to the .Vcting Secretary-
General concerning Resolution 1604 (XVI). A/5106.
March 22. 1962. 4 pp.

Letter dated March ICi, 1902, from the Rumanian repre-
.sontative addressed to the Secretary-General concern-
ing Resolution 1664 (XVI). A/5107. March 22, 1962.
4 pp.

Economic and Social Council

Commission on the Status of Women. Inheritance lawa

as thoy affect the status of women. E/CN.6/391.

January 4, liM">2. 59 pp.
Commission on the Status of Women. Age of retirement

and right to i)ension. E/CN.6/394. January 4, 1962.

132 pp.

738

Department of State Bulletin

TREATY INFORMATION

in availing themselves of the facilities and services
of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The agreement will become effective after statu-
tory and constitutional requirements have been
fulfilled by both Governments.

Atomic Energy Agreement
Signed With Colombia

Press release 231 dated April 9

Representatives of the Governments of Colom-
bia and the United States on April 9 signed an
agreement for cooperation in the peaceful uses of
atomic energj'. The agreement was signed by Am-
bassador Carlos Sanz de Santamaria of Colombia.
Assistant Secretary of State Edwin M. Martin
signed for the United States. The signing cere-
mony was held at the Department of State.

Under the proposed agreement the Governments
of Colombia and the United States will cooperate
in a nuclear project to be carried out at Bogota,
Colombia. This will include the exchange of in-
formation on the design, construction, and opera-
tion of nuclear research reactors and their use as
research, training, development, and engineering
devices, and in medical therapy. American in-
dustry would be authorized by the agreement to
supply appropriate nuclear equipment and related
services to the Colombian Government or to au-
thorized individuals or organizations under its
jurisdiction.

The proposed agreement also provides that the
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission may sell or lease
to the Colombian Government uranium enriched
up to 20 percent in the isotope U-235 for use in
research reactors, materials testing reactors, and
reactor experiments, each capable of operating
with a fuel load up to 10 kilograms of the isotope
U-235 contained in such uranium ; or uranium en-
riched up to 90 percent in the isotope U-235 to
operate with a fuel load up to 8 kilograms.
Colombia also will assume responsibility for assur-
ing that material obtained from the United States
will be used only for peaceful purposes. The
agreement further provides for the exchange of
information in health and safety matters related
to research reactors and in the use of radioisotopes
in physical and biological research, medical ther-
apy, agriculture, and industry.

Both countries also affirm their common interest

Estate-Tax Convention With Canada
Enters Into Force

Press release 234 dated April 9

According to information received from the
American Embassy at Ottawa, the convention be-
tween the United States of America and Canada
for the avoidance of double taxation and the pre-
vention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on
the estates of deceased persons, signed at Wash-
ington on February 17, 1961,^ was brought into
force by the exchange of instruments of ratifica-
tion at Ottawa on April 9, 1962.

This estate-tax convention is fundamentally
similar to, and has the same basic objectives as,
estate-tax conventions which have entered into
force between the United States and 12 countries,
including the convention of June 8, 1944, with
Canada ^ as modified by a convention of June 12,
1950.^ Such conventions are designed to eliminate
double taxation in connection with the settlement
in one country of estates in which nationals of the
other country have interests.

The new convention with Canada takes the
place of the 1944 convention as modified. The
1944 convention provided that, for Canada, the
taxes referred to therein were the taxes imposed
under the Dominion Succession Duty Act. That
convention, as modified, was rendered inoperative
by the repeal of the Dominion Succession Duty
Act and the enactment of the Canadian Estate
Tax Act effective January 1, 1959. It is provided
in the new convention that, upon its entry into
force, the 1944 and 1950 conventions shall be
deemed to have terminated as to estates of dece-
dents dying on or after January 1, 1959, and that
the new convention shall be deemed to have come
into effect as to estates of decedents dying on or
after that date.

So far as the United States is concerned, the

' Bulletin of Mar. 6, inci, p. 351.

■ .-)9 Stat. 915.

' Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2348.

April 30, J 962

739

convention applies only with respect to United
States (that is, Federal) estate taxes. It does not
apply to the imposition of taxes by the several
States, the District of Columbia, or territories or
possessions of the United States.

By its terms the convention will be in effect for
a period of 5 years from January 1, 1959, and will
continue in effect thereafter until 6 months after
the date of a notice of termination given by either
of the two Governments.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Patents

Agreement for the mutual safegruarding of secrecy of in-
vention relating to defense and for which applications
for patents have been made. Done at Paris September
21. lOGO. Entered into force January 12, 1961. TIAS
4672.
Approval deposited: Turkey, February 20, 1962.

Safety at Sea

International convention for the safety of life at sea,

1960. Done at London June 17, I960.'

Signatures: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil,
Bulgaria (with a declaration), Cameroon, Canada,
China, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Finland,
France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Hun-
gary (with a declaration), Iceland, India, Ireland,
Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Kuwait, Liberia, Nether-
lands, New Zealand, Norway. Pakistan, Panama,
Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Sweden, Smtzerland,
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (with a reserva-
tion), United Arab Republic, United Kingdom, United
States, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, June 17, I960.'

Acceptances deposited: France, October 16, 1961; Haiti,
March 17, 1961 ; Norway, August 23, 1961 ; Viet-Nam,
January 8, 1962.

Ratification advised ty the Senate: April 12, 1962.

Agriculture

Constitution of the Food and Agriculture Organization of
the United Nations, as amended. Signed at Quebec
October 16, 1945. Entered into force October 16, 1945.
TIAS 1554 and 4803.
Acceptance deposited: Tanganyika, February 8, 1962.

Fisheries

Amendment to paragraph 1 (b) of the annex to the inter-
national convention for the high seas fisheries of the
North Pacific Ocean of May 9, 1952, as amended (TIAS
278(! and 4493). Adopted at Tokyo Novemt>er 11, 1961,
at the eighth meeting of the International North Pacific
Fisheries Commission. Entered into force April 2. 1962.
Approvals deposited: Canada, March 14, 1962: Japan,
March 26, 1962; United States, April 2, 1962.

Health

Amendments to articles 24 and 25 of the World Health
Organization Constitution of July 22, 1946 (TIAS 1808).
Adopted by the 12th World Health Assembly, Geneva,
May 28, 1959. Entered into force October 25, 1960.
TIAS 4643.
Acceptance deposited: Ttirkey, January 10, 1962.

Narcotic Drugs

Convention relating to the suppression of the abuse of
opium and other drugs. Signe<l at The Hague January
23, 1912. Entered Into force February 11, 1915. 38 Stat.
1912.

Notification received that it considers itself bound:
Sierra Leone, March 13, l',X!2.

Convention for limiting the manufacture and regulating
the distributiim of narcotic drugs, as amended (61 Stat.
2230; 62 Stat. 1790). Done at Geneva July 13, 1931.
Entere<l into force July 9, 1933. 48 Stat. 1543.
Notification received that it considers itself bound:
Sierra Leone, March 1.3, 1962.

Protocol bringing under international control drugs out-
side the scope of the convention limiting the manufac-
ture and regulating the distribution of narcotic drugs
concluded at Geneva July 13, 1931 (48 Stat. 1543), as
amended (61 Stat. 22.30; 62 Stat. 1796). Done at Paris
November 19, 1948. Entere<l into force December 1,
1949; for the United States, September 11, 1950. TIAS
2.308.

Notification received tliat it considers itself bound:
Sierra Leone, March 13, 1962.

BILATERAL

Brazil

Agreement on cooperation for the promotion of economic
and social development in the Brazilian Northeast, and
exchange of notes. Signed at Washington April 13
1962. Entered into force April 13, 1962.

Canada

Convention for avoidance of double taxation and pre
vention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on estates
of deceased persons. Signed at Washington Februarj
17, 1961.

Ratifications exchanged: April 9, 1962.
Entered into force: April 9, 1962. Applicable to estate
of persons dying on or after January 1, 1959.
Convention for avoidance of double taxation and preven
tion of fiscal evasion in the case of estate taxes anc
succession duties. Signed at Ottawa June 8, 1944
Entered into force February 6, 194.5. 59 Stat. 915.
Terminated: January 1, 1959, by entry into force of con-
vention signed February 17, 1961, supra, insofar as
application to estates of decedents dying on or after
January 1, 1959, is concerned ; continues in effect
with respect to estates of decedents dying prior to
that date.
Convention modifying and supplementing convention for
avoid.uice of double taxation and prevention of fiscal
evasion in the case of estate taxes and succession duties
of June 8, 1944 (59 Stat. 915). Signed at Ottawa June
12. 19.50. Entered into force November 21, 1951. TIAS
2.348.

Terminated: January 1. 19.59, by entry into force of
convention signed February 17, 1961, supra, insofar
as application to estates of decedents dying on or
after January 1, 1959, is concerned; continues in
effect with re.si)ect to estates of decedents dying prior
to that date.
Agreement further extending the agreement of January
10 and 17, 1957 (TIAS 3732), relating to the use of the

' Not in force.

" All signed subject to acceptance, approval, or ratifi-
cation.

740

Department of Staie Bulletin

Haines cutoff road for winter maintenance of a section
of the Ilaines-Fairbanlis pipeline. Effeited by exchange
of notes at Ottawa December 22. 1961, and January 26,
19C2. Entered into force January 20, 1902.

Colombia

Agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic
energy. Signed at Wasliington April 9. 1902. Enters
into force on the date on which each Oovernment re-
ceives from the other written notitication that it has
complied with all statutory anil constitutional require-
ments for entry into force.

Israel

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agree-
ment of November 6. 19.")8. as supplemented and
amended (TIAS 4126, 418S. 4818, and 4906). Effected
by exchange of notes at Washington April 6 and 11,
1902. Entered into force April 11, 1902.

Paraguay

Reciprocal trade agreement. Signed at Asuncii'in Sep-
tember 12, Itne. Entered into force .\pril 9, 15M7.
TIAS 1601.

Notice of intention to irrminate (livcn hi/ I'nraguay:

April 2, 1902. (In accordance with provisions of

article XVII, para. 2, agreement will be terminated

October 2, 1962.)

Agreement temporarily bringing up to date .scliedule I

of the reciprocal trade agreement of September 12,

1946, supra. Effected by exchange of notes at Asunei6n

April 2, 1962. Entered into force April 2, 1962.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

State and Commerce Agree To Expand
Foreign Service Commercial Program

Press release 210 dated April 2

An agreement designed to fulfill President Ken-
nedy's export expansion program by improving
the Government's international trade services to
the American business community has been con-
cluded by the Department of Commerce and the
Department of State.

The interdepartmental agreement, signed by
Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Secretary
of Commerce Luther II. Hodges, jirovides a
stepped-up commercial program within the For-
eign Service. It identifies the overseas commer-
cial attaclie as a career specialist within the For-
eign Service; it provides for recruiting of addi-
tional specialists from the Commerce Department
and the business world and gives the Commerce
Department greater participation in the recruit-
ment, training, assignment, and promotion of
commercial officers.

The commercial officers in the Foreign Service,
as members of the statTs of U.S. embassies and
consulates abroad, represent a princii)al means for
overseas trade promotional support to the U.S.
business community. The services they perform
for businessmen and the trade opportunities and
foreign market information they develop can play
a major role in the successful increase of Amer-
ican business activity abroad and in the expansion
of our exports.

The objectives of the agreement are set forth in
these terms:

The President has directed the Executive Agencies to
place maximum emphasis on enlarging the foreign com-
merce of the United States in seeking to maintain an
over-all balance in our international payments. . . .
To provide effective leadership, the Department of
Commerce is assuming primary responsibility and direc-
tion for foreign trade promotion activities at home and
abroad. . . . The Departments of State and Commerce
agree that the President's directive can best be carried out
abroad by a single overseas service. To fulfill their re-
spective respc)nsibilities, the two Departments undertake
to establLsli new arrangements for the purpose of provid-
ing optimum commercial service.s within the framework of
a unified Foreign Service.

The agreement provides an opportunity for For-
eign Service officers to elect commercial work as a
career specialty and permits advancement within
this specialty to the highest levels in the Foreign
Service. Personnel will be augmented by an en-
larged number of appointments from the Depart-
ment of Commerce and the business community,
who, together with the Foreign Service career
commercial specialists, will provide the expertise
needed to assist American business in meeting the
increasing competition for world markets.

To attract economic and commercial talent the
two Departments will e.stablish joint recruitment
teams to visit educational institutions giving grad-
uate and tmdergraduate degrees in business ad-
ministration or foreign trade, and the Department
of State will make special provision in its written
Foreign Service examinations for candidates with
background and interest in commercial activities.

A Department of Commercial Ailairs will be
established in the Foreign Service Institute of the
Department of State, chaired by a mutually ac-
ceptable nominee of the Department of Commerce.
The chairman will develop a commercial training
program and supervise its imjjlementation and
operation.

The Department of Commerce will normally

April 30, 1962

741

initiate instructions for commercial specialists to
carry out their operational and reporting duties
and responsibilities. Current instructions will be
modified to provide for increased emphasis on the
promotion of trade, investment, and travel. Com-
mercial specialists will be encouraged to travel
more widely in their respective districts in order
to develop market information which will be
speedily communicated to businessmen in the
United States.

The two Departments consider that the agree-
ment accommodates the responsibilities of both
Departments and provides the means for the
closest possible cooperation in this imjwrtant area
of overseas activity.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

Fw sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Gov-
ernment Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. Address
requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, ex-
cept in the case of free publications, which may be
obtained from the Department of State.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4790. 4 pp.

Agreement with the United Arab Republic, amending the
agreement of August 1, 1960, as amended. Exchange of
notes — Signed at Cairo June 24, 1961. Entered into force
June 24, 1961.

Economic Assistance. TIAS 4791. 3 pp. 5^.
Agreement with Ecuador. Exchange of notes — Signed at
Quito June 7 and 17, 1961. ~
1961.

Entered into force June 17,

Technical Cooperation. TIAS 4792. 4 pp. 5<i.
Agreement with Cyprus — Signed at Nicosia, June 29, 1961.
Entered into force June 29, 1961.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4793. 3 pp.

Agreement with Greece, amending the agreement of No-
vember 7, 1960. Exchange of notes — Signed at Athens
June 22, 1961. Entered into force June 22, 1961.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4794. 4 pp.

Agreement witli Palvistan. amending certain agreements,
as amended. Exchange of notes — Signed at Karachi June
29, 19G1. Entered into force June 29, 1961.

Military Mission to Costa Rica. TIAS 4795. 3 pp. 5<f.

Agreement with Costa Rica, amending the agreement of
December 10, 194.5, as amended and extended. Exchange

742

of notes — Dated at San Jos6 February 25 and May 13,
1959. Entered into force May 13, 1959.

War Damage Claims. TIAS 4796. 4 pp. 5<t.
Agreement with Italy, supplementing the understanding
of March 29, 1957. Exchange of notes — Signed at Rome
July 12, 1960. Entered into force June 15, 1961.

Second Agreement Regarding Certain Matters Arising
From the Validation of German Dollar Bonds. TIAS
4798. 12 pp. 10(!.

Agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany —
Signed at Bonn August 16, 1960. Entered into force June
30, 1961.

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: April 9-15

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of
News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Releases appearing in this issue of the Bulletin
which were Issued prior to April 9 are Nos. 190 of
March 26; 203 of March 29; 210, 212 and 216 of
April 2 ; 222 of April 4 : 225 of April 5 ; and 228 of
April 6.

No. Date Subject

230 4/9 Air talks with Austria suspended.

231 4/9 Atomic energy agreement with Colombia.
*232 4/9 U.S. participation in international con-
ferences.

233 4/9 Withdrawal of study on Niagara Falls.

234 4/9 Estate-tax convention with Canada.

235 4/10 Austrian persecutee claims.

t236 4/12 Trezise : "Trade Policy for the 1960's."
237 4/10 Assistant Secretary Williams' trip to
Africa (rewrite).

♦238 4/10 Cleveland; "The Winning of the Non-
war."

*239 4/11 Cultural exchange (Brazil).

•240 4/11 Biography of Under Secretary Ball.

*241 4/11 Williams : "American Foreign Policy and
the Emerging Nations of .\frica."

♦242 4/11 Manning sworn in as Assistant Secretary
for Public Affairs (biographic details).

•243 4/11 Sisco: "The U.N. and U.S. National In-
terests."

t244 4/12 Bowles ; American Jewish Congress.
245 4/12 Soviet statement on nuclear test morato-
rium.

•246 4/12 Amendments to program for visit of Shah
of Iran.

•247 4/12 Greentield appointed Deputy Assistant
Secretary for News (biographic de-
tails).

•248 4/12 Gardner : "The U.S. and the U.N. : A Re-
appraisiil of the National Interest."

t249 4/13 Cleveland : "View From the Diplomatic
Tightrope."
2.50 4/13 Rusk : Pan American Day.

•251 4/13 Brodie: "Commodity Problems and Stabi-
lization Programs in Latin America."

•252 4/13 Harriman : .\merican Academy of Polit-
ical and Social Science (excerpts).

t253 4/13 Williams: "Aids and Obstacles to Polit-
ical Stability in Slid-Africa."

•2.54 4/14 Harriman ; interview on "Operation in
the Capital."

•Not printed.

tlleld for a later issue of the Bulletin.

Department of State Bulletin

J

April 30, 1962

Ind

e X

Vol. XLVI, No. 1192

Africa

Assistant Secretary Williams Visits 10 African

Countries 722

Change and Challenge in Africa (Williams) . . . 719
American Republics. Pan American Day, 1962

(Rusk) 703

Atomic Energy

Atomic Energy Agreement Signed With Colombia . 739

U.S. and U.K. State Position on Nuclear Testing

(joint statement) 707

U.S. Comments on Soviet Statement Calling for Nu-
clear Test Moratorium 708

Austria

Claims on Austrian Persecutee Fimd Must Be Filed

by August 31, 1962 718

U.S. and Austria Susi)end Air Talks, To Resume in

Near Future 718

Aviation. U.S. and Austria Suspend Air Talks, To

Resume in Near Future 718

Brazil. United States and Brazil Reaffirm Existing

Close Relations (Goulart, Kennedy) 705

Canada

Estate-Tax Convention With Canada Enters Into

Force 739

President Salutes Role of IJC in U.S.-Canadian

Relations 729

United States and Canada Withdraw Study on

Niagara Falls 728

U.S., Canada To Study Development of Pembina

River Resources 728

Claims. Claims on Austrian Persecutee Fimd Must

Be Filed by August 31, 1962 718

Colombia. Atomic Energy Agreement Signed With

Colombia 739

Congress, The. Congressional Documents Relating
to Foreign Policy 734

Department and Foreign Service. State and Com-
merce Agree To Expand Foreign Service Com-
mercial Program 741

Economic Affairs

Estate- Tax Convention With Canada Enters Into

Force 739

Mineral Resources and the World of the 1960's

(McGhee) 723

The New Europe — Its ChaUenge and Its Opportuni-
ties for the United States (MacArthur) .... 709

State and Commerce Agree To Expand Foreign
Service Commercial Program 741

Europe. The New Europe — Its Challenge and Its
Opportunities for the United States (Mac-
Arthur) 709

Germany. I'resident Commends General Clay on

Mission to Berlin 708

Iran. Letters of Credence (Qods-Nakhai) .... 707
Israel. Security Council Calls Upon Israel and
Syria To Observe Armistice Agreement ( Yost and
text of resolution) 735

Philippines. President Kennedy Greets Philippines
on Bataan Day 729

Presidential Documents

President Commends General Clay on Mission to

Berlin 708

President Kennedy Greets Philippines on Bataan
Day 729

President Salutes Role of IJC in U.S.-Canadian

Relations 709

United States and Brazil Reaffirm Existing Close
Relations 705

Publications. Recent Releases 742

Refugees. Refugees Here and Around the World

(CiepUnski) 730

Syria. Security Council Calls Upon Israel and
Syria To Observe Armistice Agreement (Tost
and text of resolution) 735

Treaty Information

Atomic Energy Agreement Signed With Colombia . 739

Current Actions 749

Estate-Tax Convention With Canada Enters Into

Force 739

U.S. and Austria Suspend Air Talks, To Resume in
Near Future jig

U.S.S.R. U.S. Comments on Soviet Statement Call-
ing for Nuclear Test Moratorium 708

United Kingdom. U.S. and U.K. State Position on
Nuclear Testing (joint statement) 707

United Nations

Current U.N. Documents 733

Security Council Calls Upon Israel and Syria To
Observe Armistice Agreement (Yost and text of
resolution) 735

'Same Index

CiepUnski, Michel 730

Goulart, Joao 705

Kennedy, President 705,708,729

MacArthur, Douglas II 709

McGhee, George C 723

Qods-Nakhai, Hosein 707

Rusk, Secretary 703

Williams, G. Mennen 719

Yost, Charles W 735

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Vol. XLVI, No. 1193

May 7, 1962

IE

FICIAL

lEKLY RECORD

UNITED STATES PRESENTS OUTLINE OF A TREATY
ON GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMA-
MENT • Statement by President Kennedy and Text of
Outline 747

ATTORNEY GENERAL EXPLAINS U.S. GOALS
TO PEOPLE OF JAPAN, INDONESIA, AND

GERMANY • Excerpts From Addresses 761

A LOOK AT THE MIDDLE EAST TODAY •

by Chester Bowles 765

TRADE POLICY FOR THE 1960's • by Acting Assistant

Secretary Trezise 774

THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY AND
UNITED STATES TRADE POLICY • by

Joseph D. Coppock • 770

IITED STATES
REIGN POLICY

For index see inside back cover

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Vol. XLVI, No. 1193 • Publication 7371
May 7, 1962

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United States Presents Outline of a Treaty
on General and Complete Disarmament

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT KENNEDY '

The United States has today [April 18] tabled
at Geneva an outline of every bt^sic provision of a
treaty on general and complete disarmament in a
peaceful world. It jirovides a blueprint of our
position on general and complete disarmament as
well as elaboration of the nature, sequence, and
timing of specific disarmament measures.

This outline of a treaty represents the most
comprehensive and specific series of proposals the
United States or any other country has ever made
on disarmament. In addition to stating the ob-
jectives and principles which should govern agree-
ments for disannament, the document calls for the
grouping of individual measures in three balanced
and safeguarded stages. We are hopeful through
the give-and-take of the conference table this plan
will have a const nictive influence upon the negoti-
ations now in progress.

I want to stress that with this plan the United
States is making a major effort to achieve a break-
through on disarmament negotiations. We be-
lieve that the nations represented at Geneva have a
heavy responsibility to lay the foundations for a
genuinely secure and peaceful world starting
through a reduction in arms.

TEXT OF OUTLINE 2

Outline of Basic PBO\^SIONS of a Tkeatt on General
AND Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World

In order to assist in the preparation of a treaty on
general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world,

' Read by the President at his press conference on
Apr. IS.

^ Submitted to the 18-nation Committee on Disarmament
at Geneva by tie U.S. delegation on Apr. 18.

the United States submits the following outline of basic
provisions of such a treaty.

A. Objectives

1. To ensure that (a) disarmament is general and com-
plete and war is no longer an instrument for settling inter-
national problems, and (b) general and complete
disarmament is accompanied by the establishment of re-
liable procedures for the settlement of disputes and by
effective arrangements for the maintenance of i)eace in
accordance with the principles of the Charter of the
United Nations.

2. Taking into account paragraphs 3 and 4 below, to
provide, with respect to the military establishment of
every nation, for:

(a) Disbanding of armed forces, dismantling of military
establishments, including bases, cessation of the produc-
tion of armaments as well as their liquidation or con-
version to peaceful uses ;

(b) Elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear, chemical,
biological, and other weapons of mass destruction and
cessation of the production of such weapons ;

(c) Elimination of all means of delivery of weapons of
mass destruction ;

(d) Abolition of the organizations and institutions de-
signed to organize the military efforts of states, cessation
of military training, and closing of aU military training
institutions ;

(e) Discontinuance of military expenditures.

3. To ensure that, at the completion of the program for
general and complete disarmament, states would have at
their disiwsal only those non-nuclear armaments, forces,
facilities and establishments as are agreed to be necessary
to maintain internal order and protect the personal se-
curity of citizens.

4. To ensure that during and after implementation of
general and complete disarmament, states also would sup-
port and provide agreed manpower for a United Nations
Peace Force to be equipped with agreed types of arma-
ments necessary to en.sure that the United Nations can
effectively deter or suppress any threat or use of arms.

5. To establish and provide for the effective operation
of an International Disarmament Organization within the

May 7, J 962

747

framework of the United Nations for the purpose of en-
suring that all obligations under the disarmament program
would be honored and observed during and after imple-
mentation of general and complete disarmament ; and to
this end to ensure that the International Disarmament
Organization and its inspectors would have imrestricted
access without veto to all places as necessary for the
purpose of effective verification.

B. Principles

The guiding principles during the achievement of these
objectives are:

1. Disarmament would be implemented until it is com-
pleted by stages to be carried out within specified time
limits.

2. Disarmament would be balanced so that at no stage
of the implementation of the treaty could any state or
group of states gain military advantage, and so that se-
curity would be ensured equally for all.

3. Compliance with all disarmament obligations would
be effectively verified during and after their entry into
force. Verification arrangements would be instituted
progressively as necessary to ensure throughout the dis-
armament process that agreed levels of armaments and
armed forces were not exceeded.

4. As national armaments are reduced, the United Na-
tions would be progressively strengthened in order to
improve its capacity to ensure international security and
the peaceful settlement of differences as well as to facili-
tate the development of international cooperation in com-
mon tasks for the benefit of mankind.

5. Transition from one stage of disarmament to the
next would take place uix)n decision that all measures in
the preceding stage had been implemented and verified
and that any additional arrangements required for meas-
ures in the next stage were ready to operate.

Introduction

The Treaty would contain three stages designed to
achieve a permanent state of general and complete dis-
armament in a peaceful world. The Treaty would enter
into force upon the signature and ratification of the
United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics and such other states as might be agreed.
Stage II would begin when all militarily significant states
had become Parties to the Treaty and other transition
requirements had been satisfied. Stage III would begin
when all states possessing armed forces and armaments
had become Parties to the Treaty and other transition
requirements had been .satisfied. Disarmament, verifica-
tion, and measures for keeping the peace would proceed
progressively and proportionately beginning with the entry
into force of the Treaty.

Stage I

Stage I would begin upon the entry into force of the
Treaty and would be completed within three years from
that date.

During Stage I the Parties to the Treaty would under-
take:

1. To reduce their armaments and armed forces and to

carry out other agreed measures in the manner outlined
below ;

2. To establish the International Disarmament Organi-
zation upon the entry into force of the Treaty in order
to ensure the verification in the agreed manner of the
obligations undertaken ; and

3. To strengthen arrangements for keeping the peace
through the measures outlined below.

A. Armaments

1. Reduction of Armaments

a. Specified Parties to the Treaty, as a first stage
toward general and complete disarmament in a peaceful
world, would reduce by thirty percent the armaments in
each category listed in subparagraph b below. Except
as adjustments for production would be permitted in
Stage I in accordance with paragraph 3 below, each type
of armament in the categories listed in subparagraph b
would be reduced by thirty percent of the inventory ex-
isting at an agreed date.

b. All types of armaments within agreed categories
would be subject to reduction in Stage I (the following
list of categories, and of types within categories, is
illustrative) :

(1) Armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of
40,000 kilograms or gi'eater ; missiles having a range of
.5,000 kilometers or greater, together with their related
fixed launching pads ; and submarine-la imehed missiles
and air-to-surfaee missiles having a range of 300 kilome-
ters or greater.

(Within this category, the United States, for example,
would declare as types of armaments: the B-52 aircraft;
Atlas missiles together with their related fixed launching
pads ; Titan missiles together with their related fixed
launching pads ; Polaris missiles ; Hound Dog missiles ;
and each new type of armament, such as Minuteman
missiles, which came within the category description,
together with, where applicable, their related fixed
launching pads. The declared inventory of t.vpes within
the category by other Parties to the Treaty would be
similarly detailed).

(2) Armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of
between 15,000 kilograms and 40,000 kilograms and those
missiles not included in category (1) having a range be-
tween 300 kilometers and 5,000 kilometers, together with
any relatetl fixed launching pads. (The Parties would
declare their armaments by types within the category).

(3) Armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of
between 2,500 and 15,000 kilograms. (The Parties would
declare their armaments by types within the category).

(4) Surface-to-surface (including submarine-launched
missiles) and air-to-surface aerodynamic and ballistic
missiles and free rockets having a range of between 10
kilometers and 300 kilometers, together with any related
fixed launching pads. (The Parties would declare their
armaments by types within the category) .

(5) Anti-missile missile systems, together with related
fixed launching jiads. (The Parties would declare their
armaments by types within the category).

(6) Surface-to-air missiles other than anti-mis.sile
missile systems, together with any related fixed launching

748

Department of Stale Bulletin

pads. (The Parties would declare their armaments by
types within the category).

(7) Tanks. (The Parties would declare their arma-
ments by types within the category).

(8) Armored cars and armored personnel carriers.
(The Parties would declare their armaments by t.yi)es
within the category).

(9) All artillery, and mortars and rocket launchers
having a caliber of 1(X) mm. or greater. (The Parties
would declare their armaments by types within the cate-
gory).

(10) Combatant ships with standard displacement of
400 tons or greater of the following classes : Aircraft
carriers, battleships, cruisers, destroyer types and sub-
marines. (The Parties would declare their armaments
by types within the category).

2. Method of Reduction

a. Those Parties to the Treaty which were subject to
the reduction of armaments would submit to the Interna-
tional Disarmament Organization an appropriate declarar
tion respecting inventories of their armaments existing at
the agreed date.

b. The reduction would be accomplished in three steps,
each consisting of one year. One-third of the reduction
to be made during Stage I would be carried out during
each step.

c. During the first part of each step, one-third of the
armaments to be eliminated during Stage I would be
placed in depots under supervision of the International
Disarmament Organization. During the second part of
each step, the deposited armaments would be destroyed
or, where appropriate, converted to peaceful uses. The
number and location of such deiwts and arrangements
respecting their establishment and operation would be set
forth in an annex to the Treaty.

d. In accordance with arrangements which would be
set forth in a Treaty annex on verification, the Interna-
tional Disarmament Organization would verify the fore-
going reduction and would provide assurance that retained
armaments did not exceed agreed levels.

3. Limitation on Production of Armaments and on Re-
lated Activities

a. Production of all armaments listed in subparagraph
b of paragraph 1 above would be limited to agreed allow-
ances during Stage I and, by the beginning of Stage II,
would be halted except for production within agreed
limits of parts for maintenance of the agreed retained
armaments.

b. The allowances would permit limited production in
each of the categories of armaments listed in subpara-
graph b of paragraph 1 above. In all Instances during
the process of eliminating production of armaments:

(1) any armament produced within a category would
be compensated for by an additional armament destroyed
within that category to the end that the ten percent
reduction in numbers in each category in each step, and
the resulting thirty percent reduction in Stage I, would
be achieved ; and furthermore

(2) in the case of armed combat aircraft having an
empty weight of 15,0(X) kilograms or greater and of mi.s-
siles having a range of 300 kilometers or greater, the

destructive capability of any such armaments pro<lueed
within a category would be compensated for by the
destruction of sufficient armaments within that category
to the end that the ten percent reduction in destructive
capability as well as numbers in each of these categories
in each step, and the resulting thirty percent reduction
in Stage I, would be achieved.

c. Should a Party to the Treaty elect to reduce its
production in any category at a more rapid rate than re-
quired by the allowances provided in subparagraph b
above, that Party would be entitled to retain existing
armaments to the extent of the unused portion of its
production allowance. In any such instance, any arma-
ment so retained would be compensated for in the manner
set forth in subparagraph b(l) and, where applicable,
b(2) above to the end that the ten percent reduction in
numbers and, where applicable, destructive capability in
each category in each step, and the resulting thirty
percent reduction in Stage I, would be achieved.

d. The flight testing of missiles would be limited to
agreed annual quotas.

e. In accordance with arrangements which would be
set forth in the annex on verification, the International
Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing
measures at declared locations and would provide assur-
ance that activities subject to the foregoing measures
were not conducted at undeclared locations.

4. Additional Measures

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to examine
unresolved questions relating to means of accomplishing
in Stages II and III the reduction and eventual elimina-
tion of production and stockpiles of chemical and bio-
logical weapons of mass destruction. In light of this
examination, the Parties to the Treaty would agree to
arrangements concerning chemical and biological weapons
of mass destruction.

B. Armed Forces

1. Reduction of Armed Forces

Force levels for the United States of America and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would be reduced
to 2.1 million each and for other specified Parties to tie
Treaty to agreed levels not exceeding 2.1 million each.
All other Parties to the Treaty would, with agreed excep-
tions, reduce their force levels to 100,000 or one percent
of their population, whichever were higher, provided that
in no case would the force levels of such other Parties
to the Treaty exceed levels in existence upon the entry
into force of the Treaty.

2. Armed Forces Subject to Reduction

Agreed force levels would Include all full-time, uni-
formed personnel maintained by national governments in
the following categories :

a. Career personnel of active armed forces and other
personnel serving in the active armed forces on fixed
engagements or contracts.

b. Conscripts performing their required period of full-
time active duty as fixed by national law.

c. Personnel of militarily organized security forces

May 7, J 962

749

and of other forces or organizations equipped and or-
ganized to perform a military mission.

3. Method of Reduction of Armed Forces

The reduction of force levels would be carried out in
the following manner :

a. Those Parties to the Treaty which were subject to
the foregoing reductions would suljmit to the Internar
tional Disarmament Organization a declaration stating
their force levels at the agreed date.

b. Force level reductions would be accomplished in
three steps, each having a duration of one year. During
each step force levels would be reduced by one-third of
the difference between force levels existing at the agreed
date and the levels to be reached at tiie end of Stage I.

c. In accordance with arrangements that would be set
forth in the annex on verification, the International Dis-
armament Organization would verify the reduction of
force levels and provide assurance that retained forces
did not exceed agreed levels.

4. Additional Measures

The Parties to the Treaty which were subject to the
foregoing reductions would agree upon appropriate ar-
rangements, including procedures for consultation, in
order to ensure that civilian employment by military
establishments would be in accordance with the objec-
tives of the obligations respecting force levels.

C. Nuclear Weapons

1. Production of Fissionable Materials for Nuclear
Weapons

a. The Parties to the Treaty would halt the production
of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons.

b. This measure would be carried out in the following
manner :

(1) The Parties to the Treaty would submit to the
International Disarmament Organization a declaration
listing by name, location and production capacity every
facility under their jurisdiction capable of producing
and processing fissionable materials at the agreed date.

(2) Production of fissionalile materials for purposes
other than use in nuclear weapons would be limited to
agreed levels. The Parties to the Treaty would submit
to the International Disarmament Organization periodic
declarations stating the amounts and types of fissionable
materials which were still being produced at each
facility.

(3) In accordance with arrangements which would
be set forth in the annex on verification, the International
Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing
measures at declared facilities and would provide assur-
ance that activities subject to the foregoing limitations
were not conducted at undeclared facilities.

2. Transfer of Fi.ssional)Ie Material to Purposes Other
Than Use in Nuclear Weapons

a. Upon the cessation of production of fissionable ma-
terials for use in nuclear weapons, the United States of
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Ucpublics
would each transfer to purposes other than use in nu-

clear weapons an agreed (luantity of weapons-grade U-
235 from past production. The purposes for which such
materials would be used would be determined by the state
to which the material belonged, provided that such ma-
terials were not used in nuclear weapons.

b. To ensure that the transferred materials were not
used in nuclear weapons, such materials would be placed
under safeguards and inspection by the International
Disarmament Organization either in stockpiles or at the
facilities in which they would be utilized for purposes
other than use in nuclear weapons. Arrangements for
such safeguards and inspection would be set forth in the
annex on verification.

3. Transfer of Fissionable Materials Between States for
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

a. Any transfer of fissionable materials between states
would be for purposes other than for use in nuclear weap-
ons and would be subject to a system of safeguards to
ensure that such materials were not used in nuclear
weapons.

b. The system of safeguards to be applied for this pur-
po.se would be developed in agreememt with the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency and would be set forth
in an annex to the Treaty.

4. Non-Transfer of Nuclear Weapons

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to seek to pre-
vent the creation of further national nuclear forces. To
this end the Parties would agree that :

a. Any Party to the Treaty which had manufactured,
or which at any time manufactures, a nuclear weapon
would :

(1) Not transfer control over any nuclear weapons to
a state which had not manufactured a nuclear weapon
before an agreed date ;

(2) Not a.ssist any such state in manufacturing any
nuclear weapons.

b. Any Party to the Treaty which had not manufac-
tured a nuclear weapon before the agreed date would :

(1) Not acquire, or attempt to acquire, control over
any nuclear weapons ;

(2) Not manufacture, or attempt to manufacture, any
nuclear weaixms.

5. Nuclear Weapons Test Explosions

a. If an agreement prohibiting nuclear weapons test
explosions and providing for effective international con-
trol had come into force prior to the entry into force of
the Treaty, such agreement would become an annex to the
Treaty, and all the Parties to the Treaty would be bound
by the obligations specified in the agreement.

1>. If, however, no such agreement had come into force
prior to the entry into force of the Treaty, all nuclear
weapons test explosions would be prohibitwl, and the
procedures for effective international control would be
sot forth in an annex to the Treaty.

6. Additional Measures

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to examine re-
maining unresolved questions relating to the means of
accomplishing in Stages II and III the reduction and

750

Deparfment of State Bulletin

eventual eliiiiination of iiuck>ar weapons stockpiles. In
the light of this examination, the I'arties to the Treaty
would agree to arrangements couceruing nuclear weapons
stocljpiles.

I). Outer Space

1. Prohibition of Weapons of Mass Destruction in Orliit
The Parties to the Treaty would agree not to place in

orbit weapons capable of producing mass destruction.

2. Peaceful Cooperation in Space

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support in-
creased international cooiwration in jieaceful uses of outer
space in the United Nations or through other appropriate
arrangements.

3. Notification and Pre-launch Inspection

With re.spect to the launching of space vehicles and
missiles :

a. Those Parties to the Treaty which conducted launch-
ings of space vehicles or missiles would provide advance
notification of such launchings to other Parties to the
Treaty and to the International Disarmament Organiza-
tion together with the track of the space vehicle or mis-
sile. Such advance notification would be provided on a
timely basis to permit pre-launch inspection of the space
vehicle or missile to be launched.

b. In accordance with arrangements which would be
set forth in the annex on verification, the International
Disarmament Organization would conduct pre-launch in-
spection of space vehicles and missiles and would establish
and operate any arrangements necessary for detecting
unreported launchings.

4. Limitations on Production and on Related Activities

The production, stockpiling and testing of boosters for
space vehicles would be subject to agreed limitations.
Such activities would be monitored by the International
Disarmament Organization in accordance with arrange-
ments which would be set forth in the annex on verifica-
tion.

E. Military Expenditures

1. Report on Expenditures

The Parties to the Treaty would submit to the Inter-
national Disarmament Organization at the end of each
step of each stage a report on their military expenditures.
Such reports would include an itemization of military ex-
penditures.

2. Verifiable Reduction of Expenditures

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to examine ques-
tions related to the verifiable reduction of military ex-
penditures. In the light of this examination, the Parties
to the Treaty would consider appropriate arrangements
respecting military expenditures.

F. RcdKCtion of the Risk of War

In order to promote confidence and reduce the risk of
war, the Parties to the Treaty would agree to the follow-
ing measures:

1. Advance Notification of Military Movements and Ma-
neuvers

Specified Partie.s to the Treaty would give advance
notification of major military movements and maneuvers
to other Parties to the Treaty and to the International
Disarmament Organization. Specific arrangements re-
lating to this commitment, including the scale of move-
ments and maneuvers to be reported and the information
to be transmitted, would be agreed,

2. Observation Posts

Specified Parties to the Treaty would permit observa-
tion posts to be established at agreed locations, including
major ports, railway centers, motor highways, river
crossings, and air bases to report on concentrations and
movements of military forces. The number of such posts
could be progressively expanded in each successive step
of Stage I. Specific arrangements relating to such ob-
servation posts, including the location and stafling of
posts, the method of receiving and reporting information,
and the .schedule for installation of posts would be agreed.

3. Additional Observation Arrangements

The Parties to the Treaty would establish such addi-
tional observation arrangements as might be agreed. Such
arrangements could be extended in an agreed manner
during each step of Stage I.

4. Exchange of Military Missions

Specified Parties to the Treaty would undertake the
exchange of military missions between states or groups
of states in order to improve communications and under-
standing between them. Specific arrangements respect-
ing such exchanges would be agreed.

5. Communications Between Heads of Government

Specified Parties to the Treaty would agree to the
establishment of rapid and reliable communications among
their heads of government and with the Secretary General
of the United Nations. Specific arrangements in this re-
gard would be subject to agreement among the Parties
concerned and between such Parties and the Secretary
General.

6. International Commission on Reduction of the Risk
of War

The Parties to the Treaty would establish an Inter-
national Commission on Reduction of the Risk of War as
a subsidiary body of the International Disarmament
Organization to examine and make recommendations re-
garding further measures that might be undertaken dur-
ing Stage I or sub.sequent .stages of disarmament to re-
duce the risk of war by accident, miscalculation, failure of
communications, or surprise attack. Specific arrange-
ments for such measures as might be agreed to by all or
some of the Parties to the Treaty would be subject to
agreement among the Parties concerned.

G. The International Disarmament Organization

1. Establishment of the International Disarmament
Organization

The International Disarmament Organization would be

fAay 7, J 962

751

established uiwn the entry into force of the Treaty and
would function within the framework of the United Na-
tions and in accordance with the terms and conditions of
the Treaty.

2. Cooperation of the Parties to the Treaty

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to cooperate
promptly and fully with the International Disarmament
Organization and to assist the International Disarmament
Organization in the performance of its functions and in
the execution of the decisions made by it in accordance
with the provisions of the Treaty.

3. Verification Functions of the International Disarma-
ment Organization

The International Disarmament Organization would
verify disarmament measures in accordance with the
following principles which would be implemented through
specific arrangements set forth in the amiex on verifica-
tion :

a. Measures providing for reduction of armaments
would be verified by the International Disarmament Or-
ganization at agreed depots and would include verifica-
tion of the destruction of armaments and, where appro-
priate, verification of the conversion of armaments to
peaceful uses. Measures providing for reduction of armed
forces would be verified by the International Disarmament
Organization either at the agreed depots or other agreed
locations.

b. Measures halting or limiting production, testing, and
other specified activities would be verified by the Inter-
national Disarmament Organization. Parties to the
Treaty would declare the nature and location of all pro-
duction and testing facilities and other specified activities.
The International Disarmament Organization would have
access to relevant facilities and activities wherever lo-
cated in the territory of such Parties.

c. Assurance that agreed levels of armaments and
armed forces were not exeeede<l and that activities limited
or prohibited by the Treaty were not being conducted
clandestinely would be provided by the International
Disarmament Organization through agreed arrangements
which would have the effect of providing that the extent
of inspection during any step or stage would be related
to the amount of disarmament being inidertaken and to
the degree of risk to the Parties to the Treaty of iwssible
violations. This might be accomplishetl, for exami>le, by
an arrangement embodying such features as the following :

(1) All parts of the territory of those Parties to the
Treaty to which this form of verification was applicable
would be subject to selection for insi>ection from the be-
ginning of Stage I as provided below.

(2) Parties to the Treaty would divide their territory
into an agreed number of appropriate zones and at the
licginning of each step of disarmament would submit to
the Iiiternati(mal Disarmament Organization a declara-
tion stating the total level of armaments, forces, and
specified types of activities subject to verification within
each zone. The exact location of armaments and forces
within a zone would not be revealed prior to its selection
for insi)ection.

(3) An agreed number of these zones would be progres-
sively inspected by the International Disarmament Or-

ganization during Stage I according to an agreed time
schedule. The zones to be inspected would be selected
by procedures which would ensure their selection by
Parties to the Treaty other than the Party whose territory
was to be inspected or any Party associated with it.
Upon selection of each zone, the Party to the Treaty
whose territory was to be inspected would declare the
exact location of armaments, forces and other agreed
activities within the selected zone. During the verifica-
tion process, arrangements would be made to provide as-
surance against undeclared movements of the objects of
verification to or from the zone or zones being inspected.
Both aerial and mobile ground inspection would be em-
ployed within the zone being inspected. In so far as
agreed measures being verified were concerned, access
within the zone would be free and unimpeded, and veri-
fication would be carried out with the full cooperation
of the state being inspected.

(4) Once a zone had l)een insi^ected it would remain
open for further inspection while verification was being
extended to additional zones.

(5) By the end of Stage III, when all disarmament
measures had been completed, inspection would have lieen
extended to all parts of the territory of Parties to the
Treaty.

4. Composition of the International Disarmament
Organization

a. The International Di.sarmament Organization would
have :

(1) A General Conference of all the Parties to the
Treaty ;

(2) A Control Council consisting of representatives of
all the major signatory powers as permanent members and
certain other Parties to the Treaty on a rotating basis ;
and

(3) An Administrator who would administer the Inter-
national Disarmament Organization under the direction
of the Control Council and who would have the authority,
staff, and finances adequate to ensure effective and im-
partial implementation of the functions of the Interna-
tional Disarmament Organization.

b. The General Conference and the Control Council
would have power to establish such subsidiary bodies, in-
cluding expert study groups, as either of them might deem
necessary.

5. Functions of the General Conference

The General Conference would have the following func-
tions, among others which might be agreed :

a. Electing non-permanent members to the Control
Council ;

b. Approving certain accessi(ms to the Treaty ;

e. ApiKiinting the Adniinislrator upon recommendation
of the Control Coiuicil ;

d. Approving agreements between the International Dis-
armament Organization and the United Nations and other
international organizations :

e. Approving the budget of Ihe Inloriialiunal Disarma-
ment Organization ;

f. Reciuesting and receiving rejiorts from the Control

752

Deparfmenf of State Bulletin

Council and deciding upon matters referred to it by the
Control Council ;

g. Ai>i)roving reports to be submitted to bodies of the
United Nations ;

h. l^roposing matters for consideration by the Control
Council ;

i. Requesting the International Court of Justice to give
advisory opinions on legal questions concerning the inter-
pretation or application of the Treaty, subject to a general
authorization of this power by the General Assembly of
the United Nations ;

j. Approving amendments to the Treaty for possible
ratification by the Parties to the Treaty ;

k. Considering matters of mutual interest pertaining to
the Treaty or disarmament in general.

6. Functions of the Control Council

The Control Council would have the following functions,
among others which might be agreed :

a. Recommending appointment of the Administrator ;

b. Adopting rules for implementing the terms of the
Treaty ;

c. Establishing procedures and standards for the instal-
lation and operation of the verification arrangements, and
maintaining supervision over such arrangements and the
Administrator;

d. Establishing procedures for making available to the
Parties to the Treaty data produced by verification ar-
rangements :

e. Considering reports of the Administrator on the
progress of disarmament measures and of their verifica-
tion, and on the installation and operation of the verifica-
tion arrangements ;

f. Recommending to the Conference approval of the
budget of the International Disarmament Organization ;

g. Requesting the International Court of Justice to give
advisory opinions on legal questions concerning the inter-
pretation or application of the Treaty, subject to a gen-
eral authorization of this power by the General Assembly
of the United Nations ;

h. Recommending to the Conference approval of certain
accessions to the Treaty ;

i. Considering matters of mutual interest pertaining to
the Treaty or to disarmament in general.

7. Functions of the Administrator

The Administrator would have the foUovying functions,
among others which might be agreed :

a. Administering the installation and operation of the
verification arrangements, and serving as Chief Executive
Otficer of the International Disarmament Organization ;

b. Making available to the Parties to the Treaty data
produced by the verification arrangements ;

c. Preparing the budget of the International Disarma-
ment Organization ;

d. Making reports to the Control Council on the progress
of disarmament measures and of their verification, and on
the installation and operation of the verification arrange-
ments.

8. Privileges and Immunities

The privileges and immunities which the Parties to the

Treaty would grant to the International Disarmament
Organization and its staff and to the representatives of
the Parties to the International Disarmament Organiza-
tion, and the legal capacity which the International Dis-
armament Organization should enjoy in the territory of
each of the Parties to the Treaty would be specified in
an annex to the Treaty.

9. Relations with the United Nations and Other Inter-
national Organizations

a. The International Disarmament Organization, being
established within the framework of the United Nations,
would conduct its activities in accordance with the pur-
poses and principles of the United Nations. It would
maintain close working arrangements with the United
Nations, and the Administrator of the International Dis-
armament Organization would consult with the Secretary
General of the United Nations on matters of mutual
interest.

b. The Control Council of the International Disar-
mament Organization would transmit to the United Na-
tions annual and other reports on the activities of the
International Disarmament Organization.

c. Principal organs of the United Nations could make
recommendations to the International Disarmament Or-
ganization, which would consider them and report to the
United Nations on action taken.

Note: The above outline does not cover all the possible
details or aspects of relationships between the
International Disarmament Organization and the
United Nations.

H. Measures To Strengthen Arrangements for Keeping the
Peaee

1. Obligations Concerning the Threat or Use of Force
The Parties to the Treaty would undertake obligations

to refrain, in their international relations, from the threat
or use of force of any type — including nuclear, conven-
tional, chemical or biological means of warfare — contrary
to the purposes and principles of the United Nations
Charter.

2. Rules of International Conduct

a. The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support a
study by a subsidiary body of the International Dis-
armament Organization of the codification and progi-es-
sive development of rules of international conduct related
to disarmament.

b. The Parties to the Treaty would refrain from in-
direct aggression and subversion. The subsidiary body
provided for in subparagraph a would also study methods
of assuring states against indirect aggression or subver-
sion.

3. Peaceful Settlement of Disputes

a. The Parties to the Treaty would utilize all appro-
priate processes for the peaceful settlement of all disputes
which might arise between them and any other state,
whether or not a Party to the Treaty, including negotia-
tion, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial
settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements,
submission to the Security Council or the General As-

May 7, J 962

753

sembly of the United Xations, or other peaceful means
of their choice.

b. The Parties to the Treaty would agree that disputes
concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaty
which were not settled by negotiation or by the Inter-
national Disarmament Organization would be subject to
referral by any party to the dispute to the International
Court of Justice, unless the parties concerned agreed on
another mode of settlement.

c. The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support a
study under the General Assembly of the United Nations
of measures which should be undertaken to make existing
arrangements for the peaceful settlement of international
disputes, whether legal or political in nature, more effec-
tive; and to institute new procedures and arrangements
where needed.

4. Maintenance of International Peace and Security

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support
measures strengthening the structure, authority, and
operation of the United Nations so as to improve its
capability to maintain international peace and security.

5. United Nations Peace Force

The Parties to the Treaty would undertake to develop
arrangements during Stage I for the establishment in
Stage II of a United Nations Peace Force. To this end,
the Parties to the Treaty would agree on the following
measures within the United Nations :

a. Examination of the experience of the United Nations
leading to a further strengthening of United Nations
forces for keeping the peace ;

b. Examination of the feasibility of concluding promptly
the agreements envisaged in Article 43 of the United
Nations Charter ;

c. Conclusion of an agreement for the establishment
of a United Nations Peace Force in Stage II, including
definitions of its purpose, mission, composition and
strength, disposition, command and control, training, logis-
tical support, financing, equipment and armaments.

6. United Nations Peace Observation Corps

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to supixjrt the
establishment within the United Nations of a Peace Ob-
servation Corps, staffed with a standing cadre of observers
who could be despatched i)romptly to investigate any
situation which might constitute a threat to or a breach
of the peace. Elements of the Peace Observation Corps
could also be stationed as appropriate in selected areas
throughout the world.

I. Transition

1. Transition from Stage I to Stage II would take place
at the end of Stage I, upon a determination that the
following circumstances existed :

a. All undertakings to be carried out in Stage I had
been carried out ;

b. All preparations required for Stage II had been
made ; and

c. All militarily significant states had become Parties
to the Treaty.

2. During the last three months of Stage I, the Con-
trol Council would review the situation respecting these
circumstances with a view to determining whether these
circumstances existed at the end of Stage I.

3. If, at the end of Stage I, one or more permanent
members of the Control Council should declare that the
foregoing circumstances did not exist, the agreed period
of Stage I would, uix)n the request of such permanent
member or members, be extended by a period or periods
totalling no more than three months for the purpose of
bringing about the foregoing circumstances.

4. If, upon the expiration of such period or periods, one
or more of the permanent members of the Control Council
should declare that the foregoing circumstances still did
not exist, the question would be ijlaced before a special
session of the Security Council ; transition to Stage II
would take place upon a determination by the Security
Council that the foregoing circumstances did in fact exist.

Stage II

Stage II would begin upon the transition from Stage I
and would be completed within three years from that date.

During Stage II, the Parties to the Treaty would under-
take:

1. To continue all obligations undertaken during Stage
I;

2. To reduce further the armaments and armed forces
reduced during Stage I and to carry out additional
measures of disarmament in the manner outlined below ;

3. To ensure that the International Disarmament Organ-
ization would have the capacity to verify in the agreed
manner the obligations undertaken during Stage II ; and

4. To strengthen further the arrangements for keeping
the peace through the establishment of a United Nations
Peace Force and through the additional measures outlined
below.

A. Aimumcnts

1. Reduction of Armaments

a. Those Parties to the Treaty which had during Stage

I reduced their armaments in agreed categories by thirty
percent would during Stage II further reduce each type
of aruKunents in the categories listed in Section A, sub-
paragraph l.b of Stage I by fifty percent of the inventory
existing at the end of Stage I.

b. Those Parties to the Treaty which had not been
subject to measures for the reduction of armaments dur-
ing Stage I would submit to the International Disarma-
ment Organization an appropriate declaration respecting
the inventories iiy tyjies, within the categories listed in
Stage I, of their armaments existing at the beginning of
Stage II. Such Parties to the Treaty would during Stage

II reduce the inventory of each type of such armaments
by sixty-five percent in order that such Parties would
accomplish the same total i)ercentage of reduction by the
end of Stage II as would be accomplished by those
Parties to the Treaty which had reduced their annunients
by thirty percent in Stage I.

2. Additional Armaments Subject to Reduction

a. The Parties to the Treaty would submit to the Inter-

754

Department of State Bulletin

national Disarmament Organization a declaration respect-
ing tlieir inventories existing at the beginning of Stage
II of the additional types of armaments in the categories
listed in subjiaragraph b below, and would during Stage II
reduce the inventory of each type of such armaments by
fifty i)ercent.

b. All types of armaments within further agreed cate-
gories would be suliject to reduction in Stage II (the fol-
lowing list of categories is illustrative) :

(1) Armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of
up to 2,500 kilograms (declarations by types).

(2) Specified types of unarmed military aircraft (dec-
larations by types).

(3) Missiles and free rockets having a range of less
than lOkilometers (declarations by types).

(4) Mortars and rocket launchers having a caliber of
less than 100 mm. (declarations by types).

(5) Specified types of unarmored personnel carriers
and transport vehicles (declarations by types).

(6) Combatant ships with standard displacement of
400 tons or greater which had not been included among
the armaments listed in Stage I, and combatant ships
with standard displacement of less than 400 toiLs (declara-
tions by types).

(7) Specified types of non-combatant naval vessels
( declarations by types) .

(8) Specified types of small arms (declarations by
types).

c. Specified categories of ammunition for armaments
listed in Stage I, Section A, subparagraph l.b and in sub-
paragraph b above would be reduced to levels consistent
with the levels of armaments agreed for the end of Stage
II.

3. Method of Reduction

The foregoing measures would be carried out and would
be verified by the International Disarmament Organiza-
tion in a manner corresponding to that provided for in
Stage I, Section A, paragraph 2.

4. Limitation on Production of Armaments and on Related
Activities

a. The Parties to the Treaty would halt the production
of armaments in the specified categories except for pro-
duction, within agreed limits, of parts required for main-
tenance of the agreed retained armaments.

b. The production of ammunition in specified categories
would be reduced to agreed levels consistent with the
levels of armaments agreed for the end of Stage II.

c. The Parties to the Treaty would halt development
and testing of new types of armaments. The flight testing
of existing types of missiles would be limited to agreed
annual quotas.

d. In accordance with arrangements which would be set
forth in the annex on verification, the International Dis-
armament Organization would verify the foregoing meas-
ures at declared locations and would provide assurance
that activities subject to the foregoing measures were not
conducted at undeclared locations.

5. Additional Measures

a. In the light of their examination during Stage I of

the means of accomplishing the reduction and eventual
elimination of production and stockpiles of chemical and
biological weapons of mass destruction, the Parties to the
Treaty would undertake the following measures respect-
ing such weapons :

(1) The cessation of all production and field testing of
chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction.

(2) The reduction, by agreed categories, of stockpiles
of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction
to levels fifty percent below those existing at the beginning
of Stage II.

(3) The dismantling or conversion to peaceful uses of
all facilities engaged in the production or field testing of
chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction.

b. The foregoing measures would be carried out in an
agreed sequence and through arrangements which would
be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.

c. In accordance with arrangements which would be
set forth in the annex on verification the International
Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing
measures and would provide assurance that retained
levels of chemical and biological weapons did not exceed
agreed levels and that activities subject to the foregoing
limitations were not conducted at undeclared locations.

B. Armed Forces

1. Reduction of Armed Forces

a. Those Parties to the Treaty which had been subject
to measures providing for reduction of force levels during
Stage I would further reduce their force levels on the
following basis :

(1) Force levels of the United States of America and
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would he reduced
to levels fifty percent below the levels agreed for the end
of Stage I.

(2) Force levels of other Parties to the Treaty which
had been subject to measures providing for the reduction
of force levels during Stage I would be further reduced,
on the basis of an agreed percentage, below the levels
agreed for the end of Stage I to levels which would not
in any case exceed the agreed level for the United States
of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at
the end of Stage II.

b. Those Parties to the Treaty which had not been
subject to measures providing for the reduction of armed
forces during Stage I would reduce their force levels to
agreed levels consistent with those to be reached by other
Parties which had reduced their force levels during Stage
I as well as Stage II. In no case would such agreed
levels exceed the agreed level for the United States of
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at
the end of Stage II.

c. Agreed levels of armed forces would include all
personnel in the categories set forth in Section B, para-
graph 2 of Stage I.

2. Method of Reduction

The further reduction of force levels would be carried
out and would be verified by the International Disarma-
ment Organization in a manner corresponding to that

May 7, J 962

755

provided for in Section B, paragraph 3 of Stage I.

3. Additional Measures

Agreed limitations consistent with retained force levels
would be placed on compulsory military training, and on
refresher training for reserve forces of the Parties to the
Treaty.

C. NiicJcar Weapons

1. Reduction of Nuclear Weapons

In the light of their examination during Stage I of the
means of accomplishing the reduction and eventual elimi-
nation of nuclear weapons stockpiles, the Parties to the
Treaty would undertake to reduce in the following man-
ner remaining nuclear weapons and fissionable materials
for use in nuclear weapons :

a. The Parties to the Treaty would submit to the Inter-
national Disarmament Organization a declaration stating
the amounts, types and nature of utilization of all their
fissionable materials.

b. The Parties to the Treaty would reduce the amounts
and types of fissionable materials declared for use in
nuclear weapons to minimum levels on the basis of agreed
percentages. The foregoing reduction would be accom-
plished through the transfer of such materials to purjwses
other than use in nuclear weapons. The purposes for
which such materials would be use<l would be determined
l)y the state to which the materials belonged, provided
that .such materials were not used in nuclear weapons.

c. The Parties to the Treaty would destroy the non-
nuclear components and assemblies of nuclear weapons
from which fissionable materials had been removed to
effect the foregoing reduction of fissionable materials for
use in nuclear weapons.

d. Production or refabrication of nuclear weapons from
any remaining fissionable materials would be subject to
agreed limitations.

e. The foregoing measures would be canned out in an
agreed sequence and through arrangements which would
be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.

f. In accordance with arrangements that would be set
forth in the verification annex to the Treaty, the Inter-
national Disarmament Organization would verify the fore-
going measures at declared locations and would provide
assurance that activities subject to the foregoing limita-
tions were not conducted at undeclared locations.

2. Registration of Nuclear Weapons for Verification
Purposes

To facilitate verification during Stage III that no nu-
clear weapons remained at the dispo.sal of the Parties to
the Treaty, those Parties to the Treaty which possessed
nuclear weapons would, during the last six months of
Stage II, register and serialize their remaining nuclear
weapons and would register remaining fission.ible mate-
rials for use in such weapons. Such registration and
serialization would l)e carried out with the International
Disarmament Organization in accordance with procedures
which would be set forth in the annex on verification.

D. Military liases and Facilities

1. Reduction of Military Bases and Facilities

The Parties to the Treaty would dismantle or convert
to ijeaeeful uses agreed military bases and facilities,
wherever they might be located.

2. Method of Reduction

a. The list of military bases and facilities subject to the
foregoing measures and the sequence and arrangements
for dismantling or converting them to peaceful uses would
be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.

b. In accordance with arrangements which would be
set forth in the annex on verification, the International
Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing
measures.

E. Reduction of the Risk of War

In the light of the examination by the International
Commission on Reduction of the Risk of War during
Stage I the Parties to the Treaty would undertake such
additional arrangements as appeared desirable to promote
confidence and reduce the risk of war. The Parties to
the Treaty would also consider extending and improving
the measures undertaken in Stage I for this purpose.
The Commission would remain in existence to examine
extensions, improvements or additional measures which
might be undertaken during and after Stage II.

F. The International Disarmament Organization

The International Disarmament Organization would
be strengthened in the manner necessary to ensure its
capacity to verify the measures undertaken in Stage II
through an extension of the arrangements based upon the
principles set forth in Section G, paragraph 3 of Stage I.

G. Measures to Strengthen Arrangements for Keeping
the Peace

1 . Peaceful Settlement of Disputes

a. In light of the study of peaceful settlement of dis-
putes conducted during Stage I, the Parties to the Treaty
would agree to such additional steps and arrangements
as were necessary to assure the just and peaceful settle-
ment of international disputes, whether legal or political
in nature.

b. The Parties to the Treaty would undertake to accept
without reservation, pursuant to Article 36, paragraph 1
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the
compuLsory jurisdiction of that Court to decide interna-
tional legal disputes.

2. Rules of International Conduct

a. The Parties to the Treaty would continue their
support of the study by the subsidiary body of the Inter-
national Disarmament Organization initiated in Stage I
to study the codification and progressive development of
rules of international conduct related to disarmament.
The Parties to the Treaty would agree to the establish-
ment of procedures wlierehy rules rccommende<l by the
subsidiary body and approved by the Control Council
would be circulated to all Parties to the Treaty and
would become effective three months thereafter unless a
majority of the Parties to the Treaty signified their dis-
approval, and whereby the Parties to the Treaty would
be bound by rules which had become effwtive in this way
unless, within a period of one year from the effective date.

756

Department of State Bulletin

they formally notified the International Disarmament
Organization that they did not consider themselves so
bound. Using sueh procedures, the Parties to the Treaty
would adopt such rules of international conduct related to
disarmament as might be necessary to begin Stage III.

b. In the light of the study of indirect aggression and
subversion conducted in Stage I, the Parties to the Treaty
vcould agree to arrangements necessary to assure states
against indirect aggression and subversion.

3. United Nations Peace Force

The United Nations Peace Force to be established as
the result of the agreement reached during Stage I would
come into being within the first year of Stage II and
would be progressively strengthened during Stage II.

4. United Nations Peace Observation Cori>s

The Parties to the Treaty would conclude arrangements
for the expansion of the activities of the United Nations
Peace Observation Corps.

5. National Legislation

Those Parties to the Treaty which had not already
done so would, in accordance with their constitutional
processes, enact national legislation in supiwrt of the
Treaty imposing legal obligations on individuals and
organizations under their jurisdiction and providing ap-
propriate penalties for noncompliance.

H. Transition

1. Transition from Stage II to Stage III would take
place at the end of Stage II, upon a determination that
the following circumstances existed :

a. All undertakings to be carried out in Stage II had
been carried out;

b. All preparations required for Stage III had been
made ; and

c. AU states possessing armed forces and armaments
had become Parties to the Treaty.

2. During the last three months of Stage II, the Control
Council would review the situation respecting these
circumstances with a view to determining at the end of
Stage II whether they existed.

3. If, at the end of Stage II, one or more permanent
members of the Control Council should declare that the
foregoing circumstances did not exist, the agreed period
of Stage II would, upon the request of such permanent
member or members, be extended by a i)eriod or periods
totalling no more than three months for the purpose of
bringing about the foregoing circumstances.

4. If, upon the expiration of such period or periods, one
or more of the permanent members of the Control Council
should declare that the foregoing circumstances still did
not exist, the question would be placed before a special
session of the Security Council ; transition to Stage III
would take place upon a determination by the Security
Council that the foregoing circumstances did in fact exist.

Stage III

Stage III would begin upon the transition from Stage II
and would be completed within an agreed period of time
as promptly as possible.

During Stage III, the Parties to the Treaty would
undertake :

1. To continue all obligations undertaken during Stages
I and II ;

2. To complete the process of general and complete
disarmament in the manner outlined below ;

3. To ensure that the International Disarmament Or-
ganization would have the capacity to verify in the
agreed manner the obligations undertaken during Stage
III and of continuing verification subse<iuent to the com-
pletion of Stage III ; and

4. To strengthen further the arrangements for keeping
the peace during and following the achievement of general
and complete disarmament through the additional meas-
ures outlined below.

A. Armaments

1. Reduction of Armaments

Subject to agreed requirements for non-nuclear arma-
ments of agreed types for national forces required to
maintain internal order and protect the personal security
of citizens, the Parties to the Treaty would eliminate all
armaments remaining at their disposal at the end of
Stage II.

2. Method of Reduction

a. The foregoing measure would be carried out in an
agreed sequence and through arrangements that would
be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.

b. In accordance with arrangements that would be
set forth in the annex on verification, the International
Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing
measures and would provide assurance that retained
armaments were of the agreed types and did not exceed
agreed levels.

3. Limitations on Production of Armaments and on
Related Activities

a. Subject to agreed arrangements in support of na-
tional forces required to maintain internal order and
protect the personal security of citizens and subject to
agreed arrangements in support of the Unite<l Nations
Peace Force, the Parties to the Treaty would halt all
applied research, development, production, and testing
of armaments and would cause to be dismantled or con-
verted to peaceful uses all facilities for such purposes.

b. The foregoing measures would be carried out in an
agreed sequence and through arrangements which would
be .set forth in an annex to the Treaty.

c. In accordance with arrangements which would be
set forth in the annex on verification, the International
Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing
measures at declared locations and would provide assur-
ance that activities subject to the foregoing measures
were not conducted at undeclared locations.

B. Armed Forces

1. Reduction of Armed Forces

To the end that upon completion of Stage III they
would have at their disposal only those forces and or-
ganizational arrangements necessary for agreed forces

May 7, J 962

757

to maintain internal order and protect tlie personal se-
curity of citizens and that they would be capable of
providing agreed manpower for the United Nations
Peace Force, the Parties to the Treaty would complete
the reduction of their force levels, disband systems of
reserve forces, cause to be disbanded organizational ar-
rangements comprising and supporting their national
military establishment, and terminate the employment of
civilian personnel associated with the foregoing.

2. Method of Reduction

a. The foregoing measures would be carried out in an
agreed sequence through arrangements which would be
set forth in an annex to the Treaty.

b. In accordance with arrangements which would be
set forth in the annex on verification, the International
Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing
measures and would provide assurance that the only
forces and organizational arrangements retained or sub-
sequently established were those necessary for agreed
forces required to maintain internal order and to pro-
tect the personal security of citizens and those for pro-
viding agreed manpower for the United Nations Peace
Force.

3. Other Limitationa

The Parties to the Treaty would halt all military con-
scription and would undertalje to annul legislation con-
cerning national military establishments or military
service inconsistent with the foregoing measures.

C. Nuclear Weapons

1. Reduction of Nuclear Weapons

In light of the steps taken in Stages I and II to halt
the production of fissionable material for use in nuclear
weapons and to reduce nuclear weapons stockpiles, the
Parties to the Treaty would eliminate all nuclear weapons
remaining at their di.sposal, would cause to be dismantled
or converted to peaceful use all facilities for production
of such weapons, and would transfer all materials re-
maining at their disposal for use in such weapons to
purposes other than use in such weapons.

2. Method of Reduction

a. The foregoing measures would be carried out in an
agreed secjuence and through arrangements which would
be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.

b. In accordance with arrangements which would be
set forth in the annex on verification, the International
Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing
measures and would i)rovide assurance that no nuclear
weapons or materials for use in such weapons remained
at the di.sposal of the Parties to the Treaty and that no
such weapons or materials were i)roduced at imdeclared
facilities.

D. Military Bases and Facilities

1. Reduction of Military Bases and Facilities

The Parties to the Treaty would dismantle or convert
to peaceful uses the military bases and facilities remain-
ing at their disposal, wherever they might be located. In

758

an agreed sequence except for such agreed bases or facili-
ties within the territory of the Parties to the Treaty for
agreed forces required to maintain internal order and
protect the personal security of citizens.

2. Method of Reduction

a. The list of military bases and facilities subject to
the foregoing measure and the .sequence and arrange-
ments for dismantling or converting them to peaceful
uses during Stage III would be set forth in an annex to
the Treaty.

b. In accordance with arrangements which would be
set forth in the annex on verification, the International
Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing
measure at declared locations and provide assurance
that there were no undeclared military bases and facili-
ties.

E. Research and Development of Military Significance

1. Reporting Requirement

The Parties to the Treaty would undertake the fol-
lowing measures respecting research and development of
military significance subsequent to Stage III :

a. The Parties to the Treaty would report to the In-
ternational Disarmament Organization any basic scien-
tific discovery and any technological invention having
potential military significance.

b. The Control Council would establish such expert
study groups as might be required to examine the poten-
tial military significance of such discoveries and inven-
tions and, if necessary, to recommend appropriate
measures for their control. In the light of such exjiert
study, the Parties to the Treaty would, where necessary,
establish agreed arrangements providing for verification
by the International Disarmament Organization that such
discoveries and inventions were not utilized for military
purposes. Such arrangements would become an annex
to the Treaty.

c. The Parties to the Treaty would agree to appropriate
arrangements for protection of the ownership rights of all
discoveries and inventions reported to the International
Disarmament Organization in accordance with subpara-
graph a above.

2. International Cooperation

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support full
international cooi)eration in all fields of scientific re-
search and development, and to engage in free exchange
of scientific and technical information and free inter-
change of views among scientific and technical personnel.

F. Reduction of the Risk of War

1. Improved Measures

In the light of the Stage II examination by the In-
ternational Commission on Ucduction of the Risk of War,
the Parties to the Treaty would undertake such exten-
sions and improvements of existing arrangements and
such additional arrangements as appeared desirable to
pnimotc confidence and reduce the risk of war. Tlie
Coiiniiissiou would rcniuin in existence to examine ex-

Department of Sfafe BuHetin

tensions, improvements or iidditional measures which
might be taken during and after Stage III.

2. Application of Measures to (Continuing Forces

The Parties to the Treaty would apply to national
forces required to maintain internal order and protect
the personal security of citizens those apiilicable meas-
ures concerning the reduction of the risk of war that had
been applied to national armed forces in Stages I and II.

G. The Internatioital Disarmament Organization

The International Disarmament Organization would be
strengthened in the manner necessary to ensure its ca-
pacity (1) to verify the measures undertaken in Stage
III through an extension of arrangements based upon
the i.rineiples set forth in Section G, paragraph 3 of
Stage I so that by the end of Stage III, when all dis-
armament measures had been completed, inspection
would have been extended to all parts of the territory of
Parties to the Treaty; and (2) to provide continuing
verification of disarmament after the completion of Stage

H. Measures to Strengthen Arrangements for Keeping
the Peace

1. Peaceful Change and Settlement of Disputes

The Parties to the Treaty would undertake such addi-
tional steps and arrangements as were necessary to pro-
vide a basis for peaceful change in a disarmed world and
to continue the just and peaceful settlement of all inter-
national disputes, whether legal or political in nature.

2. Rules of International Conduct

The Parties to the Treaty would continue the codifica-
tion and progressive development of rules of international
conduct related to disarmament in the manner provided
in Stage II and by any other agreed procedure.

3. United Nations Peace Force

The Parties to the Treaty would progressively
strengthen the United Nations Peace Force established
In Stage II until it had sufficient armed forces and arma-
ments so that no state could challenge it.

I. Completion of Stage III

1. At the end of the time period agreed for Stage III,
the Control Council would review the situation with a
view to determining whether all imdertakings to be
carried out in Stage III had been carried out.

2. In the event that one or more of the permanent
members of the Control Council should declare that such
undertakings had not been carried out, the agreed period
of Stage III would, upon the request of such permanent
member or members, be extended for a period or periods
totalling no more than three months for the purpose of
completing any uncompleted undertakings. If, upon the
expiration of such period or periods, one or more of the
permanent members of the Control Council should declare
that such undertakings still had not been carried out,
the question would be placed before a special session of

May 7, 7962

the Security Council, which would dotenuiue whether
Stage III had been completed.

3. After the completion of Stage III, the obligations un-
dertaken in Stages I, II and III would continue.

Genebal Provisions Applicable to All Stages

1. Subsequent Modifications or Amendments of the Treaty
The Parties to the Treaty would agree to specific pro-
cedures for con.sidering amendments or modifications of
the Treaty which were believed desirable by any Party
to the Treaty in the light of experience in the eariy period
of implementation of the Treaty. Such procedures would
include provi-sion for a conference on revision of the
Treaty after a specified period of time.

2. Interim Agreement

The Parties to the Treaty would undertake such specific
arrangements, including the establishment of a Prepara-
tory Commission, as were necessary between the signing
and entry into force of the Treaty to ensure the initiation
"f Stage I immediately upon the entry into force of the
Treat.v, and to provide an interim forum for the exchange
of views and information on topics relating to the Treaty
and to the achievement of a permanent state of general
and complete disarmament in a peaceful world.

3. Parties to the Treaty, Ratification, Accession, and Entry
into Force of the Treaty

a. The Treaty would be open to signature and ratifica-
tion, or accession, by all members of the United Nations
or Its specialized agencies.

b. Any other state which desired to become a Party to
the Treaty could accede to the Treaty with the approval
of the Conference on recommendation of the Control
Council.

0. The Treaty would come into force when it had been

ratified by state.s, including the United

States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
and an agreed number of the following states •

(1. In order to assure the achievement of the funda-
mental purpose of a permanent state of general and com-
plete disarmament in a peaceful worid, the Treaty would
specify that the accession of certain militarily significant
states would be essential for the continued effectiveness
of the Treaty or for the coming into force of particular
measures or stages.

e. The Parties to the Treaty would undertake to exert
every effort to Induce other states or authorities to accede
to the Treaty.

f. The Treaty would be subject to ratification or accept-
ance in accordance with constitutional processes.

g. A Depository Government would be agreed upon
which would have all of the duties normally Incumbent
upon a Depository. Alternatively, the United Nations
would be the Depository.

4. Finance

a. In order to meet the financial obligations of the
International Disarmament Organization, the Parties to
the Treaty would bear the International Disarmament

759

Organization's expenses as provided in the budget ap-
proved by the General Conference and in accordance with
a scale of apportionment approved by the General
Conference.

b. The General Conference would exercise borrowing
powers on behalf of the International Disarmament
Organization.

5. Authentic Texts

The text of the Treaty would consist of equally au-
thentic versions in English, French, Rassian, Chinese and
Spanish.

President Kennedy and Shah of Iran
Discuss Matters of Mutual Interest

His Majesty Molimnmad Reza Shah Pahlavi,
Shahanshah of Iran, accompanied hy the Emfress
Farah, made a state visit to the United States
April 10-18. Following is the text of a joint com-
onunique issued hy President Kennedy and His
Imperial Majesty on April 13 at the conclusion
of the Washington portion of his visit.

White House press release dated April 13

The President and His Imperial Majesty liave
had a cordial and useful exchange of views during
the past three days. The visit afforded an oppor-
tunity for the President and the Shah to become
acquainted personally and to discuss matters of
mutual interest to their countries.

Their talks included a review of political and
military situations in the world; a discussion of
the progress which Iran is making in economic
and social advancement; a review of defense ar-
rangements in which the two countries are as-
sociated; and aspects of United States economic
and military aid programs in Iran.

Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of
Defense Robert S. McNamara and Iranian
Foreign Minister Abbas Aram also participated
in the talks.

His Imperial Majesty described the form and
goals of the Third Iranian Economic Development
l^lan, which is scheduled to start later this year.
The President and His Imperial Majesty agreed
on the necessity for further acceleration of eco-
nomic development in Iran, and on the need for
continued external assistance to Iran to enable
that country to pursue the goals of its economic
development plans.

They discussed and were in complete agreement

on the subject of tlie nature of the threat to the
Middle East and to all free peoples. They re-
affirmed the provisions of the bilateral agreement
of 1959 ^ concerning the maintenance of the in-
dependence and territorial integrity of Iran, and
agreed on the necessity of collective security ar-
rangements to achieve this end. They also agreed
on the necessity of achieving a high level of in-
ternal economic development and social welfare
in order to continue the internal stability neces-
sary to resist external threats.

The friendly and extensive exchange of views
between the President and His Imperial Majesty
lias been consonant with the close relationship
between the two countries and has strengtliened
the bonds of friendship between them in their
quest for common objectives of peace and well-
being.

In taking leave of the President, His Imperial
Majesty expressed his thanks for the friendly re-
ception accorded him in the United States. Both
the President and His Imperial Majesty were grat-
ified by their fruitful discussions and by the spirit
of cooperative understanding which marked those
discussions.

Assistant Secretary Cleveland
Visits Europe and Congo

Press release L'tV2 dated April 21

Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary for In-
ternational Organization Affairs, will leave the
United States on April 24 for a 10-day trip to
Europe and the Congo.

Mr. Cleveland will confer with U.S. and inter-
national organization officials on future budget
and program planning and the coordination of
national and internationally administered pro-
grams. The discussions will include financial and
administrative arrangements under which U.S.
contributions to the U.N. are employed in the
Congo and elsewhere.

The Bureau of International Organization
Affairs, which handles U.N. affairs in the Depart-
ment, is also responsible for the budgeting and
management of U.S. financial contributions to
international organizations.

'For background and text, see Bulletin of Mar. 23,
1959, p. 416.

760

Department of State Bulletin

Attorney General Explains U.S. Goals to People
of Japan, Indonesia, and Germany

Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy^ & visit to
Japan, Indonesia, and Europe in February was
reported widely in the United States and through-
out the world. The lively, spontaneous exchanges
between the Attorney Gerieral and those who
heard him and the statements of officials in high
position are well known.

The reportage, Tievertheless, did not convey
inuch of the substance of the speeches he had pre-
pared. These speeches were received with great
interest, even by his hecklers.

It should be remembered that in many cases,
particularly in Indonesia and Japan, young intel-
lectuals luere heanng for the first time a inember
of the United States Cabinet.

Excerpts from the Attorney GeiveraVa talks
follow.

UNIVERSITY OF GADJA MADA,
JOGJAKARTA, INDONESIA

February 15, 1962

Let me tell you something of modern-day
America and what we stand for.

Freedom possesses many meanings. It speaks
not merely in terms of political and religious
liberty but also in terms of economic and social
progress. Over the years the concept has been
an expanding one.

In the United States today freedom speaks out
for expanding industrialization, increases in pro-
ductivity, the better distribution of the rewards
of labor, a decent return on investment.

It speaks in terms of laws to prevent monopoly
by business, corruption by labor leaders, to prevent
stock and bond frauds in investments, to grant a
$1.25 an hour minimum wage for workers.

The last few decades in America have seen tlie
rise of unemployment comi>ensation, social secu-
rity, pension funds to aid the elderly, medical
assistance, and a variety of other benefits that

May 7, 1962

636919 — 62 3

make impossible the concept of an economic so-
ciety, such as we were threatened with in the last
century by the imcontrolled rise of industrialism,
in which the rich got richer and the poor got
poorer.

Our society then, still loyal today to its orig-
inal revolutionary concept of the importance of
the individual, sees its goals in the United States
in service to mankind in ways never imagined
years ago. It reaches out to protect us in our
old age; it provides our youth with an ever better
education; it bans child labor and starvation
wages; it protects our savings in the banks; and
more and more it reaches out to newer and greater
frontiers that will provide spiritually and eco-
nomically a richer life.

This is not the society condemned some one
hundred years ago as an era of brutal capitalism
based on laissez faire. This is not the society
whose evils Marx thought were beyond tlie cure
of democracy. It is not an economy that tolerates
long hours, low wages, child labor, and the bitter
hatred between capital and labor that was the
core of Marx's Manifesto — a Manifesto that even
the Communists now recognize as being economi-
cally inaccurate and historically unsound. Indeed,
this democratic society boasts of its abolition of
these evils and cries out against ideologies of gov-
ernment that demand the supisression of freedom
of worship, freedom of speech, and call for the
complete domination and subservience of the in-
dividual to the needs of the state as determined by
a select few.

NIHON UNIVERSITY, TOKYO, JAPAN

February 6, 1962

The overriding development of the second half
of the 20th centui-y is tlie awakening of peoples
in Asia and Africa and Latin America — peoples
stirring from centuries of stagnation, suppression,

761

and dependency. Now they are seeking through
national independence the kind of economic and
social development which both your country and
mine have experienced. These are young nations,
trying desperately in the quest for political and
social progress to make up for lost centuries. . . .

We have no intention of trying to remake the
world in our image, but we have no intention either
of permitting any other state to remake the world
in its image. . . . The institutions we have de-
vised to achieve our aims may be inappropriate
in another culture or another historic setting.
The creation of the necessary political and eco-
nomic machinery to achieve these aims must be
performed by tlie people themselves.

We do not condemn others for their dilferences
in economic and political structures. We under-
stand that newer nations have not had time, even
if they so wished, to build institutions relying pri-
marily on private enterprise as we have done.
Our privately owned railroads, our airlines, our
commmiications systems, our mdustries, were not
created overnight. These enterprises developed as
a result of private initiative at a time when life
was far simpler than it is now. We thus had time
to permit their slow growth and time to permit the
intertwining of many small units into the great
systems that the modern age requires, and, under
government regulation, time to permit the con-
tmuation of private control. In many of the
newer nations, government appears to be the only
mechanism capable of performing these feats
within a reasonable length of time. This we can
understand and appreciate. It neither offends us,
nor can we deem it hostile.

UNIVERSITY OF INDONESIA, DJAKARTA

February 14, 1962

It is from our own laiowledge of difliculties we
have faced, as well as from our dedication to the
ideal of independence, that we have sought to aid
new nations with technical and financial assistance
dunng their crucial early years. Our aim is that
they survive, develop, and remain proud and
independent.

No period of the world's history lias seen the
birth in such a short space of time of so many new
nations as these postwar years.

With more nations, there is bound to bo an in-
crease in the forces that, out of jealousies and
ambitions, could disturb the peace of the world.

The prolific growth of many nations in the place
of a few makes it impossible today for there to
be anything resembling the 19th-century Pax
Britannica.

FREE UNIVERSITY OF BERLIN

February 22, 1962

Our position with regard to Berlin is well
known — but, to remove all doubt, let me re-
affirm its essential elements today.

We have stood in the past- — and we will
stand in the future — for the full freedom of
the inhabitants of West Berlin and for the con-
tinuation of West Berlin's ties with the Federal
Republic and the world beyond.

We have stood in the past — and we will stand
in the future — for the presence of allied forces
in West Berlin, as long as they are necessary and
as long as you so desire. We will not allow this
presence to be diluted or replaced.

We have stood in the past— and we will stand in
the future — for uncontrolled access to and from
Berlin. We will permit no interference with this
access, as we have recently demonstrated with
regard to the air corridors.

We have stood in the past — and we will stand
in the future — for an active, viable West Berlin.
Berlm will not merely exist. It will grow and
prosper.

We stand behind all these positions with the
full strength of American power. . . .

Herr Ulbricht himself has confessed that it was
to stop the flight of people — to lock up his workers
in the workers' paradise — that the wall was built.
For the first time in the history of mankind, a
political system lias had to construct a ban-ier to
keep its people in — and the whole world recog-
nizes the desperate meaning of this act.

They wall their people in.

We set our people free.

Robert Frost, who read from his poetry at the
inauguration of our President, once wrote these
lines:

Before I built a wall I'd ask to know
What I was walling in or walling out,
And to whom I was like to give offence.
Something there is that doesn't love a wall,
That wants it down. . . .

What wants this wall down is the whole free
spirit of man. . . .
And while today Berlin is divided, as Germany

762

Department of State Bulletin

is divided, by the decision of the Communists, you
know and I know that in the end all Berlin and
all Germany are one. My country shares with
you the peaceful but persistent purpose that Ger-
mans shall one day find themselves reunited. This
is the true path toward lower tensions and to less-
ened dangers. We shall continue to hope that as
policies of repression fail, and as fears of "re-
venge" prove unfounded, the Soviet Government,
in its own true interest, will come to share this
purpose and to cooperate in its realization. . . .

One vestige of injustice in my country has been
the treatment of fellow citizens of another color.
For a hundred years, despite our claims of equal-
ity, we had, as you know, a wall of our own — a
wall of segregation erected against Negroes. That
wall is coming down through the orderly process
of enforcing the laws and securing compliance
with court decisions, an area of government where
my own responsibilities, as Attorney General, are
heavy.

The battle against discrimination in interstate
transportation has been won ; the conquest of seg-
regation in the public schools is making new
progress each school year. Throughout the Na-
tion, the conscience of America has awakened to
press the fight against discrimination in employ-
ment, in housing, in the use of common facil-
ities. We still have far to go — but the progress
we have already made has changed the face of
America. . . .

It is communism, not free society, which is
dominated by what the Yugoslav Commmiist,
Milovan Djilas, has called the "new class" — the
class of party bosses and bureaucrats, who acquire
not only privileges but an exemption from criti-
cism which would be unimaginable in democratic
society. Far from being a classless society, com-
munism is governed by an elite as steadfast in
its determination to maintain its prerogatives as
any oligarchy known to history.

BEETHOVEN HALL, BONN, GERMANY

February 24, 1962

I trust that you are in no doubt about the en-
thusiasm with which Americans have hailed the
Common Market. We fondly regard it as an
application to Europe of the principles which
underlie so much of our own economic growth^ —
the abolition of internal trade barriers, the en-

largement of the internal market, and the conse-
quent stimulus to production, imiovation, and
efficiency.

The announcement of Great Britain's intention
to join only perfects the role of the Common Mar-
ket as one of the vital centers around which the
world economy will hereafter revolve.

As yet, the new Europe has not yet found politi-
cal institutions to match the Common Market.
No one should be surprised at this. It is easier
to reduce tariffs than to renoimce sovereignty.
Nor can an American be surprised that economic
reciprocity precedes political federation.

I recall that in our history it was the desire to
remove obstacles to commerce between the 13
newly independent American States which led to
our Constitutional Convention in 1787, and not
vice versa.

One cannot foretell today the exact shape and
structure of tlie political community of the new
Europe. But no one can doubt that the will to a
greater measure of political unity exists in
Europe — and no one can doubt that in the end
this will find its fulfillment in the creation of
common political institutions. . . .

If the new nations have repudiated European
rule, they have done so for European reasons.
They are fighting for their new societies in terms
of European ideals of nationalism and democracy.

It is their commitment to European doctrine
which has led them to reject European dominion.
The ghosts of Locke and Kousseau — and, if I may
say so, Jefferson and Lincoln — preside over the
awakening of the East. . . .

It is in all our interests to narrow the frighten-
ing gap between the rich nations and the poor —
between people living in affluence and comfort and
people scratching to survive on less than $100 a
year.

A high standard of living cannot remain the
exclusive possession of the West — and the sooner
we can help other peoples to develop their re-
sources, raise their living standards, and
strengthen their national independence, the safer
the world will be for us all. . . .

Fifteen years ago, Europe could not hope to play
its rightful role in the common undertaking. To-
day the new Europe, strong, vital, and rich, must
contribute both its wealth and its wisdom to this
task. It must do so with generosity and with
vigor.

I am happy to note that Germany has recognized

Moy 7, J 962

763

that its responsibilities increase as its capacity de-
velops. The beginnings you have made on your
foreign aid progi'am are heartening.

In 1961 I understand that you committed some
$1.4 billion in economic aid to countries through-
out the world. Other European nations have also
increased their contributions. But we must con-
tinually ask ourselves whether this is enough,
whether the temis of aid are sufficiently liberal and
the magnitude sufficiently large to meet the needs
of the developing nations. . . .

There are indications today that, while the free
states are working ever more closely together, the
Communist system is beginning to exhibit signs
of discord and fragmentation.

Moscow says one thing, Peiping another, and
the . . . small voice of Tirana compounds the
clamor.

This discord is the inevitable result of the at-
tempt to impose a single policy on a world domi-
nated by national traditions and national interests.
It confirms our own view that the world is moving,
not toward a single centralized order, but toward
a unity in diversity, with many nations developing
according to their own traditions and abilities.
They remain bound by respect for the rights of
others, loyalty to the world community, and un-
shakable faith in the dignity and freedom of man.

BUSINESS COUNCIL, WASHINGTON, D.C.

March 14, 1962

Wlierever I visited — in Japan, Indonesia, Thai-
land, Gennany, and Holland — but particularly in
Japan and Indonesia I found a great deal of mis-
infonnation and misunderstanding about the
United States.

The majority of the students abroad are not
Communists nor even pro-Communists . . . but
many of the students have serious questions about
our country and our way of life. Frequently they
don't understand us, but they have open
minds. . . .

So we have a great problem, but we have a
great opi^ortunity and, in my judgment, luiless
we have an active program to provide these stu-
dents with the infonuation and facts for which
they hunger, we will lose the cold war no matter
how much money we spend on aid — military or
economic.

But I believe that if we enter this battle for tlie

minds of tomorrow's leaders with all the vigor
and dedication at our command, we will win hands
down. I believe this l)ecause we have so much
going for us — despite what success the articulate,
highly disciplined Communist cadres have had.

First, we have the tnith on our side. We can
admit that everything is not perfect within our
borders.

Second, we have this good will and respect that
has largely been imtapped, and the sharing of the
common aspiration of peoples to be free and to be
the masters of their own destinies.

Third, we have the evidence — as stark as the
wall in Berlin — that wherever free societies have
competed directly with Communist societies, it is
freedom that has provided the greatest amount of
social progress and social justice and has been the
most effective in destroying ignorance, disease,
hunger, and want.

In Berlin lies an answer to the question of com-
petition. It is an answer so overpowering that it
had to be shut from sight by concrete and barbed
wire, tanks and machineguns, dogs and guards.
The comi>etition has resulted in so disastrous a
defeat for communism that the Commimists felt
they had no alternative but the wall. And this
defeat for communism, I found, was recognized
. . . wherever we visited. . . .

Let us move cheerfully, courageously, and posi-
tively to bring full understanding overseas of the
American people's beliefs, aims, progress, and
problems.

Let us not do so just because we are against
communism but because we believe in the great
social progi'ess the American people have made
and believe that the most secure basis for peace
and progress is in the freedom of men.

President of Ivory Coast
To Visit United States

White House press release dated April IS

President Kennedy annoimced on April 18 that
Felix IIouphouet-Boigny, President of the Ivory
Coast, has accepted the President's invitation to
visit the United States. Beginning May 22 Presi-
dent Houphouet-Boigny will spend 3 days in
Washington as a guest of the President. He also
will visit New York during the course of his trip.

764

Department of Slate Bulletin

A Look at the Middle East Today

by Chester Bowles '

I am deeply honored to be asked to address the
American Jewish Congress and to be the first re-
cipient of your International Affairs Award.
Youi-s is a long and distinguished record of philan-
thropy, education, and dedication to the public
welfare dating back to 1917.

When it was suggested that I might discuss the
current situation in the Middle East, my first in-
stinct was to substitute some other subject. It
seemed to me that everything that could possibly
be said about the Middle East had been said and
then resaid. However, as I thought about develop-
ments in the last decade I was impressed by the
way the pendulum of American opinion on the
Middle East has swung between high hopes and
dire forebodmgs and how it now appears to be
resting, momentarily at least, at some intermediate
point.

To some extent our present estimate represents
a scaling down of our high hopes for the rapid
economic development and increasing political co-
hesiveness of the area. In another sense it reflects
a realistic adjustment by our Government, by the
Soviet Union, and by the Middle Eastern nations
themselves to an enormously complex and difficult
situation.

For hundreds of years the people of this crucial
area were buffeted by wars and exploitation.
"World War I generated high hopes for inde-
pendence, prosperity, and a growing unity. How-
ever, the political vacuum created by the collapse
of the Ottoman Empire was soon filled by the
British and French, and new conflicts replaced
the old. In the wake of World War II came the

' Address made before the American Jewish Congress
at New Xork, N.Y., on Apr. 12 (press release 244). Mr.
Bowles is the President's Special Representative and Ad-
viser on African, Asian, and Latin American Affairs.

final liquidation of European colonialism in the
Arab world and the establishment of Israel as an
independent new nation.

In this period of intense bitterness many Ameri-
cans clung stubbornly to the hope that in the Mid-
dle East as elsewhere reason must somehow pre-
vail, that the fast-growing oil revenues could be
put to effective use throughout the entire region,
that the Arab and Israeli peoples could learn to
live and work together, and that such problems
as water and refugees would be subject to grow-
ing cooperation.

A few years ago, when it began to be clear that
these expectations were beyond our immediate
grasp, we developed a more pessimistic view. In
1957, for instance, we were deeply concerned by
the growing Soviet pressures on the Middle East
and the close ties being developed by the Soviets
with some countries of the region. There were
ominous warnings that Europe might be cut off
from Middle Eastern oil.

As we look at the Middle East today, it seems
apparent that the situation has been improved
in three important but uiipublicized respects :

1. Communism as such is gradually losing its
luster, and the Soviet Union is emerging as both
a modern edition of czarist Russia and a major
cutrate oil competitor to boot.

2. The United States is much less tense in its
relations with the nations of the Middle East and
less inclined to expect immediate solutions to age-
old conflicts.

3. The Middle Eastern nations themselves are
becoming less focused on conflicts with their neigh-
bors and more interested in their own internal
development.

These three changes add up to a Idnd of quiet
political and economic relaxation which, with a

May 7, J 962

765

measure of good luck, may gradually make for
lessening tensions and greater opportunities for
all concerned. In our crisis-ridden world such
relaxation doesn't make headlines, but it may write
history. Let us consider these developments.

Recent Developments

Although the Russians, who have been pressing
and prodding the Middle East since the days of
Peter the Great, would imdoubtedly like to extend
their present influence, they have ran into some
formidable roadblocks. Not the least of these is
the Middle East's ancient, deeply rooted distrust
of foreign powers and its growing sopliistication
in regard to Soviet objectives.

At the same time the U.S.S.R. has become the
largest "independent" producer in the world oil
market. Every day it is delivering 450,000 barrels
of oil to Western Europe at below world prices in
direct competition with the Middle Eastern pro-
ducers, who formerly controlled two-thirds of this
lucrative and fast-growing market.

Several years ago many Americans were con-
cerned that Arab nationalism would become a cap-
tive to communism. But in recent years we have
seen, I think, how diametrically opposed these two
political forces really are and what a powerful
obstacle to foreign infiltration the dynamic effort
of a developing new count ly can be. One has only
to look at Egypt, where President Nasser is accept-
ing large-scale Soviet aid for the Aswan High
Dam while developing his country along strictly
pragmatic lines. Far from controlling the United
Arab Republic, Khrushchev cannot even convince
Nasser to tolerate the activities of the local Com-
munist Party.

At the same time our own Government lias rec-
ognized the limits of our influence in the Middle
East and by trial and error has learned some of
the basic facts of life in dealing with this ex-
plosive area. We have learned in particular that
what we need in the Middle East is less than
what we thought we needed and that an emphasis
on a maximum military security program is not
necessarily tlio best way to protect our national
interests.

What we really want is sufficient restraint to
keep border conflicts and clashmg ambitions from
touching off a worldwide catastrophe and sufficient
stability to insure orderly political and economic
development. Above all we want to see the nations

of the Middle East grow as independent, self-re-
specting members of a free-world commmiity, de-
veloping their own economies and destinies in
accord with their own national ideals.

In the process of our own education in the
Middle East, we have learned to live with neutral-
ism and vai-ying forms of alinement as we have
learned to live with it elsewhere.

Middle Eastern oil, of course, continues to be
of enormous importance to the non-Communist
world and particularly to Western Europe. It
will remain important for a long time to come.

Yet it has been properly charged that in the
past our interest in the Middle East was "too
much concerned with oil and kings and not enough
with water and people." In any event the de-
velopment of new fields in "Venezuela, Libya, the
Sahara, and elsewhere has removed much of the
former pressure. Less than one-fifth of our own
oil consimiption now comes from this area.

At the same time the sharp increase in oil con-
sumption throughout the world is providing the
Middle Eastern oil producers with an important
share of an enormously expanding pie.

The political importance of Middle Eastern oU
lies in the bridge it forms with the more indus-
trialized non-Communist nations; its economic
imjjortance is in the large amoimts in hard cur-
rencies that it provides for Middle East economic
development.

We all hope that eventually more of the oil
capital of the Persian Gulf can be channeled into
the development of the capital-deficient areas
along the Mediterranean. Yet thoughtful ob-
servers have come to see that this will not come
from some single dramatic move such as a develop-
ment bank but rather as a long-term evolutionary
process. The recently created Kuwait Develop-
ment Fund, which last week made a major loan to
Jordan, is a step in the right direction.

Needs of the Region

The needs of the region are appallingly great.
Generation after generation of invasions, plagues,
massacres, and revolutions have taken their toll
on both the human and natural resources of the
area. Ruins of great works of irrigation dot most
of the deserts. Land once cleared of salt has been
allowed to spoO. Drainage ditches have silted in.
Irrigation terraces have been destroyed. In an
area where almost everything must be wrested

766

Department of State Bulletin

from nature, it is a gigantic task simply to restore
the economic foiuidations of the past.

In recent years a growing number of Middle
Eastern leaders have come to see that overriding
internal problems such as theirs cannot be solved
by rhetoric. There has been increasing concern
with the day-to-day problems of internal develop-
ment such as maldistribution of land, lack of edu-
cation and modern health services, and long-
neglected social reforms.

Meanwhile the United States, with a long
record of successes and failures in the Middle East,
has learned that it cannot mastermind the political
and economic decisions of an entire subcontinent
and that dollars alone will not assure a happy
society. More particularly we are learning that
a vital requirement for an effective U.S. policy in
the Middle East as elsewhere is a more sensitive
underetanding of people — of their overriding de-
sire for greater participation, for an increased
sense of belonging, for a growing measure of in-
dividual justice and dignity.

Experience has taught us that when these
human factors are overlooked rapid economic de-
velopment often becomes an instrument of frus-
tration by encouraging men to hope for more than
they can secure while at the same time disrupting
old social relationships.

Yet we also know that the developmental proc-
ess camiot be stopped.

The challenge is a double one : to find means of
meeting the essential economic goals, and to do so
in a way that will provide an increasing measure
of personal satisfaction for the individual.

Injection of Positive Elements

Although no thoughtful observer will suggest
that the answers are at hand, I believe that certain
positive elements are now being injected into what,
on the surface, may still appear to be old and
stagnant societies. In several countries we find
a gradually increasing realization that independ-
ent, viable nations cannot be created by flamboyant
political slogans or fiery radio exchanges but only
by capable planning and hard work in a stable
political environment. As I think back on a recent
visit to the Middle East, several specific examples
stick in my mind.

In Iran I foxmd a new and deeper understand-
ing of the need for sweeping economic and social
reform. Under the dedicated and vigorous direc-

tion of the Shah, Government leaders are work-
ing to ease the poverty and injustice which have
plagued this historic land for generations. In
Government offices I met many able young Iran-
ians, recently returned from studies abroad, who
I believe will play an increasingly important role
in the creation of a modem society based on in-
dividual dignity and opportunity for all of the
Persian people.

In the United Arab Republic I visited village
areas where the people seemed far less concerned
with the explosive give-and-take of Middle East-
ern politics than with the down-to-earth problems
of daily living — how, for instance, to expand the
irrigation areas of the Nile Delta and to open up
new areas in the Western Desert; how to develop
new villages with modern schools and improved
roads; how to increase agricultural output, create
new industries, provide modern health programs
on a broader scale, and better the existence of the
individual fellaheen who comprise the vast ma-
jority of Egypt's people.

The reaction against the harsh exploitation
which often characterized Egyptian capitalism
in the past has resulted in considerable talk and
some experimentation m national ownership. Yet
the hard practical problem of finding enough
able administratoi-s to manage the day-to-day po-
litical responsibilities of a developing nation is
great enough in itself without adding all the eco-
nomic decisions as well. As this becomes apparent
I believe that we may see a relaxation of Egypt's
present rush toward government economic
domination.

In Iraq, despite constant political turmoil, a
large percentage of the national budget — over 50
percent in fact — is now going to an impressive de-
velopment program. The Government of Iraq is
focusing more attention on building schools,
roads, hospitals, and housing and is working hard
to develop its natural and human resources. An
ambitious program of land reform is one of the
features of this effort.

In Jordan a youthful, forward-looking govern-
ment, under a new cabinet and an energetic yomig
king, is attempting to establish stable political
institutions, carry out a development program,
and attract private investment into the country.

Saudi Arabia is gradually improving its gov-
ernmental procedures. A Supreme Planning
Board has been established which is working

May 7, 7962

767

closely with the International Bank to organize
a total development plan ; a sizable percentage of
the Saudi budget is being allocated to implement
it.

By and large the present mood in the Middle
East is affirmative, and there is reason for meas-
m-ed confidence that this mood may continue and
increase. If so, it will be a welcome break from
the long record of destruction, of smashed cities,
shifting causes, and deeply rooted conflicts that
has characterized the Middle East for so many
years.

Yet we must not imderestimate the continuing
undercun-ent of danger. A single, explosive ac-
cident could reverse the gradual progress that is
now imder way and plunge the whole region into
bloody chaos.

Regional Problems Remain

Moreover, the overriding regional problems re-
main largely untouched, and here again it would
be folly to expect easy answere.

For instance, a sincere effort will be required on
all sides if we are to ease the Jordan Eiver and
Arab refugee problems which have helped keep
the entire Middle East in a state of permanent
crisis.

On the latter question, at least, there has been
some sign of progress. Dr. Joseph Johnson, the
able and experienced president of the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, is serving as
special representative of the Palestine Concilia-
tion Commission, and a new effort at a solution is
being made.

Let us also hope that there may be some attempt
to reach agreement on arms limitation — unofficial,
if not official. The present arms race is dangerous
and costly for all concerned.

Eventually, perhaps, we may see the emergence
in the Middle East of a smgle dominant idea whose
benefits are so important for all concerned that
traditional differences may be forgotten, as the
Common Market is now bridging similar differ-
ences in Europe. In the meantime we must deal
realistically with the day-to-day problems of eco-
nomic and political adjustment.

Here Israel has a major role to play. In less
than a generation Israel has achieved one of the
most rapid rates of development in the world
today, 8 percent annually. Her per capita gross
national product is over $1,000 a year, far more

than her Middle Eastern neighbors and higher
than that of the Netherlands, Italy, Spain, Aus-
tria, Greece, or Portugal. In 1961 Israel's rare
of industrial growth was 14 percent, one of the
highest in the world. Her exports were up 25
percent and foreign exchange reserves up 65
percent over the previous year.

At the same time the Arab boycott has forced
Israel to seek friends and markets outside the
Middle East. One of the byproducts is the am-
bitious Israeli foreign technical assistance pro-
gram that is now reaching more than a score of
nations in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Last
year there were a thousand students from 52 coun-
tries studying in Israel and over 200 Israeli tecli-
nicians serving as advisers to underdeveloped
countries abroad.

Israel's neighbors are not yet in a mood to ap-
preciate and applaud these efforts. Israel's very
success still generates an unreasoning antagonism.
Yet even this may change as the Middle Eastern
nations succeed in pushing forward their own na-
tional development plans and as a new confidence
begins to breed tolerance and understanding.

Basic Ingredients of U.S. Policy

In this context what are the basic ingredients
for a realistic American Middle Eastern policy?

First, it seems to me, we must be prepared to
help all tlie nations of the area maintain their
independence. This requires an adequate and
readily available United States deterrent to ag-
gression from any source. Second, we must use
the mstruments of the U.N. for the reduction of
specific tensions and to prevent the ^Vrab-Israeli
dispute from developing into an open conflict that
could rapidly spread.

Third, we can encourage all Middle Eastern na-
tions to devote less time to angiy propaganda de-
bates with their neighbors and more to the solution
of their own problems of internal development.
We can also give special priority assistance to
those countries which are genuinely concerned
with improving the lot of all their citizens, not
just a wealthy few. Our primarj' objective is the
development of prosperous and stable societies
throughout the Middle East whose material bene-
fits are spread throughout evei'y level of the econ-
omy and whose energies would be increasingly
devoted to the creation of an atmosphere of live
and let live.

768

Deparfmenf of State Bulletin

Fourth, a persistent, patient effort should be
maile to find some basis of cooperation between
neighboring Michlle Eastern nations, however
tentative or restrictive the areas of cooperation
may be.

There is no magic dramatic fonnula for stability
in the Middle East or anywhere else. In spite of
our vast military and industrial power, our ca-
pacity to shape events there, as elsewhere, is no
more than marginal. Yet a patient diplomacy, a
firm willingness to stand against threats of aggres-
sion, a sensitive miderstanding of what motivates
othei-s, and the wise use of our resources in assist-
ing economic development may provide the margin
between chaos on the one hand and growing po-
litical and economic stability on the other.

One thing at least is certain: Only tlu'ough the
creation of just societies, whose citizens have
genuine independence, individual dignity, and ma-
terial welfare, can world peace with dignity be
established. In this regard the future coui*se of
events in the Middle East remains uncertain. But
it is not without hope.

U.S. Supports U.N. on Freedom
of Exit for Mr. Tshombe

Following is the text of a Department state-
7nent released on April 18 indicating U.S. support
for the stand taken by Acting U.N. Secretary-
General U Thant in instructing Robert Gardiner^
oificer in charge of the U.N. Operation in the
Congo, to take such steps as were necessary to as-
swre the safe departure from, Leopoldville on that
day of Moise Tshombe, President of Katanga
Province.

Press release 259 dated April 18

Misunderstandings arose between Mr. Tshombe
and the Government of the Congo in connection
with a recess in the talks between Prime Minister
[Cyrille] Adoula and Mr. Tshombe in Leopold-
ville. Mr. Adoula left Leopoldville yesterday for
a short trip upriver after arranging with Mr.
Tshombe that the meetings would be resumed on
Saturday. Mr. Tshombe then decided to return
to Elisabethville. Mr. Tshombe's departure from
Leopoldville was delayed by officers of the Congo
Government. Under the assurances given by the
U.N., Mr. Tshombe must have full freedom to de-
part from Leopoldville whenever he wishes, and

the U.N. is taking steps to carry out its commit-
ment. At the time Mr. Tshombe was given the
U.N". assurances, the United States Government
expressed its confidence in them. The United
States Government continues fully to support the
United Nations assurances and supports the in-
struction communicated today by the Secretary-
General to Mr. Gardiner.

U.S. Economic Planning Team
Visits British Guiana

Press release 255 dated April 16

A U.S. economic planning team will arrive in
British Guiana on April 18 for a visit of approxi-
mately 4 to 6 weeks. The team will assist in
bringing the most modern economic experience to
bear upon the reappraisal of British Guiana's de-
velopment progi-am. The leader of the team will
be Harry G. Hoffmann, a specialist in economic
and social development problems and editor of the
Charleston (West Virginia) Gazette. Alvin
Mayne, chief economist of the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico, is deputy team leader. In addition to
U.S. planning experts, technicians from the
United Kingdom and international development
organizations will be associated with the team.
Dispatch of the team is responsive to the desires of
all segments of British Guiana opinion.

President and Dr. Hailstein Review
U.S.-EEC Relations

Follouyi/ng is the text of a joint communique
released at Washington on April 12 at the close
of a meeting between President Kennedy and
Walter Hailstein, President of the Commission of
the European Economic Community.

Wliite House press release dated April 12

The President and Dr. Walter Hailstein, Presi-
dent of the Coinmission of the European Economic
Community, have met at the White House today.

The President and Dr. Hailstein reviewed with
satisfaction important developments of the past
year, including the successful completion of the
first stage of the Common Market. They agreed
tliat the continuing evolution of a strong, closely
knit European entity presents to statesmen of the

May 7, 7962

769

West a historic opportunity to build an Atlantic
Partnership foimded on close cooperation between
two equal partners.

"While congratulating Dr. Hallstein on successf id
first steps toward establishment of a common agri-
cultural jx)licy and recognizing a common ap-
proach to agriculture as essential in the constrac-
tion of an integrated Europe, the President
emphasized the importance of agricultural exports
to the trade of the United States and other Free
World countries, and repeated his exj^ectation that
the Community would take these factore into ac-
count. In this respect, the President referred to
the special responsibility of the highly industrial-
ized powers, such as the United States and the
European Economic Community, to work for free
and non-discriminatory access to their markets for

the products of developing nations in Latin Amer-
ica, Africa and Asia.

Dr. Hallstein affinned his sincere support for
the President's trade program ' and for its ol>jec-
tives of reducing barriers to trade, on a non-dis-
criminatoi-y basis, between the two great trading
units of the United States and the European Eco-
nomic Community. The President and Dr.
Hallstein agreed that a program of this nature
promises to add great sti'ength and cohesion to
the West. Dr. Hallstein expressed the view that
the President's trade program ofTei-s the basis for
fruitful negotiation, in a spirit of genuine reciproc-
ity, between the United States and the European
Economic Community.

' For text of the President's message to Congress, see
Bulletin of Feb. 12, 1962, p. 231 ; for a summary of the
proposed legislation, see iliid., Feb. 26, 1962, p. 343.

The European Economic Community and United States Trade Policy

hy Joseph D. Coppock

Director, Foreign Economic Advisory Staff ^

I welcome the opportunity to discuss with you
this important subject of the European Economic
Community and U.S. trade policy.

In thinking back over the history of interna-
tional economic events, it is hard to recall any-
thing which excited as much interest and attention
as has the European Common Market. The estab-
lishment of the German Zollcerein in 1834, Great
Britain's repeal of the corn laws in 1846, the
British-French treaty of 1860 establishing almost
free trade, the acceptance of the gold standard by
the principal trading countries in the 1870's, the
suspension of gold payments by the British in
1931, the establisliment of the British Imperial
Preference System in 1032, the initiation of the

'Address made before the Texas Group of the Invest-
ment Bankers Association of America at San Antonio,
Tex., on Apr. 9 (press release 227 dated Apr. 6; as-
delivered text).

Hull trade agreements program in 1934, the cre-
ation of the International Monetary Fund and the
International Bank for Reconstruction and De-
velopment in 1945, the signing of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1947 — all of
these notable events in the field of international
trade and finance seem, at least at present, less
important than the European Economic Com-
munity. Only an event of great importance would
warrant the amount of ink that has been spilled
and the amount of woodpulp that has been used
in describing and analyzing it. It has titillated
the political mhid, the business mind, the financial
mind, the academic mind, the military mind.

Let mo refresh your minds on the basic facts.
.\ treaty was signed at Konie on March "25, 1957,
by representatives of France, Germany, Italy,
the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg. It
was ratified by their Governments in the course

770

Department of Stale Bulletin

of 1957 and went into effect on January 1, 1958.
The treaty is of book length. It has 248 articles
in the main body and several lengthy annexes.
Tlie purposes are expressed vividly in the pre-
amble of the treaty, as follows:

Determined to establish the fouiulations of an ever
closer union among the European peoples,

Deeiiled to ensure the economic and social progress of
their countries by common action in eliminating the bar-
riers which divide Europe,

Directing their efforts to the essential purpose of con-
stantly improving the living and working conditions of
their peoples.

Recognizing that the removal of existing obstacles calls
for concerted action in order to guarantee a steady ex-
pansion, a balanced trade and fair competition,

Anxious to strengthen the unity of their economies and
to ensure their harmonious development by reducing the
differences existing between the various regions and by
mitigating the backwardness of fhe less favoured.

Desirous of contributing by means of a common com-
mercial policy to the progressive abolition of restrictions
on international trade,

Intending to confirm the solidarity which binds Europe
and overseas countries, and desiring, to ensure the devel-
opment of their prosi)erity, in accordance with the prin-
ciples of the Charter of the United Nations,

Resolved to strengthen the safeguards of peace and
liberty by establishing this combination of resources, and
calling upon the other peoples of Europe who share their
ideal to join in their efforts.

Have decided to create a European Economic
Community. . . .

"\^naat the EEC proposes to do to purstie these
objectives has been concisely stated as follows:"

(1) To remove tariffs, quotas, and other barriers to
trade within the Community by gradual stages ;

(2) To create a uniform external tariff between the
Community and the rest of the world, and to act as a
unit In negotiating on external commercial policy with
others ;

(3) To abolish restrictions on the movement of services,
labor, capital, and business enterprises within the Com-
munity ;

(4) To allow colonies and associated territories of the
Six (mainly in Africa) to link themselves to the Common
Market, extending the benefits of the Common Market to
their exports, while allowing them to maintain restraints
on imports ;

(5) To prohibit private cartels and other restraints
on trade unless they foster the improving of production
or distribution or technical and economic progress ;

(6) To coordinate monetary and fiscal policies in order

' Robert R. Bowie and Theodore Geiger, "The European
Economic Community and the United States," Subcom-
mittee on Foreign Economic Policy of the .Joint Economic
Committee, 87th Cong., 1st sess. (Joint Committee print).

to promote balance of payments, high employment, and
price stability in each member country ;

(7) To establish a common agricultural policy within
the Community ;

(S) To create an Investment Bank for Europe and a
Development Fund for Associated Overseas Territories
to transfer capital to the less developed parts of the Com-
munity and to dependent or associated areas ;

(9) To equalize wages for men and women and har-
monize methods of computing overtime ; to undertake to
improve and harmonize living and working conditions
within the Community ;

(10) To create a Social Fund to finance retraining,
resettling, or otherwise assisting workers harmed by liber-
alizing trade within the Common Market.

Organizational Arrangements of EEC

The organizational arrangements are suffi-
ciently comiDlex to warrant description. In order
to do this I must remind you of two other organi-
zations embracing the same membership : the Eu-
ropean Coal and Steel Community, begun in 1952
imder the popular name of the Schuman Plan,
and the European Atomic Energy Community,
begun in 1958 under the popular name of
EURATOM. There is a Council of Ministers of
the member countries, which serves all three com-
munities. There is a Court of Justice, which also
serves as legal adjudicator of the three treaties.
There is a European Parliamentary Assembly,
composed of members elected from and by the na-
tional legislatures of the member countries. Then,
on the executive level, are the High Authority of
the Coal and Steel Conrmiunity, the Commission
of the Atomic Energy Community, and the Com-
mission of the European Economic Community.

The European Economic Community is ex-
pected to be in full effect by 1970.

The aspect of the EEC to which we Americans
have paid most attention has been the customs
union feature, which will eliminate all internal
trade barriers and provide a common external
trade policy, including a common tariff. As
should be evident from the statement of purposes
and the planned actions, the EEC involves much
more than a customs union. It is a treaty, a plan,
a constitution for the gradual but complete inte-
gration of the economies of the member countries.
Of necessity, such integration calls for much po-
litical cooperation, perhaps even confederation or
federation.

These are the bare bones of the European Eco-
nomic Community. I should now like to deal

May 7, 1962

77 \

with three major questions concerning it. First,
what brought it about ? Second, how is it doing ?
Third, how does it affect the United States?

Origins of EEC

First, its origins. It is tempting to review the
efforts through modern European history to unify
Europe, but I shall deal with events and circum-
stances only since 1945 — and with only some of
them. The end of World War II left Europe in
a weakened condition, unable to defend itself
against the aggressive push of the Russians with-
out the military and economic assistance of the
United States. The longi-un alternative to pov-
erty, internal bickering, and military weakness — if
not Communist takeover — was some kind of coop-
eration. Western Europe responded to the initia-
tive of the United States in establishing the Or-
ganization for European Economic Cooperation
and in participating in the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization. It was essential that some way be
found to bring Western Germany into close and
permanent association with other countries of
Western Europe, particularly France. Men of
great vision subordinated the long history of
Franco-German rivalry to a vision of a cooperative
or voluntarily unified Europe. Social invention
of the first order was required, and many dedi-
cated persons rose to the opportunities. The
Schuman Plan for a Coal and Steel Community
was the first really strong measure for welding
these old enemies together as friends.

Despite these European efforts, it is doubtful
if the steps toward European economic union could
have progressed without the two strong external
pressures — from the U.S.S.R. to the east and from
the U.S.A. to the west. The U.S.S.R. maintained
its threatening posture; the U.S.A. maintained its
encouraging posture. Viewed historically, the
Russian attitude is more readily understandable
than our own. The Russians have had strong
historical reasons to fear a strong, unified Western
Europe. Napoleon, Wilhelm II, and Hitler are
bitter reminders to them. Until quite recently
Americans have felt insulated from the Euroi^ean
power struggles. Only after World War II, after
much debate and soul searching, did the United
States conclude that the Soviet and Communist
threat was of such a magnitude that a unified
Western Europe was not only in the interest of
the Europeans but also in our basic interest too.

Together, Western Europe and North America
would have a preponderance of military and eco-
nomic power which could deal with the Soviet
Communist menace. We have become convinced
that the people of Western Europe share our ideals
of freedom and democracy so deeply that there is
no risk of a unified Europe throwing in its lot
with the Russians against us. Therefore we want
a strong ally, not a lot of weak or uncertain ones.

Signs of EEC Success

Now the second question : How is the European
Economic Community doing? You know what
the answer is. It is doing fine. But let me give
you some numbers to support this statement. Be-
tween 1953 and 1960 the real gross national profl-
uct of the EEC countries rose at a rate of 5.5
percent per year; the United States GNF grew
at a rate of 2.5 percent. EEC exports increased
from $14.1 billion in 1953 to $30 billion in 1960,
or 113 percent, compared with a 29-percent in-
crease in U.S. exports. EEC imports went up
by 99 percent and U.S. imjiorts by 35 percent.
These export and import figures refer to current
values, without adjustment for price changes. In-
flation has been brought under control. The EEC
countries have built up large enough monetary
reserves to allow full convertibility of their cur-
rencies on current account and moderately liberal
capital movements. Unemployment is not a
major problem, except in parts of Italy. EEC
capital investment has been running at 20 percent
or more of GNP, compared with our 15 percent.

Another sign of success, at least as impressive
as the statistical measures, is the application for
memberehip in the EEC by the United Kingdom.
The announcement was made in August 1961, and
the negotiations have been proceeding since last
fall. This is a momentous action by the United
Kingdom. Only a half century ago Great Britain
was the leading industrial country in the world;
she ruled a vast empire, her navy ruled the waves.
Now the empire is mostly gone, though cordial
bonds link the Commonwealth. British militaiy
power, relative to that of other major powere, is
now only a fraction of what it was. As of 1960
the gross national product of tlie United Kingdom
was $69 billion, comparetl with $177 billion for the
EEC, $225 billion for the Soviet Union, and $504
billion for the United States. These are estimates,
of couree.

772

Department of State Bulletin

During; the discussions of European economic
imion in the early 1950's, the Britisli took the po-
sition that their Conunonwealth obligations and
their relation \yith the United States were such
that they should not associate themselves as firmly
with continental Europe as the developing plans
envisaged. "WHien the EEC was consummated,
Britain took the lead in organizing a European
Free Trade Association, composed of the United
Kingdom, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Austria,
Switzerland, and Portugal, which called for the
gradual elimination of tariti's among the members
but with each maintainmg its own tariff with re-
spect to outsidei-s. By 1961 it became apparent
that this organization did not have the vitality
that the EEC had. For one thing, Britain had
had a slower rate of economic growth than the
EEC, and it had been in balance-of-payments
difficulties quite frequently.

It is to the great credit of tlie British leadere
and the British people tliat they have seen the
opportunities available to them in tiie Common
Market. Other countries are also seeking admis-
sion. The United States Government has played
a sympathetic but detached role in this compli-
cated and sensitive process of negotiation.

How the Common Market Affects the U.S.

This brings me to my third question: How
does the Common Market afl'ect the United States?
I have already indicated that, from a political and
military point of view, the position of the United
States is clear. We welcome strong allies. Eco-
nomically, the effects of the EEC on us are compli-
cated. The financial and economic press have vied
with the governmental economists in turning out
analyses of these effects, usually with masses of
statistics. Let me state right off that I think that
there are too many variables involved to make
quantitative predictions reliable. Moreover, some
of the variables, such as our own trade policy, are
unknown.

Some things can be said, however. One is that
the increasing European prosperity will tend to
increase the demand for U.S. exports. Imports
from the outside amounted to about 11 percent of
GNP for the EEC countries in 1960. U.S. exports
to them amounted to $2.25 billion, or one-eighth of
the total of imports into the EEC. Hence, if the
marginal propensity to import approximates the
average propensity, a 5-percent increase in EEC

May 7, 1962

GNP— about $9 billion with reference to the 1960
figure of $177 billion — would increase total EEC
imports by 11 percent of $9 billion, or $1 billion.
The U.S. share of that $1 billion would be one-
eighth, or $125 million. I can think of one good
reason why the figure might be larger, namely,
that the Europeans will want more and more of
our consumer gadgetry as they get better off. But
I can think of another good reason why the figure
might be smaller, namely, that the Europeans —
and associated American finns — will produce
many of the mass-market consumer goods in
Europe instead of import them. I do not Icnow
how you measure these forces, but the way several
hundred American companies have rushed to
establish subsidiaries or affiliates in Europe in the
last 4 years makes me think that the production in
Europe will have the edge. Of course U.S. finns
operating there will increase their earnings over
the years.

Another effect that can be analyzed pretty well
is the so-called discrimination effect. As the tariffs
among the members of the EEC move toward zero
and the external tariff becomes standardized,
American companies selling in Italy, for example,
will be at a disadvantage as compared with, say,
German companies, because American imports into
Italy will have to pay the tariff while German
imports will not. How important this effect will
be will depend on the height of the Conmnon
Market external tariff. Although the projected
Common Market tariff is now laiown, it is subject
to reduction through negotiation. "\^niatever its
height, however, it will discriminate to that degree
against American exports — and all other non-EEC
exports — and in favor of internal EEC trade.
This is the nature of a customs union. Lest this
make us feel gloomy, just remember that many
other things besides tariffs affect trade.

As I said earlier, people who start analyzing the
effects of the EEC like to inject statistics into the
picture. I wish to indulge briefly in that game
and to present to you some figures which are seeing
the light of day for the first time, as far as I know.
This is a frequency distribution of the tariff rates
for the United States and for the EEC. The rates
are all expressed in ad valorem percentage terms,
and they are the rates in existence prior to the
romid of negotiations completed in Geneva last
month. ^ A distribution of this sort is much more

' For background, see Bulletin of Apr. 2, 1962, p. 561.

773

reliable as a measure of tariffs than weighted av-
erages, which understate the restrictive effects of
high rates.

Frequency Distribution of U.S. and EEC Tariff

Rates

Rales (or ad valorem U.S. EEC

equivalent rates) Number Percent A^utnber Percent

of duty of rates of rates of rates of rates

Free 990 20 270 10

0.1-9.9% 894 18 538 19

10.0-19.9 1,510 29 1,624 56

20.0-29.9 775 15 358 13

30.0 and above 895 18 45 2

Total 5,064 100 2,835 100

The interesting thing here is not the average of
median rates but rather the spread. Thirty-three
percent of our rates are 20 percent or above; 15
percent of tlie EEC rates are that high. Many of
our rates are above 50 percent. At the other end,
20 percent of our items are duty free, while only
10 percent of theirs are. Now it is a fine parlor
game to speculate on the expansionai-y effects of
tariff reductions, but it is not a scientifically de-
pendable exercise. All we can say with confidence
is tliat lower trade barriers increa.se the oppor-
tunities for trade and inject new competition and
vitality into the economic life of the countries in-
volved. Dynamic factors cannot be measured
easily, but they may be the most important.

Now here is where the President's Trade Ex-
pansion Act of 1962 * comes into the picture. The
Europeans are prepared to negotiate tariff reduc-
tions if we are. Therefore the bill now before
Congress asks authority for the President to ne-
gotiate reductions of up to 50 percent of the pres-
ent levels in return for equivalent concessions by
other countries. It also asks for iiutliority to go
all the way to zero on items of which we and the
EEC export 80 percent of the total free-world ex-
ports. Statistical analysis shows tliat this has
meaning only if the United Kingdom is included
in the EEC. There is also a provision for lower-
ing tariffs down to zero on primary connnodities
of particular interest to the less developed coun-
tries, provided the Europeans will go along and
provided tliey are not produced in sufficient
quantities in tlie United States. I should point
out that U.S. agriculture has a tremendous in-
terest in maintaining access to the European mar-
ket but that the European farmers are under-

* For text of President Kennedy's message to Congress,
see ihiil., Feb. 12, 10G2, p. 231; for a suuiiiiary of the
proposed legislation, see ibid., Feb. 20, 19C2, p. 343.

774

standably reluctant to give up their longstanding
protective arrangements, many of them similar
to our agricultural programs.

The President's bill also has several provisions
for overcoming seriously adverse effects on Ameri-
can firms and workers resulting from tariff re-
ductions. Adjustment assistance is the most im-
portant new element here.

To conclude: The European Economic Com-
munity is a fact of life. Its success is of the first
order of importance for us in world political
terms. Its economic effects on us are difficult to
ascertain, but the probably bad effects will be
minimized and the probably good effects will be
maximized if we equip ourselves — through a clean
Trade Expansion Act — to negotiate substantial,
gradual reductions in the tariffs which tend to
divide the great new Common Market of Europe
and the even greater, older common market of the
United States, the common market that the
Founding Fathers of this Republic had tlie wis-
dom to establish in 1787.

Trade Policy for the 1960's

iij Philip H. Trezise

Acting Assistant Secretary for Economic A-ffairs ^

For 1: weeks now the Ways and Means Commit-
tee of the House of Representatives has been
holding public hearings on H.R. 9900, the Trade
Expansion Act of 1962." The committee has heard
262 witnesses testifying for and against the bill.
These hearings are a part of the national debate
on our policy toward international trade. They
will be followed by debate on the floor of the House
and by liearings and debate in the Senate. And
they have had their echoes in the Nation's press
and in innumerable public and private discussions
around the country.

It would be impossible to smnmarize in a few
moments all the matters covered at the Waj'S and
Means Committee liearings, to say nothing of all

' -ViUlress made before the Action for Foreign Policy
group at Pittsburgh, Pa., on Apr. 12 (press release 230).

' For text of President Kennedy's message to Congress,
see Bulletin of Feb. 12, 15)02, p. 231; for a summary of
H.R. i)!K)0, see ihid., Feb. 20, 1002, p. ,343; for a statement
made by Under Secretary Rail before the Ways and
Means Committee on Mar. 13, see ibid., Apr. 9, 1902, p. i""!)".

Deporfmenf of Sfofe Bulletin

the questions asked and answered in the discussions
takin<; place around the country. For this eve-
ning I would like to focus on one point. This is
the extent of the authority that would be given the
President to deal with American tariffs under the
draft bill.

During the course of the Ways and Means Com-
mittee hearings, and even more often in the press,
there have l^een statements tJiat U.K. 9900 would
give tlie President "imprecedented" and "sweep-
ing'' powers over our tariff schedules. These are
sweeping phrases themselves, and perhaps they
reflect our national tendency to use exaggerated
language in discussing public issues.

The term "unprecedented" surely is used in a
loose sense. The legislation before the Congress
would confer on the President the authority to
negotiate about tariff's with other countries. This
power has been held by every President since the
first Trade Agreements Act was passed in 1934.
Every President since 1934, moreover, has used the
power. Each one did so under rules laid down by
Congress when it delegated authority to the Presi-
dent. All of this has been reviewed by the courts,
and its constitutionality has been affii-med.

The grant of authority under the new law thus
would be an extension of a time-honored delega-
tion of negotiating power to the President by the
Congress. It is not a departure from the past. It
is true, however, that the specific kinds of negotiat-
ing authority to be given the President contain a
new element. It will be helpful to go over the
relevant provisions of the law.

Summary of Bill

First, the President would be empowered to
negotiate, on the basis of mutual benefit, reduc-
tions of 50 percent in American tariffs in return
for reductions in other people's tariffs. This pro-
vision might be called the standard trade agree-
ments authority. It would be applicable to any
of our free-world trading partners, and it would
cover, abstractly at least, almost all of the articles
covered by our existing tariff schedules. Similar
50- percent authority has been granted to Presi-
dents on two occasions in the past.

A second provision would empower the Presi-
dent to negotiate with the Common Market for
the mutual reduction or elimination of duties on
a limited number of commodity categories. This
is new in tariff negotiating authority. It would

be operative only with respect to the countries
adhering to the Treaty of Rome at the time of
negotiations. It would cover only those categories
of goods in which the United States and the Com-
mon Market countries accounted for 80 percent of
free-world trade during some base period sub-
sequent to December 31, 1956. These are limiting
definitions. On the other hand, negotiations with
the Common Market under this authority would
not be subject to a percentage limitation on the
extent of duty reductions but would rather leave
this open.

Third, the new legislation would permit the
President to offer in negotiations the reduction or
the elimination of American tariffs that are now
at 5 percent or less by value. These duties, in the
main, are nuisance levies although they are ad-
ministratively burdensome on exporters and im-
porters.

Finally, the new act would give the President
the authority to reduce or to eliminate duties on
products of tropical agriculture and forestry, sub-
ject to the condition that the Common Market
take similar and nondiscriminatory action. This
is a very special provision. It stems from our
desire to open markets in the advanced countries
on a nondiscriminatory basis to all of the pro-
ducers of tropical products, in Latin America, in
Asia, and in Africa.

These negotiating authorities, as you see, are
defined and limited by the proposed statute.
Moreover the President would be required, as he
is now, to seek the advice and guidance of the
United States Tariff Commission. Tliere would
be, upon the enactment of this or any bill, admin-
istrative provision for extensive study within the
executive branch and for hearings open to the
interested private parties before tariff negotiations
could be undertaken. In the negotiations that
would ensue, our negotiators would be trading
tariff reductions for tariff reductions as they have
in the past. They would be acting not only under
formal instructions to get benefits for the United
States but also under strong pei-sonal and official
pressures to get for the United States the most
useful reductions possible in other people's tariff
barriers.

A judgment about the merits of this proposed
grant of negotiating authority to the President
must rest in the end on the answers to two ques-
tions. First, is it in the United States interest to

May 7, J 962

775

take the lead in attempting to bring down barriers
to intemational trade generally? Second, is the
special authority to deal with the Common Market
a desirable grant of power ?

The answer to the first question may be debated,
but there are certainly impressive reasons for be-
lieving that our interests abroad and the interests
of our domestic economy as well would be well
served by an expansion of free-world commerce.
On the basis of experience we could expect our
exports to grow substantially more rapidly than
our imports with a consequent benefit to our diffi-
cult balance-of-payments problem. The growth
of international trade, we could confidently ex-
pect, would act to raise living standards every-
where and to increase underetanding among
peoples and nations. Tlie United States is so
dominant a figure in the world economy that it
alone can provide the leadership to undertake a
new drive to bring down the artificial obstacles
that now inhibit the expansion of trade. The au-
thorities to negotiate on tariffs which are provided
in the Trade Expansion Act amount to an ex-
pression of American readiness to continue our
role of leadership in the free world.

Authority To Negotiate Witii Common Market

The proposed authority to negotiate with the
European Common Market is sufficiently new and
different as to present a separate question. For
the first time in the history of our trade agree-
ments legislation we have singled out a group of
countries for special negotiations. To understand
why, we need to look at the Common Market as it
is and as it may be.

The Treaty of Rome, which was signed on
March 25, 1957, provided among other things for
a customs union among six of the industrial states
of Western Europe: Germany, France, Italy, Bel-
gium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. Al-
though customs unions are not new on the world
stage, the Common Market, even confined to tliese
six nations, is an unusual undertaking. It includes
170 million people. Its total volume of inter-
national trade is about 70 percent larger than our
own. Its total output of goods and services has
been growing recently at a rate of about 7 percent
per year, or more tlian twice ivs fast iis ours. It
is already a groat industrial power rivaling in
many respects the United States and comparable
to or ahead of the Soviet Union.

776

The success of the Common Market has been
reflected in dramatic increases in business activity,
in increased foreign trade, and in rising wages
and purchasing power. This has had its impact
throughout Europe. Greece has indicated its de-
sire to join and has already been given associated
membership. The United Kingdom, Denmark,
and Ireland are negotiating for admission, and
Norway has indicated its intention of doing so.
Elsewhere in Western Europe, in Sweden, Swit-
zeriand, Austria, and Spain, there is lively interest
in the Common Market and a deep concern to
work out some kind of arrangements for associa-
tion with it.

If negotiations with Britain, Denmark, and
Ireland are successfully concluded, the Common
Market will grow immediately to about 220 million
people. It will be the largest single element in
international trade. Inevitably it will become a
major factor in world affairs.

The customs union feature of the Treaty of
Eome has progressed very rapidly. The European
members have taken the initial steps of reducing
tariffs among themselves— so far by 50 percent—
and of agreeing on a common tariff against the
rest of the worid. The deadline for going down
to zero tariffs within the Market is 1909, but it
seems certain that this goal will be reached sooner.
The agreement on the character of the Common
Market tariff against the world has been readied,
and the European Common Market members now
negotiate as a unit with ourselves and with other
countries. In all this immensely complicated
business there has been no break in the forward
movement. On the contrary, the Common Market
members have exceeded their own timetable.

Prospects of New Trading World

The appearance of the Connnon Market on the
world scene, and the prospective adherence of the
United Kingdom, seems certain to face us with a
fundamentally new kind of trading worid. Up
until now the United States has been the world's
only mass market, i.e. a market having large num-
bers of people commanding large amounts of con-
sinner purchasing power. Now, suddenly, there
is in sight another such unit, one wliich already
imports twice as much as we do and which lias n
huge potential for expansion.

One measure of the possibilities inherent in this
new trading world that is already within our range

Department of State Bullelii

of vision is the present volume of ordinary dur-
able consumer goods in the new Common Market
as compared with the United States.

In Western Europe telephones are relatively as
common as they were in the United States in 1912.
In automobile ownei-ship Europe is as the United
States was in 19:20. The distribution of refrigera-
tors compares with the United States position as
of 1935. In washing machines the European con-
sumer stands where the American consumer was
in 1935. And so on. In brief, the European
market for durable consumer goods is not only not
saturated but in important respects is in its very
infancy. If anything is certain in the world, it
is that desires for these goods will increase. If
the new European economy lives up to its promise,
the ability to buy such goods will grow rapidly.

This is part of the meaning of the new European
mass market. It will be a market for the kinds
of things we have learned to produce with great
efficiency. Beyond that there will be needed the
kinds of machinery and raw materials that are
necessary for the expansion of manufacturing in-
dustries. Nobody now can estimate with assurance
or precision the ultimate dimensions of the Euro-
pean market. The possibilities, however, are
clearly very extensive — so extensive that we would
have to be blind indeed not to see them.

On this score alone our interests would seem
quite obviously to call for the seeking of a close
trading relationship with the Common Market.
If we do nothing, the tendency would be for the
new Europe to grow as a trading entity separated
from us by a comparatively high common tariff.
Behind this tariff producers in Europe would be
impelled to develop quickly the capacity and the
know-how for serving the European consumers,
wlio would number, perhaps, up to 250 million.
Our trade with Europe would not stop. It prob-
ably would grow, as European incomes grew. But
we would not be able to take fullest advantage, or
even optimum advantage, of the Common Market.
To a considerable extent our skills in mass produc-
tion and in mass selling would not be allowed to be
effective because of the European tariff barrier.

It is this prospect that furnishes a main reason
for the provision of special negotiating authority
with the Common Market. If Britain acUieres to
the Rome Treaty, then the new bargaining power
requested by tlie President will enable us to nego-
tiate with the Europeans across a range of com-
modities where we or the Europeans or both now

are the most efficient producers in the world. We
would be proposing, in effect, that we agree with
the Europeans to compete with one another in
these commodities without undue tariff barriers
on either side. We would be proposing that the
new Euroi^ean economy develop, witliin some
limits at least, in a fashion consistent with the
economic efficiencies that we and the Europeans
already possess. There is, as I say, a direct and
important commercial reason why we should pro-
ceed along these lines. Our producers need access
to the potential European market, and we should
be prepared to bargain as effectively as we can to
get such access. If the past is any guide, our
exports should benefit markedly from wider open-
ings in Western Europe.

Building a Partnership With Europe

In forging new links of trade with the emerg-
ing new Europe, moreover, we would be developing
some of the terms of our association with what
may become within foreseeable time the second
greatest power in the world. The European states
are taking the steps toward creating imity in an
area that has been divided and fragmented ever
since the decline of the Roman Empire. If the
European movement continues to make progress,
if the Treaty of Rome attracts adherents as it
seems likely to do, the political consequences will
be of truly enormous dimensions.

The United States is a global power with major
political, economic, and defense interests all around
the globe. Apai't from constitutional inhibitions,
our position internationally would argue against
full association with a European entity. We do
need to find the ways to partnership, however.
A strong, stable Europe can be an invaluable part-
ner in the years ahead, as we continue to contend
with the expansive pressures of <he Soviet Empire
and with the growing pains of the new and the
underdeveloped countries.

The details of a partnership with Europe will
have to be developed point by point, case by case.
AVe are in fact already making progress on this ad
hoc basis in the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development and elsewhere. It
seems clear, however, that the partnership will not
work very well in other fields if we are unable to
find a means to accommodate to one anotlier in
trade. We do not need to become a member of the
European customs union. We do not need to re-

May 7, 7 962

777

move all of our trade and tariff restrictions. We
do need to find a minimum means for building an
expanding and a mutually profitable trading rela-
tionship.

H.R. 9900 is intended, in its Common Market
provision, to provide the basis for discussion and
negotiation with the Common Market along these
lines. It will be a means and a beginning, not a
conclusion or a happy ending. But if we lack the
means or cannot make a beginning, then there can
be no prospects for a successful ending.

President Kennedy Hails Agreement
for Nortlieast Brazil Development

Following is the text of a letter from, President
Kennedy to President Goulart of Brazil conceiv-
ing an agreement signed at Washington on April
13 hy Secretary Rusk and Brazilian Foreign Min-
ister San Tiago Dantas under which the United
States and Brazil are committing a total of $276
million for a program of development in northeast
Brazil.

White House press release dated April 12, for release April 13

April 13, 1962
Dear Mr. President: I am deeply gratified by
today's signature of an agreement ^ thi'ough
which our two countries, under the Alliance for
Progress, will work together in a program of
development in the Northeast of Brazil.

We approach this program with the same sense
of urgency and in the same determined spirit that
your government has demonstrated in its planning
for this region. We share with you the convic-
tion that the twenty million people in the North-
east must be aiforded an opportunity to participate
in the future growth of Brazil, and that we must
make a bold attack on the economic and social
problems of the region.

'Wq work together under this program to give
full meaning to the Alliance for Progress, confi-
dent that this undertaking will move us forward
toward the goals set forth last August at Punta
del Este. What makes it an Alliance progi-uin
in the true sense is that the initiative came from
Brazil; that the plan was conceived in your
country; and that it will bo adiiiinisterod by
Brazilians.

' Not priiilcd here.
778

Our joint program will consist of a two-pronged
attack on the problems of the Northeast.

First, we will act to meet specific urgent needs
of highest priority to bring pure water to areas
that lack water, to create sources of electric power,
to provide education that will enhance workers
skills, and to establish emergency health units
throughout the areas.

Second, we will pledge ninety-eight million dol-
lars to the first two years of your five year long-
range program of development — a program de-
signed to bring about a steady increase in living
standards, rising opportunities, and the integra-
tion of the Northeast into the national economy
of Brazil.

At the end of the two years we will conduct a
joint review of the program and decide together
how we can most effectively work toward our
goals in the succeeding years.

We are aware that the problems we face are
complex and deep-rooted, that they will not yield
to slogans or superficial action. Only hard work,
patience and persistence in carrying project after
project to completion will achieve what we seek:
to change the face of Northeast Brazil and pro-
vide a better life for its people.

I am most grateful, Mr. President, for this
opportunity to join with you in what we hope will
be a major contribution to a better life in our
hemisphere.

Sincerely,

John F. Kennedy
His Excellency

JOAO BeLC'HIOR MaRQUI^S G0UI.ART

President of tJie Republic of the

United States of Brazil
Brasilia, Brazil

U.S. Announces Continuance
of Relations Witli Argentina

Department Statement

Press release 2r>7 dated April 18

Aml)assa(lor [I\(>lx>r(] ArcClintock today ac-
knowledged tlio receipt of a note dated Marcli 30,
1962, from the Argentine Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Worship, thus continuing relations
with the Government of Argentina.

Department of State Bulletin

President Announces Two Actions
Relating to Imports of Cheese

The President announced on March 30 (White
House press release) two actions relating to im-
ports of cheese into the United States.

New Zealand has informed the U.S. Govern-
ment of its decision to reduce its exports of Colby
cheese to the United States to a level less than
half that of calendar year 1961 because of market
conditions. Imports of Colby cheese, which are
not subject to a quota, have been growing rapidly
in recent years. These imports come mainly from
New Zealand, and imports from that country
reached 11.2 million pounds in calendar year 1961.
In the past year marketing conditions for cheddar
and cheddar-type cheeses have changed, and there
is now a surplus in the United States.

During the year July 1, 1962, to June 30, 1963,
imports of Colby cheese from New Zealand into
the United States will not exceed 6,720,000 pounds,
a reduction of about 7,500,000 pounds below the
calendar 1961 level. For the remainder of the year
ending June 30, 1962, imports from New Zealand
will be held to amounts already in the pipelines
for import into the United States. Total imports
for the year ending June 30, 1962, will thus be held
to not more than 11,600,000 pounds, which repre-
sents a substantial reduction from the average
level of calendar 1961.

Consultations with New Zealand will take place
later this year regarding market developments and
the trade in Colby cheese.

New Zealand's Colby cheese factories have al-
ready discontinued production for the current
marketing year and will not start operations again
until about September 19G2.

The action of New Zealand does not affect the
right to impose section 22 limitations on Colby
cheese imports if imports of this product from
other countries become so large as to interfere with
the Department of Agriculture's domestic price
support program for milk and butterf at. Imports
of Colby cheese from countries other than New
Zealand amounted to 217,000 pounds, mostly from
Australia, in the year ending December 31, 1961.

The other action announced on March 30 is the
issuance of a proclamation ^ by the President in-
creasing the import quota on blue-mold cheese

from 4,167,000 to 5,017,000 pounds. The quota for
blue-mold cheese has been in effect since July 1,
1953, at which time quotas were also established
for cheddar, edam, gouda, and Italian-type
cheeses.

Effective July 1, 1960, the import quota for
edam and gouda cheese was increased from 4.6
million pounds to 9.2 million pounds. On the
same date, the import quotas for certain Italian
types of cheese were increased from 9.2 million
pounds to 11.5 million pounds.

The import quota for blue-mold cheese has re-
mained unchanged at 4.2 million pounds since it
was established on July 1, 1953.

During the period fiscal year 1953 to fiscal year
1960-61, domestic production of blue-mold cheese
increased from 9.4 million pounds to 15.1 million
pounds, and during the same period total U.S.
consumption increased from 13 million pounds to
19 million pounds. Consumption of blue-mold
cheese in the United States is increasing at a rate
of 1 million to 1.5 million pounds each year.

The imported blue-mold cheese commonly sells
on the U.S. market at prices 4 to 6 cents per pound
above the similar domestic product.

Agreement Signed for Sale
of Cotton and Rice to Poland

Press release 260 dated April 19

A supplemental agreement for the sale to Po-
land of approximately 92,000 bales of cotton and
10,000 tons of rice was signed on April 19 at
Washington by representatives of the Govern-
ments of the United States and Poland. The
agreement supplements one signed by the Govern-
ments on December 15, 1961,' which provided for
the sale to Poland of $44.6 million worth of surplus
agricultural commodities, including certain ocean
transportation costs.

The supplemental agreement results from dis-
cussions undertaken since the signing of the De-
cember 15 agreement and is an amendment to it.
Under the same tenns as in the December agree-
ment, the United States will sell, for local cur-
rency (Polish zlotys), surplus commodities which
have an export market value of $15.8 million, in-

' No. 3460 ; for text, see 27 Fed. Reg. 3183 or White House
press release dated Mar. 30.

' Bulletin of .Jan. 1, 1962, p. Z5.

Moy 7, 7 962

779

cludin<r ocean transportation costs for commodi- agreement, to purchase with its own resources

ties shipped on U.S.-flag vessels. The transactions from the United States an additional 46,000 bales

are authorized by the Agricultural Trade Develop- of cotton and an additional 10,000 tons of rice,

ment and Assistance Act as amended ( Public Law These purchases are over and above the amounts to

4^gQ\ be purchased for the zloty equivalent ot the *15.»

Poland has also undertaken, as a part of this million mentioned above.

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings '

Scheduled May Through July 1962

GATT Committee III on Expansion of International Trade .... Geneva '^y

2d U.N. ECAFE Symposium on the Development of Petroleum lehran •■ y

Resources of Asia and the Far East. . Mav ''-

UNESCO Executive Board: 61st Session rans ;J ^_

NATO Ministerial Council Athens ^J ^_

ITU Administrative Council: 17th Session •„■ • • Geneva Mav 7-

lAEA Symposium on Radiation Damage in SoUds and Reactor Venice

Materials. „ May 7-

15th International Film Festival Cannes ^^^ ^_

ILO Chemical Industries Committee: 6th Session ••■••••■ geneva j

IMCO Maritime Safety Committee: Subcommittee on Code of London J'

NATo'^Pianning Board for Ocean Shipping: 14th Meeting Washington May 7-

International Seed Testing Association: 13th Congress Lisbon Mav 7-

ITU CCIR Study Group II (Receivers) Geneva y __

ITU CCIR Study Group VI (Ionospheric Propagation) Geneva J „_

GATT Committee on Balanoe-of-Payments Restrictions Geneva J

ANZUS Council: 8th Meeting Canberra Mav 8-

15th World Health Assembly Vf "?'V 'i Mav 8-

8th International Hydrographic Conference Monte l ario J ^

NATO Civil Defense Committee ^ • : ■ ■ • o. • • J''?^ Mav 8

U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Human Rights: Seminar on Status lokyo y

of Women in Family Law. _ vi. g_

U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Narcotic Drugs: Committee on lUicit Geneva ^ .>

InternatTonal Cotton Advisory Committee: Committee on Extra- Washington Ma.v 9"

Lona Staple Cotton. . -nr t- * Mav 14-

International Cotton Advisory Committee: 21st Plenary Meeting . . Washington "laj i^

FAO Committee on Commodity Problems: 35th Session . . . . . ^ome Mav 14-
Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Law: 11th Session (resumed) . Brussels M„v 14-
Exccutive Committee of the Program of the U.N. High Commissioner Geneva iviaj ii-

for Refugees: 7th Session. »*„„ j.

U.N. ECOSOC Commission on International Commodity Trade: 10th itome "^^o-

Session.

1 Prepared in the Office of International Conferences Apr. 12, 1962. Asterisk iiidicates tentative date. Following
is a li^t oTabbJevltions: ANZUS, Australia-New Zealand-tnited States; CCIR, Co-.tg consu tat.f intom
radio communications- CCITT, Comite consultatif international tflegraphique et t^l^phonique LGAIE, Lconomic
Comm°"onfo" Asia ami the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, ^?^rn,:^:^,^[^Mo^l
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on TarilTs and Trade IAEA, International Atomic
Energy Agencv IBE, International Bureau of Education: ICAO. International Civil Aviation Organiza .on: I.L^>. V>* 'f-
naUonal Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; 1 1 U, International lele-
oXmic;ition UnTon NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, OECD, "■■f='--^t\-> "[^.^.'i^lX'viti^'t^^^
and D(;velopment; PAIGH, Pan American Institute of Geography and History; PIANC, ^ ':""-\"''"t. 1"*' "^-y, °";', ,,-^,7^^
ciation of Navigation Congresses; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, ^cientilK a. < Cultural
Orga°i"zatil; UNICEf! United Nations Children's Fund; WHO, World Health Organization; \\ MO. World Meteor-
ological Organization.

7gQ Department of State Bulletin

MA^T^n??^^^ ^°'S,™'''''°" ?." ^'''^'=°"'= ^'■"Ss: 17th Session . . . Geneva M«v la-

NATO Manpower Planning Committee . . . P„ri= May 14-

World Food Forum \ Washini^ton ^.''^ ^^

8th Inter-American Travel Congress '.'.'' ' Rio de Janei'ro ^^''^ !^

19th International Conference on Large Electric Systems ' ' Paris '' ^° May 15-

Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission: Annual Meeting . Quito Vi^^ JST

NATO Civil Aviation Planning Committee . . 6 ■ guuo j,j^y jg_

ICAO Airworthiness Committee: 5th Session ' ' Mnntrenl Vi'^y ^^~

GATT Council of Representatives Geneva ^*^ ^^~

GATT Working Party on the Central American Free Trade Area. ." Geneva vJ^^ oJ~

U.N. Special Fund: 8th Session of Governing Council. . New York ^^^ "'"

Cf?nt^i"^T''T?°"^°r;-'";^'^^-'^'°" • • • • (undeSned) .•.•.•••• ^H^''

Sd International Cinema Festival Cqrtn<rpna rJ^,„u\„ ^^^ ""^~

ICAO Meteorological Operational Telecommunication Network Eu- J^^Y^g'^"^' ^"lo^nbia ^ay 25-

rope (MOTNE) Panel. "in r^u i-aris May 28-

OECD Committee for Scientific Research . . . PnrJo

WHO E.xecutive Board: 30th Session ] Geneva ^""^ ^^~

JI'£,S°^'''''"'"S Body: 152d Session (and its committees) ... ' Geneva nJ''^ nl~

IMCO Maritime Safety Committee: Subcommittee on Subdivision London m''^ ot~

and Stability. May ZH-

International Rubber Study Group: 16th Meeting .... Washington tvt „o

WMO Executive Committee: 14th Session . . Geneva ^''^ ^8-

U.N. Trusteeship Council: 29th Session .... New York H^^ ^^-

UNICEF Committee on Administrative Budget New York May 31-

U.N. Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation: 12th New York lu i ^^

Session. iviay or June

PAIGH Directing Council: 6th Meeting Mexico D F

International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries: l'2th Moscow i °® l~

Meeting. June 4-

U.N. General Assembly: 16th Session (resumed) New York

U.N. Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Qiies- New York t "*^ 1~

tions. June 4-

U.N. ECE Housing Committee: 23d Session Geneva

UNICEF Program Committee and Executive Board ... ' " New York i^ ^~

PIANC Permanent International Commission: Annual Meeting ' Brussels t °® ^~

[nternational Labor Conference: 46th Session Geneva r "^

Hh International Electronic, Nuclear, and Motion Picture Exposition Rome June 6-

[AEA Board of Governors Vienna '"*'

[JNESCO Intergovernmental Meeting on Discrimination in Ediica- Paris "I""® J.,"

tion. June Iz-

[TU CCIR Study Group X (Broadcasting), Study Group XI (Tele- Bad &euznach, Germany June n

vision), and Study Group XII (Tropical Broadcasting). ■' " June 13-

SfATO Industrial Planning Committee . . . Paris t

'^ATO Petroleum Planning Committee . Paris JuneU-

.2th International Film Festival Rprlin , "'^ ^^~

J.N. ECOSOC Technical Assistance Committee ■.■..".■.■■■■■ Geneva i""'' or"

JNESCO Committee of Governmental E.xperts To Prepare a Draft Paris i "*^ oc~

of an International Recommendation on Technical Education ''°~

!ln^\'f"'^'.^'^*,?r''i- 2d Meeting Montreal h,n. 9fi

)ECD Ministerial Meeting Pa^ris r

th FAO Regional Conference for Latin America Brazil June*

nternational Lead and Zinc Study Group: 8th Session of Standing (undcterm'ined) '. '.'.'.'. '. '. j"ng

■'AO Group on Grains: 7th Session Rome

MCO Subcommittee on Tonnage Measurement London r °®

■lATO Science Committee " ' " Paris "^"°®

louth Pacific Commission: 12th Meeting of Research Council '. '. ' Noumea "1"°®

iATT Working Party on Tariff Reduction Geneva "I"°®

TU CCITT Working Parity VII (Definitions) • • • . . geneva j

TU CCITT Study Group XII (Telephone Transmission' Per- Geneva -J""^

formance). June

TU CCITT Study Group XI (Telephone Switching) .... Geneva

J.N. ECE Consultation of Experts on Energy in Europe Geneva t °®

5th International Conference on Public Education . . . Geneva t i o®

'AO World Meeting on the Biology of Tuna and TunaHke Fishes . '. La Jolla Calif r r o

nternational Whaling Commission: 14th Meeting London ' i i i~

nter- American Ministers of Education: 3d Meeting Bogotd i i q

r.N. Economic and Social Council: 34th Session .... GenpvT July 3-

lECD Maritime Committee ] \ Paris "{"^ ^~

iTMO Commission for Agricultural Meteorology: 3d Session . . '. Toronto i i n~

outh Pacific Conference: 5th Ses.sion Pago Pago July 9-

ntarctic Treaty: 2d Consultative Meeting Under Article IX .' ." .' Buenos Aires r i' !o~

outh Pacific Commission: 23d Session Paeo Pno-o r /

BE Council: 28th Session Geneva July 22-

ECD Development As.sistance Committee: Ministerial Meeting . Paris i !^

NESCO Meeting on Protection of Cultural Property in Time of Paris t }^

Armed Conflict. July

loy 7, 1962

781

TREATY INFORMATION

logical OrRanization amending article 13 of the con-
vention of the World Meteorological Organization signed
October 11, IfHT (TIAS 20o2). Adopted at Geneva
April 15, 1959. Entered into force April 15, 1959.
Approval advised hy the Senate: March 13, 1962.
Ratified and approved by the President: April 12, 1962.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Automotive Traffic

Convention on road traffic, with annexes. Done at Geneva
September 19, 1949. Entered into force March 26, 19o2.

TIAS 2487.

Accession deposited: San Marino (with declaration),

March 19, 1962. . ^ . ,

Customs convention on temporary importation of private
road vehicles. Done at New York June 4, 1954. Entered
into force December 15, 1957. TIAS 3943.
Notification that it considers itself hound: Sierra Leone,
March 13, 1SK52.

Aviation

Convention on international civil aviation. Done at
Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force April 4,

1947. TIAS 1591. ■, ^. -.ann

Adherence deposited: Malagasy Republic, April 14, 1962.

Economic Cooperation

Convention on the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development and supplementary protocols nos. 1
and 2 Signed at Paris December 14, 1960. Entered
into force September 30, 1961. TIAS 4891.
Ratification deposited: Italy, March 29, 1962.

Postal Services

Universal postal convention with final protocol, annex,
regulations of execution, and provisions regarding air-
mail with final protocol. Done at Ottawa October 3,
1957. Entered into force April 1, 1959. TIAS 4202.
Adherence deposited: Togo, March 21, 1962.

Telecommunications

Radio regulations, with appendixes, annexed to the inter-
national telecommunication convention. 10.59 (TIAS
4892). Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered
into force May 1, 1961 ; for the United States October 23,
1961. TIAS 4893.
Notification of approval: Canada, February 16, 1962.

United Nations

Constituti(m of the United Nations Educational, Scien-
tific and Cultural Organization. Done at London No-
vember 16, 1945. Entered into force November 4, 1916.
TIAS 1.580.
Signature: Tanganyika, March 6, 1962.

Weather

Resolution by the Third Congress of the World Meteoro-
logical Organization amending article 10(a)(2) of the
convention of the World Meteorological Organization
signed October 11, 1947 (TIAS 2052). Adopted at
Geneva April 1-28, 1959."
Ratified and approved hy the Presidont: April 12, 1962.

Uesolution by the Third Congress of the World Meteoro-

BILATERAL

Canada

Convention for avoidance of double taxation and preven-
tion of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on the
estates of deceased persons. Signed at Washington
February 17, 1961. Entered into force April 9, 1962.
Proclaimed by the President: April 16, 1962.

China

Agricultural trade agreement. Signed at Washington
April 16, 1962. Entered into force April 16, 1962.

El Salvador

Arrangement relating to radio communications between
radio amateurs on behalf of third parties. Effected
by exchange of notes at San Salvador April 5, 1962.
Entered into force April 5, 1962.

India

Agricultural trade agreement. Signed at Washington
April 16, 1S)02. Entered into force April 16, 1962.

Nicaragua

General agreement for economic, technical, and related
assistance. Effected by exchange of notes at Managua
March 30, 1962. Enters into force on date of notifica-
tion that Nicaragua has ratified the agreement.

Syrian Arab Republic

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agree-
ment of November 9, 1901 (TIAS 4944). Effected by
exchange of notes at Damascus February 24, 1962.
Entered into force February 24, 1962.

' The instrument of acceptance by Tanganyika having
been doposit(>»i, the constitution entered into force for
Tanganyika on .Mar. 6, 1962.

• Not in force.

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: April 16-22

Press releases may be obtained from the Office
of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Releases appearing in this issue of the Btru^TiN
which were issued prior to April 1(1 are Nos. 227 of
.\pril 6; and 236 and 244 of Aiiril 12.

No. Date Subject

255 4/16 Economic planning team visits British

Guiana.
*256 4/16 Ball : interview on "Issues and An-
swers."
257 4/18 Continuance of relations with Argen-
tina.
•258 4/16 U.S. participation in international con-
ferences.

259 4/18 U.S. supiK>rt.s freedom of exit for Mr.

Tshombe.

260 4/19 Cotton and rice agreement with Poland.
262 4/21 Visit of Mr. Cleveland to Euroi)e and

and Congo.

•Not printed.

782

DeparJmenf of State Bulletin

May 7, 1962

Agriculture. Agreement Signed for Sale of Cotton
and Rice to I'oland

American Principles. Attorney General Explains
U.S. Goals to People of Japan, Indonesia, and
Germany

Argentina. U.S. Announces Continuance of Rela-
tions With Argentina

Brazil. President Kennedy Hails Agreement for
Northeast Brazil Development

British Guiana. U.S. Economic Planning Team
Vi.sits British Guiana

Congo (Leopoldville)

Assistant Secretary Cleveland Visits Europe and
Congo . .

U.S. Supports U.N. on Freedom of Exit for Mr.
Tshombe

Disarmament. United States Presents Outline of a
Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament
(Kennedy, text of outline)

Economic Affairs

The European Economic Community and United
States Trade Policy (Coppock)

President and Dr. Hallstein Review U.S.-EEC Re-
lations (text of joint communique)

President Announces Two Actions Relating to Im-
ports of Cheese

Trade Policy for the 1960"s (Trezise)

Europe

Assistant Secretary Cleveland Visits Europe and
Congo

The Euroiiean Economic Community and United
States Trade Policy (Coppock)

President and Dr. Hallstein Review U.S.-EEC Re-
lations (text of joint communique)

Trade Policy for the lOCO's (Trezise)

Foreign Aid

President Kennedy Hails Agreement for Northeast
Brazil Development

U.S. Economic Planning Team Visits British
Guiana

Germany. Attorney General Explains U.S. Goals to
People of Japan, Indonesia, and Germany .

[ndonesia. Attorney General Exi>]ains U.S. Goals
to People of Japan, Indonesia, and Germany .

Index Vol. XLVI, No. 1193

International Organizations and Conferences

779 Calendar of International Conferences and Meet-
ings 780

United States Presents Outline of a Treaty on Gen-
761 eral and Complete Disarmament (Kennedy, text

of outline) . , ^47

778 Iran. President Kennedy and Shah of Iran Discuss
Matters of Mutual Interest (text of joint com-

778 munique) ^gO

Ivory Coast. President of Ivory Coast To Visit

jgjj United States ^64

Japan. Attorney General Explains U.S. Goals to

People of Japan, Indonesia, and Germany ... 761
760 Middle East. A Look at the Middle East Today

(Bowles) 7gg

769 Poland. Agreement Signed for Sale of Cotton and

Rice to Poland 779

Presidential Documents
747 President and Dr. Hallstein Review U.S.-EEC Re-
lations 7gg

President Kennedy and Shah of Iran Discuss Mat-

770 ters of Mutual Interest 760

President Kennedy Hails Agreement for Northeast

769 Brazil Development 773

United States Presents Outline of a Treaty on Gen-

779 eral and Complete Disarmament 747

"'* Treaty Information

Agreement Signed for Sale of Cotton and Rice to

Poland 779

Current Actions 732

770 President Kennedy Hails Agreement for Northeast

Brazil Development (Kennedy) 775

769 United Nations. U.S. Supports U.N. on Freedom

774 of Exit for Mr. Tshombe 769

Name Indea)

77g Bowles, Chester 765

Coppock, Joseph D 770

769 Hallstein, Walter 769

Kennedy, President 747, 760, 769, 778

761 Kennedy, Robert F 761

Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza Shah 760

761 Trezise, Philip H 774

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OFFICIAL BUSINESS

THE EMERGING NATIONS OF ASIA

"These emerging nations may well hold the key to the world of
tomorrow. Our ability to identify ourselves with their aspirations,
indeed our ability to permit this revolution to unfold and not be turned
back by conmiunism, is crucial to our own future."

The above quotation is from a recent address by U. Alexis Johnson,
Deputy Under Secretai-y of State for Political Affairs, made before
the Institute of World Affairs at Pasadena, California, which is
available in this 17-page pamphlet.

Publication 7353 10 cents

Of

state

n

ONITED NATIONS RULES OUT CHANGE IN
REPRESENTATION OF CHINA

Statements made in plenary of the Sixteenth United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly by Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson, U.S. Representa-
tive to the United Nations, on the question of the representation of
China in the U.N.

This 10-page pamphlet also includes the texts of a resolution adopted
on December 15, 19G1, and a Soviet draft resolution which was rejected.

Publication 7355 10 cents

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Vol. XLVI, No. 1194

May 14, 1962

iCIAL

KLY RECORD

THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS IN THE CONTEXT

OF WORLD AFFAIRS • Address by Secretary Rusk. . 787

SECRETARY RUSK'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF APRIL
26 795

VIEW FROM THE DIPLOMATIC TIGHTROPE • by

Assistant Secretary Cleveland 803

NEW VISTAS FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
IN THE PEACEFUL USES OF OUTER SPACE •

Statement by Francis T. P. Plimpton 809

TED STATES
EtGN POLICY

For index see inside back cover

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Vol. XLVI, No. 1194 • Pdblication 7375
May 14, 1962

lioston Public Library
Superintendent of Documents

MAY 9 8 1962

DEPOSITORY

For salo by the Superlntendent'of Documents

U.S. Ooverument Printing OfDce

Washington 26, D.C.

Peice:

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Single copy, 26 cents

Use of funds for printing of this publlcu-
tlon approved by the Director of the IJurouu
Of the Budget (Junuary 19, 1U61).

Note! Contents of this publication are not
oopyrlchted and Items contained herein may
be reprinted. Citation of the Department
01 State Bcm.etin as the source will he
appreciated. The Dolletin Is Indexed In the
Beaders' Guide to Periodical Literature.

The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issited by the
Office of Public Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public
and interested agencies of the
Government with information on
developments in the field of foreign
relations and on the work of the
Department of State and the Foreign
Service. The BULLETS includes se-
lected press releases on foreign policy',
issued by the White House and the
Department, and statements and ad-
dresses made by the President and by
the Secretary of State and other
officers of the Department, as well as
special articles on i^ariotts phases of
international affairs and the func-
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and international agreements to
which the United States is or may
become a party and treaties of gen-
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Publications of the Department,
United Nations documents, and legis-
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The Alliance for Progress in the Context of World Affairs

Address hy Secretary Ritsk ■

It is a high privilege for me to join Milton
Eisenhower [President, Johns Hopkins Univer-
sity], Raul Prebisch [Executive Secretary, Eco-
nomic Commission for Latin America], Jose
Figueres [former President of Costa Rica], and
Teodoro Moscoso [Assistant Administrator for
Latin America, Agency for International De-
velopment] in this series of lectures devoted to the
Alliance for Progress. For our alliance repre-
sents the most important common venture in the
long history of our hemisphere. On its success
depends the individual welfare of himdreds of
millions of our people, the independence and free-
dom of many of our nations, and the continued
flourishing of that civilization which our ancestors
built in the wilderness and which their successors
have struggled to bring to full flower.

In previous evenings you have heard careful
and eloquent expositions of the alliance— its com-
ponents, its demands, its prospects for success.
Tonight I wish to speak of this alliance in the con-
text of United States foreign policy as a whole—
as a part of our view of the world scene with
svhich the Americas are more and more intimately
ioined.

_ For us, the alliance is a special part of an indi-
visible whole. For it rests on those indissoluble
;ies of geogi-aphy and history, of common culture
md common interest, which have always boimd
>ur nations together. It rests on the realization
hat this hemisphere is part of that Western civili-
lation which M-e are struggling to protect and that
nany of the highest values of that civilization

' Made before the School of Advanced International
Studies of Johns Hopkins University at the Pan American
Jnion, Washington, D.C., on Apr. 25 (press release 270).

Aay 74, 7962

have found their richest expression in the life of
the nations to our south. It rests on the special
responsibilities of the United States in this hemi-
sphere—responsibilities which exist independently
of the cold war, or a Soviet military threat, or the
demands of nations newly freed from colonial rule.
It is an alliance which my country has joined be-
cause of our realization that the destiny of the
United States is irrevocably joined to the destiny
of our sister Republics of the New World.

Basic Goal of American Foreign Policy

The basic goal of American foreign policy is a
world where individual men are free to pursue
their own ends, subject only to the liberating re-
straints of a free society. It is significant that this
is a policy whose central focus is man and not the
governments which rule him. For such a policy
rejects the thesis that the state is the end of human
striving, the ultimate product of individual effort.
Thus it rejects a way of life which is as ancient as
the tyrannies of the dawn of history and as modern
as the communes of Communist China. Of course
this policy is limited by the fact that we must act
as a government and, in the sphere of international
relations, our dealings must, for the most part,
be with other governments. Thus we must guide
our efforts toward the support and strengthening
of societies which share our basic goals for man.
This policy too must, at times, take account of the
realities of the world conflict, of the presence of a
powerful adversary who seeks to destroy the
framework of freedom which we are laboriously
constructing. But none of the detours or delays
which may be forced upon us will take us far off

787

course if we keep in mind the basic guiding prin-
ciples of our policy.

Each generation is called upon to write its own
chapter in the long and stimulating story of
freedom. In the world as it is today, the chapter
which we are called upon to write involves both
strength for defense against aggi-ession and a
mighty creative effort to build a decent world
order. The United States has accepted, as a
matter of necessity, the maintenance of a military
force of such undeniable power that no rational
decision could be made to attack the fi'ee world.
It is a burden we gladly bear and would as gladly
lay aside as soon as possible. We know that se-
curity does not lie in an unlimited arms race, and
we have made sober and persistent efforts to turn
that race downward and to strengthen the proc-
esses of peace. Although there are discourage-
ments, we shall continue that effort because we
imderstand that it is no simple matter to trans-
form the nature of international relations over-
night. But the transformation must come. Mean-
while we shall do our part to provide the strength
which is required in the actual world in order to
give us a chance to bring into being another kind of
world required by the nature and destiny of man.

Political Freedom and Economic Development

The second part of our "grand design" is our
readiness to contribute in every appropriate way
to the building of free, politically stable, and in-
dependent nations. Although we cannot guaran-
tee that these states will always share our hope for
the future of man, it is clear that this hope can
only be realized within such a society. Only sucJi
a society can resist efforts at subversion and revolt
promoted from without. Only such a society is
secure enough to grant enlarging individual liber-
ties to its citizens. Only such a society can hope
to carry forward the prodigious task of develop-
ment on which the welfare of its people, as well
as its future stability, so largely depends.

The instruments with which we carry forward
this part of our policy are far more complex and
subtle than even the most ingenious techniques
of modern military strength. But basically they
rest on the encouragement and strengthening of
two forces which are products of our Western
civilization: political freedom, national and in-
dividual, and the drive toward economic develop-
ment.

It was here in tliis hemisphere that men first
broke the bonds of colonial rule, destroyed alien
rule on this continent, demanded the right of self-
determination, and fought to establish that right.
It was Washington and Bolivar, Jefferson and
San Martin, who first gave national expression
to the forces which today guide the struggles of
men across turbulent Africa and Asia. This na-
tionalism is the strongest political force of the
modern world. And in all corners of the world
international communism struggles to break it
down, to impose an international discipline which
merely means the substitution of new colonial
masters for the old. But since 1776 no nation has
been able successfully to destroy the force of na-
tionalism, and indeed today we are witnessing its
pervasive effect on the Communist empire itself.

Thus we welcome and support tlie new nations
of the world. We encourage them in their efforts
to achieve national independence and to express
their legitimate national interest. For we who
have established a pluralistic national society do
not share the Cormnunists' fear of the confusions,
the uncertainties, and the liberating discords of a
pluralistic world society. In this it is we, and
not the Communists, whose national goals ride
with the events of history.

Shattering the "Wall of Glass"

The drive toward economic development is es-
sentially a product of the Western technological
revolution. It was this revolution that lias pro-
vided man with the capacity to emerge from cen-
turies of poverty and hunger and ignorance.
And it was also this revolution that awakened
man's realization that such capacity was within
his grasp.

Suddenly, in the years following World War II,
it became apparent that the vast unbridgeable gulf
between the rich and poor nations had become a
wall of glass. On one side of that wall wei-e the
capital, the scientific advances, the technological
skills of the industrialized nations, and on the
other the poverty and hunger and the fierce desire
for a better life of the great masses of the under-
developed continents. The shattering of that wall,
the api)lioation of the tools and wealth of the
industrialized nations to the needs of the poorer
nations, became, and still remains, the central
issue of our time. We have confronted this prob-
lem with tlic new tools of economic aid, national

788

Deparfment of Sfatc Bulletin

Success of Alliance for Progress Key to Welfare of Americas

Remarks hy Secretary Rusk'

I take special pleasure in opening this program
devoted to the Alliance for Progress. Tonight I
speak to you of policies that concern not only the
United States but 19 other nations of this
hemisphere.

The Alliance for Progress has been forged by 20
American Republics in their mutual interest.^ It
is based on aspirations common to them all, and
its purpose is to lay a firm economic and social
foundation for preserving their independence by
striking at poverty and injustice — the roots of
tyranny.

In pledging our full support to the Alliance for
Progress, we are keeping faith with our own tra-
dition. For it is true, as Cordell Hull remarked
in 1936, that, "We are impelled by the wish to
make known and effective the beliefs and desires
which we have in common. We are responding to
our need of declaring and carrying forward in uni-
son our common ideals. We . . . afl5rm our trust
and friendship, . . . combine our faith, to make
sure that peace shall prevail among us, and . . .
repudiate with our whole mind and spirit those
aims and philosophies that bring nations into
conflict."

This "carrying forward in unison our common
ideals" is a fine description of the Alliance for
Progress. But much stress should be laid, I feel,

^ Made on Apr. 26 in opening a television program
entitled "The Alliance for Progress" produced by
the Metropolitan Broadcasting Company (press re-
lease 271).

' For background and text of the Charter of Punta
del Este establishing the Alliance for Progress, see
Bulletin of Sept. 11, 1961, p. 4.'39.

on the "carrying forward," with work and deter-
mination, the commitment of mind and heart which
is vitally necessary if the Alliance for Progress is
to succeed. As the Charter of Punta del Este, the
founding document of the Alliance for Progress,
puts it: ". . . ultimate success rests not alone on
our faith . . . but on the indomitable spirit of free
men which has been the heritage of American
civilization."

As the world has grown smaller, we have grown
increasingly conscious of how broad the term
"American civilization" really is. It flourishes on
the Mississippi, the Rio de la Plata, and on the
mighty Amazon. Its monuments are spread over
two great continents. Its children have brought
new hope to the world — children like Washington,
BoUvar, San Martin, Benito Juarez, Jos6 Marti.
The Alliance for Progress is the distinctive fruit
of this American civilization of the New World. It
is the initiative of many nations and many states-
men inspired by like aims, but its future lies not
only in the hands of the statesmen but also in the
hands of the citizens of these 20 Republics.

Time is pressing. Dr. Jos6 Figueres, former
President of Costa Rica, has said that it is "one
minute to midnight." The President of Mexico,
Adolfo Lopez Mateos, said that "at Punta del Este,
the door was opened to the hopes of the people."
I am confident that the people of the United
States will do their full share in contributing to the
success of the Alliance for Progress, not only by
material means but also with the indispensable in-
gredients of faith and the spirit of free men.

The alliance deserves no less from any of us,
for in its success rests the welfare of our own as
well as of future generations.

planning, and social reform. Yet it is clear that
the successful completion of this task will require
new breakthroughs of thought and action— the
ievisiiig of new tools and techniques for tlie crea-
tion of capital and credit, for trade and the spread
3f technology. "\Ye will have to look afresh at all
:he institutions and procedures we have developed
;o speed up growth within each coimtiy of wealth
md productive capacity. For only new efforts of
magination and intellect will enable us to shatter
;he glass wall and liberate the undoubted capacity
)f our society to bring, and bring rapidly, a better
ife to man.

For the past 15 years the United States has
devoted itself to assisting the economic develop-
ment of other nations. For that development is
central to the basic goal of our foreign policy:
first, because it will provide the material welfare
necessary to liberate the skills and capacities of
individual men and to give them an opportunity
for the exercise of freedom; and second, because,
in today's world, only a nation which is making
steady economic progress, which is offering hope
and a realization of that hope to its people, can
maintain the political stability essential to the
maintenance of its national integrity and political

Moy 14, 7962

789

liberty. For it remains true that governments
derive their just powers from the consent of the
governed.

Advantages of Free Societies

In the harnessing and encouragement of this
second great force — tlie drive toward economic
development — free societies possess a great ad-
vantage. For it is the free societies that first set
loose this force, that first developed the techno-
logical capacity to improve the material welfare
of man, that first illuminated the prospects of a
better and more abundant life for the people of
the world. It is our science, our methods of dis-
tribution, and our economic techniques that have
lifted man into the industrial age. The history of
the past 20 years has demonstrated clearly that
economic development can best be achieved within
the context of a free society unhampered by the
ponderous arrangements of a lOth-centuiy Marx-
ist doctrine framed for another age and another
set of conditions.

At the close of World War II many nations,
their economies shattered by the war, began the
task of reconstruction and economic gro^lh.
Some began this development within the constitu-
tional framework of a free society. Others, sub-
jugated by military conquest or armed revolution,
took the Communist road to economic progress.
Today, 17 years later, the results are becoming
clear. They can be seen in the dramatic picture of
a free, prosperous Western Europe confronting
the drabness of Eastern Europe. They can be
seen in the performance of a Japan which has
reached new heights of prosperity as the fastest
growing nation of the world over against the hun-
ger and starvation which afflicts the vast popula-
tion of China. And they can be seen in Cuba,
where the decline in agricultural production, the
food rationing, the drop in real incomes illustrate
the emptiness of Communist claims that they hold
a magic key to rapid development.

We take no satisfaction from economic distress,
under whatever system it exists. But it is relevant
to point out that Communist techniques have not
produced the promised results, despite appalling
prices in human values paid for economic devel-
opment.

During the 1950's, after basic war damage had
been largely repaired, tlie Soviet Union's economy

790

grew at a rate of 6i/^ percent ; it was a good per-
formance, but it was exceeded by many free coun-
tries, including Germany, Austria, Japan, and
Venezuela. Even with a slower rate of growth,
the United States during the fifties increased the
absolute gap between its economy and that of the
Soviet Union. At current projections for 1961-
1970, the absolute gap will continue to widen as
the United States adds more than $300 billion to
its annual gross national product, while the Soviets
add a possible $170 billion to theirs.

All told, over the next 9 years the nations of
the Sino-Soviet bloc can expect to add $300 billion
to their GNP, while the nations of the Atlantic
community and Japan will add more than $500
billion.

These statistics, even with allowances for the
vagaries of statistical analysis, clearly demonstrate
that no Communist society has foimd a magic
formula for economic growth and that rapid prog-
ress can readily be achieved by a free society.

Even more important than the statistics of eco-
nomic growth are the uses to which this increased
abundance has been put. For our aim is to im-
prove the welfare of people — to relieve human
want and misery — not merely to pursue increased
output as an end in itself. The economic history
of the Communist bloc is clear and dramatic proof
that the Communist route to development, effective
as it may be in increasing national power, is the
least effective means of raising the living stand-
ards of individual men and women.

This is most dramatically illustrated in the So-
viet Union itself, the focal point and pride of
Communist development.

Sluggish Performance of Communist Agriculture

Most significant has been the sluggish perform-
ance of Communist agriculture. Throughout the
entire Communist world the doctrines of Marx
have been proven incapable of mastering the tech-
niques of modern food production and providing
an abundant diet.

Almost half of the Soviet work force is engaged
in agriculture, as compared with 9 percent of (he
American work force. But the average American,
according to the Department of Agriculture, has
at his disposal three times as much fresh fruit, ,
eggs, and edible fats and twice as much meat and
sugar as the average Soviet citizen.

Department of State Bulletin

In recognition of this agricultural problem
Chairman Ivlirushchev recently warned — 30 years
after collectivization — that "the entire economy
can be wrecked if the lagging of agriculture is not
noticed and overcome in time."

Across the Communist world the story is the
same. Eastern Europe, which in prewar years
was a net exporter of grain, has in recent years
had to import 5 million tons of grain. Production
of grain in Communist China in 1960 was actually
less than in 1957, although the population had
meanwhile increased by almost 60 million.

In other vital areas the failure of Communist
economies to meet the basic needs of human wel-
fare has been dramatic. Tlie real wages of non-
agricultural workers in the Soviet Union in 1958
were calculated at 95 percent of their wages in
1928 — a decline of 5 percent over a period of 30
years. At the end of 1960 the housing space avail-
able to the average Soviet urban dweller was about
equal to what he had under the czars. Other con-
sumer durables are even scarcer, making it clear
that the promised abundance of Soviet com-
munism is still far in the future.

In the rest of the Communist bloc economic
growth has not been translated into higher
standards of living. In Czechoslovakia, the most
prosperous of the Eastern European countries, it
took the average industrial worker in 1957 longer
to earn enough to buy a pound of butter than it
took him in 1937. Only Czechoslovakia among
these countries has an average living space greater
than the 9 square meters established as a minimum
by 19th-century hygienists. In China and North
Viet-Nam millions are struggling to avoid star-
vation on subsistence incomes, with other comforts
forgotten in the struggle for survival.

Behind these statistics and comparisons lie two
central facts: that Commimist societies are not
capable of more rapid economic growth than free
societies and that they are far less able to trans-
late growth into substantial increases in human
welfare.

To those whose desire for development stems
from concern for the welfare of the individual,
and not solely from desire for national power, it
is clear that the path of freedom offers the best
and most effective route to progress.

Thus the second great force of our era — the
drive for economic development — finds its best
model and exemplar in those free societies which
gave it birth.

May 14, J 962

Evolving the Policies and Tools for Development

However, the free nations are now faced with
the problem of evolving a set of policies and tools
which will enable us to carry forward the same
development in the rest of the world.

The Alliance for Progress represents just such
an evolution of methods and aims. Although the
alliance springs from the special relationships
between the American nations, it embodies basic
principles of development which are of broader
application. It is a product of the experience
both of Latin America and of the United States
since World War II — a period during which the
United States has devoted greater resources to the
assistance of others than any other nation in the
history of the world. These resources have helped
to sustain economies in many parts of the world,
have met emergency human needs and assisted
nations to launch programs of development. Yet
we must also admit that some of this money has
been ineffective. Some of it has disappeared,
vanished without a trace of permanent effect on
the lives of the people it was meant to help. It
was this experience that has taught us that solid
development is not possible without at least three
basic conditions.

Mobilizing National Resources and Energies

First, no nation can develop unless it possesses
its ovra iimer determination to progress. Tliis
means the mobilization of national resources and
energies, the use of national institutions, and,
above all, an intangible dedication of national
spirit and will — a singlemindedness of purpose
and an unrelenting determination which is essen-
tial to all great human achievements and without
which development is not possible. If this con-
dition is present, then external resources can give
a vital if marginal boost. If they are not present,
then no amount of external help will leave a per-
manent trace on the life of the nation.

No free nation will demand of its people the
sacrifices which the Communist nations demand —
the loss of liberty and the rigorous regimentation
of daily life. Such sacrifices destroy the goal of
freedom for man; they are imnecessary even in
economic terms and do not yield progress. But
neither can we make the assumption that economic
development is painless, that it can be achieved
without arduous labors and sacrifice; it may re-
quire increased taxes or the yielding up of large

791

estates, curbs on consumption or the barring of
luxury imports. But such sacrifices are mild in-
deed compared to the Commmiist alternatives, and
they will ultimately yield greater abmidance for
all.

This first condition, under the name of self-help,
is an essential component of the Alliance for
Progress and of economic development every-
where.

Examples of Self-Help

With this in mind it is heartening to see the
many examples of effort and will which the na-
tions of this hemisphere have made in an effort to
improve the welfare of their people. These ex-
amples are not only significant in tliemselves, but
they indicate the strength of spirit which char-
acterizes this hemisphere and which holds such
high promise for the far gi'eater effort ahead. Let
me cite a few of these examples of self-help and
cooperation among our American Kepublics —
examples which antedate the Alliance for
Progress.

Local Colombian initiative led to the formation
of the Colombian Teclmical Institute aimed at de-
veloping badly needed teclmical and scientific
skills for all Latin America.

The Mexican Ministry of Agriculture has de-
veloped one of the finest institutes of agricultural
research in the world. Agronomists from all over
Latin America and 12 from the Near and Middle
East are there learning skills to improve the agri-
cultural production of their countries.

The University of Chile has one of the finest
programs of advanced economic training in this
hemisphere. Of the 57 students enrolled in the
graduate school of economics, 45 are from outside
Chile, and the faculty is rapidly becoming a lead-
ing source for highly trained economists through-
out Latin America.

Penivian private initiative has built up the fish-
meal industry from its inception in 1950 to the
point wliere Peni is now the world's largest ex-
porter of fishmeal and stands third only to Com-
munist China and Japan in terms of total
production of fish products.

Bolivia has doubled its number of school build-
ings in the past decade, largely through the efforts
of local communities.

Under the Venczuehui land-refonn program,
which began in March 1960, 4 million acres have
already been distril)utc'd to 44,000 families.

In Argentina the Nobel Prize winner, Dr. Ber-
nardo Iloussay, after resigning from the Univer-
sity of Buenos Aires in a protest against Peronism,
built one of the hemisphere's finest institutes of
biology and experimental medicine, relying
principally on local subscriptions.

Costa Rica, a countrj' with a population of only
1.2 million, has implemented one of the hemi-
sphere's most successful programs of education ; as
of now 240,000 students are enrolled in schools of
all types.

Mexico has achieved an increase of 22.3 percent
in its agricultural production in the last 20 j'ears.
Once a large importer of com and wheat, Mexico
has in the last 6 years become self-sufficient in both
crops. And the nation as a whole has become vir-
tually self-sustaining in the agricultural field.

The Mexican record in the field of public health
has been impressive. The antimalarial campaign
which began in 1957, when 25,000 Mexicans were
dying each year from malaria, was so effective
that in 1960 not a single Mexican died from
malaria.

These and thousands of other examples serve to
illustrate the range and effectiveness which is pos-
sible to private and public initiative within a free
society. It is, in fact, one of the principal advan-
tages of a free society that it liberates the energy
and initiative of thousands of individuals and
groups in the service of human welfare.

Meeting Demand for Social Justice

Second, no real economic development, consist-
ent with the goals we have set ourselves, is possible
without a social structure which permits the great
mass of people to share in the benefits of progress
and which aff oi"ds each man the fair expectation of
social just ice. This often means basic, even revolu-
tionary, changes in the structure of society. Out-
moded systems of land tenure which allow a few
to hold great estates while most agricultural
workers are landless must be swept awaj'. Tax
systems which exempt tlie wealthy from their just
share of tlie ])urdon of development must be re-
vised. And all the institutions of societj- must be
carefully scanned to insure that they are not in-
struments for inaiiUainiug the privileges of a
fortunate few.

Some of these changes are necessary for rational
development. But many of them do not find their
justification in the calculations of economists or

792

Department of State Bulletin

the formulations of planners. They are vital
because no government and no nation can carry
forward the process of development without the
support and help of its people. And people will
only give their assistance when they are convinced
that the govermnent is serving their interest, that
they are not being exploited on behalf of a minor-
ity, and that they and their children will have
equal access to land, jobs, and education. People
can be called upon for the sacrifices which devel-
opment demands when they are convinced that
everyone is sharing those sacrifices and that there
will be a just distribution of the progress which
sacrifice brings.

I am fully aware that these fundamental social
refonns are not made without controversy. We
are deeply committed to democratic processes, and
we Icnow from our own experience that economic
and social reform involves vigorous debate, time,
and adjustment of contending views. The great
human forces which have imleashed the drive for
de^-elopment in the last several years also demand
social justice as a part of that development.

Developing Human and Material Resources

The third requisite for development is also the
most obvious: the human and material resources
necessary to permit a nation to build the basic
economic structure which will produce long-term
growth.

In our rush to create new capital we often
neglect the importance of the human resources
necessary for economic development. But fac-
tories and roads and bridges will not be built with-
out men to plan them, to engineer them, and to
manage them. The programing of economic de-
velopment itself requires the application of a
hundred skills; and the implementation of these
plans requires thousands of men to run the fac-
tories, teach new methods to the farmer, and guide
the public administration of the developing so-
ciety. The history of economic progress in all
countries is proof that general education and the
development of skills are the most productive
long-run investments which can be made in the
future of any nation.

Let me say a word here about the element of
time. It is a truism to say that each nation has
consiuned centuries in getting to where it is today.
But in development, decades or even centuries can
be jumped over because of the transferability of

knowledge and technical skills. We are celebrat-
ing the 100th anniversai-y of our land-grant col-
leges, but that does not mean that it will take a
hundred years to equal that experience elsewhere
The rapid growth of educational systems and insti-
tutions of higher education thi'oughout Latin
America in the postwar period has been deeply
encouraging and lays a solid base for the training
of the manpower needed for national development.
It is no accident that sharply increased attention
is being given within the alliance to the training
of leaders, for people remain the bottlenecks for
the accomplishment of great human tasks.

Of course large sums of capital will be needed.
Much of it will be mobilized within the developing
coimtry. But the United States also accepts its
obligation to supply a substantial share of the ex-
ternal assistance needed for the success of the Al-
liance for Progress. These funds can come from
only one source — the ordinary taxpayers of the
United States. We have no magic mountains of
gold; the alliance is for us a people's effort., just
as it is in the rest of the hemisphere. President
Kennedy has pledged us to a mammoth 10-year
effort. And we intend to live up to that pledge in
the years to come.

With the fulfillment of these three conditions,
and with unremitting effort by all of us, we can
insure the success of the Alliance for Progress.
And with these same instruments we can also help
bring a better life to men and women in other parts
of the world.

The Alliance for Progress represents an accept-
ance by all nations of the hemisphere — North
American as well as South — of our common re-
sponsibility to create an American civilization
where no man is forced to live out his life in hun-
ger or hopeless poverty, where every man has the
right to hope for a better life for himself and his
children.

We approach this task confident of the unpar-
alleled creative power of free societies. We ap-
pi-oach this task with the knowledge, evolved from
experience, of what we must do to advance the
development of the American nations. We ap-
proach this task with the same unyielding will
which created a civilization in a wilderness and
subdued a continent to the service of freedom.

And when we succeed in our alliance — as we
shall succeed — then we will have created a hemi-
sphere where every man will be liberated from
material bondage m order to pursue unliindered

May 14, 7962

793

the ceaseless quest of the human mind and heart.
In this way the basic goal of my country, and of
yours, will have been fulfilled.

Additional Remarks '

I wonder if I might conclude with just a per-
sonal observation or two.

We in this country are aware of the fact that
in this great effort which we have called the Al-
liance for Progress we are in a real sense the junior
partners — junior because the effort which we can
commit will be considerably less than the efforts
which will be committed by all the others. Of
the large sums of capital needed for new invest-
ment in the next decade perhaps some 20 percent
of it will come from external sources, and of that
more than half will come from us. But there
remains the 80 percent which will be mobilized
by the peoples of the countries of the hemisphere
themselves. As far as we in the United States
are concerned, the sums of which we are talldng
are on the order of 2 percent of the gross national
product of the other members of the alliance ; 98
percent is their responsibility and their contribu-
tion.' I hope that we in this country can recognize
that we are the junior partners and, in good man-
ners and good spirit, that we are in relationships
with mature societies with vast problems on their
hands, with peoples to lead, peoples to educate,
with efforts to mobilize, and that we can imder-
stand their problems even though many of them
seem far away.

The second has to do with what may turn out
to be the most difficult part of all our alliance
effort. We are dedicating ourselves to a decade
of impatience. That is the meaning of the Al-
liance for Progress. Now it is customary for
free men to take their deepest common commit-
ments for granted and to exaggerate the impor-
tance of their marginal differences. One of our
problems therefore within the family of the hemi-
sphere is to discover how to combine urgency —
desperate urgency — with a kind of common

" The following six paragraphs were released separately
as press release 270-A dated Apr. 25.

' The percentages are rough approximations, the 2 per-
cent representing the $1 billion U.S. commitment for the
first year of the alliance and the 9,S percent representing
the estimated $i)0 billion total gross national product of
the Latin American nations participating in the alliance.

feeling which will preserve the unity and fellow-
.ship of this hemisphere.

In certain respects we must not expect too much.
Will there be those who will be discontented with
the pace of the effort? Of course. Some will
think the movement is too slow. There will be
a few who think, in their own situations, that the
movement is too fast.

Will there be some of us here in North America
who will be impatient with the rate of progress
in one or another country or several below the
border? Of course. Will there be countries in
the hemisphere who will be somewhat disturbed
because a neighboring country seems to be moving
somewhat more rapidly than one's own country?
Yes. Will there be hard negotiations in alloca-
tions of resources? Surely. Will there be prob-
lems to solve as one neighbor helps another in any
one of the dozens of ways in which help is going
forward ? Yes.

All these things are true. All that means is
that free peoples are doing business with each
other in a common effort through free procedures.
Therefore we shall be debating domestically as
well as internationally. We shall be negotiating
seriously and hard. We shall be dissatisfied —
steadily and continually dissatisfied, I hope — be-
cause whatever we do will still leave us the great
unfinished business of freedom ahead, but our job
is to get on with this great alliance, with a soli-
darity which our commitment to the peoples of
this hemisphere requires, and keep these marginal
differences within bounds. Because we approach
this task confident of the unparalleled creative
power of free societies and we approach this task
with the knowledge evolved from experience of
what we must do to advance the development of
the American nations. We approach this task
with the same unyielding will which created a
civilization out of a wilderness and subdued a con-
tinent to the service of freedom.

And when we succeed in our alliance, as we shall
succeed, then we will have created a hemisphere
where everyone will be liberated from material
bondage in order to pursue unhindered the cease-
less quest of the human mind and heart. And
in this way the basic goals of my comitry and of
your countries, gentlemen, will have been fulfilled.
And in this way there will be many who look back
on their own lives and say with pride, "I lived
during the Alliance for Progress."

794

Department of Sfafe Bulletin

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of April 26

Press release 276 dated April 27

Secretary Rusk: Before I take your questions,
I should like to make a few comments on nuclear
testing. First, I should like to urge all of you to
study again carefully the address to the Nation
made by President Kennedy on March 2 on this
subject.^ In that statement he essentially did two
things : He set forth with great clarity the reasons
why it would be necessary for us to undertake a
certain number of tests in the absence of an inter-
national agreement banning nuclear tests with
adequate assurance, and, secondly, he indicated,
witliout any doubt whatever, that it is a major ob-
jective of American policy to bring an end to
nuclear testing immediately and permanently
through arrangements which would give all of us
assurance that testing had, in fact, been abolished.

We have had in the last several hours strident
language from the Commimist bloc which reflects
the weakness of their position on the merits. And
I should like to remind you of the nature of the
obstacle which stands between us and the abolition
of nuclear weapons testing. In essence it is the
refusal of the Soviet Union to accept the kind of
international verification which would remove
from the problem the element of blind trust and
give arrangements which would themselves lay a
basis for reasonable confidence among nations.

You might wish to refer to my statement of
March 23d at the Geneva disarmament confer-
ence ^ on this matter of espionage. The proposals
made by the United States and the United King-
dom ^ involve the location in the Soviet Union, the
United States, and elsewhere of a limited number
of control posts. Tliose would be staffed by inter-

' For text, see Bulletin of Mar. 19, 1962, p. 443.

' Ibid., Apr. 9, 1962, p. 571.

' For text of a draft treaty on nuclear weapon tests sub-
mitted by the U.S. and U.K. delegations to the Conference
on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests on Apr.
18, 1961, see ibid., June 5, 1961, p. 870.

May 14, J 962

President Gives Authorization
To Proceed With Nuclear Tests

The Atomic Energy Commission announced on
April 24 that President Kennedy has authorized
the Commission and the Department of Defense
to proceed with a series of nuclear weapons tests
in the atmosphere over the Pacific. The tests, to
be conducted by Joint Task Force Eight under the
command of Maj. Gen. A. D. Starbird, will begin
as soon as Is operationally feasible."

' On Apr. 25 the Atomic Energy Commission made
the following announcement :

"A nuclear test detonation took place at about
10 :45 a.m. EST today in the vicinity of Christmas
Island. The detonation was in the intermediate
yield range. The device was dropped from an air-
plane. The test was the first detonation in Opera-
tion Dominie, now under way in the Pacific."

national personnel. Tlie actual location of a post
in the Soviet Union would be made on the basis
of agreement with the Soviet Union, within a
range of a considerable number of square miles
of the area selected by the control organization.

The Soviet Union would have to agree on the
exact location of a control post. The personnel
would be limited to that control post and would
not be free to wander around the countryside.

Our proposals also included a necessary number
of on-site inspections. Those inspections would
be necessary to clarify the data which would be
picked up by the instruments at the control post
to determine in fact whether such an event as
recorded might be a nuclear explosion or a natural
event such as an earthquake.

On any on-site inspection inside the Soviet
Union, personnel would use Soviet transporta-
tion. They would identify in advance the exact
location of the area which they wished to observe,
they would be accompanied by as many Soviet
observers as the Soviet Union wished to have

795

alongside, and they would be limited in function
to the precise job of verifying what had in fact
occurred at the time of the so-called suspicious
event.

We cannot ourselves find in any such arrange-
ments any substance whatever in the notion that
these procedures could involve espionage. In
fact, as I pointed out in Geneva, on-site inspec-
tions would take a look in any given year at less
than l/2000th of Soviet territory. Instrumen-
tation, of course, in the control post would be much
more extensive in its coverage of so-called sus-
picious events.

We find no substance whatever in the idea that
that kind of international inspection could involve
espionage.

I think it is also relevant to point out that, under
the conditions of modem warfare, espionage in the
old-fasliioned sense is largely irrelevant because
all of the great powers today know enough about
each other to Icnow how to inflict crippling blows
in the event of a general war.

So that the incidental kind of information which
might be picked up would have little or nothing
to do with the Icind of strategic problems with
which the modern world is faced. The acceptance,
therefore, of that amount of international ma-
chinery seems to us to be a minimum contribution
which the Soviet Union can make to the halting
of the nuclear ai'ms race.

It is hard for us to vmderstand why that contri-
bution cannot be made in the interest of mutual
confidence, in the interest of the allaying of sus-
picion, when the alternatives are so unpromising,
because the alternatives are an arms race, with a
commitment of increasingly massive resources to
that problem, an increasingly instable strategic sit-
uation over the years to come. There were solid
reasons behind President Kennedy's determined
effort to achieve a nuclear test ban treaty.

There is another element which is of concern to
us and that is that, if this amomit of inspection
is unacceptable, it provides a very gloomy prospect
for advance in the field of genei-al disarmament.
The Soviet side has repeatedly indicated its readi-
ness to accept rigorous international inspection.
Thus far, apparently what they mean is that they
will permit inspection of what has come to be
called the bonfire, that is, those weapons which are
destroyed, but not inspection of armed forces or
production which remain.

Well this, obviously, is not a basis on whicli dis-
armament can go forwarel. Secrecy and disarma-
ment are basically incompatible. No government
will turn over the future of its nation to reliance
upon something going on behind a veil in another
country. No government will turn over the future
of its peojole to decisions made somewhere else on
the basis of announced policies which free people
cannot accept. Therefore we hope vei-y much that
these are questions which will be broadly re\'iewed,
and that attitudes will change, and that some prog-
ress can be made.

Now, where do we go from here? We move
in two directions. On the one side, as indicated
in the March 2d statement of the President, we
shall conduct, in the absence of an adequate treaty,
a series of selected and sophisticated tests. These
will be considerably less in megatonnage or fallout
than those conducted by the Soviet Union last
autumn. There will be no tests for political or
psychological reasons. These tests will be aimed
at the security of the United States and the free
world.

At the same time we shall make every possible
effort to achieve a nuclear test ban treaty at the
earliest occasion. As far as we are concerned, we
are ready to continue and will continue the negoti-
ations looking toward the possibilitj' of sucli a
treaty. I understand that the general view in the
present conference at Geneva is that talks should
continue and that every eft'ort should be made to
bring this arms race to an early and permanent
conclusion insofar as nuclear weapons are con-
cerned.

I might just add one other comment, that on
Saturday evening I am leaving for a 10-day ti-ip
which will encompass meetings with CENTO in
London, witli NATO in Athens, and with our col-
leagues in ANZUS in Canberra. I am grateful,
in view of some of the jM-oblems that you gentle-
men know about, that it has been possible to ar-
range these tlirce meetings in sequence so that they
can be accomplisliod in one brief jieriod of 10
days, but I am loolcing forward to the chance to
meet my colleagues in these three circumstances.

Now I will 1)0 glad to take your questions.

Reaction to Atmospheric Testing

Q. Mr. Secretary^ S,n,itor Kcathig of New
York says reaction to atmospheric testing will in-
dicate who our friends really are. Would you
agree with this?

796

Deporfmenf of Sfofe BuHefin

A. I tliink that we can assume that tliere is
generally around the world a deep regret that
atmospheric testing continues. But I think also
that there is general recognition of the circum-
stances under wliich these American tests must
go forward. Wc oureelves regret — not the deci-
sion under tlie circumstances — we regret the neces-
sity for the decision, and we would have preferred
arrangements which would have made it possible
not to proceed with these tests. But we have to
meet our responsibilities, and we do so as a matter
of necessity.

I think that when we talk about world public
opinion, we must look at it in its broadest aspects.
We nnist look at it as including our more than
40 allies. We must look at it in terms of those
neutrals who recognize that the possibility of
neutrality depends upon the strength and the
policy of the United States and its closest allies.

Yes, there is general regret in this country and
abroad, but I think also there is general under-
standing of the circumstances under which these
tests are being held.

Q. Mr. Secre(a7y, in vktv of the interest which
exists around the icorld in this series of tests, can
you or other officials of the Governinent he more
specific as to the duration of the tests, the number
of loeapons to he exploded, and other precise in-
formation which would perhaps contribute to
public understanding?

A. No, I think it would not be for me to disclose
the possible numbers of such tests or the duration
of the series. In the President's March 2d speech
he indicated that our tests would be considerably
less iji megatonnage and fallout than those con-
ducted by the Soviets last autumn, but that infor-
mation, I think, is not for me to provide today.

Position on Summit Meetings

Q. Mr. Secretary, on another subject, looidd
you care to give us your assessment or interpreta-
tion of Chairman Khrushchev^ s apparent about-
face on the question of summit meetings, in ivhich
he appears now to agree with the American posi-
tion that some agreement and preparation is nec-
essary? What do you think has caused this ap-
parent change in his position?

A. Well, I would not, myself, emphasize the
element of change in his position. Mr. Khru-
shchev did propose, as you recall, a meeting of

18 heads of government at Geneva in connection
with the disarmament proposal.* But I think
there is a sober realization on all sides that summit
meetings have to be handled with some care; I
was interested in his remarks on this subject. I
think it is reasonably clear that summit meetings
should produce a positive result rather than a neg-
ative result, because such meetings cannot occur
and leave the situation just where it was before
they convened.

Q. Mr. Secretary, on the question of test ban
negotiations in the future, is it our position at
this point that the only kind of treaty we are in-
terested in is one xvhich bans all types of tests, or,
given this current round of tests on our part and
the expected Soviet tests, is there a possibility
that we might again propose, as we have before,
a ban on atmospheric tests alone?

A. The objective certainly ought to be to ban
all nuclear tests. I would not wish to comment
on what the long-range future might hold, but the
present object ought to be to ban all nuclear tests
in order to put a ceiling, a limitation, on the nu-
clear arms race. We shall go ahead on that basis
and tiy our best to get an agreement on that basis.
One of the reasons we think so is that, quite hon-
estly, we believe that it is in the national interest
of all nuclear powers to find some way to end this
massive diversion of resources, and this injection
of unstable elements into the general world situa-
tion, to get on with the tests.

Situation in Berlin

Q. Mr. Secretary, on Berlin, the public record
is in a curious state, sir. The Soviet Union has
m,ade some detailed comments on American pro-
posals which have not officially been put on the
public record. Can you clarify this situation for
us, and also can you give us your assessment of
the present posture of the Berlin talks?

A. The Soviet comments — Mr. Gromyko's [So-
viet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko]
speech the other day — I would not suppose went
into very much detail on these questions, but I
would be willing to comment on certain aspects of
it. He refen-ed to some certain obstacles that
have to be overcome. We would agree that there
are some obstacles that have to be overcome.

He referred to the presence of Western forces

'■Ihid., Mar. 5, 1962, p. 356.

May 14, J 962

797

in West Berlin. That, I would say, is quite an
obstacle, because we are not treating that question
and will not treat that question as a negotiable
problem.

There have been other questions which have
been alluded to in the course of discussions but
which have not been pursued in any detail, because
the central issues which are involved in what the
West has defined as our vital objectives are still
there unresolved insofar as Soviet proposals are
concerned.

So there has not been any opportunity or oc-
casion to pursue some of these other questions in
any detail.

I believe the Department has clarified in the last
day or so one point which needed some clarifica-
tion. Mr. Gromyko's reference to the relation be-
tween access and what he calls the sovereignty of
East Germany, of the GDK [German Democratic
Republic], points to a matter whicli has been dis-
cussed from time to time, and that is that on our
side we see no incompatibility between free access
and the local responsibilities and authorities of
those in the area tlirough which access would
move. In other words, we see a situation where
no interference by one with the other is entirely
possible, but that does not get into the question
of recognizing the GDE or of accepting the perma-
nent division of Germany or any questions of
that sort.

It is obvious that the East Germans are very
much involved in access. Some 95 percent of the
access to West Berlm necessarily involves East
German participation — barges, trains, traffic on
the Autobahn, and so forth — but we see no basic
incompatibility between free access and the fact
that there are some authorities who are responsi-
ble for what goes on in East Germany.

International Control of Atomic Energy

Q. Mr. Secretary, this happens to he almost
exactly the 15th anniversary of the publication of
the Acheson-Lillenthal report. In other words,
we have gone down this road for 15 years and it
has been a totally sterile road, apparently. Do
you have any co7iiment to maJce on that?

A. I think my principal comment would be that
events since then have demonstrated the great wis-
dom of the efforts made by the United States just
after World War II to bring atomic energy under
international control and to prevent the competi-

798

tive kind of atomic arms race which was then
predicted, which was then predictable, and which
has, in fact, taken place.

One recalls with certain regret that, when those
proposals were made just after World War II,
the phrase used to describe them by the other side
was "atomic blackmail," and that expression con-
tinues to be used at the present time by tlie other
side.

No, these secrets of nature could not be kept
secret from man. This was known when this
weapon was first developed. The most strenuous
efforts were made to prevent just what has oc-
curred. I think my principal comment is that
we must pick up tlie problem — try once more —
because the future of man depends upon it.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you see any possibility of
a su7nrnit conference this year?

A. Well, this year has quite a few months to
run. I wouldn't want to be a prophet on that mat-
ter. I do not see one in the immediate future.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in recent days both Premier
Khrushchev and Foreign Minister Gromyho have
spoken relatively in moderate tones about Berlin.
Do you see their comments as perluips indicating
a sign that they want serious, businesslike nego-
tiations on Berlin?

A. I think there is a recognition among all of
the capitals who are directly involved in the Ber-
lin question that tliis is a serious problem and po-
tentially a highly dangerous problem and that it
ouglit to be handled responsibly, if possible. I do
believe that the indication contained in the joint
statement which Mr. Gromyko and I made at
Geneva recently,' that the matter should be dis-
cussed further, is an indication that both sides
wish to pursue this matter further and not to move
it promptly to a crisis.

Of course, these are questions which can change
in a very short time period. I probably will see
Ambassador Dobrynm before I leave on my trip,
but an announcement of any particular appoint-
ment on that would be made at the appropriate
time.

Geneva Disarmament Negotiations

Q. Mr. Secretary, ivith I'espect to picking up the
problem again of new negotiations, would we be
disposed to consider some alternate plan as con-

' For text, see ihid., Apr. 10, 1962, p. 625.

Department of State Bulletin

trasted with the one you just mentioned. At the
Geneva negotiations a numier of our good allies
did offer a number of alternate plans, such as
Canada. Would it be our position that we would
stand on the plan you have just outlined, or would
we consider some other plan?

A. This is a question -which is somewhat vexing
for a government which tries to find reasonable
answers to problems and has some reputation for
trying. Since March of last year we can honestly
say that we have made many, many adjustments
in our proposals to take into accoimt what we had
understood to be the Soviet position.

As late as the Geneva conference we made addi-
tional proposals in that direction to eliminate the
threshold, for example, and to include all under-
ground tests without an increase in the inspection
machinei-y, to locate the control posts in the Soviet
Union in direct relationship to the seismicity of
the areas which, as it turns out, would mean that
very considerable, very large areas of the Soviet
Union would not have control posts in them be-
cause there is little or no earthquake activity and
the control posts would be concentrated in those
areas where earthquakes are more frequent.

Having gone through all of that, we feel we are
very close to, or at the point, where further com-
promise on the verification would undermine confi-
dence. We do not want machinery the only effect
of which would be to multiply suspicion. We do
not expect the Soviet Union to trust us or the
Western World. We do not believe on these mat-
ters that we can trust them, but trust should be
irrelevant. What we need is machinery which
gives confidence so that these suspicions do not
build up, where all of us on both sides can give
assurance to our peoples that the situation is as it
is reported to be and agreed to be under treaties.

So, having made many, many adjustments, we
can't keep dividing the difference — we can't keep
coming up with new proposals just because some-
one else continues to say no, and particularly when
they now say no on things which they earlier
agreed to.

I was forced to comment in Geneva that the
faster we tried to move to the So\aet position the
faster they seemed to abandon their own. We
can't move beyond the point where we cannot in
good conscience to ourselves and our own responsi-
bilities and to our people and to our allies say we
think these arrangements give us adequate security

for the future of our nation and for the free world.

Q. Mr. Secretary, it has been reported that the
Western proposals or the American proposals on
Berlin do not include rail and water routes in the
access authority. Can you say whether this report
is accurate and, if it is, what the considerations
behind that are?

A. I tliink these are matters which are subject to
discussion and negotiation among the Allies and
with the other side at some point. The key ele-
ments, of course, m access would be the capability
of supporting the viability of West Berlin with
unimpeded access by whatever means are needed.
It is of critical importance, of course, that the
Autobahn and the air be unimpeded. It is also
of great importance that barge and tram traffic
move in a normal fashion.

Those arrangements have been worked out in
connection with the general flow of traffic trade
between the two parts of Germany. But I would
not want to try to spell out in detail how that
might evolve in the future. This depends some-
what on the responsibilities of the access author-
ity. If there were actual administrative
responsibility for the actual operation — for ex-
ample, in connection with one of our turnpike
authorities — you would have one sort of a situa-
tion. But if you had a super\'isory body only,
which would control and supervise the administra-
tion of access by whomever and by whatever
means, then you would have a rather different
situation. So I can't really quite honestly answer
your question precisely.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Dutch and the Indonesians
have still not met at the conference table. What
do you consider to be the main obstacle at the
moment?

A. Well, I think the principal matter is that
there are contacts with both Governments on the
basis on which they might resmne talks. We, our-
selves, hope that those talks will be resumed in the
near future. I would not, I think, want to try to
put my finger on any particular obstacle at tlais
moment. We are hopeful that those talks will
shortly resume.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you comment on
Premier Khrushchev^s call for the rewriting of a
Russian constitution and the embodiment into it
of its principles of foreign relations?

May 14, 1962

799

A. No, I think that that is something that I need
not conunent on. That is an internal matter of the
Soviet Union. Of course we will all be interested
in having a look at whatever constitution evolves
from that process.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what can you tell us aiout the
talks just held here iy the U.A.R. Economics
Minister [Abdul Moneim al-Kaissouni] and their
results if any?

A. We have had some very extensive talks with
him. I will be seeing him later this afternoon
myself. "We have been considering what role we
might play in their development program. I
think those talks have been worth while, and I
hope that the other side will think so, too, by the
time they are concluded.

Problem of Population Control

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you say what, if any, in-
terest the Government has in seeing inc7'eased re-
search on population control methods? There was
a report yesterday that State Department advisers
had called for an increase in research on this area,
but purportedly the decision on the recomme7ida-
tion has been held up for 7 months in the Depart-
ment of Health, Education, and Welfare.

A. I myself have not seen the particular report
to which you apparently refer. I personally hope
this question does not become a tempest in a teapot.
Obviously, when people are talking about eco-
nomic-social development, demographic and pop-
ulation factors are a very important part of any
consideration of such questions.

The United States back in 1946 joined in sup-
porting the establislmient of a population com-
mission in the United Nations, and we have
worked with that since that time. We are workmg
very hard on certainly one side of the ledger in
this problem as between population and available
resources. We in many countries are working
toward increasing productivity and making it
possible to take care more effectively of growing
populations. Population policy is preeminently
a question for each country to decide for itself
and as a practical matter is something which each
family must decide for itself.

For us to bo indiilerent to population factors
would be, I think, reckless on our part, and wo
do take very seriously the population trends, the

impact of population growth upon development
plans, and we shall continue to follow that prob-
lem. There are some aspects of it which are for
each government to decide for itself, but we are
not ourselves trying to press otlier governments on
that in one way or the other.

Q,. Mr. Secretary, closer to home, one of our
neighbors in South America is having quite a
political stniggle at this point. Is there any point
at which we as a friendly government can inter-
vene with any suggestions or offers of help or
anything else that might retain piolltical stability
there?

A. Well, I don't want to be indiscreet, but I
don't identify which neighbor you are talking
about. (Laughter.)

Q. Argentina.

A. In the case of Argentina, of coui-se, we do
have a deep and friendly concern in what is going
on there, and we hope very much that they will be
able to work out their situation on the basis of
constitutional and a free government and take up
again the great tasks which we all envisage in the
Alliance for Progress. I would say at the moment
today I am relatively optimistic that this can be
done. But this is a critical period for them, and
we wish them success in working it out.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you give us your evalu-
ation of the Soviet need for testing? It is a fore-
gone conclusion that they will test, but hoiu ready
and hoio much do they need to test, in your judg-
ment?

A. I think it would be for them to comment on
their need. I wouldn't want to speak to that.

Q. Mr. Secretary, tomorrow the U.N. Security
Council is scheduled to taJce up the Kashtnir dis-
pute. The United States, as I understand it, had
been exceedingly reluctant to see this come up
before. Now that it is to take place, what outcome
would the United States like to see happen here?

A. This is a matter which, as you know, has
been with us for many, many yeare. I think that,
in the longer run, this is a question which will have
to bo solved by the two governments primarily
concerned. "Wliat happens in the United Nations
has to be viewed in relation to a possible perma-
neiit settlement. But I would not wish today, in

800

Department of Stale Bulletin

advance of the Security Council meetino;, to try
to anticipate how that might best contril)ute to a
settlement.

Central Issue of Berlin Problem

Q. Mr. Secretary, what you have said, sir, and
wJuit ChahTnan Khrushclvev has said loould indi-
cate that the question of the I'ole of the Western
occupation troops in Berlin is probably the single
most formlddble problem, to be resolved in the
Berlin crisis. You have said that for us this is not
a matter that can he negotiated. Do you see any
prospects, sir, of either overcoming, surmounting,
or sidestepping — avoiding — this issue?

A. I tliink for 3 years this has been a central
issue, at least in terms of the Soviet proposals.
If the Soviet Union wishes to draw a line under
World War II, the West has some views as to how
one draws a line under World War II in terms
of a permanent settlement of the problem in Ger-
many, and those have been put forward over the
yeai-s. Give the German people a chance to decide
how they want to arrange their affairs and to unify
that countiy. But if there is no prospect for a
settlement on that basis, then we have to take a
look at the factual situation. The facts are that
we are in West Berlin and we are going to stay
there.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could I put the question
slightly differently. Given the situation you have
just described, do you see the possibility of any
agreevfient on Berlin which might he reached imth
the Soviet Union ending the occupation status on
which we have hosed our position all these years?

A. The rights and interests of the Soviet Union
in Germanj' stem from the same source from which
our rights and obligations stem — the surrender of
Nazi Germany. We would want to be very care-
ful about putting those, rights on another basis,
certainly on any unilateral framework. If we are
told, on the one side, that what happens in East
Berlin and East Germany is just not discussible,
it is only what happens in West Berlin that is
discussible — this is not acceptable. If they want
to sit down to try to find a permanent solution to
tlie German problem, we are ready at any time,
but we are not going to be able to accept a highly
unilateral, one-sided approach to the problem.

Q. Mr. Secretary, at Athens, when you get there.
May 14, 1962

637800—62 3

the problem of whether NATO is to hare a sep-
arate nuclear deterrent is due to he discussed.
There have been informal talks on this. Do you
anticipate that there will be a solution to this par-
ticular issue while you are there?

A. I would think on a question which is as im-
portant and as complex as that that these are dis-
cussions which will continue to go on quietly for
some time in the permanent Council of NATO.
I have no doubt that they will be alluded to in
the meeting in Athens, but on your particular
question, will it be solved there, I would think that
the answer to that would be probably not.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you expect to start your
talks on Berlin with Ainhassador Dohrynln as
soon as you return In your forthcoming trip?

A. I indicated earlier I shall probably see him
before I go off on my trip, and I wiU be back in
about 10 days and we will see what happens then.

Q. Mr. Secretary, Mr. Gromyho said in his
speech the other day that agreeinent had been
reached in principle on one or tioo points, includ-
ing, I believe, agreement on a nonaggression pact
betioeen NATO and the Warsaio Pact group. Is
this correct?

A. There has been no agreement formulated on
any particular point, but it is a matter that has
been well known for many years that NATO does
not intend to commit aggression on anybody. It
has also been known since 1945 that the United
States does not favor, for example, the diffusion of
nuclear weapons in the hands of governments who
do not have them. These ai'e matters which are
stated policies. They have been discussed, but
there has been no agreement formulated on them.

There are a number of these points which prob-
ably could fall into place, because of standing poli-
cies of the two sides, if the central issues could be
disposed of, but if the central issues are not dis-
posed of, then I think these other questions will
remain in the air.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you and Mr. Gromyho drafted
at Geneva, or began to draft at Geneva, an indica-
tion of major agreements and major disagreements
surrounding the Berlin Issue. Mr. Gromyko has
tried to characterize these; leaks of points have
C07ne out. Wouldn''t it he useful If you told us
xphat the basic areas of agreement and disagree-
ment were as you drafted them?

801

A. I would think the answer to that question
would be no.

Q. Mr. Secretary, token you see Mr. Dobrynin
this loeek, will you have formulated an agreed
Allied flunf In other words, are the Germans
now no longer uneasy about what you are going to
say?

A. Well, we are in regular contact with the Ger-
man Government. I think that uneasiness came
out of special circumstances, not necessarily re-
lated to our consultations with the German Gov-
ernment. No, we will try to carry these
discussions further, but how far we will get in the
next talk will have to be seen.

Q. But are all your lines of negotiation now
agreed to by Bonn?

A. I think we are in good shape on our inter-
allied relations on this point, with the exception
of the attitude in Paris with respect to the nature
of the contacts with the Soviet Union, which is
now, of course, well known.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what do you see as the point
of going on with the general disarmament talks
in Geneva? You have told us today that trust
should be irrelevant — this is one of the pillars of
the Soviet policy — aiid you have also said that
their attitude toward inspection is not a ba^sis on
which disarmament can go forumrd. What can
you hope to get out of these continuing talks?

A. Well, I think you have to ask the question
the other way around as well. "\ATiat do you hope
to get out of stopping them ? Wliat do you hope to
get out of quitting the effort ? It is so important
in the long nni that we try to make advance in
this field, if we can, that we should not be dis-
couraged, despite the fact that we have had 10
years of discouragement, despite the fact that more
than 30 resolutions have been passed in the United
Nations on disannament without, so far, per-
ceptible advance on disarmament. TVTiat we hope
to accomplish in the serious proposal that we made
at Geneva is to begin tlie process.

Now, we are under no illusion that far-reaching
disarmament literally involves the transformation
of the nature of international relations, and this
means after thousands of years of history. This
is not going to be easy or simple. It isn't strange
that it might take some time, but it is going to
take persistent effort to make a start. We would

like to see a start made in a way that is consistent
with the security of everyone concerned, to try to
find a way to bring this arms race down. So we
are not going to give up, as far as we are con-
cerned. But there are certain elementary aspects
which cannot be abandoned. One of them is that
you don't turn the fate of your country over to
someone else by not knowing what is going on in
this field of disarmament when you sign a treaty
on the subject. So we have to have some way of
assurance that the steps that are agreed to are, in
fact, being taken. But we will continue to try.

President Reviews World Problems
With Prime Minister Macmillan

Harold Macmillan, Prime Minister of the
United Kingdom, made an info)'mal visit to the
United States April 25-29. Following is the text
of a joint communiqiie released on April 29 by the
Office of the White Mouse Press Secretary and the
Office of the Prime Minister follomiiig discussioiis
between Mr. Macmillan and President Kennedy
April 28-29.

President Kennedy and Prime ^linister Mac-
millan have undertaken in Washington during
the past day a continuation of the series of discus-
sions which they began in Key West last year.^
They have conducted a general review of interna-
tional problems facing their two countries.

In particular, the President and the Prime Min-
ister reviewed the problems of disarmament and
of nuclear test control. They reaffirmed their
regret that the Soviet Government lias not been
willing to join in an effective treaty which would
end nuclear testing. They expressed the determi-
nation of their two governments to continue to
work for progress toward disarmament, including
the ending of nuclear tests.

The President gave the Prime Minister an ac-
count of the recent discussions between Secretary
of State Rusk and Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin.
They agreed on the importance of maintaining
these and other contacts between East and West.
They reaffirmed their willingness to consider meet-
ings of Heads of Government whenever there is an
indication tiiat sucli meetings would serve the in-

' For text of n joint communique released at Key West,
Fla., on Mar. 26, 1061, see Bulletin of Apr. 17, 1961,
p. 544; for text of a joint statement released at Washing-
ton on Apr. 8, 1061, see ihid., Apr. 24, 100.1. p. TuQ.

802

Department of Stale Bulletin

tei-ests of peace and understanding, and in tliis
respect thej' took note of the opinion recently
expressed by Chairman Khrushchev.

The Prime Minister informed the President of
the progress in the Brussels negotiations between
Great Britain and the European Economic Com-
munity, and explained the importance of preserv-
ing the interests of the Commonwealth and EFTA
[European Free Trade Association] countries.
The President and Prime Minister expressed their
hopes that these negotiations between the United
Kingdom and the EEC would be crowned with
success. The President informed the Prime Min-
ister of the progress of proposals for new trade
legislation to permit stronger relationships within
and beyond the Atlantic Community.

The President and the Prime Minister
then reviewed the situation of the NATO alliance
in the light of the forthcoming meeting in Atlaens.
They also discussed the situation in Southeast
Asia, and strongly reaffirmed their support for an
independent and neutral Laos under a government
committed to that objective. They discussed prob-
lems of mutual commercial interest, including
questions of shipping policy, tariffs and com-
modity problems. The President informed the
Prime Minister of the developing efforts of the
Western Hemisphere through the Alliance for
Progi-ess and explained his concern for the main-
tenance and development of adefjuate market op-
portunities for the products of the Latin American
countries.

View From the Diplomatic Tightrope

hy Harlan Cleveland

Assistant Secretary for International Organisation Affairs '

Some time ago. you will recall, the great Wal-
lendas had an accident on their high wire. Two
of the younger members of the troupe plummeted
from their pyramid and were killed ; a third is
still in the hospital. The oldest of the Wallendas,
60-year-old Herman, who still does handstands
on the high wire, was asked whether they weren't
afraid up there.

"Certainly we're afraid," he said. "If you do
not feel afraid, either you're a fool or you haven't
got enough experience. You don't want anyone
up there who is not afraid; he endangers every-
body. You have to realize there is danger in
front of you and danger behind you. Don't get
careless ; don't get too tense. You can't go too far
in either direction."

I doubt if in his busy and productive life as a
circus entertainer Herman Wallenda has ever
given much attention to that other circus called
"international relations."' But his words, bom of
wisdom and experience in his business, fit the busi-

' Address made before the American Society for Public
Administration at Detroit, Mich., on Apr. 14 (press release
249 dated Apr. 13).

ness of diplomacy as well. "Don't get careless;
don't get too tense." I cannot think of a better
text for some words about our national will and
purpose — and about its executive instrument, the
Department of State.

"The Department," as we smugly call it, main-
tains active diplomatic relations with 101 sovereign
nations. Some are rich and some poor; some are
experienced and some are new boys in the hard
school of political responsibility; some are stable,
some are volatile, and some are both in turn. But
every one is a special case. This means dealing
with a hundred separate political regimes, each
with its own policies, ideas, plans, hopes, ambi-
tions, and prejudices — and each with its own polit-
ical leadership more or less responsible to its own
domestic constituency.

We cannot assume that other countries only have
foreign policies, that only we can afford to have
domestic politics. International diplomacy is
mostly the resultant of the domestic politics of our
100 neighbors — as well as our own.

Of course on many matters — indeed, on an in-
creasing proportion of all our foreign affairs — we

May 14, 1962

803

deal not with nations but with groups of nations —
14 NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization]
allies, 7 partners in SEATO [Southeast Asia
Treaty Organization] and 4 in CENTO [Central
Treaty Organization], 19 other independent
American Republics, 2 partners in ANZUS [Aus-
tralia-New Zealand-United States], and 103 neigh-
bors on the East River in New York.

Altogether, we pay regular membership dues to
51 of these international clubs. We invest in 0
international banks and funds. We make volun-
tary contributions to 24 special programs, to feed
refugees, eradicate disease, promote research, and
finance development. And we participate in more
than 400 major intergovernmental conferences
this year. Some of these conferences are pretty
complicated — the most recent tariff-cutting meet-
ing under the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade lasted for a year and a half and involved
25 of the 40 member countries working on literally
thousands of commodities. In the General As-
sembly of the United Nations, 104 countries dealt
with about 100 agenda items in the 16th General
Assembly. Those of you who are good at arith-
metic will already have figured out that this means
more than 10,000 national decisions had to be taken
in the world community on how to vote, on issues
ranging from the representation of Red China to
the future of Ruanda-Urundi to the voting of a
$200 million issue of U.N. bonds.

Standing in the center ring of this international
circus, we never have the luxury of playing to a
single audience. Everything we do is watched
with care and apprehension by our own publics, by
our differing allies, by the several varieties of neu-
trals, and by the Communist states as well. Merely
to name the audiences is to suggest the difficulty
of satisfying all of them at once. It is, in fact,
impossible. I know of no foreign policy problems
worth di.scussing on which any given position
will not be offensive to some significant group at
home or abroad.

To formulate the national will in these cir-
cumstances is to seize the nmltiple horns of many
dilemmas. Our culture teaches us that there are
two sides to every question ; we learn this in col-
lege debating, in court proceedings, in two-party
elections, and in TV we^sterns, even of the adult
variety. We also learn about two-sidedness from
columnists who, analyzing the complexities of for-
eign policy, manage to simplify it all for us by
finding two clearly etched points of view inside

the Federal establishment, and then simplify it
furtlier by identifying the heroes and villains, the
good guys and the bad guys.

The real woi-ld is not like that at all. I am not
aware of any real problem now mider considera-
tion in the Department of State which has only
two sides. Five or six sides might be typical, and
in United Nations affairs I can point to problems
that have 17 sides or 35 sides or even 104.

Wlienever an important decision is made on a
serious issue in world affairs, a good case can be
made for any of several alternative policies or
actions. If the choice among them is a relatively
rational one, in which reasoned analysis can pro-
vide the answer that really is "best," the matter
is disposed of at the third level of our bin-eauc-
racy or below — and the chances are you will never
hear of it. But any problems that reach the level
of the Secretary of State involve a nip-and-tuck
choice, on which reasonable men can — and fre-
quently do — have very different ^news. And if a
decision has to be taken to the President, the issue
is likely to be so finely balanced that political
instinct — a sense of direction combined with a
kind of feel for the total environment — often be-
comes the decisi\-e weight in the scales.

This sense of direction cannot be discovered
merely by listening to what statesmen say their
purposes are. In fact, I am not even going to take
up your time today trying to define the purposes
of our foreign policy. I'm going to refrain from
doing this, not because it's too hard but because
it's too easy.

Tliey add up to a many-sided effort, under the
canopy of nuclear deterrence, to make the non-
Communist world hum with the cheerful and con-
tagious sounds of success and thereby help to sub-
vert the Connnunist world b}' demonstrating that
free choice works better, and feels better, than
coercion.

See ? All in one sentence. Let's rise alx)ve prin-
ciple to the I'arer, more exhilarating atmosphere
of practice.

Tendency of Policies To Become Obsolete

To illustrate what I mean, I have selected for
brief exposure five issues that are on the front
buniei- in the Department today. They are rea-
sonably typical of the business of making and
conducting foreign jjolicy. They help show that
tlie garden variety issue in world affaii-s comes

804

Department of State Bulletin

not with two sides but with several or many ; that
the answers to interesting problems are always
complex; that whatever we do, someone will be
mad — but someone else will be glad. They suggest
that foreign policy is no business for the man
with the easy answer; that, as in space travel, the
shortest distance to the goal is far from a straight
line; that horseback opinion is more than likely
to be wrong ; and that hipshooting is almost sure
to be either dangerous or silly or even both.

Above all, they show that old doctrines wear
out, old techniques become obsolete, and old poli-
cies, like old soldiers, really do fade away.

The longer I work at the busmess of diplomacy,
the more I am impressed by the rapid obsolescence
of even the most successful policies. On prac-
tically every important question we try to handle
in the State Department there is a race between
the development of the objective world around us
and the development of doctrine with M'hich to
analyze and deal with that world.

Perhaps it is obvious that in a rapidly movmg
world — a world in which, as one philosopher has
suggested, we camiot be sure where we are going
but we know we are going there fast — it stands
to reason that doctrines would have to change as
rapidly as the world itself is changmg. "What
does not stand to reason is that the human mind,
which is so incomparably complex and I'apid a
computer, has not usually kept our policies up to
date with the pace of events in the real world
outside the mind. Or maybe it is not the capacity
of our minds to think but rather a congenital
reluctance to use our minds to think ahead.

Wliatever the cause, we can see evidence of this
lag in every corner of foreign policy. We see it
in the contrast between our enthusiasm for John
Glenn's pioneering flight and the sluggishness of
our thinking on the kinds of international insti-
tutions we should be building to use this new tech-
nology for peaceful purposes. We see it in the
trouble we have — and the trouble the Russians
have — in facing up to the proliferation of nuclear
weapons. We see it in the fateful moves toward
Atlantic partnership; in our still primitive at-
tempts to unravel the mysteries of nation-building
in the world's less developed areas; in efforts to
improve the peacekeeping machinery of the world
community ; and in the search for new doctrine to
deal with the hard-core remnants of colonialism,
now that the independence movement has almost
nm its course.

Examples of Built-in Policy Lag

Consider, as one example of our built-in policy
lag, the question of nuclear weapons technology.
Fifteen years ago we had a world monopoly — and
a strong sense of the implications of the atomic
age. We offered to transfer this monopoly and
its implications to the United Nations but were
prevented from doing so because the Soviets were
determined to develop their own capacity. This
they did — sooner than most people expected.
Our minds and efforts were then focused on the
competitive development of nuclear weapons, on
the big-power nuclear arms race forced upon us.
This attitude was not altered when the British
and then the French joined the nuclear club, be-
cause these developments fitted the context of
East-West confrontation — and the doctrine of
mutual deterrence.

Now we face a quite different situation. Sev-
eral other nations now have the scientific capacity
to acquire a nuclear weapons capability. There
is not much time to prevent this from happening.
The problem, of course, is complex. There are
French, German, Chinese, and other special an-
gles— all coming together in what is known as the
"United Nations angle." But what is new is that
rather suddenly the nuclear powers and the
smaller powers share a common interest in ar-
resting the spread of nuclear weapons. Yet it is
not happening.

Our task is to find an approach based not on
competitive development by the major powers,
and the envious efforts of other powers to develop
some nuclear capability of their own, but on com-
mon interest in limiting and then dismantling
the nuclear arsenals that already exist. The di-
lemma, once again, is that scientific invention and
technological innovation have outrun our capacity
to invent the institutions to keep this most dan-
gerous teclinology imder control.

Consider, next, the dilemma of next steps to-
ward Atlantic partnership. The problem here
has been created largely by the success of our own
past policies. The Marshall plan not only trig-
gered the physical recovery of Europe from the
damage of history's worst war; it set in motion a
chain of events and innovations which, under Eu-
ropean initiative, has produced a sensational eco-
nomic renaissance and a trend toward political
unification which is one of the most stirring events
of our epoch. The six nations of Western Europe

Niay 14, 1962

805

are rapidly creating a single market as dynamic
and potentially as prosperous as our own. If all
goes well, Britain will soon join the Common
Market, further adding to the size, weight, and
influence of a great new commimity far stronger
than the Soviet Union and potentially in the same
league with the United States.

Our problem with all this is that our trade legis-
lation is obsolete for the purpose of dealing with
the European Common Market. We simply have
never had to negotiate on equal terms before, and
the doctrinal inheritance from Cordell Hull gives
us inadequate leverage for the purpose.

This does not pose a difficult dilemma in theory.
It does, however, confront us with the choice of
equipping ourselves to enter a great new Atlantic
partnership with enormous economic and political
opportunities — or of suffering disadvantages
brought on by the success of our own efforts in
the years behind us. If we move forward — as
surely we will — some of our industries which have
shown signs of middle-aged complacency will have
to sit up and take notice; and a few will find it
useful to make more radical adjustments. But a
law which served us well for three decades — and
the bargaining techniques whicli went with it —
are plainly out of date in the 1960's.

Nation-Building and Noninterference

I mentioned the mysteries of nation-building, by
which I mean, of course, our efforts to help the
emerging nations modernize their economic and
social systems. At best we know precious little
about the complex equations in the processes of
economic and social gi-owth. We do know it re-
quires, among other things, massive imports of
capital, teclmology, and professional skills. We
also know that in many cases it will require reform
of land tenure systems, tax laws, and corrupt prac-
tices baked hard in the cake of custom. We also
know that it requires the rapid growth of new
institutions of almost every kind, public and
private.

But these things can no longer be done in an
atmosphere of tutelage ; the pride of new national-
isms will not stand for the old patronizing ways,
even if their purpose is to speed tlie achievement
of nationhood. And from our side we uphold
energetically the doctrine of noninterference in the
internal afTairs of other states. Yet how can we
account responsibly for the use of public funds

if we do not exercise reasonable control over their
use inside other comitries? ^Vliat, for example,
does the Alliance for Progress mean if it doesn't
mean financing rapid social reform ?

How do we reconcile their acute sensitivity
about foreign influence, plus our own doctrine of
noninterference, with the fact that our aid pro-
grams make us deeply influential in internal de-
velopment of societies? How do we assist in
building institutions inside other countries — a net-
work of rural health clinics, an agricultural ex-
tension service, a secondary school system, a radio
and TV network, a modem army — without trip-
ping and falling across that heavily mined political
and ethical boundary called the doctrine of non-
interference ?

We have somehow been doing this, by trial and
error, for close to two decades. It says something
about our intellectual lag that we have handled
the dilemma of noninterference mostly by avoid-
ing it, by resolutely not thinking about it. But I
wonder if the time has not come when we have to
think up some new doctrine that fits the reality
of our interdependent world, the reality of deep
mutual involvement of national governments in
each country's internal development.

My own hunch is that we will find this new doc-
trine in the creative use of international organ-
izations, as is already happening on a very large
scale. We will increasingly find, I think, that
through the U.N. and through regional organiza-
tions some of the most sensitive relationships in
the world — like training for public administration,
or advising on national budgets, or reorganizing
police forces — can be effectively drained of their
political content, stripped of any implication that
the technical assistance people are intervening, by
operating in the name of the world community.
There is already a big laboratory test now in
process, as thousands of technicians operate in a
hundred countries, representing a dozen different
agencies of the U.N. family.

U.N. Peacekeeping Machinery

In some cases the problem of policy adjustment
is not related to the obsolescence of old ideas which
once were good but rather to the gi-owing realiza-
tion that some old ideas never were designed for
the real world. Such, for example, is the case of
the peacekeeping machinery of the United Na-
tions.

806

Department of State Bulletin

You will recall that the original idea, in 1945
when the U.N. Charter was signed, was that the
United Nations should have a standing force pro-
vided by the great powers to deal with breaches
or threatened breaches of the peace. But we have
found from experience that each crisis requiring
peacekeeping forces arises in a different form and
therefore requires a different kind of force.

In actual experience the United Nations has
engaged in eight peacekeeping operations — in
Indonesia, Greece, Palestine, Kaslimir, Korea, the
Middle East, Lebanon, and the Congo. Each time
the mission was different. Each time the number
and type and training and nationality of the
forces were somewhat different — and the supply
and logistical problems were different too.

In most cases the standing force envisaged by
the framers of the charter would have been the
wrong kind of force to deal with the actual situa-
tions the U.N. has had to tackle. The political
composition would have been wrong, or the mix
of weapons system would have been inappropriate.

One lesson is clear from the scattered experience
to date : We cannot run the risk of throwing to-
gether scratch teams with no training at a mo-
ment's notice — emergency forces which are, as the
President described them in his U.N. speech,^
"hastily assembled, uncertainly supplied, and in-
adequately financed." Entirely new ideas of iden-
tifying, training, commanding, transporting, and
supplying special imits for special jobs will have
to be worked out against future emergencies.

Puzzle Created by End of Colonialism

Let's take a final example of the need for new
concepts: the fascinating puzzle created by the
demise of colonialism. Most of our present doc-
trine is based on experience connected with the
rapid dismantling of the old European trading
empires. The doctrine is self-determination, lead-
ing to independence — a concept recorded deep in
tlie history of freedom, impressed on the world by
Woodrow Wilson in our own time, and reflected
in the extraordinary fact that more than 900 mil-
lion people have achieved their independence from
colonial rule in the forties and fifties, or will
surely achieve it in the early 1960's. This concept
is still valid today, but its application must be

"For text of President Kennedy's address before the
U.N. General Assembly on Sept. 25, 1961, see Buixetiit
of Oct. 16, 1961, p. 619.

tempered with judicious examination of the condi-
tions wliich exist in each dependent area.

The United Nations has recommended self-de-
termination for all, in resolutions with which we
have associated ourselves. That recommendation
can be carried out, sooner or later, in the big Afri-
can colonies. But that stUl leaves some 50-odd
enclaves and islands scattered around the world.
Even by the wildest stretch of a sentimental
imagination, most of them do not have the poten-
tial of becoming sovereign and independent na-
tions. Many of tliem are small, and some are
tiny — one of the four remaining U.N. trust terri-
tories has only 3,000 inhabitants. How much real
estate does it take to make a nation ? How many
persons add up to a people ?

The peoples of the 50 islands and enclaves
should not be deprived of the benefits of economic
development. They should not be deprived of the
rights and obligations of self-government nor the
opportunity for free association with the modem
world. The world community must find ways —
new ways if necessaiy— by which the peoples of
such territories can be associated in freedom with
the modern world.

Tlie need for new doctrine on this subject is
urgent, not only for the rational development of
the remaining bits and pieces of the colonial system
but also for tlie rational development of tlie United
Nations. The charter principle of the sovereign
equality of member states means that eacli country
gets one vote, regardless of population, size, power,
or willingness to contribute to U.N. activities.
That full vote in the General Assembly has become
the badge of nationhood, the mark of prestige, the
membership card in the world community for
more than half a hundred nations smce tlie U.N.
was founded. They are no more likely to give it
up than they are likely to return to colonial status.

But the proliferation of sovereignties does raise
two serious questions for those who are interested
in building the United Nations as an executive
organization for peace, in addition to a safety
valve for international tension. One question is
this : Are we coming to the limit of the number of
national sovereignties that are reasonable for the
size of the world we live in ?

The second question is closely related to the
first. With some further increase in U.N. member-
ship in prospect, can the U.N. devise ways of so
organizing itself that basic policy decisions con-

May 14, 7962

807

tinue, as they still do today, to give a special
weight to the judgment of those members that
carry the major political, economic, and military
burdens in the world outside the General Assembly
chamber ?

Well, that's quite a lineup of intellectual lags —
the spread of nuclear weaponiy, Atlantic partner-
ship, nation-building, peacekeeping, and the
wriggling remnants of colonialism. And I have
hardly mentioned the Congo; or the implications
(for us as well as for the Communists) of the rift
between Moscow and Peiping; or the dozen cases
where we are deeply involved in what the Secre-
tary of State calls "other people's disputes"
(Kashmir, "West New Guinea, and the recent un-
pleasantness on the shores of the Sea of Galilee) ;
or the delicate and dangerous confrontations of
power in Korea, Laos, Viet-Nam, and Berlin. And
if they were here, each of my colleagues in the
State Department would complain that I have left
out sevei'al of the missing pieces of doctrine that
have kept them working nights, Saturdays, and
Sundays in recent months, building foreign policy
by accretion in 1,600 outgoing cables a day.

It's quite a record for a race we call civilized.

Cosmic Choices and Chances

An anthropologist announced some time ago that
he had discovered the missing link between the
anthropoid ape and civilized man. The missing
link, ho said, is us.

We, tlie missing link, live at a very specialized
moment in mankind's long ascent toward civilized
behavior. The moment is unprecedented and un-
recoverable. Histoi-y holds its breath while we
decide how to act in the presence of three familiar
facts, facts no less fateful because they are
familiar :

First, our brains now contain the technical
genius to meet before long all the basic physical
wants of mankind — ^in this country and Europe in
our lifetime and in the rest of the world in the
lifetime of our children. Without a single new
scientific discovery or insight, we know how to
limit most of the hunger and disease which have
been man's chief preoccupation through tlie mil-
lennia of unremembered time. And so now, or in
just a few years' time, tlie problem is not whether
we can produce enough progress for everybody
but what kind of pi'ogress we want to produce. It

is a much more difficult question, but it will be
much more fun to work on.

Second, our brains have recently developed the
intellectual equipment and social skills necessaiy
to organize people on a scale large enough and
complex enough to put our full teclmical know-
how to work in solving the "whether" and choosing
the "what."

Then, at this moment of liistoric opportunity, a
God with a taste for irony has placed in our hands
the power to end it all.

Individual men and women have always had
the option to decide whether to live or die. But
only in our generation have men and women ac-
quired the priceless and frightening power to make
this clioice for whole societies. The cosmic choices
and chances which the social fallout of science
makes available to us were just never available
before.

We have been prepared for these choices and
chances by an uncounted infinity of mutations, bj'
half a million years — or maybe much more — of
human evolution, by only a few millennia of re-
corded historj', by a brief but brilliant develop-
ment of systematic thought — through Chinese
human relations, Greek logic, Indian philosophy,
Jewish and Christian ethics. Western science, and
the rest. From all of this rich teaching, we know
that the choices which face us are ours — youi-s and
mine, as individuals — that there is no shelter from
the social fallout of science, that we cannot duck
the questions it raises, nor turn them away, nor
refer them to higher authority — nor dare we leave
them unanswered.

In this unique moment of historj', not unduly
distracted by the crossfire from left and riglit, the
Government of the United States is in a mood to
make histoi-y, not just to watch it go by. Those of
us who ai'e in the act can take no special credit
for this circumstance; it is the mandatory spirit
of a great power in a dangerous world. Because
we ha\o the capability to act, we cannot merely
hope for peaceful change but must actively pro-
mote it — at home in each country, and abroad
among the nations.

So if you ask us whether we're afraid, as we do
our headstands on the State Department high wire
from day to day, the answer is "Certainly." Our
motto, like Herman Wallenda's, is "Don't get care-
less; don't got too tense. You can't go too far in
either direction."

808

Department of Slate Bulletin

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

New Vistas for International Cooperation
in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space

Statement hy Francis T. P. Plimpton

U.S. Representative on U.N. Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space ^

Tliis is the inaugural meeting of the expanded
United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses
of Outer Space. The United States Govenmient,
for which I have the honor to speak at this table,
regards this meeting as potentially — I stress "po-
tentially"— one of the truly significant moments
in the history of man's search for peace. It is up
to us here at this table, and to the governments
and the scientific communities for which we speak,
to do all we can to translate that potential into
fact.

The space age^the age of man's conquest of the
earth's gravitational field — is now 4i^ years old.
The launching of artificial earth satellites, which
was a wonder of the world 4 years ago, is now
commonplace. Many new vistas of scientific and
teclinical achievement in outer space can now be
envisaged, some clearly, others still only in dim
outline. But there can be no question whatever
that these new vistas will be explored, whether by
this generation or the next.

Now, why should this development concern the
United Nations ? And why should this particular
meeting be so significant? I believe the answer
is twofold :

First, this is the first meeting among govern-
ments for the purpose of planning international
cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space at
which all countries now capable of space launch-
ings are represented.

Secondly, the United States Government looks
upon this United Nations Committee as serving

' Made before the opening session of tlie Committee at
New York, N.Y., on Mar. 19 (U.S. /U.N. press release
3944).

an interest in the promise of the space age which
is shared not just by the great powers but by the
scientists and technicians and the ordinary people
of every region and continent of the world.

Space science and space technology are not the
exclusive preserve of a few advanced countries:
The special abilities which they require are dis-
tributed among many nations. And as far as the
benefits to man's life on earth are concerned —
better communications and more accurate weather
forecasting in particular — no people anywhere in
the world should be excluded from them. This is
a field in which many can contribute and all can
benefit.

Cooperation Needed at Several Stages

Nations need to cooperate at several different
stages of the space effort. Let me specify.

1. Even the most advanced and expensive tech-
nical field — that of major space launchings — is not
going to be forever limited to the United States
and the Soviet Union. A number of nations of
Europe are already developing a joint space-
launching program of their own. Doubtless
others will embark on this course too, as rocket
technology develops. Cooperation among the
growing number of launching authorities will be
an obvious necessity.

2. Scientists and technicians the world over can
cooperate in developing instruments and experi-
ments for inclusion in satellites and sounding
rockets. The United States is already engaged in
such peaceful projects with eight of the nations
represented on tliis Committee.

3. Many governments and scientific communi-

Nlay 14, 7962

809

ties can cooperate in placing scientific instru-
ments and experiments inside the space capsules
to be launched.

4. Space vehicles, once laimched, must be
tracked and the vital scientific information which
they transmit must be received on earth. As Colo-
nel John Glenn put it recently in this building,
his flight was "not only a national team effort
but international as well." This international co-
operation must and will be developed further, and
many governments and scientific communities will
be doing the furthering.

5. Numerous legal questions will arise, as the
space age progresses, requiring the development
by the nations of common legal doctrines and
standards. Outer space is thus an important area
for the future growth of international law.^

6. Finally, as I said, evei-y people and nation
stands to benefit from these activities. Wliat na-
tion that wishes to improve its crop yields can
fail to be interested in the potential benefits of
more accurate weather forecasting by satellite?
What nation that wishes to multiply its people's
friendly contacts with the rest of the world can
fail to be interested in worldwide television, on
which its people may both see and be seen, both
speak and learn, halfway round the globe?

It is difficult for us to grasp these new possi-
bilities. Last December 4, in the General Assem-
bly debate in which this meeting had its origin,
Ambassador Stevenson, speaking for my country,
referred to that difficulty in these words : '

Despite the urgent need for immediate international
action, I fear that we come to this subject ill-prepared to
thinlc clearly about it. I suspect that we are handi-
capped by our heritage of thought about the affairs of
this single planet.

Mr. Chairman, a great deal has happened in
the 3^/2 months that have passed since that state-
ment was made. And as we open these significant
meetings I dare to hope that we may lift ourselves
above that earthbound "heritage of thought," in-
spired by the realization that we already have
entered an age of great exploration, high adven-
ture, and unpredictable benefit for the human
race.

• For an address by Richard N. Gardner on "Extend-
ing Law Into Outer Space," see Bulletin of Apr. 9, 19C2,
p. 586.

" Ibid., Jan. 20, 19C2, p. 180.

810

U.N. Resolution on Outer Space

Let me review briefly with you the most notable
of these developments, some of which are the di-
rect outcome of the unanimous adoption by the
16th General Assembly of the resolution on m-
ternational cooperation in the peaceful uses of
outer space to which I have referred. Resolution
1721 (XVI).-

First, that resolution expanded the membership
of this Committee and requested it to carry out
the mandate of the resolution that established it
in 1959, Eesolution 1472 (XIV), as well as the
mandate of the new resolution. This means that
2 years of dangerous stalemate have been broken
and that a competent body of the United Nations
can take up again the urgent problems of the age
of outer space in which we find ourselves. This is
what this Committee is meeting for today — the
first step in what I hope will become a long and
rewarding record of constructive work on behalf
of all LTnited Nations members.

Second, in the General Assembly's unanimous
approval of the outer space resolution all the
members of the United Nations have committed
themselves to basic prmciples of the greatest sig-
nificance. They are:

. . . that the exploration and use of outer space
should be "only for the betterment of mankind
and to the benefit of States irrespective of the
stage of their economic or scientific development,"

. . . that "international law, including the
Charter of the United Nations, applies to outer
space and celestial bodies,"

. . . that outer space and celestial bodies are
"free for exploration and use by all States in
conformity with international law and are not
subject to national appropriation," and

. . . that the United Nations should provide a
"focal point for international co-operation" —
urgently needed in the "common interest of man-
kind."

This is to say that we, all of us — the members
of this Committee and all other member states
of the United Nations — are committed to the free
exploration and development of the great reaches
of outer space under the rule of law, on the basis
of international cooperation, and for the better-
ment of all nations and all peoples. We have re-

* For text, see ibid., p. 185.

Deparfmenf of Sfafe Bulletin

jected the concept of national sovereignty in outer
space; no moon or planet shall ever fly a single
nation's flag. These principles are sound princi-
ples, and I take this opportunity to reendorse
them heartily on behalf of the United States
Government.

Groundwork for International Cooperation

Third, preliminary steps have been taken to lay
the groundwork for active international coopera-
tion under the United Nations on specific projects
in the spirit of the principles I have just reviewed.

The World Meteorological Organization is
asked to present to the July meeting of the
Economic and Social Council, and to the I7th
General Assembly, organizational and financial
arrangements to develop on an international basis
a worldwide weather research and service program
framed in the light of the great contributions that
can be made to such a program by a system of
meteorological satellites.

Similarly, the International Telecommimica-
tion Union is asked to recommend steps to prepare
the way for the establishment of a satellite system
of world commimications on a global and nondis-
criminatory basis. In addition, the Special Fund
and the United Nations Technical Assistance
Board are asked to give sympathetic considera-
tion to requests by member states for assistance
in developing communications systems so that all
members can be in a position to participate in and
benefit from a communication satellite system.

Finally, the Secretariat is asked to and already
has established a central registry for all manmade
objects in orbit. The United States has already
complied with the request in the resolution that
launching states submit information for the regis-
try and has registered as of February 15th the no
less than 72 United States space vehicles and asso-
ciated objects that were then in sustained orbit
or space transit.' This initiates a comprehensive
space vehicle registry, available to all interested
nations and international organizations, to the end
that human uses of outer space may be ordered
and available to all peoples.

Thus this Committee, guided by agreed prin-
ciples, starts its deliberations in the knowledge
that the United Nations and its agencies have

^ For text of a letter from Ambassador Stevenson to
Acting Secretary-General U Thant dated Mar. 5, see Hid.,
Apr. 9, 19G2, p. 588.

already made a modest start on projects and ac-
tivities which show promise of real potential
significance.

U.S. Policy of Partnership

Fourth, international cooperation in space proj-
ects is already expanding rapidly. Wliile work-
ing toward global cooperation under the United
Nations, the United States has been consistently
following a policy of partnership with other na-
tions in planning and executing peaceful space
experiments.

Thus we have entered into a dozen closely inte-
grated cooperative efforts with other countries
employing small soimding rockets for scientific
investigations of the upper atmosphere. Such
programs enable the world scientific community to
obtain meteorological and other atmospheric
data of far greater value than that which
we alone could provide in the United States.
The program will have made it possible to
probe directly into the rare phenomena of the
far northern skies in Scandinavia, to observe elec-
tromagnetic radiations in Southern Hemisphere
skies, to coordinate launchings in the Eastern and
Western Hemispheres to permit comparison of
their results, and to fly in one rocket nose cone
scientific instruments designed by and in different
nations with the data open to the entire world's
scientific community. We have plans of even
broader cooperation, involving simultaneous sci-
entific laimchings over an extended period of time
by many countries.

Within a matter of weeks now, we will attempt
to place in orbit the first international satellite,
a satellite instrumented by scientists of the United
Kingdom and launched by our National Aero-
nautics and Space Administration in the United
States. Before many months, in a similar co-
operative effort, we will be laimching in this coun-
try a second international satellite prepared
entirely in Canada. Additional cooperative satel-
lites are under consideration with other nations.

In the fields of immediate practical interest to
mankind — communications and meteorology — the
United States has already taken major strides
toward establishing a broad international frame-
work in which to pursue benefits for all.

The intercontinental testing of experimental
U.S. communications satellites to take place later
this year will be accomplished through the partic-

May 14, J 962

811

ipation of major ground facilities provided by a
number of comitries in Europe and Latin Amer-
ica. An international ground-station committee,
composed of representatives from all the countries
involved in these first tests, is already meeting reg-
ularly to determine such questions as frequency
selection and other vital elements of the experi-
ments which lie just ahead of us. In fact it is
possible that this autumn there may be, on an ex-
perimental basis, a direct relay of a television
broadcast to Europe of 5 minutes of the General
Assembly's debate. Let us hope that the particu-
lar 5 minutes will be carefully chosen.

The United States has, in advance of each
launching of its Tiros meteorological satellites, in-
vited nations of the world to coordinate weather
observations of their own with data obtained
through simultaneous passes of the satellites above
their skies. This cooperative international effort,
in which some 30 nations have so far participated,
was brought to focus last year in an international
meteorological satellite workshop in this country,
to which over 100 nations were invited to study
the techniques for operational use of satellite
weather data against the day when such data may
be directly available to all.

In the operation of our own global tracking and
data acquisition network we have welcomed the
participation of scientific and technical personnel
in the host comitries, with the result that more
than half of the United States National Aeronau-
tics and Space Administration stations abroad are
operated wholly or in part by technicians of the
host countries. A technical training program
operated by that Administration contributes to
this direct participation.

We have recognized that training is a prerequi-
site in many cases to the fruitful collaboration of
scientists in these common efforts. Accordingly
the United States National Aeronautics and Space
Administration has provided specialized training
for foreign scientists preparing for joint pro-
grams and more recently has announced the availa-
bility of fellowships for as many as 100 foreign
graduate students a year who may study in U.S.
university laboratories currently engaged upon
space projects with NASA.

There is thus already abundant indication of the
value of the international linking of hands in the
common interest. We do not cite our own United
States efforts along these lines as more than an
indication of the true promise and larger benefits

812

of cooperation in space activities which will come
if all of the interested nations enter into broader
association, with the assistance and guidance of
this Committee.

A fifth development, since the outer space reso-
lution was approved at the last assembly, is that
the United States successfully launched a manned
space vehicle into orbit three times aromid the
earth. As the United States Eepresentative I
naturally take pride in recalling this event. But
I much prefer to think that the flight of Colonel
Glenn, and of the Soviet astronauts Gagarin and
Titov, will come to symbolize, not the narrow pride
of earthly rivalries, but the liberation of mankind
from its earthbound "heritage of thought about
the affairs of this single planet." It is up to us
to insure that the freedom of space first enjoyed,
by those intrepid explorers will remain unchal-
lenged for all who follow them.

In any case, Mr. Chairman, I believe tliat the
opportunity for many millions of people to share
freely and openly in the excitement of Colonel
Glenn's flight brought home with high drama the
fact that the space age is here. I believe there is
pulsing through all of us a new and widespread
sense of adventure, a feeling of keen and sharp
anticipation that we are on the threshold of a new
age. And this should serve as a lasting stimulus
to the work of this Committee.

Prospect of U.S.-U.S.S.R. Collaboration in Space

Finally, Mr. Chairman, since the General As-J
sembly acted on this matter last year, there \v
hopeful prospect of collaboration between mj
country and the Soviet Union in outer spact
projects.

For many yeai-s the United States has been call
ing for a program of outer space cooperation. It
his first state of the Union message o\\ January 30
1961, President Kennedy declared : "

... I now invite all nations — including the Sovie
Union— to join with us in developing a weatlier predictioi
program, in a new conmiuuications satellite program, am
in preparation for probing the distant planets of Mars an.
Venus, probes which may someday unlocli the deepc-
secrots of the universe.

This proposal was repeated in the rresidentV
speech to the General Assembly on September 25.'
We were gratified, therefore, when Chairmai

•/^i(/., Fel>. IXIOCI, p. 207.
' Ihhl., Oct. 10, 11)01, p. 01!).

liepox\m6n\ of Sfa>e Bo//efir

Klirushcliev, in congratulating the American peo-
ple on the successful flight of Colonel (ilenn, also
cited the advantages of a pooling of eilort in outer
space.^

On March 7 the President wrote to Chairman
Khrushchev ^ — and we are asking that the full
text of this letter be circulated as a Committee
document — proposing United States-Soviet col-
laboration on the follow-ing specific and important
space projects.

1. The President suggested the joint establish-
ment of an early operational weather satellite sys-
tem designed to provide global weather data for
prompt use by any nation. He proposed that the
United States and the U.S.S.R. each launch a
satellite to photograph cloud cover and provide
other agreed meteorological services for all na-
tions. These two satellites could be placed so as
to provide coverage of all areas of the earth's sur-
face. The worldwide data which would thus be
garnered would be of unprecedented value and
would be made available throughout the world
through normal international meteorological
channels. This would be an important step toward
implementing the weather research and study pro-
grams now being formulated by the WI\IO in re-
sponse to the outer space resolution adopted by the
General Assembly in December.

2. President Kennedy proposed that each of
our countries establish and operate a radio track-
ing station to provide tracking services to the
other, using equipment wliich the other country
would provide. We believe that both countries
would derive much valuable experience from such
a joint program, not only valuable scientific ex-
perience but valuable human experience as to the
advantages of open cooperation in each other's
country.

3. In another proposal President Kennedy sug-
gested that the United States and the U.S.S.R. co-
operate in mapping the earth's magnetic field in
space. Each country would launch a satellite in
an agreed different orbit and would make avail-
able the resulting significant scientific data
throughout the entire world scientific community.

4. President Kennedy further suggested that
Jie U.S.S.R. join the United States in a coopera-
;ive effort in space communications. We are
lappy to note that a number of countries are

' For an exchange of messages between President Ken-
ledj- and Mr. Khrushchev, see ibid.. Mar. 12, 1962, p. 411.
'Ibid., Apr. 2, 1962, p. 536.

already constructing equipment suitable for par-
ticipation in such an effort. If technological
representatives can get together soon to discuss
this complex question, an important first step
will have been taken to meet the objective, con-
tained in the last General Assembly resolution,
that communication by means of satellites should
be available to all the nations of the world as
soon as practicable on a global and nondiscrimina-
tory basis.

5. President Kennedy proposed that there be a
pooling of efforts and exchange of information in
the field of space medicine. This is an area where
there are tremendous opportunities for research,
in which scientists from many countries can co-
operate, for the problems of human health know no
international boundaries. Not only would co-
operation in medical research in this area help in-
sure man's survival in space and his safe return ; it
might well open up new vistas as to the ultimate
nature of the human body and its behavior.

6. Beyond these specific proposals for immedi-
ate collaboration the President indicated his
willingness to discuss broader cooperation in still
more challenging projects, including unmanned
exploration of the lunar surface and the mutual
definition of steps to be taken for an exhau.stive
scientific investigation of Mars and Venus, possibly
by man himself.

I want to emphasize that in this correspondence
we have suggested no condition or limitation and
that we have made clear that we are open to any
specific suggestions the Soviet Union may make.

We now await Chairman Khrushchev's response
to these proposals. If we are indeed on the verge
of a breakthrough toward real space cooperation
between our two countries — as we emphatically
hope is the case — it would be a most favorable omen
for our work here and, indeed, for peace every-
where.

Opportunities for Committee Action

So, Mr. Chairman, our deliberations begin in an
atmosphere of high exj^ectation and with enough
solid progress in the recent past to inspire my
delegation with the hope that we shall succeed in
rising above the mental inhibitions of our earth-
bound "heritage of thought," that we shall lift our
minds and sights up to heights worthy of the
spatial immensities with which we are dealing.

The space age is here — that is a fact and there
are astronauts to prove it.

V\aY 14, J 962

813

International cooperation in outer space,
although not yet wide enough, is a fact.

And the United Nations is back to work on the
subject of outer space, committed to the principles
of cooperative effort for the good of all mankind
in an effort carried out in accord with the charter
of our organization.

Based on these facts, and in the light of the
high principles which the past General Assembly
resolution so eloquently lays down, I should now
like to suggest various matters which the United
States believes this Committee could profitably
consider and act upon in our common endeavor
to further international cooperation in the peace-
ful use of outer space in the fateful years that be
ahead of us.

These matters include the exchange of informa-
tion and knowledge, joint research, cooperative
development of space projects, and the extension
of the rule of law in outer space.

Exchange of Scientific Information

We believe that this Committee has an im-
paralleled opportunity to stimulate the exchange
of both scientific and technical information.

We already have made a beginning with the
registration of objects sent into outer space.

Beyond this the Committee might consider ways
to encourage the formation of national space com-
mittees which would help member nations to par-
ticipate more effectively in international space pro-
grams. In order to form a comprehensive picture
of the nature of national space efforts and inter-
national space cooperation it might be useful for
the Committee to request reports from nations and
national groupings, such as the European Space
Kesearch Organization.

We also believe it would be helpful and prac-
ticable to have the Secretariat prepare infor-
mational material regarding measures which states
might take to increase their ability to participate in
international space endeavors. Such materials
might include information about existing national
training programs and facilities, requirements for
sounding rockets and the necessary facilities for
launching such rockets, and the minimum equip-
ment required for telemetry operations.

With the participation of i-epresentatives from
COSPAR (the Committee on Space Kesearch),
WMO (the World Meteorological Organization),
and ITU (the International Telecommunication
Union) it might be useful for the Conmiittee to

examine the operation of existing scientific and
technical data centers, translation services, and
commmiications facilities for the dissemination
and use of scientific information received from
space activities.

We hope the relationship between this Com-
mittee and such organizations will be close, effec-
tive, and fruitful. This Committee can play a use-
ful role in encouraging these organizations to move
ahead as rapidly as possible in carrying out the
General Assembly resolution. The Committee
should also work closely with UNESCO (the
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cul-
tural Organization), as the scientific and educa-
tional agency of the U.N. system, so that the maxi-
mum benefits may be derived from its assistance
and support.

Cooperative Research Efforts

It is apparent from what I have just said that
the fullest kind of exchange of information is
needed in all phases of space research. But if the
research itself can be done on a comnion or co-
operative basis, our progress will be speeded, the
cost will be reduced, and the areas of mutual
interest will be expanded.

The offers made by President Kennedy to
Chairman Khrushchev for joint research endeavor
were not intended to exclude other cooperative
projects in this field or the participation of other
nations in them. On the contrary, they were in-
tended to get things started and open the way for
cooperative research efforts on a broader mter-
national scale.

For example, the Committee might explore the
desii-ability of establishing one or more inter-
national scientific laboratories, where scientists
from all nations could join together on space-
related research projects, combining their knowl-
edge and creative talents in the search for answers
to some of tlie countless mysteries that still lie un-
resolved. We have in mind such questions as the
human aspects of space flight — medical, biological,
ecological, psychological, and other matters re-
lating to human activity and survival in space.

We believe the Committee might wish to con-
sider requesting COSPAR and the International
Astronomical Union to study the desirability of
organizing a worldwide system of ground-based
observatories to gain the new information about
the planets which will bo needed for future manned
exploration.

814

Department of State Bulletin

I have mentioned U.S. efforts in the development
of meteorological and communications satellites.
In order to prepare the way for effective inter-
national sharing of the benefits to be derived from
the use of such satellites, the General Assembly in
its Kesolution 1721 (XVI) put forward various
proposals which it requested the WMO and ITU
to examine. The first of these proposals looks
toward a worldwide program of weather research
and weather prediction.

The United Nations program calls upon the
World Meteorological Organization, in collabo-
ration with UNESCO and the scientific com-
munity, to develop two kinds of proposals. The
first is for an international research program to
yield information essential for improved weather
prediction and perhaps eventually weather con-
trol. The second is for an international weather
service program— a global network of regional
weather stations to receive, process, and transmit
meteorological information from orbiting weather
satellites as well as from earth-based instruments.

The cost of the worldwide weather program is
small compared to its potential benefits. The
challenge to the U.N. is to develop a program
which will encom-age the necessary cooperation
among nations in research, in the training of
weather experts, in constiniction of weather sta-
tions, in the tracking of weather satellites, and in
tlie exchange of weather information.

Global System of Communications Satellites

"With respect to communications, the General
Assembly resolution looks toward the establish-
ment of a global system of communications
satellites.

Space technology has opened up vast possibili-
ties for international communications. According
to many current estimates, it should be technically
possible by the end of this decade to have in opera-
tion a global system of telephone, radio, and tele-
vision communication. The cost of such a system
will be great, but its benefits will be enormous.

With the aid of satellites, telephone conmiuni-
cation between continents will become immeas-
urably easier. A single communication satellite
can offer 20 times the number of telephone chan-
nels available in our existing undersea cables. At
the same time a satellite system could make possi-
ble global radio and television. An audience of
bmadreds of millions of people could be listening

to or watching the same program in many parts of
the world.

This fundamental breakthrough in communica-
tion could affect the lives of people everywhere. It
could forge new bonds of mutual knowledge and
miderstanding between nations. It could offer a
powerful tool to improve literacy and education in
developing nations. It would enable leaders of
nations to talk face to face on a convenient and
reliable basis.

The satellite system likely to be in use within
this decade will be for point-to-point relay between
central installations in different countries, not for
direct broadcast into people's homes. This means
that the benefits of space communications can be
made available to all peoples only through politi-
cal as well as teclinical cooperation. It may prove
easier to secure cooperation in the technical area
than in the political, but our efforts must go
forward in both areas simultaneously.

The measures proposed in both meteorology and
satellite communications will be of direct impor-
tance to all the countries of the world, and tlie
United States hopes that the WMO and ITU will
give them urgent and careful attention. This
Committee can expect reports from WMO and
ITU at a reasonably early date, and at that time we
will all have an opportunity to review their work
and to provide these organizations with appro-
priate suggestions.

In the meantime, as the ITU moves ahead with
consideration of matters related to satellite com-
munications, we in the United States are laying
the basis for cooperative effort in this field. There
has recently been presented to the Congress legis-
lation to establish a United States commmiications
satellite corporation." The purpose of this corpo-
ration would be to expedite the development of
satellite commimications so that a global system
can be operational as soon as practicable.

I want to make it clear that tliis cor^joration is
intended to be the United States participant in a
global system, a truly international arrangement
with broad ownership and participation. That
the satellite communications system would be
international is dictated by a mmiber of common-
sense considerations. The satellites will be
primarily useful for communicating between coun-

" For text of President Kennedy's message transmitting
the proposed legislation to Congress, see White House
press release dated Feb. 7.

May 14. 1962

815

tries, and much of the traffic will be between other
countries not involving the United States at all.

In view of the importance of communications to
all states, many other countries will wish to have
a voice in the operation and management of the
system and will be prepared to contribute to the
cost of the system. For our part we welcome this
interest in cooperation and participation by other
countries, both as a sharing of the burden of estab-
lishing and maintaining the system and as a
demonstration of international cooperation which
will have value in itself.

Development of communications and meteoro-
logical satellites and various other projects of
course can be initiated only by those countries with
the necessary economic and scientific means. This
Committee is not in a position to undertake the
kind of major operations which such projects re-
quire. Our primaiy task at this stage is limited to
study and to the stimulation of international co-
operation in outer space work.

But this is not a passive function. Through its
promotion of research, through its studies, through
encouragement and assistance to national efforts,
and through its authority as a subsidiary organ of
the General Assembly, this Committee can expand
the sphere of international cooperation. We be-
lieve the Committee will want to maintain a con-
tinuing interest in these activities and thereby help
to assure that the benefits of all space activities
will be made available on a nondiscriminatory
basis to all nations.

We believe it would also be useful for this Com-
mittee to request reports from COSPAR on its
activities and planning. Furthermore, the Com-
mittee might consider the work which COSPAR
is doing to identify the type of future space ex-
periments and space explorations which might
profitably be undertaken and the sequence and
manner in which they should be conducted.

International Law and Outer Space

IvCt me briefly turn now to my final topic: inter-
national law and outer space. The United Nations
can and should play an important role in develop-
ing principles for the guidance of states in con-
nection with outer space activities. We should
proceed in this area with the recognition that the
task of the organized international community is
to develop principles and standards which are
sufficiently realistic and specific to have an impact
on international jiractice, and which are not so

grandiose or elaborate as to be impractical and
therefore ignored.

The practical and specific principles, which were
unanimously approved by the Assembly in part A
of General Assembly Resolution 1721 (XVI),
form the basic foundation of a legal regime for
outer space. They represent a forward-looking
expression by the Assembly that outer space is
indeed the province of all mankind. They are
practical in the sense that the enlightened self-
interest of all states should lead to compliance with
them.

Building on this foundation, we will propose
that studies be imdertaken on two subjects : first,
state responsibility for space- vehicle accidents;
and second, problems arising from the landing, by
reason of distress or mistake, of space veliicles in
the territory of other states.

Mr. Chairman, these are the suggestions which
my delegation has to offer at this time toward the
development of a work program for this Commit-
tee. We look forward with interest to what we are
sure will be the stimulating and constructive sug-
gestions and comments of other membere.

And now, Mr. Chairman, may I conclude. Our
Committee is on the launching pad, and the count-
down has begun. As we lift ourselves from our
earthbound "heritage of thought," may we free
ourselves of the gravitation of national rivalries
and suspicions, may we rise into an outer space of
new and high and unlimited perspective on the
world below us, may we enjoy the pleasant weight-
lessness of mutual confidence and underetanding,
and may o>ir orbit reach the apogee of that inter-
national cooperation and friendship which alone
can insure the survival, in any space, of the par-
ticular planet on wliich we so precariously live.

Current U.N. Documents:
A Selected Bibliography

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those
listed iclow) may he consulted at f/f/)o,si7on/ tihraries in'
the United States. U.N. printed puhlieutions may be'
purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations,
I'nited Nations l'la:a. New York.

General Assembly

Letter dnted March 20, li)C)2. from the Finni.^h representa-
tive addressed to the Secretarv-Geiieral concerning
Resolution 1004 (XVI). A/5108. March 26, 1962.
2 pp.

816

Deparfment of Stafe Bullefin

Economic and Social Council

Commission on the Status of Women. Access of girls to
elementary education. E/CN.6/39C. January 4, 1UG2
67 pp.
Economic Commission for Africa. Economic and social
consequences of racial discriminatory practices.
E/CN.14/i;i2. January 6, 19G2. 21G pp.
Statistical Commission. Report of the ad hoc working
group of specialists on sample survey methods.
E/CN.3/28-4. January 8, 10G2. 2.5 pp.
Commission on Human Rights. National advisory com-
mittees on human rights. E/CN.4/828. January 10,
1902. 34 pp.
Economic Commission for Africa. The cooperative move-
ment in Africa. E/CN.14/133. January 15, 19G2.
208 pp.
United Nations assistance for the advancement of women
in developing countries. E/3566. January IG, 1J)G2
57 pp.
Commission on International Commodity Trade. Stabili-
zation of export proceeds through a development insur-
ance fund. E/CN.13/43. January 18, 1962. 191 pp.
Progres.s reports of the Committee of Experts for Further
Work on the Transport of Dangerous Goods and the
Group of Experts on Explosives. E/3575. January 30
1962. 17 pp.
Commission on International Commodity Trade. Position
of synthetics in the measurement and analysis of inter-
national markets for primary commodities. E/CN 13/-
44. February 2, 1962. 12 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Automotive Traffic

:!onvention concerning customs facilities for touring

Done at New York June 4, 1954. Entered into force

September 11, 1957. TIAS 3S79.

Notiflcathm rct-rivcd that it considers itself bound-
Sierra Leone, March 13, 19G2.
Convention on road traffic, with annexes. Done at Geneva

September 19, 1049. Entered into force March 26, 1952.

TIAS 24S7.

Notification received that it considers itself hound-
Sierra Leone, March 13, 1962.

Aviation

lonvention on international civil aviation. Done at
Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force April 4
1947. TIAS 1591.
Adherence deposited: Tanganyika, April 23, 1962.

nternational air services transit agreement. Done at
Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force for the
United States February 8, 1945. 59 Stat. 1693.
Acceittance deposited: Tunisia, April 2G, 1962.

ultural Relations

greement on the importation of educational, scientific,
and cultural materials, and protocol. Done at Lake
Success November 22, 1950. Entered into force May 21,

' Not in force for the United States.
lay 14, 1962

Notification that it considers itself hound: Sierra Leone
March 13, 1962.

Customs

International convention to facilitate the importation of
commercial samples and advertising material. Done at
Geneva November 7, 1952. Entered into force Novem-
ber 20, 1955; for the United States October 17, 1057
TIAS 3020.

Notification received that it considers itself bound-
Sierra Leone, March 13, 1962.

Diplomatic Relations

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at Vi-
enna April 18, 19G1. Open for signature at Vienna
until October 31, 19G1, and at United Nations Head-
quarters, New York, until March 31, 19G2.^
Signatures:" Fiula.n<i, Philippines, October 20, 19G1 •
Belgium, October 23, 1961 ; San Marino, October 25'
1061 ; Thailand, October 30, 1961 ; Unitecl Kingdom'
December 11, 1961; Cuba, January 16, 1962; Luxem-
bourg, February 2, 1962; Canada, February 5 196'' •
Costa Rica, February 14, 1962; Iraq (with reserva-
tion), February 20, 19G2; Tanganyika, February 27
10G2; Italy, March 13, 1002; Japan (with declara-
tion), March 26, 1962; Central African Republic,
Korea, New Zealand, South Africa, March 28, 1962 ;
Greece (with reservation), Pakistan, March 29, 1962;
Australia, Dominican Republic, France, March 3o'
1962 ; Nigeria, March 31, 1962.
Ratification deposited: Pakistan, March 29, 19G2.
Optional protocol to the Vienna convention on diplomatic
relations concerning the compulsory settlement of dis-
putes. Done at Vienna April 18, 1961. Open for signa-
ture at Vienna until October 31, 1961, and at United
Nations Headquarters, New York, until March 31, 1962 "^
Signatures :" Finland, Philippines, October 20 1961-
Belgium, October 23, 1961 ; United Kingdom, Decem-
ber 11, 1961 ; Luxembourg, February 2, 1962 ; Iraq
February 20, 1962 ; Tanganyika, February 27, 19G2 •
Italy, March 13, 1962; Japan, March 26, 1962; Cen-
tral African Republic, New Zealand, March 28, 1962 ;
Dominican Republic, France, Korea, March 30, 1962!

Property

Convention for the protection of industrial property.
Signed at London June 2, 1934. Entered into force
August 1, 1938. 53 Stat. 1748.
Adherence effective: Iceland, May 5, 1962.

Slavery

Slavery convention signed at Geneva September 25, 1926
as amended (TIAS 3532). Entered into force March 9,
1927; for the United States March 21, 1929. 46 Stat.

Notification received that it considers itself bound:
Sierra Leone, March 13, 1962.

Trade and Commerce

Declaration on provisional accession of Tunisia to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at
Tokyo November 12, 1959. Entered into force May 21,
1960 ; for the United States June 15, 1960. TIAS 4498.
Signature: Peru, March 19, 10G2.

Procfes-verbal extending and amending declaration of No-
vember 22, 1958 (TIAS 4461), on provisional accession
of the Swiss Confederation to the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 8,
1961. Entered into force December 31, 1961 ; for the
United States January 9, 1062. TIAS 4957.
Signatures: Belgium, February 2, 1962; Finland, Janu-
ary 24, 1962; France, February 13, 1062; Italy (sub-

' Not in force.

' For earlier signatures, see Bui-letin of Aug. 14, 1961.
p. 306.

817

ject to ratification of declaration of November 22,
1958), March 8, 19C2; Japan, March 5, 1962; Luxem-
bourg, February 27, 1962; Norway, March 7, 1962;
Pakistan, February 16, 1962; Sweden, February 2,
1962; Tunisia, January 18, 1962; United Kingdom,
March 19, 1962.
Proc^s-verbal extending declaration of November 12, 1959
(TIAS 4498), on provisional accession of Tunisia to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at
Geneva December 9, 1961. Entered into force January
8, 1962 ; for the United States January 9, 1962. TIAS
4958.

Signatures: Belgium, February 2, 1962; Canada, De-
cember 29, 1961 ; Finland, January 24, 1962 ; France,
February 13, 1962; Indonesia, February 5, 1962
Italy, March 8, 1962 ; Luxembourg, February 27, 1962
Norway, March 7, 1962 ; Paliistan, February 16, 1962
Peru, March 19, 1962; Rhodesia and Nyasaland
February 27, 1962 ; Switzerland, February 14, 1962
United Kingdom, March 19, 1962.
Ninth protocol of rectifications and modifications to texts
of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade. Done at Geneva August 17, 1959."
Signature: Finland, January 24, 1962.
Declaration giving effect to provisions of article XVI : 4
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done
at Geneva November 19, I960."
Signature: Denmark, March 19, 1962.
Declaration on extension of standstill provisions of ar-
ticle XVI : 4 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade. Done at Geneva November 19, I960.'
Signature: Denmark, March 19, 1962.

United Nations

Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization. Done at London November
16, 1945. Entered into force November 4, 1946. TIAS
1580.

Signature and acceptance: Sierra Leone, March 28,
1962.

BILATERAL
Brazil

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of
1954, as amended (68 Stat. 455; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709),
with exchanges of notes. Signed at Brasilia March 15,
1962. Entered into force March 15, 1962.

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agree-
ment of May 4, 1961 (TIAS 4918). Effected by ex-
change of notes at Brasilia and Rio de Janeiro March
15, 1962. Entered into force March 15, 1962.

Agricultural trade agreement. Signed at Washington
April 19, 1962. Entered into force April 19, 1962.

Ecuador

General agreement for economic, technical, and related
assistance. Signed at Quito April 17, 1962. Entered
into force April 17, 1962.

El Salvador

Agreement relating to the furnishing of defense articles
and services to El Salvador for the purpose of contrib-
uting to its internal security. Effected by exchange of
notes at San Salvador April 10 and 13, 1962. Entered
Into force April 13, 1962.

Liberia

Agricultural commodities agreement under title IV of the
Agiicultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of
1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 73 Stat. 610; 7 U.S.C.

1731-1736), with exchange of notes. Signed at Monro-
via April 12, 1962. Entered into force April 12, 1962.

Mexico

Agreement relating to the assignment and use of televi-
sion channels along the United States-Mexican border.
Effected by exchange of notes at M6xico April 18, 1962.
Entered into force April 18, 1962.

Poland

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agree-
ment of December 15, 1961 (TIAS 4907). Effected by
exchange of notes at Washington April 19, 1962.
Entered into force April 19, 1962.

United Arab Republic

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agree-
ment of February 10, 1962 (TIAS 4947). Effected by
exchange of notes at Washington April 23, 1962.
Entered into force April 23, 1962.

United Kingdom

Agricultural trade agreement. Signed at Washington
April 26, 1962. Entered into force April 26, 1962.

PUBLICATIONS

' Not in force.
818

Recent Releases

For sale 62/ the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Gov-
ernment Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. Address
requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, ex-
cept in the case of free publications, which may be ob-
tained from the Department of State.

Guaranty of Private Investments. TIAS 4799. 4 pp.

Agreement with Argentina — Signed at Buenos Aires De-
cember 22, 1959. Entered into force provisionally Decem-
ber 22, 1959. Entered into force definitively May 5, 1961.

Economic, Technical and Related Assistance. TIAS 4800.

8 pp. 100.

Agreement with Honduras — Signed at Tegucigalpa April
12, 1961. Entered into force May 27, 1961.

Economic, Technical and Related Assistance. TIAS 4801.

9 pp. lOdf.

Agreement with Cameroun. Exchange of notes — Signed
at Yaounde May 20, 1961. Entered into force May 26,
1961.

Economic, Technical and Related Assistance — Exemption
from Income and Social Security Taxes. TIAS 4802. 4
pp. 5«J.

Agreement with the Republic of Korea, relating to agree-
ment of February 8, 1961. Exchanges of notes — Signed
at Seoul February 8, 1961. Entered into force February
8, 1961.

Joint Financing of Certain Air Navigation Services in <
Greenland and the Faroe Islands. TIAS 4804. 1 pp.
5(#.

Agreement with Other Governments, amending the agree-
ment done at Geneva September 25, 1956, as amended.
Addjited at Montreal, June 9, 1961. Entered into force j
June 9, 1961.

Department of State Bulletin

May 14, 1962

Index

Vol.XLVI,No. 1194

American Republics

Che Alliance for Progress In the Context of World
Affairs (Rusk) 787

Success of Alliance for Progress Key to Welfare of
Americas (Rusk) 789

Uomic Energy

'resident Gives Authorization To Proceed With

Nuclear Tests 795

Secretary Rusli's News Conference of April 26 . . 795
.'lew From the Diplomatic Tightrope (Cleveland) . 803

)isarmament. Secretary Rusk's News Conference
of April 26 795

Economic Affairs

?he Alliance for Progress in the Context of World

Affairs (Rusk) 787

new From the Diplomatic Tightrope (Cleveland) . 803

■"oreigTi Aid

rhe Alliance for Progress in the Context of World
Affairs (Rusk) 787

Success of Alliance for Progress Key to Welfare
of Americas (Rusk) 789

Jermany. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of
April 26 795

'residential Documents. President Reviews World
Problems With Prime Minister Macmillan . . . 802

'ublications. Recent Releases 818

Science. New Vistas for International Cooperation
in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (Plimpton) . 809

>eaty Information. Current Actions 817

J.S.S.R.

few Vistas for International Cooperation in the

Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (Plimpton) . . 809
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of April 26 . . 795

Jnited Kingdom. President Reviews World Prob-
lems With Prime Minister Macmillan (text of
joint communique) 802

Jnited Nations

Jurrent U.N. Documents 816

Jew Vistas for International Cooperation in the

Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (Plimpton) . . 809
'^iew From the Diplomatic Tightrope (Cleveland) . 803

Name Indea

Cleveland, Harlan 803

Kennedy, President 802

Macmillan, Harold 802

Plimpton, Francis T. P 809

Rusk, Secretary 787,789,795

No.

Date

*261
*263

4/23
4/23

t264

4/23

*265

4/24

t266

4/25

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: April 23-29

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of
News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Release appearing in this issue of the Bulletin
which was issued prior to April 23 is No. 249 of
April 13.

Snbject

Itinerary for visit of Macmillan.

U.S. participation in international
conferences.

iHearings on revocation of Mrs.
Flynn's passport.

Brubeck designated Special Assist-
ant to Secretary of State (bio-
graphic details).

Delegation to NATO meeting (re-
write).

Cultural exchange (Jamaica).

Hong Kong textile talks.

Cultural exchange (Togo).

Rusk: "The Alliance for Progress
in the Context of World Affaire."

Rusk: additional remarks.

Rusk : MBC program on Alliance
for Progress.

Mrs. Louchheim : United Fund
Women's Council, Philadelphia.

Itinerary for visit of President of
Cyprus.

Itinerary for visit of Macmillan.

Delegation to ANZUS meeting (re-
write).

Rusk : news conference of April 26.

Delegation to CENTO meeting (re-
write).

*Not printed.

tHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin.

*267

t268

♦269

270

4/25
4/24
4/26
4/25

270-A
271

4/25
4/26

*272

4/26

*273

4/26

•274
1275

4/26

4/27

276

t277

4/27
4/27

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THE EMERGING NATIONS OF ASIA

"These emerging nations may well hold the key to the world of
tomorrow. Our ability to identify ourselves with their aspirations
indeed our ability to permit this revolution to unfold and not be turned
back by communism, is crucial to our own future."

The above quotation is from a recent address by U. Alexis Johnson,
Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political AlTairs, made before
the Institute of World Affairs at Pasadena, California, which is
available in this 17-page pamphlet.
Publication 7353 ^^ ""*^

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state

UNITED NATIONS RULES OUT CHANGE IN
REPRESENTATION OF CHINA

statements made in plenary of the Sixteenth United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly by Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson, U.S. Eepresenta-
tive to the United Nations, on the question of the representation of

China in the U.N. . , ^ ,

This 10-page pamphlet also includes the texts of a resolution adopted

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Publication 7355 ^" '^"*^

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Vol. XLVI, No. 1195

May 21, 1962

iCiAL

KLY RECORD

THE FUTURE TRADE OF THE UNITED STATES •

Address by President Kennedy 323

THE DIRECTION OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN

POLICY • by Under Secretary McGhee 827

THE DOMESTIC BASE OF FOREIGN POLICY •

by Walt W. Rostoic 333

AIDS AND OBSTACLES TO POLITICAL STABILITY

IN MID-AFRICA • by Assistant Secretary Williams . 841

fEO STATES
EIGN POLICY

For index see inside back cover

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Note: Contents of this publlcallon are not
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be rcprlnteil. Citation of the Depaktment
or State Bulletin as the source will be
appreciated. The Bulletin Is Indexed In the
Keadors" Guide to Periodical Literature.

Vol. XLVI, No. 1195 • Publication 7376
May 21, 1962

The Department of State BVLLETIS,
a weekly publication, issued by the
Office of Public Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public
and interested agencies of the
Government with information on
developments in the field of foreiisn
relations and on the work of the
Department of State and the Foreign
Service. The BVLLETIS includes se-
lected press releases on foreign policy,
issued by the White House and the
Department, and statements and ad-
dresses nutde by the President and by
the Secretary of State and other
otjiccrs of the Department, as well as
special articles on riiriou.s phases of
international affairs and the func-
tions of the Department. Informa-
tion is incluiletl concerning treaties
and international agreements to
which the L'uited States is or may
become a parly and treaties of gen-
eral international interest.

Publications of the Department,
United yalions tlocuments, and legis-
lative material in tlie fieltl of inter-
national relations are listed currently.

The Future Trade of the United States

Address hy President Kennedy '

This port of New Orleans is the second leading
port of the United States. I would like to say
that Boston is the first, but nevertheless this great
port is symbolized by this great wharf and I think
it most appropriate to come to this city, and this
pier, on this river, and say a word about the
future trade of the United States. And I am
particularly happy to be in this city. For
throughout its history, this happy city has sym-
bolized and served our country and the world at
large. Cosmopolitan by nature, tolerant in out-
look, the product of many nations, and cultures,
and creeds, and races, New Orleans has long rep-
resented the strength of diversity working in
harmony — and I am confident that the overwhelm-
ing majority of the citizens of this city intend to
see that this most valuable reputation and char-
acter are preserved.

After the battle of New Orleans Andrew Jack-
son said that he was fighting for the reestablish-
ment of the American character. And that, in
our generation and time, is our responsibility : the
reestablislmient of the American character. And
I speak today of one facet of that character, and
that is trade. This trade and competition and
innovation have long been a significant part of
the American character.

The Founding Fathers — Washington, Jefferson,
Adams, Franklin — were men of trade as well as
men of affairs. For trade represents widening
horizons. This great river, which reaches as far
as the Eockies, and Pennsylvania in the East, con-
nects this city with the farthestmost points of the
world. It represents the spirit of liberty and the

' Made at ceremonies opening a new doclsside terminal
at New Orleans, La., on May 4 (White House press re-
lease dated May 7, as-delivered text).

spirit of democracy, and the spirit of trade goes
hand in hand with that great institution.

Today this nation sells more goods abroad than
any nation in the world ; we buy more goods than
any nation in the world ; and we gain both from
the buying and the selling. One-twelfth of all of
our transportable goods — an amount larger than
all we purchase for automobiles and auto parts —
are bound up in foreign trade, which affects the
livelihood of everyone who lives in this city. In
1960 we exported more than 50 percent of all the
locomotives we built in this country, 49 percent
of all the cotton we grew in the United States, 31
percent of the oil machinery, 57 percent of the
rice, 31 percent of the construction and mining
equipment, 29 percent of the tobacco, 23 percent
of the metal-forming machine tools, and 41 per-
cent of the soybeans. And in return we purchase
goods without which there would be no coffee
breaks, no banana splits, and no opportunity for
us to use dozens of essential materials.

In this city more than in most, your feet are in
the water. Last year $2 billion worth of goods
passed through these wharves around the worlds
feed from the Great Plains, cotton from the South),
tobacco from the South, steel plate from Bii-ming-
ham, automobiles from Detroit, and bananas and
coffee from the South American countries. Trade
has built New Orleans, trade will sustain New
Orleans, trade will develop New Orleans in the
coming months — not only on this pier but in your
banks, your insurance companies, your oil indus-
tries, your chemical industries — your industries,
which means the welfare of all of your people is
bound up with that river which flows into the
ocean.

Louisiana stands fifth — fifth — among all the
States of the United States in the percentage of

May 27, 1962

823

people in this State who work in foreign trade of
local employment. And the other four States are
Arkansas, Texas, Alabama, and Mississippi. The
five States of the Union where more people, per-
centagewise, are engaged in occupations depend-
ing on foreign trade are all here in the South.
In short, the five States which will benefit the most
from our new trade legislation are here in your
neighborhood. All this indicates we must go
forward.

A Great Dividing Point

In May of 1962 we stand at a great dividing
point. We must either trade or fade. We must
either go backward or go forward. For more
than a quarter of a century the reciprocal trade
legislation fathered by Cordell Hull of Tennessee
and sponsored by Franklin Roosevelt has served
this country well. And on 11 different occasions
it has been renewed by Congresses of both parties.
But that act is no longer adequate to carry us
through the channels and the locks of world trade
today. For the whole pattern of trade is chang-
ing, and we must change with it. The Common
Market uniting the coimtries of Western Europe
together in one great trading group indicates both
a promise or a threat to our economy. Our inter-
national balance of payments is in deficit, requir-
ing an increase in our exports. Japan has re-
gained force as a trading nation; nearly 50 new
nations of Asia and Africa are seeking new mar-
kets; our friends in Latin America need to trade
to develop their capital ; and the Communist bloc
has developed a vast new arsenal of trading weap-
ons which can be used against us, and they are
ready to take and fill any area in which we leave
a gap, whenever American leadership should
falter. And we do not intend to give way.

I believe that American trade leadership must
be maintained and that is why I come to your city.
I believe it must be furthered, and I have therefore
submitted to the Congress the Trade Expansion
Act of 1962.2

It is not a partisan measure — its provisions have
been endorsed by leaders of both parties. It is
not a radical measure — its newest features merely
add force to the traditional American concepts.
And it is not a measure favoring one section of
our country over another — farm, labor, business.

'For text of the President's message to Congress, see
Bulletin of Feb. 12, 19C2, p. 231.

and consumer groups, from every part of the Na-
tion, support this legislation. I am convinced
that the passage of this bill is of vital importance
to you and to every other American, not only to
those vast numbers of people who are engaged in
trade but to every citizen: as a consimier who is
concerned about the prices you must pay, as a
patriot concerned about national security, as an
American concerned about freedom. The basic
economic facts make it essential that we pass this
legislation this year.

Expanding Opportunities for Trade

Our businessmen, workers, and farmers are in
need of new markets, and the fastest growing mar-
ket in the world is the European Common Market.
Its consumers will soon be nearly 250 million
people. Its sales possibilities have scarcely begiui
to be tapped. Its demand for American goods
is without precedent — if only we can obtain the
tools necessary to open the door.

Our own markets here at home expand as our
economy and population expands. But think of
the tremendous demand in the Common Market
coimtries, where most consumers have never had
the goods which we take so much for granted.
Think of the opportunities in a market where,
compared to the ratio of ownership in this coun-
try, only one-fourth as many consumers have ra-
dios, one-seventh television sets, one-fifth auto-
mobiles, washing machines, refrigerators !

If our American producers can share in this
market it will mean more investment and more
plants and more jobs and a faster rate of growth.
To share in that market we must strike a bargain,
we must have something to offer the Europeans,
we must be willing to give them increased access
to our markets. Let us not avoid the fact: We
cannot sell unless wo buy. And there will be
those who will be opposed to this competition.
But let those who believe in competition — those
who welcome the challenge of world trade as our
predcces.sors have done — let them recognize the
value that will come from this exchange of goods.
It will enrich the choice of consumers. It will
make possible a higher standard of living. It will
help hold the lid on the cost of living. It will
stimulate our producers to modernize their prod-
ucts. A few — a very few — may be adversely' af-
fected, but for the benefit of those few we have
expanded and reiined the safeguards of the act.

824

Deparfmenf of Sfafe ^MeWn

As in tlie past, tariff reductions will take place
frraclually over a period of years. As in tlie past,
import restrictions can bo imposed if an industry
undergoes undue hardship. Tariif policies on
some items — such as textiles and oil — are already
covered by special arrangements or agreements
which give them the necessary assurances.

Finally, under this bill, for the first time, a
constructive, businesslike program of adjustment
assistance will be available to individual firms and
workers, specifically tailored to help them regain
their competitive strength. They will not stand
alone, therefore, in the marketplace. There will
be temporary aid in hardship cases with the crea-
tive purpose of increasing productivity, of helping
labor and management get back in the competitive
stream — instead of using tariff laws as a long-term
Federal subsidy or dole, paid by the consiuner to
stagnant enterprises.

With this variety of tools at our disposal, no
one — and I say no one — ^is going to be sacrificed
to the national interest with a medal and an empty
grocery bag.

Increasing Employment in Growth Industries

But let us not miss the main point: The new
jobs opened through trade will be far greater
than any jobs which will be adversely affected.
And these new jobs will come in those enterprises
that are today leading the economy of the coun-
try— our growth industries, those that pay the
highest wages, those that are among the most effi-
ciently organized, those that are most active in
research and in the innovation of new products.
The experience of the European Common Market,
where tariffs were gradually cut down, has shown
that increased trade brings employment. They
have full employment in the Common Market and
an economic growth rate twice that of the United
States. In short, trade expansion will emphasize
the modem instead of the obsolete, the strong in-
stead of the weak, the new frontiers of trade in-
stead of the ancient strongholds of protection.

And we cannot continue to bear the burden that
we must bear of helping freedom defend itself all
the way from the American soldier guarding the
Brandenburg Gate to the Americans now in Viet-
Nam or the Peace Corps men in Colombia. Un-
less we have the resources to finance those great
expenditures, which in the last year totaled over
$3 billion, unless we are able to increase our sur-
plus of balance of payments, then the United

World Trade Week, 1962

A PROCLAMATION'

Whereas the people of the United States recog-
nize expanding world trade as a vital force in fos-
tering growth and unity among the countries of the
free world ; and

WHEBEAS American business, labor, agriculture,
and consumers benefit whenever there is a signifi-
cant expansion of American exports and imports ;
and

Whereas the development of the European Com-
mon Market, the Alliance for Progress, and the
economic advancement of underdeveloped areas are
major free world economic developments which are
of profound importance to us ; and

Whereas it is appropriate to set aside a period
to give special recognition and emphasis to the sig-
nificance of international trade and commerce :

Xow. THEREFORE, I, JoHN F. KENNEDY, President
of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim
the week beginning May 20, 19C2, as World Trade
Week ; and I request officials of the Federal, State,
and local governments to plan appropriate cere-
monies and activities In observance of that week.

I urge business, labor, agriculture, educational
and civic groups, as well as the people of the United
States generally, to observe World Trade Week
with gatherings, discussions, exhibits, and other
activities designed to promote continuing aware-
ness of the importance of world trade and our i)oli-
cies toward It in strengthening our economy and
the unity of the free world, and a better under-
standing of the vital new problems now confronting
us.

In WITNESS WHEREOF, I havc hereunto set my
hand and caused the Seal of the United States of
America to be affixed.

Done at the City of Washington this seventh day
of May in the year of our Lord nineteen
fsEAL] hundred and sixty-two, and of the Inde-
pendence of the United States of America
the one hundred and eighty-sixth.

P.y the President :

George W. Ball,

Acting Secretary of State.

' Xo. 3474 ; 27 Fed. Reg. 4503.

States will be faced with a hard choice, of either
lessening those commitments or begimiing to with-
draw this great national effort.
One answer to this problem is the negative an-

May 27, 7962

825

swer: raise our tariffs, restrict our capital, pull
back from the world— and our adversaries would
only be too glad to fill any gap that we should
leave. This administration was not elected to pre-
side over the liquidation of American responsi-
bility in these great years.

Tliere is a much better answer, and that is to
increase our exports, to meet our commitments,
and to maintain our defense of freedom. I have
every confidence that, once this bill is passed, the
ability of American initiative and know-how will
increase our exports and our export surplus by
competing successfully in every market of the
world.

Strengthening the Partnership of Free Nations

Third and last, the new trade act can strengthen
our foreign policy, and one of these points, as Am-
bassador Morrison ' knows well, is Latin Amer-
ica. The Alliance for Progress seeks to help these
Latin American neighbors of ours. That effort
must, and will, continue. But foreign aid cannot
do the job alone. In the long run our sister Re-
publics must develop the means themselves to
finance their development. They must sell more
of their goods on the world market and earn the
exchange necessary to buy the machinery and the
technology that they need to raise their standard
of living. The Trade Expansion Act is designed
to keep this great market as a part of the world
community, because the security of the United
States is tied up with the well-being of our sister
Republics.

And we have a concern for Japan, which has
maintained its freedom. Last year Japan bought
a half a billion dollars more of goods from us
than we bought from her, and it is important that
she not be locked out of the world markets, be-
cause otherwise those who are opposed to freedom
can win a victory in the coming years. To pay
for her imports Japan must sell. Many countries
seek to discriminate against those goods, and we
need the bargaining tools of the new Trade Ex-
pansion Act to bring Japan fully into the free-
world trading systems.

•deLosseps Moriisou, U.S. Representative to the Or-
ganization of American States.

For we are moving toward a full partnership of
all the free nations of the world, a partnership
which will have within its area 90 percent of the
industrial productive power of the free world,
which will have in it the greatest market that the
world has ever known, a productive power far
greater than that of the Communist bloc, a trillion-
dollar economy, where goods can move freely back
and forth. That is the prospect that lies before
us, as citizens of this coimtry, in the year 1962.
Those who preach the doctrine of the inevita-
bility of the class struggle and of the Communist
success should realize that in the last few years
the great effort which has been made to unify
economically the countries of the free world offers
far greater promise than the sterile and broken
promises of the Communist system. Against the
Communist system of iron discipline the Atlantic
partnership will present a world of free choice.
Against their predictions of our collapse it will
present a challenge of free nations working in
harmony, and it will provide economically an
effective answer to those boasts of their ultimately
overtaking us.

That is why the passage of the Trade Expan-
sion Act is so important this year. And that is
why I salute men such as Chairman Wilbur Mills
of Arkansas of the Ways and Means Committee
and your own Congressman Hale Boggs, who are
preparing for its passage.

This is a great opportunity for all of us to move
ahead. This city would never have developed as
it has unless those who have preceded us had had
the spirit of initiative and courage. That is what
is asked of us today. This wharf demonstrates
your confidence in the future. No section of the
United States will benefit more in the coming
months and years if we are successful.

In the life of every nation, as in the life of
every man, there comes a time when a nation
stands at the crossroads— when it can either shrink i
from the future and retire into i(s shell or cam
move ahead, asserting its will and its faith in an
uncertain sea. I believe that we stand at such a
juncture in our foreign economic policy. And I
come to this city because I believe New Orleans
and Ix)uisiana— and the United States— choose to
move ahead in 1962.

826

Deparlmenf of Sfofe Boffefin

The Direction of United States Foreign Policy

hy George C. McGhee

Under Secretary for Political Affairs ^

I greatly appreciate the honor of bemg asked
to address this international luncheon of the
golden anniversary meeting of tliis distinguished
group. I could not let tlie occasion pass without
paying tribute to the founders of your organiza-
tion and to your leaders over the half century of
tlie Chamber's existence. No group has made a
greater contribution to the United States business
community. The Chamber has, moreover, pro-
vided a valuable continuing point of contact be-
tween business and government. The recent
statement by the Chamber, Policy Declarations
on World Affairs, indicates the farsiglited ap-
proach it takes to the problems which our nation
faces in the present troubled world.

I have been asked to speak today on the major
problems and challenges facing United States for-
eign policy, to identify the free world's strengths
and weaknesses, and to chart tlie course that
United States foreign policy is expected to take
in the years ahead.

The headlines of our newspapers seem today to
be concerned principally with the various crises
wjiich are endemic to the current international
scene. The acute situations we face in Berlin,
South Viet-Nam, Laos, the Congo, and Cuba tend
to attract most of our attention and, perhaps, to
distort our perspective toward more fundamental
problems.

"We hear it said that our national eflForts are
overly devoted to coping with these crises— to
reacting to ijiitiatives taken by the Communist
bloc— and that we have no broad strategy directed

'Address made before the United States Chamber of
Commerce at Washington, D.C., on Apr. 30 (press re-
lease 279).

May 2J, ?962

toward "winning" the cold war. It is true that
much of our energies are consumed by issues aris-
ing out of the crisis areas. Indeed, involving as
they do possibilities for shifts in tlie power balance
between the free world and the bloc, or even for
local "shooting" wars that could lead to a global
conflagration, we cannot ignore them. We must
continue to do what we can to assist the nations
involved in eliminating these persistent obstacles
to world peace. We must confront and defeat
Communist aggression, wherever it occurs.

But Americans are entitled to more than this
from their Government. Tliey are entitled to some
assurance tliat tlieir Government knows wlmt it
is doing— that it has a plan and that it is carrying
it out. I hope to make it clear to you that your
Government does have such a plan— a positive
strategy which looks beyond the current crises and
the cold war toward the building of a stable, peace-
ful world order which can best assure tlie security
and well-beuig of the American people. I would
today like to describe for you the goal and the
courses of action which make up this strategy.

The goal is to strengthen and unify the free
world. This can best be achieved through the
creation of what was described by the President
in his last state of the Union message as a com-
munity of free nations — a community whose mem-
bers can cooperate increasingly on matters of
mutual concern while shaping their own institu-
tions according to their own desires.

Indeed, such a world community would be en-
tirely consistent with the principles of United
States foreign policy to which your Chamber has
subscribed: that every nation has the right to
govern itself, that nations should recognize the

827

sovereign equality of every other nation, and that
nations should cooperate peacefully with each
other so that the rule of law can ultimately sup-
plant the rule of force.

Our strategy lays out five main courses of action
to achieve the commimity of free nations:

First: Creation of an enduring partnersliip
among the North Atlantic nations, so there will be
a hard core of strength at the center of this com-
munity.

Second : Defense of the frontiers of the evolving
world community.

Third: Assistance to the less developed coun-
tries, so they can assume their rightful and con-
structive role in the community.

Fourth: Creation of a framework of interde-
pendence among the members of the community
through international organizations, trade, and
private and public ties.

Fifth : Pursuance of a policy toward the Com-
munist states which will avert war, so the com-
munity will be free to build, while promoting the
chances of long-term constructive evolution in the
bloc.

I shall take up each of these five elements of our
strategy in turn.

Building a North Atlantic Partnership

I turn first to our partnership with other
Atlantic nations.

To discharge the tasks of defending and build-
ing the free community, we need a strong partner,
one with resources comparable to our own and
with a will to utilize those resources in pursuit of
common goals. Such a partner is at hand in an
increasingly cohesive Europe. It has been the
consistent policy of both this and the previous
administration to support the movement toward
European integration in every feasible way. This
policy is paying oil' handsomely in greater Euro-
pean strength, unity, and confidence.

Wo also seek to create an increasingly effective
North Atlantic community, within which Europe
and the United States can work ever more closely
in common tasks. Foremost among these tasks is
that of insuring the security of the North Atlantic
area. If the countries of Europe are to commit
themselves unreservedly to a constructive part-
nership with the United States, they must know
that their homeland is as secure from Soviet

threats and military pressures as the facts of mili-
tary life pennit.

We are now engaged in a discussion with our
allies in the North Atlantic community as to the
best means of maintaining this security. Two
basic points seem to be emerging from this dis-
cussion.

First: There is need for greater NATO non-
nuclear strength. The deterrent to Commimist
attack will be the more convincing if the Com-
munists know that we can respond effectively at
every level of aggression.

Second : Greater sharing of nuclear responsibil-
ity is politically desirable, so nuclear weapons will
be a force for cohesion instead of division. To this
end we are trying to work out with our allies
agreed NATO guidelines concerning use of United
States nuclear forces. We are developing proce-
dures to consult with our allies concerning that use
when time permits. We have, moreover, indicated
our willingness, as the President suggested at
Ottawa last year," to join our allies in developing
a truly multilateral seaborne medium-range
missile force if that is their desire.

Parallel with these efforts to create a more inti-
mate partnership among the North Atlantic na-
tions in the military field go efforts to develop
closer political and economic relations.

The processes for political consultation in
NATO are being strengthened to this end.

In the economic area, trade is believed to offer
the key area to joint action. The members of the
expanded Common ^larket account for a major
portion of American export trade — altogether $6
billion a year — and much of our imports.

We have evei-y reason to anticipate that success-
ful trade negotiations with the European Connnon
Market would add to our domestic prosperit}', in-
crease cmploj'ment, provide new opportunities to
industrial and agricultural jiroducers, help to
check inflation, and in the long run contribute
substantially to the dynamism of our whole eco-
nomic system.

A mutually beneficial trade expansion with the
Common Market could be the first and perhaps
decisive step toward converting a relatively loose
association of nations of unequal strength into a
tightly knit partnership of equals: the United

"For text of :ui iulilrcss hy I'ri'siUoiit Konuody before
the Ciinadiiui I'arliiunent on May 17, 1961, see Bulletin
of .Tuner., liKil, p. Si!).

828

Deparfmenf of State Bulletin

States and the European Conununity. By the
same step we would have increased the economic
and technological dynamism of both partners.
We would liave cemented and consolidated exist-
ing institutional relationships which might be im-
periled if tlie two great common markets of
Western Europe and North America should make
the tragic mistake of becoming economic rivals.

The building of a community of free nations
will also require joint action by the North Atlantic
partners in other economic areas. We must seek to
coordinate the Atlantic nations' monetai-y and
fiscal policies, so these comitries can sustain a high
rate of economic growth wliile maintaining fi-
nancial stability and equilibrium in international
payments. Tlie OECD [Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development] — wliich
came into existence in September last year => — is the
mechanism set up for this purpose. Its Economic
Policy Committee is now at work on these prob-
lems.

The North Atlantic nations must concert to in-
crease their financial and technical aid to less
developed countries and to insure that this aid is
soundly allocated and that its burden is equitably
shared. Again, the OECD serves this purpose,
and the work being done in its Development As-
sistance Committee is beginning to bear fruit.

As this United States-European pai'tnership
takes form, we must be increasingly aleit to the
necessity for associating Japan with its construc-
tive tasks. This powerful nation, moving forward
at an extraordinary rate, must find within the
community of free nations a useful and fitting
role of world responsibility. Japan has an es-
sential role to play in aiding growth in the less
de\'e]oped areas, not only of Asia but also of the
[Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. It is
{because of this role that Japan is the only non-
European country which is a member of the
OECD's Development Assistance Committee.

Defending the Frontiers of Freedom

I turn now to the second aspect of our strategy :
defending the frontiers of freedom throughout the
coimnunity of free nations. This requires military
strength, appropriately positioned, and the will to
use this strength effectively. This can only be
accomplished through cooperation between our-

selves and those of our European allies able to
supply military equipment and training, and our
allies along the frontiers of freedom whose mili-
tary forces constitute our first line of defense.

In developing this strength we face not only a
general threat but also a Communist military
strategy aimed at points of particular vulnerabil-
ity in the free world's defenses — such as the short-
age of local ground forces in Korea in 1950. A
major lesson of postwar history is that we must,
in order to eliminate these areas of vulnerability,
develop a full range of military capabilities.

We must not only have a strong nuclear deter-
rent, backed by both active and passive defense
systems, but we and our allies must also develop
and maintain nonnuclear ground, air, and naval
forces which can effectively meet lesser forms of
aggression, including guerrilla warfare. We do
not wish to be faced, in response to every form of
attack, with the choice between inaction and use
of nuclear weapons.

Our objective is thus to develop a stable military
environment, one which will both minimize the
temptation to others to use force against the com-
munity of free nations and reduce the likelihood
that force, if it is used, will escalate into ail-out
war.

To help create such an environment we also seek,
at the same time, agreement on arms control meas-
ures. The disarmament proposals put forward
by the United States at the Geneva disarmament
meeting on April 18 * are the most comprehensive
ever formulated by any government. They are
not a propaganda device but a sincere effort to
produce a workable plan leading toward general
and complete disarmament.

We believe that even limited progi'ess in arms
control could reduce both the chances and the de-
structiveness of war. It may seem paradoxical to
consider anns control as part of a program for
maintaining a stable military environment. Lim-
ited arms control agreements with the Soviets
could, however, make a major contribution to this
objective. Risks inherent in uncontrolled arms
competition could be reduced, even if large reduc-
tions in armed forces were not soon achieved.

One of these risks is that of tlie proliferation of
nuclear weapons capabilities. To curtail this risk
we are proposing a number of specific measures,
including a ban on nuclear testing and the cutoff

"For background, see ibiil., Jan. 2, 1961, p. 8.
I/May 21, 7962

* For text, see ihid.. May 7, 1062, p. 747.

829

of production of fissionable materials for weapons
purposes.

Another risk is that of war by accident and mis-
calculation. To reduce this risk we are pressing
for such limited measures as advance notification
of military movements and we are proposing es-
tablishment of an international commission in
which the Soviets and we could jointly devise still
further safeguards against miscalculation.

Proiri'ess in the disarmament neo;otiations lias
not so far been encouraging. The Communists set
great store on their closed society. Moreover, So-
viet arms control policies often seem to be dictated
primarily by propaganda considerations.

We should not, however, despair for the future.
Increasing Communist awareness of the perils of
the arms race, internal changes within Communist
society, and continuing joint study and considera-
tion of the need for inspection and the varied
forms which it might take — all these may even-
tually create some opportunities for agreements
which will moderate present risks.

In the meantime the main hope of creating a
stable military environment must continue to rest
on military preparedness, reflected not only in our
own defense measures but also in our military aid
to other countries. The funds that we use to im-
prove Allied armed forces, where this lies beyond
the local countries' capabilities, are just as vital
to free- world security as our own defense budget.

Assisting Growth in Less Developed Areas

To build an evolving community of free nations
we must not only defend its frontiers; the com-
munity must at the same time provide incentives
for the stiniggling less developed countries of the
world to cast their lot with the rest of this com-
munity. I turn, therefore, to the third aspect of
our stategy for building the comminiity : assisting
growth in less developed areas.

If the developing countries cannot achieve de-
sired economic progress, they may well turn from
political systems based on individual freedom and
consent to extremist solutions which would es-
trange them from the free world. This is what the
Communists are hoping for.

The record to date, however, is not one which
should give the Communists much comfort.
Widely accepted judgments that Indochina, in
1954, Egypt, in 1956, and West Africa, in 19Gi),
might be lost to the free world proved overly pes-

simistic. The plain fact is that the people of the
emerging nations do not wish to come under Com-
munist control as long as any alternative means
of achieving the progress they seek is at hand.

We are seeking to sustain and fortify just such
an alternative : progi-ess in freedom. We are using
a variety of means to this end: economic and
technical aid, educational and cultural assistance,
the Peace Corps, provision of agricultural sur-
pluses, efforts to lower artificial trade barriers,
and measures to avoid excessive fluctuations in
commodity prices.

Private American business has a key role to play
in this effort. I commend to all of you a stimulat-
ing and thoughtful pamphlet which your Cham-
ber has issued on What the Communht Offensive
Means to American Business. It makes useful
suggestions as to actions that private enterprise
can take in working for development of the fi'ee

world.

Your investments abroad provide essential cap-
ital to less developed countries. The know-how
that goes with your investments plays a vital role
in helping these countries develop business and
managerial talent of their own, which can spark
their drive toward modernization.

The Government is your partner in this exciting
task. The economic development financing which
it provides— through AID [Agency for Interna-
tional Development], the Export-Import Bank,
and the U.S. contribution to the World Bank-
helps create the roads, ports, and other basic fa-
cilities that make growth of private enterprise in
less developed areas possible. Our technical
assistance and exchange progi'ams expose peoples
to new attitudes and skills which hasten that
growth. We are grateful for the national Cham-
ber's consistent supi>ort for all these needed pro-
grams.

Creating a Framework of Organization

I have spoken of the framework of organization
within the Northern Hemisphere wliich enables
the industrialized nations to work together in
building the community of free nations. There
are many other ties which can hind (lie membei-s
of the community together. I shall turn now, as
the fourth aspect of our global strategy, to the
steps we are taking to strengthen these ties.

There are, first., the regional security organiza-
tions which join countries for the defense of key

830

Department of State Bulletin

areas in the Southern Hemisphere. CENTO,
[Central Treaty Ori,'anization], SEATO [South-
east x\sia Treaty Organization] and ANZUS
[Australia-New Zealand-United States] are of
major iniporlance in the defense of the Middle and
Far East. la Latin xVmerica the OAS [Organiza-
tion of American States] provides us with an
important regional instrument covering a wide
range of objectives. Within its framework we
seek to strengthen a sense of common mission, both
to hasten progress in the hemisphere and to defend
this region from Communist intrusion.

Then there are groupings which substitute freely
undertaken and mutually beneficial relations be-
tween countries of the Northern and Southern
Hemispheres for former colonial ties. The British
Commonwealth and the French Community, thus
replacing old ties on a new basis, add to the
strength and cohesion of the free world.

There are other organizations, largely regional
in character, which are directed solely to economic
and social tasks. The Alliance for Progress is a
notable and increasingly valuable example. The
Colombo Plan organization is another useful
grouping of this kind. We work closely with both
these instruments in promoting regional efforts.

Next there are important worldwide economic
organizations: the World Bank and its affiliate,
the International Development Association ; the
International Monetarj' Fund; and the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The United
States supports a growing role for all these world-
wide instruments of action by free nations.

The binding effects of trade and investment in
the free world, stimulated by these institutions,
link the producer and the consumer, the lender and
the borrower, the buyer and the seller. Access to
the more than $100 billion of trade among the free-
world nations is in itself one of the greatest incen-
tives for the adherence of individual nations to an
increasingly interdependent community of free
nations.

Finally, and in many ways most importantly,
we come to the United Nations. The U.N. is not
only a fonun for useful discussion; it is also at
work helping both to defend and build the com-
munity of free nations.

The U.N. helps to keep the peace, and thus to
shield the community from undue disruption, in
such troubled areas as the Middle East and the
Congo. We are working to strengthen even

further its procedures for settlement of disputes.

The U.N. helps to advance the less developed
countries' growth. Its specialized agencies assist
that growth in many different fields. The Decade
of Development, on which the U.N. has embarked,
will provide a dramatic context within which such
efforts can be accelerated.

In addition to the intergovernmental ties that
thus bind the community together there are a
widening variety of links between private and
professional groups of all kinds, which serve the
same purpose. Indeed, variety is the very essence
of the community. Unlike the monolithic Com-
munist world, it can accommodate diversity.

In seeking to strengthen the community we must
build on this multiplicity of organizational ar-
rangements, both public and private, each pro-
ceeding from a recognized area of common interest
in the solution of a common problem. It is this
combination of private and official ties together
which constitute the warp and woof of the com-
munity of free nations.

Policy Toward Communist Nations

I have spoken of four main elements of our
strategy for moving toward an effective com-
munity of free nations: the development of its
core of strength ; the defense of its frontiers ; as-
sistance to its less developed members; creation
of its organizational framework.

I turn now to the fifth and final element of this
strategy : our policy toward the Communist
nations.

This policy combines a stick and a carrot. It has
two main purposes:

First, to deter Communist efforts to harass or
frustrate the community of free nations.

Second, to hold out to Communist nations the
prospect that they can increasingly share in the
useful work of this community if they will aban-
don their aggressive tactics.

To achieve the first purpose — to deter Commu-
nist disiiiptive efforts — we seek to convey to the
Communists a clear understanding of determina-
tion to defend our vital interests. This is a major
purpose not only of our military effort but of our
diplomacy.

Press accounts of our diplomatic contacts with
the Soviets emphasize the question of whether
they will lead to agreement. The value of these

May 2?, 7962

831

contacts in giving us an opportunity to convey our
intentions is thus sometimes overlooked. Our dis-
cussions of Berlin with the Soviets, for example,
have given us a useful occasion to make clear what
we consider to be our vital interests in this area.
The Communists could not now act against these
interests in ignorance or misunderstanding of the
importance that we attach to them.

To achieve our second purpose — to promote con-
structive changes in Communist policy — we offer
the Communist rulers incentives to cooperate with,
instead of trying to destroy, the community of free
nations.

We should, first of all, recognize that we and
the Soviet Union do have many conunon interests.
We have a common interest in averting nuclear
proliferation, in reducing the risk of war by mis-
calculation, and in limiting the cost of the arms
race. As I have pointed out, we are negotiating at
Geneva to these ends.

We have a common interest in preventing crises
in such areas as Berlin and Laos from erupting
into spreading hostilities. We Iiave been engaged
in discussions regarding both these areas.

We have a common interest in cooperating in
matters affecting outer space, Antarctica, public
health, and exchanges in various fields of human
and cultural activity. Joint programs, and nego-
tiations leading to new programs, are proceeding
in all of these fields.

Progress will, however, at best be slow. It may
be that none of these efforts will yield significant
results in a short time. But our effort to build a
community of free nations would be incomplete if
it did not include steady and patient efforts to-
ward the long-term goal of promoting constructive
evolution in the policies of the Communist nations.

Conclusion

We should be clear, however, as to the main
focus of our policy. It is not geai-ed defensively
to Communist initiatives. It is based rather on
the manifold opportunities for growth and in-
creased strength within the free world.

We would have every incentive to create a com-
munity of free nations if Marx and Lenin had
never existed. We nmst not allow an excessive
preoccupation with the alternative smiles and
f I'owns of their Communist heirs to divert us from

our positive goal. Indeed, fulfillment of this
goal — the creation of a strong, united community
of free nations — offers the best hope for the ulti-
mate withering away of the Communist offensive.

I end, therefore, as I began — by commending to
you a United States foreign policy whose basic
strategy seeks to bind together the members of the
community of free nations in the tasks of develop-
ing their conunon sources of strength, defending
their frontiers, aiding their less developed mem-
bers, and perfecting their unity. Such a commu-
nity would be so strong that it could not be
assailed from without and that it would be bound
to generate increasing attractive power from
within.

This is neither a defensive nor a defeatist strat-
egy. This is a "win" strategy. A foreign policy
geared to such a strategy deserves — and will, I
hope, continue to receive — your wholehearted
support.

President Kennedy Holds Talks
With Chancellor of Austria

Alfons Gorhach, Cliancellor of Austria, made
an informal visit to the United States May 2-5.
Following is the text of a joint communique iy
President Kennedy and Chancellor Gorhach re-
leased after their discussions at Washington on
May 3.

White House presa release dated May 3

President Kennedy and Chancellor Gorbach of
Austria conferred this afternoon on a number of
matters of mutual interest.

In the course of their conversation the Chancel-
lor and Foreign Minister [Bnmo] Kroisky clari-
fied the views of the Austrian Government with
regard to certain economic problems, including
the problem of Austrian participation in Euro-
pean economic integration. The President ex-
pressed his recognition of the special situation of
Austria and there was mutiuil agreement on the
need for solutions that would take this into ac-
count. The President and the Chancellor reaf-
firmed the traditional friendship of tlieir two
countries.

832

Department of Stale Bulletin

The Domestic Base of Foreign Policy

hy Walt W. Rostow

Counselor of the Department and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council ^

My theme tonight is the connection between
our life at liome and our position on the world
scene. The substance of that theme is, quite sim-
ply, this: The object of our military and foreign
policy is to protect the kind of society we are and
wish to become; but, in order to execute such a
policy at this stage of history, we, as citizens, must
assume a high degree of personal responsibility
for the common good.

"\A1iat I have to say is a variant on the oldest
injunction in the democratic tradition reaching
back, at least, to early Greece ; namely, that free-
dom can be preserved only when citizens in a de-
mocracy voluntarily take into account the public
interest.

I know of no organization in the United States
which has acted more consistently and effectively
on this injunction than the League of Women
Voters.

Purpose and Policy on Worrd Scene

First, a brief outline of the view we take in
Washington of our purpose and policy on the
world scene. Then I shall turn to a few of its
implications for our affairs at home.

A little while back there was much talk in the
country of the need to restate our national pur-
pose. I doubt that we require a new defiiaition of
national purpose. The definition provided in the
preamble of the Constitution still serves us well.
It has not been outdated by the passage of almost

'Address made before the biennial national convention
of the League of Women Voters of the United States at
Minneapolis, Minn., on May 3 (press release 287 dated

May 2).

May 27, 7962

two centuries or by the extraordinary changes in
the world environment within which our nation
must live and forge its destiny.

Our national government was created "to form
a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure
domestic Tranquility, provide for the common de-
fence, promote the general Welfare, and secure
the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our
Posterity."

And behind this statement of purpose is the
transcendent principle written into the Declara-
tion of Independence : ". . . Governments are in-
stituted among Men, deriving their just powers
from the consent of the governed."

In a world where human liberty is everywhere
challenged ; in a world where government by con-
sent is repressed as a matter of principle in many
quarters and must painstakingly be built in oth-
ers; in a world where we must allocate almost $50
billion a year, as well as the best of our scientific
engineering and industrial skills, to provide for
the common defense, these familiar phrases are
not rhetoric from a distant, irrelevant past. They
are good working guidelines for the Nation's
policy.

Our national security policy is designed, of
course, to protect the territorial integrity of the
Nation ; but it is designed to do more. It aims to
promote and maintain a world environment for
this society in which our abiding national pur-
poses can be best attained, notably an international
environment in which it will be possible to "secure
the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our
Posterity."

This environment must be built at a time in
history when we confront the Communist intent.

833

plainly and candidly stated, to shape the life of
this planet in ways hostile to fundamental values
incorporated in our national purpose. It is a time
of revolution in military technology -which has
yielded an uncontrolled competitive arms race and
a situation where all peoples are vulnerable to
swift and heavy attack. It is a time when the
peoples of Latin America, Africa, Asia, and the
Middle East are modernizing their societies and
exerting strongly on the world scene a new sense
of nationalism. It is a time when Western Europe
and Japan have revived their economies and be-
come again important centers of power and in-
fluence.

We live in a paradoxical world, moreover, where
nationalism has never been a stronger force but
in which the individual nation-state must co-
operate increasingly with others in order to pro-
vide for its own security and economic welfare.

Wliile we do not need new national purposes,
we evidently do need a national policy that faces
these facts of life, that grips them effectively and
shapes them in ways which will meet the national
purpose. The policy we are pursuing aims to do
these things. It has five major dimensions.

First, we are strengthening the bonds of associa-
tion among the more industrialized nations of the
free world. Western Europe and Japan are pass-
ing through a remarkable phase of postwar re-
covery and economic growth. Their increased
resources and their gathering political confidence
make it possible for them to share the responsi-
bilities and burdens of building and protecting
the free world. Their revival may lighten a
little— but it will not lift— the burden of respon-
sibility we have borne since 1945. The problems
we jointly confront do not permit the United
States safely to draw back from the intimate as-
sociations of the postwar years, toward a more
detached position. On the contrary, in the face of
a purposeful Communist bloc, in a world of nu-
clear weapons and missiles, at a time when world
trade is expanding and the patterns of world trade
and monetary arrangements are being reshaped,
when the peoples and nations in the under-
developed parts of the woi-ld are foi-ging modern
ways of life which will profoundly affect the
future of us all, we must draw closer than ever
before and mount lUiiny new enterprises— from the
reshaping of NATO to the unfolding activities of
the OECD [Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development].

834

A second dimension of our policy centers on the
relation of our country to Latin America, Africa,
Asia, and the Middle East. If we are to bequeath
to our children and grandchildren an environment
in which our own liberty is secure, these nations
must maintain their independence in the difficult
transitional process of modernization through
which they are now passing. Their governments
must prove to their peoples that they are capable
of providing regular progress toward higher
standards of welfare and social justice. And we
must help keep open for them the possibility of
gradually developing, in ways of their own choice,
governments increasingly based on the consent of
the governed. The Alliance for Progress and
our other programs of development assistance, as
well as our militaiy aid programs and the special
assistance we are providing the hard-pressed peo-
ples of South Viet-Nam, are, for example, geared
to these objectives.

Third, we are working with our friends in the
more developed areas — in Europe, Canada, Japan,
and elsewhere — to create together a new set of
constructive relations with the underdeveloped
areas as a whole. Our objective is to promote new
forms of cooperation among self-respecting sover-
eign states to supplant old colonial ties which are
gone or fast disappearing from the world scene.
Wiile the headlines are filled with the residual
colonial problems— for example, Rhodesia, Angola,
and West New Guinea— quiet but real progress is
being made in fashioning new links of mutual
interest and advantage between the more devel-
oped and less developed nations of the free world.
The fourth dimension of our policy is military.
There is much for us to build within the free
world, but we must protect what we are building
or there will be no freedom. We must maintain
with our allies a full spectrum of force fi'ora well-
protected nuclear missiles to a capacity to deal
with guerrilla warfare and subversion. There
can be no safety for any of us unless it is under-
stood that we and our allies command the re-
sources and the will to use them to protect the vital
interests of the free world. But we want these
resources to be sufficiently flexible so that in deal-
ing with limited forms of Communist aggression
we are not faced with the choice of suiTender or
nuclear war.

Our ability to cope with limited aggression and
the thi-eat of aggression is being tested in Berlin
and Southeast Asia. We do not intend to sur-

Departmenf of State Bulletin

render at either point, or any other point along
the frontiers of freedom.

The fifth element of our policy concerns our pos-
ture toward the nations now under Communist
rule. With Iheni we are engaged in an historic
test of strength, not merely of military strength
but of our capacity to understand and deal with
the forces at work in the world about us. The
ultimate question at issue is whether this small
planet is to be organized on the principles of the
Communist bloc or on the basis of voluntary co-
operation among independent nation-states acting
from day to day on the principles of the U.N.
Charter. We do not intend to win this struggle
by initiating nuclear war to destroy the Commu-
nist world. We do intend, however, to build,
unify, and extend by peaceful means the commu-
nity of free nations.

Within the Communist bloc, history has not
stopped. The desire of men to shape their lives
along lines that fit their national traditions and
national interests is growing, not receding. The
desire of men to limit the powers of the state and
to enlarge the areas of personal freedom and pri-
vate integrity is growing. Despite the failure of
the test ban negotiations and the unpromising
state of the disarmament talks, men everywhere
are increasingly aware that they must work to-
gether to reduce the risks of nuclear war and the
burden of armaments by effective measures of in-
ternational control and mutual inspection.

As these forces exert themselves we are pi-epared
to find and to consolidate even very limited areas
of overlapping interest with Communist regimes,
notably in the field of arms control; to develop
wider contacts with the peoples under Commmiist
i-ule; and to build patiently toward the kind of
world we envisaged when the U.N. was set up —
while keeping our powder diy.

The strategy which guides us is, then, quite sim-
ple. We are working fi-om day to day to bind in
close partnership the industrialized nations and
to build with them a wider community by creating
a new partnership between the more developed
and less developed nations of the free world. We
intend to defend this community of free nations
in ways that will minimize the possibility that a
nuclear war will come about. And we intend to
draw the nations now under Communist regimes
toward this free community, both by preventing
the expansion of communism and by seeking co-
operation in specific areas of common interest

which we believe will increasingly emerge as the
strength, unity, and effectiveness of the free com-
munity is demonstrated.

Cost of Defending Freedom

If these are our purpose and our policies, what

does it demand of us at home?

Our i^urpose is to maintain an environment for
our society which will permit it to continue to de-
velop in conformity with our abiding principles.
But it is clear that policies necessary to fulfill this
purpose, in our day, impose responsibilities and
burdens on us at home. It was never promised
that the defense of freedom could be conducted
without cost.

The policy we are now pureuing on the world
scene i-equires that we organize our resources so
as to produce three major results.

First, we must maintain a large halance-of-
■payments surplus on current account. Other in-
dustrialized nations of the free world are
assuming and should assume a larger share of the
common burden. But our role of leadership re-
quires that we generate in our normal commercial
dealings the dollai's necessary to maintain our
bases and forces overseas and to support the ef-
forts of weaker nations to defend their independ-
ence and to develop their economies. At this
stage of history there is no substitute for our
leadership in the free world. For ourselves and
for the cause of freedom everywhere we must re-
main a front runner among the industrialized
nations of the world.

We must do this at a time when the extraordi-
nary industrial surge in Western Europe and Ja-
pan of the 1950's has given them command over
fields of modern technology in which we earlier
were dominant. Moreover, in the past decade our
industrial plant has aged more than that of our
major competitors.

Wo are up against a tough problem, then, if we
are to maintain a balance-of-payments position
necessary for continued leadership in the free
world. But we do not intend that the United
States go the way of other powers in the past who
were forced to surrender positions of vital interest
on the world scene because they lacked the will
and capacity to finance their obligations. Our
position of world responsibility requires us to re-
main also a front runner in technology and in
productivity.

Major dimensions of domestic economic policy

fAay 27, J962

835

thus flow directly from the balance-of-payments
requirements of the Nation's security.

It is the Nation's security requirement that has
led the President to propose to the Congress tax
measures which would increase the flow of funds
to capital formation and investment in new pro-
ductive equipment.

The Nation's security requirement has led us to
improve our capacity to apply research and de-
velopment techniques to the civilian economy as
well as to our militai-y efforts.

The Nation's security requirement has led us to
undertake a wide variety of measures to promote
American exports and our capacity to attract
tourists.

The Nation's security requirement has led the
President to make the public interest felt in tlie
negotiation of labor-management contracts and in
price policy.

If we are to maintain the trade surpluses on
which the Nation's leadership in the free world
depends, we must meet the competition. Tliis
means that we need higher productivity, labor-
management contracts settled in relation to pro-
ductivity increases, and respect for the old and
fundamental national doctrine that prices be set
in competitive markets.

In the most literal sense the President has made
the public interest felt in recent wage negotia-
tions and in the matter of the steel price in re-
sponse to his constitutional duty to provide for tlie
common defense. If the steel price had risen last
month, tlie tax measures necessary for rapid in-
dustrial reequipment and the case for labor self-
discipline in terms of productivity increases
would, almost certainly, have been lost. Our
ability to earn what we must earn on the world
scene to support our i-esponsibilities would have
been in jeopardy.

The second major element of economic policy
required to support our foreign policy is the trade
legislation which is before the Congress} Our
friends in Europe are engaged in an exciting his-
torical process of drawing Europe toward unity.
This process touches the history of many nations
and the deeply felt emotions of their peoples. It
will talce time and encounter many difficulties.
But, looking at the trend of events since 1947 and
the currents of thought in Europe, there is little

* For text of the Prosidont's trade message to Congress,
see Bulletin of Feb. 12, 1962, p. 2,31.

doubt that we shall see the consolidation of Europe
occur in the 1960's.

In the light of the policy I have outlined, that
process poses a fundamental question : Is this to
be a Europe powerful but tui'ned inward ? Or will
it be a Europe linked with the United States even
more closely than in the past, intimately engaged
with us in the great common enterprises of the
free conununity of nations?

That question will be answered, in part, by
whether the President receives the authority to
negotiate with Europe the kind of low-tariff ar-
rangements that the common interest of the free
world demands. Without this legislation we shall
be unable to influence effectively the outcome of
the historical process now under way.

Third, and most fundamental of all, this nation
requires a high and well-sustained rate of groicth
and relatively full employment.

We need a high rate of growth not because
there is some inlierent virtue in a particular growth
percentage or because we wish to look well in in-
ternational statistical comparisons. We need a
high rate of growth for a quite practical purpose:
We must command a flow of resources that will
permit us to deal with our military and other re-
sponsibilities on the world scene while providing
at the same time jobs for our people and an im-
provement in the standard and quality of our
domestic life.

In setting goals for our national growth we have
not picked a figure out of the air. We have cal-
culated the flow of resources necessary to provide
the arms, the jobs, the schools and roads, and the
generally rising standards of consumption our
people require and deserve.

These three grand objectives — the maintenance
of an adequate commercial balance-of-payments
surplus, a relatively free trading system within
the free world, and a high rate of American
growth — are locked intimately together and are
dependent upon each other.

We require a surge in productivity and stable
prices not merely to maintain our trade balance
but also to permit our economy to compete suc-
cessfully in a world of freer trade. And we need
it to keep pressures from arising that would force
us to cut down business activity and employment
in order to prevent our reserves from running
down at an excessive rate.

The ti'ade legislation we pro]iose is not only an
essential piece of the architecture of tlic free cnm-

836

Department of Slate Bulletin

munity — if it is to be a unified community — but
low taritTs, in themselves, will help keep prices
and costs down here at home.

Finally, our growth rate and a policy of main-
taining relatively full employment for our work-
ing force, which I described as the most funda-
mental requirement. "We Tieed a high rate of
growth not merely to provide the resources for
both public and private purposes but also to pro-
vide the profits and the hopeful expectations on
which investment decisions are ultimately based
and to provide both labor and management the
confidence to introduce the new technology avail-
able to us. Tax incentives without an environ-
ment of growth and prosperity cannot induce the
investment we need to raise productivity — as it
must be raised. Moreover, we know from prac-
tical experience that liberal trade policies are more
acceptable to our people at times of prosperity
and rapid gi'owth than at times of business re-
cession.

In the largest sense these three interlocked poli-
cies represent a fundamental challenge to the vigor
of our private enterprise system and to the demo-
cratic process in our country. After a period when
our economic primacy on the world scene was
easily — almost automatically — insured, we must
make a conscious and widespread effort if we are
to remain an effective world leader. To this end
all three policies are required.

Some say that the domestic objectives I have
described cannot be achieved without heavyhanded
and direct Government controls. They argue that
it is impossible for labor and private enterprise,
with marginal help from the Government, to ne-
gotiate the wage contracts and to conduct the
price policies that the national interest demands.
They hold that old-fashioned price competition
is a waning force in our economy.

We take a more hopeful view. We believe it is
possible for labor and management to negotiate
wage contracts which relate wage rises to produc-
tivity increases. We believe private enterprise,
aided by a revised tax structure and an environ-
ment of sustained prosperity, is capable of moimt-
ing a great program of modernization of our
industrial plant. We believe competition is still
the mainspi'ing of our economic system and ca-
pable of reconciling public and private interests
over a wide range.

In short, we refuse to take the view that the
only choice we face is between controlling the

May 21, 7962

638S36— 62 3

economy in detail or leaving the common interest
out of account in the workings of the economy.

The truth is that our society has proved vastly
more resourceful and flexible in weaving together
public and private interests than our textbooks
would suggest. Think, for a moment, of the way
we work together in the defense effort, in our
space programs, or in the reconstruction of our
urban areas. All these — and many other enter-
prises in our economy — weave elements of public
and private institutions together in subtle and
constructive ways.

We believe the challenge of these three inter-
locked national objectives can be met in the same
spirit of community partnership. We believe the
Federal Government can play a limited but essen-
tial role in the economy without administration of
prices and wages.

Need for Understanding and Leadership

The economic foundations of our national se-
curity policy are, of course, fimdamental. Na-
tions, like individuals, must be able to back their
play — in this case, with economic resources as well
as with military strength. But even more is de-
manded of us as citizens than to provide an eco-
nomic base for our security without distorting our
domestic life.

We live now — and we shall probably continue
to live over the foreseeable future — in a world of
high tension. Wliile we are building the free
community of nations we will continue to face a
series of crises arising from direct Commimist
probes, from the inevitable political and social
changes that accompany the modernization proc-
ess, and from systematic Communist efforts to
exploit those changes.

The progress we make may be slow and unsen-
sational; and it is the crises that dominate the
headlines.

Moreover, until the very day when the leaders
of the Communist regimes are prepared to accept
effective systems of international inspection and
control, we will have to live with the hard but
necessary fact of the nuclear arms race.

This demands that we all — as responsible citi-
zens of a democracy — develop an understanding
of the Nation's policy and of the world in which
we seek to make it effective. Only tliis knowledge
can produce the poise and confidence that is the
bedrock of our kind of society.

837

I believe there is good reason for Americans to
face the future with such poise and confidence.

Over the past 15 years we have thrashed out on
a bipartisan basis the bone structure of a military
and foreign policy that makes sense. The new
steps we have taken over the past 15 months are
bipartisan in their origins and in the support they
command.

We have over these years suc^;essfully defended
the frontiers of freedom : from Azerbaijan, Greece,
Berlin, and South Korea in the early postwar
years to Berlin again and Viet-Nam now.

We have helped demonstrate in Western Europe
and Japan, as well as here at home, the extraordi-
nary vitality of democratic capitalist societies.

We have begun to work out with our friends in
the underdeveloped areas pragmatic methods of
economic and social development that offer prog-
ress without the sacrifice of human freedom,
growth without the acceptance of police-stat«
methods.

Meanwhile, where Communist regimes are in
power, they have demonstrated they have nothing
to offer human lieings that cannot be better ac-
complished in freedom. Compare East and West
Germany; compare Communist China, its people
hungry, its industrial plant substantially idle,
with India, steadily forging ahead, spreading
democratic methods down to the villages. Com-
pare the growing web of partnership among
proud sovereign nations in the free world with
the repressed nationalism and deep schisms of the
Communist bloc.

As the President said at Berkeley on March 23 : '

No one who examines the modern world can doubt
that the great currents of history are carrying the world
away from the monolithic idea toward the pluralist
idea — away from communism and toward national in-
dependence and freedom. No one can doubt that the
wave of the future is not the conquest of the world by a
single dogmatic creed but the liberation of the diverse
energies of free nations and free men.

It is sometimes asked if our policy is a "no win"
policy.

Our answer is this : We do not expect this planet
to be forever split between a Communist bloc and
a free world; we expect this planet to organize
itself in time on the principles of voluntary co-
operation among ind('])endent nation-states dedi-
catetl to human freedom; we expect the pi-inciple

that governments derive their just powers "from
the consent of the governed" to triumph on both
sides of the Iron Curtain.

We stand ready to fight to the limit to defend
the vital interests of the free world. But we are
not looking for a military climax to this historic
struggle. The victory we seek will see no ticker-
tape parade down Broadway. It is a victory
which will take many years and perhaps decades
of hard work and dedication— by many peoples—
to bring about.

It will not be a victory of the United States
over the Soviet Union. |

It will be a victory of men and nations that aim
to stand up straight, over the forces that wish to
entrap and to exploit their revolutionary
aspirations.

It will be a victory for those who recognize the
profound interdependence of the nations on this
planet over those who would press to the limit
their national or ideological ambitions.

It will be a victory for those who recognize that
the powers of the state over the individual should
be limited by law and practice and that there is no
substitute in a modem society for the energy and
commitment of responsible free citizens who
understand what needs to be done and why it is in
their interest to do it.

For Americans the reward of victory will be,
simply, this : It will permit our society to continue
to develop along the old hmnane lines whicli
go back to our birth as a nation; it will pronde
"the Blessings of Lilwrty to ourselves and our
Posterity."

This is the goal, the policy, the faith of those
who carry on from day to day in Washington.
As Secretary Rusk said in speaking to the Ameri-
can Historical Association last year: ". . . we are
not merely counterpunching against crises. We
are taking our part in the shaping of history." *

And, indeed, a government — an administra-
tion— can only take its part in a democracy such
as ours. The future rests in a quite particular
way with those, like youi-selves, who have assumed
as citizens a special commitment to understantl
and to lead. It rests with the scientists and engi-
neers who create our military and civil tech-
nology; with our labor negotiators and our busi-
ness leaders; with those in uniform and those out
of uniform— like the Peace Corps— who are help-

" Ihiil.. Apr. 10. 190.2. p. 61.5.
838

'/?/((/.. .Tan. 1.5. 10C2. p. 83.

Department of Sfafe Bulletin

ing protect and build the free community overseas.
The struggle of creation and defense in which
we are engaged is not a private game played over
the cable lines that run to AVashington from
foreign capitals. It is, quite literally, a job for
us all.

U.S. Replies to Japan and Ghana
on Resumption of Nuclear Testing

Following are the texts of notes i)resen.ted to the
Goveimments of Japan and Ghana regardvng re-
sumption by the United States of atmospheric
nuclear testing.

NOTE TO JAPAN, APRIL 30

Pres? release 2S2 dated April 30

The Embassy of the United States presents its
compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and has the honor to refer to the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs note of April 26 ^ and to previous
notes from the Ministry of Foreigii Affairs con-
cerned with atmospheric nuclear weapon tests
which the United States is now conducting in the
Pacific, and has the honor to state as follows :

The United States Government shares the
earnest desire of the Government of Japan and
the Japanese people for an immediate and com-
plete end to all nuclear tests. As the Government
of Japan is aware the United States has striven
for some three years at Geneva to conclude a treaty
which would ban further tests of these weapons.
However, on September 1 of last year the Soviet
Union broke its moratorium on these tests and
inaugurated a two-month series comprising more
than forty nuclear explosions in the atmosphere.-
As the President of the United States stated in
a letter to the Prime Minister of Japan on this
subject,^ ''The nuclear test moratorium which was
so brutally broken by the Soviet Union in 1961
cannot now be kept by our side alone, if we are to
avoid the hazard of advances by the Soviet Union
■which might imperil us all."

The United States regrets profoundly the ne-
cessity for conducting nuclear weapon tests. The
United States cannot, however, unilaterally re-

frain from defense preparations. The arms race
cannot be stopped unless and until all major pow-
ers agree to stop it. Had there been a will to
reach agreement on the part of the Soviet Union,
an agreement could have been signed, for during
the past year the United States has made numer-
ous concessions of considerable importance in an
effort to reach agreement. None of these efforts
has had any effect in bringing the Soviet Union to
accept the principle of international inspection.

Negotiations on disarmament and cessation of
nuclear testing are now in progress at the Geneva
Disarmament Conference. With a view to reach-
ing rapid agreement on a nuclear test ban, the
United States is prepared to examine all sugges-
tions which appear to provide the basis for estab-
lishing an effective control system. While the
United States continues to believe that the U.S.-
U.K. draft treaty of April 18, 1961,^ does afford
the best basis for the rapid conclusion of a treaty,
the United States does not insist that this be the
only basis for negotiation. The United States
delegation has, in fact, accepted a proposal made
by eight non-NATO non-Warsaw Pact delegations
in Geneva as one of the bases for negotiation. The
United States hopes that further negotiations will
be fruitful and is doing its utmost to make them
so. The Government of Japan may be assured
that the United States test series will cease im-
mediately if the Soviet Union changes its previ-
ous position and now concludes a test ban treaty.

With respect to the statement of the Govern-
ment of Japan in its note verbale of April 9 °
concerning the general principle of the freedom of
the high seas, the United States Government can-
not accept the view of the Government of Japan
that the proclamation of danger areas in the Pa-
cific in connection with the tests is contraiy to in-
ternational law. The high seas are open to all
nations for use in any activity sanctioned by in-
ternational law. The use of the high seas and
superjacent air space for military exercises of all
kinds including weapon tests is traditional. The
proclamation of danger areas as a notice to all
that certain areas of the high seas will be used at
a certain time in testing weapons is a necessary
and humane adjunct of the use of the high seas
for such purposes. In view of the location of the
tests and the expected relatively short duration

' Not printed here.

" For background, see Btjlletin of Sept. 18. 1961, p. 475.

= For text, see ihid.. Mar. 26, 1962, p. 497.

* For text, see xhUI., .June .5, 1961, p. 870.
° Not printed here.

Nkay 21, 1962

839

thereof, it is the view of the United States Gov-
ernment that such use of the high seas is not
unreasonable.

The United States Government notes that the
Government of Japan has reserved the right to
claim compensation from the United States Gov-
ernment for losses which the Government of Ja-
pan and the Japanese people may incur as a result
of these nuclear weapon tests. As stated by Presi-
dent Keimedy in liis address on March 2, 1962,«
preparations for the current series of tests have
included all possible precautions to guard against
injui-y or damage. In consequence the United
States Government does not anticipate any losses
as a result of the test series. However, if, after the
tests have ended, evidence is officially presented
that Japan or its nationals have incurred clearly
definable losses as a result of these tests, the United
States Government will be prepared to give full
consideration to the question of compensation m
the light of such evidence.

NOTE TO GHANA, MAY 2

Press release 2S4 dated May 3

The United States Government has taken note
of the Government of Ghana's aide nwmoire of
April 26, 1962, and wishes to state that the United
States will gladly cease the testing of nuclear
weapons the moment an effectively monitored
a«n-eement to that effect enters into force. The
United States Government regrets the necessity
for conducting nuclear weapon test explosions but
wishes to point out to the Government of Ghana
that for the past three years the United States
has been second to none in its efforts to negotiate
a treaty which would provide for the ending of
nuclear test explosions. Until such time as a
treaty comes into force, the United States will not
unilaterally relinquish the right to conduct neces-
sary defense preparations.

Beginning in November 1958, there had been
for three years a de facto moratorium on the test-
ing of nuclear weapons. Last autumn, however,
the Soviet Union broke that moratorium with a
nuclear weapon test series of almost fifty nuclear
explosions, many of very large yield and one with
an explosive force of more than fifty million tons
of TNT. This was the largest and most intensive

" For text, see Buixktin of Mar. 10. VMV2, \). 443.

840

nuclear test series in histoid and it must be
assumed that the Soviet Union derived much in-
formation of military significance from these ex-
periments. If the Soviet Union were to conduct
nuclear test explosions while the United States re-
frained, military preponderance would in time
come to rest with the Soviet Union. Needless to
say, such a development would be exceedingly
dangerous for any government seeking to maintain
its independence.

The United States refrained from conducting
nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere for nearly
eight months after the Soviet series began, during
which time the United States Government con-
tinued to press for an agreement which would re-
move nuclear weapon testing from the context of
military preparations. On March 2, 1962, the
President of the United States offered to forego
any further nuclear weapon tests if an adequately
verified treaty could be negotiated and signed.
Despite the fact that in the past year the United
States has made at least a dozen concessions in
an attempt to reach a compromise agreement with
the Soviet Union, there was no corresponding
movement on the part of the Soviet Government
in the direction of even a minimal international
control system. This unfortunate situation has
far-reaching consequences, for if the Soviet Union
cannot accept even the modest amount of verifica-
tion required for a test ban agreement, the pros-
pects for disarmament are indeed somber. There
can be no disarmament without a corresponding
commitment to verification arrangements because
governments cannot risk the lives and freedom
of their peoples by disarming without certain
knowledge that other states are also disarming.
For its part, the United States is fully prepared
to admit inspectors in its territory under arrange-
ments to ensure that the inspection process is not
misused in any way. The United States asks no
more than this from any country but it can accept
no lesser commitment to verification in any general
disarmament agreement.

The United States Goveniment would appreci-
ate the support of the Government of Ghana in
the efforts that are now taking place in the Geneva
disarmament conference to achieve an agreement
on the cessation of nuclear weapon test explosions.
The United States has accepted as one basis for
further negotiations in Geneva a memorandum
presented by the delegations of eight nations rep-

Deporfmenf of Sfafe Bo//efin

reseated in the conference who are neither mem-
bers of NATO nor of the Warsaw Pact. Further
negotiations may succeed in elaborating this
meinoraiuhnn to the end that it may serve as the
basis for an adequately verified nuclear test ban
agreement. Tlie United States Government be-
lieves these negotiations should be intensified so
that during the course of the present conference in

Geneva, progress can be made towards disarma-
ment and a cessation of nuclear testing. If the
Government of Ghana and other non-aligned
states will support these efforts, particularly by
exerting their influence towards the negotiation of
a verified nuclear test ban agreement, the United
States Government is hopeful that an agreement
can be reached.

Aids and Obstacles to Political Stability in Mid-Africa

by G. Mennen Williams

Assistant Secretary for African Affairs'^

The emergence of a broad band of sovereign
nations in mid-Africa is part of one of the major
events of the 20th century — the dissolution of the
great colonial empires that were built during the
age of exploration. This development has pre-
sented United States foreign policy with some
sharp challenges to its ingenuity. It also has
given us some excellent opportunities to revitalize
America's dedication to our revolutionary heritage
and our democratic traditions.

Nowhere have the challenges been sharper nor
the opportunities gieater than in Africa. On
that continent we have met our challenges forth-
rightly and have taken a firm stand in favor of
freedom and independence for the peoples of
Africa.

Our policy toward the developing nations was
clearly stated by President Kennedy in his state
of the Union message last January.^ The Presi-
dent said :

. . . our basic goal remains the same : a peaceful
world community of free and independent states, free to

' Address made before the American Academy of
Political and Social Science, Philadelphia, Pa., on
Apr. 13 ( press release 25.3 ) .

' Bulletin of Jan. 29, 1962, p. 159.

choose their own future and their own system so long
as it does not threaten the freedom of others.

Some may choose forms and ways that we would not
choose for ourselves, but it is not for us that they are
choosing. We can welcome diversity — the Communists
cannot. . . . And the way of the past shows clearly that
freedom, not coercion, is the wave of the future.

The Area of Mid-Africa

We have implemented that policy with positive
actions in the United Nations, in all of the devel-
oping areas of the world, and, certainly, in the
area of mid-Africa. Mid-Africa is not a term in
common use, and I would like to define it for the
purpose of these remarks. As I use the phrase,
it includes all of Africa south of tlie Sahara to the
northern boundaries of Angola, Northern Kho-
desia, and Mozambique.

Mid-Africa today embraces 23 independent
nations, 21 of which became sovereign states
within the last G years. It also includes several
areas that are in various transitional stages on the
road to self-determination.

More than twice the size of the United States,
this area encompasses a wide range of geograph-
ical conditions. It comprises the belt of sand and
grassland states running across Africa below the
Sahara; the Honi of Africa, composed of the
Ethiopian highlands and the coastal lowlands:

May 21, 1962

841

the rain-forest states of the west coast, extending
from Senegal through tlie Congo; and the east
African lands of Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika,
and Zanzibar.

Within this vast arc of old, new, and emerging
nations there are readily recognizable diversities
in peoples, economies, languages, politics, and
ways of life. Some of these factors are divisive
forces and obstacles to political stability in the
mid-African section of the continent.

These forces are balanced, however, by a series
of cohesive forces — a large number of factors that
tend to unite the entire region spiritually and aid
in its desire for political stability. These include
a common love of freedom and independence, a
determination to improve standards of living and
education, an insistence on personal and national
dignity, a reluctance to be drawn into the mael-
strom of the cold war through political aline-
ments with either East or West, and a strong in-
terest in unity, both regional and Africa-wide. I
would like to concentrate on this last aspect today.

African Desire for Unity

The desire for unity — either pan-Africanism or
regional cooperation — is dear to the heart of every
African leader. Yet even within the body of this
unifying factor, which carries the seed of liealthy
coordination and cooperation, there is also the
seed of disunity, which can bear bitter fruit in
terms of unstable political relationships among
mid-African states. On balance, however, the
solidarity of purpose and belief that some form
of mutual cooperation is necessary and proper to
Africa's political, economic, and social develop-
ment is the predominant force.

The United States is glad to see the lively inter-
est Africans are taking in cooperative endeavors.
We believe this course can contribute importantly
to a stable and strong continent. But we expect
no miracles, no overnight associations that spring
full-blown from the fresh fields of African free-
dom. After all, it has taken the highly developed
nations of Europe centuries to set aside internal
strife and suspicions. Only in recent years have
they begun working together meaningfully in a
free association.

Our own development from a loosely bound
group of colonies into the United States of Amer-
ica was swift, but we were blessed with a immber

of favorable factors not found in combination in
many other parts of the world. We were bound
by the thread of a common language, a coordi-
nated revolutionary struggle, transportation and
communications that were good for that day and
age, and even interlocking economic ties to some
degree. With such factors operating in our favor,
it was much easier to form strong bonds among
our Thirteen Original States than it is elsewhere
in the world today.

Progress Toward Regional Groupings

Thus, while there is a common desire for some
form of unity among Africans in all parts of
Africa, there are not enough other points of mu-
tual interest to sustain immediate continent-wide
gi'oupings. On the other hand, there is consid-
erable activity in Africa in terms of regional polit-
ical, economic, and social consultations and
groupings. These are welcome developments be-
cause we believe that some form of mutual effort
is necessary if a number of new African states
are to become economically and politically viable.

Although we view such associations with pleas-
ure, we do not propose to tell Africans which
groupings we consider good, bad, or indifferent.
This is a matter for Africans to decide uj^on for
themselves. As President Kennedy has said, we
want for the Africans what they want for them-
selves, and we intend to hold to that position. In
a sense this is the opposite side of the coin of
African nonalinement in the cold war — a develop-
ment in which we choose not to aline oureelves
with one or another of the various associational
movements that are taking place on the African
Continent.

Some of Africa's progi-ess toward regional
groupings is the outgrowth of patterns set by
former colonial regimes, which usually were ad-
ministered on an area or regional basis. After
the first blush of independence wore off, the re-
estnblishment of old relationships with African
neighbors commenced among the new African
states and has continued through a series of shift-
ing patterns. The motivation for such regrouping
is both political and economic, stemming from
realization on the part of most new nations that
they are too limited in size, in population, in
wealth, or in defense capabilities to make their
way without cooperating together.

842

Departmenf of Slate Bullelin

Major Regional Organizations

Because there is a constant process of change in
African groupings, they present a kaleidoscopic
picture to an outside observer. At the moment
tliere are four major regional groupings in mid-
Africa.

First, there is the Union Africaine et Mal-
gache — the African and Malagasy Union — com-
posed of 12 states of French ''expression." The
UAM contains two subgroups — the Conseil de
I'Entente (Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Niger, and
Dahomey) and the Conference of Equatorial
States (the Republic of Congo (Brazzaville),
Gabon, Chad, and the Central African Repub-
lic)— and Cameroon, Senegal, Mauritania, and the
Malagasy Republic.

A second grouj) is known as the Casablanca
powers, which are five in number — Morocco,
Guinea, Ghana, Mali, and the United Arab Re-
public. This is the only group combining north
African with mid-African states. The Casablanca
group meetings also have been attended by the
Provisional Government of Algeria.

A third group is the East African Common
Services Organization. This grew out of the
common services performed by the East Afri-
can High Commission, which includes Kenya,
Uganda, and Tanganyika. At the recent Con-
ference of the Pan-African Freedom Movement
for East and Central Africa, it was agreed that
Somalia and Ethiopia should negotiate to become
members. This group one day may become the
East African Federation.

Fourth, there is the new Lagos group of 20
nations which cuts across the continent and unites
nations that speak both French and English. The
Lagos grouping includes the 12 UAM states,
Togo, Liberia, the Republic of the Congo (Leo-
poldville), Ethiopia, Somalia, Nigeria, Sierra
Iveone, and Tanganyika.

From Angola north to the Sahara, then, the
only independent mid-African country not partic-
ipating in one or more of the new African re-
gional organizations is the Sudan.

Similarity of Organizational Patterns

Apart from the east African group, which in-
cludes countries not yet independent, these origi-
nal groupings have patterns of organization so
similar that they are almost stereotypes. Gen-

erally, they are composed of a council of chiefs
of stale, which makes all political and adminis-
trative decisions; a defense council; an organiza-
tion for economic and cultural cooperation; a
customs union; and an organization for postal
communications, telecommunications, and trans-
port. None has a central capital, and the various
secretariats are scattered among the members'
capitals. The meetings of the council of the chiefs
of state rotate among the capitals, and there is a
fixed rotation for the council presidency. Methods
of operation depend on the motivating political
ideology, the area covered, and the degree of sim-
ilarity of members' institutions.

Union Africaine et Malgache

The most recent meeting of any of these four
groups took place only a few weeks ago, when the
Union Africaine et Malgache held its second
formal conference of chiefs of state at Bangui,
Central African Republic. This really was the
sixth meeting of the group known as the Brazza-
ville states since early 1960, although the group
was not organized formally as the UAM until it
met at Tananarive in the Malagasy Republic in
September 1961.

The cohesion of this grouping is favored by
common traditions and, to some extent, common
administrative arrangements inherited from the
French colonial period. They take pride in their
French cultural "expression." They are members
of the franc zone, are associate members of the
European Economic Community, and continue
to receive large French economic (and to some
extent military) support. Although they shun
any formal alinements with Western powers, most
of them consider themselves part of the West in
many ways.

The Council of the UAM meets twice a year and
is the group's organ for determining overall
internal and external policy. To make foreign
policies effective, the charter of the UAM provides
for the establishment of a corresponding group at
the United Nations and makes it obligatory for
the group to meet there on all important issues.
This has led to the 12 UAM states" voting together
on most issues. As they represent about one-eighth
of U.N. membership, tlieir posture in the U.N. is
extremely significant. The Council also has shown
definite interest in the development of wider
African groups.

May 27, J962

843

A Defense Council and a secretariat were cre-
ated by the defense pact of the 12 UAJVI states.
There is, however, no intention to create a single
command or a single army. Emphasis is on mili-
tary cooperation only to help check externally
suppoi'ted subversion. This Coiuicil could pro-
vide members with a useful means of cooperating
in the suppression of Communist subversion.
Establishment of a defense organization also may
help to reduce pressures for large national arms
buildups and their consequent drains on national
budgets.

Objectives of OAMCE

The Organization for African and Malagasy
Economic Cooperation, OAMCE, is the economic
arm of the UAM. Its objectives are to establish
common policies relating to currency, customs, and
investments. The committee structure of the
OAMCE illustrates its broad program :

a. The Committee of Foreign Commerce is
working on harmonizing customs classification
procedures and nomenclature leading toward the
establishment of an Afro-Malagasy free trade
zone. It also is studying the organization of
African markets.

b. The Committee for Study of Monetary Prob-
lems plans to propose measures to coordinate the
activities of the three existing banks of issue, to
study methods of transferring funds, and to ex-
amine annually the balance of payments of each
state and propose measures to eliminate deficits.

c. The Committee of Economic and Social De-
velopment is geared to study and coordinate the
development plans of the member states to har-
monize their investment codes and to study the
possibility of a common price stabilization fund.
It presently is considering the establishment of a
development institute and bank.

d. Tlie Committee of Scientific and Technical
Research is coordinating documentation relating
to the development of member states and the pos-
sibility of setting up technical institutes at African
universities in member states. It also has under
consideration a plan for pooling African tech-
nicians, wlio are in short supply in UAM and other
mid-African countries.

e. The Committee for Post and Telecommunica-
tions has the complicated function of coordinating
existing systems of communication, establishing
networks, and drafting codes for intraregional

postal and telecommunications services. Among
the first questions to be considered by this unit
were the issuance of stamps, transport of mail,
and unifoiTn postal rates.

f. Air Afrique is a joint airline enterprise that
serves all member states except Madagascar. It
also serves Paris and Nice and has arranged re-
ciprocal service between Dakar and Conakry with
Air Guinea. Organized in close association with
Western commercial airlines, Air Afrique repre-
sents a constructive alternative to a number of
small, uneconomic airlines established for prestige
purposes. Although Air France and Union Aero-
Maritime de Transport are minority shareholders
in Air Afrique, UAM member governments have
the controlling interest in the line. Air Afrique
has a permanent secretariat answerable to the
UAM Committee of Transport Ministers, which
is presently considering both additional internal
air links and links with the outside world.

Cultural Emphasis in Casablanca and Lagos Groups

The Casablanca and Lagos groups have laid
more emphasis on cultural relations than the
UAM. This is not surprising because the UAM
states have a common background of French cul-
ture. The Casablanca group desires to develop a
purely African culture as part of its tradition.
The Lagos group, composed as it is of both
French- and English-speaking Africans, who can-
not communicate without translators, is deter-
mined "to promote and accelerate the consolida-
tion of our African cultures and traditions in the
interests of preserving our heritage." To speed
this development, the Lagos group is forming an
educational and cultural council to :

1. break down language barriers among Afri-
can and Malagasy states;

2. harmonize the group's various educational
systems ;

3. adapt school curricula and general educa-
tional policies to the needs and experience of the
African and Malagasy states;

4. develop and use rationally university re-
sources ;

5. promote the revival of African and Malagasy
culture and traditions;

6. establish an African and Malagasy organi-
zation for educational, cultural, and scientific co-
operation ;

7. develop the education of women.

844

Department of Slate Bulletin

Need for Regional Planning

In examining tlie phj'sical and cultural frag-
mentation of Africa today, tlie need for regional
cooperation is apparent. This is a strategic
moment to begin such a task, as the field is virgin
and available funds have to be chaimeled care-
fully for most efficient use. Transportation and
connnunications facilities ai-e generally poor in
mid-Afi'ica, and it would be wise to plan for im-
provements on a regional, as well as on a national,
basis.

Larger markets are essential to attract modern
industrial investment, and these can be achieved
only by breaking down political bomidary lines to
form a common market — at least among small
neighboring countries. Within a common mar-
ket, there can be cooperation in development
planning to secure the benefits of industrial
specialization, and agreement can be reached on
legal means and ways to provide an attractive in-
vestment climate.

In the field of higher education a single center
financed from combined resources could make
possible the establishment of better institutions
for professional, scientific, and medical training
and research. Diseases — human, plant, and ani-
mal— do not respect borders and can only be held
in check by the combined efforts of neighbors.

Although many development plans are in the
blueprint stage, they give strong assurances that
Africans are thinking through their problems.
The principal problems and greatest needs are
professional cadres and investment capital, and
these have to be built rapidly to implement the
many unborn plans.

Differences Among Major Groups

In the area of pan-Africanism interest on the
part of mid-African states is very much alive, but
predictions on future developments are pre-
carious. The Conference of Independent African
States (CIAS), now favored by the Casablanca
group, held its fii-st meeting in Accra, Ghana, in
April 1958, with 8 states present, and met again
in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in June 1960, with 12
states represented. It originally was scheduled
to hold its third session in Tunis this month.
This meeting, to which all 29 independent African
states were invited, has been postponed until late
fall in the hope of attracting the 20 Lagos powers.

Although all of Africa's indejiendent states

were invited to the Pan-African Monrovia Con-
ference in June 1961 and the Lagos Conference
in January 1962, the Casablanca powers boycotted
both conferences. Although the charter of the
Lagos group, which is now in the final drafting
stage, is designed for an all-African organization,
the possible attendance of Lagos group members
at the next CIAS conference is a matter yet to be
resolved by the members. The question was de-
bated by the French-speaking members at the
recent UAM conference at Bangui and will be a
major agenda item at the next meeting of the
Lagos chiefs of state, which will probably take
place before the CIAS Tunis meeting is scheduled.
Aside from their outspoken "nonalinement" po-
sition, the deepest split between the Casablanca
powers and the other groups lies in the Casablanca
group's militant anti-imperialist and anticolonial-
ist philosophy. This group considers the UAM
members to be "neocolonialist" because they have
remained associates of the European Economic
Community and are negotiating to renew that
association. The Casablanca group claims that
regional groups "Balkanize" Africa. For their
part, the UAM and the Lagos group feel that
they are deeply anticolonial and anti-imperialist
and believe they have developed an evolutionai-y
concept of decolonialization. Instead of making
a radical break with the former colonial powers
when they became independent, these groups have
been content to loosen ties gradually and to accept
economic and military aid for support and serv-
ices they cannot yet afford.

U.N. Economic Commission for Africa

The United Nations Economic Commission for
Africa and the Commission for Technical Co-
operation in Africa South of the Sahara, known
as the CCTA, also are part of the mainstream of
pan-Africanism. Mid-African nations are very
active in these organizations.

The U.N. Economic Commission for Africa in
one sense is becoming an African parliament, to
which delegations from all of Africa come to de-
bate issues of continental interest. Although the
watchword is African unity, the free expression
of political differences frequently puts the spirit
of such unity to severe test. Agi-eement is fre-
quent, however, and at the last session of the Com-
mission one of the most important items agreed
upon was the establishment of an African Insti-

May 21, 1962

845

tiite of Economic and Social Development at
Dakar, which will be established this year. The
Commission's greatest service lies in the technical
studies which the secretariat undertakes on Af-
rica-wide social and economic problems and in the
technical committees set up to study them.

Work of the CCTA

The CCTA, which was established in 1950 by
France, Britain, Belgium, Portugal, and South
Africa, by 1961 included 19 independent African
states. Its object is to insure technical cooperation
between all the countries south of the Sahara in
four main fields :

a. problems related to the physical background
of the continent, such as geology, geography,
cartography, climatology, hydrology, and pedol-
ogy;

b. problems related to biological subjects — plant
life, forests, ecology, agriculture, plant industry,
and animal industry ;

c. human subjects — health, medicine, nutrition,
and science of man, including problems of edu-
cation, labor, and statistics; and

d. technology, such as housing, road research,
and treatment of waters.

Much important work has been accomplished
by this group. At its last meeting in February
of this year, the European members either with-
drew or were expelled, and membership is now
purely African, directed by Africa for the benefit
of African development.

Among the items of urgent consideration at
the CCTA's most recent meeting was the creation
of a specialized training fund to establish re-
gional training centei-s for middle-level pei-sonnel.
Three such centers have already been set up for
customs officers, hydrology agents, and port
guards. An audiovisual langiuvge center has been
established to assist in developing bilingualism in
French and English.

This organization presently is carrying out
projects sucli as rinderpest eradication, research
to combat bovine pneumonia, and oceanograpliic
and fisheries research in the Gulf of Guinea. The
TTnitcd States has made a substantial contribution
to tlie latter.

The CCTA and the U.N. Economic Commission
for Africa are the only two organizations sup-
ported by members of both the Casablanca and

846

Lagos groups. As instruments of inter- African
cooperation, tliey may serve not only to develop
highly important technical projects but also to
bring currently competing African political
groups closer together.

Common Interest Among All Groupings

Although this picture of the many and various
mid-African groupings may seem confused and
overlapping, there is a considerable body of com-
mon interest throughout. The need for coopera-
tion to develop Africa is found at all levels, from
a small cluster of neighbors through an all-Africa
grouping. As the small units blend into the
larger, they bring to the latter valuable practical
experience. At such times both groups reevaluate
the functions they have been performing. Some
functions are discarded in the merger, while
others of a purely local nature are retained.

These groups are all fiercely proud of maintain-
ing the purely African personajity of their various
entities. Yet they well realize, however, their de-
pendence on outside assistance, especially in the
form of capital and expertise to accomplish their
plans and projects.

How these various interests are resolved will
hold the key to Africa's rate of development and
to the future peace and stability of the continent.

White House Press Secretary Visits
Germany, Netherlands, and U.S.S.R.

The "Wliite House announced on May 1 ("\^niite(
House press release dated May 1) that ^AHiite
House Press Secretary Pierre Salinger would
leave New York City May 5 for a visit to West
Gennany, the Netherlands, and the Soviet Union.

At Bonn the Press Secretary will participate in
3 days of United States-West German meetings
on information. Also participating in these talks
will be Thomas C. Sorensen, Deputy Director
(Policy and Plans) of the U.S. Information
Agency. These meetings will take place on May
7. 8. aiid 9.

On IVIay 10 Mr. Salinger will address the Neder-
lands Genootschap Voor Public Relations ( Dutch |
Public Kelations Society) at Amsterdam.

From Amsterdam he will fly to Moscow in re-
sponse to an invitation extended by Alexei
Ad/.hubei, editor of Izvcsfia, during his visit to the
United States in January 1902. In the Soviet

Department of State Bulletin

Union Mr. Salinger will confer with Mr. Adzhubei
and other Soviet editors and Government officials
in the fields of press, radio, and television on the
subject of continuing information exchanges be-
tween the two countries. He plans to make a
special study of the operations of Soviet news-
papers and radio and television stations. He will
be accompanied on his trip to tlie Soviet Union by
Mr. Sorensen.

Hearings Held on Mrs. Flynn's
Passport Revocation Case

Press release 264 dated April 23

Tlie Department of State will begin hearings
on April 2-1 in the passport revocation case of
Mrs. Elizabeth Gurley Flynn. Mrs. Flynn's pass-
port was revoked by authority of the Secretary
of State on January 22, 1962, on the ground that
there was reason to believe she was a member of
the Communist Party of the United States, an
organization required to register with the At-
torney General under the Subversive Activities
Control Act of 1950.

The case is the first one to arise since the pass-
port provisions of the Subversive Activities Con-
trol Act went into effect. The provisions became
effective following the entry of judgment by the
Supreme Court in the case of Subversive Activi-
ties Control, Board v. Communist Party of the
United States.

Under the provisions of section 6 of the Sub-
versive Activities Control Act, it is now unlawful
for a member of the Communist Party of the
U.S.A. to apply for a passport or for the renewal
of a passport or to use a passport.

The hearing will take place before a Hearing
Officer and will be held in the Hearing Room of
the Passport Office. The Hearing Officer will be
Max Kane, a Hearing Examiner for the Federal
Power Commission, who has been assigned to this
case by arrangement with the Civil Service
Commission.

For the protection of persons suspected of Com-
munist Party membership, the regulations require
that hearings be private. The Passport Office and
tlie applicant will be represented by counsel, and
a transcript will be made of the proceedings.

The recommended decision of the Hearing Of-
ficer will be based only on evidence presented at
the hearing and will not be based on any confi-
dential information.

The Hearing Officer will prepare findings of
fact and will make a recommended decision to the
Director of the Passport Office. In the event of
an adverse decision, the applicant will have the
right to appeal to the Board of Passport Appeals,
which has been appointed by the Secretary of
State.

Inter-American Police Academy
To Open in Canal Zone

Press release 281 dated April 30

Plans for setting up an intei-- American police
academy were announced on April 30 by the De-
partment of State.

The institution will be located in the Panama
Canal Zone and will accommodate up to 100 stu-
dents. The students will be middle- and senior-
level police officials from Latin American coun-
tries, who will receive training in modern police
methods. The training will emphasize the public
service functions of the police force in a modem
democratic state. The inter- American police
academy will have available, as consultants, ex-
perts in sociology, criminology, and other aca-
demic fields relevant to police work.

The academy will be staffed with seven full-time
instructors for a standard 12- week course. Fi-
nancing will be provided by the U.S. Agency for
International Development. A temporary site for
the academy has been selected at Fort Davis in the
Canal Zone. Operations will begin in July.

Negotiations To Begin on Claims
Against Yugoslavia

Press release 285 dated May 3

The Governments of the United States and
Yugoslavia have agreed to begin negotiations in
the near future with a view to settling claims of
American nationals against Yugoslavia for the
taking by Yugoslavia of their property under the
nationalization law of December 26, 1958, and
other measures of the Yugoslav Government. The
claims to be included in the negotiations are those
which have arisen since July 19, 1948, the date of
the last settlement between the two Governments.^

' For background and text of agreement, see Bulletin
of Aug. 1, 1948, p. 137.

Aloy 21, 7962

847

The Department has limited information con-
cerning the cLaims but has recently sent question-
naires to all persons who have written to it about
their claims and requested full information. Per-
sons who have not received a questionnaire should
write to the Department promptly.

Proclamation Gives Effect to Results
of 1960-61 GATT Tariff Negotiations

The White House announced on April 30 that
the President had issued on that day a proclama-
tion ^ to give effect to the U.S. tariff concessions
resulting from the 1960-61 GATT tariff negotia-
tions which were announced on March 7.^ These
concessions resulted from reciprocal negotiations
with the European Economic Community (EEC),
Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Israel, New
Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Portugal,
Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom
and from compensatory negotiations with the
Benelux countries [Belgium, Netherlands, Lux-
embourg], Denmark, Germany, Italy, Japan,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

The reciprocal agreements provide that the
concessions in the U.S. schedules to them will take
effect 30 days after the United States formally
notifies the countries with which they were negoti-
ated, and under the proclamation a notification of
the effective date will be published in the Federal
Register. The proclamation fui'ther provides that
the compensatory concessions will become effective
on July 1, 1962, unless the President notifies the
Secretary of the Treasury of an earlier effective
date.

It is anticipated that the necessary steps will
be taken to bring into effect on July 1 the conces-
sions in these agreements, with one or two possible
exceptions. It is also anticipated that a supple-
mentary proclamation will be issued in Jinie in
order to make effective on the same date concessions
in agreements with certain other countries. In
accordance with trade agreements legislation most
of the reductions M-ill be made in two stages, the
second stage becoming effective after the first
stage has been in effect for 1 year.

U.S. and Hong Kong Conclude
Textile Discussions

Department Statement

Press release 2G8 dated April 24

A series of extensive and constructive discus-
sions have been held by officials of the Governments
of the United States and Hong Kong on mutual
problems in the field of cotton textiles. The
United States group was headed by W. Michael
Blumenthal, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for Economic Affairs. Kepresentatives of the De-
partments of Commerce, Labor, Treasury, and
Agriculture also participated in the discussions.
Hong Kong was represented by H. A. Angus and
D. M. Sellers, Director and Assistant Director of
Commerce and Industry, respectively. Officials of
the British Embassy, Washington, also partici-
pated in the meetings.

The immediate purpose of the meetings was to
discuss the United States requests to Hong Kong
to restrain its export to the United States of
various categories of cotton textiles and the United
States action of March 19 ^ under which a ban was
imposed on imports of eight categories of cotton
textiles from Hong Kong. The requests for re-
straint and the United States ban were made
pursuant to the Short-Tenn Cotton Textile Ar-
rangement of July 1961.^ Twenty-two categories
of cotton textiles from Hong Kong are now sub-
ject to restraint as a result of the LTnited States
requests.

The representatives of the two Governments dis-
cussed the serious problems faced by the cotton
textile industries of their countries. It was agreed
that there was a need to establish procedures which
would prevent disruption to the United States
market and to the Hong Kong cotton textile in-
dustry. Accordingly, the representatives agreed
upon procedures projiosed by Hong Kong, under
which the Hong Kong Government will introduce
an export authorization system in addition to the
export quota control and export licensing systems
which are already in elTect in Hong Kong. The
United States Government has agreed to honor
all export licenses issued by the Hong Kong Gov-
ernment pursuant to these systems, up to tlie level

'No. 3408; for text, see 27 Fed. Reg. 4235 or White
House press release dated Apr. 30.
'Rur.LEnN of Apr. 2, 1002, p. 501.

' VoY linckground, see Foreign Cotnmerce Weekly of
Mar. 20, 1002, p. r,^l.

' For background and text of agrccinont, see Bulletin
of Aug. 21, 1001, p. 330.

848

Department of State Bulletin

of restraint requested at auj* time by the United
States Government as provided under those
systems.

United States representatives described to Hong
Kong representatives the problems created in the
United States by the sudden and sharp increases
of certain exports of cotton textile products by
Hong Kong in the early months of the Short-
Term Arrangement. It was explained to the
Hong Kong representatives that for the time being
no consideration could be given to releasing for
consumption in the United States those cotton
textile products subject to the United States im-
port ban of March 19. Certain small quantities of
goods in Category 43, knit shirts other than T
shirts, and in Category 48, raincoats, affected by
the ban will be permitted to enter the United
States for consumption inasmuch as earlier such
shipments had not reached the level of restraint
requested by the United States.

Mr. Angus drew attention to the special in-
dustrial difficulties that confront Hong Kong and
the great importance of textiles to the economy
of the Colony. He explained that hardship cases
had developed as a result of the ban. In response,
the United States representatives assured Mr.
Angus that they understood this situation and
that the United States would give most sympa-
thetic consideration to such cases in accordance
with the cooperative spirit of the Geneva Cotton
Textile Arrangements.

President Decides Not To Increase
Duty on Straight Pins

White Ilduse press release dated April 28
WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT

The President announced on April 28 that in his
judgment the Tariff Commission's recent report ^
on straight pins does not clearly indicate serious
injury to the domestic straight pin industry from
import competition. The President, therefore, de-
clined to accept the recommendation of the Com-
mission for an increase in duty on imported
straight pins.

On February 28, 1962, the Tariff Commission
had reported to the President the results of its

' Copies of the report may be obtained from the U.S.
Tariff Commission, Washington 25, D.C.

investigation on straight pins under section 7 of
the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, as
amended. A majority of the Commission (four
members) found that straight pins are being im-
ported into tlie United States in such increased
quantities as to cause serious injury to the domestic
industry producing like products and recom-
mended that the duty be increased from the pres-
ent 20 percent to 35 percent ad valorem. Two
Commissioners dissented from this finding and
concluded that the criteria for a finding of serious
injury or the threat thereof have not been met.

In identical letters to Senator Harry Flood
Byrd, chairman of the Senate Committee on Fi-
nance, and Eepresentative Wilbur D. Mills, chair-
man of the House Committee on Ways and Means,
the President noted that the trends of such sig-
nificant factors as employment, production, and
dollar sales volume were not, in his judgment, such
as to supi^ort a finding of serious injury to the
industry from imports.

TEXT OF LETTERS TO CONGRESSIONAL
CHAIRMEN

Dear Mr. Chairman : The Tariff Commission has fur-
nished me with a report regarding its escape clause in-
vestigation of straight (dressmakers' or common) pins.
I have carefully considered this report and obtained the
advice of the Trade Policy Committee.

The data collected by the Commission show that pro-
duction, average employment, manhours worked and
total wages paid by the straight pin Industry have
fluctuated without apparent trend. Domestic production
and sales in the last five years have been relatively
steady, varying between 92 percent and 108 percent of the
annual average for the period. The average value per
pound of domestic pins increased from .$1.5C in 1957 to
$1.78 in 1961, and the value of straight pin sales by do-
mestic producers was higher in 1961 than in any preceding
year.

Imports have risen from 713,000 pounds in 1957 to
1,052,000 pounds in 1961, and in the first 11 months of
1961 accounted for 31 percent of U.S. consumption, as
against 21.3 percent in 1957. However, inventories of
imported pins have also increased, reaching a peak at the
end of 1961 equivalent to about one-half the total volume
of imports that year. The significant rise In importers'
inventories may well have a restraining effect on future
imports.

It is my judgment that the Commission's report does
not support a finding of serious injury to the domestic
industry from imports. I have, therefore, determined
that the increase in duty recommended by the Commission
should not be placed in effect.
Sincerely,

John F. Kennedy

May 2J, 1962

849

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings'

Adjourned During April 1962

U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Status of Women: 16th Session .... New York Mar. 19-Apr. 6

U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Human Rights: 18th Session New York Mar. 19-Apr. 13

ICAO Subcommittee on the Legal Status of Aircraft: 4th Meeting . . . Montreal Mar. 26-Apr. 13

IMCO International Conference on the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea London Mar. 26-Apr. 13

by Oil.

W MO Commission for Synoptic Meteorology: 3d Session Washington Mar. 26-Apr. 20

U.N. ECE Group of Experts on Steelmaking Processes Geneva Apr. 2-3

U.N. ECE Consultation of Experts on Energy in Europe Geneva Apr. 2-6

FAO Committee of Government Experts on the LTses of Designations, Rome Apr. 2-6

Definitions, and Standards for Milk and Milk Products.

ICEM Executive Committee: 19th Session Geneva Apr. 2-7

U.N. Committee on Question of Defining Aggression New York Apr. 2-9

UNESCO Meeting of Ministers of Education of Asian Member States . Tokyo Apr. 2-11

Inter- American Nuclear Energy Commission: 4th Meeting Mexico, D.F Apr. 3-7

U.N. Economic and Social Council: 33d Session New York Apr. 3-18

ITU CCIR Study Group I (Transmitters) and Study Group III (Fixed Geneva Apr. 4-18

Service Systems).

U.N. ECE Conference of European Statisticians: Working Group on Geneva Apr. 9-13

Family Budget Inquiries.

ICEM Council: 16th Session Geneva Apr. 9-14

NATO Medical Committee Paris .'^pr. 10-11

European Radio Frequency Agency Paris .\pr. 10-12

UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographie Commission: Consultative Paris Apr. 10-12

Committee.

OECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Party II (Economic Paris .\pr. 11-12

Growth) .

OECD Economic and Development Review Conference Paris Apr. 13 (1 day)

OECD Working Party III (Balance of Payments) Paris Apr. 16-17

OECD Committee for Scientific Research: Working Party Paris Apr. 16-18

FAO Council: 38th Session ." New York Apr. 16-19

FAO De.sert Locu.'ft Control Committee: 7th Session .\ddis Ababa .\pr. 16-20

PAHO Executive Committee: 46th Meeting Washington Apr. 24-28

FAO Technical Meeting on Seed Production, Control, and Distribution . Rome Apr. 24-30

OECD Trade Committee Paris Apr. 26-28

NATO Petroleum Planning Committee: Working Group Paris Apr. 26-27

Tripartite Aid Negotiations for the Somali Republic Rome Apr. 26-27

In Session as of April 30, 1962

Conference on Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests (not meeting) . Geneva Oct. 31, 1 958-

5th Round of GATT Tariflt Negotiations Geneva Sept. 1, 1 960-

International Conference for the Settlement of the Laotian Question . . Geneva Mav 16, 1961-

U.N. General Assembly: 16th Session (recessed Feb. 23, 1962, until New York Sept. 19, 1961-

June 1962).

Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament .... Geneva Mar. 14, 1962-

U.N. Committee on Information From Non-Self-Governing Territories: New York .\pr. 23-

13th Session.

U.N. ECOSOC Statistical Commission: 12th Session New York Apr. 24-

U.N. ECAFE Regional Seminar on the Development of Ground Water Bangkok Apr. 24-

Resources.

U.N. Economic Commission for Europe: 17th Session Geneva .\pr. 24-

FAO Committee for Commodity Problems: 35th Session Rome .\pr. 25-

ITU CCIR Stvidy Group V (Propagation) Geneva Apr. 25-

ITU CCJIR Study Group VII (Standard Frequencies and Time Signals) . Geneva Apr. 25-

' Prepared in the Office of International Conferences Apr. 30, 1962. Following is a list of abbreviations: CCIR
Cornit6 consultatif international des radio communications; ECAFE, Economic Commission for .Africa and the Far Easti
ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; E('()S()C, Economic and Social ('ouncil; F.VO, Food and .\griculture Organizai
tion; GATT, Cieneral .\greeinent on Tariff.s and Trade; ICM), International ('ivil .\viation Organization; ICEM, Inter
governmental Committi'e for European Migration; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization
ITU, International Telccomnumication Union; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; OECD, Organization fo
Economic Cooperation and Development; P.\HO, Pan .\merican Health Organization; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; WMO, World Meteorological Organization.

850 Department of Slate Bulletir

International Bank Issues
9-IVlonth Financial Statement

The International Bank for Eeconstruction and
Development reported on May 2 that its reserves
had risen by $74.3 million in the first 9 months of
tlie current fiscal year to a total of $676.1 million.

Tlio additions to reserves in the 9-nionth period
endinf^Marcli ol, 1002, are made up of net earnings
of $51.7 million, which were placed in the supjjle-
mental reserve against losses on loans and guaran-
tees, and loan commissions of $22.6 million, wliicli
were credited to the special reserve. On March 31
the supplemental reserve totaled $459.8 million
and the special reserve was $216.3 million.

Gross income, exclusive of loan commissions, was
$139.4 million. Expenses totaled $87.7 million
and included $73 million for interest on the Bank's
funded debt, bond issuance, and other financial
expenses.

During the period tlie Bank made 24 loans total-
ing $663.9 million — in Argentina, Australia, Co-
lombia, Cost a Rica (2 loans), Ethiopia, Finland,
Ghana, Iceland, India (5 loans), Israel, Japan,
Kenya, Peru, Philippines (2 loans). South Africa
(2 loans) , Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela.
This brought the total number of loans to 316 in 60
countries and raised the gross total of loans signed
to $6,454.4 million. By March 31, as a result of
cancellations, repayments, and sales of loans, the
portions of loans signed still retained by the Bank
had been reduced to $4,561.1 million.

Disbursements on loans were $363.3 million,
making total disbursements $4,683 million on
March 31.

The Bank sold or agreed to sell the equivalent of
$233.9 million principal amounts of loans. At
March 31 the total amount of such sales was
$1,247.2 million, of which all except $69 million
was without the Bank's guarantee.

Repayments of principal received by the Bank
amounted to $78.5 million. Total principal re-
payments amounted to $1,015.9 million on
March 31; this included $516.9 million repaid to
the Bank and $499 million to the purchasers of
borrowers' obligations sold by the Bank.

On March 31 the outstanding funded debt of
the Bank was $2,528 million, reflecting a net in-
crease of $299.5 million in the past 9 months.
During the period there was a gross increase in
borrowings of $457.6 million. This consisted of
the following public bond issues: an Italian lire

issue in the amount of Lit 15 billion ($24 million),
a $100 million U.S. dollar issue of which $5.5
million was subject to delayed delivery arrange-
ments, and a Swiss franc issue in the amount of
Sw Fr 100 million ($23.3 million) ; the private
placement of an issue of $100 million of U.S.
dollar bonds; the drawing down of the Swiss franc
borrowing of Sw Fr 100 million ($23.3 million)
of October 1961; the drawing down of US $120
million and the balance of DM 250 million ($62.5
million) of the German borrowing of August
1960; and the delivery of $10 million of bonds
which had been subject to delayed delivery
arrangements. The funded debt was decreased by
$158.1 million as a result of the maturing of $122.7
million of bonds, the redemption of Sw Fr 100
million ($23.3 million), and sinking and purchase
fund transactions amounting to $12.1 million.

During the first 9 months of the fiscal year the
Dominican Republic was readmitted to member-
ship in the Bank with a capital subscription of
$8 million, and Laos (capital subscription $10
million), Liberia ($15 million). New Zealand
($166.7 million) , Nepal ($10 million) , and Cyprus
($15 million) became members of the Bank. The
subscribed capital of the Bank amounted to
$20,484.8 million on March 31, 1962.

U.S. Presents Views to World Court
on Financial Obligations of U.N.

Press release 290 dated May 4

Hearings will begin May 14, 1962, before the
International Court of Justice at The ILigue in
the case of Financial Obligations of the United
Nations}

The United States will be represented before the
Court by the State Department's Legal Adviser,
Abram Chayes, assisted by Stephen M. Schwebel,
Assistant Legal Adviser.

In a resolution approved December 20, 1961,° the
United Nations General Assembly reejuested an
advisory opinion from the Court on tlie question
of whether the Assembly's assessments upon mem-
ber states for the costs of tlie U.N. Emergency
Force in the Middle East and tlie I'.N. Operations
in the Congo are binding under the terms of the
U.N. Charter.

The refusal of a number of nations to pay their

' For background, see Bulleti.\ of Feb. 26, 1062, p. 311.
= U.N. doc. A/RES/1731 (XVI).

May 21, 1962

851

assessments on the ground that they are not bind-
ing has been one of the causes of the current finan-
cial plight of the United Nations. The Court's
opinion is expected to have a significant impact
upon the ability of the United Nations to finance
peacekeeping activities. The issue is considered
to be one of the most important ever to come
before the Court.

The United States will argue that the Assem-
bly's assessments are binding. Australia, Canada,
Iran, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and the
United Kingdom are expected to take a similar
position in the hearings.

Written statements on the case have been sub-
mitted to the Court by the following Governments :
Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark,
France, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands,
Portugal, South Africa, Spain, United Kingdom,
U.S.A., U.S.S.R., and Upper Volta.

The view that the assessments are not binding
has been supported by Czechoslovakia, France,
Portugal, South Africa, Spain, U.S.S.R., and
Upper Volta.

The Court's opinion is expected before it ad-
journs in the summer.

President Amends Executive Order
Relating to Inter-American Bank

EXECUTIVE ORDER'

Amending Executive Order No. 10873 To PRO\'n)E fob an
Exception to the Inter-American Development
Bank's Immunity From Suit Specified in the Inter-
national Organizations Immunities Act
By virtue of the authority vested in me by section 1
of the International Organizations Immunities Act (.59
Stat. 669; 22 U.S.C. 28,S-288f), and as President of the
United States, it is hereby ordered that Executive Order
No. 10873 ' of April 8, 19C0, be amended by substituting a
semicolon for the period at the end of the last sentence
and by adding the following :

"Provided, That such designation shall not be construed
to affect in any way the applicability of the provisions of
Section 3, Article XI, of the Articles of Agreement of the
Bank as adopted by the Congress of the United States in
the Inter-American Development Bank Act (73 Stat. 299;
22 U.S.C. 283-2831)."

The White House,
April 27, 10G2.

' No. 11019 ; 27 Fed. Reg. 4145.

'For text, see Bulletin of May 2, 1900, p. 717.

852

United States Delegations
to International Conferences

ECAFE Symposium on Petroleum Resources

The Department of State announced on May 4
(press release 289) that John M. Kelly, Assistant
Secretary for Mineral Resources, Department of
the Interior, would be U.S. representative to the
Second Symposium on the Development of Petro-
leum Resources of Asia and the Far East to be
held September 1-15, 1962, at Tehran, Iran, under
the auspices of the U.N. Economic Commission
for Asia and the Far East.

Recognizing the importance of petroleum to the
developing countries of the region, ECAFE is
holding the Second Symposium on the Develop-
ment of Petroleum Resources of Asia and the Far
East in order to make available to member govern-
ments the latest information on techniques and
operations of petroleum prospecting and develop-
ment. The symposium will deal with the geology
of the ECAFE region, various techniques of ex-
ploration, natural gas problems, and problems re-
lating to the economics of petroleum exploration,
production, and distribution.

The first petroleum symposium held by ECAFE
met at New Delhi, India, in December 1958. It
was devoted to technical discussions of geology
and techniques of exploration.

15th World Health Assembly

The Department of State announced on ]\Iay 4
(press release 292) that President Keimedy on
that day had appointed Dr. Luther L. Terry, Sur-
geon General, U.S. Public Health Service, to be
chairman of the U.S. delegation to the 15th World
Health Assembly of the World Health Organiza-
tion (WHO), which will bo held at Geneva May
8-25. ,

The President also appointed Richard N. Gard-
ner, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
International Organization Affaire, and Boisfeuil-
let Jones, Special Assistant to the Secretary of
Health, Education, and Welfare for Healtli and
Medical Affairs, as delegates to the Assembly.
Other members of the delegation are:

AUcrnntc U.S. Delegates

Howard R. Caldorwood, Office of International Economic
and Social Affairs, Department of State

Malcolm II. Merrill, M.D., Director, California State De-
partment of rublic Health, Berkeley, Calif.

Department of Slate Bulletin

ames Watt, M.D., Chief, Division of Internatioual Health,
U.S. Public Health Service, Department of Health, Edu-
cation, and Welfare

'harlos L. Williams, Jr., M.D., Division of International
Health, U.S. I'ublic Health Service, Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare

'onffrcisional Advisers

ohu K. Fogarty, House of Representatives

)ur\vard O. Hall, House of Representatives

(fi'iscrs

ospph M. Bobbitt, M.D., Associate Director for Program
I'vevelopment, Public Health Service, Department of
Healtli, Education, and Welfare

!lizabeth Pickett Chevalier, Los Angeles, Calif.

:iara F. Kritini, Division of International Health, Public
Health Service, Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare

llifford A. Pea.se, Jr., M.D., Assistant Senior Health Offi-
cer, Agency for International Development

'irginia Westfall, U.S. Mission, Geneva

torm Whaley, Vice President for Health Sciences, Uni-
versity of Arkansas Medical Center, Little Rock, Ark.

Tlie WHO is a specialized agency of the United
Nations with headquarters at Geneva. Its work
mbraces international programs on a wide variety
if public health questions. The Assembly, which
leets annually, will review the past year's work
nd approve the budget and program for the com-
ng year. In addition to the usual policy of sup-
lort to the WHO program, the United States dele-
:ation will seek to have the WHO integrate ifs
irogram with the goals of the U.N. Decade of
)evelopment.

Jnited Nations Day, 1962

A PROCLAMATION'

Whereas the United Nations' vigor and e£fectivene.s»
ave increased over the years ; and

Whereas the United Nations has become the principal
arum for open discussion of world affairs ; and

Whereas the United Nations is now an effective instru-
lent against hunger, illiteracy, disease, and despair ; and

Whereas the United Nations is a main avenue for co-
peration in the peaceful uses of outer space ; and

Whereas the United Nations' peacekeeping potential
rovides a key to world disarmament ; and

Whereas the United Nations' activities have been bene-
eial to the national interests of the United States ; and

Whereas the United Nations' authority depends on the
loral and financial support of the world's nations and
eople ; and

Whereas the General Assembly of the United Nations
has resolved that October twenty-fourth, the anniversary
of the coming into force of the United Nations Charter,
should be dedicated each year to making known the
purposes, principles, and accomplishments of the United
Nations:

Now, therefore, I, John F. Kennedy, President of the
United States of America, do hereby urge the citizens of
this Nation to observe Wednesday, October 24, 1962, as
United Nations Day by means of community programs
which will demonstrate their faith in the United Nations
and contribute to a better understanding of its aims, prob-
lems, and accomplishments.

I also call upon the officials of the Federal and State
Governments and upon local officials to encourage citizen
groups and agencies of the press, radio, television, and mo-
tion pictures to engage in appropriate observance of United
Nations Day throughout the land in cooperation with the
United States Committee for the United Nations and other
organizations.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and
caused the Seal of the United States of America to be
affixed.

Done at the City of Washington this thirtieth day of

April in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred

[seal] and sixty-two, and of the Independence of the

United States of America the one hundred and

eighty-sixth.

By the President :
George W. Ball,
Acting Secretary of State.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

' No. 3649 ; 27 Fed. Reg. 4267.

Assistant Secretary Williams Opens
Consulate at Stanleyville

The Department of State announced on May 3
(press release 286) that G. Mennen Williams,
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, opened
on that day an American consulate at Stanleyville,
Orientale Province of the Republic of the Congo
(Leopoldville). The United States already oper-
ates an embassy at Leopoldville, the nation's capi-
tal, and a consulate at Elisabethville, capital of
Katanga Province. Principal officer in the con-
sulate at Stanleyville is John W. Simms.

Aay 21, 7962

853

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Amendment to article VI.A.3 of the Statute of the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency (TIAS 3873). Done at
Vienna October 4, 1961.'
Acceptance deposited: Denmark, May 4, 1062.

Aviation

Protocol relating to amendment of article 50(a) of the
Convention on International Civil Aviation to increa.se
membership of the Council from 21 to 27. Approved
by the ICAO Assembly at Montreal June 21, 1961.'
Ratifications deposited: CzechoslovalJia, March 9, 19C2 :
Dahomey, March .30, 1962; Ireland, April 9, 1062;
Laos, March 7, 1962; Mauritania, April 2, 1962;
Mexico, April 9, 1962; Nigeria, March 7, 1962; Sene-
gal, March 5, 1962 ; Spain, April 2, 1962 ; Yugoslavia,
March 5, 1962.

Finance

Articles of agreement of the International Development
Association. Done at Washington January 26, 1060.
Entered into force September 24, 1960. TIAS 4607.
Sidtiatures and acceptances: Cyprus, March 2, 1962;
Lebanon, April 10, 1962.

Law of tiie Sea

Convention on the territorial sea and the contiguous
zone ; '

Convention on the high seas ; '

Convention on fishing and conservation of the living re-
sources of the high seas.'
Done at Geneva April 20, 1958.

Notification received that it considers itself hound:
Sierra Leone, March 13, 1962.

Safety at Sea

International convention for the safety of life at sea,
1960. Done at London June 17. 1!)60.'
Acceptance deposited: Ghana, March 22, 1962.

BILATERAL

China

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of
lO.")!, as amended (68 Stat. 4."); 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709),
with exchange of notes. Signed at Taipei April 27,
1962. Entered into force April 27, 1902.

Dominican Republic

Agreement relating to investment guaranties?. Signed at
Washington May 2, 1902. Entered into force May 2,
1962.

Agreement relating to the establish rnciit of a Peace Corps
program in the Uominicau Republic. Signed at Wash-
ington May 2, 1962. Entered into force May 2, 1962.

Guinea

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agree-
ment of February 2, 1962 (TIAS 4948). Effected by
exchange of notes at Washington May 3, 1962. En-
tered into force May 3, 1962.

Indonesia

Agreement extending arrangement for landing rights for
United States commercial air carriers in Indonesian
territory of 19.59, as extended (TIAS 4287, 4.-)23, 4820).
Effected bv exchange of notes at Dj.ikarta February 27
and April"l7, 1962. Entered into force April 17, 1062.

Ireland

Agricultural trade agreement. Signed at Washington
May 3, 1962. Entered into force May 3, 1962.

Israel

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of
10."i4, as amended (68 Stat. 4.'5.j: 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709),
with memorandum of understanding. Signed at Wash-
ington May 3, 1962. Entered into force May 3, 1962.

' Not in force.

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: April 30-IVIay 6

Press releases may be obtained from the OfEce of
News, Department of State. Washington 2.3, D.C.

Releases issued prior to April 30 which appear in
this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 2o3 of April 13.
204 of April 23, and 268 of April 24.

Subject

Ball: "Viet-Nam— Free World Chal-
lenge in Southeast Asia."

McGhee: "The Direction of United
States Foreign Policy."

U.S. participation in internation.Tl
conferences.

Inter-American police academy estab-
lished.

Note to Japan on nuclear tests.

Itinerary for visit of Austrian Chan-
cellor.

Note to Ghana on nuclear tests.

Claims of U.S. nationals against
Yugoslavia.

Consulate opened at Stanleyville (ri^
write).

Riistow : "Tlie Domestic Base of For-
eign Policy."

Cultural exchange (Guatemala).

Delegate to EC.VFE symiH)siun\ on pe-
troleum resoui'ces (rewrite).

Views on U.N. financial obligations
presented to ICJ.

Fro<lericks : "The Imjiact of the Emer-
gence of Africa on American Foreign
Policy."

Delegation to 15th World Health As-
sembly (rewrite).

Itinerary for visit of President of
Ivory Coast.

Itinerary for visit of Prime Minister of
Norway.

•Not printed.

flleld for a later issue of the Bulletin.

No.

Date

»278

4/30

279

4/30

*280

4/30

281

4/30

282
*283

4/30

5/2

284

285

5/3
5/3

286

5/3

2S7

5/2

•288
289

5/3
5/4

290

5/4

1291

5/4

292

5/4

•293

5/4

•294

5/4

854

Department of State Butletin

lay 21, 1962 Index

Lfrica. Aids and Obstacles to Political Stability
ill Mid-Africa (Williams) 841

kmorican Principles. The Domestic Base of For-
eign I'olicy (Uostow) 833

imcrican Republics.

ntcr-Ainerican Police Academy To Open in Canal

Zone 847

'resident Amends Exe<-iitive Order Relating to

Inter-American Baulf (text of Executive order) . 852

atomic Energy. U.S. Replies to .Ttipan and Ghana
on Resumption of Nuclear Testing (texts of
notes) " 839

.ustria. President Kennedy Holds Tall<s With
Chancellor of Austria (text of joint communi-
que) 832

Claims. Negotiations To Begin on Claims Against
Yugoslavia 847

^mmunism

■he Direction of United States Foreign Policy
(McGhee) 827

[earings Held on Mrs. Flynn's Passport Revoca-
tion Case 847

ongo (Leopoldville). Assistant Secretary Wil-
liams Opens Consulate at Stanleyville 853

ongress. President Decides Not To Increase
Duty on Straight Pins (text of letters to Con-
gressional chairmen) 849

lepartment and Foreign Service. Assistant Secre-
tary Williams Opens Consulate at Stanleyville . . 853

conomic Affairs

he Direction of United States Foreign Policy
(McGhee) 827

he Domestic Base of Foreign Policy (Rostow) . . 833

CAB^E Symposium on Petroleum Resources (dele-
gate) 852

he Future Trade of the United States (Kennedy) . 823

iternational Bank Issues 9-Month Financial State-
ment 851

resilient Amends Executive Order Relating to
Inter-American Bank (text of Executive order) . 852

resident Decides Not To Increase Duty on Straight

Pins 849

reclamation Gives Effect to Results of 1960-61
GATT Tariff Negotiations 848

.S. and Hong Kong Conclude Textile Discussions . 848

roThl Trade Week, 1962 (text of proclamation) . 825

urope. The Direction of United States Foreign
Policy (McGhee) 827

oreign Aid

he Direction of United States Foreign Policy

(JIcGhee) 827

he Domestic Base of Foreign Policy (Rostow) . 833
iter-American Police Academy To Open in Canal
Zone 847

ermany. White House Press Secretary Visits
Germany, Netherlands, and U.S.S.R 846

Vol. XL VI, No. 119.^)

Ghana. U.S. Replies to Japan and Ghana on Re-
sumption of Nuclear Testing (texts of notes) . . 839

Health, Education, and Welfare. 15th World
Health Assembly (delegation) 852

Hong Kong. U.S. and Hong Kong Conclude Tex-
tile Discussions §48

International Information. White House Press
Secretary Visits Germany, Netherlands, and
U.S.S.R 846

International Law. U.S. Presents Views to World

Court on Financial Obligations of U.N 851

International Organizations and Conferences

Calendar of International Conferences and Meet-
ings 850

ECAFE Symposium on Petroleum Resources (dele-
gate) 8.52

15th World Health Assembly (delegation) . . . 852

International Bank Issues 9-Month Financial State-
ment 851

President Amends Executive Order Relating to

Inter-American Bank (text of Executive order) . 852

Proclamation Gives Effect to Results of 1960-61

GATT Tariff Negotiations 848

Japan. U.S. Replies to .Japan and Ghana on Re-
sumption of Nuclear Testing (texts of notes) . . 839

Netherlands. White Hou.se Press Secretary Visits
Germany, Netherlands, and U.S.S.R S46

Passports. Hearings Held on Mrs. Flynn's Pass-
port Revocation Case 847

Presidential Documents

The Future Trade of the United States .... 823
President Amends Executive Order Relating to

Inter-American Bank 852

President Decides Not To Increase Duty on

Straight Pins 849

President Kennedy Holds Talks With Chancellor

of Austria 832

United Nations Day, 1962 '. s.53

World Trade Week, 1962 825

Treaty Information. Current Actions 854

U.S.S.R. White House Press Secretary Visits

Germany, Netherlands, and U.S.S.R 846

United Nations

United Nations Day, 1962 (text of proclamation) . 8.53
U.S. Presents Views to World Court on Ij'inancial
Obligations of U.N 851

Yugoslavia. Negotintions To Begin on Claims
Against Yugoslavia 847

Name Index

Gorbach, Alfons ... 832

Kennedy, President 823, 825, «:'.2, 849, 8.52, 853

McGhee, George C 827

Rostow, Walt W 833

Williams, G. Mennen 841

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-Cameroon 7180

.Central African Republic .... 7285

.Ceylon 7203

-Dahomey 7158

-Ghana (Revised) 7212

Jndia 7029

Jordan 7030

.Korea 7042

-Libya (Revised) 7270

-Malaya 6967

-Pakistan 7073

-Sudan 7044

-Togo 7135

-Tunisia 7150

-Upper Volta 7292

Viet-Nam 7031

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Vol. XLVI, No. 1196 May 28, 1962 . .„

JUN 7 I95Z

B. P- L-
SECRETARY RUSK ATTENDS CENTO, NATO,

ANZUS MEETINGS • Statements and News Con-
ferences by Mr. Rusk and Texts of Final Communiques . . 859

THE PRACTICE OF FOREIGN POLICY o by Acting

Secretary Ball 872

THE IMPACT OF THE EMERGENCE OF AFRICA
ON AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY • by J. Wayne

Fredericks 879

ARE IMPORTS NECESSARY? • By Philip H. Trezise . . 884

U.S. REPEATS DESIRE FOR CONCLUSIVE AGREE-
MENT ON NUCLEAR TESTING • Statement by
Arthur It. Dean 888

TED STATES
EIGN POLICY

For index see inside back cover

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Vol. XLVI, No. 1196 • Publication 7381
May 28, 1962

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents

U.S. Government Printing Ofllce

Washington 25, D.C.

Peick:

S2 issues, domestic $8.50, foreign $12.25

Single copy, 25 cents

Use of funds for printing of this pubUctv
tlon approved by the Director of the Bureau
of the Budget (January ig, 1901).

Note: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and Items contained herein may
be reprinted. Citation of the Depabtuent
ot State Udlletin as the source will be
appreciated. The Bulletin Is Indexed In the
Readers' Oolde to Periodical Literature.

The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the
Office of Public Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public
and interested agencies of the
Government with information on
developments in the field of foreign
relations and on the work of the
Department of State and tlie Foreign
Service. The BULLETIN includes se-
lected press releases on foreign policy,
issued by the White House and the
Department, and statements and ad-
dresses made by the President and by
the Secretiiry of State and other
officers of the Department, as well as
special articles on various phases of
international affairs and tlie func-
tions of the Department. Informa-
tion is included concerning treaties
and intcrnatioiuil agreements to
which the United States is or may
become a party and treaties of gen-
eral international interest.

Publications of the Department,
United Nations documents, and legis-
lative material in the field of inter-
national relations are listed currently.

Secretary Rusk Attends CENTO, NATO, and ANZUS Meetings

Secretary Rusk left Washington on April 29 for London, where he
headed the U.S. observer delegation to the 10th session of the Ministerial
Council of the Central Treaty Orqanization^ which met there April 30 and
May 1. From London the Secretary went to Athens, where he was chair-
man of the U.S. delegation to the 29th ministerial meeting of the North
Atlantic Council May 4.-6, and then to Canberra, where he served as U.S.
representative at a meeting of the Australia-New Zealand- United States
Council May 8-9.

Follotoing are texts of communiques released after each meeting, state-
ments and news conferences hy Mr. Rush, and announcements of the prin-
cipal members of the U.S. delegations.

CENTRAL TREATY ORGANIZATION, LONDON, APRIL 30-IVIAY 1

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY RUSK, APRIL 30

Mr. Chairman, Your Excellencies, distinguished
guests: Permit me to join my colleagues in thank-
ing our hosts for their gracious welcome. Our
delegation is delighted to be here in London, and
we look forward to a stimulating session of the
CENTO Council. I am veiy pleased to represent
the United States at this Council for the second
time and extend a warm welcome to the newer
members of our group — Foreign Minister Erkm
of Turkey, Foreign Minister Aram of Iran, and
Pakistan's Minister for Food and Agriculture,
General Shaikh.

We are once again in the midst of various inter-
national gatherings. Last month there convened
the disarmament conference in Geneva.^ Follow-
ing this 10th session of the CENTO Council there
will be, as you know, a meeting of the NATO
Council in Athens. Thereafter I plan to travel to
Australia to confer with our allies of the ANZUS
treaty.

In all these meetings there is one general theme,
a conunon denominator which links the peoples of
the free world — to reaffirm their detei-mination to
stand together for peace and security. Through
joint efforts we seek to preserve the integrity of
our homelands, to maintain and enhance our cher-
ished traditions and institutions, and to reassert
the right of free men to their own independence
and freedom of choice. These are the high pur-
poses we promote and defend, and these meetings
are a useful means of concerting our actions to-
ward the attainment of our objectives.

I should also like to note the fact that the pres-
ent series of nuclear tests in which the United
States and the United Kingdom are engaged ^ is
fully consonant with the collective security objec-
tives of the free world. President Kennedy in-
dicated, in his address on March 2,^ that military
security requirements would compel the United
States to undertake certain atmospheric tests if
the Soviet Union failed to agree to an effective test
ban treaty. Since that time every avenue of ob-

' For background, see Bulletin of Apr. 2, 1962, p. 531 ;
Apr. 16, 1962, p. 618; Apr. 23, 1962, p. 664; and May 7,
1962, p. 747.

= See p. 888.

' Bulletin of Mar. 19, 1962, p. 443.

May 28, 7962

859

taining Soviet agreement has been explored. The
Soviet Union has thus far been unwilling to agi-ee
to an effective treaty banning all nuclear testing,
despite many efforts by the United States and the
United Kingdom to meet its view on particulars.
In the circumstances the United States has had no
choice but to assume its responsibility to look to
the common defense and conduct a limited series
of atmospheric nuclear tests.

We know, perhaps better than many others,
what it means to struggle with the dilemma for
which a solution has thus far eluded us. The
United States must treat the testing of nuclear
weapons in the same way it approaches any other
aspect of defense preparations. The arms race
cannot be ended unless and imtil all major powers
agi-ee to do this. It remains a prime objective of
U.S. policy to end all nuclear weapons testing per-
manently and as quickly as possible. We firmly
believe that negotiations on this matter must go
forward, and we will do our best to see that these
negotiations are continued until testing is ended.
This 10th session of our CENTO Coimcil af-
fords an opportunity for us to take stock of
CENTO'S accomplishments, to review our pur-
poses and objectives, and to chart our course anew
in the light of that assessment. I would venture
to suggest that an alliance such as this is its ovm
excuse for being and that its chief benefit to its
participants is the security provided by CENTO's
existence. I suggest that we keep in mind the es-
sential fact that CENTO'S existence is an asset
upon which we should continue to build.

Over the years we have succeeded in establish-
ing the credibility of our determination to resist
jointly any incursions by a potential aggTessor.
We have clearly demonstrated our mutual interest
in defense against Communist external and inter-
nal threats. We have also recognized that security
involves not only military defense but also the
promotion of our general welfare. In recognition
of this the United States has undertaken large eco-
nomic and military assistance programs in tlie
regional member countries. '\^niile these programs
are essentially bilateral in nature, they promote
our multilateral objectives in providing added
strength to the CENTO region.

At the recent 10th session of the CENTO Eco-
nomic Committee in Washington,^ it was noted

* Ibid., Mar. 26, 1962, j). 522.

that the strength of CENTO consists of the
strength of each of us and that our ability to co-
operate in regional enterprises is thus dependent
on the soundness of our domestic arrangements.
To this I would only add that, in my view,
cento's mutually cooperative efforts are some-
thing more than the sum of its parts. Through the
interchange of ideas, techniques, and experience
contributed by each of us toward the accomplish-
ment of some specific goal or project have come
new stimulus and capacity different in both kind
and magnitude. This new force has great poten-
tial benefit for the welfare of the peoples of the
CENTO area.

In sum, we of the United States delegation be-
lieve that our mutual intei'est in providing for our
security and welfare against the continuing threat
of Communist aggression is well served through
CENTO. In this Council session we look forward
to constructive deliberations through which these
accomplishments may be continued. I bring j-ou
the greetings and best wishes of President Ken-
nedy and of the American people. We are happy
to be here among our friends and to work with
each of you toward the high objectives which you
have set for CENTO.

FINAL COMMUNIQUE, MAY 1

The Tenth Session of the Ministerial Council of the
Central Treaty Organization was held in London on
April 30 and May 1, 19G2. The delegations from countries
participating in this meeting were led by :

H.E. Mr. Abbas Aram, Foreign Minister of Iran

H.E. Lt. General K. M. Shailih, Minister of Kood and Agri-
culture, Paliistan

H.E. Mr. Feridun Cemal Erkin, Foreign Minister of
Turkey

The Right Honourable The Earl of Home, Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs, United Kingdom

The Honourable Dean ItusU, Secretary of State, I'nited
States of America

The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, aS'
host, was in the chair.

The Session was inaugurated by a message of welcome
from the British I'rinie Slinister, Mr. Harold Macmillau,
wliich was rend by Lord Home.

The Council had a useful exchange of views on inter-
national developments since their last meeting. They
agreed that the troubled state of the world emphasised
the value of alliances like CEXTO. These alliances pro-
vide a shield against immediate danger from aggression
and a basis for mutual trust and coufldeuce among the'
member nations.

860

Department of State Bulletin

The Ministers were agreed that the free nations should
continue their efforts to achieve disarmament with ade-
quate provision for international inspection.

Pending a disarniaraeut agreement the CENTO coun-
tries have to rely ujjon their common defense against
the dangers which threaten them. The Ministers have
therefore considered the progress made in improving the
defensive strength of the alliance, as reported to them by
the Military Committee, particularly with regard to in-
crease of coordination and the improvement of joint facili-
ties between existing defense forces.

The Council took cognizance of the continuing progress
of CENTO'S economic programme. It specifically noted
the completion during the past year of the high frequency
telecommuuicatious link connecting Teheran via Ankara.
Inauguraticm of construction of a microwave link between
Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan was also cited. Increased air
navigational aid throughout the region, port development
at Trabzon, Turke.v, and further construction on both road
and railroad links were also emphasised as proof of
CENTO'S stride forward. The Council was in agreement
that continued economic development is of prime im-
portance in strengthening the CENTO region through a
combination of stability and progress.

Upon reviewing the economic work of the Organization,
the Council adopted the annual report of the Economic
Committee for 1961 and the report of the Tenth Session
of the Economic Committee.

The Council expressed satisfaction with the institution
of a CENTO cultural programme as presenting greater
opportunity for intensifying the cultural ties of the peo-
ples of the CENTO region.

The Ministers agreed on the desirability of continuing
close discussions among representatives of the member
nations on problems of common interest.

The Council expressed pleasure at the presence of Dr.
A. A. Khalatliary, who attended his first CENTO Minis-
terial Council meeting since becoming Secretary General.

The Council decided that the next meeting will be held
in Palcistan in early 1963.

U.S. DELEGATION

The Department of State amioimced on April
27 (press release 277) that Secretary Rusk would
head the U.S. observer delegation to the 10th ses-
sion of the Ministerial Council of the Central
Treaty Organization at London on April 30 and
May 1. Raymond A. Hare, U.S. Ambassador to
Turkey and U.S. Observer in the Council Depu-
ties, served as alternate U.S. observer.

The senior advisers on the delegation were :

David K. E. Bruce, U.S. Ambassador to the United
Kingdom

William P. Bundy, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for International Security Affairs

Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff

Ernest K. Lindley, Special A.ssistaut to the Secretary of
State

Robert J. Manning, Assistant Secretary of State for Pub-
lic Affairs

Lt. Gen. Robert W. Porter, Jr., U.S. Representative, Per-
manent Military Deputies Group, CENTO, Ankara

Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary of State for Near
Eastern and South Asian Affairs

The members of CENTO are Iran, Pakistan,
Turkey, and the United Kingdom. The United
States, while not a full member, supports the
Organization and is associated with most of its
activities. CENTO headquarters are at Ankara.

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL, ATHENS, MAY 4-6

MR. RUSK'S ARRIVAL STATEMENT, MAY 2

I am very pleased to visit Greece, which has an
especially warm place in the hearts of Americans
because of the dedication of its people to liberty.

In Ottawa — just about 1 year ago — President
Kennedy spoke ^ of the "irresistible tide" for free-
dom and against tyranny that began here in
Greece some two and a half thousand years ago.

■ For text, see ibid., June 5, 1901, p. 830.
May 28, 1962

That tide of freedom, he said, is the wave of the
future.

Our meeting here in the next few days is per-
haps best characterized as part of the normal and
established conduct of business of this alliance.
But at the same time we are reminded simply by
our presence here what it is we stand for, and why
the tide of freedom — of which the President
spoke — is in the long term indeed irresistible as
long as there are those who will work and sacrifice
for that cause.

861

For the immediate future, I wish I could hold
out a prospect for relaxation, but I camiot. It is
true that there may be the appearance of some
slight improvement in the international scene —
and even this much is welcome. But it is a long
way from the appearance to the reality, and the
reality is not even in sight.

And so we must get on with the important work
of the alliance. That work does not consist only
of the meetings of the Council of Ministers. It
consists also of the year-round work of the Per-
manent Council, the secretariat, and the military
commands to build the strength and cohesion of
our alliance. In a very real sense, this work is
never finished. It will be the purjDOse of the
furnishing further guidance to the permanent
tinning task by appraising where we stand and by
ministerial meeting to carry forward this con-
authorities of the alliance.

Finally, I want to thank our loyal Greek allies,
who have kindly offered to be our hosts and wish
them health, continued progress, and prosperity.

FINAL COMMUNIQUE, MAY 6

Press release 297 dated May 7

The regular spring Ministerial session of the NATO
Council was held in Athens from May 4 to May 6, 1962.
The meeting was attended by the Foreign Ministers of
member countries as well as by the Defense Ministers,
who had met separately on May 3.

In their review of the international situation, the Min-
isters discussed disarmament, and the problem of Ger-
many and Berlin. In addition, various statements were
made by the Ministers on matters of particular concern
to their countries.

In reviewing developments at the Geneva conference,
the Ouncil reaffirmed that general and complete dis-
armament under effective international control is the best
means of ensuring lasting peace and security throughout
I he world. They noted with satisfaction the position
taken by the Western powers in Geneva in order to
achieve this goal, and emphasized the importance and
urgency of reaching agreement.

The Council examined the Berlin question in the light
of the basic commitments of NATO in this regard. They
took note of the most recent developments in the situa-
tion, including the fact that exploratory talks were
taking jilace with the Soviet Union. They took the op-
portunity to reaflirm their attachment to the principles
set forth in their declaration of December 16, 1958, on
Berlin."

" Tor text, see ihid., Jan. 5, lORO, p. 4.
862

The Council noted the progress which has been made
in the direction of closer cooperation between member
countries in the development of the Alliance's defense
policy. In this respect, the Ministers welcomed the con-
firmation by the United States that it will continue to
make available for the Alliance the nuclear weapons
necessary for NATO defense, concerting with its allies
on basic plans and arrangements in regard to these
weapons. In addition, both the United Kingdom and the
United States Governments have given firm assurances
that their strategic forces will continue to provide defense
against threats to the Alliance beyond the capability of
NATO-committed forces to deal with.

So that all member states may play their full part in
consultation on nuclear defense policy, it has been de-
cided to set up special procedures which will enable all
members of the Alliance to exchange information con-
cerning the role of nuclear weapons in NATO defense.

The purpose of NATO is defense, and it must be cleat
that in case of attack it will defend its members by all
necessary means. The Council has reviewed the actioE
that would be necessary on the part of member countries
collectively and individually, in the various circumstances
in which the Alliance might be comi)elled to have recourse
to its nuclear defenses.

The Council noted the progress made during the lasl
twelve months in the defense effort of the Alliance and
in particular, the quantitative and qualitative improve
ments brought about in the NATO-assigned or -earmarked
forces of member countries. The Ministers noted witl
satisfaction the United States commitment of Polari:
submarines to NATO.

The Council is convinced that, if the Alliance is to meei
the full range of threats to its security, the balance be
tween conventional and nuclear forces must be the sub
ject of continuous examination. The contribution o)
member countries toward balanced forces for NATO de
fense during the coming years is to be examined withii
the framework of the triennial review procedure which is
already under way. The Council expects to consider £
report on this question at its next meeting in December.

At their separate meeting on May 3, the Defens*
Ministers discussed and approved a report from the arma-
ments committee which reviewed progress made since theii
meeting in April 1960 in .sharing the burden of research
development and production of military equipment, and
made a number of recommendations for improving this
cooperation. While there have been certain initial diffi-
culties, the Ministers agreed that the program of coopera-
tive projects launched at that time had made a successful
start. Further efforts should now be made to build ou
this foundation. To obtain speedier results from this co-
operation the Ministers decided to set up a high-level
group to examine the existing machinery, and to make
recommendations to the Ministerial meeting in December
1962 for any improvements necessary to achieve agree-
ment on future military requirements and a better coordi-
nation of the resources of the Alliance. Meanwhile, special
efforts would be made to take final decisions on projects!
ripe for joint development.

The Council reviewed Ihe development of politicnl con-'

Deparfmenf of Sfafe Bulletin

lultatiou within the Alliance. It noted the steady and
'ucouraging progress made over the past twelve mouths in
leepening and extending the process of consultation.

The Council had before it a detailed analysis of the
vork of the Alliance in scientific and technical coopera-
ion. They discus.sed the |)n)i)Osals for fostering interna-
ional scientific cooperation put forward by a group of
•miuent scientists appointed by the Secretary General.
Che Ministers requested the Council in permanent session
;o consider these proposals further with a view to making
•ecommendatious to member Governments.

The Ministers noted that the Council in permanent ses-
lion had discussed a report by the international staff on
:;ommuiiist bloc activities in the economic field in less-
ieveloped countries. It was clear from this report that
)y far the largest proportion of the aid received by these
•ouutries continued to be that contributed by the eco-
lomically most advanced countries of the Free World,
ind that the aid extended by the Communist bloc was not
)nly substantially smaller than the assistance contributed
)y the Free World, but was also closely tied to political
lurpo.ses. The Ministers noted with satisfaction the ef-
forts the Free World is making to help developing coun-
ries to raise their standards of living while fully re.spect-
ng their national independence and freedom, and em-
ihasized the importance of continuing and intensifying
hese efforts.

The Ministers gave special attention to the economic
levelopment requirements of Greece and Turkey. Bearing
n mind the contribution of Greece and Turkey to the de-
'ense of the Alliance and their continuing efforts to ac-
celerate their economic development in order to Improve
;he living conditions for their peoples, the Ministers rec-
)gnized the need for external assistance to these two
countries. With a view to achieving the common objec-
;ives in this matter, they agreed that member governments
n a position to assist Greece and Turkey should examine
irgently the manner of establishing, in an appropriate
"orum, possibly with other countries and appropriate in-
ternational organizations, consortia to coordinate the
mobilization of resources needed to ensure the economic
levelopment of Greece and Turkey at a satisfactory rate,
rhe Ministers also agreed to establish a study group to
consider further the special defense problems of Greece.

The next Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic
Council is scheduled to be held in Paris in December,
1962.

CBS INTERVIEW OF SECRETARY RUSK,
\THENS, MAY 6

FoJlowing is the text of an interview hetioeen
Secretary Rusk and Robert Kleiman of the Colum-
bia Broadcasting System at Athens on May 6.

Press release 301 dated May 8

Mr. Kleiman: Mr. Secretary, you have agreed
here to consult our allies and concert nuclear
strategy with them,. What is the aim, and nature

of this program and how much of a voice are the
Europeans really going to have in this?

Secretary Rush : Well, Mr. Kleiman, I think that
it is becoming increasingly obvious to all of us
in the alliance that the defense of the NATO
countries is indivisible, that no one of us can move
in isolation from or separate from the others.
Therefore, when we talk about these great issues
of war and peace, it is necessary for us to have
the most intimate consultation.

Here at this meeting in NATO we have given
our colleagues in this alliance a great deal of in-
formation which they would need to come to the
right political and strategic judgments which
governments must face. I think that we have
moved a long way toward increasing solidarity
and toward a greater sense of alliance responsi-
bility for these great matters.

I think our colleagues in the alliance have been
very responsible and very pleased to be brought
into this kind of close association.

Q. Will the custody of these warheads and de-
cisions on use remain American?

A. Under the arrangements that we have in
force, American warheads remain in American
custody.

Q. What has happened to our former plans
to have a NATO-owned and NATO-operated
and -controlled missile force at sea?

A. As you will recall. President Kennedy, on
his visit to Ottawa, made some comments on that
and that subject has been discussed in the North
Atlantic Council of NATO.

We did not get into that in any detail here in
Athens because it is a very complex matter that
requires detailed, highly teclmical considerations
among the governments, but we did instruct our
representatives in the Permanent Council in Paris
to put their minds to this right away and to carry
on discussions there to see whether there is any
agreement, any basis on which we should proceed.
So we are ready to take a full part in those dis-
cussions.

Q. Noiv, as I understand, the five Polaris sub-
marines that we have just committed to the
NATO Command are not part of this future
NATO deterrent of which people have been talk-
ing, but this remains an American national force
under NATO?

May 28, J 962

863

A. Those Polaris submarines are in the same po-
sition as any American forces tliat have been com-
mitted to NATO, wliether in General [Lauris]
Norstad's Command or under the SACLANT
Commander in the Atlantic, or wherever, but these
submarines will be coordinated in their strategy
with the general NATO strategy and with the
general — the non-NATO — -forces of the United
States. But this too was an extension — was a car-
rying into effect of a commitment which President
Kennedy made in his Ottawa speech. Ajid again
that was very warmly received by our colleagues
in NATO.

U.S. DELEGATION

The Department of State announced on April
25 (press release 266) that the following would
be the principal members of the U.S. delegation
to the 29th ministerial meeting of the North At-
lantic Council to be held at Athens, May 4-6 :

V.8. Representatives

Secretary of State Dean Rusk, chairman

Secretary of Defen.se Robert S. McNamara

U.S. Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic
Council

Ambassador Thomas K. Finletter

Senior Advisers

Robert R. Bowio, Consultant, Department of State

Elbridge Durbrow, Deputy U.S. Permanent Representa-
tive on the North Atlantic Council

Foy D. Kohler, Assistant Secretary of State for European
Affairs

Henry R. Labouisse, U.S. Ambassador to Greece

Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff

Lawrence Levy, Defense Adviser and Defense Represent-
ative, U.S. Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Or-
ganization and European Regional Organizations, Paris

Ernest K. Lindley, Special Assistant to the Secretary of
State

Robert J. Manning, Assistant Secretary of State for
Public Affairs

Paul H. Nitze, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Inter-
national Security Affairs

J. Robert Schaetzel, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for Atlantic Affairs

Gerard C. Smith, Consultant, Department of State

Arthur Sylvester, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Public Affairs

John W. Tuthill, U.S. Representative to the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development

AUSTRALIA-NEW ZEALAND-UNITED STATES COUNCIL, CANBERRA, MAY 8-9

SECRETARY RUSK'S NEWS CONFERENCE,
CANBERRA, MAY 8

Mr. Roberts: Ladies and gentlemen, I would
like to introduce Secretary of State Dean Rusk.

Secretary Rusk: Thank you. Before the cam-
eras start, let me just make a little administrative
comment. We have just started our ANZUS
meetings. We have gotten into just a certain
number of items on our agenda. It would be more
logical for me to have a press conference after
we liad lini.shed, but that would not be possible.

There may be certain subjects that I'll have to
pass aside, l)ecause we have not really gotten into
them in our meeting. But I will do my very best.

All right, let's get started. Well, we have
opened our ANZUS discussions today, and I think
we have gotten off to a very good start. The dis-

cussions have been entirely candid in the sense of
revealing complete information to each other
about matters of common interest. They have
been entirely friendly, as one would expect among
the three countries represented here. I was able
to make a detailed report on my recent discussions
with the Soviets on Berlin, and also the course of
the Geneva disarmament conference and the mat-
ter of nuclear testing. We will bo continuing our
talks tomorrow with a range of other questions.
But perhaps I could pause at this point to take
your own questions.

Q. Can you tell us, sir, if the question of Ne
Guinea independence was raised?

A. That has not come up yet. It may com(
up tomorrow. But I will say now that we do
believe that the two Governments concerned with

ke
ie|

864

Department of State Bulletin

that question ought to resume questions of a pos-
sible peaceful settlement. We would regret very
much if that matter should break out into violence,
and we hope that the Bunker mediation— partici-
pation— will lead to some common basis of imder-
standing on which negotiations can proceed.

The United States and the Common Market

Q. Mr. Rusk, ivas the7-e any comment or dis-
cussion at this stage on the Common Market issue?

A. Well, I'll be talking with the Ministers about
that tomorrow. But I would like to make a state-
ment on that, because the United States view on
that has seemed to me to have been quite well
known, and yet sometimes the various aspects of
it do become misunderstood.

The integration of Western Europe is a develop-
ment of profound historic significance and one,
as you know, the United States has firmly sup-
ported. We hope that the negotiations now under
way will succeed in bringing the United Kingdom
into the European Economic Community, on a
basis which strengthens the unity and vitality of
that community and at the same time takes full
account of the need to expand international trade
and safeguard the legitimate interests of nonmem-
ber countries. Such a result would, in our view,
strengthen greatly the entire free world.

The resiDonsibility for working out appropri-
ate solutions lies, first and foremost, of course,
with the United Kingdom and the members of the
EEC. However, the results of the negotiations
will affect the interests of many countries not party
to the negotiations, including Australia and the
United States.

The United States fully appreciates the great
importance of the Commonwealth in world affairs.
However, we do not believe that the strength of
the Commonwealth springs mainly from the exist-
ing preferential trade relationships. Bather, we
believe that the sinew of the system is its proven
capacity to adjust and in the great tradition of
political freedom which it represents. A recent
test has been its enlargement through the inclusion
of the newly independent members from Asia and
Africa. We have full confidence that the Com-
monwealth will continue its constructive role in
world affairs.

We have a long history of opposition to trade
restrictions of all sorts. But any suggestion that
we are indifferent to the problems of other coun-

tries or that we seek to use the U.K.-EEC nego-
tiations to achieve a special advantage for our-
selves is utterly unfounded. We believe that it is
to the interest of both the Commonwealth and
the United States to see that the current negotia-
tions between the U.K. and the Six provide .access
to the enlarged Common Market for the products
of all nonmember countries without discrimina-
tion. However, we are also aware that existing
trade practices cannot be changed overnight. We
accept the fact that transitional arrangements will
be required. And we ourselves will have to make
some adjustments as we deal with the Common
Market. Beyond this, we have a deep interest in
exploring, with Australia and other major pro-
ducing states, the kinds of long-term arrange-
ments that will bring order to the marketing of
key agricultural products. These arrangements
should rest on the premise of reward to the most
efficient producers.

The President's trade expansion program, now
before our Congress,^ will enable us to negotiate
reductions in our tariff. These reductions would
apply equally to imports from other countries un-
der the most-favored-nation principle. However,
we would expect third countries benefiting from
these reductions to make their contribution to this
process of tariff reduction.

The integration of Western Europe will require
adjustments by all of us. Similar adjustments
are constantly required by the shape and character
of the economic changes in the world around us.
We look beyond the difficulties that may be en-
countered during a period of transition to the
building of an ever more prosperous world com-
munity of free nations.

That's the end of my comment on that.

Q. Mr. Rusk, was there any comment today at
all, or will there he any, on the fact that we may
get nuclear weapons here in Australia?

A. No, we have not discussed that, and that
question does not arise.

Q. Would it arise, do you think?

A. Well, that has not arisen.

Q. Will the terms of the pact preclude the use
of nuclear weapons here in this area of the world?

A. Does it preclude ?

' For text of President Kennedy's message to Congress
on trade, see ihid., Feb. 12, 1962, p. 231.

May 28, 1962

865

Q. Yes.

A. I don't see anything in the terms of the pact
that would preclude it. But I would not infer
from that there are any plans for their employ-
ment here.

Vital Role of Australia and New Zealand

Q. Mr. Rusk, does the United States regard the
economic well-heing of Australia and New Zea-
land as a contribution to the peace and order in
the Pacific and in Southeast Asia?

A. I think there is no question whatever that
the economic vitality of these two countries is
fimdamental to the peace and security of this part
of the world and also is fundamental to the great
struggle between free institutions and other kinds
of societies. Because it is becoming, I think, in-
creasingly clear, if one looks at that vast area from
East Germany all the way across to North Viet-
Nam, that the Communist world is not perform-
ing in just that area in which it has promised
miracles — tlie economic area.

Q. Then it follows that anything which harmed
the economy of Australia and New Zealand would
do harm to peace in the area, including perhaps
Britaiii's entry into the Common Market, without
suitable guarantees for Australia and New Zea-
land''s traditional, markets?

A. I think anything that helps the prosperity
of Australia and New Zealand would help the
peace and security of the area, including the partic-
ipation of all in a growing, expanding, vital free-
world trading area, in which all of us can move
on to new levels of prosperity.

Q. Mr. Rusk, does the United States view the
terms of the pact as covering Australia''s island
territories, such as West — West New Guinea?

A. I think you can expect complete solidarity
from the United States on Austi-alia and New
Zealand's political responsibilities here in the
Pacific area.

Q. Is the U.S. concerned about the Soviet arms
b%dldup in Indonesia, Mr. Secretary?

A. Yes. Yes, we are concerned about it.

Q. What are you going to do about it, sir?

A. We expect to do our best to insure that that
arms buildup not be employed in any improper

way and that questions affecting Indonesia are
settled in the normal course tlu'ough diplomatic
discussion and negotiation.

Q. Do you feel hopeful about the outcome or
the prospects of peaceful settlement?

A. Well, I think in diplomacy one always works
on the basis of a hope for a peaceful outcome, but
that does not require one to be a prophet and to
try to guarantee one.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your readjustments of
trade, following the Common Market—

A. Yes.

Q. Would you envisage the stiffening up of
your own trade with some of the countries without
prejudice in Europe as one of those adjustments?

A. I am sorry — I didn't get the firet part of
your question.

Q. In applying the readjustments of your own
trade pattern, to which you referred, would you
consider that as embracing also adjustments of
your trade with countnes that may lose markets
in Europe?

A. Oh, I think that there will be adjustments
working in many directions. I mean, for ex-
ample, if we negotiate reduction of trade barriers,
between ourselves and the Common Market, and
those are applied on a most-favored-nation basis,
this will imdoubtedly mean that we will be buying
goods and materials from coimtries from which
we have not been buymg such goods and materials.
No, I think it will be opening up our market as
well as theirs. But we want to see both these
common markets opened up for wider free trade
among the free world.

Q. Does this mean, sir, that you might consider
lifting the tariff against Australian ivool and ein-
bargoes against Australian metals, such as lead,
above a certain import quota?

A. Well, I think when we get the trade powers
for which we have asked the Congress, for ex-
tensive authority, that we will be able to take up
quite a number of these questions and negotiate
for an e(iuitable sohit ion.

Q. Mr. Rusk, have you disctissed any of these
trade matters with the Australia/n Government so
far, or tvill you be?

A. Well, we have been for some time in touch

866

Department of Sfafe Bulletin

with the Australian Government. I will un-
doubtedly be talking further about it with — while
I am here.

Q. Will you?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you think Australia has a legitimate case
in pressing for retention of G onvmonwealth trade
-preferences?

A. The retention of — ?

Q. Preferences — trade p^references.

A. Well, I think in my statement I indicated
that as far as the United States is concerned we
do not favor these preferences as such. This has
been our position over many, many years, as you
know. But, on the other hand, we recognize that
there are practical problems which we think can
be adjusted, and that we look to the possibility of
adjustment through transitional arrangements of
some sort. But these are all matters for the gov-
ernments concerned, beginning, as far as the Com-
mon Market is concerned, for negotiation, with
the United Kingdom and with other governments,
in extension to those, or in connection with those
talks.

Let me point out that in this business of trade
it is in the nature of trade among free nations,
with vigorous private enterprise, that there are
always trading problems to be resolved. This is
because it is in the nature of trade that there is
never enough. This is how great nations have
developed, and great economies, and it is how you
and we and others have moved from one level of
prosperity to another. The more vigorous the
trading partners, the more questions of this sort
there are to be resolved. And I don't believe we'll
ever reach a time when governments are not talk-
ing trade matters with each other, and particularly
governments of close friends, who are in intimate
relations with each other.

Q. On the score of trade, sir —

A. Yes.

Q. I understand tomorrow you are meeting with
Mr. [John] McEwen, our own Trade Minister.
Did you seek that conference, sir, or did he?

A. I'm not completely sure as to which side took
the initiative in arranging the particular appomt-
ments on my schedule. I must say I welcome that
one very much.

Q. For what reason, sir?

A. Because I'd like to talk with him about trade.
(Laughter.)

East New Guinea

Q. Mr. Rusk, do you view the question of the
self-determination to the indigenous inhabitants
of East New Guinea as lively as was publicly
announced in the past?

A. Oh, I think that it is very important that
the interest of the Papuans in self-determination
be fully and adequately taken care of, and cared
for. There is no question that this is a matter of
considerable importance in the United Nations,
and I think this is something that the two Govern-
ments will have to take into account in any agree-
ment they might reach on that matter.

Q. Mr. Secretary, if Australia lost her tradi-
tional markets in the United Kingdom and else-
where and were forced into trading with Com-
munist powers such as China, would you regard
this as desirable?

A. Well, I don't believe that that contingency
will arise ; so I don't think I want to address my-
self to that as a hypothetical question. We'll get
to that if we ever get to that.

Q. Mr. Rusk—

A. Yes.

Q. hi view of your attitude on preferences,
doesn't the United States have any constructive
proposals for orderly world marketing of the kind
of Southern Hemisphere temperate foodstuffs
which will be affected? If Britain joins the Com-
mon Market treaty on her own terms, do you have
any proposals which would allow those foodstuffs
a quota into the Common Market as sufficient to
compensate the preferences which we have there
now?

A. Well, we generally have a preference for deal-
ing with these questions on a worldwide basis on
arrangements between the producing and the con-
suming countries, in order to try to stabilize price
and productivity factors. We will be going into
a series of meetings on various basic products m
the course of the coming months and will have
some ideas to put forward. But obviously on a

May 28, 7962

867

matter of this sort it would not be for me to try to
spell those out here.

Q. Do you think Britain will join with the safe-
guards for Australia., offenng any safeguards?
Do you think that Britain xoill he compelled to
join the Common Market, irrespective of giving
guarantees?

A. Oh, I don't think Britain will be compelled
to join anything. Tliis will just be a matter of
perfectly free negotiation in which Britain will
take care of her own interests, as she sees them,
and interests of the various countries with whom
she's in direct relation. There's no compulsion
that I know of in this situation. This is an utterly
fi'ee situation.

Q. Only by events?

A. Beg pardon ?

Q. Ordy hy events?

A. Well, if that is what you have in mind, we
have presented to our Congress the most far-reach-
ing legislation to give us the powers that we will
need to negotiate major changes in the patterns of
U.S. trade. Because we felt that if we did not do
so we would fall drastically behind in a situation
where trade patterns are changing.

If you mean that we are being compelled to move
strongly in this direction by events, yes, we are.
But we are trying to keep abreast of them by
moving along with the events. But I don't know
any other sense in which Britain could be said to
be compelled to do anything.

Communist Economic Difficulties

Q. You said earlier that you thought that the
Communist cj-otod had failed to perform 7niracles
in the economic field. Do you count on this to
temper their policies in the years to come, in the
immediate future ?

A. I think that tliey have had some difficulties
within tlie bloc whicli Iiave liad a bearing on their
policies. But these work in botli directions; for
example, I am inclined to tliink that the failure of
the East German regime to perform satisfactorily
there created pressures upon Moscow and tliat
those in turn made their contribution to the Berlin
crisis. I think that the problems of allocation of
resources as between, say, armaments and agricul-

ture or industry liave caused some rethinking of
some aspects of Soviet policy.

I am not certain of these things, but I would
suspect that these are questions that have entered
into their attitude toward continuing the Berlin
talks, to see if there could be some solution. I
think these economic factors are important, al-
though not necessarily decisive, when you get into
key political and security problems, because they
can always assign priorities as they wish at any
particular moment.

Q. Mr. Secretary?

A. Yes.

Q. Is the United States urging greater military
participation in Southeast Asia on Australia?

A. Well, we will be talking about Southeast
Asia tomorrow and what each of us can do about
it and what our response to the situation there
ought to be. I would not know whetlier I'm —
what I am to urge until we find out what the situa-
tion is, what the plans are, and how we agree we
ought to approach the problem.

Q. Coxdd you tell us what your principal as-
sessment of the situation in Berlin is? Do you
think ifs easing, or do you think ifs worsening?

A. I would have to say that on certain of the
key central issues such as the presence of Western
forces in West Berlin and completely free access
to that city, there has not been any significant
move toward agreement, or toward reducing the
gap between the Soviet proposals on the one side
and the determination of the West to defend their
vital interests.

I liave the impression on the other side that the
talks will continue, that both sides want them to
continue, that there is a certain caution in dealing
with those matters, and that we'll have at some
future time to find out whether some agreement is
possible.

Q. Do you think, sir, that the position is worsen-
ing or improving in South Viet-Nam?

A. Oh, well, I think the situation is improving
in Soutli Viet-Nam. I think the attitude of the
population there has shown more confidence and
more hope in recent months. I believe tlie armed
forces there are acting with much greater effective-
ness against these guerrilla bands. I think there
have been improvements in the general adminis-

868

Department of State Bulletin

tration of the \'arious programs which have been
in effect there. There are still some very difiicult
months ahead. There will be further disappoint-
ments and losses. There will be some casualties
for our people as well as the South Vietnamese,
but I believe that we can look to that situation with
confidence.

Q. Sir, Juuve you talked, or have you given any
assurances that the United States intends to make
a real fghf of South Viet-Nam?

A. The first part of your question again ?

Q. Has Australia sought or have you given
assurances?

A. Oh, those are questions which will be dis-
cussed tomorrow. I don't think that this v.-ill be a
matter in which one or another of us in this meet-
ing will seek or give assurances. We are acting
jointly on these matters, and we will, I'm sure,
act on harmony of policy and action.

Nuclear Testing and Disarmament

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you see any hofe of hu-
manity escaping from the stalemate of nuclear
experiments?

A. For the present we seem to be deadlocked
on the Soviet refusal to accept any international
inspection whatever, in order to get a test ban
treaty, which would permit us to stop tests on both
sides immediately and i^ermanently.

"We have gone very far indeed in the past year,
beginning JIarch a year ago, and continuing our
effort, up to as late as the Geneva conference, to
make adjustments in our proposals to take into
account what we suppose to be the Soviet position
and to ease any fears which they might have on
this business of espionage.

I must say I think we went the last mile. Under
the arrangements which we and Britain pro-
posed,^ for example, international inspection teams
would go and have a look at less than l/2000th of
Soviet tei'ritory in the course of any given year.
Ally inspection teams would travel on Soviet
transportation, would be surrounded by as many
Soviet advisers or observers as they wished to
have. And I just cannot see how these arrange-
ments could possibly involve the slightest element
of espionage.

' Ihiih, June 5, 1961, p. 870.

Another reason for disappointment is that here
was a case where we were offering complete dis-
armament; that is, the Soviets had said that we
will inspect disarmament but not the control of
arms. Now, in this matter of nuclear testing we
were trying to abolish them completely, and it
seemed to us that this was a measure of complete
disarmament which would qualify even under
their own formula. But the answer was no on
that one. Now, if this attitude on inspection is
maintained in the discussion of general disarma-
ment questions, in the conventional field, for ex-
ample, then I think the prospects for disarmament
are rather gloomy at the moment. But we are go-
ing to continue to work at it, because just as the
Soviets during the past year changed their own
mind about these inspection arrangements, which
have been discussed for 3 years in Geneva, we
don't overlook the possibility they might change
their minds again in order to move ahead. Be-
cause we do think it is important to try to get on
with disarmament.

Mr. Roherts: Gentlemen, I think we have time
for one more question.

Q. Which would you classify currently, sir, as
the danger spot in this part of the xoorld?

A. Oh, Viet-Nam. Viet-Nam is very danger-
ous, and Laos could become very dangerous if the
cease-fire is broken. But Viet-Nam is where the
real fever centers at the moment.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the General Parliamentary
Press Gallery would like to thank you very mu^h
for making this opportunity available to us to see
you. We are very grateful to you, sir, for coming
a half-hour out of a very busy day.

A. It's been very good to see you. Thank you
veiy much.

FINAL COMMUNIQUE, MAY 9

The ANZUS Council met on the 8th and 9tli of
May in Canberra. The Eight Honom-able K. J.
Holyoake, Prime Minister and Minister for Ex-
ternal Affairs, represented New Zealand. The
Honourable Dean Eusk, Secretary of State, repre-
sented the United States, and the Honourable Sir
Garfield Barwick, Minister for External Affairs,
represented Australia.

May 28, 7962

869

The ANZUS Council was established imder the
1951 security treaty between Australia, New
Zealand, and the United States. The treaty aims
at strengthening peace particularly in the Pacific
area by mutual action in accordance with the
piinciples of the United Nations Charter. Tlie
ANZUS Council provides a forum in which the
foreign ministers of the three governments can
meet in private consultation from time to time to
promote the objectives of the treaty and
strengthen the association among the three
countries.

The Ministers took advantage of the present
meeting for more than usually extensive discus-
sions on matters of common interest. The Min-
isters expressed their concern at the Soviet refusal
to conclude a meaningfid agreement to end
thermo-nuclear testing. The Ministers of Aus-
tralia and New Zealand recognized that tlie ab-
sence of such an agreement left the United States
with no alternative but to conduct the current
series of tests.

The Coimcil considered developments regard-
ing the broad problems of general disarmament
under discussions at Geneva. The representatives
of Australia and New Zealand noted with ap-
proval the initiative taken by the United States
in its tabling of an "Outline of Basic Provisions
of a Treaty for General and Complete Disarma-
ment in a Peaceful World." ^ The Council ex-
presses its belief tliat this document provides a
new and useful basis for the discussions now in
progress.

Particular attention was directed to problems in
East Asia, Soutli East Asia and other parts of the
Pacific region. The Ministers reaffirmed the de-
sire of their tliree governments to work in concert
with other like-minded countries to promote secu-
rity and stability and a better life for tlie peoples
of the Pacific region. The Ministers noted with
satisfaction tlie determination of the countries of
the area to preserve their independence from inter-
ference from any source. They noted in particular
the resolution with which the Government of the
Republic of Vietnam is defending itself against
Communist infiltration and insurgency fomented,
directed and supported from North Vietnam.
The Ministers expressed their full support of
measures to assist the Government of the Eepublic
of Vietnam in its defence against this tlireat.

' For text, soo ihid.. Mny 7, 1002, p. 747.
870

The three Ministers concurred in the desirability
of the continuing efforts being undertaken toward
the formation of a government of national union
in Laos, as such a government would offer the best
hope of preserving the peace, neutrality, inde-
pendence and unity of Laos. The meeting recog-
nized the effective contribution which the countries
of the region were making both individually and
through defensive alliances or other regional
associations to security, development and stability.
The Ministers reaffirmed the intention of their
governments to continue to cooperate with the
countries of the region both individually and
tlirough the various regional associations in fur-
therance of these objectives. Tlie Ministers noted
in particular the substantial contribution which
SEATO was making in these fields and they re-
affirmed the intentions of their governments to
honour to the full their individual and collective
obligations under the SEATO Treaty.

The meeting recalled that member governments
had in article I of the ANZUS Treaty reaffirmed
their undertaking under the Charter of the United
Nations to settle by peaceful means any interna-
tional dispute in wliich they might be involved and
to refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent
with the purposes of the United Nations. The
Ministers expressed their concern that despite this
solemn obligation accepted by all members of the
United Nations the peace of the area was menaced
by threats of force.

With regard to West New Guinea the Ministers
noted with approval the efforts of the Acting Sec-
retary-General of the United Nations to promote
a settlement by peaceful negotiation. They ap-
pealed to both of the parties to the dispute to give
the Acting Secretary-General their maximum
support and to refrain from the use or threat of
force.

The meeting noted that in the economic field the
developing countries of the area needed many
forms of assistance in their plans to raise their
standards of living and that the fulfilment of these
plans was of the greatest importance in the main-
tenance of their independence and stability. The
ANZUS partners pledged themselves to continue
to assist such countries. They welcomed the assist-
ance being given by other countries such as Japan
and hoped that help would also be provided in-
creasingly by other countries of the free world.

Secretary Rusk expressed his government's

Deparlmenf of Sfafe Bulletin

gratification at the important contributions being
made by Australia and New Zealand toward the
security and economic progress of the nations in
South East Asia.

The Ministers reviewed developments and fu-
ture prospects in the Pacific territories of member
governments in reaffirming the obligations of
mutual assistance undertaken under the treaty by
Australia, New Zealand and the United States.
The Ministers called attention to the fact that
these obligations applied in the event of armed
attack not only on the metropolitan territory of
any of the parties but also on any island territory
under the jurisdiction of any of the three govern-
ments in the Pacific. They confirmed their inten-
tion to continue to move steadily forward with
plans for the economic and social welfare of these
territories and for their progressive development
towards the stage at which their inhabitants
should have the opportunity to clioose for them-
selves their future form of government and their
future international relationships. The Ministers
reaffirmed their support of the objectives of co-
operative associations such as the South Pacific
Commission and tlieir intention to maintain close
and continuing consultations lx)th among them-
selves and with other interested countries.

In respect of the South Pacific area, the Min-
isters agreed that the ANZUS Coimcil meetuig
had proved extremely useful in further strength-
ening the close and friendly working relationships
between the three countries and they agreed to
take advantage of their presence at other interna-
tional conferences to consult in between regular
meetings of the Council.

U.S. DELEGATION

The Department of State announced on April 27
(press release 275) that Secretary Rusk would
serve as U.S. Representative to the Australia, New
Zealand, and United States Treaty Council
(ANZUS) meeting at Canberra, Australia, May
8-9. Other membere of the delegation are:

Advisers

Anthony B. Akers, U.S. Ambassador to New Zealand

James D. Bell, Director, Office of Southwest Pacific Af-
fairs, Department of State

William Belton, Charge d'Affaires ad interim, American
Embassy, Canberra

Walter L. Cutler, Staff Assistant to the Secretary of
State

Adm. Harry D. Felt, Commander in Chief, Pacific, Hono-
lulu

Edward 0. Ingraham, Office of Southwest Pacific Affairs,
Department of State

Ernest K. Lindley, Special Assistant to the Secretary of
State

Paul H. Nitze, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Inter-
national Security Affairs

J. Robert Schaetzel, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for Atlantic Affairs

Edwin W. Martin, Political Adviser, Commander in Chief,
Pacific, Honolulu

Secretary of Delegation

Francis Cunningham, Director, Office of International
Conferences, Department of State

This meeting is being held as a part of the nor-
mal consultative process among the treaty part-
ners, as provided in article VIII of the ANZUS
Treaty. The last meeting was held at Washing-
ton in October 1959.1°

Letters of Credence

Mali

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Re-
public of Mali, Oumar Sow, presented his creden-
tials to President Kennedy on May 11. For texts
of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's
reply, see Department of State press release 307
dated May 11.

Polish Minister of Foreign Trade
Visits United States

Presa release 299 dated May 8

Witold Trampczynski, Minister of Foreign
Trade of Poland, accompanied by Michal Kajzer,
Department Director in the Ministry of Foreign
Trade, will arrive in the United States on May 8
on the invitation of the U.S. Government mider the
leader progi'am of the Bureau of Educational and
Cultural Affairs, Department of State.

Minister Trampczynski will remain in the
United States 10 days, during which time he will
meet with high U.S. officials in Washington. He
will also visit Seattle, San Francisco, New Orleans,
and New York. The Governmental Affaire In-
stitute is assisting in completing arrangements for
Minister Trampczynski's visit.

°nid., Nov. IG, 1959, p. 708.

May 28, 1962

871

The Practice of Foreign Policy

l>y Acting Secretary BaU ^

I realize rather to my amazement that it has
been more than IG months since I deserted the
abmidant life of a pi'ivate lawyer for the hazards
and hardships of the New Frontier. I find it
pleasant this evening to be back in a familiar en-
viromnent, among affluent friends.

My greatest regret when I joined the bureauc-
racy was not that I must put aside the pursuits of
the law and leave my bereft clients m more expert
hands. It was that I could no longer participate
m the exhilarating ritual practiced by all right-
thinking jVrnericans when they mull over the
morning newspaper — the litual of denouncing the
incompetents in the State Department and la-
menting the fact that they have sold us out once
more.

But now that I have forsworn this daily cathar-
sis and have myself become one of the "incompe-
tents" in the State Department, I have begun to
wonder just how this ritual came to be so deeply
entrenched in the folkways of America.

Without attempting a profound analysis to-
night, I suggest that it derives from two sources.
First, it is a holdover from the time when the old
frontier was in fact the new frontier, when we
were a young nation still aware of o>ir colonial
past, resolutely facing westward with our backs
toward Europe, looking across a great unclaimed
land which appeared in more ways than one as our
manifest destiny.

We were preoccupied with the tasks of taming
a continent. Wliile we approached that task with
confidence — while we were sure of ourselves on our
own terrain — we still felt like country cousins m

' Address made before the Northwestern I^aw Alumni
Association at Chicago, III., on May 9 (press release 302;
as-delivered text).

the more sophisticated societj' of Europe. Al-
though we had already produced a galaxy of cx-
traordmary diplomats — beginning with Franklin,
Jefferson, and John Adams — we still had the feel-
ing that an American in Europe was out of his
depth. Mark Twain's Innocents Abroad was
more than a book title; it reflected a national
mood — the fear that America would be victimized
whenever our representatives tried to deal with the
cynical and experienced diplomats of Europe — a
mood tliat vestigially persists even to this day
when we have become the acknowledged leader of
the free world.

Shift in Power Balance

But there is a second reason for our mistrust of
our own diploniacj'' beyond the fear of being a
comitry cousm among city slickers. It is the fact
that we have seen the power balance of the world
shift with such bewildering rapidity in the last
15 years that the only easy explanation is that we
have blundered or been sold out.

This country emerged from the Second World
War in a position of predominant strength hardly
equaled since the days of the Roman Empire. Al-
most every other industrialized nation had been
shattered by enemy attack. Under the stimulus
of wartime needs we had vastly expanded our pro-
ductive plant. Not only was our economic
strength the wonder — and in fact the reliance — of
a large part of the world, but we possessed tlie
monopoly of a weapon of destruction of unparal-
leled effectiveness.

We could envisage a future in which preponder-
ant American strength might provide the guar-
antee for a new era of peace, a golden age in which
the new technology could bo liai-nossed not only to

872

Department of Stale Bulletin

the rebuilding but the reshaping of the workl.
And then, almost overnight, the temperature of
the world dropped. The cold war came to domi-
nate our affairs. The Iron Curtain clanked down
to encircle a billion people. "VVe lost our monop-
oly of the nuclear weapon that had transformed
the concepts of warfare. As a consequence we
Americans, who were just beginning to think of
our country as world leader, suddenly became
aware that for the first time since the British
burned the White House in 1814 Americans were
vulnerable in their own homes to the threat of
possible aggression from abroad. Instead of the
security that our status as world leader had seemed
to promise, we suddenly foimd ourselves exposed
as never before, with the seas that had served as a
giant moat around our house suddenly dried up
by the arrogant presumption of modern rocketry.
To most Americans these abrupt changes in our
relative security defied explanation in ordinary
terms. We went through an agonizing phase of
believing that these changes could have occurred
only because we had somehow been betrayed by
treason in high places. We went through an un-
worthy period of searching for scapegoats, failing
to face the realities, refusing to recognize that
while we might have had a temporary monopoly
of a weapon, we did not have a monopoly of
brains— nor, for that matter, of will and determi-
nation.

Today we have recovered from that season of
shock. We have learned to adjust ourselves to
the fact that other people in the world can also
master the new technology. But we have not
wholly rid ourselves of the belief that our mis-
fortimes, if not due to the treachery of our dip-
lomats, are at least due to their inadequacy.

Complexities of Foreign Policy

This lingering suspicion, it seems to me, is quite
unjustified. Historians, I am confident, will de-
cide that America's postwar conduct in world af-
fairs was marked by a high degree of wisdom and
success. To the extent that this is not generally
recognized, it is, no doubt, partly the fault of the
Department of State itself. We should have been
more forthcoming in our explanations to the
American people. But there are some characteris-
tics of any foreign office which make its activities
difficult to explain.

No responsible officer of the Department of

May 28, 1962

639870—62 3

State can make a public statement about world af-
fairs without being aware that he is speaking to
more than one audience. Wliatever he says to
Americans regarding the thrust and purpose of
any aspect of foreign policy will be meticulously
studied in the chanceries of the world. Under
such circumstances no State Department officer can
say with total candor what he thinks of the poli-
cies of a friendly country or of its leaders without
creating an international incident. In many cases
he cannot disclose all the facts or explain all the
reasons for the actions of the United States Gov-
ernment in its foreign relations without giving
away an essential element of tactic or substance
and thus destroying the effectiveness of what may
be a major diplomatic move.

This enforced reticence is not, of course, the only
reason why the State Department tends to get a
bad press. Another reason is that, unlike other
departments of the Government, we have no con-
stituency with a special interest in our activities.
Unlike tlie Department of Agriculture with farm-
ers, the Department of Commerce with business-
men, the Department of Labor with workers, the
Department of State has no special responsibility
for the interests of any one group. Instead it is
responsible for the totality of American interests
and is equally responsible to all the peoijle.

In many ways the very nature of its activities
tends to make it unpopular. The representatives
of the State Department must resist the demands
of special interests in favor of larger overriding
interests that are not always clearly apparent to
those affected by an individual situation. Some-
times the Department must deal with private par-
ties that have interests conflicting with United
States policies in respect of a foreign nation or
nations. In that case the Department can't win.
It is bound to alienate somebody.

There have been several attempts recently in
magazines and newspaper columns to explain what
is wrong with the State Department. Most of
these explanations seem to me to rest on too simple
an analysis. The allegation is made, for example,
that the Department is so preoccupied with crises
that it is imable to focus on day-to-day problems.
Yet the work of the Department is in many ways
like an iceberg — only a fraction of its activities
are visible to the public eye. The great bulk of
the Department's activities consists in the quiet

873

conduct of the day-to-day business among nations.
By and large much of our effort is spent in trying
to prevent situations from developing to the point
where they reach the public domain. The events
recorded in newspapers reflect situations where
ways and means have not been found through
routine channels of diplomacy to solve conflicts
or controversies that are the elements of good
newspaper copy.

Another reason put forward as to what is wrong
with the State Department is that it is too big.
Yet, while there may be occasional evidences of
overstaffing — as well as understaffing — it is still
the second smallest department in the Federal
Government. Nevertheless it is a big business.
On an average day we send out from Washington
more than 1,500 communications to the 292 posts
around the world for which we are responsible.
During fiscal year 1961 over 1,100 State Depart-
ment officials participated in 381 international
conferences at different points aroxmd the world.

Not only is the State Department a big business,
but it is perhaps the most complex business in
the world. Foreign policy is not a commodity that
can be built to specifications or packaged and mer-
chandised for a mass market. It is a fabric that
serves many purposes, woven in a variety of forms
and colors out of many quite disparate relation-
ships that are changing every day.

An effective foreign policy must take account of
competing domestic interests, the vagaries of pub-
lic opinion, fluctuating economic conditions, food
surpluses and shortages, the rise and fall of local
rulers, religious and ideological conflicts, the
power ambitions of nations, geography, demogra-
phy, and the impact of technological change.

And foreign policy today is given an additional
complexity by the constant need to relate our
strategy to the broad-range implications of the
power struggle between the East and West.

East-West Struggle

No matter how much we might wish that it
were not the case, this struggle conditions much
of what we do. The knowledge that this struggle,
now characterized by the cold war, may flame into
hot wars in remote corners of the globe and that
those hot wars may escalate into thermonuclear
holocausts is a kind of brooding omnipresence over
all of our affairs.

Quite naturally the State Department concen-

trates a great part of its effort on assuring that
such situations do not develop. We seek to do this
in two ways.

First, we strive to increase the strength and co-
hesion of the nations of the free world. We do
this not only to meet the challenge of the East
but because of our desire to promote the well-being
of all peoples.

Second, we attempt to anticipate and, where pos-
sible, prevent the development of situations which
can result in a direct confrontation of the great
powers — a confrontation that can readily lead to
the escalation of force and a major war.

In the short time available tonight I shall not
attempt to describe the means by which we are
attempting to build a strong and cohesive free
world. The more obvious means — those that re-
quire the expenditure of money — you have heard
a great deal about. By substantial programs of
foreign economic assistance we help the less devel-
oped nations of the world to become both econom-
ically and politically independent and thus gain
the strength to resist the pressures toward Commu-
nist alinement.

The strength of the free world cannot, however,
be built merely by the provision of foreign aid.
Such strength depends in a very real sense on the
kind of close working relations that can be devel-
oped between free nations and free men. Among
the most conspicuous qualities of the free world
today is the rapidly growing interdependence of
its component nations.

The center of power for the free world is, quite
obviously, those Atlantic nations of Europe and
North America which account for nearly 90 per-
cent of its industrial production. From the very
beginning we have supported the building of a
united Europe. Today the European Economic
Community is a reality. Within a few months it
may be expanded to include the United Kmgdom.
And as the nations of Europe continue to build
strength and unity they can become, for the first
time, an equal partner with whom we can work
toward those common objectives to which we are
all committed.

We are also forging close relations with the na-
tions of our own hemisphere. We have initiated
the Alliance for Progress, and together with 19
members of the Organization of American States,
we are building a tighter inter-American system.
That system is already a force in hemisphere af-
fairs. We have seen it work effectively in the

874

Department of Stale Bulletin

steps taken to isolate the Castro regime and to
make it a pariah among the free American nations.

We are strengthening our ties in the Pacific —
and particularly with Japan, which has risen spec-
tacularly to become an industrial giant in the years
since the war.

And, of coui-se, our military alliances remain
major sources of strength. Secretary Rusk has
just attended meetings of the Central Treaty Or-
ganization (CENTO) in London, of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Athens,
and today he was in Australia for a ministerial
meeting of the ANZUS, the military alliance of
Australia, New^ Zealand, and the United States."

Berlin

The building of the strength of the free world
in order to deter, and if necessary to resist, aggres-
sion from the Communist bloc is a long-term im-
dertaking. But, while we are striving to increase
our defensive strength, we are seeking at the same
time to avoid the development of situations which
can lead to a confrontation of the great powers
that can escalate into a nuclear war.

There are occasions when the interests of the
free world and the Commimist bloc so clearly con-
flict that a direct challenge cannot be avoided.
Such a case is Berlin. In West Berlin the Allied
powers have vital interests that we will not yield.
As President Kennedy has said : '

"We cannot and will not permit the Communists to drive
us out of Berlin, either gradually or by force. . . . We
must meet our oft-stated pledge to the free peoples of
West Berlin — and maintain our rights and their safety,
even in the face of force — in order to maintain the con-
fidence of other free peoples in our word and our resolve.
The strength of the alliance on which our security de-
pends is dependent in turn on our willingness to meet our
commitments to them.

We have made it crystal clear that, so long as the
Soviet Union insists upon taking actions that may
interfere in any way with the security of our vital
interests in Berlin, they will be on a collision
couree. We have given this point mimistakable
emphasis by increasing the defensive strength of
the West.

But while we have been firm we have not been
inflexible. In a series of conversations conducted
in Washington, Moscow, and Geneva, we have

= See p. 859.

' Bulletin of Aug. 14, 1961, p. 267.

endeavored to probe for those small areas of
agreement that might furnish the basis for a
modus Vivendi.

Tonight the Berlin problem remains unsettled.
Yet the Soviet Union cannot have a scintilla of
doubt about the Western position. We think that
they, m fact, no longer do have any doubt and
that they recognize the potential dangers of the
situation.

Our position was summarized by President Ken-
nedy when he said : *

We are committed to no rigid formula. We see no per-
fect solution. We recognize that troops and tanks can,
for a time, keep a nation divided against Its will, however
unwise that policy may seem to us. But we believe a
peaceful agreement is possible which protects the freedom
of West Berlin and Allied presence and access, while
recognizing the historic and legitimate Interests of others
in assuring European security.

VJet-Nam

The danger of great-power confrontation is not
limited to areas such as Berlin, where the Commu-
nist bloc has directly challenged vital Allied in-
terests. The danger may also arise from local
aggressions aroimd the periphery of the Commu-
nist world. We saw the heartbreaking conse-
quences of such an aggression in Korea. Today, in
Viet-Nam, we are providing training and logisti-
cal support to the South Vietnamese in their
struggle to resist a systematic effort of the Com-
munist regime in northern Viet-Nam to take over
their country by subversion, infiltration, and
terror.

Peacemaking Role

The Commimists do not restrict their ambitions
to nations on the periphery of the bloc ; they fish
in troubled waters wherever they may find them.
As a matter of prudence, therefore, the United
States, as the leader of the Western alliance, must
constantly exercise its influence or good offices to
bring about the peaceful resolution of contro-
versies between other free- world nations that could
provide a basis for Communist meddling.

The pursuit of this objective occupies a great
deal of time of the Department of State. In fact
I sometimes think that we spend almost as much
time trying to settle problems among our friends
as trying to resolve our differences with those
who would destroy us.

* lUd., Oct. 16. 1961, p. 619.

May 28, 1962

875

Little is said publicly about this special Ameri-
can role of peacemaker. It is slow, patient work —
and not spectacular. At any given time there are
perhaps 8 to 10 trouble spots around the world
where the Department of State is concerned with
trying to bring together two friendly nations en-
gaged in a bitter local dispute. Examples re-
cently in the news are the dispute between the
Netherlands and Indonesia over West New
Guinea, the border dispute between Afghanistan
and Pakistan, the perennial running argument
over Kashmir between India and Pakistan, dis-
putes between Korea and Japan, and quarrels be-
tween Israel and the Arab world.

Our role as peacemaker is of vital importance
to the peace of the world. It is not a job that we
have sought ; it is a responsibility thrust on us by
our position of leadership. It is not a task for
which we expect — and we certainly rarely re-
ceive— the gratitude of either side. It is, in fact,
a task that often tries our patience and forbear-
ance more than almost any other.

The U.N. as a Neutral Force

There are, of course, occasions when, in spite of
our efforts, conflicts between our friends cannot be
avoided. In that event a dangerous great-power
confrontation may still be prevented by the in-
jection of some neutral force such as the United
Nations.

This technique has been utilized in Palestine,
Korea, and most recently in the Congo. In the
Gaza Strip today there are over 5,000 troops of
the United Nations keeping the peace between Is-
rael and her Arab neighbors. In the Congo there
are over 16,000 in the local U.N. force.

The U.N. intervened in the Congo at the request
of the Central Government in Leopoldville and
with full United States support. It arrived in the
nick of time. The Soviet Union was already mov-
ing in, and the United States could never have
stood by while the Communists set up shop in the
heart of Africa. Filling a vacuum that would
otherwise have been filled by tlie great powers, the
United Nations has effectively prevented a great-
power confrontation that could well have turned
the Congo into anotlier Korea. Today, by patience
and effort, the U.N. is helping to bring about the
conditions under which an integi-ated Congo Re-
public may, with luck, work its way toward stabil-
ity and peace.

Strength and Unity of Free World

Much of the criticism leveled against the State
Department appears to assume that the free world
is standing still or growing weaker while the Com-
munist world is making solid advances. This, I
suppose, is what is meant by such curious slogans
as a "no win" policy. This is hardly an accurate
picture of recent history. The eventful decade
and a half since the Second World War has not
been a period of disaster for America. Duruig
the whole of this time our country has steadily in-
creased its strength, while the free world has risen
from the ashes to become increasingly vital and
vigorous. Never have the great democratic powers
of the West been more powerful than today — and,
in spite of newspaper headlines, never have they
been more united.

What has most marked this period has been an
unparalleled sense of movement and transforma-
tion. To an extent unprecedented in history vast
changes have been compressed into an extraordi-
narily short timespan. What have been the major
developments of this turbulent period ? The im-
position of the Iron Curtain and the technological
progress of the Soviet Union are only part of the
story. In the free world, in which the other two-
thirds of the people live, events have occurred of
great meaning and promise. The major colonial
systems have largely disappeared, to be replaced
by a whole geography book of new states— 42 since
the end of the Second World War. The European
powers, no longer occupied with colonial adminis-
tration, have turned their energies to the great
enterprise of uniting Europe. Today they are
stronger and richer than ever — and with the bright
prospect of ever-increasing strength as the struc-
ture of the new Europe is perfected.

The Business of Diplomacy

The object of sound foreign policy in a world
of change is not to halt the vast historical forces
that are shaping the future as some of the extreme
conservatives would have us do. King Canute
after all demonstrated more energy than states-
manship when he tried to sweep back the ocean
with a broom. The sensible objective for foreign
policy is to seek to channel and direct those vast
historic forces toward constructive ends. This,
T think, we in America have done with success.
We have not sought to stop the drive of colonial
peoples toward independence and self-respect; we

876

Deparfmenf of State Bulletin

liave rather tried to lielp them move toward a
constructive end — the creation of truly inde-
pendent states. From the very beginning of the
movement toward a united Europe we have given
it our firm support. Today, as we see tlie emerg-
ing reality of a Europe that can speak with one
voice on an ever-broadenmg range of issues, we
can look forward hopefully to a partnership of
equals that can share the great common tasks of
free men in the mid-20th century.

"We arc already performing many of those tasks
together. Together, for example, we have mounted
a common defense through the NATO alliance.
]\Iore recently, through the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (the OECD)
and its auxiliaiy committees, we are beginning to
mount a coordinated assault on the grinding pov-
erty that haunts much of the earth's population,
newly possessed of the possibility of freedom and
the hope of a decent standard of living.

As the end result of all these efforts — the build-
ing of a united Europe, the beginning institutions
of an Atlantic partnership, and the joint responsi-
bility of that partnership for the strengthening
of the less developed countries — we have a basis
tonight for cautious optimism. If we can work
with sufficient patience and good sense and if we
are mature enough to recognize that the great
convulsive forces of the world today are something
more complicated than a child's game which one
wins or loses, we have, I think, a brighter chance
than at any time since the war to achieve the con-
ditions of a secure peace.

For while the free world is changing there are
also signs of change and movement within the
Communist bloc — changes that are resulting in
part, no doubt, from the free world's success in
building its own economic strength. Perhaps it
is not too much to hope that the very technology
that threatens the whole Xorthern Hemisphere
vrith the danger of incineration may in the long
run prove a key to peace. This paradox is not
as bizarre as it sounds. The vaulting pace of that
technology is imposing obsolescence at an acceler-
ating rate on existing systems of armament, while
the fantastic increase in the cost of each new gen-
eration of weapons is consuming an ever-greedier
share of the economic resources of the Sino-Soviet
bloc. Is it not likely, therefore, that at some point
the Communist power will be forced to make the
hard choice between insistent demands for a better
standard of living and the spiraling costs of a

continuing arms race ? And is it not possible that
at such a time this conllict of pressures may be
resolved in such a manner as to make possible new
progress toward stability and even disarmament ?

If we Americans, therefore, have the forbear-
ance and the maturity, the will and the courage,
to refuse to be deflected from our principal ob-
jective of building a strong free world, we not only
can survive but we can look forward to a future far
brighter than any we have been entitled to expect
before. The next few years, of course, will be full
of hazards. We shall need strong nerves, stout
hearts, and a hospitable attitude toward new ideas
if we are to adjust to the shape and form of a
world that is changing more rapidly than any of
us realize.

In determining the shape and form of that
world, diplomacy — which is another way of saying
the practice of foreign policy — will have a sig-
nificant role to play. For that world will be no
stronger than the relations that bmd nations and
peoples together. It is the prime business of the
State Department — of those gifted "incompe-
tents" whom you celebrate every morning at
breakfast — to make sure that those relations are
in good order, that America knows her role of
leadership and plays it well, and that we employ
not only our material resources but our vested
capital of respect and good will in the patient pur-
suit of free-world strength and unity that are the
essential elements of a lasting peace.

President Kennedy and Norwegian
Prime Minister Hold TaBks

Einar Gerhardsen, Prhne Minister of Norway,
and Mrs. Gerhardsen visited the United States
May 8-18 as the guests of President and Mrs.
Kennedy. Folloxoing is the text of a joint comm,u-
nique issued by President Kennedy and Prime
Minister Gerhardsen on May 11 at the end of their
talks held May 9-11.

White House press release dated May 11

The Prime Minister of Norway and Mi's. Einar
Gerhardsen are in the United States as the guests
of President and Mrs. Kennedy. Following their
visit in Washington, they will continue on to Flor-
ida and New York. The President and the Prime
Minister met twice for substantive discussions dur-
ing the visit and exchanged views on current inter-

Ala/ 28, 7962

877

national developments. The Norwegian visitors
were entertained at a White House luncheon on
May 9, and on IVIay 10 they gave a I'eception at
Blair House in honor of President and Mrs.
Kennedy.

President Kennedy paid tribute to the many
common ties and democratic ideals Norway and
the United States sliare. He referred to Norway's
vital role in Northern Europe, expressing appreci-
ation for Norwegian contributions to the Atlantic
Commmiity in general. Noting Norway's recent
decision to apply for negotiations with a view to
full membersliip in the Common Market, the Presi-
dent stated his belief that a small but dynamic
nation can i^lay an important role in the European
integration movement. He recalled that Norway
has received international recognition for its solid
work in the United Nations.

Prime Minister Gerhardsen expressed his ap-
preciation for the bonds of friendship and alliance
which have long characterized relations between
Norway and the United States. He asserted that
Norwegian foreign policy stresses strong support
of the United Nations, membership in NATO, and
Nordic cooperation.

The President and the Prime Minister agreed
it was essential for both coimtries to back the
United Nations as firmly as ever, and reaffirmed
their determination to give unstinting support to
the NATO Alliance. It is imperative, they recog-
nized, for the West to maintain a position of
strength and to stand fast in face of outside prov-
ocations or pressures. This is a prerequisite for
a peaceful solution of conflicts through negotia-
tions. They also reviewed the dynamic political
and economic developments in Europe and the
problems which arise for other countries in their
relationship with the Common Market. The
President and the Prime Minister emphasized the
importance of extending aid to the developing
nations, and discussed American, and growing
Norwegian and joint Scandinavian efforts in this
field. There was a valuable exchange of views
of shipping matters affecting both countries. The
principals agreed that current exchanges of stu-
dents, teachers, leaders in various fields, and cul-
tural, sport and artistic presentations should be
fostered.

President Kennedy and Prime Minister Ger-
hardsen expre.ssed their fervent hopes that peace

and justice would prevail in the world. To this
end they felt that all nations, large and small, and
all responsible individuals, national leaders and
ordinary citizens, should work together.

President Greets Brazil War Veterans
on Anniversary of VE-Day

FoUoioing is the text of a jnessage from Presi-
dent Kennedy to officials of Associa^ao dos Ex-
Conibatentes do Brasil on the occasion of the
anniversary of VE-Day.

White House press release dated May 8

May 7, 1962

Twenty years ago Brazil and the United States
took up arms together to fight a common enemy
of democracy. Our great wartime leaders,
Franklin Eoosevelt and Getulio Vargas, also laid
the foundations for Brazilian-American coopera-
tion in the economic and technical fields. This
May 8th anniversary, commemorating our final
victory in Europe in 1945, finds us engaged in
another kind of war on many different battle
fronts. Today the common enemy is poverty, mal-
nutrition, disease, and illiteracy. Under the Alli-
ance for Progress we propose to attack these
problems and to move forward to final victory,
just as we did together in the war j^ears, united
by Man's highest aspirations for peace and pros-
perity with freedom.

Our common history, experience, and ideals
unite us. The names of Mascarenhas de Morais
and Mark Clark, Zenobio da Costa and Willis
Crittenberger immortalize our wartime coopera-
tion and the democratic principles that moved us
on to triumph in World War II. I^et us rededi-
cate ourselves on this V-E Day anniversary to the
ideals of Brazilian- American solidarity and
friendship. May I take this occasion to salute
the gallant Associagao dos Ex-Combatentes do
Brasil, and pay tribute to the brave servicemen of
the F.E.B. and tlie armed forces of Brazil, who
gave their lives to the cause of freedom. All
honor to you who proudly proclaim the slogan "A
Cobra esta Fumando".

John F. Kennedy

878

Department of Slafe Bulletin

The Impact of the Emergence of Africa on American Foreign Policy

hy J. Wayne Fredericks

Acting Assistant Secretary for African Affairs ^

It is a great pleasure for me to be able to take
part in the annual forum dinner of this Y.M.C.A.
It is also a welcome opportmiity to speak about
the efforts of your Department of State to estab-
lish and maintain friendly and constructive rela-
tions between our nation and the new nations of
the continent of Africa.

I would like to talk this evening about the im-
pact of Africa on the foreign policy of the United
States. Perhaps it would be useful, first of all,
to think of the approach of the United States
Government to the world community as compa-
rable to the approach of the Y.M.C.A. to its com-
munity. I am thinking particularly of the initia-
tive which the "Y" has assumed, first in identify-
ing the urgent needs of changing urban commiuii-
ties and second in mobilizing the resources of the
community to meet these needs. The Y.M.C.A.
has recognized that drifting individuals can be a
burden on the whole community and that by
strengthening individuals the whole conununity
can be strengthened ; the United States has recog-
nized also that drifting nations can threaten the
stability of the whole community of nations and
that by strengthening the independence of these
nations the whole community is strengthened.

Like a vigorous Y.M.C.A. a vigorous America
has special responsibilities in the changing world
community. I am thinking especially of the role
of the United States in a world where the tradi-
tional colonial systems of European powers, which
are at the same time our firm allies in the struggle

' Address made before the Young Men's Christian
Association of the Oranges and Maplewood at Orange,
N.J., on May 4 (press release 291).

against Russian imperialism, are being rapidly
eliminated. Colonialism is ending under the im-
pact of the principle of self-determination of
which our Declaration of Independence is one ex-
pression. Through application of this principle,
more than 1 billion people have joined the ranks
of the free in Asia and Africa in the few years
since the end of World War II.

In these same years our understanding of
Africa's peoples has grown strikingly also. At the
end of World War II Africa remained for the most
part a continent whose affairs were managed from
European capitals. Americans who went there
were either missionaries or big-game hunters
whose reports of conditions there were received
by most as awesome and mysterious tales of high
adventure. Tliis was certainly the view of many
of us who were thrown, clothed in full battle gear,
onto the shores of North Africa during the war.
Even when directly exposed to these areas, too
often our reactions were unceremoniously to pre-
scribe improvements intended to remake the lives
of the unfortunate inhabitants along familiar
American lines. To see these peoples as indi-
viduals with cultures of significance and to recog-
nize their aspirations — so like our own in the days
of our own struggle for independence — has been a
postwar development. It represents a new Amer-
ican point of view on Africa.

The period since the war has been one of unin-
terrupted political change characterized princi-
pally by the trials of independence of half the
globe. But the changes of this period have not
been only political. These new nations are today
in a very real sense our next-door neighbors. The
revolutions in transportation and communications

May 28, 7962

879

and science have drawn the nations of this world
together. Today we tend to accept as self-evident
the truth that a threat to peace anywhere on the
globe is a threat to our own peace.

In this rapidly evolving scene the American
people grasp these new relationships, and our for-
eign policy, as it is being developed to meet the
new demands of a new era, reflects American
understanding of a world vastly different from
prewar days. The objectives of our foreigii policy
are, first, to maintain the security of the United
States in order that its people may develop and
prosper under its democratic institutions in peace
and freedom and, second, to work for the develop-
ment of an international community conducive to
the maintenance of world order and hospitable
to the institutions of freedom.

Now, in order to assess the impact of Africa on
our foreign policy, it is necessary to understand
first of all what Africa is and then what Africa
seeks — in what direction her energies work.

To state what Africa is, it is necessary to state
that that vast continent contains many Africas.
It is a continent with wide variations in climate,
geography, culture, language, and economic life.
To grasp its size, consider that it is tliree times
the size of the 50 United States and that the
distance across its widest portion is about twice
the distance from Orange to San Francisco.

Africa includes arid desert, humid tropical for-
ests, and temperate plateau regions. With about
230 million people, it is not densely populated.
Asia, Europe, and North America all have lai-ger
total populations. Furthermore, the national pop-
ulations of Africa's countries vary widely — from
almost 40 million in Nigeria (o only i/i> million in
Gabon. Its peoples include those of Arab-Berber
stock who inhabit the North African coastal area
and Negroid and Nilotic peoples of Africa south
of the Sahara, as well as peoples of European an-
cestry wlio m;dve their homes in significant num-
bers in the nations bordering the Mediterranean
and in the temperate eastern and southern plateaus.
The diversity represented by use of almost 1,000
different languages and dialects, which hinder
free communication among the tribes of the newly
emerged nations, is not completely offset by the
use of European languages, primarily English and
French, because of the low level of education.

Tlio economic ba.'^es of these varied African
lands are primarily mining and agriculture. Sig-

880

nificant industrial development is so far limited
to South Africa. In minerals Africa supplies
most of the world's diamonds and large amounts
of gold, copper, cobalt, uranium, and manganese,
to name a few. Africa also exports major quanti-
ties of sucli agricultural commodities as peanuts,
cocoa, coffee, wine, palm products, and sisal.

What Africa Seeks

With all this diversity, with all the difficulty of
communication, what is it that binds these peoples
together in order that one may reasonably speak
of an African impact on American foreign policj' ?
It is Africa's aspirations wliich give a focus to
her energies and provide an impact on the world
as a whole and on United States foreign policy.

First and foremost, the peoples of Africa seek
political independence. This desire grows out of
the realization that the individual in Africa has
a natural right to the same liberty as the individ-
ual citizen of the Western World.

The African seeks also the economic and social
progress which he sees the industrial societies have
achieved. Africa's leaders are spurred by the
rising demands of tlieir peoples for more and
better education and a higher standard of living.
Unfortunately the history of colonialism causes
the African to associate what we call capitalism
with the colonial policies more characteristic of
the 19th century. But the African's desire for
independence means that he is not an easy jirey
for Communist domination, though some African
nations in their desire for progress accept eco-
nomic and technical help from the Communist
nations.

In furtherance of their aspirations, African
leaders are seeking greater solidarity and economic
cooperation in the foi-m of associations of states.*
Some of these are subregional in scope, with others
intended to embrace the whole continent. Several
of the new nations are too small or too little de-
veloped to support themselves, and economic as-
sociations with their neighbors are the practical
solution. At present these groups provide a forum
to improve mutual undei'standing, to air differ-
ences, and to avoid conflicts. Although it is still
too soon to predict their success, they hold great
prospect for the development of much-needed eco-
nomic cooperation and for tlie creation of a sys-

' For biickground, see Bi'li.etin of May 21, 1962, p. 841.
Department of State Bulletin

tem of intra-African relations leadinj^ to the
achievement of African aspirations in an atmos-
pliere free of international tnrmoil and rivalry.

At present there are four major African re-
gional groupings: (1) the African and Malagasy
Union of 11 French-speaking West African states
plus Madagascar, (2) the Casablanca group —
Morocco, Guinea, Ghana, Mali, and the United
Arab Republic (the Provisional Algerian Govern-
ment has met with this group), (3) the East Afri-
can Common Services Organization, which serves
Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika and may even-
tually incorporate neighboring states, and finally
(4) a group of 20 nations which earlier this year
at Lagos, Nigeria, adopted a draft charter for an
intra-African organization somewhat along the
lines of the Organization of American States.

All these developments which reinforce Africa's
independence drive rest on the fundamental hu-
man hopes for dignity and equality — hopes which
have been clearly stated by tlieir leadere. The
Africans want to manage their own affairs, to
make their own decisions, and to improve the
standard of living of their peoples. Awareness
of the technological achievements of the modem
M-orld intensifies the African's desire to apply these
benefits to his own society.

These goals of the new African nations are en-
tirely reasonable. They are the goals which were
set for our own young nation, and they are the
goals we set today for the community of free
nations.

The United States has sought to make clear to
African leaders the sympathy of this nation for
Africa's goals. And our support has been of im-
portance to them and to our NATO allies, which
have for the most part applied the principle of
self-determination in their African territories
since World War II. Their efforts have met with
difllculties and have been marked by varying rates
of success. Their success to date is measured by
the impressive transfer of power to 2,5 African
nations since 1951. And all of these save the
former Belgian Congo have attained independence
with little or no bloodshed and in reasonable
stability.

Problems of Still-Dependent Territories

But progress still to be made is measured by
Africans in terms of the territories still under
colonial rule or other form of dependency. Dif-

ficulties lie ahead, particularly in areas where
white populations of foreign origin have settled
most thickly and invested most heavily. It is in
these areas that government by the white majority
has been the rule. Nevertheless it is in these areas
that certain leaders of the European and African
communities are working to establish new politi-
cal formulas which will assure fair representation
to the overwhelming African majority and which
will yet protect in a fair manner the European
and Asian minorities which seek to make their
homes in Africa. Welcome progress has recently
been made in Algeria with the achievement of a
cease-fire by President de Gaulle after more than
7 years of fighting. The French and the Algerians
today are cooperating in the preparation of an
Algerian vote on the country's political future.
They are working together to end the desperate
and wanton killing by members of the Secret
Army Organization, whose extremist members
seek to avoid the inevitable and whose actions the
American people and Government deplore.

In East Africa the British Government, with
the foresight gained through years of preparing
dependent territories for self-government and
independence, is working out with the colonial
and protectorate governments and the African
political leaders the democratic constitutions
imder which independence can be achieved by
Uganda, Kenya, and Zanzibar. Negotiations for
the political evolution of the Federation of
Rhodesia and Nyasaland and its component terri-
tories are also being pressed. Last week the first
national election was held in Uganda and a new
African government formed as the outgrowth of
constitutional talks held in London last year.
Uganda is scheduled to become independent on
October 9 this year. Talks on Kenya's constitu-
tion were held in London last month and produced
an interim coalition government of the two major
African political parties. Constitutional pro-
posals are to be worked out in detail in the coming
months. Finally, the constitutional talks on the
future of the fabled island of Zanzibar, which also
took place in London last month, did not reach
any constitutional agreements and have adjourned.

In the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland,
responsible self-government has already been
established in Nyasaland. Elections have been
scheduled for October 1962 in Northern and
Southern Rhodesia to elect legislatures under new

May 28, J962

S81

constitutions, each showing an advance in political
rights for the underrepresented black populations.
The Constitution of tlie Federation as a whole has
also been the object of recent study, which may be
taken up again in the light of progress in the
three territories, and of pressure from African
leadership for the end of this political stiiicture
which they claim has slowed the enfranchisement
of the blacks.

Political change is less evident in the African
territories of Portugal, whose African province
Angola was rocked by violent rebellion in Feb-
ruai-y 1961. The matter was brought before the
United Nations, which took the view that Portugal
has not accorded the inhabitants of Angola ade-
qviate opportunities for social, economic, and
political advancement. The resolution,^ which
the United States supported, called for appro-
priate reforms, established a U.N. committee of
inquiry, and asked Portugal to acknowledge the
principle of self-determination for Angola.

The United States has long enjoyed friendly
relations with Portugal, and our votes in the
United Nations on Angola should not be regarded
as hostile to Portuguese interests. If we have not
agreed with Portugal on certain issues, this does
not mean that we intend to destroy in any way
the spirit of constructive friendship. We have
sought to clarify our views with the Portuguese
Government and to define the issues which we be-
lieve are bound up in this question.

At the end of August 1961 the Portuguese
Government announced a series of reforms affect-
ing its African territories. The reforms provided
for a system of self-government at the village and
town level and the elimination of a separate status
for "unassimilated" natives. There have been
indications that additional reforms are in prog-
ress, particularly in the important fields of educa-
tion and labor. Following a survey and report
by the International Labor Organization on labor
conditions in the Portuguese overseas territories,
the Portuguese Government annoimced a new and
progressive labor code which could go far toward
removing an important cause of unrest.

Political progress is also less evident in the
Republic of South Africa, wliere the policy of
apartheid is still enforced. We understand the
difficulties of working out harmonious relations
between races because we ourselves have long

°U.N. doc A/KES/lOO,'} (XV).
882

sought to achieve this goal. Wliile we have not
achieved full success, we have made dramatic
progress and have supported the overwhelming
view of the United Nations membership, which
seeks an end to segregation and discrimination as
a policy of government. As Britain's Prime
Minister Macmillan remarked in a speech given in
South Africa, "The wind of change is blowing
through [Africa], and whether we like it or not,
this growth of national consciousness is a political
fact. We must all accept it as a fact, and our
national policies must take account of it."

Economic and Technical Assistance

Clearly Africa's revolution has challenged the
United States to live up to its own ideals of polit-
ical liberty. But it has also challenged us to play
a constructive role in the transition to independ-
ence.

Africa's urgent need for economic and social
development has also had an impact on the for-
eign policy of the United States. It has chal-
lenged us, as it has challenged all the developed
nations, to strengthen the independence of these
new nations through economic and technical as-
sistance. If we were to neglect this challenge and
fail to strengthen the institutions of these nations,
their leaders would be dangerously dependent on
help from nations which offer regimented means
of attaining national development. This urgent
need, together with that of Asia and Latin Amer-
ica, has hastened the reorganization of American
aid machinery. President Kennedy has estab-
lished the Agency for International Development
with a new and sound approach to national eco-
nomic development.

Tlie establishment of the Peace Corps by Presi-
dent Kennedy has offered a reservoir of technical
skills on which they may draw in the difficult
period innnediately ahead before Africans are
trained in numbers sufficient to carry on alone.
Here, as in our other aid programs, the United
States has sought to support not only the vital
initial development of Africa's power, communi-
cations, and material resources but the human re-
sources also. Of importance have been our con-
tributions to the development of all phases of
education witli particular emphasis on the second-
ary school systems. The need is not only to edu-
cate larger numbers eligible for college but to
train the still greater numbers urgently required

Department of State Bulletin

in the trades and semiprofessional skills which
are the foundation of modern economies.

There is strong evidence that fniitful coopera-
tion and a continuing partnership between most
of the new African governments and the former
colonial powers will be an important factor in
Africa's future. At the present time, in fact,
European countries are well ahead of the United
States in providing economic and technical as-
sistance to African nations, possibly amomiting to
well over a billion dollars yearly.

During the next fiscal year the United States
proposes to make substantial increases in its eco-
nomic aid to Africa, but it will still fall below
the level of that provided by Europe. In our pres-
entation to the Congress, we are proposing that
between $350 and $430 million be made available
in economic aid to Africa in fiscal year 1963, de-
pending on the projects that are worked out and
on its ability to use aid effectiveh'. This compares
with approximately $250 million for the current
fiscal j'ear and an actual $204 million in fiscal year
1961, exclusive of substantial amounts of surplus
agricultural commodities and development loans
from the Export-Import Bank.

Of no less impact on United States foreign
policy has been the special emphasis Africans give
their participation in the United Nations. The
African sees the United Nations as a vitally nec-
essary international forum and considers member-
ship an element of national sovereignty. He con-
siders it such because of the equal opportunity it
affords each member to state his case before a
world audience. He sees it as an instrument for
mobilizing world opinion and for settling differ-
ences. Furthermore, the United Nations stands
between small nations and big-power rivalries. In
seeking to avoid cold- war entanglements, the Afri-
can looks to the U.N. as a source of economic
assistance.

Perhaps the most important product of African
membership in the United Nations is the added
strength it gives the forces which seek a demo-
cratic world organization. In this the African
nations are firmly alined with the United States.
Except for this issue, the Africans cannot be rea-
sonably accused of voting as a bloc. Certainly
there is no truth to the allegation that the 50 plus
African and Asian members vote irresponsibly
with the Soviets and against the United States.
In the recent General Assembly, for example, this
group voted against irresponsible and extreme

May 28, 7962

Soviet proposals on colonialism and the Congo.
The African and Asian vote, in other words, re-
jected measures put forward by the Soviets which
were intended to appeal to Africans and Asians.
The overall impact of African U.N. policy, then,
has been to reinforce a basic United States foreign
policy objective of a responsible world organiza-
tion.

Finally I would like to mention one impact of
the emergence of Africa which has special sig-
nificance for our nation. I refer to its impact on
racial prejudice in our own society. The rise of
Negro nations under able leadei-s to places of
equality on the world political scene reminds us
that we have not yet succeeded in according this
equality to Americans of African descent. It
gives impetus to the current initiative of the new
generation of American Negroes in asserting their
individual rights. Unfortunately the question of
segregation in the United States has a significant
effect on the thinking of the colored peoples of
half the globe. Racial discrimination frequently
inflicts a most regrettable, durable, and personal
affront to visitors from abroad which may be car-
ried over into the realm of foreign relations.

To my mind the emergence of Africa is to be
welcomed as a challenge to move our nation more
speedily toward the practice of "liberty and jus-
tice for all." It is to be welcomed also for its
impact on our foreign policy. For Africa's emer-
gence has challenged us to live up to our own de-
clared ideals, both at home and abroad. I believe
that we are responding with new energy and in-
genuity to this challenge. We are applying our
imique wealth and talent to assist Africa's peoples
to move with as toward these same ideals.

President Finds Import Quota on Tung
Oil and Nuts No Longer Needed

White House press release dated May 1

The President on May 1 acted on the Tariff
Commission's report to determine whether the
circumstances requiring the imposition of import
quotas on tung oil and tung nuts still exist.^ The
President did not concur in the Commission's find-
ing that the removal of the quota would result
in the importation of tung oil under such condi-
tions and in such quantities as to interfere ma-

' For text of Proclamation 3471, see 27 Fed. Reg. 4271.

883

terially with the price-support program of the
Department of Agriculture with respect to tung
nuts. Tlie Commission had reported to the Presi-
dent on December 4, 1961, concerning its investi-
gation pursuant to section 22(d) of the Agricul-
tural Adjustment Act, as amended. The
President's decision reflects the changed condi-
tions in the tung oil market wliich liave developed
in recent months.

Conditions of short supply of tung oil have de-
veloped in both the United States and foreign
markets whicli have caused prices of domestic tung
oil to rise above the support price during recent
months. The domestic carryover stocks of tung
oil are at the lowest level since 1946, the Com-
modity Credit Corporation now has no surplus
stocks on hand, and during February a severe
freeze throughout our tung-growing areas severely
damaged tlie current crop. The foreign supply
has been reduced by frost damage in Argentina,
and at the same time the demand for tung oil in
Western Europe is at a high level. Since U.S.
prices have been above the support price since
January, the Commodity Credit Corporation is
not expected to acquire any oil as a result of price-
support operations. Under these conditions the
President found that the import quota was no
longer needed.

Are Imports Necessary?

iy PhUij) H. Trezise ^

It is appropriate in this port city, at a time
when Seattle is liolding a magnificent interna-
tional exposition in which 27 countries are partici-
pating, to discuss our country's foreign trade. For
this occasion I would propose to center my re-
marks on one phase of the subject, namely, im-
ports. This is perhaps the more controvei"sial side
of the foreign trade coin, which is the more rea-
son for considering it.

Exports vs. Imports

The Trade Expansion Act of 1962,^ which is
now proceeding through the Congress, is one of
the most important of the foreign policy measures
to be considered this year. Tlie act, in essence,
■would give the President authority to bargain with
other countries for mutual reduction in tariffs.
It is intended to bring about an increase m. the

volume of free-world commerce.

We can expect that in this process our com-
modity exports will grow faster than our imports.
It is important that this should happen, for as a
country we depend on a surplus of earnings from
exports of goods to help pay for expenditures we
must make abroad. We have had over a vrhole
decade a rather persistent deficit in our total bal-
ance of payments and associated with it a sub-
stantial outflow of gold. This must be corrected.
One of the chief means to correct it is to develop
a larger export surplus.

There are strong reasons for being confident
that an expansion of world trade will in fact en-
large our surplus of exports over imports. Year
in and year out, for the whole postwar period, we
have run a substantial export margin in our mer-
chandise trade. Our exports during the 1950's
grew faster than imports and faster than our na-
tional economy as a whole. Wlicn the European
nations in 1958 removed many of their special
restrictions on trade, our exports responded very
promptly and veiy sharply to the expanded mar-
ket opportunities that were thus made available.
The record does not suggest that we have lost our
competitive power. On the contrary, we seem still
to be capable of selling in foreign markets, wher-
ever they are open to us, our farm products, our
raw materials and semiprocessed goods, and our
manufactures.

Nevertheless we should understand clearly that
the Ti'ade Expansion Act, like the trade agree-
ments legislation that preceded it, is an authoriza-
tion to enter into mutual bargaining on tariffs.
We expect to negotiate other covuitries' tariff levels
down by offering reductions in our own duties. In
seeking markets for our exports, we must open our
market more widely for imports. An increase in
imports is an integral and inescapable part of the
process of expanding Avorld trade.

Now it is probably fair to say tiiat throughout
the whole trading world exports are considered
normally to be good and desirable and contrilni-
tory to national well-being. Imports, on the other
hand, are generally looked at with some distaste.
If they are not considered to be positively bad,

' Address iiKuie before the Seattle CoimiiitttH' on ForeJgll|
Relations at Seiittle. AVash., ou May 7 (press release 295).
Mr. Trezise is Doputy Assistant Secretary for Kconomic|
Affairs.

" For text of President Kennedy's trade message to Con-
gress, see Bulletin of Feb. 12, 1",K;2, p. 231.

884

Department of State Bulletin

then they are viewed as a kind of necessary evil
which must be accepted in the same way as we
accept other unavoidable but unpleasant events.
These attitudes are not confined to Americans.
They exist in all countries.

There is another way of loolving at the matter,
of course. Exports can be thought of as not good
in themselves but as a means to enable us to buy
things from abroad that we need or that we wish
to have. In this sense exports are the sacrifices we
make in order to get things we could not other-
wise have. The end objective of trade is to import
commodities that make our economy work better,
that contribute to a riclior life for our people, and
that help to assure our national security. Let us
see how this proposition apjilies to the United
States.

Imports in Our Everyday Life

Imports play a far more pen^asive part in our
daily lives than we usually realize.

In the course of the day 1 of eveiy 13 Americans
in private employment will be engaged in an oc-
cupation directly dependent upon foreign trade,
that is, on exports and imports. One of 53 will be
engaged in transporting, or handling, or first-stage
processing of imports.

Nearly every adult American begins his day
with a breakfast drink— coffee, tea, or cocoa —
based on a commodity that we do not produce at
all. Coffee itself is our largest single import. We
spend on it a billion dollars a year or so. It is not
an item we can produce, except perhaps under hot-
house conditions and at unacceptable cost.

The American breakfast probably will be pre-
pared in utensils made of aluminimi or steel. The
raw material for aluminum production, bauxite
ore, comes in overwhelming measure from imports.
Our steel industry buys nearly all of its manganese
abroad. With the diminution of our hi^h-erade
iron ore reserves, our steel mills use more and more
iron ore from Labrador, Venezuela, Peru, Chile,
Brazil, and elsewhere. In 1960, 32 percent of our
iron ore consumption consisted of imports.

The odds are roughly 7 to 3 that the newspaper
that the American citizen reads at breakfast will
be made of imported newsprint. In 1961 we spent
almost $700 million for tliis single commodity.
Consider how this imported commodity helps to
make us among the most widely read and best in-
formed peoples in the world. It is a nice question
as to whether our continental democracy could

have functioned in this complex and dangerous
century if we had not been able to provide the
news cheaply and quickly and fully to our people.

If our typical American smokes a cigarette with
his breakfast coffee, its flavor will be a blending of
American and imported tobaccos. Tobacco is one
of our major export commodities, but we also im-
port $80 to $90 million of Greek and Turkish to-
bacco for its special characteristics. Our cigarettes
of course do not need to be blended with foreign
tobaccos. We could adjust to an unblended cig-
arette, which I imderstand woidd have much the
taste of the British product. Wliether our smokers
would approve is another matter.

There is a considerable likelihood that our
Americans will hear tlie late news on a transistor
radio tliat may have been imported from Japan
or that the chinaware on his breakfast table will
have come from Japan or Western Europe. He
need not be dependent on imports for these evciy-
day consumer items. But the availability of for-
eign goods widens his range of choice and, in many
cases, stretches his income over a wider number
of purchases.

He will doubtless drive to work in an automobile
which will incorporate such imported raw ma-
terials as manganese, bauxite, chromium, natural
rubber, and many others. The clock in his auto-
mobile or the watch on his wrist may be imports
or have imported parts.

Most Americans' meals are flavored with spices
from abroad. We get all of our black pepper,
all of our cloves, and all of our vanilla beans by
way of hnports. We buy hundreds of other food
items in world markets. These range from ba-
nanas to mustard seed, from sugar to saffron. Our
purchases of foods from abroad, inclusive of coffee,
come to more than $3 billion per year. We no
doubt could exist without these items. But our
diets would be less interesting, our dinner tables
more austere, and our grocery bills more burden-
some.

All of the copra and coconut oil that go into
our soaps comes as imports. Our houses have win-
dow or door frames of aluminum, or tiles of im-
ported ceramics. More than 25 percent of our
apparel wool is imported and all of our carpet
wool. We have linen and silk fabrics only be-
cause of imports. If we buy clothing or toys or
handicrafts, the variety of choice available to us
will be in part the I'esult of our import trade.

Many Americans find intellectual sustenance in

Moy 28, 7962

885

foreign books and periodicals. They take pleasure
in imported music and works of art. Whisky from
Scotland, wines and perfumes from the Continent,
fine cutlery from Scandinavia make their con-
tribution to the pattern of goods available to the
American consumer.

The items I have mentioned are not on the whole
matters of bedrock necessity. Our national life
could go on without them. Our people would be
clothed, fed, and housed without them. But to
remove these things from our consumption pat-
tern would be to take many of the elements that
make our standard of living the highest in his-
tory. We would be poorer in a material sense,
and we would also lose some of the variety that
lends zest to modern life. Moreover, we would
have given up a part of our freedom. The Amer-
ican consumer would have to deal with a market
artificially restricted and limited, lacking many of
the things he ordinarily would expect to choose
among.

Imports and Basic Economic Activity

If we turn aside from the ultimate consumer
and consider the operation of our basic industrial
economy, we find a wide measure of dependence
on a variety of imported raw materials. We im-
port all of our supplies of tin ore, all of our indus-
trial diamonds, 98 percent of our cobalt, 97 percent
of our platinum, 97 percent of the manganese ore
for our steel industry, 94 percent of our asbestos,
93 percent of our chromium, 89 percent of our
nickel, 84 percent of bauxite for aluminum, 45
percent of uranium concentrates, 34 percent of our
copper, 32 percent of our iron ore. We import all
of our supplies of natural rubber, jute, mahogany,
cork, and silk.

There are more exotic imports on the list.
Nearly all of our beryllium and antimony and
most of our fluorspar and columbium come from
abroad. These are not mere curiosities, however.
Among the imported materials that go into our
missile program are: castor oil, chrome, cobalt,
columbium, tantalium, tin, and tungsten. Our
telephone system, which is as basic to our economy
as any element can be, requires beryllium, chrome,
cobalt.

Wlien we take the case for these industrial raw
materials, the need for imports is not often chal-
lenged. In most instances substitutes by definition
are not of adequate quality or are too costly for

use under existing conditions. Still we probably
could if we chose expand production of marginal-
or low-grade domestic supplies or develop synthet-
ic substitutes. Our continental domain is a vast
one, and our science and technology is capable of
marvels of invention and adaptation, as we saw in
World War II. j

The reason that we continue to depend on im-
ports for raw materials is at bottom the same as in
the case of consumer goods. Imports bring us
better quality or more suitable or cheaper supplies
than we can get at home. Without imports our
industrial plant would operate less efficiently and
our costs and prices would rise. Since our capac-
ity to defend ourselves and to play our part in
maintaining the peace rests in the last analysis
on our industrial well-being, imports are in the
direct line of our national security.

Competitive Challenge of Imports

Imports play still another role in our national
life. They broaden the competitive challenge to
our industry, and they stimulate the give-and-take
of innovation that has made our era so extraor-
dinarily rich in the range of goods available to
the consumer. The story of the American compact
automobile is well known. As the small European
car made inroads into our market, Detroit pro-
vided the effective response of a free enterprise
system : a competitive product which has to a con-
siderable extent recaptured the smaller car market.

Similar if less notable examples occur all the
time. Imports are a part of tlie competitive system
which we, and rightly, consider indispensable to
our economic health. The beneficiaiy is the Amer-
ican consumer, who has access to cheaper or better
commodities because he is free to buy imported
products.

Imports and the National Goal

For the future the volume of our imports prob-
ably is destined to continue to rise, more slowly
than our connnodity exports but steadily none-
theless. As Ainerican incomes and population in-
crease and as our domestic resources of readily
available raw materials decline, tlie demand for
imports necessarily will grow. If we are able to
lead the free world to reduce further obstacles to
international trade, our market along with all
others will be progressively opened wider to
imports.

The United States no more than anv other na-

886

Department of State Bulletin

tion would be prepared to eliminate all tariffs or
to reduce tariffs without safeguards for domestic
producers. It is recognized in the draft Trade
Expansion Act that increased imports following
on tariff reductions can give rise to adjustment
problems. Actually the reduction that would be
possible under the bill would be for the most part
staged over a 5-year period, a provision which
assures against any sudden rush of imports. The
draft bill would provide for assistance or special
tariff' relief in cases where domestic industries or
parts of industries might nevertheless be adversely
affected by tariff cuts. There are other standard
safeguards in the draft act.

We are not, therefore, on the verge of a situa-
tion in which imports will make up a greatly in-
creased part of our national supply of goods. We
can look forward to a gradual expansion of im-
ports of all kinds. This process will not make us
poorer, and it will not aggravate our domestic
problems. On the contrary, it will contribute to
the national well-being, and it will enhance the
richness and vigor of our national life.

Secretary of Interior To Administer
Trust Territory of Pacific Islands

AN EXECUTIVE ORDER'

Administeation of the Trust Tebritort of the
Pacifio Islands bt the Secretary of the Interior

Whereas the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands was
placed under the trusteeship system established in the
Charter of the United Nations by means of a trusteeship
agreement approved by the Security Council of the United
Nations on April 2, 1947, and by the United States Gov-
ernment on July IS, 1947, after due constitutional proc-
ess (hereafter referred to as the trusteeship agreement) ;
and

Whereas the United States of America was designated
under the terms of the trusteeship agreement as the ad-
ministering authority of the Trust Territory referred to
above (hereinafter referred to as the trust territory) ;
and

Where.\s the United States has heretofore assumed
obligations for the civil administration of the trust terri-
tory and has carried out such civil administration under
the provisions of Executive Orders Nos. 9875 = of July 18,
1947, 1026.5 ' of June 29, 1951, 10408 * of November 10, 1952,
and 10470 " of July 17, 1953 ; and

'No. 11021 ; 27 Fed. Reg. 4409.

" Bttlletin of July 27, 1947, p. 178.

'Ibid., July 16, 1951, p. 106.

' Ihid., Jan. 12, 1953, p. 47.

^ Ibid., Aug. 3, 1953, p. 157.

Whereas thereunder the Secretary of the Navy is now
responsible for the civil administration of the Northern
Mariana Islands except the Island of Rota and the Secre-
tary of the Interior is responsible for the civil adminis-
tration of all of the remainder of the trust territory ; and

Whereas it appears that the purpo.ses of the trustee-
ship agreement can best be effectuated at this time by
placing in the Secretary of the Interior responsibility for
the civil administration of all of the trust territory :

Now, therefore, by virtue of the authority vested in me
by the Act of June 30, 1954 (68 Stat. 330 ; 48 U.S.C. 1681)
and as President of the United States, it is ordered as
follows :

Section 1. Respmisibility of Secretary of the Interior.
The responsibility for the administration of civil govern-
ment in all of the trust territory, and all executive, legis-
lative, and judicial authority necessary for that adminis-
tration, are hereby vested in the Secretary of the Interior.
Subject to such policies as the President may from time
to time prescribe, and in harmony with applicable law,
and, where advantageous, in collaboration with other
departments and agencies of the Government, the Secre-
tary of the Interior shall take such actions as may be
necessary and appropriate to carry out the obligations as-
sumed by the United States as the administering author-
ity of the trust territory under the terms of the trustee-
ship agreement and under the Charter of the United
Nations : Provided however, That the authority to specify
parts or all of the trust territory as closed for security
reasons and to determine the extent to which Articles 87
and 88 of the Charter of the United Nations shall be
applicable to such closed areas, in accordance with
Article 13 of the trusteeship agreement, shall be exercised
by the President : And provided further, That the Secre-
tary of the Interior shall keep the Secretary of State
currently informed of activities in the trust territory
affecting the foreign policy of the United States and shall
consult with the Secretary of State on questions of policy
concerning the trust territory which relate to the foreign
policy of the United States, and that all relations between
the departments and agencies of the Government and ap-
propriate organs of the United Nations with respect to
the trust territory shall be conducted through the Secre-
tary of State.

Sec. 2. Redelcgation of anthorify. The executive, legis-
lative, and judicial authority provided for in section 1
of this order may be exercised through such oflicers or
employees of the Department of the Interior, or through
such other persons under the jurisdiction of the Secretary
of the Interior, as the Secretary may designate, and shall
be exercised in such manner as the Secretary, or any per-
son or persons acting under the authority of the Secre-
tary, may direct or authorize.

Sec. 3. Cooperation with Department of the Interior.
The executive departments and agencies of the Govern-
ment shall cooperate with the Department of the Interior
in the effectuation of the provisions of this order.

Sec. 4. Prior orders. To the extent not heretofore
superseded or otherwise rendered inapplicable, the follow-
ing are hereby superseded :

(1) Executive Order No. 10265 of June 20, 1951.

May 28, 7962

887

(2) Executive Order No. 10408 of November 10, 1952.

(3) Executive Order No. 10470 of July 17, 195.3.

Sec. 5. Saving provisions, (a) Exi.sting laws, regu-
lations, orders, appointments, or otlier acts promulgated,
made, or taken by the Secretary of the Interior or his dele-
gates under the authority of Executive Order No. 10205,
as amended and in effect immediately prior to the effective
date of this order, shall remain in effect until they are
superseded in pursuance of the provisions of this order.

(b) Nothing contained in this order shall be construed
as modifying the rights or obligations of the United States
under tlie provisions of the trusteeship agreement or as

affecting or modifying the responsibility of the Secretary
of State to interjiret the rights and obligations of the
United States arising out of that agreement.

Skc. 6. Effective date. The provisions of this order
shall become effective on July 1, 19G2.

//1.^/L^

The White House,
May 7, 1962.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

U.S. Repeats Desire for Conclusive
Agreement on Nuclear Testing

Statement by Arthur H. Dean '

This is a day the United States had hoped would
not have to come about. The resumption of nu-
clear weapons tests in the atmosphere has been
undertaken by my Government with the utmost
regret and the deepest reluctance.^ The security
requirements which underlie this decision have
been made clear by the President of the United
States.^

We are certain that the representatives at this
conference do not need to be told of the unsparing
efforts we have made to achieve a safeguarded test
ban agreement that would put a stop forever to
the deadly competition in the testing of nuclear
weapons.

This has been prevented by the adamant posi-
tion of the Soviet Union, which has, successively,
broken the 3-year informal truce on nuclear weap-
ons testing, rejected the fruits of three and a half
years of most painstaking negotiation, reversing
its own position in the process, and has in
unequivocal terms repeated its unwillingness to

' Made before the Conference of the 18-Nation Com-
mittee on Disarmament at Geneva on Apr. 20. Ambassa-
dor Dean is U.S. Hcpresentative at the conference.

' For background, see Bulletin of May 14, 1962, p. 795.

' Ibid., Mar. 19, 19G2, p. 44.'5.

accept the very principle of international
verification.

In taking this position the Soviet Union has
claimed it must do so to protect itself against
Western "espionage." We have carefully ex-
plained why we believe this charge is witliout
foundation,* and we have repeatedly asked the
Soviet Union to specify precisely the basis for its
fears so that we may try to find ways to eliminate
any legitimate objections the Soviet Union may
have. It has thus far failed to do so.

The Soviet Union has claimed that the inter-
national control system wliich had been carefully
worked out was no longer necessary because of
new technical developments. Yet they remain
silent in the face of our repeated requests to pro-
duce any new technical data or evidence available
totliein.

The United States believes that we must press
on in this conference in our efforts to achieve a
nuclear lest agreement with safeguards. '\Alien
such an agreement is signed, tests can be ended in
confidence. Wo believe that the joint memoi-an-
dum of the eigiit new members of this conunittoo
should be explored on an urgent basis in order to
determine what possibilities for agreement it
presents.

Short of such an agreement, however, thei

' For a statement by Secretary Kusk before the IS-
Nation Disarummeut Committee on Mar. 23, see ihid.,
Apr. », 1962, p. 571.

888

Department of State Bulletin

United States cannot accept a situation wherein
it voluntarily refrains from testing and \\-hicli
leaves the Soviet Union free to do as it did in
September of 1961, when it betrayed the hopes
ind expectations of mankind by launching a
massive secretly prepared series of nuclear tests.^
riie last year has taught us with great clarity
ihat such a situation is not compatible with the
national security requirements of the United
States, and we do not propose to gamble with our
security.

The United States delayed resuming nuclear
iests in the atmosphere for many months after the
Soviet ITnion broke the moratoriinn last autumn.
We continued to hope that an agreement could be
reached which would take nuclear weapons testing
5ut of the arms race. We were willing to forgo
I further series of tests despite the military gains
made by the Soviet Union in its own series. This
lias not been possible, and, therefore, the United
States must treat the testing of nuclear weapons
in the same way it approaches any other aspect of
defense preparations.

It remains a prime objective of United States
policy to end all nuclear weapons testing perma-
nently and as quickly as possible. We are fully
xware that the security conferred on us by the
irms race is a most precarious one, and we must
spars no effort of will or imagination in our search
for an alternative. We finnly believe that nego-
tiations on this matter must go forward, and we
n"ill use our best efforts to see that these negotia-
tions are continued until an agreement has been
reached which will give all countries a true as-
surance that nuclear tests, in all environments,
have in fact ended and which will not leave as
dupes or victims those who are prepared to show
sood will and good faith.

Current U. N. Documents:
f\, Selected Bibliography

ilimcoyraphed or processed documents (such as those
listed heloic) may he consulted at depository libraries
in the United States. P..V. printed publientions man be
purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations,
United Nations Plaza, A'.y.

Economic and Social Council

Report on work being done in the field of nonagricultural
resources. E/3578. February 7, 19G2. 20 i)p.

Statistical Commission. Systems of industrial statistics
of live highly industrialized countries. E/CN.3/285.
February 8, 1962. 102 pp.

Question of a declaration on international economic co-
operation. E/3570. February 8, 19G2. 12 pp.

New sources of energy and energy development. E/3577.
February 9, 19C2. 149 pp.

Statistical Commis.sion. Survey of national accounting
practices. E/CN.3/291. February 12, 1902. 32 pp.

Statistical Commission. Progress report on 1960 world
population and bousing census programs. E/CN.3/295.
February 10, 19C2. 34 pp.

Revision of tie agreement between the United Nations
and UNESCO. E/3588. February 19, 1902. 7 pp.

Statistical Commission. Some recent problems and de-
velopments in industrial statistics. E/CN.3/287.
February 20, 1962. 39 pp.

Social Commission. Problems of planning for balanced
economic and social development. E/CN.5/365. Feb-
ruary 23, 1962. 17 pp.

Progress report on concerted action in the field of indus-
trialization. E/3574. February 28, 1962. 11 pp.

Economic and social consequences of disarmament.
E/ScTOS and Corr. 1. February 28, 1962. 95 pp.

Second biennial report of the U.N. Water Resources
Development Center. E/3-587. March 5, 19C2. 78 pp.

United Nations Children's Fund. E/3o91. March 8, 1962.
23 pp.

Social Commission. Report of the ad hoc group of ex-
perts on housing and urban development. E/CN.5/367.
March 16, 1962. 174 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Amendment to Article VI.A.3 of the Statute of the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency (TIAS 3873). Done at
Vienna October 4, 1961.'
Acceptances deposited: India, May 10, 1962; Israel and

Venezuela, May 7, 1962 ; Korea and Lebanon, May 4,

1962 ; United S'tates, AprU 10. 1062.
Ratified by the President: April 10, 1962.

Aviation

Convention on international civil aviation. Done at Chi-
cago December 7, 1944. Entered into force April 4, 1947.
TIAS 1501.

Adherence deposited: Congo (Brazzaville), April 20,
1962.

Finance

Articles of agreement of the International Development
Association. Done at Washington January 26, 1060.
Entered into force September 24, 1960. TIAS 4607.
Siynatnre and acceptance: El Salvador, April 23, 1962.

^ For background, see ibid., Sept. 18, 1961, p. 475.
May 28, 7962

" Not in force.

889

Oil Pollution

International convention for tJie prevention of pollution of
the sea by oil, with annexes. Done at London May 12,
1954. Entered into force July 26, 1958; for the United
States December 8, 1961.

Acceptance deposited: Liberia (with reservations),
March 28, 1962.

Postal

Universal postal convention with final protocol, annex,
regulations of execution and provisions regarding air-
mail with final protocol. Done at Ottawa October 3,
1957. Entered into force April 1, 1959. TIAS 4202.
Adherence deposited: Liechtenstein, April 13, 1962.

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention with six
annexes. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered
into force January 1, 1961 ; for the United States
October 23, 1961. TIAS 4892.
Ratifications deposited: Canada, March 26, 1962;"

Rumauia, March 19, 1962."
Accessions deposited: Ecuador and Mauritania, April 18,

1962.

Whaling

International whaling convention and schedule of whaling
regulations. Signed at Washington December 2, 1946.
Entered into force November 10, 1948. TIAS 1849.
Adherence deposited: Netherlands, May 4, 1962.

BILATERAL

Canada

Agreement for the construction by the United States in
Canadian territory of three additional pumping stations
on the Haines-Fairbanks Pipeline. EiJieeted by ex-
change of notes at Ottawa April 19, 1962. Entered
into force April 19, 1962.

Ceylon

Agreement amending and extending the agreement of
May 12 and 14, 1951, as amended (TIAS 2259 and
4436), relating to the facilities of Kadio Ceylon.
Effected by exchange of notes at Colombo April 30,
1962. Entered into force April 30, 1962.

Food and Agriculture Organization

Agreement between the United States and the Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)
concerning the Peace Corps. Effected by exchange of
notes at Rome March 23 and 29, 1962. Entered into
force March 29, 1962.

Greece

Agreement relating to the loan of additional vessels to
Greece. Effected by exchange of notes at Athens
April 4 and 14, 1962. Entered into force April 14, 1962.

Guinea

Agreement relating to investment guaranties. Effected
by exchange of notes at Washington May 9, 1962.
Entered into force May 9, 1962.

India

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act
of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 455; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709),
with exchange of notes. Signed at New Delhi May 1,
1962. Entered into force May 1, 1962.

Mexico

Agreement further amending the agreement of August 10
and September 26, 1951, as amended (TIAS 2366 and
2654), relating to the allocation of television channels
along the U.S.-Mexican border. Effected by exchange
of notes at Mexico September 8 and 24, 1959. Entered
into force September 24, 19.59.

Netherlands

Agreement relating to the use of Zanderij Airport in
Surinam by United States aircraft. Effected by ex-
change of notes at Paramaribo April 24, 1962. Entered
into force April 24, 1962.

Uruguay

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of
1954, as amended (68 Stat. 455; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709),
with exchanges of notes. Signed at Montevideo April 27,
1962. Entered into force April 27, 1962.

Yugoslavia

Agricultural commodities agreement under title IV of
the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance
Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 73 Stat. 610;
7 U.S.C. 1731-1736), with exchange of notes. Signed
at Belgrade April 21, 1962. Entered into force April 21,
1962.

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agree-
ment of December 28, 1961 (TIAS 4923). Effected by
exchange of notes at Belgrade April 21, 1962. Entered
into force April 21, 1962.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

^ With reservation contained in final protocol.
'With declaration contained in final jirotocol.

Designations

William II. Brubeck as Special Assistant to the Secre-
tary of State and Executive Secretary of the Department,
effective May 14. (For biographic details, see Department
of State press release 265 dated April 24.)

890

Deparfmenf of Sfafe Bu//ef/n

May 28, 1962

Index

Vol. XLVI, No. 1196

Africa, The Impact of the Emergence of Africa on
American Foreign Policy (Fredericks) .... 879

Atomic Energy. U.S. Repeats Desire for Conclu-
sive Agreement on Nuclear Testing (Dean) . . 888

Australia. Secretary Rusk Attends CENTO,
NATO, and ANZUS Meetings (texts of com-
muiiiiiues and statements, delegations) .... 859

Brazil. President Greets Brazil War Veterans on
Anniversary of VE-Day 878

Department and Foreign Service

Designations (Brubeck) 890

rhe Practice of Foreign Policy (Ball) 872

Economic Affairs

ire Imports Necessary? (Trezise) 884

President Finds Import Quota on Tung Oil and
Nuts No Longer Needed 883

Educational and Cultural Affairs. Polish Minister
of Foreign Trade Visits United States .... 871

Foreign Aid. The Impact of the Emergence of Af-
rica on American Foreign Policy (Fredericks) . 879

Germany. The Practice of Foreign Policy (Ball) . 872

[nternational Organizations and Conferences

Secretary Rusk Attends CENTO, NATO, and
ANZUS Meetings (texts of communiques and
statements, delegations) 859

J.S. Repeats Desire for Conclusive Agreement on
Nuclear Testing (Dean) 888

Vlali. Letters of Credence (Sow) 871

Middle East. Secretary Rusk Attends CENTO,
NATO, and ANZUS Meetings (texts of com-
muniques and statements, delegations) .... 859

^ew Zealand. Secretary Rusk Attends CENTO,
NATO, and ANZUS Meetings (texts of commu-
nicjues and statements, delegations) 859

Von-Self -Governing Territories. Secretary of Inte-
rior To Administer Trust Territory of Pacific
Islands (text of Executive order) 887

*Jorth Atlantic Treaty Organization. Secretary
Rusk Attends CENTO, NATO, and ANZUS Meet-
ings (texts of communiques and statements,
delegations) 8.59

Norway. President Kennedy and Norwegian Prime
Minister Hold Talks (text of joint com-
munique) 877

Poland. Polish Minister of Foreign Trade Visits
United States 871

Presidential Documents

President Greets Brazil War Veterans on Anni-
versary of VE-Day 878

President Kennedy and Norwegian Prime Minister

Hold Talks 877

Secretary of Interior To Administer Trust Terri-
tory of Pacific Islands 887

Treaty Information. Current Actions 889

United Nations

Current U.N. Documents 889

The Practice of Foreign Policy (Ball) 872

Viet -Nam. The Practice of Foreign Policy (Ball) . 872

Name Inded

Ball, George W 872

Brubeck, William H 890

Dean, Arthur H 888

Fredericks, J. Wayne 879

Gerhardsen, Einar 877

Kennedy, President 877,878,887

Rusk, Secretary 859

Sow, Oumar 871

Trezise, Philip H 884

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: May 6-13

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of
News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Releases issued prior to May 6 which appear in
this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 266 of April 25 ;
275 and 277 of April 27 ; and 291 of May 4.
No. Date Subject

295 5/7 Trezise: "Are Imports Necessary?"
*296 5/7 U.S. participation in international con-
ferences.
297 5/7 NATO communique.
t298 5/7 Louchheim : Radcliffe College Alumnae

Association.
299 5/8 Visit of Polish Foreign Trade Minister.
*300 5/8 Itinerary for visit of Prime Minister of
Norway.

301 5/8 Rusk : interview after NATO meeting.

302 5/9 Ball : "The Practice of Foreign Policy."
♦303 5/9 Cultural exchange (Japan).

t304 5/10 Foreign Relations volume, Europe,

1942.
*305 5/10 Bowles: ADA Roosevelt Day dinner

(excerpts).
*306 5/11 Itinerary for visit of President of

Ivory Coast.
307 5/11 Mali credentials (rewrite).
t30S .5/12 Ball : "American Business Abroad."

*Not printed.

tHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin.

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OFFICIAL BUSINESS

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the

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The following Department of State pamphlets, in the form of fact

sheets designed to give a few highlights on the peoples and the lands
of the newly independent nations, are available:

Countr; Pub. No. Price

Cambodia 7040 5 cents

Cameroon 7180 10 cents

Central African Kepublic .... 7285 15 cents

Ceylon 7203 10 cents

Dahomey 7158 15 cents

Ghana (Revised) 7212 15 cents

India 7029 5 cents

.Jordan 7030 5 cents

Korea 7042 15 cents

libya (Revised) 7270 10 cents

Malaya 6967 5 cents

Paldstan 7073 5 cents

Sudan 7044 5 cents

Togo 7135 10 cents

Tunisia 7150 10 cents

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(,cash, check, or money
order payable to
Supt. of Docs.)

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Vol. XLVI, No. 1197

Boston Public Library-
Superintendent of Documents

JUN2 8 1962

June 4, 1962

AMERICA'S DESTINY I]PE^l^T®g|lDING OF A

WORLD COMMUNITY • Address by Secretary Rusk . 895

THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO— PARTNERS IN

A COMMON TASK • Remarks by Secretary Rusk . . 919

TRADE AND THE ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP •

Remarks by President Kennedy and Secretary Rusk .... 906

AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD • by Under Secretary

Ball 912

ITED STATES
REIGN POLICY

For index see inside back cover

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents

U.S. Government Printing ODice

Washington as, D.C.

Price:

82 Issues, domestic $8.60, rorelgn $12.26

Single copy, 26 cents

Use of funds for printing of this publica-
tion approved by the Director of the Bureau
of the Budget (January 19, 1961).

NoU': Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and Items contained heroin may
be reprinted. Citation of the Department
or State Bulletin as the source will be
appreciated. The Bdlletin Is Indexed In the
Readers' Oulde to Periodical Literature.

Vol. XLVI, No. 1197 • Pubucation 7383
June 4, 1962

The Department of State BULLETIN,
a iceekly publication issued by th«
Office of Public Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public
and interested agencies of the
Government with information on
developments in the field of foreign
relations and on the work of tlie
Department of State and the Foreign
Sert'ice. Tlie BULLETIN includes se-
lected press releases on foreign policy,
issued by the White House and the
Department, and statements and ad-
dresses made by the President and by
the Secretary of State and other
officers of the Department, as well as
special articles on various pluises of
international affairs and the func-
tions of the Department. Informa-
tion is included concerning treaties
and international agreements to
which the United States is or may
become a party and treaties of gen-
eral international interest.

Publications of the Dcp<trtmcnt,
United Nations tlocuments, and legis-
lative material in the field of inter-
national relations are listed currently.

America's Destiny in the Building of a World Community

Address Tyy Secretary Rush ^

It is a great personal pleasure for me to be at
the University of Tennessee for your symposium
to mark the 20th anniversaiy of your department
of political science. As you may know, I was by
profession a teacher of jDolitical science — ^though
some of my colleagues may consider me something
of a fugitive who has fallen from gi-ace. T^Hien
I left a department of political science to join the
Army it was with every intention of returning.
That was 22 years ago ! Some day I shall yet get
back.

The service your own department of political
science has rendered during this period deser\^es
the thanks of the Nation as well as all Tennesseans.
It has fulfilled its role by helping to prepare
thousands of students to become more understand-
ing and effective citizens in an increasingly com-
plex world. Its graduate program is training
teachers needed in classrooms throughout the Na-
tion. It has gone beyond these traditional
services; through its bureau of public administra-
tion and municipal technical advisory service, it
provides a wide range of skilled professional lielp
to State, county, and city governments.

The department has added to these invaluable
domestic services a pioneering service abroad as
the first American institution to provide technical
assistance in public administration to Latin Amer-
ican governments as part of the U.S. foreign aid
program. Training in public administration is a
fundamental need in many developing nations;

' Made at the third annual symposium on "Government
and World Crisis" at the University of Tennessee, Knox-
ville, Tenn., on May 17 (press release 319) .

the work done by this imiversity in Panama and
Bolivia helps to show the way for the expanded
effort to come as part of the Alliance for Progress.

The theme of your symposium is "Government
and World Crisis." You have heard distin-
guished addresses on the meaning of our demo-
cratic government, the role which the United
Nations may play in economic development, and
the hopes for the Alliance for Progress. Perhaps
I can contribute something by discussing the great
revolutionary forces which are at work in our era,
the crises which they generate, and the central
goal which we seek to achieve — a world commu-
nity of free and independent nations living at
peace.

This theme is particularly appropriate at this
place and time because two Southern statesmen
did more than most to shape our modem concept
of such a world community. I think especially
of Cordell Hull of Tennessee and George Marshall
of Virginia.

That great Tennessean in a long life of magnifi-
cent service personally initiated many of the
fundamental policies which now guide the course
of our country and the world toward the creation
of the commmoity of free nations. He was the
great proponent of the good-neighbor policy with
Latin America. He was the apostle of freer and
expanding trade. He was the father of the United
Nations and the architect of the structure of non-
partisan support for it and for the fimdamentals
of our foreign policy. He was, with George Mar-
shall, a deserving recipient of the Nobel Prize for
Peace.

June 4, 7962

895

The Age of Revolution

We live in an era when tremendous, often con-
flicting, forces are i^ressing for change. Among
these is the force of scientific knowledge, expand-
ing in a progression of endless and breathtaking
momentum. We are learning at one and the
same time the secrets of the more abundant
life and of a more immediate destruction. For
the first time in human history there is the pos-
sibility that the world can provide adequate re-
sources to feed, house, and educate its people and
to maintain their health and welfare. Yet this
same science has brought about a radical change in
the destructive potential of military weapons —
with the power of offensive nuclear weapons for
the present far outstripping the defensive.

Against this background of scientific change
there are at work three other forces of revolu-
tionary power whose interplay determines that
we live in an era of recurrng crisis.

The first and oldest of these is the revolution
of freedom. It is our own revolution. It is, I
believe, without question the strongest political
force in the world today.

Its concept is magnificently simple. It was
stated by Thomas Jefferson with an eloquence
which will never die :

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men
are created equal, that they are endowed by their Crea-
tor with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are
Iiife, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That to se-
cure these rights. Governments are instituted among
Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the
governed. That whenever any Form of Government be-
comes destructive of those ends, it is the Right of the
People to alter or abolish it, and to institute a new Gov-
ernment, laying its foundations on such principles and
organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem
most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.

These words declare the fundamental basis of
the community of free nations. It is our belief
that governments derive their just powers from
the consent of the governed, that it is the right of
each people, in establishing their government, to
do so in such form as to them seems most likely to
effect their safety and happiness.

Although Jefferson's language was in the main-
stream of centuries of Western thought, aspira-
tion, and experience, it has meaning in every quar-
ter of the globe — on both sides of the Iron Cur-
tain— and it converges with canons developed
independently out of the history and culture of

non- Western societies. We should never let our-
selves believe that the thrust for human freedom
is a peculiar creation and concern of the West.

The revolution of freedom confronts the second
great force at work today — the counterrevolution
of coercion. Its purpose is to destroy freedom. It
does not concede the existence of unalienable
rights. Its government is not based upon the
consent of the governed but upon the will and
force of the governing. It does not concede the
right of each people to choose their own form of
government but is detei*mined to impose a mono-
lithic form, based on a historical dogma enshrined
as doctrine.

The leaders of international communism are
not content to rely on their faith in the inevi-
tability of its victory. They know that what they
want must be achieved against the will of the ma-
jority and that tight conspiratorial organization
must substitute for popular support if they are
to win.

In 40 years they have expanded their power
from a small revolutionary party in Russia to
control by force of all or parts of 18 nations with
some 1 billion people, a third of the world's popu-
lation.

I have emphasized "to control by force" for it
is significant that not a single nation has installed
the rule of communism by the free choice of its
own people. In not one case have the masters of
international communism allowed the people of
any nation under their dominion to choose whether
they wish to "institute a new Government ... in
such form, as to them, shall seem most likely to
effect their Safety and Happiness."

This is a matter which the peoples of scores of
former colonies, given their freedom of choice by
the Western nations, must have pondered, for not
one of them has passed behind the curtain.

The third great revolution is the revolution of
progress. It has long affected the Western World.
The industrial revolution, when tempered by social
reforms, has brought with it the sharp and in-
creasing rise in Western standards of living; it is
a revolution which now attracts the people of the
developing nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin
America. The intensity of the desire for progress
felt by the people of these nations springs from
the poverty and misery of their lives. Their aver-
age per capita output is only about one-twentieth
of ours. A third or fewer may be literate. Their

896

Oepariment of Sfate Bulletin

average life expectancy is perhaps one-half our
own. These peoples are determined to have eco-
nomic progress for themselves and their children.
They are also determined to have rapid social
progi-ess: opportunities for education, for health,
for homes, for employment, and for a more equit-
able share of the products of their labor. And
they know that the dignity and status of their
nations on the world scene depend ultimately on
their capacity to absorb effectively into their socie-
ties the fruits of modern science and technology.
The converging forces of the desires for material
progress, social justice, and modern nationhood
are compelling. Yet the peoples involved do not
in many cases yet have the technical and mana-
gerial skills or the capital to create the progress
to M-hich they understandably aspire. But they
will not be denied. They are, therefore, turning
to the more highly developed nations for help.
The future of the world and our own peace and
prosperity will almost certainly depend on the
character of our response.

An Era of Crises

I have referred to these revolutionary forces be-
cause I believe recognition of them helps us to
understand more fully the era of crises in which
we live.

These crises are not unrelated. They are the
result of the internal stresses and the collisions of
;he revolutionary forces I have described. With
me or two exceptions such as Berlin, the crises
>f the past decade have arisen in the newly inde-
jendent or newly developing areas of the world,
ind the great majority are the result of the efforts
)f international commimism to seize and direct the
•evolutions of independence and of progress in
hose nations. The Communists did not create the
•evolutionary forces at work in the less developed
ireas; but they aim to exploit them to the full,
rhey aim to isolate, neutralize, subvert, and take
>ver the less developed nations as opportunity and
heir own ingenuity permit. There is a time, they
ay, for every fruit to fall from the tree.

'oward the Community of Free Nations

These then are the great revolutionary forces
ind the fundamental crisis of our time. "What is
-ur policy to be? It must be to get on with our

main task — to move forward to build, protect, and
extend a community of free nations. In this task
we will find common groimd with allied, neutral,
and uncommitted nations alike. In this task also
we will be true to our own heritage, to the most
profound motivations of our history as a people.
Thomas Jefferson's declaration of the rights
of all free peoples in 1776 was echoed by Woodrow
Wilson, who said to the Nation in 1917 :

. . . tJie right is more precious than peace, and we shall
fight for the things which we have always carried nearest
our hearts — for democracy, for the right of those who
submit to authority to have a voice in their own Govern-
ments, for the rights and liberties of small nations, for a
universal dominion of right by such a concert of free
peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations
and make the world itself at last free.

A generation later tliis fundamental declara-
tion was reechoed by Cordell Hull in the Charter
of the United Nations. It called for a community
of independent nations, each free to create its
own form of government but all committed to
work together for progress in peace. It looked
toward the strengthening of human rights, the
solution of economic and social problems by co-
operative effort, the rule of law above the rule of
force, and, by the limitation and reduction of
arms, the freeing of mankind from its most costly
burden. Our nation gladly accepted these princi-
ples with the support of an overwhelming majority
of our people and a near imanimous vote of our
Senate.

The declarations of Jefferson, of Wilson, and of
Hull are among the stars by wliich we chart our
course. As President Kennedy said in his mes-
sage on the state of the Union : ^

. . . our basic goal remains the same : a peaceful world
community of free and independent states, free to choose
their own future ... so long as it does not threaten the
freedom of others. . . . We can welcome diversity — the
Communists cannot. For we offer a world of choice —
they offer a world of coercion. And . . . freedom, not
coercion, is the wave of the future.

The President thus calls upon us to resume our
leadership in the revolution of fi-eedom and to jom
with it our leadership in the revolution of eco-
nomic and social progress.

This is a noble task, worthy of our people. It
is the task of uniting the nations into one great
family of man. It is the dream of the ages toward

' For text, see Buixetin of Jan. 29, 1962, p. 159.

iune 4, ;962

897

which, with energy and devotion, we may make
true progress in our lifetimes.

How shall we work toward this goal?

To move forward toward this large objective
we are pursuing six basic policies.

Maintaining U.S. Strength and Determination

First, we must maintain the strength and deter-
mination of our own nation. "America, the hope
of the world" was never an idle phrase. It is an
image that every American generation must re-
create by its own efforts and performance. It is
an image which others will not confer upon us,
except it be earned.

The world of coercion engages in a ceaseless
drumfire of propaganda to convince the peoples
of the newly developing nations that communism
is the road to progress. The most effective re-
sponse is to show those peoples what free peoples
have achieved and are achieving in freedom and to
work and learn with them how, in their societies,
progress and freedom can go forward together.

The advances we have made here in the South,
in my own lifetime since I was a boy on a Georgia
farm, provide a most impressive example of the
progress which can be made in freedom.

Only three decades ago, just before the Ten-
nessee Valley Authority was created, our South-
land had many of the characteristics of an under-
developed area. In the deep depression year of
1933 the average per capita income here in the
valley region was $168, or 45 percent of the na-
tional average. Now it is $1,490 — up to G5 percent
of the national average and still growing. In 1933
only three farms in a hundred had electricity —
and for most of them this meant only electric
lights. Now 98 pei'cent of the farms have electric
service with all this means in terms of light, the
convenience and sanitation of running water, re-
frigeration and its benefit to the family and the
commercial storage of food, and farm shops and
equipment with their aid to farm production — and
I cannot forget some of the burdens which elec-
tricity has lifted from our women. In 1933 in
malarious areas, one-third of the population was
infected, with tlie consequent effects of misery and
impaired ability to farm and work. Now, I under-
stand, it has been over 10 years since a single case
of malaria of local origin has been found in the
Tennessee Valley.

898

In this same period there has been a basic revo-
lution in agriculture. The region has moved to a
highly diversified agriculture. There has been a
steady increase in acreage devoted to hay and
pasture and the production of livestock and live-
stock products. Seedlings initially supplied by
the TVA and now by the States— planted by the
farmers to replace the thinned-out and rundown
forests and to protect the waterheads — are now the
source of a great and growing forest industry.
There is a certain poignancy in the fact that im-
employed CCC [Civilian Conservation Corps]
boys in the thirties planted seedlings which today
are producing new jobs. At the same tmie, em-
ployment in industry has risen from less than
190,000 to over 440,000.

This unfinished process carries lessons of great
value to the leaders of scores of nations striving
to guide the economic growth of their peoples.
It is no wonder that some 3,000 visitors from for-
eign nations come to your Tennessee Valley region
each year to see this process at work.

What they see is a fine example of the American
system in action. The people of all our States,
acting through the Federal Government, made this
investment in the Tennessee Valley Authority to
attack the basic problems of the area, particularly
water, land, and forests. This was done under our
Federal system in a way designed to encourage and
strengthen the local govenmiental institutions and
private enterpi-ise in the area. The purpose was
to enable them to have an increasing capacity to
stand on their own feet and to contribute to the
education, health, and social progress of their own
people and, through rismg incomes and taxable
revenues, to contribute strength to the whole na-
tion and, indeed, to the free world.

We who have day-to-day responsibility in for-
eign policy count your performance in the Tennes-
see Valley a major national asset on the world
scene.

And what has been done here is only illustrative
of the Nation. The increase in the national prod-
uct of our country in tliese past 30 years is greater
than the entire national product of the Soviet
Union today.

We cannot, and I know we will not, rest where
we now stand. It is imperative that we increase
our present rate of gi-owth, that we increase our:
productivity and our coinpetiliAe position; for our

Department of State Bulletin '

world position rests on our ability to maintain a
large surplus in our balance of payments to finance
3ur expenses abroad in the defense of freedom.

Maintaining Western Military Strength

The second main policy we follow is to maintain
Dur own military strength and that of allied and
friendly nations abroad. As tragically wasteful
IS it is in manpower and i-esources, a defensive
shield is necessary if we are to have freedom of
iction to move toward the community of free
lations. Xo nation now fi'ee could long remain
Pree if the military' power and will of free nations,
3oth allied and uncommitted, were not available
:o deter and counter aggression. On our own part
ive must maintain great and varied forces, capable
)f responding to a variety of challenges. We must
lave not only an effective and flexible nuclear
itriking force but also conventional forces of great
30wer and mobility and a capability for helping
)ther free nations defend themselves against guer-
■illa and other subversive attacks. For the Com-
nunist assaults against the free nations will con-
:inue to be carefully calculated to probe points of
veakness — points remote from the centers of f ree-
vorld jiower where local conditions hold open the
jpportunity of advantage to be gained by limited,
)ften surreptitious, force.

We must not let ourselves be frozen in our
jhoices so that, when these remote and varied at-
tacks take place against a member of the free
community, we are limited either to submission
3r to resort to forces of unlimited and uncontrol-
able destruction.

The defense of the free world should not, how-
3ver, depend only upon our strength and our will,
[t must also depend upon the strength and the
(vill of the nations whose freedom is directly
:hreatened. It is essential, therefore, that the na-
tions along the frontiers of freedom have forces
drained, equipped, and available on their own
lome soil at points where aggression — direct or
joncealed — may come.

Our foreign military assistance program is the
>rincipal means by which we help sustain our
vorldwide collective security systems and the
strength and will of free nations. It is an essen-
tial part of our total U.S. defense. We should
lever underestimate the value of this program.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has de-

clared that no amomit of money spent on our own
forces could give the United States a comparable
asset of trained, well-equipped forces, familiar
with the terrain and in a suitable jiosition for im-
mediate resistance to local aggression. I would
add that, without the confidence which the people
of nation after nation have developed from the
presence of their own forces to which we have
given arms and training, the existing structure of
free and independent nations might well have
crumbled long ago.

Consolidating Ties of industrialized Nations

Third, we should press forward with our efforts
to strengthen and consolidate the bonds between
the already more highly industrialized nations,
such as our allies of Western Europe, Canada, and
Japan.

In Europe, after the war, we have already taken
one of the most daring steps in all history — the
Marshall plan. The Marshall plan achieved its
goal. It not only made possible the revival of a
free and vigorous economy in Europe; it laid the
foundation for evident and decisive progress
toward realization of a centuries-old dream, a
united Europe.

In 1957 six nations of Europe — France, Italy,
Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxem-
bourg— joined together in the Treaty of Rome,
creating the European Economic Community.
This was a solemn act of great political signifi-
cance. Although we hear most of the customs
union, which is rapidly taking shape under it, the
Community has far larger political implications.
The main force behind the creation of the Com-
munity was the desire to lay the groundwork for
a unified Europe.

The treaty pi-ovides for the creation of an
executive, a parliamentary body, and a court of
justice. It provides also for a wide range of
common action covering all aspects of economic
integration, including the free movement not only
of goods but of labor, capital, and sendees.

I stress these larger political implications of
the European Community because as it continues
to progress, and if the negotiations initiated by
Great Britain to join the Conimunity succeed,
there will be created on the other side of the At-
lantic a great community of states which will em-
brace a population of about a quarter of a billion

lune 4, 1962

899

people whose gross national products on the basis
of the latest figures would approximate $350 bil-
lion— a unit larger in population and resources
than the Soviet Union.

This new great center of power and commerce
and we ourselves will remain deeply interdepend-
ent. If their strength is combined tlirough close
economic relations, there will be a consolidation of
the strength of the great industrial powers of the
free world which cannot be matched within the
predictable future. We must see to it that trade
shall not become a source of difference and dis-
cord between us but a cement to bind our policies
more closely together.

This is the purpose of the trade expansion legis-
lation which President Kennedy has proposed to
the Congress.^ It is founded upon the same con-
cepts which Cordell Hull declared as the great
spokesman of reciprocal trade. Its enactment
will provide the opportunity for the President to
work out with the Common Market trading ar-
rangements which will serve to consolidate the
strength of our two great industrial complexes.
It will afford market opportunities for American
exporters of a kind unequaled in our history as a
trading nation. It will open up to American pro-
ducers mass markets of a kind hitherto known only
in the United States.

On the other hand, if we fail to take advantage
of this great political and economic opportunity,
that failure can be disastrous. For we have to sell
our products over the barrier of a common external
tariff while the producers of the same goods within
any of the Common Market countries will be able
to sell in the entire Common Market without the
equalizing tariffs which in many cases now exist.
At tlie same time, we will have put in motion
divisive processes which can lead to dangerous
weakening of the free world's strength.

We look to cooperation with a united Europe
not only in trade but in the other tasks essential to
building and defending a free community. These
tasks cannot be discharged by the United States
alone or by Europe alone. We need a strong part-
ner in a close partnership with us. The .strong
partner will be an integrated Europe. The close
partnership will be an increasingly cohesive At-
lantic commimity, within whose framework we
and Europe can work closely together.

" For text of President Kennedy's message to Congress,
see ibid., Feb. 12, 1902, p. 231.

Wliile we look to Europe for new strength, we
cannot forget that we are a Pacific as well as an
Atlantic power. In the Pacific are old and trusted
friends — the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand,
and the people of free China. In the postwar
world new ties have been woven with the peoples
of Korea and Southeast Asia. And in Japan we
have a close and vital partner which, after a period
of substantial American aid, has achieved a dra-
matic economic revival and growth and which has
joined with other industrialized nations of the
Noithern Hemisphere to aid the less developed
areas of the world.

Long-Term Partnership With Developing Nations

The fourth component of our policy is a long-
term partnership with the developing nations of
Latin America, of Africa, and Asia to assist them
in their plans to carry forward the revolution of
economic and social progress. This is a great task
and an historic opportimity. It is also immensely
complex ; and it will take time.

These nations are at different stages along the
road to self-sustaining growth. Each has its own
special problems. But through them all there runs
a determination that their nation shall have a place
of dignity on the world scene and that they and
their children shall have lives of greater oppor-
tunity. They know these large national and
human objectives require that they modernize their
economies and learn how to grow. It is our pur-
pose to aid them in this massive and intricate
historical process.

Many things are required, but this above all is
true : Our loans and technicians can only help them
to the extent that they can use such help. They
must set their targets in terms of their aspirations;
they must devise their plans and projects; they
must mobilize the administrators, foremen, work-
ers to move the earth and build the structures re-
quired for a modern economy. At every step of
the way we can help — but only marginally. No
amount of American aid can substitute for self-
help.

That is why wo are shifting our aid program to
a long-term development basis where our assistance
will flow to those nations who demonstrate a ca-
pacity and a will to organize their own resources.

The job will he long — longer than the Marshall
plan. Our working horizon should be the Decade
of Development. By the end of a decade the job

900

Department of State Bulletin

will not be done, but the bulk of the peoples in the
underdeveloped areas should be well along the
road to self-sustained growth. This is the purpose
of our programs of foreign aid, of the Alliance for
Progress, and of the Peace Corps.

It is against this background of thought over a
long period of time that the Congress last year
gave the administration authority to enter into
long-term aid programs and commitments — an
essential feature if our resources are to be effec-
tively used.

I would call to your attention one specific aspect
of the development task: the role of education.
In our own coimtry we did not wait to become
rich before we built our educational system. We
created it, and our trained people were then better
able to create our wealth. The more we learn
about economic growth — in developed as well as
underdeveloped societies — the greater the role of
education appears to be.

You here at the University of Tennessee are
particularly aware of this link. You and 68 other
land-grant institutions — along with the entire Na-
tion— are celebrating this year the 100th anniver-
sary of the land-grant college system. It is almost
impossible to exaggerate the effect which this sys-
tem, originated in legislation offered by Senator
Morrill and signed into law by President Lincoln
in 1862, has had upon the economic and social
progress of our country. It focused the educa-
tional system directly on the tasks of a developing
nation ; for we were at a stage then not very differ-
ent from that of many nations we are aiding in
various parts of the world.

The farm research and extension education con-
ducted by our land-grant institutions has trans-
formed American agriculture. "VVlien the program
was inaugurated in 1862, 55 percent of our popula-
tion was engaged in agriculture and one farm
worker could produce only enough food for four
to five other persons. Today only 8 percent work
on our farms, and each worker is able to produce
enough food for himself and some 26 other per-
sons. We have been able to achieve in this peace-
ful agricultural revolution what the Communist
system has not yet been able even to approach,
with all the misery of their collectivist experi-
ments.

Many lessons of development cannot be trans-
planted from one nation to another, but the
achievements of the land-grant system and of our
agricultural extension system carry a lesson of

universal significance to the less developed nations.

In our aid to these newly developing nations we
believe that we should be joined by all the indus-
trialized nations of the free world. Some of those
whom we have aided in the past are now thriving.
We can take a large measure of satisfaction that
the flow of assistance from our NATO allies and
Japan is substantially increasing. They are now
providing in the neighborhood of $2.3 billion per
year. For some of them the portion of their gross
national product which they contribute to this
purpose is comparable to our own.

We believe also that the developing nations
have and should use the opportunity to help each
other. As they learn the lesson of development
they may share their knowledge with others travel-
ing the same road.

And finally we are determined that our aid pro-
gram should be administered as efficiently as pos-
sible. The Agency for International Development
(AID) in the Department of State in Washing-
ton has been reshaped and staffed with vigorous
leaders determined to make each aid dollar obtain
the greatest possible benefits.

President Kennedy has asked the Congress for
the funds needed to carry forward our aid pro-
gram for the coming fiscal year.* These funds
are essential to maintain economic stability and
the gathering momentum for development. The
funds he has requested for these economic pur-
poses, together with the necessary militaiy assist-
ance, total $4,878 million, or less than 1 percent
of the gross national product of our country.
They are less than 5 percent of what the President
is requesting for new obligational authority in his
budget for the coming fiscal year, yet they are in
the most literal sense -vital to our security as a
nation and to the future prosperity of our people.
Without them we cannot carry forward the strug-
gle for the independence of the underdeveloped
areas and for progress in freedom.

This fimdamental policy of aid to the develop-
ing nations is strongly bipartisan in its origins and
rests on a firm basis of support by the leaders of
both parties. Former President Eisenhower said
of our aid program : °

We cannot safely confine Government programs to our
own domestic progress and our own military power. We

* For text of the President's message to Congress, see
ibid., Apr. 2, 1962, p. 550.
" Ibid., Mar. 30, 1959, p. 427.

June 4, 7962

901

could be the wealthiest and the most mighty Nation and
still lose the battle of the world if we do not help our
world neighbors protect their freedom and advance their
social and economic progress. It is not the goal of the
American people that the United States should be the
richest Nation in the graveyard of history.

Toward a Free-World Partnership of Equals

The fifth element in our basic policy is a new
concentration on the task of building a widening
partnership between ourselves, the other nations
of the Northern Hemisphere, and the new nations
to the south. The purpose here is to help draw
the new nations into a true free-world partner-
ship among equals, thus to strengthen even fur-
ther the links which bind the free community to-
gether. We seek to fulfill this purpose through
many organizations which join free nations of
the north and south in the common defensive and
constructive tasks.

In our own hemisphere its basis is well estab-
lished in the Alliance for Progress and the Organ-
ization of American States. For the Far East we
see the Colombo Plan organization and the United
Nations ECAFE [Economic Commission for Asia
and the Far East] in the economic field; we see
SEATO [Southeast Asia Treaty Organization]
and ANZUS [Australia-New Zealand-United
States] in the defense field. In the Middle East,
countries with a common concern in the defense of
this vital area have come together in CENTO
[Central Treaty Organization]. In Afi-ica we
look to a variety of regional and subregional or-
ganizations whose activities may transcend the
presently Balkanized structure of this emerging
continent.'' And in many of these areas the British
Commonwealth and the French Community join
former colonies and metropoles on a new basis of
mutual respect and dignity.

The same principle of common effort for com-
mon ends is reflected in a number of specialized
agencies in which the problems facing the free
community are effectively addressed. The Inter-
national Bank and its affiliate, the International
Development Association, is taking an effective
lead in bringing free nations together in aid to
less developed areas. The International Mone-
tary Fund helps these areas through fiscal crises

' For background, see ibid., May 21, 1962, p. 841.

and helps to insure that the free community makes
the most effective use of its total financial reserves.
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) is a useful forum for worldwide trade
negotiation, in which the United States will con-
tinue to press for a reduction in artificial barriers
to commerce.

Over and above these specialized agencies is the
organization that Cordell Hull did so much to
create: the United Nations. Its labors open new
vistas of progress and greater stability for all man-
kind. "We shall continue to sustain those labors
with utmost determination. We will seek to
strengthen the ways in which the U.N. contributes
to economic development within the context of the
United Nations Decade of Development. We will
also make a particular effort to strengthen its
peacekeeping machinery, including standby ar-
rangements for the dispatch of U.N. observers or
patrol forces to troubled areas.

In all these varied ways — and many that I have
not mentioned — we seek to strengthen the organi-
zational arrangements that bind the peoples of the
Northern and Southern Hemispheres together in
the free community. In these and many other
ways the ties between the citizens of these new
and old nations are becoming closer as they work
together — under public auspices and in many pri-
vate relationships — to fulfill the whole wide range
of other ordinary human activities.

The task of working closely with many peoples
to build an evolving community of nations is a
relatively new experience in our national history.
Yet of all nations ours is perhaps the one best
adapted by its own national heritage for this task.
We as a nation have received, absorbed in our na-
tional life, and lived peacefully with more people
from more nations coming to our shores to seek
freedom and opportunity than has any other na-
tion of the world. I have no doubt that it lies
within our power to apply to the world community
the lesson of this unique national experience.

Position Toward Communist-Dominated Countries

The sixth major element in our effort to build
this community relates to our posture toward the
countries under Communist rule, which have ex-
cluded tliemselves from its peaceful laboi-s. We
want to hold the community of nations open to all
men and to seek to draw them into it, if they will

902

Department of State Bulletin

abandon their efforts to disiiipt it in favor of
constructive cooperation.

We have no ilhisions about the present inten-
tions of the leaders of tJie Communist bloc and
their dedication to the ultimate destruction of tlie
independence of nations and of tlie freedom of in-
dividuals as we understand them. They tell us
this plainly, and we see it in practice year after
year.

Yet the great ideals of human freedom and of
national independence are not confined to the peo-
ples of the nations now free. We know that they
are alive in the men, women, and children in na-
tions now part of the international Communist
system. We have seen that East Germany liad to
build a wall to prevent its lifeblood of technicians,
workers, farmers, and ordinary people from flow-
ing away to freedom into West Berlin. Yet we
know that those people of East Germany, now
behind barbed wire, still cherish their old cidtural
values, their aspirations, and their hope of
freedom.

The entire Communist bloc is now caught up in
a slow-moving crisis. Power is being diffused
from the center, for the desire of men for national
independence is universal — and no respecter of the
Iron Curtain. The results of this massive and
glacial movement cannot be expected soon. But
human liberty within nations and independence
among nations is based on the diffusion of power.

We cannot tell when or by what means the peo-
ples and the nations still held under Communist
domination may move toward freedom. Yet we
must always leave the lamp of freedom lighted
for them. We recognize them as brothers in the
hnma7i race, and we look to the day when they
may join us in common existence in the community
of freemen.

Meanwhile, when we are able to find common in-
terests which the free world and the Communist
bloc share we must be prepared to talk and nego-
tiate about ways of acting together to fulfill those
interests — even if they are narrow. By this slow
process we may move toward a dampening of such
crises as Berlin, a continuation of our exchange
programs with the U.S.S.R., and new ventures of
common advantage, as in Antarctica, public
health, and outer space.

It is on this basis also that we are pressing the
Soviet leaders to talk seriously about the problems
of disarmament. Last year the President asked

for the establishment within the executive branch
of a new Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.'
Its purpose is to concentrate under one head ex-
perts to develop practical and effective plans to
bring under control the weapons which threaten
the very destruction of mankind.

At the disarmament conference now going on in
Geneva we have tabled the most comprehensive
proposal ever prepared for the reduction and con-
trol of armaments under projier safeguards.^
This is unquestionably a proposal of the greatest
magnitude, and we do not expect its acceptance
without the most thoughtful exammation by the
Soviet leaders. At the same time, we believe that
their reaction to it, after an appropriate time for
study, will provide the clearest possible guide to
the sincerity of their announced desire for reduc-
tion of armaments.

We also believe that the free world and the So-
viets have a common interest in preventing the
extension of the arms race into space and for the
use of space for peaceful purposes. President
Kennedy has therefore made serious proposals to
]\Ir. Khrushchev that our nations work together
on specified projects in meteorology, commimica-
tions, and other peaceful uses of outer space.*
Tlie Soviet response to this proposal has been di-
rect and encouraging. Negotiations are now in
process, and we can hope that there is a real possi-
bility of achieving a cooperative effort in this dra-
matic new sphere in which the two nations have
shown such scientific skill and heroism.

We are also pressing for limited measures to re-
duce two key dangers resulting from an inicon-
trolled arms race. We are seeking such measures
as a ban on nuclear testing ^^ and the cessation of
production of fissionable materials for weapons
pui-poses in order to reduce the risk of nuclear
proliferation. And we have proposed such steps
as advance notification of military movements and
exchange of observation posts — along with estab-
lishment of an international commission in which
the U.S. and U.S.S.R. could discuss still further

' For text of President Kennedy's message to Congress
transmitting draft legislation, see ibid., July 17, 1961,
p. 99.

' For test, see ihid.. May 7, 1962, p. 747.

" For an exchange of letters between President Kpnne<ly
and Mr. Khrushchev, see ibid., Mar. 12, 1962, p. 411, and
Apr. 2. 1962, p. 536.

" For background, see ibid.. May 28, 1962, p. 888.

June 4, 1962

903

measures to reduce the risk of war by accident and
miscalculation.

These matters will not move easily. Clearly
•we do not have such a good chance of success that
we can afford to relax our efforts in other direc-
tions. But our effort to build a commiuiity of free
nations would be incomplete if it did not include
some steady patient efforts to reduce the hostile
confrontation between that community and those
who have declared themselves for another kind of
world.

Our Destiny Is Still Before Us

These are our goals. I believe they are our
destiny.

The basis for my confidence is nowhere better
stated than in the final passage of Cordell Hull's
memoirs, which are the essence of my message to
you this evening :

"I conclude these Memoirs with the abiding
faith that our destiny as a nation is still before us,
not behind us. We have reached maturity, but at
the same time we are a youthful nation in vigor
and resource, and one of the oldest of the nations
in the unbroken span of our form of government.
The skill, the energy, the strength of purpose, and
the natural wealth that made the United States
great are still with us, augmented and heightened.
If we are willing from time to time to stop and
appreciate our past, appraise our present and pre-
pare for our future, I am convinced that the
horizons of achievement still stretch before us like
the unending Plains. And no achievement can be
higher than that of working in harmony with
other nations so that the lash of war may be lifted
from our backs and a peace of lasting friendship
descend upon us."

Letters of Credence

Dominican Repithlic

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Domin-
ican Republic, Andres Freites Barreras, pre-
sented his credentials to President Kennedy on
May 18. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks
and the President's reply, see Department of
State press release 322 dated May 18.

President Sends Troops to Thailand,
U.S. Policy Toward Laos Unchanged

On May 15 President Kennedy at the invitation
of the Royal Thai Government ordered U.S.
troops into Thailand because of attacks in
Laos hy Communist forces. Following are state-
ments issued hy President Kennedy and the Royal
Thai GovemTnent on May 15; the text of a letter
from Ambassador Charles W. Yost, Deputy U.S.
Representative to the United Nations, to the U.N.
Secretary-General informing him, of the U.S. ac-
tion; and a statement mxide hy William' Worth,
Deputy Secretary General of the Southeast Asia
Treaty Organization, at the conclusion of the
meeting of SEATO Council representatives on
May 16.

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT KENNEDY, MAY 15

White House press release dated May 15

Following joint consideration by the Govern-
ments of the United States and Thailand of the
situation in Southeast Asia, the Royal Thai
Government has invited, and I have today ordered,
additional elements of the United States military
forces, both ground and air, to proceed to Thai-
land and to remain there until further orders.
These forces are to help insure the ten-itorial in-
tegrity of this peaceful country.

The dispatch of United States forces to Thai-
land was considered desirable because of recent
attacks in Laos by Communist forces and the sub-
sequent movement of Communist military units
toward the border of Thailand.

A threat to Thailand is of grave concern to the
United States. I have, therefore, ordered certain
additional American military forces into Thai-
land in order that we may be in a position to ful-
fill speedily our obligations under tlie Manila Pact
of 1954,' a defense agreement which was approved
overwhelmingly by the U.S. Senate and to wliich
the Secretary of Slate and Foreign ^Minister of
Thailand referred in their joint statement of
March 0, 1962.^ We are in consultation with
SEATO governments on the situation.

I emphasize that this is a defensive act on the
part of the United States and wliolly consistent
with the United Nations Charter, which specifi-

' For text, see Bulletin of Sept. 20, 1954, p. 393.
' For text, see iUd., Mar. 26, 1962, p. -198.

904

Department of State Bulletin

cally recognizes that nations liave an inherent right
to take collective measures for self-defense. In the
spirit of tliat charter I have directed that the
Secretary-General of the United Nations be in-
formed of the actions that we are taking.

There is no change in our policy toward Laos,
which continues to be the reestablisliment of an
effective cease-fire and prompt negotiations for a
govermnent of national union.

THAI STATEMENT, MAY 15

The recent events in the Kingdom of Laos have
now developed into an mcreasingly critical and
dangerous situation. The pro-Communist Pathet
Lao, with the support of several Communist coun-
tries, has engaged itself in premeditated actions by
the seizure of Muong Sing and Nam Tha in delib-
erate and flagrant violation of the cease-fire agree-
ment. Moreover, the pro-Commimist elements
have pushed their forces in the southwestern
direction toward that Thai border. Such incur-
sions can only mean that the pro-Communist ele-
ments not only seek to gain power over and to
control the Kingdom of Laos, but also desire to
expand further their domination and influence
without limit. These circumstances constitute a
threat to the Kingdom of Thailand and the safety
of the Thai people.

In the face of this threat. His Majesty's Gov-
ernment and governments of friendly nations
which are concerned over the security and safety
of Thailand consider it necessary to adopt meas-
ures to prevent the danger from spreading into
this coimtry.

In consideration of the provisions of the joint
statement of March 6, 1962, issued by the United
States Secretary of State and the Minister of For-
eign Affairs [Thanat Khoman], in which the fol-
lowing important provision is included : "The Sec-
retary of State reaffirmed that the United States
regards the preservation of the independence and
integrity of Thailand as vital to the national
interest of the United States and to world peace.
He expressed the firm intention of the United
States to aid Thailand, its ally and historic friend,
in resisting Communist aggression and subver-
sion", and pursuant to the obligations under the
SEATO treaty, the United States Government
and His JIajesty's Government have agreed that
some units of the United States forces be stationed

in Tliailand for the purpose of cooperating with
the Thai Armed Forces in defending and preserv-
ing the peace and security of the Kingdom of
Thailand against the threat of the pro- Communist
troops which are presently approaching the Thai
territory.

It is hereby announced to the people of Thai-
land with the request that they cooperate fully
with the Government in the firm determination to
protect and maintain the freedom, integrity, inde-
pendence and sovereignty of the Thai nation.

LETTER TO U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL, MAY 15

U.S. /U.N. press release 3994 dated May 16

Mat 15, 1962
Dear Mr. Secretart General : I wish to hiform
you that in response to a request of the Govern-
ment of Thailand, the President of the United
States has ordered additional elements of United
States militaiy forces to Thailand.

You will recall that, in his address on Septem-
ber 25, 1961 ^ to the General Assembly, the Presi-
dent brought to the attention of the General As-
sembly two threats to the peace which caused con-
cern to the United States. The first concerned
Southeast Asia and the second Germany and
Berlin.

Consistent with the policy of the United States
to keep the United Nations fully info lined as to
events affecting the maintenance of international
peace and security in Southeast Asia, I am inform-
ing you of the President's decision. This decision
was considered necessary because of recent attacks
in Laos by communist forces and subsequent move-
ments of communist military imits toward the
border of Thailand. The forces of the United
States are to help ensure the territorial integrity of
Thailand which now faces a threat of communist

Sincerely yours,

Charles W. Yost

SEATO STATEMENT, MAY 16

The Council representatives met this morning
and reviewed the situation in the treaty area.
They heard statements from U.S. and Thai rep-
resentatives of moves which have already begim
for deployment of additional U.S. forces to help

' For text, see ibid., Oct. 16, 1961, p. 619.

iune 4, 1962

905

insure the territorial integrity of Thailand. The
Council representatives welcomed the detailed in-
formation provided. They noted that continuing
consultations were in progress among SEATO
nations for the purpose of considering further
possible moves by other member countries.

They further noted that movement of U.S.
forces into the Kingdom of Thailand was entirely
precautionary and defensive in character but that
it also served as a warning that any Communist
aggression would be resisted.

The movement of U.S. forces to cooperate with
and to reinforce Royal Thai Armed Forces is
wholly consistent with the United Nations Char-
ter, and the Council representatives noted that
the Secretary-General of the United Nations has
been informed of the action taken.

All SEATO member governments have on many
occasions publicly stated their desire for a united
independent Laos, with a truly neutral govern-
ment, and for the reestablislunent of an effective
cease-fire.

Trade and the Atlantic Partnership

Following is the text of remarks made iy Presi-
dent Kennedy hefore the Conference on Trade
Policy at Washington, D.C., on May 17, together
with heynote remarks made hy Secretary Rusk he-
fore the opening session of the conference on the
same day.

REMARKS BY PRESIDENT KENNEDY

White House press release dated May 17 ; as-delivered text

The trade of a nation expresses in a very con-
crete way its aims and its aspirations. When the
people of Boston in 1773 threw cargoes of tea into
the harbor, the American Revolution was in effect
underway, symbolized by this revolution against a
tariff — a tariff which meant taxation without rep-
resentation. When our nation turned, in the 19th
century, to its own protective tariffs as an aid to
industrial development, they symbolized a policy
of noninvolvement and of isolation, of detachment,
from the affairs of the world. "Wlien protection-
ism, in spite of the efforts of President Hoover,
reached its zenith in the Smoot-Hawley tariff, it
reflected a national lack of confidence and growth.
And then, in 1934, under the leadership of Cordell
Hull, the United States started on the long road
back both from protectionism and isolationism.

As the reciprocal trade program was renewed
and refined through 11 acts of Congress, under
the successive leaderships of President Roosevelt,

and through an increasing: exchange ol

President Truman, President Eisenhower, it be
came more and more an expression of America's
free- world leadership — a symbol of America's aim
to encourage free nations to grow together
through trade and travel, through a common de
fense, through aiding the development of poorei
nations,
capital and culture.

And now the time has come for a new chaptei
in American trade policy — a chapter that symbol
izes our new great aspirations: for greater growtt
at home, greater pi'ogress around the world, anc
above all, the emergence of a greater Atlantk
pailnership.^ '

Concept of Atlantic Partnership

In i-ecent days some doubts have been heard
about the reality of this concept of Atlantic part-
nership. Fears have been expressed on this side
of tlie Atlantic that the United States may be ex-
cluded from the coimcils and the markets of Eu-
rope. And fears have been expressed on the other
side of the Atlantic that the United States may
some day abandon its conunitment to European
security.

But I want to emphasize tonight, to all the peo-
ples of the Western alliance, that I strongly be-
lieve that such fears are follv. The United States ■■

' For text of President Kennedy's message to Congress
OH triulc. see Bulletin of Feb. 12, 10C2, p. 231.

906

Department of State Bulletin

cannot withdraw from Europe, unless and until
Europe should wish us gone. We cannot distin-
guish its defenses from our own. We cannot di-
minish our contributions to Western security or
abdicate the responsibilities of power. And it is
a fact of history that responsibility and influence —
in all areas, political, military, and economic —
ultimately rise and fall together. No nation can
long bear the heaviest burdens of responsibility
without sharing in the progress and decisions, just
as no nation can assert for long its influence with-
out accepting its share of these burdens. And our
policies in Europe today are founded on one deep
conviction : that the threat to Western Europe and
freedom is basically indivisible, as is the Western
deterrent to that threat.

The United States, therefore, is committed to
the defense of Europe, by history as well as by
choice. We have no wish to join, much less to
dominate, the European Community. We have no
intention of interfering in its internal afi'airs.
But neither do we hope or plan to please all of our
European allies, who do not always agree with
each other, on every topic of discussion — or to base
those decisions which affect the longrun state of
the common security on the short-term state of our
popularity in the various capitals of Europe.

Let us remember that we are working with al-
lies, with equals — and both our allies and our-
selves have a responsibility to speak frankly as well
as constructively on all issues afl'ecting the West.
If the alliance were to stand still, if we were to
pursue a policy of merely patching over the
sfaf'us quo with the lowest common denominator
of generalities, no doubt all disagi'eements could
be avoided or postponed. But dissent does not
mean disunity — and disagreement can surely be
healthy, so long as we avoid, on both sides of the
Atlantic, any ill-tempered or ill-conceived re-
marks which may encourage those who hope to
divide and conquer.

We cannot and do not take any European ally
for granted — and I hope no one in Europe would
take us for granted either. Our willingness to
bear our full share of Western defenses is deeply
felt, but it is not automatic. American public
opinion has turned away from isolation, but its
faith must not be shattered. Our commitment, let
it be remembered, is to a common, united defense,
in which every member of the Western community
plays a full and responsible role, to the limit of his
capability and in reliance on the strength of

others; and it is that commitment which will be
fulfilled. As long as the United States is staking
its own national security on the defense of Europe,
contributing today 425,000 men at an annual
cost — in the balance of payments, and therefore
in dollars, and therefore potentially in gold — of
$1,600 million to Europe, and calling up 160,000
men — at a budgetary cost of $3,.500 million since
last July — in a far greater efl'ort than that of any
other country in response to last summer's crisis,
we will continue to participate in the great de-
cisions affecting war and peace in that area. A
coherent policy cannot call for both our military
presence and our diplomatic absence.

I am confident that Atlantic unity represents
the true course of history — that Europe and the
United States have not joined forces for more than
a decade to be divided now by limited visions and
suspicions. The direction of our destiny is toward
community and confidence, and the United States
is determined to fulfill that destiny.

Far from resenting the rise of a united Europe,
this country welcomes it^ — a new Europe of equals
instead of rivals — a new Europe, born of common
ideals, instead of the old Europe, torn by national
and personal animosities. We look forward to its
increased role, as a full and equal partner, in both
the burdens and the opportmiities of aid, trade,
finance, diplomacy, and defense. We look forward
to the strengthening of world peace that would
result from a European Community in which no
member could either dominate or endanger the
others. And surely, may I add, each member
would find in the fabric of European unity and
Atlantic partnership an oj^portunity for achieve-
ment of grandeur, and for a voice in its own
destiny, far greater than it would find in the more
traditional and vulnerable fabrics of disunity and
mutual distrust.

The debate now raging in Europe echoes on a
grand scale the debates which took place in this
country between 1783 and 1789. Small states are
sometimes fearful of big ones. Big states are
suspicious for historical reasons of one another.
Some statesmen cling to traditional forms — others
clamor for new ones. And every eye is on the
hostile powers who are never far away. All this
reminds us of our own organic deliberations.

But whatever the final resolution of today's
debates. Western imity is not an end in itself.
Collective security and deterrence are not enough.
The time and the opportunity that they afford us

June 4, 7962

907

are not worth the risk and the effort they require
if we do not use them for constructive ends. If
there is to be a new Atlantic partnership, it must
be a partnership of strong, not weak, economies —
of growing, not declining, societies. And the great
attraction of trade expansion for the United States
is not only its contribution to a grand design of
Atlantic partnership but its practical benefits to
our own economy as well.

For today we wish to step up our growth — and
trade expansion, by increasing exports as well as
imports and providing new outlets and new jobs,
will help expand that growth.

Practical Benefits of Trade Expansion

We wish to avoid inflation — and trade expan-
sion, by inspiring American business to modernize
for competition abroad and by introducing new
import competition here, will help to prevent that
inflation.

We wish to improve our balance of payments —
and trade expansion, by increasing our export
surplus, will enable us to correct this deficit with-
out imposing new restrictions or reneging on our
security pledges.

We wish to increase investment at home — and
trade expansion, by putting American business-
men on an equal footing with their European
counterparts in terms of access to the Common
Market, will help make it unnecessary for our
industries to build new plants behind the Common
Market wall instead of here at home.

We wish to increase the American standard of
living — and trade expansion, by enlarging the
supply of goods from abroad and stretching the
consumer's dollar further, will help every Ameri-
can family.

There are many more gains that could be men-
tioned. Trade expansion will help spur plant
modernization; it will turn the attention of the
Government and industry to how to make our
plants more competitive and how to put them on a
basis of equality with those goods that are being
imported; it will help provide outlets for our
farm surpluses and even help reduce existing
budget costs — by lessening the costs of imported
raw materials, for example, for our national de-
fense and ultimately the cost of foreign aid to
those nations now denied the opportunity to earn
foreign exchange for their own development.

We have prospered mightily during this period

of the reciprocal trade program. Our exports, a
meager $2 billion a year during the 3 years before
the enactment of the first Trade Agreements Act
in 1934, have increased tenfold to some $20 billion.
Every American is richer because of this great
effort.

And yet, until recently — and tliis remains one
of our most serious problems today in the Con-
gress— most Americans were largely unaware of
the benefits of foreign trade. Many can "see" an
import, but very few could "see" an export.
While both labor and management in other na-
tions— such as Britain and Japan — recognize that
they must trade or die, we have for a long time
remained, in both labor and management, largely
unconcerned.

Today I believe all this is changing, but it's not,
obviously, changing fast enough. American busi-
nessmen are determined to share in the phenom-
enal growth of the Common Market, but we want
evei-y American businessman to be looking all
around the world for a place in which he can par-
ticipate successfully in private investment. The
Japanese economy as well is growing at the spec-
tacular rate of 8 jDcrcent a year or more. Over the
past 5 years Americans have sold in Japan $114
billion more than we have bought from Japan.

Trade Adjustment Assistance

In short, this trade expansion program can ben-
efit us all. I don't say that there won't be some
changes in our economy which will require adjust-
ment. But we will be producing more of what
we produce best, and othei-s will be producing
moi"e of what they produce best. There will be
new employment in our growth industries — and
this will come mostly in our high-wage industries,
which are our most competitive abroad — and less
new employment in some others. But these shifts
go on every week in our lives, in this country, as
the result of domestic competition. At the vei-y
most, the number of workers who will have to
change jobs as a result of this new trade policy
will not in a whole year equal the number of work-
ers who have to change jobs every 3 weeks because
of competitive changes here at home. And yet
for these workers we are planning special
assistance.

There may be a few cases — a very few cases —
where individual companies or grouj^s of workers
will face genuine hardships in tiding to adjust to

908

Department of State Bulletin

this changing world and market and lack the re-
sources to do so. Our bill seeks to taJie out an in-
surance policy for these cases called trade adjust-
ment assistance, wliich has worked so well in the
Common Market. It is a constructive, business-
like program of loans and allowances tailored to
help firms and workers get back into the competi-
tive stream through increasing or changing pro-
ductivity. Instead of the dole of tariff protec-
tion, we are substituting an investment in better
production.

In addition we have made special arrangements
for such industries as textiles and oil. And
tiiially, we are retaining an escape clause for those
emergencies where an entire industry requires the
temporary relief of tariff protection as the result
of abrupt changes in trading patterns.

But let us not miss the real point; let us not
focus ourselves so much on these insurance policies
that we forget the great new positive opportunities
opened to us in trade. To falter now or become
afraid of economic challenges in tliis country
which has been second to none in all of our his-
tory in our ability to compete, or become impatient
in the face of difficult and delicate diplomatic prob-
lems, or make it impossible for those Americans
who represent us in these negotiations to effec-
tively speak for this country because of provisions
written into bills which make it impossible for
them — even though they bear the responsibility,
they do not bear the authority if these powers are
too circumscribed — so that we will end with an
illusion of a tool to serve us, but not a reality.
Unless we can concentrate our attention on what
is an historic opportunity, we could well undo all
the great acliievements of this nation in buildinjr
this great Atlantic community.

There is an old Chinese saying that each genera-
tion builds a road for the next. The road has been
well built for us, and I believe it incumbent upon
us, in our generation, this year of 1962, to build
our road for the next generation. And I believe
that this bill is it.

REMARKS BY SECRETARY RUSK

Press release 31" dated May 16

I consider it a great privilege to be the opening
speaker at this gathering of the Conference on
Trade Policy. I know you by your works. You
and the organizations you represent have done
much — over a span of many years — to guide this

June 4, 1962

640621 — 62 S

nation on a course toward expanding economies
and flourishing trade throughout the world.
Through many renewals of the Trade Agreements
Act you have fought valiantly on behalf of your
organizations and your country.

I pay my respects to this distinguished service
to the national interest. Over the years, you have
been told that each new battle was the most critical,
the most significant. Each time it was true ; each
time more true than the last. With deep convic-
tion I tell you that this year the trade issue has new
dimensions that give it unique urgency.

The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 is a new
initiative, a new program to replace measures that
have become outpaced by the march of world
events. Its provisions take cognizance of the spe-
cial problems and needs of this nation as it ad-
vances to meet the promises and the complex prob-
lems of the sixties.

Growing Recognition of Interdependence

Implicit in the provisions of this act is the recog-
nition by the United States of the growing inter-
dependence of the nations of the free world.
United by the sovereignty of freedom, this family
of nations is not only menaced by Communist
ambition ; it is challenged to prove its basic tliesis
that government by free choice can best answer
man's demand for social and economic progress.

National security alone compels interdepend-
ence. Domestic goals — among them economic
growth and higher living standards— increasingly
call for cooperative measures among countries of
the free world. Fiscal and monetary problems in
today's world defy unilateral solution.

Nowhere is the recognition of interdependence
more evident than in Europe today. The Common
Market, the Coal and Steel Community, and
EURATOM [European Atomic Energy Com-
munity] are the first institutions of the rapidly
developing economic integration of Western
Europe. Powerful forces are moving the Euro-
pean Community toward political integration as
well.

Survival and growth have forced the nations of
Europe to forget their historic antagonisms and
unite. Through the pooling of resources and ef-
forts, a mighty new entity is growing out of tlie
chaos left by national rivalries and world war.

We became heavily engaged in the rebuilding
of Europe the moment the American people fully

909

recognized our common destiny with Europe in
the postwar world, and we have strongly supported
tlie move toward unity. NATO has emerged as
the military arm of our partnership with Europe.
We and the Canadians have joined with 18 Euro-
pean nations in the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development, an organization
created to bring into closer agreement the economic
and financial policies of the Atlantic community
and, with Japan, to mobilize the energies and re-
sources of the industrial free world in assisting
the developing countries.

The Atlantic community is a going concern;
Western Europe is prospering with a growth rate
greater than ours; economic and social develop-
ment in the imderdeveloped countries is moving
forward through concerted American and Euro-
pean efforts; the internal Communist threat in
Europe has been largely dissipated. Strong
NATO forces deter military adventurers. Part-
nership is working.

Last year the United States launched another
great project in partnership in another area — the
Alliance for Progress. A mutual concern for the
security of the Western Hemisphere coupled with
the urgent need for economic and social advance-
ment among our Latin neighbors prompted the
creation of a development program of great
dimension. Again the recognition of inter-
dependence has resulted in a joint commitment to
mutual assistance.

On a global scale the United Nations is working
to control centrifugal world forces through pro-
grams attacking the scourges of poverty, illiteracy,
and disease, as well as through providing ma-
chinery for the settlement of at least some of the
corrosive problems among its members.

It is in this context of the growing recognition
of interdependence and the emergence of inter-
national institutions for cooperation that we must
consider the question of expanded free-world
trade.

I must stress that we are in a period of transi-
tion, of fluidity. But we can move in some conii-
dence that the new patterns of integration in
Europe, of development in Latin America, of inde-
pendent nation-states in Africa and Asia, will
progress along lines that will bo congenial to our
foreign policy objectives. We seek a close partner-
ship with the industrial democracies, an alliance
sharing tlie burdens and responsibilities of build-

ing and defendhig the free world. We seek to
forge strong bonds with the developed nations and
the developing nations, bonds that depend on as-
sistance, cooperation, and free choice.

Support for the less developed nations in their
efforts to move toward self-sustaining growth and
independence must include not only direct eco-
nomic assistance but also a determination to pro-
vide markets for their products, so that they may
earn the foreign exchange necessary to generate
their own dynamism for development.

Challenges to Free-World Trade

Against our design for a world of free choice,
the Sino-Soviet bloc has mounted an offensive —
using trade and aid as a weapon — to bring these
less developed nations into the Communist orbit.
"We threaten capitalism," Premier Khrushchev
has said, "by peaceful economic competition." In
fact, in this period of revolutionary change and
attendant instability, Communist coercion threat-
ens to subvert the finidamental concept of a world
community of free and independent peoples.

There are other dangers. Patterns of inter-
national trade will either bring the free world into
closer harmony, or they will produce increasing
discord. The formation of a protectionist Euro-
pean trade bloc, giving preferential treatment to
associated states but discriminating against the
United States, Japan, and Latin America, would
be disastrously divisive of the free world. Euro-
pean leadership, sharing our awareness of this
fact, has pointed the market movement in the di-
rection of liberal trade. The present Common
Market countries showed themselves, in the round
of GATT negotiations concluded last winter, pre-
pared to bargain down their exterior trade barriei"s
and to eliminate other barriers to trade with the
outside world. The Common Market has set its
external tariff rates at a level that is comparable
to our own.

The time has come for the United States to in-
dicate the nature of its response. We are clial-
lenged to lead in the negotiation of relationships
with the Common Market area that will expand
trade througliout all of the free world on a non-
discriminatory basis.

The President, in the Trade Expansion Act of
10G2, has asked for the tools needed to negotiate.
Wo must make concessions to get concessions.
That the President get the powei's he has re-

910

Departmenf of State Bullef'in

quested is essential to free-world strength and
unity, and thus the national security of the United
States.

Needless to say. the trade bill alone will not
expand trade. Much depends on our ability to
use the authority etfectively. As much depends
on the initiative of American producers.

On the first requirement, that we negotiate ef-
fectively, I have no fears. Trade concessions will
be made on a truly reciprocal basis, leading to ex-
pansion of trade to the mutual benefit of the
parties concerned. Our trade negotiators act
under a mandate to serve the national interest and
protect the economic strength of the Nation as a
whole.

American negotiators have shown themselves
time and time again to be good Yankee traders.
The continued — -in fact, tenfold — expansion of
United States trade since 1934 proves their effec-
tiveness. The lowering of tariffs is not their only
objective; given effective bargaining power, they
will continue to attack the many other types of
restrictions that restrain trade. However, the ef-
fectiveness of our negotiators is dependent on their
having the requisite bargaining power.

I might add, pai-enthetically, that a vigorous
export promotion program, here and abroad, is
being carried out by the State and Commerce De-
partments. The commercial officers of our For-
eign Service will play a major role in increasing
American business activity abroad through pro-
viding foreign market information and develop-
ing new trade opportunities.

Given the authority contained in tliis bill, the
United States Government can and will secure
agreements opening the possibility of substan-
tially increased American exports. It will then
be largely up to our producers and salesmen to
capitalize on the opportunities. This new trading
world will be intensely competitive. But compet-
ing is what we do best in this country.

The countries with which we strike trade bar-
gains can be expected to exploit every new pos-
sibility to expand their exports to this country.
Exploitation of the advantages offered us will
challenge the aggressive spirit, initiative, and
imagination that are the foundation of this na-
tion's progress and power. We will be committed

to a massive demonstration of the workability and
applicability of free enterprise. What is needed
is the effort. AVe have the capability; indeed, I
am convinced that we have the comiDetitive ad-
vantage.

The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 will give the
President the authority to assure the United States
continued leadership in the formative years of a
great alliance of free nations. We are not given
the choice of sustaining the status quo. Either we
accept leadership or lay down our mantle and re-
treat to a perilous isolation. To meet the challenge
demands total commitment on the part of the
American people and total engagement of
America's resources.

President Reaffirms U.S. Friendship
for People of Philippines

Statement iy President Kennedy

White House press release dated May 15

It is with deep regret that I learned of the de-
cision of President Diosdado Macapagal of the
Philippines to postpone his visit to the United
States next month. I miderstand that President
Macapagal's decision resulted from his country's
disappointment over the failure of the Congress on
May 9 to enact the Philippine War Damage Bill.

A new bill ^ designed to fulfill this obligation
has now been introduced m Congress with biparti-
san sponsorship. The congressional leadership
has assured me that it will again give its full sup-
port for the legislation, and I am hopeful that the
new bill will pass. I am hopeful, too, that this
disappointment will not be allowed to alter the
liarmonious relations between our countries and
our profound and lasting friendship.

I sincerely hope that the many expressions of
good will and sympathy by our people and our
press will be accepted by the people of the Philip-
pines as the true measure of our friendship and
understanding. We continue to look forward with
pleasure and anticipation to welcoming President
Macapagal to the United States in the near future.

' H.R. 11721.

June 4, 7962

911

American Business Abroad

hy Under Secretary Ball ^

I should like tonight to see if the dialog between
government and business cannot be conducted
without the cliches with which it is so often
marked — and sometimes distorted. I propose to
speak to 5'ou with candor because candor is the
only form of conversation appropriate between
friends and I think that it is important that there
be full understanding on both sides.

American business is a major component of the
total national interest of the United States. A
mere assertion of this undeniable fact seems to
me sufficient comment on the argmnent as to
whether the present government is "probusinoss"'
or "antibusiness." That is a singularly sterile
formulation. Any administration not prepared
to give due support to such a major national inter-
est as American business would be irresponsible.

The question, it seems to me, should be posed
quite differently. How can the Federal Govern-
ment promote and advance the interests of Ameri-
can business in a manner consistent with the pro-
motion and advancement of other significant
components of the United States national interest ?

This question becomes particularly complex
when directed toward American business abroad —
by which I mean to include all phases of business
activity outside tlie territorial limits of the United
States in which American individuals and corpo-
rations are involved.

The question can be answered intelligently only
if we are quite clear as to the larger purposes of
our policy toward other nations. The main ob-
jective of that policy can be simply stated. It is
to assure that the United States and its citizens

'Address made before the Kusiness Council nt Hot
Springs, Va., on May 12 (press release 308; as-elelivered
text).

shall have freedom, security, and well-being in a
world menaced by a bloc of antagonistic nations
commanding weapons capable of incinerating the
whole Northern Hemisphere.

In order for us to achieve that objective the
whole free world must be strong. That means
not only that the major member nations of the
free world must be able to mobilize collective
strength but that individual member nations, large
or small, must secure the basis for independence
through economic and political stability and
progress.

A World of Change and Turbulence

The attainment of that goal is not easy, but we
do not live in an easy world. We live in a world
of change and turbulence, swept by the tides of
great historic forces. It would be folly on our
part to attempt to ignore or halt the movement of
those forces, as certain organized and vocal ele-
ments in our society would have us do. King
Canute's efforts to keep back the ocean with a
broom disclosed commenilable energj' but very
little sense of the nature of the forces with which
he was contending.

A mark of statesmanship — of good government
jwlicy, whether domestic or foreign — is to recog-
nize the potentially benign forces in the world
and to try to channel and direct them toward con-
structive ends. It is for this reason that the
United States has not tried to halt but to guide
the great convulsive movements that have shaken
the world during the last few years— the move-
ments, for example, that have brought about the
shattering of the great colonial systems or tliat are
bringing about a new unity in Europe.

I shall confine my remarks toniglit to (lie first

912

Deparfmenf of Sfafe Buf/ef/n

of these movements — the drive to end colonial-
ism— and to the implications of that drive for
American business overseas.

Supporting Aspirations of New Nations

In the worldwide process of decolonialism that
has occurred since the war, the United States has,
as a matter of policy, supported the aspirations of
the colonial peoples for economic and political
independence. We could hardly have done other-
wise and have still kept faith with our own
traditions, for our nation, after all, sprang from
a handful of colonies that revolted against the
highhanded efforts of a colonial government to
serve the selfish business interests of the homeland.
But we have had an additional reason to give our
support to this convulsive movement; we have
seen it as a force that, if frustrated, would gen-
erate chaos but if intelligently channeled and
directed could lead to highly constructive ends.

Today the world is nearing tlae end of the co-
lonial chapter. Since the Second World War 42
new countries have come into being. Most have
been born weak; some have been born prema-
turely; all face a long youth and adolescence be-
fore they can attain an adequate measure of
economic and political strength. Our task of help-
ing them through this formative period will re-
main unfinished business for many years to come.

Respecting the Sovereignty of Developing Nations

Our determination to support and assist the
nations struggling for independence and a self-
respecting place in the sun has required some re-
visions in traditional policies — and particularly
policies relating to the nature of the support which
the government in former years provided to Amer-
icans doing business in less developed countries.

"Gunboat diplomacy" — which sometimes char-
acterized our attitude toward certain of the less
developed countries during the latter part of the
10th and the early 20th centuries — reflected the
prevailing spirit of the times. It was a manifes-
tation of the colonial psychology that then domi-
nated the relations between the big, rich nations
and areas less highly endowed or developed. In
such a world environment American business
could operate with considerable freedom without
paying heed to charges of economic imperialism.
If it got into serious trouble it could rely with
reasonable assurance on direct United States in-

tervention. But within the framework of ideas
that dominate the free world today, such conduct
would be an anachronism. The United States
Government cannot disregard the sovereignty of
the less developed nations without contravening
its own policy of helping those nations to become
independent and self-respecting.

This is a matter of great sensitivity. The Com-
munists are constantly alert to capitalize on the
deeply felt revidsion of the less developed nations
not only against colonial policy as an abstraction
but against any acts reminiscent of gunboat di-
plomacy. They raise the specter of economic im-
perialism to defeat our policies whenever we give
them a chance.

Quite obviously the dynamism of these new
movements has complicated the problem of doing
business in many areas of the world. And I would
be less than candid if I did not acknowledge that
the elimination of direct intervention as a prop
and support for American business abroad has in-
creased the risks for American entrepreneurs.
Critics have contended that the present-day posi-
tions of the United States Government are incon-
sistent, that we are pursuing contradictory
courses. We encourage business to invest in less
developed areas; at the same time we pursue a
self-denying ordinance with regard to interven-
tion to protect such investments.

I think it is enough to point out, in reply, that
both policies are consistent with the larger pur-
poses of our foreign relations and are not as
mutually contradictory as they may appear.
American firms serve the national interest by in-
vesting in less developed countries and thus
hastening their economic development; and in-
vestment in such countries today is supported by
new forms of security consistent with the direction
of our modern foreign policy. Direct interven-
tion, on the other hand, would defeat the very
national interest served by such investment
overseas.

New Forms of Security for Overseas Investments

What are these new forms of security?

The first is the substantial public investment
that the United States is making in bringing about
the growth and stability of the economies of the
less developed nations.

No business can be secure over the long pull in
a climate of turbulence and trouble. No matter

June 4, 1962

913

how often the funnels of the American fleet might
loom over tlie horizon, permanent security would
depend ultimately upon the existence of stable
local governments that could resist penetration
and subversion, upon stable societies that were not
a breeding ground for communism, and upon
stable economies that were not vulnerable to dis-
astrous inflation and wild, cyclical disturbances.

Our foreign assistance programs are, of course,
an investment in trying to insure stable conditions
of this kind. Tliey are an essentia] prerequisite to
the development of private enterprise, not only
because they provide tlie capital needed for basic
facilities but also because they assist the training
of local personnel in the arts of public administra-
tion, finance, and business management.

Foreign assistance, in the nature of things, does
not remove all of the economic and political risks
of doing business in countries just starting down
the long road toward economic growth. In fact,
in its early stages under certain circimistances it
may increase those risks because of the social and
political consequences of economic change.

Our Government recognizes these problems and
now offers the means of protection against many
of these risks through a system of investment
guaranties. Initially these guaranties were writ-
ten to cover only the rislvS of expropriation, in-
convertibility of currencies, and war. At the
outset of the Kennedy administration we began to
experiment with an all-risk guaranty. Such a
guaranty can cover a negotiated percentage of the
more subtle political risks on new investments.
This guaranty is now included in our foreign-aid
legislation on a limited basis.

I do not think that we have exhausted the pos-
sibility of improving not only the scope but the
administration of these guaranties. No one has
had long experience with this form of iiu'cstment
protection, and we are inclined to view it quite
pragmatically. If we are to go farther along this
road, if we are to extend the system of investment
guaranties particularly toward the coverage of an
increased spectrum of risks, we shall need the
active interest and support of business — as well as
the ideas you can distill from your own accumu-
lating experience.

Controlling Principles for the Investor

The degree of political hazard to whicli an in-
vestment may be subject in a less developed coun-
try cannot be computed in a vacuum ; it will depend

to a considerable extent on the policies pursued by
the investor. I do not intend tonight to try to
tell you gentlemen how to manage your affairs, but
there are, I would suppose, a few controlling prin-
ciples tliat have been pretty thoroughly tested by
experience.

First, a company investing in a less developed
country can reduce political vulnerability by ar-
ranging for a substantial component of local
interest having a stake in the success of the enter-
prise. The most obvious way is to provide for
participation by local partners. In the event that
substantial local capital is unavailable the enter-
prise can still be established, under any of a num-
ber of teclmiques, on such a basis as to make
possible the gradual creation of a local investment
interest.

Second, the base of local support can also be
expanded by employing as many local citizens as
possible both in the labor force and in manage-
ment. In most instances this, of course, will in-
volve systematic programs for management
training.

Third, the character and relative magnitude of
the investment will affect the violence of the po-
litical forces it attracts. An enterprise, for ex-
ample, that dominates an entire industry or indus-
trial sector is especially likely to incite xenophobic
reactions that may grow in intensity as the nation
moves farther down the road toward self-sustain-
ing growth, acquires a heightened sense of self-
confidence, and becomes increasingly resentful that
its self-respect is compromised by a dependence on
foreign capital. Obviously this will depend to
some extent upon the nature of the enterprise.
Experience has shown that sensitivity is likely to
be greater in the case of enterprises designed to
exploit those natural resources that are regarded
as part of a country's heritage — or enterprises
that have some symbolic significance as tlie mark
of industrial power and maturity.

U.S. Policy on Expropriation

Local political interference with investments in
less developed countries may take a variety of
forms. The most forthright and dramatic form is,
of course, outright expropriation.

The United States has long recognized that any
country has tlie right to expropriate pi'operty, in-
chuliug that of Ainoricans, provided it olTers just
compensation. This means, of course, that the
compensation must bo reasonably adequate and

914

Department of Slate ButleI'm

that payment must be reasonably prompt.

The right to expropriate property is implicit in
sovereignty — as our own Constitution recognizes.
Every govei-nment must be able to take private
property when it deems it necessary to the conduct
of its business. Under American law we call it
the power of eminent domain.

This does not, of course, mean that we regard
expropriation as a good thing. In most cases it
is clearly not a useful policy, particularly for less
developed countries. Such countries characteris-
tically are starved for capital, and the taking over
of existing properties is a foolish way for them to
employ their limited resources.

Expropriation frequently involves the diversion
of resources needed for the development of na-
tions we are assisting. In many cases it means the
ti-ansf er of property from competent private hands
to governments that lack the managei'ial skill to
provide efficient administration. By tending to
spoil the climate for private investment it may
deprive a developing nation of the inflow of needed
capital that might otherwise be available. As a
matter of government policy we feel obligated to
make known to the less developed nations our
views on the disadvantages inherent in
expropriation.

We express the same view toward forms of gov-
ernmental interference with American business
that may be more sophisticated but are no less
lethal.

Let me be quite precise at this point. We do
not wish to discourage developing countries from
adopting such measures as requirements for fair
labor standards, systems of social security, pro-
gressive taxation, and the regulation of utilities.
These are all familiar features of the American
economic scene, and we cannot disown them when
they appear in an unfamiliar envii-onment. In
fact, within limits appropriate to their economic
strength, we are anxious to see the developing
nations adopt sound and progressive tax and
labor laws and other measures designed to assure
an increased sense of social justice and a broader
base of participation in the fruits of economic
progress.

But when such measures are, in fact or in form,
applied so as to discriminate against, and harass,
foreign business enterprise, they can amount to
what has been often called "creeping expropria-
tion." Wlien this occurs, the United States Gov-
ernment is prepared to make its views known to the

governments involved in no uncertain terms. It
does in fact frequently do so, and when it does —
perhaps more often than you think — it gets results.

If, in the face of American advice, a government
proceeds with expropriation, I can assure you that
the full diplomatic resources of the U.S. Govern-
ment will be made available to see that fair
treatment is accorded to the American business
involved. This means that our embassies will use
their full influence to make sure that the American
company has an opportunity to present its case
fully to the appropriate agency of the foreign
goveriunent and that the foreign government is
aware of the American Government's interest and
support. An embassy can generally make a reli-
able judgment as to whether procedures for relief
available to the American national through the
local courts are adequate and will assure him due
process of law. But — depending upon the circum-
stances of the particular case — it may not be able
to make an informed judgment as to whether any
particular amount of compensation is adequate.

Obviously, the embassies of the United States
cannot be expected to make a strong presentation
in cases where an American national may not him-
self have clean hands, where he may have been
guilty of policies which are manifestly inconsist-
ent with legitimate requirements of the host coun-
try. But any American national who has com-
ported himself according to the laws of that
country will, I can assure you, receive the full and
vigorous assistance of the State Department and
our embassies abroad.

Coercion Would Be Self-Defeating

Expropriation, government ownership, the
temptation of new countries to prefer experiments
in socialism to free enterprise, and the subjection
of foreign investment to intensive regulation — all
these tendencies raise major issues for our foreign
policy. Americans have a firm — often an evangel-
ical— conviction in the virtues and achievements of
the kind of responsible free capitalism that we
have evolved in this country. But to what extent
should we try to shape other nations in our own
image? 'N^Hiat steps, for example, should the
United States Government take to protect Ameri-
can interests where it sees tendencies developing
that are departures from our own economic
philosophy ?

Speaking from their own point of view, the

June 4, 7962

915

Communists, of course, can answer this question as
a matter of conditioned reflex. They are prepared
to bring about a Communist world by subvei'sion
if possible, by force if necessary. As President
Kennedy reported after his conversation with
Premier Khrushchev in Vienna : ^

He [Khrushchev] was certain that the tide there was
moving his way, that the revolution of rising peoples
would eventually be a Communist revolution, and that the
so-called "wars of liberation," supported by the Kremlin,
would replace the old methods of direct aggression and
invasion.

But the fact that the Communists blatantly pro-
claim their intention to impose their own economic
system on less developed countries does not mean
that we should do so also; in fact, for us to use
coercive methods would, by constituting a nega-
tion of our own basic principles, be self-defeating.

After all, what we find most attractive about
the economic system that has evolved in America
is that it preserves a substantial element of free
choice for the individual in the conduct of his
economic life. It is thus consistent with the polit-
ical principles on which we have organized our
Government. Yet our very emphasis on the right
to choose, it seems to me, precludes us from seek-
ing to coerce any country into adopting an eco-
nomic system of our choosing against its own free
will.

For this reason the State Department has con-
sistently opposed legislative proposals for auto-
matic retaliation, by the denial of aid, for example,
against economic policies abroad that are incon-
sistent with our own notions of free enterprise.
Such policies smack too much of gunboat diplo-
macy to be useful in today's more complicated
world.

Embassies Promote American Business Interests

Business, of course, may be expected to exercise
reasonable prudence in anticipating trouble. It
should often be more sensitive, better informed,
and more sophisticated with regard to local politi-
cal trends and pressures. "Wlien I was in private
life as a lawyer advising American business in
connection with investments overseas I was occa-
sionally appalled by the ignorant self-assurance of
representatives of American companies who com-
mitted substantial capital in foreign countries

'■ Bulletin of June 26, 1961, p. 991.
916

without any intelligent inquiry as to the political
environment in which they would be doing busi-
ness or the personalities wlio dominated the local
political scene. In many cases they involved
themselves in business affairs with dubious local
citizens, promoters, and operators on the fringes
of respectability, whose unreliability could have
been ascertained by a minimum of inquiry. I was
struck then — and my amazement has been com
pounded since I have been in the Government —
by the bland assumption of many American busi-
nessmen that if they can tell an honest man when
they see him in Waco, Texas, tliey can identify a
responsible citizen with the same assurance in
Graustark even though he speaks an unfamiliar
language, springs from a wholly different social
milieu, and has been trained to a different code of
business or professional behavior.

I do not suggest that these remarks are applica'
ble to you gentlemen who are the heads of our
largest enterprises, for as a rule American bij
business has usually shown judgment and political
astuteness in its overseas activities. Nevertheless,
I would be reasonably certain that the representa-
tives of even some of the companies that you gen-
tlemen head frequently tend to ignore a substantial
resource of advice and local information that is
yours by right. I refer to our embassies and con-
sular offices.

I have been amazed for many years to note how
often American enterprises make substantial in-
vestments in foreign countries without any con-
sultation whatever with the American embassies.
Not very long ago I encountered a principal offi-
cial of a major American company which had
maintained a substantial operation in a foreign
country for 10 years. Although he had had the
principal responsibility for its operations, he had
never once set foot in the embassy.

I shall not attempt at this time to account for
this curious pattern of conduct. I have no doubt
that there have been cases where our embassies i
have taken an indifferent or even disdainful atti-
tude toward American businessmen. Businessmen!
and professional diplomats in the past have had]
difficulty finding a common language, and there
has been prejudice in both directions.

I report this phenomenon to you tonight, there-
fore, merely with the suggestion that the initiative
is yours more than ours and that your representa-
tives overseas can be in touch with our embassies

Department of State Bulletin

much more easily than our embassies can bo in
touch with your representatives. And I want to
indicate beyond any question that it is tlae policy
of the Department of State that embassies abroad
have, as one of their obligations, the promotion
and advancement of the legitimate interests of
American business abroad. If you find any in-
stances where you feel this obligation is being dis-
regarded we should like to know about it.

Safeguarding the Overall National Interest

The problem of conducting either foreign policy
or business operations has become increasingly
complicated as the world has grown more complex.
New attitudes regarding the relations of men and
nations have set in motion vast forces. These
forces require the reexamination of many of the
policies and procedures that have classically been
employed by busmessmen in their overseas opera-
tions. They also demand a constant reconsidera-
tion of the governmental measures needed to
safeguard the overall United States national
interest.

On the whole I think that American business
has behaved with responsibility and wisdom in its
operations abroad during a period that has not
been an easy one. Most business enterprises have
conducted themselves in a manner to do credit to
American economic principles. Where well-man-
aged American enterprises have provided concrete
demonstrations of the achievements possible
through a free economic system, the local govern-
ments have often responded beyond expectations.
The behavior of business abroad has, in fact, been
the most effective answer to the ideological carica-
tures of American capitalism that have had such
wide dissemination in many of the less developed
countries.

The proof has been made manifest when devel-
oping countries have published their second and
third economic plans; they have — more often than
not — given an increasing role to private business,
both domestic and foreign, over the role assigned
in the initial drafts.

I cannot, in good conscience, suggest to you to-
night that I think your problems in doing business
abroad will grow any simpler. We must, I think,
look forward to a world where the only certainty is
change — change that will take place more rapidly
than any of us think. If American business is to
continue to play an effective role in this changing

world it must continue to maintain its flexibility
and an almost infinite capacity for adjustment to
new situations.

It is more than ever important during this time
of change that both business and government be
aware of the increasing interrelationship between
foreign policy and the policies of American com-
panies in their overseas activities. Certainly that
is the spirit with which the State Department and
other Departments of the Government are ap-
proaching the problem. If we are each constantly
aware of this interrelationship I know we can con-
tinue to be helpfxil to one another.

Friendship and Cooperation in Africa
Strengthened by Personal Contacts

Statement hy G. Mennen Williams
Assistant Sea'etary for African Affairs ^

One of President Kennedy's first directives to
me upon my appointment as Assistant Secretary
of State for African Affairs was to familiarize
myself as quickly as possible with the people, the
leaders, and the countries of Africa. With the
completion of this fourth trip, I have now visited
a total of 41 countries on that continent.

Our recent 1-month tour took Mrs. Williams,
my colleagues, and me to six countries I had not
previously visited and also allowed us to stop
briefly in six others included in my first trip made
a little more than a year ago.

In each of these 12 countries our group was
received in an exceedingly warm and friendly
mamaer. Government officials — both national
and local — political leaders, educators, teclmical
specialists, labor leaders, missionaries, and people
in many other walks of life went out of their way
to make our trip both informative and pleasant.
During extensive field visits and in comprehensive
conferences, we received the benefit of full and
fraiLk discussions to give us a broad appreciation
of the problems and aspirations of these countries
and their peoples.

Tlie outstanding impressions I bring back from
this trip include these five:

' Made on May 14 upon arrival at Washington, D.C.,
from a montii's visit to Africa (press release 310) ; for
an announcement of Mr. Williams' trip, see Bulletin of
Apr. 30, 1962, p. 722.

iune 4, 1962

917

1. Increasingly the leaders and the people of
many African countries ■wish to strengthen ties
of friendship and cooperation with the United
States. This was evident not only among chiefs
of state and national officials but among provin-
cial and local officials, opposition parties, and
minority and youth groups. In informal per-
sonal contacts with people in urban and rural
areas alike, we found many indications of great
interest in the United States and in further
mutually beneficial African-American relation-
ships. I was impressed with the number of coun-
tries eager to receive American private invest-
ment.

2. Leaders of African nations are preoccupied
witli overriding and interrelated problems of eco-
nomic development, education, transportation, and
communications. These leaders are working hard
to use their limited resources in overcoming these
problems, but some outside assistance is required
by them in these efforts. These African lands
count upon continued or new assistance from
older, more developed nations, particularly the
United States. Our task is to devise increasingly
effective programs with other free countries and
through tlie United Nations, and to encourage
more extensive contributions from private busi-
nesses and organizations that will help these new
nations become strong and viable.

3. Intensive Communist efforts to penetrate
Africa have resulted in a net minus rather than a
net plus. Although these efforts have extended
the Communist presence in some areas, I think it
can be said that they have had some serious re-
versals and that the overall result of their work is
relatively disappointing to them. This is not to
say that the United States' intei'est in Africa is
guided by cold-war considerations. Our interest
in Africa is in the development of that great con-
tinent in peace and prosperity, in accordance with
the aspirations of the African peoples. But wher-
ever Communist threats to such peaceful growth
are detected, we cannot disregard them. We
wouhl hope, however, that the cold war can be
minimized in Africa, and we will do all in our
power to prevent its spread there.

4. Youth is emerging as an increasingly im-
portant force in African development. During
this last African tour I talked with students and
other young Africans in many countries and
learned of their intense desire for economic and
social progress in their homelands and for world-
wide acceptance of African peoples and nations
on a basis of dignity and equality. African youth
is impatient and eager to find possible shortcuts to
the realization of desires. This is a real challenge
to African governments, and they are beginning
to give more attention to ways and means of utiliz-
ing the full potential of the younger generation
in the task of nation-building. We should give a
high priority to helping them in these efforts.

5. There is a marked increase in intra-African
cooperation.- There is, for example, evidence of
growing relationships between French-speaking
and English-speaking nations. Leaders in both
groups are studying each other's official languages
to be better able to meet and personally discuss
common problems.

On this trip I had an opportunity to study the
African and Malagasy Union (UAM) , a 12-nation,
French-speaking regional organization. We vis-
ited five of these UAM member countries — Came-
roon, Central African Republic, Congo (Brazza-
ville), Dahomey, and Upper Volta. I met with
this year's UAM Chairman, President Ahidjo of
Cameroon. I also visited with UAM Secretary
General Tevoedji-e at Cotonou, Dahomey, with
the Secretai-y General of the Organization for
African and Malagasy Economic Cooperation at
Yaounde, Cameroon, and with Secretary General
Balima of the UAM defense organization at
Ouagadougou, ITpper Volta.

These are only a few of the more important items
that will bo covered in my report to Secretary
Rusk, but I believe they indicate that many doors
to friendship and cooperation in Africa have been
opened to the United States through personal
contacts.

- For an address by Assistant Secretary Williams on
African regional groupings, see Bulletin of May 21, 19G2,
p. 841.

918

Departmenf of State Bulletin i

The United States and Mexico — Partners in a Common Task

Remarks by Secretary Rusk

President Kemiedy will later in the morning ex-
tend to our distinguished guests liis warm per-
sonal greeting and the best wishes of the American
people. It is a great privilege for me to bring to
you the greetings of other members of his adminis-
tration. "We are very happy indeed to have you
with us.

I remember about a year ago my friends in the
United States Congress came back from Guadala-
jara with a certain note of dismay in their voices,
because they said, "How can we ever repay or
match the extraordinarily wann hospitality which
we have just received from our Mexican col-
leagues ?" We hope very much that you will en-
joy your stay here and go back feeling that the
visit was not only worth while but enjoyable.

You have a very busy agenda. It is filled with
important and practical problems. This is neces-
;arilj' so, and it will always be so between our
iwo countries, because we are great neighbors with
I long, common frontier.

We are great trading partners, trading with
jach other on the scale of $2 billion a year. We
ire great visitors with each other. More than
500,000 of us in Xorth America visit our friends
n INIexico every year. We are happy to see that
nore and more of you are coming to see us, more
Jian 200,000 a year at the present rate. We want
nore of you to come to see us because the United
States is going into the tourist business at the
3 resent time.

But, as great trading partners and neighbors,
TO shall always have practical problems to re-
solve. This is in the nature of being neighbors.

' Made at the second meeting of the Mexico-United
Jtates Interparliamentary Group at Washington, D.C.. on
Hay 14.

and it is in the nature of trade, because one of the
glories of trade is that no amount is ever enough.
It is in the nature of trade that we try to expand,
to grow, to develop our people, and it is on this
basis that your country and ours have moved from
one level of well-being to another.

That does not mean that these difficult trading
problems should involve our basic friendship.

I have since wondered what the role of friend-
ship is as we discuss these matters with one or
another of our close friends, with our neiglibors
like Mexico and Canada, like our great trading
partners across an ocean. It would be easy, but
wrong, for us to say to each other in these conver-
sations, "You must agree with us because we are
friends." We each could do that. Of course we
are friends. Or to say to each other, "You must
agree with us because we are sensitive." Of course
we both are sensitive, and we have vital national
interests.

What we should do is continually to work at
fuiding reasonable and practical solutions to these
practical problems and, having found them, then
to reject the unreasonable, the impractical, the
excessive point of view on the grounds that we are
basic friends and must find that common denomi-
nator of mutual interest and good will.

A Foundation of Mutual Respect

I think also that it is important for us on both
sides to seek out those elements which contribute
to mutual respect, because friendship requires a
solid foundation of mutual respect. You, on the
Mexican side, will have to find your own points
of view as far as we are concerned, and one of
the purposes of visits of this sort is to permit you
to find not only the things that you do like about

lone 4, 7 962

919

us but the things that you do not like about us,
so that your undei-standing of us can be more
accurate and therefore more solidly rooted.

There are many elements in our respect for
Mexico, and each has his own — each individual
has his own.

As far as I am concerned, it stems from this
extraordinary combination of stability and
progress which one sees in Mexico at the present
time, a stability which is deeply rooted in the
character of your great people but a progress
which shows that you are on the move in your
economic, your social development. Most of the
world knows about this great national university
and the breathtaking vision which it presents to
every visitor, but perhaps not even all Mexicans
know how important other institutions through-
out the counti-y have become in these last 20 years.
I am thinking of such institutions, for example,
as the Institute of Cardiology in Mexico City,
the Children's Hospital, the Teclmical Institute
at Monterrey, the Graduate School of Agriculture
at Chapingo, the Colegio de Mexico in Mexico
City, institutions which are well established and
well known throughout this hemisphere and wliich
play a key role in the leadership wliich Mexico is
taking throughout the hemisphere in this matter
of general economic and social progress, because
Mexico receives each year hundreds of young peo-
ple from all over the hemisphere, including our
own country, for training and for research in
these and other great institutions which have come
up in Mexico in the most recent past.

It is important to us in this country to know
that in the very recent past more than 90 percent
of your wheat is now being planted in superior
varieties and that more than 50 percent of your
corn is being planted in superior varieties, that
your extension services have spread out over the
country to do an extraordinary job of develop-
ment in the countryside, and that you are moving
toward the development of your tropical areas
with imagination and great foresight for the
future.

These elements of progress not only will do a
great service for the people of Mexico, but they
will also do a great service for the people of this
hemisphere if Mexico assumes and continues to
develop that role of leadership which is waiting
for it and which it is now taking up in such matters
in this hemisphere.
The Alliance for Progress has a great deal to

offer, but it also has a great deal to borrow from the
Mexican experience, and we are delighted to have
a chance to talk over that experience during your
meeting.

I tliink also we must strive in our mutual rela-
tionship to find ways to understand the problems
which each of us as a nation faces, so that we do
not take each other for granted, so that we do not
take only a partial view of each other's problems.

The Defense of Freedom

I will have to confess to you that at the present
time one of the great preoccupations of the United
States and of President Kennedy has to do with
the peace of the world, which i-amifies far beyond
this hemisphere. We are trying to bring about the
most revolutionary force that is waiting for man
at the present tune, and that is the revolutionary
force of a simple decision which we think could be
made in Moscow to live at peace with the rest of
the world.

No other simple fact could transform the life of
man more than a simple determination to live at
peace in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations.

It is no accident, gentlemen, that today the de-
fense budget of the United States is four times
what it was in 1946. It is no accident that the
North American people, who would much prefer
to stay at home, have a million troops outside the
United States, ashore and afloat, in defense ol
freedom — troops in every continent.

Why?

Go back to 1945 and just study the agenda of the
United Nations for the last 16 years to discover
the events which imposed upon us and the fret
world the harsh necessity of defending freedom

Now we are trying at every point to effect 8
breakthrough on this problem, and I would like tc
express to you my great appreciation for the wis-
dom and tlie talent which your Foreign Minister
Mr. [Manuel J.] Tello, brought to the Genevf
conference on disarmament while he and I wen
there together and the very important role whicl
your colleague, Mr. [Luis] Padilla Nervo, is play
ing in the disarmament field, because in this coun
try we feel very strongly that we must find sorai
way — some way to turn down this arms race
beginning with nuclear testing and moving on U
general disarmament.

No one has regretted the necessity for the de

920

Department of Slate Bullefh

cision to resume nuclear testing more than has
President Kennedy, but no one accepts the respon-
sibility more gladly for defending the vital secu-
rity interests of the free world. But we should like
to bring this business to an end today — today and
permanently. But we cannot bring it to an end
unless we have reasonable assurance that it has,
in fact, ended, because on this point we are dealing
with the life and death of nations.

Now, at Geneva we made additional proposals
to the Soviet Union which involved, for example,
an international inspection team looking at less
than l/2000th of the territory of the Soviet Union
in any given year. That surely is a minimum con-
tribution to be asked from the other side to bring
this burdensome race to an end and begin to turn
this matter downward.

We are glad to see that Mr. Padilla Nervo is
taking the lead in keeping the Geneva conference
at its task, trying to find some basis to achieve
some practical, physical, actual steps in disarma-
ment in an effort to bring this situation into some
sort of a framework and to bring ourselves a few
steps nearer peace.

But this is a determined effort on the part of the
United States, and we have to bear this burden
because it just happens to be a fact that the power
and weight of tlie new world has to be thrown into
the affairs of the old world if this hemisphere is
to have a chance to survive in peace and freedom.

You will find us not only intellectually, politi-
cally, and economically committed to the Alliance
for Progress, but you will find the American peo-
ple deeply committed by affection to the purposes
of the Alliance for Progress, because we have our
own underdeveloped parts of the country and
many of us grew up as children in parts of the
country which we would now call underdeveloped.

We have seen what can occur rapidly through
the magical combination of education, research,
extension, technology, work, dedication, and we
get a great thrill when we see these forces at work
in ]\fexico and we see the progress which is being
made there in so many directions to improve the
economic and social life of your people.

And in that great task, as in the task of tiying
to make a peace — in that great task j'ou will find
us genuine partners, dedicated partners, working
together for the great purposes which we share in
common.

It is a great privilege for me to be here this

morning. I wish that I could interlope on some
of your discussions. You have a most interesting
agenda.

I hope that when we leave, we shall leave with
a sense of stronger ties between us, clearer under-
standing of each other's problems, and more open
avenues for closer and more intimate collaboration
in the future as we go our respective ways.

Thank you very much for coming.

Cooperation Among Women
of the Free World

Remarks hy Mrs. Katie Louchheitn'^

It is a great privilege and pleasure to be with
you in this gracious center of the largest graduate
school for women in the Nation — indeed, in the
world — of which you are distinguished alumnae.
It is a special pleasure to me to speak to this audi-
ence, because my job is to encourage cooperation
among the women of the free world. This is some-
thing to which the Eadcliffe graduate school makes
a major contribution. It opens welcoming doors
to able young women scholars from all over the
world. Your fellow alumnae from many lands
have gone home to enrich their own countries with
what they have learned here. That elm in the
Graduate Quadrangle garden, planted in memory
of Christine Buisman of the Netherlands, is a
reminder that the United States too has been en-
riched by their presence among us, and sometimes
in very concrete ways.

To all of us who are forever preaching the en-
listment of women's talents in the cause of prog-
ress. Dr. Bunting's = inspired creation of the
Radcliffe Institute for Independent Study is good
news indeed. We applaud this imaginative and
flexible plan which makes possible what has some-
times seemed impossible— for a woman to be a
wife and mother and to realize her professional
gifts at the same time.

Sometimes you have to travel a long way not
to find new truths but to rediscover old ones. Re-

'Made before the graduate chapter of the Radcliffe
College Alumnae Association at Cambridge, Mass., on
May 7 (press release 298). Mrs. Louehheim is Deputy As-
sistant Secretary for Women's Activities, Bureau of Public
Affairs.

' Mrs. Mary I. Bunting, president of Radcliffe College.

June 4, 1962

921

cent trips which I have made to the Middle East,
India, and the Far East accomplished just that.
I would like to share with you my rediscovery of
three fundamental truths.

The first is that we here in the United States are
judged by our deeds. How we live, work, com-
pete, meet our problems is no longer just our con-
cern. Everywhere, all over the world, there are
eyes and ears listening, watching, observing,
evaluating, making judgments. Our ability to
translate the democratic ideal into reality, our
willingness to assume our responsibility as citizens
in a free society, is of paramount importance.
How we women serve our communities and our
nation is known everywhere.

The second truth is that the American woman
volunteer is unique. And in this generalization
I include the professional woman who gives her
time free, as I know you do. At every meeting,
in every deliberation, ambassadors, officers of
AID [Agency for International Development]
and USIA [U.S. Information Agency], women
leaders of the countries I visited, agreed that the
talents and know-how of American women are part
of our blueprint for a better world. Women every-
where know about you. Our foreign visitors come
here expressly to study your institutions, how you
transform the face of your communities, how you
deal with school problems through your PTA's,
or float a bond issue, or manage a fund drive.

When President Kennedy created the post I
hold, he recognized the growing importance of
women all over the world. He recognized their
capacity to create a climate in which progress can
take place. He wanted to make certain that our
many American women's voluntary organizations
received the recognition and encouragement they
deserve. Implicitly he was recognizing the in-
dividual contribution of American women — and, I
might say, notably that of the wives of our Foreign
Service officers. For our Foreign Service wives
are among our most valuable diplomatic resources.
Transplanted from Detroit to Dakar, the wife of
an American Foreign Service officer puts the skills
she acquired at home at the service of her new
community. Without losing dignity or status, she
teaches, works in baby clinics, demonstrates tech-
niques to local volunteers. To each post she brings
the American woman's determination to leave the
place a little better than she found it.

In creating this post of consultant on women's

activities in the State Department, the President
also wanted to make certain that more attention
was paid to our women foreign visitors. For they
are pioneers and leaders in their own countries. In
the past year I have seen more than 250 women
from 50 countries. Some of them are leading
political figures or wives of political leaders, but
far more have been educators, social workers, or
voluntary welfare workers whose concern is with
improving the lives of their fellow countrymen
and countrywomen.

The third truth which I discovered in my
travels is that more women must exchange more
visits. In the age of shrinking distances, how wa
understand one another is desperately important.
And how we look to one another and work together
is equally so. Xo matter how much we hear about
one another, we never really know one another
without visiting face to face.

Let me give you an illustration. Last spring,
shortly after the President annoimced the Alliance
for Progress, my office sponsored the visit of 12
women social workers from 12 different Latin
American countries. Before they came, they had
pictured Americans as "essentially complacent,
homogeneous and standardized." They were as-
tonished to find "a perpetual soul-searching and
astringent self-analysis of American life, by people
at every level and in every occupation — and a great
diversity of opinion on practically everything."
Our frankness about our problems encouraged
them to greater efforts to solve their own problems.

The warmth and informality of American home
hospitality makes a strong impression on foreign
visitors. Over and over I have heard them say :
"You Americans are so much more friendly than
we expected." I remember a poignant moment
last fall, at the end of a tea party for a group of
schoolteachers from Africa. As they were leaving,
after a long chat about their schools and ours, a
teacher from Ghana asked to say a few words.
"Before taking off for America," she confessed,
"we all had many hesitations about coming. We
wondered whether we would be welcome. But
today, in your home, you and your friends have
made us know that we are truly welcome. If we
had to go home tonight, our journey would have
been a success." This happened at the start of
their tour of the United States. Three months
later I saw the African teachei-s again, after they
had visited schools from New Knixland to Cali-

922

Department of Sfafe Bulletin

fomia and back. In a final meeting at the State
Department tliey talked appreciatively of what
they had seen and learned. And then, as an ex-
pression of their feeling, they sang a song they
had learned along the way. It was "America the
Beautiful."

Because the nontypical traveler may give the
wrong impression — because the crises and not the
solutions get the headlines — we need to talk face
to face, as I did recently with women in Japan.
The Japanese women were deeply interested in the
position and achievements of women in the United
States. I told them about women like you, about
the President's Commission on the Status of
Women, about women in politics and women's
voluntary activities. I found we had a mutuality
of interests and problems.

Cooperation among women of the free world
is essential to progress. But it is to American
women that women all over the world look to give
and to keep the promise of progi'ess.

Dulles Library of Diplomatic History
Dedicated at Princeton University

Statement hy Secretary Rush ^

I am deeply distressed that overriding duties, of
the sort with which John Foster Dulles was en-
tirely familiar, make it impossible for me to be
present for the dedication of the John Foster
Dulles Library at Princeton University.

It is entirely fitting that Princeton University
should be the repository of his papers. Those of
Lis who knew him as a friend knew of his devotion
to his alma mater. It was while a Princeton
undergraduate that he undertook his first diplo-
matic mission — at the second Hague Peace Con-
ference in 1907. Thus began more than a half
century of dedicated service to his countiy in the
foreign policy field.

The Dulles Library at Princeton and the Eisen-
hower Library - at Abilene will be invaluable

' Read by Robert F. Gobeen, president of Princeton Uni-
versity, at the dedication of the John Foster Dulles
Library of Diplomatic History at Princeton University,
Princeton, N.J., on May 1.5 (press release 312). For an
iuinouncement of the establishment of the library, see
Bulletin of June 1, 1959, p. 792.

^ The Department announced on July 21, 1959, that Mr.
Dulles had given the Eisenhower Library certain of his
personal papers (ihid., Aug. 10, 19.j9, p. 207).

sources for the historians of the future. The
papers themselves, standing alone, will not tell the
complete story ; they can only be clues to the story.
For John Foster Dulles was Secretary of State at
a time when United States policy was pursued in
an utterly complex world and in a period when
events moved with breathtaking speed. Only a
fraction of what was in his mind, and in the mind
of the President he served, was inscribed in formal
documents. The historian, if he is to be accurate,
must tiy to reconstruct the context — the total con-
text— which surrounded what was written down.
Today was not yesterday, and tomorrow would be
different, too. To recapture the changing scene
and what Mr. Dulles thought about it will be the
historian's delicate and painstaking task.

Accident, mystery, the surging events in a hun-
dred comitries in every continent were all a part
of his daily fare. And he was building toward a
decent world order not on the basis of exact blue-
prints, mathematically guaranteed, but in the
light of a future but dimly perceived, as through
a fog. For the statesman must move from facts
which can never be quite complete into a future
which, perhaps mercifully, cannot be surely
known.

But out of the papers stored here in Princeton
will come a picture of a dedicated man, deeply
committed to the peace and well-being of his own
country and deeply, as well, aware that the fate of
his own country was linked to that of peoples in
the remotest parts of the world. It was a privi-
lege to serve with him as friend and colleague and
to share both his satisfactions and his disappoint-
ments as he tried to shape the course of events to
accord with the aspirations of the American people
and his own commitments to peace and freedom.

Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy

87th Congress, 1st Session

Developments in the Field of Detection and Identification
of Nuclear Explosions (Project Vela) and Relationship
to Test Ban Negotiations. Hearings before the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy. July 25-27, 1961. 440 pp.

Khrushchev and the Balance of World Power. An analy-
sis prepared for Senator Hubert Humphrey by the
Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Con-
gress. S. Doc. 66. July 27, 1961. 16 pp.

Export of Strategic Materials to the U.S.S.R. and Other
Soviet Bloc Countries. Hearings before the Subcom-
mittee To Investigate the Administration of the Inter-
nal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of
the Senate Judiciary Committee. Part 2. October 23,
1961. 234 pp.

June 4, J 962

923

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings'

Scheduled June Through August 1962

PAIGH Directing Council: 6th Meeting Mexico, D.F June I-

GATT Special Group on Trade in Tropical Products Geneva June 4-

International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries: 12th Moscow June 4-

Meeting.

U.N. General Assembly: 16th Session (resumed) New York June 4-

U.N. Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Ques- New York June 4-

tions.

U.N. ECE Housing Committee: 23d Session Geneva June 4-

UNICEF Program Committee and Executive Board New York June 4-

PIANC Permanent International Commission: Annual Meeting. . . Brussels June 5-

International Labor Conference: 46th Session Geneva June 6-

9th International Electronic, Nuclear, and Motion Picture Expo- Rome June 11-

sition.

IAEA Board of Governors Vienna June 12-

UNESCO Intergovernmental Meeting on Discrimination in Edu- Paris June 12-

cation.

U.N. ECE Working Party on Standardization of Perishable Food- Geneva June 12-

stuffs.

FAO Group on Grains: 7th Session Rome June 12-

ITU CCIR Study Group X (Broadcasting), Study Group XI (Tele- Bad Kreuznach, Germany . . June 13-

vision), and Study Group XII (Tropical Broadcasting).

NATO Industrial Planning Committee Paris June 14-

OECD Economic PoUcy Committee Paris June 20-

UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission: Working Washington June 20-

Group on the Tropical Atlantic Oceanographic Investigation.

NATO Petroleum Planning Committee Paris June 21-

12th International Film Festival Berlin June 22-

U.N. ECE Coal Trade Subcommittee Geneva June 25-

U.N. ECOSOC Technical Assistance Committee Geneva June 25-

UNESCO Committee of Governmental Experts To Prepare a Draft Paris June 25-

of an International Recommendation on Technical Education.

ICAO Visual Aids Panel: 2d Meeting Montreal June 28-

NATO Planning Board for Inland Surface Transport Paris June 28-

OECD Ministerial Meeting Paris June*

NATO Science Committee Paris June

South Pacific Commission: 12th Meeting of Research Council . . . Noumea June

GATT Working Party on Tariff Reduction Geneva June

GATT Working Party on Relations With Yugoslavia Geneva June

ITU CCITT Working Party VII (Definitions) Geneva June

ITU CCITT Study Group XII (Telephone Transmission Perform- Geneva June

ance).

ITU CCITT Study Group XI (Telephone Switching) Geneva June

25th International Conference on Public Education Geneva Julv 2-

FAO World Meeting on the Biology of Tuna and Tuna-Like Fishes . La JoUa, CaUf July 2-

International Wlialing Commission: 14th Meeting London July 2-

Inter-American Ministers of Education: 3d Meeting Bogotd July 3-

U.N. Economic and Social Council: 34th Session Geneva July 3-

OECD Maritime Committee Paris July 5-

WMO Commission for Agricultural Meteorology: 3d Session . . . Toronto July 9-

Antarctic Treaty: 2d Consultative Meeting Under Article IX . . . Buenos Aires July 18-

South Pacific Commission: 23d Session Pago Pago July 18-

South Pacific Conference: 5th Session Pago Pago July 18-

> Prepared in the OfTice of International Conferences May 11, 1962. Asterisks indicate tentative dates. Follow-
ing is a list of abbreviations: CCIR, Comit6 consultatif international des radio communications; CCITT, Comitfi
consultatif international telegraphique et t^lfchonique; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East;
ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organ-
ization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; lA-ECOSOC, Inter-American Economic and Social Council;
IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; IBE, International Bureau of luluontion; IC.'VO, International Civil .\via-
tion Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritiiiie Consultative Organization; ITU, International Telecomiuuni-
cation Union; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; 0E(^0, ()rganization for Economic Cooperation and
Development; PAIGH, Pan American Institute of Geography and History; PIANC, Permanent International A.ssocia-
tion of Navigation Congresses; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization; UNICEF, United Nations Children's Fund; WMO, World Meteorological Organization.

924 Deparfment of Sfofe Bulletin

'th FAO Regional Conference for Latin America

ith FAO Regional Conference for the Near East

BE Council: 28th Session

)ECD Development Assistance Committee: Ministerial Meeting. .

A-ECOSOC Ministerial Meeting

J.N. ECOSOC Technical Assistance Committee

J.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space

JNESCO Conference on Education in Latin America

J.N. ECOSOC Conference on the International Map of the World .

2th World's Poultry Congress

J.N. ECAFE/FAO Meeting on the Marketing Aspects of Price

Stabilization Policies.
J.N. ECB Working Party on the Transport of Dangerous Goods . .

!CAO Assembly: 14th Session

.3th International Exhibition of Cinematographic Art

'CAO Legal Committee: 14th Session

rAO International Rice Commission: Working Party on Engineering

Aspects of Rice Production, Storage, and Processing.

.6th Annual Edinburgh Film Festival

J.N. ECOSOC Technical Conference on Travel

Rio de Janeiro July 23-

Lebanon July 30-

Geneva July

Paris July

Mexico, D.F July*

Geneva July

New York July or August

Bogotd July

Bonn Aug. 3-

Sydney Aug. 13-

Rangoon Aug. 20-

Geneva Aug. 20-

Rome Aug. 21-

Venice Aug. 25-

Rome Aug. 28-

Kuala Lumpur Aug. 29-

Edinburgh August

Rome August or

September

Jnited States Delegations
:o International Conferences

iCE Housing Committee

The Department of State announced on May 17
press release 313) that Dan R. Hamaday, As-
listant Administrator, Office of International
3^ousing, Housing and Home Finance Agency,
^^ill serve as chairman of the U.S. delegation to
he 23d session of the Housing Committee of the
Jnited Nations Economic Commission for Europe
ECE), which will be held at Geneva Jiuie 4-7.
*Ir. Hamaday will be assisted by the following
idvisers :

ley J. Burroughs, Director, Division of International
Organization Affairs, Housing and Home Finance
Agency

Sachary Fisher, Fisher Brothers, New York, N.Y.

rrederlck P. Rose, Rose Associates, New York, N.Y.

fames H. Scheuer, President, Renewal and Development
Corporation, New York, N.Y.

Jeorge Tesoro, U.S. Mission, Geneva

The Housing Committee was established as a
lubconamittee of ECE in 1947 and became a full
;ommittee in 1955. Its purpose is to study housing
)roblems of common interest to European coun-
ries and to advise the Commission on the means,
technical and economic, of assisting and expedit-
pg the housing programs of the member countries.
Che Committee is composed of representatives of
l7 European nations and the United States. Meet-
ngs are also attended by representatives of the

U.N. specialized agencies and international non-
govermnental organizations.

The Committee will consider an inquiry on the
allocation of land and the control, where appropri-
ate, of land prices for housing and the planning
and cost of new residential areas in selected coim-
tries. Because of the interest that was generated
at the 21st session of the Committee in June 1961,
as a result of a symposium on urban renewal and
town planning, considerable followup work can
be anticipated, as it appears that problems of re-
development and urban renewal will become one of
the major undertakings of the Committee.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Amendment to article VI.A.3 of the Statute of the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency (TIAS 3873). Done at
Vienna October 4, 1961.'
Acceptance deposited: Hungary, May 11, 1962.

Aviation

International air services transit agreement. Done at
Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force for the
United States February 8, 1945. 59 Stat. 1693.
Acceptance deposited: Iklalagasy Republic, May 14, 1962.

' Not in force.

une 4, 1962

925

Trade and Cominerce

Proces-verbal extending and amending declaration of No-
vember 22, 195S (TIAS 4461), on provisional accession
of the Swiss Confederation to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 8, 1961.
Entered into force for the United States January 9, 1962.
TIAS 4957.

Acceptances deposited: Czechoslovakia, March 27, 1962;
Nigeria, April 16, 1962 ; Turkey, April 17, 1962.

Proces-verbal extending declaration of November 12, 1959
(TIAS 4498), on provisional accession of Tunisia to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at
Geneva December 9, 1961. Entered into force for the
United States January 9, 1962. TIAS 4958.
Signatures: Czechoslovakia and New Zealand, March
27, 1962 ; Turkey, April 17, 1962.

Wheat

International wheat agreement, 1962. Open for signature
at Washington April 19 through May 15, 1962."
Signatures: Norway, May 8, 1962; Nigeria, United
Kingdom (with declaration), May 10, 1962; Brazil,
Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, Japan,
Mexico, Philippines, Sweden, United States, Vatican
City, May 11, 1962 ; Australia, Austria, Prance, India,
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Korea, Netherlands (with
statement), Portugal, Federation of Rhodesia and
Nyasaland, Spain, Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-
lics (with statement), Venezuela, May 14, 1962;
Argentina, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Indonesia,
Liberia, New Zealand, South Africa, Switzerland,
United Arab Republic, May 15, 1962.
Acceptance deposited: Canada, May 16, 1962.
'Notification received of undertaking to seek acceptance:
Japan, May 16, 1962.

BILATERAL
Colombia

Agricultural trade agreement. Signed at Washington
May 15, 1962. Entered into force May 15, 1962.

El Salvador

Agricultural trade agreement. Signed at Washington
May 15, 1962. Entered into force May 15, 1962.

Guinea

Agreement relating to investment guaranties. Effected
by exchange of notes at Washington May 9, 1962.
Entered into force May 9, 1962.

Niger

Agreement relating to investment guaranties authorized
by chapter 2, title III, of the Act for International
Development of 1961. Effected by exchange of notes
at Niamey February 28 and April 26, 1962. Entered
into force April 26, 1962.

Somali Republic

Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace Corps
program in the Somali Republic. Effected by exchange
of notes at Mogadiscio March 29 and April 17, 1962.
Entered into force April 17, 1962.

Venezuela

Agricultural commodities agreement under title IV of
the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act
of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 73 Stat. 610; 7
U.S.C. 1731-1736), with exchange of notes. Signed at
Washington May 17, 1962. Entered into force May 17,
1962.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Confirmations

The Senate on May 1 confirmed the following
nominations :

C. Griffith Johnson to be an Assistant Secretary of
State. (For biographic details, see Department of State
press release 311 dated May 14.)

Walter M. Kotschnig to be the representative of the
United States to the 17th plenary session of the Economic
Commission for Europe of the Economic and Social Coim-
cil of the United Nations.

Edwin M. Martin to be an Assistant Secretary of State.
(For biographic details, see White House press release
dated March 8.)

Resignations

Philip H. Coombs as Assistant Secretary for Educational
and Cultural Affairs. (For an exchange of letters be-
tween President Kennedy and Mr. Coombs, see White
House press release dated April 20.)

PUBLICATIONS

' Not in force.

Department Publishes Foreign Relations
Volume on Europe for 1942

Press release 304 dated May 10, for release May 19

The Department of State released on May 19 Foreign
Relations of the United States, 19-'/^, Voliivie II, Europe.

This volume is one of a series of six regular Foreign
Relations volumes for the year 1942. The first volume of
the series, dealing with general subjects, and the third
volume, also on Europe, have already been published.
The other three volumes are in process of preparation. A
special Foreign Relations volume for 1942 on China has
also been published.

The major portion of the documentation in Volume U
is in the sections on France and Greece. Other countries
covered are Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Finland,
Germany, and Hungary. The section on Germany covers
only an agreement regarding prisoners of war, other
phases of the war with Germany being covered in sections
on other countries or in Volume I, General. Documenta-
tion on relations witli the other European countries, in
alphabetical order from Iceland to Yugoslavia, is con-
tained in Volume III.

Copies of Foreign Relations of the I'nitcd States, 19'i2,
Volume II, Furopc (vi, 863 pp.) may be obtained from
the Su]ierinteudent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Ofiice, Washington 25, D.C., for $3.25 each.

926

Department of State Bulletin

June 4, 1962

Index

Vol. XLVI, No. 1197

Africa. Friendship and Cooperation iu Africa

Strengthened by Personal Contacts (Williams) . 017

American Republics. Martin confirmed as As-
sistant Secretary of State 02G

Congress. Congressional Documents Relating to

Foreign Policy 923

Department and Foreign Service

Confirmations (Johnson, Kotschnig, Martin) . . 926

Resignations (Coombs) 926

Dominican Republic. Letters of Credence (Freites
Barreras) 904

Economic Affairs

American Business Abroad (Ball) 912

America's Destiny in the Building of a World

Community (Rusk) 895

Johnson confirmed as Assistant Secretary of State . 926
Trade and the Atlantic Partnership (Kennedy,

Rusk) 906

Educational and Cultural Affairs

Coombs resigns as Assistant Secretary of State . . 926
Cooperation Among Women of the Free World

(Louchheim) 921

Europe

America's Destiny in the Building of a World

Community (Rusk) 805

Department Publishes Foreign Relations Volume

on Europe for 1042 926

EOE Housing Committee (delegation) 925

Trade and the Atlantic Partnership (Kennedy,

Rusk) 006

Foreign Aid. America's Destiny in the Building of

a World Community (Rusk) 805

International Information. Dulles Library of Dip-
lomatic History Dedicated at Princeton Univer-
sity (Rusk) 923

International Organizations and Conferences

Calendar of International Conferences and Meet-
ings 024

ECE Housing Committee (delegation) 925

Laos. President Sends Troops to Thailand, U.S.
Policy Toward Laos Unchanged (Kennedy,
Worth, Tost) 004

iMexicQ. The United States and Mexico — Partners

in a Common Task (Rusk) 010

Pliilippines. President Reaffirms U.S. Friendship
for People of Philippines Oil

Presidential Documents

President Reaffirms U.S. Friendship for People of
Philippines 011

President Sends Troops to Thailand, U.S. Policy
Toward Laos Unchanged 004

i'ublications. Department Publishes Foreign Re-
lations Volume on Europe for 1042 026

loutheast Asia Treaty Organization. President
Sends Troops to Thailand, U.S. Policy Toward
Laos Unchanged (Kennedy, Worth, Tost) . . . 904

Thailand. President Sends Troops to Thailand,
U.S. Policy Toward Laos Unchanged (Kennedy,

Worth, Tost) 004

Treaty Information. Current Actions 025

United Nations

Kotschnig confirmed as U.S. Representative to

Economic Commission for Europe 926

President Sends Troops to Thailand, U.S. Policy
Toward Laos Unchanged (Kennedy, Worth,

Tost) 004

Name Index

Ball, George W 912

Coombs, Philip H 926

Freites Barreras, Andres 904

Johnson, C. Griffith 026

Kennedy, President 904,906,911

Kotschnig, Walter M 026

Louchheim, Mrs. Katie 921

Martin, Edwin M 926

Rusk, Secretary 895, 900, 019, 923

Williams, G. Mennen 917

Worth, William 905

Tost, Charles W 005

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: May 14-20

Press releases may be obtained from the OtEce of
News, Department of State. Washington 25, D.C.

Releases appearing in this is.sue of the Bulletin
which were issued prior to May 14 are Nos. 208 of
May 7 ; 304 of May 10 ; and 308 of May 12.

Snbject

U.S. participation in international con-
ferences.

Williams: return from Africa.

Johnson sworn in as Assistant Secre-
tary for Economic Affairs (bio-
graphic details).

Rusk : dedication of Dulles Library.

Delegation to U.N. ECE Housing Com-
mittee (rewrite).

Berger : first anniversary of South
Korean revolution.

Cultural exchange (Tunisia).

Meeting of U.S.-Japau science com-
mittee.

Rusk : Conference on Trade Policy.

Coppock : "The President's Trade Ex-
pansion Program and U.S. National
Security."

Rusk : University of Tennessee.

Delegation to South Pacific Commis-
sion (rewrite).

Cultural exchange (Japan).

Dominican Republic credentials (re-
write).

Cieplinski : Polish Constitution Day.

Itinerary for visit of President of
Ivory Coast.

Rostow : "Where We Stand."

*Not printed.

tHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin.

No.

Date

*309

5/14

310
*311

5/14
5/14

312
313

5/15
5/17

t314

5/15

*315
t316

5/15
5/16

317

t318

5/16
5/17

319
t320

5/17

5/17

*321
322

5/18
5/18

*323
*324

.5/19
5/18

t32o

5/19

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING 0FFICE:1962

the

Department

of

State

United States
Government Printing Office

DIVISION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS

Washington 25, D.C.

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE TO AVOID

PAYMENT OF POSTAGE. $300

(GPO)

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
Current Documents, 1958

ATnerican Foreign Policy: Current Docwnients is an annual, one-
volume collection of the principal messages, addresses, statements,
reports, and of certain of the diplomatic notes exchanged and treaties
made in a given calendar year which indicate the scope, goals, and
implementation of the foreign policy of the United States.

As was true with respect to the earlier volumes in the series, the
1958 compilation includes some documents issued by other govern-
ments and by regional international organizations of which the
United States is not a member where the pronouncements or settle-
ments revealed in them were of major concern to the United States in
the formulation of its own policies.

In most instances the documents are arranged under topical head-
ings within each of the 13 parts. The mechanical devices used to
facilitate quick reference include a table of contents and list of
documents; source, cross-reference, and (wherever possible) infor-
mational footnotes; and an index.

The earlier volumes in the series may be purchased from the Super-
intendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washing-
ton 25, D.C. — Avierican Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1957
(Department of State publication 7101) at $5.25 per voliune; A'nier-
ican Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1956 (Department of State
publication 6811) at $4.75 per volume; and American Foreign Policy,
1950-1955: Basic Documents (2 volumes; Department of State publi-
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:kly record

Boston Public Library
Superintendent of Documents
Vol. XLVI, No. 1198 June 11, 1962

JUN2 8 1962

NEW FRONTIERS OF §S@^ffi?%l^ACE, AND FOR-
EIGN POLICY • Address by Secretary Rusk 931

SECRETARY RUSK SPEAKS IN AUSTRALIA AND

NEW ZEALAND FOLLOWING ANZUS MEETING . 936

A REVIEW OF U.S.-KOREAN RELATIONS • Statement

by Ambassador Samuel D. Berger 951

THE PRESIDENT'S TRADE EXPANSION PROGRAM
AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY • by Joseph D.

Coppock 956

TED STATES
EIGN POLICY

For index see inside back cover

Vol. XLVI, No. 1198 • Publication 7387
June 11,1962

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New Frontiers of Science, Space, and Foreign Policy

Address l>y Secretary Rusk '

I am veiy happy to be here this evening in this
beautiful Western sea-frontier city and to experi-
ence the thrilling sweep of this first gi-eat fair of
the space age.

I congratulate the citizens of Seattle and of the
State of "Washington on a magnificent concept,
nobly executed. These new frontiers of architec-
ture cannot help but open new horizons of awe and
wonder to every visitor.

Wliat would your own legendary frontiersman
of the 19th century have thought? How would
Paul Bunyan have measured your Space Needle,
the highest edifice west of the Mississippi? I
think he would say that his beloved Pacific North-
west had performed a great service for the Nation
and the world at large. I think he would approve
and urge us to get on with building larger space
capsules — large enough for him.

My guess is that we are not looking here at
Century 21 but at the decades immediately ahead,
for the pace of change is so dazzling that our im-
aginations cannot grasp what four more decades
will bring. And all who come here must pause for
some still moment of contemplation on what this
is all about, what man's progressive masteiy of his
physical environment really means, and what kind
of a world their children will inhabit and form.

The new frontiers of science forecast at this fair
are not excursions of the imagination into fairy-
land, unreality, or science fiction. They will come
to pass — most of them in this century. We cannot
foresee a time when science and technology will
cease placing new insights, new data, new tools,

^ Made on the occasion of International Law Day at the
Seattle World's Fair, Seattle, Wash., on May 25 (press
release 336).

and new capabilities at the disjiosal of society.
Man's problem is how to use them — in his physical
environment and in his social environment of
family, nation, and international community.

New Frontiers for Science

If we look toward Century 21, what are some of
the frontiers which science will breach? Among
the prospects held out to us by the scientists are
these :

• New sources of food, water, power, and natural
resources.

• Desalinization of ocean waters, enabling deserts
to bloom ; cultivation of crops in the seas ; control
of the growth of living organisms in the oceans;
control of the weather to extend growing seasons
in some regions; alas, perhaps balanced meals in
capsule form, that can be gulped down in a couple
of seconds.

• The mining of mineral nodules on the ocean
floor; abundant supplies of magnesium extracted
from sea water; harnessing of the tides and ocean
currents for power.

• Immense quantities of power from other sources
as well — electric, nuclear, and solar ; power plants
of type and size to meet almost any contingency on
almost every location on earth; greatly enlarged
and improved power storage facilities.

• A vast proliferation of labor-saving devices.

• Continuing revolutions in construction through
plastics.

The wizards of electronics offer us, through com-
munications satellites, the physical ability to talk
to any place on earth, and to almost any person, at
low cost. They also hold before us the prospect of

lune 11, 7962

931

beaming television anywhere. But the possibility
of instantaneous visual and oral communication
with anyone, anywhere, and in privacy, has a cer-
tain appeal to a Secretary of State. My opposite
numbers in other governments and I now have to
spend a good deal of time traveling in order to
talk directly and intimately to each other. We
speak of a shrinking world. But a recent trip,
covering 2G,900 miles, reminded me that, even at
jet speeds, the earth is still a pretty big place.

In the field of medicine, we may expect
progress — perhaps deep breakthroughs — in con-
trol of such diseases as cancer, the gi-eat varieties
of viruses, and the biochemical imbalances which
affect many vital tissues, including the brain.
Biochemistry, genetics, and electronics will give
us new tools for the diagnosis and handling of
human disease.

Science, we are told, may make it possible for
us to get on with less sleep at niglit. (I know
some Government officials who, of necessity, have
already made considerable progress on that front.)

The behavioral scientists will find out more
about how the two most complex mechanisms
on earth — the human brain and body — think, feel,
and react. They may be expected to establish new
ways of keeping thought processes and the emo-
tions ill balance. With greater freedom from
mental disease, we will surely make a net gain in
constructive and congenial personal relations.
We shall almost certainly trespass nearer to those
frontiers which guard the secret of life.

And, to mention still another frontier of special
importance to foreign affairs, the social and be-
havioral sciences may improve our ability to com-
municate with and understand nations and peoples
whose cultures are radically different from our
own.

Putting Scientific Progress to Good Use

Life on earth will be affected by each of these
advancing frontiers I have mentioned. But it
will be improved only to the extent that men put
them to good uses.

For example, the potential of worldwide vocal
and visual communication can be either good or
bad. As Edward R. Muri'ow, in Avhom the State
of Washington can proudly claim a special in-
terest, since he received part of his education in
this State, recently pointed out: A communica-
tion system is totally neutral ; it has no conscience,

no principle, no morality; it can broadcast false-
hood as loudly as the truth.

We of the atomic age are starkly aware of the
ability of the physical sciences to outstrip man's
practical mastery of political and social affairs.
Sixteen years ago the United States had the vision
to present to the world through the United Na-
tions a plan to plac« all atomic enterprises under
international control.^ If that plan had been
adopted, there would have been no nuclear
arms race, there would be no nuclear weapons to-
day, and the power of the atom would be devoted
solely to bettering the life of man.

Wliat a tragedy it was that the Soviet Union
called that plan "atomic blackmail" and refused
to take it up seriously ! And what a tragedy it
is that, owing to the persistent refusal of the
Soviets to permit the most minimum international
supervision and verification, we have thus far
been imable to make a start on the reduction of
armaments and to obtain a treaty banning atomic
tests !

Despite 16 years of Soviet disagreement, we
have not given up hope. We have presented a
comprehensive plan for reductions in armaments
leading to general and complete disarmament.^
This is not a piece of propaganda but a plan
which we most earnestly hope will be adopted.
Likewise we continue to seek a test ban treaty
and are prepared to sign it the instant that the
Soviets agree to it with the essential minimum
of international verification to assure compliance.

Exploration of Space

Now we are in the earlier stages of another
scientific, teclinical, and human adventure, as
staggering to the imagination as the unleashing
of the atom — and as cliallenging to man's ability
to organize his affairs with at least a modicum of
good sense. I refer of course to the exploration
of space. I have no doubt that we shall reach
the moon and explore it. I am told that, after
the moon. Mars is the most likely target of ex-
ploration, unless we are unexpectedly lucky with
Venus. Dr. AVillard Libby says there is a 95 per-
cent probability of finding some form of life on
Mars. I have little doubt that we shall eventually
reacli Mars and somehow set foot on it, with re-

' Bulletin of Dec. 15, 1046, p. 1088.

' For text, see ibid., May 7, 1962, p. 747.

932

Department of State Bulletin

suits in expanding knowledge that none of us can
now predict.

Meanwhile, within the nearer regions of outer
space, we will perfect communications, television,
and navigational satellites. We will probe the
mj'sterics of weather and learn something of how-
to control it. We will resolve some of the am-
biguities of the eartli's magnetic field. We will
recover new, and perhaps rare, metals from the
heavenly asteroids. We will progressively press
closer to some of those secrets of the universe
which man has always yearned to know.

But let us take a more somber look at wliat
could happen. The frontiers of space might be
pierced by huge nuclear-propelled dreadnaughts,
armed with thermonuclear weapons. The moon
might be turned into a military base. Ways
might be foimd to cascade radioactive waves
upon an enemy. Weather control might become
a military weapon. Man, in short, can put outer
space to uses which might in the most real sense
imperil civilization and even life on this earth of
ours. All this seems possible.

U.S. Goals in Outer Space

We fervently hope that the exploration of space
will not augment the dreadful perils which hang
over the heads of mankind. We earnestly seek
international arrangements to assure that this
great venture outward from our planet benefits
the human race and redounds to its credit.

Our goals are simple and straightforward:

First. We think that outer space should be
free for use by all nations as long as the use is
consistent with the principles of the United Na-
tions Charter.

Second. We think that the regime of law ob-
taining among the nations on earth must be ex-
tended and improved as it pertains to outer space.

Third. We think that there must be devised
a clear and recognized means for the identification
of rights and the adjudication of disputes as be-
tween nations conducting activities in outer space.
We require, for example, mechanisms to assist in
the rescue of astronauts who land unexpectedly
in foreign territory and for the detennination of
liability for injuries or damage caused by objects
returning from outer space.

Fourth. We think that useful applications of
space technology, such as communication and
meteorological satellites, should be available to

all nations, particularly the less developed na-
tions, commensurate witli a realistic assessment of
their needs and their ability to commit resources
to the use of these applications.

Fifth. We stand for the proposition that op-
portunities to participate in outer space activities
should be open to all nations commensurate with
their ability and willingness to cooperate con-
structively.

And Sixth. We have proposed, as part of our
disarmament proposals now being discussed at
Geneva, that, under adequate inspection and con-
trol, the placing in orbit of weapons of mass de-
struction be prohibited.

Our activities in outer space are consistent with
these goals. Many of these principles are em-
bodied in a resolution of the United Nations which
the United States supported.* They are our
frame of reference in discussions now imder way
for cooperative outer space programs with the
Soviet Union and for implementation of pro-
grams already in effect with many of our Euro-
pean allies, with countries in South America and
Africa and the Far East.

We hope that these principles will continue to
be embodied in reliable and enduring agreements
which in the future will concern all nations. The
right time to subject activities in space to inter-
national law and supervision is now, before pos-
sibly untoward developments occur.

Purposes and Strategy of U.S. Foreign Policy

Now let us descend from orbit and look at some
of the new frontiers on earth. I want to state
very briefly the purposes and goals of our foreign
policy and our positive strategy for securing them.

Our paramount objectives are well known. We
seek to preserve the physical safety of our home-
land, the well-being of our people, the principles
and ideals on whicli our country was foimded, our
way of life. This requires, among other things,
that we maintain an adequate rate of growth in
our economy while keeping the lid on inflation.
It requires that we do our part in practicing and
promoting liberal trade policies.

Our way of life thrives best m a spacious en-
vironment of peace and freedom. We seek to
build, in President Kennedy's words,^ "a peaceful

* For text of a resolution adopted by the U.N. General
Assembly on Dec. 20, 1901, see ihld., Jan. 29, 1962, p. 180;
for background, see also ihid., May 14, 1962, p. 809.

V6i(?., Jan. 29, 1962, p. 159.

i\ine 11, J 962

933

world community of free and independent states,
free to choose their o^\^^l future and their own sys-
tem so long as it does not threaten the freedom
of others." This is the kind of world envisioned
by the Charter of the United Nations.

The leaders of the Communist movement, as
they have told us in plain words, have a contrary
goal. They seek to subject the whole world to
their system. They not only regard this as Iris-
torically inevitable ; they are determined to hasten
this alleged inevitability by every practicable
means.

There appear to be some differences of view
among the Communists as to the pace and tactics
of communizing the rest of the world, as well as
over ideology and internal policies. But both of
the major branches of the Commmiist movement
are determined to buiy us, and each seems intent
on demonstrating that its method of interring us
is the more efficacious.

Mr. Khrushchev appears to be aware that the
penalty for starting a great war would be the
destruction of the Soviet Union. But let us not
misunderstand what the Commimists mean by
"peaceful coexistence." By their own definition
it means extending the Communist domain by
every means short of a great war. They specifi-
cally approve what they call "wars of national
liberation," which are in fact efforts to impose
communism by force while escaping the penalties
for massive aggression.

Aggression must not be allowed to succeed. We
will defend the frontiers of freedom. In this task
we have more than 40 allies. And, although some
of them do not publicly admit it, many of the
uncommitted nations are becoming increasingly
aware that their survival in independence depends
on the ability of the free world to hold in check
the Communist imperialists.

We will defend the freedom of West Berlin.
We are determined to repel aggression in South-
east Asia, as we have demonstrated by increasing
our help to South Viet- Nam and by landing troops
in Thailand.

Partnership With Industrialized Nations

While, with our allies, we protect the free world
against aggression, we seek to build its strength.
In this great task (hero are at least four main
elements.

The first element is an ever-closer and more pro-
ductive partnership with the industrialized nations
of the free world. This calls for an increasingly
effective North Atlantic community. It calls also
for strengthening of our relations with the free
nations of the Pacific.

The partnership with Europe is well under way
through the NATO defense structure, through
systematic political consultation, and through a
variety of common programs and shared responsi-
bilities toward the less develojied world. But two
great events are mifolding in Europe to which we
must adjust : Western Europe is in the process of
forming an enlarged Common Market, and it is
moving toward some form of closer political inte-
gration. A great new power is in the making.

President Kennedy's trade legislation ^ is de-
signed to associate this country with the Common
Market in ways which will benefit the United
States and Europe and mark a decisive step toward
a viable partnership within the greatest area of
economic productivity, trade, and skilled man-
power on earth. We face similar adjustments in
coordinating the Atlantic nations' monetary and
fiscal policies in order that each can sustain a high
rate of economic growth and maintain an equilib-
rium in international payments. The Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development,
or OECD, which began operating last September,
has been established for this purpose and is now at
work on these problems.

As we envisage it the North Atlantic commmiity
will always include Canada and j^ei-petuate our en-
during bonds with that country. We must remain
vigilant, as we move toward closer partnership
with Europe, to find ways of associating Japan
with the constructive tasks of the Atlantic part-
nership. This j^owerful and dynamic nation,
which is driving forward at an astonishing rate of
economic growth and progressively consolidating
a democratic political base, has an essential, useful,
and world role to play within the conmiunity of
free nations. It can make important contributions
to the modernization process throughout the whole
of the less developed world and is, indeed, now
doing so. It is for this reason that Japan is the
only non-European country witli membership in
the OECD's Development Assistance Committee.

° For toxt of the President's message to Congress on
trade, see ibid., Feb. 12, l!l(!2, p. 2.'?1.

934

Department of State Bulletin

Relations With Developing Nations

A second olenient in our constructive task centers
on our relations with the countries of Latin
America, Africa, and Asia which are struggling
with modernization and the mai'ch toward in-
dustrialization and improved standards of living
and social welfare. Our foreign aid and military
assistance programs, together with the Alliance
for Progress within this hemisphere, are designed
to assist these countries with this range of
problems.

Our fundamental purposes toward these coun-
tries are three : to assist them in maintaining their
independence, to assist them to modernize their
economies and otherwise to develop open societies
in ways of their own choice which respond to the
aspirations of their peoples, and to make it more
possible for them to assume responsible roles
within the interdependent free coimnunity of
nations.

The third element in our task of building the
free world is the creation of fruitful and durable
relations between the industrialized and the in-
dustrializing regions. The old colonial order has
all but vanished. The peoples of Asia and Africa
have achieved "the separate and equal station to
which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God en-
title them." The new order — and a far better one
it is — between them and the old metropoles is one
of a partnership of equals.

With their mounting production the nations of
Western Europe ai'e able to shoulder more of the
load of assisting the underdeveloped areas.
Canada and Japan and other countries are playing
increasingly important roles in this effort.

One of the manifestations of tliis new partner-
ship between the advanced and the less developed
countries is the formation of consortiums to
finance development plans. We must also con-
tinue to work on the knotty problems of stabi-
lizing commodity prices in order to maintain the
ability of the developing countries to earn foreign
exchange.

Private capital has an important, although
sometimes difficult, role to play in the huge and
complex task of modernizing the underdeveloped
nations.

Among the peoples we must assist in making
economic, social, and political progress are those
of the islands of the Pacific. They vary in their
levels of development, but their aspirations are

expanding. Helping them to move forward is
a common task for our Australian and New Zea-
land allies and comrades and for our European
friends with island territories, as well as for the
United States.

Building a World Community

The international community which we are try-
ing to help build will be one of diverse values.
Herein will lie its strength. For we know that
peoples want to remain independent and free to
develop in their own ways. We and the other
advanced nations can live in a pluralistic world,
whereas we know the Communists cannot.

By diversity we do not mean anarchy. In the
world of today no nation can survive alone. We
seek a commmaity of nations which recognize their
interdependence, a community marked by increas-
ing cooperation, by order, and by law. This is
the fourth element in our constructive policy.
We work toward this end through a host of inter-
national institutions and arrangements. The
thread that runs through all our efforts on the
world scene is our concern to build a world of
order and justice under law. It is particularly
appropriate to emphasize this objective today,
which has been designated as International Law
Day.

A world of peace and order under law cannot
be achieved by decree. It must be built, piece
by piece. All of our histoiy teaches us that law
is the product of cumulative growth, won with
effort by coping effectively with problem after
problem.

When we are impressed with defects and diffi-
culties in international life today, we would do
well to reflect on the hardship and injustices of
life within any single nation of Western Europe
during the Middle Ages and indeed during much
of the modern era. Our o^vn Anglo-American
common law was not given or suddenly created;
it was fashioned and wrought out of the living
experience of many generations.

The community of nations is in a highly forma-
tive period. We need only glance backward to
the concepts and institutions of 100 years ago to
appreciate the tremendous progress that has been
made in the interval. Today there is almost gen-
eral acceptance of the idea of world organization
for the common good. Increasingly it is under-

June 7 7, 7962

935

stood that agreed rules, and decisions based on a
fair application of them, are to be preferred to
resort to force.

We must keep everlastingly at this task of
building a world community of order and law.
We must continue to search for means of draw-
ing the Communist nations into such a commu-
nity. We think that the Soviets have a common
interest with the West in attacking the dangerous
anarchy of the armaments and nuclear weapons
race, in maintaining order in outer space, and in
other measures to prevent our conflicting purposes
from erupting into a mutually destructive war.
We therefore keep on, patiently and persistently,
trying to make progress, through reliable and
enforcible agreements, on these frontiers of
danger.

I have described briefly the main elements in

our positive strategy. It is a strategy in which
the initiative lies with us rather than with the
Communists. It is a "win" strategy because it
harmonizes with the largest interests and deepest
aspirations of mankind.

We have no doubt that the peoples of the Com-
munist world will increasingly bring pressure on
their leaders to grant them the benefits of the
free community and the individual rights and
liberties which become the dignity of man. The
way of free choice, of national and personal free-
dom, is, I submit, the real wave of the future.

We know where we want to go, and we are
under way. Let us not be discouraged by the
vicissitudes of the journey. Let us keep in mind
that old maxim from Hebraic tradition: "It is
upon us to begin the work; it is not upon us to
complete the work."

Secretary Rusk Speaks in Australia and New Zealand
Following ANZUS IVSeeting

Following are texts of addresses which Secre-
tary Rusk made at parliamentary dinners at
Canberra, Australia, and at Wellington, New Zea-
land, on May 9 and 10 after he had attended a
meeting of the Australia-New Zealand-United
States Council at Canberra May 8-9}

ADDRESS AT CANBERRA, MAY 9

Prime Minister Menzies — whom all the world
knows as "Bob" — Prime Minister Holyoake, Mr.
Calwell,^ Your Excellencies Ministers of State
and distinguished members of the Parliament:

I am deeply grateful for this warm and friendly

' For text of a communique released at the close of
the ANZUS meeting and a news conference held by Mr.
Rusk at Canberra on May 8, see Bulletin of May 28,
19C2, p. 804.

' R. G. Menzies, Prime Minister of Australia ; Keith
JacUa Holyoake, Prime Minister of New Zealand ; Arthur
A. Calwell, Leader of the Ojjposition, Australian House of
Representatives.

reception you have given me this evening. Those
of you who know intimately the political system
of the United States will know how sincerely a
Secretary of State says that.

Some years ago, when I was a student at the
University of Berlin, they asked me to give a
talk to the German students — in German — about
conditions back home, and with the help of some
friends I gave them about 30 minutes about agri-
culture in my native State. "Wlien it was over
a young German came forward and said, "I en-
joyed your remark;;, but I was not here when you
were introduced. AVliere is j'our home?" I said,
"My home is in the State of Georgia." He said,
"Oh, yes, I should have known. I thought you
were speaking German with a Russian accent."

This evening I shall attempt to speak in Eng-
lish. If you think I am speaking with an accent,
the truth is that I shall be.

Mr. Menzies referred to your good and close
friends in New Zealand as brothers. I point out
that vou sometime refer to us as cousins. The

936

Department of State Bulletin

difference is that the British Crown went to the
most extraordinary trouble to get rid of its Ameri-
can Colonies before it invented the Common-
wealth. But nevertheless we have a nostalgic pull
toward the Commonwealth, which I hope you will
understand, because as you and we look around
this troubled world of ours these days it could
be a chill and lonely world if it were not for the
English-speaking members of the Commonwealth
and the United States of America.

It is a great personal pleasure to visit Australia
for this first time. My longing to do so has been
nourished quite literally throughout my life, from
the stories of exploration and adventure I read
as a boy — my State of Georgia, too, was founded
by refugees from the debtor prisons of England —
all the way from those early stories to the kind
invitation which your Prime Minister extended to
our meeting of ANZUS here in Canberra.

Australian friends at Oxford, law school studies
of appeals to the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council, associations in World War II and Korea,
team play with your delegations to the United
Nations, cooperation with your scientists and your
scholars while I was at the Kockefeller Founda-
tion— these are among some of the ties which make
this visit deeply satisfying, quite apart from the
official business we meet here to transact.

Common Heritage of United States and Australia

Like all other Americans, I feel at home here,
not only because of your warm hospitality but
because of our common heritage, our common in-
stitutions, our common values, our common pur-
poses. Our legal systems have the same roots.
We are as one in our respect for individual human
rights and the practice of political and social
democracy.

You Icnow, it just occurred to me that those
sentences sound trite. But let's be careful. These
simple, elementai-y things turn out to be the most
important, and one of the problems about letting
them become trite is that we may let them lose
strength by inattention — by taking them for
granted.

We share the pioneering spirit which goes with
the settling and development of continents. We
have a common, or at least a vaguely similar, lan-
guage, and a common tendency to enlarge — or
shall I say enrich — it by coining new words.

We are both among the inventors of a federal

system — arrangements, Mr. Prime Minister, which
continue to make a rich contribution to political
wisdom where imity and diversity must find recon-
ciliation. We haven't begim to see the end of the
story of this federal idea in the world in which
we live.

You have a special capital district, as do we.
And, like ours, we think yours is beautiful.

If we Americans have any complaints about
you Australians they are that some of your run-
ners and swimmers are rather too fast and that
your policy in regard to the Davis Cup is imcon-
scionably monopolistic. Years ago, in writing
your Ambassador in Washington to congratulate
him on Australia's victory in the Davis Cup
matches, in typical Yankee style I decided to do
a bit of timesaving forward planning. I made
myself a stack of mimeographed letters, and now
all I need to do is to fill in the date.

I am not prepared to concede that a similar let-
ter will be necessary for the America's Cup, but I
must of course at this stage recognize the possibili-
ties. I have a feeling that perhaps it will be the
turn of Sir Howard Beale to send a letter to me.

But let me congratulate you on a victory in an-
other field — the first place won by your shortwave
broadcasts in a recent worldwide poll.

The excellence which sometimes dismays us as
competitors makes us treasure you all the more as
allies and comrades.

An Enduring Partnership

Many tens of thousands of Americans know
from direct personal experience how good it is to
have Australians and New Zealanders at their
side in times of peril. One of these Americans
arrived at Guadalcanal 19 years ago last month to
take command of a PT-boat. He became well
acquainted with the neighboring waters of the
South Pacific, first by cruising on them and then
by swimming in them for some 40 hours after his
PT-boat was rammed by a Japanese destroyer and
he and his crew were presumed lost. And lost or
captured they all would have been, almost cer-
tainly, but for some friendly islanders and an
Australian — one of that intrepid band of Aus-
tralians and New Zealanders who risked their
lives in lonely vigil behind enemy lines, as
watchers over half a million square miles of
Melanesia. President Kennedy has asked me to
convey his warmest regards and best wishes to the

June 11, J 962

937

people of Australia this evening, and a special
personal greeting to Reg Evans.

It is altogether fitting that this meeting of
ANZUS should coincide with the celebration of
the 20th anniversaiy of the Battle of the Coral
Sea. Coral Sea Week not only coirunemorates
our joint struggle but signifies our enduring
partnership.

Wlien the ANZUS treaty was signed on Sep-
tember 1, 1951, Secretary of State Acheson said
that it "only puts into words strong ties and pur-
poses already in existence." And when I look
back to that day of signing, at which I was pres-
ent, I find in this present journey a journey of
sentimental affection. I also recall — and this
should be important to you — that the ANZUS
treaty was a result of the most close cooperation
between Secretary Acheson and Mr. John Foster
Dulles, who were working at that time in com-
plete harmony with respect to issues such as those
we are talking about today.

Indeed I think it may be said that no defensive
alliance was ever more firmlj^ anchored in the
solid realities of common interest, and common
ideals, and mutual confidence. As we have fought
side by side to defend liberty in the past, so we
stand today, resolved to preserve freedom against
another grave threat. Our vital common inter-
ests are not confined to the Pacific ; they are world-
wide. We are locked in a global struggle, and in
its outcome our fortunes — both yours and ours —
are indissolubly welded.

U.S. View of World Struggle

I should like to outline briefly how the Govern-
ment of the United States looks upon this world
struggle. Our central objective was set forth
succinctly by President Kennedy in his state of the
Union message in January of this year. He
said : ^

Yet our basic goal remains the same: a peaceful
world community of free and Independent states, free
to choose their own future and their own system so
long as it does not threaten the freedom of others.

This is the kind of world community envisioned
by the Charter of the United Nations and solemnly
pledged bj^ all who signed that document.

Unhappily, as we know only too well, there are
forces in the world opposed to that objective —

^ For text, see Bulletin of Jan. 29, 1962, p. 159.
938

forces determined to impose their system on all
the peoples of the earth. The rulers of the
leading Commimist states are not only Marxists
who believe that their system is destined to pre-
vail over all others. They are Leninists, intent
upon expediting that alleged historical inevitabil-
ity by every practical means.

There may appear to be disagreements within
the Communist world, not only as to ideology and
internal policies but as to the pace and tactics of
communizing the rest of the world. But in the
short run, at least, we should be wary of drawing
comfort from these differences. Both of the major
branches of the Commmiist movement are intent
upon "burying" us. And each seems to feel the
urge to prove that its particular method of hasten-
ing our demise is the more effective.

Mr. Khrushchev advocates what he calls "peace-
ful coexistence" or "peaceful competition." Inso-
far as that signifies competition in production and
improving the way men li^-e, we welcome it. We
have no doubt about which side will win this
match. Compare Eastern Germany with Western
Germany ! Or Eastern Europe with Western
Europe ! Compare Communist China with almost
any country you can think of! The "great leap
forward" has ended in a flop. The vaunted "short-
cut to the future" has proved to be the shortcut
to misery.

Mr. Khrushchev has made it crystal clear that
he is not advocating mere competition in produc-
tion. By his own definition "peaceful coexistence"
is a program of conflict — a design for extending
Commmiist domination by all means short of the
great war which would be self-defeating.

Let us identify peaceful coexistence, in Com-
munist jargon, for what it is: a tactic which rests
upon the assumption of inevitable victory. This
is not a match in which the other side intends to
accept the role of a "good loser." The failures of
East Germany spawned the crisis over Berlin;
the internal successes of South Viet-Nam since
195.5 spawned the aggression from the north.

Connnunists do not exclude the threat or even
the use of force. Indeed they expressly approve
what their leaders call "wars of national libera-
tion"-— a characteristically upside-down label
applicable to the use of foi-ce against any non- I
Communist regime, just as they use imperialism
as an upsido-down word to describe non-Commu-
nist leadership.

Department of State Bulletin

Communist efforts to expand their domain by
one means or another have produced a series of
crises. Imagine the world revohition which would
be brought about if there were a simple decision
ill Moscow to live at peace with the rest of the
world !

Where f lioy have encountered resolute resistance
they have fallen back. But they continue to probe,
and where they probe crisis results. At present
we are giving special attention to two areas of
Communist-induced crisis: Berlin and Southeast
Asia.

The Crisis in Berlin

In Berlin we face the most direct Soviet chal-
lenge to the entire free world. Having fenced and
walled off their areas of occupation in East Ger-
many and East Berlin, the Soviets seek, once
again, to encroach on the free Western sectors of
Berlin and, in so doing, to extinguish the human
rights and the very lives of the stanch citizens
of this brave city, who have proved their dedica-
tion to freedom.

The Western allies, backed by all the NATO
powers, have the most solemn obligation to pro-
tect the freedom of West Berlin. We will not be
forced, or Sfjueezed, or harassed out of West
Berlin. We have made it plain that the fi-eedom
and viability of West Berlin, and the free access
and Allied presence ne^-essary to insure its freedom
and viability, are vital interests which the West
shares with the West Berliners.

We cannot share that with the Soviet forces
which Mr. Khrushchev would like to join with
ours in West Berlin. We do not believe that
Soviet forces have had any experience in seeing
to tlio security of a free society.

We tliink tliat the Soviet leadei-ship has come to
realize that when we call these interests vital we
mean it in the literal sense and that we will defend
those interests, by whatever means may be
required.

Southeast Asia

In Soutlieast Asia, likewise, the free world has
vital interests which you and New Zealand and we,
with our other allies in SEATO, have special ob-
ligations to protect. At present, two adjoining na-
tions, Laos and the Republic of Viet-Nam, are
being subjected to aggi-ession from the north.

We seek a united and independent Laos. We be-
lieve that the interests of Laos, of Southeast Asia,
and of the free world as a whole would be served
by a neutral Laos. The Soviets informed us that
they too favored an independent and neutral Laos.
International agreement on this stated objective
was achieved at Geneva, and under this agreement
all foreign troops would be required to leave Laos.
As yet, however, the leaders of the principal politi-
cal factions within Laos have not agreed on the
composition of a coalition govei'nment. And I
cannot honestly repoit that the end of this crisis is
plainly in view.

In Laos there is a precarious cease-fire. But
next door, in South Viet-Nam, is a country under
active assault by thousands of men trained, in-
filtrated, in part supplied, and certainly directed,
from north of the I7th parallel.

The Viet Minli have systematically violated the
Geneva Accords of 1954 since the day of their
signing. But they were unable to prevent South
Viet-Nam from making remarkable economic and
social progress, while hunger and miseiy made a
mockery of the Communist claims to have created
a paradise in North Viet-Nam. The success of the
new nation to the south doubtless prompted the
renewed and stronger Communist effort to destroy
it. This assault is directed not just against soldiers
but against the village school teacher, the village
extension worker, the malaria eradication team,
the local tax collector, the rural postal carrier.

This is a prime example of what the Communists
call a "war of national liberation." In reality it is
a gangster war of horror and assassination. The
stakes are greater than South Viet-Nam itself; the
independence of all the peoples of Southeast Asia
is involved.

In the last several months the United States has
substantially increased its assistance to the people
of South Viet-Nam. You are helping there in
significant and growing ways, but there is more
for all of us to do in that situation. We should
like to see many other free nations also lend a help-
ing hand, for aggression against Southeast Asia
must not be allowed to succeed.

While we are determined to check aggression,
we persistently seek areas of overlapping interest
with the Communist nations. We were encouraged
a few years ago when the Soviet Union joined
Australia, the United States, and other nations in
the treaty on Antarctica.

June 11, 1962

939

Efforts To Secure Test Ban Treaty

We believe that the Soviets, if not the Com-
munist Chinese, recognize a common interest with
us in trying to avoid the devastation of thermo-
nuclear war. We had hoped that as a first step
toward bringing superweapons under control they
would agree to a treaty banning atomic tests. In
the effort to meet their objections to inspection.
Great Britain and the United States offered to
limit it to the barest minimum consistent with a
reasonable assurance of compliance. But even this
was too much for the Soviets. And while we were
still negotiating tliey broke the moratorium on
testing with a long — ^and obviously long pre-
pared— series of tests. Nevertheless we stood on
our offer to conclude a test ban treaty — and with
an inspection arrangement that would have in-
volved an international inspection team looking at
less than l/2000th of the territory of the Soviet
Union in any given year.

But as the Soviets wei-e still unwilling to agree.
President Kennedy felt obliged to resume our
own testing for our own security and the security
of the free world. As you know, he reached that
decision most reluctantly. And we stand pre-
pared to stop testing at any moment that the
Soviets agree to a test ban treaty with essential
international verification. But the President of
the United States will not accept the responsibility
for allowing people who want their kind of world
order to move ahead of the free world in this
nuclear field.

Disarmament Conference

At the disarmament conference in Geneva we
have tabled now the draft outline of a treaty *
providing for large and successive reductions in
all types of arms, leading to complete and general
disarmament. Here again, as so often in the past,
we have come up against an initial obstacle that
seems now to be insurmountable — the refusal of
the Soviets to accept international verifications of
the arms retained. But we continue this quest for
mutual reductions in armaments and for measures
to reduce the dangers of accidental war and sur-
prise attack. We do hope that the Soviets will
agree to a treaty, for example, on the peaceful uses
of space. And we look continually for areas of
cooperation, such as between their scientists and

those of the free world in expanding human
knowledge.

But what a pity and what a tragedy that we
cannot somehow find a way to agree on specific,
definite, physical, tangible steps of disarmament!
And why is it that we should let an obsession with
secrecy stand in the way when secrecy and dis-
armament are utterly incompatible !

Building the Strength of the Free World

I have been speaking of our policies toward the
Communist world. Let me turn for a moment to
the great constructive task: the building of the
strength of the free world.

One of the bastions of the free world is Western
Europe, which has attained levels of well-being
and rates of economic growth beyond the dreams
of a decade ago. At the same time it has made
dramatic progress toward integration — integra-
tion which is settling for all time the historic
enmities which led to two world wars.

Is it really possible to comprehend what it
means in our own minds that after 500 or 600
years we are just about at the point where we
can say, "World wars Avill not start over intra-
Western European conflicts"? How much that
can mean to your coimtry and mine, which have
been in two world wars because of those conflicts.

And now the United Kingdom seeks admission
to the Common Market. We hope these negotia-
tions will succeed. In our view the moi-e compre-
hensive integration of Western Europe would
add immensely to the strength and the stability
and the security of the entire free world. But
we recognize that it would require adjustments
by all of us, for we stand at the threshold of a
new trading Morld. The challenge is whether it
is to be an open system.

Our response to tliis challenge is the Presi-
dent's trade expansion program, now before our
Congress.^ Our purpose is to negotiate major
reductions in the Common Market's tariff in re-
turn for similar reductions in our own tariff.
The heart of our policy is to open further the two
great common markets — that of Europe and that
of the 50 American States — to the goods of tlie
free world. We remain opposed to any drift of
Europe toward a closed economic society, or to

* For text, see ibid.. May 7, 10G2, p. 747.
940

° For text of the President's message to Congress on
trade, see ibid., Feb. 12, 1962, p. 231.

Deparfment of Slafe Bulletin

new preferential arrangements related to the
Common Market.

We hope that Australia, similar in so many
ways to the United States, will wish to join us
in freeing further the channels of trade and spe-
cifically in tariff negotiations to this end with the
enlarged Common Market within the framework
of GATT.

Tomorrow night in Wellington I shall say more
about trade and some of these other questions,
and I hope you may regard my talk there as
coupled with my remarks tonight. If we can deal
with these practical trade problems as practical
problems, I am sure that we can find answers
which deal with our vital interests and can sat-
isfy the needs of both our countries, because we,
too, have some economic problems with the pro-
spective Common Market, just as we know you do.

Aid to the Underdeveloped Nations

I should like to emphasize here, however, the
crucial importance of our assistance to the hungry
half of the world where the concepts of human
liberty and dignity are so often threatened by
mass poverty. Here the Communists seek to play
upon frustration, internal weaknesses, and old re-
sentments. But the advanced countries of the free
world have more solid resources — not only su-
perior material and technical resources but the
spiritual and humanitarian resources of demo-
cratic societies. To apply these to the building of
the underdeveloped nations is a task for the entire
free- world community.

Australia is already making a very substantial
contribution through the Colombo Plan and
otherwise. We know also that you have opened
the doors of your universities to thousands of stu-
dents from Asian countries and that many of these
students receive financial help from your Govern-
ment. In helping to build a peaceful world com-
munity you also keep alive one of the command-
ments of the frontier society from which we both
have sprung, that of helping your neighbor in his
adversity.

I hope you will indulge me for a moment while
I cite a few figures indicating what my country-
men are devoting to this dual task of protecting
and building the free world. We maintain more
than 2,800,000 men under arms. Of these — per-

haps you hadn't realized— nearly 1,100,000 are
deployed outside the continental United States, on
land or afloat.

We have more than 40 allies. We are extending
technical and financial and, in some cases, military
aid to many other nations. Altogether we are pro-
viding direct financial assistance to approximately
75 countries.

These outlays for defending and building the
free world amount, this year, to nearly $54,000,-
000,000, or 24,000,000,000 Australian pounds.

I don't need to say this to you people, who are
putters in this business, but we do have to say it
to many of our friends in these other countries
because they seem to think that we have some
magic mountain out of wliich we can shovel gold
that makes no difference to anyone. Tliese are
taxpayers' dollars. They total close to 10 percent
of our gross national product and average ap-
proximately $300 for every man, woman, and child
in the United States. Additional funds are sent
abroad by our philanthropic foundations or pri-
vately invested by companies and individuals.

And I hope that you will sometimes agree — and
I'm sure you do agree — that at least we are trying
to do our share.

Our investment in the peaceful exploration of
space also is substantial. Next year it will be
about $3,800,000,000, or 1,700,000,000 Australian
pounds. And it will rise in ensuing years.

Project Mercury

We are grateful to you, Mr. Prime Minister and
ladies and gentlemen, for your indispensable as-
sistance in Project Mercury and in the whole field
of space research and exploration. I think first
of the cooperation of your Government and your
scientists and technicians. And I would remind
you that we are working together to build the
most powerful radio telescope in the world, to be
located near this city. I think also — and no
American can avoid it these days — I think also of
the citizens of Perth, who lighted the path of
Colonel Glenn on his historic triple orbit of the
globe. They touched the hearts of all his coun-
trymen— indeed, I think I may say, of hundreds
of millions of other citizens of the free world
whose hearts were with him. (Incidentally, judg-
ing from my own experience, many of those hearts
were beating much faster than Colonel Glenn's
during those memorable hours.)

June 11, 1962

941

I wonder if I might close with a personal com-
ment. There are millions of Americans who have
shared with many of you in this room the experi-
ence of having been born in what we would now
call an underdeveloped society — prescientific, pre-
teclmical, pre-medical care, pre-public health, pre-
education. We have seen in our own lifetimes
the transformation of the lives of peoples under
free institutions. Now when we say to our friends
in the developing countries that we know the
Communists have not found a magic formula for
rapid development it's because we have seen fan-
tastic and rapid development under freedom while
you and we have been alined.

Let's not concede this notion that it takes two
or three hundred years to develop just because,
almost as a truism, all of us have had two or three
hundred years of history behind us, because this
development has occurred in the most recent
times. In 1920 only 1 percent of the farms of the
United States had electricity; today 98 percent
of them have electricity. You could multiply
those examples and figures many times in your
own personal experience.

The Basic Aspirations of Man

Now what I'm saying is that we have reason for
a confidence in the capacity of free societies to deal
with these great yearnings for economic and so-
cial development that we must transfer to those
who are giving these aspirations highest jjriority
in their own situation, and that we dare not pre-
tend— we dare not concede — that those who are
now responsible for what is happening all the way
from East Germany to North Viet-Nam have
found any answer even to the central problem
to which they say they have addressed themselves,
namely the problem of economic and social
satisfaction.

Secondly, you and we come out of a great politi-
cal tradition. We received it from the same
source. It was passed on to us as a part of a
discourse about the political consequences of the
nature of man which has been going on for more
than 2,000 years. Out of that experience and that
tradition came some very simple ideas. Our
people articulated them at the end of the 18th
century with the very simple expression that gov-
ernments derive their just powers from the con-
sent of the governed. And in the great constitu-
tional history of tlie Anglo-Saxon people, it has
found other means of expression.

942

These ideas are deeply rooted in human nature.
They are also the most explosive and powerful
revolutionary forces in the world today. It is the
notion of freedom that is causing people to move.
It is the notion of dignity and the improvement
in the lot of man which is causing people to move
today.

It is not for us to fear these great winds of
change. They are a part of the tradition out of
which we ourselves came. They are part of the
unfinished business which is a part of our story.
And those who came to some notions in the middle
of the 19th century under other circumstances and
for other conditions are finding that these notions
are running di-y because they obviously do not fit
these basic aspirations of man.

We don't have to argue with people in other
parts of the world about what we are really after
and what they are really after. Have you ever
found anybody who would rather be ignorant than
educated? or sick than healthy? or who is in-
terested in tliat knock on the door at midnight
which means terror?

These simple hmnan notions, central to your
society and to ours, are the gi-eat power of the
human spirit. They are the tilings which bind
us together, and let me tell you they are the things
which give us allies, spoken or silent — allies among
men and women in every corner of the earth.
This is the basis of our confidence; this is the scope
of our task. This is the story of freedom, and
history says this story cannot fail.

ADDRESS AT WELLINGTON, MAY 10

Mr. Prime Minister, Mr. Nash,® Your Excellen-
cies Members of the Cabinet and Parliament, dis-
tinguished guests, and friends :

I do thank most warmly the Government and the
people of New Zealand for their hospitality, and
I was deeply moved, Mr. Prime Minister and Mr.
Nash, by the wann terms in which you proposed
the toast to the guest of the evening. You have
enabled me to begin to satisfy a long-cherished de-
sire to visit these emerald Islands of the Blessed —
although in a more vital condition, I hope,' than
that related in the ancient myth. And I point
with pride to the fact that you have enabled me to
claim a precious "first." I must admit that this

" Walter Nash, Leader of the Opposition.

Departmenf of Slate Bulletin

achievement is not in the same class with the
''firsts" of Sir Edmund Hillary and some of your
runners. But you have won my gratitude by al-
lowing me to become the first American Secretary
of State to visit New Zealand while still in the
harness of office.

But this is also a journey of genuine afl'ection,
one wliich I have anticipated for a vei-y, very long
time. Indeed, Mr. Prime ]\Iinister, when you in-
vited me to come here, the first question I had to
ask myself was whether my personal exchequer
could afford it, because during World "War II it
was my military duty- — I was then in uniform — to
be among those in our general staff in war plans to
follow tlie campaigns of the Second New Zealand
Division. And after watching the unbelievable
gallantry and the superb performance of that
division in battle after battle, I took an oath that
if I ever met a member of the Second New Zealand
Division I would buy him a drink. I have already
had one disastrous episode because during the war
I had to drop through Cairo on a weekend when
most of the members of that division were on
leave.

I also remember with deep gratitude, on the oc-
casion when President Truman had to make the
hard decision that the aggression in North Korea
would have to be resisted, that the first voice we
heard was the voice of the New Zealand Ambassa-
dor, who came in and said, "What do you want
from New Zealand ?"

I have heard your Commonwealth colleagues,
Mr. Prime Minister, refer to each other as brothers
and to us in America as cousins. Well, this causes
a certain amoimt of resentment which is not your
fault, but we are a little sensitive to the fact that
the British went to the most extraordinary pains
to rid themselves of their American Colonies be-
fore they invented the Commonwealth.

I have had some difficulty in establishing
friendships as easily and smoothly as I thought
would be possible in the last 2 or 3 days, as I have
met friends from New Zealand, because on four or
five occasions I have said to one or another of
them, "You know, what distresses me about this
visit is that I should like really to stay 4 or 5 days
and go down to South Island and do some fishing."
But on each occasion the answer was, "But, you
know, we have good fishing in North Island, too."
I tliink I picked the wrong New Zealanders. But
if you will settle this question between North and
South Island, I will settle Berlin!

Historic Ties Between U.S. and New Zealand

The long association between New Zealanders
and Americans began during the Pacific whaling
and sealing operations of the early 19tli century.
An American consulate was opened at the Bay of
Islands in 1839.

But over and beyond these commercial associa-
tions, which continue at the present time, Mr.
Prime Minister, Americans and New Zealanders
committed their courage and their resources in
voyages of discovery and exploration in Ant-
arctica. In latter years, for example. Sir Hubert
Wilkins was sponsored by the American Geo-
graphic Society when he made his epic flight over
Graham Land.

Our own Admiral Richard Byrd looked upon
New Zealand sincerely as his second liome. The
monument recently erected on Mount Victoria is
a testimonial not only to Byrd's work but to the
good will and friendship of the people of New
Zealand for Americans. And we are grateful for
the warm hospitality so graciously extended by all
New Zealanders, and especially by the people of
Christchurch, to Byrd's successors, the personnel
of Operation Deepfreeze.

These congenial special connections are but a
few of the strands in the stout fabric of our friend-
ship. We are woven together by common lan-
guage, common institutions, common purpose,
common belief in the rights of man and in govern-
ment by the people and for the people and of the
people.

"Wlien I think of the democracy of New Zealand
I think of an observation made in 1835 by the
young Frenchman, Alexis de Tocqueville, in his
book on Democracy in America. In the introduc-
tion he wrote: ". . . amongst the novel objects
that attracted my attention during my stay in the
United States, nothing struck me more forcibly
than the general equality of condition among the
people. I readily discovered the prodigious in-
fluence which this primary fact exercised on the
whole course of society."

The "general equality of condition among the
people" is noteworthy in your society also. New
Zealand stands as a leader among the nations in
providing for the social welfare of its people. And
you are justified in being proud — more proud than
we can be — of the racial harmony you have
achieved. You have come as close as any nation
to realizing in practice some of the great trutlis of

June i;, ;962

943

the American Declaration of Independence, that
all men are bom equal, that "they ai-e endowed by
their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that
among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of
Happiness."

Together we have fought to defend our common
way of life. As I said last night in Canberra,
many tens of thousands of Americans know from
direct personal experience how good it is to have
Australians and New Zealanders at their side in
times of peril. One of those Americans is our Am-
bassador to New Zealand [Anthony B. Akers].
Another, who also commanded a PT-boat, had a
close call in the South Pacific but lived to fight
another day and to occupy the highest office in
my country. President Kennedy asked me to
convey to the people of New Zealand his warmest
regards and best wishes.

Commitments in ANZUS and SEATO

We stand today shoulder to shoulder in the de-
fense of liberty. We are allies through ANZUS
and SEATO. In ANZUS we have just had a most
useful meeting in Canberra. ANZUS is securely
rooted in common pui-poses and, indeed, common
necessities. I can do no better than to repeat the
words spoken by my old and dear friend Sir Carl
Berendsen, then your distinguished Ambassador
to the United States, when the ANZUS treaty was
signed on September 1, 1951 :

"The treaty," he said, "therefore rests upon the
solid basis of common interests and ideals, upon
the regard and affection of the respective peoples,
upon their common desire for peace and upon
their common determination to resist aggression.
It reflects also the inescapable facts of geography
on the one hand and, on the other, the especial
perils to which the Pacific may be exposed in the
course of this world-wide conflict between liberty
and slavery with which the whole of mankind is
today oppressed."

Beyond ANZUS, we have our common obliga-
tion through SEATO to defend Southeast Asia
against aggression. This is a commitment of vital
importance. In fulfilling it, we on our side shall
do whatever may be necessary.

The Island World of the Pacific

Another deep and abiding interest which you
and we share is in the stability and welfare of the
great island world between North Cape and Ha-

waii. Although few New Zealanders or Ameri-
cans gave the matter much thought, until January
of this year our countries actually shared a com-
mon frontier in the Pacific : that between Ameri-
can Samoa and your former Trust Territory of
Western Samoa. The fact that we were hardly
conscious of facing each other across an inter-
national boundary is, I think, a confirmation of
our close relations.

But when I think of stability in the island world
I do not mean stagnation or lack of progress.
The peoples of the Pacific Islands are expanding
their horizons and developing their skills at an
increasing rate. Their aspirations are keeping
pace with their development. "Wliile the depend-
ent territories of the Pacific vary in their level
of development, all of them are being brought
increasingly into the dynamic 1960's.

To the United States and New Zealand, to our
ANZUS partner Australia, and to our European
associates in the South Pacific Commission, this
trend presents both a challenge and an opportu-
nity. We must assist the people of the island ter-
ritories in making economic, social, and political
progress. We must do this in a cooperative man-
ner, without imposing arbitrary economic bar-
riers or new spheres of economic influence.

To carry forward this task, while preserving
peace and stability in the region, obviously will
call for wisdom and experience on the part of the
administering powers. And for much of that
wisdom and experience I am sure we shall find
ourselves turning to you, in face of the record
which you have established in that regard. You
have made a notable contribution through the
skillful and understanding manner in which you
have administered the Trust Territory of Western
Samoa and prepared the way for its transition to
independence.

U.S. Nuclear Tests

Tliere is, of course, another aspect of the Pacific
Islands scene that commands our attention at pres-
ent. My country is carrying out a series of nu-
clear tests, based on Christmas and Johnston
Islands. I know that you are aware that President
Kennedy's decision to conduct these tests was made
with great reluctance, only after examining care-
fully every possible alternative. The Soviet re-
sumption of testing on a massive scale and the
unyielding Soviet refusal to agree to a meaningful

944

Department of State Bulletin

test ban treaty siuve us no other rational choice.
To have decided otherwise would have been a
betrayal of our responsibility for the defense of
the free world.

Chi'istnias and Johnston Islands, both in the
Northern Hemisphere, were selected as test sites
because, among other important advantages, they
are among the most remote of the available sites.
Johnston is about 700 miles from Honolulu, and
Christmas about the same from Penrhyn Island.
Unprecedented precautions have been taken to
insure that the safety and health of the Pacific
Islands peoples are in no way endangered by the
tests. In the Cook and Tokelau Islands, scientists
from the United States and New Zealand are co-
operating closely in the opeiMtion of monitoring
facilities to supplement our extraordinary safety
measures in other parts of the Pacific. We have
fvdl confidence in the adequacy of these precau-
tions.

Moreo\er, we continue to seek most earnestly
an effective test ban treaty. And we stand ready
to stop testing whenever the Soviets agree to such
a treaty ^vitll the minimum of international in-
spection necessary to verify compliance.

The tragedy of the situation is that these two
great powers cannot, in the face of the enormous
national, selfish, realistic interest which both of us
have in bringing these nuclear tests to an end —
that we cannot somehow find a way to stop them.
We find it difficult on our side to believe that an
international inspection system which involves the
inspection of less than l/2000th of Soviet terri-
tory in the course of any single year is an unrea-
sonable price to ask for an ending of this fright-
ful competition.

The regional interests and defensive alliances
which I have been discussing are only a part of
our common involvement in the struggle between
freedom and coercion. That struggle is world-
wide, and in it our destinies are inseparable.

Last night in Canberra I outlined my Govern-
ment's view on the fundamental political aspects
of this global conflict. I spoke of our determina-
tion to repel aggression and particularly of our
confrontations with the Communists in Berlin and
Southeast Asia. I spoke also of our persistent
quest for negotiated agreements with our ad-
versaries, above all our hopes for an agreed start
on the road to disarmament, with reliable verifica-
tion of compliance.

But the storms of crises and the reefs of Com-

June 11, 1962

641490—62 3

nnmist intransigence are not the whole story. AVe
can pass through or around them if we know
where we are going. We have in fact charted our
course toward a great goal, and that goal is a free
community of nations, independent but interde-
pendent, uniting North and South, East and
West — the kind of world order sketched in the
opening pages of the United Nations Charter.

Tonight I should like to address my remarks
primarily to ways and means of working toward
that goal — to the great constructive tasks of build-
ing the free world.

Dissolution of Colonial Empires

The world in and on which we build is of course
radically different from that into which our
fathers were born. In that older world relative
peace and stability were made possible in large
measures by British strength and an effective bal-
ance of power. Under that mantle the fniits of
the industrial revolution ripened and multiplied
and European ideas and culture and technology
spread around the world. It was widely assumed
that the colonial system, based on the comfortable
paternalism of the metropoles, was an enlightened
means of maintaining political stability and fos-
tering gradual economic growth in the vast terri-
tories of the southern half of the globe.

The two European civil wars of the iiOth cen-
tury— the second of wliich became a full-scale
world war — destroyed the old order, bringing to
a close an epoch that had begun with the age of
exploration. Out of the wreckage have emerged
the new nations of Asia and Africa, inspired by
the great ideas and aspirations which originated
in the West. We welcome these new nations to
the fraternity of free men.

According to Marxist dogma, the dissolution of
the old empires should have blighted the econ-
omies of the former ruling powers. But the eco-
nomics of the modem world is not at all the
capitalism which Marx saw; still less does it cor-
respond to what he thought he saw. The govern-
ments of the more advanced countries have learned
how to intervene responsibly to make tlieir econ-
omies serve the broad public interest and to pro-
mote economic and social progress.

Instead of withering as the old colonial empires
dissolved, as Marx would have had it, the econo-
mies of the former ruling nations have spiraled
upward to new heights of productivity and well-

945

being. In the 1950's Western Europe achieved a
rate of progress unprecedented in its long history.
Japan also has attained an unparalleled rate of
economic growth — a rate higher than the Soviet
Union's or Western Europe's. And in the United
States the increase — just the increase — in gross
national product since the First World War ex-
ceeds the total gross national product of the Soviet
Union today.

Movement Toward European Integration

One of our great tasks in building the free
world, as we see it, is to strengthen the bonds
among the more advanced free nations. These lie
chiefly in the Northern Hemisphere but certainly
include Australia and New Zealand.

For at least 14 years the United States has fa-
vored cooperation and movements toward integra-
tion among the nations of Western Europe. Our
attitude was stated in the legislation authorizing
the Marshall plan and has been reaffirmed on many
subsequent occasions by our Congress and by all
our postwar Presidents. It lias been supported
consistently by the leadership of both of our major
political parties.

We hoped, first of all, for a Europe which would
submerge for all time the old feuds which cost the
world so much in treasure and blood. We can
almost say with certainty that after 600 years we
shall not have wars which originate within West-
ern Europe. And beyond that, we have wanted to
see a free Europe that is strong and vigorous. And
we have believed that in union there is strength.

We on our side have never offered any blue-
prints for an integrated Europe. We have never
tried to tell our Western European friends how, or
to what degree, they should integrate. But when
proposals which seemed to us constructive have
originated in Eurojje, we have supported them.
We looked with favor on the creation of the Euro-
]iean Coal and Steel Community and, later, on the
formation of EURATOM and the European Eco-
nomic Community.

Generally the process of European integration
seems to us to have produced splendid results. En-
lightened leadership has established a new rela-
tionship between Germany and her Western Euro-
pean neighbors. And economically Western
Europe has forged ahead with unprecedented
dynamism.

946

Now Great Britain seeks membership in the
Common Market. It was her decision, not ours.
We did not urge it. But when the British asked
us, as old friends, for our views, we responded
favorably. We hope that the current negotiations
will soon be successfully concluded. We share
with Britain the judgment that she can better
maintain and enhance her strength inside the Com-
mon Market than outside it. And we think that
the addition of British resources, skills, and
proven political capacities will greatly strengthen
the Common Market.

Adjustment toJCommon Market

Full participation by the United Kingdom in
the great process of European unity— an objective
so eloquently outlined in the Lord Pri\^ Seal's
opening statement last October — will be beneficial
to the Community, to the British, to other Euro-
pean states, and in fact to all of us. We firmly
subscribe to this view, even though we realize that
Britain's entry into the Common Market will
create problems of adjustment for many countries,
including New Zealand, Australia, and the United
States.

We are sympathetic with the problems faced by
you and Australia because we face problems not
greatly different in kind, even though different in
degree. We share with you a considerable area of
common interest. None of us belongs to the Euro-
pean Common Market. All of us are substantial
exporters of temperate-zone agricultural products
and interested in maintaining and expanding our
markets for these products. We can, therefore,
benefit by working together toward the creation of
a trading world as open and liberal as possible.

Let me say quite frankly, as we face these mo-
mentous changes in the trading world, that we
recognize the problems posed to you here in New
Zealand by the Common Mai-ket. If you have a
problem, then we have a problem. And this is
because the United States has a great stake in your
prosperity. It is neither necessary nor profitable
for us to engage in theoretical debate or to lose
ourselves in slogans. But what we must do is to sit
down and find the practical answers to these prac-
tical problems.

As a step toward the changed trading world of
the future. President Kennedj' has requested the
United States Congress to grant him broad power*

Department of State Bulletin

I

I

to negotiate for a substantial reduction in trade
barriers. At the same time the United States has
welcomed the initiative in GATT of exploring the
possibility of global arrangements for cereals,
since it seems to us that, in a world of vaulting
agricultural technology, arrangements on a global
scale may offer the only effective solutions to our
mutual problems, not only for cereals but for other
key commodities.

Creating a More Open Trading World

The open trading arrangements we envisage are,
it seems to us, a far better approach than the per-
manent maintenance of preferential systems. In
fact the permanent extension of existing Common-
wealth preferences, within the framework of an ex-
panded Common Market, would seriously preju-
dice our vital interest in a world of expanding and
liberal trade. At the same time we recognize that,
in order to ease the problem of adjustment, transi-
tional arrangements for many of these commodi-
ties may be necessary.

I should like to enlist the active support of New
Zealand and Australia in working with us towai-d
the creation of a more open trading world, includ-
ing our own common market among the 50 States
of the United States. And I am pereuaded that
a mutual appreciation of the problems which each
of us faces, as well as a sympathetic miderstand-
ing of the problems posed for the United Kingdom
in taking the great step that is proposed, should
go far toward creating a climate in which solutions
can moi'e easily be found.

We have not the slightest doubt that the Com-
monwealth can meet this challenge. We have seen
it accommodate itself to new conditions in the
past — in the last few years to the addition of many
new members. We believe that this great stabiliz-
ing family of nations will be able to accommodate
itself constructively to the problems of the future.

AVe in the United States feel that we have a
great interest in the ties which make for solidarity
within the Commonwealth. If we would have any
hesitancy or criticism, it would be that perhaps
the Commonwealth has not moved forward with
the self-confidence which it deserved.

Let me reiterate that tlie enlarged Common
Market will require adjustments by the United
States too. But we do not believe that the prospect
of temporary difficulties should cause us to oppose
a move which promises so much for the free world

as a whole and for the cause of liberty to which
you and we are dedicated.

Task of Assisting New Nations

I return now to another constructive task: as-
sisting the miderdeveloped nations to move into
the modern world. This is a vast and critically
important task which places an inescapable duty
on all the advanced nations of the free world.

If the new nations — and some of the older ones —
are to preserve political stability and freedom, they
must satisfy the aspirations of their peoples for
a better life. The whole world knows that men
need not live like beasts at the edge of survival.
The knowledge and skills of the modem age offer
the means to achieve decent conditions of life. But
to organize and apply this knowledge and these
skills is not a simple matter.

The underdeveloped half of the world needs, in
varying degrees, assistance in education and in
mastering a wide range of technical as well as ad-
ministrative skills. And it needs capital in large
amounts. In some countries, where land and other
wealth are unduly concentrated in the hands of a
few, there is a need also for social reforms.

We do not expect this modernizing process to
take place smoothly in every instance. Nor do we
expect rapid progress on the part of all under-
developed nations. But we intend to work in part-
nership with those who would modernize their so-
cieties on the basis of national independence.

Some of the underdeveloped nations, especially
those with well-shaped programs, have made heart-
ening progress in the last few years. And others
are beginning to move ahead. Still othei-s are
coming to grips with their basic problems. Al-
most everywhere in the underdeveloped world
there is gi-eat vitality and a determination to make
progress.

My country has expended very large sums in as-
sisting the underdeveloped countries. And we
have now a program of aid geared to the needs of
systematic and long-term development. But we
think the task is one for all the advanced countries
of the free world — and even for those which may
not have large economic resources but do have
skills which others lack.

New Zealand is to be congratulated for its
fine accomplishments under the Colombo Plan.
And if there is a New Zealander who has a chance
to be in New Delhi, for example, let me urge you

June 11, 1962

947

to savor a tlirill of quiet satisfaction by visitine;
the All-India Institute of Medical Sciences, which
was launched by an initial £1,000,000 grant by
New Zealand under the Colombo Plan. One of the
great institutions of Asia has now appeared on
the basis of that remarkable initiative and en-
couragement first given by this country to India.

We are struck also by the technical assistance
that has been provided by countries of the Far
East with limited I'esources — in some cases coun-
tries which themselves are receiving aid. I am
thinking in this case, for example, of India itself.
And this is all to the good. We must all extend
ourselves to do what we can, regardless of our size,
our population, our wealth. Every bit helps, both
materially and in promoting good feeling among
men.

I hope you will indulge me while I repeat a few
figures which I cited in Caaiberra last night, to
indicate what my countrymen are devoting to the
dual task of pi-otecting and building the free
world. We maintain more than 2,800,000 men
under arms. Of these, nearly 1,100,000 are de-
ployed outside the continental United States, on
land or afloat. And if we are concerned that we
must have a so-called favorable balance of trade of
from $3 billion to $5 billion a year, one of the
necessities is for us to maintain these million men
overseas and to carry the large aid commitments
which we have undertaken.

We have more than 40 allies. We are extend-
ing technical and financial, and in some cases mili-
tary, aid to many other nations. Altogether Ave
are providing direct financial assistance to approx-
imately 7.5 countries. These outlays for defending
and building the free world amount, this year, to
nearly $54,000,000,000, or 19,000,000,000 New
Zealand pounds.

These are taxpayers' dollars. Tliey are not taken
from a magic mountain of gold out of which in-
definite resources can be taken without impact
upon anyone el.se. They come from the taxi driver
and the great corporations, the farmer and the
factory worker. They total close to 10 percent of
our gross national product and average approxi-
mately $300, or 107 New Zealand pounds, each
year for every man, woman, and child in the
United States. Additional funds are sent abroad
by our philanthropic foundations or privately in-
vested by companies and individuals.

I do hope that you will on ot^'asion believe that
we are trying to do our share.

Problem of Agricultural Surpluses

In this common effort, agricultural surpluses
are more of an asset than we have perhaps realized.
This ability to produce more food and fiber than
we can consume or readily market — which you and
our Australian friends and a few other coimtries
share with us — has caused problems for us and
among us. But let us remind oui-selves that these
are the kinds of problems with which most of the
people of the world would be delighted to be
afflicted. For in some cases they are problems of
abundance — although we recognize that in your
case they are the problems of furnishing the sinews
of your national existence.

Nowhere is the contrast in efficiency, however,
between communism and the free way of life more
evident than in food production. Wherever the
Communists take control, food production seems to
falter and tends to decline. East Germany used to
produce a food surplus; now it has a food deficit.
The Soviet Union is continuously beset with diffi-
culties in food production. The record of Com-
munist China is even more disastrous; hundreds of
millions of Chinese live on the edge of subsistence.

We have been using portions of our surplus of
food and fiber to assist the less developed countries.
In cari-ying out these programs we have taken care
to assure that they do not interfere with the normal
marketings of other nations which export agricul-
tural products.

As you know from our recent initiative in the
Food and Agriculture Organization, we think
there is an opportunity for collective international
action among all agricultural producing nations
to explore new techniques of making this rich
bomity available for the welfare of the less devel-
oped countries. But at the same time we must
press ahead with the search for collective means of
bringing supply into reasonable balance with effec-
tive demand. We know from experience that a de-
cline in agricultural prices does not automatically
result in less production but, on the contrary, may
stimulate the producer to try to increase his income
by producing still more. In the United States one
of our most stubborn problems has been to main-
tain and improve farm income while reducing ag-
ri('ultui-al surpluses and costs to the taxpayer.

I am aware that the economy of New Zealand
is basically oriented to animal agriculture. The
United States now takes more than two-thirds of
your beef and veal. And you are our principal

948

Department of Stale Bulletin

supplier of carpet wool — at the rate, I am told, of
more than 52 million pounds a year.

The prosperity of our agriculture also depends
to a large extent on exports. About one-quarter
of our overseas earnings come from agricultural
exports. American farmers, especially the pro-
ducers of wheat, cotton, and rice among other im-
portant items, have a tremendous stake in expand-
ing trade.

Sound international arrangements for bringing
supply and effective demand into better balance
will require a high level of responsibility on the
part of both major producers and major consum-
ers. Such arrangements should, we think, work
toward the goal of reward to the most efficient
producer — and mider any such system New Zea-
land would be in first-class condition.

Here again is an area in which New Zealand and
the United States are confronted with similar
problems. While we think we can see the right
objective, we do not pretend to be certain of the
best road to it. "We expect that the experience
and judgment of your people will be helpful in
this challenging task.

Trade in Basic Raw Materials

We must also be prepared to concert, with the
producers of basic raw materials — by and large the
less developed countries — to prevent collapses of
prices which would wipe out their hard-won gains
and perhaps plimge them into economic crises.

Here, too, producer and consumers should be
prepared to seek international arrangements sta-
bilizing prices of key commodities, thus providing
an indispensable breathing spell during which
longer term solutions may be found. Some coun-
tries may find their solutions through diversifica-
tion and industrialization, others through the
discovery of new markets for old materials. The
process of economic development generally will
create new demands for many raw materials and
encourage the transfer of capital and manpower
from the production of commodities which are
chronically in surplus.

Perhaps the most difficult problem for the ad-
vanced nations is to accept low-cost industrial
products manufactured in the developing coun-
tries. But if these countries are to develop they
must be able to sell their fabricated goods on our
markets. The underdeveloped and the advanced

countries must work together in finding a solution
to this problem. The former must be conscious
of the impact of their goods on established mar-
kets, and the latter must be prepared to open wider
their own doors.

In the great overall task of assisting the under-
developed nations to modernize their economies
and societies, we expect to see an integrated West-
ern Europe play an increasing role. As Western
European production continues to rise, more of it
becomes available for this purpose. Likewise
Japan is able to play an increasing role in assist-
ing the development of other countries. It falls to
all the affluent countries of the Pacific to assume
special responsibility for the economic develop-
ment and stability of this region.

The Common Purpose of All Mankind

The new era now unfolding, of partnership be-
tween the advanced nations and the underdevel-
oped, is far better than the old order. It rests on
the truth that mankind is one and on a common
purpose to make life better for the human race.
There could be no more challenging task, no
greater mission. For in helping to build the free
world, as in defending and extending freedom,
we cherish you as among our closest friends and
stoutest comrades.

In some of the last words of Franklin D. Koose-
velt : "The only limit to our realization of tomor-
row will be our doubts of today. Let us move
forward with strong and active faith."

Just in the last day or so I was reading a publi-
cation of your own Government information pub-
licity services in which someone with perhaps
more literai-y style than is customary in most of
our Government publications made this comment
on the new dangers: "Because they are free to
think and speak and work as they please and be-
cause so many know what it means to wrest a
living from an often unwilling soil, their sympa-
thies are with the aspiration of the common man
in all lands, the aspiration to make a living in
freedom and peace."

This prompted me to close with a personal com-
ment, because your people and our people — this
melting pot of ours, Mr. Nash, and this pioneering
society of New Zealand — have in many respects
had a common experience. We have within our
own lifetimes seen societies and commimities move

June 7 7, 7962

949

from prescientific, pretechnical, pre-medical care,
pre- public health, preeducation, into a transformed
society which has lifted the load of poverty and
misery from the backs of the men and women of
our respective countries. And we have seen this
happen in one generation.

People in other countries tend to think of the
United States as a place which has always been
rich. But Vice President Johnson was born on
that kind of farm. Speaker Sam Eayburn was
born in that kind of an underdeveloped situation.
In 1920, 1 percent of our farms had electricity;
today 98 percent of them have electricity.

We concede an unnecessary point if we say to
those people who are trying to organize economic
production by totalitarian methods that we have
taken two or three hundred years to develop —
therefore you developing countries shouldn't be
too anxious to get on with your job. Because our
development has occurred at the pace at which
science and technology have become available to
the ordinary working man, and that scale of de-
velopment has risen with breathtaking rapidity
in our own experience.

"This Revolution of Freedom Cannot Lose"

Those who control the situation from East
Germany all the way through to North Viet-Nam
have demonstrated that they have achieved no
miraculous formula for rapid economic and social
development. The impressive performance is
coming in the free world, and that free world is
one which you and we share.

To return to the publication which someone in
your Government wrote : "Of the future, who can
tell?" he said. "This is an uncertain world and
prosperity can flourish only in peace. New Zea-
landers have given their lives freely on the battle-
fields of the world to help thwart past threats of
world dictatorship, but new threats arise. New
Zealand, a small militai-y power, cannot defend
herself in isolation. She must have friends — free
friends. As a nation her hand will forever remain
extended in friendship to freedom-loving people
everywhere."

Now, New Zealand has friends, and in terms of
grower she has a powerful friend. But this is not
the central point, because this is not the end of
man. "Wliat is important is that New Zealand
and the United States share with freedom-loving

people everywhere the elementary, the simple, the
God-given aspirations which are basic to human
nature — health, knowledge, a reasonable security,
opportunity for family, a freeing of the mind.
Tliese are things which one finds in every country
regardless of political system, and tliese are the
things which are breaking through the established
political systems of whatever order and are prov-
ing themselves to be the most revolutionary and
powerful forces in the world today.

And you and we ai'e a part of that tradition — a
tradition which started 2,500 years ago in Greece,
transmitted both to you and to us through the
great discussion and discourse of freedom among
the British peoples through several centuries, in
the course of which many Britons risked or gave
their lives to give effect to these traditions. One
thinks of the men in uniform who did it; one
thinks of those common-law judges who at the
risk of losing their own lives would put their
arms around a prisoner at the bar and say to the
King, "No, you cannot do this to this man."

We have inherited that tradition, and that tra-
dition ties us to every people anywhere in the
world. And as we move on to your commitments
and to ours — jointly, together, cooperatively — we
shall not lack for allies, whether we put them in
treaties like ANZUS or not, because our allies are
the ordinary common men in every country of the
world, and on that basis this revolution of freedom
cannot lose and what we are hoping for cannot
fail.

Grand Duchess of Luxembourg
To Visit United States

White House press release (New York, N.T.) dated May 20

Tlie President of the United States amiounced
on ISIay 20 that Her Eoyal Highness Charlotte,
Grand Duchess of Luxembourg, has accepted an
invitation of the President to make an official visit
to the United States. She will be in the United
States for 5 days beginning October 30. Follow-
ing 2 days at Washington, she will visit elsewhere
in the United States before returning to Luxem-
bourg. The American Ambassador to Luxem-
bourg, James W. Wine, extended the invitation to
the Grand Duchess on behalf of the President on
May 18.

950

Department of State Bulletin

A Review of U.S.-Korean Relations

Statement hi/ Samuel D. Berger
Amhassador to Korea ^

I welcome the invitation to take part in this pro-
gram and to say a few words about our relations
with tlie Kepublic of Korea.

As you are aware, the United States Govern-
ment fully supports the Kepublic of Korea in its
efforts to build a free, stable, and economically
progressing nation. We joined together with 15
other nations of the free world to repel Communist
aggression in 1950 and strongly support United
Nations efforts to bring about the peaceful reuni-
fication of the Korean peninsula.

Korea's modern history has been a tragic one.
Centuries of feudal rule were followed by two
generations of alien occupation. Since Woi'ld
War II the nation has been divided by Communist
imperialism, the economy has been shattered by
Communist aggression, and South Korea has had
to adjust to the influx of millions of refugees from
North Korea. Despite these adversities Korea's
vigorous and intelligent people, with their ancient
civilization to give them pride and unity, stand
today as an example of the will of men to live in
freedom.

The present government, which came to power
through a military coup d'etat on May 16 last
year, has attacked the many problems confronting
it with vigor and sincerity. It has declared as its
principal objectives:

a. Eradication of corruption ;

b. Quickened economic progress;

c. Support of the United Nations Charter and
fulfillment of international commitments;

d. Maintenance of close ties with the United
States and other free- world nations ;

e. Strengthening the nation's anti-Commimist
posture ;

f . Eventual return to civilian government.

In pursuit of these objectives the Korean Gov-
ernment has developed a number of important

' Made on May 15 over Station WGBH-FM, Cambridge,
Mass., and the Educational Radio Network in commemo-
ration of the first anniversary of the May 16, 1961, revolu-
tion in the Republic of Korea (press release 314).

programs. In the field of law and order, beggary
and prostitution have been curbed, smuggling
greatly reduced, and the black market virtually
eliminated. A head-on attack has been made on
graft and corruption, partially through raising
the salaries of civil servants and partially through
the levying of stiff sentences on those found guilty
by the courts. To improve the quality of admin-
istration, training courses have been established
for the civil service at all levels and planning pro-
cedures have been instituted. A basic reform of
the educational system has been vmdertaken.
Budgetary reforms have been accomplished and
a long-range economic plan formulated to serve
as a guide for the economic development of the
country.

To assist the Eepublic of Korea in its efforts, we
are continuing our economic aid, which from 1945
to 1961 provided South Korea with over $3 billion
of assistance, exclusive of military equipment.
The aim of our aid is to enable the Republic of
Korea to become substantially self-sustaining.

Our aid has taken different forms depending on
the particular need it was designed to meet.

During the years immediately following the
Korean war, much of our assistance had to be uti-
lized for the reconstruction of facilities destroyed
or damaged during the war. Most of our aid went
to feed, clothe, and house the war-stricken popula-
tion, which had been increased by 4 million
refugees from North Korea. In short, our aid pro-
gram in the immediate postwar years was concen-
trated, to a great extent, on emergency needs. In
addition we assisted the Koreans to build and
maintain their defense forces, which contribute so
greatly to the defense of the free world.

Our efforts in economic reconstruction were also
extended to assisting the Korean Government in
housing, public health and sanitation, social wel-
fare, rural community development, and educa-
tion and to erecting a minimum industrial
framework of electric power, transportation, and
communication facilities.

By the end of 1957 the immediate objectives had
been substantially attained. It was, therefore, pos-
sible to start the transition from an aid program
concentrated on relief to one concerned with new
capital development. Since 1958 progress has been
made in expanding industrial and agricultural
output. In line with our worldwide policy the aid
program in Korea will be shifted over the next few

June 7 7, 7962

951

years from direct grants to loans for capital
development.

In support of these aid programs we have pro-
vided, and continue to provide, technical assistance
to help the Koreans improve their health, educa-
tion, public administration, agricultural research,
and economic planning.

Meanwhile the Korean Government has formu-
lated a long-range development plan which empha-
sizes investment in basic industries and public
utilities. Capital expenditure is to be directed to-
ward improvement in transportation, communica-
tions, power, coal mining, and certain imiDort-
saving industries such as oil refining, cement,
fertilizer, and the production of steel ingots.
Efforts are under way to mobilize domestic capital,
and economic missions have been sent abroad to
interest private foreign investors in financing
projects included in the plan. Assistance from
foreign governments in addition to the United
States and from international organizations is
being sought. The German Government has re-
cently made a substantial loan to Korea.

Many of the requisite natural resources for eco-
nomic progress are present in Korea, including
human resources. "With planning, discipline, and
careful use of the available resources, the prospects
for good progress in both agriculture and industry
are favorable.

In foreign affairs the Korean Government has
in the last 10 months sent good-will missions to
many countries, as a result of which the number of
countries with which it has diplomatic or consular
relations has been raised from 13 to 33, with more
in prospect.

On August 12 last year Chairman Pak Chong-
hui promised that government will be returned to
civilian control in the summer of 1963 following
elections in the spring, and planning and prepara-
tions for the promised return to civilian govern-
ment will occupy a significant place in the thoughts
and energies of Koreans both in and out of gov-
ernment during the coming year.

As the economic and political evolution of Korea
unfolds, the United States Government looks for-
ward to even stronger bonds of mutual respect
and common purpose which have characterized
our relationsliips with the Republic of Korea since
1945.

President Kennedy and President
of Ivory Coast Conclude Tall(s

Felix Houphouet-Boigny, President of the Re-
public of I'voiy Coast, made a state visit to the
United States May 15-25 at the invitation of
President Kennedy. Following is the text of a
joint communique released at Washington on
May 21f. at the close of President Houphouet-
Boigny's 3-day visit there.

White House press release dated May 24

President Felix Houphouet-Boigny, who is
making a ten-day State Visit to the United States
as a guest of President Kennedy, will conclude a
three-day stay in Washington tomorrow and con-
tinue his visit in New York.

Although President Houphouet-Boigny has vis-
ited this country twice before, this is his first trip
to the United States since his country became
independent and since he became its first Chief of
State. The Washington portion of the visit has
afforded a timely opportunity for the two Presi-
dents to establish a personal acquaintance and dis-
cuss fully matters of common concern. President
Houphouet-Boigny also had conversations with
Secretary of State Dean Eusk and Mr. Fowler
Hamilton, Administrator of the Agency for Inter-
national Development.

The subjects discussed with the President and
the Secretai-y of State covered broad interna-
tional issues such as Berlin, disarmament and the
decolonization of Africa, the promotion of unity
and greater cooperation amongst African States.
The two Presidents also examined the critical is-
sues in Subsaharan Africa today. President Ken-
nedy commended President Houphouet-Boigny on
his unique record of devoted service to the inter-
ests of the people of the Ivory Coast and of other
nations of West and Equatoi'ial Africa. President
Kennedy laid special emphasis on President
Houphouet-Boigny 's extraordinary efforts in pro-
moting African unity and cooperation within the
Council of the Entente, the Union of African and
Malagasy States, and at the recent twenty-nation
Lagos Conference.

The two Presidents reviewed the amicable and
mutually beneficial relations already established
between their two countries. President Kennedy
noted with satisfaction the energetic efforts toward
economic and social development being carried
forward by the Republic of Ivory Coast and of

952

Department of Stale Bulletin

the favorable climate established by the Ivory
Coast Government to welcome foreign private
capital investment and give appropriate guaran-
tees. He assured President Houphouet-Boigny of
the desire of the United States to continue to be
responsive to the development assistance needs of
the Ivory Coast. During the visit it was agreed
tliat the United States Government would take
prompt action on a request for a loan for an Ivory
Coast Development Bank which is being estab-
lished and is designed to encourage the develop-
ment of private enterprise in the Ivoiy Coast.
Agreement was also reached on several teclinical
assistance projects in the fields of education, agri-
culture, fisheries, and development of the South-
west Region. Some of the projects will be signed
within a few days.

U.S.- Japan Science Committee Adopts
Exchange and Researcli Programs

The United States-Japan Committee on Scien-
tific Cooperation inet at Washington, D.C., May
Sl-24- Following are a Department annov/nce-
ment of the meeting, welcoming remarks hy W.
Averell Harriman, Assistant Secretary of State
for Far Eastern Affairs, and text of a joint com-
munique issued at the close of the meeting.

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

The Department of State announced on May 16
(press release 316) that the United States-Japan
Committee on Scientific Cooperation would hold
its second series of meetings at Washington, D.C.,
May 21-24.' The purpose of this meeting is to ex-
plore further areas in which closer scientific col-
laboration is desirable. Specifically, the Commit-
tee will act on studies undeitaken by United States
and Japanese panels, working since the last meet-
ing at Tol^o in December,- to develop specific co-
operative science projects. The Committee will
recommend concrete programs to the Governments
of Japan and the United States.

The United States-Japan Committee on Scien-
tific Cooperation was established as a result of con-

' For tlie members of the U.S. and Japanese delegations,
see Department of State press release 316 dated May 16.

" For text of a joint communique issued at the close
of the first meeting, see Bulletin of Jan. 8, 19C2, p. 66.

versations held in June 1961 by Prime Minister
Hayato Ikeda and President Kennedy in "Wash-
ington during which both the Prime Minister and
the President, recognizing the importance of
broadening tlie educational, cultural, and scientific
cooperation between the countries, agreed to form
two committees, one to study expanded cultural
and educational cooperation and the other to seek
ways to strengthen scientific cooi^eration.^

The United States-Japan Committee on Scien-
tific Cooperation held its first series of meetings
in Tokyo at the Ministry of Foreign Afi^airs from
December 13 to 15, 1961. At this meeting the
Committee decided to concentrate on the promo-
tion of further exchange of scholars, the encour-
agement of exchange of more scientific informa-
tion and materials, and the stimidation of joint
research projects in certain specific scientific areas.
Among the joint research projects the Committee
initially selected the scientific investigation of the
Pacilic Ocean, plant and animal geography and
ecology of the Pacific area, and cancer research
as the most promising of mutually beneficial re-
sults. Five panels composed of experts in each
given field were subsequently selected and given
the responsibility of further exploring the selected
fields of joint scientific enterprise. The present
series of meetings in Washington will discuss
recommendations of these panels, establish prior-
ities for the proposed projects, and present to their
respective governments concrete programs for
joint scientific investigation.

REMARKS BY MR. HARRIMAN

Press release 326 dated May 21

It is my pleasant task to extend to you the greet-
ings and welcome of the United States Govern-
ment as you assemble here for the second meeting
of the United States-Japan Committee on Sci-
entific Cooperation. Our expectations and hopes
for your success are high.

We live in a remarkable time. Never before
has man had so nearly within his grasp the power
to create a life of abundance and general leisure
for himself and his fellows. Never before in his-
tory has man had so surely in his grasp the power
to destroy himself and his fellow men utterly.

" For text of a joint communique, see ifiirf., July 10, 1961,
p. 57.

June M, 7962

953

The power in both cases is the power of science.
As President Kennedy remarked at the time of
your fii-st meeting last December, "We have seen
that science can be either the servant of man or
his master."

I believe it is entirely fitting that a scientific
body of this kind has been established between
this coimtry and Japan, now united in a common
dedication to peace and to the unfettered growth
of the human spirit. I believe that this joint com-
mittee will not only open new areas for fruitful
joint exploration but also will serve as a model
for other nations of the world. The striking i^rog-
ress which Japan has achieved is a happy augury
for the success of this undertaking. Japan is an
outstanding example of the success of free men
making progress in freedom. Its economy, based
on free enterprise, has made unparalleled progress.
Its agriculture, freed by land reform, has increased
production by almost 50 percent over the 1952-
1954 average. Its science has contributed to the
outstanding progress achieved in both agriculture
and industry and to the great rise in the stand-
ard of living of the Japanese people.

History provides countless illustrations of the
truth that scientific knowledge and scientific prog-
ress is not confined by national boundaries. A
dynamic science must be an international science,
and it seems to me that the international respon-
sibilities of today's scientists are greater and more
urgent than ever before.

Our generation has seen two vast and still de-
veloping revolutions, one political and one sci-
entific. The scientific revolution has given man
vast new powers : the power of instantaneous com-
munication, the power to support life in former
desert areas, the power to conquer disease, the
power to leave this very earth itself. This scien-
tific revolution has given man the power to control
and, if need be, to alter his natural environment.

Similarly, the political revolution which has
brought so many nations and peoples into in-
dependent existence since 1945 has vastly increased
the area of human freedom. But we have still the
task of joining these two revolutions and of break-
ing down the artificial barriers between them.
Most of the new nations of the world sufi'er from
a host of economic and social ills which scientific
thought and technique can largely correct. If we,
the technologically advanced nations of the world,
are to fulfill our broader responsibilities to these
new nations, we must develop adequate means of

giving them a helping hand in transmitting to
them the benefits of our science and our experience
in order that they may enjoy the full meaning of
freedom.

The methods of scientific interchange between
two advanced societies which you gentlemen here
devise will have direct pertinence to this task.
The task cannot be more important. I am con-
fident that you will be successful. History is de-
termined by people, and working together we can
do much to shape a brighter future for our peo-
ples and for the newly independent countries which
look to us for assistance.

In your present meeting here in Washington
you will consider specific projects as a means of
implementing the principles for Japanese-Amer-
ican scientific cooperation agreed to at Tok^'o
last December. We in the United States Govern-
ment look forward to receiving your recommenda-
tions and to studying your plans. I can give
you my full assurance that they will receive con-
sideration at the highest levels of our Government
and that we stand prepared to give you our fullest
support.

JOINT COMMUNIQUE

Press release 333 dated May 24

The second meeting of the United States-Japan Com-
mittee on Scientific Cooperation was held at the National
Science Foundation and the National Academy of
Sciences in Washington, D.C., from Monday, the 21st,
through Thursday, the 24th of May 1962. The meeting
was characterized throughout by full and frank exchange
of views, in a most cordial and cooperative atmosphere.
Dr. Kankuro Kaneshige, the Head of the Japanese Dele-
gation, and Dr. Harry C. Kelly, the Head of the United
States Delegation, served as Co-Chairmen of the Com-
mittee.

The Committee reviewed the recommendations of spe-
cial panels in the areas of exchange of scholars, the
exchange of scientific and technical information and ma-
terials, the scientific investigation of the Pacific Ocean,
animal and plant geography and ecology of the Pacific
area, and cancer research, which had been established as
areas of common interest and mutual benefit to the United
States and Japan at the first meeting of the Committee
in Tokyo.

In the two areas of scientific exchange, the Committee
adopted the following recommendations for consideration
and action by the two Governments :

Exchange of Scholars in the Scicncex

The exchange of scientific persons between the two
countries should be examined to determine the adequacy
of existing arrangements and possible expansion of exist-
ing programs.

954

Department of State Bulletin

There should be established in Japan and the United
States information centers to assist scholars of each na-
;ion intending to study in the other nation. Special
seminars in fields of mutual scientific interest should be
leld to foster additional contacts between United States
md Japanese scientists.

The Committee expressed its satisfaction with the wide-
spread exehanse of scholars now taking place between
Japan and the United States and noted that this existing
Qow of scientists is an excellent basis for increased co-
operation between the two countries.

The Committee urged that there be greater emphasis
on Japanese language stud.v among young American sci-
entists in order that they be better fitted to take advan-
tage of the rich scientific resources of Japan.
Exchange of Scientific and Technical Information and
Materials

Representatives of leading United States and Japanese
scientific abstracting services, and editors of selected
scientific journals, should meet to consider ways to in-
crease interchange of abstracts and research articles.

The United States and Japan should each establish a
clearinghouse of scientific data from the other nation.
Research personnel and documentalists should be ex-
changed to develop a joint approach to problems of in-
formation retrieval.

In the three areas of joint scientific research, the Com-
mittee adopted the following recommendations to be con-
sidered for prompt implementation by the two Govern-
ments :
Scientific Investigations of the Pacific Ocean

Programs should be undertaken on cloud observations
over the Pacific, geophysical studies of Pacific volcanoes,
deep -sea seismic expeditions, comparison of sea-borne
gravity meters and magnetometers, geophysical data ex-
change, storm surges and tsunamis, and surface and sub-
surface thermal structure of upper ocean water layers in
the western Pacific.

Animal and Plant Geography and Ecology of the Pacific
Area

Studies should he undertaken in the classification of
species and populations, and in the biology of the natural
enemies of insect pests ; biological control in relation to
other fauna and flora of the middle Pacific, particularly
of coral reefs ; specific studies of rice blast fungus.

Cancer Research

There should be created by the Japanese in Japan a
central laboratory for the screening of potentially effec-
tive therapeutic agents and for the standardization of
procedures. The United States will provide assistance
such as technical consultation, will exchange breeding
stocks, tumor lines, tissue culture lines, and standard
chemicals, and will furnish other services and objects
required to establish and maintain the agreed-upon
standard tests. Technical experts should be designated
to select, operate, and modify these tests. In addition,
comparative studies on the incidence and causes of can-
cer in the populations of the United States and Japan
will be intensified.

June 7 7, 7962

In these three areas of joint scientific research, the
Committee also adopted recommendations for long-range
programs to be considered by the two Governments.

The Committee also discussed new areas of scientific
cooperation between the United States and Japan. It
recommended that education in the sciences, and research
on hurricanes and typhoons be jointly studied by the two
nations and that two panels be established to investigate
further these areas for the Committee.

The Committee expressed its belief that a firm founda-
tion has been established for closer cooperation in the
sciences between Japan and the United States, and trusts
that the two Governments will give serious consideration
to and take prompt action on its recommendations.

The next meeting of the Committee will be held in
Japan. The date of this meeting was tentatively set for
May 21-24, 1963.

U.S. and Pakistan Celebrate Tenth
Anniversary of Fuibright Program

Press release 334 dated May 24

The 10th anniversary of the Fuibright program
with Pakistan was observed on May 24 at the De-
partment of State at a special ceremony held by
the Board of Foreign Scholarships in connection
with its quarterly meeting.

M. Masood, Minister of the Embassy of Paki-
stan, and Syed Jaf ar, Deputy Executive Secretary,
U.S. Educational Foundation in Pakistan, ex-
pressed the strong support in Pakistan for the
educational exchange program. Mr. Masood em-
phasized the role of education in national develop-
ment, pointing out that a nation "can go forward
and generate activities within itself only if the
blessings of education are furnished."

Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary of State for
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, praised
the exchanges as "one of the most significant, one
of the most important, one of the most endunng"
of all the relationships between the United States
and Pakistan.

Dean Robert G. Storey, Chairman of the Board
of Foreign Scholarships, presided at the ceremony.

Letters of Credence

Carmda

The newly appointed Ambassador of Canada,
Charles Stewart Almon Eitchie, presented his cre-
dentials to President Kennedy on May 25. For
texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the Presi-
dent's reply, see Department of State press release
338 dated May 25.

955

The President's Trade Expansion Program and U.S. National Security

hy Joseph D. Coppoch

Director, Foreign Economic Advisory Staffs

Here, in New England, in Massachusetts, in the
Connecticut Valley, in the city of Springfield, I
feel that I should discuss my topic— the President's
trade expansion program and U.S. national se-
curity— in an historical context. All Americans
are conditioned by their study of colonial history
to take a possessive pride in New England. So
when I knew I was coming up here I did some
reading about your famous valley.

You and your predecessors have gone through a
fantastic economic evolution since William
Pynchon and his party established Agawam near
the Enfield Falls on the Connecticut River in 1636.
During the first century of its existence your com-
munity had a hard time fending off the Indians,
but the natural advantages of the location obvi-
ously encouraged the settlers to persist. The
Connecticut River was by far the most important
artery of commerce between the Atlantic Ocean
and the Hudson River. Even with this advantage
Springfield took its time about growing. There
were fewer than 3,000 people here in 1810. It got
an early push from the National Government when
the Arsenal was established in 1777. I reread with
great interest how the Arsenal was saved from
Daniel Shays. Think of the free publicity Spring-
field would have missed all these years if the
famous rifle had been developed in the Brooklyn
Gun Factory instead of here I

Springfield's big economic spurt came with the
first railroads, a little over a century ago. They
opened up a new trading world to Springfield and
its neighbors. They also brought cheaper farm

' Address made before a joint meeting of civic agencies
at Springfield, Mass., on May 18 (press release 318 dated
May 17).

956

products from the Middle West, to the distress of
many local farmers. New industries had to be
developed. They were developed.

The people of this area adapted to the new con-
ditions. In fact they thrived under the challenge
of change. The growth in population is a good
measure of what has happened. From a city of
under 10,000 in the 1840's, Springfield jumped to
33,000 in 1880, to 62,000 in 1900, to 130,000 in 1920,
and to 175,000 in 1960. Moreover, you are now the
hub of a large urban complex.

Changing Economic and Political Patterns

In the years ahead the qualities of character
which have been so important in the development
of this community — adaptability, ingenuity, re-
sourcefulness—are just as important for the
United States as a whole. Change is not just a
thing of the past; there is every evidence that it
is even more the thing of the future. The United
States is going to live in a very different economic
world. We now have about 6 percent of the
world's population, and we may Iiave only about
4 percent in two or three decades. The natural
resources of the economically sleeping continents
of South America, Africa, and Asia are being
opened up to new uses. Capital equipment is
being accumulated in the formerly backward areas,
most dramatically in the Soviet Union in recent
decades. The creative energies of millions of
people all over the world are increasingly turning
to the task of economic betterment.

In this emerging world economic pattern the
United States and Western Europe are moving^
into a world in which imaginative use of our com-
bined economic resources becomes increasingly (j

Department of State Bulletin

necessary. "Adaptability" must become our eco-
nomic watchword.

The emerging world political pattern— if we can
envisage it with any certainty— will also put us
on our mettle. The old imperialism is dead; the
new imperialism pushes out from Moscow and
Peipmg. The struggling successor states and in-
formal protectorates of the old colonial powers
provide happy hunting grounds for the Commu-
nist imperialists. There is no early prospect of
the Communists letting up, nor of these many weak
countries, dozens of them new since "World War
II, soon becoming politically stable and fully re-
sponsible members of an international political
, system such as that envisaged in the United Na-
tions Charter.

Western Europe has now recovered from World
War II and should be able, in cooperation with the
United States, to play a growing role in providing
for our mutual defense— in meeting challenges in
other parts of the world as well as in Eastern Eu-
rope. The United States must continue, of course,
to provide the leadership which corresponds with
its power.

And why must we provide the leadership ? "Wliy
do we have alliances all over the world ? Why do
we have military forces available for action any-
where on a moment's notice ? And why do we take
the lead in the U.N. and in the Organization of
American States and in other international bodies?
And why do we provide aid programs and trade
programs to strengthen our actual and potential
friends ?

Manifestly, we do all of these things because
we think they are necessary for our national se-
curity, to thwart the expansion of Soviet-Com-
munist power. We do not propose to be nibbled
to death. Moreover, with our determination and
our resources the many countries which would be
hopelessly submerged by the Communist tide can
and do cast their lots with us. There are some
free-riders, of course, but we should not be too
critical of them. We lived behind the shield of
British power until 1917.

Objectives of Foreign Economic Policies

I have painted in broad strokes the prospective
economic and political patterns which seem likely
to characterize the world scene for some time to
come. I have stated why our foreign policy is
what it is. Now I wish to go into more detail on

June 71, 7962

how Government policies, foreign economic poli-
cies in particular, can help modify those pi-ospec-
tive patterns in ways which will suit us and other
peoples not bent on conquering the world but who
are instead concerned about establishing a work-
able international system in which individual peo-
ple can lead peaceful, productive, and interesting
lives.

Obviously, we must maintain our military force
and improve it as best we can. Obviously, we
must strive to rectify domestic injustice and in-
fringement of liberties. Obviously, we must do
what is necessary to keep the national economy
rolling along in high gear.

Not so obviously to some people, however, we
must pursue international economic policies which
will do two things. First, they should contribute
to our national economic well-being, in the long
run if not in the short run. Second, and even
more important, they should contribute to our
national security. The second is more important
because the United States will get along, economi-
cally, with any foreign economic policies that are
within the plausible political spectrum; but our
national security will be endangered, in the short
run as well as the long run, if we do not have
foreign economic policies which will make our al-
lies, actual and potential, economically stronger,
politically more stable, socially more resistant to
communism, and militarily more powerful. These
considerations provide the basic rationale of our
foreign economic policy, from the point of view
of national security.

Now a few words about the various facets of
this policy. First, there must be a satisfactory
international monetary system. The world has a
good monetary system, but there is still room for
substantial improvement. Second, international
investment is a necessity if the many underdevel-
oped countries are going to progress. Despite
some setbacks, international investment is grow-
ing. Even outright aid can be justified for those
countries having modest current repayment pros-
pects. Third, the transmission of ideas across na-
tional boundaries in the form of technical assist-
ance, publications, visiting businessmen, govern-
ment officials, scholars, journalists, students, and
others is vital to the modernization process. Many
individuals, businesses, and other organizations
are carrying out this important mission, with only
an occasional assist from government. We should
receive as well as give in this field.

957

I have reserved until last the most important
facet of foreign economic policy, namely, trade
policy. Trade policy is the most important be-
cause it governs the actual movement of goods in
and out of the coimtry. By comparison service
transactions are much smaller; financial arrange-
ments and transactions are essentially only ma-
chinery to facilitate trade; aid cannot be expected
to continue on a large scale indefinitely ; ideas are
going to get aroimd the world regardless of pro-
motive or restrictive policies. But trade policy can
really help or hinder the actual movement of goods
into or out of the country.

Governments do not seem to be able to keep
their hands off foreign trade. Neither states-
men—presumably acting in the national interest —
nor businessmen — ^presumably acting in their own
interest — have been willing to trust the free-mar-
ket processes completely with respect to foreign
trade. For public or private reasons, or some com-
bination of reasons, governments are expected to
interfere with some trade and to promote other
trade. As far as I know, nobody is expecting
laissez faire to break out all over, even in our
citadel of comparatively free enterprise.

Determining Our Trade Policy

So in practical terms we as citizens, thinking
about a national trade policy for the United States
in the kind of world we are going to be living in,
have to decide whether it is in the national in-
terest to take measures which mcrease the oppor-
tunities for trade with other countries or to take
measures which 6?ecrease these opportunities.

Lest you think I am simply indulging in rhet-
oric, let me say that there are valid reasons for
restricting trade opportunities. I cite as one ex-
ample the restriction on exports to the Soviet
Union and mainland China of items of military
importance. Out of our past history I cite the
usefulness of the 10 percent tariff introduced by
Alexander Hamilton as a means of raising revenue
for the Federal Government in its earl}' years.
Still another example, of importance for three
decades now, is that provided by the restrictions
on imports of agricultural products, particularly
cotton and wheat, which are the beneficiaries of
domestic price-support programs that put U.S.
prices above world prices. The import restric-
tions are an inevitable consequence of the price-
support program, unless world prices are to be

supported at the same level. Exactly this issue
is confronting our farmers under the emerging
common agricultural policy of the European Eco-
nomic Commmiity, though the shoe is on the other
foot. These examples of plausible interferences
with opportunities to trade internationally do not
exhaust the list.

These examples must not blind us, however, to
the vast range of trade opportunities which can
be made available to firms in the United States
and other countries if the policies of governments
are generally designed to help trade rather than
hinder it. And this helping means helping both
imports and exports, since they cannot be grossly
out of balance for very long for a country. One
countiy's imports are other countries' exports.

Thanks to the perception and persistence of
Cordell Hull, the United States initiated in 1934
a program of reciprocal tariff reductions which
has been one of the triumphs of American di-
plomacy. And now, thanks to the vigorous lead-
ership of one of Massachusetts' most distinguished
sons, President John F. Kennedy, a new chapter is
about to be written in the history of international
trade policy.

The Trade Expansion Act of 1962, expected to
emerge from the House Ways and Means Com-
mittee before long, puts the trade agreements pro-
gram in a new dress, appropriate to the needs of
the 1960's and 1970's. This proposed act, though
rather lengthy because of the verbosity of legal
language, basically has only two provisions. One
is an authorization by Congress to the President
to negotiate reductions in U.S. trade barriers in
return for comparable reductions by other coun-
tries. The other is a collection of procedures and
measures designed to make the adjustment process
easier than it might otherwise be for the firms and
workers who might be adversely affected by tariff
cuts. There is no easy way for the many direct
beneficiaries of the cuts to share their gains with
the disfavored few. This act proposes to do some-
thing for the disfavored few that is even better.
It recognizes that the national interest — mainly
the national security interest — calls for the expan-
sion of trade opportunities, but it also i-ecognizes
the obligation of the whole national community
to do something special to help disadvantaged
firms and workers adjust to the new situation.

I am sure that you anticipated me when, at the
start of this talk, I spoke in such laudatoi-y tenns
of the adaptability, ingenuity, resourcefulness, de-

958

Department of State Bulletin

termination, and self-reliance required of your
forebears in the Connecticut Valley and nearby
areas. The adjustments called for by the prospec-
tive reductions in tariffs are as nothing compared
with adjustments your community, your State,
and your region have made in the past. You have
seen your farming give way to the fertile regions
of the Mississippi Valley; you have seen your
early industries shift in large measure to other
parts of the country; you have witnessed large
shifts of population into and out of this area ; and
still Massacluisetts has one of the highest per
capita incomes in the Union. You have set an
example for the rest of the country many times
before, and you will do it again.

Meeting the Needs of the Times

In conclusion let me bring together the positive
reasons for the new trade expansion program.
The old trade agreements act, last renewed in 1958,
is expiring on June 30th of this year. Failure to
have an act which would enable the United States
to negotiate on trade matters would be tantamount
to slamming the door in the faces of friendly
countries. The numerous small countries of the
world must liave markets in which to sell their
specialized wares if they are to improve their eco-
nomic lot. Do we reject the exports of numerous
friendly i^oimtries and keep them on the aid I'oUs
indefinitely ? Do we do our share to provide that
market, or do we let the Russians provide it?
There should not be much doubt about how we
answer those questions.

Then there is the European Common ^Vlarket.
Are we or are we not going to equip ourselves to
bargain with it for lower tariffs and other trade
barriers? Are we or are we not going to be pre-
pared to take the initiative in providing more
economic cement for the Atlantic community and
the NATO alliance?

Here again there can be little doubt how a re-
sponsible, informed citizenry and Congress will
respond to these questions. In addition to these
national security benefits, we will get the gains
from expanded trade and the stimulus of wider
markets — very handsome bonuses indeed. Armed
with the authority provided in this act, President
Kennedy can pursue a foreign economic policy
commensurate with the needs of the times. The
decision now lies with citizens like you and your
Congressmen.

June n, 7962

Cultural Agreement Signed
With United Arab Republic

Press release 328 dated May 21

A cultural agreement between the United States
and the I'nited Arab Republic was signed on May
21 by Ambassador John S. Badeau and the Min-
ister of Higher Education, Abd al Aziz al Sayed,
in Cairo. Also present at the signing ceremony
was Thomas Sorensen, Deputy Director of the
U.S. Information Agency. Under the cultural
agreement both countries will encourage and pro-
mote scientific and cultural cooperation through
the exchange of professors and persons engaged
in scientific research, the awarding of scholarships
for qualified students, the creation of chairs in the
language and literature of each country, and the
establishment of cultural and language institutes
and centers for cultural and teclmical interchange.
The agreement also provides that both Govern-
ments will encourage the exchange of cultural and
scientific publications, films, newsreels, artistic
and scientific exhibits, and groups of performing
artists.

U.S. and Rumania Exchange Films

Press release 331 dated May 24

Under the terms of the exchange of notes ^ cov-
ering exchanges in the fields of cultural, educa-
tional, and scientific matters between the United
States and Rumania, an American motion picture
will be presented in four cities in Rumania and
a Rumanian film will be presented in four cities
in the United States beginning June 4, 1962, in
Washington and Bucharest respectively.

The American motion picture to be shown in
Bucharest, Cluj, lasi, and Timisoara will be the
Warner Brothers production "The Old INIan and
the Sea," and the Rumanian film to be shown in
Washington, New York, Detroit, and San Fran-
cisco will be "Darclee," which is a story based on
the life of a famous Rumanian opera star living
around the turn of the 20th century.

INIotion picture personalities from the United
States and from Rumania will attend the respec-
tive film premieres in each country. The Amer-
ican group -will be composed of Frank McCarthy,

' For texts, see Bulletin of Dec. 26, 1900, p. 969.

959

producer and executive of the Twentieth Century-
Fox Studios in Hollywood, and the Hollywood
stars Miss Shirley MacLaine and Jack Lemmon.

The Rumanian delegation will be headed by Ion
Florea, vice president of the Bucharest Film Stu-
dio, Ion Popesco Gopa, Rumanian cartoonist,
and Miss Silvia Popovici, the star of the film
"Darclee."

The Rumanian film "Darclee" is being released
in the United States by J. Jay Frankel, New York
distributor of foreign films.

U.S. steps Up Food Shipments
to Northeast Brazil

White House press release (New York, N.T.) dated May 19

The President announced on May 19 that, under
the direction of George McGovern, Director of the
Food for Peace Program, the United States is step-
ping up its emergency food shipments to drought-
stricken Northeast Brazil.

The President announced the following new
actions :

Six thousand tons of U.S. com are being distrib-
uted in Northeast Brazil now. Three hundred tons
of our dried milk are on the way and due to arrive
within 1 week in Recife, capital of the Northeast
State of Pernambuco. In the Port of Baltimore
a shipment of 4,000 tons of beans is being assem-
bled for shipment to Northeast Brazil within a
few days. Another 6,000 tons of beans will be dis-
patched in 2,000-ton loads at 2-week intervals.

Tlie United States is prepared to make further
shipments of com, wheat, vegetable oils, and dried
milk as needed and requested. The Government
has also indicated to the Government of Brazil
that tlie United States is willing to organize a food
airlift to the Northeast if this should be needed
and requested. Expeditions handling of U.S.
food shipments to the Northeast is being assured
by cooperation between United States and Bra-
zilian authorities. Distribution of the U.S. food is
being carried out cooperatively by the Federal
Government of Brazil, the State governments in
the Northeast, the Superintendency for Develop-
ment of the Northeast (SUDENE), and private
U.S. voluntary agencies.

The Brazilian Government itself has recognized
th« Northeast food problem by declaring it an
emergency area and by providing funds to pur-
chase and distribute food in the stricken region.

United States Delegations
to International Conferences

South Pacific Conference

The Department of State announced on May 17
(press release 320) that the fifth session of the
South Pacific Conference will be held at Pago
Pago, American Samoa, July 18-30. The United
States is serving as host under a system of rotation
agreed upon by the South Pacific Commission,
which is composed of the metropolitan govern-
ments of Australia, France, the Netherlands, New
Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United
States.

Delegates from 17 South Pacific territories, the
Kingdom of Tonga, and the newly independent
country of Western Samoa will attend the con-
ference. The metropolitan governments compris-
ing the South Pacific Commission will send
observer delegations to the fifth session. Also at-
tending as observers will be representatives of
international oi'ganizations, missionary bodies, and
universities. At the conclusion of the conference
the Commission will meet briefly to consider the
recommendations adopted by the delegates.

The United States will be represented at the
conference by an observer delegation composed of
the following:
Senior Commissioner

Knowles A. Ryerson, Dean Emeritus, School of Agricul-
ture, University of California at Berkeley

Commissioner

Carlton Skinner, Vice President, Fairbanks- Whitney Corp.
Alternate Commissioner

Arthur S. Osborne, tJ.S. Public Health Service, "Washing-
ton, D.C.

Senior Advisers
John A. Burns, Hawaii

Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-
national Organization Affairs
Stewart Udall, Secretary of the Interior

Congressional advisers will be announced at a
later date.

The South Pacific Conference is an auxiliary
body of the Commission which was established to
associate the peoples of the area directly with the
work of the Commission. The conference is held
once every 3 years, and this session is the first time
it has been held in a U.S. territon,'. Principal
items to bo discussed include establishing a balance

960

Department of Sfafe Bulletin

etween social advancement and economic develop-
aent, training Pacific Islanders in business
tietliods and practices, and the changing role of
Fomen in the Pacific.

Slavery

Slavery convention signed at Geneva September 25, 1926,
as amended (TIAS 3.W2). Entered into force March !),
1927 ; for tlie United States March 21, 1929. 46 Stat.
2183.

Notifications received that they consider themselves
bound: Dahomey, April 4, 1962 ; Guinea, March 30,
1962.

Annual Foreign Policy Briefing Held
or Nongovernmental Organizations

'ress release 335 dated May 26

The Department of State will hold its annual
'National Foreign Policy Conference for Nongov-
irnmental Organizations on May 28 and 29.

The purpose of the conference is to provide op-
)ortunity for discussion of international affairs
)etween leaders of nongovernmental organizations
ind the senior officers of the Department. By
neans of these conferences the membership of non-
governmental organizations, and through them a
nuch broader public, gain deeper understanding
>f international issues.

Among those addressing the conference will be
he President and the Secretary of State.

Participation in the conference is by invitation
)nly.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

\tomic Energy

Amendment to article VI.A.S of the Statute of the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency (TIAS 3873). Done
at Vienna October 4, 1961.'
Acceptance deposited: Australia, May 21, 1962.

\viation

Protocol amending articles 48(a), 49(e), and 61 of the
convention on international civil aviation (TIAS 1591)
by providing that sessions of the Assembly of the Inter-
national Civil Aviation Organization shall be held not
less than once in 3 years instead of annually. Done at
Montreal June 14, 1954. Entered into force December
12, 1056. TIAS 3756.

Rntificalions deposited: Cameroon, November 14, 1961;
JIauritania, April 2, 1962.

' Not in force.

BILATERAL
Brazil

Agreement extending the agreement of October 14, 1950,
as amended and extended (TIAS 2475, 30.55, 3292, 4584,
and 4648), relating to a vocational education program,
the agreement of June 26, 1953, as amended and ex-
tended (TIAS 4130 and 4586), relating to a cooperative
program of agriculture and natural resources, and the
agreement of May 30, 1953, as extended, relating to a
special services program. Effected by exchange of notes
at Rio de Janeiro December 29, 1961, and January 11,
1962. Entered into force January 11, 1962.

Canada

Amendment to the agreement of June 15, 1955, as amended
(TIAS 3304, 3771, 4271, and 4518), concerning civil
uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington May 25,
1962. Enters Into force on the date of receipt by Can-
ada of a notification from the United States that all
statutory and constitutional requirements for entry
into force have been complied with.

European Atomic Energy Community

Amendment to the agreement of November 8, 1958 (TIAS
4173), for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic
energy. Signed at Brussels May 21 and at Washington
May 22, 1962. Enters into force on the day on which
each party shall have received from the other written
notification that it has complied with all statutory and
constitutional requirements.

Amendment to the additional agreement of June 11, 1960
(TIAS 4650), for cooperation concerning peaceful uses
of atomic energy. Signed at Brussels May 21 and at
Washington May 22, 1962. Enters into force on the
day on which each party shall have received from the
other written notification that it has complied with all
statutory and constitutional requirements.

India

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agree-
ment of May 1, 1962. Effected by exchange of notes at
New Delhi May 17, 1962. Entered into force May 17,
1962.

Indonesia

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agree-
ment of February 19, 1962 (TIAS 4952). Effected by
exchange of notes at Djaliarta May 15, 1962. Entered
into force May 15, 1962.

Peru

Agreement amending the agreement of Slay 3, 1956, as
amended (TIAS 3.502, 3859, and 4398), for financing
certain educational exchange programs. Effected by
exchange of notes at Lima January 26 and February 1,
1062. Entered into force February 1, 1062.

Viet-Nam

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agree-
ment of December 27, 1961 (TIAS 4020). Effected by
exchange of notes at Saigon May 3, 1962. Entered into
force May 3, 1962.

June 11, 7962

961

PUBLICATIONS

U.S. Releases Study on Economic
and Social Effects of Disarmament

The United States Arms Control and Disarm-
ament Agency announced on May 8 the publica-
tion of a general study prepared for the United
Nations on the Economic and Social Consequences
of Disarmament in the United States}

The study emphasizes in its examination of the
problem the positive economic interest of the
United States in achieving general and complete
disarmament under effective international control
and notes that, "if the world should be fortunate
enough to be able to rid itself of the burden of
national defense efforts, resources would then be
released everywhere which could be devoted to
the production of those goods and services which
advance man's material, cultural, and spiritual
state."

The document is the second economic study pro-
duced by the Agency since its establishment by an
act of Congress in September 1961. In January
1962 the Agency published a report prepared vmder
its sponsorship by a panel of experts headed by
Emile Benoit on the Economic Irrvpacts of Dis-
armament. The two studies reached, essentially,
the same general conclusions.

The publication represents a Government-wide
effort. Those agencies which cooperated with the
Economic Bureau of the U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency in its preparation include
the Departments of Commerce, Defense, Health,
Education, and Welfare, the Interior, Labor, and
State; the Bureau of the Budget; the Council of
Economic Advisers; and the Housing and Home
Finance Agency.

The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
prepared the study of the economic and social con-
sequences of disarmament largely in response to
a United Nations request which was addressed to ■
all member nations last year. An international
committee of experts, appointed by the U.N. Sec-
retary-General, examined these national submis-
sions and other relevant material and then
prepared and released a report ^ on the worldwide
economic and social consequences of disarmament.
The United States and other national submissions
will be released by the United Nations as part II
of this report.

It is significant that the international committee
of experts came to the unanimous conclusion that
"all the problems and difficulties of transition con-
nected with disarmament could be met by appro-
priate national and international measures" and
that "there should thus be no doubt that the diver-
sion to peaceful purposes of the resources now in
military use could be accomplished to the benefit of
all countries and lead to the improvement of world
economic and social conditions."

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Appointments

J. Kenneth Mansfield as Inspector General, Foreign
Assistance, in the Department of State, effective May 12.
(For biographic details, see Department of State press
release 329 dated May 23. )

' Arms Control and Disarmament Agency publication 6;
for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Gov-
ernment Printing OflSce, Washington 25, D.C.

Correction

Bulletin of May 28, 1962, p. 8G2 : The last sen-
tence in the second paragraph in the left-hand
coliunn should read, "It will be the purpose of the
ministerial meeting to carry forward this continu-
ing task by appraising where we stand and by
furnishing further guidance to the inrmanent
authorities of the alliance."

' U.N. doc. E/3593/Rev. 1.

962

Deporfmenf of Sfofe Bulletin

June 11, 1962

Index

Vol. XLVI, No. 1198

Agriculture. U.S. Steps Up Food Shipments to

Northeast Brazil 900

Asia. Soutli Pacific Conference (delegation) . . 960

Australia. Secretary Rusk Speaks in Australia

and Xi'W Zealand Following ANZUS Meeting . . 936

Brazil. U.S. Steps Up Food Shipments to North-
east Brazil 960

Canada. Letters of Credence (Ritchie) 955

Department and Foreign Service. Appointments

(ManstieUl) 962

Disarmament. U.S. Releases Study on Economic

and Social Effects of Disarmament 962

Economic Affairs. The President's Trade Expan-
sion Program and U.S. National Security
(Coppock) 956

Educational and Cultural Affairs

Cultural Agreement Signed With United Arab
Republic 959

U.S. and Pakistan Celebrate Tenth Anniversary

of Fulbright Program 955

U.S. and Rumania Exchange Films 959

Foreign Aid

Mansfield appointed Inspector General, Foreign
Assistance 962

U.S. Steps Up Food Shipments to Northeast Brazil . 960

International Information. Cultural Agreement

Signed With United Arab Republic 959

International Organizations and Conferences.

South Pacific Conference (delegation) .... 960

Ivory Coast. President Kennedy and President of
Ivory Coast Conclude Talks (text of joint com-
munique) 952

Japan. U.S.-Japan Science Committee Adopts Ex-
change and Research Programs (Harriman, text
of joint communique) 953

Korea. A Review of U.S.-Korean Relations

(Berger) 951

Luxembourg. Grand Duchess of Luxembourg To

Visit United States 950

New Zealand. Secretary Rusk Speaks in Aus-
tralia and New Zealand Follovring ANZUS
Meeting 936

Pakistan. U.S. and Pakistan Celebrate Tenth An-
niversary of Fulbright Program 955

Presidential Documents. President Kennedy and
President of Ivory Coast Conclude Talks . . . 952

Public Affairs. Annual Foreign Policy Briefing

Held for Nongovernmental Organizations . . . 961

Publications. U.S. Releases Study on Economic
and Social Effects of Disarmament 962

Rumania. U.S. and Rumania Exchange Films . . 959

Science

New Frontiers of Science, Space, and Foreign

Policy (Rusk) 931

U.S.-Japan Science Committee Adopts Exchange
and Research Programs (Harriman, text of

joint communique) 953

Treaty Information. Current Actions 961

United Arab Republic. Cultural Agreement Signed

With United Arab Republic 959

'Name Index

Berger, Samuel D 951

Coppock, Joseph D 956

Harriman, W. Averell 953

Houphouet-Boigny, Felix 952

Kennedy, President 952

Mansfield, J. Kenneth 962

Ritchie, Charles Stewart Almon 95.5

Rusk, Secretai-y 931, 936

No.

Date

326

5/21

*327

5/21

328
*329

5/21
5/23

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: May 21-27

Press releases may be obtained from the Office
of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Releases issued prior to May 21 which appear in
this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 314 of May 15,
316 of May 16, and 318 and 320 of May 17.

Subject

Harriman : U.S.-Japan Committee on
Scientific Cooperation.

U.S. participation in international con-
ferences.

Cultural agreement with U.A.R.

Maustield sworn in as Inspector Gen-
eral. Forei.en Assistance, Department
of State (biographic details).

C. Griflith Johnson: "The Role of
Trade Policy: Continuation of U.S.
Leadership."

Exchange of films with Rumania.

Bowles : "Coordinated Rural Develop-
ment : Key to Democratic Growth."

U.S.-Japan science committee com-
munique.

Anniversary of Fulbright program in
Pakistan.

National foreign policy conference for
nongovernmental organizations.

Rusk: "New Frontiers of Science,
Space, and Foreign Policy."

Weiss: "The Common Market and
United States Agriculture."

Canada credentials (rewrite).

* Not printed.

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.

t330 .5/22

331
*332

5/24
5/24

333

5/24

334

5/24

335

5/26

336

5/25

t33-

5/25

338

5/25

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING 0FFICEM962

the

Department

of

State

United States
Government Printing Office

DIVISION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS

Washington 25, D.C.

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE TO AVOID

PAYMENT OF POSTAGE, $300

(GPO)

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
Current Documents, 1958

American Foreign Policy: Current Dociifnients is an annual, one-
volume collection of the principal messages, addresses, statements,
reports, and of certain of the diplomatic notes exchanged and treaties
made in a given calendar year which indicate the scope, goals, and
implementation of the foreign policy of the United States.

As was true with respect to the earlier volumes in the series, the
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ments and by regional international organizations of which the
United States is not a member where the pronouncements or settle-
ments revealed in them were of major concern to the United States in
the formulation of its own policies.

In most instances the documents are arranged under topical head-
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facilitate quick reference include a table of contents and list of
documents; source, cross-reference, and (wherever possible) infor-
mational footnotes; and an index.

The earlier volumes in the series may be purchased from the Super-
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ton 25, D.C. — American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1957
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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

'^•^35?.M3^

ICiAL

KLY RECORD

Vol. XLVI, No. 1199 June 18, 1962

WHERE WE STAND • by Walt W. Rostow, Counselor ... 967

SECRETARY RUSK'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF

MAY 31 970

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY— ITS IMPLICATIONS

FOR THE WEST • by Thomas L. Hughes 977

THE ROLE OF TRADE POLICY: CONTINUATION

OF U.S. LEADERSHIP • by Assistant Secretary
Johnson 988

INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY PROBLEMS • by W.

Michael Blumenthal 997

TED STATES
EIGN POLICY

For index see inside back cover

Vol. XLVI, No. 1199 • Publication 7389
June 18, 1962

tloston Public Library
^Mpisrwiteodent ot Documents

^yL19I962

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Note: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and Items contained herein may
be reprinted. Citation of the Department
OF State Bulletin as the source »111 be
appreciated. The Bulletin Is Indexed In the
Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the
Office of Public Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public
and interested agencies of the
Government with information on
developments in the field of foreign
relations and on the work of the
Department of State and the Foreign
Service. The BULLETIN includes se-
lected press releases on foreign policy,
issued by the White House and the
Department, and statements and ad-
dresses made by the President and by
the Secretary of State and otlier
officers of the Department, as well as
special articles on various phases of
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tion IS included concerning treaties
and international agreements to
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Publications of the Department,
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i/Vhere We Stand

hy Walt W. Rostow

Counselor of the Department and Chairman of the Policy Planning Coimcil ^

It is now 16 montlis to the day since I arrived
it the White House tlirough the snow to be sworn
in as an official of this administration. I thought
it might be helpful to use the occasion of our meet-
ing this morning to take stock of where we now
stand in dealing with the foreign policy problems
svhich became our responsibility at that time.

In his inaugural address^ the President ex-
pressed his miderstanding that he took office at a
:ime of grave difficulty on the world scene; and
he committed himself to "struggle against the
;ommon enemies of man: tyranny, poverty, dis-
jase, and war itself."

His vision of the task was not a matter of
fhetoric. It translated itself quickly into hard,
concrete, and challenging day-to-day tasks.

We faced two kinds of problems: first, a series
Df urgent and dangerous crises ; second, a series of
slower moving but equally dangerous situations
SFhich, if constructive action were not taken,
might slide against us and the free world as a
svhole.

I should like to describe briefly what each of
;hese sets of problems were like, what we have
:lone about them, and then to try to assess roughly
where we now appear to stand.

-ive Areas of Crisis

In Southeast Asia we found that the agreements
nade at Geneva in 1954 with respect to both Laos
md Viet-Nam were in disarray. The United

'Address made before the 1962 Democratic Women's
:!onference at Washington, D.C., on May 21 (press release
125 dated May 19).

' For text, see Buixetin of Feb. 6, 1961, p. 175.

States is not a party to those agreements, but we
did agree not to upset them, if they were honored
by the Communists. In January 1961 they were
not being honored.

In Laos there was a civil war in which Commu-
nist Pathet Lao, backed by the North Vietnamese,
were seeking to take over the country. In South
Viet-Nam there has been built up since 1958 — as a
result of decisions taken in Hanoi — a most danger-
ous guerrilla war based on infiltration, supply,
and tutelage by Communists in the north.

In the Congo there existed all the potentialities
for a civil war which might result in the creation
of a Commimist base in central Africa. It might
then have been used to spread subversion through-
out the area.

In Cuba a Communist government existed al-
ready committed to spreading the methods of sub-
version and guerrilla warfare, which Castro had
used to gain power in Cuba, to the mainland of
Latin America.

Thus, when we read Mr. Khrushchev's speech of
Januaiy 6, 1961, and the blessing he gave to the
methods of subversion and guerrilla warfare, we
took this matter very seriously indeed. We re-
garded the challenge not merely as a series of
regional crises but part of a general Communist
offensive designed to corrode the free world with-
out confronting either our nuclear or our conven-
tional military strength. All the potentialities
existed in January 1961 for the spread of Com-
munist power by these methods into Southeast
Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

In addition, we faced the crisis in Berlin. In
1958 Mr. Khrushchev had stated his demand that
the Western Powers be withdrawn from Berlin

une 18, 1962

967

and the status of that city be so changed as to make
access to it a matter over which the East German
Communists could exercise a decisive control. By
this route they aimed to destroy the basis for a free
West Berlin.

Moves To Counter Communist Expansion

These five crises are still with us; but, on each
of them, we have moved to protect the vital in-
terests of the United States and the free world
and to seal off the danger of an extension of
Communist power.

In Laos we have set out to create a neutral and
independent state which would permit the people
of this small country to work out their destiny in
their own way. This formula is in the spirit of
the Geneva Accords, but it has been endangered
by the recent Communist attack on Nam Tha and
we have moved forces into Southeast Asia ' to pro-
tect the region against the possible breakdown of
our understanding with the Soviet Union that
this is a common policy. The achievement of this
objective will be difficult, and it may require a
prolonged effort. But we are sure our objective
is the best among difficult alternatives ; namely, to
get the foreign forces out of Laos and to create a
situation where the existence of a neutral, inde-
pendent state could avoid a direct confrontation
in that unstable area between Communist and free-
world military power.

In Viet-Nam we are working with the South
"Vietnamese to help them defeat the guerrilla war
which has been imposed by the north and to get
the North Vietnamese elements back where they
belong — north of the 17th parallel. Here we
have made progress. A situation of the greatest
and most immediate danger has been converted
into one which is much more hopeful than it was
even 6 months ago, but the road ahead may be long
and hard.

In the Congo we have backed the effort of the
U.N. to help the Congolese create a unified, inde-
pendent, and viable country. There still is no
final agreement. We are not yet out of the woods,
but we have come a long way. Despite many diffi-
culties the U.N. has played an important role in
helping the Congolese toward the creation of a
truly independent African state. In so doing, it
helped frustrate the evident ambition of Moscow
to create a Communist base in Africa.

In Cuba, after the failure last April of the
gallant band of men who aimed to restore freedom
to their country, we have worked with our friends
in Latin America to isolate the Communist gov-
ernment in Cuba and to insure that the techniques
of indirect aggression which the Cuban Commu-
nists would like to apply to Latin America will be
fi'ustrated. The danger of Cuban intervention in
Latin America has been diminished by our own
actions and the actions we have taken through the
Organization of American Stat«s at the Punta del
Este conference last January.* The hemisphere
is now alert to the danger of subversion and guer-
rilla warfare, and it is in a position to move to-
gether if the threat should become real.

Aside from our efforts to seal off and deal with
these four crises, the whole Government, under the
personal leadership of the President, has turned
with extraordinary vigor to the problem of learn-
ing how to prevent or to deal with the techniques
of subversion and guerrilla warfare on which the
international Communist movement places such
high hopes for the 1960's. This problem — long
given relatively low priority — is now being at-
tacked by the best military and civilian minds in
the Government. I

With respect to Berlin, we formulated our po-
sition and held to it. Every government in the
world knows that we are prepared to back our
play. We intend that the people of Berlin main-
tain their freedom, their unencumbered access to
the West, and the protection which the presence
in Berlin of Western military forces alone can
afford. Moreover, we intend to work with our
friends in Berlin to maintain that city as a viable,
constructive, and important part of the free-world
community.

U.S. Aid Programs

In addition to these five crises we found, as I
said earlier, that slow but dangerous erosion was
taking place elsewhere. We lacked, for example,
a policy which would aline the United States
actively with the great forces in Latin America
which seek economic development and greater
social justice. To this our response was the Alli-
ance for Progress.

We found that we lacked a foreign aid program
capable of alining the United States with the simi-
lar forces at work in Asia, the Middle East, and'

' Itid., June 4, 19G2, p. 904.
968

* For background, see ibid., Feb. 19, 1962, pp. 267-284.
Department of Stale Bulletin

Africa. In those vast regions peoples and gov-
ernments are detennined to develop their status
as independent nations and to provide for them-
selves and their children an environment of eco-
nomic growth and progress. Our response was a
foreign aid program designed to help those na-
tions M-hich showed a capacity to mobilize their
own energies and resources for the development
of their societies. Our aid program is rooted in
the sound principle of self-help. Legislation
passed by the Congress in 1061 has made it pos-
sible for us to make reliable long-term commit-
ments to nations which have created national de-
velopment programs. By this means we hope
gradually to build a stable partnership with the
new and aspiring nations as each of them goes for-
ward to the stage where it can qualify for this type
of assistance.

Both the Alliance for Progress and our foreign
aid programs in general are in the midst of a
complicated turnaround. National development
programs cannot be developed overnight, if they
are truly serious. Moreover, within the admin-
istration we have had to reorganize the policies
and men to do the new job. The President has
described our effort in terms of a "decade of de-
velopment," and we are still in its first year.

Nevertheless we are confident that we are on
the right track. A number of development pro-
grams have already come forward which meet the
new standards ; not only the United States but the
richer nations of Western Europe and Japan are
joining in efforts to back these programs. This is
a tougher and longer job than the Marshall plan,
but we deeply believe it must and can be done.

Other Areas of U.S. Activity

With respect to Western Europe we found that
our own policies and those of the Western Euro-
pean nations had not yet come to grips with two
massive facts: first, that Western Europe in the
1950's underwent an extraordinary surge of
growth and development and that it was ready to
accept a new degree of responsibility on the world
scene; second, the movement toward European
unity — which we had helped to foster immediately
after the war — had gained real momentum. A
united Europe had become a real possibility, but
its shape and our policy toward its evolution were
not yet determined.

Our response to these facts has been to encour-

June 18, 1962

age the movement toward European unity while
proposing to the Europeans a new transatlantic
partnership. We are in the process of working
out the terms of that partnership in military mat-
ters, in trade, in problems of currency and re-
serves, in aiding the underdeveloped areas, and in
many other areas. The development of these new
relationships will take time. We are dealing now
not with weak, impoverished nations, as was the
case after the war. We are dealing with proud
and strong nations seeking to find new relations
to one another and to the United States, seeking
to define also their role on the world scene for the
1960's and beyond. This exciting process, which,
if successful, will add vast strength and stability
to the free world, will certainly confront diffi-
culties. But we are confident that our policy is
pointed in the right direction and the outcome
will, in the end, fulfill our hopes.

With respect to Japan, we have moved in many
ways to come closer to that nation and its people,
whose remarkable recovery has placed it in a posi-
tion to play a constructive role on a worldwide
basis.

Finally, the President committed himself to
work to reduce or eliminate the danger of nuclear
war. Our first effort was to formulate a proposal
for a test ban treaty ° which, if accepted, would
have been both a limited contribution of substance
and a precedent for wider disarmament efforts.
As the President has said, the rejection by the
Soviet Union of that proposal was the greatest
disappointment of his first year in oflSce. Never-
theless, the stakes for the United States and for
all humanity are too high to permit this disap-
pointment to deflect us from the task.

The new Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency is now on its feet and working hard on the
difficult technical problems which are involved.
Arms control will not be achieved by wishing it,
or by merely talking about its desirability. It
will be achieved when we have devised hardheaded,
concrete proposals that offer more security for
all — and when the Soviet Government is prepared
to accept effective international inspection. We
have laid before the Geneva disarmament confer-
ence serious proposals ' which, if accepted, would
protect our vital security interests while diminish-

' For text, see iMd., June 5, 19C1, p. 870.
'For text of an outline of a treaty on general and
complete disarmament, see ibid., May 7, 1962, p. 747.

969

ing radically the dangers of war. And we shall
stay with it, for surely, as time goes on, men will
come to understand, on the other side of the Iron
Curtain as on this, that modem technology makes
it mandatory for all to accept international in-
spection as the price for living in tolerable security
on this small planet.

Where then do we stand? None of the crises
we inherited are yet finally solved; all are still
dangerous. We live close to the edge of war in
an atomic age, and we must learn to live there with
poise. But we have made real progress in reduc-
ing the dangers these crises represented, and we
have formulated policies with respect to each,
which we are prepared to back with all the great
strength at our command.

The general Communist offensive which these
crises represented has not been defbiitely brought
to an end, but the line has been held and its mo-
mentum has been halted.

In the longer run, creative tasks we have under-
taken with respect to Latin America and other
underdeveloped areas, Europe, Japan, and disar-
mament, we know where we want to go and we are
moving. But we are also aware that it will take
many years of hard, pereistent, and purposeful
effort to achieve the objectives we have set.

I can report, then, that we are well launched
along the paths the President laid out in his in-
augural address. We have met squarely the crises
we confronted. But we have not let them deflect
us from the larger task of not merely defending
the free world but moving it toward the goal of a
free community of nations — embracing in partner-
ship both the more developed and less developed
nations. Our Defense Establishment has never
been in better shape, and we intend to keep it that
way. But we are ready to move in practical ways
toward peace — if the Soviet Union is prepared to
accept effective inspection.

We are in good heart ; we have a long way to go ;
but we intend to get there.

Letters of Credence

Kmvait

The newly appointed Ambassador of Kuwait,
Abdul Kahman Salim al-Atiqi, presented his cre-
dentials to President Kennedy on June 1. For
texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the Presi-
dent's reply, see Department of State press release
350 dated June 1.

Secretary Rusk's News Conference
of May 31

Press release 347 dated June 1

Secretary Etisk: Apparently we were out-
ranked by an international meeting going on in our
other room. I hope you won't find this too
uncomfortable.

I do not have a formal statement to make today,
but I would like, before taking your questions, to
make a brief comment on the subject of disarma-
ment.

Disarmament

Today the Geneva conference is filing its re-
port to the United Nations [U.N. doc. DC/288]
on the progress of the conference thus far. That
was an interim report due by June 1. I under-
stand that the report is some 100,000 words in
length and consists primarily of a factual account
of the proceedings at the Geneva conference.

We regret that this report does not represent
more substantial progress in this field. There has
been an agreement on a preamble, but we have
been disappointed at the negative reaction of the
Soviet Union on a nimiber of other substantial
points — for example, on nuclear testing, and on
the proposals that we have made for Stage I of
a disarmament treaty,^ on the war propaganda
point on which they reversed their position this
past week, and on the indications that they are
going to be unwilling to accept a United Nations
force to assist in maintaining peace as we move
into a disarmament period.

Now, we are concerned about the possibilities of
progress in this field, because we believe seriously
and deeply that the security of all of us, the Soviet
Union as well as ourselves, does not lie in an un-
limited permanent arms race of increasing cost
and increasing instability but in arrangements
which would bring this race to a halt and, if pos-
sible, turn it downward.

We have felt that the contribution which had
been asked of the Soviet Union on a nuclear test
ban was the minimum contribution that could rea-
sonably be expected to bring tests to an end on a
permanent basis.

We should like to see some actual physical steps

• For text of a U.S. outline of a treaty on gener.nl and
complete disarmament, see Bulletin of May 7, 11X12, p.

747.

970

Deparfmenf of Sfofe Bulletin

in disarmament occur, again to turn this race
downward.

One has the impression that the Soviet Union at
the moment in this field is phxying the role of the
illusive Pimpernel.

]\Iuch has been said about it over the years, in
the United Nations and elsewhere ; sweeping reso-
lutions have been proposed ; miiny resolutions have
been adopted unanimously over the last two dec-
ades in the U.N. and in other discussions. But we
have not yet been able to embark upon actual steps
of disarmament. We think this is a great pity.
Wo think it is unnecessary.

We have in mind disarmament within the
framework of a world system outlined in the
United Nations Charter. We do not have in mind
a Leninist type of disarmament which simply ex-
poses nations and peoples to techniques of Com-
munist penetration and subversion, including
violent means, which are a longstanding part of
Leninist technique and doctrine.

But United Nations disarmament is and ought
to be possible, if we can move ahead on the basis
of the principles which were agreed to in New
York last autiunn - and if we take into account
the fact that sweeping disarmament involves a
major transformation of the world political scene,
requiring assurance that nations are determined to
settle their disputes by peaceful means, live at
peace with each other, comply with their obliga-
tions under such things as the U.N. Charter, and
begin to bring this race under control.

We hope very much that all of the governments
involved in the Geneva conference will stay at its
work ; there will be a recess for a period — but come
back and work liard at it and not give up because
it is difficult, and not be impatient because agree-
ment is not easy to reach, but stay with it. We
ha\e been encouraged by the serious and respon-
sible role which the eight new members are play-
ing in the Geneva conference, but it is going to
take pei'sistence, patience, and also reality if we
are to move forward in tliis field.

We think it is in the security interests of the
United States to try to find ways to bring this
arms race to a stop. We also are determined that
we will put forward proposals, will accept j^ro-
posals, only to the extent that they are realistic
and that we, ourselves, can live with them in keep-
ing with our responsibilities to our own security
and to the security of the free world.

• For text, see md., Oct. 9, 1961, p. .189.

We believe that our proposals which have al-
ready been filed will make it possible to proceed
with disarmament consistent with those require-
ments, and we hope vei-y much that the negotia-
tions will produce more results when we reconvene
after a break of a few weeks.

Now I am ready to take your questions.

Soviet World Trade Proposal

Q. Mr. Secretarij, ivhat do you think of the pro-
posal made by Mr. Khrushchev for some hind of
worldwide trade meeting or trade organization as
a counter, as advanced hy him, to the Common
Market plan?

A. Well, I can understand Mr. Khrushchev's
concern about the evident growing economic vital-
ity of the free world. The Common Market itself
has been flourishing. There is the prospect that
that Common Market will grow, and the prospect
that that great Conunon Market and our own
market will be linked with new trade opportunities
between us, and on a most-favored-nation basis,
which will open up expanding markets for comi-
tries in other parts of the world.

We believe that the prospects here are very great
because our own American experience has been
that increasing markets which derive from grow-
ing economies are the kinds of markets which pro-
vide great opportunities for trade not only within
the advanced and industrialized nations but be-
tween them and the less advanced or the agricul-
tural nations.

There is in prospect an enonnous increase in
economic vitality of the free world, and we want
to see that move ahead. Now, there are many
forums in which these matters can be discussed on
a general basis. Committee Two of the United
Nations [Economic and Financial], the Economic
and Social Council, and other foiiuns are places
where these matters are discussed regularly. But
we do not believe that we should interrapt these
great movements that are in process in the free
world by divereions of a sort of which we do not
yet have any information or on which we have no
proposals.

Meaning of "Victory"

Q. Mr. Secretary, Senator [Barry] Goldwater
has criticized the State Department for alleged
appeasement. He said that the word '■'■victory" is
being stricken out of all State Department

June 18, 1962

971

speeches arid cites this as evidence of a '■'■■no win''''
policy. Can you say anything at all about that?

A. Well, I don't want to take up the Senator
in long-distance debate, but Mr. Ball [Under Sec-
retary George W. Ball], by the way, will be before
the appropriate Senate committee again on Mon-
day [June 4] to discuss this matter further.

In this particular reference I gather that the
word "victory" was substituted for with the phrase
"defeat of Communist aggression" in a speech
made by a military officer early last year.

There is no doubt whatever that this adminis-
tration and this nation are committed to the no-
tion that the wave of the future lies with freedom,
that the basic commitments of this country and
these people are shared with men and women in
all parts of the world. It is no accident that when
you enter the General Assembly of the United
Nations you see sitting there row after row of
independent nations, more than 40, who have
evolved out of a Western political system.

It is rather curious that in that kind of a forum
Russian delegates from time to time get up and
pretend to be the champions of national independ-
ence, themselves representing a system which has
given no independence to anyone, so far as one
can gather.

The whole purpose of the American effort to put
itself at the head of its own revolutionary spirit
and tradition in political freedom, in economic and
social development — this whole effort — is based
upon the conviction tliat these basic commitments
are deeply rooted in human nature and are the
wave of the future.

Now, if in a particular speech — and I don't want
to get into problems of these rather minor differ-
ences in rhetoric in particular speeches which
might have been suggested by a particular official
at a particular time under particular circum-
stances— I think there is one point on which we
do have to show some caution and that is the
notion that victory in its usual sense is to be
achieved by sudden military means.

The President has indicated in his press con-
ferences more than once that a nuclear conflagra-
tion is not something which provides an easy path
to what anyone would call "victory." We are de-
termined to advance and protect our vital inter-
ests, by peaceful means if possible, but we sliall
defend those vital interests and move on with the
great tasks of the fi-ee world.

Now, I think that, if there are those who do not
see in such things as the development of the At-
lantic conmnunity, the nurture of our alliances, our
trade proposals, our aid proposals, the growing
solidarity of the free world — if they do not see in
that enough of a "win" policy, then I think that
they are called upon to state their own alterna-
tives.

There have been times — I have indicated this be-
fore— when two of the alternatives seemed to me
to be quite unrealistic. One of them is simply to
let the other side have it, with all the weapons
you have at your disposal — in other words, hydro-
gen war. That, I would suppose, is hardly a "win"
policy, if one looks at the situation realistically, as
a first choice.

Secondly, some of those who talk about a "no
win" policy, it seems to me, would just have us
quit, stop foreign aid, withdraw from the U.N.,
withdraw from NATO, forget the Alliance for
Progress. This, to me, is no substitute for the
vigorous policies of the free world in this present
situation.

So I would suppose that we are not involved
with a "no win" policy. We are involved in poli-
cies that attract — support — allies, from people all
over the world, because they are based upon the
aspirations and the commitments of ordinary men
and women in every continent.

Nuclear Weapons in Western Europe

Q. Mr. Secretary, the President had quite a hit
to say recently about the problem of nuclear
weapons in Weste'm Europe. Is it conceivable,
under any circumstances that you can envisage
now., that the United States might agree to let the
British share nuclear knowledge with the French
Government, either under present national sys-
tems of 7iuclear xoeajwns or in the case if tlie
British and the French were willing to put their
nuclear forces into a joint NATO force of some
kind?

A. I think on that question I would not be able
to add niuoli to what the President has ah'eady
said.

We do not favor the extension of national nu-
clear capabilities for a variety of reasons. One
of them is that, looking ahead to the future, we
believe tliat tlie addition of national nuclear capa-
bilities would make extremely difficult the urgent
problems of bringing these weapons under inter-

972

Department of State Bulletin

lational control and preventing their becoming
mmanageable at some stage.

We are discussing, as you know, within NATO
he possibilities of a NATO nuclear force. The
i'resident spoke of that briefly in his Ottawa
peech.' Those matters have been discussed in the
forth Atlantic Council over the past several
iionths and are being discussed tliere now.

We would like to take up these questions within
, European and within a NATO framework to
ee how these matters ought to be handled. But
'. would not suppose that we would do indirectly
rhat we would not do directly; or to put it tlie
ther way around, if we would be willing to co-
iperate on an indirect matter of this sort, we could
«t directly.

Q. May I a-ftk the second half of the question a
ittle differently?

A. Yes.

Q. Wmdd the United States favor the British
nd the French putting their current nuclear
orces into a NATO pot, so to speak?

A. Well, that is one of the questions, of course,
nvolved in how you would organize a NATO nu-
lear force and how it would be handled. I would
lot want to try to give a specific answer to that be-
ause these matters are very much imder discus-
ion in NATO ; I am sorry.

a OS

Q. Mr. Secretary, contrary to the feelings of
ome of my colleagues, I lolll not ash lohich netvs-
>apers you read. My question is on Laos:

In a quarrel between the United States and
■'houmi [Gen. Phoumi Nosavan, Deputy Prime
I mister and Mitiister of Defense^, no doubt Mr.
Jarrlman has right on his side. But some of the
Isian diplomats in town are fearful that by quar-
eling especially loith those on our side we reduce
he credibility of our deterrent and that indeed
he Communists believe that we are so opposed
nd disillusioned with the Laotians at our side
hat we would never do anything to help them
whatsoever. Do you think any such thought on
he part of the Communists is misplaced, well-
•hrased, close to the tntth, approximate?

' Ibid., June 5, 1961, p. 839.
one ?8, 1962

A. No, I think the problem has been here to get
the Laotian leaders directly involved in a serious
and responsible negotiation for the formation of
a national coalition government, on the basis of
which, coupled with the arrangements reached in
Geneva, you would get non-Laotians out of Laos.

We believe that if the Laotians could be left
alone they would be peaceful as far as their neigh-
bors are concerned and could work out their own
affairs in a way that would not threaten any of
their neighbors.

It has not been easy for these three princes to get
together. There have been times when one or
another of them has not been cooperative. We
have been pressing within the limits available to
us, and by the channels open to us we have been
pressing, that all three talk seriously and realisti-
cally about the possibilities of a national govern-
ment. But the present need is to keep this tenuous
cease-fire in being, to explore among the three
princes whether or not a coalition government is
possible.

If those efl'orts do not succeed, then, of course,
some very serious problems will be in front of us.

Q. Could you commient on the contirming Com-
mimist offensive, or rather skirmishes and buildup
in Laos, and hoxo that would affect the negotia-
tions?

A. Well, I think a persistent pressure against
the cease-fire would make negotiations very diffi-
cult. I think there is no question about that. The
cease-fire has been rather a difficult one to monitor
all along because you have relatively few forces
scattered throughout a great, vast country, which
have not had cease-fire lines in the usual sense.
There have been movements of forces back and
forth. It has been difficult to evaluate the actual
effect or the purpose in a particular event from
one side in one situation or another. But this is a
matter which should be clarified within the next
very few days, because I gather the princes do ex-
pect to meet within a week, and we shall soon see
whether there is any prospect for the kind of
result there that we have been hoping for.

Secretary's Tentative European Trip

Q. Mr. Secretary, it has been said, sir, that you
will be making a trip to Europe at the end of this
month. Could you tell us, first, what your itiner-
ary will be, and, secondly, could you tell us what

973

the relationship of your trip is to the discussions
on Berlin and also the intensifications of discus-
sions on the Common Market?

A. It is possible that I will run over to Europe
for a few days, sometime next month. I cannot
give you an exact itinerary because tliis depends
upon schedules on both sides of the Atlant ic, which
are very busy. If it is possible for me to go, and it
is not absolutely certain yet that I will be able to
get away and can fit the schedules on the other
side — but if it is possible for me to go, I will an-
nounce the itinerary just as soon as possible.

The purpose of such a trip, if it takes place,
will be to continue some of the discussions that we
had in Athens with certain of the foreign minis-
ters. I tried in tliis most recent trip that I took
to combine three meetings in one trip.* The re-
sult was that each one was a little hurried as far
as I was concerned and I was not able to finish
some of the talks that were started there, and I
think that there could be some very useful ex-
changes over a period of a few days' tune.

But quite frankly, this has not been set. Per-
haps in the next 2 or 3 days I will be able to say
something specific about it one way or the other.

Problems in Communist China

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you discuss with us
^ohat seems to he going oninside Commuiust China
and, specifically, whether the Peking government
seems to he losing some control over its own peo-
ple; and, secondly, tohat our role in all of this could
he, whether we can help hy sending food, or hinder^
what we should do?

A. Well, I am afraid that I would have to speak
with some caution about what is going on inside
Communist China for the simple reason that I
don't think we have fully adequate information
about it. There have been some reports from some
of the refugees who have appeared in Hong Kong
or Macao, which throw some light on the situation.
We do know that tliere are some serious economic
difficulties there. Tlieir food rationing or caloric
intake is down to 1,300 or 1,500 calories a day, for
example, according to some of the estimates that
have been made. We know also that shortages of
raw materials and other problems have slowed
down their industrial production, their industrial

"great leap forward," and that there are some very
significant problems there. I would not attempt
at this point to assess this in terms of the control
of the Peiping authorities over the country. I
think we would have to assume that they have
fully adequate control at this point.

In terms of our own reaction to that situation,
our relationship to it, I think I would only refer
to what the President has already said. We are
taking some steps to admit a considerable number
of Chinese refugees who have been screened for
admission to this country.^ It is our expectation
that they might begin to arrive here within 2
weeks. We have added to our personnel in Hong
Kong to assist in this process, and we are going
right ahead with that. As far as food for main-
land Cliina is concerned, the problem here has
been, in part, that we have had no indication or
sign from mainland China that they are interested
in food from U.S. sources. It has been indicated
earlier that we are reluctant to make an oiler just
for propaganda purposes. If that question arises
we will, of course, give it very serious considera-
tion. But this is not a matter which occurred to us
for the first time when the refugee flow into Hong
Kong stepped up the other day. We have been
looking at this for some time, I think, as com-
ments in various press conferences have indi-
cated. But this is basically not a problem which
can be solved by external sources of supply when
you are dealing with 650 million people who have
a caloric intake of anything like 1,300 or 1,500
calories per day.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is it correct to understand
from your reply to the second part of Mr.
[Chalmers'] Roherts'' question that the issue of
possibly putting British and French nuclear
poicer into a NATO pot is under active consideror
tionnow?

A. No, I would say that the question of a NATO
nuclear deterrent is under NATO consideration.
It will be for each of the governments there to
consider wliat their relationship to that would be,
or what they tliink of it.

I would not myself say that that particular pai't
of it has been proposed by any goverimient at
this point. This is a matter of study in the NATO
Council.

'For background, see ibid., May 28, 1962, p. 859.
974

" For a statement by Assistant Secretary for Far East-
ern Affairs W. Averell Ilarriman, see x'- f9r!.

Department of Stale Bulletin

Q. Sir, last week there was a sudden reversal
of the Russian position in Geneva with respect to
propaganda. This matter seemed at one point to
he all signed «/), and in fact the satellites seemed
to he quite surprised, as were others, at this sudden
reversal.

Would you put this, sir, into context for us and
give us some speculations as to why this happened,
when they seemed to ie so flatly on the other side?
Mr. Dean [Arthur H. Dean, U.S. Representative
to the Conference of the Eighteen-N ation Com-
mittee on Disarmament^ seemed quite surprised.

A. I wouldn't want to pretend that I was less
surprised than Mr. Dean, because he had been
conductinij those negotiations. I frankly don't
know wliy this sudden reversal on that particular
declaration. It may be that discussions within the
Communist bloc led them to believe that they
should not imderwrite the idea that one should not
speak of the inevitability of war.

It may be that there was a reluctance to seem
to agree on this particular point which is some-
what peripheral to the main lines of disarmament
when there was so little intention on their side,
apparently, to agree on significant and substantial
points in the disarmament field.

I just frankly don't know, and I think it would
be foolish of me just to speculate.

West New Guinea

Q. Mr. Secretary, in the West New Guinea
situution, do you think now the Dutch and the
Indonesians have reached a point where they will
sit down and reswme discussion of the Bunker
proposal or is it still, so far as an agreement, out?

A. So far as I know, no date has been set for
the resumption of the talks, but I must say I see
no reason why such talks should not resume in
the near future.

As you Iniow, Ambassador [Ellsworth] Bunker
took on this assignment under [U.N. Acting Secre-
tary-General] U Thant's request. He has been in
touch with the two sides. He has made a careful
analysis of the positions of the two sides, and he
has made proposals which he felt were reasonable
in light of the position of the two sides.

We ourselves believe that these are a reasonable
basis for discussion and that they can open the
way to a negotiation which could find out whether

these two Governments could not come together
and agree on a solution there. But I gather that
it isn't quite buttoned up yet as between the two
Governments as to a resumption of the talks and
to fixing a date, but I would think it would be
important that that be done promptly and that
military action or armed action be withheld, sus-
pended, in order to give these talks a chance to
work out the jiossibilities of success.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there have been some recent
reports from Europe, particularly Paris, alleging
that the United States has made some sort of tacit
agreement with the Soviets not to share nuclear
knowledge with their respective allies. Can you
comment on this?

A. The only thing that has been said to the
Soviets is what has been said to the rest of the
world since 1945, and that is that we don't want
to see the proliferation of nuclear weapons in na-
tional hands. We would like to see this brought
to an end, the arms race turned down, and these
weapons brought imder control. But that is a
long-known, long-stated policy of the United
States.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there have been reports from
India that the United States urged the Indian
Government not to go ahead with the purchase of
MIG aircraft. There have also been reactions
from, Krishna Menon that they are an independent
nation and they will buy where they see ft, and
still further reports that the MIG aircraft from
the Soviet Union might possibly be used against
the Chinese. Would you give us your thinJcing
about this situation? What does it portend?

A. Well, we are aware of the interest of the In-
dian Government in supersonic aircraft. They
feel that they need more modern aircraft for their
own defense needs. We, of course, are interested
in what that would mean in terms of the general
situation in the area and relations among the coun-
tries of that area. But I must say that I don't
think it would be wise for me to enter into that at
this point. We are, of course, following it with
close attention.

Talks With Soviet Ambassador

Q. Mr. Secretary, we have neglected so far to
ask you anything about your conversations imth
Ambassador [ATiatoliy F.J Dobrynin. I am sure

June 18, 1962

975

tJiat there must he many things that you are very
arvxious to tell us about that. {Laughter.)

A. I think that simply reflects th.at you were
adequately briefed yesterday.

Q. Could you tell us., sir, whether you see these
conversations likely to continue for some consider-
able time into the future, and also, sir. whether
you see in the Soviet position at Geneva, or else-
where, any tightening, any braking activity, on the
side of the Soviets so far as talks with the United
States are concerned?

A. Well, I think that I would say first that the
Berlin problem does not turn around any differ-
ences on minor points of detail, on one possible
proposal or another which might be under discus-
sion among the allies. The heart of the Berlin
problem is the difference between the Western
Powers and the Soviet Union on the key central
issues of the vital interests of the West in Berlin,
on which the West is united.

We have not, quite frankly, made any signifi-
cant progress on those central issues, and, there-
fore, the other issues have had no opportunity to
fall into place. I would expect there would be
some additional talks on the matter with the Soviet
Government, but I cannot report that the talks
yesterday advanced the matter in any significant
way.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in connection with this ques-
tion, because of the leak in Germany, we know
something about our proposals on how to solve the
Berlin problem, but unfortunately there was no
such leak on the German counterproposal. Would
you be in the mood to '■^leak^'' a bit?

A. No, I think those ought to be put into posi-
tion or into perspective as discussions within the

West on possible proposals. These were not pro-
posals put to the Soviet Union. I think that there
is some misunderstanding on that. These were
discussions, of which we have had a great many
over the last several months, of possible ways in
which to discuss this matter with the Soviets or
others with whom we might be talking about Ber-
lin. But it is rather a hypothetical exercise be-
cause at the moment we have no reason to think
that the Soviets would agree either to the par-
ticular United States formulation or to the West
German formulation ; so we see no particular point
in having difficulties with our friends over some-
thing that won't advance the cause.

Q. Thank you, sir.

President Chiari of Panama
Visits United States

White House press release dated May 29

The "V^^lite House announced on May 29 that
Eoberto F. Chiari, President of the Eepublic of
Panama, has accepted an invitation of the Presi-
dent to make an official visit to the United States.
He will be in the United States for 4 days begin-
ning June 11. Shortly after his arrival in this
country at Miami, Fla., he will depart for Wil-
liamsburg, Va. President Chiari will arrive in
Washington June 12. Following 2 days in Wash-
ington, he will go to New York City, where he will
be officially received by the city and will visit the
United Nations Headquarters before returning to
Panama. The U.S. Ambassador to Panama,
Joseph S. Farland, extended the invitation to
President Chiari on behalf of the President on
May 1.

976

Department of Sfafe Bulletin

Soviet Foreign Policy — Its Implications for the West

hy Thomas L. Hughes

Deputy Director of Intelligence and Research ^

It would be difficult to find a more pleasant
place to spend the first weekend in May than here
in Minnesota, difficult to find more fitting auspices
for such a conference tlian here at Gustavus Adol-
phus College during your centennial year, and
difficult to find a more provocative topic than the
one you have assigned to me, "Soviet Foreign
Policy — Its Implications for the West."

Flying over southern Minnesota late yesterday
afternoon, I was filled with memories of boyhood,
family, and friends ; of youth, school, and college.
The first 22 years of my life were lived in this
corner of America, and I was happier here than I
have words to say. I am therefore doubly grate-
ful to you for inviting me, because you have
brought me home once more.

It occurred to me, too, that in 1862, when this
college was founded, my own great-grandparents
had made their way to the pioneer farmlands of
this rich Minnesota River Valley. But already,
across the Atlantic, city-oriented Karl Marx had
written off farmers everywhere for purposes of
the Communist world revolution. They were
"lost," he said, "in the idiocy of rural life." The
thought crossed my mind that the whole world
would have been better off, and later generations
of Communists less misled, if he had joined the
German migration to New Ulm (Minnesota)
rather than sought refuge in a musty British Mu-
seum. That way, too, instead of spending so
many years writing about Capital, Marx might
even, as Mrs. Marx reputedly wished, have brought
some capital home.

' Address opening a conference on "The Sino-Sovlet
Bloc" at the Bernadotte Institute on World Affairs,
Gnstams Adolphus College, St. Peter, Minn., on May 4.

Whatever it is, the "idiocy of rural life" has
played rustic havoc with Communist agricultural
policies ever since. I'll wager that Lenin or Stalin
in their day, and Khrushchev or Mao in ours,
would privately gladly barter a good deal of
dogma in exchange for some of the soil, skill, and
spirit that has produced the agricultural abun-
dance of southern Minnesota. But Communist
rulers in practice are still trying to have the best
of both worlds. They are trying to match our
agricultural abundance, based on the released en-
ergies of a free farm community, with the metliods
of organizational coercion. Their failures are
monumental. Right now, for instance, the Chi-
nese Communists undoubtedly consider their own
chronic inability to solve their food problems as
far more of a threat to the staying power of their
regime than any prospective return to the main-
land by Chiang Kai-shek from across the Formosa
Straits.

Now all of this is closely related to the topic
of Soviet foreign policy. Indeed, the erosion of
communism as an ideology — not to be confused
with the continuing threat of Soviet and Chinese
power — is just one of several factors in the recent
past which is causing a significant, if gradual,
shift in the ingredients of ideology and practi-
cality which make up Soviet policy. I suggest
that we first turn our attention :

1. to that erosion in ideology ; then

2. to the broader context of the great 20th-
century divisions which tend now to separate the
world — divisions which condition both U.S. and
Soviet foreign policy ; then

3. to some of the unchanging elements in the
Soviet challenge ; then

June J 8, 7962

977

4. to some of the changing aspects of that chal-
lenge ; and finally,

5. to some of the implications for tlie United
States and the West.

The Decline of Communism as an Ideology

For years it has gone without saying that Soviet
foreign policy has been inspired, guided, and dom-
inated by Marxist-Leninist doctrine. But it is
not a bad idea, every now and then, to look at
sayings like this to see if they are still going.

One problem, of course, is to determine what
the Marxist-Leninist doctrine is. Books have
been written on "What Marx Really Meant" and
other books on "What Marx Really Meant Actu-
ally." Today Leninism, Stalinism, Maoism,
"peaceful coexistence," "unremitting struggle,"
"socialism in one coimtry," "world revolution,"
"complete and total disarmament," "the death
knell of capitalism," and all the other way sta-
tions of ambulatory Marxism are under new
stresses and strains — and more from their expo-
nents than their opponents. The traditional
Marxist ideology, as distinguished from Soviet
and Chinese power and example, has almost ceased
to excite interest outside the Sino-Soviet bloc.
More and more its chief role has been to provide
the polemicists inside the increasingly unbloc-like
bloc with the ideological hammers and tongs with
which to flay one another. Some of these gentle-
men themselves must be beginning to feel that
they have liad a dialectical nmaround.

If you listen to what the Soviet leaders continue
to say about the so-called capitalist world, you
are struck by their status quo ideology. For in-
stance, the recently adopted new Soviet party pro-
gram— which Khrushchev proudly called "the
Commmiist Manifesto of the present epoch" —
sounds as archaic as the original. It repeats all
the analysis of bygone days, again proclaiming
that capitalism is "imperialism in the period of
its decline and destruction" and that the state is
acting "in the interest of the financial oligarchy."

Now the writers of this Manifesto naturally
view events in the non-Commimist world through
their own glasses, darkly. But at some point
when they try to sort out their own thoughts about
such recent developments as the European Com-
mon Market, or President Kennedy's handling of
the tlireatened steel-price increase, their confidence
in their own dogma must be shaken to the point of

embarrassment. The truth is that the world is
refusing to act the way Communist ideology says
it should.

It is important, of course, to remember that on
those occasions when the Communists consciously
depart from their doctrine we are not necessarily
the first to be told. Lipservice to outworn creeds
can continue for centuries after the fervor of belief
has passed away.

In any event, the Soviet Union has in fact been
confronting certain realities lately, and some of
these realities must have had a bruising, if un-
acknowledged, effect on both the ideology and
foreign policy. Earlier this week when Cosmo-
naut Titov looked down on New York City from
the top of the Empire State Building, he did not
see the Victorian Manchester of Dickens and Marx
but the pulsating symbols of 20th-century -Vmeri-
can affluence. Titov himself reportedly sunmaed
up his reactions in two words: "Not bad!"

It is now more than a generation since Lincoln
Steffens made his famous trip to the Soi-iet Union
and came back announcing : "I have seen the future
and it works." Well, the future may look differ-
ent, perhaps even to Titov, from the top of the
Empire State Building. Undoubtedly it looks
different to Titov, and Gagarin, and Glenn, from
outer space. We are all readjusting, in one way
or another, as the space age moves on. Marxist-
Leninist texts will be of even less use on the moon,
no matter who gets tliere first.

Three Great Worid Divisions

IMeanwhile, back here on earth, there are at
least three dangerous and critical divisions con-
fronting the world commimity as we consider the
prospects for the rest of this century. Soviet, as
well as United States, foreign policy must increas-
ingly come to grips not only with one or another
of these divisions but with aU three.

First, there is the familiar East-West division
between the Communist and non-Communist
worlds, the division between Washington and
Moscow and those capitals associated with each.

Second, there is the overall North-South racial
division between the colored and the less colored
people— a division which neither white Ameri-
cans nor white Russians are admirably equipped
to heal.

Third, there is the overall North-South economic

978

Deparfmenf of Sfofe Bu/fef/n

division between the newly developing nations and
the already industrialized nations.

I myself first felt the personal impact of these
three great divisions when I went to the Middle
East in 1950, that ancient area of trouble and ten-
sion where Count Bernadotte had sacrificed his
life just 2 years before. Amid the scar tissue of
tho Arab-Israeli war, all the other elements of the
three great divisions of the 20th century were there
for all who had eyes to see.

Thousands of miles away, the Korean war had
propelled cold-war politics and Soviet-American
rivali-y into the Middle East with a vengeance.
On both sides of the Arab-Israeli barbed wire
there was a pulling and hauling linked to the
East-West contest.

There in the Middle East I also first experienced
the smoldering racial anger of the colored two-
thirds of mankind, anger which I have since seen
in many other parts of the world — in the widely
held belief of Asians that we dropped the atomic
bomb on Japan and not on Germany because the
Japanese were colored — in the bitter African re-
action to such widely reported incidents as the
refusal of a Maryland restaurant to give an Afri-
can ambassador's son a glass of water because of
his skin.

There too in the INIiddle East I first fully felt
the impulses generated by the passionate drive
for economic development, an impulse shared all
over the poverty-stricken two-thirds of the world
which so often happens to overlap the nonwhite
two-thirds as well.

It is these two other great world divisions, the
racial one and the economic one — the North-South
divisions — which are increasingly setting a con-
text in which the East- West contest must operate.
After all, there are 2 billion people in this woi-ld
who are neither Eussian nor American, and a
large percentage of them profoundly distrust both
Russian and American policy. What do they
think, these people on the awakening continents ?
It might matter.

Many of them, of course, are too sick to think.
Malaria, cholera, and intestinal parasites keep
them from thinking.

Many are too hungry to think, except about
food.

Many die when they are babies; so they never
have to think at all.

The overwhelming bulk of them are black,
brown, and yellow, and the motto of many of
them, based on centuries of experience, is "Never
trust a white man."

It is little wonder that their emerging new
leaders, even the most moderate, are preoccupied
with their own struggles for greater human dig-
nity, greater economic growth, and greater politi-
cal freedom. We should not be surprised if they
do not fully share our view that the cold war is
essentially a conflict to save the remainino- free
world from Communist encroachment. Indeed,
it is no surprise that they are basically disinter-
ested in the great East-West division. They look
at both Moscow and Washington with a certain
suspicion. Julius Nyerere of Tanganyika put it
this way: "Our desire is to be friendly to every
comitry in the world, but we have no desire to have
a friendly country choosing our enemies for us."

These three great world divisions, one East-
West and two North-South, combine to constitute
the overall challenge to United States foreign
policy for the rest of this century. They confront
Moscow too. It is against their background that
we must assess the changing and unchanging as-
pects of the Soviet challenge itself.

The Unchanging Soviet Challenge

"Wlienever we try to come to grips, as we must,
with the changing Soviet challenge, it is more im-
portant than ever to remind ourselves at the out-
set of the unchanging things about it too. In a
sense it is always true that the more things change,
the more they remain the same.

Decaying as it is, Communist doctrine, whether
propounded in Moscow or Peiping, remains an
activist doctrine. Anyone who has read Mr.
Khrushchev's frank speech of January 6, 1961, or
the subsequent statements made at the 22d Com-
munist Party Congress in Moscow, will glean an
overriding impression of fixed and unaltered in-
tention to pursue the goal of Communist aggran-
dizement and revolution — to pursue this goal
wherever opportunity offers itself and wherever
an opportunity can be created. The tactics and
teclmiques of foreign policy have been altered by
experience and changing Soviet capabilities, but
basically the effort continues to use all the instru-
ments of power and persuasion in pursuit of
Communist goals.

June 18, 1962

979

The Military Threat

It is true that recently there has been evidence
that the Soviet leaders have given up the notion
that the only way in which communism will come
to the world will be by an inevitable and cataclys-
mic war. At the same time the Chinese Com-
munists view the risks of war with greater
equanimity, and this appears to be one of the
differences between Moscow and Peiping which
underlies the current tension between them. But
even if we grant that the Soviet rulers may have
come to consider the deliberate employment of all-
out war as too risky a course, their own conduct in
practice does not give us any reliable assurance
that this is in fact so.

For example, the Kremlin time and again has
had recourse to the most blatant form of rocket-
rattling botli against weak neighbors and against
the United States. Support of the Castro regime
is a case in point, as is the deliberate challenge to
vital Western interests and rights in Berlin.

Perhaps more importantly, the Soviet leaders
remain convinced that they must continue to
shroud their military activities in complete se-
crecy, even though the prospects on all sides point
to a shrinking and more open world. It is pos-
sible that their main motivation in doing this is
their unjustified fear of an attack. But from the
standpoint of the United States and free-world
society, Soviet secrecy means that, whatever we
may believe about Soviet intentions, we can never
be sure that the curtain of secrecy is not designed
to mask the preparation of an attack upon us or
some other free country.

Moreover we see no evidence that the Kremlin
is holding its own military programs in abey-
ance; the series of Soviet multimegaton nuclear
tests last fall is graphic evidence to the contrary.
Nor can we see any signs that the Soviet Union is
refraining from using military means or threat-
ening such use to pursue its objectives in many of
the crisis areas around the world. Berlin again
is merely the most dramatic case in point.

We are thus faced with a situation where our
genuine concern over the continuing arms race
must be placed in the context of a continuing
Soviet challenge to our society by a system with
undiminished aspirations to world supremacy,
with massive military power to back up these

aspirations, and with a veil of secrecy masking its
intentions.

War iy Proxy

One of the unchanging aspects of Soviet foreign
policy, the use of military power for political re-
sults, is underscored by the continuing indirect
use of force — the use of Soviet military aid to
foster international or civil wars while minimiz-
ing the risks of direct Soviet involvement. The
Communist military threat ranges from Soviet
ICBM's armed with multimegaton warheads
down to the Viet Cong snipers in the villages of
Viet-Nam.

In addition, under cover of the umbrella of
Soviet power, Soviet strategists can use relatively
modest amounts of military aid to pose serious
political problems in the non-Communist world,
particularly in former colonial areas where strong
anti-Western sentiment is already present. Ex-
amples are the Soviet bloc aid to the U.A.R. in the
1956 Middle East crisis and Soviet offers to aid
Indonesia in its military preparations to wrest
West New Guinea from the Dutch.

Soviet Economic Growth, Trade, and Aid

Another central aspect of the unchanging So-
viet foreign policy challenge is the economic one,
based on the U.S.S.E's past growth rate of 6-7
percent per year and its anticipated continued
high rate of economic growth. This economic
power of the Soviet Union presents a challenge
to the United States and all the West on a wide
variety of fronts.

First, it means increased military potential, for
the greatest share of Soviet economic resources is
devoted to heavy industiy and military support
industries. The U.S.S.R., with a total produc-
tion less than half that of the United States, al-
ready has military expenditures approximately
equal to our own. Furthermore the Soviets de-
vote a large allocation of their resources to re-
search and development, enabling them to deepen
their tcchnologj' at the same time that thej- expand
their production.

Second is the considerable demonstration effect.
The economic successes of the U.S.S.R. are ex-
pected to persuade people outside the Iron Cur-
tain that Communist economic organization offers
the most relevant solutions to their own problems

980

Depattmenf of Sfafe Bulletin

of poverty and aspirations for rapid development.

Third, tlie combination of economic growth and
political control enables the Soviets to participate
more actively in international markets. AVlien-
ever desired, they can pursue trade at political
prices. U.S.S.E. sales of petroleum in recent
years are pei'haps the most striking example of a
vigorous Soviet trade drive which serves both
economic and political purposes. The Soviet
Union is now the major supplier in Italy, as well
as in several developing countries like Egypt.
Such Soviet sales of oil have already cut into
Western markets, reducing opportunities for prof-
itable transactions of Western firms. They prom-
ise to do so further if the Soviets achieve their aim
of increasing their sales as their production rises.

Soviet interest in trade with industrialized
Western countries also serves simultaneous eco-
nomic and political aims. One is the acquisition
of technologically advanced capital and equipment
needed to fill technological gaps in Soviet and bloc
industry, petrochemical and electronics equipment
being of high priority. A second aim is to en-
courage divisions in the Western alliance. A bla-
tant recent example was Khrushchev's letter to
Chancellor Adenauer holding out glittering pros-
pects for expanded trade with the bloc if West
Germany would only recognize the economic cost
of its ties with the West.

A fourth and growing factor is the role of eco-
nomic aid in Soviet foreign policy. Economic
approaches to less developed coimtries are intended
to complement political and propaganda tactics,
to supplant Western influence, and to condition
attitudes in these coimtries more favorably toward
the political and ideological aspirations of the
Communist world.

Offers of economic credits and technical assist-
ance provide the chief means of accomplishing this
pui-pose. Since 1954 about $4.5 billion in credits
and grants have been extended to 26 developing
countries. The Aswan Dam in Egypt and the
Bhilai steel mill in India are the best known bloc
projects. In addition, roads in Indonesia and
Afghanistan, port facilities in Ghana and Yemen,
and railroad installations in Iraq and Guinea are
important Soviet projects.

The economic assets of Soviet foreign policy in
growth, trade, and aid add up to a formidable
challenge in themselves. They also help promote

another major and unchanging Soviet ambition —
the diplomatic isolation and splitting of the West.

The Diplomacy of Isolating the West

The Soviet tactic, at the United Nations and
elsewhere, of fostering neutralist friendliness to-
ward the bloc and of distrust toward the West,
finds its favorite opportunity in issues of "colo-
nialism," where the Soviets claim to desire freedom
for the oppressed. This is not always so easy a
game for the Soviets to play, for the world is not
as simple as Soviet propagandists picture it. Ex-
amples of Soviet predicaments in a colonial con-
text are its early moves in the Congo and the
difficulty in Kuwait, where the Soviets had to
maneuver between conflicting Arab interests.

But Moscow persists, too, in exploiting oppor-
tunities to exert divisive pressure on Western al-
liances, combining both threats and blandishments.
Fulminations against coimtries where bases are
located is a standard propaganda theme, put most
strongly by Khrushchev himself in his threats to
wipe out the orange groves of Italy and the
Acropolis in Athens. Soviet overtures to West
Germany, though heavyhanded vis-a-vis the West
Germans, are also calculated to sow suspicions
among the other allies of the Federal Republic.

Foreign Communist Parties and Communist
Fronts

Among the instruments of Soviet foreign
policy, the national Communist parties and the
national and international Communist-front
organizations remain among the chief choice
organizational assets for political and propaganda
purposes.

Outside the Soviet bloc, important Communist
parties, such as the Italian, Indian, and Indo-
nesian, under great pressure to compete effectively
with other national parties, have developed a
measure of independence from Moscow which may
increase their political capabilities within their
respective countries. For most of the Communist
parties, however, their smallness in numbers and
unpopularity on the scene reduce them to the role
of holding operations. They exist merely as
propaganda arms for the Soviet Union, lioping
for the millennium.

The so-called front organizations were created
in the 1920's to harness both Communist sympa-

June 78, 1962

642173—62 3

981

t.hizers and non-Communists to support interna-
tional Communist objectives. Directed toward
such specific targets as youth, women, labor, and
peace groups, the front organization combines the
specific demands of the target group with general
Soviet propaganda themes.

These transmission belts between the Soviet
Union and the non-Communist public seek to per-
suade people of the beneficence of the U.S.S.R.,
to associate them with Communist causes gener-
ally, and, where possible, to convert them to
communism. Although Communist-front organ-
izations like the World Federation of Trade
Unions, the World Peace Council, and the World
Federation of Democratic Youth are of consider-
able usefulness as propaganda instruments for
Soviet foreign policy, their importance in the last
10 years has been restricted to the field of propa-
ganda and not much more. The international
front organizations do not number within their
ranks, for example, either the quantity or quality
of the intellectuals who fellow-traveled in tlie
interwar period. Moreover, Soviet postwar ex-
pansionism, coupled with counter-Communist
activities, has changed the character of the front
organizations to a point where membership is
largely made up of Communists and crypto-Com-
munists. The potentialities of the front organiza-
tions, therefore, seem to lie mostly in the polit-
ically unsophisticated areas of the world and
more broadly in areas where political hopes for
peace and disarmament are frustrated.

Cultural Exchanges

Last among the instruments of Soviet foreign
policy should be mentioned the use made of Soviet
cultural exchanges, grants of educational oppor-
tunities, and the interest in sending and recei\ing
tourists. These factors pose both a challenge and
an opportunity.

From a propaganda aspect these exchanges can
promote views favorable to Soviet policies, pro-
vide statements of visitors for exploitation, and
gain influence through students trained in the
U.S.S.R. One recent statement estimated that
4,000 students from maderdeveloped countries now
study in the U.S.S.R.

But these exchanges also can be counterproduc-
tive. Critical viewers can gain what from the
Soviet viewpoint are undesirable insights into tlie
Soviet system. The opening of Soviet society is
promoted, and an unusual opportunity is pre-

sented for new influences on Soviet citizens. The
effects can range from reassurance about the peace-
ful intentions of the West to a stimulated desire
for freedom inside Russia.

So much for the unchanging elements of Soviet
foreign policy — elements that seem to remain with
persistence and impact, year after year, pursuing
expansionist goals with all of the instrmnents of
power and persuasion available.

The Changing Soviet Challenge

It is not necessaiy to go back and look at Stalin's
Russia of 1952 and its view of the world in order
to perceive how different the Soviet challenge is
under Khrushchev in 1962 — or to speculate what
the challenge will be like in 1972. In fact it is
much more revealing of the changes in Soviet at-
titudes toward foreign affairs to compare the
Soviet position and approach of only 5 years ago
with that of today. The changes in even this
short period of time tell us a great deal about the
complexity of the challenge we face. They also
suggest the value of thoughtful analysis, diplo-
matic skill, and an orchestration of political, eco-
nomic, and psychological moves to help shape the
world — including the Communist world — in direc-
tions favorable to our own interests and those of
freedom generally.

With the launching of the first Soviet sputnik
in 1957, Moscow must have seen its prospects im-
proving rapidly. Soviet prestige was at its zenith.
The scientific and technical accomplishment of
launching the first satellite seemed to justify the
Soviet system in the eyes of many who had earlier
thought of the U.S.S.R. as a nation of illiterate
peasants. Moreover the sputnik, together with
earlier Soviet possession of nuclear weapons, estab-
lished the Soviet Union as a first-rate military
]iower. Soviet superiority in the rocket field, it
seemed, would soon make the Soviet Union the
strongest military power on earth. Economically
the Soviet Union had recovered from wartime
devastation and could now set its sights upon
catching up to the standard of living in the most
advanced capitalist countries. Within the bloc
the Hungarian and Polish revolutions testified to
popular unrest, but the crisis of 1956 appeared to
have been weathered successfully and Soviet domi-
nation within the bloc was apparently unchal-
lenged. Prospects for the expansion of Soviet
influence in the world were never better.

I

982

Department of State Bulletin

In retrospect Khrushchev would probably agree
that it didn't work out that way. His high hopes
of 1957 have not been justified. Something went
wrong with Southeast Asia, with the Congo, witli
tlie U.S.S.K. taking the public as well as the moral
responsibility for breaking the nuclear test mora-
torium, with the flood of East German refugees
which only a Berlin wall could stop.

Wluit has happened to set limits to Soviet hopes ?
Four developments have taken place that have cut
Moscow down to size. The West, and this country
in particular, has shown that it does not wisli to
be buried ; it has improved its military stance and
its economic vigor. Eifts have developed in the
Communist monolitli, chiefly between Red China
and Eed Russia but also within the Soviet ranks.
Underlying the controversy in the TJ.S.S.R., the
ferment in Soviet life has grown, the present re-
source allocation is being questioned, and plamiing
mistakes and indecision at the top level have made
the solution more diiBcult. Moreover there have
been disappointments for Soviet policy in the
developing nations of Africa, Asia, and Latin
America. Let us look at each of these in turn.

U.S.S.R. Has Not Achieved Military Superiority

Soviet military power has grown and is con-
tinuing to grow. But the Soviet Union has not
achieved, and does not appear likely to achieve,
military superioritj' over the West. In part the
Soviets did not do all that they might have done
to develop their military potential. Soviet re-
sources are sharply limited, and Khrushchev in
making his allocations had to content himself with
less in the way of a militarj^ establishment than
Soviet military planners might have thought in
their interest. Of course, a major factor in this
Soviet failure is the sunple fact that Western
military strength has grown at the same time and,
particularly in the case of missile power, grown
more rapidly than the Soviet Union expected.

Hence the Soviet Union must live in a world
where it is not, and cannot in the near future ex-
pect to be. militarily superior to the LTnited States.
The risk of nuclear war weighs heavily upon So-
viet policymaking. Indeed the central issue in
the Sino-Soviet dispute can probably be expressed
as the question of the degree to which one ought to
run the risk of nuclear war in dealings with the
West. Khrushchev has been the conservative on
this score, arguing that he could achieve commu-

nism's ultunate goals without involving the
U.S.S.R. or its allies in a nuclear war.

But the risk of nuclear war is not limited to
the U.S.S.R. Khrushchev has shown himself
equally well aware of the reluctance of the rest of
the world to become engaged in nuclear war and
has been able to use his jiossession of nuclear and
missile weapons to make more or less plausible
threats in a variety of situations. Soviet nuclear
power, if markedly inferior to that of the West,
still suffices to establish Soviet military presence
in a variety of situations far beyond the reach of
Soviet conventional forces.

Rifts in Communist Monolitli

The Communist bloc has begun to show signs
of decay ; Moscow is no longer assured of its he-
gemony. Its leadership has been challenged by
the Chinese Communists and even by the Alba-
nians. These intrabloc troubles should neither be
exaggerated nor underestimated. For the present
there are indications that the dispute, which flared
into the open with the denunciation of the Alba-
nians at the 22d Soviet Party Congress, is becom-
ing less acute. Faced with the embarrassment of
public discussion of their differences and the
danger of a complete ruptui'e of the Sino-Soviet
alliance, Moscow and Feiping have been casting
about to find some means of papering over the con-
troversy in public. A complete break in the alli-
ance is not to be expected in a matter of weeks or
months. But the fmidamental differences — and
they are differences covering nearly every question
of importance in world politics — remain unre-
solved. The tension and the rivalry remain, and
Moscow's troubles with its recalcitrant ally are far
from over.

Meanwhile the difTerences which have become
Icnown have created a crisis in the world Commu-
nist movement, where factions favoring one side
or the other have been created. Both Peiping and
Moscow have their supporters in the front organ-
izations and the foreign parties. Moscow can no
longer rely on the movement to do its bidding.
The resulting fracas inside the movement is likely
to be more organizationally debilitating than
intellectually stimulating.

Ferment in Soviet Union

At home there are changes too. Indeed, the
Soviet LTnion seems to be demonstrating that a
little improvement is a dangerous thing.

June 78, 1962

983

Tliough it still remains a police state, the Soviet
regime has become far less repressive than it was
a decade ago. But the relative liberalization has
brought with it intellectual ferment and a tend-
ency to question basic assumptions. Tliis tend-
ency has been particularly marked in recent
months, when, in the wake of the renewal of de-
stalinization after the 22d Party Congress, the
Soviet leaders have been plagued with the decline
of public faith in the party and its leadership.
For example, the role of the present leaders dur-
ing Stalin's regime has been questioned in both
public and party meetings.

With the improvement in living standards and
the appearance on the market of new and desir-
able evidences of the good life, the Soviet populace
is developing wants which the regime can only
satisfy very slowly. Soviet resources are scarce,
and the regime must decide whether it will put
its money into industi-y, consumer goods, or the
military establishment. Last summer's military
buildup by the West has imposed a military
buildup upon the Soviet Union, and the strain has
been evident. This is not to say that the U.S.S.K.
verges on bankruptcy, but I do suggest that Soviet
leaders have to exercise some degree of circum-
spection in avoiding situations which call for
abrupt increases in military spending.

Disappointments in Developing Nations

It must by now be apparent to the Soviets that
the determination of the anticolonial, developing
peoples to revise if not shed their old relations
with Europe is not necessarily sjmonymous with
a desire to become wards or satellites of the
U.S.S.K. It is true, of course, that the coming
of independence to a multiplicity of nations in
the Southern Hemisphere of the world has greatly
increased Soviet influence and Soviet presence
there. Yet country after country, Guinea being
the most recent and perhaps most dramatic ex-
ample, has sought, after the initial flirtation, to
curb excessive Soviet ambitions and to revert to
something of a middle course between what it
regards as the two major cold- war contenders.

This does not mean that the U.S.S.K. has given
up or will give up its ambitions in the developing,
"nonalined" areas. It does mean that the realiza-
tion of these ambitions will probably be pursued
by more sophisticated, less dogmatic, and more
deliberate means. Moscow will still seek to prove

that it is the real and only friend of these coun-
tries, that only Soviet assistance is genuinely dis-
interested, that the Commimist economic model is
more relevant than the free-enterprise model of
the West. And Moscow will still seek, depending
on circumstances, to build local Communist move-
ments— through the training of cadres, the issu-
ance of guidelines, the formation of front
groups — which at some propitious moment can lay
claim to a role in the governments of these coun-
tries and ultimately take them over. But there
can be little question that compared to the seem-
ingly justified great expectations of the period
of, say, 1955-1957, Soviet prospects have sobered.
The reordering that has been going on in the
developing world, while changing and often di-
minishing Western influence, has not led to the
massive introduction of Soviet influence that
seemed in prospect only 5 or 6 years ago.

This complex picture of the realities confront-
ing Moscow today as it pursues its "immutable"
goal of communizing the world is a far cry from
the simplistic view of the bloc as a monolithic
movement surging irresistably to victory. In
fact, no such movement ever existed. It certainly
does not exist under Khrushchev. Even the rela-
tively rosy prospects he appeared to enjoy a few
years ago were in fact not real. The complex in-
fluences at work were simply more effectively con-
cealed from our view, partly by our willingness
to be intimidated by some of the myths which
Soviet propaganda itself has perpetuated.

I now come to my central point. Our increased
awareness that the Communist world has problems
too does not reduce the size of the Communist
challenge. It may, indeed, increase the magni-
tude of that challenge. While we can draw some
comfort from the fact that Khrushchev and his
Communist colleagues are finding out that they
are not totally free agents in pursuing their
ideologically inspired goals, we must at the same
time remember that the Soviet threat to the West
is not therefore less real.

Khrushchev, at least, has demonstrated an
ability to adjust to changing conditions — to take
a page from our book, as it were — and to become
more flexible and pragmatic himself. His blend
of ideology and pragmatism may not be as revi-
sionist as the Chinese Communists think, but it
is a long way from doctrinaire inflexibility. De-
spite any disappointment he may feel in the pace

984

Department of S/ofe Bullefin

of Communist (and particularly Soviet) advances
during tlie past few yeai-s, ho is clearly delermined
to press on toward Communist victory at home
and abroad. To the extent that doctrinaire vi-
sions are subordinated to a more pragmatic ap-
proach in his conduct of Soviet foreign policy,
Khrushchev may in fact represent an increasingly
dangerous and broad-gaged threat to the West— a
threat which is more rather than less difficult to
combat.

It is at precisely this point that we come to the
strangest irony of all : the possibility that Khru-
shchev, the world's professional dogmatist, should
increasingly become in fact a practicing prag-
matist, while some of us Americans, the world's
leading pragmatists, should entangle ourselves
emotionally in unproductive dogmas of full-time,
amateur anticommunism.

implications for the West

There are many implications for the "West in
what we have just been discussing. I should like
to suggest some of them indirectly, by putting my
comments in the framework of this other subject
which I have just mentioned. It is a subject of
growing public interest, the problem of amateur
anticommunism.

Let me set the stage for what I am about to say.

Cold-War Battle Fatigue

"We are entering a period of history when the
burdens of the formulation and conduct of "Onited
States foreign policy are descending on all of us —
not just the comparative handful of Americans in
the State Department, or in the Foreign Service,
or in the Government, but all of us. In countless
ways we Americans, and other people all over the
woi-ld, are increasingly engaged in foreign policy.
We are thinking, arguing, proposing, campaign-
ing, traveling, talking, and making and receiving
impressions. Foreign visitors are increasingly in
our midst, taking our pulse as a nation or a com-
munity or a college. Each of us is increasingly
representing the "United States to foreign eyes as
much as any diplomat we send abroad.

Just at this time, when all our individual
thoughts and actions are taking on new inter-
national significance, there has grown up in cer-
tain quarters an attitude which can best be de-
scribed as "cold-war battle fatigue." In a sense
this attitude is entirely imderstandable. There

seems to be no end to the Soviet challenge, to cold-
war tensions, to new and renewed crises, to the
demands and needs of others. Some of us are
tired of all this, and we long for shortcut answers.
In its most extreme forms this cold-war battle
fatigue results in proposals to withdraw from the
United Nations, abandon our allies, raise our
tariffs, eliminate the income tax, slash the budget,
and go to war at the drop of a hat with anyone
who disagrees.

In a way it would be un-American not to be
frustrated by the prospect of a generation of un-
certainty and indecision. In the past we Ameri-
cans have been accustomed to think that every-
thing will come out all right in the end ; that the
Pilgrims had a rough first winter but managed
to survive; that "Valley Forge inevitably was fol-
lowed by Yorktown ; that Daniel Boone and the
Pony Express always got through the forest ; that
we never came to a river we couldn't bridge, a
depression we couldn't pull out of, a war we
couldn't win.

Today the implications for these assumptions in
foreign affairs are no longer self-apparent. On
balance, a good case can be made that the alterna-
tive to coexistence is no existence. The problems
staring us all in the face for the rest of this cen-
tury are not as simple as the Great Simplifiers
among us apparently think.

Amateur Anticommunism

Now these same people are usually the most
active amateur anti-Communists among us too —
not the most effective but the most active. By an
amateur anti-Commmiist I mean those among us
who are the most virtuous in their militancy, the
most vociferous at Birch Society rallies, the most
self-confident and strident in their predictions of
what the Communists will do next, the most
trigger-happy when it comes to brandishing
thermonuclear weapons.

I suggest that these amateur anti-Commimists
may have little or no relevance to the dimensions
of the Soviet challenge that actually exists. I
suggest that they can have an inhibiting and dis-
abling impact on the creation and implementation
of effective anti-Communist policy in the West.
They can lead policies into blind alleys; they can
cause diplomatic weapons to misfire.

The Great Simplifiers — the amateur anti-Com-
munists—in fact leave all the really challenging
questions imanswered.

June 18, 1962

985

How do we evaluate the changes now going on
in the Soviet Union ? The amateur anti-Commu-
nists can't help us.

Will Khrushchev's successoi'S be better or worse ?
The amateur anti-Communists aren't interested.

"iVlaat is the spectrum of pressures, incentives,
rejections, inducements, and initiatives which we
can bring to bear on Soviet foreign policy ?

What are the fundamental and what are the
peripheral areas in our own policy vis-a-vis the
Soviet Union ?

How do we change the Kremlin's calculations
about our future ?

How do we create those conditions in the free
world which will convince Soviet leaders that their
use of pressure will not help them ?

How many rigidities are necessary to keep a
policy "firm" ? How rigid does the Soviet Union
want our policies to be ?

To none of these questions do the amateur anti-
Communists have any constructive comments or
suggestions.

They cannot contemplate the gradual possibility
of a fractionalized Communist world without
going to pieces themselves.

They are uncomfortable over any notions of
complexity or movement inside the Sino-Soviet
bloc.

They turn aside when confronted with the ac-
tual problems of the Sino-Soviet rift, of formal
unity and actual collision, of surface agreement
and subsurface fratricide.

Their arguments all point to direct and cataclys-
mic military action; they undercut the role of
policies designed to prevent catastrophe.

They say they would rather be dead than Red.
Most of us would prefer to be neither.

Wlien informed of intricacies — that in Iraq, for
example, it is possible that there is a Soviet Com-
munist Party, a Chinese Commimist Party, and
a local Communist Party — the amateur anti-Com-
munists are simply helpless.

They don't Iniow what to do with countries that
are supposed to be going Communist and wmd
up being independent — like Iraq, Egypt, Guinea,
and the Congo.

When it comes to the tactical use of American
power — a sophisticated application of pressures,
toughness here, relative accommodation here, ne-
gotiations thei-e, initiatives somewhere else — once

more the amateur anti-Commimists have few if
any recommendations.

Wlien we consider the advantages of a differen-
tiated foreign policy — the manipulation of mili-
tary, economic, and diplomatic power oui-selves to
modify actions of the Soviets, to influence their
internal allocation of resources, to exert leverage —
again there is no helpful advice from the amateur
anti-Communists.

By taking comfort in selections from Lenin, the
amateurs concentrate full time on the ultimate
Commimist objective of world domination. In so
doing they cut themselves off from tlie much moi'e
important objective of engrossing the Soviets in
tactical questions which may help over time to
divert them from their long-range strategj'.

When we discuss the need for a policy differen-
tiated toward the entire Sino-Soviet bloc, and not
just the U.S.S.E., the amateur anti-Commmiists
become positively unhappy. They wish no one
to disturb their confidence that the 1 billion people
who live under Communist governments are iden-
tical, monolithic, mass-minded men. It is imset-
tling when Tito departs from the Moscow line.
It is perplexing when Albania sasses back. It is
bewildering when only 10 percent of Polish farm-
ers are collectivized after all these years. It is
upsetting when Stalin is dug up and reburied.
For the amateur anti-Communist all this is ex-
plainable only in terms of gigantic and diabolical
trickery by the Kremlin masters; they have no
policy suggestions, except to marvel at it all.

When they look at Laos they are the first to cry
appeasement. Wlien they look at South Viet-
Nam, where, tragically, some Americans have been
and may yet be killed, they talk as if they are
determined that we shall fight no more wars except
enormous ones.

In fact, they do everything they can to assure
that every public question is badly posed.

They wait to see what the Communists will do;
if the Communists are for it, they are against it.

They consistently think of the rf^.S.S.R. as em-
bai'ked on the highest kind of adventurism, with
no appreciation of the obvious Soviet effort to
choose low risks over high ones.

They seem unaware of the significant narrowing
of choices which has confi'onted American policy
in recent years, vmaware that one of our greatest
objectives must be to broaden our range of policy
choice, achieve a greater freedom for action, burst

986

Department of State Bulletin

1 1 1 rough the constricting bonds which some of our
inherited policies have given us.

They fail to realize that nothing m history is
really inevitable until after it happens.

In short, the amateur anti-Communists are con-
spicuously unlielpful in meeting the real Commu-
nist challenge or in changing it. As the Judge
Advocate General of the Navy said the other day,
they are about as useful as amateur brain surgeons.

Now there are obviously many things which we
will want to do which may not please or satisfy
I he Soviet Union.

We will want to point out to them that it is
easier to coexist if j'ou like each other.

We will want to make it abundantly clear to
them that coexistence can take many forms and
t hat we do not take kindly to the kind the Kremlin
has in mind.

We will want to make it perfectly apparent that
we intend to be neither Ked nor dead, but that if
the very worst comes to the very worst and the
nuclear race gets out of hand, it might be possible
for them to be both Red and dead.

With imagination, persistence, and skill we will
want to make it abundantly clear that America,
indeed all of the West, is on the move again, that
not all the initiati^'es will be Communist but that
we will be pursuing an increasing variety of ini-
tiatives of our own, and that they can expect to
have to react to us — to our new defense policy,
which gives us the means to respond to limited
aggressions as well as general war; to our new
disarmament policy, which proffers a detailed
treaty Me are prepared to sign; to our deep and
enduring commitment to the freedom of West
Berlin and Southeast Asia ; to the prospect of an
ever stronger and freer system of world trade ; to
the rapid economic development of the southern
continents; to an active and energetic American
diplomacy.

". . . our basic goal remains the same:" said
President Kennedy in his state of the Union mes-
sage earlier this year,- "a peaceful world comnui-
nity of free and independent states, free to choose
their own future and their own system so long as
it does not threaten the freedom of others. Some
maj' choose forms and ways that we would not

' For text, see Bulletin of Jan. 29, 1962, p. 159.

choose for ourselves, but it is not for us that they
are choosing. We can welcome diversity — the
Communists cannot. For we offer a world of
choice — they offer the world of coercion."

We are confident that, as we move in these direc-
tions, our open society with all its democracy and
discussion will still be more in tune with the 20th
century than their closed society with all its ad-
vanced space boosters and obsolete political
creeds.

There is finally, however, when all is said and
done, at least one good thing about the Soviet
challenge and its implications for the West : We
simply cannot ignore this apocalyjjtic appeal,
this false vision of a classless society, this hollow
cry of brotherhood, this empty claim of a system
based on justice. We shall have no relief from
this challenge, and we deserve none.

We in the West will expose the hypocrisy of the
Communists most convincingly when we genu-
inely end our own — when all of us Americans,
and not only our Government, help actively to
lead the world of freedom into the paths of re-
sponsible change — when each of us accepts, as
Count Folke Bernadotte so conspicuously did, full
membership in the human race — the poor old
hiunan race, so largely poor, so largely sick, so
largely himgry, and so largely colored.

Only then will each of us be personally quali-
fied, as Bernadotte and others like him were before
us, to go out into our generation to stand for the
truths that man's future on earth need not be
canceled; that his political ingenuity may still
rescue him from ruin ; that his moral and ethical
standards still are here; that some things, like
war and injustice, may seem everlasting, but that
these things are everlastingly wrong.

U.S. Helps Afghanistan
Fight Locust Menace

Press release 342 dated May 29

Following an urgent request by the Royal Gov-
ernment of Afghanistan for assistance in combat-
ing a severe locust menace in western Afghanistan,
the U.S. Government dispatched a U.S. Air Force
spraj'ing plane of the C-123 type to the affected
area. The menace is described by Afghan officials

June 18, 1962

987

as the worst in 21 years. The aircraft is specially
equipped for antilocust spraying operations. In
addition a Cessna-type aircraft also equipped
for spraying is proceeding from Iran to Afghani-
stan. Both aircraft had been participating in U.S.
Government antilocust assistance efforts in Iran.
The C-123 arrived in Kandahar on May 25 and
was met by the Koyal Afghan Minister of Agri-
culture and other Afghan and U.S. officials.

The antilocust operation in western Afghanistan
is being directed by officials of the Government of

Afghanistan in cooperation with American AID
officials. Because of the ability of the C-123 to
spray extended acreage the operations are expected
to be completed in a relatively short time. It is
hoped that immediate and effective action and
Afghan- American cooperation will limit the men-
ace and prevent spreading to neighboring coun-
tries. The prompt U.S. response to the Afghan
request was within the context of continuing
friendly interest of the United States in Afghani-
stan's welfare and development.

The Role of Trade Policy: Continuation of U.S. Leadership

hy C. Griffith, Johnson

Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs ^

I am particularly pleased to be able to speak
before this conference, whose theme is "Pitts-
burgh's Competitive Position in Tomorrow's
World Trade." The theme itself highlights two
specific aspects of today's world which I believe
should be given the most careful attention: The
first is its focus on the position of a single com-
munity or area, reflecting a lively and legitimate
interest in the future prospects of that community
within the Nation's economy as a whole. The
second underscores a growing awareness by this
community of the increasing role which foreign
trade is likely to play in shaping those future
prospects. This focus and this awareness are in-
dicative of what I hope will become a trend
throughout the Nation in the coming months for
communities like Pittsburgh. The focus on the
community is altogether appropriate and essential
in promoting effective planning by the members
of the community for the future.

The awareness of the importance of interna-
tional trade as a principal factor in that planning

' Address made before the 16th annual Pittsburgh
World Trade Conference at Pittsburgh, Pa., on May 23
(press release 330 dated May 22).

988

means that this commimity, and many others like
it, will accept and take advantage of the existence
of foreign markets and competition as a funda-
mental fact of contemporary economic life. It is
a fitting complement to the national role which
our country has been called upon to play on the
world scene. It signals the fact that we as a
nation, down to the individual factory and farm,
have come of age as a responsible world power —
in an economic as well as a political and military
sense. I would like to discuss the implications of
this development as reflected in the theme of this
conference.

It is almost superfluous to state to this gather-
ing that exports play a significant role in the com-
mercial life of a large number of individual
establishments in the Pittsburgh area. Each of
you here representing a particular company which
engages in foreign trade is fully aware of his own
company's export interest, but perhaps it would
be useful to try to translate this individual inter-
est into its meaning for the Pittsburgh area as a
whole. In 1960 exports of manufactured goods
from Allegheny County amounted to approxi-
mately $135 million. Some 86 county firms em-

Department of Slate Bulletin

ploying about 60 percent of the total number of
workei-s engaged in manufacturing here each ex-
ported more than $25,000 worth of goods. Of
these the leaders were in the fields of primary
metal industries, machinery, fabricated metal
products, and transportation equipment. For-
eign exports from these industries alone accounted
for approximately $60 million of the county's
total. Exports from the 86 establishments men-
tioned above represented nearly 5 percent of the
total value of their shipments in 1960.

However, the statistical enumeration of the
value of shipments from Pittsburgh directly enter-
ing into world trade by no means gives a full
picture of this area's interest in a thriving Ameri-
can export trade. For years Pittsburgh has been
kiiown as the steel capital of the world. It would
be diificult indeed for me to find a single industi-ial
export of consequence which did not require steel
as a major element in its fabrication. This is par-
ticularly true in transportation and construction
equipment, two of our country's leading export
categories. Last year, for example, one major
manufacturer of earth-moving equipment ex-
ported nearly 50 percent of its total domestic pro-
duction. The export market for American-made
agricultural equipment is similarly significant.
Finally, American automotive exports including
parts have consistently been strong, to a point
where, in the peak year for imports into this coun-
ti-y of foreign-made cars, in 1957, the automotive
industry was still able to report a substantial net
export surplus. I do not have to remind anyone
here how much Pittsburgh's steel industry — and,
therefore, the greater Pittsburgh community as
a whole — relies on the demand for steel which is
generated by the transportation industry alone.
A healthy export market for these industries is,
therefore, a market in which a large segment of
Pittsburgh's industry shares even though its sliip-
ments are to Detroit instead of Diisseldorf or Dar-
win.

Potential Foreign Markets

These few figures highlight how important
foreign markets are to almost every branch of
industry in this area and how significant a factor
they are in determining the level of prosperity
which this comnnmity enjoys.

Beyond this obvious fact lies an implication of
even greater importance — the potential marlret
beyond our shores for the kind of advanced indus-

trial manufactures for which the greater Pitts-
burgh area is justifiably world famous. Many of
the goods produced here are those which we refer
to as being on the "leading edge" or "growth sec-
tor" of the American economy. These are the
products which are more often of high unit value,
in greatest demand in other industrialized coun-
tries, and in scarce supply in many other areas of
the world. The products I have in mind are ex-
emplified by such categories as railway transpor-
tation equipment, rolling mill machinery, and
metal-cutting machine tools. These products —
and they are only a few of many produced here —
are basic to the industrial development of any
economy and will doubtless be in substantial de-
mand throughout the world for many years to
come.

At the same time I do not have to remind any-
one here that the existence of demand by no means
guarantees a sale. There still remain in many
countries of the world substantial barriers to trade
in these and other products. The administration
and the Congress are gravely concerned about
these barriers, in whatever form they may take,
and the State Department has made and is mak-
ing every effort to reduce them. Recent years
have witnessed very gi-eat success in our efforts,
largely through the activities made possible under
the trade agreements program and helped by the
rapid recovery and growth in Western Europe.
Now, however, we are faced with new circum-
stances, to cope with which existing powers and,
indeed, past policies and concepts are not adequate.
The European Common Market, for example,
will impose a duty of 10 percent on imports of
rolling mills from outside suppliers. The Com-
mon Market may become increasingly competitive
in the years ahead in this type of equipment and
in many other lines which are of significant in-
terest to firms in this area. With the elimination
of customs duties within Europe, and as European
industry increases its efficiency through the de-
velopment of large productive facilities to serve
the rapidly growing internal market, levels of
import duties, which may have been acceptable to
importers of American equipment before, may
eventually become prohibitive. Our share in these
increasingly prosperous markets may very well
be appreciably reduced if we are unable to bargain
their tariff barriers down to an acceptable mini-
mum.

However, it is not only our markets in Europe

June 18, J 962

989

which are threatened by the new growth of Euro-
pean productive capacity. Our markets in all
parts of the world where we have traditionally
enjoyed an advantage because of the economies
derived from large-scale production will be sub-
jected to increasing competitive pressure from in-
dustries of comparable efficiency and scale now
developing in Europe. I have no doubt that some
of you may even now be feeling the pressure of
this competition in, for example, Latin America.
To meet this competition and maintain our
position in the export markets which American
business now enjoys a variety of actions will be
necessary. Some of these must be taken by Gov-
ernment, and I will turn to this aspect in a
moment, but private industry has of course the
principal role to play. Conferences such as this
can be of great assistance in considering actions
and policies oriented toward increasing our share
in expanding world markets and also in advising
on the kind and direction of Government policies
which can provide the best framework within
which the goals can be met.

Effect of Imports on the Economy

I would like to turn now to a consideration of
the other side of the coin — imports, and their
effect on the area's economy.

Pittsburgh industry is heavily oriented toward
the manufacture of metals and metal products.
These industries could not of course exist without
imports of certain types of basic metals which are
either in short supply or do not exist at all in the
United States. Wliile the necessity for such im-
ports is not in dispute, I think it is useful to re-
member that over 60 percent of our nation's total
imports are not competitive with domestic
production.

Wliat, then, is there to be said for the remainder
which are competitive and whose competitive ef-
fects may be particularly strong on Pittsburgh's
production ? For years many people have deemed
it necessary to go on the defensive when discussing
imports \vhich compete with domestic suppliers.
There was even a tendency to regard these im-
ports, and by extension those who were supposedly
responsible for them, as rather un-American.
Such an attitude is not only a distortion of the
facts but is also a disservice to our true national
interest. Imports— and I speak here of com-

petitive imports— are not only necessary but
desirable.

Our imports provide foreign countries with the
financial means with which to buy American ex-
ports. But beyond this, imports fidfill a useful
and desirable service to the American economy.
They help expand the area of choice available to
the consumer. By offering certain goods at lower
prices, they facilitate specialization by American
industry in products which it can produce most
efficiently. They are a useful tool in holding
domestic inflationary forces to a minimum — an
objective which I think all of us can support.
Finally, they are a highly effective stimulus to
our own productive efficiency by providing a
source of competition to domestic industries which
may have tended to become complacent in a pro-
tected environment. I might say parenthetically
that we have seen in certain responses which have
already appeared within Europe a convincing
demonstration of this last and often ignored con-
tribution of imports to economic efficiency.

This is the case for imports in general, "miat
about imports of particular products which com-
pete directly with specific industries here in Pitts-
burgh? First, I might note that we are all by
no means unaware of the fact that certain of your
industries are being subjected to substantial com-
petition. We know very well, for example, that
our imports of steel-mill products now exceed our
exports. Another Pittsburgh industry of signifi-
cant importance, the sheet-glass industry, has re-
cently sought and been awarded relief from ex-
cessive import competition. However, I believe it
is important that we maintain a sense of perspec-
tive on this question. The steel industry as a
whole is not being threatened by import competi-
tion—gross imports as a whole last year repre-
sented less than 5 percent of supply. Certain
limited areas of the industry are feeling these ef-
fects far more than others. The United States,
and Pittsburgh m particular, is still a substantial
net exporter of products made from steel.

Tlie proposed Trade Expansion Act, now before
the Congress,^ was devised with an awareness of
the fact of import competition and a responsibility
to react constructively to it. It accepts the fact
that imports can make a positive contribution to

' For te.\t of President Kennedy's message to Congress,
see Bulletin of Fob. 12, 19G2, p. 231.

990

Department of State Bulletin

our own economic development and seeks to facili-
tate the occasional serious adjustments which may
bo made necessary by increased imports. This
assistance is not designed to be a substitute for the
adjustments which private industry is best quali-
fied to make for itself but only to be available
where it is truly needed. The difference from past
approaches is in the recognition that imports can
and do plaj' a useful role in our national economic
welfare. It is, in effect, an expression of our na-
tional maturity and a response consistent with our
position of free-world leadership.

Before I leave the subject of import competition,
I would like to address a few remarks to a very
popular whipping boy: the "low-wage import."
The argument is thorouglily familiar to all of you,
and I will not repeat it now. I would simply like
to call your attention again to a fact which is some-
times ignored in discussing this subject. In addi-
tion to wages the costs of raw materials, capital
equipment, enei'gy, administrative overhead, trans-
portation, and sales promotion all figure in the
final selling price of any product. Furthermore,
few will disagree that the productivity of the
American worker is in many cases substantially
greater than that of his foreign counterpart. If
these other factors are important in determining
the price of an American product, they are also
important in determining the price of a similar
foreign product. In most countries throughout
the world the sum of all these costs is in fact more
often greater for the foreign product than for the
American. Finally, so-called low-wage imports
rarely, if ever, compete with the production of our
most efficient, high-wage industries. On the whole,
such imports threaten markets which are held by
industries paying wages below the national aver-
age. Conversely, our high-wage industries, of
wliich many in the Pittsburgh area are excellent
examples and in which one should logically expect
the competition of low-wage imports to be keenest,
are in fact our most competitive.

This is proved by the fact that American ex-
ports are not only competitive in third-country
markets but are also often more competitive in
a given low-wage coimtry's own internal market.
I do not by any means intend to minimize the in-
fluence of wages on cost, but it should not be for-
gotten that wages are only one factor in the final
cost and competitive position of individual items.
Furthermore, as foreign nations develop eco-

nomically, we can expect the prevailing wage rates
in those countries to increase. AVo already have
seen this in the case of several European countries
where, over the past 10 years, the rate of increase
in wages has exceeded our own by substantial
amounts. By exercising prudent moderation in
our own wage and price policies, we can make pos-
sible the maintenance of our competitive position
in world and domestic markets.

Goals of Our New Trade Policies

I should like to turn now to some comments on
our proposed trade policies as exemplified in the
Trade Expansion Act. Since the last extension of
the Trade Agreements Act in 1958, several events
have taken place in different parts of the world
which have combined to introduce a new dimension
into the consideration of American trade policy.
Taken together these events have precipitated a
situation which makes a liberal expansionary
policy a matter of primary political importance.
Perhaps more than at any other time in our his-
tory, trade policy has assumed a unique position
in the context of our overall foreign policy con-
siderations. The most striking of these events has
been the successful development of the European
Conmaon Market — a success exceeding the antici-
pations of even the most optimistic of its original
proponents. This success has in turn precipitated
another event exercising significant influence on
our foreign as well as commercial policy considera-
tions. It was surely one of the major factors caus-
ing the United Kingdom to lay aside a policy of
detachment from Continental affairs which had
served it for centuries and to apply for negotia-
tions wMch could lead to a commitment to Europe
more profound than any in its history.

This decision by the United Kmgdom has im-
plications not only for other nations in Europe but
has caused major reassessments of policy by coun-
tries throughout the world, both within and out-
side the Commonwealth. These events have also
created a necessity for us to reexamine and recast
our own foreign trade policy in order to keep
abreast of curi-ent events and to anticipate future
develoiDments.

Since World War II one of the major objectives
of our Atlantic policy has been the creation of a
strong and united Europe able to resist Soviet and
Communist pressures, with Germany firmly linked
to this larger union. Europe could then serve as

June 18, 1962

991

an equal partner of the United States in the
achievement of our common goals : the defense of
the free world, the expansion of trade, economic
growth, assistance to the developing nations in at-
taining the level of economic and political strength
that will give them self-respect and independence.
The Common Market will clearly represent an eco-
nomic and trading unit of size and importance
comparable to that of the United States and thus
will create a new entity in Europe with the poten-
tial of playing an effective role in an Atlantic
partnership of equals committed to the achiev-e-
ment of great common objectives.

An enduring relationship is not forged by legal
instruments alone. One of the most fundamental
aspects of that relationsliip is the flow of goods
and services among ourselves. As long as unnec-
essary and overly restrictive barriers hamper this
flow, there can be no genuinely effective relation-
ship and the seeds of discord and division will
remain. In the context of the modern world,
threatened on two fronts by the menace of Com-
munist imperialism and the failure of two-thirds
of the world's population to achieve a decent
standard of living, our capacity to achieve genu-
ine economic cooperation will be of fundamental
importance. Our national commitment to a lib-
eral trade policy will be a basic expression of our
faith in the future of the free world.

However, the creation of a strong Atlantic
partnership is far from enough. Limiting our
efforts to this restricted area would only serve
to wall up the Atlantic community within an
ultimately untenable bastion of isolationism. It
is of primary importance that our posture be an
open one, inviting all free nations to participate
in working out tlie complicated relationships in-
volved in creating a prosperous world community
of free peoples. Our trade policies must be de-
fined in such a way as to insure that our friends
everywhere, who are prepared to accept the obli-
gations of such participation, also have full
opportunity to share in the fruits. This we pro-
pose to do through the extension of any reductions
in our mutual barriers to trade to all those who
would participate and by taking special measures
where appropriate, such as in commodity arrange-
ments, to help the less developed countries around
the globe obtain equal access to world markets
and be made capable of sharing in the promise
of tlie future.

Tools To Implement Trade Program

"With these goals and imperatives before us. the
administration has fashioned this year a new defi-
nition of American trade policy : the Trade Ex-
pansion Act of 1962. It has been described as
the most fundamental reconstruction of foreign
trade policy since the original Trade Agreements
Act of 193-i, yet its provisions are no more radi-
cal for this new decade than were the Marshall
plan, the North Atlantic Treaty, or the Monroe,
Truman, and Eisenliower Doctrines for their days,

In substance it remains a mandate to reduce
trade barriers, rmder appropriate safeguards and
through appropriate stages, just as its predeces-
sors were. Wliere it differs from preceding man-
dates is in the special provisions for tariff reduc-
tion by broad categories and total elimination ol
tariffs in limited areas, and in tlie concept of na-
tional responsibility to promote adjustment for
injuries caused by actions in the national interests

Adjustment assistance is a new departure in
the concept of protection against import compe-
tition, but it is a logical development in our new '
approach to trade policy if we are to i-ealize our
objective of an expanded, interdependent world
trading system. If adjustment assistance should
fail and abnormal dislocations should ensue, the
conventional methods of protective assistance,
such as increased tariffs, remain available for use
under accelerated procedures for their applica-
tion. Under the new system the President will
be able to select any one or several of a variety
of methods to help soften the effects of increased
import competition. However, the objective of
this type of assistance, as well as the former,
must be and is to promote adjustment and not to
prevent change. Others have learned through
bitter experience that a country which is innnune
to change is a country vulnerable to defeat. Tlie
insidious nature of encroaching protectionism is
not readily apparent. It lies in the hidden bar-
riers it builds against economic progress and in
tlie gradual erosion of relative industrial efficiency.

In order to implement this new approacli to
trade polic}', tlie President has requested of the
Congress an authority whose key characteristic
is flexibility. This flexibility as well as the in-j
creased authority is needed for a very simple rea- '
son — to enable U.S. negotiators to bargain
effectively in (lie interests of this country. Thf
last general round of tariff neirotiatioiis at Geneva

992

Department of Stale Bulletin

svas an ample demonstration of this fact. In the
face of an offer to reduce across the board the tar-
iffs of the Common Market on industrial products,
kve were hampered by a host of provisions in the
present Trade Agreements Act severely limiting
Dur ability to make reciprocal reductions. Tliis
resulted in the withdrawal of the Common Unv-
ket's offer in a number of key areas and products
which would have been of great benefit to Ameri-
can exporters.

The time for this kind of bargaining has passed.
We are faced today with an economic entity
across the seas which, if present negotiations suc-
ceed, will be considerably larger than our own.
Within this dynamic concept, new challenges to
our trade and commerce are developing. If we
cannot move, and move swiftly, to meet these chal-
lenges, our stature as a nation will slowly shrink.
This is a reality of which this community and
the Nation should be fully aware, and, being
aware, it should lend its support to the efforts
being made to sharpen our trade policy tools and
to the subsequent efforts which will be made at the
bargaining tables.

If we move forward with new policies and pow-
ers which are meaningful and adequate, we have
every reason to expect a new stimulus to growth
on a scale not seen before. Lower trade barriers
in the industrialized nations of the world will
mean increased export opportunities for our
farms and industries. A more closely knit world
trading system will also provide increased stimu-
lus to industrial and agricultural efficiency, and
therefore prosperity, here at home.

The implications for the world as a whole and
for our major foreign policy objectives are equally
clear and compelling. Reduction of trade bar-
riers will bind the free- world commimity together
in a close relationship of mutual advantage. By
opening up the markets of the industrialized
covmtries on a nondiscriminatory basis, it will
stimulate greater export opportunities for the less
developed countries and thereby contribute more —
and more soundly — than outside financial aid to
the development and expansion of their econo-
mies. Ad. open and nondiscriminatory free-
world trading system will be the ultimate answer
to the Communist prediction that the democracies
of the West will ultimately collapse under th.e
accumulated weight of economic warfare.

THE CONGRESS

Department Presents Views on Chinese
Refugees in Hong Kong

Statement ly W. Averell Harriman
Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs ^

Beginning about the first of May the number of
Chinese refugees trying to enter Hong Kong in-
creased spectacularly. Each week for years past,
dozens or perhaps hundreds had been making the
attempt, often at the risk of being shot by the
Communist border guards. For reasons we do
not know, the Communist guards suddenly
stopped trying to prevent border crossings. News
of this sort spreads rapidly in Clima. Where
dozens had been, there were tens of thousands.

This drew the spotlight of public attention to
the Hong Kong border. But it was not a new
situation. Since 1948 hundreds of thousands of
Chinese refugees have fled to Hong Kong, first
to escape the advancing Communist troops and
later to escape the hopeless life which Communist
leaders imposed on China. This flow has brought
to Hong Kong over a million of its 3 million
people.

In Hong Kong these refugees have been re-
settled and provided with medical assistance,
housing, and educational facilities. The Govern-
ment and people of Hong Kong have accomplished
this primarily through their own efforts and from
their own resources, and they deserve the free
world's praise and thanks for it. Most of the
refugees have found jobs to support themselves
in Hong Kong's rapidly expanding private-enter-
prise economy. Most important of all, the Hong
Kong Government has treated them on the same
footing as other residents and has insured them
the opportunity to live their own lives in freedom.

The people and Government of the United
States have long been aware of the Hong Kong

'Made before the Subcommittee on Refugees and
Escapees of the Senate Judiciary Committee on May 29
( press release 344 ) .

June 18, 1962

993

refugee situation. American voluntary agencies
operating in Hong Kong have, since 1954, dis-
tributed surplus food witli a value of over $30
million under Public Law 480, title III. These
agencies have also contributed clothing, health
supplies, and other necessities to meet immediate
needs of the refugees and help them support
themselves. These contributions apart from food
provided under P.L. 480 represent the direct gifts
of individual Amei'icans and amount to millions
of dollars each year. Under the Far East refugee
progi-am the United States Government has pro-
vided funds and other help amounting to about
$8 million for resettlement, medical aid, housing,
education, vocational training, and community
centers. The American people can justly take
pride in this effort. At the same time vre should
remember that it is a small fraction of what the
Hong Kong Government has spent to provide
new housing, schools, health services, and such
basic needs as water supplies for the increased
population.

It now appears that the spectacular flow of
border crossers has stopped, at least for the time
being. Perhaps the Chinese Communist authori-
ties could no longer tolerate this revelation to the
outside world that so many Chinese people wish to
leave "People's China." Smaller numbers of them
will probably continue to escape as was the case
in the past years. The needs of the refugees in
Hong Kong will continue. I am sure the Ameri-
can people will continue to help.

As the President stated last Wednesday [May
23], we are making arrangements as rapidly as
possible for several thousand Chinese refugees to
come to the United States. It is evident that re-
settlement of Chinese refugees here and in other
countries can in some degree help the situation,
and in addition to what we can do in this direction
ourselves we would consider sympathetically re-
quests to help other countries take in numbers of
these refugees. We are in touch with the Chinese
Government in Taipei to learn more about its pro-
posal to resettle numbers of Chinese refugees on
Taiwan.

We must remember that the increased flow of
Chinese refugees into Hong Kong is but a small
aspect of a vast problem. The i-oot of this prob-
lem is in China. Before the Communists seized
power in mainland China, Chinese people on a
number of occasions went to Hong Kong to es-
cape disasters in their home areas. On those oc-

casions the disasters were local and temporary,
and when they had passed the refugees almost all
went home again. Wlaat today's refugees have
fled is the cumulative result of 12 years of Com-
mimist rule. There is no sign that the recent
border crossings came about because conditions
where these people lived had taken a sudden turn
for the worse. They were not starving. In fact,
they did not show physical e\adence of malnutri-
tion. But most of them are farmers, and they
were well aware that what Communists had done
to agriculture in China was a worse disaster than
the most severe natural calamities they had seen
or heard of. Others were industrial workei-s
largely from Canton. They had lost their jobs
because the collapse of agriculture has severely
affected industry. They had learned that the
Communist authorities planned to send perhaps
200,000 of them to the farm villages. They might
have jobs of a sort there but the main purpose
would be to have them fed there, relieving the city
authorities of this responsibility.

The Chinese are an eminently pragmatic people.
They believed that life in Hong Kong would be
better than what they could foresee in the Chinese
Communists' promises. They saw a chance to try
to get into Hong Kong, and they took it. Hun-
dreds of thousands of other Chinese would, by all
accounts, do the same if they coidd. This is the
most telling commentary possible on what the
Chinese people think of the Comraimist system in
action.

We can be sure, I believe, that the Hong Kong
Government will continue to give safe haven to
numbers of escapees from Communist Cliina, as
they have in the past, and to the extent possible
integrate them into the Hong Kong economy.
For our part we should continue our assistance to
this humane endeavor.

Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy

87th Congress, 2d Session

The Political Slakes in East- West Trade: A Report on
a Factfinding Trip to the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe.
Submitted to the Subooinmittee on Foreign Erouomic
I'oliey of the .loint Economic Committee by .Senator
Jacob K. Javits. February 2, 1962. 10 pp. [Joint
Committee print]

Purchase of United Nations Bonds. Hearings before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee. February 6-19,
19C2. 325 pp.

994

Department of State Bulletin

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings'

Adjourned During May 1962

U.N. Comniittco on Information From Non-Self-Govcrning Territories: 13th New Yorli .... Apr. 23-May 23

Session

U.N. ECAFE Regional Seminar on the Development of Ground Water Re- Bangkok Apr. 24-May 8

sources.

U.N. Economic Commission for Europe: 17th Session Geneva Apr. 24-May 10

U.N. ECOSOC Statistical Commission: 12th Session New York .... Apr. 24-May 11

FAO Committee on Commodity Problems: 35th Session Rome Apr. 25-May 4

ITU CCIR Study Group V (Propagation) Geneva Apr. 2.5-May 4

ITU CCIR Study Group VII (Standard Frequencies and Time Signals) . . . Geneva Apr. 25-May 4

CENTO Ministerial Council: 10th Meeting London Apr. 30-May 1

Caribbean Organization: Joint Meeting of Planners and Planning Experts and San Juan May 1-8

Standing Advisory Committee of the Caribbean Plan.

GATT Committee ill on Expansion of International Trade Geneva May 1-11

NATO Ministerial Council Athens May 4-6

ICAO Limited European Mediterranean Aeronautical Fixed Telecommunica- Paris May 4-7

tions Network Panel.

OECD Committee on Scientific Research: yld Hoc Meeting on Research Cooper- Paris May 7(1 day)

ation.

OECD Development Assistance Committee: Coordinating Group on Paris May 7(1 day)

Thailand.

OECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Party on Costs of Production Paris May 7-8

and Prices.

IMCO Maritime Safety Committee: Subcommittee on Code of Signals . . . . London May 7-11

NATO Planning Board for Ocean Shipping: 14th Meeting Washington. . . . May 7-11

International Seed Testing Association: 13th Congress Lisbon May 7-12

U.N. ECOSOC Commission on International Commodity Trade and FAO Rome May 7-14

Committee on Commodity Problems (joint session).

FAO Inter-American Meeting on Animal Production and Health: 5th Meeting . Santiago May 7-18

GATT Committee on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions Geneva May 7-18

ITU CCIR Study Group II (Receivers) Geneva May 7-18

ILO Chemical Industries Committee: 6th Session Geneva May 7-18

15th International Film Festival Cannes May 7-21

ITU CCIR Study Group VI (Ionospheric Propagation) Geneva May 7-23

OECD Development Assistance Committee: Working Group on Aid to Paris May 8(1 day)

Colombia.

ANZUS Council Canberra May 8-9

NATO Civil Defense Committee Paris May 8-9

U.N. ECAFE Committee for Coordination of Investigations of the Lower Bangkok May 8-11

Mekong Basin.

U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Narcotic Drugs: Committee on Illicit Traffic . Geneva May 8-11

International Fisheries Convention of 1946: 10th Meeting Hamburg May 8-12

8th International Hvdrographic Conference Monte Carlo . . . May 8-15

U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Human Rights: Seminar on Status of Women Tokyo May 8-21

in Family Law.

] 5th World" Health Assembly Geneva May 8-26

OECD Development Assistance Committee: Group on Multilateral Investment Paris May 9 (1 day)

Guarantees.

International Cotton Advisory Committee: Committee on Extra-Long Staple Washington .... May 9-12

Cotton and Study Group on Prospective Trends in Cotton Practice.

OECD Development Assistance Committee: Aid to Northeast Brazil . . . Paris May 11 (1 day)

International Court of Justice Hearings for an Advisory Opinion on "Financial The Hague . . . . May 11-21

Obligations of Members of the United Nations."

' Prepared in the Office of International Conferences May 31, 1962. Following is a list of abbreviations:
ANZUS, Australia- New! Zealand- United States; CCIR, Comite consultatif international des radio communica-
tions; CENTO, Central Treaty Organization; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic
Commission for Europe; ECOSOC. Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT,
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ICEM, Intergovernmental
Committee on European Migration; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Con-
sultative Organization; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization;
OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; SHAPE, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers
Europe; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; UNICEF,
United Nations Children's Fund; WHO, World Health Organization; WMO, World Meteorological Organization.

June 18, 1962 99S

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings— Continued

Adjourned During May 1962— Continued

GATT Panel of Experts on Residual Import Restrictions Geneva ivr.. i^,r

""SgresPyrSon^^ *'^ ^^°^^"^ "^ '""^ U.N. High Commissioner 'for 2Z;t: : [ . . ] ^l^ Itll

f^^;"^^ W^^gton. . . . May 14-23

A?r°a''''"°P"'"' ^'"^'"""^ Committee: Coordinating Group on 'East S!"." I ; ; ; ; ^:j !tad.y)

ICEM Council: Special Meeting of the 17th Session Geneva tvto i^^m

Inter-Amencan Tropical Tuna Commission: Annual Meeting I ; i ". ! QuHo Mav fc S

S?SS C?mni>ttee on Restrictive Business Practices ...... ?aris M«v Ifcll

NATO Civil Aviation Planning Committee pZll ^^ ]^\l

G7rT^PoZ^'raltf:::\?XtL^^^^^ .::::::::: &e.s- : : : : : pllll

'^■i,f,^i,'^°^'^-^<^''^'^^^^^ope.r.k^^^^^^^^^ g:--; ; : • ■ ; May 21-23

GA^TlSciT"o? Vp^sfnfXef ^°^^^°'°^ ^°^"^^^ New York ... . May 21-28

OECD Agriculture Committee . . 2^°^''^ May 21-30

^|g^o^&j^S^j^;i?£1eSr'^'"-='^"-^'^^^^^^ ■ ■ ' £ • : • : : : ^yfi

OECD Industries Comniittee Montreux .... May 22-28

OECD Manpower Committee S^"^ May 24-25

GATT Working Party on Relations With Poland n ^ May 24-25

UNICEF Comfnittee-on Administrative Budget .■ '. '. '. .^ ." i .•.•.■••■ N:wYork " " ' ' Ma^ '«-'4

Si?SK=P.atrgTom^m="^^=^ • " f^.^ ■ ■ ■ ^ ^l-lo^

wlb^^E^^ecu^rBt'^^d^S^orS^^^ ^S I .' .^ ." ." ." .' ^^aTltlo'

Geneva May 29-30

In Session as of May 31, 1962

5';h"RTun'd%7G'l^'^^"&"?,7gS^^^^ • • • Geneva Oct. 31, 1 958-

International Conference for the Settlement of the Laotian Question .' ' ' " Geneva M « v /fi S^o^

UN General Assembly: 16th Session (recessed Feb. 23, 1962, until June 1962) ■ New York Seot IQ lOfil"

Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament .... GeTeva ' ' " ' M?r I !' l Qfio"

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996

Deparfment of State Bulletin

International Commodity Problems

by W. Michael Blumenthal

Dejmty Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs ^

A year ago I outlined to this Commission the
views of my Government with regard to the prob-
lems of international commodity trade. I re-
ported that the United States was about to
embark on an expanded program of work in this
area and, if you will permit me to recall, I under-
lined tliat this effort reflected our recognition of the
importance of commodity problems in relationship
to sound economic development, our determina-
tion to cooj^erate with other governments in the
search for equitable solutions, and our willingness
to consider sympathetically any reasonable pro-
posals for the improvement of conditions in world
commodity trade. Finally, Mr. Chairman, I said,
"The U.S. Government intends not only to co-
operate with other nations in the search for prac-
tical solutions for the problems of commodity
trade, but hopes to be able to contribute ideas and
a measure of initiative in this endeavor."

Over 1 year of intensive work is now behind us.
In implemcntmg President Kennedy's commodity
program we have gained considerable experience
and, in close cooperation with other governments,
we have made real progress.

Yet, while work has gone forward in various
international forimis and meetings, while new
approaches have been established and existing or-
gans strengthened, conditions in certain com-
modity markets have in fact worsened during the
year. Analysis of the reasons for these undesirable
developments points up clearly the great obstacles

' This is a condensed version of a statement presented
by Mr. Blumenthal before the 10th session of the United
Nations Commission on International Commodity Trade
at Rome on May 16.

that must be overcome, the underlying funda-
mental problems that must be faced, and the time
and effort required to achieve lasting improve-
ments. It is imperative that all of us work to-
gether to reverse this trend. My Government, Mr.
Chairman, is ready to do so. We believe tliat what
is needed, above all, is a common approach — an
agreed-upon set of principles upon which to define
a true woi'ld commodity policy to which the major
producing and consuming countries of the world
can subscribe.

Mr. Chairman, I propose to return to this con-
cept of a world commodity policy in a moment,
for my Government would like to suggest a few
of the basic approaches which in our opinion must
be incorporated into this common strategy. To
begin with, however, I would like to review the
major events of the past year, as seen by my Gov-
ernment, and to describe the direction in which we
have been moving.

The Problem of Coffee

One of the principal connnodities toward which
we directed our attention during the past j'ear is
coffee. The reasons are obvious. Coffee is second
only to petroleum in its importance in world trade.
Moreover, within the inter- American Alliance for
Progress, there are 15 nations to which coffee is
of great interest, and in Africa and Asia numerous
other countries derive important benefits from
coffee exports.

The problems that beset trade in coffee are par-
ticularly severe and disturbing ones. An enormous
imbalance exists at present between production
and probable demand. Vast stocks overhang the
market and exercise a persistent depressing effect

June 78, 7962

997

on prices. We estimate that almost twice as much
coffee is produced each year in the world as can be
exported, and the outlook is for a continued accu-
mulation of surpluses unless determined efforts
are made to correct the situation. There is little
hope that the price decline in coffee can be arrested
until this fundamental situation is faced resolutely
by producing and consuming countries.

In the view of my Government the situation
indicates the desirability — indeed the necessity — of
attempting to negotiate a global producer-con-
sumer agreement, designed to deal with the imder-
lying causes. As long ago as August of last year
we therefore announced our intention to promote
such an agreement and our willingness to become
a member, assuming that a sound scheme could be
negotiated. We have worked actively toward tliis
goal since that announcement.

In the Coffee Study Group we have tried to help
the work move steadily forward toward a world-
wide negotiating conference under the auspices of
the United Nations. Such a conference lias now
been scheduled for July 9, and a draft agreement
has been prepared. The draft bi-eaks new ground
in the history of commodity agreements, because
it includes provisions designed to bring about
production controls and to expedite economic di-
versification in coffee-producing areas.

There is another development with regard to
coffee which is of significance. This is the plan
to establish a Seasonal Marketing Fund in Central
America, to which my Government has pledged its
financial support, conditional upon a strengthen-
ing of production and marketing controls in the
countries concerned. The Fund is intended to
help the producing countries in the region to space
their coffee marketings more evenly throughout
the year. The project is significant in our view in
that its implementation would enhance the chances
for the successful operation of the broader inter-
national agreement and because it seems to us a
good example of the kind of nondiscriminatory
regional cooperation wliich can be a valuable
ad j unct to worldwide schemes.

The Cocoa Problem

We have also, in common with other govern-
ments, devoted a good deal of thouglit and atten-
tion to the world cocoa problem. No two com-
modity situations are alike, and the situation in

cocoa differs markedly from tliat in coffee. There
has not been as serious a gap between supply and
demand and, to date, such excess supplies as have
materialized have been absorbed into consumers'
stocks. Moreover, the rate of growth in consump-
tion over the last few years has been more than
satisfactory. In fact, increases in U.S. consimip-
tion of cocoa have averaged 9.3 percent over the
last 2 years, and 1962 promises to be almost as
good.

Yet we feel that a situation may be developing
in cocoa that will bear careful watching. In the
last few years production has increased more
quickly than consumption and prices have fallen.
At this point the outlook is unclear. Experience
of the past few years suggests that the lower prices
brought about by higher production may lead to
further increases in consumption. Because some
danger signals have appeared, however, we have
actively supported the idea of exploring various
means of international cooperation within the
Cocoa Study Group, and we pai'ticipated last June
in the work of a committee which prepared a draft
of a possible producer-consumer agreement.
"\^niether it is feasible and desirable to attempt a
formal agreement in this case and at tliis time will
be among the matters discussed by the Cocoa
Study Group at its meeting next week in
Switzerland.

Other International Study Groups

Our work on individual commodity problems
has not been confined to the coffee and cocoa mar-
kets. At the Punta del Este conference in August
1961,^ the U.S. Government also announced its
readiness to begin discussions with the Interna-
tional Tin Council concerning the terms of possible
U.S. accession to that agreement.

Lest there be some misunderstanding on this
point, Mr. Chairman, let me emphasize that the
commodity policy of the U.S. Government is by no
means exclusively, or for that matter primaril}',
directed toward the promotion of commodity
agreements. As we said last year, we believe tliat
each situation must be studied on its merits and
that a variety of techniques — sometimes several
used in combination — may be needed to cope with
particular problems.

'For background, see Bulletin of Sept. 11, 1961,
p. 409.

998

Department of Stale Bulletin

In some cases tlio most fruitful form of interna-
tional cooperation may be simply the regular ex-
cliansre of information and views in international
study groups. We believe that the activities of
the International Eubber Study Group are an ex-
cellent case in point. This group is one of the
oldest in the commodity field and one of the first
to demonstrate the possibilities of this type of
organization. The group has done a great deal of
valuable work on inaproving statistics and develop-
ing short-term forecasts and long-term projections
of production and consumption. Because of the
need for natural rubber to remain competitive
with synthetic rubber, a price stabilization agree-
ment would not serve the long-term interests of
producers. Indeed, the threat of synthetic compe-
tition has already become a matter of grave and
immediate concern. In this situation, interna-
tional action can most usefully be directed to an
exchange of ideas on research and development to
help natural rubber maintain its competitive
standing.

Incidentally, rubber as well as tin may remind
us that the IJnited States holds large strategic
stockpiles of many primary commodities bought
on world markets in earlier periods and now gen-
erally in excess of needs. These excess inventories,
which in the aggregate are very large, present
serious problems for my Government. "Wlien
disposals are undertaken, however, it is our estab-
lished policy to manage them in such a way as
to take full account of the interests of the primary
producing countries concerned, avoiding disrup-
tion of world commodity markets. Before de-
ciding finally upon any disposal plan, we consult
with the countries concerned and give most careful
consideration to their views.

These have been some of the highlights of the
work regarding individual commodities in which
the U.S. Government has actively participated
since we last met a year ago. It is of couree not
an all-inclusive list. I did not, for example, men-
tion our participation in the other study groups
and in the international wheat and sugar agree-
ments or our contacts with the banana-producing
countries of the world. In our approach to all
these problems we have attempted to proceed on
a pragmatic, case-by-case basis, intent on coop-
erating to the fullest extent possible with all in-
terested countries in improving the condition of
individual markets.

Compensatory Financing

Finally, we have moved quickly and far within
the past year in considering compensatoiy financ-
ing as a stabilization technique. Let me say em-
lihatically, Mr. Chairman, that the U.S. Gov-
ernment attaches a great deal of importance to
the idea of sound compensatory financing and is
prepared to give most serious consideration to
workable proposals. Last year this Commission
gave preliminary consideration to the U.N. ex-
perts' report^ on the subject, identified certain
issues requiring close examination, and otherwise
laid the groundwork for a thoroughgoing discus-
sion of the subject at this present session. Since
that time, my Government, like many others, has
given much thought to this question. Our aim
lias been to seek a mechanism which would free
the producing countries from the disruptive and
sometimes crippling consequences of severe cycli-
cal and other short-term declines in export re-
ceipts. It has been our view that such a
mechanism could be a decidedly useful supple-
ment to the eiforts to stabilize export receipts
through action on individual commodities and
to the assistance which the International Mone-
tary Fund gives to countries in balance-of-pay-
ments difficulties of a more general character.

To press toward a solution of this problem, we
established a special task force composed of ex-
perts from various U.S. Government agencies,
some of whom then participated actively in the
work of a Group of Experts set up pursuant to a
resolution of the Punta del Este conference. Mr.
Chairman, I commend to the careful attention of
all my colleagues here the report ^ of this Group
of Experts, to which you referred in your opening
statement and to which Mr. de Seynes [Philippe
de Seynes, Under-Secretary of the U.N. for Eco-
nomic and Social Affairs] also referred in his
address to the joint session last week. This report
has been forwarded to the CICT. My Govern-
ment has come to the tentative conclusion that a
general, basically automatic compensatory financ-
ing scheme of the type described in this report
may be both desirable and feasible.

However, let me say that while we strongly
hope that something useful can be achieved in
this area, we remain openminded concerning what

'U.N. doc. E/CN.13/40; E/3447.
'OAS doc. 59 (English rev. 4).

June 78, 1962

999

type of mechanism would be most appropriate.
Indeed, we look forward to a thoroughgoing
discussion by our colleagues on the various
possibilities.

At the same time we are persuaded that a mech-
anism of the type proposed by the experts of
the Organization of American States contains a
number of features which seem to be inherently
preferable to the U.N. experts' proposal. For one
thing, the inter-American approach achieves a sep-
aration of the aid and trade concepts and deals
only with the problem of cyclical and other short-
term instability. In addition, the scheme is auto-
matic and self-fmancing and, once established,
can stand on its own feet. Moreover, we believe
that such a scheme lends itself readily to co-
ordination with the closely related activities of
the IMF, as well as with national marketing
boards and stabilization funds now in operation.
For these and other reasons it may, in the end,
have the best chance of finding general acceptance
by the various countries concerned.

]Mr. Chairman, I would like to emphasize that
we regard compensatory financing as a supple-
mentary technique to deal solely with the short-
term problems of fluctuations in world commodity
markets. This technique alone will not do the job.
It must be coupled with work on the long-term,
structural problems affecting particular commodi-
ties and with the effort to help the developing
countries expand and diversify their export
earnings.

It would be our suggestion that a discussion
of various compensatory financing ideas by this
session of the Commission might be followed by
the appointment of a small group of governmental
experts from member countries. This group
would have the task of evaluating in depth the
various proposals discussed here and, if possible,
of reporting its findings back to this Commission
later in the year.

I would also like to suggest that we consider
asking the International Monetary Fund to look
more deeply into the various ideas on compensa-
tory financing discussed here, with the possible
objective of presenting its own views on tliis sub-
ject. In any case, it would be most useful if tlie
CICT expert group, if it is to be established, would
work in close collaboration with the IMF shvlT.

Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, this Com-
mission of the United Nations has now been func-
tioning for more than 7 years, and many of you

individually have been concerned with commodity
problems even longer. It seems to me that from
our deliberations and work there is beginning to
emerge a considerable measure of agreement, or
common understanding, concerning the essential
nature of the problems of primary commodity
trade and concerning the general character of the
solutions to be sought during the current decade —
which we want to make a Decade of Development.

A Common Policy for the Decade of Development

Wliat should be the outline of a common policy
on commodities for the sixties — a policy fitted to
the Decade of Development? Let me suggest a
first sketch.

First, we should give attention, on a commodity-
by-commodity basis, to the correction of long-term
structural defects on individual markets. In many
cases this implies a concerted attack on existing
imbalances between world production and foresee-
able world demand. On the demand side, it is im-
perative to expand markets wherever possible, to
work toward lowering trade barriers, and to mod-
ify national measures which limit market access
or inhibit consumption. Through the large-scale
application of research and modem market de-
velopment techniques, further progress could also
be made.

My Government, as you know, is now seeking
legislative authority to enter into negotiations for
the reduction of tariffs on a broad front. We hope
to make use of the proposed negotiating authority
in such a way as to enlarge the markets for the
export products of the less developed countries.

On the supply side, for those commodities where
there is a large surplus of current production, ca-
pacity, or stocks over foreseeable consumption,
there is a need to reduce production or, more
broadly, to transfer manpower and other resources
to other lines of production — with emphasis, of
course, on diversification and industrialization in
the less developed exporting countries.

Second, we should recognize the close connec-
tion between balancing demand and supplv in in-
dividual commodity markets and development
planning and economic assistance. These meas-
ures nnist be coordinated closely. The ultimate
solution for many commodity problems lies in di-
versification and economic development — in lessen-
ing the dependence on primary commodity
exports; in raising productivity and lowering
costs to make primary products as competitive as

1000

Department of State Bulletin

possible ; in developing new lines of production in
place of primary commodities in heavy oversup-
ply ; and in creating alternative opportunities for
workers who become unemployed.

What is needed is not to raise artificially the
prices of primary commodities from one day to
the next but to get at the root of the problem and
speed up our efforts to lessen the dependence of
the developing countries upon these products, to be
more competitive in world markets, and thereby
to restore the proper balance of world production
and demand. That is the proper way to get at
the price question.

We must find ways, then, of coordinating work
on commodities and work on economic develop-
ment on a broad front. Each individual commod-
ity problem must be approached in these tenns.
Existing international institutions concerned with
both sets of problems must be examined to deter-
mine whetlier they are adequate for this purpose
or whether different structures are needed to fa-
cilitate coordination.

Third, we should attempt to approach our work
on individual commodity market situations in a
worldwide context. The solutions adopted should,
wherever possible, be global ones, for the prob-
lems are global in nature and the interests of all
producing and consimiing countries are involved.
This implies that the solutions must be nondis-
criminatory and that we must seek to distribute
equitably the burdens and the benefits flowing
from consumer-producer cooperation. Limited
solutions of a regional nature, which provide relief
to some at the expense of others, should be
avoided. After all, we learned long ago the fu-
tility of attempting to export our problems to our
neighbors. In fact, the whole approach of con-
sumer-producer cooperation is based on a clear
recognition of the necessity for responsible rather
than selfish action, to protect the longrun interests
of all. Discrimination breeds coimterdiscrimina-
tion and in the end creates more problems than it
solves.

Fourth, we should leave room for and encourage
that kind of regional cooperation and coordination
of national commodity policies which strengthens
and supports global commodity approaches. Na-
tional marketing boards, the Seasonal Marketing
Fund in Central America, or other schemes which
are not discriminatory and which facilitate the
operation of worldwide plans, are most useful and
should be encouraged.

Fifth, we should supplement our work on the
long-tenn structural problems of individual com-
modity markets with an attack on the short-term
instabilities in foreign exchange earnings resulting
from cyclical and other shortrun fluctuations.
Compensatory financing is perhaps the principal
device to be considered for dealing with this prob-
lem. Here again we believe that the approach
should be a worldwide one and that the interests
of all pi'oducing and consuming countries must be
taken into accomit.

Sixth, and finally, I would add that, if we are to
make the most of our opportunities, we must guard
against the confusion of purpose and dissipation
of energy which will result if the present tendency
toward proliferation of international commodity
activities is not curbed. The number of groups
and meetings is growing apace. This is not un-
welcome where it has meant a broadening of the
total scope of the international effort, as, for ex-
ample, the creation of study groups for additional
products which warrant attention. Many of the
new activities, however, have covered the same
range of products or the same general problems
under study in other international bodies. I am
convinced that, if we are to make the progress we
desire, we must begin to concentrate our efforts
upon particular aspects of the problem in partic-
ular forums.

It was in line with this philosoiDhy that my Gov-
ernment favored having the results of the inter-
American study of compensatory financing made
available to the CICT. Because of our concern
over the current tendency we also intend to pro-
pose, at the next session of the Economic and So-
cial Council, that the Secretary-General, in
consultation with the secretariats of other inter-
ested bodies, report on the possibilities of making
our efforts in the commodity field more productive
through better coordination and perhaps some de-
gree of consolidation of existing activities.

Mr. Chairman, we live in a world of paradoxes,
a world of plenty amidst poverty, of surpluses
amidst deep needs. We speak of an excess supply
of commodities, yet we all know that in relation
to people's wants there is no excess supply of goods.
We have today not too many goods but often too
many of the wrong goods. It is the task of world
economic development to match needs and wants,
to erase hunger with ample foods, and to eradicate
ignorance and disease.

June 18, 7962

1001

This is the noble task of our time — to work to-
gether for world economic development and in so
doing to remove forever the paradox of plenty
amidst poverty.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL
Copyright

Universal copyright convention. Done at Geneva Septem-
ber 6, 1952. Entered into force September 16, 1955.
TIAS 3324.

Ratification deposited: Canada, May 10, 1962.
Accession deposited: Ghana, May 22, 1962.

Protocol 1 to the universal copyright convention concern-
ing the application of that convention to the works of
stateless persons and refugees. Done at Geneva
September 6, 1952. Entered into force September 16,
1955. TIAS 3324.
Accession deposited: Ghana, May 22, 1962.

Protocol 2 to the universal copyright convention concern-
ing the application of that convention to the works of
certain international organizations. Done at Geneva
September 6, 1952. Entered into force September 16,
1955. TIAS 3324.
Accession deposited: Ghana, May 22, 1962.

Protocol 3 to the universal copyright convention concern-
ing the effective date of instruments of ratification or
acceptance of or accession to that convention. Done at
Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force August
19, 19.54. TIAS 3324.

Ratification deposited: Canada, May 10, 1962.
Aeccssi07i deposited: Ghana, May 22, 1962.

Shipping

Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consult-
ative Organization. Signed at Geneva March 6, 1948.
Entered into force March 17, 1958. TIAS 4044.
Acceptance deposited: Korea, April 10, 1962.

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention with six
annexes. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered
into force January 1, 1961 ; for the United States
October 23, 1901. TIAS 4892.

Ratifications deposited: Argentina and Vatican City,
April 18, 1962.

United Nations

Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization. Done at London November
16, 1945. Entered into force November 4, 1946. TIAS
1580.

Signature: Yemen, February 8, 1962.
Acceptance deposited: Yemen, April 2, 1962.

BILATERAL

Belgium

Agreement for cooperation on the uses of atomic energy
for mutual defense purposes. Signed at Brussels May
17, 1962. Enters into force on the date on which each
Government shall have received from the other written
notification that it has complied with all legal require-
ments for entry into force.

Brazil

Amendment to the agreement of August 3, 1955, as
amended (TIAS 3303, 4255, and 4539), concerning civil
uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington May 28,
1962. Enters into force on the date on which each
Government shall have received from the other written
notification that it has complied with all statutory and J
constitutional requirements for entry into force.

China

Amendment to the agreement of July 18, 1955, as amended "
(TIAS 3307, 4176, and 4514), concerning civil uses of
atomic energy. Signed at Washington May 31, 1962.
Enters into force on the date on which each Government
shall have received from the other written notification
that it has complied with all statutory and constitu-
tional requirements for entry into force.

Guatemala

Agricultural trade agreement. Signed at Washington
May 21, 1962. Entered into force May 21, 1962.

Portugal

Amendment to the agreement of July 21, 19.55, as amended
(TIAS 3317, 3899, and 4519), concerning civil uses of
atomic energy. Signed at Washington May 28, 1902.
Enters into force on the date on which each Government
shall have received from the other written notification
that it has complied with all statutory and constitu-
tional requirements for entry into force.

Thailand

Amendment to the agreement of March 13, 1956. as
amended (TIAS 3522, 3842, and 4533), concerning civil
uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington May 31,
1962. Enters into force on the date on which each
Government shall have received from the other written
notification that it has complied with all statutory and
constitutional requirements for entry into force.

United Arab Republic

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agree-
ment of February 10, 1962, as amended (TIAS 4947 and
4991 ) . Effected by exchange of notes at Cairo May 21,
1962. Entered into force May 21, 1962.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Appointments

Herbert K. May as Deputy Assistant Secretai-y for
Inter-American Affairs, effective May 16.

1002

Department of State Bulletin

June 18, 1962

Ind

e X

Vol. XLVI, No. 1199

Afghanistan. U.S. Helps Afghanistan Fight

Locust Menace 987

American Republics. May appointed Deputy As-
sistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs . . 1002

Asia. Where We Stand (Rostow) 967

Atomic Energy

Secretary Rusls's News Conference of May 31 . . . 970

Where We Stand (Rostow) 967

China

Department Presents Views on Chinese Refugees

in Hong Kong (Harriman) 993

Secretary Rusli's News Conference of May 31 . . . 970

Communism. Soviet Foreign Policy — Its Implica-
tions for the West (Hughes) 977

Congress

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign

Policy 994

Department Presents Views on Chinese Refugees in
Hong Kong (Harriman) 993

Department and Foreign Service. Appointments

(May) 1002

Disarmament

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of May 31 . . 970
Where We Stand (Rostow) 967

Economic Afifairs

International Commodity Problems (Blumenthal) . 997
The Role of Trade Policy : Continuation of U.S.

Leadership (Johnson) 988

Soviet Foreign Policy — Its Imi^lications for the

West (Hughes) 977

Europe

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of May 31 . . 970
Where We Stand (Rostow) 967

Foreign Aid

U.S. Helps Afghanistan Fight Locust Menace . . . 987
Where We Stand (Rostow) 967

Hong Kong. Department Presents Views on

Chinese Refugees in Hong Kong (Harriman) . . 993

Indonesia. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of
May 31 970

International Information. Soviet Foreign Policy —

Its Implications for the West (Hughes) .... 977

International Organizations and Conferences

Calendar of International Conferences and Meet-
ings 995

International Commodity Problems (Blumenthal) . 997

Kuwait. Letters of Credence (al-Atiqi) .... 970

Laos. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of
May 31 970

Netherlands. Secretary Rusk's News Conference

of May 31 970

Panama. President Chiarl of Panama Visits United

States 970

Refugees. Department Presents Views on Chinese

Relugees in Hong Kong (Harriman) 993-

Treaty Information. Current Actions 1002

U.S.S.R.

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of May 31 . . . 970
Soviet Foreign Policy — Its Implications for the

West (Hughes) 977

Name Index

al-Atiqi, Abdul Rahman Salim 97(y

Blumenthal, W. Michael 997

Harriman, W. Averell 993

Hughes, Thomas L 977

Johnson, C. Griffith 98S

May, Herbert K 1002

Rostow, Walt W 907

Rusk, Secretary 970

Check List of Department of State

Press Releases: May 28-June 3

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of

News

Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Releases issued prior to May 28 which appear in 1

this i

ssue of the Bulletin are Nos. 325 of May 19

and 330 of

May 22.

No.

Date

Subject

*339

5/28

U.S. participation in international con-
ferences.

t340

5/28

Cleveland : "The Practice of Peace."

•341

5/29

Mrs. Anderson sworn in as Minister to
Bulgaria (biographic details).

342

5/29

Antilocust aid to Afghanistan.

t343

5/29

Cleveland : "Good Case in the Congo."

344

5/29

Harriman : Subcommittee on Refugees
and Escapees.

*345

5/31

Program for visit of President of

Cyprus.

*346

5/31

Cultural exchange (U.S.S.R.).

347

6/1

Rusk : news conference of May 31.

*34S

6/1

Coombs : "The College and the World."

*349

6/1

Morgan sworn in as FSI Director (bio-
graphic details).

350

6/1

Kuwait credentials (rewrite).

t351

6/1

Galbraith : "The Approach to Poverty."

1352

6/1

Bohlen : "The Importance of Foreign
Relations."

t353

6/1

Report of the Advisory Committee on
U.S. Policy Toward the IAEA.

ted.

*Not prin

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.

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OFFICIAL BUSINESS

Highlights of
FOREIGN POLICY DEVELOPMENTS •1961

The first portion of this 38-page background summary sets
forth the basic objectives and fundamental policies of U.S.
foreign relations as they were stated by President Kennedy,
Vice President Johnson, and Secretary of State Eusk during
1961. The remainder of the pamphlet treats chronologically
the major developments in U.S. policy during the past year with
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KLY RECORD

Vol. XLVI, No. 1200 June 25, 1962

THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE AMERICAN AM-
BASSADOR • by Under Secretary McGhee 1007

THE IMPORTANCE OF FOREIGN RELATIONS • by

Charles E. Bohlen 1012

THE PRACTICE OF PEACE • by Assistant Secretary

Cleveland 1019

TRADE POLICY CHOICES FACING THE UNITED

STATES • by Joseph D. Coppock 1027

THE COMMON MARKET AND UNITED STATES

AGRICULTURE • by Leonard Weiss 1032

THE APPROACH TO POVERTY • by Ambassador John

Kenneth Galbraith 1024

TED STATES
EI6N POLICY

For index see inside back cover

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Vol. XLVI, No. 1200 • Publication 7394
June 25, 1962

Boston Public Library
Superintendent of Documents

JUL 19 1962

DEPOSITORY

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Note: Contents of this publication are not
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OF State Bulletin as the .source will be
appreciated. The Bulletin is Indexed in the
Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the
Office of Public Services, Bureau of
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and interested agencies of the
Goivrnment with information on
developments in the field of foreign
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Department, and statements and ad-
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the Secretary of State and other
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which the United States is or may
become a party and treaties of gen-
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Publications of the Department,
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national relations are listed currently.

he Changing Role of the American Ambassador

hy Under Secretary McGhee ^

I am deeply appreciative of the honor of being
sked to give the address for the fourth gradua-
on exercises of the Senior Seminar in Foreign
olicy. It is very appropriate, indeed, that officers
f your rank and quality should spend a year in
loughtful study and discussion in depth of the
rohlems you will face when you return to active
;rvice.

Since most of you will, at some time, represent
our country as ambassador, I should like to dis-
jss with you this evening the new and changing
sle of the American ambassador — in short, his
iplomatic style.

One might say that diplomacy is the art of man-
ging relations between countries. The diction-
ry defines "style" as "the quality which gives
istinct character and excellency to artistic expres-
lon."

United States diplomatic style, then, would con-
3rn those aspects of our current dealmgs with
ther countries which, hopefully, reflect this dis-
inct character and excellence. It is a style which
[lould reflect the positive thrust of our policy,
?hich should result from the positive bent of our
leople and should represent a sharp break with
[le passive role that diplomacy was generally
bought to play in the past.

listoric Concept of Ambassador

The classic concept of the ambassador is that
f the personal representative of his sovereign at
he seat of another "prince." His task was once
[escrilied in a handbook for the French diplomatic

' AfUlress made at the graduation exercises of the Sen-
or Seminar in Foreign Policy of the Foreign Service
nstitute at Washington, D.C., on June 8 (press release

71).

service at the time of Louis XIV as that of nego-
tiating with princes.

To perform this task successfully, the ambas-
sador was required to have those qualities suitable
to the personal representative of his sovereign at
the seat of another prince; wealth, birth, and
breeding. Patience enough "to suffer fools
gladly" was regarded as an important qiuility.
The ambassador was enjoined to cultivate the
seven diplomatic virtues: truthfulness, precision,
calm, good temper, patience, modesty, and
loyalty.

In the great period of personal diplomacy in
Europe up to the time of the Congress of Vienna,
these virtues and this concept of the role were
sufficient and accurate. With communications
tenuous in the extreme, and with relations between
governments limited in the main to war and di-
plomacy, the ambassador was more than a link be-
tween rulers; rather he was the alter ego of his
sovereign abroad.

In the 1830's, in a rapidly industrializing Eng-
land, the role of the ambassador began to undergo
a major change. As England reached out for mar-
kets m the world, and as the Government became
increasingly responsive to the needs of the new
industrial class, the tools of diplomacy were used
to help create conditions in which trade could
flourish. The ambassador, while still dealing with
"princes," was doing so at least in part as the
representative of a broad range of his country-
men's interests — including their commercial and
economic interests.

In France, during the same period, the ambas-
sador became the apostle of the best in French
culture. He devoted increasing attention to the
projection of what we would today call the "im-

mune 25, 1962

1007

age" of his nation abroad. Wliile his English
counterpart was concerned with trade and com-
merce, the French ambassador involved himself
and his nation in a widening variety of cultural
and educational endeavors, including archeology
and tlie fine arts.

In times of peace in our own country, until the
First World War, the task of the ambassador was
a rather limited one. It was largely to protect
the relatively small group of private American
citizens engaged abroad in business or philan-
thropic activities — and to keep out of trouble the
few American tourists who ventured abroad. In
many places this task was accomplished by an
honorary consul, who may or may not have been
an American. Even in the key European capitals,
the ambassador was usually a passive collector of
information and opinions rather than an active
participant.

The American Ambassador Today

World War I changed this. In Europe and
the Far East the United States accepted the chal-
lenge of Hitler and his allies; the American am-
bassador became in his coimtry the symbol of
resistance to this threat and, after the war, the
symbol of reconstruction and hope for the future.

After World War II the United States had to
assume the leadership of the free world in meeting
the challenge of Communist imperialism — seeking
to prey on nations devastated by war. We could
not meet this challenge merely by reacting to it.
Something more was required. We had to have
our own positive concept of the kind of world
that we were trying to build. The United States
ambassador thus came to be the representative of
a vast range of American governmental activities
designed to create a new world order.

An American ambassador today is still perform-
ing many traditional roles. He must negotiate
treaties and executive agreements and maintain
existing alliances and friendly relations. He must
arrange for concerted political action, attempt to
gain support in the United Nations or in
demarches to other governments. He must react
to common issues involving war and peace and
must make arrangements when necessary for mil-
itary support or assistance. He must oversee the
normal conduct of trade and personal and cul-
tural exchange. He must carry on the traditional
representational functions and seek to create a

sympathetic atmosphere which will be conducive
to the success of his many tasks. He must work
to create a favorable image of the United States
and of himself as its representative.

The great new task of American policy today,
however, is to hasten the progress of the less de-
veloped nations. Unless these countries can ful-
fill their aspirations within the world community,
the stability and cohesion of the free world will
be in continuing jeopardy. Unless they can
progress toward their goals through peaceful and
orderly methods, they may well succumb to ex-
tremist appeals and leaders whose purposes and
programs will be in conflict with those of the
free-world community.

These count I'ies — which include a large part
of the free world's surface and encompass the
majority of its population — are the crucible
within which the world of the future will be
forged. It is the role of the American ambassa-
dor in these countries that I wish principally to
speak to you about this evening. For it is in
these countries that the break between the passive
diplomacy of the past and the positive role of
the ambassador today is most clearly evident.

It is in these countries that the contest between
the Communist efforts to shape the new world
order and our own concept of that order will be
decided. And the decision will hinge in good part
on the vigor and success which we attain in a busi-
ness in which we have had considerable experi-
ence : the business of development.

The Business of Development

One of the great tasks of our generation is the
attack on poverty, ignorance, and disease — which
have afflicted mankind throughout history. Our
response to the challenge of development has be-
come, in our time, a great crusade in the light of
which most historical movements pale.

All over the free world governments are rising
to the demands of this task. In Latin America,
Africa, and Asia governments are devoting re-
sources and manpower to the basic task of nation
building on a scale never dreamed of before.

These governments need our assistance. That
assistance is extended in a wide variety of ways:
through diplomacy, the stationing of our military
forces, military assistance, informational activi-
ties, exchange programs of all kinds, help in edu-
cational and cultural advancement, people-to-peo-
ple activities, assistance in economic programing,

1008

Department of Slate Bulletin

technical assistance, provision of capital, provi-
sion of agricultural surpluses, and the applica-
tion of trade and commodity price stabilization
policies. We are engaged in these and a variety
of other actions capable of affecting the orienta-
tion of men and institutions within these societies
toward the problems they face.

Some of these instruments are wholly at the
disposal of the United States Government, while
others can be utilized fully only with the coopera-
tion of private institutions (such as business en-
terprises, trade unions, universities, etc.) or
through international organizations. Each has
its own advantages, drawbacks, and side effects,
which may be as signilicant as their direct impact.

In view of the variety and complexity of these
instruments, it is of crucial importance that they
be closely concerted to common ends. A con-
scious and determined effort must be made to de-
velop, for each less developed country, a country
plan or system of priorities for the use of these
instruments based on :

• AA unified and realistic concept of the forces
at work within that country and the ways in
which these forces can be influenced or motivated
over any period of time.

• A clear understanding of the desired pace and
direction of modernization based on the limits and
possibilities set by the particular country's stage
of political, social, and economic development.

• A realistic undei-standing of the possible ef-
fect of the various instruments of action available
to us in promoting our objectives.

• A system for focusing and orchestrating
these instruments so that our limited influence is
maximized.

Coordination of U.S. Programs

In the preparation of this system of priorities,
and in coordinating and concerting United States
programs so as to insure its effective execution, the
American ambassador plays a vital role. Indeed
this is his central task in most of the less devel-
oped countries of the free world today.

In the early days after World War II many of
the United States programs designed to support
development were carried on independently in the
host counti-y. In some cases this resulted in ad-
ministrative confusion, duplication, and waste.
We have now learned that we can best accom-
plish our purposes in a coimtry by placing all of

the many activities in the charge of the
ambassador.

The resulting scope of his domain is vast in-
deed. To take the field of aid alone: The 80
United States Aid Missions abroad are staffed by
6,100 Americans and 8,500 foreign nationals, for
a total of almost 15,000 persons who are working
to hasten progress in fields that cover the whole
spectrum of hmnan endeavor. Their work in-
volves literally hundreds of different skills, from
linguistics to chemistry, from medicine to hotel
management.

In Jordan our technicians helped to develop
tourist facilities to cope with visitors to the Holy
Places; in Afghanistan we are helping to train
managers and technical people to run an airline;
in Iran we helped to develop new teaching ma-
terials so children could more readily learn to
read Persian; in the Sudan we mapped out new
roads to open up the countryside ; in Pakistan we
helped to combat the problem of the salting up of
land as a result of poor drainage. All over the
free world we have helped emerging peoples ac-
tively to seek out and solve an amazing range of
problems, helping to conduct what might well be
termed a "university of the world."

The American ambassador must supervise
United States participation in all these ventures.
In so doing he must bear in mind, however, that
basic responsibility for their success or failure
rests — and must continue to rest — on the host
counti-y. The essence of the free-world commu-
nity we are seeking to create is that each of its
members is fully independent, free to seek prog-
ress in the ways that are most congenial to its
people and its traditions. Indeed this is how
progress is most likely to be achieved — by people
who have assumed responsibility for their own
destiny and are seeking vigorously to discharge it.

If these countries wish expert counsel, however,
the American ambassador must be ready to help
them get it — from United States missions, from
such international agencies as the World Bank or
the International Monetary Fund, or from private
foundations, depending on the host country's
needs and desires. And he must himself be able
to discuss and consider with these countries the
variety of issues which are likely to arise in the
execution of United States programs for helping
that country :

Should primary or university education receive
priority ?

June 25, 1962

1009

Is public health more urgent than curative medi-
cine ?

Should roads or dams be built first ?

Should private American firms or Government
agencies assume responsibility for the fulfillment
of U.S. aid contracts?

The American ambassador must therefore un-
derstand these problems and indeed the broader
obstacles— including lack of adequate institu-
tions, the opposition of vested interests, and the
effect of fear and suspicion — which innovators
face in any comitry. He must recognize that suc-
cess in coping with these obstacles depends on the
emergence of political leaders, government admin-
istrators, military leaders, businessmen, trade
union officials, and others determined to achieve
progress— with all this involves. He must have
in mind the measures that are likely to promote
that emergence.

He must seek to insure that our economic, cul-
tural, and political programs vis-a-vis the less
developed countries are systematically geared to
this end. Programs for the exchange of persons
and information can help to widen the intellectual
horizons of potential leaders. Projects and pro-
grams to encourage private enterprise can
strengthen the growth of a progressive business
class. Assistance in education can promote the
emergence of imiovation-minded groups. Other
measures may insure exposure to appropriate ex-
ternal influence of groups which play a key role
in modernization, including the military.

In all these ways we should seek to promote
and enhance the entrepreneurial spirit which is
an indispensable component of modernization. It
is a practical lesson of our postwar experience that
a consensus among ourselves and those who take
a serious view of the modernization process within
their nations is one of the strongest bases for com-
mon action. This also makes possible a coimnon
perspective on even larger issues.

The Marshall plan was carried through by this
kind of alliance between Americans and groups of
men in each country, sometimes few in nmnber,
who were determined to work toward a revival of
their national economies. A major immediate ob-
jective in the carrying out of our policy toward the
underdeveloped areas must therefore be to help
to identify such men in each country and support
them.

The American ambassador must also focus or
the obstacles to the fulfillment of his task whicl
must be overcome in liis own Government. H(
must press Washington for prompt action and
for decision, rapidly and sensitively made, to meet
the unfolding requirements of the country tc
which he is accredited. He must insure that tlw
job gets done and that the conflicts of prioritj'
and criteria are resolved, back here in "WashingtoD
no less than in the field.

In so doing he must be attentive to the needs I
of tomorrow as well as today. The interests oil
neither the United States nor the host country
will be promoted by aid programs which do nof
face up to this challenge. This is not just a ques-
tion of conflict between political and economic aid
criteria. All of our aid has both its political and
economic aspects. It seeks to achieve overall—
or what might be termed political— progress
through economic means. It is rather a question
of making sure that our aid. in responding to the
economic and political needs of the moment, does
so in ways which contribute also to the long-term
development goals that we and the host country
share.

The "Development Man"

Development has thus become the central task
of the American ambassador in less developed
countries. He is not a negotiator with princes
but rather the representative of one whole society
to another: the representative of a vast country
dedicated, with all its talents and resources, to
lielping emerging nations master the wide-ranging
problems which confront a newcomer to the age
of growth.

Indeed, if one could stereotype tlie American
ambassador, as we have stereotyped his British and
French predecessors, he would be today the tech-
nician of modernization— t lie "development man.''
He is not a passive reporter but a man of action,
who assists the government to which he is ac-
credited in finding the means to get on with (he
job.

I describe this as an American stylo of diplo-
macy because it is a crystallization of what the
world sees— and riglitly so— as the best character-
istics of the Anu'i-ican.

Throughout the world America is l<nown as a
land in which i)pople have successfully found ways
to take full advanlage of their abundant natural

1010

Department of State Bulletin

esoiirces. Tlirougli skill, energy, and resource-
ulnt'ss our people have developed a high standard
■f living. A restless, self-critical search for better
aeans of doing the job, and a confidence that doing
o will make for a better future, have become our
lallniarks.

Happily it is precisely these qualities which are
leeded in many parts of the world today. In rep-
•esenting these qualities, the American ambassador
)ecomes both the representative of our way of life
md the crucial catalyst in assisting others to help
hemselves. He fulfills the entirely new concept
)f foreign policy wliich is required in helping the
ess developed countries meet the desperate chal-
enge which they face.

We must break with the passive role of the past,
n which diplomats registered the changes that
soldiers, explorers, and industrialists achieved,
t^ow diplomats themselves are harbingers of
jhange — among the innovators and leaders in the
march toward progress.

The American ambassador must be the spear-
head of this positive and constructive thrust. He
brings with him the tools to get on with the job.
He represents a vast array of energy and resources,
which is dedicated to this task. He must master
thoroughly the complex subject of development.
He must underetand how to project rates of
growth. He must be able to visualize the oppor-
tunities that can come from desalination of water
or the communications satellite. He must be a man
who can actively manage, not merely preside over,
the manifold work of the various United States
agencies in the counti-y to which he is accredited—
a man to whom the government of that country
can confidently turn for advice and counsel.

In short, he must be a man who can get the job
done— a man with a sense of urgency, a man whom
nothing defeats, a man who "can do" in the best
and most traditionally American sense of that
term.

In training our diplomats for this demanding
task, we must rise, as other Americans have risen
before us, to the challenge of our times. Lincoln's
judgment that the dogmas of the quiet past are
no longer adequate to the needs of the present is as
valid now as it was a century ago. A changing
world requires a changing role for the American

ambassador if the basic purposes of our foreign
policy are to be achieved.

This changing role is, indeed, already being rec-
ognized and fulfilled by members of the Foreign
Service in the furthest reaches of the free world.
Your colleagues there have already become pio-
neers of the emerging community of free nations,
as surely as our forefathers here were pioneers.
In joining their ranks, you go to posts of honor in
the great struggle that this country is waging for
a better woi"ld.

President Kennedy and President
of Cyprus Hold Talks at Washington

His Beatitude Archbishop Makarios, President
of the Repuhlic of Cyprus, visited the United
States June 5-9 as a Presidential gtiest. Follow-
ing is the text of a jomt communique released at
Washington on June 6 at the close of President
MaJcarios'' 2-day visit there.

White House press release dated June 6

President Kennedy and President Makarios
have had an extremely cordial discussion during
the past two days on topics of mutual interest to
their governments. The visit of Archbishop
Makarios afforded an opportunity for the two
Presidents to renew their acquaintance and to re-
view a variety of subjects of common concern.

Their talks included a review of major interna-
tional issues, as well as a discussion of the Govern-
ment of Cyprus' efforts to achieve economic and
social progress. President Kennedy restated
American interest in the development program of
Cyprus that is now taking shape and in assisting
in its implementation.

Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Foreign Min-
ister Spyros Kyprianou also participated in the
talks, as did the Cypriot Ambassador to the United
States, Zenon Rossides, and the American Am-
bassador to Cyprus, Fraser Wilkins.

The friendly and comprehensive exchange of
views between President Kennedy and Archbishop
Makarios has strengthened the bonds of friendship
between their two countries, which are based on
their common objectives of peace and progress.

June 25, 1962

1011

The Importance of Foreign Relations

hy Charles E. Bohlen

Special Assistant to the Secretary of State '

I must first of all express my deep personal ap-
preciation for the honor that you have just con-
ferred upon me.^ I take it also to be an honor
conveyed upon the Foreign Service of the United
States — to which I have had the pleasure and the
privilege to belong since 1929.

The importance of foreign relations to the well-
being and, indeed, the survival of our country
is a relatively recent development. Thirty-five
years ago this was not the case in regard to the
United States. Wlien I joined the Foreign Serv-
ice on March 1, 1929, this country had already
lapsed back, after our brief involvement in World
War I, to the traditional and comfortable practice
of isolationism. Foreign affairs was a matter of
interest to scholars, historians, and others in the
academic world and to a relative handful of Gov-
ernment officials.

In 1929 the cost to the American taxpayer of
Amierican foreign relations was minute. The
budget of the State Department was $14i/^ mil-
lion. The total membership in the Foreign
Service was 1,612. It was extremely difficult in
those days to elicit any great interest from the
Congress of the United States in the conduct of
our foreign policy. We had no political commit-
ments or alliances with any country in the world.
It is true we had a very small number of military
positions abroad — in the Philippines and in the
Panama Canal and in a few islands of the Pacific.
We were operating in accordance with the great
American tradition which had been set by the
Founding Fathei-s of this country. In his farewell

' Address made at commencement exercises at Wesleyan
University, Middletown, Conn., on June 3 (press release
852 dated June 1).

' Ambassador Bohlen received an honorary degree of
Doctor of Laws.

speech in 1796, George Washington, our first
President, had warned this coimtry against the
dangers of entangling alliances. We had faith-
fully followed this precept throughout our entire
history. We had, it is true, been a participant and
a very important one in the final victory of World
War I and, in effect, had been active in Latin
America. But then, so strong was this tradition,
so virtually uninterested was this country in the
development of the outside world, that we easily
and without great anxiety or concern drifted back
into the comfortable and traditional posture of
isolationism.

In 1929 the world was a remarkably different
place than it is today. The United States enjoyed
a degree of security from foreign attack perhaps
unequaled by any great power in history. We
were protected by two broad oceans; we had
friendly neighbors to the north and south of us
who had neither the power nor the inclination to
trouble our relations from the point of view of
national security. Over and above this, the com-
manding positions of the world were held by
European democracies whose basic philosophy in
regard to the relationship of man to state and
to the organization of human society was suf-
ficiently close to our own as to constitute no in-
herent menace, much less danger, to the security
and well-being of the United States. Our energies
were directed inward and devoted to the develop-
ment of this continent, to the perfection of our
industry, and to grappling with the problems of
our own society, with little or no thought as to the
consequences of the developments abroad.

The total budget of the United States in 1929
was $3.3 billion. Our expenditure on military
affairs was under $1 billion. We were, in effect,

1012

Deoartment of State Bulletin

a unarmed nation, confident in those days that
ur geographic distance and other natural de-
jnses would keep this country safe and secure.
Ve also operated, altliough we were only dimly
jnscious of it, luider the power of the British
eet, which after "World "War I effectively main-
lined the seaborne communications of the world.
929 was 4 years before the rise of Hitler. The
oviet "Union was just embarking on the first of
ps 5-year plans, designed to promote under
breed draft the industrialization of a backward,
2mil iterate, and agricultural country. Commu-
lism to the people of the "United States was merely
. term to describe the philosophy that animated
his vast country and the political movements in
ther parts of the world. In 1929 it was not a
latter of any current concern to the United
)tates.

Since that period, just 33 years ago, the changes
n the world both quantitative and qualitative
lave been breathtaking in their extent. "We have
een the rise of fascism, which led to the worst and
lost destructive war humanity has ever known.
Ve liave seen the growth of Soviet power and the
xtension of its sway over the nations of Eastern
Europe and over the mainland of China. "We have
een the breakdown of the great colonial empires
•f the "Western European democracies and the
mergence of over 42 new comitries, most of them
Fithin the last decade.

I.S. Involvement in International Scene

I could talk at length in regard to the physical
nd political changes that have occurred in the
rorld during this period. But perhaps the most
mportant and certainly the closest to the senti-
aents and lives of the American people has been
he change effected in our attitude toward foreign
.ffairs and our involvement in the international
cene. This change has not come about by the
lirect choice of the American people. It was
'orced on us by changes in the outside world. Yet
he effect on the consciousness of the American
)eople has been nonetheless as profound and
adical. The situation that I briefly described in
•egard to 1929 prevailed with only slight modifi-
iations up to the outbreak of World "War II.
riien, witliin the space of less than 5 years, this
iountry found itself quite literally catapulted
:rom a position of maximum security in which
[oreign relations cou'd be treated as a luxury, de-

manding no sacrifice or effort on the part of our
people, into a situation of virtually total respon-
sibility. There was little time in this process for
national consciousness to catch up with events;
and, indeed, even in this day — June 3, 1962 — it is
by no means certain that this process has been
completed, and it is on this aspect of our foreign
relations that I wish particularly to dwell today.

Since 1939 we have been involved in a great war,
but, in contrast to "World "War I, tliis war did not
afford us the luxury of returning to our well-worn
channel of isolationism. On the contrary, when
victory was finally acliieved over Germany and
Japan — in August 1945 — we were confronted with
a choice, new in its essence to the American people
but nonetheless vital for our future. "We had the
choice of either responding to the challenges
brought to this country by the dislocations and
devastations of wars or of turning our backs on
the world and resuming our parochial activities —
hidifferent to the fate of other countries. "We, I
am proud to say, as a people, elected the first al-
ternative. But in so doing we involved ourselves
in courses of action, programs, commitments, ex-
penditures, and dangers which could only have
been dimly perceived by the people of the United
States when peace came in 1945. And I would lika
to emphasize here that this choice was not made
because of any impulses coming from within
American society. We needed no extra territory
for its own sake; we did not need the acquisition
of favorite positions for economic reasons since
the requirements of our economy could be well
satisfied by the normal processes of change. The
story of the road that we have taken can perhaps
best be illustrated in figures. This process has
been immensely costly to the United States, but I
tliink few at this date would question that the
choice made was the right one. Let us compare
for a moment the annual expenditures of the year
1929 with those of 1962.

In 1929 the gross national product of the United
States was $104 billion. In 1961 it was $528 bil-
lion. This fivefold increase in GNP has brought
with it a considerable change in the composition of
the social structure of the United States. I shall
not attempt to outline in what form these social
changes have occurred, nor how and why they
occurred. They do not belong to the main theme
of my talk.

During this same period, there has been an even
greater increase in the Federal budget of the

lune 25. 1962

1013

United States. In 1929 the budget was approxi-
mately $3.3 billion. In 1961 it was $81.5 billion.
At a time when the gross national product was
increasing almost 5 times, the budget increased
almost 24 times. Foreign affairs represents, by
far, the chief reason for the greater increase of
budgetai-y expenses in the period I am speaking
about. The largest single item of our budget, con-
stituting over 60 percent of the total, has been the
cost of maintaining our military defenses in ade-
quate shape to meet the threats to our national
security and to permit the discharge of our inter-
national obligations in this field under postwar
conditions. Additional heavy items of annual ex-
penditures may also be written off to foreign
affaii-s. The continuing cost of foreign aid, both
military and economic, has run at the rate of about
$4 billion a year; the administrative costs of
the maintenance of the State Department estab-
lishments abroad, the cost of the aid missions, and
the USIA [United States Information Agency]
budget add up to close to another billion dol-
lars. In short, if the expenditures relating to our
new position in the world were eliminated from
the budget, we would find it in about the same
ratio of increase as our national income.

I have cited these figures merely to show you in
concrete form the cost to the American taxpayer
of the changed world situation and our involve-
ment in it ; and I must say, looking into the future
I see at the moment little grounds for believing
that our official expenditures in the foreign field
will be greatly reduced.

Changes Affecting Foreign Policy

In addition to the revolutionary change in the
position and responsibilities of the United States
in regard to the outside world, there have been a
niunber of profound and continuing changes which
affect our foreign policy and our commitments in
the world which are worth special mention.
These revolutions — for these changes are fully en-
titled to this overworked word — are interconnected
and interacting in their effect upon our foreign
policy and our operations abroad.

The first of these, and perhaps the most impor-
tant, has been the enormous growth in technical
and scientific knowledge. The past 30-odd years
have seen enormous strides and breakthroughs in
almost evoi-y field of Inunaii knowledge and scien-

tific achievement. The growth of technology and
science has been particularly noticeable in the
field of militai-y development. The discovery of
the secrets of fission and fusion has radically and
profoundly altered the circumstances of the con-
duct of foreign relations. This influence has been
concealed rather than overt but is nonetheless real.
The recognition of the enormous power of the i
nuclear weapons, and the realization that a global
nuclear war would have no winners but would be
an immeasurable catastrophe for humanity as a
whole, has tended to instill a greater sense of cau-
tion in regard to the use of force in international
affairs on the part of the governments possessing
the weapon.

I might add the qualification that this does not
apply to guerrilla warfare or acts of subversion
invoh-ing the use of force. It does, however, ap-
ply to what is known as traditional warfare;
namely, the use of the national forces of the coun-
tiy for armed military aggression against its
neighbors. It also does not apply, in the same de-
gree, to the policies and acts of governments not in
possession of the nuclear weapon. But, in relation
to the United States and the Soviet Union in par-
ticular, both of whom possess vast scores of atomic
weapons, the consequences of nuclear war ojx-rate
as a sort of brake on the traditional use of force
in international affairs. Insofar as the United
States is concerned, we are, of course, firmly com-
mitted to the principles of the Charter of the
United Nations, which precludes the use of force
as a means of settling disputes or quarrels.

In addition, however, we have thoroughly ab-
sorbed the meaning of the existence of nuclear
weapons and the care resulting therefrom which
must be used in dealing with international ]irob-
lenis. There is every reason to believe that the
leaders of the Soviet Union, who must be as aware
as we are of the destructive power of nuclear war-
fare, have drawn comparable lessons in their ef-
fect on the conduct of foreign affaii-s. Botli
nations are on record as stating their recognition
of the ineaniug of the immense advances in weapon
technology, and, more important than public
declarations, both nations have demonstrated in
practice that they indeed recognize this new factor
in international affairs. This i')rudenoe or re-
straint is not embodied in any formal agreement
between the United States and the Soviet Union.
But it most cei'tainly is a factor coiulil ioning their

1014

Department of State Bulletin

ctions in regard to the handling of international
isputes.

To some who perliiips have not assimilated the
leaning and the significance of modern weapons,
Ills restraint and prudence may sometimes appear
3 them to be brought about by timidity and lack
f boldness in our foreign policy. This is cer-
linly not the case, and I am sure that you will
,gi-ee that prudence and coolheadedness are
lerely the elementary signs of a mature realiza-
ion of the dangers inherent in any reckless use
f the military factor in the world as it is today,
t certainly underlay the willingness of the Com-
lunist powers to accept an armistice in Korea. It
ertainly lay behind the United States' willingness
0 accept an armistice in place of the more attrac-
ive and popular slogan of complete victory. It
ras this consideration, also, that underlay the
Jeneva Accords of 1954 in regard to Indochina,
t undoubtedly is a powerful factor governing the
ttitude of coimtries directly or indirectly involved
ti the sitiuition in Laos. It also plays its part in
he question of Berlin and Germany. These weap-
ns would, of course, be used to repel any attack
n the United States or its allies.

Another change which might be also described
s revolutionary has been the emergence of over
0 new nations into complete independence and
ationhood in the last decade. This has presented
he United States and other countries of the world
rith a whole range of new problems and new tasks.
^hese countries, without exception, have emerged
rom under the colonial domination of the Western
European democracies. The transition has, in
lost cases, been painful, and in many accompanied
ly armed action. The process hns not yet been
ompleted. But at the present time, while the
leady slogan of anticolonialism is still a powerful
actor in the attitude of these new countries, par-
icularly in relation to colonial possessions which
lave not yet traveled the road to independence,
here are very heartening signs of a growth of
naturity and stability in the attitudes and policies
>f many of these new nations, particularly in
^.frica. Five years ago the Conmiunists unques-
ionably had high hopes for these countries, seek-
ng to play upon and exacerbate their anticolonial
'eelings, their resentment at past domination by
he white races of the world, but more recently it
las become evident that these Communist hopes
vere misplaced and have indeed miscalculated.

These countries are so proud and sensitive in re-
gard to their newly won independence that they
are not disposed to accept the domination of Mos-
cow, wliich is inherent in the whole Communist
organization. They do not propose to substitute
new masters for the old and show every indication
of a firm intention to maintain their independence
of action and their right to organize their own
countries according to their own traditions and
not at the dictate of a foreign ideology.

Another I'evolutionary change which, in effect,
stems from the immense scientific and teclinologi-
cal advance which we have seen during this period
has been the influence of the growth of modern
methods of communication. Radio alone has
transformed the political life of many of these
countries commonly called underdeveloped. The
radio has perhaps been the greatest single instru-
ment for bringing the mass of the people into some
form of political activity. In the past political
power was very much the province of a very small
section of the population, who through inherited
position and education were able to run their coun-
tries without much regard for public opinion. The
radio, by placing loudspeakers in every bazaar, has
made mass public opinion in these comitries of
infinitely greater importance than it was pre-
viously. The wider dissemination of information
has by no means in every case brought with it
greater understanding or maturity, but it is a fact
of the modern world and one to which we pay the
greatest attention. This process will inevitably
continue into the future and render more complex,
and perhaps difficult, the conduct of our foreign
policy.

Another change which is also qualitative in its
aspect is what is pojiularly called the population
explosion in the world. The increase in popula-
tion, particularly among the underdeveloped na-
tions of the world, is a fundamental and extremely
important factor affecting international affairs.
This has been primarily due to the advance in
medical science, which has drastically reduced the
death rate in many countries, without any cori'e-
sponding reduction in the birth rate. I do not
pretend here to give you any answer to the ques-
tion, which is a most complicated and intricate one,
but I merely wish to call attention to the profound
effect tliat this great increase in the number of hu-
man beings in the world will have on the future.

The industrialized nations of the world are not
exempt in any way from this process, but the rate

June 25, 1962

1015

of growth of population in the underdeveloped
areas of the world has gone far ahead of the rate in
the more advanced countries. This is a world and
not a national problem.

I have mentioned here four areas of change,
each of which has had or will have a very definite
effect upon the foreign policies and foreign rela-
tions of the United States. There is one further
element of change which might be mentioned in
this same general connection. It arises, in part,
from the growth of information and the wider
dissemination of economic ideas. This might be
called the "revolution of rising expectations" and
has a considerable effect upon the attitudes of the
underdeveloped areas. The peoples of these areas
are increasingly aware that change and develop-
ment are dependent upon the work of human
beings, that there is no law of nature or God
which condemns people to subsistence levels.
This element may produce a contest between
achievement in this field and the political conse-
quences of the people's expectations. This senti-
ment is related to a problem in the world today
which may loom larger and larger as time passes.
The division of the world between countries with
advanced industrial technology and all of the
benefits to the people arising from this fact and
the economic development of those countries which
do not have this advantage may well become one
of the central problems of our times. It is, in
essence, the problem of rich nations and poor
nations. Despite the quantity of aid which the
United States, and increasingly the countries of
Western Europe, are providing to assist in the
development of these countries, the gap between
the two tends to widen rather than narrow.

Conduct of Relations With Free-World Countries

I have discussed so far certain generalized
changes which have occurred in the world scene
in the last 30-odd years, particularly since the
end of World War II. I would now, however,
like to devote a few minutes to the description of
how these changes have affected the conduct of
American foreign relations. In the first place
the postwar period has seen a vast expansion of
active American involvement in foreign affairs.
In 1929, for example, reflecting our posture of
political isolationism, the guidelines of our
diplomacy were those of an observer, an analyst,
and a reporter. Perhaps the most fundamental

conviction of the United States Government in
the prewar period was to avoid involvement, to
avoid any action which might create the impres-
sion of American commitment or, in fact, any
form of direct involvement in the great issues of
the day. I do not wish to overemphasize the as-
pect of isolationism in the United States because
there were a number of areas, particularly Latin
America, where our policy was far from passive.
Indeed, viewed in retrospect, our actions in Latin
America seem to smack too often of intervention.
But, in general, in regard to the great issues of
the 1930's the United States was an observer, not
a participant.

Since the war we have been a very active partic-
ipant in every respect, and this has led to a vast
increase in the number of officials abroad repre-
senting the United States in one capacity or
another. In 1929, as I have remarked, there were
only 1,612 members of the American Foreign Serv-
ice. Their functions were limited, their tasks
relatively light. Their chief duty, in addition
to those of observance and reporting that I have
mentioned, was the transaction of relatively rou-
tine matters of business with the governments to
which they were accredited. This, of necessity,
restricted their contacts and activities in any given
country. With the sudden change in the United
States position in the world and the descent upon
this country of a whole new series of responsibili-
ties, the role of the Foreign Service and of our
representation abroad was greatly expanded. At
the present time there are in the Foreign Service
of various categories some 6,660 officers — Ameri-
can citizens — staffing our embassies and consulates
in the field. In addition the AID [Agency for
International Development] and Information
Agency personnel add almost another 6,000. And,
finally, the number of our military stationed
abroad at various bases throughout the world rep-
resent approximately 1 million men. It is true
that approximately 40 percent of the number
aliroad are not pei-manently stationed in any one
place and are either on board ship or attached to
mobile activities. But essentially these million
men represent an extremely vital element of
American involvement in the world.

Furthermore, the character of our representa-
(ion has also radically changed. Our officials
abroad have to deal with an infinitely greater
variety of problems than was true of their fore-
runners in the Foreign Service. While it is still

1016

Department of State Bulletin

true that the chief function of our Foreign Service
personnel stationed abroad — and this is partic-
uhirly true of the top pei'sonnel, ambassadors,
ministers, and other senior officials — is the transac-
tion of business with the government to which
they are accredited, this is by no means the only
fmiction of our personnel abroad. Our involve-
ment with these countries, through allied associa-
tion or other forms of conmiitmcnt, places on the
shoulders of our Foreign Service personnel a very
wide range of responsibilities. Apart from the
administration of aid programs and the dissemina-
tion of information, Foreign Service personnel it-
self has greatly broadened representation respon-
sibilities. An ambassador in any given country
has executive powers as the chief representative of
the President. He has responsibility for the ac-
tivities and attitudes of all American officials sta-
tioned in that coimtry, is in direct charge of the
totality of American programs there, and any
failure of any subordinate officials will be directly
charged to his account.

In short, the duties, responsibilities, and func-
tions of American diplomatic representatives in
the countries of the free world are more arduous
and complex than they ever have been before in
our history. There is no reason to believe that
these will be reduced or lightened in the future.

Conduct of Relations With Communist Countries

"V\niat I have been speaking about earlier — the
fundamental changes that have occurred in the
world scene and the increased responsibilities of
American diplomats — relates primarily to our re-
lationships with the non-Commmiist countries of
the world. In our relations with Communist
comitries, and particularly the Soviet Union, there
has been no radical alteration insofar as dealing
directly with them is concerned. Ever since we
recognized the Soviet Union in 1933, the relations
with that country have always been special and
extremely limited in their scope. This derives
from the authoritarian nature of Soviet society,
which has been duplicated in other countries of
Eastern Europe. The reasons for this are mani-
fold and stem largely from the ideological aspect
of the Communist coimtries.

These nations are organized along lines which
are specifically designed to prevent the infiltration
of external influences. The activities of foreign
representatives in those countries, in most in-

stances, are very limited as to contact, and the
possibility of getting before the masses of people
any accurate or true account of the purposes and
aims of United States policy very difficult. All
media of information are controlled by a central
authority — the party — and nothing appears in
the Soviet press that does not have its approval.
Radio communications into the Soviet Union are
still selectively jammed, and it is up to the party
hierarchy to determine which ones and what sub-
jects can be permitted to be heard by Soviet
citizens.

But still, despite the seemingly unchanging na-
ture of Communist dictatorships, there are evident
signs of evolution and future change. These signs
are still sufficiently imprecise and vague, and it
would be a brave man who would predict the
direction in which they will tend. But certainly
the presence of the Communist powers constitutes
perhaps the chief element in the world scene which
is of concern to the United States. It is because
of the activities of these countries and the growth
of Soviet power, especially in the field of military
technology, that we spend 60 percent of our na-
tional budget for defense.

In recent years there have been signs of a cer-
tain diversity of impulse from the various members
of the bloc; and here in this field I would wani
against the danger of oversimplification. "VVliile
it is true that on major issues of foreign policy
the Communist countries assume identical posi-
tions, a perceptive glance at incipient tendencies
making for change is necessary if we are to follow
the eventual evolution of the Communist bloc
countries. Our treatment of these countries, as a
matter of policy, is not identical in every respect.
There was a time in the United States when the
view was popularly held that we had to deal with
a monolithic bloc mechanically perfected and ani-
mated by a single ideology whose one purpose
was the extension of their system over the world
at almost whatever cost. This view, I am glad
to say, has recently been considerably modified,
largely by events themselves within the Commu-
nist bloc. It is, of course, still true that the official
ideology is basically and fundamentally hostile
to our concept of the organization of society. It
is still true that this ideology is pursued without
any reference to the dictates of humanity or ethics.
But it is also true that the leaders of the Soviet
Union, as I indicated earlier, seem to be equally

June 25, J 962

1017

conscious of the devastating consequences which
would follow a general nuclear war.

It is difficult, if not impossible, to tell what will
be the course of events within the Communist bloc.
One thing, however, is certain. Change has not
been repealed by the Communist system. It is
entirely possible, if peace could be preserved with-
out surrender by the United States and its allies,
that these countries, while remaining officially
followers of the standard ideology, will, with the
process of time, begin to emerge more and more
as distinct national personalities.

Our diplomacy in regard to the Communist
bloc represents in itself a very special problem.
The function of diplomats behind the Iron Cur-
tain does not permit the same range of activities
which I have mentioned earlier in respect of di-
plomacy in regard to friendly countries, whether
allied or neutral. The scope of diplomacy is
strictly limited in Communist countries, and in the
last analysis comes down entirely to the dealings
between governments. No American diplomat be-
hind the Iron Curtain has any opportunity to
propagate American views to the peoples of those
countries. But here again the development of our
existing exchange programs with the Soviet
Union, for example, will undoubtedly, over a long
period of time, indirectly and slowly but none-
theless inevitably, bring about a greater dissemi-
nation of the truth about the United States.

I shall not speak of the specific foreign policy
issues that we have with the Soviet Union today
beyond mentioning that that of Berlin and Ger-
many is unquestionably the most potentially seri-
ous and difficult. It is the one place in the world
where the armed forces of the contending powers
are face to face and where a miscalculation or a
serious slip could start off a chain of action and
reaction which would have great consequences.
This subject, as you know, is under current dis-
cussion by the Secretary of State with the Soviet
Ambassador in Washington.

Informed Citizenry Essential

I have sought today to describe to you the
vast changes that have come about in the relation-
ships between tlie United States and tlic outside
world, but I have hardly done more than scratched
the surface. But a number of conclusions can be

drawn from these changes. The first is that,
having embarked, as befits our power and respon-
sibility in the woi'ld, with our primary objective
the well-being and security of the people of the
United States, this process will not be reversed.
We are full participants in the international scene,
and how we conduct ourselves in the world is a
matter of the utmost and intimate preoccupation
of all American citizens. In a democracy no policy
or course of action can hope to succeed unless it
enjoys a large measure of popular support. This
is particularly true in regard to the current poli-
cies of the United States, almost every one of
wliich requires considerable outlay of money,
which, in turn, means that congressional action
is necessary for their implementation.

The second conclusion that I would offer is that
change is still on the march in the world. In
fact one of the great functions and one of the price-
less advantages of democracy is that a society can
adjust relatively tranquilly to change. Change
that is held back over a long period of time pro-
duces pressures which eventually erupt into revolu-
tions or other forms of violence. The American
people in this swiftly moving world will be re-
quired to adjust to new conditions, new circum-
stances, and, indeed, new crises, and the lives of
every one of you of the graduating class of Wes-
leyan will be affected by clianges which may occur
at great distance from our shores, for foreign af-
fairs in the present world today, as distinct from
domestic events, carry with them the very survival
of the United States. In domestic matters this
country under its Constitution has shown during
the 175 years of its existence that we have the
ability to adapt our society to change. We must
demonstrate that we have the same capacity to deal
with changes in the foreign field. For in contra-
diction to domestic affairs, given the present state
of the world, a major mistake or miscalculation in
foreign affairs could produce incalculable conse-
quences for the well-being and security of our
own people.

I would, therefore, say to you that a deep and
informed interest in foreign affairs is a requisite
for all American citizens and particularly for
those of your generation. Without it, our diplo-
macy will not bo successful. With it, there is no
reason for us to fear the future.

1018

Department of State Bulletin

The Practice of Peace

iy Harlan CUvcJand

Assistant Seeretai-y for International Organization Affairs ^

Listen for a moment to the public debate about
American foreign policy. Note the spastic reac-
tions to familiar Communist ploys, the complaints
that 20-year problems remain unsolved at the end
of the first fiscal year, the doubts about the alli-
ances we have created and the United Nations sys-
tem we have nurtured. Listen especially to the
gloomy propliecies of those who are anxious to
win but reluctant to train for the race, who pine
for "victory" but cannot defuie it and would prefer
not to pay for it.

It seems that the fortunate history which led
us to world leadership did not necessarily build
into us the qualities of great leadership — which
are foresight, persistence, toughness, maturity,
and a certain unwarranted optimism. We are
quite capable of developing these qualities: for
Americans, we are bound to believe, nothing is im-
possible. The story is told in India of a cow being
chased by a tiger. The cow came to a tree, from
which a monkey called down: '"Climb up, climb
up." The cow said she could not climb a tree.
The monkey replied, "This is one tree you've gotta
climb." This business of world leadership is some-
thing we've just gotta learn to do.

We can isolate from the public debate several
themes which in my judgment are obstacles to the
effective use of our own power:

There is a self-induced pessimism, resulting
from a chronic tendency to overestimate the Com-
munists and underestimate the quality of our own
foreign policies.

" Address made at the Founders' Award dinner at the
New School for Social Research, New York, N.T., on
May 28 (press release 340).

There is the feeling of frustration which fol-
lows the discovery that leading the free world is
hard and thankless work.

There is the school of thought, miscalled "real-
istic," that underestimates the power of ideas and
especially the power of the idea of freedom.

And there is the illusion that foreign policy is-
sues are comfortably two-sided, that we're either
up or we're down, and that something called vic-
tory can be something called total.

There is, I think, a more rational (and more
complicated) way to look at American foreign pol-
icy, a more rational basis for the self-confidence we
regard as characteristically American. William
James called it the "pure inward willingness to
face the world" and "find a zest in it." Let's face
the world together for a few moments tonight and
see if we can fuid a zest in it.

Dangerous But Exhilarating World

The world we face is first of all exhilarating —
because it's an exceedingly dangerous world.
There are dangers of guerrilla war spreading into
larger conventional war; of conventional war
spreading into nuclear war; of nuclear war being
set off by accident or act of insanity.

There are other dangers. There is the danger
of Communist subversion — diminished now in
Europe, active in Asia, just beginning in Africa
and Latin America. There is the danger of vio-
lence if certain countries do not reform old and
corrupt systems which stand in the way of prog-
ress in the people's living. There is the danger to
racial minorities as dominant racial majorities ex-
periment with the levers of political power in

June 25, ?962

1019

newly independent nations. There is the danger
that some nations may try to catch up with the
20th century so fast that the machinery of gov-
ernment just breaks down or is delivered in des-
peration to Communist scavengers or men on
horseback. So it's a dangei'ous world, all right.

Second, whatever you have heard or read to the
contrary, the United States is not "losing the cold
war." The cold war still is a standoff, but leaning
our way. How it goes from here on depends more
on what toe do than on what they do.

Russia is powerful and dangerous. Communist
China is big and dangerous. And Communist
parties in some places still are a threat. But the
facts of the matter are :

That not one of the 40 countries which have
become independent since World War II has
chosen communism as a system of government;

That most nations — including some quite weak
nations — have proved to be highly allergic to
Communist propaganda ;

That Communist parties throughout the world
have lost strength in many more places than they
have gained strength during the past 10 years;

That the betrayal of the Cuban revolution to
communism after Castro took over has resulted in
the Castro government's being thrown out of inter-
American society ; and

That, in general, nationalism and the drive for
independence have turned out to be much more
powerful political forces than communism.

Third, there ob\aously are troubles in the Com-
munist world. We do not yet know all that they
mean for us. They may well contribute to the
dangers of an already dangerous world. But at
least they mean that Communist ideology is not
the monolithic force it was once assumed to be.

Fourth, the non-Communist world is growing
in strength and unity. There is a fission in the
Communist bloc, but in Europe and the Atlantic
community the trend of the fifties and sixties is
not fission but fusion. In the Western Hemisphere
a newly awakened community, cemented not by
coercion but by consent, is beginning to set a con-
tinent and a quarter on fire with a revolution of
modernization. In Africa and Asia the former
leaders of independence movements are spending
less time sliouting for indepoivlonce abroad and
more time trying to make it mean something at
home.

Making Peace Operational

All this is good news. Much of the good news
is the direct result of American leadership, Amer-
ican resources, American initiative. The lesson
fi'om experience in the postwar world is a lesson
in how to make peace operational. We have helped
invent a remarkable variety of techniques to help
leaders modernize their national economies. And
we have helped invent, also, an extraordinary
range of ways in which the international com-
munity can be physically present with firefighting
equipment when the flames from brush fires lick at
the foundations of civilization itself.

Look around the world and you see 75 members
of the United Nations furnishing nation-building
help to 110 member countries and territories.
Look around the world and you see the interna-
tional community present, always with United
States support, wherever there is danger of spon-
taneous combustion — or arson :

In the Middle East, a United Nations team of
truce supervisors has been on the job for 14 years,
ready to show up on a moment's notice if fighting
breaks out again. During the recent incident on
the shores of the Sea of Galilee, that team showed
up in the middle of the night and an action which
started at midnight had been brought to a cease-
fire by 7 :30 a.m.

Down in the Gaza Strip and at the mouth of the
Gulf of Aqaba, the United Nations Emergency
Force keeps up a ceaseless, 24-hour patrol by foot,
jeep, and small aircraft — a peace watch now in its
sixth year.

In Korea United Nations machinery is still on
the armistice line negotiated 9 years ago.

In West New Guinea hostilities sputter between
Indonesian parachutists and Dutch patrols — while
a U.N. moderator (who happens to be a trustee of
the New School) is working hard to bring the
parties back to the negotiating table.

In Kashmir U.N. observei-s try to preserve a 12-
year-old truce, and the Security Council will meet
again soon to see wliat sense can be made of an
emotional quarrel between two ancient peoples that
should be friends.

In Berlin a 15-year stalemate is still frozen
hard, but there is talk of yet another piece of inter-
national machinery, an authority to guarantee
access into AVest Berlin.

In Viet -Nam, in the most flammable spot on
earth, an International Control Commission is

1020

Departmenf of Sfafe Bulletin

onsideriiig a charge that the Communists of
^orth Viet-Nam have engaged in subversion and
;overt aggression.

In the Congo an international mission of 17,000
;oldiers and 420 civilian advisei-s is tiying to raise
ip a Congo nation while preventing civil war and
mediating the constitutional issues that the leaders
ire warring about.

In Geneva disannament negotiations talk on,
md new talks began today on an international ar-
rangement in outer space. After several months
of this, the sounds from Geneva are a little less
strident, a little more like the dialog of men nego-
tiating about reality.

In short, the practice of peace has become very
operational indeed. We are beginning to learn
from experience, and such learning is, after all,
the basis of the wisest teachings of the wisest men
in the history of civilization.

Discomforts of Power

But there are still a dozen major rows in the
world's nursery, and we are in the middle of each
of them, as party to the conflict if it stems from
Conmiunist ambitions, or as behind-the-scenes
peacemaker if it's a matter of domestic relations
inside the free world. The exercise of power is a
busy life, we find — and a frusti-ating one.

We know from the study of administration that
the high executive in business or government looks
very powerful from the outside: he can do any-
thing he likes — or so his friends tliink. But as he
rises in responsibility, he himself is mostly con-
scious of the limitations on his power, the imjior-
tunities of his friends, the "shivs" of his
competitors, and the brickbats of his critics.

Something like this has happened to us as a
nation. We worked hard for national greatness
and awoke in the first half of this century to find
we had arrived. And suddenly it seems that
greatness is a great deal of trouble, is dreadfully
expensive, is likely as not to invite a stream of
sour criticism. If we take a few thousands of
Chinese refugees, some people want to know why
we don't take a few millions; if we vote 3 billion
for foi'eign aid. there are some who think it should
liave been 4 billion ; if we put up a third of the
cost of a TT.N. project, there are those who do not
see why we should not put up half.

June 25, 1962

643010—62 8

Frustrated by the natural frustrations of great-
ness, fearful of their own fears, bored by the
loneliness of power, some Americans are willing
to shuck off the role of leadership by acting in
ways that guarantee nobody will follow our lead.
But in a world where those who believe in coercion
will win if those who believe in freedom falter, the
alternative of "osti'ich-like forgetfulness" (Wil-
liam James again) is just no longer available.
We are going to have the discomforts of power
anyway : we might as well enjoy its exhilarations
too.

When we meet in Washington on some new crisis
each week, there is nearly always somebody who
will say — or write in a newspaper column the
next day — "Lord, do we have to be in the middle
of this one too?" The answer is nearly always,
yes, we have to be in the middle of tliis one too.
For we cannot escape the reach of our own power,
and the middle of things is precisely where power
is always exercised.

Extending Freedom's Writ

Why are we doing better than most Americans
seem to think we are doing? The reason is that
we are putting our considerable power behind the
persuasive, self-advertising idea that people
should have a say in their own destiny.

All manifestations of man's inliumanity to man
arouse the deepest concern of the United States.
The case could not be otherwise with us.

By actions as well as words, we tried from the
beginning of our newly won independence to make
ourselves the advocates of the poor against op-
pression, of freedom in an age of arbitrary power,
of tolerance in an age of persecution, of the hu-
mane virtues among men accustomed to sacrificing
them to brute i-ule. By our victory in the Amer-
ican Revolution we won a charter of liberty from
the hands of power. But we did not stop there.
By our practical instincts in the American Consti-
tutional Convention we used our charter of liberty
to grant power to a charter of responsibility to do
the hard work of liberty. Thus we tried over the
years to abolish caste and monopoly. We took in
the immigrant and the hopeless — not too many,
hut a great many. We conjured great cities and
states out of prairie-s and forests. We equalized
educational opportunities and so narrowed the gap
at the start of life's contests. We extemporized

1021

governments on frontiers until mature govern-
ments could harden in the mold of responsible
power.

In all this striving we often strayed. Yet when
we strayed — as we did in the case of the Amer-
ican Negro — moral forces within the American
conscience refused to give the Nation any rest
until wrongs were righted. Today the weight of
American public opinion, and the full force of the
Federal Government, are behind a winning drive
to invest the American Negro with all the at-
tributes of effective first-class citizenship and to
integrate him full}-, if belntedly, into the social
fabric of America.

Because we have undergone and are undergoing
these trials within the United States, our Govern-
ment is alive to the similar yearnings of others.
This is why the national purpose of the United
States is to support an orderly, rapid, and peace-
ful process for eliminating conditions where one
people can dominate a second people against its
will. Our further purpose is to enlarge the mean-
ing of self-determination so that political inde-
pendence, which is only a first step toward free-
dom, will be used not for new varieties of op-
pression but to give all peoples a chance to affect
their own destiny — in legal, economic, social,
ethnic, cultural, and religious matters as well.

This larger meaning of self-determination, we
regret to see, is in trouble the world over. There
are white people who are denj-ing its bill of rights
to colored people and to other whites alike. There
are colored people who would deny its bill of
rights to white people and to other colored people
alike. We see gi-oups of all races who are willing
to use their political party, economic class, social
rank, religious sect, or the weiglit of their ma-
jority numbers to push other people around.

We don't like the idea that above the law there
is a lawgiver from whom there is no appeal and
no refuge. We never have liked that idea here at
home, and so we have mostly gotten rid of systems
that provide freedom only for the powerful to ex-
ploit the weak. We don't like it in the Couununist
dictatorship.^^. And we don't go for it in Africa or
Asia or Latin America either.

Wliatever it's called, ])eople all over the world
seem to recognize freedom when they see it^ — and
shy away from slavery even when it's called free-
dom. So they go on struggling, blindly some-
times and bloodily, and we go on trying to help
them.

We hope, of course, they will not forget tin
when the going was rough we were working han
to enlarge the area in which the writ of our Decl
ration of Independence might nm — it speaks, yoi
will recall, not of Americans but of "all men."
But we would help anyhow, because we believe
down very deep that for all men freedom works
better, and also feels better, than coercion.

When it comes to freedom's writ we Americans
liave just enougli unwarranted optimism to believe
that the future must inevitably be better than the
past. And it will, too, // we remember that the
inevitable is but another name for hard work in
vineyards with short names and long futures —
like nuclear deterrence, counterinsurgency, and
Berlin: like disannament, international peace-
keeping, and the governance of outer space; like
the Common Market, nation-building, foreign aid,
and the United Nations.

A New Kind of Victory

If we develop the foresight to thhik about the
future in decades, not just in weeks or fiscal years :
if we show the maturity to reject easy answers
which won't work; if we have the toughness of
nerve to be cool in chronic crisis; and if we acquire
the persistence to stick everlastingly at it — we
shall cei-tainly get where we want to go.

Where do we want to go ? America is called to
prophesy, a wise man said on television a few
weeks ago. The raw material of prophecy lies all
about us.

What we see emerging from these complex and
often frustrating activities is a series of overlap-
]iing communities of consent — a unified Europe, a
developing heniisphere, an Atlantic partnei"ship,
a growing consensus among the nations that rim
the Pacific Ocean. We see the shared values and
purposes of these nations matched by growing
bonds of association with the younger nations in
the older cradles of civilization. We see the Com-
munists sometimes hnpeding but never for long
obstructing the building of nations and their coa-
lescing into free conununities. We see the United
Nations as the umbrella for institutions that re-
flect this wider community of the free, the U.N. |
Charter as a noble expression of the beliefs we
ourselves hold.

Somewhere along the line we see new leadei-s of
commimism facing with realism the fact that their
old di'eam of a Communist "one world" is an ob-

1022

Deparfmeni of State Bulletin

olete and therefore perilous delusion. They may
hen persist for a further time in trying to insu-
ate themselves from tlie unifjnng forces of
icience, education, and modern industry. Even-
ually, I am persuaded, they must open their so-
dety to the overwhelming benefits and require-
nents of a hopelessly interdependent world.

Then the Soviet Union may even decide to join
he United Nations in fact, and not in name only,
^nd at tl\at moment I am sure the United States
vill eagerly vie for the honor of sponsoring the
Soviet application for full membership in tlie
■vorld community.

When the world of consent has thus seduced the
ivorld of coercion, we will be face to face with a
lew Ivind of victory.

It won't be "tota.1"' — the real world can never
)e described with absolute words; real goals are
lever fully achieved.

It won't be cheap — but, as Emei"son reminded
IS, economy does not consist in saving the coal but
n using the time while it bums.

But it will be the kind of victory that has ra-
ional meaning in the nuclear age. It will not be
von by killing or impoverisliing others. It will
)e the best of all possible victories, for it can be
ihared with all mankind.

'resident Congratulates Venezuela
>n Firm Defense of Democracy

Folloming is the text of a letter delivered on
June 5 to President Romulo Befancourt of Vene-
iuela by U.S. Ambassador C. Allan Stewart.

'ress release 365 dated Jone 6

JtTNE 5, 1962

IVIr. President: I should like, through you, to
sxtend my congratulations and those of the people
)f this comitry to the people, government and
irmed forces of Venezuela for their action in pre-
erving constitutional democracy against those who
lave attempted to overthrow your freely elected
government.

The preservation and strengthening of freely
elected constitutional government is the aspiration
3f all the peoples of the Americas and progress in
;his continent under the Alianza Para El Progreso
iepends in large measure in effecting change
through peaceful and democratic means and avoid-

ing violent interruptions of the constitutional
process.

We deeply deplore the loss of life and other
heavy casualties which were caused in your coimtry
by recent insurrections and extend our condolences
to those bereaved.

John F. Kennedy

U.S. Expresses Concern at Threat
of Renewed Violence in Algeria

Defartment Statement '

The United States considers the accords reached
at Evian as the charter of the new Algeria. The
accords bear witness to the statesmanship of the
French Government under General de Gaulle and
to the political maturity of the FLN {Forces de la
liberation nationalel leadership. They contain
the essential ingredients of a briglit future for
Algeria, cooperation between the two communities,
and cooperation between France and Algeria. We
believe this cooperation to be particularly impor-
tant because we live in a world where the pace
of development has become infinitely more rapid
than at any time in the past. Simply to remain
in step with this pace requires a major effort.
Newly independent countries face the additional
problem of having to catch up with this acceler-
ated pace. This demands an almost superhuman
effort and requires among other things the full
utilization of all the resources — spiritual, human,
and material — of the society. With these consid-
erations in mind, the free world stands aghast
at the callous announcement on the part of the
OAS [Organisation de Vannee secrete^, as re-
ported in today's press, that the merciless killing
of innocent peoples will be resumed on a schedule
beginning at midnight June 5 unless thej' obtain a
"satisfactory response" fi-om negotiations now al-
legedly in progress between certain French ele-
ments and Algerian nationalists. Such wanton
murder has no excuse, no justification, and can
lead only to a sadder future. Humanity recog-
nizes no extenuating circumstances in this brutal
violence against defenseless men, women, and chil-
dren and fervently hopes that the senseless killing
which has already cost so many lives may not be
taken up again.

' Read to news correspondents on June 4 by Lincoln
White, Director, Office of News.

^^lne 25, 1962

1023

The Approach to Poverty

hy John Kenneth Galbraith
Ambassador to India ^

Among the enterprises currently attracting the
energies of man, one of considerable moment is
his effort to lamich himself across space. A sec-
ond, less grand, rather less costly, but not perhaps
less important, is the effort to improve the position
of those who will stay behind. My jjurpose here
is to consider the way in which we are tackling the
second of these tasks and the possibility for im-
pirovement. That such a possibility exists is evi-
dent from a fairly cursory comparison of the con-
quest of poverty with the conquest of space.

The latter, we take for granted, will be ap-
proached only after the most comprehensive con-
sideration of the problem to be solved. In the case
of travel to the moon the energy requisite for
escape from the earth, protection from radiation,
extremas of temperature, tedium, and other haz-
ards and discomforts en route, the arrangement of
an unclimactic arrival, provision for a return jour-
ney by those unattracted by permanent settlement,
and, quite literally, a thousand other matters are
all, one is assured, the subject of the most minute
calculation. Nor is anything that is vital slighted
because of a shortage of money. The knowledge
that such care is being exercised will, one imagines,
substantially lessen, even if it does not entirely
eliminate, the personal misgivings of the fii-st
passengers.

Our approach to poverty is more casual. All
prophets of the commonplace agree that its amelio-
ration is also an important task. Especially in
this season of commencement speeches we are reg-
ularly so reminded. But, remarkably, we have no
agreed view or even any strong consensus as to why

* Address made at commencement exercises at Lewis and
Clarl: College, Portland, Oreg., on June 3 (press release
351 dated Jnnel).

poverty exists. Over the last two centuries we
have had an active and increasingly sophisticated
discussion of the forces which influence economic
growth, that is to say increases in total and per
capita income and well-being. Without excep-
tion, this discussion — of incentives to effort, means
for encouraging saving and capital formation,
ways of promoting technological advance — ap-
plies to societies that are m process of growth.
But the central feature of the poverty-ridden com-
munity is the absence of any tendency to improve-
ment. Instead there is stagnation in output and
income, and this perpetuates itself year after year
and from generation to generation. One caimot
extend the analysis of the advancing society to this
stagnation. Of this stagnation, we have no
analysis.

Commonly Accepted Causes of Poverty

Wliat we do have is an astonishing number of as-
sumptions as to what is wrong. It is these as-
sumptions— many of them unexamined, many of
them self-contradictory, and all of them of limited
api)licability — on which, at least until recently, we
have had to base our remedial action. One conse-
quence is that within the next few years men will
reach the moon, and hopefully all who are worthy,
righteous, and good citizens will return, while the
most acute problem of this planet will remain un-
solved. If these strictures seem severe, let me list
the causes to which, depending on ideology, per-
sonal preference, convenience, and even pure
accident, we regularly attribute the poverty of
nations.

1. The people are poor because they prefer it
that way. Poverty, in more formidable language,
reflects the value system of the people.

1024

Department of Sfate Bulletin

This is persuasive. Few Americans have looked
at an Asian or African country without reflecting
on the favorable effect of a little American drive.
Nor is the tendency ours alone. Visitors to the
Central Asian republics of the Soviet Union are
told (by Russians) that the people are relatively
backward because they are very easygoing. Yet
there can scarcely be a country in the world where
the desire for economic improvement does not
exist or where, indeed, it is not a political impera-
tive. We need also to remember that Kipling's
Englishman dismissed the sorry state of the comi-
try with an easy wave of his hand and the state-
ment: "The natives are bloody lazy, you know."
When it is so couched, we indignantly reject such
spurious anthropology.

2. The country is naturally poor.

This is the explanation which comes most readily
to our tongue. It seems the obvious answer where
the soil is sparse and unwatered, the forests thin,
and the subsoil barren. How could Bedouins or
Navajos be rich ? But this is an explanation which
badly explains the wealth of Switzerland or the
relative wealth of Israel, both states that are poor
in natural resources. It leads one to wonder why
West Virginia, a State phenomenally rich in nat-
ural resources, should have incomes far below
those of the arid and barren West.

3. The country is poor because it has been kept
in a state of colonial oppression.

Over great parts of the world this is the most
evocative of explanations. The British, French,
and Dutch were in business not for the benefit
of their subject peoples but for the benefit of
themselves. So the welfare of the colonial peo-
ples was ignored, and they still pay for these
centuries of indifference, exploitation, and rejec-
tion. Moreover, in an awkward inversion of his-
torical process, certain of the least progressive of
the colonial regimes lasted the best. The greatest
neglect was the longest endured. Yet again there
are obvious difficulties with this explanation. In
many parts of the world — Latin America comes
immediately to mind — colonialism is far in the
past but poverty continues. And elsewhere — in
Australia, Canada, Ireland, the United States —
colonial rule did not exclude a considerable meas-
ure of contemporaiy prosperity. British India —
that part of India in which British administration
was the most comprehensive and lasted for the
longest time — is today measurably the most pro-
gressive part of the subcontinent.

4. Poverty is the consequence of class exploita-
tion.

The counterpart of the poverty of the many is
the great opulence of the few. The second is the
cause of the first. This explanation is suggested
by arithmetic and supported by a formidable dia-
lectic. And it is difficult to imderstand why an
Andean peasant, or his counterpart in Central
America or the Middle East, should seek to en-
hance his income by irrigation, improved seed, or
acceptable livestock when he has learned that any-
thing in excess of subsistence will be appropriated
by the landlord, tax collector, moneylender, or
merchant. Yet the world has much poverty with-
out evident exploiters. In India and Pakistan
there are millions of small landowning peasants
who are very poor but whose poverty cannot be
related to the enrichment of any landlord, money-
lender, tax collector, or other visible oppressor.

5. Poverty is caused by insufficient capital.
This seems almost self-evident. Low income

allows of no saving. Without saving and invest-
ment, there can be no economic advance ; so poverty
is self-perpetuating. Yet in the Middle East as
also in South America — Venezuela is particularly
a case in point — oil provides a rich source of reve-
nue and capital is not scarce. But the vast ma-
jority of the people remain exceedingly poor.

6. Overpopulation is the cause of poverty.

In many countries it is plain that an insufficient
revenue must be divided between an excessively
large number of claimants. In the typical village
of India there is rarely enough work to go around.
Fewer hands could and would do the same work.
If the population were smaller, each person would
have a greater share. Yet elsewhere, were some
of the people spirited away to another planet, per
capita income would not rise. Everyone works
at full capacity for the little he gets. If the in-
dividual went, so would his contribution. Others
would produce no more ; so the share of each would
remain the same. And, as a matter of practical
observation, though poverty is often associated
with dense population, it is also often associated
with sparse population. The Amazon basin is
very sparsely populated and very poor. Southern
Brazil is much more densely populated and much
more prosperous.

7. Poverty is caused by poor economic policy.
The poor country is infirm in its commitment to

free enterprise or, alternatively, to socialism. In-
flation is the enemy of economic advance, or alter-

June 25, 1962

1025

natively, the fault lies with excessively orthodox
efforts at economic stabilization.

Experience with the less developed lands does
induce respect for well-considered economic policy.
But it is evident that these explanations involve
an awkward measure of internal contradiction.
Moreover, the most prominent fact about the very
poor country is not that it has free enterprise or
socialism but that it has nothing. And inflation,
which is chronic in many of the poor lands, is in-
variably a symptom of much more deeply seated
disorders — specifically of too many unproductive
claims on limited income and of governments that
are inherently incapable of curbing the demands
of competing groups.

8. Poverty is caused by ignorance.

There is no largely literate population in the
world which is poor, and there is no illiterate
population that is otherwise. Yet here one en-
counters the question of how a poor and illiterate
people goes about providing themselves with a
school system. Wlience will come the resources?
So considered, poverty is a cause of ignorance as
well as a result.

People the Common Denominator of Progress

The list of commonly accepted causes of poverty
is by no means complete. We regularly attribute
some role to the slow rate of transfer of techno-
logical knowledge. People remain with primitive
and poverty-inducing methods of agriculture and
industry because they have not been apprised of
anything better. Alaric, the Fourth Crusade,
Genghis Khan, and the brothers Pizarro showed
that war, rapine, and predacity, if practiced with
sufficient enthusiasm, can have an enduring effect
on income. The comnuuiities which were the
principal objects of their attention have been poor
ever since. One could go on.

But the point is sufficiently clear. We have a
gi'eat many causes of poverty, nearly all in some
measure convincing but all limited in their appli-
cation. To prescribe on the basis of any one of
these causes must obviously be dangerous. If ig-
norance is the cause of poverty, capital for power
plants or even plows will miss the point. If it is
caused by the oppression of landlords, provision
of improved seed will do no good. No one should
urge a population policy if overpopulation is not
the problem. And all other gains can obviously
be annulled if population is the problem. It will

do little good to control inflation if stabilization
serves only to reveal the underlying problems of
the society in even harsher form.

What then is our course ?

First, we must see poverty as the product of a
plurality of causes. And several causes will
normally operate in any country. This will vary
with culture and historical antecedents. So we
should expect that between Latin America, the
Asian subcontinent, Africa, the Middle East, the
difference in tlie admixture of cause will be very
great. There are some advantages in this diver-
sity. It means that any argument over the causes
of poverty can readily be resolved by agreeing
that all are right.

It follows from the diversity of causes that we
must take an eclectic view of remedies. Espe-
cially we must not allow dogma to govern our
prescription. One of our advantages, potentially
at least, over the Soviet design for economic de-
velopment is a greater freedom from controlling
doctrine and hence a greater capacity to accommo-
date remedies to cause. We must protect that
advantage.

Nor should we select remedies for their conven-
ience. There are some presumptive remedies for
poverty that come much more readily to hand than
others. Technical assistance is easier to provide
to farmers than land reform. A hydroelectric
power project is easier to launch than a soimd
system of elementary education. To provide an
effective system of public administration for peo-
ple newly emerging from colonial rule is peculiarly
baffling. Yet if a bad land system, mass illiteracy,
a corrupt, incompetent, or exiguous public ad-
ministration— or all three — are the heart of the
matter, the provision of technical aid or the dam-
ming of rivers will do little good. Given other
causes, these may do great good.

Yet some generalization about the problem of
poverty is inescapable. In pleading for a clinical
examination of each case, one could easily be
urging endless study and delay in a world that
is clamoring for action. And there is one general-
ization with which we are at least, reasonably safe :
People are tlie one common denominator of prog-
ress. So, paucis verbis, no improvement is possi-
ble with unimproved people, and advance is
inevitable when people are liberated and educated.

This is also a proposition of which, one can
report with some pleasure, there is growing recog-
nition. Thanks in considerable part to the ener-

1026

Department of State Bulletin

getic advocacy of Senator [Hubei*t H.] Hum-
phrey, there has been a growing recognition of
the urgency of education for economic develop-
ment. It would be wrong to write down the im-
l)or(ance of roads, railroads, power plants, mills,
and the other familiar furniture of economic de-
velopment. At some stages of development — the
stage that India and Pakistan have now reached
for example — they are central to tlie strategy of
development. But we are coming to realize, I
think, that there is a certain sterility in economic
monuments that stand as isolated islands in a sea
of illiteracy. Conquest of this comes first.

Similarly the Alliance for Progi-ess has recog-
nized that economic liberation is a frequent first
step to economic advance. Until people have a
part in economic progress, there will be no eco-

nomic progress. No doubt it will take time to
convince everyone, both at home and abroad, of
this often inconvenient fact. And some, no doubt,
will continue to urge that no boat be rocked, that
we buy our way around refonn, or to hope that
privilege, however unstable, will at least last their
lifetime. Nevertheless, recognition of the indis-
pensability of social justice for social progress is
a major step.

This is modest reassurance. In the tecluiiques
of problem solving, those who are tackling the
tasks of space travel are unquestionably well in
advance of those of us who continue to grovel in
the problems of this planet. So, if we are modest
about our achievements in the attack on poverty,
we should realize, as Winston Churchill once said,
that we have mvich to be modest about.

Trade Policy Choices Facing the United States

hy Joseph D. Coppock

Direct&r, Foreign Economic Advisory Staff '

It is most gratifying to meet with an industry
association which is genuinely interested in the na-
tional question of the foreign trade policy of the
United States.

Present-day politics and economics place a great
burden on the businessman. He knows that he has
to run a profitable business, if he is going to run
one at all. He also knows that he has to keep con-
stantl}' infoiTned on public policies and even to
make sound judgments on them. Our form of po-
litical and economic organization requires that
i-esponsible business people wear two hats. One
hat is obviously that of managers or owners of
enterprises. The other hat is that of conscientious
participants in the political process.

The chances are veiy high that public questions
are viewed differently, according to the hat the
person is wearing. What is good for a particular

' Address made before Uie Work Glove Institute at Chi-
cago, 111., on June 7 (press release 359 dated .Tune 5).

firm or industry might or might not be good for
the country; and what is good for the country
might or might not be good for a particular firm
or industry. Most of us can appreciate this propo-
sition more with reference to other people's busi-
nesses than we can with reference to our own. For
example, you gentlemen in a manufacturing in-
dustry no doubt see clearly that a national agricul-
tural policj' of high price supports, import
embargoes, and absence of production controls
commends itself more to some U.S. farmers than
to buyers of fann products and taxpayers. My
point is that the businessman occupies such an im-
portant place in our society that he must wear
both his business hat and his citizen hat, even
though they are often of different sizes.

In the liistory of the United States few issues
have generated more domestic political heat than
foreign trade policy, the tariff in particular. The
Constitution prohibits export, taxes; so the field of
debate has been confined largely to import tariffs.

June 25, 1962

1027

U.S. Tariff History

Let me give you a quick rundown on U.S. tariff
history. There is nothing quite like history to put
contemporary events in perspective. The Consti-
tution abolished all State tariffs. In 1789 Congress
enacted, at the suggestion of Alexander Hamilton,
the first Secretary of the Treasury, a general 5-per-
cent tariff, though rates were as high as 15 percent
for some favored industries. It brought in some
revenue for the new Federal Government, it made
imports more expensive, and it shielded some in-
dustries in some degree from foreign competition.
In 1812 all duties were doubled for wartime reve-
nue purposes. The long Napoleonic Wars had
disrupted much American trade with Europe; so
many war-baby industries had developed between
about 1795 and 1815. The resumption of peace-
time exports from Europe brought a cry for in-
creased tariff protection. This was the real begin-
ning of the bitter debate on the tariff which was
one of the factors dividing the North and the South
for the next half centuiy. The South sold its cot-
ton and tobacco at world prices and saw no reason
why it should have to pay higher than world prices
for its manufactures. Incidentally, the Middle
West was with the South on this issue imtil the
Civil War.

The Tariff Act of 1816 raised duties to an av-
erage of about 20 percent, with woolen and cotton
textiles— the expanding New England industries—
at 25 percent. The year 1824 saw additional pro-
tection for textiles, iron products, lead, and glass
and a new duty on raw wool. The Act of 1828 put
the average of duties between 45 and 49 percent,
the highest level reached before the Civil War.
In 1832 South Carolina fii-st applied Callioun's
nullification doctrine against this so-called "Tariff
of Abominations." Rates were generally lower
until 1861.

During this present period of the Civil War
Centennial you have no doubt refreshed your
knowledge of the political alliance that gave rise
to the Republican Party and Lincoln's victory in
1860. Midwestern Republicans accepted higher
tariffs in return for Eastern support of the home-
stead system of free, nonslave farmland and vari-
ous other benefits for the northern Mississippi
"Valley. For the next half centiiry — until 1913 —
the tariffs were generally high, with the average
rate on dutiable imports running between 39 and
48 percent. There were acts in 1861, 1864, 1870.

1872, 1875, 1883, 1890, 1894, 1897, and 1909. Con-
gress ran into quite a problem in 1883. Even
though practically all of the special Civil War
taxes had been repealed, and even though the na-
tional debt was almost paid off, the tariff kept
bringing in more revenue than Congress could
conscientiously spend. The pressures for main-
taining the high tariff were very strong. Congress
gradually foimd ways of increasing Government
expenditures, however. The first billion-dollar
Congress was that of 1890. Our problems have
never been the same since.

The Wilson victory in 1912 was mterpreted as
a mandate for lower tariffs, among other things.
The Underwood Law of 1913 lowered many duties,
so that the average on dutiable imports was 27
percent and for all imports, including those on the
free list, 9 percent. Over half of our imports
came in free of import taxes during this period.
(Of course, if the rates are high enough on the
dutiable items to prohibit imports of them, all
actual imports come in at a zero rate!) This re-
duction in 1913 did not mean much in practice,
liowever, because the First World War soon dis-
rupted our import trade and served the purpose
of a protective tariff for many ijidustries, just as
the Napoleonic Wars had a century earlier. The
Republican administrations of the 1920's resumed
their traditional high-tariff policy. Average rates
on dutiable goods rose to 39 percent in 1922 and
to 53 percent — the highest ever — in 1930.

In the next few years, in the depths of the Great
Depression, when practically every adult Ameri-
can was pondering the state of the economy, a
widespread view gradually developed that the time
liad come for a basic change in U.S. tariff policy.
Altliough Cordell Hull of Tennessee, the Secre-
tary of State, was the leading exponent of this
view, both Republicans and Democrats supported
it. The Trade Agreements Act was first enacted
in June of 1934 and has been renewed, witli modi-
fications, 11 times. The act gave the President
limited power to negotiate trade-barrier reductions
with other countries on a reciprocal basis. In
these 28 years the average rate of duty has dropped
to 12 percent on dutiable imports and 7 percent
on total imports. The tariffs of other important
trading countries have been similarly reduced.

Tliese averages, tliough indicative of trends, dis-
guise the resti'ictiveness of high tariff rates because
they are obtained by weighting tlie rates of partic-
\ilar classes of items by the \alue of imports. Thus

1028

Department of State Bulletin

a 100-percent tariff which effectively prohibited
imports would not get into the average at all.
Eighteen percent of our more than 5,000 tariff
classifications have duties of 30 percent or more.
The median rate is about 13 percent.

WorOd Economic Situation

Now let us get away from history for a while
and look at the contemporai-y world trade and
economic situation. Total exports among the non-
Communist countries of the world are currently
running at the annual rate of about $120 billion.
Exports of Communist countries amount to some-
thing over $10 billion. These are exports of goods,
valued f.o.b., and thus exclude income from
shipping, financial transactions, tourist expendi-
tures, and other services. U.S. goods exports
amount to aromid $21 billion — one-sixth of the
world total. Germany with $13 billion and the
United Kingdom with $11 billion are next highest.
Our exports go to all parts of the world, except to
mainland China and nearby Communist areas,
where they have been barred since the Korean con-
flict. They include a vast array of goods, includ-
ing the products of your industry.

Total sales of goods and services to foreigners
amount to about 5 pei-cent of U.S. gross national
product ; exports of goods amount to about 8 per-
cent of movable products. For particular indus-
tries and for particular areas of the comitry the
percentage differs greatly from the average. For
many firms, exports make the difference between
profit and loss. About 3,500,000 American work-
ers depend directly on exports; many more are
affected indirectly by them.

^Vlien we get to thinking about exports we some-
times forget about imports, but every item ex-
ported from one country is imported by some other
counti-y — unless it falls in the ocean. This means
that total world exjDorts and total world imports
are always equal, that there cannot be an increase
in world exports without there being an equal
increase in world imports. Such perfect equality
does not have to hold, and does not hold, for each
country, however, in a world of more than two
countries. U.S. goods imports are currently about
$16 billion a year, about one-eighth of the free-
world total. These imports are about 4 percent
of the U.S. gross annual income. They come from
all over the world, except for mainland China, and
they consist of a wide variety of products. They
range from such household staples as coffee, sugar,

and bananas to primary industrial commodities
such as oil, iron ore, and rubber, to manufactured
goods as varied as dress gloves and diesel engines.
These imports add variety to our consumption,
make possible some kinds of production, facilitate
other kinds of production, provide competition for
some domestic industries, help restrain inflation,
and provide the means by which foreigners can
pay for most of our exports.

Parenthetically, you might wonder how foreign-
ers can pay for $21 billion worth of exports from
the United States with only $16 billion worth of
exports to the United States. One way, of course,
would be for them to draw down dollar deposits
or other assets they had built up in previous pe-
riods. This is not the explanation in this case,
however. There are three factors. First, foreign-
ers had about $1 billion net earnings on services.
Second, Government grants and private remit-
tances amounted to over $2.5 billion. Third, Gov-
ernment and private loans and investments — net —
made up the balance of the $5 billion.

You might also wonder whether it makes good
sense for the United States to furnish a greater
value of goods and services to other countries than
it receives. There are two justifications for this
excess of exports at the present time. One is that
part of the excess constitutes our aid programs —
military and other — to selected foreign countries.
The other is that investment f mids are more plenti-
ful in the United States than elsewhere, illustrated
most conspicuously by the lower interest rates
here; so some foreigners find it advantageous to
borrow here and some Americans find it advan-
tageous to invest abroad. The excess of exports
over imports enables this comitiy to provide aid
and investment funds to other countries without
changing the previous net debtor-creditor relation-
ship between this country and other countries.

World Political Situation

Now let me say something about the world polit-
ical situation. This is relevant to U.S. trade policy
because our foreign trade is inevitably a part of
our foreign political relations, just as it is inevita-
bly a part of our economic life. Though not
directly comparable, its political significance is
almost certainly greater than its economic signifi-
cance. Since the collapse of the Gei-man and
Japanese Empires in 1945, there has been a new
configuration of world politics. The Soviet Union
chose not to cooperate with its Western wartime

June 25, 1962

1029

allies and with the Chinese Government of Chiang
Kai-shek, but rather to maintain its hold over war-
time conquests and to extend its control wherever
possible. This imperialism necessitated the crea-
tion of several defensive alliances, organized
mainly by the United States and including World
War II enemies as well as old allies. Beliind tliis
defensive shield, supported in the last analysis by
U.S. nuclear power, the countries of the non-Com-
munist world have tried to work out their destinies
during this past decade and a half.

Aside from these alliances there have been two
outstanding political developments in the non-
Communist or free world during this period. The
first has been the rapid decline of the colonial sys-
tem in Asia and Africa and the emergence of nu-
merous independent national states. Even the
vestigial colonial controls in the Western Hemi-
sphere are being dismantled. Much of the interna-
tional political trouble of the postwar period has
been in connection with the liquidation of the old
colonial empires in Asia and Africa and with the
efforts of the Russians to establish a new one in
Eastern Europe.

The second outstanding political development
has been the emergence of new forms of political
association among nations. The United Nations
is the most comprehensive and general, of course.
But there are regional associations, inside and out-
side of the U.N. framework, such as tlie U.N. Eco-
nomic Commission for Asia and the Far East and
the Organization of American States; and there
are fimctional organizations such as the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund and the Contracting Par-
ties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT). Countries which do not have
such formal external links tend to feel excluded,
perhaps even fearful at times.

One of the most important international organ-
izations that has em.erged is the Euro|-)ean Eco-
nomic Community, widely known as the Common
Market. Tliis organization, in operation since
Januaiy 1, 19r)8, is more than a set of high-sound-
ing declarations and annual meetings. It is actu-
ally in the process of integrating the economic
life of the six member countries — France, Ger-
many, Italy, and the Lowlands cluster of Belgium,
Netherlands, and Luxembourg. Of most immedi-
ate consequence for the United States, it is in the
process of eliminating all internal tariffs and es-
tablishing a single external tariff toward the rest
of the world.

The Common Market is a step toward the polit-
ical federation of Western Europe, whether or
not the United Kingdom and other countries be-
come members. Even without such political fed-
eration, cooperation among these countries will
make Western Europe a great policital-economic-
military force in the world, comparable with the
United States and the Soviet Union.

Adaptability of U.S. Economy

I have painted the world trade picture and the
world political picture in broad strokes. These
pictures are tlie backdrop against wliich present
and future U.S. trade policy has to be evaluated
and determined. This country is not helpless with
respect to its foreign trade policy. It is within our
power to expand our purchases and our sales
abroad, just as it is within our power to contract
them. Buying and selling is always a two-sided
affair, however, as you well know. There has to
be a buyer if one is going to sell; there has to be
a seller if one is going to buy. JNIy point is that
the United States can take the initiative in expand-
ing or contracting trade. We have the economic
resources to produce salable products and to mar-
ket them to advantage; we have the economic
resources to enable us to utilize effectively goods
from abroad and to do without some of them in
case of necessity. Our economy is adaptable. In
short, the United States really does have trade
policy choices, as indicated in the title of this
talk — "Trade Policy Choices Facing the United
States."

Let me exaggerate the range of clioices for a
moment, just to make a couple of points emphati-
cally. Conceivably the U.S. Government could
stop all foreign trade, as President Thomas Jeffer-
son almost did in 1807, during tlie Napoleonic
Wars. The industries in the United States de-
pendent on exports and on imports would suffer
tremendous dislocations, much greater than those
endured in connection with World War II. Indus-
tries in other countries dependent upon U^.S. mar-
kets and U.S. imports would be similarly dis-
turbed. Consumption levels would decline drasti-
cally. The financial distress would be terrible.
Only the Communist countries would be practi-
cally unaffected, since our trade links with them
are nominal. (The Soviet Union has the lowest
ratio of foreign trade to national income of any
country in the world.) The political consequences
would be equally bad. We would be rejecting the

1030

Department of State Bulletin

entire free world. Our participation in most inter-
national economic organizations would become
meaningless. It is not difficult to imagine what
would happen to our military alliances.

Enough of that gloom. Take the other hypo-
thetical extreme of complete abandonment of tar-
iffs and other conti'ols over our foreign trade. The
first thought that naturally rushes to our minds
is that there would be a flood of imports, which
would undersell American firms in many lines,
bringing losses and unemployment. This presup-
poses a great mass of foreign wares crowded on
their docks waiting to be dumped on us Americans.
This is unrealistic, of course, but no doubt some
lines of production would feel additional competi-
tion.

With the elimination of restrictions on imports
of cotton and wheat, for example, the Commodity
Credit Corporation would have to buy large quan-
tities of these commodities in order to maintain
prices. "Wliat would the foreigners do with the
additional dollars they earned from these sales?
They might hold them, they might invest them
here or pay off debts, they might trade them for
other currencies, or they might spend them on
U.S. products. There is no way of knowing for
sure what they would do with these additional
dollars, but the chances are that many would be
spent promptly on U.S. products, so that profits
and employment would increase in some lines of
business. Also, under this extreme assumption,
there would no longer be any control over our ex-
ports to Communist countries. Hence these coun-
tries would be free to buy what they wanted from
us with the dollars currently available to them and,
of course, to acquire more dollars by selling here.
Our policy of partial economic quarantine of the
Communist bloc would be at an end.

Trade Expansion Act of 1962

So much for this extremist speculation. It is
obvious that the United States is not going to
adopt either of these extremes. The actual policy
question is posed by the proposed Trade Expan-
sion Act of 1962, now before Congress.^

' For text of President Kennedy's message to Congress
on trade, see Bulletin of Feb. 12, 1962, p. 231.

This bill, H.E. 9900, authorizes the President to
make reductions in our tariffs in return for similar
reductions by other countries. In general, he
could negotiate reductions of up to 50 percent of
the July 1, 1962, rates, though for the few com-
modities in which the United States and the Euro-
pean Economic Community carry on most of the
international trade, and for a few other com-
modities, the reductions of duties could go to zero.
The purpose of this extra authority is, of course,
to enable the President to bargain with the Euro-
pean Economic Community for better access to
this growing market. The Common Market is
still in its formative stages; so now is the time to
do the bargaining.

This proposed act provides for positive assist-
ance to firms and workers that might be unfavor-
ably affected by trade barrier reductions. It also
provides that reductions would be made in easy
steps, generally over a period of .5 years. For ex-
ample, if a tariff of 25 percent on a $1 item were to
be reduced to 15 percent, the tariff would drop
from 25 cents to 23 cents to 21 cents to 19 cents to
17 cents to 15 cents in 5 years. These features can
mean a great deal to firms and workers that might
have to make sizable changes in their activities.

Tlie practical policy issue is whether this bill is
to be passed substantially as pi-oposed or whether
it is to be amended in ways which would deprive
the President of the power to bargain effectively
and firmly with other countries. If it should be
so amended, the United States would find it
increasingly difficult to provide its share of the eco-
nomic sinews of the Atlantic alliance and increas-
ingly difficult to help the many less developed
countries impi-ove their economic lot and resist the
blandishments of communism. Our leadership of
the free world would be weakened.

In contrast, if Congress gives the President the
authority to negotiate for lower trade barriers,
the United States will be able to take the lead, com-
mensurate with its power, in strengthening the
economic bonds among the members of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization and in promoting
the economic development of the other free coun-
tries. On top of these political-military benefits,
we will reap the economic gains from trade.

June 25, J 962

1031

The Common Market and United States Agriculture

hy Leonard Weiss

Director, Offlce of International Trade and Finance ^

I am very happy to have the opportunity to
speak to you on the Common Market and its impli-
cations for U.S. agriculture. I am doubly pleased
to be here, since Chicago is my hometown. I was
born and reared here, and it is always a pleasure
to return.

General Background

Before getting into particular aspects of the
Common Market with respect to agriculture, I be-
lieve it would be useful to make some general com-
ments on the character and implications of the
Common Market so that we can more fully appre-
ciate its significance in relation to American inter-
ests, includmg agriculture.

The European Economic Community (EEC),
more popularly referred to as the Common Mar-
ket, came into being on January 1, 1958, pursuant
to the Treaty of Eome. It presently consists of
six full members: France, Italy, Western Ger-
many, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxem-
bourg. In addition, Greece has concluded an
agreement with the EEC providing for full eco-
nomic integration, but over a longer period than
for the present members because Greece has not
reached the same level of economic development.
The United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark, and
Norway have applied for membership. Negotia-
tions for the accession of the United Kingdom to
the Common Market are intensively under way.
The Common Market thus already consists of an
important and collectively powerful group of
states and is likely to be enlarged.

On the economic level the EEC is to be an eco-

' Address made before the National Agricultural Credit
Committee at Chicago, 111., on May 28 (press release 337
dated May 25).

nomic union of the participating states, under
which the present national economies of the mem-
bers will be amalgamated into a single economic
entity. The process of amalgamation is now
imder way in a so-called transitional period which
is to end by 1970 or possibly sooner. By the end
of this period there will be a full-fledged customs
union, with a common commercial policy. The
member states will eliminate all tariffs on trade
between themselves and will maintain against out-
side countries a single tariff covering the whole
area. Capital, labor, and services will be free to
move throughout the Commimity. Common or
harmonized internal economic policies and rules
will apply to such matters as agriculture, which I
will discuss in greater detail later, transportation,
conditions of competition including antimonopoly
provisions, taxation and other fiscal questions, and
social policies including those relating to employ-
ment, mobility of workers, labor legislation and
working conditions, and regulation of trade miions
and collective bargaining.

To implement this economic union, the EEC
treaty has set up a nimiber of conunon institu-
tions. It has a Council of Ministers, which is
composed of representatives of the member states
and which serves as the highest decision-making
body. It has a Commission of nine members ap-
pointed by the member states, which serves as the
principal executive organ and represents the Com-
munity as a whole rather than the constituent
states. It has a Parliamentary Assembly, which
is composed of representatives chosen by the
Parliaments of the EEC states and which is con-
sulted by the Council and Commission on a wide
variety of subjects. Finally, it has a Court of
Justice, which interprets the Treaty of Rome and

1032

Deparfmenf of Sfafe Bulletin

the implementing regulations in the event of
disputes.

The EEC thus affects the fundamental aspects
of economic life in the member states. It is much
more than a simple customs union, which is gen-
erally the first thing which comes to people's
minds when they think of the EEC.

The Common Market is also much more than an
economic entity. Its ultimate goal is political
unity, and, building on the success of their move
toward full economic union, the members of the
EEC are currently seeking means of closer polit-
ical cooperation among themselves. The first and
principal interest of the United States in the
Common IVIarket lies in this prospect of a strong
and united Europe able to resist Soviet and Com-
munist pressures, with Germany firmly linked to
this larger union. Europe could then serve as an
equal partner of the United States in the achieve-
ment of our common goals.

Economic Potential

The Common Market has already demonstrated
its strength and vitality. It has a population of
170 million people, which would increase to 223
million with the accession of the United Kingdom
and which would then exceed the population of the
United States by 22 percent. Trade of the Com-
mon Market countries with each other has in-
creased more than with the outside world. Intra-
area imports rose from $7 billion in 1958 to $12
billion in 1961, an increase of approximately 70
percent. More than two-thirds of the total EEC
increase in imports is accounted for by intra-EEC
trade. In the 4 years since the formation of the
EEC, 1958-1961, the growth in the gross national
product of the EEC was approximately double
that of the United States, some 21 percent for the
EEC as compared to 11 percent for the United
States.

The EEC is a vast and growing market. It is
moving into an age of mass consumption similar
to that of the United States. The EEC's con-
sumption of such goods as automobiles, television
sets, refrigerators, washing machines, and other
household appliances is now only a fraction of
that of the United States and is at a point where
the United States was a decade or more ago.
With increased growth and economic activity and
rising levels of income, the demand within the
EEC for such products is bound to increase
enormously.

This growing market will also be a changing
market as tariffs are removed among tlie mem-
bers of the EEC and they adopt the common
external tariff. The prospect of such changes has
created considerable appreliension throughout the
world as many countries fear their export markets
will bo reduced. As a consequence a number of
countries which are unwilling or unable to accept
the full obligations of membership in the Common
Market are seeking special arrangements in order
to obtain more favorable access for their products.
Turkey, Austria, Sweden, Switzerland, and Spain
have applied for some form of "association" with
the Common Market, and Israel has also asked for
special arrangements for its trade. Other states
may follow suit.

Given the number and broad range of coimtries
and areas which may be affected by the changes —
and some of the countries whose trade is most
heavily concentrated in the EEC and U.K. are
geographically far removed — the most appropri-
ate solution would appear to lie in measures which
will maintain and improve access to the Common
Market on a multilateral and nondiscriminatory
basis. This would mean we could compete in the
EEC market on an equal footuig with all other
nonmember states. One of the major objectives of
the trade legislation now before Congress, which
I shall discuss later, is to enable us to obtain, on a
nondiscriminatory basis, a lowering, and in some
instances elimination, of the external trade bar-
riers of the Common Market so that any problems
of adjustment, both ours and those of other coun-
tries, can be reduced to a minimum and all coun-
tries of the free world can share in the economic
growth which would accompany the expansion of
trade.

Implications for Agriculture

I would now like to turn more specifically to the
importance and implications of the Common Mar-
ket for American agriculture.

The EEC is the largest market for our agricul-
tural exports. In 1961 U.S. agricultural exports
to the EEC were $1.2 billion. They represented
some 24 percent of our total agricultural exports
to the world and 33 percent of our total exports
to the EEC.

Some of our major agricultural exports to the
Common Market are cotton, wheat, feed grains,
tobacco, poultry, soybeans, tallow and lard, fruits
and vegetables, and vegetable oils. In 1961 our

June 25, 7962

1033

total exports of wheat and flour to the EEC
amounted to $180 million and of feed grains to
$187 million. Fourteen percent of our wlieat and
flour exports and 36 percent of our feed grain
exports went to the EEC. In 1961 our exports of
tobacco to the EEC amounted to $97 million,
representing 25 percent of our total exports of
tobacco. In recent years our exports of poultry
and eggs to the Common Market have climbed
sharply, from $4 million in 1958 to $48 million in
1961. These were 61 percent of our poultry ex-
ports in 1961. In 1961 U.S. exports of raw cotton
to the Community were $238 million, soybeans
$122 million, and tallow and lard $34 million.
Twenty-seven percent of our cotton exports went
to the EEC, 36 percent of our soybeans, and 21
percent of our tallow and lard.

^Tlnle the EEC is thus an important agricul-
tural market for us, there are a number of develop-
ments affecting our position there which must be
taken into account. One is the technological
revolution in agriculture which is under way in
Europe. Just as the United States experienced a
tremendous growth in agricultural production as
a result of new scientific developments and the
application of more effective techniques, so is Eu-
rope now undergoing a similar experience. Over
the long pull we can expect Europe to produce
more grains and other temperate-zone products
with fewer and fewer farmers. Production is
also expanding generally more than consumption
so tliat Europe is becoming increasingly self-suffi-
cient and less dependent on outside sources for its
supplies. Though the vitality generated by the
Common Market may accelerate this trend, it is
one that would have existed even in the absence of
the Common Market.

Another factor affecting our position is the com-
mon agricultural policy (CAP) of the EEC.
After the most intense and difficult negotiations
the member countries finally agreed in January of
this year on a common agricultural policy. Basic
decisions involving fundamental aspects of agri-
cultural policy and practice in tlie member states
were adopted. France, which potentially would
gain most from the adoption of a single agricul-
tural market, was adamant that some measure of
agreement on a common agricultural policy had
to be reached before the EEC moved to the second
stage of the transition toward a full-blown customs
union. Moving to the second stage has been

1034

generally interpreted as the EEC's crossing the
point of no return on its progression toward eco-
nomic union. When one reflects on the difficulties
which the United States as a single country has in
developing and obtaining congressional and public
acceptance of a farm program, one can appreciate
the tremendous hurdles which had to be overcome
in reconciling six countries, with major differences
and interests among themselves, on a common pol-
icy. It is truly an historic achievement.

The CAP provides for a unified system of inter-
nal price support and for arrangements to prevent
the system from being frustrated by imports.
Common or "target" prices for most agricultural
commodities produced in the. EEC have been ap-
proved in principle, though the preciie level of
such prices remains a major issue yet to bo resolved.
The EEC will move to common prices in stages
starting July 1, 1963. Pending the determination
of price levels, the EEC has agreed tliat the high-
price countries would not raise, and the low-price
countries would not lower, their internal support
levels. Thus the upper and lower limits within
whicli future price decisions will be made have
been set.

For many key agricultural commodities— cover-
mg about 70 percent of the domestic agricultural
production in the EEC— the internal EEC market
is to be protected by a system of variable import
levies. These levies are designed to equalize EEC
domestic prices and world market prices. Of
commodiries of export interest to the United
States, wheat, feed grains, poultry, and rice are to
be subject to the variable levy system. Levies on
wheat, feed grains, and poultrv will come into
effect on July 1 of this year. With respect to com-
modities subject to the variable levy, tlie latter is
supposed to be tlie only limitation on imports, and
quantitative restrictions and other nontariff
devices are prohibited except in limited, special
circumstances.

How this variable levy system will affect oppor-
tunities for access to the EEC market depends
upon liow it is applied. Variable levies could be
applied in an exceedingly restrictive manner to
the detriment of imports. They could also be
applied in a liberal manner so as to permit reason-
able access for imports. The EEC has given as-
surances that the latter is their intention.

A test of whether this intention is achieved is
the level of internal support prices which (he EEC

Department of State Bulletin

finally determines. Should these be set too high,
ioniestic production will be excessively stimulated
md imports will be subject to more restrictive
levies.

The U.S. Government is following this matter
closely. It will do its utmost to persuade the EEC
to follow a reasonable course and to insure that the
interests of American agriculture are protected.

Geneva Tariff Negotiations

One effort the U.S. Government has made to
maintain and expand markets for U.S. exports
in the EEC has been to obtain commitments from
the EEC to reduce or otherwise limit the tariffs
which it applies to the outside. In pursuance of
this object've the United States concluded exten-
sive tariffsnegotiations with the EEC at Geneva
last Marci\^

In the agreement reached with the EEC, the
latter made commitments on products accounting
for approximately $800 million of U.S. agricul-
tural exports to the Common Market in 1960.
These commitments cover such major items as
cotton, soybeans, tallow, hides and skins, and
certain fruit and vegetable products. On cotton
and soybeans, duty-free bindings replace tariffs
in some of the member countries. The United
States also obtained a reduction in the common
external tariff on tobacco. For this item, and
other agricultural products about which the
United States was dissatisfied with the extent of
the EEC tariff concessions, the United States has
made clear to the EEC that it intends to enter into
further negotiations for further reductions in the
external tariff of the EEC.

With respect to another group of products,
principally grains and certain livestock products,
which will be protected by variable levies instead
of fixed tariffs, the United States sought to obtain
adequate assurances of access to the EEC market.
Because of the many problems which were still
unsettled among the EEC countries themselves, it
was not possible to work out during the Geneva
negotiations definitive arrangements for access.
Instead, interim arrangements, seeking to protect
the existing U.S. trade position and providing for
future negotiations to develop more definitive
commitments for access, were worked out.

Specifically, the EEC agi-eed to interim arrange-
ments for wheat, corn, grain sorghum, poultry.

= Bulletin of Apr. 2, 1962, p. 561.
June 25, 1962

and rice. U.S. exports of these commodities to
the Common Market in 19G0 amounted to $214
million. For ordinary wheat, corn, grain sor-
ghum, poultry, and rice the EEC agreed to negoti-
ate further on these items with respect to trade
access arrangements and to maintain existing na-
tional import systems on as favorable a basis as at
present mitil a common policy is put into
operation.

In the case of quality wheat the EEC agreed to
negotiate further on ti-ade access arrangements
after the initiation of the common agricultural
policy. Before this new system is put into oper-
ation, the member countries of the EEC agreed to
continue to apply existing national import systems
on as favorable a basis as at present. Further,
the EEC agreed that when the common policy on
wheat is put into operation, and throughout the
period of negotiations then to take place, it will
take con-ective measures for any decline in U.S.
exports of quality wheat resulting from the appli-
cation of the common policy.

Future Negotiations and Proposed Trade Bill

The maintenance or expansion of U.S. exports,
industrial as well as agricultural, will depend to a
major degree on future negotiations with the EEC
to reduce its external tariff or otherwise to assure
trade access. In the recent negotiations at Geneva
the United States was seriously handicapped as a
result of its lack of bargaining power. Under
the present Trade Agreements Act the United
States could make reductions of generally no
greater than 20 percent, a completely inadequate
amomit to obtain the duty reductions necessary to
offset the competitive disadvantage to our trade
resulting from the complete elimination of duties
among the EEC countries themselves. Further-
more, the highly selective, item-by-item negoti-
ating process followed under the existing act
meant that the United States was prepared to offer
even the small duty reductions permitted under
the present act with respect to only a limited pro-
portion of its trade. Thus, for example, in the
Geneva negotiations the United States made tariff
concessions on only 20 percent of its total imports
from all the 24 countries with which it negotiated.
It made tariff concessions on only 35 percent of its
imports from the EEC.

The Trade Expansion Act of 19G2, which Presi-
dent Kennedy has recommended and which is now

1035

being considered by the Congress,' is designed to
correct this situation. It would permit the Presi-
dent to reduce duties by 50 percent in negotiations
witli any free-world country. It would further
permit the President, in negotiations with the
EEC, to reduce duties under certain conditions by
more than 50 percent or even to eliminate them
completely. It would also enable the elimination
of duties in other defined circumstances.

The proposed trade act specifically envisages
the use of the authority granted therein to obtain
tariff concessions for U.S. agricultural exports,
particularly with reference to the EEC market.
This objective is specifically recognized in the
statement of purposes of the act. The act also
explicitly authorizes the President in negotiations
with the EEC to agree to mutual elimination of
duties on an agricultural commodity if he deter-
mines that doing so will assure the maintenance or
expansion of U.S. exports of such commodity.
Beyond this special authority, it is envisaged that
the various forms of bargaining power granted by
the act will be used to obtain the best package of
agricultural and nonagricultural concessions it is
possible to conclude. Accordingly, with the pas-
sage of this legislation the hand of the President
will be greatly strengthened in opening up markets
for agricultural exports.

Wliile enactment of the proposed trade bill is
essential to provide the bargaining power neces-
sary to protect and improve the market for U.S.
agricultural products abroad, I would not wish to
suggest that, even with such enactment, the road
ahead is an easy one. There is perhaps no more
difScult problem in the field of trade policy than
that of agriculture. It will not be easy to over-
come strongly entrenched interests abroad. If we
are to be successful, our own policies and actions
will have to be as reasonable and restrained as
those we expect from others.

Conclusion

Difficult problems lie ahead. Some readjust-
ments in pattern of trade must be expected. These
problems, however, can and must be met. AVliile
the solutions may not be easy, they are, in my
judgment, achievable. In particular, if the Presi-
dent is given adequate legislative authority,
further leverage can then be applied to advance

' For text of the President's message to Congress on
trade, see ibid., Feb. 12, 1062, p. 231.

the interests of American agriculture. And in the
end American agriculture, along with the rest of
the American economy, will benefit from the
impetus to growth and expanded economic activity
which the Common Market will generate.

Goodwill IViission From Dahomey
Visits United States

The Department of State announced on Jime 8
(press release 374) that a goodwill mission from
the Republic of Dahomey would visit the United
States June 8-17. The goodwill mission is com-
posed of: Oke Assogba, Minister of State in
Charge of the Civil Servace (chief of mission) ;
Michel Ahouanmenou, Minister of Educational
and Cultural Affairs; Issaka Dangou, Deputy in
the National Assembly; and Louis Ignacio-Pinto,
Dahomey Ambassador to the United States and
the United Nations.

The mission will be in New York June 8-12,
meeting with private investors, and in Washing-
ton, D.C., June 13-16, where they will call upon
the President, the Secretary of State, and other
Government officials.

The mission will also visit Georgetown Uni-
versity and has accepted an official invitation for
a 2-day visit to Haiti, which will precede a trip to
Puerto Rico, June 19-21, where they will observe
"Operation Bootstrap," the Puerto Rican economic
development program. After Puerto Rico the
Dahomean officials will depart for an official visit
in Brazil.

Trade Agreement Concessions
Become Effective July 1

The Department of State announced on June 7
(press release 369) that appropriate international
action has been taken to bring into effect on July 1,
1962, United States schedules of tariff concessions
resulting from recently completed negotiations
with the European Economic Community and a
number of individual countries.

In these reciprocal tariff' negotiations the United
States obtained concessions for its exports with an
estimated 1960 trade value of $1,575 million and
granted concessions on imports similarly estimated
at $1,225.5 million. Most of the concessions will
bo put into effect in two or three stages, only the
first stage becoming effective on July 1.

1036

Department of State Bulletin

Action has been taken to bring into elTect the
tariff concessions in tlie United States scliedules to
;he interim bilateral trade agreements concluded
)n March 7, 1962, witli the European Economic
[Community, the United Kingdom, and Canada;
on March 6, 1962, with Japan; on March 5, 1962,
(vith Denmark, Finland, Israel, New Zealand, Nor-
(vay, Pakistan, Peru, Sweden, and Switzerland;
md on June 6, 1962, with Haiti, all of which were
negotiated at the 1960-61 tariff conference under
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
Action has also been taken to bring into effect on
July 1, 1962, the tariff concessions in the United
States schedule to the protocol for the accession of
Portugal to the General Agreement, which are
identical with tlie concessions in the United States
schedule to the interim bilateral agreement con-
cluded with Portugal on March 5, 1962.

A notification has been delivered designed to
bring into effect on July 1, 1962, the tariff conces-
sions in the United States schedule to the agree-
ment of March 6, 1962, with Austria, but the entry
into force of such concessions is dependent on the
ratification of the agreement by the Government
of Austria by tliat date.

Information has been received to the effect that
the concessions negotiated with the United States
by Peru and Portugal are already in effect and
that those negotiated by Denmark, New Zealand,
and Sweden will be put into effect on July 1, 1962.
It is understood that some other parties to these
agreements may also put their concessions into
effect on July 1, or shortly thereafter, and that the
others will probably be put into effect some time
during the fall of 1962 or by the beginning of
1963. Under all the agreements the United States
has the right to withdraw its concessions in the
event of unreasonable delay by the other parties
to the agreements.

An analysis of the concessions exchanged in
these interim bilateral agreements, except that with
Haiti under which the United States would reduce
the duty on vetivert oil from 5 percent to 3 percent
ad valorem, was released by the Department of
State on March 7, 1962.^ All of the agreements
except those with Haiti and Japan were pro-
claimed by Proclamation 3468 of April 30, 1962.^
As was indicated in the TVliite House press release
accompanying that proclamation, it is anticipated
that a supplementary proclamation relating to

' For background, see Bulletin of Apr. 2, 1962, p. 561.
' 27 Fed. Reg. 4235.

agreements not included in the April 30 proclama-
tion will be issued later this month. jNIoreover, the
proclamation of April 30, 1962, provides that the
President shall foi'mally notify the Secretary of
the Treasury of the effective dates of the conces-
sions in the United States schedules to these
agi'eements.

The April 30 proclamation also proclaimed com-
pensatory agi-eements with the Benelux countries,
Denmark, Geimany, Italy, Japan, and the United
Kingdom and provided that the tariff concessions
in the United States schedules to those agreements
would become effective July 1, 1962, unless the
President notified the Secretary of the Treasury
of an earlier date. It is still anticipated that the
effective date of these concessions will be July 1,
1962.

U.S. and Japan To Confer on Exports
of Cotton Zipper Tape From Japan

Press release 370 dated June 8

The Government of the United States has re-
quested the Government of Japan to enter into
consultations regarding the export of cotton zipper
tape from Japan to the United States. This action
has been taken pursuant to paragraph 18 of the
United States-Japan bilateral cotton textile agree-
ment.^

In the opinion of the Government of the United
States, there exists a situation of excessive con-
centration of Japanese exports in this commodity
to the United States to the detriment of the do-
mestic industry. Such imports have risen steadily
in recent years and totaled 667,000 pomids in 1961.
Paragraph 18 of the agreement authorizes the U.S.
Government in a situation of such excessive con-
centration to ask for consultations with the Gov-
ernment of Japan to determine an appropriate
course of action that it is hoped will prevent dis-
ruption of the United States market as well as of
the Japanese cotton zipper tape industry'.

Discussions will commence in the near future in
Washington. Pending agreement on further ac-
tion, the Government of Japan has agreed to hold
exports of cotton zipper tape to the United States
at 110 percent of the export level of cotton zipper
tape during the 12-month period May 1961-April
1962.

' For test, see Bulletin of Oct. 2, 1961, p. 572.

June 25, 1962

1037

New Act Step Toward Modernization
of Tariff Classification System

Statement hy President Kennedy, May B^

White House press release dated May 25

In signing into law H.E. 10607 I am taking the
first step toward the modernization of the U.S.
tariff classification system since the Tariff Act of
1930, which was enacted by Congress well before
our present concepts of world trade had been estab-
lished and even before many of the modern mate-
rials which play so important a part in free-world
commerce had been developed.

The new hvw, while it will change hundreds of
items in our tariff classifications, was designed
to have no general effect of either increasing or
decreasing the level of U.S. tariffs.

Congress passed H.E. 10607 instead to establish
tariff schedules that would be logical in arrange-
ment and terminology, up-to-date in terms of the
major present categories of commerce, and with-
out the inconsistencies and anomalies that have
crept into classification in the past 30 or more
years.

The law embodies over 6 years of effort by the
United States Tariff Commission, undertaken in
response to the mandate from Congress under title
I of the Customs Simplification Act of 1954.

The new tariff schedules will simplify the deter-
mination and application of rates of duty. This
will benefit not only the importer, and tlie user
of imported goods, but the domestic producer as
well, who will have more certain and dependable
knowledge of the tariff applying to the types of
products he sells or the materials he buys. Fi-
nally, it will benefit the United States and other
countries of the free world from whom we buy by
providing sound and detailed statistics of an
accuracy that we have heretofore been unable to
achieve.

The new act makes it possible for the United
States to respect its trade-agreement obligations
by negotiating with other countries over the con-
version of their present concessions to the language
of the new schedules. The new schedules will not
go into effect until the necessary steps in this
direction have been taken.

In view of my previous statements concerning
the critical importance of strengthening free-

world ties through greater trade, and my pro-
posals for new trade legislation,^ it should be ob-
vious that today's act, which puts in our hands the
technical instruments needed to more effectively
administer U.S. tariffs, is a signal accomplish-
ment on the path to our national and international
objectives.

THE CONGRESS

Mr. Ball Replies to Senator Goldwater
on Use of Word "Victory"

Press release 358 dated June 4

Following is the text of a letter froin Under
Secretary Ball which was delivered on June J), to
Senator Barry Goldwater.

June 4, 1962

Dear Senator Goldwater: Your statement on
the Senate Floor of May 29, 1962 regarding the
attitude of the Department of State toward the
use of the word "victory" has been called to my
attention. Your statement was api^arently base^l
on a stoi"y appearing in the Evening Star. ]

The language to which you i-efer was contained
in a lengthy compilation of materials prepared in
the State Department, intended to summarize the
reasons for changes and deletions recommended
by the State Department during the last two years
in a number of speeches prepared for deliveiy by
military officers.- As the Evening Star article
states, this compilation was transmitted by a letter
over my signature to the Special Preparedness
Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services
Committee.

The language of the specific summary to which
you draw attention was a completely eiToneous
summaiy of reasons stated at greater length in
a memorandum drafted at the time the particular
speech recommendation was made. The relevant
portion of tliat memorandum appears in the fol-
lowing statement wiiich I have submitted this
morning to the Preparedness Subcommittee:

' For text of the President's message to Congress on
trade, see Bulletin of Feb. 12, 19G2, p. 231.

1038

'' For background, see Buixetin of Miir. 20, 1962, p. 513.
Department of State Bulletin

I should like expressly to answer the recent sugges-
tion that the State Department has sought to discourage
the use of the word "victory", and that this reflects an
Ideological attitude of the Department. This is definitely
not the case, as is perfectly evident from excerpts taken
at random from speeches made by State Department offl-
eials over the last year and a half which I ask your per-
mission, Mr. Chairman, to have inserted in the record of
this Committee.

Earlier in the hearings several in.stauces were cited in
which the word "victory" was eliminated from speeches
of military officers. Our records indicate that in only
two of these cases was this elimination recommended by
the Department of State.

The reasons why the Department recommended such a
change in each of these two cases were summarized in the
material submitted to this Committee. In one of the two
eases the summary was inartistically worded and gives a
quite erroneous impression of the reviewer's intentions.
This has resulted in a misunderstanding of the Depart-
ment's attitude toward the employment of such words as
"victory".

The recommended change in language occurred in a
speech prepared for delivery on March 3, 1961, by Brig-
adier General John W. White before the National Security
Forum in Columbus, Ohio. So that there will be no further
confusion on this question I should like to read into the
record the exact language of the explanatory memorandum
submitted by the State Department reviewer to the De-
fense Department at the time this change of language was
recommended — which you, Mr. Chairman, as a lawyer will
recognize as the "best evidence". The change in question
was the substitution of the phrase "defeat of Communist
aggression" for the word "victory". The reviewer ex-
plained this, among other recommendations, as follows :

"Because this speech concerns predominantly the Cold
War we have made several incidental changes of wording
to reflect the fact that the Cold War is instigated and
promoted by aggressive international communism. We
consider that it is necessary to insure this impression
throughout because (1) the Administration presently does
not wish to give occasion for interpretation by foreign
opinion that the U.S. is stimulating the Cold War from its
side and, thus, aggravating rather than trying to reduce
international tensions, and (2) because sentences could
be quoted out-of-context in support of the Soviet propa-
ganda claim that elements of the U.S. military in par-
ticular are continuing to whip up the Cold War fever."

As the Committee will note from this statement the
recommended change did not reflect any reluctance to
speak of "victory", but rather a desire to make clear that
the Communist Bloc is responsible for the Cold War and
that victory in the Cold War can be achieved only by the
defeat of Communist aggression.

I can quite well understand your concern at the
implications of the language quoted from the State
Department materials. I assure you that that
language reflects neither the views of the State
Department nor of myself.

I should greatly appreciate it if you would have

this letter inserted in the Congressional Record so
that the matter may be fully understood.
Sincerely yours,

George W. Ball

The Honorable
Barry Goldwater,
United States Senate.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
AND CONFERENCES

U.N. Releases Bunker Proposals

for Settling West New Guinea Problem

The United Nations released to news corre-
spondents on May 26 {U.N. Note No. 2600 dated
May 25) the text of proposals hy Ellsworth
Bunker for the settlement of the West New Guinea
prohlem. Mr. Bunher, a former U.S. Ambassa-
dor.^ is acting in a private capacity. These pro-
posals had already been submitted to the Govern-
ments of Indonesia and the Netherlands and were
referred to in recent appeals by Acting Secretary-
General U Thant to the Prime Minister of the
Netherlands and to the President of Indonesia.
Following is the text of the proposals.

Proposals for Negotiations Between the Gov-
ernments OF Indonesia and the Netherlands

1. The Governments of Indonesia and the
Netherlands would each sign separate agreements
or a single agreement which would be presented
to the Acting Secretary-General of the United
Nations.

2. The Government of the Netherlands would
stipulate the transfer of administrative authority
over West New Guinea to a temporary executive
authority under the Acting Secretary-General of
the United Nations at a specified date. The Act-
ing Secretary-General of the United Nations
would appoint a mutually acceptable, non-
Indonesian administrator who would undertake
to administer the territory for a period of not less
than one year but not more than two. This ad-
ministrator wotdd arrange for the termination of
Netherlands administration imder circumstances
that will provide the inliabitants of the territory

June 25, 1962

1039

the opportunity to exercise freedom of choice in
accordance with paragraph 4 below. This admin-
istrator would replace top Dutch officials with
short-term, one year non-Indonesian and non-
Dutch officials hired on a contract basis.

3. The temporary executive authority under the
Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations
would administer West New Guinea during the
first year with the assistance of non-Indonesian
and non-Dutch personnel. Beginning the second
year the Acting Secretary-General of the United
Nations would replace United Nations officials
with Indonesian officials, it being understood that
by the end of the second year full administrative
control would be transferred to Indonesia.
United Nations technical assistance personnel will
remain in an advisory capacity and to assist in
preparation for carrying out the provisions of
paragraph 4.

4. Indonesia agrees to make arrangements, with
the assistance and participation of the Acting
Secretary-General of the United Nations and
United Nations personnel, to give the people of
the territory the opportunity to exercise freedom

of choice not later than years after

Indonesia has assumed full administrative respon-
sibility for West New Guinea. The Government
of the Netherlands would agree to transfer ad-
ministration in accordance with this pi-oposal on
condition that the Government of the Netherlands
would receive, as a result of formal negotiations,
adequate guarantees for safeguarding the inter-
ests, including the right of self-determination, of
the Papuans.

5. Indonesia and the Netherlands agree to share
the costs of the foregoing.

6. Once this agreement has been signed, the
Governments of Indonesia and the Netherlands
will resume normal diplomatic relations.

Ronald W. Green Named Member
of Atlantic Fisheries Commission

President Kennedy on May 25 (White House
press release) announced the appointment of
Ronald W. Green to bo a member of the Inter-
national Commission for the Northwest Atlantic
Fisheries, vice Francis W. Sargent, resigned.

The Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Convention
of 1949 has as its purpose the protection and per-
petuation of the fisheries of the Northwest Atlantic

Ocean. The United States, Canada, and 10 Euro-
pean countries are parties to it. It establishes the
International Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Com-
mission, which has effectively carried out its func-
tions in collecting and disseminating information
for maintaining stocks of fish and in transmitting
recommendations for regulatory action.

United States Delegations
to International Conferences

International Labor Conference

The Department of State announced on June 5
(press release 361) that the following persons
would be the principal U.S. representatives to the
46th session of the International Labor Conference
at Geneva June 6-28 : ^

Repbesenting the Government of the United States

Delegates

George L. P. Weaver, cliairman, Assistant Secretary of

Labor for International Affairs
Richard N. Gardner, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State

for International Organization Affairs

Suhstitute Delegate
John F. Skillman, Special Assistant to the Secretary ofil
Commerce

Congressional Adviser
Pat McNamara, United States Senate
Secretary of Delegation
John L. Hagan, Office of International Conferences, De-
partment of State

Representing Emploters of the United States

Delegate

Richard Wagner, Chairman of the Board, Chamber of
Commerce of the United States, and Chairman of the
Executive Committee, Champlin Oil and Refining Co.,
Chicago, 111.

Representing the Workers of the United States

Delegate

Rudolph Faupl, International Representative, Interna-
tional Association of Machinists, Washington, D.C.

The International Labor Conference, which
meets yearly, is a forum at which representatives
of employers and workers as well as governments
of the 102 member countries formulate, through
discussion and debate, suggested standards for;
improvement of working and living conditions

' For names of the advisers to the tripartite U.S. delega- ■
tion, see Department of State press release 3G1 dated
June 5.

1040

Department of State Bulletin

iromid the world. The International Labor Or-
ranization (IT^O) also offei-s technical assistance
n the social Holds to countries which request it.
rhe delegates representing the employers and the
workers vote independently of their governments.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Oil Pollution

Internatiiinal convention for the prevention of pollution
of the sea by oil, with annexes. Done at London May
12, 1954. Entered into force July 26, 1058; for the
United States December 8, 1961.
Acceptance deposited: Ghana, May 17, 1962.

Trade

Protocol for accession of Israel to the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva April 6, 1962.
Enters into force on the 30th day following date of
acceptance by signature or otherwise by any contracting
party, Portugal, or the European Economic Community.'
Signatures: Israel (subject to ratification), April 9,
1962 : United State.s, June 1, 1962.

Protocol for accession of Portugal to the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva April 6,
1962. Enters into force on the 30th day following date
of acceptance by signature or otherwise by any contract-
ing party, Israel, or the European Economic Commu-
nity. Enters into force for the United States July 1,
1962.

Signatures: Canada and Portugal, April 6, 1962; United
States, June 1, 1962.

Whaling

International whaling convention and schedule of whaling
regulation.s. Signed at Washington December 2, 1946.
Entered into force November 10, 1948. TIAS 1849.
Cancellation of notification of withdrawal: Norway,
June 6, 1962.

Wheat

International wheat agreement, 1962. Open for signature
at Washington April 19 through May 15, 1962.'
Notification received of undertaking to seek acceptance:
Saudi Arabia, June 6, 1962.

BILATERAL

Belgium

Agreement relating to the reciprocal waiver of visas and
visa fees. Effected by exchange of notes at Brussels
May 3 and 23, 1962. Entered into force May 23, 1962.

China

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agree-
ment of April 27, 1962 (TIAS 5010). Effected by ex-

' Not in force.

change of notes at Taipei May 25, 1962. Entered into
force May 25, 1962.

Denmark

Agreement for financing certain educational exchange
programs. Effected by exchange of notes at Copenhagen
May 28, 1902. Entered into force May 28, ]962. Agree-
ment for financing certain educational exchange pro-
grams, as amended. Signed at Copenhagen August 23,
1951. TIAS 2324 and 3501.

Terminated: May 28, 1962 (replaced by agreement of
May 28, 1962, swpro).

Ethiopia

Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace Corps
program in Ethiopia. Effected by exchange of notes at
Addis Ababa May 23, 1962. Entered into force May 23,
1902.

Haiti

Interim agreement relating to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade. Signed at Washington June 6, 1962.

Korea

Agreement relating to the reciprocal waiver of foes for
the issuance of nonimmigrant visas. Effected by ex-
change of notes at Seoul May 25, 1962. Entered into
force May 25, 1962.

Venezuela

Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace Corps
program in Venezuela. Effected by exchange of notes
at Caracas April 14 and May 28, 1962. Entered into
force May 28, 1962.

Yugoslavia

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agree-
ment of April 21, 1962 (TIAS 5008). Effected by ex-
change of notes at Belgrade May 18, 1962. Entered
into force May 18, 1962.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Confirmations

The Senate on May 21 confirmed the nomination of
William P. Mahoney to be Ambassador to the Republic of
Ghana. (For biographic details, see White House press
release dated May 7.)

The Senate on May 25 confirmed the following
nominations :

Mrs. Eugenie Anderson to be Minister to Bulgaria.
(For biographic details, see Department of State press
release 341 dated May 29.)

Lucius D. Battle to be an Assistant Secretary of State.
(For biographic details, see Department of State press
release 362 dated June 5.)

Seymour M. Peyser to be Assistant Administrator for
Development Financing, Agency for International De-
velopment. (For biographic details, see White House
press release dated May 8.)

The Senate on June 7 confirmed the following
nominations :

William C. Battle to be Ambassador to Australia. ( For

June 25, J 962

1041

biographic details, see Department of State press release
387 dated June 13.)

Wymberley DeR. Coerr to be Ambassador to Uruguay.
(For biographic details, see White House press release
dated May 8.)

Adm. Alan G. Kirk, U.S. Navy, retired, to be Ambassador
to China. (For biographic details, see Department of
State press release 389 dated June 14. )

Designations

Norris S. Haselton as Inspector General, Foreign Serv-
ice Inspection Corps, effective June 1.

Allen B. Moreland as Director of the Visa Office, effec-
tive June 1. (For biographic details, see Department of
State press release 364 dated June 6.)

George Allen Morgan as Director of the Foreign Serv-
ice Institute. (For biographic detail.?, see Department
of State pre.ss release 340 dated June 1.)

Seymour J. Rubin as permanent U.S. Representative to
the Development Assistance Committee in Paris, effective
June 4. Mr. Rubin also will serve as Deputy for Devel-
opment Assistance Affairs to the U.S. Representative to
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment. (For biographic details, see White House press
release dated June 4. )

J. Robert Schaetzel as Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Atlantic Affairs.'

Appointments

Andre O. Simonpietri as science attach^ at Rio de
Janeiro, Brazil, effective June 4. (For biographic de-
tails, see Department of State press release 354 dated
June 4.)

PUBLICATIONS

Department Publishes Foreign Relations
Volume on American Republics for 1942

Press release 373 dated June 8, for release June 23

The Department of State released on June 23 Foreipn
Relations of the United States, 19Jf2, Volume V, The
American Repuhlics.

This publication is one of two volumes on relations
with the American Republics in 1942 in the Department's
series of annual Foreign Relations volumes. The other
volume. Volume VI, is still in process of preparation.
Volume V contains the documentation on general, multi-
lateral relations with the American Republics and also
sections on bilateral relations with Argentina, Bolivia,
and Brazil. Volume VI will cover bilateral relations with
the other American Reiiublics in 1942.

The subjects documented in this volume relate in gen-
eral to efforts to secure cooperation within the Western
Hemisphere in the war against the Axis Powers, and
especially to efforts to eliminate Axis influence in Latin
American countries.

Copies of Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol-
ume V, The American RepulUcs (vi, 838 pp.) may be ob-
tained from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Gov-
ernment Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C., for $3.00
each.

' For a Department announcement of the creation of
this new post, see Bulletin of Apr. 23, 1962, p. C73.

Check List of Department of State

Press Releases: June 4-10

J?ress releases may be obtained from the Office of

News

, Dep

artment of State, Washington 2."», D.C.

Releases

appearing in this issue of the Bulletin

which were issued prior to June 4 are Nos. 3;i7 of

May 25, 340 of May 28, and 351 and 352 of June 1.

No.

Date

Subject

*354

6/4

Simonpietri sworn in as science attach^,
Rio de Janeiro (biographic details).

t355

6/4

Galbraith : "Economic Development :
Rival Systems and Comparative Ad-
vantage."

*356

6/4

Revised program for visit of President
of Cyprus.

*35T

6/4

U.S. participation in international con-
ferences.

358

6/4

Ball : letter to Senator Goldwater on
use of word "victory."

359

6/5

Coppock : "Trade Policy Choices Facing
the United States."

*360

6/5

Uruguayan congressmen visit U.S.

361

6/5

Delegation to International Labor Con-
ference (rewrite).

*362

6/5

Battle sworn in as Assistant Secretary
for Educational and Cultural Affairs
(biographic details).

*363

6/6

Harrimau : Press Club of Cleveland

(excerpts).

*364

6/6

Moreland designated Director of Visa
Office (biographic details).

3G5

6/6

Kennedy : letter to President of Ven-
ezuela.

•366

6/7

Koenig designated dean, School of For-
eign Affairs, FSI (biographic details).

t367

6/7

Rostow : "Ideas and Actions."

t368

6/7

Rowan : "Splendid Slaves and Reason-
ing Savages."

369

6/7

Trade agreement concessions effective
July 1 (rewrite).

370

6/8

U.S. and Japan to confer on cotton
zipper tajie.

371

6/8

McGhee: Senior Seminar in Foreign
Policy. FSl.

t372

6/8

Morgan : "Development and Crisis."

373

6/8

Foreign Rchitioiis volume on American
Republics, 1!U2.

374

6/8

Mi.ssion from Dahomey visits U.S.

♦375

6/8

Program for visit of President of Pan-
ama.

t376

6/8

Buttle: "Cultural and Educational Af-
fairs in Intornatiiiiial Kcbuions."

t380

6/10 Rusk to speak at FSl seminar.

♦Not printed.

tlleld for a hitor issue of the Buli.f.tim.

1042

Depor/menf of Sfafe Bulletin

fune 25, 1962

Ind

ex

Vol. XLVI, No. 1200

Agriculture. The Commou Market and United
States Agriculture (Weiss) 1032

Algeria. U.S. Expresses Conceru at Threat of Re-
newed Violeuce in Algeria 102.'i

American Republics. Department Publishes For-
eign Relations Volume on American Republics
for li)42 1042

Atomic Energy. The Importance of Foreign Rela-
tions (Bohlen) 1012

Australia. Battle confirmed as Ambassador . . . 1041

Brazil. Simonpietri appointed Science Attach^ . . 1042

Bulgaria. Mrs. Anderson confirmed as Minister . 1041

China. Kirk confirmed as Ambassador 1042

[Communism. The Importance of Foreign Rela-
tions (Bohlen) 1012

[Congress. Mr. Ball Replies to Senator Goldwater
on Use of Word "Victory" (test of letter) . . . 1038

Cyprus. President Kennedy and President of
Cyprus Hold Talks at Washington (text of
communique) 1011

Dahomey. Goodwill Mission From Dahomey Visits
United States 1036

Department and Foreign Service

ippointments (Simonpietri) 1042

rhe Changing Role of the American Ambassador

(McGhee) 1007

Confirmations (Mrs. Anderson. Lucius D. Battle,

William C. Battle, Coerr, Kirk, Mahoney,

Peyser) 1041

Designations (Haselton, Moreland, Morgan, Rubin,

Schaetzel) 1042

rhe Importance of Foreign Relations (Bohlen) . . 1012

Diplomacy

rhe Ch.iuging Role of the American Ambassador

(McGhee) 1007

rhe Practice of Peace (Cleveland) 1019

Economic Affairs

rhe Approach to Poverty (Galbraith) 1024

rhe Common Market and United States Agriculture

(Weiss) 1032

New Act Step Toward Modernization of Tariff
Classification System (Kennedy) 1038

Ronald W. Green Named Jlember of Atlantic Fish-
eries Commission 1040

Irade Agreement Concessions Become Effective
July 1 1036

Irade Policy Choices Facing the United States
(Coppock) 1027

U.S. and Japan To Confer on Exports of Cotton
Zipper Tape From Japan 1037

Educational and Cultural Affairs. Battle con-
firmed as Assistant Secretary 1041

Europe

rhe Common Market and United States Agriculture

(W'eiss) 1032

Rubin designated U.S. Representative to Develop-
ment Assistance Committee, Paris 1042

Schaetzel designated Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Atlantic Affairs 1042

Foreign Aid

rhe Changing Role of the American Ambassador

(McGhee) 1007

Peyser confirmed as Assistant Administrator for
Development Financing, AID 1041

France. U.S. Expresses Concern at Threat of Re-
newed Violence in Algeria 1023

Ghana. Mahoney confirmed as Ambassador . . . 1011

Indonesia. U.N. Releases Bunker Proposals for

Settling West New Guinea Problem 1039

International Organizations and Conferences

International Labor Conference (delegation) . . 1040
Ronald W. Green Named Member of Atlantic Fish-
eries Commission 1040

Rubin designated U.S. Representative to Develop-
ment Assistance Committee, Paris 1042

Japan. U.S. and Japan To Confer on Exports of

Cotton Zipper Tape From Japan 1037

Labor. International Labor Conference (delega-
tion) 1040

Netherlands. U.N. Releases Bunker Proposals for

Settling West New Guinea Problem 1039

Presidential Documents

New Act Step Toward Modernization of Tariff

Classification System 1038

President Congratulates Venezuela on Firm Defense

of Democracy 1023

President Kennedy and President of Cyprus Hold

Talks at Washington 1011

Public Affairs. Mr. Ball Rei>lies to Senator Gold-
water on Use of Word "Victory" (text of

letter) 1038

Publications. Department Publishes Foreign Rela-
tions Volume on American Republics for 1942 . . 1042

Science. Simonpietri appointed Science Attach^,

Rio de Janeiro 1042

Treaty Information. Current Actions 1041

U.S.S.R. The Importance of Foreign Relations

(Bohlen) 1012

United Nations. U.N. Releases Bunker Proposals

for Settling West New Guinea Problem .... 1039

Uruguay. Coerr confirmed as Ambassador . . . 1042

Venezuela. President Congratulates Venezuela on

Firm Defense of Democracy 1023

Name Index

Anderson, Mrs. Eugenie 1041

Ball, George W 1038

Battle, Lucius D 1041

Battle, William C 1041

Bohlen, Charles E 1012

Cleveland, Harlan 1019

Coerr, Wymberley DeR 1042

Coppock, Joseph D 1027

Galbraith, John Kenneth 1024

Green, Ronald W 1040

Haselton, Norris S 1042

Kennedy, President 1011,1023,1038

Kirk, Alan G 1042

Mahoney, William P 1041

Makarios, President 1011

McGhee, George C 1007

Moreland, Allen B 1042

Morgan, George A 1042

Peyser, Seymour M 1041

Rubin, Seymour J 1042

Simonpietri, Andre C 1042

Schaetzel, J. Robert 1042

Weiss, Leonard 1032

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Highlights of
FOREIGN POLICY DEVELOPMENTS •1961

The first portion of this 38-page background summary sets
forth the basic objectives and fundamental policies of U.S.
foreign relations as they were stated by President Kennedy,
Vice President Johnson, and Secretary of State Rusk during
1961. The remainder of the pampUet treats chronologically
the major developments in U.S. policy during the past year with
regard to specific areas or problems.

Publication 7378

30 cents

ro:

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Govt. Printing Office
Washington 25, D.C.

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DEVELOPMENTS • 1961.

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